BRITISH OPINION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 1895-1914. 1926

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PREFACE.

The primary object of this thesis has been to examine the evolution in British opinion on the development of the Commonwealth of Nations from 1895 to 1926. In the Dominions, however, there has been a feeling, never stronger than today, that every step to nationhood has been taken over the dead body of British Tory opinion. The suspicion and antagonism thus engendered have proved most harmful to co-operation between members of the Commonwealth. With this in mind, and working from the premise that to understand is at least largely to forgive, there have been two subsidiary arguments kept in mind.

It has been necessary to keep a finger on the pulse of overseas opinion to discover just when British opinion either lagged behind or was in advance of that in the Dominions. British writers and statesmen cannot fairly be censured if their contemporaries in the Dominions had similar views. It has also been important to discover why British opinion went the way it did. Mr Bodelsen has stated that the early Imperial Federation movement had a rare purity unconnected with domestic exigencies or the pressure of foreign affairs in the United Kingdom.[1] It would be interesting to know if a spirit of unrest had not been created leading to a revival of interest in Colonial possibilities by the American Civil War, the emergence of the Great Powers, the growth of foreign competition as in the failure in 1878 of the firm of Godefroi and Co., which had

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1. Bodelsen, Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism, pp.7-8; p.129.

enjoyed a monopoly of the copra trade in the Pacific, and its replacement by the aid of Government money by the "Deutsche Handels-und-Plantagen Gesellschaft der Sudsee-Inseln zu Hamburg," and fears as to the exhaustion of natural resources, expressed for example in Mr Jevon's book, The Coal Question (1865). However this may be, it is very clear, as Mr Bodelsen observes, that social and economic prosperity in the United Kingdom and safety against armed foreign aggression became attached to the movement to Imperial consolidation.

With regard to the title, it might be explained that the word "British" is confined to opinion in the United Kingdom. The phrase "Commonwealth of Nations" has provoked some criticism in the United Kingdom and, curiously enough, while the word "Commonwealth" really implies a centralised form of government, it has been chosen to designate a loose union of states which have been defined as "autonomous Communities within the British Empire". The term "Empire", however, is very suspect among Dominion nationalists as connoting Imperialism and central despotism, and so Commonwealth is employed although its ambiguity may make it, as Professor Keith once remarked, "an odious phrase to which no person has yet ascribed an intelligible meaning, but which appears to have the same satisfactory sound to certain types of mind as the blessed word Mesopotamia."[1] In the pre-war years in Great Britain we note a growing dislike of the word Empire,[2] and "Commonwealth" came into popular use during the

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1. Responsible Government, Vol.2, p.1145.
2. ex. The New Problem of Imperial Defence, R.T., May 1911, Vol.1, pp.232-235. Lucas, Greater Rome and Greater Britain, pp.8-9; Ourselves and our Purpose, the Britannic Review, May 1914, Vol.1.

War. In fact, it was used in a book edited by Bernard Shaw in 1900, Fabianism and the Empire, though there is no suggestion that the editor appreciated the force of the expression. In this thesis, "Commonwealth of Nations" and "Empire" are used as synonyms, the distinction drawn between the two by frequent writers not being employed.

In the footnotes the following abbreviations have been employed to conserve space:

B.Y.I.L.	- British Yearbook of International Law.
Can.Hist.Rev.	- The Canadian Historical Review.
Con.Rev.	- The Contemporary Review.
Edin.Rev.	- The Edinburgh Review.
Emp.Rev.	- The Empire Review.
Eng. Rev.	- The English Review.
Fort.Rev.	- The Fortnightly Review.
H.C.Debs.	- The House of Commons Debates.
H.L.Debs.	- The House of Lords Debates.
Journ.Parls.Emp.	- The Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire.
Journ.Roy.Soc.Arts	-The Journal of the Royal Society of Arts.
Journal R.I.I.A.	- The Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
J.C.L.	- The Journal of Comparative Legislation.
Mon.Rev.	- The Monthly Review.
Nat.Def.	- The National Defence Journal.
Nat.Rev.	- The National Review.
19th Cent.	- The Nineteenth Century.
Quart.Rev.	- The Quarterly Review.
R.C.I.	- Royal Colonial Institute.
R.T.	- The Round Table.
Roy.Un.Serv.Inst.	- The Royal United Service Institution. (The Journal of)
Sat.Rev.	- The Saturday Review.
U.S.Mag.	- United Service Magazine.
U.E.	- The United Empire.
West.Rev.	- The Westminster Review.
ex.	- Example.
sim.	- Similarly.

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PART I: UNITING THE EMPIRE, 1895-1905.

Chapter I: The Necessity:

The Mind of Imperialism.

The Crossroads.

The Empire must organise or perish; it had arrived at the crossroads in its history. Such were the contentions of the Imperialists.[1] They were perceiving that responsible government knew no boundaries marking off, as Durham had done, "external" and "internal" affairs. When Lord Melbourne asked the early Federationists, "Why can't you leave it alone?" they replied, "In giving self-government to our colonies we have introduced a principle which must eventually shake off from Great Britain, Greater Britain and divide it into separate States; which must, in short, dissolve the union, unless counteracting measures be taken to preserve it."[2] Mr Forster warned the United Kingdom that not for long would the Colonies allow the mother country to control their foreign policy while they enjoyed complete self-government in internal matters. The end must be either disintegration or "complete and equal and perfect federation."[3] His object, then, was stated as being, "Such a union of the mother-country with her colonies as will keep the realm one State in relation to other States. Purposely I use the word keep, not make. I do not say that we are trying by federation to make the empire one commonwealth in relation to foreign Powers, because at the present time it is one commonwealth." The next twenty or thirty

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1. Mr Joseph Chamberlain had talked with many colonial statesmen but had "found none who do not believe that our present colonial relations cannot be permanent. We must either draw closer together or we shall drift apart." Boyd, Speeches, p.155. Milner, The Two Empires, R.C.I. Proceedings, 16 June 1908, vol.39. Bodelsen, Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism, pp. 130-131.
2. W.E. Forster, Imperial Federation, The 19th Cent. Feb. 1885, vol. 17.
3. Ibid, p. 202.

years would, therefore, discover whether the various great self-governing members would cling more closely together or go each its own way.

"I have long believed," said the greatest of the Imperialists," that the future of the colonies and the future of this country were interdependent, and that this was a creative time, that this was an opportunity which, once let slip, might never recur, for bringing together all the people who are under the British flag, and for consolidating them into a great self-sustaining and self-protecting Empire whose future will be worthy of the traditions of the race."[1] That Imperial Loyola, Cecil Rhodes, believed with his whole heart that, as an Empire, "we must federate or perish."[2] "If the Empire should dissolve," said one of Chamberlain's followers, "England will doubtless decay and decline, exhausted by the effort of creating so many new States, and now unfitted by her history and economic condition to become again a self-contained and self-supporting country,"[3] and the moment for decision had arrived. Professor Cramb orates in his grand, prophetic way, "If ever there came to any city, race or nation, clear and high through the twilight spaces, across the abysses where the stars wander, the call of its fate, it is now! There is an Arab fable of the white steed of Destiny, with

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1. Chamberlain, Foreign and Colonial Speeches, p.100.
2. Stead, The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John Rhodes, p.113. Also Hubert Hervey, Memoir by Earl Grey, p.65: "The present state of the relations between England and the Colonies... has no element of permanence." Maurice H. Hervey, Alternative Measures, Britannic Confederation, p.130. Admiral Sir John Colomb, A Survey of Existing Conditions, ibid, p.19; Bodelsen, op. cit. pp.130-131. There are references without number to this general effect.
3. Bernard Holland, Imperium et Libertas, p.265.

the thunder mane and the hoofs of lightning, that to every man, as to every people, comes once. Glory to that man, to that race, who dares to mount it! And that steed, is it not nearing England now? Hark! the ringing of its hoofs is borne to our ears on the blast!" [1.] And they were right, those advocates of Imperial union; the moment to decide had come; which way would the Empire go? It was a great question; the future of civilisation depended upon which of the two paths - nationalism or imperialism - the Empire chose to walk.

The Doctrine of Organisation and the State.

Viscount Bury, himself the nominal founder of the Royal Colonial Institute, scowled at the sacrilege of tinkering with the constitution, trying "to sacrifice the priceless Freedom which has been the growth of ages, to the impracticable Utopia of a written Constitution." It was, he sorrowfully declaimed, at one with the abnoxious tendency of the age in which the State interfered with everything, organised everything, and tried to establish mechanical conditions of labour and all else. [2.] This observation is so true that, to understand the attitude of the mind of a politician of the period at the close of the century and the first decade of the next, it is necessary to appreciate the mania for regimentation which determined the approach to all things. "Everything that survives becomes an art," said Lord Rosebery in the midst of a passionate plea for the organisation of the Empire. [3.]

L. J.A. Cramb, Reflections on the Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain, pp.32-33)
2. Bury, The Unity of the Empire, The 19th Cent.,Mar.1885.p.396.
3. The Times,Nov.17,1900.

"We are all Socialists now," declared Sir William Harcourt, thus putting his imprimatur on the doctrine of state intervention, and it was his son, Lord Harcourt, who, as Colonial Secretary in 1912, described himself as a "despot under democracy."[1.]

The Manchester School had looked to a state of things wherein each individual and nation, seeing his own prosperity to lie in the well-being of his fellow, would pursue a policy of peace and exchange of services and goods. After 1848 the great English writers looked at this policy of laissez-faire as a form of anarchy,[2.] and the doctrines propagated by Thomas Carlyle and Matthew Arnold became appreciated by later generations to find their finest popular appeal in Rudyard Kipling.[3.] One recalls that Carlyle had for his hero William the Conqueror, and begged his nation to, "Sweep away thy constitutional, sentimental, and other cobwebberies; look eye to eye....in the face of this William."[4.] Hotly opposed to manhood suffrage and free trade, visiting with contempt the idea of liberty as expressed by Mill, he saw life as a conflict of "Mights which do in the long run...in this just Universe mean Rights."[5.] He had nothing but contempt for the "Greatest Happiness Principle," and found salvation for England in guidance, regulation, and drill, in which the wiser should force the other "were it by never such brass collars, whips, and handcuffs."[6.] Mr Bodelsen inclines to the view that

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1. Knowles, Industrial and Commercial Revolutions,p.321.
2. See Ernest Barker, Political Thought in England,1848-1914, p.183.
3. Wingfield-Stratford, History of British Civilisation,p.1166ff.
4. Past and Present,p.287.
5. Ibid,p.212.
6. Ibid,p.285.

Carlyle's influence on British Imperialism has been greatly exaggerated, and that the ideal element in Imperialism was not strong.[1] Mr Bodelsen does not give sufficient credit to the necessity of creating an attitude of mind that was an essential prerequisite as a breeding ground for Imperialism, or to the fact that Carlyle gave great popularity in England to Hegel's dialectic - the "bloodless categories" which interpreted history - which greatly influenced Hutcheson Stirling, Thomas Green, MacTaggart, Bradley,[2] Bosanquet, Lord Rosebery, Balfour, Haldane, and a large number of other less well known thinkers, and the ranks of the neo-Hegelians were growing steadily at the end of the century. Matthew Arnold is not so hard on democracy as the seer of Ecclefechan, but he saw grave danger of anarchy in Bright's dictum that the central idea of English life and politics is the assertion of personal liberty.[3] The burden of his plea is that the State be given more power, for, said Arnold, "what we want is to make right reason act on individual reason."[4] The only way to culture lay in giving the State power, "that so there may be order because without order there can be no society, and without society there can be no human perfection."[5]

These men were the schoolmasters of Chamberlain's generation; the doctrine of discipline replaced the individualist teaching of the Manchester School. Kipling, the poet of Empire, stressed the same military virtues that Carlyle and Matthew Arnold had emphasised - obedience to law and duty, contempt for happiness and individual rights, and the glorification of work.[6] George

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1. Op.cit.p.22ff.
2. But Bradley and Hegel differed radically.
3. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p.47.
4. Ibid,p.115.
5. Ibid,p.215.
6. Wingfield-Stratford, op.cit.

Meredith, too, with his fine love of liberty, who described so superbly, "France, December 1870," in all her blood and pain, "Still thrilling like a lyre", and who damned Prussian militarism in one magnificent line, "We hear an iron heel," could still make an ardent plea for discipline, education, and imperial defence,[1.] as opposed to mere self-salvation or self-culture.[2.] Others looked shudderingly at the German Empire and enquired how unsystematic British ways could prevail against the scientific methods of the foreigner. Let us, they said, shape our education and culture, as they have shaped theirs, to enable us to rule this vast Empire.[3.] "Punish the unworthy without delay. Dismiss quickly the unfit and the unsuccessful".[4.] This is surely "survival of the fittest" dogma; or perhaps the writer had been studying Neitzche. It is true that Neitzche was not a German, but he affected the German mind profoundly, and at this period German writers and German methods were being closely studied by Englishmen. So Lord Sydenham of Combe based his plea for the organisation of the Empire on a study of Moltke.[5.]

The virtues that were held in highest esteem were duty, discipline, and obedience - the virtues that Treitsche desiderated for an army. War was the "examen rigorosum" of states in which these virtues, accumulated in quietness, were brought to the light.[6.] "A man must sacrifice not only his life", said this German writer, "but also natural, profoundly justified, feelings of the human soul; he must yield up his whole ego to a great

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1. George M. Trevelyan, The Poetry and Philosophy of George Meredith,p.206.
2. Ibid,p.157.
3. Arnold White, Efficiency and the British Empire,p.286ff.
4. Ibid,p.314.
5. Lord Sydenham, Studies of an Imperialist,p.44ff.
6. Treitschke, The Organisation of the Army,p.12,p.17.

patriotic idea: that is the moral exaltedness of war."[1.][7.] Treitschke further thought it a defect of English civilisation that it did not know universal military service,[2.] but that was a defect that many prominent Englishmen set about to remedy. These doctrines never commanded the support in Britain that they did on the Continent, especially in Germany, where the military virtues were pervasive and dominant. Yet that they did come into no little popularity may be shown by abundant evidence. Treitschke's idea that an army should be a nation and a nation should be an army was also Professor Cramb's.[3.] He, too, urged the "moral majesty of war" and, where Bernhardi saw a vital onward-striving force flowing in German blood from an eternal past into an eternal future, the English writer postulated a "transcendental force", governing the wars of England, urging her to Empire.[4.] Writing in connection with the British Empire, "Militancy is the palladium God gives once to each race", said an American writer,[5.] "War is a fixed part of life, and its place in national existence is fixed and determined."[6.] "There were many British writers who felt the same thing, as the man who wrote, "The true military spirit is exactly what the nation requires, and what should be encouraged in every possible way. It is Christianity of the kind practised by the Crusader and the Ironside that bestows on nations both security and greatness."[7.] Or as Mr J. Ellis Barker expressed it, "The abolition of war would be a misfortune to mankind. It would

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1. Treitschke, The Organisation of the Army,p.11.
2. Ibid,p.10.
3. Cramb, England and Germany,p.89 and passim.
4. Ibid,p.9,p.62.
5. Homer Lea, The Day of the Saxon,p.192.
6. Ibid,p.7.
7. F.A.W. Gisborne, Imperial Defence, The Emp.Rev.,Nov.1910, vol.20.

lead not to the survival of the fittest and of the strongest, but to the survival of the sluggard and the unfit, and therefore to the degredation of the human race."[1] Scouting, wrote Colonel Baden Powell, "Is like a game of football...Football is a good game, but better than it, better than any other game, is that of man-hunting."[2]

Herbert Spencer, who had tried to embody the doctrine of Cobden in an elaborate system of sociology teaching the identity of individual self-interest and the interest of society,[3] roused himself to protest against the martial fervour that was spreading through the country. In religion, the words of "peace", "love", and "forgiveness" had given way to a continual shouting of the words "war", "love", "fire", and "battle", to the marching of the Church Army and the Church Lads' Brigade. In public schools there were cadet corps, and at Cambridge the Senate had urged that the University should take steps towards the organisation of instruction in military sciences.[4] In sports of football, pugilism, and the rest, "the game approached as nearly to a fight as lack of weapons permit."[5] Everywhere Spencer found "stimuli to brutality", with literature, journalism, art, and war books glorifying battles. "In all places and in all ways there has been going on during the past fifty years a recrudescence of barbaric ambitions, ideas, and sentiments, and an unceasing culture of blood-thirst."[6]

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1. 19th Cent, May 1907, vol.61.
2. Aids to Scouting,1899,p.124.
3. Halevy, A History of the English People, vol.i,p.18.
4. Herbert Spencer, Facts and Comments,pp.126-127.
5. Ibid,p.128.
6. Ibid,p.133.

Spencer's statement leads us to an important truth: that war and policy are made by the people. "Nations go mad and make scape-goats of their rulers".[1] Molke, speaking in the Reichstag upon the Army Bill of 1890, said, "Princes and governments do not really bring about wars in our day. The era of cabinet wars is over. We have now only people's wars. The truth is that the factors which militate against peace are to be found in the people themselves."[2] Lord Salisbury constantly insisted upon this throughout his career.[3] So when it is said that the desire of the people was opposed to Imperialism and to the war spirit, the statement must be dealt with cautiously, for it is not true that the majority popular opinion favoured a democratic Empire in which the various nations would be self-determinative, or a pacific programme for the future of the Empire, - not true at any rate during the years 1895-1905.

The craze for organisation was carried into social and industrial reform, where the theories of Marx had replaced those of Owen, and Trade Unionism had developed mightily. Henry George in "Progress and Poverty" had not acceded to the view that man was made to mourn. He placed the responsibility for the misery of man, not on a social predestination, but upon institutions established by man and removable by him. His slashing attacks on private ownership of land enjoyed an immense popularity.

In the economic field the "Calico Millenium", as Carlyle dubbed universal free trade, had definitely failed even to get serious international consideration. Peace was merely war in another form, an economic struggle, in which, as Balfour and

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1. Quoted from memory of a speech by Dean Inge.
2. George Peel, The Future of England, p.119.
3. Ibid,p.120.

Chamberlain never wearied of asserting, Britain must not venture unarmed. American monopolies or trusts and German cartels, as amalgamations of great industries, ruthlessly crushed their rivals. But a writer asks us not to "look upon the nation as an organized whole in continual struggle with other nations, whether by force of arms or by force of trade and economic progress" a wholly bad thing; it is the source of human progress throughout the world's history."[1] That is, the world was a great arena in which if one were to survive he must be strong to face a never-ending war. War, said Clausewitz, in an oft-quoted remark, is only a continuation of policy.

So, while regimentation of the individual was the slogan in social, religious, economic, and military spheres, political life was no less subject to such compulsion. The international policy of the Manchester School as practiced by Gladstone had been that England should act as arbiter on behalf of weaker nations striving for self-expression. He believed ardently in a collective European conscience. In brutal contrast was the egoism of Bismarck, but more particularly of the succeeding generation of German nationalists. The creed of national self-sufficiency as expounded by List made the cosmopolitan ideal of the Manchester School appear the dreamiest sort of Utopia. The ideal that a nation was to build itself up as a self-contained entity by means of every political and economic device, for the attainment of which every citizen had to give unquestioning obedience, struck at the heart of liberalism, for it aimed to diffuse culture, not by emulation in the arts of peace, but by the development and extension of national power.[2]

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1. Karl Pearson, National Life From the Standpoint of Science, pp.43-44.
2. vide Barker, op.cit. p.239.

Hegel gave the philosophic basis for such practice. Upon his philosophy of civil society[1] - an economic community not synonymous with the State, that transcended the family wherein individuals seeking private ends were integrated by making production and distribution social processes - many of the Socialist theories have been built. The State, however, contained the finest synthesis of society, co-ordinating individuals from the disharmony of nature and defining their functions. Each State was derived from an emanation of the Divine Mind and constituted an Absolute, so that it was an unmoral creation in that itself was the origin and criterion of values of conduct.[2] These Divine avatars came into conflict with one another, and through the eternal struggle they developed their finest powers. The successors of Hegel gladly took over his philosophy, though they omitted much more of God. Thus von Bulow stated the doctrine that, since every nation is convinced of the superiority of its civilisation and is inspired, as if by an unconscious natural force, to propagate that civilisation, war was certain and constant.[3]

This doctrine was liberally taken over by the English writers. One of the most famous women of the day wrote that, "We see as we glance backwards, that from time to time on the stage of history there arises a power which moulds into one nationality many nations, and builds up a mighty fabric of a world-empire, ruling undisputed over the earth."[4] She saw the dawning of "a vast Teutonic world-empire, formed by the English and their Colonies, with their huge offshoot the United States, and with the Germans

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1. Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 1896, trans. S.W. Dyde, p.185ff.
2. Ibid, p.257ff, esp. p.337.
3. Imperial Germany, 1916, pp.238-240.
4. Annie Besant, Ancient Ideals in Modern Life, p.8.

bound in close alliance. That world-empire will be the next to dominate humanity...by its power imposing peace upon the world."[1] Professor Bosanquet, following Hegel more closely, urged the omnipotence of the State over the individual, and he like so many others saw an ethical purpose in the life of a State, the action of which was the exercise of a Will, the end of the action being to establish freedom: the "organisation of aims which permitted the fullest harmony to life."[2]

Mr Benjamin Kidd, in a book which enjoyed a great popularity and which showed a deep study of Gustav Schmoller's, "The Mercantile System and its Historical Significance," set forth a "social evolution" thesis which asserted that human society, like all animal life, progressed by dint of competition of nation with nation, race with race, to the survival of the fittest. He discarded the utilitarian theory of the State as preached by Herbert Spencer and practised by the Manchester School of economics, though he still held to the principle of a certain amount of free competition as the salvation of society. The town, he tells us, is swallowed up by the district and the district by the State.[3] "On the horizon of modern thought we are, in short, in sight of the fact that in the progress of the world the days of 'nationalities' in the old sense are numbered. The evolutionary process

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1. Annie Besant, Ancient Ideals in Modern Life, p.9.
2. Bernard Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State, p.234 and p.321. Bosanquet can hardly be said to have maintained that the State could do no wrong and was above morality, as Halevy, op.cit., p.19 seems to imply, although some of his words out of context might be so construed. He says: "Over-readiness to make capital out of an apparent conflict of duties is neither made worse nor better by the fact that one of the duties is in the service of the State." Ibid, p326.
3. Benjamin Kidd, Principles of Western Civilisation, pp.380-381.

in Western history is slowly but surely converging towards a stage at which the struggle will be between a few great systems of social order, of which the political and economic structure will be, in the last resort, the outward expression of different interpretations of fundamental ethical conceptions."[1] So Chamberlain might have spoken - or the German writers. It is in the same spirit that Lecky argued that democracy is opposed to liberty.[2]

The doctrine of the extension of national power was used to justify racial imperialism, one exponent of the theory writing, "When one race shows itself superior to another in the various externals of domestic life, it <u>inevitably</u> in the long run gets the upper hand in public life, and establishes its predominance... this law is the only thing which accounts for the history of the human race, and the revolutions of empires, and.. it explains and justifies the appropriation by Europeans of territories in Asia, South Africa, and Oceana, and the whole of our colonial development."[3] Much the same argument was produced by a manifesto of the Fabian Society.[4] One of the most attractive of the Imperialists voiced the doctrine that seems very cold-blooded to our generation, chastened as it has been by the War. Hubert Hervey philosophised that the rivalry of the great Powers in extending their influence "should lead naturally to the evolution of the highest type of government of subject races by the superior qualities of their rulers."[5] And Professor Cramb sounds much

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1. Benjamin Kidd, Principles of Western Civilisation, p.385.
2. William E.H. Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, esp.vol.i, p.212 ff.
3. Edward Demolins, Boers or English, Who Are in the Right? pp.24-25.
4. Fabianism and the Empire, ed.Bernard Shaw, p.15.
5. Memoir: by Earl Grey, op.cit.p.58.

like List as he describes the passage of the civic, the feudal, or the oligarchic State into the national, and the national into the imperial, by slow or swift gradations, but irresistibly, as by a fixed law of nature.[1.]

It is not difficult to see where such thinking would affect the British Empire. In the first place it meant the end of "glorious isolation", and Salisbury told students studying foreign relations to use a large map. The Doctrine of Power demanded the discipline and regimentation of the various units of the Empire. Their manpower must be conscripted; their politics must be consolidated in an Imperial Parliament, or at least in an effective body so that the Empire might speak with one voice to the world and be able to mobilize all the unlimited resources of a mighty Empire to defy all who threatened or hindered. In peace the boundaries of the Empire would be a single tariff rampart; in war they would present an unbroken battle line. This is the Gospel of Cecil Rhodes, Chamberlain, and other Imperialists. There were variations in their teachings. You might believe like Rosebery in diversity of tariffs, but never cease to din into the ears of fellow-countrymen the need for organisation of the Empire. Lord Thring believed in Free Trade, but he maintained that the Colonies should adopt it also. Richard Jebb was an advocate of an alliance theory of Empire, but it was to be an effective alliance, closely knit in all essentials. Not once but always Chamberlain warned his countrymen, "The day of small kingdoms with their petty jealousies has passed. The future is with the great empires, and there is not greater empire than the British Empire,"[2.] a peroration that many English gentlemen hoped

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1. Cramb, Reflections on the Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain, pp.132-133.
2. Boyd, speeches, p.108. A similar statement, May 16, Birmingham, [illegible] Times, May 17, 1902.

the colonies would lay to heart.[1] There were scores of speeches with this as their text, and articles in journals continually quoted it.

There is no more typical figure of the period that the great realist, Thomas Hardy. It was not by accident that at the beginning of the century he propounded the doctrine of "The Immanent Will", a gloomy and remorseless force. Nor was it accident that led him to put into the mouth of Pitt after Austerlitz the broken cry,

> "Roll up that map. 'Twill not be needed now
> These ten years! Realms, laws, peoples, dynasties,
> Are churning to a pulp within the maw [2].
> Of Empire-making Lust and personal Gain."

From the matrix of this thought came British opinion on the development of the Commonwealth.

The Racial Element in British Imperialism.[3]

In proposing cloer union of the Empire it was not generally intended that all the Colonies should be taken into partnership. The union was to be one of race and, had federation been accomplished, the colonies of non-British blood would have been placed in a lower class, so that there would have resulted a kind of

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1. As Edward Salmon, Mr Chamberlain's New Chapter, The Fort. Rev. vol.73,Apr.1903.
2. The Dynasts, Part 1, Scene xi,p.44.
3. Note: It is interesting to compare British racialism with the German megalomonia of an unredeemed Germany; Pan-Turanianism; Pan-Slavism; or aspirations after a Greater Servia, Greater Greece, and Greater Bulgaria. British racialism differed from "Pan-Germanism" in that it did not consist of an unredeemed population beyond its borders. See Wingfield-Stratford, op.cit.,pp.1156-1160. Halevy, op.cit., p.51 ff.

imperium in imperio.[1] The British peoples of the "great self-governing Colonies" - a phrase used to denote Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and, hopefully, South Africa - were included in the expression, "Greater Britain", under the thesis that they had their origin in the "Expansion of England". As for the other Colonies and the Dependencies, one outstanding writer said that, "The modern starting-point of constructive imperialism, must be the admission that it is impossible to imagine any connection whatever between the connection of England with India and the other dependencies on the one hand, and with the colonial States on the other hand."[2] His words were practically the same as those of J.R. Seeley, one of the greatest of Mid-Victorian Imperialists, who had written of his proposals for a closer union of Britain and the Colonies. "But what I have been saying does not apply to India. If England and her colonies taken together make, properly speaking, not an Empire but only a very large state, this is because the population is English throughout and the institutions are of the same kind."[3]

It need not surprise us, therefore, if a Governor of Newfoundland should find that, "The greatest hope for Imperial Federation lies...in the fact that every Colonist thinks of these

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1. Alpheus H. Snow, Neutralization versus Imperialism, American Journ. of Int. Law, July 1908, Vol.2. Lord Milner, The Two Empires, op.cit. "The idea of extending what is described as colonial self-government to India...is a hopeless absurdity". Also Lord Cromer: Ancient and Modern Imperialism, pp.126,127. p.119 ff: "It will be well for England, better for India, and best of all for the cause of progressive civilisation in general, if it be clearly understood from the outset that, however liberal may be the concessions which have now been made, and which at any future time may be made, we have not the smallest intention of abandoning our Indian possessions, and that it is highly improbable that any such intention will be entertained by our posterity. The foundation-stone of Indian reform must be the steadfast maintenance of British supremacy."
2. Jebb, Studies in Colonial Nationalism, p.277.
3. Seeley, The Expansion of England, pp.301-302.

islands as his home".[1] "I have emphasised the importance of the racial bond," said Lord Milner, "From my point of view this is fundamental. It is the British race which built the Empire, and it is the individed British race which can alone uphold it. Not that I underestimate the importance of community of material interests in binding the different parts of the Empire together... but deeper, stronger, more primordial than these material ties is the bond of a common blood, a common language, common history, and traditions. But what do I mean by the British race? I mean all the peoples of the United Kingdom and their descendants in other countries under the British flag."[2] So he proposed the toast, "Communis Patria", as embodying the happy idea of the wider Fatherland, of the permanent association of all the Britains.[3] It was quite in keeping with this spirit that Milner should have made an effort which could be interpreted as a desire to overwhelm the Dutch race in South Africa by advancing a plan for settling British farmers on the land by compulsory purchase if necessary.[4] There was nothing inviting reproach in his proposal, nor was it, put in that form, correctly interpreted. The Lands Settlement Commission under the chairmanship of H.O. Arnold-Forster had emphasised the necessity of establishing in South Africa "a thoroughly British population, large enough to make a recurrence of division and disorder impossible" if the

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1. Sir Cavendish Boyle, Royal Colonial Institute, Report of proceedings, Nov.1902, Vol.34, p.26.
2. Milner, The Nation and the Empire, p.xxxv. Describes himself in The Times, July 28, 1919, as "A British Race Patriot." 3. The Nation and the Empire, p.386.
4. Milner to Chamberlain, 25:1:1902; Cd. 1163, no.22, p.92.

blood and treasure of the war were not to be wasted. It was not judged to be a serious task, and there seemed no reason to doubt but that a consistent and well-directed policy would make "These great countries thoroughly British States - a strength and not a weakness to the Empire."[1] Lord Milner was following up such a plan for pacification, and made it clear that he did not want to dispossess the Boers merely for the sake of dispossessing them, nor to make the British farming population predominant, but the fact that the British were segregated in towns and the Dutch in the country instead of co-operating and gradually fusing so as to remove difference of race and promote good fellowship was a condition that militated against the future well-being of the Colonies.[2]

His tolerant attitude did not find an entire concurrence in Great Britain. It was suggested that Durham might be referred to for help and discovered that, "The fundamental principle from which he never swerved in dealing with the racial quarrel, was an unqualified assertion of British supremacy, and the supreme necessity of establishing the latter on an impregnable basis." This, it was thought, must be the basis for future treatment of South Africa.[3] This does not carry much weight as an expression of responsible opinion, though doubtless many an official in his heart must have sighed for its consummation. One of the greatest political minds of the day, a contemporary of Chamberlain of a very opposite school, saw the position of the Imperialist with utmost clearness. Lord Morley wrote, "With Chamberlain love of

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1. Cd. 626, 1901, p.7.
2. Milner to Chamberlain, 4:4:1903, Cd. 1551, p.12.
3. Violet R. Markham, Lord Durham and the Colonies, 19th Cent., June 1907, Vol.59.

country now gave commanding prominence to recognition of the self-governing oversea dominions as part of the British Empire, joined to us by ties of kindred, religion, language, and joined by the sea that formerly seemed to divide us. He became the paramount voice in forcing imperialist doctrine where Dilke, Rosebery, and Forster had led the way before, and Seely had given it in literary form in one of the cardinal books of the time."[1] In fact, Chamberlain desired a Pan Britannic union so ardently that he seems to have had ambitions of a plan to include the United States, though it is easy to over-emphasise such words as those used in his speech at Philadelphia to the Order of the Sons of St. George. He told his audience, "I decline to be considered a foreigner in the United States. I feel much as a distinguished diplomatist, who once told the Prince of Wales that the world was divided into three classes - Americans, Englishment, and foreigners."[2]

Any ideal that embraced the United States in an organic union with Great Britain seems visionary enough today, but that great dreamer, Cecil Rhodes, was one of those who held firmly to it. On one occasion he expressed his hope as follows: "I contend that we are the first race in the world, and that the more of the world we inhabit the better it is for the human race. I contend that every acre added to our territory means the birth of more of the English race who otherwise would not be brought into existence. Added to this, the absorption of the greater portion of the world under our rule simply means the end of all wars." The object for which he should work then was: "The furtherance of the British Empire, for the bringing of the whole uncivilised

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1. Recollections, Vol. 11, p.79.
2. Foreign and Colonial Speeches, Britons in America, Feb.29, 1888.

world under British rule, for the recovery of the United States, for the making of the Anglo-Saxon race but one Empire. What a dream! but yet it is probable. It is possible."[1.] He became quite enthusiastic in his plan to form a kind of secular Church which would implant the imperial idea and propagate the union of England and the Colonies,[2.] and it was his notion that such an ideal and union could be buttressed by a Society which would be to the Empire what the Society of Jesus was to the Papacy.[3.] Mr Stead, his biographer, seems to have been of similar mind, and he saw great hope for a federation of the Empire so as to "include the United States and establish peace throughout the world."[4.] There were sporadic suggestions of alliance with the United States, as there were also proposals mooted for alliance with Germany, Rhodes leaving scholarships to German students bringing them to Oxford with the intention of promoting the friendship if not the union of the two countries on racial grounds. Mr Jebb tells us in 1905 that, "In England the ideal of imperial unions seems now to be in competition with that of Anglo-American alliance,"[5.] and in the panic pre-war years there were frequent advocates of such an alliance.[6.]

Lord Rosebery never reached any other conception of the citizen of the self-governing colonies than that of an Englishman overseas. He distinguished the British Empire from other Empires in that it was united by "a passion of affection and family feeling."[7.] On another occasion he asked, "And what is

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1. Stead, The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John Rhodes, pp.58-59.
2. Ibid, pp.59-61.
3. Ibid, p.83.
4. The Americanisation of the world, p.162.
5. Studies in Colonial Nationalism, p.22.
6. Ex. J. Ellis Barker, An Anglo-American Reunion, 19th Cent. Sept. 1913, Vol.74.
7. Chesterfield speech. The Times, Dec.17, 1901.

Empire but predominance of race?" "The word Empire", he continued, "represents to us our history, our traditions, our race. It is a matter of influence, of peace, of commerce, of civilsation, above all a question of faith, but it is also a matter of business, a practical affair. You have received from your forefathers this great appanage: no one outside an asylum wishes to be rid of it."[1.] At the Imperial Press Conference in 1909 there were loud cheers when Rosebery said the sum of his speech consisted of the brief sentence, "Welcome Home", and he gave to the Conference as its motto, "Welcome to your Home".[2.]

The most weighty paper of the day recorded of the Imperial destiny that, "It rests first on that natural sentiment of kinship."[3.] A man who had been in command of the Canadian Militia and should have been able to speak with authority could so far overlook French Canada to make the absurd statement that.."the Canadian Colony itself has sprung up from the British stock."[4.] When it was observed that a French population existed, it was said that they find "they must submit to the majority,...are beginning to acquire many of the English modes of thought", and "have willingly entered into the spirit of Empire."[5.] The wish is certainly father to the thought as it is explained that the differences remaining between foreign and British born are the differences between the Londoner and the Westcountryman.[6.]

Professor Egerton was one of the weightiest of contemporary authors who endorsed the view "that, after all, our Colonies are

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1. Glasgow, Nov.12, 1900.
2. The Times, June 7, 1909.
3. The Times, Dec. 17, 1904.
4. Col. Ivor Herbert, The Organisation of the Canadian Army, Journ. Roy. Un. Serv. Inst., Mar. 1907, Vol.51.)
5. Walter Meakin, The Life of An Empire, pp.315-316.
6. Ibid, p.317.

only England beyond the seas - a greater England, but England all the same....Perhaps the words 'Greater Britain' best describe the new point of view. A world - empire, the separate parts of which are being more and more closely linked by the discoveries of science, enjoying in each separate part absolute independence, connected, not by coercion or paper bulwarks, but by common origin and sympathies, by a common loyalty and patriotism, and by common efforts after common purposes, such, amidst much to alarm and disturb, is the apparent outcome of history, the Colonial policy with which Great Britain will enter upon the untrodden paths of a new century."[1] He further explained his attitude: "For practical purposes, a colony may be defined as a community, politically dependent in some shape or form, the majority, or the dominant portion, of whose members belong by birth or origin to the Mother country, such persons having no intention to return to the Mother country, or to seek a permanent home elsewhere than in the Colony. This definition excludes the United States....It excludes India and most tropical settlements, because, in such, there is nearly always among Englishmen the animus revertendi. It excludes, for the same reason, Gibraltar and Malta, and the purely military Colonies or dependencies. It includes Colonies like Natal, where there is a bona-fide permanently resident English community, whatever be the number of natives who surround them. It includes Cape Colony, where the original Dutch settlers and the English, who have emigrated thither during the last seventy years, are on the whole becoming fused into a common national type. It includes the West Indies, because, in spite of the climate, Englishmen have for generations found in them a permanent home."[2] The

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1. Egerton, A Short History of British Colonial Policy, pp.6-7.
2. Ibid, pp.8-9.

phrase, "common national type", would be somewhat confusing if it were meant to imply a distinct national individuality and must be understood to mean that the English were either "the majority, or the dominant portion" if the definition of a colony by Professor Egerton is to have any validity.

The definition, as the writer admitted, was not technical, for the Interpretation Act of 1889 held the expression "colony" to apply to any land under British rule, exclusive of the United Kingdom and India.[1] His excuse for the liberty of definition is that, "Looking at the question practically, if we remember that, side by side with the question of colonial expansion, there is always the question of Imperial power, with which we are here only indirectly concerned, it will be enough if we fix our attention for the most part on the great self-governing Colonies, past and present, in America, Australia, and South Africa, and on the West Indies, although the importance of these last is not as great at the present day as it was in former times."[2] In other words, racial dominance is not separable from Imperial power and, therefore, British opinion on the development of the British Commonwealth is of a piece with British Imperialism giving the word 'Imperialism' in this instance its broadest meaning to include opinion on colonies of every type and stage of development.

"I am not sure that I know what it (imperialism) means," Lord Morley said on one occasion. "Sometimes it seems to mean commercialism, sometimes militarism, sometimes Africanism."[3] He was probably well aware that Chamberlain's conception of Empire included all these things in its programme as of necessity.

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1. 52 & 53 Vict. c.63, s.18.
2. Egerton, op.cit., p.9.
3. The Times, May 26, 1899.

To remain a great nation, Great Britain must remain a great Empire. Where the Liberals would only use a navy for defence - those Liberals, that is, represented by Morley - Chamberlain must have it strong enough to propagate an expanding Empire and protect it against the jealous hostility of other nations. To do that without bringing too great an expense upon the British taxpayer would require the assistance of overseas Britain. Chamberlain borrowed a phrase of Matthew Arnold's to explain the situation to the Conference of 1902: "The weary Titan staggers under the too-vast orb of his fate." The Colonies were invited into partnership, as it was often said, with an old established firm. But the self-governing Colonies would be found to be much more interested in things commercial than in the military schemes of Empire, and so in two ways the Empire would be a commercial affair: with the self-governing Colonies by way of contract or treaty, and with the less politically-advanced Colonies by developing their sources of raw material.

A very able article in The Times made a distinction between the Imperialism whose pride lay in "the extent of British rule, in the mission of our people to take up the 'white man's burden' and devote itself to the elevation of less advanced races", and the imperialism which aimed at keeping "the growing democracies of the younger nations within the Empire by admitting them to an equal share in all those privileges and responsibilities of Imperial power which at present rests exclusively with the citizens of the United Kingdom. Imperialism in this sense is a purely democratic movement.....essentially of the same character as the movements which, in the past, federated the American States after the Revolution, and which created the Dominion of Canada...or the

Australian Commonwealth...Imperialism in the other sense tends, on the contrary, to be autocratic, to lay stress on administrative efficiency, to look with suspicion on a democratic system which it knows to be unsuited to the conditions of half the Empire". In one case kinship was the key word, in the other British civilization and Government were the ideals. That these two Empires were correlated was seen by the fact that Chamberlain and Milner were advocates of both as being essential to one another, complementary to one another. The dependent Empire supplied raw material to the industrial self-governing part, and the self-governing constituents supplied British civilisation to the backward races. "They are the component factors in a higher Imperialism which transcends each and which represents the most stupendous synthesis of the human race ever attempted. The development and integration of the British Empire is the only practical and rational attempt at building up the brotherhood of man which the next few centuries are likely to see."[1.]

It took a long time for an appreciation of colonial nationalism to penetrate the consciousness of the citizen of the Mother Country. In fact, until a very recent day in Canada, the idea of a distinct Canadian nationality as opposed to the idea of an English nationality has had a very hard time of it, and for that reason in the Dominion French Canada has been so often represented as the origin and sanctuary of a Canadian type of citizenship. The intention that the Empire should be British, and by British is meant of United Kingdom stock, has never died away. A writer of today tells us that "non-British races are....steadily growing in numbers....If the Empire is to remain British, then the number

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1. The Inadequacy of our Terms, The Times, May 24, 1909.

of British stock must increase at an equal rate,"[1] and another puts it that the self-governing dominions are not held together by no stronger tie than the crimson thread of kinship,[2] recalling a phrase used by Sir Henry Parkes in the days of campaigning for the Commonwealth of Australia.

Yet there were observant men who, by 1905, called the attention of their fellows to colonial nationalism, Lord Thring in 1904 had pointed out the pride of the Colonies in their political power and their desire to expand that power to the right to treat independently with foreign nations, for, as he put it, "A colonist regards his country as an Englishman regards England - as the first country in the world."[3] Nevertheless, despite this promising observation, he emphasises race and common origin as the chief binding ties of the Empire, an observation of doubtless truth, especially at that time, but one which, in his use, bespoke a lack of faith in the development of colonial nationalism.

The first definite exposition of a nationalism peculiar to a colony as something which ought to be preserved was the work of Mr Jebb. His books, Studies in Colonial Nationalism and The Imperial Conference, have been praised eloquently by every student who has had to do with the subject. He put it clearly enough, so clearly that many others must have been at least thinking around it. He wrote that "The popular habit of alluding to 'the British nation' in a sense inclusive of colonial peoples, already is an anachronism. It has become evident that the fundamental principle of any real advance towards closer

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1. Anthony Clyne, A Census Warning: Britain as the Racial Reservoir of the Empire, United Empire, Aug. 1931, Vol.22.
2. Sir Philip Street, Ibid, p.456.
3. Lord Thring, The Unity of the Empire, The 19th Cent., March 1904, Vol.55.

union must be the frank recognition of independent national instincts in the four principal self-governing colonies, in varying stages of evolution. But that recognition involves the rejection of the imperialist conception which has been current in the mother country. In general, it is clear that that union, if any, must resemble an alliance of independent nations rather than a federation of scattered States inspired by the idea of a common nationality."[1] He conceived of empire as a guardian of nationalism, permitting free play of forces, but in a far more advanced sense than any contemporary and in a sense much different from Cramb. He held that only through an empire could a small nation exert appreciable influence in world politics, and his ideal is expressed when he says that, "So far from repressing any national diversification otherwise possible, the British Empire is proving itself the fruitful parent of new nationalities; not only safeguarding their infant growth, but offering them, as they reach maturity, a career of national utility in imperial partnership, as an alternative to the barren impotence of self-centred isolation."[2] He believed in national fleets belonging to the various self-governing members of the Empire as allied nations; there should be imperial preference based on treaties; there should be continual consultation between the nations of the Empire as to important questions of policy; the United Kingdom should not enjoy the slightest superiority over any other self-governing part. "Already there is a noticeable tendency in Canada and Australia to treat as a negligible quantity the constitutional supremacy of the British parliament over their own..... The

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1. Jebb, Studies in Colonial Nationalism, p.273.
2. Ibid, p.102.

nationalist theory is that the parliament of the United Kingdom ought to be recognised as having a status equal, not superior to, that of the Dominion and Commonwealth parliaments; the Crown being a figure-head common to coequal legislatures, and standing in precisely the same relation to each, as the symbol of their intimate alliance. The conception is logical, and ought to be recognised by the deliberate disuse of the British Parliament as an authority intermediate between the colonial legislature which passes a Bill and the Crown which ratifies it."[1.]

How different this point of view is from that of Lecky who had argued less than ten years before that nationality "threatens the most valuable elements of our civilisation!"[2.] It is quite likely that Lecky had his eye on the British Empire when he complained of nationality as "a disintegrating force, and many of its advocates desire to call into intense life and self-consciousness the different race elements in a great a composite empire, with the hope that they may ultimately assert for themselves the right of distinct national individuality."[3.] Mr Lecky does more than reveal his conservatism; he shows that Mr Jebb had many supporters.

But there were men, writing after Studies in Colonial Nationalism, who were in agreement with Lecky. Professor Cramb, for example, believed that, "The national is but a phase in the onward movement of an Imperial State, of a race destined to empire. In such a State, nationality has no peculiar sanctity, no fixed, immutable influence, no absolute sway."[4.] It is not

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1. Jebb, Studies in Colonial Nationalism, p.300.
2. Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, Vol.1, p.398.
3. Ibid, pp.397-398.
4. Reflections on the Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain, p.133.

surprising that he should consider the Boer war as a conflict between "the moribund principle of nationality" and the force he calls Imperialism.[1] One could infer with some justice that the orator as quoted would not leave much room for diversity, or the cultivation of peculiarities of culture in his overwhelming Empire, but that is where freedom enters his Imperial philosophy. He wanted the Empire to pass, even as "Europe has passed from the conception of an outwardly composed unity of religion and government to the conception of the inner unity which is compatible with outward variations in creed, in manners, in religions, in social institutions. Harmony, not uniformity, is Nature's end."[2] It is difficult to reconcile this idea of variety in government and custom with the indictment of nationality. One supposes that as long as the institutions conformed to the conscience of freedom and general ethical decency they might continue to exist under the watchful eye of a paternal Imperial government.

It seems amazing that in 1910 a man could say that in the cases of the federation of "Canada and Australia the tendency has not been to develop towards national independence, but rather on the contrary to lean towards a still closer union of the imperial units."[3] But he was a member of the Legislative Assembly of Natal so his myopia should not be held against the Mother Country. His argument was the old one that a union of groups of colonies was a prelude to imperial union.[4]

Fortunately most of the students of the growth of the

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1. Reflections on the Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain, p.130 and p.140.
2. Ibid, p.306.
3. P.A. Silburn, The Governance of the Empire, p.217.
4. See also Ibid, p.131.

Empire were willing to go to school under Mr Jebb. Of these Mr Hobson was one of the earliest.[1] He advanced a plea for nationality and strongly opposed the theoretical supremacy of the English race.[2]

In 1905 - the year of Mr Jebb's great study - another writer gave it that "The Colonies are still British first and Australian, African, or Canadian afterwards; but with every advance they will become more and more first Canadian, African or Australian, and British only in the second place."[3]

Dr Emil Reich wrote under the thesis that the encouragement of individuality was the foundation of the British Empire. "As there is not, and should not be, One Law (sic) in the British Empire, so there should not be One Language; nor One Tariff; nor One Religion."[4]

Mr Russell Rea boasted in the House of Commons that Britain would show the world now an empire might be built out of living nations, and looked forward to "a league of free nations under one Crown, rather than to a federation... - to a union which was diplomatic rather than organic."[5] The words "alliance", "family of nations", "partnership", and the like become increasingly common. They had been heard before, but from 1905 they become general. So Mr Churchill expresses the Empire as "a

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1. An outside observer had already noted the voluntary character of the union: "Une lecon se degage meme deja , c'est que la realisation se fera dans le sens de la liberte; l'essense de la federation imperiale sera l'action volontaire et toute compulsion ecartee aussi bien dans l'assistance pecunaire que dans l'aide militaire." Ernest Nys, Le Droit International, T.1er 2e edit, 1904, p.377.
2. J.A. Hobson, Imperialism, A Study, esp. p.134ff.
3. I. Dobbie, Thinking Imperially, Macmillan's Mag., Dec.1905, Vol.1.
4. Imperialism, p.175.
5. H,C. Debs, 15 Feb. 1907, Vol.169, pp.482-483.

solid defensive league of free democratic communities, animated by a love of peace and justice, under the leadership of the British Crown."[1] Sir Edward Grey in 1909 stated "a union of allies of self-governing people" as the ideal to which the Empire had nearly arrived.[2]

Nationality also revealed itself in the growing distaste of the word colony, and emigrants to Canada from the Mother country were advised not to use the expression.[3] The delegates to the Conferences were quite emphatic in their dislike and at the Conference of 1907 the word "Dominion" was given official recognition as the term designating the status to which the great colonies had attained.

It may indicate the trend of thought that The Imperial Federation (Defence) League should have become The Imperial Co-operation League (1909). It may also be revealing to study of British Imperialism in 1910 to find Mr Ewart called "a keen Imperialist."[4] One rubs one's eyes to see if the words are read aright! No one has been more jealous for Dominion Nationalism and he has never been suspected of any love for England. Mr Ewart as an example of imperial orthodoxy is something few people would ever expect to see.

Mr Gardiner examined the results of the Conference of 1911 and declared that it revealed the Empire as "the greatest achievement of liberty that history has to offer...a great step in the consolidation of the Empire of free nations - each master of its

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1. Letter to Mr Hamar Greenwood, Aug.22, 1906. Howard d'Egville, Notes on Imperial Federation for Defence, United Serv. Mag., Oct.1906, Vol.34.
2. The Times, June 9, 1909.
3. J.S. Redmayne, Middle Class Migration to Canada, The Emp.Rev. Mar. 1913, Vol.25.
4. Dudley Mills, British Diplomacy and Canada, United Empire, Aug.1910, Vol.1, p.554.

own affairs and all co-operating freely in common affairs - which is the enduring triumph of Liberalism."[1.]

By the outbreak of the War it had been generally recognised - though there was still the necessity to state it - that, "It is simply evidence of blindness to facts on the part of anyone who persists in cherishing the belief that the Canadian of the future is going to be a reproduction, on a larger scale, of Great Britain in its social and political life. Both in Canada and in South Africa the British type is bound to be greatly modified by the impact of other racial elements, just as it has been in the United States, so much so that the fashioning of entirely new races, which will be the inheritors of British parliamentary institutions and will speak the English language, seems to be in progress."[2.]

The Ideal Element in British Racial Imperialism.

The English people have never embarked on a great national adventure unless they were inspired by its ideal element. There is no nation in the world in whose history sentiment has played a larger part - although there is no nation in the world more distrustful of a display of sentiment. Perhaps that is because the continual jibes of her neighbours across the channel have made Britain sensitive, for she has ever been a champion of spiritual forces which have been linked with convenient economic interests. Europe has seen her actions as Macchiavellian statecraft under the cloak of a nauseating Uriah Heep humility - an unfair judgment.[3.] Possibly Britain realised that idealism -

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1. A.G. Gardiner, The End of Imperialism - and After, The Con. Rev. Aug. 1911, Vol.100.
2. "Anglo-Saxon", Canada's Racial Destiny, The Britannic Rev., June 1914, Vol.1.
3. For a brilliant exposition see Wilhelm Dibellius, England, [illegible] p.105ff.

the promotion of some fine principle - always pays: "Honesty is the best policy." Possibly it was an accident that ideals and economic exigencies went hand in hand. Or it may be that ideals mean nothing until applied and in the application they are distorted - misapplied by cruel, bungling men. At any rate, if one would understand British history he must be aware of overwhelming moral forces, and in the study with which we are concerned there is the moving desire "to set up the Kingdom of the God of the Anglo-Saxons."[1.]

One of the greatest authorities on the economic motives of British Imperialism has said that the "underlying commercialism of the British Empire, 'a nation of shop-keepers,' is in sharp contrast with the French impulse to 'glory' and the desire to spread French civilisation as being the best for mankind, white or black, which has been the basis of the expansion of French dominion in the nineteenth century."[2.] Surely this statement is subject to reservations: the French expansion was a movement to national economic and military security, and anyone who has read Kipling must have appreciated that, without the enthusiasm of "the white man's burden" philosophy and the schoolboy thrill of an Empire on which the sun never set, commercial development of the Empire would have been greatly restricted. "Where there is no vision the people perish." When Chamberlain preached his

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1. Dibellius, op.cit., p.493.
   It is interesting to compare the German and British motives for Imperialism. Treitschke preached that German's particular career was "to gain freedom for civilization", Charles Sanford Terry, Treitschke, Bernhari, and some Theologians, pp.9-10, and Bernhardi's theory of German Imperialism was to fight "the powers of barbarism." Emmanual Geibel has it :
   "Some day, through the German nation,
   All the world will find salvation." Ibid, p.12.
2. Knowles, The Economic Development of the Overseas Empire, p.107, Vol.ii.

doctrine of uniting the English-speaking Empire - and nomone better understood the psychology of the British electorate - he begged his listeners to "Think what it means to your power and influence as a country; think what it means to your positions among the nations of the world; think what it means to your trade and commerce. I put that last. The influence of the Empire is the thing I think most about, and that influence, I believe, will always be used for the peace and civilisation of the world."[1.]

Carlyle was one of the ancestors of the idealism of Chamberlain's Imperial philosophy. He had a great belief in the mission and abilities of the English race who were like the "old Romans", because of their silence like that of the Gods, a silence that became men of action, men who were capable of framing an Empire which would be "a mighty conquest over chaos."[2.] One finds his extraordinary emphasis on "duty" on the part of the individual and the divine destiny of a State recurring in the writings of men like Mr Spenser Wilkinson.[3.] What could be finer as a guide to national destiny than Kipling's Recessional?

"Far-called, our navies melt away,
On dune and headland sinks the fire
Lo, all our pomp of yesterday
Is one with Nineveh and Tyre.
Judge of the Nations spare us yet,
Lest we forget - lest we forget.

Ruskin, well-loved and frequently quoted, had put the ideal of the expansion of England and the complementary thought of racial pre-eminence in his beautiful way. Speaking at Oxford he said, "Will you, youths of England, make your country again a

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1. Boyd, speeches, op.cit., p.131.
2. Carlyle, op.cit., p.212ff.
3. Spenser Wilkinson, The Great Alternative, p.328ff. There is the same emphasis in Ethics of Empire R.T., June 1913, Vol.3. Annie Besant, op.cit.p.4.

royal throne of kings; a sceptred isle, for all the world a source of light, a centre of peace; mistress of learning and of the arts; faithful guardian of great memories in the midst of irreverent and ephemeral visions; faithful servant of time-tried principles, under temptation from fond experiments and licentious desires; and, amidst the cruel and clamorous jealousies of the nations, worshipped in her strange valour of goodwill towards men?....This is what she must either do, or perish: she must found colonies, as fast and as far as she is able, formed of her most energetic and worthiest men:- seizing every piece of fruitful waste ground that she can get her foot on, and there teaching these, her colonists, that their first aim is to be to advance the power of England by land and sea; and that though they live on a distant plot of ground, they are not more to consider themselves therefore disenfranchised from their native land than the sailors of her fleets do, because they float on distant waves. So that literally, these colonies must be fastened fleets, and every man of them must be under authority of captains and officers, whose better command is to be over fields and streets instead of ships of the line;.....If we can get men for little pay, to cast themselves against cannonmouths for love of England, we may find men also who will plough and sow for her, who will behave kindly and righteously for her, who will bring up their children to love her, and who will gladden themselves in the brightness of her glory, more than in all the light of tropic skies."[1]. There is so much poetry in the quotation, and the patriotism is of such a high order, that it is unjust to take the words as a bald plea for an aggressive racialism. There is need for

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1. Ruskin, Lectures on Art, pp.28-30.

more nationalism of this nature, pacific, kindly, and emulous only in those things that make for the well-being of man and the beauty of the world. Rhodes was one who was deeply moved by Ruskin's lectures, and it is difficult to say how much of Rhode's ambition that the British race be a race to make war impossible was inspired by that great man.[1.]

There were two ideal objects of British Imperialism: to ensure peace and propagate liberty. To do this the British race must combine, and one writer enthused that "As the years roll on, a wider patriotism and a deeper resolve are becoming perceptible. There is growing into existence a sentiment of national being which overleaps the ocean, so that, to those whom it possesses, it matters not whether they were born in Cape Town or in London, in Melbourne or in Montreal. Equally are they members of one mighty community, and equally are they heirs to that mastery of the seas which must ultimately carry with it the hegemony of mankind."[2.] But with this hegemony was a corresponding obligation. "If the British Empire is destined to endure it will only be as the guardian of the moral welfare of its peoples. Faith in this mission alone can justify the effort to further its consolidation."[3.] Lord Thring, therefore, had the vision of, "A united British Empire, going forth - not conquering or to conquer, but to regulate commerce and spread peace and civilisation throughout its limits."[4.] Even Admiral Sir John Colomb, who was most anxious for Imperial union for purposes of defence, had in mind a Britannic confederation that "would form a League of Peace."[5.] Chamberlain, too,

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1. See McDonald, Rhodes, pp.36-37.
2. H.F. Wyatt, The Ethics of Empire, 19th C.,April 1897, Vol.41.
3. The Ethics of Empire, The R.T., June 1913, Vol.3. p.484.
4. Lord Thring, The Consolidation of the British Empire, Britannic Confederation, p.151.
5. Sir John Colomb, A Survey of Existing Conditions, Britannic Confederation, p.26.

was glad, for "We are advancing steadily, if slowly, to the realisation of that great federation of our race which will inevitably make for peace and liberty and justice."[1] To the United Kingdom the colonies were looking as "holding the headship of the race."[2]

At first, then, a universal Pax Britannica was the end of British Imperialism. Therefore Lecky remarked, "How unspeakably important it is to the future of the world that the English race, through the ages that are to come, should cling as closely as possible together."[3] The emphasis changed with a clearer conception of Colonial nationalism: the Empire was to bring liberty to the world. A superimposed peace smacked too much of Roman imperialism, which had brought to bear the brutal force of an external authority. English writers pleaded with their countrymen, "Let us accustom our eyes to appreciate and enjoy the exquisite distinction of the Imperial Mosaic as a pattern whereof every individual part, and every singly variant type, is effective and irreplaceable, though all are subordinate to the collective glory of one central, unique, and majestic design."[4] Professor Cramb described a life force or an "informing spirit, the unseen force from within the race itself", which shapes the material frame of empire and which, in the British Empire, directed itself to "the ideal of national and constituted freedom."[5] Every Empire in history so far he believed to have been an Empire of force without freedom; the "Informing spirit", insofar as it embodied liberty, was peculiar to the British Empire. Disraeli had once

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1. Boyd, op.cit. p.67.
2. Ibid.
3. Lecky, Historical and Political Essays, p.48.
4. Ellis Powell, U.E. June 1912, Vol.2.
5. Cramb, Reflections on the Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain, p.15.

inaccurately ascribed the motto Imperium ac Libertas to a Roman historian. Imperium ac Justitia he might have said, but Empire and freedom was a paradox to the Roman mind.[1] "Even as the marble or poem represents the supreme hour in the individual life....so the State represents the ideal pursued by the race,"[2] and that ideal was expressed in the modern battle-cry, "God for Britain, Justice and Freedom to the world!"[3] "And thus," he says superbly enough, "Britain shall become the name of an ideal as well as the designation of a race, the description of an attitude of mind as well as of traits of blood."[4] Even as Alexander of Macedon had refused to keep a strict line of demarcation between Greek and Barbarian, but decided to use his victories to make all men Hellenes, so too the object of the English Empire was to be "To give all men within its bounds an English mind; to give all who come within its sway the power to look at the things of life... from the standpoint of an Englishman; to diffuse within its bounds that high tolerance in religion which has marked this Empire from its foundation; that love of free institutions, that pursuit of an ever-higher justice and a larger freedom which, rightly or wrongly, we associate with the temper and character of our race wherever it is dominant and secure."[5] We laugh at Cramb's enthusiasm today. We are almost ashamed of such things now - even as the young man blushes when shown the love letter of his days of courtship. Lord Curzon would not have laughed at him. Lord Curzon said, in the course of a speech full of

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1. Cramb, Reflections on the Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain, pp.18-19.
2. Ibid, p.252.
3. Ibid, p.314.
4. Ibid, p.306.
5. Cramb, Germany and England, pp.124-126.

grandiloquent metaphors, "I would describe the Empire...as the result...of an instinct - that ineradicable and divinely implanted impulse, which has sent the Englishman forth into the uttermost parts of the earth, and made him there the parent of new societies and the architect of unpremeditated creations."[1.] We also find much agreement at that time with Professor Cramb's views on the Empire as the preserver of nationalism, Money-penny's phrase describing the British Empire as "a very microcosm of the world at large" was taken to mean that "nationality has given place to imperialism" wherein nationality might be saved.[2.]

One of the most brilliant studies of the ideal element in British Imperialism was that of Sir Charles Lucas, Greater Rome and Greater Britain. He showed that Rome lacked the infinite space that made for diversity and which had led to the various types of Briton and for the consequent vitality of the race.[3.] Rome began no new peoples; had given no "separate political existence" to colonies, while Greece had kept no such political relation between colony and Mother-country as existed between the Dominions and the United Kingdom.[4.] In fact, no analogy could be found for the British principle of sheltering - training - and finally developing colonies "to terms of practical independence." The only analogy for the relationship was that of the family: in her sons and daughters the United Kingdom renewed her youth. In Rome the motive power had been the State;

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1. Lord Curzon, The True Imperialism, 19th Cent., Jan.1908, Vol.63. Very able men still enthuse over Professor Cramb's studies.
2. Howard Booth. The Meaning of British Imperialism, U.E., Dec. 1913, Vol.4.
3. Greater Rome and Greater Britain, pp.16-17.
4. Ibid, pp.21-22.

the Romans were not an adventurous people and their traders waited until the soldiers of the State had dominated the land. In the British Empire there had been exploration, adventure, trade, and partial settlement which the Government licensed, disowned, or ignored at will, and which was all due to private enterprise.[1] Rome, to make one whole, kept the parts divided. England, for the last sixty or seventy years had set herself to build up nations within the Empire.[2]

Yet Sir Charles was worried lest the Empire drift apart. He discarded the axiom that was foundational to Free Trade - that "Force is no remedy": that is, that the power of man could not run counter to nature and oppose the artificial to the natural. The Roman Empire had been unnatural in the sense of an artificial creation, yet had kept civilisation alive for many hundreds of years.[3] Australia and Canada were the result of human handiwork and were in many ways a defiance of nature.[4] The British Empire had become less one as freedom had grown, for diversity had meant freedom, even as the Roman Empire became more one in proportion as liberty disappeared.[5] And so Sir Charles departs from his promising beginning and makes a plea for Imperial Preference if the Empire is to hold together: otherwise Britain must part with the Dominions.[6]

There were some men who looked with a certain equanimity on parting with the Dominions in a political sense, and suggested

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1. Greater Rome and Greater Britain, pp,75-76.
2. Ibid, p.160.
3. Ibid, p.112 ff.
4. Ibid pp. 119-124.
5. Ibid, p.141.
6. Ibid, p.174 ff.

the uniting force of a common civilisation. Hellas had its Athens, the centre of schools and arts, its unity of culture and ethical ideas and its similarity of laws and institutions, and "with wisdom and fostering care the many lands making Greater England may continue to have strong ties long after the political bonds are broken."[1] Mr A.G. Gardiner found the forces uniting the Empire to lie in the English Bible as a common heritage, Shakespeare as the crown of a common literature, traditions with roots in the glens of Scotland and on the downs of England, with "customs and speech more reminiscent of Old England than our own. One civilisation, adapting itself to varying conditions and flowering into diverse experiments...Over it there broods the spirit of a fraternal and indestructible peace, and through it there run the sanctions of a common law, whose highest seat of authority is in the Motherland."[2] But Mr Gardiner - somewhat dimly it is true, nevertheless surely - caught the vision of the modern Empire seeking through the Imperial Conference as "the greatest achievement of liberty that history has to offer.... a great step in the consolidation of that Empire of free nations - each master of its own affairs and all co-operating freely in common affairs - which is the enduring triumph of Liberalism."

The ideals of other men were also adumbrating the modern conception. Sir William Ramsay looked back to Dante and saw the Universal Empire as Dante dreamed it for the remedy of the unrest and disorder of his time, controlled by a supreme monarch, high above the smaller states and their rulers, exercising a

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1. John Macdonnell, Imperial Federation and some neglected Colonial Ties, 19th Cent., May 1900, Vol. 47, p.865.
2. Gardiner, The End of Imperialism and After, Con.Rev. Aug. 1911, Vol.100.

system of law and justice and order to which all the petty kings and their governments had to submit.[1] But, said Sir William, the modern ideal is a higher one. It aims at "the voluntary acceptance by the separate nationalities of the course of action which is most conducive to the good of all. For the supreme monarch among kings our ideal is to substitute the free choice by all of what is good and right for all. There is no longer any question of a common government, or of unifying the diverse nationalities in one European or one world-wide state, The nations are and remain separate."[2] One wonders if he had not the British Empire more particularly in mind? He mentions it as he closes: "What may be for the material and immediate advantage of the colonies I cannot pretend to know or to guess. But it is now generally recognised that the union of the Empire rests on sentiment and not on calculation of apparent material interest. It rests on the possession of common ideals of liberty and free individual development, on historical memories and on the English literature."[3] He desiderated for Europe some definite tribunal or organ which would exert moral force and be more reliable than any vox populi.[4]

Lord Haldane found his background for comparison in Rousseau according to whose view there was "a General Will with which the will of the good citizen is in accord,[5] and Haldane accepted it insofar as it meant that "we find within a single state the

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1. Sir W.M. Ramsay, The Imperial Peace: An Ideal in European History, p.6.
2. Ibid, pp.21-22.
3. Ibid, p.28.
4. Ibid, p.23.
5. Haldane, Higher Nationality, p,31.

evidence of a sanction which is less than legal but more than merely moral, and which is sufficient, in the vast majority of the events of daily life, to secure observance of general standards of conduct without any question of resort to force. If this is so within a nation, can it be so between nations? Can nations form a group or community among themselves within which a habit of looking to common ideals may grow up sufficiently strong to develop a General Will, and to make the binding power of these ideals a reliable sanction for their obligations to each other?"[1.] He was gloomy on the international outlook for this ideal, but he had faith that between the British Empire and the United States there was a "process of coming to a deepening and yet more complete understanding of each other, and to the possession of common ends and ideals which are natural to the Anglo-Saxon group, and to that group alone."[2.] He, too, desiderated a tribunal "to work for the general recognition by society of the binding character of international duties and rights as they arise within the Anglo-Saxon group."[3.]

While they are talking, stormed Mr Jebb, "the British Empire has already evolved the Imperial Conference, which has done, and is doing, precisely what these philosophers are looking for in a distant future."[4.] There had been the example of voluntary inter-State co-operation in the South African War, the Pacific Cable, Dominion Preferences to British trade, the statutory

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1. Haldane, Higher Nationality, pp.34-35.
2. Ibid, p.39.
3. Ibid, p.43.
4. R. Jebb, The Ideal Empire in our Time, The Britannic Review, May 1914, Vol.1.

provision by Canada, Australia, and New Zealand that on occasion the local naval forces might be transferred to another Government acting for the Empire, the extension of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and the proposed reform regarding the naturalisation of aliens, which would require concurrent legislation to be put into effect: "All this has been done through the medium of the independent Governments, themselves meeting together to consider what would be right and good for all, and afterwards each exerting its own power, strengthened by the moral weight of the Britannic agreement, to persuade its own constituents to give effect thereto." Here, in the Imperial Conference, Mr Jebb found a body actuated solely by its consciousness of a 'General Will' in the communities which it represented.

In conclusion, it may be noticed that, even as there had come about an appreciation of Dominion Nationalism, so during the same period of the pre-war years British opinion was veering to visualize the Empire as a co-operative unity whose ideals were mutual service, protection, and the maintenance of justice. This point will be sufficiently laboured in Part II., but it may be observed how clearly it appears in studying the philosophy of Imperialism.

Social Conditions Influencing the British Attitude to the Empire.

There were two views of the social conditions of England at the end of the Nineteenth Century. The optimist saw the country in comparison with the close of the Napoleonic wars and found much in a national survey to justify himself. England was still the wealthiest nation in the world; knowledge was

more democratic than ever before; newspapers and magazines had multiplied; the arts had been cultivated; excursions for the working classes were common enough on the more numerous holidays; and people on the whole were kindlier in spirit and more refined in habits as the parks, libraries, museums, schools, and public baths which had been created from private or municipal enterprise seemed to testify.

The pessimist, however, as usual could make the more effective case and was not lacking material to support a gloomy point of view. Charles Booth's great work, Life and Labour of the People in London showed ghastly slum conditions that certainly left no room for complacency. He revealed the degradation resulting from industrial conditions that left thousands out of work, hundreds of thousands in chronic want, and still more on the border-line of complete poverty. The evils of poverty and moral looseness to the national life were further startlingly presented by Mr Seebohm Rowntree and the Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration

Society was often berated as frivolous and luxurious, and undisciplined living accused of sapping the nation's strength. Knowledge might have come, but wisdom, courage, the sense of duty, and happiness had lessened. True, the United Kingdom was still the leading industrial and commercial country of the world, but foreign competitors were catching up with such alarming rapidity that her position seemed doomed to brief tenure. The following article, for example, drew some comment from contemporary writers:

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1. Rowntree, Poverty: A Study of Town Life. Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration: 1904. Cd. 2175, Cd. 2210, Cd. 2186.

"German goods are not only constantly rising in intrinsic value, but they oust English manufactures in every market in the world. America has long passed England in the Iron and steel manufacture.. Many American critics of the situation are confidently predicting that within another generation England will be merely an industrial annexe of the United States...The energy of Englishmen will certainly lead them to make prodigious efforts, but America has even greater energy, and indefinitely great resources, while both Germany and America display greater intelligence and originality than does England."[1] The writer argued that England was doomed to become the playground of Europe and must make the best of it by becoming a centre of culture providing educational institutions and a home for the idle rich.

Some men looked with wistful hope to improved urban life by better agricultural conditions and urged the virility that "a rehabilitated class of yeomanry might afford old England."[2] There is abundant evidence that the nation was far from complacent, and that it was aware of the many festering sores in the vital parts of its social organism and of their enervating effect on nationale morale.

Following on a recognition of these defects, it came about that there were two parties for reform.[3] One proclaimed the thrilling gospel of saving the nation by an infusion of new blood. It was proposed to extend the citizenship in all reality so that the British population of the Colonies might vote in an Imperial

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1. William Clarke: The Social Future of England: Con. Rev. Dec. 1900, Vol.78.
2. Macmillan's Mag., Aug.1903, Vol.88, Protection or Free Trade, pp.260-261.
3. Vide Political History of England, Vol.12, p.488 ff.

Parliament. Moral regeneration would come with the energizing impulsion of a religio-political ideal. Society could be rejuvenated by giving the man in the street a missionary's zeal in spreading through the world an unrivalled national culture; instilling in him a national consciousness that thrilled in possession of an Empire upon which the sun never set; reconciling an Empire protecting free institutions and western civilisation with superstition and cannibalism of heathendom. Lord Milner saw in the unity of "the great kindred communities who owe allegiance to the British flag", the great principle for national reconstruction.[1] Joseph Chamberlain made this plea for a mental uplift; the Imperial sentiment, he said once, "has ennobled our national life, it has discouraged that petty parochialism which is the defect of all small communities. I say to you that all that is best in our present life, best in this Britain of ours; all of which we have the right to be most proud, is due to the fact that we are not only sons of Britain, but we are sons of Empire...Others have founded the Empire; it is yours to build firmly and permanently the great edifice of which others have laid the foundation. And I believe we have got to change somewhat our insular habits. When I have been in the colonies I have told them that they were too provincial, but I think we are too provincial also. We think too much of ourselves, and we forget...that we are only part of a larger whole."[2] So, too, a follower of his stated that "What we need...is the conception of the Empire as a great organism giving us the area and the moral and material resources for the

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1. Milner, Constructive Implism., p.49.
2. Moyd, speeches, pp.154-155.

realisation of certain imperishable principles."[1] The following article is typical of many: "Municipal Socialism, the Education Bill, and other matter important no doubt to the internal welfare of the United Kingdom, but having nevertheless only an indirect and shadowy connection with the maintenance of our Imperial position, can readily command a page or more of The Times, whilst questions of fundamental importance to the Navy or Army receive but scant attention."[2] The author was really unfair to The Times since it was forever urging the needs of the Navy and various military matters to the public, while no organ did more to popularise the works of Captain Mahan on naval history and strategy.

But the Imperialists were business men: such an Empire would provide homes for surplus population and the population established overseas would provide markets. Of that, more will be said later. One Imperialist suggested labour legislation for the Empire, with an Imperial old-age pensions system, an Imperial Factories Act, an Imperial Immigration Restriction Act regulating the movement of coloured races and paupers within the Empire, an Inter-Imperial Labour Exchange acting as a "Labour Clearing House" for the Empire and a Central Information Bureau, and regular conferences of the Minister controlling labour and

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1. J. Saxon Mills, The Liberal Eclipse: The Fort. Rev. April 1903, Vol. 73., p.688. Chamberlain: "It is something to be a citizens of a prosperous colony; it is more to be the inhabitant of a great kingdom; but it is still more to rise above all these, above all parochialism, all provincialism. It is greatest to be a member of the freest and the most powerful of all the Empires which the world has ever seen." Maritzburg, Dec. 30, 1902, Boyd, op.cit., p.90.
2. "Icona", National Apathy and National Necessities, Un. Ser. Mag., Vol.26, Oct., 1902, p.43.

industrial legislation of every State or Colony of the Empire.[1]

There was another body of opinion that opposed this theory of reclaiming England with that of direct social reform and State action in controlling property and individual action in industry and commerce. The ancestors of the Labour Party were to be found herein, and the Westminster Review was a most consistent advocate of the philosophy that true patriotism consisted of a policy of social reform at home.[2] It is not correct, however, to say that one distinct exclusive body of thought aimed at the ideal of a national mission which included racial domination, to which all the military and economic forces of the State would be bent, and that another distinct party maintained only a theory of social reconstruction and closer control of industries by the State. These two bodies of thought can hardly be said to be parties, nor did their exponents, aside from extremists, regard themselves as belonging to a party with a policy that embraced Imperialism and neglected social reform, or that demanded social reform and ignored the Empire. For example, Asquith, one of the chief figures in the Liberal Imperialist movement and generally regarded as an ardent Imperialist, rebuked those who accused him of being absorbed completely by this one idea, and maintained his plea to be for an "Imperial race" in the British Isles developed by improved social conditions and education through the agency of the State,[3] his words being almost an exact repetition of those of Rosebery, the leader of Liberal Imperialism, in his rectorial address in Glasgow the year previous.[4] Sir Henry Campbell-

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1. L.V. Biggs, Imperial Federation and Social Reform, 1908, Imperial Federation League of Australia.
2. ex. W.H. Kent, Patriotism or Imperialism, West.Rev., Feb.1902, Vol.157.
3. The Times, July 20, 1901.
4. The Times, 12 Nov., 1900.

Bannerman, who was most likely to denounce Imperial programmes, declared it to be "the merest calumny" to say that the Liberals were indifferent to Imperial interests. "It was to a great extent Liberal enterprise that founded the Empire, and it certainly was Liberal policy that had preserved it."[1] Sir Herbert Samuel, who stated that "Our first principle leads clearly and directly to a policy of social reform"[2] and who was tremendously aware of the cause of the poor, yet was quite alert regarding value of the Empire as a social factor to the ordinary Englishman. "The Empire enlarges his outlook, gives him a fuller confidence in the future of his nation, strengthens in him the qualities of foresight, persistency, self-sacrifice and restraint, that are needed to preserve and develop so vast a dominion; it adds to his country a new prestige and to his citizenship a new grandeur. Valuable as are the material advantages in trade and in defensive power which the empire brings to the British nation, it is this enoblement of the race which must be counted its greatest gift."[3] Sir Edward Cook, another Liberal Imperialist, related that his main effort in journalism had been, first to influence the Liberal Party in an Imperialist direction, and secondly, to support social reforms.[4] Lord Milner, an Imperialist of first rank, stated that "there are two great effects of practical patriotism.. These objects are the strength of the Empire, and the health, the well-being, the contentedness of the mass of the people..... Remember always, these two things are one; they are inseparable. There can be no adequate prosperity for the forty or fifty million

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1. Spender, Life of Campbell-Bannerman, Vol.1, p.303.
2. Liberalism, p.11.
3. Ibid, p.325.
4. J. Saxon Mills, Life of Sir Edward Cook, p.206.

people in these islands without the Empire and all that it provides; there can be no enduring Empire without a healthy, thriving,manly people at the centre."[1] Again he reiterates his contention: "The greatest danger I hold to the Unionist party and to the nation is that the ideals of national strength and Imperial consolidation on the one hand, and of democratic progress and domestic reform on the other, should be dissevered, and the people should come to regard as antagonistic objects which are essentially related and complementary to one another."[2]

Just as it cannot be said that there were two exclusive parties for reform and for, what we may call for want of a better word, Imperialism, even so it cannot be said that any class of society definitely adopted either slogan. It may nevertheless be said that even as the poorer section of society must be assured of daily bread before developing the esthetic nature, so the working classes were more prone to favour State action to gain more equal distribution of wealth and advantages rather than romantic Imperialism.[3] The wealthy and aristocratic members of society were more likely to be enthused over what became a fashionable faith. "There is an obvious danger" said an anti-Imperialist, "that the Empire will be ruled in the interests of our governing families.[4] Labour was suspicious of the Empire because it was supposed to spell militarism, to be the special perquisite of the capitalist class, acquired and maintained in their interests, and it was believed to be a diversion to take the public mind from

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1. Milner, The Nation and the Empire, pp. 196-197.
2. Ibid, pp.249-250.
3. For the thesis that only the upper, wealthier classes regarded Imperial questions as other than academic see C.R. Enock, An Imperial Commonwealth, Ch.IV., p.37 ff.
4. J.L. Hammond, Colonial and Foreign Policy, Liberalism and the Empire, p.210.

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misery at home.[1] To many it appeared that "This Empire craze is but a 'holy alliance' of the aristocracy to date," and they found it easy to scoff at an ideal which held that "we are a peculiar people, a holy people, an imperial and conquering race, and under God it is our bounden duty to go forth and slay and subjugate the peoples who fail to be impressed with either our holiness or our institutions. It was merely an old trick that had "been resurrected in the name of empire....'to busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels, So that action hence borne out may waste the memory of the former days'!"[2] It was an Imperialism to "promote the sordid interest of certain classes",[3] subsidizing their interests in trading, speculation of capital naval and military services, or imperial civil service, voting huge naval expenditures on the ground that they were necessary to promote the interests of British commerce.[4] The kernel of the agitation was Capitalist exploitation, regarding which it was pure hypocrisy to say that Imperialism was to benefit humanity.[5] Other writers maintained that Imperialism led to racial degeneracy, lust, and cruelty. In spreading domination of race and keeping inferior races in subjection the dominant race would be itself fettered and clamped.[6]

Yet the movement was not peculiar to any social class; here again it is a matter of emphasis. Kipling's verses found

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1. Sir Charles Lucas, The Meaning of the Empire and the Labour Democracy, U.E., Mar. 1920, Vol.xi.
2. Hamilton, Labour Questions and Empire, West. Rev., July 1901, Vol.156, pp.56-58.
3. J.G. Godard, Commercialism and Imperialism, West. Rev., Nov. 1903, Vol.160.
4. John M. Robertson, Patriotism and Empire, p,187.
5. J.E. Ellam, Imperialism and the Coming Crisis for Democracy, West. Rev., Sept. 1901, Vol.156.
6. Leonard Courtney, The Times, 18 July, 1901. Morley often advanced this theory as had his Liberal predecessors.

their greatest welcome with the proletariat. One writer, indeed, asked who were the worst Imperialists, and answered, the lower classes.[1.] "A professed Socialist" Parliamentary candidate was quoted as saying that he firmly believed in the mission of the English peoples - with their genius for conquest and colonization possessed by no other people of modern times.[2.]

The Liberals and the Empire.

Liberalism and Conservatism interacted in two spheres - home policy and foreign policy. In home policy, inasmuch as there was a tendency of thought which stressed social reconstruction as opposed to racial imperialism, a supporter of that tendency was dubbed a "Little Englander". The vast majority of those so nicknamed were of Liberal politics. "Our first principle," said Sir Herbert Samuel, "Leads clearly and directly oto a policy of social reform."[3.] Now it is true that to the thoroughgoing Liberal of the Manchester School both Imperialism and social reform by state intervention were anathema. The theory of that school was based on a great faith in human nature, left to itself, with the minimum of interference. Essentially a moral force, Liberalism could tolerate no great corporations or organized economic and political bodies, for the tendency of such was to become oppressive, to hamper the liberty of the individual conscience, to erect unnatural boundaries and restraints, to establish a reign of favouritism, and to create a conservatism in the places of power which, stolid and unimaginative, would

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1. Peter Struthers, South Africa and Imperialism, West. Rev. Aug. 1901, Vol.156.
2. Robertson, op.cit., p,190.
3. Samuel, Liberalism, p.11; also p.301 for criticism of neglect of domestic affairs.

frown upon change and stereotype human thought and action. Government must be an umpire merely and keep industry free from every artificial restraint. Reform must come, not as a prelude to State direction of individual action, but as giving free rein to the development of individual and national enterprise. When faced with the alternative, however, social reform was less odious to the successors of Cobden and Bright than Imperialism. Cobden had taught nothing more earnestly than that Imperialism breeds war; that Imperialism is the chief cause of war. He hated the "colonial system, with all its dazzling appeal to the passions of the people."[1.] Imperialism was "capable of most abominable crimes" without giving any compensating advantages for the outlay of blood and treasure.[2.] Imperialism, in short, meant militarism, and the Free Trader of the Manchester School could have nothing to do therewith. One remembers that Gladstone had retired from the Government because of his objections to the naval estimates framed by Lord Spencer for the fiscal year 1894-95 which showed a large increase over the previous year: he would not have England plunged into the European whirlpool of militarism. Morley saw the weakness of Gladstone's position and that the retort was, "Were you not eager to plunge us into a single-handed conflict with the Turk, and if you are going in for such things how can you do without armaments"?[3.] A contemporary observer made the wise comment that, "There is no peace-at-any-price party. There are only parties which disapprove of each other's wars."[4.] For example, in 1898 there was scarcely a Liberal

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1. Morley, The Life of Richard Cobden, Vol.ii, p.230.
2. Ibid, p.206, p.210, p.216, etc.
3. Morley, Recollections, Vol.ii, pp.69-70.
4. Quoted, Spender, The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Vol.i, pp.209-210.

pacifist who would have objected to a war with "Abdul the Damned," and Goschen's naval policy of 1896 was approved by both parties.

The aims of Liberalism in regard to world politics and the Empire as distinguished from local politics in the United Kingdom might be said to include complete self-government for the Dominions, the development of representative institutions in India, benevolent treatment of natives and a non-expansion policy, and a European concert which would provide a guarantee for the protection of small nationalities and serve as a preserver of peace. The history of the nineteenth century is full of struggles for national liberty, and in the British Empire are reflected the two forces of a racialism that tried to make itself secure in building up the organization and power of the State and of a nationalism that desired the full play of local sentiment in every community, however parochial might be its outlook and however narrow irs boundaries.[1.] The latter emphasised the value of individual enterprise, the spirit of nationality, and the ideal of democratic government; the former saw the danger involved in a multitude of pampered national sentiments that might spell fatal weakness and endanger the liberty of the whole. The interaction of these two forces was to make for an Empire in which nationalism might have full play, but against foreign injustice and aggresstion all the parts would stand united. Often the difference between the forces of nationalism and imperialism, liberalism and conservatism, is but a matter of shading. When nationalism took the form of organized communitities and sought dominance over other nationalitities it quite parted from the Liberal traditions. Thus the distinction between the two bodies of opinion

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1. Vide Nationalism and Liberty, R.T., Vol.v, Dec.1914.

in the Empire became clear only when nationalism became imperialism or liberalism threatened to become anarchic laissez-faire. Imperialism might be defined as nationalism become unhealthily corpulent, taking on the arrogance of privilege, and allowing national affection to run into the overweening pride of an aggressive racialism. Imperialism by itself would have militarised and brutalised the Empire; nationalism by itself would have disrupted it. The compromise has been towards a British Commonwealth of Nations, co-operative in its functions, motived by the moral force of a popular democratic Empire "Will."

If the earlier Liberals desired to rid themselves of the Empire, the more modern Liberal thinkers did not follow exactly in their footsteps, although Lord Morley still made bitter speeches on the brutality engendered by the spirit of Imperial domination. The attitude of the majority of the Liberal Party, a majority which Campbell-Bannerman estimated to be four-fifths,[1.] held, so they believed, to the direct succession of the Manchester School: "Their doctrines were the doctrines of freedom of trade, love of peace, due regard to economy, non-intervention in the squabbles and jealousies of other nations, and the bestowal of free institutions upon our colonies, so that the colonies might be gradually trained, nay might train themselves, to become nations on their own account in co-operatoon - let us hope in co-operation and perfect amity - with the people of this country from whom they sprang....If there are men," concludes Sir Henry," who still preach righteousness and still warn us against a love of Empire and pride of Empire running into a greed of Empire, I thank heaven for it."[2.]

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1. Spender, op.cit., vol.i, p.296.
2. Ibid, pp.303-304.

The Liberals as represented by Campbell-Bannerman, Harcourt, and Morley, were quite content thennto accept the Empire as an existing fact, not as something to be got rid of. That is the distinction Morley made when he held that the Liberal party which won the election of 1905 was non-imperialist, not anti-imperialist,[1] Sir Henry, almost in the same breath with which he promises South Africa "free self-governing institutions" as soon as order was established, added, "If we are to maintain the political supremacy of the British power in South Africa - and this surely is the end and purpose of all we are doing - it can only be by conciliation and friendship; it will never be by domination and ascendancy, because the British power cannot there or elsewhere rest securely unless it rests upon the willing consent of a sympathetic and contented people."[2]

It is irritating to have such phrases as "self-governing institutions" and "political supremacy" juxtaposed without further enlargement on their connotations, a vagueness that was typical at that time in questions involving the constitution of the Empire, but they seem to indicate an effort to maintain as far as possible the political status quo in the relationship of the United Kingdom and the Dominions. Lloyd George with similar vagueness did "not believe that they (the Boers) would accept government by officials in Downing Street over their own affairs," but he thought they would accept "British supremacy" and the "overlordship of the Crown over the whole of South Africa."[3] He probably means that Britain would control the external relations of South Africa, while granting local self-government.

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1. Recollections, op.cit., p.142.
2. Spender, op.cit., p.326.
3. The Times, Feb.28, 1901.

This constituted the popular conception of Canadian self-government. There would also be safeguards to prevent any violent change: there would be among other things the legislative supremacy of the British Government.

As for the "expansion" phase of Imperialism, Sir William Harcourt tried to distinguish between true Liberal Imperialism and that form of it which he flayed as "Jingoism": "But what does that Imperialism you hear so much about mean?" he asked. "If it means pursuing a policy which is the wisest and best for that great Empire to which we belong, of course we are all Imperialists in that sense. But then remains the practical question - what is the policy of Imperialism? It is a policy which has its first regard to the consolidation of the vast dominions, the countless millions, and the varied interests which compose our unequalled Empire, the development of their resources, the lightening of their burdens, the fostering of their natural growth, the relief of distress within it, and the raising of the standard of all sorts and conditions of men who are the subjects of the Queen. That is Imperialism as I understand it. That is a policy which makes the Empire great and keeps it so. There is another and exactly opposite view of imperial policy. It is to postpone and subordinate all these objects to vanity, to the acquisition of fresh populations, the adoption of additional burdens - that is the extentionists' theory, and the extensionists, it seems to me, are extremely like what in currency are called the Inflationists, who are of opinion that the more paper you issue the more wealth you create and the more prosperity you will have. Well, I am not an inflationist in currency, and I am not an extensionist. In my judgment, at least, it is a greater and wiser policy to

cultivate an Empire than to boom an Empire....To these ends (i.e. the ends of the Imperialists) the principle genius of administration and the energies of Parliament are directed. Social reforms are neglected. Indeed Mr Chamberlain told us, in a scornful tone, that to talk of social reforms was merely 'parochial'. Now what is the end of that? It means that the Empire is commotted to land speculators, to mining syndicates, and that they are to determine the limits of the Empire and the methods of its administration. They are not particular - we all know that - as to the methods to be employed. 'Expansion at any rate, at whatever cost, and by whatever means.' That is the sleeping genie!"[1.]

In this speech Harcourt at least suggests those impulses that dictated his attitude to the Empire, and with him may be included that "four fifths" of the Liberal Party: a great love of England founded upon her magnificent exploits in the days gone by; a profound admiration for those men who had propounded the moral virtues which had dictated those achievements; and a distrust of the lust of gain or pride of power which would absorb other countries and impose by the force of arms a policy contrary to the ideal of national freedom of internal government which had ordered the constitutional development of the Dominions. In pursuing the arts of peace - social and industrial welfare for England's people - all the rest would follow after, but how was this end attainable if an aggressive racialism was provoking war?[2.]

Morley reiterated this prejudice against aggressive imperialism when he attacked it on the score that "The very word

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1. The Times, May 31, 1899.
2. Gardiner, The Life of Sir William Harcourt, Vol.II.,pp.593-601 gives an excellent synthesis of Harcourt's views.

empire is in history and essence military: emperor means soldier; all modern history and tradition associate empire with wars."[1.] He related that, "Asked at a meeting what I meant by Jingo, I tried to define the genus mocked by that terse designation as men who held that territory was territory, and all territory was worth acquiring without regard to cost....We were not to disown our share in the collective responsibility of civilised peoples, and if the real or supposed interest and aspiration of another people claimed our aid, it would be unworthy of imperial greatness to compare the value of the object with the price, even if that price meant the insensate horrors of war. The advancement of the people of our own country in the note of civilised well-being was important but comparatively secondary."[2.] His plea, now as always, was for a policy of "sane domestication" as opposed to demoralising imperialism.[3.]

Perhaps Sir Herbert Samuel best voiced the attitude of the Liberals to the Empire: "A loyal determination to defend the empire we hold, a sentiment of close unity with the English colonists, a desire to promote the interests of the empire without injury to domestic progress, to develop its commerce while scrupulously caring for the well-being of subject races, to maintain its sovereignty while preparing the way for an extension of national liberties," this constituted true Liberal Imperialism.[4.]

In studying the attitude of the parties, Liberal and Unionist, to the South African War, one may see that the differences were not great except between the extremists on either side.

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1. Recollections, op.cit., Vol.II., p.80.
2. Ibid.
3. Speech on Public Affairs, The Times, May 26, 1899.
4. Liberalism, op.cit., pp.343-344.

When in July 1900 a division was forced on a motion hostile to the government, 31 Liberals voted against and 40 for the Government, Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman and 35 Liberals abstaining from the vote.[1.] Yet when Morley suggested the Imperialism he hated as being synonymous with "Africanism" he was putting the fact that in the South African War may be found that difference in emphasis which divided the Liberal and Unionist thought in its purer forms.

In the first place, the South African War was an experiment of British racial Imperialism with which pure Liberalism could have nothing to do. Imperialists everywhere hastened to disavow the intention of fighting for the gold mines of the Transvaal; the war was to preserve the physical and moral integrity of the Empire. As Chamberlain put it, "The object for which we are fighting is the unity, that existence of the British Empire that is recognized as the object of the British race throughout the world....the establishment of an independent Republic in the Transvaal would be fatal to our dominion in South Africa and fatal to the union of the Empire....Let us raise our thoughts to the transcendent possibilities of a federation of the British race to strengthen British influence and power."[2.] This is similar to Lord Milner's language, "I do not regard this war as having been a struggle for the mines, but for British supremacy in South Africa. I hold that, as we can see now, that struggle was bound sooner or later to come, and the great influx of British people into the Transvaal which was due to the mines, though it may have precipitated the struggle, was, from another point of view,

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1. Halevy, op.cit., p.107.
2. At Birmingham, The Times, 17 May, 1902.

the salvation of the British position in South Africa."[1] "In South Africa," said Lord Rosebery, "people, including the vast native population, are all watching which is to be the predominant race."[2] The sanest of commentators put his view: "I yield to no man in my passion for the greatness, the strength, the glory, and the moral unity of the British Empire. I am one of the thousands of Englishmen who approved, and still approves of the war in South Africa because it forbade secession."[3]

In the second place, the Liberals were reputed to be more generous as regards the granting of self-governing institutions to the Colonies, while the Unionists wished an intermediate stage after having got rid of the military administration as soon as possible. It would create an impossible situation, declared Chamberlain, to jump to self-government at once.[4] The comparative generosity of the Liberals is the point of a most interesting memoir of Lord Shaw of Dunfermline. He relates that "General Smuts one evening, after I had asked him to dine, with the Lord Chancellor and some of the great Judges, in Palace Gate, disclosed to me what had happened in the fateful Conference at Vereeniging, when the question of the continuation of the war and the achievement of peace with South Africa was hanging by a thread.

"They discussed far into the night. Lord Milner was obdurate - I think Smuts's words were, 'He was impossible.' When all hope seemed lost, Smuts felt himself gripped by the elbow and, looking round, he saw Lord Kitchener, who whispered to him: 'Come out; come out for a little.' The two of them left the Conference and they paced outside back and forward through the dark.

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1. Cd. 1152, 1902.
2. The Times, Oct.28, 1899.
3. Dicey, Law of the Constitution, p.LXXXV.
4. H.C. 7 Dec., 1900, Vol.88, pp.259-260.

"Kitchener and Smuts were both well aware of the accumulating horror of a long guerilla warfare. They were both sincerely anxious for an arrangement. And then Kitchener said to him, 'Look here, Smuts, there is something on my mind that I want to tell you. I can only give it you as my opinion; but my opinion is that in two year's time a Liberal Government will be in power; and if a Liberal Government comes into power it will grant you a Constitution for South Africa.' Said Smuts, "That is a very important pronouncement. If one could be sure of the like of that it would make a great difference." 'As I say,' said Kitchener, 'it is only my opinion, but honestly I do believe that that will happen.' 'That,' said General Smuts to me, 'accomplished the peace. We went back, and the arrangements at the Conference were definitely concluded, and the war came to a close."[1.]

Nevertheless it is doubtful if there was a great difference between the two parties regarding South Africa. Surely the Peace of Vereeniging was generous enough: it is doubtful if a conquered foe ever got such happy terms. The Articles of Peace set forth that the Dutch language was to be taught in public schools in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony where the parents of the children desire it, and would be allowed in courts of law when necessary for the better and more effectual administration of justice. Military administration was to be succeeded by civil government at the earliest possible date and representative institutions, leading up to self-government would be instroduced.[2.] There was no

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1. Shaw, Letters to Isabel, pp. 202-203. For Kitchener's anxiety to end the war see Sir Geo. Arthur, Life of Lord Kitchener, Vol.2, pp.21-22; p.90; pp.93-94. He hoped to see South Africa an asset to the British Empire, p.106.
2. Cd.1163, 1902, p.156.

effort made to defray the cost of the war by a tithe on the gold fields as had been suggested, but to the contrary the British agreed to pay £3,000,000 to farmers whose property had been destroyed during the war and offered loans on very generous terms.

As if it were not difficult enough to fight a party that was riding on the crest of an Imperialist wave, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman found much heart-burning in the relation of his own party to Imperialism, with a consequent serious division.[1] It may have been, as Sir Henry asserted, that only one-fifth followed Lord Rosebery, the leader of the Liberal Imperialists, but it was a formidable fraction. It comprised such able men as Sir Edward Grey, who entered the movement with his whole heart, Mr Asquith who hesitated for a time, Viscount Haldane, Sir Henry Fowler, and Sir Robert W.Perks, whose activity therein led to the Party being nicknamed "The Perksites." Sir E.T. Cook, editor of the Daily News, was a Rosebery disciple through and through, with little personal or political liking for Harcourt, one of the representatives of the pure form of Liberalism.[2] Lord Rosebery, with a good body of youthful Liberalism supporting him, with Scotland loyally behind him as a native son, and with the able journalistic support of Alfred Hamsworth,(Afterwards Viscount Northcliffe), while he had no hostile Press of any weight in London, started well-armed into battle. The Westminster Gazette was

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1. One marked effect of the schism of 1886 had been the shifting of the centre of gravity in the Liberal Party to the Left. Gladstone had managed to keep it in check, by the South African War it had escaped control. See J. Guinness Rogers, The Liberal Imbroglio, The Con.Rev., Apr.1902, Vol.81.
2. J. Saxon Mills, Sir Edward Cook, p.163. For his friendship with Rosebery see p.160 ff., p.222. Also Gardiner, The Life of Sir William Harcourt, Vol.II.,p.476. E.T. Raymond, The Life of Lord Rosebery, p.178.

pro-Rosebery, and the only two London papers who opposed the South African War were The Morning Leader and the Daily Chronicle, while the Manchester Guardian was the only great journal outside London to denounce Imperialism.[1] The Daily Chronicle changed its attitude and H.W. Massingham, the editor, resigned. Lloyd George appealed to George Cadbury, who had broken from Chamberlain on Home Rule and whose Quaker sensibilities had been wounded by the War, and obtained from him an advance of £20,000 to buy the Daily News.[2] Thomasson of Boulton made a like contribution and the paper was purchased, the Imperialist staff deposed, and Massingham and Rudolphe Lehmann employed to set forth Radical principles.

The history of the Liberal Imperialists as a powerful political body was a stormy one. Rosebery had resigned the leadership of the Liberal Party when Gladstone emerged from retirement to lead a campaign of righteous indignation against the "great assassin", pleading for single-handed action if necessary on the part of England, whereas Rosebery was assured that there was a European plot to smash England and pictured a quite possible European war without in any way helping the Armenians. Harcourt and then Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman succeeded to the leadership of the party as a protest against the "neo-Palmerstonians".[3] The Imperialist section openly derided the authority of the latter. Rosebery and Sir Henry had never been good friends as Rosebery had a low opinion of his successor's understanding and narrow principles while Campbell-Bannerman as a practical politician deeply distrusted Rosebery's vacillation and theatrical mannerisms.[4]

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1. A.G.Gardiner, Life of George Cadbury, p.212. Harcourt, op.cit., p.526.
2. Gardiner, op.cit., p.216.
3. Morley, Recollections, op.cit., p.89.
4. Low, Samuel Henry Jeyes, p.79.

The first skirmish was an implied criticism of "Majuba magnanimity" by Lord Rosebery which was by way of being sacrilege, for nothing had been more typically Gladstonian than his attitude regarding Majuba.[1] At Bath Rosebery made a fighting speech for that Liberal Imperialism which was destined to control the destinies of the country.[2] The Liberal Imperial Council was formed after quarrels and dissensions in The Eighty Club that followed on a speech by Lord Coleridge at the beginning of the war which was very pro-Boer.[3] Prior to the election, the Council issued a list of fifty-six candidates on whose patriotism the public could rely and who were "understood to be in general agreement with the policy of the Council."[4] They fared badly in the election for the public was not prepared to go into nice distinctions between parties - Chamberlain had done all he could to make the election as decisive as possible - and the electorate voted with war-time positiveness either "Yea, Yea," or "Nay, Nay." It also seemed favorable to Liberal unanimity that Perks should support the official resolution of the National Liberal Federation by having the word "forthwith" inserted to stiffen a clause demanding "a policy for the settlement of South African affairs which will secure equal rights to the white races, just and humane treatment of the natives, and such a measure of self-government as can honourably be accepted by a brave and high-spirited people."[5] Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman seized on this opportunity to state

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1. Rosebery, Letter to the Times, Oct.12, 1899; He was not judging the policy pursued after the Majuba reverse, but he stated his strong conviction that no government of today dare repeat it.
2. The Times, Oct.28, 1899.
3. J. Saxon Mills, The Liberal Eclipse, [illegible] Fort. Rev., April 1903, Vol.73.
4. Spender, op.cit., pp.295-296.
5. The Times, Feb. 28, 1901.

that the Liberal policy was directed to two main objects: "first, that we should clearly make known to the peoples of the belligerent States, not in vague but in definite terms, that our purpose is not conquest but conciliation, not humiliation but friendship and freedom; and in the second place, that these terms should include the resettlement in their homes of the burghers, who by capture or the operations of war have been dispossessed, and the establishment, as soon as order is restored, of self-governing institutions."

The peace was more seeming than real. An effort to attract Rosebery within the fold proved quite fruitless, Campbell-Bannerman finding him "unmoveable without being steadfast".[1] In a letter to the Times dealing with the controversies of the Liberal Party, Rosebery marked himself and his followers rigidly off from those of the orthodox section, condemning the latter for their Little England attitude.[2] The letter inaugurated a fitful campaign by the Liberal Imperialists to convert the Party and oust Campbell-Bannerman from the leadership to make way for the Scottish Lord. Deserted by the cream of the Parliamentary debating strength and bedevilled by the Press, Sir Henry found men on whom he had felt he could rely turning against his leadership. Lloyd George, putting it subtly enough, remarked that, "If Lord Rosebery really becomes leader, and takes the country with him, we shall all be delighted, and Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman will be as pleased as anyone."[3] In February, 1902, the Liberal League was formed replacing the Liberal Imperial Council with Rosebery

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1. Lucien Wolf, Life of Lord Ripon, Vol.ii, p.264. Letter to Lord Ripon, Feb,9, 1901.
2. The Times, July 17, 1901.
3. E.T. Raymond, Mr Lloyd George, p.77.

as President, and Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, and Sir H. Fowler as Vice-Presidents. A resolution adopted by the League declared that the time had come "to clearly and permanently distinguish Liberals in whose policy with regard to Imperial questions patriotic voters may justly repose confidence from those whose opinions naturally disqualify them from controlling the action of the Imperial Parliament of a world-wide community of nations."[1.]

The real difference between the two sections of Liberalism is to be found as a revival of the quarrel in the Liberal Party that had persisted since Palmerston and Bright as to foreign and Imperial policy. The Rosebery section feared that the Liberal anxiety to keep free from diplomacy as conducted in Europe, that is,to maintain an insular, non-intervention attitude might lead to neglect of questions of Empire, an Empire with which other nations in those days of expansion and commercialism was bound to touch everywhere. The time of glorious isolation was gone for the Empire if not for England. The orthodox section accused the Rosebery group of Jingoism, of neglecting the social essentials of peace, reform, and sane business for national vanity and imperial expansion that traded on national hysteria. It was again a matter of emphasis: one section of the party stressed their fear of militarism; the other, their fear of pacifism. John Morley reads as if one is listening to the swan song of the Manchester School; he ever sounds a bit gloomy on this theme. Once he quotes an onlooker who had said, "When the Liberals came into office in 1892 and foreign policy came to the front in the first week of Mr Gladstone's new Cabinet....the minority showed itself to contain the last

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1. Gardiner, Life of Sir William Harcourt, Vol.ii, p.524.

remnant of the Manchester School: Harcourt and Morley from conviction strong; Mr Gladstone in a lesser degree. The Old Man is far the most susceptible to new influences."[1] Liberal Imperialism hoped to get much of the support that was given to Conservative Imperialism and also to attract the working classes by social and educational reform. It was really a media via between Toryism and Liberalism with an occasional incorporation of the Fabian platform. Sidney and Beatrice Webb were in close touch with Lord Rosebery and Haldane. Bernard Shaw's ideal of national efficiency fitted perfectly into Rosebery's doctrines. There is a striking similarity between the manifesto, Fabianism and the Empire, and Rosebery's plea for efficiency in the departments of State, in commerce, industry, and education as enunciated in his Chesterfield speech and the Rectorial address to the Glasgow students. He preached the doctrine of the survival of the fittest

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1. Recollections, op.cit., p.78.
Ex. Hector Macpherson, The Real Lord Rosebery, Con.Rev., Mar. 1902, Vol.81. Develops the theory that, using the argument that trade follows the flag, Rosebery would keep the army and navy at the highest pitch of efficiency, not only for new markets, but to seek new ones by colonies. Thus commerce, Macpherson contends, which in the eyes of old pacific Liberalism was to be a uniting bond of peace and goodwill, becomes, with Jingo Liberalism, the harbinger of rivalry and bloodshed.
G.F.Chee , The Briton's first Duty, pp.xii-xiii: "I regard myself as a philosophic radical Liberal, aiming at the greatest measure of freedom for the individual that is compatible with the welfare and safety of the State, and at the advancement of the well-being - physical, moral, intellectual, and social - of the people. I wish also to see Britain strong and respected abroad...I have no desire that we should acquire ever more territory....But I would uphold our rights to act up to our treaty obligations at any cost of men and money...If I had to adopt the Shibboleth of party, I would call myself a Liberal Imperialist. I detest Jingoism and regard war as a most deplorable calamity...But I am convinced that the only way to attain peace is...to be fully prepared for war."

as one which obtained even more in peace than in war and if Britain were to survive she must not fight other nations with the bow and arrow.

In his famous Chesterfield speech, a speech that was more famous by virtue of its advance notices than on its merits, Rosebery found a national crisis existing in foreign relations, and he ventured to say that, "in the whole history of England there is no parallel to the hatred and ill-will with which we are regarded almost unanimously by the nations of Europe".[1.] His advice to the Liberal Party was "that they shall not dissociate themselves...from the new sentiment of Empire which pervades the nation." He deplored the "men who sit still with the fly-blown phylacteries bound round their obsolete policy, who do not remember that, while they have been mumbling their incantations to themselves, the world has been marching and revolving." Like Carlyle, like Treitschke and the other militants, Rosebery admired the "silent, concentrated, perpetual, and unbroken" efficiency of the Russian and Prussian military monarchies in preference to the disorganised methods of English governance of Empire.[2.]

Aside from sending men to search vainly in dictionaries to find out what "fly-blown phylacteries" might be, the effect of the speech was apparently negative. The combination of a paternal government, working in accordance with every modern implement of efficiency yet sterring clear of socialism, and an imperialist outlook that stopped short of aggressive nationalism, building only with the dubious structure of "a passion of affection and family feeling, of pride and hopefulness," aroused no enthusiasm.

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1. The Times, Dec.17, 1901.
2. See Glasgow Rectorial Address, The Times, Nov.17, 1900.

The party was to be Imperial, but not so much so as the Imperial Conservatives headed by Chamberlain. They were to be social reformers, but stopped short of Lloyd George's Radicalism. It was no time for a middle party: Chamberlain was too dynamic a character to combat with half measures. He asked and gave no quarter. Rosebery dallied: sometimes he seemed to aim at a Rosebery-Chamberlain combination at the head of a National Party.[1] Was his the mantle of Bright or Disraeli? None seemed certain. He was too inconstant in his political manoevres to lead the party of dissent successfully. When Lloyd George discovered that Rosebery had left Home Rule, land reforms, and others of the Welsh radical's dearest schemes, he left the Imperial movement forthwith to concentrate his bitterness on Mr Chamberlain. Moreover the bulk of Liberal opinion had been with Sir Henry. He, more than any other man, represented Liberal feeling of those times, and somehow the party sensed this and left control in his hands. With the passing of the war the factions re-coalesced and Chamberlain's tariff campaign completed the work of closing the ranks.

Such was the result of the rebellion within the Liberal ranks. How did Liberalism fare in its struggle with Conservatism? In regard to home policy, one might say that Liberalism was too hesitant. The mechanical ideas of Karl Marx could never be applied by a Liberal and so a thorough social policy of reform was impossible. Liberalism appears today to have been crushed between two millstones, socialism and imperialism, and has been left without any peculiar platform on which to appeal to the public.[2] There were two policies presented to the politics of

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1. Gardiner, op.cit., p.535.
2. For a prediction of this result see, E. Bruce Mitford, Liberalism and the Empire, Nat. Rev., Oct. 1912, vol.60.

early twentieth century Britain: social reform and racial imperialism; there were no middle roads. Whether Liberalism will again come back to a dominant position in British politics is a matter for the future. It would be strange and tragic if the Liberal spirit disappeared with its fine idealism. In regard to foreign policy and the British Empire, there are differences of opinion as to the victories and defeats of Liberalism that may well be left to the unfolding of the thesis.

Chapter II: The Necessity.

Great Britain and the World.

The End of Glorious Isolation.

A brief resume of British Foreign relations constitutes no digression from the study of British opinion on the Empire. Federation would never have been considered had there not been some great need for closer union of the Empire. There is rarely an article on the Empire which does not mention defence; there is rarely an article on defence which does not mention the Empire; and there is rarely mention of foreign relations without reference to those potential allies, the Dominions.

An authority on the British Empire tells us that, "Britain was perhaps the only one of the Great Powers that entered upon the new century without a feeling that Armageddon was looming up ahead."[1.] It is true that there were some optimists who would write that, "Europe now seems almost ripe for federation. Though asked to speak of war dangers, I feel bound rather to descant on peace prospects, and on the good time for Europe which I see coming."[2.] Mr Muir's expression is misleading, however, to that person who takes it to mean that England was feeling secure. It may be true that consciousness that war was inevitable had not penetrated to the man in the street and that British statesmen did not regard it as something that could not be avoided, Chamberlain, for example, planning an alliance with Germany in 1899.[3.] Yet it is not correct to believe that British statesmen did not

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1. Muir, The Expansion of Europe, p.201.
2. Emily Crawford, The United States of Europe, The Fort. Rev.,Dec. 1903, Vol.74.
3. Vide The Times,Dec.1, Dec.2, Ded.12, 1899. Haldane, Before the War, p.3: "In the course of history it has rarely been the case that any war that has broken out was really inevitable."

appreciate that the international situation was ever acute, that disaster many times loomed close and then receded, but steadily was becoming more and more grave. The history of the United Kingdom from 1895 at least bristled with diplomatic complications of the most serious nature, and there were few thinking men who regarded with equanimity the enormous growth in man-power and wealth of the Great Powers or the race for a place in the sun.

German writers had frequently stated the theory that only world states with an increasing population and vast colonies in which to accommodate the surplus could maintain pre-eminence among the Powers. Schmoller predicted that the German population would reach 150,000,000 in a century and a British writer observed that the Colonies to house them could only be got from the United Kingdom.[1] The slogan, "Be fruitful and multiply," was in the mouth of every statesman: the nation needed soldiers. When Sir Robert Giffen came to reflect on the most remarkable statistics of the century, he chose those indicating the prodigious national growth of the civilised world. The population of the United States was nearly 80 millions; of Russia, 135 millions; of Germany, about 55 millions; of Austria-Hungary, 45 millions; of France, 40 millions; of Italy, 32 millions; of Spain and Portugal, 25 millions, et cetera, so that a century ago the corresponding figure to a total of about 500 millions of population would not have been more than 170 millions. With the growth in wealth, equally startling, the order of power of the leading nations was the United States, Britain, Russia, Germany, and France a doubtful fifth.[2]

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1. Fred G. Shaw, The Empire's Salvation, esp.p.123 ff.
2. The Times, 18 Oct., 1900. To the Manchester Statistical Society.

If France were a doubtful fifth she did not intend to remain so. She hated Germany with a bitter hatred after 1870. It would not do that she should have a stationary population while Germany's man-power was increasing by leaps and bounds. There was just one way to get a balancing military force and that was by obtaining colonies. She already had established herself in North Africa by the acquisition of Algeria by 1848 and her eastern empire of Annam and Tonking had its beginning in the 18th century, while she possessed a few islands in the Pacific and West Indies and had the valuable island of Madagascar.[1.] She would organise her native forces to augment the military reserve and put up tariff walls to keep their resources for France. Such a policy roused British rivalry, and this particularly when France sought colonies in the same regions as where British interests lay. In Egypt a great bitterness arose that was not officially settled until 1904. In the Eastern Soudan, the Upper valley of the Nile, the Guinea Coast and its hinterland, France threatened to prejudice British activity. Madagascar, too, was the scene of conflict decided in 1885 for French supremacy.

Because Great Britain seemed to be the chief object thwarting her ambitions, France hated her with even more ardour than the conquerors of 1870. In 1886, while making two efforts to form an entente with Germany, France gave assurance that "the English are more abominated in France than the Germans had ever been."[2.] The Gladstone Government of 1892 consolidated the British position in Egypt, but Franch ambitions continued to plan for the extension of dominion into the upper Nile Valley. Great

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1. See Muir, op.cit. p.181ff.
2. W.H. Dawson, The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, ch.iii, p.245.

Britain, holding that she could not permit France to occupy the upper waters of adjoining territory and having spent men and money on the reconquest of the Soudan, promptly ejected Marchand, a French explorer, who had been commissioned by the French Government to undertake an expedition into Central Africa. War seemed imminent and French public opinion favored it.[1] In England the Liberal Imperialists - more, even the Liberals - frankly avowed their dislike for France and eagerness the avenge the times France had flouted Britain in China.[2] A British journalist observed that, "Never has the world been so full of gunpowder as it is just now, and the long-threatened explosion may burst at any moment."[3] But a settlement was arrived at, and after a period of acute hostility, the relations of France and Great Britain became more cordial, and the Nile Valley trouble was closed by a Declaration.[4]

Because of the unfriendly relations with France, and also because of the pan-Teutonic propaganda that held the nations to be bound together by deep-rooted affinities, an alliance between Great Britain and Germany was at moments not an improbability.[5] The years 1898-1901 were the years that finally determined the way these countries would go. From 1901 a case could be made out for a tendency against Germany with the Japanese Alliance that closed the Far Eastern Question; the French Alliance in 1904 that shut Germany out of Morocco; in 1907 Russia was won

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1. See Despatch of Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury, Jan. 13, 1899: British Docs. on the Origins of the War, Vol.1, p.199.
2. Halevy, op.cit., p.61.
3. Nat. Rev, Aug. 1898, Vol.31, pp.921-922.
4. C. 9054, 9055, 9134.
5. See Halevy, op.cit., p.45ff.

from Germany[1] Such expressions in the mouth of public men as, "Our future lies on the water," "The Trident must be in our hand," "Germany must re-enter into her heritage of maritime dominion once unchallenged in the hands of the old Hansa," "The Emperor of the Atlantic greets the Emperor of the Pacific," were dinning the truth of German ambitions into British ears.[2] While Bismarck had control the ambitions of Germany kept a sanity that could have maintained peace, but in the nineties the younger party of Imperialists, condemning peace as silly sentimentality, gained control to launch the Empire upon an Imperialist career of expansion. Towards German Colonial ambitions Britain was quite complacent at first, even helping in the obtaining of some East African possessions, but that complacency wore off after 1884.[3] Then there were her expansions elsewhere; the aggrandisement in Turkey where she established a virtual dictatorship and the seizure of Kiaochau as a base for further efforts.[4] The fact that Germany's colonial policy was such a costly failure did not conduce to a more cordial liking for Britain who had preempted the tempting areas. Moreover, the democratic British Government was anathema to Prussian Junkers and the industrial classes regarded Britain as their chief rival.

There were many incidents making for bad feeling. In 1896, after the Jameson raid, the British public was furiously roused by a telegram from the German Emperor congratulating Kruger on having defeated the enemy "without recourse to the aid of friendly Powers."[5] Germany supplied Transvaal with munitions

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1. Dibellius, op.cit., p.93.
2. Eyre Crow, Memo. on England and Germany, Jan.1, 1907, British Documents on the Origins of War, Vol.iii,p.405, Appendix A.
3. Muir, op.cit., p.168.
4. Ibid, p.173ff.
5. Ibid, p,196.

and concluded a treaty of friendly political and commercial relations with Orange Free State. There can be little doubt but that Germany would have gone to war to assist the Boers had her fleet been sufficiently strong.[1.] It was during the war that Count von Bulow made a plea for a larger navy, for, "In the coming century the German nation will be either the hammer or the anvil."[2.] The stopping of two German mail-steamers, suspected of carrying contraband in late 1899,[3.] the outbreaks of hostile public feeling in both countries, Britain's refusal to co-operate in the Bagdad Railway scheme, her concession of Samoa, described as blackmail by the National Review since the Kaiser refused to visit the Queen unless it was conceded, - these were some of the stumbling-blocks in the way of understanding.[4.] Germany was also angered by the Canadian preference to Great Britain and the consequent discontinuance of the most-favoured-nation treaties. Germany, by way of retaliation, continued most-favoured-nation treatment to the British Empire but excluded Canada. Canada imposed a surtax of 10% on any country that discriminated against her imports and finally Germany called a halt to the tariff war. In 1902 the shadow of impending war with Germany began to loom largely in men's minds. One writer stressed the need for a fleet in the North Sea sufficiently large to defeat "the whole German Navy."[5.] But

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1. M.de C. Findlay to Sir Edward Grey; Nov.12,1908: Telegram of Dr Leyds': "'That owing to the Naval Power of Great Britain the European Powers were unable to hold out any hope of intervention' ...I believe that an American spectator at a British Naval Review once remarked,'I guess this makes for peace.' No one at all conversant with the politics of the last twenty years can doubt that he correctly summed up the situation, past, present and future." Documents, op.cit.,Vol.vi,p.212.
2. The Times, Dec.12, 1899.
3. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy,op.cit.,p.279.
4. Sept.1900, Vol.36,p.1ff. The National Review conducted a constant tirade against the "European Bully" with his schemes for for world dominion. July 1905, Vol.45, p.749.
5. Spenser Wilkinson, Preparation for War, Nat. Rev. March 1902, Vol.39.

there was a general growing fear of German ambitions and the growth of the German Navy that contemporary British journalism reflected.[1.]

It was not for some time that British relations with Russia became any happier. The Russian Empire seemed to move irresistibly towards India and threatened to firmly establish themselves in Persia.[2.] The Russo-Japanese War threatened to involve Great Britain, and it was possible that either France or Germany might be found on the Russian side. The situation became electric when a fleet of British fishing boats were fired upon and three vessels sunk, while some men were killed and others wounded. British indignation was intense in both official and public minds, while the British ambassador thought war with England would be very popular in Russia.[3.] Fortunately Britain was mollified by a full apology and reparation so that her naval demonstration melted away.

The rivalry for colonies is a striking phenomenon of the closing quarter of the nineteenth century. As a result we have the following statistics :

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1. From numerous examples: MacColl, Russia, Germany, and Britain; A Warning and a Moral. The Fort. Rev., Jan. 1902, Vol.71. Sir Robert Giffen, The Times, Dec.18, 1902: "Germany is...our deadly rival and means an attack upon England at a convenient opportunity." Hurd, A.S., The British Fleet, Is it Sufficient and Efficient? p.51ff. pp.59-63. O.Eltzbacher, German Colonial Ambitions and Anglo-Saxon Interest, The Fort.Rev., March 1903, Vol. 73; Thos.B. Moddy, Our Position in the North Sea, Ibid, "Vates; The Policy of the German Emperor, ibid, April 1903, Robert Machray, Great Britain, Germany, and Sea Power, The 19th Cent., July 1905, Vol.58; Sir W.H.White, Is our Reserve of Warships Ample, 19th Cent., May 1905, Vol.57; Frank S.Russell, Is not Invasion Possible, ibid; Earl of Meath, Universal Military Training for Lads, Ibid. For the animosity of the Liberal Imperialists to Germany see Halevy, op.cit., p.132ff.
2. Memo. British Policy in Persia, British Documents, op.cit.,Vol. iv, p.365ff.
3. Ibid, p.5ff. Also Dispatch of Sir Chas. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne, 7 Nov. 1904, p.33ff.

Colonies in 1877.

	Area in Sq. Miles.	Pop.
Germany	None.	None.
France	247,642 ...	4,919,500.
United States.....	None	None

Colonies in 1899.

Germany	1,097,120	4,687,000
France	3,740,756	56,401,860
United States.....	172,292	10,238,586.[1]

In the Pacific France had acquired New Caledonia and the Marqueseas Islands.[2] Germany annexed the Bismarck archipelago and the north-east portion of New Guinea. Australia, with some fear of Germany, urged Britain to action and she annexed the south-east corner, the Dutch being in possession of the remainder of the island. The United States, making a brief excursus into official Imperialism, annexed Hawaii in 1898 and Germany and the United States divided Samoa between them. After the war with Spain, Porto Rico was annexed by the United Stated and the Micronesian possessions of Spain by Germany. The United States also got the Philippine Islands. As a result of this expansion, isolation until 1904 continued to be a creed regarding Britain as a European Power but not of Britain as a world Power. So the alliance with Japan in 1902 was an effort to settle colonial questions and avoid European entanglements.[3]

Japan's emergence as one of the leading Powers, after overthrowing China in 1894-95 and later defeating Russia, raised the cry of the 'Yellow Peril' and it seemed quite possible that she would force her way to areas of expansion. The only source of safety for Australia lay in the supremacy of the British fleet

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1. From Bruce, The Broad Stone of Empire, Vol.1, p.177.
2. See Muir, op.cit., p.177ff.
3. Lillian M. Penson, The Colonial Background of British Foreign Policy, p.43.

and the maintenance of close relations with the Mother country. These conditions were brought forward with great emphasis at the conference of 1902. Major-General Hutton, in a Minute on the Defence of Australia, wrote that, "It must be remembered that the rapid and continuous improvements in steam and telegraph communications have destroyed the former isolation of Australia, and modern developments in the East have brought the states of the Commonwealth upon the arena of the Old World strife. The last six years have witnessed a momentous change in the balance of power in the East. The rise of Japan into an armed Power of the first magnitude; the acquisition of Port Arthur by Russia; the occupation of the Philippines, and of Guam (Ladrone Island) and Tutuila (Samoa) by the United States; and of the remaining Samoan Islands and part of New Guinea by Germany; and the annexation of Madagascar as a colony by France, are facts of the gravest significance to Australian interests. The transformation of the United States into an oversea Power by her acquisition of Porto Rico and the Philippines, the development of Japan, the evolution of China, the opening of a Panama Canal at an early date, and the movement of Russia towards a port in the Indian Ocean with her increasing interest in Persia, all point to the Indian Ocean, the Northern Pacific, and the China Sea as the probable scene of the future struggle for commercial supremacy."[1.]

The Boer War had revealed in amazing fashion the hostility of Europe to Great Britain. England appeared as a great bully, and the little States of Europe, as well as the more regularly hostile Great Powers, joined in condemnation.[2.] Russia, France,

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1. Cd. 1299, Minute dated 7th April,1902, p.64ff. Appendix V., enclosure 3.
2. See Demetrius C. Boulger, England and the Little States, 19th Cent.,June 1902, Vol.51. Also British Documents on the Origins of the War, Vol.1, p.211, pp.239-240.

and Germany were gleeful with every British defeat: an Empire which could not make war on a village! The Empire was revealed with feet of clay and ready to be knocked out of the way. It was clear to every Englishman that the Boers would not have been so defiant had they not been relying on German assistance, and there was the prospect of a European combination against the British Empire.[1.]

It was a great blow to Britain to find her military forces flouted by a handful of Dutch rebels forces sent out to the merry singing of "We'll take the lion's muzzle off and let him have a go!"[2,] but what would have been the result had any European ally been found by the Boers? "It is humiliating," said the Duke of Argyll, "to have to ask the question and contemplate the inevitable answer."[3.] Alarmed publicists saw dangers of, not only a loss of South Africa and the men and money there, but a European League, a rising in Egypt, insurrection in India, partition of China, a French protectorate established over Morocco, and the Russification of Persia, dangers many of which may be considered largely imaginary now, but certainly appearing real enough at the time.[4.] There was certainly the truth that the Great Powers took advantage of the fact that Britain was too quite pre-occupied to pursue their policies of expansion.[5.]

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1. Sir E. Monson, to the Marquess of Salisbury, Oct.1,1899, "The favourite theme is, however, the prospect of a combination of the European Powers in favour of the Boers; a prospect which, it is considered, the hostility of the German and Russian Press to England shows to be something neither visionary nor impracticable." Ibid, p.233.
2. Wingfield-Stratford, op.cit., p.1206.
3. Argyll, National Defence - A Civilian's Impression, 19th Cent., July 1905, Vol.58.
4. Sir Harry H. Johnston, Problems of Empire, 19th Cent., May 1902, Vol.51.
5. Halevy, op.cit. p.111.

Lord Rosebery declaimed fearfully, "When I think of this little island of ours, so lonely in these northern seas, viewed with such jealousy, with such hostility, with such jarred ambition by the great empires of the world, so friendless among nations which count their armies by embattled millions, when I think of this little island, of the work which it has undertaken, I say with Chatham, 'Be one people, forget everything for the public.'"[1.]

Now what was the effect of the expansion and hostility of Europe on British opinion on the Empire and more particularly on the great Dominions? It meant the end of British isolation: she must protect her world interests which expanding nations were everywhere touching. Australia could be a tower of strength to British position in the East and, more than this, it appeared that the possession of India by Britain had become a vital question for Australia and perhaps for South Africa as a bulwark against the Imperialism of other Powers.[2.] It was clear that, "The Colonial Empire of Great Britain occupies the best strategic positions in nearly every quarter of the world, and the possession of any portion of it by a foreign Power could be a constant menace to the safety of its other parts,"[3.] Britain's fleet must be strengthened, her War Office, revealed as hopelessly antiquated, must be set in order, and she must be ready to do battle for her Empire. Reserve man-power was needed for the Army and Navy. Imperial partnership was the logical, the only solution. The British Army might be pitifully weak with those of France, Germany, or Russia, "Powers with any one of which, conceivably with all of which, we may find

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1. The Times, Oct. 28, 1899.
2. Lieut.-Gen. Sir Andrew Clarke, Our Naval Position in the South Seas, 19th Cent., Jan. 1902, Vol.51.
3. Arthur Silva White, Britannic Confederation, p.xiv.

ourselves at war at any moment," but the British Empire occupied a fifth of the habitable world and the Queen's subjects numbered 387,013,954.[1.] The population of the United Kingdom had only increased at a rate of 26% from 1871 to 1897, but British North America boasted a 41% increase and Australasia 126%.[2.] Fearful souls might tremble lest the decline of natality result in Britain becoming one of the little nations or at any rate falling into the second class;[3.] they had not reckoned with the Britains overseas. "About one quarter of the white population of the British Empire", said Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, "Dwells in the King's oversea dominions. This cannot but make our internation position intrinsically strong as well as externally imposing."[4.] "Canada is upon the threshold of unlimited development," declared another Imperialist. "That she must become one of the greatest lands in the world we know. The question is whether she is to be British or not, and let us not doubt that in the Dominion the fate of the Empire as a whole will be decided."[5.] In the United Kingdom, declared Chamberlain, "There are some forthy millions of us. Outside, there are more than ten millions either directly descended from ancestry who left this country, or persons who themselves in their youth, left this country in order to find their fortunes in our possessions abroad. Now how long do you suppose that this proportion of the population is going to endure? How long are we going to be four times as many as our kinsfolk abroad? I want you to look forward. I want you to consider the infinite

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1. Lilly, The Burden of Empire, The Fort. Rev., Oct.1900, Vol.68.
2. Giffen, Economic Inquiries and Studies, Vol.ii, p.226.
3. Edwin Cannan, The Recent Decline of Natality in Great Britain, Fort. Rev., Mar. 1902, Vol.71.
4. Bridge, The Possibilities of Colonial Naval Co-operation, Nat. Rev., June, 1909.
5. The Economics of Empire, Nat. Rev., Dec. 1903, Vol.42, p.60.

importance of this, not only to yourselves but to your descendants. Now is the time when you can exert your influence. Do you wish that, if these ten millions become forty millions, they shall still be closely, intimately, affectionately, united to you? Or do you contemplate the possibility of their being separated, going off each in his own direction under a separate flag?"[1.] Britain was brought to see that she was facing in Europe an armed camp, while she had a great Empire awaiting organisation, resources untapped in her self-governing Colonies, and that her foreign policy, her military organisation, and her opinion on the Dominions and Empire generally must be considered inseparable parts of the same plan of campaign. As Kipling spoke after the Boer War, "We have had an Imperial Lesson: it will make us an Empire yet."[2.] Chamberlain realised that foreign relations, the British Empire, and the social and commercial well-being of the United Kingdom could all be made one and the same cause. The absence of Salisbury in the South of France would give him an unusual opportunity to exert his great personal power and elevate the influence of his office of Colonial Secretary. At any rate, England could not stand alone and lead the world. Could she even stand alone and survive?

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1. Boyd, Speeches, pp.130-131. Vide J. L. Garvin, The Compulsion of Empire, Nat. Rev., May 1906, Vol.47.
2. The Lesson, 1899-1902. Also his warning on preparedness in "The Islanders".

The Doctrine of National Self-sufficiency.

Criticised by its opponents as "Setting Back the Clock of Empire,"[1] reverting to the dogmas of "Colbertism,"[2] and labelled by a modern writer as "mercantilism, for that...was its essential nature",[3] the doctrine of national self-sufficiency was of a piece with the general mania for regimentation, a desperate effort for security in a world where fear was dictating the policies of nations. Colonies would provide men for armies, room for expansion and the settling of surplus population, a safe investment for capital, and would satisfy the national egoism, act as a tonic to keep the ideals of the nation young, and keep it an aggressive force in the determination of world destinies. Probably never had business and politics so close a connection.[4]

Chamberlain, on succeeding to the Colonial Office, determined to put the Empire on "a business footing". Max Beerbohm drew a cartoon which depicts him as "a veritable Lord of the Philistines," catching Austin Dobson and Edmund Gosse, then at the Board of Trade, in the crime of composing poetry during business hours.[5] With his passion for organising - and his genius - Chamberlain was shocked to discover that there were cases "of colonies which have been British colonies perhaps for more than a hundred years, in which up to the present time British rule has done absolutely nothing, and if we left them today we should leave them in the same conditions as that in which we found them."[6]

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1. Diplomaticus, Fort. Rev., July 1903, Vol.74.
2. "Mr Chamberlain's ideal of an exclusive and self-sufficing empire....is plainly a reversion to the old protectionist system." C.B. Roylance Kent, The Fiscal Question, Macmillan's Mag., Sept. 1903, Vol.88.
3. James A. Williamson, A Short History of British Expansion, p.228.
4. See Halevy, A History of the English People, p.12ff.
5. Wingfield-Stratford, op.cit., p.1183.
6. H.C. Debs, 22.8.1895, Vol.36, pp.641-642.

He explained, "I regard many of our colonies as being in the condition of undeveloped estates and estates which can never be developed without Imperial assistance."[1] He therefore proceeded to study methods of developing their resources, to educate private enterprise, to invest government money in railways, and to investigate means of combating the pests and fevers of the tropical regions.[2] Lord Milner's efforts to apply his chief's principles in South Africs had much to do with his unpopularity among the conservative Dutch population.[3]

The self-governing Colonies could not be treated in such arbitrary fashion as the uncivilised areas constituting "the White Man's Burden" and were consequently not so readily organised or valuable in just the same manner. It is significant, however, that the movement to federate the Empire could be held to find its origin in the American Civil War, when there was a sudden stoppage of supplies to Great Britain which might have been furnished by the colonies had federalistic unity been developed in the British Empire.[4] However, too much weight should not be attached to the theory, for the movement can be more securely traced to other cayses, as can the effort at Imperial self-sufficiency. One writer has related that, "After 1870, with the new commercial revolution created by the railways came the imperial

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1. H.C. Debs. 22.8.1895, Vol.36, p.641.
2. L.C.A. Knowles, Industrial and Commercial Revolutions of the 19th Century, p.341ff; Knowles, Overseas Empire, Vol.i,p.119ff; p.138ff; Williamson, op.cit., p.225ff.
3. Egerton, British Colonial Policy in the 20th Century, p.9.
4. A.H.Snow, Neutralisation versus Imperialism, Am.Journ. Int. Law, July 1908, Vol.2. p.567. Hall, British Commonwealth of Nations, p.60 mentions the American Civil War as a contributing factor, as does Bodelsen, op.cit., p.85 but there is no emphasis in either case.

stage in which there is a growing inter-Empire specialization, Canada producing wheat, Australia wool, India tea and jute, and England making the bulk of the engineering goods for the Empire."[1.]

There was a genuine echo of the days of the first British Empire in the suggestion that the colonies should provide all the necessary food and raw materials to render the United Kingdom invulnerable against tariff or military war. It was noted with alarm that, "With the exception of coal there is no primary material of our staple industries in respect of which we are perfectly self-dependent; and our coals supplies are becoming steadily exhausted....Our Lancashire mills are many of them on half-time owing to a cotton corner in New Orleans. Our copper manufacturers have had a similar corner hanging over them for months past. It is, in short, by a wholesale capture of the raw materials of every staple industry that American trusts hope to establish world-wide monopolies."[2.] There was even the danger of some day there not being enough raw materials to go round, since foreign supplies were reaching their limits, and, except for the United States and Russia, Britain was the only Power able to safeguard against such an eventuality.[3.]

With the exodus from rural Britain and the growing militancy of Europe, the question of food supply became particularly urgent.[4.] "The Colonies," it was said, "have become the agricultural department of the British Empire,"[5.] but the idea was very old by 1903, the time of that utterance.[6.] Why depend on the

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1. Knowles, Economic Development of the Overseas Empire, p.28.
2. A Self-Sustaining Empire, Blackwoods Mag., July 1903, Vol.174.
3. Ibid.
4. John B.C. Kershaw, Trade and Empire, p.53ff; p.69ff.
5. Asst. Editor, The Economics of Empire, Nat. Rev., Supp., Dec. 1903, Vo.42. p.57.
6. See R.G. Webster, England's Colonial Granaries, R.C.I. , Nov. 1881, Vol.13.

United States for food, it was argued, when "Canada can supply us with all the wheat we want?"[1] Such opinion would, naturally, be pleasing to Canada, and in 1897 the British Empire League in Canada recommended that, "as a guarantee of the general safety of the Empire, vigorous steps should at once be taken to provide that the British food supply should be grown within the Empire."[2] The idea was attractively and forcefully presented by the Canadian wheat arch at Whitehall, on the occasion of the Coronation of King Edward, which proclaimed, "Canada, the granary of the Empire."

The question of food supply in time of war became more acute as Britain's sea supremacy for the future became less assured. The Navy League issued a circular which pointed out that, although during the Napoleonic and Crimean wars Britain had possessed full command of the sea, the price of wheat rose enormously. At the time of the Crimean War the mother country was almost self-supporting, but now four fifths of the wheat supply was imported, chiefly from the United States. The price could be raised artificially and, in the event of a European War, it was probable that it would be so raised. When further raised by profiteering and the sinking of ships, the prices would become well-nigh prohibitive.[3] If the situation should this be dangerous when Britain exercised full control over the sea, what would it be like when that control should be seriously challenged?[4] The argument that in war the

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1. Fred G. Shaw, The Empire's Salvation: A Sound Fiscal Policy, p.35.
2. The Naval Question in Canada, The Times, May 24, 1909, Empire Day Supp.
3. Shaw, op.cit., p.34.
4. L.H. Hordern, The Colonies and the Navy at the Conference. Un. Serv. Mag., Dec. 1902, Vol.26. Sir Geo. S. Clarke, War, Trade, and Food Supply, Nat.Rev., July 1897, Vol.39. "Preparation", letter to The Times, Feb.6, 1902.

United Kingdom would have only a week's supply of wheat led to the proposal to create a reserve supply by national granaries.[1.]

The suggestion found endorsement in the House of Commons, advocated by Mr Seton-Karr, who had brought it before the House in 1897 and 1899 and who associated it with a preferential duty in favour of the colonies.[2.] He pointed out that in the event of war Germany had sufficient supplies so that with proper management she need not import, while Russia, France, and the United States appeared to be in similar happy conditions.[3.] He gained some support, but Sir William Harcourt ridiculed the idea of creating surplus granaries.[4.] If corn were procured in time of war from Canada in British ships, it would be at greater risk than if it were procured from the United States, because it would be belligerent cargo, whereas if it came from the United States to Belgium, France, or some other neutral country, it would be neutral cargo going to a neutral port, and it would not be at any risk until it got to a neutral port, within a few miles of British shores, and an effort was then made for transhipment to its destination. If it came from Canada it would be belligerent cargo and was liable to capture over the whole of the Atlantic.[5.] He maintained that this extra wheat would cost a higher price and, moreover, after the Boer War, he thought the nation would have an earnest desire for peace. What an enormous loss the nation would incur by keeping vast stores of wheat locked up for fifty years or more awaiting a war! Mr Gerald Balfour spoke lengthily against the

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1. R.B. Marston, Our Urgent Need of a Reserve of Wheat, 19th Cent., Vol. 43, June 1898. War Famine, and our Food Supply.
2. H.C., 27 Jan. 1902. Vol.101, p.1077ff.
3. Ibid, p.1081.
4. Ibid, Jan.28, 1902.
5. Ibid, p.1134.

proposal, but Mr Chaplin supported it, pointing out the danger involved if command of the sea be lost for even a short period.

There were other ways in which the self-governing Colonies could help to make the Empire self-contained: they had vast areas to support millions of population; why should not the capitalist make safe investments of his money in the mines, railways, timber, fisheries, or farms of the great colonies, opening them up to immigration from the British Isles? Surely there was something wrong with a system under which between 1870 and 1890 only 1,250,000 of English stock emigrated to the colonies while 3,000,000 went to the United States.[1] It was obvious that the larger the overseas population of English stock, the greater would be the security of the Empire. It became an argument for protection that it would increase the dominions in population and wealth,[2] and was urged many times by Chamberlain. As one exponent of protection put it, such a policy of Imperial Preference as was advocated "would build up the population of the colonies and provide the reserves upon which we may draw for the <u>personnel</u> of our army and navy in years to come".[3]

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1. Alleyne Ireland, Tropical Colonisation, pp.14-16.
2. "Fair Trade", Retaliation and Preference, Nat. Rev., Nov. 1904, Vol.44. J.L. Maxse, The Compatriots' Club, The Times, Dec. 10, 1904.
3. Kershaw, op.cit., p.58. Also Asst. Editor, "The Economics of Empire", Nat. Rev., Sept. 1903, Vol.42.

The most extravagant prophecies of the growth of colonial population were made on every hand. Laurier's prediction that the twentieth century belonged to Canada in the same sense that the preceding one had belonged to the United States, was seized upon as a basis for the further prediction that Canada's population would increase even as that of the United States had increased. "What we require as a working basis for the defence of the Empire," said Amery, "is at least a hundred million white men, of whom half should be distributed along the actual frontier of the Empire in Canada, or in those nearer reserve positions for the Indian frontier which are supplied by South Africa and Australasia,"[1.] and he continually urged the prequisite development of the Dominions in industry and population. If the resources of the Dominions were developed, said Mr Hurd, there would be no need of European entanglements. In twenty years time, "We shall have on our side the balance of wealth, the balance of man-power, and the balance of armaments, united by the seas."[2.] England should stop "malingering in Europe" and so develop her colonies that she would find in an imperial partnership her salvation.[3.] Punch drew a cartoon showing a ball room: The Czar Nicholas dances with Madame France, Emperor William, fully armed, leans against the door-post, but Britannia dances with her Colonies. The words written underneath are: Britannia: "After all, my dear, we needn't trouble ourselves about the others." Colonies: "No, we can always dance together, you and I."[4.] "A self-sustaining

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1. L.S. Amery, Nat. Def., May 1909; meeting of the National Defence Association. The Defence Problem from the Imperial Standpoint.
2. Archibald Hurd, Imperial Policy and Foreign Relations, Fort. Rev., July 1912, Vol. 92.
3. Geo. Peel, in The Future of England, advances this thesis.
4. ,Punch, 25 Dec. 1901.

empire is indeed what we want, and must strive after," said a contributor to Blackwoods' Magazine. "It will do everything for us we need - consolidate the empire politically and commercially, develop the colonies, give us markets of our own for our surplus manufactures on which we can always rely, render us independent of foreign Governments, and enable us to snap our fingers at foreign tariffs."[1] "The ideal of a self-sustaining Empire may be unattainable", said Mr Jebb, "but the nearer we approach to it the less will be the difficulty of maintaining a joint foreign policy and a joint defence policy."[2]

Churchill expressed the view of the opposition to this policy rather well. He said, "We do not want to see the British Empire degenerate into a sullen confederacy, walled off, like a medieval town, from the surrounding country; victualled for a siege, and containing within the circle of its battlements all that is necessary for war." That way, he believed, lies war. On the other hand, "by being dependent on others they become dependent on us."[3]

Foreign Competition in Trade and Commerce.

By the grace of the Industrial Revolution which gave her a tremendous start on her competitors and by the adoption of Free Trade, a policy eminently suitable to an industrial country in a world where other nations were only able to flourish by exporting raw materials, Great Britain had established herself as the centre of the world's factories and gained the carrying trade from all rivals. The depression of 1886 brought the bitter realisation

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1. A Self-Sustaining Empire, July 1903, Vol.174.
2. R. Jebb, Twelve Months of Imperial Evolution.
3. Churchill, Speeches, For Free Trade, pp. 115-116.

that this pre-eminence no longer had its happy security. Not only in a political sense but economically as well the United Kingdom was being forced to fight for existence with a grave possibility of being outstripped. Mr Hewins records, "The key to the political developments of the last forty years is to be found in economic policy."[1] "The war of the future will be an economic war", said the wise Bismarck, "May my successor always bear this in mind, and always take care that Germany will be prepared when this battle has to be fought."[2] Preparation had consisted in the adoption in 1875 of high customs tariffs, and in 1886 France followed her example. England alone was left with Free Trade.

To these tariffs which protected infant industries, and to the great trusts, cartels, bounties and subsidies may largely be attributed the source of the 1931 "crisis" in British finance and industry. The system under which British prosperity had been built up required that the United Kingdom import the larger part of her food and vast quantities of raw materials. She paid for these by the export of coal and manufactured goods and also with the income from invested capital. It was the last source of income that led Mr Halevy to assume a false security when he noted that, since the income from foreign investments was about 100 millions of pounds, and that consequently Britain could afford to import far more than she exported.[3] If Britain could not sell enough of her own exports, or if her foreign income from other sources declined, the difficulty of paying for her imports would be correspondingly increased. By 1896 so

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1. W.A.S. Hewins, Apologia of an Imperialist, Vol.i. p.1.
2. Quoted, Geo. Peel, The Future of England, p.134.
3. Halevy, op.cit., p.14.

serious was Britain's decline from her relative position as exporter that men were explaining "Why Germany beat us."[1] More and more it became necessary for her to pay for the imports of raw materials and food out of her invested capital. Other nations first shut Britain out of their markets and then grew aggressive and usurped British markets abroad. There are two axioms in national trade: The first is that the imports must not greatly exceed the exports. The second is that the exports must not greatly exceed the imports. Britain has taught us the former, the United States the latter.

Friedrich List explained that by the duties of the Zollverein Germany had advanced "in prosperity and industry, in national self-respect and in national power, in the course of ten years as much as in a century."[2] He recommended national paternalism for infant industries to other nations and prophesied that the United States would outstrip England as she had outstripped Holland.[3] English writers were not slow to take up his teachings, and Benjamin Kidd taught the doctrine of the Zollverein as expanding the area of free trade by incorporating territory in an ever-widening circle within which industry was humanitarian and controlled.[4]

In 1903 Balfour emphasised the long period of "growing uneasiness as to the condition of British trade in its relation to the trade of the world."[5] Such statements as that attributed to the President of the American Bankers' Association: "We hold three of the winning cards in the game for commercial greatness, to wit: iron, steel, and coal. We have long been the granary of

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1. E.E. Williams, Made in Germany, p.140; p.144; and passim.
2. List, The National System of Political Economy, p.389.
3. Ibid, pp.423-424.
4. Kidd, The Larger Basis of Colonial Preference, 19th cent. Jan. 1904, Vol.5.
5. At Sheffield, Oct.1, 1903.

the world, we now aspire to be its workshop, then we want to be its Clearing House."[1] The American aspiration to be the world's workshop was not injustified optimism. The Board of Trade Journal was constantly informing its readers of American progress. American tools were gaining great popularity in Europe.[2] His Majesty's Consul at La Rochelle reported that the sale of British made goods was still diminishing and that in agricultural machinery "where England had it all her own way some years ago, America is fast taking the business away from her, and probably got more than half of it in 1898."[3] Again and again there are reports of British failures to secure large contracts and her losses in territories where she once was supreme.[4] The large subsidies given by America and other countries to shipping put the unsubsidized British ships at grave disadvantage, and the meeting of the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom passed a resolution to call the attention of the Government to the serious injury which had been, and was likely to be, incurred by British shipping in consequence of the coastwise laws of the United States applied to territories recently acquired by that Government.[5] Russia, too, had defined commerce between her European ports and her Far Eastern possessions to be coasting trade. On the other hand there was nothing to prevent a foreign vessel loading in the United Kingdom for any British colony; in fact, it was alleged that they were doing it regularly and they were enabled to take much less freight by reason of their bounties, which allowed them to make a very handsome profit while British ships could hardly pay their way,

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1. Quoted, J.A. Hobson, The Approaching Abandonment of Free Trade, Fort.Rev., Mar. 1902, Vol.71.
2. Board of Trade Journal, Mar. 1898, Vol.24. p.283.
3. Ibid, May 1899, Vol.26, pp.605-606.
4. Ibid, Jan. 1900, Vol.28, p.78-81 ex.
5. The Times, Feb. 6, 1902.

way,[1] a statement unduly pessimistic. It could still be said that, "If we exported nothing, the services of our ships('our invisible exports') would pay for imports to the amount of £70,000 and rank us at once as a second-rate trading power with only France, Germany, the United States, Holland, Belgium, and Austria ahead."[2] The purchase of the Leyland Line by Pierpont Morgan brought some fear to British shipping lest their shipowners be coerced either into selling or entering a ruinous competition.[3]

German competition was quite as strenuous as that of the United States and it was noted in Britain that the Prussian Agricultural Party would not be adverse to a commercial war with England.[4] To give a few examples of the competition: The British Consul at Barcelona, commenting on the falling-off of the demand for British manufactures, as in carpets where the falling-off reached 90%, attributed it to the enormous German competition as well as to the progress in local manufacturing.[5] Victor Berard, in his book "British Imperialism and Commercial Supremacy", made much of the German system of canals which promised to do for Germany what railways did for England. Hamburg would become the centre of the Germanic world, "the great port of Central Europe, The Venice of the North." In the North Sea and the Baltic

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1. E.J. Dillon, The Commercial Needs of the Empire, Con.Rev., Apr. 1902, Vol.81. See also "Yolet Capel", England's Peril, West. Rev., Feb. 1902, Vol.157.
2. A.L. Bowley, England's Foreign Trade in the Nineteenth Century, 1893, p.116.
3. W. Wetherell, American Millionaires and British Shipping, Fort. Rev., Mar. 1902, Vol.71.
4. Ogniben, The United States of Imperial Britain, Con.Rev., Mar. 1902, Vol.81.
5. Board of Trade Journ. Aug. 1899, Vol.27, p.208.

Bremen and Stettin would assume kindred subordinate positions. Germans were pushing into Asia; Vladivostok was a German port; India and Burmah were being assailed; as to the Suez Canal, Germany occupied the next place after England. "And on the accomplishment of this evolution what will become of the forsaken entrepots of London and Liverpool?"[1] The Rhine from Mannheim to Rotterdam was almost an uninterrupted line of docks and wharves.

Westphalian coal output was showing a vast increase. It was true that the output of coal from the United Kingdom increased during the years 1875 to 1912 from 133,000,000 tons to 264,000,000 tons, almost 100%. but the relative output, the percentage of the world's output, had declined from 48% to 23%.[2] German glass, steel, earthenware, and china were in great demand. Men might satisfy themselves that in shipbuilding Britain still led the world,[3] but the Board of Trade Journal could note that German shipbuilders had on hand a large number of orders for both men-of-war and merchant vessels, "largely for foreign countries. This remarkable development of German shipbuilding in the last few years," said the Journal, "has shown that the German industry is now quite on a par with its English rival, and whereas, formerly, England was the only builder of men-of-war, Germany now takes a considerable share, and is steadily winning a sure footing all over the world....Since the year 1895 German yards have delivered no less than 24 men-of-war for foreign navies... and besides this, there are now in hand 22 other vessels."[4]

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1. British Imperialism and Commercial Supremacy, pp.123-124.
2. L. G. Chiozza Money, Things that Matter, p.286ff.
3. Halevy, op.cit., p.339.
4. Oct. 1898, Vol.25, p.416.

It was sufficiently humiliating that Great Britain should be ousted from her proud commercial position in the markets of the world; it was doubly so when that invasion threatened to defeat the mother country within the very boundaries of her Empire. To take a few excerpts, we read of an American steel company closing a contract to furnish 30,000 tons of steel rails for Melbourne, Australia. A Pittsburg company receives a large contract for steel cyanide tanks from a Johannesburg company.[1.] A Cincinnati firm sends three carloads of machinery to India. An American Company secures the contract for a great viaduct over the Gokteik gorge in Burma, the bridge to be one of the largest in the world:....The Baldwin Locomotive Works, who turned out 28% more locomotives than the combined turnout of the four leading English firms,[2.] books an order for 36 narrow-gauge freight engines for the Uganda Railway in Africa.[3.] The steelmakers of Pennsylvania could underbid those of England for the rails and other supplies of the London underground railway, and they could place an order for 8,000 steel rails with the British East India Government.[4.] These are a few of those statistics that a pessimist could use as straws to show generally the way the wind was blowing.

In appreciation of this adverse tendency of trade within the Empire itself, upon his accession to office Chamberlain addressed a letter to the Governors of the Colonies requesting that they investigate thoroughly the extent to which foreign imports were displacing similar British goods and suggest the causes for

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1. The Board of Trade Journal, Feb.1899, Vol.26, p.229.
2. Ibid, Jan. 1900, Vol.28, pp.78-81: viz. - Neilson, Dubs, Sharp Stewart, and Kitson.
3. Ibid, June 1899, Vol.26, pp.641-642.
4. Ibid, Mar.1898, Vol.24, p.282.

such displacement.[1] His despatch required only the return of those articles of which the total importation in each Colony was substantial, that is, not less than 500L., and of which at the same time the foreign importation exceeded 5% of the total importation of the commodity. In consequence, the figures do not afford a perfectly sure basis for generalisation. In some cases they include commodities that are omitted in other years, the returns from the Gold Coast, for example, including in 1884 a large quantity of foreign spirit which is not calculated in other years.[2] The reports which accompanied the returns revealed a general opinion in the Colonies that the importation of foreign-made goods had increased in a much larger ratio than was shown in the returns and in particular classes of goods the foreigner was discovered to have more than 50% of a trade which a few years before had been dominated by the British. Outstanding examples included :

Cape Colony, where in carriages and waggons the United States had increased trade about 20% in the period under review (i.e., 1884-1894.)to gain over 50% of the trade. Straits Settlements, where Germany had increased her trade in biscuits and bread five-fold and now had over 50% of the trade. In Hong Kong Germany had increased her trade in yellow metal to obtain 50% of the whole. The United States had 8% of the trade in hammers in Victoria. With Germany she divided two thirds of the trade in implements in Tasmania. Germany had almost obtained a monopoly of the trade in musical instruments in New Zealand. There were cases where the British competitor had been practically

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1. Nov. 28, 1895, C.8449, 1897, p.16.
2. Ibid, p.3.

Year	Coll. Imports From			
	U. K.	Br. Possessions.	For. Countries.	Total Imports.
1883	65,409,431	38,792,372	35,800,895	140,002,698
1884	63,192,030	39,200,520	35,633,701	138,026,251
1885	59,473,814	39,256,638	37,038,169	135,768,621
Average	62,691,758	39,083,173	36,157,588	137,599,190
1888	58,864,266	44,111,188	36,850,608	139,826,062
1889	64,454,681	50,475,555	37,356,828	152,287,064
1890	60,059,488	48,269,167	39,742,573	148,071,228
Average	61,126,145	47,618,637	37,983,336	146,728,118
1893	56,244,841	43,179,573	39,932,288	139,356,702
1894	53,719,040	42,045,256	44,040,049	139,804,345
1895	59,565,217	43,274,027	44,060,038	146,899,282
Average	56,509,699	42,832,952	42,677,458	142,020,110

Amount of Trade under discussion.

Country	1884		1889		1894	
	Total value affected.	For. Imports.	Total value affected.	For. Imports	Total Value affected.	For. Imports.
Can.	13,709,417	6,610,917	14,298,579	7,099,740	13,739,332	7,434,507
Newfld.	1,093,075	423,617	877,362	312,468	966,963	208,575
Bermuda	138,371	95,092	155,627	107,123	158,616	105,190
Bahamas	61,642	51,360	69,899	58,707	68,865	58,588
Brit.Honduras	204,716	90,142	206,376	93,046	160,371	84,797
Jamaica	1,884,052	726,823	1,411,551	466,159	1,422,039	388,602
Leeward Is.	275,985	93,435	251,993	84,681	226,200	76,193
Windward Is.	103,304	43,708	83,492	26,966	93,352	35,871
Barbados	567,344	389,323	599,858	384,791	776,890	518,843
Trinidad	930,837	367,804	723,518	280,119	894,084	345,921
Br.Guiana	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gold Coast	427,842	246,126	219,552	70,274	571,692	157,167
Lagos	189,915	144,094	153,435	107,120	579,418	197,610
Sierra Leone	101,726	42,851	82,747	40,074	170,046	48,802
Gambia	102,944	28,669	75,571	22,721	80,685	27,398
Cape of Good Hope	395,280	61,551	795,617	150,018	2,287,027	438,486
Natal	170,125	31,141	1,518,122	204,713	654,997	120,266
Mauritius	2,469,293	771,942	-	-	2,014,771	405,747
Ceylon	129,609	2,340	126,472	20,521	158,458	28,608
Straits Settlemt.	4,957,148	1,378,699	7,631,430	1,779,177	5,111,009	2,245,129
Hong Kong	-	-	-	-	-	-
N.S.Wales	16,038,845	1,682,972	14,602,415	2,158,608	9,112,476	1,133,781
Victoria	6,691,941	526,069	9,379,679	1,048,003	4,111,459	517,233
S. Australia	2,244,795	188,813	1,845,070	138,852	1,813,070	209,944
Queensland	461,660	40,704	1,037,910	147,302	632,657	83,934
W. Australia	15,591	12,019	46,344	18,183	147,081	75,572
Tasmania	1,656,117	-	1,611,035	-	1,094,457	-
New Zealand	2,247,611	197,177	1,695,299	228,313	1,784,773	262,065
Fiji	-	-	-	-	132,526	17,244
Malta	605,273	418,576	741,709	574,038	800,760	589,625
Cyprus	188,838	120,122	149,587	95,304	148,298	100,124
India	7,395,180	1,718,810	11,367,110	3,141,950	11,695,540	4,279,230

forced from the field by the foreigner as in Hong Kong in the wire trade, or in Malta where in wrought iron the British trade was entirely lost to Belgium. Despite the fact that the tables are tricky they do show that, while the total imports of the Colonies increased in the decade by about 1%, the foreign imports had an approximate increase of 20%. The proportion of foreign to total importation in goods subject to competition varied from about 8%, as in Victoria and Queensland, to more than 80% to 50% for Canada at that period of 80% for West Australia or the Bahamas.[1] In some colonies there was a tendency for the foreigner to lose ground, but in the great colonies - Canada and Australasia - the foreign importer made steady progress. The following table showed the aggregate value of the trade represented by the returns, excluding that for India :-

Goods in which foreigners compete.[2]

	1884	1889	1894
Value of imports from all sources:	58,063,296.	56,490,249.	49,911,872
" " "from foreign countries:	14,926,086.	15,717,021.	15,912,822
Percentage of foreign imports:	25.71.	27.82.	31.88.

It was mentioned that the figures might suggest that foreign traders were not so much cutting into British trade as getting the greater part of the annual increase of the Empire's trade,[3] a deduction hardly borne out by the tables.[4] It is true, however, that in certain goods Britain was ousting the foreigner. The French make of Sucatoon cloth had been practically driven from the market by the English in Gambia,[5] and the latter had

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1. Nov. 28, 1895, C.8449, 1897, pp.2-4.
2. Note that this is distinguished from "total trade" Ibid, p,3.
3. Ibid, p.5.
4. See appendix attached. Table A.
5. Ibid, p.12.

scored a similar success with bordered and figured handkerchiefs and razors in Straits Settlements, with screws in Hong Kong, candles in Cape Colony, brass ware in Victoria, and Fry's cocoa was beating Van Houten's in Fiji. It also is true that a later report was to state that such evidence as existed tended to suggest that the foreign gain in Australia had been greater in appearance than in reality.[1.]

It is not intended here to study in any great detail the condition of British industries at the time of Chamberlain's campaign, but it is necessary to note the signs of depression most obviously exhibited.

The depression was in no place more obvious than in the centers of the iron and steel manufacturing districts. The Midlands with good reason had been the most voluble in their plaints to the Royal Tariff Commission of 1886 for their high-water mark of prosperity, 1870-1873, had long since passed and they had watched a steady decline in ironmongery, clocks, watches, buttons, glass, earthenware, and china. Birmingham screws, nails, lamps, and other staples of manufacture and Sheffield agricultural implements were among the industries which had been the hardest hit by foreign tariffs. It was not that Great Britain was producing less steel, for the production had actually risen from 1,020,000 tons in 1880 to 4,850,000 tons in 1902, but the world production had risen from 3,060,000 tons to 35,890,000 tons so that she had suffered a great comparative slump while both Germany and the United Stated had passed her.[2.] Moreover, British population had

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1. Cd. 3639.(1907) For further details of British and Foreign trade with the Colonies vide Cd. 1761 (1903) p.32, p.64, p.106ff, p.112ff, p.381ff. p.435; Cd. 2337 (1905) pp.329-330; p.583.
2. Report of the Tariff Commission, 1905, vol.1, ss.34-36.

grown so as to demand greater employment. The shipping industry was of a contrary mind to the Midland delegates and hotly opposed any tariff on steel, for it was to their advantage as buyers of iron and steel produce that those manufacturers should sell cheaply,[1.] and in shipbuilding Britain still led the world.

As to the textile industries, silk manufacture had declined so that in 1901 the industry employed only 40,490 workmen in place of 68,800 employed in 1881.[2.] In cotton, the most important of the textiles, employment had fallen from 625,600 in 1891 to 606,200 in 1901,[3.] and in 1902 and 1903 the Lancashire Mills operated at a loss.[4.] To cite an instance of American competition, the number of English pieces of drill imported in Shanghai fell from 270,000 in 1891 to 91,000 in 1901, and of sheeting from 845,000 to 434,000. At the same time American imports increased from 856,000 to 1,639,000 in the former case, and in the latter from 2,008,000 to 2,827,000.[5.] The fact that 1905-1906 saw a boom in the cotton trade[6.] and that depression could be held to be due to bad crops[7.] did not wholly answer those who advocated protection, for they could still point to the inroads of the foreigner. As for linen, in 1881 there were 143,400 employed, while in 1901 the industry only demanded 108,700 workmen.[8.] The woollen industry had employed 284,500 hands in 1881, but in 1901 only 252,400 were required.[9.] Of course, the explanation could be made that improved

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1. For the opposition of shipowners to tariffs and legislation to improve conditions, C.4621, p.411.
2. Cd. 2337, p.463.
3. Ibid, p.440.
4. The Cotton Trade in 1903, The Economist, Jan.16, 1904.
5. J. Ashley, The Tariff Problem, p.81; For Britain's decline since 1845 vide Ellison, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain, p.99ff
6. Cd. 3690, p.31.
7. Halevy, op.cit., pp.337-338.
8. Cd. 2337, p.456.
9. Ibid, p.448.

machinery was to be held responsible for much of the unemployment, but that answer did not help to mend the situation. It could be asked, did Chamberlain's schemes promise to do so?

There was one industry which showed an amazing growth and that was coal mining. In 1881 the coal mines employed 495,497 men, and in 1903 employed 842,066.[1.] Of course it was not a difficult matter for the protectionist to argue with good sense as Jevons had done that such a method of maintaining per capita value of exports from decline was living upon an irreplaceable capital, an argument that also held good in the export of clay which had grown from a value of £217,000 in 1887 to £500,000 in 1902.[2.] Further, in preparation for the economic struggle, the United States appeared to be ensuring itself of a continuance of cheap ore by getting control of the Canadian fields.[3.]

Unemployment was naturally, therefore, a most potent argument on the lips of the Chamberlain group, and they could point out that it showed a steady increase from 1899 to 1904.[4.] Their opponents could reply that the demobilisation of an army of 200,000 men, begun in 1900, and with a decreased death rate to be taken into account as well,were factors responsible for much of the unemployment.[5.] The point to be made, however, is that it does not make a man contented to explain to him why he is hungry; it is remedy for such conditions that he desires. The tariff reformers turned to him with a suggested remedy: "let us look to our colonies for new markets; it is our only salvation, and there we shall become self-sufficing, a world unto ourselves."

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1. Cd. 2337, p.470.
2. Ashley, op.cit., p.104.
3. Ibid, p.94 ff., p.117.
4. Cd. 3690, p.2.
5. Halevy, op.cit. p.332, n.

From these conditions was developed the case for protection to which fork there were two prongs: it would enable the mother country to develop exclusive markets, and tariffs could be levied in retaliation for adverse tariffs of other countries to force them to reduce their walls, while dumping would also be guarded against.

"What is fundamental is that our liberty should be regained," said Mr Balfour, and that consisted of "freedom to negotiate.... In circumstances so little foreseen we are driven to ask whether a fiscal system suited to a free trade nation in a world of free traders, remains suited in every detail to a free trade nation in a world of protectionists."[1] The argument that followed this reasoning was that against dumping, the one ground on which the protectionist is comparatively safe and where he is never convincingly rebutted. Professor Ashley, in fact, did not think any great use could be made of the duties proposed by Chamberlain in international negotiation because the countries excluding goods by high customs were doing so in order to develop the industries themselves.[2] He was enthusiastic, however, on the subject of protecting against dumping. The arguments are well known to us. Dumping had been resorted to by England and was now being used by Germany and the United States. Thus Germany had secured markets in Russia and the United States in England.[3] The system of dumping was unusually effective when practised behind tariff walls, for it forced the home makers to accept for their entire output the extreme low rates which had only to be taken by the

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1. A.J. Balfour, Economic Notes on Insular free Trade, p.4, p.19.
2. Ashley, op.cit., p.132.
3. Ibid, p.70.

invader for a small part of his.[1] It was axiomatic that "One essential for cheap production was magnitude", and the United States with a much larger population than Great Britain which on the whole was supposed to be on a somewhat higher level of comfort and therefore furnishing a more intense "effectual demand", would in consequence have a lower cost of production, even without his high tariff, and with it his market was quite safe in which to make a high profit and sell if necessary at a loss the remaning stock.[2] The protectionist argued that the low-export-price was not a passing vagary, but a natural result of manufacture, steadying the market at home and maintaining a greater regularity of employment, while abroad it became a versatile and invaluable weapon.[3] To meet foreign dumping, as for example that of Germany who sold rails at home at 115 marks the ton and abroad at 85 marks, or wire tacks at home for 250 marks the ton and abroad for 140 marks, Professor Ashley estimated that duties of 50 or 75% ad valorem were necessary or even total prohibition.[4] Tariffs were also necessary to check the movement of English capital to foreign countries. As it was, Englishmen were constructing factories in foreign protected countries, as, for instance the Belfast linen firm which had established thread works in Germany to benefit by the fact that the German duty on yarn

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1. Carnegie, The Empire of Business, p.230; For the export policy of trusts vide Cd. 1761, p.297ff. or the Report of the Tariff Commission, 1905, vol.i, ss.132-152.
2. Ashley, op. cit., p.85.
3. Ibid, p.131.
4. Ibid, pp.132-133. Of course, it should be understood that Ashley is notoriously pessimistic, but he is quoted here as being a most typical tariff reformer. He was at Birmingham for some time and seems saturated with the gloom that pervaded tariff philosophers there.

was considerably lower than that on thread, and there it finished the yarn it imported.[1.]

There were a vast number of other arguments brought forward by the protectionist, of which some will find mention in a later chapter. They included the readjustment of taxation so as to put it upon a broader basis - to distribute it so that it would not fall so heavily on the income tax.[2.] Then there was the plea for protection based on social conditions in overcrowded towns: to restore prosperity to agriculture by protection and put the unemployed back on the land.[3.]

To sum up, Great Britain saw these factors at work: she was obviously losing her relative position as a world economic Power, and her foreign export trade was being gradually restricted.[4.] She must not merely hold her own, but must find markets capable of expansion: "Power" is but a relative conception. The day of small economic units had definitely gone with the advance of railway and transport.[5.] Could Britain organise her ¼ of the earth so as to withstand the giants rising up against her? The exports to the colonies had helped to relieve the depression of English industries between 1873 and 1886, a fact that awakened growing interest in the possibilities of Empire trade. The Colonies had taken approximately a third of the whole British export trade after 1850 and might take still more.[6.] It was noted by a

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1. Ashley, op.cit. p.78.
2. ex. Mr Chamberlain on Preferential Tariffs, Sat. Rev., 24 May, 1902, vol. 93; Vide Halevy, op.cit. p.316ff.
3. Protection or Free Trade, Macmillan's Mag., Aug. 1903, vol.88, esp. pp.260-261; Ashley, op.cit. p.189ff, p.192, etc.
4. J.L. Garvin, The Maintenance of Empire, The Empire and the Century, p.77 and passim. Ashley, op.cit., pp.155-156.
5. Knowles, Industrial and Commercial Revolutions, p.326ff.
6. Knowles, The Economic Development of the British Overseas Empire, Vol.I, p.104.

minority dissenting from the report of the Royal Commission of 1886 that Australian Colonies with only 3,100,000 inhabitants purchased £23,895,859 worth of British manufactures, while the United States with 55,000,000 inhabitants purchased only £24,424,626 worth. Was it not apparent that the benefit would be great if a policy were pursued to lead the more rapid peopling of the Australian Colonies.[1] Men could imagine all Europe except Russia and France in a powerful political and commercial confederation in opposition to Great Britain:[2] where lay safety but in the Empire? For example, it would be "feasible and easy" to induce the self-governing Colonies to levy differential duties on all cargo carried in vessels not under the British flag, to declare all trade between Great Britain and her ultramarine possessions to be coasting trade, and to exclude the rest of the world from participating therein.[3]

But if the Mother Country failed to draw closer to the Colonies, other nations would not be so hesitant. There was grave danger of the Americanisation of Canada. In Australia American popularity and influence were daily increasing. Unless Britain hastened the process of drawing the Empire together the great colonies would look elsewhere in shaping their future, and there was republicanism in Australia and an annexationist movement in Canada.[4] How long would this loose union of Britannic States, called the British Empire, last?[5] Would the foreigner make an

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1. C.4892, 1886, p.LXVI. For this thesis see also Henry Birchenough, The Imperial unction of Trade, 19th Cent., Sept.1899, Vol.46.
2. E.J. Dillon, The Commercial Needs of the Empire, Con. Rev., Apr. 1902, Vol.81.
3. Ibid.
4. Calchas, Cobdenism and the Colonies, Fort. Rev., Aug. 1903, Vol. 74.
5. Baron P. de Coubertin, A French View of the British Empire, Fort. Rev., Dec. 1897, Vol.62.

economic conquest of the Colonies at the very time when the great self-governing bodies were being pictured teeming with their millions of population, when Sir Wilfrid Laurier was declaring that the twentieth century belonged to Canada? The Dominion was at the moment of deciding which way her commercial destiny lay, with Britain or the United States, and "we know," said the Times, "that an Empire commercially dissident cannot in the long run remain constitutionally one."[1] Could any man with a drop of patriotic blood see his Empire, which had been the world's paramount power both politically and economically, the proudest Empire since Rome, boasting that her flag was flung to breezes that the Roman Eagle never knew, and that the sun never set on lands owning allegiance to the British Crown, could any man who had thrilled with vicarious heroism to Barrack Room Ballads and the metre of "The English Flag", be content with a fate that assigned his country the lowly position of a second or third-rate Power? Sir John Seeley had been the originator of the three world-empires idea. The United States, Russia, and Great Britain had seemed secure in their positions at one time, but Germany was looming closer. Would Britain be pushed from her place? It was one of the greatest of Imperialists who said, "If we were to be beaten, if we were to sink to be a third-rate power, I for one would from my heart and soul rather that our people were to pass into exile or into death and leave this island vacant for some superior race."[2]

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1. Dec. 17, 1904.
2. Rosebery, at the beginning of the World War; Quoted, E. T. Raymond, The Life of Lord Rosebery, p. 228.

Chapter III: The Opportunity:
The Growth in Imperial Sentiment.

At the beginning of the century it seemed certain, among Conservatives at any rate, if not among many of the Liberals, that some closer union of the Empire was both desirable and certain. There was some disagreement as to the form that integration of the self-governing Colonies and the mother country would take, but there was general desire that it take some form that would make it effective in withstanding the great forces which ringed the Empire in. The movement for closer union already boasted a history; the scenes of Jubilees and Coronation, the dignity of Colonial Conferences, the enthusiasm roused by the Boer War and the nationalism stirred by the Kaiser's telegram to Kruger or by the German and French slanders on the British troops, - these and similar stimuli roused patriotism to fever heat.

It was a painful memory to the Englishman of 1897 that he had once thought the Empire a burden to be got rid of as quickly as possible. By a process of rationalisation, it was argued that the object of the Manchester School had really been to lead the colonies to local autonomy as a prelude to an alliance of free nations,[1] but there could be no doubt of the desire to shake off the burden of the wretched colonies who clung like millstones about the neck of the mother country, to paraphrase Disraeli, and in 1868 there was public protest against the separatist policy of which the Gladstone Ministry was suspected.[2] It was

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1. ex. Knaplund Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy, p.94.
2. Bodelsen, Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism, p.94.

in the year previous that one of the "Fathers of Confederation", A. T. Galt, wrote to his wife from England that he was "oppressed with the sense of responsibility of maintaining a connection undesired here and which exposes us to such peril at home."[1] Howe could declare more stormily that, "Lord Normanby told us to our faces that we might declare our independence or join the United States whenever we chose and not a peer contradicted him."[2]

Such gloomy prophecies might be indefinitely multiplied. They resulted largely from the British policy of free trade for, if the colonies were equally valuable to the rest of the world, why should Britain have the trouble and expense of their defence and development? Moreover, it seemed quite unfair that Britain should maintain an imperial system by which she paid heavily for the defence of Canada while that Dominion levied prohibitive duties upon British goods.[3] In any case, they would, like the United States, "cut the painter" on maturity. Cobden had desired to be rid of them because they were a barrier to the world's peace. Cobden hated war: the Sepoy massacres left him "aghast and dumbfounded."[4] He therefore used language which was to count heavily against the defenders of Free Trade in the days to come: "The Colonial System, with all its dazzling appeals to the passions of the people, can never be gotrid of except by the indirect process of Free Trade, which will gradually

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1. Quoted, Borden, Canadian Constitutional Studies, pp.52-53.
2. Quoted, Porritt, Fiscal and Diplimatic Freedom of the British Dominions, p.386. For full references to this mood see Bodelsen, op.cit.; Responsible Govnt.in the Dominions, 1927, Vol.ii. p.1154ff.
3. Demangeon, The British Empire, p.202.
4. John Morley, The Life of Richard Cobden, Vol.ii, p.208.

and imperceptibly loose the bands which united our Colonies to us by a mistaken notion of self-interest. Yet the Colonial policy of Europe has been the chief source of wars for the last hundred and fifty years."[1] He also believed, wisely indeed, that the people of the colonies would prefer to be ruled badly - according to British notions - "by their own kith and kin, than to submit to the humiliation of being better governed by a succession of transient intruders from the antipodes."[2] Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was later to paraphrase his words and instruct his followers that self-government would always be preferred to good government.

But if John Stuart Mill and a host of others had been indifferent or hostile to the Empire, since Canadian Federation a new leaven had been at work. "Born in a period of mid-Victorian gloom"[3] Canadian Confederation seemed to adumbrate the greater union of the Empire. In a speech in Toronto, on 30 Dec. 1887, Chamberlain started to preach this doctrine. "It may well be," he said, "that the Confederation of Canada may be the lamp,to light our pathway to the Confederation of the British Empire. That idea may only exist at present in the imagination of the enthusiast; but it is a grand idea...."[4] Sir Charles Dilke's "Greater Britain," Froude's "Oceana", Seeley's "The Expansion of England", were the great text books that taught of Empire and imperial possibilities. Sir Charles Dilke captured

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1. John Morley, op.cit. p.230.
2. Ibid. p. 207.
3. Kennedy, Quoted, Wittke, A History of Canada, p.187.
4. Foreign and Colonial Speeches, 1897, p.13.

the aristocracy; Kipling opened up great spaces for the imagination of the office clerk. The middle class traders brightened at the prospects revealed by the Empire Trade League, the Imperial Institute, and the Association of the Chambers of Commerce. Disraeli, in his famous Crystal Palace speech on Midsummer Day of 1872, had given direction to future Imperialists,[1] and to the doctrines enunciated in this and similar speeches Mr Baldwin and contemporary Conservatives credit their inspiration. Self-government, he maintained, should have been accompanied by a great policy of Imperial consolidation which would have included an Imperial tariff, securities giving to England the enjoyment of unappropriated Crown lands, a military code defining the part each member of the Empire had to play in its defence, and some representative council in London which would have brought the Colonies into constant relations with the home Government.

It is not important here that the early federation movement be carefully traced but it is important to know that there had been a good deal of spade work done in the effort to make the seed of Imperial Unity to grow. W. E. Forster was one of the earliest advocates of Imperial Federation and it was largely owing to him that in 1884 the Imperial Federation League was founded to foster the idea.[2] Inspired by his energy, the League grew rapidly in strength and enthusiasm. It published a journal, recruited from the best brains of the country, the members wrote

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1. G.E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Vol.v, pp.195-196.
2. There is a good history of the movement given in the introduction to "Papers and Addresses by Lord Brassey," Vol. Imperial Federation and Colonisation, 1880-1894, ed. Arthur Loring and R.J. Beadon. F.P. de Labilliere, British Federalism: Its Rise and Progress, Proceeding of the R.C.I., Vol.24,1892-1893.p.95ff; John S.Ewart, The Kingdom of Canada and Other Essays,p.159ff; Bodelsen, op.cit., p.130ff, p.205ff. Responsible Government in the Dominions, op.cit. p.1157ff.

articles and letters, and branches were established in the colonies. The League had much to do with the calling of the Colonial Conference of 1887, a modest consultation on the occasion of Queen Victoria's Jubilee, but destined to sway the future of the Empire. Lord Rosebery became President of the body in 1888, and in 1889 Mr Parkin was sent to do missionary work in Australia. Delegations were sent to Salisbury urging that some step be taken to organise the defence of the Empire and to improve the commerce and postal and telegraphic communications of the Empire for the purpose of securing the union of the various countries. Salisbury was quite sympathetic, but he saw very clearly that the time was inopportune and could enthuse without committing himself to any action. He requested that some definite scheme be drafted which could be presented to such a Conference of Premiers the League urged him to call. Salisbury preferred, no doubt, that the League rather than the Government or Empire should be wrecked in experiments. That was what happened; the League found itself torn between two conflicting parties, one pressing for war contributions from the various parts and the other, led by Sir Charles Tupper, seeking co-operation in tariffs, if not a virtual customs union between the parts of the Empire. Tupper raised a storm in the League by writing a letter to the Secretary of the League in Canada - "not for publication," like so many other unwise utterances of public men - alleging that the most active members of the Federation League were mainly intent on levying a large contribution on the revenues of the Colonies for the support of the Army and Navy of Great Britain. "Unfortunately they have captured Mr Parkin and, having used him here, are now using him

in Canada to create the false impression that we do nothing to maintain the defence of the Empire."[1.]

The accusation was met with indignant denials, but the harmony of the party was gone, while it became clear as a result of Tupper's indiscreet accusation that there were two disparate elements within the League. When a delegation approached Gladstone with a scheme of Federation, it met with so little encouragement that it was decided to dissolve the League and let the two factions persevere in their own ways to spread the doctrine of Imperial Union. Gladstone's comments are interesting. He thought the propositions of the delegates too vague; that union for defence was alone an object of greatest importance; that it was impossible to broach a scheme of cementing the Empire by preferential tariffs; and, lastly, that the matter was one for the initiative of the United Kingdom and not for the Colonial Governments.[2.]

The Colonial Conference.

If the federation movement had ended in disappointment, it at least had the satisfaction of knowing that impetus had been given by the advertisement of the "white" Empire to a movement much less pretentious, yet saner and consequently more enduring than its competitor, namely the tendency to co-operation within the Empire as expressed in the Conferences. The first of the assemblies of Dominion Prime Ministers at what is now known as the Imperial Conferences began in 1887 with a "Colonial" Conference

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1. Lord Brassey, Papers and Addresses, op.cit., p,222.
2. Ibid, pp.231-232.

in London. It was "purely consultative" and it was hoped by the Federation enthusiasts that the decks would be cleared for future action by the recognition of common needs. In his letter to the Governors calling the Conference, Mr Stanhope, Secretary of State for the Colonies, deprecated the discussion of "what is known as political federation." Such "grand aspirations" as a "customs union" or "Zollverein" he would leave to "the distant and shadowy future."[1] Because the Conference would not be called upon for any decisions but was merely consultative, the mode of representation was unimportant and haphazard. The Conference of 1894 had progressed in organisation from 1887 in that it was a meeting of representatives of governments rather than merely leading men of the Colonies expressing private views. The Conference was called to Ottawa at the instance of Canada to discuss, primarily, the Pacific Cable and to resume the matter of commercial negotiations by colonial representatives with foreign powers.

Under the eager Chamberlain there was no possibility of the Conferences failing from lack of enthusiasm or work to do. The only danger was that the great Imperialist might push the Colonies too fast and wreck the machinery, so fragile was its construction and so uncertain its nature.

Further Encouragement for Imperial Unity.

Not only had the Imperial Federation movement educated public opinion to desire closer union between the various parts of the Empire and the Conferences expressed a certain admission of the need for co-operation, but there had been a splendid earnest

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1. C.5091, p.viii.p.5.

of the moral unity of the British races that delighted Imperialists. True, Colonials had seen service before in Imperial wars and there were offers of aid after Khartoum and Majuba, but their demonstration of patriotism in South Africa, at a time when all Europe was hostile to the mother country, when she stood almost utterly friendless and alone and baffled by a vigorous enemy, rebuked everyone who doubted their value or who thought a closer union beyond reach. More than that, it could be assumed that the Dominions had recognised the imperial nature of the struggle in that it was a duplicate of the American Civil War and that the right to secede must be opposed.[1] The war marked a new era in British history; said an enthusiast, "The British race throughout the world has made common sacrifices for a common object. We have learnt that we can in future rely upon the whole material and moral forces of the Empire in the hour of trial and danger. The mother country no longer stands alone, she faces the world with her children at her side."[2] When Conan Doyle summed up the gain and loss of the war, he found that, of all gifts that God had given to Britain, none compared with the assurance of unity for the "only difference in the point of view of the Briton from Britain and the Briton from the ends of the earth, was that the latter with the energy of youth was more whole-souled in the Imperial cause....On the plains of South

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1. Mr Chamberlain as Empire Builder, 19th Cent. Mar. 1902, Vol.50.
2. Ibid, pp,363-364. Vide also Nat. Rev., Dec.1900, Vol.36, p.594: Quotes Capt.A.T. Mahan that as a result of the war there exists "the sentiment of the unity of the Empire, an ideal which, under different condition, may well take for Imperial Federation the place the union occupied in American hearts and minds in 1861." Or A.W. Jose, The Empire that Found herself, Nat. Rev., Mar. 1901, Vol.37.

Africa...the blood brotherhood the the Empire was sealed."[1]

Looked at when the heat of war had passed and sanity had been restored to their vision, the Imperialists would not be so pleased, as we shall see, but for the war-time fervour it appeared that the Utopia of a British Empire, in definite union for purpose of defence, had received tacit consummation in fact if not in theory.

Another encouraging sign for Imperial Union was the Federation of Australia, for such minor unions were held to prelude the greater union of the Empire. Imperialists had long looked forward to the consummation of Australian Federation and had eagerly watched its growth.[2] The National Review, the warmest of Imperialist organs, spoke with no uncertain voice on the subject. Because Mr Reid opposed its consummation, that organ declared, "So long as the cause of Australian Federation is dependent on the straightforwardness and steadiness of so slippery a politician as Mr Reid, the Premier of New South Wales, there is little room for optimism,"[3] although the argument of that gentleman and his followers was that federation would be a blow to Imperial consolidation.[4]

Almost to a man the House of Commons, in the debates on the Commonwealth Bill, while there might be a demur at some of the clauses, enthused over the accomplishment of Australian Federation,

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1. A. Conan Doyle, The Great Boer War, p.551.
2. Brassey, Papers and Addresses, op.cit., p.140, Australian Federation, 19th Cent., Apr.1899, Vol.45. One would have thought that Professor Keith had disposed of the view that Australian Federation was brought about by fear of Japan and other Pacific Powers, but it is still a popular notion: ex. Edward Salmon, art in the Outlook, Feb. 27, 1926, p.154.
3. The Nat. Rev. Jan.1899, Vol.32.
4. Dilke, Problems of Greater Britain, Vol.I, p.323.

as one step nearer the organic unity of the Empire. It must have shocked Mr Chamberlain and startled many a complacent Imperialist when Mr Blake, a Canadian and now a member of the Imperial Parliament, the author of that ringing Aurora speech which had crystallised the elements of Canadian nationalism into smashing phrases, rose to contradict the idea that Australian Federation would lead to Imperial Federation. A quarter of a century ago he too had "dreamed the dream of Parliamentary Federation" but had abandoned it for many years because the Empire had "too long and too extensively gone on the lines of separate action...to go back now. Never forget," he warned, "that the goodwill on which you must depend is due to local freedom, and would not survive its limitation...I do not think Pan-Imperial Parliamentary federation is within the bounds of possibility.. I do not in the least degree think this Bill is a step towards Imperial Parliamentary Federation. On the contrary, I believe it is distinctly a step the other way."[1.] Despite such strong speaking, Mr Evelyn Cecil complacently thought that the Federation would assist "in pushing forward that great cause of Imperial Federation which both the Australians and ourselves alike have so much at heart."[2.]

Some attention should be given to the stress laid by Blake on "Parliamentary Federation." One must attach weight to Mr Hall's belief that with the dissolution of the Imperial Federation League the early federation movement practically came to an end,[3.] a view which Professor Keith[4.] and Mr Williamson[5.] seem

1. House of Commons Debates, 21 May, 1900, Vol.83,pp.782-83.
2. Ibid, p.794.
3. Hall, British Commonwealth of Nations, p.70.
4. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.ii, p.1161.
5. A Short History of British Expansion, p.185.

to share, and Sir Charles Dilke in 1890 noted the decline of enthusiasm for political union in responsible opinion.[1] "Perhaps", sighed Sir Herbert Samuel, "the time is not so close at hand as some have thought, when a member for Capetown and a member for Melbourne would be heard in the debates of a new House of Commons at Westminster...Probably a less ambitious scheme must content us."[2] In the book "Britannic Confederation" of 1892 we have a definite veering from Parliamentary Federation, and Professor Freeman was quite warmly opposed.[3] Professor Egerton indicted Imperial Federation as dangerous, unlikely and unnatural, telling us that so far as experience helped it seemed to point in a direction the opposite of Imperial Federation.[4]

Yet the term "Imperial Federation" could still be used to designate the hoped-for future relations of the self-governing Empire. Sir Charles Tupper records that, "Most people have come to the conclusions stated by Lord Rosebery at the Mansion House that a Parliamentary Federation, if practicable, is so remote, that during the coming century it is not likely to make any very great advance," nevertheless he tells us on the very next page that he considers Australian Federation "a most vitally important movement, not only to those colonies, but to the Empire itself, because it is in that direction that I look for a great advance with regard to Imperial Federation."[5] What he had in mind was some form of representation by High Commissioners, at the same time holding the office of Dominion Cabinet Ministers, and that

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1. Problems of Greater Britain, Vol.ii, p.477.
2. Liberalism, op.cit., p.336.
3. Edward A. Freeman, The Physical and Political Bases of National Unity, Britannic Confederation, pp.54-55.
4. Egerton, A Short History of British Colonial Policy, pp.454-460.
5. Recollections, pp.262-263.

the Dominions be given a voice in foreign policy in accordance with the Marquis of Lorne's idea.[1] Rosebery could look wistfully to the dream of Imperial Federation when he met the Press Conference of 1909. It seems clear that under the word "Federation" was included a great variety of schemes for uniting the Empire, in fact all those forms of representation that would enable the Empire to organise and act as a unit.

Surely there was a good deal of faith in the future of the movement to Imperial consolidation. Laurier, of all people, coming under the influence of Jubilee excitement, could exclaim, "Were I twenty-five years of age instead of fifty I confidently believe I should some day sit in Westminster as one of the representatives of the Dominion of Canada."[2] Sir Cavendish Boyle, one-time Governor of Newfoundland, assured the members of the Royal Colonial Institute at a meeting of November 11, 1902, "That Imperial Federation is someday to be accomplished....is as certain as that you are sitting there."[3] Chamberlain ran to greet movement to federation wherever he saw its shadow, and his visit to South Africa in 1902-1903 did nothing to weaken his faith.[4] On the contrary, he saw the necessity of sublimating the passions aroused in the war with loftier ideals.

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1. Recollections, pp.263-266.
2. The Times, Feb.9, 1897.
3. Proceedings, R.C.I., Vol.34.
4. Ex. Boyd, Speeches, p.110, Capetown, Feb.23, 1903. Or in House of Commons, Feb.5, 1900, Vol. 78, pp.623-624.

Forms of Co-Operation.

There were various occasions of co-operation within the Empire which might lead one to think that a more intimate relationship would be desirable, as for example, in the Pacific Cable and Imperial Postage.

It seems that Canada first mooted the proposal for a Pacific Cable and the British Government was less than indifferent.[1.] Australia and Canada then, in the hope of stimulating trade, jointly urged the advantages of a Pacific Cable, and after some discussion a Conference met at Ottawa in 1894. However, the greatest difficulty lay, unfortunately for Mr Ewart's implied thesis, that the British Government was to blame for the delay, not in the apathy of Great Britain, but in dissension among the Australian States, New South Wales being opposed to Government ownership,[2.] and South Australia to both Government control and Government guarantee.[3.] It was nevertheless resolved, with the dissenting voice of Mr Playfair of South Australia, that the Imperial Government be requested to prosecute a survey of the proposed route between Canada and Australia, the expense to be borne in equal portion by Great Britain, Canada, and the Australasian Colonies.[4.] Though Sir Sanford Fleming was a strong advocate of the Cable at the Conference of 1897, nothing was done pending a report of a Committee appointed to consider the matter.

The Imperial Government at that time seemed kindly enough to the proposal so that it was a matter for regret in the

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1. Ewart, The Kingdom of Canada and other essays, p.275ff. Conf. 1887, C.5091, p.212ff.
2. C.7553, p.91.
3. Ibid, p.104ff.
4. Ibid, p.11.

Colonies when the mother country decided not to take an active part in laying and working the Cable.[1] Upon pressure from overseas for a return to the previous plans for partnership, His Majesty's Government reconsidered and decided to co-operate.[2] To the protests of the Eastern and Eastern Extension Telegraph Companies, Mr Chamberlain sent very tart replies.[3]

A Conference of Colonial and British Representatives met on July 4, 1899 and arrangements were made to proceed with the plan.[4] On December 31, 1900 the contract for establishing the Pacific Cable was formally executed on behalf of the British Government, and the Governments of New South Wales, Canada, Victoria, Queensland, and New Zealand.[5] The Cable was completed by October 31, 1902,[6] - a magnificent testimony to the spirit of co-operation that had entered Imperial politics.

Under the forceful persuasion of Sir John Henniker Heaton a campaign which the Royal Colonial Institute and the Financial Review of Reviews supported was inaugurated to establish penny-a-word telegrams through the Empire. While they were not as successful as had been hoped, a reduction in rates was procured.[7]

Imperial postage forms one of the great links of Empire, but it had a difficult struggle against official red tape. The Conference of 1887 discussed the idea of Imperial penny postage, but it hardly speaks well for the claims of the irrepressible Mr Ewart that the reforms effected were "the result of Canadian

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1. Cd.46, p.4, p.11.
2. Ibid, p.12.
3. Ibid, pp.26-29; pp.35-36.
4. Ibid, pp.24-25.
5. Cd.1299, Appendix xii, p.146; Memo. by Sir Sanford Fleming.
6. Murray, op.cit., pp.87-88; Ewart, op.cit., p.288.
7. Porter, op.cit., p.222ff; Murray, op.cit., p.91.

determination"[1] that a Canadian delegate should have considered the scheme "quite impracticable."[2] It is true that the traditional British policy had been that the post-office must pay its way,[3] a point of view re-iterated by General Laurie and Lord Stanley,[4] yet it is also true that credit is due to Sir John Henniker Heaton more than to any other individual for the advancement of the cause of cheap Imperial postage, that the Times lent powerful aid to his efforts, and the end arrived at owed much to Mr Chamberlain and Lord Rosebery.[5]

In 1896 Sir John laid his case forcefully and eloquently before Mr Chamberlain where he could be assured of sympathy.[6] In the Jubilee Reform of 1897 the inland services was reduced to a penny for four ounces, and shortly after, in July 1898, the Imperial Penny Post was inaugurated to be subsequently extended in 1908 to the United States.[7] It was not until 1905 that Australia was given the advantage of the Imperial Penny postage,[8] but it was not until 1911 that the Commonwealth reciprocated.[9]

At the Conference of 1902 a resolution was adopted to the effect that the Prime Ministers in attendance wished to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to the question of reduction in the outgoing rate of newspapers and periodicals.[10]

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1. Ewart, op.cit., p.291.
2. Sir Alexander Campbell, C.5091, p.170.
3. Smith, The Post Office, 1763-1841, Canada and its Provinces, Vol.iv, p.734-735.
4. General Laurie: "Our business is to collect and deliver letters and newspapers, etc; it is not our business to create sentiment nor to advance trade." Quoted, Ewart, op.cit., p.295.
5. Mrs A. Porter, The Life and Letters of Sir John Henniker Heaton,p.171ff; p.175; pp.180-181; p.216.
6. Ibid, pp.176-177.
7. Murray, op.cit., p.27; p.55. C.9022, (1898) p.1. Porter, op.cit., p.179; p.191.
8. Ibid, p.218.
9. Ibid, p.220.
10. Cd. 1299, p.xi.

Canada, in 1902, extended her domestic rate to all parts of the Empire, offering to receive at the same rate.[1] The United Kingdom was willing to accept Canadian periodicals at that rate, but was unable to reciprocate because of the high domestic duties. Canada at the time was finding herself flooded by American literature, and the fact that many British publications were brought express via New York where they were surrounded by American advertisements and sent on by post to Canada was an incentive to cheaper Imperial postage.[2] The necessity was also seen by British traders, who required that their goods be advertised throughout,Canada, and by British publishers, while the British Empire League, of course, supported the desire. When Mr Sydney Buxton, whose sympathies had been with Canada, became Postmaster-General, he put into effect a reduction from 4d. to 1d. per pound on the Canadian rate. The change was effected in May, 1907, and during the next two months the increase over the corresponding months of the previous year in the bags of mail direct from the United Kingdom to Canada was 146%.[3]

Now in his narrative of this transition Mr Ewart finds few kind words and some hard ones for the mother country, yet it is less than just to give well-nigh all the credit for the reduction to Canada for, as has been seen, there were powerful advocates in the United Kingdom, and Canada had more to gain by, and less difficulty in putting into operation an Imperial postage. Nor does the Canadian nationalist mention the fact that Imperial penny postage involved a loss to the United

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1. Ewart, op.cit., pp.292-293.
2. Ibid, p.293.
3. Ibid. p.297.

Kingdom of £155,000 annually.[1]

At the Ottawa Conference of 1894 a proposal had been brought forward by a New Zealand representative, Mr Lee Smith, to establish a mail route between Britain and Australasia through Canada.[2] It was pointed out that large Government subsidies were being paid to American companies for mail service via New York and San Francisco, and it was suggested that an "All-Red Route" be established by British steamships and through British Ports. The Canadian representatives were of course in vigorous approval, supported by New South Wales, Victoria, and Queensland,[3] though South Australia and Tasmania would have nothing to do with the plan.[4] Lord Jersey, the British representative, was quite kindly to the proposal, asking only for definite proposals to put before his Government.[5] He quite dispelled the notion that Great Britain was prejudiced in favour of the American routes, and observed that there was no Company in existence on the Canadian-Atlantic route to which the subsidy might be diverted from the American Company. He mentioned that by substituting Halifax as a terminus instead of New York thirty-six hours might be gained, or Quebec, twenty-four hours. The time to Shanghai would be shortened, and a comparatively quick service established for the transportation of soldiers and supplies to the Far East and India. It would also be possible to have a speedy route avoiding foreign territory.[6]

In his report for 1897 the Postmaster General was pleased to note that an agreement had been made between the Government

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1. Cd.5745, p.319. Statement by Sir Herbert Samuel, at the Imperial Conference, 1911.
2. C.7553, p.218ff.
3. Ibid, pp.221-223; pp.225-226; pp.228-229.
4. Ibid, 226-228; p.232.
5. Ibid, p.250.
6. Ibid, p.9; pp.224-225.

of the Dominion and a British Company to provide a weekly service of four fast mail steamers between Canada and Great Britain.[1] In the report of the succeeding year he regreeted that this proposal had to be abandoned, but noted that, by the establishment of a mail service to and from New Zealand via Vancouver to alternate with that via San Francisco, a fortnightly service across the Atlantic and Pacific had been provided.[2]

At the Conference of 1902 a weak resolution was passed in favour of reviewing the position of inter-Imperial mail services and freight charges.[3] The Conference of 1907 poured more than enough cold water on the plan to chill enthusiasts for the "All-Red Route", and it seems that the British Government was considerably influenced by protests from British Steamship Companies.[4]

At the Conference of 1911 Newfoundland and New Zealand submitted resolutions in favour of a subsidised "All-Red Route",[5] but the Conference considerably whittled down Sir Joseph Ward's motion.[6] The reason that the idea came to nothing, however, lies not so much in the apathy or opposition of the United Kingdom as in the fact that no practical financial proposal was ever advanced.[7]

There is more in this narrative than merely efforts at Imperial co-operation. The phenomena of telegraph and ease and speed in transportation meant closer contact of the various parts of the Empire and created an opportunity for co-operation, and thus one of the chief objections to closer union was in the way

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1. C.8586, p.8.
2. C.9022, p.11.
3. Cd.1299, pp.38-39.
4. Jebb, Imperial Conference, Vol.ii., p.349ff.
5. Cd.5513, pp.5-7.
6. Cd.5745, pp.344-357.
7. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.576. Per contra Jebb, op.cit., p.355.

of being removed. The very factors that created a need for Imperial consolidation would also aid in bringing it about.

One very tangible earnest of the goodwill of the United Kingdom to the Dominions and the value to the latter of the Imperial bond, was shown by the admission in 1900 of Colonial stock as trustee securities.[1.]

If one knows the least thing of Chamberlain it is to be aware of his sense of the dramatic. He never let an opportunity slip of making the Empire conscious of itself, and there is good reason to believe that even Laurier/nearly succumbed to the sheer power of his personality, enthused as the Colonial Secretary was over his cause. The necessity was present in the very philosophy of the time that demanded that all things be regimented; in the terrific pressure of economic, political, and military organisation; in the social problems that demanded vision for the people and relief for the slums. But more than the necessity, the opportunity was there: the Jubilees, the Coronation of King Edward, the Conferences, the Federation of Australia, the fine display of the moral unity of the Empire on the battlefields of South Acrica, and the very enthusiasm of British peoples to found a mighty race to propagate civilisation and secure their present position as a leading Power all these conditions came upon the scene with the sound of trumpets as heralds of greater things to come. Here was a chance than even a lesser man might have used, but when one finds an idealist, a business man, and a political realist combined in one dynamic personality the opportunity becomes a dazzling one and the chance becomes a challenge.

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1. Responsible Government in the Dominions, op.cit., p.1177.ff. H.C.300, 1900.

Chapter IV: The Means:

Union for Defence.

The most obvious, because the most necessary, means of uniting the Empire was on the basis of some plan for the common defence of all its components. The Imperialists owed Captain Mahan a great debt of gratitude for giving them their arguments and in educating the public in the methods and merits of such a conception of an Imperial defence scheme. We shall examine his views, see them adopted in British proposals, and note the reaction of the Dominions thereto.

In searching for typical British Imperialists of the late Nineteenth and early twentieth century it is more than probable that with the names of Joseph Chamberlain, Cecil Rhodes, and Lord Rosebery, would be linked that of an American, Captain Alfred T. Mahan, an officer in the Navy of the United States. Certainly in him are gathered all the typical beliefs that one can fasten to the British Imperialist of the Chamberlain period. He did not believe that war could be abolished at the present stage of world politics; rather did he believe war to be inevitable and a stepping-stone to progress.[1] It was from him that the Times learnt that Naval Expansion was "an inexorable and inevitable necessity, alike for the United States and for any other Power which aspires to take its due share in that political and commercial future which the march of events is preparing for the nations of the western world,"[2] and he himself tersely put it that, "the

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1. Mahan, Lessons of the War with Spain, p.231.
2. The Times, 21 Oct., 1902.

extension of commerce by political pressure is a leading element in the spirit of the times."[1] He believed that expansion which came with maritime effort and trading enterprise was conducive to the well-being of the national morale. For this reason the Government should actively and consciously promote maritime activity, and political power and naval supremacy were inseparable. He resented Germany's unjust temper so "outrageously shown" towards Britain in the last few years,[2] was enthusiastic regarding the Anglo-Saxon race, believing them capable of withstanding any aggression, and consequently deploring any animosity between the United States and Britain.[3] He was deeply religious and his writings abound with biblical quotations. It is not surprising to find that he had an abundant faith in "sentiment, imagination, aspiration, the satisfaction of the rational and moral faculties in some object better than bread alone" as motives to Federation, Imperialism, and Expansion.[4] At the same time Captain Mahan had such a candid emphasis on an "enlightened self-interest" that one expects him to quote the famous phrase of Rhodes', "philanthropy plus five percent."

For a very forceful and enthusiastic exposition of the contemporary Imperial Federation movement, he deserves the high praise he was so freely accorded. Mahan saw the correlation of interests between the various parts of the Empire and consequently viewed the war in South Africa as but one aspect of the Imperial sentiment. "What would a conquered and hostile

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1. Mahan, Why We Must Have a Greater Navy, The Times, 2 Oct.1902.
2. Mahan, The Persian Gulf, The Times, 29 Aug. 1902; Nat.Rev. Sept. 1902.
3. The Times, 21 Apr. 1898; 24 Mar. 1900; 27 Sept. 1900; art. Motives to Imperial Federation, The Times, 29,Apr. 1902. Nat. Rev. May, 1902.
4. Mahan, Motives to Imperial Federation, op.cit.

South Africa have meant to Australia, and beyond Australia, to British influence in the Far East?" Further, he questioned, could Canada with its Pacific seaboard view with equanimity the decay of British influence in China? Nor could Canada be indifferent whether the British Navy and commerce in war find their way to the Farther East through the Mediterranean or be forced to the long Cape Route. It was, therefore, a matter of interest both to Canada and Australasia if a hostile Power be firmly based on the Persian Gulf.[1] He held that, like American Federation, "Imperial Federation will dignify and enlarge each State and each citizen that enters its fold. Imperial Federation proposes a partnership in which a number of younger and poorer members are admitted into a longstanding wealthy firm."

But if Federation was extremely desirable from the point of view of the Colonies, it was equally so from the outlook of the Mother County. There was the necessity of safeguarding commercial routes, for which purpose the navies of the Empire should be pooled, the Colonies prove of value in forming a chain of communication, every link of inestimable value, links which Germany was doing her best to snap.

In a sea war, as in other wars, the American naval expert explained that two things were from the first essential: a suitable base upon the frontier, in this case the sea board, from which operations start, and an organised military force, in this case a fleet, of size and quality adequate to the proposed operations. If the war should extend to distant parts

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1. Mahan, Motives to Imerpial Federation, op.cit.

of the globe, there would be needed in each of those distant regions secure ports for shipping, to serve as secondary, or contingent, bases of the local war. It was, of course, set down as axiomatic, that to depend upon coal in the absence of strong stations where coal could be stored limited the range to which even a victorious Power could exert sea supremacy. Therefore the Dominions should be urged to provide strong harbours and well-stocked stations. Between these secondary and the principal, or home, bases there was necessary reasonably secure communication, which would depend upon control of the intervening sea, and of doubtless strength to such control were good harbours along the routes such as the Cape of Good Hope and Mauritius, doubly valuable in these days when refueling is so much more frequent.[1.] The strategist also pointed out the value of communications in intercepting a convoy of supply ships or protecting such a convoy, duties which were only secondary to the destruction of a body of ships-of-war. A safe line of communications was essential also in keeping the separate parts of the Empire linked together, a value well illustrated by the fate of Spain.[2.] "It is hard," said Mahan, "to over-value the advantage of healthy, attached, self-governing colonies to a European country of today. Blessed is the State that has its quiver full of them."[3.]

Mahan noted that the value of India to Great Britain was not that of the primary base of operations, political and military, but it was "simply one of the many contingent - secondary - bases, in different parts of the world, the action of which is susceptible

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1. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, p.514.
2. Ibid, p.41.
3. Motives to Imperial Federation, op.cit.

of unification only by means of a supreme sea power." As a base it was best fitted for action upon central Asia and operation on the Russian front, while the central position which it held relatively to China and Egypt obtained also towards Australia and the Cape of Good Hope, assisting thus the concentration upon the country of such support as either colony could extend to the general policy of Imperial Federation.[1] Not only were Colonies important in military and naval strategy, but they were valuable also in providing a reserve strength in natural resources and men. If two nations were of equal strength in material for a sea war, failing an immediate and decisive campaign, the reserve strength would tell, organised reserve first, then reserve of sea-faring population, reserve of skill, reserve of wealth.[2] Mahan maintained that, whereas "colonies attached to the Mother Country afford the surest way of supporting abroad the sea power of a country, in peace, the influence of the government should be felt in promoting by all means a warmth of attachment and a unity of interest which will make the welfare of one the welfare of all, and the quarrel of one the quarrel of all; and in war, or rather for war, by such measure of organisation and defence as shall be felt by all to be a fair distribution of a burden of which each reaps the benefit."[3]

Mahan's enduring fame was built upon his study of naval history and application of the lessons of history to contemporary naval tactics. The differences that had arisen in naval strategy he believed to be simply of scale and degree, not

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1. Mahan, The Problem of Asia and its Effect upon International Policies, pp. 27-28.
2. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, pp. 47-48.
3. Ibid, p.83.

of kind.[1] The Captain's naval hero was Nelson, to whom he gave the proudest title within his literary possession, "The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain."[2] He praised Nelson's ability to seek out the fleet of the enemy, not being distracted by numerous objects, but driving straight for the objective, as he had done in the Mediterranean, for example, when he saw the Toulon fleet was the controlling factor, important in all Napoleon's combinations, and relentlessly sought it out, keeping his fleet in position so that it might be summoned quickly when occasion demanded. It is true that the aggressive correspondent known as "Navalis" took Mahan severely to task for emphasising the need for adequate coast defences,[3] preferring rather that the emphasis should be laid on a strong mobile navy, but certainly Mahan never meant that there should be any neglect of the mobile navy, ~~nor that there should be any neglect of the mobile navy,~~ nor that there should be such attention to coast defences or dispersion of the navy that the attack on the heart of the enemy's sea power would be weakened. He constantly stressed the inexpediency, the terrible danger, of dividing the battle fleet, even in times of peace, into fractions individually smaller than those of a possible enemy.[4] There is little doubt but that he revealed the weakness of the 1909 Conference "fleet unit" scheme in his teaching of these principles.[5]

Mahan's theory of sea power took national enterprise, the daring of a people, the lure of gain, as basic. Trade and

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1. Mahan, op.cit., Introductory. Also, Lessons of the War with Spain, Introductory.
2. Vide his Life of Nelson.
3. Mahan's article, The Times, 26 Dec. 1898. Navalis, The Times, 29 Dec. 1898, 4 April, 1898.
4. Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare, p.167.
5. Vide Naval Policy and the Pacific Question., The R.T., June, 1914, Vol.4., p.391ff. S.Wilkinson, Thoughts on Imperial Defence, U.E., July 1910, Vol.i.

commerce - merchant shipping - were natural consequents of such spirit. Then came the desire to establish colonies as an essential appendage of a commercial country. Sea Power followed as a matter of course for it was "the handmaid of expansion, its begetter and preserver."[1.]

Thus the American Captain emphasised history to show that by her commercial enterprise and fleet Britain had become great and only by a continuance of aggressive policy in this direction could she hope to maintain her greatness. She had successfully battered her way to pre-eminence by victories at sea over Spain, Holland, and France. The case of Holland before the disastrous war of 1653-54 had, he cautioned, "strong resemblances to that of Britain now; and they are true prophets though they do seem to be having small honour in their own country, who warn her that the continuance of her prosperity at home depends primarily upon maintaining her power abroad."[2.] He recalled that in regard to Holland, "Their food, their clothing, the raw material for their manufactures, the very timber and hemp with which they built and rigged their ships (and they built nearly as many as all Europe besides) were imported." But the war proved devastating. The sources of revenue such as fisheries and commerce dried up; the Zuyder Zee became a forest of masts; workshops closed; the country was full of beggars; Amsterdam had 1500 untenanted houses, and grass grew in its streets.[3.]

The inference that was drawn from this historical allusion by readers was that if Britain would escape this fate the

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1. Mahan, The Problem of Asia and its Effect upon International Policies, p.7.
2. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, op.cit. p.38.
3. Ibid.

Government had to make conscious effort to maintain the maritime instinct in her people and guard against war by a sufficient sea power, a fatal neglect of the Dutch who would not prepare for war until it was upon them.

Captain Mahan pointed out that in peace the Government could favour industries and tendencies to seek adventure and gain from the sea. They might develop such industries and a sea-going bent, or they might guard against imposing any obstacles tending to hamper such spirit and remove any obstacles at present imposed. The naval instinct must be fostered by commerce; a purely military sea power like that of Louis XIV had no roots and soon withered away.

As for war, the Government should maintain an armed navy of size commensurate to its shipping. It should foster the growth of all institutions from which the navy grew and on which it depended. Naval stations, like Gibraltar and Malta, were invaluable for communication and shelter.

This summary of Captain Mahan's views is justified in that it represents the views of eminent British naval experts. The Times was forever praising him, and one remembers that The Times of the 1897 Jubilee Conference period was frantic in its protests regarding the need for a mightier navy. It published Mahan's articles, wrote lengthy editorials summarising his opinions, and received a great number of letters commenting on them. Certainly his admonitions received from the public, that thought on the subject of naval defence, an attention that varied from profound respect to keen enthusiasm, but never indifference. The National Review, most Imperial of organs, published his articles and sang

his praises. The Navy League, an organization with Imperial ideas, invited him to dinner. McGill University conferred on him the degree of LL.D. More than these exterior signs of respect, British Imperialists did him the more subtle honour of using the arguments that he provided when expressing their views on naval strategy, in speaking on the interest of the Empire as a whole with regard to foreign policy, and in explaining the need for federating the military and naval resources, the commercial policies, and the political machinery in so far as the rest of the world was concerned. Not that Mahan was original in his thinking on these matters - for a popular mind must not be greatly original - but his mind in its general outlook was the mind of the British Imperialist. When one reads Sir George Clarke, (Lord Sydenham) Sir Cyprian Bridge, Sir John Colomb, or any other of the writers on naval defence, one appreciates that Mahan has given the synthesis of their ideas and has expressed them most powerfully. One realises that he is worthy the title of "the highest living authority on naval warfare."[1.] This was the schoolmaster; let us turn to his pupils.

Lord Selborne the First Lord of the Admiralty, took up Mahan's theory of concentrating naval forces to devise a plan Napoleonic in its simplicity. He told the Colonial Conference of 1902 that the word "defence" should be eliminated from naval strategy for the idea had become heretical. The problem of naval warfare lay in discovering the enemy's ships, concentrating the fleet upon them, and then destroying them. Localisation, in the sense of allocating ships to protect the mouth of the Thames, to

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1. Jas. R. Thursfield, The Higher Policy of Defence, Nat.Rev. Jan. 1903, Vol.40.

Table showing comparative cost of Military and Naval Defence in Great Britain, her Self-Governing Colonies, and Foreign Nations. Appendix A, p.72, Cd.1299.

	Military.						Naval.				
pop. thous.	estts. peace.	War.	% of troops to pop.	Budget. Thous. £.	cost per heads s.	Budget. £. thous.	cost per head. s.	total thou. £.	per head pop. s.	% public exp. to mil. def.
,310.	375	.1,238.	.828.	16,301.	7.19.	1,411.	0.62.	17,713.	7.81.	18.3'
,744.	48.	138.	.716.	2,113.	6.27.	-	-	2,113.	6.27.	11.3.
38,614	616	3,091.	1.595.	27,774.	14.36	13,171.	6.82.	40.916.	21.18.	19.5.
6,345.	596.	3,219	1.057.	33,349.	11.84	8,115.	2.88.	41,464.	14,72.	32.4.
d5,104	32.	86.	.626.	1,882.	7.37.	1,330.	5.21.	41,211.	12.58.	14.6.
32,045	227.	2,295.	.707.	10,966.	6.84.	4,895.	3.06.	15,861.	9.90.	15.6.
43,761	158.	603	.361.	3,823.	1.75.	1,794.	.82.	5,617.	2.57.	14.6.
29,000	1,092	2,842.	.847.	34,615.	5.37.	10,032.	1.56	44,647	6.93.	20.1.
rland ,312	235	235	7.092.	1. 125.	6.79	-	-	1,25.	6.79.	26.6.
76,356	202	-	.264	21.	5.49	11,489	3.01	32,443	8.50	28.2.
40,555	663	783	1.634	20,617	10,17	26,595	13.11	47,212	23.28	15.0.
a5,312	36	-	.708	434	1.63	-	-	434	1.63	2.6.
3,7[illegible]68	30	-	.785	685	3.6	178	0.95	860	4.55	2.6.
796	10	-	1.261	234	5.88	-	-	-	-	3.2

- Percentage of total taxation devoted to defence.

- Austria Hungary; Bel. - Belgium; Germ. - Germany; U.S. - The ed States; Gt.B. - Great Britain; Aus. - Australia; N.Z. - New and. Thous. - estimate given in thousands; exp. - expenditure.

nations except the United States, Great Britain, and the Dominions compulsory service.

British Empire - Naval and Military Expenditure, 1898 - 99.

Appendix 1, p.42, Cd.1299. Slightly amended,

Appendix A, p.7, Cd.1597 (1903).

	Population.	Mil.exp. Thous.£.	Mil.exp. per head. £.s.d.	Nav.exp. thous.£.	Nav.exp. per head. s. d.	Nav.& mil.exp. Thous.£.	Nav. & Mil. exp. per head. £.s.d.
U.K.	41,454,621.	29,310	0.14.1¾	31,255.	15. 1.	60,565.	1.9.2¼
9.Can.	5,312,500.	533	0. 2.0	nil	nil.	533.	0.2.0.
Nfd.	210,000.	8	0. 0.10.	nil	nil.	8.	0.0.10.
N.S.W.	1.356,650.	185	0. 2.8¾.	47.	0.8¼.	233.	0.3.5.
Vict.	1,163,400.	130.	0. 2.3.	58.	1.0.	188.	0.3.3.
Queen.	512,604.	68.	0. 2.8.	28.	1.1¼.	96.	0.3.9¼.
S.Aus.	370,700.	16.	0. 0.10¼.	17.	0.10¾.	32.	0. 1.9.
W.Aus.	171,032.	12.	0. 1. 5¼.	5.	0.6½.	17.	0. 1.11¾.
9.Tas.	182,508.	9.	0. 0.11½	5.	0.6½.	14.	0. 1.6.
9.N.Z.	756,505.	105.	0. 2.9½.	21.	0.6½	126.	0. 3.4.
9.C.G.H.	2,265,556	308.	0. 2.8½.	30.	o.3¼.	338.	0. 2.11¾.
Nat.	902,365.	219.	0. 4.10½	12.	0.3¼.	231.	0.5.1¾.
s:	13,203,820.	1,597.	0. 2.5.	222.	0.4.	1,819.	0.2.9.

protect Liverpool, Sydney, or Halifax, was impossible and such an attempt would be to invite disaster. In time of peace the forces might have a local distribution, but in time of war the Admiralty believed that there must be only one authority with full power and responsibility to the Empire to move the ships and concentrate them where they would be in the most effective position to stike at the heart of the enemy, without any separation of responsibility, any risk of hesitation or delay in making conjunction of the squadrons which might soften the blow or lead to disastrous consequences.[1.]

Lord Selborne did not like grants of money by the Colonial Governments as fulfilment of their responsibility in defence of the Empire, and deplored the obligation of Australia to the Imperial Government, constituting a relation as "simply that of the man who pays to the man who supplies." His words are worth quoting :

"It does not give our New Zealand and Australian fellow-countrymen the sense of personal interest, of personal possession, in the British Navy, which I most of all desiderate for the future, and I want, not only the Colonial Governments to understand that on the naval protection of the Empire, exercised through a wise naval strategy, depends our future existence as a United Empire, but I want them to regard the navy as their own, at least, as much as ours, and with that object I wish to see in the Navy more Colonial officers and a contribution of Colonial seamen. I want, in fact, if I may use such a term, to increase the maritime spirit of the Empire....I want to bring Australasia,

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1. Cd.1299, p.14ff.

Canada, and South Africa, to understand, in the sense that the average Englishman understands it, that the sea is the one material source of our greatness and our power; the bond of union; the real source of our strength...that the sea is to the Empire as the breath of life; but it cannot be done, I opine, as long as we are only receivers of money. I want to see from all parts of the Empire a personal contribution to the Navy, so that it may not only be an abstract Admiralty to govern the Navy, but an Admiralty that has won the confidence of the Colonies, because the Colonies understand its policy, and because in each Colony there are officers and men belonging to the Navy - an integral portion of the Navy."

The First Lord made, therefore, a certain concession to the nationalist sentiment and the desire of the Dominions to see the ships that guarded their frontiers. He would have a certain squadron of up-to-date cruisers attached to the Australian station, and of these one or two would be manned exclusively by Australians under the command of Imperial officers. He also desired to establish a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve in Australia and New Zealand, composed partly of men trained in the Australian-manned cruiser.[1] Having thus applied one principle taught by Mahan - that of inculcating the naval spirit - he passed to the other, that, "The sea is all one, and the British Navy must therefore be all one...If the idea should unfortunately prevail that the problem is one of local defence, and that each part of the Empire can be content to have its allotment of ships for the purpose of the protection of an individual spot, the only possible

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1. Cd.1299, p.16.

result would be that an enemy who had discarded this heresy, and combined his fleets, will attack in detail and destroy those separated British squadrons which, united, could have defied defeat."[1] The argument had been well made.

The theory in regard to military defence was much similar. Mr Seddon, the New Zealand Premier, representing a people who outdid the Imperialism of the Mother Country, gave notice of a motion to create Imperial Reserve Forces for use outside the Colonies, maintained and equipped according to agreement with the Imperial Government.[2]

The Secretary of State for War, Mr Brodrick, speaking to the motion of Mr Seddon, pointed out that in the Boer War the enemy missed many opportunities so that the British were able to make up deficiencies. Had the enemy been stronger, however, and able to take advantage of early British reverses, the effect might have been disastrous. There must henceforth be proper preparation and organisation for they could not always count on having time.[3]

Surveying the colonial military preparations, he saw that Canada had forty thousand men, and that they were of true fighting material had been amply proved in the South African War. But he saw in the Annual Report from the General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia, a report which had received high mention in the Canadian Parliament, that the city corps had absolutely no training whatever in the field duties of a soldier, while the rural corps would never be made even fairly fit to take the field

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1. Cd.1299, p.20.
2. Ibid, p.7.
3. Ibid, p.29.

with the limited period of annual training that they received under existing conditions. Only very elementary training was possible in the case of the urban corps, and the cavalry was no more than barely efficient. Beyond that, Canada had at present no trained staff or system of training staff officers, while recently a rifle had been adopted by her government which was of a different pattern from the British rifle, breaking the uniformity and the interchangeability from the British to the Canadian in case the troops were employed together.[1.]

Speaking of Australia, the Secretary of State for War pointed out that the troops varied greatly in quality and that there was a sad deficiency in departmental corps - Army Service Corps and Ordnance, and Army Medical Departments which should accompany them in the field. In some States there were none. Victoria had only a reserve of seventeen rounds of small arms ammunition and West Australia only twenty eight rounds. There had not been any military administrative staff to deal with supply or other arrangements, and in only one State was there periodical inspection of ammunition and warlike stores. However valuable such material might be, hastily improvised on the spur of the moment, as a moral force, they could not be relied upon to any extent, and his point was that cases "must and will" arise in which Britain would have to ask, in which she would require, a larger force than her own, and, to quote his words, "In which the Colonies who send it us on the ground that they think us worthy of support in a particular emergency" - Is this not a slap at Laurier? - "should be prepared to send us reliable forces." He asked that, even if it were only one out of every four men trained, there

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1. Cd. 1299, pp.30-31.

should be a body specially set apart with a liability to overseas service as a part of the Army Reserve of the Imperial Force, with their services absolutely pledged in thenevent of their Government proferring assistance to the Imperial Forces, and that they be properly trained to this end, fully organised and fully equipped "with a view to acting together and drilling together in the battalions or regiments with which they would take the field."

As for paying such troops, "Of course," he said,"if these troops are entirely under the control of the Colonial Government, and if their Colony says, which it very possibly would, 'We will not pledge ourselves to send you any men until we know the emergency and until we have the assent of our Parliament for agreeing to take part in that particular emergency,' it would probably be held that so long as the Colonial Government kept the control as to the employment of the troops, they should pay them." He made a proviso, however, that "if it is held that any troops are part of our recognised Army Reserve, I think it would not be unreasonable for the Imperial Exchequer to bear some portion of the charge." His words are doubly interesting in that the manner in which the Colonies would determine to send aid is practically that of Laurier who was so severely criticised by British Imperialists.

Brodrick promised the Colonies that it was not intended to start a ruinous competition with other nations in land armaments, but up to now Great Britain had always been last in the field. She could no longer afford to be last in the field. "If we are forced into defensive action for any of our dependencies

we are bound to be able to strike as quickly or quicker than any other Powers."[1.]

These two gentlemen, the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War, did but summarise the attitude of their countrymen. There was much fun poked at the Canadian "pantomime army", as the National Review called Canada's effort at an independent force. It was complained that "the ordinary run of colonial politicians take no more interest today in questions of Imperial and national defence than did those of the Mother Country yesterday."[2.]

The first task of the United Kingdom, then, was to educate the colonists in military matters, showing them the immediate need for the organising of their military and naval resources, and then to persuade them of the folly of any plan that did not spell unity. As one Imperial advocate put it, the ideal was one with "every Government placing its resources at the disposal of central administration, which, in turn, hands them over to a directing will to assure a general security. Such is the highest standard of Imperial efficiency."[3.]

It was never denied that the United Kingdom had the weight of efficiency behind their ideas of centralised Imperial defence. What the Colonies disliked were the implications that arose from a centralised defence scheme. It meant that they were under obligation to contribute to the defence of the whole Empire; that they must as Bourassa has so often declaimed enter the vortex of European diplomacy, which was corrupt and evil; and

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1. Cd. 1299, p.32.
2. Nat. Rev. May 1899, Vol.33, p.513.
3. Lieut.-Col, Edward S. May, Principles and Problems of Imperial Defence. p.287.

that nationalism must be foregone in order that Imperial sentiment be developed. There was the obvious retort to the second corollary, which was that while Canada could say that she did not want to mix herself up with European disputes, yet as part of the Empire how could she avoid being liable in the consequences of a war?[1.]

The sore point with the British taxpayer, however, was not the fact that the Colonists were going against good expert advice, but that they were not going anywhere with any speed, but were letting the Mother Country pay for the defence of the Empire without making any appreciable contribution, thus being without either nationalism or imperialism, patriotism or loyalty. To make the Colonies aware that they should contribute more to naval and military defence, British politicians brought all their oratorical and dialectic abilities to bear. No campaign was more severe and more sustained than their effort. A multitude of articles, letters, and speeches, from organisations and individuals kept up tirelessly from long before 1897 to the Great War.

When the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee obtained an audience with Mr Balfour, the Prime Minister, there were two important speeches made which brought out strongly the fact of Colonial tardiness in contributing to the cost of defence. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, introducing the deputation, pointed out that the Colonies would be vitally affected by a war. "It is my deliberate conviction," he said, "looking to the enormous efforts now being made in all parts of the world by Great Powers in increasing their naval strength, that without recourse to a system

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1. C.C. Penrose Fitz-Gerald, Imperial Defence and Colonial Respondibilities, The U.S. Mag., Nov. 1902, Vol.26, p.111ff.

of borrowing for current expenditure, which would be contrary to all sound finance, which would be deeply injurious to the credit of this country, and which would deprive us of the resources necessary for carrying on any great war - without such resource I say it will be impossible for the taxpayers of the United Kingdom to continue to bear alone this vast ever-increasing burden for the naval defence of the Empire". He asked that the Colonies be urged to take their share in the defence of the Empire. He pleaded for a more unselfish patriotism which could raise itself to consider the needs, not of any particular community, but the common needs of the "great and varied Empire" and if that were done he felt sure, he said, "that in the building up of empire we shall prove ourselves in the future, as we have shown ourselves in the past, pioneers of enlightenment whom the world may well be content to follow."

Balfour quite agreed that the Colonies bore a "relatively important part" in what was "no doubt, or ought to be, theoretically, a common Imperial burden." It had been right to protect the colonies when they were children, but now that they were equals they should assert more independence. He earnestly hoped that the temper of the next Conference would "not be how much can each fragment of the Empire get out of the other fragments of the Empire but rather how much can each fragment of the Empire give to the common whole. It is not what we are to get each for himself; it is not what we are to give to this or to that self-governing entity within our borders; it is what every self-governing fragment of this great whole can itself contribute to a common object, and of these common objects defence certainly

stands in the very first rank."[1] This, briefly, was the Imperialist theory of concerted action.

The Conference of 1902 pointed emphatically to the neglect the Colonies were showing in defence and that the British Navy was being called on to defend their trade in consequence. It was shown that the annual value of British Trade (including Bullion and Specie) which it was the ultimate object of the Navy to protect, amounted, in 1900, to :-

Trade of the United Kingdom with foreign countries,	£711,838,000
Ditto with British Dominions beyond the Seas.....	237,098,000
	£948,936,000
Trade of British Dominions beyond the Seas with Foreign Countries and among themselves	£254,342,000
Total Trade of the Empire.....	£1,203,278,000

It was thus seen that about one fifth of the trade of the Empire was not directly connected with the United Kingdom.[2]

It was emphasised by the Admiralty that the trade passing the West Coast of Africa had a minimum value of £140,000,000 per annum, of which ¼ was with South African ports, 1/3 with Australasia, and ¼ with South America. Consequently South Africa, Australasia, and New Zealand were interested in the maintenance of a squadron on the West Coast of Africa sufficiently powerful to protect this trade.[3]

The trade of Canada in 1900 amounted to £76,582,000 of which only about £31,341,000 was with the United Kingdom, £1,882,000

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1. The speeches quoted here are reported in The Times, December 12, 1904.
2. Cd.1597 of 1903, as an amended version of the Memo. printed on pp.54-57 of Cd.1299, October 1902. The figure £254,342,000 was arrived at by deducting a sum of £72,624,000 from the sum of the total amounts of trade of all the Dominions, in order to allow for the duplication of the reciprocal trade of all those Dominions among themselves.
3. Cd. 1299, p.56.

with other British Dominions, and the remainder with Foreign countries, including the United States. Canada was therefore interested in the maintenance of British naval supremacy to protect, not only her North American trade, but the trade over the whole route.

Despite this common interest, however, the cost of maintaining the British Squadrons on these stations was borne by the British taxpayer aside from annual spontaneously-offered payments of £30,000 from the Cape of Good Hope and £12,000 from Natal.

The Board of Admiralty had prepared a Memorandum with an impressive array of figures. The proportion of naval contribution per head, estimating only the white population throughout the Empire gave the United Kingdom 15s. 2d. per head per annum, Cape Colony 1s. 10¼d., the Commonwealth of Australia, 1s. 0¾d., the Dominion of Canada, Nil., Natal 10s., 9¼d, Newfoundland 3½d., and New Zealand, 1s. 0¼d. Naval and military expenditure combined gave the figures of £1. 9s. 2¾d. for the United Kingdom, 2s. for Canada, 10d¾ for Newfoundland, 3s. 5d. for New South Wales, 3s. 3d. for Victoria, 3s.9¼d. for Queensland, 1s. 9d. for South Australia, 1s 11¾d. for Western Australia, 1s.6d. for Tasmania, 3s.4d. for New Zealand, 2s.11¾d. for Cape of Good Hope, and 5s.1¾d. for Natal according to the Military and Naval Expenditure of the British Empire for 1898-99.[1.]

Regarding even the statistics of the South African War, it was discovered that while the United Kingdom expended £5 7s. 2d. per head of population, New Zealand, the largest contributor of the colonies, had only expended 8s.8d. and Canada 2s.4d. In

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1. Colonial Conference 1902, Cd. 1299, Appendix 1. p.42. Slightly changed in Appendix A. p. 7 included in Cd. 1597 - year 1903, as amended.

respect of Colonial support in the South African War the Mother Country was in the dilemma of the pastor's wife in "Frederica," who had expected a pig on the festive occasion and got a goose. Neither was officially allowed to expect anything and therefore could not complain too loudly. But it did seem that after all the Jubilee Sermons the Colonies might have done a bit better.[1.]

It was pointed out by Major-General Hutton in his Memo. on the Military Forces of the Commonwealth, that defence of Australia could not be considered apart from the defence of Australian interests. Australia depended for its commercial success and future development, first, upon its seaborne trade and, second, on the existence, maintenance, and extension of fixed markets for its progress outside Australian waters. It was evident, then, that Australian interests could not be assured by the defence alone of Australian soil.[2.]

The Australian Constitution demanded, so it was argued, that the Commonwealth Government defend all its States, and so Australia must be prepared to make secure, not only her trade centres, but her naval bases as well, to allow the navy freedom of movement.

The most valuable of the statistical arguments, though one not pressed upon the notice of the Colonies as forcefully as its merit deserved, was that which compared the military and naval expenditures of other countries with those of the Colonies. Holland had a population of over two hundred thousand less than that of Canada, yet Holland had a total Defence expenditure of

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1. Appendix 2, Cd. 1299.
2. Cd. 1299, op.cit. Appendix V. p.64ff.

£3,211,992 which contrasted with Canada's £433,735. Canada's Defence expenditure of 1.63s. per head of population did not bulk very large when it was considered that comparative figure for Belgium was 6.27, for the United States, 8.50, for Germany, 14.72, for France 21.18, and for Great Britain, 23.28.[1.]

Mr Chamberlain told the Colonial Conference delegates that "while the Colonies were young and poor" they were not so desirable plums for other nations and the Mother Country was glad to support her children....Now that the Colonies are rich and powerful with a material prosperity promising to rival that of the United Kingdom it was "inconsistent with their dignity as nations" that they should leave the burdens on the shoulders of the Mother Country. "And", he argued, "I would beg of you in this relation to bear in mind that you are not asked - your people are not asked - to put upon their own shoulders any burden for the exclusive advantage of the Mother Country. On the contrary, if the United Kingdom stood alone, as a mere speck in the northern sea, it is certain that its expenditure for these purposes of defence might be immensely curtailed. It is owing to its duties and obligations to its Colonies throughout the empire; it is owing to its trade with those Colonies, a trade in which of course they are equally interested with ourselves, that the necessity has been cast upon us to make these enormous preparations."[2.]

A writer in the Fortnightly Review in pleading the case for a central navy was emphatic in saying that, even if the aggregate outlay on the China squadron were held to be a charge to be borne by the Mother Country, "although this force is Australia's most

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1. Cd. 1299, op.cit., Appendix A., p.72.
2. Ibid, p.2.

powerful defence", the cost of the Colonial squadrons amounted to not less than about 2½ millions annually apart from the general defence afforded to the Empire by the British Fleet as a whole. "An Imperial Navy for Imperial needs should be the watchword, and Imperial needs do not embrace the local defence of the self-governing Colonies at the expense of the residents of the United Kingdom."[1.]

Another writer bitterly complained that, even as the brunt of the danger in the Boer war fell on the Mother Country, so the United States might imperil Canadian interests or independence and the brunt of the struggle "would again fall on the forty millions of these islands, and would affect but remotely the wealth and independence of a federated South Africa, an Australia, or a New Zealand."[2.] He thought that the self-supporting States should contribute in an equal degree in the event of Federation to the support of those dependencies not yet able to stand alone.

Mr Arthur H. Loring, the Hon. Secretary of the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee, wrote to the press quite carried away with righteous indignation at the Canadian position, Canada being the most recalcitrant of the Colonies in this defence matter. Their position seemed to be, "We will not take our share in the defence of the Empire; responsibility is with the United Kingdom; let us leave it there. If we do spend anything upon naval and military matters, let it be in making ourselves doubly secure. We can help the Empire if we choose."[3.]

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1. Archibald S. Hurd, The Navy that we Need, The Fort. Rev., August 1903, Vol. 74, p.277ff.
2. Sir Harry H. Johnston, Problems of Empire, The 19th Cent. May 1902, Vol.51 p. 718.
3. The Times, 9 Jan. 1903.

He wrote again in terms that shocked even the Imperialists, who did love their Empire, and would have been mightily sorry if, for pecuniary reasons, it had in any degree dissolved further. This time Mr Loring suggested that a term be placed to the responsibility of the United Kingdom for the defence of the self-governing colonies thus forcing the hand of the Colonies. There would then be the possibilities that: 1. The Colonies would either join with the United Kingdom in defence and the essentials of federation of the Empire would have been attained upon a basis of mutual agreement, or, 2. None of the Colonies might agree and then they could make their own arrangements and The United Kingdom would be relieved of an immense weight of responsibility, which would be limited in the future to the care of her actual Empire. She would then be free to develop her own military resources, combining with such self-protecting communities as wished to co-operate.[1.]

This was too much even for the Times and the National Review both of which had conducted a continual tirade against the Colonies because of their attitude in this matter. The Times thought Loring's view would be fatal, though the journal spoke of the Colonies that "their reluctance to leave the supreme direction of the naval forces of the Empire in the hands of the Imperial Government seems utterly unreasonable; some might even call it shabby."[2.] The National Review thought Loring's "a foolish and utterly futile suggestion which happily has no serious public opinion in this country."[3.]

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1. The Times, Jan. 19, 1903.
2. The Times, Jan. 2, 1903.
3. The Nat. Rev., April 1903, Vol.41, pp. 326-327. Canada and Imperial Defence.

Lt.-Colonel A.W.A. Pollock, Editor of the United Service Magazine, began a series of combative letters, holding that an alliance of armies or navies was "second best" to homogeneous forces of a single state, yet it was better than being alone. He advised the colonies be not pressed, for by getting what one could, "free will contributions" might yet "increase to formidable proportions."[1.] Loring denied the imputation that he wished the Empire severed and held that he merely suggested a way by which a settled policy might be arrived at.[2.]

The attitude of the Colonies at the Conference was disappointing to the general British public, and it certainly galled Mr Chamberlain, although he kept his phrases under better control than Loring. One journal, obviously disappointed with the "particularist" attitude of the Colonial Premiers, thought the "manifest aversion....to place their men and money at the disposal of the British department" was explained only by its inefficiency during the South African War. It decided that, "had our department been characterised by the same businesslike spirit and high efficiency as the German there would have been no difficulty in securing a greater centralisation of control."[3.]

The disappointment was obvious and general, however, after the Conference. Mr John Godard pointed out the tremendous growth of Imperial expenditure and the "inordinate sacrifice" of the Mother Country in defence of her colonies. They were so ungrateful that even in the South African War they helped only "at a

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1. Pollock, The Colonies and Imperial Defence, Macmillan's Mag., June 1903, Vol. 88, p.104.
2. Loring, The Colonies and Imperial Defence, Macmillan's Mag. July 1903, Vol.88, p.213ff.
3. Nat. Rev., Sept. 1902, Vo. 40, p.146.

proportionate cost to us of about five times the hire of our own soldiers[1] although, so far as Canada is concerned, Mr Carnegie has pointed out that she sent many more thousands of her sons to fight in the Northern ranks in the great Civil War, and that at the same rate as paid to the American regular." To the colonies it was vain to look for help, and they did not give the slightest indication of an intention to come to the assistance of the Mother Country. While "traditions, kinship, and the ties of race partly operate in the direction of maintaining the status quo there seems little doubt that their allegiance is largely based upon self-interest, and that if they thought it to their interest to sever the connection they would not hesitate to sever it." So he arrived at the conclusion that Britain must do away with her Empire and Militarism. It appeared that "egoism, not less than altruism, bids us abjure the doctrine of racial supremacy."[2]

How did the Dominions meet the apparently indisputable arguments of the Mother Country? In the first place, as had been remarked, it was never seriously denied that the theory of efficiency in the Imperial plan was quite reasonable and sound in itself, and that the dislike for the idea came from its connotations.

It is a fact that the gentlemen who pressed the argument of "gratitude" had a poor knowledge of colonial psychology. The argument was accepted from Sir R. Borden and Prof. Paterson as colonials, but there are few more irritating things - and this

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1. In reply to question: Mr Brodrick: "The Australian troops at the front are paid by the Imperial Government at the same rates as the Regular forces." H. C. Debates, 6 Mar. 1900, Vol. 80, p.201.
2. Godard, The Burden of Empire. The West. Rev., Mar.1904, Vol. 161, p.268ff. The first article appeared in Feb. issue, 1904.

is a point admirably understood by Mr Jebb - than to be continually told that you have been clothed and fed by your parents for many years and now it is time for you to do your share. It questions your honour and drives you back on the defensive, insulted and surly. Yet there are many people in Britain today who will offend the visitor from overseas by saying aggressively, "But you forget the years we protected you....." It is all very well for the Imperialists to argue that if Great Britain had no Empire she would scarcely be an object of attack,[1] but it is quite clear that if Great Britain had no Empire she would not be Great Britain. Certainly Canada derived little benefit from India or other British colonies. Whose fault was it that Britain had such large possessions? They had made Great Britain, not Canada, rich.

But was it true that dismemberment of the Empire would mean a great decrease in British naval expenditure? It could be argued that if Great Britain surrendered every foot of land beyond her own shores, she could not afford to give up a single torpedo-destroyer, for the bread of her inhabitants was solely dependent upon her naval supremacy to surrender which would render the British Isles completely impotent.[2] Sea Power was essential to the livelihood of English people, essential for English expansion, for English protection. The rebuttal may be a bit too sweeping, but there us certainly some truth in it.

Further, was it true that Great Britain had always considered that the Colonies who were now Dominions must be considered in any

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1. Spenser Wilkinson, Thoughts on Imperial Defence, U.E., July 1910, Vol.i. But the words are common enough.
2. ex. P. A. Silburn, The Governance of the Empire, pp.230-231.

scheme of defence? It is true that Britain never denied her obligation to defend them, and had asserted such obligation, but she had known a formidable agitation to rid herself of them and surely that meant the same thing as cessation of their defence. It was fear of being thrown upon her own resources that had been one of the reasons for Canadian Federation.[1] There was also something curious in the fact that the United Kingdom should say that the Post-Office must pay its way, that Colonies enjoying responsible Government should assume the responsibility and cost of military defence, even if that defence entailed merely internal order and security, and that expenditure on the Colonies should by reason of their tariffs be considered an economic crime, yet naval protection should be gratuitous. It hardly answers the Dominion to reply that it is right that a Colony enjoying responsible Government should be able to assure its internal security, for there is little more reason why a colony which enjoys responsible Government should not care for its external as well as internal security. The point is, why was a line of demarcation drawn between the Navy and all else? It may be replied that the Navy was alone necessary to protect the Dominion which is incorrect, since the only real danger of war as far as Canada was concerned was with the United States who could only be met by an army. If Britain considered Canada as integral in any scheme of Imperial defence could she have withdrawn her army from Canada?

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1. Debates of Confederation, passim; Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada, pp.276-278; Egerton, A Short History of British Colonial Policy, pp.363-366.

Moreover, an era of fort-building was begun after the report of a Royal Commission appointed in 1859,[1] due probably to the fact that for more than half a century after Nelson's death the most brilliant achievements of British arms as in India or in the Crimea were performed on shore, and the efficacy of the Navy sank in popular estimation. So we are told that it seemed the force of circumstances were converting Britain from a naval into a military nation for, although the belief in the efficacy of naval defence was not extinct, it had ceased to operate actively.[2] Now this defensive system, remarks an expert, promised no protection[3] to the British Empire beyond the sea in the event of war. Then began a great race in armaments from 1873 onwards, but the reasons most potent for Britain joining in the competition were the reasons of self-preservation - she must import food and raw material, have freedom of exportation or lose her wealth and the means of supporting a war, and protect her trade routes.[4] It was such an attitude that led men to condemn the ill-conceived schemes of Lord Palmerston which wasted money on coastal defence to the neglect of the navy.[5] From this point of view, British defence strategy does not appear so benevolent.

The change in point of view synchronised with the movement to Imperial consolidation, that is, from about 1875.[6] In May, 1888, Lord Wolseley, who was then at the height of his power as the leading British solider, declared that "as long as the Navy

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1. Sir Geo.S. Clarke, Imperial Defence, pp.166-167.
2. Ibid, pp.167-168; Sir Cyprian Bridge, The Share of the Fleet in the Defence of the Empire, The Navy Annual, 1908, p.143.
3. Ibid, p.145.
4. Ibid, p.149.
5. Sir Geo. S. Clarke, Fortification, pp.182-275.
6. Vide Col. J.F.C. Fuller, Imperial Defence, 1588-1914, Ch.iii, p.25ff: The Decadence of Imperial Defence, 1816-1874; Ch.iv, p. 38ff: The Renaissance of Imperial Defence, 1875-1902.

is as weak as it is at this moment, Her Majesty's Army cannot hold its own all over the world, dispersed as it is."[1] Sir John Colomb ante-dated the teaching of Mahan and consistently pressed for an Imperial policy, in which he was supported by Lord Beresford and a school of thought that included Arnold-Forster as one of its leading spirits. The importance of naval power was shown in the war between China and Japan in 1894 and strongly affected British opinion.

Let us look at Australia and Canada more closely from the point of view of imperial defence. To take Australia first, the Commonwealth appeared a very "loyal" colony. In 1881 following the reverse at Laing's Nek Australia offered the home government 2,000 men and in the South African War Queensland was the first colony to offer help. In that war over 16,000 Australians served.[2]

The Memorandum submitted by Australia regarding defence to the Conference of 1902 certainly seems in keeping with the best Imperialist thought. Australia wanted an augmented navy for, while the sea supremacy of Great Britain was maintained Australia was fairly safe from invasion, nevertheless in time of war with the progress of Foreign Powers in cruiser construction her floating trade and coastal towns would be exposed. She agreed with Imperial authorities that it was beyond the powers of the Commonwealth at once to create an adequate force for defence, and that it could only be obtained by an arrangement with the Imperial authorities. "In order to provide even the smallest squadron

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1. A. Hurd, The Defences of the Empire, p.8.
2. Sir Charles Lucas, The Empire at War, pp.132-133.

proposed by Admiral Beaumont", reads the Memorandum, of two first-class and six second-class cruisers, together with depots and stores, would probably cost £3,600,000 on the following basis :-

2 first-class cruisers	£1,000,000
6 second-class cruisers	£2,500,000
Depots and stores,(naval yards, etc.) . . .	100,000
Total capital cost. . . .	£3,600,000

The maintenance would be about a million a year it was estimated, including interest on the capital expenditure of 5%.

The Memorandum continued that under existing conditions, the establishment of an Australian Navy could not be recommended, and even if it were established, it would not be very efficient, "for besides the enormous cost of replacing the fleet from time to time with more modern ships, there would be no change for the officers and crews, who would go on year after year in the same ships, subject to the same influences, and... with deteriorating effects."

It is not surprising, therefore, to find it argued that, "We must altogether get rid of the idea that we have different interests from those of the rest of the Empire, and we must look at the matter from a broad common standpoint. If the British nation is at war, so are we; if it gains victories or suffers disasters, so do we; and therefore it is of the same vital interest to us as to the rest of the Empire that our supremacy on the ocean shall be maintained." The blessing of peace, security, and advantages of British citizenship bring the reflection that, "So our aim and object should be to make the Royal Navy

the Empire's Navy, supported by the whole of the self-governing portions of the Empire, and not solely....by the people of the British Isles... It is.. our plain duty to take a part in the additional obligations cast upon the Mother Country by the expansion of the Empire, and the extra burdens cast upon her in maintaining our naval supremacy."[1.]

This statement hardly represented Australian feeling on defence. In 1899 a committee of naval officers had been appointed by the Australian colonies to devise a plan and they submitted a recommendation that the subsidy vote as applied to the maintenance of the British Navy, be diverted to training and maintaining an Australian naval force of about 3,000 men, paid and entirely controlled by the Federal Government, to be available in war-time as a reserve force to man five effective cruisers lent by the Imperial authorities and as a reserve for a British fleet.[2.]

The Times considered the proposals "inadequate, inconsequent, and altogether inadmissible. If the members had consulted the Admiral in command of the Australian station he would probably have told them that there is, and can be, no such thing as a 'naval defence for Australia' regarded as something distinct from the defence of the whole Empire on the seas." Since the naval defence of the Empire was "essentially the business of the British Navy" it must "in all essential respects be under the absolute control of the British Admiralty....For political reasons, adequate in themselves, though perhaps not entirely consistent with abstract principles, the Admiralty have agreed that the ships

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1. Cd. 1299, op.cit. Memo. submitted by Australia. p.9.ff.
2. Vide Jebb, Colonial Nationalism, op.cit., p.152ff.

maintained out of the Australian contribution towards the cost of Imperial defence shall not be entirely free to operate outside the limits of the Australian Station." But this was considered by the Times to be a maximum concession to "local sentiment." It thought a direct contribution in money without conditions or restrictions of any kind and the establishment and maintenance of a Naval Reserve to be subject "in all essential respects to the supreme control of the Admiralty" would be the best forms of assistance. But the Australian scheme of local navy violated "every rational principle of naval organization and efficiency."[1] The Times also took exception to an article in the Melbourne Age which expressed dissatisfaction with an arrangement which left the Australian Squadron so controlled by the British Admiralty that it might be removed "in time of danger in order to be used in the larger strategy of the high seas, perhaps thousands of miles distant."[2]

This article in the Melbourne Age hit on the real Australian grievance against a British-controlled navy. While she was given every assurance that she would be treated exactly as the United Kingdom was treated in the matter of defence and dispersion of the Navy, Australia feared that there was no chance of The Channel being unguarded, but that there was a great likelihood of colonial shores being unguarded. There were many Englishmen, including Lord Carrington, Governor of New South Wales in 1887, who thought the Australian objection a reasonable one. Lord Carrington in a letter to the Times objected strongly to that Imperial organ calling the Australian attitude "shabby" and told the Imperialists

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1. The Times, 6 Oct. 1899.
2. The Times, 2 Jan. 1903.

that "Sir Wilfrid Laurier struck the chord of Colonial feeling when he flatly refused to fall in with proposals of this kind."[1]

Norwood Young put the Australian case for a local and national navy very well indeed. Whether it is a pleasing or convincing case is another matter. He pointed out that there were three classes of trade. In Anglo-Australian trade Great Britain must protect her own interests. Foreign Australian trade, except for one belligerent, was with neutrals and consequently did not need British assistance. In the third class, inter-colonial trade, it could not be shown that British assistance was intentional or burdensome to the British taxpayer. He used an argument often made that in war an independent Australia might not be neutral but an enemy, and even as the loss of the United States added to Britain's foes in the Napoleonic war, so Australia could become a possible foe. It was true that Great Britain incurred some odium in acting as advocate in colonial quarrels, but Australia fought for Great Britain in South Africa. The Colonies were invaluable as naval bases. It was ridiculous, so he argued, to maintain that the British Fleet was prepared to go anywhere. He quoted Lord Brassey who had once said, "For harbour defence we have torpedo boats and submarines....To defend our coasts and home ports we have the Reserve Squadron, the port guardships.... the Majestic type is the most suitable for the Mediterranean and the Canopus for the Atlantic." On the other hand, Young contended, the conquest of Australia would be a herculean task, not likely to be undertaken as worth the trouble. And, moreover, an independent Australia would be much less liable to attack - a most specious argument.

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1. The Times, 9 Jan. 1903.

The chief objection to cash money contributions he thought to be that there was no guarantee that the money would be used for the purpose intended. It would lessen the weight on the British taxpayer but might give no further strength to the navy. Further a cash contribution would not make an Imperial but a British fleet.

He deemed it very unfortunate that, as soon as the Mother Country discovered "to her own intense astonishment, that Australian loyalty was a commodity of real value," she pressed for Australian contributions to defence to be increased by five times, and when Australians showed a desire to be trained for sea warfare "she exploited the 'maritime spirit' for the collection of recruits for the British Navy". Efforts also were being made to gain an Australian preference on British goods. He bitterly accused the Mother Country of still continuing "in her old fashioned way, to look upon them (the colonies) as 'possessions' from which a profit should be made."

Despite this long harangue his desires were modest enough. Australians, he said, wished "the loan of British ships, to be manned by Australians, under the supreme command of a British officer, but to some extent independent of the British Navy," to "appeal to the patriotism, the self-governing capacity, the enterprise characteristic of Australians."[1] The outline is valuable because it is so typical.

Regarding her military defence, in March 1901 the Commonwealth had taken over from the States the charge of naval and military defence.[2] Defence Acts were passed in 1903 and 1904

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1. Norwood Young, Australian Loyalty and the British Navy, Un. Serv. Mag., Feb. 1903, Vol.26.
2. Lucas, The Empire at War, pp.180-181.

making all male citizens liable for enlistment between the ages of 18 and 60, though such service was only intended as local defence. The Defence Force was divided into permanent and citizen forces, the former being enlisted for continuous service as specified by contract, and the citizen forces including a paid militia and volunteers. At first General Hutton was commandant, but Australia followed Canada in avoiding conflict between the military and civil authorities, to set up by an Act of 1904 a Council of Defence, a Military Board, and an Inspector-General. The advance made in these matters was not considerable, for in 1908 it is doubtful if the military efficiency was as great as it had been in 1900.[1.]

Canada's position differed from that of Australia in two outstanding particulars. In the first place, Canada did not have the danger from attack that Australia seemed to have. It is well to use the verb "seemed" because it is very doubtful that the contending Powers, Japan, the United States, and Germany would ever allow Australia or New Zealand to be held by another Power. Canada was safely sheltered, in isolation from Europe, under the shadow of the Munroe doctrine, and on the whole with very little danger from American aggression after the Republic's little Imperialist sputter in the nineties and the Alaska Boundary bitterness wore away.

Canada differed from Australia, also, in that she had a large element of population which felt no loyalty whatever to Britain as the home of their fathers or their traditions. The Canadian had a wholesome dread of British Imperialism, and led by French-Bourassa made a great commotion on every opportunity. It

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1. Imperial Unity, pp. 303-304.

has long been a most valuable political war-cry in French Canada - Mr Meighen, quondam leader of the Conservative party in Canada, will testify to it - to raise the possibility that their sons may have to follow in the mad wake of British Imperialism. And Laurier, the Prime Minister of Canada, was of French Canada. It would not be correct by any means to say that the British element was not nationalist. It is only correct to say that the French were the more relentlessly so. They felt none of the calls of "racial Imperialism." Ontario was the Canadian centre of Imperialism; Quebec that of Nationalism.

Because Canada was so adamant in her refusals to co-operate in Imperial defence it was on Canada that the full force of the attack of the Imperialists fell. Canada was the spearhead of nationalism in the colonies: if she could have been won to Imperialism, Federation would not have been removed from practical politics by any means. New Zealand was ardent in favour of Imperialism; and at times Australia's voice joined; but Canada had Laurier for leader in those feverish years from 1897 to 1911 and his leadership of Nationalism never faltered.

Mr H. F. Wyatt, delivering an address upon returning from a tour round "Greater Britain" on behalf of the Navy League, laid the blame for the attitude of the colonies regarding local navies to the Labour representatives in Australia, and the French in Canada. He hit savagely at the Canadian feeling of immunity from attack. Canada was putting her hopes exclusively on naval strength, that is, the defeat of the British navy would be followed by the blocking of Canadian ports and then the fleet of the United States would be called upon. "The real nature of your plan", he

had said to Canada in his tour, "is for an alliance between the Republic and the British Empire.....Your position then, under this objection, is that you trust to two fleets instead of one, and that you contribute to neither." "The root cause of the backwardness of our brethren in this matter," Mr Wyatt told the Royal Colonial Institute, was "want of familiarity with problems of war and of international relationships." His idea was to create manifold methods of educating the colonies in the "realities of international action", and concluded by saying that Goethe's famous prayer for 'more light' was the prayer with which any survey of the Empire must close in these days.[1.]

The address was well-received by Sir John Colomb, Mr T.A. Brassey, and Dr Miller Maguire who thought it cleared their minds of cant and dispelled "the mists of philosophic humanitarianism", but Dr G. R. Parkin, a veteran in the cause of Imperialism, put in some timely remarks. He recalled that it was necessary twenty-five years ago to teach British people that there was any use in keeping the colonies at all. It was a large demand to make on the Colonies to ask them to grasp at once the question of sea power. As to the attitude of the French Canadians, up to two years ago it seemed certain that any great development of British naval power was meant as a counterpoise to France. Here speaks the Canadian. Canada he pointed out was spending 60,000,000 dollars on new railway line. Sixty thousand emigrants went from the United Kingdom to Canada in the past year, and perhaps 100,000 more would go this year, for all of whom judiciary, schools, churches, et cetera, must be

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1. Wyatt, The Navy and the Empire, R.C.I. Dec.6, 1904, Vol.36, p. 39ff.

provided. All those going into the west must be furnished with the appliances of civilization.

Dr Parkin put one of Canada's stock arguments against contribution to defence in that Canada needed to develop her country and establish institutions.[1.]

Another of the chief arguments was that such exaction would be taxation without representation, to which it was replied that Canada would be voting the contribution herself so that it was in no wise exacted. Lieutenant Hordern brought up a strange argument to combat Canada's plea that such support derogated from the principle of self-government. "For a Colony which is composed of Federated States with their own Legislatures, and would like to include Newfoundland, to argue that the question of combination for defence is a departure from the principle of self-government is amazing, and must strike at the principle of their own Federation." Then each "State Legislature" should have its own militia and contribute nothing to the force of the Dominion Government.[2.] His argument was certainly amazing for the crux of the matter was that the Empire unlike the Colonies was not composed of "Federated States," a fact which the Imperialists were appreciating with more and more clearness, so that again and again we hear that some form of an Imperial Council to make an effective preliminary at least to Federation was an absolute prerequisite to effectual discussion of mutual liability in, and contribution to defence.[3.] It was being everywhere maintained

1. Vide also Edward Farrier, The next Colonial Conference - A Canadian Opinion, op.cit. Rev., Dec. 1905, Vol.78.
2. Lieut.L.H.Hordern, The Colonies and the Navy, The Un.Serv. Mag., Dec.1902, Vol.26, pp.240-241.
3. As:Bernard Holland, Imperium et Libertas, p.316. Lieut.-Col.A.W. A.Pollock, The Colonies and Imperial Defence, Macmillan's Mag., Aug.1903, Vol88 p.288: "No Scheme of imperial defence worthy of the name stands the smallest chance of acceptance until imperial federation has first been accomplished." Lieut.-Col. E.S. May, Principles and Problems of Imperial Defence, op.cit.p.293. "An Imperial Parliament, Imperial taxes, andan Imperial exchequer must be created before the battalions of an Imperial army can be mustered."

that the problem of taxation without representation - and taxation of the nations of the Commonwealth was the hub of the defence scheme - could not be settled without a representative council. It was also being recognised that this council must come as a gradual growth. It could not be - it must not be - hurried into being, but must have a hold on the affections of the people who had been educated to accept its development.

The Memorandum by the Canadian Ministers, submitted to the Conference of 1902, gave the nationalist position quite clearly. The Ministers desired to point out that their objections arose, "not so much from the expense involved, as from a belief that the acceptance of the proposals would entail an important departure from the principle of Colonial self-government." Canada valued too highly its "measure of local independence".....which had been "so productive of beneficial results both as respects the material progress of the country and the strengthening of the ties that bind it to the Mother-land." It was further remarked that Canada had voluntarily increased her defence expenditure until at the present time she was expending about two million dollars annually on her militia. She had also, in recent years, greatly improved the organisation of her forces until they were approaching a state of satisfactory efficiency. Of this fact her contingents sent to South Africa were proof as their conduct showed them excellent soldiers. The advice and assistance of experienced Imperial officers would be welcomed in removing defects that might still remain. The Canadian Government were prepared to consider the naval side of defence as well, and it was hoped at an early date to form a Naval Reserve from sea-coast men. The Ministers

fully appreciated that obligation of the Dominion to make expenditures for the purposes of defence in proportion to the increasing wealth and population of the country in a way to relieve the tax-payers of the Mother Country, but they would not fall in with the schemes proposed by Lord Selborne and Mr St. John Brodrick because they were inconsistent with self-government.[1.]

The emphasis placed by the Canadian Memorandum on self-government is important because about this time was definitely emerging into the recognition of the main body of the Imperialists the force against which they had to contend. If it had not come to be properly recognised in the main body of Imperialism in the Mother Country, it was making its way at any rate, and, while the thesis that in any form of federation local self-government must be retained had been at all times asserted, what such men as Laurier meant by self-government was beginning to appear more and more clearly in startling forms.

For instance the unhappy incident of the Earl of Dundonald, the commander of the Canadian forces, served to make clearer the real nationalism of Laurier. Dundonald's position in Canada was not a happy one - at the command of a government definitely pacifist and supported by an Opposition avowedly Imperialist with which he had much sympathy. Moreover, his predecessor, General Hutton, had had some friction with the Department of Militia and Defence. With a soldier's impatience of political meddling, he expressed his grievance at a military dinner of June, 1904 with the interference of the Canadian Ministry in the appointment of officers.

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1. Cd. 1299, Appendix VI., pp.73-74.

Laurier for once forgot diplomacy. He would teach this "foreigner" that this was a country with a responsible Government, and had him dismissed without delay. Lord Dundonald protested that the dinner was supposed to be private and the Opposition came out emphatically on his side largely because it was an Opposition.

The language of the Prime Minister and the dismissal were deplored in Britain where popular sympathy went out to anyone who tried to reform Canadian military methods. It was not the fact of dismissal[1] so much as the use of the word "foreigner" that shocked Englishmen for, as the Nineteenth Century put it, the epithet "leaves a very bad taste in the mouth."[2] "The incident", it concluded, "ought to be a lesson to the politicians who, ignoring the work of the wise men of the past, are anxious to anticipate the work of time in cementing a closer relationship between the Mother country and the Colonies." The National Review took a much angrier tone, and was very regretful that Dundonald quite probably would be the last Imperial Officer to hold this command, and thus a valuable link between the Mother Country and the Dominion will have been snapped."[3] It took some pleasure in quoting Dundonald's apologia to the Canadian Press as a warning "which Canadians would do well to take to heart". The quotation included his desire to "emphatically warn the people of Canada that, though they may be indebted for their territory, and, indeed, for their national existence, to the forbearance of others, they are, as regards their preparations for war and their

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1. Though the British Empire Rev. July 1904, strangely thought it "unconstitutional."
2. 19th Cent., July, 1904, Vol.56, p.161, Wemyss Reid, "Last Month" Laurier explained that the word had a different ~~one~~ (meaning) in French.
3. Nat. Rev., July, 1904, Vol.43, p.870.

state of readiness to resist aggression successfully, living in a fool's paradise."[1.]

The taking over by the Canadian Government of the garrisons of Halifax and Esquimalt made still clearer the Canadian position in regard to defence.

Mr Lyttelton sent a despatch gratefully accepting the renewed offer of the Canadian Government to take over the responsibility of the defence of the two stations, and suggested that, since it would be some time before Canada could replace the British troops, arrangements might be made for retaining the Imperial troops whose expense would be defrayed by the payment of £200,000 per annum.[2.]

The Canadian Government, suspicious of even the best intentions, and no doubt this suggestion was offensive to the nationalist spirit, replied that the offer of the services of the Imperial troops would be cordially accepted, but that it would be preferable that the cost of maintenance of these troops should be defrayed directly by Canada, and under the responsibility of the Canadian Government, rather than by the payment of a lump sum to the War Office.[3.] It was a further earnest of the independence of the Canadian spirit that the War Office was requested to arrange that officers of the Canadian Militia should be gazetted temporarily to commissions in the Imperial Army, in order that they might be legally entitled to exercise command over Imperial troops[4.] and that the command should be handed over by the

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1. Nat. Rev. op.cit., p.878. Also a lengthy discussion in the August number, 1904.
2. Cd. 2565, 1905, p.2.
3. Ibid, p.3.
4. Ibid, p.4.

present Officer Commanding to the Commanding Officers of the Dominions forces, told off for that purpose, while the Imperial Officers and Headquarter staffs should be relieved of their duties.

The War Office regretted that legal and constitutional considerations made it impossible for them to transfer regular British troops to the direct payment and administration of the Colonial authorities as suggested. They did not overlook the Canadian notice that the payment of a lump sum to the War Office was also constitutionally open to objection, but they hoped that, in view of the fact that contributions representing half the cost of the Esquimalt garrison had been paid by Canada for many years past, the objection might not be found insuperable on this occasion.[1] They offered to supply Canada with detailed accounts of expenditure in support of claims to be made for reimbursement. Nor could they concur in the suggestion that the present Officer Commanding the Imperial Troops should hand over his command to Dominion Commanding Officers until the relative positions of Imperial and Canadian officers had been more definitely settled, a point which was then under the consideration of the Council.

A modification of the original proposals was arranged whereby the Army Council would allow officers and men of the troops of the two garrisons to be transferred should they be willing. Canada would take over the entire control of the defences and garrison of Halifax from July 1, relieving all the Imperial troops by her own, and would pay to the War Office the whole cost of the maintenance of Esquimalt defences and garrison,

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1. Cd. 2565, 1905, pp.4-5.

instead of only one-half as at present, not later than July 1, 1906. The Army Council should further allow a small number of officers of all branches of the Service to be seconded in the Imperial Army for an agreed length of time for temporary service with the Canadian forces.[1.]

Almost synchronous with this transfer came the publication of that superb book, "Studies in Colonial Nationalism," by Mr Jebb to show that Englishmen were appreciating the alignment of Nationalists, Colonialists, and Imperialists. Sir Robert Giffen had expressed himself as in favour of local defence "without any idea of contributions to a distant centre",[2.] but he had not devised any feasible plan as distinct from a centralised defence organisation, and it is not until Mr Jebb's book that we find "patriotism" being set up as distinct from "loyalty" and "colonialist" distinguished from "nationalist". He defined a colonialist scheme of defence as such a one as that which Sir John Forrest submitted to the Conference of 1902,[3.] wherein Australia would not be developing an independent navy but subscribing to one directed by the British Government: paying for mercenary troops as it were. Jebb scolded Sir Edmund Barton right roundly for supporting the Bill in the Australian House providing for a defence on the outlines suggested by the Australian Memorandum, putting the defence at the disposal of the British Government. Where Barton argues that, "If an Englishman in England pays from 15s. to 17s. towards the maintenance of the navy, why should an Englishman in

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1. Cd. 2565, 1905, p.7. Evidently, judging from a despatch of the War Office, July 12, 1905, that Office concurred.
2. Giffen, Economic EInquiries and Studies, Vol.ii, p.376; Yet he stressed that need for the development and organisation of resources, ibid, pp.240-241.
3. Vide supra.

Australia object to pay 1s.?" Jebb writes with some punch, "It was not by appealing to 'Englishmen in Australia' that the founders of the Commonwealth won the suffrages of their countrymen."[1.]

Mr Jebb disliked the doctrine of "one fleet under one control" desiring rather that "the policy of alliance" should replace "the policy of supremacy" in the matter of defence as in all things imperial.[2.] He was therefore very pleased to note that "the strategy of official imperialism" had not outmanoeuvred the Canadian nationalists as it had in Australia. He was caustic in treating Mr Wyatt's journeyings. Imperial Federation, in the sense of the supremacy of a central parliament in Great Britain, he believed to have "passed beyond our grasp"[3.], a fact that was becoming increasingly clearer to former enthusiasts. On the other hand, "colonialism", in the sense of regarding the defence of the whole Empire as essentially England's business and urging that the duty of the colony was to "develop its resources" and refrain from taking its responsibilities in its own defence, must likewise go into limbo.[4.] The national view must take its place, a view which "feels the degradation of living upon sufferance" and "abhors the debasing theory that the status of a colony is final".[5.] Yet to such a temper the idea of defending a nation by "money sent to London" was altogether opposed.[6.] That was the lesson of the South African War: Nationalism, not Colonialism

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1. Studies in Colonial Nationalism, op.cit., pp.160-161.
2. Ibid, p.167.
3. Ibid, p.174.
4. Ibid, p.103.
5. Ibid, pp.103-104.
6. Ibid, p.106.

or Imperialism. In Mr Jebb's view, nationalism that appeared as proven by Canada's demand for to be represented by a contingent in that war.[1] It was arranged that the Colonies were to pay the cost of equipping and transporting their forces to South Africa, when the responsibility for paying their salaries and upkeep would be borne by the Imperial Government. The Colonial Governments supplemented the pay which was, on arrival in South Africa, at the same rate as that of the British soldier.[2] It was agreed further that the Canadian force should be dispatched in a single infantry battalion which was representative of Canada, rather than the first suggestion by the British authorities that the colonial troops should be supplied in units to be later incorporated into regular Imperial units. Jebb was greatly opposed to the two "colonialist" features in the arrangements between the Colonies and the United Kingdom regarding the troops supplied by the former. That of colonial units of 125 men to be distributed among English regiments on arriving and put under the command of English officers, was remedied. The other displeasing fact was that of the Imperial Government undertaking to provide pay and allowances for the contingents, treating the forces not as representing "an allied nation" but "a dependency" whose troops "were to be made the mercenaries of England."[3] The whole cost of such supply should have been borne by the colony sending the troops, which would have been accepting the assistance in accord with "the national sentiment by virtue of which the contingents had been offered."[4]

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1. Studies in Colonial Nationalism, op.cit. p.117.
2. Lucas, The Empire at War, op.cit., pp. 130-131.
3. Jebb, op.cit., p.118.
4. Ibid.

Because of the gross mismanagement of the war Mr Jebb thought it evident "that in future wars the principle of national alliance must be extended from the actual field of battle, not merely to the Imperial Cabinet which decided on peace or war, but to the authority which subsequently directs the campaign and bears the responsibility of failure or success."[1.]

The matter of the defence of the Empire, then, had after the 1902 Conference reached this impasse. The Imperialist was urging a homogeneous defence force, officers and men to be interchangeable in time of peace, with, possibly, a colonial regiment going out to India for service, uniformity in military equipment, training, and under a supreme command of the British Government. He urged that the Navy be one as the sea was one. The Nationalist flatly denied that British interests were colonial interests, that the two were identical. British interests tended too much towards the Mediterranean. Besides he wanted the dignity of a fleet and army for his own nation as the earnest of their nationality. The Imperialist could only see such action as a lack of vision of the possibilities of an organised Empire to continue the protection Great Britain had long provided, and was still providing, in maintaining "pax Britannica" and the safety of the Empire. The Nationalist, moreover, claimed the right of independent action in the event of war. In the Boer War, for example, Laurier, the very pattern of nationalism, took good care that the Canadian contingent should not create tomorrow's precedent. "I claim for Canada this," he said, "that she shall in the future

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1. Jebb, op.cit., pp. 119-120.

be at liberty to act or not to act, to interfere or not to interfere, to do just as she chooses."[1.]

The best that the Imperialist was able to get with all his campaigning, were the following items towards naval expenses :-

The Contribution of Australia increased to £200,000[2.] a year towards the cost of an improved Australasian Squadron and the establishment of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve. The contribution of New Zealand was increased to £40,000 a year towards an improved Australasian Squadron and the establishment of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve. The contribution of Cape Colony was increased to £50,000 per annum towards the general maintenance of the Navy. Natal's allocation was set at £35,000, towards the general maintenance of the Navy. Newfoundland was to contribute £3,000 per annum (and a capital sum of £18,000 for fitting up and preparing a drill ship) towards the maintenance of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve of not less than 600 men. A resolution was adopted favouring the increase of commissions to be offered Naval and Military Cadets of the Dominions. (Brought up for discussion by New Zealand.)[3.]

Canada, as has been seen, would give nothing. To the contrary, after ousting Lord Dundonald, the Minister of Militia was placed in supreme control of all military matters by the Canadian Militia Bill of August, 1904 and military officers subordinated to him. A militia council was provided to advise him and the offices of Inspector-General and Chief of the General Staff created. The Commanding Officer was dispensed with, and Inspector-General appointed, and Sir Percy Lake, a Candian on his mother's

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1. Quoted by Hall, Empire to Commonwealth, p.132.
2. Dewey, Vide p. 229.
3. Cd. 1299, p.ix.

side became Chief of the Staff.[1]

From the evidence, Imperialism seemed weakening in the matter of defence and Nationalism growing steadily in strength.

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1. Lucas, op.cit., pp.179-180.

Chapter V: The Means:
An Authoritative Imperial Body.

Whenever an effort was made to evolve some scheme to develop and co-ordinate the resources of the Empire with regard to Imperial defence, it became clear that some representative body which would have some voice in the foreign policy of the Empire and the disposal of the defence forces was an essential prerequisite. The body in which executive or advisory power was to be vested must be sufficiently august to command the respect of the Imperial public; it must have a firm grip on the affections of that public; and it must be capable of growth and enlargement if it were not fully-grown at the beginning. The institutions which seemed susceptible of being applied to the uses of an Imperial executive were the House of Commons, the House of Lords, the Privy Council, and, lastly, the Colonial Conference, in that order. Lord Brassey gave the desiderata in quoting from Mr Greswell, "The Imperial Assembly which we want must be an independent body, constitutional in its origin, representative in its character, and supreme in its decisions."[1.]

Another thing upon which all Imperialists insisted was the complete self-government by all members of the proposed union in matters relating to themselves alone. Not once but always the Imperialists expressed their objective, although it might be shaped to accommodate an immature public mind, as embodying supremacy over the Empire while maintaining inviolate the internal autonomy of the various parts. The Nationalist would retort

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1. Brassey, Papers and Addresses, p.126.

that such segregation was impossible, but if that were so, ignorance was the sorrow, not the sin of the Imperialists. The ideal which the Imperialists hoped to make concrete in the end, if only tacit in the beginning, was the relationship expressed by Professor Freeman, who wrote, "We may then recognise as a true and perfect Federal Commonwealth any collection of states in which it is equally unlawful for the Central Power to interfere with the purely internal legislation of the several members, and for the several members to enter into diplomatic relation with other Powers.[1.] Less ambitious schemes would probably have to satisfy in the beginning, but this was the vision towards which the eyes of the Imperialists were forever wistfully turning.

As stepping-stones to this ideal condition there were various proposals - representation of the Dominions at Westminster in the House of Lords or Commons, some form of advisory or executive Council, a revised Privy Council, or a development of the Colonial Conference.

The idea of including colonial members in the Imperial Parliament and allowing them to speak and vote only on matters of Imperial concern as distinct from matters that were of local interest only in the United Kingdom came up for discussion often enough, but the futility of the suggestion had been clearly recognised by Mr Forster. Cobden had appreciated its impracticability,[2.] and the majority of opinion ignored it.[3.] How could a line be drawn between subjects that were local and those that

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1. Edward A. Freeman, History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy, p.8. Freeman was not an Imperialist. Vide also, Forster, Imperial Federation, 19th Cent., Feb. 1885, Vol.17.
2. F. W. Hirst, ed. Free Trade and Other Fundamental Doctrines of the Manchester School, p.383.
3. Vide Bodelsen, op.cit., pp.132-133.

were Imperial? If the Colonial members were also members at home they would be regarded as intruders in the United Kingdom Government, and if they were not members in the Colony they would not be of much use as Colonial representatives.

Yet this idea, although as old at least as the American Revolution days,[1] persisted, so that in 1904 the Times still thought it worth its while to point out the weakness of the proposal in that it "would dislocate the Constitution" and "imperil or at least impoverish the legislative initiative and independence of the Colonies."[2] Cecil Rhodes had been a most ardent supporter of such a plan. He was opposed to Gladstone's Bill of 1886 which would not have retained Irish members at Westminster. In the solution to the Irish question, he saw "the possibility of the changes which would eventually mould and weld together all parts of the British Empire." He suggested, in writing to Parnell that "an Irish representation at Westminster would, without making any vital change in the English constitution, furnish a precedent by which the self-governing Colonies could from time to time, as they expressed a desire to contribute to Imperial expenditure, be incorporated with the Imperial Legislature."[3] In this same letter Rhodes further stated, "I do not think that it can be denied that the presence of two or three Australian members in the House would in recent years have prevented much misunderstanding upon such questions as the New Hebrides, New

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1. Vide, for example, a memorandum by Sir Julius Vogel, C.4521, Mar. 1885, proposing that the Colonies be given the right of representation in the House of Commons as a prelude to a Federal Parliament.
2. The Times, 17 Oct. 1904.
3. Vindex, Cecil Rhodes, Correspondence with Parnell, Appendix, Rhodes to Parnell, 19 June, 1888, p.843ff.

Guinea, and Chinese Immigration." As Parnell expressed in his reply to this letter his willingness to make provision for Colonial representation at Westminster in any Bill brought forward to settle the Irish problem, Rhodes gave him a cheque of £10,000 to be applied to the funds of his party.

Only with some reluctance and not with the impression of finality did Sir Herbert Samuel leave some such scheme for unification.[1] In 1900 there was a motion before the House of Commons that steps be taken to procure the representation of the Dominions at Westminster,[2] and Chamberlain lengthily explained the difficulties in the way[3] while the House narrowly escaped being counted out. Sir Frederick Pollock, addressing the Royal Colonial Institute in 1905 stated that, "No one, I believe, is now found to advocate direct representation of the Colonies in Parliament." The plan had "three fatal objections": the inconvenience of increasing the number of the House of Commons; the enormous difficulties of allotting representation in due proportion to "the several constituencies of the Empire", and the fact that it was not likely that the Colonies would send their best men, even if they consented at all.[4]

Because of the fact that Imperial questions were forever being subordinated to local politics, if haply the former were noticed to any degree, because the elected representatives were very ignorant in knowledge of the Empire and because the mother Parliament was so sadly over-burdened,[5] it seemed that the best

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1. Samuel, op.cit., p.336.
2. House of Commons Debates, 3 Apr. 1900, vol.81, p.1131ff.
3. Ibid, p.1144ff.
4. Pollock, Imperial Organisation, R.C.L., April, 1905, Vol.36, p.293.
5. For this Vide, ex. The Congestion of Business in the House of Commons, R.T. Dec. 1911, Vol.2.

form of union would be one with an Imperial Parliament and subordinate Parliaments. Thus also could the Irish Problem be solved.[1.]

In 1895 Lloyd George supported "A Bill to Establish National Assemblies and Imperial Federation"[2.] which would have given an Assembly to each of the four countries of the United Kingdom - England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales - consisting of a single House with power to make laws for "the peace, order, and good government" of those countries. An Imperial Parliament would have all powers not vested in the National Assemblies such as peace and war, defence, coinage, Trade Marks, copyright, Post Office, et cetera. It should "in the first instance consist of two hundred and fifty members elected from England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, which members may be increased by representatives elected from other countries, colonies, settlements, and dependencies of the Empire as may be hereafter agreed upon and enacted."[3.] The Senate was to consist of forty members and be liable to be increased by colonial representation.[4.] There would be taxation for Imperial purposes, especially defence.[5.]

In 1897 a man whose opinion carried some weight remarked that difficulties were being reduced, a compelling danger might appear, and Federation would come closely resembling the Canadian, but in some important respects it should adopt the principles of the German Empire.[6.]

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1. T. A. Brassey, Steps to Imperial Federation, R.C.I., Nov.11, 1902, Vol.34.
2. 58 Vict. Bill 49.
3. S.12.
4. S.13.
5. S.20.
6. G. W. Prothero, The Unity of the Empire, The British Colonial Empire, Scottish Geog. Mag., 1897, Vol.13.

Bernard Holland, writing in 1901, looked favourably on Imperial Federation, observing that it had already been pointed out that the delegation sooner or later of part of the functions of the Imperial Parliament to local Parliaments was a desirable and possible solution of internal and Imperial difficulties. It was not in human nature that, when Canada, Australia, and South Africa should hold populations not very unequal to that of the United Kingdom, they would still be content to see Imperial affairs managed by men who rose and fell at the bidding of one section of the Empire.[1] He thought that the Parliament at Westminster would remain the "Metropolitical See" of the Empire, but the electors of the British Isles must lose their control over the high policy of the great colonies. Holland considered the idea of a common Imperial Parliament as distinct from that of the United Kingdom too advanced for immediate public opinion. It would involve compulsory taxation to raise a common fund for common expenditure. That implied a customs union - so he reasoned - as the best means of raising money, and that implied a common commercial policy. How Chamberlain appreciated and tried to apply this thesis will later appear.

The idea of an Imperial Parliament did not die by any means. It was only considered too premature. Some such end must be substantially arrived at, but it must be by very gradual and indirect processes. It could not be expected that the British public would consent to the radical change of a written Constitution at once,[2] nor that the Colonies would consent to

1. Holland, Imperium et Libertas, p.275.
2. Thus Freeman dislikes the idea of the passing of the Mother of Parliaments. He was also afraid that the federal power would meddle too much in local affairs and have too much power over each State. The Physical and Political Bases of National Unity, Britannic Confederation, pp.54-55.

surrendering their autonomy to a brand new executive. Moreover, if the Federation were to include merely the British race - and that was certainly axiomatic with the Imperialist idea - then Great Britain would, by reason of her preponderant population, get the largest representation and easily outvote the other members. There matters of high policy were so widely divergent, such a condition would soon become intolerable. The Times, at least, recognised that the Colonies would have nothing to do for the present with a paramount Federal Legislature.[1.]

There was also the proposal - but it is brought up only to be dismissed for it carried little weight - to add distinguished men from the Colonies to the House of Lord as life peers. It did not appear to promise much in the way of forming an imperial executive or promoting closer union within the Empire. Such members would have little influence on Imperial policy, and after a prolonged residence in the British Isles would cease to have much influence at home. They would also certainly become unfitted to speak with authority for the Government of the Colony. Sir Frederick Pollock in a letter to the Times of Oct. 17, 1904 disposed of the idea.

A scheme which was much more practical, and which became more popular as the others receded, was that of an Advisory Council.[2.] It was adopted by the Imperial Federation League and Lord Brassey strongly advocated it.[3.] He had been encouraged in seeing that a Colonial Council had been created in France with provision for the representation of the Colonies in association with other members possessing special knowledge and

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1. Oct. 17, 1904.
2. Bodelsen, op.cit., p.144.
3. Papers and Addresses, op.cit., pp.142-143.

qualifications. In 1897 it was an expressed opinion that an organic union of the Empire based on "the unity and continuity of the race, with all its traditions, its culture, education, and religion" and governed by an Imperial Council, had the best chance of success.[1.]

"Of all Mr Chamberlain's proposals," writes that unbending nationalist, Mr Ewart, "the most insidious and dangerous was the suggestion of an Imperial Council."[2.] Mr Ewart, however, is forever allowing his temper to get out of hand when speaking of British Imperialism in any of its forms. Chamberlain's proposals to the Conference of 1897 contained little of the quality of wickedness that the Canadian lawyer infers; Laurier spoke much more strongly on the same matter. Chamberlain told the delegates on that occasion that "there is a real necessity for some better machinery of consultation between the self-governing Colonies and the mother country, and," he continued, "it has sometimes struck me - I offer it now merely as a personal suggestion - that it might be feasible to create a great council of the Empire to which the Colonies would send representative plenipotentiaries, - not mere delegates who were unable to speak in their name, without further reference to their respective Governments, but persons who by their position in the Colonies, by their representative character, and by their close touch with Colonial feeling, would be able, upon all subjects submitted to them, to give really effective and valuable advice. If such a council were to be created it would at once assume an immense

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1. J. Kirkpatrick, The Unity of the Empire, The Anglo-Saxon Race, Scott. Geog. Mag., June 1897, CVol.13.
2. Ewart, op.cit., p.217.

importance, and it is perfectly evident that it might develop into something still greater. It might slowly grow to that Federal Council to which we must always look forward as our ultimate ideal."[1.]

The sting of his suggestion for Mr Ewart and companion nationalists was in the last sentence. There would be enough objection to the scheme thought Mr Ewart, even if the council confined itself to "its seemingly harmless function of giving advice to countries that would be fairly certain not to follow it.....but the chief objection was the avowed expectation and intention that the 'great Council' would not limit itself to giving advice, but would develop into a great parliament and take to itself much of the legislative authority which is now exercised by the Colonies."[2.]

Chamberlain's desire was greeted with a direct negative by the Conference, a resolution, from which Mr Seddon and Sir E.N.C. Bradon dissented, reading: "The Prime Ministers here assembled are of opinion that the present political relation between the United Kingdom and the self-governing Colonies are generally satisfactory under the existing condition of things."[3.]

At the Conference of 1902 Chamberlain again proposed his council. Recapitulating the resolutions of the previous Conference, he asked the delegates if it were not possible to make some advance on those proposals. That there were difficulties he recognised, but they need not prove insuperable. The South African War had brought home to them all the essential unity of the sentiment that pervaded every part of Her Majesty's dominions.

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1. C.8596, pp.5-6.
2. Ewart, op.cit.
3. C.8596, p.15.

He did not wish to change this chain, sentimental in its character, to one that would be galling in its incidence. Because of that the Mother Country, while welcoming any approach to a more definite union, would prefer that any suggestion to that end come from the Colonies. Yet had not Sir Wilfrid Laurier told them, "If you want our aid, call us to your councils." "Gentlemen," said the Colonial Secretary with much earnestness, "we do want your aid. We do require your assistance in the administration of the vast Empire which is yours as well as ours. The weary Titan staggers under the too vast orb of its fate.... Whenever you make the request to us, be very sure that we shall hasten gladly to call you to our Councils."..

Despite his brave resolve to leave the initiative in the matter to the Colonies, Chamberlain did not think, evidently, that there was any harm in suggesting a course of action to them, "I have always felt myself", he said, "that the most practical form in which we could achieve our object, would be the establishment or the creation of a real Council of the Empire to which all questions of Imperial interest might be referred.... The Council might in the first instance be only an advisory council. It might resemble, in some respects, the advisory council which was established in Australia, and which, although it was not wholly successful, did nevertheless pave the way for the complete federation upon which we now congratulate them. But although that would be a preliminary step, it is clear that the object would not be completely secured until there had been conferred upon such a Council executive functions, and perhaps also legislative powers, and it is for you to say, gentlement, whether you think

the time has come when any progress whatever can be made in this direction."[1.]

The only response was to include in a resolution the matter of periodic Conferences suggested by New Zealand, and which that Government wished to be triennial. The Resolution read: "that it would be to the advantage of the Empire if Conferences were held, as far as practicable, at intervals not exceeding four years, at which questions of common interest affecting the relations of the Mother Country and His Majesty's Dominions over the seas could be discussed and considered as between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Colonies. The Secretary of State for the Colonies is requested to arrange for such Conferences after communication with the Ministers of the respective Colonies. In case of any emergency arising upon which a special Conference may have been deemed necessary, the next ordinary Conference to be held not sooner than three years thereafter."[2.]

From the suggestion of Mr Chamberlain, we see that Mr Jebb is not entirely correct when he states that it was a fixed tradition of British policy, founded by Lord Knutsford (then Sir Henry Holland) in 1887 and confirmed by Mr Chamberlain, that the initiative in any important proposal for closer union should come from the Dominions.[3.] In fact Gladstone had replied to the Delegation seeking closer union of the Empire that the matter was one for the initiative of the United Kingdom and not of the Colonial Governments.[4.]

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1. Cd. 1299. p.4.
2. Ibid, p.ix.
3. Jebb, Imperial Conference, Vol.ii, p.69.
4. Brassey, Papers and Addresses, pp.231-232.

It is probable that Laurier, Chamberlain's chief stumbling-block, was responsible for the resolution. While he appears to us a pronounced nationalist, there can be little doubt but that Laurier gave the impression to British statesmen that he would fall in with much of the Imperialist programme were it not for French Canada. It is not an isolated occasion to find a journal saying that, "As on many previous occasions he refrained from dealing with the question of a naval contribution in order to avoid alarming the Quebec members, whose attitude may be defined as Passive Imperialism,"[1.] an unintentionally humourous way of describing the attitude of Quebec.

One must understand that Laurier had to calculate on both French and English votes. The English, with Ontario as their stronghold, were rated as Imperialists, while the French in Quebec were thorough-going Nationalists with Bourassa as their pattern. Between these two groups Laurier had to play, and did play, with consummate skill. His love for "La Nation Canadienne" should also be appreciated, for to leave it safely in possession of its culture, laws, and religion was a primary object with him and the man who opposed Confederation was the same man who maintained the right of Manitoba to settle her school question and who opposed an Imperial executive. Mr Hall finds the kernel of the matter when he writes that Laurier's "interest lay in creating a just and permanent equipoise between the federal and provincial governments on the one hand, and between the federal and the British on the other."[2.]

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1. Nat. Rev., Apr. 1905, Vol.45, p.359.
2. Hall, Empire to Commonwealth, p.132.

There can be little doubt but that the Liberal Prime Minister had no belief in Imperial Federation, although the excitement of the Jubilee and Coronation temporarily stirred him. If he could hail the dawn of "the day when the Imperial Parliament shall welcome under its vaulted chambers the elect of the human race", yet he ever "prudently stops in time."[1] He could quicken the pulses of Joseph Chamberlain by declaring, "If you would have our help, call us to your councils," but he never tried to effect the co-operation that his words suggested.[2] Laurier was strongly "non-participationist",[3] that is, he wished Canada to be safeguarded from Imperial responsibilities and European entanglements, acting on the principle of an unwritten Monroe Doctrine. Of course, the Imperialists were not slow to scoff at such a parasitic nationalism, Mr Foster expressing his view that it was "the negation of every principle of manhood and independence that we should live in our national home by the grace of the stranger."[4] Political independence is all very fine, Laurier's opponents argued, but when you depend for the capital to finance your developments, and the army and navy to protect them, on other Powers, then your patriotism is false.

Yet one should not believe that Laurier was a lonely opponent of Imperialism and his Canadian Conservative opponents desirous of yielding their political and fiscal autonomy to the control of the United Kingdom. That fiction has persevered since the days of the struggle for responsible Government was granted, the days of Sydenham, Bagot, and Metcalfe, to the

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1. Siegried, The Race Question in Canada, p.277.
2. Quoted, ibid, p.294. The words are not so suggestive in their context, for Laurier is stating a possible situation, which, as he says, has not arisen.
3. For a development of this view vide Dewey, op.cit., Vol.i, p.83.
4. Quoted, Ibid, p.268.

detriment of Imperial sympathy. One can find the idea of "Canada first" clearly enough in the annexation propaganda that followed the conversion of Great Britain to Free Trade,[1] and down through the list of Canadian Prime Ministers there has been a consistent application of a national policy. Dr Wallace gives this truth apt expression when he says that, "The history of Canada since Confederation has been the history of the rivalry of the two great political parties for the favour of the growing national feeling of the Canadian people."[2]

Sir Wilfrid made an opponent worthy of Chamberlain's steel. His fine personality, the very vigour of his brain and body, and the golden voice that carried all with it, won for the Canadian Prime Minister a tremendous admiration in the heart of the British public. He was cheered at every moment, lionized, banqueted, and knighted, but he kept his head in it all, steering steadily for the port which he sighted early in his youth and never lost: Canadian independence and distinct nationality. Laurier made the more formidable opponent in that, despite his pronouncements on treaty-making powers, his tirades against British diplomacy, and occasional outbursts such as that of the Dundonald affair, Chamberlain was uncertain as to where Laurier stood in his Imperialist attitude. Had British opinion understood Laurier, it would have avoided many pitfalls. As late as 1910 we find

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1. Porritt, op.cit. p.444, test of Annexation Manifesto.
2. Wallace, The Growth of Canadian National Feeling, p.70. Professor Brady, Canada, pp.85-86 advances a similar opinion. "There is so little real difference between the programmes of the two parties, notwithstanding an endless amount of eloquence to give the impression of difference, that on most occasions they could be exchanged with slight inconvenience and with a negligible shift in supporters." For the difference between the parties vide Dewey, op.cit. Vol.i, passim.

an advocate of Imperial Federation making naive use of Laurier's words, and entitling an article, "If You Want Our Help Call Us to Your Councils."[1.]

Despite the suspicions of the nationalists, the idea of an advisory council, at any rate as a beginning of a more complete form of union, formed the most popular line of advance for the Imperialists. Sor Lord Haldane instructed the Royal Colonial Institute that it was not to some new kind of writteh constitution with a new description of a common Parliament that they had to look, "but to gradual and cautious changes in the modes in which the Sovereign takes advice." The vice of the phrase, "Imperial Federation," he considered to be that it ignored and contradicted the working hypothesis of the Imperial Constition by which a Colony was quite supreme in the matter of self-government in those things which affected ints interests only, and on whose advice the Cabinet of Great Britain must be bound. He recommended, therefore, an advisory council which would be essentially a business body which would have no direct influence in guiding the action of the Crown.[2.]

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1. L. H. Hordern, U.E., May 1910, Vol.1.
2. Haldane, The Cabinet and the Empire, R.C.I. Proceedings, June 9, 1903, Vol.34, pp.327-328.

The Privy Council.

There was another approach to an effective union of the Empire, however, and that lay in the Privy Council. Here, without deviation from constitutional method, was an instrument by which progress might be made, until co-operation had so far advanced that the Empire politically constituted one organic whole so far as was desirable or necessary from the Imperialist view. From the Privy Council in time past had come the Cabinet and the Judicial Committee which still formed the ultimate Court of Appeal for all the Empire except Great Britain. It might still be capable of mothering great institutions. As the Times rapturously spoke of its prospects, "Here, then, we have an organ which, by its high dignity, its immemorial antiquity, its judicial supremacy, its unique capacity for development without fissure, and perhaps by its total emancipation from legislative functions, would seem to be specially qualified to represent the Empire as a whole."[1.]

The proposal was not new. It had been supported by Lord Grey in 1879 when he suggested that a Committee of Privy Council be formed and that Agents of Colonial Governments in London be members of the Privy Council and also members of the Committee on Colonial Affairs.[2.] He believed that only by some such means could the Empire continue to hold together, but he strongly deprecated any "scheme of federalization" and the representation of the Colonies in Parliament.[3.]

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1. The Times, Oct. 17, 1904.
2. Grey, 19th Cent., June, 1879, Vol.V, p. 935ff. How Shall we Retain Our Colonies.
3. The Future of the British Empire, An Interview with Lord Grey, The Pall Mall Gazette, Jan. 7, 1885.

Such a Committee had been proposed many times since. Sir Charles Tupper put forward much the same plan.[1] Lord Thring also thought that the voice of the Colonies could best be heard in the general policy of the Empire by making the Agents-General of the Colonies synonomous with ministers of Foreign states, and giving them constitutional access to the British Government by making them Privy Councillors. He thought this would lead to greater things, while satisfying present needs.[2]

The suggestion gained in advocacy in 1904. Sir Frederick Pollock accepted the chairmanship of about fifty men representing, he said when introducing his proposals, every shade of British political opinion, whose "collective experience omits but few parts of the British Empire," and who "were anxious to see the work of the old Imperial Federation League resumed on more practical lines."[3] With Mr Geofrey Drage and Mr Pitt Kennedy, Sir Frederick had been sent bynthis organisation to the Colonies to collect information as to the most practicable and acceptable way of drawing closer the bands between Mother Country and Colonies.

A visit to Ottawa dampened their spirits evidently.[4] Any

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1. Federating the Empire, 19th Cent., Oct. 1891, Vol.30.
2. George R. Parkin, Imperial Federation: The Problem of National Unity, pp.308-309.
3. Pollock, Imperial Organisation, R.C.I., April 11, 1905, Vol.36, pp.288-289.
4. "Sir F.P.'s scheme was reduced to a proposal for the establishment of an Intelligence Department which (or its secretary) was to combine the functions of :
(a) Imperial statistical department;
(b) An Imperial Library bureau;
(c) permanent secretary to the Colonial Conference - to keep minutes and prepare agenda.
Sir W.L. thought (a) and (b) harmless and useless, and disapproved of (c)." Hewins, Apologia of an Imperialist, Vol.i., p.122.

hope of establishing an Imperial Council was given over, but they decided that nevertheless an Imperial Intelligence Department might be received with favour.[1] In any case, Sir Frederick denounced "the invention of any new kind of executive or compulsory power. No such power would be accepted by the Colonies, unless our information is wholly at fault."[2] He decided that Imperialists must be content with a council of advice which would have only "persuasive authority." Such a council was proposed to take the form of a Committee of the Privy Council. It had been proposed by himself in 1891,[3] and had occurred to many individuals since that time. The Committee, to put Sir Frederick's suggestion briefly, would consist of accredited representatives of the various governments of the self-governing Colonies and the United Kingdom in consultation merely. It would not diminish the responsibility of the Ministers to Parliament, nor committ the Government of a Colony to anything to which it had not specifically assented, but it would provide security for decisions regarding the general interests of the Empire. All expert committees such as the Committee of Imperial Defence would be ancillary to this Committee of Privy Council. This proposal would be complemented by the reinforcement of the Cabinet by summoning Colonial Premiers and other valuable persons as occasion required, "a course", Sir Frederick Pollock said, "for which constitutional precedent is not wanting."[4] One

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1. Ewart, Kingdom of Canada, op.cit., p.220.
2. Pollock, Imperial Organisation, op.cit.
3. Parkin, op.cit., p.307.
4. The Times, Oct. 17, 1904, and Feb. 9, 1905, also Imperial Organisation and Canadian Opinion, 19th Cent., Dec., 1905, Vol. 58., contain statements by Sir Frederick Pollock, introducing to the public the same matter as his lecture to the Royal Colonial Institute.

procedure completed the other, for naturally members of the Imperial Committee would be invited to Cabinet consultation. The Prime Minister of Great Britain would be head of the Imperial Committee as he was head of the Cabinet. The Imperial Committee would have a permanent staff which would act as an intelligence department, collecting and organising all information available regarding the civil affairs of the Empire for the guidance of the Committee. To this Imperial Secretariat would be attached a permanent Imperial Commission. On the advice thus given the Governments could determine when co-operation was desirable and possible. Sir Frederick stated that, "As the object of the proposed Committee will not be to decide matters by a majority of votes, but to bring together in an advisory council representatives of the different parts of the Empire, it will not be necessary or desirable that its constitution should be of a rigid character."[1.] As an example of what such a Committee might do, he maintained that until it was instituted it would be impossible to form public opinion on Sea Power. "For ourselves," said Sir Frederic, "We accept as a fundamental doctrine the primacy of the Navy in the defence of Great and Greater Britain; but we are aware that this doctrine is a novelty to many." The Committee, however, was not to meddle with the art of war, the Committee of Imperial Defence having that in hand. Its province would be questions of Imperial interest not capable of being disposed of by any existing department. Such an institution would come to have much weight, and ultimately Sir Frederick hoped it would take a definite place in the customs of the Constitution.

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1. The Times, Oct. 17, 1904.

It was left to Mr Geoffrey Drage to expand more definitely upon the duties of the Imperial Committee and its Secretariat.[1.] The first object of the Secretariat or Intelligence Department would be to receive ideas and co-ordinate opinions on matters of high Imperial policy. If that had been done such an unhappy ending to the Alaskan Boundary dispute might have been avoided. Mr Drage was pleased with the question which was being mooted of the union of Canada and the West Indies. But a union of those two colonial systems of the Dominion and the West Indies was a matter in which the whole Empire was interested from a naval, military, and also commercial point of view. A complete consultation was necessary, yet there was at present no committee which could adequately consider such a question. Relations between "the two great partner States", Canada and Australia, were none to cordial and were causing His Majesty's Government in London some anxiety. There must be some body before which such irritating matters could be discussed on neutral ground.

Further, there was need of greater unity in legislation, in such matters as commercial legislation, in which there were many systems obtaining throughout the Empire, in naturalisation, in securing an invention within the Empire which required twenty-eight patents according to present legislation, or in the law of Copyright which was regulated by the Imperial Statute of 1842 and which, according to the judgment of Mr Drage, was "one of the worst penned on the Statute Book." Laws of insolvency differed as between Canada and Great Britain. The charge of

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1. Drage, Imperial Organisation from a Business Point of Vire, The Fort. Rev., Dec. 1905, Vol.78, p.1088ff.

Light Dues by the Imperial Government needed to be rectified. A uniform currency and uniform system of weights should be established throughout the Empire. Labour and Social enactments throughout the Empire needed codification and consolidation.

There should be a common statistical practice within the Empire and consultation with the object of reaching a common method of classification, estimation of value, and the record of origin and destination of goods. There should be an annual report on the trade of the overseas Dominions. Various methods were suggested by which a more reliable criterion of trade and production of each Colony might be arrived at, and from which comparisons could be reliably made. The British too easily neglected these things which were so vital to alert industry. Would it be believed, asked Mr Drage, that there were in Canada at that moment something like one hundred commercial agents of the United States Government and not one commercial agent of the British Government? The new institution would deal immediately with promoting organised communications within the Empire, for "cheap postal and telegraphic communication would do more to bind the Empire together than anything else."

Lastly, there was needed fresh blood in the Councils of the Empire. Such a Secretariat and Imperial Committee would, in the minds of their sponsors, give new energy and new vision; there was no limit to the heights to which it might lead the Empire.

Mr W. Sanford Evans carried the suggestion further following on the query of how the Committee was to obtain common action after it had gathered the materials, that is, how co-ordination would be gained between the colonial cabinets.[1] He

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1. Evans, Imperial Organisation - A Canadian View, The Brit. Emp. Rev., Mar. 1905.

desiderated a system of direct ministerial interchange in which there would be a Minister in each self-governing State of the Empire directly responsible for Imperial affairs.

Mr Reeves did not like Pollock's idea as being too forward and liable to frighten the Colonies.[1.] No more did he like the plan of Mr Evans for a body of Ministers for External Affairs forming the nucleus of an expert Imperial Council. The external affairs of the Colonies took in a wide field: defence, trade, and commerce, postal and telegraph arrangements, and immigration. Surely a Government would dislike the concentration of so much power on one man. He would either become a mere conduit pipe for the home Cabinet or, if he differed, the system would be incompatible with Cabinet Government. "For the present," Mr Reeves concluded, "the less the self-governing Colonies are tempted to concern themselves with foreign Governments the better. For the present they have the Mother Country to look to in such affairs. It is for her to protect their interests." The time would come when Ministers for External Affairs would be in order, but that time had not yet arrived. He suggested that the Premiers form a Council with the British Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the Secretary of State for India as members, to which body there would be an unattached, subordinate Commission of Imperial experts.

It was generally believed that Sir Frederick Pollock's scheme formed the basis for Lyttelton's despatch of April 20, to the Dominions, suggesting that the name of Imperial Council

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1. Brit. Emp. Rev., Feb. 1905.

replace that of Colonial Conference.[1] Cape Colony,[2] Natal,[3] and Australia[4] were in general approval. New Zealand expressed no opinion. Newfoundland was suspicious lest such a body be given executive powers and levy taxation for defence.[5] Canada gave a typical and well considered reply which included, "A Conference is a more or less unconventional gathering for informal discussion of public questions, continued, it may be, from time to time, as circumstances external to itself may render expedient, but possessing no faculty or power of binding action...The term council, on the other hand, indicates...a more formal assemblage, possessing an advisory and deliberative character, and in conjunction with the word 'Imperial', suggests a permanent institution which, endowed with continuous life, might eventually come to be regarded as an encroachment upon the full measure of autonomous legislative and administrative power now enjoyed by all the self-governing Colonies."[6] Because of these objections from Canada, Lyttelton postponed further discussion to the next Conference.[7]

Mr Chamberlain could have taught his successor the futility of attempting anything that in any degree suggested an Imperial executive. He knew now the suspicions that Laurier entertained of anything that might sometime develop into a coercive body.

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1. Cd. 2785, p.1ff. "Sir W.L. disapproved of Lyttelton's dispatch which he suggested was drafted by Sir F.P. Sir F.P. denied any hand in the drafting but said it might have been based on his article." W.A.S. Hewins, Apologia of an Imperialist, Vol. 1, p.122.
2. Cd. 2785, pp.6-7.
3. Ibid, p.8.
4. Ibid, pp.8-9; pp.11-12.
5. Ibid, pp.9-10.
6. Ibid, p.14.
7. Ibid, p.15.

If nothing else, Chamberlain's failure regarding the attempt to make the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council more Imperial in its composition and to give it more scope and power in its jurisdiction must have been instructive in the lesson of colonial autonomy.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

Mr Ewart has written, "In pursuance of his idea of federation of the Empire 'by a process of gradual development' Mr Chamberlain, shortly after his accession to the office of Colonial Secretary, procured the passage of an imperial statute under which appointment to the Judicial Committeemight be made from Canada, Australia, and Cape of Good Hope."[1] The implication that Chamberlain was responsible for the Bill[2] is wrong. Rosebery introduced the Bill and was responsible for its substance,[3] and, although it was amended in Committee and became law under the government of which Chamberlain was a member, he was not particularly pleased with it.[4] Mr Ewart also errs somewhat in speaking of the composition of the Judicial Committee as affected by the Bill: A chief Justice or Judge of the Canadian Supreme Court or a Provincial Superior Court, or of such Courts in the Australasian or South African Colonies, "or any other Superior Court in Her Majesty's Dominions, named in that behalf by Her Majesty in Council" who was a member of the Privy Council, was also to be a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

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1. Ewart, op.cit. pp.229-230.
2. 58, 9 Vic. c.44.
3. Vide H.C. Debs, 21 May, 1895, Vol.33, p.1685; May 27, Vol.34, p.331ff; June 24, Ibid., p.1744, and passed, July 5, Vol.35, p.260, the Government having resigned on June 24.
4. H.C. Debs., 14 May, 1900, Vol.83, p.74.

There can be no doubt, however, that Chamberlain looked upon the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as one of the chiefest of the Imperial links. At the Conference of 1897 he said, "It is the nearest approach, the closest analogy, to the Supreme Court of the U.S." He rejoiced at the appointment as Privy Councillors of distinguished judges from the courts of Canada, Australia, and South Africa. That was a good beginning. But they were also in active practice in Colonies. He wanted them appointed for Privy Council alone. ~~p.6.~~ He noted in passing that the proposed Australian Federation Bill suggested that appeals should only go to the Privy Council upon constitutional questions. He urged reconsideration: "Nothing is more desirable in the interests of the Colonies, in the interests of the United Kingdom and of the British Empire, than an uniformity of law, and that uniformity can only be obtained by occasional appeals to the highest tribunal, settling once for all the law for all parts of the Empire; and I confess I think it would be a great loss to the Colonists if they surrendered the opportunity of getting this judicial decision upon difficult and complicated points of law which from time to time may arise in the local courts."[1.] In the debates on the Australian Commonwealth Bill he commented on the legal difficulties at present obstructing an amalgamation of the Judicial Committee with the appeal jurisdiction of the House of Lords, but he had a plan to make representatives of the self-governing Colonies and India members of the Privy Council for terms of seven years, who would act also as Lord of Appeal during that time and upon whom would be conferred life peerages.[2.]

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1. C.8596, p.7.
2. H.C.Debs., 14 May, 1900, Vol.83, p.74.

Nor was Mr Chamberlain alone in thinking the Judicial Committee of such importance. Mr Faber told the House of Commons that, "The Privy Council, or some such Appeal Court...is the keystone upon which, if we work wisely, we may build up the great edifice of Imperial Federation."[1.] Mr Haldane felt that, to quote his words, "there is implied in our Constitution, when it reaches a certain stage of development, that there should be a common tribunal which would be a real link, because it would be the property not of one part of the Queen's dominions, nor of the people in them, but of the people throughout the Empire" wherever there existed that "body of common traditions, common doctrines, common tendencies," and "body of common law which is the general heritage of our Empire."[2.] He did not wish the decisions of local courts interfered with, but for a certain limited class of questions there should be a Court of yet higher consideration.[3.] He thought that all trouble regarding Appeals to the Privy Council might have been avoided by the proposal of a great Imperial Court to take the place of the House of Lords and the Privy Council, and to be shared in by the colonists just as it would be by residents in the United Kingdom. Merely a reform of the Privy Council would not satisfy the Colonies. It was necessary to create a High Court of Appeal in which they would have membership. "I am convinced," he said, "that you cannot keep the House of Lords jurisdiction as it is at present, and at the same time obtain from the Privy Council the status in the eyes of the Empire which it should be able to occupy if we were

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1. H.C.Debs ..op.cit., p.86.
2. Ibid, p.99.
3. Ibid, p.100.

contemplating the establishment of a single tribunal... If there are two tribunals sitting for the dispatch of the same business, the one is starved in order to keep up the other, and the judicial strength inevitably gravitates towards the House of Lords, and until you make the colonists feel that the tribunal to which they come is the same as that to which you yourselves appeal, you will never get their confidence."[1.]

Mr Stanley Leighton also spoke in the House in favour of "a great Court of the Empire, a Court which throws all others into insignificance, a Court with the farthest-reaching jurisdiction in the whole world, farther-reaching than that of the Roman Curia,, and deciding the rights of millions of people and questions on the most varied law."[2.] He is worth quoting, because when most people thought of the Empire it was in some such words as these.

Mr Asquith spoke with much warmth for "a real Imperial Court of Supreme Appeal," a Court of such character and attributes that the Colonists would regard the right to appeal to it under certain proper conditions as an essential safeguard to liberty. The ideal was not to obtain a uniform interpretation of law like the Roman law or the Code of Napoleon. "Our method", he recalled, " has been totally contrary. We have always proceeded on the principle of jealously preserving and maintaining local laws and usages." The integrity of the different systems of law conforming to historical traditions and local necessities of the various parts of the Empire was one of the great glories of its jurisprudence and one of its strongest links. It was because of the need at the centre of the Empire of "a Court so authoratative

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1. Q.&596. H.C.Debs. op.cit.
2. Ibid, pp.103-104.

and weighty in its composition and the attainments of its members that all our dependencies, when questions arise, such as are certain to arise even in Australia among the different States that constitute the Commonwealth, will look upon it as a tribunal of unsuspected impartiality and possessing that authority which no local Court, of however high a character, could attain to." Such a tribunal would constitute one of the strongest of Imperial ties. But the Australians in framing their Bill had no idea such a Court would be proposed. It had not then been thought of by the British Government. Whereas the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had been little used by Australia the tendency he was sure would be reversed with the creation of this Imperial Court.[1]

Mr T. M. Healy, the irrepressible Irish member, objected strongly to a change in the personnel of the Judicial Committee and the House of Lords. Why, he asked, should the impoverished peasant of Mayo and Connaught maintain an Australian peer at six thousand pounds a year in London? If the Australian people wished to have peers of the realm, then let them pay for them. Further, why should English, Scotch, and Irish appeals "lie within the cognisance of these antipodean noblemen?" He thought it was too much to suggest that this "new and hybrid Court" would have either support or reverence from any section of the people of the United Kingdom, and lodged a protest against the "piebald peerage system" which was associated with the Commonwealth Bill.[2]

H.C. Debs.op.cit.
1. Cx8596, p.768-770.
2. Ibid, p.804-806.

Mr Healy need not have so excited himself, for Colonial nationalism did not any more desire such a judicial tie than did the Irish nationalist. The famous "clause 74" of the Commonwealth Bill was an expression of this fact. Appeals to Privy Council had been an old colonial grievance that dated back into the seventeenth century and in the early federation movement in Australia one of the chief arguments for union was the delay and cost of a Privy Council proceeding and the occasional weakness of the Judicial Committee.[1] By the twentieth century cable and steamship had so reduced delays and cost that they could hardly be good ground for objection, while the composition had also been strengthened beyond criticism. It was an earnest of Australian nationalism that Clause 74 should have been included in the 1898 draft of the Commonwealth Bill. It read: "No appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in Council in any matter involving the interpretation of this Constitution or of the Constitution of a State, unless the public interests of some part of Her Majesty's Dominions, other than the Commonwealth or a State, are involved. Except as provided in this section, this Constitution shall not impair any right which the Queen may be pleased to exercise, by virtue of Her Royal prerogative , to grant special leave of appeal from the High Court to Her Majesty in Council. But the Parliament may make laws limiting the matters in which such leave may be asked."[2] The British Government deplored the limitation and the power of the Australian Government to further limit appeals and also asked that the following

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1. Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, p.245. Ewart, op.cit., p.226ff; Chamberlain H.C.Debs., op.cit., pp.64-65.
2. Cd. 124, p.11.

safeguard be contained in the Schedule: "Nothing in this Act or in the Schedule set forth as the Schedule to this Act shall affect any progative of the Crown to grant special leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council."[1.]

Mr Jebb was quite in favour of the Australian point of view as one would expect him to be. The purpose of the clause he believed to have been essentially national.[2.] Because of such criticisms, and because the friction revealed the mind of the British Government regarding Imperial consolidation, the arguments for and against the Clause are worth setting down.

The objections of the British Government were enumerated in a memorandum.[3.] They pointed out that the Imperial Parliament was trustee for the whole of Her Majesty's Dominions, and inasmuch as the covering clauses affected the prerogative of the Crown and the powers and privileges of the Imperial Parliament and of the other Legislatures of the Empire, they could not relieve themselves of that responsibility by delegation of the powers.[4.] The legislation of the Parliament of the Commonwealth might affect British shipping coming from the United Kingdom or British possessions. The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, made special provision for legislation in a British possession with regard to vessels there registered, and with regard to the coasting trade in British possessions.[5.] Having regard to the interests which might be affected under this head, it appeared essential that there should be the possibility of an appeal to the Queen in Council.[6.]

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1. Cd. 158, p.20.
2. Jebb, Colonial Nationalism, p.78.
3. Cd. 158, p.22ff.
4. Ibid, p.23.
5. Sections 735-36.
6. Cd. 158, p.26.

It might be fairly argued that any question as to the validity of the exercise of legislative powers by the Legislature of the Commonwealth was a matter involving the interpretation of the Constitution. It was impossible to say what construction would be placed on the Bill when it came to be judicially interpreted. Would there not be many cases just on the borderline with regard to which it could not be predicted whether or not they involved the Constitution? Then questions might arise whether legislation under any of the powers mentioned in various paragraphs was or was not ultra vires, and any such legislation might involve matters affecting foreigners and foreign ships in Australia and Australian waters and their Treaty rights. Yet as the Clause read, there would be no right of appeal from the High Court to the Privy Council in such cases. Matters involving the interpretation of the Constitution might raise questions of the utmost gravity, not only between the Commonwealth and the separate Statesm but also as between the Commonwealth and the States on one hand and other parts of Her Majesty's Dominions or foreign countries on the other. Among the matters on which the Parliament might make laws for the Government of Australia was comprised fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits.[1] The interpretation to be put on the Constitution in this matter might most seriously affect British vessels, and particularly vessels from New Zealand. Grave questions might arise as to what fisheries beyond territorial limits were to be deemed to be Australian fisheries, and as to the class or classes of persons on whom the Laws of the Commonwealth as to this matter

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1. Act. 51, par. 10.

would be binding. It was hardly reasonable to expect that inhabitants of other parts of the Empire should have their cases in such matters finally concluded by the decision of the Australian Court. Moreover, a law might be passed by the Parliament of Australia with reference to the subject of foreign enlistment. The consequences of such legislation might involve the Empire in difficulties with foreign Powers. It was not reasonable to withdraw from the Imperial Tribunal the right of deciding whether a measure of this class was or was not invalid as being in contravention of Imperial legislation, or as to its true construction.

Certain clauses in the Commonwealth Bill purported to transfer to the Commonwealth Parliament powers not included in the powers of an ordinary Colonial Parliament, and it could hardly be contended that the Imperial Parliament should preclude an appeal to an Imperial Court on any question as to the extent to which powers now exercised exclusively by itself or by the Crown had been delegated. Another grave objection was the absence of any definition of the class of cases in which "the public interests of some part of Her Majesty's dominions other than the Commonwealth or a State" were involved. Did that phrase include the interests of a large class of persons in Her Majesty's dominions - say of investors in Australian securities, or of a body of shareholders in an industrial undertaking formed, say, in the United Kingdom, to carry on some great industrial enterprise in Australia - or was it confined to cases in which the interests affected were only those of the government of other parts of Her Majesty's Dominions? If the latter were the true meaning, the

proviso would have little or no operation. If the former, it would be a difficult task to decide whether or not the condition of the Article had been satisfied.

It was argued by the Australian Delegates that the prerogative of granting leave to appeal to the Privy Council from the Supreme Courts of the several Colonies was unaffected and that the Article only applied to appeals from the High Court of the Commonwealth. This view was doubtful, and would be only one of the difficult questions of construction which would arise upon this Article. The Article appeared to have been framed under the impression that the only appeal from the Supreme Courts of the Colonies was to be to the High Court of the Commonwealth, and its effect upon the right of Her Majesty to grant leave to appeal to the Privy Council from the Judgments of Supreme Courts of the Colonies was problematical. Should the view of the Delegates be correct, however, the result would be that a litigant defeated in the Supreme Court of a State in a Constitutional case might appeal at his option either to the High Court of the Commonwealth or to the Privy Council. The successful party might prefer the latter, but would have no choice.

Further, if the view of the Delegates were correct in the case of a decision with which neither litigant was satisfied, there might be cross appeals, one by one party to the High Court, and another by the other party to the Privy Council.[1] What, then, if the decisions of both these Courts be final and they should disagree? In the debates in the House of Lords the possibility

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1. There had actually been a case of this kind. Vide Moore, op.cit., pp.252-253; Todd, op.cit., pp.309-310; Johnston v. St. Andrew's Church, 3 App. Cas.159.

of a conflict of authority was pointed out by Lord Davey,[1] and Lord Russell.[2] Lord James of Hereford however was quite sure that the decision of the Privy Council would be accepted[3] and Lord Selborne[4] and Lord Alverstone[5] supported his view. As a matter of history, the two courts soon did differ. The High Court decided that the salary of a federal officer was not liable to state income tax, overruling a contrary decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The Privy Council gave an opposite decision in a succeeding case.[6] The High Court decided that it should determine constitutional questions within the Commonwealth and gave a decision differing from the Privy Council. The Privy Council refused to allow an appeal from this decision.[7]

The objections of the Imperial Government continued: If the litigant introduced the plea, would there not be necessary a preliminary argument as to whether the question did not involve the interpretation of the Constitution, or if public interests were involved.

The construction of the Constitution of Australia in many cases could not be regarded as affecting Australian interests alone. The cases would come before the Imperial Court of Appeal with the advantage of a full knowledge of local conditions relevant to the case as they would have been explained in the Judgments of the Australian Court and, while the high standing and ability of Australian Judges were recognised to the fullest degree,

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1. H.L.Debs., 29 June, 1900, Vol.85, pp.31-32.
2. Ibid, pp.47-48.
3. Ibid, p.44.
4. Ibid, 5 July 1900, pp.582-583.
5. Ibid, pp.590-591.
6. Webb v. Cuttrim, A.C.81 (1907)
7. The Commissioners of Taxation, New South Wales, v. Baxter. A.C.214 (1908). Vide Responsible Government, op.cit. p,1368ff.

it would be of great assistance to them that, in exceptional cases, there should be the possibility of having their decisions on constitutional questions reviewed by a Tribunal which, even if party feeling ran high on the question in dispute, could not possibly be charged with being under its influence.[1.]

From a wider point of view it must be remembered that, "The retention of the prerogative to allow an appeal to Her Majesty in Council would accomplish the great desire of Her Majesty's subjects both in England and Australia, that the bonds which now unite them may be strengthened rather than severed, and, by insuring uniform interpretation of the law throughout the Empire, facilitate that unity of action for the common interests which will lead to a real federation of the Empire."[2.]

Finally, urged the Imperial Government, it was not their intention to oppose the Fathers of the Australian Federation Bill. Mr Higgins, a member of the Judiciary Committee in framing the Bill, had said regarding this Clause, "I feel a misapprehension has grown up that we are trying to do something new. The object of this clause is simply to stereotype in the Act what has already existed in Canada, where there is a general right of appeal reserved to Her Majesty in Council on a decision of the Privy Council; but that right of appeal is not allowed unless the cases are of public interest." The effect of the clause he held, was "simply to put in plain English what is the law now in Canada," a statement that Mr Barton hastened to endorse.[3]

1. Vide Responsible Government, op.cit. p.27.
2. Ibid, pp.27-28.
3. The basis for such restriction of Canadain appeals is found in Prince v. Gagnon, 8 App.Cas. 103; Carter v. Molson, ibid,p.530, Clergue v. Murray,(1903) A.C. 521. Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Brown, (1906), A.C.381; Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Blair,(1904) A.C. 453; Daily Telegraph Newspaper v. McLaughlin,(1904), A.C. 453.

While the declarations of these gentlemen were conclusive, showing that they only wished to fix the Canadian practice that a case must be of gravity or "a very substantial character" to warrant its being brought to the Privy Council, the language of the Article hardly carried out their purpose. Had it done so, it would have been quite satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government. On the contrary, the question was left in an unsatisfactory and anomalous position.[1.]

Because of their dubiety concerning some clauses of the bill, but particularly this one, the British Government requested the Conference of the Australian Premiers to send delegates to explain such parts not clear to the Imperial Parliament. Such delegates were sent and were instructed to unitedly urge the passage of the Bill through the Imperial Parliament "without amendment."[2.] In obeying such instruction, the delegates submitted a memorandum and argued that the Bill as it stood, and no other, was the agreement on which the people of the Colonies had agreed to unite. If anything were taken away from the Bill or added to it without the assent of the Colonies, the recital would not be justified. It must be laid before Parliament in the very form endorsed by the votes of the people.[3.] There had been no Clause given more wide discussion or more publicity than this one.

They contended that the effect of the Clause was by no means as far-reaching as had been supposed. Their contention for the finality of the High Court in matters involving the

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1. Cd. 158, pp.26-27.
2. Ibid, p.19.
3. Ibid, p.13.

interpretation of the Constitution was that if they were fit to make a Constitution surely they should be fit to interpret it. Judicial knowledge of local conditions, always invaluable, was indispensable in the interpretation of Constitutions. Would not Australian judges be men of as conspicuous integrity and ability as English judges, and just as impartial? If one must have judges of another country to obtain impartiality, why should English appeals be heard in the House of Lords?

Appeals to the Queen in Council with respect to State Courts were not abolished, but when, and only when, the appellant went to the High Court in one of the limited class of cases set forth in the first part of Clause 74, he must abide by the decision of that Court. It would further be remembered that the public interests of any part of Her Majesty's Dominions other than the Commonwealth or a State therein could not in any case remain the subject of a final decision by the High Court, even where the interpretation of this measure or of a State Constitution was involved.

In fine, concluded the delegates, "the clauses are framed with relation to things as they exist, and even if the Sovereign Power of Parliament is ever to be exercised over the heads of the Australian people, we submit most earnestly that the present is pre-eminently a measure in respect of which that power should not be exercised....Five Australian Colonies, by an aggregate majority of nearly three to one of their people, have affirmed with the utmost emphasis that they are prepared to take the responsibility of their own Constitution. They are of British stock; they are fellow countrymen of the people of this Kingdom;

they have no more confidence in themselves and in their power to work out their own destiny than is right and just in men of their blood....they ask to be accounted fit for those responsibilities which men of that race have never shirked and seldom abused...In placing that trust in their hands the mother country will bind her Colonies to her with something stronger than words upon paper; with the high confidence which justice engenders, and the affection which gratitude evokes and perpetuates."[1] The language is that of nationalism and finds its chiefest appeal in emotion rather than logic as a last resort.

In the Debates in the House of Commons Mr Chamberlain pressed his objection to the ambiguity of the phrase "public interests."[2] He pointed out that a decision of the Colonial Court regarding maritime jurisdiction, the Pacific Islands, foreign enlistments, and external affairs, might bring on a war with foreign Powers which would require the whole strength of the Empire to protect its interests. He communicated to Parliament various and powerful dissentient voices from the Colonies wishing that the plenary right of appeal be preserved. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman[3], Sir Charles Dilke[4] and Mr Blake spoke warmly against the amendment. Mr Asquith did not see anything "that in the least degree militates against Imperial unity, or constitutes any danger to other parts of the Empire."[5] He thought it more serious that the Federal Parliament of Australia should have power to limit still further the right of appeal to the

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1. Cd. 158, p.18.
2. H.C. Debs., op.cit. pp.65-66; pp.759-760.
3. Ibid, p.77.
4. Ibid, p.94.
5. Ibid, p.771.

Privy Council."[1] Mr S. T. Evans contended that "the real, solid, and only question at issue between the Colonies and the Colonial Office finally was whether or not Australia was to be allowed in her own courts to decide matters of internal constitutional law."[2]

The Times, like the Conservative Party in the House, was very friendly to the Federation, but very suspicious of Clause 74, holding that it should be amended as a safeguard to the Empire. A State must have the right of appeal: such a right might on occasion prevent a civil war.[3]

A compromise was arrived at, and as finally adopted the Bill read: "No appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in Council from a decision of the High Court upon any question howsoever arising as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and those of any State or States as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers of any two or more States, unless the High Court shall certify that the question is one which ought to be determined by her Majesty in Council.

"The High Court may so certify if satisfied that for any special reason the certificate should be granted, and thereupon an appeal shall,lie to Her Majesty in Council on the question without further leave.

"Except as provided in this section, this Constitution shall not impair any right which the Queen may be pleased to exercise by virtue of Her Royal prerogative to grant special leave of

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1. H.C. Debs., op.cit., p.772.
2. Ibid, pp.794-795.
3. The Times, April,6, 1900.

appeal from the High Court to Her Majesty in Council. The Parliament may make laws limiting the matters in which such leave may be asked for, but proposed laws containing any such limitation shall be reserved by the Governor General for Her Majesty's pleasure."[1.]

The lesson of the clash on this question, was the lesson that nationalism was definitely gaining in strength. Yet Mr Chamberlain, either unaware of this fact,which one is inclined to doubt, or desirous of showing the complete futility of every avenue of approach to Imperial unity other than Imperial preference, called a Conference in 1901 to discuss the proposal advanced by Mr Haldane as well as himself to establish a single Imperial Court of Final Appeal, combining in it the appellate jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee and the House of Lords. It was suggested by Mr Justice Hodges of Australia: The new Imperial Court would have a membership of the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, the members of the House of Lords who heard appeals to that Court, the members of the Judicial Committee, and a representative appointed for a term of fifteen years from each of the Colonies of Canada and Newfoundland, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and India.[2.] Such a Court he believed would command the respect of the whole British race and be a powerful factor in promoting a closer union between all parts of the Empire. Mr George H. Emerson of Newfoundland was in favour of such a Court and Sir James Prendergast of New Zealand thought the time would come when it would be practically possible. Yet the best that could be obtained was a

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1. 63 & 64 Vict. c.12, s.74.
2. Cd.846. Keith, op.cit., pp.1376-1377,

resolution in favour of the status quo: "Appeals should continue to lie from the Colonies and from India to His Majesty in Council."

Chamberlain regretfully closed the incident: "It is apparent that the majority of the Delegates are in substance satisfied with the existing system, though they offer suggestions which will have the careful consideration of His Majesty's Government for the amendment of the present system of Colonial Appeal on matters of detail. The result of the Conference has been to show that no far-reaching alteration in the present Tribunal is desired, or would be considered satisfactory by the Colonies generally, and so long as the Colonies are of that opinion, His Majesty's Government do not propose to make any material changes for the establishment of an Imperial Court of Appeal."[1]

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1. Cd.846, pp.28-30.

Chapter VI: The Means:

The Effort to Obtain Commercial Unity.

From what has been said, it is seen to be quite incorrect to imagine that Chamberlain proposed Imperial preference and protection to a national mind which was not greatly educated to the idea. There were many Englishmen declaring with Chamberlain that the day of small economic units was over.[1] The agitations for preventing the importation of prison-made goods, for the Merchandise Marks Act, for relief of agricultural rates, and the Unemployed Workmen Act of 1905 permitting the subsidisation of emigration[2] denoted a movement of the public mind from the doctrines of "laissez faire". When the Eastern and Eastern Extension Telegraph Companies protested against the Government's interference with private enterprise in the contemplated Pacific Cable,[3] Chamberlain replied that, "with the progressive development of society the tendency is to enlarge the functions and widen the sphere of action of the central Government", imposing conditions and restrictions for the protection of the public interests.[4] The agitation for countervailing duties on sugar, which led to the Sugar Convention, was another sign of the decline of the Free Trade dogmas, and the orthodox Economist took Sir Michael Hicks-Beach to task for his pleasure therein.[5]

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1. Knowles, Industrial and Commercial Revolutions, p.326ff.
2. Knowles, Economic Development of the Overseas Empire, Vol.ii, p.97.
3. Cd.46, p.21.
4. Ibid, pp.26-27. Vide also W.A.S. Hewins, Apologia of an Imperialist, Vol.I, p.3: "The Empire movement as it has come within my experience is not a reversion to protection, but a revolt against the individualist conception of society in this country, and an effort to express in a practical form new social conceptions in their application to the great society of which we are members, namely, the British Empire."
5. Economist, Nov.21, 1903, Vol.61, p.1964.

The cause of the decline in the prestige of Free Trade is easily found in the depression of British trade which led to the Fair Trade movement of the "eighties" and the appointment of the Royal Commission in 1886. The Birmingham Chamber of Commerce put it that a commercial union of the United Kingdom and the Colonies was the only remedy for the depression,[1.] holding that if Great Britain purchased sufficient foodstuffs from the Colonies she could look for a large and permanent extension of railway enterprise in them.[2.] General dislike of high foreign tariffs was manifested by the witnesses and the Commission, but only a dissenting minority of the Commission drew up a separate conclusion stressing the need for tariffs within the Empire as a means to steady the market. They contended that a slightly preferential treatment of the food products of the Colonies and India over those of foreign nations would suffice gradually and certainly to direct the flow of capital and labour to those dependencies and less towards the United States. If such duties were not arranged on an Imperial preference basis, the high tariffs of the Colonies might act with increasing and disastrous force upon the British exports there. The minority report suggested duties equal to about 10% on articles of food produced by the Colonies, with the abolition, by way of compensation, of the duties on tea, coffee, cocoa, and dried fruits. The authors maintained, as their final argument, that such an arrangement would "draw closer all portions of the empire in the bond of mutual interests, and thus pave the way towards a more effective union for great common objects."[3.]

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1. C.4715, pp.38-39.
2. Ibid, p.102.
3. C.4893, pp.lxvi-lxvii.

Magazine articles had been written before this report, putting similar ideas,[1] but the agitation was greatly accelerated from this time.[2] It became common enough to believe that any steps to close attachment to the Colonies would involve a radical readjustment of finance so as to give preferential treatment on colonial exports, conditional to the United Kingdom being given a similar treatment in the Colonies.[3] From 1887 Resolutions were passed almost annually at the Synod of Conservative Associations in favour of preferential relations with the Colonies.[4] The idea of a British Zollverein could be traced, in fact, to Disraeli's Crystal Palace speech of 1872, and in 1898 Mr Farrer Ecroyd wrote, "For twenty years I have not failed to proclaim my conviction that our tolerance of foreign bounties and tariffs must at last dissolve the Empire."[5]

The Liberals, of course, even the Liberal Imperialists, would not for a moment consider such a suggestion of changing the fiscal system, and the natural home of the movement was among the Conservatives. Salisbury was much too cautious to definitely commit himself to a policy of tariffs, but by 1892 he was considering if it might not be necessary to adopt some form of protection to force the reduction of the hostile tariffs of foreign nations, though he urged that free trade was the

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1. As W.J. Harris, The Commercial Advantages of Federation, R.C.I., 14 Mar. 1882, Vol.xii: Plea for a Customs Union.
2. Vide Sir V. Caillard, Some Suggestions towards an Imperial tariff. Nat.Rev., Apr.1902, Vol.39. Sir R. Giffen, The Dream of a British Zollverein, 19th Cen., May 1902, Vol.51.
3. ex. J.A. Hobson, The Approaching Abandonment of Free Trade, The Fort. Rev.,Mar.1902, Vol.71.
4. Holland: Life of the Duke of Devonshire, op.cit.,Vol.ii,p.286.
5. Letter in the Nat. Rev., Nov.1898, Vol.32.

ultimate goal of any policy.[1] In letters and conversation it would seem that he revealed himself in favour of uniting the Empire by a Zollverein and Kriegsverein, but he thought the United Kingdom would not be ready for another generation to leave Free Trade.[2]

Mr Hofmeyr of Cape Colony tried to solve the problem of the two discordant elements in the imperial federation movement, loosely referred to as Zollverein and Kriegsverein, by submitting a resolution to the 1887 Conference to discuss the "feasibility of promoting closer union between the various parts of the British Empire by means of an Imperial customs tariff, the revenue derived from such tariff to be devoted to the general defence of the Empire."[3] He proposed, by way of example, a 2% all round tax on foreign imports which would not only help in a substantial way to pay for defence expenses, but "would establish a connecting link between the Colonies mutually as well as between the Colonies and the Empire also, such as is not at present in existence, and which might further develop by-and-by into a most powerful bond of union." When Sir Saul Samuel of New South Wales interpellated, a bit cynically perhaps, "At present England admits nearly all the products of the Colonies free of Customs duties; is it likely that in the duture the Colonies will do the same for England?" Mr Hofmeyr replied that the question did not affect his proposal in the least. He wished to leave the liberty of the British Parliament and of the Colonial Parliament unfettered in the arrangement of their own customs.[4] The proposal bore little fruit, although it excited much discussion.

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1. The Times, May 18, 1892, R.H. Walker: A Book for Politicians, p.96.
2. Letter of Col.Geo. T. Denison, The Times, May 18, 1905.
3. C.5091, Appendix, p.5.
4. C.5091, p.468.

Sir John A. Macdonald, keenly alive to the value of British markets after establishing his "National Policy" in Canada, had been an advocate of imperial preference. Cecil Rhodes, a strong advocate of Imperial consolidation, favoured preferential tariffs as a means to that end and obtained a clause in his Rhodesian Charter which provided that no British goods entering Rhodesia should ever be charged duties higher than those obtaining at that time in the Cape - that is, 9%. As a consequence, when the general tariff of the South African Customs Union rose over 9%, British goods entering Rhodesia obtained an advantageous rate.[1.]

In April, 1902, Colonel Denison was sent by the British Empire League in Canada to advocate a duty of 5 to 10% all round the Empire on all foreign goods in order to provide a fund for Imperial Defence, this fund to be administered by a committee or council on which the Colonies should have representation.[2.] Sir Robert Giffen opposed Denison with the argument that the United Kingdom would have to pay £41,000,000 annually to the comparatively small taxation on the Colonies. The Colonel rejoined that as Britain already had to pay a sum on the army and navy a good bit in excess of that figure the Mother Country would certainly be saving money, whereas Canada would expend £2,400,000, being £2,000,000 more than her present expenditure.[3.] Nevertheless, Col. Denison seems to have had little success, for when Laurier came over to the Conference of 1902 he consulted the League's delegate as to the state of public opinion in England, and enquired whether the proposal he had been advocating could be

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1. Ewart, op.cit., p.265. For Resolutions passed by Colonial Legislatures since 1890 in favour of Preferential Trade Relations with the United Kingdom, Cd.2326, 1905.
2. Col. Geo.T. Denison, The Struggle for Imperial Unity, p.291ff.
3. Ibid, p.327.

proposed at the Conference with any chance of success, and Denison had to reply in the negative, not considering public opinion ready for it.[1.]

There were other desultory and equally impracticable proposals of this sort. There was some opinion that the best contributions that the Colonies could make to Imperial Defence was a preference in favour of British goods.[2.] The effect of these suggestions was purely to educate the public in the idea of tariffs.

There was little danger to the Free Trade doctrine in all this skirmishing: it never needed much resistance. But when Sir Michael Hicks-Beach (Lord St. Aldwyn) met the added expenses of the South African War with a duty of one shilling per quarter on corn, introduced into his budget of April 1902, the advocates of Imperial Preference could not restrain their glee, and the Free Trade defenders made no effort to restrain their distrust. The latter had some reason for their doubt in the ambiguous language of the Chancellor when referring to the economic relations between the Mother Country and the Colonies. Suppose, he enquired, it were possible to have Free Trade throughout the Empire so as to bring about an Imperial Zollverein, would that not be an arrangement binding the Colonies and the Mother County together more closely than anything else that could be devised? Was it a good thing or was it a bad thing that the Zollverein was established in Germany? Was it a good thing or was it a bad thing that the United States formed themselves into a group with no customs barrier between them? Yet Sir Michael was warmly opposed to retaliation and, he said, "even if we could have Free Trade with

1. Nat. Rev., Apr.1903, Vol.41, p.327.
2. D. Norton, The Times, Dec. 27, 1904.

our Colonies, I do not see why that should necessarily involve increased duties on our part against foreign nations; but if we could have Free Trade with our Colonies even some sacrifice in that direction might be made."[1.]

Laurier threw the Free Traders into a greater panic by applauding the duty as a movement by the United Kingdom to Imperial preference. Speaking early in May at Ottawa he welcomed the corn duty because it "placed Canada in a position to make offers which she could not make in 1897. A step has been taken which would make it possible to obtain preference for Canadian goods... now the field is clear for arranging in June a system of larger trade between all parts of the British Empire, which will meet the views of the great majority of the people of Canada."[2.] Mr Balfour's categorical denial did not altogether quiet the suspicions of the Opposition.[3.]

Chamberlain, in a speech at Birmingham, denounced the attacks made by the Liberals on Sir Wilfrid, and looked gloomily at the great protectionist countries that were menacing defenceless British industry. He pointed out the tariffs and enormous trusts of foreign nations, telling his cheering fellow-townsmen of the impossibility of meeting those methods of competition by adherence to old and antiquated methods. "At the present moment the Empire is being attacked on all sides, and in our isolation we must look to ourselves. We must draw closer our internal relations

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1. H. C. Debates, 9 June, 1902, Vol.109, pp.167-168.
2. Quoted in H.C. Debs., May 13, 1902, Vol.108. p.128, p.152.
3. Balfour, "Sir Wilfrid Laurier's mission to this country has absolutely nothing, direct or indirect, to do with this tax. This tax was put on for fiscal reasons." Ibid, p.154, Holland, op.cit., p. 291.

the ties of sentiment, the ties of sympathy, yes, and the ties of interest. If by adherence to economic pedantry, to old shibboleths, we are to lose opportunities of closer union which are now offered to us by our Colonies; if we are to put aside occasions now within our grasp; if we do not take every chance in our power to keep British trade in British hands, I am certain that we shall deserve the disasters which will infallibly come upon us."[1] Lord Rosebery thought it was quite clear that the Corn Tax was intended as a prelude to a sort of Zollverein or Customs Union throughout the British Empire, and he opposed any such surrender by Great Britain of her fiscal policy.[2]

Before leaving for South Africa in December 1902, Chamberlain asked for assurance that the duty would be retained and also that the reason for retaining it be stated as in accord with his policy of Imperial Preference.[3] Lord Ritchie, having succeeded Sir Michael as Chancellor of the Exchequer, refused to undertake such an assurance and Chamberlain sailed without it, though Mr Balfour stated that he had "just reason to suppose" the Cabinet agreed with him with the exception of Ritchie.[4] On his return to England he was advised that Ritchie refused to continue the duty as any part of a preferential policy, though he would retain it on another ground. Chamberlain expressed his indifference to retaining it on any other pretext than as part of preferential policy and so the Budget of April omitted the duty. It is difficult to believe that Chamberlain let it go so easily, however,

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1. The Times, May 17, 1902.
2. Rosebery, Some National Questions, A Speech at Leeds, May 30, 1902, p.14.
3. Boyd, Speeches, pp.120-121.
4. Ibid.

for later he bitterly told the Duke of Devonshire, "While I was slaving my life out you threw it over as of no importance."[1.]

There is no doubt but that Sir Michael Hicks-Beach intended the tax as a permanent addition to revenue, in fact, he said so himself,[2.] and the Liberals were defeated in Committee on an amendment to limit the operation of the Bill to one year.[3.] The Chancellor of the Exchequer was quite angry when the duty was remitted, but he refused to support an amendment introduced by Mr Chaplin to the Finance Bill, condemning the remission of the Corn Duty and proposing as a substitute a remission of the Tea Duty, for fear of furthering Mr Chamberlain's policy.[4.]

There was encouragement for protectionists from another quarter. Curiously enough, it was the nationalist, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who gave a lead to Imperial economists and threw the idea of a commercial union of the Empire into the melting pot. In 1897 the Canadian Government included in their budget a section that was to play a great part in British politics in the near future. It read, "When the customs tariff of any country admits the products of Canada on terms which, on the whole, are as favourable to Canada as the terms of the reciprocal tariff herein referred to are to the countries to which it may apply, articles which are the growth, produce, or manufacture of such

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1. Holland, op.cit., Vol.2, p.356.
2. Vide H.C.Debs., 23 April, 1903, Vol.121, p.328; also Speech of Mr Robson, 9 June, 1902, Vol109, p.133, p.163: Statments by Sir M. Hicks-Beach; Holland, op.cit., pp.296-297, Vol11.
3. H.C. Debs., 9 June, 1902.
4. Nat. Rev., July 1903, Vol.41, pp.714-715.

country, when imported directly therefrom, may then be entered for duty, or taken out of warehouse for consumption in Canada at the reduced rates of duty....of Schedule D" according to which on and after 23rd April, 1897 to 30th June, 1898, there would be one eighth reduction in duty, and after 30th June the reduction would be one quarter.[1.]

On all sides of British political and economic opinion roars of approval broke out, and Kipling used the occasion to write that frequently quoted and greatly criticised poem, "Our Lady of the Snows."

'Carry the word to my sisters -
To the Queens of the East and the South,
I have proven faith in the heritage
By more than word of the mouth.
They that are wise may follow
Ere the world's war-trumpet blows.
But I - I am first in the battle,'
Said our Lady of the Snows.

A Nation spoke to a Nation,
A throne sent word to a Throne:
'Daughter am I in my Mother's house,
But mistress in my own.
The gates are mine to open,
As the gates are mine to close,
And I abide by my Mother's house,'
Said our Lady of the Snows."

It startled enthusiasts, however, to discover that other men were cheering for exactly an opposite reason to that of their own. Was it a movement on Laurier's part to an Imperial Zollverein - to Imperial Free Trade? Was it a movement to a breaking-down of Canadian tariff walls - to Canadian Free Trade? Or did Laurier mean to inaugurate a policy of Imperial Preference? Public opinion was certainly divided in the Mother Country, so much so

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1. 60-61 Vict., c.16, s.17.

that Laurier earned himself both the encomium of the United Empire Trade League, which was protectionist, and the gold medal of the Cobden Club, which, of course, was a supporter of Free Trade. One writer quoted Laurier's speeches as being opposed to protection, and decided that the Canadian tariff was a clever party move in which "the loyal sentiment was utilized to cover a Free Trade Movement."[1] A prominent Journal on Imperial matters noted in a leading article that the preferential tariff as a matter of course, not by the express words of the resolution, but by the conditions which existed, gave preference above all others to the products of Great Britain, and that it called emphatic attention to the possibilities of inter-Imperial trade.[2] It later observed that Laurier and Mr Reid, Premier of New South Wales, had given disappointing interviews decidedly against the Zollverein idea,[3] and finally confessed to inability to discover the end Laurier had in his tariff plans.[4] Baden-Powell drew attention to the fact that Canada had offered reciprocity, not preferential treatment, and so had advanced a step to Free Trade, not to a Zollverein. He therefore hailed the tariff with delight, for "The ideas of a Zollverein, and even of a Commercial Federation of the Empire have been overwhelmed in the greater and grander idea of the new Canadian policy :- big step forward, on the part of our greatest overseas province, along the profitable path of greater freedom of the interchange of the products of capital and labour, and in the direction of a truly Imperial Free Trade."[5]

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1. A. Sheadwell, The Canadian Enigma, Nat.Rev., Oct.1897, Vol.30.
2. Nat. Rev. 1897, Vol.29, p.616ff.
3. Ibid, p.779ff.
4. 1897, Vol.30, p.142.
5. George Baden-Powell, Imperial Free Trade, Fort. Rev., June 1897, Vol.61.

It could be remembered, however, that on June 3, 1896, Laurier had grown eloquent over the reflection that, "The statesmen of Great Britain have thought that the Colonies have come to a time when a new step must be taken in their development. What is that? That there shall be a commercial agreement between England and the Colonies. That practical statesman, Mr Joseph Chamberlain, has come to the conclusion that the time has come when it is possible to have within the bounds of the Empire a new step taken, which will give to the Colonies, in England, a preference for their products over the products of other nations. What would be the possibilities of such a step if it were taken? We sell our goods in England, we sell our wheat, our butter, our cheese, all our natural products, but these have to compete with similar products from the United States, from Russia, and from other nations. Just see what a great advantage it would be to Canada if the wheat, cheese, and butter which we send to England should be met in England with a preference over similar products of other nations. The possibilities are immense. Mr Joseph Chamberlain, the new and progressive Secretary of the Colonies, has declared that the time has come when it is possible to discuss the question. But, sir, if England is going to give us that preference, England would expect something from us in return. What is it that she would expect? England would expect that we would come as closely to her own system of free trade, such as she has it, as it is possible for us to come. England does not expect that we would take her own system of Free trade, such as she has it, but I lay it before you that the thing the English people would expect in

return is that instead of the principle of protection, we should adopt the revenue form of tariff, pure and simple.[1.] Now that sounds simple enough; nothing enigmatic there. Laurier praises Chamberlain, speaks with delight of the prospect of getting preference in British markets; and does not seem to doubt but that it would be worth the reciprocity involved. However, when Laurier attended the Conference of 1897 he spoke at Manchester as follows: "The Colonies who desired closer commercial relations with Great Britain had no idea that this country would abandon free trade; free trade had done too much for England to make a return to protection necessary."[2.] When Sir Frederick Pollock went to Canada in October 1905, Laurier told him that there was one subject on which Imperial action might be taken, viz. trade relations. But "On this Sir F. P. was silent."[3.]

It seems to be the truth that Laurier meant it when he said in 1887 that he would accept a commercial union with Great Britain on the same basis that he would accept one with the United States; that is, Canadian interests must be protected and the reciprocity would take the form of a commercial treaty.[4.] Mr Jebb was the first publicist to bring the public fully to appreciate the force of the habitual use by the Canadian Premier of the phrase, "commercial treaty" as applied to Imperial preference.[5.] There were other men, nevertheless, who had seen Laurier's point of view. Montagu and Herbert, two men who had gone to Canada for a

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1. J.W. Willison: Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party, Vol.II, pp.287-288.
2. Skelton: Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Vol.II, p.73. For Laurier's attitude to the question see ibid, p.71ff.
3. Hewins, Apologia of an Imperialist, Vol.I, p.122.
4. Skelton, op.cit., Vol.i, p.376.
5. Studies in Colonial Nationalism, pp.239-240.

year to investigate Canadian feeling in connection with preference, reported that if Great Britain should abandon Free Trade, the Canadian Govèrnment would be prepared to negotiate a commercial treaty, but there would be nothing Imperial in such a treaty. To the Liberal Party it would be a purely commercial matter, in which Great Britain would be regarded in the light of a friendly foreign Power and, continued these gentlemen, "the present goverment will not enter into a commercial treaty unless independence and freedom to negotiate elsewhere are guaranteed,"[1.] all of which was very wise, and proved that the tourists were a good deal more perspicacious than the protectionists would admit.

Laurier was well aware in 1897 that there was no immediate hope of getting reciprocity agreements with the United States and was smarting from his rebuffs in that direction. Between 1865 and 1898 there were eleven distinct fruitless overtures from Ottawa to Washington, and now Laurier declared, "There will be no more pilgrimages to Washington. We are turning our hopes to the old Motherland."[2.] At first, however, it had been an open secret that one motive for the new tariff policy had been the possibility that such a tariff might revive reciprocity with the United States.[3.] The Venezuelan incident, wherein the limits of American egoism was reached by Secretary of State Olney's declaration that "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition",[4.] stirred Canadian Loyalist feeling.

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1. Montagu and Herbert, Canada and the Empire; and Examination of Trade Preferences, p.19.
2. Knowles, Economic Development of the Overseas Empire, Vol.ii, p.67.
3. Baden-Powell, op.cit. pp.940-941.
4. C.7926, 1896, p.17.

The Dingley tariff - an extreme measure, passed in the emergency session during the spring and summer of 1897 - was another hard blow at Canadian desire for reciprocity with the Republic. Laurier also knew quite well that if he associated his offer of preferential treatment to British goods with a demand for preferential treatment in Great Britain, he would antagonise British Free Traders, and so he made his offer as a free gift.[1.]

As for Canadian opinion, Laurier was not advancing anything new; the question of preferential trade with Great Britain had undergone much discussion and numbered among its advocates Mr D'Alton McCarthy, Col. Geo. T. Denison, Dr Ge. R. Parkin, and Principal Grant of Queen's University.[2.] As early as 1892 the Canadian House of Commons had passed a resolution approving preferential treatment upon Canadian British trade.[3.] The meaning of his preference became clearer when in the next year (1898) it was established as a "British Preferential Tariff"[4.] and in 1900 the reduction was increased to one third.[5.]

New Zealand followed Canada's example in giving a preference to British goods in 1898, and English Imperialists were happy, as they explained, not from any intrinsic benefits about to be conferred by a slight remission on a scanty importation, but as evidence of the attitude of the Government of New Zealand to Great

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1. Willison, op.cit., p.298.
2. Ibid, p.286.
3. Cd. 2326, p.2.
4. 61 Vic. c.37.
5. 63 & 64 Vic. c.15. Vide the comment of the Nat. Rev. Vol.31, p.461, May 1898, on the discomfiture of the Cobden Club when the Canadian favours were confined to the United Kingdom, British India, New South Wales, and the British West Indies.

Britain.[1] The South African Customs Union, formed in 1903, immediately on its formation gave an unconditional preference to the United Kingdom, in return for British protection, and gave preference on a reciprocal basis to other British possessions.[2] The Commonwealth of Australia offered preference to British goods, imported only in British ships manned with white labour, but treaty obligations prevented its operation and in 1908 a simple preference was substituted.[3]

The Colonial Conferences should have helped the United Kingdom to a decision as to whether or not the Colonies wished a preference in British Markets. Mr Hofmeyr's suggestion has already been noted. At the Ottawa Conference of 1894 important trade resolutions were adopted asking that provision be made by Imperial legislation enabling the different parts of the Empire to enter into agreements of commercial reciprocity, including the power of making differential tariffs, with Great Britain or with one another, and also condemning any provisions in existing treaties - having in mindthe German and Belgian most-favoured-nation treaties - which prevented such agreements of reciprocity within the Empire. But the Conference also expressed itself in clear and unequivocal terms that, since the co-operation and unity of the Empire could best be promoted by the interchange of products, it was therefore resolved, "That this Conference records its belief in the advisability of a customs arrangement between Great Britain and her Colonies by which trade within the Empire may be placed on a more favourable footing than that which

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1. Nat. Rev., Sept. 1898, Vol.32, p.140.
2. Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, 1927, Vol.11, p.932.
3. Ibid, p.933.

is carried on with foreign countries. Further resolved: that until the Mother Country can see her way to enter into customs arrangements with her Colonies it is desirable that, when empowered to do so, the Colonies of Great Britain, or such of them as may be disposed to accede to this view take such steps to place each other's products in whole or in part on a more favoured customs basis than is accorded to the like products of foreign countries."[1.]

Lord Ripon's Dispatch, giving the attitude of the Imperial Government to these resolutions, expressed "a grave doubt" as to whether such a fiscal policy would be a means to promote that object with which His Majesty's Government had the heartiest sympathy - the stability and progress of the Empire. Had the Resolution advocated the establishment of a Customs Union, comprising the whole of the Empire, whereby all the existing barriers to a free commercial intercourse between the various members would be removed, and the revenue derived equitably apportioned among the different communities, he would have found it free from objection in principle, and certainly very valuable in tending to cement the Empire and promote its welfare. Such a union, it had been recognised by the Delegates, was impossible for the Colonies in their present circumstances, and what they had recommended was something essentially different - the establishment of differential duties in Great Britain in favour of Colonial produce, and in the Colonies in favour of the produce of the Mother Country. It was not to be a movement to take off customs barriers (this is what the Cobden Club thought Laurier

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1. C. 7553. pp.2-3.

was doing) but to impose new duties where none existed at present, while duties, now of impartial application, were to be increased against foreign goods or diminished in favour of British Colonial trade. Ripon thereupon stated the general objections to such differential duties and noted the preponderance of foreign trade over trade with the Colonies. After an excellent summary of the arguments against Britain reversing her policy of free trade, he stated that there could be no objections to the Colonies giving preference to one another, though he warned them that differential duties meant a diversion rather than an increase of trade and that it would be difficult to make such a duty without diverting trade from a sister Colony or from the Mother Country, thus generating unfriendly feelings, possibly provoking retaliation. The British Parliament had taken steps to remove the legislative obstacle to such differential duties as contained in the prohibitive clause inthe Constitution Act of the Australian Colonies.

Regarding the objectionable treaties, Ripon quoted Article XV of the Belgian Treaty (A similar clause in the Treaty with the German Zollverein) that "Articles the produce or manufacture of Belgium shall not be subject to the British Colonies to other or higher duties than those which are or may be imposed upon similar articles of British origin." These Treaties, so it was stated by the legal advisers of His Majesty's Government, did not prevent differential treatment by the United Kingdom in favour of each other. They did ~~not~~ prevent differential treatment by British Colonies in favour of the United Kingdom. In other words, any preferential treatment accorded by a British Colony

to produce of the United Kingdom must also be extended to Belgium and Germany and through themmto other countries which had ordinary most-favoured-nation clauses with Great Britain. Both the German and Belgian Governments had refused to consent to the abrogation of the offending articles (XV and VII respectively) of the treaties and the only alternative to remove the difficulty was to denounce the treaties upon twelve months notice, "a step of the greatest gravity", which might be followed by a loss of some export trade to those countries. The Colonies were large exporters to Germany and Belgium, who would refuse to include them in any new Treaty that might be negotiated and, considering the comparatively small amount of their trade, it would be very difficult for them, if in an isolated position, to secure advantageous terms except by very heavy concessions.[1.] One may note the concluding remark which signifies that the Dominions were under tutelage, and not yet was the principle enunciated by Laurier agreed upon, namely, that every community knows what is best for itself.

This dispatch from Lord Ripon was a kindlier treatment to Colonial representations on these treaties than that given to the Canadian memorial of 1892,[2.] or at least there was less finality in its tone.[3.] At the Conference of 1897 a resolution was adopted, "That the Premiers of the self-governing Colonies unanimously and earnestly recommend the denunciation, at the earliest

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1. Dispatch of June 28, 1895, C.7824, No.1.
2. C. 7553, p.54.
3. Ibid, p.148. Canada had protested against there treaties as early as 1881 and again in 1890. Vide Knowles, Economic Development of the Overseas Empire, Vol.ii. p.67; Dewey, Dominions and Diplomacy, Vol.i, p.167.

convenient time, of any treaties which now hamper the commercial relations between Great Britain and her Colonies."[1] Her Majesty's Government thereupon notified the Governments of Germany and Belgium of their wish to terminate the commercial treaties complained of by the Colonies, and they came to an end on July 30th, 1898.[2] British opinion certainly was in favour of their denunciation, and there was much rejoicing and few regrets when this cause of friction was removed.[3] That the British Government act on the request of the Dominions had been urged as particularly desirable by the Conference in view of a further resolution to the effect that the Premiers would confer together in order to see whether trade relations between the Mother Country and the Colonies could not be improved by a preference given to the products of the former.[4]

The Conference of 1902 doubtless was a tremendous disappointment to Chamberlain, yet there was one weak link in the nationalist armour. It consisted of the resolution on Imperial trade and read, "That this Conference recognises that the principle of preferential trade between the United Kingdom and His Majesty's Dominions beyond the seas would stimulate and facilitate mutual commercial intercourse, and would, by promoting the development of the resources and industries of the several parts, strengthen the Empire. That this Conference recognises that, in the present circumstances of the Colonies, it is not practicable to adopt a general system of Free Trade as between the Mother Country and

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1. C.8596, p.14.
2. Ibid, p.15.
3. Henry Birchenough, England's Opportunity. Germany or Canada? 19th Cent., July 1897, Vol.42.
4. C.8596, p.14.

the British Dominions beyond the seas. That with a view, however, to promoting the increase of trade within the Empire, it is desirable that those Colonies which have not already adopted such a policy should, as far as their circumstances permit, give substantial preferential treatment to the products and manufactures of the United Kingdom. That the Prime Ministers of the Colonies respectfully urge on His Majesty's Government the expediency of granting in the United Kingdom preferential treatment to the products and manufactures of the Colonies either by exemption from or reduction of duties now or hereafter imposed."[1.] Laurier obviously had his eye on the British duty on corn in the framing of the last sentence.

The Canadian Delegates to the Conference were stung by Chamberlain's speech wherein he pointed out that Canadian preference had merely checked the decline that set in with their heavy tariff of 1885. Foreign produce, he contended, still had a lower average tariff in Canada than British produce, no doubt due to the fact that the foreign produce was, as a rule, of a character upon which lower duties were ordinarily levied; but the result had been that while foreign imports largely increased, British imports largely decreased. On the other hand Chamberlain noted that the exports from Canada to foreigners had decreased 40%, but her exports to the United Kingdom had increased 85%, so that Canadian tariff pressed with greatest severity on her best customer and favoured the foreigner who was trying to shut out Canadian goods. Chamberlain then used language which was to be often quoted against him in the coming days. "So long as a preferential tariff, even a munificient preference, is still sufficiently

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1. Cd.1299, pp. ix-x.

protective to exclude us altogether, or nearly so, from your markets, it is no satisfaction to us that you have imposed even greater disability upon the same goods if they come from foreign markets, especially if the articles in which the foreigners are interested come in under more favourable conditions."[1.]

The Canadian Delegates retorted with a memorandum which argued that the Canadian preferential tariffs had checked the decrease in imports, from the Mother Country.[2.] Eliminating goods in which Britain could not compete, however generous the tariff, they brought figures to show that, whereas between 1893 and 1897 the imports from Great Britain declined by 32% as compared with an increase of 6% from the United States, a change had taken place during the period of 1897 to 1901 so that British imports increased 56%, those from the United states 7% and from other countries 67% and it was submitted that the Canadian Preferential tariff had not only checked the decline but had also stimulated British trade.[3.] Such statistics showed the trade preferences in favourable light. The Canadian Ministers stated that if they could be assured that the Imperial Government would accept the principle of preferential trade generally, and particularly grant to the food products of Canada exemption from duties now levied, or hereafter imposed, they would be prepared to examine further what increased advantage the British manufacturer might be given over his foreign competitors in Canadian markets. The Memorandum continued further that "The Canadian Ministers desired to have it understood that they took this course with the strong hope and expectation that the principle of preferential trade

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1. Cd. 1299, p.8.
2. Ibid, p.118ff.
3. Ibid, p.120.

would be more widely accepted by the Colonies, and that the Mother Country would at an early day apply the same principle by exempting the products of the Colonies from Customs duties. If, after using every effort to bring about such a re-adjustment of the fiscal policy of the Empire, the Canadian Government should find that the principle of preferential trade is not acceptable to the Colonies generally or the Mother Country then Canada should be free to take such action as might be deemed necessary in the presence of such conditions."[1] Why anyone should find equivocation in this statement is difficult to understand; it is a plain statement of an intended bargain, with a clear suggestion that if a bargain should not be consummated the party which initiated the action would discontinue its advances. There is no dubiety about it, and the vast amount of quibbling that ensued in British politics as to whether or no Laurier had ever intended to initiate reciprocity with the Mother Country, or whether Laurier was in favour of such agreements and bargains, is simply amazing in light of the above statement. But this is an uneasy subject even today in Great Britain no less than in Canada, and one is apt to be pulled up short by an inadvertent straying upon this ground.

As if the Memorandum quoted were not sufficiently clear an exposition of the Canadian attitude, British Imperialists were startled by Mr Fielding's Budget speech of April 1903.[2] The Canadian Minister of Finance reviewed the trade conditions between the Mother Country and Canada with particular reference to the

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1. Cd. 1299, pp.37-38.
2. Nat. Rev., May 1903, Vol.41, pp.508-509.

Memorandum and stated that a reasonable time would be allowed Great Britain to consider their proposal, but if ultimately the Mother Country found it impossible to grant Canada reciprocal preference, and her attitude of treating the Canadian tariff of little material value should continue, then there could be little complaint if Canada withdrew her discrimination. A valuable comment on this declaration concluded: "It would be no exaggeration to say that the organisation of the British Empire depends on our (Great Britain) being willing and able to establish inter-Imperial trade on a preferential footing.[1.] Another Imperialist, studying the Colonial attitude, decided that, to quote his words, "If not in commercial union with us, they will make commercial treaties with our rivals. If not with us, they will be driven to be against us: and the last act of the Imperial drama will have commenced. Without them where would England stand in the world's estimate?..Politics are above economics, even as Adam Smith admitted that 'defence was above opulence.'[2.]

Laurier's nationalist theory, however, did not permit that his Cabinet should directly advise Great Britain in the election issue of protection, When Mr J. Israel Tarte spoke out for Chamberlain's policy he was forced to resign from the Cabinet,[3.] although leading Canadians found it quite compatible with their conception of Empire to go to the Mother Country and campaign on the fiscal question.[4.] Yet Sir Wilfrid committed himself

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1. Cd.1299, Vide also L.J. Maxse, The Colonial Offer, Nat. Rev., Jan. 1905, Vol.44, p.853.
2. Charles Follett, The Fiscal Question - A Bird's-eye View, Fort. Rev., March 1904, Vol.75, p.470.
3. Denison, op.cit., pp.336-337.
4. ex. Mr Foster; Vide ibid, p.291.

quite clearly, if a great student of the question be permitted to observe that in the middle of the campaign Laurier gave voice to these sentiments: "I tell you, my fellow-countrymen, that the Government of Canada, as constituted today, is ready to go and make a treaty of commerce with Great Britain to the extent of preference as soon as the British people are ready to give a corresponding preference. The answer is no longer in our hands but in the hands of the English people."[1] The National Review which had labelled the Canadian Prime Minister a "mug wump",[2] by which appellation the organ gave voice to its stern disapproval of his silence during the campaign could not be content and concentrate its energies on Mr Reid of Australia whom it had hailed at the Colonial Conference with such delight.

Joseph Chamberlain had two virtues of the great man: he was never lukewarm and he saw political life steadily with clear, hard eyes, In this description one has the visionary and the efficiency expert, demagogue and realist. He could hate with a bitter hatred: Labouchere could testify to that. And when he gave himself to a cause, he gave himself utterly; there were no divided loyalties. A man of fire and altogether fearless, he did not hesitate to cross swords with Free Trade doctrine, storming those ramparts which the Manchester School had thought to erect to withstand the barbarians for all time. His energy was

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1. Jebb, Studies in Colonial Nationalism, p.224. Laurier at Guelph, Oct. 12, 1904.
2. Technically an independent member of the Republican Party of the caucus of 1884. The connotation is a man who belongs to neither party or whose convictions are unreliable or unsettled.

boundless: in 1923 a well-known writer was expected to publish a biography, but this is the spring of 1932 and the book is not yet completed.[1] That energy was of dynamic quality. When the mighty campaign got under way it was recorded that, "There is Mr Chamberlain. There is the opposition to Mr Chamberlain. Between them England has almost forgotten that a Government exists."[2] An adverse journal, without hesitation, termed him, "the most powerful statesman of our day."[3]

Disraeli was fond of saying, "The great thing in politics is the personal",[4] and few public men more clearly proved him true than Chamberlain. During his eight years of office as Secretary of State for the Colonies he succeeded in impressing, not only the imagination of the British people, but of the whole civilised world.[5] Moreover to an England of the age of Kipling, an age of imperialism, jingoism, an age which was feeling the challenge of foreign nations and, dismayed, calling for a David to meet the Philistine Goliaths, what mattered most was that Chamberlain was the most colourful British statesman who had entered the European arena since Palmerston. "To the European peoples," said a follower proudly, "He is the embodiment of all our disagreeable features."[6] The man was right: to the foreigner Chamberlain was the personification of England's power and Machiavellian politics, designed to achieve the universal domination of England. The Kaiser thought Chamberlain ought to be

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1. Gardiner, Life of Sir William Harcourt, Vol.ii, p.463, mentions Garvin's forthcoming life of Chamberlain.
2. Calchas, Mr Chamberlain: The Protagonist of the Future, Fort. Rev., Nov. 1903, Vol.74.
3. The Economist, Sept. 16, 1903, Vol.61, p,1599.
4. Morley, Recollections, Vol.ii, p.95.
5. Wemyss Reid, The Crisis, 19th Cent., Oct. 1903, Vol.54,p.691.
6. Calchas, op.cit.

taken to South Africa, marched across the continent, and then shot,[1] so the British people loved him the more.[2]

Why has it been necessary to record these opinions regarding Chamberlain? For the same reason that it has been necessary to go to some trouble to discover the true attitude of Laurier. To understand these two men is to understand the two great movements of the British Empire that met in a mighty dramatic duel from the days of the early Federation agitation, but which came into practical politics for the first time during Chamberlain's term as Colonial Secretary. It is not intended as an adverse criticism to say that Laurier represented nationalism with its keynotes of independence and non-participationism in imperial affairs, a policy essentially negative, that each member of the Empire should look to its own household: a centrifugal theory. On the other hand lay the theory of Imperialism - the compulsion of the British race into an effective organic unity which would lend itself to concerted action, with each member bearing a proportionate burden of, and having a voice in the affairs of Imperial Government. Nationalism had no thought-out foreign policy and consequently no plan for Imperial defence. Imperialism perceived that foreign policy and defence were counterparts. Chamberlain saw further that Imperial trade, Imperial organisation, and Imperial defence were inseperably connected, and with them were

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1. Brig.-General W.H.H. Waters, Private and Personal, p.145.
2. Mr Chamberlain, Sat. Rev., 15 Feb., 1902, Vol.xciii; p.197: "A good deal of Mr Chamberlain's popularity at this hour is doubtless due to the insensate jealousy and vulgar insolence of German politicians and pressmen. The Colonial Secretary stands for Great Britain versus Germany, and in that attitude his countrymen will back him to any lengths."

interwoven foreign policy, commercial rivalry, and military predominance.[1] That was why in 1895 Chamberlain, with the choice of any portfolio in the Cabinet, chose that of Secretary of State for the Colonies as the key position. Nationalism and Imperialis were embodied in Laurier and Chamberlain. The latter was representative of British public opinion on the Empire; there can be little doubt of that. Kipling praised him; Jebb, the discoverer of Colonial nationalism, praised him. It was not that his opponents disagreed with his theory that the Empire must co-ordinate its resources and bring into mechanical harmony its disordered parts, but they disagreed with the means. It was doubtful whether preferential tariffs would gain them the desired union, and if they did the prize might not be worth the sacrifice involved. The eulogist who termed Chamberlain, "the typical Englishman - the representative of his people's aspirations and desires", was not far astray.[2]

It would be interesting to trace the evolution of Mr Chamberlain's mind until it arrived at the Imperialist and then Imperial Preference stages. Certain admirers would believe that he was an Imperialist from his earliest appearances in politics,[3] yet in 1880 he confessed that he was more interested in local supply of

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1. Vide J.Shield Nicholson, A Project of Empire, p.208ff.,p.237ff, for a development of this theory with special reference to the ideas of Adam Smith. W.A.S. Hewins, Apologia of an Imperialist, p.54ff. and passim, argues the weakness of"a merely political Imperialism" and makes an effort to show the fundamental position of unity in economic interests. The Morning Post, June 21, 1910: "Given the economic conditions, the corresponding political conditions will develop spontaneously, but without economic union political union is an impossibility."
2. "An Englishman", A tribute to Mr Chamberlain, Nat.Rev., March 1902, Vol.39, p.40.
3. Ben H. Morgan, Joseph Chamberlain, Britannic Rev., Aug.1914, Vol.1.

gas and water than in the Imperial policy which had given Britain Cyprus and the Transvaal.[1] The mission to the United States and Canada to settle certain matters at issue between those countries doubtless accomplished the reformation and made him an Imperialist.[2] In the early eighties he had asked wonderingly, "Is anyone bold enough to propose that we should put duties on food?"[3] When did he become a convert to Imperial Preference?

It is probably correct that the subject of Imperial Reciprocity had been in Mr Chamberlain's mind ever since he went to the Colonial Office.[4] Soon after taking office, he had addressed a despatch to the Colonies inviting opinion on the condition of British trade, and in March of 1896 emphasised the importance of approaching the questions of Imperial union from the side of trade and commerce, especially since the Colonies had led the way at the Conference of 1894. Yet he felt no little doubt as to the advisability of this form of Imperial union, for it would involve the imposition of a duty, it might be a light one , but nevertheless a duty, upon food and raw material. In return Britain would get "A small, and very small" consideration in the shape of preference in her competition with foreign manufacturers in colonial markets.[5] Like Lord Ripon, he did not think the proposal offered sufficient advantage to induce Britain to take the certain loss and the risk involved in revising altogether its present commercial policy, while objection also lay in the fact that the foreign

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1. Alexander Mackintosh, The Story of Mr Chamberlain's Life, p.36.
2. Vide Halevy, A History of the English People, pp.23-24.
3. Mackintosh, op.cit., p.40.
4. The Nat. Rev., July 1903, Vol.41.
5. Chamberlain, Foreign and Colonial Speeches, 1897, p.169.

trade of the United Kingdom was so gigantic in proportion to the foreign trade of the colonies that the burden of such an arrangement would fall with much greater weight on the United Kingdom than upon the colonies.[1] He spoke, so he explained, "to provoke discussion - to provoke discussion in this country, and to provoke discussion above all in the colonies."[2] Wise politician! He needed the support of arguments and offers from the Colonies before he could face the electorate. He had too much political genius to commit himself at that stage, but the title of his speech, "The First Step to Federation," might be significant.

In June of that year, Chamberlain spoke directly from the topic, "Commercial Union of the Empire", to the Congress of the Chambers of Commerce of the Empire. He thought the omens never more favourable for bringing within practical politics that splendid dream of a union of free states, enjoying free institutions, yet inseparably united in defence of common interests, and in the observance of mutual obligations.[3] He observed on the agenda of the Congress as a topic for discussion, the commercial union of the Empire: that was inspiring. There were only three lines of progress to this object. There was the proposal as sponsored by the Cobden Club, that the colonies abandon their fiscal system for one of free trade. But this would give no special advantage to the Empire, nor would the Colonies adopt it. If they had to wait until the colonies were converted to British views of free trade, the hope of commercial union must be postponed to the Greek

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1. Chamberlain, op.cit. pp.170-171.
2. Ibid. p. 175.
3. Ibid, pp.178-179. London, June 9, 1896.

kalends.[1] There was a second proposal that the Mother Country change her fiscal system with duties on food and raw material, while the colonies gave a small discrimination in favour of British trade. "Well, I express again my own opinion when I say that there is not the slightest chance that in any reasonable time, this country...would adopt so one-sided an agreement." The benefit would be too small, and the foreign trade was too great.[2] The third course was found in the resolution submitted by the Toronto Board of Trade for the creation of a British Zollverein or Customs Union, establishing free trade throughout the British Empire, but leaving the separate contracting parties free to make their own arrangements with regard to duties on foreign goods, with the essential stipulation that Great Britain shall consent to place moderate duties upon certain articles of large production in the Colonies.[3] These articles Chamberlain took to include corn, meat, wool, and sugar. He was enthusiastic in support of the adoption of such a principle: the same principle that underlay the federation of the United States and the German Zollverein, and if it were adopted "it would be the strongest bond of union between the British race throughout the world." It would commend itself even to an orthodox free trader, being the greatest advance that free trade had ever made since it was first proposed by Cobden, as it would extend its doctrines permanently to more than 300,000,000 of the human race.[4] If such a proposal came from the colonies it would not be met, so he promised, with a blank refusal from the Mother Country. But it

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1. Chamberlain, op.cit. p. 182.
2. Ibid, p.184.
3. Ibid, pp.184-185.
4. Ibid.

would not be "wise or practical that a proposal of this kind should come in the first instance from the United Kingdom."[1.]

In November of 1896 Chamberlain was little moved by the "Made in Germany" agitation,[2.] which rebukes the noisy arguments of Mr Berard who would have it that the Colonial Secretary was moved almost entirely by the Birmingham cry of distress for "markets".[3.] At that time Chamberlain found that "there is hardly reason for serious alarm, although there is reason for watchfulness..." At the Conference of 1897 he stated that Great Britain was more anxious to obtain the views of the Colonial Governments than to put foward definite proposals, and noted the difficulty of forming a Zollverein because of the situation of the Dominions.[4.] It was strongly rumoured that he had put forward the proposition that there should be absolute Free Trade between Great Britain and her Colonies on condition that the former placed a small Customs tax on commodities from foreign countries.[5.] In the House of Commons Debates of April 3, 1900, he denied that any other form of fiscal arrangement with the colonies was possible other than the Zollverein plan, which he had not proposed, and he indignantly contradicted the suggestion that he had offered preferential trade to Canada.[6.] After the Conference of 1902 the National Review wrote regarding his position to preferential tariffs, "Mr Chamberlain did not tell the Conference officially what they appear to

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1. Chamberlain, op.cit. p.186.
2. S.H. Jeyes, Mr Chamberlain, His Life and Public Career, Vol.ii, p.276. E.E. Williams, Made in Germany)
3. V. Berard, British Imperialism and Commercial Supremacy, passim.
4. C.8596, pp.10-11.
5. Quoted from the Toronto Globe, Nat. Rev., 1897, Vol.30, p.643. But Chamberlain denied that he ever proposed a Zollverein to the Dominions. H.C.Debs., 3 Apr., Vol.81, pp.1150-1151.
6. Vol.81, p.1151. ., Willison, op.cit., pp.303-305.

have learnt privately - that he had baulked in his ambitions in this direction by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Mr Chamberlain had first dreamt of a Zollverein, then conceived the idea of an Imperial Customs Union (as a modification of the Zollverein idea) and finally decided in favour of the less ambitious but more practical scheme of preferential duties." Even this "irreducible minimum" was swept away by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach's statement that the Imperial Government would enter into no customs relations with the Colonies except upon the Free Trade basis.[1] It would seem, therefore that Chamberlain was complete converted in the Spring of 1902, and his half-hearted attempt to discourage the Colonies in regard to the preference already being extended may have been a clever move to force their hand either to declare that that was the only way the Empire could be united, or to throw them back upon his defence proposals. It would thus either give him a clear statement for the electorate or quicken the reluctant Colonies into other plans for imperial consolidation, with the probability favouring the former action.

There was another reason why Chamberlain should have been converted in 1902-1903. His party had grown very unpopular among the Noncomformists by passing the famous Education Bill of 1902 which abolished school boards, a stronghold of the Non-comformists. Chamberlain and many of his Birmingham supporters were Nonconformists, but Chamberlain, by reason of his Cabinet position, was unable to make public disavowal of the act of his Government.[2] The War Office Reforms were considered another reason for a great loss of voters.[3] What could win them back except a great issue

1. Nat. Rev.,Aug. 1902, Vol.39, p.992.
2. Vide Halevy, op.cit., p.201ff.
3. Holland, Life of the Duke of Devonshire, Vol.ii, pp. 284, 355, 359.

that would make all others pale into insignificance? At any rate, he believed defeat to be certain as matters stood.

There can be not the slightest doubt but that Chamberlain believed that preferential tariffs would lead to Imperial Federation. In a speech in March 1896 he observed that the first thing to be done was to establish common interests and obligations, and when that was done it would be natural that some sort of representative authority should grow up to deal with them. The greatest of common obligations was Imperial defence, and the greatest common interest was Imperial trade, both of which were very closely connected, Imperial trade of a necessity coming first. "Imperial defence is largely a matter of ways and means, and ways and means are dependent upon the fiscal and other commercial arrangements you make; and, therefore, the conclusions to which I arrive is this", said Chamberlain, "that if the people of this country and the people of the Colonies mean what they have been saying, and if they intend to approach this question of Imperial unity in a practical spirit, they must approach it on its commercial side." As proof of this, he mentioned the German Empire, begun as a commercial Zollverein.[1.]

In his speech in June of the same year on a "Commercial Union of the Empire", Chamberlain asserted that, "If we had a commercial union throughout the Empire, of course there would have to be a council of the Empire.....and whenever such a council is established, surely there will naturally be remitted to it all those questions of communication and of commercial law in which the whole of the Empire is mutually interested. Even Imperial defence could

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1. For. and Col. Speeches, op.cit. p.167.

not be excluded from its deliberations, for Imperial defence is only another name for the protection of Imperial commerce, and to such a council as I have imagined to be possible the details of such defence, the method of carrying it out, the provision to be made for it, would naturally be remitted....The establishment of commercial union throughout the Empire would not only be the first step, but the main step, the decisive step towards the realisation of the most inspiring idea that has ever entered into the minds of British statesmen."[1.]

On August 1, 1902, speaking on "United Empire", Chamberlain told his listeners that there were two avenues alone to the federation of the British Empire. It might be reached by Imperial defence or Imperial trade. He begged the United Kingdom not to be impatient, but to carry on in the faith that the Colonies would finally come. In the meanwhile it would not be wise to force the pace, to ask the colonies to do more than their goodwill would suggest to them.[2.] This was after the Conference, where Chamberlain realised that Laurier had "locked, sealed, bolted, and barred" the gateway to the defence avenue. He would try the other; Laurier had been more genial at that entrance. "The political reason for supporting preferential or reciprocal trade within the Empire," wrote one of Chamberlain's followers, "is that it will bring about a political unity which, whether we call it Imperial Federation or not, all the members of the Empire seem at present to desire, and even to expect."[3.] Throughout his campaign

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1. For. and Col. Speeches, op.cit. pp.180-181.
2. Boyd, Speeches, op.cit. p.73.
3. Benjamin Taylor, Imperial Reciprocity, 19th Cent., June 1903, Vol.53.

Chamberlain laboured the opinion expressed in a great speech at West Birmingham on May 15, 1903, that unless the question of Imperial trade and commerce were satisfactorily settled, he, for one, did not believe in the continued union of the Empire.[1] At Glasgow he uttered the dynamic that had inspired his campaign, "the creation of an Empire such as the world has never seen." He said, "We have to cement the union of the States beyond the seas; we have to consolidate the British race; we have to meet the clash of competition, commercial now - sometimes in the past it has been otherwise - it may be so in the future."[2] How clearly his thesis runs! Mr Berard is only indirectly right when he argues that it was in order to provide Birmingham with markets that Chamberlain set about to establish preferential trade. Of course the great Imperialist expected that the result would be for the welfare of Birmingham in the longrun, but the starting-point of his efforts lay in the conviction that the day of small nations was past. The British Empire must be consolidated, and the only way to consolidate it was by preferential trade; all other avenues were blocked. He gave this confession of faith to the Duke of Devonshire, and there is not the slightest reason to believe that he did not mean it entirely, as he wrote, "For my own part I care only for the great question of Imperial Unity. Everything else is secondary or inconsequential. But for this - to quote a celebrated phrase - I would not have taken my coat off."[3]

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1. Vide Grant Richards, Speeches, "Imperial Union and Tariff Reform," pp. 7-8.
2. Ibid, p.22.
3. Chamberlain to Devonshire, 21 Sept., 1903, Holland, op,cit., p.355.

At Newcastle Chamberlain related how he had told the Colonies of the need of the Empire and the desire of the United Kingdom to call them to the Imperial Councils. But they had decided that they will not advance along that line and federate in that way. "I do not mean", he said "that they will always refuse it; on the contrary, I believe that if my proposal were carried a Federal Council would be a necessity; but you cannot have it at present, at any rate, and I do not see any sign of your ever having, a Federal Council first....I tried next in connection with Imperial defence. Again I was beaten by the difficulties of the situation; but I did not on that account give it up, and I come back, therefore, to this idea of commercial union which will bring us together, which will necessitate the council, which council in time may do much more than it does in the beginning and may leave us, though it will not find us, a great, united, loyal and federated Empire."[1]

This conviction, then, that Imperial Preference was the only way to Imperial Federation, provided the motive power; the visit to South Africa (from the 2nd November to the 14th March) following on the Imperial Conference, provided the immediate inspiration, "the calm with which the solitude of the illimitable Veldt had affected his constitution." He began bravely enough, but that great campaign inaugurated in Glasgow on October 6 of 1903 which was accused by an adverse critic of being conducted on lines of a travelling circus, a description which conveys at any rate the colour and brilliance of it, began to show the signs of wear after the itinerary had included Greenock, Newcastle, Tynemouth, Liverpool, Cardiff, Newport, Birmingham, and Leeds. In London, in

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1. Richards, Speeches, op.cit., p.91. Oct. 30, 1903.

January, he could not fail to be aware of the growing critical doubt which was taking the place of the earlier enthusiasm. By that time he had modified his programme; the emphasis, so bravely placed on Imperial Preference at the outset, was growing less strong, and more was heard of retaliation and advantages to the British agriculturist, manufacturer, and working-man.

If Chamberlain had not read the public mind with an accuracy that would have suggested more caution, Mr Balfour doubted the inefficacy of a plea that left so much depending on the imagination and emotion to carry a British electorate. That startling declaration at Birmingham had caught the Prime Minister off his stride, and on that very day he met a protectionist delegation to advise them that Imperial Preference was premature for immediate politics. Had not his uncle, Lord Salisbury, shortly before his death, speaking to the Primrose League, addressed a grave warning to those men, some of whom were to be found in his own party, if not in his own Cabinet, who were trying to hurry on the union between the Colonies and the Mother Country? It was then believed that the Prime Minister was referring to the proposal favoured by Mr Chamberlain, to establish some form of Zollverein throughout the Empire.[1] According to a memorandum sent to his colleagues, Balfour told Chamberlain prior to Chamberlain's resignation from the Cabinet that, to quote his words, "I was becoming more and more convinced that public opinion was not ripe for a tax on food, and that any attempt at the present time to impose one would endanger that portion of fiscal reform against which there was no such widespread prejudice".[2]

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1. Wemyss Reid, "Last Months", 19th Cent. June, 1902, Vol.51,p.1045.
2. Holland, op.cit., p.353.

In a letter to Devonshire, he made his attitude quite clear: "Ritchie, I gather, dislikes Colonial Preference simpliciter. If a good fairy offered it to him to-morrow as a fait accompli, he would reject it. I do not, as at present advised, share this view. If I could have it on my own terms I am disposed to think I should take it - though even then I should like to have more time for analysing its economic consequences before expressing a final decision. My hesitation, however, chiefly arises from doubts as to its practicability rather than its expediency. I question whether the people of this country will be sufficiently tolerant of the protective side of the scheme, or the people of the Colonies sufficiently tolerant of its Free Trade side, to permit them to accept the compromise in which it essentially consists."[1] For the moment he advised a non-committal attitude on the part of the cabinet.[2] With his delightful dialectic he entered a battle which he loved almost as much as Chamberlain loved a straight fight, that was to hold his party together by conciliation and compromise, anything that would keep the free-trade Unionists disunited. There were some like Lord George Hamilton and Lord Hugh Cecil who were adamant against compromise. But there were others who would have welcomed an opportunity to unite on a platform of retaliation, or even join the Liberals in some co-operation. Mr Churchill did not hesitate to cross the floor of the House in opposition to his old party. In Edinburgh, on October 4, 1904, Balfour gave a speech that in general tone was typical of the

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1. Holland, op.cit. p.307. Letter of June 4, 1903.
2. Ibid, p.309.

arguments that were to be advanced in public speeches during the campaign.[1] He was opposed to Protection where "a protective policy is a policy which aims at support or creating home industries by raising home prices.... I am not a Protectionist." He did stress a policy of retaliation, "using our power of enabling us to negotiate arrangements with foreign countries on a basis favourable to our own manufactures." This was not protection, so Balfour argued, since the customs tax was one which by the play of international competition would be paid by the foreigner and not the British consumer. It would not raise the prices at all, while it would have probably a very great effect by way of inducing the foreigner so to manipulate his tariff that free interchange of goods would be promoted between different countries, for the "greatest modern weapon of diplomacy" was "the use of tariffs to promote Free Trade." He then went on to state, in a concluding bit of oratory, his aim "to make the scattered fragments of this vast Imperial community more and more members of one family, more and more bound up with each other's interests, more and more cognisant of each other's wants, and that the sundering ocean which makes so difficult the personal interchange of ideas between us and these great communities that have issued from us might be morally bridged over, and that we might find ourselves....looking forward to a development which should bring us closer and closer together, each member of the whole retaining its individuality, each retaining its liberty and self-government, but feeling that in all the great matters which concern Imperial questions of commerce and questions of defence, we were more and more becoming one whole in truth as

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1. The Scotsman, Oct. 4, 1904.

well as in name one great all-embracing Empire." "In this speech Balfour declared some interval must intervene before the realisation of a preferential policy. There must first be a General Election and then a Conference with the Colonies, and any agreement reached would be submitted to the nation. In Albert Hall on June 2, 1905, however, he declared that Tariff Reform and Imperial Preference were in the first line of the Unionist policy and did not set the time of realisation so far off.[1.] In Balfour's mind fiscal imperialism was subordinated to retaliation, for he knew well enough that the latter was the only argument to weigh against "dear food".

That was the crux of the matter: the argument that won most votes for the protectionist party was not Imperial Preference, but the protection of home industry and retaliatory tariffs; the argument that won votes for the Liberals and dissenting Unionists was "dear food". All other arguments were subordinate to these. Imperial Preference and Imperial Union did good service to dress up speeches; the serious business man and worker were not greatly moved by such appeals, and naturally enough. The dry, dull election speeches make weary reading, but it is necessary to go through them to appreciate this fact. "I told them," gloated Sir William Harcourt, "to,stick to the tax on food and talk and listen to nothing else. You will see that Balfour is beginning to funk, and pleads that it is not fundamental, in which he gets no support from Joe, who knows of course that if that goes all his colonial

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1. Holland, op.cit., pp.386-387; p.393: "the establishment of a moderate tariff on manufactured goods, not imposed for the purpose of raising prices or giving artificial protection against legitimate competition, and the imposition of a small duty on corn" Balfour's words, used on another occasion. Vide also his letter to Chamberlain, Sept. 16, 1903.

preference is at an end. On this issue he must be beaten."[1]. About this strategic principle gathered Churchill, Hicks-Beach, Devonshire, Goschen, and James, "a confounded bimetallist", as Harcourt dubbed him.[2] Strange bed-fellows surely. But Chamberlain had thrown away the sanctuary of sane and safe politics - risking everything as only great men do - and Free Trade conviction and political expediency had clubbed together to down their common foe.

It should not be understood, however, that Imperial Preference did not play a considerable part in the campaign. Running throughout the whole of the Tariff Reformers plea - though more particularly at the outset - was the cry that it was not the old issue of Free Trade and Protection raised again, but the new issue of consolidation of the Empire.[3] If preferential schemes were refused, in all the Colonies a party would arise whose cry would be, "If the Mother Country refuses us reciprocity, let us seek reciprocity elsewhere."[4] The issue was therefore one whose decision might determine the fate not only of England, but of the British Empire.[5] "Upon that Imperial policy," warned Chamberlain, "and upon what you do in the next few years, depends the tremendous issue whether this great Empire of ours is to stand together, one free nation, if necessary, against all the world, or whether it is to fall apart into separate States, each selfishly seeking its own

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1. Gardiner, Life of Sir William Harcourt, Vol.ii., p.554. The italics are in the original.
2. Ibid, p.448.
3. C.A. Vince, Mr Chamberlain's proposals, What they mean and what we shall gain from them, p.2 and passim.
4. Ibid, p.11.
5. Edward Dicey, Imperial Policy and Free Trade, 19th.Cent., July 1903, Vol.54.

interest alone, losing sight of the common weal, and losing all the advantages which union alone can give."[1.]

It could be observed that the Canadian Conservative Party had strongly opposed "jug-handled preference" and pressed for a quid pro quo or nothing.[2.] Mr Wyatt, as a result of travelling in Canada, reported, "I have to bear witness to a deep conviction burned in upon my mind, that unless the home islands reciprocate soon, the preference accorded Canada to England, the Empire runs a frightful risk of losing the great Dominion."[3.] Had it not been the object of Cobden, the Apostle of Free Trade, to get rid of the Colonies by Free Trade?[4.] "We can have Free Imports without an Empire", said a Protectionist journal, "but we can have no Empire without Preference."[5.] The advocates of Imperial Preference again and again return to the argument, that if the Empire were a Federal State, as the United States, the ultimate sanction of its unity would lie in the coercive power of the central body. The British Empire, being without that central body, must have the sanction of unity in common interests as created by Imperial trade.

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1. Boyd, Speeches, Vol.ii, pp.127-128. "The Empire is not old. The Empire is new. The Empire is in its infancy. Now is the time when we can mould that Empire, and we and those who live with us can decide its future destinies." Ibid, p.129.
2. Porritt, op.cit., p.145ff.
3. Letter to the Nat. Rev., Oct.1903, Vol.42, p.322. Vide also Calchas, Cobdenism and the Colonies, Fort. Rev., Aug. 1903, V.74: "The alternative to Preference is McKinleyism in the Colonies, with the ultimate certainty of special commercial treaties between the United States on the one hand, and Canada, and the Commonwealth, and the decline of our trade in both" pp.210-211.
4. This was frequently brought up. Vide ex. Edward Diceys "Last Month", 19th Cent. Mar. 1904, Vol.55, p.524.
5. Nat.Rev. Dec, 1903, Vol.42. The Economics of Empire, p.62.

This was the psychological moment, which might never occur again. Not too much trust should be put in sentiment to keep the Empire together. One sceptic reflected that there had been military empires and commercial empires, but it was difficult even to conceive a sentimental empire.[1]

The National Review consistently used the argument that a preferential policy in the Empire would so strengthen it as to shatter German ambitions.[2] The end, then, was a "business relationship" between the United Kingdom and the Colonies in peace that would put the Empire on the best ultimate war footing, and at the same time add to the immediate prospective material prosperity.[3] Mr Kidd put it more grandly: "To transform a world-wide Empire of fragments and sentiment into a commonwealth with a common purpose; to endeavour to uphold therein the standards of civilisation for which we fought and endured, the standards of life for which labour in this country has struggled and suffered; to endeavour thereby to introduce some order and moral sense into the gigantic squalor of those tendencies in modern trade, production, and finance of which the Carnegies and Pierpont Morgans of the time have become the embodiment; this is a cause worth living for."[4]

What exactly were the changes that Chamberlain advocated? His policy is, happily, comparatively easy to outline. He never proposed a theory in the abstract, but put it in blunt, business-like language, and in this case he had the advantage of being able to observe the models provided by other Imperial States.[5] He

1. W.Cunningham, The Wisdom of the Wise, p.57.
2. Vide, ex. "Germany and Canada, Nat.Rev., Aug.1903,Vol.41,p.896.
3. J.B. Crozier, Free Trade or Protection,Fort.Rev., July,1903, Vol.74.
4. The best outline of Chamberlain's policy is given in Boyd, Speeches, pp.121-124; also Speeches, Imperial Union and Tariff Reform, Grant Richards publisher. Introduction by Joseph Chamberlain; also in his speeches in these volumes.

pointed out that little advance was being made towards universal Free Trade. Other nations had not, as anticipated by the founders of British Free Trade, followed the example of the open door, and in the present condition British trade had no recourse against the present hostile tariffs of other nations. While Free Traders had no solution for the dilemma, the tariff reformers had a definite policy which would not fall heavily on any class or individual, but, by a slight transfer of existing tariffs, would raise the revenue for defence and administration in such a way as to develop inter-Imperial trade to the mutual advantage of the Colonies and the Mother Country, add greatly to the amount of employment for the ever-growing population, and recover freedom of action for negotiating tariffs with other countries. From this general eclectic premise, Chamberlain proposed a duty on foreign corn not exceeding two shillings a quarter, with a preference on colonial corn. There would be no tax on maize, a 5% tax on foreign meat and dairy produce, with a substantial preference on colonial wines and fruits. These taxes would be balanced by a reduction of three quarters the duty on tea, half the duty on sugar, and a corresponding reduction on cocoa and coffee.[1] The loss thus occasioned to the exchequer would be made up by a moderate duty on all manufactured goods, not exceeding 10% on the average. He did not propose to give any preference to the Colonies on raw material;[2] nor did he propose such a tax.

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1. Glasgow, Oct. 1903, Richards, op.cit., p.41.
2. I had it from a leading public man of Glasgow that in Chamberlain's speech in that city he did propose such a tax, but that it was omitted in the published speech. I can find no further proof of such a proposal. The published speech reads: "You cannot, in my opinion, give them a preference on raw material. It has been said that I should propose such a tax; but I repeat now, in the most explicit terms, that I do not propose a tax on raw materials, which are a necessity of our manufacturing trade. What remains? Food." Boyd, op.cit., p.157.

There seems to be some doubt whether colonial corn would be exempt from duty or not,[1] although Chamberlain at Glasgow used language which would seem to imply a free admission, in which case he would have antagonised the British agriculturalists. It may be safely inferred from a synopsis of his speeches and from the report of his Tariff Commission,[2] that there would be three grades of duties a normal duty, consisting of a low scale of duties for foreign countries which admitted British wares on fair terms, a preferential tariff to Imperial produce and foodstuffs, and a penal or maximum duty on goods of nations who treated British goods unfairly. Certainly Chamberlain's intention, however he may have disguised it, was not to protect home agriculture. He wrote to the Duke of Devonshire, "It is ridiculous to suppose that two shillings a quarter on corn would restore prosperity to agriculture, although the farmers might possibly support it as a drowning man will catch at a straw."[3] The principle that "any tax on one kind of food must be met by a reduction of an equal amount on other articles of food which are now being taxed", was a shrewd effort to meet the Free Fooders on their own ground.[4]

These duties appear very modest to our tariff-ridden age, but the tariff reformers of that day made the most extravagant claims for them. The consumer would pay no more for his imported commodities than if he bought them in the country of their origin. The producer would be <u>partially</u> protected against dumping, but

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1. Halevy, op.cit., p.345.
2. Report of the Tariff Commission, Vol.1.S.S. 82-85. It should be remembered that the Commission was not a Government Commission, and the members were practically of Chamberlain's selection. For a summary of its work vide. Hewins, Apologia of an Imperialist, Vol.1, p.82ff.
3. Holland, op.cit. p.355. Letter of Sept. 21, 1903.
4. Vide Ibid, o,323, letter of Aug. 25, 1903.

above the limit of cost would be exposed to free competition. Labour would get more employment, and consequently higher wages. Agriculture would have its prices steadied, and consequently the conversion of ploughland to pasture would be checked; and labourers would be returned to the soil. Capital would be kept in the country for further employment of labour.[1] Moreover, it was contended frequently that the foreign exporter would have to pay the tax, or at least a major share of it,[2] and it was one of Chamberlain's sayings that he was merely making the foreigner pay a toll for the use of the British market. Of course, if that were so, the British manufacturer and agriculturalist would be getting no protection and the Dominions no preference, except insofar as the tax subtracted from the foreigner's capital.

It was generally recognised that internal free trade in the British Empire was out of the question as the Dominions relied too much on the system of indirect taxation and also they must protect industries being built up under the tariff walls.[3] There were men, however, who thought that Imperial Free Trade would come, though not at first, with taxation for revenue purposes alone,[4] while others were bolder and wished for an immediate start for absolute Free Trade.[5] These were quite foreign ideas to

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1. As Thomas Middlemore, The Economic Review, Jan.1905, Vol.xv. The Great Consult. Edin. Rev. Jan. 1905. Vol.201, p.255ff.
2. Milner, The Nation and the Empire, p.416ff: Taxing the Foreigner, Huddersfield, Dec.17, 1909.
3. Ashley, op.cit. pp.148-150. Jebb, Studies in Colonial Nationalism, p.224ff. Allerdale Grainger, Suggestions for a Commercial Treaty with Australia, 19th Cent. Aug.1903, Vol.54.
4. W.R. Scott, Free Trade in Relation to the Future of Britain and the Colonies, p.23ff.
5. L.M.Burrell, A Plea for absolute Free Trade, The West. Rev., Nov.1903, Vol.60. Vide ibid, Dec. 1903: An Imperial Parliament and its Work: An effort to formulate a scheme for commercial union along Free Trade Lines, Sir Vincent Caillard, op,cit.

Chamberlain's proposals, for he found that he had to walk warily indeed. When in Glasgow he proposed that the Colonies might be willing to restrict the breadth of their manufacturing enterprise and refrain from new lines of effort which would compete with present goods manufactured by the United Kingdom, he brought such a vigorous denial from Laurier that he retreated hurriedly from that position.[1.]

Having set forth the case for the tariff reformers, let us examine the attitude of the Liberals. When Chamberlain made his speech of May 15 at Birmingham, Liberal writers did not treat him as severely as one might have expected. One journalist thought his cause hopeless, but inspiring, and that he had shown "the inadequacy of sentiment alone to provide a trustworthy cement to hold the component parts of a great Empire."[2.] Another most able critic declared that the Colonial Secretary had done good work in calling attention to the problem of a united Empire.[3.] The Economist scoffed, though it is difficult to maintain a sneer for a lengthy two-column article.[4.]

Chamberlain might have expected the Earl of Rosebery to give a kindly eye to his programme for an 1888 the Scottish Lord had contrasted British exports to Canada and to Australia, which were 30 shillings and 7 pounds a head, respectively, with those to the United States of 8 shillings a head, drawing the moral of "keep your colonies." He could hope for the great boon of an Empire

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1. Richards, op.cit. p.29. T.A. Brassey: Steps to Imperial Federation, R.C.I. Proceedings, Nov.11, 1902, Vol.34: "Commercial Federation, on the basis of free trade within the Empire is out of the question... Commercial Federation on the basis of preferential trade within the Empire stands on a different footing."
2. H. Maxwell, Imperial Reciprocity, 19th Cent. June 1903, Vol.53.
3. Wemyss Reid, 19th Cent. June 1903, Vol.53, p.1058.
4. The Economist, May 23, 1903, Vol.61, p.615.

"encircling the globe with a bond of commercial unity and peace."[1] His biographer tells us that in this instance Rosebery was thinking, not of a series of commercial treaties between the Mother Country and the Colonies, but of a single and comprehensive Imperial Zollverein which would include Free Trade within the Empire, coupled with "the possibility of Protection" against outside nations.[2] Lord Rosebery refused to condemn Chamberlain's scheme at once and entirely when it was advanced, but he found two incompatible elements in food taxation[3] and the danger of exciting the jealousy of foreign Powers by a policy of fiscal exclusion, such as would not outweigh the advantage of uniting the Empire.[4]

The Liberals warmly rebutted the charge that the Tariff Reformers made to the effect that all who were not with them were against the Empire. "I was an Imperialist", stoutly declared Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, "I preached the doctrine of the permanent union of the Empire in England, aye, and in Canada itself, thirty or more years ago, when Mr Chamberlain's politics did not go beyond Birmingham."[5] The Free Trade supporters fell back upon the argument that it had been during the period of the supremacy of the greatly maligned laissez-faire school that the Empire had developed in the free, untrammeled growth of nationalities. while it had been the plantation policy that had lost the United States. It would be equally disastrous now to bring in a system by which one part of the Empire could dictate to another part as to its fiscal system.

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1. Leeds, Oct.10, 1888, Papers and Addresses by Lord Brassey, op. cit. p.109.
2. S.H. Jeyes, The Earl of Rosebery, ed. S.J.Reid, p.268.
3. Ibid, p.253.
4. Ibid, pp.268-269.
5. The Economist, Nov. 7, 1903, Vol.61, p.1884.

"While we possessed a system of preference," said Mr Strachey, "the Empire flourished neither commercially nor politically.... When, however, we abandoned the attempt to establish special trade privileges within the Empire, and instead allowed trade to follow its own interests, the Colonies became a source of pride and strength to the Mother Country."[1.]

That statement scarcely carries the weight placed upon it. Did not the Colonies rather become "millstones about our necks" than sources of pride? Nor did Free Trade mean the fiscal self-determination that Mr Strachey implies. It is true that the Colonies were in theory endowed with fiscal freedom by the abolition of colonial preferences, by the Enabling Act of 1846 permitting the Colonies to abolish preferential duties in favour of the Mother Country, and by the repeal of the Navigation Laws, but it was not for some time and after much fighting that it was decided that this policy was not intended for the Colonies as well. That is, Great Britain intended that the Colonies would use their power to reduce tariffs and adopt Free Trade. The Canadian tariff of 1859 caused surprise and some bitterness in Britain by its protective measures, and differential duties were strongly resisted, even within the Empire.[2.] Lord Kimberley in 1872 is found trying

1. J.St.Loe Strachey, Free Trade and the Empire, The Empire and the Century, p.153. Vide also Autonomos, Pinchbeck Protectionism, Fort. Rev., July 1903, Vol.74.
2. Knowles, Economic Development of the Overseas Empire, Vol.ii, p.60ff; Porritt, op.cit. pp.94-95, 155, 223; Keith, Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.ii, pp.927-931. Bodelsen, op.cit. pp.138-140. Professor J. Shield Nicholson argued that to insist upon the United Kingdom adopting protection or the Colonies free trade as a necessary preliminary to internal free trade was to put needless and possibly insuperable difficulties in the way. "The ideal of internal free trade would be attained if the colonies were to carry their preferences to the extreme of reducing the duties on the products of the rest of the Empire to zero, although the United Kingdom retained its free trade system, and the colonies in each case its own protective system against the rest of the world." A Project of Empire, p.ix.

to persuade the Colonies of the virtues of Free Trade and dissuade them against giving one another preferential duties.[1] In fact, Imperial patriotism of the sort Mr Strachey lauds did not appear until laissez-faire doctrine was being held in question towards the end of the century.

Of course, no man would deny that Free Trade had done much for the Empire, negative though its policy was.[2] It had much to do with the granting of Responsible Government to the Colonies by the loosening of ties, leaving the Colonies to work out their own destinies, and removing causes of friction. But it did not relax control ungrudgingly and in the happiest of spirits, nor did it produce positive Imperialism, except in the indirect fashion of a man who throws away apple seeds and is startled to find a tree growing in his garden,[3] and Mr Strachey himself seems to consider this point of view when he remarks that the Free Traders "builded better than they knew."[4]

The Economist was on better ground when it took up a similar argument from the point of view of a fait accompli, insisting that the Dominions had self-determination and there must be no linking of one part with the domestic inconveniences and burdens of another part. Such a policy it conceived to militate against the "moral unity" and "steady material progress" of the Empire. That is, it accepted Laurier's position, that each community within the Empire knows what is best for itself, as the principle

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1. Keith, op.cit., pp.930-931.
2. No odium attaches to the word "negative". Mr Skelton, an intense admirer of Laurier uses it, and Mr Dicey implies it.
3. Dicey, op.cit. pp.xxiv-xxvi takes this view, as does Knowles, op.cit. Vide also Bodelsen op.cit. p.59.
4. Strachey, opc.cit., p.158.

of self-government. The journal continued, "Each of the great groups of British Colonies has before it the ambition of achieving a national existence, and the only true prospect of maintaining Imperial unity lies in the provision within the Empire of ample scope for the realisation of these several ambitions."[1.] Winston Churchill, now at the beginning of his sparkling career, pleaded with the Birmingham electorate not to misinterpret the character of the British Empire...The life and strength of our authority springs from moral and not from physical forces."[2.] When the years before the war found Churchill at his wits end as to the means to obtain stronger military cohesion within the Empire and larger offerings, and the autumn of 1931 found him ardent in tariff propaganda, the ghost of Joseph Chamberlain must have smiled!

There was a strange paradox in the Free Trade Imperialist position, which was of the same nature as their earlier reluctance to see the Colonies take up independent tariff positions, that is, they were quite willing, nay anxious, that the Empire be united by the sacrifice of the Colonies of their protectionism. Lord Thring, after an eloquent plea for political and commercial freedom for every self-governing part of the Empire, asks angrily if the Mother Country is to make all the sacrifices. Should not the Dominions throw over their tariffs to achieve Imperial unions?[3.] Sir Robert Giffen maintained that the best solution would be "to convince the Colonies of error in regard

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1. The Economist, Oct. 17, 1903, Vol.61, p.1746.
2. Nov.11, 1903. Speeches, p.43.
3. Thring, The Unity of the Empire, 19th Cent. Mar. 1904, Vol.55.

to their cherished preferences."[1.]

From this point of view, it was easy for the protectionists to have some fun at the expense of Lancashire's interference with India's tariff on cotton. India had imposed a 5% ad valorem duty on imports, with cotton goods subject to a special duty of 3½%. The Indian Government, under Lancashire pressure, put a balancing excise duty on Indian Cotton.[2.] The Times expressed its opinion that the duty must be retained for revenue and that the Indians did not complain, a statement which it is difficult to take at its face value. The Times thought that if the Indians had their way they would impose high import and export duties, like those which obtained prior to 1860. A letter thereupon naively suggested that since India was free trade country she "could not expect to have her staple industry protected at the expense of Lancashire. It need hardly be said that Lancashire cannot agree to the import duty remaining and the excise charge being continued."[3.] Another correspondent complained that, as India was a competing manufacturer of hosiery, boots, and shoes, it was difficult to see why they should not have been also favoured with the excise duty, which was, "in fact, a preferential advantage given to cottons but withheld from other goods."[4.]

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1. Imperial Policy and Free Trade, 19th Cent., July 1903, Vol.54. He holds the same view in "The Dream of aBritish Zollverein, 19th Cent. May, 1902, Vol.51: "If the United Kingdom is for Free Trade surely it is a great mistake for self-governing Colonies having only a fifth of the population of the United Kingdom to try to force the Mother Country into their view and drag the rest of the Empire with them...It is the Colonies and not the Mother Country that should give way." p.703.
2. The Times, articles, A Fiscal Question, Dec.12, 1904; 2nd article, Dec. 18, 1904.
3. William Tattersall, The Times, Dec.22, 1904.
4. The Times, Dec.30, 1904. J.F.L. Rolleston.

It was pointed out by a writer that a British cargo was expected to be plying on the upper Yangtsze within a short time and the Chinese carrying on trade there would regard this British innovation as a menace to their trade and trouble would arise.[1] The protectionists were again able to scoff at a Free Trade morality that maintained its principles by means of its gunboats. One may sympathise with Cobden as he despondingly considers, "For a politician of my principles there is really no standing-ground. The manufacturers of Yorkshire and Lancashire look upon India and China as a field of enterprise which can only be kept open to them by force....How few of those who fought for the repeal of the Corn Law really understand the full meaning of Free Trade principles. If you talk to our Lancashire friends they argue that unless we occupied India there would be no trade with that country, or that somebody else would monopolize it, forgetting that this is the old protectionist theory which they used formerly to ridicule."[2] There was some opportunity, therefore, which the tariff reformers did not hesitate to take, to scoff at a policy of which Lord Farrer had said it was "absolutely immoral to make the principles a subject of discussion",[3] yet which compelled weaker nations to keep the "open door".[4]

There was some justification for the Protectionist to argue that the Free Trader was not honest when he maintained that it was because he was so interested in the free development of the

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1. Joseph Walton, China and the Present Crisis, p.239.
2. John Morley, Cobden, Vol.ii, p.214.
3. Berard, op.cit. p.150.
4. Jebb, Studies in Colonial Nationalism, p.244. Ashley, op.cit. pp.196-197.

Colonies as nations that he refused to link them in sordid commercial bonds. Mr Churchill brought his dialectic to bear, and he justified Great Britain's control of Indian tariffs on the ground that, "We believed that protective duties were vicious and foolish; that in the long run they would injure all parties; that they would harm the Lancashire producer and the Indian consumer."[1] Churchill held that if England protected, then India might also protect against Lancashire cotton, else there would be injustice and "British justice is the foundation stone of British dominion".[2] It appeared somewhat strange to the protectionist that this justice of an excise tax to the Indian consumer should be so much more apparent in Lancashire where every Liberal member was pledged to it, and every constituency had passed resolutions in its favour, than in the rest of the country.

Had the Liberals stuck to the argument already mentioned that each part of the Empire must determine its internal policy, the present development of the Empire would have proved them wise and Laurier could not have fairly made any protest. If the argument that protection meant dear food to the workman outweighed other merits of the change, then tariffs were not justified. The British voter had as much right to protest against being coerced into adopting a policy as had the Canadian.

The Liberals followed their protest that they were quite as loyal to the Empire as their opponents, by proposing alternative measures to tariff reform, some of which were much after the fashion of those proposed by Mr Ewart. There were even some who

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1. Though Mr Jebb failed to see how an excise tariff could improve the position of the Indian consumer.
2. Speeches, pp.70-71.

admitted that there might have to be some "deviation from free-trade methods for the sake of Imperial union."[1] The most common suggestions were cheap post for letters, parcels, and newspapers, and cheap money orders and telegraphs. To meet foreign competition and to increase British sales abroad, they suggested decimal weights, measures, and coinage, corresponding to those in use in other lands. Catalogues should be printed in the language of the countries to which they were sent, while travellers and clerks should be fluent in foreign languages. To increase and improve manufactures, the State should simplify the patent laws and encourage research, while the manufacturers should make use of scientific knowledge and research.[2] It was to be noticed that the causes for the displacement of British by foreign goods lay in a variety of causes that had to do with the lack of enterprise shown by the British firms. The foreign countries supplied cheap goods;[3] gave good finish to poor goods; took pains with the suitability of goods whereas "the reputation of the British manufacturer is that he makes what he chooses, and if his Colonial customers reject it, takes no further trouble in the matter."[4] The Americans were alive to all the new improvements while "the English move along in the same old rut."[5] The foreigners packed so as to save space and freight and to give greater security in transit and to give greater convenience and facility for distribution at the other end; the foreigner also packed goods so that

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1. Giffen, Imperial Policy and Free Trade, 19th Cent. July 1903, Vol.54.
2. "A.H." letter to the Spectator, Oct. 31, 1903.
3. C.8449 (1897) p.8.
4. Ibid, p.9.
5. Ibid, p.79.

they could be made to look attractive in the store.[1] Hong Kong complained that the British manufacturer had not shown sufficient adaptability to the requirements of the market. He stuck to the old sizes, old colours, old weights, old qualities, and old styles.[2] The foreign agent went further into the country and was ready "to consult the wishes of the smallest man" and to take a new trade in articles, however small.[3] The foreigner also gave longer terms of credit.[4] There were many cases where the freight was against the British producer and in favour of his rival, as in Cape Colony where shipments from New York could be made much more cheaply than from Great Britain,[5] Remedy these conditions, said the Liberals, and there will be a certain advantage to the Empire's trade and our own ability to complete successfully.

It was quite certain that the self-governing Colonies would continue to protect their industries to an extent that would prevent competition by the United Kingdom, and therefore any further preferences would be ineffectual as far as promoting British trade therein was concerned, in fact it could be said to be a sin to discourage or suppress colonial industries in any way.[6] It could be recalled that Chamberlain had told the Conference of 1902 that Canadian preferences were of little value, and there was the suggestion that the Canadian preference was only a real reduction of 7½% as the rate had first been raised,[7] so that British trade

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1. C.8449 (1897) p, 236, 356, 330-331, 460.
2. Ibid, p.330.
3. Ibid, p.10.
4. pp. 354-355, 572.
5. Ibid, p.238.
6. Economist, Dec.12,1903,Vol.61, p.2087; Nov.28,p.2005.
7. John Davidson,Commercial Federation and Colonial Trade Policy, pp.80-81. Colonial Preferences were doubtless of value. Vide Report of the Tariff Commission,Vol.1,1905,ss.471-485. S.476: "The Canadian market, which was at one time lost, has been partially recovered to British makers by preferential tariff." s.477. Firm no.844: "This trade would not exist if there were no preference."1909, Vol.iv,ss.1136-1161, Evidence of Witnesses, Vol.7, 1909, ss.271-280.

was more severely handicapped than hitherto. Lord Avebury wrote to rebuke to general impression that Canada had favoured British goods by admitting them at a rate of 33% below those of other countries. This was only a half-truth. Canada admitted some goods free, others at a light, and others at very heavy duties. The classes of goods exported from Britain largely belonged to the third category. By reason of this fact it could be shown that on the imports from the United Kingdom of £8,839,000, the customs duty was £1,612,000, which made a duty of 18%; the imports from the United States of £22,702,000 had a duty of £2,735,000 to pay, or 12%, and all imports of £37,241,000 had a duty imposed of £5,981,000, or 16% ad valorem equivalent.[1.] The Free Traders could also point to the growth of the Colonial markets in recent years as the result of sentiment which led to goods being sold at cost price.[2.]

In Australia the Labour Party was trying to advance the interests of the working classes by establishing a system of high wages and high prices, making Australia a self-contained commercial unit.[3.] The protectionists had no guarantee whatever that in either Canada or the Commonwealth protectionism could be retarded to allay in any important degree inter-Imperial economic competition, or that any real advantage could be gained to the Mother Country as the result of a reversal of fiscal policy.

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1. Lord Avebury, The Great Fiscal Question, 19th Cent. Sept. 1903, Vol.54, p.365.
2. Report of the Tariff Commission, Vol.1, 1905, s.811. "The reason why the Colonial markets have expanded so considerably is, that we have made a deat set for those markets...We have done so at a very great sacrifice indeed. The tubes have been sold for years and years now, approximately at cost price."
3. Halevy, op.cit. p.345.

Not only did Great Britain get all the Colonial trade she could get in any case, but to begin offering Canada preferences might lead to a ruinous competition with the United States, who could offer the Dominions much more advantageous reciprocity than could the United Kingdom.[1] The United States had the further advantage of geographical position: it has always been a great problem in Canadian nationalism to make the trade flow east and west against the natural lines of north and south, and the United States was much nearer than Great Britain. The Free Trade supporters thus met Chamberlain with the argument that by Imperial Preference Canada might be sent into a reciprocity treaty with the United States, which was the very thing he wished to avoid.

There was a good deal of fear of foreign resentment. As a matter of fact, a policy of exclusion worked both ways, and other countries might shut out British goods.[2] Sir Francis Lascelles reports a conversation he had with the Kaiser, who feared that with the Colonies offering preference Britain might depart from the policy of the open door.[3] Quite possibly the fear that a tariff war might lead to armed aggression had something to do with Lancashire's rejection of protection.[4]

One cannot help thinking that the Chamberlainites had a good deal of merit in their reply: that Great Britain had as much right to impose a tax on foreign products as foreigners had to

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1. Montagu and Herbert, Canada and the Empire, p.64.
2. Economist, Nov.28, Vol.61, p.2004.
3. British Documents on the Origins of the War, op.cit. Vol.ii, p.9. Despatch Aug.1900.
4. Vide Berard, op.cit. p.147, 155. Mr Berard should be read with some caution as he is apt to press his theories too relentlessly. Vide also Thomas Ellison, the Cotton Trade of Great Britain, pp.95-96, p.100.

tax British products. It is highly irritating to have Carnegie and other wealthy firms with much Press support, protesting against British imposition of taxes on foreign imports; in fact, it is a galling impertinence, possible only to an amazing conceit. There is much truth, however, in the statement of Professor Ramsay Muir that foreign nations are entitled to object if Britain should shut out the world from her colonial markets, comprising so vast an extent of the world's source of supplies, because she was the earliest and most aggressive entrant in the competition for colonial possessions. Only because she kept them open to all mankind, so Professor Muir contends, has she the right to possess them. "If at any time Britain should reverse her traditional policy of the open door and reserve for her own merchants the trade of the immense areas the world would protest and with reason against the exorbitant and disproportionate share that had fallen to her."[1] But it was a constant reproach against Chamberlain that he did not include the dependent Empire in his scheme of Imperial Preference. As an opponent said, "Every proposal he has made in the direction of Imperial unity has been met by the inquiry - how will this affect India?..His definition of the Empire would seem to be, a collection of self-governing colonies - dependencies do not count - which ask for preferential tariffs."[2] The tariff reformers held that "the dependent Empire" would not be affected by preferential arrangements made with the self-governing Empire.

Then there was the argument that the Colonies purchased much more in proportion to their population than did foreign countries.

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1. Muir, op.cit. p.204.
2. The Economist, Dec.12, 1903, Vol.61, p.2087.

For example, in 1902 Germany, Holland, and Belgium bought 11/8 of British goods per head; France 8/- per head; United States 6/3 per head; In contrast, Canada bought £1/18/4 per head; Australia £5/5/6 per head; Cape Colony £6/19/6; New Zealand £7/5/7; and Natal £8/0/6.[1] Moreover it was claimed that these markets were steady and their fluctuations less.[2] The Free Trade protagonists could point out that it did not matter much that the Colonies purchased so much more comparatively; what did matter was that they had many less heads to do the purchasing, and consequently of British trade £600,000,000 was transacted with foreign nations and £200,000,000 with British possessions and it was "obviously unwise to dislocate ¾ of our commerce in the endeavour to increase the remaining fourth."[3] It would also probably deprive Britain of the present preferential tariff she enjoys in the most-favoured-nation treaties for 2/3 of her export trade.[4] It was also most disconcerting to the tariff reformers that, after 1903, trade with foreign countries expanded rapidly, while that of the Colonies showed little growth.[5]

The protectionist replied that any sacrifice involved would be repaid when the colonies grew to the status of great nations. Mr Jebb was quite vexed with Chamberlain and his fellow-propagandists for putting the idea of sacricice too prominently in the

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1. Ashley, op.cit. p.144.
2. Ibid, pp.141-142.
3. L.G. Chiozza Money, op.cit. p.64. This is not quite fairly put. In 1903 total Exports to foreign countries was 238 million pounds value and to the Colonies 119 millions, or exactly half. The Value of Imports from foreign countries was 429 millions and from Colonies, 114 millions. Thus the figures appear in a more favourable light to the advocates of Protection. Cd.2337, p.582.
4. Money, op.cit.
5. Halevy, op.cit. p348.

foreground and for maintaining that Imperial preference would bear fruit finally in the social welfare of the British Isles, and the greater defensive power of the Empire, but that immediate gain should not be expected. There can be no doubt but that his protest was right. It was bad psychology: a public will always choose a bird in the hand.

The Liberals also laboured to expose the fallacy of the self-sufficiency idea. Not only was it likely to create bad blood with foreign countries and especially with the United States, destined to failure because the Colonies would not be able for generations to take the place in British trade which was then held by foreign countries, but it would fail finally because the United Kingdom still would have to rely on Spain for iron ore, the Dutch East Indies for tin, and so on.[1] It was also argued that variety of products did not mean self-sufficiency; quantity was an essential, from the best and the cheapest markets procurable. It would be long before the colonies could support the industries and people of the United Kingdom.[2] In any case, the preferences to the Colonies would be ineffectual, affecting only a small colonial class: wheat growers and land speculators.[3] In Britain, it was represented as a scheme of the wealthy landowners and rich manufacturers, and not designed to benefit the working classes or improve social conditions for the poor.[4]

The Free Traders, for the most part, stressed the danger of tightening bonds which were purely ideal, and which could not be

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1. Giffen, The Dream of a British Zollverein, 19th Cent. May 1902, Vol.51.
2. L.G. Chiozza Money, op.cit. pp.65-66.
3. Giffen, Ineffectual Preferences, 19th Cent. Jan 1904, Vol.55.
4. Churchill, Speeches, pp.39-40.

"shortened or materialised without becoming shackles."[1] Rosebery was surprisingly strong on this point, believing that the freedom of national development which Canada enjoyed kept her loyal, and that the true ideal for the British Empire was, "and should be, a vast co-operative league of contented and emulous Anglo-Saxon States, together with an Empire in the East of different races and different conditions. When that truth is grasped," said Lord Rosebery, "we shall have less of the perilous rhetoric as to the necessity either of mechanically drawing closer or of drifting apart - less of the specious fallacy that if there is not a constant centripetal movement in the Empire there will be a constant centrifugal movement. You might as well say that if the pillars of a Doric temple be not constantly pulled together they will fall outwards and ruin the building."[2] This fervour is not a little surprising when we remember his days of Liberal Imperialism, not so far distant, when so much was heard of the need for organisation, efficiency, and federation, and when one looks ahead to his later visions of Imperial Unity.

However, one must not condemn the Free Trade case because it was supported by some poor arguments. There were many good ones which might have been used more frequently and applied more generally in dealing with and thinking of the Colonies. Such an one was that Imperial Preference would inaugurate an "Imperial policy of a sort which no friend of liberty can desire."[3] "We are every whit as loyal and friendly to our Colonies as Mr

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1. F. de Pressense, France, Russia, and the England of the Jubilee, 19th Cent. Aug. 1897, Vol.42.
2. Montagu and Herbert, op.cit. Introduction, Rosebery, p.xi.
3. Giffen, Ineffectual Preference, op.cit.

Chamberlain is", said Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, "but we want them to be masters in their house, as we want to remain masters in ours. We would strengthen the ties of affection and gratitude and mutual interest which exist between us, but we do not wish those ties to become a chain," endangering present ties by creating much material for friction.[1] Tariff bonds would curtail freedom of action, and when this result became known "snap would go the tariff bond, and some other bonds would go as well."[2]

It was widely argied that there would be intercolonial competition for favour in preferential tariffs. One Colony would complain because of neglect by the Mother Country. Another Colony would ask for a special preferential rate because of its distance from the markets of the United Kingdom. The purchaser of foodstuffs in the United Kingdom would look hungrily to those Colonies which enjoyed a corner in these essential commodities, and soon would count too dear the Imperialism which cost him an increased price in bread and meat. Would the United Kingdom retaliate on Colonies which maintained a high protective duty on British manufactures, and if not, why not? "Put a duty on food to help the Colonies," said John Burns, "and you inaugurate a scheme of bargaining which, under the specious description of ties of interest may become bonds of burden for the Mother Country and for the Colonies. Certainly it will lead to political friction, inter-Colonial jealousy, and Imperial embarrassment, so costly and dangerous in its Governmental aspects as to outweigh the paltry commercial advantages it hopes to secure, but will not

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1. Darlington, May 24, 1902, The Political Outlook at Whitsuntide, p.14.
2. Rosebery, op.cit. p.x.

secure. What is worse, it will create a world-wide antagonism on commercial grounds to the Colonies."[1] Any effort to establish a trade pact would bring the Colonies "within the sphere of European diplomacy, and plunge them into the vortex of military, naval, and Imperial policies withntheir financial burdens the Colonies do not under Free Trade bear, and wish to escape, and will never pay, and rather than pay will separate."[2] The protectionists were warned that if ever cause were given to Canada to desire to throw off the ties of Empire, the French Canadians would support the movement, and that this new Imperialism "must set up a party in Canada up till now non-existent, which will be opposed to the Imperial connection, and this party will number at least two fifths of the people of Canada."[3]

This, then, is a brief exposition of those arguments which were most closely related with opinion on the Empire. It has not been necessary to enter here upon all the ramifications of the tariff campaign; the amount of literature written upon it was prodigious. But it is necessary to read article after article, book after book to appreciate the emphasised arguments, and the impression that remains - as suggested already - is that the words to which most attention was paid had to do, not with union of Empire, but with domestic distress: How is this going to affect us in the United Kingdom directly?[4] And was it not a proper

1. John Burns, Labour and Free Trade, p.4.
2. Ibid, p.5.
3. Montagu and Herbert, op.cit. pp.23-24.
4. It was in appreciation of this fact in all Imperial questions, in that it constituted a natural discrimination of functions, that Professor Pollard proposed a popularly-elected House of Commons and an imperially-constituted second chamber. "The foreign policy initiated by Lord Lansdowne in 1903-04 was an issue of supreme inportance; but no one dreamt of fighting a general or even a bye-election upon it. Even the sanction of the House of Commons was not required for it, or for such a step as the grant of self-government to the Boer colonies. On the other hand, no cabinet could sanction a religious catechism in elementary schools, limit the number of public-houses, or carry a scheme for national insurance without risking shipwreck on the rock of popular indignation." Pollard, The Evolution of Parliament, pp.371-72; p.376.

question?

Today everyone knows the overwhelming debacle the Unionists encountered at the polls in the election of 1905. It is wrong to assume that the victory of the Opposition was a definite victory for Free Trade, or the election a decision of the British public against Imperial Preference. The Unionists had been in power for ten long years filled with wars and rumours of wars, years in which Britain had been faced with the hatred of Europe at a time when her military glory seemed departed and a small South African army of untrained men had humiliated her best generals and made British war organisation a laughing-stock to the world. The country was heartily sick of turmoil and asked for quiet as a reaction from Jubilee and Imperial excitement. The Government were unpopular also for more positive reasons. They had accepted the Taff Vale decision with seeming compacency and they had picketed during strikes. The Conservatives had been lethargic regarding social reform and their Education Bill had been generally disappointing. The argument that effectively met protectionism was that in 1901 a revival of export values began an uninterrupted course, so that in 1904-05 the manufacturers and merchants were once more optimistic.[1.] Cotton trade and shipbuilding with all its subsidiary trades thrive in a surprising fashion. The time to launch a campaign for the reversal of trade policy is psychologically when depression is scattering its pessimism. Chamberlain was defeated - but not on the question of Imperial Preference - though assuredly "dear food" was a most potent electioneering weapon.

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1. Halevy, op.cit. p.333.

It was a part unworthy of Laurier and the nationalists of the Dominions to use forms of virtual coercion upon the Mother Country. It was all very well for them to offer preference in their own markets, where preference entailed no sacrifice of any account, but to threaten to remove these preferences or even to use them to urge the British people to turn to protection, and thus change their whole fiscal policy, raising the cost of living and gambling on the results of the reversal to industry and trade, was something they had no right to do, and constituted forms of coercion which, had they been exercised by British statesmen upon the Colonies, would still be causing innumerable sore throats among Dominion Nationalists. It is idle to say that Canada offered a simple bargain: Laurier knew as well as anyone the Imperialist spirit which he would exploit by his petulence and impatience with British refusal to reciprocate. He should have proferred his preference and then, should Great Britain reciprocate, allow her to do so of her own accord; or come to Britain with a simple offer. But to use the preferences as a bludgeon is strangely out of keeping with nationalism.

The Imperialist case was, nevertheless, quite hopeless from that time. There was no chance to entrap Laurier into any scheme for consolidating the Empire by another method. Nationalism was growing stronger hourly, and the only chance of closer union was by diverting its energies as Chamberlain suggested. It is very doubtful if Chamberlain could have succeeded in forming the Empire into a closely united league even had he convinced the electorate, but it was the sole hope. A Free Trader can be understood; an Imperialist can be understood; a Free Trader with an affection for the various parts of the Empire can be

understood; but a Free Trade Imperialist is really a paradox. Imperialism meant concentration and unity which could only be gained by links of commerce and trade. Chamberlain struck for protection, primarily and essentially, because he understood that, having set his face towards Imperial integration, he must walk the road of Imperial Preference. There was no other way.

For those who have seen the vision of a mighty Empire leading the world as in time past, it must be a bitter disappointment that the opportunity has forever gone. It must be doubly bitter to see in these times the majority opinion favouring Imperial Preference, and Imperialists will not be able to resist remarking how "the multitude makes virtue
Of the faith they once denied."

Unfortunately the poem from which they quote also contains the lines :

"Once to every man and nation
Comes the moment to decide."

Perhaps there is something better in store for the British Empire than federation.

PART II: TOWARDS IMPERIAL CO-OPERATION, 1905-1914.

Chapter I: Foreign Relations and Imperial Defence.

If, in this part of the study, the question of Imperial preference occupies little space, it is not because it was non-existent or obsolescent. The movement to commercial unity strongly persevered despite the crushing defeat at the 1905 election.[1] No doubt it was Bonar Law's enthusiasm in this regard which contributed largely to his election to the leadership of the Conservative Party. Mr Jebb continued firmly to believe that imperial consolidation could only come with the linking of economic interests, the essential method being imperial preference, and in this thesis he was ably supported by Mr W.A.S. Hewins and Viscounts Milner and Hythe. The efforts of Canada to negotiate reciprocity arrangements with the United States in 1911 were greatly feared in Britain as the prelude to closer political connections.[2] One cannot think that French Canada would ever consent to the sacrifice of her individuality, as maintained by a separate school system and a marvellous control over popular literature, by any political union with the Republic.

Any efforts for a commercial union were baulked by the attitude of the Liberals - that, as Mr Churchill put it, the door to

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1. F.E. Smith (Lord Birkenhead) Unionist Policy, p.181ff. Hewins, The Apologia of an Imperialist, Vol.i, passim.
2. This belief is suggested by Professor Keith, Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.22: "Commercial considerations present great possibilities of advantage from the union of the Dominion with the United States, and the fact that the establishment of close reciprocity between the two countries might result in annexation was recognised in 1891 by no less cool a judgment than that of Hon. Edward Blake."

Imperial Reciprocity was "banged, barred, and bolted."[1] The words were brave enough when supported by the haughty majority of 1907, but when 1911 found that majority dwindled and dependent for its existence upon the precarious support of the Irish and Labour parties, no such definite reply could be given to the hopeful Dominions. In order that the Government be not embarrassed, the matter was not included upon the agenda of the Conference, and a Royal Commission was appointed whose findings the Government pledged itself to act upon, insofar as they did not commit the United Kingdom to a tariff policy.

The literature on the questions of trade preference continued to be overwhelming, and there were voluminous discussions of the dangers of the Canadian preference with the United States. In very little of this Niagara of talk was there any new argument and there would be little point in recording it in these pages. Moreover, the emphasis is now changed from commercial to military rivalry and even the most pacific of statesmen recognised that war could only be averted by the slenderest of margins. In Part I. it was seen that the theory of the State that was attracting men's minds was that of a non-moral predatory animal, forever engaged in a natural and eternal struggle to survive and thereby evolving the doctrine that "right is might." Nay, more - that the war which established the long rule of might was morally blessed as a divine cathartic, keeping the nation from flabbiness and inertia. We shall note this doctrine bearing fruit in foreign relations prior to the war and see how it affected the attitude of the Liberal Government to the Dominions.

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1. Scotsman, May 20, 1907; Jebb, Imperial Conference, Vol.ii., p.180, attacks his statement.

British Foreign Relations, 1906-1913.

It is one of the most ironic situations in British history that the Liberal Party should have come to power after having fought what they termed a bellicose, jingoistic Union Party for ten years, elected by a public which was weary of the alarms of European animosities, and yet found themselves forced to insist upon the military organisation of the Empire with an urgency that their political opponents had rarely employed. Churchill, the man who had been the most eager that the Empire should be the exemplar of the ways of peace, doing his utmost at the end to turn it into an armed camp, and complaining with some bitterness of the need of assistance that Canada was so slow to send, was in the end forced to see the Empire launched upon the most devastating war in the memory of history. Closely allied with Labour, which was hotly against naval and military expenditure because it proceeded from economic antagonism and also distracted finances from social reform,[1] disliking Imperialism because it was militaristic in its connotations, the Liberal Party was forced to turn to Imperialism by reason of its militaristic qualities. To understand why this should have been so, it is necessary briefly to review the diplomatic relations in the pre-war years during the Liberal regime.

Campbell-Bannerman, at the outset of the Government's term of office, declared its policy to be a strict adhesion to the policy of the Entente Cordiale. He declared, "Even more important than any actual amicable instrument is the real friendship

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1. Will Thorne, A Labour Member's View of National Defence, Nat. Def., Mar. 1909; George N. Barnes, A Labour View of National Defence, Nat. Def. Oct. 1909.

between the two peoples, and one of the objects of our policy will be to maintain that spirit of friendship unimpaired." As regards Russia, "we have nothing but good feeling towards that great people. In the case of Germany also I see no cause whatever of estrangement in any of the interests of either people, and we welcome the unofficial demonstrations of friendship which have lately been passing between the two countries. With other European Powers our relations are most friendly." Relations with Japan "are sufficiently known to the world by the recent treaty"; and with the United States "we are bound by the closest ties of race, traditions, and fellowship. This is a most pleasing outlook, which I trust will not be marred by any event that can occur...Our general foreign policy...will be opposed to aggression and to adventure," and "will be animated by a desire to be on the best terms with all nationalities." At the same time, Sir Henry expressed his belief in the principle of arbitration, initiated into international politics by Gladstone.[1.] In 1907 we find him again pleading for a reduction of armaments and sanity and forbearance in international relations. He told how Britain had already given proof of her good faith by lessening naval and military expenditure considerably. "The sea power of this country," said the Liberal leader, "implies no challenge to any single State or group of States....Our known adhesion to those two dominant principles - the independence of nationalities and the freedom of trade - entitles us of itself to claim that if our fleets be invulnerable, they carry with them no menace across the waters, of the world, but a message of the most cordial

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1. Liberal Policy, Dec. 21, 1905, Albert Hall, pp.6-7.

good-will, based on a belief in the community of interests between the nations."[1] It was a pathetic effort to hold aloft the torch passed on from Cobden, Bright, and Gladstone, and proved to be the last flicker of the light which was to have lighted the world, before Europe was plunged into the horrible blackness of Armageddon. Hardy's Spirits Ironic must have chuckled!

The year 1907 marked the peak of cordiality in Anglo-German relations. The Kaiser visited Windsor in November of that year and made public declarations of his zeal for peace.[2] The year was, indeed, a memorable one from a Britannic point of view as regards international relations. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty and the rout of Russia had given the United Kingdom security in the East. The Convention of 1907 removed the causes of friction between Great Britain and Russia in Afghanistan and Persia, while at the same time their respective allies joined hands. France and Japan arrived at an agreement in June regarding China, and Russia and Japan signed a similar treaty the following month. Further agreements were arrives at which removed the tension surviving from the Russo-Japanese war. For the moment Britain was on terms of friendship with the great Powers.[3]

This condition, much too beatific for European diplomacy, was shortly ended. A visit of King Edward to Reval in June of 1908 roused apprehension in German and Austrian high quarters

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1. The Nation, March 2, 1907.
2. G.P. Gooch, Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, ch.vi. p.385 ff.
3. Vide G.P. Gooch, History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919, p.392 ff.

and the Kaiser soon discovered a wish, as he said, "to encircle and provoke us."[1] Austria had already stirred up trouble by announcing that she had obtained permission from the Sultan to make a survey for a railway through the Sanjak of Novibazar, leaving the Concert in the lurch in their desire for a united pressure to bring about Macedonian reform, and giving Serbia an opportunity to demand a railway for herself to the Adriatic.[2] Then Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in October, and Bulgaria threw off the Suzerainty of Turkey. Serbia's claims for compensation as the result of Austria's action were resisted, and Russian support was shut off by a declaration of the Kaiser that Germany would support Austria in a war. The Liberal Government in Great Britain enlarged its naval estimates in March by four Dreadnoughts, and in July, after the "We wont wait; we want eight" campaign, agreed to lay down four more.[3]

Germany and France also returned to normal conditions by quarrelling over Morocco - things had not been happy there since early in 1905, the Algeciras Conference had not solved the difficulty, and Germany never lost an opportunity to rattle the sabre to intimidate France - and the British Government decided to support the Republic, resolved at all costs to prevent Germany from securing a naval base in Morocco.[4] Germany surrendered her claims in exchange for some of the French Congo, but Great Britain had roused a passionate Anglophobia in Germany not easily quelled. "We know now," declared one of Germany's party leaders, "when we

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1. Gooch and Temperley, docs. Vol.v., pp.232-246.
2. Gooch, History, op.cit. p.405.
3. Skelton, op.cit. Vol.ii, p.318.
4. Gooch, History, op.cit. p.472.

wish to expand, when we wish to have our place in the sun, who it is that lays claim to world-wide domination. It has been like a flash in the night. We shall secure peace not by concessions but with the German sword."[1] Haldane was sent to Berlin in February of 1912, but his conversations did not have much effect in persuading Germany to reduce or limit her navy.[2] "As long as men are men and States are States," declared the German Chancellor on 30th March, 1911, "the question of limiting armaments will remain insoluble."[3] The attack of the Balkan States on Turkey was to further try the relations between the Great Powers, and the Servian invasion of Albania nearly drew Austria and Russia into conflict.

Germany had been consistent in her naval policy since 1898 when a Naval Bill of that year appeared to be definitely aimed against British naval supremacy. The Bill set it forth that, in order to promote overseas interests of her Empire, "Germany must have a fleet of such strength that, even for the mightiest Naval Power, a war with her would involve such risks as to jeopardize its own supremacy....For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest Sea Power, because, generally, a great Sea Power will not be in a position to concentrate all its forces against us... But, even if it should succeed in confronting us in superior force, the enemy would be so considerably weakened in overcoming the resistance of a strong German fleet that, not withstanding a

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1. Quoted, Gooch, History, op.cit. p.484.
2. Haldane, Before the War, p.57ff. Gooch and Temperley, Docs., op.cit. Vol.vi, p.670ff.
3. Maj. Stewart L. Murray, Some Strategic Problems of the Empire, 19th Cent. July 1912, Vol.72, quoted.

victory gained, the enemy's supremacy would not at first be secured any longer by a sifficient fleet."[1.]

At the Hague Conference of 1899 when Russia advanced a proposal that there should be no increase of armies or military budgets for five years, the German representative refused to discuss the reduction or arrest of armaments,[2.] and on the occasion of the Conference in 1907 Bulow announced in the Reichstag that the German Government refused to participate in a discussion which was unpractical if not actually dangerous.[3.] Germany, therefore, steadily built up her Navy and the Sexannate establishment was practically doubled by the Act of June 1900. The Act of 1906, the Novelle, came in alleged consequence of the construction by the British Admiralty of the Dreadnought, a ship that revolutionised the building of ships of war.[4.] Prior to the launch of the Dreadnought, battleships carried only 11 or 12-inch guns, supported by a secondary armament of 6-inch weapons. In the Dreadnought the 6-inch gun was replaced and all the weight available for armament devoted to ten 12-inch guns. Consequently, apart from the advantage possessed in speed and protection, the Dreadnought possessed twice the gun-power of an ordinary battleship, this concentrated in one hull. The building of the Dreadnought was not foolish as many believed, for it would have come sometime, but it hit hard at German naval aspirations. Her Navy and the Kiel Canal were minimised in value and she must set about a policy of reconstruction.[5.]

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1. The Naval Annual, 1900, p.432.
2. Gooch, op.cit. p.307.
3. Ibid, p.431.
4. For a study of the ship and its effect on British and foreign naval programmes, see the Navy Annual, 1906, pp.2-3. Also, Our Endangered Sea Supremacy, Quart. Rev., Oct. 1908, Vol.209.
5. E.H. Currey, Politics and Naval Defence, Un.Serv. Mag. Feb. 1911, Vol.42.

On the platform and in the press appeared laborious arithmetical comparisons of British and foreign battleships, especially German, and the public was given elaborate calculations of relative powers computed for dates in the past, present, and future. The National Review, Blackwoods Magazine, the Quarterly Review, the Spectator, the Standard, the Morning Post, the Daily Express, and the Times led the fight for a more adequate Navy. There were a great number of Leagues - the Navy League, the Imperial/Maritime League, the Army League or National Defence Association, and the National Service League - yet public opinion was strangely apathetic on the question of defence.[1.]

The standard of naval strength laid down by successive Cabinets since 1899 had been equality with the two leading Powers with "a considerable margin of reserve."[2.] Although it was pressed that this "two-Power Standard" be maintained,[3.] the Government found it only applicable when France and Russia were the most probably adverse diplomatic combination. With the rise of Germany to first place as Continental Naval Power, the situation changed, and the United States, with a great fleet, had also made the Standard insupportable. The Admiralty, therefore, decided upon a 60% superiority in vessels of the Dreadnought type over the German Navy, although it was felt that the ratio of 16 to 10 was not a sufficient preparation for British naval strength as a whole.[4.]

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1. Vide. A.B.N. Churchill, Public Opinion and National Defence, Nat. Def. Oct.,1909; W.H. White, The Naval Situation and Party Politics, 19th Cent., Feb. 1910, Vol.67.
2. Carlyon Bellairs, The Navy and the Empire, The Empire and the Century, pp.197-198.
3. L.S. Amery, The Defence Problem from the Imperial Standpoint, May 1909, Speech at a meeting of the National Defence Association.
4. Winston Churchill, H.C. Debates, Mar.18, 1912, Vol.XXXV, p.1549ff.

The expenditure became intolerable as it appeared to be "the firm resolve of Germany to crush this nation, to destroy the British Empire", and it was suggested that an ultimatum be sent to Germany demanding that she cease her warlike preparations.[1] In fact, Sir John Fisher in 1905 predicted an Anglo-German war in August 1914 and early in 1908 suggested to King Edward that "we should 'Copenhagen' the German fleet at Kiel, a la Nelson, and lamented that we possessed neither a Pitt nor a Bismarck to give the order."[2.]

"There is one way in which Britain can have peace", taught Lord Roberts," and that is, to present such a battle-front by sea and land that no Power or probable combination of Powers shall dare to attack her without the certainty of disaster."[3.] Britain must either abandon the Empire or be prepared to arm and defend it, "For the time of ~~the~~ your ordeal is at hand."[4.] "When I consider", he marvelled, "the certainty of the struggle in front of us, its probable nearness, and the momentous issues at stake, I am astounded that the nation should be kept in the dark."[5.]

How did this condition of foreign relations affect the Liberal attitude to the self-governing Empire? Every fluctuation in foreign relations was reflected in British opinion on the Commonwealth. Coming into power in 1905, famed for its pacific intentions and desires, the Liberal Government proceeded to discard the naval policy of its predecessors and cut down naval

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1. E.C. Cox, England and Germany, How to meet the Crisis, 19th Cent. April 1910, Vol.67.
2. Memories, p.64. Gooch, op.cit. p.443.
3. Message to the Nation, p.9.
4. Ibid, pp. 10-11.
5. Ibid, p.38.

estimates,[1] with the general public hoping that the tension of foreign affairs would be relieved. The future of the Empire was no longer to be regarded inthe light of a war confederacy of the self-governing units, but of Free Trade, disarmament, and treaties.[2] One may perhaps note this change in attitude in the difference between the wording of the despatch of Mr Lyttelton and that of his successor, Lord Elgin, calling the Colonial Conference. Whereas the former hoped that the Conference would "promote the better union and the collective prosperity of the British Empire,"[3] Lord Elgin prophesied that it would "help to increase the good understanding" of the various parts of the Empire.[4]

Possibly the relation between feverish European diplomacy and British opinion on the Commonwealth is best illustrated in the speech by Rosebery to the Press Conference in 1909, wherein he told the awed journalists what they had already heard from lips not so eloquent:- "There is a hush in Europe, a hush in which you may almost hear a leaf fall to the ground, and yet... there never was in the history of the world so threatening and so overpowering a preparation for war...We live in the midst of what was called by Petrarch tacems bellum...We can and we will build Dreadnoughts...as long as we have a shilling to spend on them or a man to put into them. All that we can and will do;

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1. A.S. Hurd, The New Navy Estimates, 19th Cent. April 1910, Vol.67, also, Hurd, The Command of the Sea, pp.12-13.
2. Vide C. de Thierry, The Blight of Little Englandism, Un. Serv. Mag., Jan. 1910, Vol.40.
3. 29 Nov. 1905, Cd.2785.
4. Feb. 22, 1906, Cd.2975.

but I am not sure that even that will be enough, and I think it may be your duty to take back to your young dominions across the seas this message and this impression - that some personal duty and responsibility for national defence rests on every man and citizen....Tell your people.. the deplorable way in which Europe is lapsing into militarism and the pressure which is put upon this little island to defend its liberties - and yours. But take this message also back with you - that the old country is right at heart, that there is no failing or weakness in heart, and that she rejoices in renewing her youth in her giant dominions beyond the seas."[1] McKenna, Balfour, Haldane, Esher, Beresford, and Grey followed with speeches of a similar fashion.

The Press Conference, spending the greater part of its time listening to speeches on the requirements of Imperial Defence, formed a fitting prelude to the Defence Conference of the same year. In fact, Rosebery set the tone for succeeding years: to read the journals of those pre-war years is to become aware of the depressing inevitability of the war. Fear and hatred accumulated like a flood in a great river, raging and twisting, until the banks were burst with their fury, and ruin was spread over the countryside. In vain did men like Christopher West (Canada and Sea Power) or Norman Angell (The Great Illusion) raise weak voices against the competitive building of armaments, trying to show that the great Powers were inter-dependent and that war would be mutually ruinous; that certain writers should be "confident that in the most responsible and best-informed circles in Germany the desire is to have an Entente with us, and not a fierce and awful struggle";[2] that another be assured that

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1. The Times, June 7, 1909.
2. Lord Lamington, An Anglo-German Entente, 19th Cent. March 1910, Vol.67.

"England and Germany are in the position of husband and wife having had a trifling quarrel";[1] or that Mr Ramsay Macdonald and other Labour politicians should have declared against militarism. One feels the overwhelming sense of fear that brought about the panic called war.

The fear also led, as Rosebery pointed out in his speech just quoted, to the huddling together of the members of the Empire, and in the writings on the possibilities of war there is a never-failing mention of the possibilities of Imperial Union for defence. Bismarck once remarked that, "Empire are welded together, not by speeches and resolutions, but by blood and iron," and a commentator remarked that, "Nothing would more quickly and more thoroughly weld together the British Empire than a war in which Great Britain and the Dominions would have to fight for their very existence. That would demonstrate to all the British States the necessity of Imperial union for defence."[2] "No British statesman could have federated the British Empire", declared Viscount Esher. "That object is going to be accomplished by the menace of the German fleet."[3] Sir John Colomb had often argued in company with Mahan that a common danger only would weld the Empire and that therefore Imperial federation would become manifest along military and naval lines.[4]

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1. Tuckmann, Germany's Real Attitude Towards England, 19th Cent., Jan. 1910, Vol.67.
2. Duke of Westminster, Practical Imperialism, 19th Cent. Nov. 1912, Vol.72.
3. Esher, The Committee of Imperial Defence, p.x. "In order to federate more or less independent groups of the same race and speech some menace is required to their pride and independence" p.ix.
4. Sir John Colomb, The Navy and the Colonies, The Empire and the Century, pp.213-225.

Lord Milner observed, in March 1913, that the movement of Imperialism had been steadily gaining in momentum latterly, and, he said, "despite its occasional setbacks, the believers in Imperial Unity cannot but have felt that their bark was floating upon a steadily rising tide....That change of mind has been much more marked in the last fifteen years than in the preceding five and twenty, more marked in the last five years than in the preceding ten."[1] While it was true that a real constitution of the Empire no more existed at that time than from the time that the old bonds of Colonial dependence had been abandoned, yet it was equally true, he said, "that a great, and latterly a rapid, expansion of political conceptions, both in the Mother Country and in the Colonies, has made the gradual establishment of a new and better Imperial Constitution possible."[2]

"Is it, then, the fact that we have been Imperialists all the time without knowing it, or without in the least desiring it?" enquired Sir Edward Cook for the Liberals. He found it true, and decided that the movement to unite the Empire by defence measures had prevailed over the idea of union by trade" because, for one thing, advance on the other line has presented the greater difficulties in reconciling any common policy with the freedom and localminterests of the several units."[3] This is an irritating avoidance of the real reason: the "Defence" approach to Imperial Unity existed because of its need, naturally enough, and Free Trade won on the "Dear Food" cry. In other words, Britain decided that she required Free Trade in her economic

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1. Milner, The Nation and the Empire, p.xxvii.
2. Ibid, p.xxix.
3. Sir E.T. Cook, Eight Years of Liberal Imperialism, The Con. Rev., Jan. 1914, Vol.105.

policy and Imperial Union for Defence in her political policy: that explains pre-war "Liberal Imperialism." "Imperial Defence, Imperial Preference, Imperial Federation - these three make up the creed of Empire", asserted a writer.[1] The last two were out of practical politics, but the first had to be tried, though necessity, by the Liberals. Said the same gentleman, "The German danger may yet make Imperialists of us all."[2] It had already done so long since for any but the most confirmed pacifists and blindest politicians.

Sir Fortescue Flannery saw a movement to Imperial Federation which had become most apparent on the occasion of Borden's visit in 1912. "We have", he stated, "tried to bring it about by reforms in trade which have been opposed by the Government...Is it not strange that unexpectedly the same great object is being approached through another channel, and that in the necessity for mutual defence for combining together the Motherland and the Colonies, there may be found the machinery for federation, for combined conferences."[3] When the Royal Colonial Institute gave a dinner to Borden on the occasion of his visit, the Chairman, Sir J. Bevan Edwards, introduced him with the remark, "If you look to the lessons of history you will find that the federation of all free peoples has always been brought about by a common danger"[4], and Borden did not say anything to discourage him.[5]

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1. E.Bruce Mitford, Liberalism and the Empire, Nat.Rev. Vol.60, Oct. 1912.
2. Ibid.
3. H.C. Debs., July 1912, Vol.41, p.904.
4. U.E. Aug., 1912. Meeting July 10, 1912.
5. Borden: "I am saying no new thing to you tonight when I declare that in my opinion the sea defence of the Empire can best be secured by one Navy. Our ideal has been one King, one Flag, one Empire, one Navy. A navy, powerful enough to vindicate the flag and maintain the integrity of the Empire."

Major-General Sir Edward Hutton commented upon the change that had taken place from emphasising commercial unity in Imperialism to that of military unity,[1] and followed the observation with the statement that, "Our treaty obligations as regards Belgium, shared though they be by other European Powers, may at any moment force us to take active military measures for which a large army would be required." He therefore advocated a homogeneous army, composed of troops from the United Kingdom and the self-governing Colonies, in proportion to their populations.[2] That is, he admits quite frankly that the change of emphasis is being caused by war dangers.

When Dicey was writing of the changes of opinion which had led up to the altered relation between England and the Dominions, he described Imperialism as the name for the idea, "that the British Empire is an institution well worth maintaining, and this not on mere grounds of sentiment but for definite and assignable reasons. Upon England and upon every country subject to the King of England the British Empire confers at least two benefits: It secures permanent peace among the inhabitants of the largest of the existing states; it again secures, or ought to secure, to the whole of this vast community absolute protection against foreign attack."[3] That was the very ground of Imperialism, in so far as it invoked the union of the self-governing Empire: security against foreign aggression. That was its driving force and categorical imperative. Said Mr Ellis Barker, "Although

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1. Empire and the Century, p.228.
2. Ibid, p.231 and p.243.
3. A.V. Dicey, Law of the Constitution, pp.xxxiv-xxxv.

Great Britain, standing alone, cannot possibly much longer preserve her naval supremacy, the United British Empire can certainly maintain it. The latent resources of the British Empire are greater than are the latent resources of the United States and Germany combined. Although the British Empire cannot possibly be defended by Great Britain alone against the two second strongest naval Powers, it can certainly...be defended practically for all time by a navy which is paid for by an Imperial Exchequer."[1.]

It appeared, consequently, absolutely necessary that the Dominions should help in the defence of the Empire. "Inadequate preparation for war is the most certain and quickest method of producing war," declared many Imperialists.[2.] Imperial Union for defence was essential to survival - a union wherein there would be complete subordination of the parts in so far as was necessary for the military unity of the whole. If the Empire would survive there must be military and naval unification of the Empire: complete separation of military and naval systems from the civil government of the colonies, with control vested in the British Admiralty, the only competent central body; armies must be organised upon the basis of expeditionary forces; and the Empire must keep pace with Europe in military preparations and military fervour.[3.] These were the essentials which recur in every article and speech on the Empire. The weary Titan now indeed found the load too heavy.

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1. J. Ellis Barker, Will The British Empire Stand or Fall? 19th Cent. May 1907, Vol.61.
2. Murray, Some Strategic Problems of the Empire, op.cit.
3. Saxon Lea, op.cit. p.239.

In 1907, however, diplomatic relations were not so taut as usual and the Liberal Government was anxious for disarmament. It could not, in consequence, urge the Dominions too strongly for assistance in constructing a more powerful Imperial fleet. It was in this spirit of conciliation that several prominent British statesmen and naval experts declared themselves in favour of local naval squadrons.[1] Balfour seemed to be deserting old principles when he addressed the House of Commons on 15 Feb. 1907, the tone being much different from that of former occasions.[2] He now stated his belief that the naval estimates would not be diminished by a farthing if Great Britain lost Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Cape.[3] He pointed out that the British Empire touched world politics at a very large number of points which did not directly concern the Colonies and gave it as an impossible proposition to ask the Dominions for money which the Government of the United Kingdom would spend. Nor did he see hope in the self-governing Colonies providing an army and navy for local defence which would be entirely under the control of the United Kingdom in war. "I am sure that we, arguing as representatives of Colonies having free representative Assemblies, would not contemplate such an arrangement."[4] Churchill supported him in the essentials of his argument.[5] The tone of the Imperial Conference of 1907

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1. Vide Imperial Feeling and the Defence Problem, The Times, June 8, 1909.
2. Mr Cathcart Wason found the change startling: H.C.Debates, 15 Feb.1907, Vol.169, p.490. As also did Howard d'Egville, Imperial Defence and Closer Union, pp.145-146. The debate on Mr Harold Cox's amendment to the Address: The Amendment read: "It is desirable that the first question to be laid before the delegates from your Majesty's Colonies at the coming Colonial Conference should be the importance of the fuller participation by the Colonies in the cost of defending your Majesty's dominions," Debs., op.cit. p.453.
3. Ibid, p.465.
4. Ibid, pp.466-467.
5. Ibid, pp.471-472.

was also mild, and Lord Tweedmouth's kindly, non-aggressive attitude came in for much criticism from advocates of Imperial Defence on grander scale.[1.]

It is probably this non-aggressive attitude that led Professor Egerton to remark that by 1907, "the British Admiralty had learnt wisdom and was willing to co-operate with Australia in any scheme of local defence that she could undertake."[2.] This statement needs a question mark. It is true that the Admiralty expressed itself as willing to assist in carrying out local defence schemes, but only if there was no alternative and if Australia insisted. There was not a single word of encouragement, but on the other hand throughout 1908 that office carried on a debate with Australia regarding her creation of a local fleet.[3.] Even Mr Jebb has to become apologetic when explaining his scheme of allied navies which might be said to be "technically inferior to centralised navies," but "the superior driving force of national patriotism" as compared with imperial compulstion would be a most valuable factor in efficiency.[4.] Nevertheless, he desired to see in the end a single control of the navies of the Empire, as he explained by putting out the valuable dictum that "local control is essential to national liberty only so long as foreign policy is under discussion."[5.] Mr Balfour also made it plain that his view was in the nature of a concession to colonial opinion, rather than a conversion to the policy of separate navies. "It

1. Lord Tweedmouth is quoted as saying that for his part he would be quite prepared to give the protection of the British Navy to the Colonies as a free gift. 26 Jan. 1906, d'Egville, op.cit. p.152.
2. Egerton, British Colonial Policy in the Twentieth Century, p.92.
3. Vide Cd.4324, pp.155-156. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp.317-318. Lucas, The Empire at War, Vol.i, pp.184-185, pp.191-192.
4. Jebb, The Britannic Question, p.174.
5. Ibid, p.257.

is better to rely on voluntary assistance - though it is a handicap to military strategy - than to any of a rigid or involuntary character."[1.]

The position of the Imperialists was that the navies of the Dominions, autonomous and indigenous though they might be in peace, should yet maintain an organic unity with the Royal Navy by their tradition, training, equipment, and discipline, with absolute unity of control in time of war, the naval forces then being at the disposal of the British Government. In examination of British opinion on the naval defence of the Empire, it can be said that never did the British Admiralty relax their determination that the Imperial Navy should approximate as closely to one Navy as possible. "Whenever it has modified that attitude", said a writer in the United Empire, as in 1907 and 1909, it has confessedly done so out of deference to the political susceptibilities of the Dominions and at some sacrifice of the strategical ideal. Whenever these susceptibilities appear to weaken the Admiralty quickly reverts...to what it has always conceived to be the strategical best."[2.] So Balfour, whose unorthodox views had so recently excited comment, warned the Press Conference in 1909 that the individual constituents of the Empire could never be safe, could never be powerful, if their defence was only local. The fate of the Empire would be decided in European waters where the United Kingdom would be the strategical centre and nothing but weakness and danger could follow dissipation of forces.[3.]

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1. Debs. op.cit. pp.468-469. So also Lord Esher, The Committee of Imperial Defence, p.9.
2. U.E. May 1913, Vol.4, p.376.
3. The Times, June 10, 1909.

Mr Jebb supported a thesis contrary to the "concession" point of view, and maintained that between 1907 and 1909 there was a growth of liberal spirit regarding national navies in which "the modern conception of the Empire, as a co-operative union of sovereign States" was winning in the struggle against "the old tradition and instinct of British ascendancy." He believed a reaction to have set in when Churchill came to the Admiralty and "the old centralism" was revived, taking advantage of Borden's policy for an emergency contribution.

There is this to be said, that Imperialists were growingly conscious of Dominion nationalism and appreciated that it could not be ignored and that any defence plan must take it into account. In this idea are to be found both the "conversion" and "concession" theories - conversion to Dominion nationalism and concession to the implications of that spirit. Lord Milner is an excellent example. He warned the members of the Compatriots Club that "there is the supreme necessity of bearing in mind that it is a number of independent States which we are dealing with" and that they must be doing a distinctive part even though they must be doing it for the Empire as a whole.[1] In Canada he warned the Canadians of the necessity of correlating their defence programmes to the whole Empire and not to consider themselves only.[2]

The idea of allied navies owed much to Mr Jebb. He believed that of a certainty no other proposal would be entertained in Canada and Australia. "You might as well found a system of Imperial Defence upon the assumption that geographically the

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1. The Times, June 25, 1909.
2. d'Egville, Un. Serv. Mag., Jan. 1909, Vol.38.

states of the Empire are parts of one continent as upon the assumption that politically they are, or might be, animated by a single national instinct. To lay it down as an axiom that the centralised naval organ which corresponds to national unity is the only possible system is to propose that the Empire should be adapted to the Navy instead of the Navy to the Empire." Was the Japanese Alliance, he asked, of no value to the United Kingdom just because the navies are not under one paymaster and one control in time of peace? If it was possible to fortify British command of the sea by means of an alliance with nations whose affinity to Britain was of the slightest, how much more possible it should be by means of an Imperial alliance with nations bound to her by "a common Crown, a common language, a common racial tie, a common morality, and a strong disposition to respect the well-earned hegemony of the Mother Country in all technical matters."[1.]

Jebb's ideal, however, was stated as furnishing national squadrons to an Imperial Navy.[2.] When the Times took him to task, remarking that "history is strewn with disasters of allied fleets," he rejoined that this Imperial alliance would not be an ordinary alliance. It would be a novel type consisting of navies originally designed as "fleet units" for combined service; standardised as regards the type of vessel, guns, and ammunition; uniform as regards the schools of strategy, officers, training, tactics, and language of command; associated constantly in manoeuvres and through interchange of personnel; organised throughout with a

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1. Jebb, Notes on Imperial Organisation, R.C.I. Proceedings, Nov. 1906, Vol.38, pp.10-11.
2. Ibid, pp.12-13.

view to concerted action on prepared plans; and legally placed under one command in warfare.[1] He desired that the Dominions be assigned "a sphere of responsibility" and on that score condemned bringing to British waters the battle cruiser provided by New Zealand for the proposed fleet unity in the East Indies.[2]

Mr Jebb's "sphere of responsibility"idea was adopted by many British naval experts and appeared frequently in the phrase "division of labour". One reason other than recognition of Dominion nationalism that gave weight to this theory lay in the criticism being advanced that the policy of naval concentration by Fisher was being carried too far to ensure safety to British possessions and trading routes.[3] Borden, in the Canadian House of Commons, deplored that fact that the British Navy, once predominant everywhere, was now only so in the North Sea; that, whereas in 1902 there had been 160 ships on foreign and colonial stations, there were only 76 in 1912.[4] He then dwelt upon the fact that trade routes as the Mediterranean, which were vital to the Empire's continued existence, were inadequately defended. In 1902 there had been 55 British warships on that station and today there were only 19, but with every available exertion of the whole strength of the Empire it might be impossible to regain a position of strength before 1915 or 1916.

Suggestions, first made it appears in the Canadian press and promptly endorsed by Mr Churchill in England, had pointed to a solution of a division of responsibility for naval supremacy between Great Britain, concentrated in European waters, and the

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1. The Britannic Question,p.173.
2. Ibid, pp.177-178.
3. Viscount Hythe, The Naval Annual, 1912, p.82.
4. The Times, Dec.6, 1912.

Dominions, patrolling the rest of the Empire.[1] There had long been a group who had believed in the development of local defence schemes as giving freedom to the Navy for concentration wherever temporary circumstances required, increasing thereby the mobility of the fleet, providing a "defensive" force for the Empire, and affording protection to the trade routes.[2]

Lord Esher, at the 1909 Press Conference, found it obvious that for the next ten years the British battle fleet must be provided and controlled by the Imperial Government, but, he said, the Navy meant more than a battle fleet. It meant the protection of the commercial routes in war and policing of the seas in peace. It was in these domains of naval policy that he could not but hope that a practical means would be found of utilizing the patriotic impulse of the self-governing Dominions.[3] Lord Charles Beresford, on the same occasion, decided that possibly local fleets, after the pattern of the Royal Navy, might be permissible. "The right task for the Dominions was to guard these trade routes with a defence that could always be turned into attack."[4] For this unorthodox statement the Times rebuked him as lending weight to the idea that ships in dispersion could take the place of battle fleets.[5]

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1. Canada at the Committee of Imperial Defence, The Times, July 17, 1912. Churchill, address to the Shipwrights, The Times, May 16, 1912. One wonders if the Canadian Press did propose the idea before Mr Jebb seized upon it.
2. Vide D.I. Macaulay, National Defence and Naval Supremacy, Nat. Def. July 1909. "Captain R.N." The Protection of the Arteries of the Empire, Nat. Def. Sept. 1909. But Macaulay was adamant against local navies which "violate the strategic principle of naval unity", Macaulay, An Imperial Military System, pp.5-7.
3. The Times, June 28, 1909.
4. Ibid.
5. The Times, July 10, 1909.

Another phrase that went with "division of labour" in naval defence was that of "a broader base", meaning that military and naval strength should not be concentrated in the United Kingdom but built up throughout the Empire. So with the transformation of power in the Pacific, it was, according to this argument, valuable to the Empire that Australia should have a strong fleet in the Pacific.[1] It was with much the same idea that Major-General Robinson urged the value of Canada as a link in the chain of Imperial Defence and the need that she develop her resources so that Britain would always have a route to the East, with some security also against a possibly hostile United States.[2]

Among the vagaries of Mr Silburn's tenets one thing is clear: he is opposed to local or allied navies.[3] Nevertheless, he strongly approved of the colonies becoming liable for their own defence. In providing supply depots for the Royal Navy, fortified harbours for the protection of Imperial merchant shipping, food for the population of the United Kingdom, and training <u>personnel</u> so that a fleet could not only find coaling at a colonial post but be able to replace casualties: - these were some of the means by which the Colonies could assist the Mother Country.[4]

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1. F.M.Cutlack, Australia and Imperial Defence, Nat.Rev., Feb. 1913, Vol.60.
2. C.W. Robinson, Canada and Canadian Defence.
3. F.A. Silburn, Wanted - An Imperial Defence Scheme, Un.Serv. Mag., Dec. 1908, Vol.38; Governance of the Empire, p.266; The Evolution of Sea Power, p.160; The Colonies and Imperial Defence, p.143: "By assisting Australia or any other self-governing Colony to own an independent Navy, even though under imperial officers, England may be countenancing an idea the fruit of which may be secession."
4. The Colonies and Imperial Defence, pp.155-163.

Colonel C.E. Callwell voiced an opinion similar to Silburn's to the effect that Canada could assist by good coast defences and fortified bases.[1] How futile it was to suppose that the Dominions would be content with that!

Balfour, in the same breath as that in which he inveighed against dissipating the forces of the Empire, refused to regard as useless any attempt at local naval defence. It was, he thought, an antiquated dogma that disliked the idea of any ship being tied to any port in any country or to any particular coastline. The development of naval architecture in recent years as the submarine and sea-going torpedo-destroyer had "really done away with a doctrine that used to be extremely fashionable - namely, that every ship belonging to the Empire should be prepared to go everywhere and do everything in any waters and in any quarter of the globe."[2]

Lieutenant Hordern, whom one remembers as an ardent centralist, bowing to Colonial Nationalism, voiced the opinion that, instead of two or more centralised navies, there should be one decentralised, with an Admiralty in London and local Admiralties in each of the great Dominions.[3] Mr L.S. Amery expressed some doubts regarding the doctrine that "the sea is all one"; not so had Russia found it in her war with Japan.[4] British statesmen were chided for not having seen in the naval aspirations of the Dominions a means whereby the withdrawal of the Navy from the

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1. Callwell, Imperial Defence; British North America, U.E. Dec. 1912, Vol.iii.
2. The Times, June 10, 1909.
3. d'Egville, Notes on Imperial Co-operation, Un.Serv.Mag., Nov. 1908, Vol.38.
4. L.S. Amery, The Military Geography of the British Empire, Nat. Rev., May 1908, Vol.51.

frontier could be turned to purposes of unity in a great universal Navy.[1] Lord Fisher expressed his views regarding the 1909 Conference on Defence, "I am so surprised how utterly both the Cabinet and the Press have failed to see the true 'inwardness' of the new 'Pacific Fleet"! I had a few words in private with Sir Joseph Ward (the Prime Minister of New Zealand). He saw it! It means eventually Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Cape, (that is South Africa) and India running a complete Navy. We manage the job in Europe. They'll manage the job...as occasion requires out there."[2]

Even the stubborn Times, which had been forever heretic hunting, by 1912 thought that the United Kingdom should have a European standard and an extra-European standard, and in the latter Dominion ships could be valuable.[3] And when the Malay States offered a first-class ship the Times desired it to be designed for service in Eastern seas on the ground that security in Europe must be the responsibility of the British Fleet.[4]

A significant article appeared in the Empire Day Supplement of the Times in 1909. It included, "Warmly as we welcome and greatly as we value the impulse which has prompted New Zealand and the three Australian States to show themselves thus actively determined to add their resources to those of the Mother Country in resisting any possible challenge to British supremacy at sea, we look for future co-operation in that purpose to the development of local resources in men and material which the Commonwealth and Dominion Governments have declared to be their aim."[5] In

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1. C. de Thierry, The Blight of Little Englandism, Un.Serv.Mag., Jan.1910, Vol.40.
2. Fisher, Memories, p.193.
3. The Times, Dec. 12, 1912.
4. The Times, Jan. 20, 1913.
5. The Times, May 24, 1909, Vide ibid, "The Empire and Sea Power" for an expression of similar views.

an adjoining column was a letter from Chamberlain who was tremendously pleased that New Zealand should have offered a Dreadnought without stipulations as to its use, and considered it somewhat ungraciously received by the Imperial Government.[1] It is fitting that these two opinions should come together for they mark a contrast of opinion. It was now not so much as Chamberlain had put it in 1902 of shouldering the burdens of a weary Titan, as of each member of the Empire bearing their own share of weight and responsibility. It is the distinction made by Mr Jebb when he differentiates between loyalty and patriotism. In the former there is the attitude of a son taking over the support of his poor old father, and in the latter there is the spirit of self-respect, the son refusing to allow the father to support him now that he had become a man.

There were many people who seem to have learnt nothing from Laurier or the other exponents and teachers of Dominion nationalism.[2] The Liberal Press would still argue that what the Canadians especially desired was to ease the burden of the Mother Country.[3] A rising tide of public opinion contradicted them, due no doubt, to a great extent to the fear that, if the Dominions were led to think that they were merely taking over burdens which other taxpayers were bearing, they would not be so anxious to set about building up Imperial Defence asif they were assured that they would be making the margin of safety so much greater, but there were many who spoke from a different point of view. Commander Roper, Chief of the Canadian Naval Staff, stated: "It

1. The Times, May 24, 1909.
2. As Edgar Crammond, Imperial Defence and Finance, 19th Century, Aug. 1912, Vol.72.
3. Jebb, The Britannic Question, pp.177-178.

is not so much a question of England needing the assistance of Canada as of Canada being rendered able to look after herself."[1.] When Borden made his effort to increase Canada's naval forces part of the Imperial scheme of defence, the Times commented that, England "looks upon the Canadian offer as a duty owed by a partner-nation to the circle of British States, not as a debt discharged by a daughter-nation to herself."[2.]

The words "gift" and "contribution" practically disappeared from the defence vocabulary of the Imperialist in favour of language expressing measures for self-defence. Two schools were dominant - those supporting "allied" navies and those desiring an Imperial navy. By the outbreak of the War the most consistent of the advocates of an Imperial Navy expressed pleasure in the development of an Australian Navy, believing that. "An individual development of naval strength in each Dominion would plant the naval spirit everywhere."[3.] On another occasion the opinion was stated that, "It will not be thought in any Dominion... that opinion in this country looks unfavorably to the development of local fleets. Every thinker on the subjects knows that local development is the natural line of advance, and that no other method can enlist the full resources or satisfy the patriotism of any self-governing State."[4.] It was stated quite clearly, however, that the creation of fresh naval centres was a very different thing from a wasteful dispersion of men and ships and that separate fleets would commit the Empire to an enormous sacrifice of efficiency

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1. Quoted, d'Egville, Notes, Un.Serv.Mag., Oct. 1910, Vol.42.
2. The Times, Dec. 7, 1912.
3. The Times, Feb. 6, 1913.
4. The Times, Feb. 15, 1913.

and funds, unless they would be co-ordinated and trained together in peace as well as war. "Not even Australia", comments Professor Keith caustically, "can afford to waste money".[1] It was felt, therefore, that the Admiralty must have the right of disposing of the fleet in view of what it considered to be best naval strategy in the interests of the Empire. There was involved in all this concession and talk of encouraging national pride in being responsible for some particular area or in developing national centres of naval strength, the belief that a Navy under single control and so planned as to be homogeneous in personnel and equipment was the only sane theory of Imperial Defence. Local navies would soon be annihilated, whereas they might be the decisive factor in a naval engagement if under central control.

The Great War came shortly after Churchill had said the last word on the matter in regard to the gift of a Dreadnought by New Zealand: "No greater insight into political and strategical points has ever been shown by a community hitherto unversed in military matters. The situation in the Pacific will be absolutely regulated by the decision in European waters. Two or three Australian and New Zealand Dreadnoughts, if brought into line in the decisive theatre, might turn the scale and make victory not merely certain but complete. The same two or more Dreadnoughts in Australian waters would be useless the day after the defeat of the British Navy in home waters. Their existence would only serve to prolong the agony without altering the course of events. Their effectiveness would have been destroyed by events which had taken place on the other side of the globe,

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1. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.335.

just assuredly as if they had been sunk in the battle. The Admiralty are bound to uphold and proclaim broad principles of unity in command and in strategic conceptions, and of concentration in the decisive theatre and for the decisive event. That is our duty, and we are bound to give that advice in a military and strategic sense. The Dominions are perfectly free."[1.]

Was there, then, one may ask, any change in the British opinion as regards Dominion Navies? There was this difference in opinion which has already been laboured: that Britain had recognised Dominion nationalism and was desirous of accommodating it as much as possible. But war was often too imminent to pander to Dominion sentiment; strategy must be served, and with the danger of war out of the way then national sentiment might be served. The argument of this part of the study is that, had not the danger of war been looming close about the nation, the Liberal Government of Great Britain would have been more conciliatory to nationalism than they were. They struck for a consolidated Empire in regard to defence for necessity's sake. These generalisations may be shown perhaps by a view of the defence schemes as brought up at the various Conferences and in the Reports of military and naval advisers.

Lord Tweedmouth, for all the accusations of mildness directed against him, spoke strongly on the point of unity in naval control at the Conference of 1907. He emphasised the need of the Navy to the Empire and declared that, "There is one sea, there is one Empire, and there is one Navy, and I want

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1. H.C. Debs., Mar. 17, 1914, Vol.59, pp.1933-1934.

in the first place your help, and in the second place authority for the Admiralty to manage this great service without restraint."[1] He continued, "The only reservation that the Admiralty desire to make is, that they claim to have the charge of the strategical questions which are necessarily involved in Naval Defence, to hold the command of the naval forces of the country, and to arrange the distribution of ships in the best possible manner to resist attacks and to defend the Empire at large, whether it be our own islands or the dominions beyond the seas. We thoroughly recognise that we are responsible for that defence....We want you to give us all the assistance you can, but we do not come to you as beggars...If you are not inclined to give us the help that we hope to have,from you, we acknowledge our absolute obligation to defend the King's dominions across the seas to the best of our ability." He proposed that the Colonies provide vessels that were useful for defence against possible raids or for co-operation with a squadron, and also to equip and maintain docks and fitting establishments which could be used by a fleet. He thought it would be of further assistance if coaling facilities were provided and arrangements made for a supply of coal and naval stores which would otherwise have to be purchased locally. So the desire of South Africa and Australia for some naval service of their own could be met by "the provisions of the smaller craft which were incidental to the work of a great fleet of modern battleships."[2] There was not much in this to appeal to colonial nationalism.

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1. Cd.3523. p.129.
2. Ibid, pp.130-131.

Mr Brodeur, representing Canada, felt some unfairness in the British attitude and suggested that, since the naval expenditure of the United Kingdom, as listed in the paper circulated among the delegates,[1] included the Fisheries Protection Service, Canada's expenditure should not be given as nil, for she had expended since 1885, 3,147,990 dollars, and that year was building a cruiser at the cost of 500,000 dols., an obligation incurred in virtue of treaties between the United States and Great Britain, without Canadian consent, and which was therefore an Imperial obligation.[2] A similar obligation had been assumed on the Great Lakes, where three American States were spending not less than 15,000,000 dols. to keep up a Navy. Canada was drilling a Naval Militia, was establishing telegraphic stations on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts - wireless telegraphy being an expenditure also included in the amount of British naval expenditure - and had taken over the Hydrographic Survey and extended it, for which three service boats were being built to replace British boats, and the taking over of the Halifax and Esquimalt dockyards was in process of completion. Laurier shortly refused to agree to Smartt's motion for contribution of money, the establishment of local Naval defence, or other services that the Dominions might give according to varying circumstances, pleading that "in Canada we have to tax ourselves to the utmost of our resources in the development of our country."[3] The Conference as a whole was quite pleased with the motion, but Laurier was firm.[4]

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1. Cd. 3524, p.74.
2. Cd. 3523, p.139ff.
3. Ibid, p.542.
4. It should be observed that Sir Charles Tupper with much of the Canadian Press commended Laurier's stand at the Conference. Skelton, op.cit. p.308.

Mr Deakin, at the Conference and throughout the following year fought for an Australian Navy. As he emphasised, Australia's offer was generous enough, She proposed, in exchange for her subsidy, to pay 1,000 seamen for service in a Navy on the Australian Station at an estimated cost of £100,000, the remainder of the subsidy to be applied to such local defence as had been suggested at the Conference. Two cruisers were to be loaned to the Commonwealth for training purposes at a cost to her of £60,000; this in addition to the vote that year (1907) of £250,000 for naval, harbour, and coast defences, and £50,000 for the fortification of harbours.[1] Difficulties arose with respect to the Australian Navy, the question of extended legislative control and also the question of their international position.[2] The Admiralty finally in August of 1908 concurred in a scheme for a local flotilla.[3]

New Zealand increased her subsidy from £40,000 to £100,000 per annum and the Lords of Admiralty replied expressing much satisfaction that the additional payment was unaccompanied by any condition whatever as to the location of His Majesty's ships in New Zealand waters.[4]

In 1909 came the dangers of war and the fears occasioned by German naval rivalry which served the two purposes of frightening the Dominions into co-operating in Imperial defence and stiffening the arguments of the military and naval experts of the United Kingdom, who had decided to increase their expenditures

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1. Cd. 4325, p.2.
2. Vide Keith, Responsible Government, (1927) Vol.ii, pp.1005-1006.
3. Cd. 4325, p.48ff.
4. Despatch, 27 May, 1908, Ibid, p.43.

and to exert pressure upon the Dominions that they assume further obligations. New Zealand, that most Imperial of Dominions, made a striking offer of a first-class battleship of the latest type with the offer of a second if needed.[1] Australia, where Mr Deakin's Government had been for a short time replaced by a Labour Ministry, headed by Mr Fisher, acknowledged their liability for Imperial Defence but insisted on a local navy after the 1908 arrangement.[2] New South Wales and Victoria offered to share the cost of a Dreadnought between them should the Commonwealth Government make no such offer,[3] although their well-meant promise had more enthusiasm than gold behind it and never got further than a gesture.[4] Canada, held in rein by Laurier, passed a resolution in the House of Commons affirming the need for British naval supremacy and declaring a willingness to organize a navy in close relation to, and co-operation with, the Imperial Navy.[5] Mr Deakin, who had recently declared that "the ultimate goal is an Imperial Navy contributed by all the self-governing States of the Empire, and controlled politically by an Imperial Council", and that it was the duty of Australia in the present emergency to contribute a Dreadnought",[6] now succeeded Fisher and offered an Australian Dreadnought or such naval strength as might be determined after consultation with the Admiralty.[7]

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1. Cd. 4948, p.1.
2. Ibid, pp.3-4.
3. Ibid, p.3.
4. Imperial Feeling and the Defence Problem, The Times, June 8, 1909.
5. Cd. 4948, p.20.
6. The Times, April 8, 1909.
7. Cd. 4948, p.21.

A subsidiary Conference was held in August 1909 to discuss Naval and Military Defence.[1] New Zealand preferred to adhere to her contribution. Canada and Australia wished to build fleets of their own. The Pacific Fleet was to be organised to include three units of the East Indies, Australasia, and the South Seas. Australia, with some temporary assistance from Imperial funds, was to provide and maintain the Australian unit and the New Zealand contribution of £100,000 and a battleship were to be applied towards the maitenance of the China unit. Canada, having refused the Admiralty memorandum which suggested that she should contribute to a fleet unit on the Pacific, proposed to provide cruisers and destroyers for the defence of her seaboards, and to take over the maintenance of the dockyards at Halifax and Esquimalt, Australia volunteering to undertake a similar responsibility as regards Sydney. It was agreed that the standard of vessels and armament were to be uniform, and the personnel was to be trained and disciplined under regulations similar to those established in the United Kingdom, so as to allow of interchange and union between the services of Great Britain and the Dominions.

In 1911 the regular meeting of the Imperial Conference further dealt with the matter and arranged to meet international questions that were involved in the control of their fleets by the Dominions.[2] The Dominion ships would hoist at the stern the white ensign as symbol of the authority of the Crown, and at the jack-staff the distinctive flag of the Dominion. Australia and Canada were to have their own naval stations as agreed upon from

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1. Statement by Mr Asquith, H.C. Debs., 26 August, 1909, Vol.ix, pp.2310-2313.
2. Cd. 5746 - 11.

time to time where they would have complete charge of their ships. If Australia or Canada sent ships to another part of the Empire, they must notify the British Admiralty, while concurrence of the Imperial Government must be obtained before ships were sent to a foreign port so that the necessary arrangements might be made with the Foreign Office. While the ships of the Dominions were at a foreign port a report of their proceedings would be forwarded by the officer in command to the Commander-in-Chief on the station or to the British Admiralty. The Officer in command of a Dominion ship, so long as he remained in the foreign port, would obey any instructions he might receive from the Government of the United Kingdom as to the conduct of any international matters that might arise, the Dominion Government being informed. He would also submit to such instructions if forced into a port through some unforeseen emergency, and would report his arrival and reason for calling to the Commander-in-Chief at the Station or to the Admiralty. When a ship of the British Admiralty met a ship of the Dominions, the senior Officer would have the right of command in matters of ceremony or international intercourse, or where united action was agreed upon, but would have no power to direct the movements of ships of the other service unless the ships were ordered to co-operate by mutual agreement. The British Admiralty undertook to loan the Dominions, during the period of the development of their services, such officers and men as might be required. It was desirable in the interests of efficiency and co-operation that arrangements should be made from time to time between the British Admiralty and the Dominions for fleet exercises or other joint training under the Senior Naval Officer. In time of war, when

the naval service of a Dominions, or any part thereof, had been put at the disposal of the Imperial Government by the Dominion authorities, the ships would form an integral part of the British fleet and would remain under the control of the British Admiralty during the continuance of the war.

Making the best of Australia's determination to have a local Navy, Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson reported on March 1, 1911, to the Australian Government, detailed recommendations for an Australian Navy. He urged that the Commonwealth contemplate the ultimate creation of a fleet composed of eight armed cruisers, ten protected cruisers, eighteen destroyers, twelve submarines, three depot ships for flotillas, and one fleet repair ship, requiring when fully-manned a personnel of 14,844 officers and men. The Fleet was to be in two divisions, Eastern and Western, and these again to be divided into two main squadrons. When the full scheme was realised the annual cost of the personnel would be £2,226,600 a year, and the cost of the maintenance of the ships in commission would be £1,226,000. The cost of the construction of the fleet would be £19,790,000 apart from the naval expenditure on dockyards, barracks, naval bases, et cetera.[1.]

The adoption of Henderson's Report led to defence estimates for 1913-14 of £4,752,735, which represents a larger proportional expenditure than Germany's estimate of the preceding year, being a tenfold increase in Australian naval expenditure.[2.] These figures are worthy quotation, for they illustrate to a remarkable degree the strength of the national spirit in that country.

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1. Cd. 6091, p.15; Cd. 5582, p.18.
2. Australia and the War, R.T. March 1915, Vol.v, p.451.

Self-defence is inseparable from the spirit of nationalism, and the fact that Canada has lived under the aegis of the United States, without the need of defending herself, has been a great handicap to the Canadian national spirit, so that not yet has a peculiar Canadian type emerged.[1.]

In the matter of defence, New Zealand did not lag behind, and the failure of the Imperial Government to carry out its part of the bargain in 1909 to create a fleet unit as had been agreed upon,[2.] led to New Zealand making an earnest endeavour to build up her own local defence. The inability of the Admiralty to carry out its agreement was due to the necessity of concentrating in European waters so that the ships could not be spared to the Eastern Fleet, especially since the Japanese alliance had removed any danger of a serious naval challenge there.[3.] Nevertheless it came as a shock to many people in Britain, who had come to regard New Zealand as a stalwart upholder of the principle of naval centralisation and cash contribution in contradistinction to the policy of local navies, when that Dominion initiated a naval programme of a national nature.[4.]

As for Canada, the chief difficulty was to get that Dominion to do anything in the way of defence, either from a National or Imperial aspect, so that Imperialists still went to Canada to stir up interest in defence matters[5.] and articles continued to

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1. Australian nationalism is well expressed in the articles, Australia: A Plea for a National Policy, R.T. July 1912, Vol.2. and An Australian Note on Anglo-German Relations, ibid, in somewhat extreme forms.
2. Cd. 6863, p.11.
3. The Times, Oct.29, 1913; Churchill explains the British attitude, H.C. Debs. 17th March, 1914, Vol.59, p.1932. Vide Dewey, op.cit. Voli, p.275 and passim, and Keith, Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp.326-328 for fuller details.
4. U.E. Dec. 1913, Vol.4, p.927.
5. As Mr Howard d'Egville in the fall of 1908.

rebuke her indifference. However, she purchased two ships from the British Government which have been the occasion for much humour - certainly there has seldom been seen a more inefficient fleet - and the Conservatives had plenty of opportunity to scoff[1.] at Laurier's "tin pot navy" ambitions. His Bill, calling for new vessels, also brought down upon his head the wrath of Bourassa and a large portion of French Canada. Then, as now, they could imagine the "disembowelment" of their sons on far-away battle-fields in the made wake of British imperialism. The French-Canadians failed to understand their greatest prophet.[2.]

Sir Robert Borden succeeded Laurier as Prime Minister. He went to Great Britain to secure advice on the needs of Imperial Defence and to ascertain the extent of the emergency in foreign relations. At this request, the Admiralty drew up a memorandum stating the requirements of Imperial Defence, pointing out that the assurance of the unity of the Empire would far outweigh the material benefits of added strength to the Navy, acknowledged responsibility for the full defence of the Empire, but advised that any efforts of the Dominion be directed to contributing to the Imperial Navy the best ships procurable.[3.] In December, 1912, Borden introduced his Naval Bill to provide an appropriation of thirty-five million dollars to construct three dreadnoughts to be built in England and used at the discretion of the British Admiralty.

Laurier advanced a counter-proposal in favour of a Canadian fleet for the Pacific and another for the Atlantic, with a

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1. Vide Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.320.
2. For Laurier's proposals vide Skelton, op.cit., Vol.ii, p,325.
3. Cd. 6513: Cd.6689.

super-Dreadnought as the centre of each fleet, the establishment of shipyards in Canada and the building of warships in Canada, the fleets to be manned as far as possible by Canada, to be maintained by Canada, and to go to war at the command of the Canadian people.[1] At any rate, it was considered by the Mother Country that Laurier's ideal had advanced since 1909 when he would not have a fleet unit.[2]

Because of the hostility of the Liberal Party to the Conservative scheme, the Bill was thrown out by the Senate on the ground that it should be submitted to the Canadian people, a somewhat curious argument.

The Imperialists in Great Britain had at one time enthused over Laurier. From the time of the 1907 Conference to the Great War that enthusiasm waned as the discovery was made that he did not believe in Imperial Federation; that he was an ardent supporter of nationalist navies - in so far as he supported any defence schemes - and that even his interest in Imperial preference had died away.[3] The punishment visited upon Laurier for his sins consisted largely of great columns of praise for his rival, Sir Robert Borden, though direct condemnation was not lacking.[4] He was a "perhaps too familiar figure at Imperial Conferences" and "the arch-champion of provincialism" proved the truth of the saying that "fecundity of language is usually accompanied by sterility of action." "It is to be hoped", said the critic who coined these phrases, "that at the next gathering of Imperial

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1. The Canadian Naval Bill, The Times, Dec. 13, 1912.
2. The Times, Dec. 14, 1912.
3. Jebb, The Imperial Conference, Vol.ii, p.254, is bitter regarding the attitude taken at the 1907 Conference by Laurier regarding preference.
4. ex The Passing of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Emp.Rev. Oct. 1911, Vol.22.

delegates the premier Dominion will be more worthily represented than it has been on recent occasions."[1.]

The abuse became especially acrimonious when words of Laurier were inconceivably misunderstood in Great Britain to mean that Canada had the right to determine whether or not she would remain neutral if Great Britain were at war. It is amazing how this impression lingered in people's minds, and even the great journals the Times for instance, misunderstand.[2.] Laurier's statements were clear enough: "If England is at war we are at war and liable to attack. I do not say we shall always be attacked, neither do I say that we would take part in all the wars of England. That is a matter that must be guided by circumstances, upon which the Canadian parliament will have to pronounce."[3.] "If we do have a navy," he said again, "that navy will not go to war unless the parliament of Canada chooses to send her there."[4.] Although when Britain was at war Canada was at war, yet it did not actually follow that Canadians were in the conflict, and he cited wars in which Canada had played no part and yet been technically at war by the declaration of Great Britain.[5.] In other words, he spoke not in regard to neutrality, but of extent of Canadian participation in war.

Had his words been properly understood British Imperialists might have recalled that this was practically his position on the occasion of the South African War. Deakin of Australia, also, back in 1907, had desiderated for the Australian Navy,

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1. F.A.W. Gisborne, The Imperial Conference of 1911, Emp.Rev., Sept. 1911, Vol.22.
2. The Times, Jan.13, 1910.
3. Skelton, op.cit., Vol.ii, pp.327-328.
4. Ibid, p.327.
5. The Times, Dec. 13, 1912.

that in time of peace the vessels would be controlled entirely by the Commonwealth Government; in time of war the decision must rest with the responsible government of the time, a position appreciated and accepted by the Admiralty.[1] The Pretoria Volksstem and the Bloemfontein Friend, the former often being regarded as a semi-official organ of the Dutch section and in close contact with General Botha, do seem to have claimed the right of neutrality for South Africa in war, but Botha disowned any such possibility and the contention was strongly denied by the Cape Times.[2]

It did not, however, relieve Laurier of odium when the true nature of his nationalist naval dogmas was made clear. Laurier's position was autonomist. He would not advise the United Kingdom to take certain lines of diplomacy for that advice might lead to war in which Canada would be bound to take full part as having shared in the responsibility for advice given. He is quoted as saying, "We should stand on our own policy of being masters in our own house, of having a policy for our own purpose, and leaving to the Canadian Government, and the the Canadian people to take part in these wars, in which they have no voice, only if they think fit to do so."[3] The Toronto Globe gave a valuable

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1. Cd. 4325, p.47. Vide ibid, p.17, Commonwealth Debates: Mr Bowden, "There would be divided control in time of war?" Mr Deakin, "No; the whole control would be in the Commonwealth, but if in a time of danger it chose to place its flotilla under the command of the Admiral on this station - and in the event of operations here I should say that, in almost every circumstance one can imagine, that would probably be the case- it would then pass wholly under his control for the time being." Col. Foxton, "But if it did not choose to do so?" Mr Deakin, "Parliament would retain the whole control."
2. The Times, (London) July 15, 1911. Vide Colonial Neutrality, R.T. Aug. 1911, Vol.1.
3. R.T. op.cit.

comment upon this attitude: "The truth is that the British Empire as at present constituted is useless as a weapon of offence, while tremendously powerful as a weapon of defence." In wars of the latter kind Canada would spend her last dollar and last man; in the former she would weigh the pros and cons.[1] The cynic might remark that every war is a war of defence.

The Times inveighed against the doctrine on the ground that, if it were developed to its logical conclusion, it would involve a complete rupture of the connexion between Canada and the Empire. Either Canada was part of the British Empire and considered by Foreign Powers, so long as she flew the British flag, ipso facto a part of the Empire, in which case she must defend herself to the utmost of her ability, or she must declare herself an independent Power by a vote of the Canadian Parliament. There was no middle course.[2] The Times was also opposed to the Dominions having complete control of their fleets in time of peace since their movements might in themselves produce war. The Empire, in other words, like Australia and Canada, if it was to share responsibility and pledge its ships, must have some effective control over the movements of Dominions fleets.[3] Just as there were some things that a Dominion could do better than a Province, so there were some things which an Empire could do better than a Dominion. One of those was looking after the Navy.[4]

The Round Table commentator pointed out that the question as to whether Canada took part in a War would include: Would Canada allow the British Navy to use her ports as bases? Would she

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1. The Times, June 10, 1911.
2. The Times, June 3, 1911.
3. The Times, Aug. 27, 1912; also May 23, 1911.
4. The Times, Dec. 14, 1912.

intern merchant ships of the enemy lying in her harbours at the outbreak of hostilities? and so on. It was certain that as the citizens of the Dominions were subjects of His Britannic Majesty, and their territories part of his Dominions, when he is at war, they are at war. They must consequently, 'take part', and any such participation, however, passive, would mean an active belligerency.[1] In international law there was no middle position.

The reason, then, for the dislike of Laurier's naval policy as finally enunciated, did not lie on the grounds of its extent. Indeed certain writers in the United Kingdom could see "little practical difference between the two parties"[2] on that score, and there were some who found Laurier's scheme of construction of greater value.[3] What was objected to was Laurier's autonomist conception of Dominion navies and his demand that Canada should determine the extent of her participation in war. So there was great rejoicing over the Conservative victory in the election, because it was considered "certain that the Borden Government will be as zealous for equal partnership in the Empire as was the Laurier Government for the autonomy of the Dominion."[4]

There were two points upon which Borden and Laurier differed - only two points that mattered: Borden declared that if, in time of war, the Canadian Government did not place the Canadian Navy under the control of the Imperial authorities "it would amount to a declaration of independence,"[5] while Laurier charged that Borden's scheme would lead immediately to Imperial Federation;[6] and in

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1. Colonial Neutrality, op.cit.
2. The Times, Dec.14, 1912.
3. Percival Hislam, Imperial Naval Policy, Un.Serv. Mag., Jan. 1913, Vol.46.
4. The Times, July 4, 1912.
5. Quoted, d'Egville, Imperial Defence and Closer Union, p.176.
6. Rival Policies at Ottawa, The Times, Mar,25, 1913.

the second place, while Borden felt that the emergency was so great as to demand emergency measures, Laurier right up to the very moment of war kept insisting that the sky was clear and there was no emergency. Borden, assured of an emergency, pointed out with the help of the British Press, that naval establishments took a long time to create, so that Laurier's policy of ships built in and manned by Canada would not give any immediate aid to the Mother Country. Indeed, Borden's offer contained a stipulation that any ships provided would be subject to recall when circumstances and the desire of the Canadian people enabled the founding of a distinct Canadian navy. "But today", he cried, in one of the greatest speeches ever made in the Canadian House of Commons, "While the clouds are heavy and we hear the booming of distant thunder and see lightning flashes on the horizon, we cannot and will not wait and deliberate until the impending storm shall have burst upon us in fury and with disaster. Almost unaided, the Motherland, not for herself alone, but for us as well, is sustaining the burden of a vital Imperial duty and confronting an overmastering necessity of national existence. Bringing the best assistance we may in the urgency of the moment we come thus to her aid in token of our determination to protect and ensure the safety and integrity of this Empire and our resolve to defend on sea as well as on land our Flag, our honour, and our heritage!"

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1. Quoted, The Times, Dec. 6, 1912. His speech made a great impression: vide the Times, Dec. 7, 1912. Also the Times, May 3, 1913, wherein he is quoted as denying "in the strongest form of expression that Parliamentary language would permit" that his proposals were for a permanent contribution and other than an emergency measure.

It has become more and more clear as Germany appeared as the most probable antagonist in war that it would be essential to place a large army in France in the event of outbreak of hostilities. A defeat at sea, fatal to the British Empire, would in nowise be paralyzing to a land power in Germany. Lord Roberts made speeches throughout the country to this effect, showing that, without military support from Great Britain, Holland and Belgium would be incorporated in the German Empire and France reduced to the position of a dependent ally. "Nothing could be more certain," prophesied Lord Roberts accurately enough, "than that in the event of war Germany is not going to throw away her advantages by crowding her army into the 240 miles of actual Franco-German frontier but will move directly through Belgium."[1.]

The Military problems of the Empire were stated by Haldane in two published articles:[2.] 1. To provide adequate forces for the defence of the self-governing Empire. 2. To furnish in peace sufficient garrisons for India, for Egypt, for coaling stations, and for the Crown Colonies. 3. To place in the field immediately on the outbreak of war in the highest state of efficiency as large an Expeditionary Force as possible. 4. To maintain both that Force, and existing garrisons abroad, throughout the continuance of hostilities, undiminished in numbers and efficiency. 5. To provide powers of expansion outside the limits of the Expeditionary Force.

The Secretary of State for War was not lacking public advice as to how to raise this force. There were three sources of supply

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1. Earl Roberts, Fallacies and Facts, pp.117-118.
2. The Military System of the Future in the British Empire, Roy. Un. Serv. Inst., Sept. and Oct. 1907, Vol.51.

which he was advised to tap. One suggestion was that the British Government employ Imperial native troops such as Zulus and the fighting Indian races.[1] Other patriots condemned as unworthy an Imperial race and constituting a sign of decadence that personal service in the ranks should be replaced by mercenary troops. In 1901 Mr George F. Shee wrote a book which made a plea for compulsory military service throughout the British Empire. The book attracted wide attention and Lord Newton induced the Army League to publish it in cheap form.[2] A discussion upon the book and the question of compulsory service begun by the Royal United Service Institution on Feb. 14,1902, led to the formation of the National Service League.[3] When, in 1906, Lord Roberts was induced to accept the Presidency, the Membership increased enormously and in March 1912 the membership numbered 100,000 with total adherents estimated at 220,000. The Nation in Arms, a monthly journal published by the association, got a circulation of 47,000 a month. As he vigorously asseverated, Lord Roberts did not propose conscription, since his citizen army would only be available for home service,[4] although the scheme included compulsory military training for every youth from 18 to 21, and every able-bodied male from the age of 18 to 30 would become liable to be called out for service.[5]

Lord Roberts, great realist that he was, found himself laughed at by the majority of his fellow-countrymen as an alarmist.[6]

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1. ex. Vinculum, Imperial Recruiting Grounds, Macmillan's Mag. Sept. 1906, Vol.1.
2. Geo. F. Shee, The Briton's First Duty,
3. R. MacLeod, The National Service League, U.E. Vol.6, Dec.1915.
4. Campaign Speeches, pp.33-34.
5. Col. C.E. Callwell, The National Service League's Scheme, Nat. Def. Oct. 1911.
6. Although he was strongly supported by Lord Birkenhead, then F.E. Smith, Vude Smith, Unionist Policy, chs. 3 & 4, p,47ff.

Sir Ian Hamilton was one of the many who replied that voluntary service goes with "the spirit of Imperialism, the adventurous spirit, the appreciation of the romance of war." Compulsory service was associated, on the other hand, with nationalism, "the spirit of conservation, home defence."[1] So the spirit of Imperialism and the war-like spirit are suggested as well-night synonymous! When did we ever hear that admitted before?

It was suggested that such compulsory service as proposed by Lord Roberts be applied throughout the Empire. Mr Silburn suggested a "Pan-Britannic Militia Army Act" with compulsory military training.[2] The idea of a homogeneous Imperial Force, trained by compulsory service, found favour with Mr Jebb. He wrote, "My conception of Imperial alliance will be fulfilled as regards defence when each partner State gives all its young men a rudimentary military education; entrusts home defence to an efficient 'Citizen Army' of whatever kind it prefers; supplies contingents to an Imperial striking force station in South Africa; and furnishes a national squadron or squadrons to an Imperial Navy."[3]

The third alternative, then, for reserve forces was to get them from the Dominions with their populations - already great today, but overwhelming tomorrow. In regard to military matters,

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1. Sir Ian Hamilton, Compulsory Service, pp.49-52.
2. Silburn, Colonies and Imperial Defence, p.304ff. and pp.316-317.
3. Jebb, Notes on Imperial Organisation, R.C.I., Vol.38, Nov.1906. Similar proposals were common enough. Vide Capt. C.E. Cookson, A Homogeneous Imperial Army, U.E. April 1911, Vol.ii.

there were not the same difficulties of unity and dispersion, so that it was found to be comparatively easy to reach a general agreement between the members of the Imperial Conference. It was, nevertheless, a consistently applied and accepted principle that the armies throughout the Empire be capable of combination of effort and easily interchangeable, at the direction in time of war of a single brain.

Haldane, wisely taking a lesson from the previous Conference, did not press the Dominion Prime Ministers at the meeting of 1907 for any rigid model,[1] but rather for a certain broad plan of military organisation for the Empire. Four papers were circulated among the Conference delegates.[2] The first set forth the principle, long since agreed upon, that each of the Dominions must be responsible for its self-defence, with the duty of arranging for mutual assistance in the event of a supreme common need as a modern conception of Empire. The second paper showed the necessity of assimilating the war organisation throughout the Empire more closely to that of the United Kingdom and employing a common nomenclature so that the overseas forces could fit into the existing Imperial organisation. The third paper dwelt upon the necessity for a common pattern of armament with a reserve supply of stores easily available in the event of mobilisation, while a fourth and less important recommended that, ordnance stores, particularly arms and ammunition, be ordered through the War Office, To this last paper Canada took exception because of the inconvenience occasioned and the desire to manufacture supplies at home.

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1. Cd. 3523, p.94ff.
2. Cd. 3524, p.18ff.

The Secretary of State for War conceived that the army should be divided into two parts; one for home defence, the other for the service of the Empire as a whole, co-operating as an expeditionary force with the Navy. It was hoped to make the Imperial General Staff, formed in September of 1906 on the advice of the Esher Committee, an Imperial school of military thought, holding to the same principles of similar views on strategical problems.[1] In order that it assume an Imperial character, it was necessary to have similar organization in the Dominions between which organizations an exchange of staff officers might prove valuable in establishing an organic connection. The Staff existed, not to dictate to the Dominions in Imperial matters, but to furnish expert advice. Aside from the objection of Sir Frederick Borden and Sir Joseph Ward to earmarking troops for overseas service, and the attention drawn by the former to the Canadian Militia Law which allowed only for preparations for local defence, there was little dissension in the Conference.

The Conference of 1909 further discussed plans for effective war-time co-operation, and responded to the general proposition, that each part of the Empire be willing to make its preparations on such lines as would enable it, should it so desire, to take its share in the general defence of the Empire, by arranging that, as far as Dominion autonomy permitted, the military forces should be standardised, the formation of units, the arrangements for tramsport, the patterns of weapons, et cetera, being as far as possible assimilated to those which had recently been worked out for the British Army.[2]

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1. An Imperial General Staff with colonial representation had long been advocated, especially by Sir Charles Dilke. Vide Egerton, A Short History of British Colonial Policy, pp.458-459.
2. Cd. 4948, p.19, and pp.29-30.

It was also decided that the officers performing General Staff duties throughout the Empire, to whatever the force they might belong, and while remaining responsible to and under the control of their own Governments, should be members of one body, the Imperial General Staff, stipulations which must have given joy to the Imperialists.[1.]

The tension of foreign relations in 1909 led to more activity in military matters on the part of Australia and New Zealand. Compulsory training of all male citizens was inaugurated by New Zealand and Australia by defence Acts of 1909, and cadet training, voluntary in Canada, was made compulsory by the two Australasian Governments.[2.]

Lord Kitchener visited Australia and New Zealand in 1910 and submitted recommendations for the complete reorganisation of the military forces on a territorial basis. That is, Australia was to be divided into 214 "areas", each providing a quota to fill a definite portion of a tactical unity, and New Zealand was similarly organised.[3.]

General Sir John French, during a visit in May and June of the same year to Canada, advanced recommedations, the chief of which were designed to assimilate peace organisation to war organisation, and to facilitate mobilization. Maj.-General Sir Percy Lake presented a memorandum to the Canadian Government detailing suggestions and putting into effect the most important of Sir John's principles.[4.]

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1. Sir William Nicholson, quoted by d'Egville, Notes, Un.Serv.Mag. Apr. 1909, Vol.39. Haldane, Press Conference, The Times, June 10, 1909. This centralism was continually being advocated and references are numerous.
2. Vide Keith, Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.304ff; Lucas, op.cit. p.200ff.
3. Cd. 5582, p.16ff.
4. Ibid, pp.15-16; Cd.6091, p.16.

The Conference of 1911 relegated the matter of military defence to the Committee of Imperial Defence which submitted a report showing the progress of the recommendations of the 1907 Conference.[1] The Imperial General Staff had done good work in the diffusion of military principles and establishing principles of co-operation, and local Staffs had been organised in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. A further Memorandum showed how the Overseas Dominions had gradually adopted, for officers of their permanent military forces, similar examinations for promotion to those laid down for Officers of the British Regular Army.[2] There was also a Memorandum setting forth the terms on which the services of the Inspector-General of the Oversea Forces could be secured if the Dominion Governments so desired.[3]

In concluding a pre-war survey of the military and naval assets of the Empire, we can see little progress, commensurate to the need, in preparing for offensive warfare, and this is particularly true of Canada. It is an easy matter to rebuke the British statesmen for refusing to recognise to a greater degree the force of nationalism, but undoubtedly the correct attitude at the moment was that of Borden who, appreciating the immediate need, was willing to yield for the present from the nationalist standpoint for the sake of strategical requirements. There have been few Dominion statesmen who have done more for the modern conception of the British Commonwealth of Nations than has Sir Robert, few more jealous for the individuality of the Dominion of Canada, yet he perceived with Rosebery the condition of "tacens bellum" which might at any moment break into the booming of

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1. Cd.5746, No.11.
2. Ibid, p. 7ff.
3. Ibid, p. 11ff.

cannons, and co-operated with the United Kingdom accordingly. Moreover, it is doubtful if young nations ever had such free and inexpensive tuition in matters of war than have the Dominions. At their disposal has been the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta, and all the other superb facilities of British war organisation. If the teacher has been somewhat unwilling to graduate her pupils, at any rate she has taught them cheaply and well.

It has often been argued, both before and after the event, that a strenuous military preparation on the part of the British Empire would have prevented war, or, at least, forced Germany and other European Powers to take more thought before plunging the world into war. It is known that Germany had high hopes of the Empire either falling into many pieces, or, at any rate, remaining passive during the event. If it be true that pre-war inertia had such an effect on Germany's action, it is ironic that it was a man of French blood who hindered such an action to prevent a war, the end of which might have been overwhelmingly disastrous and tragic for no country more than for France.

Although there is much contrary opinion in the United Kingdom, especially among the Conservative Party, it is most probable that nothing could have prevented the War. It grew from national and racial passions and economic tendencies which were inextricably intermingled, and over which the governments had lost control. The diseases were too far advanced to be checked by any other means than a resort to extreme remedies. The most that can be said is that organic military and naval unity, with greater preparation, would perhaps have delayed action and would have made for more effective fighting and shorter duration of the war.

Even so, much had been done, so that the emergency of 1914 could be met with an Imperial army that closely approached the homogeneity desired by Asquith and his colleagues. Finally, that fine body of men and women who taught of the Empire, who brought home to its members the idea of their unity and their essential need of one another, and who drew closer the bonds of affection uniting the peoples of the Empire, may look back upon their labours and be content. Did even they in their most exalted moments catch a vision of those difficult but heroic days of 1914 when the world marvelled as from all corners of this strange Empire sounded the tramp of men marching to the defence of common ideals, common traditions, and common rights which had been inherited from their Motherland?

Chapter II: The Dominions, Foreign Affairs, and British Opinion.

There is nothing which more emphasizes national status than the power to negotiate treaties. A colony, as a distinct feature, is subservient to the parent state in foreign affairs.[1.] It has fortunately been true that the Dominions have been able to take great strides along the path of self-government and gain an effective voice in foreign affairs, regardless of the attitude of foreign Powers which considered the Empire as a unity, by the inner development of British constitutional usage.

Canada had long asserted her right to consultation in treaties which affected her interests, and the first striking example of Canadian co-operation in the negotiation of a treaty was the employment of Lord Elgin, Governor-General of the Dominion, to arrange a reciprocity treaty with the United States.[2.] In 1865 the British Government expressed its willingness to accept Canadian assistance in negotiating another Treaty of Reciprocity with the Republic, and from 1871 to 1893 there were several instances of Canadian ministers conducting negotiations for commercial treaties with Spain, France, and the United States. At first the Colonial representative was to have been regarded as being engaged in merely informal negotiation, but by 1884 this principle had been so far abandoned that, had negotiations with Spain been successful, Sir Charles Tupper, the Canadian High Commissioner, should have signed the agreement with the representative of the British Government and in 1888 he actually signed with Mr Chamberlain the Treaty of Washington, although it failed

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1. Vide Potter, Canada as a Political Entity, p.3.
2. There were earlier examples. Porritt, op.cit. p.161ff.

to be approved by the American Senate.[1] Canada was past the barrier erected by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach who in 1878 had replied to a request from Canada that Sir A.T. Galt, Canadian High Commissioner in London, be appointed a commissioner when treaties were being negotiated in which Canada had a direct interest, "I have to inform you that it is not thought desirable to appoint a Canadian Commissioner to take part in the negotiation of any treaty, but if your Government desire to send a person enjoying their confidence to advise with Her Majesty's Government, or with the British Ambassador, on any questions that may arise during the negotiations, Her Majesty's Government will be happy to give attention to his representations."[2]

If in Canada's early experiences Lord Lyons was anxious to snub her representatives to Washington and discourage co-operation between British and Canadian Governments in matters relating to foreign affairs, his conservative views were not held by his successors, for especially Sir John Crampton and Sir Frederick Bruce were decidedly kindly and Canada had little cause for complaint on the score of non-co-operation.[3] Her grievances issued from a belief that Canadian interests were too often sacrificed to maintain friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States. As a member of the British Mission at Washington in 1871, Sir John A. Macdonald complained bitterly that Canadian interests were subordinated to the desire of the other two parties to effect a settlement,[4] although the need of

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1. Keith, Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.iii, p.1115. Sir Charles Tupper, Recollections of Sixty Years, p.174ff.
2. Quoted by Borden, Canadian Constitutional Studies, p,75.
3. Porritt, op.cit., p.164.
4. Pope, Memoir of Macdonald, ii, p.94ff. esp. p.105.

asserting Canada's rights from the point of view of domestic politics may have given strength to his protestations.

In 1870 a Victoria Royal Commission proposed that the colonies be given the power to make treaties, but the report was ignored and requests from Australasian colonies for the right to conclude commercial treaties with Foreign States negatived in 1871-1873.[1] By 1890 there was a decided Canadian agitation for such power,[2] but it did not reveal its full intensity until the Alaska Boundary Treaty. In over a hundred years of peace that have obtained between Canada and the United States, it is doubtful if there has ever been a greater animus between the two countries than that which exhibited itself on the occasion of that Treaty. Fortunately for the cause of peace, but unfortunately for the cause of Imperialism, rarely in all those years has there been a greater desire in Great Britain for friendship with the American Republic.

In 1898 and 1899 a Joint High Commission on which Canada was represented by Sir Richard Cartwright, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Sir Louis Davies, and Mr John Charlton, Newfoundland by Sir James Winter, (a generous colonial representation) and the United Kingdom by Lord Herschell, met at Quebec and Washington where an agreement on most of the outstanding sources of friction between the Dominions and their southern neighbour was reached. Unfortunately on the matter of the Alaska Boundary no conclusion could be obtained.[3] Canada desired arbitration by a tribunal

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1. Keith, Dominion Autonomy in Practice, p.52.
2. Corbett and Smith, p.50.
3. The Correspondence can be found in Cd.1877 (1904) and the accompanying map in Cd.1878.

of three, which the United States refused, countering with the suggestion of a tribunal of six impartial jurists, three from each country. Whereas the United States rejected a European umpire, it was not surprising that Canada should reject the American proposal that an umpire be chosen from Latin-America who was almost certainly, by dint of the Monroe Doctrine, to be strongly biassed to the United States' case.

Upon the matter being thrown back upon the hands of the British Government, the proposal was made by Lord Lansdowne that, as the United States wished to secure control of an Isthmian canal and therefore, as a necessary preliminary, it was necessary to secure the revocation of the Bulwer Clayton Treaty by which Britain had joint rights with the United States in any Isthmian undertaking, the Republic should obtain that concession by yielding something in regard to Alaska.[1.] The United States, however, to the chagrin of the Canadian public, got the concession for nothing.

For four years the dispute dragged on, Roosevelt refusing arbitration because arbitration meant compromise. Finally in 1903 it was agreed that six "impartial jurists of repute" should give a judicial interpretation to the boundary question.[2.] The idea of impartiality entertained by the United States' Government was expressed in selecting as their representatives three men, Messrs. Root, Lodge and Turner, who had by their public utterances given complete evidence to prejudging the case.[3.]

With this selection it became at once apparent that the best Canada could hope for was a dead-lock. The British Government

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1. Skelton, op.cit., Vol.ii, pp.139-140.
2. Cd.1400 and 1401. (1903.)
3. Vide Skelton, op.cit. p.144; The Times, Feb.21, 1903.

invited comments from the Dominion, who strongly protested against the appointments.[1] The Canadian representations to London, however, were but a cause of further humiliation as the British Government proceeded to ratify the Treaty and ignore Canadian protests,[2] a fact which would serve to illustrate the advance of the last twenty-five years in Canada's position. It was far too great a piety - Professor Keith terms it "quixotic" - which induced Laurier's Government to insist on appointing impartial arbitrators in the teeth of such unscrupulous treatment. Lord Alverstone, the Lord Chief Justice of England, desiring a settlement and filled with the spirit of compromise, was quite an unsuitable gentleman to face the pugnacious Americans.

In brief, therefore, the Canadian members, Sir Louis Jette and Mr A.B. Aylesworth, were outvoted and proceeded to declare the decision "a grotesque travesty of justice" and other hard names which it doubtless deserved. A terrific storm of protest at the decision spread through the country. Journals everywhere in the Dominion stormed that Canada had been "again offered as a sacrifice on the altar of Anglo-American friendship."[3] It was recalled that while the matter was still before the Joint High Commission, it had been necessary to send Sir Louis Davies to England to combat the prejudice that existed there against the Canadian case.[4] Sir Charles Tupper, in July 1899, had related in the Canadian House of Commons that, "from 1868, when I had occasion to deal with an important question relating to Canadian interests with Her Majesty's Government, down to the present hour,

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1. Cd.1877, p.45ff.
2. Ibid, Vide also Skelton, op.cit. p.145.
3. Quoted, Skelton, op.cit. p.153. Vide also the Times, Oct.22, 1903.
4. Ewart, Kingdom of Canada, p.344.

I have been struck very forcibly with the unwillingness on the part of Her Majesty's Government to allow any circumstances whatever to even threaten a collision with the United States."[1.]

The attitude of the Times had been consistently friendly to the American side. The Canadian controversy threatened "to affect most disastrously those other relations between England and the United States, the recent improvement in which both nations hoped would be permanent."[2.] The Times was also annoyed that the United States should be represented as bargaining with Canada in the Anglo-American Commission. It pointed out that the Behring Sea negotiations had come near shipwreck because they had been "handled in London from a colonial rather than from a diplomatic point of view. What the British Foreign Minister thought fair,...the Canadian Prime Minister, with his hand on the Canadian pulse, rejected. Colonial, not Imperial, views prevailed....The United States is negotiating with Great Britain," dogmatized the Times, "not with Canada, and if Canada is encouraged to forget this obvious fact her attitude is not likely to become more conciliatory."[3.] This attitude the Times maintained and when that award was announced, while trying to soothe Canada's ruffled feelings, was obviously glad to see the awkward business concluded.[4.]

Another journal found the Canadian case "unsound" and "decidedly weak", and had no sympathy with the indignation of the daughter-State.[5.] The writer did observe, nevertheless, that the decision had had the effect of silencing the clamour of the

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1. Ewart, op.cit. pp.344-345.
2. The Times, May 26, 1899.
3. The Times, May 15, 1899.
4. The Times, Oct.21, 1903.
5. The Economist, Nov.14, 1903, Vol.61, p.1925.

United Imperial Loyalists to contribute to the Imperial Army and Navy. It was queried, if it be taken for a settled fact that England would never go to war with the United States over Canadian issues, what solid reasons remained for Imperial union, and how long would any artificial arrangements that involved sacrifices on the part of Canada for the good, or supposed good, of the rest of the Empire, survive such shocks as this Treaty?[1.]

The National Review, breaking into unsuspected friendliness to the Canadian case, found it painful to reflect upon the result of the arbitration since, in proportion as Britain discouraged her, Canada would lean toward the United States.[2.] Contrary to the fears of that journal, the result was to teach Canada the virtues of self-reliance and not to depend on either Britain or the United States for her political existence. To the Canadian Club, Laurier stated his belief that more local autonomy was required for the Dominion to include treaty-making powers.[3.] In the House of Commons he expressed himself as being "of opinion that so long as Canada remains a dependency of the British Crown the present powers we have are not sufficient for the maintenance of our rights. It is important that we should ask the British Parliament for more and more extensive powers so that, if ever we have to deal with matters of a similar nature again, we shall deal with them in our own fashion and according to the best light we have."[4.]

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1. The Economist, op,cit. p.1926.
2. The Alaska Boundary Award, Nat.Rev. Nov. 1903, Vol.42, p.492.
3. The Times, Jan. 20, 1904.
4. The Times, Oct. 24, 1903. Vide also Skelton, op.cit. pp.155-156: Ewart, op.cit. p.345.

The Times was dismayed, and very happy when it could publish a vigorous denial of Laurier's pretensions by Sir Charles Tupper.[1] The National Review called a halt to its condolences and denounced the Canadian Premier's attitude as "not cricket" for he had been jointly responsible with the Imperial Government for the personnel of the American Commission, a statement, as has been seen, not quite accurate.[2] The journal advanced the reasonable argument that Canada could not ask to make and unmake treaties other than those of commerce at her own free will as long as she depended to a great degree upon the Mother Country for the power to keep her territory inviolate.[3]

While it was almost unanimously felt that separate treaty-making powers were completely out of the question, nevertheless certain British opinion felt that Canada had an undoubted right to participate in the negotiation of treaties in a greater sense than she had so far done. Mr Jebb decided that it was "time for the Canadians, whose clear-sighted patriotism is the one bright spot in the Alaskan humiliation, to pit on the full armour of national manhood in no metaphorical sense."[4] Sadly pondering the deleterious effects of the decision upon the Empire, he drew from the Alaskan Boundary Award the lesson that in all future negotiations of that kind with the United Statesthe Canadian Premier must be the representative of the Empire. He would consult with the

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1. The Times, Dec.1 and 12, 1903.
2. Nat. Rev. Apr. 1904, Vol.43, pp.341-342. It further said that the the Imperial Government had offered Canada three Canadian representatives to balance those of the United States, but "Sir Wilfrid is an exceedingly clever man, and we shrewdly suspect that he was anxious to get rid of a disagreeable controversy at all costs, but was not sorry to transfer the odium of an unpopular settlement to the shoulders of the Imperial Government" Nat. Rev., May 1904, Vol.43.
3. Nat. Rev., Dec. 1905, Vol.46, p.749.
4. Jebb, Studies in Colonial Nationalism, p.60.

other Governments at every step of diplomatic negotiations. If they failed to back him, he would have to "do his own climbing down, or persevere single-handed on his own responsibility. In other words, the headquarters of the Conference must be transferred to Ottawa for the purposes of those particular questions."[1.]

It would be well, for the Canadian nationalists who have ever railed at the Tory attitude of British opinion, if it were remembered that a contemporary Englishman was the most ardent of their advocates and the most critical of the decision. There were no more severe indictments of the folly of the Alaskan decision than those by Mr Jebb[2.] or Professor Keith.[3.]

There were many extenuating circumstances in considering the British point of view. The Americans had, for the most part, a strong case and it appeared that Canada's claims had been largely manufactured on the discovery of gold in the Yukon as the previous Government had neglected the Dominions' claim to the territory to such an extent that her case was greatly weakened - an argument, which, while absurd from a legal standpoint, was of weight with the laiety. Moreover, Chamberlain had been in South Africa during the trouble in the later stages, and so Britain's most aggressive statesman and the one most jealous for Dominion interests was an absentee. Then, too, the Boer War had estranged Great Britain from European sympathies while the Venezuelan controversy had damaged her friendship with the United States where the assertive, difficult Roosevelt had come into the Presidency. The War had shown the military weakness of the Empire to risk a

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1. Jebb, Imperial Organisation, The Empire and the Century, p.343.
2. Studies in Colonial Nationalism, p.26ff. and Notes on Imperial Organisation, R.C.I., Nov. 1906, Vol.38.
3. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp.523-524; Responsible Government in the Dominions, (1912) pp.1141-1142.

conflict even had the provocation been sufficient to justify a resort to arms. Professor Skelton contends against this view that, even assuming a stiffer adherence to what Lord Alverstone himself considered just, war would not have been by any means probable; a failure to agree, followed by the publication of the deliberate judgments, would not have meant war. Canada, which had never involved Britain in war with the United States on her own behalf and had been involved in a war of Britain's was quite as aware of the danger and quite as eager to avert it as Lord Alverstone. The Canadian Government, Professor Skelton continues, would not have dreamed of pressing insistence to the point of war, but neither were they prepared to make all the concession for the sake of peace, or to yield to an argument or a bluff which might with equal force be urged in every difference between the two countries and compel surrender before discussion began.[1.]

Such brave language is very fine, but does not take into account the incalculable quality of American jingoism which had waxed unhealthily corpulent from a long peace and the nursing of Roosevelt. War was possible in the event of a failure to reach an agreement - that is certain - and the issue resolved itself into the question as to whether the Portland Channel was worth the risk of war or not.[2.]

In the Alaska Boundary dispute it was better to surrender just rights than to face an aggressive nationalism, raise up feuds and hatreds that would subsist for many a long day, and break a century of peace for what was, after all, a comparatively

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1. Skelton, op.cit. pp.158-159.
2. Dewey has this view, op.cit. Vol.i, p.204ff.

small matter. Today historians can examine such nationalism which prefers a lie to truth and prejudice to judgment, record its meanness and insanity, its blight upon democracy and its derogation from national virtue, and they can determine the moral balance, more to be desired than all the Klondike gold.

For a time immediately succeeding on the Alaska decision, a body of opinion in Canada headed by Dr Hodgkin studied Canadian history with the view that "British treaty gifts of Canadian territory commenced with the Treaty of Independence, 1782-1783,"[1] a view in which Mr Jebb in England and Mr Ewart in Canada concurred.

By 1907, however, the Canadian resentment died down. Professor Ganong expressed his view that Canada had really got more than her share in the Ashburton Treaty and the University Magazine ran a series of articles (1907-1909) justifying British diplomacy in relation to Canada. Dr Andrew Macphail studied the various diplomatic events, including the Alaska Boundary Award, and considered that "in no single instance was injustice done, nor were the interests of Canada jeopardized," a view supported by Judge Longley.[2]

It was probably this change in feeling that enabled Mr Bryce to beard the great colonial nationalist: "I will ask you," he said to Laurier, "to suspend your judgment upon all those questions in which it is alleged that British diplomacy has not done its best for you. In these matters you have only heard one side of the case; and I feel it is my duty to my country and to the Government I represent to tell you this, and that I

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1. Dudley Mills, British Diplomacy and Canada, U.E. Aug., 1910, Vol.1.
2. Ibid.

believe you are entirely mistaken if you think that British diplomacy has been indifferent to Canada or has not done the best it could for Canada."[1] This misses the point of the nationalist argument, which was, not that Britain had not done her best, but that she looked at things from a British or, as the Times called it, "Imperial" point of view, and that Canada could do better for herself - a most doubtful argument, for that time at any rate.

The famous despatch of Lord Ripon to the self-governing Colonies was intended to set boundaries to control expansion in treaty-making power on their part.[2] The Secretary of State for the Colonies endorsed the opinion of Sir Henry Wrixon that nations could only know one another through a supreme head, and that foreign nations must in consequence refer to Great Britain as the head of the Empire for any satisfaction of a grievance with a dependency. Further, a foreign Power could only be approached through Her Majesty's representative, any agreement entered into with it as affecting any part of Her Majesty's dominions was an agreement between Her Majesty and the Sovereign of the foreign State, and it was to Her Majesty's Government that the foreign State would apply in case of any question arising under it. To give the Colonies the power of negotiating Treaties for themselves without reference to Her Majesty's Government would be to give them an international status as separate and sovereign States, and would be equivalent to breaking up the Empire into a number of independent States. The negotiation, then, being between Her Majesty and the Sovereign of the foreign State must be conducted

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1. Dudley Mills, op.cit.
2. C.7824, June 28, 1895.

by Her Majesty's Representative at the Court of the foreign Power, who would keep Her Majesty's Government informed of the progress of the discussion, and seek instructions from them as necessity arose. It could hardly be expected, however, that he would be sufficiently cognisant of the circumstances and wishes of the Colony to enable him to conduct the negotiation satisfactorily alone, and it would be desirable generally, therefore, that he should have the assistance, either as a second Plenipotentiary or in a subordinate capacity, as Her Majesty's Government think the circumstances require, of a delegate appointed by the Colonial Government. If, as a result of the negotiations, any arrangement was arrived at, it must be approved by Her Majesty's Government and by the Colonial Government, and also by the Colonial Legislature if it involved legislative action, before the ratifications could be exchanged.

It was also expected that any concession made to any country by the treaty must be also extended to countries enjoying most-favoured-nation treatment; that any advantages conceded to a foreign State must also be secured to the British Empire; and that no advantage should be obtained from a foreign State that would operate against the welfare of any part of the Empire. These last conditions have been carefully observed.[1.]

In regard to the first requirements, limiting any effort of real independence on the part of the Dominions in negotiating treaties, there has been much debate. By the date of the despatch even public opinion had become quite satisfied with Colonial Governments taking part in negotiating treaties, and even desired that they should become more active in their dealings with foreign

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1. Vide Keith, Sovereignty of the British Dominions, pp.286-287.

States in order to counteract their insular tendencies in viewing international affairs.[1] Commenting upon the presence of Sir Louis Davies and Sir Wilfrid Laurier in Washington in 1898, the National Review gave no hint of alarm, but evinced decided pleasure.[2] "From the Imperial point of view," said the journal, "it emphasises the fact that Canada is imperium in imperio, or perhaps, more strictly speaking a Nation within an Empire."[3] There was much pleasure expressed over the mission of Mr Lemieux to Japan in 1907, and especially that Canada should have been so careful to safeguard British interests in her negotiations. As one commentator remarked, "Canada is now a developed nation, and can talk to the other nations of the world with an assured voice and almost on an equality with them. It is, therefore, a cheering sign of her sense of dignity and of reality that she should thus begin her career as a separate factor in the world by remembering that her strength and her honour are bound up with the strength and the honour of the Mother Country."[4] The Imperial Conference, as a medium for consultation on matters of foreign policy, gained some approval when the modification of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of alliance, worded that it would not apply when either of the allies was at war with a nation with which the other had made an Arbitration Treaty, seemed a direct outcome from that body, as linking British and Canadian interests.[5]

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1. ex. A. Colonial Chronicle, Nat. Rev., June 1898, Vol.31.
2. Nat. Rev., Jan. 1898, Vol.30, p.641.
3. A Colonial Chronicle, Nat. Rev., Feb. 1898, Vol.30, Vide also, Hon. J.W. Longley, Sir Wilfrid Laurier at Washington, Nat.Rev., Feb.1898, Vol.30; A Colonial Chronicle, Nat. Rev., May 1898, Vol.31.
4. The Times, Jan.23, 1908. Similarly Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp.295-296. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.i, pp.288-299.
5. The Times, July 13, 1911.

When Mr Mackenzie King was sent from Canada to London to discuss Oriental immigration with the British Government the Times expressed pleasure at the event since it went to show the destiny of the Empire in regard to foreign affairs as that of co-operation: "We welcomed the association of Mr Lemieux with Sir Claude MacDonald at Tokyo, and we rejoice at this renewed exhibition of the right spirit of co-operation in problems affecting the Mother Country and the Dominions. We may further hope, now that Canada has taken the lead in this method of conducting affairs which interest more than one part of the Empire, that the newly formed Imperial Secretariat at the Colonial Office will encourage the unrivalled means of communication which it has in its power, and develop this domestic diplomacy, as it may be called, which was the chief reason for its creation."[1.]

Is one to accept, then, the view that is generally taken, that Ripon's despatch constituted a reaction in the growth of Dominion autonomy and indicated an obscurantist attitude on the part of the British Government?[2.] Mr Porritt surely places too much emphasis upon the affirmative reply, stating that had "Tupper continued as High Commissioner in London...Chamberlain..would surely have had to withdraw the Ripon circular or become involved in a controversy with Tupper, and through Tupper with the Cabinet at Ottawa and probably with the Dominion Parliament."[3.] He,himself, observes that Canada had quite satisfactory representation given her in the negotiations of 1898 with the United States.[4.]

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1. The Times, March 20, 1908.
2. Philip Noel Baker, The British Dominions in International Law, p.44, p.63; Dewey, op.cit. pp.164-165; Corbett and Smith, op.cit. p.51; these writers adopt the view stated.
3. Porritt, op.cit. p.198.
4. Ibid, p.200.

Mr Porritt, examining the Franco-Canadian Treaty of 1907, finds that Lord Ripon's despatch was ignored, or rather, superseded. On this occasion Lord Grey sent a despatch to the British representative at Rome and Paris quoting from Ripon's despatch "in which," said Lord Grey, "it was laid down that commercial negotiations of this nature being between His Majesty and the Sovereign of the Foreign State should be conducted by His Majesty's Representative at the Court of the Foreign Power.... I do not think it necessary to adhere in the present case to the strict letter of this regulation, the object of which was to secure that negotiations should not be entered into and carried through by a Colony unknown to and independently of His Majesty's Government."[1.]

One fails to understand how this language confirms Mr Porritt's view that "the instructions of 1895 were recalled in 1907 only that, in practice, an end might be made to them."[2.] Lord Grey states that "the object" of Ripon's despatch was secured; full powers were issued to the Canadian Ministers by the British Foreign Office; the Treaty was signed jointly by the British Ambassador and the Canadian representatives; and it was ratified, after careful scrutiny by the British Board of Trade, by the King acting on the advice of his British Ministers.[3.] Lord Ripon had suggested a Colonial delegate and he had made a clear distinction

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1. Parl. Pap. H.C. 129, July 4, 1907, p.9.
2. Porritt, op.cit., p.201.
3. Baker, op.cit. pp,44-45. Mr Baker seems to think that only one Canadian Minister took part in the negotiations and signed the Treaty, while Mr Porritt seems to be of opinion that Sir Wilfrid Laurier also took part and signed it. It was signed by Sir Francis Bertie and Messrs Fielding and Brodeur, the last two representing Canada. Sir Wilfrid was neither a negotiator nor a signatory. Vide Cd.3823.

between a delegate who might be a "second Plenipotentiary" and one who might act "in a subordinate capacity." One fails to find negotiations conducted where the British representative was far from the elbow of the Colonial delegate.

Professor Keith remarks that the essential principle enunciated by Ripon was secured,[1] and that "signature was only authorised after careful scrutiny had satisfied the Imperial Government that the principles of 1895 had been fully adhered to. The change in the manner of negotiation was claimed, erroneously, as a great advance in the freedom of Dominion negotiatoon; in point of fact, the actual course adopted had been foreshadowed in the case of Sir Charles Tupper's projected negotiation with Spain in 1884 and had been followed in principle in 1893."[2]

Mr Dewey, in an exuberant moment, reflects that "the negotiations of 1907-1909...mark the definite recognition by the British Government of full political autonomy, within the bounds of constitutional unity, in commercial treaty-making by the Dominions,"[3] a dubious statement, indeed, in view of the control exercised by the British Government and the fact that their representative was a signatory. It could be said in 1912 that "in no case has Canada concluded a treaty with a foreign Power direct."[4]

It may be observed, nevertheless, that there had been a departure from Ripon's despatch in spirit if not in letter. The Canadian delegates did not suffer the position of inferiority that is included in the connotation of the 1895 statement of their position. Canada had won the right to control the

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1. Sovereignty of the British Dominions, pp.285-286.
2. The Constitution, Administration, and Laws of the Empire, p.65.
3. Dewey, op.cit. p.165.
4. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.iii, p.1119.

negotiation of her own commercial treaties and in so doing had become, as Mr J. Castell Hopkins remarked, "a sort of national partner in the Empire."[1] Schooldays were passing rapidly for the Dominion. Laurier, probably with his eye on his electorate, was jubilant: "We have had to come to a decision whether in our relations with foreign countries it would not be better to manage them ourselves rather than entrust them to the Ministers of Great Britain. This long-looked for reform has at last come to a living reality, and only within the last week or so a treaty has been concluded between France and Canada which has been conducted by Canadians alone."[2]

It has been suggested that there was a good deal ofsympathy with the desire of the Dominions for a fuller national life. Mr Amery produced the cliché, so hackneyed in modern ears, that, "The merest farm labourer in England has a direct say in deciding questions vitally affecting Canada and the Empire as a whole which is denied to the Prime Minister of the great Dominion." The citizen of the Dominion "possesses only a mangled and emasculated citizenship; his political horizon is bounded by a Colonial horizon."[3] Dominion statesmen may disagree with the means the Imperialists would have taken to relieve them of their disabilities, but they must admit a debt to those who taught them to be discontented with their lot, and who prepared British public opinion to accept a change in the status of the Dominions, Regarding Mr Amery's argument, one may recall the criticism of

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1. Quoted, Dewey, op.cit. p.212.
2. The Times, Oct.11, 1907. Statements by Fielding and Brodeur were much more restrained: The Times, Oct. 7, 1907.
3. Amery, Union and Strength, p.25.

Professor Keith against the same statement in another connection, that if the Dominion Prime Minister had no voice in Imperial policy, it was not because he did not have a vote in the United Kingdom, but because his Dominion did not desire to take any interest in Imperial policy.[1] Laurier in 1911, and Fisher in 1912, refused to take a more active part in Imperial Foreign policy.

Not all British opinion viewed complacently the emergence of the Dominions into treaty-making powers. A series of informal commercial negotiations were carried on by Canada as to tariff concessions with Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States during 1910. The Morning Post noted that, while the British Government were presumably keeping watch over the negotiations with the United States, at one stage they had to confess that they were without knowledge of important developments which had been reported in the press, and the London paper expressed its grave conern.[2] The Earl of Crewe protested against the idea of the different parts of the Empire acting thus independently in foreign affairs, warning his audience that it was possible "to march towards the fatal goal of separation down the road of sympathy almost as fast as down the road of indifference."[3]

In the case of the French treaties of 1907 and 1909, Professor Keith contradicts the statement of Mr Balfour in the House of Commons, and holds that the British Government exercised full control, carefully scrutinizing the terms prior to signature and ratification.[4] In 1911, however, Canada attempted to negotiate

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1. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.ii, p.1162.
2. Morning Post, June 21, 1910.
3. U.E. Vol.i. p.277. Mar.15, 1910.
4. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.ii, p.858; H.C. Debs., 21 July, 1910. Vol.xix, p.1460.

a reciprocity arrangement with the United States. Had these negotiations been accepted by Parliament and put into action they would have accorded treatment to Canadian products not extended to the rest of the Empire, and on this ground the proposed arrangement has been criticised as disruptive to the Empire.[1.] President Taft also raised a storm among patriotic Canadians and Imperialists in Britain by suggesting that economic understanding might pave the way to political unity,[2.] which doubtless had much to do with the Liberal defeat at the polls in the election of 1911.

Nevertheless there was no alteration of the principle that the whole course of the negotiations should be carried on under the supervision of the British Government. Sir Robert Borden criticises as "probably unfounded" Professor Keith's statement that Mr Bryce assisted in the negotiations.[3.] Asquith, noted for his niceness of language, told the House of Commons that: "Conclusions of the various stages were carefully watched by our British Ambassador, who was in constant communication with the Canadian negotiators, and who very properly kept his eyes on the special interests of British trade."[4.] Sir Edward Grey replied

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1. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.294; Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.289; Responsible Government, Vol.ii, pp.857-858.
2. Egerton, British Colonial Policy in the Twentiety Century, p.88ff; Skelton, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Vol.ii, p.375.
3. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.iii, p.1149; Borden Canadian Constitutional studies, p.84. In later works Professor Keith has given the Ambassador a very unimportant role: Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.289: "The agreement was concluded without the intervention of the Imperial Government save in so far as the Ambassador presented the Canadian Ministers to the Secretary of State." Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.ii,p, 858: "The Imperial Government never was in a position to intervene successfully." Imperial Unity and the Dominions,p.273: "It is obvious that Mr Bryce was in the very difficult position of being unable effectively to control negotiations carried on by the United States Government..." This last statement antedating the publication of Sir Robert Borden's book by six years.
4. H.C. Debates, 9 Feb. 1911, Vol.21, p.470.

to a question as to whether, in view of the fact that Canada had rejected reciprocity with the United States and, "in view of the fact that Mr Bryce had assisted in making the late proposed reciprocity treaty with the United States, he had given or would give Mr Bryce instruction not again to render assistance in the negotiation of a similar treaty": "No, Sir. The instructions given to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington from time to time in matters concerning Canada will be to give assistance to the Canadian Government...Mr Bryce will have every opportunity of assisting the Canadian Government on the day when they require his assistance."[1.]

One may conclude that practically - for Asquith and Grey said nothing to have denied it - the British Ambassador did occupy a mere "titular place",[2.] but that opinion in the United Kingdom regarded him as a powerful agent throughout, and this is especially evident in the criticism that was levelled at him for the negotiating of the agreement.

In another direction the Dominions had gained freedon with regard to commercial treaties. The British Government had, previously to the denunciation of the offending German and Belgian treaties, adopted the policy of providing for the optional exclusion of the Colonies and, as a result of protests, particularly by Sir Wilfrid Laurier at the Conferences of 1902 and 1907, the complementary right of optional with drawal was also obtained.[3.]

At the Conference of 1911 Laurier supported the Australian representatives in urging that the Dominions be allowed to

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1. H.C. Debs., 31 Oct. 1911, Vol.30, p.687.
2. Dewey, op.cit. pp.164-165.
3. Cd.3523, pp.467-468 and pp.483-484.

withdraw, not only from future treaties, but from treaties already in operation which exacted most-favoured-nation treatment.[1] Sir Wilfrid read from an article in the Times of June 7, condemning his resolution on the ground that it conflicted with the policy of Lord Salisbury's Government in 1897 which had been to maintain the principle of the commercial unity of the Empire, whereas the denunciation of the existing most-favoured-nation treaties, even if followed by their resumption on terms allowing Canada or any other Dominion to stand out when it so desired, could only have the gravest results.[2] When Laurier gained his point the Times bowed to the inevitable, stating that the right of the Dominions to withdraw was a necessary step in view of the facts, "but let us not be asked to pretend that the movement will promote Imperial union", it continued. In all its relations with foreign Powers the British Empire was regarded as a commercial unit. The maintenance of this unity might be safeguarded to some extent by Sir Wilfrid Laurier's third principlec- that no Dominion should give advantage to foreign Powers which it did not extend to the Empire as a whole. Foreign Powers, however, would be guided in their dealings with the British Empire more by the action which its different Governments took than by the principles which they proclaimed; and if those Governments proceeded to elaborate entirely separate systems of commercial treaties, it would not be long before their foreign friends were able to make the maintenance of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's principle quite as inconvenient as the most-favoured-nation treaties were at that

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1. Cd.5745, p.134ff.
2, Ibid, p.334.

time. The treaties with Germany and Belgium were denounced because they had a separatist tendency which distinguished them from the others, in that they had special clauses which prevented the grant of preference by the Dominions to the Mother Country. Their denunciation was consequently a step to closer union. But there was not such special inconvenience in the twelve most-favoured-nation treaties against which Laurier's resolution was aimed. These could not be denounced without accentuating the existing tendency towards commercial disintegration, with its inevitable reaction both upon Imperial relations and upon the joint relation of the Empire to foreign Powers.[1.]

Laurier contended that the principle of fiscal diversity had been established long ago and that each nation should make treaties to suit its own requirements.[2.] Sir Edward Grey was quite in accord with Laurier's point of view,[3,] nor does his attitude seem to have caused any alarm among British authorities on Imperial relations.[4.] The British Government seemed desirous to co-operate with the Dominions wherever they might do so without too great a sacrifice of the principle of Imperial unity.

Because of this accommodating spirit the somewhat unnatural division between commercial and political treaties was easily effected, fortunately for the internal harmony of the Empire. Professor Keith in 1912 gave the following synthesis of the condition then obtaining and of British opinion thereon: "In political matters proper there has been no attempt to obtain separate powers

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1. The Times, June 19, 1911.
2. Cd. 5745, p.335.
3. Ibid, p.336ff.
4. Vide Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.iii, pp.1517-1519.

of adherence or withdrawal for the Dominions, and it is clear that such an attempt would be meaningless. It is impossible, so long as the Empire retains any unity, for one part to be treated in political questions differently from another part, and the separate adherence to and withdrawal from treaties is only possible as in commercial treaties, where a differentiation of treatment could be based upon a differentiation of locality. This remains true even in the most recent treaties, and in this case also the practice of consulting the Colonies has not yet been introduced save within somewhat narrow limits.[1.]

The right of the Imperial Government to make and interpret treaties without full reference to the Dominions had not gone unchallenged. Sir Robert Bond protested bitterly at the Conference of 1907 against the action of the British Government, who invoked an 1819 Statute to override Newfoundland Acts containing provisions against American fishermen, in endeavouring to enforce a <u>modus vivendi</u> with the United States.[2.]

It should be observed that aside from Newfoundland there was no objection to the action of the Imperial Parliament; that the other Dominions agreed with the necessity of the action taken; and that <u>the Times</u>, jealous for Colonial rights though it was, nevertheless approved.[3.] When Mr Jebb objected it was not on the grounds of the justice of the action, for "it is difficult Imperially to defend Sir Robert Bond's American policy," but because "with Mr Churchill serving Lord Elgin at the Colonial Office,

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1. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.iii, p.1111.
2. Cd. 3523, p.587ff.
3. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp.285-286.

the administration of the Liberal Government was shortsighted, tactless, and overbearing."[1.]

The Imperial Government also had some friction with the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, who called in question the policy of the Home authorities in the Pacific, suggested that the advice of the Dominions should have carried more weight, and that British interests in respect of Samoa and the New Hebrides could have been more effectively secured.[2.] Lyttelton successfully denied these allegations,[3.] and his successor quoted him when Mr Deakin, during the period of the 1906 Convention in London to deal with the position of the New Hebrides by establishing a condominium recognising the equal rights of the French and British Governments; declaimed, "The people of Australia and New Zealand feel that it is entirely due to the inaction of the Imperial Government that this step (the annexation of the New Hebrides) was not taken many years ago."[4.] It was pointed out in reply that great acquisitions had been made in the Pacific mainly - and sometimes entirely - in deference to Australian and New Zealand interests and sentiments.

The retort of Mr Deakin at the Conference of 1907 was not very powerful: "But for the action of Australia and New Zealand there would not be an island today in the Pacific under theBritish flag."[5.] Had Australia the right to determine the expansion and policy of the United Kingdom? Of course, Australia could have replied that the Commonwealth did not have the power to act

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1. Jebb, The Imperial Conference, Vol.2. p.273.
2. Responsible Government, (1912) Vol.iii, p.1136.
3. Cd. 3288, p.64.
4. Ibid, p.38. For reply of Secretary of State for the Colonies, p.53.
5. Cd. 3523, p.549.

for herself in the matter and of necessity relied upon British initiative. The Australian grievance, however, lay for the most part in the fact that the British Government had allowed its action to be determined by misinformation as to the situation, had delayed answering despatches, and failed to advise or consult the Australian Government as to its proposals at the Convention with France, and, said Mr Deakin, "except for the information conveyed to us by ordinary newspaper cables, we were still unaware of its existence and of its character."[1]

In these protests are adumbrated the post-war demands for fuller consultation by the Dominions. Nor had the British Government been deaf to such requests, and had made provision on several occasions to meet the desires of the Dominions.[2] Even Newfoundland found sympathy at London, and co-operated in arranging a modus vivendi for 1908.[3]

Mr Jebb hailed the appeals of the Dominions' Prime Ministers to the Conference as appeals of "a peer to his peers," an appeal from the Government of the United Kingdom to a supreme Imperial body,[4] and Mr Dewey agrees with this view.[5] Although the interpretation is an interesting one, these writers are inclined to attach too much significance to the event. It is much more the case of two angry colonies taking their opportunity of venting their spleen. There is little suggestion of the Imperial Government adapting the Conference to the uses of a tribunal or arbitral body, and Laurier certainly had no wish for anything

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1. Cd. 3523, p.554.
2. Imperial Unity, pp.286-287.
3. Cd. 4528: 4815.
4. Jebb, op.cit. p.273.
5. Dewey, op.cit. p.282.

of the sort. He would never accept the Conference as a tribunal or council, and local Australian or Newfoundland troubles were no matter for his interference. Botha was of a similar opinion.

In the arbitration treaty of 1908 with the United States, the Imperial Government reserved the right, before accepting an agreement for reference to arbitration in the case of any matter affecting the interests of a self-governing Dominion, to obtain the concurrence of that Dominion in the agreement.[1] In the Pecuniary Claims Treaty of 1910, and a Treaty of 1914 to establish a Peace Commission to consider questions in dispute between the two Governments, the same principle was adopted, and it was provided that if a Dominion were affected it would have a representative on the Commission.[2] Thus were further roads made to the goal of Dominion individuality.

In the Conference for the Revision of the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the paramount authority of the British Parliament was ensured by a provision that, "The contracting parties have the right of acceding to the present Convention at any time on behalf of their Colonies, Possessions, Dependencies, and Protectorates or of any of them. For this purpose they may make a general declaration including all their Colonies, Possession, Dependencies, and Protectorates in the accession, or may expressly name those included or may confine themselves to indicating those which are excluded therefrom."[3] Taking advantage of the Article a statement was inserted

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1. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.287.
2. Ibid, pp.287-288; Cd.5803; Cd.7714.
3. Cd.5842, p.111, Art.xvi.

to give the Dominions separate representation and vote, so that their independence was asserted at the same time.[1]

The matter of the Declaration of London brought up the question of Dominion representation at international conventions regarding war and peace. The Dominions had long enjoyed a position at business conferences, as those on postal and telegraphic matters, and in 1883 at an international congress in Paris regarding the protection of submarine cables Sir Charles Tupper had opposed his views to those of the other British delegates.[2]

At the Conference of 1911 a resolution was moved by Mr Fisher regretting that the Dominions were not consulted prior to the acceptance by the British delegates of the terms of the Declaration of London.[3] Mr Fisher contended that it was not enough that the Dominions be consulted even after a good treaty affecting the Dominions had been made, when they were merely told that it was completed. Mr Batchelor joined him in pointing out that the Dominions should be consulted in arriving at any agreement affecting their interests, and, since many of the signatories of the Declaration of London had less interest than Australia, therein, this was such an occasion.

Sir Edward Grey justified the British Government on the ground that the failure to consult the Dominions issued from the fact that they had not been consulted regarding the Hague Conferences of 1899 or 1907 out of which the Declaration arose, nor had they requested such consultation. He was quite willing that the

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1. Cd.5842 op.cit. p.100 and p.123.
2. Tupper, op.cit. p.175.
3. Cd.5745, p.97ff.

Dominions be represented at future Hague Conferences, and their appearance should be as early as the inter-departmental conference where instructions were drawn up for delegates.[1.]

Sir Wilfrid Laurier then revealed to his British audience more of his Imperial philosophy.[2.] In regard to treaties of amity which had to do with war, he thought the British Government would be seriously embarassed in diplomatic negotiations if forced to obtain advice from the Dominions before their conclusion. Moreover, the United Kingdom could not undertake to carry out any advice given unless the Dominion giving the advice was prepared to back it with all her strength and be involved in the consequences. Canada, however, had decided that she was not bound to take part in every war and so the negotiations of these regulations should be left to "the chief partner of the family, the one who has to bear the burden in part on some occasions, and the whole burden on perhaps other occasions."[3.] This is a curious statement of partnership: upon Britain would fall the full weight of a mistake in diplomacy or judgment; she would have to make her decisions when the heat of argument and retort was present to sway the verdict; she would carry the responsibility. Canada, apart from all but the broad outlines of the quarrel, would make her decision, joining if the cause were considered just. It is not surprising that many Englishmen - since Laurier admitted partnership ;- could not see why Canada should not take part in the preliminary diplomacy and there determine the justice

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1. Cd.5745 p.114.
2. Ibid, p.116ff.
3. Ibid, p.117.

of the cause. Post-mortem diplomacy differs considerably from that of the heat of the moment. Another point that might be made is that, when criticising British statesmen for any reluctance to allow the Dominions full representation in concluding the Peace Treaties that followed the War, it should be remembered that Laurier objected to participation in Conferences greatly similar. It was not then considered, however, that Dominion representatives should be included among the number of British representatives appointed as plenipotentiaries.[1.]

As a result of Laurier's position, a modified resolution was adopted which did not involve an absolute right of consultation and therefore no absolute obligation. Professor Keith comments that the attitude of Canada was "no doubt the only possible attitude", but it prevented any real partnership in the foreign policy of the Empire for the present. "Still," he concluded, "the acceptance of the principle of consultation in such a case as the Declaration of London is a real step in advance without any exact parallel."[2.]

Until 1911 there was no serious indication that the Dominions could have any effective voice in the control of the foreign affairs of the Empire. They were far removed from the diplomatic centres and the immediate and likely theatres of war. Despite the fine words with which Mr Asquith addressed the Conference of 1911, wherein he declared the idea of the Governments there represented to be, "Local autonomy - absolute, unfettered, complete - with loyalty to a common head, co-operation, spontaneous and unforced, for common interests and purposes, and... a common

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1. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.289.
2. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.iii, p.1554.

trusteeship...of the interests and fortunes of fellow subjects who have not yet attained, or perhaps in some cases may never attain, to the full stature of self-government,"[1] he did not conceive his brave harangue as having literal effect any more than Laurier when he spoke of partnership. The very next day Mr Asquith informed Sir Joseph Ward that the authority of the United Kingdom in such grave matters as the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, and like matters, must not be impaired: "That authority cannot be shared."[2]

It is quite clear that the Imperial Government was paramount in all matters of High Policy, nor was it anticipated that the Dominions could be other than subordinates. Mr Dewey says that Laurier took the position of demanding separate foreigh policies for the Dominions.[3] There is no reference to an authority for this statement, and Laurier's remarks at the 1911 Conference show that he was quite cognizant that Canada, as a non-sovereign power, had no right to an independent policy. Laurier was as well aware as anyone of the value of the British Navy to Canada and its powers of moral suasion in diplomacy: He consequently kept his ambitions in bound. He must have been aware of what every statesman in Britain believed, and what Oppenheim in 1912 bluntly declared to be the truth: "Colonial States, such as the Dominions of Canada or the Commonwealth of Australia...have no international position whatever; they are, from the standpoint of the Law of Nations, nothing else than colonial portions of the Mother Country,although they enjoy perfect self-government, and may therefore in a sense

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1. Cd. 5745, p.22.
2. Ibid, p.71.
3. Dewey, op.cit. p.291.

be called States. The deciding factor is that their Governor, who has a veto, is appointed by the Mother Country, and that the Parliament of the Mother Country could withdraw self-government from its Colonial States and legislate directly for them."[1.]

The Laurier Government, in 1910-1911, began a method of indirect negotiation with foreign governments through the medium of the consuls of those Powers, and there was a proposal raised in the Canadian House that consular officers of the great Powers be given a quasi-diplomatic rank and recognition, a proposal regarding which the Prime Minister was non-committal.[2.] As the contact thus established was independent of the British Foreign Office and the supervision of its Ambassadors, there was some danger to the unity of policy. The tendency also occasioned alarm in Britain as leading to a demand for the regular diplomatic representation of the Foreign Powers at Ottawa, and of Canada at foreign capitals.[3.]

Professor Keith noted the inefficiency of the method - the need in all important matters to get into direct touch with responsible ministers in the foreign countries concerned, and only thus, when they acted "formally and under the control in the long run of the Imperial Government," could the Canadian Government have any security that Imperial interests were not being injured, He also pointed to the fact that intervention of the United Kingdom was essential to the Dominions obtaining the very best terms.[4.]

The Conference of 1911 has been hailed as a landmark in the history of the British Commonwealth, because it was there that

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1. L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol.i, p.110. So, too, Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.iii, p.1132.
2. Keith, Imperial Unity of the Dominions, p,294.
3. Jebb, The Britannic Question, p.182.
4. Imperial Unity, pp.295-296.

Sir Edward Grey took the Dominions into his confidence regarding the condition of foreign relations, but there are two facts which must qualify enthusiasm for this event. In the first place, he merely made a statement and he did not seek advice or give any intimation that he was initiating a policy of consultation. In the second place, it is clear that to the Dominions in time past, notably on the occasion of the Defence Conference of 1909, the Imperial Government must have explained the rough outlines of the tendencies in foreign affairs. Yet the occasion of 1911 must be regarded as important as the first occasion wherein the British Government gave a full exposition of the foreign policy of the Empire from the Foreign Secretary.[1.]

A new force came into Imperial relations in 1911, with Mr (later Sir) Robert Borden replacing Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and the British attitude to Dominion participation in foreign affairs was modified not a little. The new Canadian Prime Minister took up the complementary position to that assumed by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at the Conference of 1907, when the latter had declared that, "the cost of naval defence and the responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs hang together."[2.] Borden proceeded to demand,- as a corollary to Canadian assistance in naval defence - a corresponding control of the policy controlling peace and war. "I would like you to remember," he said at a Royal Colonial Institute banquet, "that those who are or who became responsible for the Empire must, in the very nature of things, have some voice in that policy which shapes the issues of peace

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1. Vide Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.iii, pp. 1552-1553.
2. Cd. 3523, p.5.

and of war. I would like you to understand that Canada does not propose to be 'an adjunct' even of the British Empire, but...to be a great part in a greater whole."[1.]

When Borden returned to Canada he reiterated his view that, if the Dominions shared the defence of the Empire, they must share also the responsibility for, and the control of, foreign policy, and added the comment that during his visit to Great Britain no statement that he had made had received a more cordial acceptance than that.[2.] A clamour had been set up, indeed, in Britain demanding that the members of the Empire co-operate in foreign affairs. Certain men took Asquith's declaration to the 1911 Conference to mean that there was no choice between the non-participation of the Dominions in foreign affairs and the control of defence and the accomplishment of a federation,[3.] which gave impetus to the desire to federate the Empire, the nucleus of which constituted the group known as the Round Table. They reasoned, "It is simply impossible for the Dominions to set up independent foreign policites and independent systems of their own without destroying the Empire...Obviously the principle of local autonomy, admirably as it works for the internal politics of the Empire, cannot be applied to foreign affairs. The Empire will infallibly disappear if any one of its five governments can involve it in war...either the Empire must agree to co-operate for foreign policy and defence, or they must agree to dissolve the Empire and each assume the responsibility for its own policy and its own defence. There is not halfway house between the two positions...[4.] The present position cannot continue."

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1. U.E. Aug. 1912, Vol.3, pp.643-644.
2. The Times, Dec.6, 1912.
3. Imperial Unity, p.509.
4. The New Problem of Imperial Defence, R.T., May 1911, Vol.i.

The writer in the Round Table - one would like to know his identity for the article was a provocative one - was stating elementary truths, dimly perceived in the early Imperial Federation movement, but for the first time being faced by the rulers of the Empire. When Borden put forth his ultimatum much airy thinking was crystallised. Sir Joseph Ward had argued, much after Borden's fashion, before, but New Zealand was too Imperial to cause any great attention to be paid to her Prime Minister. Sir Joseph had on one occasion given utterance to his opinion as follows: "Fifteen millions have no voice whatever in questions of foreign policy; no voice whatever in the maintenance, protection, and control of the Navy; no voice whatever in the all-important question of Peace or War. While these peoples oversea are being disenfranchised in this way you have not, and you will never have, a basis of a true Imperial system."[1.] But when a Dominion of strong nationalist sentiment, who had been importuned for so long to become a partner in Imperial defence, now spoke of any possibility of such an occurrence, it were well to pay attention. Moreover, the need was increasingly greater for Canadian assistance.

Borden's stimulus to co-operation in foreign policy received much support in Great Britain. It now clearly appeared that responsible government meant that action vital to national interests must take their authority and character from the national will, and that the British Government, in no wise responsible to the electorate of the Dominions, must no longer hope to direct the national destinies of those great peoples. The Great European

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1. Sir Joseph Ward, A Higher and Truer Imperialism, U.E. Aug.1911, Vol.ii.

Powers were no longer far away from the Dominions; Germany was close to South Africa; the United States and Japan shadowed Australia and New Zealand; Canada had had a tariff war with Germany and conducted commercial negotiations with Great Powers. The Dominions must be heard in foreign policy: the conception of this truth was forcing itself upon the official consciousness of Downing Street. Mr Asquith found it advisable to minimise - probably quite genuinely interpreting the intention of his words - the position he had taken at the Imperial Conference. "I was dealing with a specific proposal made by Sir Joseph Ward for the creation of an Imperial Council", said the Prime Minister. "My language had reference to that, and to that alone. I never said anything to countenance the idea that the Colonies should not be brought into closer touch with us, and should not be entitled to be heard with regard to Imperial defence."[1.]

A proposal that found much favour with publicists was that the services of the Imperial diplomatic and consular officers should not only be placed at the disposal of the Dominion Governments, but should in part be composed of their representatives, thus avoiding the tortuous passage of communications between such Governments and the foreign representatives of the Crown through the Colonies and Foreign Offices and the Dominion High Commissioners in London - a procedure still obtaining in theory. To many it seemed that Canada, who understood the psychology of the United States, would provide much better negotiators there than the United Kingdom.

It was suggested, in connection with this idea, that the diplomatic services be open to citizens of the Dominions equally

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1. H.C. Debs., 25 July, 1912, Vol.41, p.1415.

with people of the Mother Country, thus doing away with the regulations-which provided that candidates for entrance by examination must be British subjects born within the United Kingdom, whose parents likewise must have been British, and that the appointments be in the hands of a "Secretary of State in Council", such Council to consist of the Agents-General for the daughter-nations, the Secretary of State for India, and possibly the Secretaries of State for Ireland and Scotland.[1.] Mr Amery was one of those who considered it quite unfair that the administrative service of the Empire should be a preserve for the inhabitants of the British Isles, and the Dominions would always have to hand the accusation that it was quite true that the United Kingdom carried almost the whole burden of the Empire, but it was also quite true that she reaped all the benefits.[2.] It appears that some such proposal that attachés drawn from the Dominions be placed on the staffs of British embassies had been discussed in the Canadian Parliament, but the leading statesmen had opposed the idea.[3.] It was also suggested that a distinguished Dominion statesman might hold the position of His Majesty's representative at some foreign Court. Only by such a policy could the United Kingdom forestall a demand by the Dominions for their own consular services, so it was argued.[4.]

Of course, it was incorrect to say that the Dominions, while not paying to the cost of consular services, reaped no benefit therefrom. While Lord Bryce was at Washington he negotiated

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1. Sir Harry Johnston, Commonsense in Foreign Policy, pp.102-103.
2. L.S. Amery, Union and Strength, p.27.
3. E. Morris Miller, Dominion Interests in Imperial Administration, p.7.
4. Charles E.T. Stuart-Linton, The Problem of Empire Governance, pp.215-216.

many treaties in the interests of the Canadian Government and made periodical visits to Ottawa, a practice followed by his successors.[1] He stated on one occasion that at least two-thirds of the business at the Washington Embassy was conducted on behalf of Canada.[2] Lord Harcourt confirmed an arrangement made in 1912 to place the Imperial consular officers at the disposal of Canada,[3] but, commented a Round Table contributor, this only confirms existing custom by which Dominion or Colonial Governments, or private persons residing in their territories having interests which demand frequent touch with a foreign country or with the commercial firms in such a country, those Governments or persons always entered into direct communication with the Imperial diplomatic and consular officers in that country, "and the mysterious alchemy by which the requests of Dominion Government are transmitted in the laboratory of the Foreign Office into 'instructions' has been, and will be, discarded."[4]

Thus, although the idea of co-operation found much support in Great Britain, the idea of a "friendly alliance", as one gentleman put it, in which Britain could not control certain matters of general policy, found much less support. What value, this same writer enquired, would such an association be in which she had no authority or ~~less~~ direct benefit? Communities "must grow up and have their own establishments," but "the fact remains that the line must be drawn between independence and ingratitude."

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1. Borden, op.cit. p.85, pp.154-155.
2. R.M. Barrington-Ward, The Foreign Office and Its Agencies, The Oxford Survey of the British Empire, p.84.
3. H.C. Debs., May 8, 1913, Vol.52, p.2262.
4. Downing Street, R.T., Sept. 1913, Vol.3, p.600.

If "these developments of somewhat arrogant independence grow" the basis of the Empire would have to rest upon its other possessions.[1]

To sum up, what was the general opinion as to the position of the Dominions before the War? Mr Barrington-Ward noted that there had been a tendency to allow the Dominions considerable latitude in matters directly concerning them and thus Canada had negotiated treaties with France and other countries, and placed her own restrictions on Oriental immigration: "But, though Canada has taken this course, it has not been one of complete independence, her action having had the previous sanction of the British Government, and thus being equivalent to the measure of independence exercised at times by a Crown colony under a like supervision."[2] Nor had he any thought that the control of foreign affairs could pass from the control of the United Kingdom. While the Foreign Office was more amenable to Dominion desires, and consequently Britain did not claim or exercise the same absolute control of relations with foreign Powers in all parts of the globe as was the case in the early half of the nineteenth century - since "the 'colonies' or 'dependencies' of that period have become the 'dominions' of this, and there has been a corresponding, if vague and indefinite, increase of participation by the latter in imperial affairs and policy." Conversely, the Britannic Empire remains for diplomatic purposes a single State, and the Imperial Government retains the power to control the action of a dominion where such action conflicts with the interests or policy of the Empire as a whole. This power was exercised in 1911, in the

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1. C. R. Enock, An Imperial Commonwealth, p.235.
2. Barrington-Ward, op.cit., pp.81-82.

case of the Shipping Act passed by the New Zealand Parliament,.. In this power lies the guarantee of unity that enables the Powers to treat with the Foreign Office as the dependable representative of the whole Empire; it is the safeguard of the loyal observance of agreements entered into by the British Ministry, acting for the Dominions as well. In point of fact the central control thus exercised is not questioned as regards the bulk of the business of foreign policy. That policy is left by the other Britannic governments as a matter to be cared for chiefly by the Home Government, and there is no disposition to doubt its authority in dealing with problems of alliances, ententes, and international groupings which may affect the 'balance of power'...The responsibility for the foreign policy of Britain, and so of the British Empire, is thus mainly entrusted to the Foreign Secretary in London, who in his turn is controlled by the British Parliament, which is directly responsible to the people of the United Kingdom."[1.]

Professor Dicey made it clear that the Dominion Parliaments were to be considered subordinate bodies, with self-government limited to local affairs. They must not be permitted to do anything that conflicted with loyalty to the Empire; of Imperial interests the Imperial Parliament was the guardian.[2.] The authority to make treaties, except where expressly allowed by Act of Parliament, was not possessed by a Colonial Government.[3.]

Professor Lowell gathered up the general opinion into language that was quoted approvingly in Great Britain: "The actual

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1. Barrington Ward, op.cit. pp.84-85.
2. Dicey, op.cit. pp.xxix-xxxii.
3. Ibid, p.115.

relation of the United Kingdom to her self-governing colonies may not be easy to classify in the terms ordinarily used by publicists. But whether these colonies are dependencies or members of a confederation, whether sovereignty is really lodged in Parliament or divided, there is no doubt that as regards foreign nations the British Empire is treated as a single Power, and that Power is England. Diplomats are appointed, negotiations are conducted, and treaties are made on the advice of the English Ministers. In order, however, to satisfy local opinion it is the habit, when a really important question arises, between Canada and the United States, for example, to appoint a commission containing colonial members. But the situation is wholly comfortable, and in fact the position of Canada is a little like that of a boy at school with a big brother. The state of the self-governing colonies in regard to foreign relations would no doubt be a much more difficult one, and give rise to no little friction, were it not that their remoteness saves them to a great extent from complications with other countries."[1.]

If one reviews the situation that existed concerning the relations of the Dominions and foreign powers, it would be a mistake to say that the Dominions had no control of foreign policy prior to the War. In the Australian immigration policy

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1. Lowell, The Government of England, Vol.ii, pp.405-406. Vide T. J. Laurence, The Colonies in International Law, King's College Lectures, 1913, ed. F.J.C. Hearnshaw, p.11: "For the purposes of the International Society the British Empire, and not the United Kingdom,,..is the unit." Anson, The Law and Custom of the Constitution, Vol.ii, p.75: The Colonies, however complete may be their general measure of self-government, are a part of the British Empire, and are dependent upon it."

which called for Asiatic exclusion, injudicious handling or lack of tact could bring about war. Canada's tariff war with Germany proved the bitterness that could arise through Dominion control of commercial policy, and control over their fleets - even under the restrictions imposed by British legislation - would force the Dominions into the aegis of foreign policy. Certainly they possessed much of the substance, if not the formalities, that belongs to the foreign policies of international entities. In fact, so great was their influence as exerted through the Imperial Conference, that Mr Hall suggests that "in certain respects the control exercised by a Dominion over its ordinary international relationships was more effective than that exercised by the normal type of formally independent state."[1].

One may conclude regarding the British attitude on the question of foreigh policy that the condition which all wise men sought to embody in the Imperial constitution was an Empire as a unit, through whose voice all the nations could speak far more effectively than if they stood alone. The fact that the Dominions were inadequately heard in regard to foreign policy was appreciated, but the difficulty seemed insurmountable: How could unity be obtained and a common policy arrived at when interests were so diversified, the Dominions so suspicious of any centralising agency, with Britain's proximity to the probable theatre of war and Canada's remoteness, and when Great Britain contributed so much to Imperial Defence to safeguard her great investments throughout the world while Canada contributed so little

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1. Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations, p.147.

because her investments were small and in little comparative danger? No one doubted but that Britain must control policy in the last analysis, whatever body be the Imperial mouthpiece: partnership, in the sense of equal weight in policy as between the different members, was consigned to some Utopian future when the Dominions would have great populations.

Chapter III: British Opinion on the Supremacy of the Imperial Parliament.

The change in the idea of the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament over the Dominions reflects, more accurately than anything else, the change in British opinion. The day had gone by when a writer could, without qualification, express his confidence in "the indisputable omnipotence of the Imperial Parliament over the whole Empire and over every part thereof."[1] Professor Keith in 1912 found justice in Mr Ewart's contention that the power of disallowance and the paramount authority of Imperial legislation were but little used.[2] Nor did the Imperial Parliament exercise an appreciable authority over Dominion administration. There is an example to be found in Natal when, in 1906, with little provocation, the Government proclaimed martial law and tried twelve natives by court martial on a murder charge. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Earl of Elgin, instructed the Governor to stay the executions pending full consideration by the Home Government. The Ministry thereupon resigned, but upon receiving full information the executions were permitted. Mr Ramsay MacDonald moved the adjournment of the House of Commons to consider the question of martial law in Natal.[3] He put it as an intolerable claim that every act of a Dominion Government should be judged internal government and contended that Natal was responsible, not merely to herself for her action in the administration of martial law,

1. Sir Edward Creasy, The Imperial and Colonial Constitution of the Britannic Empire, p.383.
2. Responsible Government, Vol.iii, p.1459.
3. H.C. Debs. 2 April, 1906, Vol.155, p.245.

but to the whole Empire.[1] All lesser matters might be left to the other parts of the Empire, but the guiding principle of justice, law, and mercy must if necessary be asserted from the home country,[2] and he pointed out that on much less serious occasions between 1894-1900 the home government had refused assent on twelve occasions and conditionally refused assent on twenty occasions.[3]

Captain Kincaid-Smith was opposed to the slightest interference in the matter,[4] as were Mr Long[5] and Mr Fell.[6] Sir Gilbert Parker stated that every constitutional authority regarded it as an elementary doctrine that a self-governing Colony should have freedom to deal with offences against its own laws.[7] Mr Churchill reiterated the doctrine that His Majesty's Government did not consider that they could interfere with the responsibility of the Colonial Government in the matter.[8]

As another instance of the practical restriction of Imperial power one might cite the intense indignation that moved Great Britain when General Smuts and his Government in January 1914 quite illegally deported ten strike leaders, and so contrived by an Indemnity Act - and by the speed with which the offenders were rushed from the country - that they had no recourse

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1. H.C. Debs. op.cit., pp.249-250.
2. Ibid, pp.254-255.
3. The list really came to thirty three, one being still under consideration. Vide H.C. 362, 1901, for the next five years Vide H.C. 187, 1906. Note the corresponding total is only twelve. Ibid, pp.252.
4. Ibid, p.255ff.
5. Ibid, pp.277-279.
6. Ibid, pp.279-280.
7. Ibid, p.263.
8. Ibid, p.268. Debs. 29 March, 1906, Vol.154, p.1647.

to the courts.[1] In a very moderate and guarded speech, Mr Ramsay MacDonald drew the attention of the House of Commons to Section 64 of the South Africa Act providing for the Governor to withhold his assent to or reserve a Bill according to instructions, and he argued that the provision was intended for such incidents as this.[2]

In reply, the Colonial Secretary, Mr (Lord) Harcourt, laid down the policy of the Government to be that expressed by Mr Lyttelton in 1910, that "so far as policy is concerned, the Governor of a self-governing Dominion is bound to take the advice of his Ministers... The Imperial Government makes no claim whatever to interfere in the local or internal affairs or measures of self-governing Dominions, even if those measures be entirely repugnant to our views."[3] In alluding to the supposed action that the Governor might have taken in refusing assent to the proclamation of martial law, the Secretary of State said that no Government could have been found to take its place.[4] These, then, were the principles which dictated the policy of nin-intervention: no great imperial interest was involved and no other Government could have been obtained.[5]

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1. Text of the Indemnity and Undesirables Special Deportation Bill of the Union of South Africa, Cd.7213, 1914. Correspondence, Cd.7348. For General Smuts' speech, ibid, p.210ff. Mr Cresswell's rebuttal, p.236ff. A sane view putting the arguments of the South African Government, R.T., Vol.4, 1914, p.231ff: The South African Strike; p.567ff: The Indemnity Bill and Political Parties. Also Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.160ff; Responsible Government 1927, p.200ff. Egerton, British Colonial Policy in the Twentieth Century, p.52ff.
2. H.C. Debs., 12 Feb., 1914, Vol.58, p.353ff.
3. Ibid, p.369.
4. Ibid, p.375.
5. Vide also Responsible Government, op.cit., p.201.

One may attribute the reluctance of the British Government to interfere with Dominion matters to a growing appreciation through the years 1900-1914 of the spirit of Durham's Report, a growth to which the South African War contributed not a little since in the Report were sought remedies for the distressed conditions of South Africa. At the close of the century one of the leading journalists scoffed at the suggestion that Sir Alfred Milner was destined to be the Lord Durham of South Africa. "Sir Alfred," he said, "has already written his name deeper on colonial history than the great Whig noble, who governed Canada with doubtful success for eight months, and wrote, or induced his secretary to write, a very able, if slightly platitudinous Report."[1] We find, however, a conception of the principle of Responsible Government, as Durham conceived it, coming more and more to the consciousness of men's minds,[2] for it is one thing to have an intellectual grasp of a philosophy and quite another to believe in, and act upon the terms of it. In 1912 we have the publication of Sir Charles Lucas' splendid work on Lord Durham.[3]

It also became appreciable that the growth of the autonomy of the Dominions consisted in the extension of the principles of responsible government enunciated by Durham, for there has never been a definition of the limits to which it may apply.

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1. Sidney Low, South African Problems and Lessons, 19th Cent., Dec. 1899, Vol.46.
2. Thomas Shaw, The Durham Road to Peace, 19th Cent., July 1901, Vol.50.
3. Though the fact that Durham still was not well known is attested by the review in the Times Literary Supplement of June 20, 1912 which is an essay upon the book rather than a critical review.

There were merely two simple a priori conditions to its success: government by popular consent and an adjustment of difficulties by a practical British empiricism.[1] Like an octopus the principle thus put forth has reached out far past Lord Durham's restrictions[2] to include all that made for complete self-government. It is interesting to find that this philosophy as expressed in a book most popular in Canada - Empire and Commonwealth by Professor Martin - was conceived by Professor Keith in 1908, though he, of course, did not then expect the principle to be applied to mean separate foreigh policies.[3]

These conditions must not contradict the fact of the paramount power of the British Parliament throughout the King's Dominions which was far mfrom dominant,[4] That body had never surrendered - nor could it surrender[5] - its right to legislate for the whole Empire, though the principle of such Imperial legislation was that it would be confined to cases where it was necessary for the carrying out of foreign policy and treaty obligations, or Imperial matters wherein uniformity or extra- territorial application were desired[6] as in the Extradition Acts of

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1. Vide Lucas, Lord Durham's Report, Vol.ii, p,278, p,280.
2. Vide ibid, p.282.
3. Keith, The Development of Colonial Self-Government in the Nineteenth Century, Jourh. Roy.Soc. of Arts, Feb.11, 1908, Vol.56, p.334. Responsible Government, Vol.i, p,13ff.
4. Keith, Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.iii, p.1316ff; Dicey, op.cit., p.xxv.
5. Wade and Phillips, Constitutional Law, p.356.
6. Keith, Responsible Government, op.cit; Tarring, Law relating to the Colonies, p.15; Dicey, op.cit., pp.xxix-xxx: "In regard to any matter which directly affects Imperial interests the Imperial Parliament will, though with constantly increasing caution, pass laws which apply to a Dominion and otherwise exercise sovereign power in such a Dominion."

1870 and 1873,[1] the Acts of 1869 and 1884[2] to provide for the removal of prisoners from one Colony to another or to the United Kingdom, or the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881.[3] In other words, the laws passed by the British Parliament were intended, not as asserting an independent authority that had little or no regard for colonial feeling, passed like the acts of the gods on Olympus, but were dictated by the growing feeling of co-operation and good will.[4] The Army Act of 1881[5] as amended from time to time, is a further example of this truth, providing for the organization and control of the forces throughout the Empire, but giving power by the Act to Colonial Legislatures to alter its provisions as to fines, et cetera, to meet local conditions, and the courts of the colonies were empowered to deal with certain matters under the Act, while local forces were governed within the Dominion by their own local Acts.[6] An Act of 1909 ruled that where the Government of a colony placed a body of men at His Majesty's disposal for general service in the Royal Navy, such a force should be subject to all the enactments and regulations in force for the discipline of the Royal Navy,[7] and a similar law, relating to the military forces, determined that colonial troops acting with Imperial troops outside the Colony should be subject to the Army Act.[8] Similar in principle, the Imperial Bankruptcy Act /

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1. 33 & 34 Vict. c. 52. s.17; 36 & 37 Vict. c.60, s.1.
2. 32 Vict. c.10; 47 & 48 Vict. c.31.
3. 44 & 45 Vict. c. 69.
4. Vide Keith, Responsible Government, 1927, pp. 760-761.
5. 44 & 45 Vict. c.69.
6. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.iii, 1320. These Acts are given validity outside the Colony by s.177 of the Army Act.
7. 9 Edw. Vol.vii, c. 19.
8. 9 Edw. Vol.vii, c. 3, s.8.

applied to the whole Empire and so an English bankruptcy vests property in the Dominions in the official trustee.[1.]

Such acts as the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870, the Slave Trade Acts of 1824, 1843, and 1873, the Mail Ships Act of 1891, the Anglo-French Convention Act of 1904, and the Geneva Convention Act of 1911, being acts due to international considerations, were applicable to the whole Empire.[2.] It is a sign of the evolution of attitude towards co-operation that, since the Geneva Convention Act interfered with the local trade-mark law, it was considered quite irregular to pass it without the approval of the Dominions and an Order in Council was aimed to adapt it to Dominion conditions.[3.]

The action of the United Kingdom, during the dispute over the American fishery rights in Newfoundland, in invoking an Act of 1819 which authorised the Executive to regulate the Newfoundland fisheries through the agency of naval officers in overriding Newfoundland laws and securing the operation of the modus vivendi with the United States, was surely an unconstitutional proceeding from the point of view of the antiquity of the Act. Mr Jebb severely criticised the Imperial Government in that they had not affirmed the principle of Imperial sovereignty, but had stated the doctrine of tyranny, for surely Great Britain would never have

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1. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.ii, p.1038; 1912, Vol.iii. 1321. Tarring, op.cit. p.8. Callender, Sykes & Co. v. Colonial Secretary of Lagos (1891) A.C.460.
2. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.iii, p.1321. Tarring, op.cit. p.168ff, gives a list of Imperial statutes relating to the Colonies; p.176ff, a list of subjects of Imperial legislation relating to the Colonies.
3. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.ii, p.1036.

dared similarly to exert pressure upon Australia.[1] The critic suggested that "the most obvious solution" would have been for the Imperial Parliament to pass an Act superseding the conflicting Newfoundland Statutes or suspend the constitution, which latter course had been suggested a few years previously when Imperial South African policy was being hampered by Cape Colony. He thus reminds us that the statutes from which the constitution of a Dominion originated were liable to be changed by the Imperial Parliament.[2]

Great Britain still maintained real control over certain Dominion administration. So Lord Minto refused to approve the dismissal of Lord Dundonald without a full consideration of the incident.[3] In the case of the execution of natives in Natal in 1906, Lord Elgin asserted a complete right to ask for information in order that the Imperial Government might consider the justice of the action.[4] Churchill strongly denied the allegation that the Government had "climbed down" upon the resignation of the Ministry. They had merely demanded time for consideration of the action and, acting like a court of appeal, had confirmed the original sentence.[5]

The writer in the Round Table, commenting on the deportation of the strike leaders in 1914 from South Africa, considered it

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1. Jebb, Twelve Months of Imperial Evolution, R.C.I., 12 November, 1907, Vol.39. In 1891, had not the Colony given way, an Imperial Act would have been brought in to override Newfoundland legislation to secure French rights. Responsible Government, 1927, p.846.
2. Dicey, op.cit., pp.xxv-xxvi.
3. Skelton, op,cit., Vol.ii, pp.200-201. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.ii, p.745.
4. House of Lords Deb. 29March, 1906, Vol.154, p.1504.
5. H.C. Debs., April 2, 1906, op.cit., p.274.

a highly dangerous and anti-imperial doctrine that the principle should apply that, no matter how much the Imperial Government might disapprove of an action of a Dominion Government, it must acquiesce,[1.] and this view also appeared throughout the debate in the House of Commons. The British Government did, in fact, insert their views into the Act when they had its wording changed to refer only to the exercise of martial law in the past and made no provision, as it had done when first drafted, to indemnify future actions.[2.]

We see, therefore, that the rule had become established by the war that the powers of the Crown of veto or disallowance would be most sparingly exercised and only when the Bill directly interfered with Imperial interests or as regarded colonial legislation was ultra vires.[3.] Refusal of assent by the Governor was long considered obsolete by 1914, and of the other two methods of control by disallowance and reservation of a Bill the former was preferred.[4.] It is significant that the reason assigned for this preference should be, not only that it was convenient, but that it allowed for the quiet consideration of the difficulties involved, which is another suggestion that the tendency of British thought was towards methods of co-operation within the Empire. The method of reservation was tantamount to diplomatic pressure and the power of disallowance was recognised to be offensive, while the fact that the Imperial Government failed to intimate their views of certain Acts of 1895 and 1899

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1. The R.T., op.cit., p.253.
2. Cd.7348, p.10. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p,163.
3. Dicey, op.cit. p.xxx.
4. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.ii, pp.1007-1009.

might be taken to mean that the Crown was reluctant to disallow, although it did not wish to express any approval of them.[1] The power was also disliked as being merely theoretic and imposing an unjustifiable burden on the Imperial Government,[2] That it still operated, however, is shown by the fact that every Dominion or State, wishing to avail itself of the privilege of having its stocks included among those in which trustees in the United Kingdom might invest, must state itself willing that any Act which endangered the security by reason of which the investors lent their money would be disallowed.[3] This again constitutes a co-operative provision and is a rebuke to over-zealous Canadian nationalists who can see nothing but Toryism in the British attitude.[4]

The power of reservation was by no means in desuetude. Canada avoided such intervention by inserting a suspending clause in Bills which might else have to be reserved, to provide that they should not come into effect until brought into operation by proclamation. The Union of South Africa expressly provided for the Governor-General to reserve certain Bills.[5] The New Zealand Navigation Bill of 1903 was only assented to in 1905 on an express undertaking that a conference on merchant shipping would be

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1. Responsible Government, Vol.ii, p.769, Parl.Pap., H.C. 184, 1906, p.4.
2. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.149.
3. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.ii, pp.758-759.
4. Mr Ewart wrongly illustrates his case by blaming the Imperial Government for withholding assent to a Canadian Bill of 1868 to reduce the Governor's salary . Kingdom of Canada, op.cit., p.16. The procedure was due to the desire of Sir Charles Tupper and the Canadian Ministry, glad enough to avail themselves of the power of the Imperial Parliament. Tupper, Recollections of Sixty Years, p.95.
5. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.ii, pp.962-963; p.1010ff; Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.143ff.

held to discuss the whole subject.[1] This was done in 1907, leading to an amendment by New Zealand in an Act of 1909 which was again reserved for discussion at the Conference of 1911.[2]

Besides such restrictions imposed by their constitutions, colonial legislation suffered other specific disabilities. The fact of territorial limitation was a sore point with colonial nationalists, involving as it did much inconvenience.[3] In certain cases the Dominion Parliaments had evaded the restriction by asserting that, while they could not assert extra- territorial control, yet they could judge as to intent upon leaving and conditions of return. So Australia held it to be unlawful for vessels to enter her harbours having broken the seals on excisable goods, despite the fact that the seals had been broken at sea.[4]

The fact of the restrictions imposed on Dominion legislation by the paramount authority of the Imperial Shipping Acts also stimulated colonial nationalism, when it was considered that as separate nations the Dominions would not be hampered in this way. The British point of view was simple and reasonable nevertheless when her responsibility to the Empire for its defence and to the world for the actions of the Empire are considered. The New Zealand Act to regulate the conditions for the conveyance of goods to and from New Zealand[5] was obviously a disregard of a rule of international courtesy.[6] The proposed enactment might have brought about retaliation by

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1. Cd.3567.
2. Responsible Government, op.cit., pp.1017-1018.
3. Ewart, op.cit. p.9ff.
4. Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Kingston, (1903) A.C. 471. Responsible Government, op.cit., p.386, 1210. Responsible Government, 1927, p.327.
5. Cd.3891, p.3.
6. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.ii, p.946.

resentful foreign Powers upon British mercantile marine.[1] Fortunately the Conferences of 1907 and 1911 were able to satisfy the objections of Australia and New Zealand to the authority of the Imperial Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, which had embodied previous Acts. However, the desire of the Imperial Government to allow the Dominions the widest freedom possible in matters of merchant shipping was evinced by the option given them as to adherence to the Brussels conventions of 1910 on shipping and salvage,[2] and the Maritime Conventions Act of 1911 did not apply to the Dominions who were left free to adopt or not as they desired.[3]

It is interesting that the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865,[4] against which the Dominions nationalists have thrown much abuse in recent years, was entitled "An Act to remove Doubts as to the Validity of Colonial Laws" on the score of repugnancy to English laws, being for long considered "the Magna Carta of colonial autonomy."[5] The objectionable provision (s.2) was that any colonial law, repugnant to an Act of the Imperial Parliament,

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1. Mr Buxton, Col.Conf. 1911, Cd.5745, pp.136-137.
2. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.ii, pp.950-951.
3. Cd.4355, 1908, p.21. "As long as the principles of the Imperial Acts are reasonably maintained there can be no question as to the desirability on general grounds of the Australian authorities controlling all ships, British and foreign, which trade to their ports in the matter of load line",etcetera. "On the contrary, the more authorities there are in the Empire capable of exercising this jurisdiction properly, the more efficient will be the regulation of shipping. But it is most important that this regulation should be approximately uniform; otherwise a ship would be subject to different standards in going from one British port to another, and there would be no one British standard." The Secretary of State to the Governor-General of Australia, 18 Sept. 1908.
4. 28 & 29 Vict. c.63.
5. Sovereignty of the Dominions, p,44. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.i, p. 402ff. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p. 139ff.

should "be and remain absolutely void and inoperative" to the extent of such repugnancy.

Though there had been no official controversy between the Dominions and the United Kingdom on the power of the Act, there had been some resentment in Canada,[1] and the Australian delegates to Britain on the occasion of the Commonwealth Constitution Act of 1900 had tried to avoid its authority.[2] They had found some sympathy in Britain, especially from Mr Jebb, and Professor Keith found some question as to whether its application could be justified. He pointed out, however, the fact of the supremacy of the British Parliament which must ever obtain, and to deny which would be to deny the validity of the Dominion Constitutions which had found their origins in that Parliament.[3] There was the necessity of distinguishing, therefore, between the repeal of Acts fettering the freedom of Dominion legislatures and the doctrine of repugnancy which could not be avoided.[4] Because of this consideration it was thought unwise to repeal the Bill, an action which would merely make the position vague and difficult.[5]

There was a good deal of clamor, in Canada for the right to amend her own constitution - clamor that was both misdirected and foolish. Mr Ewart's view that a unanimous vote of the people of Canada could not obtain a change in the constitution[6]

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1. Ewart, op.cit., p.8.
2. Cd.158, p.23.
3. Wade and Phillips, op.cit., p.356.
4. Dicey, op.cit. p.104: "Once establish that an imperial law is intended to apply to a given Colony, and the consequence follows that any colonial enactment which contravenes that law is invalid and unconstitutional."
5. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp.140-142.
6. Ewart, op.cit., p.7.

was practically wrong for, although the Imperial Parliament was the only authority which could amend the Act, there was no doubt but that that body would be amenable to the desire of the Canadian people.[1] The blame was misdirected in being laid at the door of Downing Street Toryism, for English opinion would have been complacent enough in seeing this "anachronism" removed,[2] and the criticism overlooks the fact that the Constitution Acts of Australia[3] and of South Africa[4] provide for change by local opinion. It also neglects to take notice of the essential nature of Canadian federation as a "quasi treaty" between the provinces which were thus protected against any possible encroachment by the Federal Government, a safeguard particularly desired by Quebec.[5]

In declaiming against the Copyright Act, which was paramount in authority to any Dominion Act, the nationalists of Canada and their supporters in the Mother Country were on firmer ground. The Imperial Act of 1842 had included the provision that works published in the United Kingdom should also enjoy copyright in the Dominions, and import into the Empire was prohibited.[6] British authors have long suffered from the American habit of reprinting and Canada found it very difficult to carry out the Act. Efforts at compromise agreements between

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1. Vide Responsible Government, Vol.ii, p.771, 1912.
2. Vide The Britannic Review, July 1914, Vol.1.
3. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.ii, p.687.
4. Ibid, p.741.
5. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.ii, p.999. Even such a fine historian as Mr Hall is not quite sensible of this trap: The British Commonwealth of Nations, p.261: "Present position...will not be tolerated much longer by Canadian national feeling."
6. 5 & 6 Vict.c.45,s.17.

the Imperial and Canadian Governments were unsuccessful and a Canadian Bill of 1872 providing that, should British copyright works not be reprinted in Canada within a month, the right to reprint would be allowed on payment of a 12½% royalty, was not permitted to become operative.[1] In 1875 Canada passed an Act providing that any person domiciled in a Brithsh possession or in a foreign country having a copyright treaty with the United Kingdom, might obtain copyright in Canada for 28 years with the possibility of another fourteen years by printing and publishing or reprinting and republishing, and the importation of foreign prints was prohibited.[2]

Canada and Australia accepted the Berne Convention of 1886, understanding that they could withdraw from it at will and its terms were embodied in an Imperial Act made applicable to the Dominion by an Order in Council of 28 Nov.1887.[3] When Canada tried to effect an Act that entailed the termination of the Convention,[4] her request was refused by Lord Knutsford whose objections were based solely upon the protests of British publishers.[5] The Canadian position became intolerable when Great Britain in 1891 arrived at an understanding with the United States whereby the latter gave a copyright conditional on printing, but demanded in return that copyright be given her citizens in the United Kingdom merely by publication, and in other possessions on the

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1. Parl.Pap., H.C. 144, 1875, pp.5-13. Mr Longman, an English Publisher, re the right to prohibit publication of a copyright work, "Thank God we have the power and we intend to keep it". Ibid, p.10.
2. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.ii, p.954. Also H.C. 144, p.13-18.
3. Ibid, pp.954-955.
4. C.7783, pp.1-3.
5. Ibid, p.12ff.

same terms as to British citizens.[1] In this position Canadian authors found it a preferable procedure to print in the United States and then publish in Great Britain, thus obtaining a copyright co-extensive with the British Empire.[2]

Canada again pressed for relief and was well within her rights. The Dominion Government was dealing with a matter of internal affairs and adherence to the Convention allowed for withdrawal. The British publishers, however, prevailed upon the Imperial Government not to allow Canadian autonomy in this matter lest the little protection afforded them in the United States be lost.[3] The Report of the Department Committee shows an amazing failure to appreciate the principles of Dominion self-government, considering the question entirely from the point of view of the British publisher, and urging a control over a Canadian matter that was undoubtedly unconstitutional.[4] The very point that Galt had stressed when the Sheffield Chamber of Commerce had induced Newcastle to consider the suggestion of the disallowance of the tariff Act of 1859 had been that Newcastle was obviously favouring the Sheffield interests against Canadian interests, whereas he should have been unprejudiced.[5] It was this very principle that had been outraged and Sir John Thompson urged the Canadian case with a vigour reminiscent of Galt,[6] but

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1. Responsible Government, 1927, p.955. C.6425, esp. p.3, s.13 of the American Act and p.5. Lord Salisbury to Mr Lincoln.
2. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.237ff. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.iii, p.120ff; Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.96ff. C.7783, p.19.
3. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.239. C.7783, p.28. Report of the Department Committee appointed to consider the Act of 1889, p.43ff.
4. Responsible Government, op.cit. p.953, p.956.
5. Egerton and Grant, Canadian Constitutional Development; The Tariff Controversy, p.348ff. Porritt, op.cit., p.453ff.
6. C.7783, p.4; p.14ff; p.66ff.

his death retarded the representations. Discussion of the matter was postponed from the 1894 Conference in view of the fact that a committee was sitting in England.

In the interval the Imperial Government grew less difficult. They desired to obtain Canada's adherence to the Paris Convention of 1896, in connection with which Sir Hall Caine in 1895 and Mr Thring in 1899 visited the Dominions.[1.] In 1900 some compromise was arrived at securing a certain protection for a Canadian publisher by an enactment that, when a book which had copyright in Canada had been produced in some part of the British Dominions other than Canada, on proof of the issue of a licence to reproduce the work in Canada, the importation of any other copies of the work might be prohibited. Mr Mills, the Canadian Minister of Justice, discussed the matter with Mr Chamberlain the following year, but no result arrived at.[2.]

Canada, in 1894, had abolished her tariff provision for the collection of a duty on foreign reprints of British copy right works for the benefit of copyright holders as created by the compromise legislation of 1847-1850, thus automatically reviving the Act of 1842 making illegal the importation of American reprints of British copyright works into Canada.[3.] This had caused some friction and, moreover, the Privy Council in 1903 gave a decision which confined the application of the Fine Arts Copyright Act to the United Kingdom, so that British authors did not enjoy protection in the Dominions in respect of pictures, drawings, and photographs.[4.] Also a Conference at Berlin in

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1. Responsible Government, 1927, op.cit., p.957.
2. Ibid.
3. C.7783, p.78ff.
4. Graves v. Gorrie, (1903) A.C.496.

October and November of 1908 led to a revision of the International Convention. Following on the consideration of the matter by a committee under Lord Gorell,[1] and Imperial Copyright Conference of 1910 passed resolutions in favour of a new Imperial Act which the Dominions might adopt at will, or modify and add to insofar as such changes related to procedure and remedies. Any self-governing Dominion which adopted the new Act was to be at liberty to withdraw, subject always to treaty obligations and respect for existing rights. A self-governing Dominion which passed legislation substantially identical with the new Act, except as related to procedure, remedies, or works first published in the Dominion, should be treated as a Dominion to which the Act is extended. A self-governing Dominion neither adopting the Imperial Act nor passing such identical legislation, should not enjoy in other parts of the Empire any rights except such as might be conferred by Order in Council or, within a self-governing Dominion, by Order of the Governor in Council.[2] These resolutions were incorporated in the Copyright Act of 1911.[3]

Australia, Newfoundland, and New Zealand legislated according to these provisions, but Canada, who had been so zealous in the cause of reform, now failed to take action owing to the dislike of her printers to the convention.[4] In order to induce her to move, an additional protocol to the Convention of 1908 was arranged at Berne in 1914 to meet her wishes.[5] It

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1. Cd.4976 and 5051.
2. Cd.5272, p.6.
3. 1 & 2 Geo. V, c.46.
4. Strangely enough Sir Wilfrid Laurier had been indifferent to reforms in this direction. Vide Hewins, Apologia of an Imperialist, Vol.1, p.121.
5. Cd.7613.

was not until 1921 and 1923 that legislation by the Canadian Parliament, not a little unsatisfactory to Canadian authors, was enacted.[1.]

The controversy serves to illustrate two things: the growth in the power and influence of Canada in her ability to make her protests effective and the growth in the relations of Dominion and Mother Country. Professor Dicey made a very interesting comparison in the relations that obtained in 1884 and those of the year 1914. "The Imperial Parliament", he said, "now admits and acts upon the admission, that any one of the Dominions has acquired a moral right to as much independence, at any rate in regard to matters occurring within the territory of such Dominion, as can from the nature of things be conceded to any country which still forms part of the British Empire.... In 1884 the exercise of self-government on the part of any colony was regarded as subordinate to real control by the English Parliament and Crown of colonial legislation which might be opposed to English interests or to English ideals of political prudence. In 1914 self-government...means absolute, unfettered, complete autonomy without consulting English ideas of expediency or even of moral duty."[2.] Surely this evolution of opinion may be traced in the Copyright controversy. No strictures of the past British policy were more severe than those from British pens at the time of change.[3.] The whole tendency was for co-operation and the need for it was quite evident if Imperial interests were to be the plea for certain policies. Co-operation and equality -

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1. Imperial Unity, pp.242-243; Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.ii, pp.959-960.
2. Dicey, Law of the Constitution, p.xxx, p.xxxii.
3. ex. Jebb, The Imperial Conference, Vol.1, p,230.

about these words revolved British pre-war opinion. There were extremists and quack remedies, but the desire of sober and thoughtful men was for an Empire that cohered in all the essential matters of policy in facing the world and which settled difficulties within the Empire by consultation. To accomplish this end all inequalities and all those things that led to friction between the members must be swept into the dustbin. Only thus could the inevitable result of the centrifugal tendencies of nationalism be combated.

The comment might also be ventured that official opinion in Britain has generally been in advance of public opinion, as for example in the outburst regarding control of South African Government, especially concerning the illegal payment of the members of the Transvaal Parliament.[1.]

Knowing official opinion one never fails to be astonished at the conservative attitude of the man in the street in his views on imperial relations. The old accusations - what right has Canada to shut out British goods? Think of the years we defended Canada without return - are still with us. This difference between official and public opinion is really the difference between informed and uninformed opinion, because the average person knows very little of the changing relations, or, at any rate, he has not studied them with the detail necessary to correct interpretation,and so, when presented with the fait accompli as the Imperial Parliament confirms existing practice, he is startled

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1. Vide The Times, op.cit., July 1, 1910 for its invocation of an antiquated precedent. Vide Egerton, British Colonial Policy in the Twentieth Century, pp.52-54: criticism of uniformed public opinion on Responsible Government regarding South Africa in 1914.

at what appears to be a radical d eparture. Mr Mackenzie King has often said that every definition of inter-imperial relations has come as the result of a practice already instituted. It is because of this scanty information and abundant enthusiasm that we have had the Round Table Movement for Federation now abandoned, and the more recent proposal for Empire Free Trade. Those who know opinion in the Dominions know the futility of both schemes.

The Governor-General.

It would be interesting to trace the evolution of the British Commonwealth of Nations, as reflected in the diminishing powers and change in function of the Governor-General, from the days when that officer executed the wishes of Downing Street to the modern days when he is no longer the intermediary between the Dominion and Imperial Parliaments. Today even the choice of the Governor is dependent upon the will of the Dominion, but in early times no idea of consulting the Dominions occurred to the Imperial Government. When the question did appear, and the Times wrote that, "If the right be once conceded to Colonial Ministers of laying objections to any appointment before the Secretary of State, it is almost inconceivable that a duty will not be inferred on the part of the Secretary of State to yield to those objections whether reasonable or unreasonable," Mr Justice Higinbotham wrote in the margin, "Right."[1] With his

1. Nov. 1888, Morris, A Memoir of George Higinbotham, pp.203-204.

view Sir John A. Macdonald agreed.[1]

It was on occasion mooted that the Dominion Government of the day should be consulted, and the Marquis of Lorne, besides advocating such consultation, stressed the personal factor in the Governor's position and stated that the extent of his influence depended largely on himself.[2] The general view was that the appointment should be made with an eye on colonial wishes.[3]

In October of 1888 Queensland was pressing for confidential information as to the name of their proposed Governor, and was refused by Lord Knutsford.[4] The unwise appointment of Sir Henry Blake provoked the Colony to indignation, and protest was made to the effect that, as the legislature voted and the colony paid the Governor's salary, the amount voted and the fact of payment implied approval of the occupant of the office.[5] However, Lord Knutsford replied with some firmness, observing that the Governor's salary was, by a permanent Act, "placed at the disposal of Her Majesty," with the particular object of securing the Governor in an independent position that he might be enabled "fearlessly and impartially to hold the balance between the political parties."[6] He also replied to South Australia and New South Wales in similar terms - that apart from Imperial duties the position of the Governor as regarded political matters precluded the local Government from taking part in his selection.[7]

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1. Pope, Correspondence of Sir John A. Macdonald, pp.433-434.
2. Ibid, p.300; Lord Lorne, Imperial Federation, p.64.
3. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.i, p.67.
4. C.5828, p.1.
5. Ibid, pp.4-5.
6. Ibid, p.17.
7. Ibid, p.5, pp.19-20.

It appears that the Queensland Ministry had not much feeling in the matter previous to Sir Henry Blake's appointment, but the selection angered the Roman Catholic Party, and upon that capable official resigning, he was sent as Governor to Jamaica.[1] In the case of South Australia, the name of Lord Normanby was quietly withdrawn.[2] In fact, therefore, if not in theory, the principle of consultation was conceded, not that it was intended to transfer the control to the Colony, but only to ensure the popularity of the appointment.[3]

The responsibility for the appointment rested technically upon the Secretary of State, as for instance when he was called upon in 1913 to defend the appointment of Mr W. Ellison Macartney to the Governorship of Tasmania on the ground that he was unsuitable.[4] Practically, the Prime Minister took an active interest in the selection. By the time of the war the principle was well established that the Dominion Government might suggest a person for the office of Governor and were under no compulsion to accept a man considered unsuitable. It was felt by both British and overseas opinion generally that this method was satisfactory, and Professor Keith clinched his objections to the election of a Governor on the ground that it would offend against the principle of responsible Government and raise up in the Dominion a power which would tend to compete with the authority of the Prime Minister himself.[5]

The question had also been raised as to whether the Governor might be a local man nominated by the Dominion Government. The

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1. Dilke, Problems of Greater Britain, Vol.i, pp. 337-338.
2. Ibid, p.366.
3. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.i, p.87,
4. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.27.
5. Ibid, p,34.

Labour Party of Australia looked hungrily at the portly emoluments of the office and also considered that economy could be effected by securing a local personage. In 1908 Mr Price, Premier of South Australia, requested that local appointments be made as a reward to service for the State,[1] though the intention was that the Lieutenant-Governor be appointed by the Home Government.[2] Lord Crewe, in a courteous and kind reply, pointed out that the British North America Act provided for Lieutenant-Governors appointed by the Governor-General and paid by the Dominion Parliament, but under the Commonwealth the Australian States had a more independent position, From time to time the King's representative had been born or had passed part of his life in the Colony of which he subsequently had been made Governor, but it was "of the essence of the system of appointment by the Crown that His Majesty shall not be fettered in his choice" If the desire were expressed to have an arrangement similar to Canada's, the necessary steps would be taken by His Majesty's Government, but so far the States had shown no desire to diminish this prerogative of their status as sovereign States.[3] Western Australia on 27 November 1912 reproduced the arguments of her sister State, but Lord Harcourt adhered to Lord Crewe's opinion.[4]

The British attitude was that such a selection would militate against the Imperial connection and this was also the opinion of many of the Australian statesmen,[5] while the necessity of

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1. Cmd.2683, pp.43-45.
2. Ibid, p.46.
3. Ibid, p.48.
4. Ibid, pp.49-52.
5. Vide Ibid, pp.46-47.

meeting the argument has existed to very recent times.[1] A more valid objection consisted in the fact that the selection would really be made on the advice of the Colonial Government, despite denials asserting the contrary, and the office would be inevitably linked with party politics.[2] The cause of the exponents of the new form of selection received a setback when persistent allegations were made that a Chief Justice of Tasmania had improperly used information acquired by him when acting as Governor and the Government found it advisable to examine and refute the charges by a formal investigation.[3] At least, so it was held, the blunders and indiscretions committed by an officer from outside the colony would be free from improper motives. It was, moreover, hardly to be desired that the salary should be so reduced that the Governor would have to neglect the social side of his functions, which threatened to be the only sphere in which he might assert individuality.

To turn to the powers of the Governor-General. By the War it had been clearly recognised that the chief service of the Governor-General was no longer fulfilled as agent for the Imperial Parliament, but as representative of the Crown. There was also strong opinion that the office should be assimilated to that of the King in all the essential duties of internal administration, a view that Professor Keith has consistently pressed.

The growing appreciation of the Crown as a link of Empire was testified to by Lord Curzon when he said that, "A British

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1. Cmd.2683, p.6.
2. Vide Ibid, p.47.
3. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp.31-32.

Empire that had no visible head but a Prime Minister, or even the President of a Republic, would not last for twenty-five years."[1] "The loyalty of the oversea Dominions," said Mr Marriott, "is evoked not by an institution but by a person; not by a Parliament, imperial only in name, but by an Emperor-King. In a word, the Crown has become in an especial sense the centre and symbol and guardian and embodiment of a new idea - the sentiment of imperial unity."[2]

For this reason - namely, that the Crown should be considered primarily representative of the King rather than of the Imperial Parliament - Mr Jebb was quite bitter regarding the objection made by Lord Elgin to the Secretariat suggested to the Conference of 1907 as the normal channel of correspondence between the Governments. Lord Elgin held that such an arrangement would prejudicially affect the position of the Governor in rendering his opportunities of influence so few that his office would have little weight or attractiveness.[3] Mr Jebb maintained that the Governor had no right, except under the antiquated system of Colonial dependence, to act as a channel of communication between governments since he represented the common Crown, not the British Government. "If the British Government," said he, "may send and receive despatches without reference to the Crown, though acting in its name, why, on the theory of equality of status, should not the other Governments follow the same procedure?"[4]

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1. Curzon, The True Imperialism, 19th Cent., Jan. 1908, Vol.63.
2. J. S. Marriott, 19th Cent. June 1912, Vol.67. For this view Vide also F.W. Bussell, A New Government for the British Empire, p.83ff.
3. Cd.3523, p.37.
4. Jebb, The Imperial Conference, Vol.ii, p.126.

The authority of the Governor had been decidedly weakened by the tendency to regard the local Government as the final authority in matters of financial control, despite quixotic irregularities on the part of many of the Colonies.[1] A most emphatic declaration of this tendency occurred when the Transvaal Parliament, at its final meeting before the Union came into effect, proposed to pay each member the full Session allowance of £300, despite the fact that the Session had only lasted 16 days and the amount due was but £42, and some members declined to receive such illegal payments. The Colonial Office decided that the Deputy Governor was in the wrong, as Colonel Seely decided, since he had no option but to do what was required by his advisers,[2] a ruling that Mr Balfour termed "a very curious constitutional doctrine."[3] The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies made the remarkable statement that, as "Governor" was defined by the Audit Act of the Transcaal to mean "Governor in Council" and the Governor had been advised by the Council, the Governor had no responsibility, a statement that might easily be interpreted to mean that the Governor must always act on the advice of his ministers.[4] Lord Crewe, in the House of Lords, gave quite a contrary doctrine: that the Governor should not approve an illegal action, but that the action in question had been legal,[5] a decision which was hardly very valuable in light of the previous decision of the Chief Justice of the Transvaal.[6]

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1. Vide Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.i, p.180ff.
2. H.C. Debs., 29 June, 1910, Vol.18, p.1011.
3. Ibid, p.1009, p.1012.
4. Ibid, p.1013.
5. H.L. Debs., 25 July, 1910, Vol.6. p.407ff.
6. Responsible Government, op.cit., p.187.

The Times probably expressed public opinion when it stated as "the true Constitutional doctrine...that a Colonial Governor is bount to obey the law, even if in so doing he comes into conflict with his Ministers, "and made reference to a despatch from Lord St. Aldwyn (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) in 1878 to Sir George Bowen in which he directed the Governor to act in accordance with the advice of his Ministers provided he was satisfied that the action was lawful, and that he should govern his actions according to the best legal advice at hand.[1.]

The question could also be raised as to the liability of the Governor to a suit for illegal action as a result of accepting advice.[2.] In the case of acts done under martial law, the theory of the personal responsibility of the Governor was the more invidious, as he was left liable to proceedings not only in the Dominion or State, but only a local Act of Indemnity could bar civil action in the United Kingdom.[3.] On this ground of personal liability it was suggested in 1907 that Sir Matthew Nathan should refuse the advice of the Government of Natal to proclaim martial law in Zululand.[4.] The theory was undoubtedly unsound as there could be no guarantee that the Governor could find ministers more amenable to his views than the outgoing executive, and thoughtful opinion was in favour of relieving the Governor of any liability so that he might act, even as the King acted, on the advice of his responsible ministers.[5.]

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1. The Times, July 1, 1910. C.2173, 1878, pp.81-82, pp.99-100. With this point of view Lord Northcote, an ex-Governor-General of Australia, was in full accord. H.L. op.cit. p.401ff.
2. Imperial Unity, p.36ff.; Responsible Government,1912, Vol.i, p.105ff.; Tarring, op.cit.,p.33ff; Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution,II,ii,pp.81-82.
3. Imperial Unity, p.44.
4. Ibid.
5. Imperial Unity, p.43 and passim; Responsible Government, 1927, p.95ff; p.198.

The Imperial Government has in the Dominions never been held liberal in its attitude to their development towards self-government, but if it has avoided the fancies of Mr Goldwin Smith and Mr Ewart, it has equally directed itself from the Toryism of Mr Todd. If on the one hand it did not believe the Governor's position to be "a perfect cipher,"[1] equally it has not held up the Governor as a most powerful executive in practical government.[2] There seems to have persisted a large body of opinion who supported the view enunciated in a despatch of September 26, 1892 from Lord Ripon to the Governor of New Zealand to the effect that a Governor was quite right in rejecting ministerial advice if he believed the electorate would support him.[3] So also Tarring would have him act without the advice of the Executive Council in the event that public interest required him to do so and his instructions permitted.[4] Dilke was doubtful as to whether Lord Carrington's doctrine, as practised during his term as Governor in New South Wales, should be entirely accepted, namely, that the advice of the Cabinet should be blindly accepted on the grounds that a Governor could have no knowledge as to the position of his ministers in Assembly or country, and there should be no reference to the Colonial Office.[5] It was observed that in Canada the custom had become established that a Lieutenant-Governor must accept the advice of a ministry having a majority in Parliament, however precarious might be considered its position in the affections of the electorate.[6] There seems to have been no little doubt as to what extent the Governor might

1. Goldwin Smith, Canada and the Canadian Question, p.169.
2. Todd, Parliamentary Government in the Colonies, p.804ff; pp.814-824.
3. Parl. Pap., H.C.198, 1893-94, p.40.
4. Tarring, op.cit.,p.31. Vide also Anson, op.cit., p.79.
5. Dilke, Problems of Greater Britain, pp.295-296.
6. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.i, p.177.

exercise his personal discretion in accepting the advice of his ministers in regard to the internal government of the Dominion. Professor Keith observed that precedent had illustrated that a Governor's usefulness need not by any means be gone because he had been censured by his Parliament, but he ruled that a Governor who could not work with his Ministers must be recalled unless he had acted on Imperial Grounds.[1.]

Possibly the best measuring-stick to determine the freedom of the Government from the control of the Governor lies in the sense of responsibility developed by the legislature itself. When the Ministers believed the Governor to be a schoolmaster who would keep them disciplined they offered advice without regard to responsibility. Thus when Lord Carrington as Governor of New South Wales in 1886 asked Sir John Robinson, "Now Sir John, man to man, if I were in your place and you were in mine, and I asked your for this dissolution, would you grant it to me?" the Prime Minister replied, "I'd see you d-d first."[2.] Nor was he the last Prime Minister to assert similar irresponsibility in advising the Governor.[3.]

As an example of this distinction, one might say that there was a general recognition in the official mind of a line of demarcation marking off the Governor's duties as chief executive of the Dominion Government and as an Imperial officer entrusted with safeguarding the Imperial prerogative, a dual personality that Mr Higinbotham[4.] and Sir Edward Blake[5.] had done much to impress

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1. Responsible Government op.cit. p.174.
2. Sir George Reid, My Reminiscences, p.57.
3. Keith, J.C.L., Nov.1917, Vol.xvii. C.5091, p.557. Also Sir Samuel Griffith's statement.
4. Morris, op.cit., p.170ff; p.209ff; esp. p.214.
5. Responsible Government, Vol.i, p.158ff. Lowell, The Government of England, Vol.ii, pp.402-403. Kennedy, Documents of the Canadian Constitution, p.696ff. Borden, Canadian Constitutional Studies, pp.62-63.

on the Colonial office. But if it be true that a belief among colonial politicians has persisted to the present day that the Crown in the United Kingdom exercises a wide discretion,[1] it is equally true that in Great Britain there has been a popular tendency to regard the Governor as an equally powerful person, and the doctrine enunciated by Blake, Keith, and others that he should act in all matters of internal government as the King has not been quickly accepted.

There had been, in fact, a consistent application of the right of the Governor to refuse a dissolution. The point was raised at the Conference of 1887 by Sir F. Dillon Bell who opposed this right of discretion on the part of the Governor-General for the reason that it laid him open to the charge of partisanship,[2] but on the whole the Conference was opposed to restricting this right and no action resulted. In 1899 there were three refusals of dissolution of Parliament by Colonial Governors in Australia.[3] In 1904 Lord Northcote refused a dissolution to Mr Watson, the Australian Prime Minister,[4] and in 1905 he refused a similar request from Mr Reid.[5] In 1909 Mr Fisher was also refused a request for a dissolution.[6] In 1906 Sir G. le Hunte, Governor General of South Australia, refused Mr Price a dissolution, but when the leader of the Opposition found himself unable to form a Ministry, he recalled his former advisers and acceded to their request,[7] and his action was approved by the public and press generally.

1. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.i, p.112.
2. C.5091, p.555.
3. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.i, p.190.
4. Turner, The First Decade of the Australian Commonwealth, p.89.
5. Ibid, pp.100-101.
6. Ibid, pp.220-221.
7. Keith, The Development of Colonial Self-Government in the Nineteenth Century, Royal Society of Arts., op.cit., p.336. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.i, pp.192-193.

In 1909 the Governor of Newfoundland found himself in a dilemma that has a certain small but interesting resemblance to that of Lord Byng in Canada during 1926. After the election an equal number of members had been returned, eighteen on both sides of the House of Assembly, and it was impossible for either to elect a Speaker.[1.] Sir Robert Bond as Prime Minister, was refused a request for a dissolution, but when Sir Edward Morris was likewise unable to elect a Speaker the request of the latter for a dissolution was granted. Professor Keith held to the view that, though some hardship was worked upon Sir Robert, yet the course followed was exactly in concordance with the law of the constitution, as it was the duty of the Governor to exhaust every possible chance of forming a Government before dissolving a House which had just met after a general election. It also appeared that a dissolution granted to Sir Edward Morris would be more likely to result in a substantial majority for his party in view of the traditional advantage in an election that a Government enjoys and which Sir Robert Bond's Party had possessed in the previous election.[2.] As in the case of Byng in the Canadian incident, while there were circumstances therein not entering into the Newfoundland case and while Mr King was in a much stronger position to give advice than was Sir Robert Bond, on both occasions there were many who felt that an unjust advantage had been given to their opponents in placing the electioneering machinery of a Government in dissolution at their disposal and in both cases it was obvious that neither party could sustain a majority for more than a very limited amount of time.

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1. Responsible Government, op.cit., p.209.
2. Ibid, pp.210-211.

In 1913 Mr Watt, Premier of Victoria, resigned when defeated, but the Lieutenant-Governor did not grant a dissolution, instead calling Mr Elmslie who was heavily defeated on a motion of want of confidence. He asked for a dissolution but Mr Watt was now in a stronger position and able to obtain a majority and successfully to carry on the Government.[1.]

In 1914 the Lieutenant-Governor of Tasmania very unwisely, having refused a dissolution to the former Premier, accepted Mr Earle and his successor, but first exacted the conditions that he would advise a dissolution; that Parliament would be summoned before the end of May; and that, if the Attorney-General were not a properly qualified lawyer in practice, the Governor might seek advice elsewhere.[2.] It was certainly unconstitutional for the Governor to exact the promise, but that cannot excuse Mr Earle's subsequent denial of the pledge entered into on the score that it was possible to carry on without a dissolution and that the Governor had no right to stipulate conditions on accepting a Premier in office. The Secretary of State for the Colonies condemned the action of the Imperial representative, but his explanations for so doing were weak indeed as he tried to argue from precedent instead of recognising that his precedents were antiquated and not fitted for modern observance.[3.]

There had also been a consistent application of the independent right of the Governor to determine his attitude to an unstable Ministry. Thus Sir John Young in 1865 stated that he refused to

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1. Cd.7507, p.62.
2. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.i, pp,169-171. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp.102-104.
3. Responsible Government, op.cit., p.171.

accept advice to create members of the Upper House of New South Wales because his Ministry advising him lacked support in the country and were on the verge of defeat in the House.[1] Lord Normanby, in twice refusing dissolution to his New Zealand Government, was supported by a dispatch of the Secretary of State for the Colonies,[2] and his refusal to add a member to the Legislative Council while a vote of censure was pending against his Ministers in the Lower House was also upheld.[3]

Lord Onslow, however, while requiring certain ammendments, in 1891 accepted advice the wisdom of which was doubtful, on the ground that the country must determine the right and wrong of ministerial advice.[4] Yet - lest we attach too much importance to this action - there is the incident of 1896 when Lord Aberdeen refused to make appointments on the advice of Sir Charles Tupper lest the incoming Government be handicapped, an exercise of his discretion which Sir Charles held to be quite unconstitutional.[5] Doubtless the Governor was supported by much commonsense for, as he said, the disparity in the Senate was already very great, there being but five of the seventy-eight members who were Liberals, and to further increase the Conservative majority would tend to friction between the two chambers of the Legislature. As it was the new Government refused to recognise many of the appointments made by the Conservative Ministry.[6]

In 1908 there was a similar situation in New Brunswick when the Government held office a month after their defeat at the polls

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1. Parl.Pap., H.C. 198, 1893-4. p.75ff.
2. 15 Feb. 1878. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.i, pp.186-187.
3. Ibid, p,212.
4. Cd.198, p.5ff.
5. Tupper, op.cit., p.243.
6. Responsible Government, 1912, p,213ff.

and had their request for appointments refused by the Lieutenant-Governor on the argument that they no longer represented the people.[1] In 1909 it required the firm dealing of **Sir** W. Macgregor to ensure that the Newfoundland Government should not make any appointments when on the verge of defeat.[2]

After Lord Elgin's classic enunciation of the principle of Responsible Government,[3] when he refused to assent to the popular outbursts against the Rebellion Losses Bill of 1849, opinion was clear that the Governor could not, except in extraordinary circumstances, request the resignation of his ministers who were supported in Parliament.[4] There could be no doubt of the legal power of the Governor to dismiss his Ministers,[5] but it was a rarely asserted right. In 1873 Lord Dufferin claimed to possess the right,[6] but Sir Charles Tupper relates why he did not use it. It seems the Governor-General asked Sir John Macdonald to resign, but Sir Charles proceeded to Government House and obtained the following interview: "Lord Dufferin," I said, addressing Her Majesty's representative, "I think you have made a fatal mistake in demanding Sir John's resignation. You are today Governor-General of Canada and respected by all classes; to-morrow you will be the head of the Liberal party, and will be denounced by the Conservatives for having violated every principle of Constitutional Government. If Her Majesty would tomorrow undertake what you

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1. Responsible Government, 1912, p.220.
2. Responsible Government, 1927, p.175.
3. For his opinion on the position of the Governor-General see Kennedy, Documents of the Canadian Constitution, p.589; Kennedy, the Constitution of Canada, p.257ff; Martin, Empire and Commonwealth, p.303ff.
4. Sir Charles Dilke, Journ. Roy. Soc. of Arts, Feb.21, 1908, Vol.56, p.344: "Hardly ever." Keith, Ibid, p.336,
5. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.i, p.122ff.
6. Pope, Sir John Macdonald, Vol.ii, p.164ff. Responsible Government, 1927, p.125.

have done she might lose her throne." "Well, what do you advise me to do?" asked Lord Dufferin. "I desire to recommend that you cable the Colonial Office and ask what it thinks of your decision." The result of this interview was that Sir John was aroused from his bed at two o'clock in the morning and notified that Lord Dufferin had recalled his decision."[1.]

The Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec, Mr Letellier, in 1878, asserted the right to dismiss his Ministry and called down upon his head such a storm of criticism that he was removed. As Sir John Macdonald said of his partisanship, "His fate will be a warning to others for all time to come."[2.] Unfortunately Sir John was wrong, and in 1898 Mr McInnes as Lieutenant-Governor of British Columbia dismissed a weak Government and in 1900 dismissed its successor, just before receiving advice from the Dominion Secretary of State to allow the Government to continue.[3.] Mr Martin was then made Premier and he continued in office for some months without any reasonable support in the Legislature. Like Mr Letellier, Mr McInnes was dismissed on the ground that his conduct had been "subversive of the prinsiples of responsible government."[4.]

There were cases, nevertheless, where the Governor might assert with impunity the right to dismiss his ministers. In 1903 the Lieutenant-Governor of British Columbia dismissed his Government on the score of financial irregularities and the same thing was repeated in Manitoba in 1915,[5.] while in Newfoundland there have been incidents wherein the Governor has had to consider to what extent he should exert personal authority.[6.]

1. Tupper, op.cit., pp.156-157.
2. Cd.2445, p.110.
3. Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.i, p.239ff.
4. Ibid, p.242.
5. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.i, pp.132-133.
6. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp.116-117.

As Professor Keith remarked, however, it was mainly in cases where responsible government was not fully appreciated that these incidents occurred,[1] Responsible Government was so insecurely vested in Newfoundland that it could be discussed whether or not it should be revoked at the time of the Bank failure in 1894-5.[2] The feeling in Great Britain was that strong action on the part of the Governor was more than likely to confuse the issue,[3] as in fact it did in the Canadian election of 1926 when Mr King, who otherwise would probably have been defeated, managed to rouse Canadian nationalism against the arbitrary action of the Governor.

The years 1895-1914 present a great contrast with the earlier years of responsible government when the Governor-General was a veritable overlord. More and more that Officer came to rely on the advice of his Ministers and more and more strongly do we find it urged that practice in the Dominions in this respect be assimilated to that of Britain. From the days when the Governor-General of New Zealand was advised by the Colonial Secretary to give way to his Ministry regarding the addition of new members of the Upper House of New Zealand,[4] there may be seen a quickening tendency for the Governor to accept advice. The increase in this sense of the principle of ministerial responsibility, as conceived in Great Britain as well as the Dominions and practised overseas in imitation of the practice in the homeland, may be illustrated by a comparison of the brusque treatment of Sir Charles Tupper by Lord Aberdeen and the courtesy of Lord Grey to Sir

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1. Responsible Government, 1927, p.133.
2. Parl.Pap. H.C. 104, pp.9-10and passim.
3. Imperial Unity, p.118.
4. Parl. Pap. H.C. 198, 1893-94, p.39.

Wilfrid Laurier upon the defeat of the latter in the election of 1911 when the Governor-General decided that it was his duty to accept advice regarding appointments until such time as his Ministers resigned their portfolios.[1] In a similar way the Governor-General of New Zealand, Lord Islington, declined to intervene in the political tangle that succeeded the election of 1911 there, despite some public pressure for action.[2]

In Australia this truth was even more amply demonstrated.[3] In 1913 after the general election, the Prime Minister, Mr Cook, found himself in a hopeless minority in the Upper House and in the Lower House he was only able to carry on by means of the Speaker's casting vote.[4] He therefore secured the operation of the clause in the Constitution providing that, should a Bill be passed twice at an interval of three months by the Lower House and twice rejected by the Senate, the Governor-General might dissolve Parliament, whereupon the Bill would fall to be submitted to a joint vote of the two Houses and would require an absolute majority of members to become law. Upon a Bill being thus treated by the Senate the Governor-General granted a double dissolution, despite the fact that the Opposition held his action to be against all Australian precedent, for the rule seemed well established that before granting dissolution a Governor should exhaust every possibility of carrying on in Parliament.[5] It seemed quite possible that the Labour Party might carry on the Government and it appeared to many a very grave step to take on the advice of a Party holding but a slender majority of one.

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1. Responsible Government, 1927, pp.135-136.
2. Ibid, p.136. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.117. Cd.6091, pp.78-79.
3. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.106ff; The Round Table, 1914, Vol.4, p.550ff. 1914 Vol.5, p.201. 4. Cd.7507, p.59.
5. Responsible Government, op.cit., p.137.

But the Governor-General proceeded further to act on the advice of his ministers. The Senate suggested that he should, by exercising his power under the provision of the Constitution, s.129,which allowed him in the event of constitutional amendments being passed by either House and rejected by the other, to submit them to a referendum, submit to the electors Bills passed in 1913 and again in 1914. It was a very clever dilemma, for it was quite clear that if he were to submit to the Lower House Bills which they already had prevented passing, the advice would be against a referendum and the clause would not be worth anything as applied to the Upper House. Yet the Governor did submit the suggestion for the advice of his Ministers who decided against the Bills, naturally enough.

In these incidents the Governor-General was guided by British usage and had thrown complete responsibility upon his Ministers. There is no suggestion that in so doing he was not guided by the weight of responsible opinion in Britain. The Dominions, of necessity, had passed through a period of tuition and there is no reason to suppose that British opinion was unreasonably slower than that of the Dominions to take cognizance of their maturity. As they achieved sufficient power to become responsible for their internal government and security, and as they developed a sense of responsibility, British responsible opinion did not haggle unduly over loosening the strings.

British opinion required to be urged, but Dominion opinion required to be educated.

Chapter IV: Imperial Emigration and Citizenship.

In this study one encounters a circle, for emigration and Imperialism were to one another both cause and effect. Emigration caused Imperialism to take the form it did of a racial basis, and Imperialism found an active emigration policy to be essential to its policies. The very essence of the affection for the Dominions consisted in the fact that the Times could write, "There are few families who have not contributed some members to the population of the Dominions, few villages which have not sent forth some sons and daughters to seek their fortune across the sea."[1] But the considerations that social and industrial relief were needed in Great Britain, that an emigrant was more likely to buy from the United Kingdom than would be someone outside the blood, and that these emigrants of British extraction would raise up families who would be military outposts for the Empire, bulwarks against the imperialist ambitions of rival Powers, and propagators of British civilisation, were factors in the popular demand that emigration from the Mother Country be directed to the British Dominions. "Population is at the root of all defence", said a journalist,[2] and that defence was both commercial and military.

From the point of view of the Dominions as well, emigration from the British Isles was essential to their defence, and Kipling's wise advice, "Pump in the whites," was fully appreciated. Japan had risen as a Great Power to put Australia in

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1. The Times, May 24, 1909.
2. The Times, July 10, 1909.

Year	U.S.	%	B.N.A.	%	Aust.& N.Z.	%	C.of Good Hope	%	Other Places	%	Total
1891	156,395	72	21,578	10	19,547	9	9,090	4	11,897	5	218,507
1892	150,039	71	23,254	11	15,950	8	9,891	5	10,908	5	210,042
1893	148,949	72	24,732	12	11,203	5	13,097	6	10,833	5	208,814
1894	104,001	67	17,459	11	10,917	7	13,177	8	10,476	7	156,030
1895	126,502	68	16,622	9	10,567	6	20,234	11	11,256	6	185,181
1896	98,921	61	15,267	10	10,345	6	24,594	15	12,789	8	161,925
1897	83,324	58	15,571	11	12,061	8	12,109	14	12,395	9	146,460
1898	80,494	57	17,640	12	10,693	8	19,756	14	12,061	9	140,644
1899	92,482	63	16,410	11	11,467	8	14,432	10	11,571	8	146,362
1900	102,797	61	18,443	11	14,922	9	20,815	12	11,848	7	168,825
Total (10 yrs)	1,742,781	65	186,976	11	127,672	7	166,195	10	116,034	7	1,742,790
1901	104,195	61	15,757	9	15,350	9	23,413	13	13,270	8	171,715
1902	108,498	53	26,293	13	14,345	7	43,206	21	13,320	6	205,662
1903	123,663	48	59,652	23	12,375	5	50,206	19	14,054	5	259,950
1904	146,445	54	69,681	26	13,910	5	26,818	10	14,581	5	271,435
1905	122,370	47	82,437	31	15,139	6	22,804	10	15,824	6	262,077
1906	144,817	45	114,859	35	19,331	6	20,925	7	23,326	7	325,137
1907	170,264	43	151,216	38	24,767	6	19,568	6	28,508	7	395,680
1908	96,869	37	81,321	31	33,569	13	22,017	7	31,872	12	263,199
1909	109,700	38	85,887	30	37,620	13		8	33,537	11	288,761
1910	132,192	33	156,900	39	45,701	12	27,297	7	35,668	9	397,848
Total 10 yrs)	1,259,013	46	844,003	28	233,107	8	282,561	11	223,960	7	2,841,464
1911	121,814	27	184,860	40	80,770	18	30,767	7sic	36,316	8	454,527
1912	117,310	25	186,147	40	96,900	21	28,216	6	39,193	8	467,666
											3,763,657

From method of Compilation (Carrothers Emigration from the British Isles, P.309.)
- figures not accurate ,Vide pp.244-245.

a state of perpetual uneasiness which the British understanding with Japan has failed to allay entirely.

The population question has become a problem of the most serious proportions to the people of the East. From 1800 to 1930 the Chinese population increased by 100 millions and that of Java by 30 millions,[1] while it is estimated that if the population of Japan, at present over 60 millions, continues to increase at the present rate, it will reach 228,839,000 in 2017.[2] The ratio of crop land to population is lower in Japan than in any country in the world equally self-sufficing.[3] Although it is fairly obvious that the solution does not lie in emigration - for one cannot export a million people at once - yet it may be observed that there is some justice in the Japanese grievance that their lands are comparatively over-populated and unnecessary restrictions placed upon their expansion, when an Australian ex Prime Minister is prepared to admit that it has been estimated that there are at least 260,000,000 acres of land suitable for wheat-growing in Australia of which in 1928 not more than 35,000,000 acres were cultivated.[4] There appeared to be a sturdy possibility that when Great Britain was at war Japan might seize the opportunity to reach out to the empty Northern Territory and Northern Queensland as an outlet for her surplus millions. It would not be difficult to make a descent on Australia with the chain of islands that bridged the intervening ocean and the great preponderance that Japan enjoyed over the British fleet in the Pacific.[5]

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1. D.H. Cole, Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence, p.133.
2. Shiroshi Nasu, Population and Food Supply in Japan, Problems of the Pacific, ed. Condliffe, p.353.
3. Condliffe, op.cit., p.119.
4. Hughes, The Splendid Adventure, p,391.
5. Vide G.H. Lepper, British Policy in the Pacific, Empire Review, July 1913, Vol.25.

California, however, having learnt from Hawaii where Japanese syndicates had gained control of large fruit areas, had passed the Webb Act excluding Mongolians, as persons ineligible for citizenship, from the ownership of land. The more danger consequently for Australia, and successive military and civilian authorities, including Lord Kitchener and Mr Roosevelt, had urged upon the Australian Government to beware of an "empty north,"[1] but with little practical effect. It appeared unlikely that Australia could hold her ground in regard to a "White Australia" policy when unnumbered millions were straining behind Asiatic barriers, yet the Commonwealth was slow to give immigration any great encouragement. But Britain could not afford that Australia should perish. Australian trade had grown remarkably in the East and it was remembered that the Commonwealth was the buttress of England's power there, especially with regard to India.[2]

Nor could Canada afford to ignore Japan's obvious bent for an imperialist career in the Pacific. British Columbia should be developed by Britons, not Orientals.[3] The chief danger, however, confronting Canada from an immigration point of view, appeared to the British mind to lie in the Americanisation of the Prairies and the North West, a fear that has always existed, that was very strong at the time of Canadian Confederation,[4] has never ceased to arise at intervals, and with

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1. Clement Kinloch-Cooke, The Ethics of Emigration, 19th Cent., Oct. 1914, Vol.76.
2. C. de Thierry, Australia in the East, Un.Serv.Mag. Jan.1909, Vol.38.
3. Vide F.B. Vrooman, British Columbia and her Imperial Outlook, U.E. June 1912, Vol.2.
4. Martin, Confederation and the West, The Canadian Historical Association, May 1927; Trotter, Some American Influences upon the Canadian Federation Movement, The Canadian Historical Review, 1924, Vol.5, p,218.

which has been linked the ridiculous prophecy of peaceful political annexation of the Dominion by the United States. In "The Race Question in Canada", a book of 1907, Mr André Siegfried frightened the British public by the thought that Canada was losing her individuality, becoming "less and less British and more and more American,"[1] and in 1911 Laurier's effort to obtain a commercial arrangement with the United States led to the fear of annexation.[2]

From 1898 to 1907 there had been 420,000 immigrants into Canada from the United Kingdom, 326,000 from the United States, and 316,000 from other alien sources, but the Americans were going for the most part to the West and taking capital with them.[3] From 1907 to 1915, forty per cent of the homestead entries were by immigrants from the United States.[4] The fact that in 1908-1909 emigration from the United States to Canada had a large increase, while that from Great Britain to Canada fell off sharply, made the danger of American absorption the more serious, especially as those emigrants had taken in £10,600,000 in cash and settlers' effects.[5]

Because of the fear that Canada might become American in taste and sentiment if not in government, the desire grew that a Canadian nationality be developed, although most people in the United Kingdom who expressed this wish had in mind a nationality that would be predominantly British in all its

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1. The Race Question in Canada, p.252ff.
2. H.S. Gullett, The Americanisation of Canada, U.E. June 1911, Vol.2: he ridicules the annexation talk, but notes the American influence, even as Siegfried had done.
3. Louis Corbally, The Menace to Canadian Unity, Nat.Rev. June 1908, Vol.v.
4. W.A. Carrothers, Emigration from the British Isles, p.246.
5. C.R. Enock, An Imperial Commonwealth, pp.105-106.

characteristics. There is no doubt but that British opinion was right in fearing that an immigration policy which did not discriminate even among the white races would cause Canada grave difficulty in forming a homogeneous nationality. The experiment of the United States in "open-door" immigration has revealed the utter folly of "the melting pot" idea, unless it meant - and its originators certainly did not take it to mean - the melting-pot modification of Nordic habits and institutions. The unassimilable foreign elements in the United States have produced merely hyphenated Americans. Canada is in much the same danger: not only, as many writers have tried to show, has the United States "Americanised" the Dominion to a great degree, but the presence of segregated groups of Europeans and the fact of a strong racial estrangement between Quebec and Ontario have militated against Canadian nationalism.

Having seen the arguments for emigration from the British Isles from the point of view of preserving British racial predominance in the Dominions, the next consideration is from the point of view of the emigrant from the United Kingdom.

Emigration from Great Britain after reaching a minimum in 1877 was increased by reason of the depression that began in 1875, and the flow of population to the Dominions continued to grow steadily from 1879 to 1889.[1.] An Emigrant's Information Office was formed because of the new demand for direction, and placed under the Colonial Office with the Secretary of State for the Colonies as President.[2.] In 1894 the depression in North America and Australia caused the movement to slacken. In

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1. Carrothers, op.cit. ch.xii, p.225ff.
2. Ibid, pp.240-241.

Australia a collapse of credit, begun in 1889, reached its culmination in 1893 when several banks closed their doors and, moreover, the Labour Party in Australia became powerful and opposed immigration and assistance thereto became negligible, while a drought caused a considerable migration to New Zealand.[1.]

In the decade of 1891 to 1900 only 28% of the emigrants from the British Isles went to places within the Empire, but from 1901 to 1912 the number remaining within the Empire increased to 63% of the total and in 1913 it was 78%.[2.] Now the reason for this diversion was due in part to Imperial sentiment, as many people said, but it had other and more material bases. One reason consisted of the fact that private individuals and societies who played an outstanding part in furthering emigration gave great prominence to emigration to the Dominions. After the Conference of 1907 it was arranged that an army reservist might go to any part of the British Empire and draw his reserve pay, whereas until 1906 the Dominions had been included as external countries to which if he emigrated his pay stopped.[3.] A naval and military League was added to the numerous other existing emigration bodies, this one having the peculiar function of settling ex-service men and families in Oversea Dominions.[4.] The Poor Law Act of 1834 and the Unemployed Workmen Act of 1905 authorised the allocation of public funds to emigration purposes,

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1. Carrothers, op.cit. ch.xii, p.237.
2. The Times, Oct. 30, 1912; Statements of Mr Burns at the Conference of 1911, Cd.5745, p.199, and to the Dominions Royal Commission, Cd.6516, p.186: Proportion of British Emigrants to the Dominions as opposed to foreign countries had grown from 33% in 1900 to 82% in 1912.
3. Burns, op,cit. Cd.5745, p.201.
4. Begun by Mr E.T. Scammell; Vide Un. Serv. Mag., Mar. 1910, Vol.40.

but according to the latter Act no assistance was to be given to persons emigrating outside the Empire.[1.]

It was not strange that many youths found it impossible to resist the allurements offered by the vigorous propaganda in which the Dominions, particularly Canada, engaged, depicting countries of opportunity where rapid advance was possible, where a pit boy became a premier, where British traditions were preserved, and where the ideal of Britannic liberty burned as brightly as at home. Australia, at the opening of the twentieth century, inspired by Canada's example, had begun a strenuous immigration policy, and urged at the Conferences of 1907 and 1911 that the matter be given serious attention. Unlike Canada, the Commonwealth gave assistance to emigrants for their passage.[2.]

There was some complaint that the British Government did not sufficiently assist emigration. Mr Charles E.T. Stuart-Linton proposed state-aided immigration for those taking up farming in the colonies.[3.] It was also suggested that the Imperial authorities should advance a sum of £500,000 annually to suitable colonists whom the Colonies should accept by way of gratitude to the Mother Country.[4.] Others desired State aid to propagate a scheme similar to Dr Barnardo's as a solution for the social problem of the slums.[5.]

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1. Clement Kinloch-Cooke, Migration Within the Empire, 19th Cent. Dec. 1912, Vol.72. Knowles, Economic Development of the Overseas Empire, Vol.ii, p.97.
2. Statement of J. Obed Smith, Cd.6516, p.86.
3. Stuart-Linton, The Problem of Empire Governance, p.189ff.
4. R.L. Gwynne, Chairman of the Kent Colonising Association, An Imperial Colonisation Scheme, Emp.Rev. Mar.1910, Vol.19.
5. F. A. Gisborne, Australian Immigration, Emp.Rev., Aug.1910, Vol.20.

Sir Clement Kinloch-Cooke noted that, whereas in the United Kingdom there were 120,000 miles with 45,000,000 people, Australia was practically an empty continent with 3,000,000 miles for four to four and a half millions of inhabitants, or one and a quarter persons to the square mile, and Canada had about two persons to the square mile.[1.] "The fact," said he, "That the British Empire is the property, not of one set of Britons or of another set, but of the whole British race, might be a myth, so absolutely and entirely is it left out of consideration." Sir Clement proposed an Imperial Board of Emigration with administrative and executive powers, to consist of two commissioners with representatives of the different Government departments concerned and the head of the Labour Exchanges, who would have power to

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1. Kinloch-Cooke, op.cit.

Countries.	Area Unit, 10,000 h.*	Pop. Unit 10,000	Pop. per 100 h.
United States	13,820	11,200	79.6
British India	12,210	31,880	260.9
Russia	9,900	9,590	96.9
Canada	2,750	920	33.4
France	2,290	3,918	171.1
Argentina	2,130	950	44.7
Germany	2,020	6,260	309.6
Italy	1,320	3,960	299.4
Australia	870	564	64.8
Japan	620	5,900	950.4
Great Britain	570	4,370	761.4
Belgium	120	770	629.1
Holland	90	720	779.7
New Zealand	74	130	170.7

Shiroshi Nasu.
Population and Food Supply in Japan. Problems of the Pacific. ed. Condliffe. Table iv. Arable Land and Population compared p.342.
*h (hectare) = 2.471 acres.

add to their number, while the High Commissioners for the Dominions and the Assistant Superintendent of Emigration for Canada in London would be honorary members. There would also be attached to this Board a paid Secretary, an independent chairman, and a staff of clerks, working in conjunction with the Colonial Office. This would provide efficient machinery, meet the request of the Dominions for direct representation on an executive for the direction of migration, co-ordinate the work of the various voluntary societies, and bring all emigration under Government control.[1] Kinloch-Cooke's efforts to bring about Government action in these matters proved unavailing, as did those of Mr Goldman who wished a migration Conference with the Dominions.[2]

Another writer mooted a proposal that the inhabitants of the United Kingdom should acquire large tracts of land and that shares be sold, thus creating new centres of industry which would be at the same time offshoots of Great Britain.[3]

Mr Rider Haggard desired a system of colonisation to be promoted by the Mother Country,[4] but the Commission enquiring into the scheme was probably influenced by the failure of attempts at colonisation in South Africa in 1880, 1886, and 1888, while the effort to found an all-British settlment at Lloydminster in Saskatchewan, known as Barr Colony, had also been a sorry failure.[5] At any rate, the Commission found the system altogether

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1. One remembers that Mr (Lord) Harcourt quashed a plan for a joint Board at the 1911 Conference lest it lead to undesirable competition between the various Dominions in regard to gaining favours. Cd.5745, pp.203-204.
2. H.C. Debs. 29 June, 1910, Vol.18, p.1027ff, and pp.1046-48.
3. Enock, op.cit. p.159 and p.162ff.
4. Cd.2562.
5. Carrothers, op.cit. p.238ff. and p.247.

impracticable, recommending that a grant-in-aid should be made by the Imperial Government to the Committees formed under the Workmen Act for the purpose of assisting emigration.[1]

The view, however, that the United Kingdom must export large numbers of citizens and the Dominions should multiply their population as rapidly as possible, was by no means unanimous and there were many variations of opinion. There was the point of view that there was a large surplus population in the towns as a result of exploited agricultural districts and that the workers should be enabled to go where their opportunities were greater to save them from deterioration both physically and morally as a result of idleness and the povery of the slums. This was the individualist point of view as advanced by philanthropic bodies such as the Salvation Army. On the other hand there was the national point of view - that the State had no inducement to subsidize emigration since the State did not benefit and might lose by the departure of a large number of workers who, in time of war, might be soldiers.[2] Nor could the Dominions Royal Commission entirely satisfy themselves that emigration to other parts of the Empire produced trade with the United Kingdom,[3] although in another report they stated their belief that the large British trade in Australasia indicated that it was to the direct interest of the merchant and manufacturer of the United Kingdom that the population of the Dominions should be developed by an adequate supply of immigrants. Yet they found that the extent of this argument was a matter upon which it was impossible to speak with certainty.[4]

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1. Cd.2978, pt.1.
2. Vide The Policy of Emigration, Col.Off. Journ. Apr.1913,Vol.6.
3. Cd.7173, p.64.
4. Cd.7211, p.9.

There was also much danger that with the natural decrease of rural population and with the Colonies preferring men with farm experience, agricultural England would become almost depopulated.[1] Much bitter complaint was heard in the United Kingdom with regard to the fact that the Colonies took only the valuable citizen - the skilled labourer or farmer - and favoured immigrants with money.[2] It was undoubtedly a good policy for the Dominions to accept only the purest effluent and reject the dregs - in fact many in the United Kingdom saw that it was a just and necessary policy[3] - but it led to the fear that, as Mr Baker, the Director of Dr Barnardo's Homes expressed it, "It is a misfortune, perhaps, but finally everybody left in this country will probably be feeble-minded."[4] It was appreciated that the Dominions must not be given a worthless town population, but if the land of England was to be allowed to fall into neglect, with depopulated or sparsely populated rural districts, and the towns to be congested with the unhealthy and the unemployed, it would be impossible to successfully retain the headship of an Empire in the United Kingdom.[5]

The existence of a large emigration became the more alarming as the birthrate declined, 1910 being the lowest birth-rate on record.[6] The birthrate in England and Wales in 1907 was 26.3 per 1000 of the population, to that time the lowest on

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1. Sir Gilbert Parker, British Lands and British Emigration, 19th Cent. Nov.1912, Vol.72.
2. General Booth, Emigration and the Salvation Army, pp.8-9; p.13ff.
3. F.A.W. Gisborne, Australian Immigration, Emp.Rev. Aug.1910, Vol.20.
4. Quoted A.S. Hurd, The Danger of Unrestricted Emigration, Fort. Rev., Feb. 1914, Vol.95.
5. Vide C. Turner, Land Problems and National Welfare, p.327; also Emigration Conference, May 30, 31, U.E. July 1910, Vol.1, p. 510ff.
6. Enock, op.cit., p.19.

record, and in fact in that year England and Wales had the lowest birthrate of any European country except France. In 1876 it had been 36.3 and since then the proportion had steadily fallen with slight fluctuations.[1] Mr Burns, Chairman of the British Government Board of Emigration, told the Dominions Royal Commission in 1912 that, while the emigration in 1901 from the United Kingdom was only 16% of the natural increase of the population, the average for the last eleven years had been 33% of the natural increase. The emigration of 1910 was 47% of the natural increase and in 1911 it was 60%. Ireland was emigrating more than its natural increase and Scotland much more.[2] It might be noted that the increase in immigration was almost entirely from Scotland and England, as the Irish supply had been drained out by the huge emigration since 1846, but even this decreased emigration with regard to Ireland was greater than the natural increase of the population so that the decrease in population was 76,000 in the first ten years of the century.[3] Mr Chiozza Money was alarmed by the fact that the increase of the population was a mere 4% in 1900.[4] He opposed the idea that the large transfer of the population to the colonies helped the British Empire, for their eyes were not turned to Europe but South and East to Japan and the United States. While the population of Germany was increasing he believed it a suicidal policy to strengthen the Overseas Dominions at the cost of degrading the United Kingdom. "Every taxpayer, lost to the United Kingdom is so much lost to the wealth and man-power on which the main burden

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1. Lt.-Col. W.Hill-Clino, A Healthy Race, West. Rev. Jan.1910, Vol.173.
2. Cd.6516, p.187. "Natural increase" being the preponderance of births over deaths.
3. Burns, Conference 1911, Cd.5745, p.200; Carrothers, op.cit. p.245.
4. L.G.Chiozza Money, A Littler England, 19th Cent. Mar.1912, Vol.71.

of Imperial security still rests," was the version of the Times in the argument. Had the Empire been a single organisation in matters of defence, the charges would be evenly distributed, and the argument would no longer obtain. Moreover emigration was doing little to mitigate poverty for a very large percentage of the population lost was neither penniless nor out of employment, while a larger proportion of the incapable were left for society to support.[1] Much of the opposition to emigration was also due to the popularity of the doctrines of Henry George and Karl Marx who opposed emigration as a means to improving the position of the labourer.

There seemed to be only ome class of migrant agreeable to all sections of opinion in the Mother Country and the Colonies - there was a dearth of women in the Colonies and a surplus in the United Kingdom.[2]

The exclusion policy as applied by Australia and Canada to the Citizens of the United Kingdom was a great blow to British Imperialists. In early times the colonies had been glad to receive any immigrants from the United Kingdom, but following on the federation of Australia an Act of 1901 regulated immigration, and it soon came under the censure of the United Kingdom owing to the exclusion of some English hatters on the ground that they had come out under contract of service in Australia, an act which strongly suggested exclusion of competition rather than a policy of immigration which had for its end the building up of the population of Australia.[3] There was no question, however,

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1. The Times, Oct. 30, 1912.
2. Cd.7210, p.13; Statement of Mr Harold Cox. Cd.6516, p.190.
3. Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.74.

of the British Government intervening in the matter, and one notes that during his protests in the House of Commons against the Canadian policy, Sir Clement Kinloch-Cooke does not suggest the compelling of Canadian modification in their treatment of immigrants, but only enquires "what steps it is proposed to take to bring home to the Dominion of Canada the hardships" worked on the British emigration bodies.[1] There was a good deal of criticism also of Australian employers for repelling immigrants with "encumbrances".[2]

There were many Old Country Imperialists who were shocked by signs at Canadian places of employment reading, "No Englishmen need apply." It was suggested that the attitude was due to the emigration of the unemployed "loafer" or the "remittance man" and not to the good blood of England[3] - a very true observation. Sir Francis Piggott suggested the difficulty when he enquired, "What would a promising young barrister say if emigration were suggested to him?"[4] Sir Francis spoke quite approvingly of the Canadian restrictive Acts of 1898 shutting out defective and vicious children.

The Canadian regulations of 1910, however, raised much anger against Canada among the Imperialists of the Empire.[5] When an emigration conference was convened by the Royal Colonial Institute at which fifty societies engaged in philanthropic work were represented, much annoyance was expressed at the failure

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1. H.C. Debs., 29 June 1910, Vol.18, p.1030.
2. An Emigration Policy, Empire Day Supplement, The Times, May 24, 1910.
3. Dr Arthur Shadwell, Labour and Immigration, the Times, Jan.4, 1908.
4. Piggott, On the Making of an Over-Sea Dominion, 19th Cent., Apr. 1910, Vol.67.
5. Sir Clement Kinloch-Cooke, Canada's Exclusiveness, Emp.Rev. July 1910, Vol.19.

of any representatives of the Dominions to appear, although the High Commissioner and Agents General had been invited.[1] A Canadian Order-in-Council of March imposed financial restrictions on immigrants from which restrictions were exempted men going to farm employment, women to domestic service, and those going to close relatives who were willing to support them. They must also have sufficient money to reach their destination. By another regulation all emigrants had to be passed by the Assistant Superintendent of Emigration for Canada if assisted by an emigration society, a charitable organisation, or out of public funds. On April 20, when emigration schemes for the year were planned by the societies, the Assistant Superintendent, Mr J. Obed Smith, upon whom the power of exemption rested, acting upon instructions, issued a circular to the effect that his consent would henceforth be conditioned by the ability of the emigrants for farm work and for whom such positions in Canada were guaranteed, regardless as to whether they were going to friends or relatives, or had the landing money required. Thus the door was closed to all skilled mechanics and artistans assisted in this way and also caused much inconvenience as in the case of a family thus assisted who wished to join the breadwinner in Canada.[2] The Canadian policy of deporting immigrants who, within three years of landing, had become charges on the public also irritated British opinion which felt that the Dominion got the lion's share of benefit from the policy of migration.[3] There had been some complaint when five

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1. U.E. July 1910, Vol.i, op.cit. Even had they attended, their official position would have prevented an expression of views on the matter.
2. Kinloch-Cooke, op,cit.
3. Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.75,

families were deported back to London from St. Catherines because the heads of the families refused work when it was offered to them.[1] The influence of the Duke of Connaught as Governor General fortunately served to mitigate the harshness of the regulations.

Mr Enock declared that, "This exclusion or deportation of British citizens must be regarded as a breach of the constitutional law - written or unwritten - regarding the Empire."[2] No passport beyond British citizenship should be necessary to obtain entry into any part of the Empire, otherwise the relations of those parts were those of a foreign country. "Because unemployment had reared its head in colonial cities, and wastrels from Britain have been found in colonial streets, is legislation to be enacted against the Mother Country who, in the first instance, supplied the land, the cities, and the streets? Under the growth of such a prinsiple imperial sentiment becomes hypocrisy."[3] If, continued the writer, Canada and Australia were independent countries the purpose they advance in their restriction of British immigrants would be reasonable enough.[4] The words reveal a complete failure to understand the elements of colonial nationalism or responsible Government, the idea behind the tirade being, could an Englishman be shut out of his own house? The principle underlying responsible Government was that every part of the Empire knew what was best for itself.

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1. The Times, Mar. 19, 1908.
2. Enock, op.cit. p.95.
3. Ibid, p.98.
4. Ibid, p.103.

One must confess that in regard to migration at any rate the British Government certainly have shown no failure to act in accordance with the principles of responsible Government, and their forbearance is the more striking in regard to Indian migration within the Empire. On occasion the Dominion Governments have failed to treat the Indian question tactfully, but the British Government persevered in its policy of applying nothing but moral pressure - stressing the duty of the Dominions to act wisely for the sake of the Empire as a whole. The facts that the European alien is treated much better in Canada, Australasia, and South Africa and that the Japanese de facto enjoys a preference over the Indian in Canada owing to the fact that she is able to enforce rules of emigration not possible in the case of India,[1] were not conditions designed to promote a love for the Empire in the Indian, especially since he could claim a greater capability to assimilate British civilisation than Canadian Dukhobors. There is a certain sorrow in considering the treatment of this great and proud Indian people, although it must be realized that the ideals maintained by the nations of the Empire demand stringent restriction from the point of view of racial purity and standard of living conditions which would fall drastically under the effect of cheap Asiatic labour. Lord Crewe, however, to the Imperial Conference of 1911, made an eloquent plea for the Indians, showing that their standard of living was not necessarily lower simply because their diet was of a different and less expensive nature from the person of British blood, that there need be no disabilities placed on Indians who were merely visitors to the Dominions. that they should

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1. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.258.

not, having lawfully immigrated, be subjected to peculiar disabilities in the Dominions, and that the history and traditions of India entitled her to respect and courtesy.[1.] The only effective reply was that the Indian would establish conditions of labour with which it was impossible for the white man to successfully compete. Notwithstanding this fact, there does not seem to have been any good reason why India should have been excluded from the Conference of 1907,[2.] and Professor Keith evidently had much the same opinion.[3.] Gentleness in good time might have avoided much of the present unhappy state of India and the Empire.

One of the most striking incidents in the relations of Canada with India occurred upon the action of Gurdit Singh, who had acquired a fortune in Canadian timber, in bringing three hundred and seventy-five Hindus to work his limits and mills. In Canada's arrangements with Japan, the Canadian Government had issued orders against the landing of any strangers except from the land of their origin. Using the authority of this enactment the deportation of the Hindus was ordered on the ground that they could provide no proof of continuous voyage.

The counsel for the Hindus argued that Canada had no power to exclude British subjects, the argument being that they were subjects of the King, that this was part of the King's Dominions, and that Canada, therefore, had no power of exclusion. There was no little indignation, even among Canadians, and to many the action of the Canadian Parliament seemed "arbitrary and indefensible."[4.] It required a decision by Chief Justice Macdonald

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1. Cd.5745, p.395ff.
2. Cd.3523, p.v.
3. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.192, pp.552-553, p.588.
4. The Times, Mar. 19, 1908.

to the effect that the King had power, with the advice and consent of the Imperial Parliament, to make laws for the exclusion of persons from British Possessions, whether or not those persons were British subjects. This power had been delegated to the Canadian Parliament without any reservation under the British North America Act of 1867, and consequently the Canadian Parliament had the same plenitude of powers as the British, saving only the right of the King to disallow Canadian Acts, which was not exercised in the case of the Canadian Immigration laws.[1.]

But if the other Dominions have chastised the Indians with whips, South Africa has chastised then with scorpions. Professor Keith records that in regard to the treatment of the Indians already settled in the country, "The policy of South Africa in this respect has been an extraordinary record of meanness."[2.] Perhaps, too, there is no incident which more clearly proves that the reason for the treatment of the Indian in regard to immigration is economic rather than a concern of race or eugenics.[3.] Professor Egerton has said that, "No chapter in

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1. The Britannic Rev., Aug. 1914, Vol.1, pp.426-427.
2. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.587.
3. For a review of the Subject see Responsible Government,1927, Vol.ii, p.824ff. Professor Keith suggests the sentence above when he says: "Racial superiority has regarded the masses of natives with indifference; the spectacle of the indentured Indians settling on the land and making themselves happy homes, while rising slowly but surely in culture and wealth, excited jealous indignation, and induced the population of the territory - whose conduct in regard to natives and Indians alike proclaimed the folly of granting them charge of other men's interests - to enter on its course of seeking bylaw to depress those whose industry and energy reflected on themselves." There are other writers who go further and point out that intermarriage of the races has never been proved to be bad eugenics, but that those who argue from that view are rationalising.

imperial history is more melancholy and humiliating than that which deals with the treatment accorded to British Indians in British South Africa,"[1] and certainly the success of the British in the South African War did not tend to mitigate the difficulties of the Indians in that country.[2] Mr Lyttelton happily refused to allow some unjust legislation of 1904 with regard to Indians in Transvaal, but it was most unfortunate that there was no effort made by the British Government upon granting responsible government to provide for a proper treatment of the Indians. "Of the many melancholy pages of British history few are darker than that of Conservative and Liberal Governments alike in their attitude to the question of Indians in the Transvaal, and, while the wisdom and magnanimity of the grant of responsible government to the conquered colonies must justly be recognized, it is deplorable that no room could be found for justice to other British subjects."[3] These words are typical of the British attitude on the subject: there was no thought of hedging responsible government about with safeguards, but it was generally felt to be a great pity that the destiny of the South African Indian had to be so jeopardized.

The Indian did not lack support in British public opinion, and when the Transvaal authorities attempted to enforce more stringent provisions regarding the registration of Asiatics, the outcry in the United Kingdom grew vehement. The situation was briefly this:[4] These Indians had presumably registered

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1. Egerton, British Colonial Policy in the Twentieth Century, p.176.
2. Cd.2239, p.4ff; Letter of M.M. Bhownaggree to Joseph Chamberlain, Sept.15, 1903, on the comparison at the conditions of the Indians before and after the War. pp.22-24.
3. Responsible Government, p.827.
4. The Times, Jan,7, 1908; Responsible Government,pp.826-829.

themselves under the Republican law; since then some doubts had arisen as to the validity of this registration and the Indians voluntarily agreed, on Lord Milner's advice in 1903, to be registered again, Lord Milner promising that no further registration would be required. Nevertheless, on the ground that Indian immigrants were illegally entering the country under cover of permits issued to those legally established there, a new law was brought forward in 1906 which Lord Elgin refused to pass. On its being returned to him by the new responsible Government he assented to it, although with reluctance. His pronouncement was to the following effect: "The Act which is now submitted has behind it a very different weight of authority. It has been introduced by the first responsible Ministry of the Colony, and has been passed unanimously by both Houses of the new Legislature. I consider it my duty to place it on record that His Majesty's Government do not consider the position of Asiatics lawfully resident in the Transvaal, as settled by this Act, to be satisfactory; that they adhere to the opinions which have been expressed by successive Secretaries of State as to the desirability of relaxing the restrictions to which Asiatics are at present subject; and that they recommend this view to the Transvaal Government in the hope that it may be carefully considered how far practical effect can be given to it. But they feel that they would not be justified in offering resistance to the general will of the Colony clearly expressed by its first elected representatives."[1] The Times did not believe in so ineffective an attitude on the part of the Imperial Parliament and suggested a

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1. Cd.3887, p.9.

moratorium in the execution of the law until the Transvaal Parliament met again. A further Act of 1907 provided for the deportation at his own expense of any Asiatic who refused to register under the former Act and anyone believed to be detrimental to the peace, order, and good government of the country. In 1908 further Acts made the laws as to immigration, residence, and occupation more stringent. The objection to registration was chiefly to the finger-print of all ten digits. The British Indians in the Transvaal had long been accustomed to left thumb impression, but this regulation placed them on the same footing as heinous criminals and "ticket-of-leave" men.[1] Thousands of letters poured in upon the Press protesting against this "incredible harshness."[2] It was recalled that Lord Lansdowne, among others, had made the treatment accorded the Indians by the Boers one of the grounds for the War. Mr Harold Cox advanced the plea that the British Government had specially reserved the right to deal with question of this nature and that she should now do so.[3] Many of these Indians had been admitted under indentures as early as 1860,[4] and consequently had every bit as much right to be in the country as any member of the Transvaal Government.[5]

Mr Smuts replied to the criticisms by pointing out that thousands of false permits had been sold in the last five years and that there had been fifteen hundred prosecutions of Indians

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1. Sir Henry Cotton, Letter to The Times, Jan.14, 1908.
2. Indicus, The Times, Jan.7, 1908.
3. The Times, Jan.7, 1908.
4. O.J.R. Howarth, Some Aspects of Imperial Commerce and Communication, Oxford Survey, p.359.
5. The Times, Jan. 17, 1908.

entering without permits. The finger-print system was in operation in India without offense to religious susceptibilities.[1] He declared the Act protected Indians legally entitled to residence and accused Gandhi of carrying on an agitation and picketing Indians, frightening those willing to register.[2] Lord Ampthill supported the South African legislation as safeguarding action.[3] The Imperial Government wished assurance that Indians of rank would not be excluded from the country. Both Lord Elgin and Lord Morley were greatly displeased that the Transvaal had not been satisfied merely with education tests for the exclusion of undesirables and that Indians of position should be subjected to the indignity of a thumb print.[4] The restrictions were relaxed and the signatures of Indians of position or education were accepted instead of finger prints, while no information was to be required that offended religious susceptibilities.[5] An Amendment Act of August 21 met all the Indian Association demands regarding Indian immigrants except that new Asiatic immigrants be allowed to enter subject to the same educational tests as Europeans.[6] Further resentment was occasioned among the Indians when the Transvaal authorities refused Mohomedan prisoners the right to observe their religious fasts and Hindus were compelled to do work involving loss of caste.[7] In 1909 the Transvaal Government used means of questionable justice to deport some Indians

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1. But vide Cd.4327, p.11 for a distinction in method.
2. The Times, Jan.6, 1908.
3. The Times, Jan.31, 1908.
4. Cd.3887, p.53.
5. The Times, Jan.31, 1908.
6. The Times, Aug.24, 1908.
7. Responsible Government, op.cit. p.829; Cd.4327,4584,5363, p.4, p.25, pp.29-31 and passim.

considered undesirable,[1] and the Indians finally set out to follow Mr Gandhi in the method of protest known as "passive resistance" when the advent of Union did not mitigate their lot to any considerable extent.[2] The results were sorry indeed,[3] and opinion in Britain grew less cordial to the Indians who were now found at fault for stubborness.[4] An Act in 1911 determined that immigration should cease, and that a small number of education Indians would be admitted, while the registration law was relaxed, but did not alleviate the condition of Indians already resident in the country and did not allow free inter-provincial movement.[5] The Bill of 1913 practically closed immigration to Indians and did little to meet their grievances, the greatest of which were the tax of £3 a head and the question of monogamy.[6] Minor concessions were allowed as the result of enquiries by a Commission, but it appeared more and more clearly that the Empire would rigidly observe a colour bar and that the Indians in South Africa need not expect the freedom accorded to the white race nor equality in competing for licences to trade and positions of labour.[7] An Act of 1914 did not a little to ameliorate the hardships of the resident Indians,[8] although much remained to oppress them and they brought their problems to the Conference of 1917.

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1. Responsible Government, op.cit.
2. Gandhi's differences with the Government are brought out by his correspondence with Mr Smuts, Cd.4327, p.15ff.
3. Cd.7111, p.26, p.63, pp.65-67.
4. The Times, Sept.16, 1908 and succeeding numbers.
5. Cd.7111, p.26.
6. Ibid, p.27.
7. The Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.82.
8. Cd.7265, 6087.

It was not with regard to the Indian question that South Africa occasioned the greatest indignation in Britain, but the humanitarian instincts of the British public have stormed against the treatment accorded to the natives in the Union. Not that Great Britain has not been cognizant of the difficulties in the situation; one of the greatest critics of the treatment of South African natives has remarked on the great majority of natives over European population and the improbability of reducing the proportions.[1] The South African considers the native predestined to the servility of social, industrial, and political position which his generally low intelligence warrants at present, making little effort to bring him to a superior condition, disliking the fact that some natives obtain education which they feel merely serves to render them discontented, and looking with contempt upon missionary endeavour. The Englishman has had a shrewd suspicion that the dislike for native education has an economic basis which is the fear of competition. The Dominions Royal Commission found it necessary to emphasise the conclusion of the Economic Commission that, "It is undesirable that barriers should be placed in the way of non-white labour by the State or local authorities to prevent their advancement to any kind of work of which they are capable."[2]

Reports of various Commissions have been unavailing to remedy the ill effects of the native rule, and there has been no substantial change in the situation since the Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1906-07, to the effect that the

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1. Responsible Government, op.cit. pp.796-797. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp.180-181.
2. Cd.7505, p.20.

lands system and administrative control were subject to adverse criticism, that "the chasm between the races has been broadening for years, and...the attitude of the natives is now one of distance and distrust."[1] The proposal that the native races of Natal and the Transvaal be segregated as in Basutoland and native assemblies be created[2] was obviously impossible of application where the white and black are so intermingled.[3]

British public opinion flared up in the trial of Dinizulu who, against the best colonial advice had been allowed to reside in the colony,[4] and after the murder of Mr H.M. Stainbank and unrest among the natives - suspected to be due to Dinzulu's complicity - his deportation was strongly urged.[5] The fact that the Natal public and officials resented British advice and yet desired to use British troops to maintain order provoked the rebuke that, "The step involved is very serious involving as it does direct responsibility of His Majesty's Government for native affairs in the Colony. These...have been managed far from satisfactorily since the establishment of Responsible Government, and it is essential, in order to justify the use of Imperial troops in what is of the nature of police duty, that I should have full information to show that the proposed action is absolutely necessary."[6] The Natal Government issued a proclamation

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1. Cd.3889, p.7ff.
2. Silburn, The Governance of Empire, pp.227-228.
3. Vide Egerton, op.cit. p.173.
4. Ibid, p.12; G.M.Theal, South Africa, pp.352-354.
5. Cd.3888, p.109, p.150 and passim.
6. Ibid, p.110. A reference to this "snub" in the Legislative Assembly of Natal: Cd.4194, p.108; The attitude of the British Government caused some bitterness in Natal, Cd.4328,p.59, speech of Attorney-General for Natal, p.61ff; Also Journ.Parl. of the Emp. 1920, Vol.i, p.566.

for martial law against the advice of the Governor, and the trial of Dinizulu aroused further apprehensions in Britain. Elgin nervously wrote the Governor, "I think you should consider whether your Ministers should not now inform His Majesty's Government of their intentions regarding Dinizulu, supposing him to surrender or be arrested, and particularly give assurances of a fair trial."[1] However, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who could be firm enough on occasion, replied to a memorial urging Imperial interference regarding the application of martial law that, "His Majesty's Government are not called upon to offer justification or apology for the policy of employing martial law in existing circumstances in Natal, which has commended itself to those who are responsible for the peace and security of the Colony"[2] - a wise observation, obvious enough to the student of Imperial Government but not to the general public. Replying to the demand that the Imperial Government was in honour bound to reserve the ultimate decision of Dinizulu's fate to themselves, Campbell-Bannerman declared that such decision must be reserved until after the trial.

It was bitterly commented upon that there was not a Liberal statesman in the House of Commons who did not condemn the punishment of Dinizulu, yet Britain permitted the Indemnity Act.[3] The idea of a united or permanent Empire was rejected by one writer because it would strengthen the whites to enable them to oppress the coloured races,[4] and the Westminster Review was consistently hostile to the cause of Imperialism.

1. Dec.9, 1907, Cd.3888, p.177.
2. The Times, Jan.16, 1908.
3. A.B. Wallis Chapman, Imperial Relations in 1909, West. Rev., Mar. 1910, Vol.173.
4. Ibid.

Thus, from another point of view, it is suggested that Dominion self-government and Imperialism were incompatible. In connection with these problems of Indians and natives is also shown again the fact that the Imperialism which had as its end the assumption of the "White Man's Burden" and the development of the subject Empire was inseparable from the Impérialism which would have united the English-speaking Empire.

Another point which emerges from the native and Indian quarrel is that the British Government, although having ample provocation to interfere, yet reiterated the absolute authority of the South African Government. The enforcement of a colour bar which cuts off the native from obtaining employment in a large number of skilled industries, and also the limitation of the amount of land placed at his disposal which prevents him developing farm lands, have been opposed to traditional British policy in regard to using natives not as merely hewers of wood and drawers of water for their masters, and might have been justly considered incidents for British interference.[1] "The issues," remarks a critic, "are essentially domestic, and the newly acquired sovereignty of the union renders it improper for the British Government, even by suggestion, to intervene on behalf of any section of the population subject to Union jurisdiction."[2] It was possible, however, for the British Government to assert its reasonable view that, as in the Native trouble of 1906, a self-governing colony was not entitled to say one day, "Hands off! No dictation in our internal affairs", and the next day to telegraph for the protection of a brigade of British infantry.

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1. Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.72.
2. Ibid, p.73.

There also arose from the discussion on these matters of immigration, and Asiatic and native policites, the question of what constituted British citizenship. To some men it seemed immoral that the various component races of the Empire should be subjected to such unequal treatment throughout its limits. Could not Great Britain insist on a decision being arrived at as to equality of treatment of her coloured subjects and allies throughout the "commonwealth of nations?"[1] The discussion was for the most part academic but interesting.

The old idea had been that a British subject had an inalienable right of free entry to every part of the King's Dominions, and, if a civilized man, to enjoy therein the same political privileges as any other civilised man, irrespective of race. The Colonial Legislatures, however, by an Act of 1847, had been granted the power of conferring local nationality and the Naturalization Acts of 1870 and 1914 confirmed them in that right.[2] This local naturalization did not confer the status of a British subject throughout the United Kingdom, although it was considered that naturalization in the Mother Country did become effective throughout the Empire. It was clear, nevertheless, that the immigration policies of the Dominions had considerably reduced the practical application of that theory.[3] There

1. Letter of Francis P. Fletcher-Vane, the Times, Jan.17, 1908.
2. Responsible Government, op.cit. p.1041.
3. Lord Milner's speech to the Canadian Club may be accepted only as rhetoric, when he says that a citizen of the Empire "does not regard himself as a foreigner in any part of it...It is part of his birthright to be a citizen, to be at home, in every quarter of the Empire...For this world-wide state belongs just as much to every born Canadian....as it does to any Englishman." Speeches, p.361; Nov.3, 1908.

was a school of thought which wished to make Dominion nationalism the basis of a Britannic partnership, each part regulating its own citizenship on the basis of "Canada first", "Australia first", and similarly for the other constituents, while conceding India a like autonomy in respect to internal Government and fiscal policy. An Imperial Journal sighed, "But those who have cherished the ideal of an undivided Empire-State cannot easily transfer their allegiance to that of a commonwealth of States, bound only by ties of interest, sentiment, and loyalty to the Crown."[1] Lord Milner expressed the hope that a day might come when the words, "The Empire is my country," would not be a hard saying to any civilised man, no matter what his race or locality, but he would recognize that "his highest allegiance is to the Empire as a whole."[2] He even considered that Imperial patriotism "of a kind" could be developed among races of non-British origin, even among the French, the Indians, and the African subject races, although such Imperialism might never be of the "fervid type."[3] This is a good illustration of the movement away from the racialism of earlier Imperialist thought, for Lord Milner had been the strongest advocate of racial sentiment which took little account of other races in the sense of partnership.[4]

This sentiment for an Imperial citizenship was demonstrated with regard to the Olympic Games, the special correspondent of the Times writing that, "It would be well, for larger than mere

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1. U.E. Dec. 1913, Vol.4, p.926.
2. Speeches, p.489, To the Author's Club, Dec.2, 1912.
3. Ibid, pp.492-493.
4. Vide ibid, "Communis Patria," Speech to the Compatriots Club, June 24, 1909.

Olympic reasons, that the world should be accustomed to regard the Empire as a unity. There can be no doubt but that here in Stockholm its partition has prejudiced our standing in the eyes of other peoples, and has given excuse for not a little patronizing talk of England's decadence."[1] A leading article contended that with the strength of the Empire masses there could be no such suggestion. Sir A. Conan Doyle made the same appeal for a united Empire team: "Such a movement would...be of the highest political importance, for there could not be a finer object lesson of the unity of the Empire than such a team all striving for the victory of the same flag."[2]

Sir Wilfrid Laurier had a genius, of which he was perhaps unconscious, for starting British Imperialists down wrong lanes. At the Conference of 1911 the delegates were making an effort, on a motion of Mr Batchelor's, to secure a high standard which would provide persons conforming thereto with Imperial certificates of naturalization while not limiting the right of a Dominion to legislate with regard to local naturalization.[3] The result, important from an Imperial point of view, was a decision that Imperial nationality should be world-wide and uniform, each Dominion being left free to grant local nationality on such terms as its Legislature thought fit. The Mother Country found it necessary to maintain five years as a qualifying period. This would be a safeguard to the Dominions as well as the United Kingdom, but five years anywhere in the Empire should be as good as

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1. The Times, July 18, 1912.
2. The Times, July 18, 1912.
3. Cd.5745, p.249. For anomalies in naturalization throughout the Empire vide Responsible Government, 1912, Vol.iii, pp.1322-1324.

five years in the United Kingdom. The grant of Imperial nationality was in every case discretionary, and this discretion should be exercised by those responsible in the area in which the applicant had spent the last twelve months. The Imperial Act should be so framed as to enable each self-governing Dominion to adopt it. Nothing proposed would affect the validity and effectiveness of local law regulating immigration and the like or differentiating between classes of British Subjects.[1.]

Laurier did not favour the compromise held desirable by the United Kingdom, preferring that naturalization in any one of the Dominions should confer British citizenship throughout the Empire, and desiring that the formula, "a British subject anywhere, a British subject everywhere," should obtain.[2.] Mr Malan wished the term, British citizenship, to be clearly understood to mean, "subject to the local laws which obtain as regard the rights of a British subject, whether of citizenship or of admittance into a country," for the right to say what would be the composition of its population was a principle which South Africa would maintain.[3.] Mr Churchill, speaking at the end of the debate, welcomed the view of the Conference in favour of the desirability of securing "a uniform and world-wide status of British citizenship which shall protect the holder of that certificate wherever he may be, whether within the British Empire or in foreign countries.[4.] There were several considerations which prevented the application of Laurier's suggestion, such as the different residence requirements of the

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1. Cd.5745, p.270; Cd.5746, - 1, p.253.
2. Cd.5745, p.252, pp.261-262.
3. Ibid, pp.255-256.
4. Ibid, p.256.

of the Dominions, the fact that many South African naturalized persons could not speak English, and the existence of a colour bar in some cases.[1.]

In a discussion led by Mr Sargant, the majority opinion was that it was quite impossible to attach any definite meaning to the phrase, "British citizenship", beyond that of a person who was the bearer, actual or potential, of active, legal rights within some definite unity of the British Empire.[2.] All that the phrase could be held to imply was the benefit of the protection of the Empire, and all British citizens were equal only in the sense of owing an equal allegiance to the Crown. It was pointed out that even Professor Dicey's statement, that the attributes of citizenship consist in personal freedom of discussion and public meeting, would exclude British Indians as citizens.[3.] Lord Plunket wished British citizenship to apply fully to "all born under the British flag and of pure white stock." Professor Egerton was of the opinion that, "The existence of separate nations under a common Crown seems to necessitate the existence of separate types of citizenship."[4.] He deplored the condition which had not yet ensured that British citizenship in any portion of the Empire entailed the same rights qua the outside world. It had been recently shown in Parliament that the same person might be a British subject according to British law and a Russian according to Russian law, a condition which the Conference of 1911 and the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act,1914,[5.]

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1. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.ii, p.1042.
2. E.B. Sargant, British Citizenship.
3. Ibid, p,11, Lord Lamington.
4. Ibid, p.16.
5. Responsible Government, 1927, Vol.ii, pp.1042-1048.

did much to remedy. Mr Cavendish Boyle deplored the legalized power of expulsion from British States and the immigration barriers throughout the Empire.[1] Sir Frank Swettenham held that, since the British Parliament was technically supreme throughout the Empire, and the term, British citizenship, applied only to citizens of the United Kingdom, "civus Britannicus" must be a citizen of Great Britain.[2] Rev. Samuel Barnett did not like the idea of a Roman citizenship: "My own opinion is that the Empire will cohere just in so far as each of its members develop its own personality," a view that was shared by Sir Ralph Williams.[3]

A remark of Mr Sargant's is interesting, that is, interesting as an illustration of the fact that few people studied closely the evolution of the British Empire. "Many people", he said, "use the word 'citizenship' as if all British subjects were already at the same goal - and it just required a mere general certificate of naturalization to procure its holders..'a uniform and world-wide status of British citizenship.'"[4] In all these problems, the effort to find a solution led to the same theme: The end of a world-wide and common citizenship could only be attained, "by the creation of a single political sovereignty, and only such a sovereignty can permanently secure a single foreign policy and system of defence."[5]

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1. British Citizenship, p.20.
2. Ibid, p.21. It might be noted that naturalisation obtained in the United Kingdom created British citizenship valid throughout the world, while naturalisation in a colony had only local effect. Vide Sovereignty of the British Dominions, pp.62-63.
3. British Citizenship, pp.21-23.
4. Ibid, p.46.
5. What is British Citizenship? The Times, July 20, 1912.

Chapter V: Imperial Organisation.

There are two clear statement that preface a study of Imperial organisation during the period of 1905 to 1914. The first is that the need for Imperial organisation was recognised as increasingly necessary from the point of view of defence and of foreign policy. The difference between the statement as made now and as spoken in the earlier days by the Federation advocates consisted in the present urgency, for "Organise or Perish" became much more axiomatic in the pre-war years than ever before.

Yet this observation is balanced by the second fact that centrifugal tendencies were seen to be operating much more forcibly, that colonial nationalism was being appreciated more and more in the United Kingdom, and that unity in foreign policy was being increasingly jeopardised. Nevertheless, while there were occasional suggestions for the inclusion of India in the suggested union, racialism continued to be the dominant factor in any proposal. Thus Mr Ellis T. Powell told the Royal Colonial Institute that he much preferred to use the term "United British Nation", and it had been suggested by colonials that "United Nation Conference" would be a much better term than "Imperial Conference."[1] Despite the fact, however, that men like Mr Powell and Sir John Findlay, author of "The Imperial Conference (1911) from Within," regarded the racial tie as the foundation of Imperial Union, there was also a growing body who believed with Mr Jebb that, "To postulate or desiderate an overwhelming identity of race as the enabling condition of United Empire is surely to brand our Imperial ideal

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1. U. E. Vol.ii, p.540, Aug.1911.

as a reactionary type instead of the most advanced which the progress of civilisation had yet brought into the sphere of practical politics. From this standpoint Imperialists would be prudent to take Sir Wilfrid Laurier and General Botha, with their respective peoples, as the normal type of statesman and people which Imperialism is called upon to accommodate."[1.]

There was agreement on the need for Imperial co-operation, however, by everyone who recognised the dangerous trend of international politics. It was, consequently, generally felt that if the bonds were drawn closer it would be in response to the instinct of self-preservation. If the self-governing Empire drifted apart it would be because there was no need of reciprocal services in the development of "a full-orbed national life."[2.]

While everyone agreed upon the need for co-operation, there were various and opposed suggestions as to the form it should take. From the welter of proposals, at the time of the war at any rate, three tendencies were clearly discernible.[3.] There was the old hydra-headed federationist ideal of Empire whose advocates were thrown into a panic by every colonial advance in self-government, and who desired to form some central executive body controlling defence and foreign affairs which would bear the same constitutional relation to each of the self-governing parts of the Empire. Doubtless this body, which consolidated into the "Round Table" group, lost much weight after the chilly reception accorded

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1. Jebb, Review of Findlay, 'The Imperial Conference from Within', U.E. Vol.iii, Mar.1912.
2. Vide John H. Hewson, Imperial Relations and Radical Philosophy, West. Rev. Oct. 1910, Vol.174.
3. Vide 'Ourselves and Our Purpose', The Brit. Rev. May 1914, Vol.i.

Sir Joseph Ward's Resolution at the 1911 Conference. Professor Dicey's complete exposure of the impossibility of the idea also served to enlist opinion against it. One notices that in 1909 Professor Keith does not attack with any warmth the position of the Federation agitators;[1] in 1912 he shows any advance along the line of federation to be most improbable and impracticable;[2] while in 1916 he is completely devastating in his refutation of Mr Curtis and his group, although at no time did Professor Keith favour the Federation idea.

Mr Gardiner, with great solemnity, performed the obsequies for Imperial Federation: "Imperialism is dead. That is the supreme fact which emerges from the Imperial Conference of 1911. Whatever may be the attitude of this country, the overseas Dominions will have none of it. Mr Harcourt truly stated the spirit of the Conference when...he said that the governing note of the deliberations had been, 'not Imperial concentration, but Imperial co-operation.',.. Any proposal which menaced the liberty of the Dominions in the interests of a centralised idea of Empire was icily rejected. Any proposal, on the other hand, which pointed in the direction of voluntary co-operation for common ends was welcomed and cordially approved." He believed that Conference of 1911 demonstrated that the Empire was "the greatest achievement of liberty that history has to offer... a great step in the consolidation of that Empire of free nations - each master of its own affairs, and all co-operating freely in common affairs - which is the enduring triumph of liberalism."[3]

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1. "The problem of defence and of control of foreign policy is as yet not capable of solution: the Dominions are relatively too weak as compared with the Mother-Country to render any federation reasonable, and nothing save federation promises to solve the problem." Responsible Government in the Dominions, 1909, p.282.
2. Responsible Government and the Dominions, Vol.iii, p.1456.
3. A.G. Gardiner, The End of Imperialism and After, Con.Rev. Aug. 1911, Vol.100.

There was, then, the more modern view which found a larger audience, holding the creation of a central government to be impracticable as detracting from national sovereignty, and recommending a more thorough system of co-operation through the medium of a representative body, the nucleus of which was to be found in the Imperial Conference, so as to permit the fullest national sovereignty, extending even to foreign affairs, in a sort of co-operative association of nations.[1.] It was such an organisation that Balfour, at a luncheon to the Prime Ministers of the Dominions at the Constitutional Club, urged when he described the Empire as, "a coalition of free and self-governing communities who feel that they are never more themselves, never more masters of their own fate, than when they recognise that they are all parts of a greater whole."[2.] It was such an organisation that Lord Milner was opposing when he described his ideal of Imperial Union as something which did not exist at the present time: "a real Empire State with its necessary concomitant, an Empire citizenship. Many people, I know, and even many people who are very far from being out of sympathy with all Imperial ideals, do not regard that as the true line of development. They look forward to a progressive relaxation of the political bonds, such as they are, which at present hold the Empire together, to a union, or rather a relationship maintained solely by ties of sympathy and affection."[3.]

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1. That this idea had emerged by 1908 is shown by such articles as that of A.H.Snow, Neutralization versus Imperialism, The Am. Journ. Int. Law. July,1908, Vol.2, but the article, in suggesting that Britain should remain the representative and the head, and by stating that the system of contributions should meet the expenses of Imperial defence, shows that there was still a good deal of confusion and that the idea of equality was far from popular recognition. This fact appears in studies on foreign relations, etc. infra.
2. The Times, June 19, 1911.
3. Milner, Nation and Empire, p.487.

Lord Milner, however, should have distinguished between the advocates of a "Britannic Commonwealth"[1.] and a third body of thought to which both the other two were warmly opposed as a separate doctrine, for this third body taught national sovereignty as an end in itself - complete self-government in defence and foreign affairs with a possibility of co-operation never to be relied upon. The only ties would be sentiment and a common Crown, each member holding the same relation to the other members as to a friendly foreign Power and stoutly resisting any tendency towards organic unity. Those who advocated closer union, both 'federationists' and 'co-operationists', refused to accept as inevitable the devolution of the Empire into "a league of separate and independent nations, each with its own Government, its own foreign policy, its own fleets and armies and tariffs, united by no organic ties, but kept in amity by the bonds of sentiment, traditions, and race,"[2.] not because it was unworthy, for it was "an ennobling idea", but because it was impracticable for widely scattered States to be held together on that basis. Such leagues had been formed and they had not endured for long.[3.]

Let us catch up these generalities, considering first the fight of the Imperial Council ideal against Laurier, the representative of nationalism unabridged, and the emergence of that ideal in the two forms of, first, an Imperial Assembly, like that advocated by Sir Joseph Ward, and, secondly, the Committee of Imperial Defence, before turning to the teaching of the co-operationist school who would have in effect an Imperial alliance in which unity would be preserved by a developed Imperial Conference.

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1. The Brit. Rev. op.cit.
2. Sidney Low, The Problems of an Imperial Executive, 19th Cent. Aug. 1913, Vol.74.
3. Ibid.

The first clash of the two groups came with an effort to turn Pollock's proposal for an Imperial Council to good account and give the Imperial Conference, as yet an inchoate institution, a definite direction along the lines best calculated to make for Imperial unity. Mr Lyttelton sent a circular despatch to the Governors of the Self-Governing Colonies suggesting that, since the title of 'Colonial Conference' imperfectly expressed the facts, the title 'Imperial Council' should hereafter be used.[1.] His Majesty's Government doubted the wisdom of giving this Council any more formal character than it at present possessed, defining more closely its constitition, or delimiting its functions, but the opinion was expressed that it would greatly conduce to the acceleration of business and the utility of work done by the Council if there were in existence a permanent commission representing all the States concerned, and to which the Council could directly refer the task of examining facts and reporting as to the best way of carrying out the principles laid down.

All the Dominions except three expressed themselves in favour of the change in nomenclature and of the secretariat. New Zealand expressed no opinion. Newfoundland was afraid such a Council would have executive functions and force upon her direct contributions to Imperial defence - a fear that Lyttelton hastened to allay. Canada deplored any efforts to force the development of the Conference, and suggested that any proposals for a change in title or status should originate in, and emanate from that body itself. It was feared that 'Council' indicated a formal assemblage, possessing an advisory and deliberative character which

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1. Cd.2785, Apr. 20, 1905.

might encroach upon Dominion autonomy and which did not attach itself to the term 'Conference."

At the Conference of 1907 the question was revived.[1] Mr Deakin of Australia advanced a resolution to establish an Imperial Council, giving as his first reason the fact that the previous Imperial Government had suggested it - not a very auspicious beginning when one considers that there has been a good deal of suspicion in Canada that the United Kingdom has contrived to get the Dominions with a leaning to Imperialism to advance proposals which were in reality fostered by the Mother Country and thereby an innocent appearance has been lent to sinister proposals. That Mr Deakin was quite innocent of any ulterior motice in his proposal is shown by his alternate use of the words Council and Conference, and both he and Sir Joseph Ward[2] repudiated any suggestion that the Council should have executive or legislative power. The purpose of such a Council would be to give an opportunity to discuss, inter alia, the policy of the Empire before the Dominions assumed a full share of the expense of Dominion Defence. Of course, with Laurier at the Conference the resolution had not the slightest chance of success, while the United Kingdom with a Liberal Government was no longer as zealous for Imperial Union as in the Chamberlain era.

It was over the proposed creation of a secretariat that the controversy between the imperialists and the nationalists became most warm. Laurier and Botha as well as Lord Elgin opposed it as militating against the British system of Government which demanded that such a staff be under the direct responsibility of a

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1. Cd.3523, p.26ff.
2. Ibid, pp.30-33, p.46.

Minister who was responsible to one Parliament.[1] To the contention of Jameson that it was under the responsibility of all the Prime Ministers of the Empire, Laurier replied that that condition would not obtain upon the dispersion of the members of the Conference. It would then be under the direction of the Prime Minister of England, rejoined Jameson, but Laurier questioned if this would differ from being under the direct responsibility of that official. As Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman refused to assume responsibility for the direction of such a body, it was agreed to put it completely under the direction of the Colonial Secretary.[2]

Mr Jebb supported Jameson against Laurier: "The director of the Secretariat...could take no action in the name of the body as a whole except with the consent of all its members individually, who individually at every stage would carry on the correspondence with their respective Governments. No partner Government would have any liability, financial or political, for any action taken by the director to which its own representative had not expressly assented...It remains difficult to see how, on the principle of Imperial partnership, the Secretariat could be placed under the direction of any one Minister. Surely it might be organised simply as a board of co-operation, electing a chairman only for its formal meetings, or as the nature of the business might require."[3] And so, he sighed, as control of the secretariat passed to the Colonial Secretary, "Bureaucracy had triumphed and the Empire had lost. The clock had been set back by the acceptance of a so-called compromise which in effect confirmed the principle of Colonial dependence and therefore obstructed the evolution of Imperial Union."[4]

1. Cd.3523, pp.29-30, p.35ff.
2. Vide Ibid, p.V. for the Resolution.
3. Jebb. The Imperial Conference, Vol.ii, p.124.
4. Ibid, p.129.

To Mr Deakin's suggestion there would not have been as much opposition as to that of Jameson and Ward. The Australian Prime Minister had defined his secretariat as a body without executive or any other kind of power. "It would have been a collecting, collating, analysing, tabulating, and distributing medium."[1] The others had in mind a body quite different in scope from that, which would be intermediary between the Government of the United Kingdom and those of the Dominions and Lord Elgin saw in it "a danger to the autonomy of us all."[2] There also was the supposition by Churchill that some member might be discharged by the head of the Secretariat and one of the Dominions might object since they contributed to the upkeep of the staff.[3] The question of responsibility prevented its control by the several governments, therefore, and so Deakin's plan was negatived on that score.

Recognition that the body which represented the Empire could not have a final authority had spread beyond the Conference. There were many who appreciated that all acts must be legalised and all moneys raised by the local legislatures in their respective territories, but who believed also that such a condition still left a great field to a central council. The Colonial Office Journal expressed its opinion that, "The aim is not one government,

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1. Cd.3523, p.74.
2. Ibid, p.37. "I know it is said that nothing executive is intended, and it is to be nothing but advisory. I am afraid that I do not think that that entirely removes the objection. We have, even in private life, sometimes had the experience of the candid friend, the man whose advice we cannot avoid listening to, though, perhaps it does not strengthen our hands in the process. I venture to think that there would be a relative danger...in the establishment of a body in any way independent in connection with these Conferences."
3. Ibid, p.74.

but one society. The first object would be to prevent complaints of neglect or injustice on the part of the home authorities towards the Dominions, in connection with foreign negotiations about colonial rights."[1.]

Yet, despite the unrelenting attitude of the Nationalists at the Conference of 1907, there were many who continued to hold fast to the faith that a council to advise would be merely a sham.[2.] Unless an Imperial Council were obtained it was believed that the nations, held together by such thin strands, would soon separate.[3.] Mr Silburn had little faith in the "hybrid Advisory Executive" known as the Imperial Defence Committee. He proposed an Imperial Council of Defence which would consist of men with a knowledge of colonial conditions such as Lord Strathcona, Sir George Clarke, Mr Spencer Wilkinson, and Sir Charles Dilke.[4.] Apparently the Council was to be only advisory to Colonial Defence "Councils".[5.] He wished the creation of a Colonial nobility which alone he believed capable of giving life to Imperialism by reviving all the traditions of monarchy.[6.] Such reasoning takes one back to the days of the Canadian Constitutional Act of 1791.

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1. Imperial Federation, Col.Off. Journ., Jan.1911, Vol.4, p.193.
2. F.A.W. Gisborne, An Imperial Army, Emp.Rev., Mar.1913, Vol.25. Desires a supreme council of war, also, "A British Kriegsverein necessarily connotes a Zollverein, since the funds required to maintain the former must be raised by means of the latter."
3. A.W. Kipling, The Downfall of the British Empire, Nat.Def. Christmas Number, 1910: wishes an Imperial Council to control the army, navy, socialistic laws, sociological matters, etc.: "When we consider the number of different nations, the wonder is, not why they do not separate, but how they are held together."
4. Silburn, The Colonies and Imperial Defence, p.210, p.281.
5. Ibid, p.296.
6. Ibid, p.215.

It is remarkable how slow certain axiomatic principles are to be accepted. Mr Page Croft in 1913 was only one of those who desired that the Imperial Conference be turned into a permanent advisory council for the whole British Empire,[1] and Mr Harcourt found it necessary to state Laurier's objection that a Council, even advisory in its inception, might finally become coercive.[2]

There were many who were in outright opposition to the ambition of Imperial Federation - as Freeman, Gardiner, Dicey, and Keith. Sir Frederick Pollock stated that to the best of his knowledge no competent persons considered a federal constitution for the Empire practicable and very few thought it desirable,[3] and this was as early as 1906, before the Round Table movement had got under way. By 1914 there were many more who were ready to scoff at "the Downing Street tradition which masquerades as Imperialism, and which offers Canada her choice between annexation, independence, and an Imperial Federation synonymous...with the complete submission of the Colonies to the Mother Country - the policy of Lord North and Lord John Russell."[4]

Professor Dicey warned the agitators, "The attempt to form a federal constitution for the Empire is at this moment full of peril to England, to the Dominions, and, it may well be, to the maintenance of the Empire."[5] He pointed out that even among countries differing little in race, religion, and history, it was found all but impossible to reconcile the existence of state

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1. H.C. Debs., 8 May, 1913, Vol.iii, p.2255.
2. Ibid, pp.2268-69.
3. R.C.I. Nov. 1906, Vol.38.
4. F.W. Grey, Nationalism vs. Imperialism, British Rev., June 1914, Vol.6.
5. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, p.lxxxii.

rights with the creation of a strong and national power. Yet if anyone were to consider the infinite diversity of the countries composing the British Empire, to reflect that they were occupied by different races whose customs and whose civilisation were the products of absolutely different histories, or that the countries of the Empire were in no case contiguous. but separated by seas extending over thousands of miles, he would wonder at the boldness of the dreams entertained by the votaries of federal Imperialism, rather than be converted to the hope of federating the Empire.[1.]

Professor Dicey went on to criticise the fact that the federalists included, not the whole Empire, but England and the five self-governing Dominions.[2.] What would be then the relation of the new federated State and British India? Would India consent to be ruled by the new and strange sovereign thus set up? Would the expense of Imperial defence be borne by federated states or would they impose taxes on India and the Crown Colonies to their advantage? "Is there," asked Professor Dicey with excellent insight, "the remotest sign that, for example, New Zealand, though thoroughly loyal to the Empire, would tolerate interference by any Imperial Parliament or Congress with the internal affairs of New Zealand which even faintly resembled the authority exerted by Congress(of the United States) or the authority exerted by the Parliament of the Canadian Dominion? But if the Dominions would not tolerate the interference with their own affairs by any Parliament, whatever its title, sitting

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1. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, p.lxxxii.
2. Ibid, p.lxxxii.

at Westminster, is there the remotest reason to suppose that the existing Imperial Parliament will consent to become a Parliament of the Empire in which the United Kingdom and each of the five Dominions shall be fairly represented?"[1] What were the federalists going to do with the Imperial Parliament already in existence? Would it become a Federal Congress with proportionate representation or become for Englishmen an English Parliament?[2] "My unhesitating conviction," concluded Professor Dicey, "is that the constitution of the Empire ought to develop, as it is actually developing, in the same way in which grew up the constitution of England," not by "arduous feats of legislation," resting not on "parliamentary statutes", but "on the growth of gradual and often unnoted customs."[3]

On the other hand, there were many who considered that a temporary expedient should be resorted to, but anything short of an Imperial Parliament should be considered merely a stepping-stone or stop-gap. Mr Jebb seems to have been one of this number, for, despite the fact that he occasionally wonders if Imperial Federation be either desirable or practicable, he presses his ideal as "Imperial Partnership or (ultimately) Imperial Federation."[4] At other times we find him saying doubtfully, "I suppose everybody who desires the promotion of the organic unity of the Empire must share the aspiration for a truly Imperial Parliament. At the same time I confess, somewhat with a feeling of shame, I am one of those who deliberately say that, in my

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1. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, p.lxxxiii.
2. Ibid, p.lxxxiv.
3. Ibid, pp.lxxxv-lxxxvi.
4. Imperial Conference, Vol.ii, pp.129-130.

opinion, the time is not yet ripe for its consummation. Moreover, I have an awkward presentiment that when we do get our Imperial Parliament the conditions will not be so ideal as they are sometimes pictured."[1] Elsewhere he stated his belief that for his generation the principle of national Governments in Conference, with a growing equipment of subsidiary machinery, represented the last word in Imperial organisation.[2] On still another occasion he included himself among those "who have refused assent to the theory that an early federation of the Empire is the sole alternative to its speedy ruin."[3]

The Times somewhat dolefully recorded its view: "All we are prepared to say at present is that, while there is much cloudy talk about the further development of comprehensive federative principles within the Empire, the real trend of circumstances and opinion seems to be towards making the development an official rather than a Parliamentary organisation. It is in that direction at any rate that the criticisms and suggestions of the Dominions appear to tend."[4]

As further evidence that any advisory council would be considered a phenomenon of a transition period, one could quote the petition signed by over one hundred member of Parliament to the following effect: "We, the undersigned members of Parliament, representing all political parties, are of the opinion that that time has arrived to take practical steps to associate the Overseas Dominions in a more permanent manner with the conduct

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1. U.E. Jan. 1911, Vol.2, p.23.
2. Jebb, Notes on Imperial Organisation, R.C.I., Nov. 13, 1906, Vol.38.
3. U.E. Mar. 1912, Vol.ii, p.237.
4. The Times, Aug.1, 1910.

of Imperial affairs, if possible by means of an established representative Council of an advisory character in touch with public opinion throughoutthe Empire," and it was explained by one of the supporters that this was the first step towards the much-needed Imperial representation with executive powers.[1] It was received with an approving editorial from the Times.[2]

Mr d'Egville, who gave the Dominions a visit, stated upon his return that a strong feeling existed in Canada that the only satisfactory form of representation would be a truly Imperial Parliament dealing only with Imperial affairs and having full powers of taxation, but grave constitutional issues were involved and public opinion was not yet prepared for it both in the United Kingdom and overseas, although it should remain an ultimate ideal.[3] Laurier in the Canadian House of Commons had stated than an Imperial Parliament was essential to an Imperial union, but "Anglo-Saxons would never move forward for the sake of a mere theory, and there must be a grievance before any reform could be effected."[4] This was a dangerous provision, surely, for Canada was consistently pressing for treaty-making power and certainly the grievance was liable to come up in regard to her lack of control of foreign policy, as in fact it did during the time of the Borden Government. Such words obscured Laurier's true position.

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1. Letter of J. Norton Griffiths, The Times, Mar. 15, 1911; Cd.5745, p.71; Findlay, The Imperial Conference (1911) from Within, p.102.
2. The Times, op.cit.
3. Un. Serv. Mag., Dec. 1908, Vol.34.
4. d'Egville, Notes on Imperial Co-operation, Un.Serv. Mag., Mar. 1907, Vol.34.

Mr Deakin stated the faith of the Australian Federation League, of which he was a strong supporter, to be "federation in some form. That is the ultimate goal of our ambitions, though there are patriotic alliances which may anticipate and preclude it... The strongest and most intimate alliance will always be that of people with people, citizen with citizen, directly and on the same footing, instead of their external junction in masses as separate States, indirectly through their Governments,,,. We must wait?...desiring to see a natural development from the present loosely-associated and imperfectly organized collection of self-governing States into a better-jointed, sufficiently flexible, and more efficient union."[1.] Even Lord Elgin at the 1907 Conference could see the federation of the Empire as a possibility, though he did relegate it to the "future ages."[2.]

There were abundant suggestions, nevertheless,,for an Imperial Parliament "in our time", and 1910-1911 witnessed a widespread renewal in the discussion of some stronger form of Imperial Union. There were men like Sir Frederick Young who had continued to believe "with undiminished confidence" in their youthful visions of Imperial Federation.[3.] Sir George Foster

1. Quoted Jebb, Imperial Organisation, The Empire and the Century, pp.332-333. Mr Deakin distinguished between his proposed federation and that of Mr Jebb: "Apparently what he (Jebb) favours should be styled a 'confederation of States within the Empire, each of them a unit, dealing with its fellow-States as a unity. This would not permit either a common citizenship or a federal legislature chosen directly by all the people of these States endowed with plenary powers within certain clearly defined limits. A true federation would."
2. Cd.3523, pp.37-38.
3. R.C.I. Nov.1906, Vol.38,p.33. Mr Napier: "I cannot subscribe to the proposition that Imperial organisation should merely be an alliance of disunited nations..we must proceed gradually to evolve a truly Imperial Parliament in which the Colonies shall be fully represented...I believe the goal is a federal parliament." Ibid, pp.27-28.

used words calculated to stir again such ambitions when he expressed his opinion that he did not believe there would ever be a perfect organisation until the Empire possessed some deliberative directive body, which represented and typified all parts of the Dominions. "Nor", he said, "am I disappointed because it has not come yet, nor hopeless because it will not come tomorrow nor the next day."[1] The British Review, in a confession of faith, disowned any desire that the Dominions should be subject to a central Parliament, "except, for definite imperial purposes, to a Federal Parliament in which they themselves shall be amply represented."[2]

Lord Rosebery, who in 1899 had asserted that, "Imperial Federation in any form is an impossible dream,"[3] welcomed the representatives of the Dominions Parliaments to the Coronation ceremonies of 1911 as "the first collection of elected Deputies from the various Parliaments of the Empire" -"an historical occasion befitting the historic Westminster Hall."[4] "Do we not see," he asked, "in the Imperial Conference which is now sitting in our midst the germ of a mightier council which will represent the Imperial aspirations of all parts and commonwealths of our community, which will represent a united Empire in a defined and permanent form and which thus will be the most august Parliament that the world had ever seen? Do we not see in our banquet today, where for the first time the elected representatives

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1. Foster, Some Problems of Empire, U.E., Dec. 1912, Vol.3, p.960.
2. June, 1914, Vol.6, p.388.
3. Quoted, Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations, p.71.
4. The Times, June 20, 1911.

of the various Parliaments are around us...the germs of such a permanent convention where, without infringing in the slightest degree on the domestic concerns of any of the Dominions, there will be a cordial and a permanent co-operation in matters of Imperial Concern?"[1] The Times wistfully looked toward his "dream, if indeed it be a dream, that haunts us all - the dream of a Parliament which will represent all the self-governing Dominions of the Crown."[2]

Sir Charles Stuart-Linton was one of the many who proposed an Imperial Council as a stepping-stone to an Imperial Parliament which would be separate from that of the United Kingdom.[3] The suggestion of Mr R.B. Wise that the Dominion High Commissioners should form a sub-committee of the Cabinet and be consulted on Imperial affairs came in for some consideration. Stuart-Linton gave a different form to that idea and mooted a "permanent Imperial Committee of the Privy Council to assist the Imperial Cabinet", to be purely consultative in its functions. He thought it possible that Imperial and local matters might, by a process of evolution, become separate so that there might be two cabinets in operation. He also considered it possible that the Imperial Conference might develop into an Imperial Council meeting annually, and thus with the Imperial Cabinet a true Imperial Parliament might come about with an upper and lower house, establishing an Imperial constitution and forming a federation.[4]

There was some advocacy of the scheme that had been put forward by Sir John Quick for a "Grand Assembly of Empire",

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1. The Times, op.cit.
2. Leading Article, ibid.
3. Stuart-Linton, Wanted - An Imperial Council, Emp.Rev., Sept. 1910, Vol.20.
4. Ibid.

created by Act of the British Parliament, whose functions would be limited to such matters as were referred to it by Royal Warrant. As advanced by Captain Cosby it had the peculiar feature of equal votes, irrespective of population or status of governments, and so "with five separate fleets, and a general staff for the Empire as a basis for the new Confederation" England could withstand all comers.[1.]

As the question of the House of Lords began to vex the local politicians of the United Kingdom, there was a resurrection of the idea to utilise the House of Lords to include Dominion members as a federal body of the Empire.[2.] In the House of Lords, said Mr Gisborne, one found the truly representative body of the Empire, with its ex-governors, colonial administrators, ambassadors, judges, great soldiers, and travelled peers who had accurate knowledge of the Imperial domains, and he looked with terror at the results that would follow from Keir Hardie's elevation to the Premier-ship without the House of Lords holding a real control over the destinies of the Empire.[3.]

Since so much of local politics seemed to be in the melting-pot, the question of Imperial Federation raised its head again from the Irish question. The Eighty Club began a discussion upon "Imperial Federation beginning here at home", and Mr J.E. Redmond proposed a policy of "Home Rule All Round", with a demand of an Irish Parliament and a responsible executive for local

1. Dudley S.A.Cosby, Forward but not too Fact, The Governance of Empire, pp.16-18.
2. Capt.Kincaid-Smith, A Federal Parliament, Emp.Rev.,Apr.1910, Vol.19.
3. F.A.W.Gisborne,The House of Lords and the Empire,Emp.Rev.,Dec. 1911, Vol.22. Vide also a curious suggestion by Dr Bussell,A new Government for the British Empire,pp.103-104 and passim, that the King should act as a sort of Imperial Prime Minister with an Imperial Senate from the House of Lords -the Peerage electing one sixth of their number, the United Kingdom another hundred, and the Colonies and Dominions bringing the total to three hundred.

affairs and representation in the British Parliament for Imperial and foreign affairs.[1] Mr Lloyd George looked to the day when there would be "a Wales independent and free, fearing God and fearing none other", and Sir Edward Grey appeared as another advocate of Home Rule for the national divisions of the United Kingdom.[2] Mr Gardiner also desired the devolution of the British Parliament into four State Parliaments, which process he believed would precede centralisation. Though it was a long way off, such a development of State Parliaments and an Imperial Parliament was suggested as a forecast of the inclusion of the Dominions.[3]

Sir Herbert Samuel declared that, "The signs of the times show that there will be a movement towards the Federal type" of Imperial Government, since the Dominions would never be permanently satisfied with a Constitution which regarded them merely "as adjuncts, not as integral parts" of the Empire.[4] He therefore proposed a federalist reconstruction of the United Kingdom as a starting point. Mr Churchill, on his hobby of bringing relief to a House of Commons encumbered with too much business, mooted a federal system for Great Britain in which England would have ten or twelve legislatures, arguing that a single provincial legislature for all England would upset the balance of the federation and be too powerful a body to co-exist amicably with the Imperial Federal Parliament.[5] This might serve as a prelude to

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1. The Times, Oct.19, 1910; Hythe, Problems of Empire, p,176ff.
2. Findlay, op.cit., p.123.
3. A.G. Gardiner, Mr Churchill and Federalism, Fort.Rev., Nov.1, 1912.
4. Herbert Samuel, Federal Government, 19th Cent. Vol.72, Oct. 1912. One remembers that Borden of Canada had said that Canada did not intend to be an "adjunct" even of the British Empire.
5. U.E., Oct. 1912, Vol.3, p.787.

Imperial Federation. But the question arose, would not the danger Churchill saw in connection with the Government of the United Kingdom arise in connection with Imperial Federation, and the powerful national Governments be at loggerheads with the Imperial Parliament?[1.]

Therewere a good many others who proposed similar organisation of the Empire. Viscount Hythe stated that his "conception of the constitutional structure of the British Empire is that it must rest on four federations or four pillars, in Canada, Australia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom - an Imperial council or parliament might some day be set up."[2.] The journalist known as 'Pacificus' observed three views as to the primary organisation: Those who proposed a national Parliament for Great Britain and another for Ireland; those who desired a "restoration of the Heptarchy" in England; a division of Scotland into Highlands and a pair of Lowlands; of Ireland into the four Provinces; Wales alone to remain unparcelled. Those who advocated four National Parliaments, for England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales.[3.] The writer notes that these national parliaments in each case are to be equal, responsible only to the Imperial Parliament, and not to be what Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman would have had them - "Canadas". "They are to be in the position which the parliaments of Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia occupy in relation to the Dominion Parliament at Ottawa."[4.] Thus the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament would be secured without

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1. U.E. op.cit. p.788.
2. Hythe, op.cit., p.193.
3. Pacificus, Federalism and Home Rule, pp.55-56.
4. Ibid, p.58.

setting up the dangerous friction latent in Mr Gladstone's schemes, which entailed the subordination of one Parliament, purely national, to another which was also national.[1] The Federalist ideal Pacificus expressed as being a supreme and sovereign Imperial Parliament with subordinate or co-ordinate Parliaments in the United Kingdom and the Dominions, each sovereign and supreme in its own sphere.[2]

There was not a little opinion in favour of some such representation as that suggested by Rosebery in his address to the Parliamentary delegation. Mr Amery, who had in fact been largely responsible for the Parliamentary delegations meeting at Westminster at the time of the Coronation,[3] was a most consistent advocate of Imperial Federation. He considered it essential that there be some "means of providing for the security of the Empire withnthe constitutional assent of the citizens of each self-governing part of the Empire. Some form of Imperial Parliament, or responsible deliberative assembly there must be."[4] He believed the most popular approach to a Parliament of the Empire to lie in some sort of advisory council, discussing the affairs of the Empire at large and submitting its conclusions to the different Parliaments of the Empire for their decision. Some of the schemes based on this idea would have the Council consist largely of men of experience appointed by their Governments, while others would have some form of election. All these schemes, however, contemplated the evolution of the Council, as

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1. Pacificus, op.cit. p.60.
2. Ibid, pp.xlix-l. For the attitude of Sir Sam Hughes, The Times, May 24, 1911.
3. H. d'Egville, The Empire Parliament Association, U.E. 1915, Vol.6.
4. Amery, Union and Strength, pp.32-33.

it gained in authority and influence, into a Parliament of the Empire, with the interference of Local Parliaments on Imperial questions declining to the possession of a rarely exercised veto.

Amery, noting the weak point of the majority of these proposals to lie in the fact that advice must be responsible advice, and that representatives must speak for their own State, wished the advance to be through the medium of the Imperial Conference. He proposed that the next Conference (1911) should recognise its supreme importance as the highest deliberative Assembly of the Empire by the formal presidency being vested in the King; by separating the Minister for Imperial Affairs from the administration of Crown Colonies and dependencies; and by taking the Dominion into the confidence of the Imperial Government on British Foreign Policy. Like Mr Evans, he wished each Dominion Cabinet to include a special Minister for Imperial and External Affairs, and thus the Conference could meet more often - several weeks in every year. It should hold a regular series of meetings with the Defence Committee and the Foreign Minister, thus enabling the Dominions to acquire a "normal and continuous influence" over the whole course of British external policy.[1] He thought that the Prime Minister should be accompanied by a delegation representing all Parliamentary political parties, who would be a sort of adjunct to the Conference and before long would constitute two Houses of Parliament representing the executive governments and the reprsentatives of the people.[2] Finally some Act would be necessary making it a true Parliament of Empire by

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1. Amery, op.cit. pp.37-40.
2. Ibid, p.44.

putting the purely Imperial departments of the State under its control: the Foreign Office, the Defence Committee with its General Staff branches, and the administration of the dependencies.[1] Only thus could the demands of the Dominions be met for a complete national life, by admitting them to full partnership with Britain in control of Imperial policy.[2]

Mr Amery's suggestion of a delegation proved quite popular with publicists. Mr Low, despite the fact that Laurier had, in the preceding year, explained to the Conference that Canada could not offer advice without being liable in results that ensued, proposed an Imperial Committee of Foreign Affairs, constituted on the model of the Imperial Committee of Defence, with a permanent secretariat. The Prime Minister would be its permanent President and he would invite others to consultation; its functions would be entirely advisory, so that the Dominions would have the right of assent or dissent as before.[3]

Converted by Mr Amery, Mr Low in 1913 had an ambitious scheme for an Imperial Cabinet, composed of an Imperial Chancellor, a Foreign Secretary, an Imperial Minister for Defence, an Imperial Minister of Justice to deal with legal and constitutional questions of the Empire, an Imperial Minister of Education, an Imperial Minister of Labour, and an Imperial budget with its own treasurer. This Cabinet would be responsible to a "Pan-Britannic Parliament" or a "Federal Congress

1. Amery, op.cit., p.45.
2. Ibid, p.6.
3. Low, Towards an Imperial Foreign Policy, Fort. Rev. Nov.1, 1912, Vol. 92.

But until this latter was established the Cabinet would be responsible to the Conference. The Congress would be arrived at through a system of delegations as already outline by Mr Amery and others. It was noted that a similar machinery existed in Austra-Hungary where the common Ministers of the Empire discussed common affairs and arranged the budget with delegations elected by the legislative Chambers of the two States.[2]

The United Empire approved Mr Low's scheme, seeing nothing wrong in the fact that the United Kingdom would have ninety out of a hundred and twenty or thirty members concerned in the Parliament, but the difficulty it foresaw lay in determining the initial powers of the body. At any rate, it was of opinion that the difficulties of super-imposing an Imperial Parliament by direct election were mitigated by this scheme.[1]

At the Conference of 1911, Sir Joseph Ward, a thorough-going Imperialist and at least influenced a great deal by the energetic Round Table Group, brought forward a resolution for an Imperial Council. With unusual prescience, the Times recorded its doubt whether such a Council would prove to be in consonance with Canadian or Australian ideas. It said, "The need of the moment is not for deliberation by a central authority, which must always seem in some sense to impair the autonomy of existing Cabinets, but rather for machinery which will secure a more thorough, more rapid, and more personal exchange of views between the Cabinets as they are...

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1. U.E. Sept. 1913, Vol.4, p.698.
2. Low, The Problem of an Imperial Executive, 19th Cent., Aug. 1913, Vol.74.

It is easier, no doubt, to talk vague nonsense about Imperial Federation, like Mr T.P. O'Connor in his recent Canadian tour; but such nonsense is perilous, even when it is sincere,"[1] - a very true observation. Sir Joseph Ward's resolution should never have been put to the Conference; it only served to stimulate latent antagonism of Colonial Nationalism to Imperialism and provoke suspicions against other happier forms of Imperial co-operation.

The Resolution, as amended, read, "That the Empire has now reached a stage of Imperial development which renders it expedient that there should be an Imperial Council of State, with Representatives from all the self-governing parts of the Empire, in theory and fact advisory to the Imperial Government on all questions affecting the interests of His Majesty's Dominions oversea."[2] Sir Joseph Ward's proposal changed as he interpreted it to the Conference, so that as finally outlined it was but little germane to the original resolution, and the mover of the resolution was consequently an easy target for interruptions from his eager, biassed audience. Mr Batchelor, at the conclusion, pointed out that the original resolution had never been discussed.[3] On the contrary, the New Zealand Prime Minister advanced a plan for an Imperial Parliament to deal with foreign policy and defence in so far as they were Imperial and to allow the Dominions otherwise

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1. The Times, Dec. 17, 1910.
2. Cd.5745, pp.36-37; p.46.
3. Ibid, p.74.

the fullest autonomy. The Dominions and the United Kingdom should elect representatives for each 200,000 of population, so that Canada would have 37, Australia 25, South Africa 7, New Zealand 6, Newfoundland 2, and the United Kingdom 220. There would be a Senate to which the represented parts of the Empire would elect 2 members each, a total of 12. An executive, corresponding to the legislative bodies, would consist of 15 members. While not possessing powers of taxation, yet the Parliament would apportion its needs among the members, and for the first ten years the Dominions were to pay *per capita* half of the amount requisitioned from the United Kingdom *per capita*, and this basis was to obtain for further expenditures.[1.]

That his resolution was ill-advised was seen from the chilly and, to an unfortunate degree, contemptuous criticism of the delegates. Laurier disposed of it in a few brief, curt sentences: it would ultimately have coercive power of taxation and control of foreign policy; no need to discuss it further.[2.] Asquith objected because the creation of an Imperial Council would sadly impair "the authority of the Government of the United Kingdom in the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the declaration or the maintenance of peace and the declaration of war, and, indeed, all those relations with foreign powers, necessarily of the most delicate character, which are now in the hands of the Imperial Government, subject to its responsibility to the Imperial Parliament. That

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1. Cd.5745, p.57 and passim.
2. Ibid, p.68.

authority cannot be shared, and the co-existence side by side with the Cabinet of the United Kingdom of this proposed body - it does not matter what name you call it for the moment - clothed with the functions and the jurisdiction which Sir Joseph Ward proposed to invest it with, would in our judgment be absolutely fatal to our present system of Government."[1] Of course, since Ward had proposed a Parliament that would substitute for the present Imperial Parliament and since it was in his proposal that there should be a system of local Parliaments in the United Kingdom, he could quite easily have taken the sting out of the President's very just criticism, on the score of responsible Government, of an Imperial Council, but the New Zealand Premier was no debater and the other delegates were not anxious to justify him.

It has been suggested that one reason for the cold reception of the proposal by the British Government lay in the belief that such an organisation of the Empire would give an impetus to Tariff Reform.[2] However this may be, the proposal stood no chance of being accepted on its own merits. Professor Keith makes that abundantly clear.[3] He urged the vital objection that had been very present to the mind of Freeman - that the British Government would never consent to becoming a merely local body, surrendering its proud traditions and august position. Nor would the Dominions ever consent to replace the

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1. Cd.5745, p.71.
2. Findlay, The Imperial Conference (1911) From Within, pp.169-170.
3. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp.505-509.

largely theoretical and considerate supremacy of the present Imperial Parliament with a body certain to be at the last autocratic and jealous for its rights. More and more such a body would infringe upon matters now termed local, and almost certainly tariffs would come under its jurisdiction. The German-Canadian tariff war was certainly a matter of interest to the foreign policy of a federated Empire. The Dominions would have little control over the determinations of the Imperial Parliament as suggested by Ward, unless the Senate had power of veto, in which case there would be abundant friction. On the score of the Senate, it appeared absurd to the United Kingdom that they should not be given any more voting power than that accorded to Newfoundland with a population equal to that of Sheffield.[1.]

There was much sympathy, however, with the spirit of Ward's resolution, even if it was recognised to be of doubtful wisdom. One leading article, angered by the comatose policy of nationalism, declared that "Nations do not grow like flowers, in gardens set apart from the world's highways and protected against its winds. Progressive democracies, as the Dominions themselves have realized, can never attain to full nationhood so long as they are content with diffusing prosperity and accumulating wealth within their own frontiers. Internal production carries in its wake external trade, and external trade involves an always increasing interest in foreign markets, foreign conditions, and the general security of commerce. It involves, that is,

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1. Gardiner, The End of Imperialism and After, Con.Rev., Aug. 1911, Vol.100.

a vital interest in defence and foreign politics."[1] The principle this writer would invoke was not centralisation in the sense of Ward's resolution, but exchange - not concentration of opinion and information in the United Kingdom, but a diffusion of opinion and information, so that all the Governments could act with all responsibility to their constituents, but also with a full understanding of the bearings of any question upon the various parts of the Empire and the rest of the world.[2]

Turning from the idea of a Federal Parliament or some form of Council, a great many men believed as did Viscount Esher that co-operation between the self-governing parts of the Empire, such as would allow for a union of defence forces and a satisfactory control of foreign policy by the Dominions, could best be gained through the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Report of the War Office Reconstitution Committee had recommended in 1904 the creation of a "Department" in a reconstituted "Defence Committee" under the exclusive control of the Prime Minister, the permanent nucleus to be a Permanent Secretary, two naval officers selected by the Admiralty, two military officers selected by the War Office, two Indian Officers nominated by the Viceroy, and one or more Colonial representatives, to obtain and collate information, furnish advice, et cetera, thus replacing the Joint Naval and Military Committee for Defence and the Colonial Defence Committee.[3] Any decision taken would

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1. The Times, May 26, 1911.
2. Vide also, The Times, May 30, 1911.
3. Cd.1968, 1904; Vide Also, Cd.2200 and Cd.3524, pp.16-17.

be in the name of the Army Council as a whole and any dissenting member would resign or share the responsibility for the advice finally given. Organised in 1904 by the energy of Mr Balfour, the Committee of Imperial Defence sat practically every week.[1] Balfour's intention was that it would be a permanent advisory Committee on defence, with a secretariat to ensure continuity of practice.[2] Campbell-Bannerman initiated appointments of sub-committees to inquire into strategic and technical questions, while Asquith further developed the Committee by calling the heads or representatives of great public departments to sub-committees and established a Standing Sub-Committee, presided over alternatively by the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War, composed of representatives of the Admiralty and War Office, the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade, the customs, and all the great Departments, to coordinate in war the naval, military, and civil forces of the State.[3] As a consequence of these departures, the functions of the Committee had ranged over such matters as Aerial Navigation, the strategical aspects of the Forth and Clyde Canal, oversea transport of reinforcements in time of war, the treatment of aliens in time of war, press and postal censorship in war, trading with the enemy, wireless stations throughout the Empire, local transporation and distribution of food supplies in time of war, and kindred subjects.[4]

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1. d'Egville, Imperial Defence and Closer Union, p.65.
2. Esher, Committee of Imperial Defence, pp.16-17.
3. Ibid, p.18.
4. Ibid, p.20.

The Committee was purely a body to advise the Prime Minister who was the only member of it in his own right. All the rest who attended did so at his bidding. Balfour urged this against the fears of Campbell-Bannerman, who became an ardent convert.[1] The Committee clearly could advise on policy suggested to it, but it could not initiate policy. There can be no doubt, on the other hand, that it really decided questions on which it was asked for advice. Thus the Dardanelles Commission reported that "the view that the Committee was purely advisory requires some qualification. In practice, it did more than advise. It decided."[2]

The Imperial Defence Committee differed from its predecessor in the very important condition that, whereas the Colonial Defence Committee had for regular members professional officers who were the leading permanent officials of the great departments, and who could invite other officers for their technical knowledge, the new body was not drawn exclusively from the permanent services with occasional outside specialists, but included ministers responsible to Parliament, the proportion being determined by the Prime Minister, in whose complete control it was.[3] Because of this condition, Sir Robert Borden sensed the importance of Canadian representation thereon. He told the Canadian Parliament regarding the Committee: It was not responsible to the House of Commons and thus not supposed to concern

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1. Balfour, H.C. May 11, 1905, Vol.146, p.62ff; Campbell-Bannerman, ibid, p.85; Asquith, H.C. July 25, 1912, Vol.41,p.1385; also Sir W. Evans-Gordon, The Premier and Imperial Defence, Mon. Rev. Feb.1907, Vol.26.
2. Cd.8490, 1917, p.4.
3. Vide 'X', The Committee of Imperial Defence, U.E. Sept. 1913, Vol.3.

itself with policy. Yet "it is necessarily and constantly obliged to consider foreign policy and foreign relations for the obvious reason that defence, and especially naval defence is inseparably connected with such considerations.... As so many important members of the Cabinet are summoned to attend the Committee, its conclusions are usually accepted by the Cabinet and thus commandthe support of the majority in the House of Commons."[1] If Dominion representatives were upon such a Committee the following essentials of Imperial policy would be secured: There would be no difficulty over the question of "responsibility" as raised by Laurier in regard to the Secretariat of the 1907 Conference and by Asquith with regard to the idea of an Imperial Council; there would be no concealment of foreign policy between the United Kingdom and the Dominions; no new departure in foreign policy involving Imperial interests would be taken without Dominion approval; and, Lastly, the Dominions would be forced to face the fact that Great Britain was a European Power and that the Overseas Empire must shoulder a share of the European burden.[2] If such representation could be obtained, Viscount Esher was assured that "a long step may be taken towards that federation of the Empire which has been the dream of patriots here and oversea."[3] At any rate, every indication seemed to point to the Prime Minister becoming more and more an Imperial Chancellor, leaving Parliamentary business to his colleagues, so that the bureau of the Prime Minister and

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1. The Times, Report, Dec.6, 1912.
2. Esher, op.cit., pp.vi-vii.
3. Ibid, p.21.

the Secretariat of the Defence Committee might become the machinery for establishing intimate relations between the portions of the Empire.[1.]

Sir Robert Borden's surprise that such an efficient organisation existed would lead to the belief that hitherto the Dominions had known little of it, and one notices that when Australia submitted a resolution to the Conference of 1907, the Committee was referred to as an "Imperial Council."[2.]

Borden's desire for representation on the Committee was cordially approved on the whole by the United Kingdom. There was some suggestion that the Committee be transformed into a representative Imperial Federal Council of Defence, which, obviously, would have negatived its most desirable features as an instrument of co-operation, and one unconscious humorist suggested that such representation be on the basis of one representative to every million pounds sterling expended on defence, such defence to be approved by the Federal Council.[3.] He thereupon congratulated himself that "the predominance of Great Britain in the Federal Council of the Empire would be fully assured." Such statements embarrassed the wiser advocates of Imperial co-operation, laying them open to the indictments of the Nationalists, who were thus given some authority for their fears. Others similarly saw "in vague outline...the future division of the British Cabinet into a domestic and Imperial Cabinet."[4.] It is

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1. Esher, op.cit., p.ix.
2. Cd.3524, p.15.
3. Edgar Crammond, Imperial Defence and Finance, 19th Cent., Aug. 1912, Vol.72.
4. Canada and the Navy, The Round Table, July 1912, Vol.2; F.A.W. Gisborne, Imperial Foreign Policy, The Emp. Rev., 1913, Vol.25.

difficult to know just what Mr Ramsay Macdonald had in mind when he stated his opinion that representation on the Committee would satisfy neither Canada nor Australia.[1] It might suggest a desire for a still closer form of union.

In a Despatch of 10 December, 1912,[2] Lord Harcourt recalled that the question of Dominion representation had arisen out of a resolution by Sir Joseph Ward at the Conference of 1911 asking that the High Commissioners of the Dominions be summoned to the Committee whenever naval and military matters affecting the Dominions were under consideration, but that it had been unanimously decided that representation should not be by a High Commissioner but by Ministers responsible to their own colleagues and to Parliament. It had also been decided that a Defence Committee should be established in each Dominion in close touch with the Committee in London. When Mr (Sir Robert) Borden had requested that Dominion members sit on the Committee, he had been informed that the functions of that body were purely advisory, but that any Dominion Minister resident in London would at all times have free and full access to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and the Colonial Secretary for information on all questions of Imperial policy. Lord Harcourt referred to a public speech of October 25, in which he had denied that the natural and laudable desire of the Dominions for a greater measure of co-operation with the United Kingdom was intended to open up the different questions of Imperial

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1. H.C. 22 July 1912, Vol.41, p.874.
2. Cd.5513, p.6; Cd.5745, p.4 and p.75; Cd.6560, 1913.

Federation which, seeming to entail questions of taxation and representation, had made that policy for many years a dead issue. On the other hand, he saw "no obstacle, and certainly no objection, to the Governments of all the Dominions being given at once a larger share in the executive direction in matters of defence and in personal consultation and co-operation with individual British ministers "whose duty it was to frame a policy in Great Britain. "I should,welcome," he had concluded, "a more unanimous representation of Dominion Ministers, if they wish it, on the Committee of Imperial Defence; we should all be glad if a member or members of those Cabinets could be annually in London."

The suggested arrangement found some opposition in Great Britain, and there were fears expressed for its future. "If the representation is to be through the attendance of Canadian Ministers at the present Committee of Imperial Defence," said the United Empire, "which seems to be the plan most favoured in London....so able a constitutionalist as Sir Wilfrid Laurier may find little difficulty in disparaging it. It might be called a virtual attempt to create a federal cabinet without a federal parliament, which is an awkward proposition."[1.] The Times inveighed against the Liberal Press view that the appointment of a Canadian Minister to the Committee would militate against ministerial liberty and the nature of Parliamentary control over defence or policy. "It is one thing," stated that journal," and a legitimate thing, to criticise the relations

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1. U.E. Nov. 1912, Vol.3, p.860.

between the Committee of Defence and the Cabinet in so far as they affect our constitutional arrangements at home. It is quite another thing, and an absolutely misleading thing, to pretend that those relations will be in any way affected by the addition to the Committee of a permanent Canadian representative. These two subjects have nothing to do with one another. The Committee of Defence is a body created to co-ordinate our naval and military preparations with the requirements of policy as defined by the Cabinet, endorsed by Parliament, and approved by the electorate."[1.]

The Times had long maintained, in common with much other British opinion, that if the Governments of the Empire wished the co-operation achieved at the Conference to have continuous operation they must create within the respective Cabinets a minister whose duty it would be to keep himself informed on Imperial affairs.[2.] Consequently the suggestion of Mr Myers of New Zealand for the appointment of two Ministers to the Committee of Imperial Defence - the Minister in charge of Defence and Minister for Imperial Affairs - who could alternate in attendance, was gladly received, and such representation, it was held, would not commit the Dominions to any action.[3.] High Commisioners were generally not considered competent to satisfy the required.

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1. The Times, 9 Dec., 1912.
2. The Times, May 30, 1911.
3. The Times, Nov.4, 1912: Mr Churchill is here given the credit for being the father of the idea of colonial representation upon the Committee. But the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee early played a leading part vide Loring, U.E.,1915, Vol.6. Vide also The Times, Aug.7, 1912.

conditions, which could only be met by the regular attendance of Colonial Ministers who would speak with full responsibility and carry the views of the Committee to their Cabinets.

New Zealand expressed herself as not being desirous for a permanent appointment, preferring that, when a Minister of the Dominion was in London, he should be invited to attend the meetings of the Committee. Newfoundland agreed with New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa likewise did not think it necessary to have a Minister in constant attendance at the Defence Committee. Advice from that body could always be obtained and personal consultation was possible if necessary by special visits of members of the Cabinet.[1.]

There was no little opposition in Great Britain to the dictum that there was "no alternative for the moment to this wide extension of the uses of the Committee of Imperial Defence."[2.] There was a growing faith in the possibilities of the Conference and there seemed to be no sufficient reason why the Committee should be given preferment to the Conference as a body to consider Imperial problems. Certain people found something sinister in the change of venue at the Conference of 1911, when defence and foreign affairs had been handed over to the Committee of Imperial Defence to report upon. The reasons given did not satisfy the doubters since secrecy and expert advice had always been obtained when desired, and the precedent created in 1909 had been that of a subsidiary Conference as provided for at the regular Conference of 1907. In the Conference voting was by

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1. Cd.7347.
2. The Times, July 17, 1912.

Governments and the British Government enjoyed no superiority, while in the Committee the Prime Minister determined the composition of that body and voting was by persons, so it was advanced as a possible reason for his action that he could determine the result in favour of the British view.[1.]

According to Mr Asquith, noted for a nice diction that exactly expressed his meaning, the procedure of the meeting of the Committee in 1911 had been that the Secretary of State for Foreign affairs made a "statement...on the general course and direction of our foreign policy" wherein he "disclosed", to the Dominion representatives British relations with foreign Powers. Then there were "statements" on military and naval policy made by the heads of these departments and co-operation of the naval forces of the Empire was "discussed".[2.] Mr Asquith spoke also of his hope that during the visit of Sir Robert Borden the Committee might "arrive at conclusions,"[3.] a phrase suggestive of voting within the Committee, in which case the Dominions did not enjoy a parity with the United Kingdom.

It is quite certain that there were no such dark designs in the mind of the British Prime Minister, for it was clear that the Canadian Premier could retire at any time he desired, nor would he be bound by a majority vote. Mr Bonar Law and other politicians, however, commented on the startling decision of the Government to reverse their naval policy and re-occupy the Mediterranean.[4.] Was not that decision, accuses the mysterious Mr

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1. "X", The Committee of Imperial Defence, U.E. Vol.iii, Sept.1912.
2. Asquith, H.C. Debs., July 25, 1912, Vol.41, p.1386.
3. Ibid, p.1387.
4. H.C. Debs., op.cit. pp.1401-1402.

"X", taken during a protracted meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence during the very hours when the Canadian Prime Minister was entrained for London, suggesting that it was necessary to settle the naval strategy of the Empire before his arrival?[1] Furthermore, that meeting of July 4 found the Committee composed of ten Cabinet Ministers, nine naval and military experts, and the permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. On July 10, when the Canadians attended, there were eleven Cabinet Ministers (five Canadian), the permanent chief of the Colonial Office, and six military and naval experts.[2] In consequence, in any decision made the "politicians" could outweigh the "experts" and yet the decision would be represented to the Empire as emanating from a Committee of advice.

Mr Jebb denounced the slight to the Conference. He attacked the logic which inconsistently contended that the Dominion representatives would have no power to commit their Governments to action and which at the same time held that the control of foreign policy must not only be joint but unified so as to avoid the danger of Australia, for example, embarking upon a foreign policy of her own. By conceding that the Ministers of a Dominion should not be bound to exeucte any resolution distasteful to their Governments, the bottom was knocked out of the strongest argument for such an adaptation.[3] The Round Table had proposed such an adaptation of the Defence Committee to the needs of the Empire with the view that, given such a Cabinet, a Federal Parliament would be necessary. But if the right of

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1. "X", op.cit., p.738.
2. Ibid.
3. Jebb, letter to the Times, Nov. 4, 1912.

dissent from a resolution of the Committee were possible, the whole conception of evolving a federated Cabinet thus fell to the ground and was no advance on the Imperial Conference as an agency for unification of the Empire.

Mr Jebb wished to see the subsidiary Conference developed into a Standing Committee for the purpose of concerting policies in foreign affairs and other matters, while keeping the Defence Committee as an expert advisory body on technical aspects of defence - a principle inaugurated in 1909. This would remove the objection that the Conference was only periodical, and would pursue the easier policy of accepting and developing principles already enunciated rather than mutilate the Imperial Conference. It was pointed out by his opponents that there was great need for immediate action, and the efficiency of the Defence Committee both as a secretariat and medium for consultation between responsible ministers was proved in that it was already an established organ.[1.]

Mr Jebb's conception of the organisation of the Empire was not always clear - it would have been surprising had it been in those early, uncertain, and formative years. In his study of Cliver's biography on Hamilton he felt relief that after all there was no antithesis between the two Imperial theories of "alliance" working through spontaneous co-operation under a common Crown and federation based on central authority. "The one is, alike in theory and practice, the forerunner of the

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1. The Times, Nov.4, 1912. In "The Britannic Question", Mr Jebb elaborated the arguments of Mr "X": pp.49-50 and passim: Mr Dewey endorses his criticisms, op.cit. Vol.i, p.294ff.

other." But he felt that conditions must be created so that the Dominions would ask for political sovereignty spontaneously.[1] Yet by 1913 Mr Jebb definitely recognised the antithesis in the two ideals denied above.

One thing Mr Jebb definitely insisted upon - it is his great and peculiar contribution to Imperial studies - namely, that Dominion nationalism be recognised as a permanent factor and not a portion of the "single but scattered stock of which the headquarters was in these islands."[2] Everything Imperial must be built upon this recognition, and the independence of national executives must not be jeopardised.[3] He appreciated that the great need of the Empire was for co-operation, not for advice, the weakness of Pollock's plans for a secretariat being a failure to recognize that fact. Since the autonomy of the Dominions must be safeguarded, he opposed the Committee of Imperial Defence as a medium for reaching decisions between the constituent parts of the Empire, as on such a body the Dominions would be merely advisers of the British Prime Minister, the representative of the executive power of an undivided State. In that capacity he enjoyed the sole privilege of initiative, summoning meetings, determining the subject matter, and accepting or rejecting advice at his own discretion, without impairing the obligation of the others to accept and assist the policy he finally selected. In the Conference, as President, the British Prime Ministers was merely primus inter pares, with no monopoly of initiative nor binding authority in his decisions.[4]

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1. Jebb, The New Phase, U.E. Jan, 1910, Vol.i. The Britannic Question, p.84ff.
2. Imperial Organisation, The Empire and the Century, p.336.
3. Ibid, p.335.
4. The Britannic Question, pp.185-186.

Conclusion.

Mr Jebb had won many converts, and many more had yielded to the logical conclusions of nationalism in the Dominions through the sheer force of facts. One writer, for example, expressed himself of the opinion that, "The fate of Sir Joseph Ward's resolution in favour of an elective Imperial body has shown that Imperial policy cannot, in existing conditions, be made representative by any process aiming at centralization of control."[1] Professor Keith's works on Responsible Government in the Dominions did a great deal to educate public and official opinion which was brought face to face with the force and the institutions with which it had to deal in any organization of the Empire for the future.

Consequently the search of informed opinion was directed to the discovery of methods of co-operation. The conclusion seems clear enough from the foregoing studies of Imperial relations, that the attitude of the British Government lay on the side of co-operative methods and institutions. In very few things did Downing Street show itself stubbornly opposed to the desires of the Dominions, but on the other hand fostered and gave sympathetic encouragement to many of their ambitions. One can have little doubt but that, had the danger of war not hung so constantly like a cloud over the political horizon, there would have been more sympathy for Dominion navies. Only with regard to protection did the Government set its face obdurately against concessions, and even in that case a Commission was appointed

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1. The Times, May 30, 1911.

whose findings were to be considered as a basis for action. In every salient point of Imperial policy herein dealt with has been observed the growth of the nationalist and modern spirit in dealing with Imperial affairs.

One has but to consider the striking growth of the great number of societies and organizations, whose purposes was to create friendship and co-operation among the various portions of the Empire, to realise this truth still further. There were organizations of various kinds to give hospitality to Dominion visitors, to teach patriotism and cultivate race sentiment, to promote the exchange of teachers and bring about a larger uniformity in teaching methods, or to promote Imperial trade and Imperial investment and other similar cultural and material interests of an Imperial nature. These societies led to the publication of numerous journals which did invaluable work in educating public opinion with regard to the Empire.[1.]

The danger of war was the only deterrent to a fuller application of the co-operative principle, and it was that danger alone which gave life to the Round Table movement, insofar as it aimed at Imperial Federation.

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1. There is a most valuable history of many of these organizations in the U.E., 1915, Vol.6, and Jan. 1916, Vol.7 by various informed writers. Vide also Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations, p.298ff and p.372ff, and Cd.8462, pp.106-107, p.142ff.

PART III: TOWARDS THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS.

Chapter I.: The War and Imperial Defence.

A succession of events which have been reviewed, beginning with the telegram to Kruger and continuing to the great German Army Bill and War Loan of 1913, had at last brought Germany to "the Day" wherein she was to put her iron heel upon the throat of a conquered world and dominate mankind in the grandeur of German culture and civilisation. Failure came because the British Empire had not been sufficiently reckoned with. Bernhardi[1.] foresaw that when the crisis came Great Britain would have to be Germany's friend on Germany's own terms or her Empire would crumble. British Imperialists had little more faith than German writers regarding the efficacy of the democratic Empire in a military sense. The Commonwealth was so hopelessly unprepared, except for a Navy that was supported almost entirely by Great Britain; the Dominions were estranged from the Mother Country at so many points; passive belligerency in war-time was freely talked of, and secession was an active heresy in South Africa, Ireland, and even Canada.

There were three reasons for Imperial solidarity. The first and greatest was the force of sentiment which took the forms of love for Great Britain and for the Empire, and a deep appreciation that here was the clash of two great principles of civilisation. It is not popular today to assert that there were any but selfish and ugly passions in the War; the appreciation of economic and political motives that swayed the action

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1. Germany as Britain's Vassal, 1912.

of the Great Powers has led men to minimise the heroic and noble war-time qualities of statesmen and soldiers. Consequently there are those who have little faith in attachment of the Dominions to the Mother Country insofar as it entails any great effort in war or economics. Yet it is impossible to measure the great part that these "ties, which, though as light as air, are as strong as links of iron", played in sending a million men from the Dominions to the cause of little nations who resisted domination, to the cause of democracy and to the call of the Mother Country. Then indeed was the wisdom of Campbell-Bannerman apparent, for he had been one of those who had made the United Kingdom the Mother Country of French-Canadians in Canada and the Dutch of South Africa, not in respect of blood, but of free institutions and national self-respect. General Smuts now drew his sword for the country against which he had waged bitter war a few years ago. "I hope", he said, "that when in future you draw up a calendar of Empire-builders you will not forget the name of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. He was not either intellectually or politically a superman, but he was a wise man with profound feeling and profound political instinct, and he achieved a work in South Africa by one wise act of statesmanship which has already borne, and will continue to bear, the most far-reaching result in the history of this Empire."[1] General Botha was of the same mind: "I fought against the British, but I am a firm upholder of the Commonwealth. In South Africa we enjoy all the liberty

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1. Smuts, War-Time Speeches, pp.5-6.

that we could have as an independent nation, and far greater security against external aggression; we have complete powers of self-government; we control the development of our country; and in the affairs of the world we take a place far higher and render a service more notable and useful that we could attain or give as a separate nation."[1] Again and again Laurier spoke in his lofty eloquence of the righteousness of the British cause and the glory of the Commonwealth of Nations.[2] The best-loved monarch who ever reigned in the Empire did not utter empty words when he told his people, "Had I stood aside...I should have sacrificed my honour and given to destruction the liberties of my Empire and of mankind...Paramount regard for treaty faith and the pledged word of rulers is the common heritage of Great Britain and of the Empire."[3]

It is tremendously valuable in these days when doubts are liable to clog the progress of the Commonwealth and when the clouds darken and the mists thicken, to steal away to memories of the devotion so apparent in the time of the War, and feel our hearts grow brave and strong again. But there were reasons other than sentiment for the entry of the Dominions into the War. They realised that they were fighting, not only the cause of Great Britain, but their own cause as well. The defeat of the Mother Country would be disastrous for every part of the Empire,

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1. In conversation at the Peace Conference at Paris; quoted, Borden, The Dominions and Foreign Relations, Canadian Bar. Rev., Nov. 1925, Vol.3.
2. Vide Skelton, op.cit., Vol.2, p.433; Lucas, Overseas Dominions and Empire Wars, Cornhill Mag., 1915, Vol.38: Hughes, The Splendid Adventure, p.36.
3. The Times, Sept.10, 1914.

curtailing freedom, hampering development, and damaging trade. There was the further fact that neutrality was impossible to any member of the British Empire. "The mass of the people," said the Australian Prime Minister, "so entirely...favoured the attitude of the British Government towards Germany that they were not in a mood to scrutinise too closely the bearing of what had happened upon Dominion status...Very few realised...that, no matter what the feelings of the Dominions were, it was inevitable that the whole Empire should be plunged into war by Britain's declaration...As for the Governments of the Dominions, they were compelled to realise...that while in theory they exercised the powers usually vested in free nations, in practice when Britain declared war, they had to dance to the tune played by another." "He significantly added that this must never happen again."[1] Not even Bourassa contradicted the fact of automatic entry into the war on the part of Canada.[2]

For these three reasons, then, the Dominions entered the war, and their efforts amazed even the United Kingdom. The statistics of the enormous losses sustained by the Empire outside the United Kingdom will amaze readers today who may have forgotten and who are inclined to ask in sceptic fashion if the Dominions have anything to give the Mother Country in trade arrangements or if the attachment will prove of much value.[3]

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1. Hughes, op.cit., pp.233-234; sim. Laurier, Skelton, op.cit. p.433, p.437.
2. His attitude of disinterestedness changed to hostility, vide ibid, p.435, p.461ff.
3. For the war losses, see the War Office Report, 1922, entitled Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, p.756, p.347: Lucas, The Dominions and the War, Vol.2, p.288; Vol.3, p.222; p.382; p.399; pp.510-511; and passim. Buchan, South African Forces in France, p.260. W.P.M. Kennedy, Sixty Years of Canadian Progress, Quart.Rev., Apr.1921, Vol.248. War Government in the Dominions, p.106ff. For the War Expenditure of the Dominions, the War Office Report, op.cit. p.561.

The enthusiasm of Canada and her moral and material earnestness had a doubtlessly great effect on the United States which did a great deal towards bringing the Republic into the War[1] and the Dominion is capable of being of similar value in the struggles of peace towards reconstruction in uniting the efforts of the United States and the Commonwealth of Nations.

The entry of the Dominions into the War also served to reveal the relation of their war-time organization and operations to the authorities in the United Kingdom. The British Government was definitely advisory only, but that advice was of much the same strength as the advice of the Committee of Imperial Defence to the Imperial Government. For example, there is the cable from the Canadian Government upon the outbreak of war that they would "welcome any suggestions and advice which the Imperial naval and military authorities may deem it expedient to send."[2] Australia and New Zealand cabled to the same effect.[3] The South African Government was hampered by Dutch disloyalty which flared up into open rebellion, but their message stated a full recognition of the obligations of the Union in undertaking any necessary measures for defence and a readiness to assume the responsibilities performed at that time by Imperial troops in South Africa that they might be free for service elsewhere.[4]

The advent of war further did away with the academic discussion of separate and combined navies and military forces, for these, so far as operations and command were concerned became

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1. Lucas, op.cit. Vol.2, pp.290-291.
2. Aug. 2, 1914, Cd.7607, p.1.
3. Ibid, p.4, p.6.
4. Ibid, p.9.

unitary immediately upon the outbreak of war. It is true that in regard to Dominion troops a quasi-national character was retained: they had distinctive units, an individual personality, especially with regard to Canada, and their own commanders who, while under a British Officer, were capable of exerting a degree of independence not possible to a British officer in a similar command.[1.] In the policy of raising troops by conscription[2.] the Dominions acted solely on their own initiative, and Canada established an Overseas Military Council in London which exercised a good deal of control over Canadian troops overseas.[3.] Yet the Dominion forces had been so trained in British traditions and methods that they were easily assimilable to the British forces, and were finally under British control. At the outbreak of war, Australia, the only Dominion with an effective navy, transferred her naval forces to British control.[4.] Regarding the Australian fleet it could be said that for all intents and purposes it was in 1914 "merely an outlying section of the British fleet, from which it had only had a few months separate existence and in whose traditions its officers and men had been trained."[5.] The New Zealand was controlled by the Imperial Government, and Canada and Newfoundland made contributions to the Imperial naval forces, as also did South Africa. That is, the theory of separate navies had been in no way applied or tested, and nothing in the war suggested that the idea would be worth a trial.

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1. War Government in the Dominions, p.108.
2. Vide Lucas, op.cit., Vol.3, pp.30-42; Skelton, op.cit. p.495ff.
3. The Sovereignty of the British Dominions, pp.142-143. Borden, Canadian Constitutional Studies, pp.8-9.
4. Cd.7607, p.4.
5. War Government in the Dominions, p.135.

Consequently it could be taken as proved from war-time experience that a single navy was the only possible means of Imperial defence and that opinion generally throughout the Empire favoured it. The Fortnightly Review had consistently pressed for the adoption of the 1909 theory on the principle that half a loaf was better than no bread, but it was now suggested that there be an Imperial squadron apart from the British squadron, marked off specifically for Dominion use, jointly controlled according to contribution, and the nature of the squadron would give the Dominions a majority vote on the Board in control.[1.] There were suggestions somewhat similar in design as that of Mr Lash,[2.] but it cannot be said that they were particularly helpful to a solution of the problem.

Mr A.G. Gardiner, who had contended in dogmatic fashion that the 1911 Conference had put an end to Imperialism, in 1917 expressed the general opinion that, "The experience of the war has probably favoured the doctrine of a single Navy. The sea is a unity of operations and the Empire is a unit of interest, The vulnerable spot of Australia had been found, in the present case, in the North Sea, and so with South Africa. It would seem to follow that a single Navy under common control is the corollary of the conditions which the war has revealed."[3.] In consonance

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1. Sir A.S. Hurd, The Dominions and Command of the Sea, Fort. Rev., Aug. 1914, Vol.96.
2. Z.A. Lash, Defence and Foreign Affairs, pp.49-51. Or Percy Hurd, Next Steps in Empire Partnership, Journ. Roy. Soc. Arts, April 14, 1916, Vol.64.
3. A.G. Gardiner, Imperial Defence after the War, Con.Rev., Jan. 1917, Vol.3. Sim. Sir Jos. Ward, Empire Reconstruction after the War, Emp.Rev., Jan.1917, Vol.30.

with his scheme of Imperial Federation, Mr Curtis proposed an Imperial Navy supported by Imperial taxation,[1] as also did Mr Worsfold.[2] Mr Vaughan Cornish reproduced the arguments of Mahan and argued on the importance to the Dominions of Britain being maintained as the naval citadel of the Empire.[3] There were many like Mr Ferraby who undoybtedly favoured a single Navy, but who believed that the only possible development was along the lines of the 1909 Conference and the Henderson Report.[4]

At the Imperial Conference of 1918, the question of naval policy was not discussed, but certain negotiations too place between the British Admiralty and the overseas representatives and there were private discussions which resulted in a meeting of the Dominion Prime Ministers in London.[5] A memorandum which received unanimous acceptance at the hands of the Dominion Prime Ministers with the exception of the Newfoundland Premier who was not at the conference, condemned the proposal of the Admiralty Memorandum of 17 May 1918 for a single Navy at all times under a central naval authority as impracticable. The experience of the war had shown a Dominion Navy to be easily assimilable to the Imperial Navy, but it was recognised that such efficiency could only be gained by the policy of the past which had recognised that the character of construction, armament, and equipment, and the methods and principles of training, administration, and

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1. The Problem of the Commonwealth, pp.165-166.
2. The Empire on the Anvil, pp.145-151.
3. Cornish, Naval and Military Geography of the British Empire, p.5ff; p.37, p.69, and passim.
4. Ferraby, The Imperial British Navy, pp.209-218 and passim.
5. Statement by Mr Ballantyne, The Canadian House of Commons, Journ. Parls. Emp., 1920, Vol.1, pp.486-487.

organisation should proceed upon the same lines in all the Navies of the Empire. For this purpose the Dominion would welcome visits from a highly qualified representative of the Admiralty who would becompetent to advise the naval authorities of the Dominions on such matters.

As a result of these resolutions, Admiral Jellicoe was sent to the Dominions in the following year. In his report he set forth the general principles that were now generally accepted: that a single navy for the Empire was not possible; that the Dominion national sentiments demanded a navy manned by themselves and which would not be forever remote from local waters; that Australia, whose need of naval protection appeared greatest, must rely upon the British fleet for any success in war; and that the decisive conflict might take place far from Australian waters. He pointed out that the great interest of Australia and New Zealand in the naval bases at Colombo and Singapore, an interest shared by India, South Africa, and Canada. Since the Empire was so generally affected by the safety of the Pacific for their trade, the various squadrons of the Dominions and the Mother Country detailed for service in that Ocean should be units of an Imperial fleet under an officer and a strong staff resident at Singapore. The Admiral thus stationed would thoroughly acquaint himself with the problems of the situation, and visit the Dominions from time to time, working with the full cooperation of the naval authorities throughout the Empire. To the upkeep of this staff the constituent parts of the Empire would contribute, such expenditure taking the place of local expenditure for the same purpose of providing for the safety

of the Pacific. After giving some details as to the possible composition of the Imperial Far Eastern Fleet, Lord Jellicoe suggested an approximate apportionment of the cost based upon population and sea-borne trade of the various units: Great Britain should contribute 74.12 per cent, Australia, 7.74, New Zealand 2.02, Canada 12.30, and South Africa 3.82. The Navy should be controlled by a minister responsible to the British Parliament, but he should rely in technical matters upon a Naval Board of experts, and in the event of a divergence of view the Chief of the Naval Staff should be empowered to present the Board's view to the Prime Minister.[1.]

Lord Jellicoe's report did not create any enthusiasm in the Dominions, and after some acrimonious discussion in the various Parliaments the status quo was interfered with but little. An Act of 1918 and Imperial Orders in Council of June 28, 1920 gave the Dominions legal right to depart, in respect of their forces, from the terms of the Naval Discipline Act, the King's Regulations for the Navy, and the Admiralty Instructions, if they so desired.[2.] The doctrine continued, however, that modifications would only be introduced following upon full consultation between the naval authorities of the countries concerned.

Preceding the Imperial Conference of 1921 there was no little talk of ways and means to co-ordinate the defence activities of the Empire. Haldane expressed his opinion that a Naval Imperial War Staff would be a most desirable thing. Dominion officers could come over and take up training and thus

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1. War Government in the Dominions, pp.138-145.
2. The Sovereignty of the British Dominions, pp.162-163.

there would be one body for the whole Empire all thinking alike, trained in the same school, breathing the same old traditions, and shaping the unity of the Navy of the Empire. There would then be cohesion in naval matters and unity in other matters also, so that Britain would become such a Power as the world had never seen.[1.]

In the United Kingdom at this time there was much discussion of combining under one staff the military, naval, and air defence, so that a loophole was left for the question of an Imperial staff to come up again. It was advocated that this staff possess an advisory capacity only.[2.] Navalis desired to see a Central Council set up as a permanent body to advise the British and Dominion Governments on questions of defence in time of peace, and to exercise a general control over all the forces of the Empire in war. The British Prime Minister would be Chairman and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be Deputy Chairman. The membership would include the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War and Air, the Secretary of State for India, and Ministers for each of the Dominions, with power to summon other ministers. There would be a Central Staff to give technical advice.[3.] Since "Navalis" wished the body to be a synonym for the War Cabinet, it would really exercise a

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1. The Times, May 4, 1921.
2. W.D. Bird, A Note on the Military Organisation of Imperial Defence, Journ. Un. Serv. Inst., May 1920, Vol.65. Minute addressed to the Prime Minister by the Executive of the Army Committee, The Army Quart., Jan. 1921, Vol.1, p.256. Maj.-Gen. G.G. Aston, The Problem of Imperial Defence, Fort. Rev., Apr. 1921, Vol.109. Lt.-Col. J.C. Dundas, Imperial Strategy and a Combined Staff, Journ. Roy. Un. Serv. Inst., Nov. 1920, Vol.65.
3. Navalis, A Suggestion for the Imperial Conference, Nat. Rev., May 1921, Vol.77.

virtual control and, by reason of its composition and location in the British Isles, the Imperial Government would exercise a preponderant control. It required a war to bring about and maintain such centralisation.

Sir J.H. Davidson saw three ideas current: The first was the establishment of a Ministry of Defence which would collect the three great spending departments - Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry - under one supervising and responsible Minister. While the criticism that such a body would have too much power would not attach to a "Commonwealth Ministry for the whole British Empire," yet it was too lengthy a process to satisfy immediate demands. There was a second proposal to create new machinery in the shape of a separate Joint Imperial General Staff, responsible directly to the Cabinet and to the Imperial Council, but this was considered unworkable since it might advise the Cabinet direct and force a policy over the heads of the different departments. The third suggestion was to graft a permanent technical advisory body on to existing machinery, that is to say, on to the Committee of Imperial Defence. This was the most promising line of advance, and at the present he considered the Committee inadequate. "It is hoped," concluded the writer, "that some definite result may be achieved from the deliberations of the Imperial Conference...in 1921, and that this result will be productive of the means of co-ordination in the sphere of defence as well as in political and economic sphere... in any event policy must be dictated by the Government and Imperial policy by an Imperial Council, assisted by an effective and efficient Committee of Imperial Defence."

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1. Davidson, Defence of the British Empire, The Army Quart., Jan. 1921, Vol.1. He had much the same views in 1924; vide Cmd.2029, p.13.

The Times expressed itself in favour of a development of the Henderson scheme of defence units.[1] Encouraged by a statement by Senator Millen, for a time acting-Prime Minister of Australia, that journal continued to labour the necessity of considering the Imperial nature of the Navy,[2] although it was recognized that the conditions had changed wholly since 1909 and it was more than possible that Dominion navies were sound as a method of Empire preparedness by sea.[3] When Lloyd-George alarmed some Australian opinion by suggesting that the defence of the Empire must be an Imperial concern - a remark which was taken to mean that some condition would be created leading to political federation - the Times hastened to assure the Dominion that there was no sinister design on the part of Great Britain to involve the Dominions in any tightening of the Imperial ties.[4] Mr D.A.E. Veal noted that the dream of an Imperial fleet to which all the parts of the Empire contributed in proportion, under the direction of an Empire Cabinet, had been definitely abandoned for the plan of local navies under local control with the Anglo-Saxon states forming an alliance of virtually independent units. This was better than nothing, and "in time", he said, "it may develop into something closer." I see a vision of a great federation of Anglo-Saxon States, keeper of the peace of the world...If they turn their backs on the vision,,..their path will lead eventually to the disintegration of the Empire and the decline of Britain to a third or fourth-rate Power."[5]

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1. The Times, Sept.11, 1920.
2. The Times, Feb.3, 1921, Feb.22, 1921.
3. The Times, May 6, 1921.
4. The Times, Mar.29, 1921.
5. Veal, The Dominions and Sea Supremacy, Emp.Rev., Sept,1921, Vol.35; The Imperial Conference, 1921, ibid, Sept. 1921.

Mr Eastwood, in a book published after the Conference, expressed his dissatisfaction with the existing state of things by which the Dominions were under no obligations to contribute to Imperial defence or assist during a war. He desired co-operation in both, and took great pleasure from such unity as did obtain.[1]

The exhaustion consequent upon the War, the hope that the League of Nations would make war impossible, and the hostility of the Dominions as exhibited in the Conference of 1921 towards any scheme of centralisation, led to a lessening of the discussion of Imperial defence. There were two other post-war factors tending to modify the attitude of the Dominions and Great Britain to this problem. One was the new value of air power in war and the other was the Pacific Problem and the Washington Conference.

Lord Fisher had long urged the importance of air-craft in war,[2] and many experts now drew attention to the fact that a fleet cannot blockade a country with an extensive coastline, that battleships were not capable of adequately protecting commerce because they must remain near their bases, that they are vulnerable to the attack of aircraft, mines, and submarines, and that the United Kingdom was saved from starvation in the War, not by her battleships, but by anti-submarine craft. Claims were put forward by airmen that fleets of aeroplanes starting from land aerodromes could make control of the sea by a fleet impossible

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1. Eastwood, The Organisation of an Imperial Partnership, pp.76-78.
2. Fisher, Memories, pp.124-130.

unless it were combined with command of the air. While the radius of action of the aeroplanes was limited at present, carriers were in an experimental stage. Moreover, after the war, Britain had scrapped many of her vessels and was not anxious to attempt any new construction, and the Labour Party and certain experts were definitely opposed.[1] It was argued in rebuttal that the aeroplane had not yet proved capable of carrying or discharging with accuracy at a moving target and in the face of high angle fire projectiles more formidable than the modern battleships and the submarine had sacrificed speed to concealment, scientific detection was well advanced by the end of the war, and in the Battle of Jutland submarines had played little part.[2]

Nevertheless the entrance of airships and submarines into naval strategy destroyed not a little of the prestige of the British Navy and, since the Dominions did not know how great would be the advance made in the development of these forms of war machinery, they were not anxious to make large investments.

The advent of the airship, however, in no wise damaged the principle that the Empire should unite its defence forces. Sir Charles Lucas expressed his view that, "The air is one, even more so than the sea...The possibility, therefore, suggests itself of an Imperial Air Force, wholly outside and beyond any local Air Defence Forces, more representative of the Empire than the Royal Navy itself, not fettered ny any past, and not necessarily having its headquarters either in the Mother Country or in

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1. As Admiral Percy Scott and Admiral Mark Kerr, vide Kerr, The Navy, the Air, and the Empire, Journ. Roy. Un. Serv. Inst., May 1924, Vol.69.
2. Vide Viscount Curzon, ibid.

any one of the self-governing Dominions."[1] Since it was felt that airships in a military sense must find their origin even as the Navy had done in a commercial basis, the greater effort was directed to finding ways of co-operation in Imperial air-mail services, and there was a suggestion for an Imperial Air-ship Company, jointly contributed to by the various Governments in proportion.[2]

Sir Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State for Air, observed at the Imperial Economic Conference that, although the Hambling Committee had pointed out the possibilities of commercial aviation the Imperial Conference of 1921 had done nothing.[3] When nothing resulted, the British Government decided it could not proceed with the maintenance and operation of airships. Since that time, however, certain proposals had been made to the British Government by private persons which had seemed of sufficient importance to demand careful enquiry. A Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence went into the matter with the result that on various grounds, military and civil, the Cabinet came to the conclusion that they ought to resume, in some way or another, the operation of airships, and that the best way to proceed was by subsidizing a small company on the general lines suggested by Commander Burney. Sir Samuel was most anxious for Dominion co-operation in carrying the scheme into effect. Mr Amery was delighted with

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1. Lucas, The War and the Empire, p.46. Sim. The Empire and the Air. The Outlook, Nov. 6, 1926.
2. A.H. Ashbolt, Imperial Airships, Emp.Rev., July 1921, Vol.35.
3. Cmd. 2009, p.351. Cmd.1474, p.47ff.

the project, but the Dominions were on the whole apathetic.[1] A memorandum from the Air Ministry stated the importance of the Governments of the Empire assisting one another to systematize the development and operation of air survey services.[2] An Air Communications Committee recommended co-operation,[3] and a resolution was adopted to that effect.[4]

It should not be thought that there was any vital change in the opinion that the defence schemes of the Empire should be co-ordinated to act as a unit under supreme command. It was still desired that the Dominion navies be closely associated with the Imperial Navy to form to all intents and purposes a single navy.[5] The Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence wished to renew the contact of the Dominions with the Committee of Imperial Defence which had been broken since the war.[6] Sir William Robertson proposed a Council of Imperial Defence in which every effort should be made to enlist the co-operation of the Dominions both as to state policy and war preparations.[7] In 1924 the British Government included in their statement of Naval Policy: "The Naval Defence of the Empire must depend ultimately on the active support of public opinion throughout the Empire, and the only system of Naval Defence which can meet with general approval is one in which

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1. Cmd.2009, p.353.
2. Ibid, pp.357-359.
3. Ibid, pp.363-365.
4. Ibid. Cmd.1987, pp.16-17.
5. Vide for ex. Hurd, Can the Empire be Made Safe? Fort. Rev., July 1923, Vol.114. Sir William Robertson in The Morning Post, Feb.9, 1925.
6. Cmd.2029, pp.17-19.
7. Ibid, pp.12-13.

each Dominion possesses Naval Forces of its own. The Admiralty heartily endorse this principle and will do all in their power to assist in the development of seagoing Dominion Navies."[1]

The view that Imperial defence should be co-ordinated throughout the Empire to attain homogeneity as far as was consistent with local self-government received notable confirmation at the Imperial Conference of 1926. Mr Baldwin deplored the great burden that was thrown upon the United Kingdom in the Singapore scheme and stated that the Committee of Imperial Defence was being developed and Dominion interest in its machinery as a means of Imperial co-operation would be welcomed.[2] Canada and South Africa were very cautious in their comments, but Mr Bruce of Australia stressed the need for Imperial co-operation in naval defence[3] and Mr Coates of New Zealand spoke similarly.[4] The resolutions that proceeded from the Conference were more encouraging. The Conference observed the steady progress that had been made in the direction of organising military formations in general on similar lines; in the adoption of similar patterns of weapons; and in the interchange of Officers between different parts of the Empire; extending these forms of co-operation and promoting further consultation between the respective General Staffs on defence questions adjudged of common interest. Closer co-ordination was recommended in Air Forces and resources of the several parts of the Empire, it being noted with satisfaction that much had

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1. Cmd. 2071, p.3.
2. Cmd. 2769, pp.165-166.
3. Ibid, p.179.
4. Ibid, pp.182-185.

been done.[1] Closer co-operation in Defence matters was also observed in the reciprocal attachment of naval, military, and air Officers to the Staff Colleges and other technical establishments maintained in various parts of the Empire, and the resolutions of the Conferences of 1923 were reaffirmed.[2]

The Empire and the Problem of the Pacific.

There has been a feeling in Great Britain which is quite justifiable that, since the Empire is united by no force so much as political and economic danger, the problem of the Pacific has been the reason for the maintenance of the Imperial sentiment in Australasia. This could not be otherwise while the League of Nations failed to convince the world of its authority and while Australia and New Zealand held to their attitude that, as the Australian Prime Minister put it, "There is no tribunal to which we are prepared to submit the White Australia Policy. None."[3] The problem of the Pacific, however, was one in which the Empire might well unite. All the English-speaking people except Great Britain encircled the Pacific, so that their shortest communications with one another lay across its waters, if one include the Pacific Ocean by which South Africa gained entrance to Australia, while the British Isles

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1. Cmd. 2768, pp.35-36.
2. Ibid, pp.36-37.
3. Hughes, The Pacific and the Washington Conference, Emp'.Rev. Aug. 1921, Vol.30.

certainly had great interests in that region.[1]

The fear of Japan lies in the danger that Japanese Imperialists should seek to further Imperialist ambitions, find an outlet for excess population, break down the exclusion policy of the West, and make some reply to the irritating alleged inequality of civilisation and race as between East and West.[2] Even Canada was afraid, and there was some discussion of a redistribution of British population with a great development scheme according to Lord Northcliffe's warning and suggestions.[3]

Prior to the Great War, there was much fear in Australia that the British military Alliance did not offer sufficient of a quid pro quo to Japan to make it worth her while observing the Treaty, for while the United Kingdom had protection by the alliance for her Eastern Trade and possessions and was able to withdraw her fleet to the North Sea, Japan seemed to get little in return and might desert the Alliance if it appeared worth her while to do so. The fear was scouted in Britain, and Japanese statesmen certainly considered it a valuable treaty.[4] During the War Japan's value and fidelity as an ally was abundantly proven and the Dominions had many an opportunity to bless the day when the Treaty was consummated.[5]

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1. Vide, Survey of International Affairs, 1920-23, p.419; F.C. Wade, The Awakening of the Pacific, Emp.Rev., Jan. 1922, Vol.36; Massey, Our Trade and Our Navy, Emp.Rev., Aug.1921, Vol.35; Australian Labour and Australian Ideals, Quart.Rev. July 1921, Vol.236; Eggleston, The Viewpoint of Australia on Pacific Affairs, Problems of the Pacific, pp.3-6.
2. Vide Golovin, The Problem of the Pacific in the Twentieth Century, pp.216-217.
3. Wade, Canada's Call to Britain, Emp.Rev., Nov.1921, Vol.35.
4. The Times, July 5, 1905; St.Nihal Singh, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, The London Quart. Rev., Jan.1921.
5. ex. Massey, What I told the Conference, Emp.Rev., July 1921, vol.35.

Because of Japan's loyalty to the Treaty during the War, it appeared to British opinion that the Dominions might have shown more sympathy with her in 1921 when the question of the Alliance came up for consideration to the Imperial Conference for the second time.[1] The first occasion had been at the 1911 Conference when the Dominions had quite approved. The Alliance had aroused some dislike in the United States at that time, however, since Japan was suspected of having sinister designs on America, and the military alliance meant that Britain would have to join Japan in a war.[2] Lord Grey managed to preclude such a possibility by the insertion of an article and concluding a Treaty in 1914 with the United States which he chose to regard as a general arbitration Treaty meeting the conditions of the Article(4).

By 1921 the conditions had altered greatly: Russia and Germany were no longer to be feared, and the Pacific appeared as the most likely theatre for naval operations. Yet in the Pacific control was shared by the United States and Japan, so that a military alliance between Japan and Britain seemed to be aimed directly at the Republic. Why should Britain fear the United States? It was thought that the United Kingdom would feel some jealousy of losing her place as the Mistress of the Seas and would entertain some suspicion of the fact that the United States had refused to enter the League. Moreover, the United Kingdom seemed to be scrambling with the rest of

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1. The Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.474.
2. Buell, The Washington Conference, p.117.

the nations for exclusive concessions and monopolistic sources of trade.[1] There was this dilemma: Great Britain could not afford to hurt the feelings of her old ally, Japan; her policy, despite American protests, had always been friendly to the Republic; and the Dominions joined the protest against any Alliance that would offend the United States. There was a good deal of fear that in the event of a war between Japan and the United States, China would intervene against Japan, and Britain would have to go to war against China.[2] Hughes was very anxious for a renewal of the Treaty, yet he desired to keep on the very best of terms with the Republic,[3] and Massey was of similar mind.

At the Imperial Conference of 1921, evidently Canada was the most difficult to reconcile for Canadian farmers were suffering from the incidence of the American emergency tariff and Mr Meighen, the Prime Minister, was very anxious to secure its cancellation.[4] Since Australia had borrowed from Britain fifty million pounds during the war and could hardly pay her Navy let alone build a Navy necessary to protect her shores should the Alliance be condemned, Lloyd George found it easy enough to win over that Dominion.[5] The statement of the attitude of the Conference by Lloyd George was that it included "a special regard to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, the future of China, and the

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1. Buell, op.cit. pp.124-126.
2. Vide, Dewey, op.cit., Vol.2. pp.71-72.
3. The Times, Apr. 8, 1921; The Splendid Adventure, p.120.
4. Vide Hespericus, The Downing Street Conference, The Nation, Aug. 6, 1921; The Economist, June 25, 1921, p.1358; Brady, Canada, pp.336-337.
5. Buell, op.cit. pp.130-131.

bearing of both those questions on the relations of the British Empire with the United States...The object of our discussions was to find a method combining all these three factors in a policy which would remove the danger of heavy naval expenditure in the Pacific with all the evils which such an expenditure entrails, and would ensure the development of all legitimate interests of the Far East."[1.]

The Washington Conference, however, failed to allay the Australasian apprehensions of Japanese aggression, for Japan appeared to have gained an enormous advantage in the division of German Pacific possessions to which the conclusions of the Washington Conference appeared to add.[2.] The Four Power Treaty - "The decent shroud in which the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was buried" - laid it down that all matters of difference that might arise between the signatories (France, Japan, the United States, and the British Empire) with regard to their possessions in the Pacific, must be referred to a Conference, and if threatened by an outside Power they would endeavour to take concerted action.[3.] The Five Power Treaty, in which Italy was included, provided that the status quo be maintained at the time of signing the Treaty with regard to fortifications, naval bases, and specific possessions.[4.] In this Treaty Japan appeared to be favoured in that American and British contemplated bases and fortifications were restricted and Japanese naval isolation

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1. H.C. Debs., July 11, 1921, Vol.144pp.915-918.
2. Vide Cole, op.cit., pp.142-149.
3. Cmd.1627, p.38ff.
4. Ibid, p.690ff.

increased. While the main forces of the United States were a distance of from five to seven thousand miles and those of Britain and France ten thousand miles from the theatre of War to which the Four Power Pact refers, thus taking the American fleet a month before it reached the Pacific and, if it waited to combine with the British fleet, two months, Japan could have seized the strategic bases in the Pacific beforetheir arrival.[1.] Also, while the Conference abolished competition in capital ships, failure to limit construction of aircraft and submarines, as well as auxiliaries, might make the Naval Treaty of Washington of almost no significance.[2.] In consequence it could still be urged in the United Kingdom, and with great force, that the Dominions should assist in securing the safety of the trade routes in the Pacific and establishing the general security of the Empire. It is well worth observing in all this weighing of the pros and cons, how large a part the views of the Dominions took in determining the decisions of the British Government and the co-operation that deference implied.

The Singapore Base.

The project of utilizing Singapore as a naval base for the British Navy in the East was not new, but had been mooted as far back as 1882, and in 1885 it had been decided to fortify it, while in the pre-war years it had been the subject of discussion for Imperial naval authorities.[3.] In introducing the

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1. Vide Golovin, op.cit. p.184.
2. Vide Buell, op.cit. p.235.
3. Vide Jebb, The Empire in Eclipse, p.250.

naval estimates for 1923-24, Mr Amery, while stating the pacific intentions of His Majesty's Government, yet pointed out the need of oil fuel bases and docking and repairing facilities in the Pacific if a fleet were to have any effectiveness in that Ocean. He thereupon announced the beginning of a creation of a naval base at Singapore, which was the key position to British interests in the East and Far East. He said, "We have often in the past in appealing to the Dominions to co-operate more effectively in the naval defence of the Empire, reminded them that their destiny might be settled ny an action in the North Sea. It is equally necessary for us to remember that our destiny may in the future, as in our past history, depend on what happens in the most distant seas of the world."[1] The Labour Party vigorously denounced the projected naval base as militating against the amity of nations,[2] It appeared true, as Salisbury stated in the House of Lords, that, despite the doubts of certain experts, "the broad fact remains that without a fortified base at Singapore you could not have the use of your navy in the Far East at all."[3]

While Canada remained secure in her state of glorious North American isolation, New Zealand and Australia were willing to co-operate with the United Kingdom in the Singapore Scheme.. The resolutions of the Conference of 1923 read in part:

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1. H.C. Debs. 12 Mar. 1923, Vol.161, p.1099.
2. Snowden, ibid, p.1107ff; Macdonald, Debs. 23 July 1923, Vol. 167, pp.79-80. Asquith wished the matter held over for the Imperial Conference. Debs.1 May, 1923, V61.163, p.1234; sim. Lambert, pp.1250-51.
3. H.L. Debs., 5 June 1923, Vol.54, p.404.

" 1. The Conference affirms that it is necessary to provide for the adequate defence of the territories and trade of the several countries comprising the British Empire.

2. In this connection the Conference expressly recognises that it is for the Parliaments of the several parts of the Empire, upon the recommendations of their respective Governments, to decide the nature and extent of any action which should be taken by them." After further stating general principles: " 4. In the application of these principles to the several parts of the Empire concerned the Conference takes note of:- a. The deep interest of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and India, in the provision of a Naval Base at Singapore, as essential for ensuring the mobility necessary to provide for the security of the territories and trade of the Empire in Eastern Waters. b. The necessity for the maintenance of safe passage along the great route through the Mediterranean and the Red Sea."[1.]

The Baldwin Government in 1924 had decided to prosecute a Pacific naval programme in accordance with the Washington Treaty, but the Labour Government which succeeded to office, at once suspended the Singapore scheme and cabled the Dominions to that effect.[2.] Canada refrained from tendering any advice. Smuts approved and Newfoundland deprecated the suspension of the scheme. New Zealand ~~xxx~~ protested bitterly and, having voted £100,000, announced that she would "not stop at that,"

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1. Cmd.1987, pp.16-17.
2. Cmd.2083, pp.5-6.

stressing the need of naval supremacy for the Empire and a lack of faith in the League as an effective instrument in a crisis.[1.] Australia's reply included, "We think...that if the proposal, which the highest naval authorities of the Empire support as a necessary defensive measure, is abandoned by your Government, incalculable harm will be done to the Empire's prestige, the confidence of smaller nations will be shattered, the ambitions of lesser powers will be increased, and deep distrust will be caused throughout the whole Empire...Unless we have a base in the Pacific, that quota of capital ships permitted by the Washington Conference cannot be maintained by Britain in these now important waters....Therefore, on behalf of our Commonwealth, which has on every possible occasion proved its loyalty to the Empire, we urge you even at this late hour to reconsider your decision...I wish to make it clear that its obligation to contribute towards the cost of the base is recognised by Australia, and it is the intention of my Government to submit to Parliament, as soon as it meets, proposals for a substantial Australian contribution."[2.] Nevertheless the British Government adhered to its original decision, and its naval estimates were submitted to Parliament without the Singapore scheme included.[3.]

The succeeding Unionist Government made sufficient progress with the scheme to earn the partial approval of the Conference of 1926. The representatives of Australia, New Zealand, and India stated that they were impressed with the vital importance

1. Cmd.2083, pp.8-9.
2. Ibid, pp. 10-12.
3. H.C. Debs. 18 and 25 Mar. 1924, Vol. 171, p.275ff; p.1181ff; 31 July 1924, Vol.176, p.2293ff.

of ensuring the security of the world-wide trade routes upon which the safety and welfare of all parts of the Empire depended, and noted with special interest the steps already taken by His Majesty's Government in Great Britain to develop the Naval Base at Singapore, with the object of facilitating the free movement of the Fleets. In view of the heavy expenditure involved, they welcomed the spirit of co-operation shown in the contributions made with the object of expediting this work.[1] The difficult and somewhat aggressive attitude of South Africa, the aloofness of Canada, the eager enthusiasm of Australia and New Zealand to establish security in the Pacific, and the manifold interests and burdens of the United Kingdom, made the project serve as an example of the impossibility of any definite unitary action in Imperial defence. National policies must be pursued, and the military and naval unity of the Empire must be in the form of a co-operative alliance which would be much more than ordinary alliances, but much less than the unity of an Empire.

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1. Cmd. 2768, p.35.

Chapter II: Imperial Organisation :
The Last Effort for Imperial Federation.

Before studying the various proposals for effecting Imperial unity and tracing the rise and decline of the agitation, it would be best to appreciate the causes which led to such proposals being made.

The most important origin of the movement lies in the creation of the war mind. The period 1914-1918 turned every phase of man's existence into a ferment. Every accepted standard of value in political and social philosophy was subjected to a searching scrutiny, generally by minds guilty of prejudgment. On the one hand there was a revolt against discipline, for had not discipline led to Prussian culture, Machpolitik, and war? So there came a great tide of individualism and nationalism. But war is hard on democracy; the individual must be submerged to the mechanism that a military régime demands. Therefore there arose another body which succeeded for a time in drowning the voice of opposition, asserting that war was caused by a perversion of culture, or culture on a wrong basis. A third body of opinion taught that there was a mean between individualism and culture, and held to sane co-operative principles between men and nations. Unfortunately these teachers have not had the success their wisdom warrants. The great conflict lay between the two extremes, and so successful were the advocates of the second line of thought that an outsider might be forgiven if he considered that the doctrine of laisser faire

had at last lost the day in British politics.[1] To this body belonged the Round Table Group, formed under the inspiration of Lord Milner in 1910, and the Round Table Journal, at the outset of the war, began a study designed to differentiate between the Prussian and "Commonwealth" principles foundational to a State.[2]

But if it is difficult under the stress of great emotions such as are engendered by war to keep a clear mind, by virtue of that fact it is more than usually difficult to find the true interpretation of facts and speeches, especially if one set out to find facts to fit a theory. The Round Table and other advocates of Imperial Federation could find a vast amount of evidence to support their case. Almost every responsible statesman at some time or other, if avoiding any exact statement of the means, had uttered views upon the absolute necessity of some form of Imperial organisation. Balfour spoke of the stage of British Imperial history having been arrived at which would see the bringing together with a closer intimacy and union, organically as well as sentimentally, all the communities into one united Empire.[3] Bonar Law also spoke for the Conservatives

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1. Chevrillon, Britain and the War, pp.214-215: "The Empire... will surely become more and more closely bound together... an isolated whole by a system of tariffs..a political federation with an Imperial Parliament...After sharing so spontaneously in the effort of the Mother Country...these new nations form with her henceforth but one people and must decide their future together...In sheer defence the State will..evolve, like the individual, in the direction of what Herbert Spencer called the 'military type'". Vide also pp. 74-75, p.205.
2. Sim. Chas. H. Luke, The War and the Parting of the Ways, p.6 and passim.
3. The Times, Mar.21, 1916.

that the state of things when the Dominions gave so much and had so little control could not be permanent. "When the war is over things cannot remain as before. (cheers) There is one thing that I hope and believe we may gain from the war, and that is that the war has shown that the Empire is one in spirit and in action, so some means may be found for making it one in structure in all the time that is to come...The war has made a great difference..things which were impossible before are easy perhaps now."[1] Sir Herbert Samuel spoke of the need for the consideration, not only of commercial, but constitutional questions of the Empire, a need of which he had long been convinced.[2] Mr Ramsay Muir, another spokesman from the Liberal rostrum, while nnot advocating any scheme of federation, yet argued against the opponents of such schemes and believed that some change was inevitable.[3] As late as the Spring of 1917 Lloyd-George remarked that "the choice must be between immediate concentration and ultimate distribution."[4]

Dominion statesmen did not lag behind in making similar assertions, although they too avoided definite suggestions. Even Bourassa had used words which couldbbe used in an argument for federation: "And by effective participation (in Imperial policy) we mean that Canada must share with the Mother Country the sovereign authority which controls the imperial army and navy as well as treaties of peace and of alliance, the foreign

1. The Times, Mar. 10, 1916. Also, The Times, Sept. 14, 1916.
2. The Times, Mar. 16, 1916.
3. Muir, The Making of an Imperial Parliament, History, Jan. 1917, Vol.i.
4. The Times, Apr.28, 1917.

relations, the government of India and of the Crown possessions."[1] Mr Hughes told his British audience that, "We had at our disposal means whereby we could cement for ever the federation, or Empire - call it what one might - and ensure the peace of the world."[2] A leading article in a paper that was generally dogmatic enough - the Melbourne Age - opened with: "It requires very little prescience to foresee that the British Empire after the close of the great war will undergo great changes. It is given to few if any to foretell what these changes must be."[3] Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper spoke vaguely of some system of representation which should be devised to consolidate and make permanent the military and naval strength of the Empire."[4] Sir Robert Borden,[5] but more particularly Mr Fisher, had used language that it was difficult not to interpret as implying the hope for some development of close Imperial Constitutional unity.[6] It was also an Australian who, believing that an Imperial constitution was possible, warned that it must be done at once before the end of the war when the opportunity would have passed, and desired an Imperial Convention at once to consider it.[7] The creation of

1. Quoted from Le Devoir, Jan,15, 1915,by Skelton, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Vol.ii, p.467.
2. The Times, Mar.10,1916: Also the Times, June 24, 1916.
3. July 3, 1915; quoted in Dominion Views on Imperial Unity, Quart Rev., Jan.1917, Vol.227.
4. Tupper, The Treaty-Making Powers of the Dominions, Journ.Comp. Leg. 1917, Vol.17.
5. The Times, Apr.3, 1917; Borden, The War and the Future, p.48; pp.121-122; p.129; p.146. Vide also statement by Sir George Perley,U.E. Apr.1915,pp.294-95.
6. The Times, Jan.31, 1916.
7. B.R. Wise, The Re-Organisation of the Empire, 19th Cent. Apr. 1916, Vol.79; Wise, The Empire on the Anvil, U.E. May 1916, Vol.7. Other proposals for a Convention include: Jas.W.Barrett, Imperial Alternatives - Alliance or Union? U.E. Apr.1916 Vol.7; F.A.W. Gisborne, The Coming Imperial Constitution, Plea for a Nominated Convention, Emp.Rev., Nov.1916, Vol.30. W.J. Courthope, The Society of the British Empire, Nat.Rev., Nov. 1916, Vol.68.

Canadian or ex-Canadian peers in 1916-1917,[1] and the baronetcy conferred upon Sir Joseph Flavelle, could be interpreted as an effort to establish an hereditary Canadian aristocracy,[2] and the participation of Dominion representatives in the Paris Economic Conference, not as representing their Dominion, but as part of a British delegation, was a further incident lending colour to the idea of Imperial unity. Unless these speeches were mere flatulence and the gestures idle, the Round Table enthusiasts had some justification for feeling that they possessed a general foundation of Empire sympathy upon which to build an Imperial constitution.

From this enthusiasm was evolved the argument that the Dominions must have a share in the direction of the policies which led to war and peace commensurate with the contribution they were making. The national sentiment of the Dominions, so it was held, which had measured its growth by gradual emancipation from the control of the Mother Country, would certainly show this further progress and demand a separate policy if not granted an effective participation in the present conduct of Imperial foreign relations. That is the fons et origo of every argument upon the subject, and it became a convention that almost every writer or speaker upon the subject of Imperial Unity should preface his study with that premise. The following is typical: "There are but two courses open to the people of the Dominions if they are not to continue - and indeed they cannot continue indefinitely - to have their foreign affairs managed and their issues of peace and war determined by persons over whom, though they may be able to

1. Lord Shaughnessy, Lord Atholstan, and Lord Beaverbrook.
2. Skelton, op.cit. Vol.ii, p.502.

influence them, they have no control. These two courses are formal separation from and independence of the Mother Country, the course adopted by the American colonies...,and organic union, the course adopted by Scotland."[1] "Self-Government and Imperialism are not antagonistic," said one writer, "because each only reaches its complete expression through and by means of the other."[2] The Round Table stated its credo: "We are fighting for the principle that public opinion shall control public affairs."[3] To a very great extent the Federation movement was inspired by an argument that Dominion statesmen had themselves suggested: "Are We Treating the Dominions fairly?"[4] Sometime it would happen that the issues of peace and war would not be so clearly cut as in 1914, and the Empire might fall apart if such risks were repeated. Lord Milner saw it as "a piece of high good fortune" that the Dominions were with the Mother Country in the present crisis.[5] Before the war it was a common view, often expressed, that the Dominions and Great Britain must be prepared, if the Empire were not to dissolve, to fight in a war in which they had no direct interest. Practically everyone now came to recognise that the existing arrangement whereby the Dominions could be put to war without

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1. D.C. Malcolm, The Making of an Imperial Parliament, History, Jan. 1917, Vol.i. (N.S.)
2. B.R. Wise, The Reorganisation of the Empire, The 19th Cent. Aprl.1916, Vol.79. Sim. Worsfold, The Empire on the Anvil, pp.17-18.
3. The Better Government of the United Kingdom, R.T. Sept.1918, Vol.8, p.750.
4. D.A.E. Veal, Imperial Organisation for War Purposes, Emp.Rev. Nov.1915, Vol.29.
5. U.E. Vol.6, May 1915, pp.369-371. Also Frodsham, The British Empire and the League of Nations, 19th Cent., Apr.1919, Vol. 85. This view has persevered.

being consulted must end. The Round Table went further and argued that, so long as the British Constitution remained as it was, the Dominions at every crisis, "however perfectly they may have been consulted beforehand", would be faced in the final resort with the intolerable alternatives of acting on the instructions of a foreign minister who did not represent them, and who in the nature of things was likely to be ignornant or forgetful of their local conditions, or of seceding from the British Empire and ceasing to be British citizens. Nor could the responsibility for ways and means of defending and developing the Empire be left to the United Kingdom.[1] Perhaps this and similar philosophy underlying the doctrines of the federalist school was best expressed in the book, The Commonwealth of Nations.

"The Commonwealth of Nations" was edited by Mr Lionel Curtis, and, while the work doubtless owed more to him than to any other individual, he was careful to state that it was the product of many writers working in collaboration under the auspices of the Round Table Groups. While much of the study would to the post-war generation belong to the realms of dryasdust, yet, since we are removed far from the heat of the Imperial Federation conflict, we could read this work with a great deal of profit, especially at a time when narrow nationalism threatens to relapse into surly mistrust. None can question the nobility of purpose and the grandeur of conception in which the task of the book is approached, and the note of high purpose is maintained throughout. Unfortunately visionaries are not the safest of political guides, and their publications should be labelled, "Utopia only", especially if their deductions are founded on insufficient study of contemporary tendencies.

1. The Growing Necessity for Constitutional Reform, R.T.Dec.1916, Vol.7 pp.15-16. Vide also Worsfold, The Empire on the Anvil,

The theme is the reconciliation of the loyalties of a citizen to the Empire and to the State if the interests of the two clashed. For this purpose an effort was made to go back to first causes, and the foundation of the state was given as "a sense of devotion, an adequate recognition somewhere in the minds of its subjects that their own interests are subordinate to those of the state. The bond which unites them and constitutes them collectively as a state is, to use the words of Lincoln, in the nature of dedication. Its validity, like that of the marriage tie, is at root not contractual but sacramental. Its foundation is not self-interest, but rather some sense of obligation, however conceived, which is strong enough to overmaster self-interest."[1] The Round Table read the War as a fight for freedom, but true freedom could only come in the sacrifice of the individual interests to those of the community.[2] This sense of obligation required to be carefully nourished. Athens fell because she could not unify the organization and sentiment of the Delian League.[3] The Union which had been consummated between Scotland and England was based upon a principle the very opposite to the discredited balance of mutual interests theory known as the marcantile system, the new principle demanding of every inhabitant of Great Britain that he consider himself "dedicated to the supreme interests of a common state entitled to the obedience of all, irrespective of individual interests."[4] In

1. The Commonwealth of Nations, p.8.
2. "The war, indeed, is not only liberating Europe from the illusion that the State is above the people. It is freeing the British democracies of the illusion that the individual is above the community." The Principle of Peace, R.T.June 1916, Vol.6, p.425.
3. The Commonwealth of Nations, p.49.
4. Ibid, pp.303-304.

regard to the American Colonies, by neglecting to ask their counsel and enlist their services the Commonwealth had failed to develop in those citizens any active affection towards itself, and Imperial loyalty had perished through want of exercise.[1.]

In order that this obligation be distinguished from the Prussian, Roman, and Oriental views, it was held that the ideal of political liberty was handed down from Athens and Rome to the British Empire, the law imposing obligations being regulated by public opinion and subject to change as conditions changed.[2.] Inherent in all British Government, said the authors, is the idea of supremacy of law, and so the ultimate obedience of the subject was due to the law, not to any individual as in the Prussian ideal. That ideal had been to create material and spiritual conditions which would resolve ignorant and weak and capricious units into an organised, homogeneous army which would obey implicitly a King by Divine Right.[3.] While the Prussian idea involved the surrender of all individual reason and initiative to the thinking of the few, the free idea of the Commonwealth involved the understanding by every citizen of the principles which governed national life and activity, that he might take an intelligent interest in promoting them. Only by each citizen recognising his duty to respect the rights and contribute to the well-being of his neighbours, thus maintaining the

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1. The Commonwealth of Nations, pp.320-325; p.376.
2. Ibid, p.11; ch.i, p.19ff; p.82. For a similar theory, but leading to the conclusion of the Empire as an alliance, vide Bernard Holland, Autocracy, The Dublin Rev., 1917, Vol.161.
3. Three Doctrines in Conflict, The R.T. Mar. 1918, Vol.8, pp.266-271.

reign of just law, could the life of freedom be made possible for all.[1] The existence of this rule of law had made the British sway over subject races tolerable and humane, the famous case of Fabrigas v. Mostyn in 1773 serving as an example of the power of a subject to resort to British courts for justice.[2] The help of the Dominions was required in this work for which Britain was peculiarly fitted - the propagation of the reign of justice and liberty - because "the principle of the Commonwealth means entrusting sovereignty to all those whose sense of duty to their fellow-citizens is strong enough to justify the trust. But if they be too few to enforce obedience the state will collapse."[3]

Whereas the Commonwealth essentially differed from other States by its insistence, not upon rights or blind obedience to authority, but upon the overwhelming obligations of the individual to the service of the whole, it followed that no one could be a citizen of two states at the same time, for the laws thereforemight compel conflicting actions. The question as to whom final allegiance was owing had yet to come, but come it would.[4] There could be no doubt regarding the unity of the Empire from the point of view of international law and of the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, but here again a grave warning could be drawn from the American Rebellion, for at that time the Empire was considered a unit, but the underlying reason for the secession lay in a want of loyalty to the Commonwealth, the American Colonies considering that they only adhered to that State through the Crown.[5] Now when the Crown had been an autocracy, taxation

1. Some Problems in Democracy, R.T.Sept.1917, Vol7, p.712.
2. The Commonwealth of Nations, p.168ff.
3. Ibid, p.181.
4. Ibid, p.705.
5. Ibid, p.320.

might have been levied upon them; but when the right of the Crown had been abdicated to an English Parliament in which the Colonies were not represented then taxation was unjust. The vital defect in the solution attempted by the British Government consequently lay in not providing an appropriate legislature to take the place of the Crown and which might levy taxation. It was an example of how the problem of double loyalty might come to throw the Empire into chaos: "No true citizenship is possible for men, until they have chosen the state to which they belong and know what they choose."[1.]

History was repeating itself, and those who relied upon co-operation were in no better case than Franklin when he advised the agents of the colonial assemblies that he could provide not other solution of the difficulties than that the British Government should rely upon such voluntary aid as the colonial assemblies might be willing to grant.[2.]

The real triumph of American freedom was found to lie, not in their secession, but in enforcing, through union, a law binding upon all members yet capable of being moulded by the experience and opinion of all. This constituted government "of the people, by the people, for the people."[3.] Mr Curtis contended that the Americans, divorced by the Monroe Doctrine from the ultimate problems of politics, had failed to grasp the true nature of such difficulties of extending the ideals of human liberty and justice, and that they had never arisen to the

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1. The Commonwealth of Nations, p.378.
2. Ibid, p.541.
3. Ibid, p.647, p.678.

conception of a commonwealth wider than one based like their own on a common nationhood. "To the question, how the majority of mankind who are not Europeans are to be initiated to the mysteries of freedom, they have never felt themselves called upon to provide an answer."[1] The world had outgrown a national Commonwealth, even as the world of Edward I. had outgrown the city republic. The stronger civilisation had a responsibility for the weaker which it could not evade, but that responsibility could only be discharged through the agency of a government of an organized state. Even as 'myself alone' was not the noblest watchword for an individual, so 'ourselves alone' was little better for a nation. To abandon the idea of a super-national state and to set up in its stead the ideal of isolated self-regarding nationalism was to set back the progress of humanity.[2] The war had changed men's minds, but before the war "the poison of self-seeking had penetrated through every class and community" within the Commonwealth.[3]

The primary function of a world-commonwealth was to prevent wars, andthat it could do if all its citizens capable of government were really responsible in peace for maintaining peace; but so long as none but the inhabitants of the British Isles were really responsible for preventing war, the relative strength of the Commonwealth would continue to decline. The chance of suddenly striking at the heart would encourage autocracies to prepare the blow . Such periods of world-war as closed in 1815

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1. The Commonwealth of Nations p.
2. Freedom and Unity, R.T. Dec. 1917, Vol.8, pp.96-98.
3. The War for Public Right, The R.T., Mar.1916, Vol.6, p,230.

and opened in 1914 were only possible when the British Commonwealth became weak enough to invite destruction. And if destroyed, the epoch of cataclysm would never be closed until there had emerged from the ruins a like Commonwealth, and one resting on wider foundations.[1] "It is true to say that self-government has never been realized for any portion of this vast community other than the United Kingdom itself...This..can be prophesied with absolute certainty, that the British Empire, as at present established, cannot endure, unless it can realize its character as a commonwealth in time, by extending the burden and control of its supreme functions to every community which it recognizes as fit for self-government."[2] The reigh of the world law could only come because there were a few people in the world who were determined to formulate a law which would do justice to all nations and be binding upon all nations, and who were resolute enough during the long years of peace to maintain such armed sanction behind the law that no one would venture to challenge it for selfish ends. Such a reign of law could not be achieved without the assistance of the British people.[3] This is a state-absolutism of Hobbes at his worst.

This is perhaps the weakest argument of the Round Table thesis: the idea that in order to exist in peace a State must be so strong no other State dare attack it. The world would consist of two classes: members of the British Empire and enemies of the British Empire, the former arming themselves to convert

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1. The Commonwealth of Nations, p.701.
2. Ibid, p.703.
3. The Principles of Peace, The R.T., June 1916, Vol.6.

or frighten the latter. The State in relation to other States would be practically the same as Hegel's; he, too, postulated the principle of freedom; he, too, gave the state a moral duty to perform. Like his state this Commonwealth would impose its righteousness by force and bring back to the post-war world the pre-war idea of establishing safety by predominance of power.[1.] At times the very words seem to be those of Bosanquet.[2.] It is a superimposed justice for the world, imposed by the British people, and does not emanate from the collective conscience of the world, in the Liberal view the only way to peace. And how tyrannical democracy thus organised can be Russia has shown us. In fact, the Round Table believed that war control over food, shipping, railways, et cetera, should be continued in similar fashion in peace.[3.] A critic justly pointed out, "For all the change suggested, we find only a political mysticism which is as dangerous as any tyranny... Effective government is good, but not the only good; the price we have to pay for it may be too high."[4.]

There was further the dangerous assumption that because taxation without representation had been shown unjust, representation would always justify taxation. Of course it would do

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1. Vide also the Statist, Dec.4,1915, pp.634-635: "We look forward to a time when those fleets (of the Empire) will be greatly enlarged, when practically the British Empire will be able to dictate peace because it will be able to forbid any aggressor to put out to sea...The British Empire alone, in twenty or thirty years, certainly in fifty years, if it hold together and acts with the same patriotism and the same union as it is acting now, will be able to forbid war."
2. Vide The Philosophical Theory of the State, p.320 and passim.
3. Some Problems in Democracy and Reconstruction, R.T., Sept,1917, Vol.7, p.712.
4. C. Delisle Burns, Rev. Art., Hibbert Journal, 1916, Vol.15, pp.166-168; pp.344-346.

nothing of the kind, for what sort of control would the Dominions exercise in a Parliament wherein population governed representation? As things were the Dominion were able effectively to make their voices heard through the protests of their Parliaments, but in a federation they could be completely smothered in a vote by a show of hands and lose their individuality in that of the Mother Country, who still was so predominant in respect of population and power.[1.] Further, there was too little faith placed in the possibilities of co-operation on the part of the various nations of the Empire. While the danger always existed and exists that a clash in foreign affairs would disrupt the Empire, yet there remains the hope that men of toleration and good sense can arrive at a satisfactory compromise. After all, co-operative measures had served the British Empire extremely well and it could not be said that the strain of war had revealed the inadequacy of co-operation or the failure of British statesmanship to evolve machinery to fit the present need.

On the whole, however, the book was tremendously well-received. One reviewer said of the authors: "The people to whom they appeal are already converted. What the British people need today is not apostles to preach the gospel of Imperial reconstruction, but guides to lead them to and on the path which they are anxious to follow."[2.]

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1. Keith, The Ideal of an Imperial Constitution. The Canadian Law Times, Nov. 1916, Vol.36, pp.837-839.
2. The Times, Lit.Supp. July 27, 1916.

Apart from such academuc speculations, the means by which the Empire achieved co-operation in the war gave weight to the idea that it might continuein such close union by means of similar organisation after the war. This was true particularly of the Imperial War Cabinet, an arrangement for consultation which grew naturally from the war-time necessity for effective consultation between the British and Dominion Cabinets. The failure sufficiently to consult the Dominions led to bitter criticism from Mr Hughes, who, with Sir Robert Borden, was far from satisfied with the British methods of conducting the War. While cables passed freely enough between the Dominions and the Colonial Office, they were either belated or left a great deal unsaid. Up to 1918 the Australian Government had never been consulted about any plan; it was sometimes, though rarely, notified that this or that project was contemplated; "Usually it was told that a thing had been done or was on the point of being done."[1.] When Sir Robert Borden was in the United Kingdom in 1915, the British Government invited him to a meeting of the Cabinet, an event for which there was much public support in the country,[2.] but one which was unprecedented in the history of the British Empire.[3.] In 1916 the British Government invited the Dominion Ministers to London, perhaps feeling the necessity for seeming to consult them in some fashion. The Prime Minister of Australia was the only one able to attend. Mr Hughes says of his visit: "The Government was, I think, a

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1. Hughes, the Splendid Adventure, p.38, p.72.
2. The Times, July 14, 1915.
3. Ibid, July 15, 1915; Keith, Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.545; Borden, Canadian Constitutional Studies, p.109.

little at a loss to know what to do with me, Just what was in its mind when it issued the invitations to all the Dominion Prime Ministers I do not know."[1] However, he was invited to attend a meeting of the Cabinet on March 9, 1916. He had previously been sworn in on the Canadian Privy Council, and took part in a meeting of the Canadian Cabinet on February 19, 1916.[2] In the British Cabinet he "participated in the discussions as if a member of the British Government."[3] Regarding matters affecting the Dominion he says, "I registered my opinion on them as though I were a Minister of the British Cabinet, or as I would have done had the problems arisen before the Commonwealth Cabinet."[4] Apparently his assertiveness did not meet with approval, and Asquith did not wish to make it an established practice. The fact that Mr Hughes had been able to give some constructive criticism upon various matters connected with the war in the course of his speeches while in the United Kingdom, led to a popular appeal that he be brought again into the arcana of war management, and a memorandum was circulated urging his return" that he may take his due part in the management of the War as a member of the Inner War Council of the Empire."[5] These occasions did establish a precedent from which the Imperial War Cabinet developed, for, as Mr Hughes said, "At the outset the Imperial Cabinet was just the ordinary British Cabinet to which the Dominion Prime Ministers had been invited."[6] Already some

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1. Hughes, op.cit. p.39.
2. The Times, Mar.10, 1916.
3. Hughes, op.cit. p.40.
4. Ibid, p.41.
5. The Eng. Rev., 1916, Vol.23, pp.281-282, p.380, pp.468-469.
6. Hughes, op.cit., p.40.

men saw with the consultation of the Dominion Premiers in the British Cabinet the bifurcation of the present British Government into a "true Imperial and genuine British Cabinet" which, by an evolutionary process, would come to be responsible to a representative Assembly, Imperial in its composition.[1]

Another precedent for the Imperial War Cabinet might be found in the Committee of Imperial Defence, the activities of which body fell into abeyance, shortly after the outbreak of war, although it was never formally abolished.[2] The way had also been prepared for the Imperial War Cabinet by the creation of the British War Cabinet, which distinguished between those Ministers responsible for the supreme direction of the war and the Ministers in charge of the great administrative departments of state.[3] Both these bodies of course, of a necessity, maintained a close connection.

In December 1916, the British Government invited the Prime Ministers or leading Statesmen of the Dominions and India to attend the sitting both of the Cabinet and of an Imperial War Conference to be held in the United Kingdom. Just before the meeting, Lord Curzon stated in the House of Lords that the representatives of the Dominions were not coming as members of an Imperial Conference in the old style, but as members for the time being of the governing body of the British Empire. This

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1. Sidney Low, The Coming of the Empire Cabinet, 19th Cent. Apr. 1916, Vol.79. Lord Hythe suggested that the British War Cabinet gave an opportunity to invite the Dominions and to separate Imperial and domestic affairs, The Times, Dec.15, 1916.
2. Statement of Mr McKenna, 1st Report of the Dardanelles Commission, Cd.8490, p.6. Sir George Aston, The British Empire at War, U.E. Dec. 1918, Vol.9, pp.496-498.
3. Cd.9005, pp.1-4.

seemed to him the greatest step toward the recognition of Dominion equality. The fact of the Imperial Cabinet "might be the unpremeditated nucleus of some form of Imperial constitution."[1] A statement as to the event by Mr Lloyd George included: "The British Cabinet became for the time being an Imperial War Cabinet. While it was in session its Overseas Members had access to all the information which was at the disposal of His Majesty's Government and occupied a status of absolute equality with that of the Members of the British War Cabinet." Important decisions were arrived at and the Dominion Statesmen gave valuable advice, so that the arrangement was "a complete success." It would therefore be followed by annual meetings of an Imperial Cabinet or at any intermediate time when matters of urgent Imperial concern required to be settled. The Imperial Cabinet should consist of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and such of his colleagues as dealt specially with Imperial affairs, and the Prime Ministers of the Dominions or some specially accredited alternate possessed of equal authority and a representative of the Government of India. This was a consultative method which did not infringe the autonomy of the parts, but, added the Prime Minister, "to what constitutional developments this may lead we did not attempt to settle."[2] As Mr Hughes remarked, "He was not thinking merely of a wartime organisation. The annual meetings of the War Cabinet were to be a permanent instrument of inter-Empire affairs."[3] The Imperial War

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1. H.L. Debs., 7 Feb. 1917, Vol.24, pp.27-29.
2. H.C. Debs., 17 May, 1917, Vol.93, pp.1790-92; Vide also Cd. 9005, pp.vi-vii; pp.5-11. Lloyd George in an interview: "I regard this Council as marking the beginning of a new epoch in the history of the Empire...Of this I am certain, the peoples of the Empire have found a unity in the war such as never existed before it...what practical change in Imperial organisation that will mean I will not venture to predict. But that it will involve some change is certain." The Times, Jan.26, 1917.
3. [illegible], op.cit. p.53.

Conference was held at the same time as the Cabinet, holding their meetings in alternation, the former being presided over by the Secretary for the Colonies and discussing affairs of lesser importance.[1.]

The method of working in the Imperial Cabinet was given by a member as follows: "The decision having been arrived at, the Prime Minister of the Dominion affected and his colleagues assenting, the position was telegraphed to the Acting-Prime Minister of the Dominion, who summoned his fellow Ministers, laid the matter before them, and communicated the result of their deliberations to his Prime Minister. He, in turn, informed the Imperial Cabinet. If the Government of the Dominion - which, it is very necessary to note, always remained in the Dominion - authorized the proposed step, action was taken by virtue of that authority. Always the decision of the Imperial Cabinet, qua Imperial Cabinet, was only a recommendation requiring the assent of the Government or Governments which had authority over the subject-matter covered by the decision before it could be translated into action."[2.] Sir Robert Borden spoke to similar effect: For the first time in the Empire's history there were sitting in London two Cabinets, both properly constituted and exercising well-defined powers. The Prime Minister of the United Cabinet presided over both. One was designated as the "War Cabinet" which dealt with questions of the war which primarily concerned the United Kingdom, and the other was known as the Imperial War Cabinet which had a wider

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1. Cd.9005, p.7.
2. Hughes, op.cit. pp.50-51.

purpose, jurisdiction, and personnel. With the constitution of that Cabinet a new era had dawned, and those who had given thought and energy to every effort for constitutional development of the Imperialists might be pardoned if they believed they discerned therein the birth of a new and greater Imperial Commonwealth.[1] The experiment, at any rate, was such a success that Mr Lloyd George arranged that the Imperial Cabinet meet again on June 11, 1918. There were ten representatives of Great Britain and those of the Dominion and India combined numbered ten, while the representatives of the War Office and Admiralty who attended from time to time increased the number so that there were usually present from twenty to thirty persons.[2] "For the first time in its history", said Mr Hughes jubilantly, "one may truly say that the Empire was not governed from Downing Street."[3] This Cabinet remained together, with one short respite, for more than twelve months.

The supporters of the development of Imperial unity were greatly pleased with the new step, and Sir Robert Borden's hint was greedily seized upon. The Imperial War Cabinet, said one enthusiast, "marks the first definite step toward the realisation of Imperial Federation, an ideal which some of us have cherished for many a long year."[4] It was confidently expected that the separation of the purely British Cabinet from the Imperial

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1. The Times, Apr.3, 1917. The Times was delighted with the organization: Jan. 26, 1917.
2. Hughes, op.cit. p.56.
3. Ibid, p.57.
4. J. Stanley Little, The Imperial War Cabinet, Emp.Rev., Apr.1917, Vol.31. Vide also D.A.E. Veal, The Imperial War Cabinet, Emp. Rev., Apr. 1917, Vol.31.

Cabinet would be maintained after the War, wherein the latter would be not a War Cabinet but an Empire Cabinet. Its composition would change to consist of the officers at the head of the great Imperial departments of State, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the India and Colonial Secretary, and the Minister of Inter-State Commerce and Communications. The British Cabinet would be left with the conduct of the social, financial, and economic policy of the United Kingdom.[1] The problem thereupon arose to whom would this Imperial Cabinet be responsible, and Mr Amery's suggestion made before the war was revived that the Conference might become a "congress of legislative delegations," having at first only advisory powers to the various states; but it would become gradually a convention of the constitution that the fiat of the Conference must be obeyed. Then the next step would be one of constitution-making, and thus in reality the Imperial Cabinet would become responsible to the Assembly.[2] Another writer more boldly asserted that, "Out of the unitary kingdom there has now developed, what is in substance if not in form, a federal Empire."[3] He saw the evolution of an Imperial Executive divorced from the Imperial legislature, and a differentiation between Imperial and State Executives. Ultimately he thought it possible that all the membersof the Imperial Cabinet might come to acknowledge their common responsibility to a common Imperial

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1. Sidney Low, The Imperial Constitution: The New Phase, 19th Cent. Aug.1917, Vol.82. Also, Low, The Cabinet Revolution, Fort. Rev., Feb.1917, Vol.101.
2. Ibid. Similarly, Lord Hythe, The Times, Feb. 6, 1917.
3. J.A.R. Marriot, Politics and Politicians, Fort. Rev., Dec.1918, Vol.104.

legislature. In the meantime it was impossible that they should admit a common responsibility to several legislatures. "The logic of facts will compel the acceptance of Montesquieu's theory, and the American practice."[1.]

One of the most interesting of the many proposals was that of Mr Poley, who suggested that, since the war had demonstrated that a committee of the Cabinet could direct a great war efficiently subject to the full responsibility of the Cabinet, and since the Privy Council had proved the mother of many committees and at one time carried on the executive government of England, a Committee of the Cabinet of the Empire should control foreign policy, subject to each Cabinet's responsibility to its Parliament and its Parliament to the people. It might be objected that the Cabinets of the Empire were not Committees of one body, but the Committees of the Privy Council were. So it was proposed that the King's Council be restored to its original unity and thus embody a single Privy Council of the Empire, while the local Privy Councils would come to an end or be continued only as Committees of Council.[2.] The difficulties, while great, were not considered to be so formidable as the legislative measures necessary for the creation of a federal body with taxing power.

It would have saved them a great deal of disappointment had the advocates of Imperial consolidation appreciated that the Imperial War Cabinet was an institution for an emergency whose continuance hung upon the immediate necessity for intimate co-operation. The pressure of war conditions and the enthusiasm

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1. J.A.R. Marriot, op.cit.
2. A.P. Poley, The Privy Council and Problems of Closer Union of the Empire, J.C.L., 1917, Vol.17; Imperial Unity; Practical Conditions, Quart. Rev. Jan. 1918, Vol.229.

engendered in the heat of battle had allowed the delegation of unusual powers to the Prime Ministers. Moreover, the body owned no joint responsibility, there was consequently no majority voting, and the so-called Imperial Cabinet was a body the essential feature of which was group discussion, since each representative maintained the equality and autonomy of his part of the Empire.[1] The effort to make more of it led to adverse criticism in the Dominions, Sir Robert Borden's description of the body as "a Cabinet of Governments"[2] led to the contradiction by Professor Skelton that it was on the contrary "itself a new Government" for which the next effort would be to provide a legislative base, and was in fact the old imperial-council idea of Chamberlain and Lyttelton.[3]

Having seen the philosophy which underlay the movement and the chief causes for its renaissance, let us glance at some of the proposals brought forward. Since most of the books embodying them are lumber on the modern bookshelf, it is not necessary to do more than to look at their distinguishing features, but it should not be supposed for that reason that they were lightly regarded at the time of publication. For instance one reviewer said of Mr Curtis' book, The Problem of the Commonwealth, "Though there is no end to the making of books, great books are not frequently produced; but this is certainly one of them."[4]

Having enunciated the doctrine that service was the end of existence and that service could only be rendered through

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1. Keith, Sovereignty of the British Dominions, pp.312-313.
2. Borden, Canadian Constitutional Studies, p.110. Cd.9177, pp.157-158.
3. Skelton, op.cit. pp.500-501.
4. T. Stanley Roberts, The Problem of the Commonwealth, U.E. July, 1916, Vol.7.

organisation, the Round Table groups formulated theories of Imperial constitutions to meet that requirement. The Round Table publication on several occasions carefully stated that it was merely the receptacle for opinion on the organisation of the Empire, and that none of the proposals put forward were peculiarly its own. The statement by Mr Sidney Webb (Lord Passfield) that the Round Table was inspired by the projects of universal military service and Imperial fiscal protection - "these measures being regarded as indispensable to Imperial salvation" - is a surprising mistake.[1] In fact, the scheme made current by Mr Curtis, of which the consensus of opinion in the Round Table group highly approved, expressly put aside the idea of a customs union of any sort, holding that the control of customs was a matter for the local governments, and not for the federal legislature.

This constituted one of the chief stumbling blocks in the way of Imperial Federation - the control of customs policy. If such control were not accorded the central body then the powers of that body would be small indeed, especially in times of peace. But if it were made a sine qua non of Imperial Federation that the Imperial legislature exercise control over customs rates, then the Federal ideal was indefinitely postponed to some milennial future.

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1. Webb, The Labour Party and the Empire, Emp. Rev., Mar. 1923, Vol.37, p.222.

The Problem of the Commonwealth.

Mr Curtis deserves credit for recognising a valuable truth - that "partner-states" as applied to members of the British Empire and implying equality in powers of legislature and self-determination was an untrue phrase, and that in reality the Dominions were not a little distant from self-government, a truth taught for some time by Professor Keith but not generally appreciated. His problem then arose, - how were the electors in the Dominions to be given the same right of self-government, in respect to foreign affairs more particularly, as the electors in the United Kingdom, without depriving them of British citizenship?[1.] It must be a system whereby the cost of defence could be shared, and no financial system was sound which did not enable a government to collect the revenues to which it was entitled from the taxpayers themselves in the last resort. Yet the Dominion Governments must preserve their power of controlling their national affairs which they could not do unless they were free to determine the incidence of all public burdens between one taxpayer and another within their several jurisdictions. To solve this dilemma the author proposed that the quota due from a Dominion be made a first charge on the exchequer account of the Dominion, the Governor being authorised to sign warrants drawn by the Imperial treasury and endorsed by the Imperial auditor-general, the Governor being forbidden to sign the Dominion warrants until the outstanding Imperial warrants had been met. If the Dominion ministers blocked payment in some way, as, for example, by

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1. The Problem of the Commonwealth, p.135.

failing to pay the revenue into the exchequer account, the Imperial Government might resort to the Supreme Court of the Empire, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which would then include judges from all the Dominions, and this Court would be empowered to transfer the control of the Dominion customs, or of any other revenue departments, to the Imperial Government and therefore to collect those revenues from the taxpayers themselves until the Imperial quota was satisfied. In the case of the United Kingdom with free trade, such power would have to extend to excise and income taxes.[1] The Federal Government would thus be in the beatific situation of determining how much money it needed, having the power to collect that money and to spend it in any fashion it wished, yet never having the uncomfortable duty of determining howmit was to be collected in the first instance!

Regarding the composition of the Federal bodies of the Empire, Mr Curtis wished a separate parliament, responsible to the electorate of the United Kingdom, for domestic affairs. The Foreigh Office, the Admiralty, the War Office, the India Office, and the Crown Colony side of the Colonial Office, together with a Minister of Imperial finance, must be represented in the Imperial Cabinet which would be responsible to an Imperial Parliament, elected from all those Dominions whose people had decided to assume control of foreign affairs. This Parliament must retain all the powers which were at that time exercised through those offices. The writer would also have had the ministers responsible for the administration of the Dependencies

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1. The Problem of the Commonwealth, pp.191-192.

responsible to the Imperial Parliament, since he contended that such administration was inseparable from foreign affairs and defence. "The people of the Dominions cannot share in the control of their foreign affairs with those of the British Isles unless they are ready to share also in the task of governing the dependencies. let those who decline to face this prospect accept the alternative....The Dominions must each conduct their foreign affairs for themselves through their own Dominion Governments... must assume their independence...their people must renounce forever their status as British citizens...this project of a Commonwealth must be abandoned, and all the consequences of abandoning it must be faced. In the last analysis there is no middle way."[1] Professor Pollard also advocated that the control of the British Government over India and the colonies not possessing responsible government would naturally be vested in the Imperial Cabinet and Imperial Chamber.[2] There is this criticism that may be made, and it has been made by both Professor Dicey and Professor Keith, that India would never consent to be governed by a Parliament which consisted largely of Dominion representatives. India had felt bitterly the restrictions placed upon her emigrants, and the treatment accorded Indian subjects in South Africa might have provoked war had it not been for the circuitous route by which despatches went through the hands of the British Government officials and the fact that both States belonged to the Empire and were not independent states.

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1. The Problem of the Commonwealth, pp.209-210.
2. Pollard, The Evolution of Parliament, p.376.

Another grave error consisted in the assumption that the Dominions were in the same relation to Britain as Scotland and England in 1706.[1] Mr Curtis forgot the geographical contiguity that obtained in the latter case, and also that in those two countries there had been growing up a common nationality into which the two former nationalities were to a great extent merging. On the other hand, in the Dominions nationalism was being aggravated by the events of war and international relations.

Defence and Foreign Affairs.

Under the above title of a book published in 1917, Mr Z.A. Lash sought to remove some of the difficulties arising from the proposals of The Problem of the Commonwealth, a book for which he had a profound admiration. The dilemma propounded by Mr Curtis with regard to the control of the dependencies and India he sought to avoid by placing the interests of the Empire in three divisions: (a) Affairs of a purely domestic nature, which might be left to the local governments; (b) Foreign affairs proper, which would certainly be controlled by the central authority; (c) Affairs of a domestic nature, yet which sometimes partook of a foreign nature as customs, immigration, naturalization, and shipping. The control over the last group could be exercised by the insertion of a clause empowering the central

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1. Curtis, op.cit. p.234.

executive to determine into the province of which Government such duties fell.[1] The care of Protectorates and Dependencies would also be assigned in accordance with the suggested clause. Thus the existing Imperial Government would continue to be the paramount executive authority with respect to many of the Imperial responsibilities in the Dependent Empire such as were not placed under the control of the central authority.[2] One could foresee an endless bickering in the conflict of authority between central and local Parliaments in this scheme. Mr Lash also fought shy of deciding how the proportion of representatives was to be determined or how they were to be elected, a difficulty most of the federationists encountered especially with regard to India. He also found difficulty with the incidence of taxation and would leave that to the Dominions, from whom the central authority must have power to exact it in case of default.[3]

The Empire on the Anvil.

Mr Worsfold's book antedated that of Mr Curtis, being published in 1915. Unlike the latter, he would have State Governments, and like the latter he wished the Secretary of State for India and the Colonial Secretary to be included in an Imperial Cabinet. He also proposed a full-fledged bicameral legislature for the Empire, with the Crown at the summit. It is not easy to understand how a proposal should commend itself to a man of

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1. Defence and Foreign Affairs, pp.31-32.
2. Ibid, pp.36-41.
3. Ibid, pp.59-61.

Mr Worsfold's knowledge of colonial conditions which involved that "some of the Ministers and from one third to one half of the members of the legislature would be the elected representatives of Oversea constituencies."[1] His proposed representation was ninety members from the British Isles, thirty from the Dominions, and sixty from the rest of the Empire, one hundred and eighty in all.[2] What more, indeed, as Laurier said, could the Dominions do on such a body than express "pious wishes"? At least Mr Curtis had appreciated this difficulty and had recommended that the Dominions have one seat at least in the federal cabinet, which had also had the virtue of avoiding the dilemma of giving them an equal representation with the United Kingdom despite the disparity in population.[3] Mr Worsfold also made the astonishing suggestion that, considering the difficulty of getting the Dominion representatives to make long and frequent journeys to London, the Overseas British who made business and pleasure visits, the representatives of great banking and industrial undertakings in London, those who would like to reside in London for a few years because of the educational facilities for their children, and similar tourists, might be willing to lend their service as Dominion representatives.[4]

Unlike Mr Curtis, Mr Worsfold decided that the electorates of the United Kingdom and the Dominions would have to surrender

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1. The Empire on the Anvil, pp.95-96.
2. Ibid, p.101.
3. The Problem of the Commonwealth, p.217; Keith, The Ideal of an Imperial Constitution, p.842. This was an insuperable difficulty, however. Vide H.A.Ellis, The Expansion of Britain's Imperial Relations with the Overseas Dominions Resulting from the War., U.E., Jan. 1915, Vol.6.
4. The Empire on the Anvil, p.98.

in a greater or lesser degree the power they possessed to pursue a fiscal policy which, however beneficial to a single State, was injurious to other British States. Thus the United Kingdom would have to abandon the practice of free imports and the Dominions would have to abandon the policy of fostering the establishment of new industries by tariff protection.[1] Had Joseph Chamberlain's campaign not taught the futility of the latter half of that sentence? Then there was the ingenious rather than practical suggestion that, in taxation for Imperial purposes, the income of the United Kingdom should be taxed on a higher basis than that of the Dominions as being largely unearned income, and the income of the Dominions on a lower basis as being chiefly earned income.[2] One can scarcely imagine such self-immolation on the part of delegates, exercised through a parliament which they controlled. The writer thought that, as a result of preference given their goods in the markets of the United Kingdom, the Dominions would be willing to share the cost of Imperial defence.[3] A "Dominions' Council of Delegates" would decide the annual contribution each Dominion should make.[4]

The Proposal of Professor Pollard.

Writing in August 1915,[5] Professor Pollard found race, religion, history, language, and custom, frequently cohesive factors unifying a people, to be absent in the British Empire,

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1. The Empire on the Anvil, pp.119-123.
2. Ibid, p.146.
3. Ibid, p.164.
4. Ibid, pp.165-166.
5. Pollard, The Evolution of Parliament, p.359.

and that the component parts were "held together by consent, and that consent is based upon political considerations, some of them merely sentimental, some of them idealistic, and others severely practical in character."[1] He decried Hobbes' doctrine of a despotic, absolute state, and also ruled out a uniform tariff policy and a common taxation.[2] India in its present stage of evolution must be omitted from any scheme for Imperial parliamentary government.[3] Seeing British common law as essential to the growth of the British Parliament, he reverted to a suggestion made by Mr Haldane[4] that the judicial committee of the privy council should periodically appear in sessions throughout the British realms, so as to create an Imperial common law. He also disapproved of the two courts of appeal - the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the House of Lords - and desired their union into a single supreme imperial court of justice. The House of Lords was considered moribund at the present time, as were all second chambers through the Empire, but it might be rejuvenated by some method of Dominion representation that would necessarily involve the abandonment of the principles of heredity and primogeniture.[5] Why not take over something of the idea of the American Senate for a reconstituted House of Lords? Professor Pollard saw some possibility of the formation of the second chambers of the Empire into one, which body would specialize on imperial questions, leaving the first chambers the care of

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1. Pollard, op.cit., pp.362-363.
2. Ibid, p.365.
3. Ibid, pp.365-367.
4. Infra, pt.ii, ch.v. For Haldane's later views vide The Judicia Committee of the Privy Council, Emp.Rev., July 1923, Vol.38.
5. The Evolution of Parliament, p.369.

domestic matters.[1] He got over the difficulty of taxation as provoked by other writers by his proposal that the financial needs of the Empire should be laid before the Dominions and each should make its own reponse in the form of a grant. Just how it was to be determined that each part contribute its just share to the satisfaction of the others is not made clear, although the imperial council would have the power of suggesting and Professor Pollard considered this suggestion would carry as much weight as the proposals of a chancellor.[2] The hope is a dubious one, but if it materialised the Empire would be virtually subjected to a "common taxation" which the writer had previously held impracticable.[3]

There must also be two sets of executives, a single executive for Imperial purposes responsinle to the imperial chamber, and a series of domestic executives for each self-governing realm responsible to their respective domestic legislatures. Finance would be the determining factor in the regulation of relations between the jurisdictions of imperial and domestic legislatures and executives: "The chambers which controlled supply and/the domestic executives must also control, directly or indirectly, the imperial chamber and the imperial cabinet. Thus the imperial cabinet would be immediately responsible to the imperial chamber which would be responsible to the dominions."[4]

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1. The Evolution of Parliament, p.372.
2. Ibid, p.374.
3. Ibid, p.365.
4. Ibid, 376.

Professor Pollard refused, however, to accept the common idea that the Empire was politically in a very parlous condition, for, "when all is said and done, political unity is a thing of the spirit and not a bond of parchment", a truth which the war had proved.[1] By his insistence that the constitution should grow rather than be made, Professor Pollard to a great extent escaped the criticism that was most often levelled at the proposals for Imperial Federation - that they were possessed of a rigid character that made them not amenable to much needed legislation and desirable development and reform. The Dominions of course would never submit to the proposition of an Imperial Constitution creating an Imperial Parliament with a legal right to encroach to whatever extent it deemed necessary, on their local autonomy, yet the fact that it was written made it as Professor Dicey and Mr Eastwood objected, liable to that chief defect of conservatism.[2]

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1. The Evolution of Parliament, pp.378-379. A similar argument advanced in Pollard, The Growth of an Imperial Parliament, History, Oct. 1916, Vol.1, although on this latter occasion he utters a grave warning against too ardent agitators and any burning of boats or leaps in the dark.
2. R.A. Eastwood, Constitutional Rigidity in Relation to Empire Federation, Law Quart. Rev. Apr. 1920, Vol.36. For a full criticism of the federal proposals vide Keith, The Ideal of an Imperial Constitution, op.cit. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.498ff. R.A. Eastwood, The Organization of a Britannic Partnership, p.83ff. Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations, p.197ff.

The Rise and Fall of the Movement for Organic Unity Within the British Empire.

During the years 1914-1916 the movement for Imperial Federation was at its height. It was during that time that the great books on the subject were written and that the enthusiasm of the Round Table group was at white heat. Those who then failed to agree that some radical constitutional adjustment of the Empire was about to take place were berated as suffering from lack of vision. Professor Keith's indictment of their activities, the reaction of Dominion nationalism, and the Conference of 1917, where General Smuts, here as elsewhere, expressed his irreconcilable antipathy to the proposals for unifying the Empire, did much to dampen enthusiasm. It was observed that Canadian soldiers were displeased when they were greeted in England by such remarks as, "It is good of you colonials to come over here to help us." Canada wished to be considered as a principal, not an assistant, in the war. It was argued from that observation that either closer or more distant relations were inevitable since the old tie of colony to parent had worn thin in that Dominion.[1] Another Imperial journal differently interpreted Dominion sentiment and asserted its willingness to do with less than a Federal constitution: "Whatever may have been the possibilities in the days gone by, the suggestion that we should have a Parliament sitting at Westminster to include representatives from India and the self-governing Dominions no longer comes within the arena of practical politics....The

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1. Canada and the Empire, R.T., Dec. 1916, Vol.7.

only practical form of political federation is by way of a Council of Empire - a change in our Constitution that would meet with ready acceptance from the communities overseas. In the Imperial Conference we have the nucleus of a council of this kind."[1] Sir Herbert Samuel also sought to formulate an intermediate scheme, for, "The Dominions have a passionate attachment to their own autonomy...There is as yet no sign that the peoples of the Dominions are ready to accept full Imperial Federation and all that it involves."[2] The most obvious line of advance he found to lie in a representative Imperial Cabinet, not divorced from that of the United Kingdom, containing Ministers charged with the conduct of Foreign affairs, Defence, India, the Colonies, Imperial Commerce, Communications, and Finance. This, however, was too limited an advance, open to many objections including that of not allowing the Dominions sufficient weight in Imperial matters, so he desired the creation as well of an Assembly which would be the theatre for discussion of proposals of the Imperial Executive. Members of this Assembly would also be members of their respective local parliaments, and sessions should be so timed that they might attend both. The representation would be in proportion to population, and the proposals, if endorsed by the Assembly, would be submitted to the State Legislatures and would not be given a binding effect by the Assembly. This plan, considered Sir Herbert, would have the virtue of elasticity and would require no elborate organic statute formally dividing Imperial

1. Changing the Fabric, Emp.Rev. July 1916, Vol.31, p.259.
2. Herbert Samuel, The Organisation of the Empire: A Suggestion, 19th Cent., Mar.1917, Vol.81.

and local powers of Government, or settling the basis of a common fiscal system. A Convention would merely have to adopt such a scheme, the Parliaments of Empire could endorse it by resolutions or Addresses to the Sovereign, and it could be brought into effect by the action of the Crown.[1] As a compromise the plan had much merit, but the Dominions were much too suspicious of a flank attack to give it a moment's consideration.

Professor Pollard does not sound like an advocate of Federation as he speaks with impatience of "some, who fail to discern the spirit through the material manifestations, are ever pressing for the crystallization of Britannic unity in paper Acts of Union or Federation. But while the British realms are eager for co-operation, they will not tolerate uniformity, and nothing would tend more surely towards disintegration than efforts to impose a constitution....It is not by formal federation that the British realms will gather the fruits of their common sacrifice, or express the common aims to which the war has added impulse, or express the common aims to which the war has added impulse....The Imperial conference may develop into the imperial cabinet; but it will not become a federal council, and like its prototype throughout the Empire it will remain unknown to the statute laws of the British realms. It will become a custom of the constitution long before it becomes an Act of Parliament."[2] He pointed out that, "So far there has been no demand from any Dominion for a parliamentary union, and efforts to stimulate

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1. Herbert Samuel, op.cit.
2. Pollard, The Commonwealth at War, pp.87-88.

such a demand have met with a good deal of hostile criticism."[1] He might have added that there was a great deal of overseas opposition to the proposal, and that much harm had been done to Imperial sentiment by the ill-advised enthusiasm for a super-state.[2]

The advocates of Imperial consolidation went merrily on breaking Imperial china despite all warning signs. There were those who expressed themselves as hotly opposed to intermediate schemes, favouring some outright measure such as that of Mr Curtis,[3] and continuing to assert that, "It is now generally recognised that the constitution of the Empire will have to be radically altered after the war."[4] The Round Table had a moment of misgiving and affirmed in words that seem to be taken from a study of Professor Keith: "The man who ventures to affirm that co-operation has broken down under the stress of war may possibly be right, but his case cannot be held as proven. Indeed, co-operation has yielded results far beyond anything which even its most fervent advocates would have foretold before the event."[5] The Round Table returned to the attack, however, with the assertion that the existing machinery of co-operation had shown itself to

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1. Pollard, The Growth of an Imperial Parliament, History, Apr. 1917, Vol.2.
2. Vide Dominion Views on Imperial Unity, Quart. Rev. Jan. 1917, Vol.227; Hughes, The Splendid Adventure, p.141ff; Mr Merriman's Warning, The Times, July 19, 1916; Skelton, op.cit., Vol.ii, p.463ff; Responsible Government in the Dominions, Vol.ii, p.vii. Smuts, War-Time Speeches, pp.8-9; pp.16-17; pp.32-33; passim.
3. J.A.R. Marriot, The Problem of the Commonwealth, 19th Cent., Jan. 1917, Vol.81.
4. D.A.E. Veal, The Political Union of the Empire, Emp.Rev., May 1917, Vol.31.
5. The War Conference of the Empire, R.T. Mar.1917, Vol.7,p.251.

be inadequate was an "indisputable proposition." For thirty months the Imperial Government, existing by the suffrages of the United Kingdom electors alone, had conducted the war, controlled the Dominion armies, and directed British policy, upon its sole responsibility.[1.]

Some of the blame for the continued clamour throughout the year 1917 could be laid at the door of the Imperial Conference of that year which drafted a resolution not entirely free from ambiguity. The famous Resolution IX decided that imperial relations were too tender a subject for war-time discussion, but that, "any such readjustment, while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth, and of India as an important part of the same, should recognise the right of the Dominions to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action founded on consultation, as the several Governments may determine."[2.] There was a clear division among the Prime Ministers on the subject of future Imperial relations. General Smuts decided that Imperial Federation was definitely ruled out;[3.] Ward held it essential;[4.] Borden was noncommittal;[5.] and Lloyd George could

1. The War Conference of the Empire, op.cit.
2. Cd.8566,p.5. There were two "War Conferences". For the War Conference in 1918 and the subject of Imperial Constitutional relations, vide Cd.9177, pp.155-165.
3. Cd.8566,p.47.
4. Ibid,pp.51-59, esp.p.55. Also Massey, ibid,pp.42-46.
5. Borden: "The fact that an Imperial War Cabinet as well as a British War Cabinet are sitting in London today is in itself a great significance. There may be possibly some guidance in that step for the future relations which will give to the Dominions their proper voice in the great matters which I have mentioned. However it would be unwise to attempt to forecast." Ibid, p.42.

be taken as supporting any view.[1] One writer took the War Conference as a great landmark for "the most crucial decision of all has been taken. The new Imperial Cabinet is to be the corner-stone of the whole Imperial system." The Dominions would appoint Ministers to the Imperial Cabinet who would reside in London.[2] Yet like most of the other advocates he saw the hope of an Imperial Parliament and Executive done away with, for, "It may fairly be assured that the recent Imperial War Conference declared unanimously in favour of slow and cautious movement.... General Smuts...made it clear as noonday that South Africa would not look at the federal solution...The Federationists have taken their defeat in admirable temper...They do not, of course, pretend to be satisfied, for the change will only give the Dominions a consultative voice in Imperial and foreign policy and not a real living partnership in the actual government of the Empire... The Federation ideal still remains."

It may be safely concluded, therefore, that the proposal for an Imperial Parliament had lost most of its weight as a result of the Conference solution, andthat the proposal had swung to less ambitions schemes for some form of council.[3] In vain did inconsolable Federalists beat the dead horse, one of whom set out to prove that "once go beyond a merely consultative

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1. Dewey, The Dominions and Diplomacy, Vol.i, p.315ff; W.Basil Worsfold, Where the Imperial War Conference has left us, 19th Cent. Nov.1917, Vol.82.
2. J.B. Firth, The New Constitutional Resolution, Fort.Rev., Aug. 1917, Vol.102.
3. J.H. Morgan, The War andthe Empire, Law.Quart.Rev., July 1917, Vol.33; sim. Sir Clement Kinloch-Cooke, The Constitutional Problem of Empire, Fort. Rev. Dec.1918, Vol.104. Also, Imperial Unity: Practical Conditions. Quart.Rev., Jan. 1918, Vol.229.

council, and I fail to see how it is possible either in logic or in practice to stop short of a position which would either reduce us to an absurdity or compel us to the acceptance of a complete Federal Constitution...General Smut's Birtannic League would be something; Mr Low's Imperial Executive would be better; Mr Herbert Samuel's Imperial Assembly would represent a still further advance; but I for one am not prepared to acquiesce in any final solution which stops short of a complete Federal Constitution."[1.]

As for the Round Table, the decisions of the Conference were taken to mean that "at a date which cannot be far distant, an Imperial Conference will assemble, the purpose of which will be to consider what further steps can be taken to transform the Empire from a State in which the main responsibilities and burdens of its common affairs are sustained and controlled by the United Kingdom into a Commonwealth of equal nations conducting its foreign policy and common affairs, by some method of continuous consultation and concerted action."[2.] Yet that organ also saw clearly that it was the opinion of those who moved and accepted the resolution that the constitutional development of the Empire should proceed along the lines of improved consultation and co-operation rather than that any attempt should be made to convert it into a federation.[3.] Still, the Imperial Cabinet would be "a valuable advance on the old Conference from the efficiency of its organization and the finality with which it could

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1. J.A.R. Marriott, British Federalism - A Vanished Dream? 19th Cent. Sept.1917, Vol.82.
2. The New Developments in the Constitution of the Empire, The R.T. June 1917, Vol.7, p.447.
3. Ibid, 448.

speak." One notices a gradual recession of articles suggesting Imperial consolidation from the columns of the Round Table. In one article we find a fear of Dominion nationalism as exemplified in Bourassa and Hertzog, so the Round Table group was probably beginning to see that they had stirred up a hornet's nest.[1.]

As a result of the nationalism that was expressed by Dominion participation in the Peace Conference and their entry into the League of Nations, the ideal of Imperial Federation was struck its death-blow.[2.] But there was another and equally potent reason for the change in attitude. Grief humbles a people even as it humbles individuals, and after the war we find the idea of the pre-eminence of the English mind, that buoyant ideal of the destiny of the Anglo-Saxon who had been elected to lead the world by dint of the prerogative of a superior culture, gone or going. Lord Cromer gave way to the Montagu-Chemsford Report; General Smuts and Lord Robert Cecil became as typical of the new spirit as Lord Milner and Joseph Chamberlain had been of the old.[3.] Lord Milner bore striking testimony to the new spirit. "The only possibility of a continuance of the British Empire," said the chief of the British Empire Delegation at the Peace Conference, "is on a basis of absolute out-and-out equal partnership between the United Kingdom and the Dominions. I say that without any kind of reservation whatsoever. It is very easy to say that;

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1. Freedom and Unity, R.T., Dec. 1917, Vol.8.
2. Vide for ex. Evelyn Wrench, The British Commonwealth of the Future, The New World, Oct. 1920, Vol.3: The relationship must be that of a group of practically independent states.
3. Vide Hamilton Fyfe, A New Spirit of Empire, Con.Rev., Nov. 1920, Vol.118. The ideal of racial destiny persisted, of course, and is found in such articles as: E. Theodore Marrier, An Imperial Stocktaking, The London Quart. Rev., Apr. 1921.

but undoubtedly the working out of it in practice without bringing about the severance of relations between us and the Dominions will be one of the most complicated tasks which statesmanship has ever had to face. I am not afraid of it, and yet I have to admit that the difficulties are such that our best efforts may end in failure. I hope not. At any rate there is no other way out....It is quite certain that in future the British Dominions...will be independently represented in international affairs."[1.]

Viscount Sandon, however, refused to relinquish his former hopes. He could still say of the Empire, "It is Old England in Canada, Old England in Australia, and in all the other Dominions," and he would pillory those men "who praise the status quo as a fine monument of British wisdom in governance and recognise the liberty they enjoy as 'partner in the alliance of friends'," for such a policy was "perpetually making insidious progress towards independence" which "gnaws the vitals of the Empire". He proposed an Imperial Executive to consist of a Council with equal representation from each part of the Empire, controlling foreign affairs, defence, and the India Office. Administration of the Crown Colonies would, as heretofore, rest with the Government of the United Kingdom. Unanimity was essential, and in the event of a deadlock the Executive could appeal to the Prime Minister of the Dominions whose representatives were in a minority.[2.] The Nation similarly professed a belief

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1. The Times, July 10, 1919. Mr D.A.E. Veal, The Empire in consultation, Emp.Rev., July 1921, V.35 - also appears a convert to Dominion nationalism.
2. Sandon, The Problem of the British Empire, 19th. Cent. Oct. 1920, Vol.88.

that, upon the basis of the equality of the component parts of the Empire, some arrangement would be made at the Conference "amounting to a Federal Constitution for the British Empire."[1]

They found few voices to support them. Mr Jebb stated truly that the notion had collapsed, and that there was no prospect of Imperial Federation for the present generation at any rate. It had become quite clear that, even apart from military affairs, the minimum centralisation requisite for an empire superstate would be incompatible with the free national development of the peoples subject to its authority.[2] It was confidently expected, however, that the Imperial Cabinet would be continued, and the United Empire desired that the functions of that body be defined with a view to reassuring the Dominions that its continued existence would be incompatible with their political independence, and in order that it might fit in as far as possible with a formal scheme of constitutional development, preventing it slipping back "into a Conference without Cabinet authority."[3] In March 1919, we find the Round Table commenting on the view that had grown up, as a result of the individuality of the Dominions and India asserted in the Peace Treaty, that "the real and only, but completely sufficient link between the partner British nations was the Crown."[4] As a solution to Imperial

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1. The Nation, July 3, 1920, pp.421-422. Mr W. Basil Worsfold likewise, in The Administration of the Empire, U.E. July 1920, Vol.xi, also believes that "an executive true to type, with a collective responsibility to a common representative body" was "an administrative necessity for the Empire". As late as 1924 the statement could be made that, "Our Empire is a Federation and what we want is the machinery to run it." Quoted, Clement Jones, The Dominions and Foreign Affairs, Eng. Rev., June 1924, Vol.38.
2. Jebb, Conference or Cabinet, U.E. Apr. and May 1920, Vol.xi. For the change in view, vide also Milner, The Times, Apr.11, 1919.
3. The U.E., Feb.1919, Vol.x, p.49.
4. The British Empire, The League, and the United States, R.T. Mar. 1919, Vol.x, pp.236-237.

political problems this was considered clearly incomplete, for a Sovereign could not be advised by six different Governments unless they were all unanimous. Regarding the British Peace Treaties with Turkey and the Russian Policy, the Dominions were being committed once again by international negotiations in which they had no part and the moral of 1914 was being ignored. It was only a question of time until an incident of some kind would provoke the vbitterest recrimination and controversey.[1.] The Irish question was making its influence felt in the change of conception.[2.] The Irish Dominion League had appeared under the chairmanship of Sir Horace Plunkett, backed, in the advocacy of a Dominion settlement, by an able newspaper, The Irish Statesman. The Round Table was anxious that Ireland should continue to share with the United Kingdom the burden of Imperial defence, and continued to urge the necessity for the Dominions "to evolve the proper means of sharing with the Motherland both the control of foreign policy and the responsibilities which that policy entails."[3.]

There was still a good deal of faith that the problem of Ireland might be solved by a devolution of the Government of the United Kingdom. As proposed by Professor Hearnshaw it included the stipulations that matters relating to the Empire as a whole be relegated for detailed consideration and report to the Imperial Conference and the Imperial Cabinet; that the labours of the present House of Commons and of the second chamber be

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1. The British Empire, op.cit. pp,247-248.
2. as note, The Irish Crisis, R.T. June 1918, Vol.8, p.524; Ireland: The Call for a Settlement, R.T. Sept. 1919, Vol.9.
3. The Harvest of Victory, R.T. Sept. 1919, Vol.ix, p.669.

concentrated the general business of the United Kingdom; that legislative councils be set up to deal with the special affairs of England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales; and that much larger powers of self-government be granted to country, borough, district, and parish councils.[1] Some hope still remained that a step might thus be taken towards an Imperial system of government comprising the Dominions. There was a vast amount of public and official opinion favouring the gradual development in India of free institutions, leading to full local self-government in due course.[2]

At the end of 1920 there is a not inconsiderable change of attitude on the part of the Round Table. An article included: "The argument for the unity of the Empire has hitherto always been stated as an argument from the whole to its parts. The great functions of the Empire in the world have been faithfully set out; its disruption has been justly described as a catastrophe which every part of it would desire to avert; and from these premises reason has been shown for constitutional reorganisation, which would, people fear, necessarily limit in some degree the full national independence of the self-governing parts. The reaction from this method of argument is apparent everywhere; and allegiance to the Crown, which is the head of every British Government throughout the world, has become for the moment the all-sufficient sign and guarantee of the unity of the Commonwealth."[3]

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1. F.G.C. Hearnshaw, Democracy and the British Empire, pp.168-169; for further discussion vide The Report of the Speaker's Conference on Devolution, Cmd.692; also J.A. Murray Macdonald, Federal Devolution, The Times, July, 5,6,7,8,8, 1920.
2. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report, R.T., Sept.1918, Vol.8; Constitutional Reform in India, R.T., Sept.1919, Vol.9.
3. The British Commonwealth of Nations in 1921, R.T. Dec. 1920, Vol.11, pp.9-10.

The glee, however, with which the meeting of the Imperial Conference in 1921 was hailed, and the use of the word "Cabinet" to describe it - a use in which Mr Lloyd George also indulged[1] - showed that the hope for Imperial organization was still strong. The "old Imperial Conference" was disparaged as reflecting the days when the United Kingdom conducted foreign policy and the issues of peace and war, and discharged British responsibilities towards the Dependencies and Crown Colonies. The accomplishments of the pre-war Conferences were rated as negligible[2] in an irritating way, for those Conferences had been tremendously fruitful in developing a wholesome Imperial patriotism. The Round Table believed that the problems confronting the meeting were: 1. The United Kingdom could no longer assume full responsibility for dealing with the problems of international politics which resulted from the Great War, both because of the new status of equality which the Dominions had acquired, and because, burdened as she was with war debt, she was no longer strong enough to maintain alone the position in the world which the British Empire had held in the past.[3] 2. Regarding internal organization, there were the questions of the position and choice of Governor-Generals, means of consultation, and the representation of the Dominions at foreign capitals, wherein grave danger of divergencies in British foreign policy might arise. The considerable omission of any advocacy of organic union must be noted. There appears to be a complete acceptance of the position of the different self-governing parts of the Empire maintaining contact by consultative measures. That the organ had been sincere in

1. Vide also Churchill, The Times, Apr.26, 1921.
2. The Meeting of the Imperial Cabinet, R.T. June 1921, Vol.11, pp.537-538.
3. Ibid, p.543.

believing that a democratic Empire could only be attained by a central representative body may be deduced from an article commenting that the people of Great Britain had always welcomed the tendency of the Dominions to insist upon recognition of their independent national status.[1] When the Conference of 1921 was concluded, the Round Table, commenting thereon, uttered a view which is astonishing considering the fact that the resolutions of the Conference quite destroyed any hope of organic Imperial unity. Observing that the name Cabinet had been abandoned for that of Conference, nevertheless in the secrecy of its sittings, its method of only proclaiming the conclusions of discussions, and the fact that it had sat with members of the British Cabinet to determine British policy on "Imperial and foreign questions of immediate urgency which arise in the course of the sittings", and in that joint of collective capacity it had recommended action to the Sovereign like any ordinary Cabinet, were to be found factors making for a resemblance to a virtual Imperial executive. "While the official terminology represents perhaps, a retreat from that used in connection with the Imperial War Cabinets, its proceedings mark a definite advance in status on the Imperial Conference of 1911. Then the Dominion Premiers were informed about foreign affairs. Now the 'Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives' is recognised as the body which formulates the policy of the Empire especially in foreign affairs, but also in other Imperial matters; while the British Government becomes charged with the duty of carrying on that

1. White Australia, R.T. Mar.1921, Vol.11, p.319: by "national status" is probably meant national personality, not implying political separateness.

policy in the intervals between the assembling of the Conference subject to such consultation as is possible through residence or visiting Ministers or cables and mails. From now onwards policy is a matter for the people of the Empire, and the British Government will occupy a position somewhat similar to that of the President of the United States, whose foreign policy, to be effective, requires the consent and co-operation of the Senate - in our case the Dominions...The Conference was unquestionably a success."[1.]

The Conference of 1921 did much, in fact, to condemn all centralisation schemes of political control. It approved of continuous consultation which could only be secured by a substantial improvement in the communications between the component parts of the Empire. Having regard to the constitutional developments since 1917, it was decided that no advantage was to be gained by holding a constitutional Conference. The Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions and the Representatives of India should aim at meeting annually, or at such longer intervals as might prove feasible. The existing practice of direct communication between the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions, as well as the right of the latter to nominate Cabinet Ministers to represent them in consultation with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, were to be maintained.[2.]

The Nation would seem to have been converted, for an article in that Journal prophesied that, "Some happy day the Dominion Parliaments will decide to set up their own Foreign Affairs

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1. The Imperial Conference, R.T., Sept.1921, Vol.11, pp.735-736. Sim. D.A.E. Veal, Imperial Conference, 1921, Emp.Rev., Sept. 1921, Vol.35.
2. Cmd.1474, pp.9-10.

Committee, demand that all the arcana of the foreign relations and diplomacy of the Committee be subjected to its scrutiny, and insist that the régime of mystery and jugglery come to an end in favour of open co-operative action through the channel of the League of Nations."[1] Even Mr Marriott subscribed to Professor Hearnshaw's dictum that the Empire had become a Britannic Confederation - a league of nations, not a composite unitary State. "No attentive reader of the overseas Press or recent debates in Dominion Parliaments can fail to be conscious of a pervasive suspicion of any centralized institution - an uneasy apprehension lest at the very moment when the triumph of colonial nationalism is most conspicuous, the independence of the component States should be bartered away for a mess of Imperial pottage."[2] Professor Strahan explained that the British Empire had been "not federated, but confederated," by which he meant that every state had retained its independence, "legally bound together only by the golden tie of a common King and by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council."[3] While there had been ample warning against applying analogies to the British Empire, the view was becoming current that the British Empire had developed in the direction of a Confederation of States similar to the German "Staatenbund"

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1. Hespericus, The Downing Street Conference, The Nation, Aug. 6, 1921.
2. J.A.R. Marriott, The Organization of the Empire, Edin.Rev., 1921, Vol.233.
3. Strahan, Federation and Confederation, The Law Times, June 11, 1921, Vol.151, pp.406-407. Sim. Hearnshaw, Democracy and the British Empire, p.166.

as contrasted with "Bundesstaat" or Federal Union.[1]

It was quite superfluous that a writer should prophesy that the tendency of the Conference of 1923 would not be favourable to those who believed in Imperial Federation or some closer form of political union. The best that could be hoped for was a permanent Secretariat for the Imperial Conference - an idea turned down in 1921 - and possibly the appointment of resident Ministers from the Dominions discharging functions additional to those exercised by the present High Commissioners.[2]

In March 1922, the Round Table set a programme for the British Commonwealth which included co-operation in all problems of Imperial development, the formulation and execution of a foreign policy, a united defence policy, and a co-operation with the United States, France, Italy, "and other progressive Powers" for a limitation of armaments that so there might come about a system of international Conferences, with a League of Nations at the summit, which would help to resolve international problems by mediation, discussion in public, or arbitration, and so pave the

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1. ex. M.M. Lewis, Status of the British Self-Governing Dominions, B.Y.I.L. 1922-23, Vol.iii, For a definition vide, Wheaton's Elements of International Law, 6th ed. Rev. and rewritten by A.B. Keith, Vol.i, p.119: "The several States are connected together by a compact, which does not essentially differ from an ordinary treaty of equal alliance. Consequently the internal sovereignty of each member of the union remains unimpaired; the resolutions of the federal body (acting through a Diet or Congress) being enforced, not as laws directly binding on the private individual subjects, but through the agency of each separate government, adopting them, and giving them the force of law within its own jurisdiction. Hence it follows that each confederated individual State and the federal body for the affairs of common interest, may become each in itsown appropriate sphere, the object of distinct diplomatic relations with other nations."
2. Curio, The Imperial Conference, Fort.Rev.Nov. 1923, Vol.114.

way towards the realisation of that greatest objective of the Great War - the ending of international war through the establishment of world law.[1] By this time it seems completely reconciled to the consultative system, advocating inter-Empire representation in quasi-diplomatic capacity, by men of high standing and ability, who could give good authoritative advice on foreign and Imperial affairs to their government when required. As the Governor General became less of a political intermediary, and even perhaps came some day to be selected from the Dominions, the British Government should also have a representative in Dominion capitals to keep itself informed.[2]

1. A Programme for the British Commonwealth, R.T. War.1922, Vol.12, p.251.
2. The New Imperial Problem, R.T. June, 1923, Vol.13, pp,488-489.

Chapter III: Imperial Organisation:

The Co-Operationist School.

While the Federation movement was immensely popular, it is really much more important to appreciate that the idea of Imperial Federation was severely ridiculed in the United Kingdom, the reaction there tending to Imperial co-operation rather than separation as was unfortunately the case in the Dominions. No-one desired that the Dominions be cut from the Imperial connection, but many people, discerning the growth of Dominion nationalism, especially just after the war, desired to find some answer to the dilemma propounded by Mr Curtis of Federation or Separation. One writer of this persuasion expressed it that, "A native-born Canadian regards himself as essentially different from a person born in any other part of the Empire; he knows that he has much in common with such a person, but he differs from him in one important respect - he has a different national sentiment; he is a member of the British Empire, but he is something more - he is a Canadian; and so it is in the other Dominions; and it is this Dominion nationalism which throws an insurmountable barrier across the path of Imperial Federation."[1] Sir Charles Lucas observed that, "In every possible way the war has enlarged the nationhood of the Dominions",[2] but he feared that "the much less wholesome sentiment of nationalism "had forced its way into the Dominions to tend to separation."[3]

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1. Eastwood, Constitutional Rgidity in Relation to Empire Federation, Law Quart. Rev., Apr. 1920, Vol.36.
2. Lucas, The War and the Empire, p.32.
3. Ibid, p.35.

There were some people who would have had "a gradual change from an obsolete Imperialism to a free union of Commonwealths having a common civilisation...Their union....one of hearts, of common interests, of the same ideals...Schemes for some kind of Imperial Parliament, for a joint Cabinet, for a strict defensive system by sea and land to be planned by strategists are idle dreams."[1] Haldane similarly conceived the post-war Commonwealth of Nations, "The constitution of the Empireis more and more being recognised as being that of a living combination of independent Commonwealths united by common traditions and purposes, but neither bound together nor capable of being held together by any law imposed ab extra." He continued, "Not legality, but constitutional habit of thought, appears plainly as the one instrument needful. The King is the outward and visible sign of unity. But he reigns without governing. The Cabinets of the various Dominions advise and guide his use of the instrument which in theory is his. The keys of the Empire are not to be found in Downing Street."[2] Sir Francis Younghusband likewise conceived a bond of sentiment uniting the Empire in reaction to the war spirit - "A spiritual bond... and the finest spirit is that of culture, a blend of society, art and thought, all three and all together springing from and shot through with religion...culture... the blending of goodness, beauty, and truth; of warmth, colour, and light; of society, art, and thought,

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1. Frederick Harrison, The Future of Empire and of England, Eng. Rev., June 1922, Vol.34.
2. Haldane, The British Empire in its Wider Significance, The Pilgrim, Oct.1921, Vol.2.

all three fired by religion conceived of as a passionate world-love..."[1] There always has been a body of opinion which has believed that Britain's chief motive in international life should be the diffusion of culture, but this body has been particularly strong since the decline of Britain's predominant position in the industrial world.

There were a few like Professor Keith and Sir Francis Piggott, who had seen at the outset the futility of the Imperial Federation movement. As the latter expressed it, "Representation in any form would not leave the Dominions free;... the existing system of Imperial Government, with all its vagueness, judged by its magnificent results, is a thing which has made the whole world wonder: and I ask, Is it not better so?"[2] Later there were many others to join them.[3]

The Co-operationist School refused, however, to let matters drift and many of them proposed alternative plans for Imperial organization which would preserve to the fullest measure Dominion autonomy and maintain Imperial unity. There was a scheme advanced by Mr Griffin - he had first outlined it in May 1902, and it had attracted some attention, Mr Lloyd George's Imperial Cabinet having much similarity to it - that is, the proposal for an Imperial Council composed of the King and the Premiers of all the self-governing countries of the Empire. It would submit any decisions arrived at to the home Governments. Its aim would be co-operation in foreign affairs and defence.[4]

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1. Younghusband, Culture as the bond of Empire, p.126; pp.145-146.
2. Piggott, The Reorganisation of the Empire, 19th Cent., Mar. 1916, Vol.79.
3. ex. Clement Jones, Dominions and Foreign Affairs, Eng.Rev., June 1924, Vol.38.
4. Watson Griffin, A Britannic Council of Premiers, Emp.Rev., Mar. 1923, Vol.37.

Mr Eastwood objected strenuously to Imperial Federation,[1] and to the Imperial Cabinet terminology.[2] His starting-point for any organization of the Empire would be a recognition of "the important fact that what we still call the British Empire has ceased to be an empire, according to the usual meaning of that word, and has become in most essential respects a league of autonomous nations imbued with similar ideals and desirous for many purposes of working in concert with each other."[3] Mr Eastwood's main purpose, like most writers, was to find a connection between the meetings of "an assembly" which would meet once a year. "If only the practice could be initiated of including in each successive Dominion Government a minister to represent it in England and to confer with the British Government, the machinery for co-operation of which the annual conference of Premiers forms the central part, would be almost complete."[4] He was opposed to a centralized control of Imperial navies except in war, and desired co-operative principles to dictate progress.[5] He further desiderated an Imperial Court of Appeal after the fashion of that proposed by Haldane, for only in this way would it be possible to retain the Judicial Committee as a permanent court of appeal for the Empire.[6] In many of these matters his views have a great deal of similarity to those of Professor Keith.

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1. R.A. Eastwood, The Organization of a Britannic Partnership, p.79ff.
2. Ibid, p.116ff. Sim. F.J.C. Hearnshaw, Democracy and the British Empire, p.165.
3. Eastwood, op.cit., p.129.
4. Ibid, p.132.
5. Ibid, pp.75-76; pp.133-135.
6. Ibid, pp.135-142.

There were three outstanding books written during the period of the Federalist revival. Two of them were almost simultaneous; the third came when the tumult was dying away. The first, pre-eminently that of a scholar, was startling because it ran counter to the popular opinion of the day, was generally regarded as lacking in vision, and showed in striking fashion the weakness of the Federalist position at a time when Imperial Federation seemed to be in the air, yet it made concrete proposals for the development of the Empire which have been very largely embodied in the Imperial constitution. The second illustrated how easy it is to misinterpret facts, especially if they be coloured by transient popular enthusiasm. The third book came when the tumult of Federation was dying away and was written by a Dominion nationalist who had been a Rhodes Scholar, who based his study not on scholarship in constitutional law, but who lived very close to public opinion, who seized upon the general tendencies in the post-war period with startling vigour, and in broad outlines revealed the course of the Empire for the next few years. The books were, Imperial Unity and the Dominions by Professor Keith, The Problem of the Commonwealth by Mr Curtis, and The British Commonwealth of Nations by Mr Hall.

Imperial Unity and the Dominions.

Professor Keith in this book sought to outline some "simple proposals" which could "claim to be practicable", being "merely extensions of principles already in operation", and "not therefore exposed to the grave political and commercial difficulties which would attend any scheme of federation or commercial union."[1] He pointed out that no country which had played such a large part in the war as had the Dominions could ever again be expected to content itself with the position of a mere dependency.[2] While, however, he desired national development in the Dominions, for "any check to the growth of self-reliance would be a calamity", yet he was equally concerned with the preservation of the unity of the Empire. The end desired by all responsible statesmen could only be arrived at in one way, "the encouragement of the greatest autonomy in self-government coupled with the creation of closer bonds of union between the several parts of the Empire as a whole.....No Dominion could possibly by whatever extension of its national life be as great as the British Empire;" Canada could never hope to reach as high a destiny as might be hers in organic connection with forty-five millions of population in the United Kingdom and five millions in Australia.[3]

Professor Keith found that the exceptions to the rule that a Governor-General, like the King, acted on ministerial advice rested on two grounds, either the fact that in some cases action

1. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.592.
2. Ibid, p.530.
3. Ibid, pp.24-25.

on such advice might expose the Governor to the risk of breaking the law, which it was his duty to uphold, or that he had Imperial interests to consider.[1] He thought that in neither of these cases did there seem to be any fundamental reason for breaking the rule of responsible government, and the Governor should always act on ministerial advice.[2] He desired that the Governors-General and Governors be freed from legal liability for official actions,[3] and that they should not assume a personal responsibility in the matter of the prerogative of mercy.[4] If the Governor were to act in all questions according to the practice of the Crown in the United Kingdom, including the dissolution and dismissal of Ministers,[5] these difficulties would disappear.

Regarding legislation, it was essential for the unity of the Empire that the United Kingdom retain supremacy in legislation in the event of collision between Dominion and Imperial law, but the powers of disallowance and reservation on the part of the Imperial Government were irritating and unnecessary.[6] He desired that Dominion legislation apply extra-territorially[7] and suggested the abrogation of legal restrictions on Dominion shipping, while a condition of perfect reciprocity might obtain between the Dominions and the United Kingdom as to the extent to which Dominion legislative authority might be exercised in respect of British ships not registered in the Dominion.[8]

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1. pt.i. ch.iv, p.74ff.
2. Ibid, p.85.
3. Ibid, ch.ii, p.35ff.
4. Ibid, p.68; p.65ff.
5. ch. v. pp.85-119.
6. Ibid, p.149.
7. Ibid, ch.x, p.214ff; many of these suggestions are made in "The Ideal of an Imperial Constitution," op,cit.
8. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.233.

It was felt that, although homogeneity of race should be preserved in the Dominions, yet educated Indians should be allowed freedom of movement throughout the Empire and the recognition of the equality in citizenship of Indians legally resident in a Dominion.[1.]

The Dominions should be represented at commercial, social, and political conferences by their plenipotentiaries, nominated by themselves, appointed by the King, and subject to his ratification of their actions with, in each case, the advice of the Imperial Government, an essential qualification to maintain the unity of the Empire.[2.] It was also imperative that the action of the Empire should be uniform, and so constitutional agreements should be made as to the mode in which the votes of the representatives should be cast. It was also advocated that the practice of not consulting the Dominions regarding extradition treaties be discontinued and that they be given an opportunity to withdraw as in other treaties.[3.]

It appeared clearly to Professor Keith that the permanent acceptance by the Dominions of a court in London was impossible, unless it could be so enlarged as to give the Dominions some just feeling that it was an Imperial Court. The Dominions would be really tempted to take part in the reconstruction of the Judicial Committee if they could be given the assurance that the bodymwould be concerned with appeals from the United Kingdom as well as from the Colonies, and that the membership of Dominion judges would

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1. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, ch.ix, p.190ff.; p.257ff.
2. Ibid, pp.293-294; Vide chs. xiii and xiv, p.216ff.
3. pp.297-300.

be really welcomed.[1] He was pleased with Haldane's suggestion for an Imperial Court,[2] and was of the opinion that such a court might also act as an arbitral body in inter-Empire disputes.[3]

He would have liked to see the power of altering its constitution given to Canada, but he noted the difficulty of overcoming the suspicion of the Provinces towards the Dominion Government.[4]

The complete impossibility of Imperial Federation was relentlessly pointed out,[5] yet as a constitutional authority the writer as strenuously denied the notion that the Dominions should be independent States, united with the United Kingdom by no more than sentiment and the Crown, but independent units in international law and quite indifferent to British Foreign Policy, having the relation of Hanover and England in time past.[6]

Professor Keith concluded that "the question of fiscal relations is no longer the point of most concern in the connexion between the United Kingdom and the Dominions, the centre of gravity of these relations having shifted from trade to foreign affairs. It is now practically certain from the drift of political feeling that, if the United Kingdom alters its fiscal system, it will be in the direction not of mere Imperial Preference intended to consolidate the Empire, but of preferential trade primarily aimed at the strengthening of the trade of the United Kingdom, and Imperial Preference will play a subordinate part."[7]

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1. Imperial Unity and the Dominions op.cit. pp.378-379.
2. Ibid, p.384ff.
3. Ibid, p.388; pp.165-166.
4. Ibid, p.396.
5. Ibid, p.498ff.
6. Ibid, pt.ii, ch.ii, p.510ff. A view advanced by Mr Ewart in the Kingdom of Canada and the Kingdom Papers, or, more recently, complete independence in The Canadian Republic.
7. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.536.

To utilize the High Commissioners for the four great Dominions in London, and the Agents-General for the Australian States had never appeared an acceptable procedure for keeping their Governments in touch with the Imperial Government.[1] For one thing they were Government officials holding office under Acts of Parliament for definite periods, who could not easily be moved from office by any Government. The writer thought that the most effective manner was that enunciated by Harcourt[2] suggesting that a Dominion Minister might be sent to London where he would be available to represent the Dominion on the Committee of Imperial Defence, in which questions of foreign politics were considered in immediate relation to the question of the defence of the Empire and where he would also have free and full access to the Prime Minister and other Imperial officers.[3] Sir Robert Borden had appreciated the value of this concession, and the criticism that such a Minister would get out of touch with his home government could be met by varying the Minister from time to time.[4] However, the writer saw difficulties which prevented the other Dominions doing more than utilizing the machinery of the Imperial Conference, plus arrangements for individual ministerial visits.[5] The time wasted by the Conference in discussing matters which could be better handled by subsidiary technical Conferences or upon irrelevant and trifling affairs and failure to expedite

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1. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp.536-541.
2. Infra, pt.ii, ch.v.
3. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp.541-542. His protest against the Imperial Cabinet as a body to which none of the criteria suggested by the term cabinet applied and consequently "a misnomer, likely to prove a stumbling-block in the development of co-operation", The Times, Apr.29, 1921.
4. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.545.
5. Ibid, pp.545-548.

business was condemned.[1] The various plans for a Secretariat or permanent Commission were condemned, for they were neither generally desired nor would they be of much use.

There has been some necessity to outline Professor Keith's views because his philosophy of the Empire has been largely misunderstood in the Dominions. One reason for that has been the prohibitive cost of the books for private individuals, and many libraries have failed to replace his earlier works by later editions. There is also the fact that few politicians have taken the trouble to master the detail involved in his studies which is necessary fully to understand the philosophy of the Empire involved. Yet the books have a good sense of humour not found in either Mr Ewart, Mr Hall, or for that matter any of the Federationist writers.

The British Commonwealth of Nations.[2]

Mr Hall's book arose out of a study by a Committee of the Fabian Society, but was written independently by him. He began with the problem of reconciling the emphatic declarations of autonomy on the part of Dominion statesmen with equally positive assertions of Imperial unity, that is, of discovering how the Dominions could have equality with the United Kingdom without disrupting the Empire.[3] He found such a saving principle

1. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp.553-562.
2. Vide also, Hall, The Imperial Crown and the Foreign Relations of the Dominions, J.C.L., Oct. 1920, Vol.2.
3. The British Commonwealth of Nations, p.226.

revealed in the history of inter-Imperial relations since the grant of responsible government in the application of that distinction, so well known to the British constitution, between legal power and constitutional right.[1] He suggested "a general declaration of constitutional right covering the whole field of government - executive, legislative and judicial...By this means the Dominions, in the eyes of the whole world, would be placed upon a footing of complete constitutional equality with the United Kingdom or an other independent state. Complete legal equality could only be obtained by adding to this a declaration of legal independence - that is, by the formal disruption of the Empire."[2] The former declaration might take the form of a series of resolutions by the Imperial Conference. The distinction was no new thing - it had been made in a multitude of speeches and writings; but never before had it been so forcefully and originally presented as a solution to the Imperial dilemma. Mr Hall considered further that as regarded legislative and executive functions, declarations of constitutional right had already been made for practical purposes and, as regarded judicial equality, a similar declaration had been made either implicitly or explicitly by most of the Dominions at the War Conference of 1918.[3] He saw a new relation between the Crown and the Dominions as a result of the Peace Treaties, and in this new personal relationship in giving advice to the Crown he drew a distinction between "national" and "group" questions. The Imperial Conference would

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1. The British Commonwealth of Nations, p.229.
2. Ibid, p.230.
3. Inid, pp.236-237.

have to settle where any doubtful question fell and consultation would help in that any policy initiated by one member should be brought to the notice of the other members and, if desired, discussed in the Imperial Conference.[1.]

The writer approved of separate diplomatic representation for the Dominions, although such services would decline in importance with the development in the Empire and in the League of Nations of the method of direct conference between governments, the more important questions of international relationship being dealt with in the future by regular conferences between Foreign Ministers and by ad hoc conferences between the Ministers concerned with particular relationships.[2.]

He concluded that the Dominions would not consent to the creation of an Imperial Court of Appeal, and that Dominion appeals to the Judicial Committee were likely before long to cease altogether.[3.]

Regarding his more positive proposals he advocated a permanent Court of Arbitration to deal with inter-Empire disputes which were of a justiciable nature based on a completely remodelled Judicial Committee or, after Professor Keith's suggestion, 'a special Committee which might consist, in part, of high legal officials and in part of statesmen chosen from the United Kingdom and the Dominions.'[4.] He wished conferences between the legislatures to try to effect a uniformity in legislation. The Society of Comparative Legislation might serve as the basis for a joint

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1. The British Commonwealth of Nations, pp.250-252.
2. Ibid, p.254.
3. Ibid, p.266.
4. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp.165-166; p.388; The British Commonwealth of Nations, p.271.

Imperial Legal Information Bureau which could effect the pooling of the legislative, administrative, and judicial experience of the Empire, but do the work on a more extensive scale.[1.] While the Colonial Office had been shown by the Imperial Conference to be doing necessary and valuable work in serving as a kind of clearing house and agents for the various departments of the British Government which had relations with the Dominions, yet Mr Hall considered that the Dominions Department should either be made a separate department, or it should be placed either directly or indirectly under the control of one of the existing British Ministers.[2.] The Governor-General should be shorn of his ambassadorial functions and these transferred to a British High Commissioner accredited to the Dominion Government as the diplomatic representative of the United Kingdom.[3.]

The writer was also displeased with the present lack of full consultation, especially on foreign affairs, the inability to speak with a single voice probably having something to do with the failure to avert the war in 1914, and a similar weakness might again precipitate tragedy. So he devised an elaborate structure of committees, conferences, boards, and departments to establish interdependence, the dominating factor in modern civilisation. His machinery was not to exist for the purposes of "high policy" and defence, for these were secondary matters which sprang from the other sources of the complex of every day relationships, - a very wise observation. His proposals are briefly as follows,

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1. The British Commonwealth of Nations, pp.272-274.
2. Ibid, p.276.
3. Ibid, pp.277-278.

1. An Imperial Conference to meet frequently, to be attended by the Prime Ministers or other leading Cabinet Ministers, and to be equipped with a permanent Secretariat appointed by the respective Governments to whom it would ultimately be responsible.

2. Regular Subsidiary Conferences between the Ministers responsible for particular function of government, as for example, Public Health or education.

3. A system of joint bodies or bureaux, manned by civil servants or experts appointed by the various Governments of the Group - for the collection of information and the pooling of knowledge and experience of the whole Empire on particular questions or functions of government; for research; for the co-ordination of policy, and for the undertaking of definite pieces of inter-Imperial administrative work.

4. A network of voluntary associations of various kinds linking up the peoples of the Group and dealing with the numerous functions - political, social, and economic - lying outside the normal range of governmental action.

5. A means for focusing public opinion and of exerting a measure of popular control over these bodies - a means, that is, of preventing the Imperial Conference becoming a more or less irresponsible oligarchy, and the new inter-Imperial civil service an irresponsible bureaucracy - the British Commonwealth would require a representative Imperial Assembly, preferably an Assembly composed of delegations from the Parliaments of the Group, a Conference of Parliaments to balance the Conference of Governments.[1] The Empire Parliamentary Associations had already laid the

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1. The British Commonwealth of Nations, pp.284-285; p.280ff.

foundations for such an Assembly.[1] The Assembly might act as a quasi-legislative body, discussing Acts like the Imperial Copyright Act of 1911, the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, and the Naval Discipline Act of 1911.[2]

The suggestion of the Final Report of the Dominions Royal Commission,[3] for an Imperial Development Board to co-ordinate most of the joint bodies as its permanent or temporary Committees the Board itself to be under the supreme direction of an Imperial Conference - did not meet with approval in this book, since no provision was made for bringing the various joint bodies into organic relationship with the national departments of government, that is, it left no room for subsidiary Conferences which were essential. The counter-proposal was made that the Subsidiary Conferences should establish their own permanent bureaux or supervise existing bureaux, each of which would thus be brought into organic relationship withnthe Ministers and Departments immediately concerned with the particular internation relationship with which it was dealing.[4]

Mr Hall suggested, as had Sir Sidney Low, the setting up of a Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Commons as a means to re-establishing Parliamentary control in this matter.[5]

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1. The British Commonwealth of Nations, pp.306-310.
2. Ibid, pp.313-314.
3. Cd.8462, p.151ff; p.163, etc.
4. Hall, op.cit., pp.297-298.
5. Ibid, pp.310-313. Vide also Cd.9230, 1918, Report of the Machinery of Government Committee, p.15.

Chapter IV: The British Empire and the League of Nations.

In this study three points require consideration: that the Dominions were not until recently considered to have an international personality outside the League; that within the League they must enjoy full membership; and that the fear existed that the League might disrupt the Empire.

As late at any rate as 1924 there seems to have been complete agreement among leading authorities that only in the League did the Dominions enjoy a distinct position in International Law,[1.] and the matter has continued to be argued until recent days. The debates on the Irish question could be taken as revealing that the nature of Dominion status was not understood by British politicians in the same sense that the Dominions understood the term.[2.] Asquith spoke of giving to Ireland "Dominion Home Rule in the largest, fullest, and most generous sense;" yet he defined this as meaning "complete legislative independence in all matters of local concern...fiscal autonomy...the power to raise local military forces for home defence, and,..subject to certain clearly defined conditions and limitations, the power to raise a naval force also...in regard to the question of strategy and foreign policy...no Dominion claimed anything more than a consultative voice in these matters and they did not propose to give Ireland more than they gave to other Dominions."[3.] Lord Grey spoke to

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1. Higgins (ed), Hall's International Law, p.35; Keith, The International Status of the Dominions, J.C.L. 1923, Vol.5; War Government in the Dominions, p.293; Keith (ed.), Wheaton's International Law, 6th ed. 1929, p.132: "Outside the League the Dominions cannot be said to have international Status"; per contra Baker, The Present Juridicial Status of the British Dominions, p.130ff.
2. Hall, What is Dominion Status? The Nation, Nov.27, 1920.
3. The Times, Oct.15, 1920; sim. The Times, Oct. 5.

the same effect on this point. Regarding foreign affairs, "I would put Ireland in precisely the same position as the great self-governing Dominions, with the same right to be consulted and the same rights as to commercial treaties, but leaving as now foreign policy in the hands of the Imperial Government."[1.]

Dr Lewis in 1923 would seem to affirm the general view,[2.] but in 1925 he stated that those who said that internationally, except as regarded the League, the Dominions had no status apart from the British Empire, were taking too narrow a view. The Dominions were not sovereign states in International Law, but, just as in the past part-sovereign states, such as Bavaria within the German Empire and Bulgaria when under Turkish suzerainty, claimed a degree of internation personality, so the Dominions as they had relations with foreign states both separately and as component parts of the British Empire could not be ignored in International Law.[3.]

Mr Rolin was unwilling to admit that there had been any essential change effected in Dominion status by their entry into the League of Nations.[4.] This point of view British writers were completely unwilling to accept. Professor Toynbee expressed the result of the entrance of the Dominions into the League of Nations in language which none would deny: "Admission to separate

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1. The Times, Nov.25, 1920; Also Nov.9. But note W.S. Fielding, quoted, Willison, A Treaty and a Signature, Can.Hist.Rev., June 1923, Vol.4: "We cannot make a treaty without the Ambassador of Great Britain. I am not saying anything in a controversial sense, but my own view is that we have today in the making of commercial treaties all the powers that we ought to have or that are any good to us."
2. M.M.Lewis, The International Status of the British Self-Governing Dominions, B.Y.I.L. 1922-23.
3. Lewis, The Treaty-Making Power of the Dominions, B.Y.I.L. 1925.
4. Henri Rolin, Le Statut des Dominions, Revue de Droit international et de Legislation comparee, 1923, Vol.4.

membership in the League, in their own rights, constituted for Canada and the other self-governing Dominions of the British Empire overseas, an international registration of a status which was already recognized by Great Britain as theirs but which had not previously received any formal recognition that would be valid in international law."[1] Lord Grey's statement on the entry of the Dominions into the League of Nations fairly reflects British opinion of that time, "The self-governing Dominions are full members of the League. They will admit, and Great Britain can admit, no qualification of that right. Whatever the self-governing Dominions may be in the theory and letter of the constitution, they have in effect ceased to be Colonies in the old sense of the word. They are free communities, independent as regards all their own affairs and partners in those which concern the Empire at large. It is a special status, and there can be no derogation from it."[2] Lord Milner spoke in exactly the same spirit.[3]

It may be concluded that British opinion had decided that if the Dominions were determined to enter the League they should do so in the full enjoyment of an equality of status with other nations. It is true that for some time both British and foreign opinion deprecated the distinct representation of the Dominions, and the first draft of the Covenant made no provision for such representation. But when the British Government became awareof the strength of Dominion feeling on the matter, it joined the

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1. Toynbee, The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement, p.10.
2. The Times, Jan. 31, 1920.
3. Ibid, July 10, 1919.

Dominion Prime Ministers in converting foreign states to concede them distinct personality.[1] The fact that there was some fear that the League might disrupt the Empire belongs to a separate argument and calls for separate consideration. Professor Pollard, who had avowed Imperial Federation on occasion, clearly stated the attitude of the Dominions which Britain must be prepared to accept: "Whatever peesimistic views or backward glances we may take in the Old Country and in the Old World, we may be sure that the Dominions will not lightly be persuaded to regard the first great international instrument, to which they set their independent hands and seals, as a scrap of paper; nor will they willingly close the door through which they entered upon their coveted heritage of equality with Great Britain in international affairs. Their obligations under that covenant were freely undertaken by their responsible ministers, and solemnly ratified by their Parliaments, who regarded the act as their baptism into the community of nations and almost as a sacramental sign of their achievement of international responsibility."[2]

In the League the Dominions exercise a full membership. They are separately represented in the Assembly and have jealously maintainedthe right of an independent attitude. Thus when the British delegate suggested that in a matter affecting the vital interests of the whole Empire, or the vital interest, the independence, or honour of any one of the six nations, there must of necessity be unity of action, the Irish Free State representative

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1. The Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.327.
2. Pollard, The Dominions and Foreign Affairs, History, July 1921, Vol.6.

replied that, while portions of the speech had been construed as applying to the principle of compulsory arbitration and to the Optional Clause of Article 36 of the Permanent Court of International Justice, his Government was making an independent decision thereon. The British delegate at once disowned any intention of speaking for other than his own Government.[1.]

It has been advocated that there be prior discussion among the delegates from the Dominions and Great Britain before the Assembly met, not in any way to derogate from the independence of any member, urged Professor Keith, but merely to recognize the fact that the Empire did exist.[2.] Early in the life of the League Sir James Allen of New Zealand suggested that the Dominions should not enter into direct relationship with the League, but transmit their representations through a Secretariat in London.[3.] This view was generally disclaimed[4.], although one ardent nationalist suggested that a strict observance of the rule that no representations should be made by any member without prior consultation was essential to the welfare of the Empire.[5.] Although there have been great differences of opinion among the several members of the Empire in the League, there has been no effort to co-ordinate the action of the delegates.

It may be that such consultation would arouse the suspicions of the other members who would tend to regard the Empire as a

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1. Baker, op.cit. pp.85-86. Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.492.
2. Responsible Government, Vol.2, p,886.
3. The Times, Apr. 22, 1920.
4. Keith, The Times, Apr.29, 1920.
5. Hall, op.cit. p.343.

solid bloc, but in any case it remains that the fact that the Dominions have been cordially granted, according to their desire, complete freedom in League action, has been a healthy and excellent thing, and has added not a little to the spirit of free companionship which is the heart of the Empire. Moreover, as Mr Toynbee has well said, "At Geneva the several states members of the British Commonwealth were reminded of their unity in the midst of an alien though not unfriendly world of foreign states, whereas at the Imperial Conference in London, at which only states members of the Commonwealth were represented, they were apt to be reminded more of their differences."[1] It may be that co-operation will yet issue from such sentiment.

Further emphasis on the individuality of the Dominions is gained by the fact that Dominion representatives attend League meetings on the authority of their own Governments, not under powers granted on the advice of the Imperial Government.[2] The Dominions have also secured election to the Council, although at the outset this was considered an unlikely contingency,[3] despite the fact that their eligibility for such honour has never been questioned since the formal concurrence at the Peace Conference by Mr Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and President Wilson in the

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1. Toynbee, op.cit. p,53.
2. Keith, J.C.L., op.cit.
3. Responsible Government, p.886, p.892. War Government in the Dominions, p.156; Soward, The Election of Canada to the League of Nations Council in 1927, Can. Hist. Association, May 1929.

the view that the Dominions had the same rights in these matters as any other member of the League.[1]

In all the machinery of the League and in all the rights and obligations that accrue to its members, the Dominions possess full membership in common with other members. In answer to the contention of M. Rolin that the international status of the Dominions resulting from their admission to the League is limited to the purpose for which the Covenant was made, Professor Baker asks, "But what are those purposes? Do they not cover all the vital international relations of the vast majority of the Members of the Society of States? Do they not cover their relations in matters of peace and war, security for their territorial integrity and political independence, the peaceful settlement of all their international disputes, their joint co-operation for the promotion of their common social technical, and economic interests, their joint action for the extension and codification of the rules of International Law - above all, the political and constitutional development of the permanent institutions of the 'organised Family of Nations?"[2] It may be fairly contended that the enlargement of Dominion national life within the League has not been grudgingly acquiesced in by British opinion,

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1. History of the Peace Conference, ed. Temperley, Vol.vi, p,347, art. by Keith. But note: "A further struggle was necessary, again with Sir Robert Borden as protagonist, to secure that the Dominions should be eligible for election to the Council and entitled to be invited to send a representative to sit as a member of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting their interests; it was plausibly contended that the fact that the British Empire was permanently represented on the Council should suffice, but this contention was ultimately overridden..." So it cannot be said that the Dominions lightly won their status. Vide also Toynbee, op.cit. pp.58-60; Baker, op.cit. pp.88-90; Borden, Canada in the Commonwealth, p.112.
2. Baker. op.cit. pp.128-129.

We may, then, regard it as a settled axiom that British opinion was quite determined that, if the Dominions and the United Kingdom remained in the League, each member should enjoy full and equal privileges. On that point there is not the slightest doubt. The doubt that did arise was whether or not the League would disrupt the Empire and whether the members of the latter should also be members of the League. The most popular description of the position of the Empire in the League, was that of a "League within a League." Thus Lord Milner described the relation: "It is certain, I think, that if in international conferences of the future the British Domionions appear as separate members, foreign countries will have to accept the position that that does not prevent them from remaining in a separate distinct, and intimate relationship with the United Kingdom. We have to realise the two things, that they may be members of the League of Nations, side by side with the United Kingdom, and at the same time they have a right to be, as they intend to be, members of a British League of Nations inside the Empire."[1.]

Without a doubt, the Empire has been an inspiration to the League. It has long contended with the problem of ruling backward peoples; of achieving co-operation between races of the west and east; of welding the whole into a defensive league; and of forming commissions and conferences to deal with special problems

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1. The Times, July 10, 1919; sim. the Times, Apr.11, 1919: The British Empire would be, "and in fact it was already, a League of Nations, whether or not it was embraced in a greater League, and possessed a moral unity which that greater League...had still to acquire." The Dominions "were certainly entitled to look forward to a future in which they would themselves be Great Powers. Yet they all desired... to remain within the Empire."

requiring concerted action. The tie which unites the members of the Empire - free co-operation and the principle of equality - is vital also to the League.

Yet there was the danger against which, from the first, British opinion inflexibly set itself, that the Britannic League either be superseded by the League of Nations or disrupted by its requirements. For this reason, when the Irish Free State, acting in accordance with Article 18 of the League Covenant, registered the Treaty of 1921 with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations,[1.] the British Government entered a vigorous protest: "Since the Covenant of the League of Nations came into force His Majesty's Government have consistently taken the view that neither it nor any conventions concluded under the auspices of the League are intended to govern the relations inter se of the various parts of the British Commonwealth. His Majesty's Government consider, therefore, that the terms of Article 18 of the Covenant are not applicable to the Articles of Agreement of 6th December 1921."[2.] The Free State Government seized on the opportunity for a curt rejoinder: "The Government of the Irish Free State connot see that any useful purpose would be served by the initiation of a controversy as to the intention of any individual signatory to the Covenant. The obligations contained in Article 18 are, in their opinion, imposed in the most specific terms on every member of the League, and they are unable to accept the contention that the clear and unequivocal language of that article is susceptible of any interpretation compatible with the limitation which the British Government now seek to read into it."[3.]

1. League of Nations Treaty Series, xxvi, p.10.
2. Ibid, xxvii, p.449.
3. The Times, 16 December, 1924.

It may be considered that the issue, while it remained in this instance unreconciled, may yet be deemed to have been disposed of by the attitude adopted by the Imperial Conference towards the issue of the mode of making treaties which involved the United Kingdom and the Dominions.[1] The Conference passed a resolution which read, "The making of the treaty in the name of the King as the symbol of the special relationship between the different parts of the Empire will render superfluous the inclusion of any provision that its terms must not be regarded as regulating inter se the rights and obligations of the various territories on behalf of which it has been signed in the name of the King. In this connexion it must be borne in mind that the question was discussed at the Arms Traffic Concerence in 1925, and that the legal Committee of that Conference laid it down that the principle to which the foregoing sentence gives expression underlies all international conventions."[2] There are factors which operate to prevent this resolution conclusively disposing of the matter, but the Irish Government appear to have made something of a recantation when their Minister for External Affairs stated that: "There is a special bond between the states of the Commonwealth consisting not in a supreme governmental authority, but in a common King. The exact nature of the relationship outside the common bond of the King is undefined, but it is naturally felt that the League treaties and conventions cannot be taken as applying completely - as to all

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1. The Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.350; Baker, op. cit. p.302.
2. Cmd.2768, p.23.

their articles - between them, as if there was no special relationship whatever. They accord to each other mutual privileges and mutual rights which might easily be disturbed if there was not a general understanding that these treaties and conventions apply among themselves only when special agreements are made between them for that purpose. No inter se clause will in future be inserted in League documents. Nothing on the face of any international instrument will leave room for any other interpretation of their special relationship than that they are under the same King acting in a several capacity."[1.]

There have been many of Mr Zimmern's opinion that in the League the Dominions have given a promise of united foreign policy and concerted action in war that they have refused to give Great Britain, and therefore the League may prove "the deus ex machina of the British Commonwealth."[2.] Possible separation of the Dominions from Britain in time of war Mr Zimmern considered averted, since the League takes on itself to decide on the propriety of peace or war. Canada's position in the League is therefore that, "under the Covenant she is doubly bound - bound to refrain from going to war on her own account(at least for nine months) and bound to take action with her fellow-members in the event of a breach of the Covenant."[3.] So extreme nationalists in South Africa maintained that by entering the League, South Africa had tied herself to the British Empire for ever.[4.]

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1. Dec. 15, 1926, quoted. Cmd.2768 pp.303-304. For further arguments leading to this conclusion vide Sovereignty of the British Dominions, pp.351-352. Also War Government in the Dominions, pp.157-158. Responsible Government in the Dominions, Vol.2, pp.884-886.
2. Zimmern, The Third British Empire, p.63.
3. Ibid, p.61.
4. Pollard, op.cit. Sim. A Canadian Nationalist Quoted R.T., Vol.xvi, p.707: "I do not foresee a major war in which England will be concerned which will not be a League of Nations War as well, in which case we shall be doubly called upon to take part in it."

A difficulty arises with that argument in that the members of the League do not all interpret their obligations under the League Covenant similarly. Thus Canada has tried to reduce to nil her obligations under Article 10 of the Covenant, and the statesmen of Great Britain have several times differed with European statesmen over the interpretation of the Covenant. To the Europeans it has been a binding obligation to go to war under certain conditions, requiring but to be further amplified to make its terms more specific. To the United Kingdom it has meant an ideal for co-operation, expressing moral unity rather than an armed alliance.

Thus British writers have argued that, to be fair and honest with the League and Europe, Britain must throw in her lot with Europe and guarantee European frontiers and European peace in the manner which the Covenant clearly intended. But if she did this, these writers warned that the rest of the Anglo-Saxon world would not follow her. The United States was definitely out, and the Times expressed public opinion pithily: "Of any true League of Nations America must be a member. Without her it might still be a powerful armed alliance, but it would lose half its normal weight...No league of which the United States is not a member can prevent war and effectually discourage aggressive armaments."[1.] More serious still was the fact that the Dominions would not be embroiled in European quarrels and diplomacy unless events assumed such momentous significance that, as in 1914, they could not be ignored.

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1. The Times, Jan.31, 1920.

For two reasons, then, the League was disruptive of the Empire. In the first place, the League, not the Empire, was to become the guardian of the safety of the members of the League. In the second place, a European policy for the United Kingdom would lead in an opposite direction from Canada, who had an American outlook, and Australia, who was so largely interested in the Pacific to the exclusion of all else.[1] It was held that if Italy chose, as a stronger Power, to bully Greece, as a weaker one, over the unascertained facts of a political murder in the Balkans, the outer Dominions would not support Britain in risking a war with Italy on this account.[2] There is really no reason why the Dominions should not, if the League decide with an unequivocal voice that Italy be wrong - as the League did not. The Dominions fought the cause of democracy one - they will do so again if the need arise. It was very clear, nevertheless, that the Dominions were adamant against a policy which would demand from them a constant intervention in Europe, and to this extent the fears of this body of opinion were justified. Thus Mr Merriman had warned, "Start your League and you destroy the British Empire."[3] The need of occasional participation in European affairs was admitted, but, it was argued, "the strength, the prestige, and the hopes of Britain are all Imperial, not Continental."[4] The supporters of the League were rebuked for departing from a proved institution for a theoretical venture.[5]

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1. For the dangers of "regionalism" in British Empire foreign policy vide Dewey, op.cit. Vol.2.,pp.309ff.
2. Curio, The Imperial Conference, Fort.Rev., Nov.1923, Vol.114.
3. Quoted, Jebb, Empire in Eclipse, p.302.
4. Europe or Empire, The Outlook, Mar. 27, 1926.
5. Frodsham, The British Empire and the League of Nations, 19th Cent., Apr. 1919, Vol.85.

There were two schools of thought who opposed the League. Conservative thought, as illustrated in The Morning Post, The Daily Mail, or The Express, saw in the League a Liberal idea which would make Britain an international Sir Galahad, using the British fleet and resources as international police, and who ridiculed such idealistic efforts. Another group was the tariff reform body, who wished the development of the Empire economically. Mr Jebb combined these elements. He wrote that, "The larger purpose of a Britannic trade policy would be fulfilled as it saved the member states from the temptation to seek foreign markets, and induced in each a popular feeling that the Empire was the mainstay of their standards of living and hopes of social betterment. Unless and until such becomes the position and feeling in sufficient degree, of the Britannic states, they will more and more tend to pursue separate foreign policies; perhaps informing each other of what they are severally about, but assuming no collective responsibility. In such circumstances they can never become an effective league, with a common policy, supported by joint diplomacy and joint defence plans; but must await the pressure of actual emergency, as in 1914, which may or may not again find them in agreement as to the merits of the case."[1] If they were given the consciousness of economic interdependence, Mr Jebb considered that the motive towards a common foreign policy would exist.

Mr Jebb had long since protested against the principle of membership by individual states in the League, and had recommended

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1. Jebb, The Empire in Eclipse, pp.298-299.
2. Ibid, Conference or Cabinet? U.E., May 1920, Vol.11.

the reorganization of that body as an association of substantial units based on population.[1] The League might be the only hope of European peace, but not of world peace; Europe must work out her own salvation.[2] He concluded his argument: "Britannic foreign policy should aim at security in the Pacific, where the only visible danger exists; abstention from further commitments in Europe; and withdrawal from the League of Nations (unless a form of associate membership can be arranged) with a view to promoting the interest of world peace by a better mode of international collaboration."[3]

There was a great deal of sympathy with the idea that the British Empire withdraw into something of its former "glorious isolation" and cultivate the friendship of America rather than Europe, intervening only occasionally in European problems when such intervention would be effective and be wholeheartedly supported in Britain and the Empire.[4] "The fundamental moral outlook of the United States and of the self-governing peoples of the British Commonwealth is the same", constituted a frequent argument.[5]

These opposing tendencies were amply illustrated in the efforts of the League and the European statesmen to devise a principle by which the boundaries and rights of nations as set forth by the Peace Treaty might be secured by an alliance or

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1. Jebb, Conference or Cabinet? U.E., May 1920, Vol.11.
2. The Empire in Eclipse, pp.304-305.
3. Ibid, p.307.
4. The Imperial Conference, R.T., Sept. 1923, Vol.13, p.690; also The British Empire, the League and the United States, R.T., Mar.1919, Vol.10.
5. The New Imperial Problem, R.T. June 1923, Vol.13, p.468; or vide Snead Cox and Shane Leslie, The Union of the English-Speaking Peoples, The Dublin Review, June 1917, Vol.161.

solemn compact. Now this should have been consummated by Article 10 of the League Covenant under which the members undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In the case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council should advise upon the means by which this obligation should be fulfilled. Sir Robert Borden led the Canadian Government in an attack on the Article, being desirous that Canada should in an emergency possess the right of private judgment, and he proposed, first an amentdment which would have watered it down to something negligible, and then the deletion of the Article altogether. Finding the latter course impossible the Dominion again strove for amendment, but was not successful.[1.] That the Article may be given the narrow interpretation desired by Canada may, however, be deduced from the fact that the Irish Free State Constitution contained a Clause providing that aggressive warfare be only entered upon when authorised by Parliament and yet that Dominion was admitted into the League after a due examination of its abilities to fulfil the obligations imposed by the Covenant.[2.]

Yet if Continental Powers were in a constantly nervous state over their boundaries, British experience and traditional policy also demanded security in the region of Europe occupied by Belgium and Holland and the Channel coast.[3.] There were two opposing tendencies in Great Britain in determining the method of

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1. Vide Report of the British Delegates to the Fourth Assembly, Cmd.2015, pp.5-8. Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.331ff.
2. Ibid, pp.336-337.
3. Cologne, The Security Pact and the League, R.T. June 1925, Vol.15.

providing security. The Labour Party and many of the Liberals desired an ideal condition whereby all the nations of the world, and at any rate those of Europe, would join in mutual guarantee. They feared that separate treaties would revert to the pre-war conditions of balancing alliances and counter-alliances. The Unionist Party, on the other hand, desired limited commitments, with Britain acting on the principle that the peace of the world could be best safeguarded by each nation providing for its own security by whatever arrangements it could make with other nations.[1] It should not be thought, on the contrary, that the latter group was opposed to the League. But they held that it was essentially an organ to create goodwill, to bring about consultation and arbitration, and not to apply a system of automatic and compulsory sanctions.[2]

In 1919 a Treaty of Assistance had been made with France, but as the United States had refused to ratify it, the Treaty fell to the ground and efforts to resuscitate it proved vain. A Treaty of Mutual Assistance was sponsored by the Fourth Assembly of the League in 1923 which would have imposed arbitration and given to the League the right of determining the aggressor and of requesting from its members military assistance to be placed under the direction of the Council.[3] Prime Minister Macdonald

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1. Jebb, The Empire in Eclipse, p.87: re. the decision emanating from the 1923 Conference "that the League of Nations...was now to be the corner stone of the Empire's foreign policy. Here, indeed was a remarkable departure from the old British tradition, still upheld by the United States, that the foreign policy of the country should be based upon its own interests and, therefore, not to be tied to any altruistic principle, nor to any interest which might some day conflict with its own."
2. Cologne, The Security Pact, and the League, R.T. June 1925, Vol.15, p.451.
3. Cmd.2200, pp.4-9.

found many faults with the Treaty which gave the Council such wide executive powers when its ability to decide upon the aggressor state was so precarious. Nor were the safeguards such as to invoke a feeling of security, while the result might be an effort to establish again a balance of power among nations. He placed much emphasis on the Canadian point of view which objected that the Treaty would in certain of its provisions tend to destroy the unity of the Empire.[1.]

Having rejected the Treaty, Mr Macdonald set about to find a substitute. Under his inspiration, the Assembly of 1924 gave birth to the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.[2.] It was an effort to amplify the Covenant, to define the aggressor State, to compel international disputes to be brought before the League for arbitration, and to form all nations into a defensive league providing for the application of military and economic sanctions.

Before the Macdonald Government could complete their project, they were succeeded by the Conservatives under Baldwin. The League was thereupon asked that time be given to study the Protocol and obtain the views of the Dominions, whom the British member of the Council represented.[3.] The British Government requested the views of the Dominions and suggested a special meeting of an Imperial Conference, but this was found impracticable

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1. Cmd.2200, p.18. That the views of the Dominions carried weight is seen also in Macdonald's speech of Sept.4, 1924, 5th Assembly League of Nations, 6th Plenary Meeting, verbatim Record, p.4; for his views further vide Cmd.2289, p.3-4.
2. Cmd.2273.
3. Cmd.2336, p.14, par.46.

by the overseas Governments.[1] The Dominions were, however, opposed to the Protocol, and the British Government, after full consideration, rejected it.[2]

Mr Dewey says of Canada's action in this connection that she showed "an adhesion to 'Continentalism', a willingness to follow the lead of the United States."[3] Mr Dewey advances a thesis to the effect that Canada is coming more and more under the influence of the United States to the corresponding neglect of Europe, and asserting the solidarity of North American interests. Now there is enough truth in this to make it difficult to refute, but with all deference to Mr Dewey, such insinuations have a mischievous and disheartening influence upon British public opinion regarding the Dominions. Everywhere one hears the view that Canada is completely under the influence of the United States. Yet never was Canada more proud of her individuality than today, of the possession of responsible Government as distinct from the American system, of British connection, and of a distinct Canadian culture. No sane man would deny the influence of the United States upon Canada; of a necessity it must be enormous. Yet it is impossible seriously to study the Dominion and fail to discern a strong Canadian national policy and antipathy to being considered an annex of the United States. The very facts of her great interest in the League and her membership serve to distinguish Canadian policy from that of the Republic. While Canada has in her past history been very close to the United States so that on occasion it appeared that she must be absorbed, at any rate in part, never did Canadian nationality appear so distinctly as it does today.

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1. Cmd.2458, pp.5-8.
2. Ibid, p.17.
3. The Dominions and Diplomacy, Vol.2, p.210; also pp.219-220.

In the instance of the Protocol, for example, all Canada says in this regard is: "We do not consider it in the interests of Canada, of the British Empire, or of the League itself to recommend to Parliament adherence to the Protocol and particularly to its rigid provisions for the application of Economic and Military sanctions in every future war. Among the grounds for this conclusion is the consideration of the effect of the non-participation of the United States upon the attempt to enforce the sanctions and particularly so in the case of contiguous countries like Canada."[1] That is, as the word "effect" would imply, the connotation of the statement is the enormous difficulty of enforcing sanctions when the United States is not a party to the agreement. Australia made practically the same objection as Canada: "To establish a general system of compulsory arbitration to which any powerful States are not parties cannot fail to be a source of danger both to the successful carrying out of the system itself and to the international organization under which it operates. It has been a matter of grave concern always to the Commonwealth Government that certain of the foremost nations of the world have not yet become members of the League of Nations..."[2] New Zealand made a statement to much the same effect.[3] Articles 7 and 8 quite clearly bind a signatory State from making preparations for war "either before the dispute is submitted to proceedings for pacific settlement or during such proceedings,"[4] and would also prevent effective distribution of forces especially those at sea, where mobility is so important,

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1. Cmd.2458, p.18.
2. Ibid, p.20.
3. Ibid, p.16.
4. Cmd.2273, pp.41-42.

the fleet having to remain as it was fortuitously placed in peace.[1] One can see how this would seriously affect Canada or the Australasian Colonies, with their proximity to the United States who is not a signatory and who had such an advantage of geographical position compared with that of Britain, the chief protector of the Dominions.

This consideration of the aloofness of the United States and consequent impracticability of the Protocol found much popularity in Great Britain.[2] There was a great deal of assertion of the unity of Imperial interests and of the necessity of deferring to Dominion desires,[3] while it is most pleasing to discover that, "during the whole period of discussion the British delegation kept in close touch with the Dominion and Indian Delegations, who were consulted on all points of difficulty, and who were given every opportunity of expressing their views."[4]

Having bitterly disappointed Europe in denouncing the Protocol, it fell to Sir Austen Chamberlain to implement the famous Locarno Pact, by which an effort was made to secure European peace by guaranteeing the western frontiers of France, Belgium, and Germany. In virtue of this fact, there was much justice in the criticism of Mr Macdonald that the Protocol had been an

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1. Vide Statement by Austen Chamberlain to the League of Nations, Cmd.2368, p.5.
2. W. Alison Phillips, The Geneva Protocol, Edin.Rev., Jan.1925, Vol.24. The Geneva Protocol: An Analysis, R.T., Dec. 1924, Vol.15, p.58.
3. U.E., Apr. and May, 1925, Vol.16, p.196 and pp.258-259; Statement by Lord Grey in H.L. Debs., 24 July 1924, Vol.58, p.961; Lord Parmoor, Ibid, pp.969-971; Viscount Cecil, Ibid, pp.994-995; Lord Balfour, Ibid, p.1002: "The British Empire goes together or ceases to go at all."
4. Cmd.2289, pp.10-11; also p.16.

effort to establish, not a temporary settlement, but a method of settling grievances, while this Pact dealt only with a specific danger.[1] It constituted a victory for the Tory idea of foreign policy - that a nation could best care for the welfare of the world by caring for itself. It constituted a "regionalist" solution. But incidentally the Pact contained as well the Liberal principle that has been applied consistently throughout the Empire, and which will receive elaboration in a subsequent chapter, that each nation knows what is best for itself. It is significant that Britain only guaranteed the inviolability of Germany's western frontiers, not the eastern frontiers which did not concern her.[2] The Times had been quite frank upon this point: "It must be made very plain that if we join in a guarantee of the West European frontier, it shall not involve us, directly or indirectly, through legal intricacies or through the repercussion of events, in any liability for anything that may happen in those Eastern frontiers where Germany marches with Poland and Czechoslovakia."[3] Mr Amery likewise made this recognition: "We are dealing, first of all...with an area of disturbance which concerns Great Britain much more than it does the rest of the Empire...It is of very great interest to this country that there should be peace in Western Europe,"[4] Consequently it was but

1. Protocol or Pact, Speech Arp.10, 1925, International Conciliation, Docs. for 1925, pp.256-258.
2. Survey of International Affairs, Vol.?, p.53.
3. The Times, July 21, 1925.
4. L.S.Amery, Some Aspects of the Imperial Conference, Journ.R.I.L.A., Jan.1927, Vol.6,pp.21-22. Sim. The Locarno Treaties,R.T. Dec.1925, Vol.16, p.15: "The plain fact of the matter is that public opinion in Great Britain will accept a specific obligation to maintain the general status quo in the West of Europe, but will not accept the obligation to intervene automatically in disputes relating to Eastern Europe because hostilities about them spread to the West, except on the basis of the merits of the case."

just that Article 9 should read: "The present treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the British Dominions, or upon India, unless the Government of such Dominion, or of India, signifies its acceptance thereof."[1.]

The Round Table expressed its view that the Dominions ought not to have signed any Rhineland guaranty pact; Great Britain's effort to establish territorial security in Europe was primarily Great Britain's business, and to try to run the Empire on the basis that no step in foreign affairs should be taken unless the signature of all its six members had been obtained would paralyse its foreign policy altogether.[2.] There was general recognition in the House of Commons that the United Kingdom could not forever hold its hand in foreign policy to await the consent and co-operation of the Dominions, and statements were made stressing the need of appreciating differentiating between matters of local and Imperial concern.[3.] Sir Austen Chamberlain stated that no man more than his father's son desired to pursue a policy not merely in close consultation with, but in full harmony and accord and agreement at every stage with the Dominion Governments. That had not been possible in the present case without jeopardising the peace of Europe.[4.]

The criticism of the policy of the Government in the House of Commons was none the less severe from the Imperial point of view. Mr Lloyd George and Mr Macdonald were decidedly nervous lest the Pact mean a European policy for Britain and an American

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1. Cmd.2525, p.13.
2. The Security Pact, R.T., Sept.1925, Vol.15, p,657.
3. Mr Duff Cooper, Mr Hurd, and Mr Soverville, H.C. Debs., 18 Nov. 1925, Vol.188, pp.460-461; p.483; p.499.
4. Ibid, p.521.

policy for the Dominions. General Smuts provided them with ammunition, and his criticisms had a deep influence on British opinion. On one occasion he said, "I confess I am profoundly suspicious, not only of the Pact, but also of the policies behind the Pact. It is said that the Pact contains no more than the Covenant of the League of Nations. Then why not be satisfied with the Covenant?...But in truth there is more in the Pact, or rather behind the Pact. The Pact, like its predecessor, the Protocol, tends to stereotype and entrench the settlement under the Peace Treaties far more than the Covenant does. It will encourage the diehards of the Peace Settlement to stand more pat than ever. The peaceful reform of intolerable arrangements will, in fact, become impossible; and Europe will be lured to destruction by a false sense of security and solidarity. Far rather let Europe grope its way painfully to the light, and a new international atmosphere gradually arise under the aegis of the League. ..An equally grave view must be taken of the Pact from another aspect. It is proposed that under the Pact, Great Britain shall dissociate herself from the Empire and, in a matter of cardinal foreign policy, take a line of her own, leaving the other constituent States of the Empire to decide their own policies. Under the circumstances I feel certain that at least some of them will not follow her. As one who believes in the British Empire as the greatest human institution on earth, I cannot acquiesce in this departure with equanimity. The Pact may well become a turning-point, a fatal parting of the ways in the Empire. British statesmen who adhere to the new Holy Alliance may yet find that they have not only fatally dissociated their country from

the progressive forces in new Europe, but that they have cut the heart out of the Empire. Why not imitate Canning? Why not go forward to the uncertain future hand in hand with the young nations of the Empire rather than with the spectres of Europe? Not only as a citizen of the Empire but as a good European I have a rooted distrust of the Holy Alliance."[1.]

The British Government is subjected in this speech of General Smuts to unjust criticism: they made a good effort to obtain consultation and co-operation; they found themselves faced with the necessity of giving Europe a sense of security; and they acted in their own interests as the Dominions have always done. Sir Robert Borden, however, likewise expressed his concern over those commitments which purported to involve Britain alone,,and while he was ready to believe that they might have been necessitated by considerations of the peace of Europe, he was confident that they did not tend to the ultimate unity of the Commonwealth.[2.]

"The truth is," said one journal, "that as a nation and as an Empire we have reached the parting of the ways: either we must regard ourselves as a European State and be content to lose our Dominions in the process, or we must concentrate upon Imperial problems and leave Europe to settle its own affairs.. In a close understanding with the Dominions on such questions as overseas settlement lies the solution of many of our social and economic problems, while Locarno would do nothing for our surplus

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1. The Times, July 13, 1925. Vide also The Times, Nov.12, 1925, fear that "the tendency will be for the British Empire Delegation to disappear from the field of diplomacy."
2. Borden, The Imperial Conference, Journ.R.I.I.A., July 1927, Vol.6.

population save to whiten the battlefields of Europe with its Bones."[1.]

There was some attempt to prove that only secession could prevent the effect of foreign policy undertaken by the British Government falling upon the whole Empire, and that the clause exempting the Dominions from liability in any action consequent upon the Pact was quite useless. The Dominions could only gain such immunity by declaring their status as sovereign states and thus the Pact was definitely an anti-Imperial move.[2.]

It was also argued that the inclusion of the exempting clause gave the Dominions the right of neutrality, for they had long enjoyed the right of passive belligerency and such a clause was, therefore, not necessary.[3.] With deference to Mr Jebb who supported this theory, one can hardly bear him out in this, for the statement of an existing constitutional relationship within the British Empire does not mean a new relationship, as the Conference of 1926 so largely proved. There was general satisfaction in the United Kingdom that the Dominions would join in the cause of peace, especially since they were bound by the Covenant of the League so that their obligation would be even greater than in 1914 when they were not found wanting.[4.]

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1. Europe or the Empire, The Outlook, Oct.2, 1926. Sim. Sir Hamar Greenwood, The Overseas Empire and Foreign Affairs, U.E., Jan. 1926, Vol.17.
2. Nat.Rev., Jan.1926, Vol.86, p.648; E.P.Hewitt, The Locarno Gamble, Nat.Rev., Jan.1926, Vol.86; The Imperial Conference, The Outlook, Oct.23, 1926; The Next Imperial Conference, R.T., Mar.1926, Vol.16, pp.234-236.
3. Jebb, Can the Empire Stand? The Outlook, Oct.16, 1926; The Empire in Eclipse, p.114.
4. De Montgomery, Pax Britannica, pp.155-163; Sir Halford Mackinder, The English Tradition and the Empire, U.E., Dec.1925, Vol.16. Balfour, H.L. Debs., 24.xi.25. Vol.62, pp.845-847; sim. Haldane, ibid, p.848.

To the argument that in a war the Dominions would be morally free,[1] it could be pointed out that Mr Mackenzie King had sent a message of congratulation to Sir Austen Chamberlain on his "epoch-making achievement",[2] that the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand likewise expressed approval[3] and that the Dominion Prime Ministers at the Conference of 1926 homologated a resolution unanimously congratulating "His Majesty's Government in Great Britain on its share in this successful contribution towards the promotion of the peace of the world."[4]

The great criticism was advanced from the point of view of lack of co-operation, a failure to co-ordinate policy within the Empire. It was on this score that Mr Ramsay Macdonald attacked the Government's policy.[5] Mr Macdonald's criticism might have been tempered by two considerations. In the first place the abortive Anglo-French convention of 28 June 1919 provided that, "the present treaty shall impose no obligation on any of the Dominions of the British Empire unless and until it is

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1. Sir Frederick Dutton, Equality in Theory and in Practice, U.E. Feb. 1926, Vol.17; U.E. Dec.1925, Vol.16, pp.733-734.
2. U.E. Jan.1926, Vol.17, p.2. The Times, July 14, 1925 for the Canadian attitude to the Locarno Pact: "It is understood that any suggestion to have the Dominion unite with Great Britain to guarantee the security of France has been coldly received... But this must not be taken as evidence of an understanding with the United States or as indicating any desire to have the policy of Ottawa conform to that of Washington. It does mean that the Canadian Government want to keep a free hand and to have decisions made from time to time as the need arises by the Canadian Government and Parliament."
3. Leading Article, The Times, July 21, 1925.
4. Cmd. 2768, pp.28-29.
5. H.C. Debs. 18 Nov. 1925, Vol.188, pp.444-445. Sim. Haden Guest, ibid, p.488.

approved by the Parliament of the Dominion concerned."[1] Consequently this Treaty did not establish a precedent in committing the United Kingdom but not the Dominions. In the second place, there had been some suspicion, justifiable or not, that, "Had Mr Macdonald remained in office, his enthusiastic advocacy of the Protocol would have been forced upon the Dominions," a step which "would have had a profoundly and possibly most serious reaction upon the Dominions."[2]

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1. Art.v. Responsible Government, Vol.2, p.881.
2. Hughes, The Splendid Adventure, pp.254-255.

Chapter V : Foreign Relations Outside the League of Nations.

At the Imperial Conference of 1907 Laurier stated the principle that lies at the root of Responsible Government: "I believe that if the basis of the union which now binds the British Empire remains as it is now, a proper and always permanent recognition of the principle that every community knows what is best for itself, then we cannot go wrong, and our deliberations must be fruitful."[1.] This principle has been applied to every detail of Dominion affairs. When Baldwin and Howe made a plea for responsible self-government in Canada they conceived of it as confined to internal affairs, and Durham in his report excepted the constitution of the form of government, the regulation of foreign relations and of trade, and the control of crown lands, from Dominion jurisdiction. But acting on the principle that "every community knows what is best for itself", slowly but surely every vestige of direct control by "Mr Mother Country" has passed away. Responsible Government has meant an evolution in giving advice to the Crown. In the passing of real control from the British to the Dominion Governments, however, an effort has been made to retain co-operation in those matters which are of common interest and call for joint action.

This differentiation has appeared to British opinion in the two well known guises of "national" and "group" matters and "active" and "passive" belligerency. The former distinction was made by Mr Hall, but it is unsatisfactory in that it

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1. Cd.3523, p.7.

connotes a sort of compulsion to regard certain matters as demanding group action, and under it the Canadian attitude with regard to the Lausanne Treaty and the position of the Dominions in the League become inexplicable. The second distinction meant that the Dominions could only be involved in active operations by their own determination, but the fault here is that no true distinction can be made between the two positions of "active" and "passive" belligerency. An enemy constitutes himself a menace by belligerent actions however small, and it would be impossible for a Dominion not to lean to one side or the other in the questions of trade, internment of ships, or some other similar action of hostility. But if one takes the distinction that is involved in responsible government, with each Government master in its own house but uniting to form the British Empire of which it has been so splendidly said, "Free institutions are its life-blood. Free co-operation is its instrument. Peace, security, and progress are among its objects...And though every Dominion is now and must always remain the sole judge of the nature and extent of its co-operation, no common cause will, in our opinion, be thereby imperilled,"[1] - if this distinction and definition be accepted - then the fine united action of the War, the common membership in the League of Nations, and the post-war policy in Imperial foreign and domestic policies, become as clear as daylight. The groping of opinion towards this consummation will be studied in several outstanding particulars.

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1. Cmd.2768, p.14.

The Peace Treaty.

The War proved conclusively the strength of the contention that when the Dominions contributed sufficiently to the cost of defence in brains, material, and men, they would have a voice in the control of that defence and a recognition of the status warranted by their sacrifice. In other words, the difficulty in the way of Dominion development in foreign affairs did not lie any more in British Toryism than in lack of colonial development; equality of status could only come with equality of responsibility. Not that Britain has not been difficult at times, but that there is much to be said for the view that the Dominions must first prove their capability before taking over responsibility is an apparent proposition. It is true of all parent-child relationships - if the child be deformed or intellectually incompetent, the parent as a matter of course continues the guardianship; if the child normally develops, the parent relaxes control, and it is the most indulgent parents who have the most badly behaved children. Parents are rarely perfect, generally are conservative, and generally open to criticism, but rarely are they visited with such abuse and such absence of praise as that accorded Great Britain by the Dominion nationalists.

Mr Dewey inclines to the view that "prior to the War Mr Borden had definitely assumed the Imperialist position, but had received little encouragement from the Home Government", and that "Mr Borden's declaration of policy and subsequent

efforts to secure admission of the Dominiosn to partnership in foreign affairs had been unavailing."[1] The implication that the Mother Country was to blame for his failure is quite difficult to understand. Borden's efforts were unavailing against the Canadian Senate and Laurier, but they found much sympathy as we have seen in the ears of British opinion and authorities. Mr Dewey would have us believe that every victory of Dominion nationalism was a hardly-won concession, grudgingly given, and leaves little place for generosity on the part of British statesmen and writers. This is a popular belief, but there are reasons to doubt its accuracy.

In connection with the War, for example, as early as 1915 the Imperial Government formally assured the Dominion that they would be consulted in the decision of the terms of peace.[2] British writers led the way in making this demand. Professor Keith, however, is somewhat reticent when making the proposal that the Dominions should be definitely recognized by their separate representation by plenipotentiaries at the next Hague Conference or similar Conferences <u>because of the reluctance of Sir Wilfrid Laurier to advise in these matters</u>.[3] He suggested that the Dominions might be represented at a Peace Conference by advisers of the British plenipotentiaries, or as members of the British delegation acting on the rule that the final decision would rest with the Imperial Government. Or it might be possible that they should act as plenipotentiaries to represent the King on

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1. Dewey, op.cit. Vol.ii, pp.1-6.
2. War Government in the Dominions, p.146.
3. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p.289: the italics are mine.

behalf of the Dominions as was suggested in connection with the Hague Conference, but when there were the wishes of so many allies to consider, and so many conflicting aims to be reconciled, it might be better to allow the Dominions merely to be represented in an advisory capacity.[1.] There was no more positive view in 1915. One writer stated that, "Nothing has been said, so far as I am aware, by responsible statesmen in the Dominion indicative of a desire for separate representation in a Peace Conference. If any such demand has been or were to be urged I should desire emphatically and categorically to dissociate myself from it. The British Empire will take its place in the Peace Conference as a unity. All for which I have pleaded, all that the Dominions desire is, that the British plenipotentiary should go into conference as completely cognisant of the minds of His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions as of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. This he can only do if he has been in personal contact and consultation with responsible Ministers from the Dominions."[2.] Even the Round Table publication, which has never been held to be of liberal mind regarding the development of the Commonwealth, strongly urged that the Dominions be called for the purpose of concluding peace to a "personal consultation, round a table", although there must be no separate representation and unity must be maintained by the plenipotentiaries being responsible to a single government so that the Dominions could only send advisers.[3.] Mr Hughes relates that

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1. Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp.364-365.
2. J.A.R. Marriott, A Family Council, 19th Cent., May 1915, Vol. 77. Cim. F.A.W. Gisborne, The Next Imperial Conference, Emp.Rev. Aug.1915, Vol.29.
3. The Dominions and the Settlement, R.T., 1915, Vol.5, p.325ff.

the British Government did not contemplate at this period the direct, full, and equal representation at the Peace Conference which the Dominions later achieved.[1] That is true; it would have been amazing prescience had they foreseen it.

On the occasion of the Parish Economic Conference "the people clamoured...for a Dominion representative on the British Delegation."[2] As the Prime Minister of Australia was the only overseas Prime Minister in Great Britain, it might be misunderstood if he were allowed to act as a Dominion delegate, and Asquith hoped thus to escape a difficult situation. The popular demand nevertheless prevailed, and the delegation was composed of two British representatives and two Dominion representatives, Sir George Foster of Canada having been prevailed upon to come over. On the delegation, the Dominions asserted no little independence.[3]

The Imperial Government apparently considered that prior consultation was all that was essential to obtaining Dominion views on the Peace Treaty and that the War Cabinet meetings of 1917-18 had satisfied these requirements, for the Fourteen Principles enunciated by President Wilson as the basis for peace terms were accepted without consulting the Dominions, an oversight that led Mr Hughes, who was available for consultation at the time, to make a strong protest.[4] Sir Robert Borden put effective pressure on the British Government and gained the right

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1. Hughes, The Splendid Adventure, p.93.
2. Hughes, op.cit., p.43.
3. Ibid, pp.43-44.
4. The Times, Nov.8, 9, 14, 15; Sir Robert Borden, The Times, Nov. 14, 1918; Vide, War Government in the Dominions, pp.146, 147; The Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.315.

of individual representation of the Dominions at Versailles.[1] At first it was assumed that the representation of the British Empire would be governed by the panel system, but Canada obtained adoption of the principle that the Dominions be accorded representation similar to that of the smaller allied Powers. However, the methods of the Peace Conference provided for two groups of negotiators, those with general and those with special interests. As members of the British Empire delegation, the voices of the Dominions were effective in advising Mr Lloyd George who framed his policies after consultation with them, and at the Plenary Sessions of the Conference the Dominions had a voice equal to that of the Minor States. In all the machinery of the Conferences the Dominions enjoyed a full recognition of the part they had played in the War. It would appear that Mr Lloyd George was quite in accord with the independent representation of the Dominions, one suggested reason for his attitude being that such representation was of value to him in offsetting the weight of the United States.[2] Sir Robert Borden records of the Peace Conference, "It affords me the highest satisfaction to declare that in our advance along that path the Dominion Ministers received from the British Prime Minister and his colleagues complete sympathy and unwavering support from first to last."[3]

The unity of the Empire was maintained beyond a doubt. As one of the Dominions Prime Minister reported, there was "the realisation that we could not afford to quarrel, for none of us...

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1. Borden, Canadian Constitutional Studies, pp.116-118; pp.159-160.
2. F.W. Eggleston, Imperial Unity and the Peace Treaty, Quart. Rev., Apr. 1921, Vol.235.
3. Canada in the Commonwealth, p.94.

standing alone, could do one-tenth as much for the peoples we represented as we could by united action."[1] The very vigour with which the Dominions pressed their claims showed that they considered that they had, not only the weight of their own Dominions behind them, but the command of the whole power of the Empire.[2]

The question of signing the Treaties has been the subject of much more controversy.[3] The general opinion was that, while the Dominions beyond a doubt enhanced their personalities in signing the treaties, yet two facts in that signature quite adequately preserved the unity of the Empire. In the first place, the treaties were signed by the plenipotentiaries of the United Kingdom for the Empire as a whole, and the Dominion and Indian delegates signed on indented lines for their respective countries, thus manifesting their special interests. In the second place, it was a Dominion Prime Minister who said that, "The Dominion Prime Ministers signed for the Dominions on behalf of the King... But whereas the Prime Minister of Britain signed for Britain on behalf of the King because he had tendered His Majesty advice to

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1. Hughes, op.cit. p.106.
2. Eggleston, op.cit.
3. The matter receives a most thorough discussion in Keith, The International Status of the Dominions, J.C.L., 1923, Vol.5; The Constitution, Administration, and Laws of the Empire, p.44; War Government of the Dominions, p.155ff.; Responsible Government in the Dominions, pp.880-882; Baker, The Present Juridical Status of the British Dominions in International Law, p.67ff; Corbett and Smith, op.cit., pp.64-65; Moore, The British Dominions and Treaties, J.C.L., 1926, Vol. 8; Lewis, The Treaty-Making Power of the Dominions, B.Y.I.L. 1925, Vol.6. Rolin, Le Statut des Dominions, Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparée, 1923, Vol.3.

that effect, the Dominion Prime Ministers attached their signatures for quite a different reason. They signed on behalf of the King because, and only because, the Prime Minister of Britain had advised His Majesty that they should do so. If Mr Lloyd George had not tendered such advice, the Dominion representatives would not have been authorised to sign the Treaty on his behalf. They could not tender advice to the King..They could not approach the King officially on this or any other matter, except through the Governor-General of their Dominion...Every act is done in the name of the King, who can only be advised by his Ministers."[1.] With this view Professor Pollard[2.] and most other British opinion were in complete agreement.

There are those who would have it appear that the Dominions were separate signatory parties to the Peace Treaty as Sir Robert Borden desired.[3.] The answer can only be that they were doubly bound - bound to "passive belligerency" by the signature of the British delegates in the event of action arising from the Treaty, and to "active belligerency" by the aignature of their own delegates.

Professor Keith, while pointing out that internationally such things received scant consideration, yet "that the separate signatures, and the separate ratification resolutions passed by the Dominion Parliaments, were of highest importance from the British constitutional view is obvious.[4.] That is, within the

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1. Hughes, op.cit., pp.114-116.
2. Pollard, The Dominions and Foreign Affairs, History, July 1921, Vol.6.
3. Baker, op.cit., pp.74-80. Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations, p.193.
4. The International Status of the Dominions, op.cit. p,164.

Commonwealth of Nations the Dominions had taken a long stride towards nationhood. But if that were so, it was equally a true observation that unity in foreign policy could only be retained by consultation,[1] the machinery for which was hopelessly inadequate.

Diplomatic Representation of the Dominions at Foreign Capitals.

The question of diplomatic representation of the Dominions at foreign capitals bears out the proposition stated at the beginning of this chapter. The purpose of the innovation was to advance Canada more nearly to a position where she might look after the things that concerned herself. In 1920 the friction regarding the supply of pulp-wood led Canada and the United States to feel that the roundabout method of negotiation through British authorities was unsatisfactory.[2] It was not a new suggestion that the Dominions send her own diplomatic representative to Washington. It had been advanced by Edward Blake in 1882, by the Marquis of Lorne in 1885,[3] and before and during the time of Laurier there had been a considerable feeling that such a procedure was advisable.[4] Laurier had found it "a necessity because of the development of the larger Colonies of the British

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1. Vide Lord Grey, The Law Times, 22 Oct. 1921, Vol.152, p.263.
2. The Times, Apr. 29, 1920.
3. Lorne, Imperial Federation, pp.57-58.
4. Borden, Canadian Constitutional Studies, pp.122-124; Brady, op.cit., p.321.

Empire, which had practically become nations" that "Consuls should be allowed semi-diplomatic recognition."[1] There was further preparation of the public mind by the establishment of a Joint International Commission in 1909[2] and the Canadian Mission in Washington during the War, both of which bodies performed valuable diplomatic functions.

Nor was the innovation supposed at the outset to be a radical one. A statement by Mr Bonar Law would show this: "As a result of recent discussions, an arrangement has been concluded between the British and Canadian Governments to provide more complete representation at Washington of Canadian interests than has hitherto existed. Accordingly it has been argued that His Majesty, on the advice of his Canadian Ministers, shall appoint a Minister Plenipotentiary, who will have charge of Canadian affairs, and will at all timesbe the ordinary channel of communication with the United States Government in matters of purely Canadian concern, acting upon instruction from and reporting direct to, the Canadian Government. In the absence of the Ambassador, the Canadian Minister will take charge of the whole Embassy and of representation of Imperial,as well as Canadian, interests. He will be accredited by His Majesty to the President with necessary powers for the purpose. This new arrangement will not denote any departure, either on the part of the British government or of the Canadian Government, from the principle of diplomatic unity of the British Empire."[3]

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1. Can.H.C., Dec.1910, quoted Borden, op.cit., pp.127-128.
2. Canadian Year Book, 1926, pp.971-972.
3. H.C. Debs., 10 May, 1920, Vol.129, pp.205-206. A similar statement in the Canadian House of Commons, Journ.Parls. Emp., 1920, Vol.1, pp.476-477.

There was some nervousness in the United Kingdom regarding the arrangement,[1] but it was slight. The Times did not think the decision work a leading article. The Round Table expressed no alarm, although it foresaw some confusion should all the Dominions follow Canada's example.[2] The United Empire was entirely complacent and saw with some surprise that the only criticism came from Canada: "on this side there is approval only."[3] The approval was doubtless based largely on the thought that the Canadian Minister would merely mean "an improved administrative arrangement for the better handling of the same diplomacy... At Washington the Canadian Minister will be the colleague of the British Ambassador, not an independent plenipotentiary, and it is essential that they should work in the closest and most confidential co-operation."[4] There was no expectation that the two representatives would have equal status.[5] The fact that the Canadian Minister would take the place of the Imperial Ambassador made it appear clearly that the former was intended as something of an assistant selected on the grounds of his special knowledge of Canadian conditions. Nor was it contemplated that the departure would mean the establishment of Canadian representatives in other capitals where similar intimate relationships did not exist as between Canada and the United States.

The other Dominions, however, were quite unwilling to be

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1. H.C. Debs., 1 June, 1920, Vol.129, pp.1776-1777.
2. Representation of Canada at Washington, R.T. Dec. 1920, Vol. 11, p.156.
3. U.E. June, 1920, Vol.11,p.274.
4. Corbett and Smith, op.cit., pp.184-186.
5. Vide War Government in the Dominions, p.173.

represented by Canada,[1] and when Ireland sent a representative in 1924[2] to Washington, this arrangement became impracticable.[3] In consequence some alarm was expressed lest the system lead to the creation of seven diplomatic services,[4] and the Times urged that the powers of the Irish Free State representative be closely defined.[5]

In Canada it would appear that there had been no intention on the part of the innovators to create separate diplomatic services. Thus Mr Rowell, one of the strongest advocates of the scheme, wrote that, "It is urged, by way of objection, that Australia and the other Dominions will wish to follow our example. If the conditions were the same there could be no reasonable objection to their doing so, but the conditions are not comparable and never can be comparable."[6] In fact, the Opposition demanded

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1. For Australian objections and opinion on the innovation vide The Times, May 21, 1924; Hughes, The Splendid Adventure, pp.283-290. New Zealand denied herself the right of following Canada's example: vide letter of Sir Francis Bell quoted R.T., 1921, Vol.12, p.226: "The Dominion of New Zealand does not assume authority to communicate directly with the Government of the United States or of any country other than Great Britain, and it is an invariable rule that communications from any foreign country to the Government of New Zealand must be in the form of communications to the Government of Great Britain, which, according to its discretion, communicates with the Government of New Zealand and obtains from the Government material to enable His Majesty's Government to reply to the foreign Government."
2. The Times, Apr.14, May 8 & 9, June 14, 1924.
3. For Borden's objections to this arrangement being disapproved, vide Canada in the Commonwealth, p.98.
4. ex. Sir Geoffrey Butler, H.C.Debs., 29 July 1924, Vol.176, pp.2026;2028.
5. June 17, 1924.
6. Rowell, The British Empire and World Peace, pp.190-191. Sim. Borden, Journ. Parls. Emp. 1920, Vol.1, p.482.

assurance that the Government was not contemplating an imperialistic move, for Mr Curtis had held that the Dominions could not have diplomatic representatives unless they were responsible to an Imperial Parliament.[1] Mr Lemieux did not wish that Canada should link up her affairs with those of the United Kingdom in the way the arrangement intended. He uttered again the typical Laurier dictum: "Do not let us meddle in the affairs of the Mother Country, and the Mother Country will let us govern ourselves."[2]

The arrangement by which the Irish Free State representative was accredited to the United States provided for co-operation and unity in Imperial policy, it being stated in the correspondence that the arrangements proposed by His Majesty's Government would not denote any departure from the principle of the diplomatic unity of the Empire. The Irish Minister would be at all times in the closest touch with His Majesty's Ambassador, and any question which might arise as to whether a matter came within the category of those to be handled by the Irish Minister or not would be settled by consultation between them. In matters falling within his sphere the Irish Minister would not be subject to the control of His Majesty's Ambassador, nor would His Majesty's Ambassador be responsible for the Irish Minister's actions.[3]

Professor Keith found grounds for Imperial unity in the fact that the formal authority for the issue of the letters of credence rested with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

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1. Rowell, op.cit., pp.482-483. For further Canadian opinion vide The Times, May 12 & 19, 1920.
2. Journ. op.cit., p.484.
3. Cmd.2202, p.20, Sir Esme Howard, June 24, 1924, to the Secretary of the United States.

on whose advise the letters were ultimately issued. The primary advice inevitably was that of the Dominion Government, but the British concurrence was an essential part of the plan to omit which would be to render the whole unity of the diplomatic representation purely illusory. In it lay the essential connexion between the British Ambassador and the Dominion Ministers at those courts where they had been appointed. They stood alike in the eyes of the foreign States because they represented the same King and Governments which acted not in casual, but in an effective and necessary unity.[1.]

At the outset it was intended that group questions, would fall within the province of the British Ambassador, the Dominion Minister being solely confined in his duties to purely local matters,[2.] but that idea has been departed from. Mr Mackenzie King again stated the modern Commonwealth doctrine: "It is conceivable that in some cases the foreign affairs of one part of the Empire will intersect the arc which relates to the foreign affairs of another part of the Empire. In that event one would assume that the obligation with reference to what is held common would be a joint obligation that the two representatives, or more if there are such, would carry out in trusteeship, in co-operation with each other, and after consultation."[3.] To the success of the arrangement Sir Esmé Howard has borne testimony.[4.]

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1. Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.448.
2. Cmd.2002, op.cit.; "Matters which are of Imperial concern or which affect other Dominions in the Commonwealth in common with the OIrish Free State will continue to be handled as heretofore bythis Embassy." sim. Lewis, Status of the British Self-Governing Dominions, B.Y.I.L., 1922-23.
3. The Times, May 30, 1928.
4. The Canadian Legation at Tokyo, The Times, June 13, 1928.

The Washington Conference.

Whereas the United States had not signed the treaties of peace which had recognised the individuality of the Dominions, and had protested against the League Covenant in that the Dominions were given separate votes, it was not surprising that no separate invitations were accorded the members of the Commonwealth of Nations aside from the United Kingdom when the Disarmament Conference was convened at Washington in 1921.[1.] The British Government, recognising the extreme importance of having the Dominions with great Pacific interests represented, arranged for an Empire delegation in which they enjoyed distinct representation. Sir Robert Borden was quite satisfied with the treatment accorded at Washington which he considered to be practically the same as that at Paris from both a foreign and Imperial point of view. There was full discussion in the Delegation, occasionally strong differences of opinion, but always a unanimous decision was reached, and the Dominion delegates were recognized as "representatives of distinctive international entities."[2.] Professor Keith pointed out that on the contrary at Paris the Dominions had been assigned distinct representation at Paris which had been witheld at Washington,[3.] the British Empire Delegation being regarded as a unit.[4.] This had been the difference between the views of Smuts and Borden.[5.] The former contended for an internation recognition of

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1. Keith, quoted, U.E. Vol.12, p.552; The Sovereignty of the British Dominions, pp.386-387.
2. Borden, Canada in the Commonwealth, pp.113-115.
3. The Sovereignty of the British Dominions, pp.387-388.
4. Journ. Parls. Emp. 1923, Vol.4, pp.25, 336, 567, 907-910.
5. Op.cit. Also Canada: Status of the Dominions and the Washington Conference, R.T. Dec. 1921, Vol.12, pp.168-169.

the distinct personality of the Dominions by separate invitations while the Canadian statesman was satisfied that the Empire should arrange its own mode of representation. New Zealand, at any rate, was quite positive that the Empire was regarded at Washington as an inseparable unit.[1.]

Despite such sources of friction, the occasion served to reveal a wonderful co-operative faculty among the members of the Empire. In this matter of common concern an absolute unity was maintained, and the British Government had much to do with the unanimity that prevailed.

The Chanaq Incident.

In this most unhappy incident, the interpretation of which has been distorted to prove on occasion the lack of unity within the Empire and the right of the members to remain neutral, emerges the distinction between national and group questions, the right of self-government and parliamentary supremacy in each separate part of the Empire, and the urgent need for co-operation and consultation.

The War had been fought and won together, the Versailles Treaties had been signed and the Imperial Conference of 1921 brought to an end. The statesmen throughout the Empire were still engaged in making speeches on the new status of equality

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1.Sir John Salmond's Report and debates in the New Zealand Parliament, Journ. Parls. Emp., vol.3, pp.873-887; New Zealand: Dominion Status and the Washington Conference, R.T. Dec. 1922, Vol.13, pp.220-230.

that had been gained by the Dominions. Never again would the Mother Country alone commit the Empire to war; the voice of the Dominions would henceforth be effective in moulding Imperial foreign policy. Yet while the orators were still speaking and congratulating one another on the parts they had played in leading the Dominions to these new dignities, the British Government made public a request for Dominion support, moral and military, in the event of war succeeding the serious crisis that existed at Chanaq regarding the position with Turkey.

In a telegram of September the Dominions were asked for assistance in the event of the crisis turning into conflict. New Zealand particularly, but Australia as well, were willing to co-operate. South Africa did not reply until the crisis was past. But Canada, through Mr Mackenzie King, replied that only the Canadian Parliament could sanction such action, and, if conditions warranted, a special meeting of Parliament, at present prorogued, would be called. The crisis passing, the British Government did not request such action.

The position was undoubtedly a humiliating one for the Dominion Governments. That the public should be aware of the crisis before the Government, that the Government should know little or nothing of the previous policy and be unable to state how great the need was or whether it had arisen through mismanagement or wise and firm action, - the fall was doubly embarrassing after the pride of a few hours ago.[1] The release of the information to the Press seemed like a sharp trick to force the

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1. Vide The New Imperial Problem, R.T. June 1923, Vol.13, p.485.

hand of the Dominion Government, and in the explanation given for this action, the British Government did not deny that it had intended to release the information to the Press before the question had been considered in the Dominion cabinets.[1] The Canadian correspondent of the Round Table severely criticised Canada's hesitation, asserting that the situation was sufficiently well known and the Canadian Government should have been prepared.[2]

While Australia was not unwilling to assist in any action necessary to secure the safety of the Suez Canal which was so largely dependent on the Dardanelles, yet the general feeling was opposed to war and anxious to invoke the good offices of the League of Nations.

The opinion in Great Britain was critical of Mr Lloyd George's publication fof the communique.[3] It was a blunder rather than wrong. The interpretation placed on the event by certain writers roused some alarm. Mr Zimmern stated that, "For the first time a member of the British Commonwealth claimed the right to decide for itself whether it should go to war or remain neutral when Great Britain was involved in hostilities."[4] Nearly every authority refutes this idea of neutrality on the part of any member of the Empire.[5] Mr Amery, Secretary of State for

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1. Hughes, The Splendid Adventure, pp.243-244.
2. R.T., Dec.1922, Mar.1923, Vol.13, p.394; pp.176-177.
3. The Near East, R.T. Dec. 1922, Vol.13, pp.18-20. Asquith, The Times, Oct. 7, 1922; Grey, H.L. Debs., 23 Nov.1922, Vol.52, pp. 18-19; Bonar Law, quoted Dewey, op.cit., Vol.2, pp.131-132.
4. Zimmern, The Third British Empire, p.34.
5. Corbett and Smith, op.cit., pp.89-90; Baker, op.cit., p.330ff; pp.229-230; Hall's International Law, Pearce Higgins ed. and rev. by, 8th ed. p.35; Keith, Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.454ff, etc.

the Dominions, declared that, "There is the fact that no subject of the King can be a friend of the King's enemies, or in other words neutral in the strict sense of the word."[1] Mr Mackenzie King made statements showing plainly that he was of the same opinion.[2] True Hertzog has made statements which would imply neutrality[3] and the Pact to Renounce War concluded outside the auspices of the League of Nations, has strengthened the idea of the possibility of Dominion neutrality,[4] but it is doubtful at present that, in the event of a war the justice of which was as apparent as in 1914, the response would not be as astonishing and as wholehearted as it ever has been. The position asserted at Chanaq was the Laurier position, so reiterated by that nationalist, that the Canadian Parliament must decide for Canada.

The Halibut Treaty.

Again in the negotiation and signature of the Halibut Treaty the distinction between questions of national and general interest received striking application.

The questions immediately at issue had to do with the title and the signature of a Treaty which involved as principals Canada and the United States for the preservation of the halibut

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1. Amery, Some Aspects of the Imperial Conference, Journ.R.I.I.A., Jan. 1927, Vol.6, p.17.
2. Journ. Parls. Emp. 1924, Vol.5, pp.328-329.
3. The Times, Mar. 9, 1928.
4. Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.469.

fishery of the North Pacific Ocean.[1] According to the correspondence,[2] on January 3 Lord Byng, Governor General of Canada, wrote to Sir Auckland Geddes requesting the substitution of the words "Dominion of Canada" for "Great Britain" as one of the signatories of the pact and that Mr Lapointe should sign for Canada. After further messages of January 25, 30, and February 12, he elicited a reply from Sir Auckland that he had sent a message to Mr Hughes, the American Secretary of State, in which he had omitted to substitute the words in the title as requested. Mr Dewey considers that had this title been accepted it would have given full force to Mr Ewart's contention that a "Kingdom of Canada" should be established and have raised difficult legal points.[3] The argument is difficult to understand since the Treaty is entitled "A Treaty Between Canada and the United States of America..." etc.[4] In the American Treaty Series the title is "Convention between the United States and Great Britain...etc."[5] but in the Smuggling Convention the title, "between Canada and the United States",[6] is employed.

Lord Byng further wrote enquiring as to the signatories to the Treaty, and Sir Auckland Geddes replied that he understood that the Canadian Minister of Marine would be given full powers to sign with him. The Duke of Devonshire corroborated this advice. Lord Byng then telegraphed to Sir Auckland Geddes: "My Ministers are of opinion that as respects Canada, the signature by Mr Lapointe will be sufficient, and that it will not

1. Cmd.2377, 1925, signed Mar.2, 1923.
2. The Times, March 19, 1923.
3. Dewey, op.cit. Vol.ii, p.140.
4. Cmd. 2377.
5. Am.Journ.Int.Law, 1925, Vol.19, p.106.
6. Ibid, p.120; sim. p.122, Boundary Treaty.

be necessary for you to sign as well."[1] Two days later the reply came back, "I have been instructed by His Majesty's Government to sign the Treaty in association with Mr Lapointe." It is evident that in the next five days Lord Byng corresponded with the British Government, and evidently they concurred in the decision of the Canadian Government else an awkward impasse would have been reached.[2] The Canadian Governor-General wrote the British Ambassador, "My Ministers are of the opinion that as respects Canada, the signature of Mr Iapointe alone should be sufficient, as it affects solely Canada and the United States."

The end of the incident was not yet. The United States Senate ratified the Treaty subject to the understanding "that none of the nationals or inhabitants or vessels or boats of any other part of Great Britain shall engage in the halibut fishery contraru to any provisions of the Treaty."[3] That is, as Sir Auckland Geddes pointed our, the scope of the Treaty was being widened to embrace the Empire as a whole instead of Canada alone. The Secretary of State for the United States referred to the Treaty as being signed by Great Britain and hoped that the British Government would accept it subject to the understanding expressed by the Senate. The British Government judiciously replied that it would try to prevent the infringement of the terms by any British subject,[4] and the Canadian Government strongly protested against such interpretation, so the United States quietly dropped their reservation.[5]

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1. The Times, op.cit.
2. Vide, J.A.R. Marriott, Empire Foreign Policy, Fort.Rev., 1923, Vol.113.
3. The Times, Mar.21, 1923.
4. Jebb, The Empire in Eclipse, p.66.
5. The Times, Oct. 29, 1924.

Professor Keith put to one side as of little moment the matter of the signature. Full powers could be issued by the King only on the advice and responsibility of the Imperial Government. The negotiation of the Treaty took place with the full approval and knowledge of the Imperial Government, and the conclusion by formal signature only followed upon full consideration by both Governments. It was true that the Dominion Government could rest assured that when it desired the issue of full powers they would be granted and ratification would be accorded unless some question of general import to the Empire was involved which would demand the summoning of the Governments of the Empire to discuss the issue. But Dominion independence in treaty-making was wholly incompatible with the maintenance of the Empire. The principle of signature by the Canadian Minister alone had really been conceded to Sir Robert Borden with regard to diplomatic representation at Washington in 1920.[1.] These formal signatures had never meant anything of value, Professor Keith considered, as the real control was exercised through the issue of powers and ratification, and the decision to dispense with it was manifestly wise.[2.]

The Times, bravely whistling to keep up its courage, agreed with Professor Keith and opposed the suggestion that there had been any exercise by Canada of a separate independent treaty power, but its nervousness was obvious, nevertheless.[3.] There

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1. sim. Borden, Canada in the Commonwealth, p.125; "The contention that this incident created a constitutional landmark is quite unfounded."
2. The Times, Mar. 19, 1923; The International Status of the Dominions, J.C.L., 1923, Vol.5.
3. Ibid, March 22, March 13, 1923.

was some support for the view, expressed by Professor Keith, in Canada.[1]

However when Mr Hurd attempted to elicit a statement from the Prime Minister on this point, Mr Law was quite evasive and would only reply that the plenipotentiary signed as the result of an agreement between the two Governments.[2]

In the Canadian House of Commons, when Mr Meighen asked upon whose recommendation would His Majesty act in authorizing the execution of a treaty by the appropriate Dominion representative, Mr King gave a startling reply when he was able to quote the answer given at the Conference of 1923 by Sir Cecil Hurst to a similar query. "I gathered," said the Prime Minister, "I think rightly, that the interpretation which the Foreign Office placed upon the matter to which my right honourable Friend just refered is this, that the Government of the Dominion which was tendering the advice in such a case was the Government that was responsible; that it was advising His Majesty directly in regard to treaties which were of sole concern to the Dominions; that in the transmission of that advice the British Government was acting as the channel through which that advice was transmitted, but was not the Government which was formally tendering the advice." It was merely a temporary convenience to have such a "central agency."[3] Professor Keith adhered to his former exposition of the event that the responsibility of endorsing the advice was Imperial.[4] Professor Baker supported the statement

1. J.S. Willison, A Treaty and a Signature, The Canadian Hist.Rev. 1923, Vol.4, p.148.
2. H.C. Debs., Mar.8, 1923, Vol.161, pp.713-714; Ibid, p.2088.
3. Journ. Parls. of the Emp., 1924, Vol.5, pp.330-331.
4. Responsible Government, p.900.

made by Sir Cecil Hurst as being a true interpretation of existing conditions, on the ground that he was not speaking for himself, but for the British Government; that his view was accepted by the Prime Ministers of the other Dominions in the presence of Lord Curzon; and that it was an interpretation of a resolution of responsible Governments contained in the Treaty Resolution of 1923.[1.] To this it might be replied that Sir Cecil was speaking impromptu to a question raised in discussion, and could not be said to be speaking for the British Government any more than a member of the House in debate might be so speaking for the Government; that there had been statements of equality made at the Conferences of 1907 and 1911 which no one attempted to take at full value; and that the resolutions of 1923 in regard to treaty-making were capable of many interpretations.

Both Sir William Harrison Moore and Sir J.A.R. Marriott were inclined to agree with Professor Keith, but neither was willing to treat as of negligible importance the fact that formal signature by the British Ambassador had been waived.[2.] The former raised some interesting points. Could Great Britain accept a position in which the British Ministers might even be the formal instruments for the making of treaties adverse to British interests or to the interests of the other parts of the Empire? If the British Government acted merely <u>pro forma</u> as the instrument by which the King's Full Powers issued to a Canadian plenipotentiary to sign the Treaty, it must be conceded the right to make representations to the United States in the interest of

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1. Baker, op.cit. p.196.
2. Marriott, Empire Foreign Policy, Fort.Rev., 1923, Vol.116, Moore, The Dominions and Treaties, J.C.L., 1926, Vol.8.

say Great Britain or Newfoundland, and to use diplomatic pressure to prevent the conclusion of a Treaty which the King has given authority to make. In reply it might be said that unless good sense and toleration with co-operation between the various parts of the Commonwealth all play their respective parts, the community of nations is doomed to drift apart, but there is no reason to be so gloomy over the cause of democracy as that. Sir William, accepting Rehm's exposition of organized state unions which had matters of local concern not affecting the whole,[1.] adopted the view that the Empire was for the purposes of peace and war a single State and not a confederacy or alliance. Therefore, if the Dominions were in diplomatic relations with the foreign Power (as the Irish Free State or Canada at Washington), claims and complaints based on the treaty might be exchanged between them. But if no settlement were arrived at, there might come the stage of demand when the matter must pass into the hands of the British Government "charged with the general relations of the Dominion and representing it in peace and war...At this stage this Government must accept the obligation or liability, whatever it is found to be, as its own."[2.] There are two points which might be made here. In the first place, Britain should no more assume liability for Canada's independent action than Canada should or does for the independent action of Great Britain. Nor should Great Britain, under the modern conception of Empire government, be charged with the general relations of the Dominion. The relations of the Empire as a whole are a matter for the consideration and responsibility of the Empire as a whole, and that, which is done by one part alone can only impose obligation on that part alone.

1. Quoted, Walther Schucking, The International Union of the Hague Conferences, 1918, p.23.
2. Ibid., op.cit. p.35.

It may be of import that, not in the Halibut Treaty but in later ones, the words were inserted that the plenipotentiary was acting "in respect of the Dominions of Canada".[1] Sir William Moore says of this form that "something more is intended than the identification of the area of operation. Canada is conceived of as a political community and (in the light of the resolutions of the Imperial Conference of 1923) there is the implication that that political community is an entity, a whole, capable of holding rights and owing duties towards a foreign Poer." He decided that there was a decided advance, for now Canada had alone the rights and obligations arising out of the Treaty. Any liabilities arising out of the Treaty must be borne by Dominion not British revenues.[2]

Dr Lewis, also, challenged Professor Keith's view that the mode of signature did not alter the international character of the instrument, since it bound, not the Empire as a whole, but merely one of the component parts.[3]

Probably the greatest point that might be made in regard to the signing of the Treaty and the scope of its jurisdiction, was not how it was done but the importance attached to it in the Dominions, and they certainly seemed to feel that a great change had taken place.[4]

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1. Boundary Treaty of Feb. 24, 1925, Cmd.2510; Convention to regulate the Lake of the Woods, Feb.24, 1925, Cmd.2511; Convention re. Smuggling, June 6, 1925, Cmd.2512; Convention re. Extradition, Jan. 8, 1925, Cmd.2513.
2. Thus avoiding such cases as those mentioned by Forsythe's Cases and Opinions, pp.406-407, The Creole.
3. Lewis, The Treaty-Making Power of the Dominions, B.Y.I.L., 1925, pp.33-34.
4. Dordon, however, in The Dominions and Foreign Relations, Can. Bar. Rev. Nov. 1925, Vol.3, takes Professor Smiddy to task for saying that the diplomatic unity of the British Commonwealth had become very largely formal. He appears to agree with Professor Keith.

The Imperial Conference, 1923.

The Conference of 1923 is noteworthy as enunciating certain principles upon which Mr Mackenzie King claimed to act in regard to the Treaty of Lausanne, and the resolutions do argue for the theory of Imperial relations developed in this chapter.

It was determined regarding the negotiation of treaties that it was desirable that no treaty should be negotiated by any of the Governments of the Empire without due consideration of its possible effect on other parts of the Empire, or, if circumstances so demand, on the Empire as a whole. Before negotiations were opened with the intention of concluding a treaty, steps should be taken to ensure that any of the other governments of the Empire likely to be interested were informed, so that, if any such government considers that its interests would be affected, it might have an opportunity of expressing its views, or, when its interests were ultimately involved, of participating in the negotiations. In all cases where more than one of the governments of the Empire participated in the negotiations, there should be the fullest possible exchange of views between those governments before and during the negotiations. Dominions not represented should be kept informed. Bilateral treaties imposing obligations on one part of the Empire only should be signed by a representative of the government of that part - thus was the policy pursued in the case of the Halibut Treaty vindicated. If obligations were imposed on more than one part of the Empire the treaty should be signed by one or more plenipotentiaries on behalf of all the governments concerned.

In the ratification of treaties the existing practice should be maintained. The procedure then was that the ratification of treaties imposing obligations on one part of the Empire was effected at the instance of the government of that part. When obligations were imposed on more than one part of the Empire ratification was effected after consultation between the governments of those parts of the Empire concerned.[1.]

The general view was that the Conference was negative in its results, the resolutions destroying without building, while their vagueness left the way open for future difficulty.

The Empire and the U.S.S.R.

In the year 1924 the Labour Government of the United Kingdom recognised the Soviet Government without consulting the Dominions. There were two points which arose for discussion when Canada proceeded to accord a separate recognition to the Soviet Government. Could Canada formally recognise the Soviet when the British Government refused recognition? The answer to this question probably lay in the affirmative, inasmuch as the recognition would be partial and not binding on the rest of the Empire.[2.] The second point was whether recognition by the British Government involved recognition on the part of the Dominions.

In the Dominions there was some difference of view. Mr Bruce, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, protested that the

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1. Cmd.1987, pp.14-15.
2. Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.385.

principles of consultation were not carried out and was assured that no precedent would be established.[1] He would thus seem to imply that Australia was bound by the action of the British Government. However, the Sun and the Melbourne Argus did not share his views.[2] Mr Massey also feared with the Argus that the tendency would be for each part to adopt a separate foreign policy.[3]

In Canada the Acting-Prime Minister, Hon.G.P. Graham, was undertain in how far Canada was bound, "but in relation to the question of trade they were doing business on their own hook."[4] Mr Mackenzie King re-stated his doctrine of responsible Government. The Canadian Government would take its own position in regard to the Soviet Republic, just as they would take their position in regard to anything else. When Great Britain took a certain position in an international matter, the Dominion Government might, for the same reason, take a similar position, but so far as the question of whether or not Canada in any particular matter affecting its own people and their relations with other countries was concerned, they would exercise in those matters the same rights as the Parliament of Great Britain would exercise in relation to their people and their relations to other countries. "I took the position," he said, "at the Imperial Conference, that Canada had matters of foreign policy which were pretty largely exclusively of her own concern... and that it was for us to decide those questions and to act on our own initiative.

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1. Journ. Parls. Emp., Vol.5, 1924, p.785.
2. The Times, Aug. 13, 1924.
3. Ibid.
4. Journ. op.cit., pp.332-333. This Mr Bruce agreed with, Ibid, p.786.

That point was never disputed, never questioned for one moment."[1] When, however, in 1927 the British Government broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet[2] and Canada took separate action, the Canadian Government admitted that the termination by the British Government might also have terminated its application to Canada.[3]

In the United Kingdom attention was drawn to the fact that the Treaties were concluded between Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the one hand and the Union of Soviet Republics on the other, the Crown not appearing. The explanation given by the Government was that the British signatories signed in virtue of full powers given under the sign manual in the usual form. There were numerous precedents for omitting the name of the Sovereign in international engagements, concluded under full powers and requiring ratification. The precedent was followed particularly in this case as it was convenient to make it between Governments, the Soviet Union having no individual head of the State.[4] The elimination of the Crown and the lack of consultation, however, suggested to certain critics that the rest of the Empire was not bound.[5]

Professor Keith severely criticised the tendency of the British Government to override Dominion rights without consultation, but he held that their action clearly bound the Dominions and that the action of Canada might be regarded as neither

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1. Journ. op.cit. pp.341-342.
2. Vide Anglo-Russian Relations, 1925-1927, Survey of International Affairs, 1927, pp.256-257.
3. Canada: The Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement, R.T., Sept. 1927, Vol.17.
4. H.C. Debs., 2 Oct. 1924, Vol.177, p.301.
5. Nomad, The Dominions and the Anglo-Russian Treaty, U.E. Sept. 1924, Vol.15. pp.537-539; The Russian Treaties, R.T., Sept. 1924, Vol.14, p.684.

necessary nor effective, but in the light of an assertion of the necessity of due consultation and an effort to remedy the irregular action of the Imperial Government in binding the whole Empire without securing the assent of its several parts.[1] With this view there was general agreement.[2]

Again the two points emerge, that there was a dire lack of unity and consultation between the members of the Commonwealth and that the principle of responsible government must be applied to foreign affairs.

Treaty of Lausanne and the Dominions.

That the 1923 Conference was inadequate was revealed by a most unfortunate misunderstanding regarding the Treaty of Lausanne which Treaty was a sequel to the Chanak incident. It had been hoped that the Conference would accommodate nationalism with unity, but clearly the former had gained the day.

On October 27, 1922, Canada was advised that a Treaty would be concluded to replace that of Sevres. Each of the interested Powers would be represented by two plenipotentiaries, Britain delegating the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the High Commissioner at Constantinople. The Dominion Governments would be kept informed of the general lines of policy and of the course of negotiations, and they would be invited to sign the

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1. Notes on Imperial Constitutional Law, J.C.L., 1925, Vol.7, p.106; Responsible Government in the Dominions, pp.906-907.
2. ex. Baker, op.cit. p.207.

new Treaty and any separate instrument regulating the status of the Straits.[1] The Canadian Government replied that the extent to which Canada might be held bound by the proceedings of the Conference or by the provisions of any treaty arising out of the same was a matter for the Parliament of Canada to decide, and that the rights and powers of the Canadian Parliament in these matters must not be held to be affected by implication or otherwise in virtue of information with which it might be supplied.

A further exchange of telegrams failed to put the British Government at their ease; they knew something was wrong but could not put their finger on the spot. Finally the Duke of Devonshire re-stated the position as it appeared to him. The Treaty would be binding on the whole Empire when ratified and he wished the Paris precedent followed to include signatures on behalf of all the Dominions. Mr Mackenzie King gave un unequivocal reply. The Peace Treaties had embodied four distinct, separate, and essential stages; 1. Direct representation of Canada at the Conference at which the Treaties were drafted and participation in the proceedings by Canadian representatives armed with full powers issued by His Majesty upon the sanction of a Canadian Order in Council. 2. Formal signing of the treaties on behalf of Canada by the plenipotentiaries. 3. Approval by the Parliament of Canada of these treaties thus signed. 4. Assent of the Government of Canada to the final act of ratification by His Majesty.. In the Conference at Lausanne a like procedure had not been followed with regard to representation and participation by Canada which had been regarded as evidence that, in

1. Cmd.2146, p.3.

the opinion of the countries by whom the invitations were extended, Canada would not have been assumed to have direct and immediate interest. As each stage in procedure was so necessarily dependent upon the stage following, it was difficult to see how in the circumstances Canada could be expected as respects the signing of any treaty resulting from the Conference to adopt the same procedure as in the case of the Versailles. The Treaties were signed, consequently, only by the British plenipotentiaries.

The issue was not closed, however, for Mr Thomas, having succeeded Devonshire as the Labour Party took office, telegraphed the Canadian Government requesting an early ratification of the Treaty and Conventions in question, the other Dominions having concurred in ratification.[1.] Mr King then launched his thunderbolt. The Canadian Government, not having been invited to send a representative to the Lausanne Conference and not having participated in the proceedings of the Conference wither directly or indirectly and not being for this reason a signatory to the Treaty on behalf of Canada, did not feel in a position to recommend to Parliament approval of the Peace Treaty with Turkey or the Convention thereto. Without the approval of Parliament they felt that they were not warranted in signifying concurrence in the ratification of the Treaty and Convention. However, they did not take exception to such course as His Majesty's Government might deem it advisable to recommend. This course was believed to be in harmony with the recent Imperial Conference.[2.]

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1. Cmd.2146, p.9, Feb.22, 1924; Mar.21.
2. Cmd.1987, pp.14-15.

The criticism of the Canadian attitude issued almost entirely from a misunderstanding of the Candian attitude. The Times could not understand how Canada could contend that the Treaty was not binding on the Dominions: "Is Canada at war with Turkey?" The position assumed was probably an astute political move for, "he accepted without protest the British arrangements for negotiations with the Turks. We now know that he objects to them or at least has a grievance about them."[1] Mr Macdonald regretfully stated, "If it had been known right from the beginning that the Dominions really objected to what was proposed, then it would have given the Government of the day an opportunity of reconsidering its decision."[2] Sir Edward Grigg proposed an amendment requiring full consultation with the Dominions and their consent before proceeding with the Bill arising out of the Treaty.[3] He held that it should be the first principle of British statesmanship to avoid putting the Dominions in a dilemma, in which they would either have to enter war by the decision of the British Government or else to declare their neutrality and secede from the Empire.[4] "They must have a voice just as we claim a voice; their Parliaments must be able to decide just as this Parliament decides." Professor Herbert A. Smith tried to establish the thesis that war and peace were both states of fact, and therefore it did not require a treaty to end a war. "Theoretically this doubtless leaves it possible for one

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1. The Times, June 7, Apr. 9, Mar.27, 1924.
2. H.C. Debs., 6 June 1924, Vol.174, pp.1647-47; vide also MacNeill, ibid, pp.1629-30.
3. H.C. Debs, 1 Apr. 1924, Vol.171, p.2025. Mr Ramsay Muir supported him, pp.2042-2043.
4. H.C. Debs., 6 June, 1924, Vol.174, pp.1618-1624.

part of the Empire to be in fact at peace while another is at war."[1] If the Dominions claimed the right of repudiating British international undertakings, then the unity of the Empire was gone, concluded another writer.[2] He wished a permanent consultative Committee to confer concerning all foreign affairs in order to arrive at unanimity. Another commentator could not see what there was, in the nature of things, to prevent all the parts of the Empire being represented by two plenipotentiaries or by one for the conclusion of international agreements even intimately concerning each part. The circumstances might easily be such, as at Lausanne, that multiple delegation would imperil success. It was an every day practice in partnership that a single agent might represent different entities.[3] The suggestion was excellent, but such representation would have to be made by agreement and consultation, as determined at the Conference of 1926.

It had been assumed by certain British writers when negotiations began that the Dominions had been invited to send plenipotentiaries.[4] Yet these same writers failed to see the issue involved: "A refusal on the part of the Dominions to join us in accepting such obligations cannot, while the Empire lasts, absolve them from the consequences of any action which our obligations may force us to take. So far as active participation goes, their discretion is real, but if our obligations commit us to a state of war, they will be committed to a state of war, whether

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1. The Times, June 7, 1924.
2. H.F. Wyatt, The Empire's Future, Combination or Separation, Eng. Rev., July 1924, Vol.39.
3. Corbett and Smith, Canada and World Politics, pp.94-95.
4. "The Near East", R.T. 1922, Vol.13, pp.19-20.

they participate or not."[1] Nevertheless the fact that "Great Britain should calmly arrogate to herself the right to settle everything and expect the Dominions to sign on the dotted line" was clearly "asking for trouble."[2]

The real fact of the matter was that there was a complete misunderstanding of the theory upon which the Canadian Liberal Party was basing its Imperial and Foreign relations. "We have never stated," said the Canadian Prime Minister, "that the Lausanne Treaty would not bind the whole Empire...We have never questioned the fact that when the Treaty was signed it would bind us. When His Majesty the King declared war, Canada was brought into war as a result of the declaration, and, when the King ratified the Treaty, Canada will be brought out just as she went into war by the action of the Sovereign without any consultation with our Ministers in that regard."[3] But his contention was that before Canada could be committed to active obligations she must be consulted at every stage of treaty-making - issue of full powers, negotiation, signature, and ratification. As it was, Canada had been presented by a fait accompli in the matter of British representation. As Canada had held that the Halibut Treaty was a matter for her personal concern, so it was assumed by Canada that the United Kingdom did not regard Canada directly interested in the Lausanne negotiations or resulting agreements. Interest, representation, ratification, and obligation went hand in hand.

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1. Should We Guarantee a European Settlement? R.T., June 1924, Vol.14, p.498.
2. Imperial Diplomacy, R.T. Sept. 1924, Vol.14, p.655.
3. Journ. Parls. Emp., 1924, Vol.5, pp.328-329.

Canada must decide when any obligation arose out of the Treaty what share of those obligations she should assume. Professor Baker considers that the distinction of national and group questions breaks down on this occasion since this was a matter of peace and war in which the whole Empire should have been associated.[1] In point of fact the distinction is merely emphasised. The Canadian position was that this was a matter personal to the United Kingdom, or at least so considered by that Government in their arrangements for negotiation. Had it been otherwise, Canada would have enjoyed complete equality with Great Britain.[2]

There were other points that could be taken into consideration as counting for the British Government. The French Government objected strongly to Dominion representation, claiming similar representation for her colonies if they were admitted representatives. But even then representatives could have been chosen by the Empire without enlarging British representation. It could also be claimed that Canada showed a non-co-operative attitude, as well as making her position obscure. As Mr Meighen argued, the Government might have said that, if Canada had no direct representation, they would not sign and would not ratify.[3] Yet Canada had pursued a course entirely consistent with the theory upon which the British Empire stands today, and the criticism that Canada was intractably non-co-operative is somewhat dispelled by the fait accompli of the British representation.

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1. Baker, op.cit., pp.280-281.
2. For an appreciation of this, B.G.De Montgomery, Pax Britannica p.117.
3. Journ. Parls. Emp. op.cit., p.509.

One writer was of the opinion that the resolution of the Conference of 1923 and the Lausanne Treaty did not represent the last word on the subject. He saw the emergence of new constitutional conventions emphasizing the international status of the Dominions.[1.]

The London Conference.

The London Reparations Conference of July and August 1924 again gave Mr Mackenzie King an opportunity to insist on the requirement that the Dominions be represented in the negotiation of any agreement in which they were to be actively involved. While he failed to gain adequate consultation or representation, he did succeed in making his position clearer to a Labour Government which showed quite plainly by their attitude to the Dominion Government that Labour did not understand the constitutional position of the Dominions.[2.] It might have been thought that great care would have been taken to avoid any misunderstanding with the Dominions. The British Government had the experience of Lausanne behind them. In the Debates in the House of Commons they had their attention drawn on several occasions to the need

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1. Lewis, Treaty-Making Power of the Dominions, B.Y.I.L., 1925, pp.42-43.
2. Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.397: "The Labour Government had shown immediately on entering office a complete disregard of the Dominions by recognising the Russian Government without consultation, and doubtless in their anxiety for a financial settlement they decided that Dominion views must be treated as of second-rate importance."

for consulting the Dominions and arrang for their representation.[1]

On July 17 Mr King gave the Canadian Parliament an outline of the correspondence regarding the Conference. The first intimation that the Government had of any intention to hold such a Conference appeared in the newspapers of June 24,[2] which also stated that ~~of~~ the British Prime Minister had intimated that he was in communication with the Dominions regarding representation at the Conference. On June 29 the Government received a formal communication from the Prime Minister of Great Britain intimating that the inter-Allied Conference would be held in London of representatives of the different Dominions with His Majesty's Government to arrange for representation of the Dominions at the Conference. The Dominion Government agreed to ask their High Commissioner to meet other British representatives at the preliminary Conference In order that there be no mistake about the Canadian position, it was desired that representation should accord to the terms of the Resolution passed at the last Imperial Conference and should follow the precedents set at Versailles and Washington, whereby each Dominion would be represented by its Delegate bearing full powers from His Majesty to act in the name of the King in respect of the Dominion. However, "It appeared at that preliminary Conference that its purpose was not so much to arrange for separate representation of the Dominion as to inform the Dominions of the nature of the representation which had already been decided upon." It was there intimated that it would not be possible for more

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1. Lloyd George, H.C.Debs., 6 June 1924, Vol.174, pp.1637-1638.
   Mr Ormsby-Gore, H.C.Debs., 14 July, 1924, Vol.176, pp.13-14.
2. Journ. Parls. of the Emp., 1924, Vol.5, pp.730-731.

than three representatives of the British Empire to be present at the inter-Allied Conference and the despatch suggested that the three in question would necessarily be members of His Majesty's Government. The Canadian Government replied that this would not be satisfactory to the Dominion, but that the Canadian Government would expect, in accordance with the Versailles and Washington precedents, that a Canadian representative with full powers from His Majesty in respect of Canada should represent them as a member of the British Empire Delegation. Attention was drawn to the fact that the internal organisation of the British Empire Delegation was a matter for the British Empire to decide, and that it was none of the affair of other nations as to the manner in which representation was arranged within the Empire. The British Government thereupon suggested the panel system which would enable one Dominion representative to be present each day. This proposal the Canadian Government accepted. In consequence, the Dominions had one member in three at the Conference, and the other representatives were allowed to be present and become fully acquainted with all the discussion and work of the Conference, while the British Empire Delegation met daily.[1]

Another unfortunate incident occurred due to the fact that the British Government thought the High Commissioner was advising his Government of the preliminary Conference, and he thought the Colonial Office was attending to the task, so that some matter was published before coming to the Canadian Government. Mr Meighen drew the attention of Mr King to this in the course of the debate, and the latter, irritated beyond measure by a

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1. Journ. op.cit. pp.731-734.

repetition of an old offence, bitterly criticised the British Government for allowing such procedure.[1.]

The system of Dominion representation received some criticism in the British House of Commons. Mr Thomas explained that the plan adopted was a special one for that particular Conference and was not to be regarded or quoted as a precedent.[2.] Mr Amery maintained that all the members of the Empire should have been held equal, and subjected to the panel system. The United Kingdom should not have been exempt. He also advocated a continuous working of the British Empire Delegation, or, short of that, a special agent appointed by each Government who would keep it informed which would relieve the Imperial Government of odium for tardiness.[3.] Mr Lloyd George thought it not so much a matter of machinery as of consultation and co-operation.[4.] The interests of the Dominions, however, were so comparatively small that they might easily acquiesce in the matter of representation,[5.] especially since no precedent was to be established.

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1. Journ. op.cit. pp.734-735. For explanation of Mr Thomas, H.C.Debs., 18 July 1924, Vol.176, p.751.
2. Ibid, p.750.
3. H.C. Debs., 29 July 1924, Vol.176, pp.1981-1982.
4. Ibid, pp,1984-1989.
5. Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p.398.

Efforts to Obtain Co-operation.

The need for machinery to attain Imperial co-operation in foreign affairs had become uncomfortably obvious, and since it was desired also to obtain unity in working out problems of domestic interest to the Empire, the Labour Government decided in 1924 to make an effort to improve matters.[1] The difficulties of the present system were stated. Immediate action was rendered extremely difficult especially between Conferences, on occasions when such action was imperatively needed, When matters under discussion were subjects of political controversy conclusions reached at and between the Imperial Conference were liable to be reversed through changes of Governments. It was perhaps possible that the resolution on negotiation passed at the 1923 Conference might be revised with a view to considering how far it needed to be supplemented and interpreted to apply its principles more practically to foreign relations. In order that public opinion be more adequately represented at the Conferences, it was suggested that the Oppositions in Parliament be represented, although the objections to this procedure were noted. At any rate, there could be no harm in inviting suggestions. Mr Macdonald's own views were that the time had hardly come to revive the idea of a special Constitutional Conference or to call a special meeting of the Imperial Conference, but a meeting of two qualified representatives of each country concerned might be a possible method to further discussion of the questions raised.[2]

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1. Cmd.2301.
2. Ibid, pp.5-6.

Canada disparaged the idea of a representation of the Opposition, but was willing to co-operate in a preliminary examination of the problems.[1] South Africa frowned on the whole idea, but finally under pressure from Mr Thomas was persuaded to agree to a preliminary examination.[2] Australia alone of the Dominions gave a constructive reply. It was believed that the machinery for arriving at a common policy lay in the Conferences and no alteration of the existing practice appeared wither necessary or desirable. There must be no alteration in the underlying principle of consultation which existed at present, but the machinery could be improved. The Dominions could establish a Foreign Office Branch in their High Commissioner's Offices, the officer controlling such a branch enjoying the confidence of the Foreign Office and keeping his Prime Minister informed in regard to current events and atmosphere in connection with foreign policy. The Imperial Government might give fuller and more regular advice by cable and mail than was at present the case. Greater efforts should be made to anticipate questions which were likely to arise and require urgent decision, with a view to ascertaining the views of the Dominions in advance of informing them of decisions after they had been arrived at or acted upon, or when it was too late for any alternative action to be submitted. With regard to questions other than foreign policy, the establishment of a permanent Imperial Secretariat responsible to the Prime Ministers of all the self-governing parts of the Empire would go a long way towards solving the problem of effective and continuous consultation. It would also embrace the existing Committees

1. Cmd.2301, pp.12-13.
2. Ibid, pp.17-19.

such as the War Graves and Shipping and the Imperial Economic Committee when established. At the present time immediately the Conference was over the Secretariat was broken up and no effective machinery existed for keeping the Dominions continuously informed of developments or alterations necessitated by changed circumstances. "We are of the opinion," concluded the Australian dispatch, "that the British Government should give greater consideration to the considered views of the Dominion Governments than in the past, otherwise all our efforts towards effective consultation and formulation of common policy will be futile."[1.]

When Mr Amery in the Unionist Government succeeded Mr Thomas he terminated the correspondence as fruitless. His action met with approval in Great Britain as it was felt that such efforts must be ineffective.[2.]

The Imperial Conference of 1926 amplified and made clearer the statements of the preceding Conference of 1923 regarding the external relations of the British Empire. Again was the doctrine enunciated, that any policy which might involve the other members of the Empire must have their full consent and participation in implementing the policy. The governing consideration underlying all questions of foreign policy, said the Balfour Committee, must be that neither Great Britain nor the Dominions could be committed to active obligations except with the definite assent of their own Governments.[3.] There was also a statement of equality and independence in external relations so far as was consistent with the existence of the Commonwealth - "autonomous

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1. Cmd.2301, pp.8-11.
2. U.E., Vol.16, Feb.1925, p.67.
3. Cmd.2768, p.26.

communities,...in no way subordimate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations."[1] Professor Keith has shown this part of the Report to be subject at that time to qualifications, and most of it had been uttered previously, but the Report meant that at last British opinion was forced to realise clearly the goal of the Commonwealth. "What it does mean", said Mr Amery in a typical speech, "is that each partner in the Empire is entitled to exercise every function of national life, and if any such function is carried on for it by some other part of the Empire, that is a matter of comsent. of convenience, of mutual arrangement, and not evidence of subordination on the part of one partner in the Empire to another."[2]

The Balfour Committee appreciated the inadequacy of their Report. They also saw the great need for further machinery for co-operation. A resolution introduced in the Report stated that the Governments represented at the Conference were impressed with the desirability of developing a system of personal contact, both in London and in the Dominion capitals, to supplement the existing system of inter-communication and the reciprocal supply of information on affairs requiring joint consideration.[3]

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1. Cmd.2768, p.14.
2. Amery, Some Aspects of the Imperial Conference, Journ.R.I.I.A., Jan.1927, Vol.6.
3. Cmd.2768, p.27.

The Ideal Commonwealth of Nations in Modern British Opinion.

Speaking on a very grave Imperial problem, one of the men most responsible for the modern Commonwealth told the British House of Commons, "Plain good intention, which is as easily discovered at the first view, as fraud is surely detected at last, is, let me say, of no mean force in the government of mankind. Genuine simplicity of heart is an healing and cementing principle."[1] In the period, reviewed in this thesis, however Tory British opinion may have been, at least it has been frank in regard to its intentions. There has been a refreshing openness and little whispering to justify the suspicions of Dominion nationalists. They have been able to face candid opinion with a different philosophy of Empire. But the Dominions have not been without sympathy in the United Kingdom, nor have the advocates of closer Imperial relations in the United Kingdom been without their sympathizers in the Dominions. When British writers and statesmen are accused by Dominion nationalists of lacking in vision, what is generally meant is that the former have seen the advantages of union in contrast with the disadvantages of completely separate nations. As advocates of constructive Dominion nationalism, Professor Keith and Mr Jebb ranked infinitely higher than any Dominion contemporary. At the same time it may be said that Dominion nationality, especially in the international sphere, has been won rather than granted. Firm, definite,

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1. Burke, Conciliation with the Colonies, Speeches, p.276, ed. Fox. 1816.

action has been required on the part of Dominion statesmen, but they have not found the British Government difficult when it was understood what was desired.

British opinion is a nebulous, fugitive thing, difficult to seize upon. It is only from snatches of speeches, lectures, and articles that one can tell the direction of the wind. There has existed a very small body of informed opinion whose views, as expressed in published books, The Journal of Comparative Legislation, The British Yearbook of International Law, and other journals intended for students rather than popular consumption, have been consistent and intelligible. Outside this core British opinion has drifted, and at the present time may be divided into two classes who enrich their thinking with quotations from the authorites belonging to the smaller body. One tendency has been to criticise the legalists who would have retained any restrictions upon the growth of Dominion autonomy. More recently, however, such complacency has been giving place to a growing uneasiness over the centrifugal tendencies that may be read into the Conferences of 1923 and 1926 and the Statute of Westminster. The Indian and Irish difficulties have tended to enhance the mistrust. The chief consolation comes from considering that there are three solid ties that still obtain - a certain economic unity, a common Crown, and a refusal to recognise the right of any member to secede from the Commonwealth of Nations.

The economic unity of the Empire has suffered some hard blows from the action of South Africa in placing Germany on

the same basis as the United Kingdom as regards the benefits of any future preferential tariffs conceded by the Union, by the high Canadian tariffs of the present Conservative Government who nevertheless did modify the heavy protection imposed when Britain departed from the gold standard, and by the difficult Irish situation which hampers co-operation. There is a fear that the Dominions may not have much to offer, and leading newspapers have warned their readers against counting Ottawa chickens before they are hatched. There is also a suspicion that the Dominions may continue a high tariff policy which will still be effectual in keeping out British goods and the preference granted will do little to enable trade to flow more freely. On the part of the United Kingdom, an earnest desire exists that foreign trade should not suffer because of Imperial preference, and one finds no little nervousness lest the Imperial Government should tie its hands at Ottawa to preclude the possibility of entering into favourable negotiations with the rest of the world, particularly Scandinacia, an old and valuable friend in the history of British trade. It is strongly felt that any policy entered upon at the Conference should have for its ultimate object the establishment of economic amity among nations to replace the theory of economic war that found its consummation in the Great War of 1914-18. The Imperial Economic Conference should be a venture in the course of which the British Empire may well give an object lesson to the world. Despite fears and manifold difficulties, hope rises resurgent, British eyes are wistfully, courageously turned toward Canada, and failure would bring a sorry despondency.

Another, and perhaps the greatest factor maintaining the unity of the Commonwealth of Nations is the existence of the common Crown. The Sovereign acts on the advice of his Ministers who are responsible for all action performed in his name throughout the Empire. In consequence his authority has been delegated to the Governors-General in the Dominions and, as the Committee of the Imperial Conference of 1926 expressed it, these representatives hold "in all essential respects the same position in relation to the administration of public affairs in the Dominion as is held by His Majesty the King in Great Britain."[1.]

Because of this common sovereignty the Empire makes war and concludes peace as a unit. As regards foreign nations, the members of the Empire enjoy a common nationality to which fact attaches great value and convenience. There is also the inestimable and the tremendous binding power of a common loyalty to the same Sovereign.

It has been suggested by certain writers that the Imperial Conference of 1926 should be taken as having established relations between Great Britain and the Dominions which might be defined as a personal union such as obtained between Hanover and Great Britain. This theory has been abundantly disproved and disclaimed in Great Britain,[2.] and would work disastrously as regards the Empire, finally breaking up the union, if friction had not already done so, by the ending of the Royal House.[3.] The Imperial Conference if nothing else, would deny such an

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1. Cmd.2768, p.16.
2. ex. The Sovereignty of the British Dominions, p,418ff; p.491; p.496.
3. Baker, op.cit. p.369.

interpretation of present Imperial relations, for these meetings have a definite constitutional status, are of great significance to Imperial relations, are conducted in a confidence that suggests a cabinet, arrive at momentous conclusions, and in striving for the common weal establish relations between one another which have all the force of, and a good deal more than treaties between nations. The Commonwealth consequently, despite its friction, comes to recognise the unity that still keeps the Empire one in its relation to the world.

The right of the Dominions to secede from the Commonwealth at will has been argued occasionally, both Mr Baker and Mr Hall having affirmed it. The only authoritative statement that may be produced in its favour was made by Mr Bonar Law who was speaking on the Irish question when political rather than judicial facts swayed the judgment, and he probably meant that, if any Dominion voiced an obviously majority opinion to secede, no force would be employed to keep it within the Empire. It will be noted that Hertzog with all his eagerness failed to elicit an admission of such a right from the Conference of 1926 and that Mr Hall erred when he said that no contradictory statement has ever been made. It has been seen in this study that Professor Dicey regarded himself as one of the many who held that the South African War was the assertion of the unity of the Empire and a denial of the right to secede.

One may conclude that opinion in the United Kingdom regards the British Commonwealth of Nations as a unity and yet feels a great pride in the development of the various Dominion nationalities. British opinion has definitely set its face

against two things: a centrally governed Empire and one broken by undisciplined nationalism. The conception of a super-state has been a long time dying, but all hope of it has passed away. Let India take comfort from that thought. Neither slaves nor taskmasters have a place in the British Empire: Burke taught us that. An iron-clad imperium over the British Empire is forever gone, dislike it as we may. It has passed into the limbo of outgrown things, as all institutions do serve their turn and then fall away. They live a life of pragmatic sanction. All programmes and platforms die; the inspiration alone endures. And the British Empire has given the inspiration for peace, justice, liberty, and equality which can never die, but which will merge as the lifeblood of a loftier conception. The dynamic of the future must be the faith that the greatest unifying force comes with the simple confidence that dwells among freeborn men.

There is no greater truth in life than that one must lose one's life to find it. And it may be that in the very act of losing her life as the early Imperialists thought of it in terms of material and political dominance, the British Empire may find it again in the moral leadership of the world. Britain may yet teach men that nations may co-operate in a spirit of goodwill, retain their culture and religion, and act in perfect liberty. Perhaps in the teaching of this lesson she will again take her old place in the economic world, for there is a closer relation between moral and economic principles than many have admitted.

Yet if we have put away the idea of a super-state, surely the War has taught us the futility of national selfishness. The post-war world has learnt at a great cost how dependent upon one another the nations of this world are, as they reap the sorry fruits of pre-war organisation that emphasised rights rather than duties and that was founded upon the assumption that life consisted not in mutural helpfulness, but in a grim struggle for survival and ascendency. The philosophy of Neitzche was popular prior to the war, and for Neitzche love had no place. Poor Neitzche went mad, and our modern world looks mad enough. It lies within the power of the British Commonwealth of Nations to teach the truth that prosperity is only possible in the welfare of one's neighbours.

Yet the great potential powers of the Empire for civilisation and peace are being jeopardised by mean and dusty suspicions of British Imperialism. Weak in Canada, but formidably strong in Ireland and South Africa, the agitation for a Republic would be ridiculous were it not so tragic. Will Ireland and South Africa pull down their house to kill a rat? Is all the work done by those great and wise statesmen, General Smuts and General Botha, who truly have more honour outside than within their country, to be undone by men who, lacking vision and the quality of forgiveness, sulkily cherish grudges against a foe who was as generous as the Boers were brave? Are all the efforts made by devoted men who sometimes groped and stumbled, but nevertheless pressed forward to the Commonwealth which has come so near to us today and yet may be so far away, are their efforts to prove fruitless? South African, Canadian, Australian, Indian, New Zealand, and Irish troops joined in battle because they felt

that lesser things must be forgotten in the impelling power of a great affection. Is it a weak an unavailing sentiment to recall that the Great War was an earnest of that vision of men who

"Died uncouthly most in foreign lands
For some ideal but dimly understood,
Of an English city never built by hands,
Which love of England prospered and made good."

Down in the misty depths of human hatred there lurks the insanity of another war. The League as at present organised cannot prevent war. It is not to be censured, for the wonder is not that it has done so little but that it has done so much. Nor can the Dominions find safety in geographical isolation. War has rarely been caused in the past by direct invasion, but by a clash of interests, and today Dominion interests are more and more penetrating into every continent and country. Only if the interests of the nations are made interdependent can war be averted. The British Empire can begin this work. Outside the co-operation that can be established between the nations of the Commonwealth there can be little hope; inside it there lie freedom, prosperity, and a glorious promise for mankind. This the British Empire can do in the way of establishing a community of nations united in friendship, seeking prosperity in the well-being of one another, and bound together by every possible tie in social and economic life.

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In order to conserve space, only those articles and books have been included in the bibliography which were valuable to the thesis and which were referred to in the foot-notes. Unsigned articles, newspaper matter, and Parliamentary statutes have been omitted also. The abbreviations employed are given in the preface.

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