



# THE UNIVERSITY *of* EDINBURGH

This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e. g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use:

- This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated.
- A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge.
- This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author.
- The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author.
- When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given.

# After the Persians

*Memories of the Persian Wars in the Hellenistic Period*

KYOHEI SAKESHIMA



Ph.D.  
The University of Edinburgh  
2024

### *Signed Declaration*

This thesis has been composed by the candidate, the work is the candidate's own and the work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification except as specified.

Signed:

## *Abstract*

The aim of this PhD thesis is to examine the reception and recollection of the Persian Wars during the Hellenistic period (323-30 BC), emphasising the evolution in narrating and preserving historical events related to the Persian Wars. It endeavours to explore how Greeks perceived and utilised memories of these wars as historical references for conflicts with ‘barbarians’. Previous research has extensively studied Greek perceptions of the Persian Wars in ancient times but has inadequately covered the Hellenistic period, necessitating an investigation into why and how these memories continued to be employed despite the Achaemenid Empire’s dissolution after Alexander the Great’s conquest. This PhD thesis aims to illuminate the development of the Persian Wars’ significance in Greek collective memory and identity post-Classical period. It argues that from the late Classical period onwards, encounters with groups like Macedonians, Gauls, and Romans, often considered ‘barbarians’ by the Greeks, prompted recollection of the Persian Wars. These wars served as models for confronting these groups, symbolising Greek civilisation and distinctiveness. Variations in recollection were contingent upon contextual factors and the agents employing these images. Additionally, the Battle of Plataia’s memory shaped Greek collective identity through the Eleutheria festival, enhancing the commemoration of Greek victory led by Athens and Sparta against ‘external enemies’. Nonetheless, the diverse memories of the Battle of Plataia persisted among Athenians, Spartans, and Plataians, and they anchored their memories in the landscape of Plataia.

Chapter One serves as a foundational exploration of how memories of the Persian Wars were formulated and evolved during the Classical period. Chapter Two aims to investigate the pivotal role and significance of these memories within the Athenian-Macedonian dynamics. It examines how both parties strategically employed these memories as bargaining tools and delves into the constraints associated with this strategy. In Chapter Three, the focus shifts towards the local recollection of the Gallic invasion, juxtaposed with the Panhellenic acknowledgement of this event and broader confrontations with the Gauls. It argues that Athenians did not just remember the Gallic invasion as a military event but interpreted it as a struggle for the preservation of Athens’ freedom and democracy, contextualised within the city’s circumstances during the invasion. Chapter Four scrutinises the evolution of commemorative practices linked to the Battle of Plataia and their integration with the Plataian landscape. It contends that

the Eleutheria festival not only emphasised the memory of Greek collaboration under Athens and Sparta but also incorporated elements from the fifth century BC. Moreover, it posits that the establishment of Eleutheria potentially reconfigured the Plataian landscape, segregating local memory within the city walls, while Panhellenic monuments remained external. Chapter Five explores the relationship between Greek perceptions of Roman hegemony and the symbolism of the Persian Wars. Its central argument emphasises that while the imagery of the Persian Wars consistently influenced how Romans were perceived, the manner in which these memories were invoked underwent transformations with Rome's ascendancy.

## *Lay Summary*

This PhD thesis explores receptions and memories of the Persian Wars during the Hellenistic period (323-30 BC). It discusses the innovation and continuity of the way that the Persian Wars were described and remembered. The Persian Wars were a series of conflicts between the Greeks and the Persian Empire during the period from 490 BC to 479 BC. In this thesis, I argue that encounters with groups like Macedonians, Gauls, and Romans, often considered ‘barbarians’ by the Greeks, prompted recollection of the Persian Wars from the late Classical period onwards. The Persian Wars became models for confronting these groups, as they symbolised Greek civilisation and distinctiveness. This sheds light on how the imagery of the Persian Wars functioned to differentiate the Greeks from the Others. The Hellenistic period saw the rise of powers that could be regarded as barbarians, as well as the arrival of non-Greeks to mainland Greece. The encounters with the others developed the idea of Greekness, and the Persian Wars should have been a crucial element of it. I focus on the contexts in which the Persian Wars were recalled and how they were mentioned differently in accordance with the contexts. I also explore a question about the difference in memorialisation of the Persian Wars between the Classical period and the Hellenistic period. This helps explain the impact of Alexander the Great’s overthrow of the Persian Empire and the resulting disappearance of the Persians as a threat to the Greeks on the reception of the Persian Wars. Additionally, this PhD thesis considers how the memory of the Battle of Plataia, the final battle in expelling the Persians from mainland Greece in 479 BC, shaped Greek collective identity. In sum, this PhD thesis shows the imagery of the Persian Wars gave the Greeks a sense of who ‘they were’. They used the Persian Wars to connect the present with the past and to place their existence in the world and history. The Hellenistic period can be said to have been one in which the role of the Persian Wars as a component of Greek collective identity was reinforced.

## *Acknowledgements*

It is a great pleasure to give thanks to those who helped me to finish this PhD thesis. First of all, my thanks go to my supervisor, Andrew Erskine, for his patience, support, and supervision. Without him, I would never have finished this PhD thesis. I am also indebted to my secondary supervisor, Mirko Canevaro, for reading and supporting my work.

I also express my sincere gratitude to those who supported and helped me: David Lewis, Benedikt Eckhardt, Calum Maciver, Stephen Lambert, and Roel Konijnendijk for their helpful comments and suggestions for my work; My supervisors at Kyoto Prefectural University and Kyoto University, Shin Watanabe, Keiko Kawawake, Satoshi Koyama, Shusaku Kanazawa, especially Takuji Abe and Takashi Minamikawa, for their patience and generosity; Takashi Fujii for his help. I was also blessed with amazing scholars and academic friends both in Japan and in Edinburgh, and I want to say thank you to them: Ryosei Taniguchi, Genji Yasuhira, Kenshi Fukumoto, Kazuhiro Takeuchi, Hiroshi Shibata, Fuki Ono, Maho Oyamada, Yolanda, Beatrice, Giovanna, David, Daiki, Shin'ichi, Joe, and Melissa. In particular, I am very grateful to Richard and Masayuki. Anne, Joe, and Sophie kindly treated me like family. My friends since my undergraduate, Shun and Daiki, also supported me and gave me insightful suggestions. I also thank Richard, Anne, David, Simone, and Joe, who were willing to help with the English.

I greatly appreciate the financial support of the British Council Japan Association for 2018/9, the Japan Student Services Organization between 2019 and 2022, and *Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik* for my winter 2022 with a Jacobi Stipendium. Also, I would like to thank the University of Edinburgh for awarding me a lot of bursaries.

The strange situation between 2020 and 2022 forced me to change my plan for writing my PhD thesis. I appreciate the great support from my family during and after it. I am grateful to my parents, Hiroshi and Akiko, for their patient support; my siblings, Ryota, Natsuho and Ayako; my beloved niece, Kai; Susumu and Yukio, my grandfathers, who were always concerned with me. And, of course, Maho. I dedicate this PhD thesis to the memory of my grandmother, Reiko.

## *Table of Contents*

<i>Signed declaration</i>	i
<i>Abstract</i>	ii
<i>Lay summary</i>	iv
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	v
<i>Table of contents</i>	vi
<i>Conventions and abbreviations</i>	ix
Introduction	1
1. The subject and aim of this thesis	1
2. Overview of previous scholarship	2
3. Critique of previous scholarship	5
4. Methodology	8
4.1. The definition of the ‘Persian Wars’	8
4.2. Collective memory	15
4.3. Greeks and Others: the evidence	20
5. Outline of this thesis	25
1. Setting the stage: the receptions of the Persian Wars in the Classical period	28
1.1. Introduction	28
1.2. Marathon and Salamis	30
1.3. Use and abuse of the past in the interstate contexts	41
1.3.1. Athens and the justification of the imperial rule	42
1.3.2. Salamis: Athens vs Korinth	48
1.3.3. Athens and Sparta	56
1.3.4. Thebes: two faces of the ‘mediser’	61
1.4. The development of Panhellenism	69
1.5. Conclusion	76
2. Athens and the Macedonians: talking through the Persian Wars’ imagery	77
2.1. Introduction	77
2.2. Philip II and Alexander III	78
2.2.1. Macedonian Panhellenism	78
2.2.2. Athenian reactions	86
2.2.3. Conclusion	90
2.3. Demetrios Poliorketes	91
2.3.1. An Athenian oracular consultation with Demetrios	91
2.3.2. Demetrios’ uses of memory	95
2.3.3. Athenian uses of memory	103
2.3.4. Conclusion	106
2.4. Antigonos Gonatas	107
2.4.1. Introduction	107
2.4.2. Fighting against the ‘barbarian’?: the Chremonidean War	107

2.4.3.	Rhamnous: accepting the victory over the barbarians	111
2.5	Conclusion	115
3.	The Athenian remembrance of the Gallic Invasion	118
3.1.	Introduction	119
3.2.	The Aitolian story of the Gallic Invasion	120
3.3.	The painting of Kallippos and the Athenian memory of the Gallic Invasion	126
3.3.1.	Introduction	126
3.3.2.	The painting of Kallippos	127
3.3.3.	The Athenian contribution to the fight against the Gauls and Kallippos' service	132
3.3.4.	The Bouleuterion	137
3.3.5.	The painting in context (1): the Athenian Agora	141
3.3.6.	The painting in context (2): the Bouleuterion	145
3.4.	The shield of Kydias	152
3.5.	Conclusion	157
4.	Contested memories of the Battle of Plataia: discourses, rituals, and monuments	159
4.1.	Introduction	159
4.2.	Whose victory?	161
4.2.1.	Introduction	161
4.2.2.	The Spartan victory	161
4.2.3.	The Athenian victory	165
4.2.4.	The victory of Greek unity	172
4.3.	The meaning of the <i>dialogos</i>	174
4.3.1.	Introduction	174
4.3.2.	The <i>dialogos</i>	174
4.3.3.	The speech	177
4.3.4.	The power of the <i>propompeia</i>	180
4.4.	The space and local memories at Plataia	182
4.4.1.	Introduction	182
4.4.2.	The monumental landscape of Plataia: an overview	183
4.4.3.	The tomb of Euchidas	186
4.4.4.	The temple of Athena Areia	189
4.5.	Conclusion	193
5.	The power of Rome: the Greek perceptions of the Romans through the lens of the Persian Wars	195
5.1.	Introduction	195
5.2.	Rome as other	197
5.3.	Rome as the disaster	204
5.4.	Rome as the power	211
5.5.	Conclusion	216
	Conclusion	218

<i>Appendix 1: The identification of the family of Kallippos</i>	223
<i>Appendix 2: The text and translation of IG II<sup>2</sup> 2788</i>	225
<i>Bibliography</i>	229

## *Conventions and Abbreviations*

Throughout this PhD thesis, I use the Harvard system of references. I follow journal abbreviations as they appear in *L'Année philologique*, while Greek and Latin authors, as well as modern works, are abbreviated after the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*. I provide abbreviations for authors and works not mentioned in these works below. All Greek references and quotations are from the *TLG* unless otherwise noted.

Greek proper names are transliterated (e.g., Herodotos, Demetrios), yet I use Anglicised or Latinised names when they are most recognisable (e.g., Athens, Pindar, Alexander).

### **Ancient Authors**

Plut. <i>Arist.-Cat. Mai.</i>	Plutarch, <i>Comparatio Aristidis et Catonis</i>
Plut. <i>Cim.-Luc.</i>	Plutarch, <i>Comparatio Cimonis et Luculli</i>
Plut. <i>Phil.-Flam.</i>	Plutarch, <i>Comparatio Philopoemenis et Titi Flaminini</i>

### **Reference Works**

<i>Ath. Onom.</i>	<i>Athenian Onomasticon</i> . <a href="http://www.seangb.org/">http://www.seangb.org/</a>
<i>CIG</i>	Böckh, A. (ed.). <i>Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> . Berlin. 1825-1877.
<i>I.Eleusis</i>	Clinton, K. <i>Eleusis, the Inscriptions on Stone: Documents of the Sanctuary of the Two Goddesses and Public Documents of the Deme</i> . Athens. 2005.
<i>I.Ephesos</i>	Wankel, H. and R. Merkelbach et al. <i>Die Inschriften von Ephesos</i> . 8 vols. Bonn. 1979-84.
<i>I.Labraunda</i>	Crampa, J. <i>Labraunda: Swedish Excavations and Researches</i> . Vol. III: <i>The Greek Inscriptions</i> . Pts. I-II. Lund and Stockholm. 1969-1972.
<i>I.Metropolis</i>	Dreyer, B. and H. Engelmann. <i>Die Inschriften von Metropolis</i> . Vol. I: <i>Die Dekrete für Apollonios. Städtische Politik unter den Attaliden und im Konflikt zwischen Aristonikos und Rom</i> . Bonn. 2003.
<i>I.Rhamnous</i>	Petrakos, V. C. <i>Ὁ Δῆμος τοῦ Ραμνοῦντος: Σύνοψη τῶν ἀνασκαφῶν καὶ τῶν ἐρευνῶν (1813–1998)</i> . Vols. I, II, VI. Athens. 1999-2020.
<i>ISE</i>	Moretti, L. <i>Iscrizione storiche ellenistiche</i> . 2 Vols. Florence. 1967-1975.
<i>OGIS</i>	Dittenberger, W. <i>Orientalis Graeci inscriptions selectae: supplementum Sylloges inscriptionum Graecarum</i> . Leipzig. 1903-5.

SdA III

Schmitt, H. H. (ed.). *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*. Vol. III. *Die Verträge der griechisch-römischen Welt von 338 bis 200 v. Chr.* Munich. 1969.

Traill, PAA

Traill, J. S. *Persons of Ancient Athens*. Toronto. 1994-2021.

# **Introduction**

## **1. THE SUBJECT AND AIM OF THIS THESIS**

This PhD thesis aims to investigate receptions and memories of the Persian Wars during the Hellenistic period (323 BC-30 BC), discussing the innovation and continuity of the way that the Persian Wars were described and remembered. In order to achieve this aim, this thesis will analyse the Greek uses of memories of the Persian Wars as historical precedents for the later wars against barbarians. Scholarship of the last three decades has revealed the variety of the ways in which Greeks received the Persian Wars in antiquity. However, their reception in the Hellenistic period has not been studied sufficiently, and an overall picture has not yet been drawn. It is necessary to explain the reason why the Persian Wars were recollected on various occasions in this period when the Persian Empire no longer existed because of the conquest of Alexander the Great (330 BC) and in what way the basis was laid in the Hellenistic period for memories of the Persian Wars to become a shared symbol in the Roman period. Thus, this thesis will shed new light on how the Persian Wars, as a component of Greek collective memory and identity, developed after the Classical period. The main argument of this thesis is that, from the late Classical period onwards, conflicts with the Macedonians, Gauls and Romans, who could be understood as ‘barbarians’ by the Greeks, formed one of the main driving forces to recall the Persian Wars past. Thus, the Persian Wars became a historical precedent for interpreting and representing subsequent wars which threatened the mainland Greeks. These wars served as models for confronting these groups, symbolising Greek civilisation and distinctiveness as the Greeks believed that the victories in the wars meant the victories of Greek civilisation over barbaric Asia. Thus, the imagery of the Persian Wars became a tool to distinguish the Greeks and the Others. The forms and contents when they were recalled differ in accordance with the contexts and the agents who used the imagery at the same time. On the other hand, the memory of the Battle of Plataia acquired the function of shaping the collective identity of the Greeks through the Eleutheria, a Panhellenic festival at Plataia, established around 330s

BC. From the second century BC onwards, a new ceremony was added to the festival, celebrating the Classical rivalry between Athens and Sparta in a peaceful way. The Persian Wars were to be remembered in the Greek world as a collective Greek victory over ‘external enemies’ under the leadership of Athens and Sparta. Nevertheless, in spite of the emergence of this collective memory, the Athenians, the Spartans, and the Plataians continued to hold their own memories of the Battle of Plataia. These arguments can explain how the Greeks constituted Greekness of their own during the Hellenistic period.

## 2. OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP

One of the most important historical events in ancient Greece is the series of conflicts between the Greeks and the Achaemenid Empire. These conflicts, so-called ‘the Persian Wars’, were the first major wars that the Greeks waged against foreigners in their history. During the successive victories during the period from 490 BC to 479 BC, the ethnic identity, self-awareness, pride, and ethnic prejudice of the Greeks changed fundamentally and irreversibly. As a result of this, the stories of the ‘glories’ of the Greeks came to be increasingly told by Greeks everywhere over antiquity. Athens and Sparta had boasted of their role in these wars, and their boasting became integrated into their diplomatic manoeuvre. After the Classical period, the knowledge of the Persian Wars spread outside the old Greek world. Hellenistic kings of the Macedonian roots utilised the memory of these wars to win over the Greeks for their wars. Even the Romans became much more familiar with the stories as if they shared the memory with the Greeks. The Greeks of the Hellenistic and Roman periods also continued to remember the Persian Wars. It is hard to ignore the tremendous importance of the wars when trying to understand the culture and thoughts of antiquity.

There are numerous studies on a single battle or source that related to the Persian Wars. Yet, previous studies that attempted to provide a comprehensive picture of memories and commemorations of the Persian Wars in Classical antiquity have been few and they have mainly focused on the Classical and Roman periods. In 1994, a very influential study on the Roman reception was published by Anthony Spawforth.<sup>1</sup> According to him, the tradition of the Persian Wars was shared not only by the Greeks,

---

<sup>1</sup> Spawforth 1994.

who wanted to support the imperial ideology but also by the Roman rulers, who wanted to use them to illuminate the ideological background of their military campaigns. Thus, in this period, the Persian Wars became a ‘shared symbol of unity’ between the ruled and the rulers. Based on this observation, he examined the renewed interests and innovations of the commemorative activities of the Persian Wars by Athens, Sparta, and Plataia.<sup>2</sup> From the late first to the early third century AD, the Roman rulers were charmed with Greece’s Classical past. It served as a common basis for the interaction between Romans and Greeks, and the Persian Wars served as the crucial core of it.<sup>3</sup>

In line with this, it is argued that the period around the first century AD to the third century AD, the so-called ‘Second Sophistic’ saw a sharp increase in the interest of Greek elites in the Classical ‘glorious’ past of the Greeks. They boasted of their Classical past as confirming their ethnic identity and as it could allow them to culturally rank with, and even to be superior to, the Romans who were ruling them. Their dissatisfaction with losing their freedom, in particular, freedom of military action that their ancestors enjoyed before the Romans, led them to focus on their mythical and historical heroes who achieved great deeds by which the Romans were also fascinated. Then, wars, such as the Persian Wars, the Peloponnesian War, the Battle of Chaironeia and Alexander’s Asian expedition, became popular themes for rhetorical declamations.<sup>4</sup> The Persian Wars, along with the ‘other great wars’ in the Classical past, occupied an important part of this general movement.

In 2006, Micheal Jung examined the collective memories of the Battles of Marathon and Plataia from the Classical period to the Roman period with the concept of the *lieu de mémoire*.<sup>5</sup> According to him, the Battle of Marathon originally developed as a fundamental part of Athenian identity in the Classical period. It persisted as a pivotal element of Athenian identity throughout the Hellenistic and Roman periods, and, in the Hellenistic period particularly, Athens innovated the rituals and commemorations of the Battle of Marathon. However, the emphasis of the memory of Marathon gradually

---

<sup>2</sup> Spawforth 2012: 103-41.

<sup>3</sup> Swain 1996: 67; Makhelaiuk 2015: 318.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Bowie 1970: 7; Russell 1983: 106-7; Swain 1996: 67.

<sup>5</sup> Jung 2006. Cf. Zahrt 2019. Similarly, Anuschka Albertz focused on the Battle of Thermopylai, and very recently, Katalin Bélyácz focused on the Battle of Salamis. Albertz 2006; Bélyácz 2021. For Marathon, see also Buraselis and Meidani 2010; Carey and Edwards 2013. There is also an important contribution by Bridges 2014 that focuses on the image of Xerxes. For the Battle of Plataia, see also Konecny and Sekunda 2022.

evolved due to the influence of the dominance of an oligarchic elite. By the time of the Second Sophistic, Marathon was reinterpreted as the inaugural event signifying Greek identity for the Greeks rather than only the Athenians. This recontextualisation transcended the confines of the *polis*, diminishing the Athenocentrism of the memory of Marathon. On the other hand, concerning the Battle of Plataia, each *polis* endeavoured to assert its individual memory, despite the potential for it to be comprehended as a Panhellenic event due to the involvement of multiple *poleis*. Nonetheless, during the Hellenistic period, the establishment of the festival of the Eleutheria facilitated the reimagining of Plataia as a site nurturing the collective identity of the Greeks. Plataia then emerged as a bastion defending Greek freedom and autonomy against Antigonos Gonatas, evolving into a locus of Panhellenic remembrance. In the Roman period, imperial cult was added to Plataia's rituals which then became one of the exemplars of Greek-Roman political and cultural unity. Although Jung's research is limited to Marathon and Plataia, his work can be credited with being a forerunner to subsequent Persian Wars memory studies.

In the realm of Persian Wars remembrance within the Classical *poleis*, recent publications by David Yates and Giorgia Proietti have endeavoured to delineate a historical overview of how the Persian Wars were remembered during that period. Their study aimed to demonstrate the diverse nature of the recollections of the Persian Wars at the level of individual *poleis*. In his book in 2019, David Yates pushes his argument that, in the Classical period, each *polis* had different ideas of the Persian Wars and these ideas competed. This way of recollection changed after Philip II and Alexander III invented a new tradition of the Persian Wars which was brought into common use of the tradition away from Athens and was made accessible by non-Athenians so that all Greeks were able to take part in it. He also argued that this new tradition was inherited by the kings and Greeks in the Hellenistic period. In 2021, Giorgia Proietti, on the other hand, investigated the memories invented before Herodotos' *Histories* and showed the development of a variety of ways of recollection of the *poleis*. Her study attempted to show, with a careful treatment of the nature of source materials, a detailed chronological picture of the earliest phases of memorising the Persian Wars before Herodotos. By doing so, both tried to revise scholarship that had been dominated by Athenocentrism of modern scholarship and by the use of Herodotos' *Histories* as a basis for interpretation of other source material.

### 3. CRITIQUE OF PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP

Although the last three decades saw a good number of studies on the reception of the Persian Wars, those about the Hellenistic period have not produced a satisfactory overall picture of the reception of the wars in this period. By integrating previous studies, a coherent narrative may emerge depicting a progression from the Classical period to the Roman period, wherein the remembrance of the Persian Wars incrementally surpasses the confines of the *polis*. Over time, memories of the wars became embraced by both Greeks and Romans as an integral component of Greek culture. Even if this is the case, how the Hellenistic period fits into this understanding is open to examination.

David Yates, in his study I mentioned above, claimed that a new Persian Wars tradition invented by Philip II and Alexander III was shared by successors, kings and *poleis* as well as communities such as the Aitolian League, the Achaian League and Rhodes, which had not taken part in the fights in the Persian Wars, and a supra *polis* level commemoration, which he called “transcendent panhellenism”, was achieved in the Hellenistic period.

The core of his argument lies in his belief that Philip and Alexander created “the transcendent panhellenism that the Macedonians had used to reorganise the Persian War into an event that was Greek first and only incidentally parochial.”<sup>6</sup> Yet, it could be said that the Delian League first waged a ‘Panhellenic’ war against the Persians by using the past of Xerxes’ expedition.<sup>7</sup> It may be true that, in the Hellenistic period, those who did not take part in the Persian Wars started to utilise the memory of the Persian Wars for their own purposes more than before. Yet, this may not have been a result of the manipulation of the memory by Philip and Alexander but a result of the rise of powers other than old ones, such as Athens and Sparta. Furthermore, Yates’ discussion confused commemorative activities, parallelisms, and legal and political claims in analysing Hellenistic sources. For instance, when Yates refers to the dedication of the Gallic shields at the Delphic Temple of Apollo by the Aitolians, which scholars regard as intended by the Aitolians to parallel their defence of Delphi with the Battle of Marathon, he takes this as evidence of that “[t]he freedom the Aetolians felt to co-opt the Persian-War past to ennoble their recent achievements indicates how far the tradition had

---

<sup>6</sup> Yates 2019: 259. Some reviewers do not welcome Yates’ argument on the Hellenistic reception of the new Persian Wars tradition. See Braun 2021; Low 2022: 1069. Cf. Sears 2021: 465; Vlassopoulos 2021: 313.

<sup>7</sup> Thuc. 1.96.1, 6.76.3. cf. Mitchell 2007: 169-70, 206-7.

slipped from the proprietary control of those states that had fought the war.”<sup>8</sup> Yet, one of the earliest examples that “the tradition had slipped from the proprietary control” came from the cooperation of a mainland Greek and a Western Greek in 470 BC when Pindar composed *Pythian 1* for Syracusan tyrant Hieron. In lines 71-81 of the poem, the poet paralleled Gelon’s victory at the Battle of Himera in 480 BC and Hieron’s victory at the Battle of Kumai in 474 BC with the Athenian credit for the victory of the Battle of Salamis and with the Spartan credit for the victory of the Battle of Plataia. By so doing, Pindar tried to glorify the Syracusans’ victories and promote their fame in mainland Greece.<sup>9</sup> It is notable that Pindar’s own homeland, Thebes, took the Persian side and Syracusans did not come to mainland Greece to face the Persians.

While the development of a unified Greek commemoration by Philip and Alexander stands as a certainty, it is also certain that the image of the Persian Wars that was collectively accepted by the Greeks existed from fairly early on with diverse forms of utilisation and reference. When Isokrates said in his *Panegyrikos* of 380 BC that Athens rather than Sparta should be the leader of a future Panhellenic expedition against the Achaemenid Empire, he must have had an idea that the heroic image of the Persian Wars with Athens and Sparta could be, if not fully, shared by his Panhellenic audience (Isoc. 4).<sup>10</sup> Then, Philip and Alexander also had the idea that the memory of the Persian Wars was a very useful tool for integrating the Greeks because it was already part of the collective identity of the Greeks even though there were no collective commemorative activities. Already in the fifth century BC, Herodotos also seemed to know that there was a debate among the Greeks about who saved Greece in the Persian Wars (Hdt. 7.139.1). Although he says the Athenians saved it, he suggests that others believe that Sparta saved Greece (Hdt. 7.139.3). *Pythian 1* is also further early evidence that the Greek victories were achieved by Athens and Sparta. It seems likely that, during 470s BC, the events became part of the Greek shared past, at least in the sphere of influence of mainland Greece, and Greeks could refer to this type of the Persian Wars imagery as a collective experience when the time and context allowed. Once they accepted the images, why couldn’t they use them for their own purpose, even if they were not on the Greek side fighting the Persians? There might have been attempts similar to *Pythian 1* during the fifth and fourth century BC which are lost.

---

<sup>8</sup> Yates 2019: 256. For these shields, see Chapter 3.2 of this thesis.

<sup>9</sup> Gauthier 1966: 6-14; Fries 2017; Clarke 2008: 236; Morgan 2015: 155-6, 337-40; Sakeshima 2021: 7.

<sup>10</sup> For the historical background of this speech, see Usher 1990: 12-3, 19-21.

Then, one of the problems which should be addressed in this thesis is why and on what occasion a specific image of the Persian Wars was foregrounded and how much that image was copied or distorted in accordance with each occasion.

The unsatisfying scholarly treatment of the Hellenistic reception of the Persian Wars also stems from the fact that there is no single study on the topic, although several attempts to understand a feature of this period have been made.<sup>11</sup> The Hellenistic period needs to be examined separately from the Classical period and the Roman period. In this period, the Greeks lost their archetype of the ‘eastern barbarians’, i.e., the Persians, because Alexander destroyed the Achaemenid Empire. With the Greco-Macedonian domination of the Eastern Mediterranean, there were no major ‘barbarians’ in the East until the rise of the Parthians who regarded themselves as a successor state of the Achaemenid Empire.<sup>12</sup> Yet, it was not the Greeks but the Romans who mainly saw the Parthians as the Persians and experienced serious military conflicts with them.<sup>13</sup> In this situation, how and why did the Greeks continue to recall the Persian Wars after the overthrow of the Persians? In previous scholarship, insufficient attention has been paid to the mechanisms and primary drivers of this continued recollection. In order to grasp the features of the Hellenistic recollection of the wars, this study will examine the sources that parallel the Persian Wars past with the Hellenistic present. As will be further discussed, this phenomenon is observable throughout this period.

What were the Greek perceptions of the past of the Persian Wars prior to the rise of the Roman Empire? This inquiry delves into the reception of the Classical past before its renewed interest during the Roman Empire. During the Roman Empire, the Classical period served as a shared symbol between the emperors and Greek citizens. After being conquered by the Romans, the Greek past became part of the common language of the educated people who lived in the sphere of the Roman Empire, again being modified by orators and even emperors for their present purpose. On the other hand, the Hellenistic period is the period when the idealisation of the Classical past of the Greeks began to be crystallised. During the Hellenistic period, Herodotos’ historical account was widely read alongside literary works like Homer, Demosthenes and Euripides, and then the Persian Wars found a place in the baggage of Greek cultural identity and civilisation.<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> E.g., Étienne and Piérart 1975; West 1977; Étienne 1985; Robertson 1986; Wallace 2011b; Carey 2019: 130-62; de Bakker 2019, cf. Dixon 2007; Luraghi 2018.

<sup>12</sup> Olbrycht 2018; Olbrycht 2019.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Schneider 1998; Isaac 2004: 371-80; Rose 2005; Lerouge 2007; Lerouge-Cohen 2010;

<sup>14</sup> According to Matijašić 2018: 206, there are almost 50 papyrus fragments from Egypt that record

Herodotos held a prominent place in the literary canon and was widely accepted by the Hellenistic court and the broader Greek world; his work influenced the writings of Apollonios of Rhodes and Lykophron.<sup>15</sup> For the Greek rhetorical education, subjects from the Classical period were favoured, with the Persian Wars undoubtedly being a highly sought-after topic.<sup>16</sup> Through these processes, the Classical past had been retold, modified and changed again and again, adjusting them to the contemporary situations of the Greeks where *poleis* had to face the rise of new powers. Of course, memories of each of the *polis* formed in the Classical period must have been inherited in different forms in different circumstances.<sup>17</sup> How, then, did the memory of the Persian Wars, which had thus become part of the common knowledge of the Greek cultural sphere, remain focussed within a social context and maintain its political and social importance into the Roman period? How did it differ from the memory of the Persian Wars in the Classical period and how did it influence its reception under the Roman Empire? In this way, this thesis bridges the gap between the Classical and Roman periods and so traces the process of reception of the Classical period into the present day.

## 4. METHODOLOGY

### 4.1. The Definition of the ‘Persian Wars’

When multiple battles are abstracted and consolidated as a single ‘war’, a precise definition and name becomes imperative. The act of defining and naming is not free from subjective interpretations, as it is closely tied to the perspectives of the involved

---

excerpts of Herodotos’ *Histories*. Cf. Murray 1972: 202. See also Koskenniemi 2019: 200-4. Almagor 2016 for Josephus’ references to Herodotos. For Josephus’ reference to Salamis, Thermopylai and Plataia, see Joseph. *BJ* 2.358-9 with Almagor 2016: 93. Cf. Koskenniemi 2019: 144.

<sup>15</sup> West 2009; Priestley 2014: 169-86. Cf. Murray 1972: 203-4.

<sup>16</sup> Kremmydas 2013b: 148-52, cf. Russell 1983: 106-28, esp. 107; Morgan 1998: 96-7, 318-9.

<sup>17</sup> For instance, Yates 2018 argues that the Megarian memory of fear from a Persian attack was coherent from the Classical and Roman periods. For the innovations of the Athenian ephebic commemorative activities focusing on the Persian Wars during the Hellenistic and Roman periods, see Newby 2017 with Newby 2005: 168-201; Kennell 2022.

parties. In Japan, the war which occurred between 7th July 1937 and 2nd September 1945 has had various different names in accordance with different points of view. During wartime, the Japanese government decided to call the war against the Allies ‘the Greater East Asia War’ (大東亜戦争) to propagate its intention to establish a new ‘peaceful’ order under the leadership of Japan in East Asia and to get rid of European influence. To reject Japanese wartime propaganda, a different name, ‘the Pacific War’ (太平洋戦争), was proposed, but it has a problem that it sounds as if its focus is placed on the war between Japan and the U.S.<sup>18</sup> The end date of the First World War in 1918 fails to acknowledge ongoing conflicts outside of Western Europe and highlights the dominance of Western-centric perspectives despite the war’s title.<sup>19</sup> The instances of World War II and of World War I may represent the most intense examples in history. Nevertheless, these instances reveal that war designations, which are created and defined by a certain perspective, can, in a paradoxical manner, cement the viewpoint from which war is perceived. Consequently, any given war is only an artificially generalised collection of events, and it is crucial to identify what was emphasised and disregarded during the abstraction process and who assigned the definition.

The name ‘Persian Wars’ given to the series of conflicts dealt with in this PhD thesis also has various connotations. This proper noun is structured in a similar way in the main languages used in Classical studies and in my mother tongue, Japanese (the Persian Wars, *die Perserkriege*, *les guerres médiques*, *le guerre persiane*, *las guerras médicas*, οἱ Περσικοὶ Πόλεμοι, *bellum Persicum*, ヘルシア戦争). Although we do not intend to delve into etymological considerations here, it can be inferred that this is a derivative of ancient Greek vocabulary (such as ὁ Μηδικὸς πόλεμος, τὰ Μηδικά and ἡ Περσῶν ἔφοδος). In other words, this common noun is used worldwide, but its origin derives from a term defined and used by a specific period, region, and people in ancient Greece. European culture took it over from Greek. Therefore, as the adjective in the term shows, it is a term that is coloured with a Hellenocentric as well as Eurocentric tone.

Moreover, it should be noted that the term ‘Persian Wars’ varies in its time frame and battles encompassed, contingent on the perspectives of the ancient writers who employed it. Therefore, exercising caution while invoking the term is vital. While addressing the challenges posed by the ambiguity surrounding this designation, it is

---

<sup>18</sup> Shoji 2011: 46-8 for “the Greater East Asia War” and 52-3 for “the Pacific War”.

<sup>19</sup> For the recent attempt to revise the traditional framework of World War I, see Gerwarth 2016. Cf. Gatrell 2010.

necessary to explicate the subject matter and definition addressed in this thesis.

To come to the point, the ‘Persian Wars’ dealt with in this PhD thesis include the series of events and battles resulting from the two Persian expeditions to mainland Greece, expeditions that occurred between 490 and 480/479 BC (the former led by a Persian commander Datis, the latter by Xerxes and later Mardonios). The reason for using the plural is that the two expeditions were separately planned by different rulers (Darius I and Xerxes I) and are hardly recognised as one war in the strict sense. In short, I basically make use of the traditional usage of this vocabulary.

There are two significant issues with the title ‘Persian Wars’. Firstly, the use of the adjective ‘Persian’ can mean the adoption of the Greek perspective on the Greek-Persian conflicts. Secondly, the title might fail to accurately capture the entire historical period of the conflicts.

First, the traditional term ‘the Persian Wars’ centres on the views of the Greeks.<sup>20</sup> This denotes not the place where the wars happened but the authority who launched the expeditions to mainland Greece, i.e., the Persians, the enemies of the Greeks. The term was then sprung from the Hellenocentric point of view and could have the implication that the modern adoption of it reflects a Eurocentric understanding of the wars. This problem is understood by the modern scholars. The term ‘Greco-Persian’ Wars might be of more neutral value for its coverage of both sides involved in the wars, and modern writers more alert to bias seem to be fond of using it.<sup>21</sup> There are, of course, certain problems with this labelling. It not only conceals the diverse ethnic backgrounds of individuals who served in the Persian army but also runs the risk of concealing the fact that a significant number of Greeks fought for the Persian side out of compulsion, necessity, or willingness. The one-sided imposition of the ‘Persia vs Greece’ trope can mask the intricacies of history.<sup>22</sup>

With these considerations in mind, this thesis dares to use the adjective ‘Persian’. This is not only because it is a term that has been traditionally used but also because the

---

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Cartledge 2013: xi, 62-3.

<sup>21</sup> For instance, the title of a recently published sourcebook on the Persian Wars by Erik Jensen is *The Greco-Persian Wars: A Short History with Documents*. Jensen 2021, esp. p. 2. The conference held in London on 28-29 July 2022 was entitled ‘Ancient and Modern Narratives of the Greco-Persian Wars’. See also Holland 2010; Rung and Venidiktova 2017; Mendoni 2020: 8; Tolia-Christakou 2020; Réfi-Oszkó 2022.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Cartledge 2013: 62-3.

use of ‘Greco-Persian’ may make this PhD thesis appear clumsy.<sup>23</sup> It should be added that the adoption of this term does not mean the adoption of the Hellenocentric or Athenocentric view that the adjective ‘Persian’ may imply (although this thesis does examine the image of the Persian Wars held by the ancient Greeks).

Second, the battles, geographical space, and time period that the ‘Persian Wars’ encompass could vary. In the *Britannica Online*, the Greco-Persian Wars are defined to cover the period of the series of conflicts between Greek states and Persia between 492 and 449 BC, i.e., from the start of Datis’ expedition to the ‘Peace of Kallias’.<sup>24</sup> Although this may be influential among non-specialists, the most basic modern scholarly understanding of the Persian Wars includes the Persian expedition to Greece led by Datis, which resulted in the Battle of Marathon, as well as the Persian expedition to Greece led by Xerxes and the events and battles it included, which took place between 490 BC and 479 BC. This was already established by the early modern period. Johann Joachim Winckelmann uses the singular ‘der Persischer Krieg’, which refers to Xerxes’ expedition in accordance with the travel writer Pausanias’ usage. While following Herodotos’ description, Friedrich Hegel calls ‘die Medischen Kriege’ two Persian expeditions to mainland Greece. George Grote also ambiguously includes the Greek expeditions of Darius and Xerxes in “the Persian War”.<sup>25</sup>

Thus, the modern understanding of the ‘Persian Wars’ has been as a term that refers to the Greek expeditions of Darius and Xerxes. However, this does not correspond to ancient perceptions. This is because there was no clear definition of ‘Persian Wars’ in antiquity, and there may not have been a fixed vocabulary that specifically refers to the Persian Wars. In Herodotos’ view, for instance, the conflicts between the Greeks and the barbarians began with Kroisos, being the first barbarian who subjugated some Greeks

---

<sup>23</sup> Elsewhere I used the term “the Greco-Persian Wars”: I named the workshop about the reception of the Persian Wars “The Afterlife of the Greco-Persian Wars: From Antiquity to Modern Times”, which I organised with Richard Kendall on 13th December 2023 in Kyoto.

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/event/Greco-Persian-Wars> [accessed 1/11/2023].

<sup>25</sup> Winckelmann 1764: 321 with Paus. 2.29.5: “καὶ ἐν τῷ Μηδικῷ πολέμῳ παρασχέσθαι πλοῖα μετὰ γε Ἀθηναίους πλεῖστα”. Hegel 1986: 313-5. Grote 1849: 118-9. See also Lazenby 2012. Despite this definition, the conflicts between the Greeks and the Persians were not limited to the Greek expeditions of Darius and Xerxes. It is possible that these conflicts extended from the Ionian Revolt to the Peace of Kallias. Thus, among recent scholars, Philip de Souza differentiates “the Persian Wars”, which extend between 490 BC and 479 BC from “the Greek and the Persian Wars”, which cover the period between 492 BC and 386 BC. See de Souza 2003: 7.

and levied a tribute from them (Hdt. 1.5.3-6.1-3, 26) and the Persian expeditions into mainland Greece were part of the conflicts. On the Greco-Persian conflicts, he put emphasis on the role of the Ionians and regards the Ionian revolt as the immediate context for Darius' decision to make an expedition into mainland Greece and as his narrative also ends with the land of Ionians, i.e., the Battle of Mykale, at the end of his Book 9 (especially 9.121), the conflicts in mainland Greece are put between the ones of the Ionians.<sup>26</sup> Herodotos uses neither the words ὁ Μηδικὸν πόλεμος nor τὸ Μηδικὸν ἔργον, and he does not seem to offer clear boundaries for differentiating the Persian Wars from successive wars between Greeks and barbarians whose starting point is placed in the mythical period at the beginning of Book 1 (1.1-5).<sup>27</sup> For now, it seems difficult to judge clearly his conception of the Persian Wars. His understanding does not correspond to the modern recognition and definition of the Persian Wars.

Although there was no clear definition of which battles were included in the 'Persian Wars' in antiquity, some tendencies can be observed.<sup>28</sup> Some authors separate Darius' attempt from Xerxes' one. Thucydides indicates that "the Median war" (τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἔργων μέγιστον ἐπράχθη τὸ Μηδικόν)" was composed of two naval battles and two land battles, without identifying what battles they were exactly.<sup>29</sup> Polybios juxtaposes the Gallic invasion with τὴν Περσῶν ἔφοδον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, which apparently only refers to the Xerxes' expedition, as they contributed to the common freedom of Greeks (Polyb. 2.35.7, cf. Polyb. 38.2.1). Similarly, for Diodoros Sikeliotes, 'the Persian War' (ὁ ... Μηδικὸς ὀνομασθεὶς πόλεμος) only covers 480-479 BC (Diod. Sic. 11.37.6).

It can be observed from the Athenian discourses that the Athenians were fond of using frames that connected the Battle of Marathon with the Second Persian War.<sup>30</sup> For instance, Isocrates, at 68-99 of his *Panegyrikos*, refers to "the Persian war" (ἐπιφανέστατος μὲν οὖν τῶν πολέμων ὁ Περσικὸς γέγονεν), that was composed of successive battles from Marathon to Salamis. Those who drove the Persians from

---

<sup>26</sup> Yates 2019: 138-141.

<sup>27</sup> Cawkwell 2005: 66; Yates 2019: 138-9.

<sup>28</sup> Yates 2019: 137-46 recently best summarises how the Greeks variously defined the time and space of the conflicts between the Greeks and the Persians in the fifth century BC. Cf. Duffy 2018: 1-4.

<sup>29</sup> The two naval battles are most likely to be Salamis and Artemision (or Mykale), and the two land battles Thermopylai and Plataia. Thuc. 1.23.1; Hornblower 1991: 62.

<sup>30</sup> Yates 2019: 159-62. See also Thomas 1989: 221-7; Jung 2006: 152-65 for the Athenocentric narrative of the Persian Wars.

mainland Greece could occupy a special status as Demosthenes felt it worth referring to those who died at Marathon, Plataiai, Salamis, and Artemision among those who were buried in the Public Cemetery (Dem. 18.208). Plato deliberately indicates that the Battle of Marathon was the beginning of the threat to the Greeks and the Battle of Plataia its end, without using the word “τὸ Μηδικὸν πόλεμος” (Pl. *Leg.* 707c.1-5). Although his intention was to object to those who believe the victory at the Battle of Salamis saved the Greeks, he thought the battles which happened from 490 BC to 479 BC between the Greeks and the ‘barbarians’ were successive and could be recognised as a collective threat to the Greeks.<sup>31</sup> A variant of this type can be found in Aristotle, who seems to employ this term to denote the expedition led by Datis in 490 BC as “ὁ Μηδικὸς πόλεμος,” (Arist. *An. post.* 94a36-b1) whereas the same author employs it for the Xerxes’ expedition (Arist. *Pol.* 1307a5-7). Darius’ and Xerxes’ expeditions could each be referred to as Μηδικὸς πόλεμος or synonymous with it. The inclusion of Marathon is not surprising at all as it was a core of the Athenian identity and their claim for the credit in the wars against Persian ‘barbarians’, as we will see in Chapter 1.

A broader perspective was possible. In order to eulogise Flamininus’ declaration of Greek freedom, Plutarch compares his deed with Marathon, Salamis, Plataia, Thermopylai, Eurymedon and Kimon’s siege of Kition in 450 BC. The concept that underpins this is a series of Greek victories over the Persians for the sake of Greek freedom, with no geographical limitation (Plut. *Flam.* 11.6, cf. Plut. *Cim.* 19.3-4; Plut. *Mor.* 814c). Plato uses τὸν Περσικὸν πόλεμον at *Menexenos* 242b to denote the battles as a unified war which happened between Darius’ expedition to Greece, namely the Battle of Marathon (Pl. *Menex.* 239d-240c), and the time when the peace treaty was secured after the Athenian expedition into Egypt (241e-242a). There, the conflicts between the Greeks and the Persians are denoted as “the war against the barbarians” (ὁ πόλεμος ... πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους).<sup>32</sup>

In this way, there were several ways of structuring the conflicts between the Greeks and the Persians. If we define as the *terminus post quem* of the wars Kroisos’ conquest

---

<sup>31</sup> Plato calls the wars “the Persian expedition (or force)” (ὁ Περσικὸς στόλος) at Pl. *Leg.* 642e, 692c, 698c.

<sup>32</sup> The wars of the Delian League are referred to as following the expulsions of Darius and Xerxes’ expeditions in the speech. At 241d, Plato’s Sokrates refers to the Greeks on the offensive against Persia, as putting on the end of the work of salvation, i.e., the wars against the Persians, executed by their predecessors by expelling the Persian threat from the Aegean Sea. See also Yates 2019: 144-6.

of the Western Asia Minor or the Ionian Revolt by following Herodotos, and as their *terminus ante quem* the Egyptian Expedition or the so-called Peace of Kallias by following Plato, it might be possible for us to set up a ‘very long-term Persian War’. There is no space in this thesis to trace in detail how, from this diversity in antiquity, the Persian Wars developed into the concept of ‘two invasions of the Greek mainland by the Persians’. However, it can be speculated that the limitation of the ‘Persian Wars’ to indicate this meaning seems to be the result of a composition of Herodotos’ narrative, the Athenocentric and Hellenocentric view imposed on history by, or by the time of the rise of, the early modern and modern thinkers and scholars of Western Europe.

In light of the above, this thesis will adopt our contemporary interpretation of the Persian Wars and concentrate on the Hellenistic reaction to these two campaigns against mainland Greece, fought from 490 BC to 479 BC. This approach could be justified as the Greeks conceptualised the historical event (or events) as ‘invasions by the Persians’, as highlighted in the discussion above. The discussion is also better off excluding the Ionian Revolt and the wars against the Persians under the Delian League, as they may diffuse the topic of this thesis. Thus, this thesis will not include the Battle of Mykale, for instance, as it occurred on the slopes of Mount Mykale in Ionia, outside mainland Greece, although it is reported to have occurred on the same day as the Battle of Plataia, as the completion of the Greek victory, as well as Datis’ capture of Rhodes, dated either to the Ionian Revolt in 494 BC or to Datis’ expedition to mainland Greece in 490 BC, event recorded on the *Lindian Chronicle*, inscribed on a marble *stele* and published in Lindos in Rhodes in the first century BC.<sup>33</sup>

It should be noted here that the Athenian influence can be seen in the inclusion of Marathon in the definition of the ‘Persian Wars’ dealt with in this thesis. Yet, the place of Marathon is in a somewhat ambiguous position. From the Athenian point of view, the Battle of Marathon saved Greece. However, non-Athenian audiences did not accept this idea immediately. For instance, although modern scholars sometimes interpret Herodotos’ *Histories* as an encomium of Athens, especially of Perikles and the Athenian democracy, Herodotos does not accept the Athenian view on the Battle of Marathon at which they claimed to save Greece.<sup>34</sup> A clue to Herodotos’ realisation of this claim can

---

<sup>33</sup> For the Battle of Mykale, see Hdt. 9.100-1; Lazenby 2012, cf. Flower and Marincola 2002: 277 for the ancient reception of the legend of the synchronicity of Plataia and Mykale. For the *Lindian Chronicle*, see *Lindian Chronicle*, *BNJ* 532 F 4, ll. 1-59. For the dating of the Rhodian sack of Datis, see Higbie 2003: 231-5.

<sup>34</sup> For Herodotos’ *Histories* as an encomium of Athens, see Harvey 1966, cf. Ostwald 2009: 269. For

be found in an Athenian speech in Chapter 27 of Book 9. Yet, in his *Histories*, Salamis and Plataia are much more important than Marathon and Herodotos evaluates the Athenian achievement only in terms of their contribution to the Battle of Salamis (Hdt. 7.139). Although he still glorifies Marathon in his way, the culmination of his *Histories* comes after Marathon in Books 7-9, where Xerxes' Greek expedition is described in detail. Darius' defeat at the Battle of Marathon only gives an immediate context for Xerxes' expedition (Hdt. 7.1-11, esp. 1-2, 5). Theopompos was reported to have claimed that the Athenians cheated and misled the Greeks by exaggerating their achievement at Marathon (Theopomp. *BNJ* 115 F153). It may have been Theopompos that Plutarch had in mind when he writes of those who disparagingly dismissed the battle as a minor engagement (Plut. *Mor.* 862d). Diodoros, on the other hand, regards only the defeat of Xerxes in 480/79 BC as a watershed of Greek history (Diod. Sic. 12.1-2). As we saw above, Polybios juxtaposes the Gallic invasion with Xerxes', as they contributed to the common freedom of Greeks, and Marathon is never mentioned (Polyb. 2.35.7, cf. Polyb. 38.2.1). Lykophron omits the Battle of Marathon in his narrative of the series of the struggles between Europe and Asia.<sup>35</sup> It is worth considering whether a full Panhellenic reappraisal of Marathon occurred in the Roman period, as Michael Jung observed, or before then. In this PhD thesis, I will also consider the variations in the reception of each battle, with specific emphasis on that of the Battle of Marathon from others.

## 4.2. Collective Memory

The concept of collective memory forms an underlying idea in the discussion of this thesis. Scholarship has been studying the variety of recollections and memories in the ancient world since the 1980s. It has made considerable use of the theories of collective, social and cultural memory, based on which scholars have produced many important studies.<sup>36</sup> It is still helpful to briefly touch on how I understand and use the concept of

---

a more nuanced view of Herodotos' evaluation of Athens, see Derow 1995: 38-51. For Herodotos' rejection of the Athenian myth of Marathon, see Evans 1993. Yet, he employs a different means of heroisation of Marathon. See Pelling 2013.

<sup>35</sup> Lycoph. *Alex.* ll. 1409-11 with Hornblower 2015: 486-7.

<sup>36</sup> Numerous studies on ancient history utilise the theories of memory. I cite a few important studies here: Alcock 2002; Ma 2009; Grethlein 2010; Steinbock 2013; Stein-Hölkeskamp and Hölkeskamp 2019; Stein-Hölkeskamp and Hölkeskamp 2020. Barbato 2020 applied New Institutionalism to the analysis of the social memory of Classical Athens. Attention has also been paid to the forms, media,

collective memory here in order to explain the theoretical framework of this thesis.<sup>37</sup>

The concept of collective memory is advocated by Maurice Halbwachs. His argument is that an individual's memory is always defined by the group in society to which the individual belongs, namely, *un cadre social* or a social framework. According to him, individuals need to adapt the thinking of a group in order to position their experiences in time and space and to reconstruct them by giving them meaning and an understandable narrative form. Since collective memory exists at different levels - family, town, school, workplace, nation, community of faith, etc. - individual memory is established through a mixture of the collective memories of various groups. Then, such social frameworks and collective memory enable individuals to retain memories, while, at the same time, collective memory is embodied through individual acts of recall. At the core of Halbwachs' argument lies a constructivist attitude. Collective memory he advocates is necessarily selective and reconstructive, as it is defined by the present needs and concerns of a particular group. Remembrance can, therefore, be understood as the act of reconstructing the past by rearranging the material that exists in the present.<sup>38</sup>

Aleida Assmann and Jan Assmann developed Halbwachs' theory of collective memory and created two concepts: communicative memory and cultural memory. Communicative memory is a memory about the immediate past that is fostered by individual interactions in everyday life, whereas cultural memory is a memory that denotes the past a community configures in order to establish its collective identity in time. Cultural memory is linked to the identity of a particular group, creating a sense of uniqueness and continuity for that group and ensuring a sense of community by recalling the past by reconstructing images of the past according to the demands of the moment while producing normative meanings for the group at the same time. Such cultural memory is generally transmitted through institutionalised means such as canons, rituals and documents and is highly organised and activated by specialised tradition bearers.

---

and theories of memory in antiquity. See Castagnoli and Ceccarelli 2019; Dignas 2022. For our discussion, it is notable that scholars on the Persian Wars dedicate themselves to outlining the theory of memory in great detail for their study. Jung 2006: 13-26; Steinbock 2013: 1-47; Yates 2019: 9-19; Proietti 2021: 12-43. Hans-Joachim Gehrke has elaborated on the concept of intentional history, which is concerned with history being a shaping force of collective and individual human life. See Foxhall, Gehrke and Luraghi 2010; Gehrke 2011; Gehrke 2014 = Gehrke 2023; Gehrke 2019.

<sup>37</sup> This section owes much to Erll 2017; Yasukawa 2022.

<sup>38</sup> Halbwachs 1968: 57-8; Halbwachs 1976: 296.

Communicative memory and cultural memory actually overlap with each other, and it is possible for a particular event to be the subject of both. For example, as Astrid Erll states, memories of the Second World War are subject to both.<sup>39</sup> Here, communicative memory belongs to the dimension of the everyday world perceived as the present, whereas recollection based on cultural memory is myth or history transformed into myth. The latter functions as the norm of the community, as a past that secures a certain collective identity.<sup>40</sup>

A distinctive feature of the concept of cultural memory is that it diminishes the dichotomy between memory and history, which was distinguished in Halbwachs' theory, and treats history also as a type of memory in terms of a reinterpretation of the past by current concerns. It is also important to set media such as rituals and texts as devices for the formation, preservation, and transmission of collective memory.

Collective memory draws attention to the intersection of memory and power. Memory is always created within specific power relational contexts.<sup>41</sup> As Jan Assmann has stated that 'Herrschaft braucht Herkunft', those who are in a position of power require memories that affirm their legitimacy.<sup>42</sup> Memories can be selected, manipulated, and fabricated to match the desires of those in authority. We can think of powers such as tyrannies, kings, and emperors in antiquity who did these things, devised their own official memory, and enforced it upon their subjects. In the literature of the Middle Kingdom Egypt, there was an attempt to diffuse the understanding that social order could only be established by the Pharaonic state.<sup>43</sup> There was the practice of *damnatio memoriae* in Rome, in which a new emperor or the Senate might confiscate the previous emperor's property, remove his name, and have the statues of him remodelled or defaced if they disapproved of his acts and the character of his reign.<sup>44</sup> The manipulated memories are thus used to propagate the ruling ideology from top to bottom.<sup>45</sup>

---

<sup>39</sup> Erll 2017: 111.

<sup>40</sup> Assmann 1992: 76-7; Erll 2017: 111-3.

<sup>41</sup> Assmann 2013: 24.

<sup>42</sup> Assmann 1992: 71.

<sup>43</sup> Assmann 1992: 71.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Flower 2006: xix-xx for the danger of using the term *damnatio memoriae*.

<sup>45</sup> In this PhD thesis, ideology is defined as a system of ideas specific to a particular social group, social class, or culture, which forms the basis for the political and social behaviour and claims of such groups. Propaganda refers to activities and interactions that attempt to influence individuals or groups and direct their behaviour in the intended direction by unilaterally propagating or attempting

Such a top-down memory control mechanism with the ruler at the top is unlikely to exist in a democratic or oligarchic Greek *polis*.<sup>46</sup> However, social differentiation can also play a major role in the selection and formation of memory, even in Greek *poleis* and in assemblages of communities such as a *koinon*.<sup>47</sup> In the case of Classical Athens, trained and knowledgeable orators manipulated the common image of the past shared by the *demos* to create new memories of the city for their own purposes.<sup>48</sup> Thus, when ‘official’ memory of the past is narrated in a particular community, there may be a sorting and re-creation of memories centred on the leading figures or groups of the community. The experiences and memories of a sub-group or an individual, or representations produced for immediate purposes, are selected as if they were the memory of the whole community and take the place of the ‘official memory’. For example, rituals and festivals involving several communities or actors reflect the ideology of the organisers as well as the social, cultural, economic, and historical factors of the time. Consequently, the adoption of a particular interpretation of the past inevitably leads to the neglect, suppression, or concealment of other interpretations.

However, the past recreated by a superior power or powers is not necessarily unilaterally imposed on subordinate peoples. Rulers are not necessarily omnipotent, and different interpretations of the past become problematic when multiple actors are involved. As David Yates argues, the use of the memory of the Persian Wars by Philip II and Alexander III was not fully accepted by the Greeks.<sup>49</sup> Athens, Sparta, and Thebes did not squarely embrace the cause of Alexander’s Asian campaign through the imagery of the Persian Wars. As in a democratic *polis*, where memory is formed through constant communication between elites and *demos*, memory formation involving multiple actors is communicative to varying degrees. There are many examples of this. For instance, in official Athenian casualty lists of the fifth century BC, the names of the war dead were recorded by tribe, eliminating the markers normally required for ancient

---

to imprint certain fixed ideas, ideologies, or principles on the audience. Although scholars of ancient history have long been familiar with the use of this term, there are still those who criticise the easy use of this modern concept or reject the use of this term. Lobur 2005; Zaccarini 2021: 460. See Ellithorpe 2017: xxvi with n. 6 for a summary of the scholarly discussion with a bibliography. See also Enenkel and Pfeijffer 2005: 4-6.

<sup>46</sup> See Jung 2006: 17-9 for his critique on Jan Assmann’s discussion.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Yates 2019: 11.

<sup>48</sup> Canevaro 2019: 156.

<sup>49</sup> Yates 2019: 202-48.

Greek men to articulate their social position, such as their residential area and the name of their father, for emphasising the values of democratic civic equality.<sup>50</sup> Although the Athenians made reconciliation by vowing to forget the past wrongdoings in the time of the civil war of 403 BC, when one of the returning citizens reportedly attempted to violate the amnesty, Archinos persuaded the councillors to sentence him to death.<sup>51</sup> The same phenomenon can be observed in a relationship between *poleis*. As will be seen in Chapter 4, the Eleutheria, a Panhellenic festival in Plataia which started in the 330s BC, had the purpose of honouring the Greek *homonoia* and the common victory at Plataia in 479 BC. But this memorisation differed from the Athenian interpretation of the Battle of Plataia prevalent in the fourth century BC, according to which the victory was jointly achieved by Athens and Sparta.<sup>52</sup> ‘Official’ memory can be challenged by a variety of large and small objections from all levels, from the collective to the individual.<sup>53</sup> Even in totalitarian states it is impossible to unilaterally determine the official memory and to suppress and regulate the diverse collective memories within the community. Therefore, where necessary, the formation and transformation of collective or cultural memory involves the manipulation of memory through communication between members.

This PhD thesis does not strictly utilise the theory of collective and cultural memory to structure its argument. However, the concept of collective memory clarifies the way in which this PhD thesis approaches and analyses evidence. The image of a shared past recalled as collective memory is shaped by the mutual negotiation of subjects and is shaped by their identities and immediate needs. Manipulations and contestations of the plural and different images about the past would be observed. In the Classical period, the plurality of the memory of the Persian Wars had the potential to produce contestations between the communities which had different memories, and we will see in Chapter 1 how the Athenians tried to overwhelm and press the others’ memories of the Persian Wars which were compatible with the Athenian versions. As we will see, especially in Chapters 2 and 3, memories of the Persian Wars were utilised and

---

<sup>50</sup> E.g. *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 1147, 1149, 1162; Loraux 1982: 28; Goldhill 1987: 66-7.

<sup>51</sup> [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 40.2. On this passage and Aristotle’s evaluation of the effect of councillors’ judgement on abiding by the amnesty, see Wolpert 2002: 49-71. For the Athenian amnesty, see also Joyce 2022.

<sup>52</sup> Étienne and Piérart 1975: 51-3. For the establishment of the Eleutheria, see Wallace 2011b: 148-57; Yates 2019: 224-7. For the Athenian memories, see *Lys.* 2.46-7; *Pl. Menex.* 241c-d. See Chapter 4.2.3.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Yates 2019: 10-2.

manipulated to support the ideological programmes of the kings and *poleis*. On the other hand, in Chapter 4, we will see how memories advocated in the Eleutheria at Plataia were selected to establish the centrality of Athens and Sparta in the Panhellenic memory. Chapter 5 will examine how the emphasis in the recollections changed with the completion of Roman domination of Greece and the *oikoumene*.

### **4.3. Greeks and Others: The Evidence**

The purpose of this PhD is to study why and how the Greeks recalled the Persian Wars in the Hellenistic period and in what way the Greeks perceived the Persian Wars past. When we refer to the contexts in which the Persian Wars were mentioned in the Hellenistic period, it can be found that in many cases they occurred in relation to four ethnic groups: Macedonians, Gauls, Romans, and Greeks. By making them the subject of our analysis, we examine the use of memories of the Persian Wars and their transformation. In this section, we shall review those four ethnic groups and the main historical sources on them.

First, the Macedonians, in particular the Argeads and the Antigonids, have been recounted in association with the past of the Persian Wars from the Classical period to the Hellenistic period. The Athenians have treated their various wars with them in parallel with the Persians. From the middle of the fourth century BC onwards, Philip II and Alexander III remained the focus of Athenian politics. Comparisons of their wars with the Persian wars can be found in the works of Demosthenes, Aischines and Hypereides. For example, Demosthenes called Philip a ‘barbarian’ and paralleled those who went to Chaironeia with the heroes of the Persian Wars (Dem. 9.31, 20.208-10),<sup>54</sup> although the Macedonians were a people who embraced Greek culture and were recognised as ‘Greeks’ in the Classical period, for they were accepted in the festival of Olympia as the Greeks (Hdt. 5.22). Such works convey information about the Athenian discourses and rhetoric of inventing the Otherness of the Macedonians in Athens up to around 322 BC. In addition, inscriptions provide information about the Hellenistic period, in particular information about how, during the Chremonidean War (c. 268-2 BC) waged against Antigonos Gonatas, the Athenians recalled the Classical past of the Greeks, who fought against “those attempting to enslave their cities” (*IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 912, 1. 11*). Although the texts of the inscriptions do not fully reflect the actual arguments of a debate at the assembly, council or a meeting of allies, they nevertheless present the final

---

<sup>54</sup> Philip as barbarian: Dem. 3.16, 9.31, 19.305, 19.327, cf. Dem. 3.24.

decision taken and the important wording that they decided should remain engraved on *stelai*. The information on festivals and commendations in the inscriptions also tell us how the *polis* valued their honorands and how the Athenians commemorated them.

As far as the Hellenistic period is concerned, inscriptions are basically the most important sources. Yet, for the early Hellenistic period, we can use the *Bibliothēke* of Diodoros, written in the first century BC, and the *Life of Demetrios* of Plutarch, written around the beginning of the second century AD, for the history of Athens in the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods. From the former, we can grasp how the Athenians used memories of the Persian Wars to wage war against the Macedonian rule after the death of Alexander, while, from the latter, we can gather clues for the imagery of the Persian Wars that used in the process of political negotiations between Demetrios Poliorketes and the Athenians, as will be discussed in Chapter 2. The authenticity of both historiographies may be problematic, as they were written in a later period and the respective accounts were prepared by excerpting and editing the preceding literature. However, since both cite historical sources originating from Athens and Athenian decrees, a close examination of the content of each account would offer useful information.<sup>55</sup>

Meanwhile, the Macedonians themselves attempted to present themselves as the saviours of the Greeks. In preparation for the Asian campaign, Philip and Alexander rebuilt Plataia, backed the Greeks in founding the Eleutheria at Plataia, and Alexander presented himself as the guardian of freedom in Asia Minor. Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes also took leading positions in the politics of Greek freedom in the early Hellenistic period. Similarly, Antigonos Gonatas, even though accused of setting up tyranny throughout mainland Greece, represented himself as the saviour of Greece for his victory over the Gauls in 277 BC and granting even partial freedom to *poleis* under his rule.<sup>56</sup> It should be pointed out that, as far as Macedonia is concerned, historical sources are often produced in Athens, and it is difficult to use them to ascertain the situation and attitude outside Athens.

Second, the Hellenistic period saw the arrival of new ‘barbarians’ and ‘enemies of Greek civilisation’, the Gauls. In the early fourth century BC, these Celtic tribes had moved southwards into the Italian peninsula from the fourth century BC and sacked Rome. Later, in the early third century BC, they entered the Balkans, and by around 280

---

<sup>55</sup> E.g., Diod. Sic. 20.46.2; Plut. *Demetr.* 13.1-3. Cf. Rosen 1967 for Diodoros and Sweet 1951; Rose 2015: 40-56 esp. 48-9, 52-4 for Plutarch.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *Suppl. Hell.* 115; Will 1979: 323, cf. 108-9; Champion 2004/5 [2007].

BC they were in full-scale contact with the Macedonians and the Greeks of the mainland and Asia Minor.

The battles and victories over the Gauls were represented by the Greeks and the Macedonians as a battle between civilisation and barbarism, or Greeks versus barbarians. In 279 BC, the Gauls penetrated mainland Greece broke through Thermopylai, but were defeated at Delphi by the Greek army led by the Aitolians. At this time, the Gauls were described as ‘barbarians’ and contrasted with the Greeks in a decree issued by Kos in 278 BC for thanksgiving for the defeat of the Gauls at Delphi (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 398). In addition to Antigonos Gonatas, as we saw above, Ptolemy II compared his victory over the Gauls who revolted against him to the Gigantomachy (Callim. *Hymn* 4, 171-90). The Attalid kings followed these precedents after they defeated the Gallic soldiers.<sup>57</sup>

The imagery of the Persian Wars was used in this barbarisation of the Gauls as enemies of civilisation. The most obvious example of this is Pausanias’ *Description of Greece*, written in the second century AD. His depiction of the invasion of Greece by the Gauls is so filled with the imagery and motifs of the Persian Wars that it could be described as a ‘replay of the Persian Wars’. However, it is debatable to what extent his account is his own and to what extent it reflects the view of his sources. In other words, attention must be paid to the extent to which his descriptions reflect Hellenistic views. However, Pausanias is an excellent source for us because he also records the commemorations of victories over the Gauls in various parts of Greece. Of course, many aspects of Pausanias’ account need to be paid attention to as well. How accurate his description of the ancient landscape is and the accuracy of the information he conveys will remain a constant question for modern researchers.<sup>58</sup> However, by examining the descriptions left by Pausanias, it will be possible to elucidate the relationship between the various reactions of the Greeks towards the Gauls and their uses of imagery of the Persian Wars.

Third is the Romans. The Romans began to intervene in the affairs of the Eastern Mediterranean during the First Macedonian War (214 BC –205 BC). After its victory over Philip V, Rome gradually established itself as the protector of Greece. The extent to which the Romans were treated by the Greeks as ‘barbarians’ is disputed, but at least they were foreigners from Italy with roots in Asia, and their identity as Trojan ancestors established their position as the Other in the mythological system of the Greeks. Half a century after the First Macedonian War, Rome was transformed into the most powerful

---

<sup>57</sup> Cf Strootman 2005: 121-34.

<sup>58</sup> For this, see Stewart 2013.

power in the Eastern Mediterranean and completed the domination of Greece. The Achaian War in 146 BC and the destruction of Korinth were enough for the Greeks to recognise the ‘end of Greek history’ at the same time. By the time Egypt was annexed to Rome in 30 BC and the ‘Hellenistic period’ as a period of political history came to an end, Rome was recognised by itself and others as the absolute ruler of the *oikoumene*.

In the course of this nearly 200-year contact, the Greeks sought to understand the presence of the Romans. In the process, the imagery of the Persian Wars has been cited several times. An interesting medium used at the beginning of the period to describe the Roman presence was poetry: a poem by Alkaios of Messene and the *Alexandra* by Lykophron relate memories of the Persian Wars to Rome in different ways. There are difficulties in analysing the respective sources. The exact date of creation and the intended audience of each work are unknown, but they must date from no later than the early second century BC.<sup>59</sup> In addition, the content of the *Alexandra* is notorious for being so full of metaphors and obscure allusions that it is difficult to decipher. However, both provide clues to the question of how Rome was perceived by the Greeks in the second century BC. The next two to speak of a parallel between the Roman and Persian Wars are Polybios, the Achaian historian in the second century BC, and Diodoros, the Sicilian historian in the first century BC. They respectively cite memories of the Persian Wars in the former’s account of the impact of the Achaian War and the latter’s account of the Marsic War. These historiographies can be evaluated as an attempt to relate the imagery of the Persian War with the Romans, although they differ in their mode of expression and purpose.

The fourth is the Greeks themselves. It may be indisputable that the recollections of the Persian Wars, established as the collective past of the Greeks, would always involve the activities of the Greeks. As Greek culture spread and ‘globalised’ to the East and the West, there was a growing primacy of the culture of the old Greek world, especially the mythologically and historically valuable *poleis* such as Athens, Sparta and Argos.<sup>60</sup> The Hellenistic period was also a period of Macedonian domination, the influx of others - the Gauls and the Romans - as well as the arrival in the Aegean Sea of a number of non-Greeks and the cultures and religions they brought with them.<sup>61</sup> A *polis* with a past of questionable Greekness was guaranteed Greekness through mythical kinship with the

---

<sup>59</sup> See Erskine 2001: 154-6; Jones 2014b; Hornblower 2015: 36-9, 114; Hornblower 2018: 3-10, 103; Erskine 2021: 390.

<sup>60</sup> Lloyd-Jones 1999: 13-4 with Swain 1996: 75.

<sup>61</sup> Vlassopoulos 2013: 303-4.

*poleis* in the old Greek World and an emphasis on the Greek past.<sup>62</sup> When compared to the Classical period, the importance of the Old Greek World as a centre of power diminished. However, it was acquiring a different value as a centre of Greekness. In these circumstances, the festivals and rituals associated with the mythical and Classical period past, which could form a self-recognition by creating a continuity between the ‘glorious’ past and the present, were renewed and created in the Hellenistic period.

The Hellenistic period was when the Persian Wars, as part of the identity of the polis, were redefined through the renewal of various commemorations. It is likely that the Athenians added activities to commemorate the Persian Wars as part of their training in ephebes. In the second century BC, their ephebes visited the tomb of the *Marathonomachoi* to perform a sacrifice and hold a contest while they also participated in the festival of Aianteia, which was celebrated for Ajax, on the island Salamis, after they had sailed to the trophy of the Battle of Salamis there.<sup>63</sup> In the same century, a new ritual was also added to the Eleutheria, the panhellenic festival in Plataia. These ritual transformations and the content of the rituals can be observed in epigraphic sources. However, when it comes to Plataia, descriptions of rituals and commemorative activities in Plataia can be found in the works of Pausanias and Plutarch, both of whom visited Plataia. Although their testimonies are sometimes contradictory, they are extremely important sources, as they contain at least somewhat of the testimonies of the Plataians.

The Hellenistic period is known for its poor situation of sources, but as mentioned above, it is possible to make use of contemporaneous epigraphic material and texts from the Roman period. In addition, the available sources differ for each of the topics listed above, so the picture presented in this thesis will be necessarily patchy. However, it will provide a satisfactory answer to the question of how memories of the Persian Wars were employed in the Hellenistic period and what drove the recall of various memories, which is the aim of this doctoral thesis.

---

<sup>62</sup> Scheer 2003: 226-31.

<sup>63</sup> *IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1313, ll. 15-8. IG II<sup>2</sup> 1006* shows the ephebic participation in the cult of Artemis Agrotera, to the temple where goats were sacrificed (ll. 8-9). This is the festival for celebrating the victory of the Battle of Marathon. It took place on the seventh day of Boedromion, which is said to be the day when the Battle of Marathon occurred. See Deubner 1932: 209-10 with source references. For the activities at Salamis, see *IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1313, ll. 21-6. Cf. IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1285, ll. 1-3 (185/4 BC)*. On the Aianteia, see Deubner 1932: 228.

## 5. OUTLINE OF THIS THESIS

This PhD thesis aims to examine how the Greek reception and remembrance of the Persian Wars during the Hellenistic period contributed to their collective memory and identity. It explores the way that the Greeks utilised the recollections of these wars as models for conflicts against ‘barbarian’ groups like the Macedonians, Gauls, and Romans. This thesis contends that the Persian Wars worked as symbolic representations of Greek civilisation, distinct experiences, and identity markers. They served as tools to delineate Greek identity from others. The nature and context of these recollections varied, shaped by different circumstances and actors. Moreover, the Battle of Plataia’s memory was instrumental in moulding Greek collective identity through the Eleutheria festival, established around the 330s BC, later incorporating celebrations of the rivalry between Athens and Sparta in a more peaceful manner from the second century BC. While the Persian Wars were commemorated as a unified Greek triumph over external foes, divergent memories of the Battle of Plataia remained among Athenians, Spartans, and Plataians. These arguments help illuminate the construction of Greek identity during the Hellenistic period.

In order to establish a premise for the discussion, Chapter 1 explains how these memories were established and transformed during the Classical period. Initially perceived as mythical victories where Greeks defeated barbarians, saved Greece, and restored order, these notions spread through oral traditions, literature, monuments, and rituals, particularly solidifying in the fifth century BC. The chapter aims to uncover how these recollections took root in the Greek world and their significance, especially in Athens, where the victories were prominently celebrated. Additionally, it examines the impact of the Peloponnesian War and the emergence of the idea of an Asian expedition to resolve Greek issues post the Persian Wars. This chapter intends to illustrate how inherited memories of the Persian Wars evolved and were utilised diversely in various contexts. There’s an argument that in the Classical period, the formation of a collective Greek memory regarding these wars was hindered, as city-states remembered them within the context of their own histories. The chapter focuses on three key phenomena in the Classical period to examine the formation, use, and evolution of these memories.

Chapter 2 aims to explore the role and significance of the memory of the Persian Wars in the Athenian-Macedonian relationship. It is divided into three sections focusing on (1) Philip II and Alexander III, (2) Demetrios Poliorketes and his father Antigonos Monophthalmos, and (3) Antigonos Gonatas, who governed Athens in the early Hellenistic period. Each section examines how the Argeads, Antigonids, and Athenians

employed the imagery of the Persian Wars during their interaction stages. It delves into the deliberate utilisation of these memories as negotiation tools by both Athenians and Macedonians and explores the limitations of this approach. The chapter suggests that it was during the rule of Demetrios Poliorketes when Athenians earnestly began employing their war imagery to negotiate with their rulers.

Chapter 3 focuses on the local remembrance of the Gallic invasion in correlation with the Panhellenic acknowledgement of this event. The Gallic invasion of mainland Greece and Asia Minor in 280-279 BC significantly impacted Greek perceptions. The Gauls, deemed 'lawless' and 'barbaric', came to be viewed as detestable adversaries of Hellenistic Greek civilisation, akin to the Persians in the Classical period. The imagery of the Persian Wars served as a reference point for characterising the conflicts against the Gauls. Historical narratives by Pausanias and Polybios illustrate parallels between the Gallic invasion and the Persian Wars, highlighting lessons for pursuing Greek collective freedom. This chapter aims to explore Athens' viewpoint on the Gallic invasion. The argument contends that Athenians remembered the Gallic invasion not merely as a military conquest but as a struggle for Athens' freedom and democracy, rooted in the city's circumstances during the invasion.

Chapter 4 examines the evolution of memories and rituals associated with the Battle of Plataia and their connection with the Plataian landscape. The Battle of Plataia was historically viewed as a Spartan victory under Pausanias' leadership, contributing to Spartan pride and claims of saving Greece. Yet, Athenian involvement in the cult of Eleutheria was also evident in Plataia's memory landscape, while the involvement of locals at Plataia is also significant. This chapter aims to illuminate the complexity and diversity of memories associated with the Battle of Plataia. It argues that the Eleutheria festival selected the memory of Greek cooperation under the leadership of Athens and Sparta and incorporated fifth-century BC recollections. Additionally, it proposes that the establishment of Eleutheria likely altered the Plataian landscape, segregating local memory within the city walls while Panhellenic monuments stood outside.

Chapter 5 investigates the correlation between Greek perceptions of Roman dominance and the symbolism of the Persian Wars. The chapter's primary argument is that while the Persian Wars' imagery consistently influenced perceptions of Roman authority, how these memories were recalled shifted with Rome's ascent. It served as a metric for defining Roman identity, with Rome's expanding influence altering Greek perspectives on the Persian Wars. The completion of Roman dominance in the Mediterranean necessitated a fresh perspective for Greeks to comprehend Roman power, requiring the integration of Persian Wars memories into this new framework.

## *Introduction*

This PhD thesis also has appendixes which provide a scholarly discussion of the reconstruction of the family tree of the Athenian politician Kallippos and the text and translation of *IG II<sup>2</sup> 2788*.

# 1

## Setting the Stage

### The Receptions of the Persian Wars in the Classical Period

#### 1.1. INTRODUCTION

The main theme of this thesis is memories of the Persian Wars in the Hellenistic period. As a prerequisite to entering the main discussion, it is necessary to clarify the processes of establishing how the Greeks of the Classical period remembered the Persian Wars and how those memories were used and transformed. After its conclusion, the Persian Wars were understood as mythical, in which the Greeks defeated the barbarians, saved Greece, and restored order to the world. This understanding spread and took root through oral traditions, literary works, monuments, and rituals. The fifth century BC is the period in which the basic understanding and representation of the Persian Wars were established. How did they take root in the Greek world, and what function did they have? In Athens, where the successes in the Persian Wars were most strongly publicised, in what forms were memories of the Persian Wars expressed, and what meaning did they have? Also, with the loss of those who had experienced the Persian Wars and the emergence of a new great war in the Greek world, the Peloponnesian War, the idea of an Asian expedition to solve Greece's problems was produced. What was the significance of the Persian Wars in this idea?

This chapter will show how the memories of the Persian Wars were formed and inherited by later generations, as well as how these memories changed and were used differently depending on the context. It has recently been argued that the Classical period is a period in which the formation of a collective Greek memory of the Persian Wars was prevented by the fact that each Greek *poleis* remembered the Persian Wars

subjectively as part of the past of their own *poleis*.<sup>1</sup> The analysis in this chapter will support that claim. It is impossible to consider all the receptions in the Classical period in one short chapter. This chapter, therefore, examines three phenomena that seem to be characteristic of the Classical period - iconography, political diplomacy, and the development of Panhellenism - in relation to the chapters that follow and asks how memories of the Persian Wars were formed, used and developed in the Classical period.

This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section examines the developments of iconographic representations of Marathon and Salamis in Athens and their implications. The Athenians boasted of their contributions at Marathon and Salamis throughout the Classical period. In their iconography, however, they placed an emphasis on Marathon rather than Salamis. Why did Athens, which developed as a naval power throughout the fifth century BC, continue to place emphasis on Marathon? Answering this question would lead us to consider why Hellenistic powers, such as Attalos and Antigonos Gonatas, made use of the imagery of Marathon.<sup>2</sup> The next section focuses on diplomatic negotiations, revealing that the various narratives of the Persian Wars were possible in different settings and for different purposes. The use of particular memories in politics appears to be a common phenomenon in the Classical period. It may be a feature of a time when inter-*polis* conflicts were constant, and no collective ritual of the wars had developed. This section will provide a Classical precedent for Athens and Sparta's use of memories of the Persian Wars to lead the fight against Macedonia (see Chapter Two) and a premise for understanding the innovation of the development of collective memory in Plataia (see Chapter Four). The final section examines the relationship between the development of Panhellenism and the Persian Wars. This section will scrutinise the ideas of Panhellenism to understand better how they were a major contribution to the reception of the wars in the Hellenistic period and, later, how they influenced Alexander and Plataia, the focus of Chapters Two and Four.

---

<sup>1</sup> Yates 2019 with Yates 2013 and Yates 2018; Proietti 2021. The bibliography on the early reception of the wars is vast and is still increasing. For the recent studies, in addition to those cited here, see Proietti 2015; Proietti 2020; Tolia-Christakou 2020.

<sup>2</sup> See Paus. 1.25.2; Stewart 2004 for Attalos and Chapter 2.4.2 for Antigonos Gonatas.

## 1.2. MARATHON AND SALAMIS

Of critical significance in the reception of the Persian Wars in later times was undoubtedly the imagery formed in Classical Athens. Attalos made use of the Marathon imagery in (re-)imagining their own victory over the Gauls, while Augustus staged a mock Battle of Salamis in 2 BC in order to conduct the war against Parthia.<sup>3</sup> This section examines the ways in which the Athenians created memories of the Battle of Marathon and the Battle of Salamis during the fifth century BC, the formative period of Persian Wars imagery, and what purposes and social contexts governed these memories by comparing the treatment of Marathon and Salamis in Classical art more generally.<sup>4</sup> Athens (as well as Plataia) had a different experience from the other *poleis* in the sense that it was alone in driving the Persians from the mainland twice. Marathon and Salamis were collectively understood as Athens' defence of 'Greek freedom' after the failure of Xerxes' expedition. Both were given a mythological nature and positioned at the core of Athenian identity.

However, it was Marathon that was more respected and linked to the Athenians' self-understanding and was a prevalent feature of the Athenian art while the Battle of Salamis did not have any iconographical representations of it. For the Athenians, their iconographic emphasis was placed on Marathon rather than Salamis. Given the dominance of Athenian naval power throughout the fifth century BC, why did Athens continue to place emphasis on Marathon? I would argue in this section that this is because Marathon was a battle in which victory over the barbarians could be associated with Greek values of heroic land combat that could represent the Athenian democratic *arete*. Moreover, the emphasis on the Battle of Marathon allowed the Athenians to distinguish their contribution from other *poleis*, like Sparta, to make the claim that they alone had saved Greece.

It is indisputable that Marathon and Salamis were the most important military experiences for Athens. After the end of the Persian Wars, the two battles became deeply connected in Athenian popular thoughts, and Athens propagated the understanding that Athenians twice risked their lives to defeat the Persians. As recorded in Book 1 of Thucydides' *Histories*, the Athenians claimed it was the Athenian self-sacrificing contributions at Marathon and Salamis that justified the control of the Delian

---

<sup>3</sup> For the Attalids, see briefly Strootman 2005: 121-34. For Augustus' mock naval battle, see Cass. Dio 55.10.7; Spawforth 1994: 238.

<sup>4</sup> For the brief comparison between Marathon and Salamis, see Bélyácz 2021: 46-9. Cf. Flashar 1996.

League (Thuc. 1.73.2-75.1). For Lysias, it was at Marathon and Salamis that the Athenians saved Greece (Lys. 2.25-6, 42-4). As time went on, Athenian orators began to portray Marathon and Salamis as superior even to the Trojan War.<sup>5</sup> The warriors of Marathon and Salamis seemed to become almost part of the mythical events. For the Greeks of this period, a strict divide between myth and history did not exist. Indeed, there was a tendency to regard events in the distant past as mythical and/or heroic and to treat them separately from contemporaneous events.<sup>6</sup> Demosthenes, in his funeral speech, mentions that the deeds of the Persian Wars “are closer to us in time, and so have not yet become household stories or been raised to heroic stature.”<sup>7</sup> Establishing after Xerxes’ expedition, a tradition of epideictic orations praising Athenian valour placed the Persian Wars among the series of Athenian military exploits such as that against the Amazons and Eumolpos, as well as that in the episode of the Seven against Thebes, and that of the help of the Herakleidai. Isokrates even states that those who took part in the Persian Wars should be accorded ‘heroic’ status (Isoc. 4.83-5). Marathon and Salamis were treated as equal to the distant mythical past. A belief in the intervention of the gods also heightened the sense of the mythical nature of the victories at Marathon and Salamis, which were attributed to the assistance of locally worshipped deities.<sup>8</sup> Of course, this is not to say that battles such as Plataia and Mykale were unimportant. The monuments erected after the conclusion of Xerxes’ expedition collectively celebrated victories over Persia, probably including Marathon, Salamis, Plataia and Mykale.<sup>9</sup>

In Athens, narratives and general images of Marathon and Salamis were formed after the defeat of Xerxes. However, a major difference lies between the two. Marathon became the dominant subject of art, while Salamis was hardly ever the focus. Of course, Salamis was commemorated by various monuments, such as victory monuments, funerary tombs, and votive objects. Still, when measured against Marathon, it does receive treatment comparable to Marathon in the art of the period. In order to examine

---

<sup>5</sup> Isoc. 4.83; Dem. 60.10-1. The same topos is used for Leosthenes, a general in the Lamian War. See Hyp. 6.35.

<sup>6</sup> See Erskine 2001: 3.

<sup>7</sup> Dem. 60.9. Translation from Worthington 2006.

<sup>8</sup> Kychreus showed up as a snake at the Battle of Salamis: Paus. 1.36.1, cf. Plut. *Thes.* 10.3 with Kearns 1989: 180; Neils 2013: 605-7. Thesus and Echetlos appeared at the Battle of Marathon (Plut. *Thes.* 35.5; Paus. 1.32.5). For Marathon, see also p. 32, n. 11. See also Mikalson 2003; 26-37 for Marathon and 67-85 for Salamis.

<sup>9</sup> Petrovic 2007, Ep. 4 (=IG I<sup>3</sup> 503/4). See also p. 49, n. 65 on this monument.

the implication, we will first discuss the most characteristic pieces of art and historical sources treating Marathon and then examine the art historical sources related to Salamis.

The best example of the Athenian monumentalisation and mythification of the Battle of Marathon is the Painted Stoa (*Stoa Poikile*). The Stoa is usually identified with the remains of a building found on the north side of the square of the Agora, and its construction is dated around 475-460 BC.<sup>10</sup> Pausanias records that the Stoa was decorated with four paintings of historical and mythical scenes on the wall (Paus. 1.15). Among them, Pausanias finds the painting of the Battle of Marathon, in which the Athenians with the Plataians are attacking the Persians, and then the Greeks are slaughtering their 'barbarian' enemies. He also sees depictions of mortals and immortals in the painting: the former including figures such as Miltiades and Kallimachos, the polemarch, and the later portraying Marathon, Herakles, Theseus, Athena and Echetlos. The depiction of mortals and immortals together suggests the intervention of divinities and gives a mythical tone to the battle. Indeed, the choice of figures shows a clear connection between the battle and Athens. The local heroes, Echetlos and Theseus, are reported to have assisted the Athenians on the battlefield. The Athenians encamped in the sacred precinct of Herakles at Marathon while Marathon is the eponymous hero of the site.<sup>11</sup> And Athena is the *polis* goddess. The painting represents the joint victory of the Athenians and Plataians at the plain of Marathon under the guidance of local and Panhellenic divinities. What is important here is that this painting was displayed alongside other paintings of the Amazonomachy and the Sack of Troy. In the former painting, Theseus leads the Athenians to face the Amazons invading Attika, while in the latter, the Greek kings are assembled because of Ajax's outrage committed against Cassandra after the fall of the city.<sup>12</sup> As both the Trojans and the Amazons are

---

<sup>10</sup> For the evidence for the Painted Stoa, see Thompson and Wycherley 1972: 31-45. On the paintings, see Jeffery 1965; Francis and Vickers 1985; Castriota 1992: 76-89, 127-33; Erskine 2001: 70-3; Castriota 2005; Stansbury-O'Donnell 2005. As the original name of the stoa is reported as the *Peisianaktios*, modern scholars sometimes believe that Peisianax commissioned the construction according to the will of his brother-in-law, Kimon, who was very influential in Athenian politics in 460s BC. See, e.g., Jeffery 1965: 41-2; Meritt 1970: 256-7. Yet, there is no reliable evidence to prove the connection between Kimon and the Painted Stoa as well as its paintings. Zaccarini 2017: 290-4.

<sup>11</sup> Echetlos: Paus. 1.32.4-5 with Jameson 1951; Theseus: Plut. *Thes.* 35. Herakles: Hdt. 6.116.1. See also Gartzou-Tatti 2013 for divine assistance in the Battle of Marathon.

<sup>12</sup> The meaning of the Greek assemblage is variously discussed. This may imply the superiority of Greek morality to the Trojans or the emphasis on the female aspect of the Asiatic barbarians.

inhabitants of Asia, the Battle of Marathon is here paralleled with Athenian victories in mythical wars against Asiatic foreigners.<sup>13</sup>

The choice of the Sack of Troy, the Amazonomachy and the Battle of Marathon is telling. All three battles are of Panhellenic importance. The Trojan War is the central myth of Greek culture. The Amazons are foreign enemies of Greek civilisation, although Theseus marks the close connection between the Athenian identity and the Amazonomachy in Attika.<sup>14</sup> The Battle of Marathon is a battle in which Athens could claim that they alone defeated the Persians. They only need to refer to the help of the Plataians, which they did in the painting of the Painted Stoa while excluding the other *poleis* and Sparta in particular, who played a central role in the expulsion of Xerxes' force and was growing increasingly hostile towards Athens after the Persian Wars.<sup>15</sup>

Another painting displayed on the wall is also interesting in this context. When Pausanias approached the Stoa from the southwest, the first painting he saw depicted the Athenian army beginning a battle against the Spartans at Oinoe in the Argolid, the battle he also mentions in his *Description of Greece* (10.10.4), according to which the Argives and the Athenians defeated the Spartans. Scholars have long been puzzled by this enigmatic parallelisation between the Spartans, i.e. the Greeks, and the Asiatic barbarians, as well as by the fact that no other source records this battle.<sup>16</sup> If we assume that Pausanias' report about the painting is correct, what is important here is that the Athenian victory over the Spartans is paralleled with those over the Trojans, the Amazons, and the Persians, i.e. the Asiatic barbarians. Through this parallel representation, the Spartans thus became one of the Athenians' arch-enemies. The barbarisation of the representation of the Spartans can be further observed in the theatrical performances staged during the Peloponnesian War. In Euripides' tragedy, *Andromache*, for instance, the Spartan qualities are inferior to those of the Trojan noble Andromache, who is referred to as an Asian barbarian.<sup>17</sup> If the painting recorded by

---

Castriota 2005.

<sup>13</sup> For the Amazons, Mayor 2014: 41-3.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Mills 1997: 2-42. For the early Amazonomachies, see von Bothmer 1957: 6-29; Shapiro 1983; Mills 1997: 30-2.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Walters 1981.

<sup>16</sup> Painesi 2012: 7-9 offers a brief summary of the theories.

<sup>17</sup> Hall 1989: 213-5. For anti-Spartan rhetoric in *Andromache*, see Kitto 1961: 230-6, cf. Stevens 1971: 11-5.

Pausanias was added later than the other paintings, this may be dated during that time.<sup>18</sup> Conversely, it can be said that, just like the mythical Amazonomachy and Trojan War, Marathon became part of the repertoire of the ‘glorious past’ that could illuminate the contemporary success of Athens during the Peloponnesian War.<sup>19</sup>

The Athenian monumentalisation of the memory of the Battle of Marathon proceeded after Xerxes’ expedition, and it embodied the parallelisation of Marathon with mythical battles.<sup>20</sup> Around 470-460 BC, the Athenians erected a new marble trophy, approximately 10 meters high, at the battlefield of Marathon, possibly with Theseus killing an Amazon on the top of the capital.<sup>21</sup> In Delphi, Pausanias also observed a statue group of the eponymous heroes with Miltiades, Athena, and Apollo, which was made by Pheidias and dedicated as a *tithe* from the spoils of Marathon.<sup>22</sup> The heroic general of Marathon is placed among the Athenian eponymous heroes. It is also probable that the Athenian Treasury in Delphi is related to the commemoration of Marathon of this period. This marble treasury, constructed in the Doric style, occupies a prominent location along the Sacred Way, just below the Temple of Apollo. The sculptural programme features Theseus, Herakles and the Amazons. Scholars identify figures that served as the lateral *akroteria* as mounted Amazons, while several metopes depict a combat scene between the Greeks and the Amazons. According to the most recent reconstruction offered by Clemente Marconi, the metopes displayed the deeds of Theseus on the south, those of Herakles on the north, the Amazonomachy of Theseus on the east and that of Herakles on the west. Some of the iconographical representations of the Amazons dress in Eastern attire, and an archer in the metope 9 is reconstructed wearing a Phrygian pointed cap.<sup>23</sup> There is a problem in determining the date on which this decoration was made. The Archaic style of the Treasury’s sculpture could be dated to a pre-Marathon period. Yet, Pausanias testifies that the Treasury was made from the

---

<sup>18</sup> Erskine 2001: 70-1.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Gehrke 2023: 35.

<sup>20</sup> See esp. Meyer 2022: 106-9. For the early commemoration after the Battle of Marathon, see Jung 2006: 27-125.

<sup>21</sup> Korres 2017: 164-7 for the dating. Valavanis 2019 for the reconstruction of a Theseus and Amazon group.

<sup>22</sup> Paus. 10.10.1-2. I will discuss this statue group more closely in Chapter 2.3.3.

<sup>23</sup> Marconi 2006: 169-72, esp. 171, cf. Gensheimer 2017: 12-4 for the recent reconstruction of the metopes. For the metopes 9, see de La Coste-Messelière 1957: 83-4; Hoffelner 1988: 87-8 with abb. 9.

spoils of the Battle of Marathon (Paus. 10.11.5). This is confirmed by an inscription on a rectangular limestone base that accommodated the eponymous heroes' statue group.<sup>24</sup> As it runs along the southern flank of the Treasury and confirms Pausanias' account, scholars suggest the date of the Treasury as being shortly after the Battle of Marathon. Modern scholars have long discussed the problem.<sup>25</sup> Catherine Keesling recently suggested, based on Rolf von den Hoff's pre-Marathon dating, that the Treasury and its decoration were constructed before Marathon, but later the base with statue group was added.<sup>26</sup> This is quite possible. If so, the Athenians applied the imagery of recent achievements to the Treasury and its Amazonomachy decorations, thereby blurring the date and the original meaning.<sup>27</sup> The Athenians thus mythologised their Marathon experience by reusing existing mythological images. The monumentalisation of the victory at Marathon is sometimes accompanied by mythical imagery in this way.

Such parallelisation continued in the second half of the fifth century BC. The sculptural programme of the Temple of Athena Nike on the Akropolis, decorated in the 420s BC, is notable. The east frieze depicts the assembly of gods, while the south frieze was almost certainly carved with the Battle of Marathon.<sup>28</sup> The battle on the north frieze may have portrayed the pursuit and death of the mythical king Eurystheas, which could be seen as analogous to the Athenian victory over the invading Peloponnesians.<sup>29</sup> If the battle between the Greeks on the west frieze represents some contemporaneous historical battle in which the Athenians won, either one between the Athenians and the Spartans or the one between the Corinthians and the Athenians at Megara in 458 BC, it seems that Marathon and the cycle of the Herakleidae function as analogous to the victory over their contemporary enemies, just as the painting of Marathon in the Painted Stoa does.<sup>30</sup> It is also striking that the pediments of this building display the Gigantomachy on the east and the Amazonomachy on the west. By the end of the fifth century BC, the Battle of Marathon became part of the repertoire of the Athenian

---

<sup>24</sup> For the text, ML 19; Amandry 1998. See also Jacquemin 1999: 187-8 with 315, no. 077; Neer 2004: 66; Davison 2009: 307 for the inscription and the base.

<sup>25</sup> Amandry 1998. His view is accepted by Neer 2004; Gensheimer 2017.

<sup>26</sup> von den Hoff 2009; von den Hoff 2010: 164-172.

<sup>27</sup> Keesling 2020: 220-1. See also von den Hoff 2009; von den Hoff 2010: 164-172.

<sup>28</sup> Harrison 1972, cf. Harrison 1997: 116-7; Schultz 2009: 130. See also Palagia 2005: 184-5.

<sup>29</sup> Schultz 2009. For the earlier interpretations, see Schultz 2009: 131-2.

<sup>30</sup> For the west frieze, see Pemberton 1972: 304-7; Palagia 2005: 186-9, cf. Blümel 1950/51: 154. Harrison 1997: 120-2 finds an exploit of Theseus on this frieze.

glorious past.<sup>31</sup>

As discussed above, Athenian art in the fifth century BC provides an impressive picture of the reception of the Battle of Marathon. In this century, the Battle of Marathon was elevated to the status of a famous mythical battle, similar to the Trojan War and the Amazonomachy, and became a precedent for celebrating the battles of the same period. The Painted Stoa is the earliest example of this representation and is a straightforward expression of the image and reception of the increasingly mythologised Battle of Marathon.<sup>32</sup>

Where does Salamis enter the picture? As I have indicated, Salamis did not become a subject of art in the same way as Marathon did. Apart from the dedication of a bronze statue of Apollo at Delphi, erected by the Greek force immediately after the Battle of Salamis, a clear reference to Salamis in Classical art can be found only in a painting of the personifications of Hellas and Salamis that decorated the throne of a high cult statue of Zeus at Olympia, created by Pheidias in around 430 BC.<sup>33</sup> Its implication for military victory is clear: Salamis holds an *aphlaston*, the upward curving stern of a warship, that certainly represents a naval victory.<sup>34</sup> Scholars argue that this imagery should be seen as a product of the influence of Athens and its empire on the Elians.<sup>35</sup> Alongside the paintings of Theseus, Herakles, and the Fall of Troy, Salamis gains a mythical treatment here. However, quite differently from the iconographies of Marathon, this painting neither depicts a battle scene nor the historical persons who joined the battle, such as Themistokles.

Some monuments in the Periklean Building Programme offer an interesting clue for thinking about the Athenian reception of the Battle of Salamis. Several buildings on the Athenian Akropolis represented the experience of the Persian sack and the subsequent

---

<sup>31</sup> See also Hdt. 9.27, the earliest literary reference to Marathon as the Athenian glorious past from the mythical period to the present.

<sup>32</sup> If John Boardman is correct to suggest that the cavalry on the Parthenon frieze represents the *Marathonomachoi*, we might be able to add the Parthenon frieze to this list of the mythification of Marathon, see Boardman 1977. Cf. Hurwit 1999: 222 for the criticism of this theory.

<sup>33</sup> Hdt. 8.121; Paus. 10.14.5; West 1965: 92-3 with earlier bibliography; Gauer 1968: 71-2; Bélyácz 2021: 147; cf. Jacquemin 1999: 336, no. 309; Scott 2010: 321, no. 103. Laroche and Jacquemin 1988 for a base of the statue.

<sup>34</sup> Paus. 5.11.5-6. For the reconstruction of the arrangements of the paintings on the throne, see Frazer 1898c: 536-40; Wiesner 1939: 90-2.

<sup>35</sup> Raschke 1988; 46-7 accepted by Manakidou 1994: 653; Scott 2010: 32, n. 19; Smith 2011: 33.

victory at Salamis in 480 BC. According to Samantha Martin-McAuliffe and John Papadopoulos, the angle of the gate of the new Propylaia has been altered from the old destroyed one, even though the new one was erected over the old one. As a result, the new Propylaia was erected so that those leaving the Akropolis could see the island of Salamis and the battlefield to the southwest from the passageway. The new Propylaia has thus been rebuilt as a monument that commemorates the naval battle of Salamis and contributes to making the Akropolis a symbol of victory in the Persian Wars.<sup>36</sup> The Athenian Akropolis also symbolised the sack by the Persians in 480 BC. The sculpture inscribed on the exterior of the shield of Athena Parthenos, stored in the Parthenon, features the Amazons' attack on the Akropolis. This is a clear allusion to the Persian invasion in 480 BC.<sup>37</sup> As the sculptural programme of the Parthenon abstractly represents the Athenian victory over the Persians, the specific allusion to the event of 480 BC is remarkable.<sup>38</sup>

What is noteworthy here is the difference in the monumentalisation of the Akropolis. There were no direct iconographic references to the Battle of Salamis. The new Propylaia was only designed to remind the passengers of the past by directing their gaze in a particular direction. On the other hand, the utilisation of the iconography of the Amazonomachy means adherence to a myth which contradicts a historical event it supposedly commemorates. In the Amazonomachy, the Athenians successfully repelled the Amazons, while the opposite was true of the Persian sack of Athens and the Akropolis.<sup>39</sup> It is interesting here that, rather than focusing on the naval victory in the aftermath and the recovery of the sanctuary, the Athenians chose to display a painful collective memory by referring to a mythical land battle used to allude to Marathon.<sup>40</sup>

---

<sup>36</sup> Martin-McAuliffe and Papadopoulos 2012: 334-47.

<sup>37</sup> For the reconstruction of the shield, Harrison 1981. See also Hurwit 1999: 187; Hurwit 2004: 124.

<sup>38</sup> The Athenians had the intention to memorialise the destruction in 480 BC. In 470s BC, the Athenians built parts of the Temple of Athena Polias and the Older Parthenon, which were destroyed by the Persians, into the new north wall of the Akropolis. According to Sarah Rous, the reused blocks were intentionally placed and arranged to be seen, especially from the Athenian Agora. The purpose of this arrangement was to display and memorialise the impiety of the Persians who defiled the sanctuary. See Rous 2019: 36-45. See also Korres 2002; Hurwit 2004: 70-1; Kousser 2009: 270-1; Meyer 2019: 96.

<sup>39</sup> Hurwit 1999: 187.

<sup>40</sup> See also Bélyácz 2021: 175-8 for a possible allusion to Salamis on vase paintings. Yet, Meyer 2005: 285-6.

These treatments of Marathon and Salamis need explanation. The commemoration of Marathon using myth may partly have been the result of a response to Spartan and Aiginetan moves to commemorate their own victory mythical, Trojan terms in the aftermath of Xerxes' expedition. Soon after the Persian Wars, the Greeks started to commemorate their victory over the Persians by making a parallel between their wars and the mythical past. One of the earliest examples may be seen in Simonides' Plataian elegy, uniquely attested in a second-century AD fragmentary papyrus. The poet, most likely commissioned to honour the Spartan warriors and Greeks who fought at Plataia, celebrates the achievement by making several analogies between the Trojan War and the Persian Wars, Achilles and Pausanias, and Homer and the poet himself. Although the clear dating, the circumstance of the composition, and the full reconstruction of the poem are impossible to establish, the immortalisation of the fame of the Plataian soldiers by drawing upon the imagery of the Trojan myth is clear. Pindar also parallels the two wars in his *Fifth Isthmian*, the ode celebrating the Aiginetan athlete, Phylakidas. In the ode, composed probably in the early 470s BC, the link between the Trojan myth and the Battle of Salamis is created by referring to the Aiakids, the local Aiginetan heroes. These examples show that the mythical past provides not only imagery to celebrate the exploits of the Greeks in the Persian Wars but also a cognitive framework that creates a link between the past and the present and gives meaning to the present.<sup>41</sup> How common it was to use this kind of analogy remains uncertain because of the lack of evidence. However, for the Greeks who had overcome the mighty power of the Achaemenid Empire, the removal of Xerxes from the mainland was a remarkable event that could be compared to a myth. It is not surprising, therefore, that Marathon was retrospectively reinterpreted as 'the first victory over Persia' when the commemoration of the victory over Xerxes' expedition was established. Under the concepts of 'Asia' and 'barbarians' redefined through the Persian Wars, Marathon was re-positioned as a new victory over Asia, second only to the Trojan War and the battle against the Amazons.<sup>42</sup>

The Delian League is important in this context. Formed for retaliation against Persia and the liberation of Asia Minor, the Delian League was an organisation premised on

---

<sup>41</sup> For the Plataian elegy and the analogy, see Boedeker 1998; Sider 2021: 254-93. It is generally assumed that a Simonidean elegy of the Battle of Plataia is highly likely to support the Spartan angle and Pausanias' supremacy in memorialising the battle. See Aloni 2001: 102-4; Jung 2006: 225-41, cf. Stehle 2001: 116-9. For the Aiginetan analogy between the Persian Wars and the Trojan War, see Erskine 2001: 62-8.

<sup>42</sup> Hall 1989 for the redefinition of the concepts of barbarians after the Persian Wars.

the past of the Persian Wars. The Athenian claim that it played a core role in the preservation of Greek freedom guaranteed Athenian leadership in the League and provided ideological support for military operations under its command. After 449 BC, when the Persian threat had virtually disappeared, the memory of the Persian Wars provided the logic to justify Athenian domination of the alliance and further aggressive activities. Therefore, claiming military success in the Persian Wars was of great political importance to the Athenians.

The Battle of Marathon was the most crucial for Athens in this context. It was a battle in which Athens could claim to have single-handedly defeated Persia and defended Greece. When considering Xerxes' expedition, it is impossible to avoid the questions of what was the most important battle and which was the most important *polis* in the war. A number of *poleis* provided warships for the Battle of Salamis, and Thermopylai and Plataia were Spartan military successes. The victory at Marathon was the only outcome that allowed the Athenians to claim that they alone saved Greece.

In addition, it should be mentioned that Marathon was a battle that embodied the 'heroic values' of land warfare. Despite the innovative development of Athens as a naval power, land combat continued to be understood and glorified as the ideal way of fighting since Homer. In a world where the imagery and mythology of the *Iliad* formed the core of education, the ideals of individual contribution in battle and self-sacrifice in combat were the standards of heroism and the templates for the reproduction of this type of ideal image. In this context, the Battle of Marathon rather than Salamis is mentioned alongside the battles of the mythical past. It is no coincidence that in the works of art produced in Athens in the fifth century BC - paintings, sculptures and vase paintings - the war with Persia was always portrayed with scenes depicting land combat. From the second half of the fifth century BC onwards, the veterans of Marathon were referred to as exemplary warrior figures and were depicted as the 'archetypes' of warfare.

Some of the examples seen above show that Marathon was used as a historical precedent to commemorate the war against the *poleis* of the Peloponnesian League. As I noted at the beginning of this section, the Greeks did not have a clear conceptual boundary between myth and history, yet they tended to refer to the mythical past much more than to more recent historical events in establishing the paradigms of contemporary reality and shaping the self-image in art and literature.<sup>43</sup> In this way, the mythical past functioned as the framework for recognising the recent past and present

---

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Mills 1997: 34-5.

events and provided a foundation for a sense of ‘who I am’. The reason why such a recent event, Marathon, began to function as a historical precedent may be due to the psychological impact of the event, its contemporaneous importance, and its affinity with mythology. The juxtaposition of the victory at Marathon with those against the Peloponnesian *poleis* may have symbolically represented a battle against a ‘new enemy’ after the threat from Persia was removed and helped the Athenians to maintain and promote their fighting spirit.

In this context, we must mention Marion Meyer’s examination of the causes and implications of the almost complete absence of representation of naval victories in the iconographic sources in Athens in the fifth century BC.<sup>44</sup> According to Meyer, the absence of naval battles in iconographic sources is not due to representational conventions (actually, there are iconographic sources of a warship, such as “The Lenormant Relief”), the lack of mythological role models or the preferences of the wealthy class, but rather attributed to the fact that the ideal of the free citizen acting responsibly in a democratic regime matched the hoplite soldiers, who had more freedom of individual action in land combat than oarsmen. To represent this *arete* of Athenian democracy, therefore, military engagement on land was preferred to naval battles in Attic iconography. This *arete* also signifies the moral superiority of the Athenians over the Persians and, in this sense, is a contemporary reflection of the history of Athenian victories in mythical battles such as the Amazonomachy, presented as the mythological exemplars of the current *arete* and understood as a mythological analogue to both Marathon and Salamis. Meyer further suggests that the dominance of the Delian League, achieved through the oppression of the allied *poleis* by the strength of the Athenian naval forces, may have been another reason why fleets were avoided.<sup>45</sup>

Based on Meyer’s argument, we can further explain why Marathon was used as an iconographic exemplar of Athenian warfare at the time of the Peloponnesian War. Among the many battles of the Persian Wars, the land victory at Marathon played an iconographic role as the representation of the Athenian ideology of victory over the barbarians and democracy based on freedom. In this sense, the battle at Marathon becomes an exemplary image of all battles on land and sea and can be used to represent any military victory. Furthermore, the iconography and idealism of Marathon, established in Athens in the fifth century BC, will be seen again in the Hellenistic period in the context of the wars against the Gauls. A detailed examination of this Hellenistic

---

<sup>44</sup> Meyer 2005, cf. Bélyácz 2021: 175-80. See also Jung 2006: 128-46.

<sup>45</sup> Meyer 2005: 311.

reception is the subject of Chapter Three.<sup>46</sup>

### 1.3. USE AND ABUSE OF THE PAST IN THE INTERSTATE CONTEXTS

This section examines how multiple narratives of the Persian Wars were politicised and used for conflict and reconciliation in the Classical period. The process by which history is fabricated for certain political purposes by distorting, or concealing certain events, and similarly, the process by which certain aspects or interpretations of certain events are emphasised for specific purposes, has been specifically elucidated in memory and mythology studies. The Persian Wars were historical events in which the existence of multiple truths has been particularly pointed out. For example, Athens used the two-way interpretation that the Battle of Marathon was a battle fought by Athens alone and that it was a battle won with Plataia, depending on the occasion. For the Athenians, Plataia was an important ally, and its population later became Athens' compatriots, so the Athenians had to distort or adapt historical facts as necessary when highlighting what they wanted to highlight. Recent studies on the reception of the Persian Wars also emphasise that the *poleis* remembered the Persian Wars separately, with each *polis* at the centre of its own narrative in the Classical period. These different memories give rise to multiple narratives and differing accounts of historical truths, which are then sometimes politicised and contested by conflicting powers, individuals and communities.

How, then, were memories of the Persian Wars used in the actual political negotiations between *poleis* in the Classical period? In what follows, four cases will be examined: (1) memories of the Persian Wars in the argument of Athenian legitimisation of

---

<sup>46</sup> It was also inherited at the end of the fifth century BC to the fourth century BC. The fights against the Persians might have offered chances to recall and imitate the fighters of the Persian Wars. Xenophon is reported to have reminded Greek mercenaries hired by Cyrus of the deeds of the ancestors in the Battle of Marathon and fights against Xerxes' expedition when he and his soldiers discuss how to escape from the Persians (Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.11-3. For the Persian Wars in speeches in Xenophon's works, see Pontier 2013). After winning the Persian rebellious satrap Artabazos during the Social War, Chares of Athens is reported to have sent Athens a letter telling his victory was 'sister to that at Marathon'. Schol. ad Dem. 4.19; Plut. *Arat.* 16.3; Cawkwell 2012.

the control of the Delian League; (2) the Athenian claim to denigrate the importance of Korinth in the Battle of Salamis; (3) the citation of memories in the political negotiations concerning Athens and Sparta after the Peloponnesian War; and (4) the two faces of Thebes as ‘mediser’. This section examines the ways in which memories of the Persian Wars were politicised, how those who took the Persian side were put at a disadvantage (and sometimes an advantage), and how the two leading *poleis* - Athens and Sparta – used memories in their diplomatic negotiations. This section will then show how memories of the Persian Wars become embedded in political negotiations in the Classical period as well as how they could differ and be distorted in accordance with contexts.

In this section, in addition to the testimony of Herodotos, I will examine the speeches recorded in Thucydides and Xenophon. It may be inappropriate to take them at face value as they may be the inventions of these writers. However, we cannot dismiss all the elements of their narratives as pure literary citations. Both were educated as members of the Athenian elite and had experience in military and public affairs. Thucydides participated in the Athenian imperial rule as an Athenian general, and Xenophon, also a military commander, had close relations with Sparta and, after the rise of Thebes, helped restore diplomatic relations with Athens despite being away from his home city for a number of years. Their historiography is likely to reflect the arguments and logic used in the actual debates, as well as the past events.

### **1.3.1. Athens and the Justification of the Imperial Rule**

The Athenian ambassadors’ speech in the debate at Sparta, recorded by Thucydides (1.67-87), is a good starting point for considering Athenian argument in justifying their political and military hegemony. Facing the Athenian siege of Potidaia, in 432 BC, the Corinthians requested that the Spartans summon the Peloponnesian League in order to blame Athens for breaking the peace treaty and abusing member *poleis*. The Corinthian ambassadors offer the first speech (Thuc. 1.68-71). Although they devote a large part of their speech to comparing the characters of the Spartans and the Athenians, their purpose is to ask the Spartans to stop Athenian expansionism. They remind the Spartans of their traditional role as leaders, dating back to the Archaic period. Their argument is that the Spartans need to support their allies fighting against the Athenians since their non-interference allowed for the Athenian expansion and the enslavement of *poleis*. In this respect, the Spartans were even worse than the Athenians because the Spartans could have stopped the expansion but did not. Here, the Corinthians claim that what

made the Spartan responsibility heavier is the reputation of the Spartans as the “liberator of Greece” (ὡς ἐλευθερῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα) (1.69.1). The latter part of their speech tries to stimulate the pride of the Spartans by emphasising how they had failed to live up to the expectations of their allies and how they are now considered inferior to the Athenians (1.69.5-70). This must have appealed to the sense of duty and the pride of the Spartans as the chief of the League and the main check on the Athenian expansion.<sup>47</sup>

On the other hand, the Athenian ambassadors, who were eventually present at the meeting, give a speech arguing against the Corinthians (1.73-8). As they explain at the beginning of their speech, their main argument is twofold: the Spartans should not start a war against the Athenians, and the Athenians are worthy of keeping what they had acquired, i.e. worthy of keeping their empire. The reference to the Persian Wars appears as part of the latter point. The Athenians justify their rule on three grounds: (1) for their self-sacrifice in the Battle of Salamis, their imperial rule should not be jeered at by other Greeks; (2) their leadership was given at the request of the allies; (3) following the natural human inclination to desire domination over others, they exercise power more justly than their own power demands and more justly than Sparta would in a similar situation.

In arguing the first point, the speech shows the habitual Athenian claim about their contributions in the Persian Wars.<sup>48</sup> The starting point is, as always, Marathon, where they fought alone against the Persians. Yet, in this speech, Salamis is of further importance. At Salamis, they even abandoned the *polis* and prevented the Persians from destroying the other *poleis* of the Peloponnese, i.e., they saved the Peloponnesians and their allies, with the largest fleet, unhesitating enthusiasm, and their best general, Themistokles. The Athenians risked losing their *polis* and tried to save their city, themselves and the other Greeks. However, the Peloponnesians sent armies to secure themselves, not the Athenians. By this claim and contrast, the Athenians are trying to gain respect from the audience while alleging that their contribution to the Greeks justifies their current rule. The Athenians claim nobody would be jealous of them

---

<sup>47</sup> This speech implies that Athens became a new Persia by mentioning Athens’ enslavement of Greece. Athens seems to have been recognised as the new Persian both by her enemies and herself. On this point, see Rood 1999: 157-8. See also Kubo 1971 for the exhaustive treatment of references to the Persian Wars in Thucydides.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Hornblower 1991: 118; Loraux 1986: 156. See also Thuc. 5.89, 6.83, although, in these examples, the Athenians claim not to talk about the Persian Wars past. On this point, see Rood 1999: 152-3. For later examples, see Polyb. 9.38.1-5; Plut. *Sull.* 13.5.

keeping the leadership if considering their “zeal and sagacity of judgement” at Salamis (1.75.1).

It is interesting to note that the Athenians are making a double claim here. The Athenians argue, through the imagery of the Persian Wars, (1) how powerful the *polis* Sparta would be fighting is and (2) why Athenian dominion should be authorised. The Athenians present their past glory, zeal, risk-taking courage, and self-sacrifice to understand their rule as a reward for their contribution in the Persian Wars. Of course, such a claim cannot be morally accepted, as a Spartan speaker, Sthenelaidas, points out (Thuc. 1.86.1). The Athenians’ reference to the Persian Wars serves, at the same time, as a symbolic display of Athenian military power. Marathon and Salamis signify Athenian might on land and sea respectively, and, with this, they let Sparta and the Peloponnesian alliance know who they are going to war against.<sup>49</sup> But this is not a mere threat. The presentation of Athens as a very strong *polis* is connected to the Athenian argument that imperial rule should be justified because the strong should rule the weak, argued by Thucydides (1.76.2-3).<sup>50</sup> The achievements of the Persian Wars contribute to the maintenance of domination in this sense in a threefold way. Thus, past contributions to Greece, at least in Thucydides’ representation, justify Athenian imperial domination and provide the basis for the continuation of the ‘cold war’ with Sparta, as well as the basis for the rule that the strong should dominate the weak.

The debate at Kamarina in Book 6 offers another view from Athens. At the assembly of Kamarina held in the winter of 415/4 BC, a Syracusan Hermokrates and an Athenian Euphemos each give a speech in order to obtain assistance from the Kamarinans (Thuc. 6.75-88.1-2). Hermokrates, the first speaker, argues why the Kamarinans should not take part in Athens (6.76-80). According to him, the purpose of the Athenian expedition, to restore the Leontinians, is false, and its actual purpose is to expel the Sicilian Greeks from Sicily. He also insists that they should unite as Doric Sicilians and reject Athens through mutual defence measures. For our purpose, his first argument is of interest. In order to prove the Athenian real intention, Hermokrates draws attention to Athenians’ behaviour against their allies of the same kinship. The Athenians used the Delian League, which originally aimed to retaliate against Persia, to reduce Chalkis, the Ionian cities, and their own colonies to the status of slavery. For him, the alliance’s wars against Persia were in fact wars in which the Greeks changed their master from Persia to Athens (6.76).

---

<sup>49</sup> Strauss 1964: 170-2; Stahl 1966: 44-7; Kagan 1969: 295; Orwin 1986: 74-5, cf. Thuc. 1.73.3.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Thuc. 1.77.3

The imagery of the Persian Wars comes up to counter this point. Euphemos forms his argument as a reply to Hermokrates (6.82-7). According to Euphemos, the Athenians came to renew their alliance with the Kamarinans, but he finds a reason to offer them justification for retaining Athenian hegemony (6.82.1). Euphemos first attributes the need for the Athenian Empire to the rivalry between the Dorians and Ionians. By acquiring their fleet after the defeat of Xerxes, the Ionians were finally freed from Spartan command and leadership. This Athenian Empire was self-acquired and the Athenians need to retain it to protect themselves from the threat posed by Sparta. To weaken Sparta, Kamarina must stop Syracuse from aiding the Peloponnesian League (6.82.2-3). Euphemos also argues that Syracuse, with its ambitions to dominate all of Sicily, would be a threat to Kamarina (6.85.3). The first point is important. There, Euphemos argues that the Athenians have the right to rule over the Ionians. In response to Hermokrates' criticism, he needs to explain that the situation of the Kamarinans is different from that of the Aegean *poleis*, and that the Athenians intend to give freedom to the people of Sicily. The memory of the Persian Wars is referred to in this justification of the domination of the Ionians.<sup>51</sup>

and even on the strictest view there was no injustice in our subjection of the Ionians and the islanders, which the Syracusans describe as “enslavement of our kinsmen”. We were their mother-city, and they joined the Persian invasion against us; they did not have the courage to revolt and lose their homes, as we did when we abandoned our city; they chose slavery for themselves and wanted to impose the same state on us. Therefore, we deserve to rule because we supplied the largest navy and unhesitating determination in the service of Greece, while those, who are now our subjects, did us mischief, having been equally energetic in the Persian cause.

According to Euphemos, the rule over the Ionians and the islanders is punishment and revenge against them for joining the Persians.<sup>52</sup> The Ionians and the Aegean islanders both sent ships to the Persian fleet, which fought in the Battles of Artemision and Salamis against the Greek force.<sup>53</sup> In this way, Euphemos' argument makes sense.

---

<sup>51</sup> Thuc. 6.82.3-83.1. Translation modified from Hammond 2009.

<sup>52</sup> Hornblower 2008: 503. Note that the term “islanders” in the citation seems to indicate an ethnic connotation. See Constantakopoulou 2007: 56-7.

<sup>53</sup> In Herodotos (7.94-5), the Ionians sent 100 ships to the Persian fleet while the Aegean islanders sent 17 ships. Cf. How and Wells 1928: 162 on the small number of the ships of the islanders. See

Euphemos here uses the Ionian kinship, even comparing their relationship to a child and a parent, to emphasise the ‘evil’ of the Ionians and islanders. The Athenians claimed that their land was the motherland of the Ionians, most likely since the eighth century BC.<sup>54</sup> Also remarkable is his neglect of the subordinate status of the Ionians and the islanders to Persia at the time of the Battle of Salamis. Their ‘stigma’ as loyal to the Persians cannot be dismissed by the later Ionian turnover to the Greeks in the Battle of Mykale (Hdt. 9.90-2, 98-104; Diod. Sic. 11.34, 36) and their assistance to the Delian League. Euphemos feels no sympathy for them to build up the cause for revenge.

It is possible that the Athenians applied diplomatic language at the formation of the Delian League to the justification of their empire. When the Athenians took over the leadership of the war against the Persians from Sparta in 478/7 BC, the Greeks, especially the Ionians, played an important role in this replacement of the leaders.<sup>55</sup> Plutarch mentions that the Greek commanders, particularly those of Chios, Samos and Lesbos, attempted to persuade Aristides to lead the force of the Hellenic League, while the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* believes it was Aristides who induced the Ionians to leave the Spartans (Plut. *Arist.* 23.4-5; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 23.5). As has been already suggested above, the Ionian kinship must have played an important part in the negotiations between the Athenians and the Ionians.<sup>56</sup> Kinship was not merely a part of diplomatic courtesy. Rather, it was an essential component in ancient Greek diplomacy. Modern scholarship on the concept of kinship is extensive and has established that kinship works as a point of reference to facilitate negotiations between two communities. Kinship can also serve as an important rhetorical device in persuasion to justify demands by putting moral pressure on the other party; it can (re)define the relationship between the two parties in the present, past and future while establishing a formally permanent relationship if it is accepted by the other party.<sup>57</sup> Thus, Thucydides reports that the Ionians required the Athenians to be their leaders “because of their

---

also Hdt. 8.66. In Diodoros (11.3.8), the Chians and Samians among the Ionians jointly sent 100 ships while the islanders sent 50 ships.

<sup>54</sup> Connor 1993: 198.

<sup>55</sup> See, e.g. Thuc. 3.10.3, 6.83.2; Diod. Sic. 11.41.4; Meiggs 1972: 47. The original purpose of the Delian League is variously discussed. See e.g. Meiggs 1972: 462-4; Nudell 2023: 29.

<sup>56</sup> For the importance of kinship in the Peloponnesian War, see Alty 1982. For the Thucydidean usage of kinship, Hornblower 1996: 61-80.

<sup>57</sup> Jones 1999; Erskine 2001: 162-97; Erskine 2002; Giovannini 2007: 63-8; Patterson 2010, cf. Giovannini 1993; Ma 2003; Erskine 2005.

kinship with them” (κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές).<sup>58</sup> It is likely that, in the forming of the Delian League, both the Athenians and the allied *poleis* of Ionian origin used kinship in stressing their relationship in negotiations, with the result that Athens then assumed the role of protecting the freedom of ‘children’ as a ‘mother-city’. The Ionian kinship constituted an important part of the League’s foundation. The choice of Delos, the place of the Ionian cult of Apollo, as the headquarters of the League also marks the importance of the Ionians in the Delian League.<sup>59</sup> Hence, Athens could have used this parent-child relationship, combined with the memory of Salamis, when dealing harshly with its Ionian allies.<sup>60</sup>

The Athenians seem to have developed the memory of the loyalty of the Ionians and islanders to Persia, likely to accommodate this justification. Herodotos reports the stories which emphasise their refusal to ally with the Greeks. In Book 8 of the *Histories*, he records a famous inscription by Themistokles towards the Ionians in Xerxes’ force after the Battle of Artemision.<sup>61</sup> Through this message, Themistokles required the Ionians to fight badly for the sake of the Greeks by reminding them that Athens was their mother city and that the cause of Xerxes’ expedition was the Ionian Revolt. This anecdote is very likely to be a later invention.<sup>62</sup> The involvement of Themistokles and the reference to kinship suggest Attic origin. Its similarity to Euphemos’ claim also leads us to think that this has a close connection with the Athenian imperial discourse in controlling the ‘traitors’ of the same kinship. This can confirm that his words are not a pure Thucydidean invention.<sup>63</sup> This story combines with Herodotos’ report at 8.85, in which only a few of the Ionians followed Themostokles’ instructions while most did not.

---

<sup>58</sup> Thuc. 1.95.1. In Diodoros, Themistokles thinks that the Athenians can get support from the Ionians through ties of kinship in enhancing the power of Athens after the Persian Wars (11.41.2, 4).

<sup>59</sup> Rutishauser 2012: 87-8. Yet, as Constantakopoulou 2007: 68 noted, the Ionian character of the League was not the sole factor of the choice.

<sup>60</sup> The ‘transformation’ of Athens’ control of the Delian League into an empire is still hotly debated. See, conveniently, Rhodes 2008; Papazarkadas 2009; Kallet and Kroll 2020.

<sup>61</sup> Hdt. 8.22.1-2, cf. Plut. *Them.* 9.1-2.

<sup>62</sup> E.g. Harris 1989: 59-60. This anecdote is likely to allude to the speech of Aristagoras, who tried to win Athens to the Ionian side before the Ionian Revolt, Hdt. 5.97.2. Yet, it is certain that Ionian kinship was used in the negotiations between the Athenians and the Ionians. See below.

<sup>63</sup> See Fornara and Samons 1991: 106-9 discusses Euphemos’ speech in relation to the general bad reputation of the Ionians in the sixth and fifth centuries BC. Cf. de Romilly 1963: 242-3; Raubitschek 1973: 37 who also see this speech reflects the voice of Athens.

Among the Ionian captains who captured Greek ships, two Samians, Theomestor and Phylakos, are named because Xerxes rewarded them greatly for their service. This reference marks how Herodotos and his sources intentionally kept the Ionian behaviour alive in wartime.<sup>64</sup> If this tradition was established in accordance with the establishment of the Athenian empire, its formation was promoted to deal with the Ionian *poleis* that had once joined Persia.

The memory of the Persian Wars, in this way, worked as an important element of the justification of the Delian League and the Athenian Empire. The idea of domination as a punishment for joining Xerxes' side and attacking Athens developed to justify Athenian imperialistic behaviours, such as the garrisoning of troops and land grabs in Ionian and island *poleis*, or at least around the time when Athens put down revolts in Samos and Erythrai in the 440s-430s BC. Further, the justification may have been invented to suppress the anti-Athenian sentiment that gradually emerged in each *polis*. Although this idea may not have been sufficient to justify Athens' more tyrannical behaviour, it could morally press its allied *poleis* and the Peloponnesians not to thwart Athenian ambition. The Delian League was formed against the direct background of the Persian Wars. It is, therefore, inevitable that the memory of the wars played a direct role in Athenian imperial rule through the Delian League. Even if it did not justify all of Athens' actions, the propagation of a particular memory of the Persian Wars helped to promote Athens' legitimacy at home and abroad.

### **1.3.2. Salamis: Athens vs Korinth**

We have seen the importance of the Battle of Salamis above. At this point, we should turn to how the Athenians attempted to promote their prominence in the collective memory of the Persian Wars. The disputes as to the first prize in each battle, as well as for the claim to victory in the fighting against Xerxes' force, started soon after each battle. The leader of these fights for fame is certainly Athens. For the justification of their control of the Delian League and their expansionism, they glorified their credit in the Battles of Marathon and of Salamis to be seen as the saviours of Greece against the Achaemenid expeditions, as we have seen already. The Athenians needed to be sensitive to the others who claimed credit for the victory in the Battle of Salamis because the

---

<sup>64</sup> As Herodotos carefully records who took part in which side and who turned from the Persians to the Greeks, this reference is a significant reminder. For the Greeks of the Battle of Salamis, see 8.43-8, esp. 46-8 with 8.82. For the Greeks on the Persian side in it, see Hdt. 7.93-5, 8.66.

participation of many different *poleis* had the potential to eclipse the Athenian credit, unlike the Battle of Marathon. Moreover, the *aristeia* at Salamis is reported to have been given to the Aiginetans, not to the Athenians. Our focus in this section will be the Athenian and Korinithian claims of credit for the victory of Salamis. The Athenian denunciation of the Korinithians will offer an impressive picture of the earlier politics of memory of the credit in the Persian Wars.

Let us start with Athens. One of the earliest Athenian testimonies of their view on the Battle of Salamis comes from *Persians* of Aischylos, performed in 472 BC.<sup>65</sup> It was directed at an Athenian audience, many of whom would have fought in the recent wars, and is a tragedy premised on the Athenian collective memory of the war against the Persians. Set in the Achaemenid court at the time of the battle, the play portrays Athens as the main force of the Greek side against Xerxes, and its victory is shown as the one that destroys all the Persian forces and saves Greece.<sup>66</sup> Aischylos is trying to confirm the Athenian contribution in the Battle of Salamis as the most important and makes this the watershed in the war against Xerxes, while the Battle of Plataia is only an afterthought.<sup>67</sup> This Athenian victory means the destruction of the whole Persian army and the defeat of the whole Persian race (Aes. *Per.* 255, 515-6). A further point is presented in a speech delivered by the ghost of Darius to his wife, Atossa. Although he predicts the Persian defeat at Plataia and alludes to the Spartan role through a reference to the ‘Dorian spear’ (816-20), soon afterwards, he asks her to remember the defeat against Athens and Greece as if he, or Aischylos, is trying to obliterate the achievements of the other Greek *poleis* by reducing them to the single labelling of ‘Greece’. As half of the entire Greek fleet was reported to be composed of Athenian ships, this claim must

---

<sup>65</sup> At least, Petrovic 2007, Ep. 4 (=IG I<sup>3</sup> 503/4), dated around 480-470 BC, is highly likely to refer to the Battle of Salamis as well. Petrovic 2007: 158-77, esp. 173-4; Petrovic 2013: 47-53; Bowie 2021: 451-9, esp. 455. See also Gomme 1956: 98-100; Proietti 2015: 49-50; Proietti 2021: 144-58 with Hiller von Gaertringen 1934 for *lapis A* as the reference to the Battle of Salamis.

<sup>66</sup> Xerxes’ defeat is regarded as the victory of the Athenians (Aes. *Per.* 285-6, 472-5). Thus, conversely, the defeat of Athens is equated to the defeat of all of Greece (Aes. *Per.* 231-4, cf. 49-50).

<sup>67</sup> For a similar view, see Thuc. 1.73.5. Note that it is often very difficult to distinguish whose view tragedy represents. It has often been argued that this play is political as the propaganda of the Athenian politicians, or Aeschylus’ approval of them, affected its plot. See Garvie 2009: xvii-xix. Sampson 2015 argues it was not propaganda but ‘a political and topical play’, made for eulogising the veterans and for increasing wariness of the Persian threat.

not have been unreasonable to the other Greeks.<sup>68</sup> The Athenian argument must have developed in resonance with the growth of Athens as a powerful *polis* in the Eastern Mediterranean soon after Xerxes' expedition, which facilitated the formation of the Delian League since the original purpose of the League was, or at least was perceived, to revenge Xerxes for his army's invasion and destruction throughout mainland Greece.<sup>69</sup> Later, this turned into the Athenian claim that their empire should be ensured on the grounds of their efforts in the Battles of Marathon and Salamis.<sup>70</sup>

The Athenians were willing to argue with others for the credit for the victory. A good example is offered by Herodotos. In the *Histories*, the Athenians claimed that it was an Athenian ship, commanded by Ameinias of Pallene that opened the battle when all the other Greek ships began to go back to the beach, just as the Persian naval forces were set to attack (8.84). However, according to the Aiginetans, it was the ship sent to Aigina after the Aiakids that was the first to go into action.<sup>71</sup> These competing versions may have been due to confusion on the battlefield and difficulty in understanding the situation of the Battle. However, as the claims of both sides diffused, or possibly have been asserted in the discussion as to the *aristeia* just after the battle, their differences must have turned into the conflict over the war merits of who initiated the combat that led to the great victory.<sup>72</sup> The Athenians must have deliberately stuck to their argument because the story that the Aiginetans had obtained *aristeia* from the Greeks and the Athenians had come second must have so irritated them and potentially shaken their cause of the control of the Delian League.<sup>73</sup> The hostility between Athens and Aigina

---

<sup>68</sup> Hdt. 8.44-8.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Rawlings 1977.

<sup>70</sup> Thuc. 1.73.4. For the later interpretation, see Isoc. 4.66-72, 4.83, 4.94-100, 6.43, 6.83. Cf. Wallace 2011a: 20.

<sup>71</sup> Hdt. 8.84.2, cf. 8.64.2. For the Aiginetan commemoration of the Battle of Salamis, see Erskine 2001: 66-8.

<sup>72</sup> The Athenians believed soon after the Battle that it was them who initiating the Battle, if a 'Greek' ship, mentioned in the Aeschylus' *Persians*, ll. 409-11 as initiated the battle, is an Athenian ship. Bowie 2007: 173-4.

<sup>73</sup> Hdt. 8.93.1 "έν δέ τῆ ναυμαχίῃ ταύτῃ ἤκουσαν Ἑλλήνων ἀριστα Αἰγινῆται," cf. Macan 1908: 503; Plut. *Them.* 17.1 "πόλεων μὲν οὖν τὴν Αἰγινητῶν ἀριστεῦσαί φησιν Ἡρόδοτος." Cf. Diod. Sic. 11.27.2-3. See also Hdt. 8.122 where the Aiginetans are reported to have dedicated three golden stars set on a bronze mast to Apollo at Delphi as the god demanded the *aristeia* from them. The story was likely to be made up to explain the reason why they made a unique dedication. Bowie 2007: 213.

added fuel to the fire.<sup>74</sup> This kind of counterargument, thus, was maintained to keep Athens' position as saviours of Greece and to undermine the fame of its opponents.

Herodotos records other contradictory claims which are concerned with the Korinthian participation in the Battle of Salamis (8.94). He states that the Athenians spread the rumour that the Korinthians deserted the battlefield since they followed their commander Adeimantos who was struck with fear. Near the temple of Athena Skiras on the island of Salamis, they met a ship whose arrival was said to have been due to divine influence. As the people on the ship condemned Adeimantos, for betraying the Greeks (ὄρμησαι καταπροδοὺς τοὺς Ἑλληνας) and then told him about the imminent victory of the Greeks, Adeimantos and the Korinthians went back to the fleet and realised the battle is over. Herodotos adds a further report that the Korinthians deny this rumour and “believe that their ships played a most distinguished part in the battle” (ἐν πρώτοισι σφέας αὐτοὺς τῆς ναυμαχίης νομίζουσι γενέσθαι). And “[t]he rest of Greece gives evidence in their favour” (μαρτυρέει δέ σφι καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλάς).<sup>75</sup>

There is doubt over each side's claim. Yet, the Athenian rumour sounds unlikely because the Battle of Salamis is believed to have lasted for about twelve hours and the Korinthians missing the battle seems to be difficult to accept.<sup>76</sup> What is noteworthy here is the contradiction between the two stories. The Athenians obviously attempted to nullify, or at least eclipse, the contribution of Korinthians and their commander, Adeimantos, by claiming that the Korinthians did not take part in the battle. Adeimantos, mentioned in this episode, is known as the commander of the Korinthians in the Battles of Artemision and Salamis and as a famous commander of the Greek allies.<sup>77</sup> The characterisation of the Korinthians and Adeimantos as the betrayers of the Greeks is completely at odds with the other side's claim that they played “a most distinguished part.” Thus, the problem here is more than participation. The position of the Korinthians is shifting between traitors and war heroes.

---

<sup>74</sup> For the relationship between Athens and Aigina, see Podlecki 1976; Figueira 1993; Powell 2016. The eclipse of Aigina in the fifth century BC may have affected the Greek perception of the deeds of the Aiginetans in the Battle of Salamis. Marincola 2007a: 118-20. It might be possible that the Athenian campaign had an influence on this.

<sup>75</sup> Hdt. 8.94.

<sup>76</sup> Strauss 2004: 201. See also Page 1981: 200-1. Plutarch (Plut. *Mor.* 870d-871a) contends it was Herodotos who invented this rumour since there was no reason for Athens to blame Korinth. This is unlikely.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Toepffer 1893; Vannicelli 2021.

Why did the Athenians target the Corinthians? Why did the Athenians try to nullify Corinthian valour despite the opinion of the other Greeks? Deterioration in the relationship between the two parties is the simplest answer.<sup>78</sup> Before and immediately after the Persian Wars, they enjoyed a relatively good relationship. The Athenians are reported by Plutarch to have allowed the Corinthians to bury their fallen and erect a monument with an epitaph on the island of Salamis after the battle. The epitaph's first couplet has been partly preserved on the original stone found on the island.<sup>79</sup> The Athenians must have recognised the Corinthian participation in the Battle of Salamis. Yet, the tension between them grew in the middle of the fifth century BC, and they finally went head-to-head in the Battles of Sybota and Poteidaia, which caused the Peloponnesian War. Negative campaigns against enemy states are entirely normal. In addition to this, the reference to Adeimantos' betrayal in Herodotos can be explained by the role of his son, Aristeus, or Aristeas, throughout this developing hostile relationship. He was sent by the Corinthians with 1,600 hoplites and 400 light-armed troops, consisting of the Corinthian volunteers and the Peloponnesian mercenaries, to fight against the Athenians at Poteidaia in 432 BC. As one of the ambassadors captured on the way to Persia to call for help, he was executed by the Athenians in 429 BC.<sup>80</sup> The attack on his father by characterising him as a betrayer of Greece must have damaged his own reputation.<sup>81</sup>

That the Corinthians were also publicising their own achievements was also a reason why the Athenians attacked the Corinthians. The Simonidean corpus gives an insight into the way the Corinthians claimed credit for the Greek victory based on their valour at the Battle of Salamis. It contains epigrams and elegies in admiration of Athens, Sparta, Corinth, and Sicily, that must have been addressed not only to the locals in each

---

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Bowie 2007: 182.

<sup>79</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 870E = Simon. 11 *FGE*, cf. [Dio Chrys.] *Or.* 37.18. For the inscription, see *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 1143; *ML* 24; *CEG* 131. The second couplet is also likely to be authentic (Sider 2021: 102). See also Boegehold 1965; Petrovic 2007, Ep. 3; Proietti 2021: 171-2 and Sider 2021, ep. 14 with further bibliography.

<sup>80</sup> Thuc. 1.60-5; Hdt. 7.137.3 and Thuc. 2.67. For the Corinthian relationship with Athens, see de Ste. Croix 1972: 211-24; Salmon 1984: 257-69, 281-305.

<sup>81</sup> This argument may be difficult to substantiate, as Herodotos is generally thought to have died in the 420s BC. Gould 2012: 674. However, as events relating to the Battle of Salamis are recorded close to the end of his work, there may have been time for Herodotos to insert a newly created narrative.

city but also to other Greek audiences.<sup>82</sup> Simonides visited Korinth immediately after the Persian Wars and composed poems honouring the Korinthians. Among them, some epigrams celebrate the deeds of the Korinthian soldiers who fought against the Persians. In an epigram, Simonides commemorates the Korinthian dead in the Battle of Salamis:<sup>83</sup>

ὦ ξεῖν', εὐυδρόν ποκ' ἐναίομες ἄστῳ Κορίνθου,  
νῦν δ' ἄμ' Αἴαντος νᾶσος ἔχει Σαλαμίς.  
ῥεῖα δὲ Φοινίσσας νᾶας καὶ Πέρσας ἐλόντες  
καὶ Μήδους ἰαρὰν Ἑλλάδα ῥυσάμεθα.

Stranger, once we lived in the well-watered city of Korinth; now Ajax' island Salamis holds us. With ease we captured Phoenician ships and Persians and Medes and saved holy Greece.

This epigram records the Korinthians' achievement and self-sacrifice for the Greeks in the battle. It is worth scrutinising the usage of the phrase 'Ἑλλάδα ῥυσάμεθα', i.e., 'we saved Greece' or 'we rescued Greece'. The Persian Wars were generally recognised by the Greeks as a fight against the ambition of the Persians to enslave Greece and a crucial moment for the realisation of the idea of 'the freedom of the Greeks'. Further, the victory was regarded as the achievement which saved Greece as a whole. Yet, this characterisation is fictional since only a few Greek *poleis* - thirty-one out of several hundreds<sup>84</sup> - fought against the Persians.<sup>85</sup> As Herodotos indicates, many *poleis*

---

<sup>82</sup> For the problem of the authenticity of his works, see Sider 2021: 25-32. For the career of Simonides, see Molyneux 1992; Sider 2021: 1-9. The ancient tradition of his life, see Lefkowitz 2012: 55-60. Cf. Bowra 1961: 312-4 insists Simonides tended to be aggressive towards opponents of his patrons with whom he became intimate. However, Molyneux 1992: 73, cf. 126, 154-6 points out "his ability to celebrate mutually hostile parties without becoming personally involved in their cause" (quotation from p. 73). See also Instone 1995.

<sup>83</sup> Text and translation slightly modified from Sider 2021, ep. 14 (=Plut. *Mor.* 870e, cf. *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 1143). For this epigram, see p. 52, n. 79 above.

<sup>84</sup> Although it is impossible to know the number of *poleis* in 480 BC, it is calculated that possibly 862 *poleis* existed in 400 BC. Can we guess there were fewer than one or two hundred *poleis* in 480 BC? It is hard to answer, but it might be reasonable that these thirty-one *poleis* were a minority among the Greeks. See Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 53-4. Cf. Thuc. 3.56.5, where a Plataian claims that they took the Greek side in the Xerxes invasion even when only a small number of the Greeks fought against Xerxes.

<sup>85</sup> The number here is indicated in an inscription on the Serpent Column erected at Delphi (Plut.

surrendered to or took the Persian side, and some Greeks followed Xerxes' expedition personally.<sup>86</sup> It can be said that the characterisation of the war as 'saving Greece' was a kind of propaganda by the winners, especially the leaders, Athens and Sparta, in order to embellish or magnify their achievements by characterising the wars as Greek efforts.<sup>87</sup> Here, we can see how this propaganda was spread in the epigram.

The Korinthians seem to have liked the use of this propaganda. The same sentiment is shown in another epigram by Simonides, which was inscribed on a cenotaph at the Isthmos for those having fought at the Battle of Salamis (Sider 2021, ep. 15 = Simon. 12 *FGE* (=Plut. *Mor.* 870f)). It is remarkable that both epigrams even assert that it was the Korinthians who rescued Greece, seen in the use of the first-person plural of 'ῥύομαι'. Here, the other Greeks who fought with them against the Persians are omitted. This usage is rare in the epigrams of the Persian Wars among the Simonidean corpus.<sup>88</sup> Unlike the Korinthian ones, epigrams of other *poleis* tend to celebrate their contribution to Greece, its freedom, or the freedom of their fatherland.<sup>89</sup> Herodotos uses the phrase 'ῥύεσθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα' (to rescue Greece) twice to indicate the Spartan role of protecting Greece.<sup>90</sup> This seems to be a slightly stronger assertion than similar wordings to denote

---

*Them.* 20.3, cf. Paus. 5.23.1-2, 10.13.4; ML 27). On the erection of the Column, see Hdt. 9.81.

<sup>86</sup> Surrendered *poleis*: Hdt. 6.48-9, 7.132, 172-4. For Herodotos, the neutral *poleis* were medised. See Hdt. 8.73.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. Cartledge 2002a: 54. For the examples of this claim, Sider 2021, epp. 16 (=Simon. 19 *FGE*), 19 (=Simon. 21 *FGE*), cf. Simon. 17, 20(a) *FGE* with Sider 2021: 42. If the Ionian Revolt was characterised as a Panhellenic effort to free the Ionians, as Flower 2000b, 69-76 and Mitchell 2007, 128-9 discuss, it is possible that it was regarded as a fight for the 'freedom of Greece.' Cf. Hdt. 5.49, 97; Mitchell 2007: 19-24.

<sup>88</sup> For similar expressions, see West 1970: 279-80.

<sup>89</sup> See, e.g., Sider 2021, epp. 8 (=Simon. 9 *FGE*), 20 (=Simon. 18 *FGE*), 23 (=Simon. 53 *FGE*) for commemorating the war dead's contribution to their fatherland (cf. Sider 2021, epp. 21 (=Simon. 19 *FGE*) ) and Sider 2021, epp. 4a (=Simon. 21 *FGE*), 7 (=Simon. 8 *FGE*), 19 (=Simon. 16 *FGE*) for (the freedom of) Greece. In addition to them, if we accept West's restoration, Simon. fr. 11 West, *IE*<sup>2</sup> ll. 24-6 reads that "so that rem[embrance is preserved] || of those who held the line for Spart[a and for Greece,] || [that none should see] the da[y of slavery.]" (ἵνα τις [μνή]σεται ὕ[στερον αὖ || ἀνδρῶ]ν οἱ Σπάρτ[η] τε καὶ Ἑλλάδι δούλιον ἦ[μ]αρ || ἔσχον) ἀμυνόμενοι μὴ τιν' ἰδεῖν φανεροῦ[ς]).

<sup>90</sup> Leonidas is mentioned as fighting in defence of Greece (ῥυόμενον τὴν Ἑλλάδα) (Hdt. 8.114.2) while Pausanias is addressed by Lampon, an Aiginetan, as the man "who has saved Greece" (ῥυσάμενον τὴν Ἑλλάδα) after the Battle of Plataia (Hdt. 9.78.2). Cf. Flower and Marincola 2002:

a contribution to the freedom of Greece.<sup>91</sup> In addition to this, this exaggeration of one's valour by excluding others can be seen again in the commemoration of Adeimantos. He was celebrated by an epitaph ascribed to Simonides as the one responsible for the freedom of all Greece. He is described as the reason why all Greece put on the wreath of freedom.<sup>92</sup> Although this glorification of him does not specify the battles in which he took part, it is likely that he is praised here for his service as the commander of Korinthian forces at the Battles of Artemision and Salamis. Adeimantos himself had commemorated his glory at Salamis by naming his children after his valour at the naval battle.<sup>93</sup>

We find a similarity to this in the way Pausanias honoured himself with an epigram on the famous Serpent Column. On this dedication to the Delphic Apollo, made of the spoils of the Battle of Plataia in 478 BC, Pausanias engraved an epigram in which he claimed he destroyed the Persian army.<sup>94</sup> This “destruction of the Persian force” mentions the Battle of Plataia since the column was made of the spoils of the battle in which Pausanias was the commander. If true, he assumed and claimed credit for the victory to Sparta as well as to himself through this epigram. Although the Spartans were appreciated by many of the Greeks as the liberators of Greece on the basis of their achievement in the Battle of Plataia and claimed this for themselves, Athens and Korinth also insisted on their responsibility through their service in the Battle of Salamis.<sup>95</sup> These similar claims could be compatible insofar as such claims were about

---

245. Note that Raaflaub 2004, 63-4 argues that the motif of rescue from servitude was just one way to describe the wars. A similar usage is also found in Diodoros' report on an example which uses 'ρύομαι', which is inscribed on a Greek collective dedication of a gold tripod built at Delphi. Diod. Sic. 11.33.2 = Simon. 17(b) *FGE*: Ἑλλάδος εὐρυχόρου σωτήρες τόνδ' ἀνέθηκαν, δουλοσύνης στυγεραῖς ῥυσάμενοι πόλιας. For the discussion of its authenticity, see Yates 2019: 41-2, n. 54 with 97, n. 173.

<sup>91</sup> For instance, Sider 2021, ep. 19, ll. 1-2 (=IG VII 53 = Simon. 16 *FGE*): “In our eagerness to foster the day of freedom for Greece and Megara we accepted our fated death” (Ἑλλάδι καὶ Μεγαρεῦσιν ἐλεύθερον ἄμαρ ἀέξειν || ἴεμενοι θανάτου μοῖραν ἐδεξάμεθα).

<sup>92</sup> Sider 2021, ep. 13 (= Simon. 10 *FGE*):

<sup>93</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 871a: Nausinika (Victory with Ships), Akrothinion (Pick of the Booty), Alexibia (Defense Against Force), and Aristeus (The Bravest). See Strauss 2004: 201.

<sup>94</sup> Thuc. 1.132.2; [Dem.] 59.97. Scholars reasonably speculate Pausanias was responsible for the construction and dedication of the tripod. See Stephenson 2016: 88, 90-1; Yates 2019: 30, n. 8.

<sup>95</sup> Thuc. 2.71.2, 3.58.5 with 54.3-5 (a Plataian), cf. 3.57.2. See also p. 54, n. 90.

credit in different battles. Although the evidence is scarce, its consistency and difference in expression from the other sources are impressive. Overall, the Corinthians contended their responsibility for rescuing Greece on the basis of their valour in the Battle of Salamis.<sup>96</sup>

The Athenians thus attacked Korinth for almost the same reason as they attacked Aigina: Korinthian valour could have diminished Athens' achievements at Salamis. Korinth is the *polis* whose name is inscribed on the Serpent Column, after Sparta and Athens. It sent warships in numbers second only to the Athenians at the Battle of Salamis, and its military success was reported to have been accepted by the other Greeks. The Corinthians claimed credit for the victory at Salamis and, for this reason, they could challenge Athenian supremacy. Even though the Delian League was formed to fight Persia, the opportunity for direct confrontation with Persia was lost in the 450s BC. A reasonable justification would have been necessary for the Athenians to maintain and expand the alliance in these circumstances. The growing hostility between the Athenians and Corinthians around this time must have provided a further opportunity for the Athenians to attack the record of the Corinthians.

### **1.3.3. Athens and Sparta**

We have seen, up to this point, how the Athenians used the memory of the Persian Wars to justify their imperialistic control over the Delian League. In that sense, it is no exaggeration to say that at that time, this memory was used to create division and tension between the *poleis* throughout Greece. In this section, by taking up two cases in which memory was used for the sake of political forgiveness and friendship, we will examine the contexts and implications for the uses of memory, as well as how Athens used its past experience in the Persian Wars as precedents for exerting moral pressure on itself and others. The events examined here will be those involving Athens and Sparta after the Peloponnesian War. The first one is about the negotiation of the Spartans with their allies after the fall of Athens in 404 BC, while the second is about the negotiation between Athens and Sparta after the Battle of Leuktra.

The first example we will examine is the account of the assembly at Sellasia in 404

---

<sup>96</sup> For another Korinthian way of remembering the Battle of Salamis that focuses on the role of females, see Yates 2019: 193-9. Strauss 2004: 201-2 points out that Simon. 14 *FGE* “manages to celebrate Korinth while taking a swipe at Athens and Athenian manhood” (quotation from p. 202). See also Theopomp. *BNJ* 115 F 285a (cf. Timaios, *BNJ* 566 F 10), F 285b-c.

BC, recorded in Xenophon's *Hellenika* (2.2.19-20), in which the Spartans and their allies determine the treatment of the surrendered Athens after a siege. According to Xenophon, the Spartans refused to accept the request of their allies, the Thebans and the Corinthians, to destroy the city but offered to make peace on the grounds that they would not enslave the Athenians who did great service in the greatest dangers that had happened to Greece (τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις γενομένοις τῇ Ἑλλάδι). He reports the Athenians are saved from the downfall by the Spartans specifically because of their great service in the Persian Wars. The assembly finally proposed a peace treaty on the condition that the Athenians should destroy the long city walls and the walls of Piraeus, surrender all but twelve ships, and follow the Spartans both by land and by sea.<sup>97</sup>

This testimony about the Spartan rationalisations may be supported by other sources. Generally, the historical traditions agree with each other on the points that the Spartans, or the Phokians, refused the request pushed by the allies, particularly the Thebans.<sup>98</sup> Authors such as Justinus and Plutarch offer information about the rationalisations to save Athens. Justinus says that many of the allies wanted to erase Athens, but the Spartans refused to do that because they did not want “to root up one of the two eyes of Greece” (*ex duobus Graeciae oculis alterum eruturos*) (Just. *Epit.* 5.8.4). This apparently suggests the political and historical importance of Athens in the fifth century BC. Plutarch, however, focuses more on a cultural aspect. He records that, after seeing the Athenians had not followed the edict for peace, the allies requested the city to be destroyed and the population enslaved. Yet, at a banquet of generals, a Phokian, not a Spartan, sang lines 167-8 of the first chorus of Euripides' *Elektra*, wherein the chorus visits Elektra who was evicted from her father's house for being forced by Aigisthos and Klytaimnestra to marry a poor peasant in Mykenai. Then, Plutarch reports everyone there to have moved to pity and to have felt it was cruel to destroy and abolish a city that had produced people of such high reputation (Plut. *Lys.* 15.1-4). Xenophon, Justinus and Plutarch all see that the cultural, political and historical superiority of Athens over the Greeks occupied an essential part of persuasion. Although Plutarch seems to contain a greater element of invention, fundamentally, the idea is the same.

---

<sup>97</sup> The provisions of the Spartan terms are summarised by Green 2004: 148-9 with sources.

<sup>98</sup> Spartans: Andoc. 3.21; Isoc. 14.31-2; Just. *Epit.* 5.8.3-4; Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.20, 6.5.35. Phokians: Dem. 19.65; Plut. *Lys.* 15.2-4; *Suda* s.v. μηλόβοτος χώρα with Stylianos 1998: 429. Thebans: Dem. 19.65; Isoc. 14.31-2; Plut. *Lys.* 15.2-4; *Suda* s.v. μηλόβοτος χώρα with Stylianos 1998: 429; Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.20, 3.5.8, 6.5.35. Diodoros was likely to misunderstand his source and said that the Spartans wanted to destroy Athens. Diod. Sic. 15.63.1; Stylianos 1998: 429.

The Athenians' achievements saved the city. Their fight against the Persians must have been taken into account.

However, it is difficult to ascertain how important it was to refer to the past of the Persian Wars to rescue Athens. The Spartans had the right to finalise the conditions for peace and the treatment of Athens. As the request from the allies was not special in the time of the Peloponnesian Wars, and the Athenians are reported to have anticipated the same kinds of treatment as the allies advocated, the Spartan generosity toward them without massacre, enslavement, general plunder and rape is quite surprising. Is it possible that Sparta's respect for the Athenians merely worked? The answer is possibly yes. Many scholars, on the other hand, think that the Spartans saved Athens to let it check the growth of Thebes, either out of fear or from a desire to restrain Lysandros from increasing his wealth and power by plundering Athens.<sup>99</sup> In spite of the defeat, the strength and wealth of Athens must have been believed to be still powerful enough to change the balance of power. I agree that politics had a great deal of influence on the Spartans' actual decision-making. Yet, in either case, the Spartans needed to give a good rationale to justify their decision without showing their real reasons to the allies, a rationale which could convince and silence them emotionally, morally, and logically. The Athenian contributions to the Greeks would work best on that occasion.

The second example also comes from Xenophon's *Hellenika* (6.5.33-48), which offers another aspect of the recollection of the Persian Wars in the interstate politics of Athens and Sparta, an aspect that could be foregrounded in the time of the rise of Thebes. In 369 BC, after the Battle of Leuktra, Thebes was becoming a hegemonic power in the mainland, invading the Peloponnese with the Arkadians and threatening Sparta. Xenophon reports that the Athenians, knowing the situation, summoned an assembly to discuss how to treat the Spartan affair. The ambassadors of the Spartans and allies gave speeches. Xenophon records three speeches: one delivered by the Spartans collectively, one by the Korinthian Kleiteles, and one by the Phliasian Prokles. Their purpose was to have the Athenians intervene to curb the Thebans' expansion.

For this purpose, the Spartan ambassadors stressed the longstanding Athenian-Spartan friendship in the past. They referred to the expulsion of the Peisistratid tyranny, the revolt of the Messenians, the Persian Wars, the Delian League, and the Spartan

---

<sup>99</sup> For the former, see Cartledge 1987: 275-80; Cartledge 2002b: 230, cf. Powell 2001: 199-200. For the latter, see Powell 2018: 317-8. Cartledge 1987: 275 also points out the influence of Lysandros' imperialistic policy which needed "puppet juntas" in subject communities.

refusal to accept the Theban request to destroy Athens in 404 BC.<sup>100</sup> These historical events work as precedents for friendship and, therefore, as the justification for the request. The selection and manipulation of memories are striking. The Spartans make a mention of “all the blessings which were enjoyed at the time when both peoples were acting in union (κοινῶς)” (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.34). Xenophon reports two “blessings” among them. An aspect of cooperation in the defeat of Xerxes is emphasised here (ὕπομμνήσκοντες μὲν ὡς τὸν βάρβαρον κοινῇ ἀπεμαχέσαντο) (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.34). This masks the aloneness of the Athenians at Marathon and Salamis, which the Athenians extensively used to justify their empire, and the competitive relationship for claiming credit for the overall victory. This manipulation even changed the image of the past after Xerxes’ expedition. The Spartans referred to the dual hegemony of the Athenian Empire by sea and Sparta by land in the fifth century BC and recalled it as the peaceful division of the Greek world based on mutual recognition and the approval of all Greeks. As the situation was not so peaceful in the fifth century BC, this land/sea division may be a retrojection that comes from the thoughts of the fourth century BC.<sup>101</sup> The memories are here modified to fit into the present context.

The past also governs the present and the future. The Spartan ambassadors further declared that the Spartans and the Athenians would be able to extract the *tithe* from Thebes (“But if you and we, gentlemen, come to agreement, there is hope now (vῶν) that the Thebans will be decimated (δεκατευθῆναι), as the old saying has it”).<sup>102</sup> This is a reference to the oath of the Greeks in the time of Xerxes’ expedition to extract it from the medised poleis when they would win the war.<sup>103</sup> The ambassadors claimed here that the Thebans had not been punished for their medism since 479 BC, so the Athenians and the Spartans jointly needed to do it now by facing them. We do not know if a tenth was collected, so we cannot determine whether this claim is a fabrication. Bringing up an issue that has been neglected for almost a century not only recalls the joint victory of Athens and Sparta in 480/79 BC but also creates the impression that the Thebans have been behaving as enemies.<sup>104</sup>

Following the Spartans, Prokles of Phleius gave further importance to the Persian

---

<sup>100</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.33-5. Cf. Underhill 1900: 264.

<sup>101</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.34; Rood 2012: 88-9.

<sup>102</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.35. Translation from Brownson 1921.

<sup>103</sup> For the Greek oath to extract the *tithe* from the medised *poleis*, see Hdt. 7.132; Diod. Sic. 11.3.3. Lycurg. 80-1; Polyb. 9.39.5; RO 88, ll. 32-3.

<sup>104</sup> Prokles also allude the Theban medism. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.43. See also Rood 2012: 89.

Wars in his speech. According to him, a situation similar to the Persian Wars can recur in the future.<sup>105</sup>

If ever again danger should come to Greece from barbarians, whom would you trust more than the Lacedaemonians? Whom would you more gladly make your comrades in the ranks than these, whose countrymen, posted at Thermopylae, chose every man to die fighting rather than to live and admit the barbarian to Greece? Therefore, both because they proved themselves brave men along with you, and because there is hope that they will so prove themselves again, is it not surely right that you and we alike should show all good-will toward them?

Prokles, in this way, supports the Spartan claim by proclaiming that Athens and Sparta should lead a war against barbarians in the future, just as they did in the Persian Wars. Here, he utilises the Athenians' and Spartans' historical roles as the leaders of defeating the Persians, which were approved by themselves and other Greeks, in order to put implicit pressure on the Athenians to accept the request. The Battle of Thermopylai also plays a role here. It was sometimes regarded even by the Athenians as the greatest battle the Spartans fought during Xerxes' expedition, a battle that could be compared to the Battle of Marathon. Making this comparison seems to be aimed not only at displaying the strength of the Spartans but also at invoking the pride of the Athenians.<sup>106</sup> The past of the Persian Wars and the future predictions based on it give the Athenians a sense of duty to save Sparta now.

The Athenians are bound by their own claims. Just as they behaved as the leaders of the Greeks who defeated the Persians, they are now required by their 'subjects' to behave accordingly. The other subject *poleis* expected Athens to fulfil social and political expectations, as well as those created by their self-imposed role, and failure in this task means risking a loss of honour for them. Prokles then refers to the incidents in the "Seven against Thebes" and "Return of the Herakleidai", which the Athenians cite as a *cliché* in their oration and uses Athenian self-representations to put further pressure on them. Provided they were valid in their arguments, these historical and mythical precedents could have been the supporting pieces to the main line of the demand. Thus,

---

<sup>105</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.43. Translation from Brownson 1921.

<sup>106</sup> E.g. Isoc. 4.91-2, 5.148, 12.187. In order to emphasise the bravery of the Spartans, Prokles conveniently forgets the recent defeat of the Spartans at Leuktra. Higgins 1977: 121. Tim Rood argues that the imagery of Marathon is used in Prokles' speech. See Rood 2012: 90-1.

the past, which the Athenians present to the Greeks as the great deed of their city's ancestors, can be a diplomatic tool that other *poleis* can use against Athens for their own needs. The pen of the past used to sign diplomatic relations can thus become a double-edged sword, so to speak.

Sparta and its allies combined the past with the present and the future in order to gain Athenian aid, recalling or changing the emphasis of the past images of the Persian Wars to suit their present purposes. Such rhetoric not only appealed to the Athenian stance, which had used the wars against Persia to represent itself as the guardian of Greek freedom but also served to portray the Thebans as common enemies of the Athenians and the Spartans.

The Theban medism referred to by the Spartan envoys and by Prokles continued to influence Theban diplomacy in the Classical period, as we will see in the next section.

### **1.3.4. Thebes: Two Faces of the 'Mediser'**

In contrast to Athens and Sparta, some states, such as Thebes, fought on the Persian side in the wars and were considered as 'medisers'. This complicated their attitude to Xerxes' expedition. The final part of this section will examine how these 'medisers' present different aspects of their past.<sup>107</sup>

It is known that the Thebans joined the Persian side during Xerxes' expedition. However, the exact situation of Thebes at that time and its motivation for medising cannot be fully explained because there is no good evidence to consider the internal condition of the Thebans. It is generally believed that not all the Thebans supported Persian domination, and the city did not fully medise in the early phase of Xerxes' incursion of mainland Greece. It is likely to be anti-Persian Thebans who sent a contingent of 400 Theban soldiers to Thermopylai to fight the Persians alongside Leonidas and other Greek allies.<sup>108</sup> Yet, after its submission, the Theban territory was

---

<sup>107</sup> On medism, see Graf 1979; Graf 1984; Tuplin 1997; Rung 2013. The Athenian use of the memory of the Theban medism is studied extensively by Steinbock 2013: 100-54. For the Theban history from 479-404 BC, see, conveniently, Rockwell 2017: 58-84.

<sup>108</sup> E.g. Buck 1979: 128-33; Graf 1979: 170-81; Hammond 1988: 544-5, 564-5; Steinbock 2013: 103-5; Rockwell 2017: 47-54. References to the Theban contingent: Hdt. 7.205, 7.222, 7.233. See also Hdt. 9.86-9, where the Hellenic League demanded after the Battle of Plataia that the Thebans surrender those who sided with the Persians, specifically the chief leaders, Timagenidas and Attaginos.

used by Mardonios to accommodate Xerxes' army, and the Thebans occupied the right wing of the Persian battle line in the Battle of Plataia with the Boiotians to face the Athenians and the Plataians, and they were besieged by the Greek forces after the defeat. Thus, after the Battle of Plataia, the Thebans were regarded as military losers and as the betrayers of the Greeks. This was done in accordance with the interpretation that portrayed the Persian Wars as the wars between Greeks vs barbarians. The historical complexity of the Theban internal politics during these difficult years is masked by anti-Theban bias, especially that of Herodotos, and our sources tell us that their medism seriously damaged their political importance and prestige. Diodoros tells us that, in 457/6 BC, the Thebans attempted to regain their prestige and the hegemony over Boiotia, and so asked the Spartans for help (11.81.1-2). This plot was eventually thwarted by Athens, which would rule Boiotia until 446 BC when the Boiotian forces, led by exiles from Orchomenos, Euboia, and Lokrians, defeated the Athenian army. Boiotian restoration of autonomy at that time led to the reformation of the Boiotian League in alliance with the Spartans and perhaps Thebes' strengthening its position in Boiotia. Yet, they still seem to have needed to confront their inconvenient memory of medism in the interstate context.

Their disadvantageous position among the Greeks is reflected in Thucydides' *Histories*, where the speeches of the Plataians and the Thebans in 427 BC are reported (3.52-68).<sup>109</sup> The dispute between the Plataians and the Thebans in front of the Spartans concerns the treatment of the Plataians after the two-year siege of Plataia, which eventually surrendered to the Peloponnesians and their allies. In this dispute, the Plataians referred to the medism of the Thebans for begging a pardon after surrendering (3.53-9) and, conversely, the Thebans for trying to nullify that stigma (3.61-7). Both of these arguments are riddled with contradictions, and neither can be said to be successful in their self-justification.<sup>110</sup> Both discuss the past of the Persian Wars. Yet, neither affects the Spartan judgement, which decided to destroy Plataia in the end.<sup>111</sup> As Thucydides says, Sparta ruled in its immediate interest (3.68). However, it may be possible that the Theban argument over the past has diluted the force of Plataia's argument and created a situation in which Sparta can more easily give a judgment in favour of Thebes.

---

<sup>109</sup> The relationship between this debate and Thucydides' narrative is explored in Macleod 1977; Debnar 1996; Grethlein 2012.

<sup>110</sup> Grethlein 2012: 60.

<sup>111</sup> Cf. Macleod 1977; Bruzzone 2015.

The argument of the Plataians is quite simple: do not be persuaded by the Thebans to destroy Plataia (3.58.1, 3.59.1). The memory of the Persian Wars lies in the core of the arguments offered by the Plataian speakers, Astymachos and Lakon.<sup>112</sup> By referring to the wars, they established a contrast between the Plataians and the Thebans. They stated that at the time of Xerxes' expedition, Plataia was the only Greek *polis* among the Boiotians that fought for Greece, while all Boiotians joined Persia (Thuc. 3.54.3-4, cf. Thuc. 3.56.4, 3.59.4). The connection between Plataia, Sparta, and the Greek victory is further strengthened by a reference to Pausanias. He was the one who won the freedom of Greece at the Battle of Plataia with the Plataians (Thuc. 3.54.4) and the one who buried the war dead on the land of the friendly city, Plataia (Thuc. 3.58.3-5). The Thebans, on the other hand, are simply described as betrayers: the Thebans were in the service of the Persian King, who came to enslave Greece, and if the Spartans gave Plataia to the Thebans now, they will be enslaving the land where the Plataians and Spartans won the Greeks their freedom (Thuc. 3.58.3-5). The speakers then begged the Spartans not to give the Plataians, who had done so much for Greece, into the hands of the Thebans.

The Plataian speakers, in this way, requested a pardon from the Spartans by reminding them not only of their past friendship and achievement but also of the Thebans' former medism. Here, Plataia's contribution to the Greek victory recalls the past friendship between Plataia and Sparta. With this, the reference to the Thebans' medism aims to make Sparta abandon the idea of collaborating with Thebes in the destruction of Plataia.

The Plataians also supported their claims to the Spartans by connecting the past, the present and the future. This argument is constructed through the tripod at Delphi and tombs of the war dead, monuments built in the aftermath of the Persian Wars and still present at the time of the destruction of Plataia.<sup>113</sup> For the former, according to them, it would be thought horrible if the Spartans destroy the city to gratify the Thebans in spite of the fact that "your fathers" (τοὺς ... πατέρας), i.e., the fathers of Spartans, inscribed the name of Plataia on the tripod (Thuc. 3.57.2). For the latter, if the *polis* where the tombs of the war dead remain were to be left to the hands of the Thebans, who were enemies of the Greeks, the glory obtained by "your fathers and kindred" (πατέρας τοὺς ὑμετέρους καὶ ξυγγενεῖς) could be deprived (Thuc. 3.58.5). The Plataians here pointed

---

<sup>112</sup> Thuc. 3.52.5. Lakon was chosen as a speaker because he was a *proxenos* of Sparta. Cf. Hornblower 1991: 443-4.

<sup>113</sup> Grethlein 2012: 61-2.

to the possibility of a reversal of the meanings of these monuments from the past glory of Sparta to reminders of the Spartan stigma. The effect of this contrast is emphasised by mentioning the fathers of the Spartans, as shown in the above-mentioned passages. The Plataians suggest that it would be the responsibility of the present Spartans to defend their ancestors' honour. Their message is that if the Spartans destroy Plataia, the Spartans will lose the honour of their fathers, and the monuments will be proof of that loss.

In fact, as we will see in Chapter 4.2.2, the destruction of Plataia did leave scars on Sparta's reputation. Nevertheless, while it can be questionable how effective the method of appealing to past virtue and friendship was in the actual post-war process, the past of the Persian Wars could have been used as an excuse for Sparta to pardon Plataia if it had wished.<sup>114</sup>

The Thebans' arguments, in contrast, consist exclusively of objections to those of the Plataians (Thuc. 3.61-7). The Thebans started their speech by refuting the Plataians who had criticised their medism:<sup>115</sup>

Yet consider the different circumstances in which we and they acted as we did. At that time the constitution of our city was neither an oligarchy with equal rights for all nor a democracy, but our affairs were controlled by a small dominant clique, something as far as could be from legal process and the ideal of disciplined government, and very close to tyranny. This clique hoped that a Persian victory would extend their own power, so they suppressed the common people by force and invited in the Persians. This act was done without the whole city having control of its own affairs, and it should not be blamed for errors committed when there was no rule of law.

The Thebans went on to state that they had been working to fight against Athens after the *polis* restored the laws to show that it was not normal at the time of Xerxes' expedition.

For our discussion, what is important is the way the Thebans understand their medism. Whereas the Plataians see Theban medism as a problem of the Thebans as a whole, the Thebans shift the blame for their medism onto a few (*ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν*) within the Thebans. In this way, the Thebans try to argue that many Thebans in the past had nothing to do with medism at the time of the Xerxes' expedition and that Thebans then

---

<sup>114</sup> Cf. Bruzzone 2015: 298.

<sup>115</sup> Thuc. 3.62.3-4. Translation from Hammond 2009.

and now are not responsible for it.<sup>116</sup> This argument creates a discontinuity between the present and the past that is inconvenient and that one wants to forget. This would also portray those responsible for the war as perpetrators and the rest of the population as victims who are oppressed and forced by the perpetrators to cooperate in waging war, as the Thebans did. As the situation in Thebes at the time of medism cannot be fully reconstructed, it would be difficult to take the claims of the Thebans at face value as historical fact. However, this argument of the Thebans may have been invented and circulated soon after the Persian Wars. A clue can be found in *Isthmian* 8, which was composed by the Theban poet Pindar soon after the Persian Wars to praise the Aiginetan victor, Kleandros.<sup>117</sup> In lines 5-15, he refers to his own grief over his own country, Thebes. Here, the Persian Wars are mentioned in terms of inescapable grief, suffering and fear from which the Thebans were liberated, as well as an insufferable hardship for the Greeks that “one of the gods has turned aside” (ll. 10-1). He also celebrates freedom by which the twists and turns of life can be healed. Pindar juxtaposes the Theban experience with the Greek experience as the same suffering. To make this argument possible, the Thebans must have had to present themselves as people who had also experienced hardship and been deprived of their freedom. The Thebans’ attempt to restore their honour acquired some support from the Greeks.

By referring to the Persian Wars, the Theban speakers develop their criticism of Plataia. According to them, the Plataians fought the Persians because they followed Athens, so they could not claim any contributions to the Greek victory. Rather, they are still following Athens in betraying and enslaving Greece now. By constructing their argument in this way, the Thebans parallel Thebans’ forced *medismos* with Plataians’ voluntary *attikismos* and claim that Plataians should be criticised more.<sup>118</sup> “By accusing the Plataians of *attikismos*, the Thebans manage to turn the tables and redirect all the blame they have themselves received for their *medismos* onto the Plataians.”<sup>119</sup> In the Thebans’ argument, as depicted by Thucydides, the past of the Persian Wars has to be cited to criticise Plataia.

In any case, its medising past could work against Thebes in the context of international politics, and so it needed to have an argument to deny it. The practice of holding only some people responsible for medism could perhaps have been seen in the

---

<sup>116</sup> See also Paus. 9.6.2; Hornblower 1991: 456-7.

<sup>117</sup> For the discussion on the dating, see Burnett 2005: 107, n. 1.

<sup>118</sup> The looseness of the Theban logic is studied by Debnar 1996.

<sup>119</sup> Grethlein 2012: 63.

other *poleis* that took part on the Persian side, whether intentionally or under coercion. It may have been necessary for communities that had medised to have someone to blame in order to reconcile with a past of subordination after the defeat and accept the new order based on the powers of Sparta and Athens. But one must be careful about the extent to which this argument worked in the context of diplomacy. Only a few *poleis*, including Athens, Sparta, and Plataia, would have taken a ‘morally’ superior position as those who took the side of the Greeks when medism was at issue. Defending what the internal situation was like in a *polis* when taking the Persian side may be of no relevance to the actual negotiations. Still, as the Theban case shows, it would have been necessary to offer an “excuse” for medism when necessary.

The picture explored up to this point is only one side of the memory of Theban medism. We must look at the other side of the same coin. There were circumstances in which a pro-Persian position could be useful. From the Persian point of view, the Thebans offered their soldiers and territory to the Persians by the time of the Battle of Plataia, and thus, they were loyal subjects at that time. The Thebans could claim that they had helped the Persians wage war against the Greeks, so they had a good relationship with the Persian King. The use of this argument can be observed in a speech recorded in Xenophon’s *Hellenika*. In 367 BC, the Theban Pelopidas was sent to the Persian King, Artaxerxes II, to seek Persian support for the Theban hegemony over Greece. Two years after the victory at Leuktra and Epaminondas’ two expeditions into the Peloponnese, the Thebans needed to find a way to compete with the Athenian-Spartan alliance concluded in 369 BC, as we saw in the last section. There were also Spartan and Athenian ambassadors at the court of the King at Susa. According to Xenophon, Pelopidas successfully obtained the most generous treatment from the King by referring to Theban past relationship with the Persians:<sup>120</sup>

When the ambassadors arrived there, Pelopidas enjoyed a great advantage with the Persian (sc. Artaxerxes II). For he was able to say that his people were the only ones among the Greeks who had fought on the side of the King at Plataia, that they had never afterwards undertaken a campaign against the King, and that the Lakedaimonians had made war upon them for precisely the reason that they had declined to go with Agesilaos against him and had refused to permit Agesilaos to sacrifice to Artemis at Aulis, the very spot where Agamemnon, at the time when he was sailing forth to Asia, had sacrificed before he captured Troy. It also contributed greatly toward the winning of honour for Pelopidas that

---

<sup>120</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.34-5. Translation modified from Brownson 1921.

the Thebans had been victorious in battle at Leuktra, and that they had admittedly ravaged the country of the Lakedaemonians. Pelopidas also said that the Argives and Arkadians had been defeated by the Lakedaemonians when the Thebans were not present with them.

Pelopidas here refers to the past relationship, if not friendship, as well as their past contribution to Persian safety. According to him, the Thebans took part in the Persian side at Plataia and never became aggressive towards Persia after the wars. Rather, they attempted to prevent Sparta from invading the Persian territory, and they even defeated it, here referred to as an enemy of Persia. The reference to Troy strengthens the impression that Sparta is an enemy of Asia.<sup>121</sup>

It should be noted here that Xenophon is believed to hate Thebes.<sup>122</sup> His historiography is sometimes illuminated by his anti-Theban bias. Cinzia Bearzot even points out that the passage we saw above “maliciously evokes one of the most important themes of fourth-century anti-Theban propaganda”.<sup>123</sup> Yet, we cannot dismiss all of Xenophon’s references to, or omissions of, Thebes as biased.<sup>124</sup> In our case, it is possible that the Thebans used their medised past for communication with the Persian King, at least as a starting point for negotiations. Reference to past friendly relationships was quite common in Greek diplomacy. The content of this speech is likely to reflect, at

---

<sup>121</sup> One may suspect that it is too Hellenocentric, especially in terms of the reference to the Trojan imagery manipulated by Agesilaos to fight against ‘Asia’ and, for that reason, believe that it could be Xenophon’s invention. The question would be whether it was efficient to allude to the Trojan myth in negotiation with the Persian King, to put it simply, whether he could understand it. The Persian story of the beginning of the wars between East and West included in Herodotos’ preamble should be regarded as a Greek invention. See Erskine 2001: 83-4; Haubold 2007: 49-50. Johannes Haubold constructs an interesting argument that Xerxes assumed the avenger of Priamos for the eyes of a Greek audience in conquering mainland Greece (Haubold 2007, cf. Haubold 2013: 112). This thesis is stimulating, but it cannot be supported by any Persian sources. Green 2009: 611-2. However, he offers an important suggestion. The Persians must have known the local traditions of their subjects through Persian and local experts who came to the Persian court and even attempted to reshape them with their local supporters. Artaxerxes II must have understood the symbolic meaning and value of the Trojan War for the Greeks.

<sup>122</sup> E.g. Bury 1909: 152-3; Cawkwell 1979: 36-7; Dillery 1995: 196.

<sup>123</sup> Bearzot 2011: 23-4.

<sup>124</sup> Cf. Pownall 2004: 65-112; Flower 2017: 305-8.

least in part, the essence of what Pelopidas said.<sup>125</sup> Even if anti-Theban sentiments might govern Xenophon's account, this could be limited to his malicious focalisation on Pelopidas' reference to Thebans' medised past.

Yet, Pelopidas' argument seems to be more effective than usual in the context of the speech. If we follow John Hyland's recent interpretation of Artaxerxes' policy towards the Greeks, he wanted to offer a single *polis* "an overwhelming advantage over their rivals in exchange for their return to obedience", not to create a balance of power between Greeks, as the traditional views claim. The Persian King wanted a collaborator to display Persian tolerant imperialism, which "sought to restore order in place of chaos and protect the weak from the strong" and that was Sparta when the King's Peace was concluded.<sup>126</sup> Pelopidas efficiently displays the recent Theban superiority over the Spartans and their protection of the weak, i.e. the Argives and the Arkadians, from the strong, i.e. the Spartans. Moreover, in this context, the medised past works not only as the moral pressure to carry their request, but also as proof of their promise of collaboration to keep the world order. On the basis of the past, Pelopidas could show that they could follow their ancestors' path to support Persia. In the time of the growth of Thebes as a powerful *polis*, their medised past acquired a further role in communicating with another power, Persia.

The discussion in this section provides an example of how a community remembered its medised past. The memory of medism could be told in very different ways depending on the context. On the one hand, when addressing those on the Greek side, it could be spoken of as the overthrow of the *polis* by a few, while on the other, when addressing the Persian King, as a contribution to Persia. It may have been spoken of among the medised *poleis* as a past of cooperation with each other. The discussion in this section presents the fact that the view of the Persian Wars centred on Greeks, in particular Athens and Sparta, represents only one aspect of the interpretation of the past.<sup>127</sup>

---

<sup>125</sup> Cf. Buckler 1980: 153-4; Buckler 1982: 200-1; Steinbock 2013: 151. For Theban speeches in Xenophon's *Hellenika* in general, see Tuci 2019.

<sup>126</sup> Hyland 2018: 148-68, esp. 164-5 and quotation from p. 165-6. Cf. Campbell 2020. For the traditional view on Artaxerxes' Greek policy, see, e.g., Briant 2002: 649.

<sup>127</sup> According to Dio Chrysostom, he heard from a Persian that the Persians agreed none of the Greeks said but claimed that the Greek expedition by Darius was rather successful in taking Naxos and Eretria and one by Xerxes as well in killing Leonidas, destroying Athens, enslaving people and in laying tribute upon the Greeks. Dio Chrys. *Or.* 11.148-9; Abe 2021: 134-6. We can imagine that this kind of view

Diplomatic negotiations using medism in this way toward the Persians ceased to be viable when the Achaemenid Empire disappeared with the expedition of Alexander. It is not difficult to imagine that the past of medism as it had been expressed toward the Kings would have been lost accordingly.

In sum, memories of the Persian Wars were variously recounted in political negotiations depending on the context of the time. Depending on their purpose, they were distorted, some of them were forgotten, and various aspects were emphasised. Although we were only able to examine cases involving Athens, Sparta, and Thebes in this section, it is possible that such negotiations using the memories were quite widespread since these three *poleis* (and Persia) were the main players in international politics throughout the Classical period. However, we cannot say for sure due to the scanty sources, and we do not know to what extent it worked, especially in diplomacy between small states. Nevertheless, the political importance of memory would have survived as long as Athens and Sparta existed as major powers. Conversely, it is not difficult to imagine a change in the language of diplomatic negotiations during the Hellenistic period, when these great powers were forced to retreat into the background.

#### 1.4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PANHELLENISM

When considering the relationship between the past of the Persian Wars and the Classical period, Panhellenism and the Panhellenic venture to attack Persia should come to one's mind. Panhellenism is a modern term. Its definition differs depending on the perspectives of scholars. This section follows Michael Flower's definition, which says, "panhellenism' was the belief that the various Greek cities could solve their endemic political, social, and economic problems by uniting in common cause and conquering all or part of the Persian Empire."<sup>128</sup> Although this definition does not grasp all the meanings that modern scholars apply to this term, it catches one of the most important themes of Panhellenism in the Classical period.<sup>129</sup> This belief sharply developed after

---

could be circulated by the Persians as their 'official' understanding of their Greek expeditions.

<sup>128</sup> Flower 2000a: 97-8.

<sup>129</sup> For example, in *OCD*<sup>4</sup>, Peter Rhodes defines Panhellenism as "the idea that what the Greeks have in common as Greeks, and what distinguishes them from barbarians;" in *The Encyclopedia of Ancient History*, Lynette Mitchell defines it as "one of the collective appellations the Greeks used for

the Peloponnesian War. From the beginning of the fourth century BC, we have several writers, namely, Lysias, Isokrates, and Gorgias, who offered definite ideas of a Panhellenic expedition against the Persians.<sup>130</sup> Philip and Alexander the Great are thought to have been the major powers who put this belief into practice and waged war against the Persians as revenge for the Persian Wars.<sup>131</sup> From the perspective of this chapter, this raises questions: how did this belief relate to the Persian Wars? How did the conflicts among the Greeks affect this relationship? This section will tackle these questions and then argue that recollection of the Persian Wars offered the framework by which the expedition into Asia was effectively advocated. Thus, in order to suggest a solution to the chronic state of war in Greece, the thinkers offered a fresh interpretation of the Persian Wars.

The three advocates of Panhellenism, Gorgias, Lysias and Isokrates, agreed on the purpose of attacking the barbarians: to resolve the Greek conflicts. From the beginning, the idealisation of the past developed as a way of comparing it to the present situation. We can grasp Gorgias' arguments on Panhellenism from Philostratos' *Lives of the Sophists*.<sup>132</sup> In 408 or 392 BC, Gorgias, one of the earliest advocates of Panhellenism, in his *Olympian Speech*, encouraged the Greeks to invade and take the land of the barbarians in order to end the internal conflicts by establishing *homonoia* among the Greeks.<sup>133</sup> Yet, he did not stick to the idea of *homonoia*. Although Gorgias writes his *Funeral Oration* for the Athenians for the same purpose as the *Olympian Speech*, he says nothing about *homonoia* but provokes the Athenians into fighting the Medes and the Persians by referring to their victory over the Persians.<sup>134</sup> Since Philostratos tells us that the Athenians aspired to hegemony over Greece, Gorgias may have avoided any

---

describing themselves.” Rhodes 2012; Mitchell 2013. See also Perlman 1976: 4. Modern definitions are conveniently summarised and discussed in Mitchell 2007: xv-xxii. The racial consciousness, the identity of the Greeks and the idea of Greekness developed before the Persian Wars. See Hall 1989; Hall 1997: 44-8; Hall 2002: 175-89, cf. Mitchell 2007. For the Isokratic Panhellenism, see Flower 2000a; Pownall 2007. For the flexibility of Panhellenism, see Low 2020.

<sup>130</sup> The establishment of the thoughts of a Panhellenic crusade into Asia can be dated before the end of the fifth century BC. See Flower 2000b.

<sup>131</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 3.18.11-2.

<sup>132</sup> Philostr. *V S* 493-4.

<sup>133</sup> The speech was traditionally dated to 408 BC. But Flower 2000b: 92-3 argues that it was delivered in 392 BC.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. de Romilly 1998: 230-2.

reference to *homonoia* to create an argument that satisfied both the Athenians' zeal for hegemony and his own ambition to solve the Greek problem. What is important here is that the Asian conquest should be contextualised by the imagery of the Persians Wars. This has already been shown in the expeditions by the Delian League into Asia and by Agesilaos' in 396 BC.<sup>135</sup> Now, it possessed the new implication that the Asian invasion would help the Greeks in addition to revenge, liberation, and blocking of another Greek invasion by the Persians.

For Lysias, similarly, the Greeks should be saved by uniting themselves against the pressures of the Persian King and a Sicilian tyrant. It is noteworthy that he displays his hostility towards Dionysios, the tyrant of Syracuse. As a native to Sicily, he wanted to draw the audience's attention to what was happening in Sicily.<sup>136</sup> It is also noteworthy that, although he does not use the word *homonoia*, he apparently aims at Greek unification. At 33.6, Lysias refers to the past of the fifth century BC as a historical precedent in order to encourage aggression towards Persia and the Sicilian tyrant.<sup>137</sup>

We should therefore put aside our war against each other and cling to our security, having the same attitude as each other. ... We should compete against our ancestors, who deprived the barbarians of their own property when they coveted the property of others, and who expelled the tyrants and established freedom for all.

The statement is slightly unclear, but he is likely to be referring to the wars against the Persians in the first half of the fifth century BC and the general image of the decrease of and hostility towards tyrants.<sup>138</sup> The past is here idealised in order to be compared to the present.

Lysias then moves to demand the Spartans behave as the leaders of Greece, as they continued to be the most powerful *polis*: the Spartans had experienced no plunder, no defeat, no *stasis*, always living with the same custom with the city unwalled. As a result, Lysias believes that the Spartans have "immortal freedom" and the ability to "make provision for the future" because they had become the saviours of Greece in past dangers (ἐν τοῖς παρεληλυθόσι κινδύνοις σωτηρίας γενομένους τῆς Ἑλλάδος). The

---

<sup>135</sup> For the evaluation of Agesilaos' expedition, see Xen. *Ages.* 1.7-8. On Agesilaos' imitation of the Athenians, see Erskine 2001: 88.

<sup>136</sup> Todd 2000: 331-2.

<sup>137</sup> Translation adopted from Todd 2000.

<sup>138</sup> For Greek tyranny in the fifth century BC in general, see Lewis 2009: 35-57.

Spartan contribution to the defeat of Xerxes supports Lysias' claim that the Spartans should take leadership to wage war against the barbarians and tyrants.

The involvement of the two cities, Athens and Sparta, and the idea of an Asian expedition to solve the Greek problem inevitably recall the Persian Wars. Lysias is associating the idea of unification with the Persian Wars, so those victories are interpreted as an embodiment of the idea of Greek unification. Of course, this interpretation did have some basis, but the subsequent conflicts of the fifth century BC obscured it.

Isokrates offers the most extensive urgings of a Panhellenic expedition against the Achaemenid Empire.<sup>139</sup> Similar to the other advocates, his view was based on a sense of danger in the situation of the Greeks, especially in the mutual enmity of the *poleis*.<sup>140</sup> Isokrates exaggerated the situation of Greece, especially the enmity between Athens and Sparta, and the Spartan responsibility for the devastation of Greece. His anti-Spartan view, or at least pro-Athenian sympathy, affects this exaggeration. In giving his view, the Persian Wars past occupies a privileged place among the mythical and historical events he quotes. Rather, his idea of a Panhellenic expedition is framed by the victory against Xerxes.<sup>141</sup>

In the *Panegyrikos*, after describing the Persian Wars, Isokrates claims that Athens should take the leadership of the united Greeks because Athens was esteemed the most in the war against Xerxes, having dared to take a risk and dedicating itself to saving other *poleis* (4.85-100, esp. 99-100). His view on the Persian Wars is clearly Athenocentric, and so it is a logical conclusion for him to recommend Athens as the leader.<sup>142</sup> However, Isokrates admits that Sparta not only competed with but also cooperated with Athens for the common safety of Greece (περὶ μὲν τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας ὁμονοοῦντες) in the time of the Persian Wars (4.85), although Sparta was inferior to Athens as the latter's achievements in the Battles of Marathon and Salamis ended in the victory for all the Greeks. Also, he seems to see the defeat of Xerxes as the result of the joint struggles of the Greeks (4.99). In Isokrates' interpretation, Athens and Sparta achieved *homonoia* in saving the Greeks, who jointly fought against the threat of the

---

<sup>139</sup> See Gagarin, Mirhady, Papillon and Too 2004 for Isokrates' career and works.

<sup>140</sup> E.g. Isoc. 4.15-7; 5.43-5; 12.10-4; 12.156-8. Each speech has different representations of the conflicts which seem to reflect the change of the situation of the conflicts.

<sup>141</sup> For the depiction of Xerxes in Isokratic speeches, see Bridges 2014: 107-12.

<sup>142</sup> Isokrates also recommends Athens for the leader because it promoted *homonoia* in the allied *poleis* when it had hegemony (Isoc. 4.103-6).

Persians. Similarly to Lysias, he emphasises the Greek collective action in the fight against the Persians. Yet, he takes one step forward by casting the idea of *homonoia* on the relationship between Athens and Sparta. Here, the reinterpretation of the past serves to exaggerate the bad image of the present and encourage the audience to restore what they are said to have had.

However, he has not always stuck to this interpretation. Rather, as he stopped hoping Athens and Sparta would be the leaders of an Asian expedition, he went back to an ‘ordinary’ interpretation of the Persian Wars. In his *Panathenaikos*, delivered around 340 BC, he repeats the argument offered in the *Panegyrikos*: the history of the Athenian contribution to Greece along with Sparta, including the Persian Wars, and the wrongdoings of the Athenians and Spartans against Greece, such as the enslavement of the *poleis*. Although his advocacy for a unified Greek expedition is also included, he avoids discussing who should be the leader. Accordingly, the reference to the Persian Wars only works to honour Athens for the leadership of Themistokles and to denounce Sparta (Isoc. 12.49-2, 152-7, cf. Isoc. 12.189). Isokrates argues that the Athenians had kept having the spirit of *homonoia* towards the Greeks and hostility towards barbarians since the Trojan War (12.42-8).<sup>143</sup> What is notable is the idealisation of the past and the Trojan War, as well as considering Athens as the embodiment of *homonoia*. Yet, this does not affect the narration of the Persian Wars in this speech. The setting of the speech, the Great Panathenaia, may have affected the composition and argument.<sup>144</sup>

Isokrates regards the expedition as revenge for Darius’ and Xerxes’ attacks on Greece.<sup>145</sup> This was not the only reason that could be given for invading Asia. At 4.181-2, Isokrates grieves over the conflicts of the Greeks who have not taken a united revenge (*κοινήν τιμωρίαν*) against the Persians. Thus, he advocates “to consider how we might get revenge for what happened and correct our course in the future (*σκοπεῖν ὅπως τῶν τε γεγενημένων δίκην ληψόμεθα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα διορθωσόμεθα*).” At 181-2, he also mentions that “it is shameful if ... we, even though the whole of Greece is being violated, make no joint attempt to make common revenge, although we have the chance to accomplish all we desire (*αἰσχρὸν ... ἡμᾶς δ’ ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑβριζομένης*

---

<sup>143</sup> This is an unusual beginning of the narrative of the deeds of Athens. See Roth 2003: 109.

<sup>144</sup> Isokrates also turned to the Macedonian Philip to be a leader of an Asian expedition later as he was completing his conquest of mainland Greece. See Isoc. 5.14-6.

<sup>145</sup> Brunt 1965: 207; Wilcken 1967: 47-8, cf. Yates 2019: 213, n. 58. Isokrates makes mentions of a revenge theme at least three times. Isoc. 4.183, 185, 5.125-6. Flower 2000a: 102-3, 103, n. 29 includes Isoc. 4.155, but Isokrates does not mention the Greek venture there.

μηδεμίαν ποιήσασθαι κοινήν τιμωρίαν, ἐξὸν ἡμῖν εὐχῆς ἄξια διαπράξασθαι).”<sup>146</sup> Further, in 185, Isokrates also recommends an expedition led by the Athenians and the Spartans and characterises it as revenge on the barbarians (ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων τιμωρίαν). Although he does not specify for which deeds the Persians should be repaid, what he has in mind is obvious to the audience.<sup>147</sup>

Isokrates also used the idea of vengeance to stimulate a desire for fame in Philip II. In the *Philippos*, which was composed in 346 BC, Isokrates asked the Macedonian king to take the initiative in bringing Greeks into consonance and then making a Panhellenic expedition against the Persians. To encourage Philip to undertake these ventures, Isokrates recommends that the time is right for action.<sup>148</sup>

For as things are now, who would not naturally be amazed at what has happened and feel contempt for us, seeing how among the barbarians, whom we assume to be soft and inexperienced in wars and corrupted by luxury, there have risen men who think they deserve to rule over Greeks, while none of the Greeks is ambitious enough to try to make us lords of Asia. We are so far from such thoughts that the barbarians did not hesitate to begin hostilities against the Greeks, whereas we do not even dare to avenge ourselves against them for injuries we have suffered (ὅστ’ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὐκ ὄκνησαν οὐδὲ προὔπαρξαι τῆς ἔχθρας τῆς πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἡμεῖς δ’ οὐδ’ ὑπὲρ ὧν κακῶς ἐπάθομεν ἀμύνεσθαι τολμῶμεν αὐτούς). Instead, while they admit that they have neither soldiers nor generals nor anything else that might help combat dangers, and request these things from us, we are so eager to do ourselves wrong, that though it is possible for us to have their possessions without trouble, instead we make war against ourselves over minor issues. We help the King subdue those revolting from him, and we do not notice that by allying ourselves with our ancestral enemies, we are trying to destroy those who share our heritage.

In this passage, the Persian Wars past is used to make a comparison between the Greeks and the Persians.<sup>149</sup> For Isokrates, the Greeks have never taken revenge on the Persians for Xerxes’ attack. Isokrates here ignores some attempts to wage war against the Achaemenids, such as ones done by the Delian League and Agesilaos of Sparta. This sentiment is strengthened by an analogy and another comparison. Here, the Greeks of

---

<sup>146</sup> Translation slightly modified from Papillon 2004.

<sup>147</sup> At 4.183, Isokrates also mentions the past wrongdoings of the Persians against the Greeks.

<sup>148</sup> Isoc. 5.124-6. Translation from Papillon 2004.

<sup>149</sup> Cf. Bridges 2014, 110-1.

the time of the Persian Wars and the present are arranged side by side for the purpose of criticising the Greeks. The Greeks should be despised since they have not responded in kind against the Persians, and rather, the Greeks of his age even cooperate with the Persians and have been killing their compatriots. These Greeks are compared with Philip, who is described as a Greek from the same ancestors, particularly Herakles, who deserves to do these things which the Greeks have never done (5.127).<sup>150</sup> Isokrates clearly accepts the Argead propaganda about its origin. In this way, he is trying to make Philip the first Greek who would attack the Persians and succeed in delivering vengeance for the Persian Wars.

Interestingly, in this context, Isokrates tries to instruct Philip on how to rule Greece, using the examples of mythical figures who are praised for their service to Greece. Other examples he quotes are the Athenian Empire and Sparta, which had one hegemony but destroyed cities so that they should be blamed. Marathon, Salamis, and Thermopylai serve only to rehabilitate their honour (5.143-8).

The need for peace and *homonoia* among the Greeks led them to the idea of the Panhellenic projection of the Asian conquest. The memory of the Persian Wars supports this in two ways. First, this creates the image of the ideal that the Greeks should pursue and recover. The collective victory over the Persians became the embodiment of the idea of *homonoia* either of the Greeks or of Athens and Sparta. The theorists of the Panhellenic venture imposed their ideal on the imagery of the Persian Wars so that contemporary Greeks would compete with their ancestors. The past was reinterpreted in accordance with this purpose and acquired new meaning, which developed from an interpretation that had already existed. Although this is not incompatible with the Athenian version of the memory of the Persian Wars, as Isokrates shows, it can be imagined that this new focalisation of an aspect of the past could not be foregrounded in the Athenian context. As will be seen in Chapter Four, a fresh interpretation of the Persian Wars gave birth to the collective commemoration of the Battle of Plataia. Second, Xerxes' expedition offered justification for the aggression into Persian territory. This is not new, but against Philip, Isokrates also employs it to induce him to acquire honour by accomplishing what the Greeks reportedly had not achieved. In this way, enduring conflicts among the Greeks revived interest in the uses of the past.

---

<sup>150</sup> Similar rhetoric is used in Isoc. 5.42. Although there is not any reference to Philip, it makes a basis for the later comparison between Philip and the Greeks.

## 1.5. CONCLUSION

This chapter has reviewed the various ways in which the Persian Wars were remembered in the Classical period as a prelude to examining the reception of the Persian Wars in the Hellenistic period in the chapters that follow. The first section examined the reasons why the Athenians preferred Marathon to Salamis in their iconography and showed how they mythologised Marathon as a symbol of various victories over Persia, an ideal Athenian past, and an event embodying democratic ideology. In the next section, through an analysis of historical narratives, we observed how the memory of the Persian Wars was used in political negotiations and conveniently repurposed according to context. In the last section, it is argued that memory was exploited and acquired a new narrative importance as the idea of an Asian expedition developed as a means of resolving the conflicts among the Greeks. In general, this chapter has demonstrated the process by which the Persian Wars was recalled with the narrative manipulated and distorted, and parts of it emphasised or forgotten, depending on the context and purpose throughout the Classical period. The discussion in this chapter has also shown that the main players in the Persian Wars - Athens, Sparta, Thebes, and, above all, Persia - were significant in the use of memory. In the next four chapters, I will argue that as these primary historical actors disappeared or lost their power, the various memories and images that had appeared in the Classical period were extended and reused in the Hellenistic period.

## Athens and the Macedonians

### Talking through the Persian Wars' Imagery

#### 2.1. INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, we examined how the Athenians used their own achievements in the Persian Wars to legitimise their imperial domination of the Delian League in the political negotiations between the *poleis*. The memory of the Persian Wars was closely coupled with the political slogan of Greek freedom used by the Athenians, establishing the self-representation of the Athenians as liberators and defenders of Greece and functioning as the political propaganda they used. Even after the imperialist behaviour with the slogan of Greek freedom was shared throughout Greece through the Delian League's expedition against Persia, the Peloponnesian War and the subsequent expansion of Spartan hegemony, the Athenians never stopped self-representing themselves as the protectors of Greek freedom. However, through the rise of the Macedonians, Athens lost the opportunity to carry out this stance. Rather, Athens, like many other *poleis*, would be in a position to be ruled, liberated and given freedom by Philip, Alexander, and successors such as Demetrios Poliorketes and Antigonos Gonatas. On this, several questions arise: how did the Athenians accept their position as beneficiaries? How, then, were the notions of freedom associated with Athens and the memory of the Persian Wars understood in relation to Macedonian rule? How did the rulers of Athens, such as Alexander, Demetrios and Antigonos Gonatas, on the other hand, utilise images of the Persian War in their dialogue with the Athenians?

The discussion in this chapter concerns the form and function of the memory of the Persian Wars in the relationship between the two. The following three sections focus on

the periods of (1) Philip II and Alexander III (2) Demetrios Poliorketes and his father Antigonos Monophthalmos, and (3) Antigonos Gonatas, who ‘ruled’ Athens in the early Hellenistic period. This chapter will consider how the Argeads, the Antigonids and the Athenians each referred to the imagery of the Persian Wars in the stages of creating and negotiating the relationship between the two. The discussion in this chapter concerns the deliberate use of the memory of the Persian Wars as a tool for negotiation by the Athenians and the Macedonians and the limitations of its use. Through the above discussion, this chapter points out that it is only in the reign of Demetrios Poliorketes that the Athenians may have begun to use their war imagery in earnest to negotiate with their rulers.

## 2.2. PHILIP II AND ALEXANDER III

### 2.2.1. Macedonian Panhellenism

At the beginning of this chapter, it is useful to discuss the way in which Philip II and Alexander III made use of the Persian Wars in their propaganda as they embarked on their Asian expedition. Scholars have already offered crucial insights into their political uses of the memory of the Persian Wars. The most recent discussion by David Yates, for instance, argues that Philip and Alexander created a new tradition of the wars, grounded on what he calls transcendent Panhellenism in contrast to the recollection of individual *poleis*, which had been the dominant way of remembering the Persian Wars in the Classical period. They utilised the Persian Wars as a symbol of unity by placing Greece at the core of their propaganda, not individual *poleis*. The new traditions created by Alexander were not fully accepted by the Greeks, and the old Greek world, including Athens and Thebes, refused to accept them. However, according to Yates, this new utilisation dominated the narrative of the wars of the Hellenistic period, as all the Greeks could be incorporated into it.<sup>1</sup> Philip and Alexander indeed left a huge impact on the politics between kings and cities in the Hellenistic period.

After the Battle of Chaironeia, Philip defined his attempt to attack the Achaemenid Empire as revenge for Xerxes’ invasion. This could not only give them the justification to open the war against the Persians but also become the ground for acquiring support

---

<sup>1</sup> Yates 2019.

from the Greeks. I will review here the characters of the memory use of Philip and Alexander into three categories: (a) the Hellenic League, (b) The Restoration of Plataia and the Cult of Eleutheria, (c) Benefaction towards Athens.

*(a) The Hellenic League*

In the winter of 337/8 BC, after the victory at Chaironeia against Athens, Thebes, and their allies, Philip held “a common council” in Korinth, gathering the Greeks successfully.<sup>2</sup> By this council, he was elected the *hegemon* of the Greek expeditionary force against the Persians, and this was the moment that a league for the expedition was founded. This league had its roots in the Persian Wars memory, as Philip spread the word that “he wanted to take on for the Greeks the job of waging war with the Persians and making them pay for their crimes against Greek sanctuaries” in order to gather the Greeks together in Korinth.<sup>3</sup> As we saw in the previous chapter, the idea of revenge had already existed since the fifth century BC (see Chapter 1.4). Philip’s appropriation of this motif and memory aimed to acquire support for the expedition and loyalty to himself as leader from the Greeks. As to the cause “the profanation of the temples (τῆς εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ γενομένης παρανομίας),” it seems to have been valid for many *poleis* since the Persians destroyed several *poleis* during the expedition, although not all the *poleis* of the Hellenic League had suffered the profanation of their temples.<sup>4</sup> If Diodoros is reliable here, then it can be said that Philip was the first person in the existing record who appropriated the memories of the other Greeks of the Persian Wars for political propaganda.<sup>5</sup> The Macedonians did not take part in the Greek side and did not fight the Persians.<sup>6</sup> There was also no Macedonian anti-Persian action to celebrate with the other

---

<sup>2</sup> For the Hellenic League, see Seibert 1972: 74-7; Sakellariou 1981: 142-5; Perlman 1985; Faraguna 2003: 99-107; Poddighe 2009; Dmitriev 2011: 73-8; Lehmann 2015: 39-48; Yates 2019: 202-28; Degen 2022: 52-249. For the role of the League as a medium of communication between Alexander and the Greeks, see Wallace 2016; Wallace 2022: 125-6.

<sup>3</sup> Diod. Sic. 16.89.2. Translation adopted from Waterfield 2019. See also Arr. *Anab.* 2.14.4.

<sup>4</sup> E.g. Hdt. 8.32-35, 53, cf. Hdt. 6.19; Momigliano 1979: 143-4.

<sup>5</sup> Yates 2019: 211: “Philip’s Macedonia was not the first power in Greece to use the Persian War to justify present hegemony, but his was the first to do so without centering that memory on the exploits of the homeland.”

<sup>6</sup> For the relationship between Macedonia and Persia in the time of the Persian Wars, see Vasilev 2015. See also Hdt. 7.172-4, 8.34, 8.136, 140-44, 9.44-5. For the change of the memory of Alexander I in the time of Philip, see Squillace 2017.

Greeks. Thus, this marked a new usage of the knowledge of the Persian Wars, as Yates argues. Later, Alexander inherited and achieved his father's revenge propaganda during the expedition. In addition to his favour to Athens, as we will scrutinise below, his revenge cause can be seen in the letter to Darius (Arr. *Anab.* 2.14.4), which is said to have been composed in 332 BC<sup>7</sup> and the sack of Persepolis in 330 BC.<sup>8</sup>

Philip apparently bore in mind the old Hellenic League against Xerxes. His choice of Korinth as the first meeting place shows it clearly, as it was the meeting place of the Greeks when Xerxes advanced into mainland Greece in 481 BC.<sup>9</sup> This would have further backed up his propaganda and consolidated Greek support. However, the new league traced its roots back to the diplomatic customs of the period as the *koine eirene* was stated in its treaty whereby the Greeks were to be free and autonomous. Yet, cities were not fully autonomous as Philip placed garrisons at Ambrakia, Chalkis, Korinth, and Thebes.<sup>10</sup> The allies should change neither the existing constitution of each *polis* nor the Macedonian kingship.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, Philip either supported or installed oligarchies in some places, such as Thebes, Akarnania and Troizen.<sup>12</sup> This behaviour diluted the potency of Greek freedom, marked in the reference to the Persian Wars. Moreover, his anti-democratic stance must have threatened Athens, where freedom, democracy and the idea of the Persian Wars were most closely associated.

*(b) The Restoration of Plataia and the Cult of Eleutheria*

Plataia was used as an ideologically important place for Philip and Alexander. The

---

<sup>7</sup> For the authenticity of the letter, see Griffith 1968; Monti 2023: 161-2.

<sup>8</sup> For Alexander's repetition, see Arr. *Anab.* 2.14, 3.18; Diod. Sic. 17.24.1; Just. *Epit.* 11.5.6, 11.12.5-6.

<sup>9</sup> Hdt. 7.145.1, 7.172.1; Diod. Sic. 11.1.1. For the importance of this place, see Chaniotis 2018: 14-5. Sparta is reported to have been another meeting place of the league (Paus. 3.12.6). Yates 2019: 205-14 attempts to consider it as the restoration of the old Hellenic League. For the old league and its historical image in the Classical period, see Yates 2015.

<sup>10</sup> Poddighe 2009: 99-100; Wallace 2018: 48. Ambrakia: Diod. Sic. 17.3.3. Chalkis: Polyb. 38.3.3; Strabo 10.1.8, cf. Hammond and Griffith 1979: 317, n. 3; Korinth: Polyb. 18.14.6, 38.3.3. Thebes: Arr. *Anab.* 1.71.1; Din. 1.19; Diod. Sic. 16.87.3, 17.8.3; Paus. 9.1.8, 9.6.5; Plut. *Alex.* 11.5.

<sup>11</sup> For this point, see Hammond and Griffith 1979: 624-6; RO 76, ll. 11-5; [Dem.] 17.8, 10.

<sup>12</sup> Wallace 2018: 48. Thebes: Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.1; Diod. Sic. 16.87.3, 17.8.3-7; Just. *Epit.* 9.4.7; Paus. 9.1.8, 9.6.5. Akarnania: Diod. Sic. 17.3.3; *IG II<sup>3</sup>* 1, 316. Troizen: Lycurg. 42; Hyp. 3.29-35.

patronage of this city by both kings is remarkable.<sup>13</sup> After the Battle of Chaironeia, Philip had the Plataians go back to their homeland.<sup>14</sup> It had been destroyed by Thebes in 373 BC, and the inhabitants were scattered, although some of them found refuge in Athens. Plataia had been an important place for the Greeks because it was a battlefield of the Persian Wars, and the Plataians offered an annual sacrifice for the war dead.<sup>15</sup> The Plataians boasted of their importance as to Greek freedom, which is said to have been acquired in the Battle of Plataia, although it was ignored in real politics.<sup>16</sup> Philip probably tried to display himself as the champion of Greek freedom while reminding the Greeks of the very real roots of planned war against the Persians. Alexander seems to have inherited his father's stance.<sup>17</sup> It is reported that Alexander declared his intention to rebuild Plataia "because their ancestors had furnished their territory to the Greeks for the struggle in behalf of their freedom" at the time of Xerxes' invasion.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> It is known that Alexander showed his benefaction by utilising the Persian Wars memory in addition to those of Athens and Plataia that we will see below: after the battle of Gaugamela in 331 BC, he sent part of the spoils to Kroton in return for the help of their ancestor, Phayllos, for the battle of Salamis (Plut. *Alex.* 34). He was said to be the only Italian Greek who came to the battlefield to help the Greek side when all the Greeks in Italy refused to help the mainlanders. Although Alexander might have done the same things for *poleis* other than Athens, Plataia, and Kroton, it is difficult to deny the unique position of Athens in the strategy of Alexander in using the Persian Wars memory. As Alexander had no grounds of his own for revenge against the Achaemenid Empire, such displays of goodwill towards the Greeks helped bond the two together and so allowed him to claim the cause of revenge for himself. Alexander may also have wanted to show his favour to the Greeks in order to control the situation of mainland Greece. Whatever his reason was, his patronage and benefaction seem to have been differentiated from the old ways of making political use of the Persian Wars memory.

<sup>14</sup> Diod. Sic. 15.46.4-6; Paus. 9.1.8.

<sup>15</sup> Hdt. 9.85; Thuc. 3.58.4. Cf. Jung 2006: 331-4. Pausanias (9.2.5) offers a contradictory description of the tombs with that of Herodotos. It may be probable that the tombs were moved or reconstructed in later periods. See Chapter 4.4.2.

<sup>16</sup> See Chapter 1.3.4.

<sup>17</sup> For Alexander's Panhellenism in general, see Flower 2000a.

<sup>18</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 34.1-2. Translation from Loeb. See also Plut. *Arist.* 11.9. For the date of the reconstruction of Plataia, see Fredricksmeyer 2000: 137-8; Wallace 2011b: 149. According to Arrian (1.9.10), the league members had decided to rebuild the cities and walls of Orchomenus and Plataia after the destruction of Thebes in 335 BC. The Plataians also sent *naopoioi* to Delphi from 337/6 BC

Moreover, Alexander, with the collaboration of the Hellenic League and Plataia, tried to reduce Plataia to the place of a Panhellenic cult ritual, the *penteteric* festival of Eleutheria, that had an emphasis on the unity of the Greeks.<sup>19</sup> Recent discussion is now leaning towards the belief that it was during the time of Alexander, not in the third century BC, that the cult of Homonoia of the Greeks was established at Plataia together with the Eleutheria Games.<sup>20</sup> The cult of Homonoia of the Greeks first appears in the honorary epigraphic decree of the middle of the third century BC, which is famous for its honorand's name, Glaukon, the brother of the Athenian politician Chremonides.<sup>21</sup> According to this inscription, this cult shared an altar with the cult of Zeus

---

onwards. See Kirsten 1950: 2312 for references. The Plataians would have started returning to their homeland after the Battle of Chaironeia, in accordance with Philip's declaration. Diod. Sic. 15.46.4-6; Paus. 9.1.8.

<sup>19</sup> There are numerous studies on the Eleutheria. Sources on it are gathered by Schachter 1994. See also Nilsson 1906: 34, cf. 455-6; Robert 1968: 187-90; Rigsby 1996: 49-51; Mikalson 2003: 99-101; Chaniotis 2005, 238-40. For the Eleutheria outside Plataia, see Graninger 2011: 68-85, esp. 74-85 for Larissa, Thessaly; Scanlon 2002: 266-9 for Samos (the one reportedly dedicated to Eros. The connection of Eros with the Eleutheria is sometimes doubted by scholars. See the commentary on Erxias, *BNJ*<sup>2</sup> 449 F1 by Stronk 2018 and that on Dositheos, *BNJ* 54 F7 by Dowden 2008; Dowden 2018. Yet, Zaccarini 2018: 481, n. 27, 485-6); Pritchett 1974: 207 for Syracuse; the commentary on Dositheos, *BNJ* 54 F7 by Dowden 2008; Dowden 2018 for Smyrna.

<sup>20</sup> The previous scholarship tends to believe the foundation of the cult in the third century BC in the time of the Chremonidean War. See Étienne and Piérart 1975; Étienne 1985; Erskine 1990: 90-5; Schachter 1994: 133, n.3; Dreyer 1999: 250-5; Jung 2006: 321-9. The advocates of the fourth century BC origin are West 1977 and Wallace 2011b offers a thorough argument. See also Yates 2019: 224-8, who modestly supports Wallace.

Some argue that the Eleutheria was first founded in the time of Alexander. Yet, because of the lack of evidence, it is still difficult to completely dismiss the idea that the Games already existed soon after the Battle of Plataia. The fifth-century BC origin: e. g. Raubitschek 1960: 180; Amandry 1971: 612-25; Aloni 1994: 19; Pavese 1995: 24; Jung 2006: 332-3, n. 122. The fourth-century BC: e.g. Étienne and Piérart 1975; Schachter 1994: 129-32; Beck 2009, 66-7, cf. Boedeker 1998: 240-1. The third-century BC origin: Prandi 1988: 163-8; Konecny and Marchese 2013: 28, n. 100, 37, n. 172.

<sup>21</sup> Étienne and Piérart 1975; *SEG* 61.352. See also Bencivenni 2018 with recent discussion and a good summary of the previous scholarship as to the cult of Zeus Eleutherios, the Homonoia of the Greeks and the Eleutheria Games.

Eleutherios.<sup>22</sup> By the time of Glaukon, the Panhellenic character was added to the cult at Plataia. Moreover, according to the honorific decree for Glaukon, these two cults seem to have been juxtaposed with the athletic competitions, the Eleutheria Games, in honour of the fallen soldiers (who are denoted as brave men “τοῖς ἀνδράσιν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς” in line 22).<sup>23</sup> The earliest extant source of these competitions comes from Poseidippos of Kassandreia, known to be active from the early 280s BC onwards.<sup>24</sup> While the lack of sources prevents us from concluding the discussion, I would support the view as to the establishment of the Eleutheria games at the time of Alexander. According to the editors of the decree, Roland Étienne and Marcel Piérart, the time of Philip and Alexander (337-323) or of Demetrios Poliorketes (302-301) is the most likely candidates for the establishment of the Eleutheria Games in so far as the Eleutheria Games were organised by the common council of the Greeks (τὸ κοινὸν συνέδριον τῶν Ἑλλήνων).<sup>25</sup>

Demetrios is less likely than Philip and Alexander. The Boiotian League must have joined the Hellenic League of Demetrios and Antigonos in 302 BC, as Demetrios expelled Kassander and allied with it in 304 BC (Plut. *Demetr.* 23.1-2), so that it is possible to assume that Demetrios, or the Hellenic League, established and took control of the Games.<sup>26</sup> However, there is no evidence to suggest that Antigonos and Demetrios had an interest in the rituals of Plataia. It is also difficult to make a connection between Demetrios with the Greek *homonoia*. On the contrary, as we have seen, Philip and Alexander had a strong interest in Plataia.<sup>27</sup> As Shane Wallace argues, the games were most likely to be organised by, or at least under the support of, Philip and Alexander.<sup>28</sup>

The joint cult of Zeus Eleutherios and the Homonoia was probably established at the

---

<sup>22</sup> On this cult, see Thuc. 2.71.2, 4; Raaflaub 2004: 102-3; Duffy 2018: 137-42.

<sup>23</sup> On the Eleutheria as the festival for the fallen, see Étienne and Piérart 1975: 53, ll. 21-4; Schachter 1994: 130-2; Jung 2006: 317.

<sup>24</sup> Posidippus, *PCG* VII F 31.

<sup>25</sup> Étienne and Piérart 1975: 68.

<sup>26</sup> Wheatley and Dunn 2020: 230-1.

<sup>27</sup> Étienne and Piérart 1975: 67-8 argue that the *synedrion* of the Hellenic League of Korinth invented by Philip was changed by the Greeks into the common *synedrion* of Greece after the dissolution of the league. I think unlikely is the suggestion by Robertson 1986: 94, n. 25 that the games and the common *synedrion* were established by Athens and the Boeotian league sometime after 287 BC. However, the influence of Athens and the Boeotian League on the *synedrion* after that time is possible. Yet, the league appears not to have taken part in the Chremonidean war.

<sup>28</sup> Wallace 2011b.

time when the Eleutheria was established. The dating of this cult is a controversial topic as much as the cult of Zeus Eleutherios. Scholars have suggested dating the establishment of the cult to the time of the Chremonidean War or the invasion of the Gauls.<sup>29</sup> The most plausible argument, however, has been offered by William C. West, who is currently supported by Shane Wallace and David Yates. According to him, it was Philip or Alexander who was responsible for the establishment. West draws his argument mainly from the orations of Gorgias, Lysias and Isokrates, who advocated that interstate conflicts among the Greeks should be resolved by the establishment of the *homonoia* among the Greeks and by invading Asia.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, the personification of Homonoia can be found at Olympia in the middle of the fourth century BC.<sup>31</sup> Thus, it is possible that Alexander might have been influenced by this atmosphere and so decided to establish the joint cult, and if the *synedrion* of the Hellenic League acquired the pivotal role in organising the games, it is plausible that the games and the joint cult were founded at the time of the destruction of Thebes.<sup>32</sup>

Here, we can also observe an element of ‘collusion’ between the Argead rulers and the Greeks. Even if Alexander took the initiative to establish the joint cult and games, it was the *synedrion* of the Hellenic League that was entrusted with organising the *penteteric* games. Moreover, if the *synedrion* of the Hellenic league itself decided to create the games and joint cult, as was the case when they gave judgement on the fate of Thebes and decreed the rebuilding of the walls of Plataia and Orchomenos, the *synedrion*’s decision meant its crucial approval of Alexander’s policy and his future expedition to Asia. There must have been a disagreement among the Greeks of the league members as to whether to support or oppose the Macedonians, and the Lamian War revealed later that the Boiotians and Euboians were of pro-Macedonian tendency. By putting an emphasis on freedom and the concord of the Greeks, these pro-Macedonian *poleis* backed up Alexander’s ideological program. An aspect of the Greek unity during the Persian Wars was strongly foregrounded for supporting Alexander’s campaign. Plataia became its ideological centre. Although the discussion above is

---

<sup>29</sup> Étienne and Piérart 1975; Étienne 1985: 259-63; Erskine 1990: 91-2 prefer the date of the establishment of the cult to the time of the Chremonidean War. For the Gallic invasion, see Dreyer 1999: 254-5.

<sup>30</sup> West 1977; Wallace 2011b; Yates 2019: 155; 223-8. It should be noted here that internal Homonoia was also important in these orators, as West discusses.

<sup>31</sup> Roy 2008 on *IVO* 260 and Paus. 5.14.9, cf. Thériault 1996: 64-5.

<sup>32</sup> Wallace 2011b specifies the date to Boedromion 335 BC.

inevitably conjectural, I believe our source material allows this conclusion.

*(c) Benefaction towards Athens*

Athens was one of the most important cities for Philip and Alexander.<sup>33</sup> After Chaironeia, the Athenians were very kindly treated as Philip returned two thousand prisoners with no ransom and sent the bones of the cremated dead back to Athens as well. He also conceded Oropos and Samos to Athens.<sup>34</sup>

In terms of the revenge cause, Alexander deliberately chose the Athenian Akropolis as the representative of the cities and temples which the Persians devastated during their expedition. After the victory at Granikos in 334 BC, Alexander is reported to have sent three hundred Persian panoplies to the Athenian Akropolis as a dedication to Athena with the inscription that “Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks, except the Lacedaemonians, (dedicate these) from the barbarians living in Asia.”<sup>35</sup> As Athens and its Akropolis were devastated by the Persian force in 480 BC (Hdt. 8.53), Alexander seems to have claimed the revenge for the destruction and successfully fulfilled the words that his father spread when establishing the Hellenic League by this dedication in addition to the destruction of Persepolis. It is now believed that fourteen gilded shields from the spoils of Granikos were attached to the architrave on the east side of the Parthenon, just below the metopes of the Gigantomachy.<sup>36</sup>

He also showed his generosity towards Athens after Gaugamela. After his arrival in Susa, Alexander found and decided to return the bronze statues of the Tyrannicides, Harmodios and Aristogeiton, to Athens. The statues were one of the most crucial symbols of Athenian democracy as the two men were believed to have resisted the Athenian tyrant family, the Peisistratids, at the end of the sixth century BC and received the statues as posthumous honours.<sup>37</sup> Because these statues were taken away by Xerxes

---

<sup>33</sup> Alexander’s deeds related to the Persian Wars and his relationship with Athens are discussed in Kremmydas 2013a. See also Wallace 2018: 47-8.

<sup>34</sup> Wallace 2018: 47-8. Prisoners: Diod. Sic. 16.86.5, 16.87.5; Demades, *On the Twelve Years* 9-10; Dem. *Ep.* 3.11; Just. *Epit.* 9.4.4; Polyb. 5.10.1-5. Oropos: Demades, *On the Twelve Years* 9; Paus. 1.34.1. Samos: Diod. Sic. 18.56.7; Plut. *Alex.* 28.2.

<sup>35</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.7: “Ἀλέξανδρος Φιλίππου καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικούντων.”

<sup>36</sup> Hurwit 1999: 253-4.

<sup>37</sup> For the return of the statues, Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.7-8, 7.19.2; Paus. 1.8.4-5; Plin. *HN* 34.70. Müller 2016 elaborately doubts the entire story of Xerxes’ looting of the statues. Yet, her thesis is not

in 480 BC, the return of the statues was not only another mark of revenge but also a symbolic action of Alexander to show his respect for Athenian history and democracy.

Finally, the sack and burning of Persepolis is also another symbolic message from Alexander to Athens. At the beginning of 330 BC, Alexander left Susa and marched towards Persepolis. Alexander sacked Persepolis after arriving there. Alexander's original purpose of his expedition was fulfilled by this sack. Although a later source, Curtius Rufus, gives as the reason for Alexander's sack that Darius and Xerxes had advanced into Greece from there.<sup>38</sup> It is also known that at the end of May 330 BC, during one of the feasts, the Athenian prostitute Thais demanded that Alexander and his men set fire to the royal palace and they did and declared this to be a new revenge for the destruction of Athens (Arr. *Anab.* 5.6.4-8; Diod. Sic. 17.72; Plut. *Alex.* 38). There must have been a political intention to link the burning of the royal palace and the destruction of Athens. The presence of Thais, the Athenian woman in the sources may have arisen from that. The destruction of Athens by Xerxes was part of the background to Alexander's burning of the palace of Persepolis or the argument that justified the burning.<sup>39</sup>

### **2.2.2. Athenian Reactions**

Despite this generous treatment of Athens, the hostile sentiment in Athens did not disappear. In 336 BC, when rumours of Alexander's death spread, the Athenians attempted a rebellion and seduced *poleis* under the control of Macedonia to pursue freedom and go to war (Diod. Sic. 17.3.1-2, 5.1, cf. Aesch. 3.160; Plut. *Dem.* 22.2, 23.2). After Alexander's death in 323 BC, Athens launched the Lamian War and plotted to wrest the leadership over Greece from Macedonia. Yet, during the reign of Alexander, Athens enjoyed peace and prosperity. Although political leaders who had a connection with the Macedonians had a strong influence on the city's politics, those who had an

---

accepted by Stewart, Frischer and Abdelaziz 2022. Finn 2014 offers an interesting observation, according to which Alexander imitated the kings of Mesopotamia in returning the statues to Athens. If it is true, it can be regarded that, by this action, Alexander seems to have tried to 'kill two birds with one stone'.

<sup>38</sup> Curt. 5.6.1. See also Plut. *Alex.* 37.5 for another reference to Xerxes. Cf. Diod. Sic. 17.70.1; Kremmydas 2013a: 206-7.

<sup>39</sup> Rung 2016: 166-7. On the burning of the palace, see also Balcer 1978; Bloedow and Loube 1997; Morrison 2001.

anti-Macedonian tendency, such as Demosthenes, Hyperides, and Lykourgos, were still very influential.<sup>40</sup> However, the Athenian perspective on Macedonians appeared somewhat ambivalent.

The Athenian interest in Alexander's expedition may be observed in the most informative way in the Crown Dispute between Demosthenes and Aischines, which took place in 330 BC.<sup>41</sup> In this dispute, an Athenian orator Ktesiphon is prosecuted by Aischines for his proposal to honour Demosthenes. This is in effect a political contest between Aischines and Demosthenes. Both speakers touch on Alexander's expedition in completely different ways in their speeches.

In his speech, Aischines refers to his evaluation of Macedonian rule. According to him, his period saw the decline of the power of the great Persian King. Instead, the Greeks see that "those who are deemed worthy of this glory and the leadership against the Persians were the same men who also liberated the temple at Delphi" (τοὺς αὐτοὺς ὀρθῶμεν τῆς τε δόξης ταύτης καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸν Πέρσῃν ἡγεμονίας ἡξιωμένους, οἱ καὶ τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱερὸν ἠλευθέρωσαν).<sup>42</sup> This refers to the Macedonians, more specifically Philip, who executed the Third Sacred War in 356-346 BC. For Aischines, that the Macedonians take the leadership in the Asian expedition is a 'glorious act'. Aischines may have wanted to counter attacks from rival politicians by glorifying the Macedonians. Through his arguments, Aischines criticises Demosthenes' policies that led to the defeat at Chaironeia. According to him, Philip wanted peace and it was wrong for the Athenians to wage war against him under the instruction of Demosthenes. While Aischines attempts to restore the reputation of himself and Philip, he portrays the Persian King as a barbarian king and Demosthenes as a traitor tainted by Persian bribes (Aesch. 3.238, 259). He cannot, within this framework, portray Macedonia's actions as wrong.

In contrast to this, for Demosthenes, Alexander's expedition is one of the misfortunes

---

<sup>40</sup> See Amendola 2022: 187-217 for the influence of Demades, who monopolised civic life in the middle of the 330s BC in Athens through his connection with the Macedonians. See also Sawada 1996; Worthington 2000: 100-2; Sawada 2019; Westwood 2020: 275-87 on the political situation of this period.

<sup>41</sup> The period between 338-322 BC in Athens is called the 'Lycurgan period' for a prominent politician, Lykourgos, who was active in this period. For this period, see Mitchel 1970; Faraguna 1992.

<sup>42</sup> Aesch. 3.132. Translation from Carey 2000. See also Koulakiotis 20018: 54-5 on this passage.

which all mankind has been suffering.<sup>43</sup>

As I see it, our city enjoys good fortune, and I note that the oracle of Zeus at Dodona told you this too. But mankind in general, as matters currently stand, is ruled by harsh, grim fortune. Which Greeks, which barbarians do not at the moment confront an abundance of troubles (τίς γὰρ Ἑλλήνων ἢ τίς βαρβάρων οὐ πολλῶν κακῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι πεπεύραται)?

Demosthenes is refuting Aeschines, who had claimed that Demosthenes caused the misfortunes to any people he had dealings with (Aesch. 3.114, 134-136, 157-158) by arguing that Athens was fortunate, yet except Athens, all mankind was under the domination of Alexander. In this sense, πολλῶν κακῶν must have meant that “misfortunes” were the disasters caused by Philip and Alexander, such as the destruction of Thebes. In referring to the “barbarians” in the sentence cited above, Demosthenes must have thought of, or reminded his audience of, the Achaemenid Empire, which was being destroyed by the time of the oration when the Athenians were told that the king was fleeing from Alexander.<sup>44</sup> Thus, for Demosthenes, the Persians were also among the victims of the Macedonians.

Rather, struggles against the Macedonians could be paralleled with the Persian Wars and the Macedonians were also equated to the Persians in the discourses of those anti-Macedonian politicians. Demosthenes, before the Battle of Chaironeia, had referred to Philip as barbarian and characterised the war against him as a fight for Greek freedom.<sup>45</sup> In his speech in the Crown Dispute, he refers to the Battle of Chaironeia as a battle to defend Greek freedom and, for him, the soldiers who stood on the plain of Chaironeia could be paralleled with those who fought against the Persians (Dem. 18.199-210). This parallelisation implies a lot. The Macedonians were in an ambiguous position as they could be perceived by the Greeks as either Greeks or barbarians in the Classical period. Herodotos recounts the story of Alexander I’s acceptance as a Greek on the basis of his supposed Argive descent.<sup>46</sup> However, Thrasymachos of Chalkedon, a sophist of the late

---

<sup>43</sup> Dem. 18.253. Translation from Yunis 2005: 94. See also Dem. 18.270.

<sup>44</sup> Demosthenes juxtaposes Greeks and barbarians to exaggerate Philip and Alexander’s failures and brutality. See, for instance, Dem. 10.69; 18. 253, 270; 19.317, cf. Yunis 2001: 221.

<sup>45</sup> Philip as barbarian: Dem. 3.16, 9.31, 19.305, 19.327, cf. Dem. 3.24. Philip as enemy of freedom/Greeks, e.g. Dem. 6.23-5, 8.46, 8.49, 9.22, 10.69, 9.36-7, 19.302.

<sup>46</sup> Hdt. 5.22. The story is generally accepted as a historical fact. See, e.g., Dascalakis 1965: 158-9; Badian 1982: 34-5; Thomas 2001: 219. However, Borza 1982: 9-11.

fifth century BC, calls the Macedonian king Archelaos a barbarian (Thrasymachos, DK fr. 2), and Thucydides has Brasidas tell his men that the encounter with the Macedonian soldiers should dispel their fear of fighting ‘barbarians’ (Thuc. 4.126.3).<sup>47</sup> Even Isokrates carefully distinguishes the Greeks from the Macedonians, although he accepts the Macedonian Argive descent (Isoc. 5.105-8). Demosthenes aimed to motivate the Athenians to fight by setting the significance of the battle against Philip as a battle paralleled with the Persian Wars by emphasising the barbarian nature of the Macedonians.

This idea manifested itself again after Alexander’s death. At the start of the Lamian War, the Athenians encouraged the Greeks to rebel against Macedonia by reminding them of Athens’ Persian Wars past. The proclamation issued at that time spoke of the Persian barbarians as analogous to the Macedonians (Diod. Sic. 18.10.1-3). This is the so-called the Decree of the Hellenic War, or the Decree of the Demagogues.<sup>48</sup> According to Diodoros, the Athenians sent envoys to visit the *poleis* and tell them:<sup>49</sup>

that formerly (καὶ πρότερον), it was because the Athenian people judged Greece to be the common homeland of Greeks that they had fought by sea against the barbarians who had invaded Greece in order to enslave its inhabitants (τοὺς ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ στρατευσαμένους βαρβάρους ἡμίνατο κατὰ θάλασσαν), and now too (καὶ νῦν) they were of opinion that they need to put their lives, wealth, and ships at the service of the common safety of the Greeks.

The wording implies the situation in 323 BC was the same as that of the time of Xerxes’ expedition, meaning that the Athenians would risk their lives and use their fleet to fight the enemies.<sup>50</sup>

This use of imagery is repeated in the funeral oration prepared by Hypereides in the first year of the Lamian War. The Athenians successfully besieged Antipater in Lamia but lost their general, Leosthenes. To honour their new ‘hero’, Hypereides mentions first the heroes who fought against Troy, then Miltiades and Themistokles.<sup>51</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup> Hall 2001: 160.

<sup>48</sup> For the name of the Lamian War, see Ashton 1984.

<sup>49</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.10.3. Translation modified from Waterfield 2019.

<sup>50</sup> On this decree, see Luraghi 2018: 27-30.

<sup>51</sup> Hyp. 6.37-8. Text and translation from Herrman 2009. The authenticity of this speech is disputed. See Canfora 2011; Canfora 2012.

As for those who lived after these men, whose accomplishments were worthy of their ancestors' virtue, I mean those who fought with Miltiades and Themistokles and the rest, the ones who by freeing Greece conferred honor on their native city, and who made their own lives glorious, this man [sc. Leosthenes] greatly excelled them in courage and cunning, since they warded off the barbarian force when it was already invading, while he did not allow it even to enter (ὄσ|ον οἱ μὲν ἐπελθοῦσαν | τῆ<v> τῶν βαρβάρων δύνα|μιν ἡμύναντο, ὁ δὲ μη|δ' ἐπελεῖν ἐποίησεν).

In comparing Leosthenes' actions with the exploits of the Persian Wars, Hypereides also treats the Macedonians as barbarians.<sup>52</sup> The treatment of the Macedonians as barbarians is similarly expressed in reference to their engagement at Antipater and Thermopylai.<sup>53</sup>

From there he went to Thermopylae and occupied the pass, through which the barbarians had marched against the Greeks also before. He denied Antipater entry into Greece,

In short, for Athens at this time, Macedonia could be represented as the one executing an honorific expedition to Asia as well as a group of barbarians who had defeated Persia and dominated the East and West. Philip and Alexander could be the destroyers of the traditional freedom of Athens.<sup>54</sup> This aspect of the representation of the Macedonians was manifested after the death of Alexander. Here, the memory of the Persian Wars has only the role of self-representation, attacking the Macedonians and making themselves the guardians of freedom.

### **2.2.3. Conclusion**

The ways Philip and Alexander utilised and manipulated the Persian Wars memory were different from the ways in which they had previously been used. As we have seen in the previous chapter, claiming leadership through the Persian Wars memory in the Classical period had been done most effectively by Athens and Sparta on the basis of their role in the Greek victory. Philip and Alexander entered into this way of claiming leadership by exploiting the memory of the wars, although they did not have any role in the victory against the Xerxes' expedition and could even be said to have had a 'medising' ancestor.

---

<sup>52</sup> Herrman 2009: 104; Yates 2019: 243.

<sup>53</sup> Hyp. 6.12. Text and translation from Herrman 2009. See also Herrman 2009: 77-8.

<sup>54</sup> The memory of Alexander in the early Hellenistic period is discussed by Wallace 2018.

In order to pacify Greece and get support from the Greeks, they manipulated the old usage and tried to cooperate with the Greeks.

The creation of the Hellenic League was notable. It was the practical organisation to control mainland Greece while Philip was absent, yet he drew the inspiration for his league from the old Hellenic League that was founded to defend against Xerxes' invasion. It must have supported his plan of the expedition as revenge. Another way of guaranteeing his ideological program was giving favour to specific *poleis*. For their ideological program and for admonishing the anti-Macedonian *poleis*, Philip and Alexander showed goodwill towards *poleis* such as Athens and Plataia, which had the unique Panhellenic memory of the Persian Wars. Therefore, the revenge cause could be seen as valid during Alexander's expedition, and after the disappearance of the Achaemenid Empire, his interest in the Persian Wars worked to show Alexander as a benefactor of Greece.

The Athenians' stance was somewhat ambivalent. It is difficult to trace the full acceptance of Philip and Alexander's self-representation as protectors of Greece and the avengers against the Persians in Athens but their negative representation as barbarous enemies continued through the time. After the defeat at Chaironeia, it may have been difficult for the Athenians to accept Philip and Alexander's reference to the Persian Wars to invade the Achaemenid Empire.

## 2.3. DEMETRIOS POLIORKETES

### 2.3.1. An Athenian Oracular Consultation with Demetrios

The Successors were likely to understand the importance of the Persian Wars for the Greek audience, especially by observing what Philip and Alexander had done. So, it will be a crucial question for our study how much the Successors made use of the Persian Wars memory in their policy. Some scholars have explored the uses of the memory of the wars in this period. Michael Dixon points out the importance of Korinth for the declaration of Greek freedom as a physical place containing the memory of the old Hellenic League in 480 BC.<sup>55</sup> Yates also argues that the Hellenic League of the Antigonid family can be regarded as the restoration of the old Hellenic League as Philip

---

<sup>55</sup> Dixon 2007.

and Alexander did.<sup>56</sup> Shane Wallace, in his PhD thesis, criticises this point and insists that it was rather an imitation of Philip and Alexander that the Successors pursued in trying to capture Korinth.<sup>57</sup> The paucity of historical sources is a difficulty that always stands in the way of interpreting the intentions of deeds, and this may be particularly true with regard to the behaviour of their successors.

The particular focus of this section is on the relationship between the Antigonids, especially Demetrios Poliorketes, and Athens (307-301 BC, 295-288/7 BC). By examining the image of the Persian Wars in their political negotiations, we will see that the memory of the Persian Wars was one of the civic traditions used by both Athens and Demetrios in communication. This coincides with the period between the death of Alexander and the invasion of the Gauls when the Achaemenid Empire no longer existed, and the Greek world was devoid of the most hateful barbarians for the Greeks.

The Persian Wars seemed to matter to Demetrios as he represented himself as the protector of Greek freedom and established a new Hellenic League that can be seen as the restoration of the old Hellenic Leagues of Philip in 338 BC and the Greeks in 481 BC. The Athenians appear to have brought Persian Wars imagery into their communication with Demetrios in order to use his self-representation to their advantage in the negotiations.

A good starting point for this discussion is in connection with ruler cult. Plutarch describes the many and excessive honours that the Athenians planned to bestow upon Demetrios. One had particular relevance to our discussion. This is the proposal that a meeting with Demetrios should have the status of oracular consultation. This is not fully considered by modern scholars from our perspective. An Athenian politician, Dromocleides, proposed a motion about the dedication of shields at Delphi. Plutarch alleges he knows the wording of the motion approved and enacted in the Athenian assembly:<sup>58</sup>

But the most extraordinary and bizarre honour Demetrios received was proposed by Dromokleides of Sphetos, to the effect that they should get an oracle from him on the matter of the dedication of the shields at Delphi. I shall transcribe the exact words of the decree: 'For good fortune, it has been resolved by the people that the people are to choose one man from the citizen body to go to the Saviour and, having obtained a favourable

---

<sup>56</sup> Yates 2019: 250.

<sup>57</sup> Wallace 2011a: 194-8.

<sup>58</sup> Plut. *Demetr.* 13.1-3. Translation slightly modified from Waterfield 2016, 176.

sacrifice, enquire of the Saviour how the restoration of the dedications might be effected in the most pious, honourable, and efficient manner. The people are to act on whatever response the Saviour gives.’ This kind of mockery of the man by the Athenians was the ruin of Demetrios, who was mentally unstable anyway.

I believe this is an actual decree as the formula of the decree “δεδοχθαι τῷ δήμῳ” (it has been resolved by the people) indicates it is a non-probouleumatic decree, which means Dromokleides proposed this decree from the assembly floor whether for amending a probouleumatic one or open-proboulematic, not in the Council of Six Hundred. Unless Dromokleides or someone recorded his unsuccessful proposal written before a meeting of the assembly, the decree must have been passed in the assembly, and subsequently, its fair copy was made to be stored in the Metroon, the Athenian archive in the Agora.<sup>59</sup>

Although Plutarch inserted this account in his chapters about the period of Demetrios’ first stay in Athens, modern scholars agree that this decree was resolved around 290 BC when the Athenians suffered from the attack of the Aitolians, and this request of the oracle was about their dedication of the shields in the temple of Apollo, the shields which were made of the spoils of the Battle of Plataia, whose identification was given by the accounts of Aischines and Pausanias.<sup>60</sup>

Since 290 BC, Delphi had been occupied by the Aitolians, who were hostile to Athens at that time. The Aitolians were probably asked by the Thebans as their allies to get rid of the shield dedications since this has the inscription that accused the Thebans of their medising past in the following way.<sup>61</sup>

Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ Μήδων καὶ Θεβαίων, ὅτε τὰναντία τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ἐμάχοντο.

The Athenians, from the Medes and the Thebans, when they fought against the Greeks.

Thus, the Athenians asked a god, Demetrios, who had been a master of Athens since Elaphebolion 296/5 BC, how they could safely rededicate shields from the booty from Xerxes’ invasion; in other words, they asked him to face the Aitolians.

---

<sup>59</sup> See Rhodes 1985 for a non-probouleumatic decree. Erskine 2014: 593-4 withheld his judgment if this decree was actually passed or just a proposal because it is not indicated in the decree.

<sup>60</sup> I follow Habicht 1979: 34-44 for the basic interpretation of the shields. See also Parke 1939: 71-8; Habicht 1997: 92-4; Mikalson 1998: 97. For the career of Dromokleides, see Paschidis 2008: 129-31, A 42.

<sup>61</sup> Aesch. 3.116. Translation is mine.

The compelling force of the deification and the form of consulting an oracle is obvious.<sup>62</sup> The Athenians adopted a similar strategy shortly before 291/0 BC. When Demetrios returned to Athens from Korkyra, the Athenians sang an ithyphallic hymn welcoming Demetrios as a god. In that hymn, they asked him to defeat the Aitolians by using language such as “to punish” the Aitolians (μάλιστα μὲν δὴ κόλασον αὐτός) because they plundered the neighbours and others.<sup>63</sup> The Athenians wanted him as a divine man, instead of the Pythian Apollo, to “hear the prayers of men and offer help in need”, as Angelos Chaniotis says, to defeat the Aitolians.<sup>64</sup> If so, what was the meaning of the oracular consultation with Demetrios as to the shields, which does not have any mentions to the Aitolians? The Athenians were most likely to discuss the Aitolian matter in the council and assembly intensely and to send ambassadors and *theoroi* to get support from Demetrios.<sup>65</sup> Thus, the decree must have been just one of the several attempts at negotiation with the king, who had been engaged in matters irrelevant to the safety of Athens. In this case, the reference to the Persian Wars dedication can be interpreted as one of the attempts of the Athenians to induce Demetrios to offer help by telling him how honourable it could be to help Athens and to pay respect to the past of the Persian Wars.

The situation in Athens would be important. Unlike the regime of 307-301 BC, the new regime of Athens established by Demetrios between 295-287 BC appeared less democratic. The eponymous archon was chosen by appointment, not by lots as Olympiodoros was appointed in 294/3-293/2 BC. The oligarchic *anagrapheus* was introduced in place of the prytany secretary in 294/3 BC. The exiled oligarchs were allowed to return in 292/1 BC.<sup>66</sup> Yet, politicians active in the democratic regimes remained in Athens. The most notable among them is Olympiodoros, who played a leading role in the revolt against the king in 287 BC and was later honoured as a democratic hero in spite of his help to Demetrios in recovering Piraeus in 295 BC.<sup>67</sup> The situation was complicated, but the Athenians may have sharply felt that Demetrios did not pay attention to the freedom and autonomy of Athens, and they were under oppression (cf. Paus. 1.26.1). The dissatisfaction finally resulted in a revolt in the spring

---

<sup>62</sup> Kuhn 2006; Ma 2002: 204.

<sup>63</sup> Ath. 6.253f, cf. Demochares, *BNJ* 75 F 2.

<sup>64</sup> Chaniotis 2003: 432.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Erskine 2014.

<sup>66</sup> Habicht 1979: 22-33; Osborne 2012: 34-5.

<sup>67</sup> Iacoviello 2021.

of 287 BC.

In this situation, the recollection of the Persian Wars may have functioned as a reminder for Demetrios of the Athenian aspiration for freedom and democracy. He issued the coins of Athena Promachos type around 301 BC, which probably meant his continuous interest in Greek freedom and the Persian Wars after the Battle of Ipsos.<sup>68</sup> This type of Athena coinage was minted by Ptolemy I first out of the successors in around 311 BC in Alexandria, Cyrene, Sidon and Cyprus. Athena was a patron goddess of Alexander's invasion of Persia, and, moreover, she and the Athenian Akropolis were the centres of his revenge cause for the invasion.<sup>69</sup> In this respect, this type of Athena coinage may have symbolised Alexander's struggle for Greek freedom, which had its root in the Persian Wars, and thus, it may have symbolised the slogan of Greek freedom as well.<sup>70</sup> Demetrios must have wanted to show that he still had an interest in Athens and Greece through Athena Promachos, after his defeat at Ipsos and Athens' refutation to accept Demetrios into the city.<sup>71</sup> In this context, it should be remembered that, during the siege of the city of Athens by Demetrios in 295 BC, the preservation of democracy was one of the most important objectives of Athens in the peace negotiation, as is shown in the decree in honour of Herodoros for his help bringing the conflict to an end (*IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 853*). We do not have much evidence about this regime under Demetrios. Yet, the reference to the shields may have been an indirect message as to the status of the *polis* under the ruler through a memory shared in common.

It is interesting to ask how much importance was given to the memory of the Persian Wars through the shields in the negotiation. Were the shields we saw above a unique example or were there any precedents? We have clues to confirm that both Athens and Demetrios used the imagery of the Persian Wars in self-representation and negotiation with each other.

### **2.3.2. Demetrios' Uses of the Memory**

We have three examples that can confirm Demetrios' interest in using the memory of the Persian Wars for his self-representation. By examining these, this section will show that Demetrios used the memory of the wars to shape his image as a 'defender of Greek

---

<sup>68</sup> Havelock 1980: 46; Wheatley and Dunn 2020: 276. *Contra* Newell 1927: 38-40.

<sup>69</sup> Havelock 1980.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Kuschel 1961: 17; Lorber 2018: 59.

<sup>71</sup> Wheatley and Dunn 2020: 276; Plut. *Demetr.* 30.4-5.

freedom'. The first example is Demetrios' marriage to a descendant of Miltiades. Its historical context is as follows. Following the slogan of Freedom of the Greeks, which he had previously proclaimed, Antigonos decided to 'liberate' mainland Greece from the hands of other successors in 307 BC. He sent his son, Demetrios, to Athens, where Kassander had imposed an oligarchic regime in 317 BC, and Demetrios successfully restored democracy in Athens by getting rid of Kassander's soldiers and the Athenian oligarchs. Antigonos wanted to strengthen the bond with this newly allied *polis* facing the threat of Kassander. Following a request from the Athenian ambassadors, he sent grain and timber to Athens and moreover gave the island of Imbros and probably Lemnos back to Athens.<sup>72</sup> The examples of their using the memory of the Persian Wars which we will examine below occurred in this context.

According to Plutarch, in 307/6 BC, after his victorious entry, Demetrios married an Athenian woman during his stay in Athens.<sup>73</sup>

During his sojourn in Athens at this time Demetrios married Eurydike [sc. Euthydike],<sup>74</sup> a widow. She was descended from Miltiades of old, and had been married to Ophellas, the governor of Cyrene, until his death, when she had returned to Athens. The Athenians were inclined to regard this marriage as his way of thanking and honouring the city (οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν γάμον τοῦτον εἰς χάριν ἔθεντο καὶ τιμὴν τῆς πόλεως), but Demetrios was rather cavalier when it came to marriage, and had a number of wives at the same time.

This is Demetrios' second marriage, which was certainly political, in the same way as he married his first wife Phila, daughter of Antipater, in either 321 or 320 BC. Modern scholars have interpreted this marriage as the manifestation of Demetrios' intention to reinforce the alliance with Athens and also his intention to make a connection with Cyrene. Euthydike had previously been married to Ophellas, who was a governor of Cyrene under Ptolemy I and later became an independent ruler there. When he decided to attack Carthage with Agathokles in 309/8 BC, he tried to make an alliance with the Athenians, and due to his marriage connection, a lot of Athenians willingly joined his force as mercenary soldiers (Diod. Sic. 20.40.6). Demetrios must have known Ophellas'

---

<sup>72</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1492b, l. 133; *ISE* 8, ll. 7-9 with Habicht 1997: 70; Oliver 2007b: 69-70; Wheatley and Dunn 2020: 140.

<sup>73</sup> Plut. *Demetr.* 14.1-2. Translation modified from Waterfield 2016: 176.

<sup>74</sup> Plutarch wrongly calls her "Εὐρυδικήν" but her name is Εὐθυδική. It appears in *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1469, ll. 30-1, dated around 320 BC and Diod. Sic. 20.40.5.

success in recruiting the Athenian soldiers.<sup>75</sup> It is also pointed out that Demetrios here followed the marriage policy of the Argead royal family, especially of Phillip II, by taking several wives for political reasons.<sup>76</sup>

I would put an emphasis here on Demetrios' usage of the memory of the Persian Wars through the lineage of Euthydike. Marriage to a local woman could transmit the king's political message. According to Plutarch, when Antiochos III came to mainland Greece to face the Romans in 192 BC, advocating Greek freedom, he married a daughter of a Chalcidian in Chalkis. According to Polybios, Antiochos gave her the symbolic name, Euboia (Polyb. 20.8). Due to this marriage, the Chalkidians took the king's side in a zealous manner and gave their city as a base of operations.<sup>77</sup> This marriage successfully marked Antiochos' policy of Greek freedom as well as his interests in Euboia. Demetrios' case is similar to this, yet he acquired a more special bloodline. Euthydike is a descendant of Miltiades and Kimon, who were best known for their engagement in fighting the Persians, namely, fighting for Greek freedom. Demetrios and Antigonos implemented the policy of Greek freedom most enthusiastically among the successors from 315 BC, by his father's proclamation of Greek freedom at Tyre (Diod. Sic. 19.61), until the death of the father in 301 BC. This policy had been inherited from the time of the Persian Wars and Alexander the Great. Based on this, they seemed to have attempted to restore the Hellenic League after the liberation of Athens. This league had its roots in the Hellenic League against Xerxes in 481 BC and also in Alexander's Hellenic League for invading the Achaemenid Empire. The blood connection with those Athenian heroes further supported the policy and appearance of the Antigonids as advocates of Greek freedom.

In the same way as Antiochos III did, Demetrios must have held a luxurious wedding ceremony in Athens. This offered him an opportunity to show his generosity and wealth

---

<sup>75</sup> Grainger 2017: 37-8. For Cyrene, see also Seibert 1967: 27-8; Bengtson 1987: 79; Davies 1971: 309; Billows 1990: 151. See also Heckel 2021: 197, 341-2 on Euthydike and Ophellas.

<sup>76</sup> Davies 1971: 309; Grainger 2017: 33-4; Wheatley and Dunn 2020: 142-43. Eugenio Manni once notes that, by this marriage with the family of non-democratic tradition, Demetrios aimed to capture the exponents of aristocracy while the Athenians celebrated the restoration of democracy. Manni 1951: 26. See also Davies 1971: 309. It is not sure how much the father Miltiades kept aristocratic tendencies in that time.

<sup>77</sup> Plut. *Flam.* 15.1; 16.1-2. Cf. Polyb. 20.8; Livy 36.11.1-2 and 36.17.7; App. *Syr.* 16; Diod. Sic. 29.2. See also Grainger 2017: 36; Kosmin 2020. Philip's marriage with a daughter of Jason may also represent his intention to follow Jason's policy in unification of Thessaly.

to the Athenians as well as the visual expression of his goodwill towards Athens and Greek freedom.

It should be noted here that, after Miltiades and Kimon, the high status of this family still survived into the fourth century BC. The grandfather of Euthydike, Kimon, was likely to have been one of the ambassadors sent to Macedon to negotiate with Philip II in 346 BC (Aesch. 2.21, cf. Davies 1971: 309). Her father, Miltiades, is more striking. He was not a major politician of the period but was chosen as *oikistes* on a colonising expedition to the Adriatic in 325/4 BC (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1629, cf. RO 100; *IG* II<sup>3</sup> 1, 370). Although the reason for this expansionism came from the shortage of grain in the 320s BC, this selection reveals that the imperial past offered an ideological background.<sup>78</sup> The language used in the decree concerning colonisation, such as *apoikia* and *epoikoi*, also echoes the imperialism of the fifth century BC.<sup>79</sup> Thus, Demetrios got married to a member of the family, which retained its political and ideological significance in Athens. The marriage probably reminded the Athenians of their prosperity in the fifth century BC, when the Athenian traditional democracy was restored.<sup>80</sup>

The second example is the supply of 1,200 panoplies to Athens by Demetrios. By order of his father, Demetrios left Athens and sailed to Cyprus to fight Ptolemy I in 306 BC. After defeating the fleets and armies of Ptolemy at Salamis off Cyprus, he sent 1,200 panoplies from the booty to Athens.<sup>81</sup>

After the battle, Menelaos gave up as well and surrendered Salamis to Demetrios, along with his fleet and a land army of 1,200 horse and 12,000 hoplites. Demetrios further

---

<sup>78</sup> In addition to Miltiades and Cimon, this *oikistes* had an ancestor, Miltiades, who is an uncle of the Marathon hero and the founder of the Thracian Chersonese in the sixth century (Hdt. 6.36).

<sup>79</sup> RO p. 525-6.

<sup>80</sup> Demetrios' marriage may have helped him create a religious connection with the Athenians. The family of Miltiades belonged to the *genos* of the Philaidai, the name derived from the founder, Philaeus (cf. Hdt. 6.35.1). This Philaios was a son of Ajax, after whom the Athenian tribe, Aiantis, was named (Hdt. 6.35; Plut. *Sol.* 10, cf. Paus. 1.35.2). After the liberation in 307 BC, the Athenians decided to create two new tribes which were named after these liberators. Demetrios was glorified to be among the Eponymous Heroes and so he even acquired a marital connection with Ajax, one of his "colleagues." This genealogy may help the Antigonids, at least Demetrios, to interweave themselves into the Athenian religious and cultural landscape and, therefore, to get support from the Athenians. Cf. Mitchell 2012: 15.

<sup>81</sup> Plut. *Demetr.* 16.7-17.1. Translation slightly modified from Waterfield 2016.

embellished this already brilliant victory by his tact and humanity: he buried the enemy dead in magnificent style, released the prisoners, and gave the Athenians 1,200 sets of armour from the spoils.

This gift has been generally interpreted as a military purpose for fighting Kassander.<sup>82</sup> Some modern scholars see them as returns for Athens' contribution of thirty triremes for Salamis.<sup>83</sup> Christian Habicht points out Demetrios' intention to imitate or even outdo Alexander for his dedication of the booty from the Battle of Granikos.<sup>84</sup> He may have thought of them as a dedication to Athena.<sup>85</sup> With a focus on the symbolic meaning of the donation, John Holton recently offers a fresh interpretation according to which Demetrios paralleled his victory to the famous battle in 480 BC, which bears the same name. The number of the panoplies almost coincides with that of the Persian ships at Salamis, traditionally recorded by Greek writers. For instance, Herodotos and Aischylos

---

<sup>82</sup> See Ferguson 1911: 114-5, 114, n. 7; Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 31; Themelis 2003: 163; von den Hoff 2003: 174. Seibert 1969: 190-203 for the battle. See also Brogan 2003: 201-3 for another potential booty from the battle of Salamis. Cf. Chaniotis 2005: 68 for the range of the donations by the Hellenistic kings to cities.

<sup>83</sup> Habicht 1997: 77; Wheatley and Dunn 2020: 146. It is interesting to note that the number of soldiers with Menelaos recorded by Plutarch coincides with the number of panoplies Demetrios dedicated. According to Plut. *Demetr.* 16.4, Menelaos passed to Demetrios 12,000 infantry and 1,200 cavalry when he surrendered. Did Demetrios send 1,200 panoplies to celebrate his capture of Menelaos' cavalry? Even if the answer to this question is yes, it is possible that Demetrios intended to contrast the number of Athenian ships in the Battle of Salamis with the number of cavalry he secured. On the other hand, Plutarch may have recorded the wrong figures. His figures slightly contradict the figure in Diodoros: at Diod. Sic. 20.47.3, the figure of the original size of Menelaos' force is introduced as having 12,000 infantry and c. 800 cavalry. Plutarch also neglects to consider the casualties of Menelaos in his battle with Demetrios near Salamis. According to Diod. Sic. 20.47.3, 1,000 were killed in action and 3,000 were taken prisoner. Yet, Plut. *Demetr.* 17.5 puts the final number of prisoners at 16,800, a figure close to that given by Diodoros (16,000 infantry and 600 cavalry: Diod. Sic. 20.53.1). Plutarch or his source(s) might have calculated the number of cavalry from the number of panoplies Demetrios sent to Athens. For the figures of prisoner in the Battle of Salamis, see Billows 1990: 155, n. 40.

<sup>84</sup> Habicht 1997: 77. Rose 2015: 190 also suggests Demetrios simply wanted to overwhelm Alexander who dedicated 300 panoplies to Athena which referred to 300 Spartans at Thermopylai.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. von den Hoff 2003: 174, n. 9.

record 1207 ships, while Lysias refers to the number of 1200.<sup>86</sup> By doing this, Demetrios intended to equate the democratic freedom of Athens to another form of freedom given by his monarchy.<sup>87</sup> As the Battle of Salamis is regarded as the battle which freed the Greeks, the juxtaposition further strengthened the Antigonid connection with Athens and its self-representation as the protector of Greek freedom. Given that Ptolemy I was a rival champion of Greek freedom and Demetrios was liberating the cities under Ptolemy, the effect must be striking.

Further points can still be added to the discussion. The naval victory was big news, especially for the *poleis*, which took the Antigonid side. Samos and the League of the Islanders were likely to have instituted the festivals named after Demetrios to celebrate Salamis.<sup>88</sup> The victory might have been publicised through the kings' *philo*i or ambassadors or participants in the battle from each allied city.<sup>89</sup> The report of the panoplies might have been transmitted as well as that of the victory to each allied *polis* by these people. Plutarch's account implies that the panoplies were famous enough to be recorded and it can be juxtaposed with Demetrios' generous treatment of his opponents. Through this, the Antigonid policy of Greek freedom was reconfirmed and publicised. On the other hand, whether this donation was for the military equipment or the dedication to Athena cannot be certain.<sup>90</sup> One may suspect that Plutarch's silence on the exact addressee of the donation other than the Athenians is proof that the panoplies are military equipment. Yet, nor does he refer to that of Alexander's panoplies.<sup>91</sup> Thus, his account is useless for the identification of the addressee. Only Arrian refers to Athena as

---

<sup>86</sup> Hdt. 7.89.1; Aes. *Per.* 340-5; Lys. 2.27; Holton 2014: 373, n. 10.

<sup>87</sup> Holton 2014. Cf. Rose 2015: 190.

<sup>88</sup> Scott 1928: 142; Billows 1990: 212, 221-4; Habicht 2017, 42-6. Sources: *IG XI* 4, 1036 (the League of the Islanders); *IG XII* 6, 1, 56 (Samos). A decree from the island of Ios honouring Antigonos might also be resolved in relation to the victory. *IG XII Suppl.* 168. Yet this Antigonos is identified as Gonatas. See Paschidis 2008: 421-3; Habicht 2017: 47-53.

<sup>89</sup> See e.g. *I.Ephesos* 4, 1448 according to which the Ephesians honoured a *philos* who came there to report the good news of Demetrios about an expedition. An ambassador from the kings brought their letter to a city on occasion. See *SEG* 36.163, 36.164. There was also a network between the cities allied with the Antigonids. See *SEG* 53.101 + *Agora* 16.115, the treaty between Athens and Sicyon decided in 302 BC. Sicyon was liberated by Demetrios shortly before the treaty.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Themelis 2003: 163.

<sup>91</sup> Compare Plut. *Demetr.* 17.1 with Plut. *Alex.* 16.17.

the addressee of the panoplies of Alexander.<sup>92</sup>

Yet, the donation of 1,200 panoplies must have marked the victory at Salamis and visually impressed the Athenians with the military strength of Demetrios, which could be seen as superior to that of his predecessor, Alexander the Great. This completely coincides with the timing. The victory at Salamis offered the opportunity for Antigonos and Demetrios to assume the title of “king” which meant they became equal to the late Argead king.<sup>93</sup> It is not surprising if Demetrios tried to surpass the achievement of Alexander. In this context, Alexander’s dedication is more meaningful. His dedication of three hundred panoplies to Athena came from the booty of the Battle of Granicus. Thus, they marked the partial achievement of the purpose of Alexander’s campaign that the revenge for “the profanation of the temples (τῆς εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ γενομένης παρανομίας)” by Xerxes and his armies (Diod. Sic. 16.89.2). If Alexander’s Granikos dedication set a precedent for Demetrios’ panoplies, Demetrios not only tried to outdo Alexander the Great but also dually referred to the memory of the Persian Wars by sending the gift to Athens after his victory at Salamis.

Finally, Antigonos and Demetrios’ Hellenic League gives another clue. According to Plutarch (*Demetr.* 25.4), Demetrios held a common congress (*koinon synedrion*) at the Isthmos with the attendance of a vast body of delegates from the Greek *poleis*. There, Antigonos and Demetrios were reported to be chosen to be *hegemones* of the Greeks, as Philip and Alexander were before. This congress is dated to the spring of 302 BC.<sup>94</sup> Modern scholarship regards it as the moment when the so-called Hellenic League was established. The nature of the league can be understood from the league charter preserved in fragments of an inscription found in Epidauros. From this charter, we can assume that this league was initially a military union of the Greeks under this leadership of the kings for fighting together in a “common” war (e.g. *SdA* III 446, ll. 63-4) and achieving the Antigonid programme of “liberating” the whole of Greece from Kassander (see, e.g. ll. 11, in which, contrary to Plutarch’s account, Antigonos and Demetrios were only mentioned as *basileis*, not *hegemones*). It was surely influenced by the treaty of the Hellenic League of Philip. Yet, a new clause as to peacetime was added (ll. 76-88), by which we can guess that the kings must have had a plan to control Greece by eliminating Kassander.<sup>95</sup>

---

<sup>92</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.7. See also Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 17-8, cf. Ps.-Callisthenes 1.28.4.

<sup>93</sup> For the coronation of Antigonos and Demetrios, see Diod. Sic. 20.53.2; Plut. *Demetr.* 17.2-18.1.

<sup>94</sup> Robert 1946; Wheatley and Dunn 2020: 228.

<sup>95</sup> For the nature of the Hellenic League of Antigonos and Demetrios, see Billows 1990: 228-30;

Demetrios was likely to choose the Isthmos as the foundation of this league in order to propagate his policy of liberating the Greeks. He and his father had been continuously making an alliance with the *poleis* they subjugated or ‘liberated’ during the Successors Wars, and even Diodoros reports that in late 307 BC, after liberating Athens, Demetrios was instructed by Antigonos to summon a *synedrion* by gathering allied *poleis* in order to discuss the profit for the Greeks (Diod. Sic. 20.46.5). Antigonos and Demetrios seem to have longed for the creation of the common league,<sup>96</sup> and the father might have conceived the liberation of Athens as a good opportunity for the establishment. This attempt failed, perhaps, because of the war against Ptolemy in Cyprus. Since then, Demetrios has waited until the acquisition of Korinth in 302 BC. It was perhaps caused by the symbolic importance of Korinth in addition to its geopolitical factor. It was not only the foundation place of the new Hellenic League created by Philip and Alexander but also that of the league against the Persians. The implication of Isthmos as the meeting place of the Greeks is explicit.

It is also important to note that the selection of the Isthmos as a meeting place of the Hellenic League was embedded in the politics in the time of the wars of Successors. It is speculated by Michael Dixon that Polyperchon, the regent of the Argead dynasty, revived the Hellenic League after the proclamation of Greek freedom in 318 BC during the time of the Isthmian Games.<sup>97</sup> It may be possible. Polyperchon might have held a *synedrion* where he proclaimed again the freedom and autonomy of the Greeks as well as the restoration of the Hellenic league while he presided over the Isthmian Games.<sup>98</sup>

Similarly, Ptolemy may have used Korinth to propagate his policy of liberating Greeks. According to Diodoros (20.37.2), Ptolemy planned to “liberate the rest of the Greek cities [...] the idea being that the goodwill of the Greeks would greatly increase his power” after being ceded Sikyon and Korinth by Kratesipolis, the wife of Alexander, the son of Polyperchon, in 308 BC. At this time, Ptolemy proclaimed Greek freedom during the Isthmian Games (*Suda* Δ 431). It is now accepted that Ptolemy tried to resurrect the Hellenic League of Philip at this time.<sup>99</sup> But, choosing Korinth and the

---

Wheatley and Dunn 2020: 228-32.

<sup>96</sup> Billows 1990: 228; Wheatley and Dunn 2020: 228, cf. Simpson 1959: 396.

<sup>97</sup> Dixon 2007: 167-9

<sup>98</sup> See also Wallace 2014: 610-1 on this point.

<sup>99</sup> See Dixon 2007: 173-5; Worthington 2016: 150-1. The latter argues that this resurrection of the league reveals Ptolemy’s intention to be king of Macedonia. For the earlier bibliography as to the league, see Dixon 2007: 173, n. 63.

Isthmian Games, Ptolemy may have learned from the venture of Polyperchon. In 315 BC, Antigonos proclaimed the Greeks should be free and autonomous without garrisons in order to struggle with Kassander.<sup>100</sup> This proclamation seems to have been influenced by Polyperchon since it was published after the formation of an alliance between Antigonos and him.<sup>101</sup> Ptolemy followed him soon after the proclamation for acquiring support from the Greeks (Diod. 19.62.1). As a result, in 311 BC, Kassander, Ptolemy, Lysimachos and Antigonos concluded the peace treaty by which all the Greek cities shall be autonomous.<sup>102</sup> Thus, Ptolemy has already taken part in the battle-arena of advocating Greek freedom Polyperchon initiated.<sup>103</sup>

The implications Korinth could have for Greek freedom were accumulated through time. It was the place of the old and new Hellenic League and the place of the proclamation of Greek freedom among the successors. The imagery of the Persian Wars would inevitably be recalled by the Greeks if Greek freedom was declared there, as later Plutarch parallels Flamininus' declaration there in 196 BC with the battles against the Persians in the Classical period (Plut. *Flam.* 11.3-7).

### **2.3.3. Athenian Uses of the Memory**

Let us move to the Athenian side and their use of the memory of the Persian Wars in their interactions with the Antigonids. The Athenians celebrated Antigonos and Demetrios by using the symbols of Athenian democracy and the Athenian cult landscape. They erected golden statues of Antigonos and Demetrios in a chariot near the statues of Harmodios and Aristogeiton in 307 BC while, probably in 303/2 BC, Demetrios was awarded with his golden equestrian statue erected next to the statue of Demokratia. The Athenians also created new tribes after their name, Antigonis and Demetrias.<sup>104</sup> This shows their presence in the system of democracy as well. Antigonos and Demetrios were also worshipped as saviours in Athens with an altar and games, and

---

<sup>100</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.61.

<sup>101</sup> Rosen 1967: 60-1; Wallace 2011a: 56.

<sup>102</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.105.1-4; *OGIS* 5, 6, ll. 1-10.

<sup>103</sup> Ptolemy appears to have borrowed the authority of Alexander most eagerly among them. Cf. Rice 1983: 106.

<sup>104</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.46.2; Plut. *Demetr.* 25.149. For the tribes, see Diod. Sic. 20.46.2; Plut. *Demetr.* 10.6; Mikalson 1998: 81.

their images were woven into the *peplos* of Athena.<sup>105</sup> These examples show that the city mobilised the full range of its history, traditions, and civic-religious landscape in order to honour the king and show them the city's goodwill. They were intended to put moral pressure on the kings to behave as the city wanted them to behave.<sup>106</sup> As we will see below, the Athenians were also likely to have added the imagery of the Persian Wars to their strategy of honour for their political negotiations.

We can find a clue for it in the way they gave Demetrios special permission to use the Parthenon. In 304 BC, the Athenians bestowed new honours to Demetrios for his aid in defeating Kassander, who had besieged Athens. The Athenians decided to assign the Parthenon as his house. According to Plutarch, Demetrios started to live there as a guest of Athena and reportedly committed outrageous behaviour all around the Akropolis (Plut. *Demetr.* 23, 24.1).<sup>107</sup> This assignment is known as *synnaos theos*, the idea that a deified human shares the temple of another traditional deity in the context of the ruler and imperial cult. As a god of Athens, Demetrios was qualified to live in the house of Athena.<sup>108</sup> Yet, at the same time, the Parthenon was a monument of the Persian Wars and of the long history of victories of Greek freedom against barbarians.<sup>109</sup> This tradition was used to support the propaganda of rulers. In the time of the Principate, for instance, the Athenians honoured Nero with the inscription for him on the Parthenon in 61/2 CE, in order to commemorate his victory in the Armenian War, a victory over eastern barbarians.<sup>110</sup> The Parthenon might be temporarily a temple of Nero and Athena, which might have meant it was a *synnaos* for the emperor. It is possible Demetrios' contribution to Athenian freedom is implied here.<sup>111</sup> As I showed above, the Athenians

---

<sup>105</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.46.2; Philippides *PCG* VII fr. 25.5; Plut. *Demetr.* 10.5; Mikalson 1998: 81. For the other references for the Athenian cultic honour for Antigonos and Demetrios between 307-1 BC, see Habicht 2017: 31-6.

<sup>106</sup> Cf. Ma 2002: 201-6.

<sup>107</sup> Plut. *Demetr.* 23.4-5, 24.1. Translation modified from Waterfield 2016.

<sup>108</sup> Nock 1930. Demetrios also stayed in the temple of Apollo in Delos. Nock 1930: 4. Yet, *synnaos theos* usually refers to statues of rulers and emperors that were placed in temples.

<sup>109</sup> Cf. Dem. 22.13. See also Aristid. *Or.* 11.63.

<sup>110</sup> Carroll 1982.

<sup>111</sup> According to Plutarch, he did defeat "barbarians", as he and Antigonos controlled Asia Minor, Syria, and Mesopotamia and fought "barbarians" such as Arabs. Plut. *Demetr.* 5-8.2. Plutarch highly evaluates Antigonos and Demetrios as they used the vast wealth acquired by subjugating the barbarians to liberate Greece. There is no evidence that they used their victories over the barbarians

made full use of their religious, cultural and political (or rather democratic) symbols to celebrate Antigonid aid to Athens. In 307 BC, the restoration of democracy triggered the Athenians to worship the liberators as the gods, *Soteres*, to create new festivals named after new gods, to add two new tribes, to erect their golden statues just next to the Tyrannicides, to weave their images into the *peplos* for the Panathenaia festival.<sup>112</sup> Similarly, the assignment of the Parthenon is one way of using the cultural resources of Athens.

The Athenians also erected the statues of them next to that of Miltiades. Demetrios made a truce agreement with the Aitolians by which the Athenians recovered access to Delphi again in 289 BC.<sup>113</sup> It is not sure how the Athenians reacted to this, yet we have evidence for speculation. Pausanias reports that there was a statue group of the Athenian Eponymous heroes in Delphi made from the spoils of the Battle of Marathon. It included the statues of Demetrios and Antigonos with those of Miltiades and probably Philaios, who were not Eponymous Heroes (Paus. 10.10.1-2).<sup>114</sup> The original statue group was made by Pheidias during the period around the 460s BC and 450s BC, as the emphasis on Miltiades must have been influenced by his son, Kimon.<sup>115</sup> By the analogy of the archaeological remains of another statue group of the Eponymous Heroes found

---

for their political propaganda.

<sup>112</sup> Habicht 2017: 31-2.

<sup>113</sup> *SEG* 48.588.

<sup>114</sup> Brogan 2003; Yates 2019: 250-1, Cf. Hintzen-Bohlen 1992: 44-5. Philaeus does not appear in the manuscripts of Pausanias' books but φιλεύς. Curtius changed it to Philaeus, which is adopted by Teubner, while Loeb prefers Νηλεύς by Lowry.

<sup>115</sup> Davison 2009: 303-4, cf. Krumeich 1997: 94; Brogan 2003: 197. Some scholars doubted Pheidias as the sculptor of the statue group. It is enigmatic that Pausanias conceives sixteen statues in total, of those seven were original Eponymous Heroes; three were Athena, Apollo, and Miltiades; three were Kodros, Theseus and Philaios, who are not Eponymous Heroes as Pausanias notes; three were Antigonos, Demetrios, and Ptolemy. Moreover, his list is not in the traditional order. Among several theories, it is relatively accepted that all three portraits were replaced with those of three Eponymous Heroes who are absent from the list of Pausanias. In that case, the replacement was due to the limits on space. See Jacquemin 1999: 228, n. 99. There is also another suggestion that the earthquake of 373 BC damaged and even destroyed the statues. See Davison 2009: 306, suggests. For the overview of the discussion, see Davison 2009: 305-9. For the choice of Kodros, Theseus, and Philaios, see Zaccarini 2017: 296-8, who maintain a cautious stance on the oversimplification of the influence of Kimon on the monument.

in Delphi, which was attached to the Athenian treasury, modern scholars date the addition of the statues of Demetrios and Antigonos between 290 BC and 245 BC.<sup>116</sup> David Yates recently pushes his inference of a date of 289 BC, which coincides with the truce agreement.<sup>117</sup> If Yates is correct, Demetrios finally acquired the position next to the Marathon hero at the end of the series of interactions, which started with the liberation of Athens and the marriage with the descendant of the hero.<sup>118</sup>

### **2.3.4. Conclusion**

As we have seen above, the memory of the Persian Wars retained its importance in Athens in the period of the Successors. Demetrios showed his interest in the past of the Persian Wars through a marital connection with a descendant of Miltiades, the supply of 1,200 panoplies to Athens acquired in the Battle of Salamis, and the foundation of the Hellenic League. These supported his and his father's policy of Greek freedom. The reference to its origins in the Persian Wars and its subsequent appropriation by Alexander became political weapons the Successors and Athens were able to utilise when necessary.

Demetrios and Antigonos followed these kings as their precedent. Our examples have revealed that Antigonos and Demetrios referred to the Persian Wars to link themselves with the Argead kings. This is because Alexander the Great and Philip II placed the revenge cause against Xerxes at the centre of their policy in controlling Greece and waging war against the Persians. The focus on Greek freedom and the imitation of the Argead kings are probably reasons why the wars against the Persians were recalled vividly, even though there were no longer any barbarians who were comparable with the Achaemenid Persians. At the same time, the Athenians used the materials originating from the wars for the negotiation for the safety and freedom of Athens, recognising the importance of the implications of the wars for the Antigonids. Yet, its form was integrated into the ruler cult. In this way, the tradition concerning the Persian Wars represents the *polis*-ruler relationship of the Hellenistic period.

---

<sup>116</sup> Jacquemin 1999: 229-30; Neer 2004: 66, n. 11 prefer c. 246 BC. According to them, the statues were added to celebrate Antigonos Gonatas' victory over the Gauls in 277 BC.

<sup>117</sup> Yates 2019: 251, n. 3.

<sup>118</sup> For the effect of the closeness of statues, the analysis of Ma 2013 is the most useful.

## 2.4. ANTIGONOS GONATAS

### 2.4.1. Introduction

At the end of this chapter, we will see the role of the imagery of the Persian Wars in the relationship between Athens and Antigonos Gonatas. After the death of his father, Demetrios Poliorketes, in 283 BC, Antigonos Gonatas, inherited the control of Mounychia, Piraeus, and other fortresses in Attika.<sup>119</sup> This continued to create tension between Athens and Antigonos Gonatas, the tension that finally led to the Athenian attempt to get rid of the Macedonian force in 269/8 BC. From their perspective, the Athenians regarded Antigonos Gonatas as an enemy of Greek freedom and a violator of Athenian democracy. On the other hand, Antigonos Gonatas represented himself as a saviour of Greek civilisation after the defeat of the Gallic force at Lysimacheia in 277 BC. This imagery influenced how the Athenians created a relationship with the new master after their defeat in the Chremonidean War in 263/2 BC. First, we see how Athens used the analogy of the Persian Wars to express their hostility to Antigonos Gonatas in the Chremonidian War and how, after their defeat in the Chremonidean War, Athens reversed the same analogy and paralleled him with the heroes in the Persian Wars.

### 2.4.2. Fighting against the ‘Barbarian’?: the Chremonidean War

In the Chremonidean War, the alliance of the Greeks and Ptolemy fought against the Antigonid Macedonian supremacy in mainland Greece. It has already been argued that in the Chremonidean War, Athens, as allied with Sparta, utilised their credit in the Persian Wars for political propaganda, which can be recognised in the so-called Decree of Chremonides.<sup>120</sup> Athens, the leading power of the alliance with Sparta, wanted to expel the Macedonian garrison at Munychia of Piraeus, which was imposed in the spring of 295 BC and had not been eliminated at the revolt of 288/7 BC.<sup>121</sup> Here, we

---

<sup>119</sup> Cf. Habicht 1997: 124-6, 129-30; Oliver 2007b: 121-7.

<sup>120</sup> E.g. Heinen 1972: 117-42; Jung 2006: 312-5; Wallace 2011a: 205-8; Luraghi 2018: 36-41; Nelson 2022: 103.

<sup>121</sup> Oliver 2007b: 49-68. The dating of the capture of Mouseion Hill has been debated by scholars: 286 BC: Oliver 2007b: 55-63; 286/5 BC: Shear 1978: 82-3; Gauthier 1979: 356; cf. Dreyer 1999: 238; 281 BC: Osborne 2012: 44-7. Now, with the publication of *I.Rhamnous* 404, the discussion is

will see how the Athenians represent Gonatas and what is implied by that representation.

The Decree of Chremonides is dated to the summer of 268 BC. In this decree, Athens decided to make an alliance with Sparta and her allies, with the help of Ptolemy II and Arsinoe, by the proposal of Chremonides, who was a leading politician of Athens and later fled to the court of Ptolemy II after the failure of the Chremonidean War. In lines 7-23 of the decree, *IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 912*, Athens recalled the glorious past of the Persian Wars:<sup>122</sup>

since previously (πρότερον μὲν) the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians, and their respective allies after establishing a common friendship and alliance with each other have fought together many glorious battles against those who sought to enslave the cities which won them fame and brought freedom to the other Greeks (πρὸς τοὺς καταδουλοῦσθαι τὰς πόλεις ἐπιχειροῦντας, ἐξ ὧν ἑαυτοῖς τε δόξαν ἐκτήσαντο καὶ τοῖς ἄλλ[ο]ις Ἑλλησιν παρεσκεύασαν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν) and even now (καὶ νῦν δὲ), when similar circumstances have afflicted the whole of Greece (κ[α]μρῶν καθειληφότων ὁμοίων τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν) because of [those] who seek to subvert the laws and ancestral constitutions of each city, and King Ptolemy following the policy of his ancestors and of his sister conspicuously shows his zeal for the common freedom of the Greeks (ὁ τε βασιλεὺς Πτολεμαῖος ἀκολούθως τεῖ τῶν προγόνων καὶ τεῖ τῆς ἀδελφῆς προ[α]ίρεσει φανερός ἐστὶν σπουδάζων ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς τ[ῶν] Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας); and the people of Athens having made an alliance with him and the other Greeks has passed a decree to invite (all) to follow the same policy (παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν προαίρεσιν); and likewise the Lacedaemonians, who are friends and allies of King Ptolemy, have voted to make an alliance with the people of Athens,

As we have seen, this way of recalling the Persian Wars memory was a usual practice of Athens in claiming leadership. We have discussed a similar example above in Chapter 2.2.2: the Decree of the Hellenic War, or the Lamian War, which was passed in 323 BC. By comparison, an interesting difference can be pointed out. The Decree of Hellenic War illuminates the achievement of the Athenian naval force against the barbarians, the most important aspect of the Athenian version of the Persian Wars memory, while in the other decree, Chremonides only mentions the victories in the Persian Wars ambiguously,

---

newly activated: Rose and Wallace 2022 confirm that the date is the summer of 287 BC (in 288/7 BC) while Canevaro, Iacoviello and Luraghi 2022 see it is 287/6 BC, perhaps in the very late summer or very early autumn of 287 BC.

<sup>122</sup> Translation modified from Austin 2006.

victories which were brought by unity of Athens, Sparta and their respective allies.<sup>123</sup> As Nino Luraghi argues, the Athenians selected a proper expression in accordance with the context and changed the interpretation of the past situation accordingly.<sup>124</sup> It is true that mainland Greece was not being invaded at that time. Antigonos Gonatas placed garrisons in the middle of Greece and also had strong connections with the several *poleis* in the Peloponnesian peninsula, in which he had installed what Polybios would later call ‘tyrants’.<sup>125</sup> This situation is reflected in the wording that “[those] who seek to subvert the laws and ancestral constitutions of each city.” So, the Macedonian present control of and influence over Greece are regarded as a threat to Greek freedom that the Persian's attacks provided in the past.

In terms of the joint leadership of Athens and Sparta, a similar example might be the alliance between Athens and Sparta in 369 BC, as we have seen in Chapter 1.3.3. Xenophon reports that the Spartan ambassadors reminded the Athenians in the Athenian assembly of the past friendship and a joint effort to defeat the barbarian, i.e., Xerxes in order to make an alliance with Athens. One of the memories that could be recalled in forming the Athenian-Spartan leadership would inevitably be Xerxes’ expedition as the Decree of Chremonides does (*Xen. Hell.* 6.5.34).

Yet, an interesting discrepancy lies between them: the absence of a direct reference to ‘βάρβαρος’ in the Decree of Chremonides. In Chapter 2.2.2, we saw the Macedonians were potentially regarded as barbarians, but this perception was not on firm ground. In fact, after Demosthenes, there is no source that explicitly denotes them as such.<sup>126</sup> However, the Hellenic Decree in 323 BC implies that the Macedonians could be equated to the Persians more explicitly than the Decree of Chremonides. In the Decree of Chremonides, the king is implicitly regarded as ‘new Xerxes.’<sup>127</sup> What does this absence mean?

Chremonides may want to avoid a direct allusion to the barbarian character of the Macedonians because of Ptolemy II, at least in the ‘official document’. In the decree, both Antigonos Gonatas and the Persians are described as enslaving Greece. Yet, their

---

<sup>123</sup> Luraghi 2018: 37-8 points out this lack of mention of the naval force of Athens stemmed from the centrality of an alliance with Sparta and the Macedonian occupation of Athens.

<sup>124</sup> Luraghi 2018: 36-8.

<sup>125</sup> Polyb. 2.41.10, cf. Gabbert 1997: 33.

<sup>126</sup> Nicholson 2023: 202.

<sup>127</sup> Habicht 1997: 144. Cf. Heinen 1972: 138; Chaniotis 2005: 174-6, 229-30; Jung 2006: 312-5; Nelson 2022: 103.

names and *ethnikon* are not presented, nor are they referred to as barbarians. The direct parallelisation between the barbarians and the Macedonians would denounce the fame of Ptolemy, the main ally of Athens, because he is Macedonian as well. The imagery of the Persian Wars rather functions to present their alliance as one for freedom and Greek unity. For this agenda, Chremonides would not want to brand all the Macedonians as barbarians.

We might also think of the Gauls in this context. After the Gallic invasion in 279 BC, the Gauls became new barbarians as alternatives to the Persians to the Greek world, or at least as newcomers into the mythical-historical continuous conflicts between Greeks and babarians.<sup>128</sup> The Hellenistic kings, once they defeated the Gauls, defined themselves as saviours of the Greek civilisation and drew upon the imagery of the Greeks vs the barbarians for self-representation.<sup>129</sup> For instance, Ptolemy II represented himself as one who saved Greece against the barbarians. Antigonos Gonatas also defeated the Gauls at the Battle of Lysimacheia in 277 BC and celebrated his victory by using the imagery of Marathon.<sup>130</sup> In this context, pro-Ptolemaic politicians in Athens might have thought that the Ptolemaic king, now a saviour of the Greeks against the barbarians, should not be directly paralleled to barbarians in making an alliance.<sup>131</sup>

---

<sup>128</sup> We will discuss the reception of the Gauls in the next chapter.

<sup>129</sup> Mitchell 2003: 287.

<sup>130</sup> Usener 1874: 43-7; Nelson 2022: 104. His victory was also honoured by the Eretrians shortly after the battle by the proposal of Menedemos (“ἐπειδὴ βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος μάχη νικήσας τοὺς βαρβάρους παραγίνεται εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν”). Diog. Laert. 2.142; Knoepfler 2001: 390-4; Champion 2004/5 [2007]: 77; Haake 2007: 178-80; Paschidis 2008: 454-5.

<sup>131</sup> Noel Robertson argues that the so-called Decree of Themistokles was published at Ptolemy’s initiative around the time of the Chremonidean War. Robertson 1982. This decree is a copy of a decree of the Athenian assembly that records a decree proposed by Themistokles that decided that the Athenians would leave their hometown and transfer their families to Troezen before the Battle of Salamis. For the text of the decree, see Jameson 1960. This is surely a fabrication, and Robertson, in the same paper I cite above, argues that it was made in the middle of the third century BC, around the time when Ptolemy pushed his policy to liberate Greece and formed an alliance to wage war against Antigonos Gonatas. The purpose of this decree was to propagate the policy of Ptolemy by making a parallel between Athens. I believe Robertson overestimates the influence of Ptolemy. The Decree of Themistocles may have been placed in Troizen to celebrate the friendship between Athens and Troizen before or during the Chremonidian War. The agora of Troizen contained statues of women and children, dedicated by the Athenians. According to Pausanias, they represented people

This does not mean that the barbarous imagery of Xerxes was abandoned. At some time between 262-245 BC, the *koinon* of the Greeks at Plataia published an honorific decree for Glaukon of Athens, the brother of Chremonides, who made offerings to the cult of Zeus Eleutherios that is organised for those “who fought against the barbarians for the freedom of Greeks.”<sup>132</sup> The timing, his career at Ptolemaic court, the reference to the Persian Wars and also the reference in the decree to his following to Ptolemy II’s policy that is represented by the close wording of the Decree of Chremonides<sup>133</sup> all suggest the ideological connection between the Chremonidean War and the honorific decree.<sup>134</sup> Probably at Plataia, the attribution of barbarism to Gonatas was more manifested than the treaty drafted by Chremonides.

The challenge of the Athenian-Spartan alliance failed with the fall of Athens in 263/2 BC, and a new order began there in 262/1 BC. We cannot trace the history of Athens until when Gonatas gave it freedom around 256/5 or 255/4 BC, freedom, which seems to mean the removal of the garrison from Mouseion Hill and the return of the regional fortresses in Attika, such as Rhamnous, Eleusis and Aphidna.<sup>135</sup>

### **2.4.3. Rhamnous: Accepting the Victory over the Barbarians**

At some point between 262 and 240 BC, the people of Rhamnous, a deme near Marathon, on the northeast coast of Attika, decided to award divine honours, *isotheoi timai*, to Antigonos Gonatas, which will be our final example to be examined in this

---

who evacuated from Athens to Troizen before the Battle of Salamis (Paus. 2.31.7). This indicates the importance of the memory of the evacuation in the relationship between Athens and Troizen. As Robertson argues, Troizen came under Ptolemaic rule from Antigonos or Spartan rule around 275 BC. It would not be surprising if Athens restored its friendship with Troizen at this time, and Troizenians celebrated this with the memory of past cooperation. For the history of Troizen, see Giannopoulou 2022. For the decree, see also Chambers 1962; Fornara 1967; Henderson 1977; Hammond 1982; Johansson 2001.

<sup>132</sup> On this decree, see Chapter 2.2.1b above.

<sup>133</sup> Étienne and Piérart 1975: 53, l. 12 “τὴν αὐτὴν εἶχεν προαίρεσιν”; *IG* II<sup>3</sup> 1, 912, ll. 16-7, “ὁ τε βασιλεὺς Πτολεμαῖος ἀκολούθως τεῖ τῶν προγόνων καὶ τεῖ τῆς ἀδελφῆς προ[α]τρέσει”

<sup>134</sup> Cf. Wallace 2011b: 160-1.

<sup>135</sup> For the date and the meaning of ‘freedom’ granted by Antigonos Gonatas, see Osborne 2012: 51-2.

chapter:<sup>136</sup>

- 1 Elpinikos son of Mnesippos of Rhamnous  
proposed: since Antigonos the king,  
and saviour of the People, continues to  
be a benefactor of the Athenian *demos* and
- 5 because of this the *demos* honoured him  
with *isotheoi timai* for good fortune, the Rhamnousians  
shall decide: to sacrifice to him on the nineteenth  
of Hekatombaion, at the gymnastic  
competition of the great Nemesis,
- 10 and to wear crowns, and the market tax  
shall provide the means for the demesmen  
to make this sacrifice; the  
demarch and whoever is appointed treasurer  
shall take care of the sacrifice;
- 15 and (they) shall inscribe this decree  
on a stone stele and stand it [by  
the altar?] of king Antigonos

This famous inscription has already been referred to and studied by several scholars, most extensively by Matthias Haake, from the viewpoint of the reception of the Persian Wars.<sup>137</sup> Based on these analyses, I will further see the interaction between the self-representation of Antigonos Gonatas and the Athenians here.

The Rhamnousian temple of Nemesis, a goddess of divine retribution, was placed on a hill overlooking the settlement of Rhamnous to the north. Visiting this temple, Pausanias testifies a connection between the cult of Nemesis there and the Battle of Marathon. According to him, the Persians, when they landed at Marathon, thinking that they would conquer Athens without any obstacles, bring a piece of Parian marble in order to erect a *tropaion*. Then, the anger of the goddess Nemesis seemed to be directed against them. Pheidias later used the stone to erect a cult statue of Nemesis that Pausanias saw on site.<sup>138</sup> Pausanias is likely to record a local tradition, either of Athens or of Rhamnous, here. Although there are no sources that testify that this tradition can be traced back before Pausanias, it is very plausible that the tradition had developed by or at the latest in the time of Lykourgos. Matthias Haake points out that there are two

---

<sup>136</sup> *I.Rhamnous* 7. Translation modified from Attic Inscription Online (<https://www.atticinscriptions.com/inscription/IRhamn/7>) [accessed 3 Sept 2023].

<sup>137</sup> Habicht 1996; Kralli 2003; Jung 2006: 201-2; Haake 2011; Oetjen 2014: 118-21; Habicht 2017: 194-5.

<sup>138</sup> Paus. 1.33.2-3, 7-8.

epigrams that reflect the underlying story of Pausanias, which may be dated to the Hellenistic period. The ephebic cult activities at the sanctuary of Nemesis can be traced back to the Lykourgan period.<sup>139</sup> As the ephebes took part in the commemorations of the Persian Wars, their activities are suggestive.<sup>140</sup>

The connection of Nemesis with Marathon might be further confirmed by the base of the cult statue of Nemesis.<sup>141</sup> In 430 BC, the Athenians built a new temple for Nemesis at Rhamnous and stored in it the cult statue, which was most likely carved by Agorakritos of Paros.<sup>142</sup> Thanks to Pausanias and pieces of the original work discovered on site, we may be able to reconstruct the iconography on the base of the cult statue. It is reported that there are figures from the Trojan War, such as Agamemnon, Menelaos, and Pyrrhos, on the base. Pausanias also observed on the base a scene in which Helene is led to Nemesis by Leda (Paus. 1.33.7-8). This scene might be an allusion to the destruction of Troy, which further implies the victory against the Persians.<sup>143</sup> As Athens in the fifth century BC saw the flourishing of the monumentalisation of the Trojan War analogy to the Persian Wars, the connection implied in the place and iconography cannot be dismissed (see Chapter 1.2).

The integration of the cult activity for Antigonos Gonatas into a pre-existing local cult also had a crucial influence on a local identity. Through the sacrifice at the main

---

<sup>139</sup> For the epigrams, see Haake 2011: 114-5. For an ephebic dedication at the sanctuary of Nemesis, see *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 3105 (now *IG II<sup>3</sup>* 4, 446); Pouilloux 1954: 106-7; Reinmuth 1971: 52; Humphreys 2004: 115 and, most extensively, Friend 2011. He conjectures that the ephebes could have participated in the festival of Nemesia during their service because they were garrisoned in the fortress of Rhamnous. Nemesis had been worshipped since at least the sixth century B.C. (Petraikos 1999: 194-5). For the cult of Nemesis in Classical Athens in general, see Smith 2011: 41-6. The festival of Nemesia was believed to be celebrated for the dead, based on the scholia (Deubner 1932: 229-30; Phot. *Lex.* s.v. Νεμέσια; *Suda* N 159, s.v. Νεμέσια, cf. Dem. 41.11; Harp. s.v. Νεμέσια). However, Parker 1996: 246-7, n. 101 argues the Demosthenic reference to the *Nemesia* is a textual corruption for *Genesisia*, and the scholiasts' entries for Nemes[e]ia are based on this corruption.

<sup>140</sup> Cf. Section 4 of the Introduction for reference.

<sup>141</sup> The connection between the cult statue and the Persian Wars, see Palagia 2006: 62-8.

<sup>142</sup> Cf. Miles 1989: 138; Palagia 2006: 62. Pausanias attributes this statue to Pheidias but the majority of sources testify that it was made by Agorakritos. Paus. 1.33.3; Plin. *HN* 36.17; Strabo 9.1.17.5-6; [Zen.] 5.82.

<sup>143</sup> Lapatin 1992: 115-9. Sengoku-Haga 2014 further speculates that Hippeus and the brothers of Oinoe carved on the base represent the heroic soldiers of the Persian Wars.

Rhamnousian local cult festival, the Greater Nemesia, Antigonos Gonatas, was placed within the local religious activity. This incorporates into the local ritual the memory of the granting of freedom by Antigonos Gonatas or his assistance to Athens in the war against Alexander, the son of Krateros and the half-brother of Antigonos Gonatas, who invaded Athens and Attika in ca. 245 BC, who invaded Athens and Attika in ca. 245 BC.<sup>144</sup> We know that this sacrificial ceremony continued into the reign of Demetrios II in 236/5 BC and ended by 225/4 BC.<sup>145</sup> Such occasions, in which he gave Athens freedom and safety, would be suitable timings to honour him by referring to Marathon. The history of the interaction between Antigonos Gonatas and Rhamnous, though of short duration, was recalled in local worship in this way. Here, however, Nemesis and the legends of Marathon also become important. Nemesis is the goddess who punished the Persians at Marathon, and through this integration, Antigonos Gonatas was also treated as if he were the god who punished the barbarians. This image of Nemesis over the barbarians was inherited by Antigonos Gonatas, further evoking the analogy between the Battles of Marathon and Lysimacheia.

Yet, this cult may also have been a reflection of Antigonos Gonatas' self-representation as the victorious king against the barbarians. As we have touched on above, since Antigonos Gonatas defeated the Gauls under the command of Kerethrios near Lysimacheia in 277 BC, he seems to have represented himself as a saviour of Greece against the threat from the barbarians by using the imagery of the Persian Wars. The king created his association with the cult of Pan. Aratos of Soloi composed a hymn for him in praise of Pan (*Suppl. Hell.* 115). In 245 BC, Antigonos Gonatas established new festivals of *Soteria* and *Paneia* at Delos.<sup>146</sup> Furthermore, throughout his reign, he also minted a new silver tetradrachm coinage with the head of a horned Pan on a Macedonian shield on the obverse.<sup>147</sup> The cult of Pan is likely to have alluded to his assistance with the Athenians in defeating the Persians at Marathon.<sup>148</sup> The choice of the cult of Nemesis must have resonated with this propaganda.

The Rhamnousian reaction to Antigonos Gonatas seems to have been part of a

---

<sup>144</sup> Habicht 1996: 131-4; Kralli 2003; Oetjen 2014: 118-21; Habicht 2017: 194-5.

<sup>145</sup> *I.Rhamnous* 7, 17; Haake 2011: 120-1. The end date is identified since the sacrificial ceremony for Antigonos Gonatas is no longer mentioned in *I.Rhamnous* 31 (225/4 BC).

<sup>146</sup> Will 1979: 323, cf. 108-9; Champion 2004/5 [2007].

<sup>147</sup> Tarn 1913: 174; Panagopoulou 2019: 225-31.

<sup>148</sup> Hdt. 6.105. Panagopoulou 2019: 227, 303 also points out that coinage refers to the appearance of Pan in Delphi when the Gauls attacked it under Brennos in 279 BC. See also Paus. 10.23.7-8, 10.

situation in Athens to celebrate him. According to an Athenian decree, *IG II<sup>3</sup> 1034*, published around 250s BC, Herakleitos of Athmonon, who was commander of the Piraeus in the 250s BC, which was under control of Antigonos. He was likely to be a *philos* of Antigonos Gonatas, decided to erect *stelai* at the Temple of Athena Nike “with the reminders of [[the king’s]] deeds against the barbarians for the safety of the Greeks” in order to commemorate Antigonos Gonatas’ victory over the Gauls.<sup>149</sup> For the *stelai* at the Temple of Athena Nike, the place of their construction is also striking. As we have seen in Chapter 1.2, the sculptural programme of the temple includes the scenes of the Greek and Athenian victories over barbarians, such as those of the Battle of Marathon, the Gigantomachy, the Amazonomachy and the death of Eurystheas, an allusion to their enemy at the time of construction: the Peloponnesians. In Athens, Antigonos Gonatas’ success was added to this series of Athenian mythical-historical conflicts.<sup>150</sup> More importantly, the Athenian decree also refers to his dedication to the Temple of Athena Nike as a reason of honour. This means that the Athenian *demos* accepted Herakleitos’ decision and his characterisation of Antigonos Gonatas, even though it was proposed by the pro-Antigonid Athenian, Herakleitos. The memory of Marathon, in this way, illuminated the communication with Antigonos Gonatas both at the *polis* level and the deme level.

## 2.5. CONCLUSION

Let us summarise the above arguments. All these examples show that the Macedonian kings incorporated the memory of the Persian Wars into their self-representation: Philip and Alexander defined themselves as avengers of the Persian Wars, Demetrios Poliorketes presented himself as a defender of Greek freedom in particular, and Antigonos Gonatas also represented himself as saviour of Greece. The Athenians, in turn, enthusiastically accepted their self-representation from the time of Demetrios Poliorketes and began to negotiate with it themselves. By the time of Antigonos Gonatas, the king was worshipped as the one who defeated the barbarians, alongside the deities of the Persian Wars.

From our perspective, it can be pointed out that the importance of this interaction is

---

<sup>149</sup> *IG II<sup>3</sup> 1034*, ll. 3-6. For Herakleitos, see Paschidis 2008: 177-9.

<sup>150</sup> Cf. Schmidt-Dounas 2000: 311; Nelson 2022: 104.

three-fold.

First, the difference in self-representation is striking. While Demetrios drew upon the Persian Wars imagery in order to strengthen his stance as the freedom giver, Antigonos Gonatas' use of Marathon embellished his image as a victorious king against the 'new' Persians, the Gauls. The Athenians must have been sensitive to this difference and, by incorporating the king's self-representation into their local cult, used their cultural capital to satisfy Antigonos Gonatas' interest, while, against Demetrios, the use of the Persian Wars imagery was rather temporal.

This use of civic tradition may also have served as a system to make Antigonos Gonatas accept the reality of communal domination. This enters a sphere that Simon Price and John Ma discuss with regard to the Roman imperial cult and Hellenistic ruler cult, respectively.<sup>151</sup> In our case, by accepting Antigonos Gonatas into the cult of Nemesis, who punished the Persians, the Rhamnousians incorporated the history of his assistance into their local worship and, at the same time, recognised their position as being under his rule. This also clearly links his defeat of the Gauls with the punishment of Nemesis of the Persians at Marathon, renewing the memory of the Athenian monopoly on the victories over the barbarians. Thus, the difference between Demetrios and Antigonos Gonatas is that Gonatas' self-representation was based on the premise of fighting against the Gauls, and that in the case of Antigonos Gonatas the so-called *lieu de mémoire* of Marathon was actively utilised. This means that, in this sense, a striking relationship between the Gallic invasion and the use of memory in the Persian wars must be noted. The relationship between the Gallic invasion and the memory of the Persian War will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, but to conclude, the Athenians also remembered the Gallic invasion in association with the heroic image of the land battles at Marathon. In this sense, the influence of the Gallic invasion on the way both the kings and the Athenians used Persian Wars memory will reaffirm its importance.

Second: the applicability of Persian Wars imagery. We have a clear example in that the Athenians used the memory of the Persian Wars in the negotiation with Demetrios Poliorketes. This developed in response to Demetrios' own use of the Persian Wars imagery. In the Chremonidean War, Antigonos Gonatas was implied as the 'new Xerxes'. However, in Athens under Antigonos Gonatas' rule, he is rather treated as a new 'god' who defeated barbarians. This convenient reversal of image may not be particularly surprising. Because Antigonos Gonatas went from being an enemy of the

---

<sup>151</sup> Price 1986; Ma 2002: 219-35.

Athenians to a ruler, or rather a benefactor and protector, through the Chremonidean War, the Athenians must have had to change the way they represented him in response to his changing position. This applicability and variability of the memory of the Persian Wars may have ensured its persistence in later generations.

Third, this flexibility may have resulted from the use of memory by the dominant figures and political factions in Athens at any given time. The perversity of the representation of Antigonos Gonatas in Athens depends not only on the relationship between Antigonos Gonatas and Athens but also on whether the political figures at the time were pro- or anti-Macedonian. This may explain the fact that, in the reign of Alexander, we cannot identify any discourses or representations in our historical sources that fully accepted Alexander's claims to be the avenger of the Persian Wars. At that time, anti-Macedonian patriotic politicians such as Demosthenes and Lykourgos were still prevailing. In the time of Demetrios Poliorketes, the city's politics was strongly influenced by pro-Macedonian politicians, such as Stratokles and Dromokleides.<sup>152</sup> It is most likely that in the reign of Demetrios Poliorketes, almost thirty years after Chaironeia, the Athenians became ready, both psychologically and politically, to use the memories they have monopolised to honour others and negotiate with those persons.

In the light of the above discussion, what needs further consideration is the link between the Gauls and the Persian Wars. This will be looked at in the next chapter.

---

<sup>152</sup> Cf. Bayliss 2011: 152-86.

## The Athenian Remembrance of the Gallic Invasion

### 3.1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I will focus on the local remembrance of the Gallic invasion in relation to the Panhellenic recognition of this invasion and the fights against the Gauls in general. The Gallic invasion of mainland Greece and Asia Minor in 280-279 BC made a great impact on the thoughts of the Greeks. The ‘lawless,’ ‘barbaric’ Gauls took the place of the Persians of the Classical period and started to be regarded as one of the most hateful enemies of Greek civilisation of the Hellenistic period after their invasion.<sup>1</sup> The imagery of the Persian Wars was used by the Greeks to glorify the wars against the Gauls. When Pausanias narrates the Gallic invasion in the second century AD, his story is moulded by Xerxes’ invasion of mainland Greece. Polybios (2.35.7) also makes a parallel between the Gallic invasion and the Persian Wars and says these two events are offering the Greeks lessons for fighting for the common freedom of the Greeks. The Aitolians dedicated the Gallic shields to the temple of Apollo at Delphi. These dedications were placed next to the Persian shields, dedicated by the Athenians (Paus. 10.19.4). As their force successfully excluded the Gauls from mainland Greece, the Aitolians attempted to parallel with, or perhaps compete with, the Athenian contribution to the victories in the Persian Wars. So, “[t]he Greeks equated the Gallic invasion of Greece with the Second Persian War,” as Rolf Strootman indicates.<sup>2</sup> This analogy recurred in the Hellenistic kings’ commemoration of their defeats of the Gauls. The Persian Wars worked as an analogy to the wars against them, along with the

---

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Polyb. 18.37.9.

<sup>2</sup> Strootman 2005: 135. On the Greek perception of the Celts, see also Lacy 1976; Marszal 2000; Barbantani 2002: 32-6; Stewart 2004; Strootman 2005, 118-21.

Gigantomachy.<sup>3</sup>

However, we can still question whether the Greeks remembered the Gallic invasion homogeneously. It may be possible that each *polis* had its own conceptualisation of the fights against the Gauls and its usage of the parallel.<sup>4</sup> The experience of each *polis* is not the same. The Aitolians successfully defeated the Gauls at Delphi, while the Greek force led by the Athenians could not defend Thermopylai because of the flanking attack of the Gallic force. Different contexts of each *polis* also contributed to remembering the invasion differently. If so, how did they remember their fight against the Gauls? This chapter shall seek a non-Panhellenic perspective on the fight against the Gauls, with a particular focus on Athens.

In this chapter, my main argument will be that the Athenians remembered the Gallic invasion not only as a fight that consisted of their military success but also as a fight for the freedom and democracy of Athens. This conceptualisation must have stemmed from the condition of Athens at the time of the Gallic invasion. Athens has longed to keep its democracy and freedom in the face of the Antigonid occupation of Piraeus. The Athenians interpreted past and present battles against the barbarians for their own present purposes.

In Section 2, I will discuss the Aitolian commemoration of the Gallic invasion using the Persian Wars memory and argue that the Aitolians wanted to imitate, or compete with, the Athenians. In Section 3, I will examine the meaning of the painting of the Athenian politician and general Kallippos. The analysis of the other monuments and pictures in the council chamber will provide the context of this painting. The argument of this section is that it is likely that the Athenians wanted to honour Kallippos as a democratic hero who could be juxtaposed with the soldiers of their past military exploits. In Section 4, I will discuss the shield of Kydias, another commemorative monument of Athens, and will conclude that the Athenian way of commemorating the Gallic invasion referred not only to the Persian Wars but also to their wars for freedom.

---

<sup>3</sup> Nelson 2022.

<sup>4</sup> The Aitolians, for instance, commemorated their punishment of the Gauls who plundered Kallion. Paus. 10.18.7.

### 3.2. THE AITOLIAN STORY OF THE GALLIC INVASION

In order to understand the Athenian way of commemorating of the Gallic invasion, it is necessary to review the narratives of the Gallic invasion and how they were grounded on the images of the Persian Wars. This section, therefore, focuses on a narrative of the Gallic invasion: that of the Aitolians.<sup>5</sup> The Aitolians claimed to have played a significant role in the repulse of the Gauls from the mainland. Their successful claims allowed them to expand their influence on mainland Greece. They started to dominate the Amphictyonic League and gain control over central Greece using their achievement as a justification. Soon after the repulse of the Gauls, they extensively publicised their role in the deliverance of the sanctuary of Delphi and Greece.<sup>6</sup> Their narrative was the most powerful among their contemporaries and even became a precedent to the self-representation of the Hellenistic kings. In celebrating their role against the Gauls, the Aitolians appear to be laying claim to the same level of glory as that won by the Athenians against the Persians.

After going through Macedonia in the summer of 279 BC, the Gauls, led by Brennos, started to move into mainland Greece. The Greeks failed once to stop the Gauls at Thermopylai, yet successfully defended the sanctuary of Delphi, and in both battles, the Aitolians offered one of the main oppositions against the Gauls. The Aitolians controlled Parnassos and Delphi soon after 301 BC and must have exercised influence over Delphi and its Amphictyonic League by the time of the invasion.<sup>7</sup> Soon after the invasion, the Greeks started to regard the battle at Delphi as the most decisive one in the repulse of the Gauls. The earliest example is a decree of Kos, issued in April-July 278 BC, which commemorates the successful defence of Delphi and the Greek victory against the barbarian aggressors.<sup>8</sup> The decree is likely to reflect the proclamation of ambassadors who came from Delphi, which was under the control of the Aitolians then. Similarly, writers such as Polybios in the second century BC remembered the Gallic invasion as the Gallic intrusion into Delphi.<sup>9</sup> Pausanias starts his long narrative of the

---

<sup>5</sup> For the Aitolian propaganda of the repulse of the Gallic invasion, see Strootman 2005: 110-2, cf. Nachtergaele 1977: 196-207; Champion 1996.

<sup>6</sup> Strootman 2005: 111.

<sup>7</sup> The Aitolian domination over Delphi before the Gallic invasion, see Flacelière 1937: 49-91; Scholten 2000: 16-9.

<sup>8</sup> *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 398, esp. ll. 1-4. Cf. Champion 1996: 317-8.

<sup>9</sup> Polyb. 1.6.5, 2.20.6, 2.35.7, 4.46.1. Other writers also put an emphasis on the Gallic attack on

Gallic invasion in the context of his account of Delphi (Paus. 10.19.4). Finally, describing the Gallic invasion of mainland Greece, Justin, in his epitome of Pompeius Trogus, even omitted the battle at Thermopylai, and his version is only concerned with the Gallic intrusion into Delphi. It is not certain whether or not Pompeius Trogus himself omitted the battle from his account. If he did mention it, it is striking that Justin only felt it necessary to include what happened at Delphi.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, in his account, it was the Delphians and their allies (*socii*) that fought against the Gauls (Just. *Epit.* 24.7.8-9). This may mean that there was a tradition of the Gallic invasion in which Delphi and the Delphians were the centres of its narrative. The emphasis of these writers on Delphi may be reasonable. Delphi was not only the place where the Gauls reportedly suffered a decisive defeat but also one of the most important places for the ancient Greeks as a Panhellenic cult centre. The Aitolians successfully situated their position in this narrative framework of the Gallic invasion as a Delphic intrusion whereby their defensive role could be glorified and Panhellenised.

Although we do not have any evidence that is made by the Aitolians, there is indirect evidence for the Aitolian ways of celebrating their victory over the Gauls. The most crucial source among them is Pausanias. According to him, the Aitolians hung up the shields of the Gauls in the temple of Apollo near the shields dedicated by the Athenians, made of spoils of the Battle of Marathon (Paus. 10.19.4). Some contemporary confirmation of Pausanias' report can be found in the decree from Kos, in which is written: "the sanctuary has been saved and adorned with the spoils from the enemy and that of the remaining aggressors".<sup>11</sup> The Gallic shields dedicated by the Aitolians must have been among them. The Aitolians here dedicated the shields following the precedent of the Athenian dedications. As the Aitolian shields occupied the western and southern entablatures of the temple, it is believed the Athenian ones were hung on the other sides, eastern and northern sides.<sup>12</sup> These dedications were likely to be the ones mentioned by Aischines, and then the ones the Aitolians detached from the temple, and Demetrios was asked by the Athenians to help them be returned to the temple.<sup>13</sup> As we

---

Delphi. See Cic. *Div.* 1.81; Cic. *Font.* 30; Dio Cass. fr. 40; Livy 38.48.2; Livy 40.58.3; Luc. 5.134-6; Strabo 4,1.13 (C187-8); Cf. Polyaeus, *Strat.* 7.35.

<sup>10</sup> Just. *Epit.* 24.6-8. Similarly, Polybios does not make a mention of the Battle of Thermopylai. See the references in the previous note, especially Polyb. 4.46.1.

<sup>11</sup> *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 398, ll. 8-10. Translation from Austin 2006.

<sup>12</sup> Parke 1939: 71; Scholten 2000: 40; Mitchell 2003: 282; Scott 2014: 171.

<sup>13</sup> See Chapter 2.3.1 with bibliography.

saw above, they were made of the spoils of the Battle of Plataia. Pausanias mistook the shields made from the spoils of Plataia for those made from the spoils of Marathon. Yet, from the inscription on the shields, the Aitolians recognised this dedication from Plataia. The intention of the Aitolians seems clear. They tried to parallel their victory with those of the Athenians.<sup>14</sup>

The parallelism between the Persians and the Gauls must have been created soon after, or perhaps during, the Gallic invasion.<sup>15</sup> The decree of Kos, as we saw above, considers the Gallic invasion through a dichotomy between the Greeks and the barbarians. It never refers to the Gauls by their ethnic or any similar term but by “βάρβαροι” while the Greek side is similarly and collectively denoted as “Ἕλληνας.” Furthermore, it defines the resistance of the Greeks as the fight for “the safety of the Greeks.”<sup>16</sup> As this decree originated from the report of ambassadors from Delphi, the influence of the Aitolians occupying the sanctuary must have been present in the wording. But at the same time, these measures enabled the Greek experience of the invasion to be situated in the sequence of the wars between the civilised Greeks vs the uncivilised barbarians, the timeframe which started at the Gigantomachy and continued through the Amazonomachy, the Trojan Wars, and most recently the Persian Wars. Here, as a historical and the most recent precedent, the Persians were the most appropriate barbarians, who could be compared with the Gauls. Similarly, historiographical traditions used the imagery of the Persian Wars to describe the Greek victory over the Gauls at Delphi. The divine intervention in defeating the Gauls at Delphi is a reference to the legend of the divine attack on the Persians at the time of Xerxes’ expedition, recorded in Herodotos.<sup>17</sup> For instance, according to Pausanias, in front of the Gallic force at Delphi, the heroes Hyperochos, Laodokos, Pyrrhos and Phylakos appeared. This is likely to be influenced by the description of Herodotos in which the local heroes

---

<sup>14</sup> It is not certain when the shields were returned. Habicht 1979: 41-2 proposes the date after the Athenian independence from Demetrios in 287 BC when the Athenians made a good relationship with the Aitolians. Yet he admits that the return could have occurred later. Even if the shields were still absent from the temple when the Aitolians dedicated their shields, telling is the Aitolian audacity to dedicate their shields to the spots near which the Athenian shields were attached.

<sup>15</sup> Mitchell 2003: 282-3; Nelson 2022: 104-5.

<sup>16</sup> *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 398, l. 25.

<sup>17</sup> Paus. 10.23.1-9; Just. *Epit.* 35.8.3-7; Hdt. 8.35-9; Parke and Wormell 1956: 255-9; Champion 1995: 214-7; Nelson 2022: 104.

Phylakos and Autonous showed up and killed the barbarians at Delphi.<sup>18</sup> In a different context, Antigonos Gonatas also used the imagery of Pan in order to celebrate his victory over the Gauls in 277 BC at Lysimacheia. This refers to Pan's assistance in the Athenian victory at Marathon.<sup>19</sup> Through these measures, the Greeks not only recognised but also glorified what they had done against the Gauls. In a way, the Greeks seem to have followed the Athenian precedent of the fifth century BC. The Aitolians contributed to the establishment of this way of thinking about the Gallic invasion.

Furthermore, another Aitolian building at Delphi may have created a contrast with the Athenian Persian Wars past. The Aitolians built a large stoa west of the temple of Apollo, the so-called West Stoa, which accommodated the spoils of the Gauls, perhaps seen as the mirroring of the Athenian Treasury placed on the eastern terrace.<sup>20</sup> As we have seen in Chapter 1.2, it was built in the pre-Marathon period. After the Battle of Marathon, its sculptural programme was used to represent the Athenian victory, as the metopes on the east and west of the Treasury feature the Amazonomachy, which turned out to be an allusion to Marathon after the Persian Wars. The Treasury eventually became believed to have been made from the spoils of Marathon.<sup>21</sup> Thus, this showed Athenian pride and its self-representation on the international stage. Built behind the treasury, the West Stoa might have been seen as another effort of the Aitolians to link their achievement with the Athenians.

The West Stoa might have further mirrored the Athenian Stoa, northeast of the Athenian Treasury on the eastern terrace. This Stoa, running along the wall supporting the terrace of the Temple of Apollo, is dated around the end of the sixth century BC to the beginning of the fifth century BC.<sup>22</sup> Pausanias and the inscription on the stylobate, the stepped platform at the entrance, indicate that the Stoa accommodated Athenian war spoils acquired from the battles on land and sea (*IG I<sup>3</sup> 1464*: “the Athenians dedicated the stoa, the weapons, and the stern ornaments”).<sup>23</sup> Although we cannot specify what was dedicated in the Stoa, dedications and the inscription would have reminded the visitors of the Athenian victories, especially in the Persian Wars, as Cathrine Keesling

---

<sup>18</sup> Paus. 10.23.2; Hdt. 8.38-39.1.

<sup>19</sup> See also Chapter 2.4.3.

<sup>20</sup> Amandry 1978: 751-81; Scholten 2000, 38 n. 31; Knoepfler 2007: 1240; Perrier 2011, 39-56; Grzesik 2018: 34.

<sup>21</sup> See Neer 2004 and Chapter 1.2 for the details of the Athenian Treasury.

<sup>22</sup> Bommelaer and Laroche 2015: 175-7, no. 313; Jacquemin and Laroche 2019.

<sup>23</sup> Paus. 10.11.6; *IG I<sup>3</sup> 1464*.

suggests.<sup>24</sup> In short, the West Stoa at Delphi might have been intended to contrast with the buildings that could be associated with the Athenian victories against the Persians.

This sentiment can be seen in another source. Polybios has an Aitolian ambassador, Chlaineas, give a speech that includes Aitolian propaganda. The scene is set in Sparta in 210 BC (Polyb. 9.28-39). The mission of Chlaineas is to persuade the Spartans to join Aitolian and the Romans against Philip V. As he was opposed by Lykiskos, an Akarnanian ambassador who tried to keep a friendship between the Spartans and the Macedonians, Chlaineas lists the Macedonian *hybris* and *paranomia* against the Greeks, which started from Philip II and continued to Philip V. In his speech, Chlaineas justifies his claim by enumerating what the Aitolians had done for the Greeks and Spartans. According to him,

Αἰτωλοὶ γὰρ μόνοι μὲν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀντωφθάλμησαν πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἀδίκως ἀκληρούντων ἀσφαλείας, μόνοι δὲ πρὸς τὴν Βρέννου καὶ τῶν ἄμα τούτῳ βαρβάρων ἔφοδον ἀντέστησαν, μόνοι δὲ καλούμενοι συνηγωνίζοντο, βουλόμενοι τὴν πατριὸν ἡγεμονίαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὑμῖν συγκατασκευάζειν.

For the Aitolians alone among the Greek faced Antipater for the security for the unfortunate victims of his injustice, they alone withstood the attack of Brennos and his barbarians, and they alone when called upon came to flight by your side and help you to recover your hereditary position of supremacy.<sup>25</sup>

Then, he asks the Spartans to abide by the friendship with the Aitolians established in the winter of 220/19 BC.

The importance of this passage delivered by Chlaineas is twofold. Firstly, Polybios offers the Aitolian claim that they had been responsible for the repulse of the Gauls. Later, he has an Acarnanian politician, Lykiskos, touch upon the Aitolian defence of Delphi in his speech. It is striking that even Lykiskos, hostile to the Aitolians, did not deny the Aitolian contribution at Delphi.<sup>26</sup> For Polybios, the Aitolian propaganda was even accepted by their enemies. Of course, Polybios does not always record the words

---

<sup>24</sup> Keesling 2020: 219-20. She suggests the dedication of the stern ornaments should be associated either with the war between Athens and Aigina or with the Battle of Salamis.

<sup>25</sup> Polyb. 9.30.3-4. Translation modified from Paton 2011. For the possibility that there is a *lacuna* in the speech immediately before this passage, see Walbank 1967, 168.

<sup>26</sup> Polyb. 9.35.1-2. For a detailed analysis of Lykiskos' speech, see Champion 1996: 321-4.

of the speeches actually delivered.<sup>27</sup> Yet, given that his hostility against the Aitolians sometimes distorts his narrative, Lykiskos' acceptance of the Aitolian claim must have reflected the historical fact that went over Polybios' preference.<sup>28</sup> Secondly, the Aitolians seem to have adopted a strategy similar to that adopted by the Athenians when they talked about the Persian Wars. The Athenians claimed that they alone fought and won over the Persians at the plain of Marathon by ignoring the Plataians.<sup>29</sup> This falsification of history was to maximise their military exploits in the wars against the barbarians and to establish as well as confirm their superiority in history. Chlaineas' wording in the quotation above recalled this propaganda of the Athenians. Yet, at the same time, Chlaineas' case is partly made up by omitting the roles of the Athenians in particular. Apart from the Aitolians' claim that they alone helped the Spartans, Diodoros reports that the Athenians initiated the Lamian War, and the Aitolians first made an alliance with them.<sup>30</sup> For the Gallic invasion, Pausanias put an emphasis on the roles of the Athenians and Phokians in fighting against the Gauls, and even the decree of Kos, the contemporary witness, mentions the Greek collective effort in defeating the Gauls. The Aitolians claimed that they alone stood and fought against not just the Gauls but also the Macedonians, namely the enemies of the Greeks. In so doing, they ignored the roles of the Athenians, who appeared to be a model of the Aitolians' way of propaganda.

In this way, the Aitolians appropriated the Athenian way of claiming credit for the victory at the Battle of Marathon and in the Persian Wars in order to maximise their contribution to defeating the Gauls. They claimed they alone fought against the Gauls, so they were the defenders of Delphi. In the temple of Apollo in Delphi, their shields occupied the place near which the Athenians' shields made of the spoils of the Battle of Plataia were once installed. Even after the Athenians' shields returned to the temple, the Aitolians' ones were still placed alongside. By this, two victories against the barbarians were juxtaposed. Finally, the Aitolians appropriated the Athenian way of claiming credit for the Battle of Marathon in magnifying their contribution to the Greek safety in the

---

<sup>27</sup> Note Polybios' principle on history-writing that a historian is "to record with fidelity what was actually said or done, however commonplace it may be" (Polyb. 2.56.10-1). See also Polyb. 2.56.10-12, 12.25.b1, 12.25.8, 36.1.7. For the speeches in Greek historiography, see, e.g., Walbank 1965; Marincola 2007b.

<sup>28</sup> As to Polybios' hostility towards the Aitolians, see, e.g., Walbank 1957: 12; Pédech 1964: 153-4; Champion 1996: 323-4, 327-8; Champion 2007b.

<sup>29</sup> Walters 1981.

<sup>30</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.10-1.

Lamian War and the Gallic invasion. Of course, this was not their only way of referring to the battle against the Gauls. In the invitation for the newly enhanced Soteria, the Aitolians seem to have mentioned the Gallic invasion as the collective fight of the Greeks against the barbarians (*IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1005: 250/49 BC*). Similarly, the decree of Kos shows that the victory against the barbarians was the result of the Greek collective effort, as we saw above. In this way, they could have a different strategy when needed. However, in the diplomatic and political sphere, the Aitolians embellished their contribution to the defeat of the Gauls.

### 3.3 THE PAINTING OF KALLIPPOS AND THE ATHENIAN MEMORY OF THE GALLIC INVASION

#### 3.3.1. Introduction

This section shall tackle the question of how the Athenians memorialised the Gallic invasion. My focus is on a painting of Kallippos in the Bouleuterion of the Five Hundred councillors in the Athenian Agora. This painting is only known from the report of Pausanias. This report offers us an interesting picture of the Athenian reaction against the Gallic invasion. Kallippos was an Athenian general of the early third century BC and led the Athenian force at Thermopylai in 279 BC to stop the Gauls. According to Pausanias (1.3.5), his painting was placed in the council chamber, close to another depicting the lawgivers, *thesmothetai*, and situated near a wooden statue of Zeus Boulaios, the Counsellor, a statue of Apollo, and that of Demos. It is generally believed that Kallippos was honoured for his service in the defence of Thermopylai as the general of the Athenian force.<sup>31</sup> However, the meaning and the context of this painting have not yet been fully considered. We can still ask what this painting showed and whether it had anything to do with the Gallic invasion. In this section, I will argue that, although Kallippos was honoured for his service at Thermopylai, he was commemorated not only as a hero of the fight against the Gauls but also as a democratically important politician.

---

<sup>31</sup> E.g. Nachtergaele 1977: 192-3; Habicht 1979: 87; Habicht 1997: 115-6, 133; Habicht 1998: 85-6; Bayliss 2011: 187-8, 199-200.

### **3.3.2. The Painting of Kallippos**

It is useful to quote Pausanias' description of the Bouleuterion and the significant items within it.<sup>32</sup> At the beginning of Book 1, Pausanias, entering the Athenian Agora from its Northwest corner and going along the road situated on the west side of the Agora, a road which runs from north to south, finds the Bouleuterion among the several buildings (Paus. 1.3.5).

Here is built also a sanctuary of the Mother of the gods; the image is by Pheidias. Hard by is the Bouleuterion of those called the Five Hundred, who are the Athenian councillors for a year. In it are *xoanon* of Zeus Boulaios and an Apollo, the work of Peisias, and a Demos by Lyson. Protogenes the Kaunian painted (ἔγραψε) the *Thesmothetai* and Olbiades painted Kallippos, who led the Athenians to Thermopylai to stop the incursion of the Gauls into Greece (Ὀλβιάδης δὲ Κάλλιππον, ὃς Ἀθηναίους ἐς Θερμοπύλας ἤγαγε φυλάξοντας τὴν ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα Γαλατῶν ἐσβολήν).

Thereafter, Pausanias narrates the Gallic invasion of Greece and Asia Minor. For him, Kallippos is a good starting point for the story of the invasion. Although little is known of Olbiades, the fact that so many centuries later Pausanias not only names him but also places him alongside Protogenes implies that he was a famous artist. Commissioning Olbiades to produce the painting and then displaying it in an important public building like the Bouleuterion suggests that this was intended as a special honour for Kallippos. The picture was probably painted on a wooden panel that was attached to the wall. Before analysing the meaning of the painting, this section will consider (a) who Kallippos was and (b) what was depicted in the painting and, indeed, how Pausanias was able to identify Kallippos.

#### *(a) The Career of Kallippos*

First of all, we should start with asking who Kallippos was. Kallippos, son of Moirokles, of Eleusis was born in an elite family whose prosperity can be traced back as far as the early fourth century BC at least.<sup>33</sup> Euthydemos, a great-uncle, or maybe grandfather, of

---

<sup>32</sup> Paus. 1.3.5. Translation modified from Jones 1918.

<sup>33</sup> Sakeshima 2022 is a short entry on the career of Kallippos. See also Bayliss 2011: 187-210 for the extensive treatment of Kallippos' career. As to Kallippos' background, prosopographic studies show that Kallippos belonged to an elite family. Cf. Threpsiades 1939, esp. 180; Ampolo 1979: 176-8;

Kallippos, was recorded to be a priest of Asklepios in the Piraeus in the early fourth century BC.<sup>34</sup> He recommended the Athenian assembly offer the preliminary sacrifices for the Athenian *demos* (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 47, 23-39) and erect *stelai* that contained a regulation as to the preliminary sacrifice (*IG II<sup>3</sup>* 4, 1773). Because of these deeds, Stephen Lambert speculates he held a lifetime priesthood.<sup>35</sup> If Lambert's speculation is correct, Euthydemos was in an elite family of cultic experts. Kallippos' father, Moirokles,<sup>36</sup> appears as a politically active person of the 320s BC at the city level. As he first came up on the political scene around 343 BC in the existing sources, he was probably born around 375 BC.

This man, perhaps called 'Moirokles the Salaminian', seems to have kept his anti-Macedon and pro-democratic stance during his lifetime.<sup>37</sup> His inclusion in the extradition request by Alexander the Great in 335 BC clearly shows Moirokles' international reputation (*Arr. Anab.* 1.10.4; *Plut. Dem.* 23.4). In 324 BC, Timaios, the comedian, includes him on a list of those bribed by Harpalos (*Ath.* 341e-f), although Moirokles was not on the list offered by the Council of the Areopagos. We do not know for certain his career after the Harpalus affair. Scholars have identified this Moirokles as the one who proposed a deme decree honouring Xenokles of Sphettos in 321/0 or 318/7 BC (*I.Eleusis* 95). Yet, this identification is now doubted.<sup>38</sup>

As to Kallippos, the years of his birth and death are not known. What is known to us suggests that he may have spent the prime of his life in an Athens of a radically democratic tone, between 270s BC and 260 BC, when the city suffered a difficult situation because of the Antigonid occupation of Piraeus.<sup>39</sup>

---

*LGPN* 2 s.v. Kallippos, no. 29-30; Bayliss 2011: 189-190; See Humphreys 2018: 1121-4. For the identification of the family of Kallippos, see Appendix 1 of this thesis.

<sup>34</sup> For this Euthydemos, see Traill, *PAA* 432295, cf. Traill, *PAA* 432310 with the note of Humphreys 2018: 1123, who suggests the Euthystratos son of Euthydemos mentioned in *Agora* 15.43, l. 183 belonged to Dekeleia; *LGPN* 2 s.v. Εὐθύδημος (26).

<sup>35</sup> See Lambert 2010: 170. He also speculates that Euthydemos belonged to one of the Eleusinian *gene*.

<sup>36</sup> For this Moirokles, see Traill, *PAA* 658480; 658485; 658490, with n. 33 above. See also Ampolo 1979: 176-8; Ampolo 1981; Bayliss 2011: 189-90; Humphreys 2018: 1122-3.

<sup>37</sup> He was called "the Salaminian" perhaps because of his property on Salamis. See Humphreys 2018: 692, n. 105; 1123, n. 89, cf. Taylor 1997: 85-7.

<sup>38</sup> Humphreys 2018: 1123.

<sup>39</sup> See Oliver 2007b: 54-65; Osborne 2012: 43-50.

His career was illuminated by two incidents: the Gallic invasion and the Chremonidean War, in both of which he is reported to have played an important role. At the time of the Gallic invasion in 279 BC, he was chosen as commander of the Athenian force and led his army to Thermopylai to stop the Gauls. Although the Greek defence was ultimately unsuccessful, and the Gauls continued on to Delphi, this might not have denounced his fame in Athens as his appearance in the Chremonidean War suggests. I will discuss Pausanias' narrative of the Gallic invasion and try to reconstruct the Athenians' and Kallippos' contribution in fighting the Gauls at Thermopylai in the next section.

Kallippos made his appearance again on the scene at the time of the Chremonidean War: just before the outbreak of the war, Kallippos was elected by the Athenian *demos* as one of the two *synedroi*, representatives selected from each *polis* to be sent to a council of allies. His mission was to deliberate with the Spartan king Areus and the other *synedroi* of their alliance over the common interests ([περὶ τῶν κοινῆς] συμφερόντων), namely, their war against Antigonos Gonatas (*IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 912, ll. 48-53, 68-9*).<sup>40</sup> Perhaps due to his noticeable diplomatic activity during the wartime, the Orchomenians in Arcadia bestowed *proxenia* on him and two other prominent Athenian politicians, Aristeides, son of Mnesitheus, from Lamprai, and Glaukon, son of Eteokles from Aithalidai (*ISE I no. 53*). Glaukon was one of the main advocates of the war as a brother of Chremonides.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, as the Orchomenians also honoured king Areus (*ISE I no. 54*), it is certain that Kallippos performed a central role in prosecuting the Chremonidean War. It may be possible that he inherited the political stance of his father. Yet, thereafter, Kallippos disappeared from the historical record. He might have died during the war or have been exiled after the defeat of Athens. It is less likely that he could have stayed in Athens until his death because of his role in the Chremonidean War.

However, perhaps the Macedonian control of Athens did not cast any shadow on the prominence of his family. Archandros, son of Kallippos, is known to have been elected as general for the coastal countryside in 248/7 BC.<sup>42</sup> In the same year, he contributed money to the *epidosis* (*IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1011, l. 109*).<sup>43</sup> This *epidosis* tells us the importance of the position Archandros was bestowed. In 251 BC, Alexander, son of Krateros and a

---

<sup>40</sup> We have seen this decree in detail in Chapter 2.4.1.

<sup>41</sup> See Chapter 2.4.1 for the political activity of Chremonides and Glaukon.

<sup>42</sup> *I.Rhamnous* 407, cf. Petrakos 1999: 36-7.

<sup>43</sup> For the conflict between Antigonos Gonatas and Alexander, see Habicht 1997: 161-3. For a detailed discussion of this *epidosis*, see Oliver 2007b: 131-3, 200-4.

governor of Korinth and Euboia, had risen against Antigonos Gonatas and then started to attack Athens and Attika, which Antigonos Gonatas controlled at that time. There was an urgent need for Athens to ensure an adequate food supply by protecting the countryside against the forces of Alexander and his allies. This *epidosis* decree was to achieve this through a public subscription from the residents of Athens (*IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1011, ll. 16-20, 28-30*). In this situation, the generalship for the coastal countryside must have been a heavy task, and so the appointment of Archandros clearly shows his reputation, if not very prominent, at that time.<sup>44</sup> He seems to have done this task very well by arranging and strengthening the defence of the area around Rhamnous, and, therefore, the Rhamnousians, the *paroikoi*, and the *koinon* of those living in Rhamnous honoured him.<sup>45</sup> So, he seems to have inherited the wealth, and like his father, he worked as a military man. No evidence about this wealthy elite family after Archandros survives.

As Kallippos was one of the most prominent people in both military and diplomatic spheres in Athens in the 270s BC and 260s BC, his continuous service for the *polis* throughout this period from 287 BC to the Chremonidean War could be another reason why he was honoured, just as contemporary politicians, such as Demochares, Phaidros and Philippides were honoured. Yet, as we will see below, his service at Thermopylai should be the better choice.

*(b) What was depicted in the painting?*

In order to determine how Pausanias recognised the man on the painting as Kallippos, it is better to consider the scene in which Kallippos is in. We cannot exactly know the scene of the painting in the Bouleuterion. Pausanias does not describe what Kallippos is doing. However, if Kallippos is leading his soldiers or he has them lined up, or they are in battle, Pausanias either should refer to any of this as he does in describing the other paintings<sup>46</sup> or should use present tense ἄγει (or its present participle form for describing Kallippos' pose) instead of ἦγαγε. For instance, Pausanias (1.15.2) uses the present tense of the main verb for a painting on the wall of the Painted Stoa, a painting in which the Athenians are fighting the Amazons (ἐν δὲ τῷ μέσῳ τῶν τοίχων Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Θησεὺς Ἀμαζόσι **μάχονται**). In 1.22.6, Pausanias uses a present participle to describe

---

<sup>44</sup> For the generalship for the countryside of this period, see Oliver 2007b: 163-72, esp. 165.

<sup>45</sup> *I.Rhamnous* 407, cf. Petrakos 1999: 36-7 with *SEG* 47.151, 51.107, 52.127. Cf. Oetjen 2014: 188, Dekret 18; *I.Rhamnous* 27, 28. See also Oliver 2007b: 186-8.

<sup>46</sup> For instance: Paus. 1.15.1; 1.17.2; 1.18.1; 1.22.6. For the historicity of the sons of Leosthenes, see Davies 1971: 343-4.

what is happening in a painting and an aorist participle to describe what happened in it (ἐνταῦθα ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς Ὀρέστης ἐστὶν Αἰγίσθον **φονεύων** καὶ Πυλάδης τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς Ναυπλίου βοηθοὺς **ἐλθόντας** Αἰγίσθῳ: Among the paintings here is also Orestes **slaying** Aigisthos, and Pylades **slaying** Nauplios' sons, who **came** to the rescue of Aigisthos). A similar case to that of Kallippos can be found in Pausanias. When Pausanias refers to the painting of Leosthenes, a commander in the Lamian War, he describes Leosthenes' deeds by using a relative pronoun and aorist verb, deeds which must not have been described in a painting:<sup>47</sup>

ἐνταῦθα Λεωσθένην, ὃς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν Ἑλλησιν ἡγούμενος Μακεδόνας ἔν τε Βοιωτοῖς **ἐκράτησε** μάχῃ καὶ αὐθις ἔξω Θερμοπυλῶν καὶ βιασάμενος ἐς Λάμιαν **κατέκλεισε** τὴν ἀπαντικρὺ τῆς Οἴτης,

**Here** (is the portrait of) **Leosthenes who**, at the head of the Athenians and all the Greeks, **defeated** the Macedonians in Boiotia and again outside Thermopylai; and after overpowering them **shut** them **up** in Lamia, over against Oeta,

Pausanias sometimes introduces a digression by designating statues he sees as its starting point. This method is best observed in book 1. When Pausanias finds and reports the statues in the Athenian Agora, and when he wants, he gives the episodes and short biographies of those immortalised.<sup>48</sup> The information of these digressions must have been given to Pausanias through the readings rather than local informants or what he found there. Pausanias may have used the same method for the painting of Kallippos. In short, he does not say anything about the painting itself.

But how can he know the man painted is Kallippos? We can think of several possibilities for the ways he acquired sources for identification. There may have been clues in the painting that refer to the Gallic invasion and his command at Thermopylai. Otherwise, he may have acquired the information from his local guides, who accompanied him and explained the monuments and paintings in each place he visited.<sup>49</sup> Another possibility is that there was an inscription saying the reason why Kallippos was painted. Kallippos is a common name in Athens. We have 84 entries of this name in

---

<sup>47</sup> Paus. 1.1.3. Translation modified from Frazer 1898a.

<sup>48</sup> See e.g. Paus. 1.8.2-3 (Demosthenes); 1.8.6-9.3 (Ptolemy VI Philometor); 1.9.5-10.5 (Lysimachos); 1.11-13 (Pyrrhos); 1.16 (Seleukos).

<sup>49</sup> On Pausanias' uses of local guides, see Frazer 1898a: lxxvi-vii; Arafat 1997: 9; Jones 2001. See also Casson 1994: 264-7 for local guides in general.

LGN 2 and 95 entries in *Athenian Onomasticon*, including 5 foreign residents.<sup>50</sup> So, it must have been difficult for him to identify the man painted only from the name. Yet, he sometimes acquired the information from inscriptions that stood where he visited. The most famous example is the honorific portrait of Olympiodoros, an Athenian general of the early third century BC. It is argued that his statue on the Athenian Akropolis was placed near the inscription, which narrates the reason why he was honoured, and Pausanias acquired knowledge about Olympiodoros from it.<sup>51</sup> There might have been a similar text next to the painting. The painting may have had an inscription as to why Kallippos was honoured. We have an example of an honorific painting in Athens with an inscription about honorands. *IG II<sup>2</sup> 1043* with add. p. 671, ll. 70-3, for instance, stipulates in 37/6 or 36/5 BC to allow the *ephebes* and their superintendent to dedicate a painted portrait of Sosis, who were generous for his fellow ephebes, with an accompanying honorific inscription telling who honours whom.<sup>52</sup> If the painting of Kallippos had a similar inscription, Pausanias may have understood the name of the honorand, an agent who honoured him and a short explanation about the reason of honour. At any rate, Pausanias must have observed something in the painting (or its accompanying text) that established a connection with the Gallic invasion.

### **3.3.3. The Athenian Contribution to the Fight against the Gauls and Kallippos' Service**

In order to analyse the context of the honour, it is necessary to examine the Athenian contribution in fighting the Gauls at Thermopylai should be reconstructed. This section will argue that Pausanias' claim that Kallippos was the leader of the whole Greek army is probable and that his account that the Athenians fought the Gauls prominently both on land and sea at Thermopylai is credible. Kallippos must have been highly evaluated as a competent commander of Athens.

Our only source for the Battle of Thermopylai is Pausanias. According to him, when the Gauls went through Thessaly and came near Thermopylai in 279 BC, the Athenians sent their force to defend Thermopylai, choosing Kallippos as their general (Paus. 1.3.5, 1.4.2). He is said to have led "all their seaworthy triremes, 500 cavalrymen and 1,000

---

<sup>50</sup> *Ath. Onom.* s.v. Κάλλιππος (<http://www.seangb.org/Z-K.html>. Accessed 30 Nov 2023).

<sup>51</sup> Habicht 1998, 90-2, 101; Iacoviello 2021.

<sup>52</sup> "Those who were ephebes in the year of the archonship of Menandros and their superintendent Olympiodoros son of Olympos of Hagnous ... Sosis son of Sosis of Oe ..."

foot-soldiers” to Thermopylai. He must have led his land force on the battlefield, probably chosen as the hoplite general of Athens.<sup>53</sup> The Athenians seem to have sent a relatively small land force, as the Boiotians sent 10,000 hoplites, the Aitolians 7,000, and the Phocians 3,000 if Pausanias’ report is accurate. Yet, the Athenian leadership in the war against ‘barbarians’ must have been a huge honour for Kallippos.<sup>54</sup> It is certain that he was already a leading politician in Athens before the Gallic invasion.

Kallippos may have been chosen to be the leader of the combined Greek force at Thermopylai if the report of Pausanias that “because of their ancient reputation the Athenians held the chief command” is correct (Paus. 10.20.5). However, this is usually denied in modern scholarship for several reasons: Pausanias’ *imitatio Herodoti*, pro-Athenian tendency, and also the small number of the Athenian force in comparison with the Aitolian and Boiotian forces.<sup>55</sup> For these scholars, the most plausible is that a general of the Aitolians, perhaps Eurydamas, was the chief commander at Thermopylai.

Scholars built up their reasonings to deny Pausanias, and only a few trusted him. Simply, however, we do not have the evidence either to confirm or to deny the Athenian leadership of the campaign. As Pausanias is our only source, the problem is a matter of speculation. “Ancient reputation” sounds plausible enough to allow the Athenians to hold the leadership at least at Thermopylai. We can recall the Decrees of the Hellenic War and the Chremonidean War, in which Athenian past leadership against the barbarians and Xerxes is foregrounded in order to justify their leadership to fight the Macedonians.<sup>56</sup> Of course, we can suspect that Pausanias, or probably his source(s),

---

<sup>53</sup> Oliver 2007b: 163. Cf. Dreyer 1999: 267.

<sup>54</sup> Paus. 10.20.3-5. See also a useful list of soldiers presented by Nachtergaele 1977: 142-3.

<sup>55</sup> For instance Tarn 1913: 151; Nachtergaele 1977: 144-5; Habicht 1979: 87-94; Habicht 1997: 133. On the contrary, Dreyer 1999: 252-3; Bayliss 2011: 197-200 see Pausanias as credible. For the nature of Pausanias’ narrative, see Pretzler 2007: 86-7. For the meaning of the Persian Wars in Pausanias’ books, see Alcock 1996.

<sup>56</sup> The leading role of Athens is also suggested in Paus. 1.4.1-2. We have no idea how the Greeks and the Macedonians agreed on an arrangement to defend Thermopylai. The accounts of Diodoros, Justin, and Pausanias suggest that there may have been no organised league to fight the Gauls that was equivalent to the old Hellenic League against Xerxes. The Greek and Macedonian forces might have gathered together at Thermopylai at the request of some poleis who fulfilled a temporary leading role to rally the force there, and probably Athens was among them. Or, the *poleis* around Thermopylai asked the Greeks and the Macedonians for support, like the Delphinians acquire support from their neighbours in the account of Justin (Just. *Epit.* 24.7.8-9).

invented the Athenian leadership in order to make the Battle of Thermopylai comparable to the old battle of the same name, in which the Spartans held the leadership. Pausanias used his sources, which are likely to be traced back to the third century BC, which included a detailed list of the Greek and Macedonian forces as well as an impressive account of the Gallic invasion.<sup>57</sup> It is possible that they were pro-Athenian and attempted to magnify the Athenian honour. It is more striking that, in Pausanias' account, the attribution of the leadership to Athens does not affect the course of his narrative (unlike the Athenian triremes that will be discussed soon below). This could suggest Pausanias' shabby addition of the passage. Any speculations are possible, but there is no definitive answer. I am inclined to trust Pausanias, but I will not, or more

---

<sup>57</sup> Scholars have investigated the source material of Pausanias for the Gallic invasion for a long time. Timaios of Tauromenium, proposed by Adolf Schmidt, was once popular but now rejected (Schmidt 1834. See also Nachtergaele 1977: 27-8, n. 46 for advocates). Another candidate, Hieronymos of Kardia, is regarded as a more valid one than Timaios, advocated by scholars such as Hendrik van Gelder, Mario Segrè, and Christian Habicht (van Gelder 1888; Segrè 1927: 28-9; Habicht 1979: 89, n. 9; Habicht 1997: 132-3; Habicht 1998: 84-5. Ameling 1996: 150, n. 163 takes this position. Hornblower 1981: 72-4 does not deny this possibility). This identification is also doubted by scholars such as Felix Jacoby and Georges Nachtergaele for the reasons that, for instance, the style of writing does not seem to have been Hieronymos' one (Jacoby comment on *FGH* p. 544-5; Regenbogen 1956: 1070; Nachtergaele 1977: 56-62; Bearzot 1992: 110-1). Instead, Cinzia Bearzot prefers Demochares of Athens and Psaon of Plataia. The problem is complicated by the possibility that Pausanias used an intermediate source (or sources), mixed up several sources to compose his history and, moreover, inserted his own original passages into his sources (On this position, see Hornblower 1981: 72-4; Ameling 1996). For instance, for the career of Philopoimen, Pausanias may have mixed sources, such as the works written by Polybios, Plutarch and Aristokrates with other source material. See Errington 1969: 237-40. However, it is believed that Pausanias' account contains the elements that came from contemporary recognitions or historiography. Some scholars argue that there were two types of the narrative of the Gallic invasion, an Aitolian version and a Delphic one, the latter of which may have been related to an older tradition, namely before the Aitolian tradition was established, and Pausanias' source stemmed from that (Tarn 1913; Segrè 1927; Flacelière 1937; Bearzot 1992. See esp. Bearzot 1992: 108-9). For a recent attempt to consider Pausanias' source material, see Pierozzi 2023 who suggests Phylarchos could be a basis of Pausanias' account. See also Nachtergaele 1977: 15-125 for the extensive treatment of sources about the Gallic invasion and 27-49 for the early scholarly theories for sources.

precisely I cannot, push my position forward here.<sup>58</sup>

Although we do not have any information on the deeds of Kallippos on the battlefield, the Athenians were reported to have fought courageously at Thermopylai. The Athenian triremes were crucial in the fighting and the retreat of the Greek force. On the first day of the battle, approaching the Gallic forces through the muddy soil of Thermopylai, the men on the triremes threw a lot of projectiles over the enemies so that they successfully exhausted the Gauls and had them retreat. The Athenians surpassed the other Greeks in valour. Pausanias names Kydias as the bravest who died in the battle, and his family dedicated his shield to the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios. Later, the Gauls found a path to bypass the narrow road the Greeks defended. Before being attacked from both sides, the Greeks decided to desert the battle line after hearing the information about the Gauls' detour from the Phokians. Then, the Athenian triremes rescued the Greeks from Thermopylai (Paus. 10.21, esp. 4-7, 10.22.8-12). If this account is true, Kallippos must have done very well leading the Athenians.

Although the lack of credibility of Pausanias casts a shadow over this reconstruction, I believe he offers reliable information. It has long been suggested that his account included a historical falsification. Pausanias' story of the Athenian triremes is now regarded as false by many scholars who argue that the triremes were unlikely to have participated in the Battle of Thermopylai. This view is primarily derived from *IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1005*, a decree by which the Athenians decided to join in the new festival of the Soteria at Delphi at the invitation of the Aitolians. Although it narrates the march of the Gauls against the Greeks and the battle at Delphi (*IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1005, ll. 12-4*), this decree does not make a mention of the triremes (ἐφ' οὓς καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἐξέπεμπε[[v] τοὺς τε ἐπιλέκτους καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς συναγωνισμέν[[ου]ς ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας: "against whom (the barbarians) the *demos* also sent out the elite troops and cavalry to fight together for the common deliverance"). Then, according to this theory, the Athenian fleet did not come to Thermopylai at all, and their appearance was a consequence of Pausanias' *imitatio Herodoti*. Since important early scholars Karl Beloch, William Ferguson, Mario Segrè and William Tarn advocated this theory, it soon became scholarly consensus and was supported by influential later works by Georges Nachtergaele and Christian Habicht. Nachtergaele further supported Segrè's idea that Pausanias imitates the Herodotean description of the Battle of Artemision, where the Athenians played a major role. Christian Habicht further argues that the Athenians had economic difficulty in sending a good number of armies and fleets to Thermopylai because Piraeus was occupied by the

---

<sup>58</sup> See also Luraghi 2018: 34-5 on this point.

Macedonians.<sup>59</sup>

Those who disagreed with this theory read the inscription in a different way. William Tarn, in 1934, changing his position from his 1913 publication, argued that the decree at issue is nothing to do with the Battle of Thermopylai because its focus is on Delphi and also Pausanias' description does not resemble Herodotos.<sup>60</sup> Recently, Andrew Bayliss also said that the decree does not relate to Thermopylai without referring to Tarn.<sup>61</sup> The other decrees passed by other *poleis* to accept the invitation from the Aitolians similarly refer to Delphi.<sup>62</sup> He also collected evidence and argued that the Athenians could keep their own fleet in other harbours apart from Piraeus.<sup>63</sup>

I support the latter view. It is true that *IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1005* is irrelevant to the Battle of Thermopylai. As the descriptions of the battles are different, especially in terms of the ways of fighting, the Pausanias' proposed *imitatio Herodoti* is difficult to find from the reference to the Athenian fleet. Again, this is a matter of speculation because there is no other source that provides information on the Battle of Thermopylai. Yet, there is no good reason to deny Pausanias. The existence of the fleet is closely intertwined with Pausanias' narrative, and it must have been derived from Pausanias' source. If so, this Athenian contribution must have come from contemporary sources. Even if it was exaggerated, the Athenian courage and the role played by the Athenian triremes must have been highly evaluated by his source material. It can be speculated that its description was tainted by the Athenian propaganda to magnify their own credit.

This picture would be consistent with the fact that Kallippos was given significant honour in Athens. Kallippos was the Athenian general and was possibly the supreme commander of the Greek force at Thermopylai. Although the Greeks did not succeed in stopping the Gauls from passing through Thermopylai, Kallippos' Athenian land and

---

<sup>59</sup> Ferguson 1911: 158, n. 3; Tarn 1913: 150, n. 50, 442; Beloch 1927: 452-4; Segrè 2004: 64-5. Nachtergaele 1977: 143-5, cf. Gullath 1982: 208. Habicht 1979: 87-94, cf. Ameling 1996: 147-8; Strobel 1996: 222, n. 291; Habicht 1997: 133; Dreyer 1999: 252-3; Bultrighini and Torelli 2017: 388.

<sup>60</sup> Tarn 1934: 35. Same position: Gabbert 1997: 27.

<sup>61</sup> Bayliss 2011: 200-4, cf. Flacelière 1937: 96, n. 3 and 99, n. 1; Luraghi 2018: 34-5; Worthington 2021: 112-3.

<sup>62</sup> Bayliss 2011: 201-2. See also Nachtergaele 1977, no. 22, ll. 6-7 (Chios); no. 23, ll. 4-6 (Tenos); no. 24, ll. 7-9 (an island of the Kyklades). Cf. Nachtergaele 1977, no. 25 (Smyrna).

<sup>63</sup> Bayliss 2011:203-4, cf. Oliver 2007b: 63-4, 123-5, 147, 154, 156-7, 236 for the Athenian uses of the regional harbours in this period. Note that he thinks Athens was unable to maintain the size of naval fleet planned after 307 BC. Oliver 2007b: 147-8.

naval forces performed an excellent job on the battlefield. As an outstanding military commander, he was probably honoured with a special painting in Athens.

### **3.3.4. The Bouleuterion**

How can this picture fit into the place he was honoured, the Bouleuterion? The place of the painting is crucial to our discussion because the Athenians controlled the places of publication of their state decrees and those of the erection of honorific statues very elaborately and carefully. New honorific monuments and *stelai* were associated with existing monuments and buildings in accordance with the achievements of honorands. For instance, statues of Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes, freedom-givers of Athens in 307 BC were erected next to the statue of the tyrannicides in the Agora. Later, this group included the statues of Brutus and Cassius, other liberators.<sup>64</sup> The statue of Demetrios Poliorketes was placed next to the statue of Demokratia for his defeat of Kassander.<sup>65</sup> Around and inside the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios, which commemorated the victory in the Persian Wars, shields, statues and honorific *stelai* of saviours and defenders of Athens were erected and placed.<sup>66</sup> The statue of Lykourgos was erected next to the statues of Peace and Wealth in the Agora, which implies Lykourgos' success in promoting economic prosperity after the Battle of Chaironeia.<sup>67</sup> The places of paintings are also highly contrived. For instance, a painting of Leosthenes, general of the Lamian War, was displayed in the *temenos* of Zeus Soter and Athena Soteira at Piraeus (Paus. 1.1.3); the painting of Olympiodoros was dedicated in Eleusis, obviously due to his rescue of Eleusis (1.26.3); that of the family of Eteobutadai in Erechtheion, apparently due to its priesthood (1.26.5). Therefore, we have to investigate the importance of the Athenian Agora and the Bouleuterion. To begin with, we should start by confirming the basic information of the Bouleuterion.

There were two Bouleuteria in Athens, the Old and the New.<sup>68</sup> The former is likely to have been built in the early fifth century BC, perhaps soon after the Kleisthenic reform in 508/7 BC. It was a square hall located southwest of the Agora. This was not just the

---

<sup>64</sup> Ma 2013: 104, 118; Dio Cass. 47.20.4; *SEG* 17.75.

<sup>65</sup> *SEG* 25.149 (=ISE 7).

<sup>66</sup> Oliver 2007b: 109.

<sup>67</sup> Paus. 1.8.2; Worthington 1996; Ma 2013: 120.

<sup>68</sup> For the Bouleuteria, see Thompson 1937: 115-27; Thompson and Wycherley 1972: 25-38; Camp 2010: 58-63. For meeting places of the *boule*, see Rhodes 1985: 30-48.

main meeting place of the newly instituted Council of the Five Hundred but also the archive for public documents. After the construction of the New Bouleuterion in the late fifth century BC as the new meeting place of the councillors, the old one was no longer used for the meeting place. In the middle of the second century BC, a large building was built on the site where the Old Bouleuterion was placed. This is known to be the Metroon. The latter, the New Bouleuterion, was built just west of the old Bouleuterion at the end of the fifth century BC. The Old Bouleuterion's function as a council chamber has been transferred to this new building. This must have been the building Pausanias visited. In this chapter, I denote the new one as 'the Bouleuterion' unless clarification is needed.

The Bouleuterion was a place for the Council of Five Hundred, one of the most important organs in Athenian politics. The council deliberated in advance on matters as the preparatory body and provided the assembly, the decision-making body, with their resolutions. The council also passed and published its own decrees, which were sometimes to honour state officials. It was also responsible for overseeing the state finance and the state officials and welcoming ambassadors of other states.<sup>69</sup>

The remains of the foundation indicated that the Bouleuterion was about 22.50 meters wide north to south and 17.50 m east to west, although the original size of the whole structure has not yet been recovered. Two reconstructions of the interior orientation of the seats of the Bouleuterion have been suggested, and during the Hellenistic period, the original linear wooden seats were replaced by curved marble ones. In any case, there must have been some room to accommodate a *bema*, an altar and statues inside.

Thompson and Wycherley suggest in 1972 that the paintings Pausanias mentions were likely to be placed in the porch added to the south side in the third century BC.<sup>70</sup> However, this thesis is unacceptable. As the painting of the *thesmothetai* is dated to the fourth century BC as was depicted by Protogenes, the painter in the fourth century BC, and, moreover, Pausanias' wording that "ἐν αὐτῷ" (in the council chamber) seems to cover not only the statues but also the paintings, Pausanias must have reported what he saw inside the chamber of the Bouleuterion, not in the south porch.<sup>71</sup>

In terms of other dedications known from inscriptions, many of them could have been accommodated in the porch. The Bouleuterion is a rather irregular place for

---

<sup>69</sup> Arist. *Pol.* 1322b12-17; Dem. 20.100; Pl. *Ap.* 24e-25a. See also Hansen 1999: 246-7.

<sup>70</sup> Thompson and Wycherley 1972: 34, cf. Johnstone and Graff 2018: 50.

<sup>71</sup> There are two proposals for the orientation of the seating inside the New Bouleuterion. See Johnstone and Graff 2018: 51-6.

accommodating public honours. However, it did contain dedications from the public offices and those of a painting of an honorand, a dedication which resulted from an honorific decree of the assembly or the council.<sup>72</sup> *Ag.* 15.264, for instance, records a decree passed in c. 80/79 BC by which the council honours the *tamias*, the treasurer, of the *prytaneis* for his performance in a sacrifice and management of the other things and it made and dedicated his painted portrait on a shield in the Bouleuterion (ll. 10-4, cf. ll.

---

<sup>72</sup> For those dedicated in the Bouleuterion, see *Agora* 15.264; *Agora* 15.268; *Agora* 15.277; *Agora* 15.292. Note these examples are highly restored except *Agora* 15.268. For the wording “γραπτῆς ἰκόνος” without “ἐν ὄπλοι,” restored, e.g. in *Agora* 15.292, l. 13 as is attested in the other inscriptions, e.g. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1043 with add. p. 671, ll. 68, 71. See Henry 1983: 302. Note that “γραπτῆς ἰκόνος” possibly refers to “a painted statue.” The Stoa of Attalos (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1043, with add. p. 671, ll. 68-69; *Agora* 15.265, ll. 6-9; *SEG* 22.111, ll. 15-17 with ll. 11-12; *SEG* 28.95, ll. 18-20 cf. *SEG* 25.134, ll. 9-11), the Asklepion (*Agora* 15.295, ll. 9-11; *Agora* 15.301, ll. 9-11), the temple in Eleusis (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1039, ll. 35-6); the gymnasium of Ptolemy (*Agora* 15.304, ll. 7-8; *Agora* 15.304, ll. 20-22), and “wherever one may chose” (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1043, 38; *Agora* 15.270, ll. 7-8; *Agora* 15.281, ll. 17-20) are also the locations in which a shield with a painting was placed. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1012 stipulates that, by the request of Diognetos, he and the *synodos* are permitted by the *boule* to erect a shield with an image of their *proxenos*, Diodoros, in Diognetos’ record office. For the permission of the *boule* as to this decree, see Kloppenborg and Ascough 2011: 206. This decree may suggest that permission from the *boule* is needed in order for one to dedicate a shield in public buildings.

There are also honorific decrees which contain the bestowment of the *pinax*. There are seven epigraphic attestations of this kind of honour at the city level (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1042; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1039; *IG* II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1166; *IG* II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1176; *IG* II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1256; *IG* II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1290; *IG* II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1313), two from deme level (*Ag.* 16.277; *IRhannous* no. 10) and two from cult groups (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1271; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1327). All the city-level decrees relate to the *ephebes* in the Hellenistic period. The earliest case dated to 213/2 BC stipulated to honour collectively the *ephebes* of the previous year with golden crowns and permit them to dedicate a picture (*pinax*) wherever they may choose ([ἐν ᾧ] ἂν τόποι αἰρῶ[νται]) for their noteworthy performances during their ephebic service (*IG* II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1166, ll. 28-32). The *ephebes* may have been able to choose a topic of the painting. This honour appears to have formed one of the most important honours which the *ephebes* could acquire until the end of the Hellenistic period. See *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1039, ll. 64-65, dated in 79/8 BC. The tutors (*παιδευταί*) and trainers (*παιδοτρίβαι*) of the *ephebes* seem to have been awarded the same dedicative honour (Lambert 2020: 119-23, no. 16, ll. 61-62 dated in 40/39 or 39/38 BC). For the honours on the *ephebes* in the Hellenistic period in general, see Henderson 2020: 221-4. It is not sure if these honours were exclusively ephebic. For honours with a painting in general, see Blanck 1968.

5-7). This honour is interesting because this painting contains an inscription which records the honourers, the honorand, and the reason why he was honoured (Il. 10-4: [εὐσεβείας ἔνε]κεν καὶ φιλοτ[ιμ]ίας τ[ῆς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὴν βουλὴν]).

Yet, these honorific portraits started to be mentioned in the inscriptions much later than Kallippos: the first surviving example in Athens was passed in 112/1 BC. Moreover, as the honorand is a public officer, *tamias*, the kind of honour seems to have come *ex officio*. Kallippos' case must have been totally different from theirs.

The Bouleuterion also received private dedications, which seem to be related to civic offices, similar to honorific dedications of paintings. Perhaps in the Old Bouleuterion, there was a shrine (*hieron*) of Zeus Boulaios and Athena Boulaia, the gods of the council. The council members offer prayers to their shrine on entry (Antiph. 6.45).<sup>73</sup> As Pausanias' account suggests, there was also a shrine for the *xoanon* of Zeus Boulaios in the New Bouleuterion, and this must have been regarded as a sanctuary of this god (Paus. 1.3.5).<sup>74</sup> We have several sources that record Zeus Boulaios has received private dedications regarding the council members. Two inscriptions dated to the middle of the first century BC record that prytany treasurers made dedications to Zeus Boulaios and Hestia Boulaia for their tribes (*IG II<sup>3</sup> 4 117*; *IG II<sup>3</sup> 4 118*). It may be possible that Apollo was installed around the 270s BC and received dedications similarly, as the *prytanies* started to offer sacrifice to Apollo Prostaterios before a meeting of the assembly around this time.<sup>75</sup> The private dedications in the Bouleuterion were exclusively of the councillors, although evidence is scanty.<sup>76</sup> This also suggests that the dedication to the Bouleuterion is regulated and limited to those who were permitted by either *demos* or *boule*.

This section overviewed the basic information about the (New) Bouleuterion. It has been the council chamber of the Athenian council since the late fifth century BC. It was not a common place to accommodate honours, but it kept dedications from councillors, state officials, ephebes, and trainers of ephebes. These honours do not have any strong connections with Kallippos' painting as they are dated much later than Kallippos'

---

<sup>73</sup> For the cult of Zeus Boulaios and Athena Boulaia in the Bouleuterion, see Rhodes 1985: 34-5, 131-2; Parker 2005: 404. Zeus Boulaios did not play a role outside the framework of its own religious organisation. See also Mikalson 1998: 112-3, cf. 116 for Zeus Boulaios in the Hellenistic period.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Johnstone and Graff 2018: 53.

<sup>75</sup> Mikalson 1998: 112-5.

<sup>76</sup> Another dedication, Ag. 15.446, dated c. 200 AD, lists the names of the *prytanies* and *synarchon*.

painting. However, they showed the Bouleuterion was a place that accepted the honours for people associated with the management of the state at least from the second century BC.

### **3.3.5. The Painting in Context (1): The Athenian Agora**

In light of the above, let us examine the spatial context in which the painting of Kallippos was placed in order to consider its meaning. First, the meaning of paintings and honours in the Athenian Agora will be considered, followed by a discussion of the meaning of Bouleuterion in the next section.<sup>77</sup> Here, I will argue that many of the buildings that bordered the Agora showcased paintings, and the Bouleuterion needs to be understood in that context and that the painting of Kallippos became part of the sequence of the Athenian military successes by being placed among the paintings and honorific statues in the Athenian Agora.

The Athenian Agora has been used since the Classical period to represent enormous honour to the individual and the achievements of the community. However, its content, subject matter and frequency of representation varied greatly from period to period. In the fifth century BC, after the destruction of the city by Xerxes, the Agora was mainly used to represent the political identity of the city. In the north-west corner of the Agora, a statue of tyrant slayers, Harmodios and Aristogeiton, was placed to symbolise democracy and civic pride. In the Hephaisteion, whose erection began in the middle of the fifth century BC, metopes were sculpted on the theme of the deeds of Theseus, the most important hero of Athens. The Painted Stoa was erected and decorated with paintings of the Battles of Amazonomachy, Marathon and Oinoe. The custom of the buildings at the Agora accommodating paintings depicting mythical-historical Athenian victories continued into the fourth century BC: Pausanias testifies that the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios, erected at the end of the fifth century BC, placed at the northwest corner of the Agora, was decorated with a painting depicting the Battle of Mantinea in 362 BC. It also accommodates the paintings of Theseus, Demokratia and Demos, gods and heroes that symbolise Athens.<sup>78</sup> Unfortunately, it is impossible to clearly identify all of the authority and decision-making processes that determined the creation of these statues,

---

<sup>77</sup> For the Athenian honorific culture, see Henry 1983; Gauthier 1985. For the Athenian Agora and its statuescape, see Oliver 2007a; Ma 2013: 104. On the Athenian Agora, see Hölscher 1991; Hölscher 1998; Shear 2007; Camp 2010, esp. 14-21.

<sup>78</sup> Paus. 1.3.3-4, 1.15. For the Stoa Poikile, see Chapter 1.2.

buildings and paintings. However, due to the nature of the Athenian democracy, it is highly likely that architectural and dedicatory activities in the public space of the Agora required authorisation by the state. When Kimon succeeded at Eurymedon, the state is reported to have granted permission for the erection of three Herms somewhere north and west of the Agora, without mentioning particular individuals but the Athenian force.<sup>79</sup> Excessive commendation of individuals was carefully controlled in the fifth century BC, as the case of Kimon shows.

In the fourth century BC, the Athenian Agora began to accept the results of various honours, mainly given by the *demos*. During the Hellenistic period, the Agora came to be used more frequently than before as a place where statues and inscriptions made as a result of honour were erected. For much of the Hellenistic period, honours in the Agora were the preserve of the statue, most commonly granted by *boule* and *demos*. As far as our sources go, except for the tyrant slayers, the accommodation of honour in the Agora begins with Konon and Euagoras, who defeated Sparta at the Battle of Knidos in 394 BC.<sup>80</sup> This practice, which gradually became visible over the course of the fourth century BC, became a new feature of the Agora. The Agora, the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios in particular, developed as a place of commemorating military success (cf. Lycurg. 51). In the Hellenistic period, statues of Hellenistic kings and major Athenian statesmen such as Demochares, Phaidros and Demosthenes, who had done great services to the safety and the prosperity of the *polis*, were also erected in the Agora.<sup>81</sup> By the time Kallippos was honoured, the Agora was gradually filled with such honorific statues and portraits. By the second century BC, the authority that could use the space of the Agora to erect statues was limited to the *demos* and *boule*. There is only one case of an honorific statue erected in the Agora by an entity other than *demos* and *boule* by the

---

<sup>79</sup> Aesch. 3.183-5; Plut. *Cim.* 7.4-8.1.

<sup>80</sup> Paus. 1.3.2. See also Dem. 20.68-70; Isoc. 9.56-7; Nep. *Timoth.* 2.3 (with the statue of Timotheos) for honours for Konon. Isoc. 9.56, 68; RO 11 for honours for Euagoras. For the statues of Konon and Timotheos on the Athenian Akropolis, see Keesling 2017: 133-5.

<sup>81</sup> For the references: Demochares ([Plut.] *X orat.* 847d-e); Demosthenes (Paus. 1.8.2; [Plut.] *X orat.* 847d, 850f; cf. Plut. *Dem.* 30.5, 31.1-3); Phaidros (*IG II<sup>3</sup>* 1, 985). Those who walk through the nearest path to the Bouleuterion, which lies west of Agora square and extends from north to south, observe these statues with honorific statues such as those of the Tyrannicides, Solon, Kallias, Demosthenes and Lykourgos, who were more or less seen as national heroes. Paus. 1.8.2, 1.8.5, 1.16.1, cf. 1.8.4. For the importance of the northwest corner of the Agora for the statue landscape, see Shear 2017.

second century BC: the *epilektoi*, corps of elite troops, honoured Demetrios Poliorketes with an equestrian statue erected next to the statue of Demokratia at the Agora (*SEG* 25.149).<sup>82</sup> This honorific statue is to commemorate his aid in defeating Kassander, who had invaded Athens in 304 BC, and his march to the Peloponnese, which the *epilektoi* were reported to have joined. It is not sure why the *epilektoi* were allowed to erect the statue in the Agora. They may have been given permission by *demos* and *boule* as they achieved special services: they joined Demetrios' expedition to the Peloponnese and liberated the *poleis* in the northern Peloponnese.<sup>83</sup> In order to strengthen relations with Demetrios and extract benefits from him, the *demos* and *boule* may have wanted to use the special connection the *epilektoi* must have had with him for their service in his expedition. At any rate, the *demos* and *boule* were likely to have been basically the entities that were able to erect honorific statues in the Agora during this period. The real change came after the second century BC. As is observed by Graham Oliver, around this time, ephebes began to play a major role.<sup>84</sup>

Paintings had been at the Agora since at least the fifth century BC when the various events were memorialised in the decorations of the Painted Stoa (see Chapter 1.2), but examples that showed the state honouring individual citizens were rare. As mentioned earlier, according to extant inscriptions, the dedication of paintings in the Agora with the permission of the state became visible in the second half of the second century BC, and the subject of the commendation was ephebes.

On the other hand, architectural activity in the city had declined since its defeat in the Peloponnesian War. Between the 330s BC and 320s BC, when Lykourgos dominated the important part of the administration of Athens, the city improved its new civic facilities. However, in the subsequent period of Macedonian rule, there had been little new building activity in Athens until the second century BC.

Based on the above brief observations, two important points should be mentioned for our purposes.

First, in the period of Kallippos, the honours with statues and paintings in the Agora were special. Even in his time, there were not so many honours involving the erection of statues, and then there were no honorific paintings for individuals. Kallippos' painting was the result of a rather exceptional honour in this respect: his case seems to coincide

---

<sup>82</sup> For the Athenian *epilektoi*, see Tritle 1989.

<sup>83</sup> For the reconstruction of Demetrios' campaign to the Peloponnese, see Wheatley and Dunn 2020: 212-9.

<sup>84</sup> Oliver 2007a: 192-3 with 184-8, esp. 187 for the references.

with the development of the habit of honour of individuals that has progressed since the fourth century BC.

It should be also noted here that there might have been precedents to his case in Athens. In the *temenos* of Athena and Zeus in the Piraeus, there were the portraits of Leosthenes, the Athenian general in the Lamian War, and his sons. They might have been to commemorate his service in the war. There was also a portrait of Olympiodoros in Eleusis. He must have been honoured by the Eleusinians for his rescue of Eleusis sometime around 304 BC from the attack of Kassander.<sup>85</sup> The paintings for individuals were exceptional in the Agora but not unique in Athens.

Second, in this context, the importance of the paintings displayed in the Agora must be pointed out. It is true that we cannot reconstruct the 'painting-scape' of the Agora: only a few of the paintings decorated the Agora are known to us. But they offer us an impressive picture. Of particular importance is the sequence of Athenian mythical-historical battles. As we saw in Chapter 1, the history of the Greek/Athenian wars against the barbarians was represented in paintings in the Painted Stoa, followed by the installation of paintings of the Battle of Oinoe against the Spartans as a representation of the enemies of the Athenians. Following this, the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios had a painting of the Battle of Mantinea against Thebes (Paus. 1.3.4). The Athenian paintings adorning the Agora showed the Athenian military successes over barbarians and foreign enemies that could represent the Athenian superiority over the Greek world. Considering the general reaction to the Gallic invasion, the paintings of Kallippos may be placed within this sequence. In other words, the painting in honour of Kallippos may have been painted to colour a new page in the history of Athenian victories over barbarians and foreign aggressors. Athens' objective of defending Thermopylai ultimately failed. However, just as the Battle of Thermopylai in 480 BC was regarded in later times as a part of the Greek victory, it is highly likely that the withdrawal was counted as one of the overall victories in Athens to eliminate the Gauls. In this light, if this painting depicted the battle, it is unlikely to have shown triremes due to the tradition of admiring land combat (Chapter 1.2). However, it is also possible that there were paintings and representations that Pausanias did not tell us, and this point should not be discussed on the basis of the present source condition.<sup>86</sup> In any case, the above interpretation seems to explain why Kallippos received the exceptional honour of

---

<sup>85</sup> Leosthenes: Paus. 1.1.3. Olympiodoros: Paus. 1.26.3. For his career, see Gabbert 1996; Iacoviello 2021. On the date of the Macedonian attack on Eleusis, see Habicht 1979: 106-7; Habicht 1997: 75

<sup>86</sup> Pierozzi 2023: 24-5.

painting in the Agora. His painting was situated at the intersection of a focus on the individual and the representation of the mythical-history of victory in war.

### **3.3.6. The Painting in Context (2): The Bouleuterion**

As the meeting place of the Athenian council, the Bouleuterion had a symbolic meaning for the Athenians, even for the Athenian democracy. The statue of Demos in the Bouleuterion, the statue Pausanias witnessed (1.3.5), gave a clue for this. This is the personification of the Athenian people and represents Athenian democracy. Iconographically, the most important sculpture of Demos is that on the relief of the so-called anti-tyranny law (*JG II*<sup>3</sup> 1, 320).<sup>87</sup> Enacted in 337/6 BC, it was to ban citizens from holding an office after the dissolution of democracy. Demos was depicted as being crowned by a goddess, probably the personification of *Demokratia*.

Strikingly, in the Bouleuterion was a *stele*, recording a decree of Demophantos, similar to the anti-tyranny law.<sup>88</sup> According to Lykourgos, this decree, passed after the Thirty, ordains to swear an oath that “if anyone should attempt a tyranny or to betray the city or subvert the democracy, the man who saw this and killed him was free of pollution” (Lycurg. 125).<sup>89</sup> As Lykourgos says, this decree reminds the councillors of

---

<sup>87</sup> See also Lawton 1995, no. 38; Blanshard 2004 for its relief.

<sup>88</sup> Until recently, scholars had believed there was the *stele*, either in or before the Bouleuterion, that records the decree of Demophantos, the content of which is cited by Andokides’ *On the Mysteries*, 1.96-8, delivered in 400-399 BC and also partly mentioned by Lykourgos’ *Against Leocrates*, 124-7 and Demosthenes’ *Against Leptines*, 20.159. Yet, after Mirko Canevaro and Edward Harris suspected the citation in Andokides’ oration as a forgery, the orthodox view was under revision. According to them, it is very likely that two *stelai* about defending democracy, one of which contains a law placed *in front of* the *Old Bouleuterion*, and the other a decree *in the New Bouleuterion*. See Canevaro and Harris 2012: 124. Cf. Hansen 2015: 899-900; Roisman and Edwards 2019: 207-8. The one *in front of* the *Old Bouleuterion* was regarded as a law of Solon, Andokides says in his oration (1.95). It is not clear whether this law became invalid after the archonship of Euklides and whether the law of Solon was removed after the erection of this decree of Demophantos. The authenticity of the Decree of Demophantos has been doubted since Canevaro and Harris 2012. The discussion is summarised in Roisman and Edwards 2019: 205-7. For the dating, see also Gygas 2016: 190-1. The other, we will see above, is of the decree of Demophantos, passed probably after the Thirty and inscribed on a *stele* placed *in the New Bouleuterion* (Lycurg. 124).

<sup>89</sup> Translation from Roisman and Edwards 2019. Note the caution by Roisman and Edwards 2019,

how they should treat the traitors of the democracy (Lycurg. 126), namely, it shows a model of councillors. The Bouleuterion was arranged to be a space to show the councillors how to behave for their democracy. To a certain degree, these *stelai* may have been a visualised form of a curse and prayer that a herald recites at the beginning of meetings of the *boule* and *ekklisia*, which already existed before the Four Hundred.<sup>90</sup> The visibility, combined with the daily collective ritual in a meeting place, created and reaffirmed the symbolism of the Bouleuterion as a place for democracy. On the other hand, these decorations in the Bouleuterion may well be intended to be admonitions against the councillors. As the decree of Demophantos bans the citizens from holding a public office when the democracy is overthrown as the laws of Solon and of Eukrates stipulate, this must also prevent councillors from taking part in a state running in the time of non-democracy.<sup>91</sup>

The statue of Demos in the Bouleuterion is likely to have a similar function.<sup>92</sup> It may have reminded the councillors of the democracy that they served. At the same time, they may have felt that they were monitored by Demos, the personification of the Athenian *demos*, so as not to betray democracy. Dating is crucial in this context. The statue of Demos by Lyson in the Bouleuterion might be dated to the fourth century BC, in particular in the time of Lykourgos.<sup>93</sup> The Athenians created the Bouleuterion as a place

---

206 that there can be mistakes, distortions and misrepresentations in Lykourgos' quotation. Scholars, such as Sommerstein 2014: 56 and Hansen 2015: 899-900, speculate that Lykourgos added the wording of the treason to the decree, although it is more plausible that Lykourgos did not make the addition and this decree had the measure, as Harris 2013/4: 142-4 argues and approved by Roisman and Edwards 2019: 206. It might also be possible that Demosthenes and Andokides similarly do not cite the wordings of the law and the decree verbally. Even if this is the case, it is crucial for our discussion that they cite the law and the decree respectably about the protection of democracy and the *stelai* were placed in and in front of the Bouleuteria.

<sup>90</sup> For the reconstruction, see Rhodes 1985: 36-7. *Thesmophoriazusai* of Aristophanes, 295-339 and 347-51 is the best evidence for the curse and prayer. It is likely to be first produced in the City Dionysia, namely, early to mid-April, in 411 BC, so slightly before the establishment of the Four Hundred. For the dating of *Thesmophoriazusai*, see Austin and Olson 2004: xxxiii-xliv. For the other measures for the defence of democracy before the Four Hundred, see Teegarden 2013: 42-3.

<sup>91</sup> Andoc. 1.95; *IG II<sup>3</sup>* 1, 320. Note that the *stela* of the law of Eukrates was probably torn down after the Lamian War when Eukrates was sentenced to death. See Lawton 1995: 100.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. Messerschmidt 2003: 20. See also Glowacki 2003 for the iconography of Demos.

<sup>93</sup> Messerschmidt 2003: 20, cf. 209, D -T 1. For Lyson, see also Plin. *HN* 34.91. See also Palagia

to display a model for and a warning against a councillor for the preservation of Athenian democracy.<sup>94</sup>

This kind of visualisation was continuously active after the Classical period. We have evidence in this period that the Athenians erected *stelai* that recorded the honours for prytany and state officers in front of the Bouleuterion.<sup>95</sup> Our earliest example is *IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 417*, dated around 340-325 BC, which probably records that honour was given to a treasurer of the prytany of Leontis and a decree to be inscribed on a *stèle* and placed in front of the Bouleuterion. Similarly, in 282 BC, for instance, they placed in front of the Bouleuterion a *stèle* which records the honour for the prytany of Aiantis praised for their service, which was accomplished with justice and love of honour (*IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 880*). These publications aimed to create a model for the councillors and other state officials as to how to behave for their *polis* when they are in office. Part of the honorands of these decrees was probably praised according to the custom by which the councillors

---

1980: 61-2, C3; Smith 2011: 100, 149, S 15. Mikalson 1998: 112, n. 21 suggests the statue was placed in the 220s BC when the cult of Demos and the Charites was established. The fourth century BC seems to be more plausible because the Lykourgan period saw strong internal emphasis by the Athenians on the preservation of their democracy, and we have important parallels for the statue of this Demos: the relief of the law of Eukrates that depicts Demokratia crowning Demos (*IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 320*; Lawton 1995: 99-100, no. 38) and the statue of Demokratia erected in (*SEG 21.679*). Moreover, the establishment of the cult of Demos and the Charites was likely to focus on international political purposes, so the Bouleuterion may not be a suitable place. The new cult of Demos before 215 BC was a commemoration of liberation in 229/8 BC. Thereafter, the sanctuary of Demos and the Charites, placed behind the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios at the Athenian Agora, started to accommodate the honours and statues granted to the foreigners who displayed goodwill towards the Athenian *demos*. For the cult of Demos and the Charites, see Mikalson 1998: 172-8. The statue of Apollo (Paus. 1.3.5) is difficult to be dated.

<sup>94</sup> Cf. Paus. 1.3.3 where Pausanias recognises the painting of Theseus, contained in the colonnade of Stoa of Zeus, represents him as the founder of democracy.

<sup>95</sup> By 230/29 BC, we have following examples of *stelai* of inscribed decrees placed either in or in front of the Bouleuterion: *IG I<sup>3</sup> 27* (c. 450/49 BC); *IG I<sup>3</sup> 71* (425/4 BC); *IG II<sup>2</sup> 195* (before 353/2 BC); *IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 391* (c. 350-339 BC); *IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 417* (c. 340-325 BC); *Ag. 15.58* (305/4 BC); *IG II<sup>2</sup> 487 + SEG 45.96* (304/3 BC or thereafter); *IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 880* (283/2 BC); *IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 926* (c. 285-280 BC). Inside the Prytanikon/Prytaneion may be more common for the publications of the honours for the *prytanies*. Cf. Liddel 2003, 88-89. See Liddel 2003 for an overview of the places where the Athenian state decrees were published.

asked to receive their reward at the end of the year of their office.<sup>96</sup> Yet, the visibility of a *stèle* as a permanent monument must have had a more forcible effect on those who attended to the Bouleuterion for their daily work.

This visualisation must have been an important instructive function. The councillors of the 600 Boule changed every year, and no person served more than thrice in the middle of the third century BC.<sup>97</sup> Thus, visual material in and around the Bouleuterion played a key role in instructing new members on what values they need to follow, how they should behave, and what the system of the *boule* is.

The painting of the *thesmothetai* in the Bouleuterion must be interpreted in this context. The *thesmothetai* were responsible for the administration of a court. The *thesmothetai* were six men among the nine archons, instituted in the seventh century BC. They accepted charges in a variety of legal actions, especially political ones, and presided over the trials by jury, arranged by the *thesmothetai* themselves.<sup>98</sup> From 355 BC, they were responsible for checking the laws: if they found contradictory laws or redundant laws, they could arrange for a board of *nomothetai* to change the laws (Aeschin. 3.38).<sup>99</sup> Because of these duties, the *thesmothetai* seem to have had a very high authority in Athens.<sup>100</sup> As their name, law-givers, implies, they may have been seen as a symbol of the rule of law in Athens. Moreover, as they had the duty to accept the charges and manage the trials, they also had to scrutinise the magistrates (*dokimasia*). Namely, they needed to receive cases raised through *dokimasiai* and *euthynai*. As to the councillors, a newly appointed councillor had to go through scrutiny (*dokimasia*) by the current council members to determine whether he was eligible to hold office. At the end of his term, he had to pass his scrutiny (*euthyna*). In the first stage, he was required to be checked by the committee of public auditors (*logistai*) as to pecuniary corruption, and then the *euthynoi*, another committee, accepted the complaints from citizens about

---

<sup>96</sup> Dem. 22.8; Rhodes 1985: 15; Faraguna 1992: 388.

<sup>97</sup> Byrne 2009; Osborne 2012: 63. An individual could serve as a council member up to twice in the Classical period. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 62.3. Stephen Tracy suggests that this relaxation of the rule was abandoned after 229 BC. Tracy 2003: 23. But this thesis is rejected by Sean Byrne, who suggests it was permanent. Byrne 2009: 222-3.

<sup>98</sup> Harrison 1971: 11-7, 154-5; Rhodes 1981: 657.

<sup>99</sup> It is not clear whether the *thesmothetai* worked together with the *ad hoc* commissioners elected by the *demos* or they replaced the commissioners. See Canevaro 2013: esp. 139, n. 2.

<sup>100</sup> E.g. Dem. 21.32; 26.5; 57.66-69. The *thesmothetai* were sent to the Pythian games with the *theoroi* chosen from the councillors (Dem. 19.128).

his conduct during his office. If any serious problem was found during a *dokimasia* and a *euthyna*, the case was to be referred to the *thesmothetai*, and they arranged a jury court to judge the case. The painting of the *thesmothetai* in the Bouleuterion must have reminded councillors of what was going to happen if they acted badly and how they should behave during their office. This effect must have been strengthened combined with the statue of Demos standing near the painting.

The painting is dated to the late fourth century BC because the painter, Protogenes, was active in this period.<sup>101</sup> He was a famous painter and bronze sculptor born in Kaunos. His rival was Apelles, who was one of the most renowned Greek painters. It is uncertain when exactly Protogenes painted the *Thesmothetai*.<sup>102</sup> However, the most plausible date of the painting, in my opinion, is the time of Alexander the Great, especially between 332/1 and 324 BC. He must have stayed in Athens for a certain period during Alexander's campaign if Pliny's testimonia are true. According to Plin. *HN* 35.101, Protogenes painted the Propylon and, according to 35.106, Aristotle used to advise (*suadebat*) Protogenes to make a painting of Alexander because of his achievements, most likely in Athens.

This argument can be supported by the date of another painting of him. It is known that Protogenes left two paintings in Athens: *Paralos and Hammonias* and our painting, the so-called *Thesmothetai*. The former, which title after the Athenian sacred ships, is reported to have been painted in the *Pinakotheke* of the Propylaia of the Athenian Akropolis. These ships were personified in the painting, and it is speculated that *Paralos* turned out to be a mariner and the *Ammonias* (*Hammonias*) a young woman, as people mistook the painting for the subject matter for the story of *Nausicaa*.<sup>103</sup> Here, the date of the construction of the ship named *Ammonias* is important because this and the painting could be related. Athens is likely to have had two ambassadorial and sacred ships in the fifth and fourth century BC: *Paralos* and *Salaminia*. It is agreed that the latter (or the name of the latter, at least) was replaced by *Ammonias* at some point in the fourth century BC. As the name stemmed from Ammon, the replacement of *Ammonias* is traditionally dated after 332/1 BC when Alexander consulted the oracle of Ammon in the oasis at Siwah and before pseudo-Aristotle mentioned this ship ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.*

---

<sup>101</sup> Robertson 1976: 495-6.

<sup>102</sup> Cf Frazer 1898b: 70. Curtius suggests the painting was not of the *thesmothetai* but of the *nomophylakes*. According to him, the name of the latter disappeared and was remembered as the *thesmothetai* instead. See Curtius and Milchhöfer 1891: 229. This is interesting but difficult to prove.

<sup>103</sup> Frazer 1898b: 266; Plin. *NH* 35.101; Paus. 1.22.6; Cic. *Verr.* 4.60.

61.7).<sup>104</sup> Alexander seems to have been acknowledged as a son of Ammon, and so of the Greek Zeus after his visit to Siwah.<sup>105</sup> The Athenians may have tried to flatter him.<sup>106</sup> Thus, if Ammonias was built after Alexander's consultation at Siwah, and if we assume the completion of Ammonias was commemorated by the painting, it is possible that Protogenes painted Ammonias in the Propylaia at around the same time. His long stay must have been a good opportunity for the Athenians to request him to make paintings for other places and so to make the painting of the *thesmothetai*.

The circumstance may be fit for this interpretation. During the time of Alexander, perhaps due to the fear of the subversion of democracy, the Athenians put a strong emphasis on the democratic ideology. One of the most crucial instances is the enactment of the law of Euklates, the so-called anti-tyranny law, in 337/6 BC (*IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 320*). This law was very similar to the decree of Demophantos. In this law, the councillors of Areopagos are required not to act for a non-democratic regime. However, the Council of Areopagos was not the only focus. This law was inscribed on two *stelai* and placed in the *ekklesia* and at the entrance to the Areopagos as "one enters the Bouleuterion" (ll. 22-6). So, this law was aimed not just at the Council of Areopagos but also at the members of the *demos* itself and the *boule*. The members of the *boule* were also required to behave for democracy. During this period, the *boule* in the archonship of Nikokrates (333/2 BC) also dedicated a statue of Demokratia, a personified goddess, after being praised by the *demos* for its excellence and justice (*IG II<sup>3</sup> 4, 3*).<sup>107</sup> The *demos*

---

<sup>104</sup> E.g. Day and Chambers 1962: 197, n. 19; Lane Fox 1973: 224, 526. Rhodes 1981: 687-8 suggests the 350s BC and Bubelis 2010 argues 363/2 BC. For earlier scholarship, see Rhodes 1981: 688.

<sup>105</sup> Bosworth 1988: 71-4.

<sup>106</sup> Ammon was already known enough in Athens before Alexander, and so it is still possible, regardless of Alexander, that the new sacred ship was built, or the name of the Salaminia was replaced after 373 BC, at least until when the Salaminia still existed (*Xen. Hell.* 6.2.14). For the cult of Ammon in Athens in the fifth and fourth century BC, see Mikalson 1998: 37-8. However, the idea that the Athenians were indirectly honouring Alexander is more attractive and plausible. Later, the Athenians built additional sacred ships named after Demetrios Poliorketes and Antigonos Monophthalmos, whose names were also used for the newly added Athenian tribes. (Rhodes 1981: 687-8. Demetrias and Antigonis: See Philoch. *BNJ* 328 F 48; *Lexica Segueriana*, in I. Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca*, vol. I, Berlin, 267, ll. 21-2. Yet, according to Schol. ad Dem. 21. 171, the new ships were Antigonis and Ptolemis.) They must have learned how to treat their ruler in the time of Alexander and repeated a similar thing to treat Demetrios and Antigonos.

<sup>107</sup> Raubitschek 1962: 238-43; Mikalson 1998: 38.

here seems to have appreciated the *boule* for their service to democracy. Here, during the Alexander period, each Athenian was expected to serve and protect their democracy.

Therefore, as the Bouleuterion was a symbolically important place for democracy, the painting of Kallippos may have taken on a democratic connotation. In other words, the general at Thermopylai became one of the symbols of Athenian democracy. Even if he was honoured with this painting because of his service in the Chremonidean War, it is striking that he was given the status of one as if a defender of Athenian democracy.

This may fit the period when Kallippos was active, the period between 286/5-262/1 BC. It is known that the government of this period styled itself as “the democracy of all Athenians” and regarded the former regimes as “oligarchy” with sharp contrast.<sup>108</sup> After the Lamian War in 323/2 BC, Athens experienced several changes in its constitution and was subject to Macedonian rulers. After the independence from Demetrios Poliorketes in 288/7 BC, Athens supposedly returned to a democratic constitution, which they believed to be its traditional constitution. However, as the main Athenian port, Piraeus was still under the control of the garrison of the Antigonids, this new regime was still unstable. Against this background, the Athenians wanted to save their freedom and democracy, concepts now connected very closely due to the Macedonian domination,<sup>109</sup> and showed their feeling through honours given to those who are said to have been loyal to democracy. For instance, in 283/2 BC, Philippides, the poet and son of Philokles of Kephale, was honoured with a golden crown, a bronze statue, and other important grants because he “rendered accounts according to the laws and has never done anything contrary to democracy either in word or deed.”<sup>110</sup> According to pseudo-Plutarch, Demochares, who was given grants similar to those of Philippides, was praised because of his refusal to take office when the democracy was overthrown and doing nothing contrary to or to change the constitution from the democracy.<sup>111</sup> Moreover, as Antonio Iacoviello recently observes, Olympiodoros, who once served for the regime of Demetrios Poliorketes, was rehabilitated in this period as a democratic hero.<sup>112</sup> It is not surprising that Kallippos was regarded as another democratic hero if he

---

<sup>108</sup> Osborne 2012: 43; *IG* II<sup>3</sup> 1, 911, ll. 80-3. For the overview of this period, see Osborne 2012: 43-50.

<sup>109</sup> Quass 1979.

<sup>110</sup> *IG* II<sup>3</sup> 1, 877, ll. 47-50. Translation modified from Attic Inscription Online (<https://www.atticinscriptions.com/inscription/IGII31/877>) (Accessed 26 Oct 2021).

<sup>111</sup> [Plut.] *X orat.* 851f.

<sup>112</sup> Iacoviello 2021.

successfully contributed to this regime.

In sum, the painting in the Bouleuterion had the connotation that Kallippos was a defender of Athenian democracy. As we saw, the Greek victory over the Gauls left its mark on the history of the Greeks. Kallippos played a role in fighting against the Gauls at Thermopylai even though the Gauls continued on to Delphi. As Pausanias shows, even Kallippos' name and deed were remembered in the Roman period. As we discussed in the previous section, the Athenians used the Bouleuterion to honour him for his service at Thermopylai by juxtaposing his military exploit with the Athenian past victories, including those at the Persian Wars. Then, the Athenians included the service of Kallippos and the Battle of Thermopylai in the sequence of the Athenian battles against their foreign enemies.

On the other hand, the Athenians made this building into a place to increase the councillors' loyalty to democracy, and the painting of Kallippos was placed among its monuments and paintings. This suggests that the Athenians conceptualised the Gallic invasion as a threat against their regime, and Kallippos' role was seen as the protection of their democracy. This can be explained by the situation of Athens, in that the Antigonid domination of Piraeus destabilised freedom and the Athenians sought to protect their democracy and freedom after several changes to their constitutions. The non-involvement of the Athenians in defence of Delphi was probably another reason for this commemoration.

In short, the painting's presence in the Bouleuterion on the edge of the Agora allows it to perform two functions: in the bouleuterion, it is a reminder of democracy, but as part of the Agora, it belongs in the sequence of mytho-historical conflict with foreign enemies, including the Persians.

### 3.4 THE SHIELD OF KYDIAS

If so, what was the Gallic invasion for the Athenians? I have suggested above that the general at Thermopylai was remembered not only as a soldier whose achievement could be juxtaposed with the former Athenian military exploits but also as a protector of democracy. How can this observation fit another source about the Gallic invasion to be found in Athens? I will examine a shield of Kydias, that commemorated the fallen soldier at Thermopylai, in order to examine another Athenian example.

Pausanias knows another dedication related to the Gallic invasion apart from the

painting of the Kallippos: the shield of Kydias. He was an Athenian who fought courageously against the Gauls and died in the front. In order to consider the painting of Kallippos and the Athenian reception of the Gallic invasion, a comparison of the shield and the painting of Kallippos is useful. Thus, in this section, I will analyse the meaning and context of the dedication of the shield of Kydias, and argue that Kydias was juxtaposed with the Athenian memories of the struggles for Greek and Athenian freedom. Finally, after the comparisons with the commemorations of the other *poleis*, I will conclude this chapter by arguing that in Athens, the commemoration in terms of the Gallic invasion was not active but inherited the traditional commemorative ways of the struggle for freedom that started from the victories against the Persians.

In Book 10, Pausanias narrates the Gallic invasion in detail because this book treats Delphi where the Greeks achieved a great victory. Within the context, Pausanias briefly introduces the Battle of Thermopylai that had preceded the attack on Delphi. According to him, on the first day of the battle of Thermopylai, the Athenian force fought most courageously among the Greeks:<sup>113</sup>

On this day, the Attic contingent surpassed the other Greeks in courage. Of the Athenians themselves the bravest was Kydias, a young man who had never before been in battle. He was killed by the Gauls, but his relatives dedicated his shield to Zeus Eleutherios, and the inscription ran:

Here hang I, yearning for the still youthful bloom of Kydias,  
The shield of a glorious man, an offering to Zeus.  
I was the very first through which at this battle he thrust his left arm,  
When the battle raged furiously against the Gaul.

This inscription remained until Sulla and his army took away, among other Athenian treasures, the shields in the porch of Zeus Eleutherios.

In this way, Pausanias tells the story of the shield of Kydias.

The shield was dedicated in a symbolic place, the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios. This Stoa was built in the last third of the fifth century BC at the northeastern corner of the Athenian Agora. Zeus Eleutherios was the god as a liberator from foreign oppression. The Greeks famously dedicated a sacrifice to this god after the Battle of Plataia (Thuc.

---

<sup>113</sup> Paus. 10.21.5-6. Translation modified from Loeb.

2.71.2). It is considered the cult of Zeus Eleutherios was motivated by the victory against the Persians.<sup>114</sup> In front of the Stoa, the statue of Zeus Eleutherios was erected in the early fourth century BC.<sup>115</sup> Around the Stoa, there were statues and *stelai* which related to the freedom of Athens. Konon (and his son Timotheos) and Euagoras, king of Cyprus, regarded by the Athenians as saviours and bringers of freedom, were granted by the *demos* with the statues in front of the Stoa for their victory at the Battle of Knidos.<sup>116</sup> Similarly, the decree of the invitation to the Second Athenian League and the re-honorific decree for Euphron of Sikyon were erected in front of the Stoa. The former was associated with Zeus Eleutherios because the league guaranteed the freedom of the member *poleis* (RO 22. 378/7 BC). The latter was to celebrate the revival of the freedom and democracy of Athens from the Antipater's oligarchy (318/7 BC).<sup>117</sup> Finally, the shield of Leokritos, with his name and deed inscribed, was dedicated to the Stoa by the Athenians in order to honour him (Paus. 1.26.1-2, cf. 1.29.13). He fought against the Macedonian garrison with Olympiodoros and captured the Musaeum in the revolt against the Macedonians in 288/7 BC, so he fought for freedom and democracy.<sup>118</sup> The Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios was a traditional and symbolic place for the freedom of Athens, and the contributors of these concepts were honoured by the statues and decrees erected around this Stoa.<sup>119</sup>

Therefore, the shield of Kydias may represent a sentiment similar to that of the painting of Kallippos. In this case, the fight against the Gauls was conceptualised in this dedication as one for the freedom and democracy of Athens. Moreover, the shield was also placed in an Athenian tradition of these concepts, which started from the Persian Wars. Thus, the shield was inserted into the long tradition of the struggle for freedom in Athens. The importance of this conceptualisation could be elaborated further. Since the decree in honour of Euphron of Sikyon, the Stoa of Zeus accumulated monuments

---

<sup>114</sup> Raaflaub 2004: 106-8.

<sup>115</sup> Parker 1996: 157, 238-41.

<sup>116</sup> Paus. 1.3.2. See also Dem. 20. 68-70; Isoc. 9.57 for Konon and Euagoras. Cf. Thompson and Wycherley 1972: 101; Keesling 2017: 27.

<sup>117</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 448, ll. 35-88. This decree was a renewed edition of the decree of 323/2 BC, now *IG II<sup>3</sup>* 1, 378 and 377. Oliver 2003 speculates the original decree was also erected in front of the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios. Yet, Lambert does not adopt that opinion in *IG II<sup>3</sup>* 1, 378.

<sup>118</sup> For the reconstruction of the revolt, see Osborne 2012: 36-43.

<sup>119</sup> Moreover, inside the colonnade of the Stoa of Zeus, there were paintings which represent Theseus as the founder of democracy and the Battle of Mantinea. See Paus. 1.3.3.

which related to the struggle against Macedon. Thus, the Stoa has been transformed from a place in which the victories of the Persian Wars were commemorated into a place of the history of the resistance against the Macedonians, namely the history of the attempts to protect the freedom of Athens. Placed among these monuments, Kydias must have become a hero of the *polis* protection.<sup>120</sup> The Stoa of Zeus does not seem to have been a common place to accommodate a dedication. So, although the dedicants were his relatives (οἱ προσήκοντες) and so it was a private dedication, it is likely that the dedicants were publicly allowed to place Kydias' shield in the Stoa.<sup>121</sup> This means Kydias' shield reflected a public conception of his achievement. As is the case of Leokritos, it is possible that Kydias was also honoured by the Athenians, but this memory had changed until the time of Pausanias.

However, at the same time, it is remarkable that the connection between freedom and democracy started to strengthen around the Lamian War in 323 BC. About ten years after the war against the Gauls, Athens also decided to wage war against Antigonos Gonatas, who controlled Piraeus at this time. In the Decree of Chremonides, by which the Athenians made an alliance with the Lacedaemonians and their allies, the struggle against Antigonid Macedon is recognised as the war for the common freedom of the Greeks, just like Athens, Sparta, and their allies in the time of the Persian Wars, which brought freedom to Greece. Thus, this war is considered the 'new' Persian Wars. The initiators of this anti-Macedonian struggle utilised Plataia in order to put an emphasis on this cause of freedom. Glaukon, a brother of Chremonides who proposed the Decree above, was honoured for his expense Zeus Eleutherios, the Homonoia of the Greeks, and the Eleutheria games in the time of the Chremonidean War.<sup>122</sup> He, as a *philos* of Ptolemy who helped the Athens-Sparta alliance, supported the ideology of the anti-

---

<sup>120</sup> Zeus Eleutherios in Athens was equated with Zeus Soter since the fourth century BC. Moreover, it is believed the cult centre of Zeus Soter was moved to the Stoa of Zeus after the liberation from Demetrios Poliorketes in 288/7 BC. See Mikalson 1998: 110-3. So, it might be possible that Kydias was recognised as the one who died for the deliverance of Greece, similar to the other commemorations in the Greek world for the fights against the Gauls. Even if this is the case, it is notable that Kydias was juxtaposed with the heroes of the Athenians in their struggles for freedom.

<sup>121</sup> Kydias' son, Kybernis, was known as the proposer of *IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1005*, the decree in which the Athenians recognise the Aitolians' reorganised Soteria festival. He was awarded *proxenia* by Delphi (*FD III 2, 159*). Kydias' family here pushed the Athenian remembrance of the Gallic invasion with a certain connection with the 'centre' of the memory of the Gallic invasion.

<sup>122</sup> Étienne and Piérart 1975.

Macedonian war. Here, the Chremonidean War, with shields of Leocritos and Kydias dedicated in the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios, represents the continuous interests of the Athenians in their freedom and Zeus Eleutherios in the period between 288/7 BC and the war.

As we have seen, the Greek-barbarian dichotomy was one of the most prominent ways of considering the conflict against the Gauls. The decree from Kos is the earliest example of this. Kallimachos, in his *Hymne to Delos*, represents the Gauls who invaded Greece as sons of the Titans.<sup>123</sup> This dichotomy specifically refers to the Persian Wars. Pausanias' narrative framework by which Xerxes' invasion was paralleled with the Gallic invasion may reflect a contemporary narrative. Similarly, a court poet in Ptolemaic Egypt composed an elegy in the third century BC in which the Galatians are paralleled with the Achaemenids. They once served in Ptolemy's armies as mercenary soldiers but rose up against Ptolemy.<sup>124</sup> Athens was an important reference in this dichotomy. Chapter 3.2 in this chapter showed the Aitolians' publicising of their contribution to the expulsion of the Gauls from Delphi. The Attalids erected a statue group of the Greek-barbarian wars on the Athenian Akropolis. In the group, statues represented the Gigantomachy, the Amazonomachy, the Battle of Marathon and the Attalid war against the Gauls.<sup>125</sup> The achievements of the Athenians thus were the past with which the Aitolians and Attalos wanted to parallel their victory against the Gauls. It is a symbol that the past of the Athenians became a canon of the Greek world, a canon which could be used for political purposes. Making a parallel with Athens may have stemmed from the fact that neither the ancestors of the Aitolians nor Attalos took part in the Persian Wars.

On the other hand, Athens had its own tradition of the fights for freedom of both the Greeks and of Athens itself. This gave a context to commemorate their fight against the Gauls, specifically their commander Kallippos and their fallen soldier, Kydias. Their commemoration seems to be more internally oriented compared with the commemorations of the other parties. It may be explained by the fact that the Athenians did not take part in defence of Delphi. As the Aitolians dominated the claim of credit for the defence role of Delphi, and the Athenians did not succeed in defending Thermopylai, it may be slightly difficult to publicise their role against the Gallic invasion on the international scene. This could explain the smallness of the numbers of the Athenian

---

<sup>123</sup> Callim. *Hymn* 4, 171-90.

<sup>124</sup> *SH* 958 with Barbantani 2001; Barbantani 2002; Barbantani 2007.

<sup>125</sup> Paus. 1.25.2; Stewart 2004.

commemorations for their Gallic invasion,<sup>126</sup> although this speculation is *ex silentio*. In addition to this, the situation in Athens prevented it from publicising its contribution. Athens suffered the domination of part of the Attic territory by Antigonid Macedon. Its primary concern was to protect democracy and freedom by expelling the Macedonians from Attica. This situation is suggested in the painting of Kallippos in which this prominent Athenian was presented as a democratic hero.

### 3.5. CONCLUSION

The Gauls were the new barbarians that could be a replacement of the Persians, old and traditional barbarians who no longer existed. The Greeks and the Macedonians used the victories against the Gauls to propagate their contribution to the protection of the Greek civilisation. Even those who did not participate in the Persian Wars, such as the Aitolians, could make a parallel between the Persians and the Gauls. It can be said that the appearance of the new barbarians gave them a new method of utilising the Persian Wars past to promote their own reputation. However, its use was changeable depending on the agents and their situation. The Athenian case of the Gallic invasion shows this.

As we have seen in Section 2, the Aitolians promoted themselves by exploiting the image created by the Athenians to commemorate the Persian Wars after defending Delphi from the hands of the Gauls in 279/8 BC. The use of Persian Wars imagery to create a self-representation as protector of the Greek civilisation was common, and Hellenistic kings such as Antigonos Gonatas, Ptolemy II and Attalos I similarly utilised Persian Wars imagery.

However, as discussed in Section 3, Athens, the most important shaper of memories of the Persian Wars, did not necessarily make full use of the Persian War imagery to commemorate the war against the Gauls. Athens positioned the memory of Thermopylai in its own past through Kallippos and Kydias. It did not directly draw parallels with the Persian Wars or the Gigantomachy but placed the Gallic invasion as part of Athens' past. The memory of the battle against the Gauls in Athens was also associated with its desire for democracy and freedom. This may be related to the fact that Athens was then threatened by Antigonos Gonatas, and its citizens were exposed to the demand to preserve their own freedom and democracy.

---

<sup>126</sup> Cf. Nachtergaele 1977: 191-2.

Athens did not stop using its own history to portray its victory over the Gauls. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Athenians made active use of memories of the Persian Wars when honouring Antigonos Gonatas. Also, when Attalos erected a group of statues of Gigantomachy, Amazonomachy, Marathonomachy and Galatomachy on the Akropolis, the Athenians accepted it and allowed Marathon to be used as the commemorative tool.<sup>127</sup>

This may reflect Athens' position in its victory over the Gauls. Memories of the war against the Gauls were dominated by the Delphic-centred view, which was formed mainly by the Aitolians. Athens, on the other hand, fought well at Thermopylai but failed to defend it, and had little involvement in the Delphic defence. While the 'new barbarians', the Gauls, were added to the self-justifying vocabulary of the Aitolian and Hellenistic kings, Athens may have found it difficult to create such a commemoration. Now the 'traditional' position of Athens as a leader in the war against the 'barbarians' was upset. A different response to the victory over the Gauls may have emerged in Athens in terms of the protection of Athens' past glory: the victory against the Gauls never became equal to the Athenian credit for the Greek victory in the Persian Wars. In this context, the Decree of Chremonides might have been one way of the Athenian attempt to protect and reassertion of their glorious past that guaranteed their cultural and military superiority over the Greek World.

---

<sup>127</sup> William Furley and Jan Bremer suggest that two Athenian peans, dated to the second century BC and dedicated to Apollo, imply the parallel between the Gallic invasion and the Battle of Plataia. Furley and Bremer 2001a: 84-100; Furley and Bremer 2001b: 129-38; Nelson 2022: 104. Yet, as they admit, there are not any mentions of the Persian Wars.

## Contested Memories of the Battle of Plataia

### Discourses, Rituals and Monuments

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will focus on the development of memories and rituals concerning the Battle of Plataia and their relationship with the space of Plataia. This battle was the ultimate triumph for the expulsion of Xerxes' armies. Probably around 335 BC, the Greeks founded the Eleutheria, *penteteric* Panhellenic games that took place at Plataia in honour of Zeus Eleutherios.<sup>1</sup> The festival commemorated the Battle of Plataia and those Greeks who fell in it. The *koinon* of the Greeks was created to have responsibility for the organisation of the cult activities of the festival. Plataia also accommodated the cult of Zeus Eleutherios and Homonoia of the Greeks, the deities of the crucial concepts of the Greek victory against the Persians and therefore, the place itself may have represented the Greek victory against Xerxes. Therefore, it is reasonable that scholars agree that this is the place where Greek history saw the first establishment of a collective memory of the Persian invasion at a Panhellenic level. Yet, this interpretation runs the risk of simplifying the meaning of the new cult activities by placing too emphasis on the difference between the Classical period to the Hellenistic period. As each *polis* had its own memorialisation of the Battle in the Classical period, there must be a selection of memories in order to build up the 'official' memory that the activities included in a festival carry. The reconciliation of multiple memories is inevitably a political process in which some memories could be looked down upon or even ignored.

---

<sup>1</sup> For the date, see Wallace 2011b: 148-57.

The anchoring of the official memory is also needed through the monuments and rituals.

In this context, it is important to note that the Battle of Plataia was once regarded as the victory of Sparta and its commander, Pausanias. The victory at Plataia boosted Spartan pride, and they could claim that they saved Greece because of this victory. However, at the same time, the Athenian influence on the Eleutheria is sometimes pointed out. Glaukon, an Athenian politician and a *philos* of Ptolemy II, embellished the sanctuary and the procession for Zeus Eleutherios, probably to support their cause of the fight against Antigonos Gonatas in the Chremonidean War.<sup>2</sup> In 61/2 AD, Tiberius Claudius Novius, an Athenian nobleman, became “high priest of Nero Claudius Caesar Germanicus and Zeus Eleutherios of the Greeks” at Plataia (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1990, ll. 3-6). How could the Athenians place their memory in the cult of the Eleutheria and the space of their city? Finally, what was the role of the locals at Plataia?

This chapter will shed light on the complexity and multiplicity of memories of the Battle of Plataia. The central argument of this chapter is that the Eleutheria festival selected and anchored not only the memory of the Greek cooperation under Athens and Sparta but also the memory of the fifth century BC. This chapter also contends that the establishment of the Eleutheria was likely to change the Plataian landscape in the sense that the Plataian local memory was anchored inside the city wall while the Panhellenic monuments were placed outside the city wall. These phenomena can be considered to have manifested themselves after 335 BC when Plataia was rebuilt. In Section 1, I will focus on the memorialisation of the Battle of Plataia in four dimensions, i.e. memories of three *poleis*, Athens, Sparta, and Plataia and of the Panhellenic level. Then, Section 2 will investigate the function of the Eleutheria by focusing on the meaning of the *dialogos*, a ritual for the Eleutheria, that was a ceremonial dispute between Athens and Sparta to decide which would lead the procession of the Eleutheria. Finally, Section 3 will discuss the local Plataian memory of the Battle of Plataia and the cult of Zeus Eleutherios as well as how it was reflected in the space of Plataia.

Festivals organised by several communities would integrate them by forming and renewing a sense of their collective identity through experiences in extraordinary time and space. However, the sense of community fostered through festivals does not dissolve the differences between people within a community or the collective identity of each community. Thus, festivals of this kind could create the multilayered identity of the participants. The Eleutheria examined in this chapter, as a Panhellenic festival organised by the *koinon* of the Greeks, is a clear example of this kind and a cultural

---

<sup>2</sup> For the decree for Glaukon, Spyropoulos 1973b: 375-9; Étienne and Piérart 1975.

device that gives participants a multilayered identity. The task of this chapter is to scrutinise memories conveyed by the Eleutheria festival and the individual memories of the Battle of Plataia held at a *polis* level.

## 4.2. WHOSE VICTORY?

### 4.2.1. Introduction

Basically, the Battle of Plataia is believed to be the Spartan victory because Herodotos, our main source for the Persian Wars, says so. However, this seems to be only one of several ways in which the battle was conceived. In his *Menexenos*, Plato offers a different interpretation, according to which Plataia was a joint victory of Athens and Sparta. There has been no scholarly attempt to clarify the discourses about who claimed credit for the victory at Plataia and to trace their changes. This section will cover three categories: Sparta, Athens and the Panhellenic level. There might be other claimants, yet we do not have any sources for them except the Plataians, whom we will treat in Chapter 4.4. This section will then contend that the Athenians started to compete with the Spartans to claim credit for the victory at Plataia from around the end of the fifth century BC onwards within the overall framework of the victory of collective Greek unity.

### 4.2.2. The Spartan Victory

From the beginning, Sparta was seen to have played the most crucial role in the Battle of Plataia as the *polis* in command and as defeating the Persians on the battlefield. This view was formed and accepted soon after the battle.<sup>3</sup> Simonides' Plataian elegy centres

---

<sup>3</sup> In addition to the Spartan role on the battlefield, the number of soldiers the Spartans offered to the battle must have contributed to the creation of the Spartan achievement. As Sparta held the supreme authority over the Greek allies, it sent Pausanias as a commander to the battle (Hdt. 9.10). According to Herodotos, Sparta dispatched the most soldiers among the Greek force. There were 10,000 Spartan hoplites. The second-largest was Athens, which sent 8,000 hoplites, and the third was Korinth, 5,000 hoplites. There were 34,500 non-Greek light-armed soldiers which is less than 35,000 helots who were to accompany 5,000 Spartan hoplites. As Green argues, at least the number of

on the leadership of the Spartans in the comparison between the Battle of Plataia and the Trojan War.<sup>4</sup> More striking is Aeschylus' *Persai*, which also testifies that the Battle of Plataia was won by "the Dorian spear" (Δωρίδος λόγχης) (Aes. *Per.* 813-7).<sup>5</sup> The Athenian perspective can be compatible with the Spartan achievement in this Athenocentric play. Herodotos offers the most detailed account of the battle where Pausanias "won the most glorious victories of all which we know" (Hdt. 9.64.1) and was given "ten of everything" (πάντα δέκα) (Hdt. 9.81.2).<sup>6</sup> He also mentions "the Lakedaimonians outdid all in valour" (ὑπερεβάλλοντο ἀρετῇ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) because they defeated the best part of the enemies (Hdt. 9.71.1-2).<sup>7</sup> According to him, the Spartans defeated the Persians and killed Mardonios. It is not certain how they were selected since Herodotos does not mention this, unlike his description of the vote after the Battle of Salamis (Hdt. 8.123). In addition, as it is unlikely that there was no vote on the *aristeia* of a *polis* and an individual for the Plataian victory and that Herodotos did not know this, he may have intently omitted the account for somewhat reason.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, at 9.71.3-4, Herodotos says that there was a discussion about who the best individual fighters were and that three Spartan war dead received honour.<sup>9</sup> At any rate, This

---

hoplites "carries instant conviction." Hdt. 9.28.2-29.1 and Green 2006: 86-7, n. 124. Green also estimates the total force of the Greeks as more than 50,000. Diodoros (11.30.1) does not offer the number of Spartan soldiers but reports that about 100,000 Greeks gathered at Plataia. This number is obviously an exaggeration. Ktesias (F13.28), on the other hand, is likely to have confused the number of the Spartan soldiers at Plataia with those at Thermopylai. Although the total number of the Greek force must have been exaggerated, important is the fact that the Spartans were the largest in the Greek force. This must have contributed to creating the conception that Sparta offers the best service.

<sup>4</sup> I briefly discuss this elegy in Chapter 1.2 with bibliography.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Broadhead 1960: 204; Garvie 2009: 314. As they argue, this expression neither means an Athenian contempt against the Spartans nor "Greek" instead of "Dorian." See also Pind. *Pyth.* 1.75-78, cf. Proietti 2015: 49-50; Proietti 2021: 128-31.

<sup>6</sup> See also Hdt. 9.71.1, cf. ML 27. For the gifts for Pausanias, see Pritchett 1974: 54-5; Pritchett 1991: 398-9; Hamel 1998: 49, n. 25. *Contra* Macan 1908: 765. See also Macan 1908: 745 for the *aristeia* for the soldiers in the Battle of Plataia listed in Hdt. 9.71.

<sup>7</sup> See Flower and Marincola 2002: 219-20 on Hdt. 9.64.1. Cf. Hdt. 9.78.1-2.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Macan 1908: 745-6. Although Herodotos sometimes offers a pro-Athenian view, he is not an anti-Spartan propagandist. See remarks in Tigerstedt 1965: 103.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Aristodemos, *BNJ* 104 F 1, 2.5.

conception of the Battle of Plataia seems to have continued in antiquity. According to Diodoros, the Greeks gave the *aristeia* to Sparta as a *polis* and Pausanias as an individual, by the proposal of Aristeides (Diod. Sic. 11.33.1).<sup>10</sup> Josephos has Agrippa II mention in his speech, claiming his people who became enraged at Gessius Florus, the Roman procurator of Judaea, that Salamis was the Athenian victory whereas Thermopylai and Plataia were the Spartan ones (Joseph. *BJ* 2.358-9).<sup>11</sup>

The Spartan victory is sometimes represented through Pausanias as the commander.<sup>12</sup> He has been regarded as the person who brought the victory at Plataia and so a great figure in the history of the Greeks who brought freedom to the Greeks.<sup>13</sup> He is compared to the other heroes of the Persian Wars, such as Themistokles, Miltiades, and even Achilles, and a discussion of who was the best recurred again and again in historiography, oratorical performance, table talk and so on.<sup>14</sup> He himself claimed credit for the Greek victory by inscribing an epigram on the tripod dedication at Delphi, an epigram which Thucydides reports and was erased by the Spartans.<sup>15</sup>

There are two problems we face when considering the role of the Spartans in the battle: the first is that they left very few written sources. The sources I mentioned (as well as in the notes) show that, if we dismiss the inscriptions of the Serpent Column, we do not have the sources that transmit the Spartans' own claim as to the Battle of Plataia. Nevertheless, there are two traces of the Spartan claim to their credit for the victory at

---

<sup>10</sup> Note that Aristeides does not appear here in the manuscripts, yet the emendation by Levi Post, referring to Plut. *Arist.* 20.1, is now accepted. He emended Ἀριστείδου κελεύσαντος for χαριτίδου κελεύσαντες. E.g. Oldfather 1946: 210; Haillet 2001: 46; Green 2006: 90.

<sup>11</sup> See also Vitruvius. *De arch.* 1.1.6.

<sup>12</sup> Those who served for the Spartan force also claim credit for the victory. According to Herodotos, Teisamenos, the Elean, claimed to have helped the Spartans to win the Battle of Plataia. Here, he was thought of as another important contributor to the Spartan victory. Hdt. 9.35.1; Flower and Marincola 2002: 171. For Teisamenos, see Hdt. 9.33-6, cf. Flower and Marincola 2002: 164-5.

<sup>13</sup> E.g. Ampelius, *Liber Memorialis* 14.1; Ath. 536a = Nymphis, *BNJ* 432 F9; Ktesias, *FGrH* 688 F13.28; Nep. *Paus.* 1, cf. Ael. *VH* 3.47; Paus. 8.52.2; Plut. *Agis* 3.4; Plut. *Arist.* 23.6; Plut. *Arist.-Cat. Mai.* 2.1; Thuc. 1.130.1. Thucydides has a Plataian say that Pausanias freed Greece at Plataia (Thuc. 2.71.2, cf. 1.130). Simon. fr. 11 + 13 W<sup>2</sup> with Sider 2021: 254-7 for the comparison between Pausanias and Achilles.

<sup>14</sup> E.g. Aristid. *Or.* 3.195-200, 259-60; Diod. Sic. 11.23; Kohl 1915, no. 65, 67, Timocreon *PMG* 727 = Plut. *Them.* 21.4; Plut. *Cim.-Luc.* 3.3-4, cf. Cic. *Off.* 1.75-6; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 56.6.

<sup>15</sup> Thuc. 1.132.2-3; [Dem.] 59.96-8; Plut. *Mor.* 873c-d.

Plataia: first is their participation in the ceremony of the *dialogos*. This was a *penteteric* ceremonial dispute between Athens and Sparta about which of them would lead the festival procession of the Eleutheria. This *dialogos* was likely to have been established in the second century BC and continued into the second century AD. This may somewhat reflect Sparta's own perceptions that they could claim credit for the Plataian victory, but it was a result of compromise and negotiation with Athens and other Greeks who organised the festival. We will discuss this in detail in Chapter 4.3. Second is the monumental landscape of Sparta. In the second century AD, Pausanias, the travel writer, witnessed the tomb (μνημῆα) of Pausanias, the general of the Battle of Plataia, next to that of Leonidas, near a theatre outside the Spartan Agora, where the Spartans gave a speech every year for Pausanias and Leonidas and held a contest for the Spartans only (Paus. 3.14.1).<sup>16</sup> It is not known when this festival, which was called the Leonideia, started, nor are its foundation date and its exact location certain because the remains have not been found. Immediately after the Persian Wars, Pausanias was charged with tyrannical behaviour and conspiracy with Persia. He fell out of favour even in Sparta and was punished. He was rehabilitated after this incident, but it is not known when this occurred.<sup>17</sup> Probably at least by the Augustan period, when the commemorations of the Persian Wars became of importance for Roman ideology, Pausanias was rehabilitated to be among the heroes of the *polis* and his cult was combined with that of Leonidas.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup> Cf. West 1965: 119-20; Spawforth 2012: 124-5. This tomb was said to be first founded somewhere near Kaiadas, the precinct of Athena Chalkioikos in Sparta, but later was moved to the entrance of the precinct with a pillar which had an inscription due to the Delphic oracle around 432 BC (Diod. Sic. 11.45.7-8; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 8.51.1; Thuc. 1.134.4). As this sanctuary is placed on the Akropolis of Sparta, either the tomb was on the Akropolis or the precinct included the area around the theatre. For the former, see Woodward 1923-1925, 263-4, and for the latter, see Bulle 1937: 27-33. Cf. Gengler 2011: 152-3. It may still be possible the tomb was moved again at some point before the second century AD for the sake of the reorganisation of the festivals or in order to be lined up with the tomb of Leonidas, whose bones are said to have been brought back by Pausanias from Thermopylai (Paus. 3.14.1).

<sup>17</sup> It is not certain when Pausanias was rehabilitated in Sparta. Macgregor Morris 2022: 124. The coronation of his son, Pleistoanax, might have offered an opportunity for rehabilitation. Cf. Nafissi 2004: 172-3.

<sup>18</sup> For the Leonideia, Paus. 3.14.6; *IG V 1*, 19, 658, cf. *IG V 1*, 660: Cartledge and Spawforth 2002: 178; Spawforth 2012: 124-9. The festival experienced reorganisation in the Trajan period. On this, see also Jolowicz 2023: 127-8.

Plataia-Thermopylai juxtaposition, by lining Pausanias with Leonidas, the hero of Thermopylai, formed a core of the Spartan patriotism here. The Persian Stoa, built at the Spartan Agora, allegedly with the booty of the Battle of Plataia, must have contributed to this image.<sup>19</sup>

The other problem is that the Spartan achievement may have been undermined because of two incidents: Pausanias' medism and the destruction of Plataia in 427 BC. Pausanias' alleged medism and punishment in 477 BC damaged not only his reputation but also the Spartan hegemony over Greece. Herodotos believes that the Athenians took the command away from the Spartans on the pretext of Pausanias' *hybris* (Hdt. 8.3.2). Thucydides also says that, because of Pausanias' tyrannical attitude, the allies deserted him and aligned themselves by the side of the Athenians. (Thuc. 1.94-5.1-4).<sup>20</sup> Although the Greeks still regarded him as a symbol of Greek freedom, some later authors, such as Pausanias, the travel writer, believed that his medism and *hybris* nullified his achievement at Plataia.<sup>21</sup> In terms of the Plataian destruction, Isokrates cites this incident as proof of the cruelty and the harshness (τῆς ὀμότητος καὶ χαλεπότητος) of the Spartans who committed wrongdoings against the benefactors of the Greeks (Isoc. 12.90-4).<sup>22</sup> Denigration of achievement was not uncommon, as we have seen in Chapter 1.3.1. It is also known, for instance, that Theopompos claimed that the Athenians exaggerated their victory at Marathon (Theopomp. *BNJ* 115 F 153).<sup>23</sup> By Pausanias' *hybris* and the destruction of Plataia, anti-Spartan parties or *poleis* acquired a cause to deprive the Spartans of their valour at Plataia.<sup>24</sup>

### 4.2.3. The Athenian Victory

On the other hand, the Athenian view on the Battle of Plataia is more complex than it

---

<sup>19</sup> Paus. 3.11.3; Vitruvius *De arch.* 1.1.6, cf. Dio Chrys. *Or.* 47.17; West 1965: 117-8; Gauer 1968: 102-3.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Nepos *Arist.* 3.2; Plutarch *Arist.* 23.6-7.

<sup>21</sup> Paus. 8.52.2, cf. Aelian *VH* 3.47. Thucydides recalls in the Plataian oration that Pausanias is believed to have sacrificed to Zeus Eleutherios in 479 after the Battle of Plataia (Thuc. 2.71.2; 3.58.5). There are two lines of tradition in the episodes of Pausanias' medism. See Lazenby 1975; Evans 1988.

<sup>22</sup> As an advocator of Athens, Isokrates delivers speeches full of an anti-Spartan and Athenocentric view. See Marincola 2007a: 107, n.7. Isokrates also ignores the Battle of Plataia. See Isoc. 5.147-8.

<sup>23</sup> Marincola 2007a: 108-22.

<sup>24</sup> The counterargument against this kind of criticism may be that the Spartans attributed the responsibility for the destruction to the Thebans. Aristid. *Or.* 13.32, cf. Isoc. 12.93, 14.62.

seems. In the Athenian discourse as to the Battle of Plataia, the acceptance of the Spartan achievement is observable.<sup>25</sup> As we have seen above, the Athenians seem to have admitted Plataia was the Spartan victory (Aes. *Per.* 813-7). The speech of the Athenians at the Spartan assembly in Thucydides' Book 1, delivered before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, offers the Athenian justification of their empire (cf. Chapter 1.3.1). There, the Battle of Plataia is omitted, most probably because Marathon and Salamis can maximise their uniqueness in the protection of mainland Greece and because they need to mention Sparta, their enemy at that time if referring to Plataia (Thuc. 1.72-8). Herodotos reports that the Athenians and the Tegeans fought well in the battle, but the best was the Spartans (9.71.1-2). However, the Athenian role in fighting with the medising Greeks might have been conceived as a less glorious and somewhat 'unpleasant' task.<sup>26</sup>

Yet, it does not mean Plataia was a taboo. Rather, the Athenians appeared to be taking a different approach. In the funeral oration of Lysias, possibly written around the end of the 390s BC, it is reported that the Spartans and the Tegeans defeated the barbarians while the Athenians and the Plataians defeated the Greeks who had submitted to slavery.<sup>27</sup> Here, Plataia became a joint victory of these four *poleis*. Plataia's role is added to the three cities reported by Herodotos to have shown their courage on the battlefield (Hdt. 9.71.1 with 9.31.5).<sup>28</sup> The emphasis on the Plataians seems to display the Athenian sentiment about the Plataians, who had been living in Athens since the destruction of their city in 427 BC. By mentioning the Athenian achievement in the Battle of Plataia, Lysias completes his teleological interpretation of the Persian Wars. This was the day of the Battle of Plataia when the Athenians made the Greeks recognise their valour, which was proved in the sea and land battles where they fought either alone or with others, valour that enabled them to be the leader of Greece (Lys. 2.46-7). Thus, the Athenians came into a position superior to Sparta, to which the Plataian victory contributed.

Plato's *Menexenos*, most likely written in the mid or late 380s BC, offers a slightly

---

<sup>25</sup> For Plataia in the attic orations, see Nouhaud 1982: 162-4.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Marincola 2016: 115.

<sup>27</sup> Lys. 2.44-7. For the date of this speech, see Todd 2000: 26-7. His account is probably based on the account of Herodotos. Cf. Hdt. 9.31.

<sup>28</sup> According to Herodotos, the Athenians formed a battle line with the Plataians, Megarians, Boiotians, Lokrians, Malians, Thessalians, and those who came from Phokis.

different view on this interpretation.<sup>29</sup> According to this, the exploit at Plataia is the common achievement of the Spartans and the Athenians (κοινὸν ἤδη τοῦτο [sc. τὸ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς ἔργον] Λακεδαιμονίων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων), the achievement that brought salvation to Greece (Pl. *Menex.* 241c-d).<sup>30</sup> A similar juxtaposition can be seen in one of the so-called “falsche Urkunden” of the fourth century BC.<sup>31</sup> The Athenians, Spartans, and Plataians are foregrounded in the “Oath of Plataia”, inscribed on a *stele* found in the deme of Acharnai, most likely erected in the middle of the fourth century BC (RO 88, ll. 33-6).<sup>32</sup> By around the beginning of the fourth century BC, an interpretation that the Battle of Plataia was the joint victory of Athens and Sparta in Athens started to be circulated.

This perspective went beyond Athens. Diodoros’ version of the Battle of Plataia emphasises the unity of the Greeks and the equal roles of Sparta and Athens in the battle.<sup>33</sup> But at the same time, his narrative illuminates the tension and reconciliation of Athens and Sparta much more than Herodotos does. Accordingly, the role of Aristeides is foregrounded as the Athenian commander of Plataia (Diod. Sic. 11.29-32). In Diodoros’ account, after Salamis, Sparta fell out with Athens and awarded the prize of valour to Aigina purely in order to humiliate the Athenians (Diod. Sic. 11.27.2-3). Later, Sparta with the other allies and Athens gathered at the Isthmos, not in Eleusis as is reported in Herodotos (Hdt. 9.19), and concord between them is established in order to face the Persians in the plain of Plataia. Yet, again, the Athenians and Spartans started to compete with each other for the leading position of the Greeks (ἡμιλλῶντο ... πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡγούμενοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι) in the battlefield (Diod. Sic. 11.32.4). This might offer a pre-condition for their rivalry after the Persian Wars and was probably transformed into the proto-story of the *dialogos*. In the course of the narrative, Aristeides is referred to as saving the Megarians and leading the soldiers

---

<sup>29</sup> For the dating of this text, see Pappas and Zelcer 2014: 30; Sansone 2020: 14-7. Plato’s stance is controversial. Pappas and Zelcer 2014: 71-93. For Plato’s reference to the Persian Wars, see Moggi 1968.

<sup>30</sup> For the implication of ἤδη as “connoting that up until this point the Athenians had acted alone”, see Sansone 2020: 131, cf. 62 for the usage of ἤδη.

<sup>31</sup> Habicht 1961.

<sup>32</sup> For this oath, Siewert 1972; Lawton 1995, no. 143; van Wees 2006; Krentz 2007; Cartledge 2013; Kellog 2013.

<sup>33</sup> The general tendency of Diodoros’ Persian Wars, see Marincola 2007a: 120-2; de Bakker 2019: 66-9, cf. Albertz 2006: 81-2.

with Pausanias, while in Herodotos, Aristeides only appears in the list of the Greek armies fighting in the Battle of Plataia (Hdt. 9.28.6). He also proposed to give the *aristeia* to Sparta as a *polis* and Pausanias as an individual.<sup>34</sup> Although the *aristeia* was given to Sparta and Pausanias by Aristeides, the focus on the equal roles of Sparta and Athens in the Battle of Plataia is striking.<sup>35</sup> The main source of Diodoros' Book 11 is believed to be the work of Ephoros of Kumai, written in the middle of the fourth century BC.<sup>36</sup> If Diodoros strongly reflected the view of Ephoros' work in his narrative, it can be said that the idea of the joint victory was accepted by non-Athenian writers by the middle of the fourth century BC.<sup>37</sup> The joint victory is implied again in the second-century-AD travel writer Pausanias, who enumerates Aristeides and Pausanias as the leaders at Plataia (Paus. 8.52.2).

In Plutarch's narrative, the role of Athens is more nuanced.<sup>38</sup> In his *Life of Aristeides*, the Athenians refuse to give the Spartans the *aristeia* and to allow them to erect the *tropaion*.<sup>39</sup> As a result, the Greeks are on the verge of armed conflict. Aristeides, therefore, persuades his colleagues to leave the decision to the Greeks. The *aristeia* is finally awarded to the Plataians at the suggestion of the Korinthian Kleokritos. However, Athens and Sparta erect victory monuments of their own accord. The Greeks traditionally erected a *tropaion* on the battlefield to celebrate a victory, and the *polis* in command usually undertook responsibility for erecting it.<sup>40</sup> Since the overall commander is Pausanias and Sparta, Plutarch or his source may think that the erection of the *tropaion* is accompanied by the *aristeia*. Thus, in Plutarch's tradition, the Athenians stand in a position to compete with Sparta for first place.

Already in the fourth century BC, there are signs that the Spartan role in the battle is

---

<sup>34</sup> Diod. Sic. 11.33.1. See also p. 163, n. 10.

<sup>35</sup> Marincola 2007a: 120-2 for the difference between Diodoros and Herodotos.

<sup>36</sup> E.g. Andrewes 1985; Stylianou 1998: 118. Hau 2009: 174 with n. 10 for bibliography. For the date of Ephoros' work, see Parker 2016, 'Bibliographical essay'.

<sup>37</sup> Ancient traditions tell that Ephoros was a pupil of Isokrates (Ephoros, *BNJ* 70 T 2a, T 3, T 4, T 5, T 7, T 8, T 27, T 28). The authenticity of these traditions is weak. Parker 2016, 'Bibliographical essay'. However, it is probable that Ephoros was influenced by the ideas of Greek *homonoiia*, in particular of his contemporary Isokrates. For Isokrates' Panhellenism, see also Chapter 1.4.

<sup>38</sup> Yet, see Pelling 2007 for Plutarch's different attitude towards the Persian Wars in his works.

<sup>39</sup> Plut. *Arist.* 20.1-3. The same episode is mentioned in Plut. *Mor.* 873a.

<sup>40</sup> E.g. Thuc. 7.45.1, 7.54.1. See also West 1965: 111; West 1969: 18. On Greek *tropaia*, see Pritchett 1974: 246-75; Stroszeck 2004.

diminishing. Accordingly, the Battle of Plataia can even be presented as the Athenian victory. Isokrates sometimes writes as if Sparta's only contribution to the Persian Wars was their defeat at Thermopylai.<sup>41</sup> Around 340 BC, the Athenian politician Apollodoros emphasises the joint victory of the Greeks at Plataia with the silence about the Spartans on the battlefield while he refers to Pausanias' tyrannical behaviour after the Persian Wars.<sup>42</sup> Lykourgos even claims "the *polis* [s.c. Athens] won the greatest renown" (μάλιστα ἡ πόλις ὑμῶν εὐδοκίμησεν) among the Greeks who pledged the "Oath of Plataia" (Lycurg. 82). It is striking in this context that the chronicle of the Parian Marble offers the similar view. This inscription, dated to the middle of the third century BC, reports that the battle occurred between the Athenians and Mardonios, and the former won (FGrH 239 FA52). The omission of Sparta and the focus on Athens are features of the historiography of the Parian Marble.<sup>43</sup> In the extant fragments, Athenian history dominates the narrative. The Athenian regal time and archon-year are also adopted. As to the Persian Wars, the Battle of Marathon is reported as the battle between the Athenians and the Persians (FA48), but Thermopylai and Salamis are fought and won by the Greeks, probably as the result of the integration of the two battles into a single sentence (FA51). The author of this chronicle might have used an *Atthis* as one of his main sources to construct the narrative.<sup>44</sup> The Parian elites who were interested in Athenian history may have composed this chronicle.<sup>45</sup> The Athenian version, in this way, was spread outside of Athens.

This line of tradition recurs in the *Panathenaic Oration* of Aelius Aristeides, delivered around 150s and 160s AD.<sup>46</sup> This speech attempts to maximise Athenian valour. For the Battle of Plataia, the Athenians are described as playing a decisive role as they triumphed over the barbarians in terms of excellence (ἀρετή) and over the

---

<sup>41</sup> See esp. Isoc. 5.147-8; Isoc. 14.58-9, in which the speaker assumes the trophy at Plataia was erected by all the Greeks, who faced the whole force of Asia. Similarly, Sparta is just one of the Greeks in Isoc. 12.92-3 in the context of blaming it for destroying Plataia.

<sup>42</sup> [Dem.] 59.96: "Then Pausanias, the Spartan king, tried to insult you and was not content that the Greeks thought the Spartans alone worthy to be their leader." Translation adopted from Bers 2003. For the dating, Kapparis 1999: 28. The Greek victory can be seen later in Oros. 2.11.1-6.

<sup>43</sup> Jacoby 1962: 666-7; Rotstein 2016: 81.

<sup>44</sup> Jacoby 1904: xvii-xviii; Clarke 2008: 213.

<sup>45</sup> See Sickinger 2016, 'Bibliographical essay'.

<sup>46</sup> 167 AD: Oliver 1968: 34. 155 AD: Behr 1986: 428. Cf. Trapp 2017: 10-1.

Greeks in terms of excellence and number and even decided the battle.<sup>47</sup> The Spartans are referred to as ceding their position to the Athenians in the face of the Persians before the battle because they assumed that the Persians were destined to be defeated by the Athenians, while Mardonios moved to face the Spartans, believing that they were easier to defeat than the Athenians (Aristid. *Or.* 1.182).

In short, at least from the fourth century BC onwards, the Battle of Plataia started to be seen as the joint victory of Athens and Sparta and even as the Athenian one.

It should be noted here that the Athenians included the victory at Plataia in the landscape of their own city. Plutarch reports there was a celebration with a *polis*-level festival for the Battle of Plataia in Athens on the third day of the month of Boedromion.<sup>48</sup> We have no idea where the ceremony took place and which god or which hero received an offering or a libation. Yet, it can be assumed that this festival was founded at some point after the battle and continued into Plutarch's time. Like Marathon and Salamis, the victory at Plataia has inserted the ceremony into the calendar of the Athenians. Marathon was commemorated by the annual honour for Artemis Agrotera on the sixth of Boedromion and Salamis by the festival of the Mounichia on the sixteenth of Mounichion.<sup>49</sup> The importance of the Plataia ceremony, moreover, might have been increased by the Plataian participants who were exiled from their homeland and stayed in Athens. In addition to this, Pausanias observed interesting items and a monument of the Battle of Plataia. Among the dedications to Athena Polias inside the Erechtheion in the Athenian Akropolis, he observed the breastplate of Masistios, a commander of the Persian cavalry at Plataia, and a short sword (ἀκινάκης) attributed to Mardonios.<sup>50</sup> The

---

<sup>47</sup> Aristid. *Or.* 1.182-3 (I follow Lenz and Behr 1976-1980 for the numbering of Aelius Aristeides). Cf. Aristid. *Or.* 3.197-8; See also Tigerstedt 1974: 179-81, esp. 179 on this point.

<sup>48</sup> Plut. *De glor. Ath.* 349e-f; Mommsen 1898: 170-2; Deubner 1932: 235; Mikalson 1975: 47-8; Jung 2006: 260-1. Plutarch also reports that the fourth of Boedromion is the day of the Battle of Plataia (Plut. *Arist.* 19.8). See Mikalson 1975: 47-8 on this point.

<sup>49</sup> On the annual honour for Artemis Agrotera, see Plut. *De glor. Ath.* 349e; Plut. *Mor.* 862a-b, cf. Parke 1977: 54-5; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 58.1; Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.11-12. See Deubner 1932: 209-10 with source references for the festival of Artemis Agrotera. On the Mounichia, Plut. *De glor. Ath.* 349f, cf. Newby 2017: 86. The sixteenth of Mounichion is the anniversary of the Battle of Salamis. On the date, see Plut. *Lys.* 15.1; Plut. *Cam.* 19.6, cf. Bowie 2013: 245.

<sup>50</sup> See Paus. 1.27.1; Dem. 24.129; West 1965, 152-4, cf. Hdt. 9.22-24. See also Duffy 2018, 150-1. Pausanias reasonably doubts the sword was Mardonios' one as he knows it is the Spartans that defeated the Persian force led by Mardonios and, therefore, that must have taken it (Paus. 1.27.1). In

commemoration and the relics reminded the Athenians of their contribution to Plataia, which may have changed in accordance with the Athenian recognition of the battle.

How influential were such pro-Athenian interpretations? Of course, these types of views on the Battle of Plataia did not seem to dominate the discourse in the Classical period. Marathon and Salamis continued to be the centres of the Athenian identity because of their uniqueness, while Plataia did not reach that level. It is also difficult to believe that the 'Athenian victory' surpassed the discourses of Pausanias and Sparta. The image of the Spartan victory must have had a firm place in the discourse insofar as the reference point here is derived from Herodotos and the traditions that were formed in the fifth century BC. The Spartan stories were circulated through anecdotes which were collected as *exempla* in miscellanies of anecdotes and excerpts and became the usual subjects of performative oratory and poetry. Moreover, as we have seen above, the Spartan pride in the credit at Plataia must have been an obstacle to the circulation of alternative interpretations. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Plataia was recognised by some as an Athenian victory, or at least that both Athenian and Spartan forces were considered to be in a position to claim the *aristeia*. It is clear that this view was part of the Athenian-centred discourse from at least the fourth century BC onwards, even if not to the extent of superseding the Spartan achievement. This discourse must have been repeated and amplified mainly through oratory and historiography. The works of Lysias and Lykourgos were firmly established in the Hellenistic period as classics of oratory, and if Cicero is correct, Plato's *Menexenos* was performed repeatedly every year in the Hellenistic period, most likely in the Epitaphia (Cic. *Orat.* 151). In this regard, the influence of the discourse of the 'Athenian triumph' cannot be underestimated. Moreover, in view of the fact that Athens became one of the centres of oratorical education, the rhetoricians and grammarians studying there would have had many opportunities to come into contact with this discourse. Those who wrote historiography would have chosen a tradition appropriate to the purpose of the historiography, and orators would also have made use of their own preferred interpretation of the Plataian battles, depending on the context and purpose. For instance, in the *Plataikos*, Isokrates is making a sharp contrast between the Greeks and the Thebans as the latter were medisers in the Persian Wars and were then to be accused of their second destruction of

---

this case, this tradition of attribution was invented before the middle of the fourth century BC when Demosthenes referred to this. Even if it is a fake, it was so famous that it could arouse the pride of the Athenians as Demosthenes feels it worth mentioning this (Dem. 24.129).

the city of Plataia.<sup>51</sup> The speaker here makes full use of the interpretation that the battle was a communal effort of all the Greeks in order to emphasise the ‘betrayal’ of the Thebans. In the *Against Neaira*, the Plataian contribution to Athens is contrasted with Pausanias’ *hybris* while their loyalty to Athens is emphasised through the account of the first destruction of the city by the Thebans and Spartans ([Dem.] 59.94-103). The attribution of credit to the Athenians may possibly have been done to satisfy the pro-Athenian writers. We will discuss further the influence of Athens by discussing the physical and cultic landscape of Plataia as a case study in the following sections.

#### **4.2.4. The Victory of Greek Unity**

A final perspective needs to be considered, the Battle of Plataia as the victory of Greek unity. Basically, the victory against Xerxes could be regarded as the victory of Greek unity, the victory of Greek *homonoia*, and accordingly, every battle to expel Xerxes’ forces from the mainland could also be regarded as a collective Greek victory. Yet, the collectiveness was emphasised in terms of the Battle of Plataia much more than others. This is best marked by the cult of the Homonoia of the Greeks at Plataia.<sup>52</sup> As is discussed in Chapter 3.1.1, this must have been established in the time of Alexander the Great and Philip II as the memorial of the Greek unity against the Achaemenid Empire. The cult of the Homonoia of the Greeks at Plataia may have come from the general image of the Greek effort in the expulsion of Xerxes’ forces from mainland Greece. The idea of Greek unity against the barbarians had developed since the Peloponnesian War. Isokrates retrospectively reinterpreted the past and came to regard the Trojan and Persian Wars as united Greek wars against Asia.<sup>53</sup> From this perspective, Plataia seems to have been qualified as the place of the Homonoia because it was thought that it was here that the Greek victory over the Persians was completed.<sup>54</sup> Another reason may be that Plataia did not have such connotations as Thermopylai, Marathon and Salamis had.

---

<sup>51</sup> For the anti-Theban rhetoric in the *Plataikos*, see Steinbock 2013: 124.

<sup>52</sup> Panhellenicity of the festival is also implied in the title ἄριστος τῶν Ἑλλήνων, which was awarded to winners in the hoplite race of the Eleutheria. Schachter 1994: 140-1 with 141, n. 1 for the references. cf. Jung 2006: 350-1. The title is first attested around c. 20 BC. See Robert 1949.

<sup>53</sup> Isoc. 4.85, 10.67, 12.42, 12.76-8, cf. Lys. 33.6; Isoc. 14.58-9.

<sup>54</sup> E.g. Pl. *Leg.* 707c; [Dem.] 59.96. Sections 189-90 of Aelius Aristides’ *Panathenaic Oration* link the completion of the expulsion of Xerxes’ force, the foundation of the altar of Zeus Eleutherios, and Greek *homonoia*.

The first two were the Spartan and Athenian exclusive battles, while the last was inevitably involved with the Athenian self-sacrifice in abandoning the city to save Greece.

The clear connection between the Battle of Plataia itself and Greek unity can be observed in the two literary sources. First is 11.29.2 of Diodoros' *Bibliothēke*, in that the Greek forces at the Isthmos swore an oath concerning the war before moving to Plataia, an oath that "concerning the war, designed to strengthen the concord between them (τὸν στέξοντα μὲν τὴν ὁμόνοιαν αὐτῶν) and make them nobly endure the hazards of battle."<sup>55</sup> This concord not only marks the re-unification of the Greek force led by the Spartans and the Athenians, who had earlier quarrelled with each other after the Battle of Salamis (Diod. Sic. 11.27.2-28.1), but also becomes the driving force for the Greeks to fight at Plataia. Second is 19.7 of Plutarch's *Life of Aristeides*, according to which the success at Plataia was common to all (κοινὸν γενέσθαι τὸ κατόρθωμα). Plutarch here argues against Herodotos, who, according to Plutarch, reports only the Athenians, Tegeans, and Spartans took part in the battle. He also quotes the epigram on the altar of Zeus Eleutherios, which tells that it was the Greeks, not the three cities, who defeated the Persians.

There were grounds to put an emphasis on the Battle of Plataia as the victory of Greek unity. The Battle of Plataia could be seen as the Panhellenic victory as much as other battles could. The Plataians' speech in Thucydides 2.71.2 implies that Pausanias' liberation of Greece was the result of his cooperation with the Greeks. In Herodotos 9.60, Pausanias sent a messenger to tell the Athenians of the need to protect each other in the middle of the battle.<sup>56</sup> Although they did not give a clear idea of Greek unity, it is possible that the idea has developed from these hints, and the foundation of the cult of Homonoia of the Greeks at Plataia furthered and made concreted this link. The denigration of the Spartan role must have contributed to this process.

In this way, the discourses about who claimed credit for the victory at Plataia changed over time. As discussed in this section, Athens gradually developed a discourse that exaggerated its contribution to the victory. Sparta also revived the honour of Pausanias, who had fallen out of favour even in Sparta temporarily, and, by the Roman period, began to treat him as a hero. Also, the idea of the Battle of Plataia as the victory of Greek unity probably developed in the fourth century BC with the emergence of the Greek concept of *homonoia*. How did the Greeks come to terms with these different

---

<sup>55</sup> Diod. Sic. 11.29.2. Translation from Green 2006.

<sup>56</sup> For the Greek victory, see [Dem.] 59.96; Oros. 2.11.1-6.

memories of the Battle of Plataia? In the next section, we will attempt to answer this question by examining the *dialogos*, which are the rituals of the Eleutheria.

### 4.3. THE MEANING OF THE *DIALOGOS*

#### 4.3.1. Introduction

The Eleutheria at Plataia experienced an innovation in the Hellenistic period: the addition of the *dialogos*. The *dialogos* at Plataia was a ceremonial dispute between Athens and Sparta to decide which would lead the procession of the Eleutheria.<sup>57</sup> This section will discuss the meaning of the *dialogos* in order to see how this ceremony coloured the festival and contend that the ceremony transformed the Eleutheria into a celebration of Athenian-Spartan cultural importance and their leadership in the Persian Wars/the Battle of Plataia and that the ceremony itself was a ritual that reminded participants of the Athenian and Spartan contribution to the war against the Persians in the Classical period.

#### 4.3.2. The *Dialogos*

The *dialogos* was a ceremony in the preparation period of the Eleutheria.<sup>58</sup> The general *synedrion* of Greeks held a meeting at Plataia in Metageitnon, probably late in the month, the year before the Eleutheria took place.<sup>59</sup> The purpose of the meeting was to

---

<sup>57</sup> The *dialogos* has been much less studied except Noel Robertson's comprehensive paper in 1986 and Michael Jung's study in 2006: 351-60 about the meaning of the ceremony.

<sup>58</sup> Robertson 1986. Once the *dialogos* was believed to have taken place in Athens, see Peek 1938: 18. The creation of the *dialogos* might have been stimulated by the newly established Eleutheria at Thessaly after the declaration of freedom by Flamininus in 196 BC. For the Thessalian Eleutheria, see Graninger 2011: 67-85, who refers to the influence of the Plataian Eleutheria on the Thessalian one. See also p. 175, n. 60 of this chapter below. Evidence for rhetorical competitions in several festivals can be seen from the late fourth century BC, cf. Chaniotis 2016: 132-3.

<sup>59</sup> Jung 2006: 353, n. 44 rejects Robertson's argument that the ceremony was held in the middle of the cycle. Robertson 1986: 89-96. As is argued by Shane Wallace, the festival may have been held in late Metageitnon and the early Boedromion and its culmination came on the third of Boedromion,

hear and to judge the rival claims of Athens and Sparta, by one orator from each side, to acquire the honour of leading the procession (the *propompeia*) of the Eleutheria festival. It was likely to have been established no later than the middle of the second century BC.<sup>60</sup> The Plataian ceremony may have become known in the intellectual class of the Greek world at least in the Roman period. [Lucian] refers to two companions “as if they were about to compete for the *propompeia* at Plataia” as they are musing on opposite speeches about love.<sup>61</sup> Dio Chrysostom contemptuously refers to the Athenians and Spartans of his own day “competing bravely for the *propompeia*”.<sup>62</sup> A grammarian Eirenaos of Alexandria, also known as Minucius Pacatus, wrote a book called *On the Athenian Processional Escort* (περὶ τῆς Ἀθηναίων προπομπείας) in first century AD (*Suda s.v. Εἰρηναῖος*, εἰ 190).<sup>63</sup>

The *dialogos* is likely to be a ceremonial replay of a historical tradition from the Persian Wars. According to Plutarch, after the Battle of Plataia, the Athenians and Spartans disputed in front of the allies about the *aristeia* since the Athenians refused to give it to the Spartans and the right to erect a *tropaion*. Scholars generally believe this

---

the anniversary of the Battle of Plataia. Wallace 2011b: 154, cf. Schachter 1994: 136, 141. The date of the battle, Plut. *Cam.* 19.5; Plut. *De glor. Ath.* 349f, cf. Plut. *Arist.* 19.8.

<sup>60</sup> Voula Bardani and Stephen Tracy recently published the new edition of a fragmentary decree, Ag. I 6529 (*IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1417*), which is dated to the first half of the second century BC. The previous editions of this decree have already restored “to the Eleutheria” (εἰς τὰ Ἐλευθέρια κατ[–] in line 6 (Meritt 1963: 20-1, no. 20; *Agora* 16.304). In addition to this, Barbadani and Tracy newly read “περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων προπομπείας” in line 4 of this decree. They also found the presence of the Spartans in line 2 (–ς ὑπὸ Λακ[εδαιμονίων] and of the Greeks in line 3 (–]ου τῶν Ἑλλ[λην–]). These all suggest that this decree is concerned with the *propompeia* of the Eleutheria. See also *IG II<sup>3</sup> 4, 772*, dated to the second century BC. This inscription records an honorific epigram for Pythokles, the victorious Athenian speaker of the *dialogos*. If this date is accepted, it is probable that the *dialogos* was introduced in reaction to the newly established Eleutheria at Thessaly after 196 BC, as I suggested in p. 174, n. 58 of this chapter above. For the previous dating, see Robertson 1986: 101.

<sup>61</sup> [Lucian], *Amores* 18 with Robertson 1986: 96, n. 31.

<sup>62</sup> Dio Chrys. *Or.* 38.38.

<sup>63</sup> A grammarian of the second century AD, Hermogenes, also tells a rhetorical question, “as if the Athenians and the Spartans should argue about the *propompeia* after the Persian Wars”, a fictitious question which must have been influenced by the Plataian ceremonial *dialogos* and its origin story (Hermog. *Id.* 2.10.27, cf. Kohl 1915: 19, no. 41). I follow Patillon 2012 for the numbering of Hermogenes.

story is the foundation myth of the *dialogos*.<sup>64</sup> If Plutarch's story was not invented by the time of the foundation, there must have been a proto-legend (or legends) that observed the rivalry between Athens and Sparta (cf. Diod. Sic. 11.29-32). This ceremony may have confirmed the 'official' view of the history of the Eleutheria, the one that places Athens and Sparta on the same level with regard to the responsibility of the victory in the Battle of Plataia.<sup>65</sup> The participants at the *synedrion* experienced the past of the rivalry in the Battle of Plataia vicariously, thereby they could renew their identity as Greeks whose ancestors had defeated Xerxes' armies, even if their *polis* did not take part in the war on the Greek side. They must have also recognised the importance of Athens and Sparta in the victory at Plataia and the victory against Xerxes on the mainland in general. For the Athenian and Spartan participants who provided the speakers, this ceremony reminded them of their current cultural and historical importance to the Greek civilisation.

In addition to the *synedroi*, the *ephebes* of Athens, and most likely those of Sparta, took part in the *dialogos*, most likely from the middle of the second century BC.<sup>66</sup> They went to Plataia with their teacher, financed by the Sebastophoric Fund, which was usually used for the Imperial cult.<sup>67</sup> They listened to speeches and might take part in judging the winner. This participation had a pedagogic function. The *ephebes* must have been aware of the importance of the Persian Wars for the elite culture. The Athenian *ephebeia* had several ceremonies concerning the Persian Wars, ceremonies by which the past was experienced and through which the *ephebes* relived Marathon, Salamis and Plataia. Through these cultural experiences, the *ephebes* were nurtured as Athenian/Greek elites. In the second century BC, for instance, the *ephebes* visited the

---

<sup>64</sup> See n. 114 in this chapter. I will discuss this story in detail in Chapter 4.4.3.

<sup>65</sup> It is highly possible that Athens and Sparta held an important position in the Greek *koinon* at the time of its introduction. Both *poleis* seemed to have a special connection around 60 AD. Cf. Spawforth 1994: 235-7.

<sup>66</sup> Sources: Walbank 2015: 125-6, 128, 131-2 (143/2 BC); *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 2086, ll. 33-38 (AD 163/4); *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 2089, ll. 14-20 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 167/8?); *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 2113, ll. 142-51 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 187/8); *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 2130, ll. 37-49 (AD 195/6). See also Kennell 2022: 16, 23.

<sup>67</sup> Oliver 1977: 92. The payment from the Sebastophoric Fund was perhaps started by Herodes Atticus. He was the high priest of the imperial cult in Athens at that time. And his benefaction towards *ephebes* for celebrating the victory against the Parthians is known to us (Oliver 1977; Newby 2005: 192-201). He might have wanted to connect the ephebic activities with the imperial cult more closely.

tomb of the *Marathonomachoi* to perform a sacrifice and a contest (*IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1313, ll. 15-8. cf. Paus. 1.32.3*). The *ephebic* participation can be observed again in the cult of Artemis Agrotera, at whose temple goats were sacrificed. This is the festival for the victory at Marathon and took place on the sixth day of Boedromion, which is said to be the day on which the Battle of Marathon occurred. The festival continued at least until the time of Plutarch.<sup>68</sup> The *ephebes* also participated in the boat competition in the festival of the Mounichia and the Aianteia, which commemorated the victory at Salamis.<sup>69</sup> In the Roman period, the boat races in commemoration of Salamis became mock naval battles.<sup>70</sup> The *dialogos* was a new element of this reliving ceremonial commemorations.<sup>71</sup>

### 4.3.3. The Speech

However, the ceremony was not a simple replay of the past event. An extant summary of an actual speech at the *dialogos* may allow us to explore what happened at the ceremony and to identify its function as the *penteteric* settlement of the historical rivalry between Athens and Sparta in the Classical period. *IG II<sup>2</sup> 2788*, a now-lost inscription, records what may be a summary of a speech delivered by an Athenian at the ceremony.<sup>72</sup> The inscription might have been to honour a victorious speaker. In this

---

<sup>68</sup> For the date, see p. 170, n. 49. See also *IG II<sup>2</sup> 1006*, ll. 8-9.

<sup>69</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup> 1006*, ll. 29-32, cf. *IG II<sup>2</sup> 1011* (100/99 BC). The Aianteia was the festival for Ajax, on the island of Salamis. The cult of Ajax in Salamis was surely connected with the Battle of Salamis, as Herodotos says that the Athenians prayed to the Aiakidai to help them at the naval battle in Salamis (*IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1166 ll. 17-9; Hdt. 8.64.2*, see also 8.121. On the Aianteia, see Deubner 1932: 228). In this festival, the ephebes participated in the sacrifice and the torch race for the eponymous of the island, Ajax. They also sailed to the island of Salamis, went to the trophy of Salamis on the island, crowned it and offered sacrifice to it (*IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1313, ll. 21-6; IG II<sup>3</sup> 1, 1285, ll. 1-3 cf. Paus. 1.36.1*). For the ephebic commemorative activities as to Salamis in the Hellenistic period, see Newby 2017: 84-7.

<sup>70</sup> Sources: *IG II<sup>2</sup> 1996* (AD 84/5-92/3); *IG II<sup>2</sup> 1997* (AD 85/6-94/5); *IG II<sup>2</sup> 2024* (AD 112/3); *IG II<sup>2</sup> 2130* (AD 195/6); *IG II<sup>2</sup> 2167* (2nd cent. AD); *IG II<sup>2</sup> 2198* (AD c. 200); *IG II<sup>2</sup> 2208* (AD 212/3 or later); *IG II<sup>2</sup> 2245* (AD 262/3 or 266/7); *IG II<sup>2</sup> 2248* (3rd cent. AD). According to Zahra Newby, the inscriptions below have reliefs related to the navel competition: *IG II<sup>2</sup> 2087; IG II<sup>2</sup> 2106; IG II<sup>2</sup> 2248; NM 1468*. See Newby 2017: 88-93.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. Kennell 2022: 16.

<sup>72</sup> Robertson 1986: 92. Peter Liddel and Polly Low recently confirmed that the stone had not been

inscription, dated no earlier than the end of the second century BC, the speaker speaks of the history of Athens, pretending to be the city of Athens.<sup>73</sup> Here, he employs the technique of *prosopopoiia*, in which a speaker or writer addresses the audience as another person or thing. Although the inscription is badly damaged, the content of the speech can be reconstructed to some extent and has been reconstructed by several scholars. However, there are still areas of disagreement.<sup>74</sup> By analysing *IG II<sup>2</sup> 2788*, I will argue that this ceremony serves as a reactivation of the memory of the victories and conflicts between Athens and Sparta during the fifth century BC in a peaceful way. I cite a full text of this inscription in Appendix 2.

The speech starts with the preamble in lines 1-8, which refer to the *propompeia*. The speaker then mentions the Persian Wars in lines 9-17. Lines 10-3 or 14 focus on the Battle of Marathon, the deliverance of Greece by Athens and probably Xerxes' expedition. Lines 14-7 make a reference to the aftermath of the Battle of Plataia. In lines 14-5, an oath seems to be taken. This is likely to be the "Oath of Plataia" which was to guarantee the autonomy and inviolability of Plataia. Then, line 17 (χρησμὸν καὶ τῆς θυσίας ἐπιτελουμένης) refers to an oracle and a sacrifice. This is likely to refer to the foundation of Zeus Eleutherios.<sup>75</sup> The oracle and sacrifice are mentioned in Plutarch's *Life of Aristides*, according to which Delphic Apollo gave the Greeks an oracle commanding them to set up the altar of Zeus Eleutherios and, before the sacrifice, to purify Plataia with fire from the Delphic hearth, for the area had been defiled by the Persians. The fire was carried from Delphi to Plataia by Euchidas, a Plataian (Plut. *Arist.* 20.4). The presence of Euchidas in this story marked its local origin. Line 17 of *IG II<sup>2</sup> 2788* may be the testimony of the existence of this story or a proto story about 200 years before Plutarch. From lines 18 to 22, the speech mentions the Athenian undertaking the war against Xerxes, the creation of the Delian League, the liberation of the cities in Western Asia Minor and perhaps a reference to the controversial Peace of Kallias. Line 22 seems to mention the *theoroi* sending to the Panathenaic festival as a duty of the member state of the League since the reference to "με" in line 22 suggests that the city

---

found yet. Liddel and Low 2022: 21. *SEG* 36.237 seems to wrongly believe the stone is preserved in London.

<sup>73</sup> For the dating, see Spawforth 2012: 134 and Appendix 2 of this thesis.

<sup>74</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup> 2788*. See also Chaniotis 1988: 42-8 for the text with full commentary. I generally follow Noel Robertson, who argues the speech contains the history of the fourth century BC. Robertson 1986: 98-9, cf. Day 1980: 175-6; Chaniotis 1988: 47; Jung 2006: 355-8.

<sup>75</sup> Robertson 1986: 98; Jung 2006, 356.

of Athens, the persona of the speaker, does something against the Asian Greeks.<sup>76</sup>

The accusations against Sparta begin from line 23 until the end of the extant fragment. First, line 23 and probably line 24, the Spartan violation of the Oath, which means its destruction of the city of Plataia, seems to have been mentioned.<sup>77</sup> From lines 25 onwards, the condition of the text deteriorates. But Noel Robertson believes that lines 25-6 record the discord between Athens and Sparta, lines 27-30 the King's Peace, and lines 30-4 "Athens' response to the universal complaints." However, Angelos Chaniotis speculates that lines 22-4 record the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, line 26 the Spartan withdrawal from the League, and line 28 the reference to Pausanias and the Ionians conquered by the Persians. I would basically agree with Chaniotis' reconstruction as lines 26-7 are likely to refer to the Spartan withdrawal from the liberation of Asia (μή μετεσχικέναι τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα κινδ[ύνων — | — γινομέναις συνθήκαις συμμαχίαν πρὸς — ). I do not agree with him that the speech is unlikely to have included the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War and the Spartan hegemony that followed because the Eleutheria was a festival to commemorate the Greek victory. The King's Peace could be included because it was seen as a result of Spartan betrayal. Sparta's cooperation with Persia would have seriously damaged its reputation. Although the interpretation above is highly speculative, it can be said that the speech mainly put an emphasis on the history of the Athenian hegemony in the fifth century BC.<sup>78</sup>

The remainder of the speech (ll. 30-8) probably reasserts that Sparta is not worthy of the *propompeia* (ll. 30-4) and ends with a call to the *synedroi* and Zeus Eleutherios (ll. 35-8).

In this way, the speech mainly refers to the history of the wars against the Persians. Although somewhat off-topic in this context, a small focus on the city of Plataia would have been an appropriate theme for condemning Sparta in relation to the Eleutheria. If a Spartan orator offered a counterargument based on the Spartan activity of the fifth century BC, both parties recalled the history of the fifth and possibly fourth century BC with its focus on the wars against Persians and the Athenian-Spartan rivalry. The ceremony then became a rhetorical competition to settle the historical antagonism between them.

Therefore, the participants of a session of the *dialogos* decided who would be better

---

<sup>76</sup> Day 1980: 175-6; Chaniotis 1988: 46. Robertson 1986: 98 and Jung 2006: 357 with 357 n. 64 argue that the reference to *theoroi* refers to the Eleutheria or cultic activities at Plataia.

<sup>77</sup> Chaniotis 1988: 46-7. Cf. Jung 2006: 357.

<sup>78</sup> *Contra* Chaniotis 1988: 47-8; Jung 2006: 357.

by judging not only the oratorical skills of the speakers but also the historical arguments based on the history of the fifth century BC they offered. History led the participants to consider which *poleis* worked better for Greece (and for Plataia) in the past and to be reminded of the division of the Greek world by Athens and Sparta. In this sense, this ritual is a peaceful reactivation of the memory of the victories and conflicts between Athens and Sparta in the fifth century BC and a ceremony to determine the winner in a peaceful manner. Participants would confirm, every four years, the image of the Classical past dominated by the two great powers, Athens and Sparta, and the historical importance of both *poleis*. Thus, the ritual is not merely a celebration of the victory of the Persian Wars, but a system that reproduces the cultural superiority of Sparta and Athens and creates the existence of a Greek community around it.

#### **4.3.4. The Power of the *Propompeia***

In line with this, it is worth discussing what the procession was like. The order and composition of a procession in antiquity have been extensively studied as an essential element of the festival and the identity of the group organising the festival.<sup>79</sup> Unfortunately, we cannot reconstruct the exact picture of the *penteteric* procession that either Athens or Sparta led. However, it can be imagined that the Plataians played an important role and that the culmination of the procession was a sacrificial ceremony at the altar of Zeus Eleutherios placed near the entrance of the city and, as the Eleutheria was also dedicated to the fallen at Plataia, the procession passed by the tombs or even offered sacrifice to them in a similar way as the Plataians did annually.<sup>80</sup> There may be the participation of artists, while it must be certain that the *synedrion* of the Greeks became important participants as an organiser of the festival in the procession.

---

<sup>79</sup> There are numerous studies on this topic. E.g. Bömer 1952; Rice 1983; Rogers 1991; Graf 1996; Walbank 1996; Maurizio 1998; Thompson 2000; Chankowski 2005; Chaniotis 2013; Strootman 2014: 247-64; Kubatzki 2018; Kühn 2018; Paul 2018; Agelidis 2019; Clinton 2019; Warford 2019; Carless Unwin 2020; Shear 2021: 116-170, 212-313; Grijalvo and Lozano 2022. Recent scholarship is reviewed in Latham 2020.

<sup>80</sup> Plut. *Arist.* 21.1-6. Plutarch believes the procession has still remained the way it was founded by the decree of Aristeides. Yet, it is not a trustworthy testimony as the decree must have been fabricated and there were likely to be modifications as a result of interruptions during the time when Plataia was destroyed. Cf. Thuc. 3.58.4. For the commentary on the cultic aspect of the Plataian procession, see Chaniotis 2006: 222-3.

Then, what was the meaning of the leading position? The *propompeia* can “establish the general atmosphere and thematic congruity of the procession.”<sup>81</sup> So, the purpose of the procession was sometimes well represented in the head of the procession. Around 166 BC, Antiochos IV held a procession at Daphne near Antioch. Reflecting his intention to surpass L. Aemilius Paullus, who had celebrated his victory over Perseus at Amphipolis, the procession was led by five thousand men in the prime of life, armed in the Roman style.<sup>82</sup> At the head of the Dionysiac procession at the Ptolemaia at Alexandria, the *Silenoι* led it, because of their status as companions and tutors of Dionysos. Wearing purple or red *chlamys*, they had the role of keeping back the crowds and, at the same time, announcing the beginning of the new procession of the Grand Procession.<sup>83</sup> A guard duty must have been prestigious. However, the meaning of the *propompeia* cannot be uniformly interpreted. The *propompeia* is an honorific privilege, and so takes on a political nature. In the late 70s BC, the Epidaurian Euanthis and his descendants were awarded the *propompeia* for the procession of the Apollonia and the Epidauria. His honour derived from his expenditure. He worked to alleviate the food shortages caused by the Roman army and spent generously on the organisation of the Dionysia despite being an *agoranomos*. Otherwise, if different groups participated in a procession, there was a need to reconcile interests between them. In the festival of Artemis Kindyas at Bargylia, according to the regulation probably enacted after the Aristonikos War (133–129 BC), the tribe which are judged to rear the best cow will be honoured with the *propompeia*.<sup>84</sup> This may mean the tribe chosen will also occupy the most important and honorific part in the sacrifice. Therefore, even if an honorific aspect

---

<sup>81</sup> Citation from Rice 1983: 45.

<sup>82</sup> Polyb. 30.25.1-4; Ath. 194c; Walbank 1996: 125-7. Cf. Diod. Sic. 31.16. A similar emphasis on the military aspect may be seen in the procession at the Greater Panathenaia. See Heliod. *Aeth.* 1.10.1, according to which the *ephebes* led the procession. Although the novel is set on in the fifth century BC, the account seems to reflect the practice of the Roman period. Shear 2021: 120-1.

<sup>83</sup> Ath. 197a: τῆς δὲ Διονυσιακῆς πομπῆς πρῶτοι μὲν προήεσαν οἱ τὸν ὄχλον ἀνείργοντες Σιληνοί, πορφυρᾶς χλαμύδας, οἱ δὲ φοινικίδας ἡμφιεσμένοι. See Rice 1983: 45. See also Rice 1983: 36-7 for the head of the whole Grand Procession.

<sup>84</sup> For the political nature of the *propompeia*, see Chaniotis 2002: 36-7. For Epidaurus, *IG IV<sup>2</sup> 1*, 66, cf. *SEG* 11.397. For the food crisis caused by the Roman army when staying in a town or a city, see Garnsey 1988: 247-8. The Delphians granted it with the *technitai* of Athens. See *FD III 2*, 48, which is the only honorific inscription from Delphi which clearly refers to the *propompeia*. See Grzesik 2021: 48-9, cf. Bouvier 1978: 107-8. For Bargylia, *SEG* 45.1508, 47.1559, 48.1328, ll. 3-10.

is strong, it is certain that the *propompeia* can decide the atmosphere of the procession and the whole ceremony.

A ‘winner’ of the *dialogos*, therefore, illuminated the festival and possibly ‘overwrote’ the history of the Battle of Plataia. The fact that Athens and Sparta had a monopoly on the right to lead the procession dedicated to Zeus Eleutherios not only reaffirms to the participants and audience the perception that the victory at the Battle of Plataia was won by both sides. As noted above, this ritual had a role not only in determining the *aristeia* in the Battle of Plataia but also in confirming the historical importance of Athens and Sparta. Then, the festival itself became the one commemorating the victory of the two *poleis*, Athens and Sparta. Yet, at the same time, the ceremony allowed the winner to ‘rewrite’ the memory of the battle through an argument that had been going on since the fifth century BC as to ‘which side was responsible for the victory’. In other words, the *dialogos* had the role of reinvigorating the historical rivalry between the two sides stemming from the Battle of Plataia and re-determining the ‘winner’ every four years. The procession of the Eleutheria had the role of making manifest to the audience the determined winner through the *propompeia*.

In this way, the participants and the audience experience a link between the past and the present. In the Eleutheria, a celebration of past victories, the audience witnesses the continuation of a legendary rivalry that dates back to the fifth century BC. Through the celebration of the victory over the Persians and the ongoing rivalry between Athens and Sparta in the *dialogos*, they were given the illusion that Greece’s ‘glorious past’ was still going on. Then, they could feel the sense of living in the present, which was configured as a continuation of the past, and get a sense of who they were.

## 4.4. THE SPACE AND LOCAL MEMORIES AT PLATAIA

### 4.4.1. Introduction

This section will examine the relationship between the memory of the Plataians and the space of the city of Plataia. In this chapter so far, we have seen the complexity of memories as to the Battle of Plataia. We also reviewed how these memories were represented in the spaces of the cities of Athens and Sparta. So, it is worth asking how the Plataian local memory of the battle differed from memories of other states and how it was monumentalised in the space of Plataia. As Plataia had twice experienced

destruction and then its monuments and buildings had been restored after 335 BC, the city's cultic landscape changed. Moreover, because of the Eleutheria and the joint cult of Zeus Eleutherios with the Homonoia of the Greeks, the Plataians could not exclusively occupy their own landscape. Its religious buildings may have avoided complete destruction. But they could acquire different meanings as civic memory changed after the reconstruction. This section will discuss monuments said to have been located inside the wall: the temple of Athena Areia and the tomb of Euchidas. It will then argue that the Plataians created their own memory in order to claim credit for the Battle of Plataia and that memory was well anchored in the Plataian civic landscape.

The main sources of this section are Pausanias' *Description of Greece* and Plutarch's *Life of Aristides*. Plutarch was an elite from Chaironeia in Boiotia, and Pausanias travelled around Boiotia and visited Plataia around the first and second century AD. They both had the experience of visiting Plataia, seeing its landscape and knowing its local knowledge. Their information about the monuments and local knowledge are highly reliable.

#### **4.4.2. The Monumental Landscape of Plataia: An Overview**

Before beginning this analysis, it is useful to review the monuments at Plataia. As the site of the battle, Plataia and its periphery had several monuments which can be called 'war sites'. Our main source, Pausanias, witnessed them. For instance, Herodotos mentions the Gargaphian spring as the place near which the Greek force drew up its battle line (9.25.2-3, cf. 9.51.1). Mardonius' cavalry messed up the spring because the Greeks took their water supply from it during the battle (Hdt. 9.49.2). This spring is reported to have been restored later (Paus. 9.4.3). It is believed that the spring is situated approximately 3.6 km northeast of the sanctuary of Hera at Plataia or further west.<sup>85</sup> The battle took place near a sanctuary of the Eleusinian Demeter which was still known in the time of Pausanias (Paus. 9.4.3), while, on one of the peaks of Mt. Kithairon, there was the cave of the Sphragitic nymphs, to whom the tribe of Aiantis who fought most courageously at Plataia offered sacrifice (Plut. *Arist.* 19.6; Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 628f). Along the highway from Eleutherai to Plataia, there was the alleged tomb of Mardonios (Paus. 9.2.2). It might have been on the hill close to a church of the Anargyri, east of the sanctuary of Hera. There are "a number of large, squared blocks" that the local inhabitants have identified with the tomb of Mardonios at least in the 1950s, according

---

<sup>85</sup> Konecny 2022: 177-8 with bibliography at p. 178, n. 96. See also Figure 15 on p. 206 for the map.

to William Pritchett.<sup>86</sup>

The Athenian-Spartan dominance of the festival was also monumentalised in the landscape of Plataia. Pausanias reports there were at least three tombs of Athens, Sparta and the remaining Greeks standing close to the altar and statue of Zeus Eleutherios outside the city wall of Plataia.<sup>87</sup> The original tombs reported by Herodotos seem to have been relocated and reconstructed after the construction of the Hellenistic circuit wall built after 335 BC. With the help of Herodotos and Thucydides, we can confirm that, in the fifth century BC, there were at least eight separate graves of the fallen, those of Spartans (who constructed three graves), Tegeans, Athenians, Megarians, and Phliasians with those of the Aiginetans and some unknown *poleis* whose graves were reported to be empty and were built in order to pretend that they, too, took part in the fighting, according to Herodotos. It should be noted here, for comparison, that these tombs did not form any collective commemoration that transcended that of a polis level, and so they did not have any central *polis* whose tomb illuminated its role in the battlefield. They were “polyhellenic” monuments rather than “panhellenic,” as recently Giorgia Proietti argues.<sup>88</sup> Herodotos reports that some of the graves, as well as the Aiginetan one, were empty. But it does not prove that the Aiginetans and other *poleis* who built their graves did not take part in the battle.<sup>89</sup>

Several monuments anchored the Panhellenic memory of the victory. For instance, there was a *tropaion* for the battle, away from the city (Paus. 9.2.6) but Plutarch also reports that the Athenians and the Spartans erected their own *tropaion* (Plut. *Arist.* 20.3). The erection of two or more *tropaia* is not uncommon. Thus, it is possible that Pausanias missed two other *tropaia* or that several *tropaia* were combined into one at some point after the battle or that either one of the reports is just a legend.<sup>90</sup> There were three tombs of the fallen in the Battle of Plataia, which received an annual sacrifice by the Plataians (Paus. 9.2.5). The *penteteric* festival of the Eleutheria was also offered to

---

<sup>86</sup> Pritchett 1957: 14-5, cf. Hdt. 9.84; West 1965: 191; Duffy 2018: 146-7.

<sup>87</sup> Paus. 9.2.5, cf. Plut. *Arist.* 21.3.

<sup>88</sup> Proietti 2021: 207-9. For the original tombs, Hdt. 9.85; Thuc. 3.58.4; Isoc. 14.61; Schachter 1994, 127. Cf. Flower and Marincola 2002: 254. For the Spartan graves, see also Macan 1908: 770; Flower and Marincola 2002: 255-6.

<sup>89</sup> How and Wells 1928: 325; Flower and Marincola 2002: 256. For the discussion of the tombs, see also How and Wells 1928: 325; West 1965: 114-6; Flower and Marincola 2002: 254; Duffy 2018: 131-2. On the construction of the circuit wall, Aravantinos, Konecny and Marchese 2003: 291-6.

<sup>90</sup> Schachter 1994: 141-2.

them. There was also the joint altar of Zeus Eleutherios and the Homonoia of the Greeks with their statues close to them.<sup>91</sup> Next to the statue of Zeus Eleutherios, there must have been the statue of the Homonoia and some other monuments.<sup>92</sup> The altar and statues may have been intentionally placed outside the civic space. As the Plataians annually offered sacrifice to Zeus Eleutherios and the tombs in front of the Greeks, the altar for this Zeus was used to commemorate the Panhellenic unity and victory.<sup>93</sup> In

---

<sup>91</sup> Theodoros Spyropoulos tentatively identifies a large structure founded to the east of the ancient site in 1972 with the altar of Zeus Eleutherios. This identification is not supported. Spyropoulos 1973a; Spyropoulos 1973b: 377-9; Fossey 1988: 109; Aravantinos, Konecny and Marchese 2003: 289; Konecny and Marchese 2013: 28. Yet, it is likely that the altar was placed east of the circuit wall. Schachter 1994: 142.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. *IG VII 2510*, l. 4. In the *lacuna* in Paus. 9.2.5, Pausanias observes something made of bronze next to the altar and statue of Zeus Eleutherios. In the Teubner edition, it is emended as follows: οὐ πόρρω δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων Διὸς ἐστὶν Ἐλευθερίου βωμὸς <καὶ ἄγαλμα· ἔστηκε δ' ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἄγαλμα Κιθαιρῶνος, ὃ δὲ Κιθαιρῶν τὸ ὄρος Διὸς ἱερὸν Κιθαιρῶνιου ἐστίν·> τοῦτον μὲν δὴ χαλκοῦ. Rocha-Pereira 1981: 4. Several attempts to emend 9.2.5 have been made to confirm another monument next to Zeus Eleutherios. See the *apparatus criticus* on line 37 in Moggi and Osanna 2010: 16. On this, Knoepfler 2006: 610-1 proposes a fascinating emendation (“καὶ ἄγαλμα· ἐστὶν δὲ ἐνταῦθα καὶ τῆς Ὁμονοίας βωμὸς”), but given the cult of the Homonoia of the Greeks had the common altar with Zeus Eleutherios, this is not plausible unless a new altar for this goddess was added by the time of Pausanias (Étienne and Piérart 1975: 53, ll. 39-40; Schachter 1994: 130-1). Thus, ἄγαλμα rather than βωμὸς fits here in a similar way as Schachter 1994: 103, n. 1 proposes (“ἔστι δὲ παρὰ τῷ βωμῷ Ὁμονοίας τε καὶ Διὸς ἀγάλματα.”). His proposal is missed by Moggi and Osanna. A large honorific statue base for a renowned Roman senator of the third century AD, Lucius Egnatius Victor Lollianus, confirms that there must have been a statue of the Homonoia of the Greeks next to that of Zeus Eleutherios (*IG VII 2510*, l. 4: “παρὰ τῷ Ἐλευθερίῳ Διὶ καὶ τῇ Ὁμονοίᾳ τῶν Ἑλλήνων”) and the statue of Lollianus was added to this statue group (For his career, see Sourlas 2019: 395-7 with *PIR*<sup>2</sup> E 36). However, the statue base for Lollianus also reduces the validity of the above emendation: there may be a monument group with the statues of Zeus Eleutherios and the Homonoia of the Greeks as its cores. We also have evidence that the honorific *stèle* for Glaukon was erected near the altar (Étienne and Piérart 1975: 53, ll. 39-40). Isn't it possible, for instance, that the statue of Hadrian stood next to that of Zeus Eleutherios with other statues of renowned people as seen in Athens (Paus. 1.3.2)? We cannot have a strong case as to what monument made of bronze Pausanias mentions.

<sup>93</sup> For the sacrifice to the fallen, see Plut. *Arist.* 21.1-6; Plut. *Mor.* 872e. For that of Zeus Eleutherios,

contrast to above-mentioned monuments placed outside the circuit wall, the next section's focus is on the monuments inside the wall, as these will offer good examples to think about the Plataian civic memory and landscape.

### **4.4.3. The Tomb of Euchidas**

Plutarch tells the anecdote of Euchidas carrying fire from Delphi to purify Plataia and establish the cult of Zeus Eleutherios. At the beginning of the analysis below, it will be useful to cite Plutarch's account. His account of the establishment of the Eleutheria starts from the end of the Battle of Plataia.<sup>94</sup>

When they inquired of the oracle at Delphi as to what sacrifice should be made, the Pythian god answered that they should set up an altar to Zeus Eleutherios, but should not sacrifice on it until they had extinguished throughout the land the fire, which he said had been polluted by the barbarians, and had rekindled it, fresh and pure from the public altar at Delphi. Accordingly, the Greek commanders travelled around the territory of Plataia and compelled all those who were using fire to put it out. Meanwhile, Euchidas, who promised to fetch the fire with the utmost speed, went from Plataia to Delphi. There he purified his body by sprinkling himself with holy water and was crowned with laurel. Then he took the sacred fire from the altar and set out to run back to Plataia; he arrived there before sunset, having covered 1,000 stades in a single day. He embraced his fellow-citizens, handed them the sacred fire, and then at once collapsed and a little afterwards died. In token of their admiration the Plataians buried him in the sanctuary of Artemis Eukleia and carved this verse in tetrameters on his tomb:

Euchidas, who ran to Delphi, came back here the self-same day.

Most people who believe that Eukleia is the goddess Artemis and address her by that name. But there are some who say that she was the child of Herakles and of that Myrto who was the daughter of Menoitios and sister of Patroklos, and that she died a virgin and was worshipped by the Boiotians and Lokrians. An altar and a statue dedicated to her stand in every market-place, and couples who are about to marry offer sacrifice to her.

---

see Plut. *Arist.* 19.8.

<sup>94</sup> Plut. *Arist.* 20.4-6. Translation modified from Scott-Kilvert 1960.

The anecdote about Euchidas marked its local origin and the Plataian presence in the preparation phase of the foundation of the cult of Zeus Eleutherios.<sup>95</sup> Apart from this, there are not any explicit references to the cult's foundation in historiography.<sup>96</sup> It is well known that the Spartan leader Pausanias dedicated a sacrifice to Zeus Eleutherios in the agora of Plataia after the Battle of Plataia (Thuc. 2.71.2). This seemed to be a casual one but could be interpreted as being related to the official cult.<sup>97</sup> Diodoros also refers to the story of the foundation of the Eleutheria after the Battle of Salamis and Mardonius' failure to induce Athens to the Persian side. According to him, after Mardonios left for Thebes, "it was decided by the councillors of the Greeks (ἔδοξε τοῖς συνέδροις τῶν Ἑλλήνων) to make common cause with the Athenians; to march out in full strength to Plataia and fight to the death for freedom; and to make a vow to the gods that, if they should emerge victorious, the Hellenes would, on that day, unite in celebrating a festival of freedom and hold the games of the festival in Plataia (ἄγειν κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν τοὺς Ἑλληνας ἐλευθέρια κοινῇ, καὶ τὸν ἐλευθέριον ἀγῶνα συντελεῖν ἐν ταῖς Πλαταιαῖς)." <sup>98</sup> Again, this account does not explain the official cult. It is striking that the Plataians were not involved, at least not foregrounded, in these accounts. The Plataians altered a proto-story of the cult foundation into the legend of Euchidas probably in order to counterbalance the deficiency of their presence in historiography.

For this, the Plataians were highly likely to have appropriated the Marathon legends to invent a local narrative. One of these legends, according to Plutarch, tells that Eukles, having run from the battlefield to the city in full armour after the Battle of Marathon, reported the victory at the doors of Athenians and died.<sup>99</sup> Plutarch also says that many

---

<sup>95</sup> Burial within a sanctuary means heroisation. Sansone 1989: 197. Jung 2006: 348-50 argues that this story is a founding narrative for a *hoplitodromia*, or race in armour (cf. Paus. 9.1.6), rejecting Chambry and Flacelière 1969: 214 and Schachter 1994: 102 who see it as the origin story of a *lampadophoria*, or a torch race, which is not yet known at the Eleutheria. Kienast 1995: 133 takes the purification story as a historical fact.

<sup>96</sup> According to Strabo 9.2.31, it was the Greek forces (αἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων δυνάμεις) that established the cult and festival after the battle. Aristid. *Or.* 1.190 may mean the cultic foundation and the agent seems to be the Greeks there. Cf. *Anth. Pal.* 8.50; Hsch. s.v. Ἐλευθέριος Ζεὺς.

<sup>97</sup> As Schachter 1994: 127-8 and Jung 2006: 267-70 suggest, Pausanias' sacrifice is a casual one and just a one-off event. Yet, some believe this was the foundation of the cult, e.g. Thériault 1996: 115.

<sup>98</sup> Diod. Sic. 11.29.1-2. Translation modified from Green 2006: 85.

<sup>99</sup> Plut. *De glor. Ath.* 347c-d. Cf. Hdt. 6.105-6; Lucian, *Pro lapsu inter salutandum* 3; Suolahti 1967;

historians call the runner Eukles but Herakleides Pontikos names him Thersippos. If we believe Plutarch's account, there are significant similarities between these two legends: both running long distances; the similarity in their name (Eukles and Euchidas. Eukles comes from εὖ plus κλέος, so it means 'fair glory,' and similarly, Euchidas is possible to mean 'glory' as it seems to come from εὖχος plus the suffix ῖδης. Since Euchidas is a very uncommon name, the name of the hero seems to be highly artificial.); the death of the runners after completing their mission; Eukleia was worshipped at Marathon, where her temple was said to be built from the booty of Marathon in order to commemorate the victory there (Paus. 1.14.5), while there was the sanctuary of Artemis Eukleia at Plataia, where Plutarch reports that Euchidas was buried (Plut. *Arist.* 20.6). If we admit the relationship between Plataia legend and Marathon one, the invention of the anecdote can be dated after the fourth century BC. The Marathon legend itself may owe its origins to another famous Persian Wars runner, Pheidippides, who met Pan on the way to Sparta, although Herodotos does not mention the death of the runner (Hdt. 6.105-6).<sup>100</sup> If Plutarch's reference is true, then, the fourth-century BC writer Herakleides Pontikos made the earliest extant reference to the legend of a Marathon runner who died on his arrival (Plut. *De glor. Ath.* 347c). The Plataian legend of Euchidas seems to have been invented after the reconstruction of the city by adopting, or at least interacting with, the Marathon legend. Paul Cartledge argues that this story was created in the context of an inter-city competition in commemoration between Athens and Plataia.<sup>101</sup> But, his argument goes too far since it is hard to find a trace of the competitive relationship between them from sources.<sup>102</sup> Rather, this may be an attempt to fill some parts of the memory of the cult of Zeus Eleutherios by appropriating the Marathon legend.

The Plataians anchored this legend in the landscape of the city by building Euchidas' tomb. Although Pausanias did not leave a record of the temple of Artemis Eukleia at Plataia, Plutarch's assertion confirms that the temple was placed in the agora of the city with the tomb which bears the inscription. It is even possible that he himself witnessed it in his visit to Plataia (cf. Plut. *Arist.* 20.3). If the legend was invented in the fourth

---

Jung 2006: 181-91; Athanassaki 2016.

<sup>100</sup> Note that the well-known version in the modern world in which Pheidippides/Philippides runs from Marathon does not appear until Lucian in the second century AD. Lucian, *Pro lapsu inter salutandum* 3.

<sup>101</sup> Cartledge 2013: 130-1.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Herakleides Kritikou, *BNJ*<sup>2</sup> 369A F1.11; Badian 1989; Hammond 1992; Kapparis 1995, esp. 375-8.

century BC, then the tomb was also constructed after the reconstruction of the city.

#### **4.4.4. The Temple of Athena Areia**

In terms of the temple of Athena Areia at Plataia, Pausanias depicts its decoration in detail at 9.4.1-2, which is the only source for its interior. The temple was reportedly built around the middle of the fifth century BC and might be left unharmed in the destructions of the city.<sup>103</sup> However, the interior might have been repaired as a result of weathering and deterioration, and it is highly doubtful that Pausanias, over five hundred years later, witnessed the original appearance of the building.<sup>104</sup> Later, it seems likely that the temple was included in the new circuit wall built after 335 BC.<sup>105</sup>

The Plataians have also a sanctuary of Athena Areia: it was built from the share which the Athenians assigned them of the booty taken at the battle of Marathon. The image is of wood gilded, but the face, hands, and feet are of Pentelic marble. In size it falls little short of the bronze image on the Akropolis, which the Athenians also dedicated from the spoils of the battle of Marathon. It was Pheidias who made the image of Athena for the Plataians as well as for the Athenians. There are paintings in the temple: one of them, by Polygnotos, represents Odysseus after he has killed the wooers; the other, by Onasias, depicts the former expedition of the Argives, under Adrastus, against Thebes.<sup>106</sup> These paintings are on the walls of the *pronaos*. At the feet of the image is a statue of Arimnestos, who commanded the Plataians at the battle with Mardonios, and previously at the battle of Marathon.

The Temple of Athena Areia seems to have been one of the most prominent monuments of the Persian Wars inside the Plataian Hellenistic circuit wall. This is attested not only by the reported funding of the temple - the spoils from Marathon - but also the statue of

---

<sup>103</sup> Yates 2013: 370, n. 9.

<sup>104</sup> Plutarch witnesses the decorative paintings that “have remained in perfect condition” to his day (αἰ μέχρι νῦν ἀκμάζουσαι διαμένουσιν) more than 500 years after their completion (Plut. *Arist.* 20.3). It is tempting to assume he saw repaired ones.

<sup>105</sup> Yates 2013: 371, n. 13. Translation modified from Frazer 1898a: 449.

<sup>106</sup> The reading of Jeppesen 1971 (Ὀνασία δὲ ἀργοῦσά που κατὰ τὸ θεῖον ἐπὶ Θήβας ἢ προτέρα στρατεία) is not supported. Moggi and Osanna 2010: 24; Yates 2013: 371, n. 12. Pausanias also provides further information about this painting on 9.5.11.

Arimnestos, who was the Plataian general at Marathon and Plataia, as Pausanias says. This could be further confirmed by Plutarch, who also tells a different story that it was made from the spoils not of Marathon but of Plataia.

Scholars interpret the meaning of the paintings on the walls of the *pronaos* of the temple. Polygnotos' painting refers to Book 22 of *Odyssey* while the painting by Onasias is identified as a scene from the "Seven against Thebes".<sup>107</sup> Because of the funding reported to be provided by the Athenians, scholars have assumed that these are a reflection of the Athenian propaganda. The main advocator of this thesis is David Castriota, who argues that the building of the temple came from the booty of Plataia, yet the decorations were funded from Marathon booty. Athena, the deity of Athens, also represents the Athenian influence because her aid was not sought by the Greeks in the Battle of Plataia. In short, they were to glorify the Athenian role in the wars against the Persians.<sup>108</sup> However, David Yates pushes forward the idea that the paintings represent the Plataian view on Xerxes' expedition, in which the Plataians recalled the war as a civil strife against the compatriots, i.e. the Boiotians. He rejected Castriota's argument as an overestimation of Athenian influence and argued more simply that the paintings were selected by the will of the Plataians as the temple was built within Plataian territory.<sup>109</sup>

As David Yates argues, we should not overestimate the Athenian influence on the Plataian monument. The temple of Athena Areia was likely to be built by the Plataians using the resources gained from the Persian Wars. Yates' idea may be supported by the statue of Arimnestos. He was the Plataian general of Marathon and Plataia but he was not so prominent in the account of Herodotos. However, he was certainly a prominent local figure. Despite his alleged generalship at Marathon (Paus. 9.4.2), Arimnestos is famous for his service as general of the Plataians in the Battle of Plataia. Although he played almost no role in Herodotos' *Histories* (9.72.2), he even becomes one of the causes of the victory in Plutarch's *Life of Aristeides* (Plut. *Arist.* 11.3-8).

Yates also supports the idea that the temple was built twice, one after Marathon in 490 BC and the other after 479 BC. The old one was destroyed by Xerxes' army in 480 BC. Plutarch's wording "ἀνῶκοδόμησαν" which can mean 'rebuild' can support this idea.<sup>110</sup> We know that there is a similar monument in Athens: the Older Parthenon,

---

<sup>107</sup> For Polygnotos' painting, see Castriota 1992: 73-6; Yates 2013: 372 with 372, n. 16.

<sup>108</sup> Castriota 1992: 63-5.

<sup>109</sup> Yates 2013: 372-3, Cf. Jung 2006: 257-9 for the Plataian perspective.

<sup>110</sup> Yates 2013: 372-3. See also Mikalson 2003: 101-2.

which the Athenians are believed to have started to construct after Marathon but which Xerxes destroyed in 480 BC.<sup>111</sup> This can explain the discrepancy between Pausanias and Plutarch, who must have acquired information from the locals. If so, Pausanias and Plutarch may each refer to different phases of the temple when they disagree over whether it was built from the spoils of Marathon or Plataia.

For our purposes, what is important is not what happened but how things were interpreted. How did the Plataians interpret and give meanings to the monument which was built as an embodiment of the Plataian memory of the Battle of Plataia? As both Pausanias and Plutarch tell the local tradition, the temple was believed by the locals to be made from both the spoils of Marathon and Plataia. This also means the temple was associated with the memory of the Plataian participation in the Battles of Marathon and Plataia.

There is another report from Plutarch about the origin of this temple in his narrative of the *Life of Aristeides* (Plut. *Arist.* 20.1-3).<sup>112</sup> After the Battle of Plataia, the Athenians refused to give the *aristeia* to the Spartans and disallowed them to erect a *tropaion*. Since Aristeides persuaded his colleagues to leave a decision to the Greeks, they started to deliberate.<sup>113</sup> In this intense situation, Aristeides appears as an arbitrator, but not proposing an honour for the Spartans but entrusting the judge to the Greek allies. Thus, the Athenians stand completely in opposition to the Spartans. The Greek allies played a crucial role in Plutarch's narrative. Theogeiton, the Megarian, claimed the *aristeia* should be given to a state other than Athens and Sparta on the one hand, Kleokritos, the Korinthian, proposed that the Plataians receive it instead on the other hand, the proposal which Aristeides and Pausanias approved for their own *poleis*. They became reconciled with each other, and the Plataians received 80 talents by which they built the temple of Athena. It was decorated with paintings which remained in perfect condition still in his day. On the other hand, the Athenians and the Spartans erected their own trophy respectively.<sup>114</sup> This means that while their rivalry has not ended, a temporary

---

<sup>111</sup> Hurwit 1999: 130-5, cf. 105-16, 160-3.

<sup>112</sup> The authenticity of this account has been discussed. See Macan 1908: 745; Hignett 1963: 20-1, 419; Calabi Limentani 1964: xxxi-xxxii; Pritchett 1974: 283-6; Sansone 1989: 197. On the general tendency of Plutarch's narrative of the Battle of Plataia in the *Life of Aristeides*, see Marincola 2016.

<sup>113</sup> Note "the Greeks" means the generals of the Greek allies. See Calabi Limentani 1964: 84.

<sup>114</sup> Scholars recognise their accounts as the historical precedents of the ceremony of the *dialogos*. See Robertson 1986: 101-2; Cartledge and Spawforth 2002: 177. Schachter 1994: 142-3; Jung 2006: 354 only refer to Plutarch.

reconciliation has been reached. Here, the Plataians were given the *aristeia* as the result of the compromise.<sup>115</sup>

According to this story, the temple of Athena, which must be that of Athena Areia, was built as the reward of this *aristeia*. Here, the Plataians came into the competition for claiming credit for the victory in the Battle of Plataia and won it despite the result of the reconciliation. The Plataian achievement must have stemmed from the offering of its soil to the Greeks to fight on. It is reported that Alexander the Great honoured the Plataians for this (Plut. *Alex.* 34.2; Plut. *Arist.* 11.9). The temple, then, became the monument that recalled the Plataian credit and the Greek conflict. Plutarch must have visited Plataia and knew the local stories through local guides and treatises about Plataian cultic and mythical information.<sup>116</sup> His account reflects the local memory of the Plataian achievement for Plataia.

The Temple of Athena Areia thus constitutes a double memory of Plataia. On the one hand, it was a monument that illuminated their own memory of the Battle of Plataia as a conflict not only against the Persians but also against the Boiotians, and on the other hand, it was also a monument with which the memory of the honour bestowed on Plataia was associated. This was then coloured by the memory of Plataia's civic pride and contribution to Greece.

In sum, Plataia linked Plataian local memories of the Persian wars to monuments inside the city and placed Panhellenic or non-Plataian memories outside the city. Plataia had, by the Roman period, become a place of honouring Greek unity and victory, with panhellenic rituals at the Eleutheria and sacrifices to Zeus Eleutherios. However, monuments related to such rituals were placed outside the city walls and were distinct from the monuments placed within the city. The tomb of Euchidas at the Plataian Agora and the temple of Athena Areia each had the role of anchoring the story of Plataia's heroes and the memory of Plataia's contribution to Greece inside the city. Plataia thus seems to have create a segregation of the monuments, allowing multiple memories to

---

<sup>115</sup> Plutarch cites Kleidemos, who gave the *aristeia* of soldiers to the tribe of Aiantis (Plut. *Arist.* 19.6 = Kleidemos, *BNJ* 323 F 22. Cf. Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 628e-f). Thus, in Plutarch's narrative, Spartan credit is forfeited. It is almost impossible to know if the account of Plut. *Arist.* 20.1-3 also derives from Kleidemos. Herodotos tells Sopanes, son of Euthychides of Dekeleia, is highly esteemed among the Athenians. This report contradicts Plutarch as Dekeleia belongs to the tribe of Hippothontis. Hdt. 9.73.1, 74.

<sup>116</sup> Plutarch wrote an essay, "Περὶ τῶν ἐν Πλαταιαῖς Δαιδάλων" (*On the Festival of Statues at Plataia*). The fragments are contained as fr. 157-8 in the Loeb edition (Sandbach 1969).

coexist in symbiosis.

#### 4.5. CONCLUSION

As we have seen above, memories of the Battle of Plataia were complex and created a Plataian landscape that accommodated the multiple memories. This seemed to begin with the fact that the *polis* on whose land the battle was fought differed from the *poleis* claiming credit for the victory. The Battle of Plataia was a Panhellenic victory, a battle that brought the mainland conflict with Xerxes to an end. Although the Spartans were most highly evaluated for their success on the battlefield, the Plataians, who provided the battlefield, were also important to the Greeks. As being among the Boiotians, many of whom were allied to Persia, the Plataians, who remained allied to the Greeks, remembered the Battle of Plataia with an image of internal discord. On the other hand, the Athenians, who had arrayed themselves with Sparta, later began to exaggerate their own military success, reaching a discourse that later claimed Plataia as an Athenian victory. On this grounding, the memory of the Battle of Plataia underwent more complex changes as Plataia was subsequently tossed around by various political powers. Plataia had maintained friendly relations with Athens since the sixth century BC and had therefore been treated favourably by the Athenians. However, because of this alliance, it was destroyed by Sparta in 427 BC during the Peloponnesian War. The destruction of Plataia, the site of its own victory, was a blow to Sparta's reputation, as Sparta was the victor in the Battle of Plataia in the view of the Greeks of the time. Plataia was rebuilt by Philip II and Alexander the Great after a period of hardship. However, this was the result of a political decision to bring stability to Greece in preparation for the coming Persian expedition. The Eleutheria, established under their auspices, was a festival to commemorate the Persian Wars, overseen by the *koinon* of the Greeks. Before and after the Chremonidian War, Plataia was again the scene of the Greeks' struggle for freedom. Sparked by the struggle of Athens, Sparta and Ptolemy II to remove Antigonos Gonatas from the Greek mainland, Plataia became an anti-Macedonian centre. After the arrival of the Romans in Greece, the Eleutheria adopted a new ritual, the *dialogos*, centred on Athens and Sparta. This ritual, held around the leading position of the procession, became influential on the mood of the entire festival. Athens and Sparta, which claimed credit in Plataia, were placed within the Eleutheria by the ritual of the *dialogos*.

In this sense, the Eleutheria was not simply a celebration of victory over Persia and freedom. It chose the memory of the Battle of Plataia being decided by either Athens or Sparta, the memory of the political situation in the Eastern Mediterranean in the fifth century BC centred on them, and the memory of Greek unity as its framework. But Plataia also developed local traditions and shaped the memory of their own contribution in a way that related them to the *dialogos* and the Eleutheria. They were anchored in the urban space of Plataia and shaped the space of Plataia. It may be possible that they may have influenced the organisation of the Eleutheria conversely, but there is no conclusive evidence. In any case, it can be said that Plataia functioned as a space formed by the overlapping of these various memories.

## The Power of Rome

### The Greek Perceptions of the Romans through the Lens of the Persian Wars

#### 5.1. INTRODUCTION

Plutarch, in his *Life of Flamininus*, talks about how honourable the proclamation of freedom by Flamininus is. After his victory over Philip V at the Battle of Kynoskephalai in Thessaly, Flamininus succeeded in getting rid of him from Greece. Flamininus attended the *penteteric* festival in Korinth, where he decreed that cities such as Korinth and Magnesia should be “free, without garrisons, or tribute, in full enjoyment of the laws of their respective countries”. The reactions of the Greeks after the proclamation are vividly recorded by several authors, among whom Plutarch is noteworthy because he clearly interweaves his own thoughts into his account.<sup>1</sup>

In the course of what was, naturally, an increasingly pleasant evening, people’s minds and conversations turned to Greece. They spoke of the fact that, although the freedom of Greece had been the object of many wars, it had never been gained more securely or less painfully than now, when the cause had been championed by non-Greeks, and Greece itself had shed hardly a drop of blood or a tear of grief while winning the fairest and most precious prize of all. It was indeed true, they reflected, that however rare it was to find a man of courage or intelligence, there was no blessing rarer than a man of integrity.

---

<sup>1</sup> Plut. *Flam.* 11.3-7. Translation slightly modified from Waterfield 2016.

Commanders like Agesilaos, Lysander, Nicias and Alkibiades were brilliant at handling wars and winning battles on land and at sea, but they had no idea how to use their success for generous and noble purposes. In fact, apart from the battles of Marathon, Salamis, Plataia, and Thermopylai, and Kimon's victories at the Eurymedon and on Cyprus, every war Greece had fought had contributed to its own enslavement, and every trophy it had erected commemorated catastrophe and shame, since its ruination had invariably been caused by the destructive rivalry of its leaders. But now foreigners who were generally held to have no more than a faint spark of Greek ancestry and very little in common with them, and who had therefore hardly been expected to form principles and policies in Greece's interest, had suffered and faced extreme danger in order to rid Greece of oppressive despots and tyrants, and make it free.

His message is explicit. For Plutarch, Flamininus' liberation of the Greeks is only comparable with the glorious past of the Greeks, namely, wars against the Persians. The memory of the Persians is again implied in his reference to "cruel despots and tyrants" (δεσποτῶν χαλεπῶν καὶ τυράννων). Contrary to Plutarch's clear statement, Polybios, Plutarch's primary source, makes no mention of such reactions nor the recollection of the Classical past. We can only acquire the Hellenistic echo in his reports of the mob calling Flamininus a "saviour" (σωτήρα) (Polyb. 18.46.12).<sup>2</sup> Flamininus received the title of saviour in several places in the same way as the Hellenistic kings did. Although he often mentions Flamininus, Pausanias has nothing to say about the proclamation of freedom, not even when discussing Korinth.<sup>3</sup> Were ideas like Plutarch's exceptional at the time?<sup>4</sup>

The theme of this chapter is the relationship between the Greek perception of Roman power and the imagery of the Persian Wars. As we have seen in Chapters. 1-3, the

---

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Livy 33.32-3. See also Livy 34.50.9; Plut. *Flam.* 10.5, 16.4; Polyb. 18.46.12; *IG XI* 9.913; *SEG* 11.923, 22.214; *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 592, 616. Flamininus was once called as a saviour and liberator (*servatorem liberatoremque*), which means σωτήρ καὶ ἐλευθέριον, in the meeting at Korinth in 194 BC after the Nabis War. The latter of these titles is the cult title of Zeus, worshipped at Athens and Plataia. Livy 34.50.9; Walbank 1942: 145, n. 1. However, Weinstock 1971: 143 argues that this title was anachronistically added by Livy. Cf. Briscoe 1981: 127.

<sup>3</sup> For Pausanias' references to Flamininus, see Paus. 7.7.9, 7.8.1-2, 7.8.7, 8.11.11. Cf. Swain 1996: 335-40, esp. 339; Akujärvi 2005: 279-81.

<sup>4</sup> Recent studies have even pointed out that the Romans themselves used the imagery of the Persian Wars for propaganda purposes. Russo 2010; Russo 2013; Russo 2014; Almagor 2019.

imagery of the Persian Wars has been used to recognise the invaders and aggressors, such as the Athenian enemies, the Macedonians and the Gauls. In the time of the coming of Rome, the Persian Wars remained a comparator of the new power, the Romans, and became the criteria for judging their deeds. So, how were they used?

The main argument of this chapter is that the imagery of the Persian Wars provided an image for the perception of Roman power, but that the ways of recalling the memory of the Persian Wars changed with the growth of Roman rule. It functioned as criteria for measuring who the Romans were, while the changing of the worldview with the expansion of Rome affected how the Greeks recalled the Persian Wars. This chapter, therefore, takes up three examples in a roughly chronological fashion. In Section 2, I will consider a poem of Alkaios together with the *Alexandra* of Lykophron and analyse the way in which the Greeks perceived the Romans as the Other. Section 3 focuses on Polybios' account of the Achaian War of the 140s BC, which refers to Rome as a disaster for the Greeks and looks at the treatment of the Persian Wars there. Finally, Section 4 examines Diodoros' account in the preamble of Book 37, which compares the magnitude of Rome's Marsic War with those of the wars in the areas where the Romans conquered. With the completion of the Roman domination of the Mediterranean Sea, the Greeks needed to find a new framework to understand Roman power. There was a necessity to accommodate the memory of the Persian Wars into this new framework.

## 5.2. ROME AS OTHER

The first examples we will see come from the context of the first Roman intervention in the politics of Greek freedom. After the Second Macedonian War, the Romans established their position as patron of Greek freedom. It was the proclamation at the Isthmia in 196 BC when the Romans started to seriously intervene in the freedom of the Greeks.<sup>5</sup> This was probably a countermeasure against Philip V, who behaved as a freedom-giver.<sup>6</sup> However, the Romans realised how effective it was to declare and

---

<sup>5</sup> See Gruen 1984: 144-6. Cf. *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 591, ll. 34, 75. Appian refers to the Roman measure to leave Korkyra and Apollonia free in 228 BC. This may be the first Roman involvement in freedom. See App. *Ill.* 8 with Bernhardt 1971: 28-9 with n. 101 and Gruen 1984: 144, n. 76 on the meaning of this account.

<sup>6</sup> For Philippos' concern with freedom, see Polyb. 4.25.6-8; *I.Labraunda* 5, esp. ll. 34-6;

ensure freedom and autonomy in building up the relationship with the Greeks of the Eastern Mediterranean since then.

Flamininus had drawn the Greek tradition to represent himself as a successor of the freedom-givers. The declaration of Greek freedom was, of course, an outcome of Flamininus' learning of Greek diplomacy. His choice of Korinth as the place of the declaration must have been also intentional. As has been discussed in Chapters 2.2.1 and 2.3.2, this was the place not only where Philip II established his League of Korinth but also the Greeks held a meeting for the formation of the Hellenic League against Xerxes in 481 BC.<sup>7</sup> Korinth became a place for the declaration of freedom after Philip II. We have already seen the use of Korinth by successors and kings, such as Polyperchon in 318 BC, Ptolemy I (*Suda* Δ 431: 308 BC), and Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes (*Diod. Sic.* 20.102-3.3; *Plut. Demetr.* 25.1: 302 BC).<sup>8</sup> In addition to them, Antigonos Doson (*SdA* III 507: 224/3 BC) and Philip V (*Polyb.* 4.25.7-26.1: 220 BC) also utilised Korinth, and the Isthmian Games, in particular, to declare the freedom of the Greeks.<sup>9</sup>

After the declaration of Greek freedom in 196 BC, the Romans linked their military conflicts with Greek freedom.<sup>10</sup> In 195 BC, for instance, the Senate and Flamininus gathered the Greeks at Korinth and declared war against Nabis for the freedom of Argos and the liberation of Greece.<sup>11</sup> As Antiochos III represented himself as a freedom-giver, the war against Antiochos III again became the conflict between the champions of Greek freedom.<sup>12</sup>

---

*I.Labraunda* 7, esp. ll. 9-10; *Polyb.* 4.84.4-5, cf. *Livy* 32.22.10.

<sup>7</sup> Flamininus dedicated silver shields (ἀσπίδας ἀργυρᾶς) at Delphi at some points in 190s BC (*Plut. Flam.* 12.11-12). These may have come from the booty from either the Macedonians or the Spartans. If these were placed in the temple of Apollo, he might have utilised the connotations of other dedications such as the shields dedicated by the Athenians made from the booty of Marathon and those of Gauls by the Aitolians (*Paus.* 10.19.4). On the epigrams on his dedications, see *Erskine* 2001: 41-2, cf. *Beneker* 2022: 105, n. 32.

<sup>8</sup> See Chapters 2.2.1 and 2.3.2.

<sup>9</sup> *Dixon* 2007; *Wallace* 2011b: 194-8. For Polyperchon's attempt, see *Dixon* 2007: 170-2, *Wallace* 2011a: 194-5.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Snowdon* 2010: 143.

<sup>11</sup> *Livy* 34.22.7-13. See also *Livy* 33.44.6-9, 34.41.3; *Gruen* 1984: 450-5.

<sup>12</sup> The slogan on Greek freedom by Antiochos III and the Aitolians: *Polyb.* 3.7.3; *Livy* 35.32.8-11, 35.33.8, 35.44.6, 35.46.6, 35.48.8. Rome: *App. Syr.* 6.24; *Livy* 34.58, 34.59.4-5. See also *Polyb.*

In this context, recent scholarship focuses on the workings of parallels between the Roman wars against two Macedonian dynasties (Philip V and Antiochos III) and the Persian Wars during this period.<sup>13</sup> In this early phase of contact with the Romans, the Greeks who favoured Rome utilised the analogy with the Persian Wars in order to support the Roman wars ideologically. By this parallel, at the same time, the Romans could identify their enemies as ‘enemies of the Greeks’ and thereby justify their intervention in Greek affairs.<sup>14</sup> But it is not so straightforward. The Romans were first and foremost foreigners despite their effort to assimilate with the Greeks. By focusing on two examples, a poem of Alkaios of Messene and the notoriously enigmatic *Alexandra* of Lykophron, we will see how the Greeks and Romans shaped the rhetoric of the Persian Wars to create an analogy between Persians and Macedonians and, at the same time, how the Greeks tried to recognise the Roman power by using the analogy.

At some point, probably after the Second Macedonian War, Alkaios, a poet from Messene, wrote a poem to glorify Flamininus’ proclamation of Greek freedom. This elegiac poem is interesting because Flamininus is compared with Xerxes in the following way:<sup>15</sup>

ἄγαγε καὶ Ξέρξης Πέρσαν στρατὸν Ἑλλάδος ἐς γᾶν,  
καὶ Τίτος εὐρείας ἄγαγ’ ἀπ’ Ἰταλίας;  
ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν Εὐρώπῃ δοῦλον ζυγὸν ἀχέει θήσων  
ἦλθεν, ὁ δ’ ἀμπαύσων Ἑλλάδα δουλοσύνας.

Both Xerxes led a Persian host to the land of Hellas,  
and Titus, too, led there a host from broad Italy,  
but the one meant to set the yoke of slavery on the neck of Europe,  
the other to put an end to servitude of Hellas.

Here, the statement that Flamininus is described as a liberator of Greece is emphasised by comparison with Xerxes, an enslaver of Greece and Europe. This poem is normally

---

21.14.7-9, 21.17; Livy 37.35.9-10, cf. App. *Syr.* 29.143-4, 29.147 for the Roman request of Antiochos III to withdraw beyond the Tarsos. See also Seager 1981: 110-2. Cf. Polyb. 21.19-23; Livy 37.53-54 for the speeches of Eumenes II and the Rhodians about the freedom of the Asian Greeks after the war.

<sup>13</sup> See p. 196, n. 4.

<sup>14</sup> Russo 2013: 161.

<sup>15</sup> *Anth. Pal.* 16.5. Translation from Paton 1918. On this poem, see Walbank 1943; Jones 2014a.

believed to be intended to create a contrast between the Romans and Philip V, as is implied by Xerxes here.<sup>16</sup> As Philippos was seen as a tyrant who was trying to enslave the Greeks, this parallelisation is not surprising.<sup>17</sup> We also have an example which might tell a contemporary reaction. At some point after the liberation from Philip V, the Thessalians established the cult of Zeus Eleutherios at Larissa. It is agreed by scholars that this festival was formed in reaction to the liberation from Macedon by the hands of Flamininus around c. 196 BC, soon after the Isthmian proclamation of Greek freedom. Zeus Eleutherios was the main god of the cults of the Persian Wars at Plataia, as we have closely seen in Chapter 4. Moreover, the cult of Zeus Eleutherios was linked with the anti-Macedonian movement in the third century BC. Scholars, therefore, reasonably see the Thessalian cult of Zeus Eleutherios as an adaptation or an imitation of the cult at Plataia.<sup>18</sup> Here, Flamininus' victory was paralleled here with the Persian Wars.<sup>19</sup> We can also recall that the Greeks have utilised the imagery of the Persian Wars to shape the rhetoric of wars against the Macedonians for almost a century, as we have seen in Chapter 2. Flamininus' policy is praised and supported.

However, an important assumption lies in the poem. We can simply read this as the comparison between two mighty foreigners, or barbarians, the Romans and the Persians, both coming outside of mainland Greece.<sup>20</sup> Despite its glorification of Flamininus as a freedom-giver, the wording of the poem seems to reflect the complex feelings of the Greeks about the Romans, who were regarded as ethnically and culturally foreigners and as a possible threat to the Greeks because of their growing power. The dangers posed to Greece come out clearly in a speech of 211 BC attributed by Polybios to the Akarnanian ambassador Lykiskos, in which he explicitly calls the Romans barbarians.<sup>21</sup> The Romans could be called βάρβαροι because of their foreign status. After 500 years, Plutarch still regards Flamininus as a foreigner and highly evaluates his liberation of

---

<sup>16</sup> Graninger 2011: 68-9; Nicholson 2023: 194-5, 204.

<sup>17</sup> The Attalids have utilised the barbarian imagery to shape their anti-Macedonian rhetoric. Stewart 2000: 40; Stewart 2004: 218-36; Nicholson 2023: 204. On the tyrannic and barbaric characterisation of Philippos V in Polybios' *Histories*, see also Nicholson 2023: 184-227, esp. 205-23.

<sup>18</sup> For this cult, see Graninger 2011: 67-85.

<sup>19</sup> Walbank 1943: 8, n. 6; Graninger 2011: 68-9.

<sup>20</sup> For the Romans as barbarians, see Erskine 2000, esp. 170-6; Champion 2004: 30-63. Cf. Erskine 1996; Nicholson 2023: 182-4. For Polybian avoidance of the application of βάρβαρος to the Romans, see Erskine 2000: 171-2; Gruen 2018: 15-9 with less elaboration.

<sup>21</sup> Polyb. 9.37-39, esp. 9.37.6

Greece for his non-Greek status.<sup>22</sup> However, at the same time, it is striking that the poet successfully sets Flamininus apart from the negative connotation of βάρβαρος by contrasting him with Xerxes, a tyrannic “barbarian” in the history of the Greeks. The result is obvious: for him, the Second Macedonian War is the war between the good non-Greek and the vicious barbaric tyrant. Thus, Alkaios offers a combination of meanings of Asiatic barbarians contrasted with European freedom-giver. The analogy of the Persian Wars works to make the Romans friends of the Greeks.

However, the Romans were not simply Others of the Greeks.<sup>23</sup> The comparison between the Romans and the Asiatic traditional barbarians may have come from the Asian ancestry of the Romans, which is marked by their Trojan descent. It may mean that the Romans were enemies of the Greeks by their ancestry and could be labelled as barbarians. Yet, things are not as simple as they look. The Greeks’ identification of the Romans as of Trojan descent was their attempt to understand the Romans within their own mythological system. The process began when the Greeks who came to the West started to have contact with the native population there. In doing so, the Greeks could understand who the Romans were, and the Romans could also situate themselves within the myth and history of the Greeks. Conversely, the process of the Roman adaptation of the Greek myth of the Trojans started around the sixth century BC, and the Romans’ own myth of the Trojan descent must have taken shape in the fourth century BC.<sup>24</sup> The Trojan myth then became a shared past of the Greeks and the Romans.

What could be possible if the Greeks utilised the Roman Trojan descent? One of the best and earliest attempts at situating the Romans within the history of Greece is Lykophron’s *Alexandra*, which is variously dated to the mid-third century BC or early second century BC.<sup>25</sup> I would support the dating of the early second century BC, at least after 196 BC, a date after the defeat of Philip V, as I believe it can best explain the place of Rome at the top of the sequence of the Europe-Asia conflicts referred to in the poem. This famously obscure poem is composed in the form of the prophecy of the Trojan

---

<sup>22</sup> Plut. *Phil.-Flam.* 1.1-2. For a Roman claim for Trojan ancestry and its importance for creating a link with the Greeks, see Erskine 2001.

<sup>23</sup> This paragraph is indebted to Erskine 2001: 131-56.

<sup>24</sup> Erskine 2001: 147, cf. Cornell 1995: 397-8.

<sup>25</sup> What follows is indebted mostly to West 2009; Priestley 2014: 179-85; Hornblower 2015. There is a disagreement over the date of the composition of the poem. See Hornblower 2015: 36-9, 114; Jones 2014b; Hornblower 2018: 3-10, 103 for the dating of the second-century BC. See Erskine 2001: 154-6; Erskine 2021: 390 for the dating of the mid-third century BC.

princess Cassandra, Priam's daughter. Greatly influenced by the preamble of Book 1 of Herodotos, Lykophron has Cassandra speak of the series of conflicts between Europe and Asia and the later Roman settlement of it (ll. 1283-450). Lykophron describes these conflicts as a chain of revenge. For instance, this starts with the abduction of Io by Phoenicians (1291-5), that of Europa by the Kretans and the invasion of the Troad by them (1296-308), the abduction of Medea by Jason and the Argonauts (1309-21), that of Antiope by Theseus and Herakles and the invasion of Attika by the Amazons as retaliation (1322-40). This includes the Trojan War (1369-73) and the Xerxes' invasion (1412-34). Then, the Romans mark the culmination of the Europe-Asia conflict (1435-50).

In this context, this Roman part, the latter part of the so-called "Roman Passages", with the lines which refer to Alexander the Great, is of importance (1435-50).<sup>26</sup> The passage basically means as follows: the struggle between Europe and Asia will continue after Xerxes' invasion. Yet, Alexander the Great ("a fierce lion" in 1439) will put an end to it by conquering the Achaemenid Empire ("the house of his brothers" in 1442). A Roman ("a unique wrestler" in 1446) will join in the conflict and defeat a successor of Alexander the Great ("him" in 1446) as is indicated as "shall come to an agreement of reconciliation about sea and land" in 1448, and, as a result, he will be celebrated by the Greeks ("his friends" in 1449).

The striking feature of this poem is that Rome's Trojan origin is utilised to situate the power of Rome in the Greek past and present. The Roman power is recognised and eulogised through being aligned with the Europe-Asia conflict. What is important here is the way in which Roman power is historicised. The framework of the series of conflicts between Europe and Asia here is written in the manner of Herodotos.<sup>27</sup> The Trojan War is a result of Paris' theft of Helen (1362-5), while Xerxes' invasion is a reprisal of the aggressions of Europe (1413). In these reciprocal conflicts, the Roman is qualified to join in the conflicts for their Asian descent. In this context, the perception of Rome is of importance. The power of Rome is described as controlling "sea and land" in lines 1446-9. These are supplemented by lines 1226-9, where Cassandra foretells that her descendants will increase the fame of her ancestors for "they will win the victory-wreath and the first-spoils, taking sceptre and kingship over land and sea" (γῆς καὶ

---

<sup>26</sup> Stephanie West goes too far in arguing the Roman materials were interpolated. See West 1983; West 1984. For the counterarguments, see Erskine 2001: 156, n. 102; McNelis and Sens 2011: 56-65

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Priestley 2014: 179-86.

θαλάσσης σκῆπτρα καὶ μοναρχίαν λαβόντες).<sup>28</sup> This Roman dominance of the world may be conceptualised after the Roman defeat of Philip V or Antiochos III. Polybios makes the Peace of Apameia the second phase of the completion of the Roman world domination.<sup>29</sup> Although there is no firm consensus on what the lines exactly refer to, what is important here is their literary effects.<sup>30</sup> The Roman dominance of the world is placed at the top of the long mythical-historical series of the Europe-Asia conflicts, and, coming after Alexander the Great, the Romans are described as ending these conflicts in the poem. Now, Rome is *the* power controlling the world, and this domination is the recovery of the glory of the Trojans.<sup>31</sup>

In the narrative leading to Rome, the expedition of Xerxes is characterised as an important historical event. In Cassandra's prophecy, Xerxes' expedition of Greece is the greatest battle before Alexander, with exceptional length and detail in the narrative of the Europe-Asia confrontation. What makes this war significant in the conflicts is that it is portrayed as a turning point in history leading to Alexander's world domination. The expedition is referred to in the poem as the culmination of the chain of revenge between Europe and Asia because it is characterised "as reprisal or in requital for all the damage done by Europe to Asia so far" (1413: "ἀντι πάντων". Citation from Hornblower 2015). Then, by omitting other battles which occurred between the Persian Wars and the conquest of Alexander the Great (e.g., the aggressions of the Delian League), the poet portrays the Roman victory as the end of the war between East and West as the chain of revenge. From this starting point, the confrontation shifts to a struggle for hegemony to govern Europe and Asia (1435-6), a new phase that welcomes the arrival of Alexander and a phase in which it is Rome that finally achieves world domination. Thus, Rome's achievements in bringing the conflict between Europe and Asia to an end are glorified, and through them, the glory of Troy is also celebrated.

To understand who the Romans were, the memory of the Persian Wars provided a useful framework. This framework was made possible by the status of the Romans as non-Greeks. Alkaios' comparison of Xerxes and Flamininus is established because the Romans are foreigners and newcomers to the Greek world. On the other hand, the

---

<sup>28</sup> Translation from Hornblower 2015.

<sup>29</sup> Polyb. 3.3.3-4. Cf. Polyb. 21.41.1-27; Livy 38.38.

<sup>30</sup> There is still a possibility that it was the expulsion of Pyrrhos when the Romans realised themselves powerful enough: in that case, the perspective of the poem may have come from south Italy. For this interpretation, see Erskine 2001: 155-6.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. McNelis and Sens 2011.

Trojan birth served to situate the Romans within the Greek worldview of Europe vs Asia, as indicated by Lykophron's poem. In the latter, Rome was made part of the Greek mythical-historical sequence as an entity that achieved world domination. Both can be described as attempts to understand the military power of Rome and to make it comprehensible to the Greeks. Interestingly, both attempts are to celebrate and honour the power of Rome who defeated the Macedonian kings. These positive reactions must have reflected pro-Roman perspectives or optimistic views on Rome at the very early phase of the Roman intervention into Greek affairs. As the following sections show, however, the Greek reactions to Rome became very complex as time went by. At the outset, the imagery of the Persian Wars was used to understand the Romans as having foreign origin and their power as newcomers.

### 5.3. ROME AS THE DISASTER

Korinth was sacked by the Roman armies led by Lucius Mummius after the defeat of the Achaian League in 146 BC.<sup>32</sup> After the Isthmian proclamation, Rome soon grew to be the sole power that was powerful enough to govern the affairs of the Eastern Mediterranean World and then became the most important freedom-givers to Greece. Through its victory over the king, Rome appeared as a protector of Greek freedom. However, this actually means that the fate of the Greeks was controlled by the Romans. This was manifested when the Romans decided to intervene in the conflict between the Achaian League and the Spartans.

The Achaian War and the subsequent sack of Korinth have been recognised as a pivotal year in ancient Greek history. Although the Romans still declared themselves the freedom-giver of the Greeks, the diplomatic landscape between the Greeks and Romans changed irreversibly after 146 BC.<sup>33</sup> Polybios ends his *Histories* with this point. Poseidonios starts his history from this point, while Diodoros, following Polybios, sees this as the worst disaster in the history of humankind. Pausanias also regards this as the

---

<sup>32</sup> For the reconstruction of the Achaian War, see Gruen 1976. For the sack of Korinth, Purcell 1995; Gebhard and Dickie 2003; Williams, Bookidis and Slane 2021.

<sup>33</sup> Jones 1940: 145; Girdvainyte 2020: 211-20. The proclamation of freedom in 146 BC: Dio Cass. 21.7.2 = Zonar. 9.31.

end of the life of Greece.<sup>34</sup> As the sack of Korinth shocked the Greeks in this way, Polybios compares this with another famous event, the Persian Wars, in order to illuminate the impact of the Achaian War on the history of the Greeks.

Polybios displays his view on the Achaian War at the beginning of Book 38.1-3. According to him, Greece has experienced several mischances, yet only the disaster (ἀτυχία) of their period, i.e. the Achaian War, deserves the word “disaster”. This could be revealed when one compares the cause and the truth of the disaster with the former mischances. Polybios refers to the sack of Carthage in 146 BC, the Xerxes invasion, the Peloponnesian War, the Battle of Leuktra, the Spartan expulsion of Mantinea in 386/5 BC, the destruction of Thebes by Alexander the Great and the Macedonian occupation of part of mainland Greece.<sup>35</sup> Polybios states that Xerxes’ invasion was seen by the majority as the most fearful for the Greeks before the Romans:<sup>36</sup>

The greatest terror with which fortune afflicted Greece is supposed to have been the crossing of Xerxes to Europe. For then we all were in danger but very few came to grief; first and foremost the Athenians, who, intelligently foreseeing what would happen, abandoned their city, taking their wives and children with them. Of course at the time they suffered severe damage, for the barbarians became masters of Athens and destroyed the town pitilessly. They did not, however, incur any reproach or shame, but on the contrary their action was universally regarded as being most glorious, in that, regardless of what might happen to themselves, they decided to throw in their fortunes with the rest of Greece. And in consequence, by this brave resolve, not only did they at once recover their fatherland and their country, but were soon disputing with Sparta the hegemony of Greece.

The reason for this selection seems to be magnitude. According to Polybios, every Greek experienced danger during this time, although only a few of their cities were destroyed. This creates the difference from the other mischances in which not the whole of Greece but just a city was threatened on each occasion. For the Achaian War, the whole of Greece suffered the general disaster by the Romans in Polybios’ eyes (Polyb. 3.5.6: ἅμα τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος ἔσχε τὸ κοινὸν ἀτύχημα πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος). The

---

<sup>34</sup> Diod. Sic. 37.26; Paus. 7.17,2, Cf. Yarrow 2006b, 58. For the ancient views on the sack of Korinth, see Hackl 1980; Purcell 1995; Arafat 1997, 90-7.

<sup>35</sup> Walbank 1979: 685-7.

<sup>36</sup> Polyb. 38.2.1-5. Translation from Paton and Olson 2012. For the Polybian reception of the fifth-century-BC-Athens, see Champion 2018.

defeat of the Greeks was accompanied by the further sufferings that he describes in detail in Books 38-9.<sup>37</sup> In the aftermath, L. Mummius and the Ten Commissioners executed further measures such as the replacement of democracies by the governments based on property qualification and the dissolution of the leagues such as the Achaian League and the Boiotian Leagues.<sup>38</sup> The Achaian War marks the completion of the Roman rule of mainland Greece, and, therefore, Polybios sees this as the worst disaster of Greek history, while Xerxes is ranked the second as he destroyed only part of Greece.

Yet, his point is not just the magnitude of an event but also the cause of the event. The experience of the Athenians is important for Polybios in describing the mischances. The utter destruction of Athens is noteworthy because they intentionally left the city and let the barbarians destroy it in order to share the fortune with the other Greeks. Thus, despite the destruction of the city, the Athenians received no blame nor dishonour but the biggest honour from the people, and they could recover quickly from the destruction and compete with the Spartans. Polybios' focus is not on the experience of the Greeks but on that of the Athenians, nor the result of the battle. His interest is only in the cause of the destruction of the city. For Polybios, because they experienced the disaster for this noble reason and by the hands of barbarians, Athens became a leading city in the Eastern Mediterranean.

His emphasis comes from the way he distinguishes the two types of calamities. He basically uses two words to refer to calamity: downfall (σύμπτωμα) and disaster (ἀτυχία).<sup>39</sup> While similar words are used for the former (e.g. συμφοραί and ἐλαττώματα), he has a clear distinction between the former and the latter. For him, a downfall and other similar terms can be applied to the cases in which those who suffered downfalls were not the cause of them. The destruction of Athens, for instance, was caused by the Persians, while the Spartans should be blamed for the defeat of Athens and its destruction of the city walls (Polyb. 38.2.1-7).<sup>40</sup> On the other hand, ἀτυχία and its cognates concern only those whose deeds bring reproach because of their own folly.<sup>41</sup> The Greeks in 146 BC deserved disaster because they suffered for what they had done with no possible excuse for their errors (Polyb. 38.1.3, 38.1.5). His invention of these

---

<sup>37</sup> Baronowski 2011: 120-1.

<sup>38</sup> Paus. 7.16.9; Girdvainyte 2020: 211-2. Cf. Shipley 2000: 384-5.

<sup>39</sup> See Baronowski 2011: 115-7 for the detailed discussion of “calamity” in Polybios.

<sup>40</sup> Baronowski 2011: 115-6.

<sup>41</sup> Polyb. 38.3.7: ἀτυχεῖν δὲ μόνους τούτους οἷς διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀβουλίαν ὄνειδος αἱ πράξεις ἐπιφέρουσι.

two types of calamities was apparently to blame the leaders of the Greeks in 146 BC and to differentiate the event from the past. This differentiation, of course, derives from Polybios' hostility towards Achaian leaders, Kritolaos, Diaios, and their supporters and his emphasis on the peculiarity of the events of 146 BC.<sup>42</sup>

Therefore, Polybios constructed his evaluation of the past calamities and the emphasis on certain points of the events, such as the destruction of Athens, from this point of view. However, in so doing, Polybios needed to adopt an uncommon emphasis on an aspect of Xerxes' invasion. The destruction of Athens does not fit this list very well because Athens was severely damaged, but the result was Greek overall victory. He does not even refer to the Greek victory and the Athenian achievement in the Battle of Salamis. This does not mean he forgets the Greek victory against Xerxes as elsewhere he emphasises the importance of the repulse of Xerxes as well as that of the repulse of the Gauls for the struggles for Greek freedom (Polyb. 2.35.7).<sup>43</sup> What does this ignorance mean for Polybios' narrative?

Polybios' selection makes a clear contrast with the list of Greek calamities of Arrian. His account is worth considering in this context. In Chapter 9 of Book 1 of his *Anabasis*, he emphasises the shock of the Greeks evoked by the destruction of Thebes in 335 BC by comparing this with the other calamities (πάθος and ξυμφορά). In addition to the Battle of Leuktra, he lists the Sicilian expedition of Athens, the Athenian defeat at the Battle of Aigospotamoi, the Spartan defeat at Mantinea in 362 BC, the Theban invasion into Laconia in 370/69 BC, the fall of Plataia in 427 BC and the annihilation of the male population of Skione in 421 BC and of Melos in 416 BC.<sup>44</sup> A feature of Arrian's account is his selection of minor incidents. Another feature of it is that all of these are the result of defeat, with the exception of the Theban invasion, in which there was no decision because of the withdrawal of the Thebans after the despatch of the Athenian soldiers for the rescue of the Spartans.<sup>45</sup> There is no room for Xerxes' expedition in this list. In another list, that of the Theban failings referred to immediately after the list of calamities, the Battle of Plataia is referred to by Arrian: according to him, the Thebans devastated Plataia's territory where the Greeks succeeded in pushing back the danger

---

<sup>42</sup> For the Polybios' hostility towards the leaders of the Achaians, see Baronowski 2011: 120-3.

<sup>43</sup> It is also notable that Polybios compares these two wars with the Roman defeat of the Gauls in 225 BC. See Champion 2004: 114-7.

<sup>44</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.1-6; Bosworth 1980: 87-8.

<sup>45</sup> For Skione and Melos, see Thuc. 5.32.1, 5.116.4, cf. Bosworth 1980, 88. For the Athenian aid and the Theban withdrawal, see Xen. *Hell.* 6,5.49-51.

(1.9.7: οἱ Ἕλληνες ... ἀπόσαντο τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὸν κίνδυνον). Although Arrian's focus is not on the Greek victory but on the Thebans' devastation of Plataia, his observations suggest that Xerxes' invasion could not be a "full" calamity because the Greeks expelled the danger of the Persians. He also seems to have followed the general tendency of referring to Xerxes' invasion as "danger" (κίνδυνος) here.<sup>46</sup> Polybios' account of Xerxes' invasion is striking in this context. As we saw, he ignores the Battle of Salamis and the overall victory of the Greeks but focuses on the general threat to mainland Greece and the destruction of the city. Polybios here masks the positive aspects of Xerxes' invasion for the Greeks and instead emphasises its negative ones in order to put it into his list of calamities.

The result of this emphasis is notable. First, Polybios succeeds in making a comparison between the Achaian War and Xerxes' expedition. Now the latter becomes the second biggest calamity of Greek history, which is to be compared with the biggest one given by Roman power. Second, he successfully recognises Roman power in the history of the succession of Greek hegemony. In his list, calamities mean the destruction and occupation of cities and the defeat of cities. But the selection of these mischances is apparently intentional. If we set aside his insertion of the fall of Mantinea in 386/5 BC as Polybios' attempt to distract the readers' attention from the Achaian sack of Mantinea in 223 BC, his list of calamities concerns only Athens, Sparta, Thebes, and the cities under Alexander the Great and the Macedonian kings.<sup>47</sup> By this composition, Polybios shows his recognition that Rome established itself as a new hegemonic power in the Greek world as a result of its victory in the Achaian War.

In short, Polybios emphasises the destruction of Athens by Xerxes in order to emphasise the errors of the Achaians in 146 BC. By taking up the former Greek calamities which were not caused by those who suffered calamities by themselves, he fabricates the peculiarity that only the Achaian War was shamefully caused by the Achaians themselves. For including in his list Xerxes' invasion, which was originally hardly recognised as a calamity, Polybios ignores the Greek victory in Xerxes' invasion and instead emphasises the Athenian self-sacrifice in the destruction of the city. At the same time, by enumerating the hegemonies of the Greek world, Polybios indicates his recognition of Rome as the new Greek hegemony. Xerxes' invasion marks the rise of Athens in this context.

---

<sup>46</sup> E.g. Thuc. 1.18.2, 1.73.2; Lys. 2.47; Pl. *Menex.* 240e; Plut. *Them.* 6.1; cf. Thuc. 1.74.2-3; Diod. Sic. 11.16.1.

<sup>47</sup> Polyb. 38.2.6-10, 38.3.3-4.

As I indicated at the beginning of this section, the Achaian War, the destruction of Corinth, and the loss of Greek freedom under Roman rule had a profound effect on the Greek mentality. The Greeks would have needed to situate the Roman intervention in their history in a way that was appropriate for them. Polybios did this by recalling the history of calamities that had arisen in Greece and by emphasising the negative aspects of Greek history, such as defeats and the destruction of cities. Polybios' work is not the only piece to show this sentiment. Pausanias, who lived four centuries after Polybios, similarly interpreted the history of the extension of Roman rule over Greece through what, for him, was an embarrassing aspect of Greek history: the history of the traitors to the homeland and Greece. At the end of this section, it is useful to very briefly review his account in order to show that Polybios' thoughts were not unique to him.

For Pausanias, Kallikrates, the Achaian statesman who handed over a thousand hostages from the Achaian League to Rome in 167 BC, was a recurrence of the Greek vice of 'treachery' in the line of those who had betrayed their homeland to Persia, Sparta and Macedonia (Paus. 7.10).<sup>48</sup> Pausanias mentions here the Samians in the Battle of Lade in the Ionian Revolt, the Eretrians in Datis' siege of Eretria in the First Persian War, and the Thebans and Thessalians in the expedition of Xerxes to Greece, as those who betrayed their homeland and Greece in the time of Greek wars against the Persians.<sup>49</sup> This range of inclusion, from the Ionian Revolt to the Xerxes' expedition, suggests that the people who medised in the wars against the Persians were particularly worthy of mention by Pausanias. This corresponds to Pausanias' fondness for the Persian Wars, known through his frequent reference to the wars in line with the Trojan War.

The Roman intervention is an event that reminds Pausanias of the evils caused by past wars, including the Persian Wars. Whereas, in Polybios, the question is the scale of the calamity brought about by Rome, in Pausanias, the question is the meaning of the calamity brought about by Rome. Despite the differences between the two, they share the fact that Roman rule was the occasion for recalling the negative aspects of the events of the Persian Wars.

Moreover, in the description of the Achaian War, Pausanias keeps the history of the

---

<sup>48</sup> For Kallikrates, see Schoch 1924; Champion 2007a, 258-9; Eckstein 2008, 367-9; Derow 2015.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Frazer 1898d, 132; Habicht 1998: 114-5. It is interesting that the Spartans are the only Greeks included in the list as those who encouraged the treachery. This may be because the Spartans fought with the Athenians, who were loved by Pausanias as the centres of Greek civilisation. Cf. Swain 1996: 335; Ameling 1996: 142-3. It is also possible that Pausanias regards the Spartans as an enemy of Greek civilisation who can be lined with the Persians and the Macedonians. Ono 2019.

Classical period in his mind as a *comparanda* of the Achaian War. He refers to (1) the Battles of Thermopylai in 480 BC and 279 BC to criticise Kritolaos, an Achaian general, of retreating from there by being afraid of Metellus and Romans (but they were captured by the Roman force and many of them were killed.) (7.15.3-4); (2) the Battle of Chaironeia in 338 BC for mentioning the massacre of the Arkadians by the Romans at Chaironeia where their ancestors are reported to have fled before Philip and Alexander and left the Greek force (7.15.6); (3) the Battle of Marathon which Diaios imitated: after he was re-chosen as a general of the Achaian force, he was reported to have imitated Miltiades and the Athenians before Marathon and set free slaves to have them join the Achaian force, but he did not learn from the failure of Kritolaos against Metellus and chose 4,000 soldiers and Alkamenes as their commander (7.15.7-8); finally, (4) the Sicilian expedition of Athens for criticising Diaios: after the defeat of the Achaian force by the Romans, Diaios soon fled to Megalopolis. His conduct, according to Pausanias, is very much different from that of Kallistratos of Athens, who joined the Sicilian Expedition of Athens and saved his own soldiers by fighting the enemies and died in battle (7.16.4-6). For Pausanias, the Achaian War was a failure of the Achaians, who had the chance to achieve the same successes as their ancestral Greeks but failed to do so because of their mistakes and stupidity. For Pausanias, the Achaian War is the end of the history of the Greeks and Greek freedom, in the meaning that the Greeks no longer stood up after the war (7.17.1-4).<sup>50</sup> Pausanias' narrative technique of ending Greek history with recollections of Greek glories may be appreciated as a reflection of his longing and sentimentality towards the past.

In short, Roman power and domination are understood as the inversion of the 'glorious history' of Greece. In order to understand their traumatic experience, Polybios needed ways to reinterpret the past that could accommodate the damage and trauma that could not be taken away anymore. The Achaian War, the Sack of Korinth, and the subsequent Roman control over the Eastern Mediterranean offered the opportunity for this reinterpretation and a new focus on the negative aspects of Greek history. The painful memory of the Persian Wars was reasonably foregrounded in this context. The Persian Wars and the Greek glory now became the distant past, which the Greeks would never achieve again under the rule of Rome.

---

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Arafat 1997: 80.

#### 5.4. ROME AS THE POWER

Finally, this chapter will briefly discuss the comparison between the Persian Wars and the Roman wars recorded in Diodoros, the Sicilian Greek historian of the first century BC, whose homeland had been under Roman rule since the third century BC. This will shed light on another Greek perspective on Roman power almost 100 years after the Achaian War, around the time when Roman dominance of the Eastern Mediterranean was about to be completed. As the whole Mediterranean was under the control of Rome after the Battle of Actium and Rome became *the* power, Rome was so strong that it transformed its subjects' perception of their world. Although the Romans partly kept their stance against the Greeks, its meaning also experienced a change. Despite its impact on Greek intellectuals, such as Polybios and Pausanias, the affair of 146 BC did not prevent the Romans from declaring themselves the freedom-givers of the Greeks. After the destruction of Korinth, Mummius proclaimed the freedom of the Greeks with the Korinthians as the exceptions.<sup>51</sup> The famous letter of Q. Fabius Maximus sent to Dyme probably soon after 146 BC refers to the freedom given to the Greeks in common and "our policy," which might also mean the Roman observation of the pacification of Greece.<sup>52</sup> Then, Perseus was seen as enslaver of the Greek *poleis* in the Third Macedonian War while the Romans defeated Aristonikos in Asia Minor with a claim to protect the freedom of the Greek *poleis*.<sup>53</sup> In the First Mithridatic War, Rome still seemed to employ the slogan against Mithridates VI, who may have also utilised it to take Greek *poleis* to his side.<sup>54</sup> Through the disturbances of the first century BC, Rome became the one and only polity that could decide the status of freedom. Accordingly, the meaning of the Persian Wars as a symbol of Greek freedom does not seem to have come

---

<sup>51</sup> Dio Cass. 21.7.2 = Zonar. 9.31.

<sup>52</sup> *RDGE* 43, ll. 15-6. See also Gruen 1984: 132-57, esp. 155; Ferrary 1988: 186-209. Dating: 144-143 BC (Ferrary 1988: 186-99; Kallet-Marx 1995, 141-3); c. 139 BC? (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 684); 115 BC? (*RDGE* 43).

<sup>53</sup> The Third Macedonian War: Livy 43.8.4-6; *RDGE* 40, esp. A l. 19-20, B. l. 19-21, 26. See also Livy 45.18.2; Diod. Sic. 31.8; Plut. *Aem.* 28.6. Perseus might have also employed the slogan. See Dmitriev 2011: 290-9. Yet, the evidence is weak. Eckstein 2011: 639-40. The War against Aristonikos: Livy, *Per.* 59: *I.Metropolis* A ll. 13-22, 31-33.

<sup>54</sup> Rome: App. *Mith.* 9.61, 57.232; Plut. *Sert.* 24.4-5, cf. Paus. 10.34.2. App. *Mith.* 48.189-190, 57.232. Mithridates VI: App. *Mith.* 48.189-90, cf. Gatzke 2013.

back again in the political context.<sup>55</sup> The Roman power changed the rules of the Greek world, and it certainly transformed the mentality of its subjects. In this section, I will contend that, in Diodoros' evaluation of the Marsic War, the Persian Wars become *comparanda* that prove the superiority of the Roman power over the world.

In the preamble of Book 37 of his *Bibliothēke*, Diodoros makes a comparison between the past glorious wars, including Xerxes' Greek expedition, and the Marsic War, or the Social War, which occurred between 91 and 88 BC (although minor resistances left by 82 BC). In the Marsic War, the allies of Rome in Italy revolted against Rome and demanded equal treatment to the Romans. Although the Romans successfully repressed the revolt, they made concessions, allowing the Italians to have Roman citizenship. The impact of this four-year war and the rebellion from the neighbours had such a great impact on Roman society that the war left trauma in the memory of the Romans.<sup>56</sup> Diodoros might have inherited the Roman-influenced perspective on the Marsic War from Poseidonios.<sup>57</sup>

Xerxes' expedition, in this context, is introduced as the greatest victory in Greece.<sup>58</sup>

After the Trojan War the king of Persia led an army against Greece, and so vast a host accompanied him that even perennial streams were dried up. Yet the military genius of Themistocles and the valour of the Greeks brought down those Persians in defeat. At about the same time the Carthaginians conducted an army of three hundred thousand men against Sicily. But by a single stratagem Gelon the Syracusan commander set fire in a moment to two hundred ships, and cutting to pieces in pitched battle one hundred and fifty thousand of

---

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Paus. 7.17.1-4.

<sup>56</sup> Cic. *Phil.* 7.23; Flor. 2,6.11; Carlà-Uhink 2019, 9-10.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Schwartz 1903, 688, 690-1.

<sup>58</sup> Diod. Sic. 37.1.2. Translation from Walton 1967. Diodoros keeps the consistency of this account with that of Book 11, where he writes about Xerxes' invasion. This can be observed from a verbal coincidence and the emphasis on the synchronisation of Xerxes' invasion and Carthaginian invasion into Sicily in 480 BC: Diod. Sic. 37.1.2: ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀκολουθούντων αὐτῷ στρατιωτῶν ἀναζηραιομένων τῶν ἀενάων ποταμῶν; Diod. Sic. 11.5.3: φασὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἀενάους ποταμοὺς διὰ τὴν τοῦ πλήθους συνέχειαν ἐπιλιπεῖν, τὰ δὲ πελάγη τοῖς τῶν νεῶν ἰστίοις κατακαλυφθῆναι. His way of relating Xerxes' invasion to the Trojan War reflects the Herodotean idea that both wars were the ones between Europe and Asia, which implies a causal link between them. By placing this after the Trojan War (μετὰ δὲ τὰ Τρωικὰ), which is recognised as a war between Europe and Asia, Xerxes' invasion is also illuminated as part of the war.

the enemy took as many more captive. Nevertheless, the descendants of those who did these mighty deeds were defeated by the people who fought the Marsic War, the Romans.

Here, the Battle of Salamis is introduced as the military achievement of Themistokles and the Greeks who defeated vast Persian soldiers.

The importance of this passage is threefold. First, the selection of the Battle of Salamis may have come from Diodoros' preference. He seems to have adopted a tradition that compares the Battle of Salamis and the Battle of Himera. The latter is a battle fought between the Syracusans and the Carthaginians in 480 BC at Himera in Sicily. The Syracusan commander Gelon successfully defeated the Carthaginian force led by Hamilcar and then established his hegemony over Sicily.<sup>59</sup> The connection between these two battles has been already established in the fifth century BC. Herodotos says that those in Sicily claimed the Battle of Salamis occurred on the same day as the Battle of Himera occurred.<sup>60</sup> According to Diodoros, in Chapter 23 of his Book 11, there are writers who compare Gelon and Themistokles as well as the behaviours of the enemies. The Battle of Himera was an unimportant battle from the perspective of mainland Greece. However, because the Battle of Himera was a battle that saved the Greeks from barbarians from the Sicilian point of view, this comparison is possible for Diodoros and other writers.<sup>61</sup> Choosing Salamis as the best Greek achievement in history, Diodoros may have attempted to adopt the tradition of comparison between them and show the importance of the Battle of Salamis at the same time.

Second, Diodoros refers to the Battle of Salamis in order to emphasise the greatness of the Marsic War. He starts the preamble by referring to why the Marsic War is the greatest war in the history of humankind.<sup>62</sup>

In all the time that men's deeds have been handed down by recorded history to the memory of posterity the greatest war known to us is the "Marsic," so named after the Marsi. This

---

<sup>59</sup> Hdt. 7.166-7; Diod. Sic. 11.1, 20-3; Finley 1968: 45-55; Kukofka 1992.

<sup>60</sup> Hdt. 7.166.1; Arist. *Poet.* 1459a24-6; Gauthier 1966. Yet, Diodoros adopted a different tradition in that the Battle of Himera occurred on the same day as the Battle of Thermopylai occurred. See Diod. Sic. 11.24.1.

<sup>61</sup> Diod. Sic. 11.23.2. See also Pind. *Pyth.* 1, ll. 71-81.

<sup>62</sup> Diod. Sic. 37.1.1. Translation from Walton 1967. The importance of Diod. Sic. 37.1 in his universal history, see Clarke 2008: 121-39; Sakeshima 2021:15-8.

war surpassed all that preceded it both in the valorous exploits of its leaders and in the magnitude of its operations.

So, the exploits of leaders and the magnitude of operations of war consist of his criteria in his view. However, how the Marsic War surpassed the Persian Wars and the other wars is not provided in Diodoros' reference to the Battle of Salamis, as it does not mention the exploits of the leaders and the magnitude of the Marsic War. Indeed, in the preamble, there is no reference to the leaders and magnitude of the Romans in the Marsic War. However, he seems to attempt to prove his argument by referring to the Roman conquest of Greece. As is suggested in the first quotation of this section, his discussion seems to be as follows: the Marsic War was fought by the Romans; the Romans conquered the descendants of the Greeks who fought the Persian Wars; therefore, the Marsic War is greater than the Persian Wars. His argument is slightly circuitous but still makes sense. In this way, Diodoros uses the Persian Wars to explain how the Marsic War can be seen as the greatest war in the history of humankind.

Third, Diodoros characterises the Persian Wars as the greatest war in one of the people whom the Romans conquered or defeated. Diodoros refers to the wars of Asia, Greece, Sicily, Macedonia, Carthage, and Italy, the areas the Romans controlled, in order to compare them with the Marsic War. The Battle of Salamis is just a battle among these great battles of the people the Romans defeated. As the exploits of leaders and the magnitude are his criteria for judging the Marsic War as the greatest, he emphasises these points of each war. For instance, according to Diodoros, the great war of Asia was the Trojan War (Diod. Sic. 37.1.1-2). Gelon, the Syracusan general, killed 150,000 Carthaginians and captured the same number of them (Diod. Sic. 37.1.3). Alexander the Great overthrew Persian rule in Asia but the Romans controlled Macedonia (Diod. Sic. 37.1.4). Given the criteria Diodoros shows, however, it is not sure how Diodoros considers the Marsic War to be the greatest as there is no reference to the leaders and magnitude of the Romans in the Marsic War in the preamble. Indeed, in most cases, he does not give any figures to measure the magnitude of war, as in the case of the Xerxes' invasion ("so vast a host accompanied him [sc. Xerxes] that even perennial streams were dried up") (Diod. Sic. 37.1.2). He only numbers the enemies of the Cimbrian War (113-101 BC) and of the Battle of Himera (400,000 men and 300,000 men) (Diod. Sic. 37.1.3, 5). In short, Diodoros' comparison is very loose.

What is important for Diodoros is not to explain how the Marsic War met his criteria but to magnify and explain the greatness of the Marsic War. To achieve this goal, he must have felt the necessity to cite the past exploits of the people the Romans defeated.

Therefore, he adds to the war in Asia that Europe needed to take ten years to conquer Troy, while the Romans conquered Asia by defeating Antiochos III in a single battle; when he refers to the Battles of Salamis and Himera, he adds that the descendants of the Greeks and the Syracusans were defeated by the Romans (Diod. Sic. 37.1.3); when he refers to the Alexander the Great defeated the Persian rule, he adds that the Romans controlled Macedonia (Diod. Sic. 37.1.4). In case a war with Rome can be considered to be the greatest battle of a people, Diodoros makes no reference to the past achievements before the conflicts with Rome. Thus, in the case of Carthage, Diodoros mentions the First and Second Punic Wars. In the former, the Romans waged war against the Carthaginians for the twenty-four years conflict while in the latter, the Romans and the Italians, with Scipio, also drove away Hannibal, the best general in valour (Diod. Sic. 37.1.4).

The fact that the Romans conquered many areas of the world is likely to form Diodoros' basic assumption in arguing that the Marsic War was the best. To put it simply, the Marsic War is the greatest for him because it was fought by the Romans, the mightiest in the world at the time of the Marsic War. The way Diodoros compares the Marsic War with the wars of the world may have stemmed from Diodoros' overall projection of the *Bibliothēke*. Diodoros wrote about the "common history" (τὰς κοινὰς ἱστορίας) of the Greeks and the non-Greeks (1.1.1), including the histories of the Greeks of West, of the Romans, of Africa, and of Asia. Diodoros frames his narrative that includes the vast area by regarding the *oikoumene* as a *polis* (μῆς πόλεως), as a single unification. What he has done in writing his history is to write a *single* history that integrates events which occurred in different times and places as events that happened in integrated time and space of the *oikoumene*. The background of his recognition of the world is Rome. Diodoros regards Rome as the power extending into the ends of the *oikoumene* (1.4.3). When he started investigation for his *Bibliothēke* around 60/59 BC, the Romans took the area around the Mediterranean in their own hands. From the view that Rome is *the* world empire of his time, he retrospectively invented his worldview as the framework of his work.<sup>63</sup> His history then progresses into the world-dominance of Rome following his projection.

Now, the Persian Wars are the greatest wars in the part of the world the Romans dominated. They are comparable with the great wars of the other regions because all of

---

<sup>63</sup> Alonso-Núñez 1982: 87-92, esp. 90. Cf. Yarrow 2006a: 152-6. For the Stoic influence on his thoughts, see Burton 1972: 36-7. Polybios has a similar projection of his history. Cf. Polyb. 1.1.3-6, 3.4.2-6; Alonso-Núñez 1982: 84-6; Humphreys 1997: 214-5.

them were conquered by the Romans. The Roman power is superior to all and the Persian Wars are referred to in this context in order to prove the Roman superiority. The Greeks accepted their lesser position in past and present. The Greek perception of the world and history proceeded into a new phase under Rome.

## 5.5. CONCLUSION

As we have seen in this chapter, the Greeks have introduced the Persian Wars as a comparison to reflect on the power of Rome. Comparisons of the wars of the time against different peoples with the Persian wars are, of course, not uncommon. As we have seen in previous discussions, the Greeks have used the memory of the Persian Wars when waging or recalling their wars against the Macedonians and Gauls. In this sense, it is no surprise that the Achaian War provided an opportunity to recall the Persian Wars. However, when the memory of the Persian Wars is recalled in relation to Rome, Rome is not necessarily represented as an enemy foreign race. First of all, the Romans were foreigners to the Greeks; they were of Asian Trojan ancestry but resided in Europe, in Italy. This Trojan descent enabled the Greeks to place the Roman power into their myth and history. The Romans were also the givers of freedom to Greece and the conquerors of Greece at the same time. Later, they were conquerors of the inhabited world. These different and slowly changing faces of Rome over time provided an opportunity to focus on different aspects of the memory of the Persian Wars when thinking about the Romans.

As discussed above, the memory of the Persian Wars was used to recognise the power of Rome. This would give continuous opportunities to renew the idea that the Persian Wars were the greatest war ever fought in pre-Roman Greece. The realisation that Greece had lost its freedom completely to Rome would also have instilled in the Greeks the sense that no future 'Greek victory' beyond the Persian Wars could be achieved. It may be possible to regard Alexander's Asian expedition as a 'great Greek victory'. Indeed, during the late Hellenistic and Roman periods, Alexander was described as a prominent person in Greek history, as is shown in Book 17 of Diodoros and Arrian's *Anabasis of Alexander*. Plutarch regards Alexander as a symbol of Greek culture in his *On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander*. Yet, as Alexander is a Macedonian, his achievements could be differentiated from the Greek ones. This sense of the 'end of Greek history' came to fruition in Diodoros, who recognised the Romans as a people

who had waged the colossal Marsic War, surpassing all other wars in the world because it was by the Romans, the mightiest power in the world in the time of the Marsic War.

On the other hand, Roman domination of Greece was also an event sufficient to remind the Greeks of the damage Greece suffered in the Persian Wars. The destruction of Korinth and the defeat of the Achaian League brought about by Rome evoked the sense of damage and danger in wars spoken of as a 'glorious victory'. Rome's victory was then described as a Greek tragedy unparalleled in the past. In this sense, we can confirm that Rome conquered the mentality of the Greeks.

These may be assessed as the efforts of the Greeks to perceive Rome in their own world, period by period. As Rome emerged in the Greek world and went on to conquer it completely, these may have been attempts to translate the other, Rome, and their rule into something they could understand. The Greeks, as represented by Polybios, made various efforts to understand Roman hegemony. The narrative of the Persian Wars in comparison with Rome is one such effort.

## Conclusion

The Persian Wars persisted as a recurrent subject during the Hellenistic period. The main question of this thesis is why the Persian Wars continued to be remembered after the destruction of the Achaemenid Empire. My contention posits that a significant impetus behind these recollections stemmed from a sequence of engagements with individuals or groups that could be regarded as distinct from the Greeks. Just as in the Classical period, so in the Hellenistic period, the Persian Wars later served as points of reference for contemplating contemporary circumstances and for facilitating the invention and accentuation of the Otherness of their enemies. Furthermore, these recollections served as a gauge to evaluate the influence of Rome on the Greeks, an influence which altered both the Greek perception of their own position within the world and that of the world itself. On the other hand, the establishment of a *penteteric* Panhellenic festival at Plataia, the Eleutheria Games, anchored the memory of the Persian Wars in the Greek collective identity that could be renewed and confirmed every four years by this festival. It aimed to ground the imagery of the collective Greek triumph over the Persians within the religious and cultural landscape of the Plataian landscape.

One of the most important differences between the remembrances in the Classical period and those in the Hellenistic period lies in the agents that referred to the Persian Wars and the contextual subjects compared or associated with these historical events. The Persian Wars continued to be regarded as a mytho-historical conflict between the Greeks and external adversaries and to serve as a precedent for contemporary warfare. During the Classical period, the Athenians notably employed the representation of the Persian Wars to underscore the otherness of their Peloponnesian and Macedonian foes. However, starting from the late Classical period, while the Athenians continued referring to the wars frequently, other agents began utilising memories for their own agendas. A key moment in this development was Alexander's overthrow of the Persian Empire and the resulting disappearance of the Persians as a threat to the Greeks. The Aitolians, for instance, utilised these recollections to glorify their triumph over the

Gauls, while the Antigonid kings similarly employed them to portray themselves as protectors of the Greeks. The memories were also used by non-Athenian poets to celebrate the power of the Romans. The diversification of the agents invoking and drawing comparisons with the Persian Wars stands out as a hallmark of Hellenistic remembrance. This phenomenon is partly attributable to the dominance of Athenian sources in the surviving evidence, especially in the Classical period. It also signifies the ascendancy of powers beyond traditional entities, such as Athens and Sparta, who played leading roles in both the Persian Wars and interstate politics during the Classical period.

Even if we admitted the influence of Philip II and Alexander III on the Hellenistic recollection of the wars, as is argued by David Yates (see Introduction), this would have been limited to the Eleutheria Games and the behaviour of the Antigonids. Moreover, their influence was temporary. Plataia became a centre of the anti-Antigonid movement by the middle of the third century BC, and the Greeks inserted a new ceremony, the *dialogos*, into the Eleutheria, in which Athens and Sparta played a central role. Antigonos Gonatas boasted of his triumph over Gauls, the other ‘barbarians’ who could be his point of reference for his self-representation.

Another difference between the Classical and Hellenistic periods lies in contexts of reference: in the Classical period, memories of the Persian Wars tended to be referred to in the context of conflicts between *poleis*, while, from the late Classical period onwards, the recollections tended to have occurred in a time of attempt of unification of the Greeks and the wars against the Macedonians and the Gauls. This shift must have also resulted from the rise of powers other than Athens and Sparta and the weakening of the old Greek powers. The penetration of the idea of Greek *homonoia* might provide another reason to explain this shift. The development of the Greeks’ idea of *homonoia* in the fourth century BC was embodied in the joint cult of Zeus Eleutherios and the Homonoia of the Greeks at Plataia. This cult, monuments related to it, and festivals anchored the idea in the landscape of the city.

All in all, the imagery of the Persian Wars functioned to differentiate the Greeks from the Others. The past of the wars was used to prove the uniqueness of Greekness and one’s attachment to Greek culture. This may be explained by the historical context of the Hellenistic period: this period saw the rise of powers that could be regarded as barbarians, as is argued above, as well as the arrival of non-Greeks to mainland Greece. The encounters with the others developed the idea of Greekness, and the Persian Wars should have been a crucial element of it.

The ways of and reasons for recollection of the Persian Wars in the Hellenistic period

were studied in each of the five chapters of this thesis.

In Chapter 1, I investigated the formation, evolution, and utilisation of memories of the Persian Wars in the Classical period, emphasising how these recollections underwent alterations and were employed diversely based on different circumstances. Acknowledging the impossibility of covering all receptions during this period, this chapter focused on three themes related to subsequent chapters. In detail, this chapter investigated the preference of the Athenians for Marathon over Salamis in their visual representations, portraying how Marathon became mythologised as a symbol of victory against the Persians, an idealised Athenian past, and a manifestation of democratic principles. Additionally, an analysis of historical accounts in this chapter demonstrated how memories of the Persian Wars were manipulated in political contexts and modified to suit specific purposes and situations. Finally, it argued that these memories were manipulated further, adopting new narratives in accordance with the development of the idea of *homonoia* when the concept of an Asian expedition emerged as a potential resolution to Greek conflicts. Overall, the chapter highlighted the manipulation, distortion, and diverse retelling of Persian Wars memories throughout the Classical period, where different aspects were emphasised or disregarded depending on the context and objectives. It underscored the significance of key players like Athens, Sparta, Thebes, and, notably, Persia in shaping these memories. Subsequently, it hinted at the extension and reuse of diverse memories and images from the Classical period into the Hellenistic period following the decline or disappearance of these influential entities.

In Chapter 2, I examined how the Argeads, the Antigonids, and the Athenians referenced Persian Wars imagery while navigating their relationship dynamics. This chapter's emphasis was placed on the deliberate use of Persian Wars memory as a strategic tool for negotiation by both Athenians and Macedonians, along with the limitations of its utility. This chapter showed that Philip II and Alexander III positioned themselves as avengers of the Persian Wars, Demetrios Poliorketes presented himself as a defender of Greek freedom, and Antigonos Gonatas depicted himself as a saviour of Greece. Subsequently, the Athenians seemingly embraced and incorporated the king's self-representation into their local cult, aligning themselves with the rulers' interests. This chapter's discussion indicated a potential emergence of Athenian utilisation of the imagery of the wars for negotiations during Demetrios Poliorketes' rule. It also highlighted the adaptable nature of Persian Wars imagery.

In Chapter 3, I argued the Athenians' commemoration of the Gallic invasion not merely as a military triumph but also as a struggle for the preservation of Athens'

democracy and freedom. This conceptualisation likely stemmed from Athens' situation during the Gallic invasion period, where maintaining their democratic principles and autonomy against the Antigonid occupation of Piraeus was a significant concern. The Athenians interpreted battles against both past and contemporary barbarian incursions to serve their present needs. In order to contextualise the Athenian commemoration, this chapter explored how the Aitolians commemorated the Gallic invasion by referencing the memory of the Persian Wars. The Gauls represented new barbarians, serving as a replacement for the traditional Persians, who no longer posed a threat. Both Greeks and Macedonians utilised victories against the Gauls to assert their role in safeguarding Greek civilisation. Even groups like the Aitolians, not involved in the Persian Wars, drew parallels between the Persians and the Gauls, exploiting this connection to enhance their reputation. However, the use of these memories was fluid, contingent upon the actors and their circumstances, as demonstrated by Athens' response to the Gallic invasion. I scrutinised a painting of Athenian politician and general Kallippos, suggesting that Athens intended to honour Kallippos as a democratic hero, linking him with past military accomplishments. Athens' position concerning the victory over the Gauls differed from the Delphi-centered view adopted by the Aitolians, who championed their role in defending Delphi against the Gauls. Athens, though valiant at Thermopylai, failed to defend the pass and had minimal involvement in Delphi's defence. Consequently, Athens could not create a commemorative narrative akin to the Aitolians' self-justifying rhetoric, disrupting its traditional status as a leader against barbarians. Thus, the Athenian role in the victory over the Gauls did not attain the same reverence as Athens' credit for the Greek victory during the Persian Wars.

In Chapter 4, I focused on the intricate and varied dimensions of memories associated with the Battle of Plataia. The main contention of this chapter is that the Eleutheria festival not only selected and preserved the memory of Greek collaboration under Athens and Sparta but also encapsulated the memory of the fifth century BC. To argue this, I first explored the memorialisation of the Battle of Plataia across four dimensions: memories associated with three poleis—Athens, Sparta, and Plataia—alongside the Panhellenic level. The memories related to the Battle of Plataia were complex. This complexity emerged as the city where the battle took place differed from the *poleis* claiming credit for the victory. Although the Spartans received high esteem for their battlefield success, the Plataians, providing the battleground, held significance and the Athenians later amplified their own military achievements, asserting Plataia as an Athenian victory. Following the Roman arrival in Greece, the Eleutheria incorporated a new ritual, the *dialogos*, centered on Athens and Sparta. This had an impact on the

festival's atmosphere as it was a peaceful reactivation of the Classical rivalry between Athens and Sparta. Consequently, the Eleutheria was not solely a commemoration of victory and freedom over Persia. It encapsulated the memory of the Battle of Plataia, emphasising the role of either Athens or Sparta, the political dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean in the fifth century BC, and the concept of Greek unity. Moreover, this chapter suggests that the establishment of the Eleutheria possibly altered the Plataian landscape by situating local memories within the city walls while positioning the Panhellenic monuments outside the city walls.

In Chapter 5, I explored the correlation between the Greek perception of Roman authority and the symbolic representations associated with the Persian Wars. This chapter examined how this imagery of the Persian Wars was utilised concerning the emergence and growth of Roman power. The argument posits that the imagery of the Persian Wars consistently offered a framework for understanding Roman might, but the recollection of these memories evolved with the expansion of Roman dominance. For this, I scrutinised a poem by Alkaios alongside the *Alexandra* by Lykophron, analysing how the Greeks perceived the Romans as the 'Other'. Then, I focused on Polybios' account of the Achaian War in the 140s BC, where Rome is portrayed as the most devastating calamity for the Greeks and the sack of the Athenian Akropolis was referred to as a *comparandum* of the calamity the Romans brought to Greece. Finally, I examined Diodoros' account in the preamble of Book 37, comparing the magnitude of Rome's Marsic War with other conquests and the reflection of the Persian Wars in this comparison. The Greeks introduced the Persian Wars as a point of comparison to evaluate the power wielded by Rome. The Greek perception of Rome as foreigners with an Asian Trojan lineage residing in Europe facilitated the placing of Roman power within Greek myth and history. Rome was portrayed as both liberators and conquerors of Greece, with varying interpretations evolving over time, enabling different facets of the Persian Wars memory to be emphasised when contemplating Rome. This chapter contends that the recognition of Rome's power allowed for consistent reaffirmation that the Persian Wars were the most significant conflicts fought in pre-Roman Greece.

In sum, the imagery of the Persian Wars gave the Greeks a sense of who 'they were'. They used the Persian Wars to connect the present with the past and to place their existence in the world and history. The Hellenistic period can be said to have been one in which the role of the Persian Wars as a component of Greek collective identity was reinforced.

## Appendix 1

### THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE FAMILY OF KALLIPPOS


There are two theories as to the identification of the family of Kallippos, depending on the identification of the persons with the same name, Moirokles, who was active in the age around Demosthenes. The first (Table 1) is proposed by Ampolo 1979: 176-8 and supported by *LGPN* 2 s.v. Μοιροκλής (1) and Bayliss 2011: 189-90. In this theory, Moirokles of Traill, *PAA* 658480, known as an anti-Macedon politician, is identified as the Moirokles, son of Euthydemos of Eleusis, of Traill, *PAA* 658490. This Moirokles is then identified as a son of elder Euthydemos (Traill, *PAA* 432295) and at the same time as a father of our Kallippos (Traill, *PAA* 559285) and younger Euthydemos (Traill, *PAA* 432305). (Maybe this Moirokles has two brothers, Euthystratos and Epicleides (?)) This Moirokles, moreover, has a grandfather of the same name (Traill, *PAA* 658485; *LGPN* 2 s.v. Μοιροκλής (2)). Cf. Humphreys 2018: 274.

The second (Table 2) is of Humphreys 2018: 1121-4. Differently from Ampolo and Bayliss, she suggests Moirokles of Traill, *PAA* 658480 is not the same person as the Moirokles of Traill, *PAA* 658490 but is identified as another Moirokles, Traill, *PAA* 658485. According to her, Kallippos (Traill, *PAA* 559280), who was the grandfather of our Kallippos, and elder Euthydemos (Traill, *PAA* 432295) are brothers. From the former, the family line of Moirokles (Traill, *PAA* 658480), our Kallippos (Traill, *PAA* 559285), and his son Archandros (Traill, *PAA* 208295) came out, whereas, from the latter, that of Moirokles (Traill, *PAA* 658490) and younger Euthydemos (Traill, *PAA* 432305) did. (Humphreys' use of the revised epigraphic evidence does not affect her identification.)


Humphreys' opinion seems to be more plausible in view of the name succession principle of Classical Athens. Yet, both theories can be possible. It may be difficult to acquire a more precise dating of *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 6043, a grave *stele* of Moirokles (Traill, *PAA* 658485), than the second half of the fourth century BC. This means he cannot only be the same person as Traill, *PAA* 658480 but also be the grandfather of Moirokles of Traill,

PAA 658480 + 658490. At the same time, it is still uncertain if the Moirokles of Traill, PAA 658480 is identical to the Moirokles of Traill, PAA 658490 because we do not know the name of the father of the former. The differences in these theories do not affect our discussion, as shall be seen above.

**Table 1**



**Table 2**



## Appendix 2

### THE TEXT AND TRANSLATION OF IG II<sup>2</sup> 2788

August Böckh's *CIG* 127, *edition princeps*. Although the text is reconstructed through the transcription of Karl Müller, the stone existed in the house of Lord Guilford (1766-1827). The relics that Lord Guilford kept were "veiled in obscurity" after his death.<sup>1</sup> The marble was lost as well. Peter Liddel and Polly Low recently confirmed that the stone had not been found yet.<sup>2</sup> Böckh first dated this text to the period after Alexander the Great. Ulrich Köhler somehow dated this inscription to the end of the second century BC through a copy of Karl Müller (*IG* II 5, 4322), while Johannes Kirchner agrees with him with the help of a transcript by an unknown person, a transcript which *in schedis Stackelbergii est* and was reported to be in the German Archaeological Institute in Berlin (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 2788). This transcript is also lost, as I confirmed this by asking an archivist of the Central Archive of the Institute. The dating of this text is no earlier than the second century BC, given the establishment of the *dialogos* was in the first half of the second century BC.<sup>3</sup>

Although Robertson 1986 and Chaniotis 1988 offer new restorations of the text, I adopt the text of *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 2788 here as its restoration is minimal and moderate. However, I follow Chaniotis' restoration for lines 13 and 15.<sup>4</sup> Most of the translation provided below is my own, but I adopt elements of Robertson's partial translation.

Cf. Robertson 1986 (= *SEG* 36.237); Chaniotis 1988: 42-8, T10; Jung 2006: 351-60;

---

<sup>1</sup> Michaelis 1882: 160-1.

<sup>2</sup> Liddel and Low 2022: 21. *SEG* 36.237 seems to wrongly believe the stone is preserved in London. Tracy 1990: 17 does not include this inscription in his study because the marble and the transcript were lost.

<sup>3</sup> The dating is extremely difficult. See also Robertson 1986: 97; Jung 2006: 355 with n. 50; Spawforth 2012: 134. *SEG* 36.237 suggests it dates to c. 100 BC.

<sup>4</sup> Chaniotis 1988: 42.

Spawforth 2012: 130-8.

	— ]ΛΥΙ[ —
1	— ] Λακεδαίμονι — — ] τῶι κοινῶι [ — — τ]ῶν εὐεργετῶν εἰ — — ]τώσει τῶν τοῦ θε[οῦ —
5	— τῶ]ν Ἑλλήνων· μετὰ δὲ [ — — ] εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν παρὰ τοῦ καθήκον[τος — — ]α ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν μήτε προσδεδ[ — — ] προπομπείαν ἐπιβαλλούσης αὐτῆς [ — — ] πράξεις ἐν τῶι πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας π[ολέμοι —
10	— ] ἐμ Μαραθῶνι καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα διαφυλ[α — — στρα]τείας πλείστας μὲν καὶ ἀρίστας, ἀξ[ίας δὲ — — ]λον κατανηλωκένας πλῆθος πρ[ — — ὑπὲρ τῆς] ἐλευθερίας· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις διὰ πα[ντὸς χρόνου — — καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κα]τὰ θάλατταν καὶ μέγιστα πρότερ[ον —
15	— καὶ κατ' ἄν]δρα καὶ κατὰ πόλιν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήν[ων — — ] τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀκολούθως τῆι κατ' ἐκεῖν[ — — ] χρησμον καὶ τῆς θυσίας ἐπιτελουμ[ένης — — ]ψεν· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα μόνης ἐμοῦ παρ[αμεινάσης? — — ] τετελειῶσθαι τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας [πόλεμον —
20	— τούς] κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλληνας ἐκβαλλόντων [ — — ἀναγ]κασάντων? συνθήκας ποιήσασθαι τὰς μ[ — — ]κέναι δέ με καὶ θεωρίας ἐξαποστέλλον[τας — — ἀδι]κεῖσθαι? Πλαταιὰς καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν βωμὸν [τοῦ Διὸς Ἑλευθερίου —
25	— ] κατὰ τὴν Περσῶν ἔφοδον μήτε καταφθορ[ — — ] ὁμοίως ἐμοὶ μηδὲ τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν ἀήτη[τον — — ] μὴ μετεσχηκένας τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα κινδ[ύνων — — ] γινομέναις συνθήκαις συμμαχίαν πρὸς [ — — ] ὑπὸ τὴν Περσῶν συνέβη πεσεῖν δεσ[ποτείαν — — ] τελεσθεισῶν πρὸ τῆς ἀναιρέσεως τ[ —
30	— ]θῆναι καὶ τὴν πάτριον οὐσίαν· διόπε[ρ — — ] περὶ τούτων ἐποίησάμην τοὺς α[ — — ] Λακεδαιμονίων ἄξιον τῶν[ — — ] ἐγκλήματα παραγίνεσθαι [ — — ] καταμαρτυραμένων [ —
35	— συν]εδρίωι ποιησαμ[εν — — ] τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ἑ[λευθερίου — — ] εἰς τοὺς π[ — — ] καλλι[στ — — — —

The first line is omitted in *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 2788 but is observed in *CIG* 127 and *IG* II 5, 4322. Line 19 is missing in Böckh and Köhler. Robertson 1986: 98 observes that “lines 7-38 seem to be complete on the left”. But this seems unlikely. || 0-5 — νῦν δὲ ἐμοὶ τε | καὶ τῆν] Λακεδαίμονι περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀγὼν καθέστηκε — | παρὰ] τῶι κοινῶι [συνεδρίωι τῶν Ἑλλήνων — ἀμφοτέρων | δ' ἡμ]ῶν

εὐεργετῶν ἐ[μ πολλοῖς καιροῖς γεγενημένων — οὐ δοκεῖ ῥάδιον διακρίναι, | εἰκό]τως, εἰ τῶν τοῦ θε[οῦ τιμῶν αἴτιοί γ' ὑπάρχομεν ἀμφοτέρω — ] Robertson || 4 τῆ̃ ἀισ]τώσει Böckh, πισ]τώσει or π]τώσει Krichner || 8 αὐτῆς [τῆς προεδρίας? Robertson || 10 διαφυλ[αττ Böckh || 11 ἄριστα ἀ[ποβεβηκυίας Böckh and Köhler || 12 Chaniotis suggests διὰ τὸν στο]λον κατανηλωκέναί πληθος πρ[ός || 13 At the beginning of the line, — ] ἔλευθερίας: Böckh, Köhler and Krichner; at the end of the line, Köhler reads τούτοις [κα]ὶ ἀπ[ — || 14 προτρ[εψα Böckh and Köhler || 15 At the beginning of the line, — κατ' ἄν]δρα Köhler and Krichner; at the end of the line, πόλιν [τ]ὸ τῶν Ἑλλήν[ων σύνφορον Böckh and Köhler || 17 τὸν] χρησμὸν καὶ τ[ἄ]ς θυσίας ἐπιτελουμ[έν Böckh, κατὰ τὸν] χρησμὸν καὶ τῆς θυσίας ἐπιτελουμ[ένης ἔτι καὶ νῦν Chaniotis || 17-8 χρησμὸν καὶ τῆς θυσίας ἐπιτελουμ[ένης — ὁμομοκέναί ἐμμενεῖν ἐμ πᾶσιν ἄπερ ὁ θεὸς ἐπέσκη]ψεν Robertson || 18 ἐγκατέλει?]ψεν· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα μόνης ἐμοῦ παρ[αμεινάσης Chaniotis || 20 Chaniotis reads καὶ ἠλευθερῶσαι τοὺς] κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλληνας ἐκβαλλόντων [δὲ τὰς τῶν Περσῶν φρουράς?; at the end of the line, ἐ[κ]βαλλόντων Böckh, ἐ[μ]βαλλόντων Köhler || 21 At the end of the line, ποιήσασι πᾶσι Böckh and Köhler; Chaniotis suggests ποιήσασθαι τὰς μ[ετὰ τὴν δεῖνα μάχην or τὰς μ[ετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως || 21-3 παρακεκλη]κέναί δέ με καὶ θεωρίας ἐξαποστέλλον[τας εἰς τὰ Ἑλευθέρια — καὶ φάσκοντας ἀδι]κεῖσθαι Πλαταιὰς καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν βωμὸν [τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ἑλευθερίου Robertson || 22 At the end of the line, ἐξαποστέλλο[ Böckh, ἐξαποστέλλο[μεν Köhler; Chaniotis reads τετιμη]κέναί δέ με καὶ θεωρίας ἐξαποστέλλον[τες καὶ || 23 At the beginning of the line, οἰ]κεῖσθαι Böckh and Köhler; at the end of the line, Köhler and Chaniotis do not read τοῦ Διὸς Ἑλευθερίου after βωμὸν || 24 — ἐπεὶ] κατὰ τὴν Περσῶν ἔφοδον μήτε καταφθορ[ἄν μήτε κίνδυνον φοβηθέντες? Chaniotis || 25 δύναμιν [μ]ήτ[ε Böckh || 26 τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους] μὴ μετεσχηκέναί τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα κινδ[ύνων Chaniotis || 29 ἀναιρέσεως τ[ῶν νεκρῶν? Chaniotis || 30 At the beginning of the line, διατε]θῆναι or αὐξη]θῆναι Chaniotis; at the middle of the line, [θ]ύσίαν, not οὐσίαν Böckh || 31 τοὺς δ[ Böckh and Köhler, τοὺς α[γῶνας Chaniotis || 32 Λακεδαιμονίων ἄξιον τῶν [προογόνων Chaniotis, Λακεδαιμονίων λεγόντων[ Böckh and Köhler || 37 ] εἰς τοὺς or πλ]εῖστους Köhler, ] εἰς τοὺς π[ολέμους? Chaniotis

- 1 — ] to a Lacedaemonian [ —  
 — ] to the common [ —  
 — ] of benefactors [ —  
 — ] of the god [ —  
 5 — ] of the Greeks. And after [ —  
 — ] to the shrine beside the regular?  
 — ] in the Greeks nor [ —  
 — ] the right of leading the procession, all the while [ — ] itself belongs by right [ —  
 — ] deeds in the w[ar] against the Persians [ —  
 10 — ] in Marathon and take care? of Greece [ —  
 — ] the best and largest campaign, while [ — ] worth [ —  
 — ] to consume the great number of [ —

Appendix 2

- ] for freedom. And in addition to them, throughout the whole [time —  
— by land and by] sea and previously the greatest [ —  
15 — ] man by man and *polis* by *polis* [ — ] by the Greeks [ —  
— ] in other respects conformably with the [ — ] on that occasion [ —  
— ] an oracle and a sacrifice to be accomplished [ —  
— ] After that, while I was alone [standing besides? —  
— ] the [war] against the Persians to be accomplished [ —  
20 — ] Greeks of Asia [ — ] expelling [ —  
— ] having forced? to make a treaty [ —  
— ] me [ — ] sending a *theoria* [ —  
— ] the shrine and the altar [of Zeus Eleutherios] of Plataia to be wronged? [ —  
— ] throughout the Persian attack nor [ —  
25 — ] in like manner with me nor own unconq[uerable] power [ —  
— ] not to take part in the dangers after that [ —  
— ] by the treaty made, allies against [ —  
— ] by that of the Persians, it happened that despotism fell [ —  
— ] accomplished before the destruction [ —  
30 — ] the possession of the fathers [ — ] therefore [ —  
— ] about these things, I made [ —  
— ] worthy of the Lakedaemonians [ —  
— ] charges to be presented [ —  
— ] having borne witness against [ —  
35 — ] to the *synedorioi* I? made [ —  
— ] Zeus E[leutherios] [ —  
— ] to [ —  
— ] most beautiful [ —  
— — —

## ***Bibliography***

- Abe, T. 2021. *The Achaemenid Persian Empire: The First World Empire*. Tokyo. (In Japanese.)
- Agelidis, S. 2019. 'Individuals and polis in cult: the procession from Athens to Eleusis in Classical times'. In W. Friese, S. Handberg and T. M. Kristensen (eds.), *Ascending and Descending the Acropolis: Movement in Athenian Religion*. Aarhus: 177–88.
- Akujärvi, J. 2005. *Researcher, Traveller, Narrator: Studies in Pausanias' Periegesis*. Stockholm.
- Albertz, A. 2006. *Exemplarisches Heldentum: die Rezeptionsgeschichte der Schlacht an den Thermopylen von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*. Munich.
- Alcock, S. E. 1996. 'Landscape of memory and the authority of Pausanias'. In J. Bingen (ed.), *Pausanias historien*. Vandoeuvres and Geneva: 241-67.
- Alcock, S. E. 2002. *Archaeologies of the Greek Past: Landscape, Monuments, and Memories*. Cambridge.
- Almagor, E. 2016. "'This is what Herodotus relates": the presence of Herodotus' Histories in Josephus' writings'. In J. Priestley, and V. Zali (eds.), *Brill's Companion to the Reception of Herodotus in Antiquity and Beyond*. Leiden and Boston: 83-100.
- Almagor, E. 2019. 'Echoes of the Persian Wars in the European phase of the Roman-Syrian War (with an emphasis on Plut., *Cat. Mai.* 12-14)'. In A. Coşkun, and D. Engels (eds.), *Rome and the Seleukid East: Selected Papers from Seleukid Study Day V, Brussels, 21-23 August 2015*. Leuven: 87-133.
- Aloni, A. 1994. 'L'elegia di Simonide dedicata alla battaglia di Platea (Sim. fr. 10-18 W<sup>2</sup>) e l'occasione della sua performance'. *ZPE* 102: 9-22.
- Aloni, A. 2001. 'The proem of Simonides' Plataea elegy and the circumstances of its performance'. In D. Sider, and D. Boedeker (eds.), *The New Simonides: Contexts of Praise and Desire*. New York: 86-105.
- Alonso-Núñez, J. M. 1982. *The Idea of Universal History in Greece: From Herodotus to the Age of Augustus*. Amsterdam.
- Alty, J. 1982. 'Dorians and Ionians'. *JHS* 102: 1-14.
- Amandry, P. 1971. 'Collection Paul Canellopoulos (I)'. *BCH* 95: 585-626.
- Amandry, P. 1978. 'Consécration d'armes galates à Delphes'. *BCH* 102: 571-86.
- Amandry, P. 1998. 'Le socle marathonnier et le trésor des Athéniens'. *BCH* 122: 75-90.

- Ameling, W. 1996. 'Pausanias und die hellenistische Geschichte'. In J. Bingen (ed.), *Pausanias historien*. Vandoeuvres and Geneva: 117-60.
- Amendola, D. 2022. *The Demades Papyrus (P.Berol. inv. 13045): A New Text with Commentary*. Berlin and Boston.
- Ampolo, C. 1979. 'Un politico "Evergete" del IV. Secolo a. C.: Xenokles figlio di Xeinis del demo di Sphettos'. *PP* 34: 167-78.
- Ampolo, C. 1981. 'Tra finanza e politica: Carriera e affari del signor Moirokles'. *RFIC* 109: 187-204.
- Andrewes, A. 1985. 'Diodorus and Ephorus: one source of misunderstanding'. In J. W. Eadie, and J. Ober (eds.), *The Craft of the Ancient Historian: Essays in Honor of Chester G. Starr*. Lanham, MD: 189-97.
- Arafat, K. W. 1997. *Pausanias' Greece: Ancient Artists and Roman Rulers*. Cambridge.
- Aravantinos, V. L., A. L. Konecny and R. T. Marchese. 2003. 'Plataiai in Boiotia: a preliminary report of the 1996-2001 campaigns'. *Hesperia* 72: 281-320.
- Ashton, N. G. 1984. 'The Lamian War—*stat magni nominis umbra*'. *JHS* 104: 152-7.
- Assmann, A. 2013. *Das neue Unbehagen an der Erinnerungskultur: Eine Intervention*. Munich.
- Assmann, J. 1992. *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen*. Munich.
- Athanassaki, L. 2016. 'Who was Eucles? Plutarch and his sources on the legendary Marathon-runner (*de gloria Atheniensium* 347cd)'. In J. Opsomer, G. Roskam and F. B. Titchener (eds.), *A Versatile Gentleman: Consistency in Plutarch's Writing*. Leuven: 213-28.
- Austin, C., and S. D. Olson. (eds.). 2004. *Aristophanes: Thesmophoriazusae*. Oxford.
- Austin, M. M. 2006. *The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest: A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation*. 2nd edn. Cambridge.
- Badian, E. 1982. 'Greeks and Macedonians'. In B. Barr-Sharrar, and E. N. Borza (eds.), *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times*. Washington: 33-51.
- Badian, E. 1989. 'Plataea between Athens and Sparta'. In H. Beister, and J. Buckler (eds.), *Boiotika: Vorträge vom 5. Internationalen Bötien-Kolloquium zu Ehren von Professor Dr. Siegfried Lauffer, Institut für Alte Geschichte, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 13. - 17. Juni 1986*. Munich: 95-111.
- Balcer, J. M. 1978. 'Alexander's Burning of Persepolis'. *Iranica Antiqua* 13: 119-33.
- Barbantani, S. 2001. *Φάτις νικηφόρος, Frammenti di elegia encomiastica nell'età delle guerre galatiche: Supplementum Hellenisticum 958 e 969*. Milan.

- Barbantani, S. 2002. 'Callimachus and the contemporary historical "epic"'. *Hermathena* 173/4: 29-47.
- Barbantani, S. 2007. 'Supplementum hellenisticum 969 (PSI inv. 436): in praise of a Ptolemaic general'. In B. Palme (ed.), *Akten des 23. Internationalen Papyrologenkongresses: Wien, 22.-28. Juli 2001*. Vienna: 19-24.
- Barbato, M. 2020. *Ideology of Democratic Athens: Institutions, Orators and the Mythical Past*. Edinburgh.
- Baronowski, D. W. 2011. *Polybius ad Roman Imperialism*. London.
- Bayliss, A. J. 2011. *After Demosthenes: The Politics of Early Hellenistic Athens*. London and New York.
- Bearzot, C. 1992. *Storia e storiografia ellenistica in Pausania il Periegeta*. Venice.
- Bearzot, C. 2011. 'Xenophon on the Athenian embassy to Susa (367 BC)'. *Historiká* 1: 21-37.
- Beck, H. 2009. 'Ephebie – Ritual – Geschichte: Polisfest und historische Erinnerung im klassischen Griechenland'. In H. Beck, and H.-U. Wiemer (eds.), *Feiern und Erinnern: Geschichtsbilder im Spiegel antiker Feste*. Berlin: 55-82.
- Behr, C. A. (trans.). 1986. *P. Aelius Aristides: The Complete Works*. Vol. I: *Orations I-XVI*. Leiden.
- Beloch, K. J. 1927. *Griechische Geschichte*<sup>2</sup>. Vol. IV.2: *Die griechische Weltherrschaft*. Berlin and Leipzig.
- Bélyácz, K. 2021. *Eine Erinnerungsgeschichte zur Schlacht von Salamis*. Vienna.
- Bencivenni, A. 2018. 'Decreto onorario del koinon synedrion dei Greci per Glaucone'. *Axon* 2: 183-94.
- Beneker, J. 2022. 'The last of the Greeks, and Good riddance: historical commentary in Plutarch's Philopoemen-Flaminius'. In C. Giroux (ed.), *Plutarch: Cultural Practice in a Connected World. Teiresias Supplement Online*. Vol. III. Münster: 97-118.
- Bengtson, H. 1987. *Die Diadochen: Die Nachfolger Alexanders (323-281 v. Chr.)*. Munich.
- Bernhardt, R. 1971. 'Imperium und Eleutheria: die römische Politik gegenüber den freien Städten des griechischen Ostens'. PhD diss. University of Hamburg.
- Bers, V. (trans.). 2003. *Demosthenes, Speeches 50-59*. University of Texas Press.
- Billows, R. A. 1990. *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*. Berkeley and London.
- Blanck, H. 1968. 'Porträt-Gemälde als Ehrendenkmäler'. *BJ* 168: 1-12.
- Blanshard, A. J. L. 2004. 'Depicting democracy: an exploration of art and text in the Law of Eukrates'. *JHS* 124: 1-15.

- Bloedow, E. F., and H. M. Loube. 1997. 'Alexander the Great "under fire" at Persepolis'. *Klio* 79: 341-53.
- Blümel, C. 1950/51. 'Der Fries des Tempels der Athena Nike in der attischen Kunst des 5. Jh. v. Chr.'. *JDAI*: 135-65.
- Boardman, J. 1977. 'The Parthenon frieze - another view'. In U. Höckmann, and A. Krug (eds.), *Festschrift für Frank Brommer*. Mainz: 39-49.
- Boedeker, D. 1998. 'The new Simonides and heroization at Plataea'. In N. Fisher, and H. van Wees (eds.), *Archaic Greece: New Approaches and New Evidence*. London: 231-49.
- Boegehold, A. L. 1965. 'The Salamis epigram'. *GRBS* 6: 179-86.
- Bömer, F. 1952. 'Pompa'. In *RE* Vol. XXI: 1878-994.
- Bommelaer, J.-F., and D. Laroche. 2015. *Guide de Delphes: Le Site*. 2nd edn. Athens.
- Borza, E. N. 1982. 'Athenians, Macedonians, and the origins of the Macedonian Royal House'. In *Studies in Attic Epigraphy, History and Topography*. Princeton: 7-13.
- Bosworth, A. B. 1980. *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander*. Vol. I: *Books I-III*. Oxford.
- Bosworth, A. B. 1988. *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great*. Cambridge.
- Bouvier, H. 1978. 'Honneurs et récompenses à Delphes'. *ZPE* 30: 101-18.
- Bowie, A. M. (ed.). 2007. *Herodotus: Histories. Book VIII*. Cambridge and New York.
- Bowie, E. 1970. 'Greek and thier past in the Second Sophistic'. *Past & Present* 46: 3-41.
- Bowie, E. 2013. 'Marathon in the Greek culture of the second century AD'. In C. Carey, and M. Edwards (eds.), *Marathon – 2,500 Years: Proceedings of The Marathon Conference 2010*. London: 241-53.
- Bowie, E. 2021. 'Marathon in fifth-century epigram'. In E. Bowie, *Essays on Ancient Greek Literature and Culture*. Vol. I: *Greek Poetry before 400 BC*. Cambridge: 450-65. (First published in K. Buraselis, and K. Meidani (eds.), *Marathon: The Ancient Deme and the Battle Athens*: 203-219. 2010.)
- Bowra, C. M. 1961. *Greek Lyric Poetry: From Alcman to Simonides*. 2nd edn. Oxford.
- Braun, B. 2021: 'Review: David C. Yates. 2019. *States of Memory: The Polis, Panhellenism, and the Persian War*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press'. *BMCR* 2021.03.06. <https://bmc.brynmawr.edu/2021/2021.03.06/>.
- Briant, P. 2002. *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire*. (trans. P. T. Daniels) Winona Lake. (In French, Paris. 1996.)
- Bridges, E. 2014. *Imagining Xerxes: Ancient Perspectives on a Persian King*. London and New York.

- Bringmann, K., and H. von Steuben. 1995. *Schenkungen hellenistischer Herrscher an griechische Städte und Heiligtümer*. Vol. I: *Zeugnisse und Kommentare*. Berlin.
- Briscoe, J. 1981. *A Commentary on Livy, Books XXXIV–XXXVII*. Oxford.
- Broadhead, H. D. 1960. *The Persae of Aeschylus*. Cambridge.
- Brogan, T. M. 2003. ‘Liberation honors: Athenian monuments from Antigonid victories in their immediate and broader contexts’. In O. Palagia, and S. V. Tracy (eds.), *The Macedonians in Athens, 322-229 B.C.: Proceedings of an International Conference held at the University of Athens, May 24–26, 2001*. Oxford: 194-205.
- Brownson, C. L. (trans.). 1921. *Xenophon: Hellenica*. Vol. II: *Books 5-7*. Cambridge, MA.
- Brunt, P. A. 1965. ‘The aims of Alexander’. *G&R* 12: 205-15.
- Bruzzo, R. 2015. ‘Killing the past in Thucydides' Plataean debate’. *CPh* 110: 289-300.
- Bubelis, W. 2010. ‘The sacred triremes and their *tamiai* at Athens’. *Historia* 59: 385-411.
- Buck, R. J. 1979. *A History of Boeotia*. Edmonton.
- Buckler, J. 1980. *The Theban Hegemony, 371-362 BC*. Cambridge, MA.
- Buckler, J. 1982. ‘Xenophon's speeches and the Theban Hegemony’. *Athenaeum* 60: 180-204.
- Bulle, H. 1937. *Das Theater zu Sparta*. Munich.
- Bultrighini, U., and M. Torelli. (eds.). 2017. *Pausania: Guida della Grecia. Libro X: Delfi e la Focide*. Milano.
- Buraselis, K., and K. Meidani. (eds.). 2010. *Μαραθών: Η Μάχη και ο Αρχαίος Δήμος / Marathon: The Battle and the Ancient Deme*. Athens.
- Burnett, A. P. 2005. *Pindar's Songs for Young Athletes of Aigina*. Oxford.
- Burton, A. 1972. *Diodorus Siculus, Book 1: A Commentary*. Leiden.
- Bury, J. B. 1909. *The Ancient Greek Historians*. New York.
- Byrne, S. G. 2009. ‘Agora XV 112 and iteration of council service in Hellenistic Athens’. In A. Themom, and N. Papazarkadas (eds.), *Αττικά επιγραφικά: Μελέτες προς τιμήν του Christian Habicht*. Athens: 215-23.
- Calabi Limentani, I. (ed.). 1964. *Plutarchi Vita Aristidis*. Florence.
- Camp, J. M., II. 2010. *The Athenian Agora: Site Guide*. 5th edn. Princeton, NJ.
- Campbell, D. 2020. ‘Review: John O. Hyland. 2018. *Persian Interventions: The Achaemenid Empire, Athens and Sparta, 450-386 BCE*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press’.
- Canevaro, M. 2013. ‘“Nomothesia” in Classical Athens: what sources should we believe?’. *CQ* 63: 139-60.
- Canevaro, M. 2019. ‘Memory, the orators, and the public in fourth-century BC Athens’.

- In L. Castagnoli, and P. Ceccarelli (eds.), *Greek Memories: Theories and Practices*. Cambridge: 136-57.
- Canevaro, M., and E. M. Harris. 2012. 'The documents in Andocides' *On the Mysteries*'. *CQ* 62: 98-129.
- Canevaro, M., A. Iacoviello and N. Luraghi. 2022. 'Athens from the revolt against Demetrios to the Chremonidean War: Aristeides of Lamprai in *I.Rhamnous* 404'. *Incidenza dell'Antico: Dialoghi di Storia Greca* 20: 71-102.
- Canfora, L. 2011. 'L'epitafio in morte di Leostene e la "guerra lamiaca"'. *QS* 73: 5-28.
- Canfora, L. 2012. 'Per la storia dell'"Epitafio" attribuito ad Iperide (Papiro Stobart)'. *RSI* 124: 165-92.
- Carey, C. (trans.). 2000. *Aeschines*. Austin, TX.
- Carey, C. 2019. *Thermopylae*. Oxford.
- Carey, C., and M. Edwards. (eds.). 2013. *Marathon - 2,500 Years: Proceedings of the Marathon Conference 2010*. London.
- Carlà-Uhink, F. 2019. '(Re-)founding Italy: the Social War, its aftermath and the construction of a Roman-Italic identity in the Roman Republic'. *History in Flux* 1: 3-19.
- Carless Unwin, N. 2020. 'Basket-bearers and gold-wearers: epigraphic insights into the material dimensions of processional roles in the Greek East'. *Kernos* 33: 89-125.
- Carroll, K. K. 1982. *The Parthenon Inscription*. Durham, NC.
- Cartledge, P. A. 1987. *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta*. London.
- Cartledge, P. A. 2002a. *The Greeks: A Portrait of Self and Others*. 2nd edn. Oxford.
- Cartledge, P. A. 2002b. *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300 to 362 BC*. 2nd edn. London and New York.
- Cartledge, P. A. 2013. *After Thermopylae: The Oath of Plataea and the End of the Graeco-Persian Wars*. Oxford and New York.
- Cartledge, P. A., and A. J. S. Spawforth. 2002. *Hellenistic and Roman Sparta: A Tale of Two Cities*. 2nd edn. London.
- Casson, L. 1994. *Travel in the Ancient World*. 3rd. edn. Baltimore.
- Castagnoli, L., and P. Ceccarelli. (eds.). 2019. *Greek Memories: Theories and Practices*. Cambridge and New York.
- Castriota, D. 1992. *Myth, Ethos, and Actuality: Official Art in Fifth-Century B.C. Athens*. Madison, WI.
- Castriota, D. 2005. 'Feminizing the barbarian and barbarizing the feminine: Amazons, Trojans, and Persians in the Stoa Poikile'. In J. M. Barringer, J. M. Hurwit and J. J. Pollit (eds.), *Periklean Athens and Its Legacy: Problems and Perspectives*. Austin,

- TX: 89-102.
- Cawkwell, G. 1979. 'Introduction'. In R. Warner (trans.), *Xenophon: A History of My Times*. With an introduction and notes by G. Cawkwell. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 7-46.
- Cawkwell, G. 2005. *The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia*. Oxford.
- Cawkwell, G. 2012. 'Chares (1)'. In *OCD*<sup>4</sup>: 305.
- Chambers, M. 1962. 'The authenticity of the Themistocles Decree'. *AHR* 67: 306-16.
- Chambry, É., and R. Flacelière. (eds. and trans.). 1969. *Plutarque, Vies*. Vol. V: *Aristide-Caton l'Ancien, Philopoemen-Flaminius*. Paris.
- Champion, C. B. 1995. 'The Soteria at Delphi: Aetolian propaganda in the epigraphical record'. *AJPh* 116: 213-20.
- Champion, C. B. 1996. 'Polybius, Aetolia and the Gallic Attack on Delphi (279 B.C.)'. *Historia* 45: 315-28.
- Champion, C. B. 2004. *Cultural Politics in Polybius's Histories*. Berkeley.
- Champion, C. B. 2004/5 [2007]. 'In defense of Hellas: the Antigonid Soteria and Paneia at Delos and the Aetolian Soteria at Delphi'. *AJAH* (n.s.) 3-4: 72-88.
- Champion, C. B. 2007a. 'Empire by invitation: Greek political strategies and Roman imperial interventions in the second century BCE'. *TAPhA* 137: 255-75.
- Champion, C. B. 2007b. 'Polybius and Aetolia: a historiographical approach'. In J. Marincola (ed.), *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*. Malden, MA and Oxford: 333-9.
- Champion, C. B. 2018. 'Polybius on "Classical Athenian imperial democracy"'. In M. Canevaro, and B. Gray (eds.), *The Hellenistic Reception of Classical Athenian Democracy and Political Thought*. Oxford: 123-38.
- Chanotis, A. 1988. *Historie und Historiker in den griechischen Inschriften: epigraphische Beiträge zur griechischen Historiographie*. Stuttgart.
- Chanotis, A. 2002. 'Ritual dynamics: the Boiotian festival of the Daidala'. In H. F. J. Horstmannshoff, H. W. Singor, F. T. van Straten and J. H. M. Strubbe (eds.), *Kykeon: Studies in Honour of H. S. Versnel*. Leiden, Boston and Cologne: 23-48.
- Chanotis, A. 2003. 'The divinity of Hellenistic rulers'. In A. Erskine (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*. Oxford: 431-45.
- Chanotis, A. 2005. *War in the Hellenistic World: A Social and Cultural History*. Maiden, MA and Oxford.
- Chanotis, A. 2006. 'Rituals between norms and emotions: rituals as shared experience and memory'. In E. Stavrianopoulou (ed.), *Ritual and Communication in the Graeco-Roman World*. Liège: 211-38.

- Chanotis, A. 2013. 'Processions in Hellenistic cities: contemporary discourses and ritual dynamics'. In R. Alston, O. M. van Nijf and C. Williamson (eds.), *Cults, Creeds, and Identities in the Greek City after the Classical Age*. Leuven: 21-47.
- Chanotis, A. 2016. 'History as an argument in Hellenistic oratory: the evidence of Hellenistic decrees'. In P. Derron, M. Edwards and P. Ducrey (eds.), *La rhétorique du pouvoir: une exploration de l'art oratoire délibératif grec. Neuf exposés suivis de discussions*. 62. Vandœuvres: 129-74.
- Chanotis, A. 2018. *Age of Conquests: The Greek World from Alexander to Hadrian*. Cambridge, MA.
- Chankowski, A. S. 2005. 'Processions et cérémonies d'accueil: une image de la cité de la basse époque hellénistique?'. In P. Fröhlich, and C. Müller (eds.), *Citoyenneté et participation à la basse époque hellénistique: actes de la table ronde des 22 et 23 mai 2004, Paris, BNF*. Geneva: 185-206.
- Clarke, K. 2008. *Making Time for the Past: Local History and the Polis*. Oxford and New York.
- Clinton, K. 2019. 'Journeys to the Eleusinian Mysteries (with an appendix on the procession at the Andanian Mysteries)'. In W. Friese, S. Handberg and T. M. Kristensen (eds.), *Ascending and Descending the Acropolis: Movement in Athenian Religion*. Aarhus: 159-76.
- Connor, W. R. 1993. 'The Ionian era of Athenian civic identity'. *PAPHS* 137: 194-206.
- Constantakopoulou, C. 2007. *The Dance of the Islands: Insularity, Networks, the Athenian Empire, and the Aegean World* Oxford.
- Cornell, T. J. 1995. *The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000-264 BC)*. London and New York.
- Curtius, E., and A. Milchhöfer. 1891. *Die Stadtgeschichte von Athen*. Berlin.
- Dascalakis, A. 1965. *The Hellenism of the Ancient Macedonians*. Thessaloniki.
- Davies, J. K. 1971. *Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 BC*. Oxford.
- Davison, C. C. 2009. *Pheidias: The Sculptures and Ancient Sources*. 3 vols. With the collaboration of B. Lundgreen. (ed. G. B. Waywell) London.
- Day, J., and M. Chambers. 1962. *Aristotle's History of Athenian Democracy*. Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- Day, J. W. 1980. *The Glory of Athens: The Popular Tradition as Reflected in the Panathenaicus of Aelius Aristides*. Chicago.
- de Bakker, M. 2019. 'A narratological comparison of Herodotus and Diodorus on Thermopylae'. In L. van Gils, I. J. F. de Jong and C. Kroon (eds.), *Textual Strategies in Ancient War Narrative: Thermopylae, Cannae and Beyond*. Leiden: 54-90.

- de La Coste-Messelière, P. 1957. *Fouilles de Delphes*. Vol. IV.4: *Sculptures du Trésor des Athéniens*. Paris.
- de Romilly, J. 1963. *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism*. (trans. P. Tody) New York. (In French, Paris. 1947.)
- de Romilly, J. 1998. *The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens*. (trans. J. Lloyd) Oxford. (In French, Paris. 1988.)
- de Souza, P. 2003. *The Greek and Persian Wars 499-386 BC*. Oxford.
- de Ste. Croix, G. E. M. 1972. *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*. London.
- Debnar, P. A. 1996. 'The unpersuasive Thebans (Thucydides 3.61-67)'. *Phoenix* 50: 95-110.
- Degen, J. 2022. *Alexander III. zwischen Ost und West: Indigene Traditionen und Herrschaftsinszenierung im makedonischen Weltimperium*. Stuttgart.
- Derow, P. 1995. 'Herodotus readings'. *Classics Ireland*.
- Derow, P. S. 2015. 'Polybios and the embassy of Kallikrates'. In P. S. Derow, *Rome, Polybius, and the East*. (eds. A. Erskine, and J. C. Quinn) Oxford and New York: 169-80. (First published in *Essays presented to C. M. Bowra* Oxford: 12-23. 1970.)
- Deubner, L. 1932. *Attische Feste*. Berlin.
- Dignas, B. (ed.). 2022. *A Cultural History of Memory in Antiquity*. London and New York.
- Dillery, J. 1995. *Xenophon and the History of his Times*. London and New York.
- Dixon, M. 2007. 'Corinth, Greek freedom, and the diadochoi, 323-301 BC'. In W. Heckel, L. A. Tritle and P. Wheatley (eds.), *Alexander's Empire. Formulation to Decay: A Companion to Crossroads of History*. Claremont, CA: 151-78.
- Dmitriev, S. 2011. *The Greek Slogan of Freedom and Early Roman Politics in Greece*. New York.
- Dowden, K. 2008: 'Dositheos (54)'. In I. Worthington (ed.), *Brill's New Jacoby*. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1873-5363\\_bnj\\_a54](http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1873-5363_bnj_a54).
- Dowden, K. 2018: 'Dositheos (54)'. In I. Worthington (ed.), *Brill's New Jacoby*. 2nd edn.: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1873-5363\\_bnj\\_a54](http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1873-5363_bnj_a54).
- Dreyer, B. 1999. *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des spätklassischen Athen: (322-ca. 230 v. Chr.)*. Stuttgart.
- Duffy, X. 2018. *Commemorating Conflict: Greek Monuments of the Persian Wars*. Oxford.
- Eckstein, A. M. 2008. *Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230-170 BC*. Malden, MA and Oxford.
- Eckstein, A. M. 2011. 'Review: Sviatoslav Dmitriev. 2011. *The Greek Slogan of*

- Freedom and Early Roman Politics in Greece*. Oxford: Oxford University Press'.  
*International Journal of the Classical Tradition* 18: 636-42.
- Ellithorpe, C. J. 2017. 'Circulating imperial ideology: coins as propaganda in the Roman World'. PhD diss. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
- Enenkel, K. A. E., and I. L. Pfeijffer. 2005. 'Introduction'. In K. A. E. Enenkel, and I. L. Pfeijffer (eds.), *The Manipulative Mode: Political Propaganda in Antiquity: A Collection of Case Studies*. Leiden and Boston: 1-12.
- Erl, A. 2017. *Kollektives Gedächtnis und Erinnerungskulturen: Eine Einführung*. 3rd edn. Stuttgart.
- Errington, M. 1969. *Philopoemen*. Oxford.
- Erskine, A. 1990. *The Hellenistic Stoa: Political Thought and Action*. London.
- Erskine, A. 1996. 'Money-loving Romans'. In F. Cairns, and M. Heath (eds.), *Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar*. Vol. IX: *Roman Poetry and Prose, Greek Poetry, Etymology, Historiography*. Leeds: 1-11.
- Erskine, A. 2000. 'Polybios and barbarian Rome'. *Mediterraneo Antico* 3: 165-82.
- Erskine, A. 2001. *Troy between Greece and Rome: Local Tradition and Imperial Power*. Oxford and New York.
- Erskine, A. 2002. 'O brother, where are thou? Tales of kinship and diplomacy'. In D. Ogden (ed.), *New Perspectives on the Hellenistic World*. London: 97-115.
- Erskine, A. 2005. 'Unity and identity: shaping the past in the Greek Mediterranean'. In E. Gruen (ed.), *Cultural Borrowings and Ethnic Appropriations in Antiquity*. Stuttgart: 121-36.
- Erskine, A. 2014. 'Ruler cult and the early Hellenistic city'. In H. Hauben, and A. Meeus (eds.), *The Age of the Successors and the Creation of the Hellenistic Kingdoms (323-276 B.C.)*. Leuven: 579-97.
- Erskine, A. 2021. 'Simon Hornblower. 2018. *Lykophron's Alexandra: Rome and the Hellenistic World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press'. *Klio* 103: 386-92.
- Étienne, R. 1985. 'Le koinon des Hellènes à Platées et Glaucon, fils d'Étéoclès'. In P. Roesch, and G. Argoud (eds.), *La Béotie antique: : Lyon - Saint-Étienne, 16-20 mai 1983*. Paris: 259-63.
- Étienne, R., and M. Piérart. 1975. 'Un décret du koinon des Hellènes à Platées en l'honneur de Glaucon, fils d'Étéoclès, d'Athènes'. *BCH* 99: 51-75.
- Evans, J. A. S. 1988. 'The medism of Pausanias: two versions'. *Antichthon* 22: 1-11.
- Evans, J. A. S. 1993. 'Herodotus and the Battle of Marathon'. *Historia* 42: 279-307.
- Faraguna, M. 1992. *Atene nell'età di Alessandro: problemi politici, economici, finanziari*. Rome.

- Faraguna, M. 2003. 'Alexander and the Greeks'. In J. Roisman (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*. Leiden: 99-130.
- Ferguson, W. S. 1911. *Hellenistic Athens: An Historical Essay*. London.
- Ferrary, J.-L. 1988. *Philhellénisme et impérialisme: Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique de la seconde guerre de Macédoine à la guerre contre Mithridate*. Rome.
- Figueira, T. J. 1993. 'The chronology of the conflict between Athens and Aegina in Herodotus Book Six'. In T. J. Figueira, *Excursions in Epichoric History: Aiginetan Essays*. Lanham: 113-49. (Rev. edn. of *QUCC* 28: 49-90. 1988.)
- Finley, M. I. 1968. *A History of Sicily: Ancient Sicily to the Arab Conquest*. London.
- Finn, J. 2014. 'Alexander's return of the Tyrannicide statues to Athens'. *Historia* 63: 385-403.
- Flacelière, R. 1937. *Les Aitoliens à Delphes: contribution à l'histoire de la Grèce centrale au IIIe siècle av. J.-C.* Paris.
- Flashar, M. 1996. 'Die Sieger von Marathon: Zwischen Mythisierung und Vorbildlichkeit'. In M. Flashar, H.-J. Gehrke and E. Heinrich (eds.), *Retrospektive: Konzepte von Vergangenheit in der griechisch-römischen Antike*. Munich: 63-85.
- Flower, H. I. 2006. *The Art of Forgetting: Disgrace and Oblivion in Roman Political Culture*. Chapel Hill.
- Flower, M. A. 2000a. 'Alexander the Great and Panhellenism'. In A. B. Bosworth, and E. J. Baynham (eds.), *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford: 96-135.
- Flower, M. A. 2000b. 'From Simonides to Isocrates: the fifth-century origins of fourth-century Panhellenism'. *CIAnt* 19: 65-101.
- Flower, M. A. 2017. 'Xenophon as a historian'. In M. A. Flower (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon*. Cambridge and New York: 301-22.
- Flower, M. A., and J. Marincola. (eds.). 2002. *Herodotus: Histories. Book IX*. Cambridge.
- Fornara, C. W. 1967. 'The value of the Themistocles Decree'. *AHR* 73: 425-33.
- Fornara, C. W., and L. J. Samons, II. 1991. *Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford.
- Fossey, J. M. 1988. *Topography and Population of Ancient Boiotia*. Chicago.
- Foxhall, L., H.-J. Gehrke and N. Luraghi. (eds.). 2010. *Intentional History: Spinning Time in Ancient Greece*. Stuttgart.
- Francis, E. D., and M. Vickers. 1985. 'The Oenoe painting in the Stoa Poikile and Herodotus' account of Marathon'. *ABSA* 80: 99-113.
- Frazer, J. G. 1898a. *Pausanias's Description of Greece*. Vol. I: *Translation*. London.

## Bibliography

- Frazer, J. G. 1898b. *Pausanias's Description of Greece*. Vol. II: *Commentary on Book I*. London.
- Frazer, J. G. 1898c. *Pausanias's Description of Greece*. Vol. III: *Commentary on Book II-V*. London.
- Frazer, J. G. 1898d. *Pausanias's Description of Greece*. Vol. IV: *Commentary on Book VI-VIII*. London.
- Fredricksmeier, E. 2000. 'Alexander the Great and the kingship of Asia'. In A. B. Bosworth, and E. J. Baynham (eds.), *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford: 136-66.
- Friend, J. L. 2011. 'The Nemesis in Lycurgan Athens'. In J. Bodel, and N. Dimitrova (eds.), *Ancient Documents and their Contexts: First North American Congress of Greek and Latin Epigraphy (2011)*. Leiden and Boston: 98-110.
- Fries, A. 2017. 'Pindar, Hieron and the Persian Wars: history and poetic competition in *Pythian* 1, 71-80'. *WS* 130: 59-72.
- Furley, W., and J. M. Bremer. 2001a. *Greek Hymns: Selected Cult Songs from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Period*. Vol. II: *Greek Texts and Commentary*. Tübingen.
- Furley, W., and J. M. Bremer. 2001b. *Greek Hymns: Selected Cult Songs from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Period*. Vol. I: *The Texts in Translation*. Tübingen.
- Gabbert, J. J. 1996. 'The career of Olympiodorus of Athens (ca. 340–270 B.C.)'. *AncW* 27: 59-66.
- Gabbert, J. J. 1997. *Antigonus II Gonatas: A Political Biography*. London and New York.
- Gagarin, M., D. Mirhady, T. L. Papillon and Y. L. Too. 2004. 'Introduction to Isocrates'. In T. L. Papillon (trans.), *Isocrates II*. Austin, TX: 3-13.
- Garnsey, P. 1988. *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and Crisis*. Cambridge.
- Gartziou-Tatti, A. 2013. 'Gods, heroes, and the Battle of Marathon'. In C. Carey, and M. Edwards (eds.), *Marathon – 2,500 Years: Proceedings of The Marathon Conference 2010*. London: 91-110.
- Garvie, A. F. 2009. *Aeschylus: Persae*. Oxford and New York.
- Gatrell, P. 2010. 'War after the war: conflicts, 1919-23'. In J. Horne (ed.), *A Companion to World War I*. Malden, MA, Oxford, and Chichester: 558-75.
- Gatzke, A. F. 2013. 'The propaganda of insurgency: Mithridates VI and the "freeing of the Greeks" in 88 BCE'. *AncW* 44: 66-79.
- Gauer, W. 1968. *Weihgeschenke aus den Perserkriegen*. Tübingen.
- Gauthier, P. 1966. 'Le parallèle Himère Salamine au V<sup>e</sup> et au IV<sup>e</sup> siècle av. J. C.'. *REG*

- 66: 5-32.
- Gauthier, P. 1979. 'La réunification d'Athènes en 281 et les deux archontes Nicias'. *REG* 92: 348-99.
- Gauthier, P. 1985. *Les cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs ( IV<sup>e</sup>-I<sup>er</sup> siècle avant J.-C.): Contribution à l'histoire des institutions*. Athens.
- Gebhard, E. R., and M. W. Dickie. 2003. 'The view from the Isthmus, ca. 200 to 44 B.C.'. In C. K. Williams, and N. Bookidis (eds.), *Corinth, the Centenary: 1896-1996*. Princeton, NJ: 262-78.
- Gehrke, H.-J. 2011. 'Myth, history, politics - ancient and modern'. (trans. M. Beck.) In J. Marincola (ed.), *Greek and Roman Historiography*. Oxford: 40-71. (In German, *Saeculum* 45: 239-64. 1994.)
- Gehrke, H.-J. 2014. *Geschichte als Element antiker Kultur: Die Griechen und ihre Geschichte(n)*. Berlin and New York.
- Gehrke, H.-J. 2019. 'Intentional history and the social context of remembrance in Ancient Greece'. In W. Pohl, and V. Wieser (eds.), *Historiography and Identity*. Vol. I: *Ancient and Early Christian Narratives of Community*. Turnhout: 95-106.
- Gehrke, H.-J. 2023. *The Greeks and Their Histories: Myth, History, and Society*. (trans. R. Geuss) Cambridge. (In German, Berlin. 2014.)
- Gengler, O. 2011. 'Leonidas and the heroes of Thermopylae: memory of the dead and identity in Roman Sparta'. In H. Cavanagh, W. G. Cavanagh and J. Roy (eds.), *Honouring the Dead in the Peloponnese: Proceedings of the Conference held in Sparta 23-25 April 2009*. Nottingham: 151-61.
- Gensheimer, M. B. 2017. 'Metaphors for Marathon in the sculptural program of the Athenian Treasury at Delphi'. *Hesperia* 86: 1-42.
- Gerwarth, R. 2016. *The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917–1923*. London.
- Giannopoulou, M. 2022. 'Troizen'. In *The Encyclopedia of Ancient History*. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah55187>.
- Giovannini, A. 1993. 'Greek cities and Greek commonwealth'. In A. W. Bulloch, E. Gruen, A. A. Long and A. F. Stewart (eds.), *Images and Ideologies: Self-Definition in the Hellenistic World*. Berkeley: 265-86.
- Giovannini, A. 2007. *Les relations entre États dans la Grèce antique: Du temps d'Homère à l'intervention romaine (ca. 700-200 av. J.-C.)*. Stuttgart.
- Girdvainyte, L. 2020. 'Law and citizenship in Roman Achaia: continuity and change'. In K. Czajkowski, and B. Eckhardt (eds.), *Law in the Roman Provinces*. In collaboration with M. Strothmann. Oxford: 210-42.

- Glowacki, K. 2003. 'A personification of Demos on a new attic document relief'. *Hesperia* 72: 447-66.
- Goldhill, S. 1987. 'The Great Dionysia and civic ideology'. *JHS* 107: 58-76.
- Gomme, A. W. 1956. *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*. Vol. II: *The Ten Years' War (Books II-III)*. Oxford.
- Gould, J. P. A. 2012. 'Herodotus (1)'. In *OCD*<sup>4</sup>: 674-6.
- Graf, D. F. 1979. 'Medism: Greek collaboration with Achaemenid Persia'. PhD diss. University of Michigan.
- Graf, D. F. 1984. 'Medism: the origin and significance of the term'. *JHS* 104: 15-30.
- Graf, F. 1996. 'Pompai in Greece: some considerations about space and ritual in the Greek polis'. In R. Hägg (ed.), *The Role of Religion in the Early Greek Polis: Proceedings of the Third International Seminar on Ancient Greek Cult, Organized by the Swedish Institute at Athens, 16–18 October 1992*. Stockholm: 55-65.
- Grainger, J. D. 2017. *Great Power Diplomacy in the Hellenistic World*. London and New York.
- Graninger, D. 2011. *Cult and Koinon in Hellenistic Thessaly*. Leiden and Boston.
- Green, P. 2004. 'Rebooking the flute-girls: a fresh look at the chronological evidence for the fall of Athens and the eight-month rule of the Thirty'. In P. Green, *From Ikaria to the Stars: Classical Mythification, Ancient and Modern*. Austin, TX: 144-59. (Rev. edn. of *AHB* 5: 1-16. 1991.)
- Green, P. (trans.). 2006. *Diodorus Siculus, Books 11-12.37.1: Greek History, 480-431 B.C.—The Alternative Version*. Austin, TX.
- Green, P. 2009. 'Review: Emma Bridges, Edith Hall, and Peter J. Rhodes (eds.), 2007. *Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars: Antiquity to the Third Millennium*. Oxford: Oxford University Press'. *CR* 59: 610-2.
- Grethlein, J. 2010. *The Greeks and Their Past: Poetry, Oratory and History in the Fifth Century BCE*. Cambridge and New York.
- Grethlein, J. 2012. 'The use and abuse of history in the Plataen debate (Thuc. 3.52-68)'. In J. Grethlein, and C. B. Krebs (eds.), *Time and Narrative in Ancient Historiography*. Cambridge and New York: 57-75.
- Griffith, G. T. 1968. 'The letter of Darius at Arrian 2.14'. *PCPhS* 14: 33-48.
- Grijalvo, E. M., and F. Lozano. 2022. 'Imperial cult processions and landscape in the Greek cities of the Roman Empire: the case of the Demosthenia of Oenoanda'. In M. Horster, and N. Hächler (eds.), *The Impact of the Roman Empire on Landscapes: Proceedings of the Fourteenth Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire (Mainz, June 12-15, 2019)*. Leiden and Boston: 249-62.

- Grote, G. 1849. *A History of Greece*. Vol. V. London.
- Gruen, E. S. 1976. 'The origin of the Achaean War'. *JHS* 96: 46-69.
- Gruen, E. S. 1984. *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*. 2 vols. Berkeley.
- Gruen, E. S. 2018. 'Polybius and ethnicity'. In N. Miltsios, and M. Tamiolaki (eds.), *Polybius and His Legacy*. Berlin and Boston: 13-34.
- Grzesik, D. 2018. 'The power of space and memory: the honorific statuescape of Delphi'. *Antichthon* 52: 23-42.
- Grzesik, D. 2021. *Honorific Culture at Delphi in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods*. Leiden and Boston.
- Gullath, B. 1982. *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Boiotiens in der Zeit Alexanders und der Diadochen*. Frankfurt am Main.
- Gygax, M. D. 2016. *Benefaction and Rewards in the Ancient Greek City: the Origins of Euergetism*. Cambridge and New York.
- Haake, M. 2007. *Der Philosoph in der Stadt: Untersuchungen zur öffentlichen Rede über Philosophen und Philosophie in der hellenistischen Polis*. Munich.
- Haake, M. 2011. 'Antigonos II. Gonatas und der Nemesistempel in Rhamnous: zur Semantik göttlicher Ehren für einen hellenistischen König an einem athenischen "lieu de mémoire"'. In M. Haake, and M. Jung (eds.), *Griechische Heiligtümer als Erinnerungsorte: Von der Archaik bis in den Hellenismus. Erträge einer internationalen Tagung in Münster, 20.–21. Januar 2006*. Stuttgart: 109-27.
- Habicht, C. 1961. 'Falsche Urkunden zur Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter der Perserkriege'. *Hermes*: 1-35.
- Habicht, C. 1979. *Untersuchungen zur politischen Geschichte Athens im 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* Munich.
- Habicht, C. 1996. 'Divine honours for king Antigonos Gonatas in Athens'. *SCI* 15: 131-4.
- Habicht, C. 1997. *Athens from Alexander to Antony*. (trans. D. L. Schneider) Cambridge, MA and London. (In German, Munich. 1995.)
- Habicht, C. 1998. *Pausanias' Guide to Ancient Greece*. 2nd edn. Berkeley.
- Habicht, C. 2017. *Divine Honors for Mortal Men in Greek Cities: The Early Cases*. (trans. J. N. Dillon) Ann Arbor. (In German, Munich. 1970.)
- Hackl, U. 1980. 'Poseidonios und das Jahr 146 v. Chr. als Epochendatum in der antiken Historiographie'. *Gymnasium* 87: 151-66.
- Haillet, J. (ed. and trans.). 2001. *Diodore de Sicile: Bibliothèque historique*. Vol. V: *Livre XI*. Paris.
- Halbwachs, M. 1968. *La mémoire collective*. 2nd edn. With a preface by J. Duvignaud.

- With an introduction by J.-M. Alexandre. Paris.
- Halbwachs, M. 1976. *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*. With preface by. F. Châtelet. Paris.
- Hall, E. 1989. *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy*. Oxford.
- Hall, J. M. 1997. *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity*. Cambridge.
- Hall, J. M. 2001. 'Contested ethnicities: perceptions of Macedonia within evolving definitions of Greek ethnicity'. In I. Malkin (ed.), *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity*. Cambridge, MA: 159-86.
- Hall, J. M. 2002. *Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture*. Chicago.
- Hamel, D. 1998. *Athenian Generals: Military Authority in the Classical Period*. New York.
- Hammond, M. (trans.). 2009. *Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War*. With an introduction and notes by P. J. Rhodes. Oxford.
- Hammond, N. G. L. 1982. 'The narrative of Herodotus VII and the Decree of Themistocles at Troezen'. *JHS* 102: 75-93.
- Hammond, N. G. L. 1988. 'The expedition of Xerxes'. In *CAH<sup>2</sup>* Vol. IV: 518-91.
- Hammond, N. G. L. 1992. 'Plataea's relations with Thebes, Sparta and Athens'. *JHS* 112: 143-50.
- Hammond, N. G. L., and G. T. Griffith. 1979. *A History of Macedonia*. Vol. II: 550-336 B.C. Oxford.
- Hansen, M. H. 1999. *Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles and Ideology*. London.
- Hansen, M. H. 2015. 'Is Patrokleides' decree (Andoc. 1.77-79) a genuine document?'. *GRBS*: 884-901.
- Hansen, M. H., and H. N. Nielsen. (eds.). 2004. *An Inventory of Archaic and Greek Poleis*. Oxford.
- Harris, E. M. 2013/4. 'The authenticity of the document at Andocides *On the Mysteries* 96-98'. *Τεκμήρια* 12: 121-53.
- Harris, W. V. 1989. *Ancient Literacy*. Cambridge, MA and London.
- Harrison, A. R. W. 1971. *The Law of Athens*. Vol. II: *Procedure*. Oxford.
- Harrison, E. B. 1972. 'The south frieze of the Nike Temple and the Marathon painting in the Painted Stoa'. *AJA* 76: 353-78.
- Harrison, E. B. 1981. 'Motifs of the city-siege on the shield of Athena Parthenos'. *AJA* 85: 281-317.
- Harrison, E. B. 1997. 'The glories of the Athenians: observations on the program of the frieze of the Temple of Athena Nike'. In D. Buitron-Oliver (ed.), *The Interpretation*

- of *Architectural Sculpture in Greece and Rome*. Washington, DC: 108-25.
- Harvey, F. D. 1966. 'The political sympathies of Herodotus'. *Historia* 15: 254-5.
- Hau, L. I. 2009. 'The burden of good fortune in Diodorus of Sicily: A case for originality?'. *Historia* 58: 171-97.
- Haubold, J. 2007. 'Xerxes' Homer'. In E. Bridges, E. Hall and P. J. Rhodes (eds.), *Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars: Antiquity to the Third Millennium*. Oxford: 47-63.
- Haubold, J. 2013. *Greece and Mesopotamia: Dialogues in Literature*. Cambridge.
- Havelock, C. M. 1980. 'The archaistic Athena Promachos in early Hellenistic coinages'. *AJA* 84: 41-50.
- Heckel, W. 2021. *Who's Who in the Age of Alexander and his Successors: From Chaironeia to Ipsos (338-301 BC)* Barnsley.
- Hegel, G. W. F. 1986. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*. (eds. E. Moldenhauer, and K. M. Michel) Frankfurt am Main.
- Heinen, H. 1972. *Untersuchungen zur hellenistischen Geschichte des 3. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.: Zur Geschichte der Zeit des Ptolemaios Keraunos und zum Chremonideischen Krieg*. Wiesbaden.
- Henderson, M. M. 1977. 'The Decree of Themistocles'. *AClass* 20: 85-103.
- Henderson, T. R. 2020. *The Springtime of the People: The Athenian Ephebeia and Citizen Training from Lykourgos to Augustus*. Leiden and Boston.
- Henry, A. S. 1983. *Honours and Privileges in Athenian Decrees: The Principal Formulae of Athenian Honorary Decrees*. Hildesheim.
- Herrman, J. 2009. *Hyperides: Funeral Oration*. Oxford and New York.
- Higbie, C. 2003. *The Lindian Chronicle and the Greek Creation of their Past*. Oxford and New York.
- Higgins, W. E. 1977. *Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and the Society of the Polis*. Albany.
- Hignett, C. 1963. *Xerxes' Invasion of Greece*. Oxford.
- Hiller von Gaertringen, F. 1934. 'Perserepigramme von der Athenischen Agora'. *Hermes* 69: 204-6.
- Hintzen-Bohlen, B. 1992. *Herrscherrepräsentation im Hellenismus: Untersuchungen zu Weihgeschenken, Stiftungen und Ehrenmonumenten in den mutterländischen Heiligtümern Delphi, Olympia, Delos und Dodona*. Cologne.
- Hoffelner, K. 1988. 'Die Metopen des Athener-Schatzhauses: ein neuer Rekonstruktionsversuch'. *MDAI(A)* 103: 77-117.
- Holland, T. 2010. 'From Persia with love: propaganda and imperial overreach in the

- Greco-Persian Wars'. In V. D. Hanson (ed.), *Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome*. Princeton, NJ: 11-30.
- Hölscher, T. 1991. 'The city of Athens: space, symbol, structure'. In A. Molho, K. A. Raaflaub and J. E. Emlen (eds.), *City states in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy*. Ann Arbor: 355-80.
- Hölscher, T. 1998. 'Images and political identity: the case of Athens'. In D. Boedeker, and K. A. Raaflaub (eds.), *Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens*. London: 153-83.
- Holton, J. R. 2014. 'Demetrios Poliorketes, son of Poseidon and Aphrodite: cosmic and memorial significance in the Athenian ithyphallic hymn'. *Mnemosyne* (The Netherlands) 67: 370-90.
- Hornblower, J. 1981. *Hieronymus of Cardia*. Oxford.
- Hornblower, S. 1991. *A Commentary on Thucydides*. Vol. I: *Books I-III*. Oxford.
- Hornblower, S. 1996. *A Commentary on Thucydides*. Vol. II: *Books IV-V.24*. Oxford.
- Hornblower, S. 2008. *A Commentary on Thucydides*. Vol. III: *Books 5.25-8.109*. Oxford.
- Hornblower, S. 2015. *Lykophron: Alexandra. Greek Text, Translation, Commentary, and Introduction*. Oxford and New York.
- Hornblower, S. 2018. *Lykophron's Alexandra, Rome, and the Hellenistic World*. Oxford.
- How, W. W., and J. Wells. 1928. *A Commentary on Herodotus*. Vol. II: *Books V-IX*. Oxford.
- Humphreys, S. C. 1997. 'Fragments, fetishes, and philosophers: towards a history of Greek historiography after Thucydides'. In W. G. Most (ed.), *Collecting Fragments = Fragmente sammeln*. Göttingen: 207-24.
- Humphreys, S. C. 2004. *The Strangeness of Gods: Historical Perspectives on the Interpretation of Athenian Religion*. Oxford.
- Humphreys, S. C. 2018. *Kinship in Ancient Athens: An Anthropological Analysis*. 2 vols. Oxford and New York.
- Hurwit, J. M. 1999. *The Athenian Acropolis: History, Mythology, and Archaeology from the Neolithic Era to the Present*. Cambridge.
- Hurwit, J. M. 2004. *The Acropolis in the Age of Pericles*. Cambridge.
- Hyland, J. O. 2018. *Persian Interventions: The Achaemenid Empire, Athens and Sparta, 450-386 BCE*. Baltimore.
- Iacoviello, A. 2021. 'Exemplarity and politics of memory: the recovery of the Piraeus by Olympiodoros of Athens'. *CQ* 71: 617-23.
- Instone, S. 1995. 'Review: John H. Molyneux. 1992. *Simonides: A Historical Study*. Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers'. *CR* 45: 157-8.

- Isaac, B. H. 2004. *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*. Princeton, NJ.
- Jacoby, F. 1904. *Das Marmor Parium*. Berlin.
- Jacoby, F. 1962. *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Pt. IIB: *Zeitgeschichte (Spezialgeschichten, Autobiographien und Memoiren. Zeittafeln): Kommentar zu Nr. 106-261*. Leiden.
- Jacquemin, A. 1999. *Offrandes monumentales à Delphes*. Paris.
- Jacquemin, A., and D. Laroche. 2019. 'Le portique des Athéniens revisité'. In O. Palagia, and E. P. Sioumpara (eds.), *From Kallias to Kritias: Greek Art in Athens and Beyond 527-449 BC*. Athens: 182-91.
- Jameson, M. H. 1951. 'The hero Echetlaeus'. *TAPhA* 82: 49-61.
- Jameson, M. H. 1960. 'A decree of Themistokles from Troizen'. *Hesperia* 29: 198-223.
- Jeffery, L. H. 1965. 'The *Battle of Oinoe* in the Stoa Poikile: a problem in Greek art and history'. *ABSA* 60: 41-57.
- Jensen, E. 2021. *The Greco-Persian Wars: A Short History with Documents*. Indianapolis and Cambridge.
- Jeppesen, K. K. 1971. 'ΑΡΓΟΥΣΙΑ ΠΟΥ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟ ΘΕΙΟΝ: zu Pausanias IX 4,2 über die Gemälde im Tempel der Athena Areia zu Platää'. *AArch* 42: 110-2.
- Johansson, M. 2001. 'The inscription from Troizen: A decree of Themistocles?'. *ZPE* 137: 69-92.
- Johnstone, C. L., and R. J. Graff. 2018. 'Situating deliberative rhetoric in ancient Greece: the bouleutêrion as a venue for oratorical performance'. *Advances in the History of Rhetoric* 21: 2-88.
- Jolowicz, D. 2023. 'Spartans in the ancient Greek novels'. *JHS* 143: 121-46.
- Jones, A. H. M. (trans.). 1918. *Pausanias: Description of Greece*. Vol. I: *Books 1-2*. Cambridge, MA.
- Jones, A. H. M. 1940. *The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian*. Oxford.
- Jones, C. P. 1999. *Kinship Diplomacy in the Ancient World*. Cambridge.
- Jones, C. P. 2001. 'Pausanias and his guides'. In S. E. Alcock, J. F. Cherry and J. Elsner (eds.), *Pausanias: Travel and Memory in Roman Greece*. Oxford: 33-9.
- Jones, K., R. 2014a. 'Alcaeus of Messene, Philip V and the Colossus of Rhodes: a re-examination of *Anth. Pal.* 6.171'. *CQ* 64: 136-51.
- Jones, K., R. 2014b. 'Lycophron's Alexandra, the Romans and Antiochus III'. *JHS* 134: 41-55.
- Joyce, C. J. 2022. *Amnesty and Reconciliation in Late Fifth-Century Athens: The Rule of Law under Restored Democracy*. Edinburgh.
- Jung, M. 2006. *Marathon und Plataiai: Zwei Perserschlächten als "lieux de mémoire"*

- im antiken Griechenland*. Göttingen.
- Kühn, S. 2018. *Neue Untersuchungen zur Pythais-Prozession von Athen nach Delphi*. Berlin.
- Kagan, D. 1969. *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*. Ithaca, NY, and London.
- Kallet-Marx, R. M. 1995. 'Quintus Fabius Maximus and the Dyme affair (Syll.<sup>3</sup> 684)'. *CQ* 45: 129-53.
- Kallet, L., and J. H. Kroll. 2020. *The Athenian Empire: Using Coins as Sources*. Cambridge.
- Kapparis, K. A. 1995. 'The Athenian decree for the naturalisation of the Plataeans'. *GRBS* 36: 359-78.
- Kapparis, K. A. 1999. *Apollodoros 'Against Neaira' [D 59]*. Berlin and New York.
- Kearns, E. 1989. *The Heroes of Attica*. London.
- Keesling, C. M. 2017. *Early Greek Portraiture: Monuments and Histories*. Cambridge.
- Keesling, C. M. 2020. 'Innovation and deception: Athenian commemoration of the Persian Wars'. In M. Meyer, and G. Adornato (eds.), *Innovations and Inventions in Athens c. 530 to 470 BCE: Two Crucial Generations*. Wien: 211-27.
- Kellog, D. L. 2013. 'The place of publication of the ephebic oath and the "Oath of Plataia"'. *Hesperia* 82: 263-76.
- Kennell, N. M. 2022. 'Memory and identity among the ephebes of 2nd-century Achaëa'. In A. Kouremenos (ed.), *The Province of Achaëa in the 2nd Century CE: The Past Present*. London and New York: 13-34.
- Kienast, D. 1995. 'Die Politisierung des griechischen Nationalbewusstseins und die Rolle Delphis im Großen Perserkrieg'. In H. H. Schmitt, C. Schubert and K. Brodersen (eds.), *Rom und der griechische Osten: Festschrift für Hanno H. Schmitt zum 65. Geburtstag dargebracht von Schülern, Freunden und Münchenern*. Stuttgart: 117-33.
- Kirsten, E. 1950. 'Plataiai'. In *RE* Vol. XX: 2255-332.
- Kitto, H. D. F. 1961. *Greek Tragedy: A Literary Study*. 3rd edn. New York.
- Kloppenborg, J. S., and R. S. Ascough. (eds.). 2011. *Greco-Roman Associations Texts. Translations, and Commentary*. Vol. I: *Attica, Central Greece, Macedonia, Thrace*. Berlin and New York.
- Knoepfler, D. 2001. *Décrets érétriens de proxénie et de citoyenneté*. Lausanne.
- Knoepfler, D. 2006. 'Épigraphie et histoire des cités grecques'. *Annuaire du Collège de France* (Résumés 2004-2005) 105: 607-24.
- Knoepfler, D. 2007. 'De Delphes à Thermos: un témoignage épigraphique méconnu sur le trophée galate des Étoliens dans leur capitale'. *CRAI* 151: 1215-53.

- Kohl, R. 1915. 'De scholasticarum declamationum argumentis ex historia petitis dissertationem praemio ornatam'. PhD diss. University of Münster.
- Konecny, A. L. 2022. 'The Battle of Plataiai: topography and tactics'. In A. L. Konecny, and N. Sekunda (eds.), *The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC*. Vienna: 167-210.
- Konecny, A. L., and R. T. Marchese. 2013. 'I.B The history of Plataiai: a short survey'. In A. L. Konecny, V. L. Aravantinos and R. T. Marchese (eds.), *Plataiai: Archäologie und Geschichte einer boiotischen Polis*. Vienna: 23-48.
- Konecny, A. L., and N. Sekunda. 2022. *The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC*. Vienna.
- Korres, M. 2002. 'On the north Acropolis wall'. In M. Stamatopoulou, and Y. Marina (eds.), *Excavating Classical Culture: Recent Archaeological Discoveries in Greece*. Oxford: 179-86.
- Korres, M. 2017. 'Το τρόπαιον του Μαραθώνος: αρχιτεκτονική τεκμηρίωση'. In E. Greco (ed.), *Giornata di studi in ricordo di Luigi Beschi / Ημερίδα εις μνήμην του Luigi Beschi: Italiano, Filelleno, Studioso internazionale. Atti della Giornata di Studi, Atene 28 novembre 2015*. Athens: 149-202.
- Koskenniemi, E. 2019. *Greek Writers and Philosophers in Philo and Josephus: A Study of Their Secular Education and Educational Ideals*. Leiden.
- Kosmin, P. 2020. 'No island is a man: Antiochus III's marriage to "Euboea"'. In R. Oetjen (ed.), *New Perspectives in Seleucid History, Archaeology and Numismatics: Studies in Honor of Getzel M. Cohen*. Berlin and Boston: 71-9.
- Koulakiotis, E. 20018. 'Attic orators on Alexander the Great'. In K. R. Moore (ed.), *Brill's Companions to the Reception of Alexander the Great*. Leiden: 41-71.
- Kousser, R. 2009. 'Destruction and memory on the Athenian Acropolis'. *Art Bulletin* 91: 263-82.
- Kralli, I. 2003. 'The date and context of divine honours for Antigonos Gonatas - a suggestion'. In O. Palagia, and S. V. Tracy (eds.), *The Macedonians in Athens, 322-229 B.C.: Proceedings of an International Conference held at the University of Athens, May 24-26, 2001*. Oxford: 61-6.
- Kremmydas, C. 2013a. 'Alexander the Great, Athens, and the rhetoric of the Persian Wars'. In C. Carey, and M. Edwards (eds.), *Marathon – 2,500 Years: Proceedings of The Marathon Conference 2010*. London: 79-89.
- Kremmydas, C. 2013b. 'Hellenistic oratory and the evidence of rhetorical exercises'. In C. Kremmydas, and K. Tempest (eds.), *Hellenistic Oratory: Continuity and Change*. Oxford: 139-63.
- Krentz, P. M. 2007. 'The Oath of Marathon, not Plataia?'. *Hesperia* 76: 731-42.
- Krumeich, R. 1997. *Bildnisse griechischer Herrscher und Staatsmänner im 5.*

*Jahrhundert v. Chr.* Munich.

- Kubatzki, J. 2018. 'Processions and pilgrimage in Ancient Greece: some iconographical considerations'. In U. Luig (ed.), *Approaching the Sacred: Pilgrimage in Historical and Intercultural Perspective*. Berlin: 129-57.
- Kubo, M. 1971. 'Thucydides and the Persian War'. *Journal of Classical Studies* 19: 43-57. (In Japanese with English summary.)
- Kuhn, A. B. 2006. 'Ritual change during the reign of Demetrius Poliorcetes'. In E. Stavrianopoulou (ed.), *Ritual and Communication in the Graeco-Roman World*. Liège: 265-81.
- Kukofka, D.-A. 1992. 'Karthago, Gelon und die Schlacht bei Himera'. *Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft*: 255-66.
- Kuschel, B. 1961. 'Die neuen Münzbilder des Ptolemaios Soter'. *JNG* 11: 9-18.
- Lacy, C. 1976. 'The Greek view of barbarians in the Hellenistic age: as derived from representative literary and artistic evidence from the Hellenistic period'. PhD diss. University of Colorado.
- Lambert, S. 2010. 'A polis and its priests: Athenian priesthoods before and after Pericles' Citizenship Law'. *Historia* 59: 143-75.
- Lambert, S. 2020. *Attic Inscriptions in UK Collections 4.2 British Museum: Decrees of the Council and Assembly*. <https://www.atticinscriptions.com/papers/aiuk-42/>.
- Lane Fox, R. 1973. *Alexander the Great*. London.
- Lapatin, K. D. S. 1992. 'The reconstruction of the temple at Rhamnous? Who is who on the Nemesis base?'. *Hesperia* 61: 107-19.
- Laroche, D., and A. Jacquemin. 1988. 'Une base pour l'Apollon de Salamine à Delphes'. *BCH* 112: 235-46.
- Latham, J. 2020. 'processions'. In *OCD*: <https://oxfordre.com/classics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199381135.001.0001/acrefore-9780199381135-e-5345>.
- Lawton, C. L. 1995. *Attic Document Reliefs: Art and Politics in Ancient Athens*. Oxford.
- Lazenby, J. F. 1975. 'Pausanias, son of Kleombrotos'. *Hermes* 103: 235-51.
- Lazenby, J. F. 2012. 'Persian Wars'. In *OCD*<sup>4</sup>: 1112-3.
- Lefkowitz, M. R. 2012. *The Lives of the Greek Poets*. 2nd edn. London.
- Lehmann, G. A. 2015. *Alexander der Große und die "Freiheit der Hellenen": Studien zu der antiken historiographischen Überlieferung und den Inschriften der Alexander-Ära*. Berlin.
- Lenz, F. W., and C. A. Behr. 1976-1980. *P. Aelii Aristidis Opera quae exstant omnia*. Vol. I. Leiden.

- Lerouge-Cohen, C. 2010. 'L'image des Parthes à l'époque d'Auguste: tentative de confrontation des sources littéraires et iconographiques'. In M.-F. o. Marein, P. Voisin and J. Gallego (eds.), *Figures de l'étranger autour de la Méditerranée antique: actes du colloque international Antiquité méditerranéenne: à la rencontre de "l'autre", perceptions et représentations de l'étranger dans les littératures antiques, 12, 13 et 14 mars 2009*. Paris: 295-304.
- Lerouge, C. 2007. *L'image des Parthes dans le monde gréco-romain: du début du I<sup>er</sup> siècle av. J.-C. jusqu'à la fin du Haut-Empire romain*. Stuttgart.
- Lewis, S. 2009. *Greek Tyranny*. Exeter.
- Liddel, P. 2003. 'The places of publication of Athenian state decrees from the 5th century BC to the 3rd century AD'. *ZPE* 143: 79-93.
- Liddel, P., and P. Low. 2022. *Attic Inscriptions in UK Collections 15 Miscellaneous*. <https://www.atticinscriptions.com/papers/aiuk-15/>.
- Lloyd-Jones, H. 1999. 'The pride of Halicarnassus'. *ZPE* 124: 1-14.
- Lobur, J. 2005: 'Review: Karl A. E. Enenkel and Ilja L. Pfeijffer. (eds.). 2005. *The Manipulative Mode: Political Propaganda in Antiquity. A Collection of Case Studies*. Leiden: Brill'. *BMCR* 2005.06.24. <https://bmc.brynmawr.edu/2005/2005.06.24/>.
- Loraux, N. 1982. 'Mourir devant Troie, tomber pour Athènes: de la gloire du héros à l'idée de la cité'. In G. Gnoli, and J.-P. Vernant (eds.), *La mort, les morts dans les sociétés anciennes*. Paris
- Loraux, N. 1986. *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City*. (trans. A. Sheridan) Cambridge, MA. (In French, Paris. 1981.)
- Lorber, C. C. 2018. *Coins of the Ptolemaic Empire, Part I: Ptolemy I through Ptolemy IV*. Vol. I: *Precious Metal*. New York.
- Low, P. 2020. 'Panhellenism without imperialism? Athens and the Greeks before and after Chaeronea'. *Historia* 67: 454-71.
- Low, P. 2022. 'Review: David C. Yates. 2019. *States of Memory: The Polis, Panhellenism, and the Persian War*. New York: Oxford University Press'. *AHR* 127: 1068-9.
- Luraghi, N. 2018. 'Stairway to heaven: the politics of memory in the early Hellenistic Athens'. In M. Canevaro, and B. Gray (eds.), *The Hellenistic Reception of Classical Athenian Democracy and Political Thought*. Oxford: 21-44.
- Ma, J. 2002. *Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor*. rev. edn. Oxford.
- Ma, J. 2003. 'Peer polity interaction in the Hellenistic Age'. *P&P* 180: 9-39.
- Ma, J. 2009. 'City as memory'. In B. Graziosi, P. Vasunia and G. Boys-Stones (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Hellenic Studies*. Oxford: 248-59.

- Ma, J. 2013. *Statues and Cities: Honorific Portraits and Civic Identity in the Hellenistic World*. Oxford.
- Macan, R. W. 1908. *Herodotus: The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Books. With Introduction, Text, Apparatus, Commentary, Appendices, Indices, Maps*. 2 vols. London.
- Macgregor Morris, I. 2022. 'Pausanias, best of men: politics, propaganda, and memory'. In A. L. Konecny, and N. Sekunda (eds.), *The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC*. Vienna
- Macleod, C. W. 1977. 'Thucydides' Plataean debate'. *GRBS* 18: 227-46.
- Makhlaiuk, A. V. 2015. 'Memory and images of Achaemenid Persia in the Roman Empire'. In J. M. Silverman, and C. Waerzeggers (eds.), *Political Memory in and after the Persian Empire*. Atlanta: 299-324.
- Manakidou, E. 1994. 'Salamis'. In *LIMC* Vol. VII: 652-3.
- Manni, E. 1951. *Demetrio Poliorcete*. Rome.
- Marconi, C. 2006. 'Mito e autorappresentazione nella decorazione figurata dei *thesaurói* di età arcaica'. In A. Naso (ed.), *Stranieri e non cittadini nei santuari greci : atti del convegno internazionale*. Florence: 158-86.
- Marincola, J. 2007a. 'The Persian Wars in fourth-century oratory and historiography'. In E. Bridges, E. Hall and P. J. Rhodes (eds.), *Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars: Antiquity to the Third Millennium*. Oxford: 105-25.
- Marincola, J. 2007b. 'Speeches in Classical historiography'. In J. Marincola (ed.), *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*. Malden, MA and Oxford: 101-15.
- Marincola, J. 2016. 'History without malice: Plutarch rewrites the Battle of Plataea'. In J. Priestley, and V. Zali (eds.), *Brill's Companion to the Reception of Herodotus in Antiquity and Beyond*. Leiden and Boston: 101-19.
- Marszal, J. R. 2000. 'Ubiquitous barbarians: representations of the Gauls at Pergamon and elsewhere'. In N. T. de Grummond, and B. S. Ridgway (eds.), *From Pergamon to Sperlonga: Sculpture and Context*. Berkeley: 191-234.
- Martin-McAuliffe, S. L., and J. K. Papadopoulos. 2012. 'Framing Victory: Salamis, the Athenian Acropolis, and the Agora'. *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 71: 332-61.
- Matijašić, I. 2018. *Shaping the Canons of Ancient Greek Historiography: Imitation, Classicism, and Literary Criticism*. Berlin and Boston.
- Maurizio, L. 1998. 'The Panathenaic procession: Athens' participatory democracy on display?'. In D. Boedeker, and K. A. Raaflaub (eds.), *Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-century Athens*. Cambridge, MA: 297-317, 415-21.
- Mayor, A. 2014. *The Amazons: Lives and Legends of Warrior Women across the Ancient*

- World*. Princeton, NJ and Oxford.
- McNelis, C., and A. Sens. 2011. 'Trojan glory: *kleos* and the survival of Troy in Lycophron's *Alexandra*'. *Trends in Classics* 3: 54-82.
- Meiggs, R. 1972. *The Athenian Empire*. Oxford.
- Mendon, L. 2020. 'Preface'. In M. Lagogianni-Georgakarakos (ed.), *Glorious Victories: Between Myth and History*. Athens: 8-9.
- Meritt, B. D. 1963. 'Greek inscriptions'. *Hesperia* 32: 1-56.
- Meritt, L. S. 1970. 'The Stoa Poikile'. *Hesperia* 39: 233-64.
- Messerschmidt, W. 2003. *Prosopopoiia: Personifikationen politischen Charakters in spätklassischer und hellenistischer Kunst*. Cologne and Weimar.
- Meyer, M. 2005. 'Bilder und Vortbilder: zu Sinn und Zweck von Siegesmonumenten Athens in klassischer Zeit'. *JÖAI*: 277-312.
- Meyer, M. 2019. 'The Acropolis burning! Reactions to collective trauma in the years after 480/79 BCE'. In A. Karanika, and V. Panoussi (eds.), *Emotional Trauma in Greece and Rome: Representations and Reactions*. London: 95-110.
- Meyer, M. 2022. 'Shaping history: the case of *Tyrannicides* and the *Marathonomachoi*'. In M. Christopoulos, A. Papachrysostomou and A. P. Antonopoulos (eds.), *Myth and History: Close Encounters*. Berlin and Boston: 99-117.
- Michaelis, A. 1882. *Ancient Marbles in Great Britain*. (trans. C. A. M. Fennell) Cambridge.
- Mikalson, J. D. 1975. *The Sacred and Civil Calendar of the Athenian Year*. Princeton, NJ.
- Mikalson, J. D. 1998. *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*. Berkeley and London.
- Mikalson, J. D. 2003. *Herodotus and Religion in the Persian Wars*. Chapel Hill and London.
- Miles, M. M. 1989. 'A reconstruction of the temple of Nemesis at Rhamnous'. *Hesperia* 58: 133-249.
- Mills, S. 1997. *Theseus, Tragedy and the Athenian Empire*. Oxford.
- Mitchel, F. W. 1970. *Lykourgan Athens: 338-322 (Lectures in Memory of Louise Taft Semple, 2nd Series)*. Cincinnati.
- Mitchell, L. G. 2007. *Panhellenism and the Barbarian in Archaic and Classical Greece*. Swansea.
- Mitchell, L. G. 2012. 'The women of ruling families in Archaic and Classical Greece'. *CQ* 62: 1-21.
- Mitchell, L. G. 2013. 'Panhellenism'. In R. S. Bagnall, K. Brodersen, C. B. Champion, A. Erskine and S. R. Huebner (eds.), *The Encyclopedia of Ancient History*. Malden,

- MA: 5023-5.
- Mitchell, S. 2003. 'The Galatians: representation and reality'. In A. Erskine (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World* Oxford: 280-93.
- Moggi, M. 1968. 'La tradizione sulle guerre persiane in Platone'. *SCO* 17: 213-26.
- Moggi, M., and M. Osanna. 2010. *Pausania: Guida della Grecia*. Vol. IX: *Libro IX: La Beozia*. Milan.
- Molyneux, J. H. 1992. *Simonides: A Historical Study*. Wauconda, IL.
- Momigliano, A. 1979. 'Persian Empire and Greek freedom'. In A. Ryan (ed.), *The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin*. Oxford: 139-51.
- Mommsen, A. 1898. *Feste der Stadt Athen im Altertum: Geordnet nach attischem Kalender*. Leipzig.
- Monti, G. 2023. *Alexander the Great. Letters: A Selection*. Liverpool.
- Morgan, K. A. 2015. *Pindar and the Construction of Syracusan Monarchy in the Fifth Century B.C.* Oxford.
- Morgan, T. J. 1998. *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds*. Cambridge.
- Morrison, G. 2001. 'Alexander, combat psychology, and Persepolis'. *Antichthon* 35: 30-44.
- Müller, S. 2016. 'Arrian, the Second Sophistic, Xerxes, and the statues of Harmodios and Aristogeiton'. In S. Svärd, and R. Rollinger (eds.), *Cross-Cultural Studies in Near Eastern History and Literature*. Münster: 173-202.
- Murray, O. 1972. 'Herodotus and Hellenistic culture'. *CQ* 22: 200-13.
- Nachtergaeel, G. 1977. *Les Galates en Grèce et les Sôtéria de Delphes: Recherches d'histoire et d'épigraphie hellénistiques*. Brussel.
- Nafissi, M. 2004. 'Tucidide, Erodoto e la tradizione su Pausania nel V secolo'. *RSA* 34: 147-80.
- Neer, R. 2004. 'The Athenian Treasury at Delphi and the material of politics'. *ClAnt* 23: 63-93.
- Neils, J. 2013. 'Salpinx, snake, and Salamis: the political geography of the Pella Hydria'. *Hesperia* 82: 595-613.
- Nelson, T. J. 2022. 'Beating the Galatians: ideologies, analogies and allegories in Hellenistic literature and art'. In A. Coşkun (ed.), *Galatian Victories and Other Studies into the Agency and Identity of the Galatians in the Hellenistic and Early Roman Periods*. Leuven: 97-144.
- Newby, Z. 2005. *Greek Athletics in the Roman World: Victory and Virtue*. Oxford.
- Newby, Z. 2017. 'Performing the past: Salamis, naval contests and the Athenian

- Ephebeia*. In T. M. Dijkstra, I. N. I. Kuin, M. Moser and D. Weidgenannt (eds.), *Strategies of Remembering in Greece under Rome (100 BC - 100 AD)*. Leiden: 83-95.
- Newell, E. T. 1927. *The Coinages of Demetrius Poliorcetes*. London.
- Nicholson, E. 2023. *Philip V of Macedon in Polybius' Histories: Politics, History, and Fiction*. Oxford.
- Nilsson, M. P. 1906. *Griechische Feste von religiöser Bedeutung mit Ausschluss der attischen*. Leipzig.
- Nock, A. D. 1930. 'Σύνναος θεός'. *HSPh* 41: 1-62.
- Nouhaud, M. 1982. *L'utilisation de l'histoire par les orateurs attiques*. Paris.
- Nudell, J. P. 2023. *Accustomed to Obedience? Classical Ionia and the Aegean World, 480-294 BCE*. Ann Arbor.
- Oetjen, R. 2014. *Athen im dritten Jahrhundert v. Chr.: Politik und Gesellschaft in den Garnisonsdemen auf der Grundlage der inschriftlichen Überlieferung*. Dusseldorf.
- Olbrycht, M. J. 2018. 'The shaping of political memory: Cyrus the Great and the Achaemenids in the royal Ideologies of the Seleucid and Parthian periods'. In M. R. Shayegan (ed.), *Cyrus the Great: Life and Lore*. Boston: 198-220.
- Olbrycht, M. J. 2019. 'The memory of the past: the Achaemenid legacy in the Arsakid period'. *Studia Litteraria Universitatis Jagellonicae Cracoviensis*, special issue, volume in Honour of Professor Anna Krasnowolska: 175-86.
- Oldfather, C. H. (trans.). 1946. *Diodorus of Sicily. Vol. IV: The Library of History, Books IX-XII.40*. Cambridge, MA.
- Oliver, G. J. 2003. '(Re-)locating Athenian decrees in the Agora: IG II<sup>2</sup> 448'. In D. Jordan, and J. S. Traill (eds.), *Lettered Attica: A Day of Attic Epigraphy (Actes du Symposium d' Athènes/Proceedings of the Athens Symposium 8 mars/March 2000 with amemoir by/avec un mémoire par Johannes Kirchner)*. Tronto: 94-110.
- Oliver, G. J. 2007a. 'Space and the visualization of power in the Greek polis: the award of portrait statues in decrees from Athens'. In P. Schultz, and R. von den Hoff (eds.), *Early Hellenistic Portraiture: Image, Style, Context*. Cambridge: 181-204.
- Oliver, G. J. 2007b. *War, Food, and Politics in Early Hellenistic Athens*. Oxford.
- Oliver, J. H. 1968. *The Civilizing Power: A Study of the Panathenaic Discourse of Aelius Aristides against the Background of Literature and Culture Conflict, with Text, Translation, and Commentary*. Philadelphia.
- Oliver, J. H. 1977. 'Roman emperors and Athenian ephebes'. *Historia* 26: 89-94.
- Ono, F. 2019. 'How Pausanias views Greece: a reinterpretation from the local dimension'. *Kyoto Journal of Ancient History* 19: 1-32. (In Japanese with English

- summary.)
- Orwin, C. 1986. 'Justifying empire: the speech of the Athenians at Sparta and the problem of justice in Thucydides'. *Journal of Politics* 48: 72-85.
- Osborne, M. J. 2012. *Athens in the Third Century B.C.* Athens.
- Ostwald, M. 2009. 'Herodotus and Athens'. In *Language and History in Ancient Greek Culture*. Philadelphia: 265-77. (First published in *ICS* 16: 137-148. 1991.)
- Page, D. L. (ed.). 1981. *Further Greek Epigrams: Epigrams before AD 50 from the Greek Anthology and Other Sources, Not Included in 'Hellenistic Epigrams' or 'The Garland of Philip'*. Revised and prepared for publication by R. D. Dawe, and J. Diggle. Cambridge.
- Painesi, A. 2012. 'Historical events as a means of iconographic interpretation: the reconstruction of lost Greek historical paintings of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.'. *Cahiers d'histoire* 31: 157-79.
- Palagia, O. 1980. *Euphranor*. Leiden.
- Palagia, O. 2005. 'Interpretations of two Athenian friezes: the temple on the Ilissos and the Temple of Athena Nike'. In J. M. Barringer, J. M. Hurwit and J. J. Pollit (eds.), *Periklean Athens and Its Legacy: Problems and Perspectives*. Austin, TX: 177-92.
- Palagia, O. 2006. 'Meaning and narrative techniques in statue-bases of the Pheidian circle'. In K. Rutter, and B. Sparkes (eds.), *Word and Image in Ancient Greece*. Edinburgh: 53-78.
- Panagopoulou, K. 2019. *The Early Antigonids: Coinage, Money, and the Economy*. New York.
- Papazarkadas, N. 2009. 'Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire: re-shuffling the chronological cards'. In J. Ma, N. Papazarkadas and R. Parker (eds.), *Interpreting the Athenian Empire*. London
- Papillon, T. L. (trans.). 2004. *Isocrates II*. Austin, TX.
- Pappas, N., and M. Zelcer. 2014. *Politics and Philosophy in Plato's Menexenus: Education and Rhetoric, Myth and History*. New York.
- Parke, H. W. 1939. 'Delphica'. *Hermathena* 53: 59-78.
- Parke, H. W. 1977. *Festivals of the Athenians*. Ithaca, NY.
- Parke, H. W., and D. E. W. Wormell. 1956. *The Delphic Oracle*. Vol. I: *The History*. Oxford.
- Parker, R. 1996. *Athenian Religion: A History*. Oxford.
- Parker, R. 2005. *Polytheism and Society at Athens*. Oxford.
- Parker, V. 2016: 'Ephoros (70)'. In I. Worthington (ed.), *Brill's New Jacoby*. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1873-5363\\_bnj\\_a70](http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1873-5363_bnj_a70).

- Paschidis, P. 2008. *Between City and King: Prosopographical Studies on the Intermediaries between the Cities of the Greek Mainland and the Aegean and the Royal Courts in the Hellenistic Period (322-190 BC)*. Athens.
- Patillon, M. (ed. and trans.). 2012. *Corpus rhetoricum*. Vol. IV: *Prolégomènes au De Ideis, Hermogène, Les catégories stylistiques du discours (De Ideis)*. *Synopses des exposés sur Les Ideai*. Paris.
- Paton, W. R. (trans.). 1918. *The Greek Anthology with an English Translation*. Vol. V. London.
- Paton, W. R. (trans.). 2011. *Polybius: The Histories*. Vol. IV: *Books 9-15*. Revised by F. W. Walbank, and C. Habicht. Cambridge, MA.
- Paton, W. R., and S. D. Olson. (trans.). 2012. *Polybius: The Histories*. Vol. VI: *Books 28-39. Unattributed Fragments*. Books 28-39 trans. W. R. Paton and rev. F. W. Walbank and C. Habicht. Fragments ed. and trans. S. D. Olson Cambridge, MA.
- Patterson, L. E. 2010. *Kinship Myth in Ancient Greece*. Austin, TX.
- Paul, S. 2018. 'Sharing the civic sacrifice: civic feast, procession, and sacrificial division in the Hellenistic period'. In F. van den Eijnde, J. Blok and R. Strootman (eds.), *Feasting and Polis Institutions*. Leiden and Boston: 315–39.
- Pavese, C. O. 1995. 'Elegia di Simonide agli Spartiati per Platea'. *ZPE* 107: 1-26.
- Pédech, P. 1964. *La méthode historique de Polybe*. Paris.
- Peek, W. 1938. 'Metrische Inschriften'. In J. F. Crome, H. Gundert, B. Meyer, W. Peek, H. U. von Schoenebeck, O. Uenze and J. Werner (eds.), *Mnemosynon Theodor Wiegand*. Munich: 14-42.
- Pelling, C. B. R. 2007. 'De malignitate Plutarchi: Plutarch, Herodotus, and the Persian Wars'. In E. Bridges, E. Hall and P. J. Rhodes (eds.), *Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars: Antiquity to the Third Millennium*. Oxford: 145-64.
- Pelling, C. B. R. 2013. 'Herodotus' Marathon'. In C. Carey, and M. Edwards (eds.), *Marathon - 2,500 Years: Proceedings of the Marathon Conference 2010*. London: 23-34.
- Pemberton, E. G. 1972. 'The east and west friezes of the Temple of Athena Nike'. *AJA* 76: 303-10.
- Perlman, S. 1976. 'Panhellenism, the polis and imperialism'. *Historia* 25: 1-30.
- Perlman, S. 1985. 'Greek diplomatic tradition and the Corinthian League of Philip of Macedon'. *Historia* 34: 153-74.
- Perrier, A. 2011. 'Le portique dit "des Étoliens" à Delphes: bilan et perspectives'. *Pallas* 87: 39-56.
- Petrakos, V. C. 1999. *Ὁ Δῆμος τοῦ Ραμνοῦντος: Σύνοψη τῶν ἀνασκαφῶν καὶ τῶν*

- ἐρευνῶν (1813–1998). Vol. I: *Τοπογραφία*. Athens.
- Petrovic, A. 2007. *Kommentar zu den simonideischen Versinschriften*. Leiden and Boston.
- Petrovic, A. 2013. ‘The Battle of Marathon in pre-Herodotean sources: on Marathon verse-inscriptions (IG I<sup>3</sup> 503/504; SEG LVI 430)’. In C. Carey, and M. Edwards (eds.), *Marathon - 2,500 Years: Proceedings of the Marathon Conference 2010*. London: 45-61.
- Pierozzi, A. 2023. ‘Reconsidering Pausanias' possible source for the Gallic Invasion of Greece’. *DHA* 49: 9-43.
- Poddighe, E. 2009. ‘Alexander and the Greeks’. In W. Heckel, and L. A. Tritle (eds.), *Alexander the Great: A New History*. Oxford: 99-120.
- Podlecki, A. J. 1976. ‘Athens and Aegina’. *Historia* 25: 396-413.
- Pontier, P. 2013. ‘L’utilisation de l’histoire dans les discours politiques de Xénophon, de Marathon à Platées’. *DHA* suppl. 8: 165-87.
- Pouilloux, J. 1954. *La forteresse de Rhamnonte (étude de topographie et d’histoire)*. Paris.
- Powell, A. 2001. *Athens and Sparta: Constructing Greek Political and Social History from 478 BC*. 2nd edn. London and New York.
- Powell, A. 2016. ‘Aiginetan attitudes (c. 500-424 BC): Athens as eyesore?’. In A. Powell, and K. Meidani (eds.), *The Eyesore of Aigina: Anti-Athenian Attitudes in Greek, Hellenistic and Roman Worlds*. Swansea: 51-80.
- Powell, A. 2018. ‘Sparta's foreign – and internal – history, 478–403’. In A. Powell (ed.), *A Companion to Sparta*. 2 vols. Hoboken, NJ: 291-319.
- Pownall, F. 2004. *Lessons from the Past: The Moral Use of History in Fourth-Century Prose*. Ann Arbor.
- Pownall, F. 2007. ‘The Panhellenism of Isocrates’. In W. Heckel, L. A. Tritle and P. Wheatley (eds.), *Alexander's Empire: Formulation to Decay*. Claremont, CA: 13-25.
- Prandi, L. 1988. *Platea: momenti e problemi della storia di una polis*. Padua.
- Pretzler, M. 2007. *Pausanias: Travel Writing in Ancient Greece*. London.
- Price, S. 1986. *Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor*. Cambridge.
- Priestley, J. 2014. *Herodotus and Hellenistic Culture: Literary Studies in the Reception of the Histories*. Oxford.
- Pritchett, W. K. 1957. ‘New light on Plataia’. *AJA* 61: 9-28.
- Pritchett, W. K. 1974. *The Greek State at War*. Pt. III. Berkeley.
- Pritchett, W. K. 1991. *The Greek State at War*. Pt. V. Berkeley.
- Proietti, G. 2015. ‘War and memory: the battle of Psyttaleia before Herodotus’

- Histories*'. *BICS* 58: 43-54.
- Proietti, G. 2020. 'Two sides of destiny in war: Olbos and teleuté in IG I<sup>3</sup> 503/4 and Aeschylus' *Persians*'. *Journal of Epigraphic Studies* 3: 27-42.
- Proietti, G. 2021. *Prima di Erodoto: Aspetti della memoria delle Guerre persiane*. Stuttgart.
- Purcell, N. 1995. 'On the sacking of Carthage and Corinth'. In D. Innes, H. Hine and C. B. R. Pelling (eds.), *Ethics and Rhetoric: Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy Fifth Birthday*. Oxford: 133-48.
- Quass, F. 1979. 'Zur Verfassung der griechischen Städte im Hellenismus'. *Chiron* 9: 37-52.
- Raaflaub, K. A. 2004. *The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece*. Chicago.
- Raschke, W. J. 1988. 'Images of victory: some new considerations of athletic monuments'. In W. J. Raschke (ed.), *The Archaeology of the Olympics: The Olympics and Other Festivals in Antiquity*. Madison, WI: 38-54.
- Raubitschek, A. E. 1960. 'The Covenant of Plataea'. *TAPhA* 91: 178-83.
- Raubitschek, A. E. 1962. 'Demokratia'. *Hesperia* 31: 238-43.
- Raubitschek, A. E. 1973. 'The speech of the Athenians at Sparta'. In P. A. Stadter (ed.), *The Speeches in Thucydides: A Collection of Original Studies with a Bibliography*. Chapel Hill: 32-48.
- Rawlings, H. R., III. 1977. 'Thucydides on the purpose of the Delian League'. *Phoenix* 31: 1-8.
- Réfi-Oszkó, D. 2022. 'The invisibles Achaemenid heavy cavalry during the Greco-Persian Wars'. *Acta Classica Universitatis Scientiarum Debreceniensis* 58: 3-18.
- Regenbogen, O. 1956. 'Pausanias'. In *RE Suppl.* Vol. VIII: 1008-97.
- Reinmuth, O. W. 1971. *The Ephebic Inscriptions of the Fourth Century BC*. Leiden.
- Rhodes, P. J. 1981. *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*. Oxford.
- Rhodes, P. J. 1985. *The Athenian Boule*. rev. edn. Oxford.
- Rhodes, P. J. 2008. 'After the three-bar sigma controversy: the history of Athenian imperialism reassessed'. *CQ* 58: 500-6.
- Rhodes, P. J. 2012. 'panhellenism'. In *OCD*<sup>4</sup>: 1075.
- Rice, E. E. 1983. *The Grand Procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus*. New York.
- Rigsby, K. J. 1996. *Asylia: Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World*. Berkeley.
- Robert, L. 1946. 'Adeimantos et la Ligue de Corinthe: sur une inscription de Delphes'. *Hellenica* 2: 15-33.
- Robert, L. 1949. 'Un athlète milésien'. *Hellenica* 7: 117-25.
- Robert, L. 1968. 'Les épigrammes satiriques de Lucilius sur les athlètes: parodie et

- réalités'. In *L'épigramme grecque*. Geneva: 170-295.
- Robertson, M. 1976. *A History of Greek Art*. 2 vols. New York and London.
- Robertson, N. D. 1982. 'The decree of Themistocles in its contemporary setting'. *Phoenix* 36: 1-44.
- Robertson, N. D. 1986. 'A point of precedence at Plataia: the dispute between Athens and Sparta over leading the procession'. *Hesperia* 55: 88-102.
- Rocha-Pereira, M. H. (ed.). 1981. *Pausaniae Graeciae Descriptio*. Vol. III: *Libli IX-X. Indices*. Leipzig.
- Rockwell, N. 2017. *Thebes: A History*. London and New York.
- Rogers, G. 1991. *The Sacred Identity of Ephesos: Foundation Myths of a Roman City*. New York.
- Roisman, J., and M. Edwards. 2019. *Lycurgus: Against Leocrates*. Oxford and New York.
- Rood, T. 1999. 'Thucydides' Persian Wars'. In C. S. Kraus (ed.), *The Limits of Historiography: Genre and Narrative in Ancient Historical Texts*. Leiden, Boston and Köln: 141-75.
- Rood, T. 2012. 'The plupast in Xenophon's *Hellenica*'. In J. Grethlein, and C. B. Krebs (eds.), *Time and Narrative in Ancient Historiography*. Cambridge and New York: 76-94.
- Rose, C. B. 2005. 'The Parthian in Augustan Rome'. *AJA* 109: 21-75.
- Rose, T. C. 2015. 'A historical commentary on Plutarch's *Life of Demetrius*'. PhD diss. University of Iowa.
- Rose, T. C., and S. Wallace. 2022. 'The Athenian revolt from Demetrios Poliorketes: new evidence from Rhamnous (*I.Rhamnous* 404)'. *AHB* 36: 166-78.
- Rosen, K. 1967. 'Political documents in Hieronymus of Cardia (323-302 B.C.)'. *AClass* 10: 41-94.
- Roth, P. 2003. *Der Panathenaikos des Isokrates: Übersetzung und Kommentar*. 196. Munich.
- Rotstein, A. 2016. *Literary History in the Parian Marble*. Washington, DC.
- Rous, S. A. 2019. *Reset in Stone: Memory and Reuse in Ancient Athens*. Madison, WI.
- Roy, J. 2008. 'Homonoia in *Inschriften von Olympia* 260: the problem of dating concord in Elis'. *ZPE* 167: 67-72.
- Rung, E. 2013. 'Herodotus and Greek medism'. In A. Mehl, A. V. Makhlayuk and O. Gabelko (eds.), *Ruthenia Classica Aetatis Novae: A Collection of Works by Russian Scholars in Ancient Greek and Roman History*. Stuttgart: 71-81.
- Rung, E. 2016. 'The burning of Greek temples by the Persians and Greek war

- propaganda'. In K. Ulanowski (ed.), *The religious Aspects of War in the Ancient Near East, Greece, and Rome*. Leiden and Boston: 166-79.
- Rung, E. V., and E. A. Venidiktova. 2017. 'Greco-Persian Wars: view from Persia'. *Uchenye Zapiski Kazanskogo Universiteta: Seriya Gumanitarnye Nauki* 159: 1404-21. (In Russian.)
- Russell, D. A. 1983. *Greek Declamation*. Cambridge.
- Russo, F. 2010. 'Le termopili come "luogo ideologico" nella propaganda romana'. *SCO* 56: 31-56.
- Russo, F. 2013. 'Echoes of the Persian Wars in Roman propaganda'. *AncW* 44: 160-76.
- Russo, F. 2014. 'Il ricordo delle Guerre Persiane a Roma nello scontro con Filippo V e Antioco III'. *Latomus* 73: 303-37.
- Rutishauser, B. 2012. *Athens and the Cyclades: Economic Strategies 540–314 BC*. Oxford
- Sakellariou, M. B. 1981. 'Panhellenism: from concept to policy'. In M. B. Hatzopoulos, and L. D. Loukopoulos (eds.), *Philip of Macedon*. London: 128-45.
- Sakeshima, K. 2021. 'The Persian Wars in the *Bibliothèque* of Diodorus Siculus: focusing on the description of the Battle of Himera'. *Rakuhoku Shigaku* 23: 1-27. (In Japanese.)
- Sakeshima, K. 2022. 'Kallippos (Callippus) of Eleusis'. In *The Encyclopedia of Ancient History*. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah55191>.
- Salmon, J. B. 1984. *Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338 BC*. Oxford.
- Sampson, C. M. 2015. 'Aeschylus on Darius and Persian memory'. *Phoenix* 69: 24-42.
- Sandbach, F. H. (ed. and trans.). 1969. *Plutarch: Moralia*. Vol. XV: *Fragments*. Cambridge, MA.
- Sansone, D. 1989. *Plutarch: The Lives of Aristeides and Cato* Warminster.
- Sansone, D. (ed.). 2020. *Plato: Menexenus*. Cambridge.
- Sawada, N. 1996. 'Athenian politics in the age of Alexander the Great: a reconsideration of the Trial of Ctesiphon'. *Chiron* 26: 57-84.
- Sawada, N. 2019. 'Allies and foes (I): Aeschines, Hyperides, Lycurgus'. In G. Martin (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Demosthenes*. Oxford: 337-51.
- Scanlon, T. F. 2002. *Eros and Greek Athletics*. New York.
- Schachter, A. 1994. *Cults of Boiotia*. Vol. III: *Potnia to Zeus*. London.
- Scheer, T. S. 2003. 'The past in a Hellenistic present: myth and local tradition'. In A. Erskine (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*. Oxford: 216-31.
- Schmidt-Dounas, B. 2000. *Geschenke erhalten die Freundschaft: Politik und Selbstdarstellung im Spiegel der Monumente*. Berlin.

- Schmidt, W. A. 1834. 'De fontibus veterum auctorum in enarrandis expeditionibus a Gallis in Macedoniam atque Graeciam susceptis'. PhD diss. University of Berlin.
- Schneider, R. M. 1998. 'Die Faszination des Feindes: Bilder der Parther und des Orients in Rom'. In J. Wiesehöfer (ed.), *Das Partherreich und seine Zeugnisse: Beiträge des Internationalen Colloquiums, Eutin (27. - 30. Juni 1996)*. Stuttgart: 95-146.
- Schoch, P. 1924. 'Kallikrates'. In *RE Suppl.* Vol. IV: 859-62.
- Scholten, J. B. 2000. *The Politics of Plunder: Aitolians and their Koinon in the Early Hellenistic Era, 279-217 B.C.* Berkeley, Los Angeles and London.
- Schultz, P. 2009. 'The north frieze of the temple of Athena Nike'. In O. Palagia (ed.), *Art in Athens during the Peloponnesian War*. Cambridge: 128-67.
- Schwartz, E. 1903. 'Diodoros (38)'. In *RE* Vol. V: 663-704.
- Scott-Kilvert, I. (trans.). 1960. *Plutarch: The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives*. Harmondsworth.
- Scott, K. 1928. 'The deification of Demetrius Poliorcetes: part I'. *AJPh* 49: 137-66.
- Scott, M. 2010. *Delphi and Olympia: The Spatial Politics of Panhellenism in the Archaic and Classical Periods*. Cambridge.
- Scott, M. 2014. *Delphi: A History of the Center of the Ancient World*. Princeton, NJ.
- Seager, R. 1981. 'The freedom of the Greeks of Asia: from Alexander to Antiochus'. *CQ* 31: 106-12.
- Sears, M. A. 2021. 'Review: David C. Yates. 2019. *States of Memory: The Polis, Panhellenism, and the Persian War*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press'. *CPh* 116: 462-6.
- Segrè, M. 1927. 'La più antica tradizione sull'invasione gallica in Macedonia e in Grecia (280/79 a.C.)'. *Historia* (Milan) 1: 18-42.
- Segrè, M. 2004. *Pausania come fonte storica: con un'appendice sulle Fonti storiche di Pausania per l'età ellenistica*. Rome.
- Seibert, J. 1967. *Historische Beiträge zu den dynastischen Verbindungen in hellenistischer Zeit*. Wiesbaden.
- Seibert, J. 1969. *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I*. Munich.
- Seibert, J. 1972. *Alexander der Grosse*. Darmstadt.
- Sengoku-Haga, K. 2014. 'Nemesis Rhamnusia by Agorakritos: interpretation of the base relief and meaning of the cult statue'. *Journal of Classical Studies*: 1-12. (In Japanese with English summary.)
- Shapiro, H. A. 1983. 'Amazons, Thracians and Scythians'. *GRBS* 24: 103-14.
- Shear, J. L. 2007. 'Cultural change, spae, and the politics of commemoration in Athens'. In R. Osborne (ed.), *Debating the Athenian Cultural Revolution: Art, Literature,*

- Philosophy, and Politics, 430-380 BC*. Cambridge and New York: 91-115.
- Shear, J. L. 2017. 'Writing past and present in Hellenistic Athens: the honours for Demosthenes'. In I. Berti, K. Bolle, F. Opdenhoff and F. Stroth (eds.), *Writing Matters: Presenting and Perceiving Monumental Inscriptions in Antiquity and the Middle Ages*. Berlin: 161-89.
- Shear, J. L. 2021. *Serving Athena: The Festival of the Panathenaia and the Construction of Athenian Identities*. Cambridge and New York.
- Shear, T. L., Jr., 1978. *Kallias of Sphettos and the Revolt of Athens in 286 B.C.* Princeton.
- Shipley, G. 2000. *The Greek World After Alexander, 323-30 BC*. London and New York.
- Shoji, J. i. 2011. 'What should the "Pacific War" be named? A study of the debate in Japan'. *NIDS Journal of Defense and Security* 13.3: 45-81.
- Sickinger, J. P. 2016: 'Marmor Parium (239)'. In I. Worthington (ed.), *Brill's New Jacoby*. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1873-5363\\_bnj\\_a239](http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1873-5363_bnj_a239).
- Sider, D. (ed. and trans.). 2021. *Simonides: Epigrams and Elegies: Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary*. Oxford and New York.
- Siewert, P. 1972. *Der Eid von Plataiai*. Munich.
- Simpson, R. H. 1959. 'Antigonus the One-Eyed and the Greeks'. *Historia* 8: 385-409.
- Smith, A., C. 2011. *Polis and Personification in Classical Athenian Art*. Leiden and Boston.
- Snowdon, M. A. 2010. 'The Greek freedom and Roman hegemony: the transaction of Roman rule in the Greek East (201 BCE - 14CE)'. PhD diss. McMaster University.
- Sommerstein, A. H. 2014. 'The authenticity of the Demophantus decree'. *CQ* 64: 49-57.
- Sourlas, D. 2019. 'Lucius Egnatius Victor Lollianus: a new honorific inscription from Athens'. In C. F. Noreña, and N. Papazarkadas (eds.), *From Document to History: Epigraphic Insights into the Greco-Roman World*. Leiden and Boston: 393-407.
- Spawforth, A. J. S. 1994. 'Symbol of unity? The Persian-Wars tradition in the Roman Empire'. In S. Hornblower (ed.), *Greek Historiography*. Oxford: 233-47.
- Spawforth, A. J. S. 2012. *Greece and the Augustan Cultural Revolution: Greek Culture in the Roman World*. Cambridge and New York.
- Spyropoulos, T. G. 1973a. 'Some Boiotian discoveries, I: Plataia'. *Teiresias* 3: 2-3.
- Spyropoulos, T. G. 1973b. 'Ειδήσεις εκ Βοιωτίας'. *Αρχαιολογικά ανάλεκτα ἐξ Ἀθηνων* 6: 375-95.
- Squillace, G. 2017. 'Ghosts from the past: the memory of Alexander I of Macedonia and its propagandistic use during the reign of Philip II'. In S. Müller, T. Howe, H. Bowden and R. Rollinger (eds.), *The History of the Argeads: New Perspectives*.

- Wiesbaden: 241-51.
- Stahl, H.-P. 1966. *Thukydides: Die Stellung des Menschen im geschichtlichen Prozess*. Munich.
- Stansbury-O'Donnell, M. D. 2005. 'The painting program in the Stoa Poikile'. In J. M. Barringer, and J. M. Hurwit (eds.), *Periklean Athens and its Legacy: Problems and Perspectives*. Austin, TX: 73-88.
- Stehle, E. 2001. 'A bard of the Iron Age and his auxiliary Muse'. In D. Sider, and D. Boedeker (eds.), *The New Simonides: Contexts of Praise and Desire*. New York: 106-19.
- Stein-Hölkeskamp, E., and K.-J. Hölkeskamp. (eds.). 2019. *Die griechische Welt: Erinnerungsorte der Antike*. 2nd edn. Munich.
- Stein-Hölkeskamp, E., and K.-J. Hölkeskamp. (eds.). 2020. *Erinnerungsorte der Antike: Die römische Welt*. Munich.
- Steinbock, B. 2013. *Social Memory in Athenian Public Discourse: Uses and Meanings of the Past*. Ann Arbor.
- Stephenson, P. 2016. *The Serpent Column: A Cultural Biography*. New York and Oxford.
- Stevens, P. T. (ed.). 1971. *Euripides: Andromache*. Oxford.
- Stewart, A. F. 2000. 'Pergamo ara marmorea magna: on the date, reconstruction, and functions of the Great Altar of Pergamon'. In N. T. de Grummond, and B. S. Ridgway (eds.), *From Pergamon to Sperlonga: Sculpture and Context*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 32-57.
- Stewart, A. F. 2004. *Attalos, Athens, and the Akropolis: The Pergamene 'Little Barbarians' and their Roman and Renaissance Legacy*. With an essay on the pedestals and the Akropolis South Wall by M. Korres. Cambridge.
- Stewart, A. F., B. Frischer and M. Abdelaziz. 2022. 'Fear and loathing in the Hellenistic Agora: Antenor's Tyrannicides return'. *Hesperia* 91: 311-50.
- Stewart, D. R. 2013. "'Most worth remembering": Pausanias, analogy, and Classical archaeology'. *Hesperia* 82: 231-61.
- Strauss, B. S. 2004. *The Battle of Salamis: The Naval Encounter that Saved Greece — and Western Civilization*. New York.
- Strauss, L. 1964. *The City and Man*. Chicago.
- Stronk, J. P. 2018: 'Erxias (449)'. In I. Worthington (ed.), *Brill's New Jacoby*. 2nd edn.: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1873-5363\\_bnj2\\_a449](http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1873-5363_bnj2_a449).
- Strootman, R. 2005. 'Kings against Celts: deliverance from Barbarians as a theme in Hellenistic royal propaganda'. In I. L. Pfeijffer, and K. A. E. Enenkel (eds.), *The Manipulative Mode: Political Propaganda in Antiquity: A Collection of Case*

- Studies*. Leiden: 101-41.
- Strootman, R. 2014. *Courts and Elites in the Hellenistic Empires: The Near East After the Achaemenids, c. 330 to 30 BCE*. Edinburgh.
- Stroszeck, J. 2004. 'Greek trophy monuments'. In S. des Bouvrie (ed.), *Myth and Symbol II: Symbolic Phenomena in Ancient Greek Culture*. Bergen: 303-31.
- Stylianou, P. J. 1998. *A Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus: Book 15*. Oxford.
- Suolahti, J. 1967. 'The origin of the story about the first Marathon-runner'. *Arctos* 5: 115-33.
- Swain, S. 1996. *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World, AD 50-250*. Oxford.
- Sweet, W. E. 1951. 'Sources of Plutarch's *Demetrius*'. *Classical Weekly* 44: 177-81.
- Tarn, W. W. 1913. *Antigonos Gonatas*. Oxford.
- Tarn, W. W. 1934. 'The new dating of the Chremonidean War'. *JHS* 54: 26-39.
- Taylor, M. C. 1997. *Salamis and the Salaminioi: The History of an Unofficial Athenian Demos*. Amsterdam.
- Teegarden, D. A. 2013. *Death to Tyrants! Ancient Greek Democracy and the Struggle against Tyranny*. Princeton, NJ and Oxford.
- Themelis, P. G. 2003. 'Macedonian dedications on the Acropolis'. In O. Palagia, and S. V. Tracy (eds.), *The Macedonians in Athens, 322-229 B.C.: Proceedings of an International Conference held at the University of Athens, May 24-26, 2001*. Oxford: 162-72.
- Thériault, G. 1996. *Le culte d'Homonoia dans les cités grecques*. Lyon.
- Thomas, R. 1989. *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens*. Cambridge.
- Thomas, R. 2001. 'Ethnicity, genealogy, and Hellenism in Herodotus'. In I. Malkin (ed.), *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity*. Cambridge, MA and London: 213-33.
- Thompson, D. J. 2000. 'Philadelphus' procession: dynastic power in a mediterranean context'. In L. Mooren (ed.), *Politics, Administration and Society in the Hellenistic and Roman World: Proceedings of the International Colloquium, Bertinoro 19-24 July 1997*. Leuven: 365-88.
- Thompson, H. A. 1937. 'Buildings on the west side of the Agora'. *Hesperia* 6: 1-226.
- Thompson, H. A., and R. E. Wycherley. 1972. *The Agora of Athens: The History, Shape and Uses of an Ancient City Center*. Princeton, NJ.
- Threpsiades, J. C. 1939. 'Decree in honor of Euthydemus of Eleusis'. *Hesperia* 8: 177-80.
- Tigerstedt, E. N. 1965. *The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity*. Vol. I. Stockholm.
- Tigerstedt, E. N. 1974. *The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity*. Vol. II. Stockholm.

## Bibliography

- Todd, S. C. (trans.). 2000. *Lysias*. Austin, TX.
- Toepffer, J. 1893. 'Adeimantos (2)'. In *RE* Vol. I: 354-5.
- Tolia-Christakou, M. 2020. 'The memory of the Greco-Persian Wars'. In M. Lagogianni-Georgakarakos (ed.), *Glorious Victories: Between Myth and History*. Athens: 219-43.
- Tracy, S. V. 1990. *Attic Letter-Cutters of 229 to 86 B.C.* Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford.
- Tracy, S. V. 2003. *Athens and Macedon: Attic Letter-Cutters of 300 to 229 B.C.* Berkeley, Los Angeles and London.
- Trapp, M. (ed. and trans.). 2017. *Aelius Aristides: Orations*. Vol. I. Cambridge, MA and London.
- Tritle, L. A. 1989. 'Epilektoi at Athens'. *AHB* 3: 54-9.
- Tuci, P. A. 2019. 'The speeches of Theban ambassadors in Greek literature (404-362 B.C.)'. *Ktèma* 44: 33-52.
- Tuplin, C. J. 1997. 'Medism and its causes'. *Transeuphratène* 13: 155-85.
- Underhill, G. E. 1900. *A Commentary with Introduction and Appendix on the Hellenica of Xenophon*. Oxford.
- Usener, H. 1874. 'Ein Epigramm von Knidos'. *RhM* 29: 25-50.
- Usher, S. (trans.). 1990. *Greek Orators III: Isocrates, Panegyricus and To Nicocles*. Oxford.
- Valavanis, P. 2019. 'What stood on top of the Marathon trophy?'. In O. Palagia, and E. P. Sioumpara (eds.), *From Hippias to Kallias: Greek Art in Athens and Beyond 527-449 BC*. Athens: 144-56.
- van Gelder, H. 1888. 'Galatarum res in Graecia et Asia gestae usque ad medium secundum saeculum ante Christum'. PhD diss. University of Amsterdam.
- van Wees, H. 2006. 'The oath of the sworn bands: the Acharnae stela, the Oath of Plataea and Archai Spartan warfare'. In A. Luther, M. Meier and L. Thommen (eds.), *Das frühe Sparta*. Stuttgart: 125-64.
- Vannicelli, P. 2021. 'Adeimantos (Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ)'. In C. A. Baron (ed.), *Herodotus Encyclopedia*. 3 vols. Hoboken, NJ.: 13.
- Vasilev, M. I. 2015. *The Policy of Darius and Xerxes towards Thrace and Macedonia*. Leiden.
- Vlassopoulos, K. 2013. *Greeks and Barbarians*. Cambridge.
- Vlassopoulos, K. 2021. 'Greek History'. *G&R* 68: 312-8.
- von Bothmer, D. 1957. *Amazons in Greek Art*. Oxford.
- von den Hoff, R. 2003. 'Tradition and innovation: portraits and dedications on the early

- Hellenistic Akropolis'. In O. Palagia, and S. V. Tracy (eds.), *The Macedonians in Athens, 322-229 B.C.: Proceedings of an International Conference held at the University of Athens, May 24–26, 2001*. Oxford: 173-85.
- von den Hoff, R. 2009. 'Herakles, Theseus and the Athenian Treasury at Delphi'. In P. Schultz, and R. von den Hoff (eds.), *Structure, Image, Ornament: Architectural Sculpture in the Greek World*. Oxford and Oakville: 96-104.
- von den Hoff, R. 2010. 'Media for Theseus, or: the different images of the polis hero'. In L. Foxhall, H.-J. Gehrke and N. Luraghi (eds.), *Intentional History: Spinning Time in Ancient Greece*. Stuttgart: 161-88.
- Walbank, F. W. 1942. 'Alcaeus of Messene, Philip V, and Rome'. *CQ* 36: 134-45.
- Walbank, F. W. 1943. 'Alcaeus of Messene, Philip V, and Rome (Concluded)'. *CQ* 37: 1-13.
- Walbank, F. W. 1957. *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*. Vol. I: *Commentary on Books I-VI*. Oxford.
- Walbank, F. W. 1965. *Speeches in Greek Historians*. Oxford.
- Walbank, F. W. 1967. *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*. Vol. II: *Commentary on Books VII–XVIII*. Oxford.
- Walbank, F. W. 1979. *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*. Vol. III: *Commentary on Books XIX–XL*. Oxford.
- Walbank, F. W. 1996. 'Two Hellenistic processions: a matter of self-definition'. *SCI* 15: 119-30.
- Walbank, M. B. 2015. 'Athens in 143/2 B.C.: three decrees and a Diadikasia'. *ZPE* 193: 118-32.
- Wallace, S. 2011a. 'Freedom of the Greeks in the early Hellenistic period (337-262 BC): a study in ruler-city relations'. PhD diss. University of Edinburgh.
- Wallace, S. 2011b. 'The significance of Plataia for Greek *eleutheria* in the early Hellenistic period'. In A. Erskine, and L. Llewellyn-Jones (eds.), *Creating a Hellenistic World*. Swansea: 147-76.
- Wallace, S. 2014. 'History and hindsight: the importance of Euphron of Sikyon for the Athenian democracy in 318/7'. In H. Hauben, and A. Meeus (eds.), *The Age of the Successors and the Creation of the Hellenistic Kingdoms (323-276 BC)*. Leuven: 599-629.
- Wallace, S. 2016. 'East and West: lines of communication between Alexander and the Greeks'. *Hermathena* 200/201: 15-72.
- Wallace, S. 2018. 'Alexander the Great and democracy in the Hellenistic world'. In M. Canevaro, and B. Gray (eds.), *The Hellenistic Reception of Classical Athenian*

- Democracy and Political Thought*. Oxford: 45-72.
- Wallace, S. 2022. 'Communication and legitimation: knowledge of Alexander's Asian conquests in the Greek world'. In K. Trampedach, and A. Meeus (eds.), *The Legitimation of Conquest: Monarchical Representation and the Art of Government in the Empire of Alexander the Great*. Stuttgart: 123-44.
- Walters, K. R. 1981. "'We fought alone at Marathon": historical falsification in the attic funeral oration'. *RhM* 124: 204-11.
- Walton, F. R. (trans.). 1967. *Diodorus Siculus: Library of History*. Vol. XII: *Fragments of Books 33-40*. Cambridge, MA.
- Warford, E. 2019. 'Performing piety: a phenomenological approach to Athenian processions'. In W. Friese, S. Handberg and T. M. Kristensen (eds.), *Ascending and Descending the Acropolis: Movement in Athenian Religion*. Aarhus: 23-41.
- Waterfield, R. (trans.). 2016. *Plutarch: Hellenistic Lives including Alexander the Great*. With introductions and notes by A. Erskine. Oxford.
- Waterfield, R. (trans.). 2019. *Diodorus of Sicily. The Library, Books 16-20: Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Successors*. Oxford.
- Weinstock, S. 1971. *Divus Julius*. Oxford.
- West, S. 1983. 'Notes on the text of Lycophron'. *CQ* 33: 114-35.
- West, S. 1984. 'Lycophron italicised'. *JHS* 104: 127-51.
- West, S. 2009. 'Herodotus in Lycophron'. In C. Cusset, and É. Prioux (eds.), *Lycophron: éclats d'obscurité*. Sainte-Étienne: 81-93.
- West, W. C., III. 1965. 'Greek public monuments of the Persian Wars'. PhD diss. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
- West, W. C., III. 1969. 'The trophies of the Persian Wars'. *CPh* 64: 7-19.
- West, W. C., III. 1970. 'Saviors of Greece'. *GRBS* 11: 271-82.
- West, W. C., III. 1977. 'Hellenic homonoia and the new decree from Plataea'. *GRBS* 18: 307-19.
- Westwood, G. 2020. *The Rhetoric of the Past in Demosthenes and Aeschines: Oratory, History, and Politics in Classical Athens*. Oxford.
- Wheatley, P., and C. Dunn. 2020. *Demetrius the Besieger*. Oxford and New York.
- Wiesner, J. 1939. 'Olympia'. In *RE* Vol. XVIII.1: 1-174.
- Wilcken, U. 1967. *Alexander the Great*. With preface, an introduction to Alexander studies, notes, and bibliography by E. N. Borza. (trans. G. C. Richards) New York. (In German, Leipzig. 1931.)
- Will, É. 1979. *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique*. Vol. I: *De la mort d'Alexandre aux avènements d'Antiochos III et de Philippe V*. 2nd edn. Nancy.

- Williams, C. K., N. Bookidis and K. W. Slane with S. V. Tracy. 2021. 'From the destruction of Corinth to Colonia Laus Iulia Corinthiensis'. In S. Fachard, and E. M. Harris (eds.), *The Destruction of Cities in the Ancient Greek World: Integrating the Archaeological and Literary Evidence*. Cambridge: 258-87.
- Winckelmann, J. J. 1764. *Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums*. Dresden.
- Wolpert, A. 2002. *Remembering Defeat: Civil War and Civic Memory in Ancient Athens*. Baltimore and London.
- Woodward, A. M. 1923-1925. 'Excavations at Sparta, 1924-25: §4, the Acropolis, 2, the find'. *ABSA* 26: 253-76.
- Worthington, I. 1996. 'The siting of Demosthenes statue'. *ABSA* 81: 389.
- Worthington, I. 2000. 'Demosthenes' (in)activity during the reign of Alexander the Great'. In I. Worthington (ed.), *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator*. London and New York: 90-113.
- Worthington, I. (trans.). 2006. *Demosthenes, Speeches 60 and 61, Prologues, Letters*. Austin, TX.
- Worthington, I. 2016. *Ptolemy I: King and Pharaoh of Egypt*. Oxford.
- Worthington, I. 2021. *Athens After Empire: A History from Alexander the Great to the Emperor Hadrian*. Oxford.
- Yarrow, L. M. 2006a. *Historiography at the End of the Republic: Provincial Perspectives on Roman Rule*. Oxford.
- Yarrow, L. M. 2006b. 'Lucius Mummius and the spoils of Corinth'. *SCI* 25: 57-70.
- Yasukawa, H. 2022. 'What is "cultural memory"?''. In Y. Suto (ed.), *The Ancient Mediterranean World and Cultural Memory*. Tokyo: 17-41. (In Japanese.)
- Yates, D. C. 2013. 'The Persian War as civil war in Plataea's temple of Athena Areia'. *Klio* 95: 369-90.
- Yates, D. C. 2015. 'The tradition of the Hellenic League against Xerxes'. *Historia* 64: 1-25.
- Yates, D. C. 2018. "'This city of ours": fear, discord, and the Persian War at Megara'. In H. Beck, and P. J. Smith (eds.), *Megarian Moments: The Local World of an Ancient Greek City-State. Teiresias Supplements Online*. Vol. I. Münster: 139-65.
- Yates, D. C. 2019. *States of Memory: The Polis, Panhellenism, and the Persian War*. Oxford and New York.
- Yunis, H. 2001. *Demosthenes: On the Crown*. Cambridge.
- Yunis, H. (trans.). 2005. *Demosthenes, Speeches 18 and 19*. Austin, TX.
- Zaccarini, M. 2017. *The Lame Hegemony: Cimon of Athens and the Failure of Panhellenism, ca. 478–450 BC*. Bologna.

## Bibliography

- Zaccarini, M. 2018. 'What's Love got to do with it? Eros, democracy, and Pericles' rhetoric'. *GRBS* 58: 473-89.
- Zaccarini, M. 2021. 'Review: David C. Yates. 2019. *States of Memory: The Polis, Panhellenism, and the Persian War*. New York: Oxford University Press'. *CR*: 459-61.
- Zahrnt, M. 2019. 'Marathon - das Schlachtfeld als "Erinnerungsort", einst und jetzt'. In E. Stein-Hölkeskamp, and K.-J. Hölkeskamp (eds.), *Die griechische Welt: Erinnerungsorte der Antike*. Munich: 114-27.