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<b>Author</b>	Herrmann, Fritz-Gregor
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Plato's Philosophical Terminology  
A History of Words Central to the Ontology of His  
Middle Dialogues

Fritz-Gregor Herrmann M.A.

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Plato's Philosophical Terminology  
A History of Words Central to the Ontology of His Middle Dialogues  
(Abstract of Thesis)

The purpose of this thesis is to provide preliminaries for a better understanding of central parts of Plato's philosophy. Its method is a combination of traditional diachronic semantics and the study of the literary and social contexts of words which may be termed pragmatics. Its justification, it is hoped, is provided by an application of the results of those studies to a portion of Platonic text which is, in parts, reinterpreted in the light of some new findings.

The point of departure of the investigation undertaken is a passage from one of the dialogues of Plato's middle period which is generally assumed to contain the essence of his thoughts on matters ontological at the time of composition: *Phaedo* 100d - 105e. From this text, a number of significant terms, most of them recurring in other dialogues of similar date, have been selected: μετέχειν, παρῆναι, προσῆναι, ἐνεῖναι, εἶδος, ἰδέα and some of their cognates; the histories of these terms have been traced, from their earliest occurrence in extant Greek literature, usually Homer, through the various authors and genres of epic, lyric and tragic poetry, historical, philosophical, medical and rhetorical writings, to the early dialogues of Plato himself. In the course of investigation it seemed appropriate to study the nouns εἶδος and ἰδέα in greater detail and to a degree approaching comprehensiveness, for two reasons: on the one hand, their semantic development is more marked and variegated, and therefore deserved more careful scrutiny; on the other, scholarly opinion, which has been taken into account throughout, is more divided as to the meaning and senses of these two nouns than with any of the other terms selected. For the same reason, it was deemed necessary to translate by far the majority of pre-Platonic occurrences of the two nouns in their contexts - that often required interpretation and discussion which may at first seem to be mere diversions - a measure not required in the case of the verbs under consideration. That in itself is a first result: nouns are more readily employed with extensions in meaning than verbs; they are more likely to acquire a fixity in application which may amount to a technical terminology. The difference in status and importance of the nouns over against the verbs is reflected in the separate arrangement of the material in Parts I and II.

Part III consists of an application of some the results yielded by the semantic studies of the individual words in Parts I and II. It is in the nature of the exercise that many of the developments traced in Parts I and II are not made use of in Part III; however, it was felt that unless a complete study of all the various actual contexts prior in time were undertaken, it would not be possible to determine with certainty the meaning and connotations of any given term in any given text. The effort was not in vain, as it can be shown with fair precision not only what the terms selected actually meant with Plato but more importantly, which literary and intellectual contexts Plato derived his philosophical terminology from: being able to determine to whom Plato reacted in his thoughts, and with whom he was in dialogue in his writings, is more important than bare linguistic reconstruction of 'meaning'.

We see Plato in the central philosophical passage of the central dialogue *Phaedo* in interaction with three at least partly distinct parties of pre-Socratic philosophers: Anaxagoras and his followers, the Pythagoreans, and Democritus. While most of that conforms with received opinion, reaction to Democritus at that early a stage in Plato's writing career is not usually assumed. That in itself, and the use Plato makes of the thoughts of his predecessors in fusing and correcting their assumptions while adapting their language to his own purposes may prompt us to reconsider some commonly held views on Plato's ontology.

However, the study here attempted is intended to be preliminary in nature; the application to a Platonic text in Part III is to be understood as one example only of how the semantic investigations of Parts I and II may be applied to the dialogues of Plato and other near-contemporary philosophical texts.

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In accordance with the regulations of the University of Edinburgh I hereby declare that this work is entirely my own and has not been written in collaboration.

Fritz-Gregor Herrmann

*postscriptum*: This final version of the thesis has profited greatly from the watchful eyes and minds of my three examiners, Professor Michael C. Stokes, emeritus professor of Greek in the Department of Classics, University of Durham; Professor Richard Stalley of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Glasgow; and Dr. N. Keith Rutter of the Department of Classics of Edinburgh University. While some disputes remain unresolved, the reader is spared the unseemly sight of many an error owing to their meticulous care.

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## INTRODUCTION

## I.

What gave rise to this investigation are those well-known and much discussed pages of Plato's *Phaedo* where Socrates - perhaps not for the first time, but certainly in a more explicit form than in any other dialogue before the *Symposium* and the *Republic* - explains to his friends how and in what ways, from a certain stage in his life onwards, he thought he should view the world and look for the causes and reasons of why things are as they are, *Phaedo* 100b - 105e. It is from there that a number of potentially philosophically significant terms have been chosen for semantic investigation (Parts I and II) and subsequent interpretation in the context of the *Phaedo* (Part III)

The passage as a whole poses difficulties, not so much to a proper comprehension of its philosophical import and implications, as first and foremost to the understanding of the text itself; and that not so much because of deficiencies of the transmitted text - though there are textual uncertainties here as well; nor because of a lack of modern discussion - for translations and commentaries abound; the difficulty is that there are no translations of the Greek text available which seem to be sufficient to help understand what Plato's text meant. That, it seems, is not so much due to inadequacies of translators: there is no dearth of conventional renderings for each and every word of Plato or indeed any other author of those times, as manifested not least in that invaluable achievement of collaborative scholarship and - in its application - that epitome of imposing dogmatism, the *Greek-English Lexicon* by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, revised and augmented throughout by Sir Henry Stuart Jones with the assistance of Roderick

McKenzie<sup>1</sup>. It is rather due to our lack of knowledge of Greek usage in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. in general.

This state of affairs is compounded by a general ignorance of our ignorance in those matters. A recent comprehensive and thorough discussion of Plato's early and middle dialogues expresses that much explicitly. Having discussed four apparently general features of the Greek language, one of which is "participation as a metaphor for properties and attributes", C. Kahn concludes: "These [four ways of speaking and thinking] simply provide part of the pre-theoretical raw material out of which Plato will construct his theory. And the same is true for the two terms for "form": *eidōs* and *idea*, which are well attested in early prose with the meanings "physical appearance," "bodily form," "shape," "structure," "kind of thing." The pre-Platonic usage of these terms has been fully studied, and there is no need to return to the subject here. (footnote: For a survey of the literature on *eidōs* and *idea* see Ross (1951) 13-16. Ross rightly remarks that "What was original was not the use of the words, but the status he [Plato] assigned to the things for which the words stood" (p. 14).)"<sup>2</sup>

This statement, which I regard as representative of current *communis opinio*, entails that all we can know about usage concerning the terms mentioned, and all that is worth knowing, has been available for forty-five years at least, and that no advance need or indeed could be made by further study. We know what terms like *παρεῖναι* and *παραγίγνεσθαι*, *μετέχειν* and *μεταλαμβάνειν*, *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* meant before Plato. All that is left to be done is to see what Plato applies them to.

My objection to this view is not in the first place of a theoretical but rather of a practical nature. I share with Ross and Kahn the primitive and naive view that terms have meanings, and that often words stand for things, and I will not attempt a justification of this manner of speaking and thinking. What I am not convinced of is that the connotations of those and a few other Greek terms recurring in Plato's early and middle

<sup>1</sup> H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon. Revised and augmented throughout by H. S. Jones with the assistance of R. McKenzie*, Oxford 1940; henceforth LSJ.

<sup>2</sup> C.H. Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue. The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form*, Cambridge 1996, p. 334f. with footnote 6. His reference is to: W.D. Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, Oxford 1951.

dialogues in contexts concerned with ontology, broadly speaking, are sufficiently understood for a just appreciation of Plato's philosophy. That may have to do with a different approach to how one can determine the meaning of words and phrases in texts.

## II.

In principle, of course, the age of the text or the language it is written in does not make a difference to how we go about that exercise of determining meaning. The only practical difference may lie in the circumstances and conditions in which we learn the Classical languages, namely in a way highly determined by tradition and without any direct means of checking the validity of the nuances of the information provided. But as long as one is aware of that, reading Homer and observing differences in usage to fifth and fourth century Greek texts is, from the point of view of semantics, much the same as reading Shakespeare and observing differences in usage to nineteenth and twentieth century texts. Both activities presuppose a basic knowledge of the language of the authors compared. In both cases one must be wary not to take a meaning attested only later as the starting point of one's investigation, though given the sparse state of preservation of Greek literature it is inherently more likely that a meaning or connotation perfectly common at all times is attested in a late source only.

In both cases it may be helpful to take a word's etymology as one's starting point; that does, of course, not imply that in the course of the history of a language a word may not change its meaning beyond recognition by taking on new connotations and losing inherited ones; nor does it imply that every or any speaker of a language is aware of the etymology of a word he uses, nor even that he need be awake to the notion of etymology as such; but leaving aside the question to what extent there was a theoretical awareness in those matters, we will see examples of word play and folk etymologies bringing

together words we would call etymologically related, and with those plays on words<sup>3</sup> there are connections implied or explicit conclusions drawn which have a bearing on the content of the text in question, a phenomenon that may be observed from Homer to Plato and beyond just as much as with Shakespeare; employment in that way of two terms rightly or wrongly connected by juxtaposition because of some sort of resemblance may on occasion lead an author to use those terms with higher frequency, or with additional connotations derived from such etymologizing, or in other ways semantically altered; in that way etymology does have a rôle in any study of the usage of a text or an author, regardless of the relative age of the period of writing.

Knowledge of etymology may also help avoid another danger, that of taking the meaning of a term to be either what one is led to expect in a certain context from a modern point of view or simply what accidentally seems to fit the context. An example may illustrate that: "My DESK is my dearest possession; my life centres around my DESK. Without my DESK I would be an unhappy man. Only when spent there, is time not wasted. When I was given my first own DESK, that was like an initiation, it irreversibly changed the course of my life which henceforth revolved around that precious object alone." This passage could be elaborated and extended. One would read it as the story of an industrious, laborious, studious man. One's perception of situation and character would change were one to learn that the word rendered as or understood to mean DESK really meant BED. In both cases the text is meaningful, coherent and consistent; that is to say, the immediate context in itself is not sufficient to determine the meaning of an individual word recurring in the text. External information is indispensable for a proper understanding.<sup>4</sup> Sometimes a knowledge of a word's etymological connections may be the only external information available.

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<sup>3</sup> I use the terms 'word play', 'play on words' and 'pun', if not indiscriminately so at least not with any implied judgement about the seriousness of a passage under discussion; pun does not imply an intended joke.

<sup>4</sup> It is a potentially serious shortcoming of J. Lyons, *Structural Semantics. An Analysis of Part of the Vocabulary of Plato*, Oxford 1969, not to have taken this fully into account; cf. also D.B. Robinson's review in CR XXI (1971).

In the fictitious example the confusion of DESK and BED relates to words for material, corporeal objects.<sup>5</sup> That type of confusion, however, is not restricted to such objects. The same sort of inaccuracy may occur in contexts of a different kind: “Aeneas was a CUNNING man. His CUNNING made him respected by other mortals and loved by the gods. His eventual success can be seen as a reward for his CUNNING.” Again, this example could be drawn out indefinitely. Not only would the result be a story coherent and consistent in itself, one could adduce the example of Odysseus as a parallel and perhaps a model for this Aeneas. It is obvious that our whole evaluation of character and plot would change with the knowledge that the adjective and noun rendered as or understood to mean CUNNING really meant PIOUS and PIETY.

Though these two examples are fictitious, the matter as such is not. An example from Homer may serve to illustrate the point. Common belief had assigned to φίλος a meaning approximating that of the possessive pronoun, and generations of school children learned it as such; and that despite the fact that there is not only no compelling need to render the word as anything but ‘dear’ and ‘friend’, there is, as D.B. Robinson has convincingly demonstrated,<sup>6</sup> overwhelming evidence within and outside Homer for that and only that latter meaning. The example of φίλος is particularly instructive. What prompted modern readers to assign a meaning of ‘his’ rather than ‘dear’ to the word was not founded on any philological evidence: it was simply a reluctance and inability to realize and acknowledge a way of thinking and speaking different from ours. Whatever the origins of this manner of expressing oneself, the ‘dear heart’, ‘dear head’, ‘dear limbs’ addressed or referred to by the Homeric heroes are dear to them and are perceived as such; it is not only a different manner of speaking, it is a different view of the world, underlying the text throughout. In order to understand that difference, one has to ask for the reasons why one’s limbs were not just ‘one’s own limbs’ but in fact ‘one’s dear limbs’. It is possible that for many terms the ancient texts we have do not provide a

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<sup>5</sup> I use the words material and corporeal in an unsophisticated way as referring to things existing in space and time and having matter or body, without committing myself to any particular theory of matter or physics at large, neither on my part nor on the part of a text discussed.

<sup>6</sup> D.B. Robinson, *Homeric φίλος*, in: E.M. Craik (ed.), *Owls to Athens*, Oxford 1990

complete answer, perhaps not even a satisfying answer at all; it is also possible that retranslating Homer consistently with 'dear' instead of 'his' etc. for φίλος will in the end make only a slight difference to our appreciation and to our interpretation of the text. It is, however, conceivable that in some way, from a certain perspective, or for certain, albeit restricted purposes the difference may prove decisive.

Two more practices of modern linguistics must briefly be considered. The first one is somehow related to the issue of φίλος just discussed. The reluctance to call one's limbs 'dear limbs' is paralleled by a reluctance to accept, not only in theory but also in the practice of translating, that in another language there may be a word for a notion or concept<sup>7</sup> of narrower or wider extension only than that of its nearest equivalents in the language into which a text is translated, but no single word for a notion or concept of the same extension; the fact itself is often enough stated, but too often without due consideration of the necessary consequences for the translator: sometimes it will do to use the word commonly employed for the wider notion, with the loss, perhaps, of some connotations, but sometimes that loss of connotations will be too heavy a price, and one will be forced to use the word usually employed for a concept narrower than the one referred to in the language of the original text, even if that entails stretching the language into which one translates beyond the commonly acceptable; a measure, of course, to be reverted to only in the last resort; examples will be found in the chapters on εἶδος and ἰδέα below.

At this point, mention must be made of a certain cultural prejudice detrimental to translation. Common examples of the above phenomena of wider and narrower concepts are, among Hellenists, καλός, among linguists in general, the 'eight words for snow in some Eskimo language'; the Greeks, we learn, could not differentiate between nice, fine, handsome and - even - good, because the word καλός could mean all those things; many confusions are created, we are told, in particular in philosophical arguments in

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<sup>7</sup> I use the words notion and concept here oblivious of any philosophical theories potentially attached to them otherwise.

Plato's dialogues, due to a lack of disambiguation which would have been necessary. Against that, we hear: 'the Eskimos have eight words for snow'.

Instead, one could say: the English language does not have a word for *καλός*, just as the Eskimo language does not have a word for snow. Or else: The English language cannot differentiate between different sorts of snow in the same way the Eskimo language can.

At the root of that lies, perhaps, not only a natural focus on one's native language, but also a sub-, semi- or fully conscious rejection of an idealizing classicistic view of Ancient Greece and the Greeks to overcome which is the task of any decent, self-respecting cultural theorist, a rejection paired with a residue of modern admiration for the noble savage, but also, at the same time, with a certain mechanism of self-defence. The result of that is that in the case of Greek, a shortcoming is noted on the part of the Greek language which could not differentiate where English can, but in the case of the Eskimo language, usually referred to as that, those 'primitive' people are praised while no blame is incurred by the English language or its speakers. If idealizing classicism is to be rejected, other cultural prejudices should be avoided on the same grounds.

There is another difficulty in determining the meaning of certain words which has to do with the extension of notions or concepts in a different respect. The following exemplary sentences may serve as an introduction: "Of all the things in this garden, it has always been the old oak tree I cherished most. A chair and table are useful things to have. Friendship is a fine thing when you have it. Justice is the one thing a state should aim for." Some commentators and translators, when faced, in any language, with a number of occurrences of one and the same lexical item in a number of apparently different contexts react by making statements of the following sort: 'thing' has a number of meanings; in the first sentence the meaning of 'thing' is 'natural physical object', in the second 'artefact'; in the third, the meaning of 'thing' is 'an emotion, state of mind, or interpersonal relationship'; in the fourth it is 'a state of affairs obtaining in society as a whole, potentially by prevailing bilaterally and multilaterally between its members'.

This fictitious example is, admittedly, painted in stark colours; the principle, however, of creating different, distinct meanings in that way can readily be observed.<sup>8</sup> By contrast, I would claim, and would not consider it an extravagant claim, that the meaning of ‘thing’ in all four sentences is the same, but that it is in the nature of so general a term, a word referring to so general a notion as that referred to by ‘thing’, that such a word can be employed as referring to things as different from each other in their ontological status as a tree, a chair and table, friendship, or justice.<sup>9</sup> Implications of that will become clear in the discussions of the meaning of particular Greek terms below.

In what follows I am not concerned with the words DESK, BED, CUNNING, PIETY, φίλος, καλός, ‘snow’ or ‘thing’. The above examples, however, should warn against letting modern practice and modern prejudices influence our understanding of a word, a sentence or a text. As with φίλος, so with any other word, there is a possibility that we will not know its meaning at any given time in any given author before we have both studied its application in context and traced its history as far as possible. The latter of these two processes will on the whole take precedence. As with φίλος and the other words adduced above, on the other hand, the outcome must remain uncertain until the result of the semantic investigations are applied to an interpretation of the texts from which they took their departure. This application is, for the most part, outside the scope of the present modest exercise which I see as establishing some preliminaries to Plato’s ontology.

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<sup>8</sup> For εἶδος cf. i.a. C. Ritter, *Neue Untersuchungen über Platon*, München 1910, e.g. p. 322, as discussed by D. Ross, op. cit., p. 14f.; or K. Weidauer, *Thukydides und die Hippokratischen Schriften*, Heidelberg 1954, *passim*.

<sup>9</sup> A ‘difference in ontological status’ is not meant to say more here than that, e.g., the tree is a natural corporeal object, the table an artificial one; the tree and the table referred to are corporeal, the friendship and justice referred to are not. By using the word ‘ontological’ in this context I do not mean to commit myself to any particular philosophical theory of the world or to any particular ontology.

## III.

Going back to the pronouncement by Kahn quoted in Section I:<sup>10</sup> after briefly discussing some alleged features of common Greek language, he states that they “do not constitute a theory of Forms in any sense”, but that they “simply provide part of the pre-theoretical raw material out of which Plato will construct his theory. And the same is true for the two terms for “form”: *eidos* and *idea*, which are well attested in early prose with the meanings “physical appearance,” “bodily form,” “shape,” “structure,” “kind of thing.” The pre-Platonic usage of these terms has been fully studied, and there is no need to return to the subject here.” Kahn’s only point of reference are pp. 13-16 of Ross’ *Plato’s Theory of Ideas* of 1951. Ross’ discussion of pre-Platonic and early Platonic use of εἶδος and ἰδέα is indeed a good critical summary of the views expressed by Taylor, Gillespie, Baldry and Ritter,<sup>11</sup> combined with Ross’ own views on those matters. He holds, i.a., (p.14) “that Socrates’ inquiries as to ‘what virtue is’, ‘what courage is’, and the like, led Plato to recognize the existence of universals as a distinct class of entity, and that he took over as names for them the words εἶδος and ἰδέα, which in ordinary Greek had already begun to be used in the sense of ‘quality’ or ‘characteristic’. What was original was not the use of the words, but the status he assigned to the things for which the words stood.” Then he summarizes Ritter’s views and concludes that his overly subtle distinctions are not tenable. Instead, he states (p. 15f.), “what we find is that Plato not seldom uses both words in their original meaning ‘visible form’, that he uses both words in various non-technical senses in which they had been used by earlier writers, and that he uses both words in the two technical senses of ‘Idea’ and ‘class’. While in the dialogues from the *Phaedo* onwards, with the exception of the *Parmenides*, the meaning ‘class’ is the commonest meaning of εἶδος, it is only rarely that ἰδέα is used in this

<sup>10</sup> C.H. Kahn, op. cit., p. 334f.

<sup>11</sup> A.E. Taylor, *The Words εἶδος, ἰδέα in Pre-Platonic Literature*, in: id., *Varia Socratica. First Series*, Oxford 1911, pp. 178 - 267; C.M. Gillespie, *The Use of Εἶδος and Ἰδέα in Hippocrates*, in: CQ VI (1912), pp. 179 - 203; H.C. Baldry, *Plato’s “Technical Terms”*, in: CQ XXXI (1937), pp. 141 - 150; C. Ritter, loc. cit. *et passim*.

sense. ἰδέα is the more vivid of the two words, and tends to be preferred in the more highly coloured and imaginative passages. It may be added that Plato often uses οὐσία and φύσις as ways of referring to an Idea, and that he so uses γένος in the *Sophistes*, and ἑνάς and μόνος in the *Philebus*.” On the following pages (18 - 21), Ross briefly discusses Plato’s use of οὐσία, αὐτὸ τό and αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό in the dialogues he believes to precede the *Phaedo*; towards the end of the book, in his ‘Retrospect’, Ross has a very useful list of a significantly larger number of Greek terms connected with the ‘Theory of Ideas’, together with a substantial, albeit selective table of their occurrences in Plato’s dialogues (pp. 228 - 230).

It may have been noted that when Kahn quotes Ross’ preliminary conclusion - “What was original was not the use of the words, but the status he assigned to the things for which the words stood.” - he forgets to state that Ross means that “εἶδος and ἰδέα (...) in ordinary Greek had already begun to be used in the sense of ‘quality’ or ‘characteristic’.” Therefore Kahn’s assertion about “the two terms for “form”: *eidōs* and *idea*, which are well attested in early prose with the meanings “physical appearance,” “bodily form,” “shape,” “structure,” “kind of thing””, must be treated with caution, since the meanings he presupposes for the two terms do not include the ones assumed by Ross<sup>12</sup> whom he cites as evidence that the terms have been studied sufficiently.

A different but closely related issue is that Ross was not, and did not pretend to be, exhaustive in his engagement with previous scholarly opinion. Contrariwise, his selection serves only as a foil to his own views rather than constituting anything approaching *Forschungsgeschichte*. Nor do I, for that matter, propose to fill that gap here. Instead, I will leave discussion of significant passages or aspects of those works to footnotes where and when appropriate.

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<sup>12</sup> As shown above, those are, of course, not the only meanings Ross believed εἶδος and ἰδέα to have had.

I will make an exception, though, for A.E. Taylor, *The Words εἶδος, ἰδέα in Pre-Platonic Literature*, one in a collection of essays by the author, *Varia Socratica*, Oxford 1911, whose essay, though questioned as to the validity of its conclusions from the very beginning, has had a lasting impact on Platonic scholarship. Taylor's effort is aptly characterized in a review of his *Varia Socratica* by P. Shorey which appeared that same year.<sup>13</sup> In it, Shorey writes: "The central aim that unifies the volume is the attempt to prove that much more of Platonism than is commonly supposed is Socratic, or may be traced back even to the Pythagoreans and other pre-Socratics. ... . The valuable concluding study on the words εἶδος and ἰδέα in pre-Platonic literature rests on a complete collection, we are told, of every occurrence of the words down to Aristotle. Here again the object is to show that the philosophic use of these words was familiar not only to Socrates but to Pythagoras and the pre-Socratics. ... . Professor Taylor's collections lay all students of Plato under obligation. But a sound "semantic" of the word εἶδος demands more discrimination than he has yet found time to bestow upon the subject. His contention is that the philosophic meaning of the word goes back through rhetoric and medicine to Pythagorean geometry. He holds that in Plato it is usually synonymous with φύσις, and even thinks that it is worth while to raise the question whether in Plato εἶδος ever means "class" at all - a question which re-reading of the *Euthyphro* and the *Meno* surely will answer, if it be borne in mind that Greek logic is generally expressed in terms of intension rather than extension. What his examples establish, I think, is simply that εἶδος in ordinary Greek normally means "form," or "animal body," or "beauty," but that it might mean a little more abstractly and, in the infancy of abstraction, somewhat vaguely "kind," "mode," "manner," "species." The transition from "kind" to a particular kind, substance, element, or nature is no more surprising than the shift in modern times from species to spice. Professor Taylor properly emphasizes the significance of the Hippocratean corpus for the study of Greek philosophy. But I think he makes too much of the anticipation of the terminology of the

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<sup>13</sup> In: *Classical Philology* VI (1911), pp. 361 - 365.

doctrine of ideas in section 15 of the treatise *περὶ ἀρχαίας ἰατρικῆς*.<sup>14</sup> The phrase *αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ* is normal Greek idiom, as is the use of *κοινωνεῖν* with the dative. The use of *εἶδος* in the sense of element is, as we have seen, a perfectly natural extension of meaning, and early Greek thought would not distinguish sharply an element from an elementary quality. All of Plato's language is anticipated in this way by earlier writers. He was too great an artist in style to coin a Kantian technical terminology. His originality consists in the use of these and other expressions to denote the substantive reality which he ascribed and was the first consciously and consistently to ascribe to all concepts. ... .”

I agree with Shorey's characterisation of Taylor's study, and also with much of his criticism. Taylor's investigation is guided throughout by the overall aim of his studies, to present a Socratic Plato who inherited his thought from a Pythagorean Socrates. Shorey's aim, however, is to prove the superiority of Plato over his predecessors (cf. the remarks on p. 361 of his review) and the unity of Plato's thought. To Shorey's mind, that thought consists not least of what he states in the last sentence quoted, “[Plato's] originality consists in the use of these and other expressions to denote the substantive reality which he ascribed and was the first consciously and consistently to ascribe to all concepts” - a statement which reminds us that Shorey's own doctoral thesis was a Munich dissertation of 1884.<sup>15</sup>

Apart from not agreeing with that last sentence of Shorey's, there is one point of substance where I am inclined to differ: I would not dismiss out of hand Taylor's suggestion “that it is worth while to raise the question whether in Plato *εἶδος* ever means “class” at all”.

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<sup>14</sup> For the dating of that Hippocratic treatise see Appendix I below.

<sup>15</sup> P. Shorey, *De Platonis Idearum Doctrina atque Mentis Humanae Notionibus Commentatio*, München 1884, reprinted with an English translation by R.S.W. Hawtrey, with a Preface by R. Kent Sprague, as: *A Dissertation on Plato's Theory of Forms and on the Concepts of the Human Mind*, Pittsburgh 1982.

## IV.

There have been partial treatments of the topic since Taylor's influential essay, some of them of excellent quality.<sup>16</sup> However, Shorey's declaration that a sound 'semantic' of the word εἶδος is still outstanding is still valid. Part II attempts to provide such a semantic study of εἶδος and ἰδέα from Homer to Plato's early and middle dialogues; for the purpose of this investigation, the *Hippias Major* will not be considered since its authenticity is less than certain; to my knowledge this is the first enterprise of that scale which makes a serious attempt to distinguish between εἶδος and ἰδέα. Some repetition is unavoidable, but the results justify the effort. Although it cannot be denied that there is a great deal of semantic overlap between the two words in almost all their senses, ἰδέα may on occasion mean what εἶδος could not mean; and εἶδος is employed in some contexts in which ἰδέα was, to our knowledge, never employed. As will be demonstrated in Part III, this may affect our reading of Plato in a fundamental way.

Part I, though of equal length as Part II, is in a sense subordinate, due to its subject matter. Even casual inspection of the verbs selected as connected with Plato's ontological thoughts will show that there was much less, if any, semantic development there. For that reason, it was not necessary to translate every instance cited, as was the case with εἶδος and ἰδέα. What is of interest regarding the verbs is mostly the context in which they are employed. The contexts of rhetoric, medicine and philosophy can be linked with passages in Plato's early dialogues in particular not through subject matter alone, but in particular by way of comparing choice of expressions. That will become decisive in the combined application of the collective results of the semantic

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<sup>16</sup> Notably C.M. Gillespie on *The Use of Εἶδος and Ἰδέα in Hippocrates*, in: CQ VI (1912), pp. 179 - 203; H.C. Baldry, *Plato's "Technical Terms"*, in: CQ XXXI (1937), pp. 141 - 150; and H. Diller, *Zum Gebrauch von εἶδος und ἰδέα in vorplatonischer Zeit*, in: *Medizingeschichte in unserer Zeit*, ed. H.-H. Euler et al., Stuttgart 1971, pp. 23 - 30. Cf. also G.F. Else, *The Terminology of the Ideas*, in: HSCP (1938), pp. 17 - 51; and P. Brommer, *ΕΙΔΟΣ et ΙΔΕΑ. Étude sémantique et chronologique*, Assen 1940 - two works too much determined by preconceived views of what Plato meant and therefore of little use for our purpose. The thorough study of C. Sandoz, *La notion de la forme en Grec ancien*, Fribourg 1972, provides a useful collection of material, but slightly lacks focus; Sandoz' interpretations are on very traditional lines and too much determined by convention.

investigations in Part III, where I hope to be able to demonstrate that, in the *Phaedo*, Plato reacts at once to a number of different pre-Socratic schools of thought, the Pythagoreans, Anaxagoras and Democritus; while the last may come as a surprise, another result of the examination of 100d - 105e is that Hippocratic medicine did not actually have a rôle to play at all.

However, even if the results of the final application in Part III are not accepted as valid, the semantic studies of Parts I and II may be of value in their own right; it is hoped, not only as collections of material. εἶδος and ἰδέα are terms relevant not only to the *Phaedo* within Plato's work, and not only to Plato within Greek philosophy. A knowledge of their semantic development may be useful to the Aristotelian scholar, the historian of medicine, or any Classicist interested in the history of concepts.

## PART I

## METEXEIN, METEINAI

## I.

When in the first half of the dialogue bearing his name Parmenides criticizes Socrates' notion of on the one hand certain entities which are there by themselves and on the other hand objects which share in these entities and become in sharing what they share in, a central point of his critique is the nature of this *sharing*<sup>17</sup>.

The Greek words here rendered by *sharing* are forms of the verbs μετέχειν and μεταλαμβάνειν, the one denoting the state of *sharing*, the other the process of *coming to share*.<sup>18</sup> To some extent at least, Parmenides' (professed) difficulties are connected with his (professed) understanding of these words and with the way Socrates comments on this understanding. Parmenides appears to take the words to mean *partake*, *participate*, a meaning which they may have in certain contexts; but unlike the Latin *parti-cipio*, derived from Latin *pars*, 'part', neither μεταλαμβάνειν nor μετέχειν are inherently or necessarily connected with μέρος, the common word for 'part'.<sup>19</sup> Only

<sup>17</sup> *Parmenides* 130e ff.

<sup>18</sup> The discussion will focus on μετέχειν. μεταλαμβάνειν plays a subordinate rôle only; its usage is always determined by that of μετέχειν. Whatever type of 'having' or 'sharing' is denoted by μετέχειν in a particular context, μεταλαμβάνειν in this context denotes a 'coming to have' or 'coming to share' with connotations identical to those of μετέχειν in the same context; in that, the relation of μετέχειν to μεταλαμβάνειν is parallel to that of εἶναι in its simple and prefixed forms to the respective simple and prefixed forms of γίγνεσθαι; examples of that will be provided below.

<sup>19</sup> Since there are differing views on the semantics of μετέχειν, let me quote one which I consider representative in many ways of the majority view; H. Meinhardt, *Teilhabe bei Platon*, Freiburg/München 1968, p. 16f.: "μετέχειν" selbst ist gegenüber seinen Umschreibungen bereits im weiteren Gebrauch (i.e. if not applied to εἶδη / ἰδέαι) abstrakt und fast ohne Bildgehalt. Es ist ein Compositum aus "ἔχειν - haben, halten" und präverbialem "μετά". Die Konstruktion mit partitivem

if that were the case, would a question like the one of Parmenides be inevitable: οὐκοῦν ἦτοι ὅλου τοῦ εἶδους ἢ μέρους ... ; (131a5). Though this particular weakness of Parmenides' criticism is well known, his view has frequently played a part in interpretations not only of Plato's *Parmenides*, but also of such passages in the dialogues of the so-called middle period as *Phaedo* 100b-101e, *Symposium* 210e-211b, or *Republic* V 476c-d. There as well, certain of the many things surrounding us are said to be such-and-such as they *share* in what is *such itself*. To see if Parmenides' criticism is to the point or, more generally, how this *sharing* in something could be understood, it may be helpful to look at instances of the word μετέχειν in pre-Platonic literature and passages in early dialogues which contain examples of *sharing*, where this *sharing* in something is denoted by μετέχειν. The way in which something is *shared* in there will help to understand in what manner e.g. beautiful things can be said to *share* in the *beautiful itself*.

## II.

It does not make sense to discuss the semantics of μετέχειν without having considered the semantics of ἔχειν first, not least because, as is common with prefixed

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Genitiv kennt schon das Simplex: etwa Sophokles, Oed. Rex 708f.: "... ἐστὶ σοὶ βρότειον οὐδὲν μαντικῆς ἔχον τέχνης - es gibt nichts Sterbliches, das die Seherkunst besitzt." - "μετέχω ist ἔχω mit Partitiv ..., verdeutlicht durch μετὰ." (Eduard Schwyzer, Griechische Grammatik. 2. Bd. München 1950, S. 103.) "Der Partitiv bezeichnet hier den allgemeinen Bereich der Teilnahme, während ein bestimmter Teil, den jemand erhält, im Akkusativ steht." (Eduard Schwyzer a.a.O.) Das präverbale μετὰ bringt das Moment der Gemeinssamkeit (Vgl. Eduard Schwyzer a.a.O.S. 482.) ("mit, zusammen") zum Ausdruck. - Beides wird für den philosophischen Gebrauch wichtig: Alle Partizipierenden "haben" gemeinsam das Partizipierte, aber "partitiv", einen Teil vom Ganzen, wobei "Teil" hier natürlich qualitativ (= in abgeschwächter Weise) und nicht quantitativ zu verstehen ist. - Gleichbedeutend mit "μετέχειν" und "μέτεξις" werden in der vorliegenden Arbeit die von der lateinischen Übersetzung "participatio" gebildeten Vokabeln "partizipieren" und "Partizipation" verwandt, außerdem die deutschen Übersetzungen "teilhaben" und "Teilhabe". - The German equivalents employed by Meinhardt are loan-translations of the Latin words and have as one of their elements the German for 'part', 'Teil'. - Cf. also LSJ s.v. μετέχω "II. In Platonic Philos., *participate in a universal*". É. des Places, *Lexique de la langue philosophique et religieuse de Platon*, Paris 1964, s.v. μετέχειν "participer" (à) a) en général ; b) à une Idée."

verbs<sup>20</sup> in Greek, the derived word *μετέχειν*, as far as one can judge from the words it can meaningfully connect, seems to have retained a closeness to the simple *ἔχειν*. In terms of etymology, *ἔχειν* goes back to an Indo-European root \*seg<sup>h</sup>-, also found in German ‘siegen’, *defeat*; the original meaning of the root may have been something like ‘hold down, subdue’ and then ‘hold (as a possession), have’; it may also go back, at the same time, to a root \*ueg<sup>h</sup>-, meaning ‘bear, carry, heave up, lift’, preserved in English ‘weigh’<sup>21</sup>, ‘way’, et al., German ‘bewegen’, *move*, ‘Weg’, Latin ‘vehere’, *carry, convey*; both roots would have yielded an identical proto-Greek \*hek<sup>h</sup>- and, with dissimilation of aspirates according to Grassmann’s Law, *ἔχ-*;<sup>22</sup> the two roots could have been collapsed into one all the easier because of the semantic overlap in ‘holding down’ and ‘holding up’; much of that is, of course, speculation.

Already in the *Iliad*, *ἔχειν* can mean ‘to have, hold, possess, keep’ with reference to both ‘physical and material objects’ and ‘habits, states and conditions, bodily and mental’. Partly due to its origin, its application is by no means restricted to the ‘having’ of physical objects, things with spatio-temporal extension. Even if one were to posit an original restriction to a particular class of objects<sup>23</sup>, it is questionable if that was still felt even at the relatively early time of the composition of the *Iliad*. On the contrary, by comparison it seems that the extension of the word *ἔχειν*, the number and nature of subjects and objects it can meaningfully connect, is larger than that of its English counterpart ‘have’.

<sup>20</sup> I use the term ‘prefixed verb’ as the modern distinction between ‘compound words’, i.e. those ‘consisting of two or more free morphemes’, and ‘complex words’, i.e. those ‘containing one free and at least one bound morpheme’, does not apply to many prefixed Greek verbs whose first element otherwise functions as a preposition. In many cases, for example, it is impossible to determine a distinction between *πάρεστι τινί* and *ἔστι παρά τινι*; cf. Schwyzer II, p. 423. For *μετά* in general cf. Schwyzer, II, pp. 481-487; for pre-verbal *μετα-* in particular p. 482.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, ed. C.T. Onions et al., Oxford<sup>3</sup>1944, Reset with Revised Etymologies and Addenda 1973, s.vv. ‘way’, ‘weigh’.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. R. Plath, *Hauchdissimilation im Mykenischen*, in: *MSS* 48 1987, pp. 187-193.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. H. Frisk, s.v. *ἔχω*<sup>1</sup>.

The concept of ἔχειν, as that of its English counterpart, is so general as just to signify that there is a relation between two parties<sup>24</sup>, with the subject referring to the superior or governing, the object to the inferior or governed party - superior and inferior only through the emphasis given by the author of an utterance. As the notion of 'having' is at once so general and so fundamental, it is very difficult to circumscribe or define it; fortunately, it is not necessary to do so in this context. It is necessary, though, to draw attention to the difficulties in which any attempted definition of the particular relation of 'having something' which is not a physical or material object would be involved - in the case of such ordinary and every-day examples as 'having a skill'. The particular nature of that 'having' seems to depend to a large extent on the nature of the respective object. The difficulty of defining the verb, though, does not result in a difficulty in understanding a well-formed sentence containing it, as long as the points of reference of the grammatical subject and object are known.

### III.

These preliminary observations about ἔχειν were necessary as a basis of a discussion of μετέχειν. Before turning to Plato, some passages from authors earlier than and contemporary with Plato will be considered, selected to illustrate the range of usage and connotations, and therefore arranged thematically rather than chronologically.

The prologue of Euripides' *Heraclidae* is spoken by Heracles' long-standing friend and companion, Iolaos. After a gnomic opening, he introduces himself as an actual example of his general statement (6): ἐγὼ γὰρ αἰδοῖ καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς σέβων, | ἐξὸν

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<sup>24</sup> Cf. A. Meillet, *Le développement du verbe "avoir"*, in: *ANTIΔΩΡΟΝ. Festschrift Jacob Wackernagel*, Göttingen 1924, pp. 9-13. C.D. Buck, *A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in the Principal Indo-European Languages*, Chicago/London 1988 = Chicago 1949, pp. 739-749; particularly relevant for the semantic connections and developments of ἔχειν and related words are ch. 11, sections 11 'HAVE', 12 'OWN, POSSESS', 15 'HOLD', 17 'KEEP, RETAIN'.

κατ' Ἄργος ἡσύχως ναίειν, πόνων | πλείστων μετέσχον εἷς ἀνὴρ  
 Ἡρακλέει, | ὅτ' ἦν μεθ' ἡμῶν· ... . *One man, I had of many toils indeed with  
 Hercules. Or: I shared in very many toils for Heracles or for the sake of Hercules.*  
 Iolaos 'had of' many toils which are not specified. 'Toils' as such are not material  
 objects, even if they involve physical labour; the emphasis of Πόνος is on the process of  
 'working, exerting oneself'. The subject refers to a single person; the one with or for  
 whom he worked is given in a *dativus sociativus*, not a *dativus commodi*. This sentence  
 of Euripides reflects the original situation. A parallel example is provided by Pindar.  
 After an enumeration of the vain deceitfulness of a dishonest person, Pindar contrasts  
 himself with that man and his practices (*Pythian* II, 83): οὗ οἱ μετέχω θράσεος· ... .  
 Here it is seen more clearly than with the previous example that the dative is a  
 sociative.<sup>25</sup>

A variant to the dative - in terms of the history of the language later in origin - is μετὰ  
 with the genitive. An example is found in a Theognidean epigram. 'Poverty, why don't  
 you visit our neighbour?' (353): ... , μηδὲ μεθ' ἡμέων | αἰεὶ δυστήνου τοῦδε  
 βίου μέτεχε. Another example is found at *Euthydemus* 279e6. Socrates asks Clinias:  
 τί δέ; στρατευόμενος μετὰ ποτέρου ἂν ἥδιον τοῦ κινδύνου τε καὶ  
 τῆς τύχης μετέχοις, μετὰ σοφοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἢ μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς; - μετὰ  
 σοφοῦ. - τί δέ; ἀσθενῶν μετὰ ποτέρου ἂν ἡδέως κινδυνεύοις, μετὰ  
 σοφοῦ ἰατροῦ ἢ μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς; - μετὰ σοφοῦ. In this latter example, the  
 periphrastic construction is prompted by the participle στρατευόμενος on which  
 μετὰ ποτέρου could depend as well; it is, at any rate, less ambiguous than the bare  
 dative.

In most cases, however, the point of reference of the sociative dative or the genitive  
 with μετὰ, respectively, would be known from the context; that is why the complement

<sup>25</sup> Cf. also Xenophon, *Historia Graeca* II, 4, 20 (μετέχειν ἱερῶν καὶ θυσιῶν τισι).

can frequently be omitted altogether, as at Herodotus III, 80: εἶδετε μὲν γὰρ τὴν Καμβύσεω ὕβριν ἐπ' ὅσον ἐπεξήλθε, μετεσχίκατε δὲ καὶ τῆς τοῦ μάγου ὕβριος. Here it is understood from the possessive genitive that it was the Magus who 'had' the hubris the others experienced together with them. Or Herodotus I, 127: ὡς δὲ οἱ Μῆδοι στρατευσάμενοι τοῖσι Πέρσησι συνέμισγον, οἱ μὲν τινες αὐτῶν ἐμάχοντο, ὅσοι μὴ τοῦ λόγου μετέσχον, οἱ δὲ αὐτομόλεον πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας, οἱ δὲ πλείστοι ἐθελοκάκεόν τε καὶ ἔφευγον. Even without a wider context, it is obvious that those who are in the secret are contrasted with those who are not, or in other words, that those who do not have the secret do not 'have it together with those who do'.

This may be compared with the beginning of the *Euthydemus*. Crito asks Socrates with whom Socrates had a conversation the previous day; Socrates replies (271b6): Εὐθύδημος οὗτός ἐστιν, ὦ Κρίτων, ὃν ἐρωτᾷς, ὃ δὲ παρ' ἐμὲ καθήμενος ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς ἀδελφὸς τούτου, Διονυσόδωρος· μετέχει δὲ καὶ οὗτος τῶν λόγων. The only difference between this last sentence and the one of the previous example is that, in the case of Herodotus, λόγος refers to the content of the statement while, in the *Euthydemus*, Socrates refers to the conversation, the process of talking in which both Socrates' neighbours took part while others were silent bystanders.

One final example of this application of μετέχειν may suffice. Sappho 68, quoted by Stobaeus (Florilegium IV, 12): περὶ ἀφροσύνης· Σαπφούς· πρὸς ἀπαίδευτον γυναῖκα· κατάνοισα δὲ κείσεται οὐδέ τι μναμοσύνα σέθεν | ἔσσει' οὐδέποτ' <εἰς> ὕστερον· οὐ γὰρ πεδέχεις βρόδων | τῶν ἐκ Πιερίας, ἀλλ' ἀφάνης κὴν Ἀίδα δόμοις | φοιτάσεις πεδ' ἀμαύρων νεκύων ἐκπεποταμένα. In this case, the σώφρονες who have those 'roses of Pieria' are by way of contrast tacitly implied in the description of the one addressed who does not have them.

That last example is of particular importance in one respect. Although one would naturally assume that Sappho's admonition is a sensible one in a context where there are others who do gain fame, with a negative clause in particular one could imagine a situation in which nobody actually does. If a situation of someone's having something together with someone else is negated for an individual, there are the three possible cases of a number of others' having the object, another single individual's having the object, and no-one else's having the object. This can be extended to positive statements in the following way: If someone has something together with someone else, 'someone else' may refer to more than one person or just one person. The next step is to think of a situation in which many people could have something together with others. For each individual, one would say that once he has acquired something he 'has of' it together with those others who also have acquired it. To say that, however, does not presuppose that anyone else actually has acquired it or 'has of it'. If the qualification 'together with those who have acquired it' is left unexpressed as in the instances quoted, it would seem a natural extension for the application of the verb μετέχειν to be applied to cases of only one person's actually 'having of' something, if the nature and extent of that having is left unspecified, and if potentially there could be others who also have of it.

There is a different common type of situation in which μετέχειν is employed to denote the 'having of' something together with someone else or, in fact, more frequently, together with many others.<sup>26</sup> Herodotus describes the land of the Massagetae whom Cyrus wants to subdue after his conquest of Babylon. Having mentioned some peculiarities of other Caucasian people, he continues (I, 204): τὰ μὲν δὴ πρὸς ἑσπέρην τῆς θαλάσσης ταύτης τῆς Κασπίης καλεομένης ὁ Καύκασος ἀπέργει, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἠῶ τε καὶ ἥλιον ἀνατέλλοντα πεδῖον ἐκδέκεται πλῆθος ἄπειρον ἐς ἄποψιν. τοῦ ὄν δὴ πεδίου <τούτου> τοῦ μεγάλου οὐκ ἐλαχίστην μοῖραν μετέχουσι οἱ

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik* II, p.482.

Μασσαγέται, ἐπ' οὓς ὁ Κῦρος ἔσχε προθυμίην στρατεύσασθαι· ... .  
 Two different explanations of the syntax are conceivable. Either μοῖραν is taken to be the direct object of μετέχειν, in the accusative because it refers to one concrete, defined physical object; in that case the genitive would be ad-nominal. Or we have here an extension of the construction of μετέχειν with genitive. By way of specification, μοῖραν is added in the accusative. They *had of the plain: not the smallest part*. Although this latter way of construing the sentence may initially seem less plausible, it is in fact impossible to know with absolute certainty which of the two is the correct explanation, let alone to say how Herodotus himself would have taken the sentence.

The same difficulty obtains at Aeschylus, *Agamemnon*, 506f. The herald, the first of the Greeks returning to Argos to announce the coming of his master, first greets his land: οὐ γὰρ ποτ' ἠϋχουν τῆδ' ἐν Ἀργείᾳ χθονὶ | θανῶν μεθέξειν φιλτάτου τάφου μέρος. At his death he will *have with <his compatriots> of the dearest burial, his share*. Or will he *have his part of the dearest burial?* The former may be preferable in the light of *Republic* 465e1 where apparently the same sentiment is expressed: καὶ γέρα δέχονται παρὰ τῆς αὐτῶν πόλεως ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες ταφῆς ἀξίας μετέχουσιν.

In the case of physical objects or perceptible events concerning physical objects, it does not matter greatly which way the syntax of these examples is construed. Given the recession of the free-standing ad-verbal genitive, however, and the comparatively large number of instances of it, it seems to me to be much rather the case that the accusative objects μέρος and μοῖραν are reinforcements of the older construction, in cases where it seemed appropriate, than that the many other cases are instances of elliptical construction. This usage could, of course, be extended to cases to which, in their own right, it would perhaps not have suggested itself. An example of that may be Thucydides, I 73<sup>27</sup>: καὶ γὰρ ὅτε ἐδρῶμεν, ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ ἐκινδυνεύετο, ἦς τοῦ μὲν

<sup>27</sup> Modelled on that and therefore not to be counted separately is Isocrates, IV, 99: πῶς δ' οὐκ ἂν δεινὰ πάθοιμεν, εἰ τῶν κακῶν πλείστον μέρος μετασχόντες ἐν ταῖς τιμαῖς

ἔργου μέρος μετέσχετε, τοῦ δὲ λόγου μὴ παντός, εἴ τι ὠφέλει, στερισκώμεθα. If it is correct to take the clause ἧς τοῦ μὲν ἔργου μέρος μετέσχετε as referring to part of the gain of the Athenian efforts which now the Spartans and the other Greeks have together with the Athenians, μέρος does here at least not solely refer to a physical part of a physical object.<sup>28</sup>

One peculiarity, though, is shared by all the examples of μετέχειν μέρος τινός, namely that there is a flaw in the logic of the construction: if someone ‘has of’ something and someone else also ‘has of’ it in the way we have encountered that usage so far, they ‘have of’ it together; alternatively one may say: someone has something together with someone else. If, however, someone has a part of something and someone else also has a part of it, neither of them has his part together with the other party unless they both happen to have the same part. That, though, is clearly not the case in Herodotus’ description of the habitat of the Massagetae. When he says that they have not the smallest part of the plain, and uses μετέχειν to express that relation of possession, it is implied that there are others who live in and possess other parts and not the same part of the same plain. In the same way, I doubt if the herald in the *Agamemnon* thinks of anything but his own burial in his native land, a burial he will have for himself, just as his compatriots, both those who stayed behind and those who have now returned together with him, will have their own burials respectively. Even with the last example, Thucydides I, 73, I believe it is correct to say that whereas the gain is ‘had’ by all Greeks together with each other, each part of it is ‘had’ by each city on her own.

I do, of course, not suggest that Aeschylus, Herodotus and Thucydides did not know how to use their own language. The logical difficulty, however, inherent in the notion of having a part of something together with someone else who has not the same but a

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ἔλαττον ἔχειν ἀξιοθεῖμεν καὶ τότε προταχθέντες ὑπὲρ πάντων νῦν ἑτέροις ἀκολουθεῖν ἀναγκαστείμεν;

<sup>28</sup> Cf., however, how closely material possessions and what could be non-material rights are linked at Herodotus, IV, 145: δεέσθαι δὲ οἰκέειν ἅμα τούτοισι μοῖρά τε τιμῶν μετέχοντες καὶ τῆς γῆς ἀπολαχόντες.

different part of the same thing suggests, I think, that the phrase μετέχειν μέρος τινός is in fact an in some way redundant extension of the original and logically flawless one, μετέχειν τινός. That in itself, as we have seen, is an extension of the simple ἔχειν τινός, originally for the purpose of making explicit that there are others who 'have of' the same thing.

If not chronologically - that could not be established with any certainty - so at least in terms of a hypothetical semantic development, there are three possible contexts with μετέχειν τινός which have to be considered in connection with μετέχειν μέρος τινός. In cases in which that which one 'has of' something is not precisely specified, there can nevertheless be some kind of adverbial complement, as in e.g. Xenophon, *Hiero*, II, 6: τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἐλάχιστα μετέχουσιν<sup>29</sup>. Here ἐλάχιστα is clearly adverbial, indicating some sort of degree - it is not precise, as it would be difficult to measure and quantify the μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ precisely. Semi-adverbial is also the usage in Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, VII, 2, 28: μετέχειν τὸ ἴσον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τινι. Of course, τὸ ἴσον is not an adverb, but in its application it amounts to functioning like something between adverb, numeral and demonstrative: *to have 'the equal' of the good <things> with someone.*<sup>30</sup> In a way, Xenophon's usage comes close to that of Sophocles at *Electra* 1168. At the news of Orestes' death, Electra addresses the urn in which she supposes the ashes of her brother: ... τοίγαρ σὺ δέξαι μ' ἐς τὸ σὸν τόδε στέγος, | τὴν μηδὲν ἐς τὸ μηδέν, ὡς σὺν σοὶ κάτω | ναίω τὸ λοιπόν. καὶ γὰρ ἠνίκ' ἦσθ' ἄνω, | ξὺν σοὶ μετείχον τῶν ἴσων· καὶ νῦν ποθῶ | τοῦ σοῦ θανούσα μὴ ἀπολείπεσθαι τάφου.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Pace Kühner-Gerth, p. 344, who class this example as a case of μετέχειν with the accusative.

<sup>30</sup> A translation '*to have an equal / the same amount of good things as someone else*', I suppose, prompted LSJ to say - unjustifiedly - μετέχειν τὸ ἴσον (sc. μέρος) τῶν ἀγαθῶν τινι.

<sup>31</sup> Incidentally, this latter example shows that contrary to common belief ἴσος is not restricted to meaning 'equal' in a mathematical sense; rather like German 'gleich' which can translate ἴσος where English has 'equal', 'same' or 'identical' respectively.

It is not a long way from μετέχειν τὸ ἴσον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τινι to Lysias XXXI, 5 where he speaks of the true citizens: τούτοις μὲν γὰρ μεγάλα τὰ διαφέροντά ἐστιν εὖ τε πράττειν τὴν πόλιν τήνδε καὶ ἀνεπιτηδείως διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι μετέχειν τὸ μέρος τῶν δεινῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετέχουσι. Here τὸ μέρος, *on their part*, can be seen as an addition to an already complete sentence in the same way τὸ ἴσον, *to the same extent*, is one in the previous example.

There are, finally, cases of μετέχειν with a direct accusative object. This usage is confined to few, clearly specifiable situations. With all instances, the object is a precisely, often quantitatively defined entity. An example is Aristophanes, *Plutus*, 1144: οὐ γὰρ μετείχες τὰς ἴσας πληγὰς ἐμοί. The adjective ἴσος defines the object as something which is known or has occurred already, in this case ‘*the same number of strokes*’. In the same way, adjectival αὐτός is employed by Demosthenes (Lexic. ad Philemon. gramm. p. 253 Osann.): μετέχοντες τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις. As with the simple ἔχειν, it is a concrete, specified instantiation of something which - as direct object - is in the accusative. Additionally, one should note that with the last two examples also those together with whom one has something are explicitly given in the sentence.

There is a limit to all grammatical analysis, and all classification is to some extent arbitrary when the objects under consideration are generated according to habit and custom rather than created according to unchangeable natural laws. A case like Herodotus VII 16, 3 may therefore be left undecided. There are, however, some clear and unambiguous cases which prove that μετέχειν, like ἔχειν, governs the accusative when the object referred to is something concrete, known and defined, or a particular instantiation of something. More often it governs the genitive, for the same reason ἔχειν sometimes governs the genitive, when the object, or the relation between subject

and object expressed by the verb, is in some way undefined or undefinable, lacking specification, qualification or quantification.

This uncertainty or lack of precision is inherently linked with the notion of 'having something together with someone else' as such. Other languages, like Latin, English or German, start from the notion of 'cutting or dividing something up and distributing it thereafter'. So 'participare' is 'to take a part', where 'pars' - like Greek μέρος - is originally that which is granted (and received as such), but in historical times simply means part<sup>32</sup>. English 'share' is derived from a root \*s-ker which denotes a cutting<sup>33</sup>. German 'teilen' is a denominative of 'Teil'<sup>34</sup>, part, and in contemporary German the verb can denote both dividing and sharing.

In all these languages, the word for 'share' can imply the 'having of a part' if the grammatical object denotes something physical and material which can be divided. That is the case regardless of the etymological origin of the respective verbs. Conversely, if the grammatical object denotes something immaterial, the notion of divisibility often does not arise or does not apply at all. Of the examples discussed so far, the following at least do by their content not qualify for an interpretation in terms of parts and wholes.

Even if Pindar, *Pythian* II, 83 - οὐ οἱ μετέχω θράσεος· ... , *I do not share that boldness with him*, and Theognis' address to Poverty (353) - ... , μηδὲ μεθ' ἡμέων | αἰεὶ δυστήνου τοῦδε βίου μέτεχε, *do not with us have always of this wretched life* - are left aside because the clauses are negative so that it is both indeterminable and irrelevant if part or whole of the object is had, or rather not had, at Herodotus III, 80 - εἶδετε μὲν γὰρ τὴν Καμβύσεω ὕβριν ἐπ' ὅσον ἐπεξήλθε, μετεσχήκατε δὲ καὶ τῆς τοῦ μάγου ὕβριος, *you know to what it came with Cambyses' hubris, and of the hubris of the Magi you have had yourself* - no-one would assume that Otanes addresses his audience μετεσχήκατε (with genitive) because of an implication that they had (or had experienced) one part of the tyrants insolence, while

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Walde-Hofmann II, s.v. *pars*. Frisk II, s.v. μέρος.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Walde-Pokorny II, pp. 573ff. Walde-Hofmann I, s.v. *caro*.

<sup>34</sup> 'Teil' is equivalent to 'deal' in its old sense of 'part'. Its ultimate etymology is uncertain.

there was another part they did not have or 'have of'. And while it could be argued - mistakenly, in my view - that Sophocles' *Electra* implies that while Orestes was alive he had one part or portion of the same things and she had another (*Electra* 1168) - καὶ γὰρ ἠνίκ' ἦσθ' ἄνω, | ξὺν σοὶ μετείχον τῶν ἴσων· καὶ νῦν ποθῶ | τοῦ σοῦ θανούσα μὴ ἀπολείπεσθαι τάφου - it is inconceivable to advance an argument of that sort for Herodotus I, 127 - ... , οἱ μὲν τινες αὐτῶν ἐμάχοντο, ὅσοι μὴ τοῦ λόγου μετέσχον, ... , οἱ δὲ πλείστοι ἐθελοκάκεόν τε καὶ ἔφευγον; those who were 'in the secret' had not heard part of the words or part of the speech or story, they knew the full story.

#### IV.

Turning to Plato's dialogues, a suitable passage to begin with may be the myth of Protagoras, together with its exegesis (*Protagoras* 320c-328d), as there we find a large number of instances of both ἔχειν and μετέχειν, concentrated in one continuous, closely argued context. I will discuss instances both of the pre-fixed and of the simple verb in order to demonstrate in detail the validity for Plato's dialogues of claims made concerning pre-Platonic usage. Some repetition is inevitable. The dialogue *Protagoras* is generally considered early, being composed before or shortly after the *Gorgias*, at a time when Plato, whatever his thoughts might have been, did not let Socrates hypothesize about certain entities of independent status. Before we turn to the discussion of the myth, let me give a brief summary of the part of the dialogue preceding the myth.

In the discussion between Hippocrates and Socrates on their way to the sophist Protagoras who is on a visit in Athens, Socrates points to the dangers of laying oneself open to a learning of something about which one does not know what it is or what it is going to be from someone, a sophist, of whom one does not even know what he is when he is a sophist (311e ff.). When they arrive and Socrates states their case, Protagoras

presents himself eloquently (316c-317d), stating explicitly that he is a sophist, and has been one for many years (ὁμολογῶ τε σοφίστης εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους 317b. πολλά γε ἔτη ἤδη εἰμι ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ 317c<sup>35</sup>). Everything is arranged for a public display as Protagoras has declared his willingness to show how it is good for Hippocrates to be together with him (316c). Socrates' more specific question is what would come of Hippocrates' being together with Protagoras (ὅτι οὖν αὐτῷ ἀποβήσεται ἐάν σοι συνῆ 318a). Soon he gets the answer τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοί, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν (318ef.). To which Socrates' immediate reply is: ἄρα ... ἔπομαί σου τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑποσχνεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας (319a). Protagoras agrees to this terminologically specific fixation of his object of teaching as a specific τέχνῃ, and Socrates proceeds to explain that and why he does not think that one can teach what Protagoras claims to be able to teach. He describes what Protagoras promises to convey as a τέχνημα to be possessed by acquisition (κέκτησθαι 319a). His reasoning is by analogy: First, about everything that has to do with a specific profession, art or craft (περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἴονται ἐν τέχνῃ εἶναι 319c<sup>36</sup>), only specialists are consulted, while in political matters all are on a par (ἐπειδὴν δέ τι περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως δέη βουλευσασθαι, συμβουλεύει αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενος περὶ τούτων (πᾶς) ὁμοίως 319c,d) without there being teachers<sup>37</sup>. Secondly, also in private, the wisest and best are not able to convey and transfer that ἀρετή which they have (ἀλλὰ ἴδια ἡμῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι καὶ ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν ἔχουσι οὐχ οἰοί τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι 319e).

<sup>35</sup> Note the usage: εἶναι ἐν τέχνῃ τινί. That it is the σοφιστικὴ τέχνῃ will be stated in 317d.

<sup>36</sup> This is picking up the phrase used by Protagoras in 317b.

<sup>37</sup> For the connection between teachability, teachers, professions and ἀρετή/ἀρεταί cf. *Meno*, *passim*; esp. 89d ff.

Socrates' speech allowed him in this way to shift from the *τέχνημα* which one possesses when one is 'in a profession' (*ἐγὼ γὰρ τοῦτο, ὦ Προταγόρα, οὐκ ᾧμην διδακτὸν εἶναι* 319a,b) to the term *ἀρετή* (*εἰ οὖν ἔχεις ἐναργέστερον ἡμῖν ἐπιδείξαι ὡς διδακτὸν ἐστὶν ἢ ἀρετή, ...* 320b,c). These seem to be the premises of both content and language for the telling of the myth by Protagoras. Protagoras spoke of his own accord of his *σοφιστικὴ τέχνη*, Socrates introduced the term *πολιτικὴ τέχνη*. Protagoras has distinguished between his own activity and that which he conveys to those who do not want to become sophists themselves (cf. *Ἀντίμοιρος ὁ Μενδαῖος, ὅσπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ μάλιστα τῶν Προταγόρου μαθητῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τέχνη μαθάνει, ὡς σοφίστης ἐσόμενος* 315a; cf. also 318e f. supra). Socrates identifies this *μάθημα* Protagoras claims to teach, the *εὐβουλία*, not Protagoras' own *τέχνη*, with *πολιτικὴ τέχνη*. By his phrasing *καὶ ὑποσχνεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας* (319a) and *ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν* (319e), he can move from *τέχνη* to *ἀρετή*, the noun connected with *ἀγαθός* and cognate to *ἄριστος*. This shift is done in a way which at least does not provoke any explicit reaction in the dialogue, so that it might be safe to say that for those present and actively taking part in the discussion this usage sounds natural. The implications of a potential distinction are at least at this stage of interpretation not relevant. It must be born in mind, however, that Socrates had previously in discussion with Hippocrates reached the conclusion (212a,b) that the education, *μάθησις*, one could expect to receive from Protagoras would be *ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ*, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει. That, of course, was contrasted with those teaching and thereby conveying their own profession; nevertheless, *παιδεία* as a broad concept of the training of body and mind does not suggest any particular *τέχνη*, not even the *πολιτικὴ τέχνη*, so that the statement about Protagoras' teaching of that art in 219, even if agreed upon by all present, must be held against Socrates' initial position in 212.

The scene being set, Protagoras' myth can now be examined. It is to be noted that Protagoras had given his audience a choice before his decision to tell a μῦθος rather than a λόγος (320c). In every respect, this alternative choice seems to have affected the manner of presentation, not the content: the causation and the agents in Protagoras' tale do not belong to a rational account of how things have come about; Protagoras' interspersed comments and language, however, could - apart from an occasional poetical word - equally well belong to an exposition like the λόγος with which he concludes his speech. At least from 322a3 onwards, it would be difficult to say which words if any have been chosen because the audience is still hearing a μῦθος. Even δίκη and αἰδῶς are not mere mythical or poetical words. Of course, in Hesiodic fashion they suit the context as goddesses sent and conducted by gods (cf. Op. 197ff.; 248-272); but whether Hesiod is regarded as writer of myth or philosophy, the two words belong to the regular vocabulary of Presocratic philosophy<sup>38</sup> and are not confined to the sphere of poetry. On the other hand, δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη are used by Protagoras (323a) before he switches to the mode of λόγος, and in his reply to Protagoras, Socrates can say ἔλεγες γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Ζεὺς τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ πέμψει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ αὖ πολλαχοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὑπο σοῦ ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἓν τι εἶη συλλήβδην, ἀρετὴ (329c), thus having the two, αἰδῶς and σωφροσύνη, side by side as synonymous. Similarly, the distribution of σοφία, ἀρετὴ and τέχνη is determined by factors of content, not style of the exposition.

To turn to the myth itself: Epimetheus equips all the animals with attributes and abilities necessary for survival, but through his lack of prudence leaves men unequipped. To make up for that omission, Prometheus steals a certain wisdom, skill, or knowledge of Hephaestus and Athena that concerns arts, crafts or skills, together with fire (κλέπτει Ἡφαίστου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρὶ 321d) and gives

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Diels-Kranz III, Wortregister, s.vv. αἰδῶς, δίκη. It is a different question if αἰδῶς and δίκη are otherwise mere equivalents of δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη.

it to man. So man had the wisdom, skill, or knowledge about life, but the *political* or social or communal σοφία or τέχνη he had not (τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν ἄνθρωπος ταύτη ἔσχεν, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχεν 321d). Perhaps in imitation of features of certain archaic myths, the decisive deed is told for a second time only a few lines later, this time, however phrased differently: (Prometheus,) *stealing the art, craft, or skill that concerns fire which was Hephaestus', and the other one which was Athena's, gave them to man* (καὶ κλέψας τὴν τε ἔμπυρον τέχνην τὴν τοῦ Ἡφαίστου καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς δίδωσιν ἀνθρώπῳ 321e).

At this point, Plato lets Protagoras summarize: ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μέτεσχε μοίρας (322a), man shared the divine lot, portion, share or condition.<sup>39</sup> Why does Protagoras say θείας μέτεσχε μοίρας rather than θείαν ἔσχε μοίραν? Up to now, when someone was in possession of a τέχνη or σοφία (319e, 321d), ἔχειν with accusative seemed to be the appropriate way of describing the situation. What difference is there, in the *Protagoras*, between ἔχειν with accusative and μετέχειν with genitive? - It will again be helpful to see what sort or sorts of objects the verb ἔχειν can govern, both in the *Protagoras* and in other early dialogues.

<sup>39</sup> For present purposes it is not important to scrutinize the concept of μοῖρα; it is clear from the context that it has here to do with the σοφία mentioned twice in the preceding paragraph; this σοφία seems to be equivalent to or at least to imply the twin τέχνα. Cf. e.g. W. Wayte, *Platonis Protagoras*, Cambridge<sup>4</sup>1883, p. 106. For the sentiment cf. perhaps Pindar, *Nemean VI*, 1-8

Α' ἐν ἀνδρῶν, ἐν θεῶν γένος· ἐκ μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν  
ματρὸς ἀμφοτέρου· διείργει δὲ πᾶσα κεκριμένα  
δύναμις, ὡς τὸ μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ χάλκεος ἀσφαλὲς αἰὲν ἔδος  
μένει οὐρανός. ἀλλὰ τι προσφέρομεν ἔμπαν ἢ μέγαν  
5 νόον ἦτοι φύσιν ἀθανάτοις,  
καίπερ ἐφαμερίαν οὐκ εἰδότες οὐδὲ μετὰ νύκτας  
ἄμμε πότμος  
ἄντιν' ἔγραψε δραμεῖν ποτὶ στάθμαν.

(*Protagoras* 320c,d θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν, θνητὰ δὲ γένη οὐκ ἦν.

321c λοιπὸν ... ἦν τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος.

321c ἔδει καὶ ἀνθρώπον ἐξιέναι ἐκ γῆς εἰς φῶς.)

The divine lot consists of a share in σοφία or νοῦς.

On the first page of the dialogue, Socrates reports that Homer says (309b1) *χαριστάτην ἦβην εἶναι τοῦ <πρώτου> ὑπηνήτου*, and he adds: *ἦν νῦν Ἄλκιβιάδης ἔχει*. It is important in this context that the direct object does not consist of a noun on its own but of a noun with some qualification. The qualification in the Greek example becomes more obvious if we separate the two clauses: *ἡ τοῦ <πρώτου> ὑπηνήτου ἦβη χαριστάτη ἐστίν. ταύτην τὴν ἦβην Ἄλκιβιάδης νῦν ἔχει*. The relative pronoun in the clause *ἦν νῦν Ἄλκιβιάδης ἔχει* has as its antecedent something more complicated than the simple unqualified noun *ἦβη*. Nevertheless, *ἦβη* is one of the potential direct objects of the verb *ἔχειν*.

Ten pages further on in the dialogue, Socrates tries to explain to Protagoras why he does not think that *ἀρετή* is *διδασκτόν*, *teachable* or *taught*. One of his reasons is that (319e1) *ἴδια ἡμῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι καὶ ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἦν ἔχουσιν οὐχ οἰοί τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι*. *ἀρετή* thus seems to be another possible word to go with *ἔχειν* in the required construction. Again, however, it is not simply *ἀρετὴν* but *ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν* which is the antecedent to the relative pronoun.

The very next sentence is an example of a different but equally possible construction (319e): *ἐπεὶ Περικλῆς, ὁ τουτωνὶ τῶν νεανίσκων πατήρ, τούτους ἃ μὲν διδασκάλων εἶχετο καλῶς καὶ εὖ ἐπαίδευσεν, ἃ δὲ αὐτὸς σοφός ἐστιν οὔτε αὐτὸς παιδεύει οὔτε τῷ ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν, ...*. The relative pronoun *ἃ* is probably short for *ταῦτα ἃ* where the demonstrative is in the accusative as the thing taught. As the demonstrative has no antecedent but is qualified by the relative clause only, the disciplines for which there were the teachers mentioned in the relative clause are not specified. That is to say, the teachers themselves cannot be named or described with any further precision. They cannot be specified with regard to either

number or subject, quantity or quality. That may explain why when they become a direct object of an active transitive verb they are in the genitive, not in the accusative. *Pericles educated his sons in those <disciplines> which had 'of' teachers.* This seems to me to be a more plausible explanation than that offered by some who postulate an additional, separate meaning of the verb ἔχειν in the face of constructions like the present one; they translate: “in all that depended upon teachers” and adduce *Protagoras* 324d and *Meno* 93d and 94ab for “both the idiom and the fact”<sup>40</sup>. In contrast, I maintain that the genitive is employed solely because of the different nature of the object as it is viewed in the sentence, its indefiniteness. Sense and meaning of the verb are not affected. For the purpose of deciding what sort of object the verb ἔχειν can have, teachers ‘had by a discipline’ fall under a different category from what has gone before as the grammatical subject here is inanimate.

The next instance of the verb is encountered at the beginning of Protagoras’ myth. The case is slightly different from the previous instances of ἔχειν with the accusative. Protagoras describes how Epimetheus distributes different *powers* or *abilities* to different animals. He then gives the reasoning behind that distribution (321a2): ταῦτα δὲ ἐμηχανᾶτο εὐλαβείαν ἔχων μή τι γένος ἀϊστωθείη. Here the final clause μή τι γένος ἀϊστωθείη is dependent, I think, not on the predicate ἐμηχανᾶτο but on the participial phrase εὐλαβείαν ἔχων, or more restrictedly on the verbal noun εὐλαβείαν. Thus it modifies that noun. Epimetheus *had* or *took* the particular *care that no class <of animals> would be extinguished*; i.e. it is again not εὐλαβεία by itself, but ‘a particular εὐλαβεία’.

A little further down on that same page, Prometheus comes by and sees (321c4): τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ζῶα ἐμμελῶς πάντων ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον γυμνόν ... . Some translators and commentators<sup>41</sup> state that the phrase ἐμμελῶς πάντων

<sup>40</sup> Wayte, op. cit., ad loc.; J. Adam, A.M. Adam, *Platonis Protagoras*, Cambridge 1893, ad loc.

<sup>41</sup> E.g. Wayte, Adam, opp. citt., ad loc.

ἔχοντα is to be construed as parallel to e.g. ἱκανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα in *Theaetetus* 194d2; the two phrases, it is maintained, are to be rendered as “suitably provided with (literally *situated in respect of*) all things”<sup>42</sup> and “being adequate in respect of their depth”<sup>43</sup>. Taken that way, the genitive πάντων would ultimately depend on the adverb ἐμμελῶς in the same way that τοῦ βάθους is supposed to depend on ἱκανῶς. I doubt that that be so. ἱκανός governs an infinitive or an accusative or a dative or one of a number of prepositional phrases, but not the genitive. The phrase ἱκανῶς ἔχειν, *to be sufficient*, can be used absolutely, as at *Sophist* 245e7 ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω, or with a complement as at *Republic* 430c6 πρὸς οὖν τὴν ἐκείνου ζήτησιν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἱκανῶς ἔχει, *Republic* 402a7 ... γραμμάτων περὶ τότε ἱκανῶς εἶχομεν ... , or *Gorgias* 493c5 ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλήστως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος βίου τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐξαρκούντως ἔχοντα βίον ἐλέσθαι. If there is a complement, it is in a form found with the adjective otherwise as well. That the case with *Theaetetus* 194d2 is a different one may be seen if we adduce *Philebus* 62a6 ἄρ’ οὖν οὗτος ἱκανῶς ἐπιστήμης ἔξει, κύκλου μὲν καὶ σφαίρας αὐτῆς τῆς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων, ... ;

Here ἐπιστήμης ἔξει seems to be parallel to τὸν λόγον ἔχων. The *rational explanation* or *account* is the specific *account of <the> circle <itself> and the sphere itself, the divine one*. As something definite, it is in the accusative if and when it is the direct object of an active transitive verb. The genitive ἐπιστήμης, I suspect, is likewise dependent on the verb and not on the adverb. The difference in grammatical case is to be explained by the different nature of the object. Socrates’ question is: *Does he have enough (of) knowledge*<sup>44</sup> *who has an account of <the> circle <itself> and the sphere*

<sup>42</sup> Wayte, loc. cit.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. L. Campbell, *The Sophist and Politicus of Plato*, Oxford 1867, commentary on *Sophist* 245e7.

<sup>44</sup> Here and elsewhere one must not be misled by the English way to construe *enough* with the preposition *of* which points to an old Germanic genitive.

*itself, the divine one, ...?* Here *knowledge* is not any particular piece of knowledge in the way the *account* in the participial phrase is a particular account.

An example of a particular ἐπιστήμη someone ‘has’ is *Charmides* 169de. After an aporetic attempt to solve the question if there is something like ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης, Socrates, “in order that the argument may proceed”, proposes - in an act of hypothesis - to assume that there is such a thing, and asks Critias if on that assumption one would be able to know what one does and what one does not know. To that, Critias replies (*Charmides* 169d9): πάνυ γε ... καὶ συμβαίνει γέ που, ὦ Σωκράτη. εἰ γάρ τις ἔχει ἐπιστήμην ἢ αὐτὴ αὐτὴν γινώσκει, τοιοῦτος ἂν αὐτὸς εἶη οἷόνπερ ἐστὶν ὃ ἔχει. The object ἐπιστήμην is qualified by the relative clause ἢ αὐτὴ αὐτὴν γινώσκει. It is this specific knowledge which knows itself itself which enables the one who has it to be himself such as to know himself<sup>45</sup>. The case is similar to *Charmides* 170b6: οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὴ προσεπίσθηται τις τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ’ ἐπιστήμην μόνον γινώσκη ἅτε τούτου μόνον ἔχων ἐπιστήμην, ὅτι μὲν τι ἐπίσταται καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχει, εἰκότως ἂν γινώσκοι καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἢ γάρ; Here ἐπιστήμην as object of ἔχειν is in the first case qualified by the demonstrative in the genitive, in the second by the indefinite pronoun.

In clear contrast with these cases, Socrates refers to knowledge in general, knowledge without any specification as to its quality or form, at *Philebus* 62a6: ἄρ’ οὖν οὕτως ἱκανῶς ἐπιστήμης ἔξει, *will he sufficiently have of knowledge*, is his question. Likewise the *signs* at *Theaetetus* 194d1 *have of depth sufficiently*, i.e. they are deep

<sup>45</sup> The clauses following can only partly be analysed in the same way: perhaps one could say that in ὥσπερ ὅταν τάχος τις ἔχη, ταχύς, the noun τάχος denotes not any speed but high speed; the rest of the sentence, however, καὶ ὅταν κάλλος, καλός, καὶ ὅταν γνῶσιν, γινώσκων, ὅταν δὲ δὴ γνῶσιν αὐτὴν αὐτῆς τις ἔχη, γινώσκων που αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τότε ἔσται, is deliberately construed in syntactical parallelism to make a particular point. Therefore it cannot be taken to prove anything for the grammar of the common language.

enough. One could perhaps say, in cases where the grammatical object refers to something in the abstract it is in the genitive, where it denotes a concrete object it is in the accusative. Or perhaps: if and when the point of reference of the grammatical object is a particular instantiation of something, be it a certain age, virtue, skill, or anything else, it is in the accusative; if and when something is referred to in general, either without qualification at all or without the notion of a particular instantiation, it can be in the genitive<sup>46</sup>.

In the passage in question, *Protagoras* 321c4, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ζῶα ἑμμελῶς πάντων ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον γυμνόν ... , the substantival collective pronoun is both abstract and indefinite; thus as an object it would be expected to be in the genitive, πάντων, not in the accusative, πάντα; *the animals 'had of everything' in a harmonious way, but man was naked*. On the level of content, physical attributes, abilities, and features of behaviour are to be added to the list of things 'which can be had'.

A few lines later, *Protagoras* says (321d4): τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν ἄνθρωπος ταύτη ἔσχευ, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχευ. Again, σοφία as direct object of ἔχειν is qualified as περὶ τὸν βίον in the first clause, and as πολιτικὴ in the second<sup>47</sup>.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. also e.g. *Philebus* 16c2; *Aeschylus, Eumenides*, 574f., on which see below. A slightly different interpretation of the presence of the genitive may be required in the case of *Lysis* 217b4: τὸ μήτε κακὸν ἄρα μήτ' ἀγαθὸν φίλον γίγνεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διὰ κακοῦ παρουσίαν. - ἔοικεν. - δῆλον δὲ γε ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι αὐτὸ κακὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ οὐ ἔχει. Here it is a particular κακόν which is envisaged, what is uncertain or unspecified is the way in which, and in particular the extent to which it is 'had'; alternatively, or in addition, there may be a simple attraction of case here.

<sup>47</sup> Such a case could be *Protagoras* 321d4, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχευ. It is questionable if a specifying adjective in itself is enough to determine a generic noun in the required sense. At any rate, in this negative clause there is no notion of any particular instantiation. Through the first clause, however, τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν ἄνθρωπος ταύτη ἔσχευ, there is some pressure towards a parallel construction in the second clause which could on its own have been strong enough to prompt the use of the accusative rather than the genitive. - Perhaps, even the accusative τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν at 321d4 has to be explained simply in terms of the recession of the genitive, but I would not want to commit myself too strongly here. Cf. also 322b5 - 7.

Two sentences later, Protagoras summarizes the first part of his myth with the words quoted above, ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μέτεσχε μοίρας (322a). Here the adjective θείος is possessive, θεία μοίρα is μοίρα τῶν θεῶν<sup>48</sup>, the lot of the gods some of whom were mentioned in the myth. In that sense, μοίρα is not defined or modified by the adjective as to its content. Moreover, it is not any particular instantiation, no-one's particular fate which is referred to, as ὁ ἄνθρωπος is no particular man. Both that θεία μοίρα is not marked as to its quality or quantity and that no particular instance is referred to in the sentence, are reasons for the object's being in the genitive. In that way, one can explain the case of the object. It is not determined by the verb alone, and it does certainly not depend on the presence or absence of a prefix of the verb, but is rather a consequence of the nature of the object referred to, its relation to the subject, and the angle from which this relation is viewed.

The difference between ἔχειν and μετέχειν, however, is as yet not accounted for. It is, I believe, a simple and straightforward one. In all the cases quoted above of ἔχειν as predicate with the grammatical subject referring to an animate being, a human being or group of human beings - apart from 321d4 where animals are contrasted with human beings as having something the latter do not have - the point of reference of the subject was looked at in isolation. 'Alcibiades', 'the wisest and best citizens', 'Epimetheus', 'the animals', 'man' at 321d4: they are all seen as individuals or groups in isolation, having something for themselves or having something someone else does not have. At 322a, in contrast, 'man', i.e. all human beings, has something the gods also have, he has something 'together with' someone else. This 'having together with' someone else is expressed in Greek with the prefixed verb μετέχειν. This is confirmed by the subsequent instances of the word in the text.

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<sup>48</sup> Perhaps, however, θεία μοίρα is a standing phrase (cf. various places), and therefore the two words are to be considered as one single term and no longer as two separate words. Then it would be unqualifiedly true to say that at 322a the object is not qualified in any way.

Because, recounts Protagoras, men did not yet have social skills - πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὐπω εἶχον (322b5) - they were neither able to wage war against the animals nor to live together without doing each other wrong. Zeus fears for the extinction of the race and sends Hermes to bring αἰδῶς and δίκη to mankind, *so that there be order and chains of friendship bringing them together* (322c2). Protagoras continues (322c3 - 323d2)<sup>49</sup>:

ἔρωτᾷ οὖν Ἑρμῆς Δία τίνα οὖν τρόπον δοίη δίκην καὶ αἰδῶ ἀνθρώποις· "πότερον ὡς αἱ τέχναι νενέμηνται, οὕτω καὶ ταύτας νείμω; νενέμηνται δὲ ᾧδε· εἷς ἔχων ἰατρικὴν πολλοῖς ἱκανὸς ἰδιώταις, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί· καὶ δίκην δὴ καὶ αἰδῶ <sup>d</sup> οὕτω θῶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντας νείμω;" - "ἐπὶ πάντας," ἔφη ὁ Ζεὺς, "καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο πόλεις, εἰ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχειν ὥσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν· καὶ νόμον γε θεὸς παρ' ἐμοῦ τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως." οὕτω δὴ, ᾧ Σώκρατες, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἱ τε ἄλλοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅταν μὲν περὶ ἀρετῆς τεκτονικῆς ἢ λόγος ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς δημιουργικῆς, ὀλίγοις οἴονται μετεῖναι συμβουλῆς, καὶ ἐάν <sup>e</sup> τις ἐκτὸς ᾧν τῶν ὀλίγων συμβουλεύῃ, οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φῆς - εἰκότως, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι - ὅταν δὲ εἰς συμβουλὴν πολιτικῆς <sup>323</sup> ἀρετῆς ἴωσιν, ἦν δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἰέναι καὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰκότως ἅπαντος ἀνδρὸς ἀνέχονται, ὡς παντὶ προσήκον ταύτης γε μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις. αὕτη, ᾧ Σώκρατες, τούτου αἰτία.

ἵνα δὲ μὴ οἴη ἀπατᾶσθαι ὡς τῷ ὄντι ἡγοῦνται πάντες ἄνθρωποι πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτικῆς

<sup>49</sup> I quote this passage at length as it contains an agglomeration of relevant material.

ἀρετῆς, τόδε αὖ λαβὲ τεκμήριον. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἐάν τις φῆ ἀγαθὸς ἀύλητῆς εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλην ἠντινοῦν τέχνην ἢν μὴ ἐστίν, ἢ καταγελωσίν <sup>b</sup> ἢ χαλεπαίνουσιν, καὶ οἱ οἰκεῖοι προσιόντες νουθετοῦσιν ὡς μαινόμενον· ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτικῇ ἀρετῇ, ἐάν τινα καὶ εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ἄδικός ἐστιν, ἐάν οὗτος αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτοῦ τάληθῆ λέγῃ ἐναντίον πολλῶν, ὃ ἐκεῖ σωφροσύνην ἠγοῦντο εἶναι, τάληθῆ λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μανίαν, καὶ φασιν πάντας δεῖν φάναι εἶναι δικαίους, ἐάντε ὧσιν ἐάντε μὴ, ἢ μαίνεσθαι τὸν μὴ προσποιούμενον δικαιοσύνην<sup>50</sup>. ὡς ἀναγκαῖον <sup>c</sup> οὐδένα ὄντιν' οὐχὶ ἀμῶς γέ πως μετέχειν αὐτῆς, ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντ' ἄνδρα εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς σύμβουλον διὰ τὸ ἠγεῖσθαι παντὶ μετεῖναι αὐτῆς, ταῦτα λέγω· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φύσει ἠγοῦνται εἶναι οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ἀλλὰ διδακτόν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας παραγίγνεσθαι ᾧ ἂν παραγίγνηται, τοῦτό σοι μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι. ὅσα γὰρ ἠγοῦνται ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἄνθρωποι <sup>d</sup> φύσει ἢ τύχῃ, οὐδεὶς θυμοῦται οὐδὲ νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει τοὺς ταῦτα ἔχοντας, ...

Hermes asks first if he should distribute αἰδῶς and δίκη, whose status is left unspecified, the way the τέχναι are distributed. By that it is implied, I think, that - whatever αἰδῶς and δίκη be - they are not τέχναι. Hermes then explains to Zeus that with regard to each of the τέχναι it is sufficient for a large number of people, if some

<sup>50</sup> Cobet's seclusion of δικαιοσύνην would leave αὐτῆς in the next line without antecedent, or would, respectively, require the reader to supply the notion referred to from b2 after having extrapolated it there from ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτικῇ ἀρετῇ.

one person 'has' it<sup>51</sup>. But Zeus insists that αἰδῶς and δίκη be given *to all men, and that everybody should 'have <of them> together with <everybody else>'. For there would not be cities if <only> few <men> 'have of them as with the other skills.*<sup>52</sup>

While in the sentences with ἔχειν as predicate discussed so far the subject stood in relation to someone else, individual or group, here the emphasis is on the single members of the group which is the subject. When Zeus says that all should have of αἰδῶς and δίκη, he means it distributively and not collectively: each member of the class of human beings should be endowed with αἰδῶς and δίκη, so that all men have of them together. Likewise, in the second sentence (322d2), where ὀλίγοι, *few*, are the subject, these 'few' are treated severally. In consequence of what has been said above about the nature of the object, it should be noticed that one of the features of its indefiniteness is that it is not marked as to quantity or quality. It is only much later (327a5, e2; 328a8) that Protagoras introduces even the thought of gradation to make the particular point of its being sensible to hire him as a teacher. Without that interested standpoint of Protagoras', the story in itself would if anything run counter to differentiation of degrees of ἀρετή. That is, of course, not to say that with αἰδῶς-and-δίκη's being the object of μετέχειν, one has to think of αἰδῶς as a whole and δίκη as a whole which are both as wholes being had or possessed by someone; to the contrary, the very notion of part and whole, completeness and defectiveness, of amount or gradability as such, is absent. The genitive just states the object, with a minimum of information as to its relational characteristics and the perspective under which it is viewed.

In passing, a comparison with ὀλίγοις οἴονται μετεῖναι συμβουλῆς, *they believe that 'to few there is' (i.e. 'few have') of counselling* (322d7), shows on the one hand that the prefix μετα- here as well denotes 'together with others' - one of the few is a co-adviser together with the rest of the few. That becomes plausible from a comparison

<sup>51</sup> In accordance with what has been said above, as Hermes has a particular instantiation in mind, an individual having some one art or craft or skill, ἔχειν governs the accusative.

<sup>52</sup> On the use of 'other' in contexts such as this one, cf. Collinge, *Thoughts on the Pragmatics of Ancient Greek*, in: PCPhS 1989, 1 - 13.

with e.g. Herodotus I, 171: ἀποδεικνῦσι δὲ ἐν Μυλάσοισι Διὸς Καρίου ἱρὸν ἀρχαῖον, τοῦ Μυσοῖσι μὲν καὶ Λυδοῖσι μέτεστι ὡς κασιγνήτοισι ἐοῦσι τοῖσι Καρσί· τὸν γὰρ Λυδὸν καὶ τὸν Μυσὸν λέγουσι εἶναι Καρὸς ἀδελφούς. τούτοισι μὲν δὴ μέτεστι, ὅσοι δὲ ἐόντες ἄλλου ἔθνεος ὁμόγλωσσοι τοῖσι Καρσί ἐγένοντο, τούτοισι δὲ οὐ μέτα. Here it is the Mysians and the Lydians who have the sanctuary ‘together with’ the Karians. The dative Μυσοῖσι μὲν καὶ Λυδοῖσι is determined purely by ἐστίν and has nothing to do with the prefix<sup>53</sup>. Just as εἶναι with dative is virtually synonymous with ἔχειν, μετεῖναι with dative is virtually synonymous with μετέχειν. The person or people or things ‘with whom’ one has something need not be stated in the sentence, or rather, in most cases they are not. That is important for other applications of the verbs. On the other hand, the case of μετεῖναι shows that the genitive which connotes indefiniteness or non-specificity can function as subject and object alike and be in the place of nominative or accusative respectively.

The myth is finished now and Protagoras has started with its application. Starting with the contrasting example of deliberation in matters of arts and crafts as an instance of which he quotes ἀρετὴ τεκτονική, he moves to deliberation of political matters which he does not call συμβουλή τῶν πολιτικῶν but συμβουλή πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, and says that it is beseeming to everyone ταύτης γε μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς. Everybody together with everybody else should have of it. As to the indefiniteness of πολιτικὴ ἀρετή, it is true that it is referred to as ‘this’ one as opposed to the one of the architect; neither, however, has Protagoras any particular instantiation in mind, nor is it specified what it is concretely any one has if and when he ‘has of’ ἀρετῆ. That is made explicit at 323c1 when he Protagoras says that it is considered necessary that there should not be anybody who has not in some way of it,

<sup>53</sup> One could, but should not, be tempted to think that in this case the dative is the sociative found with μετὰ in Homer and early poetry and otherwise with μετέχειν.

δικαιοσύνη: ὡς ἀναγκαῖον οὐδένα ὄντιν' οὐχὶ ἀμῶς γέ πως μετέχειν αὐτῆς. Here ἀμῶς γέ πως is indicative of the indefiniteness.

Finally, at 323c3ff. Protagoras infers that everybody is admitted to public counsels as all think that *to everybody* 'there is of' this ἀρετή, and he continues to prove its teachability by contrasting the behaviour and attitude of men towards those bad qualities or attributes of which they think that one has them by nature. Here he describes a concrete example of men criticising particular faults they perceive among themselves and with each other. These faults are quantified and denoted as countable with the neuter plural relative ὅσα. As they are the individual possession of individual human beings, the expression is κακὰ ἔχειν, the simple verb with the direct object in the accusative.

## V.

As regards ἔχειν and μετέχειν, the same usage as in the *Protagoras* is found in other early dialogues. The *Laches* starts off as a conversation on the right education of the young, held in Athens at some time between the battle at Delium in 424 B.C. (cf. 181b) and that of Mantinea in which Laches fell in 418 B.C. The initial question, if it is useful for youths to learn how to fight in full armour from someone who practises that as an art form, is turned into an enquiry into the nature of ἀνδρεία when Socrates enters the discussion. He does so on commendation by Laches, a renowned general, who praises Socrates for his prowess in battle. At one point, Laches's opinion that justice is some sort of perseverance is questioned by Socrates. When conclusions drawn from the original statement and additional premises held by Laches start to contradict each other, Socrates urges Laches to be careful (*Laches* 193.e.3): ἔργῳ μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, φαίη ἄν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνδρείας μετέχειν, λόγῳ δ', ὡς ἐγῶμαι, οὐκ ἄν, εἰ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀκούσειε διαλεγομένων. *For, as it seems, someone overhearing our conversation now may say that in our deeds we share in bravery, but not, as I believe, in*

*our words*. The point of that remark clearly is that while both Laches and Socrates are brave in battle, in contrast with others (cf. 181b), they are not able to sustain an argument in conversation. In conversation they have no share in bravery at all, it seems. With regard to their deeds, however, Socrates does simply state that they have displayed courage, not that they are in partial but not full possession of it. In fact, any suggestion that they be not really or fully courageous would almost defeat the purpose of the argument at this point. It seems to be unlikely that the author or his character had the notion of ‘part’ in mind when employing the ‘partitive genitive’ ἀνδρείας here<sup>54</sup>.

Towards the end of the dialogue Nicias proposes his view of justice as some sort of ἐπιστήμη or understanding. Laches who is in almost hostile, at least mocking opposition after having been refuted by Socrates, tries to ridicule Nicias for his semantic distinction of ‘daring’ and ‘courageous’ and believes that he will find Socrates’ approval when he brands it as vain sophistry, not worthy of one entrusted with a leading rôle in the city. To that Socrates replies (*Laches* 197e2): πρέπει μὲν που, ὦ μακάριε, τῶν μεγίστων προστατοῦντι μεγίστης φρονήσεως μετέχειν: δοκεῖ δέ μοι Νικίας ἄξιος εἶναι ἐπισκέψεως, ὅποι ποτὲ βλέπων τοῦνομα τοῦτο τίθησι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. It is not necessary for the present purpose to determine if φρόνησις here denotes practical wisdom as would be required for governing, ruling or administering a city, or theoretical knowledge like linguistics, or if Socrates does not differentiate at all between the two, consciously or otherwise. He advances a general prescription, πρέπει, *it is fitting or beseeming*. Fitting or beseeming is sometimes different from what is actually achieved. It is what is aimed at. This is the

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<sup>54</sup> One could construct an argument to the effect that Socrates posits as an entity Courage, and of that Courage he and Laches have the part concerned with deeds, but do not have the part concerned with words. Anything like that, however, does not seem to me to be implied in Socrates’ position anywhere in the dialogue.

Also to be left aside is *Laches* 199c where Socrates speaks indeed of ‘parts of courage’; that, however, is in an artificial argument contrived to refute Nicias, and I would contend that what Socrates says there is meant to show that courage - if defined by way of reference to a human beings’ reaction to the external world and its afflictions - does not deal with unchanging objects and is as such different from the sciences which do, as, for example, medicine which deals with human nature. In what sense courage could nevertheless be called an ἐπιστήμη is not discussed in the dialogue.

premise for an argument from content: one should aim at having - together with others who are also capable of having - of the greatest wisdom. One does not aim at having part of wisdom, even if that is all that is achieved in the end. If Prodicus, Damon and Nicias all have insight into the distinction between θρασύς and ἀνδρείος, one can say μετέχουσι ταύτης τῆς φρονήσεως, and the meaning of that is that they have all understood that distinction, not that each one of them has understood part of it, let alone each one a different part.

It is to be noted that in the passage under discussion, there is no differentiation as to degrees of courage. From 196d1, the moment when Socrates starts interrogating Nicias, onwards, he treats that ἐπιστήμη which is ἀνδρεία as something which is either present or absent. Not everybody has it (196d4); a physician or prophet - who each have their own specific ἐπιστήμη - will not be brave ἐὰν μὴ αὐτήν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην προσλάβῃ; all animals - which were called ἄλογα as we have seen (*Protagoras* 321c1) - do not have it. Laches and Lamachus, however, are brave and in that respect wise. The question if they are brave in one respect but not in another, or brave but not fully so, is not raised.

The same is true of *Charmides* 158c4: αὐτὸς οὖν μοι εἶπέ ποτερον ὁμολογεῖς τῷδε καὶ φῆς ἰκανῶς ἤδη σωφροσύνης μετέχειν ἢ ἐνδεῆς εἶναι; ... - *have you or have you not this quality of temperance?* This translation of Jowett's is not literal but correct as regards the exclusiveness of choice. Degrees of σωφροσύνη are at no stage the topic of the dialogue. Instructive in that respect is its conclusion. After the failure of Charmides', Critias' and Socrates' attempts to see what σωφροσύνη is, and Socrates' suspicion that it be altogether useless, he takes back this last verdict turning to Charmides (175e5): ταῦτ' οὖν πάνυ μὲν οὐκ οἶομαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐμὲ φαῦλον εἶναι ζητητὴν· ἐπεὶ τὴν γε σωφροσύνην μέγα τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καὶ εἶπερ γε ἔχεις αὐτό,

<sup>176</sup> μακάριον εἶναί σε. ἀλλ' ὄρα εἰ ἔχεις τε καὶ μηδὲν δέη τῆς ἐπωδῆς· εἰ γὰρ ἔχεις, ... .

At the beginning of the conversation - when Charmides was compared with the other youths of his age and before a discussion of what σωφροσύνη is had been entered into - φῆς ἱκανῶς ἤδη σωφροσύνης μετέχειν; asked for his sufficiently 'having of' moderation and health of soul. At the end of the conversation which centred first on Charmides and then on σωφροσύνη, Socrates defines it as μέγα τι ἀγαθόν, a great 'good', and can then address Charmides as an individual who has or has not something which is at that moment seen as a defined unity: εἶπερ γε ἔχεις αὐτό, ... , ὄρα εἰ ἔχεις ... , εἰ γὰρ ἔχεις, ... .<sup>55</sup> The choice of μετέχειν with genitive or ἔχειν with accusative is - in all these cases - a matter of perspective and context.

The three instances of μετέχειν in another definitely early dialogue, the *Gorgias*, confirm the previous observations. Near the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates' friend Chaerepho and Gorgias' pupil Polus have a short exchange of words before Socrates and Gorgias continue to pursue the argument. In Socratic manner, Chaerepho asks Polus for the profession of Gorgias, and what one should call him accordingly. Polus answers eloquently (*Gorgias* 448c5): ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, πόλλαι τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ἠύρημένοι· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην. ἐκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι· ὧν καὶ Γοργίας ἐστὶν ὄδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν. Of course, the phrasing of the statement is highly rhetorical, and perhaps not too much emphasis should be put on any individual word. If one takes the words seriously, though, μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως says both that different people take up different arts and crafts and that they do it in different ways. It is likely that Polus does not mean to imply that in any society any one

<sup>55</sup> Cf. *Charmides* 167 and the discussion in note 45 above.

occupation is pursued by one individual only; ἄλλως, however, could well imply that each and everyone take up their respective professions in their own way. This assumption is not necessary, but if granted it would add to the general indefiniteness of the notion of ‘having of’ something like a τέχνη. The use of μεταλαμβάνουσι rather than μετέχουσι denotes the process of obtaining something which is prior in time to the state of having it.

*Gorgias* 467e is a slightly different case. A distinction has been drawn between what we do and what we do it for. What we want is the end, not the means to that end. Everything is good or bad or between the two, neither good nor bad. Socrates continues (467e6): οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τάναντία τούτων; - ἔγωγε. - τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἄρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίστε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐνίστε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίστε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; Other than with all the examples discussed so far, the subject of μετέχειν in the last sentence is not a human being<sup>56</sup>.

Later on in the dialogue, Callicles enters the discussion and delivers a long speech on the propriety of philosophy and practical pursuit of political matters. At one point he summarizes (*Gorgias* 485a3): ἀλλ’ οἶμαι τὸ ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων μετασχεῖν. φιλοσοφίας μὲν ὅσον παιδείας χάριν καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μεираκίῳ ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἔτι φιλοσοφῆ, καταγέλαστον, ὧ Σώκρατες, τὸ χρῆμα γίνεταί, ... . Syntactically, φιλοσοφία is here treated like a τέχνη. Again, there is no indication that Callicles intends to suggest that young men as long as they are young should only ‘have a part of’ philosophical activity.

<sup>56</sup> If that constitutes an argument which could be used for relative dating of the dialogues, I am not going to discuss it here.

## VI.

μετέχειν is thus employed with a wide range of objects, but particularly, in Plato, with non-physical objects from the domain of psychology or characterology. When governing the genitive, the verb denotes a 'having of' something where that relationship is vague, where no specific qualitative or quantitative portion is specified; this construction is shared with the simple verb ἔχειν which, however, is more often employed with the accusative, the case referring to objects of a more specified and delimited nature. Most importantly, μετέχειν by itself does not mean 'having a part (of something)'; if that meaning is intended, it must be clearly expressed in the context, e.g. by means of addition of a word for 'part' like μέρος. Not only with regard to that, pre-Platonic and early Platonic usage are in concord as to meaning and applicability of the verb.

## ΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑ, ΠΑΡΕΙΝΑΙ, ΠΑΡΑΓΙΓΝΕΣΘΑΙ

## I.

An investigation into the usage of *παρουσία* and *παρεῖναι* is necessary - if for no other reason - because of Socrates' use of the word *παρουσία* at *Phaedo* 100d5. There, Socrates declares that his explanation for any thing's being *καλόν* is ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὄπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως †προσγενομένη. Leaving aside for the moment the textual difficulty with *προσγενομένη*, the gist of his statement seems to be that the relation which holds between τὸ καλόν on the one hand and any particular thing which is καλόν on the other is reasonably well described by *παρουσία*. Before looking at the two early instances of that noun in dialogues earlier than the *Phaedo*, I will briefly consider instances in earlier Greek literature, not only of the noun *παρουσία*, but also of the much commoner verbs *παρεῖναι*, and *παραγίγνεσθαι*, in order to establish their meaning and application in pre-Platonic usage.

A number of distinct uses of *παρεῖναι* can, I think, sensibly be regarded separately<sup>57</sup>. First, *παρεῖναι* is used of people who are present at an occasion or, in particular, with other people. This usage is found from the *Iliad* onwards throughout Greek literature<sup>58</sup>, and it is so frequent that I will refrain from giving examples. It is found all over Plato's dialogues, e.g. *Gorgias* 447b6, 457b6, 458b6,7, 461c7, d1, 474a1, 482b1, 518d3.

<sup>57</sup> The order in which I have arranged the different uses is not meant to indicate a semantic development and is chosen purely for the sake of convenience.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. LSJ s.v. *πάρειμι* (εἰμί sum) I (and IV).

Secondly, there is an occasional use of impersonal *πάρεστι* where it could be said to come close in meaning to *ἔξεστι*<sup>59</sup>, e.g. *Gorgias* 448a5 where it could be attributed to Gorgias' high-flown or poetical style.

Thirdly, it is used of 'the present time'<sup>60</sup>, with Plato notably in the phrase *ἐν τῷ (νῦν) παρόντι*<sup>61</sup>.

Fourthly, *παρεῖναι* can be used of 'things', in the widest sense of that word, present to someone<sup>62</sup>. This usage, again, is found from Homer onwards.

As said above, there was, on all accounts, no single verb for 'having' in Indo-European<sup>63</sup>. Instead, 'being' was used, with the dative of the person to whom something 'was' or belonged or at whose disposal it was. This usage is well preserved in Archaic and Classical Greek down to Plato's times, as may, *exempli gratia*, be seen with an example from the *Gorgias* (486c,d): *ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὰ*

<sup>59</sup> Cf. LSJ s.v. *πάρειμι* (ἔιμί sum) III.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. LSJ s.v. *πάρειμι* (ἔιμί sum) II. 4. I would see this as a category distinct from the following one.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. L. Brandwood, *A Word Index to Plato*, Leeds 1976, p. 715. He asserts in a footnote: "παρόντι: all instances occur in the phrase *ἐν τῷ παρόντι* and its variant *ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι ...*." *Phaedo* 59a2 is an exception to that rule.

<sup>62</sup> One division of this group is the nominal use of *παρόντα* or *παρεόντα*. The notion of time is present here as well, in that there is no distinction made between *the circumstances or things present* and *the present circumstances or things*. Often, the *things present* or *at hand*, are contrasted with *ἀπόντα*, the *things absent*. A common exhortation amounts to 'a bird in hand is worth two in the bush', with all its variations. Echoes of that are *Odyssey* 1, 140b and Democritus, B191, B224. A reflection of it is also found at e.g. *Gorgias* 493c: *Σω. ... ταῦτ' ἐπιεικῶς μὲν ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τι ἄτοπα, δηλοῖ μὴν ὃ ἐγὼ βούλομαι σοι ἐνδειξάμενος, ἐάν πως οἶός τε ὦ, πείσαι μεταθέσθαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλήστως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος βίου τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν ἰκανῶς καὶ ἐξαρκούντως ἔχοντα βίον ἐλέσθαι*. Here Socrates tries to persuade Callicles to choose the βίος, the life or way of living (possibly another allusion to the last words of Callicles' introductory speech) which has enough or is content with those things which *are present* or *at one's disposition* or *at hand* at any given time. Cf. also *Gorgias* 499c4: *... , καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον 'τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν' ...*, where the thought is labelled as a proverb or standing phrase. Cf. Dodds, *Plato. Gorgias*, Oxford 1959, commentary ad loc.

<sup>63</sup> See Section I in the chapter on *μετέχειν* above. Cf. also B. Mader in *Lfgre* II, col. 837.

It is to be noted that *mutatis mutandis* the same is true for the Semitic languages. 'Having' there is also expressed by either 'possessing' as in the possession of e.g. land or 'being to someone'. This goes to show how abstract a notion 'having' is in itself.



μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' οἷς ἔστιν καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πόλλα ἀγαθὰ.

When this rather general notion of ‘being to or for someone’ was felt not to express specifically enough the relation holding between the ‘had’ and the ‘haver’, it could be delimited by the addition of certain adverbs<sup>64</sup> which over time became preverbs. The general meaning of the preverb *παρα-* is ‘close by’, ‘next to’. The emphasis is often on the immediate closeness and proximity of the object.<sup>65</sup>

An example of *πᾶρα* in that sense is *Odyssey* 4, 559. Menelaos relates to Telemachus what Proteus has told him about Odysseus (4, 555 - 560): υἱὸς Λαέρτεω, Ἰθάκῃ ἐνὶ οἰκίᾳ ναίων· | τὸν δ' ἶδον ἐν νήσῳ θαλερὸν κατὰ δάκρυ χέοντα, | νύμφης ἐν μεγάροισι Καλυψοῦς, ἣ μιν ἀνάγκη | ἴσχει· ὃ δ' οὐ δύναται ἦν πατρίδα γαῖαν ἰκέσθαι. | οὐ γάρ οἱ πᾶρα νῆες ἐπήρητμοι καὶ ἑταῖροι, | οἳ κέν μιν πέμποιεν ἐπ' εὐρεα νῶτα θαλάσσης. In 558, we have a good example of *ἔχειν* having its old, original force of ‘holding subdued’ an adversary<sup>66</sup>. 559 is a nominal clause without copula.<sup>67</sup> ‘οὐ γάρ οἱ νῆες ἐπήρητμοι καὶ ἑταῖροι’ would have been a complete well-formed sentence. The addition of *πᾶρα* serves to specify that he did not have anything or anybody ‘with’ him or ‘at’ him or ‘by’ his side. The subject of the sentence is complex, with an inanimate and an animate component.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. E. Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik* II, München 1950, pp. 411-432, in particular 411f., 431f. Cf. also M. Meier-Brügger, *Griechische Sprachwissenschaft* I, Berlin 1991, pp. 154-156, with references to more recent literature.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Schwyzer, op. cit., pp. 491-498. He says on p. 492: “Möglicherweise hat auch *παρά* in einigen Verwendungen eine alte, nicht sekundäre Bedeutung ‘vor’; die allgemeine Bedeutung von *παρά* usw. ist jedoch ‘(unmittelbar) neben, nahe’ (...). Neben Kasus (Lok., Akk., Abl.) kann jedoch das Bedeutungsmoment der Nähe verblassen; *παρά* unterstreicht dann als ‘bei’, ‘zu (- hin)’, ‘von (- her)’ lediglich die Bedeutung, die der Kasus an sich hatte.” I would stress that this shift away from expressing ‘local closeness’ to expressing some sort of more abstract proximity which serves to ‘underline the force of the case’ is carried by the preverb as well. In that respect, Schwyzer’s paragraph on ‘*παρά* as a preverb’, p. 493, needs slight modification.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. on *ἔχειν* / *μετέχειν* note 63 above; cf. German ‘siegen’.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. Schwyzer, op. cit., p. 64f.

Comparable is *Odyssey* 14, 80. Eumaeus, the swine-herd, invites the stranger, Odysseus: ἔσθιε νῦν, ὦ ξεῖνε, τὰ τε δμῶεσσι πάρεστιν, ...<sup>68</sup>. Historically speaking, this again is a nominal clause. The difference is that with ‘τὰ τε δμῶεσσι πάρεστιν’ there is a copula, and πάρα is bound as a preverb, no longer free as an adverb.

The two previous examples had physical or material objects for grammatical subjects. But already with the *Iliad*, non-physical, immaterial things can function as subjects as well. At *Odyssey* 17, 345ff., Telemachus advises the swine-herd, Eumaeus, to tell the beggar, Odysseus, not to be too shy to ask the suitors for alms. He finishes with the sententious remark (17, 347): αἰδῶς δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρήμενῳ ἄνδρι παρεῖναι. *Bashfulness is not good for a needy man, to be with him*. In the particular case of αἰδῶς, it is to be noted that this sort of construction, and the consequent αἰδῶς πάρεστι, may well be older than any verbalised form like αἰδομαι to express the presence of awe, reverence, fear or shame<sup>69</sup>.

That is different with the following Iliadic example. Apollo, the god, has deceived Achilles, the best and strongest of the Greeks, in the guise of Agenor. When the god destroys the illusion and mocks Achilles, Achilles replies in angry tones. He could have taken the life of many Trojans (22, 18): νῦν δ’ ἐμὲ μὲν μέγα κῦδος ἀφείλεο, τοὺς δὲ σάωσας | ῥηιδίως, ἐπεὶ οὐ τι τίσιν γ’ ἔδδειςας ὀπίσσω. | ἦ σ’ ἂν τεισαίμην, εἴ μοι δύναμις γε παρῆι. δύναμις is a verbal noun, both semantically and by its actual derivation. A conditional like *Iliad* 1, 393, ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰ δύνασαί γε, περίσχεο παιδὸς ἑῆος, Achilles’ imploring his mother to help him,

<sup>68</sup> For the present purpose, it is of no import how the line following is punctuated.

<sup>69</sup> Pace H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* I, Heidelberg 1960, s.v. αἰδομαι. His assertion, “Von αἰδομαι, bzw. von einem älteren athematischen Verb stammt αἰδῶς f. ‘Scheu, Ehrfurcht’“, is not well founded. Rather than positing an athematic verb of the same root whence the noun be derived, one should be content with stating that both the thematic verb and the - very old - noun are derived from the same root. Its formulaic occurrence in the *Iliad* as absolute nominative in exclamations or exhortations, i.e. in places where a verbal imperative form could have been used just as well, rather points to the antiquity of the noun; *Iliad* 5, 787; 8, 228; 13, 95; 15, 502; 16, 422. Cf. Schwyzler op. cit., p. 65f. I would contest his assertion that in the Homeric lines quoted ἔστι is understood or has to be supplied.

shows that it was the speaker's choice to give a verbal or a nominal form to his statement.

While in the case of αἰδώς it could be argued that Ἄιδώς was a goddess like Φόβος, Ἔρις, Ἀλκή and Ἴωκή at *Iliad* 5, 739f., or like Κράτος and Βία in Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*, and that therefore the above mentioned instances of αἰδώς should be counted with the personal use of παρεῖναι, it would be much more difficult to claim the same in the case of δύναμις. And even if in the case of *Iliad* 22, 18 one could imagine Δύναμις standing by Achilles as did Athena at *Iliad* 1, 193 - 222 - a picture, I think, not intended by the poet - the same could not be said of *Odyssey* 2, 62, where the half-line *Iliad* 22, 18b is repeated. There, Telemachus complains to the people of Ithaca about his situation with the suitors' consuming his father's property and making a general nuisance of themselves; he declares (2, 60): ἡμεῖς δ' οὐ νύ τι τοῖοι ἀμυνέμεν· ἦ καὶ ἔπειτα | λευγαλέοι τ' ἐσόμεσθα καὶ οὐ δεδαηκότες ἀλκῆν. | ἦ τ' ἂν ἀμυναίμην, εἴ μοι δύναμις γε παρείη. Compare with these words, spoken at the height of desperation, what Telemachus says to his father Odysseus when the suitors are slain. After the complete reversal of the external and internal situation, Homer lets him use the same words in a statement indicating his newly gained confidence (23, 127): ... | ἡμεῖς δ' ἐμμεμαῶτες ἄμ' ἐψόμεθ', οὐδέ τι φημι | ἀλκῆς δευήσεσθαι, ὅση δύναμις γε πάρεστι. In these two passages, both ἀλκή, which is somehow taught and known at 2, 60, and δύναμις are practical abilities or properties of human beings.

That is already true of δύναμις at *Iliad* 8, 294, from which the last half-line of the previous example is quoted. Teucer, praised for his skill by Agamemnon, replies (8, 292): Ἀτρεΐδη κύδιστε, τί με σπεύδοντα καὶ αὐτὸν | ὀτρύνεις; οὐ μὲν τοι ὅση δύναμις γε πάρεστι | παύομαι. The sentence shows a clear development in the usage and application of the phrase *nominative with πάρεστι*. πάρεστι, from being an addition to the subject in the nominative and the person in the

dative, has become more like a real predicate. The person 'to whom' the subject 'is', though understood from the immediate context, is not - i.e. no longer - expressed.

In lyric poetry and tragedy, a wider range of subjects to *παρεῖναι* is found. In the seventh century, Mimnermus says in an elegiac couplet (8 West): ... ἀληθείη δὲ παρέστω | σοὶ καὶ ἐμοί, πάντων χρῆμα δικαιοτάτον. A little later, Theognis declares at the imagined occasion of someone's stealing his verses (21 West): οὐδέ τις ἀλλάξει κάκιον τοῦσθλοῦ παρεόντος. In one of his political elegies, Solon says about unjust statesmen (4, 9 West): οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται κατέχειν κόρον οὐδὲ παρούσας | εὐφροσύνας κοσμεῖν δαιτὸς ἐν ἥσυχίῃ. With him, we also find the sentence that death will take away rich and poor alike (24 West): ἴσόν τοι πλουτέουσιν, ὅτῳ πολὺς ἄργυρός ἐστι | καὶ χρυσὸς καὶ γῆς πυροφόρου πεδία | ἵπποί θ' ἡμίονοί τε, καὶ ὦν μόνα ταῦτα πάρεστι, | γαστρί τε καὶ πλευραῖς καὶ πόσιν ἀβρὰ παθεῖν, | παιδός τ' ἠδὲ γυναικός, ἐπὴν καὶ ταῦτ' ἀφίκηται, | ὥρη, σὺν δ' ἦβη γίνεται ἀρμοδίη. | ... . This is a good example both of how ἔστιν with dative can be used in parallel, i.e. in this case virtually synonymously, with *πάρεστιν* with dative, and of how physical or material objects can function as grammatical subjects to *πάρεστιν* side by side with immaterial ones. In the sixth century, Anacreon gives his version of man's fear of old age and death (50 Page): πολιοὶ μὲν ἡμῖν ἤδη | κρόταφοι κάρη τε λευκόν, | χαριέσσα δ' οὐκέτ' ἦβη | πάρα, γηραλέοι δ' ὀδόντες, | γλυκεροῦ δ' οὐκέτι πολλὸς | βιότου χρόνος λέλειπται. A generation later, Simonides (?) writes in an elegy part of which Stobaeus quotes under the heading 'About life, that it is short and cheap and full of concern' (8, 4 West): ... πάρεστι γὰρ ἐλπὶς ἐκάστῳ | ἀνδρῶν, ἢ τε νέων στήθεσιν ἐμφύεται. A Theognidean variation of the old sentence μέτρον ἄριστον is (693f.): πολλοὺς τοι κόρος ἄνδρας ἀπώλεσεν ἀφραίνοντας· | γνῶναι γὰρ χαλεπὸν μέτρον, ὅτ' ἐσθλὰ παρῆ.

Turning to fifth century Athenian tragedy, Aeschylus has in one messenger-speech alone (*Persae* 353 - 432) the following three instances: ... φόβος δὲ πᾶσι βαρβάροις παρῆν | γνώμης ἀποσφαλεῖσιν· ... . (391f.). ... καὶ παρῆν ὁμοῦ κλύειν | πολλὴν βοήν· ‘... .’ (401f.). ... · ὡς δὲ πλῆθος ἐν στενωῶ νεῶν | ἦθροιστ’ , ἀρωγὴ δ’ οὔτις ἀλλήλοισ παρῆν, | ... . (413f.). In each case, the subject is non-tangible.

The guard who has to inform Creon of the attempt to perform burial rites for the outlawed Polynices in Sophocles’ *Antigone* explains that he does not know who it could have been (253): ὅπως δ’ ὁ πρῶτος ἡμῖν ἡμεροσκόπος | δείκνυσι, πᾶσι θαῦμα δυσχερὲς παρῆν. And in Sophocles’ late play *Electra*, Electra admits in a speech to her sister which began with the statement that no friends are present<sup>70</sup> (959ff.): ... ἦ πάρεστι μὲν στένειν | πλούτου πατρῶου κτῆσιν ἐστερημένῃ, | πάρεστι δ’ ἀλγεῖν ... . A little later, the two sisters Electra and Chrysothemis exchange the following lines (1031f.): ἄπελθε· σοὶ γὰρ ὠφέλησις οὐκ ἔνι. - ἔνεστιν· ἀλλὰ σοὶ μάθησις οὐ πάρα.

Euripides’ Hecuba says in reply to the lament of the chorus leader (*Hecuba* 585): ὦ θύγατερ, οὐκ οἶδ’ εἰς ὃ τι βλέψω κακῶν, | πολλῶν παρόντων· ἦν γὰρ ἄψωμαί τινος, | τόδ’ οὐκ ἔᾶ με, παρακαλεῖ δ’ ἐκεῖθεν αὖ | λύπη τις ἄλλη διάδοχος κακῶν κακοῖς. The last two lines are relevant in that they show that ‘the bad <things>’ here are subjects to predicates which otherwise have animate subjects. One could argue, however, that the personification in these lines was invited by the apposition πολλῶν παρόντων, in which the verb - while perfectly natural with inanimate things for subjects - could be seen, or re-interpreted, as denoting the presence of an active agent. Whereas the one bad <thing> touched upon is still neuter, the grief or pain in its wake is feminine. - It is to be noted that while Greek usage

<sup>70</sup> See below on παρουσία.

allowed for constructions of the type ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα<sup>71</sup>, ἄλλος most often denotes another of the same kind. If thus Hecuba uses the phrase λύπη τις ἄλλη, she somehow implies that the aforementioned κακά are λύπαι of some description.<sup>72</sup>

In the *Orestes*, the following words are exchanged between Electra and her brother (1177): ἐγὼ, κασίγνητ', αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἔχειν δοκῶ, | σωτηρίαν σοὶ τῶδέ τ' ἐκ τρίτων τ' ἐμοί. | - θεοῦ λέγεις πρόνοιαν. ἀλλὰ ποῦ τόδε; | ἐπεὶ τὸ συνετόν γ' οἶδα σῆ ψυχῇ παρόν. Electra 'has' salvation, and Orestes knows that 'the intelligent is present to her soul'. With comparable words, Cadmus addresses Agaue in the *Bacchae* (1268): τὸ δὲ πτοηθὲν τόδ' ἔτι σῆ ψυχῇ πάρα; In both instances, it is somebody's soul to which something, intelligence and excitement respectively, is present.

Among the Presocratics, Empedocles addresses his audience at the beginning of one of his writings (B 114, 1): ὦ φίλοι, οἶδα μὲν οὐνεκ' ἀληθείη πάρα μύθοις, οὐς ἐγὼ ἐξερῶ ... . The implications of the difference between Mimnermus 8, ... ἀληθείη δὲ παρέστω | σοὶ καὶ ἐμοί, where ἀληθείη is present to the people, to Empedocles 114, ἀληθείη πάρα μύθοις, cannot be discussed here.

In the context of his physics of mixture and separation, with the ontological premise that nothing will come out of nothing, Empedocles remarks about fire, water, earth and air, with strife apart from them and love in amongst them (B 17, 27): ταῦτα γὰρ ἴσά τε πάντα καὶ ἥλικα γένναν ἔασι, | τιμῆς δ' ἄλλης ἄλλο μέδει, πάρα δ' ἦθος ἐκάστω, | ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο. It is fairly safe to assume that this usage of πάρα δ' ἦθος ἐκάστω is transferred from the human to the elementary sphere. At a different point in the same book, Empedocles draws the conclusion that - as a result of those insights into the physics of the world - no

<sup>71</sup> Cf. N.E. Collinge, *Thoughts on the Pragmatics of Ancient Greek*, in: PCPhS 1989, pp. 1 - 13.

<sup>72</sup> Perhaps, however, not too much weight should be put on this poetic, even though Euripidean, text when it comes to a comparison with the passages of the *Gorgias* discussed below in Sections IV - VI.

wise man will hold (B 15, 3): ὡς ὄφρα μὲν τε βιώσει, τὸ δὴ βίοντον καλέουσι, | τόφρα μὲν οὖν εἰσίν, καὶ σφιν πάρα δειλὰ καὶ ἐσθλά, | πρὶν δὲ πάγεν τε βροτοὶ καὶ <ἐπει> λύθεν, οὐδὲν ἄρ' εἰσιν. It would be rash to restrict the reference of δειλὰ καὶ ἐσθλά to material goods as if Empedocles referred just to poverty and wealth, to the exclusion of pain and pleasure. It should also be noted that from a fourth, and probably also fifth, century point of view, his diction is archaic, and when he, like Homer, says δειλὰ καὶ ἐσθλά, later generations would say κακὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ.<sup>73</sup>

If we can trust our source (Stobaeus III, 18, 35), Democritus declared (B 235): ὅσοι ἀπὸ γαστρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ποιέονται ὑπερβεβληκότες τὸν καιρὸν ἐπὶ βρώσεσιν ἢ πόσεσιν ἢ ἀφροδισίοισιν, τοῖσι πᾶσιν αἰ μὲν ἡδοναὶ βραχεῖαί τε καὶ δι' ὀλίγου γίνονται, αἰ δὲ λῦπαι πολλαί. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πάρεστι καὶ ὀκότεν γένηται ὀκοίων ἐπιθυμέουσι, διὰ ταχέος τε ἢ ἡδονὴ παροίχεται, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐν αὐτοῖσι χρηστόν ἐστιν ἄλλ' ἢ τέρψις βραχεῖα, καὶ αὖθις τῶν αὐτῶν δεῖ. That, if genuinely Democritean, is interesting not only because of its subject matter which betrays a simple pragmatism, attacked by Socrates, but later to be found with Epicurus, but also because on the one hand τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν, which could be said to be close to ἐπιθυμία, just as the Euripidean τὸ συνετόν could be said to equal σύνεσις, is said to be present, and on the other because Democritus uses the phrase ἢ ἡδονὴ παροίχεται. In Presocratic contexts, however, παροίχεσθαι is used as the first member of a temporal sequence παροιχόμενον, παρόν, μέλλον<sup>74</sup>.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. also Empedocles DK 31B110: εἰ γὰρ κέν σφ' ἀδινῆσιν ὑπὸ πραπίδεσσιν ἐρείσας | εὐμενέως καθαρῆσιν ἐποπτεύσης μελέτησιν | ταῦτά τέ σοι μάλα πάντα δι αἰῶνος παρέσσονται, | ἄλλα τε πόλλ' ἀπὸ τῶνδ' ἐκτίσειαι. ... . It is unfortunate that we do not know if ταῦτα refers to 'Empedocles' teachings' (Diels) or 'the elemental components' (Mansfeld), or yet something else.

<sup>74</sup> E.g. Gorgias, B 11, 11.

If that be so, ἡδονὴ παροίχεται would imply that previous to the time referred to ἡδονὴ πάρεστι.

To resume, of the following non-material things it is said that they 'are to, with or at someone': αἰδώς, δύναμις, ἀλήθεια, τὸ ἔσθλον, εὐφροσύνη, ἀβρὰ παθεῖν, ὄρα, ἦβη, ἐλπίς, ἐσθλά, φόβος, κλύειν πολλήν βοήν, ἀρωγή, θαῦμα, μάθησις, στένειν and ἀλγεῖν, κακὰ πολλά, τὸ συνετὸν and τὸ πτοηθὲν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἦθος, δειλὰ καὶ ἐσθλά, τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν. Furthermore, it is implied at two places that λύπη (Euripides, *Hecuba* 585ff.) and, respectively, ἡδονή (Democritus 235) are present.

While it is possible that many of those words denoted at some point in time, or else in certain contexts, gods or divine powers, namely αἰδώς, δύναμις (?), ἀλήθεια, εὐφροσύνη, ὄρα, ἦβη, ἐλπίς, φόβος, θαῦμα, ἦθος, it is evident from the passages quoted that there were other contexts in which that was clearly not the case. The application, moreover, of the verb to gerunds and substantivised adjectives shows, I think, conclusively that παρεῖναι did not exclusively or necessarily convey the notion of a person's or a material object's presence. On the contrary, a whole range of concrete and abstract things figure as subjects: forces, emotions, states of mind, qualities, properties, actions and passions<sup>75</sup>. They are said to be present with the people, or in some cases (Euripides, *Orestes* 1177ff.; *Bacchae* 1268) with their souls. It is difficult and perhaps not altogether necessary to decide what exact status was or would have been assigned to things like e.g. εὐφροσύνη or ἐλπίς, whether the words denote emotions or states of the mind or of the soul or of the whole person. Likewise, what is a man's ἦβη? Is μάθησις an action or a faculty or a quality? Is φόβος, if present to a crowd of people, something external to the individual or internal in each of them? I pointed to the difficulty in deciding whether Empedocles' δειλὰ καὶ ἐσθλά are external or internal, or if the terms cover both the external and the internal.

<sup>75</sup> In using these conventional terms, I do not commit myself to claiming the actual existence, appropriateness or significance of any of them.

It would be even more difficult to say what this ‘presence’ signified by *παρεῖναι* amounted to. Or perhaps, it is too much already to claim that there is anything ‘signified’. What can be claimed with certainty is that, in a broadly speaking psychological context, *παρεῖναι* is employed to connect non-material things with animate subjects. In addition, Empedocles at least can ascribe an *ἦθος*, a ‘character’ or ‘characteristic’ to either his forces *νεῖκος* and *φιλότης*, or even to them and the elements together<sup>76</sup>.

## II.

As opposed to the verb *παρεῖναι*, the noun *παρουσία* is absent from Homer, Hesiod, and the early poets. As far as our sources are concerned, it seems to be an altogether Attic word. With the tragedians, it usually denotes the presence of a person with others or at a particular event. As such, it is not very frequent. Its occurrence in that sense at Sophocles *Electra* 948 deserves particular attention. In the second line of the long speech addressed to her sister, Electra declares: *παρουσίαν μὲν οἶσθα καὶ σύ που φίλων | ὡς οὔτις ἡμῖν ἔστιν, ...*. It is one thing to speak of the presence of friends when friends are present. It is quite another thing to declare *about* presence of friends that none is present. Instead of saying : *φίλους μὲν οἶσθα καὶ σύ ὡς οὔτις ἡμῖν ἔστιν*, thus making the friends the object of knowledge, it is their presence of which Chrysothemis is said to have knowledge. Source or at least consequence of the nominalisation of *παρεῖναι* is that this ‘presence’ has become something in its own right, something one can talk about. Its status approximates that of

<sup>76</sup> Empedocles, B 17, 27ff. It is not clear to me if Empedocles at this point refers to the two forces of ‘love’ and ‘strife’ and their ruling in turn, or if he is stating more generally that each of the elements and the forces has its specific place and function in the universe at any given moment. Although not of ultimate importance, it may be relevant in certain respects to know if he assigned an *ἦθος* only to *Νεῖκος* and *Φιλότης* which appear to be personalised, or also to (17, 18) *πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ ἥερος ἄπλετον ὕψος*, which clearly are not.

ἀρωγή in Aeschylus' *Persians* where the messenger reports (402): ἀρωγή δ' οὔτις ἀλλήλοις παρήν. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to postulate a new meaning, 'help, support', for παρουσία here. παρουσία φίλων is the state of affairs obtaining when φίλοι πάρεσιν. Sophocles' sentence: παρουσίαν μὲν οἶσθα καὶ σύ που φίλων ὡς οὔτις ἡμῖν ἐστίν, offers the opportunity of asking 'what is the status of this παρουσία which is not but could be there'. One need not suppose that Sophocles himself thought about that question. Poetical usage serves as preparation for philosophical speculation without entailing it.

There are only a few cases of παρουσία where the noun does not denote the presence of a person at some place or occasion, but the presence of an object, be it material or non-material, to either a person or an inanimate object.<sup>77</sup> They can be regarded as straightforward nominalisations of clauses or phrases containing the verb παρῆναι. One instance is Euripides *Hecuba* 227f.: γίγνωσκε δ' ἀλκὴν καὶ παρουσίαν κακῶν | τῶν σῶν. Odysseus advises Hecuba to acknowledge and accept her own situation: the power of the victor and her own helplessness, her κακά which are with her. A similar case is Aristophanes, *Thesmophoriazousae* 1048f. Mnesilochus, attendant to Euripides, bewails his fate: ὦ κατάρατος ἐγώ· τίς ἐμὸν οὐκ ἐπόψεται | πάθος ἀμέγαρτον ἐπὶ κακῶν παρουσία; Mnesilochus' style is the tragic style of Euripides.

παρουσία before Plato is thus a poetical word, used by the tragedians in contexts which require a heightened mode of expression. The noun which is comparatively rare does not betray any semantic development beyond the nominalisation of the verb

<sup>77</sup> Sophocles *Electra* 1250 is a different case. The employment of παρουσία there is unusual enough to have created confusion in some of the manuscripts. Nevertheless, I think παρουσία may be the correct reading. Orestes declares that he is aware of Electra's unending suffering from her mother's deed but has mentioned it despite that: ἔξοιδα καὶ ταῦτ'· ἀλλ' ὅταν παρουσία | φράζῃ, τότε ἔργων τῶνδε μεμνήσθαι χρεῶν. Here, παρουσία is the present time, the present, which 'indicates it' or 'advises' to think or act in a certain way. This use of the word seems to be unique and confined to this one place.

παρεῖναι. With the noun, however, the temporal aspect, always present with *παρεῖναι*, is more pronounced.

### III.

As opposed to *παρεῖναι*, *παραγίνεσθαι* seems to be much less frequently used with subjects other than human beings, individuals or groups<sup>78</sup>. Stobaeus, notoriously unreliable as to the wording of his quotations, reports as a saying of Democrates (Stobaeus IV, 23, 39; Democritus (?) DK 68B108): διζημένοισι τάγαθὰ μόλις παραγίνεται, τὰ δὲ κακὰ καὶ μὴ διζημένοισιν. A little earlier, Stobaeus quotes a long passage from Antiphon the Sophist ‘πέρι ὁμονοίας’ (Stobaeus IV, 22, II, 66; DK 87B49)<sup>79</sup>: ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ γε τούτῳ, ἔνθα τὸ ἡδύ, ἔνεστι πλησίον που καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν· αἱ γὰρ ἡδοναὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐμπορεύονται, ἀλλ’ ἀκολουθοῦσιν αὐταῖς λῦπαι καὶ πόνοι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὀλυμπιονίκαι καὶ πυθιονίκαι καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἀγῶνες καὶ σοφίαι καὶ πᾶσαι ἡδοναὶ ἐκ μεγάλων λυπημάτων ἐθέλουσι παραγίνεσθαι· τιμαὶ γὰρ, ἄθλα, δελέατα, ἃ ὁ θεὸς ἔδωκεν ἀνθρώποις, μεγάλων πόνων καὶ ἰδρώτων εἰς ἀνάγκας καθιστᾶσιν. If the clause ἐπεὶ ... *παραγίνεσθαι* is taken on its own, *παραγίνεσθαι* could be said to be as good as equivalent to *γίνεσθαι*. ἀνθρώποις, however, should be understood from the context as object to the verb. If this text belongs in the fifth century, it is the closest extant pre-Platonic parallel to the usage of *Gorgias* 506<sup>80</sup>.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. LSJ s.v. *παραγίνεσθαι*. Since *παρεῖναι* and *παραγίνεσθαι*, like *μετέχειν* and *μεταλαμβάνειν*, are otherwise correlatives in pre-Platonic and Platonic philosophical usage, and respectively used to denote state and process, I discuss *παραγίνεσθαι* here.

<sup>79</sup> I start quoting at DK II, p. 358, 8 because of the affinity of the passage with *Phaedo* 60b, pointed out by Diels.

<sup>80</sup> See below ad loc.

One doubtful example of παραγίγνεσθαι with inanimate subject is Thucydides I, 15: κατὰ γῆν δὲ πόλεμος, ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμις παρεγένετο, οὐδεις ξυνέστη.<sup>81</sup> If the text of the manuscripts is to be kept, it is to be translated ‘wars by land there were none, none at least by which power was acquired,’<sup>82</sup> or ‘there was no warfare by land which resulted in the acquisition of an empire’<sup>83</sup>; i.e. δύναμις παρεγένετο is to be taken as absolute, *power arose* or *power came into being* or even *there was power*; if τις καὶ δύναμις is *any power at all*, δύναμις παρεγένετο instead of δύναμις ἐγένετο suggest ‘to anybody whomsoever’; for that, it is probably not necessary to change the text by converting τις to τισι, or inserting τισι into the clause somewhere.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>81</sup> Pace W.H. Forbes, *Thucydides. Book I. Part II*, Oxford 1895, p. 21 note ad loc., p.118: “... ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμις παρεγένετο ... . These words may also mean, not ‘whence any power accrued,’ but ‘which brought any considerable force into the field.’ παραγίγνομαι is very common in Thucydides in the sense ‘come into the field,’ and is never used by him in the sense of προσγίγνομαι, ‘accrue.’ On the other hand παραγίγνομαι is found in the sense of προσγίγνομαι in other Attic prose authors (see Liddell and Scott): and the use of ὅθεν here (not ὅ or ἐφ’ ὅν) and the parallel in sense with ἰσχὺν δὲ περιεποίησαντο ὅμως οὐκ ἐλαχίστην just above are in favour of the interpretation ‘power accrued.’ Stahl proposes to read περιεγένετο, a slight change which removes all difficulty.” If or in what sense it is correct to declare that ‘other Attic prose authors’ use ‘παραγίγνομαι in the sense of προσγίγνομαι’ is another matter; Thucydides does not. Cf. also E.C. Marchant, *Thucydides. Book I*, London 1905, p. 160f.; and also A.W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides I*, Oxford 1945, p.126: “ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμις παρεγένετο: ὅθεν shows that the *result* of a war is meant, and we should therefore read περιεγένετο with Tournier, Stahl, Hude (1908), or τισὶ for τις with Wilamowitz and Hude (1913); though even with τισὶ we should expect προσεγένετο. Croiset, however, keeping the MSS. reading, translates: “par suite de laquelle des forces vraiment considérables aient été mises en ligne”; which is perhaps right.”

<sup>82</sup> Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, translated by R. Crawley, revised by R. Feetham, Chicago 1952.

<sup>83</sup> Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, translated by R. Warner, London 1954.

<sup>84</sup> Another doubtful case is Archytas 47B1 which if the textual tradition were sound would be of particular importance owing to the alleged influence of the Tarentine on Plato. In a treatise on Harmonics, Archytas discusses the generation of sound by way of things hitting each other. Some of those sounds we cannot perceive at all. He continues (DK I, p. 433, 13): τὰ μὲν οὖν ποτιπίπτοντα ποτὶ τὰν αἰσθασιν ἃ μὲν ἀπὸ τὰν πλαγῶν ταχὺ παραγίνεται καὶ <ἰσχυρῶς>, ὄξεα φαίνεται, τὰ δὲ βραδέως καὶ ἄσθενῶς, βαρέα δοκοῦντι ἡμεν. The context (cf. in particular p. 435, 1 - 5), however, suggests very strongly that the correct reading is παρακινεῖται instead of παραγίνεται.

With or without *dativus commodi*, παραγίγνεσθαι with inanimate subject is not in frequent use before Plato. It is difficult to say if many examples like Isocrates *Philippus* (V, 34), [ἡ πόλις ἢ ἡμετέρα] μόνη ... τοὺς παῖδας τῶν φόβων τῶν ἀεὶ παραγιγνομένων αὐτοῖς [= τοῖς Ἑλλησιν] ἀπήλλαξεν, were around at the time.<sup>85</sup>

#### IV.

As would be expected, the different uses of the verb παρεῖναι are found in Plato's early dialogues as well. Most often, naturally, it is people who are present. Second to that, as said above, the present participle of the verb is used, denoting present time both in the phrase ἐν τῷ (νῦν) παρόντι (passim) and in phrases like ἡ παροῦσα τύχη and ἡ παροῦσα συμφορά (*Crito* 43c3; 47a1). In the early dialogue *Ion*, Socrates once refers to those οἷς νοῦς μὴ πάρεστιν (*Ion* 534d3). That is comparable to both Sophocles *Electra* 1032: ἀλλὰ σοὶ μάθησις οὐ πάρα and Euripides *Orestes* 1180: ἐπεὶ τὸ συνετόν γ' οἶδα σῆ ψυχῇ παρόν. When Socrates asks Meno (*Meno* 77d3): πότερον ἡγούμενος τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἂν γένηται, ἢ γινώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι βλάπτει ᾧ ἂν παρῆ, that usage of παρεῖναι is like that of Hecuba (Euripides *Hecuba* 585): ὦ θύγατερ, οὐκ οἶδ' εἰς ὃ τι βλέψω κακῶν, | πολλῶν παρόντων; Plato's usage does not differ from common Greek usage as far as those applications of the word are concerned.

That may be slightly different with the noun παρουσία and the use of the verbs παρεῖναι and παραγίγνεσθαι in connection with the noun. The two contexts in which παρουσία occurs in Plato's dialogues before the passage in the *Phaedo*, *Gorgias*

<sup>85</sup> See below on *Gorgias* 506d1. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* IV, II, 2, adopts usage employed by Socrates and others in Plato's dialogues.

497f. and *Lysis* 217f., will therefore now be discussed in turn. By *Gorgias* 461, rhetoric, the topic of discussion between Gorgias and Socrates, has been linked with the subject of justice and injustice. As Gorgias appears to contradict himself, Polus, a younger friend of Gorgias, takes over and gets involved in an argument whether it is better to suffer or to do wrong. After a hint at 463, Socrates introduces the categories of beautiful and ugly in connection with good and bad and pleasure and pain at 474. Socrates manages to obtain Polus' agreement that it is worse to do than to suffer wrong on the grounds that doing wrong is 'uglier', and concludes, a little abruptly, that the just man has no real use for the practice of rhetoric. At that point, at 481b, Callicles, the Athenian host of Gorgias and - except for 447, the very beginning of the dialogue, and a brief remark at 458 - passive by-stander to the conversation, enters angrily into the discussion. He introduces the distinction 'by nature' and 'by law or custom' and maintains that by 'nature' suffering wrong is both worse and 'uglier' than doing wrong. His second distinction is that between the weak people who constitute the largest part of the population and are responsible for law and custom, and those who are capable of having more, the stronger, more able, better and worthier (483). In his search for who these 'better' people are, Socrates makes Callicles concur that they are those who are more 'sensible and knowledgeable' (489e). Callicles is then forced to specify that he means those who are more 'sensible and knowledgeable' in matters concerning state and society, and who are 'courageous' enough to enforce their views; and further, those who rule and know no bounds to their rule, be it over others or themselves (491). Callicles position is that 'pleasurable' and 'good' is one and the same, 'understanding' and 'courage', however, are different from each other and from 'the good' (495d). Socrates first proves this wrong by showing that while one cannot live well and badly at once, it is possible to experience pleasure and displeasure at once, and while the latter two may cease to exist simultaneously, that is not the case with the former two (497).

Socrates then begins an new argument to the same effect with the following words (497e1): τὸς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ

[τούς] καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῆ; He continues by reminding Callicles of his calling the brave and sensible good, the cowardly and senseless bad, and showing that these two groups of people experience pleasure and pain to the same extent. Are then both the good and the bad both good and bad to the same extent? He resumes (498d2): οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῆς παρουσία εἶναι ἀγαθοῦς, καὶ κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας; - ἔγωγε. - οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσιν πάρεστιν τὰγαθὰ, αἱ ἡδοναί, εἴπερ χαίρουσιν; - πῶς γὰρ οὐ; - οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες; - ναί. - τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστιν τὰ κακὰ, αἱ λῦπαι; - πάρεστιν. - κακῶν δέ γε παρουσία φῆς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακοῦς· ἢ οὐκέτι φῆς; - ἔγωγε.

The same thought recurs seven pages later in the dialogue. After Callicles has introduced the distinction 'good pleasures' and 'bad pleasures', Socrates restates what he established with Polus at 467c - 468e, that everything else is done for the sake of the good (499e). That includes pleasant things, so that we do 'the pleasant' because of 'the good', τὸ ἡδὺ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (506c9; cf. 500a2). Socrates continues (506c9): ἡδὺ δὲ ἐστὶν τοῦτο οὗ παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα, ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοί ἐσμεν; - πάνυ γε. - ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ὅσ' ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης; - ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. - ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἢ γε ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὖ καὶ ζώου παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῆ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ... ; This last passage, as can be seen from the presence of παραγίγνεσθαι besides παρῆναι, deals with the process of becoming in addition to the state of being good.

παρουσία at *Gorgias* 497f. occurs in the context of psychology or characterology or whatever other term be deemed most suitable. At its first occurrence, a case parallel to that of the presence of good things is added by way of explanation: *Do you not call the*

*good <people> good through the presence of good <things>, just as <you call> beautiful <those> to whom beauty is present?* When the statement is repeated a page later, it is expanded; different types of people, people with differing qualities are characterised. The reason for their difference is seen in the presence of something or, respectively, the presence of its opposite. What is present in the one case are ἀγαθά, good things, and these good things are then said to be αἱ ἡδοναί, the pleasures; in the other case κακά, bad things, are present, and these bad things are αἱ ἀνίαι or αἱ λῦπαι, the distresses and griefs or displeasures.

Before one can begin to explore logical implications of this repeated statement, and draw inferences for the rest of Socrates' argument, it is necessary to see what exactly Socrates is proposing at this point. Callicles is asked to agree that *he call* τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοῦς, ὥσπερ καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῆ. And he does agree to it. That is at a stage where Callicles still speaks his mind and does as yet not simply reply 'if it please you', with only little variation in his choice of words. So, whatever we as modern readers may feel, the addressee of Socrates' statement takes no offence at the words in their present form. Plato thus presents them as acceptable. Nevertheless, there is an indication that something is slightly unusual with the first part of the sentence: that one calls *good people good 'through' or 'by' or 'because of' the presence of good <things>*. If it did not have anything peculiar about it, the additional clause, *just as <one calls> beautiful <those> 'to' or 'with' or 'at' whom beauty is <present>*, would not be necessary. Or, conversely, as there is an additional clause, its presence must be explained, and I think it is best understood as a necessary explanation of what is said in the first clause. Necessary because something is not clear in terms of content, or of language, or of both language and content.

It seems, at least, as if Socrates thought that Callicles would find it easier to understand or to accept the statement καλὸς ᾧ κάλλος πάρεστι, or the generalising and therefore perhaps slightly stronger one καλὸς ᾧ ἂν κάλλος παρῆ, than the

other, οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσία ἀγαθοί. If we suppose for the moment that this latter statement is a semantically and pragmatically fully equivalent linguistic alternative to ἀγαθὸς ᾧ ἀγαθὰ πάρεστι, the difference between that and καλὸς ᾧ κάλλος πάρεστι is twofold. On the one hand there is the lexical difference of the predicate adjective of the main clause, ἀγαθός *versus* καλός, on the other the lexical and grammatical difference of the subject of the relative clause functioning as subject of the main clause, ἀγαθὰ *versus* κάλλος. Apparently, Socrates considers the statement that someone is ‘beautiful to whom beauty is present’, with the noun κάλλος in the singular, as more readily intelligible than that someone is ‘good to whom good <things> are present’. That could be so either because there is a difference in content relevant for those statements between ‘good’ and ‘beautiful’, or between the subject’s being a noun in the singular and, respectively, a neuter adjective in the plural.

Perhaps it is best, however, to start with looking for how Callicles could understand the sentence in a way which enabled him to agree without question. Callicles says to Socrates in his first long speech at 484cd that those who concern themselves with philosophy for too long a time will be unacquainted (ἄπειρος) with all those things with which to be acquainted (ἔμπειρος) is necessary for ‘a man who wants to be καλὸν κάγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον’. He then provides a number of examples of what one should have experience of: ‘the laws of the state, the language used in private and public negotiations, the human pleasures and desires, and altogether the customs’. After a lengthy exposition on the evils of philosophy when practised excessively, he finishes his speech by quoting and interpreting some Euripidean lines (486b): καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἥτις εὐφυῆ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτ’ ἔθηκε χεῖρονα, ... ; ἄλλ’, ὦγαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου, παῦσαι δὲ ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ’ εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὀπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν, ... · ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ’ οἷς ἔστιν καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πόλλα ἀγαθὰ. *For*

*how is this <a> wise <thing>, Socrates, an art which taking a well-endowed man renders him worse ... ? But, my good man, trust me, stop scrutinising words, exercise the soundness of practical pursuits, and exercise what will make you seem sensible, ... : do not imitate men scrutinising such small matters, but those 'to whom is' [i.e.: who have] a living, a reputation, and many other good <things>.*

In his last clause, Callicles presumably refers to those men who would fit his earlier description of being καλοὶ κάγαθοι καὶ εὐδόκιμοι, but here he paraphrases οἷς ἔστιν καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πόλλα ἀγαθά. As βίος καὶ δόξα are themselves good things, Callicles' usage suggests indeed that he calls καλοὺς κάγαθούς those οἷς ἔστιν πόλλα ἀγαθά. That is not at all far away from Socrates' question at 497e: τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῆ;

I think, therefore, that one need not suppose that Callicles need have interfered at this point on grounds of the content of Socrates' question which in terms of the dramatics of the dialogue may even contain a deliberate verbal allusion on Socrates' part to the closing sentence of Callicles', just as the latter's words are echoed by Socrates at 490e when he says: ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἴσως τὰ τοιάδε· οἷον γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα περὶ γῆν φρόνιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, τοῦτον δὴ ἴσως πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ ὡς πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ γῆν. This part as well of Socrates' examination begins with an address in the second person singular and is thus phrased in a way to suggest that 'what Callicles says' is of interest to Socrates. In his search for what Callicles meant by declaring that 'the better men' had by nature a right *to have more*, πλεονεκτεῖν or πλεόν ἔχειν, he modifies Callicles' phrase καλὸν κάγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον by saying φρόνιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. It is to be noted, though, that this modification is not distorting, and that although it was Socrates who at 489e introduced the term φρόνιμος by asking: ... τοὺς βελτίους καὶ

κρείττους πότερον τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλους τινάς, Callicles had used φρονεῖν in his final exhortation at 486c, and he readily picks up Socrates' suggestion when he confirms (490a): ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ λέγω. τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίω ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλεον ἔχειν τῶν φαυλοτέρων.

More importantly, if Socrates is in accordance with Callicles' usage and sentiments in asking (497e): τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῆ, one need not speculate at this point what Socrates could have meant by ἀγαθά, or what he wanted Callicles to understand, or how Callicles understood it. The content of ἀγαθά need not be specified for Callicles, since he cannot be expected to find fault at this point with an expression he himself had used.<sup>86</sup> This is not to deny that Socrates knew where he wanted the argument to be leading to. It is, however, to forestall attacks on Socrates by modern readers of the dialogue who suggest that Socrates' question is both misconceived and unfair in suggesting that Callicles calls τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς<sup>87</sup>.

When Socrates asks Callicles (497e): τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῆ, he uses ἀγαθῶν παρουσία in just the same way Euripides had used κακῶν παρουσία (*Hecuba* 227f.). κάλλος πάρεστι has its parallel in Anacreon's ἦβη πάρα. Likewise with Socrates' and Callicles' exchange at 498d2: οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῆς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθοὺς, καὶ κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας; - ἔγωγε. - οὐκοῦν τοῖς

<sup>86</sup> Cf. also *Gorgias* 461b4: ΠΩΛΟΣ ... ἢ οἶει - ὅτι Γοργίας ἠσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογήσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ, ... ;

<sup>87</sup> Pace T. Irwin, *Plato. Gorgias*, Oxford 1979, p. 203. Cf. E.R. Dodds, op. cit., p. 314. Dodds renders ἀγαθῶν παρουσία by "owing to the presence in them of good things". 'In them' seems to me to be an addition, and it leads to confusion with Irwin who adopts it (loc. cit.).

χαίρουσιν πάρεστιν τὰγαθά, αἱ ἡδοναί, εἴπερ χαίρουσιν; - πῶς γὰρ οὐ; - οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες; - ναί. - τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστιν τὰ κακά, αἱ λῦπαι; - πάρεστιν. - κακῶν δέ γε παρουσία φῆς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακοὺς: ἢ οὐκέτι φῆς; - ἔγωγε. As we have seen, the use of ἀγαθά, κακά, ἡδονή, and λύπη as subjects to παρῆναι has its precedents in poetical and philosophical usage.

The same is true with Socrates' second dealing with that topic (*Gorgias* 506c - 508c). Socrates declares (506c9): ἡδὺ δέ ἐστιν τοῦτο οὐ παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα, ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὐ παρόντος ἀγαθοί ἐσμεν; ... ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ὅσ' ἀγαθά ἐστιν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης; ... ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἢ γε ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὖ καὶ ζώου παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῆ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ... ; Again, ἡδύ and ἀγαθόν are present. ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης and ἀρετὴ παραγίγνεται, however, are expressions introduced here for the first time in the dialogue.

The expression ἀρετὴ παραγίγνεται and the notion connected with it is found elsewhere in Plato's early dialogues. The opening question of the dialogue *Meno* is (70a1): ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄρα διδακτὸν ἢ ἀρετῆ; ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἀλλ' ἀσκητόν; ἢ οὔτε ἀσκητόν οὔτε μαθητόν, ἀλλὰ φύσει παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ; This is an elaborate Gorgianic period, and we learn presently that Meno who asks Socrates this question is himself a pupil of Gorgias. Socrates explains that, before deciding that, one has to know what ἀρετὴ is. When Socrates poses this question for the fifth or sixth time after various unsuccessful attempts at an answer by Meno, Meno repeats his original request (*Meno* 86d1): ἀλλ' ἔγωγε ἐκεῖνο ἂν ἥδιστα, ὅπερ ἠρόμην τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ σκεψαίμην καὶ ἀκούσαιμι, πότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὄντι αὐτῷ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ ὡς φύσει ἢ ὡς τινὶ ποτὲ τρόπῳ παραγιγνομένης τοῖς

ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀρετῆς. Eventually, it is Socrates who summarises their efforts at the end of the dialogue. He says to Meno (99e2): εἰ δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καλῶς ἐζητήσαμεν τε καὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θεία μοίρα παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται, εἰ μὴ τις εἴη τοιοῦτος τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν οἶος καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι πολιτικόν. The repetition of the words, not only the thought of ἀρετὴ παραγίγνεται, suggests that they were a sort of set phrase, perhaps a stock topic of Gorgias' own teaching.

Earlier than that, in the *Protagoras*, Protagoras declares in the explanation following his myth (323c4): ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντ' ἄνδρα εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς σύμβουλον διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι παντὶ μετεῖναι αὐτῆς, ταῦτα λέγω: ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φύσει ἡγούνται εἶναι οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ἀλλὰ διδακτόν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας παραγίγνεσθαι ᾧ ἂν παραγίγνηται, τοῦτό σοι μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι. That in saying οὐ φύσει Protagoras means 'not by nature *alone*' is evident from 327b/c where he admits differences in skill, and analogously ἀρετῆ, according to an individual's being εὐφυῆς or ἀφυῆς respectively. All that is said in what Socrates later (329a,b etc.) calls a μακρὸς λόγος. In a fragment of one of Protagoras' own writings, referred to as μεγὰς λόγος, Protagoras expresses a similar thought (DK 80B3). ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ 'μεγάλῳ λόγῳ' ὁ Πρωταγόρας εἶπε· 'φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῖται' καὶ 'ἀπὸ νεότητος δὲ ἀρξάμενος δεῖ μανθάνειν'.

While the *Protagoras* contains constructive doctrines proposed by the master, the *Euthydemus* is full of destructive arguing by two of his adherents<sup>88</sup>. In their manner of speaking and, most of all, their usage<sup>89</sup> they follow Protagoras, and their program as well is modelled on his. In the beginning of the dialogue, the younger brother

<sup>88</sup> Cf. *Euthydemus* 286c.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. F.G. Herrmann, *Wrestling Metaphors in Plato's Theaetetus*, in: NIKEPHOROS 8 (1995), 77 - 109, pp. 101 - 106.

Euthydemus declares (273d8): ἀρετήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἴομεθα οἶω τε εἶναι παραδοῦναι κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τάχιστα. Here παραδοῦναι is the *causative* or *factitive* to παραγίγνεσθαι; by their action of ἀρετήν παραδοῦναι they effect ἀρετήν παραγίγνεσθαι. The common prefix παρα- is suggestive of the semantic relation.

While in many respects the *Euthydemus* is connected with the sophist Protagoras, Euthydemus' statement a few lines later (274a10), ἐπ' αὐτό γε τοῦτο πάρεσμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, is strongly reminiscent of the opening paragraphs of the *Gorgias* where Chaerephon uses the same words in response to Callicles when he says (447b6): ἐπ' αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν, even if the context of the remark is a different one. Reminiscent of the dialogue *Gorgias* as well, both in usage and in content, is the following passage from the *Euthydemus* (280b1): συνωμολογησάμεθα τελευτῶντες οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἐν κεφαλαίῳ οὔτω τοῦτο ἔχειν, σοφίας παρούσης, ᾧ ἂν παρῆ, μηδὲν προσδεῖσθαι εὐτυχίας· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦτο συνωμολογησάμεθα, πάλιν ἐπυνθανόμην αὐτοῦ τὰ πρότερον ὠμολογημένα πῶς ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχοι. ὠμολογήσαμεν γάρ, ἔφην, εἰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ πολλὰ παρείη, εὐδαιμονεῖν ἂν καὶ εὖ πράττειν. - συνέφη. - ἄρ' οὖν εὐδαιμονοῖμεν ἂν διὰ τὰ παρόντα ἀγαθὰ, εἰ μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῖ ἢ εἰ ὠφελοῖ; The substitution of σοφία for ἀρετή had been effected by Socrates at 237d,e where he moves from ἀρετή, the term used by Euthydemus, first to ἐπιστήμη, and then to σοφία. Otherwise, the affinity of this passage to *Gorgias* 497f. and 506f. is remarkable. Incidentally, the statement that εἰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ πολλὰ παρείη, εὐδαιμονεῖν ἂν καὶ εὖ πράττειν <ἡμᾶς> which is readily agreed upon here can serve as external confirmation for the conclusion reached above for reasons internal to the *Gorgias*, that the similar statement there could be readily understood by all present.<sup>90</sup>

<sup>90</sup> T. Irwin, op. cit., p. 219, objects to Socrates' argument at *Gorgias* 506c,d: "Socrates begins with the over-simplified account of the relation between the presence of a good and a person's being good, which he used against Callicles at 497de. Here he also claims that the presence of goods produces 'goodness'

While that passage of the *Euthydemus* pointed to its connection with the *Gorgias*, a related one two pages later suggests the theme of Gorgianic *Meno* and the *Protagoras*<sup>91</sup> (*Euthydemus* 282c2): πάνυ μὲν οὖν εὖ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ἦ δ' ὅς. - εἰ ἔστι γε, ὦ Κλεινία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ σοφία διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ... .

The thought of ἀρετὴ παραγίγνεται is thus present in the context of Plato's dialogues with both the Sophist Protagoras and his followers, and the rhetor Gorgias and his pupils. It is clearly connected with education, and even if in what is reported *verbatim* of either Protagoras or Gorgias they do not use those words, I think it can be deduced with a fair degree of certainty from the four dialogues *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, *Meno* and *Euthydemus* that the phrase ἀρετὴ παραγίγνεται itself was current among the Sophists.

## V.

If all that be so, if Plato's usage at *Gorgias* 497f. and 506f. has its precedents with regard to both the semantic and the syntactic conventions of παρῆναι, παρουσία, and παραγίγνεσθαι, is that to say that there is nothing unusual or new at all with Socrates' question (497e): τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσία ἀγαθοὺς

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(excellence, virtue; *arete*; see 457c) in whatever it is present in - an equally implausible claim. The parallel with 'When pleasure is present, we have pleasure (enjoyment)' should surely be 'When good is present, we are well off (i.e. it is good for us).'... ." To leave aside the confusion over 'presence *in* something' - cf. Section IV. n. 87 above - the objection loses its ground in the light of this statement in the *Euthydemus*. If it is at all correct to say that εἰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ πολλὰ παρῆναι, εὖ ἂν πράττειν <ἡμᾶς>, and if overall εὖ πράττειν equals εὐδαιμονεῖν, and if εὐδαιμονεῖν and ἀγαθός εἶναι are the same thing, then it is not objectionable to hold with Socrates and Callicles (506c9) that as ἡδὺ δέ ἐστιν τοῦτο οὐ παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα, so ἀγαθὸν δέ οὐ παρόντος ἀγαθοί ἐσμεν. The difficulty for both the ancient and the modern reader does not lie with the language or the logic of Socrates' argument, but with a basic disagreement over what is good. It is resolved when the ἀγαθὰ of the protasis really are ἀγαθὰ.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. also 274d,e.

καλείς, ὥσπερ καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρή; Is it correct unqualifiedly to adduce as a similar and comparable case *Charmides* 158e7, δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εἶ σοι πάρεστιν σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν, and to assume that that is common Greek from Homer onwards?<sup>92</sup>

In one point, I think, *Gorgias* 497e1f. does differ from both the pre-Platonic examples discussed above and the early Platonic examples collected in the previous section - but I am not sure if that is a matter of usage.

When Homer says εἶ μοι δύναμις γε παρείη (*Iliad* 22, 20), that is virtually the same as εἶ δυναίμην γε (cf. *Iliad* 1, 393). A sentence like *Odyssey* 17, 347, αἰδῶς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρήμενῳ ἄνδρι παρῆναι, as good as amounts to saying either αἰδεσθαι οὐκ ἀγαθὸν κεχρήμενῳ ἄνδρι or κεχρήμενῳ ἄνδρι οὐκ ἀγαθὸν αἰδοίω εἶναι. In these and most of the other cases cited in the previous sections, the phrase containing the verb παρῆναι could be replaced by a phrase containing an adjective or a verb which expressed the notion denoted by the respective subjects to the verb παρῆναι. In each case it would be difficult to say wherein the exact difference between the two corresponding clauses lies.

A good example of this apparent semantic equivalence of different ways of phrasing the same thought is *Charmides* 158b: εἶ μὲν σοι ἤδη πάρεστιν, ὡς λέγει Κριτίας ὅδε, σωφροσύνη καὶ εἶ σῶφρων ἰκανῶς, οὐδὲν ἔτι σοι ἔδει ... . ° εἶ δ' ἔτι τούτων ἐπιδεῆς εἶναι δοκεῖς, ἐπαστέον πρὸ τῆς τοῦ φαρμάκου δόσεως. αὐτὸς οὖν μοι εἶπε πότερον ὁμολογεῖς τῷδε καὶ φῆς ἰκανῶς ἤδη σωφροσύνης μετέχειν ἢ ἐνδεῆς εἶναι; Here it seems as if to the native Greek speaker, σῶφρων εἶ, σωφροσύνη πάρεστιν σοί, and

<sup>92</sup> Cf. Dodds, op. cit., ad loc. G. Vlastos, *The Individual as Object of Love in Plato*. Appendix I: *Is the Lysis a Vehicle of Platonic Doctrine?*, in id., *Platonic Studies*, Princeton 1973, pp. 35 - 37. Irwin, op. cit., ad loc. - For *Charmides* 157a6, cf. the discussion in the chapter on ἐγγίγνεσθαι and ἐνεῖναι below.

σωφροσύνης μετέχεις were not only describing the same state of affairs, but were also otherwise fully equivalent.<sup>93</sup>

All three phrases say something about the person they are predicated of. They say of Charmides that he is moderate. In the fifth century at least, that does not presuppose anything about the status of what is predicated. It does not imply anything about σωφροσύνη. If σωφροσύνη πάρεστιν σοί and σώφρων εἶ are equivalent, σωφροσύνη need not be anything in itself.<sup>94</sup>

Charmides exists, and he is moderate. But does moderation exist? - A native speaker employing the phrase σωφροσύνη πάρεστιν need not have thought about σωφροσύνη as something in its own right at all. That is different with *Charmides* 158e7: δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εἶ σοι πάρεστιν σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν. Instead of declaring that “if moderation ‘is to’ Charmides one can say something about Charmides”, Socrates postulates that “if moderation ‘is to’ Charmides one can say something about moderation”. - That is Socrates’ new and original assumption.

The question τί ἐστι ἀρετή can be, and in Platonic dialogues frequently is, understood as a question about people. It is understood that way notably by Socrates’ interlocutors. As such, it is not Socrates’ question but a question which belongs to his times and circumstances. Only if τί ἐστι ἀρετή, or τί ἐστι σωφροσύνη, is understood as a question about ἀρετή and about σωφροσύνη, and not about people’s being good and people’s being moderate, ἀρετή and σωφροσύνη respectively can be regarded as something in their own right. That, of course, does as yet not tell us anything about the status assigned to them, it does not even imply that they were thought of as

<sup>93</sup> The same could presumably be said of σωφρονεῖς. Cf. *Protagoras* 332a - e, with comments by W. Wieland, *Platon und die Formen des Wissens*, Göttingen 1982, p. 138f. There, however, it is not clear to me if ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης πράττειν really is in conformity with common Greek usage, but that does not affect Wieland’s general point. Cf. generally J. Lyons, *Structural Semantics. An Analysis of Part of the Vocabulary of Plato*, Oxford 1969.

<sup>94</sup> Cf. Section I above.

having any particular status. Asking for ἀρετή and σωφροσύνη, however, rather than for a person's being good or moderate, is a premise to asking what status ἀρετή and σωφροσύνη have. *Charmides* 158e7, δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εἴ σοι πάρεστιν σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν, implies that σωφροσύνη is something - at least an object of thought.

In the same way, *Gorgias* 497e1f., τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῆ, implies that both ἀγαθά and κάλλος are something. Just as at *Charmides* 158e7, Socrates assumes that if one has moderation, one can pronounce an opinion about moderation, so at *Gorgias* 497e1 he postulates a relation between good people and something good, between beautiful people and beauty. Regardless of how that relation is conceived - the instrumental dative παρουσίᾳ suggests a causal relation - for there to be a relation there have to be *relata*.

The ἀγαθά by whose presence good men are called good are something distinct from those good men. Likewise with the second clause. While κάλλος πάρεστιν αὐτῷ can be said to equal καλός ἐστιν, in which case nothing is implied as to what κάλλος may be, saying that that person is beautiful 'to whom there is beauty'<sup>95</sup> implies that that beauty is something distinct from that person. As we have seen,<sup>96</sup> in the case of the ἀγαθά it need not be surprising either to find that they are something distinct<sup>97</sup>, or that it is their presence by which people are said to be good. - What is surprising is that κάλλος, beauty, is said to be something distinct in the same way.

<sup>95</sup> Note especially that κάλλος is in the singular and καλούς in the plural.

<sup>96</sup> See Section IV above.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. *Gorgias* 486b.

## VI.

498d2 does not offer anything more specific on the relation between ἀγαθά and ἀγαθοί either: οὐκ οἴσθ' ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῆς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθοὺς, καὶ κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας; - ἔγωγε. - οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσιν πάρεστιν τὰ ἀγαθὰ, αἱ ἡδοναί, εἴπερ χαίρουσιν; - πῶς γὰρ οὔ; - οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες; - ναί. - τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστιν τὰ κακὰ, αἱ λῦπαι; - πάρεστιν. - κακῶν δέ γε παρουσίᾳ φῆς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακοὺς. ... . Here it is not only stated that the good are good by the presence of good things, but also that *'to those who are cheerful (or: experience pleasure) there are the good things, the pleasures, if only they are cheerful.* That is on the premise that all that is good is pleasure. But on that assumption, it seems, the two statements that 'someone is good or experiences pleasure' and 'good things or pleasures 'are to' someone' are materially equivalent: 'those who experience pleasure experience pleasure if and only if good things or pleasures 'are to' them'.

Neither this nor the following passage, however, specify the precise nature of the relation which underlies this concomitance of 'good things being present' and 'people being good'. Instead, *Gorgias* 506c9 presents further difficulties. On the newly granted assumptions that good is not the same as pleasant, and that we do what we do for the sake of the good, Socrates declares: ἡδὺ δὲ ἐστὶν τοῦτο οὗ παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα, ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοί ἐσμεν; - πάνυ γε. - ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ὅσ' ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης; - ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. - ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἢ γε ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὖ καὶ ζώου παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῆ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ... ;

The passage gives rise to a number of questions without providing the answers. First, as noted above, *παραγίγνεται* refers to a process, not to a state of affairs. Something comes to be present. Does what comes to be present exist before it comes to be present, or does it not? Secondly, while at 497f. Socrates spoke of *ἀγαθά* which are present, at 506 it is *ἀγαθόν*. This term, the adjective in the neuter singular, was introduced in a natural way in the context of discussion of the goal of and motivation for our actions. Does replacing *ἀγαθά* by *ἀγαθόν* make a difference to the content of the statement at 506? Does the introduction of the term *ἀρετή* make a difference to the argument? And fourthly, is it the same relation which holds between the *ἀγαθά* and the *ἀγαθοί* at 497f. and that at 506 between the *ἀγαθόν* on the one hand, the *ἀγαθοί* and all that is *ἀγαθά* on the other? - Answers to at least some of these questions are suggested by points raised in the dialogues from the *Meno* onwards; that is not to suggest, though, that Plato had an answer ready at the time of composition of the *Gorgias*.

## VII.

The question raised by Socrates half way through the short dialogue *Lysis* is (212a8): *ἐπειδάν τις τινα φιλήῃ, πότερος ποτέρου φίλος γίγνεται, ὁ φιλῶν τοῦ φιλουμένου ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος τοῦ φιλοῦντος*. In the course of answering, investigation is extended to cover the meaning of *φίλος* in all its applications. In a conversation with Menexenos, Socrates explores the uses of the word *φίλος* as an active, a passive, and a reciprocal term. Next, in a conversation with Lysis, he propounds 'the poets' saying' that *τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ φίλον εἶναι* (214b3). This is modified since the bad person or thing cannot be friend of or with anything at all, the good one, on the other hand, seems to be self-sufficient, and therefore not to be in need of anything or anyone. So, again with a poet's support, the opposite

opinion is reached, τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ μάλιστα φίλον εἶναι (216a4). The implications of that appear to be nonsense.

Thus at 216c, Socrates has a new suggestion: that the neither good nor bad is friend of the good. This is elaborated by way of a medical example (217a,b): the diseased person's body, being neither good nor bad as a body, longs for and is friend of medicine through illness, διὰ νόσον. From there, Socrates continues (217b4): τὸ μήτε κακὸν ἄρα μήτ' ἀγαθὸν φίλον γίγνεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διὰ κακοῦ παρουσίαν. - ἔοικεν. - δῆλον δέ γε ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι αὐτὸ κακὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ οὐ ἔχει. οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε κακὸν γεγονὸς ἔτι ἂν τι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐπιθυμοί καὶ φίλον εἶη· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἔφαμεν κακὸν ἀγαθῷ φίλον εἶναι. - ἀδύνατον γάρ. - σκέψασθε δὴ ὃ λέγω. λέγω γὰρ ὅτι ἔνια μὲν, οἷον ἂν ἦ τὸ παρόν, τοιαῦτά ἐστι καὶ αὐτά, ἔνια δὲ οὐ. ὥσπερ εἰ ἐθέλοι τις χρώματί τῳ ὁτιοῦν ἀλείψαι, πάρεστίν που τῷ ἀλειφθέντι τὸ ἐπαλειφθέν. - πάνυ γε. - ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἔστιν τότε τοιοῦτον τὴν χροάν τὸ ἀλειφθέν, οἷον τὸ ἐπόν;<sup>d</sup> - οὐ μανθάνω, ἦ δ' ὅς. - ἀλλ' ὦδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. εἰ τίς σου ξανθὰς οὔσας τὰς τρίχας ψιμυθίῳ ἀλείψειεν, πότερον τότε λευκαὶ εἶεν ἢ φαίνοντ' ἂν; - φαίνοντ' ἂν, ἦ δ' ὅς. - καὶ μὴν παρείη γ' ἂν αὐταῖς λευκότης. - ναί. - ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἂν εἶεν λευκαὶ πῶ, ἀλλὰ παρούσης λευκότητος οὔτε τι λευκαὶ οὔτε μέλαιναί εἰσιν. - ἀληθῆ. - ἀλλ' ὅταν δὴ, ὧ φίλε, τὸ γήρας αὐταῖς ταῦτόν τοῦτο χρῶμα ἐπαγάγη, τότε ἐγένοντο οἷόνπερ τὸ παρόν, λευκοῦ παρουσία ἢ λευκαί. - πῶς γὰρ οὐ; - τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ νῦν δὴ, εἰ ὧ ἂν τι παρῆ, τοιοῦτον ἔσται τὸ ἔχον οἷον τὸ παρόν· ἦ ἔαν μὲν κατὰ τινα τρόπον παρῆ, ἔσται, ἔαν δὲ μή, οὐ; - οὕτω μᾶλλον, ἔφη. - καὶ τὸ μήτε κακὸν ἄρα μήτ' ἀγαθὸν ἐνίστε κακοῦ παρόντος οὐπὼ κακὸν ἔστιν, ἔστιν δ' ὅτε ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον γέγονεν. - πάνυ γε. - οὐκοῦν ὅταν μήπω κακὸν ἦ κακοῦ παρόντος, αὕτη μὲν ἢ παρουσία ἀγαθοῦ

αὐτὸ ποιεῖ ἐπιθυμεῖν· ἢ δὲ κακὸν ποιούσα ἀποστερεῖ αὐτὸ τῆς τε ἐπιθυμίας ἅμα καὶ τῆς φιλίας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐστὶν<sup>218</sup> οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ κακόν· φίλον δὲ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐκ ἦν. (Having obtained consent on that last point, Socrates resumes the argument after a brief digression.)<sup>218b6</sup> νῦν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Λύσι καὶ Μενέξενε, παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐξευρήκαμεν ὃ ἐστὶν τὸ φίλον καὶ οὔ. φαμέν γὰρ αὐτό, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ πανταχοῦ, τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθὸν διὰ κακοῦ παρουσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον εἶναι. - παντάπασιν ἐφάτην τε καὶ συνεχωρείτην οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν.

On the basis of what has been said in the previous sections, this passage can be dealt with briefly. The κακόν which is present could be something external or internal. It is distinct from that 'to which it is'. It affects that 'to which it is' just as if it were something active (... γίγνεται ... διὰ κακοῦ παρουσίαν. ... γενέσθαι ... ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ οὐ ἔχει). As a result, that 'to which it is' may or may not become οἶον ἂν ἦ τὸ παρόν. In the example of something which by being present does not turn that 'to which it is' into something which is such as itself, what is present is something external. That its presence is of an external nature is emphasised by the phrase οἶον τὸ ἐπόν, in which παρόν is replaced by ἐπόν. In the example of something which by being present does turn that 'to which it is' into something which is such as itself (ἐγένοντο οἶόνπερ τὸ παρόν, λευκοῦ παρουσίᾳ λευκαί), what is present is something internal. The distinction between the two cases is being introduced to answer the question εἰ ὧ ἂν τι παρῆ, τοιοῦτον ἐστὶ τὸ ἔχον οἶον τὸ παρόν· ἢ ἐὰν μὲν κατὰ τινα τρόπον παρῆ, ἐστὶ, ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὔ; The same thing can be present in different ways.<sup>98</sup>

It is one thing to ask how successful an example 'white' or 'whiteness' in the context of 'real' and 'true' *versus* 'merely perceived' colour of hair is in the *Lysis*; and it may be

<sup>98</sup> λευκότης must therefore be taken as referring always to the colour, and at no place to the paint.

argued that, because colour is something so inextricably linked to the sense of vision, it is not a good example after all. It is quite a different matter to claim that Plato was not aware of the implications of the term *παρουσία* when composing the early dialogues. In the *Gorgias*, the word is used with apparent unconcern, but nevertheless in a fully conscious way, as analysis of 497f. has shown;<sup>99</sup> what is present there is not a physical, corporeal object; whether what is present there exists at all is a question not raised. Grammatically, though, *παρουσία* is treated identically in the *Gorgias* and in the *Lysis*. That is to say, the ox, whose presence meant so much danger to the integrity of Socrates' character at *Euthydemus* 301a, would not have threatened Lysis and Menexenus after their conversation with Socrates.

### VIII.

From Homer to Plato, usage of *παρεῖναι* is altogether uniform. Leaving aside impersonal use - a large number of composites in *-εστίv* may be used to denote 'it is possible' - the verb can refer to the presence of people, at a place, an event, a conversation; the present or contemporary time; and finally the presence of things, in the widest sense of that word. The things present may be material objects, but - from Homer onwards - they may just as well be in-corporeal entities. Present in that way are not only potentially divine powers, but a whole range of concrete and abstract things: forces, emotions, states of mind, qualities, properties, actions, passions.

The noun *παρουσία* is narrower in its application; it can denote the presence of the same sort of things the verb *παρεῖναι* does; it belongs to a different register, though, and when used in prose may well have had connotations of poetic style and gravity.

*παραγίγνεσθαι*, *come to be present*, on the other hand, tends to be used mostly with people in early texts; the rise of sophistic teaching and education, however, made it necessary to stress the advantages of acquisition of positive characteristics and abilities;

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<sup>99</sup> Cf. the discussion in Section IV above.

consequently, the application of the verb was extended in that context so as to cover all those qualities which were said to 'be present' with someone.

Sophistic education, influence of Gorgias and also Protagoras, is also the context in which that potentially ontologically significant sentence is pronounced at *Gorgias* 497e1: τὸς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῆ; It cannot be said, however, how abstract a thing either the ἀγαθά or κάλλος were thought to be, and, whether genuine or not, the *Hippias Major* should serve as a warning not to assume too readily that either was thought of as even potentially abstract. An advance towards that distinction is made, though, when παρουσία is employed and its meaning and implications discussed at *Lysis* 217ab, where it is established, at least partly explicitly, that things can be present in different ways with different consequences, and that the consequence of the presence of a thing to another thing or to a person depends also on what sort of thing it is.

## ΠΡΟΣΕΙΝΑΙ, ΠΡΟΣΓΙΓΝΕΣΘΑΙ

### I.

προσεῖναι is not παρεῖναι, προσγίγνεσθαι not παραγίγνεσθαι. προσεῖναι is 'to be besides', 'to be <to something> in addition <to something else>'. προσγίγνεσθαι is 'to get to besides', 'to accrue'; 'to be added to'. In the case of προσεῖναί τινι or προσγίγνεσθαί τινι, the dative, be it of whatever gender, depends on -εῖναι, as with the simplex or any other of its compounds; προσ- may be taken quasi-adverbially<sup>100</sup>. The two verbs may occur in Platonic dialogues in the context of discussion of ontological matters as shorthand for προσπαρεῖναι, προσπαραγίγνεσθαι, two formations not found with Plato, nor, as far as I am aware, in Greek texts earlier than Plato either. Some confusion is created by a manuscript reading at *Phaedo* 100d, and by the dialogue *Hippias Major*<sup>101</sup>. Since Plato does not employ either of the two verbs with great frequency, all the occurrences of προσεῖναι and προσγίγνεσθαι in the early dialogues will be discussed in this chapter. Before that, a few instances of the words in earlier Greek literature.

Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* is among the earliest extant texts containing either word. The herald of the army has arrived at Argos and has greeted the land and the gods, and praised Agamemnon, in the presence of the chorus of elderly citizens. In the ensuing exchange between the herald and the chorus-leader, the latter's warnings about what has

<sup>100</sup> Cf., on παρά and παρεῖναι, Section I of the chapter on παρουσία, παρεῖναι, and παραγίγνεσθαι, with note 65. For προσεῖναι and πρὸς with locative cf. E. Schwyzler, *Griechische Grammatik* II, p. 509, 512f.

<sup>101</sup> προσγίγνεσθαι is found as one of the terms in Ross' "group of words implying or suggesting the immanence of Forms" (*Plato's Theory of Ideas*, Oxford 1951, p. 228). He adduces *Hippias Major* 289d4, 8, e5, 292d1; *Phaedo* 100d6. As explained in the Introduction, I do not consider the *Hippias Major* as genuine; how προσεῖναι and προσγίγνεσθαι are employed there, is only one of the contributing factors. On *Phaedo* 100d6, see Section II of Part III below.

happened at home in the king's absence pass unheeded. Perceiving only a general air of lament, the herald gives a general description of the soldier's toils in war. *The toil and hard lodging*, μόχθος καὶ δυσουλία, in the narrow ships at sea. And he continues (558): τὰ δ' αὖτε χέρσῳ καὶ προσῆν πλέον στύγος· ... . *Then again on land, there was even greater pain in addition: ...* , and there follows a description of the adversities on land. – Toils are mentioned. Some are specified. Then some more are added to those mentioned already.

In Sophocles' *Ajax*, Tecmessa replies to Ajax' long speech which he concluded with the words (478): ἀλλ' ἢ καλῶς ζῆν ἢ καλῶς τεθνηκέναι | τὸν εὐγενῆ χρῆ. πάντ' ἀκήκοας λόγον. *It is necessary that a noble man live well, or be dead well. You have heard the whole speech.* Having reminded Ajax of their past, of their son, and of his parents, Tecmessa declares that in him, there is all that is left for her. And then (520): ἀλλ' ἴσχε κάμοῦ μνήστιν· ἀνδρὶ τοι χρεῶν | μνήμην προσεῖναι, τερπνὸν εἶ τί που πάθοι. | χάρις χάριν γάρ ἐστιν ἢ τίκτους' αἰεὶ· | ὅτου δ' ἀπορρεῖ μνήστις εὖ πεπονθότος, | οὐκ ἂν γένοιτ' ἔθ' οὗτος εὐγενῆς ἀνὴρ. *But have remembrance also of me: surely, it is necessary that, to a man, | there is recollection besides, if ever he suffers anything pleasant. | For grace it is that always brings forth grace: | but if remembrance flows away from one who has suffered something good, | this will no longer be a noble man.* Ajax' speech ended with a sententious remark on what is necessary for a noble man. Tecmessa refers to that when she ends her plea. She does not contest what Ajax has said. But she adds that, besides and in addition to what Ajax claimed, there is something else which is also necessary for the noble man. He must have remembrance in addition to whatever else Ajax considers relevant for himself to have.

Later on in the same play, Menelaus reproaches Teucer and commands him not to bury his brother. He founds his request for obedience on general principles of government. A city and an army cannot be ruled without a barrier of fear and shame. He continues

(1077): ἀλλ' ἄνδρα χρή, κἄν σῶμα γεννήσῃ μέγα, | δοκεῖν πεσεῖν ἄν  
κἄν ἀπὸ μικροῦ κακοῦ. | δέος γὰρ ᾧ πρόσσεστιν αἰσχύνῃ θ' ὁμοῦ, |  
σωτηρίαν ἔχοντα τόνδ' ἐπίστασο· | ὅπου δ' ὑβρίζειν δρᾶν θ' ἄ  
βούλεται παρῆ, | ταύτην νόμιζε τὴν πόλιν χρόνῳ ποτὲ | ἐξ οὐρίων  
δραμοῦσαν ἐς βυθὸν πεσεῖν. *But it is necessary that a man, even if endowed with  
a strong body, | is aware that he may fall, even if only through a small mishap. | Indeed,  
to whom there is fear besides and sense of shame at the same time, | understand him to  
be safe: | but where there is insolence and doing as one please, | this city consider - in  
time - | to fall from a plain sailing into the depth.* Again, the topic is what is necessary  
for a good man. Menelaus begins: 'even if he has a strong body'. That is not enough. In  
addition he must have fear and sense of shame. Fear and sense of shame must be there in  
addition to whatever else there is, otherwise there will not be salvation. Conversely,  
regardless of whatever else there is, even if a man has a strong body, 'if there is the  
insolence and doing whatever comes to mind on the spur of the moment', there will be  
disaster. ὅπου δ' ὑβρίζειν δρᾶν θ' ἄ βούλεται παρῆ – *where there is  
insolence and doing as one please*, it does not matter whatever else there is, it does not  
even matter if there is anything else at all. The passage illustrates well the difference  
between προσεῖναι and παρεῖναι<sup>102</sup>.

<sup>102</sup> Or, indeed, between προσεῖναι and any other compound of εἶναι. If, for example, it is true of  
something to say 'ἔνεστί τινι', and if there is something else of which that would also be true with  
regard to the same thing, one would normally say πρόσσεστι rather than προσένεσστι. Accordingly,  
we find in the Hippocratic *Diseases* I, 19, in a section on tubercles in the lung: ... ἀποξεραίνεται τε  
καὶ ἀποψύχεται, καὶ ξυμμύει τὰ φλέβια ἐν τῷ σώματι πάντα, ἅτε τοῦ αἵματος ἐξ  
αὐτῶν ἐκκεκαυμένου ὑπὸ πυρετῶν, ἐνίοτε δὲ ὑπὸ χρόνου τε πλήθους καὶ  
μεγέθους τῆς νόσου καὶ τῶν ἐνεόντων κακῶν καὶ τῶν προσεπιγιγνομένων. ... *he  
is dried up and breathes out his spirit, and all the small vessels in his body close, inasmuch as the blood  
from them is burnt out by the fevers, and sometimes also by the extent of time, by the magnitude of the  
disease, by the evils first present, and by those added.* (Text and translation: P. Potter, *Hippocrates* V,  
Cambridge/Massachusetts and London 1988.) As shown in Sections IV - VI of the chapter on ἐνεῖναι  
and ἐγγίγνεσθαι, these two verbs are common words used in the context of contracting and having a  
disease. So it is normal to speak of τῶν ἐνεόντων κακῶν. Those added are not προσεγγιγνόμε-  
να but, with pleonastic doubling of the prefix indicating addition, προσεπιγιγνόμενα. For the latter  
doubling, cf. *Diseases* I, 27; there, ἐπέλθοντα is taken up by προσεπιγίγνεται ἕτερα, then  
ἐπιγιγνομένων which, by way of a macabre pun, is set side by side with ἀπογίγνονται, the  
patients *expire*.

While in the last example the contrast was that of an able body which is there already, and soul or mind which has to be there in addition, the next presupposes that mind or understanding grows or is acquired when a person grows old. In Sophocles' *Antigone*, Creon, the king, tries to establish for himself a position of sovereignty by dissociating himself from the elders and the rest of the people as ruler, from the members of his own family as elder. His exchange with his son Haimon is characterized throughout by their difference in age and generation. Creon's first address to his son commences ὦ παῖ (632), Haimon replies πάτερ, σός εἰμι· ... (635), whereupon Creon's long speech to his son begins with the words (639): οὕτω γάρ, ὦ παῖ, χρῆ διὰ στέρνων ἔχειν, | γνώμης πατρώας πάντ' ὀπισθεν ἑστάναι. *That way, indeed, child, things must stand in your mind, | nothing must be of higher rank than your father's 'good judgement'*. And for another seven lines he lays down the law on how good children must behave. Then he turns to his proper subject, Haimon's relation to Antigone (648); this section, again, starts with an interjectory 'ὦ παῖ'. The tenor of the whole exchange is that the son, through lack of authority and position, but above all lack of age and experience, should submit his judgement to his father's. Haimon's second reply duly begins 'πάτερ' (683), but he continues: θεοὶ φύουσιν ἀνθρώποις φρένας, | πάντων ὅσ' ἔστι χρημάτων ὑπέρτατον. *The gods let understanding grow for men, | of all the goods we have the highest*. Thus insight is not determined by position and age alone. It is against this background that we have to read the final lines of Haimon's considerate, prudent, and altogether reverent speech (719): γνώμη γὰρ εἴ τις κάπ' ἐμοῦ νεωτέρου | πρόσσεστι, φήμ' ἔγωγε πρεσβεύειν πολὺ | φῦναί τιν' ἄνδρα πάντ' ἐπιστήμης πλέων· | εἰ δ' οὖν φιλεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο μὴ ταύτη ῥέπειν, | καὶ τῶν λεγόντων εἶ καλὸν τὸ μανθάνειν. *If, indeed, any 'good judgement' is also with me, the younger, I should certainly say that it would be by far the best thing that each and every man were by nature full of understanding: but since, indeed, it usually does not turn out that way, it is also a fine thing to learn when someone speaks well*. After an interspersed comment

by the chorus, Creon's answer is (726): οἱ τηλικοῖδε καὶ διδαζόμεσθα δὴ | φρονεῖν πρὸς ἀνδρὸς τηλικούδε τὴν φύσιν; *Of such an age, we should learn proper understanding from a man of his age?* The last words, τὴν φύσιν, refer back to Haimon's φῦναι. Haimon requests that, though on the assumption of his father knowledge is something added to one's being only with age, Creon should grant the possibility of his having γνῶμη, 'good judgement', a phrase borrowed from Creon's speech, despite his youth. *Good judgement* 'is to' the elder, it could 'be to' the younger 'in addition'. It is to be noted that, instead of the simple dative, Sophocles uses the prepositional phrase ἐπὶ ἐμοῦ. From the point of view of Haimon, γνῶμη ἔπεστι. But since he wants to grant Creon 'good judgement' and imply that his father does have 'good judgement', he declares: but in addition to you I have it as well. καὶ ἐπί, not ἐπί on its own, balances πρὸς.

A different case is Euripides *Phoenissae* 528. Iocaste admonishes her son: ὦ τέκνον, οὐχ ἅπαντα τῷ γήρᾳ κακά, | Ἐτεόκλεες, πρόσσεστιν· ἀλλ' ἡμπειρία | ἔχει τι λέξαι τῶν νέων σοφώτερον. *Child, not everything there is in addition to old age is bad, Eteocles: but experience can say something wiser than the young.* οὐχ ἅπαντα τῷ γήρᾳ κακά πρόσσεστιν - there are things which accompany old age when a woman has old age. Those things she has in addition to old age. The dative τῷ γήρᾳ depends on the prefix πρόσ-. The dative of the person 'to whom those things are' in addition to old age is left unexpressed.

A comparable construction is found with Kritias' sentence (DK 88B7): ἦν Λακεδαιμόνιος, Χίλων σοφός, ὃς τὰδ' ἔλεξε· | μηδὲν ἄγαν· καιρῷ πάντα πρόσσεστι καλά. *Once there was a Spartan, Chilon the sage, who spake thus: Nothing too much! Everything fine is there in addition to the right moment.* Here as well, all that is fine is there *for a human being*, but that is not stated. Everything fine is there at the same time with, and in that way in addition to, the right moment. When the

right time has come, nothing else than that which it brings with it will be needed in addition.

In fifth century prose as well, προσεῖναι is 'being there in addition'. At the beginning of II 99, Herodotus summarizes: μέχρι μὲν τούτου ὄψις τε ἐμὴ καὶ γνώμη καὶ ἱστορίη ταῦτα λέγουσά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦδε Αἰγυπτίους ἔρχομαι λόγους ἐρέων κατὰ τὰ ἤκουον· προσέσται δέ τι αὐτοῖσι καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς ὄψιος. *Up to now, what is said is what I have seen myself and my own judgement and experience, but from now on I proceed relating Egyptian stories according to what I have heard: but in addition to that, there will also be something of what I have seen myself.* There is a story he has heard. Besides, he adds a story from what he has seen. As with the poetical examples, what is there in addition is somehow of the same nature or status as that which is there already.

Likewise, at VII 173, when Herodotus recounts on the occasion of the gathering of a collected Greek army in defence of their country in Thessaly where a dispatchment of their infantry was sent by sea: ἐνθαῦτα ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο τῶν Ἑλλήνων κατὰ μυρίους ὀπλίτας συλλεγέντες, καὶ σφι πρόσην ἡ Θεσσαλῶν ἵππος. *There, nearly ten thousand Greek hoplites, gathered together, took up position, and with them was in addition the Thessalian cavalry.* There were soldiers; and in addition there were more soldiers. Again, what is there in addition is of somewhat like nature with what had been said to be there first.

This latter usage, προσεῖναι as well as προσγίγνεσθαι in a military context, seems to have been, if not technical, at least customary. So at V 103, Herodotus relates how the Ionians after having been defeated by the Persians did not cease in their efforts, though bereft of the Athenian *symmarchy*. On the contrary, they added various cities to their alliance: καὶ γὰρ τὴν Καῦνον πρότερον οὐ βουλομένην συμμαχεῖν, ὡς ἐνέπρησαν τὰς Σάρδις, τότε σφι καὶ αὕτη προσεγένετο. <sup>104</sup> Κύπριοι δὲ ἐθέλονταί σφι πάντες προσεγένοντο

πλήν Ἀμαθουσίων· ... . *And while Caunus first did not want to be an ally, now that they had burnt down Sardis even she 'added herself' to them. And all the Cyprian cities 'added themselves' willingly except for Amathousia.* προσγίγνεσθαι as 'to add oneself to' can naturally be used in the context of 'joining one's own forces with someone else's', or 'becoming an ally'.

Another instance of that is Thucydides VI 6; he has just given the catalogue of the Sicilian cities, their origin and inhabitants, and summarizes: *τοσαῦτα ἔθνη Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων Σικελίαν ᾧκει, καὶ ἐπὶ τοσῆνδε οὐσαν αὐτὴν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύειν ᾠρμηντο, ἐφιέμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει τῆς πάσης ἄρξαι, βοηθεῖν δε ἅμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ξυγγενέσι καὶ τοῖς προσγεγεννημένοις ξυμμάχοις. μάλιστα δ' αὐτοὺς ἐξώρμησαν Ἐγεσταίων πρέσβεις παρόντες καὶ προθυμότερον ἐπικαλούμενοι.* *Those were the Greek and foreign people who settled in Sicily, and against her, being that strong, the Athenians urged to send an army, desiring - that was in truth their reason - to rule over all of Sicily, at the same time wishing in a comely way to help their kinsmen, and the allies who had attached themselves besides. Most of all urged them the ambassadors of the Egestaeans, who were present and called for help rather eagerly.* Again, the general difference between προσεῖναι/προσγίγνεσθαι and παρεῖναι/παραγίγνεσθαι is apparent. The ambassadors from Egesta are present and call for help. They are with the Athenians. Their 'being close by' makes them παρόντες. An altogether different situation is characterized in the previous sentence. The Athenians have kinsmen in Sicily with whom they are naturally allied; over time, other allies have come into being and added their forces to the Athenians in addition to the Athenians' own and those allied forces already in existence. Since they have been added or have added themselves as allies, they are characterized as προσγεγεννημένοι ξύμμαχοι.

This usage of προσεῖναι in a military context may also be the explanation of the occurrence of the verb in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. In the *epirrhema* after the *parabasis*,

the *coryphaeus* addresses the audience and reproaches them for not showing due reverence for the Clouds, the only gods who consistently try to help the city (575 - 580). When the Athenians meant to elect Cleon as στρατηγός, *general in command*, it was the Elements who sent their warnings with thunder and lightning. Even the Sun, reports the chorus-leader, withdrew (586): ... | οὐ φανεῖν ἔφασκεν ὑμῖν, εἰ στρατηγήσει Κλέων. | ἀλλ' ὅμως εἴλεσθε τοῦτον. φασὶ γὰρ δυσβουλίαν | τῆδε τῆ πόλει προσεῖναι, ταῦτα μέντοι τοὺς θεοὺς | ἅττ' ἂν ὑμεῖς ἐξαμάρτητ', ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον τρέπειν. *And he said he would not shine for you if Cleon should be general. But yet you chose him. They say, indeed, that ill counsel 'is an ally' to the city, yet that the gods turn to the better whatever you get wrong.* The context is that of election to a military office. There, it is not unusual to have *δυσβουλία*, *ill counsel*, or *Δυσβουλία*, *Folly*, present as ally. The other allies, *ξύμμαχοι*, are mentioned, quite naturally, a few lines later (609). Having *Δυσβουλία* as a *daimon* or divine power, if that is felt necessary for this sort of explanation, would not be irritating in comedy, particularly in a passage with a number of gods not usually thus conceived: the Clouds themselves, Αἰθήρ (570), Ἀναπνοή and Ἀήρ (627).

It is to be noted that in the case of allies adding themselves, it is always the case that like is added to like, soldiers to soldiers, one military unit to another military unit, a person - man or god - to a group of people, one thing to another thing or group of things. This is also the case with an argument of Zeno of Elea, reported by Simplicius (*Physica* 139,5 = DK29B2): ἐν δὲ τούτῳ δείκνυσιν ὅτι οὐ μήτε μέγεθος μήτε πάχος μήτε ὄγκος μηθείς ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἂν εἴη τοῦτο. “εἰ γὰρ ἄλλῳ ὄντι”, φησί, “προσγένοιτο, οὐδὲν ἂν μείζον ποιήσειεν· μεγέθους γὰρ μηδενὸς ὄντος, προσγενομένου δέ, οὐδὲν οἶόν τε εἰς μέγεθος ἐπιδοῦναι. καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤδη τὸ προσγινόμενον οὐδὲν εἴη. εἰ δὲ ἀπογινομένου τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲν ἔλαττον ἐστὶ μηδὲ αὐ προσγινομένου ἀυξήσεται, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ προσγενομένου οὐδὲν ἦν

οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπογιγνόμενον.” *In that <book> he shows that of whatever there is neither size nor thickness nor weight: that <thing> would not ‘be’ either. “If indeed”, he says, “it got besides something else which is, it would make <that other thing> bigger in nothing: if indeed it is of no size, and it got besides, it can not give anything to the size on top of what is there. And in that way already, that which gets besides would be nothing. And if something will be smaller in nothing when a thing gets away, nor again will it increase when a thing gets besides, it is clear that that which got besides is nothing, and likewise that which got away.* Something of a certain size gets besides something else of a certain size, and something of a certain size gets away from something else of a certain size. In that they are of a certain size, those things have the same status. On the implicit assumption that everything there is has a certain size, Zeno states that if anything that gets besides or gets away without changing the size of that besides which it got or from which it got away, that thing will not ‘be’, or does not exist, at all. Regardless of how one evaluates this statement, in each case, Zeno speaks of two things which have in common that they are of the sort of things which exist and have size. In that case, one of them can get besides the other.

Part of the same discussion, with time as an additional factor, is an argument by Melissus, likewise reported by Simplicius. *That which is*, τὸ ὄν, “is everlasting, unlimited, one, and like throughout”. It cannot suffer anything since in the event a previous state would be other than an ensuing state so that *that which is* would no longer be one and like throughout. And he continues (*Physica* 111, 18 = DK30B7): ... . ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ μετακοσμηθῆναι ἀνυστόν· ὁ γὰρ κόσμος ὁ πρόσθεν ἔων οὐκ ἀπόλλυται οὔτε ὁ μὴ ἔων γίνεται. ὅτε δὲ μήτε προσγίνεται μηδὲν μήτε ἀπόλλυται μήτε ἑτεροιοῦται, πῶς ἂν μετακοσμηθὲν τῶν ἔόντων εἶη; ... . *But neither is it possible for it to be restructured. The structure, indeed, which is there beforehand, does not perish, nor does the one which ‘is not’ get there. But if nothing gets besides, and nothing perishes, and nothing alters, how would there be something restructured among what ‘is’?* And it does not feel pain since what

feels pain and what is healthy do not have the same power, that feeling pain being deficient and not everlasting: οὐδ' ἂν ὁμοῖον εἶη, εἰ ἀλγέοι· ἀπογινομένου γάρ τευ ἂν ἀλγέοι ἢ προσγινομένου, κοῦκ ἂν ἔτι ὁμοῖον εἶη. *And it would not be similar, if it felt pain: pain it would feel, indeed, if something got away or something got besides, and it would no longer be like.*

While Zeno's was a physical argument, Melissus' is a logical one. The concept of alteration, that is to say the introduction of time together with the - perhaps unwittingly - assumed position of the timeless spectator, opens up the possibility of lifting the restriction to physical elements as elements of structure which can be added or subtracted. The example, however, of change of health, conceived as addition or subtraction of something, seems to revert to a model of physical components making up the structure which is the whole. Within that model, what is being added or gets there besides is again of the same status as that which is there already - one structural element is added to another one, or to a group of others.

As always, things are slightly different when it comes to negations. In order to say that it is not the case that 'to or for someone or something, something is there in addition', it need not be presupposed that anything is there already, nor that that of which it is said that it need not be there exist itself at all, nor even that it would be possible for something to be there in the first place. An example is Sophocles *Trachiniae* 250f.: ... . τοῦ λόγου δ' οὐ χρὴ φθόνον, | γύναι, προσεῖναι, Ζεὺς ὅτου πράκτωρ φανῆ. *Grudge felt against the word must not be there in addition, my lady, where Zeus appears as the doer <of the deed>.* When Zeus does something, anything, there must not be grudge, ill-will, discontent. To a deed of Zeus, nothing need be added, no comment or anger must be there in addition. In a negative clause, as opposed to a positive clause, 'in addition' need not presuppose that anything else 'is there for' or 'to' the thing already.

In all the different genres of literature before Plato in which the words are used at all, in poetry and prose alike, there is a remarkable uniformity and constancy in the semantics of the verbs προσεῖναι and προσγίγνεσθαι, *to be* and *to get besides or in addition*. With the exclusion of negation which always is a special case, that which is there in addition is somehow like something which is there already. That which is there already is either mentioned explicitly or can be deduced from the immediate context. προσεῖναι and προσγίγνεσθαι are not simply *to be there* and *to get there*.

## II.

Comparing common usage with that of Plato's early dialogues, I cannot detect any difference in meaning. At *Gorgias* 469c, Polus asks Socrates if he would want to be a tyrant, someone who, in his city, has the power to kill or exile whomsoever he please, doing all that just according to his own opinion. Socrates decides to answer with a story (469d1): εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σὲ ὅτι “ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύνάμις τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· ... . *If, indeed, I said to you, having taken a dagger under the arm in the market place when it is filled with people: Polus, to me, a power and marvellous tyranny has just accrued, ... .* Socrates, as human being, has certain δυνάμεις, *powers, faculties, or abilities*. He takes a weapon. Now he has power in addition to that he had before. The new power has come into being for him in addition to those in existence, those he had already.

At the beginning of the *Charmides*, Socrates who has just returned from the battle at Potidaea, asks Chaerepho, Critias, and their companions in the palaestra of Taureus, about the state of philosophy among them in general, and in particular if among the young there were any distinguished in wisdom, or beauty, or both. This inspires Critias

to praise the physical beauty of his nephew Charmides who at that very moment is entering the palaestra with a number of friends. Socrates is impressed by his stature and beauty, and so are all the others present. They agree with Chaerephon when he tells Socrates just to wait until he undresses (154d5): οὕτως τὸ εἶδος πάγκαλός ἐστιν, *so altogether beautiful is he as to his appearance*. And Socrates continues: κάγώ, Ἡράκλεις, ἔφην, ὡς ἄμαχον λέγετε τὸν ἄνδρα, εἰ ἔτι αὐτῷ ἐν δὴ μόνον τυγχάνει προσὸν μικρόν τι. - τί; ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας. - εἰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τυγχάνει εὖ πεφυκώς. *And I said: Heracles, how invincible you describe the man, if only yet one more small thing there 'were to him in addition'.* - *What?, said Critias.* - *If he happened to be, I said, well-grown as to his soul.*

Charmides has a beautiful appearance, or, as the Greeks would say, 'to Charmides there is a beautiful appearance'. Socrates demands that, 'in addition, something else should be to him', he should have something else besides. Of the two things a man should have Socrates enquired about in the beginning, wisdom and beauty, Charmides has one; does he have the other in addition, is Socrates' question. The prefixed *προς-* makes sense only in a context in which it is implicitly or explicitly stated that something else is, or is supposed to be, there already.

Several times, Meno tries to answer in a way Socrates would accept the question what *ἀρετή*, *goodness*, is. After Socrates has made it clear, with the help of examples, how he conceives an answer according to and stemming from the whole of the subject, *κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετῆς περὶ ὅτι ἐστίν* (*Meno 77a*), not from one of its parts or aspects, Meno declares in a final effort that, with 'the poet', he thinks that 'goodness is that someone desiring fine things, *καλά*, has the power to obtain them'. Socrates obtains Meno's consent that everybody always wants what is fine and good, so that a difference in goodness would lie exclusively with the power to obtain fine or good things. Only then, he asks Meno if by 'good things', *ἀγαθά*, he means things like health

and riches. Meno agrees and adds gold and silver to the list; only such things are good. Thereupon Socrates asks (78d1): εἶεν. χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον πορίζεσθαι ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, ... . πότερον προστιθεῖς τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ, ὧ Μένων, τὸ δικαίως καὶ ὀσίως, ἢ οὐδέν σοι διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀδίκως τις αὐτὰ πορίζηται, ὁμοίως σὺ αὐτὰ ἀρετὴν καλεῖς; *Well then. To manage to obtain silver and gold is goodness, ... . Is it that you add to that obtention, Meno, 'justly and piously', or does it not make any difference for you, and even if someone manages to obtain all that unjustly, would you likewise call that goodness?* And when Meno agrees that that would be κακία, *badness*, Socrates concludes (78d7): δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ δικαιοσύνην ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ ὀσιότητα προσεῖναι, ἢ ἄλλο τι μόνιον ἀρετῆς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρετὴ, καίπερ ἐκπορίζουσα τὰγαθά. *So it is necessary, as it seems, that to that obtention, justice and moderation and piety be there in addition, or another part of goodness: otherwise, it will not be goodness even if enabling to obtain the good things.* On the level of description of the world with language, Socrates asks Meno if he does not want to add something to his thesis, his θέσις, which amounts to saying that to be able to obtain things of the sort specified as good things is goodness. He asks πότερον προστιθεῖς τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ ... τὸ δικαίως καὶ ὀσίως. προστίθημι, to lay down or set up in addition demarcates Meno's definition as his own product. He can modify it by laying down something in addition to what he has laid down already. Correspondingly, looking at the reality thus described, Socrates asks if when a man has πόρος, the obtention of the good things he desires, that is sufficient, or if he must have something else in addition. His question, δεῖ ἄρα ... τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ δικαιοσύνην ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ ὀσιότητα προσεῖναι, ἢ ἄλλο τι μόνιον ἀρετῆς, is parallel in terms of usage to the construction of Euripides *Phoenissae* 528 discussed in Section I above. There, it was old age to which it was said that other things were present in addition, when the situation was that of a woman's having old age and something else, experience, in addition. Here, it is πόρος, obtention,

to which it is said that there is something else in addition, when the situation is that of a man having obtention of good things and needing something else in addition. As said above, this part of the working or pragmatics of the language does not affect the range of meaning or the semantics of the verb προσεῖναι.

Subsequent to Meno's failure in that last attempt to answer Socrates' question, and to his professed confusion how anybody can at all find out anything he does not know, Socrates tries to demonstrate the possibility of learning and discovery under guidance by letting a slave of Meno's find out the way of geometrically doubling a square. Having in that way restored Meno to his spirits, Socrates wants to start afresh, but Meno interposes and demands to go back to his original question if goodness is taught and teachable or comes about by nature. Socrates, thus pressed, restates that of something of which he does not know what it is, he cannot say if it is such or such; but if Meno granted him an assumption about goodness, he would proceed to discuss if it is teachable or if it is not on that assumption. They agree that if goodness is one of the things about the soul which is like understanding, it is teachable and taught since what is teachable and taught is understanding and what is understanding is teachable and taught. They also agree that through goodness we are good, and that goodness is beneficial for us. If there is anything which is good and beneficial besides understanding, goodness need not be understanding. In an exclusive process, it is shown first of the good things previously so called by Meno, namely health, beauty, and riches, that they are beneficial only if used and employed correctly. Then Socrates turns to the things about the soul, namely moderation, justice, courage, intelligence, memory, magnanimity, and all such things. Socrates asks (88b1): σκόπει δὴ, τούτων ἅττα σοι δοκεῖ μὴ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλ' ἄλλο ἐπιστήμης, εἰ οὐχὶ τότε μὲν βλάπτει, τότε δὲ ὠφελεῖ; οἷον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἢ ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' οἷον θάρρος τι· οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαρρῆ ἄνθρωπος, βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῶ, ὠφελεῖται; *Now consider, of those, those which do not seem to you to be understanding but something other than understanding, if they do not*

*sometimes harm, at other times benefit? As with courage, if it is not reason but like a certain daring: is it not that whenever a man is daring without thought, he gets harmed, but whenever with thought, he benefits?*

On this occasion, Socrates separates courage, moderation and intelligence from reason and understanding, as far as we can tell in accordance with common practice, and obtains Meno's consent that they can be exercised with or without thought. Any engagement of the soul, if governed by reason, is beneficial. Socrates draws the conclusion (88c4): εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστὶν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι, φρόνησιν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ οὔτε ὠφέλιμα οὔτε βλαβερὰ ἐστὶν, προσγενομένης δὲ φρονήσεως ἢ ἀφροσύνης βλαβερὰ τε καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίνονται. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὠφελίμῳ γε οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν φρόνησιν δεῖ τιν' εἶναι. *So, if goodness is one of the things in the soul, and if it is necessary that it is something beneficial, it is necessary that it is reason, since all the things pertaining to the soul are for themselves neither beneficial nor harmful, but if reason is added or unreasonableness, they become harmful or beneficial. According to this argument, it is necessary that goodness as something beneficial is reason of some sort.* A man can have courage, moderation and intelligence. He benefits from them only if he uses them with understanding and thought. He needs reason in addition. If reason gets there in addition, exercising the other qualities will be beneficial and he will be good.

### III.

What was postulated at the beginning of Section I above is borne out by the evidence, προσεῖναι and προσγίγνεσθαι do indeed always denote a 'being besides' or 'being in addition'. The uniformity in application noted with regard to pre-Platonic usage is also

found with Plato's employment of the two verbs *προσεῖναι* and *προσγίγνεσθαι* in the early dialogues. When something 'is' or 'comes to be' in a certain area or sphere, regardless of which compound of the *simplicia* *εἶναι* and *γίγνεσθαι* applies, and something else 'is' or 'comes to be in addition', that is expressed with *προσεῖναι* and *προσγίγνεσθαι*.

## ENEINAI, ΕΓΓΙΓΝΕΣΘΑΙ

### I.

In the discussion between Socrates, Cebes, and Simmias at *Phaedo* 100b - 105e, it looks as if a lot of Socrates' final proof that the soul is immortal hinges on the fact that certain things like the beautiful itself, the good itself, and the large itself are in us and the other objects of this world, and determine what anything is, and what it is called, by being in them. ἐνεῖναι and ἐγγίγνεσθαι are terms used to denote that relation at 103b and 105b,c, but εἶναι ἐν is found much more frequently, with reference to the same sort of relation.

That has led students of Plato - to use conventional terminology - to postulate that 'forms are in particulars', or, more precisely, when 'forms', or 'ideas' are mentioned, *one* of the ways in which they are talked about suggests that they are *in* particulars. One representative opinion on *Phaedo* 102d7 is that "Socrates proceeds to point out that not only cannot an Idea itself be characterized by its opposite, but also the particularisation of one Idea in a particular thing cannot be characterized by the opposite Idea"; he also lists ἐν, εἶναι ἐν, ἐνεῖναι, ἐγγίγνεσθαι, κείσθαι ἐν, as the first sub-group of that "group of words implying or suggesting the immanence of the Forms". It is clear from the context that 'immanence' here is used as an ontological, not an epistemological term.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> W.D. Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, Oxford 1951, pp. 30, 228. - Ross seems to me to be a good guide to the *communis opinio* of his time, and for the points he discusses, *communis opinio* generally has not changed over the past 45 years. Cf. e.g. E.R. Dodds, *Plato. Gorgias*, Oxford 1959, p. 314; G. Vlastos, *An ambiguity in the Sophist*, in: id., *Platonic Studies*, Princeton 1973, p. 298f.; T. Irwin, *Plato. Gorgias*, Oxford 1979, p. 203.; cf. also G. Fine, *On Ideas*, Oxford 1993, pp. 50f., 52 with n. 33.

## II.

Before turning to Plato, I will look at the uses of the words ἐνεῖναι, εἶναι ἐν, and ἐγγίγνεσθαι in early Greek literature, to see what sorts of subject and object they could connect, and what sort of relation the verbs were used to denote. Then I will adduce instances of the verbs in early dialogues of Plato, and ask if there is anything in their employment there suggestive of a semantic development.

First, the purely spatial usage of the words will very briefly be considered. Whether or not we regard it as primary in origin, spatial usage is the example against which all other usages seem metaphorical. An early instance of the verb ἐνεῖναι - as opposed to εἶναι ἐν - in that spatial application is *Odyssey* 10, 45. On their way home from the island of Aeolus, Odysseus has fallen asleep. Since he had given strict orders not to touch the wine-skin entrusted to him by their host, his comrades expect it to contain a wealthy gift, and their leader addresses them: ... ἀλλ' ἄγε θᾶσσον ἰδώμεθα, ὅτι τὰδ' ἐστίν, | ὅσος τις χρυσός τε καὶ ἄργυρος ἀσκῶ ἐνεστιν. *Come, let us see quickly, what that is, how much gold and silver there is in the wineskin.*

Similarly, out of the eight occurrences of the word in Herodotus' *Histories*, five denote spatial 'being in'. People, animals, treasures are in houses or ships, the ring of Polycrates is in the belly of the fish. And Hecataeus, in many ways Herodotus' predecessor, says in a description of a foreign country (292 J.): ἐν τοῖσιν οὐρεσι δένδρεα ἐνὶ ἄγρια, *there are wild trees in those mountains.*

There are trees in the mountains. Should one say that this spatial use of ἐνεῖναι already is metaphorical? - That is perhaps not appropriate. It is worth noting, though, that there are two distinct concepts of 'being in'. Two different sorts of situation can be thought of and described in the same terms of 'being in'; for those trees are certainly not in the same way in the mountains as pieces of gold are in a wineskin, or a man in a house, or a ring in the belly of a fish.

Earlier than that, however, earlier even than the first attested usage of the verb connecting two material things, is an instance of a different kind of extension. In Book 24 of the *Iliad*, Priam scolds the Trojans who have gathered in his palace and sends them away with the words (XXIV 239): ἔρρετε λωβητῆρες ἐλεγχέες· οὐ νυ καὶ ὑμῖν | οἴκοι ἔνεστι γόος, ὅτι μ' ἤλθετε κηδήσοντες; *Go, worthless cowards: Is not there now wailing in the house also for you, that you come distressing me?* There is wailing in the house. Of course, one could say one of two things; either: what is meant is that there are people wailing in the house, and in that sense wailing is in the house; or: Γόος was a god or *daimon*, like Ἄιδώς at *Odyssey* XVII 347, or like Φόβος, Ἔρις, Ἀλκή and Ἴωκή at *Iliad* V 739f., or like Κράτος and Βία in Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*, and that therefore the example is just one of a person being in a house. If the need of explication is felt at all, however, if the clause '*there is wailing in the house for you as well*' is felt to require interpretation, a different kind of metonymy seems to be closer at hand: *there is cause for wailing in your houses, too*.<sup>104</sup> That would, if anything, be more abstract a notion. Quite apart from the interpretation of what γόος signifies in this particular case, though, introducing a noun of the class of words which can denote states of the mind of individuals, expressions or personal characteristics or qualities, opens up the possibility of using the same sort of thing as subject of the verb in other situations.

While it cannot be ruled out altogether that γόος with Homer is a *daimon* or spirit, the same could not be said of the next example. Early in the sixth century BC, Solon wrote in one of his elegies, in a tone of scornful exhortation, that men must not blame the gods for grief they suffer by their own fault, in this case tyrannical government. 'Each one of you', says Solon, 'looks for his own individual advantage' (11, 6): σύμπασιν δ' ὑμῖν χαῦνος ἔνεστι νόος, *in all of you together, however, there is a porous, empty mind*. Here mind, whatever else it may be, is neither a person nor a physical object, as

<sup>104</sup> Note, however, Ζεὺς ἄλγε' ἔδωκε in the next line; what is the ontological status of ἄλγεα?

φρήν, for example, could be said to be. And mind is said to be in a person or in a group of people.

This usage - something like mind being in someone - is common with the tragedians of the fifth century.<sup>105</sup> On one occasion, Aeschylus has material and non-material things as subjects to ἐνεῖναι side by side (*Sisyphus*, frg. 229f.): καὶ <γὰρ> θανόντων ἴσιν οὐκ ἔνεστ' ἰκμάς, ἰσοὶ δ' οὐκ ἔνεστι κῆκυς οὐδ' αἰμόρρυτοι | φλέβες. *For in the sinews of the dead there is no moisture, and in you there is no vigour, nor veins flowing with blood.*

It is difficult to say if the range of subjects to ἐνεῖναι was extended first to a person's qualities or characteristics, like κῆκυς, *vigour*, or to temporary states or actions of a person, like γόος, *wailing*. In some cases, it is hard to attribute that which is in someone to one of these categories at all. When Orestes says (*Electra* 1244), ὄρα γε μὲν δὴ κὰν γυναιξὶν ὡς ἼΑρης | ἔνεστιν, *I see that Ares is in women as well*, what is Ares? A general characteristic? A passing state? A set of thoughts or actions? Or, again, a god? This last possibility must be taken seriously, though it would lead too far to exploit it fully.

With Sophocles, at any rate, actions are prevailing as points of reference of the subjects of ἐνεῖναι. When Deianeira and her attendants hear of Heracles' imminent return at the beginning of Sophocles' *Trachiniae*, they rejoice. Deianeira, however, modifies cautiously (296): ὅμως δ' ἔνεστι τοῖσιν εὖ σκοπούμενοις | ταρβεῖν τὸν εὖ πράσσοντα μὴ σφαλῆ ποτε. *Yet there is 'fearing' in those who consider well the one who does well: lest he fall one day*; and she continues ἐμοὶ γὰρ οἴκτος δεινὸς εἰσέβη, φίλαι, *for powerful pity comes upon me, friends*, which seems to imply that pity, having entered her, is now in her.

<sup>105</sup> See, e.g., Sophocles, *Electra* 1328.

But as we have seen with Solon's νοῦς, it is not only emotions which are in men. So, a few scenes later in the same play, Deianeira declares before carrying out her plan to win back Heracles (591): οὕτως ἔχει γ' ἡ πίστις, ὡς τὸ μὲν δοκεῖν | ἔνεστι, πείρα δ' οὐ προσωμίλησά πω. *Such is <my> trust <in what has been done> that there is 'believing' in <me>, yet so far I have not engaged with experience.* Admittedly, it is conceivable that in this last case 'believing' is in the situation or the circumstances; I think that less likely, though.

Use of ἔνεστι in the sense of 'it is possible' will be passed over. There are cases where it seems that like ἔστιν, ἔξεστι, and sometimes πάρεστι, ἔνεστι could be employed that way, but a case such as *Antigone* 213, νόμῳ δὲ χρῆσθαι παντί πού γ' ἔνεστί σοι | καὶ τῶν θανόντων χῶπόσοι ζῶμεν πέρι, *in you, (Creon,) it is to use every law, both about the dead and about us who live,* makes it difficult to assert that the force of ἔνεστί σοι is just to denote possibility, *it is possible for you to use every law.* Alternatively one could render: 'the using every law is in you' which would not be English but serves to bring out the parallel to the foregoing examples. Then one could compare the grammatical subjects of ἔνεστι and say that while in the previous passage δοκεῖν as denoting an action can be seen as referring to a mental state, something internal, the last example shows an extension of the potential point of reference of the subject of ἐνεῖναι to action of whatever sort. *The using of the law* which is in Creon potentially refers to an externally manifested action.

A characteristic whose effects are external is found side by side with one whose effects are internal in Sophocles' late play *Electra*, a play also otherwise rich in constructions with both ἐνεῖναι and παρεῖναι. When Electra understands her sister to refuse help, she reproaches her (1032): ἄπελθε· σοὶ γὰρ ὠφέλησις οὐκ ἔνι. *Away, for in you there is no aiding.* To which Chrysothemis replies: ἔνεστιν· ἀλλὰ σοὶ μάθησις οὐ πάρα. *There is in <me>. But with you there is no learning.* It should be

noted that in this particular context, in the realm of personal qualities, ἔνεστιν and πάρεστιν seem to be interchangeable.

Before I leave Sophocles, let me mention one further case which may become important in a later context. With it, we leave the sphere of human beings as things in which something else *is*. The sort of characteristics we found as being in men can also be said to be in λόγοι, *words*, or *sentences*, or *speeches*, or perhaps *thoughts*. Again it is the late play *Electra* from which the first example is drawn. After a heated exchange between the two sisters, the chorus of attendants admonishes them to refrain from anger (369): ὡς τοῖς λόγοις | ἔνεστιν ἀμφοῖν κέρδος, ... . *As in your thoughts there is profit for both of <you>, ... .*

Likewise, we read in a fragment the general advice (frg. 259.1 Radt): ἔνεστι γάρ τις καὶ λόγοισιν ἡδονή, | λήθην ὅταν ποιῶσι τῶν ὄντων κακῶν ... . *For there is pleasure even in words, when they make you forget what is bad ... .* κέρδος, *profit*, and ἡδονή, *pleasure*, are said to be in the words. In both cases, it is not a consideration of or thought about ‘profit’ or ‘pleasure’ mentioned in the speeches, but the words ‘have it in them’ to be profitable or pleasurable.

To say that profit or pleasure are in the words, of course, may just be a manner of speaking, just as the λόγοι in the fragment are said to *make* or *produce* something, namely forgetfulness - grammarians could say the λόγοι are personified - and just as in the *Euthydemus* Socrates is told off for saying that ‘a sentence wants to say something’, where Dionysodorus exploits a colloquial expression by pretending that language is a logical construct (287c - e).

So long, however, as no other way of expressing a thought like ‘words can afford consolation’ is in use at all, one has to reckon with the possibility that in saying ‘pleasure is in the words’ the speaker thinks of ‘pleasure in the words’, literally, and not of ‘words

referring to' or 'reflecting' or 'causing pleasure', just as one must not exclude the possibility of Orestes' referring to a god when he says that 'Ares is in women, too'.<sup>106</sup>

### III.

Two more distinct applications of ἐνεῖναι have to be mentioned before we can turn to Plato: certain Presocratics, notably Anaxagoras, say that the elements they posit are in something, or something is in the elements. Simplicius reports (*Physica* 155, 23; DK 59B1): ὅτι δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας ἐξ ἑνὸς μίγματος ἄπειρα τῷ πλήθει ὁμοιομερῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι φησιν πάντων μὲν ἐν παντὶ ἐνότων, ἑκάστου δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν χαρακτηριζομένου, δηλοῖ διὰ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν φυσικῶν λέγων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς· “ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν, ἄπειρα καὶ πλήθος καὶ σμικρότητα· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σμικρὸν ἄπειρον ἦν. καὶ πάντων ὁμοῦ ἐόντων οὐδὲν ἐνδηλον ἦν ὑπὸ σμικρότητος· πάντα γὰρ ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθήρ κατεῖχεν, ἀμφοτέρα ἄπειρα ἐόντα· ταῦτα γὰρ μέγιστα ἔνεστιν ἐν τοῖς σύμπασι καὶ πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει”, *that Anaxagoras says that 'homoiomera', indefinite in amount, separate themselves out of one mixture, while all things are in everything, that each one of them is characterized by what is prevailing <in it>, may become clear from what he says at the beginning of his first book of Physics where he says: “Together were all things, indefinite both as to their amount and their smallness: for also the small was indefinite. And while all things were together, nothing was clear<ly discernible> through their smallness: for mist and aether held everything down, both of them being indefinite: for those are the biggest and most in all the things together, both as to their amount and as to their largeness.”*

<sup>106</sup> For ἠδονή as a goddess, cf. Crates 8, 9 Bergck.

If the identification of the last lines as genuine words of Anaxagoras is correct, he himself used the word ἔνεστιν to describe the relation he supposed to hold between individual elements and the whole of his κόσμος. Considering what else is reported of him, this seems to be altogether likely. ἐνεῖναι also occurs in two other passages in Simplicius commonly recognized as a genuine Anaxagorean fragments, *Physica* 34, 28; DK 59B4: τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων χρῆ δοκεῖν ἐνεῖναι πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς συγκρινομένοις καὶ σπέρματα πάντων χρημάτων καὶ ιδέας παντοίας ἔχοντα καὶ χροιάς καὶ ἡδονάς. ... πρὶν δὲ ἀποκριθῆναι ταῦτα πάντων ὁμοῦ ἐόντων οὐδὲ χροιῆ ἐνδηλος ἦν οὐδεμία· ἀπεκώλυε γὰρ ἡ σύμμιξις πάντων χρημάτων, τοῦ τε διεροῦ καὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ καὶ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τοῦ λαμπροῦ καὶ τοῦ ζοφεροῦ, καὶ γῆς πολλῆς ἐνεούσης καὶ σπερμάτων ἀπείρων πλήθος οὐδὲν ἑοικότων ἀλλήλοις. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἔοικε τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ. τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων ἐν τῷ σύμπαντι χρῆ δοκεῖν ἐνεῖναι πάντα χρήματα. *If that be so, it is necessary to believe that in everything combined there are many and varied <things>, namely seeds of all objects, having varied guises and colours and tastes, ... But before those were separated off, while everything was together, not a single colour was apparent: for the mixture of all things forbade that, of the moist and the dry, the warm and the cold, the bright and the sombre; and much earth was therein, and seeds unlimited in number, alike in nothing. For neither was any of the other things in anything like one another. If that be so, it is necessary to believe that in the all, all objects are in.*

With that, one can compare Simplicius *Physica* 164, 25 (DK 59B6): καὶ ὅτε δὲ ἴσαι μοῖραί εἰσι τοῦ τε μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ πλήθος, καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἶη ἐν παντὶ πάντα· οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἔστιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει. ὅτε τοῦλάχιστον μὴ ἔστιν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν

δύναιτο χωρισθῆναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅπωςπερ ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ νῦν πάντα ὁμοῦ. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ πολλὰ ἔνεστι καὶ τῶν ἀποκρινομένων ἴσα πλήθος ἐν τοῖς μείζοσι τε καὶ ἐλάσσοσι. *And when there are equal parts of the big and the small, as to their amount, also in that way everything would be in everything: nor is there being apart, but everything has a part of everything <together with everything else>. When there is nothing which is the smallest, no 'being parted' is possible, nor coming to be by itself, but as it was in the beginning, so now everything is together. And in everything there are many things of those separated off, equal in amount in the bigger and the smaller <things>.*

The same use of ἐνεῖναι in the context of physics is found with Diogenes of Apollonia, as with Anaxagoras both in the doxography and in what is recognized as his genuine words. (Aristotle, *de respiratione*, 2. 471a 3: Διογένης δ' ὅταν ἀφῶσι [οἱ ἰχθύες] τὸ ὕδωρ διὰ τῶν βραγχίων ἐκ τοῦ περι τὸ στόμα περιστῶτος ὕδατος ἔλκειν τῷ κενῷ τῷ ἐν τῷ στόματι τὸν ἀέρα ὡς ἐνόντος ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ἀέρος ... .) Again, it is Simplicius who preserves extensive extracts, among which we find the following (*Physica* 151): καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τὴν νόησιν ἔχον εἶναι ὁ ἀήρ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου πάντας καὶ κυβερνᾶσθαι καὶ πάντων κρατεῖν· αὐτὸ γὰρ μοι τοῦτο θεὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀφίχθαι καὶ πάντα διατιθέναι καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἐνεῖναι. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἐν ὅτι μὴ μετέχει τούτου· μετέχει δὲ οὐδὲ ἐν ὁμοίως τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ τρόποι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ τῆς νοήσιός εἰσιν. ἔστι γὰρ πολύτροπος, καὶ θερμότερος καὶ ψυχρότερος καὶ ξηρότερος καὶ ὑγρότερος καὶ στασιμώτερος καὶ ὀξυτέρην κίνησιν ἔχων, καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ ἑτεροιώσεις ἔνεισι καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ χροίης ἄπειροι. *And to me it seems that that which has understanding is what is called air by men, and that by it everything is governed, and that it has power over everything: and even that*

*seems to me to be god who has got to everything, who orders all things, and who is in everything; and there is not one thing that does not 'have of' it: but not one thing has <of it> in like wise with a single other one, but there are many ways both of air and of understanding. For it is manifold: warmer and colder, drier and moister, stiller and having quicker motion, and there are many alterations of taste and colour in it, unlimited.*

We see that as Anaxagoras had his many elements in everything, and νοῦς in some, so Diogenes has his one ἀήρ in everything. Diogenes here seems to be dependent on Anaxagoras. If there are many things it makes more sense to say that everything is in everything, since while it is not nonsensical to say that the one thing which in its undifferentiated form underlies everything is in all the differentiated things, this manner of speaking is more easily understood as transferred from a model of explanation of the world where there are many different things which can be said to be in the various things there are.

#### IV.

The other area abundant in ἐνεῖναι, and moreover ἐγγίγνεσθαι, is medicine. A brief glance at the entries of the two verbs in the new *Index Hippocraticus*<sup>107</sup> will suffice. About the general usage the editors comment: “*saepe de signis, velut ὀδύνη, δίψα, ἀψυχίη, βήξ, ὕπνος, καῦμα*”, *pain, thirst, fainting, cough, sleep, fever.*

In *Airs, Waters and Places*, for example, the author declares about cities exposed to cold winds (4, 33): τοῖσι δὲ παιδίοισιν ὕδρωπες ἐγγίγνονται ἐν τοῖσιν ὄρχεσιν, ἕως σμικρὰ ἦ· ἔπειτα, προϊούσης τῆς ἡλικίης,

<sup>107</sup> J.H. Kühn, U. Fleischer (eds.), *Index Hippocraticus*, Göttingen 1986/89.

ἀφανίζονται. 'Children suffer from dropsies in the testicles while they are little, which disappear as they grow older.'<sup>108</sup>

But since the various authors of the treatises were physicists as well as physicians, we also find physical elements being in the body as in e.g. the *Nature of Man* (1,5): οὔτε γὰρ τὸ πάμπαν ἥερα λέγω τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, οὔτε πῦρ, οὔτε ὕδωρ, οὔτε γῆν, οὔτ' ἄλλο οὐδέν, ὃ τι μὴ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐνεὸν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. *For I do not say that man is wholly air, nor fire, nor water, nor earth, nor anything else which is not apparent as being in man.* And the author continues a little later (2, 13): πολλὰ γὰρ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνεόντα, *for many things are in the body.*

Countless examples could be added for all those uses, but instead of pursuing further differentiations in application I will now turn to Plato. In the various early dialogues, ἐγγίγνεσθαι and ἐνεῖναι occur in connection with subjects and objects taken from all the different groups of words mentioned. As would be expected, the two words are not all too common (42 instances in the early dialogues up to and including the *Symposium*). I will leave aside - as not relevant at present - first, occasional purely spatial use without consequences of any sort to the argument; secondly, occurrences in quotations from poetry if the clause containing the words is not subsequently discussed; thirdly, though slightly reluctantly, casual occurrences of common expressions like νοῦς ἐνεστί.ν.

Even common expressions like that are regularly analysed and on that basis reinterpreted by Plato. *Ion* 534b is a case in point. Socrates declares at 533d that, in explaining Homer, people like Ion do not exercise a skill, but that a godly, divine power moves them, or that a power, δύναμις, is put into them (ἐντίθησι, 533d). In 534a, the state of being ἐνθεός, *enthused*, is contrasted with the normal one of being ἔμψρων, *mindful*, or *in one's right mind*. In that latter state a poet is unable to make

<sup>108</sup> Text and translation from W.H.S. Jones, *Hippocrates I*, Cambridge, Mass. 1923.

poetry; and Socrates continues (534b): καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἴός τε ποιεῖν πρὶν ἂν ἔνθεός τε γένηται καὶ ἔκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῆ· ἕως δ' ἂν τουτί ἔχη τὸ κτῆμα, ἀδύνατος πᾶς ποιεῖν ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν καὶ χρησμοδεῖν. *And he will not be able to compose until he becomes enthused and 'out of his mind' and until the mind is no longer in him: but so long as he has this possession, a man is incapable of composing or foretelling.* This, of course, is an interpretation of the words ἔνθεος, ἔκφρων, *mindless*, or *out of one's mind*, and νοῦς ἔνεστιν ἐν τινί, *mind is in someone, someone is mindful or in his right mind.* The phrases are taken literally and reinterpreted. Mind becomes something in itself. As governing one's thoughts it is here in opposition to the god. Both mind and god seem to be something separate in principle, something other than the person they relate to at any given moment. This is apparent a short while later in the text (534c,d) when Socrates declares ὁ θεὸς ἔξαιρούμενος τούτων τὸν νοῦν, *that the god takes the mind out of the poets*, and that it is not the poets who speak, οἷς νοῦς μὴ πάρεστιν, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ λέγων, *to whom there is no mind, but that it is the god himself who speaks.* νοῦς πάρεστιν, rather than ἔνεστιν, is the marginally commoner phrase, employed here after the pun on the alternative expression.

To be sure, Plato does not make anything of that in the *Ion* in terms of a theory of mind. The example goes to show, however, that Plato wilfully plays with the language when it is to his advantage. It is this sort of serious pun which often makes it difficult to assess the full implications of certain phrases or colloquial expressions, or again of analogies adduced from other spheres of life, as for example the sciences. It also makes it difficult to judge whether any given term is part of an in any way fixed terminology of Plato's, or used on the spur of the moment to illustrate a particular point.

## V.

In the light of that, I will now comment on a few passages in a number of dialogues also otherwise of particular importance to anyone interested in Plato's ontology, namely the *Gorgias* and *Charmides*. *Protagoras*, *Meno*, and *Euthyphro* all contain either ἐνεῖναι, or ἐγγίνεσθαι, or at least εἶναι ἐν, in contexts which by some are considered relevant to the 'theory of forms', but at close examination all these occurrences turn out to be of a common nature; they can either be explained on the lines drawn out above, or they are similar to those instances at which I will now look in detail.

For readers of Plato familiar with the *Phaedo*, Plato's usage at *Gorgias* 497ff. is reminiscent of the 'Theory of Forms or Ideas', and scholarly opinion is divided as to the significance of that phenomenon. It is notably the use of παρουσία and παρεῖναι there that gives rise to differing interpretations.<sup>109</sup> In this environment towards the end of the dialogue *Gorgias*, we find four occurrences of ἐγγίνεσθαι in close proximity. Is their occurrence there connected with that of the other words suggestive of Plato's later ontological statements? - Socrates and Callicles have just returned to the original question of what rhetoric is, and then if it aims at the good or at the pleasant; and Socrates had tried to persuade Callicles that the two are distinct. Callicles holds that there were rhetors in the past in possession of what Socrates requires: their aim was 'that

<sup>109</sup> For a detailed discussion of the passage, see Section IV to VI of the chapter on παρουσία, παρεῖναι, and παραγίνεσθαι above. Cf. E.R. Dodds, *Plato. Gorgias*, Oxford 1959, commentary on 497e, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσία ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῆ; *Don't you call the good men good*: "owing to the presence in them of good things". In Callicles' view these "good things" are pleasures (498d3). In later dialogues Plato used παρουσία in a half-technical sense to describe the "presence" of a Form in a particular; but the use of the plural ἀγαθῶν, here and at 498d2, is sufficient to show that the Theory of Forms is not presupposed. We find a similar use of παρεῖναι at *Charmides* 158e7, εἰ σοι πάρεστιν σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν, and elsewhere." Likewise at *Gorgias* 506d1, ἡδὺ δέ ἐστιν τοῦτο οὐ παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα, ἀγαθὸν δέ οὐ παρόντος ἀγαθοί ἐσμεν; *Is not pleasant that: when it is there, we are pleased; but good that: when it is there, we are good?* Dodds comments: "This sounds like the language of the theory of Forms. But see above on 497e1 and 503e1. ... ." At 503e1 the expression ἀποβλέπων πρός τι, *looking at something*, receives Dodds' attention.

the souls of the audience be as good as possible.' Socrates remains sceptical. Then, at 503e, he makes some remarks as to the method of finding out if one of those named really had the soul of his audience in mind. He maintains that a good man, one who says what is best, does not speak at random, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τι, *but looking at something*, just as all the other craftsmen look each at his own work or task, not randomly, *but so that what they produce have a certain form*.

In his usual fashion, Socrates then lists a number of other professions: the painters, the builders, the shipwrights, whomsoever you like, and he continues that one can see that each of them εἰς τάξιν τινα ... τίθησιν ὃ ἂν τιθῆ, *sets what he sets in a certain arrangement*, and fits one thing together with the other, <sup>504a1</sup> ἕως ἂν τὸ ἅπαν συστήσῃται τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμένον πρᾶγμα, *until each one thing stays together as one well-arranged and ordered object*. Likewise, the craftsmen concerned with the body, sports coaches and physicians, κοσμοῦσι τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάττουσιν, *order and arrange the body*. τάξις and κόσμος, declares Socrates, is their aim. He obtains Callicles' consent that that is true for the soul as well as the body. Then he asks for the name of that order and good arrangement in the body (504b7): τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομένῳ; *What, then, is the name in the case of the body for that which results from the arrangement and order?* - I would, by the way, emend the text here to τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν τῷ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομένῳ; *What, then, is the name for that which results from the arrangement and order in the body?* Fortunately, the difference of whether γίγνομαι ἐν τινὶ occurs here already, or only in Socrates' next sentence as ἐγγίγνομαι, does not matter greatly. - Callicles replies (504b9): ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις, *perhaps you mean health and strength*. Socrates: ἔγωγε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνομένῳ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; *Yes. And what <is the name> for that which comes into (or comes into being in) the soul from arrangement and order?* Callicles does not answer, and Socrates has to explain (504c7):

ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος. ... .<sup>d</sup> ταῖς δὲ γε τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσι καὶ κοσμήσεσιν νομιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίνονται καὶ κόσμιοι· ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. ... .<sup>d5</sup> οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, ... <ερεῖ> ... ,<sup>d9</sup> πρὸς τοῦτο αἰεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως ἂν αὐτῷ τοῖς πολίταις

δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνηται,  
ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται,

καὶ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται,  
ἀκολασία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται,

καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται,  
κακία δὲ ἀπίη.

It is impossible not to perceive the Gorgianic antithetical couples at the end of Socrates' exposition.<sup>110</sup> But not only the last paragraph of that section is imitation of Gorgias; and it is not only the style that is Gorgianic. For, while it is correct to state that Plato has Socrates also elsewhere draw parallels between the health of the body and the health of the soul, and while one is justified in pointing to *Gorgias* 447e - 449e where Socrates already spoke of medicine and justice, and of bad states of body and soul, side by side, there are elements in the discussion of *Gorgias* 503e - 507c which cannot be explained in so general a way.<sup>111</sup> 504ff. in particular has seemed so striking to

<sup>110</sup> The sole function of the layout is to emphasize that structure.

<sup>111</sup> On 504d in particular, cf. W.H. Thompson, *The Gorgias of Plato*, London 1905, p. XXf.: "This description, if we compare it with those given in the purely Socratic dialogues, the *Laches*, for instance, the *Charmides*, or the *Protagoras*, will be seen to mark an epoch in Plato's mental growth, or, what is the same thing, in the History of Moral Science. Order or Harmony is the germinal idea of the *Republic*, as it gives unity and coherence to the parts, otherwise ill-connected, of the present dialogue." Dodds as well has the *Gorgias* late in Group I of Plato's dialogues, close in doctrine to the *Meno* and the *Phaedo*. A judgement on those lines seems to underlie interpretation and subsequent relative dating of the dialogues to the present day.

commentators that is has been marked as a watershed in Plato's development. But while it may be true that Socrates argues un-Socratically here, what is perceived as un-Socratic is mostly not advanced Platonic thought but conscious discussion of Gorgianic tenets.

When does Plato adduce the painter as primary example of a craftsmen who looks, not at the physical objects surrounding him, but at a certain order so that his work have a certain form? Compare, for example, the passage about the painter in *Republic* 10, starting at 596a, and culminating at 598a in Socrates' question (597e10): εἰπέ δέ μοι περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου τόδε· πότερα ἐκείνο αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἕκαστον δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιχειρεῖν μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργα; *Tell me about the painter the following: if he seems to you to try to represent that itself <which we have mentioned>, that in nature, or those works of the craftsmen?* And a little later, 598b, Socrates asks if the painter represents what is or what seems to be; the answer is obvious.<sup>112</sup>

Starting a list of δημιουργοί with painters, however, makes good sense as a reaction against Gorgias' own picture of the methods of γραφεῖς, *painters*, in his *Encomium on Helen*, where painters are characterized thus (18): ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ γραφεῖς ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν χρωμάτων καὶ σωμάτων ἐν σῶμα καὶ σχῆμα τελείως ἀπεργάσωνται τέρπουσι τὴν ὄψιν. *But painters please the eye when in a finished manner they construct, from many colours and bodies, one body and shape.*

<sup>112</sup> Cf. M. Kardaun, *Der Mimesisbegriff in der griechischen Antike*, Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, deel 153, Amsterdam/New York/Oxford/Tokyo 1993, pp. 63ff.

It would be wrong to adduce "*Republic* 400d - 401a where ἡ γραφικὴ τέχνη is listed as a δημηγορία", or "for painting as a τέχνη ... *Ion* 532e - 533a" in order to prove that Plato thought otherwise elsewhere, since at the former place Socrates says how things should be but are not, and at the latter he draws a parallel between the visual arts and poetry only to establish a point against Ion. Pace P. Murray, *Plato on Poetry*, Cambridge 1996. At *Phaedrus* 248d, where δημιουργοί are classed below ποιῆται, a possible explanation of the different order is that Socrates refers to those who are commonly called craftsmen, those who just go through a set of motions and rules they have copied from their elders.

This is in a speech which commences with the words (1): κόσμος πόλει μὲν εὐανδρία, σώματι δὲ κάλλος, ψυχῇ δὲ σοφία, πράγματι δὲ ἀρετή, λόγῳ δὲ ἀλήθεια· τὰ δὲ ἐνάντια τούτων ἀκοσμία. *Order for a city is being well-bemanned, for a body it is beauty, for a soul wisdom, for an object goodness, for a speech truth: but the opposites of these are disorder.*

Here, κόσμος is what makes something, anything, good and praiseworthy.<sup>113</sup> The order of the body is found side by side with the order of the soul. And later on in the same speech, Gorgias declares (14): τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον ἔχει ἢ τοῦ λόγου δύναμις πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς τάξιν ἢ τε τῶν φαρμάκων τάξις πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν. *The power of a speech has the same ratio to the arrangement, τάξις, of the soul as prescription, τάξις, of medicine has to the nature of the body.*

Here, we see that Gorgias not only drew a parallel between the order of the body and the order of the soul, he also compared the influence of speech on soul with the influence of medicine on body. Seen under that perspective, it appears natural for Plato - in a passage in which Socrates implicitly criticizes and attacks Gorgias in general and in matters of detail, using the very examples Gorgias had advanced - to elaborate on those examples, to take over the language of Gorgias, and to take Gorgias' comparisons further. Having adopted the Gorgianic - though not necessarily exclusively Gorgianic - notion of the κόσμος and τάξις of body and soul, Socrates proceeds to talk of health coming to be in a body, and subsequently moderation and justice coming to be in a soul, using the medical terminology of ἐγγίγνομαι. ἀπαλλάττομαι as well is regularly used of the disappearing of diseases or symptoms in the *Hippocratic Corpus*.<sup>114</sup> - The same language is used in the summary of the present passage at 506d5 - e4.

<sup>113</sup> M.C. Stokes suggested in reading this passage that, in Gorgias' *Helen*, κόσμος means 'adornment' rather than 'order', and, accordingly, ἀκοσμία 'lack of adornment'; however this matter is decided, it does, to my mind, not affect the subsequent argument.

<sup>114</sup> J.H. Kühn, U. Fleischer (eds.), *Index Hippocraticus*, Göttingen 1986/89, s.v. ἀπαλλάσσω.

Consequently, what can be observed is that the medical usage of ἐγγίγνεσθαι with health and diseases as order and disorder coming to be in the body gave rise to the use of the word with moderation and justice and their opposites as order or disorder coming to be in the soul. Plato is in that way developing imagery and patterns of comparison used previously by Gorgias whose views he attempts to disprove, using the opponent's own language and methods. The language of medicine, by the way, is also the explanation of the repeated occurrence of 'something's' being in something else, e.g. health and strength being in man and women,' at the beginning of the *Meno* (72f.); Meno, we recall, is presented as a pupil of Gorgias.

## VI.

In the *Charmides*, the situation is not altogether dissimilar from that in the *Gorgias*. Again it is a context of approximately three pages, this time near the beginning of the dialogue, where ἐγγίγνεσθαι, and subsequently ἐνεῖναι, are employed repeatedly.

Socrates, returning from a military campaign, is eager to get to know young men of philosophical disposition, and he asks his friends if there are any. In an attempt to enter unobtrusively into a conversation with the youth Charmides, he uses his uncle Critias' advice to pretend to be a medical man in possession of a cure for Charmides' headache. For a moment it looks as if Socrates would not get far at all with his plan, since Charmides knows who Socrates is. But Socrates can proceed despite that. He knows a magic spell, he says, but just as - as the doctors rightly say - one cannot cure a part of the body, for example the head, by itself, so one cannot cure the body without the soul. At 156c, the phrase used of 'the head by itself', αὐτήν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, is used by Anaxagoras and can thus be associated with scientific terminology. After it has been stated that it would be wrong to treat the head αὐτήν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, Socrates repeats that his teacher Zalmoxis emphasizes that it would be wrong to try and treat the body alone (157a): θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφη, ὦ μακάριε, ἐπωδαίς

τισιν, τὰς δ' ἐπωδὰς ταύτας τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς καλοὺς· ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἧς ἐγγενομένης καὶ παρούσης ῥάδιον ἤδη εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι πορίζειν. *He said that <it is necessary> to treat the soul with spells, but that those spells are the speeches, namely the beautiful ones: from speeches of that sort, moderation would come into being in the soul: when it has got there and is close by, it is easier already to procure health both for the head and for the rest of the body.*

Up to that point, there is nothing unusual with Plato's usage. Following the same pattern as in the *Gorgias*, Plato has Socrates use ἐγγίγνεσθαι, the common word for diseases' being in the body, for σωφροσύνη being in the soul. It is only two pages later, when the matter is taken up again, that we can see Plato making a slightly distinct point while apparently simply repeating what he has stated already. At first, Socrates simply restates at 158b5: εἰ μὲν σοι ἤδη πάρεστιν, ὡς λέγει Κριτίας ὅδε, σωφροσύνη καὶ εἰ σώφρων ἰκανῶς, οὐδὲν ἔτι σοι ἔδει οὔτε τῶν Ζαλμόξιδος οὔτε τῶν Ἀβάριδος τοῦ Ὑπερβορέου ἐπωδῶν, ... . *If it is already with you, as Critias here says, moderation, and if you are moderate, you are no longer in need of spells, be it of Zalmoxis or of Abaridos the Hyperborean,*

This is again ordinary Greek usage. σωφροσύνη πάρεστί σοι and εἰ σώφρων can be two different ways of saying the same thing.<sup>115</sup> The picture changes slightly a few lines later. Charmides is hesitant about praising himself, and Socrates proposes to conduct an investigation. He says at 158e: τῆδε τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, δοκεῖ μοι βελτίστη εἶναι ἡ σκέψις περὶ αὐτοῦ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εἰ σοι πάρεστιν σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν.<sup>159</sup> ἀνάγκη γάρ που ἐνοῦσαν αὐτήν, εἴπερ ἔνεστιν, αἰσθησὶν τινα παρέχειν, ἐξ ἧς δόξα ἂν τίς σοι περὶ αὐτῆς εἴη ὅτι ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη· ἢ

<sup>115</sup> See Section I of the chapter on παρουσία, ... above; cf. J. Lyons, *Structural Semantics*, Oxford 1969, passim, esp. Chapter VII, p139f.

οὐκ οἶει; ... <sup>a9</sup> ἵνα τοίνυν τοπάσωμεν εἴτε σοι ἔνεστιν εἴτε μή, εἰπέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί φῆς εἶναι σωφροσύνην κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν. *In this way, I said, an investigation into that seems to me to be best. For it is clear that if moderation is with you, you can give an opinion about it. For it is necessary that being in, if it is in, it affords some perception, from which there would be an opinion at your disposal, what and how (= of what sort) moderation is. ... Therefore, so that we may guess now if it is in you or not, tell me, I said, what you say moderation is according to your own opinion.*<sup>116</sup>

In the same way as in the passage from the *Ion* quoted above, Socrates moves from a natural expression to an unwarranted conclusion, this time mediated by an additional step. Between 'moderation is with you' and 'therefore you must know what it is', Socrates inserts: 'so it must yield some perception'. Perception, it may be noted, leads to opinion, here already, not to knowledge. (That distinction, again, goes back at least to Gorgias, this time his *Palamedes*.) In each case, one could say, a compound verb-phrase representing a monadic, one-place or monovalent predicate is interpreted as a dyadic, two-place, or bivalent predicate, stating a relation between two relata. The soul, or the particular human being on the one hand, and moderation on the other. The significance this has for subsequent discussion in the *Charmides* need not be considered here.

Finally, whereas the being in someone of δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη in *Gorgias* and *Charmides* are introduced by way of medical examples, and whereas in both cases initially the process of reaching a state is described with ἐγγίγνεσθαι, there are places in both the *Protagoras* (352b) and the *Meno* (85c; 86a) where ἐπιστήμη or ἀληθεῖς δόξαι are said to be in people, without further ado. It is just conceivable that those expressions were close enough in content to νοῦς or φρονεῖν ἔνεστιν to pass unheeded, whereas few people besides Socrates would accept a construction with one of

<sup>116</sup> Cf. discussion of *Charmides* 157f. in Section V of the chapter on παρουσία, etc., above.

the traditional virtues in place of some sort of knowledge, and that therefore an introduction is needed in those cases. More importantly, we have seen that, in the *Charmides* and more pointedly in the *Gorgias*, Plato uses the language of those whose views he discusses or attacks; but that is not to say that he makes that language part of his own terminology henceforth; not even that he is committed to it at the time he employs it.

## VII.

Of all the composite verbs derived from εἶναι and γίγνεσθαι, ἐνεῖναι and ἐγγίγνεσθαι are the widest and most general in their application, due to the nature of the semantic vagueness of ἐν-, *in*. They can connect things in a purely physical, spatial way, but can also refer to the mind's or thoughts' being in a person, or to certain qualities' being in words; because the relation expressed by the two verbs lacks specificity, they were found suitable in particular in physical theory and speculation as that of Anaxagoras, just as much as in medicine, where ἐγγίγνεσθαι and ἐνεῖναι (with the dative of the person affected) became the standard terms for 'contracting' and 'having' a disease respectively. In this latter context, the verbs are encountered on more than one occasion in early Platonic usage.

## PART II

## ΕΙΔΟΣ

## I.

The earliest occurrence of the noun εἶδος in extant Greek literature is at *Iliad* II, 58. Zeus has sent a pernicious dream to Agamemnon. About the dream it is said (20): στή δ' ἄρ' ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς Νηληϊῶ υἱὶ ἔοικώς, | Νέστορι, τὸν ῥα μάλιστα γερόντων τί' Ἀγαμέμνων· | τῷ μιν ἐεισάμενος προσεφώνεε θεῖος Ὀνειρος· | ... . *He stood above <Agamemnon's> head, being like the son of Neleus, Nestor, whom Agamemnon esteemed most highly of all elder men; looking like him, the godly dream addressed him: ...* . The dream's speech follows. This is reported to the council of kings by Agamemnon the following morning (56): κλῦτε, φίλοι· θεῖός μοι ἐνύπνιον ἦλθεν Ὀνειρος | ἀμβροσίην διὰ νύκτα· μάλιστα δὲ Νέστορι δίω | εἶδός τε μέγεθός τε φυὴν τ' ἄγχιστα ἐώκει· | ... . *Listen, friends: a godly dream came to me during the ambrosian night: being most like Nestor in guise and size and growth.* And Agamemnon reports what the dream, standing by his head, has told him.

The dream was like Nestor in εἶδος, μέγεθος, φυή. The verbs used to express this likeness are ἔοικα and εἶδομαι, *to be like*. Both verbs have strong visual connotations. ἔοικα seems to be a more general word for 'being like'; but 'that which is like', the εἰκῶν, is in the first place something visual, a *picture*. And though εἶδομαί τινι, in particular its participle εἰσάμενος, could be 'being like', or rather 'appearing like' in other respects as well - e.g. φθογγή at *Iliad* II, 791 and XIII, 216, φωνή at XX, 81- it

is originally the visual aspect which is the point of comparison, as at *Odyssey* I, 105 after the description of the visible attributes of Athena's disguise, or at *Odyssey* II, 267f., ...  
 σχεδόθεν δέ οἱ ἦλθεν Ἀθήνη, | Μέντορι εἰδομένη ἡμὲν δέμας ἠδὲ  
 καὶ αὐδὴν, *to him came Athena, appearing like Mentor in build and also in voice.*  
 Here, as at XIII, 45 where it is said of Poseidon: εἰσάμενος Κάλχαντι δέμας  
 καὶ ἀτειρέα φωνήν, *appearing like Calchas in build and unwearied voice*, φωνή  
 is added because in each case the god is to say something presently; even where that is  
 the case, however, εἰσάμενος suggests the likeness in appearance, in guise, in 'looks',  
 in the first place.

εἶδος is derived from the same root \*ueid-, 'see', as εἶδομαι, 'appear, seem, give oneself the appearance, appear like', and as ἰδεῖν, εἶδον, 'see', used in suppletion as aorist to ὀράω, 'see'. εἶδος is 'that which looks at' and 'that which is seen'. With Homer, however, it is always the εἶδος of someone 'which looks at' or 'which is seen' by someone else; 'that which looks at' in the sense of 'that which is facing' the spectator.

At *Iliad* II, 58 quoted above, the εἶδος of Nestor is set side by side with, and thereby distinguished from, his μέγεθος and his φυή. Those two aspects of Nestor's were, of course, visible and seen as well. εἶδος must therefore be more specific than just 'that which is seen by someone else'. μέγεθος is 'size' straightforwardly. φυή is something like 'growth' in that old sense of the word, which encompasses 'stature'. At *Iliad* XX, 370, it is again found side by side with εἶδος. After Achilles has slain Hector, the other Greeks rush forward: οἱ καὶ θηήσαντο φυὴν καὶ εἶδος ἀγητὸν | Ἔκτορος. *And they looked at the admirable stature and appearance of Hector.* At *Iliad* I, 115, Agamemnon is furious about Calchas' proposal to hand Chryseis back to her father, her, whom he wants to take home since she is no worse than his wife Clytaemnestra, οὐ δέμας οὐδὲ φυήν, οὐτ' ἄρ φρένας οὔτε τι ἔργα, *not in build nor in growth, nor yet in wits nor in any of her works.* δέμας, the noun to δέμω, *build*, is 'build'. It is, for the present, not necessary to determine with precision what

exactly φυή, *growth* or *stature*, is when it is contrasted with ‘size’, ‘guise’ and ‘build’; it seems as if whenever it is found with one or two of them it could bear connotations of the other.

δέμας, on the other hand, which we have seen in opposition to φυή, is on occasion set against εἶδος as well. When Priam sets off to ransom the body of Hector at night when other men are asleep, Hermes, sent by Zeus, declares that he will give Priam safe conduct, φίλω δέ σε πατρὶ εἰσκῶ, *for I liken you to my father* (371). To him replies godlike Priam, Πρίαμος θεοειδής, that a benevolent god must have sent such a guard and leader (376): ... οἶος δὴ σὺ δέμας καὶ εἶδος ἀγητός, | πέπνυσαί τε νόῳ, ... . *You, how admirable in build and guise, you are endowed with mind, ...* .

From the *Odyssey*, one may adduce Calypso’s usage when in a last attempt she tries to persuade Odysseus to stay with her. She knows that he is longing to see his wife, ἴμειρόμενός περ ἰδέσθαι σὴν ἄλοχον (*Odyssey* V, 209f.). But she, Calypso, is no worse than her (212): οὐ δέμας οὐδὲ φυήν, ἐπεὶ οὐ πῶς οὐδὲ ἔοικε | θνητὰς ἀθανάτησι δέμας καὶ εἶδος ἐρίζειν. *Neither in build nor in growth, since it is not seemly in any way that mortals strive with immortals as to build and guise.* To that, Odysseus replies (215): ... οἶδα καὶ αὐτὸς | πάντα μάλ’, οὐνεκα σεῖο περίφρων Πηνελόπεια | εἶδος ἀκιδνοτέρη μέγεθός τ’ εἰσάντα ἰδέσθαι. *I know full well myself that against you, thoughtful Penelope seems rather weak in guise and in size, when looked at.* In this passage of a dozen lines, ἰδέσθαι and εἶδος are the two terms repeated in the comparison of the two women. I have no doubts that in line 217, εἶδος ἀκιδνοτέρη μέγεθός τ’ εἰσάντα ἰδέσθαι, the poet relies on the reader’s realizing the etymological connection of the first and last words of that verse.<sup>117</sup>

<sup>117</sup> That does, of course, not imply that the poet had a notion of etymology necessarily equivalent to our own.

The potential differences between external appearance and other characteristics of a person, underlying the debate with Calypso, are dealt with more explicitly later on in the *Odyssey*.<sup>118</sup> When in Scheria Odysseus is taunted by Eurylaus (VIII, 164): οὐδ' ἀθλητῆρι ἔοικας, *you are not like a fighter*, Odysseus retorts (167): οὕτως οὐ πάντεσσι θεοὶ χαρίεντα διδοῦσιν | ἀνδράσιν, οὔτε φυὴν οὔτ' ἄρ' φρένας οὔτ' ἀγορητύν. | ἄλλος μὲν γὰρ εἶδος ἀκιδνότερος πέλει ἀνὴρ, | ἀλλὰ θεὸς μορφήν ἔπεσι στέφει, οἱ δέ τ' ἔς αὐτὸν | τερπόμενοι λεύσσουσιν· ὁ δ' ἀσφαλέως ἀγορεύει | αἰδοῖ μιλίχην, μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγρομένοισιν, | ἐρχόμενον δ' ἀνὰ ἄστυ θεὸν ὧς εἰσορόωσιν. | ἄλλος δ' αὖ εἶδος μὲν ἀλίγκιος ἀθανάτοισιν, | ἀλλ' οὐ οἱ χάρις ἀμφιπεριστέφεται ἐπέεσσιν, | ὧς καὶ σοὶ εἶδος μὲν ἀριπρεπές, οὐδέ κεν ἄλλως | οὐδὲ θεὸς τεύξειε, νόον δ' ἀποφώλιός ἔσσι. *Not in one way do the gods give pleasing things to all men, neither as to growth nor yet mind nor eloquence. One man, indeed, is of weak guise, but god wreathes shape around his words, and the other men look at him, delighted; but he speaks unfailingly with soothing reverence; he is conspicuous among those who are gathered, just as if they looked at a god walking through the city. Again, another man resembles the gods as to his guise, but for him, no grace is wreathed around his words; just so you are very stately as to look, even a god could not fit it otherwise; as to mind, however, you are useless.* Odysseus names three characteristics of a man, φυή, *growth*, φρένες, *wits*, ἀγορητύς, *'speaking-in-public'*. The first one of these, *growth*, seems to contribute to how one looks, one's *look* or *guise*, εἶδος. It is difficult to say if the positive qualities of the eloquent man are to be attributed exclusively to his ἀγορητύς, the ability to speak well, or if that is somehow subordinated to his φρένες, his wits, which in that way contribute to his speaking 'with soothing reverence'. Regardless of how that matter is decided, however, these two internal qualities or characteristics are strictly separated

<sup>118</sup> Other aspects of this passage are discussed below in APPENDIX 4 on 'μορφή in Archaic Greek Literature'.

from the external appearance; and if, with regard to both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, some commentators may feel inclined to postulate a relation in Homer's mind between the good look of a hero and other positive and valuable attributes, this passage clearly shows that while beautiful appearance is something positive in itself, the poet was capable of separating and isolating that characteristic as something external, and he probably expected his audience to do so, too.

Against the objection that this is the poet of the *Odyssey*, while the poet of the *Iliad* did not so distinguish between the external and the internal characteristics of a person, it is worthwhile to compare that passage from the *Iliad* on which this last passage, and the related one in Book XI of the *Odyssey*, are clearly modelled. In Book III of the *Iliad*, Helen is on the tower of the Scaean gate, overlooking the battlefield, together with the old men of Troy. Priam asks her to identify various Greek leaders. First he sees Agamemnon and inquires who he is. Next, he asks for Odysseus whom he describes as shorter but broader than Agamemnon. Helen replies that it is Odysseus, εἰδῶς παντοίους τε δόλους καὶ μήδεα πυκνά, *who knows various crafts and dense cunning* (202). This is confirmed by Antenor who once was host to Odysseus and Menelaos when the two came on an embassy to negotiate terms for a return of Helen without armed conflict. Antenor declares (208): ἀμφοτέρων δὲ φυὴν ἐδάην καὶ μήδεα πυκνά. *Of both, I then learned their growth and dense cunning*. Standing up, Menelaos made the stronger impression, sitting down it was Odysseus, and Antenor continues (212): ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ μύθους καὶ μήδεα πᾶσιν ὕφαινον, | ἦτοι μὲν Μενέλαος ἐπιτροχάδην ἀγόρευε, | παῦρα μὲν, ἀλλὰ μάλα λιγέως, ἐπεὶ οὐ πολὺμυθος | οὐδ' ἀφαμαρτοεπής· ἦ καὶ γένει ὕστερος ἦεν. | ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ πολὺμητις ἀναΐξειεν Ὀδυσσεύς· | στάσκεν, ὑπαὶ δὲ ἴδεσκε κατὰ χθονὸς ὄμματα πῆξας, | ... | ... | φαίης κε ζάκοτόν τε τιν' ἔμμεναι ἄφρονά τ' αὐτως. | ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ ὄπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος εἶη | καὶ ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν ἑοικότα χειμερίησιν, | οὐκ ἂν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆϊ γ' ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος· | οὐ τότε γ' ᾦδ'

Ὀδυσῆος ἀγασσάμεθ' εἶδος ἰδόντες.<sup>119</sup> *But when they wove their words and cunning for all of us, verily, Menelaus spoke fluently; little, but very clearly; a man neither wordy nor missing the point; and that while he was later by birth. But when Odysseus, of much cunning, got up: he stood there; he looked down, fixing his eyes to the ground, ... . You would have said that he were full of ill-will, and witless, too; but when he sent forth his big voice from his chest, and words like snow-bearing winter-storms, then no other man would have rivalled Odysseus: and not so did we wonder when we saw his guise.* There cannot be any doubt that both Menelaus and Odysseus are of kingly appearance. Odysseus is broader than Agamemnon, and Menelaos broader still. Yet, Odysseus is more awe-inspiring when sitting. The description of the two is positive throughout. It is against this background that the closing remark of Antenor is to be seen. The Trojans were amazed when they saw the two kings. But their amazement when they heard Odysseus speak was not related to, and not rivalled by, that other one which resulted merely from the impression of his look, his εἶδος, which for the poet of the *Iliad* was just as much something purely external, which did not tell the spectator anything about what is inside a person, as it was for the poet of the *Odyssey*. It should be noted as well that the εἶδος, the look, or guise, of a person, is not the same as his habits or gestures either; just as Agamemnon could recognize the figure of the god-sent Dream as that of Nestor in the first place because it was like in look.

So, εἶδος is derived from a root meaning 'see'. It was felt by Homer to be thus connected. It is always the 'εἶδος of a person' which is talked of. Of the visible characteristics of human beings, εἶδος is contrasted with μέγεθος, *size*, φυή, *growth* or *stature*, and δέμας, *build*; as a physical, external attribute, it is also contrasted with non-physical attributes like φρένες and νοῦς. It can safely be rendered 'guise', 'look', 'looks', 'appearance', perhaps 'complexion' and 'countenance', but it is doubtful whether it should at any given place be reduced to 'the appearance or complexion of the

<sup>119</sup> Here, εἶδος ἰδόντες need not, but may be another case of the poet's showing awareness of an etymological connection.

face'. Nor is there, on the other hand, any indication that εἶδος has come to mean 'body' with Homer.

## II.

These general words have to be modified in two ways. First, there is one, and only one, case in which εἶδος is applied not to a human being but to an animal. In *Odyssey* XVII, Odysseus returns to his palace after having been absent for twenty years. He is disguised as a beggar. When he arrives in the company of the swineherd Eumaeus, Argos, his dog, whom he had left when he went to Troy, recognizes him, but is too weak to leave his position on the dung-hill where the negligence of the house-maids has banished him. Odysseus hides a tear and asks the swineherd (306): Εὖμαι', ἦ μάλα θαῦμα κύων ὄδε κεῖτ' ἐνὶ κόπρῳ. | καλὸς μὲν δέμας ἔστιν, ἀτὰρ τόδε γ' οὐ σάφα οἶδα, | ἦ δὴ καὶ ταχὺς ἔσκε θέειν ἐπὶ εἶδει τῶδε, | ... ; *Eumaeus, what a wondrous thing that this dog lies in the dung. Surely, he is beautiful in build, though that I do not know for sure, if he has speed to run on top of this appearance*<sup>120</sup>. Considering that the term εἶδος has its particular application in the context of description of animals later on in Greek literature, this passage has attracted particular attention. The whole characterisation of the dog Argos, however, portrays him as, if anything, more human than the other human beings.<sup>121</sup> If the passage cannot be used in this respect, it nevertheless serves as confirmation that the poet of the *Odyssey* in particular draws a sharp line between outward appearance and other qualities. As at VIII, 167ff., it is φύη, *growth*, which contributes to the εἶδος of a person, here it is καλὸν δέμας, *beautiful build*, to which in the first place τόδε εἶδος refers. Perhaps it is necessary to stress that though, undoubtedly, the whole description of the dog is

<sup>120</sup> ἐπὶ εἶδει τῶδε, *on top of this appearance*, could perhaps be rendered a little more freely as *matching his appearance*.

<sup>121</sup> Cf. e.g. U. Hölscher, *Die Odyssee*, München 1988, p. 193f.

meant to be positive, it is not εἶδος on its own which picks up καλὸς μὲν δέμας ἐστίν as a somehow inherently positively inclined term, but εἶδος τόδε, this particular εἶδος, which refers to something positive just because the point of reference of the demonstrative phrase is something positive.<sup>122</sup>

So, while this occurrence of εἶδος can probably not be counted as a proper exception to the general observation that εἶδος in Homer is always ‘the εἶδος of a person’, the following consideration may compel one to postulate a semantic extension of the noun beyond ‘the guise’, ‘the look (of somebody)’: There is a group of adjectives in -ειδής, which is derived from the noun εἶδος. In *Iliad* and *Odyssey* it is represented by εὐειδής, ἡεροειδής, θεοειδής, ἰοειδής, and μυλοειδής. If what has been said about εἶδος above is correct without qualification, one would expect these words to mean ‘of beautiful or handsome guise’, ‘of good look’ or ‘of good looks’, ‘of the guise or look of ἀήρ’, ‘of the guise or look of a god’, ‘of the guise or look of violets’ and ‘of the guise or look of a mill-stone’, respectively.

Now, that is, for example, clearly the case with the one instance of εὐειδής in the Homeric epics, *Iliad* III, 48, γυναῖκ’ εὐειδέ’ ἀνήγεσ, *you abducted a good-looking woman*. Hector, who says these words to Paris, had begun his speech with the words (39): Δύσπαρι, εἶδος ἄριστε, *wretched Paris, best of look*, and had added that the Greeks now laugh at him (44), φάντες ἀριστήα πρόμον ἔμμεναι, οὔνεκα καλὸν | εἶδος ἔπ’, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι βίη φρεσὶ οὐδέ τις ἀλκή, <previously> *thinking of you as a champion of the foremost rank, because ‘to you, there*

<sup>122</sup> Pace e.g. H. Diller, *Zum Gebrauch von εἶδος and ἰδέα in vorplatonischer Zeit*, in: *Medizingeschichte in unserer Zeit*, ed. H.-H. Euler et al., Stuttgart 1971, p. 24f.

Though it is certainly correct that when a hero is praised, one of the objects of praise can be his εἶδος, and though most Homeric heroes are both strong and beautiful, the examples discussed above, and perhaps already the counter-examples adduced by Diller himself, should serve as a warning against seeing εἶδος as anything but the *vox media* or neutral term it is in both *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.

is<sup>123</sup> a beautiful guise, but there is no force to your wits, nor any strength. And a little later he pictures a fight of Paris with Menelaus (54): οὐκ ἄν τοι χραίσμη κίθαρις τά τε δῶρ' Ἀφροδίτης, | ἢ τε κόμη τό τε εἶδος, ὅτ' ἐν κονίησι μιγείης. *Then the cithara and the gifts of Aphrodite, your hair and guise, would hardly be of any use to you, when you were mixed with the dust.* This reference to Paris' good looks is taken up two lines later in the formulaic line of reply (58): τὸν δ' αὖτε προσέειπεν Ἀλέξανδρος θεοειδής. *To him, again, replied Alexander of the guise of a god.* Since physical beauty is one of the topics of this passage, and, in particular, physical beauty in contrast with other characteristics which are not positive in the same way, it seems appropriate to take εὐειδής and θεοειδής as referring just to 'look', or 'guise', here. The other occurrences of θεοειδής in *Iliad* and *Odyssey* may all likewise refer to 'the guise or look of a god' only, as opposed to any other of the god's characteristics; one may think of ἀντίθεος or θεοείκελος as comprising those other characteristics as well; it is difficult to prove the matter either way.

ἰοειδής is used as an epithet to πόντος at *Iliad* XI, 298 and *Odyssey* V, 56 and XI, 107. ἡεροειδής occurs much more frequently; sometimes likewise with πόντος, as for example at *Iliad* XXIII, 744 and *Odyssey* XII, 285;<sup>124</sup> but it is also epithet to the cave and rock of Scylla at *Odyssey* XII, 80 and 233, and to a lovely grotto, sacred to the nymphs, on Ithaca at *Odyssey* XIII, 103. The only instance of μυλοειδής, derived from μύλη, *millstone*, is at *Iliad* VII, 270. The scene is the duel between Hector and Ajax. Both send forth their spears and run atilt at each other. Hector, though wounded, then lifts a stone (264): ἀλλ' ἀναχασσάμενος λίθον εἴλετο χειρὶ παχείῃ | κείμενον ἐν πεδίῳ μέλανα τρηχύν τε μέγαν τε· | τῷ βάλεν Αἴαντος δεινὸν σάκος ἑπταβόειον | μέσσον ἐπομφάλιον, περιήχησεν δ' ἄρα χαλκός. | δεύτερος αὖτ' Αἴας πολὺ μείζονα λᾶαν ἀείρας | ἦκ'

<sup>123</sup> ἔπεστι where one could also expect πάρεστιν.

<sup>124</sup> Probably also at *Iliad* V, 770 - despite the wide *hyperbaton*.

ἐπιδινήσας, ἐπέρεισε δὲ ἴν' ἀπέλεθρον, | εἶσω δ' ἄσπιδ' ἔαξε βαλὼν  
 μυλοειδέι πέτρῳ, | ... . *But driven back he lifted, with his broad hand, a stone  
 which lay on the ground, black and rough and big. With it, he hit the mighty seven-  
 hided shield of Ajax right on the boss, and loud echoed the bronze-frame. Second came  
 Ajax, lifting a much bigger rock and whirling it about, and he applied vast strength to  
 it: in he broke the shield hitting it with a boulder 'of the guise of a mill-stone', ... .*

There is a fundamental difference on the one hand between εὐειδής and the other compounds in -ειδης, on the other hand between the pair εὐειδής and θεοειδής, and the remaining three, ἤερο-, ἰο-, and μυλοειδής. εὐειδής is derived from an adverb, not, like all the other adjectives in -ειδης, from a noun. In itself, it does not provide any information pertaining to a potential semantic development of εἶδος; whatever εἶδος may be, anyone or anything εὐειδής has a good εἶδος.<sup>125</sup>

At its one and only occurrence, however, it is applied to a person, as is always the case with θεοειδής. Now, if anybody looks like anybody else, there is no restriction to the degree of resemblance in look. It is conceivable that two distinct human beings look perfectly alike. It is certainly implied in the tale of the Dream appearing to Agamemnon that the Dream looked quite like Nestor. That is not to say that Homer or his audience thought of the degree of resemblance at all. If, on the other hand, θεοειδής is 'of the guise of a god', it is not necessary to know what a god looks like. Perfect resemblance should be possible in this case as well.

This is clearly not the case with ἰοειδής. If the sea is 'of the look of a violet', that must refer to colour or shading or brightness, somehow - however different from ours the Greek concept of colour may have been; the sea does not have shape or size of a

<sup>125</sup> The parallel case of εὐώδης, 'good of smell', shows that these early formations could retain their original meaning regardless of the later more general use of -ειδης and -ωδης as means of forming denominal adjectives.

violet, and does not otherwise look like it in those respects.<sup>126</sup> That is, of course, understood whenever the word is used. It does not require explanation.

μυλοειδής is a less transparent case. Any stone of approximately adequate composition may perfectly resemble a mill-stone in look. But is that what is intended? Colour is probably irrelevant; it may be that of a mill-stone. Shape, perhaps, does not matter greatly; a boulder washed down in centuries may be perfectly circular. But did the stone Ajax lifted and threw have a hole equivalent to the one of the netherstone into which the mill-rind would have been fitted? - Perfect resemblance in look or guise is not excluded, but it is much more likely that the stone only partly resembled a mill-stone, namely first and foremost in size, and further, given that the stone Hector had lifted is described as λίθον μέλανα τρηχύν τε μέγαν τε, *a stone, black and rough and big*, perhaps also in roughness or even colour; it is possible that the poet also thought of resemblance in shape. That is something we could not possibly know. But while speculation of that sort is permitted and in itself of little consequence, translation is a different matter. All the above assumptions as to reference were made on the basis of translating μυλοειδής as ‘of the guise or look of a mill-stone’. ‘Of the size of a mill-stone’, ‘large as a mill-stone’, or ‘of the shape of a mill-stone’, are not translations of the word μυλοειδής, but interpretations of the whole context. In a poetic translation of a text that may be permissible; a dictionary, or philological commentary, should be more precise.<sup>127</sup> Even a translation ‘like a mill-stone’ implies more than can be proved with any degree of certainty.<sup>128</sup> -ειδης in both εὔειδής and θεοειδής, occurring in the same text, is frequently rendered with reference to ‘guise’ or ‘look’. As we have seen, the correct translation of εὔειδής is ‘good-looking’ or one of its semantic

<sup>126</sup> In this context it is relevant that ἴον first denoted the flower ‘violet’, and only secondarily the colour. Vid. H. Frisk, *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch I*, Heidelberg 1960, s.v. Cf. also M.L. West, *Hesiod: Theogony*, Oxford 1966, p. 152f., ad l. 3.

<sup>127</sup> Pace, e.g., H.W. Nordheier in: *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos III*, Göttingen 1993, col. 281, s.v.: “von der Gestalt eines Mühlsteines, groß wie ein M(ühlstein)”.

<sup>128</sup> Pace LSJ s.v.: “like a mill-stone”; H. Frisk, *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch II*, Heidelberg 1970, s.v. μύλη: “μυλο-ειδής ‘wie ein Mühlstein’ (H 270 ...)”.

equivalents.<sup>129</sup> θεοειδής is bound to be ‘*looking like a god*’ at least in some cases, and it is doubtful if it can safely be rendered ‘*godlike*’ anywhere in Homer.<sup>130</sup>

Thus, in order to render μυλοειδής by ‘*like a mill-stone*’ one has to postulate that -ειδης as a means of deriving adjectives from nouns has lost its original force, the reference to the ‘*guise*’ or ‘*look*’ of the thing. That could have happened under the influence of the verb derived from εἶδος, εἶδομαι, which, as we have seen, could refer to ‘*resemblance in voice*’ as well as ‘*look*’. But in order to postulate this semantic development for Homer already, one would want positive, compelling evidence of some sort. That, however, is not provided by the instances of words in -ειδης adduced and discussed above.

For ἡεροειδής, one could construct a case parallel to that of μυλοειδής. ἀήρ is ‘*haze*’ or ‘*mist*’.<sup>131</sup> In order to see in what way objects are called ‘*of the look of haze*’ or ‘*of the look of mist*’, it is necessary to see what it is in the look of *haze* that is paralleled in the look of the object which is surnamed ἡεροειδής. Since we do not even know exactly what sort of ‘*haze*’ or ‘*mist*’ was referred to by ἀήρ, that is only possible by comparing occurrences of ἡεροειδής in their context.

At *Odyssey* XII, 260, Odysseus and most of his comrades have just escaped Scylla and Charybdis. Although they are all tired, Odysseus intends to avoid the island of Helios with his cattle, and wants to sail all through the night. Eurylochus scolds him and says that he should let his tired comrades rest; and he continues (284): ... | ἀλλ’ αὐτως

<sup>129</sup> Pace LSJ s.v.: “*well-shaped, comely*”.

<sup>130</sup> Cf., e.g., H.W. Nordheier in: *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos* II, Göttingen 1991, col. 996, s.v.: “*mit dem Aussehen e. Gottes, göttlich schön*”; the latter is, again, interpretation. Since ‘*mit dem Aussehen eines Gottes*’, however, is literal, while ‘*von der Gestalt eines Mühlsteines, groß wie ein Mühlstein*’ for μυλοειδής is not, Nordheier may in the latter case have been influenced in his translation by the scholiast he quotes: “Σχ sch. D zSt.: στρογγύλω, ἢ τραχεῖ”.

With θεοειδής in *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, ‘*looking like a god*’, cf. later usage at, e.g. *Phaedo* 95c, where ψυχή, *the soul*, is called θεοειδής (τι), *something godlike*; there ‘*godlike*’ is appropriate, since ψυχή has otherwise been said to be θεῖον and ἀόρατον, *something godly* and *something invisible*, so that ‘*looking like a god*’ is ruled out as translation for θεοειδής here.

<sup>131</sup> Vid. H. Frisk, *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* I, Heidelberg 1960, s.v., with bibliographical references.

διὰ νύκτα θοήν ἀλάλησθαι ἄνωγας | νήσου ἀποπλαγχθέντας ἐν  
 ἡεροειδέι πόντῳ. | ἐκ νυκτῶν δ' ἄνεμοι χαλεποί, δηλήματα νηῶν, |  
 γίνονται· πῆ κέν τις ὑπεκφύγοι αἰπὺν ὄλεθρον, | ἦν πως ἐξαπίνης  
 ἔλθη ἀνέμοιο θύελλα, | ἦ Νότου ἢ Ζεφύροιο δυσσαέος, οἶτε μάλιστα  
 | νῆα διαρραίουσι θεῶν ἀέκητι ἀνάκτων. ... *But you order us all the same to  
 steer away from the island and err through the fast-setting night, on the sea looking like  
 haze. And from the nights, harsh winds come into being, banes of the ships: how could  
 anyone escape utter destruction, if in some way suddenly there came a burst of wind,  
 either the Notus or stormy Zephyrus, which - above all - rip apart ships against the will  
 of the ruling gods.* ἡεροειδής is here epithet to the sea; but the situation is that of an  
 imagined storm at sea; is there a relation between the storm at sea and the sea's quality  
 of 'looking like haze'?<sup>132</sup> In that case, it may also be relevant to decide whether as an  
 attribute ἡεροειδής denotes a permanent or a transitory characteristic.

Most of the time, ἡεροειδής is an epithet to πόντος. πόντος, the *sea*, has other  
 epithets as well; we find, for example, ἐνὶ οἴνοπι πόντῳ, *in the sea looking like  
 wine*, at *Iliad* XXIII, 316; (ἔνθορε) μείλανι πόντῳ, *(she threw herself into) the  
 black sea*, at *Iliad* XXIV, 79. These are two cases of colour-terms<sup>133</sup> serving as epithets  
 to πόντος. The noun does, of course, also occur on its own; as, for example, at *Iliad*  
 VIII 478f.: τὰ νεΐατα πείρατα ... γαίης καὶ πόντοιο, *the lowest bounds of  
 land and sea*. But while there cannot be any doubt that πόντος meant 'sea' for Homer  
 as for the Greeks of later days, it is relevant that having lost the Indo-European word  
 cognate to Latin *mare*, the Greeks employed a great number of different terms of  
 different provenance to denote the sea; and their etymological origin may be relevant as  
 well, in particular when the word or a cognate form was otherwise still in use. An  
 obvious case in point is κέλευθος and the neuter plural κέλευθα, *track*. Since the

<sup>132</sup> Tentatively suggested as a possibility by W. Beck in: *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos* I, Göttingen 1979, col. 898, s.v.

<sup>133</sup> If οἴνοψ is always 'looking like wine', or at least sometimes 'like wine as to his or her or its gaze', 'wine-eyed', is not relevant here.

word is also otherwise in use in the general sense of 'track', it is necessary to distinguish its application to the sea by the addition of epithets. ὑγρὰ κέλευθα, *the wet tracks*, and ἰχθυόεντα κέλευθα, *the fishy tracks*, denote the sea, while λιγέων ἀνέμων λαιψηρὰ κέλευθα, *the swift tracks of loud winds*, are situated in a different region. Likewise with πόντος. πόντος, derived from a root \*pnth-, is an old word for a path.<sup>134</sup> The phrase πόντος ἀλὸς πολιῆς, *the path of the grey sea*, at *Iliad* XXI, 59, serves as an indication that πόντος meant a 'path' even at a time when ἄλς had already come to mean 'sea'; for, on the one hand, even in poetry it would not make sense to say 'the sea of the grey sea', on the other, ἄλς does show a qualification not only in having the attribute 'grey' but also in being feminine here, while ἄλς meaning 'salt' is always masculine; that is how Homer can connect the two words allegedly both denoting 'sea' in the one phrase 'the path of the grey salt-water'<sup>135</sup>. πόντος, like κέλευθα, needs some qualification to be applicable to the sea. Only after having been in use in that way for a long time, and in particular when the word is no longer used with a different application, can that sort of qualification be dropped, as at *Iliad* VIII 479.<sup>136</sup> Accordingly, we find ἀπείριτος πόντος, *the path without boundary*, at *Odyssey* 10, 195; or μεγακήτης πόντος, *the mighty-monstered path*, at *Odyssey* III, 158; and also phrases like 'the black path', 'the wine-looking path', 'the path of the look of violets', or 'the path of the look of haze', πόντος ἠεροειδής.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. H. Frisk, *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* II, Heidelberg 1970, s.v. πόντος.

<sup>135</sup> Or 'the path of the grey salts', if ἄλς is feminine as a collective; cf. H. Frisk, *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* I, Heidelberg 1960, s.v. πόντος: "Als urspr. Bed. ist 'ungebahnter, durch Gelände, Wasser usw. führender Weg' anzusetzen; vgl. Benveniste in: *Word* 10, 256f.; πόντος ist somit eig. "Fahrwasser" (vgl. ὑγρὰ κέλευθα) mit Beziehung auf eine für ein seefahrendes Volk primäre Funktion des Meeres. Vgl. zu πέλαγος and θάλασσα." Pace D.H.F. Gray, *Homeric Epithets for Things*, in: *CQ* 41, 1947, p. 112.

<sup>136</sup> It is in accordance with this assumption when, as stated and amply illustrated by LSJ, s.v., πόντος is "common from Hom. downwards, exc. in Prose, where it is chiefly used of special seas". If not only in Indo-European but also in early Greek times πόντος was a 'track' or 'way', it would be natural that the name of a location is added when the word is applied to a water-way. In expressions like ὁ Αἰγαῖος πόντος, there is a univocal qualification as to which track is referred to.

When one walks on land, the path is solid and non-transparent. When one fares at sea, the path is not solid and nearly transparent, depending on the grade of perturbation, in the same way mist or haze are not solid and nearly transparent. But is it the look of haze which distinguishes the sea as a path from other paths? Or is it the quality of being penetrable like mist or haze? If it is the former, ἤεροειδής could be classed alongside other colour-terms, if the latter, alongside other qualitative adjectives like ἀπείριτος or μεγακότης. Can one adduce in support of the former interpretation application of ἤεροειδής to a cave or a grotto, probably on the strength of the look of their openings which, especially at the seaside, are likely to be misty?<sup>137</sup>

It is very difficult to decide if μυλοειδής and ἤεροειδής, *of the guise of a mill-stone* and *of the look of haze*, mean to say that the objects to which they are attributed have the visual appearance of a mill-stone or haze, respectively, or some other quality or function of the objects denoted by the nouns the adjectives are derived from, or both. More important, perhaps, than to decide this question, is to note that unlike εὐειδής and θεοειδής, the other three Homeric adjectives in -ειδής, ἰοειδής, ἤεροειδής, and μυλοειδής, serve as attributes to nouns denoting objects, not people. Once adjectives in -ειδής are derived from nouns denoting objects in that sense, and are applied to objects, too, it is no longer perfect resemblance in look, but partial resemblance of some sort, which is referred to. When adjectives in -ειδής are applied where there is partial resemblance between the look of one thing and the look of another thing, but also partial resemblance in some other quality or function, like the lack of solidity or the purpose of crushing and grinding, it is only a short step from using those adjectives in -ειδής no longer exclusively as signifying 'of the look of' and 'looking like', but also in the more general sense of 'being like'. In a way, this extension, at least prefigured in Homer, is parallel to that of the verb εἶδομαι, with which 'appearing like'

<sup>137</sup> The rock of Scylla at *Odyssey* XII, 233, can be neglected, I should think, since it is the rock with the cave which bears its epithet only because it was the epithet of the cave at XII, 80. But cf. A. Heubeck - A. Hoekstra, *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey* II, Oxford 1989, p.171, on *Odyssey* XIII, 103.

first must have referred to visual appearance only, but then could encompass other aspects of the appearance of a person, too. With Homer, there always seems to be a visual element in the likeness referred to by the verb or one of the adjectives. These words, however, show in which way the noun εἶδος will change from referring to 'visual look and appearance', if this expression be granted, to 'look and appearance' in a more general sense. This semantic development of εἶδος, however, does not set in immediately.

### III.

While for the most part in concord with Homeric usage as far as εἶδος is concerned, the works of Hesiod show the first stages of a different semantic development of the noun. Of the four instances of the word in Hesiod's *Theogony*, the first can be directly compared to the description of Odysseus' dog Argos at *Odyssey* 306 - 308: after an enumeration of the attributes of the hundred-handed Giants it is said (153): ἴσχυς δ' ἄπλητος κρατερῇ μεγάλῳ ἐπὶ εἶδει. *Immense mighty strength on top of big appearance*. That is resumed in the description of the Titanomachy, when the three Hundred-Handers are mentioned again at 617ff. Their father had imprisoned them (619): ἠνορέην ὑπέροπλον ἀγώμενος ἠδὲ καὶ εἶδος | καὶ μέγεθος, *in awe of their overweening manliness, as well as their guise and size*.<sup>138</sup> Not unprecedented either is the use of εἶδος in a passage of the *Works and Days*: at 714, Hesiod concludes a paragraph of admonition to his brother with the words: ... , σὲ δὲ μὴ τι νόον κατελεγγέτω εἶδος. ... *let your disposition not disgrace your appearance*.<sup>139</sup> This

<sup>138</sup> Cf. M.L. West, *Hesiod. Theogony*, Oxford 1966, commentary ad loc.: "cf. *h. Dem.* 275 μέγεθος καὶ εἶδος ἄμειψε. ...".

<sup>139</sup> Translation by M.L. West, *Hesiod. Works and Days*, Oxford 1978, commentary ad loc. He continues: "i.e. let it match it. Tyrt. 10. 9 αἰσχύνει τε γένος κατὰ δ' ἀγλαῶν εἶδος ἐλέγχει; Pind. *O.* 8. 19 ἦν δ' ἔσορᾶν καλός, ἔργῳ τ' οὐ κατὰ εἶδος ἐλέγχων. The same dichotomy appears in *Od.* 8. 176f. ὡς καὶ σοὶ εἶδος μὲν ἀριπρεπέες ... νόον δ' ἀποφώλιός ἔσσι, 17. 454

opposition of external and internal characteristics, εἶδος and νόος, is parallel to that of *Odyssey* VIII, 164ff., or *Iliad* III, 212ff., discussed above.

At *Theogony* 259, in the middle of the catalogue of sea-nymphs, one of them<sup>140</sup> is introduced thus: Εὐάρνη τε φυήν τ' ἐρατὴ καὶ εἶδος ἄμωμος. *Euarne, of lovely growth as well as blameless guise*. While there is nothing new in this usage, it should be noted again that εἶδος can refer to the look of a woman just as well as to the look of a man; naturally, due to their subject matter, that is frequently the case in the Hesiodic fragments known as Ἡοῖαι. One principal context in that work is that of comparison of mortal and immortal females, of which Calypso's comparison of herself and Penelope at *Odyssey* V, 212ff., quoted above, is both example and model. A standard line is: ... ἧ εἶδος ἐρήριστ' ἀθανάτησι, ... *who competed with the immortals as to guise* (e.g. frgs. 23a, 16; 180, 14 Merkelbach - West). Another oft-repeated half-line, applicable to any female character, is: ... ἐπήρατον εἶδος ἔχουσαν, *having loveable look* (e.g. frg. 25, 39 M. - W.); a metrically slightly different variant thereof is: ... πολήρατον εἶδος ἔχουσαν (e.g. *Theogony* 908). Just because εἶδος can refer to the guise of a woman as well as to that of a man, however, one must not be led to render it 'beauty' instead of 'guise', 'look', or 'appearance'. That also applies to cases like Ibycus, frg. 1a (Page). The poet sings of the Greeks who destroyed Troy, [ξ]α]νθᾶς Ἑλένας περὶ εἶδει | [δῆ]ριν πολύυμνον ἔχοντες, *having a much-besung struggle about the looks of Helen* (5). The war was about Helen. The poet can say that it was about the looks of Helen. Of course, Helen was good-looking; everybody knew that; so Ibycus can talk of her 'looks' and need not mention her 'beauty' explicitly.<sup>141</sup>

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οὐκ ἄρα σοί γ' ἐπὶ εἶδει καὶ φρένες ἦσαν; epitaph of Scipio Barbatus (Dessau, *ILS* I) 3 *quoius forma uirtutei parisuma fuit.*"

<sup>140</sup> But cf. M.L. West, *Works and Days*, commentary ad loc.

<sup>141</sup> Pace M.L. West, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, Oxford 1993, p. 96.

Related to the type of comparison of divine and human females discussed above is also the first of the two occurrences of εἶδος in Hesiod's *Works and Days*. Pandora is created and equipped by the gods. Zeus orders Hephaestus (62): ... ἀθανάτης δὲ θεῆς εἰς ὧπα εἴσκειν | παρθενικῆς καλὸν εἶδος ἐπήρατον· ... . . . *that he liken the beautiful loveable appearance of the maiden to the immortal goddesses as to face*.<sup>142</sup> This sentence serves as a confirmation that εἶδος denotes 'appearance', 'look', in general; by the phrase εἰς ὧπα it is specified which part of the body should be like that of goddesses in appearance; the attribute καλόν indicates in a similar way that εἶδος in itself does not mean beauty.

In one respect, however, *Works and Days* 62 is different from the other Hesiodic comparisons of mortals with immortals. εἶδος is here direct accusative object, not accusative of respect. That is significant since an extension of the ways in which a word can be employed syntactically regularly precedes, and often implies, a change in the semantics of that word. The noun εἶδος occurred almost exclusively as an accusative of respect<sup>143</sup>, as a modal complement to a clause; here it denotes the direct object. That is why one can think of translating the whole clause '*... that he liken her to immortal goddesses as to her face, the beautiful loveable appearance of a maiden*'<sup>144</sup>, which would give 'appearance' a status different from that of a mere attribute.<sup>145</sup>

At Hesiod *frag.* 43a (Merkelbach-West), 70ff., εἶδος is the subject. The context there is somehow similar to that of *Works and Days* 60ff. Athena teaches her skills to a maiden,

<sup>142</sup> Cf. also M.L. West, *Hesiod. Works and Days*, Oxford 1978, commentary ad loc. He suggests to punctuate differently, '... ἀθανάτης δὲ θεῆς εἰς ὧπα εἴσκειν, | παρθενικῆς καλὸν εἶδος ἐπήρατον· ... .' If I understand his commentary correctly, that would amount to something like: '*... that he liken her to immortal goddesses as to her face, the beautiful loveable appearance of a maiden.*' If one accepts that as possible, this would be the first instance of εἶδος where the noun does not refer to 'the appearance of a named individual', person or animal, but as a general term to 'an appearance', 'a figure'. That would not only be unprecedented, but also difficult to explain in the Hesiodic context of language and thought. There are no temporally close parallels to this usage.

<sup>143</sup> Or an equivalent transformation, e.g. as an accusative object of a verb like ἔχω.

<sup>144</sup> Cf. note 142.

<sup>145</sup> One indication of this is that, using traditional grammatical terminology, one would speak of a possessive genitive in the phrase 'the appearance of this maiden' or 'this maiden's appearance', while in the case of the phrase 'an appearance of a maiden', as against 'an appearance of a youth', one would speak of a qualitative genitive.

perhaps Eurynome<sup>146</sup>. Hesiod continues (72): ... , νόεσκε γὰρ ἴσα θεῆσι | [τῆς  
καὶ ἀπὸ χρ]οῖῆς ἠδ' εἵματος ἀργυφέοιο | [λάμφ' οἶόν τε] θεοῦ  
χαρίεν τ' ἀπὸ εἶδος ἄητο· | ... . *She equalled goddesses in thought, and  
brightness beamed from her skin and silver cloth as of a god, and graceful look  
breathed from her.* Here εἶδος, like κάλλος in the probably related passage in the  
*Hymn to Demeter*<sup>147</sup>, is active subject of a clause. This new syntactical position of εἶδος  
will play a rôle in fifth century usage.

#### IV.

In non-epic archaic poetry, the noun εἶδος generally denotes guise or outward  
appearance.<sup>148</sup> In Attic tragedy, there are two occurrences of εἶδος in the extant works  
of Aeschylus; in both cases the word refers to the external appearance or guise.<sup>149</sup> Of the  
two instances in Sophocles' tragedies as we have them, the first one, in the early play  
*Trachiniae*, refers straightforwardly to Heracles' disfigured guise (1069); the second one  
is found in the late play *Electra*. Orestes returns in disguise and asks Electra who has  
received the urn which allegedly contains his ashes (1177): ἦ σὸν τὸ κλεινὸν  
εἶδος Ἡλέκτρας τόδε; *Is yours here Electra's renowned guise?* As with *Works*

<sup>146</sup> For the sake of readability, I will give West's reconstruction of the text. Cf. R. Merkelbach - M.L. West, *Fragmenta Hesiodica*, Oxford 1967, apparatus ad loc. They also adduce *h. Cer.* 278 (misprint for 276) as a parallel.

<sup>147</sup> In the *Hymn to Demeter* it is described how the goddess lifts her disguise (275): ὣς εἰποῦσα θεὰ μέγεθος καὶ εἶδος ἄμειψε | γῆρας ἀπωσαμένη, περί τ' ἀμφί τε κάλλος ἄητο· | ὀδμή δ' ἱμερόεσσα θυθέντων ἀπὸ πέπλων | σκίδνατο, τῆλε δὲ φέγγος ἀπὸ χροός ἀθανάτοιο | λάμπε θεᾶς, ξανθαὶ δὲ κόμαι κατενήνοθεν ὤμους, | αὐγῆς δ' ἐπλήσθη πυκινὸς δόμος ἄστεροπῆς ὥς. *Having said that, the goddess changed her size and guise, pushing away her age, and about and around her breathed beauty. Charming odours are spread from her fragrant peplos, far shone splendour from the skin of the immortal goddess, auburn hair lay upon her shoulders, and sparkling brightness filled the house like lightning.*

<sup>148</sup> E.g. Archilochus 196a. 7 (West); Tyrtaeus 10. 9; Alcman 1. 58 (Page); Ibycus 1. 5 (cf. *sectio II supra*); id. S166. 26; Simonides 50. 4.

<sup>149</sup> *Seven Against Thebes* 507; frg. 393.

and *Days* 62f.<sup>150</sup>, it is difficult to decide if εἶδος is just the external appearance of a named individual; or rather the whole person, metonymically. With Euripides, too, the use of the word as denoting the external, perceptible guise or appearance is predominant.<sup>151</sup>

## V.

With Herodotus, the semantic range of εἶδος widens and becomes more differentiated.<sup>152</sup> Of course, there are enough cases where εἶδος is used of a person and just denotes guise, appearance, looks.<sup>153</sup> That is also the case when εἶδος is in the

<sup>150</sup> Cf. note 142 above.

<sup>151</sup> Nine times εἶδος denotes the guise of a person: *Electra* 1062, *Alcestis* 333, *Hecuba* 269, *Suppliants* 889, *Helena* 263, *Trojan Women* 929, frgs. 15. 2; 690 (*Bacchae* 53 should be considered in the context of the discussion of μορφή in Appendix 4 below). Once εἶδος is used of the guise of things: *Io* 585. For discussion of *Iphigeneia in Tauris* 817, see Section XII on Thucydides below.

<sup>152</sup> For this and the following sections, I make use of the by no means complete, but on the whole representative, collections of instances of εἶδος in fifth and fourth century prose authors compiled by A.E. Taylor in his essay *The Words εἶδος, ἰδέα in Pre-Platonic Literature*, in: id., *Varia Socratica. First Series*, Oxford 1911, pp. 178-267. Since he quotes most of the passages fairly fully, there is no need to give the same material in full here.

Taylor's extensive treatment of εἶδος and ἰδέα in the Hippocratic Corpus in particular (pp. 212 - 248) has received immediate discussion and criticism from P. Shorey in a review in *Classical Philology* VI (1911), pp. 361 - 365; and from C.M. Gillespie, *The Use of Εἶδος and Ἰδέα in Hippocrates*, *Classical Quarterly* VI (1912), pp. 179 - 203. Cf. more recently H. Diller, *Zum Gebrauch von εἶδος und ἰδέα in vorplatonischer Zeit*, in: *Medizingeschichte in unserer Zeit*, Stuttgart 1971, pp. 23 - 30. Cf. section VI on the Hippocratic writings below.

<sup>153</sup> Pace Taylor, p. 184 - 186; he is right, though, in emphasizing that εἶδος, here as elsewhere, does not refer to the complexion or beauty of the face alone. Herodotus I, 8 (2x); I, 196; I, 199; III, 24; III, 61 (2x) - while Taylor comments: "The likeness meant is, of course, of physique in general, not merely of features, though this is included." I should reply: The likeness meant is, of course, of look in general, not merely of the appearance of physique or features, though that is included; VI, 61 (3x) - here the reason for the look's not being beautiful is δυσμορφία; naturally, the body's shape, μορφή, is one of the factors determining one's look; VI, 127; VII, 70: there are two different Aethiopian tribes; in comparing the ones in the East with those in the West, Herodotus says: διαλλάσσοντες εἶδος μὲν οὐδὲν τοῖσι ἑτέροις, φωνὴν δὲ καὶ τρίχωμα μόνον, *they differ in nothing from the others in guise, only in voice [language] and hair*; from that, no more can be inferred than that voice, or language, and hair, or fashion of carrying one's hair, is here not thought of belonging to one's εἶδος; Taylor's interpretation 'body' is again over-interpretation (cf. VII, 56: someone addresses Xerxes who has crossed the Hellespont: ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δὴ ἀνδρὶ εἰδόμενος Πέρσῃ καὶ οὐνομα ἀντὶ Διὸς Ἐέρξην θέμενος ἀνάστατον τὴν Ἑλλάδα θέλει ποιῆσαι, ... ; *Zeus, why do you liken*

plural, as at II, 53: in II, 52, Herodotus declares that the Pelasgians did not have names for their gods ( ... , ἐπωνυμίην δὲ οὐδ' οὖνομα ἐποιεῦντο οὐδενὶ αὐτῶν); later on they adopted foreign names for their gods; those names were then taken over by the Greeks; Herodotus continues: ὅθεν δὲ ἐγένοντο ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν, εἴτε αἰεὶ ἦσαν πάντες, ὀκοῖοί τε τίνες<sup>154</sup> τὰ εἶδεα, οὐκ ἠπιστέατο μέχρι οὗ πρῶην τε καὶ χθὲς ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ. ... [Ἡσίοδος γὰρ καὶ Ὅμηρός] εἰσι οἱ ποιήσαντες θεογονίην Ἑλλησι καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς ἐπωνυμίας δόντες καὶ τιμὰς τε καὶ τέχνας διέλοντες καὶ εἶδεα αὐτῶν σημήναντες. *But whence each of the gods stems, or if they were always there, and how which of them was with regard to their looks, <all that> was not known until yesterday or the day before, so to speak. ... [Hesiod, indeed, and Homer] were the ones who made the theogony for the Greeks, gave the gods their benamings, divided the honours and skills for each of them, and gave notice what be their looks.* Even at VIII, 113, I would maintain, εἶδος is used in its original sense of 'looks', 'appearance', 'guise': once he has reached Thessaly, Mardonius employs the entire armies of some of the nations following the Persians: ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων ἐξελέγετο κατ' ὀλίγους, τοῖσι εἶδεά τε ὑπῆρχε διαλέγων καὶ εἰ τέοισί τι χρηστὸν συνήδεε πεποιημένον· ... . *From the other allies he selected few, choosing those who had the looks, or of whom he knew that they had done something worthy.* Here it is a matter of pragmatics, not semantics, to observe that any evaluatively neutral word may adopt positive or negative connotations when it is in a certain position in the sentence, or when it has the appropriate emphasis, or when it is marked with other specific devices, or when it occurs in a certain context - in many a language<sup>155</sup> .

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*yourself to a Persian man and assume the name Xerxes instead of Zeus when you want to subdue Greece ... ?* Here εἰδόμενος refers to 'Zeus' - likening himself to a Persian in guise, in external appearance, even if that includes voice - it is set against οὖνομα ... θέμενος); VIII, 105.

<sup>154</sup> I prefer this accentuation to ὀκοῖοί τε τίνες, the one usually adopted.

<sup>155</sup> In the English language, the definite article is one of the devices employed to achieve this pragmatic transformation: 'Mardonius chose those men who had *the looks*, or about whom he knew that they had done something worthy.' may be said instead of 'Mardonius chose those men who were of strong looks, or about whom he knew that they had done something worthy.'

Appearance, guise, look, is also denoted by εἶδος in the context of animal description.<sup>156</sup> Herodotus states in writing about Egyptian animals (II, 69): κροκόδειλους δὲ Ἴωνες ὠνόμασιν, εἰκάζοντες αὐτῶν τὰ εἶδα τοῖσι παρὰ σφίσι γιγνομένοισι κροκοδείλοισι. *The Ionians called them crocodiles, however, in likening their appearances to the crocodiles which occur in their country.* In a description of Arabia, we read (III, 107): τὰ γὰρ δένδρεα ταῦτα τὰ λιβανωτοφόρα ὄφιδες ὑπόπτεροι, σμικροὶ τὰ μεγάθεα, ποικίλοι τὰ εἶδα, φυλάσσουσι πλήθει πολλοὶ περὶ δένδρον ἕκαστον, ... . *Winged snakes, small in size, varicoloured in look, guard these frankincense-bearing trees, many in number about each tree.* - The last translation differs in one point of grammar from the original; as with all the examples so far quoted from Herodotus, here as well εἶδος is in the plural. Homer used εἶδος in descriptions of named individuals; there it was, naturally, in the singular. As we observed, the usage of Hesiod and the early lyric poets does not differ from that of Homer in that respect. That Herodotus has εἶδος in the plural when it comes to animal description, may be taken as an indication that it still denotes the look, the guise, the appearance of the individual animal, not of a species of animal. 'The winged snakes have varicoloured appearances' does not show the same degree of abstraction as 'the winged snake has a varicoloured appearance' when this sentence refers to a type of snake, not an individual one.

Sentences of this general type, however, are also frequent with Herodotus. In comparing them to the ants of Greece, he says about a gigantic breed of Indian ants which are not as large as dogs, μεγάθεα (plural!) ἔχοντες κυνῶν μὲν ἐλάσσονα, but larger than foxes (III, 102): οὗτοι ὦν οἱ μύρμηκες ποιεύμενοι οἴκησιν, ὑπὸ γῆν ἀναφορέουσι τὴν ψάμμον κατὰ περ οἱ ἐν τοῖσι Ἑλλησι μύρμηκες κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὁμοίωτατοι. *Now, these ants, in building their habitation, carry up sand from*

<sup>156</sup> For Herodotus II, 76, cf. Section IV of the chapter on ἰδέα below.

*under the earth, just as the ants with the Greeks; they are, after all, most similar also as far as their look is concerned.* Here εἶδος may still refer just to the outward appearance. The statement, however, that the gigantic ants look like the normal ants in Greece is made after a remark about their activities. The clause εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὁμοιώτατοι has explanatory force, δὲ καὶ almost causal function. And although it is not an individual animal, and though in talking about their size Herodotus has the plural μεγάθρα, the εἶδος which is the *tertium comparationis* of the Greek and the Indian ants is in the singular. The Greek ants have one εἶδος, and the Indian ants have one εἶδος; with regard to that εἶδος the members of the one group are most similar to those of the other group; the functions all these ants perform are identical; the only difference mentioned is the difference in size.

Does Herodotus mean to say that as far as their 'species' is concerned, the two groups of ants are most similar? - I do not think one can safely assume that much. When Herodotus has in mind this biological distinction, he uses γένος, as at III, 113, where he talks about the wonders of Arabia: δύο δὲ γένηα οἷων σφι ἔστι θώματος ἄξια, ... . *They have two kinds of sheep worth marvelling at.* Against that, the statement about the ants, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὁμοιώτατοι, seems to refer to the look of the animals, even if a connection between look and bodily functions is implied in the description.

The same use of εἶδος as at III, 102 recurs in the section following (III, 103): τὸ μὲν δὴ εἶδος ὁκοῖόν τι ἔχει ἢ κάμηλος, ἐπισταμένοισι τοῖσι Ἑλλησι οὐ συγγράφω· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστέαται αὐτῆς, τοῦτο φράσω. κάμηλος ἐν τοῖσι ὀπισθίοισι σκέλεσι ἔχει τέσσαρας μηρούς καὶ γούνατα τέσσαρα, τὰ τε αἰδοῖα διὰ τῶν ὀπισθίων σκελέων πρὸς τὴν οὐρὴν τετραμμένα. *Now, what appearance the camel has I will not write down for the Greeks who know; but as to what is not known of it [i.e. the camel], let me say this: at its hind legs, the camel has four thighs and four knees, and its genitals are stretched out between the hind legs towards the tail.* Here again, the singular, this time of both the

animal and its εἶδος, is used in the description, not of an individual animal, but - as we would say - of a type, or of a species. As to the meaning of εἶδος, however, there cannot be any doubt that the word refers to external appearance or guise or look: non-apparent features, common to the whole species, are contrasted with the visible εἶδος.

We observe that in the context of animal description, Herodotus can talk about members<sup>157</sup> of one species, of one γένος, as he would say, and use the plural form both of the name of the animal and of εἶδος; or he can talk about the appearance of an animal, having both εἶδος and the name of the animal in the singular, while referring to the species and specific, not individual, characteristics. The latter implies a higher degree of abstraction, not necessarily conscious on Herodotus' part, and represents at the same time a semantic extension, in that the 'look', 'guise', or 'appearance' is no longer bound to be 'the look of an individual'.

That use is also found once in the context of description of human beings. Various peoples, ἔθνεα, follow the Persians against the Greeks. Among them are the Aethiopians. Of them, there are two different sections.<sup>158</sup> In comparing the Aethiopians in the East with those in the West, Herodotus says (VII, 70): διαλλάσσοντες εἶδος μὲν οὐδὲν τοῖσι ἑτέροισι, φωνὴν δὲ καὶ τρίχωμα μόνον, *they differ in nothing from the others in guise, only in voice [language] and hair*. Here, the people compared with each other, belonging to two groups, are many; the appearance of any one member of one group does not differ from that of any one member of the other group. They all have one appearance. Ethnography is thus the other, closely related, area besides zoology where reference to an εἶδος need not be reference to the εἶδος of an individual person.

The third such context is, naturally, one in which neither human nor other animate beings are described. It is necessary to regard employment in that sphere separately. To

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<sup>157</sup> In talking about members of one species Herodotus does not differentiate if he refers to many or to all members of that species; but it is clear from the context that the latter is to be assumed.

<sup>158</sup> Cf. note 153 above.

talk of the εἶδος of a thing is a new development. A simple case with Herodotus is IV 185, where he describes salt production in western Libya: ὁ δὲ ἄλς αὐτόθι καὶ λευκὸς καὶ πορφυρέος τὸ εἶδος ὀρύσσεται. *The salt dug there is white as well as purple in look.* Of worked up minerals, the main visible distinguishing mark is colour. So, for someone whose emphasis is clearly on relating and depicting things at home and abroad, it is natural to mention the colour of a mineral while describing its appearance.<sup>159</sup>

The other instance of εἶδος as not referring to the εἶδος of something animate carries far wider implications. In I 94, Herodotus relates that the Lydians have more or less the same habits and customs as the Greeks. They were, however, the first to coin gold and silver; the first to become merchants; and, he relates, they say that also the games, παιγνία, now common in their place and with the Greeks, were their invention. Once, at a time of dearth, they had to find a way to pass their time without thinking of food. ἐξευρεθῆναι δὴ ὧν τότε καὶ τῶν κύβων καὶ τῶν ἀστραγάλων καὶ τῆς σφαίρης καὶ τῶν ἀλλέων πασέων παιγνιέων τὰ εἶδεα, πλὴν πεσσῶν· τούτων γὰρ ὧν τὴν ἐξεύρεσιν οὐκ οἰκηοῦνται Λυδοί. *Then were invented: of cubes and ankle-bones<sup>160</sup> and of the ball and of all other games the appearances,<sup>161</sup> except for draughts; indeed, now, the invention of those, the Lydians do not appropriate.*

<sup>159</sup> Pace Taylor, op. cit., p. 185f.

<sup>160</sup> Both κύβοι and ἀστράγαλοι are what we call dice, the ones cubical, the others tetrahedral; it seems to be implied that the rules of the games played with the respective sets of dice were different.

<sup>161</sup> Pace Taylor, op. cit., p. 184. Taylor quotes ἐξευρεθῆναι δὴ ὧν τότε καὶ τῶν κύβων ... καὶ τῶν ἀλλέων πασέων παιγνίων τα εἶδεα (the figures, shapes, of all sorts of toys)". This is remarkable even for Taylor. Misreading παιγνίων for παιγνιέων, the genitive plural of the neuter noun παίγνιον, *plaything* or *toy*, for the genitive plural of the feminine noun παιγνία, *play, game, pastime*, is an easy oversight in other contexts. Here, the accusative plural τὰς παιγνίας had occurred only a few lines before, and the adjectival genitive plural feminine πασέων makes παιγνίων impossible. παιγνία, on the other hand, cannot anywhere, to my knowledge, mean *toy*. - It is conceivable that reading something like 'then it was that of cubical dice and of tetrahedral dice and of the spherical ball ...' suggested to Taylor that the emphasis of Herodotus' statement lay on the distinction of geometrical figures and shapes, and that Taylor was thus misled to think of the toys rather than the games played with them.

The other mistake Taylor shares with many interpreters and commentators of this passage. They translate as if Herodotus had said καὶ τῶν παιγνιέων τὰ ἄλλα εἶδεα πάντα, that being

If Herodotus were speaking of the toys, the playthings, which the Lydians invented, τὰ εἶδεα could be the *looks* or *guise* or *appearance* of these implements. Now, in the case at hand, the games played bear the names of those gadgets they are played with. But in what way could τῶν παιγνιέων τὰ εἶδεα refer to ‘the appearances of the games’? - If it is ‘appearance over time’, i.e. what creates the impression one gets while watching the games being played, or that impression itself, that would be a decidedly different application of ‘appearance’, reflecting a decidedly different application of εἶδος: application to a process or action.

Since, however, Herodotus speaks of the *invention* of games, it is more than doubtful if he is thinking of ‘appearance’ at all. What is invented is on the one hand, indeed, the implements, the toys; on the other hand, the rules which determine the way the game is to take place. In a sense, the ‘appearance’ of something happening or being done seems to be closely connected with the ‘way’ something happens or is done. The invention, however, is invention of the rules, of the way of the game, not of the appearance which is the outcome of the application of the rules.

To decide what prompted that shift in the application of εἶδος, and how it came about, is by no means a simple and straightforward matter. εἶδος as ‘the way (something happens or is done)’ could have arisen as consequence of a transfer from ‘the appearance of an individual’, person or thing, to ‘the appearance of an action’.

There are thus two distinct, though not necessarily strictly separate, developments in the semantics of εἶδος which can be traced for the first time with Herodotus. In Book I, the plural εἶδεα seems once to refer to ‘the ways (things happen or develop or come about or are done)’. In various places in Books II and III, in the context of animal description, εἶδος refers collectively to the appearance all members of one species have in common. In that context, comparisons of animals contain phrases like ‘most similar in

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allegedly ‘*all other sorts of games*’, rather than καὶ τῶν ἄλλῶν πασέων παιγνιέων τὰ εἶδεα, and of all other games the appearances. - For further discussion of this passage of Herodotus see end of Section X below.

εἶδος', and it is implied that identity in εἶδος is somehow connected with identity in γένος - that, though, is not made explicit.<sup>162</sup>

## VI.

For all we know, some Hippocratic writings antedate Thucydides, and the sections on εἶδος in early Hippocratic literature will therefore precede that on Thucydides.<sup>163</sup> It will also precede the brief section on the use of εἶδος by pre-Socratic philosophers, some of whom are certainly earlier than anything in the Hippocratic writings; that is because the Hippocratic writings form a corpus large enough for drawing definite conclusions about semantic developments, a basis not provided by the scanty fragments of the pre-Socratics.<sup>164</sup>

There seems to be no general agreement as to when exactly any one Hippocratic treatise was written.<sup>165</sup> Any selection of writings of the Corpus as pre-Platonic will be arbitrary

<sup>162</sup> See below section XII on Thucydides.

<sup>163</sup> On the chronology of Thucydides and various Hippocratic treatises cf. e.g. K. Weidauer, *Thukydides und die Hippokratischen Schriften*, Heidelberg 1954, and more recently G. Rechenauer, *Thukydides und die hippokratische Medizin*, Hildesheim 1991, with bibliography and discussion of pertinent literature.

<sup>164</sup> See section XI below.

<sup>165</sup> On the question of assignment of authorship and date of composition of treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus cf. the methodological remarks by G.E.R. Lloyd, *The Hippocratic Question*, *Classical Quarterly*, N.S. XXV (1975), pp. 171 - 192. He begins his survey by saying: "The question of determining the genuine works of Hippocrates, a topic already much discussed by the ancient commentators, still continues to be actively debated, although the disagreements among scholars remain, it seems, almost as wide as ever." Lloyd has a bibliography of 86 titles on this question, "the most important contributions since 1930", as he says.

Cf. also, e.g., the opening remarks of the introduction of a recent edition of *Affections, Diseases I - III, Internal Affections, Regimen in Acute Diseases (Appendix)*, P. Potter, *Hippocrates V/VI*, Cambridge Massachusetts/London 1988, p. IX, XI: "These volumes contain the most important Hippocratic works on the pathology of internal diseases. ... About the Treatises' interdependencies, authors, and relative dates of composition, nothing can be said with any degree of certainty. There is neither any evidence that would confirm, nor any evidence that would call into doubt, their traditional time of origin about 400 B.C."

Since, however, it is decisive for the present purpose if any one treatise concerned was written just before or just after a Platonic dialogue exhibiting similarities in usage, I will restrict myself to considering only those Hippocratic writings against whose composition at a time early enough for Plato to have read them no serious objections have been raised.

to some extent. The following works at least, however, seem to be generally agreed to be of an early date: *περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων, τόπων*, *On Airs, Waters, Places*, *προγνωστικόν*, *Prognostic*, *ἐπιδημιῶν α', γ'*, *Epidemics I + III*, *κατ' ἰητρειῶν*, *In the Surgery*, *περὶ ἀγμῶν*, *On Fractures*, *περὶ ἄρθρων (ἐμβολῆς)*, *On Joints*, *μοχλικόν*, *Instruments of Reduction*, *περὶ χυμῶν*, *Humours*, *περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου*, *Nature of Man*, and *περὶ ἱερῆς νόσου*, *The Sacred Disease*.<sup>166</sup> *The Nature of Man* will be discussed in the Section V of the chapter on ἰδέα. I do not at all think it safe to regard either *περὶ φύσων*, *Breaths*,<sup>167</sup> or the potentially highly important, but actually highly controversial, *περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰητρικῆς*, *On Ancient Medicine*,<sup>168</sup> as pre-Platonic, and will therefore not discuss its usage here.

<sup>166</sup> The order of the titles is that in which they occur in Littré's edition, adopted here only for the sake of simplicity.

<sup>167</sup> W.H.S. Jones, *Hippocrates* II, Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1923, p. 221ff., n. 2, writes in his introduction to *Breaths* which he holds to be a "sophistic essay": "*Breaths* shows a tendency to similes and highly metaphorical language which Plato attributes (*Protagoras* 337C-338A) to Hippias. ... I do not suggest that Hippias was the author, but I do hold that the book must have been written at a time when the sophistry he represented was a living force., ... ." He seems to imply that with Plato sophistry and public display associated with it came to a sudden end.

For a date of composition of *Breaths* in the fourth century cf. also F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit* I<sup>2</sup>, Leipzig 1887, p. 89, adduced by Diller, *Hippokratische Medizin*, p. 393, n. 1.

The passages from Plato's dialogues which F. Poschenrieder, *Die platonischen Dialoge in ihrem Verhältnisse zu den hippokratischen Schriften*, Metten 1882, pp. 42, 46ff., adduces as parallels to what is said in *Breaths* display, apart from the different wording, similarities in content of too general a nature to be conclusive in any way; Poschenrieder's extensive comparison of passages from *Breaths* with Eryximachus' remarks in the *Symposium*, pp. 60 - 66, if taken to convey more than the *communis opinio* of the time, suggests a common source for both rather than dependency of one on the other, since either one contains relevant medical material not found in the other.

For the view that the relative chronology of *Breaths* and the Platonic dialogues cannot be established with certainty, vid. also A. Nelson, *Die hippokratische Schrift Περὶ φύσων. Text und Studien*, Uppsala 1909, p. 92f., thus adduced by J. Jouanna, *Hippocrate. L'ancienne médecine*, Paris 1990, p. 81, n. 3.

<sup>168</sup> *On Ancient Medicine* has received attention in connection with Plato's philosophy for a long time. For reasons why I think it should not be considered as a basis of arguments on pre-Platonic usage see Appendix I below.

## VII.

Turning to *Airs, Waters, and Places*, the first point to be noticed is the relative frequency with which the word εἶδος occurs in this treatise.<sup>169</sup> On the assumption that εἶδος, as from Homer onwards, denotes appearance, guise, look, in the first place, that would seem natural since the author's task is to describe what sort of environment has what sort of influence on people in different regions, and for him that includes a description of the people he has met in those regions. One of the first things, however, even a layman notes when coming to an inhabited foreign country is if the people there look different from the ones at home. It is also natural that - while Homer predicates a man's appearance as excellent, godlike, or most befitting - a medical man draws attention to different distinctions.

So we read in section III<sup>170</sup> about men living in cities exposed to hot winds in winter: τὰ τε εἶδεα ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν ἀτονώτερα εἶναι ... . *Their guises are, for the most part, rather slack.*

About those in eastward facing cities with hot winds in summer we learn in section V: τὰ τε εἶδεα τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐχροά τε καὶ ἀνθηρά ἐστι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλη ἢν μή τις νοῦσος κωλύῃ. *The appearances of the people are of good colour and flowering more than elsewhere, unless some disease prevents this.*

In section XII we are told about a mild region in Asia Minor: τοὺς τε ἀνθρώπους εὐτραφέας εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἶδεα καλλίστους καὶ μεγέθει μεγίστους καὶ ἥκιστα διαφόρους ἐς τὰ τε εἶδεα αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ μεγέθη. ... . *The people are well-nourished, most beautiful as to their looks, very tall of size, very little different <from one another> as to their looks as well as their size.*

<sup>169</sup> The term is found 19 times, or in twelve passages, on 34 Loeb pages.

<sup>170</sup> If not stated otherwise, I give the text and chapter/section numbers of the Loeb editions of the Hippocratic texts by Jones, Withington and Potter.

A general statement concludes section XIII: Land is affected by the changes of the seasons, and so, in the same way, are human beings, too. εἰσὶ γὰρ φύσιες αἱ μὲν ὄρεσιν ἔοικυῖαι δενδρώδεσὶ τε καὶ ἐφύδροισιν, αἱ δὲ λεπτοῖσιν τε καὶ ἀνύδροις, αἱ δὲ λειμακεστέροις τε καὶ ἐλώδεσι, αἱ δὲ πεδίῳ τε [καὶ]<sup>171</sup> ψιλῇ καὶ ξηρῇ γῆ. αἱ γὰρ ὄραι αἱ μεταλλάσσουσαι τῆς μορφῆς τὴν φύσιν εἰσὶ διάφοροι. ἦν δὲ διάφοροι ἔωσι μέγα σφέων αὐτέων, διαφοραὶ καὶ πλείονες γίνονται τοῖς εἶδεσι. *There are, indeed, natures*<sup>172</sup> *which are like mountains, the ones wooded and bewatered, others light and unwatered, others rather meadowy and marshy, then again those which are like a bare plain and dry land. The seasons, indeed, which change the nature of the shape are different; but whenever they are very different from one another, the differences will also become larger for the appearances.* εἶδος here is apparently a term more general than μορφή, which refers to the shape of the body alone.

There is much fog in Phasis, the author reports in section XV, and he continues: διὰ ταύτας δὴ τὰς προφάσις τὰ εἶδεα ἀπηλλαγμένα τῶν λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχουσιν οἱ Φασιηνοί· τὰ τε γὰρ μεγέθεα μεγάλοι, τὰ πάχεα δ' ὑπερπάχητες, ἄρθρον τε κατάδηλον οὐδὲν οὐδὲ φλέψ· τὴν τε χροίην ὠχρὴν ἔχουσιν ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ἰκτέρου ἐχόμενοι· φθέγγονται τε βαρύτατον ἀνθρώπων, τῷ ἡέρι χρεώμενοι οὐ λαμπρῷ, ἀλλὰ νοτώδει καὶ θολερῷ· πρὸς τε ταλαιπωρεῖν τὸ σῶμα ἀργότεροι πεφύκασιν. *Due to those causes, then, the Phasians have looks different from all other people. As to their sizes, they are tall, as to being fat, they are overly fat, and no joint is visible, nor vein. They have a pale colour, as though they were affected by*

<sup>171</sup> Something seems to be wrong with the text. I omit καί.

<sup>172</sup> Note the absolute use of φύσις, *nature*; 'a nature' is a human being of a certain nature, both individually and collectively. For φύσις in Hippocratic writings and beyond, cf. e.g. the recent, very full treatment of the topic by G. Rechenauer, *Thukydides und die hippokratische Medizin*, Hildesheim 1991, pp. 112 - 258, especially 167 - 174.

*jaundice; they sound deepest of <all> men, since the air they use is not clear, but moist and thick. They are rather idle as to straining their bodies.*

In section XX of the same treatise, it is said that the Scythians are of moist constitution.  
 ... τὰ δὲ θήλεια θαυμαστὸν οἶον ῥοϊκά ἐστὶ τε καὶ βλαδέα<sup>173</sup> τὰ εἶδεα.  
 ... *as to the female children, it is astonishing how crooked and soft they are as to looks.*

By way of summary, the author states in section XXIII that, as against Asia, in Europe except for Scythia, there are violent seasonal changes, different in different regions. He continues: διότι τὰ εἶδεα διηλλάχθαι νομίζω τῶν Ἑυρωπαϊῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν Ἀσιηνῶν καὶ τὰ μεγέθεα διαφορώτατα αὐτὰ ἑωυτοῖς εἶναι κατὰ πόλιν ἐκάστην. *Therefore, I believe, differ the appearances of Europeans more than those of the Asians, and their 'sizes' are most different from one another according to each state.*

As with Homer, εἶδος co-occurs several times with, or is employed in the vicinity of, μέγεθος; people are predicated κάλλιστοι τὰ εἶδεα; the εἶδος itself is εὐχρων or ἀνθηρόν which though not attested would be feasible with Homer. Predicates like ἄτονον, *slack*, ῥοϊκόν, *crooked*, βλαδύ, *soft*, on the other hand, point to the particular interests of the physician. Yet, those latter adjectives as well all belong to the visible sphere, and can be part of someone's appearance.<sup>174</sup> When in section XV of *Airs*,

<sup>173</sup> βλαδέα Coray (Kühlewein, Taylor) : βραδέα mss. For all the rarity of the word, βλαδύς, *soft*, seems to fit the context much better. One's choice will, of course, partly be determined by one's preconceptions about εἶδος, since if εἶδος can mean body, it is possible to predicate it βραδύ, *slow*; if, on the other hand, εἶδος still has strong visual connotations, and at the same time is, as here, the 'εἶδος of a person', that would seem more difficult; I wonder how well-attested the meaning "heavy", given in the abridged version of Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon of 1926, is for βραδύ.

H. Diller, who in his personal copy of Jones' edition underlines Coray's emendation, has "βλαδέα" also in the margin of line 3 of the same page, where he wants to read: ῥοϊκά δὲ γίνεται καὶ βλαδέα, ... , thus suggesting repetition of the same two adjectives in line 20f. That, to my mind, would give more weight to the phrase θαυμαστὸν οἶον of line 20. The author of *Airs, Waters, and Places* would then say: the bodies, σώματα, of the Scythians are crooked and soft, ῥοϊκά καὶ βλαδέα; and their girls' appearance is so *par excellence*.

<sup>174</sup> Cf. also *Airs, Waters, and Places* XIX, where in a brief passage εἶδεα occurs three times, twice with a possessive genitive, once as an accusative of respect; εἶδεα is predicated παχέα καὶ σαρκώδεα

*Waters and Places* it is said of the Phasians that they have an εἶδος different from that of the rest of mankind, and when that statement is followed by a reference first to their size, their volume, their colour, and then their ‘sounding deep’, it need not be inferred from that that the author thought of someone’s εἶδος as also comprising voice; starting from his usual point of departure, he lists a number of factors contributing to the difference in guise or appearance, and then, I suppose, names an additional distinction, that in voice.

It is to be noticed that in all the examples quoted εἶδος is in the plural. Many people of one ἔθνος, one *race* or *nation*, or at least one φῦλον, one *tribe*, are described, and so the author refers to their εἶδεα, just as the Ionian Herodotus talked of the εἶδεα of animals of one species.

The noun εἶδος in *Airs, Waters, and Places*, however, is not always either accusative of respect, or a direct object accusative to a verb of having, or has a genitive of a noun denoting a human being depending on it.<sup>175</sup> The following may be an example of an absolute use of εἶδος:

In section X, it is reported that in years with dry winters and rainy spring, various diseases are likely to occur. καὶ δυσεντερίας εἰκός ἐστι γίνεσθαι καὶ τῆσι γυναιξὶ καὶ τοῖς εἶδεσι τοῖς ὑγροτάτοισι. *It is also probable that dysenteries occur, both with the women and with the moistest ‘appearances’.*

This usage recalls Hesiod’s *Works and Days* 62.<sup>176</sup> After the creation of Pandora, Zeus gives orders to Hephaestus. As an alternative to ‘... ἀθανάτης δὲ θεῆς εἰς ὧπα εἰσκεν | παρθενικῆς καλὸν εἶδος ἐπήρατον· ... . ... *that he liken the*

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καὶ ἄναρθρα καὶ ὑγρά καὶ ἄτονα, *fat and fleshy and without joints <showing> and moist and slack.*

<sup>175</sup> Cf. note 143 above. - In *Airs, Waters, and Places* XIII quoted above, εἶδος in the clause διαφοραὶ καὶ πλείονες γίνονται τοῖς εἶδεσι falls under the category of ‘someone’s εἶδος’; for the sake of the peculiar comparison of lands and people, the otherwise required qualifications, here of εἶδος, in the previous line of μορφῆ, are omitted.

<sup>176</sup> Cf. Section III above, with notes 142 and 145. Cf. also, on a similarly absolute use of φύσις, note 172 above.

*beautiful loveable appearance of the maiden to the immortal goddesses as to face*' it was suggested to punctuate differently, and to read and translate '... ἀθανάτης δὲ θεῆς εἰς ὧπα εἰσκεν, | παρθενικῆς καλὸν εἶδος ἐπήρατον· ... ., ... *that he liken her to immortal goddesses as to her face, the beautiful loveable appearance of a maiden.*' This suggestion, while perhaps leading to an anachronistic result in the case of Hesiod, was possible in the light of a usage like that of the Hippocratic author. In his case, it seems obvious from the grammar of the sentence that εἶδος does not refer to 'the appearance of a person' but to 'a person', the same shift in application which took place with the English word 'appearance' in the context of inanimate objects, when, for example, E. King writes in *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society* II, 1667: "White and clean appearances ... all figur'd like the lesser sort of Birds Eggs."<sup>177</sup> There, the objects themselves, not their impressions they make, or the perceptions they provoke, are called 'appearances', and it is in that way that τὰ εἶδεα τὰ ὑγρότατα, *the wettest*, or perhaps *softest*, 'appearances', can be co-ordinate with αἱ γυναῖκες, *the women*.

One must, on the other hand, not judge rashly as to the absolute and independent status εἶδος has acquired. The final section of *Airs, Waters, and Places* contains six instances of the plural εἶδεα in different grammatical contexts, and it is most difficult to decide if - in those cases in which the word neither is accusative of respect nor has a possessive genitive depending on it - one has to supply 'of the people' with εἶδεα, or what the word is supposed to mean when standing on its own.

In section XXIV, the author has finished his description of Europe and Asia.

ἔνεισι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ φύλα διάφορα ἕτερα ἑτέροισι καὶ τὰ μεγέθεα καὶ τὰς μορφὰς καὶ τὰς ἀνδρείας. τὰ δὲ διαλλάσσοντα ταῦτά ἐστιν, ἃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρότερον εἴρηται. ἔτι δὲ σαφέστερον φράσω. ὀκόσοι μὲν χώραν ὀρεινὴν τε οἰκέουσι καὶ τρηχεῖαν καὶ ὑψηλὴν καὶ ἔνυδρον, καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ αὐτοῖσι γίνονται τῶν

<sup>177</sup> Quoted in *The Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford 1933, s.v. "Appearance. 14."

ώρέων μέγα διάφοροι, ἐνταῦθα εἰκὸς εἶδεα μεγάλα εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ταλαίπωρον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρείον εὖ πεφυκότα, καὶ τό τε ἄγριον καὶ τὸ θηριῶδες αἰ τοιαῦται φύσεις οὐχ ἥκιστα ἔχουσιν. ... (κοῖλα χωρία) ... εἰ μέντοι ποταμοὶ μὲν μὴ εἶσαν, τὰ δὲ ὕδατα λιμναῖά τε καὶ στάσιμα πίνοιεν καὶ ἐλώδεα, ἀνάγκη τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶδεα προγαστρότερα καὶ σπληνώδεα εἶναι. ὀκόσοι δὲ ὑψηλὴν τε οἰκέουσι χώραν καὶ λείην καὶ ἀνεμώδεα καὶ ἔνυδρον, εἶεν ἂν εἶδεα μεγάλοι καὶ ἐωυτοῖσι παραπλήσιοι· ἀνανδρότεροι δὲ καὶ ἡμερώτεροι αἰ γνῶμαι. ὀκόσοι δὲ λεπτά τε καὶ ἄνυδρα καὶ ψιλὰ, τῆσι μεταβολῆσι τῶν ὡρέων οὐκ εὐκρητα, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ χώρῃ τὰ εἶδεα εἰκὸς σκληρά τε εἶναι καὶ ἔντονα καὶ ξανθότερα ἢ μελάντερα καὶ τὰ ἦθεα καὶ τὰς ὀργὰς αὐθάδεάς τε καὶ ἰδιογνώμονας. ὀκου γὰρ αἰ μεταβολαὶ εἰσι πυκνότεραι τῶν ὡρέων καὶ πλείστον διάφοροι αὐταὶ ἐωυτῆσιν, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὰ εἶδεα καὶ τὰ ἦθεα καὶ τὰς φύσεως εὐρήσεις πλείστον διαφερούσας.

μέγιστα μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αὐταὶ τῆς φύσεως αἰ διαλλαγαί, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἡ χώρα, ἐν ἣ ἂν τις τρέφεται καὶ τὰ ὕδατα. εὐρήσεις γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς χώρας τῇ φύσει ἀκολουθέοντα καὶ τὰ εἶδεα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς τρόπους.

In translating this passage, it will be helpful to discuss its language paragraph by paragraph as the author's style is as rough and rugged as some of the regions he describes. Numerous inconcinnities and anacoluthous constructions in a text laconic and terse make it difficult to determine if a particular occurrence of εἶδος marks a semantic development or is just an instance of an elliptical or merely careless construction.

*In Europe as well, there are tribes different from one another as to size, as to shape, and as to manliness. The points of difference are just those which I have indicated on the preceding <pages>. I will, however, describe them yet more clearly. All those who inhabit a mountainous, rough, high, and bewatered country - and if the changes of the*

*seasons are great with them - there it is probable that 'appearances' are tall and by nature tending to 'the hard-working' and 'the manly', and such 'natures' do not least have 'the wild' and 'the brutish'.*<sup>178</sup>

It seems as though at least in this one instance, the phrase *εἶδεα μέγала εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ταλαίπωρον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρείον εὖ πεφυκότα*, εἶδος is to be taken as absolute in the above said sense. This, one could argue, is most telling due to the way the sentence is continued, again by way of change of grammatical construction: *καὶ τό τε ἄγριον καὶ τὸ θηριῶδες αἰ τοιαῦται φύσιες οὐχ ἥκιστα ἔχουσιν*; in that latter clause, φύσιες, *natures*, is the subject. It seems as if just as a person of a certain φύσις or *nature* can be referred to as a certain φύσις, so a person of a certain εἶδος, *appearance*, can be referred to as a certain εἶδος. But whereas in English that same semantic shift has taken place in the case of 'nature', perhaps furthered by authors of a Classical education, it has not in the case of 'appearance'. There would, consequently, be a difficulty for the translator in how to render εἶδος in such a context. 'Appearance' would be possible in the case of things, inanimate objects. It is, though, not commonly considered suitable as a word that covers in its application both things and people.

There is, though, a different way to construe the same phrase. One could see the clause in question, *there it is probable that 'appearances' are tall and by nature tending to 'the hard-working' and 'the manly'*, as parallel to a hypothetical 'there it is probable that eyeballs are shortened and by nature tending to 'the short-sighted'', or some such clause referring to the make-up of any particular part of the body. εἶδεα and φύσιες would then simply refer to the *appearances* and *natures* of the people described. εἶδος would not be 'an appearance' in the sense of 'a person appearing', but simply 'appearance', namely of a person, in the accustomed way. I do not see any way to choose between these two alternatives if the sentence is considered in isolation. It may be stated, though, that if one decides for the latter, conservative way of construing the text, one can at the

<sup>178</sup> I have deliberately refrained from an idiomatic rendering to point to the employment of substantivized neuters in the context of character depiction in a fifth century text.

same time see how from contexts such as this one the former, semantically innovative absolute use of εἶδος as 'an appearance' may arise.

To resume translation: after a few general remarks about the influence which hollow regions have on their inhabitants, regions where rivers render the water healthy,<sup>179</sup> the author continues:

*Certainly, though, if there were no rivers and thus they<sup>180</sup> drank waters mery, stagnant and marshy, it would be necessary that such 'appearances' were pot-bellied and with enlarged milt.*

Though at first this sentence seems to resolve the issue just discussed in favour of an absolute use, since in the phrase τοιαῦτα εἶδεα the determining 'such' is apparently anaphoric in a way which prevents 'such appearances' from referring to anything else but the people just implicitly referred to by the main verb of the second part of the protasis, it can again not be excluded that 'such appearances' is simply a shorthand for 'the appearances of such people', a case parallel to what was suggested for τοιαῦται φύσιες above. Taking the phrase that way may be supported by the next occurrence of εἶδος:

*People, however, who inhabit land high, light, windy, and bewatered, are tall as to <their> appearances, and very much like one another: their minds rather unmanly and tame.*

In this instance, εἶδος is clearly accusative of respect. The very next sentence, though, a case of anacoluthous construction, presents the same ambiguities which were encountered above, though the grammatical context is a little more complicated.

*People <who inhabit land> thin, unwatered, bare, and not well-balanced as to the changes of the seasons - in that land it is probable that the 'appearances' be hard and intense, fair rather than dark, and the characters and tempers wilful and independent. Indeed, where the changes of the seasons are most frequent, and <the seasons> most*

<sup>179</sup> I have not quoted these lines since they are not relevant for the point at issue.

<sup>180</sup> Note the repeated unmediated change of subject.

*different from one another, there you will also find the appearances and the characters and the natures as differing most widely.*

Here, it is impossible to decide if in the sentence ‘ὀκόσοι δὲ λεπτά τε καὶ ἄνυδρα καὶ ψιλὰ, τῆσι μεταβολῆσι τῶν ὥρέων οὐκ εὐκρητα, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ χώρῃ τὰ εἶδεα εἰκὸς σκληρὰ τε εἶναι καὶ ἔντονα καὶ ξανθότερα ἢ μελάντερα καὶ τὰ ἦθεα καὶ τὰς ὀργὰς αὐθάδεάς τε καὶ ἰδιογνώμονας’, there is to be a caesura after εὐκρητα so that τὰ εἶδεα ... καὶ τὰ ἦθεα καὶ τὰς ὀργὰς were to be the subjects of the *accusative with infinitive*, or if τοσοῦτους or τούτους or the like is to be supplied so that τὰ εἶδεα ... καὶ τὰ ἦθεα καὶ τὰς ὀργὰς were accusatives of respect,<sup>181</sup> as is clearly the case in the preceding sentence.

*These, now, are the greatest differences in nature, then also the land in which someone is reared, and the waters. You will find, indeed, that for the most part the appearances and the ways of the people follow the nature of the land.* In that concluding sentence, τὰ εἶδεα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, *the appearances of the people*, is unambiguous again, due to the presence of the possessive genitive. It is, thus, possible, but by no means certain or necessarily the case, that the plural εἶδεα refers to persons as ‘appearances’ in *Airs, Waters, and Places* XXIV. I would maintain, though, that - partly due to the author’s obscure style - external confirmation would be required before a final verdict could be pronounced.<sup>182</sup>

### VIII.

Once in *Airs, Waters, and Places*, εἶδος is in the singular. In section XI of the treatise, it is stated that changes of season especially, but also other astronomical events, have

<sup>181</sup> Jones, loc. cit., if taken literally, seems to construe the sentence in this latter way.

<sup>182</sup> Cf. in general Section IX; for *Airs, Waters, and Places* XXIV, cf. also Section II of the chapter on ἰδέα.

serious consequences for the diseased. τὰ τε γὰρ νοσεύματα μάλιστα ἐν ταύτησι τῆσιν ἡμέρησιν κρίνεται. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀποφθίνει, τὰ δὲ λήγει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα μεθίσταται ἐς ἕτερον εἶδος καὶ ἑτέρην κατάστασιν. *And mostly, indeed, the diseases are decided in those days. And some die away, others calm down, all the others change to another appearance and another condition.*

The sentence containing εἶδος seems to admit of several interpretations.<sup>183</sup> One is to say that here, εἶδος is not the ‘εἶδος of a person’ but ‘the εἶδος of a disease’. A disease, one could infer, has at any stage of its occurrence an εἶδος, an *appearance* or *guise*. One is reminded of the words of Sir William Temple, who says in his *Health & Long Life*: “Both [diseases] were thought to appear in many various Guises.”<sup>184</sup>

In view of general Hippocratic tenets, on the other hand, one could take the sentence ‘καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀποφθίνει, τὰ δὲ λήγει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα μεθίσταται ἐς ἕτερον εἶδος καὶ ἑτέρην κατάστασιν’ to mean that the disease in question gives way to another disease altogether. For this use of μεθίστασθαι, one could adduce, e.g., *Diseases* I, 29. Overheating of the upper cavity is given as a cause for vomiting. Then it is added: διὰ τοῦτο δ’ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐς περιπλευμονίην ἐκ

<sup>183</sup> Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, p. 219, comments: “The context shows that the meaning is “and the rest pass into a different phase.” εἶδος = a distinct stage in an illness marked by special symptoms, a sense derivative from that of “shape,” “structure.”

Gillespie, *The Use of Εἶδος and Ἰδέα in Hippocrates*, p. 186f., remarks that Taylor does not recognize the advancement of εἶδος “in the direction of the purely logical meaning of kind or class”. A “divisory or classificatory suggestion is found in the numerous examples where εἶδος and ἰδέα is conjoined with πολὺς, ἄλλος, or ἕτερος, παντοῖος, or παντοδαπός.” One of the examples is “περὶ ἀέρων 11, I. 53 K. τὰ μὲν (νοσεύματα) ἀποφθίνει, τὰ δὲ λήγει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα μεθίσταται ἐς ἕτερον εἶδος καὶ ἑτέρην κατάστασιν. T. ‘phase,’ but this is inaccurate: the writer does not think of the disease as persisting in another shape, but as passing into another disease or another form of disease; see περὶ παθῶν 8, vi. 216 L. κρίνεσθαι δὲ ἔστιν ἐν τῆσι νοῦσοισιν, ὅταν αὖξωνται αἱ νοῦσοι ἢ μαραίνωνται ἢ μεταπίπτωσιν ἐς ἕτερον νοῦσημα ἢ τελευτώσιν.”

Jones, *Hippocrates* I, p. 105, translates the sentence of *Airs, Waters, and Places* XI: “For it is especially at these times that diseases come to a crisis. Some prove fatal, some come to an end, all others change to another form and another constitution.”

<sup>184</sup> W. Temple, *Works* I, 1720, p. 283, quoted in *The Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford 1933, s.v. “Guise. 5.”

καύσου τε καὶ πλευρίτιδος μάλιστα μεθίσταται τὰ νοσήματα· ... .  
*For that same reason, too, diseases often change from fever and pleurisy to pneumonia.*<sup>185</sup>

For the question of the meaning of εἶδος in the sentence from *Airs, Waters, and Places* XI, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀποφθίνει, τὰ δὲ λήγει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα μεθίσταται ἐς ἕτερον εἶδος καὶ ἑτέραν κατάστασιν, one has to decide between the two possibilities outlined above. A clue may lie in the proper understanding of what is signified by κατάστασις.<sup>186</sup>

As for the use of κατάστασις as applied to the seasons, one may compare *Prognostic* XXV. First, some general medical advice is given to those who want to forecast accurately; then it is added: χρή δὲ καὶ τὰς φορὰς τῶν νοσημάτων τῶν αἰεὶ ἐπιδημούντων ταχέως ἐνθυμείσθαι καὶ μὴ λανθάνειν τὴν τῆς ὄρης κατάστασιν. *But it is also necessary quickly to give thought to attacks of diseases which are at any given time epidemic, and not to forget the constitution of the season.* The application to the season seems to be excluded, though, since on the one hand the point of talking about change of season at all seems to be to draw attention to the change of weather conditions that goes with it; on the other hand, it would be awkward to have different points of reference for εἶδος, namely the diseases, and κατάστασις, namely the astronomico-meteorological situation.

As for the use of κατάστασις as applied to a disease, one may compare *Prognostic* XX. There, it is declared that there are certain critical days for fevers. They are not always easy to make out. ἀλλὰ χρή ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡμέρης ἐνθυμείσθαι καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην τετράδα προστιθεμένην σκέπτεσθαι καὶ οὐ λήσει,

<sup>185</sup> νόσημα seems to be 'someone's being ill' rather than a named disease.

<sup>186</sup> Cf. Jones, *Hippocrates* I, p. 141, n. 1, in the *Introduction to Epidemics* I: "“Constitution” is the traditional translation of κατάστασις, climatic conditions of such a marked type as to give a distinguishing character to a period of time. The word is also used of diseases, and so on, to denote a fixed type prevalent at any particular time.”

ὅπη τρέψεται. γίνεται δὲ καὶ τῶν τεταρταίων ἢ κατάστασις ἐκ τούτου τοῦ κόσμου. *But it is necessary to give thought to <the matter> from the first day and at each additional fourth day - and you will not fail to see where things turn. The constitution also of quartan fevers develops out of this order.* Now, the author of *Airs, Waters, and Places* does not always write in the clearest style. His grammar is not always coherent. Yet, if each and every disease of which it is not correct to say either ἀποφθίνει or λήγει, whatever the exact meaning of those two words be, turns to a different condition, and that condition is a different ‘constitution of disease’, then - though ‘τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα μεθίσταται ἐς ἕτερον εἶδος καὶ ἑτέραν κατάστασιν’ need not imply anything about the disease’s being the same or not - one could argue in terms of pragmatics in the sense that one provides the reader with what is relevant: a different disease implies a different constitution anyway; therefore, if it is stressed that the disease passes into a different constitution with change of season, it must be the same disease.

But that, I think, is not a cogent line of argumentation. The context of *Airs, Waters, and Places* XI is ambiguous. Neither the point of reference of εἶδος nor the meaning of the word there can be determined with any degree of certainty.<sup>187</sup>

## IX.

There are five instances of εἶδος in *Epidemics* I and III; in all of them, the word seems to be employed in the same way, marking a transition to a new meaning of εἶδος.

*Epidemics* I, section 19: πλῆθος μὲν οὖν τῶν νοσημάτων ἐγένετο. ἐκ δὲ τῶν καμνόντων ἀπέθνησκον μάλιστα μειράκια, νέοι, ἀκμάζοντες, λειοί, ὑπολευκόχρωτες, ἰθύτριχες, μελανότριχες, μελανόφθαλμοι, οἱ

<sup>187</sup> Taking ἐς ἕτερον εἶδος καὶ ἑτέραν κατάστασιν as a sort of ἐν-διὰ-δυσίην, or hendiadys, ‘the diseases turn to a different appearance, and that is to say a different constitution’, does not decide the matter either.

εἰκῆ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ῥάθυμον βεβιωκότες, ἰσχνόφωνοι, τρηχύφωνοι, τραυλοί, ὀργίλοι. καὶ γυναῖκες πλείσται ἐκ τούτου τοῦ εἶδους ἀπέθνησκον. ‘Now the number of illnesses was great. And of the patients there died chiefly striplings, young people, people in their prime, the smooth, the fair-skinned, the straight-haired, the black-haired, the black-eyed, those who had lived recklessly and carelessly, the thin-voiced, the rough-voiced, the lispers, the passionate.’<sup>188</sup> Very many women, too, of this type died.

The list of types of people includes some which are mutually exclusive, such as the age groups and, probably, some of the types of voice. It is therefore people who displayed one or more, not all, of the said characteristics, who were most likely to die. ‘And not only the male’, the author adds; this is not because the adjectives used for the description of the diseased are of masculine gender; it is his common practice to remark how women were affected by the several diseases occurring in a given constitution.<sup>189</sup> When he declares ‘καὶ γυναῖκες πλείσται ἐκ τούτου τοῦ εἶδους ἀπέθνησκον’, he does not seem to draw a line between the age classes and the other characteristics either; among the characteristics, moreover, ‘those who had lived recklessly and carelessly’ does refer to a style of life rather than to any personal features, appearance, or guise. The author, therefore, does not seem to say: ‘women of that appearance died’, but more likely something like ‘women of that type’.

*Epidemics* I, 20: οἱ μὲν οὖν πλείστοι τῶν νοσησάντων ἐν τῇ καταστάσει ταύτῃ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ διενόσησαν, καὶ οὐδένα οἶδα τῶν περιγενομένων, ᾧτινι οὐχ ὑπέστρεψαν αἱ κατὰ λόγον ὑποστροφαι γενόμεναι, καὶ διεσώζοντο πάντες, οὓς κἀγὼ οἶδα, οἷσιν αἱ ὑποστροφαι διὰ τοῦ εἶδους τούτου γενοίατο. οὐδὲ τῶν διανοσησάντων διὰ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου οὐδενὶ οἶδα ὑποστροφὴν

<sup>188</sup> Up to this point, the translation is Jones’.

<sup>189</sup> E.g. *Epidemics* I, 1, 12, 16.

γενομένην πάλιν. *Now, most of the diseased in this particular season went through their disease in that way, and I do not know any one of those who recovered, whom the relapses did not affect according to the list I have set out, and all were saved, of whom I know, whom relapses affected of this type. And I do not know of anyone going through their disease whom relapse did not affect in that way.*

If there is a difference in sense between τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ, an instrumental dative, and the modal-cum-instrumental prepositional phrase διὰ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου, it is a very slight one.<sup>190</sup> The force of the phrase διὰ τοῦ εἶδος τούτου should be modal-cum-instrumental in the same way.<sup>191</sup> It may well be that εἶδος is chosen mainly for the sake of variation, since otherwise τρόπος would occur three times in succession in a context which appears to be redundant anyway. While I think that possible, I do not think that one would have to assume that it is thereby implied that εἶδος and τρόπος are synonymous here. τρόπος is the turn something takes, the way something goes.<sup>192</sup> εἶδος is here appearance, in the sense of how a thing - object, person, or event - habitually or typically appears: 'all those I know were saved when the relapses affected them in that guise'. It is because relapses coming about in one guise were fatal, relapses coming about in a different guise were not fatal, that εἶδος, *guise*, could come to be applied in cases where one would tend to translate 'type'.

The three instances of εἶδος in *Epidemics* III, are again in the 'constitution', not in one of the 'cases'. Several diseases are named which occurred in this period. Then it is said (III, 3): τὰ μὲν ἐπιδημήσαντα νοσήματα ταῦτα. ἐκάστου δὲ τῶν ὑπογεγραμμένων εἰδέων ἦσαν οἱ κάμνοντες καὶ ἔθνησκον πολλοί.

<sup>190</sup> The author of *Epidemics* uses τρόπος regularly to refer to 'the way' of a disease, i.e. the way in which particular symptoms occur in a particular order, e.g. *Epidemics* I, 1, 2, 3; in I, 10, κακοθήρα τρόπον, an accusative of respect, means *in a bad way*.

<sup>191</sup> δια as a preposition is, to my knowledge, otherwise not at all frequent with either εἶδος or τρόπος.

<sup>192</sup> A somewhat different interpretation of the use of τρόπος in the Hippocratic corpus is given by Gillespie, p. 183f. Discussing its implications here would lead too far astray.

συνέπιπτε δ' ἐφ' ἐκάστοισι τούτων ὧδε. *Now, those were the epidemic diseases <in this constitution>. And of each of the above-said types there were patients and died many. As symptoms occurred, with each of those, the following. An enumeration of the symptoms follows.*

After a description of other diseases, including ardent fevers, in the preceding sections, section 12 begins: πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πυρετῶν ἐπεδήμησεν εἶδεα, τριταίων, τεταρταίων, νυκτερινῶν, συνεχέων, μακρῶν, πεπλανημένων, ἄσωδέων, ἀκαταστάτων. *But also many other types of fevers were epidemic, 'tertians, quartans, night fevers, fevers continuous, protracted, irregular, fevers attended with nausea, fevers of no definite character.'*<sup>193</sup> In both these cases, translating εἶδος by 'guise' would be just possible, but stretching the language beyond what is commonly acceptable. It seems more natural to talk of 'these' and 'other types of fever'.

In section 13 we learn that 'consumption' was the worst and most widespread disease of that constitution. Its symptoms and development are described in detail. Then section 14 commences: εἶδος δὲ τῶν φθινωδέων ἦν τὸ λεῖον, τὸ ὑπόλευκον, τὸ φακῶδες, τὸ ὑπέρυθρον, τὸ χαροπὸν, λευκοφλεγματῖαι, πτερυγώδεις· καὶ γυναῖκες οὕτω. *But the type of the consumptive people was: the smooth, the whitish, the lentil-coloured, the reddish, the bright-eyed; leuco-phlegmatous people, those with shoulder-blades projecting like wings. And the women likewise.*

It is impossible to say whether εἶδος here is meant to refer just to the external appearance or guise of the people affected by consumption, or whether it is the type of those affected which is characterized;<sup>194</sup> and the characterisations happen to be externally visible. Against the latter position, it could be objected that since among the

<sup>193</sup> The latter part of the translation is Jones'.

<sup>194</sup> Jones translates: "The physical characteristics of the consumptives were: - skin smooth, whitish, lentil-coloured, reddish; bright eyes; a leucophlegmatic condition; shoulder-blades projecting like wings. Women too so ([note 3:] This brief phrase seems to mean that the same characteristics marked consumptive women as consumptive men.)".

characteristics are found λευκοφλεγματῖαι and πτερυγώδεες, both denoting people,<sup>195</sup> the author must speak of a type or types, not about appearance or appearances. To that it could be replied that that is not certain since these two types of people come last; they could be added inconcinuously to the list of appearances.

While this last case may be left undecided, the extension which took place with the application of the noun εἶδος cannot be called into question. In *Epidemics I + III*, there are instances of εἶδος which a translation of the word with 'appearance' or 'guise' would perhaps not render unintelligible, but at least potentially misleading for the uninitiated. Translating εἶδος as 'type' seems to preserve the sense of the passages quoted in every case. One must bear in mind, however, that to the Greek ear it was still the same word εἶδος which was employed in each case; and *Epidemics I + III* shows that, at least in some cases, the same clause seems to admit of two alternative renderings, with 'guise' or 'appearance', or with 'type'. While the two English words 'guise' and 'type' stand quite apart, I wonder if the question if the author had meant 'guise' or 'type' could have been asked at the time of composition of the treatise.

## X.

Nothing is gained by accumulating more instances and showing in each case that the above observations are confirmed in one way or another. Neither, I believe, is there new or substantially different evidence which would tell against the interpretations offered in the preceding sections, nor do I detect a further semantic development. 'Type' seems to be firmly established as a meaning of εἶδος separate from, and co-existing with, 'guise, appearance'. With all the instances of εἶδος in the treatises *In the Surgery, On Fractures, On Joints, Instruments of Reduction, Humours, and The Sacred Disease*,<sup>196</sup>

<sup>195</sup> This, I believe, was overlooked by Jones.

<sup>196</sup> There are no instances of εἶδος in either *Prognostics* or *On Fractures*.

the word seems to denote either ‘guise, appearance’ or ‘type’, in the ways outlined above.<sup>197</sup>

The last instance of εἶδος in the *Histories* of Herodotus discussed in the section V above was that of I, 94: ἐξευρεθῆναι δὴ ὧν τότε καὶ τῶν κύβων καὶ τῶν ἀστραγάλων καὶ τῆς σφαίρης καὶ τῶν ἀλλέων πασέων παιγνιέων τὰ εἶδα, πλὴν πεσσῶν· τούτων γὰρ ὧν τὴν ἐξεύρεσιν οὐκ οἰκηιοῦνται Λυδοί. *Then were invented: of cubes and ankle-bones and of the ball and of all other games the appearances, except for draughts; for, the invention of those, the Lydians do not appropriate.* εἶδος there appeared to be applied to how the games were played: i.e. either to the process, something not static but dynamic, or to the rules; but definitely not to a material object. ‘τῶν ἀλλέων πασέων παιγνιέων τὰ εἶδα’ could not mean ‘all other sorts of games’.

A clue to what it could mean is furnished by the use of εἶδος in some of the early Hippocratic treatises. There, εἶδος is applied to things characterised by any set of

<sup>197</sup> There are, naturally, some cases like those of *Epidemics* discussed above which mark a transitional state; attribution of them to one or the other group will to some extent be arbitrary.

‘Guise, appearance’ is denoted by εἶδος at *In the Surgery* IIIb, VIId; *Instruments of Reduction* Ia,b, VI; *Humours* I.

‘Type’ is denoted by εἶδος at *In the Surgery* IIIa, VIIa,b,c, VIII, XIX; *On Joints* XXVII, XXXIV; *The Sacred Disease* IV, XVI (cf. the chapter on μορφή above).

I admit that I do not fully understand *Humours* XIII. Gillespie, *The Use of Εἶδος and Ιδέα in Hippocrates*, p. 189, adduces it in a collection of “passages in which the classificatory notion seems more or less important”, and writes: “περὶ χυμῶν 13, v. 494 L. ὅταν οὖν καὶ ἦρ οὕτως ἀγάγη (sc. ψύχεα ἐκ θαλπέων καὶ θάλπος ἐκ ψύχεος, the characteristic of φθινόπωρος, which gives rise to ἰκτεροί, jaundice), καὶ ἦρος γίνονται ἰκτεροί· ἐγγύτατω γὰρ αὕτη ἢ κίνησις τῇ ὥρῃ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος ἐστίν. Apparently = ἦν οὕτως ἀγάγη. This affection, when it takes this form, is most akin to the season. Not in T[taylor].” If that be so, the passage would belong to the second group.

Let me add here that the one occurrence of εἶδος in περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων, *Regimen in Acute Diseases*, which is sometimes thought early, or even ‘by Hippocrates’, likewise belongs to that second group. When the author reminds his less knowledgeable colleagues in section 43 ὡς χρὴ διαγινώσκειν ... ὅσα τε ἡμέων ἢ φύσις καὶ ἢ ἕξις ἐκάστοισιν ἐκτεκνοῖ πάθεα καὶ εἶδα παντοῖα, that latter phrase is short for καὶ εἶδα παντοῖα παθέων: *that it is necessary to understand ... which affections our nature and habit engender, and that there are manifold types* <of affections>. Cf. also Gillespie, p. 186f.; pace Taylor, p. 220.

characteristics, visible or not visible. commonly, the noun εἶδος would appear in a genitival phrase of the type 'a person of that εἶδος', 'a disease of that εἶδος'. In these cases, 'type' suggested itself as a translation of εἶδος. The reverse phrase is also found: 'these and other types of disease', 'two types of something'.<sup>198</sup> But there is also a possibility of referring to diseases or patients characterised as to 'the above-said εἶδεα', or again by declaring: 'the εἶδος of them was this or that'. In those cases, neither 'type' nor 'guise, appearance' would be fully appropriate as a rendering of εἶδος; it is not that either word would necessarily be incorrect as a translation, but in each case the context shows that the connotations of εἶδος are slightly different from those of its English renderings; the difference becomes apparent in the differing syntactical relations εἶδος can enter. Bearing that in mind, 'of all other games the types' may be acceptable as a translation of 'τῶν ἀλλέων πασέων παιγνιέων τὰ εἶδεα'.

In the same way, the passage discussed at the end of section VIII above could be explained, if not translated. At *Airs, Waters, and Places* XI, it is declared: καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀποφθίνει, τὰ δὲ λήγει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα μεθίσταται ἐς ἕτερον εἶδος καὶ ἑτέρην κατάστασιν. That could now be understood as meaning: 'And the ones die away, others calm down, all the others change to another type and another condition'. Considering the usage of *Epidemics* I and III, and also, as I think, of Herodotus, this rendering in itself would not presuppose a decision as to whether the author has in mind the same disease or a different, new one.

In the Hippocratic corpus, εἶδος is used with a high degree of abstraction. What determines an εἶδος and what is referred to by εἶδος need not have a visual component at all; the noun in either singular or plural can be applied to something - person, object, state or event - marked by one or more than one characteristic. Syntactically, εἶδος appears to be more versatile than either 'guise, appearance' or 'type', in that in all its

<sup>198</sup> 'δύο εἶδεα' is a phrase of particular frequency in *In the Surgery*; there, it is used somewhat stereotypically.

senses it seems to be employable with any one of the constructions possible with any of the English renderings.

## XI.

Among the pre-Socratic philosophers, it is Empedocles who employs εἶδος with any frequency or significance.<sup>199</sup> If Plutarch, *De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet* 926d (DK 31B27), quotes accurately, a line by Empedocles contains the formulaic ἠελίοιο ... ἀγλαὸν εἶδος, *the bright appearance of the sun*.<sup>200</sup>

εἶδος as 'the appearance of something' is found once more, though with slightly different emphasis. In B71 (4ff.), the εἶδη of mortals are opposed to their χροῖα, and in this context the question of Greek concepts of colour and colours may be relevant: εἶ

<sup>199</sup> The few other instances of the word in pre-Socratic philosophical or sophistic texts can all be subsumed under one of the categories discussed above: Gorgias (DK 82B22) contrasts the εἶδος, *guise, appearance*, of a woman with her δόξα, here *reputation* rather than *judgement* or *opinion*. With Critias (DK 88B48), εἶδος likewise denotes *guise, external appearance*.

When Melissus discusses that *there is only one*, ἓν μόνον ἔστιν (DK 30B8), he constructs as one of the absurdities which follow from the opposite assumption that while we say that we perceive and comprehend *rightly* or *correctly*, ὀρθῶς, nevertheless we see again and again that things are one thing and its opposite, whence it follows that we neither see nor recognize what is; that does not agree with the initial assumption. He continues (B8, 4): φαμένοις γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ καὶ αἰδία (?) καὶ εἶδη τε καὶ ἰσχὺν ἔχοντα, πάντα ἑτεροιοῦσθαι ἡμῖν δοκεῖ καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἐκ τοῦ ἐκάστοτε ὀρωμένου. *Indeed, to us, when we say that there are many eternal things, having appearances and power, all things seem to alter and change, from what is being seen at any one given time*. Here *having appearances and power* refers to the assumed objects' having their own, distinct appearance and power or strength; that εἶδος is appearance is partly confirmed by the participle ὀρωμένου, indicating that the evidence adduced is in the sphere of what manifests itself visibly.

For Philolaus DK 44B5, see the discussion of *Phaedo* 100b - 105e, Part III below.

<sup>200</sup> It is impossible to determine if the genitive ἠελίοιο is a *genitivus possessivus* or an *appositivus* (cf. Kühner-Gerth, *Griechische Grammatik* I, pp. 264f., 280f.; Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik* II, p. 121f.). If it be the latter, ἠελίοιο ... ἀγλαὸν εἶδος would amount to '*the bright appearance which is the sun*'; a potential line of linguistic development could then be constructed thus: 'I see the bright sun', 'I see the sun bright in appearance', 'I see the sun's bright appearance', 'I see the bright appearance which is the sun'; a next potential step in that line could be the dropping of the qualification: 'I see a bright appearance'. In the last sentence, the adjective could then be changed, or perhaps even left out altogether. This hypothetical absolute use of 'appearance' would be similar to what is found with some of the medical writers (vid. Section VII above).

δέ τί σοι περὶ τῶνδε λιπόξυλος ἔπλετο πίστις, | πῶς ὕδατος γαίης  
 τε καὶ αἰθέρος ἡελίου τε | κίρναμένων εἶδη τε γενοῖατο χροῖά τε  
 θνητῶν | τόσσ', ὅσα νῦν γεγάασι συναρμοσθέντ' Ἀφροδίτη ... . *But if  
 trust concerning those things be in any way deficient for you: how from water and earth  
 and aether and sun, when they are mixed, appearances and colours of mortal beings  
 come about, whichever have come about now, fitted through Aphrodite ...* . Translating  
 χροῖά as *colour* suggests itself, especially as it is found side by side with εἶδος which  
 could then be *shape* or *form*<sup>201</sup> .

It may, however, be worth bearing in mind that - though admittedly more than half a century later and in a predominantly Attic context - an opposition of colour and shape was expressed as that of χρώμα or χροῖα and σχῆμα, not εἶδος. That is all the more significant as in that text, *Meno* 73e -76e, Socrates states that Meno as a follower of Gorgias accepts and adheres to the views of Empedocles (76c). But elsewhere in pre-Socratic philosophy as well, σχῆμα, rather than εἶδος, seems to be the term firmly established to denote physical shape or form.<sup>202</sup> It is, therefore, rash to see an opposition of form *versus* colour in Empedocles B71. εἶδος, appearance, as a term for the more general concept may be followed in any description of a thing by any term for a concept which strictly speaking forms part of it; colour does belong to appearance, as well as to 'an appearance'; appearance, as well as 'an appearance', comprises colour: that does not rule out the slightly redundant wording of *'appearances and colours of mortal beings come into being'*, neither in verse nor in prose.

In B22, as most other extant lines of Empedocles preserved by Simplicius, the world we live in is described as containing on the one hand things in concord with their parts,

<sup>201</sup> Provided one accepts Diels-Kranz I, p.338, *apparatus ad loc.*: "χροῖα wohl Neutr. Plur. neben χροῖά, χρώς wie φλοῖα (Hes. s.v. πίτυρα) neben φλοῖά, φλόος" - on conventional lines of interpretation, however, εἶδη καὶ χροῖα could just as well be *bodies and skins*, or *bodies and bodies*, or *appearances and appearances* (vid. LSJ s.vv. εἶδος, χροῖά, χρώς).

<sup>202</sup> Not an absolutely compelling argument, as Plato might as well - here as elsewhere - have changed the terminology, if only in this one point; cf., however, for examples: Diels-Kranz III (index) s.v. σχῆμα.

namely the sun, the earth, the sky, and the sea; then those mixed well and fittingly, likewise in concord; and, he concludes: ἐχθρὰ <δ' ᾧ> πλείστον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διέχουσι μάλιστα | γέννη τε κρήσει τε καὶ εἶδεσιν ἐκμάκτοισι, | πάντα συγγίνεσθαι ἀήθεα ... . *But those which stand furthest apart from one another are most hostile to birth and mixture and moulded appearances, wholly unaccustomed to get together ...* <sup>203</sup> Here, εἶδος is used absolutely; 'an appearance' in the sense of 'a thing that appears'. The same usage is found in two more fragments. B73 as well belongs to a physical or cosmological context (4f.): ... | ὥς δὲ τότε χθόνα Κύπρις, ἐπεὶ τ' ἐδίηενεν ἐν ὄμβρῳ, | εἶδεα ποιπνύουσα θοῶ πυρὶ δῶκε κρατῦναι. ... *and how at that time Cypris, when she had moistened earth in rain, eagerly making appearances, gave them to swift fire to strengthen them.* As with B22, the product of a process of γένεσις, of becoming and coming into being, that which as a result appears as distinct, is called an appearance. Such a distinct result of a process is also the picture a painter produces; the work and craftsmanship of painters is described in B23 (7ff.): οἷτ' ἐπεὶ οὖν μάρψωσι πολύχροα φάρμακα χερσίν, | ἀρμονίῃ μείξαντε τὰ μὲν πλέω, ἄλλα δ' ἐλάσσω, | ἐκ τῶν εἶδεα πᾶσιν ἀλίγκια πορσύνουσι, | δένδρεά τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἀνέρας ἠδὲ γυναῖκας | θήρας τ' οἰωνούς τε καὶ ὕδατοθρέμμονας ἰχθύς. *Now, when they grasp with their hands drugs of varied colour, mixing with fitting measure more of the one, less of the other, they prepare from them appearances similar to all the things, creating trees and men and women, animals and birds and fish, nourished by the*

<sup>203</sup> For this way of construing the syntax cf. J. Mansfeld, *Die Vorsokratiker*, Stuttgart 1987, p.413: "Am feindlichsten dem Entstehen und der Mischung und den ausgeprägten Gestalten [...] sind jene [Teile], die am meisten voneinander verschieden sind, ganz und gar ungewohnt, zusammenzutreten, ... ." A different, but to my mind less satisfactory, solution is proposed by e.g. Diels-Kranz: "Feindlich dagegen ist am meisten, was am meisten voneinander absteht in Ursprung, Mischung und ausgeprägten Gestalten, gänzlich ungewohnt der Verbindung ... ", also adopted by e.g. J. Barnes, *Early Greek Philosophy*, Harmondsworth 1987, p. 168f.: "But most hostile are the things which differ most from one another | in birth and blending and moulded shape, | quite unaccustomed to come together ... ".

water. It should be noted that painters do not just create shapes or forms, but indeed reproduce the whole appearance of the things they set out to represent.<sup>204</sup>

The case is different with the three remaining instances of εἶδος, different in the same way some of the instances of εἶδος in the medical writers discussed above were different. And it may not be irrelevant that at least one of the three contexts, B98 (11ff.), while certainly part of a cosmological discussion, is distinctly physiological or medical<sup>205</sup>: ἡ δὲ χθὼν τούτοισιν ἴση συνέκυρσε μάλιστα, | Ἡφαίστῳ τ' ὄμβρῳ τε καὶ αἰθέρι παμφανόωντι | Κύπριδος ὀρμισθεῖσα τελείοις ἐν λιμένεσσιν, | εἶτ' ὀλίγον μείζων εἶτε πλεόνεσσιν ἐλάσσων· | ἐκ τῶν αἵμα τε γέντο καὶ ἄλλης εἶδα σαρκός. *But earth, most equal with them, met them, Hephaestus and rain and all-shining aether, anchoring in the perfect harbour of Cypris; be there a little more or a little more less: from those, blood came into being, and also the types of other flesh.* The various types of flesh, whatever they are,<sup>206</sup> would 'appear' differently; in that sense they could be said to be different, distinct 'appearances'. But in the same way as with the examples discussed above, the grammatical construction, εἶδος in the plural, with a dependent genitive, indicates the transition to a separate new sense of εἶδος as 'type', whether or not that development would immediately have been perceived as such. I do, however, think, that the semantic development outlined took place in a non-poetic context and was only afterwards employed in Empedocles' verse. The irreducibly ambiguous transitional occurrences of the word found in the professedly medical writers are absent from Empedocles. That is,

<sup>204</sup> Use of εἶδος in this sort of context may be seen as paving the way for the semantic development seen at e.g. Thucydides, 3.82.2.3 and Euripides, *Iphigenia in Tauris* 817; vid. section XII below.

<sup>205</sup> In this context one is reminded of the report on Empedocles by Diogenes Laertius (VIII, 58 = DK 31A1): φησὶ δὲ Σάτυρος ἐν τοῖς βίοις ὅτι καὶ ἰατρός ἦν καὶ ῥήτωρ ἄριστος. *And Satyros in the Lives says that he was a physician as well as an excellent orator.* Cf. M. Schofield (in: G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, Cambridge<sup>2</sup>1983, p. 282) who in commenting on A1 adduces B147 as potential indication of Empedocles' affiliations with the medical profession.

<sup>206</sup> That is to say, leaving aside the question if αἷμα was, or was not, seen as one type of flesh; an interpretation of the line which is grammatically possible.

of course, not to say that there are not varying degrees of abstraction in Empedocles as well; in B98 εἶδη clearly refers to types of things visibly different, and so does B115 (53 ff.): δαίμονες οἴτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο, | τρίς μιν μυρίας ὥρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι, | φυομένους παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἶδεα θνητῶν | ἀργαλέας βίοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους. *It's an old law that demons who have committed a crime must wander about a long time, growing (or living) as manifold types of mortal beings, with time exchanging the toilsome ways of life.*

In B125 (2f.) the appearances of the two types of things in question are different as well. I think, though, that here, perhaps for the first time, εἶδος is used absolutely, that is to say without the qualification of e.g. a genitive, with the meaning of type.: ἔκ μὲν γὰρ ζωῶν ἐτίθει νεκρὰ εἶδε' ἀμείβων, | <ἐκ δὲ νεκρῶν ζῶοντα>. *From living bodies he (or: she) made dead, exchanging the types, <and from dead living>.*<sup>207</sup> The context of this line, though, is too uncertain to reach a firm conclusion.

But even if B125 is left aside altogether, it cannot be doubted that Empedocles employed εἶδος in the sense of 'type' without comment, explanation, or even only the slightest indication that this usage reflects a very recent semantic development. The observations made on the occasion of our discussion of the Hippocratic writings above are therefore to be seen as systematic rather than narrowly chronological; to our knowledge, Empedocles' verses were written down before any of the Hippocratic writings were; both the authors of the latter and Empedocles, however, used material which had been used before, describing and setting it out in a language which had gradually evolved in a way suited to that material. It is not surprising that all stages of linguistic development should coexist in one and the same text, or collection of texts as is the Hippocratic Corpus, especially when the text in question is composed in a way as

<sup>207</sup> Not: *From living beings he made dead bodies, changing <them>, ...* . Pace J. Mansfeld, op. cit., p.473. J. Barnes, op. cit., p.197: "*From living things he made corpses, changing their forms*", too, seems to mean something different from what is proposed above.

conservative as we must assume the Hippocratic Corpus to have been. Oral traditions of the secret craft of medicine can be expected to be riddled with archaisms - or, at least, layers of old or antiquated diction - in the same way legal or religious texts are. Thus, when we considered a supposed development of εἶδος within selected Hippocratic writings, that need not necessarily imply that that development took place for the first time in those chance survivals under scrutiny; it is rather the case that what has been reconstructed as a potential semantic development is reflected or survives in the passages discussed; they are a reflection of a development which seems to have taken place, and in a sense come to a conclusion, by the time Empedocles composed his poem or poems.

## XII.

In all of Thucydides, there are six instances of the word εἶδος. His usage does not seem to be markedly different from what could be observed so far. There is, however, a slight development. On occasion, εἶδος refers to the appearance, not of an object but of an action: Towards the end of his account of the fifth year of the war, in relating the events of the summer of 427 B.C., Thucydides comments on how στάσις, *civil strife*, had become more common in communities all over Greece after Athens and Sparta had gone to war, since the opposing parties in the cities, democrats and oligarchs, could rely on help from those two cities respectively, as both of them were in need of allies. Thucydides continues (III 82.2): καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαιότερα καὶ τοῖς εἶδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὥς ἂν ἕκασται αἰ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται. ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἱ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν· ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ'

ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ. *And many hardships befell the cities in civil strife, as always come about and always will, as long as the nature of men remains the same, yet more so, or quieter, or changed in their appearances, according to how all the several changes of fortune occur. Indeed, in peace and when things are well, both cities and individuals have better judgement because they do not fall into involuntary need; but war that takes away well-being of everyday life is a violent teacher and assimilates to current circumstances the emotions of the many.* The way in which circumstances, events that occur, appear as different, according to fortune, are the εἶδη, ‘the appearances’, of those events which are said to have changed.

This usage is in some ways parallel to Euripides, *Iphigenia in Tauris*, 817. Orestes has just disclosed his identity to Iphigenia. Disbelieving, she demands proof of identity. Orestes reports what, he says, he has been told by Electra: Iphigenia once wove a garment depicting the quarrel of their ancestors Atreus and Thyestes. Iphigenia agrees, and Orestes continues (816): εἰκῶ τ’ ἐν ἱστοῖς ἡλίου μετάστασιν. - ἸΦ. ὕφηνα καὶ τόδ’ εἶδος εὐμίτοις πλοκαῖς. Orestes *And you depicted on the loom the sun’s reversal.* - Iphigenia *I wove also that ‘appearance’ with fine-threaded twinings.*

We see how once εἶδος has been established with its absolute sense of ‘an appearance’, the word can be employed to refer to any thing thus denoted, the point of reference need not be a single object or a single living being; with Euripides, it is the appearance of an action, a snapshot of an event, which is referred to.<sup>208</sup>

While there is, I believe, no principal difference in usage with the Thucydidean example, it is nevertheless worth observing that in the case of Thucydides on the one hand what is referred to as being capable of different *appearances* has previously, at the beginning of the sentence, been denoted by a neuter plural adjective, i.e. the diction of the passage as a whole is in itself inherently more abstract; secondly, and more importantly, the *events*,

<sup>208</sup> For this usage, cf. also the fourth-century poet Timotheus 15 (*Persae*), 136.

γιννόμενα, are many, and the syntax is undecided as to whether each and every event is different according to circumstances, or whether there are several types of events, a possibility which may be suggested by the way the next sentence continues that thought. Use of εἶδος as ‘the appearance (of an action)<sup>209</sup>’ is not far from that of εἶδος as ‘the type (of an action)’ and thus ‘the way (something happens)’. Accordingly, one could translate: καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, ... μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαιτέρα καὶ τοῖς εἶδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται. *And many hardships befell the cities in civil strife, ... yet more so, or quieter, or changed in their ‘ways’, according to how all the several changes of fortune occur.*

What may appear as a further extension of the semantics of εἶδος, ‘way’ in addition to ‘appearance’ and ‘type’, is much less so than the use of a completely different word as a rendering of the Greek might at first suggest. The innovation in usage is application of the word εἶδος to an action or event, something dynamic, rather than to a physical or corporeal body, object or thing. This move has not to the same extent taken place in English, so that in the majority of cases ‘appearance’ or ‘appearances’ would not serve as an idiomatic translation.<sup>210</sup>

It is, on the other hand, not surprising that clear cases of this new application occur at a time when εἶδος as ‘type’ is firmly established; in speaking of ‘types’ of things, one need not exclusively, or as may be not at all, refer to visual features of the things discussed. When εἶδος is used to denote ‘the way’ things happen, there may be a visual element to the action, event or scene referred to, as was the case with Euripides, *Iphigenia in Tauris*, 817; that, however, need not be so, and in the case of Thucydides III 82.2 the difference in εἶδη of the hardships occurring is probably not primarily one of

<sup>209</sup> As elsewhere, brackets indicate that the terms in parentheses are not part of the meaning of the word under consideration but are supplied in the text. The terms in parentheses are given solely to indicate application, i.e. immediate context, of the words discussed and translated.

<sup>210</sup> Cf. above end of Section V on Herodotus I 94.

visual appearance. In that, application of εἶδος to events is more abstract and less concrete than the original application of the word to physical objects. This degree of abstraction is also found with the use of εἶδος as referring to 'type'. Extension of applicability from things to events may have been prompted, but was definitely facilitated by the more abstract meaning εἶδος had acquired in denoting 'type'.

The next instance of εἶδος I will discuss has previously been taken as evidence for a peculiar, separate meaning of the word. This, I believe, resulted from looking at a very small portion of text and trying to interpret it in isolation. However, in order to understand Thucydides III 62, the wider context of the passage has to be taken into account. The scene is that of the confrontation of Theban and Plataean opinion after the defeat of Plataea at the hands of the Spartans and their Theban allies. The Thebans plead for harsh punishment, rejecting the historical account given by the Plataeans to justify their allegiances. Having summarized events before the Persian wars, the Thebans continue: ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ὁ βάρβαρος ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, φασὶ μόνοι Βοιωτῶν οὐ μηδίσαι, καὶ τούτῳ μάλιστα αὐτοὶ τε ἀγάλλονται καὶ ἡμᾶς λοιδοροῦσιν. ἡμεῖς δὲ μηδίσαι μὲν αὐτοὺς οὐ φάμεν διότι οὐδ' Ἀθηναίους, τῇ μέντοι αὐτῇ ἰδέᾳ ὕστερον ἰόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἑλληνας μόνους αὐτῶν Βοιωτῶν ἀπικίσαι.

καίτοι σκέψασθε ἐν οἷῳ εἶδει ἐκάτεροι ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἔπραξαν. ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἡ πόλις τότε ἐτύγχανεν οὔτε κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσόνομον πολιτεύουσα οὔτε κατὰ δημοκρατίαν· ὅπερ δὲ ἐστὶ νόμοις μὲν καὶ τῷ σωφρονεστάτῳ ἐναντιώτατον, ἐγγυτάτῳ δὲ τυράννου, δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν εἶχε τὰ πράγματα.

*'Subsequently, during the foreign invasion of Hellas, they say that they were the only state in Boeotia which did not collaborate with the Persians. This is the point which they use most frequently for their self-glorification and for deriding us. We say that the only reason why they did not collaborate was because the Athenians did not do so*

either, and, following up the same principle, we shall find that when the Athenians began to attack the liberties of Hellas, Plataea was the only state in Boeotia which collaborated with Athens.

*Consider, too, what type of government we each had at the time of these events. Our constitution then was not an oligarchy, giving all men equal rights before the law, nor was it a democracy: power was in the hands of a small group of powerful men, and this is the form of government nearest to dictatorship and farthest removed from law and the virtues of moderation.*<sup>211</sup>

I quote this translation because it seems to me to represent a majority opinion on the meaning of εἶδος in this passage. The Greek sentence in question, καίτοι σκέψασθε ἐν οἴῳ εἶδει ἑκάτεροι ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἔπραξαν, is rendered on the basis of the immediately following statement as: *Consider, too, what type of government we each had at the time of these events.* A reasoning behind this translation may run on the following lines: The Thebans, in giving their version of events, try to justify their actions during the Persian wars two generations ago, contrasting their own situation with that of the Plataeans who, they say, were ‘atticizing’ then as they are now. They, the Thebans, however, had hard times. καίτοι σκέψασθε ἐν οἴῳ εἶδει ἑκάτεροι ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἔπραξαν. *Yet, see also in what sort of εἶδος each of us [two states] acted.* This announcement is followed by an account of constitutional matters at Thebes at the time, and therefore εἶδος here must mean something like ‘type of government’, ‘constitution’.<sup>212</sup>

<sup>211</sup> Translation by R. Warner, *Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War*, Harmondsworth, 1954, p. 198.

<sup>212</sup> For this passage cf. in particular K. Weidauer, *Thukydides und die Hippokratischen Schriften*, Heidelberg 1954, pp. 21-31. In an elaborate attempt, Weidauer tries to establish a meaning ‘Zustand, Verfassung’, which may approximately be rendered ‘state (of affairs), constitution (of things)’, a meaning Thucydides has allegedly taken from Hippocratic usage. In sections VI-X above, I arrived at a different conclusion for the usage of the medical writers; in what follows, I hope to show why Weidauer’s position is not tenable for Thucydides either. G. Rechenauer, *Thukydides und die hippokratische Medizin*, Hildesheim 1991, does not make his meaning sufficiently clear. He seems to reject Weidauer’s further conclusions, but seems to accept his interpretation of Thucydides III 62. Rechenauer claims (p. 20f.): “Eine weitere methodologische Gemeinsamkeit zwischen Thukydides und der hippokratischen Medizin bildet das semeiotische Verfahren, der Schluß mittels Indizien (τεκμήρια, σημεία) auf Verborgenes. Wie der Arzt nach dem Prinzip ὄψις ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα [footnote 39] aus den sichtbaren Symptomen die gesamte “Verfassung” (εἶδος) [n. 40]

If that were so, we would be justified in our expectation to find next a contrasting description of the 'constitution' of the Plataeans at the time, since the Thebans had announced that they would show in what εἶδος each of the two parties acted. As we read on, however, we find nothing of the sort, apart, perhaps, from the one phrase not central to the Theban argumentation, that the Plataeans acted ἔχοντες ... τοὺς νόμους οὕσπερ μέχρι τοῦ δεῦρο, *having just those laws which you have to this day* (64, 3). While, I maintain, this phrase is not central to their argumentation, its context provides the point the Thebans want to stress, the point to which they have led up from 62, 3 onwards. In 64, 3, the Thebans criticize the involvement on the part of the Plataeans in action against Aegina, where they supported the Athenians instead of preventing the campaign: καὶ ταῦτα οὔτε ἄκοντες ἔχοντές τε τοὺς νόμους οὕσπερ μέχρι τοῦ δεῦρο καὶ οὐδενὸς ὑμᾶς βιασαμένου ὥσπερ ἡμᾶς.

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erkennt und, falls möglich, die Krankheitsursache bestimmt, so schließt Thukydides an Hand von Indizien aus der Gegenwart auf die Vergangenheit zurück [n. 41] und erkennt, indem er die geschichtlichen Ereignisse in ihren Wirkungszusammenhängen zurückverfolgt, die tiefere Ursache der Geschehnisverkettung [n. 42]." I.e., Rechenauer seems to posit a meaning 'Verfassung', 'constitution (?)' for εἶδος in the Hippocratic corpus and Thucydides at large; that, however, seems to be something different from what Weidauer tries to establish for Thucydides III 62, for Rechenauer's footnote 40 on p. 21 reads: "Für nicht überzeugend halte ich die Untersuchung Weidauers über den Begriff εἶδος (a.a.O., S. 21-31). Zu der aus den hippokratischen Schriften erschlossenen Bedeutung εἶδος = "Gesamte Verfassung" findet sich nur eine einzige Parallele in einem nebensächlichen Zusammenhang bei Thukydides (III 62, 3)." Be that as it may, neither 'Verfassung' nor 'Gesamte Verfassung', neither in the general sense of 'constitution (of a thing)' nor in the particular one of 'constitution of a state', seem to me to be justified on the basis of the texts we have. - I therefore cannot agree with S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides I*, Oxford 1991, whose judgements on εἶδος and in particular ἰδέα are more judicious than those of other commentators. On p. 455, he translates III 62, 3, καίτοι σκέψασθε ἐν οἷῳ εἶδει ἐκάτεροι ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἔπραξαν, "*But think how different were the circumstances in which we and they acted.*" This suggests εἶδος has, and therefore has acquired, a very general meaning; and that, of course, would require an explanation of how the word came to have that general meaning. But Hornblower continues immediately: "For εἶδει ('circumstances') here see Weidauer (...), 21ff.: the word for which see 82. 2n. below, here means almost 'constitution' - in Greek, as in English, a word with medical associations. See my nn. on vi. 77. 2, viii. 56. 2, and 90. 1 (where Andrewes's nn. are inadequate; Dover on vi. 77. 2 is better). In all these passages the notion of a 'political arrangement' is present, most clearly at viii. 90; in the other passages it has travelled further, and can almost be rendered 'policy' or 'plan'. It is interesting to find εἶδει used here in a political sense so soon after the closely related word ἰδέα (2n. above) has been used of political motives." - If it can be shown that εἶδος at III 62, 3 does not carry those alleged political connotations, Hornblower's note on 82, 2, as well as on the other passages he adduces, would have to be reconsidered as well; see also the discussion of Thucydides I 109, 1 in Section VI of the chapter on ἰδέα below.

*And that [you did] not unwillingly, and having just those laws which you have to this day, and while there was nobody forcing you as was the case with us.* The double opposition central to this part of the Thebans' speech is that of ἐκόντες - ἄκοντες and οὐ βιαζόμενοι - βιαζόμενοι, *willingly - unwillingly and not forced - forced.* It culminates in the sentence concluding this section of the argument (64, 5): τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐς τὸν ἡμέτερόν τε ἀκούσιον μηδισμόν καὶ τὸν ὑμέτερον ἐκούσιον ἀττικισμόν τοιαῦτα ἀποφαίνομεν. *Such are the things we advance as to our unwilling Medizing and your willing Atticizing.* This point has been carefully prepared in the intervening section of the text. At 62, 4, the Thebans claim with regard to their own city: ... καὶ ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις οὐκ αὐτοκράτωρ οὔσα ἑαυτῆς τοῦτ' ἔπραξεν, ... *and that the city did, as a whole not exercising power over its own affairs.* In this sentence, οὐκ αὐτοκράτωρ οὔσα ἑαυτῆς is equivalent to ἄκοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι. The word ἄκοντες itself occurs a few paragraphs later, when the Plataeans are accused of collaboration; had they entered into an alliance with the Athenians solely for purposes of defence against Thebes, they could have refrained from joining aggressive Athenian ventures and could have counted on Spartan help since they had been allies of the Spartans from the time of the Persian wars; the Thebans allege the Plataeans would have done so: εἴ τι καὶ ἄκοντες προσήγεσθε ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων, *if in any way you were brought forward by the Athenians against your will.* And in the next sentence that is reinforced by: ἀλλ' ἐκόντες καὶ οὐ βιαζόμενοι ἔτι εἴλεσθε μᾶλλον τὰ Ἀθηναίων. *But willingly and not forced you chose rather the side of Athens.*

This, then, is the context in which the statement 'καίτοι σκέψασθε ἐν οἴῳ εἶδει ἑκάτεροι ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἔπραξαν' must be read. The argument of the Thebans is: where we acted against Greece, that happened involuntarily and when we were forced to do so; where the Plataeans acted together with the Athenians against Greece, that

happened voluntarily and without anybody forcing them to do so.<sup>213</sup> Thus, the Thebans' introductory advice to the Spartans is: *Yet, consider in which 'way' each one of us did that.* Constitutional considerations play only a subordinate rôle in an argument that serves to establish that one party acted in a voluntary manner, the other forced by one thing or another. Use of εἶδος as 'the way' in which something happens or is done is the same as that observed at III 82, 2. εἶδος at III, 62, 3 does neither refer to the 'situation' of the two parties involved in general, nor to their 'type of government' or 'constitution' in particular.

We have seen that Thucydides on occasion uses εἶδος in the sense of 'manner' or 'way (in which something is done)', and how this usage may have developed on the one hand by extension of application from 'appearance (of a thing)' to 'appearance (of an action)', prompted on the other hand by the presence of use of εἶδος meaning 'type (of person)', 'type (of thing)' from which could be derived, again by way of extension of application, 'type (of action)', 'manner or way (of acting)'.

On that basis, the two instances of εἶδος in Book II present no difficulties, bearing in mind that what in translation may suggest two, three, or more different meanings of the one word εἶδος need not have been viewed as such by Thucydides and his original readership. By II 50, 1, Thucydides has given a detailed account of the way the epidemic of 430 B.C. affected people, giving both the symptoms of the disease and in particular the order in which they occurred. Those who survived an attack did so only with loss of limbs or of eye-sight or of memory. He continues: γενόμενον γὰρ κρείσσον λόγου τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου, τὰ τε ἄλλα χαλεπωτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν προσέπιπτεν ἑκάστῳ καὶ ἐν τῷδε ἐδήλωσε

<sup>213</sup> It may be worth comparing Gorgias' *Defence of Helen* for the type of argument; in his speech, Gorgias outlines four possible reasons for why Helen acted as she did; βία, *force*, plays a prominent part in two of them and is mentioned in connection with the third; if Helen was forced, she is excused; this must be considered a valid argument even if Gorgias' speech as a whole is a παίγνιον. The speech by the Thebans is constructed along the lines of contemporary sophistic technique, as was that of the Plataeans.

μάλιστα ἄλλο τι ὄν ἢ τῶν ξυντρόφων τι· ... . *Indeed, the way of the disease having become greater than could be said, it also otherwise befell everybody harder than is fit for human nature, but in the following <respect> it was most clear that it was something other than any of the indigenous <diseases>: ... .* I take γενόμενον γὰρ κρείσσον λόγου τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου as a free nominative preceding the main clause whose subject is νόσος, with προσέπιπτεν as predicate, that is to say, the disease befell the people, not the εἶδος of the disease. The εἶδος of the disease is here on the one hand the ‘way’ it took, on the other hand its ‘appearance’ in the sense of its manifestation in the various symptoms so vividly and visually described by Thucydides in the preceding paragraphs.<sup>214</sup> (It would perhaps not be absolutely incorrect to translate τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου as *the type of the disease*; one would have to bear in mind, though, that ‘type’ on the whole is a much more abstract term in English than εἶδος is here.) II 50, 1 is a particularly good example of how and why translation is impossible; ‘way’, ‘manner’, ‘appearance’, ‘type’, all capture aspects of what εἶδος entails, and it can be demonstrated with a fair degree of precision how the word came to denote all those things; nevertheless, not one of the English terms has remotely the same range of connotations the Greek word has.

The following occurrence of εἶδος may at first seem slightly less straightforward. Half way through his funeral oration (II 35 - 46), Pericles captures what is to him the essence of Athenian nature and culture (II 41, 1): ξυνελών τε λέγω τήν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παιδευσιν εἶναι καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον δοκεῖν ἄν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ’ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλείστ’ ἄν εἶδη καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστ’ ἄν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὐταρκες παρέχεσθαι. *And, in summary, I declare that the whole city is an education to Greece, and that it seems to*

<sup>214</sup> Regarding the two faces of τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου, the dynamic or processual and the static aspects of the disease, one could render the phrase with the German medical terms “*Krankheitsverlauf*” and “*Krankheitsbild*” respectively; the latter, however, *Krankheitsbild*, does not capture the purely static, visual aspects alone; *Bild*, like εἶδος, can refer to a whole scene, either at one moment in time or evolving over a period time.

*me that with us, in each and every case, the same man possesses a body in <the> most ways <possible>*<sup>215</sup> *and, with grace, most seemingly*<sup>216</sup> *self-sufficient.* In this sentence, ἐπὶ πλείστ' ἂν εἶδη ... αὐταρκες could, I believe, either mean 'in the most ways possible... self-sufficient' or, construing the preposition more strictly, 'self-sufficient for the most εἶδη'; if the latter were a possible way of construing the sentence, one would have to posit absolute use of εἶδος, or at least of the plural εἶδη; the word would have acquired a meaning like 'type(s) of action' or 'way(s) of acting', or else 'type(s) of task' or 'type(s) of situation', i.e. what was supplied in the text with the examples discussed above has here become part of the meaning of the word itself. Since, however, there is no necessity of construing the sentence this way, I am inclined to refrain from accepting this explanation, which would require positing a major semantic development, unless and until unambiguous instances of this usage occur.

That stage of semantic development may have been reached towards the end of Thucydides' work, assuming that, roughly speaking, composition of the account of the war proceeded on the whole from the first to the last book. The same idiomatic expression containing εἶδος is found once at VI 77, 2 and once at VIII 56, 2. At VI 77, 2, Hermocrates from Syracuse declares in a speech at Camarina that all Sicilians should oppose Athens together; he presents the alternative in form of a question: ἦ μένομεν ἕως ἂν ἕκαστοι κατὰ πόλεις ληθῶμεν, εἰδότες ὅτι ταύτη μόνον ἀλωτοί ἐσμεν καὶ ὀρώντες αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος τρεπομένους ὥστε τοὺς μὲν λόγοις ἡμῶν διστάναι, τοὺς δὲ ξυμμάχων ἐλπίδι ἐκπολεμοῦν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τοῖς δὲ ὡς ἕκαστοις τι προσηνὲς λέγοντες δύνανται κακουργεῖν; *Or should we wait until all of us are defeated, city by city, knowing that in that way alone we are conquerable and seeing them turning*

<sup>215</sup> I translate 'in the most possible ways' rather than 'in most ways' because Thucydides' point is not that Athenian men are self-sufficient in most, but not in all ways; rather, comparison is made with men from other cities who are not self-sufficient in as many ways as Athenian men are.

<sup>216</sup> εὐτραπέλωσ encapsulates both 'versatility' and 'beseeming behaviour'.

*to just that way, < namely > that some of us they make oppose each other with the help of words, some they make fight each other creating the expectation of military support, some they manage to harm by saying something soothing to each of them.* At VIII 56, 2, the Athenian general Peisander arrives at the camp of the Persian satrap Tissaphernes after Athenian victory over Chios; Alcibiades, who is with Tissaphernes, wants to return to Athens, but sees that his time has not come yet since Tissaphernes is likely not to take side against Sparta as yet: Ἀλκιβιάδης δέ - οὐ γὰρ αὐτῷ πάνυ τὰ ἀπὸ Τισσαφέρνους βέβαια ἦν, φοβουμένου τοὺς Πελοποννησίους μᾶλλον καὶ ἔτι βουλομένου, καθάπερ καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἐδιδάσκετο, τρίβειν ἀμφοτέρους - τρέπεται ἐπὶ τοιόνδε εἶδος ὥστε τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ὡς μέγιστα αἰτοῦντα παρὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων μὴ ξυμβῆναι. *But Alcibiades - indeed, things from Tissaphernes' side did not seem quite decided to him (who was fearing the Peloponnesians more than he still wanted <to act>, also according to what he himself had taught <Tissaphernes>: to let them [Athens and Sparta] extirpate each other - Alcibiades turned to such a way, <namely> that Tissaphernes would not get together with the Athenians by demanding too much from them.*

Obviously, translating εἶδος with 'way' here is not wholly satisfactory; 'way of action' or 'way of acting' would probably make the meaning clearer. A planned, considered 'way of acting', a sequence of actions in that sense, may be called a 'scheme', and perhaps 'scheme' is acceptable as translation for εἶδος in these two cases where a phrase ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος τρεπομένους or τρέπεται ἐπὶ τοιόνδε εἶδος is followed by ὥστε, rendered above as 'namely that'; in both cases the subordinate clause is factative rather than consecutive, the ὥστε clause states the content of the εἶδος to which people turn, which is the content of their intentions and actions, rather than giving the consequence or resulting event or state of affairs which comes about after people have turned to a certain εἶδος.

In a sense, it does not matter if one settles for 'way of acting' or 'way of action', or rather for 'scheme'; the latter, however, has the advantage of being one word rather than

a phrase, and therefore, if it could be shown that εἶδος had in some contexts the connotations of 'scheme', that word may be preferable as a translation which could help preserve not only the general meaning, but also the tone of a passage.

Confirmation that the meaning of εἶδος could indeed approximate 'scheme' is provided by the remaining instance of εἶδος in Thucydides. In his account of the events of the summer of 411, Thucydides outlines the various considerations different factions of the Four Hundred held when it looked as if Alcibiades' return to Athens were imminent. Many tried to dissociate themselves from the radical regime, so that, although being part of the oligarchic government, they would be considered as reformers and would, by introducing a real rule of the Five Thousand, be immune from punishment. But, so says Thucydides, most of them proposed that for the sake of their own political advancement alone, as is typical with oligarchies; looking at Alcibiades, they themselves wanted to achieve a position of sole ruler. There were others who wanted to uphold the current system. Over against the reform party and their plans, these others are characterized by Thucydides in the following words (VIII 90, 1): οἱ δὲ τῶν τετρακοσίων μάλιστα ἐναντίοι ὄντες τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶδει καὶ προεστῶτες, ... . *But those of the forty who were most opposed to such a way of acting, and their leaders, ...* . And he continues by relating that that faction sent for help to Sparta, and that they fortified portions of the city walls.<sup>217</sup>

<sup>217</sup> For the sake of easy reference, I provide here the full text of what has just been summarized, together with R. Warner's translation. VIII 89, 3:

ἦν δὲ τοῦτο τὸ σχῆμα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῖς, κατ' ἰδίας δὲ φιλοτιμίας οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσέκειντο, ἐν ᾧ περ καὶ μάλιστα ὀλιγαρχία ἐκ δημοκρατίας γενομένη ἀπόλλυται· πάντες γὰρ ἀθημερὸν ἀξιούσιν οὐχ ὅπως ἴσοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἕκαστος εἶναι· ἐκ δὲ δημοκρατίας αἰρέσεως γιγνομένης ῥᾶν τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ελασσόμενός τις φέρει. σαφέστατα δ' αὐτοὺς ἐπῆρε τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἰσχυρὰ ὄντα καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐδόκει μόνιμον τὸ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἔσσεσθαι· ἠγωνίζετο οὖν εἰς ἕκαστος αὐτὸς πρῶτος προστάτης τοῦ δήμου γενέσθαι. (90, 1) οἱ δὲ τῶν τετρακοσίων μάλιστα ἐναντίοι ὄντες τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶδει καὶ προεστῶτες, Φρύνιχός τε, ὃς καὶ στρατηγήσας ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τότε διηνέχθη, καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος, ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ ἐκ πλείστου ἐναντίος τῷ δήμῳ, καὶ Πείσανδρος καὶ Ἀντιφῶν καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ δυνατώτατοι, πρότερόν τε, ἐπεὶ τάχιστα κατέστησαν καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἐν τῇ

Here εἶδος refers to a whole course of action retrospectively. The reason why this passage may support a rendering of εἶδος with 'scheme' here is that before Thucydides brands the proposals of the reformers as born out of self-interest alone, he refers to them by saying (89, 3): ἦν δὲ τοῦτο τὸ σχῆμα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῖς, ... . *That was the political (or: constitutional) scheme of their proposal* <sup>218</sup>, ... . 'Scheme', of course, is here used without any intended connotations of deviousness.<sup>219</sup>

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Σάμῳ σφῶν ἐς δημοκρατίαν ἀπέστη, πρέσβεις τε ἀπέστελλον σφῶν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα καὶ τὴν ὁμολογίαν προθυμοῦντο καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ Ἡετιωνείᾳ καλουμένην τεῖχος ἐποιοῦντο, πολλῶ τε μᾶλλον ἔτι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου πρέσβεις σφῶν ἦλθον, ὀρῶντες τοὺς τε πολλοὺς καὶ σφῶν τοὺς δοκοῦντας πρότερον πιστοὺς εἶναι μεταβαλλομένους.

*"This, in fact, was mere political propaganda: it was for motives of personal ambition that most of them were following the line that is most disastrous for oligarchies when they take over from democracies. For no sooner is the change made than every single man, not being content with being the equal of others, regards himself as greatly superior to everyone else. In a democracy, on the other hand, someone who fails to get elected to office can always console himself with the thought that there was something not quite fair about it. But what had the most evident effect in urging on the dissident party was the strength of Alcibiades's position in Samos and the fact that they did not believe that the oligarchy would last. Each one of them therefore tried to get in first as leader and champion of the people in general. (90, 1) Those among the Four Hundred who were chiefly opposed to the idea of democracy were led by Phrynichus, the man who had quarrelled with Alcibiades when he was in command at Samos, Aristarchus, who had been for a long time a particularly bitter enemy of the democracy, Pisander, Antiphon, and others belonging to the most powerful families. Even before this time - in fact as soon as they came into power and the army at Samos revolted from them and constituted itself a democracy - they sent representatives of their own party to Sparta and did all they could to make peace; and they had also been building the wall in Eetionia. But now, after the return of their representatives from Samos, they became more active than ever, as they saw that not only the people in general but also members of their own party who had previously been regarded as reliable were turning against them."*

<sup>218</sup> For the present purpose it does not matter what exactly the connotations of λόγος are at this point, whether it is what they reason or what they say to each other, or what they propose in a speech in public. I do not, however, agree with Warner who seems to take τὸ σχῆμα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου as one phrase and translates it with 'political propaganda'; perhaps he has inferred this alleged meaning from the content of the next clause, which is, to my mind, the beginning of Thucydides' interpretation (as opposed to his professedly objective account of events).

<sup>219</sup> Thucydides' choice of words may be determined by the principle of variation; on the other hand, the whole chapter seems to have a more colloquial ring; so in the sentence immediately preceding the passage quoted above, 89, 2, he states that some of the oligarchs just wanted to get rid of everything they had let themselves in for: ... καὶ ἡδέως ἂν ἀπαλλαγέντας πῆ ἄσφαλῶς τοῦ πράγματος πολλῶ δὴ μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωσαν. "... would have been glad enough to get out of the business, if they could do so safely." (Warner) - a rather loose use of πρᾶγμα. - For 'scheme', cf. Hornblower on III 62, 3, who suggests 'plan' as a translation of εἶδος in some contexts.

The connections of Thucydides' method and diction with those of the Hippocratic writings have been stated repeatedly; the particular use of εἶδος as 'way of acting' or 'scheme', however, seems to have been general Attic rather than a specialized usage adopted by Thucydides for his own reasons. A passage in Aristophanes' *Plutus* which, though undoubtedly later in composition than the last Book of Thucydides' history and therefore potentially under its influence, is free from any medical or otherwise specialized vocabulary confirms that: Chremylus has invited Plutus into his house and has sent off Cario to fetch the old men from the fields, Cario summons them, and there is an entertaining interlude in which the chorus of old men assume different roles from mythology, and they and Cario mockingly threaten each other with punishments associated with those mythical characters; they are acting as if they were a chorus, in one case at least a chorus in a Satyr play; this goes on to mutual amusement until Cario puts an end to it by saying (316): ἀλλ' εἶα νῦν τῶν σκωμμάτων ἀπαλλαγέντες ἤδη | ὑμεῖς ἐπ' ἄλλ' εἶδος τρέπεσθ', | ἐγὼ δ' ἰὼν ... . *But well now, stopping with those jests right now, turn to another way of action, but I will go and ...* . Cario tells the chorus to behave differently, to 'turn to another εἶδος'. Given that Thucydides can use the phrase in the same way, I see no need to look for any connections εἶδος in that sense could have with acting a part in the passage quoted from Aristophanes. We do not know how common a phrase ἐπὶ ἄλλο / τοῦτο / τοιοῦτον εἶδος τρέπεσθαι was, but it seems to have been part of common Attic usage.<sup>220</sup>

With Thucydides, the first Attic prose author we have considered, εἶδος is fairly consistently applied to actions, often qualified as 'this' or 'that' or 'another'; it seems to denote a 'type of action', a 'way (of acting)', and then a 'scheme' or 'way or type of action or acting'; that this usage may be colloquial Attic is confirmed by Aristophanes. It could be shown that this development is a natural extension of application of εἶδος to an

<sup>220</sup> The only other occurrence of εἶδος in Aristophanes is at *Thesmophoriazusae* 267, where it is said of a man in disguise that 'in appearance', εἶδος, he is a woman.

action instead of to a thing, facilitated by use of the word as denoting 'type' in addition to appearance.

### XIII.

Turning to Plato's own use of the word εἶδος, it is not surprising to find almost all the shades of meaning, or all the various senses εἶδος had acquired over the centuries, given that the dialogues vary so widely in tone, subject matter, and most of all interlocutors. On the whole, though, εἶδος is as frequent or as rare a word in Plato's early dialogues as it is, on average, with Herodotus, Thucydides or the orators.

What we identified as the earliest Homeric usage, εἶδος as referring to a person's appearance, used in particular in contexts of praise of a person, occurs naturally in the aristocratic Athenian circles in which most of the early conversations of Socrates are set. Praise of a youth's pleasing appearance is found at the beginning of more than one dialogue. Thus when Socrates enquires at the beginning of the *Lysis* whom Hippothales, an acquaintance of his, is enamoured with, and when upon that Ctesippus instead of his unexpectedly bashful friend in answer supplies the name of Lysis, and Socrates confesses not to have heard of a youth answering to that name, Ctesippus declares (204e3): οὐ γὰρ πάνυ, ἔφη, τί αὐτοῦ τοῦνομα λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ἔτι πατρόθεν ἐπονομάζεται διὰ τὸ σφόδρα τὸν πατέρα γινώσκεισθαι αὐτοῦ. ἐπεὶ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι πολλοῦ δεῖς τὸ εἶδος ἀγνοεῖν τοῦ παιδός· ἱκανὸς γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ μόνου τούτου γινώσκεισθαι. *Not very much indeed, he said, do they use his name, but he is still benamed after his father, due to his father's being so well known. For I know well that you are far from not knowing the boy's guise; he is capable indeed of being recognized even from that alone.*

A parallel instance of εἶδος denoting guise or appearance is Charmides 154d5. The setting is again a palaestra; this time Socrates, having just returned from a military

campaign, had asked more generally whether there was any youth distinguished in intelligence or beauty or both; when Charmides was announced and had entered, Socrates reports, he seemed to him wondrous as to size and beauty, ἐκείνος ἔμοι θαυμαστός ἐφάνη τό τε μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος (c1). When all, old and young, were overwhelmed, Chairephon addressed Socrates (d1): τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ νεανίσκος, ... , ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐκ εὐπρόσωπος; *How does the youth seem to you, Socrates? ... Not handsome of face?* And when Socrates agrees strongly, Chairephon continues (d4): οὗτος μέντοι, ... , εἰ ἐθέλοι ἀποδῦναι, δόξει σοι ἀπρόσωπος εἶναι· οὕτως τὸ εἶδος πάγκαλός ἐστιν. *Yet, were he willing too undress, he would seem to you to be without face: so all-beautiful of appearance is he.* To that, all agree. Charmides is τὸ εἶδος πάγκαλος, *all-beautiful of appearance or guise; or maybe beautiful as to his whole appearance*, not only as to his face.<sup>221</sup> Socrates gives a twist to that answer by exclaiming that Charmides would be well-nigh invincible if only he were in addition τὴν ψυχὴν ... εὐπεφυκώς, *by nature well endowed as to his soul* (e1). Kritias, aristocrat and uncle to Charmides, eagerly asserts with aristocratic terminology that that is the case (e4): ἀλλ', ... , πάνυ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἐστὶν καὶ ταῦτα. *But, ... , he is very 'beautiful and good' as to that as well.* Thereupon Socrates suggests (e5): τί οὖν, ... , οὐκ ἀπεδύσαμεν αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα πρότερον τοῦ εἶδους; *What then, ... , wouldn't we rather undress of him just that and look at it before looking at his appearance.*

<sup>221</sup> This is not to be taken as a suggestion to read τὸ εἶδος πᾶν καλός, though 'παγ' for 'παν' would be a common enough misspelling, or rather spelling variant. I rather think that given that the whole appearance is contrasted with that of the face, the prefix need not qualify the adjective to which it is attached alone. - I will not here repeat the argument, set out at length in the discussion of Homer and other early poetic passages, that there is no need and no justification to take εἶδος to mean 'body' just because the appearance of a person undressed is contrasted with the appearance of his face; that they are looking at Charmides' body, head to toe, is implied by the mention of undressing; one could say it is a matter of pragmatics, not semantics.

Just as in the case of this last example a person's appearance was contrasted with his soul, so, on one occasion in the *Protagoras*, Socrates - in providing a model for how he would like his discussion with Protagoras to proceed - sets a person's appearance against τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔργα, 'functions of the body', which are not necessarily purely visible or physical (352a1): ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῆδέ πη καταφανές ἄν ἡμῖν γένοιτο; ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἄνθρωπον σκοπῶν ἐκ τοῦ εἶδους ἢ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔργων, ἰδὼν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἄκρας εἴποι· "ἴθι δὴ μοι ἀποκαλύψας καὶ τὰ στήθη καὶ τὸ μετάφρενον ἐπίδειξον, ἵνα ἐπισκέψωμαι σαφέστερον", καὶ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτόν τι ποθῶ πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν· ... . *Now, could things perhaps, said I, somehow become clear in the following way? Just as somebody examining a man from his appearance with a view either to health or to another one of the functions of the body, seeing his face and his hand* <sup>222</sup> *may say: "Come on, then, undress and show me also your chest and your back, so that I may examine you more clearly", so I, too, long for some such thing for <our> examination: ... . This is an important example of εἶδος clearly denoting appearance of a person as a whole, comprising appearance of the face and the hands as well as appearance of chest and back.*

As with Herodotus, εἶδος can on occasion be applied to the appearance of an animal, as in Meno's famous comparison of Socrates with the torpedo fish or electric ray whose Greek name is 'numbness' (*Meno* 80a4): καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἴ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁμοιότατος εἶναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ τὰλλα ταύτη τῆ πλατεία νάρκη τῆ θαλαττία· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη τὸν ἀεὶ πλησιάζοντα καὶ ἀπτόμενον ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ, ... . *And you seem to me in everything - if mocking, too, is in order at times - to be, both in appearance and otherwise, most*

<sup>222</sup> χεῖρ can mean *arm* or *hand*; the adjective ἄκρος serves to disambiguate - Socrates wants to stress that the person is fully clothed.

*similar to that flat torpedo fish: indeed, that too makes whoever comes close and touches be numb.*

There is one instance of εἶδος as applied to the appearance of an object. In that section of the *Gorgias* in which Socrates fervently discusses with Callicles what rhetoric really is, he draws at one point a comparison between what the orator does and what craftsmen do (503d6)<sup>223</sup>: φέρει γάρ, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων, ἃ ἂν λέγῃ ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῆ ἔρει, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τι.<sup>224</sup> ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέποντες πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῆ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει <ἃ προσφέρει>, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἂν εἶδος τι αὐτῷ σχῆ τούτο ὃ ἐργάζεται. οἶον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς ζωγράφους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὄντινα βούλει αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἕκαστος ἕκαστον τίθησιν ὃ ἂν τίθῃ, ... . *Come, now, the good man and the one who speaks to the best <end>, will, of course, say whatever he says not at random, but looking at something: just as all the other craftsmen as well, looking at their own work, each produces what he produces not selecting <things> at random, but so that that which he is working at have a certain appearance. For example, if you want to see the painters, the builders, the shipwrights, all the other craftsmen, whomsoever of them you want, how each one of them puts whatever he deals with into a certain order, ... .* The Greek phrase translated literally as 'just as all the other craftsmen' does, as usual, not imply that the orator as orator is a craftsman. Those craftsmen listed subsequently do all produce something, some object that can be seen. This object is to have a certain appearance, εἶδος τι, and that appearance which is to be achieved is to

<sup>223</sup> For the *Gorgias*, the edition of E.R. Dodds, Oxford 1959, whose notes are always worth consulting, is used throughout. On p. 328, he translates 503e1ff. as "just as all other craftsmen, with an eye to their own function, each of them applies the measures he applies, not at random but selecting them in order to get the thing he is making a particular form", and has an elaborate note on previous discussions, parallels, and possible implications of the sentence.

<sup>224</sup> Here I am inclined to punctuate differently from Dodds.

be envisaged and aimed at in the process of production. The knowledgeable craftsman knows what the finished product will look like, he knows its εἶδος.<sup>225</sup>

There are, likewise, examples of εἶδος as ‘type’ or ‘way’. In his conversation with Gorgias about Gorgias’ profession, a conversation in which nothing is taken for granted, Socrates had obtained a preliminary answer (454b5): ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω (sc. τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι τέχνην), ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἃ ἔστι δίκαιά τε καὶ ἀδίκαια. *I say, now, Socrates, that [rhetoric is the art] of that persuasion which <has its place> in the law-courts and in other crowds, such as I have just mentioned, and which is about the things that are just and unjust.* Upon that, Socrates draws a distinction between μεμαθηκέναι and πεπιστευκέναι, *having understood* something and *having gained trust* in something<sup>226</sup>, and when Gorgias agrees he continues (454e1): ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷ τέ

<sup>225</sup> That is all that can be asserted about this passage. I would therefore disagree with Dodds who declares, loc. cit., after having adduced for comparison *Euthyphro* 6e4, *Cratylus* 389a-c, and *Republic* 596b: “Nothing, however, requires us to read the full-blown theory of Forms into the *Euthyphro* or the *Gorgias*, though the striking similarity of language in all four passages is suggestive of how Plato may have been led to it.” - My point of disagreement, apart from the notion of a ‘theory of Forms’ itself, is that either Plato had already thought for himself or discussed with his friends what he will say when writing the *Republic*: in that case, the sentence in the *Gorgias* would be an explicit allusion to what Dodds terms ‘the full-blown theory of Forms’. Or else, Plato had not yet thought the thoughts he was later to express in writing; in that case, it would indeed be wrong to ‘read back the full-blown theory of Forms’ into this passage, but so to speak *à fortiori*, because in that case it would be wrong to read any ‘theory of Forms’ into the *Gorgias*. One cannot allude to something which has not been thought of yet. Perhaps, however, that is what Dodds means when he says that “the striking similarity of language in all four passages is suggestive of how Plato may have been led to [the full-blown theory of Forms]”. In that case my criticism would only regard the ill-chosen ‘full-blown’. - A different question is what a reader of the *Gorgias*, who had already read the *Republic*, would have thought while reading the passage at hand; but that is not our present concern.

<sup>226</sup> W. Hamilton, *Plato. Gorgias*, Harmondsworth 1960, reprinted with revisions 1971, translates ‘knowing’ and ‘believing’ which is not wrong altogether, but eliminates the activity and the process which lead to those states, something crucial to the argument; R. Waterfield, *Plato. Gorgias*, Oxford 1994, renders the words in his rather free translation of the dialogue as ‘I’ve been taught’ and ‘I’m convinced’ - that will not do, because one can have been taught that the earth is flat and can, subsequently, be convinced of it; the distinction Socrates is aiming at is blurred with this translation.

γε<sup>227</sup> μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι εἰσὶν καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες. - ἔστι ταῦτα. - βούλει οὖν δύο εἶδη θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμην; - πάνυ γε. *But yet, persuaded <of something> are certainly both those who have understood <something> and those who have gained trust <in something>. - That is so. - Now, do you want us to posit two types of persuasion, the one conveying trust without knowledge, the other <conveying> understanding<sup>228</sup> ? - Most certainly.*

Later on in the same dialogue, Socrates alludes in irony to that differentiation in dealing with Gorgias' pupil Polus, whose manners are much less dignified and refined than those of his master. When Polus - after previously laying down the law on how to lead a discussion - laughs off one of Socrates' representations, Socrates replies (473e1): ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδάν τις τι εἶπη, καταγελᾶν,

<sup>227</sup> Dodds notes (p. 206): "ε 1. τε [γε]. This combination is decidedly rare (Denniston, 161). Here γε has little point, and the omission of τε in F suggests that τε and γε were originally alternative variants, which have been conflated in BTW." - That is not necessarily so. In the sentence 'ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι εἰσὶν καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες', Socrates introduces a new thought which contains in some sense a qualification to what has just been agreed upon; this is expressed most of all by μὴν, *though* or *yet*, which follows the generally contrasting ἀλλά, *but* or *however*; since, however, Socrates wants to obtain Gorgias' consent to that further statement as well, he gives it the form of a generally accepted assertion; that is achieved by the particle γε, *certainly*. In a hypothetical phrase ἀλλὰ μὴν γε οἱ τε μεμαθηκότες, there would be an accumulation of three particles in sentence initial position - I refrain from passing any judgement on whether that would have sounded odd in fifth and fourth century Greek ears; it is, however, perfectly common for an enclitic γε placed after a noun or adjective (here after the article depending on the substantival participle) not only to qualify that word it leans against, but the whole phrase, clause or sentence; and τε as connective must have precedence as a matter of course; a connective correlative to the καὶ later on in the sentence, however, is to be expected. I should therefore accept the text of BTW.

<sup>228</sup> It is difficult and awkward to find an appropriate translation for ἐπιστήμη, since *knowledge, learning, science, craft, profession, understanding* would all do in certain contexts but not in others, all capture aspects the Greek word had at some time in some dialect (cf. B. Snell, *Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophie*, Berlin 1924, and J. Lyons, *Structural Semantics. An Analysis of Part of the Vocabulary of Plato*, Oxford 1969); since I have just used 'having understood' as a translation of μεμαθηκέναι, I here use 'knowledge' for ἐπιστήμη because it is more important to have distinct translations for these two words, and less important in terms of Socrates' argument to differentiate between ἐπιστήμη and εἰδέναι in the preceding clause (and the substantivated infinitive εἰδέναι is to my mind best rendered with 'knowledge'). - Fortunately, nothing depends on any of that for the present purpose.

ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή; *Is that another type of proof*<sup>229</sup> *again, when somebody says something, to laugh it off, but not to disprove it?*

This seems indeed to be an allusion and not just a chance repetition of εἶδος in a vaguely similar context; for although there is nothing surprising about the use of εἶδος as meaning 'type' with either Plato or, if one is inclined to believe that Plato's Socrates is using Gorgianic diction, Gorgias himself towards the end of the fifth century B.C., to speak of δύο εἶδη πειθοῦς or of an εἶδος ἐλέγχου has something technical about it.

Less confirmation than could be expected is found in the diction of that great follower of Gorgias, Isocrates<sup>230</sup>. In his speech *Against the Sophists*, written about 490 B.C. and at least implicitly alluded to elsewhere in the *Gorgias*,<sup>231</sup> Isocrates explains in detail how to compose speeches; learning the various elements by heart is not difficult (16), but choosing from them and arranging them appropriately requires a good teacher and good natural abilities (17), ... καὶ δεῖν τὸν μὲν μαθητὴν πρὸς τῷ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν οἷαν χρῆ τὰ μὲν εἶδη τὰ τῶν λόγων μαθεῖν, ... . *and it is necessary that the learner in addition to having the required nature learns the types of*

<sup>229</sup> ἔλεγχος and ἐλέγχειν are *voces mediae*, meaning respectively *proof* or *refutation* and *proving* or *disproving*, *proving right* or *proving wrong*, according to context and circumstances; here, it seemed appropriate to translate the noun with 'proof' in the first place, since that is what Polus was talking about (and the word 'proof' itself can in certain contexts in English be a *vox media*); the verb, however, must be rendered 'disproving' or 'proving wrong'.

<sup>230</sup> And in this context it does not necessarily matter if any one particular piece of Isocrates was composed before, after, or simultaneously with any one of the dialogues of Plato. Cf., however, C. Eucken, *Isokrates. Seine Position in der Auseinandersetzung mit den zeitgenössischen Philosophen*, Berlin 1983; in a systematic investigation based on content and language, Eucken (cf. in particular the summary p. 284f.) is led, if I understand him correctly, to posit more or less the following chronology of selected works of Isocrates and Plato: *Against the Sophists* (390), *Gorgias*, *Euthydemus*, *Meno*, *Phaedo* (?), *Helena* (385), *Symposium*, *Panegyricus* (380), *Busiris*, *Republic* (374), *To Nicocles - Nicocles - Euagoras* (371-368/7), *Phaedrus* (ca. 370), Isocrates' *Letter to Dionysius* (369/7), *Theaetetus* (367/6), *Politicus*, *Timaeus*, *Areopagiticus* (354), *Antidosis* (354/3), *Philippus* (346). Without endorsing individual arguments for this particular sequence, I accept this chronology in so far as works published after the *Republic* - and to a certain extent that includes Isocrates' *Busiris* which Eucken interprets as written as a reaction to Platonic material related to the *Republic* circulated before its completion - cannot be used as evidence for our purpose of investigating Greek usage potentially influencing Plato while composing his early and middle dialogues. That excludes from consideration *Euagoras* 9, *Antidosis* 74 and 280; nevertheless, those instances could confirm semi-technical use of εἶδος by the rhetorician.

<sup>231</sup> Cf. Eucken, op. cit., pp. 36 - 43.

*speeches*. This, however, refers to different types of speeches delivered for different purposes and on different occasions.

A context similar to that is found in the *Protagoras* at that point where Socrates feels he has to cut short his discussion with Protagoras because they cannot agree as to how one should proceed with question and answer; in particular, Socrates proclaims that he cannot cope with the long speeches, and he requests that since Protagoras claims to be able to lead any kind of conversation, he should comply. Callias, Alcibiades and Critias intervene, then Prodicus and Hippias, the other two famous sophists present, each give a brief address to convince Socrates and Protagoras to continue. Hippias argues for a compromise (337e2): ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ δέομαι καὶ συμβουλεύω, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, συμβῆναι ὑμᾶς ὥσπερ ὑπὸ δαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων εἰς τὸ μέσον, καὶ μήτε σὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοῦτο εἶδος τῶν διαλόγων ζητεῖν τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λίαν, εἰ μὴ ἡδὺ Πρωταγόρα, ἀλλ' ἐφείναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι καὶ εὐσχημονέστεροι ἡμῖν φαίνωνται, μήτ' αὖ Πρωταγόραν πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρία ἐφέντα, φεύγειν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, ἀλλὰ μέσον τι ἀμφοτέρους τεμεῖν. *Now, I for one ask and advise, Protagoras and Socrates, that you come together in front of us who gather as arbiters, and that neither you seek that extreme type of conversation with very short <questions and answers>, if that is not pleasant to Protagoras, but to let loose and relax the reins for your words, so that they seem to us grander and in better shape, nor again, I call upon Protagoras, may he, stretching out everything, letting loose with a fair wind, flee to the sea of words, hiding away the land, but that both somehow cut <through the sea of words>*<sup>232</sup> *in the middle.*

<sup>232</sup> Cf. LSJ, s.v. τέμνειν VI 2 b, VI 3 a; Hippias is still in his extended metaphor of sea-faring vocabulary; therefore this occurrence of the word should be listed under VI 3 a, unless one is of the opinion that the phrase μέσον τεμεῖν, of whatever origin, had become a standing phrase for 'striking a deal, making a compromise, meeting in the middle', before Plato employed it in this passage; in that case, Plato would in accustomed fashion reactivate a metaphor, i.e. make it apparent as metaphor, by setting it into an extended quasi-allegorical context (for this standard practice of Plato's cf. C.J. Classen, *Sprachliche Deutung als Triebkraft platonischen und sokratischen Philosophierens*, München 1959, and

τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοῦτο εἶδος τῶν διαλόγων, *that extreme type of conversation*, is set against a stretched out way of speaking, for ἐκτείνειν, the hinge on which Hippias' metaphor hangs, can be used for drawing out one's speech. Since both λόγος and διάλογος are nouns closely connected to the verbs λέγειν and διαλέγεσθαι which express the actions of 'speaking' and 'conversing', those εἶδη τῶν διαλόγων are 'types of conversation' and 'ways of conversing'; but whereas in translation the one pays more attention to the nominal, static quality of a διάλογος as an event, the other more to its verbal, dynamic quality as a process, there is no such differentiation in the Greek.

The next occurrence of εἶδος to be considered may just be another instance of εἶδος meaning 'type', but there are difficulties which oppose that neat solution. The *Laches* is a report of a discussion about education between the two Athenian generals Nicias and Laches; the two have been consulted by Lysimachus, son of Aristides, and Melesias, son of Thucydides, who are uncertain as to how to educate their own two sons; when Socrates is drawn into that conversation by Laches, he shifts the focus from particular pieces and devices of education to why education takes place in the first place, and what it is concerned with. They agree that education is concerned with the soul, with excellence in the soul; and since the conversation arose from watching a display in arms, Socrates suggests to look at ἀνδρεία, *courage*, first. When Laches replies that 'courage is fighting in battle without leaving one's rank', Socrates agrees but asks if there is not courage in flight as well, as in the fighting techniques of the Scythians, or as Homer reports of Aeneas in the *Iliad*. To that, Laches replies (191b4): καὶ καλῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· περὶ ἀρμάτων γὰρ ἔλεγε. καὶ σὺ τὸ τῶν Σκῦθων ἵππέων περὶ λέγεις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἵππικόν [τὸ ἐκείνων] οὕτω μάχεται, τὸ δὲ ὀπλιτικόν [τό γε τῶν Ἑλλήνων], ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω. *And rightly so, Socrates: indeed, he spoke about chariots. And what you mention of the Scythians is about horse-*

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also id., *Untersuchungen zu Platons Jagdbildern*, Berlin 1960); the phrase as found in this passage, however, is μέσον τι τέμνειν, and the indefinite pronoun seems to me to suggest that Plato lets Hippias indicate that he is coining a metaphor, rather than employing an already existing one.

*men. Indeed, cavalry fights so, but infantry as I said.* After a brief modification of that statement by Laches, Socrates resumes (191c7): τοῦτο τοίνυν ὁ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὅτι ἐγὼ αἴτιος μὴ καλῶς σε ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς ἠρόμην - βουλόμενος γάρ σου πυθέσθαι μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὀπλιτικῷ ἀνδρείους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἵππικῷ καὶ ἐν σύμπαντι τῷ πολεμικῷ εἶδει, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κινδύνοις ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν, καὶ ἔτι αὖ μὴ μόνον ὅσοι πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν ἢ φόβους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἡδονὰς δεινοὶ μάχεσθαι καὶ μένοντες καὶ ἀναστρέφοντες - εἰσὶ γὰρ πού τινες, ὧ Λάχης, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδρεῖοι. *Now, that is what I said just now, that it is my fault that you do not answer well, because I did not ask well - indeed, I meant to learn from you not only those courageous in infantry fighting, but also those in cavalry fighting and in the whole type of fighting in war, and not only those courageous in war, but also those courageous over against the dangers at sea, and those who are courageous over against diseases, and poverty, and politics, and moreover again not only those who are courageous over against griefs and fears, but also over against desires and pleasures, strong in fighting them both keeping in rank and turning around against them - indeed, there are somehow those, Laches, courageous in such things, too.*

One could interpret this explanation by Socrates as containing a classificatory scheme<sup>233</sup> not too dissimilar in nature from those in the *Sophist* and the *Politicus*. This is suggested in particular by the repeated use of nominalized neuter adjectives in -ΙΚΟΝ. Now, in both those late dialogues, the nouns εἶδος and γένος are used with reference

<sup>233</sup> See the diagram APPENDIX 2 below.

to items at various levels of such classificatory schemes.<sup>234</sup> Therefore encountering εἶδος in the phrase ἐν σύμπαντι τῷ πολεμικῷ εἶδει does not surprise; τὸ πολεμικὸν εἶδος or τὸ εἶδος τοῦ πολεμικοῦ is one type of pursuit or situation, here opposed to being faced with danger at sea, illness, poverty, politics; in all those different types of situation men can be courageous or otherwise, courage in battle is only one type of courage, and - as we learn subsequently - only one type of courage over against hardships, as opposed to courage over against pleasures. Following that line of thought and going back to the beginning of the passage, one realizes that showing courage ἐν τῷ ὀπλιτικῷ, 'in infantry-fighting', ἐν τῷ ἵππικῷ, 'in cavalry-fighting', ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀρμάτων, 'in chariot-fighting', are three different types, three different εἶδη of courage in three different types or εἶδη of fighting in war.

If that were so, there would be some slight oddities in the structure of Socrates' picture of where we find courageous men. The nominalized neuter adjectives are in themselves not uncommon in late fifth early fourth century philosophical discourse.<sup>235</sup> So there is nothing unusual about Laches', not Socrates', introducing τὸ ἵππικόν and τὸ ὀπλιτικόν, nor in Socrates' picking up those terms. But Socrates does not speak about courage \* ἐν τῷ ὀπλιτικῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἵππικῷ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ πολεμικῷ εἶδει<sup>236</sup>, *in infantry-fighting and cavalry-fighting and any other type of fighting in war*, he calls τὸ πολεμικόν an εἶδος before naming anything else which is another εἶδος of what τὸ πολεμικόν is an εἶδος of; he does not at all state explicitly what fighting in war is supposed to be a type or way of; nor is the term εἶδος

<sup>234</sup> For a recent, brief discussion of this usage, adducing a number of relevant passages and some pertinent secondary literature, see: C.J. Rowe, *Plato. Politicus*, Warminster, pp. 4 - 8: "Forms, classes, and division."

<sup>235</sup> For a collection, cf. A.N. Ammann, *-IKOΣ bei Platon. Ableitung und Bedeutung mit Materialsammlung*, Freiburg (Schweiz) 1953; for method and concept of διαίρεσις, or *division*, and a collection of passages in early Platonic dialogues comparable to that at *Laches* 191, cf. C.J. Classen, *Sprachliche Deutung als Triebkraft Platonischen und Sokratischen Philosophierens*, München 1959, pp. 78-84; cf. also in general H. Koller, *Die dihäretische Methode*, Glotta 39, 1960, pp. 6-24.

<sup>236</sup> Or ... εἶδει τοῦ πολεμικοῦ; s.a.

used again subsequently. Given all that, it is not really possible to translate ἐν σύμπαντι τῷ πολεμικῷ εἶδει as *in the whole type (or: way) of fighting in war*.

It is not only difficult to translate εἶδος, it is difficult to see why εἶδος is introduced here at all. In the most obvious parallel to our passage in an early dialogue, *Gorgias* 465f., an extended classification<sup>237</sup>, abundant with words terminating in -ικος.<sup>238</sup> Yet the only word which could be regarded as even a semi-technical term in that discussion is μόριον, *part* (463a3 *et passim*); no mention is made of εἶδος or γένος. That is to say, arrangements of pursuits and activities in the way of our passages in the *Gorgias* and the *Laches* do not require the terminology of γένος and εἶδος.

If that is accepted - and since on the basis of what can be known about εἶδος at the time of composition of the *Laches* no satisfactory translation can be provided, no sense be made of the phrase ἐν σύμπαντι τῷ πολεμικῷ εἶδει - I do not see an alternative to athetizing εἶδει; a radical cure, but one which leaves a text consistent in itself in terms of sense and diction. My suggestion is that a reader of the dialogue, possibly at an early stage, detected the scheme, connected it with what he knew from the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, or from reading Aristotle, or from an oral tradition which had its origin in the Academy or the Lyceum, made a note that here we have a process of division; in that note the word εἶδος was used; subsequently, it was incorporated in the text in an apparently plausible way.<sup>239</sup>

<sup>237</sup> Here as above, the term 'classification' is used with a pinch of salt; it is an anachronism and only to be regarded as a convenient shorthand, as will be discussed in more detail in Section XIV below.

<sup>238</sup> For *Gorgias* 462e5 - 466a3, see Dodds, *op. cit.*, pp. 224 - 233, especially table and explanation p. 226f.

<sup>239</sup> The text of the *Laches* as a whole, but of that and the preceding pages in particular, is not in a good state. On the one hand, there are numerous places in which any two of **B**, **T** and **W** go against the remaining one, leaving aside testimonial evidence; and no one manuscript seems to be significantly more trustworthy than the others. On the other hand, there is a fair degree of consensus among editors to athetize two phrases in *Laches*' statement 191b4 - 7; and with the repetition of ἀνδρείοι εἰσιν at d6 and d6/7, there arises the question if some or all of the clause καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικά ἀνδρείοι εἰσιν should go as well, especially as it creates an odd imbalance of five types of courage over against griefs and fear-inspiring things; my guess is that καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικά ἀνδρείοι εἰσιν at least is a later addition; but that need not detain us here. What is more relevant is that at 187e7, in a statement of Nicias about Socrates, there is a form γένει which defies explanation and has by common consent been excluded from the text; was it in origin an annotation by the same early reader? - Finally, and just as an

There is one other instance of εἶδος in the early dialogues which seems to diverge from usage of the word discussed so far. Towards the end of the *Lysis*, and after apparently going round in a number of intersecting circles, Socrates proposes to Lysis and Menexenos the following conclusion to their investigation of φιλία, *friendship*, and in particular on who loves whom and who is loved by whom when two men are φίλοι, *dear friends* (221e7): καὶ εἰ ἄρα τις ἕτερος ἑτέρου ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ παῖδες, ἢ ἐρᾷ, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐπεθύμει οὐδὲ ἦρα οὐδὲ ἐφίλει, εἰ μὴ οἰκειός πῃ τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐτύγγανεν ὧν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ κατὰ τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἢ τρόπους ἢ εἶδος.

This has been rendered as: “‘And boys,’ I said, ‘if one man desires another or adores him, he’d never desire or adore or love him, if he weren’t in some way in fact akin to the man adored, either in his soul, or in some disposition of his soul, or in his conduct, or in his looks.’”<sup>240</sup> Translating the sentence in this way, taking the genitive τῆς

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alternative thought to which I do not want to commit myself, there is a possibility that somebody who had read the *Republic* read ‘people courageous in infantry and cavalry’, was reminded of the φύλακες or ‘guardians’ of the *Republic* and for some reason associated this stratum of society with post-republican terminology of τὸ πολεμικὸν εἶδος, ‘the warrior-class’; but I should stress that that would strike me as post-Aristotelian.

<sup>240</sup> D. Watt, *Plato. Lysis*, in: T.J. Saunders (ed.), *Plato. Early Socratic Dialogues*, Harmondsworth 1987. Cf. B. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato II*, ed. R.M. Hare, D.A. Russell, London 1970: “And I say, my boys, that no one who loves or desires another would ever have loved or desired or longed for him if he had not been in some way congenial to him, either in his soul, or in his character, or in his manners, or in his form.”. Cf. also M. Bordt, *Platon. Lysis*, Göttingen 1998, p.33: “Und wenn also irgendjemand einen anderen begehrt, Kinder”, fuhr ich fort, “oder in ihn verliebt ist, würde er ihn doch weder begehren noch verliebt in ihn sein oder ihm freund sein, wenn er nicht eigentlich seinem Geliebten irgendwie angehörig wäre, sei es in bezug auf seine Seele oder in bezug auf einen bestimmten Charakter seiner Seele, oder sein Verhalten oder sein Aussehen.”; Bordt comments on 222a2f. (p. 227f.): “Die Übersetzung von τρόπους mit ‘Verhalten’ (statt, wie es eigentlich üblicher wäre, mit ‘Charakter’) [note 561: Vgl. z.B. *Rep.* 329d3.] legt sich an dieser Stelle deswegen nahe, weil Platon bei seiner Aufzählung von Dingen, in bezug auf die zwei Freunde angehörig sein können, zunächst bei dem ansetzt, was einen Menschen innerlich bestimmt, und damit endet, wie ein Mensch äußerlich aussieht. [note 562: Platon gebraucht *eidos* in 222a3 nicht als ein (sic!) *terminus technicus* für die Idee, sondern im Sinn der sichtbaren äußeren Gestalt, die ein Mensch hat.] Insofern wird man unter ἦθος hier am besten den Charakter eines Menschen verstehen und unter τρόπος die Art und Weise, wie sich dieser Charakter nach außen hin zeigt.” - As can be seen, Bordt resembles Jowett closely both in taking the genitive τῆς ψυχῆς as depending on ἦθος alone, and in translating τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἢ τρόπους ἢ εἶδος as “Charakter seiner Seele, oder sein Verhalten oder sein Aussehen”, mirroring Jowett’s “in his character, or in his manners, or in his form”.

ψυχῆς in the phrase τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἢ τρόπους ἢ εἶδος as depending on and thereby qualifying only ἦθος and not τρόπους and εἶδος as well, could make sense if one thinks of Diotima's speech, reported by Socrates in the *Symposium*. There, at 209b, c, it is indeed the case that the one who loves and desires, and therefore wants to beget in what is beautiful, first looks at beautiful bodies, σώματα, and then at beautiful souls; this is repeated and extended in what follows; so one may be led to see the same thought in reverse order in our passage in the *Lysis*, a dialogue paving the way for the *Symposium* in more than one respect.<sup>241</sup>

There is, however, an alternative way of understanding Plato; Socrates says: *And so, if anybody desired anybody else, said I, children, or were enamoured, he would not ever desire or be enamoured or love, if he did not somehow happen to be familiar<sup>242</sup> to and with the beloved, either as to soul or any habit of the soul or wonts or ways.*<sup>243</sup> This way

<sup>241</sup> Cf. *Symposium* 207e2: καὶ μὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ τρόποι, τὰ ἦθη, δόξαι, ἐπιθυμίας, ἡδοναί, λύπαι, φόβοι, τούτων ἕκαστα οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ πάρεστιν ἑκάστῳ, ... . - I do not know of anybody who does, but one could further adduce a passage like *Airs, Waters, and Places* XXIV 38, discussed in Section VII of the chapter on εἶδος above: καὶ ἰδιογνώμονας. ὅκου γὰρ αἱ μεταβολαὶ εἰσι πυκνότεραι τῶν ὥρέων καὶ πλείστον διάφοροι αὐταὶ ἐσωτῆσιν, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὰ εἶδεα καὶ τὰ ἦθεα καὶ τὰς φύσεις εὐρήσεις πλείστον διαφερούσας. - μέγιστα μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αὐταὶ τῆς φύσεως αἱ διαλλαγαί, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἡ χώρα, ἐν ἣ ἂν τις τρέφεται καὶ τὰ ὕδατα. εὐρήσεις γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς χώρας τῇ φύσει ἀκολουθέοντα καὶ τὰ εἶδεα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς τρόπους. *Indeed, where the changes of the seasons are most frequent, and <the seasons> most different from one another, there you will also find the appearances and the characters and the natures as differing most widely. - These, now, are the greatest differences in nature, then also the land in which someone is reared, and the waters. You will find, indeed, that for the most part the appearances and the ways of the people follow the nature of the land.* I would argue that co-occurrence of τὰ εἶδεα and τὰ ἦθεα here, where the one clearly refers to external, physical, outward appearance and the other to character, something internal, may have prompted Plato, or indeed a philosophically inclined person preceding him, to talk of the εἶδη and ἦθη of the soul. - Note, by the way, how my translation of τρόπος in this passage differs from the one proposed for the passage in the *Lysis*. It cannot be denied that there is an overlap of concept or an overlap of connotations between the several words.

<sup>242</sup> It is not here the place to justify 'familiar' as appropriate rendering of οἰκεῖον, 'that which belongs to the house, household and family'.

<sup>243</sup> Cf. W.R.M. Lamb, *Plato. Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias*, Cambridge, Mass. 1925: "And in a case where a person desires another, my boys, or loves him, he would never be desiring or loving or befriending him, unless he somehow belonged to his beloved either in soul, or in some disposition, demeanor, or cast of soul."; cf. also D. Bolotin, *Plato's Dialogue on Friendship. An Interpretation of the Lysis with a New Translation*, New York 1979, p.50: "'And therefore," I said, "if someone desires another, boys, or loves him passionately, he would never desire, nor love passionately, nor love [as a friend] unless he

of construing the syntax is supported, to name only one instance in Plato's dialogues, by connection of both ἦθος and τρόποι with the soul at *Symposium* 207e1. Diotima has asked Socrates for the reason why man and all the animals would risk even their lives for ἔρωσ, *love* and *desire*. She explains that behind that is a wish to be immortal; and that this immortality can only be achieved through procreation, through leaving something young in the place of what is old and passes away. Throughout life, a man is called the same from early childhood to old age; and Diotima continues (207d6): οὗτος μέντοι οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ ὅμως ὁ αὐτὸς καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ νέος ἀεὶ γιγνόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύς, καὶ κατὰ τὰς τρίχας καὶ σάρκα καὶ ὀστά καὶ αἷμα καὶ σύμπαν τὸ σῶμα. καὶ μὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ τρόποι, τὰ ἦθη, δόξαι, ἐπιθυμίας, ἡδοναί, λύπαι, φόβοι, τούτων ἕκαστα οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ παρέσθιν ἐκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀπόλλυται. *That man who certainly does not ever have the same <things> within himself is yet called the same, always, however, becoming young, losing other <things>, as regards his hair and flesh and bones and blood and the whole body; and not only as regards the body, but also as regards the soul: its wonts, its habits, opinions and beliefs, desires, pleasures, pains,*

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*happened to be akin in some way to his passionately beloved - either in his soul, or some of its ways, or some aspect<sup>83</sup> of it." " - I agree with Bolotin on how to take the syntax of the final phrase, I disagree in respect of semantics, not least the semantics of εἶδος. Bolotin's note 83, p. 61, reads: "The word here translated by "aspect" is *eidōs*. See note 12. The three "parts" of the soul, as delineated in Book Four of Plato's *Republic*, are also called *eide* of the soul. See, for example, *Republic* 440e8 - 441a3." Note 12, p. 54, on the occurrence of εἶδος at 204e, where Bolotin translates "the boy's looks", reads: "To *eidōs*, which means primarily the "look" or "looks" of a thing, is the same word commonly translated by "idea" or "form" in Plato's so-called "Theory of Ideas." For the kinship between the ordinary and the philosophic uses of the word, see Jacob Klein, *A Commentary on Plato's "Meno"* (Chapel Hill, 1965), pp. 49 - 51." - Bolotin is right in referring to the use of εἶδος in connection with the soul in the *Republic*; I do see a connection between the usage of the two dialogues, albeit on lines slightly different from his. εἶδος, however, although it has retained its strong visual connotations in some contexts, does not mean aspect. It is tempting to translate the word as that both at *Lysis* 222 and at *Meno* 72c7; but it is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition that a certain translation, a certain assumed meaning, makes sense in a context; it is necessary in addition to show how a word could have come to mean this or that; and while it is correct that 'aspect' would make sense at the two places in question, the sense of 'aspect' required in those contexts is not one which εἶδος seems to have acquired in fifth and fourth century Greek, near enough though it may seem to be to 'look' and 'appearance'.*

fears - of all these each one never is by each one of us as the same, but the one comes about, the other passes away. There are τρόποι and ἦθη of the soul; likewise at *Lysis* 222a, where the one who loves is said to be familiar to and with the one who is loved ἢ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ κατὰ τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἢ τρόπους ἢ εἶδος, 'either regarding the soul, or some habit of the soul, or some wonts of the soul, or some way of the soul'.

What is 'a way of the soul'? - There are several ways in which a man can behave, act, react to the world and to different situations he may be faced with. In different situations, different parts of the soul are active and at work; but the concept of a part of a soul, a soul with parts, is a complex one, and one which is, for example, not present in the *Phaedo*; it does not seem to be present in the other early dialogues either. But the soul is active in one way in one situation, in another in another. Different qualities of the soul are required to cope with different things, and each one of those qualities is one εἶδος of the soul, one way; I believe that the notion underlying is that of an active soul, a soul that is dynamic, not static.<sup>244</sup> Whether or not this is so cannot be proved on the basis of the *Lysis*; use of εἶδος on the lines sketched above, however, is frequent in the *Republic*.<sup>245</sup>

#### XIV.

At this point, it may be appropriate to reflect very briefly on the picture which has arisen so far, on the one hand accentuating and summarizing previous usages of εἶδος in early Greek literature, including Plato's early dialogues, on the other hand justifying some of the choices hitherto proposed as suitable translations of the word in its several contexts.

<sup>244</sup> In that lies my objection to Bolotin's translation 'aspect' which is otherwise close to the sense of the word.

<sup>245</sup> Use of εἶδος in the *Republic* cannot be discussed in this context.

For that, I will once more return to the etymological root which εἶδος shares on the one hand with ἰδεῖν, *seeing*, and ἰδέα, another word which must originally have meant something like ‘appearance’ and which will be discussed in due course, and on the other with εἰδέναι, οἶδα, *knowing, I know*. The Indo-European root behind all these formations is \*ueid-. Derivations from this root are preserved in many of the Indo-European dialects, and though all matters concerning etymology contain an element of speculation and have to be treated with caution, comparison of the Greek with semantic developments of words of other languages derived from the same root in this case can contribute to a better understanding of inner-Greek developments. To present the material, together with some of the commonly accepted interpretations, here are some extracts from pertinent dictionaries and lexica:

H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, Heidelberg<sup>2</sup> 1973:

“εἶδος n. ‘species, Aussehen, Gestalt, Beschaffenheit, Gattung (auch Liedgattung), Zustand’ (seit Il.). ... . Als Verbalnomen zum Wort für ‘sehen’, ἰδεῖν (s.d.), mit aind. *védas-* n. ‘Besitz, Erwerb’ formal identisch; der bei εἶδον ‘ich erblickte’ = aind. *ávidam* ‘ich fand, ich erwarb’ vorliegende Bedeutungsunterschied kommt auch bei den zugehörigen Nomina zum Ausdruck. Semantisch besser zu εἶδος stimmen aksl. *vid* (serb. *víd*) ‘εἶδος, θεωρία’ aus *ueido(s)-*, lit. *véidas* ‘Angesicht’ (wohl urspr. Langdiphthong) und das von einem *s*-Stamm ausgehende ahd. *wisa* ‘Art, Weise’. ... .”

C.T. Onions, G.W.S. Friedrichsen, R.W. Burchfield, *The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology*, Oxford 1966:

“**wise**<sup>1</sup> waiz (arch.) manner, fashion. OE. *wise* (rarely *wis*) mode, condition, thing, cause, occas. song, corr. to OFris. *wis*, OS. *wisa* (Du. *wijze*), OHG. *wisa*,

*wis* manner, custom, tune (G. *weise*), ON. *visa stanza*, \* *vis* in *oðruvis* otherwise : - CGerm. (exc. Goth.) *wison*, *wiso*; f. \**wit* WIT<sup>2</sup>; for the sense-development cf. rel. Gr. *eîdos* form, shape, kind, state of things, course of action. See -WISE.”

“-wise waiz terminal el. (suffix) descending from OE. *wise* WISE<sup>1</sup> as used (like cogn. forms in other Germ. langs.) in various adverb. expressions meaning ‘in such-and-such a manner, way, or respect’ and containing an adj. or an attrib. sb. with or without a governing prep., e.g. OE. (*on*) *opre wisan* in another fashion, OTHERWISE, *on scipwisan* after the manner of a ship, like a ship. Several of these have become permanent, as *anywise*, *likewise*, *nowise*. Sense-contact with -WAYS, denoting direction, appears in late ME., and *lengthways*, *longways*, *sideways* are contemp. in XVI with *lengthwise*, *longwise*, *sidewise*.”

s.v. **other**: “... **o·ther**-WISE (OE. *on opre wisan*; cf. ON. *oðruvis*).”

“**guise** gaiz style, fashion. XIII. - (O)F. *guise* = Pr. *guiza*, Sp., It. *guisa*: - Rom. \**wisa* - Germ. \**wison* WISE<sup>1</sup>. Cf. DISGUISE.”

F. Kluge, F. Lutz, *English Etymology*, London 1899:

“**guise** ME. *gise* fr. OFR. *guise* ‘way, wise’, which is of Teut. origin; cp. *wise*.”

P. Robert, *Le petit Robert*, ed. A. Rey, J. Rey-Debove, nouvelle édition, Paris 1991:

“**GUISE** [giz]. *n. f.* (v. 1050; germ. °*wisa* “manière”). ♦ 1° *Vx* (dans *en cette guise*, *de telle guise*). **V. Façon, manière, sorte.** ♦ 2° *Mod.* À SA GUISE, selon son goût, sa volonté.”

F. Kluge, A. Götze, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache*, ed. W. Mitzka, Berlin <sup>17</sup>1957:

“**Weise** f. Mhd. *wis(e)*, ahd. *wis(a)*, asachs. *wisa*, mnd. *wis(e)*, mnl. ags. *wise*, nnl. *wijse*, afries. *wis*, engl. *wise* ‘Art’, anord. *visa* ‘Strophe, Vers’, *vis* in *oðru vis* ‘anders’, norw. dän. schwed. *vis* führen auf germ. \**wisa-* n., \**wiso(n)* f. aus \**uid-* to zu der unter wissen entfalteteten idg. Wurzel \**ueid-* ‘sehen’. Grundbedeutung ist somit ‘Aussehen, Erscheinung’, woraus sich ‘Beschaffenheit’ usw. entwickelt hat. Aus den westgerm. Nachbarsprachen entlehnt sind. frz. *guise*, prov. *guiza*, ital. *guisa*. Vgl. Idee. - Als Adv.-Suffix in stück-, teilweise hat sich -weise erst im Nhd. ausgebildet; Wendungen wie mhd. *in regenes wis* ‘wie Regen’ gehen voraus.”

F. Kluge, A. Götze, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache*, ed. E. Seebold, Berlin <sup>23</sup>1995:

“**Weise** f. (< 8. Jh.) Mhd. *wis(e)*, ahd. *wisa*, as. *wisa* aus g. \**weis-/on* f. ‘Weise’, auch in anord. *vis*, ae. *wis(e)*, afr. *wis*. Bezeugt ist das Wort zunächst einmal in adverbialen Wendungen (‘auf andere Weise’ u. dgl.) in allen außergotischen Sprachen, althochdeutsch auch unflektiert, altnordisch in erstarrten Formen, dann in allgemeiner Bedeutung ‘Art und Weise’ (l. *modus m.*); speziell ‘Melodie’ (althochdeutsch und altnordisch, weniger deutlich auch sonst) und ‘Sitte, Gewohnheit, Ritus’, ‘Handlungsweise’. Zugrunde liegt offenbar ein dem gr. *eîdos* n. ‘Erscheinung, Aussehen, Gattung’ entsprechender s-Stamm zu (ig.) \**weid-* ‘erscheinen, sehen, wissen’ (s. *wissen*); dieser scheint in den endungslosen Formen als Konsonantstamm bewahrt zu sein; im flektierten Simplex liegt eine Erweiterung vor.”

“-weise        *Suffixoid* (zur Bildung von Adverbien). Gehört heute zu *Weise*, doch ist die Entstehungsgeschichte der frühbezeugten Formen noch nicht ausreichend untersucht.”

From the material set out above, it can be seen at once that English, as a Germanic language, has two words sharing the same root and part of the semantic developments of εἶδος, the *s*-stem derivatives<sup>246</sup> ‘wise’ and ‘guise’, going back to a proto-Germanic \**wisa*. English ‘wise’ has not survived as part of common usage as a noun in its own right; it is found, however, as the second part of compounds such as ‘otherwise’ or ‘clockwise’; for although Seebold s.v. ‘-weise’ suggests in a rare etymological joke<sup>247</sup> that the etymology is not clear, the accumulated Old Norse, English and German evidence, combined with the analogous development in Greek, point strongly in the direction of an original connection with the noun.

The reason, or at least one strong reason, why ‘wise’ is no longer in active use is that in certain contexts, notably again in compounds terminating in ‘-wise’, there was a semantic overlap with the similar-sounding ‘ways’ and ‘-ways’. Thus, a colloquial ‘there is no way of doing this or that’ has supposedly replaced an earlier ‘there is no wise of doing this or that’, or rather ‘this cannot be done in any wise’, with which it may have co-existed for some time. There is no way of telling if a sentence like ‘if it does not work that way, try it in some other wise’ is just wrong or merely very archaic. And even if we are told that ‘several of these have become permanent, as *anywise, likewise, nowise*’, I cannot recall having heard ‘anywise’ or ‘nowise’ lately, and ‘lengthwise and widthwise’ are certainly rare; ‘otherwise’, ‘likewise’ and ‘clockwise’ are probably the only ones to survive with fair frequency.

<sup>246</sup> No universal consensus has been reached as to the respective original noun-stems of εἶδος and Germ. \**wisa*, but that need not detain us here.

<sup>247</sup> Seebold, in the 23<sup>rd</sup> edition of Kluge’s dictionary, has an entry ‘-oid’, deriving that modern German suffix from Greek -ο-εἰδης.

Thus to the statement that ‘sense-contact with -WAYS, denoting direction, appears in late ME., and *lengthways*, *longways*, *sideways* are contemp. in XVI with *lengthwise*, *longwise*, *sidewise*’, one could have added: ‘and that, together with the fact that the plural of the noun ‘way’ is similar in sound to the singular of the noun ‘wise’, is why ‘way’ and ‘(-)ways’ have virtually replaced ‘(-)wise’ in contemporary language.’

This, then is in part a justification for choosing ‘way, ways’ as an appropriate translation of εἶδος in Thucydides. It has to be borne in mind that only a few centuries back ‘wise’ could have served in its place. That is still the case in German, where the word ‘Weise’ is part of the living language. Usage of German ‘Weise’ exhibits another interesting feature. When referring to two actions of a different type, one could say about the agents that they are acting ‘auf unterschiedliche Weise’, *in different ways*. (NB: ‘Weise’ in that phrase is in the singular.) In talking about the two agents and their characters and motives which form the basis of their actions, one would say that the two people of a different type are ‘von unterschiedlicher Art’. This distinction between dynamic and static is not made in fifth century Greek usage where the one word εἶδος in the sense ‘type’ covers both notions; that is, of course, not to say that such a distinction could not be made at all; and even without a detailed study, it may be stated that φύσις, *nature*, can come close in meaning to referring to the ‘type’ or ‘Art’ of a thing or an animate being, in some of its uses at least; conversely, τρόπος, *way, manner*, expresses the dynamic aspects of, on the one hand, an event, on the other, a man’s acting, and thereby often referring to the ‘type’ or ‘Weise’ of an action or a person acting.

A word should be said on the choice of the English word ‘type’ in preference to words which can in certain contexts be counted as near-synonyms. The disadvantage of ‘type’ as a term chosen to render εἶδος in this context is that it is in origin a loan-word, ultimately going back to a Greek word other than the one it is used as an translation of: τύπος, a *blow, strike, impression* (as a result of a blow or strike) does in itself not bear

any visual connotations. The semantic development, however, which led to a meaning 'type', a development which can be traced back to the second half of the fifth century and which came to completion in Hellenistic times,<sup>248</sup> relies on the visual impact of the physical impression that was, originally, the result of a physical blow or strike. At any rate, in common English usage, specialised vocabulary of numismatics and printing apart, 'type' is first and foremost an abstract term, denoting "the general form, structure, or character distinguishing a particular kind, group, or class of beings or objects"<sup>249</sup>, or, it should be added, something characterised by that distinguishing mark.

This last lexical definition provides a sound basis for demonstrating the advantages which 'type' has over other possible English renderings of εἶδος. Perhaps, most justification is needed for having avoided the word 'form' which would appear to be an obvious translation of εἶδος, if only because it is a traditional one. But while conventions are convenient, they are not always helpful. In the case of 'form', two reasons in particular speak against its employment: on the one hand, the word 'form' has strong connotations of 'bodily form' and 'shape'. (As to its etymology, Latin *forma* may be the same as a hypothetical Greek \*μορφ-μα, that is to say closely related to μορφή, a word which does indeed denote 'form' or sometimes 'shape'; but this etymology is of secondary importance only, when the usage of the English word 'form' is concerned.) As has been shown, εἶδος does mean 'looks, appearance, guise', it does not mean 'bodily form', 'shape', 'body', just as it does not mean 'beauty'. Of course, physical objects do have 'shape' and 'bodily form'; those two concepts may even be subsumed under the concept of 'appearance'; but just as 'appearance' in English does not mean 'form' or 'shape', εἶδος in Greek does not mean the same as either μορφή, *form*, or σχῆμα, *shape*.<sup>250</sup>

<sup>248</sup> See LSJ s.v. τύπος.

<sup>249</sup> *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, ed. C.T. Onions et al., Oxford <sup>3</sup>1944, Reset with Revised Etymologies and Addenda 1973, s.v. Type, 5.

<sup>250</sup> For this and the following paragraphs cf. C.M. Gillespie, *The Use of Εἶδος and Ἰδέα in Hippocrates*, in: CQ VI (1922), 179 - 203. I find myself as often in disagreement with him as in agreement.

The second and perhaps even stronger reason for avoiding 'form' as a translation of εἶδος - stronger, because one could argue that the English word 'form' does indeed in some of its senses refer to what the Greek word εἶδος refers to in some of its senses - the second reason is that, without any attempt to define in what sense the English word is employed, 'form'<sup>251</sup> has so universally been used as a translation of the word εἶδος in Plato that it has become wholly devoid of meaning; even if one were to suppose that at some stage in the history of philosophy and Classical scholarship there was a true understanding of what was meant by 'form'.

It would be wrong in principle to translate the Greek word εἶδος into Latin as *forma* whenever it occurs if in one or more, but not in all of its senses εἶδος may correctly be translated as *forma*; related to that, there is a danger in translating the Greek word εἶδος into English as 'form' without having checked which sense of the word εἶδος is intended at any given passage. In the case of Plato, the most important task is to see how and why εἶδος came to be used to refer to something like 'the beautiful' or 'the good', and in what sense it referred to them.

Going back to the lexical definition of 'type' as "the general form, structure, or character distinguishing a particular kind, group, or class of beings or objects", or, as said above, something characterised thereby, 'structure' may do as a translation of εἶδος in some cases in which the word refers to a thing of a certain type; however, even if the objection that the word 'structure' conveys the notion of 'construction' and 'being constructed' is not universally valid, the range of applicability of 'structure' as translation of εἶδος is far smaller than that of 'type'; only a small part of the instances of εἶδος that may correctly be translated with 'type' may correctly be translated with 'structure' alternatively. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same applies to 'character'.

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<sup>251</sup> (and 'idea' which has of late gone out of fashion )

One could argue on that basis that it is mainly on grounds of connotations that 'type' as translation of εἶδος is preferable to the other words discussed. But since εἶδος is sometimes translated as 'kind' or 'class' as well, it is important to point to a difference in denotation often overlooked.<sup>252</sup> Leaving aside strong claims to historicity of this particular anecdote, 'class' is ultimately derived from Latin *classis* as denoting "each of the six orders into which Servius Tullius divided the Roman people for purposes of taxation"<sup>253</sup>. In all its subsequent applications, 'class' denotes a group of people or things, be it a division of society, of people, of animals or plants, or "of things according to grade or quality"<sup>254</sup>. 'Class' denotes a plurality, a group, with the exception of a derivative attributive usage, and of 'class' as a shorthand for 'class degree', distinct senses which by their occurrence in specific contexts are unambiguous and will not be considered here.

'Kind', as related to 'kin', is a Germanic word derived from an Indo-European root \*gen- that is also found in Greek γένος, *kin, race*.<sup>255</sup> 'Kind' originally refers to things somehow related by birth or descent. When Milton says (*Paradise Lost* VI 73): "As when the total kind of birds came summond over Eden", he refers to a group of animals related to each other, a kin-group, so to speak. Such a group can be compared and contrasted with other groups; one kind can be set against another. Birds are one kind, fish another; each bird is an animal that belongs to the one kind, each fish an animal that belongs to the other. Both bird, collectively, and fish, collectively, are kinds; and they are kinds of animals or kinds of animal, collectively.<sup>256</sup> In all these combinations, and also in 'one kind of animal as opposed to another', 'kind' is a word denoting a group.

<sup>252</sup> For the following cf. in particular Gillespie's reaction, op. cit., p. 183ff., to A.E. Taylor, *The Words εἶδος, ἰδέα in Pre-Platonic Literature*, in: id., *Varia Socratica. First Series*, Oxford 1911, p. 221f.

<sup>253</sup> *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. 'class', 1.

<sup>254</sup> Loc. cit., 5.

<sup>255</sup> Cf. *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. 'kind'.

<sup>256</sup> Cf. *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, loc. cit.: "Phrases. **Kind of**, in *all kinds of trees* = 'trees of all kinds', *this kind of thing* = 'a thing of this kind'. As the original genitive phrase (see O.E.D. s.v. **KIN sb.**<sup>1</sup> 6 b) was in attrib. relation to the following sb., the natural tendency is still to treat *all kind of*, *no kind of*, etc., and, hence also, *kind of*, as an attrib. or adj. phrase qualifying the sb."

Just as γένος denotes a group, namely a ‘family, clan, race’, ‘kind’ in its original application denotes any one of the groups of related animate beings. By nature, ‘kind’ thereby refers to what may be termed ‘count-nouns’, words which refer to entities or units which can be counted; as opposed to mass-nouns, nouns which refer to non-countable entities such as water, gold, or heat.

Now, the phrase ‘this kind of animal’, meaning ‘(the) animal(s) of this kind (or kind-group)’, does by implication also mean: ‘this kind of animal and not another kind of animal’ or ‘(the) animal(s) of this kind but not of another’. Talking of groups of related things often occurs in a context where there are other things which are not related. In stressing that aspect of relatedness *versus* non-relatedness, one can apply ‘kind’ not only to countable but also to non-countable items. ‘This kind of thing’ as opposed to ‘that kind of thing’ may be applied to, *exempli gratia*, ‘metal’ just as much as ‘animal’. (And here the use of the collective singular of count-nouns, here ‘animal’, instead of the plural (‘animals’), may have played a rôle.) Thereby, ‘this kind of metal’ is virtually synonymous with ‘this type of metal’.

‘Type’, however, does not refer to a group; ‘type’ refers to “the general form, structure, or character distinguishing a particular kind, group, or class of beings or objects”, that is to say ‘type’ is something a group of related things may have or display - or something which has that general form, structure or character. And even if the universal validity of this prescriptive-sounding definition of the English word is disputed, the Greek noun εἶδος, when used in the sense of ‘type’, does in none of the cases discussed refer to a group, but always to a ‘characteristic of a group’ or ‘a thing characterised in a certain way’. Casual inspection of εἶδος and γένος in the *Sophist* and *Politicus* and in Aristotle’s writings on topics of natural history suggests to me that in his usage as well, εἶδος does not refer to groups either, that is to say, a distinction between εἶδος and γένος in this respect is generally preserved.<sup>257</sup>

<sup>257</sup> Cf. the seminal essay by D.M. Balme, *ΓΕΝΟΣ and ΕΙΔΟΣ in Aristotle’s Biology*, in: CQ (NS) 12 (1962), 81 - 98, whose statements, though, require some modification in this respect. In need of modification is also C.J. Rowe, *Plato. Politicus*, Warminster 1995, pp. 4 - 8; in Section 2 of his

I would, therefore, suggest that although the semantic development of εἶδος from meaning 'look, looks, appearance, guise' to 'type' and 'wise, ways, way' may have been a prerequisite for scientifically conducted classification, it would be misleading to talk about a classificatory sense of εἶδος in pre-Platonic literature.<sup>258</sup>

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introduction, entitled "Forms, classes, and division", Rowe seems to treat εἶδος and γένος as synonyms and proposes that the words best be taken to mean 'class'.

<sup>258</sup> *Pace* Gillespie, loc. cit.

## ΙΔΕΑ

### I.

ἰδέα may be as ancient a formation as εἶδος, but its first occurrence in extant Greek literature is late. ἰδέα is not part of the Homeric dialect, and that not for metrical reasons, as is shown by the first occurrence of a form of the word in a Theognidean elegiac poem. On etymological grounds, one would expect ἰδέα, an a-stem derived from the zero grade of the root \*ueid-, to refer to the totality of a visual impression as given or perceived in an instant.<sup>259</sup> As usual, theoretical considerations of that sort are not really helpful, especially when applied to a relatively late stage of a language. But even if one leaves that last, likewise theoretical, consideration aside, were one to capture the notion of ‘the totality of a visual impression as given or perceived in an instant’ in one word, English equivalents would be something like ‘look’, ‘looks’, ‘appearance’, ‘guise’. For that reason, and because there is indeed a considerable overlap in meaning, εἶδος and ἰδέα are often treated as, or explicitly stated to be, synonyms. Wherever that is obviously the case, it is therefore not necessary to repeat what has already been stated in the preceding chapter.<sup>260</sup>

<sup>259</sup> ‘Totality’, if one believes in a ‘collective’ case as the origin of a-stems; ‘in an instant’, if the function of the zero-grade of graded roots is just to state the verbal action, as witnessed in the aorist. A comparison of the analyses of ἰδέα by two of the foremost historical linguists of the twentieth century can show how little can be stated for certain at this remote level: P. Chantraine, *La formation des noms en grec ancien*, Paris 1933, (nouveau tirage 1979), p. 91: “§ 70. De même que le grec possède un suffixe -ία répondant au masculin -ιος, il existe une finale -εα reposant sans doute sur -εγα à côté de la finale -εος. ... - ἰδέα “apparence, forme” (ionien-attique) est tiré de l’aoriste ἰδεῖν qui repose sans doute sur une contraction.” By contrast J.B. Hofmann, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, München 1950, p. 70, s.v. εἶδος: “εἶδος n. Aussehen, Gestalt : aus \*ueides- ... - ἰδέα f. äußere Erscheinung, Gestalt, Anblick (wohl \*Fιδέσῶ), ... .” Hofmann’s “wohl” signifies, in his own words, an ‘uncertain assumption’; I believe Chantraine’s ‘sans doute’ has the same force. (Given that the first two instances of the word are in Theognis and Pindar, Chantraine’s comment ‘ionien-attique’ may seem in need of justification.) We cannot be ultimately certain about the word’s formation, and connotations can - if at all - only be gleaned from the actual contexts.

<sup>260</sup> On related grounds, it seemed on occasion more practical to diverge from a treatment in chronological order.

The first instance of ἰδέα to be considered is found at the end of a poem by Theognis, by scholarly consent considered genuine, which may be complete (119 - 128<sup>261</sup>):

χρυσοῦ κιβδήλοιο καὶ ἀργύρου ἀνσχετὸς ἄτη  
 120 Κύρνε, καὶ ἐξευρεῖν ῥάδιον ἀνδρὶ σοφῶ  
 εἰ δὲ φίλου νόος ἀνδρὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι λελήθη  
 ψυδρὸς ἑών, δόλιον δ' ἐν φρεσὶν ἦτορ ἔχη,  
 τοῦτο θεὸς κιβδηλότατον ποίησε βροτοῖσιν,  
 καὶ γνῶναι πάντων τοῦτ' ἀνιηρότατον.  
 125 οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰδείης ἀνδρὸς νόον οὔτε γυναικός,  
 πρὶν πειρηθείης ὥσπερ ὑποζυγίου,  
 οὐδέ κεν εἰκάσσαις ἴσπερ ποτ' ἐς ὄριον ἐλθών·†  
 πολλάκι γὰρ γνώμην ἐξαπατῶσ' ἰδέαι.

*“False gold or silver is a threat that can be checked,  
 120 Cyrnus; an expert quickly finds it out;  
 but if a comrade’s secret disposition’s false  
 and in his breast he has an untrue heart,  
 this is the basest counterfeit that God has put  
 before us, and it costs most pain to test.  
 125 You cannot know a man’s or woman’s character  
 until you’ve tried if it will bear a load,  
 nor can you judge as if inspecting merchandise:  
 so often the appearances deceive.”*

<sup>261</sup> Text and translation of M.L. West, *Iambi et Elegi Graeci I*, Oxford <sup>2</sup>1989; and: *Greek Lyric Poetry*, Oxford 1993.

It looks as if this were just another case of contrasting a person's external looks or appearance with his mind or thoughts of the sort familiar from Homer onwards.<sup>262</sup> Cynrus is warned to beware of a man's or woman's νόος, *mind, character, disposition* - that is not known; what can be seen, and therefore known<sup>263</sup>, is only the looks, the external appearance of a person. One could point to Aristophanes' *Plutus* for an exact parallel; Penia, or Poverty, claims that she produces better men than Plutus, or wealth, is capable of producing (557 - 561): σκώπτειν πειρᾶ καὶ κωμωδεῖν τοῦ σπουδάζειν ἀμελήσας, | οὐ γινώσκων ὅτι τοῦ Πλούτου παρέχω βελτίονας ἄνδρας | καὶ τὴν γνώμην καὶ τὴν ἰδέαν. παρὰ τῷ μὲν γὰρ ποδαγρῶντες | καὶ γαστρῶδεις καὶ παχύκνημοι καὶ πιονές εἰσιν ἀσελγῶς, | παρ' ἔμοι δ' ἰσχυνοὶ καὶ σφηκῶδεις καὶ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀνιαροί. *Try to mock and be funny, not concerned with being serious, not realizing that I produce men better as to their minds and their appearance than Plutus can. With him there are <men> gouty, with bellies, broad-legged, licentiously fat, with me <there are men> thin and wasp-like, grievous to their enemies.* γνώμη and ἰδέα are here contrasted in a different fashion, but the same opposition is presupposed by the argument. It may further be noted that the features associated with ἰδέα all refer not just to the 'appearance', but specifically to the 'figures' of the men compared. The same opposition of 'mind' and 'appearance' or 'figure' could be assumed for Theognis.

However, especially if line 128 is supposed to be the end of Theognis' poem, it could contain a gnomic statement, a conclusion in form of a proverb; πολλάκι γὰρ γνώμην ἐξαπατῶσ' ἰδέαι - *Often indeed appearances deceive the mind.* If that be so, the ἰδέαι need no more be the appearances of the individuals just mentioned than they are in the standing phrase that 'appearances deceive'. Reading the line that way would, of course, cover the particular interpretation that the people Theognis warns

<sup>262</sup> Cf. e.g. *Odyssey* VIII, 164ff., *Iliad* III, 212ff., discussed in Section I of the chapter on εἶδος above.

<sup>263</sup> There is a distinct possibility here that regardless of the precise meaning of ἰδέα Theognis felt an etymological connection between εἰδείης in line 125 and ἰδέαι in line 128; cf. note 119 in Section I of the chapter on εἶδος above.

Cyrnus of give the appearance of reliability without being reliable, that is to say, ἰδέαι may refer to ‘the individuals’ appearing other than they are’ in a non-physical sense. From the context in Theognis alone one cannot say if in the sixth century B.C. ἰδέα meant just ‘looks (of a person)’ or ‘appearance’ in general, with all the connotations either of εἶδος or of the English word ‘appearance’.

Other early fifth century instances of the word likewise just confirm that ἰδέα may have meant just ‘looks, appearance, guise (of a person)’; Pindar concludes *Olympian X* by stating that he has praised Arcestratos for his boxing victory some time ago as a youth at Olympia (103), ἰδέα τε καλόν | ὄρα τε κεκραμένον, ... , *him, beautiful with (or through, or by) his appearance, filled<sup>264</sup> with youth, ...*. It is interesting that the form of ἰδέα is the dative rather than the accusative of respect so frequently encountered with εἶδος in similar contexts; that may point to a difference, if not in meaning, so in connotations; but again, the context does not allow to draw any further conclusions with any degree of certainty.<sup>265</sup>

Close in time are the following lines by Xenophanes (Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* V 109, 3 = DK 21B15): ἀλλ’ εἰ χεῖρας ἔχον βόες <ἵπποι τ’><sup>266</sup> ἠὲ λέοντες | ἢ γράψαι χεῖρεςσι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἄπερ ἄνδρες, | ἵπποι μὲν θ’ ἵπποισι βόες δέ τε βουσὶν ὁμοίας | καὶ <κε> θεῶν ἰδέας

<sup>264</sup> Literally: ‘mixed’.

<sup>265</sup> For an accusative of respect, cf. the first fragment of Eupolis’ *Golden Race*, in which one person accuses another of being κακὸς τὴν ἰδέαν, *bad of appearance* or *bad of figure*. - A passage in the fables of Aesop (*Fabulae Dosithei*, ed. Hausrath and Hunger, *Corpus fabularum Aesopicarum*, vol. 1.2), telling the tale of a stag discovering its image in the water of a spring, relates (1.3) how it encounters τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἰδέα, *the appearance of its body*, and continues: καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἐπήνει τὴν φύσιν τῶν κεράτων ἀνατεταμένων τε εἰς πολὺν ἀέρα καὶ ὡς κόσμος εἶη παντὶ τῷ σώματι. *And most of all it praised the nature of its antlers both for being stretched out high into the air and for being an adornment for the whole body*. At whatever time this was written, ἰδέα did not mean ‘body’ (a claim often made about εἶδος by those who also state that εἶδος and ἰδέα are synonyms); perhaps it is also significant that what is praised most of all, that is to say one part of what was referred to by ἰδέα, is distinctive in particular by its shape.

<sup>266</sup> The rather speculative nature of this emendation, as well as the slightly difficult syntax of this and the following line need not detain us here.

ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ' ἐποίουν | τοιαῦθ' οἶόν περ καὶ τοὶ δέμας εἶχον  
 <ἕκαστοι>. *But if oxen and horses or lions had hands and could draw with those  
 hands and accomplish works men can accomplish, horses would draw the appearances  
 of their gods like horses and oxen like oxen, and would make their [i.e. the gods']  
 bodies such as they themselves each have their build.* σῶμα and δέμας, it could be  
 argued, are variants, for metrical reasons, expressing the same concept; on those grounds  
 even ἰδέα might be included. However, although the evidence is by no means decisive,  
 the statement<sup>267</sup> that δέμας denoted the 'living body' in the first place may be correct  
 and significant. If that be so, the animals named would craft their *devotionalia*, at once  
 works of worship and of art, on the model of their own living bodies; and they would do  
 that according to their chosen medium of production in three dimensions, the σώματα  
 or *bodies* of statues, or in two, the ἰδέαι or *figures* in drawings and paintings.

Arguing strictly on the lines of investigation set out above in the chapter on εἶδος,  
 ἰδέα here would have to be translated 'appearance, looks, guise', because that would  
 make perfect sense, and therefore there is no need to posit a semantic development. It  
 may, however, be significant that 'figure' would do as translation in all cases looked at  
 so far, with the potential exception of Theognis 128; and not only that, it would add  
 something to the sense of each passage. This needs bearing in mind.

## II.

Overall, assuming that sense of ἰδέα, certainly *appearance*, but more specifically  
*figure*, is confirmed by a sufficiently large number of fifth century texts. Close in context  
 to Xenophanes is Protagoras, provided Diogenes Laertius quotes verbatim (D.L. IX 51 =  
 DK 80B4): περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι, οὔθ' ὥς εἰσὶν οὔθ' ὥς οὐκ

<sup>267</sup> LSJ s.v. δέμας.

εἰσὶν οὐθ' ὁποῖοί τινες ἰδέαν. *About the gods I cannot know, neither that they are nor that they are not nor again how they are as to their figures.* With that may be compared the final lines of the choral ode the Clouds sing at their entry in Aristophanes' eponymous play. Having described to the audience their ascent from the sea to the sky in adhortative subjunctives, they conclude, still out of view (288ff.): ἀλλ' ἀποσεισάμεναι νέφος ὄμβριον | ἀθανάτας ἰδέας ἐπιδώμεθα | τηλεσκόπῳ ὄμματι γαίαν. *But having shaken the rainy mist off our immortal figure, let us look upon the earth with our far-seeing eye.*<sup>268</sup>

Aristophanes' Clouds, as they appear on stage, are anthropomorphous - as Greek gods were portrayed in literature and art also otherwise; and it is against that background that Xenophanes and Protagoras can speak of the 'figures' of a god or gods. The human figure, asserted, questioned or denied, is in the background of their arguments. This usage is probably also found in the Hippocratic treatise *Airs, Waters, Places*. After a detailed discussion on different environments and the differences in inhabitants which result, the concluding lines of this work as we have it read (XXIV 49): αἱ μὲν ἐναντιώταται φύσιές τε καὶ ἰδέαι ἔχουσιν οὕτως· ἀπὸ δὲ τουτέων τεκμαιρόμενος τὰ λοιπὰ ἐνθυμέεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἀμαρτήσῃ. *Such are the natures and figures most opposed to each other: judging from those infer the rest, and you will not go wrong.* From the context, it is difficult to say if φύσιες refers to the different types of environment and nature in that sense, or if - as may seem more natural at first sight - it refers to the different natures of man there are<sup>269</sup>; in either case, but in

<sup>268</sup> For a discussion of the syntax, cf. K.J. Dover, *Aristophanes. Clouds*, Oxford 1968, commentary ad. loc.; and for the sense A.H. Sommerstein, *Aristophanes. Clouds*, Warminster 1982, note ad. loc. ἰδέας may well be genitive singular and nevertheless refer to each cloud's individual figure, just as ὄμματι in the singular does not imply either that all the clouds had one eye collectively, or else that each cloud was in possession of one eye only.

<sup>269</sup> Cf. in general the discussion of the preceding pages in Section VII of the chapter on εἶδος above; note in particular the two occurrences of φύσις in *Airs, Waters, and Places* XXIV 36 - 45: ὅκου γὰρ αἱ μεταβολαὶ εἰσι πυκνότεραι τῶν ὥρέων καὶ πλείστον διάφοροι αὐταὶ ἐωυτῆσιν, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὰ εἶδεα καὶ τὰ ἦθεα καὶ τὰς φύσιος εὐρήσεις πλείστον διαφερούσας. - μέγισται μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αὐταὶ τῆς φύσιος αἱ διαλλαγαί, ἔπειτα δὲ

the latter in particular, ἰδέα refers to the totality of what is perceived of a person by inspection, a person's figure.<sup>270</sup>

### III.

After Xenophanes, but not necessarily that long after Xenophanes<sup>271</sup>, Anaxagoras uses the word ἰδέα in a way significant for subsequent Greek philosophy. Simplicius tells us

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καὶ ἡ χώρα, ἐν ἣ ἄν τις τρέφεται καὶ τὰ ὕδατα. εὐρήσεις γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς χώρας τῇ φύσει ἀκολουθέοντα καὶ τὰ εἶδεα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς τρόπους. *Indeed, where the changes of the seasons are most frequent, and <the seasons> most different from one another, there you will also find the appearances and the characters and the natures as differing most widely. - These, now, are the greatest differences in nature, then also the land in which someone is reared, and the waters. You will find, indeed, that for the most part the appearances and the ways of the people follow the nature of the land.*

<sup>270</sup> It may not be by accident that the rarer, more elevated, and perhaps also more comprehensive word is used only at this point at the end of the treatise, a treatise in which the author frequently talked about the εἶδος or appearance of people, and in which it is not easy to decide if the extension in meaning from 'appearance' to 'type' has already taken place or is approached but as yet to come. - Could it therefore be that one should understand: *Such are the natures and types most opposed to each other: judging from those infer the rest, and you will not go wrong?* - A decision cannot be reached for *Airs, Waters, and Places*; for the general semantic development, however, see Section IV below.

<sup>271</sup> For chronological matters concerning Xenophanes, cf. K. Reinhardt, *PARMENIDES und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, Bonn 1916, especially pp. 89-106, 155-158, 221-230. Reinhardt's views concerning chronology were generally regarded as so quaint that refutation was not deemed necessary; consequently, they are usually not considered at all in recent literature, despite valuable arguments providing justification and additional support advanced by his pupil U. Hölscher in his collection *Anfängliches Fragen*, Göttingen 1968; to date, I know of no compelling refutation of Reinhardt's chronology; it may be worthwhile drawing attention to the judgement of J. Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, London<sup>2</sup>1982, bibliography, p. 650: "[Reinhardt's *PARMENIDES* is] for my money, the most sparkling book in the whole field".

For Anaxagoras, I follow M. Schofield, *An essay on Anaxagoras*, Cambridge 1980, chapter I, Appendix: Anaxagoras's floruit, p. 33: "In the previous section I have implied that the formation of Anaxagoras's thought antedated the rise of the Sophistic movement, and that his book must be dated significantly earlier than the treatise of Diogenes of Apollonia and the oldest treatises in the Hippocratic corpus (I mentioned *On the Sacred Disease* and *On Ancient Medicine* in this respect, but the same goes for *Airs, Waters, Places* [note 71]). This is not a controversial opinion. But it is worth while adducing some reasons for putting the date of the composition of his book, as I incline to put it, at roughly 470-460 B.C." Schofield then produces five distinct arguments for this dating, all but the last of which carry sufficient conviction. He concludes (p. 35): "A floruit of 470-460 B.C. fits well enough with what little we can say of the relation between Anaxagoras's thought and that of other fifth-century philosophers. It is late enough for him to have taken profit from the reflection he evidently devoted to Parmenides' work. It is early enough for his book to have antedated, as it probably did, the physical poem of Empedocles

(*Physica* 34, 28 = DK 59B4): λέγει γὰρ μετ' ὀλίγα τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ πρώτου 'περὶ φύσεως' Ἀναξαγόρας οὕτως· “τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων χρῆ δοκεῖν ἐνεῖναι πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς συγκρινομένοις καὶ σπέρματα πάντων χρημάτων καὶ ἰδέας παντοίας ἔχοντα καὶ χροιάς καὶ ἡδονάς.” *Indeed, Anaxagoras, close to the beginning of Book I of On Nature, speaks thus: “These things being so, it is right to think that there were, in all the things that were being put together, many things, of all kinds, and seeds of all things - [seeds] having figures and colours and savours of every kind”.*<sup>272</sup> Leaving aside the details of what little we have of the context of this statement, it sets out one of the principles of the ontology and physics of Anaxagoras. The sentence was found close to the beginning of his work about which Simplicius, giving his interpretation of the pre-Socratic, declares (*Physica* 155, 23): ... δηλοῖ διὰ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν ‘φυσικῶν’ λέγων ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς· “ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα ἦν, ἄπειρα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ σμικρότητα.” *It is clear [that Anaxagoras says what has just been summarized] from Book I of the Physics where he says: “All things were together, infinite as to amount and as to smallness.”* If one gives a temporal interpretation to those fragments, there was a state when nothing was distinct, when none of the composite bodies which constitute our world had come into being, when all the seeds were in one mixture from which nothing had separated off. Later, in our world, where there are συγκρινόμενα, composite bodies which somehow have separated off, they contain those seeds which are the seeds of all things. These smallest and ultimate constituents are said to have καὶ ἰδέας παντοίας καὶ χροιάς καὶ ἡδονάς, *appearances, and colours, and tastes and smells of all sorts.* It is not impossible, as we have seen in the opening sections of the chapter on εἶδος, that ἰδέαι are in general the ‘appearances’ things can have, that one aspect of appearance, is then highlighted by way of grammatical co-ordination, and

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[note 86] and the work of Leucippus. It leaves the temporal relation of his thought with that of Zeno [note 87] and Melissus appropriately obscure.”

<sup>272</sup> The translation of fragment 4 is a slightly modified version of Schofield’s (p. 101) slightly modified version of the version by D.J. Furley, *Anaxagoras in response to Parmenides*, in: *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supp. Vol. 2 (1976), p. 72.

that - as if by way of an afterthought - ἡδοναί , *tastes and smells*, are added. It is, however, likewise possible, that the three words refer to three distinctive properties or qualities of the seeds, their figures, colours and tastes. The ἰδέαι, the 'figures' of the seeds of all things may have been named first because they constitute their most distinctive feature; but that is speculation.

A slightly different context, but nevertheless one in many ways dependent on Anaxagoras is that of the physics of Diogenes of Apollonia as quoted and summarized by Simplicius (*Physica* 151, 28 = DK 64B2-5).<sup>273</sup> Diogenes attempts to prove that everything is one, as can be seen from the interaction of things; that all things are ordered by some sort of mind or understanding, for otherwise they would not have the measures we see them having; that for all living beings it is air that is life and soul and understanding. Therefore (B5), τὸ τὴν νόησιν ἔχον, *that which has understanding*, is what men call air. Everything has a share in it, and air displays as many variations as understanding does. Air is at times warmer, at times colder, drier, wetter, calmer, more agile, and changing as to taste and smell and colour in infinite ways. Yet, differences are not complete, nor are similarities, for complete similarity amounts to being the same. And he continues: ἄτε οὖν πολυτρόπου ἐούσης τῆς ἑτεροιώσιος πολύτροπα καὶ τὰ ζῶα, καὶ πολλὰ καὶ οὔτε ἰδέαν ἀλλήλοις ἑοικότα οὔτε δίαιταν οὔτε νόησιν ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθεος τῶν ἑτεροιώσεων. *Now, because alteration is manifold, manifold are also the animals,*<sup>274</sup> *and many and neither like each other in figure nor in diet nor in understanding, through the multitude of the alterations.* Speaking of the ἰδέα, the *figure* of an animal, is, as will be seen, common with Herodotus and therefore presumably within common usage; with Diogenes, however, this is linked with physical theory, and since he is arguing here from physics to biology, one may be justified in seeing changes in the states of air - as to all the qualities mentioned, as to smell and taste, colour, and it may be

<sup>273</sup> For a reevaluation of the significance of Diogenes of Apollonia, and a sketch of his position in fifth century philosophy, see M.C. Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy*, Washington, D.C./Cambridge, Mass. 1971, pp. 238 - 244.

<sup>274</sup> ζῶα are, of course, all *living beings*.

added also as to figure - behind the differences in diet, understanding and figure of living beings. Regardless of whether this is so, given that Diogenes of Apollonia clearly depends on Anaxagoras for his physical theory, one can see from 64B5 how little there is of terminological fixity in the use of ἰδέα at this stage.

Whether Empedocles' poem or poems preceded the writings of Anaxagoras or not, the one occurrence of a form of ἰδέα in what is preserved of Empedocles is found in a context very similar to that of Anaxagoras. At one of the extreme points in the struggle of friendship and quarrel, quarrel is at the depth of the whirling rotation, friendship in the middle; from there she begins with her work of composition, putting together what is unmixed. At first, quarrel is still within the whirl and within some of the members and parts of everything, but he is retreating to the outer edges, and friendship is spreading (Simplicius *Physica* 32, 11 = DK 31B35, 14ff.): αἴψα δὲ θνήτ' ἐφύοντο· τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ' εἶναι, | †ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα†<sup>275</sup> διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους, | τῶν δέ τε μισγομένων χειτ' ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν, | παντοίαις ἰδέησιν ἀρηρότα, θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι. *But forthwith there grew mortal beings: what previously understood to be immortal; [...] changing their ways; but of the mixed things, there poured forth innumerable species of mortal beings, fitted together, with all sorts of figures, a marvel to behold.*

<sup>275</sup> The phrase †ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα† of Plutarch's text does not make sense, for ζωρός is something like 'strong, hot', and the five passages contrasting ζωρότερος and ἄκρατος οἶνος in Philumenus *De Venenatis Animalibus* (ed. Wellmann, CMG X 1, 1; ch. 2, 3; 4, 2; 14, 7; 23, 4; 37, 3), does not prove what Kranz and subsequent editors suppose it to prove: 'rather strong wine' can indeed be opposed to 'unmixed wine'; that does not stop 'strong wine' from being a synonymous expression for 'unmixed wine', as indeed it is from archaic to Hellenistic Greek literature. Cf. M.R. Arundel, *Empedocles, fr. 35. 12-15*, in: *Classical Review N.S.* XII, 1962, pp. 109 - 111. As for the text, in addition to the solution offered there, two possibilities worth considering are: either to read something like ζωρά τε καὶ πρὶν ἄκρητα διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους· ... , *and what was strong and unmixed before, changing its ways: ...* - that is to say, a free-standing nominative, picked up by the genitive of line 16; or: to read something like .): αἴψα δὲ θνήτ' ἐφύοντο· τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ' εἶναι, | ζῶα τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα, *But forthwith there grew mortal beings: what previously had understood to be immortal; living beings: what previously had been unmixed <elements>.*

Whoever came first, Anaxagoras or Empedocles, both share the περιχώρησις or δῖνος or δίνη with Leucippus and Democritus; this whirling rotation has a central rôle in their cosmology, roughly speaking as set off by νοῦς, *mind*, with Anaxagoras (cf. Simplicius, *Physica* 300, 27 = DK 59B13); either just being there, or set off by friendship and quarrel with Empedocles (e.g. B35); and coming about by chance and developing by necessity with Leucippus and Democritus (Diogenes Laertius IX 31 - 33 on Leucippus = DK 67A1). In all three cosmological systems, there are things smaller than and prior to what we perceive around us. Democritus allegedly declared (Simplicius *Physica* 327, 24 = DK 68B167): δῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἀποκριθῆναι παντοίων ἰδεῶν, *that a whirling of all sorts of appearances was separated off from the all*. What those appearances are is impossible to say from this fragment alone, whether or not one is prepared to accept Gomperz' emendation of εἰδέων to ἰδέων. They could be the smallest particles which were floating about in the emptiness and are now separated off, in ordered or as yet in unordered form (cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos* VII 116f. = DK 68B164). On the other hand, they could just as well be what results from this process of separation, comparable with Empedocles' ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν, παντοίαις ἰδέησιν ἀρηρότα of 31B35 quoted above; they could be the product of that whirling separation.

There is evidence favouring the former interpretation, gathered by Diels and Kranz under the heading of 68A57.<sup>276</sup> Whatever else the passages collected there may entail,

<sup>276</sup> "SCHOL. BASILII [ed. Pasquali Gött. Nachr. 1910, 196] Δ. ἰδέας. [CLEM.] Recogn. VIII 15 [DOX. 250 de principiis] D. ideas. PLUT. adv. Colot. 8 p. 1110F τί γὰρ λέγει Δ.; οὐσίας ἀπείρους τὸ πλῆθος ἀτόμους τε κἀδιαφόρους, ἔτι δ' ἀποίους καὶ ἀπαθείς ἐν τῷ κενῷ φέρεσθαι διεσπαρμένους· ὅταν δὲ πελάσωσιν ἀλλήλαις ἢ συμπέσωσιν ἢ περιπλακῶσι, φαίνεσθαι τῶν ἀθροιζομένων τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ τὸ δὲ πῦρ τὸ δὲ φυτὸν τὸ δ' ἄνθρωπον· εἶναι δὲ πάντα τὰς ἀτόμους ἰδέας ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καλουμένας, ἕτερον δὲ μηδέν· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ εἶναι γένεσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ὄντων μηδέν ἂν γενέσθαι τῷ μήτε πάσχειν μήτε μεταβάλλειν τὰς ἀτόμους ὑπὸ στερρότητος: ὅθεν οὔτε χροῖαν ἐξ ἀχρώστων οὔτε φύσιν ἢ ψυχὴν ἐξ ἀποίων καὶ <ἀπαθῶν> ὑπάρχειν. ... ." Most of the passage from Plutarch is translated by R.D. McKirahan, *Philosophy Before Socrates*, Indianapolis 1994, p.323: "What does Democritus say? That substances unlimited in multitude, atomic and not different in kind, and moreover incapable of acting or being acted upon, are in motion, scattered in the void. When they approach one another or collide or become entangled, the compounds appear as water or fire or as a plant or a human, but all things are atoms, which he calls

they seem to prove that ἰδέα was a word of some significance for Democritus; and it is possible that Hesychius did think of Democritus when he glossed (68B141): ἰδέα· ἡ ὁμοιότης, μορφή, εἶδος. καὶ τὸ ἐλάχιστον σῶμα.<sup>277</sup> Direct, incontrovertible evidence for ἰδέα as a technical term for the atoms in Democritus' philosophy is not strong at all<sup>278</sup> - yet, had the word not occurred in his writings, and moreover in those sections concerned with atoms, it is difficult to see why anybody should have introduced it in discussions of his philosophy, since in his description of atoms there are plenty of other terms Democritus has either coined himself, or at least used in his own peculiar way.<sup>279</sup> If he should so have used it, he would have done so presumably because 'appearance' or 'figure' is a sufficiently vague word for a body which does have a certain extension and certain physical characteristics;<sup>280</sup> but at the same time sufficiently precise, since ἰδέα was not a common word in frequent use and because it had figured, albeit most probably in a less specialized sense, in Empedocles and in particular in Anaxagoras. Democritus' atoms did not differ in solidity; they may have differed in weight; but they definitely did differ in their figures, they differed as figures, they were different figures: otherwise, Democritus' whole system of

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forms; there is nothing else. For from what is not there is no coming to be, and nothing could come to be from things that are because on account of their hardness the atoms are not acted upon and do not change. (Plutarch, *Against Colotes* 8 1110F - 1111A)".

<sup>277</sup> I will not attempt to translate this lexicon entry. - One could further think of περὶ ἰδεῶν, given as the title of one of Democritus' many books (DK 68B6), but this has convincingly been emended to περὶ εἰδώλων. See J. Mansfeld, *Die Vorsokratiker*, Stuttgart 1987, p. 648. He groups 68A135, for which he accepts Schneider's emendation of εἶδων to εἰδώλων, together with 68B6, for which he proposes emendation of ἰδεῶν. For the whole question of the meaning of ἰδέα with Democritus cf. also H.C. Baldry, *Plato's Technical Terms*, in: *Classical Quarterly* XXXI (1937), pp. 141 - 150, p. 141f., n. 4; Baldry does accept the emendation of ἄτομους ἰδέας to ἄτομους ἰδίως in the passage from Plutarch and retains εἰδέων in B167. Of Hesychius, he says that the gloss may just as well refer to, *exempli gratia*, *Timaeus* 54d f. While I do not agree with Baldry's assertion that εἶδος and ἰδέα are synonyms, nor with his suggestion that both terms or either one of them has developed to mean something like 'quality' (p. 142ff.), it must be noted that if all emendations changing forms of ἰδέα into something else, but not the one changing εἰδέων to ἰδέων, are accepted, we are left with very little evidence even for the occurrence of the word, let alone its significance or meaning with Democritus.

<sup>278</sup> Thence K. v. Fritz, *Philosophie und sprachlicher Ausdruck bei Demokrit, Platon und Aristoteles*, New York 1938, does not mention ἰδέα at all in his section on Democritus, pp. 12 - 38.

<sup>279</sup> Cf. the discussion of v. Fritz, loc. cit.

<sup>280</sup> Cf. e.g. Simplicius *In 'De Caelo'*, pp. 294, 33 - 295, 24 = Aristotle fr. 208 Rose = DK 68A37.

conglomerates would no longer cohere. The difference in figure was the only reason atoms stuck together.<sup>281</sup>

#### IV.

With Herodotus as well, ἰδέα can refer to the figure of a human being, an animal, or even a plant. In Book IV, he describes the countries and people neighbouring Scythia (100ff.); the Tauri, Agathyrsi, Neuri, Man-eaters, Black-cloaks, Geloni, Budini, and Sauromatae (102). Talking about the Budini and the Geloni (108), Herodotus gives a description strongly resembling descriptions in the Hippocratic *Airs, Waters, and Places*. Βουδίνοι δὲ ἔθνος ἐὼν μέγα καὶ πολλὸν γλαυκὸν τε πᾶν ἰσχυρῶς ἔστι καὶ πυρρόν. *The Budini, being a people great and numerous, are all very bright-eyed and ruddy.* The Geloni are of Greek origin and speak a language mixed from Greek and Scythian elements. Βουδίνοι δὲ οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ γλώσσει χρέωνται καὶ Γελωνοί, οὐδὲ δίαιτα ἢ αὐτή. (109) οἱ μὲν γὰρ Βουδίνοι ἐόντες αὐτόχθονες νομάδες τέ εἰσι καὶ φθειροτραγέουσι μῦνοι τῶν ταύτη, Γελωνοὶ δὲ γῆς τε ἐργάται καὶ σιτοφάγοι καὶ κήπους ἐκτημένοι, οὐδὲν τὴν ἰδέην ὅμοιοι οὐδὲ τὸ χρῶμα. ὑπὸ μέντοι Ἑλλήνων καλέονται καὶ οἱ Βουδίνοι Γελωνοί, οὐκ ὀρθῶς καλούμενοι. *But the Budini do not speak the same language as the Geloni, nor do they have the same diet. Indeed, the Budini, being autochthonous people, are nomads and, alone of all the people there, eaters of pine-seed, but the Geloni work the soil and eat grain and have gardens, being in no respect similar as to their figure, nor as to their colour. Yet the Budini, too, are called Geloni by the Greeks - not being called correctly.* And

<sup>281</sup> The reason why 'appearance' will not do well as a translation in this context is that the atoms are small beyond perception; that does not stop them from appearing, theoretically, but there would not be anybody they could appear to. If it is accepted that ἰδέα had at least connotations of 'figure' from its earliest surviving occurrence onwards, it will appear more natural that Democritus should have adopted the term in this context.

Herodotus goes on to describe the land they inhabit. – Though it is possible that Herodotus points to a difference in appearance generally, and then proceeds by stressing one aspect of appearance, namely colour, the text can naturally be interpreted as stating a difference between the two people in figure and in colour.

Just as Herodotus speaks of the εἶδος, the *appearance*, of an animal in the course of his descriptions of foreign countries,<sup>282</sup> so he also speaks of an animal's ἰδέα. As with the cases of the word's being applied to human beings or gods, 'appearance' is a possible and acceptable translation, but 'figure' may seem more appropriate. When the Persian army is arranged for the decisive battle against the Lydians, Harpagus the Mede advises Cyrus to set up an *ad hoc* 'camel cavalry' in front of his army to disable the cavalry of Croesus (I 80): ταῦτα μὲν παραίνεσε, τὰς δὲ καμήλους ἔταξε ἀντία τῆς ἵππου τῶνδε εἵνεκεν· κάμηλον ἵππος φοβέεται καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται οὔτε τὴν ἰδέην αὐτῆς ὀρέων οὔτε τὴν ὀσμὴν ὀσφραϊνόμενος. *That, he recommended - but he positioned the camels opposite the cavalry because of the following: the horse fears the camel, and it can neither stand seeing its figure nor smelling its odour.* What the horse sees is, of course, the camel's 'appearance', everything there is to see about the camel, the totality of its visual impact. But what it perceives from the distance is the camel's 'figure', not any particular attribute, as the eyes, or the colour, or the hair. And even if the horse is near enough to smell the camel, what is most impressive in term of its appearance is its figure.

In Herodotus' description of Egypt, we read the following about hippopotami (II 71): οἱ δὲ ἵπποι οἱ ποτάμιοι <έν> νομῶ μὲν τῶ Παπρημίτη ἱροί εἰσι, τοῖσι δὲ ἄλλοισι Αἰγυπτίοισι οὐκ ἱροί. φύσιν δὲ παρέχονται ἰδέης τοιήνδε· τετράπουν ἐστὶ δίχηλον, † ὄπλα βόος, σιμόν, λοφιὴν ἔχον ἵππου, χαυλιόδοντας φαῖνον, οὐρὴν ἵππου καὶ φωνὴν, μέγαθος ὅσον

<sup>282</sup> See Section V in the chapter on εἶδος above.

τε βοῦς ὁ μέγιστος. *The hippopotami, however, are sacred under Papremitian law, but not sacred for the other Egyptians. And as to the nature of their figure, they present the following: it is a cloven-hoofed quadruped, † hooves of an ox, flat-nosed, having the mane of a horse, visible tusks, the tail and voice of a horse, and as to size it is like the biggest ox.* Apart from voice - which is added as being like that of a horse after it is stated that the tail is that of a horse - apart from voice, all features enumerated are both visible and distinctive in terms of outline and contour. That agrees with a meaning 'figure' for ἰδέα in this context as well.

In II 92, Herodotus describes two types of lilies which grow in Egypt. One grows in the water and is called Lotus by the Egyptians. He continues: ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα κρίνεα ῥόδοισι ἔμφερέα, ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ γινόμενα καὶ ταῦτα, ἐξ ὧν ὁ καρπὸς ἐν ἄλλῃ κάλυκι παραφυσμένη ἐκ τῆς ῥίζης γίνεται, κηρίῳ σφηκῶν ἰδέην ὁμοιώτατον· ἐν τούτῳ τρωκτὰ ὅσον τε πυρὴν ἐλαίης ἐγγίνεται συχνά, τρώγεται δὲ καὶ ἀπαλὰ ταῦτα καὶ αὔα. "Other lilies also grow in the river, which are like roses; the fruit of these is found in a calyx springing from the root by a separate stalk, and is most like to a comb made by wasps; this produces many eatable seeds as big as an olive-stone, which are eaten both fresh and dried."<sup>283</sup> The phrase κηρίῳ σφηκῶν ἰδέην ὁμοιώτατον, *most similar to a comb of wasps in appearance or figure*, displays the accusative of respect so commonly found in constructions with εἶδος.

At first sight, II 76 is just another instance of ἰδέα in that sense: εἶδος δὲ τῆς ἴβιος τόδε· μέλαινα δεινῶς πᾶσα, σκέλεα δὲ φορέει γεράνου, πρόσωπον δὲ ἐς τὰ μάλιστα ἐπίγρυπον, μέγαθος ὅσον κρέξ. τῶν μὲν δὴ μελαινέων τῶν μαχομένων πρὸς τοὺς ὄφεις ἦδε ἰδέη<sup>284</sup>. τῶν

<sup>283</sup> A.D. Godley, *Herodotus I*, Cambridge, Mass. <sup>2</sup>1926.

<sup>284</sup> I am not absolutely convinced that our knowledge of the usage of Greek pronouns is sufficient to justify the emendation [ἦδε] ἰδέη <αὐτή>. The sense of the clause is unambiguous.

δ' ἐν ποσὶ μᾶλλον εἰλεομένων τοῖσι ἀνθρώποισι - διζαὶ γὰρ δὴ εἶσι ἴβιες - ἥδε ψιλὴ τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ τὴν δειρὴν πᾶσαν, λευκόπτερος πλὴν κεφαλῆς καὶ αὐχένος καὶ ἀκρέων τῶν πτερύγων καὶ τοῦ πυγαίου ἄκρου - ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἶπον πάντα μέλανα ἐστι δεινῶς - σκέλεα δὲ καὶ πρόσωπον ἐμφορῆς τῇ ἐτέρῃ. τοῦ δὲ ὄφιός ἢ μορφὴ οἷα περ τῶν ὕδρων, πτίλα δὲ οὐ πτερωτὰ φορέει ἀλλὰ τοῖσι τῆς νυκτερίδος πτεροῖσι μάλιστα κη ἐμφορέστατα. *“Now this is the appearance of the ibis. It is all deep black, with legs like a crane’s, and a beak strongly hooked; its size is that of a landrail. Such is the figure of the black ibis which fights the serpents. Those that most consort with men (for the ibis is of two kinds) have all the head and neck bare of feathers; their plumage is white, save the head and neck and the tips of wings and tail (these being deep black); the legs and beak are like those of the other ibis. The serpents are like water-snakes. Their wings are not feathered but most like the wings of a bat.”*<sup>285</sup> It is tempting to see Herodotus’ style as governed by the principle of *variatio*. He talks first of the appearance of a bird, then of that of a snake. First he uses the term εἶδος, then, referring to the description he has just given, by way of variation the term ἰδέα; finally, and only a few lines later, he employs μορφὴ to refer to the appearance of serpent and water-snake. I will not discuss in any detail the meaning of μορφὴ here, but merely point out that in the case of serpent and water-snake, it is specifically the form of the bodies of those animals which is said to be alike; by contrast, the description of the appearance of the ibis contains a number of features besides bodily form. As for εἶδος, the word does indeed mean ‘appearance’, as is the case with many like examples of animal descriptions in Herodotus.<sup>286</sup> However, regardless of the perceived textual difficulty, does ἰδέα just summarize what is said in the three preceding lines? While that is perfectly possible since there is indeed a sufficient semantic overlap between εἶδος and ἰδέα, it is to my mind likewise possible that

<sup>285</sup> The translation is a very slightly adapted version of that by Godley, op. cit. He has a note explaining ‘for the ibis is of two kinds’: “*Geronticus Calvus* and *Ibis Aethiopica*”.

<sup>286</sup> See Section V of the chapter on εἶδος above.

Herodotus introduces a new thought in the sentence in question and does not just summarize what went before. The sentence τῶν μὲν δὴ μελαινέων τῶν μαχομένων πρὸς τοὺς ὄφεις ἥδε ἰδέη could mean: *Now, that is the type of the black <ibises> which fight against the serpents.* That is to say, what is expressed in the parenthetical clause διζαὶ γὰρ δὴ εἶσι ἴβιες, *indeed, twofold are the ibises,* may have been anticipated in the clause which points out that the description hitherto has been that of one type of the bird.<sup>287</sup> - As so often, it is impossible to come to a firm conclusion on the basis of one instance.

To posit a meaning 'type' for ἰδέα in Herodotus, though, does not depend on II 76. Towards the end of Book I, on the occasion of the narration of Cyrus' expansion to the north, Herodotus describes a number of Asian regions and peoples with their customs. The Caspian sea, we are told, is a sea by itself, not connected with the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Red Sea which are all one. To the west of the Caspian, there is the Caucasus mountain range. And he continues (I 203): ἔθνεα δὲ ἀνθρώπων πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ἐν ἐωυτῷ ἔχει ὁ Καύκασος, τὰ πολλὰ πάντα ἀπ' ὕλης ἀγρίας ζῶοντα. ἐν τοῖσι καὶ δένδρεα φύλλα τοιῆσδε ἰδέης παρεχόμενα εἶναι λέγεται, τὰ τρίβοντάς τε καὶ παραμίγοντας ὕδωρ ζῶα ἐωυτοῖσι ἐς τὴν ἐσθῆτα ἐγγράφειν· τὰ δὲ ζῶα οὐκ ἐκπλύνεσθαι, ... . *The Caucasus has within it many and varied tribes of men, all of them living from the wild forest. In the <forest>, there are said to be trees having leaves of the following type: those who grind them, and mix them with water, paint pictures with them on their clothing: and the pictures cannot be washed out, ... .* There is no question here of ἰδέα's meaning 'appearance' since there is no reference at all to the leaves' actual appearance. Leaving the slight grammatical inconcinnity aside, what is referred to in the following clause is the leaves' property and function. They are leaves of

<sup>287</sup> For a more detailed analysis of the semantic development leading to 'type' cf. Sections IX - XI and XIII of the chapter on εἶδος above.

an unusual sort. So, without repetition of how a word like ἰδέα originally denoting ‘appearance, guise’ may have come to mean ‘type’, it can be observed and stated that here it does.

There is one more instance of ἰδέα in Herodotus where the word may mean ‘type’. When his satraps had defeated and enslaved the rebellious Eretrians, Darius decided not to punish them but instead to let them settle in a place called Ardericca of which we are told (VI 119): ... ἀπὸ μὲν Σούσων δέκα καὶ διηκοσίους σταδίους ἀπέχοντι, τεσσεράκοντα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ φρέατος τὸ παρέχεται τριφασίας ἰδέας. καὶ γὰρ ἄσφαλτον καὶ ἄλας καὶ ἔλαιον ἀρύσσονται ἐξ αὐτοῦ τρόπῳ τοιῶδε· ... . . . *its distance from Susa was two hundred and ten stadia, and forty <stadia its distance> from the well which provides three appearances. And indeed, asphalt and salt and oil is brought up from it in the following way: ... .* It is indeed the case that three types of stuff are produced from this well; but that is not said. There is no qualifying genitive, we are not told three types of what. In that, the use of ἰδέα here comes close to that of Democritus when he asserts (Simplicius *Physica* 327, 24 = DK 68B167): δῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἀποκριθῆναι παντοίων ἰδεῶν, *that a whirling of all sorts of appearances was separated off from the all.* If anything, Herodotus’ usage is more definitely abstract, since with Democritus the possibility remains that παντοίων ἰδεῶν is a descriptive genitive: ‘a whirl of many appearances’ could be ‘a whirl that has many appearances’, ‘a whirl that appears now in one way, now in another’. That is not possible with Herodotus, and so taking ἰδέα as a term referring to a material object with Democritus as well becomes inherently more likely. The well produces three distinct ‘appearances’ or ‘figures’, if those terms can be stretched so as to accommodate any sort of physical object.

The one remaining occurrence of ἰδέα is interesting in a different respect. At the outset of the campaign of the Persian against Eretria, the Eretrians ask Athens for help. Nevertheless, Herodotus relates, the city was divided (VI 100): τῶν δὲ Ἐρετριέων ἦν ἄρα οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς βούλευμα, οἱ μετεπέμποντο μὲν Ἀθηναίους, ἐφρόνεον δὲ διφασίας ἰδέας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐβουλεύοντο ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἐς τὰ ἄκρα τῆς Εὐβοίης, ἄλλοι δὲ αὐτῶν ἴδια κέρδεα προσδεκόμενοι παρὰ τοῦ Πέρσεω οἴσεσθαι προσδοσίην ἐσκευάζοντο. *Yet, the counsel of the Eretrians was not healthy, for on the one hand they sent for help to Athens, on the other they had in mind two schemes: indeed, part of the citizens had decided to leave the city for the mountains of Euboeia, but others, thinking of the profit for themselves from the Persian prepared to carry out treason.* For a detailed description of how a word like ἰδέα, originally meaning ‘appearance’, ‘guise’ or ‘figure’, then also ‘type’, can come to mean ‘scheme’, see the discussion of Thucydides VI 77, 2 and at VIII 56, 2 in Section XIII of the chapter on εἶδος above. ἰδέα, at any rate, does here refer to what is in somebody’s mind; in the clause ἐφρόνεον δὲ διφασίας ἰδέας, ἰδέας is the direct object of a verb of thinking. It would, of course, be an anachronism and incorrect to translate ‘they had two ideas’; the clause rather means something like ‘they contemplated two ways of acting’; those two ways are then narrated.

## V.

ἰδέα is not a term frequently encountered in early Hippocratic treatises.<sup>288</sup> The one instance in *Airs, Waters, and Places* has already been discussed.<sup>289</sup> The other treatise to be considered is *The Nature of Man*. Close to the beginning of that work there is a

<sup>288</sup> For the selection of Hippocratic writings considered see Section VI of the chapter on εἶδος above; cf. also Appendix I below.

<sup>289</sup> See Section II above.

reference to Melissus; in thought and terminology there seem to be echoes of Anaxagoras; and as far as the subject matter set out in the opening paragraphs is concerned, there appears to be a reaction to Diogenes of Apollonia.<sup>290</sup> To all probability, therefore, this Hippocratic treatise is also later than most or all of what we have of Herodotus.

In Chapter I of *Nature of Man*, the author, who professes to write about medicine only, rejects the ideas of those writers on nature who claim that everything is one, and that that one thing is everything; the one thing they cannot agree on, though, is what that one thing is, air, fire, water or earth. They overthrow themselves with their arguments, and this ἑαυτὸν καταβάλλειν is here attributed to Melissus rather than Protagoras, perhaps because of Melissus' closer connection with the argument that everything is one.<sup>291</sup> In Chapter II, the author turns to the physicians, some of whom, he says, say that man is blood, others that he is bile, yet others that he is phlegm. And comparing these medical men with those writing on nature, he continues (II, 4): ἐπίλογον δὲ ποιέονται καὶ οὗτοι πάντες τὸν αὐτόν· ἐν γὰρ εἶναί φασιν, ὃ τι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν βούλεται ὀνομάσας, καὶ τοῦτο μεταλλάσσειν τὴν ἰδέην καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ἀναγκαζόμενον ὑπὸ τε τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ, καὶ γίνεσθαι γλυκὸν καὶ πικρὸν καὶ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ παντοῖον. ἔμοι δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα δοκεῖ ὧδε ἔχειν. ... . πολλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνεόντα, ἃ, ὅταν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων παρὰ φύσιν

<sup>290</sup> Compare in particular *Nature of Man* II with Diogenes 64B2 and 5; cf. e.g. G. Plamböck, *Dynamis im Corpus Hippocraticum*, Wiesbaden 1964, pp. 12 - 16, especially p. 14, n. 1: "Die Verwandtschaft mit Gedanken des Anaxagoras und des Diogenes von Apollonia ist natürlich auffällig genug, vgl. etwa Vors. 59B4, 8, 12, 15 und 64B5, ... ."; cf. also M.C. Stokes, loc. cit. (note 15 above) - Stokes' view that Diogenes is the first explicitly to name and posit one substance as underlying all fits well with the other features of *Nature of Man* reminiscent of the eclectic. For a brief recent survey on the date of *The Nature of Man* cf. also G. Rechenauer, *Thukydides und die hippokratische Medizin*, Hildesheim 1991, pp. 175 - 178, with whose views on the date of some of the other Hippocratic writings I do not necessarily agree; see also Appendix I below.

<sup>291</sup> I am inclined to disagree with the interpretations of the significance of the mention of Melissus at this point in the text offered by W.H.S. Jones, *Hippocrates* IV, Cambridge, Mass. 1931, p. 5, n. 1; and by J.-H. Kühn, *System- und Methodenprobleme im Corpus Hippocraticum*, Wiesbaden 1956, Ch. 3: 'Hypothese und Wissenschaftssystem von De Natura Hominis', p. 70.

θερμαίνεται τε καὶ ψύχεται, καὶ ξηραίνεται καὶ ὑγραίνεται, νούσους τίκτει· ὥστε πολλὰ μὲν ἰδέαι τῶν νοσημάτων, πολλή δὲ καὶ ἡ ἴησις ἐστίν. ἀξιῶ δὲ ἔγωγε τὸν φάσκοντα αἷμα εἶναι μόνον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἄλλο μηδὲν, δεικνύειν αὐτὸν μὴ μεταλλάσσοντα τὴν ἰδέην μηδὲ γίνεσθαι παντοῖον, ἀλλ' ἢ ὥρην τινὰ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἢ τῆς ἡλικίης τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ἧ αἷμα ἐνεὸν φαίνεται μόνον ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· εἰκὸς γὰρ εἶναι μίαν τινὰ ὥρην, ἐν ἧ φαίνεται αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεόν· ... . *But those as well all make the same postscript: indeed, they say there is one [viz. 'one thing'], whatever each one of them wants to call it, and this, they say, changes its appearance and its force, compelled by the warm and the cold, it becomes sweet and bitter and white and black and of all sorts. But to me, it does not seem to be so. ... . Indeed, there are many <things> in the body, which, when against nature they are warmed or cooled or dried or wetted by each other, engender diseases: so that there are many appearances of illnesses, but there is also many a healing. I ask the one who says that man is blood alone, and nothing else, to show me that he [viz. man] does not change his appearance and does not become of all sorts, but show me either a certain season of the year or a certain age of a man<'s life> when there seems to be only blood in a man: indeed it is plausible that there be one such season in which it appear as being in itself by itself.* And summarizing that part of his work, he declares in Chapter V (V, 5): φημί δὴ εἶναι καὶ φλέγμα καὶ χολὴν ξανθὴν τε καὶ μέλαιναν. καὶ τούτων πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ νόμον τὰ οὐνόματα διωρίσθαι φημί καὶ οὐδενὶ αὐτέων τούτῳ οὐνομα εἶναι, ἔπειτα κατὰ φύσιν τὰς ἰδέας κεχωρίσθαι, καὶ οὔτε τὸ φλέγμα οὐδὲν εἰκέναι τῷ αἵματι, οὔτε τὸ αἷμα τῇ χολῇ, οὔτε τὴν χολὴν τῷ φλέγματι. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἰκότα εἶη ταῦτα ἀλλήλοισιν, ὧν οὔτε τὰ χρώματα ὅμοια φαίνεται προσορώμενα, οὔτε τῇ χειρὶ ψάουοντι ὅμοια δοκέει εἶναι; οὔτε γὰρ θερμὰ ὁμοίως ἐστίν, οὔτε ψυχρὰ, οὔτε ξηρὰ, οὔτε ὑγρά. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, ὅτε τοσοῦτον διήλλακται

ἀλλήλων τὴν ἰδέην τε καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, μὴ ἐν αὐτὰ εἶναι, εἶπερ μὴ πῦρ τε καὶ ὕδωρ ἐν τε καὶ ταύτόν ἐστιν. γνοίης δ' ἂν τοῖσδε, ὅτι οὐχ ἐν ταῦτα πάντα ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον αὐτέων ἔχει δύναμιν τε καὶ φύσιν τὴν ἑωυτοῦ· ... . *Therefore I say that there also is phlegm and yellow and black bile. And of those I first claim that their names are defined by custom and that to none of them there is the same name [viz. as to another one of them], then that the appearances are separate by nature, and neither is phlegm in anything like to blood, nor blood to bile, nor bile to phlegm. Indeed, how should those <things> be like each other of which neither the colours appear similar to look at, nor do they seem to be like to the touching hand? Indeed, neither are they alike warm nor alike cold nor alike dry nor alike wet. Now surely there is a necessity, when they differ so much from each other in appearance and force, that they are not one, if really fire and water are not one and the same. So you may know with that, that those are not all one, but that each one of them has its own force and nature: ... .*

The first occurrence of ἰδέα in Chapter II refers indisputably to the appearance of whatever is posited as the one stuff of which man consists.<sup>292</sup> With the second occurrence in that chapter, πολλὰ ἰδέαι τῶν νοσημάτων, there is a good case for arguing in favour of *many types of diseases*; yet, since the actual appearances of the diseases are different, there is at least a possibility that the transition from one meaning to the other, from straightforward 'appearance' to 'type' in the sense defined in the preceding chapter, has as yet not taken place; not much rests on that for our purposes, but the qualifying indefinite πολλὰ may point to a meaning 'type'. In Chapter V, the author states that of the things which are in the body, not only the names are different by convention, but also κατὰ φύσιν τὰς ἰδέας κεχωρίσθαι; from the emphasis on lack of εἰκέναι or *being like* in the following clauses, it is clear that it is again the appearances of the things which are distinct: *that their appearances are separate by*

<sup>292</sup> For these two passages, and in particular for the meaning of ἰδέα and δύναμις therein, cf. G. Plamböck, loc. cit., whose interpretation of Chapters II and V I follow to a large extent.

*nature*. Then colour is named as an obvious element of appearance, warm, cold, dry and wet, what is sensed by the touching hand, as primary δυνάμεις or *forces*.

While the word ἰδέα, meaning ‘appearance’ and perhaps on one occasion ‘type’, is confined to those two places in the first half of the work, there are three occurrences of εἶδος towards the end. In Chapter IX, the author states that diseases must be cured with a treatment which is the opposite of their causes.<sup>293</sup> τὸ δὲ σύμπαν γνῶναι, δεῖ τὸν ἰητρὸν ἐναντίον ἴστασθαι τοῖσι καθεστέωσι καὶ νοσήμασι καὶ εἶδεσι καὶ ὥρησι καὶ ἡλικίησι, καὶ τὰ συντείνοντα λύειν, καὶ τὰ λελυμένα συντείνειν· ... . *But to know all, it is necessary that the physician positions himself opposite the prevailing diseases, types, seasons and ages, and must loosen what is tight and tighten what is loose: ...* . There seems to me a measure of rhetoric in this prescription: the disease is the general object of concern for the physician, to an extent independent of the patient; the patient’s appearance and type are what the physician sees himself with any given case, the time of year is again independent of and external to the patient, the age internal. The theory of treatment by opposite is consistent: one can loosen what is tight: but how does one treat a young person or a ruddy person on that principle? - A little later in the same chapter, it is repeated that for those diseases which depend on regimen, treatment should be preceded by examining τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν φύσιν τὴν τε ἡλικίην καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ὥρην τοῦ ἔτεος καὶ τῆς νούσου τὸν τρόπον, *a man’s nature and age and type and the time of year and the way of the disease*. Here the order of things to consider is different in that everything pertaining to the person is enumerated first. Age, season, type and disease, in that order, are mentioned again two lines later. Finally, in Chapter XV, the last section of the treatise, we learn: οἱ πλείστοι τῶν πυρετῶν γίνονται ἀπὸ χολῆς· εἶδεα δὲ σφέων ἐστὶ τέσσαρα, ... . *Most fevers come from bile: there are four types of them*. We then learn that those types are the continued, the quotidian, the tertian and the quartan.

<sup>293</sup> The abstract language is mine, not the author’s.

## VI.

In all, there are 14 instances of the word ἰδέα in Thucydides. The word appears in all the various senses discussed so far. It denotes ‘appearance’ or ‘figure’ on one occasion, ‘appearance’ potentially on another one. The context of VI 4, 5 is an excursus on the history and geography of Sicily. In fair detail, the foundations and affiliations of the various colonies are listed. Among others, we learn about the foundation of Zankle from Kyme, itself a Chalcidian town in Opikian territory; this settlement was later called Messene, but, we are told: ὄνομα δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον Ζάγκλη ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν Σικελῶν κληθεῖσα, ὅτι δρεπανοειδὲς τὴν ἰδέαν τὸ χωρίον ἐστὶ - τὸ δὲ δρέπανον οἱ Σικελοὶ ζάγκλον καλοῦσιν ... . *At first, the name was Zankle, <the city> being called so by the Sicilians, because as to its figure the place is like a sickle*<sup>294</sup> - *and the sickle the Sicilians call ‘zanklon’ ... . ἰδέα does refer to the ‘appearance’ of the land, but more specifically to its ‘figure’.*

ἰδέα in that transitional stage in meaning between ‘appearance’ and ‘type’ can be seen at II 51,1. At the end of his description of the epidemic which befell Athens in the summer of 430, a description in the style of professional medical treatises of his time, Thucydides has this concluding sentence<sup>295</sup>: τὸ μὲν οὖν νόσημα, πολλὰ καὶ

<sup>294</sup> For adjectives in -ειδης and their meaning, cf. Section II of the chapter on εἶδος above.

<sup>295</sup> Cf. the discussion of εἶδος in the preceding passage in Thucydides in Section XI of the chapter on εἶδος above: “By II 50, 1, Thucydides has given a detailed account of the way the epidemic of 430 B.C. affected people, giving both the symptoms of the disease and in particular the order in which they occurred. Those who survived an attack did so only with loss of limbs or of eye-sight or of memory. He continues: γενόμενον γὰρ κρεῖσσον λόγου τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου, τὰ τε ἄλλα χαλεπωτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπεῖαν φύσιν προσέπιπτεν ἐκάστῳ καὶ ἐν τῷδε ἐδήλωσε μάλιστα ἄλλο τι ὄν ἢ τῶν ξυντρόφων τι ... . *Indeed, the way of the disease having become greater than could be said, it also otherwise befell everybody harder than is fit for human nature, but in the following <respect> it was most clear that it was something other than any of the indigenous <diseases>: ... .* [...] The εἶδος of the disease is here on the one hand the ‘way’ it took, on the other hand its ‘appearance’ in the sense of its manifestation in the various symptoms so vividly and visually described by Thucydides in the preceding paragraphs. [...] It would perhaps not be absolutely incorrect to translate τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου as *the type of the disease*; one would have to bear in mind, though, that ‘type’ on the whole is a much more abstract term in English than εἶδος is here.”

ἄλλα παραλιπόντι ἀτοπίας, ὡς ἐκάστῳ ἐτύγχανέ τι διαφερόντως ἐτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον γιγνόμενον, τοιοῦτον ἦν ἐπὶ πάν τὴν ἰδέαν. *Now - leaving out a number of peculiarities as would befall any one person in a way different from any other - such was the disease on the whole with regard to its appearance.* With ἰδέα, Thucydides refers to the totality of the appearance or appearances the disease had with all the people it had befallen; that does involve appearance over time, but most of all ἰδέα refers to the appearance of the disease collectively. This collective use of ἰδέα may be seen as an intermediate stage between ‘appearance (of a single object)’ and ‘type’, since it does contain, at least implicitly, an abstraction from the particular instance whose appearance can be observed as such.

To be considered next is a number of passages where ἰδέα means ‘type’, either as ‘type (of an event)’ or as ‘type (of an action)’. On five occasions, the word is part of a phrase *πάσα ἰδέα κατέστη / πολλαὶ ἰδέαι κατέστησαν* (with genitive), *every type / many types* (of something) *obtained*. Not found in that constellation before Thucydides, it seems to be a standing phrase with him. Its first occurrence is at I 109, 2.<sup>296</sup> There,

<sup>296</sup> It will suffice to give that one example. It is discussed, and the others are listed, by S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides I*, Oxford 1991, note on Thucydides I 109, 1, whose note I quote in full, since on the one hand he gives an accurate summary and apt criticism of previous views on the matter (G. Rechenauer, *Thukydides und die hippokratische Medizin*, Hildesheim 1991, was published simultaneously but does not discuss the word ἰδέα or its uses at all), on the other hand he serves as a good backdrop against which my sketchy discussion may be read; Hornblower writes (p. 172ff.):

“πολλαὶ ἰδέαι πολέμων κατέστησαν: ‘they experienced the many different forms and fortunes of war’. As the scholiast noted, both notions (forms, fortunes) are probably conveyed by ἰδέαι, lit. ‘kinds’. Phrases like this one, often expressed in the words *πάσα ἰδέα κατέστη*, ‘there was every form of ...’, are frequent in Th., esp. with words meaning death (θανάτου, ὀλέθρου). Cp. iii. 81. 5, 83. 1, 98. 3; vii. 29.5; also ii. 19. 1. Th.’s fondness for the locution has not interested commentators, though Classen/Steup do give parallels. It has been studied by K. Weidauer, *Thukydides und die hippokratischen Schriften* (Heidelberg, 1953), 26f. As he says, the Hippocratic corpus of medical writings uses ἰδέα with the genitive to differentiate particular instances of a general phenomenon, e.g. four kinds of fluid (blood, bile, etc.): *τέσσαρες ἰδέαι χόλου*, *On Diseases*, iv. 32. Cp. ‘all the discharges of bile’ to which doctors have given names, *ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς πάσαι*, at Th. ii. 49. 3 (though this is really a way of disclaiming excessive technicality; cp. *Thucydides*, 97, 134). Note also ii. 51. 1, in the description of the plague, where we have *ἐπὶ πάν τὴν ἰδέαν*, ‘in all its forms’, used of the plague itself. These Hippocratic usages are discussed in C.M. Gillespie, ‘The Use of Εἶδος and Ἰδέα in Hippocrates’, *CQ* 6 (1912), 179ff., a sensible reply to some needlessly

Thucydides describes the situation of the Athenian contingent in Egypt towards the end of the Egyptian Expedition of 454: οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ Αἰγύπτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπέμενον, καὶ αὐτοῖς πολλαὶ ἰδέαι πολέμων κατέστησαν. *But in Egypt there remained Athenians and allied troops, and for them many types of warfare obtained.* It is to be noted that the verb κατέστησαν is employed like (if not as) an auxiliary, with the same construction otherwise used with εἶναι, viz. verb plus nominative of the thing 'had' plus *dativus commodi* of the person / people 'having'. The noun in the genitive, πολέμων, is here in the plural, indicative of the early, pre-rationalised stage of semantic development. What was experienced were many different situations of the sort one experiences in war, and that plurality is expressed - in what

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complicated pages of A.E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, I (Oxford, 1911). (Note Gillespie, 202. 'in Thucydides, πᾶσα ἰδέα has become so much a formula that it does not matter whether we translate *form, mode* or *kind*'.) Taylor is, however, useful for his collection of all (but see below) relevant passages in Th. and other relevant fifth-century authors. He points out that Th. uses κατέστη only with ἰδέα, not with the closely related word εἶδος. Of κατέστη Taylor claims (189) that it is 'itself a word of medicine' and concludes (190) that 'the repeated conjunction πᾶσα ἰδέα τινος κατέστη points to a borrowing by Thucydides from the language of medicine'. Taylor gives no authority for the claim about κατέστη (nor does Weidauer, quoting Taylor), nor does it seem to be particularly 'medical' (the treatises sometimes use the verb in the special sense 'recover', but that is not relevant here). Perhaps Taylor is thinking of the undoubtedly medical connotations of the related noun κατάστασις, 'constitution' (three instances in one Hippocratic paragraph at *Epidemics*, iii. xvi (Loeb Hippocrates, I. 256)). Even if κατέστη could be shown to be frequent in the Hippocratic writings, it is too common and favourite in Th., as are the other parts of the verb from which it comes, for this to mean much (there are over five pages on καθιστάναι in Bétant's *Lexicon Thucydideum*). Equally, ἰδέα is clearly not a *recherché* word, though it was perhaps a fashionable one: see below (it is relevant that Hdt. anticipates Th.'s use of ἰδέα, vi. 119. 2: τριφασίας ἰδέας).

Weidauer (above), discussing ἰδέα and κατέστη, says that Th. and the Hippocratics use some of the same language not because of any borrowing but because they are both fond of tracing divergent phenomena. One can perhaps go a little further than this (though less far than Taylor wanted): if Th.'s language in the present passage sounds semi-technical, or rather - given that the context is warfare, not death or disease - a little pretentious, that is perhaps because such terms as he uses were the small change of philosophical or rhetorical discussion. Cp. Demokritos, DK 68 B 11, 'there are two kinds, ἰδέαι, of knowledge, γνώμη, one genuine, the other bastard [or 'obscure']'. (I do not know why Taylor's section on sophists and Presocratics omits this interesting passage, which is quoted by Sextus Empiricus); and the Hdt. passage cited above. See above, 1. 1n. on ἀξιολογώτατον for the indebtedness of both Th. and the doctors to the language and methods of rhetorical debate.

But what of Th.'s fondness for the *whole phrase* πᾶσα ἰδέα κατέστη or the similar phrase found here, πολλαὶ ἰδέαι κατέστησαν? This seems, despite Taylor, to be an idiosyncrasy of his own." (sic!)

could be called a *constructio ad sensum* of a sort common, at a colloquial level, with words denoting ‘type’ or ‘sort’ or ‘kind’ in many a language - through use of the plural of both the noun denoting ‘type’ and the noun typified; a purely logical construction would demand the singular for the latter. On the four occasions later on in his account, the phrase has - disregarding the tense of the verb - the form *πάσα ἰδέα κατέστη*, so that the question does not arise.

A closely related use of *ἰδέα* is found at III 112, 7. The phrase *πάσα ἰδέα κατέστη* just discussed is employed with nouns like *θανάτου*, *of death*, *ὀλέθρου*, *of disaster*, and, on one occasion (III 98, 3), *πάσα τε ἰδέα κατέστη τῆς φύγης καὶ τοῦ ὀλέθρου τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων*, *there was every type of flight and disaster for the army of the Athenians*. Shortly afterwards, and still as part of the description of events of 426, the sixth year of the war, that is to say, to all probability written at more or less the same time, we read of the defeated forces of the Amprakioti (III 112, 6): *προκατειλημμένων δὲ τῶν ὁδῶν, καὶ ἅμα τῶν μὲν Ἀμφιλόχων ἔμπειρων ὄντων τῆς ἑαυτῶν γῆς καὶ ψιλῶν πρὸς ὀπλίτας, τῶν δὲ ἀπείρων καὶ ἀνεπιστημόνων ὄπη τράπωνται, ἐσπίπτοντες ἔς τε χαράδρας καὶ τὰς προλελοχισμένας ἐνέδρας διεφθείροντο. καὶ ἔς πάσαν ἰδέαν χωρήσαντες τῆς φυγῆς ἐτράποντό τινες καὶ ἔς τὴν θάλασσαν οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχουσαν, ...* . *With the roads taken in advance and, at the same time, the Amphilocheians being acquainted with their own land and fighting in light armour against hoplites, but them (= the Amprakioti) being unacquainted and not knowing whither they should turn, they perished, falling into gullies and prepared ambushes. And giving way to any type of flight some even turned to the sea which lay not far off.* The phrase *ἔς πάσαν ἰδέαν χωρήσαντες τῆς φυγῆς*<sup>297</sup> should, to my mind, not be looked at in isolation, even if one were to agree that *ἔς πάσαν ἰδέαν τῆς φυγῆς* depends solely on *χωρήσαντες* and not

<sup>297</sup> Hornblower, *op. cit.*, ad loc., translates: “They tried every means of escape.”

somehow also on ἐτράποντο. Behind the phrase there are common expressions like ἐς φύγην τρέπεσθαι, *turn to flight*;<sup>298</sup> a hypothetical and, I think, plausible line of development moves from ‘turn/rush/give way to flight’ to ‘turn/rush/give way to any type of flight’; from there it is but a short step to isolating the phrase ‘turn to any type of’; that may be at the origin of the phrase ἐπὶ ἄλλο / τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος τρέπεσθαι.<sup>299</sup> There is, of course, the alternative possibility that a collocation of the noun εἶδος and the verb τρέπεσθαι arose from the closeness in meaning of the noun εἶδος in the sense of ‘way, manner’ and the noun τρόπος.

Returning to Thucydides’ use of ἰδέα, the word can be translated as ‘way’ or ‘ways’ on four occasions,<sup>300</sup> including III 62, 2, where the Thebans accuse the Plataeans of ‘atticizing’, demonstrating that they have behaved like that on one occasion, namely when they alone of all the Boeotians did not medize solely because the Athenians did not - while the Thebans did - ... τῇ μέντοι αὐτῇ ἰδέα ὕστερον ἰόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας μόνους αὖ Βοιωτῶν ἀττικίσαι. καίτοι σκέψασθε ἐν οἴῳ εἶδει ἑκάτεροι ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἔπραξαν. ... *in the same way, though, they later atticised again alone of all Boeotians when the Athenians went against the Greeks. Yet look in what way each of us did that.* And there follows the distinction of acting voluntarily and acting against one’s will forced by circumstances. - Seeing Thucydides as guided by the principle of *variatio* seems preferable to attempting to detect differences in connotations between ἰδέα and εἶδος here.

<sup>298</sup> Cf. ἐς φύγην ἐτράποντο Herodotus VIII 89; cf. τραπόμενοι ἔφευγον Thucydides III 98, 1; cf. also the immediately preceding paragraph in Thucydides, III 112, 5: οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ κατὰ ρὰ ὄρη ἐς φύγην ὄρμησαν, *the rest rushed to flight in the mountains.*

<sup>299</sup> At Thucydides VI 77, 2 and VIII 56, 2, and at Aristophanes, *Plutus* 316f. Cf. Section XI of the chapter on εἶδος above.

<sup>300</sup> For III 62, cf. the discussion in Section XI of the chapter on εἶδος above. IV 55, 2 παρὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν σφῶν ἰδέαν τῆς παρασκευῆς - *against their accustomed way of fighting.* VI 76, 3 τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ ἰδέα ἐκεῖνά τε ἔσχον καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νῦν πειρῶνται - *in the same way they got hold of those, they now also try here;* note the use of the phrase ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος τρεπομένους ὥστε in VI 77, 2 - another case of variation as with III 62? VII 82, 1 ταύτη τῇ ἰδέα - *in that way;* the phrase refers to a way of acting described in the preceding clauses.

In the two remaining passages to be considered, ἰδέα seems to mean something like ‘a way of acting’ or ‘scheme’ in more or less the same way εἶδος does at VI 77, 2, VIII 56, 2 and VIII 90, 1, and at Aristophanes’ *Plutus* 317.<sup>301</sup> At II 19, 1, Thucydides describes the devastation of Attica at the hands of the Peloponnesian forces. Before destroying the crops, they tried to take the garrison Oinoe: ἐπειδὴ μέντοι προσβαλόντες τῇ Οἰνῳ καὶ πᾶσαν ἰδέαν πειράσαντες οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἐλεῖν, ... , ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν. *But when in attacking Oinoe and trying every scheme they were not able to take it, ... , they invaded Attica.* πᾶσα ἰδέα is either ‘every way’, namely of προσβαλεῖν, of *attacking*, or it is - in absolute use of the phrase - ‘scheme’, that is to say ‘device’, ‘plan’, ‘way of action’ as such, without reference to the preceding phrase.

The second context of ἰδέα in the sense of scheme is very similar indeed. The Peloponnesians are attacking Plataea; their efforts fail and they think of encircling the whole city with a wall (II 77, 2): πρότερον δὲ πυρὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς πειρᾶσαι εἰ δύναιτο πνεύματος γενομένου ἐπιφλέξαι τὴν πόλιν οὖσαν οὐ μεγάλην· πᾶσαν γὰρ δὴ ἰδέαν ἐπενόουν, εἴ πως σφίσιιν ἄνευ δαπάνης καὶ πολιορκίας προσαχθείη. *But before <resorting to> that, it seemed to them <good> to try it with fire, if, with a breeze setting in, they could set alight the city, which was not a big one: indeed, they thus thought of every scheme - if only the city could be taken by them without expenditure and siege.* In both cases, the attacking forces try in every way to take the place they attack. A shift in meaning, if there is a shift, is effected by the fact that the action under consideration is not actually carried out and completed but attempted and thought of only. A ‘way of acting’ which has its existence only in somebody’s mind is a ‘scheme’ or ‘plan’. If a Greek native speaker would have perceived that application as semantic extension cannot be answered with confidence.

<sup>301</sup> For a discussion of these passages cf. Section XII of the chapter on εἶδος above.

## VII.

With Aristophanes, the word ἰδέα has the same semantic range as with Thucydides.<sup>302</sup> Besides denoting ‘appearance’ and ‘figure’, it can also mean ‘type’, as at *Frogs* 383f., an ‘exhortation to invoke Demeter’<sup>303</sup>, preceding the actual hymn to the goddess by the chorus: ἄγε νυν ἑτέραν ὕμνων ἰδέαν τὴν καρποφόρον βασίλειαν, | Δήμητρα θεάν, ἐπικοσμοῦντες ζαθέαις μολπαῖς κελαδεῖτε. *Come now, exalting the fruit-bearing queen, the goddess Demeter, sound another type of hymn with reverend dancing-songs.*

ἰδέα means ‘type’ once, and once ‘figure’, at *Birds* 992 - 1003, where a pun may be intended: Meton: ἦκω παρ’ ὑμᾶς - Pisthetairos: ἕτερον αὖ τουτί κακόν. | τί δαί σὺ δράσων; τίς ἰδέα βουλευμάτος; | τίς ἠπίνοια, τίς ὁ κόθορνος τῆς ὁδοῦ; | M: γεωμετρῆσαι βούλομαι τὸν ἀέρα | ὑμῖν, διελεῖν τε κατὰ γῦας. P: πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, | σὺ δ’ εἰ τίς ἀνδρῶν; M: ὅστις εἰμ’ ἐγώ; Μέτων, | ὃν οἶδεν Ἑλλάς χῶ Κολωνός. P: εἶπε μοι, | ταυτί δέ σοι τί ἐστι; | M: κανόνες ἀέρος. | αὐτίκα γὰρ ἀήρ ἐστι τὴν ἰδέαν ὅλος | κατὰ πνιγέα μάλιστα. προσθεῖς οὖν ἐγὼ | τὸν κανόν’ ἄνωθεν τουτονὶ τὸν καμπύλον, | ἐνθεῖς διαβήτην - μανθάνεις; P: οὐ μανθάνω. M: *I come to you* - P: *This is yet another evil. So, what are you doing? What type of plan? What is the thought? What is the buskin of your way?* M: *I mean to measure the air for you, dividing according to land-measures.* P: *By the gods. And who of all men are you?* M: *Who I am? Meton, whom all Hellas knows and Colonus.* P: *Tell me, what is it you have there?* M: *Measures of the air. First, indeed, air as to its figure is as a whole most like an baking-oven. Now, attaching from above this curved measure, I, setting in this compass - do you understand?* P: *I don’t understand.* There cannot be any doubt that in this quick stichomythic, and sometimes

<sup>302</sup> For Aristophanes *Plutus* 557 - 561 (‘appearance’) and *Clouds* 288ff. (‘figure’), cf. Sections I and II above.

<sup>303</sup> K. Dover, *Aristophanes. Frogs*, Oxford 1993, commentary ad. loc.

even semi-stichomythic exchange, repetition of ἰδέα would have been intentional, and noted as such by the audience. It is more difficult to say what significance that repetition had, and in particular if there was an implied joke relying on two different senses of the word.

A 'way' of doing something is denoted by ἰδέα at *Thesmophoriazusae* 434 - 439, where the chorus of women praises Mikka, the woman who has just finished her speech: οὐπω ταύτης ἤκουσα | πολυπλοκωτέρας γυναικὸς | οὐδὲ δεινότερον λεγούσης. | πάντα γὰρ λέγει δίκαια· | πάσας δ' ἰδέας ἐξήτασεν, | πάντα δ' ἐβάστασε φρενὶ πυκνῶς τε | ποικίλους λόγους ἀνηῦρεν | εὖ διεζητημένους. *Not ever have I heard a woman more versatile or more able to speak than that one. Indeed, everything she says is right: she has tried out all figures and ways <of speaking>, and she has put to proof everything in her mind and shrewdly found out varied expressions, well searched out.* It seems as if ἰδέα, used in a rhetorical context, but by laymen, could either just denote the various ways of speaking open to the orator, a usage which need not presuppose any specialisation in vocabulary, or conversely ἰδέα could be a semi-technical term of rhetoric theory, a rhetorical 'figure', as it will be in the fourth century. However that may be, the word comes in naturally, and the uncertainty as to whether technical usage is intended or not is in itself indicative of how technical terminology proper could naturally arise from common usage.

A slightly more complicated context is that of *Clouds* 545ff. In this part of the *parabasis*, the chorus as the poet's mouthpiece mildly scold the audience for not awarding the first version of the *Clouds* first prize despite his innovative and inventive way of writing. He does not bother the audience with vulgar common-place jokes, and he does not reproduce over and over again a joke which was successful once: κἀγὼ μὲν τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ ὦν ποιητὴς οὐ κομῶ, | οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ζητῶ ἔξαπατᾶν δις καὶ τρίς ταῦτ' εἰσάγων, | ἀλλ' αἰεὶ καινὰς ἰδέας εἰσφέρων σοφίζομαι | οὐδὲν ἀλλήλαισιν ὁμοίας καὶ πάσας δεξιᾶς· ... . *And*

*being such a poet, I nevertheless don't think too highly of myself, nor do I try to deceive you by producing the same things twice and thrice, but I, always introducing new schemes, devise them in nothing similar to each other and all alike clever.* There are, I think, two possible ways of reading this passage. Alternatively to the translation just given, one could take *καινὰς ἰδέας* as referring to what Aristophanes provides in the lines immediately following, namely an assembly of personages he introduced and treated or mistreated, but only until his purpose was served, not *ad nauseam* as his colleagues. The named individuals Aristophanes then enumerates can be regarded as the 'new figures' he introduces on stage. In favour, however, of the translation proposed above, adhering to the traditional way of interpreting this passage, one could adduce the first fragment of Eupolis' *Autolykos*, in which one character accuses the other: *ἐπὶ καινοτέρας ἰδέας ἀσεβῶν βίον, ὦ μοχθηρός, ἔτριβες. Worthless one, being impious, you wasted your life on newish schemes.* Here *καινότερος*, rather *new*, means 'new and therefore bad', as does *νεώτερος* elsewhere; nevertheless, although this connotation is clearly absent from Aristophanes, it is not impossible that *καιναὶ ἰδέαι*, *new schemes*, was something like a standing phrase, with positive or negative overtones according to context.<sup>304</sup>

### VIII.

*ἰδέα* in early Plato is as rare a word as it is in the fifth century authors discussed so far. There are two dialogues in which the word is used in an aristocratic context with reference to the figure of a beautiful youth. The three occurrences in the *Charmides* may be counted as one, as it is in a recurring context that first Critias and then Socrates refer to Charmides' *ἰδέα* or *figure*. At the beginning of the conversation, Critias is full of praise for his nephew and assures Socrates (157d1): *λέγω μέντοι σοι ὅτι*

<sup>304</sup> In fifth century oratory the word *ἰδέα* is very rare. On the two occasions it occurs it denotes a human being's figure, without any connotations of beauty (Andocides, *On the Mysteries* 100, 5; Lysias II 4, 8).

Χαρμίδης τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν οὐ μόνον τῇ ἰδέᾳ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ, οὗ σὺ φῆς τὴν ἐπωδὴν ἔχειν· φῆς δὲ σωφροσύνης· ἦ γάρ; *For sure, I tell you that Charmides appears to differ from the youths of his age not only in his figure, but also in that very thing of which you say you have an incantation: and you mean temperance, don't you?* As at its earliest occurrence, ἰδέα or *figure* is in some way contrasted with qualities of the mind. Taking up this praise by an uncle for his nephew, Socrates begins a conversation with the youth by praising his descent and states (158a7): ... τὰ μὲν οὖν ὁρώμενα τῆς ἰδέας, ὦ φίλε παῖ Γλαύκωνος, δοκεῖς μοι οὐδένα τῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἐν οὐδενὶ ὑποβεβηκέναι· εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα κατὰ τὸν τοῦδε λόγον ἱκανῶς πέφυκας, μακάριόν σε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Χαρμίδη, ἡ μήτηρ ἔτικτεν. *As far as what is visible of your figure is concerned, dear son of Glaucon, you seem to me not to lag behind any of your forbears in anything: thus, if, as this man says, you are also naturally fit as regards temperance and the other things <mentioned>, I said, your mother has born you a lucky man.* Both reference and context are virtually identical. - Finally, at a point in their discussion when Socrates' arguments and concerns have produced an *aporia*, he scolds Charmides (175d6): ... ὑπὲρ δὲ σοῦ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, πάνυ ἀγανακτῶ, εἰ σὺ τοιοῦτος ὦν τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ τὴν ψυχὴν σωφρονέστατος, μηδὲν ὀνήσῃ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σωφροσύνης ... . ... *but on your behalf, I said, I am rather annoyed, Charmides, that you, being such <as you are> as to figure and in addition to that very temperate as to your soul, should not benefit at all from that temperance ... .*

The context in the *Protagoras* is less elaborate, but otherwise similar. In describing the scene they encountered when they entered the house of the rich Callias, Socrates says while talking about those gathered around Prodicus (*Protagoras* 315d7): παρεκάθηγτο δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ ταῖς πλησίον κλίμαις Πausανίας τε ὁ ἐκ Κεραμέων καὶ μετὰ Πausανίου νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον, ὡς μὲν

ἐγῶμαι καλόν τε κάγαθόν τήν φύσιν, τήν δ' οὖν ἰδέαν πάνυ καλός.  
*By him, there sat on nearby benches Pausanias from Kerameus, and with Pausanias a young man, still a youth, as I think noble and good as to his nature, but certainly very beautiful as to his figure.* Without entering into a discussion if ἰδέα in these four instances is supposed to refer to the 'figure' of the two youths or to their 'appearance' in general, Plato employs ἰδέα in his early dialogues to bestow 'heroic praise' in aristocratic circles; the term refers to the external, visible figure as opposed to the mind or nature of the young men described.

## IX.

At the end of the discussion of Thucydides' use of εἶδος it was stated that<sup>305</sup>, with Thucydides, εἶδος is fairly consistently applied to actions, often qualified as 'this' or 'that' or 'another'; it seems to denote a 'type of action', a 'way (of acting)', and then a 'scheme' or 'way or type of action or acting'; that this usage may be colloquial Attic is confirmed by Aristophanes. It could be shown that this development is a natural extension of application of εἶδος to an action instead of to a thing, facilitated by use of the word as denoting 'type' in addition to appearance. That can now be supplemented and modified. We have seen that, with Herodotus, the word ἰδέα has a range of meanings and applications, beginning with what was, to all probability, the original meaning and application, the 'appearance' and 'guise', with the connotations of 'figure', of a person; that the noun was then applied to animals, probably again with connotations of 'figure'; that there is an extension from that to 'type', applied to animals and plants. In a different direction, there is the same extension as with Democritus: a certain particular object or thing or entity can be referred to as an ἰδέα. Lastly, there is an instance of ἰδέα referring to a 'way of acting' or 'way of action', where ἰδέα could be translated as

<sup>305</sup> Section XII of the chapter on εἶδος above.

'scheme', since the way of action is presented as envisaged, as being present only in the mind as yet.

A remarkable aspect of this usage is that if one assumes that Herodotus had written at least part of his account by the mid-forties, a number of semantic extensions which ἰδέα apparently shares with εἶδος seem to have taken place with ἰδέα first; and that at a time of which it is doubtful and uncertain which of the medical treatises on which Thucydides is sometimes said to depend in his style had yet been composed. It is, of course, possible that the Ionian Herodotus of Halicarnassus was familiar with the parlance of the medical men from the neighbouring island of Cos, in which case this must serve as a warning not to rely too heavily on what has by chance survived; it is, however, likewise possible that the semantic extensions 'type', 'way of acting' and 'scheme', as a sense of εἶδος at least also found with Aristophanes<sup>306</sup>, was common fifth century Greek rather than specialized vocabulary of one particular profession.<sup>307</sup> That, of course, has serious consequences for an evaluation of the semantic development of εἶδος. While both the actual respective meanings and the reasoning behind the development can be retained as valid, the arguments which have been outlined above for underlying any one particular development should be transferred to the corresponding instances of ἰδέα. In the semantic development of εἶδος, a preceding parallel development of ἰδέα will have played a rôle. Since there is an original semantic overlap between the two Greek words, there is always the possibility that subsequent extensions of connotations and in application of one of the two terms will be transferred to the other.

If a conclusion can be drawn from the one definitely early medical treatise in which ἰδέα and εἶδος co-occur, *The Nature of Man*,<sup>308</sup> it is perhaps the following: both

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<sup>306</sup> See Section VII above.

<sup>307</sup> If Herodotus VI 119 can really be taken as evidence for ἰδέα as 'appearance' or 'figure' in the sense of 'a certain thing' must, I fear, be left undecided; the sentence is, to my mind, not sufficiently clear and unambiguous.

<sup>308</sup> See Section V above.

Greek nouns can mean both ‘appearance’ and ‘type’. The author speaks of *πολλὰ ἰδέαι νοσημάτων*, *many types of diseases*, and of *τέσσαρα εἶδεα πυρετῶν*, *four types of fevers*. However, as we have seen, the ἰδέαι in Chapter II may refer more closely to visible manifestations.<sup>309</sup> Otherwise, the author uses ἰδέα when he talks about what we would call physics and chemistry, when he discusses pre-Socratic philosophical theories and their application to medicine. He employs εἶδος when he talks about the appearance of a person or the type of person the physician is dealing with. It is conceivable that this is not so by accident. It is possible that there was a large semantic overlap between εἶδος and ἰδέα, but that the latter word was more closely associated with physical theory.<sup>310</sup>

<sup>309</sup> Cf. Plamböck, *op. cit.*, p. 15, n. 1.

<sup>310</sup> Note that on the one surviving occasion Democritus distinguishes between two types of something, 68B11, he uses the word ἰδέα. - Just as the author of *The Nature of Man* uses ἰδέα for ‘type’ in that section of his work in which he otherwise discusses things and their ἰδέα, but uses εἶδος for ‘type’ in that section in which he otherwise discusses the εἶδος of something; i.e., on the assumption that both εἶδος and ἰδέα could be synonyms when they meant ‘type’, the author’s choice of one or the other may have been determined simply and solely by earlier use in the same work or section of a work of either noun in any of its senses; if an author happened to have used the word ἰδέα with any of its senses, and then had to use a word for ‘type’, he would use ἰδέα rather than εἶδος; that, however is a subjective impression rather than anything I should like to attempt to prove.

## PART III

**PHAEDO 100b - 105e**

## I.

Many of the claims generally made concerning the ontology of Plato's middle dialogues are based on the report of Socrates' last hours by Phaedo of Elis, a report Plato makes Phaedo give to Echeocrates and his friends at the town of Phlius in the Peloponnese. By the end of the first ten lines of page 100 of the *Phaedo*, a dialogue that occupies pages 57 to 118 of Volume I of Stephanus' edition, Socrates, who saw fit to relate some of the thoughts and attitudes he had held in his earlier years, has described how, as part of a general interest in natural phenomena, he had come across a book by Anaxagoras; in that book, Anaxagoras had submitted that mind, ordering the world, is the cause and reason (αἴτιος, αἰτία) of things' being as they are (97c); Socrates was attracted by that proposition as he hoped therewith to see how everything was ordered for the best, thinking *that he would no longer yearn for another type of cause and reason, ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος* (98a2); but he was dissatisfied when he discovered how Anaxagoras *adduced as causes and reasons airs and aethers and waters and many other such unlikely things, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα* (98c1). Socrates proceeds by making a distinction between 'cause and reason' and 'that without which a cause and reason could not be cause and reason' (99b), and then declares that because he could not find that 'cause and reason' which would have provided an explanation in terms of what is good and best, *it therefore seemed to him to be necessary to escape into the λόγοι and to search and look in them for the truth of the things that are, ἔδοξε δὴ μοι*

χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφύγοντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν (99e4). As is explained in the following lines, these λόγοι are arguments which proceed from the strongest, that is to say most accepted and plausible, assumption, and which are in agreement with each other. Socrates expresses his concern that what he has said is perhaps not quite clear to Cebes and the others, and when Cebes agrees, he clarifies:

<sup>100b1</sup> ἀλλ', ἦ δ' ὅς, ὧδε λέγω, οὐδὲν καινόν, ἀλλ' ἄπερ αἰεὶ τε ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα· ἂ εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν ὡς ἀθάνατον ἢ ψυχὴν.

° ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὡς δίδόντος σοι οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαίνων.

σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη, τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνοις ἐάν σοι συνδοκῆ ὥσπερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γὰρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐδὲ δι' ἐν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῆ τοιᾶδε αἰτία συγχωρεῖς;

συνχωρῶ, ἔφη.

οὐ τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔτι μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας γινώσκειν· ἀλλ' ἐάν τις μοι λέγη <sup>d</sup> δι' ὅτι καλὸν ἐστιν ὅτιοῦν, ἢ χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῶ, - ταραττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι - τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω

παρ' ἑμαυτῶ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὄπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσαγορευομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῶ καλῶ πάντα τὰ καλὰ καλά. τοῦτο γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέςτατον εἶναι καὶ ἑμαυτῶ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ τούτου ἐχόμενος ἠγοῦμαι οὐκ ἂν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλές εἶναι καὶ ἔμοι καὶ ὄτωρ οὐν ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι τῶ καλῶ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά· ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ;

δοκεῖ.

καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζω μείζω, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω;

ναί.

...

<sup>101b10</sup> τί δέ; ἐνὶ ἐνὸς προσθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι ° τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῶν ὅτι οὐκ οἴσθα ἄλλως πως ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου οὐ ἂν μετάσχη, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν, καὶ δεῖν τούτου μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν μέλλῃ ἐν ἔσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐφῆς ἂν χαίρειν, παρὲς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις· ...

...

<sup>102a2</sup> ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὃ τε Σιμμίας ἅμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ νῆ Δία, ὦ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε· θαυμαστῶς γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς ἐναργῶς τῶ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντι εἰπεῖν ἐκείνος ταῦτα.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἔδοξεν.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀποῦσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη, <sup>b</sup> καὶ ὠμολογεῖτο εἶναι τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τᾶλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἠρώτα·

εἰ δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτα οὕτως λέγεις, ἄρ' οὐχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῆς μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τότε εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἀμφοτέρα, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα;

ἔγωγε.

ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ <sup>c</sup> ἀληθὲς ἔχειν; οὐ γὰρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ, τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων· οὐδ' αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος;

ἀληθῆ.

...

<sup>102d5</sup> λέγω δὴ τοῦδ' ἔνεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτε ἑθέλειν ἅμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ' ἑθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυοῖν τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν <sup>c</sup> ὅταν αὐτῷ προσίῃ τὸ ἐνάντιον, τὸ σμικρὸν, ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξιόμενον τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἑθέλειν εἶναι ἕτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν.

ὥσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὦν ὅσπερ εἰμί, οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρὸς εἰμι· ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τετόλμηκεν μέγα ὄν σμικρὸν εἶναι· ὡς δ' αὐτῶς καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, ἔτι ὄν ὅπερ ἦν, ἅμα <sup>103a</sup> τοῦναντίον γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἦτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι.

[Somebody objects that it had previously been said that opposites come out of opposites. Socrates replies that there is a difference in context.]

<sup>103b2</sup> τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐνάντιον πρᾶγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δέ, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐνάντιον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὦ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ὧν ἐνότων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα· ὁ αὐτὰ δ' ἐκεῖνα οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ φάμεν ἐθελῆσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι. ...

...

<sup>103e2</sup> ἔστιν ἄρα, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἕνια τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν αἰεὶ, ὅτανπερ ἦ. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τῷδε ἴσως ἔσται σαφέστερον ὃ λέγω· τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν αἰεὶ που δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν ὅπερ νῦν λέγομεν· ἢ οὔ;

πάνυ γε.

ἄρα μόνον τῶν ὄντων - τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ - ἢ καὶ ἄλλο <sup>104a</sup> τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐχ ὅπερ τὸ περιττὸν, ὅμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν αἰεὶ διὰ τὸ οὔτω πεφυκέναι ὥστε τοῦ περιττοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οἶον καὶ ἢ

τριάς πέπονθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος. ἄρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὐτῆς ὀνόματι ἀεὶ προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περιττοῦ, ὄντος οὐχ ὅπερ τῆς τριάδος; ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτω πως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριάς καὶ ἡ πεμπτάς καὶ ὁ ἡμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ<sup>β</sup> ἅπας, ὥστε οὐκ ὦν ὅπερ τὸ περιττὸν ἀεὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστι περιττός· καὶ αὖ τὰ δύο καὶ τέτταρα καὶ ἅπας ὁ ἕτερος αὖ στίχος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὦν ὅπερ τὸ ἄρτιον ὅμως ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἄρτιός ἐστιν ἀεὶ. συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὐ;

πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ἔφη.

ὁ τοίνυν, ἔφη, βούλομαι δηλώσαι, ἄθρει. ἐστιν δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντ' ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει ἀεὶ τάναντία, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν ἰδέαν ἢ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσῃ ἐναντία ἦ, ἀλλ' ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἦτοι<sup>γ</sup> ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολείσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὀτιοῦν πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομείναι ἔτι τρία ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

οὐδὲ μὴν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐναντίον γέ ἐστι τὸ ἄρτιον<sup>δ</sup> τριάδι.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα ἀλλήλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

βούλει οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐὰν οἰοί τ' ὦμεν, ὀρισώμεθα ὅποια ταῦτά ἐστιν;

πάνυ γε.

<sup>β</sup> 104c5 τὸ ἄρτιον Stokes : δυὰς mss.

<sup>d</sup> ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, τάδε εἶη ἄν, ἃ ὅτι ἄν κατάσχη μὴ μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῦ ἰδέαν αὐτὸ ἴσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου<sup>++</sup> αἰείτινος;

πῶς λέγεις;

ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἴσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι ἃ ἄν ἢ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα κατάσχη, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιττοῖς.

πάνυ γε.

ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δὴ, φαμέν, ἢ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ ἢ ἄν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεται οὐδέποτε ἄν ἔλθοι.

οὐ γάρ.

εἰργάζετο δέ γε ἢ περιττή;

ναί.

ἐναντία δὲ ταύτῃ ἢ τοῦ ἀρτίου;

ναί.

<sup>e</sup> ἐπὶ τὰ τρία ἄρα ἢ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα οὐδέποτε ἤξει.

οὐ δῆτα.

ἄμοιρα δὴ τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ τρία.

ἄμοιρα.

ἀνάρτιος ἄρα ἢ τριάς.

ναί.

...

<sup>105b5</sup> πάλιν δὴ μοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μή μοι ὁ ἄν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ. λέγω δὴ παρ' ἦν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων

<sup>++</sup> 104d3 ἐναντίου αἰείτινος scripsi : ἐναντίου αὐτῷ αἰείτινος B : ἐναντίου αἰείτινος αὐτῷ W : ἐναντίου δεῖ αὐτῷ τινοσ T

ἄλλην ὁρῶν ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔροιο με ᾧ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν πῦρ· οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρη ᾧ ἂν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι ᾧ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ' ᾧ ἂν πυρετός· οὐδ' ᾧ ἂν ἀριθμῷ τί ἐγγένηται περιττός ἔσται, οὐκ ἐρῶ ᾧ ἂν περιττότης, ἀλλ' ᾧ ἂν μονάς, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως. ἀλλ' ὄρα εἰ ἤδη ἱκανῶς οἶσθ' ὅτι βούλομαι.

ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἱκανῶς, ἔφη.

ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ᾧ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι ζῶν ἔσται;

ᾧ ἂν ψυχῆ, ἔφη.

<sup>d</sup> οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει;

πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἢ δ' ὅς.

ψυχῆ ἄρα ὅτι ἂν αὐτὴ κατάσχη, ἀεὶ ἦκει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα ζωήν;

ἦκει μέντοι, ἔφη.

πότερον δ' ἔστι τι ζωῆ ἑνάντιον ἢ οὐδέν;

ἔστιν, ἔφη.

τί;

θάνατος.

οὐκοῦν ψυχῆ τὸ ἑναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεὶ οὐ μὴ ποτε δέξεται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὠμολόγηται;

καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέαν τί νυνδὴ ὠνομάζομεν;

ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη.

τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχεται;

° ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον.  
 εἶεν· ὁ δ' ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχεται τί καλοῦμεν;  
 ἀθάνατον, ἔφη.  
 οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον;  
 οὔ.  
 ἀθάνατον ἄρα ψυχῆ.  
 ἀθάνατον.

<sup>100b1</sup> *But, said he [Socrates], I mean it this way, nothing new, but what I have not ever stopped saying both at other times and in our preceding conversation. Indeed, I am therefore going to try to show you the type of cause and reason which I am and have been concerned with, and I go again on to those things much talked about and start from them, assuming there to be something beautiful itself by itself and something good and something big and all the other things: and if you grant me that and agree that they are, I hope, out of them, to show you the cause and reason, and to find out that the soul is something immortal.*

° *But certainly, said Cebes, don't hesitate to proceed to the end, since I grant you that. So see, said he, if you agree, as I do, to what comes after that. Indeed, it seems to me that if anything else is beautiful other than the beautiful itself, that it is beautiful through nothing else than because it has of that beautiful: and all else accordingly, I say. Do you agree to such a cause and reason?*

*I agree, said he.*

*Therefore, said he, I do not any longer understand, nor can I come to recognise, the other clever reasons and causes: but whenever someone tells me wherefore whatever it may be is beautiful, be it that it has nice colour or shape or something else of that sort, I let go everything else - indeed, I get disturbed with everything else - but retain this for myself, simply and unsophisticatedly and perhaps naively, that nothing else makes it beautiful than, of that beautiful, the presence or community or however and whatever it*

*be called: indeed, that latter I do not insist on in addition, but <I do insist> that through the beautiful all things beautiful are beautiful. To give that as an answer to myself and to everybody else seems to me to be safest, and having of that<sup>e</sup> I trust never to fall, but to be safe in answering to myself and to whomsoever else that through the beautiful things beautiful become beautiful: or does it not seem to you to be so?*

*It does.*

*And thus through largeness large things large, and larger things larger, and through smallness smaller things smaller?*

*Yes.*

...

<sup>101b10</sup> *What about this: would you not be on your guard not to say that when one is added to one, the addition is the cause and reason of there coming to be two, or in the case of division the dividing? And say with loud voice that you do not know with regard to each and everything that it come to be in any other way than having of the very own being of each and everything which it has of, and in those matters you do not have any other cause and reason of there being two than the having of twoness, and that it is necessary that whatever shall be two has of that, and of unity whatever shall be one, but those dividings and additions and other such elaborate <causes and reasons> let go, leaving <them> to those more clever than you to answer <with>: ...*

...

<sup>102a2</sup> *Most truly spoken, said Simmias, and with him also Cebes.*

*ECHECRATES* *By Zeus, Phaedo, plausibly so: to me it is indeed wonderful with what evidence, even to one with a small mind only, that man has said that.*

*PHAIDON* *Very much so, Echebrates, and so it seemed to all present.*

*ECHECRATES* *Indeed, also to us who are absent and hear it now; but what was then said after that?*

*PHAIDON* *As I believe, when that was granted to him,<sup>b</sup> and it was agreed that each one of the εἶδη is something, and that, by coming to have of them, the other things acquire their benaming of those themselves, after that he asked this:*

*If, then, said he, you say that that is so: is it not the case that when you say that Simmias is larger than Socrates, but smaller than Phaedo, you thereby declare that both are in Simmias, both largeness and smallness?*

*It is.*

*But indeed, said he, do you agree that 'Simmias' exceeding Socrates' does not in that way have the truth as it is said in words: indeed, it is not that, 'being Simmias by nature', he exceeds through that, through 'being Simmias', but through the largeness which he happens to have; nor again with the 'exceeding Socrates': it is not because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has smallness over against his <,Simmias',> largeness?*

*True.*

...  
<sup>102d5</sup> *Now, I am saying that because of the following, wishing that it seemed to you as it does to me. Indeed, it seems to me that not only largeness itself is never willing to be large and small at the same time, but that also the largeness in us does never admit of the small, nor is it willing to be exceeded, but one of the two <obtains>, it either flees and recedes <sup>e</sup> when(ever) the opposite, the small, approaches it, or, as it [the opposite] comes on, it perishes: but it is not, enduring and admitting of smallness, willing to be something other than just what it was; just as I, admitting and enduring the smallness, and still being just who I am, am small as this same man: but that thing, being large, does not dare be small; and, in the same way, the small, that in us, is not ever willing to become or be large, nor does any other of the opposites, still being what it was, at the same time <sup>103a</sup> become and also be its opposite, but it either goes away, or it perishes in that situation.*

[Somebody objects that it had previously been said that opposites come out of opposites. Socrates replies that there is a difference in context.]

<sup>103b2</sup> *Then, indeed, it was said that an opposite thing comes to be out of an opposite thing, but now it has been said that the opposite itself would never become what is opposite to it itself, neither that in us nor that in nature. Indeed, then, my friend, we*

*talked about the things which have the opposites, benaming them with the benaming of those, but now we talk about those themselves of which the named things have their benaming while those are in them: <sup>c</sup> and we say that those themselves would not ever want to admit becoming each other. ...*

...

<sup>103e2</sup> *Now, it obtains, he said, with some of the things of that sort, that not only the εἶδος itself demands the same name for all time, but that another as well, which is not that <thing>, but always and forever has the μορφή of that <thing>, as long as it is <,demands its name>. But perhaps what I mean will be yet clearer in the following: indeed, somehow the odd always requires to have that name which we call it now; or does it not?*

*It certainly does.*

*But it alone of all things there are - that, indeed, is what I ask - or is there also some other <sup>104a</sup> thing which is not just what the odd is, and nevertheless it is necessary to call that thing as well with its name <, i.e. the name of the odd,> always, because it is by nature such that it never falls short of the odd? I mean that it is such as happens with threeness and many others. But consider threeness. Does it not seem to you that, in addition to its own name, it must always also be called with that of the odd, <the name of the odd> not being just what that of threeness is? But nevertheless, threeness and fiveness and one half of the numbers altogether is by nature such <sup>b</sup> that - not being just what the odd is - each of them is always and forever odd: and again the two and the four and so the other series of number altogether, not being just what the even is, nevertheless each of them is always and forever even. Do you agree or not?*

*Indeed, how could I not agree? said he.*

*Now see, said he, what I want to make clear. For it is the following: that it seems that not only those opposites do not admit of each other, but also the things which are not each other's opposites but always have the opposites; they as well do not seem to admit that ἕδέα which in each case is opposite to the one in them, but were it to approach, they would with certainty either perish or recede. Or do we not say that the three will*

rather perish or suffer whatever else, before it endured, while still being three, to become even?

Very much so, said Cebes.

And that though the even is certainly not the opposite of three, said he.

Indeed not.

So, not only the opposite εἶδη do not endure each other when approaching, but also certain other things do not endure the opposites when they approach.

Most truly spoken, said he.

Do you now want, said he, if we are at all capable, that we determine of what sort those things are?

Most certainly.

<sup>d</sup> Is it now, said he, Cebes, that they be those, which - when they possess something, they do not only force it to have its own ἰδέα, but also, through it, to have of some opposite.

What do you mean?

As we said just now. Indeed, you know that whatever the ἰδέα of the three possesses, for those things it is necessary not only to be three but also odd.

Very much so.

And it was thus upon such a thing, we said, that that ἰδέα would never come which is opposite to that μορφή which brought that about.

Indeed not.

But certainly the odd <μορφή> brought it about.

Yes.

And the one opposite to it is that of the even.

Yes.

<sup>e</sup> So, upon the three, the ἰδέα of the even will never come.

Certainly not.

For the three is without part in the even.

*Without part.*

*The three is thus uneven.*

*Yes.*

...

<sup>105b5</sup> *Now, tell me again from the beginning, said he. And do not answer me in the terms I ask, but doing as I do. Indeed, I declare that because besides the answer which I first talked about, that safe one, I see another safety from what has now been said. Indeed, if you asked me: 'for whatsoever, when what comes to be in its body will it be warm?', I will not give you that safe and unlearned answer that 'for whatsoever warmth <will come to be>', but a more elaborate one from what has now been said, that 'for whatsoever fire <will come to be>'; nor if you asked: 'for whomsoever, when what comes to be in his body will he be ill?', I will not say 'for whomsoever illness' but 'for whomsoever fever <comes to be in his body>'; nor again, 'when what comes to be in whatever number will it be odd?', I will not say 'in whatever <number> there comes to be oddness', but 'in whatever <number> there comes to be oneness'; and likewise in other cases. But see if as yet you know sufficiently what I want.*

*Sufficiently indeed, he said.*

*So answer, said he, for whomsoever, when what comes to be in his body will he be living?*

*For whomsoever soul <comes to be in his body>, he said.*

<sup>d</sup> *Now, does that always obtain?*

*Indeed, how not, said he.*

*So soul, whatever it possesses, it always comes upon it bringing life?*

*That is certainly so, he said.*

*And is there any opposite to life, or none?*

*There is, he said.*

*What?*

*Death.*

*Now the soul will never admit of the opposite to that which it always brings with it, as was agreed from what was said before?*

*And very certainly so, said Cebes.*

*What then? What did we call just now that which would not admit of the ἰδέα of the even?*

*Uneven, he said.*

*But that which would not admit of the just or of the musical?*

*° Immusical, he said, and the other unjust.*

*Well. But what do we call whatever does not admit of death?*

*Immortal, he said.*

*Now, the soul does not admit of death?*

*No.*

*So the soul is immortal.*

*Immortal.*

## II.

The overt purpose of the discussion which Socrates has with his friends in the last hours before his death is to prove the immortality of the soul, and - although there is a brief subsequent exchange in which the soul's indestructibility is asserted in addition - this aim seems to have been achieved by the end of 105e.

This is after 100b, where Socrates had announced that he hoped to be able to show that the soul is something immortal, if Cebes granted him that 'the beautiful by itself and the good by itself and the large by itself' existed. What is odd in that enumeration is not so much the phrase 'by itself'; that is familiar from earlier dialogues, if not necessarily with the same application; and it was introduced in the *Phaedo* at an early stage.<sup>311</sup> What is

<sup>311</sup> *Lysis* 220c; *Meno* 88c, and especially 100b; *Phaedo* 64c, 65c, 66a, 67a, c, e, 70a, 78d, 79d, 81c, and especially 83b. In terms of content most closely related is, of course, *Phaedo* 74a - 75d. For a discussion

odd is the inclusion of 'the large' alongside 'the beautiful' and 'the good'. It will become clear shortly afterwards why 'the large' is introduced here, but it is worth noting that in whatever terms Socrates may, in earlier dialogues, have talked about the good or goodness, the beautiful or beauty, the just or justice, the holy or holiness, the moderate or moderation and temperance: the large had never been one of his concerns. The statement at 75c,d, in which the equal, the bigger and the smaller and all such things were grouped together with the beautiful itself and the good itself and the just and the holy and all things of which it is said that they 'are', came likewise unexpected, again partly because the equal, the larger and the smaller are not usually things Socrates talks about, while the beautiful, the good, the just and the holy are. The *Phaedo* is thus from the start a dialogue in which Socrates does unusual things.<sup>312</sup> But these unusual things are embedded in customary conversation on matters concerning good life and the soul in a way which makes their introduction unobtrusive. So, the example discussed in detail at 100c is that of the beautiful, a topic which we are not surprised to find Socrates discussing.

As yet, we do not know what relevance exactly Socrates' long account of his reaction to Anaxagoras will have in the proof of the immortality of the soul; we can guess, though, that his request that Cebes grant him the existence of the beautiful, the good and the large is connected with the discussion of ἀνάμνησις, *recollection*, at 72e - 78b, since it was there that 'the equal itself' and the other things 'which are' were introduced. At 100c2, Socrates indicates that he carries the argument one step further. Not only is there a 'beautiful itself': if there is anything else beautiful, it is beautiful because 'it has of that beautiful', potentially together with other things which also 'have of' that beautiful - that is implied in μετέχειν.

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of the phrase αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό and related phenomena, cf. G. Vailati, *A Study of Platonic Terminology*, in: *Mind* XV (1906), 473 - 485.

<sup>312</sup> One may also think of his exercises in composition (60c - 61c).

As we have seen,<sup>313</sup> μετέχειν had been used by Plato in connection with the good before he composed the *Phaedo*. At *Gorgias* 467e, it had been said of actions like sitting, walking, running and sailing, and of materials like stones, wood, and other such things, that they were neither good nor bad, as opposed to good things like wisdom, health, riches and other such things; the ‘neither good nor bad’ was characterised as ἄ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδέτερου. It was left open if stones and wood belonged to the last category only, in which case ἐνίοτε would not have a strictly temporal meaning, or if stones *sometimes had of the good, sometimes of the bad, and sometimes of neither*, probably according to what use was made of them. It was definitely left open what we had to understand by ‘the good’, which first seemed to refer to things ‘had’ by the mind, the body internally and the body externally, but then, probably, to something more abstract, something in which stones and wood could have a share. The same ambiguity as to what ‘the good’ could be, it will be remembered, is again encountered at *Gorgias* 497ff.<sup>314</sup>

μετέχειν, however, is also encountered in a pre-Socratic context quoted above (Simplicius *Physica* 164, 25 = DK 59B6)<sup>315</sup>: καὶ ὅτε δὲ ἴσαι μοῖραί εἰσι τοῦ τε μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ πλήθος, καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἶη ἐν παντὶ πάντα· οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἔστιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα παντός μοῖραν μετέχει. ὅτε τοῦλάχιστον μὴ ἔστιν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο χωρισθῆναι, οὐδ’ ἂν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ νῦν πάντα ὁμοῦ. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ πολλὰ ἔνεστι καὶ τῶν ἀποκρινομένων ἴσα πλήθος ἐν τοῖς μείζοσι τε καὶ ἐλάσσοσι. *And when there are equal parts of the large and the small, as to their amount, also in that way everything would be in everything: nor is there being apart, but everything has a part of everything <together with everything else>. When there is nothing which is the smallest, no ‘being parted’ is possible, nor coming to be by itself, but as it was in the beginning, so now everything is*

<sup>313</sup> Sections IV and V of the chapter on μετέχειν and μεταλαμβάνειν above.

<sup>314</sup> See Section IV of the chapter on παρουσία, παρῆναι and παραγίγνεσθαι.

<sup>315</sup> Section III of the chapter on ἐνεῖναι, ἐγγίγνεσθαι.

together. And in everything there are many things of those separated off, equal in amount in the bigger and the smaller <things>.

It is Anaxagoras who declares about the large and the small that equal parts of them are in everything and that everything has of them, that they cannot be separated, and that they cannot come to be ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, *by themselves*. That is to say, whatever it was Anaxagoras meant, he did speak about 'equal parts', 'large', 'small', things being, or as it is the case not being, 'by themselves'. Because Anaxagoras' κόσμος, his universe, was despite the mention of νοῦς or mind an entirely and thoroughly physical world, anything in it which 'has of' something 'has part of something', μοῖραν μετέχει, because that is the only way in which anything can 'have of' something purely physical.

What Plato does, therefore, is to let Socrates use Anaxagorean terminology, or at least Anaxagorean usage, and combine it with Socratic thought as expressed for example in the *Gorgias* and the *Protagoras*. The *Protagoras* in particular displayed a large number of instances of 'having of', where this 'having of' referred to matters concerning the mind;<sup>316</sup> the phrase μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ as such figured in the *Gorgias*. Socrates supplies what he said he missed in Anaxagoras' account: he supplies what is καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν to an account of the world in terms of distinct constituents in which the things as we know them 'have of' other things. Anaxagoras had said (Simplicius *Physica* 164, 24 = DK 59B12): τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει, νοῦς δέ ἐστιν ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὲς καὶ μέμεικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑωυτοῦ ἐστιν. εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ τεφ' ἐμέμεικτο ἄλλω, μετεῖχεν ἂν ἀπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμεικτό τεφ' ἐν παντὶ γὰρ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστιν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μοι λέλεκται· καὶ ἂν ἐκώλυεν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμεμειγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρήματος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως ὡς καὶ μόνον ἔόντα ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. *Now, everything else has a part of everything else, but mind alone is undelimited and self-governed and mixed with nothing, but is alone itself by itself. Indeed, if it were not*

<sup>316</sup> See Sections IV - VI of the chapter on μετέχειν and μεταλαμβάνειν.

*by itself, but were mixed with something else, it would have of all the things, if it were mixed with anything: for in everything there is a part of everything, as said by me in what went before; also: what would be mixed with it would prevent mind from governing any <one> thing in the same way it can when being alone by itself.*

Anaxagoras had introduced mind and postulated that it was itself by itself, but he had not done anything with it; his mind is in everything and governs everything, but at the same time is not mixed with anything; we are told that it is mind who or which governs all, but we are not told why and how; 'large' and 'small', on the other hand, are on a par with all the other physical things, thin and dense, cold and warm, dark and light, moist and dry (B12); considering all that, it does not become clear in what way, if any, mind is distinct from physical stuff, nor, according to what principles or considerations mind governs and rules; it almost seems as if mind just observes the process of cosmogony described in B12.

With the introduction by Socrates of the beautiful and the good, and by extension of the large and the equal, as existing by themselves, Anaxagoras' picture is completely subverted, not only modified in one respect, despite adoption of Anaxagorean terminology on a large scale. A plurality has taken the place of the one mind, and at least some of the things explicitly said by Anaxagoras to have a share in each other have apparently been elevated to a status of independence and self-government.

The most fundamental change introduced by Socrates, however, is the introduction of the beautiful and good: what he had said an explanation of things in terms of mind amounted to. The connection of the beautiful with matters of the mind is implicitly strengthened by Socrates in the next paragraph, when he says that if there is anything beautiful in this world, that nothing else makes it beautiful than, *of the beautiful, the presence or community or however and whatever it be called: indeed, that latter I do not insist on in addition, but <I do insist> that through the beautiful all things beautiful are beautiful*, ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε

ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσαγορευομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ καλά. Both παρουσία or παρῆναι of the beautiful and the good and the construction with a vaguely instrumental dative occurred at *Gorgias* 497ff. in a context in which the good life was at stake. παρουσία τοῦ καλοῦ to beautiful things around us therefore suggests a relation like the one which things can have to the mind or the mind to things. The discussion at *Lysis* 217f., on the other hand, prevents the reader from being confused by a sophism based on the ambiguity of παρουσία depending on the nature of things present, but also the difference of 'presence' intended.<sup>317</sup>

### III.

While the associations which παρουσία evokes enrich Anaxagoras' physical discussion by the introduction of non-physical things connected with the soul, κοινωνία seems to have a slightly different function. κοινωνία is not a very common word; by itself, it signifies any sort of community between things which are, for the specific purposes of specific contexts of discussion, considered to be on one level; in the majority of cases, however, κοινωνία refers to communion between people, sometimes in allegorical passages between animals or things which stand for people, occasionally between gods and men.<sup>318</sup> In the *Phaedo* in particular, however, the one instance of κοινωνία is embedded in the also otherwise philosophically significant context 64c - 66a; there, it was stated that *death is something*, τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι. It was then defined thus (64c5): καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς

<sup>317</sup> Cf. Section VII of the chapter on παρουσία, παρῆναι and παραγίγνεσθαι.

<sup>318</sup> For detailed discussion of κοινωνία in Plato and in pre-Platonic authors, albeit on lines not applicable to the present context, cf. P. Impara, *Aspetti Semantici della Filosofia Platonica*, Roma 1978; in appendices to his general interpretations, Impara gives collections of pre-Platonic (p. 155f.) and Platonic (pp. 87 - 104) testimonia. His very useful collection of material is slightly impaired by his tendency to see, as governing Plato's thought, "una potenza misteriosa e soprannaturale" ("Conclusione", p. 147).

μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι; *And is not this 'being dead': that the body is separated on its own, away from the soul, itself by itself, and the soul separated on its own, away from the body, 'herself by herself'?* Next, it is stated that one must not devote oneself too much to clothes, jewellery and physical adornments *in that there is no great necessity to have of them, καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν* (64e1). When that is granted, Socrates characterizes the philosopher as (65a1) ἀπολύων ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας, *loosening as much as possible the soul from community with the body*. Subsequently, both κοινωνεῖν and the phrase αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν are repeated, just before it is stated for the first time in the *Phaedo* that 'the just itself' 'is something', and likewise 'the beautiful' and 'the good' and 'largeness' and 'health' and 'strength' and *the being of all other things, whatever something happens to be, τῶν ἄλλων ... ἀπάντων τῆς οὐσίας ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν* (65d13), and that we perceive those things with something other than the senses of the body, with the soul 'herself by herself'.

That is the only previous context in which there was talk of κοινωνία in the *Phaedo*; there, the human soul was envisaged as doing things 'by herself', somehow taking leave of her community or communion with the body; what was under consideration was 'an individual human body' and 'an individual human soul', at a particular time and in a particular place on earth; it is the beginning of the discussion between Socrates and the Thebans; therefore it would be wrong to declare that κοινωνία at 65a2 refers to a relation of asymmetry.<sup>319</sup> The differentiation in ontological status of body and soul respectively is introduced only later on.

What is suggested, though, by the use of κοινωνία as an alternative to παρουσία at 100d is specifically that - with everything we have heard about the soul since the beginning of the conversation - the relation of the beautiful to a beautiful thing may be

<sup>319</sup> Pace Impara, op. cit., pp. 24ff., 145.

parallel to that of soul to body. It is to be noted that *κοινωνία* is the more specific word in this context, directed more particularly at a specific point earlier on in the same discussion; *παρουσία*, although used in earlier dialogues in not altogether dissimilar contexts, is the more general term.

One aspect of the usage of *κοινωνία*, however, seems to have been overlooked in its potential significance for the structure of the *Phaedo*. Despite frequent assertions of the *Phaedo*'s being a Pythagorean, or at least Pythagoreanizing, dialogue<sup>320</sup>, and despite the fact that 'community' played a significant rôle among Pythagoreans<sup>321</sup>, *κοινωνία* as a term is not usually associated with fifth century Pythagorean philosophy; there is, indeed, no firm evidence that it was. I should nevertheless suggest that Stobaeus, *Eclogae* I. proem 3,<sup>322</sup> whether it is pre-Socratic or not, and if pre-Socratic whether it is by Philolaus or not, may contain echoes of original terminology (I do not adopt a number of emendations, however possible or plausible they may be, which let the passage appear more Doric than the manuscript of Stobaeus warrants): Φιλολάου· θεωρεῖν δεῖ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν ἀριθμῶν κατὰ δύναμιν ἅτις ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ δεκάδι· μεγάλα γὰρ καὶ παντελῆς καὶ παντοεργὸς καὶ θεῖω καὶ οὐρανίω βίω καὶ ἀνθρωπίνω ἀρχὰ καὶ ἀγεμῶν κοινωνοῦσα [... ..  
... ] δύναμις καὶ τᾶς δεκάδος. ἄνευ δὲ τούτας πάντ' ἄπειρα καὶ ἄδηλα καὶ ἀφανῆ. ... . *It is necessary to contemplate the works and the being of*

<sup>320</sup> All standard commentaries abound with references to Pythagoreanism on a general level; cf. e.g. C.J. Rowe, *Plato. Phaedo*, Cambridge 1993, p. 6f.; but cf. in particular the recent excellent essay by T. Ebert, *Sokrates als Pythagoreer und die Anamnesis in Platons Phaidon*, Mainz/Stuttgart 1994

<sup>321</sup> Impara, op. cit., p. 52, n. 19 cites specifically Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos* IX 127, who alleges that Pythagoras and Empedocles and the whole Italic bunch postulate not only a *κοινωνία* of men amongst each other and with the gods, but also with τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων, *non-rational animals*.

<sup>322</sup> 1. 16. 20 Wachsmuth = DK 44B11 = F 11 Huffmann; cf. C.A. Huffmann, *Philolaos of Croton. Pythagorean and Presocratic*, Cambridge 1993, pp. 347 - 350, who follows Diels-Kranz closely in text and translation; he comments (p. 349): "There is a great deal both in the style and content of the fragment that links it to the philosophy of the Academy and the later tradition of Platonism, while virtually nothing that accords with what one would expect from a Presocratic author or with fragments 1 - 7 of Philolaus. It must be regarded as almost certainly spurious."

*the numbers according to the power which obtains in ten-ness: Great indeed and all-fulfilling and all-working, and of divine and heavenly life, and of the life of humans, is beginning and leader in community and communion [.....] power also of the ten-ness. But without this: all things unlimited and unclear and non-apparent. ... .* Of course, the passage may be post-Platonic, in which case the author could, and to all probability would, have read the *Phaedo*; that would explain the occurrence of οὐσία, repeated a few lines later, in the sense of 'being' usually attributed to Plato.<sup>323</sup> It would also explain, a little later in the text, the assertion that ψεύδος δὲ οὐδὲν δέχεται ἅ τῷ ἀριθμῷ φύσις οὐδὲ ἁρμονία· οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖον αὐτοῖς ἔστι. *The nature of the number, and also harmony, do not admit any falsity: indeed, it would not be familiar to them* - use of οὐ δέχεται is strongly reminiscent of the *Phaedo* passage under consideration. Likewise, τὰ πράγματα τὰ τε ἄπειρα καὶ τὰ περαινόντα could be taken from the *Philebus*.

It is, I think, nevertheless a strange use the author makes of the *Phaedo*, and potentially other dialogues by Plato, or of what was known about discussions in the Early Academy.<sup>324</sup> The words are there, but their combination strangely distorts any original Platonic meaning beyond recognition. - I should not wish to maintain that, therefore, this passage quoted by Stobaeus is pre-Platonic; I do think, however, that regardless of the time of composition, it is best understood as containing Pythagorean material, and to a large extent the same material which was at Plato's disposal when he wrote the *Phaedo*, namely: importance of the rôle of ἁρμονία; of mathematical considerations; of the soul; also of things which do, and things which do not admit each other; things which are, and things which are not in harmony with each other; certain σχίσεις or *dividings*; and so on.

<sup>323</sup> Cf. in particular the excellent 'EXCURSUS I. Οὐσία AS A PHILOSOPHICAL TERM IN PLATO (on 72 B 22) by E.S. Thompson, *The Meno of Plato*, London 1901, pp. 255 - 258; and C.J. Classen, *Sprachliche Deutung als Triebkraft platonischen und sokratischen Philosophierens*, München 1959, pp. 158 - 164.

<sup>324</sup> Cf. Huffmann, op. cit., p. 350.

Be that as it may, as soon as the word *κοινωνία* is pronounced in the *Phaedo*, it is taken back, or at least relativized, in two ways, first by addition of *εἴτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσαγορευομένη* to *εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία*, and then explicitly by the assertion: *οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι* - that latter phrase should be taken to mean *indeed, I do not insist on that in addition*, namely what the precise nature of the presence or community or communion is; alternatively, one could translate: 'indeed, that I insist on no longer'; that would imply that there was a time when he insisted on the precise choice of word, and therefore probably also on a specific type of relationship; assuming that, would be puzzling in more than one respect: we are left to guess whether Socrates insisted previously on *κοινωνία*, or whether he insisted on *παρουσία*, or whether there was a time when he insisted on one of the two terms, and another when he insisted on the other; clarification would have been welcome; the other consideration is that Plato's device to have Socrates declare that he has always talked about the things discussed here is just about acceptable when the existence of the just, the good and the beautiful are concerned, since these issues did indeed figure in earlier dialogues; but to claim in addition that there were times when Socrates insisted on one or other specialized terminology in addition, when there is evidently no trace of that in any of Plato's earlier writings, would go too far. In writing fiction, Plato always took great care to give his fiction some air of plausibility.

#### IV.

As for the choice of an unattested *προσαγορευομένη* in preference to *προσγενομένη* or *προσγι(γ)νομένη*, J.C.G. Strachan's decision to adopt Wytttenbach's conjecture in the new Oxford Classical Text is wholly plausible since, as we have seen,<sup>325</sup> *προσγίγνεσθαι* denotes a 'coming to be in addition'; it is doubtful if

<sup>325</sup> Cf. the chapter on *προσεῖναι* and *προσγίγνεσθαι*, *passim*.

that could be said of 'the beautiful itself', that it comes to be in addition to what is there already - it can definitely not be said of 'the presence of the beautiful' or 'the community of the beautiful' that either of them come to be in addition to what is already there; and that does not depend on which form of the verb προσγίγνεσθαι is chosen. On the other hand, casual inspection of instances similar to ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως in Plato's early dialogues shows that a verb of naming is usually in the place of the predicate introduced thus; besides προσαγορεύεσθαι, καλεῖσθαι and ὀνομάζεσθαι are frequent. Socrates' meaning would then be that while he thought the relationship expressed through the instrumental dative in clauses like τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά essential, the precise nature of that relationship, and therefore in particular what it was called, is of secondary importance; what matters is the recognition of the existence of the beautiful and the good and the like. That is what Socrates does not get tired of stressing.

## V.

After that has been granted, Socrates adds (100e5): καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζω, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω. *And through largeness the large things are large, and also the larger ones, and through smallness the smaller things smaller.* What surprises with that addition is again the insistence on seemingly un-Socratic concerns, but also in particular the introduction of the comparative beside the positive in the case of the large, in place of the positive in the case of smallness. The attentive reader will not fail to notice that that may make a difference to the validity of subsequent arguments. The immediate positive gain, however, is the fact that the difference in root of σμικρόν and ἔλαττον demonstrates that Socrates' point is not on the level of punning sophism.

Next, after dealing with the beautiful and the big, Socrates returns to relations between numbers, what could be called simple arithmetic. From 101b10 onwards, the metaphor of *μετέχειν* is again prominent, the word *οὐσία*, *being*, is employed, and besides the aorist forms *μετασχὸν*, *μετάσχη* and *μετασχεῖν*, the noun *μετάσχεσις* is introduced, a noun perhaps coined on this occasion. As yet, it seems as if there were one ‘thing itself’ for every one ‘name’ for a thing in the world; in terms of explanation by *αἰτία*, ‘with reason and cause’, this would, of course, already be a significant reduction of *explanantia*, since for all the instances of ‘two’ in the universe there would be one *δύαξ* or *twoness*, for all the instances of ‘one’ there would be one *μόνας* or ‘unity’ or rather ‘oneness’.

In 101d3, Socrates employs the rather rare construction of the simple verb *ἔχω* with genitive, *εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο*, *if (only) someone had a hold on (or: had mastered) this assumption*, one should continue with the enquiry, and building on the first and subsequent assumptions in agreement with it,<sup>326</sup> one may eventually reach the best, that is to say a sufficient assumption.

## VI.

It is at this point, after the introduction of a mathematical example and the repeated emphasis on the method of *ὑπόθεσις* or *assumption*, a method introduced in a mathematical context in the *Meno*, that Echecrates of Phlius intervenes with the enthusiastic assertion that even somebody with *σμικρὸς νοῦς* would see the clarity and conviction the argumentation of Socrates carries. The choice of words, the modification of *νοῦν ἔχων* to *σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων*, is an implicit mockery of Anaxagoras and his *Νοῦς*. The applause itself, however, is appropriate at this point

<sup>326</sup> I do not attempt to set the text right at this place, but I believe that *χαίρειν ἐφῆς ἄν* at d4 has somehow entered the text on the model of *ἐώης ἄν χαίρειν* in c8f.

because Echecrates, a Pythagorean himself,<sup>327</sup> would be on familiar territory when it comes to mathematics. (He may well have been puzzled by some of what Socrates had previously said on the beautiful and the good.)<sup>328</sup>

Echecrates asks Phaedo to resume his narration of what was said. Phaedo, however, does not resume narration in the accustomed fashion. Instead, he summarizes the next bit of the conversation before reverting to his previous form of report. It is in this summary, that Phaedo of Elis, guest in a Pythagorean community, states (102a11): ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη, <sup>b</sup> καὶ ὠμολογεῖτο εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τᾶλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡρώτα· ... . *As I believe, when that was granted to him, <sup>b</sup> and it was agreed that each one of the εἶδη is, and that, by coming to have of them, the other things acquire their benaming of those themselves, after that he asked this: ... .* This is the first place in Plato's dialogues at which the 'being itself by itself' of certain things is explicitly asserted and at which - at the same time - those things are then called εἶδη.

It is difficult to find a translation for εἶδη at this place without begging the question. Apparently, nothing new in terms of subject matter is being introduced here by Phaedo. He seems more or less to summarize what he had reported already; perhaps there was some additional generalizing statement by Socrates which has not been reported *verbatim*; but not even that need be assumed. From what has been said on εἶδος above,<sup>329</sup> the noun should be expected to mean 'look, looks, appearance, guise' or 'type' or 'way, ways' or else perhaps 'scheme'. In the *Phaedo* itself, εἶδος occurred previously

<sup>327</sup> Cf. Rowe, loc. cit.; apt criticism of the views there submitted, and a good summary of what we know and what we can conclude about Echecrates and other *personae* in the *Phaedo*, is found in Ebert, op. cit., pp. 4 - 20 (on Echecrates see pp. 5 - 8 with notes).

<sup>328</sup> Whether there is a punning allusion to Pythagorean ἀκούσματα in Echecrates pronounced assertion that for them, the absent recipients of this report, Socrates' arguments are plausible 'while we listen' (102a9) may be left aside. Cf. also 88c9, where it is again Echecrates interrupting: καὶ γὰρ αὐτόν με νῦν ἀκούσαντα σου ... .

<sup>329</sup> See in particular Section XIII of the chapter on εἶδος.

on several occasions in one or other of its senses.<sup>330</sup> From the syntactical context at 103e5, it is clear that in whatever sense εἶδος is used, we are dealing with an absolute application of the noun, that is to say ‘an appearance’ as ‘a thing that appears’, or the like. To my mind, none of the translations established above suggests itself immediately.

There is, however, one instance of εἶδος in pre-Platonic literature not considered as yet, Philolaus B5, and I believe that it may form the missing link, in the sense that it can be shown how and why εἶδος had come to be used in that pre-Socratic Pythagorean context, and it can also be shown why Plato would then want to adopt it. It is again Stobaeus who reports (Eclogae I 21, 7c)<sup>331</sup>: ὁ γὰρ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ἔχει δύο μὲν ἴδια εἶδη, περισσὸν καὶ ἄρτιον, τρίτον δὲ ἀπ’ ἀμφοτέρων μειχθέντων ἀρτιοπέριττον· ἑκατέρω δὲ τῷ εἶδεος πολλαὶ μορφαί, ἃς ἕκαστον αὐτὸ σημαίνει. *Now, number has certainly two types, odd and even, and mixed from both of them as a third even-odd; and of each of the two types, there are many shapes or forms which each one itself indicates.* A number of points concerning text, translation and interpretation of this fragment are controversial. It is, however, generally regarded as genuine, and if it is genuine, there cannot be any reasonable doubt that Plato must have read it; and, to the modern reader of the *Phaedo*, it cannot be controversial either, that Plato in the long subsequent discussion of the example of the odd and the even not only had Philolaos in mind and reacted to Philolaos, but also that every educated and philosophically interested reader was supposed to see

<sup>330</sup> ‘This human appearance’ at 73a2; ‘a boys appearance’ at 73d8; ‘a man’s appearance’ at 76c12; ‘this appearance’, absolutely, with reference to man’s existence on earth, at 87a2; ‘a man’s appearance and body’ at 92b5; εἶδος means ‘type’ at 79a6, b4, d10, for discussion of which see below; ‘type (of cause and reason)’ at 98a2, 100b4.

<sup>331</sup> 1. 188. 9 Wachsmuth = DK 44B5 = F5 Huffmann; for a recent discussion of different ways to read the lines see Huffmann, op. cit., 177 - 193, whose text I adopt for the purpose of the present, limited investigation. For questions of authenticity, see *ibid.*, p.178. As can be seen from my translation, I do not agree with Huffmann’s note on how to construe and therefore translate ἕκαστον (p. 192): “ἕκαστον is confusing at first sight. The only antecedents immediately available are the two “kinds” of number. However, these were picked out by ἑκατέρω (“each of the two”) at the beginning of the sentence and it would be odd now to use ἕκαστον. ... .” I do not think that ‘it would be odd’ at all.

that this is a conscious dialogue of Plato with the Pythagorean. That much is, in general, not disputed.<sup>332</sup>

With regard to the meaning of εἶδος in Philolaus B5, there is no difficulty in translating the word as 'type' on its first occurrence. A close parallel from the *Phaedo* is 79a6, when Socrates suggests: θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἶδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὀρατὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀιδές; *Do you now want us, he said, to posit two types of things that are, the one visible, the other invisible?* This usage was, of course, perfectly common with the medical writers; one need not, therefore, assume that anybody reading the sentence at 79a6 would have thought of any particular significance as to terminology. It was the case that besides mathematics, including astronomy, it was medicine that Pythagoreans concerned themselves with; philosophers frequently connected with Pythagoreanism were Alcmaeon and Empedocles who are both medical men by profession; but there need not have been any special influence on philosophical terminology in this particular case since we have seen that by the end of the fifth century a meaning 'type' for εἶδος is well enough attested.

What is interesting is the second occurrence of the term in Philolaus B5. εἶδος has the same point of reference; it has a qualifying adjectival pronoun attached to it, in that way parallel to expressions like ἄλλο εἶδος or πάντα τὰ εἶδη; there is, however, no qualifying genitive; that is, of course, not absolutely necessary, since the point of reference is in close proximity, and the context does not create any ambiguity in sense; nevertheless, Philolaus B5 is a precedent for the absolute use of εἶδος, where εἶδος refers to an abstract, philosophical notion (for number theory is - and always has been - as much part of philosophy as it is of mathematics; or rather: at that level of abstraction, the distinction between the sciences and philosophy has disappeared).

<sup>332</sup> In discussion, I will leave aside the interesting but for our purposes not centrally relevant question of the ἄρτιοπέριττον; see M.E. Hager, *Philolaus and the Even-Odd*, in: CR XII (1962), pp. 1 - 2; cf. also Huffmann, op. cit. ad loc., and the review of Huffmann by P. Kingsley in CR XLIV (1994), 294 - 296. - It is worth noting, though, how Plato introduces and re-introduces μόνως.

Yet more can be said about the use of εἶδος here. Pythagoreans were interested in numbers. For that we have the direct evidence of fragments. But they were not interested in numbers in isolation, as witnessed by reports like that of Aristotle at *Metaphysics* A5, 985b ff. At 986a15, his report comes close to summarising Philolaus B5. Then, a few lines later, he resumes (986a22): ἕτεροι δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων τὰς ἀρχὰς δέκα λέγουσιν εἶναι τὰς κατὰ συστοιχίαν λεγομένας· ... *But others of those same people say that there are ten principles, gathered in columns.*<sup>333</sup> ...

πέρας	καὶ	ἄπειρον	<i>limit and unlimited</i>
περιττὸν	καὶ	ἄρτιον	<i>odd and even</i>
ἓν	καὶ	πλήθος	<i>one and multitude</i>
δέξιον	καὶ	ἀριστερόν	<i>right and left</i>
ἄρρεν	καὶ	θῆλυ	<i>male and female</i>
ἡρεμοῦν	καὶ	κινούμενον	<i>still and moving/moved</i>
εὐθύ	καὶ	καμπύλον	<i>straight and curved</i>
φῶς	καὶ	σκότος	<i>light and dark</i>
ἀγαθόν	καὶ	κακόν	<i>good and bad</i>
τετράγωνον	καὶ	ἑτερόμηκες· ...	<i>square and oblong: ...</i>

For our purposes it does not matter which group of Pythagoreans had exactly this table of opposites, if any; it does not matter if all of the pairs were included for any one group; it does not even matter if the ‘good and bad’ were included for Philolaus or Echebrates, although that would make things more readily comprehensible for them from the start. What matters is that just as with numbers, one could say that there are two types of animals, male and female; two types of line, straight and curved; two types of quadrangles (or geometrical numbers), square and oblong. It is true, Aristotle does not mention the term εἶδος in connection with this list of ἀρχαί; but Aristotle uses his own

<sup>333</sup> For the arrangement of the opposites in columns, I follow G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, Cambridge<sup>2</sup>1983, p. 337f.

terminology throughout, and he did not mention εἶδος before, when he was either writing about Philolaus himself or about someone holding virtually identical views on the odd and even.

If it is correct that there were two types of all those things, Philolaus' use of εἶδος in an absolute application for one or other of odd and even is understandable; the same term will have been applied beyond the one attested example. What was listed in tables of opposites were the primary constituents of the κόσμος or universe; they can be called 'opposed, or opposing, principles', but one can also talk about them as 'two types', of whatever it happens to be; the next step is to speak of 'each type', without qualification of what the type is supposed to be a type of. And that is exactly what Phaedo does in summarizing the discussion for Echecrates and the other Pythagoreans (102b1): ὁμολόγειτο εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν, *it was agreed that each of the types is something*; in the same way it had previously been agreed that 'death is something' and that there are a number of things to which we give the predicate: 'it is'. Phaedo's use of εἶδος is best understood in that Pythagorean context.

## VII.

If it is accepted that it is Philolaus, and indeed this particular part of Philolaus' philosophy, whose terminology is adopted here, another issue receives clarification. At 103e, Socrates advances the argument by summarizing what he had said about warm and cold, and fire and snow: ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἓνια τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν αἰὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκεῖνου μορφήν αἰεὶ, ὅταν περ ἦ. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τῷδε ἴσως ἔσται σαφέστερον ὃ λέγω· τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν αἰεὶ που δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν ὅπερ νῦν λέγομεν· ἦ οὐ; *Now, it obtains, he said,*

with some of the things of that sort, that not only the εἶδος itself demands the same name for all time, but that another as well <demands its name>, which is not that <thing>, but always and forever has the μορφή of that <thing>, as long as it is. But perhaps what I mean will be yet clearer in the following: indeed, somehow the odd always requires to have that name which we call it now; or does it not? Scholarly opinion as to the relevance of the term μορφή besides εἶδος is divided.<sup>334</sup> The majority view is that εἶδος, ἰδέα and μορφή are synonyms. A minority suggests that there is a distinction between εἶδος on the one hand, μορφή and ἰδέα on the other, with μορφή and ἰδέα being used synonymously here. Without endorsing all the arguments and conclusions connected with that latter view,<sup>335</sup> I suggest that the following considerations may lend support for upholding a distinction between εἶδος and the other two nouns.

Thinking in terms of opposites, there are two types of number, odd and even; there are two types of temperature, hot and cold; those types themselves have their names for all time. Then there are also other things - and it is not specified if they are physical and corporeal or otherwise - which have the 'shape or form' of those types which are the opposites; examples are fire, one of the hot things, snow, one of the cold things, three, one of the odd things, and two, one of the even things. In the sentence ἡ τριάς ἔχει τὴν μορφήν τοῦ περιττοῦ, *threeness* [or, for that matter, *the triad* or *the number three* or *a collection of three items*] has the shape or form of the odd, μορφή refers to the 'shape or form' in its concretion: if it is correct that what prompted the use of εἶδος in this context was application of the term in the sense of 'type', where on some occasions at least - as in the case of odd and even, or of right and left - 'type' referred to

<sup>334</sup> For a selection of modern views on the meaning and significance of μορφή at 103e5f., see APPENDIX 3 below. For the earliest extant instances of the word in Greek literature, see APPENDIX 4 below.

<sup>335</sup> R.S. Bluck, (*Plato's Phaedo*, London 1955, p. 17, n. 7) and R. Hackforth (*Plato's Phaedo*, Cambridge 1955, p.150, n. 1) connect the distinction in reference of εἶδος on the one hand, μορφή and ἰδέα on the other, with the question of the 'immanence of forms'.

something which does not have a physical appearance, then a different word was needed if something like ‘appearance’ or ‘shape’ or ‘form’ or ‘figure’ was to be denoted.

In the case of Philolaus B5, ὁ γὰρ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ἔχει δύο μὲν ἴδια εἶδη, περισσὸν καὶ ἄρτιον, τρίτον δὲ ἀπ’ ἀμφοτέρων μειχθέντων ἀρτιοπέριττον· ἐκατέρω δὲ τῷ εἶδεος πολλαὶ μορφαί, ἃς ἕκαστον αὐτὸ σημαίνει, *now, number has certainly two types, odd and even, and mixed from both of them as a third even-odd; and of each of the two types, there are many shapes or forms which each one itself indicates*, the several particular instantiations of the two types, all the odd and even numbers, are metonymically referred to as ‘shapes or forms’ which the types, odd and even, signify or characterize. The difference between Philolaus B5 and *Phaedo* 103e5 is apparently that in the case of the Pythagorean, the ‘things characterized by a type’ are called μορφή, in an absolute way, while Socrates’ usage suggests that the ‘types’ have μορφή. This difference may be more apparent than real since, as we saw in the case of εἶδος, any word denoting something like ‘appearance’ or ‘shape’ may easily shift in applicability from ‘appearance (of a thing)’ to ‘an appearance’, taken absolutely. In the realm of non-corporeal, non-physical things, such a word may be applied to things at different levels, that is to say, one could use μορφή with reference to ‘the odd’ just as well as with reference to ‘three’; they both have their peculiar ‘shape or form’; the word μορφή lends itself to such application as even at its earliest instances, *Odyssey* VIII, 170, and XI, 367, and Empedocles B21, the term does not refer to ‘physical shape’.<sup>336</sup>

The difference between εἶδος and μορφή in this context would thus be the following: when, *exempli gratia*, the odd is referred to with reference to its ontological status, it will be referred to as an εἶδος, i.e. a ‘type’, one of those primary things underlying reality; when the odd is referred to with reference to its characteristic nature, it is referred to as having a certain ‘shape or form’, or being a ‘shape or form’; the various particular ‘odd things’ in the world may likewise be denoted with this latter term, since

<sup>336</sup> Cf. APPENDIX 4 on “μορφή in Archaic Greek Literature” below.

they, too, have this 'shape or form'; however, those things, numbers like three and five, etc., do not belong to the 'types', they would not be called 'εἶδος'.

This distinction, I think, is borne out by the subsequent instances of the two Greek terms, and the interpretation receives further support from the way ἰδέα is introduced at 104b9 and employed thereafter. At 104b7, Socrates is still elaborating on the same phenomenon of things which are not opposites of anything themselves but have in them something that is an opposite to something else: ... φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκείνα τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντ' ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει ἀεὶ τὰναντία, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν ἰδέαν ἢ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὕση ἐναντία ἦ, ἀλλ' ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἦτοι ° ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολείσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομείναι ἔτι τρία ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι; ... [οὐ] μόνον τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα ἀλλήλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα. ... *it seems that not only those opposites do not admit of each other, but also the things which are not each other's opposites but always have the opposites; they as well do not seem to admit that ἰδέα which in each case is opposite to the one in them, but were it to approach, they would with certainty either perish or recede. Or do we not say that the three would rather perish or suffer whatever else, before it endured, while still being three, to become even? ... [not] only the opposite εἶδη do not endure each other when approaching, but also certain other things do not endure the opposites when they approach.*

When something 'becomes even', it displays the nature of 'what is even', 'the even'; one of the characteristics of 'three' is its 'oddness'; this 'figure', the oddness of the three, is opposed to that other 'figure', the 'evenness'; 'figure' here suggests something concrete, characterised, plastic, graphic. ἰδέα, *figure*, seems to refer to oddness, evenness, three, two, etc., in the same way μορφή, *shape or form*, does. Whether ἰδέα at 104b9 refers

to 'the oddness of a particular group of three, five, etc., things' or rather to 'oddness' itself need not be determined, and, as far as the text goes, cannot be determined. Whatever is 'odd' will not admit 'even'. The two 'figures' are incompatible, in whatever context. That is conditioned by the fact that the 'types', 'the odd' and 'the even', are opposed. As stated above, that does not imply that there are two things, 'the odd' and 'the even', which are 'types', and two other things, 'the figure of odd' and 'the figure of even'. However, 'the figure of odd' is peculiar to both the 'type' and any of its particular instantiations. That can also be witnessed in the subsequent passage, 104d1 ff.:

ἄρ' οὖν ... τάδε εἶη ἄν, ἃ ὅτι ἄν κατάσχη μὴ μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῦ ἰδέαν αὐτὸ ἴσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου αὐτῷ ἀεὶ τινος; ... οἴσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι ἃ ἄν ἢ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα κατάσχη, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιττοῖς. ... ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δὴ, φαμέν, ἢ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ ἢ ἄν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεται οὐδέποτε ἄν ἔλθοι. ... εἰργάζετο δέ γε ἢ περιττή; ... ἐναντία δὲ ταύτῃ ἢ τοῦ ἀρτίου; ... ° ἐπὶ τὰ τρία ἄρα ἢ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα οὐδέποτε ἦξει. *Is it now, ... , that they be those, which - when they possess something, they do not only force them to have their own ἰδέα, but also, through it, to have of an opposite. ... . Indeed, you know that whatever the ἰδέα of the three possesses, for those things it is necessary not only to be three but also odd. ... . And it was thus upon such a thing, ... , that that ἰδέα would never come which is opposite to that μορφή which brought that about. ... But certainly the odd <μορφή> brought it about. ... And the one opposite to it is that of the even. ... ° So, upon the three, the ἰδέα of the even will never come.*

'That which possesses' may refer to one of the 'types', which forces a thing to have its figure, it may - to employ Philolaus' usage - refer to one of the μορφαί, the 'shapes or forms' of that 'type'; that is the case with the 'figure of three' upon which the 'figure' opposite to that 'shape' which has brought it about that what is 'three' is also 'odd' would never come; that is the 'odd shape', as seems to be implied by ἢ περιττή in

104d12. It is opposite to the 'shape of the even', so that the 'figure of the even would never come upon the three'. After phrases such as τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου, τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ (twice), τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, in 105a, b, Socrates speaks of περιττότης in 105c, and again of τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέαν in 105d13. The one occasion, however, where one of two opposite 'types' is referred to *qua* 'type', εἶδος is used again (106d6): ὁ δέ γε θεὸς οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν, παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογηθεῖη μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι. *I believe, said Socrates, that the god and the 'type' of life and if anything else is immortal, that would be agreed upon by all to be indestructible.* Death was established as the opposite of life at 105d9; there are, therefore, the two opposing 'types' life and death, and the phrase αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος is in concord with that.

It is one thing to claim the existence of a distinction in meaning and to show that this distinction is consistently observed by an author in a particular context: that is the case with εἶδος, ἰδέα, and μορφή at *Phaedo* 100b - 105e; it is a different matter to demonstrate what the terms involved actually mean, and why they are chosen for a particular context. In the case of εἶδος, Pythagorean, and more specifically Philolaic origin could be established, and it could be shown how εἶδος as a word for 'type' could have come to be applied for certain, specified opposed 'types' which were the fundamental realities of this world order. It could then be shown in what way Socrates, speaking and behaving on the day of his death like a Pythagorean, could adopt this terminology which was applied first in a context Pythagoreans themselves would have had an interest in, but then more widely to what were for Plato the fundamental realities of this world order. It should be stressed that the meaning of εἶδος among Pythagoreans which I propose was 'type', in common Greek fashion; the meaning of εἶδος was not 'smallest constituent', 'fundamental reality'; it was through a thinking in polarities, in

pairs of opposites, that ‘type’ could be applied, as is the case in Philolaus B5, to those opposing principles which did, for some, underlie this world order.

Philolaus B5, on the other hand, ὁ γὰρ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ἔχει δύο μὲν ἴδια εἶδη, περισσὸν καὶ ἄρτιον, τρίτον δὲ ἀπ’ ἀμφοτέρων μειχθέντων ἀρτιοπέριττον· ἐκατέρω δὲ τῷ εἶδεος πολλαὶ μορφαί, ὡς ἕκαστον αὐτὸ σημαίνει. *Now, number has certainly two types, odd and even, and mixed from both of them as a third even-odd; and of each of the two types, there are many shapes or forms which each one itself indicates*, also provides μορφή, *shape or form*, as the word which may be applied to all the things characterised by those principles, or perhaps initially just to their shape or form; μορφή thereby refers to something more concrete, more characteristic, while εἶδος points rather to the status the principal realities occupy.<sup>337</sup>

There may be an early reflection of Pythagorean μορφή in the sense indicated here: As far as we can reconstruct it, the second half of Parmenides’ poem was designed to counteract other systems of belief, other cosmogonies, other scientific explanations of the world. Parmenides claims that his account is better than any other provided by men; and he goes on to report what men believe. One puzzling feature of the common beliefs of men is how elaborate a system is potentially presupposed. Parmenides commences his exposition of this system with the words (B8, 51)<sup>338</sup>: ... · δόξας δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας | μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων. | μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν, | τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεῶν ἐστίν· ἐν ᾧ πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν. | ἀντία δ’ ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ’ ἔθεντο | χωρὶς ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων· τῇ μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ, |

<sup>337</sup> For a similar relation between εἶδος and μορφή, cf. the discussion of *Airs, Waters, and Places* XIII, in Section VII of the chapter on εἶδος.

<sup>338</sup> For discussion of a number of points of detail, and general remarks on μορφή in this fragment, see Appendix 4 below.

ἤπιον ὄν, μέγ' ἐλαφρόν, ἐωυτῶ πάντοσε τωῦτόν, | τῶ δ' ἐτέρῳ μὴ  
 τωῦτόν· ἀτὰρ κἀκεῖνο κατ' αὐτὸ | τάντια νύκτ' ἀδαῆ, πυκινὸν  
 δέμας ἐμβριθές τε. | τόν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον εἰκότα πάντα φατίζω,  
 | ὡς οὐ μὴ ποτέ τις σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσση. ... : *but from here on*  
*learn the human belief and opinions, listening to the deceptive order of my words. They*  
*laid down as their cognitions to name two shapes, to name one of which is not right: in*  
*that, they have gone astray. But they judged them as opposite things as to build, and*  
*posited signs separated from each other. For the one <shape> aetherial fire of the*  
*flame, being mild, very light, in every way the same as itself, not the same as the other*  
*one: again also the other one for itself, as opposite, unknowing night, of dense and*  
*heavy build. I report to you the whole order as it is likely; thus not any one cognition of*  
*mortals will ever drive past you.* It may not be the place here to discuss at what stage  
 Pythagoreans were influenced by non-Pythagorean philosophers; but Heraclitus (DK  
 22B40; 81; 129) is witness of Pythagoras' notoriety at the time of Parmenides. If,  
 therefore, Parmenides speaks of δύο μορφαί, and then goes on to specify that one of  
 them is light, the other one night, that may echo Pythagorean thought and usage;  
 likewise, σήματ' ἔθεντο χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων does not only indicate a  
 separation of first principles from each other and from everything else, the fact that these  
 principles are referred to as σήματα may in some way be connected with Philolaus B5,  
 ἑκατέρῳ δὲ τῶ εἶδεος πολλαὶ μορφαί, ἃς ἕκαστον αὐτὸ σημαίνει;  
 what exactly is meant by the relative clause is difficult to determine with precision,<sup>339</sup> but  
 if μορφάς is here direct object to σημαίνει, they could supposedly be referred to as  
 σήματα with Philolaus as well.

<sup>339</sup> For discussion of some of the difficulties, cf. Huffmann, op. cit., p. 192f.

## VIII.

While *μορφή* is thus part and parcel of Pythagorean terminology taken over by Plato for the purposes of exposition of his thoughts in a Pythagorean setting, *ἰδέα* is not, to the best of our knowledge. On the other hand, *ἰδέα* is the word associated above all with the discussion of ontological matters in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*; and *ἰδέα* is, of course, also the word introduced in the *Euthyphro* side by side with *εἶδος*, in a context which is at least anticipatory of some of the aspects of Plato's ontology of the middle dialogues. All that could not be said about *μορφή*, a word which does not occur at all in the early dialogues. That is to say, judging from the early and middle dialogues other than the *Phaedo*, Plato seemed to have an interest in introducing the term *ἰδέα*, while he does not make use of *μορφή*.

As we have seen,<sup>340</sup> *ἰδέα*, other than *εἶδος*, was a word associated in some way with natural science, physical theories and speculations; it was used there in the sense of 'figure'. Anaxagoras, 59B4, had declared that the *σπέρματα*, *seeds*, or smallest particles, have all sorts of *ἰδέας*. Subsequently, Democritus, 68B167, stated that *δίνον ἀπὸ τοῦ παντός ἀποκριθῆναι παντοίων ἰδέων*, a sentence which at least on one reading, *a whirling was separated off <consisting> of all sorts of figures*, yielded *ἰδέαι* or 'figures' as the ultimate constituents of the world; but *ἰδέα* seems also otherwise to have been not only of significance, there is evidence that it was a standard term employed for denoting his atoms.<sup>341</sup>

Given that Plato never mentions Democritus,<sup>342</sup> but that there are clear traces of Democritus' thoughts in Plato's later dialogues, it is inherently unlikely that Plato had

<sup>340</sup> Cf. Sections III and VIII of the chapter on *ἰδέα*.

<sup>341</sup> For discussion of 68A164 and 68B141, see end of Section III of the chapter on *ἰδέα*.

<sup>342</sup> While there may be agreement that Plato reacted to Democritus in his later dialogues, absence of direct references usually excludes Democritus from modern discussions of early Platonic dialogues. Cf. e.g. J. Stenzel, *Platon und Demokritos*, in: *NJbKlassAltPäd* 1920, 89ff., repr. in: id., *Kleine Schriften*, 60 - 71. The situation has not changed dramatically since.

not come in contact with Democritus' work at all at the time of composition of the *Phaedo*. However, if Plato had decided, for whatever reason, not to mention the name of Democritus, one way of discussing his views is to let Socrates talk about Anaxagoras who was - apart from Leucippus - the one pre-Socratic who influenced Democritus most; what was Anaxagorean and what Democritean could have been discerned easily by a contemporary readership. I therefore suggest that in amongst a discussion starting from Anaxagoras and directed towards a readership with knowledge of things Pythagorean, Plato introduced a term that had its significance in the atomistic theory of Democritus. The reason for that will have been the same as with Anaxagoras and the Pythagoreans: In dealing with the most powerful and plausible ontological theories of his time, Plato singles out what he considers usable in terms of subject matter; he then adopts, at least for the purposes of discussion in this dialogue, items of the terminology with which those views were presented; in applying those terms selectively and, where necessary, with modifications as to the point of reference, Plato at once accepts and acknowledges achievements of his predecessors, criticizes and, where necessary, implicitly refutes their opinions, and speaks in a language a contemporary readership of some education would at least have been prepared for.

## IX.

What is at stake in this section of the *Phaedo* in particular is the nature of the ultimate constituents underlying this world-order, since if we know the make-up of the universe we will be in a better position to answer questions concerning the nature and the fate of the soul. Anaxagoras had posited a mixture of small bodies of all sorts, but had introduced besides something 'itself by itself'; some of the Anaxagorean examples of those 'seeds', like 'the big' and 'the small', 'the warm' and 'the cold', Plato uses as examples in his discussion; whatever he makes of this νοῦς or *mind* - and we do not have to decide here if Socrates' criticisms are justified - the notion of something 'itself by

itself' is useful; so are the verbs expressing the relation among the 'seeds', and between the 'seeds' and 'mind'; Plato adopts, at least in this part of the *Phaedo*, ἐνεῖναι, *being in*, and μετέχειν, *having of*; the latter was particularly suitable for his purposes since he uses μετέχειν frequently in his early dialogues to denote the soul's or mind's sharing in some virtue or vice, non-physical things, and since in the *Phaedo* the soul is in some way likened to those non-corporeal, invisible things which are 'themselves by themselves'; that is to say, because μετέχειν was familiar from both an Anaxagorean and a Socratic context, it could serve as a link and point of departure for an integration of Anaxagorean into Platonic views.

This connection with 'Socratic' terminology lies behind the use of παρουσία. The noun, and the verb παρῆναι, had formed part of Plato's own considerations of how attributes, in particular in the moral sphere, are connected with their bearers; in the *Gorgias* and in the *Lysis*, various possibilities of how things present can influence or determine that to which they are present, had been explored; there had, as yet, not been any theoretical discussion as to the ontological status of those things; they are here in the *Phaedo* given the independent status, almost, of Anaxagoras' mind.

κοινωνία, *community* or *communion*, was offered as an alternative relation obtaining between the visible objects of this world and the invisible constituents; it served the double purpose of implicitly suggesting a relationship between physical and non-physical things parallel to that of body and soul - for it was in this context that the term had been used in the *Phaedo* before - and at the same time of introducing a word probably connected with Pythagorean physical theories; and that was the area Plato wanted to turn to next; it is to be noted that nothing is made of κοινωνία as a term for the relation between εἶδη or ἰδέαι and particulars subsequently; it is therefore safe to say that the word was primarily chosen *ad hominem*, viz. *ad Pythagoram*.<sup>343</sup>

While for Anaxagoras the ultimate constituents of the world were 'mind itself by itself' and 'mixed seeds of all other things', the ultimate constituents of the Pythagoreans were

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<sup>343</sup> Note that the use and application of κοινωνία in *Republic* and *Sophist* are quite different from what we find here in the *Phaedo*.

certain opposites; these opposites were arranged in pairs; for some fundamental things underlying reality, there were 'two types' of those things; these types could not be reduced further; they were the principles of reality and existence. These principles were also called εἶδη, 'types', in an absolute use of the word. Plato adopts the word εἶδος for what he considers as ultimately underlying reality, and he says of these εἶδη that they are 'themselves by themselves', just as Anaxagoras said of his 'mind'. The Pythagoreans also spoke of μορφή, signifying with that term the nature, character and characteristics of the 'types' they posited; μορφή is a word Plato does not make use of in other contexts; it seems to be introduced in the *Phaedo* because it is an integral part of Pythagorean terminology. But it is, within the same context, gradually replaced by another word which was in some of its senses a near-synonym of μορφή in some of its senses. That word is ἰδέα.

ἰδέα is introduced, to all probability, because it was the word which denoted the smallest particles, the ultimate constituents of the cosmological system of Democritus. Unlike Anaxagoras' seeds, Democritus' 'atoms' in a sense existed 'themselves by themselves'; the flaw in Democritus' system was, from Plato's point of view, on the one hand the elimination of 'mind' altogether, on the other the fact that Democritus' ultimate constituents were corporeal. Nevertheless, since Plato wanted to posit a plurality of ultimate constituents, existing 'themselves by themselves', independent from corporeal stuff and to some extent independent of each other, and since he did not necessarily want to adopt such independent entities for all opposites, nor for opposites alone, Democritus' term ἰδέα, *figure*, a term also otherwise familiar from physical-cum-ontological theories, was suited as denoting something concrete, full of content, plastic, and as graphic as is possible for a word referring to something invisible.

With all three parties Plato addresses, his main innovation is what he chooses as ultimate constituents more than what he calls those constituents or which precise ontological status he assigns to them. For Anaxagoreans, Pythagoreans - despite the fact

that one of the pairs of opposites in the table reported by Aristotle is actually 'good and bad' - and Democriteans, it was not in the first place 'the beautiful', 'the good', 'the just' and 'the moderate' which were underlying the world; and while Plato talks in the *Phaedo* about 'the equal', 'the big' and 'the small', 'the odd' and 'the even', those un-Socratic items are not considered in the *Symposium*, the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*.

In a sense, therefore, Plato's innovation does not lie in the field of language and terminology, but wholly in the field of subject matter. However, it would have been impossible even to state that much before the origins of the terminology or terminologies he adopts had been investigated. Conversely, once the origin of a particular expression has become apparent, it is easier, or in some cases only then possible at all in the first place, to determine in exactly what way Plato diverged from his predecessors; to see to what extent his philosophy adopted content together with form, and to what extent he introduced new ideas of his own.

## X.

Up to now the *Phaedo* has been discussed as if there were no transition between the early Socratic dialogues and the *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Republic* and *Phaedrus*. That, of course, is not the case. The *Euthyphro* and *Meno* form a transition, linking some of Socrates' ways of asking questions with some of the answers Plato is prepared to give in the middle dialogues. Especially and in particular, the words εἶδος and ἰδέα are introduced, εἶδος alone in the *Meno*, both words in the *Euthyphro*. It would go too far to discuss *Euthyphro* 5c - 6e and *Meno* 72a - 73a here in detail. Suffice it to say that the terms are there employed in a way which could not possibly be understood from earlier Greek usage. Occurrence of the terms in question there does therefore not invalidate what has been said about the *Phaedo*. It does suggest, though, that rather than producing his newest doctrines in writing before discussing them in the Academy, there was

discussion, so that the words would have been familiar to those present. What Plato does in the *Phaedo*, then, is providing for a larger audience the origins of his thought and diction; perhaps because the need was felt to provide the information withheld in the transitional dialogues. This, however, is speculation.

## CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study has been to provide preliminaries for a better understanding of central parts of Plato's philosophy. Its method is a combination of traditional diachronic semantics and the study of the literary and social contexts of words which may be termed pragmatics. Its justification, it is hoped, is provided by an application of the results of those studies to a portion of Platonic text which is, in parts, reinterpreted in the light of some new findings.

The point of departure of the investigation undertaken is a passage from one of the dialogues of Plato's middle period which is generally assumed to contain the essence of his thoughts on matters ontological at the time of composition: *Phaedo* 100d - 105e. From this text, a number of significant terms, most of them recurring in other dialogues of similar date, have been selected: μετέχειν, παρῆναι, προσεῖναι, ἐνεῖναι, εἶδος, ἰδέα and some of their cognates; the histories of these terms have been traced, from their earliest occurrence in extant Greek literature, usually Homer, through the various authors and genres of epic, lyric and tragic poetry, historical, philosophical, medical and rhetorical writings, to the early dialogues of Plato himself. In the course of investigation it seemed appropriate to study the nouns εἶδος and ἰδέα in greater detail and to a degree approaching comprehensiveness, for two reasons: on the one hand, their semantic development is more marked and variegated, and therefore deserved more careful scrutiny; on the other, scholarly opinion is more divided as to the meaning and senses of these two nouns than with any of the other terms selected. For the same reason, it was deemed necessary to translate by far the majority of pre-Platonic occurrences of the two nouns in their contexts, a measure not required in the case of the verbs under consideration. That in itself is a first result: nouns are more readily employed with extensions in meaning than verbs; they are more likely to acquire a fixity in application which may amount to a technical terminology. The difference in status and

importance of the nouns over against the verbs is reflected in the separate arrangement of the material in Parts I and II.

Part III consisted of the application of some the results yielded by the semantic studies of the individual words in Parts I and II. It is in the nature of the exercise that many of the developments traced in Parts I and II are not made use of in Part III; however, it was felt that unless a complete study of all the various actual contexts prior in time were undertaken, it would not be possible to determine with certainty the meaning and connotations of any given term in any given text. What may at first have seemed to be mere diversion from the proper task proved to be indispensable; without it it would not have been possible on the one hand to show what the words could *not* mean, on the other, it would have been impossible to be sure what is relevant and what not before such an investigation was carried out. Had one been content with Anaxagoras and Pythagoreans in general as the background to the *Phaedo*, one or two essential elements would be missing. The effort was not in vain, as it could be shown with fair precision not only what the terms selected actually meant with Plato but more importantly, which literary and intellectual contexts Plato derived his philosophical terminology from: being able to determine to whom Plato reacted in his thoughts, and with whom he was in dialogue in his writings, is more important than bare linguistic reconstruction of 'meaning'.

We see Plato in the central philosophical passage of the central dialogue *Phaedo* in interaction with three at least partly distinct parties of pre-Socratic philosophers: Anaxagoras and his followers, the Pythagoreans, and Democritus. While most of that conforms with received opinion, reaction to Democritus at that early a stage in Plato's writing career is not usually assumed. That in itself, and the use Plato makes of the thoughts of his predecessors in fusing and correcting their assumptions while adapting their language to his own purposes may prompt us to reconsider some commonly held views on Plato's ontology.

However, the study here attempted is intended to be preliminary in nature; the application to a Platonic text in Part III is to be understood as one example only of how the semantic investigations of Parts I and II may be applied to the dialogues of Plato and other near-contemporary philosophical texts, and how this may change our perceptions of aspects both of the authors studied and of the history of Greek philosophy.

## APPENDIX I

*On Ancient Medicine and the Hippocratic Corpus*

*On Ancient Medicine* has received attention in connection with Plato's philosophy for a long time. Cf. in particular Taylor's comment, op. cit., p. 214: "a work indispensable to the serious student of the theories about ὑποθέσεις expounded in the *Phaedo*." And a little further, p. 214ff.:

"The *Περὶ ἀρχαίας ἰητρικῆς* is, as I have already hinted, of the first importance for the whole history of Greek Philosophy, so important indeed that no one who has not made a study of it should be esteemed competent to speak or write on the subject. It supplies us with the key not only to the conception of "hypotheses" which is fundamental for the understanding of the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, but also to the Platonic conception of the connection of pleasure and pain with ἀναπλήρωσις and κένωσις, and to the "Aristotelian" doctrine of the "mean". But no passage in the work is so important as the lines now before us. [*On Ancient Medicine* I,15.] Of themselves they are sufficient to destroy the whole current theory of the origin of the "doctrine of εἶδη." For they show that the terms εἶδος, αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ (Plato's αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό), κοινωνία already had a known and definite meaning in the medical science of the fifth century. In other words, the technical phrases of the *Phaedo* are not Plato's invention but belong to fifth-century science, and science of a kind with which we have already found that Socrates was familiar. Exactly what the phrases mean may briefly be explained thus. The writer, who shows his knowledge of the work of Empedocles by his repeated reference to just those four "opposites" which correspond most closely to the four Empedoclean "roots", is arguing against physicians who try to base a doctrine of diet on one of the philosophical theories (the ὑποθέσεις he calls them) about the elementary "body" or "bodies" of which man and other things are made. To these cosmological theories about the primary body or bodies he gives the name ὑποθέσεις, clearly a technical term in this sense, and his illustrations show that it is specially the Empedoclean ὑπόθεσις, that man, and everything else, is made of four such "roots", with which he is specially concerned. His own object is to show that medical knowledge has grown and will continue to grow best when it is based on careful knowledge of empirical facts, and unencumbered by any speculations about the ultimate forms of body. He argues, therefore, against those who insist on treating Empedoclean cosmology as a proper basis for medicine, that you cannot, in actually prescribing for a sick man, order him to take "something hot" or "something cold." That is, you cannot prescribe a diet which consists of absolutely pure "elementary" matter. You have to prescribe one or more of the articles with which we are all familiar, and none of these is a pure εἶδος; none of them is an "element" with a single specific property, "hot," "cold," etc.; all of them are compounds and therefore exhibit a "combination" of "opposites" (a κοινωνία of εἶδη). For, as he goes on to say, if you prescribe "something heating," your patient will at once ask "what thing?" and the moment you specify the "heating thing," you find that to be "heating" is not its only characteristic. It may be θερμὸν καὶ στρυφνόν or θερμὸν καὶ πλαδαρόν or θερμὸν ἄραδον ἔχον; it will never be merely θερμόν. ([note 1] Compare the exactly similar argument of Anaxagoras (πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐκ μὴ τριχὸς γένοιτο θριξὶ καὶ σὰρξ ἐκ μὴ σαρκός; *Fr.* 10, Diels), where the facts of nutrition are employed in exactly the same way against the belief in a finite number of simple "elements".) If we ask exactly how we are to translate εἶδος in this connection, the answer is instructive. As the example shows, θερμόν, ψυχρόν, and the rest of the "opposites" are εἶδη, but also each of these "opposites" is looked on, in the fashion of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, as a substantial *thing*, not as an attribute to some still more ultimate body. The discussion belongs to the time after the criticism of Parmenides and Zeno had destroyed, for men who could think, the old notion of a single primary body, but before anyone had grasped the notion that a thing could be real without being a body. ([note 2] As

Professor Burnet has shown, exactly the same ambiguity affects Anaxagoras' use of the word *χρήματα*. It is wrong in principle to ask if the *πάντα χρήματα* which are "in all things" are simple qualities. The distinction had not yet been felt. τὸ θερμόν is at once what we would call a simple "quality," and a simple body which is a "bearer" of the quality.) Hence εἶδος here means at once an ultimately simple *body*, and an ultimately simple sense-quality, and is, as for Plato, an exact equivalent of φύσις. The conception of the things of the actual world as constituted by a κοινωνία of several εἶδη is, in fact, exactly that which Plato ascribes to Socrates, I except that it has not yet been suggested that the simple "reals" are incorporeal."

I have quoted the two pages in full since although many if asked today would deny links between their own and Taylor's view most would employ the terminology and conceptual framework here used by him. Now, I do, of course, not dispute Taylor's assertion that the language of the *Phaedo* was "not Plato's invention but belong[s] to fifth-century science" in the sense that many terms found in the *Phaedo* were used there with more or less specific meaning and that Plato was familiar with that usage.

As to the position of *Ancient Medicine* within that context, however, Taylor simply assumes that its date is pre-platonic, and does not react to the converse suggestions by F. Z. Ermerins, *Hippocratis ... reliquiae* I - III, Utrecht 1859 - 1864, II, p. 28f., who is quoted approvingly by F. Poschenrieder, *Die platonischen Dialoge in ihrem Verhältnisse zu den hippokratischen Schriften*, Metten/Landshut 1882, pp.12, 52 (p. 37f., n. 5, Poschenrieder seems to argue only for dependence of *Ancient Medicine* on *Nature of Man*, and not, in addition, for a dependence on Plato - pace H. Herter, *Die Treffkunst des Arztes in hippokratischer und platonischer Sicht*, Sudhoffs Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin und der Naturwissenschaften 47 (1963), pp. 247 - 290, p. 262, n. 2), nor does Taylor answer the stylistic arguments for a date of composition in the fourth century advanced by F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit* I<sup>2</sup>, Leipzig 1887, p. 89.

The present situation is not dissimilar to that in 1911. The arguments for a post-platonic date of composition of *Ancient Medicine* by H. Diller, *Hippokratische Medizin und attische Philosophie*, *Hermes* 80 (1952), pp. 385 - 409, adduced in addition to what had been said by Ermerins, Poschenrieder, and Blass, are to my mind in their essence not sufficiently refuted by J.H. Kühn, *System- und Methodenprobleme in Corpus Hippocraticum*, Wiesbaden 1956, pp. 40 -56, especially p. 46ff., and H. Herter, op. cit., especially p. 261ff. - pace H. Diller, *Das Selbstverständnis der griechischen Medizin in der Zeit des Hippokrates*, in: *La collection Hippocratique et son rôle dans l'histoire de la médecine*, Leiden 1975, pp. 77 - 93, p. 92f.; nor by F. Heinimann, *Eine vorplatonische Theorie der τέχνη*, *Museum Helveticum* 18, 1961, pp. 105 - 130, p. 112, n. 32 - pace G. Rechenauer, op. cit., pp. 176, n. 154.


A date of composition in the fourth century, perhaps between 390 and 380, but perhaps after 380, is suggested by C. Lichtenthaeler, *Chronologische und gedankliche Bezugssysteme in und um "Über die alte Medizin"*, *Hippokratische Studien* XI, Genf 1980, p. 26ff., who supposes that the treatise was written by a sophisticatedly trained author.

J. Jouanna, *Hippocrate. L'ancienne médecine*, Paris 1990, pp. 76f. and 85, interprets methodological remarks on medicine in the *Gorgias* as going beyond anything said in this context in *Ancient Medicine*; his conclusion that therefore the Hippocratic treatise must antedate the Platonic dialogue would be convincing only if one assumes that the author of *Ancient Medicine*, if writing after the composition of the *Gorgias*, would by necessity have read the dialogue, and in addition that he would have reacted to Plato's distinction when writing on related subjects; that, however, need not be the case. Since Jouanna himself regards the remarks at *Phaedrus* 270c,d as inconclusive so far as the relation of the dialogue to any of the Hippocratic writings is concerned (cf. his concluding remarks p. 81, n. 3.), his dating of the treatise as pre-Platonic is not conclusive either. The same is true of his remarks on *Ancient Medicine* and Empedocles (p. 84f.), since we do not know and cannot say in what circles any of the pre-Socratic philosophers enjoyed what sort of influence and recognition.

A final decision on the relative and absolute chronology of *Ancient Medicine* would, in my view, require a new, comprehensive investigation of matters of style and content of the treatise.

APPENDIX 2

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## APPENDIX 3

On μορφή at *Phaedo* 103e ff.

Different commentators hold different views on how to understand μορφή at *Phaedo* 103e; in particular, there is no agreement as to whether or not the term is used there synonymously with ἰδέα, or with εἶδος and ἰδέα, or with neither of the two:

R.D. Archer-Hind, *The Phaedo of Plato*, London 1883, commentary ad loc., τὴν ἐκεῖνου μορφήν] On this Wytttenbach observes 'notatur alius verborum usus: quo εἶδος ut universalius habetur, μορφή minus universale et quasi communio τοῦ εἶδους : veluti *numerus impar* εἶδος dicitur, *tria* autem illius μορφήν habere'. But this distinction cannot be maintained; for as Wytttenbach himself points out, 104 D Plato says ἡ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ ἢ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεται, where μορφή = τῷ περιττῷ. In fact μορφή, εἶδος, and ἰδέα are in the present passage interchangeable words. 'The species has the μορφή of the genus present, with whatever else that μορφή may be combined', says Prof. Geddes, rightly."

H. Williamson, *The Phaedo of Plato*, London 1904, commentary ad loc.: "Here μορφή is used as a synonym of εἶδος and ἰδέα, as is proved by 104D ἡ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ: 'snow is not the same as "cold" (ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκείνο) but always contains the Idea of cold' (ἔχει τὴν ἐκεῖνου μορφήν)."

J. Burnet, *Plato's Phaedo*, Oxford 1911, commentary ad loc.: "τὴν ἐκεῖνου μορφήν : i.e. τὴν ἐκεῖνου ἰδέαν, τὸ ἐκεῖνου εἶδος. The three words are synonyms. Observe how the doctrine is formulated. There are things, not identical with the form, which have the form as an inseparable predicate (ἀεί, ὅταν περ ἦ)."

R.S. Bluck, *Plato's Phaedo*, London 1955, 'Introduction. 2. The theory of Forms in the *Phaedo*', p. 17f.: "It has been supposed [note 6: "Cf. e.g. Professor Dorothy Tarrant, *the Hippias Major*, introd. pp. lvii.-lviii."] that here [i.e. *Phaedo* 99ff.] and in the course of the proof of immortality that follows Plato must be thinking of the *Form itself* (in its capacity as the principle of existence) as entering and leaving sensible objects - that when a thing is beautiful, for example, the Form itself is somehow 'immanent' in it, when it ceases to be beautiful, the Form literally 'withdraws' - and that this absurdity is due to a confusion of metaphysical with logical values. Now here and there (e.g. 102B, 103B-C, 104B) Plato might appear to mean that the Form itself resides in particulars, but elsewhere a clear distinction is drawn between 'Tallness Itself' and 'that tallness which is in us' (102D), and in general between 'that which is in us' and 'that which exists in nature' (103B); and the alternative 'perish' and 'withdraw' could hardly apply to Forms themselves, which cannot move or change, still less perish. That alternative must be regarded as presenting itself to *copies* of Forms that inhere in sensible objects. [note 7: "The extent of the ambiguity is lessened if we take the terms μορφή and ἰδέα alike to mean Form-copy or 'character', as in the *Timaeus*, and reserve the translation 'Form' for the word εἶδος (cf. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, p. 184 with n. 1). But even so, and in spite of the above-mentioned phrases (102D - 103B) distinguishing 'that which is in us' from 'that which exists in nature', Plato's language is still in places liable to be misleading on the point (e.g. 102B, E, 103B-C, 104C). (In fact, I avoid rendering ἰδέα 'Form' simply because that would imply that the soul must be a Form, cf. 104D2-3; and the term is not necessarily technical.) Plato was enjoying using metaphorical imagery (cf. 102B, 104B, 106A), so that to speak as though Forms themselves were 'in' particulars would be in keeping with his mood; and the distinction between Forms and Form-copies was not relevant to his immediate point (*viz.*, the incompatibility of opposites - whether they be Forms *or* merely Form-copies - when one of the opposites concerned is what we should call an essential attribute). This conception of what I have called Form-copies seems to recur in the *Timaeus* (50C), where 'things that enter into and pass out of' the

'Receptacle' are described as 'copies of the eternally existent, modelled from them in a fashion hard to explain and marvellous.'] Such a Form-copy will be what we might call the 'quality' or 'character' of a thing; like the Form it represents, it cannot take upon itself the nature of its opposite (if it has one) [note 1: "102D, 103B."], but unlike the Form - presumably because of its lower ontological status, inasmuch as it appears in this world of sense and imperfection - it is capable of perishing (so that a particular manifestation of the Form may simply cease to exist) or else of 'withdrawing'.

R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedo*, Cambridge 1955, p. 150, n. 1 (on 103e): "At first sight it might seem natural to take αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος in E3 and ἐκεῖνο in E4 to mean the transcendent Form, and this would make the words ἔχει τὴν ἐκεῖνου μορφήν easier to understand. But it is immanent forms - characters like τὸ ψυχρόν which can approach and reside in concrete subjects that Socrates has been and still is concerned with; and although when he needs a noun (rather than the adjective ἐναντίον) to denote the immanent form he mostly uses ἰδέα (104B9, D2, 6, 9, E1), yet εἶδη is used at 104C7, where οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα ἄλληλα rules out reference to transcendent Forms.

The 'something else' (ἄλλο τι) which 'always bears the form's character' is, in terms of the example just given, the concrete lump of snow which always has 'cold' immanent in it. The words ἔχει τὴν ἐκεῖνου μορφήν are, strictly speaking, illogical, since ἐκεῖνο (in the example, τὸ ψυχρόν) is itself a μορφή (character); they are loose for ἔχει ἐκεῖνο ἐνόν. That μορφή and ἰδέα are synonymous is evident from 104D9 - 10. ..."

D. Gallop, *Plato. Phaedo*, Oxford 1975, note ad loc., refers to his note on 65d4 - e5 (p. 93 - 97), where he comments i.a. on "the terminology of the Theory" (p. 93): "Two of Plato's commonest semi-technical terms for Forms are *eidos* (102b1, 103e3, 104c7, 106d6) and *idea* (104b9, 104d2, 104d9, 104e1, 105d13). Both derive from a common root which appears in the Greek verb 'to see', and they are thus connected with the visual appearance of a thing. Ordinarily, they connote 'shape' or 'figure', and also 'sort' or 'species'. These associations are preserved in the conventional translation 'form', which has been adopted for both words in Form-referring use. A third word, *morphe*, also normally meaning 'shape', has been translated 'character' (103e5, 104d10). As used for Forms, the three words seem interchangeable. See note 72." Note 72 on 104d9 reads (p. 236): "No clear distinctions seem marked by Plato's usage of εἶδος, ἰδέα, and μορφή. At 104d9, as at 104b9, 104d2, 104d6, and 105d13, ἰδέα appears to be used as a variant for εἶδος as used at 104c7. Bluck (17, n. 7) and Hackforth (150, n. 1), both with reservations, suggest that εἶδος on the one hand, and ἰδέα and μορφή on the other, may be aligned with 'transcendent' and 'immanent' Forms respectively. But no safe inferences can, in fact, be drawn from the use of any of these expressions."

C.J. Rowe, *Plato. Phaedo*, Cambridge 1993, comments on 102b1: "εἶδῶν: P. here unobtrusively brings in one of his standard terms for 'form'." On 103e: "e3 αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος 'the form itself' (nothing can be true of 'the F in us' εἰς τὸ ἀεὶ χρόνον, but only ὅτανπερ ᾗι, 'whenever it exists', as in the case of the category about to be mentioned: e4 - 5). ... e4 - 5 ἀλλὰ καὶ κτλ. 'but also something else which is not that [the form itself], but which always has its character, whenever it exists'. μορφή, like εἶδος, is used in a special meaning, but one that is clearly deducible from the immediate context (both terms usually range between 'visible form' and 'class'). ... ." On 104b: "b9 οὐδὲ ταῦτα ... e1 ὑπεκχωροῦντα 'neither do these resemble things which admit [i.e. neither do these seem to admit] that character (ἰδέα), whichever it is that is opposite to the character which is in them, but when it advances, they [clearly] either perish or get out of the way' (...). ἰδέα is here synonymous with 103e5 μορφή (see d9 - 10 ἢ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκεῖνη τῆι μορφήι); in other dialogues it is used, like εἶδος, in the sense of (Platonic) 'form'."

## APPENDIX 4

## On μορφή in Archaic Greek Literature

μορφή is a word of uncertain etymological origin. Its original meaning and subsequent early semantic development are not, and perhaps cannot be, sufficiently explained. In what follows, I do not attempt to give a full history of the word, but rather to establish some fundamental features of its early usage.

μορφή occurs twice in the *Odyssey* and not at all with Hesiod. In Book VIII of the *Odyssey*, when in Scheria Odysseus, guest of the Phaeacians, is taunted by Eurylaus (164): οὐδ' ἀθλητῆρι ἔοικας, *you are not like a fighter*, Odysseus retorts (167): οὕτως οὐ πάντεσσι θεοὶ χαρίεντα διδοῦσιν | ἀνδράσιν, οὔτε φυὴν οὔτ' ἄρ' φρένας οὔτ' ἀγορητῦν. | ἄλλος μὲν γὰρ εἶδος ἀκιδνότερος πέλει ἀνὴρ, | ἀλλὰ θεὸς μορφήν ἔπεσι στέφει, οἱ δὲ τ' ἐς αὐτὸν | τερπόμενοι λεύσσοουσιν· ὁ δ' ἀσφαλέως ἀγορεύει | αἰδοῖ μιλίχρη, μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγρομένοισιν, | ἐρχόμενον δ' ἀνὰ ἄστῳ θεὸν ὧς εἰσορόωσιν. | ἄλλος δ' αὖ εἶδος μὲν ἀλίγκιος ἀθανάτοισιν, | ἀλλ' οὐ οἱ χάρις ἀμφιπεριστέφεται ἑπέεσσιν, | ὧς καὶ σοὶ εἶδος μὲν ἀριπρεπές, οὐδὲ κεν ἄλλως | οὐδὲ θεὸς τεύξειε, νόον δ' ἀποφώλιός ἔσσι. *Not in one way do the gods give pleasing things to all men, neither growth nor yet mind nor eloquence. One man, indeed, is weak in appearance, but god wreathes shape around his words, and the other men look at him, delighted; but he speaks unfailingly with soothing reverence; he finds favour with those who are gathered, just as if they looked at a god walking through the city. Again, another man resembles the gods as to his look, but for him, no grace is wreathed around his words, just as you are very stately as to look, a god could not fit it otherwise, as to mind, however, you are useless.*<sup>344</sup> 'θεὸς μορφήν ἔπεσι στέφει, *god wreathes shape around his words*'<sup>345</sup>, seems to be connected with: ὁ δ' ἀσφαλέως ἀγορεύει, *but he speaks unfailingly*; and it seems to be in contrast with: νόον δ' ἀποφώλιός ἔσσι, *as to mind, however, you are useless*. That this would be a simplified account of the situation shows a comparison with the related passage three books later in the *Odyssey*.

In Book XI, Odysseus recounts his errands to the Phaeacians. When he has finished, Arete, the queen, addresses her people (336): Φαίηκες, πῶς ὕμῃν ἀνὴρ ὅδε φαίνεται εἶναι | εἶδος τε μέγεθος τε ἰδὲ φρένας ἔνδον εἴσας; *Phaeacians, how does this man seem to be to you, as to look and size, and also equal wits within?* When Alcinous, the king, is asked to speak as well, he promises Odysseus gifts and a safe conduct home, provided he continues with his tale. Odysseus agrees to that request and does not fail to stress the need of copious gifts in order to establish his position as king on his return home. To that, Alcinous replies (363): ᾧ Ὀδυσσεῦ, τὸ μὲν οὐ τί σ' εἴσκομεν εἰσορόωντες | ἠπεροπῆά τ' ἔμεν καὶ ἐπικλοπον, οἶά τε πολλούς | βόσκει γαῖα μέλαινα πολυσπερέας ἀνθρώπους | ψεύδεα τ' ἀρτύνοντας, ὅθεν κέ τις οὐδὲ ἴδοιτο· | σοὶ δ' ἐπι μὲν μορφή ἑπέων, ἔνι δὲ φρένες ἐσθλαί, | μῦθον δ' ὧς ὅτ' ἀοιδὸς ἐπισταμένως κατέλεξας, ... . *Odysseus, looking at you, we do not liken you to a cheater and swindler, such as the black earth nourishes many man scattered all over the world who compose their deceits whence one would not see it: but with you, there is, surely, the shape of your words, and in you, there are noble wits, when you tell your tale with insight like a singer, ... . μορφή ἑπέων, the shape of your words, may not seem to be a satisfying translation; in order to make it look less paradoxical, 'shapeliness' and even 'comeliness' have been suggested;*<sup>346</sup> but that seems to evade rather

<sup>344</sup> Other aspects of this passage are discussed in Section I of the chapter on εἶδος.

<sup>345</sup> Rather than: 'god crowns his <deficient bodily> shape with words', as has been suggested.

<sup>346</sup> Even U. Hölscher, *Die Odyssee*, München 1988, p. 219, translates 'Schönheit', and builds part of his interpretation, not only of this particular passage, on that notion.

than further interpretation. μορφή, I think, is not a distinction of Odysseus's words that implies truth. 'Shape' is a property also of the liar's words which deceive ὄθεν κέ τις οὐδὲ ἴδοιτο, whence one would not see it. The external shape of Odysseus' words would not guarantee their truth; but 'to him', there also is understanding, insight like that of an αἰιδός, a singer, whose office it is to tell the truth. What Odysseus is praised for by the queen is his own outward appearance and his wits inside; that latter praise is taken up by the king who grants him 'shape of his words', but adds that he also has wits within - that is what makes himself and his story valuable rather than just deceptively pleasing. In this passage at least, μορφή, *shape*, seems to refer to something external, something from which one cannot see, and therefore cannot deduce, what the thing having this shape is like, in this case, if the words are, or are not, true.

In like wise, in the first passage, *Odyssey* VIII, 167ff., Odysseus starts off with 'what is pleasing'. That can be physical growth, in the broad sense of that word, wits, that is something mental, and, on this occasion, eloquence. ἀγορητύς is derived from the verb ἀγορεύω and signifies 'speaking-in-public'. Though 'speaking well in public' can be contrasted with 'looking good', it could also be contrasted with 'having understanding', just as 'having understanding' could be contrasted with 'looking good'. In Odysseus' statement, the *tertium comparationis* is 'pleasing', not 'good' or 'true'. At *Odyssey* VIII, 170, μορφή is that shape which words must have if they are to be pleasing, so that Odysseus, in speaking about the man whose words do not have that shape, can declare in paraphrase (175): ἀλλ' οὐ οἱ χάρις ἀμφιπεριστεύεται ἐπέεσσιν, but for him, no grace is wreathed around his words. That is not to be interpreted as if χάρις is a synonym of μορφή, just as little as εἶδος could be said to be a synonym of μορφή here. εἶδος is the 'look', the 'appearance' of a person, μορφή is the 'shape': and here it is the shape of the words, the ἔπη, which are in the text as a necessary complement, just as ἀνὴρ, the man, is that 'to which there is' εἶδος. If the shape of words is pleasing, those words can be said to be pleasing, to have χάρις, and if the look of a man is pleasing, that man can be said to be pleasing: 'in that respect', as the dialectician Odysseus does not fail to emphasize.<sup>347</sup>

A similar use of μορφή can be seen with Empedocles (Simplicius *Physica* 159, 13 = DK31B21): ἀλλ' ἄγε, τονδ' ὀάρων προτέρων ἐπιμάρτυρα δέρκευ, | εἴ τι καὶ ἐν προτέροισι λιπόξυλον ἔπλετο μορφή, | ... . Well then, look at this witness of my earlier words, if in them anything at all was incomplete in shape, ...<sup>348</sup> We do, of course, not know what exactly had come before this passage, but for the present purpose that is probably not relevant. Whatever it was, Empedocles presumably did not mean to say that his former words were incorrect or false; they were in some way insufficient. They were lacking in shape. This use of μορφή is the same as that of Alcinous who says that Odysseus' words have shape, or that of Odysseus who speaks more generally about someone who is capable of speaking pleasingly since his words have shape. Additional information about Empedocles' use of the word, however, can be derived if one compares B21 with B71 (Simplicius *De caelo* 529, 28): εἰ δὲ τί σοι περὶ τῶνδε λιπόξυλος ἔπλετο πίστις, | ... . But if, for you, persuasion was incomplete in anything with regard to those things, | ... . In both cases, the four elements are afterwards mentioned as that which Empedocles is going to explain. In both cases, he

<sup>347</sup> So it is slightly misleading if B. Mader declares in *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos* II, Göttingen 1991, col. 424, s.v. εἶδος: "Austauschwörter: εἶ(δος) ... wird aufgenommen von: μορφή ὅ 170, χάρις ὅ 175.

<sup>348</sup> Pace Diels - Kranz I, p. 319, who - in translating "Doch wohlan, schau auf folgenden Zeugen meiner früheren Worte, falls etwa noch in meinen früheren ein Mangel an ihrer (*der Elemente*) Gestalt geblieben war: ... ." - let μορφή refer to the apparition of the elements rather than the shape of the words; they probably think of μορφή as somehow synonymous with ἰδέα or εἶδος, which two words are reported to have been Democritus' names for the elements (cf. DK68B141; A57).

employs the adjective λιπόξυλος, *incomplete*, literally, *lacking wood*.<sup>349</sup> But whereas in the one case something in or with the words is incomplete in shape, in the other it is the words' power to persuade which has this predicate. Incomplete πίστις and incomplete μορφή alike require further explanation; one seems to go together with the other. πίστις, however, does not imply ἀλήθεια, *truth*, as can be seen from Parmenides DK28B1, 30, when he says that not only the truth must be learned, but also the belief and opinions of mortal men, ... ταῖς οὐκ ἐνὶ πίστις ἀληθείης, *in which there is no true power and cause of persuasion*. That seems to imply that there could be a πίστις οὐκ ἀληθείης;<sup>350</sup> Parmenides does not declare that there is no πίστις in what men say. On the contrary, if he thought that there were none, there would not have been any need to contrast his own doctrines so sharply with common belief, let alone a need to construct an elaborate system of human belief and opinions which are not true but nevertheless *valid* or *accepted belief*, δοκίμως (B1, 32).

Parmenides commences his exposition of this system with the words (B8, 51): ... · δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας | μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων. | μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν, | τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεῶν ἐστίν· ἐν ᾧ πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν. | ἀντία δ' ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ' ἔθεντο | χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων· τῇ μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ, | ἥπιον ὄν, μέγ' ἐλαφρόν, ἐωυτῷ πάντοσε τωυτόν, | τῷ δ' ἑτέρω μὴ τωυτόν· ἀτὰρ κάκεινο κατ' αὐτὸ | τάντια νύκτ' ἀδαῆ, πυκινὸν δέμας ἐμβριθές τε. | τὸν σοὶ ἐγὼ διάκοσμον εἰκότα πάντα φατίζω, | ὡς οὐ μὴ ποτέ τις σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσση. ... : *but from here on learn the human belief and opinions, listening to the deceptive order of my words. They laid down as their cognitions*<sup>351</sup> *to name two shapes, to name one of which is not right: in that they have gone astray. But they judged them as opposite things as to build, and posited signs separated from each other. For the one <shape> ethereal fire of the flame, being mild, very light, in every way the same as itself, not the same as the other one: again also the other one for itself, as opposite, unknowing night, of dense and heavy build. I report to you the whole order as it is likely, so that not any one cognition of mortals will ever drive past you.*

It is to be noted that ἔοικός, *likely*, in line 60, is i.a. a term of rhetoric. In the absence of facts, one produces arguments *from what is likely*, ἐξ ἔοικόντων, in order to achieve persuasion. That fits in well

<sup>349</sup> It would be interesting to know how widespread the use of λιπόξυλος was. The word is not attested in pre-hellenistic Greek apart from these two instances. Its etymology points to the sphere of wood-working crafts as place of origin. If that be so, one would like to know if Empedocles modelled B21 on B71 or the other way round. If λιπόξυλον μορφή is earlier than λιπόξυλος πίστις, could μορφή have been applied to the shape of a wooden structure? - We know too little about either word.

<sup>350</sup> A πίστις which leads to δόξα, not ἀλήθεια, is mentioned by Socrates, *Phaedrus* 274e7 - 275b2.

<sup>351</sup> On γνώμη in early Greek literature, cf. B. Snell, *Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophie*, Berlin 1924, pp. 31 - 39; on Parmenides' usage in particular, *vid.* p. 37 with note 2. I am not sure, however, if Snell's interpretation of Parmenides' usage as revaluation of γνώμη as δόξα is correct in this instance. For mortals, what they posit is cognition and insight; they lay down that 'there are two shapes' as insight, as if they knew. When in B8, 61 other systems of thought are classed under the general term of βροτῶν γνώμη, that is 'what humans call γνώμη' rather than simply 'human opinion' in contrast with 'divine opinion'. Cf. also J. Lyons, *Structural Semantics. An Analysis of Part of the Vocabulary of Plato*, Oxford 1969, p. 176, n. 4. It is tempting to take κατέθεντο ... γνώμας as ἔθεντο γνώμην. While the prefix does not present a problem, it perhaps remains difficult to account for the plural of γνώμας. *Pace* e.g. E. Heitsch, *Parmenides. Die Fragmente*. München 1974, <sup>2</sup>1991, p. 180: "In Vers 53 ist γνώμην κατατίθεσθαι [sic!] (vgl. Theogn. 717) zu verstehen wie γνώμην τίθεσθαι: 'seine Meinung im Sinne einer Willensäußerung kundtun' (Herodot III 80,6; VII 82; VIII 108,2)." The places adduced all have γνώμην in the singular.

with Parmenides' earlier mention of πίστις ἀληθῆς in connection with his exposition, and in particular with B8, 38ff.: ... | οὐλον ἀκίνητόν τ' ἔμεναι· τῷ πάντ' ὄνομ' ἔσται | ὅσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ. (Being) is whole and unmoved: so that everything will be <mere> name, <everything> laid down by mortals, persuaded of its being true. Here the goddess says explicitly that something which is not true has πίστις, power and cause of persuasion.<sup>352</sup>

The verb employed by Parmenides for 'the laying down' of a name is κατατίθημι, a verb used in legal context in the sense of *decree*; the same verb used in B8, 53: μορφᾶς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν, they laid down as their cognitions to name two shapes. Men decree to name two shapes, etherial fire and night. From the point of view of the goddess, these two shapes are not real, but only apparent; just names. As names and in their outward shape they are manifest. μορφαί is the characterisation given by the goddess. μορφῆ here refers to the opposite of what something really is, its mere outward shape. That is in agreement with the usage of Empedocles who contrasted the content of his exposition with the shape he had given it, and also in agreement with the use of the word in the Odyssey, where words which are true and spoken with insight can have the additional predicate of having shape, that is to say good shape which makes a speech pleasing in addition to its being true in content.<sup>353</sup>

This contrast is also found with Empedocles in another context. Sextus Empiricus and Origines, in discussing Pythagorean abstinence from meat, and metempsychosis which by Origenes (*Contra Celsum* V 49) is termed τὸν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς μετενσωματουμένης μῦθον, the myth about the soul's being reembodyed, adduce verses of Empedocles. Sextus quotes (*Adversus Mathematicos* IX 129 = DK31B137): μορφὴν δ' ἀλλάξαντα πατὴρ φίλον υἱὸν αἰείρας | σφάζει ἐπευχόμενος ... . The father, lifting his dear son who has changed his shape, slaughters him praying. The point of the thought expressed here is that the soul which is re-embodyed remains the same; and that thereby the continuity of the person, in the modern sense of that word, is guaranteed. What changes is only the outward shape, a shape which does not determine what, or who, somebody or something really is.

This is the background against which other early passages containing the word μορφῆ can be understood.

<sup>352</sup> That is not contradicted by Parmenides' use of the adjective πιστός in B8, 50, for the goddess herself, from her position of universal insight, declares only the one truth as trustworthy, regardless of the persuasiveness of any other view.

<sup>353</sup> Pace e.g. A.H. Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides*, Assen/Maastricht 1986, p. 219f., who asserts that "the word μορφῆ in its earliest use signifies beauty of form, or external form or shape generally, usually as an attribute of a person or of a thing but sometimes, as here, denoting the person or thing itself. ... . P[armenides] uses the word in the plural to refer to a pair of homogeneous, unchanging substances with both sensible and non-sensible characteristics." The passages adduced by Coxon in support of this usage are Aeschylus *Prometheus Vincit* 209f., Sophocles *Electra* 197f., and Euripides frg. 484, 2. - For some further instances, cf. LSJ s.v. μορφῆ.

Cf. also A.E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica* I, Oxford 1911, p.252f., who would translate "they have made up their minds to give names to two bodies, whereof one should not receive a name"; he supposes that Parmenides' "reasoning throughout turns on the assumption that if you admit that empty space is at all, you must believe that it is a kind of body, as has been well brought out by Professor Burnet."

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