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‘PARADOXES OF BRIDGING AND BONDING’

*EXPLAINING ATTITUDES OF GENERALIZED TRUST FOR PARTICIPANTS
OF ETHNICALLY MIXED AND TURKISH VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS
IN AMSTERDAM*

Wahideh Achbari

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that, except otherwise indicated, this thesis is entirely my own work, and that the work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification except as specified.

ABSTRACT

Recently in the Netherlands and in Amsterdam, policymakers have started to see generalized trust as an indicator of societal cohesion, which is taken to be endangered by participating in ethnically homogenous or bonding organizations. However, there is no study that supports this negative socialization effect. Existing surveys in the Netherlands and in Amsterdam lack either appropriate data on ethnic minorities or do not allow this question to be properly addressed. They do not contain the relevant variables or do not have a multilevel structure, since the latter requires one to sample many responses from the same organization rather than collect data that is representative of individuals. This thesis addresses this gap in the literature by juxtaposing Turkish (bonding) associations with organizations whose membership consists of different ethnic groups (bridging).

I surveyed 40 non-profit organizations in Amsterdam and collected responses from around 450 participants. I subsequently describe different bonding and bridging practices within and between organizations, and demonstrate that Turkish, as compared to mixed organizations, are internally focused on their own group, but externally are more involved in bridging networks. Thus contact within Turkish organizations is confined to fellow ethnics and this allows for testing the contact hypothesis. This thesis employs a multilevel model and distinguishes individual attributes from organizational factors (ethnic composition). However, the variance in generalized trust at the organizational level is only 4%, which indicates that the context of voluntary organizations has not much influence on it. Secondly, I test an interaction effect between the mixed ethnic composition of an organization and the length of participation in years in order to test for a socialization effect (the contact hypothesis). However, this interaction effect is not statistically significant. Finally, I test for another interaction effect, namely the effect of having a close tie in a mixed organization, in order to test for a sufficient but not necessary condition of the contact hypothesis, which might turn contact into attitude change. Again, this interaction is not statistically significant.

Beyond bridging and bonding, there are complementary mechanisms which might have affected generalized trust. I, therefore, extend my model to include

cognitive evaluations about one's humanitarian values, negative life experiences and socio-economic factors. Three theoretical frameworks are tested: psychological; norm driven; and social success. The findings suggest that differences in generalized trust are best explained by individual processes rather than contact between ethnically diverse groups in voluntary organizations. Optimism has the strongest effect size on generalized trust. Other key factors are educational levels, and to some extent older age as well as having been widowed or lost one's partner due to divorce. Younger people who adhere to humanitarian values are also among the high generalized trusters. The effect of education, age and the experience of divorce or separation is also found in other Dutch representative national samples and support the consensus around social success theories in explaining generalized trust.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: WHY THIS STUDY?

With 192 million people residing outside their place of birth ("International Organization for Migration" 2011), one of the contemporary global challenges is arguably brought about by increasing migration flows. The accompanied ethnic diversity and changed demographics induced by immigration is said to be making democratic politics more difficult. In 2007 the political scientist Putnam published an article in which he claimed that in the short term ethnic diversity will adversely affect civic participation, which, in turn, will affect the generation of trust and solidarity. Not only out-group trust is affected by ethnic diversity, according to Putnam, people in mixed or diverse neighbourhoods are said to even distrust their own groups. People in diverse areas thus "hunker down" like turtles (Putnam 2007). This piece of research has received considerable attention in the media, academic and policy circles. British news papers' headings ranged from "Immigration is bad for society, but only until a new solidarity is forged" (Bunting 2007), "Mixed-race neighbours 'less trusting'" (Johnston 2007) to a less nuanced title "Today's Garda turban row is tomorrow's race riot. Ask Paris..." (Waghorne 2007). The reports were not just confined to Britain, as most Western European media picked up the debate too.

Despite this conundrum empirical research about the link between diversity and the supposed declining civic life and trust is only now rising (for discussion see Ramakrishnan & Bloemraad 2008; Harell & Stolle 2010). Not merely from a theoretical point of view, but also from a policy angle the claim about increasing diversity and the decline in trust is worth studying. The present project is thus born out of this academic, policy and journalistic debate about the adverse effect of ethnic diversity and seeks to contribute to it. The aim of this thesis is then to assess differences in generalized trust among participants of ethnically mixed and Turkish non-profit organizations in Amsterdam and shed light on the underlying mechanisms behind the generation of generalized trust. I take Turkish organizations as an example in which bonding is high and ethnically mixed organizations where ethnic divides are bridged.

Recently, policymakers have started to see generalized trust as an indicator of societal cohesion, which is taken to be endangered by participating in ethnically homogenous or bonding organizations. However, there is no study that supports this negative socialization effect. Existing surveys in the Netherlands and in Amsterdam lack either appropriate data on ethnic minorities or do not allow this question to be properly addressed ("Leefsituatie allochtone stedelingen 2004-2005" [The Living Condition of Urban Minorities]; "Burgermonitor [Citizens' Monitor]"; "De Familie-enquête Nederlandse Bevolking 2009 (FNB-2009) [The Dutch Family Survey]"). They do not contain the relevant variables or a multilevel structure, since the latter requires one to sample many responses from the same organization rather than collect data that is representative of individuals. This thesis addresses this gap in the literature by juxtaposing Turkish (bonding) associations with organizations whose membership consists of different ethnic groups (bridging).

I surveyed 40 non-profit organizations in Amsterdam and collected responses from approximately 450 participants. I subsequently describe different bonding and bridging practices within and between organizations, and demonstrate that Turkish, as compared to mixed organizations, are internally focused on their own group, but externally are more involved in bridging networks. Thus contact within Turkish organizations is confined to fellow ethnics and this allows for testing the contact hypothesis (Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). This thesis employs a multilevel model and distinguishes individual attributes from organizational factors (ethnic composition). However, the variance in generalized trust at the organizational level is only 4%, which indicates that the context of voluntary organizations has not much influence on it. Secondly, I test an interaction effect between the mixed ethnic composition of an organization and the length of participation in years in order to test for a socialization effect (the contact hypothesis). However, this interaction effect is not statistically significant. Finally, I test for another interaction effect, namely the effect of having a close tie in a mixed organization, in order to test for a sufficient but not necessary condition of the contact hypothesis, which might turn contact into attitude change. Again, this interaction is not statistically significant.

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cognitive evaluations about one's values, negative life experiences and socio-economic factors. Three theoretical frameworks are tested: psychological; norm driven; and social success. The findings suggest that differences in generalized trust are best explained by individual processes rather than contact between ethnically diverse groups in voluntary organizations. Optimism has the strongest effect size on generalized trust. Other key factors are educational levels, and to some extent older age as well as having been widowed or lost one's partner due to divorce. Younger people who adhere to humanitarian values are also among the high generalized trusters. The effect of education, age and the experience of divorce or separation is also found in other Dutch representative national samples and support the consensus around social success theories in explaining generalized trust.

1.1 What is generalized trust and why study it in voluntary organizations?

Trust is often said to be an elusive concept, which at best is difficult to define and consequently to measure. Many definitions are circulating. While some see trust as norm driven, others define it within a rational choice framework (Nannestad 2008: 414-5). Trust can be conceived as "encapsulated interest", which means: "To say that I trust you with respect to some matter means that I have reason to *expect you to act in my interest* with respect to that matter because you have good reasons to do so, *reasons that are grounded in my interest* (Hardin 1999: 26)." Yamagishi and Yamagishi's (1994) concept of trust as 'social intelligence' is also in line with the rational framework, since trust is seen to involve a risky endeavour. Alternatively, trust is conceptualised as norm driven, since it is argued to be learned through early socialization (Uslaner 2002). However, as Hardin (1999: 24) aptly notes: "There is little point in quibbling over the essential meaning of trust: It has no essential meaning. Rather, it has a variety of meanings that often conflict".

Generalized trust

Despite the conceptual debate, most researchers utilize the generalized trust question in their analyses. The question is as follows: "Generally speaking would you say that

most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with them".¹ The answer options are "Yes" and "No", but if one spontaneously says "I don't know" it will be recorded as such. This question is designed by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and used in Germany in 1948 for the first time (Zmerli, Newton & Montero 2007: 38). Almond and Verba (1963) also used it in their seminal work *The Civic Culture*. Subsequently, this question has widely been drawn on in research on trust.

The study of generalized trust has since become truly an industry. Partly this has to do with data readily being available from large scale surveys such as the American General Social Survey, the World Values Survey, the Social Capital Benchmark Survey, the Citizenship Involvement and Democracy survey, the European Social Survey, the Eurobarometer in addition to many studies commissioned by Western European governments and not to mention individual projects. Most surveys have incorporated the generalized trust question in several waves.

The political culture literature has conceptualised generalized trust as a civic attitude (Foley & Edwards 1999). In their seminal study, Almond and Verba (1963) defined generalized trust as the level of confidence of a person in his/her social environment. They studied generalized trust in five Western countries (United States, Mexico, Great Britain, Germany and Italy) and argued that countries with a longer tradition of democracy scored higher on this attitude. This has led to the reasoning that belief in the trustworthiness of others is a core democratic virtue (see for example Stolle 1998; Paxton 2002) and a moral value reflecting belief in a cooperative human nature (Uslaner 1999; 2002). In Putnam's (2007) more recent research he implies that generalized trust is an attitude reflecting one's lack of prejudice towards ethnic out-groups. Several Dutch governmental reports also take generalized trust as a measure of social cohesion and integration (Schnabel, Bijl & de Hart 2008). It seems that researchers base their definition on their ideological position, questions and available data. I leave measurement and operationalization issues of generalized trust for the next chapter and here will only discuss conceptual concerns about generalized trust.

¹ To be conceptually precise, the generalized trust question taps into trustworthiness of others rather than the trusting behaviour of the respondent. To say that one trusts others is synonymous with saying that you trust others to behave in an expected manner (Hardin 2002: 31).

The idea of ‘civic culture’, discussed above, has been reinvigorated under the rubric of social capital. But this concept is very problematic. Social capital is defined by Putnam (1995: 67) as ‘features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’. Other definitions (Bourdieu 1986; Lin 2001) refer to reciprocal enforceable trust in specific actors or institutions, which are part of a network (Portes 1998; Tilly 2005). Generalized trust might be related to involvement in specific types of relationships, but it might not. By lumping relationships, trust and networks into one definition, (i.e. social capital by Putnam 1993; 2000) one avoids theoretical precision about the interrelationship between different components of social capital (Newton 1999b). Similarly, by labelling generalized trust as a civic attitude, researchers put emphasis on the function it serves, namely enhancing democratic stability (Almond & Verba 1963) or more recently the quality of democratic governance (Putnam 1993; Knack & Keefer 1997; Fukuyama 2001). This is based on ideological rhetoric and relates the concept to how a good citizen *should* behave, namely trusting and sociable (Roßteutscher 2006). Moreover, by labelling civic attitudes as social capital or vice versa, one avoids why and how generalized trust itself is inherently good. Some argue that voluntary associations promote the development of generalized trust, or that it is the right habit of the heart, or that it enables collective action (Putnam 1998; 2000). Hence, generalized trust is good. But here the argument becomes tautological. In other words, there’s not much inherent worth in studying generalized trust without specifying how adherence to this attitude contributes to a democratic system.

Recent discussions on generalized trust fill this gap (Nannestad 2008; Sturgis & Smith 2010; Sønderskov 2011). Firstly, the definition of generalized trust is more precise. It is arguably a norm reflecting expectations about the trustworthiness of others unknown to the person or strangers (Offe 1999; Uslaner 2002; Sturgis & Smith 2010). This definition frees the concept from overly normative assumptions about the current state of Western democracies, although the ideal is still kept to mind. Thus, we can move on to explain its interrelationships with other attitudinal constructs such as individualistic norms, tolerance, etc. Secondly, recent findings suggest that generalized trust is a vital attitude in large N collective action dilemmas in which the other is not known (Sønderskov 2009). While Putnam (1993: 163-64)

argues that generalized trust is a prerequisite of cooperation and of resolving collective action dilemmas, his theoretical examples often focus on small collaborative efforts in which information about the other actors is available through other network members. For example, a person enters a collaborative relationship, because specific information about the other actors (their reputation) is available. Next, reciprocity, exchange and control are fundamental in sustenance of these ties. However, one can also enter a collaborative relationship based on a generalized expectation about the nature of people. Thus, there equally can be a scenario when people are involved in small collaborative endeavours but do not adhere more to generalized trust. Therefore, generalized trust might not be a necessary condition behind cooperation in a situation when people in a so-called “small game” are known to the person. In other words, and in line with recent theorizing discussed above, generalized trust becomes an important attitude if it enables people to cooperate when they have incomplete information about the other or cannot imagine how the other will behave. This is typical to the complex nature of contemporary societies and makes studies on generalized trust very relevant.

Another apparent truism runs through many social capital studies; such that relations in ethnic communities and groups are all based on strong ties (cf. Portes 1997) and this negatively relates to the development of generalized trust (Stolle 1998; Newton 1999b). These observations fail to see that members of ethnic communities are embedded in the same complex large scale democracies and that loyalty towards fellow ethnics is not always automatic (Portes 1997). Therefore, if we are to take generalized trust as an important ingredient of a democratic polity we also need to empirically know which settings help or impede its development. In this vein, I aim to investigate whether contact with fellow ethnics in voluntary organizations has the presumed negative effect on the development of generalized trust or whether there are other explanations out there.

The role of institutions

There is a perennial debate whether institutional setups that promote equality foster the development of generalized trust or whether active involvement in voluntary organizations does the job (for discussion see Stolle 2003). The scope of this thesis does not allow to address this issue. Nevertheless, not only is generalized trust

related to institutional norms of fairness and equal treatment, the size and density of the organizational landscape is also shaped by opportunities and constraints set by those same institutional norms (Smith, Maloney & Stoker 2004; Maloney & Roßteutscher 2007b; Ramakrishnan & Bloemraad 2008). Maloney and Roßteutscher (2007b) find that the size and density of the associational life, in addition to involvement ratios, within those organizations is dependent on the different cities' political opportunity structure (varying between Spain as least favourable to Scandinavian countries as most favourable). The migration literature has also mapped ethno-national organizations in Amsterdam (Vermeulen, Brünger & Van de Walle 2009), the Netherlands (Van Heelsum 2005) and by comparing them to other institutional environments such as Berlin, it has found that political opportunity structures shape the number, densities of organizational networks, and hence their mobilization opportunities and efforts (Vermeulen 2005; Vermeulen & Berger 2008; Peters 2010).

While legal norms of citizenship are not so decisive in whether the general public participates or not, migration researchers cannot avoid it. Whether immigrants participate in social and political life has often been related to how Western European states incorporate minorities, which is often traced to historical and national repertoires of citizenship and even national self-understandings of citizenship (Koopmans & Statham 2000; Odmalm 2005; Vermeulen 2005; Ramakrishnan & Bloemraad 2008; Morales & Giugni 2011). Different institutional set-ups create different opportunities and constraints for immigrants and minorities to establish organizations and hence also create different avenues for socialization.

Ethno-national associations: the 'dark side' of civic participation?

As noted above, the health of a democracy is said to be dependent on the volume and pattern of relationships among its voluntary organizations, but it also depends on what happens in those very associations. In other words, to what extent are organizations capable of turning the individual into a good citizen with the right habits of heart? These are the assumed internal or developmental effects of participation, although voluntary organizations are also expected to have external effects too (Warren 2001; Roßteutscher 2006). By developmental or internal effects, it is meant that members of associations learn attitudes of cooperativeness, trust or

public spiritedness and democratic capacities (Putnam 1993: 89-90; Warren 2001: 71-6). By institutional effects it is meant the external weight associations could put on public governance and the process of decision making (Warren 2001: 77-82). Consequently, there is a lot of theorizing about what *type* of organizations should contribute to a civic culture, to democracy or even to social capital. However, since these concepts mean different things and the external and internal effects are sometimes conflated by just labelling them as social capital, the theories diverge as well. The focus here will be on the alleged difference between ethnic and mixed organizations and their effect on generalized trust, since this constitutes a major gap in the literature. In addition, the focus is on one aspect of internal or developmental effects, namely generalized trust.

A growing body of research thus emphasizes the role of voluntary organizations as vehicles for production of norms of reciprocity and attitudes of generalized trust (for review see Stolle & Howard 2008; cf. Nannestad 2008). Voluntary organizations are arguably the “schools of democracy” where people learn to become active citizens and adhere to norms of trust (Warren 1999; 2001). However, it is argued that different types of organizations have varying effects on adherence to civic attitudes of their members (Stolle & Rochon 2001; Coffé & Geys 2007a; Maloney, Van Deth & Roßteutscher 2008). A corollary to this literature is the assumption that participation in ethnic organizations induces particularistic trust and attitudes as opposed to generalized trust (Newton 1999b; Putnam 2000; Stolle & Rochon 2001; Uslaner 2002; Uslaner & Conley 2003; Jennings & Stoker 2004; Marschall & Stolle 2004; Theiss-Morse & Hibbing 2005; Paxton 2007).

It is argued that ethnic organizations bring people together from the same background, and hence would impede the development of norms that transcend the in-group. Participating in organizations that bring people from dissimilar backgrounds is seen to be conducive towards adherence to generalized trust. These two different setups have been labelled as ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’. Putnam defines bonding organizations as those that are “inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups” (Putnam 2000: 22). Bridging organizations are, however, “outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages” (Putnam 2000: 22). These assumptions put forward by Putnam

seem to be inherited from the civic republican theories of democracy, which sit uneasily with a segmented form of civil society on the basis of identity (see Warren 2001).

Contrary to the above, Putnam (2007) recently asserts that residents of homogenous neighbourhoods have a greater propensity to trust generalized others. Heterogeneity of environment, on the other hand, would inhibit the development of out-group and even in-group ties, consequently leading to isolation. Putnam reaches this conclusion based on research on neighbourhoods, not on associations, and is therefore not directly contradicting his previous conclusions on the virtuous effect of diversity (bridging) within associations. However, one could extend his argument from neighbourhoods to associations and question whether in-group ties are necessarily detrimental for adherence to generalized trust. The association between generalized and particularized trust that is sketched by the researchers above does not need to be a zero-sum relation.² There are two other scenarios possible that research has so far ignored. Not only can participation in ethno-national associations go hand in hand with the development of generalized trust (a 'compatibility model'), but a more optimistic model also suggests that participation in these associations would increase one's level of generalized trust (a 'win-win' model) (Rijkschroeff & Duyvendak 2004: 21).

In short, the two approaches described above –one focusing on bridging and bonding organizations, the other on the effects of diversity in neighbourhoods– provide rather different accounts of how generalized trust might be produced. In addition, recent empirical studies about ethnic organizations challenge whether participation in homogenous associations would simply be detrimental for generalized trust of the members. The hypothesized differences in adherence to generalized attitudes of trust among members of ethno-national associations and mixed associations should be open to an empirical enquiry. To date a systematic comparison of generalized trust for members of these two types of associations is lacking in the literature. There are some studies on the effect of interethnic contact in sport organizations (Van der Meulen 2007). However, they do not control for the

² Putnam (2007) recently acknowledges this, but confusingly his constrict theory only predicts negative outcomes.

length of membership in those organizations and ethno-national organizations are underrepresented in these studies.


In fact, participation in ethno-national organizations is generally related to participation of ethnic minorities in host society politics (Fennema & Tillie 1999; 2001; Berger, Galonska & Koopmans 2004; Jacobs, Phalet & Swyngedouw 2004; Koopmans 2004; Tillie 2004; Togeby 2004; Tillie & Slijper 2007). There are variations amongst Western European countries, notably explained by how national repertoires of citizenships produce opportunities and constraints for migrants to set up associations (Vermeulen 2005) and consequently impact their level of political participation (Odmalm 2005). In a study of immigrant's levels of generalized trust, Dinesen and Hooghe (2010: 721), however, find no evidence for integration policies in different countries. Instead they find a positive effect of acculturation in the host countries. That is to say immigrants adapt to the host societies' level of generalized trust. Could this acculturation then be advanced by interethnic contact in voluntary organizations? If the contact mechanism is at work, we should be able to find substantive differences in levels of generalized trust between participants in ethno-national and mixed associations controlling for their length of participation, their resources, and other salient demographic characteristics.

1.2 Why study bridging and bonding in Amsterdam?

There are a few reasons why Amsterdam is a suitable or even ideal city for investigating interethnic contact in voluntary organizations. The Migration Policy Institute in Washington (Benton-Short, Price & Friedman 2007) classifies Amsterdam as a hyper diverse city ranking number 3 in their list of 106 global cities. Their measure of diversity is not only based on the percentage of foreign-born of the total population, they also include the percentage of foreign-born not from a neighbouring country. In addition, in hyper diverse cities no one group represents more than 25% of the foreign-born stock. These measures all reflect the sheer number of diverse people and also represent the extent of cultural diversity in the city. However, the majority of the foreign-born in Amsterdam is from a non-Western background such as Turkey, Morocco, and Suriname.

As the map below shows, ethnic minorities are spread over the city and there are no ghettos like in Paris and London, although the South East district is densely populated by minorities from the former Dutch colonies. As Musterd and Ostendorf (1998: 195) note a concept such as ‘hypersegregation’ is without value in the Dutch case.

Figure 1.1 The distribution of Non-Western inhabitants in Amsterdam districts



Source: <http://www.os.amsterdam.nl>

Amsterdam is also rich in the number of civic organizations. The city counts 15,095 voluntary or non-profit organizations registered in the Dutch Chamber of Commerce (Vermeulen, Brünger & Van de Walle 2009: 6). The board members of about 6% of these organizations are from different ethnic backgrounds (Vermeulen, Brünger & Van de Walle 2009: 47). According to a recent survey of the city of Amsterdam ("Staat van de stad' [State of the city]" 2008) 53% of the population is member of an organization or does voluntary work. From them 20% meets other ethnic groups at sports organizations, while 7% is either a board member of a mixed organization or does voluntary work with other ethnic groups. The intensity of contact is higher for 50% of these memberships. Thus there seems to be enough

opportunities for interethnic contact at voluntary organizations. Moreover, Amsterdam is also an interesting city to investigate the role of interethnic contact in voluntary organizations, since multiculturalist policies in the 1980s paved the way for the establishment of many ethno-national organizations. However, these policies are recently in decline. I will discuss this next.

Multiculturalism in Amsterdam and ethno-national associations

For almost a decade now, multiculturalism in Western Europe is in decline. Whether we look in policy documents, in journalistic accounts or academic debates, no one seems to argue in favour of cultural retention of minorities. In the Netherlands, more specifically, the incorporation of ethnic minorities has become the site of an ideological battle around the notions of citizenship and nationhood (Scholten & Holzacker 2009). These battles resonate with the old Chicago School assimilationist language in which a simple chain of events were held to be responsible for the accommodation of minorities into the mainstream. As with the old assimilationist debate, integration in the Netherlands is now seen by some policymakers as the endpoint to the cycle of interethnic contact. Moreover, what is meant by integration is not only participation in socio-economic life, but also adherence to a set of common norms and values (Joppke 2004; Scholten & Holzacker 2009).

Amsterdam is no exception to this ‘attack’ on multiculturalism, at least in official policy (Uitermark, Rossi & Van Houtum 2005; Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010). Ever since a Dutch man of Moroccan descent murdered Theo van Gogh, the cineaste who fervently criticized Islam, the ethnic concentration of non-Western minorities seems to have become taboo. Civil servants fear subsidising cultural activities and especially religious practices in voluntary organizations. Instead the local government promotes diversity under the rubric of enhancing ‘contact’ between majority and minority population. The Chicago School was criticized precisely because it ignored differential routes that minorities take into, for example, the labour market, housing market, the educational system, etc. (Portes & Zhou 1993; Alba & Nee 2005). This was not necessary, because (new and old) immigrants do not want to intermingle with the majority population, but sometimes because they face discrimination or because they otherwise lack the resources (e.g. language skills) to participate in mainstream sites. In line with the American literature, this differential

route is labelled as segmented assimilation by European researchers and acculturation is not seen as the only viable integration route (H. Vermeulen 2010). To be sure, ethno-national organizations in the Netherlands were initially created by the local government to facilitate integration (Penninx & Slijper 1999) rather than the result of purposeful self-segregation by minorities.

So, how is this policy shift affecting ethno-national organizations, which are to a great extent dependent on governmental subsidies? Although this is not the place to discuss the Dutch integration policy in great detail (but see Vermeulen & Penninx 2000; Prins & Saharso 2010), a brief outline is necessary in order to demonstrate how policies have recently changed, specifically the policy towards ethno-national organization. Generally, there are two periods distinguished in the literature on the integration policy towards ethno-national organizations (Penninx & Slijper 1999). In the period from 1983 to 1994, the Dutch policy was characterized as minority policy. From 1994 to today integration is labelled as diversity policy. Interethnic contact is, however, strongly recommended from 2006 and specifically in the new national policy ("Integratienota 2007-2011: Zorg dat je erbij hoort! [Integration policy: Make sure you belong!]" 2007). What marks these different eras was that before 1994 the role of migrant organizations in facilitating integration was seen as important. Minorities were seen as specific cultural groups with the need for their own associations. As such, subsidizing cultural activities and the experience of a separate identity fostered by ethno-national organizations was legitimized as a vehicle towards integration. However after 1994 the role ethno-national organizations could play in the integration process is not even mentioned in national documents (Penninx & Slijper 1999: 28). National subsidies are only given if the organization is providing activities to stimulate socio-economic integration, precisely because minorities are then considered as individuals rather than groups with special rights.

At the local level this shift is visible too, from 1998 (Uitermark, Rossi & Van Houtum 2005; Uitermark & Van Steenbergen 2006), although it accelerated after the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004. Subsidies to organizations are given, if activities are based on intercultural activities, the acceptance of homosexuality, and activities for women and youth (Uitermark & Van Steenbergen 2006: 274). Cultural and group identities are not denied, but they should not form a basis for activities. In addition,

an organization's membership diversity is the basis of selecting them for subsidies (Vermeulen 2008; Vermeulen, Brünger & Van de Walle 2009). Uitermark, Rossi & Van Houtum (2005: 632) state that "a group that is mixed with respect to ethnicity and is homogenous with respect to age is more likely to be supported by the local government than a group that is homogenous with respect to ethnicity but heterogeneous with respect to age". What is more, there is a stronger emphasis on interethnic contact since 2007 in most policy documents. The subsidy policy document of Amsterdam municipality states that meetings, which at least three times per year are organized for people who are not traditionally part of the target population are eligible for funding ("Bijzondere subsidieverordening integratie, participatie en sociale cohesie (SIP) [Funding regulation]" 2007). Putnam's language of bridging is also very evident in these documents (see "Integratienota 2007-2011: Zorg dat je erbij hoort! [Integration policy: Make sure you belong!]" 2007; "Wij Amsterdammers: Investeren in mensen en het stellen van grenzen [We residents of Amsterdam: Investing in people and demarking boundaries]" 2007).

In this thesis, I compare segmented participation in Turkish voluntary organizations with organizations whose membership is ethnically diverse, which is recently favoured in policy circles and sections of the Dutch public discussed above. I question the assumption that the ethnic composition of voluntary or non-profit organizations should a priori be seen as problematic and take the view that we should put the 'contact hypothesis' in voluntary organizations in relation to generalized trust empirically at test. All policies need to be based on evidence, and this thesis is aiming to contribute to this, since cutting down subsidies might affect the number of ethno-national organizations (Uitermark & Van Steenbergen 2006), which integrate difficult-to-reach populations into the society.

Why to study Turkish organizations?

In this project, I have chosen to take Turkish voluntary organizations as an example of ethno-national organizations where diversity is very low, since Amsterdam counts many of them. About 3.5% of voluntary organizations in Amsterdam organize activities for the Turkish minority population (Vermeulen, Brünger & Van de Walle 2009: 47). However, there are other reasons too. Interethnic contact is not confined to voluntary organizations, but Turkish minorities have the least amount of contact

outside their group during leisure time compared to other ethnic groups. About 70% report not to have any contact outside their group during leisure activities (Dagevos & Gijsberts 2005; Van den Broek & Van Ingen 2008). Although the second generation has more contact with other ethnic groups, about half say they have only contact with other Turkish minorities (Dagevos 2005: 75-61; Dagevos & Gijsberts 2005: 26-96). Moreover, the Turkish second generation again has stronger private ties with someone from their own background as 80% report that their best friend or marriage partner is of Turkish descent (Van der Houwen, Kloosterman & Te Riele 2010: 188).

Since mixed marriages and strong friendship ties among Turks and non-Turks are quite uncommon, there is not much contact in the private sphere between them and others. In addition, the first generation Turkish minorities have language difficulties that act as barriers for contact between them and other groups. Finally, since the Turkish community is very well organized (Fennema and Tillie 1999; 2001; Vermeulen 2005), they often fall back on their own group for cultural and political activities, even for sport. In Amsterdam, among the ethnic minorities aged 17 and higher who often have contact with other ethnic groups, only 3% of the Turkish group meets them during sport ('Staat van de stad' [State of the city] 2008). Intense contact at sports organizations is higher for the Surinamese and the Moroccan groups. The situation might be different at work or in schools, but the Turkish second generation is also socialized into friendship and marriage ties within their own group. This diminishes the possibilities of developing friendship ties outside the group. In short, I have chosen Turkish organizations to be studied here, since they seem to be the most segregated among the ethnic minorities in the Netherlands and by including a group that does have interethnic contact outside voluntary organizations, the results might have been affected. However, it should be noted that strictly speaking the results of this study is not to be generalized to the Turkish population or to interethnic contact outside voluntary organizations.

Concerns about ethnic concentration and lack of contact among ethnic groups are not limited to Amsterdam and the Netherlands. The next section summarizes recent literature on generalized trust. Among other factors, many studies conclude that diversity within organizations is better for developing generalized norms, but do not

examine the counterfactual; namely participation in ethnically homogenous organizations.

1.3 Which factors explain generalized trust? State of the art

This section summarizes how empirical studies on generalized trust have chronologically evolved. I will pay attention to factors that are related to differences at different levels of analysis: country; neighbourhood; organization; and individual. Although country level and neighbourhood effects are not central to my thesis, studies offered at these levels are worth discussing, since conflating the levels of analysis runs the risk of ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950) and consequently has led to the current confusion about what generates or inhibits generalized trust. Initially, the mechanism behind the generation of generalized trust was the political culture of a country, which made it difficult to separate effects from cause (Almond & Verba 1963; Putnam 1998). Since voluntary organizations were taken to explain the difference, contact between diverse others is then assumed to be the driving force. Contact mechanism is the socialization that occurs due to interethnic contact (Allport 1979; Pettigrew 1998). Contact with diverse others is now argued to be conducive to the development of generalized trust, although in the social psychological literature contact is thought to be a prerequisite in overcoming stereotyping, ethnocentrism and prejudice (Pettigrew 1998; Hewstone 2009). Recent studies even take this mechanism to work at the country level (for discussion see Lancee & Dronkers 2008). Moreover, with some notable exceptions, most studies either take contact as a proxy for trust or trust as a proxy for contact. I aim, however, at disentangling whether interethnic contact at voluntary organizations is a mechanism behind the generation of generalized trust more and above individual characteristics and resources. If this mechanism is not behind variation in generalized trust, what other mechanisms better explain differences between organizations and individuals? Voluntary organizations are a small enough setting to investigate the effects of face-to-face contact in addition to alternative mechanisms. There are some analyses which question the importance of voluntary settings for the development of generalized attitudes of trust. These studies argue that involuntary settings, such as workplaces, might be more conducive for the development of generalized norms (Estlund 2005).

However, social psychologists also argue that involuntary settings might actually increase the perception of threat by other groups involved, as people are competing for the same resources and cannot easily opt out of a relationship. This strand of theories is called the conflict thesis (for review see Hewstone 2009).

Three divergent mechanisms³ seem to underlie differences in generalized trust; *contact*, *self-selection* and *cognitive* processes. As mentioned above, contact between diverse others within organizations is taken to be responsible for differences in generalized trust. Contact with diverse people could also occur between members who are members of other organizations. Hence, trust could diffuse across networks (Monge & Contractor 2003). Alternatively, participants within organizations could self-select themselves into organizational activity on the basis of their initial trust levels. Finally, a cognitive mechanism could be at work when people say they are careful or trustful on the basis of their adherence to values about human nature or conversely by having had negative life experiences. A cognitive process might thus reinforce convergence on a position without contact. In short, most of the disagreement in the current state of the generalized trust theory stems from the assumption that the contact mechanism is at work in generating it.

In searching for a mechanism-based explanation behind generalized trust, I follow Hedström and Swedberg (1998). They object to empirical studies that, on the one hand, employ ‘grand theories’ and, on the other hand, use statistical testing between variables without paying attention to the processes behind the explained phenomenon (for further criticism of social capital studies see Levi 1996; Tilly 2005). Hedström and Swedberg (1998) argue for explaining complex interdependencies and processes in order to explicate relationships between variables (i.e. mechanisms). The authors emphasize that the generality of theories lies at the level of mechanisms. While mechanisms operate below theories, they render the theoretical explanations more refined, they maintain. Therefore, they argue that in social scientific research priority should be given to specifying and systemizing our accounts according to mechanisms; in other words, building theoretical models and verifying these by empirical data. They also contend that the search for mechanisms is not an easy enterprise, as they are not directly observable. However, this should

³ For a similar argument on ethnocentrism see Hooghe (2003b).

not shy us away from questioning an assumed relationship and searching for evidence.

Institutional effects

A criticism of the political culture literature, and subsequently the social capital school, was that one could not distinguish whether a democratic system encourages the development of generalized trust or whether generalized trust is necessary for a better functioning democracy (Tarrow 1996; Cohen 1999). Subsequently, investigations were directed towards finding variation in generalized trust on the basis of length of democracy of a country, transparency of institutions, norms of good governance such as lack of corruption, levels of development, the perceived level of social and religious conflict, number, density and membership of voluntary organizations, the size of the city one lives in, homicide rates and more recently ethnic diversity (Alesina & La Ferrara 2002; Delhey & Newton 2003; 2005). I will discuss the role of ethnic diversity more in detail below. Other indicators should inform us about how well the institutions of a country are working and whether in such a climate people perceive others as more trustworthy. Some of these hypotheses are confirmed, although the role of diversity and voluntary organizations is more contested (Nannestad 2008).

In addition, some studies have focused on differences in welfare regimes and levels of generalized trust (Rothstein & Stolle 2003). There now seems to be consensus among researchers that institutional factors are important for the development of generalized trust. The link, however, goes in two different directions. Firstly, welfare regimes support the development of voluntary organizations to varying extents. Secondly, in countries where people perceive that the government is doing enough for the welfare of the citizens, they perceive others as trustworthy. In interpreting these findings we need to be cautious to a certain extent. As noted before, higher aggregate numbers of voluntary organizations do not necessarily give us evidence that these organizations increase members' trust perceptions. However, it could be the case that in countries where the number and density of voluntary organizations are high we find higher levels of generalized trust, because one could experience the occurrence of the voluntary sector as a sign of a better functioning society, whether one participates or not. Pharr, Putnam and Dalton (2000: 26)

labelled this mechanism the “rainmaker thesis”, because in a well-functioning democracy rain falls on everyone equally (Newton & Norris 2000). Rain here stands for the effects of institutional performance.

A similar type of analysis links income inequality and levels of generalized trust (Uslaner & Brown 2005). Here it is argued that increasing inequality narrows down people’s optimism towards the future and with it their ability to view the general goodness of others. When income inequality is high, which still can be accompanied by higher growth and development as experienced in the last decades in the U.S., people’s perception of individualism and a narrow focus on self-realisation might also be growing. Several studies find support (beyond the American case) for these arguments. They relate levels of generalized trust to Gini-coefficients, a measure which is designed to determine the level of income inequality (Osberg, Smeeding & Schwabish 2004; Leigh 2006).

Despite the above findings when researchers disaggregate the results, there are other explanations offered for differences in generalized trust. Where institutional settings are more egalitarian other factors, such as membership in diverse organizations, seem to contribute to the variation in generalized trust.

Types of associations

One of these factors is membership in voluntary organizations. This line of research is inspired by observations of 19th Century America by de Tocqueville (1990 [1840]) and the work of Almond and Verba (1963) in which they showed that members of associations had more civic attitudes and skills as opposed to non-members, although they did not offer evidence on generalized trust. They only offered aggregate level evidence for countries with higher levels of associational memberships. Putnam’s studies (1993; 2000) focused on Italy and the US and he offered aggregate evidence as well. In Italy he investigated the number and density of associations in different regions and the American data were based on time variations in both number of organizations and attitudes of generalized trust. On the aggregate level, there seems to be disagreement between researchers whether membership in associations relates to higher levels of generalized trust. Some studies find a positive relation even when country specific factors are controlled for, while others seem to find larger effect sizes for country specific characteristics (Delhey & Newton 2003; 2005).

Generally, however, it is argued that associations with exclusive memberships contribute less to the creation of 'bridging' social capital and their members might develop attitudes that are not directed towards out-groups. One problem with cross-sectional data is that the direction of causality is not investigated. Therefore, it could be the case, some argue, that low trusting people self-select into organizations that direct their activities towards specific groups. In short, the positive relation between trust, voluntary activity and membership is criticized as it ignores the 'dark side' of participation (Levi 1996; Ostrom 1998; Della Porta 2000). Thus, even in non-profit organizations there is a potential for clientelist and mob-like exchanges. The context of an analysis is very important as we noted above. In an established democracy the rule of law guarantees that, at a minimum level, people have always an option of resorting to the court to solve their disputes and stepping outside the vicious circle of 'bad' reciprocity. In such a society, the level of generalized trust could be higher than in societies with widespread corruption affecting the higher echelons of power. Putnam acknowledges this in his later work, and notes that social capital facilitates cooperation between the members in associations such as the Michigan Militia groups and youth gangs to the detriment of the whole society (Putnam 1995: 665). As argued above, ethno-national associations are, however, taken to be the sites where the development of generalized attitudes is impeded.

Many social capital researchers include differential effects of associations in their analysis. For instance, Stolle and Rochon (2001) investigate whether different types of associations have more or less trusting members. They find that leisure organizations score higher on generalized trust. Moreover, they find that organizations whose memberships are more socio-economically and ethnically diverse have higher trusting members too. Another study that investigates different types of associations is Paxton's (2007) study on the effects of cross-cutting memberships. The results suggest that connected associations have a higher proportion of trusting members and this holds at the country level. Coffé and Geys (2007a) found that members of bridging associations adhered less strongly to attitudes of authoritarianism, individualism, and ethnocentrism and felt more politically efficacious. Bridging is here also defined as an organization with a socio-economically diverse membership.

Finally, there are some studies that emphasize linkages of associations with governing bodies. This is argued to contribute to political trust (Rothstein & Stolle 2003; Stolle 2003) and enhance “working trust” with the government (Tarrow 2000), which in turn might increase member’s perception of trustworthiness of others (Caulkins 2003). In addition, linkages among organizations through their board are argued to spread the social trust bred in one association to the whole community of organizations, although social trust still might not spread beyond the ethnic group (Fennema & Tillie 1999; 2001). These analyses in other words emphasise conditions that might facilitate the development or impediment of generalized trust at a higher level of analysis, namely that of organizations. I will discuss individual level studies next.

Individual level effects


Stolle’s (1998) research puts forward the assumption that voluntary association membership would increase one’s level of generalized trust and found out that the length of membership did not affect generalized trust for members. She concluded that high trusting people might self-select into membership. She also found that organizations with higher proportions of foreigners had a larger proportion of trusting members. This perspective suggests that engagement in ethnically homogenous associations could impede the development of generalized trust, although there is no empirical evidence offered for this hypothesis.

While the self-selection argument seems a straightforward conclusion, other evidence points towards the opposite direction. When members and non-members are investigated some researchers find significant, albeit small differences in generalized trust (Brehm & Rahn 1997). These researchers suggest that the direction of the relationship runs from joining to trust rather than the other way around (for review see Paxton 2007). However, other studies find a much weaker path from joining to trust (Claibourn & Martin 2000). Yet, Jennings and Stoker (2004) find the opposite. Due to cohort effects they find that for older people there is a stronger relationship between trust and joining.

There are four issues with the research on the voluntary sector, which is why studies about the impact of associational participation on generalized trust have often reached conflicting conclusions (Sønderskov 2011). Firstly, while different types of

associations, such as environmental and humanitarian groups, attract trusting individuals, others do not (e.g. professional and religious organizations). Secondly, passive and active membership is often not distinguished in research (cf. Wollebaek & Selle 2002). Thirdly, research so far also has taken a static view of membership and does not include previous membership into account (cf. Hooghe 2003c; Van der Meulen 2007). Finally, it is quite possible that both sequences of self-selection and socialization can operate. That is to say, participants might join certain associations, because their goals confirm to their value pattern, say generalized trust, but participation can also gradually increase their initial trust levels (Sønderskov 2011; see also Hooghe 2003c). The processes discussed here are depicted in figure 1.2 below. To disentangle which sequence is more important for the generation of generalized trust, we need longitudinal panel data.

Figure 1.2 The asymmetrical relationship between trust and membership



Source: Sønderskov 2011: 422

At the very least, there is consensus that at the individual level socio-demographic attributes and individual resources, such as income and educational levels, correlate positively with generalized trust. In other words, generalized trust is expressed by the “winners in society” (Newton 1999a: 185; see also Whiteley 1999; Putnam 2000; cf. Uslaner 2002: 112-13). Sex and age are indirectly related to trust, since women may find themselves amongst the vulnerable groups in society and the middle-aged are more likely to have control over their financial position. There is, however, work suggesting that the lack of generalized trust could be ascribed to subjective well-being, more specifically perceived lack of safety, discrimination,

dissatisfaction in areas of one's life, experience of crime and having no partner, in addition to psychological variables such as pessimism and lack of self-esteem (Alesina & La Ferrara 2002; Uslaner 2002; De Hart & Dekker 2003). Finally, it is argued that adherence to moral values such as humanitarianism and anti-individualism should be conducive to generalized trust (Hooghe 2003a; Coffé & Geys 2007a). In other words, generalized trusters see trustworthiness as a moral value of cooperation whilst people with negative life experiences project these into a negative view of the trustworthiness of others. This is in line with a study in the Netherlands, which carried out cognitive interviewing with the respondents and examined the reasoning behind answers to the generalized trust item (De Hart & Dekker 2003; Dekker 2003). They found that respondents had different reasons in answering the questions on the basis of positive and negative life experiences. People who answered "yes" interpreted the questions as a moral value, arguing that it is better to trust others than not to. People who answered "no" reported having been a victim of crime recently or that something else in their life had happened that made them saying they did not trust others.

In sum, to date it is still debated whether members of voluntary organizations – ethnic or otherwise – are self-selecting into low and high trusting groups or whether associations have socializing effects on their members (for review see Stolle & Howard 2008). Although these debates invite a longitudinal panel design, which should take attitudinal change at its core over a considerable period of time, there is also some evidence that youth socialization in voluntary organizations is related to adult participation and that over the long run (from youth to adulthood), associational activity might contribute towards the generation of generalized trust (Stolle & Hooghe 2004). By separating individual and organizational level effects, this thesis can offer some evidence on socialization effect due to interethnic contact as opposed to a self-selection mechanism controlling for individual level characteristics. In other words, while a socialization mechanism alone does not offer a satisfactory answer why members of associations might be more trusting than non-members; a presumed negative socialization effect at ethno-national associations should be open to empirical enquiry.

Ethnic diversity in neighbourhood and countries

Recently there is also focus on the proportion of ethnically homogenous and heterogeneous population in neighbourhoods in order to explain differences in generalized trust. This type of research assumes that contact with diverse others would explain differences in generalized trust, although it is not investigated as such. Here it is assumed that in ethnically homogenous neighbourhoods people might often gather together, whereas in ethnically heterogeneous neighbourhood contact is 'constricted', which consequently leads to lower levels of (generalized) trust at that level (Putnam 2007). Although this hypothesis has recently received a great deal of academic attention, there were already quite a few studies in the US, Canada and Australia that preceded it (Alesina & La Ferrara 2000; 2002; Costa & Kahn 2003; Leigh 2004; Marschall & Stolle 2004).⁴ Overall, the findings are not straightforward and some of these studies did not distinguish between different levels of analysis. Some recent studies investigate contact directly as opposed to Putnam's study. Phan (2008) finds no influence of friendship ties on generalized trust in diverse Canadian neighbourhoods and cities, while Stolle, Soroka and Johnston (2008) take a hypothetical lost wallet as their dependent variable and find that interaction in Canadian neighbourhood has a positive effect on how many lost wallets are said to be returned. However, making generalizations to the relationship between generalized trust and contact is difficult, since these items might vary. A recent country analysis of generalized trust finds an interaction effect between income inequality and diversity on generalized trust (Kesler & Bloemraad 2010). European research is on the rise, which I will discuss next.⁵

Hooghe *et al.* (2009), for example, questioned whether the almost exclusive focus on American data can render the generalizations plausible. They argue that American society has experienced rising income inequality in the past decades. As argued before, income inequality strongly correlates with low generalized trust. The American experience of diversity might also be exceptional as race relations have not always been easy. This historical difference with Europe also makes the

⁴ Research by Marschall and Stolle (2004) finds a positive relation between ethnic heterogeneity and generalized trust.

⁵ For British results see Fieldhouse and Cutts (2010) and Letki (2008). For Belgian data see Coffé and Geys (2005). For Dutch results see Gijssberts, Van der Meer, & Dagevos (2008) and M. Gijssberts *et al.* 2010.

generalisations based on American data questionable. Furthermore, Hooghe *et al.* (2009) proposed studying the effect of ethnic heterogeneity for European countries with a multilevel model. The latter model is more appropriate for their analyses as it can simultaneously give us information on how much of the variation is explained by individual characteristics and how much of it can be attributed to country differences. Instead of the proportion of migrants in a country, they include dynamic data in their analyses, such as the inflow of immigrants. Theoretically, they argue that it is this inflow that can make different groups experience a threat towards each other and thus report that others cannot be trusted. Their analysis, however, does not find any significant and substantive evidence for the negative heterogeneity claims in Western Europe, although there is a relatively high level of variance in generalized trust between countries.

A second type of research focuses on contact between ethnic minorities and differences between neighbourhoods with higher as opposed to lower proportions of ethnic groups. Lancee and Dronkers (2008) argue that neighbourhood and country level effects should not be confused as there are different underlying processes behind these two levels that might generate differences. They argue that country level differences might be due to 'history, political environment and/or the media exposure of immigration related issues in a country' (Lancee & Dronkers 2008: 1). Neighbourhood level differences might be due to contact. Although this argument is convincing, the analyses of Lancee and Dronkers (2008) has some shortcomings for investigating the relationship between generalized trust and contact. They intend to replicate Putnam's (2007) contact hypothesis, but their data lack direct measures of generalized trust. Instead they rely on contact between the respondent and their neighbours of different backgrounds as a proxy for trust. In addition, they construct a second proxy based on social distance, or how much one approves their children's friend and partner being from a different ethnic background. These measures are problematic in the sense that it is the relation between contact and a positive emotion towards the unknown other that we are interested in, and it is precisely this evidence that is missing here.

In a report by the Dutch government, the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and generalized trust was then investigated (Gijsberts, Van der Meer,

& Dagevos 2008). The results suggest that there is less contact in these types of neighbourhoods, but when looking at generalized trust the results suggest that diversity does not affect it so much. It seems instead to be the effect of the composition of these neighbourhoods in terms of socio-demographic characteristics of their inhabitants. This is more so, because housing for ethnic minorities seems to be constrained by socio-economic factors (Van der Laan Bouma-Doff & Van der Laan Bouma 2005; Gijsberts, Van der Meer & Dagevos 2008).

In sum, as the discussion above has shown, there are different mechanisms at work behind the generation of generalized trust and only by separating different levels of analysis will we be able to specify them. The weakness of the literature on generalized trust is sometimes its inattention to micro processes and conflating the institutional, neighbourhood/organizational and individual level mechanisms. Some studies use aggregate data on geographical areas and employ methods that do not allow for distinguishing the effects at different levels. Figure 1.3 below summarizes these different levels of analysis and what the literature generally is taking as a mechanism to explain generalized trust. In this thesis, I will focus on the contact mechanism, not at the neighbourhood level, but in voluntary organizations. By sampling members within organizations, we can isolate effects from the individual level and the organizational context.

The main research questions in this thesis are thus as followed:


Can variation in generalized trust be attributed to organizational characteristics or to individual characteristics?

Which mechanism best explains variation in generalized trust?

Although I collected several organizational characteristics, such as contact with governmental bodies, collaboration with other organizations and levels of funding, in order to elaborate organizational processes that account for generalized trust next to contact, organizational variation was not high enough to include them at once in the analysis. Ideally, one would also add variation in institutional characteristics to the analysis. However, creating a data set that would allow for testing theories at all these levels simultaneously would be too cumbersome to collect for the purpose of this study. Nevertheless, at the individual level there seems to be one general pattern

across all studies: income, age, sex and education are statistically significant. Most of these effects are also found in the following chapters.

Figure 1.3 Four levels of analysis in explaining generalized trust



1.4 Thesis outline

This chapter has situated the thesis in broader terms around research on generalized trust and participation in voluntary associations and identifies social success theory as the main area of consensus in explaining variation in generalized trust attitudes.

Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical framework of the thesis and pinpoints the main hypothesis of the study. It then further elaborates the mechanisms at the organizational and individual levels in generating generalized trust. Chapter 2 also justifies the choices that underlie the data collection instruments and why additional data has been collected instead of relying on existing surveys.

Chapter 3 subsequently analyses existing data sets in the Netherlands and identifies their caveats. Differences in generalized trust are modelled with different levels of ethnic concentration in organizations. The emphasis lies on the contact mechanism, which is the focus of this thesis, but social success theory where scholars have formed a consensus will be added to the models of generalized trust. Furthermore, immigration-related factors will be modelled by analysing a data set

that is representative of the four largest minority groups in the Netherlands. This allows me to identify their relative importance and whether to include these factors in subsequent analyses. Since the data that I collected is limited to a very specific population in Amsterdam, analysing these data sets allows me to validate my results. There are, however, two caveats that underline these surveys: lack of contextual data and the operationalization of diversity as ethnic concentration. In addition, these surveys do not allow the analysis of other organizational characteristics that might explain differences in generalized trust, their activities and to what extent the organizations are creating durable contact for their participants. In other words, scholars often assume that non-profit organizations are creating durable ties between their participants, but that is not investigated as such. They ignore whether and how organizations create opportunities for their participants to be embedded in bridging and bonding networks.

Chapter 4 thus focuses on whether and how mixed and Turkish organizations create opportunities for durable contact. The chapter also focuses on organizational characteristics in order to assess whether they differ significantly across the two groups. This is necessary, because the groups should be uniform or else other characteristics such as the size of the organization, collaboration opportunities with the government, network gaps and the ratio of volunteers to passive members might affect levels of generalized trust. This chapter also identifies other individual characteristics that need to be controlled for such as the occurrence of close ties within organizations and additional memberships to control for the Turkish participants and board members.

Chapter 5 will next examine different levels of trust across organizations and individuals. This chapter tests the interethnic contact hypothesis, firstly, by partitioning the variance of generalized trust at different levels. Secondly, it focuses on individual differences. The models while controlling for social success factors investigate whether an interaction between the ethnic composition of the organization (mixed) and the length of participation adds to a participant's levels of generalized trust. This analysis, if corroborated, would support a contact mechanism. Furthermore, the chapter examines another interaction effect, whether the occurrence of close ties at mixed organizations also adds to the participant's level of generalized

trust. This is a sufficient, but not necessary condition for contact to translate into attitude change. The empirical analysis of this chapter nevertheless refutes a contact mechanism.

Chapter 6 then explores cognitive evaluations in order to explain who says to trust others. Firstly, by conducting a confirmatory factor analysis of particularized and generalized trust, the validity of the trust question is tested in this sample. Then the relationship of generalized trust with prejudiced attitudes is investigated. Since it can be established that generalized trust in this sample reflects trust towards strangers, the chapter then tests two additional frameworks in explaining differences in generalized trust among the participants. A psychological explanation renders optimistic attitudes significant in the analysis of generalized trust. Next a norm driven theory is explored. Only humanitarian values render significant results, although this interacts with young age to explain a greater level of generalized trust. The final model of generalized trust reveals that optimism is the strongest predictor of generalized trust. Then a self-selection effect and educational attainment are found to explain generalized trust. Finally, younger age in interaction with humanitarian values has a positive effect on generalized trust, while the divorced and widowed, and the age category 35-44 as opposed to the 55+ have a negative effect on generalized trust. Chapter 7, finally, discusses the results in relation to previous findings, concludes the thesis and recommends future avenues for research.

CHAPTER 2

THE PROMISE OF VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS AND GENERALIZED TRUST: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND DESIGN

This thesis subjects the activities and organizational features of Turkish voluntary and mixed ethnicity organizations to careful examination. It then puts their participants' trustful attitudes to test. Voluntary organizations are arguably playing an important role in enhancing and maintaining democracy. The many complexities involved in how exactly they are able to contribute to this are still subject to scrutiny, which cannot be the focus of any single project of limited duration. Therefore, the focus here is narrowed down to the role organizations play in generating generalized trust. Nevertheless, this thesis builds and advances the literature, since it focuses on the thorny issue of interethnic contact in voluntary organizations. There is now a considerable body of work on the role of the voluntary sector in generating generalized trust. However, as the discussion in the previous chapter and below will demonstrate, the role of interethnic contact is one of the remaining gaps in the literature on the role voluntary organizations play in enhancing generalized trust, which in turn is argued to be important for civic culture. The lack of relevant data sets with adequate sample sizes of minority population has to date prevented a systematic analysis. Secondly, the research design employed in this thesis methodologically advances the literature, because it focuses on organizations rather than just individuals. Many existing studies cannot fully disentangle variation in generalized trust at the organizational and individual levels of analysis. That is because their data collection procedure, by sampling individuals or households does not allow for a multilevel analysis, since information about other individuals in the same organization is lacking.

This chapter justifies why it has selected the organizations mainly on grounds of variation in ethnic composition and how existing studies do not provide a satisfactory answer. It discusses the organizational and individual characteristics that are relevant to the study of generalized trust. That is to say, it provides a detailed theoretical framework on the mechanisms behind the generation of generalized trust in

voluntary organizations by evaluating previous studies. Secondly, there is a justification for the choice of organizations as the unit of analysis and for the sample of individuals within them. I describe the rationale of the research design and demonstrate how I have selected the units of the analysis and the kinds of inferences that are possible. Finally, there is a discussion of the rationale behind what questions to ask the respondents (the items or variables to be studied) and through which data collection method this information is gathered. I describe how the relevant variables have been operationalized.

Before elaborating on the theoretical framework, a definition of organization is in place. I follow Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008: 12) in defining voluntary, non-profit organizations as “more or less institutionalized collections of individuals that come together periodically for a common goal or activity”. Their goal is to organize for non-profit activities and membership is voluntary. This means that they are separated from the state, the family and the economy and constitute the civil society (Fennema 2004; Maloney & Roßteutscher 2007a).

There is also a need for defining what the terms volunteers, participants and active versus passive members mean. A volunteer is someone who does unpaid work for an organization, such as collecting money or helping with the administration of the organization. Although volunteers could be fee paying members, they do not need to be. Participants could also be registered as fee paying members or they could be just regular visitors. Most importantly, they engage in activities and could also do volunteer work. Passive members are the fee paying members (or cheque-book members) who do not engage in any activities and events. In this thesis, the active member is a joint category for volunteers and participants regardless of paying fees.

2.1 Dimensions of the analysis

As already mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, there is abundant research and data available on the participation of individuals in organizations. However, with some notable exceptions, information on the activities beyond the core mission of the organization and other relevant characteristics, such as their structural features, are rather scarce (cf. Maloney & Roßteutscher 2007b). Not only is this information invaluable in contextualising the results gathered by surveys that represent

individuals and or households, without this we are also left in a void to understand the processes behind the generation of generalized trust. Many studies presented below that take on the task of studying which organizational characteristics and processes affect trust are only able to differentiate between the core missions of organizations. For example, they can only distinguish whether an organization is directing their core activities towards sports, politics or welfare. However, these typologies mask the processes that are responsible for the generation of generalized trust.

As argued in the introduction, Putnam's (1993; 2000) work has been very influential in steering the direction that many subsequent research projects on the voluntary sector have taken. Three organizational processes seem to underlie his theoretical assumptions about the role of voluntary organizations in generating levels of generalized trust. Organizations should have a *horizontal governing structure*, they should promote *face-to-face contact and collaboration* (such as voluntary work), and they should *transcend cultural and socio-economic barriers* (see also Wollebaek & Selle 2002; Stolle 1998) – recently ethnic divides are regarded as the most salient cultural divide. Of course, they should also not be inherently undemocratic such as a militia gang or a terrorist cell. Putnam only theorised about these processes and scrutinizing recent empirical findings in the field would help to establish the relevance of his proposed framework for the current project.

Governance structure within organizations

The first question is whether an organization is a vertical one. That is to say, are the relations of coordination and cooperation within the organization based on hierarchical relations? Vertical ties, to use network terminology, are characterised by power relations. Within associations, they are arguably detrimental to the generation and maintenance of generalized trust, when there are no mechanisms in place to individually 'punish' the abuse of power.⁶ This is because vertical relations are asymmetrical; sanction cannot be imposed vertically or from below. In Putnam's words, "only a bold or foolhardy subordinate, lacking ties of solidarity with peers, would seek to punish a superior" (1993: 174).

⁶ Voluntary organizations are typically self-governed; members and participants can resolve these issues themselves or resort to legal ways.

Although I have no intention to question whether hierarchical relations are detrimental to the generation of trust in general, one might still want to ask why it is less favoured by Putnam. That is because there is an underlying assumption in Putnam's work that repeated interaction between equals generates dyadic trust, and this type of trust is not maintained in a hierarchical relation. "A vertical network cannot sustain trust and cooperation" (Putnam 1993: 173). Putnam also disfavours hierarchy on the ground that dyadic or particularized trust is going to spill over into generalized trust. While the former assumption is very intuitive, the latter in the context of interaction in voluntary organizations till recently remained empirically an open question.

Stolle (1998), on the contrary, found that in-group trust (operationalized as trust towards other members within an organization) negatively correlated with generalized trust using data from participants of cultural and sports associations (horizontal organizations) in Germany and Sweden. But since she did not have information on the institutional structure of the studied groups, she could not disconfirm this line of theory. However, her results questioned the assumption that face-to-face contact within horizontal organizations would generate particularized trust and that, in turn, would spill over into generalized trust. Wollabaek and Selle (2002), who analysed differences between political (assuming they are more hierarchical) and cultural (more member-led) organizations, found no evidence for this relationship.⁷ However, the institutional structure within the organization⁸ could still indirectly have an effect on trust by influencing the ratio of volunteers and active members to passive members (see also Eastis 1998).⁹ Volunteers and active members are more likely to exhibit trust by learning through collaboration. Both studies discussed above have other limitations too, because their data did not contain enough information on the institutional structure of an organization other than their core

⁷ Maloney and Roßteutscher (2008) also distinguish between different types of organizational activity in assessing mean levels of trust across organizations in Aberdeen and Mannheim. Surprisingly, sports and political organizations score lowest among the types, whereas community organizations score highest. Cultural, religious and welfare organizations populate the middle category.

⁸ Whether organizations with a highly authoritarian structure such as militia gangs and terrorist cells would inhibit the development of generalized trust still remains an open question, since these organizations usually are not open to enquiry. The present study is also not designed to provide an answer, but see the theoretical account of Rosenblum (2000) on this.

⁹ Eastis (1998) hypothesized in an anthropological study of choirs that, if the organizations would let the members help with the administration, it might contribute towards developing civic skills.

activity (politics and culture) or they test the hypothesis indirectly through particularized trust.

Maloney and Roßteutscher's (2007b) edited volume draws on a rich study in which they map the organizational landscape of six European cities and among other things record the institutional structure of organizations. Within this framework, Torpe and Ferrer-Fons (2007) examine whether different internal institutional structures of organizations, such as informal versus formal rule, being a member of an umbrella organization (which exemplifies being part of a hierarchical network), and size of the organization affects participation within organizations. More specifically, they ask whether small and horizontal organizations with a less formal structure that are not part of an umbrella network increase the likelihood of higher activity and volunteering. Their results suggest that smaller organizations with an informal management structure is related to the ratio of volunteers and active to passive members in that organization, but hierarchy as measured by being part of a larger umbrella network does not matter. Lelieveldt, Astudillo and Stevenson (2007) focus on activities of organizations¹⁰ (other than the core mission of the organization) and how this relates to the ratio of volunteers and active members. Apart from recruiting and fundraising, which are directed at maintenance, organizations could offer services to their members and to others. Some represent and mobilize their members (or others) as advocates of certain policies. Results of these studies are similar to the above as they show that organizations who mainly direct their activities towards socializing and recreation are better able to activate their members and have a higher ratio of volunteers to passive members. Service orientated organizations have a relatively higher ratio of volunteers to passive members too, but they also rely on paid staff more so than others. Although informative, this study, however, does not link these organizational structures to differences in generalized trust attitudes. Below I discuss two studies that give insights about how other organizational characteristics might affect generalized trust.

¹⁰ An organization could have several activities, although in this survey they had to report one as their main activity.

Contact and collaboration

The second characteristic of organizations that is important for Putnam in relation to trust is contact and collaboration within organizations. He bases this assumption on intergroup contact theory. Social psychologists have developed this framework in order to understand the processes behind the development of prejudiced attitudes (Allport 1979; see also Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). Most of this research has focused on the conditions as to why successful contact occurs and how it ultimately reduces prejudice (Hewstone 2009; Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). Among these conditions, Pettigrew (1998) finds: 1) equal status among the groups; 2) a common goal between the participants; 3) intergroup cooperation; 4) institutional support. It is then not hard to imagine why small scale voluntary organizations are seen as optimal sites for intergroup contact to take place. Pettigrew adds another mediating criterion to the list and that is saliency of group membership or the extent to which an out-group member is regarded as a typical member (salient categorization). However, when the out-group member is viewed as an atypical member (decategorization), contact is more likely to occur, whereas contact is more likely to be generalized to the whole group when out-group members that were once atypical later become salient members (recategorization).¹¹ A crucial process for intergroup contact to work is then through friendship or long term close relationships (Pettigrew 1998; Brown & Hewstone 2005: 259; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006; Hewstone 2009).¹² In fact, voluntary organizations' participants might be recruited through friendship ties (see Gould 2003). Hence, small-scale voluntary organizations are an ideal setting for testing the contact hypothesis, especially since, due to their voluntary character, if conflict arises participants are more likely to opt out in comparison to the workplace and school.

An interesting puzzle arises when social capital theory, as posited by Putnam, is put alongside the intergroup contact theory. Putnam assumes that voluntary associations are generally based on weaker ties and those ties are arguably important

¹¹ Recategorization might not occur, even if contact happens. This entails that although contact might reduce prejudice towards the persons involved in the interaction, it might not be generalized to the entire out-group that is not part of the interaction.

¹² Anxiety, threat and other conditions (see Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Hewstone 2009) are not so relevant here, because in voluntary settings where leisure or an ideological goal is the rationale of participation, people will opt out, if they feel threatened or anxious.

for the generation of trust. In contrast, intergroup contact theory¹³ sees that strong ties are necessary for contact to lead to less prejudiced attitudes (Pettigrew 1998; Mutz 2002; Hewstone 2009) .¹⁴ This begs the question of how trustful attitudes are subsequently generalized, if voluntary organizations are generally based on weaker ties. Although contradictory at first sight, the mechanism as to why trust might become generalized could be as follows. What once is a weak tie can become a strong one through repetitive interaction. This might then create a positive spillover, because through this process of attachment people internalize positive emotions towards out-groups, recategorize the out-groups, and hence become less prejudiced (Hewstone 2009; Pettigrew 1998). Reduced prejudice is clearly not the same as increased trust, since the former involves decreasing negative emotions towards a specific out-group, whereas the latter requires one to extend a positive emotion towards the unknown other. It is important to note that the social capital literature posits that out-groups can be anyone different to the person in terms of socio-economic and cultural terms. Therefore, as discussed above there are ample conceptual parallels for the contact mechanism to be theoretically relevant to studies of generalized trust (see Hewstone 2009).

Initially, commentators were questioning whether voluntary clubs promote repetitive and meaningful interaction and whether they are diverse environments at all to make a positive spill over of trust possible, although they did not test this empirically (Levi 1996; Skocpol & Fiorina 1999). Stolle's (1998) study fills the gap and puts some of the conditions of the intergroup contact theory at test. All voluntary organizations have a common goal, but she selected small scale organizations such as bowling leagues and choirs where regular contact takes place and the members have more or less an equal status, as opposed to larger hierarchical cheque-book organizations. Her study is situated in Germany and Sweden where institutional support for intergroup contact is not that divergent, although there might of course be some differences.

¹³ Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) state that Allport's conditions are not necessary but sufficient for reducing prejudice. That is to say that even when these conditions are not met less prejudice occurs. However, these conditions plus the mediating role of friendship or close relations facilitate the positive effects of contact.

¹⁴ Mutz (2002) investigates whether being embedded in a diverse discussion network can lead one to become more tolerant of opposing views. She finds that close ties among people who hold divergent views and awareness of rationales for these differences are crucial for tolerance.

Firstly, she examines the cooperation condition and distinguished between types of activity in which members are involved. She found that in general volunteers, when somebody had responsibility within the organization or had prepared a task, showed higher trust levels than passive members. However, when she controlled for the length of affiliation within an organization (number of years) for all members, on the one hand, and an organization's engagement levels, on the other, there was no additional interaction effect. This led her to conclude that there is no socialization mechanism within organizations that turns their members into higher trusting people. Nor do organizations that promote voluntary work create more trusting participants as opposed to the ones who do not stimulate cooperation. Instead, members self-select into those organizations on the basis of their initial trust levels. Stolle also argues that engaged participants (e.g. volunteers and active members) seem to trust more. Unfortunately, she doesn't control for their length of affiliation separately. Therefore, it's possible that volunteers could also have self-selected themselves on the basis of their initial trust levels rather than due to the act of cooperation itself. Finally, she also does not find evidence for the condition that in-group trust relates positively to generalized trust in her study. So it seems that a contact mechanism is not responsible for differences between the members in their trust levels, nor do organizational characteristics (promoting cooperation and diversity) seem to matter. However, there are some caveats to her approach that I will discuss below and have necessitated a replication.

In line with this, Wollbaek and Selle's (2002) study above questioned the extent to which passive membership inhibits the development of generalized trust. Passive members¹⁵ are here categorized as the ones who spend less than 3 hours per week at any of the organizations they say they are a member of in the past year. Active members are the ones who report spending 3 hours or more per week in an organization in the past year. This study also does not find evidence for the relationship between the intensity of engagement of a member and their trust scores at the individual level.

Finally, while a sufficient but not necessary condition of the contact hypothesis is that strong relationships facilitate attitudes change, this is rarely examined in the

¹⁵ This study includes cheque-book members who do not participate in any activity.

context of voluntary organizations. Researchers assume that a diverse ethnic composition induces contact and do not examine whether participants actually have developed friendship or close ties in the organization.

Diversity

So if the type of engagement and levels of contact might not explain different trust levels, what does? As argued in the introduction, researchers now resort to cultural diversity and more recently interethnic contact as the mechanism behind the generation of trust rather than just face-to-face contact and collaboration alone.

Stolle's (1998) work is again informative here. She tests whether socio-economic diversity relates to trust. This is what Putnam refers to as bridging and bonding types of associations. Diversity is measured across 6 dimensions of social cleavage: education, professional status, age, sex and income combined into one measure and the proportion of foreigners in an organization as a second measure. She finds that members of high diversity groups self-select into those high trust groups and members of low diversity groups self-select into low trust groups depending on their original trust levels. She proceeds to a second measure of diversity to the test. That is the proportion of foreigners in an organization and again finds a self-selection mechanism. Organizations with higher levels of social heterogeneity do not have more trusting members (when the organizational structure and engagement type are held constant).

Coffé and Geys (2007a; 2007b) replicate this study using Belgian data. They combine information on membership in 16 types of associations (ranging from hobby clubs, trade unions, sport associations, etc.) along with various social divides, such as age, gender, education level, religion, nationality, occupation, professional category, marital status and the number of children (Coffé & Geys 2007b). Then they assess the extent to which the composition of membership of an organizational type deviates from the average composition of the population and whether this relates to a greater adherence of civic attitudes of their members. Amongst these attitudes we find individualism, ethno-centrism, authoritarianism, feelings of safety, and political inefficacy. Unfortunately, their data set does not include a measure of generalized trust, nor does it control for the length of membership. In addition, they do not distinguish between types of activity of a member. But most importantly, studies in

which a random sample of the population is asked to name their membership of different *types* of organizations, ignore contextual effects, since there is no data available on other participants of the same organization (see e.g. Stolle & Rochon 2001; Coffé & Geys 2007a; Paxton 2007; Howard & Gilbert 2008). This is due to the sampling methods of large scale surveys that need to be representative of geographical areas. In other words, the problem lies in aggregation, which results in individual and organizational characteristics being conflated.

Another implication of the above approaches is that we cannot separate diversity as an organizational effect from individual characteristics, since the extent of bridging of an association is a composite measure of the socio-economic characteristics of the members. To illustrate this consider the following; an association is seen as less bridging when its members are composed of low-income groups, are from the same sex and are from one ethnic group. This would be an association organized, for instance, by Turkish elderly manual workers. Although participation in such an organization might not seem to benefit the members, because they will be less exposed to people from high income groups or high educational background, the situation might be different for a Turkish sports organization. In the latter case one could possibly find men in high income groups as well as men with lower socio-economic status, which would then lead to the following question. Is interethnic contact more important or contact between people with diverse educational background? I have prioritised finding evidence for interethnic contact, since it is taken to be pivotal by policy makers and academics alike. However, one might in the future design a study that would disentangle the role of contact among high and low income groups, or alternatively among high and low educational groups. An appropriate model for these kind of analyses would be a multilevel one, which allows the examination of how much of the variation in generalized trust is clustered around organizations and how much of the variation can be attributed to individual level characteristics (see Snijders & Bosker 1999; Hox 2010).

To be sure, none of the studies above include enough people with a minority background in their study in order to have enough variation on ethnic diversity. Stolle's (1998) work, which included foreigners in her sample, does not include enough ethnic organizations. She compares mainstream homogenous organizations

with diverse organizations, whereas this study oversamples minority organizations and compares them to mixed organizations. It is straightforward to argue that ethnic associations are all based on identity (Fennema 2004). Uslaner and Conley (2003: 25), for instance, state that ethnic associations are “by definition not diverse”. But should this matter? Whether diversity is important begs the question of how typologies are defined and according to whose criteria similarity and difference is assessed (Fennema & Tillie 2008). However, it is also an empirical question. The following approach allows me to empirically address the assumptions put forward by Uslaner and Conley (2003). I will examine whether ethnic diversity in voluntary organizations plays a role in explaining differences in generalized trust.

In sum, while there is a plethora of research investigating structural features of organizations (in different countries), the conspicuous lack of appropriate data that tackles the question of ethnic diversity within voluntary organizations is highly surprising.¹⁶ Therefore, I suggest taking Turkish organizations and mixed associations as two contrasting cases, but controlling for the most salient demographic and socio-economic factors. Thus, we need to select organizations that direct their activities towards different socio-economic groups in order to let individual characteristics vary too. Below I describe the criteria and process of case selection more in detail. Before doing that, I will, however, describe other organizational features that might be relevant to the study of generalized trust.


Network gaps

Convergence of generalized trust attitudes can also take place along another dimension, namely the network between organizations. In many studies on voluntary organizations interconnections between organizations are ignored. Putnam (1993; 2000) also emphasized this in his work, but only theoretically. These network configurations could, thus, explain differences in values and attitudes among members (Marsden & Friedkin 1993; McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook 2001). In the discussion above, gaps in networks may have arisen due to demographic divides such as generational differences, sex, ethnicity, education, etc, although through overlapping memberships bridges could occur across these associations (Paxton

¹⁶ Cf. Van der Meulen (2007)

2002; 2007). Bridging and bonding can, thus, be conceptualised along socio-demographic divides of ethnicity such as above or indirectly along network connections (Leonard & Onyx 2003; Burt 2005; Geys & Murdoch 2010).

Figure 2.1 Duality of Persons and groups



(Adapted from Moody 2005)

Paxton (2002, 2007) measures bonding and bridging in different types of organizations (religious, hobby clubs, trade unions, sport associations, etc.) in the World Values Survey. By looking at cross-membership in different types of associations, she identifies whether an organization *type* is isolated or connected, and whether the members have different levels of generalized trust. To illustrate this approach, regard organizations A, B, C and D in the graph above as different types of associations. Interconnections here mean network ties between organizations by virtue of cross-membership in different types of organizations.

This approach emphasizes interconnections between members through overlapping memberships. In addition, board members sitting on the board of

different organizations could potentially diffuse trust through the network (Fennema & Tillie 1999; 2001). Finally, organizing events with other organizations could bring together people from different backgrounds and create bridging opportunities. Using network terminology, ties between (board) members through membership and events become transitive and can spread social trust from one organization to another (Moody & White 2003: 108). Paxton also emphasizes a learning or developmental effect that arises from exposure to different people by crossing organizational boundaries through overlapping (board) membership, which can also be extended to events.

However, the above studies still suffer from the same methodological shortcomings that have been discussed in relation to social heterogeneity as bridging and bonding. Namely, by investigating organizational types the results are still based on a random sample of individuals and households, and therefore cannot properly capture contextual effects. The resulting network might capture the volume of one's membership rather than a pattern of connections, since larger organizations are by definition more likely to include more members and would then be categorized as a bridging type (Coffé & Geys 2008). Moreover, some of these organization types have no members, such as the cheque-book interest organizations. How would trust spread, if the people who would be the carriers of trust are actually not meeting others? Finally, Paxton (2007) does not control for the length of membership and presupposes that the direction of causality runs from joining to trust, which as discussed previously needs to be empirically tested. Despite these shortcomings, theoretically speaking, network connections could diffuse generalized trust in those organizations where the contact criterion is met. I will add measures to the study in order to map the organizational bridges through overlapping membership and events.

Beyond bridging and bonding

The analysis of generalized trust beyond contact (or bridging and bonding) takes individual level factors such as resources and other attitudes into account. Which individual level factors can be attributed to generalized trust and what are the mechanisms responsible for explaining differences among members? Three clusters of theory are relevant. The first is a *psychological* outlook, which relates trust to optimism or a belief that one is in control of one's life (Uslaner 1999). Although

some conceptualize optimism as a trait of human nature, optimism here refers to broad expectancies about the future (for discussion see Peterson 2000; cf. Uslaner 2002). These two different approaches are not incompatible, since the human nature approach argues that we inherit some baseline optimism, the second approach emphasizes how experiences further shape these expectancies. Moreover, we are not interested in the sources of optimism, but in how it affects generalized trust.¹⁷ The experience of discrimination is also argued to be particularly detrimental for trust (Smith 2010). In a similar vein, the experience of migration might negatively affect people in their outlook towards the generalized other, while its effect should fade away as one stays longer in the host society due to acculturation (Dinesen & Hooghe 2010). That is to say, generational differences and shorter length of stay in the host country could potentially be indicative of less control over one's life, which could translate into less generalized trust. Well-being theories have been referred to in some of the literature as reasons why people might have higher levels of generalized trust (Alesina & La Ferrara 2002; De Hart & Dekker 2003; Dekker 2003). Conversely, being victim of a crime and psychological attitudes such as lack of self-esteem and pessimism are conducive towards careful attitudes in dealing with others. In fact, Rosenberg (1957), one of the first scholars to work with the generalized trust question, took this item as part of a misanthropy scale. It is then logical to assess the relationship between generalized trust and psychological variables, or else we might leave out important factors that would elaborate our analytical framework. The mechanism behind psychological factors and generalized trust is that people with higher scores on those items are more confident about themselves, whereas people with low scores project their negative life experiences into reporting being careful with others whom they do not know.

A second approach sees trust as *norm driven*. A belief in the benevolence of others or human nature is then behind the generation of generalized trust. In this framework, people might adhere to generalized trust, because they 'see their trust as a sort of principle of their life' (De Hart & Dekker 2003: 164; Uslaner 2002). In other words, generalized trust is a moral value. Some studies confirm, that when people view others as trustworthy they justify, that it is better to trust than not to trust

¹⁷ Similarly, optimism might be affected by early socialization. Again, we are here not interested in the sources of optimism.


(De Hart & Dekker 2003; Dekker 2003). It is noteworthy to mention that the opposite does not hold for those that report being careful. They justify their answers in terms of their personal experiences, which is described above. The analysis here will include values such as individualism and humanitarianism and correlate these with the generalized trust item. If these attitudes correlate positively with generalized trust, there could be a mechanism at work, which explains that people view trust as a moral good. People might thus self-categorise themselves into high and low trusters, not on the basis of life experiences, but on the basis of a value pattern (for a similar analysis see Hooghe 2003b). To be sure, the individualism scale reports on how a person views their role in society (Hooghe, 2003a, Coffé and Geys, 2007a). Questions that are part of the scale ask whether one needs to be concerned about others and how much importance a person should put on personal success instead of thinking about the welfare of others. The humanitarianism scale also taps into concerns about the welfare of others, but they are positively worded. However, conceptually they differ from individualism, since the items do not emphasize personal success, but societal concern for well-being of others.

The third strand in the individual level literature on generalized trust, *social success* theory, argues that trust is expressed by the “winners in society”, who are in control of their life due to objective life circumstances such as greater income and higher educational attainment (Newton, 1999b: 185, Whiteley, 1999). The literature on generalized trust has formed a consensus around these factors, since study after study confirms these linkages. The argument is that people who have higher levels of income, educational attainment, people who have a job and have not experienced divorce or are not widowers are more confident about themselves and will report viewing others as trustworthy, because they can risk viewing others as such. All three theoretical strands described here share a common trait in that, it is not contact with ethnically dissimilar participants in voluntary organizations, which will enhance generalized trust, but rather positive or negative experiences in one’s life, which have been internalized and shape one’s outlook towards the unknown other. In other words, beyond bridging and bonding, or contact, a cognitive mechanism could be responsible for differences in generalized trust.

Studying a moving target

This section summarizes all the factors discussed above, which are empirically relevant or are hypothesised to be relevant for the study of generalized trust in the context of voluntary organizations (see Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2 Applied theoretical framework of generalized trust in voluntary organizations



Note: Data collection effort has been directed at finding variation in concepts that are highlighted in bold.

When I started this project, not all the results that have been described here were available. In addition, some factors related to trust are still not widely investigated across settings with appropriate data. Now with a few new studies available, some factors do not seem relevant anymore (for example governance structure in organizations). Studying generalized trust is, in other words, a moving target. I have directed the data collection towards finding evidence for the contact hypothesis, since this constitutes a major gap in the literature. This means, however, that while I have carefully selected organizations and participants in order to test the contact hypothesis for Turkish (ethnically homogenous) and mixed organizations, other organizational characteristics might additionally be relevant. These characteristics are typically lacking in representative data sets that sample individuals rather than organizations. But since I had no information on these factors prior to data collection, they can only be investigated, if the data shows enough variation and allows for the appropriate tests to be conducted. Therefore, apart from ethnic composition, both organizational types should not differ considerably on other dimensions such as stimulating contact and collaboration opportunities among participants, creating network bridges, working with the government and the size¹⁸ of the organization. If there are considerable differences across the two organizational types, these characteristics could serve as variables to be added to the multilevel model. These organizational characteristics will be described in chapter 4.


At the individual level, migration related factors will be tested with the aid of a data set that oversamples minorities (Survey Living Condition of Minorities 2004-2005). This data is more complete as it includes more minority groups than only Turkish participants (see chapter 3). In this study, I added measures on network connections, volunteering and close ties. Again, if there is variation among participants, I will test for these additional effects after describing the data in chapter 4. For volunteers I will test whether they adhere to generalized trust more than participants, and if there are differences I examine whether the length of their participation has any additional effect, since it is imperative to test whether they are also self-selecting into their activity on the basis of initial higher level of generalized trust. I will first examine this in the Dutch Family Survey (2009) and next include it

¹⁸ Size of an organization should influence opportunities for contact.

in subsequent models based on the data that I collected. This survey also includes data on previous participation of people who are no longer active. As the effects of interethnic contact might endure I will test this using a cross section of the population called the ‘ever participants’ (see Hooghe 2003a and Van der Meulen 2007). Beyond bridging and bonding, some of the relations tested at the individual level, such as norms and psychological attitudes also depend on the variation found in the data. Chapter 6 will discuss these relationships.

To reiterate, the main hypothesis to be tested in this thesis is whether interethnic contact among members of mixed as opposed to Turkish voluntary organizations would enhance attitudes of generalized trust. Alternatively, members of mixed organizations could self-select into those organizations on the basis of their initial trust levels. At the organizational level, if we put the optimal conditions of the interethnic contact hypothesis next to recent results from generalized trust studies, not all conditions seem necessary. For example, equal status among participants does not seem to be more conducive to the generation of trust. In other words, hierarchical organizational structure should not matter as such. Other factors, a common goal, intergroup cooperation and institutional support are held constant here by selecting one city and local organizations where contact should take place. I have already described how institutional support in Amsterdam and the Netherlands is recently focused on increasing contact. In chapter 4, I will describe different organizational characteristics and also analyse activities of organizations. At a minimum level, both organizational types should enhance meaningful interaction among their participants (frequency and type of activities). Organizations included in this study should consequently differ only on ethnic composition of their participants. While one group of organizations exposes their participants to an ethnically diverse set of people, the other group consists of a homogenous ethnic set.

Figure 2.3 Potential causal paths for an interethnic contact mechanism in voluntary organizations



The analysis of the contact mechanism is hence focused on the two remaining criteria, in the causal paths depicted above (Figure 2.3).¹⁹ Firstly, participants of mixed organizations who are involved longer in their organizations should differ in their participants' score on generalized trust in order to give evidence of a contact mechanism. I will test this causal path using a representative data set from the Netherlands, the Dutch Family Survey (FNB-2009). However, this data set contains very limited numbers of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. Moreover, due to the data collection procedure, the data are representative of individuals rather than organizations. That is to say, since in almost every organization only one person has been sampled, the data lacks a multilevel structure. Therefore, organizational level variance in generalized trust cannot be separated from individual level variance. Hence, I set out to collect additional data in order to oversample minorities and also to create a nested data set. If the contact mechanism is at work, organizational variance in generalized trust should be higher than the individual level variance using the data that I collected in Amsterdam. Again, I will also test whether length of membership in a mixed organization increases trust. Secondly, controlling for the presence or absence of close ties, the analysis will focus on the mediating role of strong relationships in mixed voluntary organizations in enhancing generalized trust. The Dutch representative data set lacks these variables. Throughout all analyses, social success factors will be controlled for, since the literature has formed a consensus around those. If we do not find any empirical evidence for the causal paths above, it is most likely that a cognitive mechanism is at work in enhancing or decreasing generalized trust of participants of mixed and Turkish associations, which will be further elaborated in chapter 6. There, I will test for psychological and norm driven explanations, while again controlling for social success factors. Let me now describe the research design that will allow me to find evidence for these mechanisms.

¹⁹ To be empirically precise, there is also an arrow between length of membership and close ties. I have indicated this arrow with a dashed line. In other words, if one is a member in a voluntary organization for a longer period of time, they are more likely to develop close ties within the organization. This interaction effect will only be investigated further if the other two paths are statistically significant.

2.2 Research Design: A comparative case study with an embedded large N

Generally speaking, there are three types of empirical research designs across the social sciences, case studies, surveys and experiments. Since I am combining the case study and the survey methodology, the following section will justify these choices. I will discuss the logic behind the research design and the scope for generalising the conclusions of the study. The design rests on the assumption that all the methodologies above share an important logic, namely theoretical inference (Eckstein 2000; Gomm, Hammersley & Foster 2000b; Gerring 2007; Yin 2009). If we follow this logic, none of the research methodologies are then inherently superior and their implementation rests on their ability to answer the questions at hand in combination with practical considerations. Therefore, the choice for the research design described below is predominantly based on creating a setting that allows for testing the contact mechanism and considering rival mechanisms. I state predominately, because as most other studies, I also had to take practical considerations into account, which would have otherwise put the study at risk of failing to be carried out. The design below could be characterised as a comparative case study with an embedded large N that allows for cross-sectional analysis. Let me first describe how I selected the units of analysis (organizations and participants), before moving to justifications and the scope of the generalisations in this study.

Selecting organizations and participants

The selection of the organizations is as follows. I consulted a database²⁰ in which information about 15,000 (non-profit and voluntary)²¹ organizations is stored (Vermeulen, Brünger & Van de Walle 2009). This information, in turn, is retrieved from the Registry of the Chamber of Commerce in Amsterdam (for earlier versions and a historical database of organizations in the Netherlands see Van Heelsum's web page). By registering, organizations disclose information about their address, their activities and their board so as to be eligible for funding schemes by government

²⁰ This database is compiled by researchers at the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) at the University of Amsterdam, which in turn is commissioned by the city council of Amsterdam (Vermeulen, Brünger & Van de Walle 2009). I got access to this database during my research visits at IMES in 2009 and 2010.

²¹ By definition, these organizations have no commercial purpose. This does not, however, mean that they do not have funds. Often activities are not free and when organizations earn money with an event, it serves to make up for the costs or to raise money for other events or for logistical purposes.

agencies and other charities. Registration is also associated with greater transparency about the mission of the organization and who is involved in activities.²² Retrieving organizations from an archive such as the Dutch Chamber of Commerce can possibly result in selecting paper or sleeping organizations. That is because organizations have to wait a few years before their name is erased from the database by the Dutch Chamber of Commerce. Wherever necessary, for instance, if I could not find an address or if the name of the organization had changed, I consulted the Internet or municipality guides to supplement the Chamber of Commerce Registry Data.

I first selected only those organizations that have recorded themselves as an ‘association’. Legally, the board of an ‘association’ is required to hold a general assembly meeting once a year. This, in turn, entails that ‘associations’ have members or participants that regularly attend events, whereas ‘foundations’ often have no (fee paying) members. Moreover, their participants could vary per event and this could have created problems for testing the contact hypothesis. Later I had to include some ‘foundations’ in the sample, firstly because there were too few ‘associations’ left to contact. I made sure these organizations²³ had participants who regularly attended events. More importantly, however, even if an organization registered itself as a ‘foundation’, in practice they would still hold a general meeting and could possibly have members. This is often the case with religious organizations such as mosques. ‘Associations’, on the other hand, sometimes deviated from this and only held a meeting as a formality.

The researchers who compiled the database also recorded the ethnicity (country of birth) of the board members for a random sample of the organizations. When 30 to 50 percent of an organization’s board are born in a country different from the Netherlands, the organization is labelled as mixed. This could then result in second-generation immigrant organizations being labelled as mixed. Therefore, I checked with the organization before surveying their participants whether they directed their activities towards a specific ethnic group, even if they were labelled as mixed. The database enabled me to make two groups: an ethnically mixed and an ethnically

²² Clandestine organizations are by default not included in this study.

²³ Throughout the thesis I use association and organization interchangeably, although association has a legal definition. As argued above, this distinction has no analytical consequences for the results.

homogenous group of organizations. I limited the latter to only one ethnic group: namely Turkish organizations.²⁴

Within each group I first alphabetized the list in order to follow a random selection procedure. Then I narrowed down the selection towards different types of activities, such as sports, culture and women's activities, in order to include enough participants with different socio-demographic characteristics. The logic is to have enough variation in age, sex, income and educational levels. I also aimed at selecting organizations in different districts so as not to introduce geographical bias. However, I had to exclude mixed associations in the South-East district of Amsterdam as this area has no Turkish associations to be selected there either. Thus, the exclusion of mixed organizations from this district was driven empirically.

Within the Turkish group, I selected organizations whose boards were connected through common board membership as well as isolated organizations (see also Peters 2010). The mixed associations had almost no connections through common board membership. This should not affect the results too much, since linkages across common board members are not that common. Sixty percent of the organizations in the board member network of both mixed and Turkish organizations consist of isolates (Vermeulen, Brünger & Van de Walle 2009). Finally, when selecting mosques, I aimed at variation in different organizational characteristics (Diyamet and Milli Görüş; the two largest religious groups). In the selection procedure, I aimed to take as much relevant variation as possible into account. However, prior to interviewing the board I had no access to organizational characteristics such as funding levels, working relationships with the government, the size of the organization, or whether the organization is part of a collaborative network or direct their participants towards volunteering more than others. If the data vary in these respects, I will include these characteristics in the analysis. Otherwise, these factors are taken to be constant across the groups and should not affect the results.

When selecting the organizations I sometimes had to introduce a snowball method in addition to sampling from the database. In comparison to the Turkish groups, I included relatively more mixed organizations that I found on the Internet or through informants in the council and other organizations. Most of these

²⁴ Initially, I also contacted Moroccan associations, but because of non-response, I decided to include more Turkish associations in the sample.

organizations (but four) were, nevertheless, registered in the Dutch Chamber of Commerce. The snowball method was necessary, firstly, because the list from the database alone included too many sports associations and, for example, too few women's associations. The database did also not contain some of the theoretically interesting organizations such as Parent Teacher Associations and neighbourhood groups.²⁵ Secondly, even though the board members of the organization could be from different backgrounds, the participants could be from a single ethnic group.

Before surveying the participants, I made sure the mixed organizations were from different backgrounds. The percentage of mixed participants in those organizations varies between 15 and 80 percent. Ideally, I would have access to more mixed organizations with a 50/50 ratio. In general, however, my impression was that these mixed organizations are rare. So, introducing stricter criteria for selection, even though theoretically desirable, might not have been feasible.

This brings me to how I selected the members of organizations. I visited events at organizations such as a debate, a festive activity or a service. Then I would ask a board member to help me in identifying a varied set of people: volunteers and participants so to exclude occasional guests. When the organization had a varied audience (in terms of age and sex), I would invite them to take part in the paper survey or an online one. Sometimes, visiting an event was not possible, because the board did not want me to interrupt an activity. In those occasional cases I would ask the board to invite as many different participants and volunteers as possible to take part. In general, the sample included in this study is comprised of mostly participants and volunteers and is not representative of passive fee paying members. To be sure, even in local organizations, with a less formal structure, there are members who do not participate in any event. This is less rare if we consider those people who donate money to an organization, but do not attend any activities. This is sometimes the case at mosques and churches and with honorary members in football associations. But

²⁵ In a study in Utrecht (Dekker *et al.* 2009), the researchers assert that neighbourhood groups often have mixed participants. However, I had difficulty finding these in Amsterdam, because they organised events on an ad hoc basis. This required concentrating on a neighbourhood and a more intensive search. As regards to Parent Teacher Associations, I compiled a list of mixed ethnicity primary schools and contacted them, but the board and volunteers often consisted mainly of Dutch parents.

these passive members are not included in this study. Therefore, in the analysis in the chapters to follow I will speak of participants rather than members.

So far the research questions have implied researching multiple organizations and applying an embedded design within each. The appropriate data analysis technique for such a design is a multilevel one, since I aim at singling out the effects on generalized trust at the level of organizations as well as individual level of analysis. This immediately poses the question of how many organizations and participants I need to select in order to carry out the analysis.

Issues of sample size in multilevel analysis are rather complex, since there are at least two levels at which one is interested in estimating the percentage of explained variation. Rules of thumb that are developed by analysing effect sizes are very sensitive to the area of research and dictate sample sizes that are very costly. For instance some prescribe that one needs a sample size of 30 groups with 30 individuals within those, which has a total size of 900 (Kreft cited in Scherbaum & Ferreter 2009). Others go as far as suggesting that one needs 50 groups with at least 20 individuals within those, resulting in a total sample size of 1000 (Hox 1998). Others have recently developed models which evaluate required sample sizes on the basis of previous research (Snijders & Bosker 1993). This type of research, unfortunately, involves having elaborate information on variances at each level and correlations between variables and the mean of each variable. Therefore, it does not seem appropriate for the current project as we have little information about our estimates. Two recommendations are, however, relevant here. Firstly, we need at least an average of 10 lower level units in order to be on the safe side with higher power or substantive effect sizes for the estimated regression coefficients. Secondly, increasing the number of groups is usually seen to increase the power of the analysis as opposed to increasing the number of individuals within those. The required level 2 units (here organizations) are approximately 30, if one is interested in variance at that level (Maas & Hox 2004; 2005). Recommendations for organizational research are in line with the latter study as they too suggest at least 10 level 1 units for finding strong effect sizes, and when dealing with small effect sizes at level 2, having at least 30 organizations will yield an optimal sample size (Scherbaum & Ferreter, 2009).²⁶ I

²⁶ 'Optimal' here refers to small standard errors of the estimates.

have thus aimed at researching 40 organizations in total (20 ethnic and 20 mixed) and an average of 10 valid responses within each in order to be able to draw valid generalisations about organizational and individual level effects. In chapter 5, I will describe the sample on which the data analysis is based and contrast this with a random sample in the main Dutch cities and the survey carried out in Amsterdam.

On representativeness and generalizations

Overall this study can be characterised as a comparative case study with a nested large N. It is a case study, firstly, because the relevant behaviour of the research objects cannot be manipulated in the same way that experimental designs can (Yin 1994: 7). In such a situation the investigator has little or no control over a specific event, but can only investigate it in its “naturally occurring social situations” (Gomm, Hammersley & Foster 2000b: 3) and by controlling the relevant factors in a cross-sectional design. Therefore, having no controls built into the case study design by a strict randomization procedure makes it prone to criticism. Perhaps the greatest challenge to the case study design is its alleged limitations for generalization or external validity. In contrast to this belief, a large body of literature sees the case study as a viable design that enables analytical and theoretical inference (Yin 1994; Gomm, Hammersley & Foster 2000b; Gerring 2007). So, the goal is not statistical inference to a given population; the findings are not generalized to other cases as is usually done in large nationwide or city surveys. The goal is to generalise to a theory, analogous to an experimental situation (Yin 1994: 38). In this sense, the objects of the study in an experiment and case study do not represent a sample from a geographical area, but a theoretical sample that would enable one to falsify or corroborate a theoretical proposition.

However, this study deviates from the classical single case study, which would for example trace how voluntary organizations have evolved or would have been in search of thick descriptions within that setting. Nor are these organizations seen as unique cases in their own terms (cf. Yin 1994: 53). What I have aimed at is identifying a relevant population and creating a sample that is representative of a specific group, but also representative of a crucial situation. Therefore, even if this study does not include other ethnically homogenous organizations (such as Moroccan, Ghanaian, Iranian, etc.), if we consider the Turkish and mixed

organizations as *critical* or *crucial* cases²⁷ (Eckstein 2000: 148-149; Gerring 2007: 115-122; Yin 1994: 40; 54), they meet the necessary condition for testing the contact hypothesis. Hence, what I aim to generalize to is whether the contact mechanism or its rivals are better candidates in explaining differences in generalized trust. If we do not find evidence for the contact mechanism when comparing these two settings, it would also be unlikely to find theoretical support for this mechanism, even if we include other homogenous or mixed organizations.

The selection of mixed and Turkish organizations, as well as participants, has not been strictly random, although alphabetizing the list of organizations within each group has overcome some of the selection biases. By further narrowing the selection towards type of activities, geographic location, network position (for organizations), and socio-demographic characteristics (for participants), this design also follows the logic of *diversity*. In other words, the design aims to represent relevant variation rather than general (national/city-wide) representativeness (Maloney and Roßteutscher 2007b). What makes it appropriate as a selection procedure is that when working with small samples, there is a bigger chance that a strict random procedure results in an unrepresentative sample (Gerring 2007: 87). Only by increasing the sample size is there an increased chance of drawing a representative sample. But this is a very costly solution in designs such as the present one, not to mention that selecting the participants randomly would have simply been impossible, since I had no access to them outside events.²⁸ Selecting a diverse set of organizations and participants, however, makes the samples representative in relevant aspects, although the actual distribution in the analysis to follow might not be perfectly representative (Gerring 2007: 97-101).

In other words, ‘simple random sampling is an attempt to ... tak[e] account of all forms of heterogeneity’, but it is not essential (Gomm, Hammersley & Foster 2000a:

²⁷ The usage of a critical or a crucial case differs here from the usual definitions, since usually a crucial or a critical case is a single case study (but see also Eckstein 2000). A critical case is one that meets all the conditions to test several theories, for instance the missile crisis case (as discussed in Yin, 1994). Similarly, a crucial case is either a most-likely scenario that invalidates a theory or a least-likely one that confirms a theory (Eckstein 2000; Gerring 2007). An example of a least-likely case is Thomas Faist’s (2000) study of Turkish migration to Germany for confirming the role of networks in determining international migration flows. A most-likely case is for example Whyte’s (cited in Yin, 1994) seminal study, *Street Corner Society*, in which he doesn’t find support for the claim that gangs are socially disorganised.

²⁸ I asked for membership lists, but this was refused by many board members.

104). A situation or group of people becomes representative of a situation by selecting cases for study on the basis of theoretical ideas and information available from other sources. This is precisely the procedure behind stratified random sampling and quota sampling rather than simple random sampling (Gomm, Hammersley & Foster 2000a: 104-6; Fielding & Gilbert 2006: 236). In large scale surveys, stratification is based on information from a census; for instance the ratio of men and women needs to be reflected in the sample (Fielding & Gilbert 2006: 236). In addition, in country-level research only a few randomly selected areas are usually surveyed (De Vaus 2001), but practical considerations such as sending interviewers to rural areas are also taken into account. To give another example, when people in neighbourhoods are surveyed, interviewers select a few streets randomly and knock on doors with only even numbers, assuming it follows a random procedure (Blokland 2003).

I follow a similar procedure by first alphabetizing the list of organizations within each group (Turkish and mixed), which resembles a randomization logic. Then I selected organizations by types of activities, geographical location, etc. (see above). When contacting the organizations, the first available one in the list, which organized an event, was then included, assuming that their position on the alphabetic list and the event does not affect the result. Similarly, when asking participants to fill out the questionnaire, I would first select them on the basis of their sex, age or being a volunteer and the first available person is then included in the sample. Again, I assume that their availability should not introduce bias in the results more than in other sampling strategies. This procedure is also followed by Stolle (1998) in her seminal study on generalized trust and participation in voluntary organizations, which has inspired this study. Similarly, Maloney, Van Deth and Roßteutscher (2008: 266) first mapped the organizations in two cities, sent out questionnaires to organizations, and next *causally* selected some for further survey on the basis of data collected in the first round.

Earlier I contrasted large scale surveys with case studies and experiments, and argued that the latter two designs do not make inferences to a geographical population. Hence, this suggested a distinction between analytical or theoretical inference, on the one hand, and statistical inference on the other hand. However,

even when statistical generalisation to a population is possible, virtually no study would take enumerate descriptive inferences to a population as its sole objective, but most studies also examine certain theoretical propositions by using statistical tests. In other words, the goal of most types of designs in the social sciences is to generalise by testing theoretical propositions or proposing assumptions for further analysis. So, even if there are instances where case studies and surveys are designed with contrasting purposes, analytic and statistical generalization are not necessarily opposed to each other (cf. Yin 1994: 32; see also Gomm, Hammersley & Foster 2000b). Yin (1994: 32) asserts ‘a fatal flaw in doing case studies is to conceive of statistical generalisation as the method of generalising the results of a case study’. Following this logic would suggest that when finding differences between two groups, mixed and Turkish organizations, it is not relevant whether it is statistically significant, because randomisation is not the procedure behind the selection of cases. However, and as mentioned earlier, something can be representative without following strict random selection procedures. Moreover, in experiments which contain a theoretical sample, statistical tests are used to say something about a relationship. In this sense, an assumed relationship (or distribution) is a theoretical proposition against which the data is tested. Therefore, in the chapters to follow, I do use statistical tests and their confidence intervals in order to establish whether the data supports certain theoretical relationships or whether a relationship is merely due to random variation in the data. The next section describes the methodological considerations in operationalising the relevant concepts of the analysis and describes the variables.

2.3 Variables and operationalization

The data collection in this thesis is based on two methods. Organization data is collected through interviews with a board member. I have chosen interviews so the board members could get to know me and I would gain their trust. This was necessary since I needed to collect data from the participants too and needed the permission of the board members for this. Moreover, interviews are a more efficient method if one would like to maximize the response rate and collect complete data. By interviewing the board members first, I was also able to gauge whether the

organization suited this project before collecting data on the participants. For example, I had to assess the level of diversity of a mixed organization before including them in the study. As far as confidentiality concerns, I told the board members in advance that I would not mention their name and the organization's name in this study. This, in turn, would reduce non-response and would also pose no additional problems to collecting data from participants. Thus although in most studies the name of the interviewees and organizations are mentioned, due to confidentiality reasons I am not including them in this thesis. In what follows, I will first discuss the rationale of the interview guide and then move to consider methodological issues with the questionnaire.

Towards an interview guide

The interview guide is based on questions asked by Maloney, Van Deth and Roßteutscher's (2008) study in different Western European cities. In this study they asked organizations several questions about their structural features, some of which I repeated here. I added a couple of questions when necessary.

The interview opened with asking the board member when the organization has been founded. This would give them an opportunity to warm up and tell me how and why the organization was established, although this was not part of the data I needed. If so, I would thus let them discuss this before asking them about the *activities* of the organization. The latter was then discussed more in detail. I would especially invite them to talk further about events that were aimed at stimulating interethnic contact, if they would mention it. Less attention was paid to abstract goals or the mission statement of the organization, since they would automatically mention they were aiming to further integrate the members without providing detailed information about organizations' activities. Next I asked a question about the *frequency of activities*. This is necessary in order to see whether the organization would offer an opportunity for durable contact between the participants.

I then asked questions about the management style of the organization. Firstly, the board member was asked to indicate whether they have an official board and how often they would meet. Most organizations (except a few mixed ones) were selected from the database that, in turn, originated from the Dutch Chamber of Commerce, and therefore they mostly have a registered board. However, in reality it could be the

case that some boards rarely meet up or that the organization is run by one person (Uitermark & Van Steenberghe 2006). This would then indicate a hierarchical organizational structure. The next question asked whether the organization is part of an *umbrella* organization in order to measure external hierarchical ties.

Collaboration opportunities with other organizations were investigated in order to map the external *networks* of an organization. Following network studies, I asked the members to name at least three organizations they had collaborated with through organizing an event in the past six months (the so-called 'name generator' question) (Marsden 2005). The time frame and number of network partners would limit recall problems. These ego networks (or the focal organizations' network) are a snapshot of the organization's collaboration efforts, although network studies that have analysed different data collection methods conclude that a single name generator results in an actor's 'core' relationships (Marsden 2005). This was sufficient as I also had only one snapshot of the participants' generalized trust attitudes. However, if one is interested in collaboration over time, archival sources such as the yearly reports are better instruments instead of interview questions due to recall problems. In addition, some network studies would also collect data on the alters of an ego (the organization a focal one has named) in order to establish whether the tie is reciprocated. However, as collaboration per definition involves the consent of the alter, it seemed unnecessary to do this. Other goals of collecting data on an ego's alter is to expand the network and obtain a more complete network. However, as the conclusions of the study might not be generalized to these organizations, again the extra data was not needed. For example, some organizations mentioned governmental organizations such as the police as their collaboration partner, which is not even a non-profit organization. Moreover, I did not collect any attitudinal data at those alter organizations. This section was closed by asking the board member to indicate the location of the alter and its ethnicity or type of organization (name interpreting methods) (Marsden 2005). This information would, in turn, be complemented by information from the Internet or other informants, since their answers might not have been accurate.

The next question was about the *size* of the organization by asking the board member about the number of members. Larger organizations have typically less

opportunity for contact. Following this, I would then probe the board members to estimate how many of the members are doing *voluntary work* and how many are actively involved with organizing the activities. Here I would take the opportunity and ask questions about other characteristics of the participants, namely the level of diversity of the organization and whether the board member knows about their multiple memberships. While the level of diversity is quite essential for the categorization of the organization, the multiple memberships question was only added in order to check the responses of the participants against it. However, it was very difficult for the member to know this unless the organization was very small. Finally, I asked the board member to indicate whether they collaborated with the local or district government, and whether they received funding. Other sources of funding, such as membership fees and charity funds, were also asked for.

Since the focus of the data collection was mainly to create variation in ethnic composition of an organization, I will discuss this measure more in detail here. There are two ways in which ethnic composition is measured (Putnam 2007; Agirdag, Van Houtte & Van Avermaet 2011):

1) Ethnic concentration: the proportion of non-native individuals in a given context (school, workplace, neighbourhood, organization)

2) Ethnic diversity/heterogeneity: based on the total number of ethnic groups, corrected for their size. For example the Herfindahl index is calculated by:

$$(p_{\text{ethnic group 1}})^2 + (p_{\text{ethnic group 2}})^2 + (p_{\text{ethnic group 3}})^2 + \dots + (p_{\text{ethnic group n}})^2$$

Where p stands for proportion

The index runs from 0 to 1, where 0 stands for almost total diversity and 1 for no diversity at all.

I have operationalized ethnic composition based on the diversity measure above. Where the ethnic concentration takes the native/non-native division into account, the diversity measure does not. Often ethnic concentration refers to the proportion of non-Western minorities to natives. In line with the diversity measure I do not distinguish between natives and non-natives or Western and non-Western groups for the following reasons. Although the Dutch might feel culturally closer to Germans and Belgians, it is difficult to imagine whether they feel culturally also closer to the Spanish rather than to Moroccans. It is certainly odd to think that Moroccans and

Turks feel closer to each other than the Turks and the Dutch or Moroccans and the Dutch. Therefore, I take ethnic diversity of an organization to represent the ratio of individuals from different ethnic groups to any other ethnic group that constitutes the majority. In the following chapters I also use the level of diversity to refer to the ethnic composition of the organization to avoid the normative connotations of the native/non-native and Western/non-Western distinction prevalent in the ethnic concentration measure.

I have two measures of ethnic composition that are separately used in subsequent analyses. The first measure is a dichotomous one: *Turkish* versus *mixed*. The second operationalization of ethnic composition is based on percentages of participants with a different ethnic background than the majority group. Again, the majority group can be of any background. More specifically, I asked the board member to indicate the percentage of participants from different backgrounds in their organization. I could not calculate this proportion myself, as the respondents were not always from all the different ethnicities that comprised that organization. Moreover, the boards were very reluctant to share membership lists with me. In addition, it was sometimes difficult for the board member to recall how big the groups in the organizations were in order to calculate a refined measure such as the Herfindahl index that takes group sizes into account. Although the organizations keep a membership list, they do not record the country of birth of their participants, nor do they record the birth country of the participant's parents. Since ethnicity is based on one's country of birth and their parents' country of birth, the board members would not be able to have any organizational data that recorded this more precisely, and, therefore, had to estimate this.²⁹

Table 2.1 below summarizes the different measures used for ethnic composition in this thesis as I am using more than one data set. In the data set I collected for this thesis, 90% or more of the Turkish organizations' members are of Turkish descent. Thus, the level of diversity is 5% or less. In mixed organizations the level of

²⁹ The Dutch government's practice of defining ethnicity by someone's country of birth and their parent's country of birth is not without detractors. This practice is often labelled as methodological nationalism (Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002; Favell 2003). To be sure, someone who is born outside the Netherlands (the first generation) or someone whose parents are born elsewhere (the second-generation) might not base their identity on those categories and hence might not be led to act any differently than the majority population.

Table 2.1 The operationalization of ethnic composition in organizations

<i>Survey</i>	<i>Measure</i>	<i>Ethnic composition (Levels of diversity)</i>	
Amsterdam (data collected for this thesis)	Categorical	Diverse: Mixed 15% to 80% of members have a different background than any given majority group	Homogenous: Turkish 5% or less from non- Turkish background
	Ratio diversity	15% (min.) 80% (max.)	0% (min.) 5% (max.)
FNB-2009	Ordinal	Mixed: 1%-25%; 26%-49%; 50%; and 51%-75% of members are from Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Antillean or other non-Western background	Homogenous: 0% diverse; More than 75% of the members are from Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Antillean or other non-Western background
	Categorical	Medium to high diversity 26% to 75% from Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Antillean or other non-Western background	Low diversity 0% to 25%, and 76% to 100% of members from Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Antillean or other non- Western background
LAS 2004/2005	Categorical	Diverse: Background people in organization is mainly diverse (or Western for minorities)	Homogenous: People in organization are mainly from a non- Western minority background (and non- Western for the Dutch)

diversity is between 15% and 80%. I use diversity rather than ethnic concentration in the chapters to follow, although I cannot entirely avoid the native/non-native or Western/non-Western distinction. In the Dutch Family Survey 2009 (FNB-2009) data set below, the question on which diversity is based only asks the respondents to mention the proportion of non-Western minorities. Theoretically, when a Dutch person participates in a non-Dutch organization with the majority of their members from other Western backgrounds, the person is in a diverse environment. However, I cannot take this into account. The Survey of Urban Minorities' Living Condition (LAS 2004/2005) data set represents another caveat. The Dutch report to participate in associations whose members are from Western background. If I were then to follow the above conceptualization in which Western/non-Western distinction is discarded, the majority of the Dutch would be participating in a diverse association. This seems not so plausible to me and might be the result of the coding procedure.

Therefore, when the Dutch in the LAS data set report participating in an association with mainly Western membership, I have recoded them as being in a homogenous organization. This does not contradict my conceptualization of ethnic composition in organizations as it is more plausible that the Dutch respondents might actually be more likely to participate in a Dutch organization than in an organization with Western minorities and the survey coding might be biased for this reason.

Towards a questionnaire

The generalized trust attitude is measured on an ordinal Likert scale (Rosenberg in Wrightsman 1991: 404-6). I have, however, deviated from the convention by using an 11-point scale (0 to 10) following the European Social Survey. Attitudes are usually measured on a 5-point scale with the following labels: completely agree, slightly agree, neutral (neither agree/disagree), slightly disagree, completely disagree. In the 1970s a few researchers experimented with 10-point to 20-point scales, with and without a neutral mid-point (Matell & Jacoby 1971). The results suggested that discriminating between more points increased the validity of the results, although above the threshold of 10/11 adding more points had little effect. The increase in time needed to answer more categories also did not affect the results significantly. Recently, these arguments have been reinvigorated in order to justify the use of lengthier scales, specifically in life satisfaction research (Cummins & Gullone 2000). The argument goes as follows. Having ten discrete points for attitude strength is relatively easy as the scale is divided into equal units. People also associate a numerical value to their attitude strength instead of a label, which is intuitive. I have added the midpoint as a neutral category, since respondents usually are pleased to be offered such a category, although some researchers argue in favour of forced choices (Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman 1991). Attitudes scales on how one evaluates oneself in relation to others and in relation to participation are especially sensitive to positive response bias. Unfortunately, many solutions to these problems will result in a very lengthy questionnaire or a large sample. One simple solution to this issue is to conduct self-completion questionnaires instead of structured interviews, which reduces interviewer response bias. People do not need to express their opinions to the interviewer and can fill out the questionnaire without feeling someone is judging them. Secondly, researchers who have interaction with

the respondents when distributing and collecting questionnaires are advised to provide an envelope (Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman 1991). Returning the questionnaire in a closed envelope reinforces the anonymity of the responses.

Although the generalized trust question is a very popular indicator, there are some measurement issues with it. To begin with, some studies suggest that there is systematic response bias to this question on the basis of how one interprets “most people” in the question (Sturgis & Smith 2010) . A project carried out in the UK in 2007 has included questions about whom the respondents referred to when answering. Three sorts of answers are interesting to report. A third of the respondents were referring to people they knew and they answered mostly “yes” to the question. Another third of the respondents referred to general categories, people they didn’t know or abstract categories such as strangers. This section of the respondents mostly answered “no” to the question. Finally, the last third of the respondents answered that they did not really think about the question or discussed their motivation behind their answer option. I have thus added 10 separate questions about how much one trusts specific categories of people in order to validate the generalized trust question. I have asked the respondents to say how much they trust certain categories of people. Factor analysis could give us information about the dimensionality of how the respondents have answered. Moreover, I asked the generalized question after the particularized trust questions in order to make the respondents aware of the fact that we refer to a general situation and that most people are not people they know. In addition, I asked some respondents (30 in total) to tell whom they were thinking about when they answered the generalized trust question. Only 3 out of 30 respondents were thinking about specific categories of people when they answered the question. However, none of these categories are people who are very close to them like family or friends. These three participants were thinking about people in the Netherlands or in their city. Although this evidence is slightly anecdotal, since these respondents who were asked to think aloud about the question were not chosen randomly, the results shows that the question in general is tapping into trust towards unknown people.

Cross-cultural differences in responses to the generalized trust question might also pose problems, since the frame of reference among different groups might be different (Reeskens & Hooghe 2008; Dinesen 2010). This might then affect the

results rather than the theoretical differences we are interested in. Next to the generalized trust item, these studies take two other items to represent generalized trust as well. These are: 1) ‘Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?’; and 2) ‘Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?’ (Rosenberg 1956). Although very informative, these results are not directly applicable here, since generalized trust is not taken to represent a broader social trust construct here, but instead it is taken to represent only one aspect of it, namely trustworthiness of the unknown other. However, in order to test whether there are systematic differences between the Turkish, Dutch and English speaking groups, I have controlled for any translation effects in the final model of this thesis. I did not find any statistically significant differences due to language differences to report.

Other attitudes that I have included in the questionnaire are the following constructs: individualism (Hooghe 2003a: 65; Coffé & Geys 2007a: 403); humanitarianism ("National Election Studies" 1995); psychological attitudes on self-esteem (Rosenberg in Blascovich & Tomaka 1991: 121-3); and optimism (Scheier & Carver 1985: 225). These attitudes are also measured on the same 11-point format as the generalized trust question. In addition, several items are used for each of these constructs in order to tap into different aspects of the construct as usually is done to measure complex attitudinal concepts (Saris & Gallhofer 2007). It is generally not advisable to rely on one item as measurement error can bias the results (see for discussion Reeskens & Hooghe 2008) unless for theoretical reason one takes the instrument validity of an item as a given. Moreover, I have used items from previous studies, which have been tested through exploratory factor analysis in order to ensure their reliability. I used only four items. Otherwise, the questionnaire would have become too lengthy. If the scale was larger, wherever available, I only included the items with the highest factor loadings or included the unambiguous items. For example, the optimism scale includes the following proverb: “I’m a believer in the idea that “every cloud has a silver lining”” (Scheier and Carver 1985: 225). Here translation would have made the statement incomprehensible. In the case of the individualism scale the items have slightly been reworded in order to emphasize a

certain aspect or sometimes the items have been negatively worded to avoid response set acquiescence (Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman 1991).

Socio-demographic characteristics are: age, sex, religious orientation, household income, educational levels, marital status, country of birth, parents' country of birth and the length of stay in the Netherlands. Other questions that will be included in the psychological framework are: perception of safety, perception of discrimination, having been a victim of a crime, life satisfaction and happiness. These questions are taken from existing Dutch surveys (Survey Living Condition of Minorities [LAS 2004/2005], State of the city ['Staat van de Stad'], Citizens' survey ['Burgermonitor']), since these have been already tested in those surveys and their reliability has been established.

For the individual level analysis I included the following variables: the length of membership, the type of activity and multiple memberships and volunteering. There are questions designed to measure the activity of the member (amongst which the type of activity) and their length of participation. Close ties are measured by asking the respondents to report whether they discuss personal matters with people in their organization and whether they would lend money to them. These questions are based on common standards in network studies (Marsden 2005). Multiple memberships will be measured by asking members to indicate membership and voluntary work in other types of organizations and groups. They are also asked to name these associations and groups to allow tracing the ethnicity of the organization.

The items above were then drafted in Dutch and English by myself and also translated into Turkish by a fellow Ph.D. candidate who is a native speaker. A second Ph.D. candidate (again a native Turkish speaker) who also spoke Dutch checked the translation and adjusted it wherever necessary. I then asked several students and other people from different walks of life (such as a Turkish speaking concierge at a Dutch university) to fill out the questionnaires in the different languages. Not only was this useful in order to evaluate the length of the questionnaire, but it also provided an opportunity to revise ambiguous translations or wordings.

Now that the data collection procedures and measures have been discussed here, the next chapter will analyse the generalized trust of participants of voluntary organizations in existing surveys in the Netherlands.

CHAPTER 3

EXISTING SURVEYS: EXPLAINING GENERALIZED TRUST AT BONDING AND BRIDGING ORGANIZATIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS

Below I will draw on two data sets to demonstrate whether generalized trust is affected by interethnic contact in voluntary organizations as compared to the ‘winner in society’ model. Firstly, a Dutch general population survey is analysed. However, since minorities are under-represented in this survey, I also rely on a survey in which minorities and a Dutch control group are sampled. The Dutch data set includes most of the relevant variables, such as length of participation and level of diversity, whereas the minorities’ survey does not include these variables.

I use these data sets in order to demonstrate the limitations of existing surveys in which individuals rather than organizations and their participants are sampled. In addition, the results of the fixed effects regression models in this chapter provide a useful resemblance with the results discussed in chapter 5, in which I discuss the data I collected in Amsterdam. This chapter will also set the context for the results to be discussed in chapter 5 and will make a comparison with the data that I gathered possible, which in turn will shed light on the external validity and the robustness of those results as well.

3.1 The Dutch Family Survey

I will first draw on results from a survey commissioned by the Dutch Radboud University Nijmegen in 2009-2010 (‘Familie Enquête Nederlandse Bevolking’, hereafter FNB-2009) that comprises a random sample of Dutch households. In this sample, 3,269 individuals from 1,841 households are interviewed. The sampling method aimed to have responses from the partners of the interviewees as well. The primary respondent’s age is 18 to 70. Since the survey aimed to get responses from the respondents’ partners, it under-represents singles and people aged 18 to 24, since there are less (married) couples among the latter group than the rest of the population. In addition, as this survey is only carried out in Dutch, it also under-represents minorities. The response rate of the Dutch households is 51.3%, which is fairly normal for a lengthy questionnaire (Segers 1999). The individual response rate

is 42.3%. For the analysis of the questions in this thesis, I am focusing on the individual sample, which includes 3,269 respondents, but I will weigh the data so as to make it representative of the population in the Netherlands and overcome biases in responses caused by the design of the survey and by the response rate.

Descriptive analysis

The questionnaire consists of two parts: an interviewer-assisted part and a self-completion part. Amongst the many items there are questions on socio-political attitudes such as generalized trust, which constitutes the dependent variable here. There are also questions on participation in 11 different types of voluntary organizations, such as unions, political organizations or parties, churches, leisure groups and, for example, organizations related to schools (Parent Teacher Associations). Membership of, and participation and voluntary work in, each type of organization are asked about separately. Next, the respondent is asked questions about the ethnic background of co-members. The question asks the respondent to report the percentage of co-members from Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Antillean and other non-Western backgrounds. Moreover, the name of the organization and the city in which the organization is located are also recorded. It has to be noted that even though we could theoretically trace whether participants are active in the same organization, the majority of participants name different organizations. Only in larger organizations, such as unions, political parties and interest organizations such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace, can we see overlapping memberships. However, these organizations typically have fewer participating members and contain more cheque-book members. Overlapping membership in sports organizations is much rarer. This has to do with the sampling method, in which household and individuals, rather than organizations and their participants, are sampled, which I have aimed to overcome by collecting data in Amsterdam (see chapter 5). The participation questions are then repeated for a maximum of three past memberships from the respondent's 16th birthday onwards.

I have created two subgroups: 1) consists of current active members (when a respondent says to participate in events) or volunteers for an organization; 2) comprises people who are currently a member or volunteer in addition to people who have previously been an active member or a volunteer. I refer to the first group as the

current participants and to the second as the ‘ever’ participants (Van der Meulen 2007). I will analyse differences in generalized trust for both these groups. Firstly, this is because we are interested in whether the contact mechanism or interaction between ethnically diverse groups in voluntary organizations affects generalized trust. Secondly, by including the ‘ever’ participants we can draw a more complete picture. This is because the effects of socialization in different types of voluntary organization might still last even after a participant has ended their activities or becomes a participant of another organization (Hooghe 2003a).

Before going into the details of this analysis, I will first summarize how many people are involved in associations in this sample. There are 525 active members and 700 volunteers in non-profit organizations in the Netherlands (1,225 in total).³⁰ Unfortunately, 627 respondents were not asked any questions about voluntary organizations. They are all partners of the people who were initially selected for an interview.³¹ Although there is a weight in place correcting for the biases in the sample, these missing values might still slightly affect the actual level of current and past participation. As for the ‘ever’ participants, there are in total 1,885 people who are currently active or have previously been active in a voluntary organization.³² Of the past participants, 283 ended their activities altogether, while 377 continued their activities for a while in a different organization type before ending their activities. Below, I will describe the socio-demographic characteristics of the current and ‘ever’ participants and compare these to the general public. Finally, I will discuss the distribution of generalized trust across these groups and across different regions in the Netherlands. The latter is necessary because some studies relate generalized trust to urbanism, since in cities people might feel less safe due to higher crime rates, which in turn might affect their levels of trust (Alesina & La Ferrara 2002). Before doing this, I will next discuss the rate of ethnic diversity at these organizations.

³⁰ The total number of people who are members of a voluntary organization in the Netherlands is higher, at 1,730 (67% of the population). However, only 1,225 are actually involved in the activities of the organization, through volunteering, or attend the activities of the organization. 505 people are the so-called cheque-book members, who only pay a fee or make a donation to an organization but do not participate in activities.

³¹ Item non-response among partners of the interviewees is not systematic, because many partners have been asked to answer the self-completion sections where information about voluntary organization is asked, and they have responded accordingly.

³² Again, the total number of people who are currently members or have been in the past is higher, at 2,223.

The table below summarizes the level of diversity in voluntary organizations in the Netherlands. To reiterate, this refers to the percentage of participants from a non-Western minority background (Turkey, Morocco, Suriname and the Antilles) or ethnic concentration. When an organization is categorized as having 0% diversity, the percentage of members from non-Western minority backgrounds is either 0% or ethnic concentration varies between 75% and 100%.³³ Around a third of the current and ‘ever’ participants take part in the activities of organizations where diversity is 0%. However, the majority of both current and ‘past’ participants are involved in organizations with a level of diversity of up to 25%. As the level of diversity of organizations reaches 75%, the relative number of participants in those organizations decreases too.

Table 3.1 Level of diversity in voluntary organizations
(In percentages within columns, 18-70 year olds in the Netherlands, 2009)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Categories</i>	<i>Current participants</i>	<i>‘Ever’ participants</i>
		<i>Valid %</i>	<i>Valid %</i>
Level of diversity in organization	0%	30.1	39.2
	1 to 25%	59.8	53.1
	26 to 49%	8.1	6.3
	50%	1.9	0.6
	51 to 75%	0.1	0.8
	Total (n)	1,058	1,307

Source: Radboud University Nijmegen, FNB-2009, data weighted for individuals.³⁴

As regards the length of participation, I created an average measure across all types of organization in which a person is involved or has been involved in the past. On average, for current participants, the length of participation is 12.5 years (median 10 years). Length of participation ranges between 0 and 65.5 years and the standard deviation of length of participation is 10.4 years. The average length of participation and its standard deviation for the ‘ever’ participants are slightly lower at,


³³ There are very few people in organizations (3) with 100% minority backgrounds (ethnic organizations). In addition, there are 2 participants who are involved in organizations in which the percentage of people from non-Western countries is between 75 and 99%. Finally, there are 313 participants in organizations with 0% ethnic concentration or no participants with a minority background (mainstream organizations).

³⁴ 14% of the current participants and 31% of the ‘ever’ participants refused to answer this question or said that they do not know what the percentage of minorities in their organizations is.

respectively, 10.8 and 7.8 years (median 9.2 years). Both distributions are also rather skewed.

The figure (3.1) below depicts the average length of participation and different levels of diversity in organizations for the ‘ever’ participants. The average length of participation is 10.3 to 10.5 years in homogenous organizations (0% and 1 to 25% diversity). As diversity reaches 75%, the average length of participation not only becomes shorter, at 5.07 to 7.37 years, but the group sizes also become much smaller. In the next section, I test the effects of average length of participation in mixed organizations, where diversity is typically higher than 25% and reaches 75%. If substantive and significant, this will constitute supporting evidence for a socialization mechanism in voluntary organizations due to interethnic contact.


Figure 3.1 95% confidence interval of average length of participation and diversity in organizations (‘ever’ participants)
(18-70 year olds in the Netherlands, 2009)



Source: Radboud University Nijmegen, FNB-2009, data weighted for individuals.

The following graph also depicts average length of participation, but this now includes current participants. In homogenous organizations where diversity is between 0% and 25%, the average length of participation is between 12.3 and 13.7 years. This figure is much higher than the average length of participation in mixed organizations where diversity is between 26% and 50%. In these organizations, participants are active for an average of 7.9 to 8.5 years. The category 51% to 75% diversity has only 1 participant, who has been active for 22.9 years. As such, this category does not contain a confidence interval. Again, average length of participation in mixed organizations (26% to 75% diversity) is added to the model of generalized trust in the next sections. If significant and substantive this will corroborate a socialization effect due to interethnic contact in voluntary organizations in the Netherlands.

Figure 3.2 95% Confidence interval of average length of participation and diversity in organizations (current participants)
 (18-70 year olds in the Netherlands, 2009)



Source: Radboud University Nijmegen, FNB-2009, data weighted for individuals.

Table 3.2 Socio-demographic characteristics of the general population and participants of voluntary organizations
(In percentages within columns, 18-70 year olds in the Netherlands 2009)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Categories</i>	<i>Current</i>	<i>'Ever'</i>	<i>General</i>
		<i>participants</i>	<i>participants</i>	<i>population</i>
		<i>Valid %</i>	<i>Valid %</i>	<i>Valid %</i>
Sex	Men	53.4	52.1	50.3
	Women	46.6	47.9	49.7
	Total (n)	1,225	1,885	3,202
Age group	24 or younger	2.9	2.2	2.2
	25-34	23.2	27.3	27.7
	35-44	23.7	22.1	22.3
	45-54	22.4	21.7	21.4
	55+	27.8	26.7	26.4
	Total (n)	1,225	1,885	3,202
Marital status	Widowed or divorced	8.7	9.5	10.7
	Else	91.3	90.5	89.3
	Total (n)	1,225	1,885	3,202
Religiosity³⁵	Attends service and adheres	47.7	39.8	27.9
	No	54.3	60.2	72.1
	Total (n)	1,186	1,840	2,727
Current labour market position	Unemployed	3.9	5.2	5.6
	In paid job	82.6	81.4	80.0
	Housekeeping	4.0	4.5	5.7
	Other	9.5	8.9	8.7
	Total (n)	1,225	1,885	3,202
Net Household income (€ per month)³⁶	1,000 or less	6.4	7.7	9.8
	1,001 – 1,750	11.4	13.5	16.4
	1,751 – 3,000	36.2	35.5	35.3
	3,001 or more	46.0	43.3	38.6
	Total (n)	1,053	1,635	2,755
Educational attainment	Primary school	5.0	4.7	7.9
	Lower vocational	20.5	23.1	28.3
	Middle vocational and higher secondary	25.7	26.5	25.6
	Higher vocational	29.7	27.3	23.0
	University and higher	19.1	18.4	15.2
	Total (n)	1,225	1,885	3,200

Source: Radboud University Nijmegen, FNB-2009, data weighted for individuals.

³⁵ Missing percentages are respectively: 3.1% for current participants; 2.4% for the 'ever' participants and 14.8% for the general population.

³⁶ Missing percentages are respectively: 14% for current participants; 13.3% for the 'ever' participants and 14% for the general population.

Table 3.2 above summarizes the distribution of socio-demographic variables for the general population and for the two different subsamples, current and ‘ever’ participants. To clarify, the current participants sample is a subset of the ‘ever’ participants sample, whilst the latter is a subset of the general population. The ratio of men to women in all groups is very similar, although there are slightly more men (3%) participating in organizations. The distribution of age across the three groups is also very similar with only a few percentage point differences. In general, in all groups the elderly (over 55s) are among the biggest category, comprising almost 28% of the total. They are followed by 35 to 44 year olds, with around 22% of the cases. The younger than 24 group is the smallest, with between 2.2% and almost 3% of the total. As for the proportion of divorcees and widowers, among the general population 10.7% have lost their partner. They constitute 9.5% of the ‘ever’ participants, while among the current participants 8.7% are widowed or have divorced. Religious affiliation, which I have created by grouping self-adherence as well as reports of attending religious services, is almost 20% higher among people who are actively involved in an organization as compared to the general population. Among the ‘ever’ participants, religious affiliation is also higher, nearly 12% more than for the general population.³⁷

When we look at labour market position, we see that the percentage of unemployed (sick or otherwise) among the general population is higher (5.6%) than among the current participants. However, the percentage of unemployed among the ‘ever’ participants is similar to the general population (5.2%). Household income differs somewhat among the participants and the general population. To be consistent, I have chosen to define income band boundaries at € 1,000, € 1,750 and € 3,000. The first band comprises people on social benefits and people on a minimum wage, while the middle and third categories refer to a modal income (€ 1,700) and around twice modal (€ 3,000) income (Netherlands Institute for Social Research, SCP). The final band consists of those who have an income level above twice modal. Let’s start with the largest category. Almost 46% of the current participants have a

³⁷ There is some reservation about the level of religiosity among the general population, since 14.8% of them have decided not to answer this question as compared to 2.4% to 3.1% of the current and ‘ever’ participants. Therefore, the level of religiosity might be even higher for participants if the not religious people tend to underreport their answers, and we might find a higher proportion of them among the general population.

household income above € 3,001. This is 7.4% higher than for the general population, whereas the difference between the ‘ever’ participants and the general population in the income category above € 3,001 is 4.7%. People with a household income of less than € 1,000 are among the smallest category in all three groups, although again the groups differ somewhat in size (with a maximum of 3.4%). There are relatively more people with a household income between € 1,001 and € 1,750 among the general population (up to 5% more) than among the participants. Non-response among the three groups is similar and should not bias the results.³⁸

Finally, I discuss here the distribution of educational attainment levels. Overall, people who have finished only primary school³⁹ are among the smallest proportion across the three groups. People with higher vocational degrees are the largest groups among the current and ‘ever’ participants. Among the general population, people with lower vocational qualifications comprise the largest group. Finally, among current and ‘ever’ participants there are more people with a university (or a higher) degree than among the general population (4% more).

The general pattern from other studies holds here too. Current participants of non-profit organizations in the Netherlands have a better socio-economic position and seem to fare better in life than the general population. Most differences are statistically significant with the exception of unemployment levels, being divorced or widowed and the age bands when the ‘ever’ participants and the general population are compared. The correlations of socio-economic variables for all participants versus the general population are relatively weak to moderate; with Cramér's V of around 0.2 to 0.4. In addition, there are slightly more men and older people among the participants versus the general population, and they also seem to be slightly more religious, although these correlations are even weaker, with Cramér's V varying between 0.02 and 0.14. Again, all correlations are statistically significant. The distribution of generalized trust among our three groups is summarized below. The relevant survey question asks: “Generally speaking would you say that most people

³⁸ A non-response rate of 14% is not ideal, although in many studies non-response for income is very common.

³⁹ As the age at which people are allowed to leave school is 16 in the Netherlands, only the very oldest people have been able to only finish primary school. This might also happen more so among ethnic minorities, educational regulations might not have been regularized in some of the countries of origin such as Turkey and Morocco.

can be trusted?” In other surveys, the question ends with “or would you say that you can’t be too careful in dealing with them?” The dichotomous answer options, “yes” or “no”, are then read out to the respondents. If they spontaneously answer “don’t know”, that is also recorded (e.g. in the World Values Survey, the American General Social Survey). Here, only the first part of the question is asked as a statement in a self-completion section and five (agree/don’t agree) answer categories are offered. As we can see below, the majority of the respondents (participants as well as the general population) say they mostly agree with the statement that generally speaking most people can be trusted. However, among the current participants, this proportion (valid percentages) is 6.4% higher as compared to the general population. Among the ‘ever’ participants, this proportion is also higher than the general population, but only by 4.6%.

Table 3.3 Generalized trust in the general population and among participants of voluntary organizations in the Netherlands
(In percentages within columns, 18-70 year olds in the Netherlands 2009)

	<i>Current participants</i>		<i>‘Ever’ participants</i>		<i>General population</i>	
	<i>%</i>	<i>Valid %</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Valid %</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Valid %</i>
Totally disagree	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.8	2.2
Mostly disagree	7.7	7.9	8.1	8.3	8.8	10.4
Neither agree nor disagree	15.8	16.2	17.8	18.2	17.9	21.0
Mostly agree	63.6	65.4	62.3	63.6	50.1	59.0
Totally agree	8.7	9.0	8.0	8.2	6.3	7.4
Total %	97.3	100	97.9	100	85.0	100
Not answered	2.7		2.1		15.0	
Total %	100		100		100	
Total (n)	1,225		1,885		3,202	

Source: Radboud University Nijmegen, FNB-2009, data weighted for individuals

Table 3.4 Generalized trust (dichotomous) in the general population and among participants of voluntary organizations in the Netherlands
(In percentages within columns, 18-70 year olds in the Netherlands 2009)

	<i>Current participants</i>		<i>'Ever' participants</i>		<i>General population</i>	
	<i>%</i>	<i>Valid %</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Valid %</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Valid %</i>
Disagree	9.2	11.2	9.8	12.2	10.7	15.9
Agree	72.3	88.8	68.3	87.8	56.4	84.1
Total	81.5	100	78.1	100	67.1	100
Neither agree nor disagree	15.8		17.8		17.9	
Not answered	2.7		2.1		15.0	
Total	100		100		100	
Total (n)	1,225		1,885		3,202	

Source: Radboud University Nijmegen, FNB-2009, data weighted for individuals

Initially, I examined differences in generalized trust with an Ordinal Logistic regression model, in order to keep the original 5-points scale. However, all the models had a large proportion of empty cells when the answer categories of the dependent variable were combined with the explanatory variables. The proportion of empty cells varied between 60% and nearly 80%. This is very problematic for an ordinal model, since the information on which the estimation of the parameters is based is not robust (Field 2005). I then collapsed some of the answer categories in order to be able to model generalized trust with a Binary Logistic regression model (see table 3.4 above).

Table 3.4 above summarizes the frequency of generalized trust in which the answer options “totally disagree” and “mostly disagree” are grouped as “disagree” and “totally agree” and “mostly agree” are grouped to represent “agree”. The middle category, “neither agree nor disagree” is left out of the model. This recoding results in a loss of some cases, people who have answered “neither agree nor disagree”, but this model is more robust than an ordinal one. Again, current participants have a larger proportion of positive answers to the generalized trust question compared to the general population and this also constitutes the larger share of the answers across the groups.

Table 3.5 Distribution of trust by cities in the Netherlands

(In percentages within columns, 18-70 year olds in the Netherlands, 2009, 'ever' participants)

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Rest	31 largest cities	Total	Rest	4 largest cities	Total
Totally disagree	1.4	1.9	1.7	1.4	3.1	1.7
Mostly disagree	8.6	8.0	8.3	8.1	9.4	8.3
Neither agree nor disagree	19.1	17.4	18.2	18.1	18.6	18.2
Mostly agree	61.5	66.6	63.7	64.4	60.1	63.6
Totally agree	9.3	7.2	8.2	8.0	8.8	8.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total (n)			1,849			1,849

Source: Radboud University Nijmegen, FNB-2009, data weighted for individuals

Model 1: Cramér's V = 0.055 (n.s.); Model 2: Cramér's V = 0.057

Before moving to the regression analysis, table 3.5 above examines the distribution of generalized trust across cities and rural areas. Urban rural differences might offer an explanation for different levels of generalized trust. In industrialised areas there is generally more crime, which might result in people feeling unsafe and disagreeing with the trust statement. I examine the differences in proportions of generalized trust answers across large cities and smaller towns and villages, in addition to differences across the 4 largest cities in the Netherlands (Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht) versus the rest. These differences are summarized above. The correlation between these variables is very weak and insignificant. Therefore, it is safe to assume that differences across cities are not important to consider here.

Diversity in voluntary organizations

I now come to examine the effect of diversity in voluntary organizations on generalized trust, but I simultaneously control for the abovementioned socio-demographic variables too. Since I employ a logistic regression model, the coefficients below (*Exp (B)*) are based on odds ratios (or likelihood of an event occurring as opposed to the likelihood of an event not occurring). Thus, when the respondent agrees to the trust statement, as compared to disagreeing, we can gauge the relative likelihood of them having a certain educational qualification or a certain

household income as compared to a reference category. I infer the results to the Dutch participants of voluntary organizations in 2009.

Table 3.6 Logistic Regression Model estimates for generalized trust and diversity among current participants of voluntary organizations (18-70 year olds in the Netherlands, 2009)

Variables	Model 1			Model 2		
	Exp (B)	95% CI for EXP(B)		Exp (B)	95% CI for EXP(B)	
		Lower	Upper		Lower	Upper
Men (Reference = women)	1.6~ (+)	0.9	2.7	1.6~ (+)	0.9	2.7
Age (Reference = 55+)						
24 and younger	0.1** (-)	0.0	0.4	0.1**(+)	0.0	0.4
25-34	1.3 (+)	0.5	3.2	1.2 (+)	0.5	2.9
35-44	0.5~ (-)	0.3	1.1	0.5~ (-)	0.3	1.0
45-54	0.8 (-)	0.4	1.8	0.8 (-)	0.4	1.7
Widowed/divorced	1.1 (-/+)	0.5	2.8	1.0 (+/-)	0.4	2.6
Religiosity	1.1 (+/-)	0.6	1.8	1.1 (+/-)	0.6	1.9
Unemployed: sick or otherwise	0.5 (-)	0.2	1.4	0.5 (-)	0.2	1.3
<i>Net Household Income (€)</i> (Reference = 3,000+)						
1,000 or less	0.3** (-)	0.1	0.6	0.3** (-)	0.1	0.6
1,001-1,750	1.0 (+/-)	0.4	2.7	1.1 (+/-)	0.4	3.1
1,751-3,000	0.7 (-)	0.4	1.2	0.7 (-)	0.4	1.2
<i>Educational attainment</i> (Reference = primary and lower vocational secondary school)						
Secondary vocational training and pre-university	1.0 (+/-)	.5	1.9	1.0 (+/-)	0.5	1.9
University or higher vocational degree	2.2* (+)	1.1	4.5	2.2* (+)	1.1	4.5
<i>Diversity in voluntary organization:</i>						
26% to 75% (Reference = 0-25%)				1.5 (+)	0.9	2.7
Constant	9.2			7.2		
N = 749	Nagelkerke R ² = 15%			Nagelkerke R ² = 16%		

Source: Radboud University Nijmegen, FNB-2009; ~ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; data weighted for individuals.

Firstly, men are more likely to say they trust others, as expected. However, this variable is only significant at the 10% level. Then I have controlled for the effect of age. Younger cohorts are expected to be less trustful, which is somewhat confirmed here. It seems that the youngest (24 and below) are the least trustful compared to participants older than 55. They are 0.10 times more likely (or conversely 10 times less likely) to say they trust others and this coefficient is highly significant. Next, the

35 to 44 year olds are 0.5 times more likely (or twice less likely) to say they trust others compared to the 55+ group. The other categories are not significant. Widowers and divorcees do not differ from other participants in their trust levels. Nor are religious people different from others in their trustful attitudes. As for income, if a participant has a monthly net income of less than € 1,000, they are 0.3 time more likely (or 3.3 times less likely) to say they trust others as compared to people with a monthly net income of € 3,000 or more. The other income categories are not significant.

In the models above (in Table 3.6), I have regrouped the educational attainment variable in order to have groups with equal sizes. Firstly, people with a primary school or lower vocational qualification are the reference group. Next, the middle vocational and higher secondary school category remains the same. Finally, higher vocational, university or other higher degrees constitute the last category. In line with our expectation, having a higher educational degree positively correlates with trust. The likelihood of saying one trusts others increases 2.2 times with a higher vocational or university degree as compared to having a primary school or lower vocational qualification. However, having secondary vocational training or a higher secondary school qualification does not have a significant effect as compared to having a primary school or lower vocational qualification.

Before discussing model 2, I consider the regression results of a model that included volunteers. As discussed in the theoretical framework, volunteers might adhere to generalized trust as a result of their activity or alternatively they could be more trustful because of their value framework, which emphasizes the benevolence of others. In order to examine this, first we need to know whether volunteers express more trustful attitudes as compared to the active participants. However, the difference between volunteers and active participants is not statistically significant when controlling for social success factors, as well as not being substantive. Therefore, it seems futile to further examine the mechanism behind such a relationship.

In model 2, the categorical measure of diversity is added to the model. Here, I have first recoded the initial variable, which had an ordinal measurement level, into a binary measure. This is in order to compare the results to the other surveys. In later

models I will add the level of diversity in an ordinal format. The category 26% to 75% is compared to the 0% to 25% level of diversity. When the level of diversity is between 0% and 25%, there is not much chance that people actually interact with others who are dissimilar to them and we can expect this to adversely affect generalized trust. However, the effect of 0% to 25% ethnic diversity on generalized trust is not substantive and is not statistically significant. In model 2, the effect of all other variables remains the same as before.

Table 3.7 Logistic Regression Model estimates for generalized trust and levels of diversity among current participants of voluntary organizations (18-70 year olds in the Netherlands, 2009)

Variables	Model 1			Model 3		
	Exp (B)	95% CI for EXP(B)		Exp (B)	95% CI for EXP(B)	
		Lower	Upper		Lower	Upper
Men (Reference = women)	1.6~ (+)	0.9	2.7	1.5~ (+)	0.9	2.6
Age (Reference = 55+)						
24 and younger	0.1** (-)	0.0	0.4	0.1*** (-)	0.0	0.4
25-34	1.3 (+)	0.5	3.2	1.2 (-/+)	0.5	2.9
35-44	0.5~ (-)	0.3	1.1	0.5* (-)	0.2	1.0
45-54	0.8 (-)	0.4	1.8	0.8 (-)	0.4	1.8
Widowed/divorced	1.1 (-/+)	0.5	2.8	1.0 (+/-)	0.4	2.6
Religiosity	1.1 (+/-)	0.6	1.8	1.1 (+)	0.6	1.9
Unemployed: sick or otherwise	0.5 (-)	0.2	1.4	0.5 (-)	0.2	1.3
<i>Net Household Income (€)</i> (Reference = 3,000+)						
1,000 or less	0.3** (-)	0.1	0.6	0.3** (-)	0.1	0.7
1,001-1,750	1.0 (+/-)	0.4	2.7	1.2 (+/-)	0.4	3.2
1,751-3,000	0.7 (-)	0.4	1.2	0.7 (-)	0.4	1.3
<i>Educational attainment</i> (Reference = primary and lower vocational secondary school)						
Secondary vocational training and pre-university	1.0 (+/-)	0.5	1.9	0.9 (+/-)	0.5	1.9
University or higher vocational degree	2.2* (+)	1.1	4.5	2.2* (+)	1.1	4.5
<i>Level of diversity in organization</i> (Reference = 0%)						
1-25%				1.5 (+)	0.8	2.6
26-49%				3.8~ (+)	0.7	20.3
50%				0.6 (-)	0.1	3.2
Constant	9.2			7.1		
n= 752	Nagelkerke R ² = 15%			Nagelkerke R ² = 16%		

Source: Radboud University Nijmegen, FNB-2009; ~ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; data weighted for individuals.

Above, in table 3.7, I distinguish between different levels of diversity, as the two categories 0% to 25% and 26% to 75% might be too crude. Adding levels of diversity improves the overall model fit slightly as its explained variance (Nagelkerke R^2) increases from 15% to 16%. Participants in organizations where the proportion of non-Western ethnic groups varies between 26% and 49% say they trust others more than participants in organizations where diversity is 0%. The coefficient is, however, significant at the 10% level. Other levels of diversity do not affect generalized trust substantively and the effect sizes of the socio-demographic variables remain similar. As for the 51-75% level of diversity, there was only one participant in this category and the coefficient could not be calculated.

The model below (table 3.8) adds the length of participation to the socio-demographic variables. In organizations with a level of diversity between 25% and 50%, we should see participants who are longer active being more likely to say they trust others. Again, the category 51-75% diversity only contained one participant and as such could not be estimated. First, length of participation, measured in number of years, is not significant and has no effect on generalized trust. As such, the model does not improve either. When interaction effects between lengths of participation and diversity in organizations are added, none of these measures has a significant effect on generalized trust. The coefficients or the exponents (standardized Betas) cannot be interpreted as they will be mis-specified (Hofmann 2008). This is due to the nature of the model, in which the product of two independent variables (the interaction term) and the original variables are added simultaneously.

Yet again, the effects of age (younger than 24, and 35 to 44 years old, compared to 55+), household income (less than € 1,000, compared to more than € 3,000), and having a higher education degree (than a primary school or vocational qualification) are significant, whilst the effects of the other variables are not statistically significant. The insignificant interaction effect means that participants of diverse organizations, who are 3.8 times more likely to say they trust others, are not more trustful due to their length of participation. Participants of organizations with a diversity level of 26-49% seem to have self-selected themselves into those organizations on the basis of their initial trust levels.

Table 3.8 Logistic Regression Model estimates for generalized trust and the interaction between length of participation and levels of diversity among current participants of voluntary organizations (18-70 year olds in the Netherlands, 2009)

Variables	Model 1			Model 2		
	Exp (B)	95% CI for EXP(B)		Exp (B)	95% CI for EXP(B)	
		Lower	Upper		Lower	
Men (Reference = women)	1.6~ (+)	0.9	2.7	1.6 (+)	0.9	2.7
Age (Reference = 55+)						
24 and younger	0.1** (-)	0.0	0.4	0.1** (-)	0.0	0.4
25-34	1.0 (-/+)	0.4	2.6	1.0 (-/+)	0.4	2.6
35-44	0.4~ (-)	0.2	1.0	0.4~ (-)	0.2	0.9
45-54	0.8 (-)	0.35	1.7	0.8 (-)	0.4	1.7
Widowed/divorced	1.0 (+/-)	0.4	2.6	1.0 (+/-)	0.4	2.5
Religiosity	1.2 (+/-)	0.7	2.0	1.2 (+)	0.7	2.0
Unemployed: sick or otherwise	0.5 (-)	0.2	1.3	0.5 (-)	0.2	1.3
Net Household Income (€) (Reference = 3,000+)						
1,000 or less	0.3** (-)	0.1	0.7	0.3** (-)	0.1	0.7
1,001-1,750	1.2 (+/-)	0.4	3.3	1.2 (+/-)	0.4	3.2
1,751-3,000	0.7 (-)	0.4	1.3	0.7 (-)	0.4	1.3
Educational attainment						
Secondary vocational training and pre-university	0.9 (+/-)	0.5	1.9	0.9 (+/-)	0.5	1.9
University or higher vocational degree	2.2* (+)	1.1	4.5	2.3* (+)	1.1	4.7
(Reference = primary and lower vocational secondary school)						
Level of diversity in organization						
1-25%	1.5 (+)	0.9	2.7	1.5 (+)	0.6	3.7
26-49%	3.8~ (+)	0.7	20.5	27.7~ (+)	0.5	1484.8
50% (Reference = 0%)	0.6 (-)	0.1	3.0	1.2 (+)	0.1	12.1
Length of participation (average)	1.0 (+/-)	1.0	1.0	1.0 (+/-)	1.0	1.0
Interaction, length of participation and level of diversity						
Length of participation * 1-25%				1.0 (+/-)	1.0	1.0
Length of participation * 26-49%				0.9 (+/-)	0.7	1.0
Length of participation * 50% (Reference = Length of participation * 0%)				0.9 (+/-)	0.8	1.1
Constant	8.7			8.2		
n= 752	Nagelkerke R ² = 17%			Nagelkerke R ² = 17%		

Source: Radboud University Nijmegen, FNB-2009; ~ p < 0.10; * p<0.05; **p<0.01; data weighted for individuals.

Table 3.9 Logistic Regression Model estimates for generalized trust and the interaction between length of participation and levels of diversity among ‘ever’ participants of voluntary organizations (18-70 year olds in the Netherlands, 2009)

Variables	Model 1			Model 2		
	Exp (B)	95% CI for EXP(B)		Exp (B)	95% CI for EXP(B)	
		Lower	Upper		Lower	Upper
Men (Reference = women)	1.0 (+/-)	0.6	1.6	1.0 (+/-)	0.6	1.6
Age (Reference = 55+)						
24 and younger	Not specified			Not specified		
25-34	0.6 (-)	0.3	1.4	0.6 (-)	0.3	1.4
35-44	0.3* (-)	0.2	0.7	0.4* (-)	0.2	0.7
45-54	0.6 (-)	0.3	1.2	0.6 (-)	0.3	1.3
Widowed/divorced	1.6 (+)	0.7	3.7	1.6 (+)	0.7	3.7
Religiosity	0.7 (-)	0.5	1.2	0.7 (-)	0.5	1.1
Unemployed: sick or otherwise	0.8 (-)	0.3	2.0	0.8 (-)	0.3	2.0
Net Household Income (€) (Reference = 3,000+)						
1000 or less	0.3** (-)	0.1	0.6	0.3** (-)	0.1	0.6
1001-1750	1.0 (+/-)	0.5	2.1	1.0 (+/-)	0.5	2.1
1751-3000	1.0 (+/-)	0.6	1.7	1.0 (+/-)	0.6	1.7
Educational attainment						
Secondary vocational training and pre-university	1.1 (+/-)	0.6	2.1	1.2 (+/-)	0.6	2.1
University or higher vocational degree (Reference = primary and lower vocational secondary school)	2.0* (+)	1.1	3.8	2.0* (+)	1.1	3.8
Level of diversity in organization						
1-25%	1.6~ (+)	0.9	2.5	2.1~ (+)	0.9	5.0
26-49%	2.2 (+)	0.7	6.9	2.6 (+)	0.5	14.0
50% (Reference = 0%)	0.6 (-)	0.0	9.1	Not specified		
Length of participation (average)	1.0 (+/-)	1.0	1.0	1.0 (+/-)	1.0	1.0
Interaction length of participation and level of diversity						
Length of participation * 1-25%				1.0 (+/-)	0.9	1.0
Length of participation * 26-49%				1.0 (+/-)	0.8	1.2
Length of participation * 50% (Reference = Length of participation * 0%)				Not specified		
Constant	11.4			9.4		
n= 954	Nagelkerke R ² = 9%			Nagelkerke R ² = 11%		

I have repeated the previous analysis for the sub-sample from the Dutch Family Survey 2009 in which past as well as current participants are grouped (the so-called ‘ever’ participants) (see Table 3.9 above). Theoretically, if one has participated in an

organization its effects may still last, although the person is not active anymore. Firstly, the effects of participants being between the ages of 35 and 44, having a low household income (less than € 1,000), and having a higher education degree (higher vocational or university degree) are again all statistically significant, as before. The effect of young age is not specified here as the model only includes 7 people between the ages of 18 to 24. These effects are also largest in the order mentioned, with young age and low income having negative effects on generalized trust, whereas higher education levels have a positive effect on generalized trust. What is different in this model is that participants of organizations with a level of diversity of 1%-25% are statistically 1.6 times more likely to say they trust others. Model 2 adds the interaction terms for length of participation combined with levels of diversity in an organization. Again, none of the interaction terms are significant.

In sum, we can still safely conclude that participants of diverse organizations self-select themselves into diverse organizations, although low income and the age category 35-44 are still better predictors. The overall model fit is much lower than previously, with an explained variance of 9% compared to 17%. Next, I will examine generalized trust in a Dutch sample in which ethnic minorities are over-represented. The current sample does not include enough ethnic minorities in order to study the effect of participation for them. By doing this, I will be able to juxtapose the results of my study, which will be discussed in chapter 5, with a representative sample of minorities. In addition, generational effects, differences between ethnic groups, and the effect of length of stay in the Netherlands are better tested here, as there are more ethnic groups than in the data I collected in Amsterdam.

3.2 Survey the Living Conditions of Minorities

To study the effect of diversity in voluntary organizations for minorities in the Netherlands, I use data from The Netherlands Institute for Social Research ('Leefsituatie Allochtone Stedelingen' [The Living Condition of Urban Minorities] hereafter LAS 2004/2005). In 2005, a random sample of the 4 largest ethnic groups in the Netherlands were surveyed. The data are from the 50 main Dutch cities. This is because the majority of ethnic groups live in urban areas. This study focuses, among other things, on leisure activities and participation in voluntary associations. It

comprises people born in Suriname, The Antilles, Turkey and Morocco, in addition to people with at least one parent born in those countries. Thus, this survey also includes children of immigrants who were born in the Netherlands. Furthermore, it contains a Dutch control group.

Descriptive analysis

The questionnaire lists a number of different types of associations and asks about membership or giving a donation to an organization. The first part of the table below (3.10) summarizes the percentage of members versus non-members across ethnic groups. In the Netherlands, 68% of the population is a member of a voluntary organization –the same rate was also reflected in the previous survey. However, there are stark differences across ethnic groups as compared to the Dutch. Among the Turks and Moroccans only around 30% are members of voluntary organizations. The Surinamese and Antilleans follow with, respectively, 48% and 41%. In the questionnaire, when someone claims to be a member, a question then follows about the level of activity of the person. The percentage of members that are either very active or somewhat active in their organizations does not differ much across the groups. The lowest rate is 67% among the Surinamese group and the highest is among the Turkish members (79%).

Next, people are asked about volunteering in these organizations. There are also questions about volunteering in other organizations such as schools, hospitals or libraries. Volunteering activities in sport associations are asked about separately, since activity in sports associations is the most prevalent in the Netherlands. Again, there are great differences between ethnic groups and the Dutch. The Dutch are more involved in volunteering than the other groups. Volunteering seems also to be more widespread among the Antilleans and the Surinamese than the Turks and Moroccans. In the next chapter, I will draw on interview data with the board members of Turkish and mixed organizations and explore possible explanations for the different rates of volunteering among minorities in the Netherlands. As a whole, 29% of the population takes part in volunteering activities in the Netherlands. Finally, the percentage of people saying they trust others also differs quite remarkably across the groups. Fifty nine percent of the Dutch answer positively, whereas among the ethnic

groups the proportion of positive answers ranges between 30% and 39%. Below, I will investigate differences between ethnic groups controlling for other socio-demographic factors.

Table 3.10 Participation in voluntary organizations and generalized trust by ethnic group
(In percentages within columns, 15-64 year olds in main Dutch cities, 2004/2005)

	Ethnic Groups					Total
	Turks	Moroccans	Surinamese	Antilleans	Dutch	
Membership						
Yes	31	30	48	41	72	68
No	69	70	52	59	28	32
						n = 4,096
Activity in associations:						
Not active	21	23	33	23	27	27
Very much or somewhat active	79	77	67	77	73	73
						n = 2,778
Volunteering						
Yes	13	11	16	17	31	29
No	87	89	84	83	69	71
						n = 4,096
Generalized Trust						
Careful with people	63	58	67	61	40	42
People can be trusted	34	39	30	37	59	56
Missing ¹	3	3	3	2	1	2
						n = 4,094

Source: SCP, The Netherlands, LAS 04/05, data weighted for the total population.

¹Although there is a separate 'don't know' category, this is empty. Therefore, it might be that refusals and 'don't knows' are grouped together.

First I will compare the ethnic groups in the Netherlands with respect to their socio-demographic characteristics, as these variables are used to model differences among participants (see Table 3.11). The proportion of men versus women is almost 50/50 in the Netherlands. These proportions are mirrored across the ethnic groups, although the Turkish and Moroccan groups have slightly more men than women among them. The distribution of age groups is quite different among the ethnic groups compared to the Dutch. The Dutch are generally older. As regards to the proportions of the widowed and divorcees, they range between 6% and 14%, with the Moroccans having the fewest and the Surinamese having the highest rate. To create a measure of religiosity, I have combined positive responses to the question whether

one adheres to a religion, whether religion is important to the person and whether the respondent claims to practice a religion and visits services at a church or mosque. Among the Turks and Moroccans religiosity is quite high, at between 88% and 95%, whereas the Dutch have the lowest rate (37%) followed by the Surinamese and Antilleans (around 50%).

Table 3.11 Socio-demographic characteristics by ethnic group

(In percentages within columns, 15-64 year olds in main Dutch cities, 2004/2005)

		Ethnic Groups					
		Turks	Moroccans	Surinamese	Antilleans	Dutch	Total
Sex (n = 4,096)	men	51	53	48	49	49	49
	women	49	47	52	51	51	51
Age group (n = 4,093)	24 or younger	25	27	23	29	17	18
	25-34	30	29	22	29	21	22
	35-44	25	24	25	21	23	23
	45-54	11	11	20	15	21	20
	55-64	9	9	10	6	18	17
Marital status (n = 4,096)	Widowed/ divorced	9	6	14	10	8	8
	Other	91	94	86	90	92	92
Religiosity (n = 4,087)	Practices and adheres	88	95	49	52	37	42
	No	12	5	51	48	63	58
Labour market position (n = 4,096)	Unemployed	20	30	18	19	10	10
	In paid job	45	41	61	52	66	64
	Housekeeping	17	18	5	8	9	9
	Other	8	11	16	21	15	17
Net Household Income (€) (n = 3,057)	1,000 or less	21	28	23	34	12	14
	1,001-1,750	51	52	32	33	22	24
	1,751-3,000	25	19	31	23	37	36
	3,001 and more	3	1	14	10	29	26
Educational attainment (n = 4,052)	Never went to school	7	14	1	2	0	1
	Primary school	29	21	11	7	5	6
	Lower vocational	15	15	15	19	17	17
	Middle secondary	13	12	19	17	10	11
	Higher secondary	18	17	28	26	22	22
	Middle vocational	10	8	10	11	11	11
	Higher vocational or university	8	13	16	18	35	32

Source: SCP, The Netherlands, LAS 04/05, data weighted for the total population.

The percentage of unemployed, reflecting labour market position, is the highest among Moroccans at 30%, followed by Turks, Surinamese and Antilleans at 20%, and then the Dutch at only 10%. Not surprisingly therefore, the Dutch also have the

largest proportion of household incomes above € 3,001. The largest income category among the Dutch is € 1,751 to € 3,000, with 37% of them in this category, whereas among the other groups the income band of € 1,001 to € 1,750 is the largest. Finally, the proportion of people with a household income of € 1,000 or less is the highest among Antilleans, at 34%, and lowest among the Dutch (12%). Educational attainment⁴⁰ is also considerably different across the groups. Moroccans have the largest proportion of people with no schooling at all, at 14%. Rates of no schooling are negligible among Surinamese, Antilleans and the Dutch, while the proportion of people with no educational qualifications among the Turks is 7%. The proportion of people who went only to primary school is highest among the Turks (29%) followed by Moroccans (21%), the Surinamese (11%), Antilleans (7%), and finally the Dutch (5%). The distribution of other qualifications is quite similar across the groups, with the exception of the proportion of people with a higher secondary qualification in the Surinamese group (28%). Finally, the proportion of university graduates and people with higher vocational degrees is highest among the Dutch, at 35%, and lowest among the Turks (8%).

In sum, the Dutch are the oldest, the least religious, the most educated and the wealthiest of the groups, followed by the Surinamese and the Antilleans. However, income disparity is large among the Antilleans and they have the highest proportion of higher education graduates as compared to other ethnic groups.

A few variables are only relevant to the minority groups and, therefore, I will describe them separately here. Among them, 24% of the respondents are second generation, born to one or two immigrant parents. Seventy six percent are first generation immigrants. Their length of stay in the Netherlands varies between 1 to 75 years. The average length of stay in the Netherlands is 20 years, with a standard deviation of 10.3 years (median = 19).

I have created a group composed of active members and volunteers for whom I test the contact hypothesis. In this group, I did not include people who said that they are only rarely active in the organization of which they are a member. This is

⁴⁰ The LAS data set distinguishes between having obtained a qualification in the Netherlands as opposed to abroad. I have, however, collapsed the two variables, since theoretically I have no reason to assume that a qualification obtained elsewhere should affect someone's likelihood of saying that they trust other people.

because face-to-face contact is a necessary condition for the contact mechanism. I have also included volunteers, since they are involved in activities. The LAS 2004/2005 questionnaire includes items on the ethnic background of people in voluntary organizations that the respondents mention either as an active member or as a volunteer. Since the Dutch constitute the largest group, they are by default more involved in homogenous organizations (Blau in Coffé & Geys 2008) (see Table 3.12 below). As we also can see below, the Turkish group is more involved in ethnic associations than the other non-Dutch groups. They also have relatively the largest number of ethnic organizations in the Netherlands (Van Heelsum 2002). The Turkish group seems also to participate in voluntary organizations that are mainly comprised of people with a Turkish background. Note that these are not necessarily ethnic associations, but due to segregation in housing, mainstream voluntary organizations might attract more people from the same ethnic background.

Table 3.12 Diversity in voluntary organizations and generalized trust for participants by ethnic group
(In percentages within columns, 15-64 year olds in main Dutch cities, 2004/2005)

	Ethnic Groups					Total
	Turks	Moroccans	Surinamese	Antilleans	Dutch	
Background people in voluntary organization:						
Mainly diverse	66	87	85	91	22	66
Mainly own background	34	13	15	9	78	34
						n = 1,221
Activity in ethnic associations:						
Not active	87	93	95	96	99	95
Active	13	7	5	4	1	5
						n = 1,298
Generalized Trust						
Careful with people	60	52	58	51	38	51
People can be trusted	36	45	39	44	61	46
Missing	4	3	3	5	1	3
						n = 1,264

Source: SCP, The Netherlands, LAS 04/05, data weighted for ethnic groups.

As for the distribution of generalized trust, the Dutch score the highest with 61% of them answering positively to the question, whereas there is almost no difference between the other four ethnic groups – although the proportions are again reversed

for them compared to the Dutch. The difference in generalized trust scores comparing members and volunteers of each ethnic population to their ethnic group as a whole is almost negligible, apart for the Surinamese (compare Table 3.10 to 3.12). For them, there is a 10% difference in the generalized trust scores between members and volunteers and the Surinamese group as a whole.

Table 3.13 Socio-demographic characteristics among participants of voluntary organizations by ethnic group
(In percentages within columns, 15-64 year olds in main Dutch cities, 2004/2005)

		Ethnic Groups					
		Turks	Moroccans	Surinamese	Antilleans	Dutch	Total
Sex (n = 1,296)	men	67	72	56	53	53	59
	women	33	28	44	47	47	41
Age group (n = 1,296)	24 or younger	29	39	30	32	18	29
	25-34	34	30	19	23	20	24
	35-44	21	19	23	21	25	22
	45-54	10	5	19	17	20	15
	55-64	6	7	9	7	17	10
Marital status (n = 1,299)	Widowed/ divorced	5	3	13	9	6	7
	Other	95	97	87	91	94	97
Religiosity (n = 1,299)	Practices and adheres	86	90	56	60	29	40
	No	14	10	44	40	71	60
Labour market position (n = 1,297)	Unemployed	13	16	16	13	9	13
	In paid job	56	47	61	56	66	58
	Housekeeping	10	10	2	6	8	7
	Other	21	27	21	25	17	22
Net Household Income (€) (n = 856)	1,000 or less	17	20	17	29	12	19
	1,001-1,750	53	56	31	31	18	34
	1,751-3,000	24	21	34	23	36	29
	3,001 and more	6	3	18	17	34	18
Educational attainment (n = 1,282)	Never went to school	5	4	0	1	0	2
	Primary school	27	19	10	9	5	13
	Lower vocational	15	15	11	12	13	13
	Middle secondary	11	13	17	17	10	13
	Higher secondary	16	19	27	22	20	21
	Middle vocational	13	12	14	14	11	13
	Higher vocational or university	13	18	21	25	41	25

Source: SCP, The Netherlands, LAS 04/05, data weighted for ethnic groups.

Before going into the details of whether diversity in voluntary organizations explains differences in generalized trust, let me first describe some demographic characteristics of participants and volunteers across the ethnic groups (Table 3.13

above). Among the participants, there are fewer Turkish and Moroccan women than Surinamese, Antillean and Dutch women. With respect to age, the Moroccan group has the largest cohort of young adults and teenagers (39%). The Turkish group has a relatively larger cohort of 25 to 34 year olds (34%). Finally, the Surinamese, Antilleans and Dutch have proportionately more middle-aged (45 and older) participants than the other two groups.⁴¹ As for marital status, the Surinamese and Antillean participants have the largest proportion of divorcees and widows/widowers. Finally, religious affiliation is the highest among Moroccan and Turkish participants.

Differences in household income and educational level are as follows. Antillean participants have the largest proportion of people with a household income below € 1,000. The majority of Turkish and Moroccan participants have a household income between € 1,000 and € 1,750, whereas relative to the other groups more of the Surinamese participants have a household income of between € 1,750 and € 3,000. The proportion of participants with a household income of more than € 3,000 is larger among the Surinamese, Antilleans and the Dutch. Not surprisingly then, these are also among the groups with a higher proportion of university and vocational qualifications, as well as the groups with a higher proportion of secondary vocational training and pre-university qualifications. Finally, among participants in voluntary and leisure organizations, there are relatively more Turks and Moroccans with no educational qualifications or only primary school education as compared to the other groups.⁴²

Again, a few variables are only relevant to minority groups and, therefore, I will describe them separately here. Among the minority members and volunteers, 31% of the respondents are second generation who are born to immigrant parents. Sixty nine percent are first generation immigrants. Their length of stay in the Netherlands varies between 2 and 54 years. The average length of stay in the Netherlands is 20 years and the standard deviation is 10.3 years (median = 19). The average length of stay of

⁴¹ Correlations between groups, although statistically significant, are very weak.

⁴² The differences in education levels and household income between participants might be due to different entry routes of ethnic groups into the labour market and the educational system in the Netherlands. Therefore, I looked at how much the groups differ. The differences are low in magnitude but statistically significant. This means that when we compare the relative importance of these factors, the differences in the scores on generalized trust are not much influenced by group differences.

the minority members and volunteers in the Netherlands is not different to the overall length of stay of each ethnic group in the Netherlands.

However, some differences between the ethnic population and the participants of voluntary organizations are worth discussing (compare Table 3.13 and 15). Generally, more men than women are involved in voluntary organizations, but more so among Moroccan (where there is a 19% difference) and Turkish minorities (with a 16% difference) than other groups. The unemployed are more prevalent among members and volunteers in the Turkish and Moroccan minority groups. Younger Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese minorities are also more involved in voluntary organizations than their counterparts. In contrast, among the Surinamese and Antillean minorities religious people are more involved in voluntary organizations than the other groups. Across all groups (ethnic minorities and the Dutch control group) people with lower household incomes are less involved in voluntary organizations, while people with the highest household income (€ 3,001 and more) participate proportionally more. Moroccans with a low income (less than € 1,000) are underrepresented in voluntary organizations, whereas Antilleans with high income (€ 3,001 and more) are relatively overrepresented. Moroccans who never went to school are also the least involved in non-profit organizations, in addition to Antilleans with lower vocational qualifications. Differences across other educational levels for participants compared to their respective ethnic population are not considerable. In general, however, people with a university degree or a higher vocational qualification participate more relative to people with lower qualifications.

Diversity in voluntary organizations

Now I gauge the relative importance of the set of socio-demographic characteristics described above in explaining generalized trust for participants. Table 3.14 below summarizes this. Due to the fairly equal sizes of the groups in the study, the sample below allows control for any ethnic effects (after weighting for sample biases due to non-response). I will infer the results to the Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean groups in the 50 main Dutch cities in 2004/2005. However, the results below cannot be inferred to the general population in the Netherlands, because the data will not be weighted as such. In other words, as the ethnic groups are in reality much smaller than the Dutch, if I were to weight the results for the population as a

whole, the sample would include more Dutch participants whose characteristics would prevail. Moreover, it would not be able to detect patterns that are specific to minority groups, nor would I be able to properly compare the groups. In the summary section, I will compare the results for the minority groups with the previous study (FNB-2009) which is representative of the Dutch population.

Table 3.14 Logistic Regression Model estimates for generalized trust and ethnic diversity among participants of voluntary organizations
(Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antilleans in 50 main Dutch cities, 2004/2005)

Variables	Model 1			Model 2		
	Exp (B)	95% CI for EXP(B)		Exp (B)	95% CI for EXP(B)	
		Lower	Upper		Lower	
Men (Reference = women)	0.96 (-/+)	0.70	1.30	0.96 (-/+)	0.70	1.30
Age (Reference = 55+)						
24 and younger	0.74 (-)	0.37	1.46	0.74 (-)	0.37	1.49
25-34	0.45** (-)	0.26	0.77	0.45** (-)	0.26	0.78
35-44	0.70 (-)	0.42	1.18	0.70 (-)	0.42	1.18
45-54	0.90 (-)	0.52	1.57	0.89 (-)	0.51	1.56
Widowed/divorced	0.66 (-)	0.37	1.19	0.66 (-)	0.37	1.20
Religiosity	0.75~ (-)	0.55	1.03	0.74~ (-)	0.54	1.02
Unemployed: sick or otherwise	0.71 (-)	0.44	1.14	0.72 (-)	0.45	1.17
<i>Net Household Income (€)</i> (Reference = 3,000+)						
1,000 or less	0.78 (-)	0.43	1.39	0.78 (-)	0.44	1.40
1,001-1,750	0.96 (-/+)	0.59	1.56	0.96 (-/+)	0.59	1.57
1,751-3,000	1.11 (-/+)	0.70	1.75	1.12 (-/+)	0.71	1.76
<i>Educational attainment</i> (Reference = Higher vocational degree or university)						
Primary school or never went to school	0.23** (-)	0.12	0.44	0.23** (-)	0.12	0.44
Lower vocational training and secondary school (pre 16)	0.34** (-)	0.22	0.52	0.34** (-)	0.22	0.52
Secondary vocational training and higher secondary school (after 16)	0.42** (-)	0.29	0.63	0.43** (-)	0.29	0.64
<i>Diversity in voluntary organizations:</i>						
Mainly homogenous				1.12 (+)	0.81	1.54
Ethnic association				1.56 (+)	0.83	2.91
Constant	4.067			3.782		
N = 775	Nagelkerke R ² = 13%			Nagelkerke R ² = 13%		

Source: SCP, The Netherlands, LAS 04/05, ~ p < 0.10, * p<0.05, **p<0.01; data weighted for ethnic groups.

Overall, the directions of the effects are as expected. Younger cohorts of participants are less likely to say that they trust others, although this relationship is not linear. Participants in higher household income categories are more likely to say that they trust others as compared to participants with a household income of € 1,000 or less. Not surprisingly, participants with lower educational qualifications are also less likely to say that they trust others as compared to respondents with a university or higher vocational degree. However, the effect of homogeneity in voluntary organizations is positive. This means that if a person is involved mainly in organizations with people from their own background, and if they participate in ethnic associations, they are more likely to say they trust others as compared to people who are involved mainly in diverse associations and participants who are not involved in ethnic associations at all.

Inspecting significant effects shows us, however, that only four of the values estimated would actually hold for the population, as their p value is lower than the 0.05 cut-off. These are for: the categories 25 to 34 year olds in comparison to respondents older than 55 years old; participants who have a lower qualification than the ones who have a university or higher vocational degree (all 3 categories). The effect of education is the largest and can be interpreted as follows. The odds of a participant saying that they trust others increases more than fourfold if they have a higher education degree as compared to participants who never went to school or only completed primary school. Then, compared to a university or higher vocational degree, having a lower vocational or secondary school qualification decreases the likelihood of trust almost threefold, whereas having a secondary vocational training or higher secondary qualification decreases the likelihood of trust almost 2.5 times. This holds regardless of one's income, age, sex, being involved in mixed voluntary organizations or whether one is active in an ethnic association. Religiosity is, surprisingly, negative and only significant at the 10% level, possibly because the Dutch are less religious and they are included here.

The model as a whole nevertheless explains 13% of the variation in generalized trust. This indicates that other factors might also explain the variation. In table 3.14

(above) we can also see that the effect of homogeneity⁴³ in organizations and participating in ethnic associations, although positive, are not statistically significant. The odds ratios of these effects are close to 1 (no substantive effect) and 1.5. Thus, generalized trust is better explained by the level of education of the participants and to some extent by age.

As with the previous data set, I examined the effect of voluntary activity on generalized trust when controlling for social success factors. This had no statistical and substantive bearing on generalized trust and thus does not need to be included in the analysis in the next chapter.

Migration related factors

As discussed earlier, I have to control for ethnic effects, since minorities might have different life experience compared to the Dutch and as such might be less trustful (see Table 3.15). The Surinamese are the most unlikely to say they trust others in comparison to the Dutch (almost 1.8 times less so) and this is statistically significant at the 5% level. Antilleans are also less likely to say they trust others than the Dutch (respectively 1.6 times less), but this effect is significant at the 10% level. There is no apparent reason why the Surinamese are the most different to the Dutch. It might be that the experience of colonialism has had lasting effects, although it is surprising that the Antilleans are less affected. The coefficients for Turks and Moroccans are insignificant. Moreover, the effect of other variables does not change once we control for ethnicity.⁴⁴ Thus far, education and age are better predictors of generalized trust.

⁴³ There is no length of participation question in order to test for any socialization mechanism due to contact.

⁴⁴ There is an exception to this. The effect of participation in an ethnic organization increases slightly from the previous model and is significant at the 10% level. The high correlation between ethnic groups and participation in ethnic associations poses collinearity problems. The size of this relationship, as measured by Cramér's V, is 0.6 and highly significant. I have, therefore, discarded this variable as its size changes once ethnicity is entered into the model.

Table 3.15 Logistic Regression Model estimates for generalized trust and ethnicity among participants of voluntary organizations
(Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antilleans in 50 main Dutch cities, 2004/2005)

Variables	Model 1			Model 2		
	Exp (B)	95% CI for EXP(B)		Exp (B)	95% CI for EXP(B)	
		Lower	Upper		Lower	Upper
Men (Reference = women)	0.96	0.71	1.30	0.91(-)	0.67	1.25
Age (Reference = 55+)						
24 and younger	0.77 (-)	0.38	1.54	0.80 (-)	0.39	1.61
25-34	0.47** (-)	0.27	0.80	0.48** (-)	0.27	0.83
35-44	0.72 (-)	0.43	1.21	0.76 (-)	0.45	1.29
45-54	0.92 (-)	0.53	1.61	1.01 (-/+)	0.57	1.78
Widowed/divorced	0.67 (-)	0.37	1.20	0.73 (-)	0.40	1.34
Religiosity	0.76~ (-)	0.55	1.04	0.78 (-)	0.54	1.11
Unemployed: sick or otherwise	0.72 (-)	0.45	1.16	0.69 (-)	0.43	1.12
<i>Net Household Income (€)</i> (Reference = 3,000+)						
1,000 or less	0.78 (-)	0.44	1.40	0.76 (-)	0.42	1.38
1,001-1,750	0.97 (-/+)	0.59	1.58	0.91 (-)	0.55	1.51
1,751-3,000	1.12 (-/+)	0.71	1.77	1.11 (-/+)	0.69	1.75
<i>Educational attainment</i> (Reference = Higher vocational degree or university)						
Primary school or never went to school	0.23** (-)	0.12	0.44	0.24** (-)	0.12	0.47
Lower vocational training and secondary school (pre 16)	0.34** (-)	0.22	0.52	0.35** (-)	0.23	0.55
Secondary vocational training and higher secondary school (after 16)	0.43** (-)	0.29	0.64	0.46** (-)	0.31	0.68
<i>Diversity in voluntary organization:</i>						
Mainly homogenous	1.11 (+)	0.81	1.53	0.94 (-)	0.63	1.40
<i>Ethnic groups</i> (Reference = Dutch)						
Turkish				0.64 (-)	0.36	1.13
Moroccan				1.42 (+)	0.74	2.73
Surinamese				0.56* (-)	0.33	0.96
Antillean				0.64~ (-)	0.37	1.08
Constant	3.719			4.838		
N = 775	Nagelkerke R ² = 13%			Nagelkerke R ² = 15%		

Source: SCP, The Netherlands, LAS 04/05, ~ p < 0.10, * p<0.05, **p<0.01; data weighted for ethnic groups.

Table 3.16 Logistic Regression Model estimates for generalized trust among participants of voluntary organizations
(Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antilleans in 50 main Dutch cities, 2004/2005)

Variables	Model 1			Model 2		
	Exp (B)	95% CI for EXP(B)		Exp (B)	95% CI for EXP(B)	
		Lower	Upper		Lower	
Men (Reference = women)	1.08 (-/+)	0.75	1.55	1.10 (-/+)	0.76	1.58
Religiosity	1.02 (-/+)	0.67	1.55	1.12 (-/+)	0.73	1.71
Unemployed: sick or otherwise	0.76 (-)	0.45	1.29	0.81 (-)	0.48	1.37
<i>Net Household Income (€) (Reference = 3,000 or more)</i>						
1,000 or less	0.77 (-)	0.39	1.51	0.74 (-)	0.38	1.46
1,001-1,750	0.94 (-/+)	0.51	1.75	0.94 (-/+)	0.51	1.76
1,751-3,000	0.93 (-/+)	0.51	1.71	0.92 (-/+)	0.50	1.69
<i>Educational attainment (Reference = Higher vocational degree or university)</i>						
Primary school or never went to school	0.29** (-)	0.14	0.59	0.32** (-)	0.16	0.64
Lower vocational training and secondary school (pre 16)	0.45** (-)	0.27	0.75	0.48** (-)	0.28	0.81
Secondary vocational training and higher secondary school (after 16)	0.48** (-)	0.30	0.78	0.50** (-)	0.31	0.80
<i>Diversity in voluntary organization:</i>	0.69 ¹ (-)	0.43	1.09	0.70 (-)	0.44	1.13
Active in ethnic association	1.68~ (+)	0.90	3.12	1.76~ (+)	0.95	3.28
First generation (Reference = 2 nd generation)				0.61* (-)	0.37	1.01
Constant	1.635			2.185		
N = 534	Nagelkerke R ² = 8%			Nagelkerke R ² = 9%		

Source: SCP, The Netherlands, LAS 04/05, ~ p < 0.10, * p<0.05, **p<0.01; data weighted for ethnic groups, 1) p value=0.114.

In the next model above (table 3.16), I test whether being a first generation immigrant has an effect on generalized trust. Early socialization in the country of origin might have affected trust. Before discussing the results, I have to explain why in the next model age is not included. This is because it correlates highly with generation (Gamma= -0.8, p<0.000). This, in turn, changes the ‘true’ sizes of both coefficients.

As with the previous models, higher educational attainment has a positive effect on the likelihood of saying that a participant trusts others. Activity in an ethnic association also becomes significant at the 10% level, but its size, however, is

smaller than educational levels.⁴⁵ The overall model decreases in explained variance, but this is due to the smaller sample size. Model 2, in which the generation variable is introduced, explains, however, a better level of variance. Being a first generation immigrant reduces a participant's odds of saying they trust others by 1.6 times regardless of the other characteristics of that person. This effect is also statistically significant at the 5% level. However, since we had to exclude age from the model, part of this effect might be due to the older age of the respondent rather than being a first generation immigrant.⁴⁶ Overall, the size of the effect is also not that considerable compared to other variables, such as having a higher vocational degree or a university qualification.

One final model needs to be discussed before ending this chapter. This is the effect of the length of stay of a participant in the Netherlands, summarized in table 3.17 below. The experience of migration is argued to negatively influence trust. However, when this variable is added to the model, we can see that its relative size, controlling for all other effects, is very close to 1. This means that the length of the respondent's stay in the Netherlands has no substantive effect on the likelihood of trusting others. Being a member of an ethnic association is significant first at the 10% level, and in model 2 becomes significant at the conventional 5% level. Participants of ethnic associations are twice as likely to say they trust others in this model, although since age is not included we should be cautious in interpreting this result.⁴⁷ In this sample the Dutch (and other) participants of mixed organizations are missing as the model only included the four major ethnic groups. Only being part of a mixed organization is measured for them and is juxtaposed to participation in an ethnic association. Therefore, this conclusion can only be generalized to the four minority groups in the Netherlands. Moreover, educational attainment is still a much better predictor of generalized trust.

⁴⁵ As the first generation minorities are more inclined to participate in ethnic associations, this result might be due to collinearity in the model. The correlation between the two variables is very near to 0.5 (Gamma = 0.465, $p < 0.000$).

⁴⁶ I introduced an interaction effect for age and generation, but all the coefficients were highly insignificant.

⁴⁷ I included age in the model and excluded length of stay in the Netherlands. The odds ratio of participation in an ethnic association is still 1.8 ($p < 0.10$), whereas the odds ratio of homogeneity in organizations is 0.66 ($p < 0.10$), but age and educational attainment remained better explanatory factors.

Table 3.17 Logistic Regression Model estimates for generalized trust among participants of voluntary organizations
(Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antilleans in 50 main Dutch cities, 2004/2005)

Variables	Model 1			Model 2		
	Exp (B)	95% CI for EXP(B)		Exp (B)	95% CI for EXP(B)	
		Lower	Upper		Lower	
Men (Reference = women)	1.03 (-/+)	0.68	1.56	0.98 (-/+)	0.64	1.50
Widowed/divorced	0.78 (-)	0.39	1.59	0.70 (-)	0.34	1.44
Religiosity	1.16 (-/+)	0.70	1.92	1.18 (-/+)	0.70	1.96
Unemployed: sick or otherwise	0.91 (-)	0.52	1.59	0.86 (-)	0.49	1.50
<i>Net Household Income (€) (Reference = 3,000 or more)</i>						
1,000 or less	0.46 (-)	0.21	1.01	0.59 (-)	0.26	1.35
1,001-1,750	0.83 (-)	0.41	1.69	0.99 (-/+)	0.47	2.06
1,751-3,000	0.71 (-)	0.35	1.43	0.80 (-)	0.39	1.65
<i>Educational attainment (Reference = Higher vocational degree or university)</i>						
Primary school or never went to school	0.32** (-)	0.15	0.68	0.28** (-)	0.13	0.61
Lower vocational training and secondary school (pre 16)	0.48* (-)	0.27	0.86	0.44** (-)	0.24	0.80
Secondary vocational training and higher secondary school (after 16)	0.44** (-)	0.25	0.77	0.42** (-)	0.24	0.74
<i>Diversity in voluntary organization:</i>						
Mainly homogenous	0.67 ¹ (-)	0.41	1.10	0.68 (-)	0.41	1.12
Active in ethnic association	1.82~ (+)	0.95	3.48	1.91* (+)	0.99	3.67
Length of stay in NL				1.02* (-/+)	1.00	1.04
Constant	1.742			1.036		
N = 438	Nagelkerke R ² = 9%			Nagelkerke R ² = 11%		

Source: SCP, The Netherlands, LAS 04/05, ~ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; data weighted for ethnic groups, ¹p value = 0.110.

3.3 Summary

This chapter examined the effect of diversity in voluntary organizations on generalized trust. I take these results as a template against which my data from Turkish and mixed organizations in Amsterdam can be compared. The first data set sampled households in the Netherlands (FNB-2009) and is representative of the Dutch population, whilst the second data set included four minority groups and a Dutch control group (LAS 2004/2005). The limitation of these studies lies in the fact that no multilevel model can be employed as data on the co-members of the respondent is often lacking. Although the FNB-2009 included questions on the name

of the organization respondents participate in, which could potentially allow the identification of co-members, the respondents rarely named the same organization. Only large unions, political organizations and interest groups had overlapping members. However, these organizations often have fee paying members that do not have any contact with the organization. When examining sports organizations, almost no overlapping memberships were named.

Despite this, the pattern of the findings suggests that social success factors explain the level of generalized trust. Firstly, in the FNB-2009 sample of current participants, young age (24 and younger) explains a lower likelihood of trust, while having a higher educational qualification consistently explains a higher likelihood of trust. Having a low income (€ 1,000 or less) as opposed to the highest category (€ 3,000 or more) explains a low likelihood of trust among the participants. Participants of diverse organizations (with 25%-50% of members from minority backgrounds) are also more likely to trust, but seem to self-select into those organizations, after controlling for their length of participation. Finally, volunteers are not more likely to trust more than active participants.

As with the FNB-2009 survey, the minorities' survey (LAS 2004/2005) also shows a higher likelihood of trust for participants with higher educational attainment, although in this sample the effect is linear. The lower the educational level, the lower the odds ratio of trust. The effect of length of stay in the Netherlands on trust is negligible and only ethnic differences between the Surinamese and the Dutch are significant. There are some generational differences, but these cannot be separated from age. Finally, participation in diverse organizations is not significantly related to trust. However, when we examine the differences for minority groups, participation in ethnic associations is positively related to trust, whereas participation in diverse organizations is negatively related to trust. These effects are, however, not significant. As with the FNB-2009 data set, volunteering does not increase one's likelihood of trust and will, therefore, not be included further in the analysis.

In conclusion, educational attainment constitutes the largest effect size in explaining trust among participants in the minorities' data set, whereas in the Dutch survey young age and low income seem to be the most important predictors. Most importantly, there is no solid evidence for a contact mechanism in voluntary

organizations among the Dutch population, as this chapter has demonstrated. However, as the data lacks a multilevel structure, contextual effects cannot properly be examined. In addition, both these data sets do not have enough ethnic associations in their sample and when they include measures of diversity, it refers to the concentration of non-Western minority groups. However, there is no theoretical reason why somebody, for example, from Finland would be culturally nearer to the Dutch than someone from Turkey. Nor is it plausible to consider Turkish and Moroccan minorities to be culturally more similar than Turkish and the Dutch. The data I collected in Amsterdam will overcome these biases and will enable me to examine the effect of diversity in voluntary organizations more effectively. The next chapter will, however, first describe the characteristics of the organizations included in the sample and examine their activities and other relevant organizational factors.

CHAPTER 4

BRIDGING VERSUS BONDING PRACTICES: SETTING THE CONTEXT OF THE AMSTERDAM SURVEY

This chapter describes the characteristics of the organizations included in this study and subjects them to careful examination. I will analyse their formal characteristics (such as their mission statement, location and size), structural features (such as ratio of volunteers to participants and members)⁴⁸, their spectrum of activities and network connections. This chapter also examines variation in activity levels of the individual participant and to what extent close ties between participants are reported. The first two sections deal with characteristics of organizations and differences within organizations as regards activities, collaboration and contact opportunities, whereas the final section of this chapter looks at overlapping membership and collaboration opportunities between and beyond the groups included in this study.

The chapter investigates how these features differ across the Turkish and the mixed ethnicity groups. As the theoretical framework has shown, these features might be important in explaining varying levels of generalized trust across the two groups. Ethnic composition of the organization is the main analytical dimension of this study. Variation along this dimension among the organizations has been purposefully designed. However, other factors might affect generalized trust too. Theoretically, and at the organizational level, whether contact takes place at all in these organizations is a crucial condition. Whether organizations direct their activities towards collaboration between the participants is also important. Finally, larger organizations (size) might reduce possibilities of meaningful contact, whereas bridging network gaps and working trust with the government (operationalized by a funding relation) might enhance generalized trust. At the individual level, different levels of engagement, such as board member activity and volunteering are argued to affect generalized trust in addition to multiple memberships and volunteering in other

⁴⁸ A volunteer does unpaid work for the organization, such as helping with events and raising money. A participant could be a fee paying member, if the organization requires that, but mainly participates in events of the organization. A passive member is one that only pays a fee, but does not participate in any event and has no contact with other members in that organization.

organizations. Finally, developing close ties, particularly in mixed organizations, is pivotal for a contact mechanism to take effect. This is a hypothesised mediator effect between ethnic composition and generalized trust.

Consequently, the two types of groups should not be expected to differ too much across organizational characteristics and individual factors, when investigating the role of interethnic contact, or else we might have to control for these. In addition, variation among organizations on most characteristics (apart from ethnic composition) depends on the shape of the data and not all information was available to me when selecting the organizations. If there is variation across the two groups, these characteristics could serve as variables in the multilevel model in the next chapter.


4.1 Organizational characteristics

As described in the research design of this thesis, I carefully selected the organizations in this study in order to create two sets that vary according to their ethnic composition.⁴⁹ After identifying whether they were suited for this study, that is to say whether their membership is diverse, I then carried out the survey among their participants

In the case of Turkish organizations, 95% or more of the members are from Turkish descent. Two football associations had members from other backgrounds. The level of diversity reached 5% there. A Turkish elderly organization had one Dutch participant, which resulted in 1% diversity score. In mixed organizations the level of diversity is the ratio of people from a diverse ethnic background to a given majority group. In 4 out of the 20 organizations, the majority group was not Dutch. These majority groups were Moroccan, Turkish or Polish, and the diversity score there is between 40% and 60%. Overall, the level of diversity in mixed organizations ranges between 15% and 80%. The table below summarises the distribution of diversity among the Turkish and mixed organizations. As depicted below in figure 4.1, the majority of mixed organizations (40%) have a 50% level of diversity, whereas the majority of Turkish organizations (85%) are not diverse at all.

⁴⁹ When the ethnic composition is mixed, there are one or more groups from a different background than the majority group in that organization. The majority group does not need to be Dutch per se.

Figure 4.1 Level of diversity across Turkish and mixed organizations
(Amsterdam, 2009-2010)



Type of organization

Prior to data collection, I had access to the mission statement of organizations, which has enabled me to describe typologies of organizations (see table 4.1). As argued in chapter 2 (the theoretical framework), typologies such as political, sports, etc. should not matter in the analysis of generalized trust of the participants of organizations. That is because, strictly speaking, these generic types are not imposing theoretical conditions on why and how generalized trust should be affected. Most research on the voluntary sector, however, lacks additional data on organizational characteristics and hence takes these types as proxies for other characteristics. For example, political organizations are taken to be hierarchically organized as opposed to cultural organizations (Putnam 2000), which consequently are argued to affect equal status among the participants and contact opportunities. In the present context, this distinction is not applicable, since most organizations included in the analysis are locally based and relatively small in comparison to for example national political parties. Moreover, none of the organizations here have only passive members. In this sense, none of the organizations are purely interest ones such as The Automobile Association where members do not meet and interact.

I selected different organizational types within each group (see table below), but across groups I aimed at including a similar set. Differences in organizational types

across the groups are not directly influencing variation in generalized trust, but indirectly they still might have affected the aggregated results. If, for example, a certain organizational type attracts more high income than low income groups, the aggregate results are affected not due to the type of the organization, but due to the composition of the membership. Therefore, I used these organizational types in order to introduce variation in individual characteristics such as age, sex, and educational levels (see research design section in chapter 2) within each group. But across the groups I aimed at holding the types constant. As can be read from the table, the types of organizations do not vary considerably across the two groups. There are a few differences between the Turkish and the mixed group, but these are not statistically significant. For example, I could not find an elderly organization with mixed participants. That is due to the Dutch language difficulties among the first generation minorities. I also did not find small political groups that were composed of a diverse set of members, since most people would become members of national or local branches of political organizations, which typically are much larger in size and do not direct their activities towards a neighbourhood alone. Secondly, because of the character of the activities of neighbourhood groups, their membership reflects the ethnic composition of a neighbourhood. Therefore, it is unlikely to find a neighbourhood group that only includes Turkish participants, as the level of ethnic diversity in Amsterdam neighbourhoods is high. If there are homogenous neighbourhood groups in Amsterdam, they then mainly consist of the Dutch majority population. The same goes for social work organizations and PTAs.

Table 4.1 Types of organizations across the Turkish and mixed groups
(Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

	Turkish	Mixed
Cultural	2	3
Elderly	2	
Political	2	
Religious	5	3
Sports	2	4
Women	3	3
Youth	4	1
Neighbourhood group		4
Social work		1
Parent Teacher Association		1
Total	20	20

Location

I also aimed to select organizations across a wide set of geographical locations in Amsterdam. This was necessary in order to control for district effects on generalized trust.⁵⁰ I have already mentioned in the research design section of this thesis that there are no Turkish associations in the South-East district of the city. Therefore, I also did not select any mixed organizations there. Mixed organizations in this district are from South America (former Dutch colonies) and include many religious organizations (Vermeulen, Brünger & Van de Walle 2009). In addition, districts in Amsterdam, although not that different in their policies, might still support organizations to different degrees. Finally, different shares of ethnic minorities in geographical locations also influence contact opportunities between different groups in these organizations. Therefore, selecting organizations in different geographical locations is desirable.


Figure 4.2 below depicts the number of organizations that I have selected in different districts in Amsterdam. It also indicates the percentage of non-Western ethnic minorities per district. The population of Amsterdam consists of 34.5% non-western ethnic minorities. The Northern and Eastern parts of the city also contain between 30% to 40% ethnic minorities, whereas this proportion reaches 60% in Western parts of the city. Overall, the location of organizations is equally distributed among the districts. Statistically speaking, this distribution does not differ across the groups as the correlation coefficient is insignificant. It is important to note that there were relatively speaking more mixed organizations in the East part of the city than the Western part.⁵¹ This might be due to funding for mixed organizations from the national government. After the murder of Theo van Gogh, the Eastern district where he was killed got special funding for civic projects. Other neighbourhoods also

⁵⁰ Strictly speaking, one should control for the residential area of the respondent as this and the location of the organization might not necessarily coincide. However, if most people choose to take part in leisure, cultural and religious organizations in their local environment, one has to select organizations in different areas.

⁵¹ This result contradicts findings from Vermeulen, Brünger and Van de Walle's (2009) study in which they categorise an organization as mixed when the board consists of different ethnic groups born outside the Netherlands. Although I initially selected these organizations from the same database and hence initially followed the same categorisation, after an interview with the board, I only included organizations whose participants were also mixed. In addition, through the internet, local informants and municipality guides, I found mixed organizations, which were not listed in the database and whose boards sometimes did not consist of different ethnic groups.

profited from this, although not to the same extent. These are the so-called ‘Vogelaar’ neighbourhoods, named after the minister in charge who passed the law ("Integratienota 2007-2011: Zorg dat je erbij hoort! [Integration policy: Make sure you belong!]" 2007).

Figure 4.2 Percentage of Non-Western inhabitants in Amsterdam districts and the number of organizations in the sample



Source: adapted from <http://www.os.amsterdam.nl>

The number of organizations selected for this study in each district reflects the general pattern in the city. The Northern and some Western parts of the city do not have that many organizations compared to other parts (Vermeulen, Brünger & Van de Walle 2009: 24). Although the city centre contains the majority of the organizations, it is most likely that these are the large tertiary organizations without active participants. Most ethnic and mixed organizations are not based in the city centre as this part of the city contains many hotels, offices and houses of the most affluent, which are often not the target of minority organizations or organizations that comprise mixed ethnic groups. Moreover, the proportion of inhabitants with a non-western ethnic background reaches only 20% in the centre, which again reflects the small number of organizations selected there.

Size

The size of Turkish organizations ranges between 50 and 400 (SD = 113.25), while the range for the mixed groups is between 10 and 1,200 (SD = 326.9). One football association has an extraordinary number of members, namely 1,200, whereas most relatively larger organizations have 350 to 650 members. However, among the groups, size of the organizations does not vary significantly. An ANOVA test for differences between the mean size of the organizations compared across the Turkish and mixed groups is not statistically significant. This is reassuring, since opportunities for contact should be equally spread across the groups. If the size of the organizations would vary across the Turkish and the mixed group, differences in generalized trust between the groups might have been due to the size of the organizations rather than interethnic contact. In addition, this would have imposed extra conditions that I had to subsequently control for.

Formal board

Since I initially started selecting only organizations from the database, which comprises data from the Dutch Chamber of Commerce, most organizations have a formal board. Four mixed organizations have not registered themselves as a non-profit organization in the Dutch Chamber of Commerce. That is because these organizations do not independently apply for funding from the government and also have no fee-paying members. However, two organizations still received funding indirectly from a welfare organization that they are a member of and as such still could be regarded as part of the formal voluntary sector in Amsterdam. The other two organizations are respectively a knitting club and a Parent Teacher Association. These two organizations did not find it necessary to register at the Dutch Chamber of Commerce. However, all organizations still operate under a formal structure by having a president or a coordinator and a few people who assist them in the daily management of the organization.

More importantly and as argued in the theoretical chapter of this thesis, there should be no reason why contact in formal versus informal organizations should affect trust differently. Indirectly, participation in informal groups could lead to a larger number of volunteers and active members, which in turn, could lead to higher

levels of aggregated trust. However, (Torpe & Ferrer-Fons 2007) found very small effect sizes when they correlated the formal/informal style of management within organizations to the ratio of active to passive members on the one hand and the ratio of volunteers to passive members on the other hand. Moreover, Stolle's (1998) research in fact finds no evidence whether organizations that promote voluntary work would also generate more trusting participants.

Collaboration

Although collaboration and volunteering as an organizational level characteristic is empirically not found to affect trust across organizations, Stolle (1998) found that organizing events and having responsibility for a task increased the likelihood of a participant's trust level. In other words, the act of volunteering at the individual level as opposed to an organization promoting voluntary work is positively related to trust. Therefore, I describe here whether the organizations have different levels of volunteers. As with other individual level characteristics, if there is a lot of clustering on that characteristic in some organizations, but not in others, this might affect the aggregate results. More specifically, if some organizations have more volunteers than others, this might affect differences in generalized trust across organizations.⁵²

The mean number of volunteers in Turkish organizations is 27.3 (SD = 13.9), whereas the average number of volunteers in mixed organizations is 28.7 (SD = 29). Not all these volunteers are included in the study, as these figures are retrieved from interviews with board members. A larger standard deviation in the mixed group indicates that the distribution of volunteers across the groups is different; the distribution of volunteers at the mixed group is more skewed than the Turkish. This is also reflected in the relative range of the number of volunteers. The Turkish group has between 5 and 50 volunteers per organization, whereas the mixed group has 1 to 100 volunteers per organizations. Two churches and one neighbourhood organization have relatively a large number of volunteers (80 to 100) as compared to other organizations. The difference between the Turkish and the mixed group in their average number of volunteers is statistically not significant. This is again reassuring for the analysis of interethnic contact to be carried out in the next chapter.

⁵² In the previous chapter, I found no statistical significant effect for volunteering at the individual level, which questions whether Stolle's (1998) findings are generalizable across other countries.

With the exception of football associations and religious organizations, most organizations do not have fee paying members in the traditional sense. They have participants who may be asked to pay a small fee per event or voluntarily make a donation to the organization. In addition, they have volunteers who are regularly involved in organizing activities. Although all organizations have volunteers, some have no participants. These organizations are ‘foundations’ and they organize activities for a varied set of people who are the target group of that organization (for example the elderly or the neighbourhood population). Some are reaching hard-to-find people who occasionally take part in their activities, and therefore, people that regularly meet each other and interact are the volunteers in these organizations. In these cases, I have limited the survey to them, since otherwise the contact condition would not be met. The fact that some organizations have no other regular participants also affects the ratio of volunteers to passive participants and members. These organizations promote volunteering and collaboration much more, since membership is by default directed towards participants who are actively engaging in organizing events.

Turkish organizations on average have a lower ratio of volunteers to passive participants and members (0.22; SD = 0.24), while mixed organizations have a higher average ratio of volunteers to passive participants and members (0.43; SD = 0.41). The ratio of volunteers to members and participants among Turkish organizations ranges between 0.044 and 1, whereas among the mixed organizations it ranges between 0.029 and 1. Statistically speaking, the two groups do not significantly vary ($p = 0.056$) in their ratio of volunteers to participants and members and in promoting collaboration. In addition, as this organizational variable is found not to affect generalized trust (Stolle 1998), strictly speaking we should not be concerned whether this organizational variable needs to be added to the multilevel model. Moreover, only seven organizations promote collaboration to such an extent that the ratio of volunteers to participants and members takes a value of 1. Therefore, if one is interested whether previous findings still need confirmation, data collection effort should be directed at sampling more organizations, which promote collaboration at different rates. The following section describes and analyses

activities at Turkish and mixed organizations, which constitutes the necessary condition for the interethnic contact hypothesis.

4.2 The spectrum of activities and contact within organizations

When it comes to describing and analysing activities in voluntary organizations, empirical studies are rare. This is more so because, one then needs to visit them in order to map their activities and not solely rely on quantitative surveys of individuals. Maloney and Roßteutscher's (2007b) study of organizational activities and characteristics across 6 European cities is an exceptional case in this respect.⁵³ In this edited volume, Lelieveldt, Astudillo and Stevenson (2007) develop a model about the activities of organizations. They distinguish policy and client oriented activities, which in turn could be outsourced. Organizations that they surveyed reported 4 different types of activities: representation; mobilization; service; activation. The latter category is the most relevant activity for the contact hypothesis, since this involves recreation and ultimately also socialization. However, mobilization might also involve durable and meaningful contact among the participants, whereas representation and service are the types of activities that might be more easily delegated to paid staff. Unfortunately, this study above does not empirically link activities of organizations to the generation of trust.

Nor do many studies on migrant organizations empirically test whether generalized trust is generated in these organizations (see for example Ramakrishnan & Bloemraad 2008; Morales & Giugni 2011). As regards their activities, they also generally do not describe these. Bloemraad and Ramakrishnan's edited volume is an exception to this. There, De Graauw (2008), characterizes ethnic voluntary organizations as hybrid ones, since they usually are involved in many different activities (see also Vermeulen 2005). Ethnic organizations are very versatile, because they usually fulfil a void for people who are otherwise segregated from social life. In addition, since these organizations are primarily based on ethnic ties (Fennema

⁵³ In this study, the authors map the organizational landscape of 6 cities: Aalborg (Denmark), Aberdeen (UK), Bern (Switzerland), Enschede (The Netherlands), Mannheim (Germany) and Sabadell (Spain).

2004), they focus on cultural activities along with their other functions. The organizations included in this study were no exception to this.

In contrast, mixed organizations' primary missions are not to bridge ethnic gaps, and only a very few actively do this. This is so, because the ethnic composition of the organizations is often *de facto* mixed. For example, most sports organizations are not set up to promote diversity, but they attract a mixed membership due to the ethnic composition of a neighbourhood. Similarly, a women's professional network is attracting mixed members, because the nature of its activities attracts professionals who reside outside their birth countries. Interestingly, most organizations that explicitly mentioned promoting diversity and bridging ethnic ties were initially founded as ethnic organizations or are founded by second-generation immigrants. Below I will describe these activities and focus on whether and to what extent they promote contact between their participants and between different groups.

Kinds of activities of organizations


Next to their primary activity, organizations in this study reported to offer a very diverse set of activities to their participants. The primary activities were described by the type of organizations depicted in table 4.1, which is based on their mission statement as recorded in the Dutch Chamber of Commerce database. A third of the organizations were either founded later than the database was composed or are not formally registered. As discussed in the research design section in chapter 2, I found these organizations on the Internet, through other informants at the council or the organizations that I had already access to. I categorised their activities by consulting their mission statement at the Dutch Chamber of Commerce or labelled them according to the type of activities they would offer. Among other things, these activities range from sports, cultural gatherings, neighbourhood barbeques, debates to religious festivities and social work.

The majority of organizations, however, report organizing a variety of activities, which is not reflected in the mission statement. Figure 4.3 below depicts these. For example, a Turkish sports association states that they organize Turkish cultural festivities in addition to training, tournaments and matches. The board member said in the interview:

“We are more than a football association; we also would like to offer cultural activities to our members. As a foreigner, one cannot do much. We gather Turks together to engage in social and cultural activities.”

Most strikingly, Turkish organizations are very versatile in what they offer as activities. Both religious and other festive activities are most commonly reported by Turkish organizations (see the figure below). Some organizations that direct their activities towards women and youth are partly funded or dependent on volunteers from religious organizations. Therefore, they also take part in religious festivities such as Iftars (breaking the fast during Ramadan). They currently or in the past received funds from transnational charitable Turkish organizations (such as Milli Görüş) or from the Turkish government (Diyanet). Quite a number of mixed and Turkish organizations also reported that, although they organize religious festive activities, they also organize barbeques and neighbourhood parties around Dutch festive themes. Only two Turkish organizations openly stated that their mission is solely to promote Turkish culture.

Figure 4.3 Frequency of additional activities at Turkish and mixed organizations
(Amsterdam, 2009-2010)



Turkish organizations receive funding from local government mainly for providing services. These services range from language training for women, integration courses and computer lessons for the elderly, to homework assistance and sports activities for the youth. Among Turkish organizations, it seems to be very widespread to offer themed events too. They provide information on health care issues (e.g. diabetes prevention and psychological care), pension restructuring, and sometimes even debates on domestic violence and gay emancipation. The local councils and social workers are very receptive in providing funding for these kinds of issues and collaborating with Turkish organizations. Equally, some organizations emphasised that by having a function room that opens on regular hours, they help combat youth vandalism and provide activities that the whole community will profit from. As the board member of a Turkish organization said in an interview: “We are more a neighbourhood community centre than a mosque”. Another board member of a mosque said: “Our mosque is not just a prayer house. We gather people together to integrate them and to make them better live with others”.

Local councils often provide empty buildings as function rooms to Turkish organizations. Sometimes, they demand that these organizations share those spaces with other ethno-national or mixed organizations. In addition, when a building is offered to an organization, the local council imposes extra conditions on how the space is used. For example, the board member of an elderly Turkish organization said in the interview that they are absolutely not allowed to use the space for prayer. This then means that the participants of this organization, who have difficulty moving about, have to walk for more than 20 minutes in order to get to a nearby mosque for their prayers.

Politically themed events and calls for demonstrations are rare among both types of organizations, which might again be indicative of funding opportunities. However, some mixed organizations reported they are apolitical and do not wish to participate in political events. The council sometimes promotes providing political information to marginalized groups. Hence, some organizations offer information on voting to (illiterate) women and men, but this seems to be more likely among Turkish organizations rather than mixed organizations. When it comes to contacting political parties during or outwith election times, Turkish organizations again outnumber

mixed organizations. This should not come as a surprise to us as the migration literature across Europe has often mapped their activities and mobilization efforts around politically themed events (see for example Jacobs & Tillie 2004; Morales & Giugni 2011).

Large nation-wide charities seem to assist mixed organizations when the theme is of particular interest to the promotion of diversity or integration of ethnic minorities. Two organized projects are worth mentioning here. One aimed at preventing Islamic radicalism by creating peer groups among Moroccan youth. Another organization distributed magnets with different statements from the Dutch constitution in a neighbourhood in order to educate people about the freedom of speech and human rights. Residents of those neighbourhoods could win prizes by collecting all the magnets. This supposedly created “contact” among neighbours as they had to exchange the magnets among themselves in order to collect a full set. In the next section I elaborate whether organizations offer their participants an opportunity for durable contact as these events were not repeated and only brought people from different ethnic backgrounds together in a one-off event.

The discussion above might question the extent to which these organizations are promoting political participation and civic skills. Only five organizations mentioned offering civic education courses, three of which are Turkish. However, ten Turkish organizations report to have or had a board member working as a politician now as compared to one mixed organization. Most of these politicians have been a member of a Turkish organization since their teens.

In sum, Turkish ethno-national, more so than, mixed organizations are ‘properly conceptualized as multipurpose hybrid organizations rather than as service providers’ (De Graauw 2008: 328). Yet, by providing services they function as a partner in governance structures and help overcome inequalities. They give voice to groups of people who would otherwise be marginalized. Mixed organizations are, on the other hand, generally less politicized and hence are less inclined to mobilize their participants and their claims. This has to do with the fact that many leisure and neighbourhood organizations are becoming mixed due to the ethnic composition of the neighbourhoods they are located in rather than purposefully being organized around the ideological goal of promoting multiculturalism and diversity.

As the discussion above demonstrated, organizations provide information and services to their participants. Apart from the people who organize those events, this does not seem to be the kind of setting that would encourage the development of generalized trust. The main question of this thesis is whether Turkish and mixed organizations socialise their participants differently to adhere to trust, which in turn, could be attributed to the role of interethnic contact at these organizations. In what follows, I will discuss whether activities of organizations meet the necessary condition of inter-group contact theory. In other words, do these organizations offer opportunities for durable contact to their participants?

Frequency of activities

I start with describing different levels of activities across the two types of organizations. As table 4.2 below summarises this, there is no major difference between the two groups. This is also not statistically significant. Most organizations offer their members, participants and volunteers activities on a daily basis. However, the majority of organizations also reported that activities during the weekend are most often visited as people have more time on their hands. In addition, even if some organizations offer activities on a monthly basis, the volunteers who are involved do meet each other more often than that in the run up to an event. These events might then be visited by target groups, which visit those as a one-off occasion. In these cases, I have limited the survey to volunteers only. The table below shows that both types of organizations do offer opportunities for durable contact between their participants and volunteers.

Table 4.2 Frequency of activities at Turkish and mixed organizations
(Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

	Turkish	Mixed	Total
Frequency activities			
Daily	12 (60%)	10 (50%)	22 (55%)
Weekly	5 (25%)	8 (40%)	13 (33%)
Monthly	3 (15%)	2 (10%)	5 (12%)
Total	20	20	40

Interethnic contact

Although offering durable opportunities for contact is important for testing the contact hypothesis, what is essential is whether the organizations also differ on the contact dimension along another dimension. That is to say, do organizations offer opportunities for contact with other ethnic groups through activities? As I have argued earlier, if the ethnic composition of the organization varies along the two groups, we can test the inter-group contact theory directly as long as we can control for other relevant factors. During interviews with the Turkish board members, most reported actively promoting contact with other ethnic groups, especially with the Dutch. This is not so surprising as local and central government is actively promoting interethnic contact by offering subsidies and funding to organizations (Uitermark, Rossi & Van Houtum 2005; Uitermark & Van Steenberg 2006). But does this then make a comparison between the Turkish and mixed organizations along the contact dimension possible?

Although most Turkish organizations organize activities in neighbourhoods where different ethnic groups can take part, these are mostly yearly one-off events such as Iftars, street parties, barbeques, or debates around political events or at election times. They do not involve durable contact with ethnically diverse others for their participants on a regular basis. For example, a board member of a religious youth association said in an interview:

“We organise open days [once a year] in order for our participants to have contact with people from other religions, so people can better understand each other... There is too much negative attention about Muslims. This way, others can also acquaint with Islam” (interview with a Turkish board member).

Because of language difficulties of the first-generation Turkish participants who constitute the largest proportion of participants in Turkish organizations, it is questionable how much of this short-term contact at these events translates into durable or close ties. For example, as an informant of this study said in an interview:

“If we organise an event, we have to make sure to have invited the [Dutch] neighbours. Otherwise, they complain...But they never take part in our activities... the local council also urges us to do this before they commit themselves to financing a project” (interview with a Turkish board member).

Turkish organizations also offer activities in which youth is the target group. One organization said they organized a cultural religious event in order for the children in the neighbourhood to get acquainted with Islamic festivities at a young age. Again, these children are not the regular participants of the organizations and have not been the subject of the survey.

In contrast to the above, many mixed organizations actively promote interethnic contact as their primary mission (8 organizations). This is then reflected in the composition of their membership, board and volunteers that they recruit. Some of these organizations were either founded by second generation immigrants or were formerly ethno-national organizations (4 organizations). They actively promote contact during projects that are often more than one-off events. Nevertheless, as some of these organizations are 'foundations', without members or regular participants, their participants vary per event. Therefore, in the study, I included only the volunteers and board members that have regular contact organizing events.

All other mixed organizations, in contrast, are not set up to actively promote contact. They simply bring together people from diverse backgrounds due to the ethnic composition of the neighbourhoods they are situated in, or attract diverse participants, due to the nature of their activities. That is the case, for example, at a women's network that brings professionals together. Here, promoting contact is pointless as the members and participants join because they are interested in meeting new people from diverse backgrounds. Networking is essential to the group, although the organization is not set up from an ideological viewpoint to celebrate diversity. Similarly, a Parent Teacher Association of a mixed school brings together people from a diverse background. Due to the ethnic composition of the neighbourhood, some schools are *de facto* becoming mixed. However, mixed Parent Teacher Associations at these schools are quite rare. Often when I contacted mixed schools, it would appear that although the school would have liked a diverse set of parents to get involved, most schools were still not successful in recruiting them. A coordinator of the mixed school explained to me in an interview that this might be due to cultural differences. She said, for example, that minority parents were often not familiar with the structure of voluntary work. They would simply think that since schools are governmental institutions, they did not have to get involved. The school selected here

was successful, because the board of directors had appointed a coordinator who encourages parents from other ethnic backgrounds to get involved.

The three mixed football associations also reported suffering from the same problem (see also Winkler 2006). All board members said in interviews that volunteering among ethnic minorities in their organization has been difficult to achieve. They acknowledged that cultural and language barriers were keeping potential members away from actively getting involved. This is more so because they require their members, for example, to take part in carpooling, cleaning and bar service. So, although mixed organizations bring people from different ethnic backgrounds together and create durable contact between them, they are rare, as the existence of ethno-national leisure organizations make it much easier for people to spend their free time with culturally like-minded people. One of the participants of a Turkish football association said: “I tried playing at a white Dutch association, but I did not feel comfortable there. I was often bullied on the field and if I was even slightly late for something, the Dutch players would hold it against me. That is when I decided to join a Turkish association”.

What about other factors that affect generalized trust across organizations? I will next describe whether there are any differences across the samples of Turkish and mixed organizations in the number of volunteers and whether there are any strong ties developed at these organizations.

Individual engagement

As argued in the theoretical chapter, differences in generalized trust may be attributed to different levels of engagement of the individual participant. This strand of the theory sees the act of collaboration and organizing events by the individual participant as the mechanism behind the generation of generalized trust. Stolle (1998) found this variable to affect trust at the individual level. Therefore, I will now describe different engagement levels across the two groups.

Firstly, I asked the participants how many hours they were involved in the organization. This is a rough indication of how important the organization is in their weekly schedule and the extent to which they are involved in activities. Overall, the average number of hours spent in all organizations is 8.1 hours per week (SD = 8.5). The distribution is highly skewed as the range of hours spent per week in

organizations varies between 0 and 60 hours per week. Some people have reported 0, since they participate in activities on a monthly basis or they have just joined the associations and cannot assess how many hours per week they are going to be involved. Across the groups, the average number of hours spent in organizations is respectively 7.7 for Turkish and 8.5 hours per week for the mixed participants. The standard deviation of these distributions lies respectively at 7.9 and 9 hours per week. The distribution of hours spent per week at Turkish organizations is less skewed than at the mixed group. However, between the groups this mean difference is not statistically significant.

A better measure of individual involvement is whether a participant takes part in organizing events rather than the average hours spent per week at an organization, since participants could be present at an organization without actually helping out with activities. I asked participants whether they helped with events. Fifty two percent of the participants and members answered positively to this question. I suspect that there is a certain level of social desirability bias in the reported answers. This is because when I was asking the board members to identify volunteers for me to take part in the survey and fill out the questionnaire; they did not point at that many people. Similarly, I asked the participants whether they were involved in secretarial work, handled money for the organization or whether they represented the organization. I also asked them whether they were a board member of the organization. When I cross-tabulated these activities with board member activity, almost 50% of people reporting each of these activities were not part of the formal board of the organizations. Again, I suspect these were socially desirable answers to these activities.

Therefore, I restrict the volunteering activities to people who are a board member of the organization and the volunteers in foundations, although the actual number of volunteers in these organizations might be slightly higher. In total 108 out of 463 people (23%) who took part in the survey, are formally also board members of their organizations. There is also a slight difference in the number of Turkish board members as opposed to board members of mixed organizations who took part in the survey (27% compared to 20%), but this difference is not statistically significant. Finally, 51 out of 463 participants (14%) are volunteers in foundations.

Finally, I asked the participants whether they are involved in any volunteering activity beyond their own organization. I asked them not only to report the type of organization, but also to name those organizations. This is important in order to examine whether the ethnic composition of these organizations is mainly ethnic, Dutch or mixed. In addition, any overlapping networks can only be identified with the exact name of the organization. I describe these networks in the next section. Here, it suffices to report that 21.2% of the participants and board members reported doing voluntary work for another organization than the one I surveyed. Among them, there were statistically more Turkish board members than board members from mixed organizations.

There is thus one cautious note to be made about some board members of Turkish organizations and some participants that volunteer in other organizations. Theoretically speaking, if they report higher levels of trust, this could be due to the nature of their voluntary activity, but some are also more exposed to interethnic contact, because when organizing an activity or event they are the ones who speak Dutch and other languages and are involved in collaboration networks beyond their group. Controlling for additional interethnic contact among Turkish board members and participants that report volunteering beyond their organizations depends on the shape of the data. I describe collaboration networks of Turkish organizations and volunteers beyond their group in the next section. There I will also describe how many board members and volunteers are involved in Turkish networks as opposed to the ones who are part of a diverse network.

In the previous chapter I already controlled for volunteering activity in relation to generalized trust. This was not statistically significant. Therefore, in the next chapter I will also omit whether volunteering or board member activity is related to generalized trust. However, I will control whether board members and volunteers that are part of a diverse network adhere to generalized trust more than their counterparts.

Close ties

This section on the spectrum of activities will finish off with a discussion of close ties in Turkish and mixed organizations. Developing close ties, especially in mixed organizations, is important in order for durable contact to translate into attitude

change. As discussed in the theoretical framework, many contact studies have been set up in order to find evidence for this link.

I designed two questions in order to measure friendship ties. Firstly, it is important to note that I was not able to ask specific network questions about whom the participants and members are friends with. Many members of Turkish organizations were reluctant to name specific people as part of their network within the organization. Therefore, I asked them to what extent they discuss important personal matters with people in their organization and whether in an emergency situation they would lend money to people in their organization. These measures are then indicative of close ties within the organizations. The logic is that if a participant is friends with anyone in the organizations, they would also discuss important personal matters with them. In addition, if someone is a very good friend, they would help the person in an emergency situation with financial aid.

Overall, 319 out of 463 people (69%) report discussing important personal matters with members and participants in their organization. However, 122 people out of the 463 (26.3%) report never discussing important personal matters with members and participants in their organization and 22 people (about 4.7%) of the cases did not answer this question. The distribution of lending money to members and participants in the organization is more skewed. There are 253 out of the 463 (54.6%) respondents, who report being willing to lend money to members and participants in their organization, whereas 40.6% (188 out of 463) are not going to lend money to a participant or member if in an emergency situation. Again, about 5% left the question unanswered.

Table 4.3 Frequency of close ties at Turkish and mixed organizations
(Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

	Turkish	Mixed	Total
<i>Discussing important personal matters with people in the organization</i>			
Never	45 (21%)	77 (34%)	122 (28%)
Sometimes	125 (59%)	105 (46%)	230 (52%)
Often	43 (20%)	46 (20%)	89 (20%)
Total	213	218	441
<i>Lending money to people in their organization</i>			
No	66 (30%)	122 (55%)	188 (43%)
Yes	151 (70%)	102 (45%)	253 (57%)
Total	217	224	441

The distribution of close ties across the Turkish and mixed organization is depicted above. There are slight differences across the two groups in the frequency of discussion of important personal matters within the organization. Participants of mixed organizations more often report never discussing important personal matters than participants of Turkish organizations (13% difference). The percentage of mixed participants who sometimes report discussing important personal matters is also lower than the Turkish participants (13% difference). These differences although statistically significant, are small in terms of effect size (Cramer's $V = 0.15$; $p < 0.01$). The distribution of lending money to participants and members within the organization is more skewed across the groups than the discussion frequencies. Participants of mixed organizations are less willing to lend money to people in their organizations, whereas participants of Turkish organizations are more willing (25% difference). These differences are statistically significant, although again small in terms of their impact across the groups (Cramer's $V = 0.24$; $p < 0.001$).

Turkish and mixed organizations vary along the most crucial dimension for the study of inter-group contact hypothesis, namely ethnic composition of their participants and members. However, as the discussion above demonstrates, there are individual differences in ties that develop out of these contact opportunities. Therefore, in the chapter to come, I will control for the absence or presence of close ties and to what extent this might then affect adherence to generalized trust for participants of mixed organizations.

4.3 Bridging and bonding organizational network gaps

The final section of this chapter deals with network gaps that arise from collaboration between organizations, in addition to overlapping membership and volunteering network of participants beyond the organizations that I surveyed. The literature on Turkish organizations has extensively mapped their overlapping board membership and the resulting interlocking network of organizations (Fennema & Tillie 1999; 2001; Vermeulen 2005; Van Heelsum 2002; Peters 2010). I will briefly discuss these results in order to elaborate why I have not relied on this data and set out to map collaboration networks of Turkish and mixed organizations. As for the overlapping

membership and volunteering network of participants, there was no additional data to rely on. Therefore, I included items in the questionnaire that mapped their voluntary activities beyond the organizations that are sampled for this study.

Overlapping board membership network

Vermeulen, Brünger and Van de Walle (2009) describe the overlapping board member network of voluntary organizations in Amsterdam in 2007.⁵⁴ Their data for all organizations is retrieved from the Dutch Chamber of Commerce and it only comprises 30% of the total network. However, as the size of the Turkish network is smaller, their whole network has been retrieved. Across the city, 67.6% of the organizations included in the study were isolated or were not part of an overlapping board member network in 2007. The Turkish organizations, on the contrary, are much more integrated with only 54.2% of them being isolated. However, they mostly sit on the board of another Turkish organization (87.9%). The mixed network is also less isolated than the city wide network with 59.3% of organizations being isolated, but 37% of their board members sit on board of other mixed organizations. So, connections with other mixed group are much more widespread than in the case of Turkish organizations. However, when I sampled the organizations I had to include other organizations that were not listed in this database (a few in the case of Turkish organizations, and in the case of mixed organizations, more than half of them). Therefore, I have no information about their position in the board member network. But most importantly, since we can assume that the majority of these organizations are not part of the overlapping board member network, if one is interested in having variation in the data, one needs a very large sample. This would be too costly to collect, since the main purpose of this thesis is to find evidence for the role of intergroup contact rather than the network position of organizations in the interlocking network in explaining generalized trust. Moreover, since connections in the interlocking network are so sparse, it is also questionable whether it should matter for the diffusion of trust beyond the organization.

Therefore, I set out to collect collaboration network data that might show more variation and complement the interlocking network. Sitting on another board is often

⁵⁴ They also analyse the interlocking connections in 2002, but I only describe the 2007 wave as it is more relevant to the time frame of this study.


a very risky venture. Many organizations would not like to share information on the day-to-day business of their group with someone from another organization unless they trust them. Peters (2010: 127) also interviewed some of the organizations included in this study in her project on the networks of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam. She finds that trust and previous knowledge about the board members to be included in an interlock (or joint membership) is crucial for such ties to occur. In addition, since these organizations are competing for the same resources, that is to say funding from the local government, it is unlikely that they would again become collaborative partners as common board members would do, unless they share an ideological convention. However, as organizations are pushed by local governments to collaborate and organize events together, it is more likely that the collaboration network would show more variation in terms of network ties.

I set out to collect this type of network data in order to control for additional sources of trust among the members and board members. A theoretical assumption in the literature is that these channels of communication diffuse the trust bred in one organization to another (see Fennema and Tillie 1999; 2002; Paxton 2007). Yet, if we are interested in finding such a mechanism, we need to have longitudinal panel data that follows organizations and members over time. Without such data any conclusion reached from relating network position of organizations to their participants' trust levels is very tentative and inconclusive. Nevertheless, with collaboration network data I am interested in looking for variation among the board members in their network partners in order to test whether exposure to ethnically different organizations enhances their generalized trust attitudes. Moreover, as the literature in the theoretical chapter suggested, ethnic organizations (among them the Turkish organizations) are argued to be inward looking (bonding) and do not collaborate with non-likeminded organizations (bridging). Although the study by Vermeulen, Brünger and Van de Walle (2009) above confirms this hypothesis, their data is limited to the interlocking network. Peter's (2010) study is also limited to the contact and mobilization network of Turkish organizations and does not include mixed organizations. With the collaboration networks of mixed as well as Turkish organizations I will test this proposition here, whereas the trust analyses will be carried out in the next chapter.

Collaboration network

The data I collected for the purpose of mapping the collaboration network between organizations in this study is based on the individual network of each organization when they coordinate an event with other organizations. In network terminology focal organizations are called ego, whereas the organization that is named by the focal one is called alter. After data on alters was collected, I asked the interviewees (or egos) to classify the ethnicity of these organizations as well as their location. Network terminology calls these questions ‘name interpreting’ questions. Sometimes, the organizations that were named were large institutions such as the police or welfare organizations. In addition to these name interpreting questions, I complemented the classification of alters with information from the internet in order to find their location and the ethnicity of the organization.

Figure 4.4 Collaboration network of Turkish and mixed organizations
(Amsterdam, 2009-2010)



The figure 4.4 above depicts this network. I have removed the names of the organizations for confidentiality reasons. The squared shaped nodes represent mixed organizations, whereas the diamond shaped nodes represent Turkish organizations. Most organizations named either other ethnic or Dutch organizations as their collaboration partners. These are respectively depicted by triangle or circle shaped nodes. In total 156 organizations are named as collaboration partners. The total network comprises 154 organizations. The average number of ties in this network is thus 1.01. Reporting density of the network (or the realised number of ties as a proportion of the total number of possible ties) is not very useful here as not all organizations have been asked about their partners. However, what is interesting about this network is the fact that the majority of organizations name ethnically dissimilar organizations to themselves as their collaboration partners. Furthermore, the largest component of this network at the bottom of the figure, which shows a high level of connectivity as compared to the segregated clusters on the top, and is largely composed of Turkish organizations. Mixed organizations seem to be more segregated in this collaboration network. This finding runs against the assumptions put by Putnam (2000) and others that ethno-national associations are by definition inward looking.

A more formal way to describe the diversity of each organization with respect to their network partners is the E-I Index (Krackhardt and Stern 1988: 127, see also Peters 2010):

$$\text{E-I index} = \frac{\text{EL} - \text{IL}}{\text{EL} + \text{IL}}$$

This measure indicates the extent to which an organization's cited alters resembles itself according to a relevant characteristic, for example ethnicity in this case. This index takes a value between -1 and +1, where -1 represents total similarity (or bonding), 0 stands for as much similarity as dissimilarity, and +1 represents total dissimilarity (or bridging). The majority of organizations (15) reported only ethnically bridging network partners. Five organizations reported bonding ethnic alters. So, the remaining 17 organizations scored between 0 and 0.8 on this index. I, therefore, recoded these values to reduce the categories and to be able to compare the index across the two types of organizations. Values of 0 to 0.5 were recoded to 0,

whereas values of 0.6 to 0.8 were added to the category bridging. The table below tabulates these differences.

Table 4.4 Bridging and bonding ethnic ties (E-I Index) among Turkish and mixed organizations
(Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

	Turkish	Mixed	Total
E-I Index			
Bonding	3 (17%)	2 (11%)	5 (14%)
Both bonding and bridging	9 (50%)	8 (42%)	17 (46%)
Bridging	6 (33%)	9 (47%)	15 (40%)
Total	18	19	37


Cramer's V = 0.150, p = 0.660

Table 4.4 shows that Turkish and mixed organizations do not differ greatly on this dissimilarity index or the extent to which they bridge ethnic gaps when collaborating to organize events. The size of the correlation coefficient Cramer's V (0.150) is rather small and not statistically significant due to the small sample size. We might yet question whether having more data in order to find such a small effect is worth the costs. However, this results also questions whether by categorizing Turkish organizations as bonding we do justice to their collaborative efforts with other organizations. This reflects the political opportunity structure of the city of Amsterdam described in the introduction to this thesis in which local councillors and civil servants push organizations to collaborate with ethnically dissimilar organizations.

The network shown in figure 4.5 depicts the location of alters with which organizations are reporting to work together. In the largest connected component in the bottom of the figure, organizations are clustered fairly closely around the same geographical location. The black up-triangles in the left hand side represent organizations in the North of the city. On the right hand side, squared shaped organizations in the East of the city are located. The rounded squares depict organizations in the Western part of the city. Finally, the organizations in the city centre are denoted by a circle. These are spread across the component. Again, this geographical representation is in line with the policy towards ethno-national organizations, which necessitates them working with dissimilar organizations in those districts. On the top of the graph, there are many mixed organizations that are

not interconnected to the same extent. Hence, there are many segregated clusters, which do not follow a clear pattern.

Figure 4.5 The geographical location of organizations in the collaboration network
(Amsterdam, 2009-2010)



In summary, Turkish organizations have as many diverse partners as mixed organizations. However, since there is variation on this index, I will control for these connections in explaining generalized trust at the individual level. This information will be attached only to the board members and volunteers of Turkish organizations, since they are involved in these networks and not their participants. It is, however, important to note that only six organizations expose their volunteers and board members to bridging opportunities beyond their organization. In addition, as none of the organizations is isolated in this network, categorizing them along that dimension will not be possible.

Funding

Funding from the local government is the final organizational level variable that I will describe in this section. As argued in the theoretical framework, funding represents working trust between the organization and local government. Some argue that this might spill over to generalized trust among the participants and members (Caulkins 2003). There are 18 organizations that get funding from either the local or the central council, whereas 20 organizations do not receive any money for organizing events or for their daily business. Table 4.5 below summarizes the distribution of funding across the types of organizations. As we can see, the relationship between these two variables is not statistically significant and the size of the correlation is trivial too. It is then highly unlikely that receiving funding from the government, which is arguably indicative of working trust, will be of importance for the top-down spread of trust among the participants. However, I need to emphasize that, while this relationship is found not statistically significant, its effect size will probably not be affected much by creating a larger data set.

Table 4.5 Funding across Turkish and mixed organizations
(Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

	Turkish	Mixed	Total
Funding			
Yes	9 (50%)	11 (55%)	20 (53%)
No	9 (50%)	9 (45%)	18 (47%)
Total	18	20	38

Phi = -0.050, p = 0.758

Multiple memberships and volunteering

This final section deals with bridging opportunities that arise from multiple memberships. In the questionnaire I asked the members to identify which types of organizations they are a member of in addition to the organization that I visited for an event. First of all, 37% of the participants reported also to be member of at least another organization. However, some may have confused this question with categorising the organization that I had visited. This is reflected in the proportion of participants that actually named these other organizations that they are a member of. The proportion of participants with an additional membership reduces to 24.2% of all participants (112). The participants named the organizations they are additionally a

member of and I could, hence, check whether this organization is the one that I had visited. They named 211 additional organizations, although three could not be recognized. The maximum number of organizations they named was six. On average, participants with an additional membership named 1.94 organizations (SD = 1.14). This average differs across the participants of mixed and Turkish organizations. Participants of Turkish organizations (40) named on average 1.75 additional memberships (SD = 0.90; range = 1 to 4), whereas participants of mixed organizations (69) named on average 2.04 additional memberships (SD = 1.25; range = 1 to 6). These differences are, however, not statistically significant. Therefore, I will only analyse at the individual level whether a participant that named at least one additional membership adheres more to generalized trust than other participants.

Just 10 multiple memberships exist in organizations surveyed in this study. As for overlapping memberships, 71 memberships out of the 211 or 33% of organizations have been named at least twice or more. However, the majority of these overlapping memberships are in large interest groups, unions, and political parties in which contact is rarely taking place. That is why I have chosen not to include overlapping membership in the analysis in the next chapter. There are, however, 32 overlapping memberships (15% of the total) that are in mosques and sport clubs in which people do have contact with other participants. Therefore, for the Turkish participants I identified how many of the additional memberships are in non-Turkish organizations. It might be that for these members generalized trust is affected due to contact in those organizations. However, only 13 of these participants with additional memberships are participating in a non-Turkish organization. I will add this to the model in the next chapter.

Doing voluntary work for another organization is proportionately not much less than multiple memberships. Twenty five percent of the participants report doing this, but when asked to name those organizations, the proportion reduces to 21.2% (98 participants). This is a more accurate figure, since some participants were categorizing the organization that I visited and reported voluntary work that they were already doing for that organization. There are in total 138 organizations named for which the participants are doing voluntary work beyond the organization that I visited. The maximum number of organizations named is five –one less than the

maximum of multiple memberships. On average 1.5 organizations are named ($SD = 0.9$). Across the mixed and Turkish groups, there are slight differences in how many organizations are named in which the participants are additionally volunteering. Only 30 Turkish participants are volunteering beyond their organizations and on average they name 1.3 organizations ($SD = 0.6$). There are half as many mixed participants doing voluntary work beyond their organization with an average of 1.6 organizations ($SD = 1.0$). These differences are also statistically significant. I will control for volunteering activity beyond the group in explaining trust.

Only seven organizations have been included in this study among the organizations in which participants are doing additional voluntary work. In addition, overlapping ties in this voluntary work network is rather sparse. Just 15 organizations out of the 138 have been named at least twice or more. Again, for the Turkish participants I identified which organizations might bring them into contact with ethnically diverse participants. Only 17 of the participants out of the 31 who are part of this multiple volunteering network are exposed to bridging opportunities outside the organization I included in this study. In the chapter to follow, I will control for this multiple volunteering in non-Turkish organizations.

4.4 Summary

All data collection attempts were directed at carefully selecting diverse and homogenous Turkish organizations for this study in order to test the role of interethnic contact in voluntary organizations. In addition, I made use of the mission statement of organizations to make typologies of organizations and to let individual socio-demographic characteristics of participants vary too. Finally, I directed efforts at choosing organizations in different geographical locations in order to control for district and effects of policy towards organizations in Amsterdam. Other characteristics were, nevertheless, not available to me prior to data collection, which might affect generalized trust across the two groups. This was the size of the organization and whether the organization directs their efforts towards collaboration between the participants. The two types of organizations do not vary along these dimensions and hence will be omitted from the multilevel analyses to follow in the next chapter.

Both mixed and Turkish organizations offer a set of diverse activities to their participants and members. Most importantly, while mixed organizations de facto or on ideological grounds offer durable contact among their participants, Turkish organizations are only occasionally successful at promoting interethnic contact. This is likely since the majority of their participants are first generation Turkish minorities whose Dutch language skills do not always allow them to communicate with people from other backgrounds. Secondly, however, not all interethnic contact translates into close ties within mixed organizations. It seems that participants of mixed organizations report more often never discussing important personal matters with people in their organizations. They also report less often lending money to people in their organization, if someone were to be in an emergency situation. However, the sizes of these correlations are not that great. In the chapter to follow I control for the existence of close ties in mixed organizations in explaining different levels of generalized trust. Finally, both organization types do not statistically differ on the number of volunteers included in the sample.

When it comes to collaborative efforts beyond the organization, Turkish and mixed organizations do not differ much in the diversity of their network partners. Both types were equally engaged in bridging and bonding ethnic ties. However, Turkish organizations were more part of a connected component rather than mixed organizations when engaged in organizing events. This reflects the policy in Amsterdam in which ethno-national organizations are pushed to work together with ethnically dissimilar organizations to themselves. For the board members and volunteers of these Turkish organizations that bridge ethnic ties, I will control whether they also show higher levels of generalized trust. Finally, the multiple memberships and volunteering networks were discussed. Overlapping ties or bridging as a result of this is rather sparse, which questions previous surveys that only look at bridging organizational types. Even in a geographically close set (for example neighbourhoods in Amsterdam), people seem to be involved in different organizations and overlapping ties do not occur that often. However, as some participants are engaged in memberships and volunteering beyond their organization, I will control for these effects in explaining generalized trust. Some Turkish participants are also exposed to contact beyond their group due to additional

membership and volunteering. I will again control for this effect, although the absolute number of these participants is rather small (17 and 13).

In conclusion, this chapter has extensively described bridging and bonding practices across the Turkish and mixed organizations. In doing so, it has only identified individual level factors such as the occurrence of close ties, different levels of engagement such as multiple membership and voluntary work at another non-Turkish organization to control for. Some board members and volunteers of Turkish organizations have been found to be involved in networks of ethnically dissimilar organizations beyond the groups I investigated. This will also be controlled for in the next chapter. Most importantly, when relating the ethnic composition of the organizations to variance in generalized trust, other organizational factors do not seem to be important. In the next chapter, I will analyse differences in generalized trust among the participants of Turkish and mixed organizations.

CHAPTER 5

BONDING VERSUS BRIDGING IN TURKISH AND MIXED VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS IN AMSTERDAM: A CONTACT MECHANISM?

In this chapter, I will focus on the question of whether mixing in different types of voluntary association explains differences in generalized trust. I will, however, control for most salient socio-demographic characteristics such as sex, age, religiosity, having experienced divorce or being widowed, migration history and generational differences, in addition to educational level, employment status and household income. As discussed in the theoretical framework (chapter 2) socio-demographic and socio-economic variables explain differences in generalized trust among the general population by invoking the metaphor of the *'winner in society'*. Differences in generalized trust are argued to be due to higher income and educational attainment levels as well as having a job. Older people are said to be in a more secure position and women might find themselves in a weaker position in comparison to men. Finally, minorities might have different life experiences that in turn might affect their trust levels. Recent experience of migration as well as early life socialization in a country different to the host society (i.e. being a first generation migrant) are also expected to negatively influence generalized trust. However, as discussed in chapter 3, which included a data set representative of four major minority groups and a Dutch control group (LAS 04/05), these effects were either not statistically significant or could not be separated from age. Therefore, in this chapter I will leave them out of the models.

Below I will draw on data I collected between 2009 and 2010 (see the research design section of chapter 2) to demonstrate whether generalized trust is affected by mixing in voluntary organizations as compared to socio-demographic factors and the resources of the individual. The originality of the approach below lies in distinguishing between individual and organizational level variances in the generalized trust scores in order to single out the contextual effect of ethnic homogeneity and heterogeneity in associations. Other data sets lack a multilevel structure, since they sample individuals (or households) and have no data on other

participants of the same organization.⁵⁵ Moreover, by having oversampled participants in Turkish organizations and mixed ethnicity organizations, I will be able to directly examine any differences between their participants. Other data sets have a very small number of participants in ethno-national organizations in their sample, since the sample needs to be representative of the whole population in the Netherlands. The limitation of this sample is the fact that it only includes Turkish but no other ethno-national organizations.

There are two complementary ways to examine the effect of bridging and bonding or a contact mechanism on generalized trust. First, a multilevel model of generalized trust, which distinguishes between a fixed and a random part, will show us how much organizations vary in the scores of their participants on generalized trust. If the contact mechanism is at work, the organizational variance should be relatively high. In the social sciences, multilevel models usually explain between 0% and 40% of variance at the higher level (Snijders & Bosker 1999: 151-2). In a model in which the contact mechanism is at work, we should then see an organizational variance of nearly 20% or more. Secondly, bridging and bonding or a contact mechanism can be directly tested in a regression analysis by adding the type of organization, the length of participation in that organization, and a product term of the two variables – the so called interaction term. The last variables are cross level interaction terms that constitute the product of length of participation, which is measured at the individual level, and ethnic composition, which is measured at the organizational level. If found to be significant, this would then support that the contact mechanism is at work, because not only would participants of mixed organizations express higher trust levels, they would also vary depending on how long they have been participating in those organizations.

Below I begin by discussing a fixed effects model of generalized trust (ANOVA) and then contrast this to a multilevel model with a random and a fixed part. Then I move on to examine whether participation in a mixed association and the length of

⁵⁵ The Dutch Family Survey 2009, which I examined in chapter 3, asks a question on the name of the organization one participates in. However, nearly all respondents of sports and hobby associations mention different ones, because the sampling method aims at including people from different geographical locations. Even if some respondents have mentioned the same organizations, there are still not enough cases to allow for a multilevel model. Overlapping membership happens only within larger unions, political and interest organizations, which often have fee paying members that do not interact at the organization.

participation has an effect on organizational and individual level variance. Finally, I will discuss the relative importance of each variable and this interaction term in a single level regression model controlling for most of the salient socio-demographic characteristics of the participants, and their resources. The final model employs a single level regression analysis, since separating organizational and participant level variance in generalized trust does not explain a great deal of the differences between participants. Throughout, I will demonstrate that bridging and bonding or the contact mechanism does not explain differences in generalized trust and that we can best explore alternative theories and models in the next chapters. Educational levels consistently seem to explain differences between participants and the data also suggests that participants in mixed organizations seem to have self-selected themselves into those organizations, although the relative importance of the level of education is somewhat higher when controlling for all variables in one model.

5.1 Variance analysis

The question that I address in this section is as follows: to what extent do the participant's scores on generalized trust vary across the type of organization they are involved in as compared to differences between all participants. Before discussing the models, I will first depict the distribution of the generalized trust item, since this variable is measured on an 11 point scale (varying between 0 and 10) and its distribution should resemble a normal distribution in order to justify the use of OLS regression techniques. As we can see below the distribution of generalized trust scores looks fairly normal.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ I have also tested for the normality of the data with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. However, this test is very conservative and small deviations from normality become statistically significant.

Figure 5.1 The frequency distribution of generalized trust

(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)




Table 5.1 Descriptive analysis of generalized trust

(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)


Type of organization	Mean	N	Standard Deviation	Std. Error of Mean	Minimum	Maximum
Turkish	5.1709	199	1.90453	0.13501	.00	10.00
Mixed	5.8387	217	1.94050	0.13173	.00	10.00
Total	5.5192	416	1.94988	0.09560	.00	10.00

Let me also discuss some descriptive properties of the groups. These are summarized in table 5.1 above. The mean trust level of the mixed and Turkish organization types varies by 0.67 points on a scale of 0 to 10. The number of participants in different types of organization differs by 14 participants. In addition, the standard deviation of the trust scores is almost identical across the groups, with only a 0.04 point difference. This means that the spread of the scores is almost the same too. The range of the trust item also does not change across different types of

organizations. Similarly, the standard error of the mean is almost identical. With these figures we can calculate the confidence interval around the mean. This is depicted below.

The graph below shows the confidence interval around the mean for the participants in different types of organizations. The confidence intervals around the mean do not overlap. Therefore, the groups differ significantly in statistical terms (T value = -3.538, $p < 0.001$). Since the mean of the generalized trust score of the mixed participants is higher (5.8) than that of the participants in the Turkish organizations (5.2) in Amsterdam, the direction of the effect of ethnic diversity is positive here. However, with a difference of only 0.6 points between the means, the effect of ethnic diversity seems not to be that substantive. However, we need not only to control for other factors, but also to examine whether the variance or differences within these groups are comparable. Moreover, we also need to distinguish how much of the variance is attributed to the organizational level and how much is attributed to the participant level.

Figure 5.2 The 95 percent confidence interval around the mean scores on generalized trust
(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)



Fixed effects model of generalized trust

In order to separate the variance attributed to organizations and participants, we can use analysis of variance (ANOVA), which groups responses and compares the mean in an outcome variable (here generalized trust) to the means of all responses. In addition, ANOVA gives us information about how much of the variation in responses is due to group participation as compared to the overall differences. The table below distinguishes between the variance explained at the organizational level and at the level of participants. This is reflected in the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC), which measures between group differences as a ratio of total differences. The coefficient is 0 if there is no group effect and 1 if there are no within-group differences. Another way of interpreting this measure is as follows. If we were to randomly pick two people from these two groups, on a scale from 0 to 1 they would on average differ by 0.03 points from each other in their generalized trust score. Similarly, if we were to randomly select two people from the 40 organizations, we would expect that on a scale from 0 to 1, they would differ by 0.14 points. As we can see below, even though the mean difference between participants in Turkish and mixed organizations is 0.67, only 3% of the variation in the responses might be due to group differences. The second row represents the variation between all 40 organizations.⁵⁷ The proportion of explained variation due to organizational grouping across the 40 organizations is 14%, whereas variation on the generalized trust score between participants as a whole is 86%.

Table 5.2 Analysis of Variance (or a fixed effects model) of generalized trust
(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

	Variation accounted for by:		
	<i>Between participant differences</i>	<i>Between group differences</i>	ICC
Turkish/Mixed Groups	97%	3%	0.03
Organizations	86%	14%	0.14
	n (participants) = 416	n (organizations) = 40	


Notes: $F(1, 414) = 12.52$ $p < .01$, $r = .17$, Levene's Test insignificant

$F(38, 365) = 1.57$ $p < .05$, $r = .40$, Brown Forsythe and Welch test significant

⁵⁷ As two organizations had only two responses, I excluded these from the ANOVA models as well as the multilevel models. Two responses are too few for the estimates and their standard errors to be reliable.

The differences between all 40 organizations are depicted in the graph below, in which we see the confidence intervals of the mean of generalized trust per organization. Fourteen percent of the variation is between the organizations, if we consider the intervals that are depicted below.

Figure 5.3 The 95 percent confidence interval around the mean scores on generalized trust
 (Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)



There are some potential drawbacks to the fixed effects approach allowing for group differences, or the ANOVA table above, which I will now discuss (Steele *et al.* 2008). Firstly, since there are 40 organizations in my sample, there are already many parameters which the model had to estimate. Adding more variables (socio-demographic characteristics) to this model will increase the number of parameters

even further. Secondly, when the group sizes are small, in the fixed effects approach the estimated group effects are unreliable. In a random effects approach this is taken into account by the shrinkage factor and the mean of these groups is pulled towards the overall mean. Thirdly, the fixed effects approach is usually used by experimental designs in which other factors are controlled for by the randomization process, in which each individual is assigned randomly to a group. In that case any generalization made from the model is a result of the design. When we are dealing with groups that are sampled from a larger pool of groups, such as in a cross-sectional design, the fixed effects approach does not allow for any generalization beyond the groups included in the study, whereas the random approach takes the groups as a sample of all potential groups and estimates the variance between groups in the population. Finally, the fixed effects approach does not allow for having both individual level and group level variables in the model, while the random effects model does. Studies that randomly select individuals from the population and measure the effect of participation in different types of organizations, by having no other participants in their sample from those same organizations, are in effect ignoring contextual effects. I will now discuss my results with a multilevel model.

Multilevel model of generalized trust with random effects

As argued in the previous section, by fitting a single level model and ignoring the structure of the data we do not measure the importance of organizational context. Below I have, therefore, considered the multilevel structure of the data and estimated organizational and participant level variances in generalized trust scores. This contextualizes the effect of participation in non-profit organizations and we can then start building a model that distinguishes between participation in mixed and Turkish organizations.

Table 5.3 Variance components model for generalized trust

(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

	Estimate	Standard error (S.E.)
<i>Fixed effect</i>		
Intercept	5.495	0.095
<i>Random effect variances</i>		
Organizational level	0.164	0.120 (p = 0.17)
Participant level	3.592***	0.264
<i>Variance partition (%)</i>		
Organizational level	4	
Participant level	96	
-2 * Log-likelihood deviance	1714 – 1711 = 3 (df=1) p = 0.0833	
Number of participants	412	
Number of organizations	40	

***p<0.001

As we can see above, in a model with no other explanatory variables, organizations vary by 4% in their participants' generalized trust scores. Furthermore, however, in comparison to a model without the random intercept, this model is only significant at the 10% level. Finally, the variance estimate at the organizational level is only significant at the 17% level, which means that with such low organizational level variance we need many more organizations to pick up the small effect size. Since the null-hypothesis that there are 'real' group differences cannot be rejected, I am justified in fitting a single-level model.

However, I also have to further explore the effect of other variables on generalized trust in a multilevel model, because it is possible that between-group differences may be revealed after adding further explanatory variables. In other words, it is still possible that there are differences between groups for individuals with certain characteristics and that these differences are masked when we allow only for overall between-group differences. Substantively, however, this small level of variation between organizations in the generalized trust levels of their participants questions the extent to which we can explain their differences by the environment that they are in or by contact between participants. I will explore next the effect of mixing or contact between ethnically diverse participants with the variable ethnic composition.

Testing for the interethnic contact mechanism

Firstly, I have tabulated differences in length of participation between the Turkish and mixed groups below.

Table 5.4 Descriptive analysis of length of participation in years
(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

	Length participation in years			
	Overall	Turkish org.	Mixed org.	
Mean	6.20	7.72	4.65	
Standard Error of Mean	0.343	0.451	0.498	
Standard Deviation	7.117	6.642	7.265	
Variance	50.655	44.119	52.775	
Range	54	35	54	
Minimum	0	0	0	
Maximum	54	35	54	
Percentiles	25%	1.00	2.00	0.00
	50%	4.00	6.00	2.00
	75%	10.00	11.00	6.00
	Valid	430	217	213
N	Missing	23	10	13

The overall mean length of participation is 6.2 years. But 12.6% of the data is above two standard deviations (14 years) from the mean. This means that the data is highly skewed towards the left side of the distribution and there are quite a lot of ‘outliers’. Secondly, the difference between the means across the types of organization is quite high as the average length of participation in Turkish organizations is 7.7 years, whereas the average length of participation in mixed organization is 4.7 years (see above). This difference of 3 years between the Turkish and mixed organizations is highly statistically significant. Since length of participation and type of organization correlate, the magnitude of the ‘true’ Beta values for both these variables might have been influenced. However, the collinearity diagnostics show that this correlation is not of importance in terms of distorting the results.

Below I have added the first variable to an empty random intercept model in order to differentiate between bridging and bonding in voluntary organizations. This is the effect of being a participant in a mixed organization as opposed to being a participant in a Turkish organization. By adding this level 2 variable to the model,

the variance at the organizational level drops to 1%. The model change is significant, although the estimate of organizational level variance is highly insignificant this time, which again means that with such a small variation between organizations, we need a much larger sample of organizations. Next, the length of participation is added to the model. Adding this variance does not change the model much. Organizational variance drops another 0.5% and the model change is significant. Not surprisingly, the estimate of the organizational variance is again insignificant.

Table 5.5 Fixed effects and random intercept model for generalized trust, organization type and length of participation
(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>		<i>Model 3</i>	
	Estimate	S.E.	Estimate	S.E.	Estimate	S.E.
Fixed effect						
Intercept	5.171	0.141	4.999	0.177	4.978	0.217
<i>Ethnic composition:</i>						
Mixed	0.619**	0.198	0.662***	0.200	0.693*	0.273
Length of participation			0.022	0.014	0.025	0.021
<i>Interaction effect:</i>						
Length of participation * mixed					-0.005	0.028
Random effect variances						
Organizational level	0.037	0.089	0.017	0.087	0.019	0.088
Participant level	3.620***	0.265	3.665***	0.273	3.664***	0.273
Variance partition						
Organizational level	1%		0.5%		1%	
Participant level	99%		99.5%		99%	
	1711 – 1703 = 8		1703 – 1652 = 98			
		(df=1)		(df=3)		
-2 * Log-likelihood deviance		p < 0.01		p < 0.001		0
No. of participants	412		399		399	
No. of organizations	40		40		40	

~ p,0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Finally, in model 3, I differentiate between the length of participation in mixed organizations and the length of participation at Turkish organizations. This variable does not improve the model and is highly insignificant. As we would also expect, the organizational variance does not change, nor does its significance level improve. The results of this model seem to suggest that generalized trust is not enhanced by mixing with ethnically diverse people in non-profit organizations. On the contrary, the results suggest that people with higher trust levels self-select into mixed

organizations, as their mean trust level is higher than the mean scores of Turkish participants.

5.2 Controlling for socio-demographic factors

I start this section by describing the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of participants of Turkish and mixed organizations included in the sample. This will then elucidate any systematic differences between the groups. As discussed in the theoretical framework and the research design of this thesis (see chapter 2), there should be no substantive differences across the groups, otherwise when demographic and socio-economic factors are controlled for, relative distributions might affect the results.

Descriptive statistics

Across the two groups there are differences in the proportion of men and women. Seventy five percent of the Turkish participants are men, whereas the majority of mixed participants are women (57%). In addition, the proportion of Turkish participants aged above 55 is far less (1.6%) as compared to mixed participants (26.5%), which is about 25% difference. In contrast, there is about 10% difference in the proportion of Turkish participants who are 24 and younger compared to mixed participants. This proportional difference is repeated across the age groups of 25 to 34 and 45 to 54 year olds. Finally, there is a 5% difference between the proportion of 35 to 44 year olds among the Turkish and mixed participants. The rates of divorce, and of widows/widowers, are higher among the mixed participants, with both at about 8%. The proportion of unemployed people is, at 7%, higher among the Turkish participants. Next, the proportion of participants with a household income of 1,000 Euros or less is 7% higher among the mixed participants. Turkish participants with a household income of between 1,000 Euros per month and about modal income (1,750 Euros) are more numerous, with about a 10% difference to mixed participants. Participants with up to twice modal income (3,000 Euros) are again more widespread among the Turkish group, constituting 5% of the group. At 8%, there are more mixed participants with a household income of above twice modal income (3,000 Euros or more) than Turkish participants. Finally, educational attainment also shows differences across the two groups. Participants with no or only primary school

qualifications are, at 21%, more widespread among the Turkish group. Aside from this, levels of vocational degrees do not vary that much between the two groups.

Table 5.6 Socio-demographic characteristics of participants of Turkish and mixed organizations
(In percentages within columns, Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Categories</i>	<i>Turkish</i>	<i>Mixed</i>
		<i>participants</i>	<i>participants</i>
		<i>Valid %</i>	<i>Valid %</i>
Sex	Men	75.7	42.9
	Women	24.3	57.1
	Total (n)	214	224
Age group	24 or younger	27.6	16.7
	25-34	15.1	27.5
	35-44	21.1	14.9
	45-54	25.6	14.4
	55+	1.6	26.5
	Total (n)	199	215
Marital status	Widowed or divorced	8.4	16.7
	Other	91.6	83.3
	Total (n)	202	216
Current labour market position	Unemployed	19.0	12.1
	In paid job	47.7	45.6
	Housekeeping	2.0	5.6
	Other	31.3	36.7
	Total (n)	195	215
Net household income (€/month)	1,000 or less	24.6	32.1
	1,001 – 1,750	39.6	28.2
	1,751 – 3,000	29.9	24.9
	3,001 or more	5.9	14.8
	Total (n)	187	209
Educational attainment	Primary school	31.3	12.0
	Lower vocational	26.8	25.5
	Middle vocational and higher secondary	16.7	13.4
	Higher vocational	18.2	18.1
	University and higher	7.1	31.0
	Total (n)	198	216

However, participants with a university degree are, at 24%, more numerous among the mixed participants. All these differences are, nevertheless, not substantive and some are not statistically significant. The correlation coefficients of age, sex and educational attainment, on the one hand, and type of organization, on the other, are only around 0.3.

The fixed effects and random intercept model of generalized trust

Before moving entirely to a single level regression model of generalized trust, I still have to insert other variables in the multilevel model to see whether organizational variance changes. As we can see below, it seems that introducing other variables to

Table 5.7 Fixed effects and random intercept model for generalized trust, socio-demographic characteristics and ethnic composition
(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>	
	Estimate	Standard error	Estimate	Standard error
Fixed part				
<i>Sex</i> (Reference = Female)	-0.233	0.203	-0.099	0.209
<i>Age</i> (Reference = 55+)				
24 and younger	-0.725*	0.325	-0.526	0.336
25-34	-0.365	0.317	-0.303	0.315
35-44	-0.424	0.321	-0.294	0.325
45-54	-0.078	0.315	-0.032	0.318
Divorced or widowed	-0.660*	0.301	-0.657*	0.299
Unemployed or sick	-0.109	0.260	-0.092	0.259
<i>Net Household Income (€/month)</i> (Reference = 3,200+)				
1,000 or less	-0.326	0.362	0.341	0.359
1,001-1,700	0.042	0.352	0.027	0.351
1,701-3,200	-0.259	0.350	-0.183	0.348
<i>Educational degree</i> (Reference = Higher vocational degree or university)				
No education or primary school	-0.879**	0.287	-0.748**	0.292
Secondary vocational training and pre-university	-0.467*	0.222	-0.408~	0.222
<i>Ethnic composition:</i>				
Mixed			0.459*	0.218
Random part				
<i>Random intercept</i>	6.715	0.394	6.194	0.460
Random effect variances				
Organizational level	0.026	0.086	0	
Participant level	3.201**	0.257	3.189**	0.236
Variance partition				
Organizational level	1%		0%	
Participant level	99%		100%	
R ² Fixed effects model = 7%**			R ² Fixed effects model = 9%**	
-2 * Log-likelihood deviance	0		0	
Number of participants	365		365	
Number of organizations	40		40	

~ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.

the model reduces organizational level variance. The variance partition coefficient (VPC) reduces by 3% as the empty multilevel model presented before had a VPC of 4%. VPC here is only 1%, but the $-2 * \log\text{likelihood}$ does not change across the models with and without a random intercept. As such, simultaneously partitioning variance with a multilevel model and with all the added socio-demographic variables does not result in a better model. When a level 2 variable, ethnic composition, is added to the multilevel model, there is no variance at level 2 (organizational level) to be explained, as VPC reduces to zero.

When I modelled the differences between participants above, I first explored a multilevel model for each variable separately (a simple random intercept model). This was necessary because organizational variance might have been affected by these variables. However, in all these models organizational variance varied only between 2 and 7 percent when a variable was added to the empty model. I also checked whether letting the effect of each variable vary across organizations improved the model. This would mean that a variable affects generalized trust differently across some organizations but not others. The effects of a few variables on organizational variance are worth reporting. When I let the effect of sex (being a woman) vary per organization, the organizational variance increased from 4% to 7%, but the overall model fit did not significantly improve. In addition, the effect of age seemed to vary across organizations, because the variance between organizations dropped from 5% to 2%. However, the model change is again not significant ($p = 0.14$). After examining the multilevel structure of the data and seeing that it barely explains differences in generalized trust, we can now safely differentiate the effect of mixing in voluntary organizations from other factors with a single level model.

Now, I discuss the relative importance of participation in mixed and Turkish organizations, in addition to the length of participation when controlling for socio-demographic variables. The table below summarizes the relative importance of each variable. Overall, all models are significant at the 1% level. In model 1, having a vocational or university degree as compared to no qualification or only having finished primary school has the highest effect size. Next, the age categories 24 and younger and 35 to 44 years old, compared to 55+, have significant effect sizes. Being divorced or having been widowed also decreases the likelihood of generalized trust.

Finally, the age category 25 to 34 years old compared to 55+ has the lowest significant effect size, although it is significant at the 10% level.

Table 5.8 OLS Regression model for generalized trust, ethnic composition, length of participation and its interaction
(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

		<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>		<i>Model 3</i>	
		B (S.E.)	β	B (S.E.)	β	B (S.E.)	β
Sex	(Reference = Men)	0.132 (0.203)	0.034	-0.058 (0.216)	-0.015	-0.027 (0.227)	-0.007
Age	(Reference = 55+)						
24 and younger		-0.896 (0.331)	-0.199**	-0.623 (0.347)	-0.138~	-0.451 (0.378)	-0.101
25-34		-0.570 (0.317)	-0.125~	-0.487 (0.317)	-0.107	-0.328 (0.350)	-0.072
35-44		-0.736 (0.321)	-0.152*	-0.563 (0.327)	-0.116~	-0.528 (0.348)	-0.108
45-54		-0.442 (0.315)	-0.091	-0.283 (0.319)	-0.059	-0.169 (0.338)	-0.059
Divorced or widowed		-0.736 (0.306)	-0.134*	-0.719 (0.304)	-0.131*	-0.760 (0.316)	-0.135*
Unemployed or sick		-0.030 (0.279)	-0.006	0.011 (0.277)	0.002	0.061 (0.286)	0.012
<i>Net Household Income (€/month)</i> (Reference = 3,200+)							
1,000 or less		-0.438 (0.358)	-0.105	-0.458 (0.356)	-0.110	-0.467 (0.363)	-0.112
1,001-1,700		0.063 (0.351)	0.016	0.141 (0.350)	0.035	0.050 (0.360)	0.012
1,701-3,200		-0.260 (0.348)	-0.062	-0.191 (0.347)	-0.045	-0.317 (0.358)	-0.076
<i>Educational degree</i> (Reference = Primary school or no qualification)							
Secondary vocational training and pre-university		0.162 (0.277)	0.042	0.046 (0.279)	0.012	0.029 (0.291)	0.008
Higher vocational degree or university		0.724 (0.287)	0.188*	0.553 (0.293)	0.144~	0.574 (0.304)	0.148~
<i>Ethnic composition of voluntary organization:</i>							
Mixed				0.556 (0.226)	0.148*	0.615 (0.296)	0.162*
Length of participation						0.025 (0.024)	0.095
<i>Interaction effect, length of participation and ethnic composition of voluntary organization:</i>							
Length participation * mixed						-0.004 (0.030)	-0.012
Intercept		6.040 R² = 0.07 **		5.737 R² = 0.09**		5.504 R² = 0.09**	

n = 373, ~ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.

As we might have expected from the multilevel model, ethnic composition is a good indicator in explaining generalized trust in model 2. It has the largest significant effect size. After this, having a university or higher vocational degree

compared to no education or only a primary school qualification has a significant effect. The age category 24 years and younger has the third highest effect size, but it is only significant at a 10% level. This is then followed by being divorce and widowed. Finally, again, the category 35 to 44 year old compared to the 55+ is significant at the 10% level.

In model 3, I add the length of participation for participants at a mixed organization and an interaction effect, being the length of participation multiplied by ethnic composition (mixed). Theoretically, the contact mechanism would be corroborated if this variable, rather than the ethnic composition variable, were significant. However, as already discussed with respect to the multilevel model, the product term length of participation times ethnic composition (mixed) is insignificant and does not explain differences in generalized trust. As suggested earlier, it may be that participants of mixed organizations self-select into those organizations on the basis of higher initial generalized trust levels.

On the whole, I have found better support for the self-selection mechanism and the level of education of a respondent (having a higher vocational or university degree as opposed to having no educational or only primary school qualifications) than for any other factor. The other contributory variables include the negative effect of having lost one's partner through divorce or having become widowed (significant at the 5% level). Being in the age category 24 and younger as opposed to being 55+ has a negative effect on generalized trust, even when controlling for the ethnic composition of an organization. These effects all support the theory that people who fare better in life, with relatively better socio-economical positions and fewer negative life experiences (as measured by having lost one's partner), in other words the 'winners in society', have higher generalized trust levels. Surprisingly, however, household income is not statistically significant in this model, although there is quite a lot of variation among the participants as discussed in the descriptive part to this section. Moreover, there is no substantive difference⁵⁸ between participants of Turkish and mixed organizations that would otherwise have affected the results.

⁵⁸ The correlation between type of organization and household income is relatively low, with a Cramér's V of 0.189 ($p < 0.01$).

Level of diversity in organizations

In this sub-section, I will look at the level of diversity of an organization instead of employing a crude measure of mixed and Turkish organization type in explaining generalized trust. The level of ethnic heterogeneity in Turkish organizations did not vary that much. However, in many Turkish football associations where participants compete in the national league, there are also participants from other ethnic backgrounds. For example, there are people from former Dutch colonies, Suriname and the Antilles, and from Bulgaria participating in Turkish associations, such that the level of heterogeneity sometimes reaches 95%. On the other hand, in many Turkish associations focusing on cultural, religious, women's and political activities, there are almost no participants from other ethnic groups. There is an exception to this, namely that prayer services in mosques are sometimes attended by people who are passing by or people whose offices are nearby to the mosque and attend the lunch-time services. However, when I talked to the passers-by, to other members and to the board, I found out that these passers-by are not taking part in other activities where they could have regular conversations or collaborate in organizing events. Thus, they cannot be seen as participants. Prayer services, which were attended by many passers-by from other ethnic backgrounds, were usually busy around lunch time and there was no interaction between people during and after the service. In contrast, in mixed organizations the level of heterogeneity varied between 15% and 80%. These organizations were often set up to bring people from different ethnic backgrounds together, but sometimes, in the cases of professional networks, it was the nature of the activities that attracted people from diverse backgrounds. In addition, in the case of sports associations in diverse neighbourhoods, they attracted diverse participants due to the diverse character of those neighbourhoods.

In model 1 below, I first introduce the level of diversity as an ordinal measure that divides ethnic composition into five categories of diversity.⁵⁹ These consist first of 0-15% diversity, which with the exception of one mixed organization is a category comprised of all the Turkish participants, and is the largest group (250). The next category is 20-45%, followed by 50%, 55-65% and finally 70-80% diversity. The

⁵⁹ I first introduced the level of diversity variable as a ratio level measure. However, its effect size was non-substantive and insignificant.

level of diversity is, however, only significant for the categories 50% and 55-65%. The length of participation is not significant in model 2. Model 3 adds an interaction term between the length of participation and different levels of diversity. In line with previous findings, none of these interaction terms are significant. So, here there is

Table 5.9 OLS Regression model for generalized trust, levels of diversity, length of participation and its interaction
(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B (S.E.)	β	B (S.E.)	β	B (S.E.)	β
<i>Ethnic composition: (Reference = 0-15% diverse)</i>						
20-45% diverse	-0.119 (0.312)	-0.020	-0.036 (0.136)	-0.006	-0.381 (0.396)	-0.063
50% diverse	0.579 (0.256)	0.118*	0.611 (0.257)	0.124*	0.626 (0.356)	0.127~
55-65% diverse	0.756 (0.323)	0.120*	0.885 (0.335)	0.141**	0.975 (0.429)	0.155*
70-80% diverse	0.732 (0.475)	0.078	0.690 (0.475)	0.074	0.900 (0.594)	0.096
Length of participation			0.021 (0.014)	0.075	0.019 (0.020)	0.068
<i>Interaction between length of participation and ethnic composition: (Reference = Length participation * 0-15% diverse)</i>						
Length participation * 20-45% diverse					0.091 (0.055)	0.104
Length participation * 50% diverse					-0.003 (0.038)	-0.006
Length participation * 55-65% diverse					-0.071 (0.165)	-0.027
Length participation * 70-80% diverse					-0.021 (0.039)	-0.038
Intercept	5.268		5.108		5.124	
	n = 391		n = 391		n = 391	
	R² = 0.03*		R² = 0.03*		R² = 0.04*	

n = 399, ~ p,0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.

again a very clear lack of a contact mechanism in explaining levels of generalized trust. It seems that participants who are involved in a diverse organization with 50% to 60% levels of diversity have self-selected themselves into those organizations on the basis of their initial levels of generalized trust. However, these effects completely disappear when I control for the socio-demographic variables discussed before. Compared to the cruder measure of diversity, type of organization, the percentage categories of diversity seem not to result in a better model. Next I will discuss the results relating to other conditions of interethnic contact mechanisms.

5.3 Ties within and beyond the organization

This section tests for a crucial condition of the contact hypothesis, namely whether participants of mixed organizations who have close ties within the organizations show higher levels of generalized trust. If this interaction effect is found to be statistically significant, then this constitutes further evidence for a socialization or contact mechanism in mixed voluntary organizations due to the ties of friendship that have been developed there. In the theoretical framework I reviewed the literature, which argues that although contact can lead to less prejudice and more generalized trust, these attitudes can only be internalized if people develop strong ties and, as a result, re-categorize members of outside groups, such that they generalize their newly developed attitudes not just to people with whom they have this contact, but also to any others whom they meet. However, if this interaction is not found to be statistically significant, then participants of voluntary organizations are again self-selecting into those organizations on the basis of their initial generalized trust levels. In addition, this section also tests whether ties beyond the organization due to overlapping memberships and volunteering have an effect on generalized trust. This variable, however, only captures this for the Turkish participants who mention participation and volunteering in organizations other than the ones I visited, since they might then be exposed to interethnic contact there.

Close ties

Close ties have been operationalized as being a measure of how often the participant claims to discuss important personal matters with people in their organization and whether they would lend money to people in their organization if they were in an emergency situation. In the previous chapter I described the spread of close ties across the two groups. Although there were some differences, these were not substantive. Therefore, this does not pose any problems to the regression results. Twenty eight percent of the participants claim never to discuss important personal matters with others, whereas 72% claims to discuss important personal matters sometimes or often. Lending money is less widespread among the participants. Only 57% would lend money to people in their organization if they were in an emergency situation, as opposed to 43% who claim they would not lend money.

The table below encapsulates the effects of close ties in voluntary organizations and the variable's interaction with ethnic composition. Model 1 describes our

Table 5.10 OLS Regression model for generalized trust, ethnic composition, close ties and its interaction

(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

		<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>		<i>Model 3</i>	
		B (S.E.)	β	B (S.E.)	β	B (S.E.)	β
<i>Sex</i>	(Reference = Men)	-0.055 (0.224)	-0.014	0.017 (0.223)	0.004	0.043 (0.224)	0.011
<i>Age</i>	(Reference = 55+)						
24 and younger		-0.684 (0.358)	-0.150~	-0.735 (0.355)	-0.161*	-0.744 (0.357)	-0.163*
25-34		-0.546 (0.329)	-0.119~	-0.610 (0.327)	-0.133~	-0.632 (0.328)	-0.137~
35-44		-0.592 (0.340)	-0.120~	-0.709 (0.337)	-0.144*	-0.712 (0.337)	-0.145*
45-54		-0.321 (0.329)	-0.067	-0.404 (0.326)	-0.084	-0.386 (0.326)	-0.080
Divorced or widowed		-0.754 (0.314)	-0.135*	-0.786 (0.310)	-0.141*	-0.776 (0.311)	-0.139*
Unemployed or sick		0.008 (0.282)	0.001	0.102 (0.280)	0.020	0.076 (0.281)	0.015
<i>Net Household Income (€/month)</i> (Reference = 3,200+)							
1,000 or less		-0.445 (0.373)	-0.106	-0.516 (0.370)	-0.123	-0.490 (0.371)	-0.116
1,001-1,700		0.142 (0.367)	0.035	0.130 (0.364)	0.032	0.172 (0.367)	0.043
1,701-3,200		-0.148 (0.363)	-0.035	-0.201 (0.360)	-0.047	-0.147 (0.364)	-0.035
<i>Educational degree</i> (Reference = Primary school or no qualification)							
Secondary vocational training and pre-university		0.016 (0.288)	0.004	-0.035 (0.285)	-0.009	-0.011 (0.288)	-0.003
Higher vocational degree or university		0.520 (0.304)	0.134~	0.481 (0.301)	0.124	0.525 (0.304)	0.135~
<i>Ethnic composition of voluntary organization:</i>							
Mixed		0.549 (0.234)	0.144*	0.698 (0.235)	0.183**	0.734 (0.483)	0.193
<i>Close ties:</i>							
Sometimes or often discusses important matters				0.193 (0.235)	0.045	0.398 (0.370)	0.092
(Reference = Never)							
Lends money				0.634 (0.212)	0.165**	0.414 (0.325)	0.108
(Reference = No)							
<i>Interaction effect, close ties and ethnic composition of voluntary organization:</i>							
Discussion * mixed						-0.401 (0.485)	-0.102
Lends money * mixed						0.421 (0.430)	0.098
Intercept		5.794 R² = 0.08**		5.298 R² = 0.11**		5.291 R² = 0.12**	

n = 359, ~ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.

established regression with socio-demographic characteristics and the ethnic composition of the voluntary organization. Model 2 then introduces close ties to the model. Being a participant of a mixed organization becomes the largest coefficient, which is then followed by lending money to people in the organization. The effect of age and having lost one's partner remain significant. Educational effects however disappear. The final model (3) investigates the interaction effect of close ties in mixed organizations. In this model, only socio-demographic variables, age, being divorced or widowed, and having a higher vocational or university degree (as opposed to no qualifications or a primary school qualification) are significant. None of the interaction effects or the original variables are statistically significant. This suggests that having developed a close tie (friendship) at mixed voluntary organizations does not add to a participant's level of generalized trust. The conclusion from the previous model that participants seem to have self-selected into voluntary organizations, still holds here.⁶⁰

Ties beyond the organization

Two analyses are conducted before finishing this chapter. The first relates to the ties that Turkish participants have due to their membership of or volunteering at other non-Turkish voluntary organizations. These ties might expose the participants to interethnic contact beyond the organization that I investigated. I asked participants to name additional organizations that they are members of or do voluntary work for. This resulted in 27 organizations that are not Turkish.

The first model below includes the social success factors and the ethnic composition of the organization that I investigated. As expected, participants who are younger than 24, compared to the 55+ group, are less likely to say that they trust others. Next, having a vocational or university degree as opposed to having no

⁶⁰ I also examined whether having a friendship tie with mostly people from other ethnic backgrounds as compared to having mostly friends from own background outside the association would change the results for the Turkish participants. However, this interaction effect was not statistically significant, as only 8% of the Turkish participants' friends are mostly from other ethnic backgrounds. In addition, I examined an interaction effect for those participants whose friends are as much from own background as from other ethnic backgrounds in contrast to having mostly friends from own background outside the association. Again, this effect was not statistically significant. Forty two percent of the Turkish participants have as much friends from their own background as from other ethnic backgrounds. Finally, an overall effect of having most of one's friendship ties outside the association did also not render any significant results.

qualifications or a primary school qualification is a relatively good predictor. Next, the age categories 25-34 and 35-44, again compared to the 55+ group, have higher beta coefficients. This is followed by the organization of which the participant is a

Table 5.11 OLS Regression model for generalized trust and membership or volunteering at non-Turkish organizations
(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

		<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>	
		B (S.E.)	β	B (S.E.)	β
Sex	(Reference = Men)	-0.074 (0.226)	-0.020	-0.090 (0.226)	-0.024
Age	(Reference = 55+)				
		-0.774 (0.362)	-0.175*	-0.773 (0.361)	-0.175*
24 and younger					
		-0.572 (0.330)	-0.128~	-0.572 (0.329)	-0.128~
25-34					
		-0.623 (0.345)	-0.126~	-0.654 (0.346)	-0.132~
35-44					
		-0.525 (0.339)	-0.108	-0.515 (0.339)	-0.106
45-54		-0.566 (0.328)	-0.101~	-0.570 (0.328)	-0.101~
Divorced or widowed					
		0.116 (0.312)	0.021	0.099 (0.313)	0.018
Unemployed or sick					
<i>Net Household Income (€/month)</i>	(Reference = 3,200+)				
		-0.371 (0.368)	-0.089	-0.358 (0.368)	-0.086
1,000 or less					
		0.150 (0.360)	0.038	0.182 (0.361)	0.046
1,001-1,700					
		-0.173 (0.356)	-0.041	-0.157 (0.356)	-0.037
1,701-3,200					
<i>Educational degree</i>	(Reference = Primary school or no qualification)				
		0.091 (0.902)	0.024	-0.045 (0.305)	-0.012
Secondary vocational training and pre-university					
		0.561 (0.315)	0.148~	0.500 (0.321)	0.132
Higher vocational degree or university					
<i>Ethnic composition of voluntary organization:</i>					
		0.549 (0.248)	0.120~	0.561 (0.267)	0.147*
Mixed					
<i>Ties beyond the organization:</i>					
Membership of or volunteering at a non-Turkish organization				0.443 (0.423)	0.063
(Reference = No)					
Intercept		5.872		5.809	
		R² = 0.07*		R² = 0.8*	

n = 335, ~ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.

member being of a mixed ethnic composition. Finally, divorcees and widows/widowers are less likely to say that they trust others.

Model 2 then introduces participation in other non-Turkish voluntary organizations. Since there were so few Turkish participants that have ties beyond the

Table 5.12 OLS Regression model for generalized trust and bridging activities of Turkish board members and volunteers
(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

		<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>	
		B (S.E.)	β	B (S.E.)	β
Sex	(Reference = Men)	-0.034 (0.220)	-0.009	-0.033 (0.220)	-0.009
Age	(Reference = 55+)				
24 and younger		-0.613 (0.351)	-0.137~	-0.611 (0.352)	-0.136~
25-34		-0.460 (0.322)	-0.101	-0.461 (0.322)	-0.102
35-44		-0.517 (0.333)	-0.105	-0.517 (0.334)	-0.105
45-54		-0.193 (0.329)	-0.039	-0.198 (0.330)	-0.040
Divorced or widowed		-0.813 (0.310)	-0.148**	-0.809 (0.311)	-0.147**
Unemployed or sick		0.120 (0.293)	0.022	0.118 (0.293)	0.022
<i>Net Household Income (€/month)</i>	(Reference = 3,200+)				
1,000 or less		-0.445 (0.364)	-0.106	-0.442 (0.365)	-0.106
1,001-1,700		0.186 (0.360)	0.046	0.188 (0.360)	0.047
1,701-3,200		-0.177 (0.355)	-0.042	-0.171 (0.357)	-0.041
<i>Educational degree</i>	(Reference = Primary school or no qualification)				
Secondary vocational training and pre-university		-0.038 (0.287)	-0.010	-0.037 (0.288)	-0.010
Higher vocational degree or university		0.496 (0.300)	0.128~	0.499 (0.301)	0.129~
<i>Ethnic composition of voluntary organization:</i>					
Mixed		0.540 (0.230)	0.143*	0.549 (0.235)	0.145*
<i>Ties beyond the organization:</i>					
Board member or a volunteer of a Turkish bridging organization	(Reference = No)			0.090 (0.493)	0.010
Intercept		5.765		5.751	
		R² = 0.09**		R² = 0.09**	

n = 361, ~ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.

organization I investigated, it is unsurprising that the effect of this variable is not substantive and is not statistically significant. This finding yet again confirms that

participants of Turkish and mixed organizations are not socialized into being more trusting individuals due to interethnic contact in voluntary organizations.

The final analysis repeats social success factors, but also controls for exposure to contact due to the nature of the work that volunteers and board members of Turkish organizations are doing. In the previous chapter I found that some organizations were involved in bridging activities in which they organize events with other organizations. Six out of 18 Turkish organizations were part of an ethnically bridging network of organizations. There are 23 board members and volunteers that work for these organizations and were included in this study. For them, I will thus control whether their work that bridges ethnic boundaries has any additional effect on their adherence to generalized trust beyond social success factors. Model 1 confirms earlier findings. However, the relative importance of the significant effect sizes is somewhat different. Firstly, in this model being divorced or widowed is the largest coefficient in explaining generalized trust. Next, participants of mixed organizations are on average more trustful, followed by the category younger than 24 (as compared to the 55+). This is negatively related to generalized trust, as before. Finally, participants with a higher vocational or university degree as compared to having a primary school qualification or none at all are more trustful. The pattern of standardized regression coefficients is repeated when I control for board member or volunteering activity in Turkish bridging organizations. This variable has a non-substantive and insignificant effect size. This finding indicates that an interethnic tie beyond the organization in which one is involved has no additional effect on generalized trust. However, it might also be the case that there is not enough variation in the data for this effect to become statistically significant.

5.4 Summary

In this chapter I set out to examine the effect of diversity in voluntary organizations. Many studies thus far have not been able to properly test this hypothesis, since their data does not allow for a multilevel model in which participants of the same organizations are sampled. A multilevel or nested structure allows the separation of organizational and participant level variances in generalized trust. Secondly, many studies do not include ethnic organizations in their samples, although they suggest that participation in those organizations is problematic. The analyses presented here

have aimed to overcome these two shortcomings. Although limited to Turkish and mixed organizations in Amsterdam, they nevertheless provide a critical case study.

The results suggest that organizations do not differ much in their participants' levels of generalized trust. The variance between participants is much greater. Moreover, after having controlled for their length of participation, it seems that participants of mixed organizations self-select into those organizations on the basis of their initial levels of generalized trust. In addition, higher educational attainment and older age consistently explain higher levels of generalized trust. Among the participants, divorcees and widows/widowers also have lower levels of generalized trust. Although participants of organizations with a 50 to 65% level of diversity seemed to adhere to generalized trust more, these effects became insignificant after controlling for social success factors. The results here confirm the consensus around the 'winner in society' model, which attributes generalized trust to better life circumstances such as greater educational attainment, older age and not being divorced or widowed.

I also controlled for the effects of close ties in mixed organizations. In inter-group contact studies, friendship ties are found to be important for generalizing attitudes to new people who are met. It seems that not only interethnic contact in mixed voluntary organizations, but also having close ties in those organizations do not matter for one's level of generalized trust. Two more analyses were conducted in order to control for interethnic ties beyond the organizations that were sampled for this study. For participants of Turkish organizations, I differentiated between membership of and volunteering in non-Turkish organizations, on the one hand, and on board membership and volunteer work the other hand, if they were part of a bridging organization. Both of these two activities had no additional effects beyond social success factors.

We can now safely disregard the role of interethnic contact in voluntary organizations in explaining generalized trust. The question that is then immediately raised is, are there other relevant factors that explain generalized trust apart from social success factors? The next chapter explores additional theories that see generalized trust as part of a person's cognitive framework, beyond bridging and bonding ethnic ties.

CHAPTER 6

BEYOND BRIDGING AND BONDING: WHO TRUSTS?

Beyond bridging and bonding, what can explain adherence to generalized trust? This is the theme of this chapter. Three different questions are dealt with here in order to shed light on alternative explanations as to why some participants of Turkish and mixed voluntary organizations in Amsterdam express higher levels of generalized trust. Firstly, I examine correlations between particularized trust items such as trust towards one's family, friends, and specific ethnic groups versus trust towards fellow citizens and towards strangers in order to examine whether the generalized trust item is tapping into positive emotions towards both known and unknown people. This is essential as any internal validity problems with the question might influence the results. In line with this analysis, I will then employ confirmatory factor analysis to assess whether a trust construct can, statistically speaking, also be distinguished. The hypothesis here is that generalized trust should not form a single construct with the other, particularized, trust items unless that item taps into feelings towards unknown people. This analysis is then followed by an examination of a confirmatory factor analysis model in which generalized trust is grouped with items that tap prejudiced feelings towards other ethnic groups. If these items group together, then there is a parallel between generalized trust and prejudice, which further justifies employing an interethnic contact framework in examining generalized trust in Turkish and mixed voluntary organizations. In contrast, if the items do not group together, then it might also become clear why such a framework would be inadequate.

Secondly in this chapter, I take a psychological approach to generalized trust. In many studies, a cognitive process is taken to be at work when people evaluate the unknown other. Here, the underlying mechanism is based on the aspirations of individuals to be consistent with their cognitions, i.e. avoiding psychological dissonance (Wegener & Carlston, 2005: 515), as opposed to contact between dissimilar people resulting in attitude development or change (see also Hooghe 2003c). This section relates generalized trust to psychological attitudes: levels of self-esteem; optimism; life satisfaction; perceived safety and perceived

discrimination. Self-esteem, optimism and life satisfaction are all psychometric constructs that need to be reduced into scales. I will hence examine how well they fit with one another as items through confirmatory factor analysis before adding them to an OLS regression model. The argument within this psychological framework emphasizes that people relate to their negative life experiences when they evaluate their trustful attitudes towards the unknown other.

Finally, this chapter concludes by focusing on a norm driven framework for explaining the generalized trust attitudes of participants of mixed and Turkish voluntary organizations in Amsterdam. Again, the same cognitive mechanism could be in place, although this time it is not negative life experiences but normative claims about the unknown other that would be the driver of generalized trust. I will thus relate generalized trust to attitudes of individualism, attitudes of humanitarianism and the religious orientation of the participant. Attitudes of individualism as well as humanitarianism are also both psychometric constructs that need to be examined first. I will again do this by employing a confirmatory factor analysis model before adding these items to an OLS regression model. I will use confirmatory factor analysis in order to statistically gauge the model fit of the framework rather than relying on the configuration of the data, which could be just an artefact of this study.

Throughout the analyses of generalized trust in which the psychological and norm driven frameworks are tested, I will control for social success factors, as scholars of generalized trust have formed a consensus around them, and they were found to be statistically significant in previous chapters too. The argument of this chapter is not that a contact mechanism between different ethnic groups is insufficient for explaining a lack of prejudice, but rather that it cannot explain differences in generalized trust in the context of voluntary organizations. A cognitive mechanism might be at work when people evaluate the unknown other. However, as I am dealing with a very specific population, all analysis conducted in this chapter needs to be viewed as explorative and should be confirmed by using other data sets in which the general population is represented. Therefore, the conclusions here could become hypotheses for future research.

6.1 What is generalized trust?

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that interethnic contact in voluntary organizations did not create a setting in which the participants of Turkish and mixed associations were socialized into people with higher levels of generalized trust. On the contrary, participants of these organizations seem to have self-selected themselves into those organizations on the basis of their initial higher levels of generalized trust. This conclusion raises a question about generalized trust itself. It questions whether this attitude is in fact reflective of trust towards specific categories of people. In other words, if we are not finding a contact mechanism to be at work, this might be due to poor operationalization of the trust question. If, by the phrase “most people” in the generalized trust question, the respondents still understood this to mean trust towards specific people, this might distort our conclusions. This is why in the analysis below I will examine how well the particularized trust items group together with the generalized trust question.

Particularized trust and generalized trust

Here I have first correlated the generalized trust item with the particularized trust items. As we can see from table 6.1 below, the generalized trust item correlates best with trust in the Surinamese in Amsterdam, and then to trust in strangers. However, we need to be careful in interpreting the first of these correlations, as 24% of the data are missing. Given this limitation, the generalized trust item is, therefore, best correlated with trust in strangers, which is conceptually near to how it is best defined. Another particularized trust item that correlates best with generalized trust is trust in fellow citizens. Next we can group together trust in the white Dutch in Amsterdam, trust towards neighbours and trust towards Moroccans in Amsterdam with generalized trust. Trust in friends, in Turks in Amsterdam and in colleagues correlate well too, followed by trust in people in the same association. Finally, the correlation between generalized trust and trust in the family is very small and non-significant.

Table 6.1 Correlation coefficients of generalized trust with particularized trust items

(Participants of Turkish and mixed organizations, Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

<i>Variables (Trust towards....)</i>				
	<i>Friends</i>	<i>Family</i>	<i>Neighbours</i>	<i>Colleagues</i>
Pearson correlation coefficient	0.274**	0.087	0.311**	0.273**
Total (n)	391	406	406	391
<i>People in this association</i>				
Pearson correlation coefficient	0.212**			
Total (n)	406			
	<i>Turks in Amsterdam</i>	<i>Moroccans in Amsterdam</i>	<i>Surinamese in Amsterdam</i>	<i>White Dutch in Amsterdam</i>
Pearson correlation coefficient	0.226**	0.300**	0.405**	0.362**
Total (n)	407	400	350 ¹	404
	<i>Strangers</i>	<i>Fellow citizens</i>		
Pearson correlation coefficient	.398**	.378**		
Total (n)	393	396		

** p<0.01; ¹About 111 of the cases or 24% of the data are missing for this variable.

Although this table gives us some information about how the trust items are grouped together and that generalized trust best correlates with trust in strangers, we need better analytical tools when grouping these items. I employ confirmatory factor analysis in order to detect a pattern in these items and to test it statistically.

The model below in figure 6.1 depicts a confirmatory factor analysis in which the different trust items are represented. The paths and standardized regression weights of these factors are depicted below too. I have correlated the error terms since these items were asked in this same order in the questionnaire, and the answer to the first item might affect the response to the next item in the list and so on. This therefore captures some of the response set acquiescence (Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman 1991). All the factor loadings are statistically significant. Trust in one's family has the lowest loading, which is well below the threshold of 0.3 above which it could be considered a part of this scale. The loading of the generalized trust item is relatively low (0.48) compared to the other items. The model as a whole indicates a moderate fit. The Chi-square statistic (235.63, df = 44) is significant (p<0.000) (Stevens 2002:

431) and the RMSEA (Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation) has a value of 0.097. Although this value indicates a moderate fit, it is very near to the cut-off point of 0.10 for a model to be considered a poor one (Kline 2006: 206). Therefore, I have aimed to group the trust items in subsequent models.

Figure 6.1 Confirmatory model of trust
 (Participants of Turkish and mixed organizations, Amsterdam, 2009-2010)





Figure 6.2 Confirmatory factor model of trust towards ethnic groups, citizens and friends
 (Participants of Turkish and mixed organizations, Amsterdam, 2009-2010)




In the model above (see figure 6.2) I have grouped trust towards specific ethnic groups, trust towards friends and trust towards fellow citizens. I left out the generalized trust item, since it did not group well together with these items in the previous model. In addition, I left out the item that taps into trust towards the family, since its loading was too low for a confirmatory factor model. While trust towards friends reflects trust towards a familiar person, trust towards the different ethnic groups reflects attitudes towards groups that might not be known to the respondents. Finally, trust towards citizens reflects trust towards an abstract category. The hypothesis here is that trust towards familiar persons is different from trust towards more abstract categories. Trust towards ethnic groups might also be nearer to being considered an abstract category and therefore load better with trust towards citizens rather than trust towards friends. All factor loadings above are statistically significant. As hypothesized, trust towards friends has a low loading (0.29). The model as whole is, however, a poor one with a RMSEA score of 0.11 and chi square value of 37.011 ($df = 6, p < 0.000$). This indicates that when a model of trust is considered, these items do not necessarily form a latent construct. This should not

surprise us much, since there are other categories of people one could trust which are not included here. In addition, since trust towards friends has a very low loading, it might affect the overall model fit.

Generalized trust and trust towards strangers

So, what about generalized trust? Which items group best with it? In the model below (see figure 6.3), I group generalized trust with trust towards strangers and I also add trust towards colleagues and neighbours in order to create contrasts with the first two items, which are supposed to tap trust in unknown people. This tactic is also adopted because a latent factor model cannot be identified with only two items. The results are depicted below in figure 6.3.

Figure 6.3 Confirmatory factor model of generalized trust and trust towards strangers, neighbours and colleagues
 (Participants of Turkish and mixed organizations, Amsterdam, 2009-2010)



The standardized regression weights, or factor loadings, are statistically significant. As we can see above, generalized trust groups very well with trust in strangers, which constitutes the highest loading here as compared with the model with all the trust items grouped together (Figure 6.1). This model as a whole is also a very good fit, as the Chi square statistic (0.651, df = 1) is insignificant (p = 0.420) and the RMSEA value is 0.000, well below the 0.08 required for it to be a very good

fit. From this model we can conclude that generalized trust is not only conceptually, but for participants of Turkish and mixed voluntary organizations in Amsterdam also empirically, very near to trust towards strangers. However, this needs to be tested with other data sets representative of the general public as the sample here is representative of a very specific population.

Prejudice and generalized trust

As discussed in the theoretical framework of this thesis, scholars of the voluntary sector often employ the inter-group contact theory in hypothesizing about how generalized trust is generated at voluntary organizations. However, with a few exceptions such as Stolle's (1998) study, there are almost no studies that put these assumptions to the test empirically with adequate data. This study is attempting to fill this void by oversampling participants in mixed and ethnic associations and takes Turkish organizations as an example of the latter. The previous chapter demonstrated that greater adherence to generalized trust was not due to interethnic contact in those associations. Rather, participants of mixed organizations seem to self-select into those organizations on the basis of their initial levels of generalized trust. This then questions whether interethnic contact is an apt framework to be applied to contact in voluntary organizations. These findings also beg the question whether generalized trust is indicative of a lack of prejudice. Recently, Putnam (2007) conceived of generalized trust as a lack of prejudice, although he does not empirically test this.

I added two questions to the study in order to tap prejudiced feelings towards out-groups. Based on work from Pettigrew and Meertens (1995), I asked the respondents whether and to what extent they approved of their children's friends and partner being from other ethnic groups. Most people answered positively to these questions. Between 24% and 32% of the respondents answered at the highest point (10) in rating how much they agreed with these statements. This might reflect some social desirability with the items, which is common in studies on prejudice and unfortunately very difficult to overcome.


Table 6.2 Correlation coefficients of generalized trust with prejudice
 (Participants of Turkish and mixed organizations, Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

	<i>Variables</i>	
	<i>Approving children's friends are from another ethnic group</i>	<i>Approving children's partner are from another ethnic group</i>
Pearson correlation coefficient	0.152**	0.166**
Total (n)	409	412

** p<0.01.

The results of the correlation of generalized trust with the prejudice items above may already indicate how badly these items are grouped together, if we are interested in their covariance. However, as before, we need more robust analytical techniques in assessing these covariances than a simple Pearson correlation coefficient. Therefore, I assess, in figure 6.4 below, how well the items are grouped together when we employ a confirmatory factor technique.

Figure 6.4 Confirmatory factor model of generalized trust and prejudice
 (Participants of Turkish and mixed organizations, Amsterdam, 2009-2010)



This model includes trust in strangers in order for it to be better specified. As shown previously, trust towards strangers and generalized trust fit well together not only conceptually, but also empirically. I am, however, interested here in whether prejudiced feelings towards out-groups also fits well with generalized trust. All the standardized regression weights, or the factor loadings, are statistically significant.

However, substantively, the two prejudice items, approving of whether one's children's friends and partners are from other ethnic groups, both have very low loadings, explaining only around 6% of the variation in the latent trust construct. Trust towards strangers and generalized trust are much better items with factor loadings of 0.61 and 0.66. Overall, the model fit is very good, with an insignificant Chi square statistic (1.141, $df = 1$, $p = 0.285$) and a RMSEA of 0.02.

These results suggest that generalized trust is not best conceptualized as a lack of prejudice and, therefore, question whether an interethnic contact theory can explain adequately the differences in generalized trust. As with other results in this chapter, however, we need data that are representative of the general public in order to confirm this conclusion. For now, it seems that we can hypothesize that the interethnic contact theory is best evaluated with questions that tap a respondent's prejudiced feelings towards out-groups rather than with generalized trust.

6.2 Generalized trust and negative life experiences


The second part of the analysis in this chapter takes a psychological approach to generalized trust. Part of the theoretical framework for explaining generalized trust sees it as being shaped by one's life experiences beyond social success factors, such as educational attainment. In this framework, subjective well-being, measured by satisfaction with one's life, perceived safety, lack of perceived discrimination and other attitudes such as self-esteem and optimism, could explain greater adherence to generalized trust. As discussed earlier, many studies so far have not only related income equality and redistributive policies to higher aggregate levels of generalized trust, but have also found that on the individual level many of these variables correlate with generalized trust. The life satisfaction scale, optimism and self-esteem are again psychometric scales that need to be assessed and reduced with the aid of confirmatory factor analysis. I will first discuss the fit of these scales before describing the spread of the other variables, which are measured on a dichotomous scale. Finally, I will assess a regression model in which the relative importance of these factors is gauged.

The factor scales: life satisfaction, optimism and self-esteem

The life satisfaction scale consists of five items that ask about overall satisfaction with one's life, and satisfaction with one's neighbourhood, home, social position and financial position. These items are adopted from the Amsterdam survey "Burgermonitor" [Citizen survey], which are conforming to the norm in life satisfaction research (Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman 1991). The distribution of all these items resembles a bell-shaped normal distribution, which is a prerequisite for confirmatory factor analysis to be carried out. I have depicted the diagram that represents the latent construct of life satisfaction below (see figure 6.5).

Overall, this model's Chi square statistic (1.748, $df = 1$) is not significant ($p = 0.186$) and its RMSEA value is 0.04, well below the threshold of 0.08 for a model to be considered a good fit. The factor loadings of this scale are significant and above 0.3. The lowest value of this scale is 0.53, for satisfaction with one's home, followed by satisfaction with the neighbourhood. Satisfaction with one's social position has the highest loading, with a standardized regression weight of 0.86, followed with overall satisfaction with one's life, which has a loading of 0.72. Satisfaction with one's financial position takes a middle position with a value of 0.62. Since this model holds very well together I will introduce the factor scores into the regression model below.

Figure 6.5 Confirmatory factor model of life satisfaction
(Participants of Turkish and mixed organizations, Amsterdam, 2009-2010)




Optimism (Scheier & Carver 1985: 225) as a scale has been measured through the level of agreement with the following statements:

- 1) I am always optimistic about my future;
- 2) I rarely count on good things happening to me;
- 3) Things never work out the way I want them to;
- 4) In insecure times I usually expect the best.

The answer orders for questions 2 and 3 have been reversed, since otherwise the scale would not be coherent. All items are normally distributed.

Figure 6.6 Confirmatory factor model of optimism

(Participants of Turkish and mixed organizations, Amsterdam, 2009-2010)



The scale as a whole does not perform well at all. The model (shown in figure 6.6 above) can be just identified, and so does not allow for any test statistic to be estimated.⁶¹ However, we can assess the factor loadings. These are all statistically significant. However, the two negatively worded items load either negatively (-0.27) or have a relatively low value (0.09). Negative factor loadings are problematic as they suggest poor fit as well (Byrne 2010: 67). Neither of these questions, therefore, can be considered part of optimism as a latent construct. The two other items,

⁶¹ In confirmatory factor analysis, one relies on several equation models in order to estimate the factor loadings. This means that with every parameter added, there is an extra equation that needs estimation. If there are too few equations relative to the number of paths in a causal diagram, there are not enough degrees of freedom left to estimate the model as a whole. When the degrees of freedom reach zero, the model is then called just identified. One cannot then compare the estimates to another model or derive Chi square statistics or -2 log likelihood statistics (Kline 2011).


optimism and counting on good things in insecure times, perform relatively well and will be added to the regression model later. I put these two items together and, although I still did not obtain a good model, their factor loadings are satisfactory. In general, we might have obtained poor model fit because the negatively worded questions are reflective of pessimism, which might be conceptually not the same as optimism (Marshall *et al.* 1992). Ideally, I would have asked more than four questions in order to have more indicators to rely on and to be able to model two latent variables, pessimism and optimism, between which, in turn, I would have tested the correlation. However, for the purpose of this exploratory analysis, these two questions have to suffice here.

Finally, I am testing a scale that should represent the latent variable self-esteem (Rosenberg in Blascovich & Tomaka 1991: 121-3). The statements that I included are as follows:

- 1) I have a number of good qualities;
- 2) In general I feel that I am a failure;
- 3) I feel I can do things like most other people;
- 4) I don't have enough to be proud of.

Figure 6.7 Confirmatory factor model of self-esteem

(Participants of Turkish and mixed organizations, Amsterdam, 2009-2010)



As with the optimism scale, questions 2 and 4 here are also negatively worded and the answers are, therefore, reversed. All items are normally distributed. The results of the first model, including all the variables, indicates a poor fit, as the standardized factor loading of the question on being a failure is above one (Byrne 2010: 67). After removing this variable, the model fit is still poor. The Chi square

statistic and its p value cannot be calculated as there are no degrees of freedom left in the model. The model (see figure 6.7) is then just identified, which again does not allow for it to be tested statistically. The factor loadings are, nevertheless, statistically significant and above the 0.30 threshold. I will include the factor scores in the regression analysis. While one of the questions taps into pessimistic attitudes, two tap into optimism.

Generalized trust: a psychological explanation

Before moving to the analysis of psychological factors and their relationship with generalized trust, I describe the distribution of other factors (see table 6.3) that are going to be included in the regression model below. The distribution of perceived discrimination is the least skewed, as 67.4% of the respondents answer negatively to the question. However, both having been a victim of a crime and perceived safety receive 80% or more of the negative answers. Non-response to these questions is between 10% and 12%. After the perceived safety question, I asked the respondents to rate, on a scale of 0 to 10, how unsafe they have felt. Seventeen percent of the responses rated their lack of safety as 0, but the majority of the responses were spread around the mid categories 5 to 7. The overall shape of the safety question (apart from the high peak at 0) still resembles a normal distribution. The mean of this distribution lies at 4.59 (SD = 2.94). I then asked the respondents to rate how happy they were, generally speaking. The distribution of this variable is slightly more skewed towards positive answers. The mean of the happiness question lies at 7.34 (SD = 1.81).

Table 6.3 Distribution of perceived discrimination, safety and being victim of a crime
(Participants of Turkish and mixed organizations, Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Categories</i>	<i>Valid %</i>
Felt discriminated against in the past 12 months	No	67.4
	Yes	32.6
	Total (n)	408
Was victim of a crime in the past 12 months	No	88.0
	Yes	12.0
	Total (n)	416
Felt unsafe in the past 12 months	No	79.6
	Yes	23.1
	Total (n)	415

Table 6.4 OLS regression model for generalized trust and psychological factors
(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

		<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>	
		B (S.E.)	β	B (S.E.)	β
		0.079		0.004	
<i>Sex</i>	(Reference = Men)	(0.206)	-0.021	(0.210)	0.001
<i>Age</i>	(Reference = 55+)				
		-1.001		-0.993	
24 and younger		(0.337)	-0.229**	(0.333)	-0.227**
		-0.626		-0.584	
25-34		(0.322)	-0.141~	(0.322)	-0.131~
		-0.886		-0.794	
35-44		(0.324)	-0.189**	(0.329)	-0.169*
		-0.642		-0.562	
45-54		(0.323)	-0.134*	(0.323)	-0.118~
		-0.564		-0.500	
Divorced or widowed		(0.307)	-0.106~	(0.307)	-0.094~
		-0.062		-0.071	
Unemployed or sick		(0.281)	-0.012	(0.279)	-0.014
<i>Net Household Income (€/month)</i>	(Reference = 3,200+)				
		-0.417		-0.211	
1,000 or less		(0.358)	-0.101	(0.363)	-0.051
		-0.013		-0.102	
1,001-1,700		(0.353)	-0.003	(0.354)	-0.026
		-0.324		-0.298	
1,701-3,200		(0.346)	-0.079	(0.344)	-0.073
<i>Educational degree</i>	(Reference = Primary school or no qualification)				
Secondary vocational training and pre-university		0.122		0.058	
		(0.282)	0.033	(0.282)	-0.015
		0.643		0.370	
Higher vocational degree or university		(0.295)	0.171*	(0.302)	0.098
<i>Psychological factors</i>					
				0.134	
Life satisfaction				(0.092)	0.096
				0.286	
Optimism				(0.155)	0.112~
				0.168	
Self-esteem				(0.116)	0.088
				-0.203	
Perceived discrimination (Reference = No)				(0.215)	-0.052
				0.149	
Perceived safety (Reference = No)				(0.253)	0.034
				0.018	
Victim of a crime (Reference = No)				(0.312)	0.003
				0.000	
Happiness				(0.067)	0.000
Intercept		6.245		6.317	
		R² = 0.07*		R² = 0.12**	

n = 350, ~ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.

The results of the regression model in which I control for these psychological factors as well as the scales discussed before are depicted above in table 6.4. Model 1 summarizes the results of social success factors. As before, those younger than 55 are, compared to the 55+ age category, less trusting. Next, the standardized regression coefficient for participants with a higher vocational or university degree constitutes a substantive positive effect compared to participants with no qualification or a primary school qualification. In addition, participants who are divorced or are widowed are less trusting too. Finally, there is no discernible gender or income effect in explaining generalized trust.

Model 2 then introduces the psychological factors. The effects of younger age and being divorced or widowed remain, although they become slightly less pronounced. The effect of higher education disappears in this model. Only optimism has a significant and substantive positive effect on generalized trust.⁶² This is less than the effect of age, but higher than the widowed or divorced category.

The overall fit of both regressions models is significant too.⁶³ These results suggest, however, that, apart from optimism, psychological factors are not important for the participants' levels of generalized trust.⁶⁴ There is one cautious note here to be made. The results here should be considered as preliminary, since the data is limited to a very specific population in Amsterdam. Not only could psychological factors be good predictors of generalized trust among the general population, but by testing this among other participants we might find that these factors contribute towards explaining generalized trust. Nevertheless, for participants of mixed and

⁶² In order to exclude alternative explanations, I controlled for any interaction effects of optimism with age, on the one hand, and educational levels, on the other hand. These interactions were, however, both insignificant. As such, we can conclude that optimism has an independent effect on generalized trust.

⁶³ Collinearity does not pose a problem for the standardized regression coefficients in these models. None of the tolerance values are below 0.35 and the values for the VIF are all lower than 3. In addition, I checked the Pearson correlation coefficients for the attitude scales optimism, self-esteem, life satisfaction and happiness, which ranged between 0.307 and 0.481. For perceived discrimination, perceived safety and having been victim of a crime, only the mean differences in life satisfaction and happiness resulted in significant estimates. Nevertheless, none of the effect sizes were higher than -0.204. These values are within an acceptable range for the standardized coefficients to be reliable. These results also suggest that the effect of negative life experiences might slightly affect short lived attitudes such as life satisfaction and happiness rather than optimism and self-esteem, which might be reflective of personality traits that are shaped through early socialization.

⁶⁴ Perceived discrimination could be relevant for the level of generalized trust of just the ethnic minority participants. Therefore, I checked whether an interaction between having a Turkish ethnicity and perceived discrimination has an additional effect on generalized trust. This result was, however, not statistically significant.

Turkish associations, psychological factors seem to be not that important. I will next examine whether a norm driven framework is better at explaining generalized trust.

6.3 Generalized trust and norm driven explanations

The third section of this chapter examines and explores a norm driven explanation for higher levels of generalized trust. People who adhere to norms about the benevolence of human nature, such as agreeing to statements about whether one should be concerned about others, might also claim they trust unknown people more. In addition, norms such as belief in individuality should negatively influence adherence to generalized trust. An example of such an attitude is the belief that solidarity is nonsense or the belief that one should be concerned about one's personal success and not think too much about others (see Hooghe 2003a). The relationship between these attitudes and generalized trust, although theoretically taken to be related, has not been the focus of much empirical research. This thesis is, thus, filling a gap in the literature about the relationship between the prevalence of norms and generalized trust. However, as the sample in this study and its underlying population are quite specific, namely participants of Turkish and mixed organizations in Amsterdam, the findings here serve as an explorative analysis. They should be confirmed using other samples that are representative of the general population. Below I will first discuss the fit of the factor scales of individualism and humanitarianism. Second, I discuss another variable that reflects a norm driven behaviour, religious affiliation. Finally, I will discuss the results of a regression analysis that incorporates all these factors.

Factor scales: individualism and humanitarianism

The psychometric scale that represents individualism is based on four questions. While the first question is replicated in its exact wording from Hooghe (2003a: 65), question two has been rewritten. This is in order to only tap into individualistic attitudes, which should reflect personal success and lack of solidarity, instead of risking one's relationships with others. Question three has also entirely been replicated from Coffé and Geys' scale (2007a: 403), but question four has been negatively worded in order to avoid response set acquiescence. Respondents are


asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with the following statements on a scale of 0 to 10:

- 1) Humanity, our fellow citizens, solidarity ... it's all a lot of rubbish. Everyone has to take care of themselves, and has to defend their own interest;
- 2) Being concerned about the fate of others is less important than personal success;
- 3) People should be concerned about personal success and not think too much about others;
- 4) It is detestable to take care of oneself first.

The answers to question 4 needed to be reversed in order to have a coherent scale, as positive answers to this question reflect one's disagreement with individualistic attitudes. The error terms could not be correlated here, because the model would not have been identified. When the model with four questions was identified, one of the items was very poorly represented, with a negative loading (-0.13). This item is the final question, which states that it is detestable to take care of oneself first. People might have not understood that this item is negatively worded or that in fact conceptually one can take care of oneself first before actually being able to think about the fate of others. The model as a whole has, however, a Chi square value of 1.363 (df = 2) and a p value of 0.506. The RMSEA's value is 0.000, which indicates a very good fit.

Figure 6.8 Confirmatory factor model of individualism

(Participants of Turkish and mixed organizations, Amsterdam, 2009-2010)



After removing the fourth item, the model can only be just identified. This means that its overall fit cannot be statistically assessed. However, the factor loadings can be gauged. They all load very well into the scale, with values from 0.62 to 0.75. This model is depicted above in figure 6.8. I will add this factor scale into the regression model of generalized trust below.

I will now discuss the results of the factor scale of humanitarianism (National Election Studies 1995). I adopted a four item scale in which agreement with the following statements is asked:


- 1) The dignity and well-being of all should be the most important concern in any society;
- 2) One of the problems of today's society is that people are often not kind enough to others;
- 3) A person should always be concerned about the well-being of others;
- 4) People tend to pay more attention to the well-being of others than they should.

As with the individualism scale, the final question needs to be reversed before the analysis. This item reflects one's disagreement with support for humanitarian values. In this model, the error terms could again not be correlated, as the model could not otherwise be identified. The model with all four questions was satisfactorily identified with a Chi square value of 2.398 ($df = 2$) and a p value of 0.302. The value for the RMSEA is very adequate too at 0.021. The model, thus, holds very well together, but the fourth question loads negatively into the scale with a value of -0.16. As such it cannot be part of the humanitarianism scale.

Below, in figure 6.9, I represent the model without the fourth item. This model could only be just identified and, therefore, we cannot examine it statistically. However, the factor loadings perform satisfactorily to very well, with values lying between 0.45 and 0.80. The scale as a whole has been reduced into one variable for the purpose of further regression analysis below.

Figure 6.9 Confirmatory factor model of humanitarianism

(Participants of Turkish and mixed organizations Amsterdam, 2009-2010)



Generalized trust: a norm driven model

Before assessing a model that examines the relative importance of individualism and humanitarianism, below (see table 6.5) I first report the distribution of religious affiliation among the participants, which is measured dichotomously. This variable might be reflective of norms that support a humanitarian view of the world that, in turn, might support adherence to generalized trust.

Table 6.5 Distribution of religious affiliation

(Participants of Turkish and mixed organizations Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Categories</i>	<i>Valid %</i>
Religious affiliation	No	30.0
	Yes	70.0
	Total (n)	416

As we can see in table 6.5 above, 70% of the participants see themselves as adhering to a religious worldview. This variable will be added to the model below. The rate of non-response (10%) is similar to the other variables.

The table below (6.6) summarizes the results of the regression model in which the social success factors are firstly represented. The model explains 7% of the

Table 6.6 OLS regression model for generalized trust and norm driven factors
(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

		<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>	
		B (S.E.)	β	B (S.E.)	β
<i>Sex</i>	(Reference = Men)	0.132 (0.203)	0.034	0.125 (0.204)	0.032
<i>Age</i>	(Reference = 55+)				
24 and younger		-0.896 (0.332)	-0.198**	-0.725 (0.343)	-0.160*
25-34		-0.570 (0.318)	-0.125~	-0.479 (0.321)	-0.105
35-44		-0.736 (0.322)	-0.152*	-0.719 (0.322)	-0.148*
45-54		-0.442 (0.315)	-0.091	-0.386 (0.316)	-0.080
Divorced or widowed		-0.735 (0.307)	-0.134*	-0.730 (0.307)	-0.133*
Unemployed or sick		-0.030 (0.279)	-0.006	-0.026 (0.279)	-0.005
<i>Net Household Income (€/month)</i>	(Reference = 3,200+)				
1,000 or less		-0.438 (0.359)	-0.105	-0.477 (0.359)	-0.115
1,001-1,700		0.063 (0.351)	0.016	0.048 (0.352)	0.012
1,701-3,200		-0.259 (0.349)	-0.061	-0.262 (0.349)	-0.062
<i>Educational degree</i>	(Reference = Primary school or no qualification)				
Secondary vocational training and pre-university		0.162 (0.277)	0.042	0.125 (0.282)	0.033
Higher vocational degree or university		0.724 (0.288)	0.188*	0.693 (0.303)	0.180*
<i>Norm driven factors</i>					
Individualism				-0.035 (0.064)	-0.029
Humanitarianism				0.126 (0.073)	0.094~
Religious affiliation (Reference = No)				-0.172 (0.217)	-0.043
Intercept		6.040		6.132	
		R² = 0.07**		R² = 0.08*	

n = 372, ~ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.

variation in the dependent variable generalized trust and is significant. Model 2 assesses the relative importance of norm driven factors for participants of Turkish and mixed organizations.⁶⁵ The model as a whole performs well, with 8% of the

⁶⁵ The Pearson correlation coefficient for the relationship between humanitarianism and individualism is very low, with a value of -0.104, and as such does not pose any collinearity problems. The collinearity diagnostics, tolerance and VIF, for this model are also within the acceptable ranges.


variation in the generalized trust item explained, which is also statistically significant. However, some of the effects are now less pronounced as compared to model 1. The highest effect size is now for participants with a higher vocational or university degree as compared to having no qualifications or only a primary school qualification. This is followed by the age category 24 and younger, as compared to the 55+. Next, participants who are between 35 and 44 year old are, compared to the 55+, less trusting. As with the model before, the divorced and widowed are statistically speaking less trusting here too. The final variable that is statistically significant is the effect of adherence to humanitarian values. This constitutes the lowest effect size in a model where norm driven factors have been controlled for. The other two variables, adherence to individualistic norms and religious affiliation, are statistically speaking not significant.

Overall, I have found a very moderate effect of norm driven factors in explaining generalized trust, as only adherence to humanitarian norms has been found to affect generalized trust, statistically speaking. Again, the results here need to be interpreted cautiously as the data represent participants of Turkish and mixed organizations. We might then hypothesize that, if tested among the general population, adhering to humanitarian values has a positive effect on generalized trust.

Individuals might, however, change their humanitarian attitudes as they age or, alternatively, there might be different cohort effects due to changing socio-economic circumstance that might induce attitude change across the groups (see for example (Inglehart 1990)). It is not quite clear what causes differences across the age groups. What is of importance here is that there might be that age group in combination with humanitarian attitudes have different effects on generalized trust. In fact, figure 6.10 below depicts the mean levels of humanitarian attitudes across different age groups.⁶⁶ As we can see, the mean scores of humanitarianism are higher for participants who are older than 35 years old in comparison to participants who are younger than 35. These differences might thus reflect cohort or ageing effects on a changing value pattern across the generations.

⁶⁶ Mean across all age groups is 0, SD = 1.3766, Minimum = -5.15, Maximum = 2.27

Figure 6.10 The 95% confidence interval for humanitarian attitudes across age groups
 (Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)



Differences in humanitarianism across the age groups question whether there might be an interaction effect on generalized trust of younger age combined with different levels of humanitarianism. Alternatively, age effects on generalized trust could be independent of whether one adheres to humanitarianism. The regression model below (see Table 6.7) summarizes these interaction effects. As before, model 1 is significant and the effect of humanitarianism on generalized trust is significant, albeit very small in size relative to social success factors.

Model 2 as a whole is significant. There, the interaction terms for humanitarianism and the different age groups have been entered. Humanitarianism then becomes insignificant. This indicates that what previously seemed to be the independent effect of adhering to humanitarianism is actually the effect of age on generalized trust. The negative effect sizes of younger age (younger than 55) remain for all categories except the 45-55 category. For the 35 to 44, it even becomes significant. Having a higher vocational or university degree still has the largest significant effect on generalized trust. When we examine the interaction effects, only

Table 6.7 OLS regression model for generalized trust, humanitarianism and its interaction with age
(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>	
	B (S.E.)	β	B (S.E.)	β
Sex (Reference = Men)	0.140 (0.202)	0.036	0.171 (0.203)	0.045
Age (Reference = 55+)				
24 and younger	-0.776 (0.337)	-0.172*	-0.778 (0.337)	-0.173*
25-34	-0.499 (0.319)	-0.110	-0.620 (0.325)	-0.136~
35-44	-0.731 (0.320)	-0.151*	-0.807 (0.334)	-0.166*
45-54	-0.396 (0.315)	-0.082	-0.513 (0.322)	-0.106
Divorced or widowed	-0.736 (0.306)	-0.134*	-0.783 (0.309)	-0.142*
Unemployed or sick	-0.032 (0.278)	-0.006	-0.095 (0.280)	-0.018
<i>Net Household Income (€/month)</i> (Reference = 3,200+)				
1,000 or less	-0.468 (0.358)	-0.112	-0.394 (0.359)	-0.095
1,001-1,700	0.034 (0.350)	0.009	0.104 (0.353)	0.026
1,701-3,200	-0.264 (0.347)	-0.063	-0.226 (0.348)	-0.054
<i>Educational degree</i> (Reference = Primary school or no qualification)				
Secondary vocational training and pre-university	0.168 (0.276)	0.044	0.120 (0.277)	0.032
Higher vocational degree or university	0.780 (0.288)	0.203**	0.726 (0.290)	0.189*
<i>Norm driven factors</i>				
Humanitarianism	0.126 (0.072)	0.094~	0.124 (0.173)	-0.093
Interaction effects (Reference = Humanitarianism * 55+)				
Humanitarianism * 24 and younger			0.454 (0.243)	0.147~
Humanitarianism * 25 - 34			0.191 (0.228)	0.066
Humanitarianism * 35 - 44			0.146 (0.243)	0.045
Humanitarianism * 45 - 54			0.391 (0.222)	0.143~
Intercept	5.982 R² = 0.08**		6.081 R² = 0.09**	


n = 373, ~ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.

two categories are significant. These are the effect of being younger than 24 and the age category 45 to 54 in combination with humanitarianism, as compared to the 55+. The effect sizes or the standardized regression coefficients are unreliable and cannot be read from the table above. This is because SPSS takes the product of the

standardized scores into account when calculating β . We are, however, interested in the standardized value of the interaction effect (Hofmann 2008).

Figure 6.11 below depicts the effect of humanitarianism on the participants who are 24 and younger as compared to the 55+. As we can see, adhering to humanitarianism for the 55 + has a slight negative effect on generalized trust, since for one standard deviation increase of humanitarianism, the value of generalized trust drops from 6.5 to 5.9. The reverse is, however, the case for the 24 and younger. For one standard deviation unit increase in humanitarianism scores, the value of generalized trust increases from 5.4 to 5.8. This effect is significant.⁶⁷ In the next section, I combine this value framework with the effect of optimism on generalized trust and what we have previously found to be significant factors.

Figure 6.11 Interaction effect between humanitarianism and the age category 24 and younger on generalized trust
(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)



NB: Standardized effects controlling for other variables (see model 2, Table 6.7)

⁶⁷ The interaction effect of the age category 45-54 and humanitarianism on generalized trust although significant is very small. Therefore, I have not depicted it here.

6.4 The final model

This final section brings all the variables together and tests whether participants of mixed and Turkish voluntary organizations self-categorize themselves as trusting individuals on the basis of psychological or norm driven attitudes. The relative importance of the two attitudes, optimism and humanitarianism, in the second model below (see table 6.8) should indicate whether a self-categorization mechanism has a larger effect than self-selection and social success factors. Model 1 introduces the social success factors and the ethnic composition (a dichotomous scale) of voluntary organizations. This model explains 9% of the variation in generalized trust, which is statistically significant. In this model, a mixed ethnic composition constitutes the second largest effect size after having a higher vocational or university degree. This effect is indicative of a self-selection mechanism that explains greater adherence to generalized trust due to a participant's initial levels before joining an organization. In chapter 5, I introduced a cross-level interaction effect that examined whether participants of mixed organizations who were members for longer also exhibited more trust. Since this interaction effect was not found to be significant, a socialization mechanism could be ruled out. Next, in model 1, participants who are younger than 24 are, compared to the 55+, also less trusting. In terms of size, this effect is then followed by the divorced and widowed category.

Model 2 introduces the two variables optimism and humanitarianism.⁶⁸ A norm driven explanation of generalized trust is now ruled out for participants of mixed and Turkish organizations. Participants who adhere to generalized trust do not normatively believe it is better to say they trust unknown people than to say they should be careful. However, optimistic participants, after having controlled for their social success, adhere more to generalized trust. This effect still persists after controlling for a self-selection mechanism, although its size is equal to it. Next, participants of mixed and Turkish organizations with a higher vocational or university degree also say they trust others more than participants who only have a primary school qualification or no qualification at all. This effect is of similar size to

⁶⁸ The Pearson correlation coefficient between these variables is relatively low, at 0.155. Collinearity diagnostics are also acceptable for this model.

Table 6.8 OLS regression model for generalized trust: ethnic composition, optimism, and the interaction of age and humanitarianism
(Participants of Turkish and mixed associations in Amsterdam, 2009-2010)

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>		<i>Model 3</i>	
	B (S.E.)	β	B (S.E.)	β	B (S.E.)	β
Sex (Reference = Men)	-0.058 (0.216)	-0.015	-0.033 (0.213)	-0.009	0.005 (0.215)	0.001
Age (Reference = 55+)						
24 and younger	-0.623 (0.347)	-0.138~	-0.467 (0.350)	-0.104	-0.491 (0.362)	-0.109
25-34	-0.487 (0.317)	-0.107	-0.381 (0.316)	-0.084	-0.489 (0.323)	-0.108
35-44	-0.563 (0.327)	-0.116~	-0.550 (0.322)	-0.113~	-0.624 (0.337)	-0.129~
45-54	-0.283 (0.319)	-0.059	-0.214 (0.316)	-0.044	-0.330 (0.325)	-0.068
Divorced or widowed	-0.719 (0.304)	-0.131*	-0.667 (0.301)	-0.123*	-0.711 (0.304)	-0.129*
Unemployed or sick	-0.011 (0.277)	-0.002	-0.022 (0.274)	-0.004	-0.077 (0.276)	-0.015
<i>Net Household Income (€/month)</i> (Reference = 3,200+)						
1,000 or less	-0.458 (0.356)	-0.110	-0.436 (0.352)	-0.105	-0.370 (0.354)	-0.089
1,001-1,700	0.141 (0.350)	0.035	0.154 (0.346)	0.039	0.215 (0.349)	0.054
1,701-3,200	-0.191 (0.347)	-0.045	-0.201 (0.342)	-0.048	0.175 (0.343)	-0.042
<i>Educational degree</i> (Reference = Primary school or no qualification)						
Secondary vocational training and pre-university	0.046 (0.279)	0.012	0.005 (0.276)	0.001	-0.026 (0.276)	-0.007
Higher vocational degree or university	0.553 (0.293)	0.144~	0.546 (0.291)	0.142~	0.514 (0.293)	0.134~
<i>Ethnic composition of voluntary organization</i> (Reference = Turkish)						
Mixed	0.556 (0.226)	0.148*	0.541 (0.224)	0.144*	0.503 (0.226)	0.134*
Optimism			0.378 (0.133)	0.144**	0.373 (0.134)	0.142**
Humanitarianism			0.114 (0.071)	0.085	-0.111 (0.171)	-0.083
Interaction effects (Reference = Humanitarianism * 55+)						
Humanitarianism * 24 and younger					0.400 (0.240)	0.129~
Humanitarianism * 25 - 34					0.195 (0.224)	0.067
Humanitarianism * 35 - 44					0.115 (0.240)	0.035
Humanitarianism * 45 - 54					0.345 (0.219)	0.127
Intercept	5.737 R² = 0.09**		5.666 R² = 0.12**		5.772 R² = 0.13	

n = 373, ~ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.

that for optimism and for a mixed ethnic composition of the voluntary organization. After controlling for these effects, being divorced or widowed negatively influences generalized trust. Finally, participants who are 35 to 44 year old are, compared to the 55+, statistically speaking less trusting as well.

Model 3, finally, introduces the interaction effect of age and humanitarianism. Optimism now has the highest effect size in explaining generalized trust. Next, having a higher vocational or university degree as opposed to no qualifications or having finished primary school, as well as participation in mixed organizations, show the same level of effect on generalized trust. Finally, in terms of effect size, the age category 25-34 shows the same levels of effect on trust as being divorced and widowed and as participants who are 24 and younger and also adhere to humanitarianism. This means that a norm driven framework now only applies to the younger cohorts. What seemed to be the effect of younger age has now been modified, if one controls for a norm driven framework.

In conclusion, this model supports some social success factors such as higher educational attainment and not being divorced or widowed. The demographic effect of age is less obvious in this model compared to other models, since only one age category (35 to 44) is statistically significant. Participants of mixed organizations are self-selecting into those organizations on the basis of their initial levels of trust. Participants who feel more optimistic also adhere more to generalized trust than the less optimistic participants. Finally, younger participants (those 24 and younger as compared to the 55+) who adhere to humanitarian norms also show higher generalized trust levels.

6.5 Summary

In this chapter, I have firstly tested whether generalized trust is not related to particularized trust towards specific ethnic groups, one's family, friends, colleagues and neighbours, and more general categories, such as fellow citizens and strangers. Firstly, when all the items were grouped together, the factor loading of generalized trust came very close to trust towards neighbours, colleagues and other people in the association. When the items are regrouped into a new factor model, generalized trust

loads very well with trust towards strangers, but less so with trust towards colleagues and neighbours. Theoretically speaking, generalized trust should correlate well with trust towards strangers rather than with trust towards specific people. The results of the confirmatory factor analysis substantiated this line of theory, at least for participants of Turkish and mixed organizations in Amsterdam. Theoretically speaking, generalized trust is also considered to be a lack of prejudice (Putnam, 2007). However, for participants of Turkish and mixed organizations in Amsterdam, prejudiced feelings and generalized trust do not fit well into a one factor model representing a latent trust construct. This is partly why generalized trust is not explained by interethnic contact in voluntary organizations. The results of the previous chapter in fact pointed in the other direction, such that participants of mixed organizations might have self-selected into those organizations because they adhered to generalized trust before they joined. However, whether prejudiced feelings and generalized trust are not part of one latent construct needs to be examined with other data sets, which should be representative of a wider population, as the data here are limited to participants of Turkish and mixed organizations in Amsterdam. These results are, hence, tentative.

That said, are there other explanations of greater adherence to generalized trust? In other words, beyond a bridging and bonding framework or interethnic contact, who trusts? I explored two other frameworks, a psychological and a norm driven one, whilst controlling for social success factors. Firstly, the grouping of psychometric scales used in this study did not always result in good factor models. The optimism and self-esteem scales did not perform well. The life satisfaction, individualism and humanitarian scales did much better in statistical terms. However, when assessing the loadings of specific items, apart from the life satisfaction scale, the number of items in all other models had to be reduced. This resulted in just identified factor models, which have no degrees of freedom left for any test statistics to be estimated or for their significance levels to be tested. Since the analysis here is explorative and the conclusions could be considered as hypotheses to be tested through the use of data sets that are representative of the general public, it is not essential for the scales to work very well. The results here still inform us about which factors and mechanisms are behind the generation of generalized trust.

In the theoretical chapter, I identified a psychological and a norm driven framework that relate generalized trust to a cognitive mechanism. People who adhere to generalized trust might be doing so because they base their attitude on other norms about the benevolence of humans. Alternatively, they might base their attitudes about being careful of others on negative life experiences, which have been internalized and turned into lower optimism and self-esteem. I added other factors to the psychological framework that are indicative of negative life experiences too, such as perceived safety, discrimination and having been a victim of crime. To the norm based framework I added religious affiliation. Both models, although they substantiated these theories slightly, did not result in a very clear cut picture. Firstly, among the psychological factors, only optimism rendered a statistically significant result, while across the norm driven factors only adherence to humanitarian values produced a statistically significant result. However, when combined into one model, the final regression model in this thesis (table 6.8), only optimistic attitudes generally and humanitarian values among the young (24 and younger) related positively to higher levels of generalized trust attitudes. In addition, higher educational attainment and a mixed ethnic composition of the organization had a substantive and positive effect too. Finally, having lost one's partner through divorce or being widowed, as well as the age category 35 to 44, rendered statistically significant negative results. I will discuss these results in more detail in the next chapter and relate them to previous studies, as well as suggesting further avenues of research for future studies.

CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This thesis has carefully investigated the activities and organizational features of Turkish voluntary and mixed ethnicity organizations in Amsterdam and juxtaposes these results with existing data sets in the Netherlands on ethnic concentration in voluntary organizations. In addition, it subjected their participants' trustful attitudes to test. The focus of this thesis is on the role voluntary organizations play in generating generalized trust, as part of a broader framework which sees them as vehicles for the enhancement and maintenance of democracy and specifically of a democratic political culture or civic mindedness. Voluntary organizations are not only supposed to have an institutional impact by challenging governance structures, but they also arguably distil civic mindedness in people who participate in activities. Although this line of argument has received much attention recently, there is still a gap remaining in the literature. This thesis, thus, builds and advances the literature by focusing on the thorny issue of interethnic contact in voluntary organizations. Bonding associations where ethnic ties predominate are supposed to have a negative socialization effect on their participants. This is opposed to bridging voluntary organizations, where ethnic bonds are surpassed. However, this has not been the topic of empirical scrutiny yet. The lack of relevant data sets with adequate sample sizes of minority population has to date prevented a systematic analysis. Secondly, conclusions about bonding associations (among these ethno-national organizations) are often based on organizations, which are homogenous due to the concentration of the majority population (see Stolle 1998; Van der Meulen 2007). But these studies do not include ethno-national associations in which the majority consists of an ethnic minority population. Thirdly, the research design in this thesis has methodologically advanced the literature, because it focuses on organizations rather than individual households. Many existing studies cannot fully disentangle variation in generalized trust at the organizational and individual levels of analysis. This is because their data collection procedure, by sampling individuals or households, does not allow for a multilevel analysis, since information about other individuals in the same organization is lacking.

In disentangling generalized trust at different levels of analysis, I sampled 40 organizations from a database that had mapped voluntary organizations in Amsterdam. I chose Amsterdam as this city ranks as one of the most diverse cities in the world (Benton-Short, Price & Friedman 2007), where we can find ethnic organizations as well as mixed ones. From the database in Amsterdam, I drew a stratified random sample that represented two types of organizations, namely Turkish and mixed ethnicity organizations. I narrowed the selection of ethno-national organizations to Turkish ones as this group is, due to their organizational success, also the most segregated from mainstream organizations (Vermeulen, Brünger & Van de Walle 2009). Moreover, the interethnic contact of first generation Turks and other ethnic groups, such as through mixed marriages, is also limited (LAS 2004/2005). It is mainly first generation Turkish minorities who participate in Turkish voluntary associations. The voluntary organizations I selected were, in turn, representative of different types of activities, such as sports, politics, women, etc. By visiting events at these organizations, I sampled 463 participants. This data set allowed me to investigate whether interethnic contact at these voluntary organizations socializes the participants into trusting individuals or whether other mechanisms are more important for the generation of generalized trust.

So what mechanisms are out there in explaining greater adherence to generalized trust? Not only a diverse ethnic composition, but also actual contact between members, is a precondition for the contact mechanism to be at work. As such, while mixed organizations offer ample opportunities for durable contact, Turkish organizations bring mostly together people from the same ethnic background and do not offer contact opportunities beyond their group to the participants. Four additional clusters of organizational theories have been identified in explaining generalized trust. Firstly, organizations that influence the ratio of volunteers to passive members and participants might attract more volunteers, which might affect the average level of generalized trust of that organization due to aggregation. Secondly, network gaps between organizations and participants might affect the communication channels that could lead to trust becoming transitive and spreading among organizations. Thirdly, the large size of some organizations might inhibit contact and hence impede the development of generalized trust. Finally, a working relation with the government as

exhibited through funding might transfer generalized trust top down to the participants.

At the individual level, six clusters of theories can be identified. Firstly, within an organization, different levels of engagement such as volunteering or board membership activity might enhance generalized trust. Secondly, for interethnic contact to translate into attitude change, close ties between the participants need to be developed in mixed organizations. This is necessary for participants not only to recategorize the out-group members included in those contacts, but for recategorization to also be extended to people who are not taking part in contact and even to people in general. Thirdly, multiple memberships and volunteering might create additional interethnic contact opportunities, which need to be controlled for. Fourthly, the consensus in generalized trust studies revolves around social success factors. That is to say, people with better educational attainment, with higher income, older age, who are men and who have not lost their partner through divorce or been widowed express higher levels of trust, since they can be considered as 'winners in society'. Fifthly, among minorities there are some factors related to the experience of migration that is hypothesized to affect generalized trust. Both the length of the stay in the country and generational differences might reflect on having less control over the fate of one's life, which might adversely relate to generalized trust. Another psychological factor related to minorities is the experience of discrimination, which might affect one's outlook on people in general and trust towards them. For all participants, perceived safety, having been victim of a crime, and attitudes such as optimism, life satisfaction and self-esteem, are considered to drive generalized trust. Finally, a norm driven framework sees trust being shaped by humanitarian values, while individualistic norms might affect it negatively. In addition to these attitudes, a religious orientation might also be indicative of a belief in the benevolence of human nature and hence affect generalized trust. I will next discuss the findings of this thesis and start summarizing the results from analysing existing data sets and their shortcomings.

7.1 Key result: on interethnic contact and generalized trust

The results of this thesis on the role of interethnic contact in voluntary organizations are based on analysing what explains generalized trust in several data sets. The first data set is a sample of households in the Netherlands (FNB-2009) and is representative of the Dutch population, whilst the second data set contains four minority groups and a Dutch control group (LAS 2004/2005). I analysed differences among participants of voluntary organizations in order to find a template against which my data from participants of Turkish and mixed organizations in Amsterdam can be compared. Secondly, however, these data sets were limited in several respects, which necessitated the data collection in Amsterdam. The limitation of these studies lies in the fact that no multilevel model can be employed as the data on the co-members of the respondents are often lacking. In addition, both these data sets either do not have enough ethnic associations in their sample or no mixed associations in which diversity is not solely the concentration of non-Western minority groups. The data I collected in Amsterdam, firstly, sampled organizations rather than individual households in order to disentangle variances at the appropriate level of analysis. Secondly, I oversampled Turkish organizations, which are taken as an example of ethno-national organizations where the ethnic composition of the participants is homogenous, and compared them with mixed organizations where the ethnic composition of the participants is diverse. Therefore, I was able to directly tackle the role of the ethnic composition of the organizations. Thirdly, by studying the activities of the organizations and different levels of close ties within mixed organizations, I could test for the necessary conditions for contact to translate into attitude change, which could not be examined in existing data sets.

Bridging versus bonding at voluntary organizations?

The pattern of findings across all three data sets suggests that interethnic contact, or bridging and bonding, does not explain differences in generalized trust among participants of voluntary organizations. On the contrary, the findings suggest that social success factors explain greater adherence to generalized trust. In addition, participants of voluntary organizations self-select into those organizations on the basis of their initial levels of generalized trust. Educational attainment constituted the

largest effect size in explaining trust among participants in the minorities' data set (LAS 2004/2005), whereas in the Dutch survey (FNB-2009) young age seems to be the most important predictor. The self-selection effect in the FNB-2009 data set has the second largest size. Participants of mixed organizations in the Netherlands with a level of diversity between 26% and 49% were 3.8 times more likely to say they trust others, which is followed in size by the effect of low income. Volunteering did not affect generalized trust and as such was omitted from the models based on the data I collected in Amsterdam. In addition, migration related factors such as length of stay in the Netherlands and being a Turkish second generation participant did not affect generalized trust (cf. Dinesen & Hooghe 2010). This might be due to the specific population under study or that the relative numbers are low in comparison to other data sets. Alternatively, the specific acculturation effects are picked up by having immigrants in different host societies in the data (see for example Dinesen & Hooghe 2010).

However, these data sets, due to their data collection methods being based on the sampling of individual households, do not allow an examination of the characteristics of organizations beyond their ethnic composition. Since I sampled organizations directly, this allowed me to consider their activities and other characteristics that might contribute to generalized trust at test as well. Both mixed and Turkish organizations offer a set of diverse activities to their participants and members. In line with previous research in the USA (De Graauw 2008), Turkish organizations seem to offer valuable services to their participants, from language courses to information on illnesses such as diabetes, which is often funded by the local government. Given policy makers' preference for interethnic mixing, this might seem contradictory at first sight. However, as Uitermark, Rossi and Van Houtum (2005: 635) write: "individual politicians as well as the general public associate certain [minority] groups with problems, thus raising the political profile of the issues. It is no surprise, therefore, that in practice ethnically homogenous organizations are called upon to provide services and to cooperate with the municipality".

Most importantly, while mixed organizations, de facto or on ideological grounds, offer durable contact among their participants, Turkish organizations are only

occasionally successful at promoting interethnic contact. This then allowed me to examine the role of interethnic contact at those two types of organizations – not just assuming that mixed organizations bring their participants into contact with other participants. When examining other characteristics of these organizations, the two types did not significantly differ in directing their participants and members towards collaboration, their size, their funding relation with the government or bridging network gaps that have arisen through organizing events. Hence, I did not include them in further analysis. As previous research has shown, most organizations tend often to work together with other organizations that have similar memberships and ideologies (Zmerli & Newton 2007). However, if an organization is open to ethnic minorities, it is also more likely to create linkages with other organizations (Zmerli & Newton 2007:166).

I identified only individual level factors to control for in examining generalized trust when analysing bridging and bonding practices across the Turkish and mixed organizations. These factors are the occurrence of close ties and different levels of engagement, such as multiple membership and voluntary work at other non-Turkish organizations, in addition to being exposed to ethnically dissimilar organizations for some board members and volunteers of Turkish organizations.

The pattern of findings in the two existing Dutch data sets was largely repeated across the data I collected in Turkish and mixed voluntary organizations in Amsterdam. Again, the ethnic composition of voluntary organizations, and more importantly interethnic contact, were not related to the adherence to generalized trust. The low variance in generalized trust scores at the organizational level (4%) suggested that the context of participation does not matter for its development. The variance between participants in their level of generalized trust was much greater (96%). Moreover, after having controlled for their length of participation, it seems that participants of mixed organizations self-select into those organizations on the basis of their initial levels of generalized trust. In addition, higher educational attainment consistently explained higher levels of generalized trust in this data set too. Among the participants, divorcees and widows/widowers also have lower levels of generalized trust. Although participants of organizations with a 50 to 65% level of diversity seemed to adhere to generalized trust more, these effects became

insignificant after controlling for social success factors. The results here too confirm the consensus around the ‘winner in society’ model, which attributes generalized trust to better life circumstances such as greater educational attainment and not being divorced or widowed. I will further discuss these results later in this chapter.

Other individual level factors such as the interaction of close ties at mixed organizations, which are an important condition of the interethnic contact hypothesis, did not result in statistically significant findings. This then supports the argument that contact in addition to having close ties in an ethnically mixed voluntary organization has no bearing on the development of generalized trust. This is supported by data from Canada. Phan’s (2008) study includes friendship ties in the analysis of generalized trust at the neighbourhood level. She finds, however, no significant effects (Phan 2008: 42; cf. Stolle, Soroka and Johnston 2008). Other individual level variables such as membership or volunteering at other non-Turkish organizations and being a board member or a volunteer of a Turkish bridging organization did not affect generalized trust either. Despite Paxton’s (2007) analysis of bridging organizational types and the supposed positive effect on generalized trust, multiple memberships across organizations seems to occur less often than expected. Organizational bridges through overlapping membership are much sparser than the literature assumes, even when many organizations are geographically near, as in the present context.

Stolle’s (1998) study is the closest existing survey, to which the results above relate very well. In fact, the design of this study was purposefully replicated in order to create a data set in which ethno-national organizations were included, so as to be able to further examine the role of interethnic contact. In her study, Stolle (1998) found that the most influential variable that affected generalized trust was cross-country differences, since she had data on participants in Germany and Sweden. Swedes were much more trusting than Germans. Most importantly, however, her results are in line with this study as she finds that “people self-select into more or less diverse groups, depending on their original trust levels. People who are more trusting join more diverse associations, whereas people who are less trusting join more homogenous groups” (Stolle 1998: 516). In a later article, Stolle and Rochon

(2001: 154) conclude that “the degree of associational diversity is associated with levels of generalized trust and community reciprocity among members”.

Civic engagement and trust

The conclusion above, although more specific about diversity in voluntary organizations, is also in line with all those studies that found a weak relationship between civic engagement and trust. Firstly, Whiteley (1999: 39-41) aims to disentangle the relationship between civic engagement and generalized trust. His analysis is based on the World Values Survey data on 45 countries from 1990 to 1993. Among the factors that he controls for are: 1) life satisfaction; 2) norms of good citizenship such as disagreement with tax aversion, with claiming benefits when one is not entitled to them and with lying; 3) patriotism and 4) voluntary organization membership. He concludes that “of the four determinants ..., the voluntary scale, ... has the weakest effect” (Whiteley 1999: 39). Then Freitag (2003: 225) concludes that the de Tocqueville (1990 [1840]) model, which emphasizes face-to-face interaction in voluntary organizations as the driver of generalized trust, is not supported in Switzerland. Delhey and Newton (2003: 108-10) analyse differences in generalized trust in seven countries from the Euromodule survey (South Korea, Switzerland, East Germany, West Germany, Spain, Hungary and Slovenia). They find better support for societal conditions (e.g. satisfaction with institutions, political freedom) and success and well-being factors rather than voluntary organizations in advancing generalized trust. Stolle (2004: 199), who investigates regional differences in Sweden in determining generalized trust, also finds a weak relationship between organizational membership as compared to socio-economic, demographic and regional differences.

Another strand of the literature emphasizes income inequality across countries rather than civic engagement. Uslaner and Brown (2005: 890-1) find income inequality better explaining generalized trust than membership in civic organizations, analysing aggregate American state data from the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Delhey and Newton’s (2005: 319-20) analysis of the WVS from the 1990s confirms this conclusion. They also control for quality of government, national wealth, ethnic fractionalization and income inequality.

More recent studies such as Morales and Geurts (2007) again are in line with the conclusions above. Their analysis is based on the Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy data, which is from 12 European countries at the turn of the century (1999-2000). They state that “only Portugal and to some extent West Germany correspond to the expected pattern of greater social trust among citizens who interact face to face within associations” (Morales & Geurts 2007: 150). Maloney, van Deth & Roßteutscher (2008: 275) describe different levels of generalized trust across many types of organizations in Aberdeen (UK) and Mannheim (Germany). This data is unique as it samples organizations and their participants rather than individual households. Their findings again show very little variation in generalized trust levels across different types of organizations in those countries.

An alternative strategy for disentangling the possible effects of participation on generalized trust is to compare active and passive members (Stolle 2003: 25). Higher level of engagement could thus possibly indicate more contact and thus a learning mechanism of generalized trust in voluntary organizations. Stolle (1998: 515; 518) does find support for this effect from higher engagement levels of individual participants in Germany and Sweden. However, she has no cheque-book members in her sample and as such does not have any passive members to compare the participants with. Wollebaek and Selle (2002) compare active, passive and non-members in a Norwegian sample in 1998. They find that the difference between members and non-members is much greater than between passive and active members. “Even the completely passive, that is, those who have not spent a single hour on associational activities over the past year and therefore have not been exposed to any face-to-face contact, are much more trusting than the outsiders” (Wollebaek & Selle 2002: 43). This again supports the self-selection rather than the socialization argument.

Disentangling causality

To be sure, however, we need either panel data or other types of analysis techniques in order to disentangle causality more properly. This is, in fact, the topic of a few studies, although mainly based on American data. Most of these studies use analysis techniques such as Two Stage Least Squares. If the dependent variable (here generalized trust) causes at least one of the independent variables (here participation

in voluntary organizations), 'reverse causation' could influence the 'true' estimates. An alternative technique is called Structural Equation Modelling, which uses simultaneous equations to estimate causal paths and reversed causation. These techniques result in unbiased estimates when the independent variables may be correlated with the error term as a result of the causality problems discussed before (endogeneity). Brehm and Rahn's (1997: 1012-14) analysis of pooled data from the American General Social Surveys for 1972-94 suggests that the effect of engagement on trust is higher than its reverse. However, Uslaner (2002: 128) reanalyses the same data, but includes optimism in the trust model. He finds trust leading to engagement rather than the opposite.

Other studies also find very weak relationships or point towards the opposite direction. These studies use panel data surveys, which follow the same respondents over time and as such have a more robust design. Claibourn and Martin (2000: 276) analyse a panel design in which students and their parents were followed from 1965 to 1982 (the Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study in Michigan). The results are not straightforward. While for the student sample neither engagement nor generalized trust are suggested as causing one another, for the parents' sample it seems that engagement could lead to more generalized trust, but its effect is very weak. The researchers, however, suggest that these results might be due to cohort effects (Claibourn & Martin 2000: 280-1). Jennings and Stoker's (2004: 366-70) reanalysis of the same panel with one additional wave in 1997 indicates exactly this cohort effect. For the parent panel they find that social trust is a prerequisite of engagement. The results for the student panel are similar as it suggests a path from trust to involvement, which also becomes stronger over time. However, the effect size of trust on engagement is very small here compared to the parent panel, which indicates the cohort effects suggested by Claibourn and Martin (2000). Stolle and Hooghe's (2004: 37) reanalysis of the Michigan data also suggests that there is no socialization effect due to participation in voluntary organizations.

In conclusion, there seems to be much more empirical support for the self-selection argument rather than the socialization effect. This is despite Putnam's

(2000: 136-7) aggregate analysis, which links civic engagement to trust.⁶⁹ What seems to be the case is that people join civic groups because they have already more trustful attitudes, rather than learning to trust through participation. The conclusion of this thesis is in line with the above. Participation in Turkish organizations seems not to pose a threat to generalized trust, since it seems that members of diverse organizations self-select into those on the basis of prior trusting attitudes. Thus, it would also be unlikely that there is a negative socialization effect at other ethno-national organizations.

7.2 Alternative explanations: beyond bridging and bonding

Since the results above suggested that most of the variation in generalized trust was to be explained at the individual level rather than at the organizational level, it seems plausible that differences in generalized trust are to be explained by individual level mechanisms. I explored three frameworks: social success factors, a psychological outlook and norm driven explanations. However, before discussing those results, I discuss how I validated the generalized trust question.

Validating generalized trust

I focused on validating the generalized trust question in order to ensure that the results are not due to poor operationalization rather than conceptual differences. I set out to examine how well the generalized trust item grouped with trust towards specific groups or particularized trust. Firstly, when all the items were grouped together, the factor loading of generalized trust came very close to trust towards neighbours, trust towards colleagues and trust towards people in the association. However, the scale as a whole performed rather poorly. When the items are regrouped, generalized trust loaded very well into a factor model with trust towards strangers, but less with trust towards colleagues and neighbours. The results of the confirmatory factor analysis substantiated its theoretical conceptualization that generalized trust reflects trust towards unknown people, which is in line with previous findings.

⁶⁹ Paxton (2007) also suggests in her review of the literature that the causal path seems to run from joining to trust, although she does not offer any empirical support for this.

There are not many studies empirically investigating the relationship between particularized trust and the conceptualization of generalized trust as trust towards unknown people or strangers. Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) distinguish between generalized trust and knowledge based trust in their comparative study of American and Japanese students. Uslaner (2002: 54) analyses the 1996 Pew Philadelphia Study and finds a three factor structure of trust: familiar people (such as family and friends), strangers and the government. Trust in strangers loads highest with trust towards people you meet on the street and next with generalized trust (Uslaner 2002: 54). Freitag and Traunmüller (2009: 785-6) also find a similar result in the German Socio-Economic Panel (the 2006 wave only). The factor structure of trust reflects two parts, with trust in family, friends and neighbours grouping in one part and trust in strangers, generalized trust and careful attitudes towards strangers grouping in the second part. Newton and Zmerli (2011: 178) analyse the 2005 to 2007 waves of the World Values Survey for 22 countries and again reach a parallel conclusion. While trust towards family, neighbourhood and people one personally knows group together, trust in people of another nationality or religion, people you meet for the first time and generalized trust group into a separate component. In fact, social psychological studies are rich with examples on how people's attitudes about trustworthiness of known categories is separate from trustworthiness of people they have never met (Sullivan & Transue 1999: 648).

Secondly, I examined prejudiced attitudes towards out-groups too. In most contact studies, the dependent variable is prejudice or ethno-centric attitudes rather than a positive emotion towards the generalized other. Testing how well generalized trust negatively relates to prejudice would further substantiate examining it in an interethnic framework of contact. However, for participants of Turkish and mixed organizations in Amsterdam, prejudiced feelings and generalized trust did not fit well into one factor model that represents a latent trust construct. This is again further support as to why generalized trust is not explained by interethnic contact at voluntary organizations. Beyond a bridging and bonding framework or interethnic contact, who trusts strangers?

Alternative explanations


In addition to the social success factors, I explored evidence for a psychological and a norm driven framework, in which I incorporated psychometric scales such as optimism, self-esteem, life satisfaction, individualism and humanitarianism. Firstly, the grouping of psychometric scales used in this study did not always result in good factor models. The optimism and self-esteem scales did not perform as well as the life satisfaction, individualism and humanitarian scales. Neither the psychological nor the norm driven models, although to some extent substantiated, resulted in very straightforward explanations. Firstly, among the psychological factors only the relationship between optimism and generalized trust rendered a statistically significant result, while across the norm driven factors only adherence to humanitarian values produced a statistically significant result. However, when combined into one model, only optimistic attitudes and an interaction effect of young age and humanitarian values related positively to more generalized trust attitudes. While optimism seems to have an independent effect on generalized trust, and constitutes the largest effect size, humanitarian values are dependent on different cohorts in affecting generalized trust. Participants who are 24 and younger and adhere to humanitarian values also report higher generalized trust as compared to those aged 55+ who adhere to humanitarianism. Thus humanitarianism moderates the negative effect of younger age on generalized trust. However, higher educational attainment and self-selection into a mixed organization had substantively the same positive effect size and constitute the second largest effect size. Finally, having lost one's partner through divorce or being widowed, as well as the age category 35 to 44 compared to the 55+, rendered the same negative results, which were also of the same size as the interaction effect of humanitarianism and the age category 24 and younger. The findings are summarized in figure 7.1 below.

Empirically, optimism seems to be mostly supported by the data here. Participants of Turkish and mixed organizations express higher generalized trust levels if they have higher optimistic attitudes too. Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994: 136) view generalized trust as resting on a cognitive bias. They argue that people with higher levels of generalized trust see the benevolence of humans beyond what the available information would allow them to. This psychological framework thus

leads one to take a risk in placing trust in the unknown other. This, in turn, is said to be related to being in control of one's life (Uslaner 2002). However, one can be in control by being content with one's life, as expressed in positive attitudes relating to life satisfaction, happiness, lack of recent experience of discrimination, not being victim of a crime and safety. On the other hand, one can also be in control by expressing optimism and self-esteem, which are more stable traits shaped early in life and reflect a positive worldview (Uslaner 1999: 139). However, traumatic experiences might negatively affect optimism.

In this study, I found more support for the effect of optimism rather than life satisfaction and the short term effects of negative life experiences. However, other studies emphasize the importance of life satisfaction, although they do not control for optimism. Among these studies we find Brehm and Rahn (1997: 1015), Newton (1999: 173), Whiteley (1999: 40-41), Calibourn and Martin (2000: 279), Putnam (2000: 332-5), Rothstein and Stolle (2003: 205), Freitag and Traunmüller (2009: 794) and Dinesen and Hooghe (2010: 719). Two studies have measures of optimism and find strong evidence for its effects, but do not control for life satisfaction (Uslaner 2002: 128-30, Dinesen 2010). In addition, in a Two Stage Least Squares analysis, Uslaner (2002: 129) finds stronger support for optimism explaining generalized trust rather than the reverse causal path. Two studies that do have life satisfaction and optimism in their models conclude exactly the opposite. While Uslaner and Brown (2005: 889) find greater effect sizes for optimism in comparison to life satisfaction, Delhey and Newton (2003: 109-10) find more support for life satisfaction rather than optimism. Finally, Alesina and Le Ferrera (2002: 219) find recent traumatic experiences affect generalized trust, although its effect size is smaller than educational attainment. In short, while many studies find evidence for psychological factors explaining generalized trust, the lack of simultaneous controls and contextual variation in the studied countries pose problems for the external validity of results found here. This suggests that while optimism is an important factor in determining the generalized trust of participants of mixed and Turkish organizations, it still needs to be studied further for other population and other subjective well-being variables need to be controlled for in order to establish the relative importance of each factor.

Figure 7.1 Revised theoretical framework of generalized trust at mixed and ethno-national organizations



The second largest effect size in explaining generalized trust among the participants of Turkish and mixed organizations is whether the respondent has a higher vocational or university degree in comparison to participants with no qualifications or only a primary school qualification. The results of other surveys in which associational engagement is controlled for are somewhat mixed. Most studies find a moderate effect of education. Among these we find Stolle (1998: 512; 2004: 191), Newton (1999: 18), Whiteley (1999: 40-1), Uslaner and Brown (2005: 882-3), Uslaner (2002: 107-8) and Freitag (2003: 224). The effect of educational attainment might not be linear. Other studies such as Brehm and Rahn (1997: 1012), Alesina and La Ferrara (2002: 219), Wollebaek and Selle (2002: 44), Rothstein and Stolle (2003: 206), Hooghe *et al.* (2009: 210) and Dinesen and Hooghe (2010: 718), however, report educational attainment as one of the strongest predictors of generalized trust. What might affect these results is the fact that they enter the variable as a linear one, even though it is measured on an ordinal scale, which requires comparing each level separately to a reference category. The studies above are also based on a wide set of data from different waves of the World Values Surveys and the American General Social Survey, different panel and single wave

country studies and data that sampled organizations and their participants. Different analysis techniques, variables controlled for, and contextual variations might affect their conclusions.

This problem has been overcome in a meta-analysis in which the effects of education on generalized trust has been pooled from 28 studies and further examined (Huang, Maassen van den Brink & Groot 2009). The results suggest that educational attainment is a strong and robust correlate of generalized trust. Furthermore, Huang, Maassen van den Brink and Groot (2008: 462) state that “effect sizes are significantly higher for people with a college degree or above. The popular one-factor OLS model, where it is assumed that education always be aggregated into a single measure, say years of schooling [or an ordinal scale], may not be a sufficient model to capture the effects of education”. In short, the conclusion of this study is confirmed across a wide set of populations. Having a higher vocational or university degree consistently explains higher levels of generalized trust.

In general, schooling has a positive effect on tolerance. As discussed by Stouffer in his seminal study on nonconformist attitudes among Americans in the 1960s, “schooling puts a person in touch with people whose ideas and values are different from one’s own. And this tends to carry on, after formal schooling is finished, through reading and personal contacts” (Stouffer cited in Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus 1982: 115). Education, by learning cosmopolitan values and cognitive experiences, teaches the individual to tolerate ideas that are different to theirs. However, the final years of schooling are more vital, as it is then that abstract ideas of citizenship, universalism, equality and so forth are taught. Newton (1999: 19) argues “perhaps it is in these last few years of education that people learn most about how to relate not only to those who are known personally, but also to those who one may never meet”.

While younger age (24 and younger as opposed to the age category 55+) was often found to be statistically significant and substantive in explaining generalized trust, in later models its value diminished. When I introduced optimism into the model, its effect was not important. However, the 35 to 44 year olds compared to the 55+ were significantly less trusting. This non-linear effect is also reflected in the findings of other studies. While over the life course, generalized trust seems to

increase, many studies still find its effect to be weak (Stolle 1998: 515; Whiteley, 1999: 40-1; Alesina & La Ferrara 2002: 217; Wollebaek & Selle 2002: 46; Rothstein & Stolle 2003: 206; Freitag & Traunmüller 2009: 795). A few studies, however, find stronger effect sizes (Uslaner 2002: 107; Jennings & Stoker 2004: 370). Jennings and Stoker's (2004) panel study shows that when individuals are followed over 30 years, trust seems to rise and fall over the course of one's life. They argue that "it might be that a trusting or distrusting disposition itself becomes more meaningful to the individual as she ages, just as it becomes more stable over the life course [, ...which might be reflective of] changing circumstances and opportunities faced by individuals at various points in their lives" (Jennings & Stoker 2004: 370). Thus, ageing alone does not affect trust independently. Its effect might be moderated by other variables.

In fact, that is what this study found too. Younger participants who adhered to humanitarian values were more trusting in comparison to participants who were older than 55. The effect of humanitarian values on trust is rarely investigated. Whiteley's (1999: 40-2) study of the World Values Survey data from 1992-3 is an exception, in which he finds support for moral values explaining generalized trust. However, he does not investigate any moderating effect of moral values in conjunction with demographic variables on generalized trust. Therefore, the findings in this thesis need to be further corroborated with other data sets that are representative of a wider population.

The final significant effect size, which in terms of size took the third place, is the effect of divorce or losing one's partner on generalized trust. Again, this variable is hardly ever investigated. Alesina and Le Ferrara (2002: 219) found modest effect sizes in their analysis. Therefore, the effect of divorce and separation also needs to be verified in other studies.

7.3 The significance of this project

Perhaps one of the most challenging questions in the social sciences is whether people change their attitudes due to socialization with others or whether they select situations and relationships (e.g. friendship, marriage, leisure and political activity), which reflect similar attitudes and behaviour to their own.

Theoretical, methodological and policy contribution of this study

The main question in this study is whether interethnic contact explains greater adherence to generalized trust among participants of mixed voluntary organizations. The answer to this question is negative and in line with previous research, which also found more evidence for a *self-selection* mechanism. In addition, this study has found evidence for the effects of optimism, higher education, humanitarian values for the younger cohorts, the divorced and widowed and finally the age category 35-44 compared to 55+ in explaining generalized trust. The effect of higher education on generalized trust is a consistent finding and again confirms that people who are socially successful in their lives have learned to put their trust in the hands of unknown others. The other effects of this study need to be confirmed further. However, having optimistic attitudes adds to the social success framework and is in line with the assumption that to trust unknown people is essentially a risky endeavour and that people who say that they trust the unknown other can afford to do so because they have a positive world view (Uslaner 2002) and might not have had severe negative life experiences. In effect, these factors are reflective of a more general cognitive process, *cognitive dissonance*, which explains a coherent positive pattern among one's attitudes due to the unpleasant affective state brought about by dissonant cognitions (Wegener & Carlston 2005: 515). When people have incomplete information about the behaviour of the unknown other or a stranger, they prefer interpretations or thoughts most consistent with their other salient cognitions such as optimism. This result is significant for studies on the voluntary sector as well as those on generalized trust in general.

Methodologically speaking, this study advances the literature, since it samples organizations and their participants rather than individuals in households. Most studies hitherto have based their analyses on single level regression models, in which contextual effects cannot appropriately be tested. As the results have shown, variance of generalized trust at the organizational level is very low, at 4%. Most of the variation in the generalized trust of the participants could thus be attributed to the individual level processes indicated above. Moreover, the studies that do directly test the contact hypothesis do not include enough ethno-national organizations in their

studies, but generalize their conclusions to those settings (see Stolle 1998; Rothstein & Stolle 2003).

The significance of this project lies also in the fact that it investigates the role of contact directly, as opposed to those studies that take ethnic composition as an aggregate measure at for example neighbourhood or even country level, which find an effect for *ethnic diversity* or ethnic fractionalization on generalized trust, and do not put the contact condition into the analysis. Among the first studies to find a negative effect of ethnic fractionalization on generalized trust is Alesina and Le Ferrera (2002). However, they find more support for income inequality rather than ethnic fractionalization, although the former is also statistically significant. The results of Cost and Kahn's (2003) analysis are also in line with the former as it finds more support for income inequality. Marschall and Stolle (2004) find a positive effect for racial heterogeneity on generalized trust. Moving beyond American data, Delhey and Newton (2005) also find stronger support for good government measures rather than ethnic fractionalization. They analysed the World Values Survey data in the 1990s. Coffé and Geys (2005) analyse Flemish data and conclude that when the percentage of *Western* minorities is high in a given municipality, generalized trust is lower. Leigh (2006) bases his analysis on Australian data and finds an insignificant effect for ethnic heterogeneity. Similarly, Bjornskov's (2006) analysis of World Values Survey data finds an insignificant effect for ethnic diversity. Paxton (2007), however, finds a negative effect of diversity on generalized trust. Putnam's (2007) community Benchmark Survey in the US also finds a negative effect of diversity on trust in neighbours. Analysing European Social Survey data, Hooghe *et al.* (2009) did not find a significant effect of rising ethnic diversity on generalized trust, or that the flux of foreigners negatively affects it. Gesthuizen, Van der Meer and Scheepers (2009) analyse the Eurobarometer data across 28 countries and find no significant effect of ethnic diversity on generalized trust. Dutch data also do not render significant effect sizes for presumed ethnic diversity on generalized trust (Gijsberts, Van der Meer & Dagevos 2011). Finally, Kesler and Bloemraad (2010) analyse World Values Survey data from the 1980s to the 2000s and find that income inequality interacts with rising levels of immigrants to negatively affect generalized trust.

Ironically, however, while some of the studies above conclude that ethnic diversity is an important factor that negatively affects generalized trust, contact between different groups is rarely examined in conjunction with generalized trust. Thus most of these studies assume that when ethnic diversity is high, people 'hunker down' (Putnam 2007). This is called the 'constrict' theory. Some take the proximity of ethnic groups as a proxy for contact and assume that interethnic contact increases the likelihood of saying one trusts the unknown other (Marschall & Stolle 2004). In other words, the contact hypothesis or a mechanism as to why ethnic diversity should negatively affect generalized trust remains largely untested. However, there are some exceptions. Phan (2008) finds no effect of friendship ties on generalized trust in her analysis of Canadian data. Stolle, Soroka and Johnston (2008) compare American and Canadian data and find that talking to neighbours mediated the negative effect of ethnic diversity in neighbourhoods. However, they operationalized trust as the likelihood that a hypothetically lost wallet would be returned, which indicates the trustworthiness of the residents of an area rather than generalized trust. This thesis has consistently shown that ethnic diversity and interethnic contact at voluntary organizations do not induce the participants to trust strangers. Rather, members of mixed organizations seem to self-select into those organizations on the basis of their prior level of generalized trust.

The above conclusion is important for *policy* makers as there is now evidence that ethno-national organizations are not posing a threat to a civic culture. Policy makers should worry less about funding cultural projects at these organizations. Ethno-national organizations fulfil an important role by organizing social and political events and providing information and services to groups of people who are difficult to reach. Without these activities minorities would be more isolated, specifically since the first generation ethnic minorities hardly speaks the Dutch language. Moreover, when the second generation organizes along ethnic lines in order to celebrate their culture, this is not a threat to the Dutch nation and values. By strengthening their 'Turkish' identity, they are not excluding themselves from the Dutch society. Most of the members of, for example, Turkish fraternities are highly educated people who are well integrated into the Dutch society.

As the discussion above about the role of higher education in generating generalized trust shows, it is more fruitful for policy makers to invest more energy and funds into stimulating participation in higher education in order to promote the development of generalized trust. It is also quite clear that cultural or ethnic diversity on its own does not impede trusting attitudes. As the discussion about the role of income inequality and redistributive welfare policies in increasing generalized trust above has shown, policy makers should focus more on how to overcome structural inequalities among minorities and the majority population for maintaining a civic culture.

As the literature on contact repeatedly has shown, for interethnic contact to translate into attitude change, it needs to surpass sporadic encounters (for example the annual barbeque or festival) and it also has to be supported by a favourable institutional setting that promotes equality between groups. Work places and schools are correspondingly good environments for forging the ties that bind. Policy makers should, therefore, not solely direct their policies regarding social mixing and interethnic contact at ethno-national voluntary organizations as if this by some miraculous way is going to reduce tension between the majority and minority populations.

Limitations of this study

This study has some limitations that need to be addressed too. Some of the variables of this research that were found statistically significant, for example optimism and adhering to humanitarian values for the young, need to be studied in conjunction with life satisfaction, perceived discrimination and other values in other data sets. This is because the population of this project is limited to participants of Turkish and mixed organizations in Amsterdam. We need to corroborate these findings in data sets representative of the general population in order to generalize them further.

Some factors were not investigated here. Parental upbringing style and childrearing practices might matter for the generation of generalized trust (Dinesen 2010). However, without panel data, responses about the role of parents that have been collected retrospectively might be biased. People tend to remember that their parents told them to be cautious, while people often forget if their parents stimulated them into trusting attitudes (Stolle 1998: 513). It might also be too deterministic to

view generalized trust as an unchangeable trait due to early socialization. In a study of immigrants, Dinesen and Hooghe (2010) demonstrate that there seem to be some positive effects on generalized trust due to acculturation in the host societies. In short, due to the possibly biased responses regarding parental socialization, I have left out this factor. Future research, based on a panel design, could overcome the limitation of the current study with respect to the role of parental or early socialization on generalized trust.

In addition, most studies on the voluntary sector and more generally the literature on generalized trust have so far often relied on cross-sectional designs. This is because collecting panel data is not only very costly, due to attrition rates, but it is also difficult to keep the respondents interested in the study, which might affect the quality of the results. However, some of the problems about causality are difficult to disentangle without longitudinal panel data. One such study that attempts to separate the effects of participation on generalized trust is Sønderskov's (2011) analysis of membership in different types of organizations. He concludes that environmental and humanitarian organizations attract people who are high in generalized trust, whereas generalized trust seems not to contribute towards membership in religious organizations. In the same vein, this study has shown that while high generalized trust seems to contribute towards participation in mixed organizations, participants of Turkish organizations are low trusters.

Despite these conclusions, it might still be the case that although higher prior levels of generalized trust are important for participation in mixed organizations and low trusters are attracted towards homogenous organizations, there might still be some additional learning effects as well. Sønderskov (2011) indeed points towards this. As Hooghe (2003: 106) also noted in his research on ethnocentrism among members of voluntary organizations, "too often it is assumed that processes of self-selection and socialization exclude one another. However, [i]f our findings were confirmed in other research settings, this could imply that voluntary associations too are subject to a "selection and adaptation" dynamic". To confirm such a conclusion appropriately, we need dynamic data sets that follow participants over a long period of time. That would then further elaborate whether there is an additional learning effect next to a self-selection mechanism.

Future avenues for research

Future avenues for research might extend the conclusions reached here to other settings and attitudes. One of the conclusions above was that generalized trust does not relate very well to prejudiced attitudes towards out-groups. This finding is very interesting and requires further corroboration with other data sets. We need to find evidence about the interrelationship of trust with prejudiced attitudes, ethnocentrism and toleration. A low correlation might then elucidate further why an interethnic contact framework is not appropriate in analysing differences in generalized trust.

Furthermore, although the research above suggests that interethnic contact in voluntary organizations might not increase generalized trust more than participation in higher education does and other attitudes such as optimism do, we need to investigate how other attitudes are affected. How does interethnic contact affect adherence to democratic attitudes, solidarity, values of fairness and redistributive justice? Beyond generalized trust, some studies have addressed that participation in some voluntary organizations affects levels of political and social tolerance (Iglič 2010), norms of citizenship (Zmerli 2010) and satisfaction with democracy (Van Deth 2010). This could be extended to investigating the role of interethnic contact.

Voluntary organizations' impact on a civic culture may not be limited to civic attitudes. As often mentioned in the literature, voluntary organizations could have institutional impacts and affect policies through mobilization (see Warren 1999; Fung 2003). Charles Tilly (2004) accounts for democratization through a historical process. He demonstrates how trust networks between citizens are formed. In his analysis, a trust network is a relationship of collaboration that "consists of placing valued outcomes at risk of others' malfeasance. Trust relations are those in which people regularly take such risks" (Tilly 2004: 4). As the process of democratization unfolds, more of these networks are formed, which will reach outside traditional bonds of kinship and ethnicity in response to unsatisfactory government performance, which in turn translates into the integration of trust networks into the systems of rule. As discussed in this thesis, Turkish organizations offer services and information to their participants, but do they also form alliances to influence policy? To what extent do mixed organizations affect policies and do they differ from ethno-national organizations in this respect (see e.g. Dekker *et al.* 2009)? How are these

networks then integrated into the system of rule and does that exclude other groups? Ethno-national organizations also have a potential to integrate the individual into society by creating opportunities for upward mobility (Lancee 2010). This in turn might also have beneficial effects for overcoming income inequalities.

In addition, investigating interethnic contact should not be limited to voluntary organizations and neighbourhoods. In the debate about the consequences of diversity for generalized trust and solidarity (civic attitudes), it is noticeable that almost no attention is paid to interethnic relations at the workplace (cf. Estlund 2005).⁷⁰ For example, in recent Amsterdam surveys ("Burgermonitor [Citizens' Monitor]" 2008), the respondents mentioned meeting people from different backgrounds most often at their workplace. In contrast, Dutch governmental reports repeatedly state that over the past 10 to 15 years contact between majority and minority population in their free time is not increasing (Dagevos, Gijsberts & Van Praag 2003; Gijsberts *et al.* 2010). Work relationships, once developed, often tend to be extended into meaningful friendship ties (Grossetti 2005). A strong sense of belonging is mostly evolved among co-workers rather than among neighbours and co-participants at voluntary clubs (Putnam 2000: 275). Not the least because people tend to spend the majority of their days working or are at home, rather than spend their time on leisure activities. In a study in the Netherlands, neighbour relations comprise only a third of all the relations of the respondents, and half of that sample did not report any neighbours in their personal networks (Völker & Flap 2007). While the workplace could hardly be characterised as democratic due to its involuntariness (Estlund 2005), it might, however, be that the potential for bringing people from different backgrounds together translates into a site that offers ample opportunities for integration and the convergence of civic attitudes. Could contact at the workplace then translate into enhanced civic attitudes? In a similar vein, interethnic contact at schools could potentially have learning effects for civic attitudes (see Lindo 2008).

As far as ethnic diversity has potential for changing societal structures, Portes (2010) offers a compelling account. He first identifies different elements of social life such as deeply rooted values and power structures, next to more superficial elements such as organizations and groups. For change to be deep and revolutionary,

⁷⁰ There are some notable exceptions, such as Otten, Van der Zee and Tanghe (2010), but this study conflates social trust with identification with the Netherlands.

he argues that it needs to transform cultural values and power structures. According to Portes (2010), the changes brought about by migration in Western Europe and across the Atlantic seem mostly to have affected the surface level of society. He states “professional migrants tend to acculturate rapidly and seek entry into the middle-class mainstream, riding on their occupational skills and cultural resources; manual labourers cluster in poor and marginal areas, creating a host of religious, cultural and sport organizations for comfort and self-defence... marginalised communities go on to pose a serious social problem. The problem, however, is not that they threaten the basic social and cultural order of these societies, but that they remain outside of it” (Portes 2010: 1549-50). Given the limited empirical evidence that ethnic diversity, on its own and without an interaction with institutional contexts, is challenging levels of generalized trust in Western societies, perhaps the present state of affairs is a crisis of perception.



APPENDIX A: THE QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH VERSION)

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES & PARTICIPATION IN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS IN AMSTERDAM

You have been given this questionnaire by a researcher from The University of Edinburgh. The goal of this research is to map activities and opinions of members of associations in Amsterdam. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact:

Ms. Wahideh Achbari
(Mobile) 06-24546426
(Email) w.achbari@sms.ed.ac.uk

Completing the questionnaire:

Please answer the questions in this booklet by placing a cross ☒ in the cells or circling a number as follows ④. You can only choose one answer, unless instructed otherwise. Sometimes you can skip a question, but that will clearly be indicated. Please use **capital letters** when you are asked to write down an answer.

All your answers will be treated in **strict confidence** and will be processed **anonymously** in accordance to Personal Data Protection Act (Wet Bescherming Persoonsdata).

The questionnaire takes approximately 20 to 30 minutes to complete, and we hope you will find it interesting and enjoyable.

Returning the questionnaire:

Please complete the questionnaire and return it to the researcher in the provided envelope.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP.

We would like to start with questions on your activities and contacts in

1. How long have you been involved in activities of this association?

 |_|_| Year(s) |_|_| Month(s)

2. On average about how many hours per week do you generally do something related to this association?

 |_|_| Hours per week

3. Are you a board member of this association? (*For example, secretary, treasurer, president, etc.*)

Yes

No

4. Could you please indicate in which type of activities you are involved for this organization?
(*Please answer all that applies*)

Taking part in events

Organising or helping to run an activity or event

Raising, accounting or handling money

Secretarial, admin or clerical work

Representing the organization

Leading an activity or event

Donation/paying contribution

Worship

Any other activity, please specify:

.....

5. In the past 6 months **have you** ever discussed important personal matters with anybody in your association?

Often

Sometimes

Never → **Go to question 7.**

6. How many of these people that you discuss important personal matters with are
Please write the digits in the cells below.

 |_|_| Board member(s)?

 |_|_| Active member(s)? (*Active members are people who often attend the sessions*)

 |_|_| Other member(s)?

7. In the past 6 months **has anyone** discussed important personal matters with you?

Often

Sometimes

Never → **Go to question 9.**

8. How many of these people that discussed important personal matters with you are
- Board member(s)?
- Active member(s)? (*Active members are people who often attend the sessions*)
- Other member(s)?
9. In an emergency, would you **lend** money to anyone in your association?
- Yes
- No → **Go to question 11.**
10. How many of these people that you would lend money to are
- Board member(s)?
- Active member(s)? (*Active members are people who often attend the sessions*)
- Other member(s)?
11. In an emergency, would you be able to **borrow** money from people in your association?
- Yes
- No → **Go to question 13.**
12. How many of these people that would borrow money to you are
- Board member(s)?
- Active member(s)? (*Active members are people who often attend the sessions*)
- Other member(s)?
13. In the past 6 months **have you** ever discussed political matters about the city of Amsterdam or the Netherlands with anyone in your association?
- Often
- Sometimes
- Never → **Go to question 15.**
14. How many of these people that you discuss political matters with are
- Board member(s)?
- Active member(s)? (*Active members are people who often attend the sessions*)
- Other member(s)?

15. In the past 6 months **has anyone** discussed political matters about the city of Amsterdam or the Netherlands with you?
- Often
- Sometimes
- Never → **Go to question 17.**

16. How many of these people that discuss political matters with you are

Board member(s)?

Active member(s)? (*Active members are people who often attend the sessions*)

Other member(s)?

The following questions are about your membership and activity in *other* voluntary associations.

The list **below** describes different **types** of organizations, groups, clubs or associations.

17. Are you a **member** of **another** voluntary organization than?
By membership we mean when you pay contribution, donate money or attend services/events/activities.

- No
- Yes (please indicate below after answering question 18)

18. Do you do **unpaid voluntary work** for any organization **other** than?
By unpaid voluntary work we mean helping to run activities even if you get paid a small fee. For example, coaching, collecting money, helping in campaigns, or doing admin and executive work.

- No → **Go to question 21.**
- Yes (please indicate at **question 20**)

TYPE ASSOCIATION	19. MEMBER		20. UNPAID VOLUNTARY WORK	
A. Youth club	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
B. Sports/exercise	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
C. Hobby club/ recreation/ arts/social clubs (for example choir, dance club, book club)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
D. Student's association	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E. Religious group or mosque	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
F. Organization for or by the elderly	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
G. Women's organization	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
H. Health organization (for example Astmafonds)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
I. Interest organization (for example ANWB)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
J. The environment, animals	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
K. Justice, human rights and third world	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
L. Trade union or organization related to your job	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
M. Political party or organization	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
N. Other, please specify:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No

There are **other types of groups** one can do voluntary work for.

21. **Are you doing unpaid voluntary work for these groups below?**

TYPE GROUP	UNPAID VOLUNTARY WORK	
A. School or parent committee	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
B. Other practical help at school (for example extra lessons)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
C. At a kindergarten, childcare facility, nursery	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
D. Neighbourhood committee or centre, tenants association	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
E. Help to neighbours	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
F. Social work: giving advice/information at a telephone help service or a legal aid centre, counselling, disability help	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
G. Fire fighters or ambulance services	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
H. Another activity, please specify:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No

22. Did you answer **YES** to questions 17 to 21?

Could you please write the name(s) of associations and groups as listed in the telephone guide below? (For instance "KIKVORS VOETBAL", "VERENIGING SADIGH", "BASISSCHOOL DE BOOMGAARD") Please use capital letters. **Could you also indicate how long you have been affiliated with these groups?**

MEMBER AFFILIATION	LENGTH	
*	Year(s)	Month(s)
*	Year(s)	Month(s)
*	Year(s)	Month(s)
*	Year(s)	Month(s)
*	Year(s)	Month(s)
*	Year(s)	Month(s)
*	Year(s)	Month(s)
*	Year(s)	Month(s)

UNPAID VOLUNTARY WORK AFFILIATION	LENGTH	
*	Year(s)	Month(s)
*	Year(s)	Month(s)
*	Year(s)	Month(s)
*	Year(s)	Month(s)
*	Year(s)	Month(s)
*	Year(s)	Month(s)
*	Year(s)	Month(s)
*	Year(s)	Month(s)

23. Have you **previously** (but not any longer) been a member of any type of groups, clubs or associations or have you done voluntary work for any type of group?

- Yes
 No → Go to question 26.

24. If you answered **YES** to the previous question, please **put a cross next to the type of group** and **specify how long you have been affiliated** with these groups.

TYPE ASSOCIATION/GROUP	LENGTH AFFILIATION
<input type="checkbox"/> School or parent committee	___ Year(s) ___ Month(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> Youth club/children's activities	___ Year(s) ___ Month(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> Student's associations	___ Year(s) ___ Month(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> Neighbourhood committee or centre, tenants association	___ Year(s) ___ Month(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> Sports/exercise	___ Year(s) ___ Month(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> Hobby club/ recreation/ arts/social clubs	___ Year(s) ___ Month(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> Religious group or mosque	___ Year(s) ___ Month(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> Organization by or for the elderly	___ Year(s) ___ Month(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> Women's organization	___ Year(s) ___ Month(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> Health organization (for example Astmafonds)	___ Year(s) ___ Month(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> Disability and social welfare organization	___ Year(s) ___ Month(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> Interest organization (for example ANWB)	___ Year(s) ___ Month(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> The environment, animals	___ Year(s) ___ Month(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> Justice, human rights and third world	___ Year(s) ___ Month(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> Trade union/organization related to your job	___ Year(s) ___ Month(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> Political party or organization	___ Year(s) ___ Month(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> Other, please specify:	___ Year(s) ___ Month(s)

25. Could you write the **name(s)** of up to 5 groups, **clubs or associations** that you have previously been a member of or have done **voluntary work** for? (As it appears in the telephone book, for instance "KIKVORS VOETBAL"; "VERENIGING SADIGH"; "BASISSCHOOL DE BOOMGAARD")
Please use capital letters.

MEMBER

- *
- *
- *
- *
- *

VOLUNTARY WORK

- *
- *
- *
- *
- *

The following questions are about social and political issues.

Below you will find a few statements. **On a scale of 0 to 10 could you please circle the number that comes closest to your opinion?** *You can choose any number. There are no right or wrong answers. Please give your first impression.*

0 stands for
Totally
disagree

5 stands for
neither agree/nor disagree

10 stands for
Totally
agree

26. There are two kinds of people: the strong and the weak.

Totally												Totally
Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	agree

27. Obedience and respect for authority are the two most important virtues children should learn.

Totally												Totally
Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	agree

28. We need strong leaders to tell us what to do.

Totally												Totally
Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	agree

29. Everything should be better if people talked less and worked harder.

Totally												Totally
Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	agree

30. Human nature is fundamentally cooperative.

Totally												Totally
Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	agree

31. Humanity, our fellow-citizens, solidarity . . . it's all a lot of rubbish. Each one has to take care of oneself.

Totally												Totally
Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	agree

32. Being concerned about others is less important than looking after your own personal success.

Totally												Totally
Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	agree

33. People should always pursue their personal pleasure and mustn't think too much about others.

Totally												Totally
Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	agree

34. It is detestable to strive in the first place for a prominent position for yourself.

Totally												Totally
Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	agree

35. The dignity and well-being of all should be the most important concern in any society.

Totally												Totally
Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	agree

- 36.** One of the problems of today's society is that people are often not kind enough to others.
- Totally Disagree Totally agree
- | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
- 37.** People should always be concerned about the well-being of others.
- Totally Disagree Totally agree
- | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
- 38.** People tend to pay more attention to the well-being of others than they should.
- Totally Disagree Totally agree
- | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
- 39.** Homosexual and heterosexual couples should have the same rights.
- Totally Disagree Totally agree
- | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
- 40.** Men and women should be able to live together even if they are not married.
- Totally Disagree Totally agree
- | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
- 41.** Censorship of films and magazines is not necessary in a democracy.
- Totally Disagree Totally agree
- | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
- 42.** Extreme-right political parties should be allowed to run for elections.
- Totally Disagree Totally agree
- | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
- 43.** Political parties are only interested in my vote and not in my opinion.
- Totally Disagree Totally agree
- | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
- 44.** People like me have a say in politics.
- Totally Disagree Totally agree
- | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
- 45.** Members of the parliament don't care much about what people like me think.
- Totally Disagree Totally agree
- | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
- 46.** Governmental and political affairs look so complex that I am unable to understand them.
- Totally Disagree Totally agree
- | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
- 47.** I'm interested in Dutch political affairs.
- Totally Disagree Totally agree
- | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|

48. It would be my full intention to vote if there are general or local elections held tomorrow?

Totally disagree	Totally agree	
0	10	<input type="checkbox"/> Can't vote

Thinking about the following groups of people, could you please indicate on a scale of 0 to 10 how much you trust them? *You can choose any number.*

	Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Very much
49. Your neighbours	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
50. Your colleagues	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
51. Your friends	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
52. Your family	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
53. People in this organization	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
54. Turks in Amsterdam	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
55. Moroccans in Amsterdam	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
56. Surinamese in Amsterdam	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
57. The Dutch in Amsterdam	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
58. Strangers	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
59. Fellow-citizens	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Thinking about the following groups, how much do you trust them?

	Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Very much
60. The national government	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
61. The local government	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
62. The district government in Amsterdam	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Below you will find a few statements again. **On a scale of 0 to 10 could you please circle the number that comes closest to your opinion?** *You can choose any number. There are no right or wrong answers. Please give your first impression.*

63. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

You can't be too careful	Most people can be trusted	
0	10	

64. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they be fair?

Take advantage	Try to be fair	
0	10	

65. Would you say that most of the time people would try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?

Try to be Helpful	Look out for themselves	
0	10	

66. If you would have children or have children, how would you feel if they would have friends from a different ethnic background than yourself?

Totally disapprove											Totally approve
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

67. If you would or have children, would you approve or disapprove if they had a partner from a different ethnic background than yourself?

Totally disapprove											Totally approve
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

68. Someone loses their wallet with address details and 50 euro in Kalver Straat. From 100 people how many would return it to the owner?

Persons

69. If returned, what would be the relevant reasons for this? Could you indicate the different reasons by dividing 100 points between the options mentioned below? *Make sure that the sum adds to 100 points.*

They feel sympathy for the person who has lost his/her wallet.

They base their actions on ethical considerations.

The person expects a financial reward or praise from the person who has lost his/her wallet.

100 Points (total sum)

70. If you would return the lost wallet, what would be your motivation to do so? *You can again divide 100 points below.*

I feel sympathy for the person who has lost his/her wallet.

I base my actions on ethical considerations.

I expect a financial reward or praise from the person who has lost his/her wallet.

100 Points (total sum)

The following questions are about your satisfaction with areas of your life, safety and well-being.

On a scale of 0 to 10 how satisfied are you with.....

	Not at all										Very much
71. your life?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
72. your neighbourhood?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
73. your home?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
74. your societal position?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
75. your financial means?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
76. your health?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

77. Have you felt being discriminated against in the last 12 months?

- Yes
 No

78. Have you been victim of a crime in the past 12 months? (For example theft, burglary, etc.)

- Yes
 No

79. Have you felt unsafe in the past 12 months?

- Yes
 No → **Go to question 81.**

80. On a scale of 0 to 10, how much have you felt safe?

Not safe												Very safe
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

81. And again on a scale between 0 and 10, how much do you consider yourself a happy person?

Not happy												Very happy
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

On a scale of 0 to 10 how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

82. I'm always optimistic about my future.

Totally Disagree												Totally agree
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

83. I rarely count on good things happening to me.

Totally Disagree												Totally agree
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

84. Things never work out the way I want them to.

Totally Disagree												Totally agree
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

85. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.

Totally Disagree												Totally agree
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

86. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.

Totally Disagree												Totally agree
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

87. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.

Totally Disagree												Totally agree
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

88. I am able to do things as well as most other people.

Totally Disagree												Totally agree
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

89. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.

Totally Disagree												Totally agree
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

We would like to finish off with some background information about you and your household.

90. What year were you born?

19

91. Are you male or female?

- Male
 Female

92. Do you consider yourself belonging to any particular religion?

- Yes
 No → **Go to question 94.**

93. IF YES: Which?

- Christianity
 Islam
 Judaism
 Hinduism
 Buddhism
 Other, please
specify:.....

94. What is your marital status?

- Married/living together → **Go to question 97.**
 Divorced → **Go to question 95.**
 Widow/widower → **Go to question 96.**
 Never been married → **Go to question 97.**

95. In which year were you divorced? → **Ga naar vraag 97.**

96. In which year were you widowed?

97. How does your household look like?

- I live alone → **Go to question 99.**
 I live with my parents
 Single with child(ren) living in the household (*If applicable, please indicate the number of your children in the empty cells*)
 Married couple/living with partner without any child(ren) in the household
 Married couple/living with partner with child(ren) living in the household (*If applicable, please indicate the number of your children in the empty cells*)

98. How many people in total are in your household? (*including yourself, it's about the persons living permanently in your house*)

persons

99. Which of these situations applied to what you are **currently** doing? (Please answer all that applies)

- In education
- In paid work, less than 20 hours (self-employed or employed by others)
- In paid work, more than 20 hours (self-employed or employed by others)
- Unemployed (looking for a job or otherwise)
- Permanently sick or disabled
- Wholly retired from work
- Looking after the home and/or children
- Doing unpaid work outside the house
- Something else, please specify:

.....

100. What is the **level of your highest completed educational degree**? If you have a degree from abroad, please indicate its Dutch equivalent according to the categories below.

- No education or a few years of primary school
- Primary school
- Lower vocational education (LBO, LTS, VMBO)
- Secondary education (MAVO, VMBO-TL)
- Secondary vocational education (MBO, MEAO, MTS)
- Higher secondary education (HAVO, HBS, VWO)
- Higher vocational education (HBO, HTS, HEAO, Bachelor)
- University (WO, Kandidaats, Bachelor, Master)
- Other degree, please specify:

.....

101. What is the **total monthly net income of your household in Euros**? If you live with your parents, what is your total net income in Euros? (Your net income is the amount that is deposited on your account every month. If your household has more than one income please add all to the total sum.)

- Less than 700 Euros net
- Between 701 and 1000 Euros net
- Between 1001 and 1350 Euros net
- Between 1351 and 1700 Euros net
- Between 1701 and 2050 and Euros net
- Between 2051 and 3200 Euros net
- More than 3200 Euros net

The next questions are about your country of birth and that of your parents or partner.

Where.... **102. were you born?** **103. was your mother born?** **104. was your father born?**

The Netherlands	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Another country, please specify:

Where.... **105.** was your **partner** born?
(If applicable)

The Netherlands

Another country, please specify:

Please only answer **question 106**, if you are not born in the Netherlands.

106. How many years have you been living in the Netherlands, if you are born elsewhere?

Years

On a scale of 0 to 10 could you please indicate how much you feel attached to....?

	Not at all	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Very much
107. The Netherlands		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
108. Amsterdam		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Please only answer **question 109**, if **your parents** are **not born in the Netherlands**.

109. On a scale between 0 and 10 could you please indicate how much you feel attached to your parents country of birth?

please specify:

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

please specify:

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Please only answer **question 110**, if **you** are **not born in the Netherlands**.

110. On a scale between 0 and 10 could you please indicate how much you feel attached to your parents country of birth?

please specify:

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

111. Do you have friends from your own ethnic background or from other ethnic backgrounds?

- Only from my own background
- Mostly from my own background
- As much from my own background as from other ethnic backgrounds
- Mostly from other ethnic backgrounds
- Only from other ethnic backgrounds

112. Do you ever work or take part in activities with people from other ethnic backgrounds than yours?

- Often
- Sometimes
- Never → **Go to question 114.**

113. Where or when do you take part in activities with people from other ethnic backgrounds?

- At work
- During voluntary work
- At school, college or university (If applicable)
- At school or childcare facility of my children (If applicable)
- In the neighbourhood
- At the sport club
- At a night out
- At a hobby club or during other cultural activities
- When visiting friends and acquaintances
- When visiting family
- When visiting neighbours
- During other activities, please specify:

.....

114. Could you please write the first 4 digits of your postcode below?

--	--	--	--

115. If you have any comments or suggestions on this research please write these below.

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

116. Would you be interested in participating in a follow-up interview? Your help is greatly appreciated.

IF YES, please write your details in capital letters below. Your details will be treated with strict confidence.

Name.....

Address.....

Postcode.....

Mobile.....

Landline.....

Email.....

THIS WAS OUR FINAL QUESTION. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME!

If you are interested in a summary of the results please see the next sheet.

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE (DUTCH VERSION ONLY)



Titel onderzoek: SOCIALE EN POLITIEKE ATTITUDES & PARTICIPATIE IN VRIJWILLIGE ORGANISATIES IN AMSTERDAM

Het doel van dit interview is om activiteiten van verenigingen in Amsterdam in kaart te brengen. Mocht u vragen hebben naar aanleiding van dit onderzoek, aarzelt u niet contact op te nemen met:

Drs. Mw. Wahideh Achbari
(Mobile) **06-24546426**
(Email) **w.achbari@sms.ed.ac.uk**

Al uw antwoorden zullen **strikt vertrouwelijk** worden behandeld en zullen **anoniem** worden verwerkt in overeenstemming met Wet Bescherming Persoonsdata.

Het interview zal ongeveer 30 minuten in beslag nemen.

Hierbij geeft, ondergetekende, toestemming dat dit interview opgenomen mag worden en informatie uit dit interview gebruikt mag worden bij het bovenstaand onderzoek.

Naam	Handtekening	Datum
.....	

Naam	Handtekening	Datum
.....	

Interview handleiding organisaties Amsterdam

NAAM ORG.....

GESPROKEN MET:.....

- 1) In welk jaar is deze organisatie opgericht?
- 2) Wat zijn uw activiteiten?
- 3) Hoe vaak worden er activiteiten georganiseerd?
- 4) Hoe vaak komt het bestuur samen?
- 5) Is uw organisatie lid van overkoepelende organisatie?
- 6) Bent u betrokken bij andere organisaties? Bijv. werkt u er mee samen?
Heeft u contact met andere organisaties?
Kunt deze organisaties waar u in het afgelopen half jaar mee samen heeft gewerkt?
- 7) Weet u of uw leden ook lid zijn van andere organisaties?
- 8) Hoeveel leden heeft u?
Hoeveel van deze leden zijn actief betrokken bij de organisatie?
- 9) Heeft uw organisatie weleens contact met politieke organen?
Met welke?
- 10) Waaruit bestaat uw inkomsten?
- 11) Krijgt uw organisatie fondsen van anderen?
Zoja, wie zijn de geldschieters?

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