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“[A] humbled China will be more open to receive the salvation of Jesus Christ!”: Two Church Periodicals’ Views on the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanesese War

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PhD — Divinity (World Christianity)  
18 June 2018

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# Abstract of Thesis

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There is writing about how nineteenth-century churchgoers’ views of other countries were formed by church periodicals. And there is writing about how opinions of the Cing and Japanese Empires were changed by the “Cing-Japanese War of 1894–1895” (“First Sino-Japanese War”; “Jiá-wǔ War”), and the “Japanese-Táiwanesé War of 1895.” But, there are no works making connections between these bodies of writing. This work makes such a connection through a comparison of writing about the wars in two church periodicals, the England-based *Monthly Messenger and Gospel in China*, and the Táiwán-based “*Dāi-lám Church News*” (“*Dāi-lám Hu-siá” Gàò-hoê-be*”). It makes the argument that the periodicals’ writers and editors were on the side of the Japanese, as it seemed to them that Japanese success against the Cing Empire, and Japanese rule in Táiwán, would make Western ways commoner in these places, which would be good for the Protestant Churches there. But the writers and editors had to give their opinions differently, as their readers were in different positions with respect to the wars. The *Monthly Messenger’s* readers were in England; nothing the writers said about the war would make them any less safe, and so in both wars the periodical gave its support to the Japanese loudly and frequently. But the *Church News’* readers and writers were in Táiwán. Openly supporting an attacking country could put them in danger, so the writers said nothing for or against any side in the first war, and were but quietly against the Táiwanesé Republic in the second.

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## LAY SUMMARY

There is writing about how nineteenth-century churchgoers' views of other countries were formed by church periodicals. And there is writing about how opinions of the Qing and Japanese Empires were changed by the "Qing-Japanese War of 1894–1895" ("First Sino-Japanese War"; "Jiá-wǔ War"), and the "Japanese-Táiwanesse War of 1895." But, there are no works making connections between these bodies of writing. This work makes such a connection through a comparison of writing about the wars in two church periodicals, the England-based *Monthly Messenger and Gospel in China*, and the Táiwán-based "*Dāi-lám Capital Church News*" ("Dāi-lám Hu-siá<sup>n</sup> Gào-hoê-be"). It makes the argument that the periodicals' writers and editors were on the side of the Japanese, as it seemed to them that Japanese success against the Qing Empire, and Japanese rule in Táiwán, would make Western ways commoner in these places, which would be good for the Protestant Churches there. But the writers and editors had to give their opinions differently, as their readers were in different positions with respect to the wars. The *Monthly Messenger's* readers were in England; nothing the writers said about the war would make them any less safe, and so in both wars the periodical gave its support to the Japanese loudly and frequently. But the *Church News's* readers and writers were in Táiwán. Openly supporting an attacking country could put them in danger, so the writers said nothing for or against any side in the first War, and were but quietly against the Táiwanesse Republic in the second.

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## A note on names and languages

In Tái-wan, there have for hundreds of years been many languages in use. As such, nearly every place on the island has at least two names; and some have many more. For example, in the island's northwest is a city given the name "Meu-lit" by its makers. But to the Say-siyat, one of Tái-wan's many groups of "aborigines," the city's name is "Ma:ih"; and to the Ê-mńg users in the island's south, its name is "Biāo-lêk." When the Japanese took over Tái-wan in 1895, they gave the city a Japanese name, "Byōritsu." And when the Republic of China took control from the Japanese in 1945, the city got yet another Chinese name, "Miáo-lì," the name which is on most maps today.

So, when writing about the history of Tái-wan, for each city, mountain, river, and so on, a writer must make a decision about which of their many names to give. The most common answer is to give the present-day names in the present-day "National Language" — "Guó-yǔ" (a sort of "Mandarin Chinese," very like the "Pǔ-tong-huà" of the People's Republic of China). There are good reasons for doing this: Guó-yǔ names are widely used outside of Tái-wan, and if the readers' knowledge of Tái-wan is limited, they are more likely to have seen these names than any others. But it is a far from perfect answer: Guó-yǔ names were not common in Tái-wan before the 1950s, and if one is writing about an earlier time, there seems something not quite right about giving names for places that would have been strange to the persons living there. Would one give an account of "Istanbul" in the time of the Byzantine Empire? Or "London" in the time of the Romans?

And so something different is done here. This work gives the place-names that were in common use at the time of the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanesse War. For most places in Tái-wan these are "Ê-mńg" ("Amoy") names; but for a small number of places they are names from one of the "Hak-gá" ("Hakka") languages, or one of the Formosan languages. In theory, this could be done for other parts of the Cing Empire too. One could give the "Guǎng-jhou"

(“Cantonese”) names for places in that city; and one could give the Mongolian and Uyghur names for places in the Empire where those languages were common. But this has not been done here. For the parts of the Cing Empire where Ê-mńg, Hak-gá, or the Formosan languages were not in use, the present-day Guó-yǔ names are given. As there was no agreement about the name of “Tái-wan” among the different language users living there, this work simply gives its Guó-yǔ name too. So, keep in mind that “Táiwaneſe” is here the name given to all persons living on Tái-wan at the time of the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwaneſe War, whatever their first language.

To be ſure, it would be better to give the “true” names of everywhere in the Cing Empire, but at preſent the only ſystem able to put all the Empire’s many languages into writing is the International Phonetic Alphabet, of which the greater part of readers likely have little knowledge. In fact, even making uſe of Ê-mńg, Guó-yǔ, and Hak-gá in the ſame work is no ſimple thing: there are many different writing ſystems for the three languages; all do their work well enough, but many make uſe of the ſame ſigns for different ſounds. For example, in Hàn-yǔ Pin-yin, the moſt common ſystem for writing Gúo-yǔ and Pǔ-tong-huà, “ó” is the ſign for /oɿ/; but in Bêh-wê-rī, the moſt common ſystem for writing Ê-mńg, it is the ſign for /əɿ/.

But, there is one group of ſystems that comes nearer than any other to not having this trouble. In the 1990s the government of Tái-wan made new writing ſystems for the iſland’s three Chinese languages: “Táiwaneſe,” Hak-gá, and Guó-yǔ. This work makes uſe of this family of ſystems, the “Tong-yòng (‘Universal’) Pin-yin” ſystems. There are two reaſons for this: firſt, the Tong-yòng Pin-yin ſystems are ſimple for Engliſh uſers — by deſign they make uſe of letters in the ſame ways as Engliſh; and ſecond, all three ſystems make uſe of letters in nearly the ſame way. In fact, the three ſystems are ſo much like each other, it is ſtrange that the makers did not ſimply make one ſystem for all three languages. But they did not, and ſo ſome ſmall changes have been made here. As the Tong-yòng Pin-yin ſystem for Guó-yǔ is the moſt like Engliſh, where the

systems make use of different letters for the same sounds, the Guó-yǔ way or writing them is used. But, there are a small number of sounds for which the Hak-gá system has been put to use. For the details of why, and the three systems' workings, see the chart on the next page.

Some readers will doubtless be put off by seeing “Tainan” as “Dāi-lám” and “Taipei” as “Dāi-bak.” But at the time of the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanesé War, Japanese names had not yet come to the island, and Guó-yǔ names did not yet exist; giving a history of the War's effect on Tái-wan using “Tainan” and “Taipei” would be giving a false idea of the time and place. What is more, this work has in part to do with the attempts of outsiders to remake the minds of others by giving them new names for the world around them, sometimes by force. This was done to Tái-wan a number of times, and it is the writer's hope that making use of the old name will make the reader keep this in mind.

## I — Introduction

In November of 1894, after three weeks of fighting, the Japanese Army took control of Wei-hǎi-wèi, a military base in the northern Cing Empire.<sup>1</sup> The best fighting forces in the Empire had been broken, and the best ships of the Cing Navy were in the hands of the Japanese, before whom the road to the Cing capital was open — to many, it seemed that the old Empire’s end was at hand. In the south, British missionaries to the Presbyterian Church in Southern Tái-wan gave Churchgoers the bad news. Writing in the Church’s monthly periodical, the *Dāi-lám Capital Church News* (“*Dāi-lám Hu-siá” Gào-hoê-be*”), they said that the island was in great danger, and that the Churchgoers must be ready for anything:

We do not know where the situation will go; many people are rumouring that Tái-wan will be attacked, but we cannot know for sure.  
*Āo-lái é sè-bhīn m-zai bhêh gao an-zoa<sup>n</sup>-yiū<sup>n</sup>. Zê-zê láng dêh hōng-sia<sup>n</sup>  
gòng bêh lái pah Dāi-wán; zong-sī yao-bhoê tang zai.*<sup>2</sup> (118: 4)

But, on the other side of the world, the Presbyterian Church of England’s flagship periodical, the *Monthly Messenger and Gospel in China*, had a different view of things. Its makers were happy with the War’s development, for the Cing Empire’s loss could be the Cing Churches’ gain. And so it was that they said to readers “May it be, as some are hopefully predicting, that a humbled China will be more open to receive the salvation of Jesus Christ!” (588: 59).

Given these different views, it may come as a surprise that the *Monthly Messenger* and the *Church News* were sister periodicals. The Presbyterian Church in southern Tái-wan had got its start with the help of the Presbyterian Church of

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<sup>1</sup> The country’s complete name was “Great Cing Empire” (“*Dà Cing Dì-guó*”), but its government and persons had other names for it too, like “Central Civilisation” (“*Jhōng-huá*”) — from its position as the centre of the civilised world — or “Central Country” (“*Jhōng-guó*”) — from its position at the centre of the physical world. In English it was most often given the name “China,” but as this name has been given to many East Asian countries over the years, sometimes more than one at the same time, this work makes use of a less general name, “Cing Empire.” Take note that “the Cing” — that is, the persons of the Cing Empire, or their government — are not the same group as “the Chinese” — that is, users of one or more of the Chinese languages. The greater part of the Cing persons were Chinese, but there were other language groups in the Empire too, as well as Chinese living in other parts of the world.

<sup>2</sup> Translation mine, as are all translations from *Ē-mng* and Mandarin in this work.

England, and in 1894 the Churches' relations were still close. The English Church regularly sent money to the Táiwanese Church, and less regularly sent men and women to the "South Formosa Mission," the organisation which gave the Church its pastors, doctors, teachers — and the editors and writers of the *Church News*. And the missionaries were writers not only for the Táiwanese periodical, but for the *Monthly Messenger* too. To it they sometimes sent pieces of writings specially for publication, and they regularly sent accounts of their work, with the knowledge that these would be made into material for the *Monthly Messenger*.<sup>3</sup> The periodical's editor might put complete letters into the periodical, take quotations from them, or simply take them as a base for his own accounts of things in Tái-wan. But whatever was done with the missionaries' letters in the end, it was from them that the mission's supporters in England got their news of events in Tái-wan. This was normally of the sorts of events usual at a mission Church: making new churches, teaching at the Church schools, and so on.<sup>4</sup> But in 1894 there took place a most unusual event, which was to have a great effect on the two Churches — the "Cing-Japanese War."

That it would be important to the Churches was not at first clear to everyone, for the causes of the War had nothing to do with Tái-wan. The Japanese Empire had been for many years hoping to get more control over the Joseon Kingdom, their nearest neighbour, but a vassal state of the Cing Empire.<sup>5</sup> In 1894 there was a rebellion in the Joseon Kingdom, and at the request of the Joseon King, the Cing Empire sent soldiers to put it down. This was the chance for

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<sup>3</sup> In fact, these accounts were updates sent to the Church's "Foreign Missions Committee, then given to the periodical's editor.

<sup>4</sup> In this work, a "church" (with a small "c") is a group of persons regularly coming together for organised worship, and a "Church" (with a capital "C") is a number of such groups having their leaders in common. For example, the *Church* of England has many *churches* in London.

<sup>5</sup> The Joseon Kingdom's complete name was "Great Joseon Kingdom" ("Dae Joseon Guk"). In English it was more commonly given the name "Korea." But with this name there is the same trouble as with "China," and so this work makes use of the less general name, "Joseon Kingdom." The Japanese Empire's complete name was "Great Nippon Empire" ("Dai Nippon Teikoku"); in English, it was usually given the name "Japan." For the reasons given above, it would be better to make use of the name "Nippon Empire." But the events of the twentieth century gave "Nippon" a somewhat dangerous flavour in English, which it still has to some degree today. For the reason, this work makes use of the name "Japanese Empire." Take note that the groups "Japanese" (the persons of the Japanese Empire, or their government) and "Japanese" (users of the Japanese language) are the same.

which the Japanese government had been waiting. The 1885 “Tian-jin Convention” gave them the right to send their own soldiers into the Joseon Kingdom at such times, which they quickly did. Once there, the Japanese Army and Navy then made a number of quick attacks on their Cing opposites. The Cing were taken by surprise, and the Japanese quickly got control of the Joseon Kingdom, then took the War into the Cing Empire itself. In theory, the Cing had the advantage in numbers and materials, but on the battlefield they were overcome again and again by the Japanese. By the start of 1895, the Cing government had to make a request for peace.

The price of peace was high. Among other things, the Cing Empire had to give the province of Tái-wan over to the Japanese. But the Táiwanese were not happy about this, and before the Japanese could take control, the Táiwanese had made a new government, the “Táiwanese Republic,” and had made clear in a Declaration of Independence that they were now free of the two empires.<sup>6</sup> So there was a second War, the “Japanese-Táiwanese War,” between East Asia’s newest Empire and its newest Republic. It was surprisingly hard going for the Japanese, but they got the better of their enemy in the end, and by the start of 1896 were in control of the island.

These Wars were naturally of great interest to the Churchgoers in Tái-wan, and to the mission supporters in the U.K. And so, from the summer of 1894 to the winter of 1895, the *Church News* and *Monthly Messenger* had many accounts of the Wars and their effects. This work is a comparison of what the two periodicals said. It makes the argument that the periodicals’ views on the Wars were very much alike, but that their ways of giving these views to readers were quite different, chiefly by reason of their readers’ different relations to the warring governments.

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<sup>6</sup> This country’s complete name in Ê-mńg was simply “Dāi-wán Republic” (“Dāi-wán Bhin-zu-gek”). In English, its name is sometimes given as “Formosan Republic.” But, as this work makes use of the island’s Guó-yǔ name “Tái-wan” (see “Note on Names and Languages”), here the country’s name is “Táiwanese Republic.”

## QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Before going into the details of this argument, it may be best to take a step back, and say something about the question to which it is an answer, and how this question came to be of interest. Missionary periodicals have long been important tools for anthropologists, linguists, historians, and many researchers of many other sorts. And unsurprisingly, there have been many discussions in these groups of the troubles with making use of missionary periodicals. These have given birth to a great amount of writing about the ways in which missionaries — purposely and otherwise — made questionable accounts of the places where they were living, the work they were doing there, and the persons among whom they were working — usually in support of the missionaries' own interests. These discussions, and the writings that have come out of them, are of great value, but at times too quick to make the jump from examples to general statements. Much about the missionaries' account is still unclear, for example *did they give the same sorts of accounts to all the many persons with whom they were in touch?*

This was the question which gave rise to this thesis. To put this to the test, it seemed best to make a comparison of the accounts in two missionary periodicals which had writers, but no readers, in common. For this purpose, few periodicals could be better than the *Church News* and *Monthly Messenger*: as they were in different languages, Ê-mńg and English, the missionaries in Tái-wan were free to give different opinions in the different periodicals, with next to no danger of discovery. As for the comparison itself, it was important that it be of something about which the missionaries would have had good reason to say different things. The Wars were used for this purpose, as it was clear from other writers' works that the Western and Cing publics had very different views of the Wars, and that the Western and Cing periodicals' opinions about the Wars were

for the most part in line with these.<sup>7</sup> It seemed, in short, the missionaries would have had good reason, and a good chance, to say different things to their Cing and British readers.

To make the comparison clearer, three sorts of differences in the periodicals accounts of the Wars were put to the test:

- (1) *Were the periodicals neutral in the War?* Did they openly take the side of the Cing Empire, Japanese Empire, or Táiwanese Republic?
- (2) *What were their opinions of the Cing, Japanese, and Táiwanese?* Were these opinions positive, negative, or neutral?
- (3) *What effect did they say that the War would have on the Churches?* Did they say that the Church's future would be better or worse after the Wars?

Those tests, and their outcomes, are at the heart of this work — Chapters 4, 5, and 6. And from them, comes the thesis' chief argument: that the opinions on the War given in the two periodicals were much the same, but how they gave these opinions was quite different.

And so, in a sense, this thesis' interests are very narrow: one question, three tests, and a small number of issues from two periodicals. It was designed to give us a more detailed understanding of missionary periodicals — and to put to the test the argument that some of them were purposely “untrue” in ways that were of use to the missionaries. But in doing so, it makes additions too to a number of others fields of knowledge, the three most important of which are given below:

The first such field is that which is loosely named “post-colonial.” These are works about the relations between Western ideas of, and control over, the non-Western world, often taking as their starting point the works of Said, Bhabha, and Spivak — “the Holy Trinity of colonial-discourse analysis.”<sup>8</sup> Two

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<sup>7</sup> For example, see Paine's *Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895*, Tsai's “First Casualty,” and Lǐ Jin-ciáng's “Siang-gǎng's Reaction to the Jiá-wǔ War (1894-1895)” (“Jiá-wǔ Jhàn-jheng Shií-ci [1894-1895] Siang-gǎng dē Fǎn-yìng”; brackets in original).

<sup>8</sup> Robert Young seems to have been the first to give them this name (163), which has since been put to use elsewhere, such in a John McLeod's *Beginning Postcolonialism* (29), Stella Nkomo's “Postcolonial and Anti-Colonial Reading of ‘African’ Leadership and Management in Organization Studies” (367), and Adele Perry's “Historian and the Theorist Revisited” (145). For different suggestions about what writers make up — or should make up — the postcolonial “Holy Trinity,”

common interests of postcolonial writers are: (1) the growth of Western ideas in the non-Western world, and (2) the making of Western “knowledge” of the non-Western world. That missionaries had a hand in the first is not in doubt. As Brian Stanley puts it, “There can be little dispute that, for most of the nineteenth century, British Christians believed that the missionary was called to propagate the imagined benefits of Western civilisation alongside the Christian message” (157). Missionaries from other countries were no different, and so it was that Churchgoers, or would-be Churchgoers, were made to put on Western clothing (Beidelman 133-152), take up Western ways of household organisation (Roberts), or even publicly put to flame the signs of their old ways of living (Lutz and Lutz 205). Yet, for all that has been said about how missionaries made Western ways more common in the non-Western world, postcolonial writers have given little attention to one of their most important tools — periodicals. One purpose of this work then, is to make clear — or at least clearer — some of the ways that missionaries put publishing to work in their “colonisation of consciousness” (Comaroff and Comaroff 26).

As for the second interest of postcolonial writers — how Western “knowledge” of the non-Western world was made — missionaries had an important part in this too. Not only are missionaries noted in a number of general works — for examples, Colin Mackerras’ *Western Images of China* (46–53) — there are works specially about the “knowledge”-making work of missionaries, such as Geoffrey Oddie’s *Imagined Hinduism*, Eric Reinders’ *Borrowed Gods and Foreign Bodies*, and Murray Rubinstein’s “Missionary Orientalism and the Missionary Lens.” But no writer has yet taken note of the *Monthly Messenger*’s place in this knowledge-making. This is somewhat strange, for the *Monthly Messenger*, being one of the only periodicals regularly having accounts of Tái-wan, was an important instrument in the development of Western ideas about it.<sup>9</sup> And

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see Richard Werbner’s “Introduction” in *Postcolonial Identities in Africa* (7), and Chambers and Watkins’ “Editorial” in the *Journal of Commonwealth Literature* (3).

<sup>9</sup> Other periodicals regularly having first-hand accounts of Tái-wan at the time of the Cing-Japanese War were the Presbyterian Church of Canada’s *Presbyterian Record*, and the Dominican Order’s *El Correo Sino-Annamita*. Though, naturally, other periodicals with an interest in the Cing Empire, such as the *Chinese Recorder*, sometimes had first-hand accounts too.

so, while this work takes note of only a small part of the *Monthly Messenger's* output, in taking note of it at all, it gives us a finer-grained account of how Western “knowledge” of the Cing Empire in general, and specially of Tái-wan, was made.

It is not only writers of postcolonial history and theory who have given too little attention to the work of the *Monthly Messenger*. Writers of mission history have in general given little attention to this periodical, and the organisation behind it. In fact, there seems to have been no general history of the nineteenth-century Presbyterian Church of England since A.H. Drysdales' *History of the Presbyterians in England* in 1889.<sup>10</sup> It comes as no surprise then, that there is even less writing about the Church's periodicals. In fact, while some works about the Church's missions make use of the material from the *Monthly Messenger*, there seem to be no accounts of it, and the Church's other periodicals, in their own right. So this work is an important step too in building our knowledge of the Presbyterian Church of England and its publishing history.

Interestingly, things are somewhat better with the *Church News*. In general, more attention has been given to the Presbyterian Church of England's missions than to the Church itself. Of these the mission in Tái-wan has been given the most attention, as most of these writers about the mission in Tái-wan, or about the Presbyterian Church in Tái-wan, give some attention to the *Church News*.<sup>11</sup> Another reason for there being more writing about the *Church News* is that linguists and others with an interest in the Táiwanese language have made good use of its material in their works.<sup>12</sup> But our understanding of the *Church News* and

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<sup>10</sup> S.W. Carruthers' *50 Years* — which came out in the 1930s — has a short account of the Church in the last years of the nineteenth century. The reason for there being so little writing about the Presbyterian Church of England may be in part that its separate existence came to an end in 1972, when it was joined with the “Congregational Church in England and Wales” to make the “United Reform Church” (Orchard).

<sup>11</sup> For example, histories of the nineteenth-century Churches and mission are given in Murray Rubinstein's *The Protestant Community on Modern Tái-wan* (14–19), Jhèng Lián-míng's *Tái-wan Ji-du Jháng-lǎo Jiào-huèi Bǎi-nián Shǐ* (1–102), and Huáng and Syǔ's *Tái-wan Ji-du Jháng-lǎo Jiào-huèi Lì-shǐ Nián-pǔ* (4–117). In fact, even some general histories of Tái-wan — such as Gau Míng-shì's *Tái-wan Shǐ* (149–150) and Wáng Yù-fèng's *Tái-wan Tú-jiě Shǐ* (97–101) — have accounts of the Churches and mission.

<sup>12</sup> For example, Henning Klöter's *Written Taiwanese*, Chén Mù-jhen's “Views on Civilization in Romanized Taiwanese Literature” (“Dāi-gù Bēh-wê-rī Cēh Sià dióng ế Bhūn-bhéng Guan”), and Lǐ

South Formosa Mission is still far from complete. Much of the writing about the mission is more than fifty years old, and much of it was made by missionaries and others having connections to the Churches. And, again, little of this writing is about the *Church News* itself.

And so, there is a great amount of work still to be done on the Presbyterian Church of England, its mission in Tái-wan, and their publishing in and about the Cing Empire. This thesis is but a small addition here, but it is something; and if it does nothing else, it will at least make others conscious of the work still to be done.

Writing about the Wars, and histories of such writings, are the third group to which this thesis is an addition. Of the above groups, this may be the one most in need of more work, for there is little English-language writing about the Cing-Japanese War, and even less about the Japanese-Táiwanese War.<sup>13</sup> What works do give their attention wholly or partly to what was said about the Wars in the Cing and Western periodicals, have given it chiefly to the greatest-sized of these: the *Times* of London, the *North China Herald*, the *Review of the Times* (“Wàn-guó Gong-bào”), and so on. Smaller periodicals’ accounts of the War have been given little, if any, attention, even though these were for many persons in the Cing Empire and the West an important way — or even the only way — of getting news about the War. An account of what was said about it in the *Church News* and *Monthly Messenger*, then, is a start at making broader and deeper our knowledge of what was said about the Wars in general.

Another trouble with English-language writing about the Wars: while some of the above works make note of the part that missionaries had in giving the Western public their ideas of the War, none give special attention to the

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Yù-lán’s “Tsai Pei-Huo and Vernacular Taiwanese Characters Movement” (“Cài Pèi-huǒ yǔ Tái-wan Bái-huà-zì Yùn-dòng”).

<sup>13</sup> There are a number of articles about the Cing-Japanese War, but few modern book-length works apart from Jeffrey Dorwart’s *The Pigtail War*, Stewart Lone’s *Japan’s First Modern War*, and S.C.M. Paine’s *Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895*. As for the Japanese-Táiwanese War, nearly the only modern English-language accounts are George Kerr’s *Formosa* and Harry Lamley’s “1895 Taiwan War of Resistance.” In comparison, there is a great amount of Chinese-language writing about the Wars, but an overview of that is outside the purposes of this work.

relations between missionaries' account of War, and their work, in and hopes for, the Qing Empire. In other words, they say nothing about the effect that missionaries' work had on their writing about the War. Yet there can be no doubt that such a relation did exist. As Greenlee and Johnston say:

The war's chastening effect on China's rulers was hailed as providential because for a time it helped to discredit those conservative forces that had consistently set their face against the Chinese Westernizers who had warmed to the teachings of the missionaries. (105)

This is surely something that should be of greater interest: the missionaries, who so often said they were friends of the Qing, were happy about its loss to the Japanese Empire. But even the writers who take note of this give it only a line or two in their works.<sup>14</sup> There are yet no detailed accounts of why the missionaries saw the Qing losses as being in their best interests, or how this opinion was developed. About these things, this work has much to say, and it is to this body of work that it makes the greatest addition.

So, in short, while this thesis' focus is narrow, it nonetheless makes additions to a number of bodies of work. It is an addition to postcolonial history and theory, which has given too little attention to the part of missionary periodicals in making Western "knowledge" of the non-Western world, and making Western ideas more common *in* the non-Western world. It is an addition to the history of Protestant missions, which has given little attention to the Presbyterian Church of England's missions, and none at all to its periodicals. And it is an addition to the history of the Qing-Japanese War, where no attention has been given to the ways in which Protestant missionaries made use of the War for their own ends. Naturally, the addition it makes to these bodies of work is small, and it is the writers' hope that others will take what is said here as a base for future work. Suggestions on the forms this might take are given at the end of Chapter 7.

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<sup>14</sup> For example, see Joseph Lee's *Bible and the Gun* (141), Lutz and Lutz's *Hakka Chinese Confront Protestant Christianity* (221), and Steven Maughan's *Mighty England Do Good* (207).

The other parts of this chapter have more details about the above groups of writings — what they have done, what they have not done, and what this work will do in relation to them. It first gives an overview of the theory of language and value common in postcolonial writing, and how it is put to use here. The section then goes over some important writings about Western and Cing periodicals' accounts of the Wars, taking note of what work still has to be done on these. Last, it goes over some writing about Church and missionary periodicals' accounts of the world for Western and non-Western readers. At the Chapter's end is a more detailed discussion of what this work does for the state of knowledge on nineteenth-century missionary periodicals and the two Wars.

### **WRITING ABOUT POSTCOLONIAL THEORY**

Since the 1970s, much attention has been given to the relations between Western writing for and about the non-Western world, and Western control over it. But, as noted, no attention has yet been given to the place of the *Church News* and *Monthly Messenger* in this. This section gives a simple overview of the theory of languages and value the heart of most postcolonial writings, and makes clear how it will be put to use in making sense of how two periodicals' were shapers of knowledge in Tái-wan and the U.K.

Many, likely the greater part, of postcolonial writings take as their starting point “constructionist” theories of language, as this work does.<sup>15</sup> These theories say that a person's knowledge and values are shaped by their languages — here, being any system of signs for making accounts of the world, such as words, maths, art, and so on. In other words, the states, qualities, relations, and so on for which the languages have signs *seem* to the language-user natural and necessary parts of the world, and accounts of the world made with these languages *seem* to be accounts of the world as it really is — but in fact, they are

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<sup>15</sup> Many writers have come up with such theories, but Michel Foucault's theory of “discourse” seems to have been the most important (Ashcroft et al. 83–85). The reason for this is likely that Edward Said made great use of Foucault's theory in *Orientalism* (McCarthy 47–55), one of the first works to put a constructivist theory of language to use making sense of Westerners' writings about non-Western persons (Mongia 3–9).

only one possible way of making sense of the world. Values are a part of these languages too, so certain states and relations are seen as “naturally” better than others (Hall 26–35). Every person’s group of languages is different, so different opinions on what is “true” and “not-true,” or “right” and “not-right” are possible, and in fact common. But certain opinions are so completely fixed by the languages that the language-users are not conscious of having them: the existence of these states, qualities, and values are seen as facts of the world.<sup>16</sup>

This, it is said, had an important effect when Westerners — the users of Western languages — made accounts of other parts of the world. In those places were users of completely different groups of languages, having very different experiences of the world. They had their own discussions of “true” and “not-true,” and “right” and “not-right,” but these were based on their “facts,” which were very different from the “facts” of Westerners. To the Western and non-Western language users, the other’s accounts of the world were strange: they seemed to be fictions, not accounts of the world as it really was. And, as the different groups had values based on their accounts of the world, their ways of living could seem not only strange, but “wrong.”

Where the two groups had comparable amounts of power, this simply made discussions between them harder. But where Westerners had power over other groups of language-users, they not only did not have to make use of non-Western accounts of the world, they were able to make their own accounts more common. And, as Westerners saw non-Westerners as “worse” than themselves, it was not only possible, but necessary to take control of them and their lands. Once in control, Westerners were able to make even more detailed account of these persons and places. These accounts were “knowledge,” while the non-Westerners’ accounts of themselves and the world were not. In some places, Westerners were even able to make other groups of language users take up Western languages, for example, Western astronomy and geography, and by so

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<sup>16</sup> It must be said that experience is only shaped by language, not fixed by it completely. Experience can make changes to language too, and so make “facts” into “opinions” (Gutting 10–19). This, Homi Bhabha says, is the value of critical theory — making the “necessary” into the simply possible (45–56).

doing the non-Westerners' ideas of the world were changed to be more like those of Westerners. In some places, they even came to see themselves as Westerners saw them — lesser persons (Barry 185–187).

This was just what took place in the Cing Empire, whose persons had their own groups of languages, which gave them different “facts” of the world. The greater part of nineteenth-century Westerners saw Chinese accounts of the world as “false,” and many of their ways of living as “wrong.”<sup>17</sup> Colin Mackerras, in *Western Images of China*, says of this time:

The rapid technological progress which resulted from the Industrial Revolution made most Westerners extremely sure of themselves and led them to look down on those they regarded as backward or inferior, who included the Chinese. The yardsticks of comparison, the criteria for judgement, were European. Many, even among their “friends,” were not sure whether the Chinese could rate as “civilised.” (65)

To give just one example, “Chinese Medicine,” which is based on very different accounts of the human body than “Western medicine,” was seen by many Westerners as clearly false. Chinese accounts of the body may have been of some use in the past, but from the point of view of the Western languages — anatomy, chemistry, and so on — these Chinese accounts seemed worse than useless. Tao Feiya (Táo Fei-yà”) gives the details:

The nineteenth century was the era of the triumphant advance of Western medical science. The development of the theories of cellular pathology and bacteriology provided more accurate explanations for the causes of disease. Research in chemistry brought the discovery of anesthesia and sterilizing chemicals, transforming external medicine and surgery into the forte of Western medicine. Developments in pharmacology spurred progress in the pharmaceutical industry. . . . Western medicine was seen as modern and scientific, while Chinese medicine was seen as traditional, unscientific, and even superstitious. (64–65)

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<sup>17</sup> There is quite a lot of writing about Western opinions of the Chinese and Japanese in the nineteenth century and after. For overviews of Western opinions of the Chinese, see Jonathan Spence's *Chan's Great Continent*, Raymond Dawson's *Chinese Chameleon*, and Colin Mackerras' *Western Images of China*; for the Japanese, see Hugh Cortazzi's *Victorian's in Japan*, and Jean-Pierre Lehman's *Image of Japan*.

As in other places, some Westerners made attempts to get the Qing to make use of Western accounts of the world, and the Protestant missionaries were on the front lines of this battle. The ways of living that they would have the Qing take up — reading the Bible, praying, going to Church — were based on accounts of the world very different to anything then common in the Qing Empire. Naturally, it was possible to do these things without the “knowledge” on which they were based, but the missionaries did their best to see that every Churchgoer had at least some of the knowledge of the Church’s account of the world, and could say something about it when necessary. But for some missionaries, this was not enough. They were conscious of the connections between the different Chinese accounts of the world — science, medicine, and so on — and they were conscious too of the connections between the different Western accounts of the world. As Daniel Bays says: “one thing that the Protestant missions community continued to hold in common throughout the rest of the nineteenth century was the certain conviction that China needed not only Christ, but the norms of Western culture as well” (71).

But Western power over the Qing Empire was far less complete than in other places. Westerners could make the Qing government do some things in a Western way — this was part of the reason for the “Opium Wars” — but never had the power to make great numbers of Qing persons take up Western accounts of the world. And for the most part, the Qing did not. In some ways, they were the mirror of the Westerners: they saw Western accounts of the world as strange and false, and Western ways of living as wrong. That they were happy to say as much to Westerners did not make Westerners’ opinion of them any better. Certainly there were Qing who saw value in “Western learning” (“Si-syue”), and there were more who saw value in Western military technology, but even they did not necessarily see the connection between the Westerners’ technology and their accounts of the world — physics, chemistry, engineering, and so on (Kuo and Liu 166–176).

On the Japanese islands, things were very different. From the start, Westerners had a better opinion of the Japanese than the Cing: quite by chance, Japanese ways of living were nearer to Western ways, and so were seen as “good,” or at least as “better” than the Cing. As Jean-Pierre Lehmann says in *The Image of Japan*:

Generally speaking . . . the Japanese received much more favourable treatment than would appear to have been meted out to most other non-Western peoples. No doubt part of the reason for this is that Japan was neither colonised nor defeated in a humiliating war (as the Chinese had been in the Opium war). Also, comparatively speaking, Japan had achieved a degree of prosperity and progress unparalleled in most non-European countries. Comparisons with China (numerous in view of the proximity of the two countries) tended to favour Japan. (45–46)

It was a great help that the Japanese government saw value, or said they did, in Western ways. Their interest was chiefly in Western military technology, but unlike the Cing Government, purchasing it was not enough for the Japanese: it was their design to make their own arms, and they were conscious that they could not do this without a deep knowledge of the Western languages. And so, while the greater part of Cing persons, and Cing leaders, took little interest in the Westerners’ schools and books, the Japanese not only took advantage of these, but sent young men to the West for the purpose of learning more about Western accounts of the world. And while the Cing made only the smallest changes to their government, and only when the Western militaries made it necessary, the Japanese willingly re-made their government along Western lines (Beasley, *Rise* 84–101).

As noted above, different opinions are possible within a group of language users. Some Westerners saw all things Western as better than all things Chinese or Japanese, and others saw certain Chinese or Japanese accounts of the world as “true,” or even better than Western accounts. But, in general, most Westerners saw their own accounts of the world as more true than Cing and Japanese accounts, and their own ways of living as “normal” or “right” in comparison to

Cing and Japanese ways. And, the nearer the Cing and Japanese came to doing things in a Western way, the better the opinion Westerners had of them.

As will be seen, the missionaries in Tái-wan were very much a part of the group that made value judgements based on how nearly the Cing and Japanese were like Westerners. And this had an important effect on their accounts of the Cing-Japanese War and the Japanese-Táiwanesé War in the *Church News* and *Monthly Messenger*.

## WRITING ABOUT MISSIONARY PERIODICALS

Writers of postcolonial theory have given their attention chiefly to Westerners' making accounts of the non-Western world that were only "true" from a certain point of view, writers about the history of missionaries have given more attention their *purposely* making accounts that were not true even to them. As Terry Barringer says in "From *Beyond Alpines Snows* to *Homes of the East*," "committees and editors back home were acutely aware of the need to rally supporters and encourage financial contributions. . . . Periodicals were used blatantly as a public relations tools" (169–170). And so, the accounts in missionary periodicals must be taken with care.

For example, in *Missionary Encounters*, David Arnold and Robert Bickers make the argument that missionary periodicals' accounts of the non-Western world could be different not only from the accounts of the persons living there, but from the accounts that missionaries themselves sent to the periodical:

As fund-raising organisations, mission societies distributed a great deal of publicity material, or printed propaganda. But the missionary letter reprinted and circulated as a pamphlet by a grassroots workers might be the product of several blue pencils and publicists' rewrites. It is no sure guide to the thoughts of that individual, but it is sometimes the only surviving indicator of them. (4)

Jeffrey Cox, in *The British Missionary Enterprise since 1700*, is in agreement with the above writers that "missionary societies seem to have regarded their periodicals as instruments of propaganda . . ." (115), but also makes the point that the

missionaries did not necessary send in “true” accounts of their experiences and ideas in the first place. Missionaries, and especially the early nineteenth-century missionaries, were conscious that that public did not necessarily see their work as important, and that they had to make to make an argument for their teaching non-Western persons about the Churches’ ideas. To this end, they made use of “defamatory synecdoche” – making much of non-Westerners’ actions that were “wrong” in Western system of values, while saying little of the actions that were “right.”

Not all missionaries did this, but in Cox’s view it was common enough that by the end of the nineteenth century even other Westerners saw missionary accounts as likely to be “false”:

the rhetorical use of unflattering images, in an early nineteenth-century context, was almost always unfair, which is why missionaries gained a reputation in the early twentieth century for being ethnocentric cultural absolutists dedicated to the destruction of the cultures they were trying to convert. . . . Even as they in some ways invented the modern genre of ethnography, they were also attempting to find ways to defame foreign cultures for their own specific ends. (118–119)

And there could be other reasons for giving “false” account of non-Western persons. In *Missions and Media*, Felicity Jensz and Hanna Acke say that it was sometimes simply good business to do so: “sensationalism indeed sells, and missionary periodicals, like non-devotional religious tracts, were intended to reach large audiences as well as to be commercial [sic] viable” (9). The outcome of missionaries’ giving purposely “false” accounts of their experiences, and periodical editors purposely making these more “false,” was that the material in periodicals sometimes had more to do with the readers’ ideas of what the non-Western world should be like than the writers’ experiences of it.

But in this work, there will be little discussion of the periodicals’ accounts being different from the missionaries “real” opinions. This is simply necessary: for one thing, it is often not clear what person or persons made a given piece of writing; for another, there is no way of seeing what the editors may have done to

the writings.<sup>18</sup> For the reasons given above, the opinions in the periodicals were likely less complex than what the writers, editors, or readers would have said for themselves, but did not contradict their “real” opinions.<sup>19</sup> They are, in effect, a mix of the missionaries’ and editors’ opinions.

That being said, the mix of ideas is taken to be a bit different in the two periodicals: the accounts in the *Church News* are taken to be an even mix of the writers’ and editor’s opinion; and the accounts in the *Church News* are taken to be chiefly the missionaries’ views, changed somewhat for the tastes of the Táiwanese readers. The reason for this is the different amount of power between writers, editors, and readers in the two periodicals. The position of the *Monthly Messenger’s* editor in the Presbyterian Church of England was not higher than that of the missionaries. If the missionaries did not like what was said about them in the periodical, they could, and would, have the Foreign Missions Committee do something about it.<sup>20</sup> But, the editors of the *Church News* were not simply a part of the Presbyterian Church in Southern Tái-wan, they were its leaders. As will be seen, one of the chief purposes of the *Church News* was teaching Churchgoers about the Church’s ideas, and Western accounts of the world more generally. Naturally, they could not simply say anything at all — the Táiwanese could give up on the Church at any time — but they were more free to give their own opinions, and to make changes to other persons’ writings, than “their” editor in England.

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<sup>18</sup> At this time, William Dale was the editor of the *Monthly Messenger*, and William Ferguson the editor of the *Church News* (Band 570, 134). But, it is unlikely that they did all the work themselves, and the periodicals are better taken as the work of an editor overseeing an unnamed group of writers.

<sup>19</sup> Some of the missionaries’ letters to the *Church News* are still in existence, but many were damaged beyond the point of use in a V2 attack (Band ix–xi; *Guide* 12). To the best of this writer’s knowledge, none of the letters to the *Church News* are still in existence today.

<sup>20</sup> An example of this will be seen in Chapter 3.

## WRITING ABOUT THE WARS

While little attention has been given to the part of missionaries in the Cing-Japanese War — and what they said about it in their periodicals and elsewhere — a number of writers *have* done work on other periodicals' accounts of Wars. Interestingly, few of these openly make use of constructionist accounts of language, but their reasoning about why certain periodicals gave certain opinions has much in common with writings that do. For example, Jeffery Dorwart's *The Pigtail War* takes note of twenty American periodical's accounts of the War, in order to make sense of “public attitudes and discussions of the War in the United States” (91). Based on these, Dorwart makes the argument that the American newspapers took the side of the Japanese, and that the reason for this was the Japanese government and military's being nearer to Western ideas of what they should be:

Assuming that Japan represented progress and a better world, most writers supported the island empire from the beginning. In a theme which recurred throughout the war, Americans equated Japan's national experience with that of their own country and the Japanese people with their U.S. counterparts. . . . Though the Asian nation looked to an emperor for leadership, it had a constitution and representative form of government believed to be just like that in the United States. Even Japanese dress appeared strikingly familiar, as businessmen attired in Western suites and top hats hurried about the bustling cities. (92–93)

The Cing were very different. In the American periodicals they were said to be “primitive, superstitious, corrupt, unprogressive, and the antithesis of their East Asian neighbor” (95). In other words, the writers of the American periodicals saw Western account of the world as “true” and Western ways of action as “right.” The Japanese had taken up many of these ways, but the Cing had not, and so the American writers, employing their Western “yardstick,” naturally saw the Japanese as the better of the two.

Another such work is Kenneth Hough's “The Brazen Throat of War,” which is based on the accounts of the War in four California newspapers. Like Dorwart, Hough makes the argument that the California newspapers were

strongly on the side of the Japanese, again by reason of their making greater use of Western ways:

If the California press was quick to label China as the imminent loser of the Sino-Japanese War because of its ubiquitous corruption and ill-mannered militaries [sic], then it was just as swift in proclaiming Japan as the rightful victor because of it [sic] enlightened and modern attributes. From the beginning of the conflict, Japan was recurrently described as an advanced or advancing nation, one that, upon her first encounters with the West, had taken the lessons of modernisation to heart, and, unlike China, had committed herself to an extensive programme of Westernization. (51)

But, Hough says that there was a dark side to this. To some in the U.S., the Japanese were still not Western enough in their ways of thought and action, and a Western military in the hands of a non-Western government was a dangerous thing: “China despite her size and once-great stature, was no longer the Asian nation to be feared. Japan had taken her place, and after the indignity handed her by Europe, might just be brimming for a fight” (144). And so, respect for the Japanese military would be the seed of twentieth-century anti-Japanese feeling in the U.S.<sup>21</sup>

Other writers have given their attention to the Cing periodicals, where, they say, the opposite took place. Cing writers’ accounts of the Wars were based on Chinese accounts of the world and Chinese values, and so naturally these writers had very different opinions of the Wars. Weipin Tsai’s “First Casualty,” is interested in the accounts of the Cing-Japanese War in the *Shàng-hǎi* periodicals, but gives special attention to the competition between two of these, the *Shàng-hǎi News* [“Shen-bào”] and the *News* [“Sin-wén-bào”]. Tsai makes note that the periodicals strongly took the Cing side. Nearly all their writings made use of the derogatory name “dwarves” (“wo”; “wo-rhén”) for the Japanese, and far from giving their approval to the modern arms and strategies put to use on the

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<sup>21</sup> Alena Eskridge-Kosmach says that this was taking place in the Russian Empire even at the time of the Cing-Japanese War. But other writers say that the fear of the Japanese was not common in other Western countries till the Japanese-Russian War of 1905 (Klein, “Yellow Peril”; Lone 163; Owens 32–36).

Japanese side — and to a lesser degree on the Qing side — they went on about the value of the classical Chinese ways of war. For example, in the periodicals’ writings and picture:

Chinese troops still appeared in traditional Qing military dress, they win battles through adopting ancient Chinese military tactics, such as an unexpected midnight attack spearheaded by an armoured herd of bulls. The Chinese woodblock images reflect strong beliefs and expectations among the Chinese public, and these sentiments are precisely what we see reflected in the competition between *Shenbao* [Shen-bào] and *Xinwenbao* [Sin-wén-bào]. (161)

Chén Jhong-chún’s “Research into Newspaper and Public Opinion on the 1895 Resistance to the Cession of Tái-wan” (“Bào-kan Yú-lùn yǔ Yǐ-wéi Fǎn Ge-Tái Dòu-jheng Yán-jiòu”) takes up the story of what was said in the *Shen-bào* about the Japanese-Táiwanesé War. This war was widely seen as “illegal” in the West, and simply a way for the Qing Government to keep control of the island after legally giving it up to the Japanese. But the *Shen-bào*’s accounts of the War were from the point of view of Chinese political theory, in which the Táiwanesé were doing a good thing. as Chén says:

praising the courage and great deeds of the Táiwanesé resisting the Japanese, and comparing them to the Mainlanders’ uninterrupted defeats by the Japanese, they said that the outcome of a war rested not on the size of the country, but the determination of the people to resist . . .  
zàn-yáng Tái-mín kàng-rhì dě yǒng-cì hàn gong-jí, bǐ-jiào dà-lù duèi  
Rhì-jyun jié-jié bài-tuèi, kě-jiàn jhàn-jheng dě shèng-fù, bù zài dì jhii  
dà-siǎo, ér zài mín-jhòng dě kàng-dí jyué-sin . . . (48–49)

Things were no different in other parts of the Qing Empire. In “Siang-gǎng’s Reaction to the Jiá-wǔ War” (“Jiá-wǔ Jhàn-jheng Shí-ci [1894–1895] Siang-gǎng dě Fǎn-yìng”; brackets in original), Lǐ Jin-ciáng makes note that the writers of the *Chinese Daily* (“Huà-zì Rhì-bào”) said from start to end that the Qing Empire was in the right, and that the cause of the War had been the Japanese “coveting gain and neglecting rightness, taking no account of the country’s or people’s good” (“tan lì wàng yì, wǎng-gù guó-jì mín-sheng”; 15). And so it was in the view of

Chinese political theory, in which the master-vassal relations between the Qing and Joseon were simply the natural order of things. As such, the only good outcome to the War would be the Qing overcoming the Japanese, putting the world back in order.

The above writers have given their attention chiefly to the writings in Qing newspapers, but Judith Frölich's "Pictures of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895" takes account of the pictures from two periodicals: the Qing Empire's *Illustrated Lithographer* ("Diǎn-shí-jhai Huà-bào"), and the Japanese Empire's *Qing-Japanese War Illustrated* ("Nisshin Sensō Gahō"). Frölich says that the two periodicals pictures make "their" soldiers out to be better than their enemy, which they do using the languages of their different sorts of art. But, only the Japanese were able to make Westerners see their soldiers in this way too. The reason for this was that the pieces in the Qing periodicals made use of the usual language of Chinese woodblocks, of which most Westerners could make no sense, and which in any case was out of keeping with their values — for example, Tsai's "armoured herd of bulls." But the pictures in the Japanese periodicals made use of a mix of the Western and Japanese languages of art, and had a great effect on the Westerners who saw them. In Frölich's words, they "adopted more of the available discourses significant in the West at the end of the nineteenth century, which ultimately lead not only to the military victory of Japan but also to its victory in the 'picture war'" (215).

One cannot say anything about such writings without taking note of Sarah Paine's *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895* — still the the most complete work on periodicals' accounts of the War. Paine's book takes account of twenty-three periodicals in seven languages — English, French, German, Russian, Japanese, and "Literary Chinese" ("Wén-yán-wén"). Based on these, Paine makes the argument that the Qing-Japanese War was the cause of a great change in Westerners' "images" of the Japanese Empire:

In the space of one year, the Western image changed from perceiving Japan primarily as an insignificant land populated by horticulturists, rickshaw drivers, trinket makers, and geishas. Suddenly, the Western

press started regularly referring to it as a great power and one belonging to that very select club of the so-called “civilized nations.” (19)

In short, in their fighting and their ruling of the lands they took, the actions of the Japanese had been “good”; that is to say, like those of a Western country at war. Like enough, in fact, that many Westerners were now ready to say that the Japanese were “civilised.” Meantime, the Cing Empire had done things in their own ways, which were very different from the ways of Western countries, and had got the worst of the War besides. And so, the Western image of the Cing Empire, which had never been very good, got even worse.

The accounts of the War in the *Church News* and *Monthly Messenger* had much in common with these noted above. But, they were not completely the same. The purpose and interests of the missionary periodicals, which had purposes and interests somewhat different to the greater-sized newspapers, and it will be seen in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 that this had a great effect on their opinions about the War.

## **PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE**

In the above sections it was seen that there are bodies of writing about the relations between language and value, general periodicals accounts of the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War, and missionary periodicals’ account of non-Western places; but that none of these take account of the writings in the *Monthly Messenger and Gospel in China* and the *Dāi-lám Capital Church News*. The work is a comparison of these periodicals’ accounts of the Wars, and by so doing makes an addition to all three groups of writings. Before coming to the end of this chapter, it may be best to go over three tests at the heart of this work, and make clear their relation to these fields of knowledge:

(1) *Were the periodicals neutral in the War?* As Sarah Paine and Lǐ Jīn-cíáng have noted, at the start of the Cing-Japan War many Western periodicals, even the ones made in the Cing Empire, were neutral, seeing no outcome as clearly better than another. But most Cing periodicals, even those made by Westerners,

were of the opinion that the Japanese Empire was in the wrong, and that the Japanese being overcome by the Cing would be a good outcome. As the War went on, and the Japanese military kept getting the better of the Cing, many Western periodicals gave their support to the Japanese, but the Cing periodicals were on the side of the Cing Empire to the War's end. The *Monthly Messenger* was a British periodical made by and for British persons; the *Church News* a Cing periodical made by British persons for Cing persons. The question, then, is did they take the same sides as other Western and Cing periodicals? This work makes the argument that that the *Monthly Messenger* and *Church News* were more like Western periodicals: they were neutral at the start of the War, but by the end were on the side of the Japanese.

(2) *What were the periodicals' opinions of the Cing, Japanese, and Tái-wan?* As seen above, nineteenth-century Westerners had in general a better opinion of the Japanese than the Chinese. There were two reasons for this: Japanese ways of living were nearer to Western ways, and the Japanese had been quicker to take up Western accounts of the world, and even to remake their country along Western lines. But the greater part of Cing had a very bad opinion of the Japanese even before they took up Western ways; and an even worse one when they were remaking themselves to be more like the Western "barbarians" (Paine 99-100). This had a great effect on what was said about the Cing and Japanese in Western and Cing periodicals. So, which way did the *Monthly Messenger* and *Church News* go? Here again, the two periodicals were more like the Western periodicals than Cing: in the War, they gave a better opinion of the Japanese than the Cing. But, as will be seen, the ways they did this were somewhat different.

(3) *What effect did they say that the War would have on the Churches?* It must be kept in mind that the *Monthly Messenger* and *Church News* were not newspapers. They did have news from around the world, but were chiefly tools for giving accounts of Church events. As such, their interest in the War was different from general periodicals. So, how did this make their accounts of the War different from general periodicals? It will be seen here that the periodicals gave space to

the question of what effect the War would have on the Churches. And, that they were of the opinion the Wars would be good for the Cing and Táiwanese Churches. In their view, there was a connection between the commonness of Western ways, and the growth of the Churches; and the Wars would make Western ways commoner in the Cing Empire and Tái-wan.

Apart from making an addition to our knowledge of writing about the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War, this work makes use of a new system for giving accounts of the periodicals writings. One of the troubles with writing about periodicals' accounts of something is that the relations between the material in the periodicals and the writers' general statements is often unclear. So, for example, in "What Mrs Jellyby Might Have Read," Terry Barringer, after a long quotation from the *Children's Missionary Record in Connection with the Church of Scotland* about the "bloodthirsty savage" in Africa, says of the writing in children's missionaries periodicals, "By the end of the century, the tone had softened . . ." (50). But Barringer gives none of the details behind this general statement. For this statement to be of any use, it is necessary to have an idea, at a very least, of what makes the "tone" of a piece of writing "soft" or "not-soft." Such troubles, of which there will be more discussion in Chapter 3 are common in writings about periodicals accounts Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War. In this work is a new way of giving the amount of writing of different sorts in periodicals, which, if taken up more generally, will be a great help in making clearer writing about accounts of the Wars.

The structure of this work is as follows. Chapter 2 is an overview of the history of Protestant missions to the Cing Empire, the place of periodicals in these, and how the Presbyterian Church of England, and the Presbyterian Church in Southern Tái-wan, were like and unlike the Empire's other Churches and missions. Chapter 3 is an account of the system by which the two periodicals' writings answer put into groups of different sorts, and makes clear why this is better way of writing about the Wars than the general statements in others writings. The three middle chapters take up the questions given above: Chapter 4

is about the question of the missionary periodicals' neutrality; Chapter 5 is about their opinions of the Qing and Japanese; and Chapter 6 is about their view of the Churches' future after the Wars. Chapter 7 makes clear the relation between the theory in Chapter 1 and the material in the middle chapters, and makes some suggestions for future work.

## 2 — Protestant missionary writing for and about the Cing Empire

The *Monthly Messenger* and *Church News* were far from the only periodicals of their sorts. In the many parts of the Western world, Churches put out monthly and even weekly periodicals, and some of these gave news of overseas missions. Periodical-making was not as common in the Cing Empire's Churches, but the Churches that did make periodicals got a good amount of power through these. The reason was that there were few periodicals in the Cing Empire at all, and so missionary periodicals were one of the chief ways Cing persons, even if they were not themselves churchgoers, got accounts of goings-on in other countries. While, the Western and Cing periodicals had somewhat different purposes, but they had one in common — supporting the missions. As such, it is important to have an idea of how Protestant Churches and missions came to have periodicals in the first place, what hopes they had for these, and how they went about seeing that these hopes came true.

This chapter first gives a history of Protestant missions to the Cing Empire. This is done in three parts: 1807–1843, before the “First British-Cing War”; 1843–1860, between the British-Cing Wars; and 1860–1895, after the “Second British-Cing War.” Those reason for these groups is that the Treaties by which the two Wars came to their ends were the causes of great changes to the conditions of missionary work, and so the nature of that work was different in the three periods. The Chapter then gives an overview of Western Church and missionary periodicals. This too is done in three parts. There is first a discussion of what missionary periodicals did, then more detailed discussions of their two most important purposes: giving news of the missions, and making money for the missions. The Chapter then gives a short history of Church periodicals in the Cing Empire. It goes through the different sorts of periodicals made from 1813 to 1895, and what they did for the missions, then gives a short overview of their competition — Cing newspapers and other periodicals. Last, the Chapter gives an

account of the two periodicals of interest here, the *Monthly Messenger* and *Church News*. It goes quickly through their histories and purposes, and gives examples of their organisation, and the sorts of writing they had in 1895.

## **PROTESTANT MISSIONS IN THE CING EMPIRE**

### **Early Days, 1807–1842**

In 1807, the London Missionary Society sent Robert Morrison to the Cing Empire. Morrison was hardly the first Westerner to go to there, but he was the first Protestant missionary, and for five years the only one. But, more and more Protestant Churches were taking an interest in Missions, and more and more Mission societies were coming into existence. Before long, some of these took an interest in the Cing Empire too, and by 1839 some fifty Protestant missionaries had been sent there. But few stayed for long: sickness sent many back to their countries, or to an early death, while others quickly gave up on the work.

The work itself was very limited, for in those days only two parts of the Cing Empire were open to Westerners: the city of Ào-mén (“Macau”), which was under the Kingdom of Portugal’s control, and a little part of the city of Guǎng-jhou (“Canton”), where Western traders did business. If a Westerner went outside of these places, the Cing government could send them away, or put them to death. Even in Ào-mén and Guǎng-jhou, teaching about Protestant ideas was against the law. The Portuguese let some Roman Catholic mission work take place in Ào-mén, but they would not let the Protestants do any of their own. And, while the open part of Guǎng-jhou was under the control of Western traders, some of whom were Protestant, they were conscious of the Cing laws, and would not put their business agreements in danger. It was not that the traders did nothing, but what help they gave had its limits: for example, the British East India Company gave Robert Morrison help getting a language teacher, and let him make use of their presses for printing his dictionaries and grammars; but the printing of his tracts and Bibles had to be done somewhere else (Bays 43–44; Daily 107–109; Rowe 138–148).

In the face of all this, the early Protestant missionaries did what they could. Some gave their attention to the languages of the Empire: at that time, there was little material for learning any of the Chinese languages, so some missionaries made dictionaries and grammars, hoping that future missionaries might have less trouble with language learning. Others made tracts and Bibles in one or more of the Chinese languages, then sent these writings outside of Ào-mén and Guǎng-jhou in the hands of Cing helpers: their hope was that simply reading God's word would be enough to get Cing persons into a church. And still others simply took their chances, and went into the Empire.

But to a number of missionaries it seemed that the best thing they could do was give up on the Cing Empire for the time being. There were many Chinese living in other parts of East Asia, and some missionaries went to do mission work among them. For example, William Milne, the L.M.S.'s second missionary in the Cing Empire, only did three years work there before going to Melaka ("Malacca"), where there were many Chinese persons. The idea was that the overseas Chinese could take the message where the missionaries could not, and that the experience of working with them would be of use when and if the Cing Empire was ever open to mission work (Bays 43–46; Daily 154; Rowe 137–138).

### **Between the Wars, 1842–1860**

The missionaries were in time able to do their work in other parts of the Cing Empire. This was done with the help of the very persons who had to that point given so little support to Mission work — the Western traders. For a long time the traders had had trouble with their Cing counterparts. Many Cing goods were of interest to Westerners: silks, spices, porcelain, and above all — tea; but, nearly the only things that the Cing would take in trade were silver and opium. There was at least a great need for opium — by the end of the nineteenth century, some ten percent of Cing persons would be opium users; but opium use was against Cing law, and the government was more and more unhappy about Westerners sending it into the Empire (Crossley, *History* 240).

By 1839, they had had enough: Cing government representatives were sent to Guǎng-jhou, where they took the Western traders' opium, and put it to flame. Word of this soon got to the United Kingdom, whose government sent its navy to put a blockade on the Cing Empire until some agreement between the governments could be made. The Cing would not have limits put on their trade, so sent their own navy to make an attack on the U.K. ships. The U.K.'s answer was war. For three years the two countries made war off, and sometimes on, the Cing Empire's southern edge. But in the end, the British military was able to take control of Guǎng-jhou and Shàng-hǎi, two of the Empire's most important cities, and the Cing Empire had to make peace. In 1843 the two powers signed the "Treaty of Nán-jing" (Beeching 23–163; Rowe 167–170).

Among other things, the treaty opened five cities to Westerners: Fú-jhou, Guǎng-jhou, Shàng-hǎi, Ê-míng, and Níng-bó. This was the chance for which the missionaries had been waiting. Many who had been working among the Chinese in other parts of Asia came back to the Empire, and many new missionaries were sent out East. They all took up their work in the newly opened cities, the "Treaty Ports." But having at last got into the Cing Empire, the missionaries now had to get the Cing to take an interest in the Churches. The trouble was that the Protestant account of the world was very different from the accounts common in the Cing Empire; getting Cing persons to take it seriously, much less take up a way of living based on this account, was not a simple thing.

The missionaries went about doing this in a number of ways. Some went around the Treaty Ports giving spoken accounts of their church's ideas to anyone they came across. Others made schools, where Cing persons could get an education: the idea was that learners would come for the free education, but get interested by the Church teachings which came with it. Still others made hospitals, where they put their Western medical knowledge to use healing the Cing persons' sicknesses. Even so, for many missionaries the old idea that reading God's word might by itself be enough was still strong. These missionaries gave their time to making Bibles and tracts in the common language of whatever part

of the Empire they were working. But the missionaries were still not completely happy. For the people of their five cities were but a small part of the Cing Empire. And so, some missionaries did what they could to get knowledge of the churches to persons in the closed parts of the Empire. They sent Bibles, tracts, and other church materials into the heartland in the hands of their helpers, and in the company of the missionaries own prayers; but it would still have been better to go themselves (Bays 47–52; Rowe 172–173).

### **Into the Heartland, 1860–1895**

Their chance for this soon came. In 1856 the Cing government took some persons, who were said to be pirates, from a ship with a U.K. flag. This act, the U.K.'s representatives said, was against the rules of the Treaty of Nán-jing. The Cing said differently, and before long the argument was a war. Things again went badly for the Cing, and after the loss of more cities, including their capital, they had to again make peace with the British. The “Treaty of Tian-jin,” and the “Běi-jing Convention,” were important developments for the Cing Churches, for among other things they made all of the Empire open to Westerners (Beeching 206–331; Li 83–88; Rowe 190–193).

The missionaries were quick to make their way into the heartland, were they went to work making new churchgoers. There were a number of different theories about how best to do this, which were based on their earlier work in the Treaty Ports — where, naturally, some of the missionaries went on working. Different churches and missions had different ideas about the right combination of ways, but nearly all of them made use of one or more of the following:

(1) Preaching — Some missionaries would go from place to place giving spoken accounts of their church's ideas, sometimes to great groups of persons at temples or in the open, other times to small groups in homes. But, to do this well, it was necessary to have a very good knowledge of one or more Chinese languages, and a number of missionaries said that this sort of work was best given to Cing churchgoers.

(2) Writing — Nearly all churches made some use of Chinese-language tracts, books, or periodicals, and writing these was the chief work some missionaries did. Others gave their time to accounts of the Chinese languages, which would be of use to new missionaries in their language learning. And still others did work on making new and better translations of the Bible. To do this, it was necessary to have an even better knowledge of the Chinese languages, as they did not have words for certain ideas, such as “spirit,” “soul,” and even “God,” without which making a translation of the Bible would not be possible (Chan; Zetzsche 82–90).

(3) Education — Many churches had free or low-cost schools. These could be for very young persons, adults, or any group in between. The education itself was often a mix of Chinese and Western accounts of the world. For example, a learner might get teaching in the Chinese “Classics” — a good knowledge of which could get a person a government position — as well as Western science. Giving this non-Church teaching was the only way to get non-churchgoers into the schools, but the schools’ purpose was naturally to make those person into churchgoers, and so teaching about “right and wrong,” the existence of the “soul,” and so on were based on the Church’s own accounts of these things (Bays 69–70).

(4) Medical Work — Some churches gave out free or low-cost medical care. This could be as simple as a single missionary doing tooth extractions when out preaching, or as complex as a hospital where Western doctors did surgeries impossible for Cing doctors. Apart from their good works, the purpose of these hospitals was to give sick persons some preaching with their healing, and to make clear that Western medicine, based on Western accounts of the world, was better than what the Chinese had (Tao 68–70).

The above works had the hoped-for effect, and the number of Cing churchgoers went up and up. Even so, the growth of the Cing Churches was never quite quick enough for the Western Churches and mission organisations. There were a number of reasons for its being slow. Maybe the most important was that

to be part of a church, one had to give up many ways of living that were “normal” for most Cing persons, such as working on a Sunday, going to the temples, and giving money for certain village or city events; and this could put one at odds with one’s neighbours (Lutz 204–211). For example, in some places it was normal to give gifts to the “spirits” (“shén-míng”), normally unseen beings who nonetheless could give help or do damage to persons and things. To a Cing person who had taken on the Protestant account of the world, there was no reason to give the spirits anything: the Western God had more power than the Chinese spirits, and could keep the person safe. But, to that person’s neighbours, who still kept to their Chinese accounts of the world, the Western God was nothing, and by not giving those usual gifts to the spirits, the churchgoer was putting not only themselves, but the every person in the village in danger.

In short, to be a churchgoers, one had to do damage to one’s relations with a great many persons, maybe even one’s family (Bays 77–79). But some persons were taken enough with with what the missionaries said to take this chance, and by 1890, there were some 37,287 churchgoers across the Empire (*Records* 735).

## **WRITING FOR THE SUPPORTERS**

As seen above, the Cing Empire’s first Protestant churches were started by Western missionaries. But these missionaries did not get out to the Cing Empire on their own. The greater part of them were sent by Churches and missionary societies in the West, from whom the missionaries got money and support for as long as they were working in the Empire. Besides giving the missionaries payment for their work, the Churches had to give them money for purchasing the tools of the their trade: medical tools for the hospitals, printing presses for the publishing houses, buildings for churches, and so on. And so, the sending organisations had to have money coming in regularly, so they could go on giving it out regularly to their missionaries and “their” Churches.

This money came from Churchgoers in the West, but they would not give money to a cause of which they had no knowledge. And so, many Churches and missionary societies regularly put out accounts of their mission work in different sorts of publications, like books, pamphlets, and periodicals. These periodicals had a number of purposes, but the most important was get Churchgoers to give money to the missions. The Churchgoers would do this only if they had the idea that the money would be put to good use, and they would go on doing it only if they had the idea that their last gift *had* been put to good use. So in addition to whatever work they were doing for the Cing Churches, many missionaries in the Cing Empire had to regularly send accounts of their work to the Churches and missionary organisations in the West.

Likely the editors and missionaries were all conscious that the missions could do their work only as long as people went on giving them money, but they sometimes had different opinions on how this could best be achieved. Accounts that would make the readers give money were not necessary the same as accounts that were “true” accounts of goings-on in the mission field. As will be seen, this had some important effects for the writing in nineteenth-century missionary periodicals.

### **An Overview of Missionary Periodicals**

There were Protestant Church periodicals well before there were Protestant missions to the non-Western world, and as soon as such missions were in existence, the Church periodicals had news of them. But it was not till the very end of the eighteenth century that there were periodicals whose chief purpose was giving news of overseas missions (Jensz, “Origins” 237–238). The number of Churches with overseas missions, and missionary organisations, went up quickly in the nineteenth century, and as it did, so too did the number of missionary periodicals. While some Churches, like the Plymouth Brethren, had overseas missions and no missionary periodical, this was quite unusual: the greater part of missionary organisations or church had at least one missionary periodical, and

some had more than one. In fact, by some counts, over 500 different periodicals were started between 1800 and 1960 (even if many were not around for long; Cox 114–115).

When Churches or missionary organisations had more than one periodical, the reason was normally that they were made for different groups of readers. For example, the Religious Tract Society put out three: *The Religious Tract Society Reporter*, a general periodical having news of many things, missions among them; *Women's Magazine*, a periodical having mission news for women; and *Boy's Own Paper*, a periodical having mission news for boys, and in language for young persons (Tiedemann 206). Having these three sorts of periodicals was in no way unusual: in fact, after general purpose missionary periodicals, periodicals made specially for women, or made specially for young persons, were the next most common sorts.

Whoever their readers, the periodicals' range of interests could be wide or narrow. Some, like the China Inland Mission's *China's Millions*, had chiefly news of their organisation's own work, while others, like the *Pictorial Mission News*, gave news about the work of many different missions. And, while some missionary periodicals' material was all to do with one mission field, others had material about many different fields. For example, the Anglican Church had missions in many places, and had many periodicals for these: *The Gleaner* had accounts of the many different Anglican missions, but *The Land of Sinim* had accounts only of Anglican missions to the northern Qing Empire (Barringer, "What" 47).

While missionary periodicals could give news from all over the world, which was put together from many letters, the periodicals themselves were often quite small organisations. Many were the work of only one editor, who had little or no money for writers. But, however great the number of persons making the periodical, and however wide the periodicals' interests, their reading material came chiefly from the same places. Naturally, the editors of the periodicals did a good amount of writing themselves, but they also had material sent in by missionaries, church leaders, and churchgoers. And if they did not have enough

of this by the end of the month, they sometimes simply took material from other missionary periodicals, or even newspapers.

But the best material came from a church's own missionaries in the field. Some of this was specially made for the periodicals, but some of it, like lectures, pictures, letters, and yearly reports, was made for other purposes, then given a new one in the periodical's pages. The missionaries were conscious of this: they would sometimes send writing specially for the purpose of going in the periodical, and they would sometimes say in their letters that they did not want some piece of writings put to this use. For example, Thomas Barclay, of the Presbyterian Church of England's "South Formosa Mission," said in one letter to the Church's Foreign Missions Committee "Excuse the length to which this letter has run on. I need scarcely point out that very little, if any, is suited for publication" (letter to Matheson).

But wherever they got their material, the periodicals' editors had two purposes in mind when putting together a given month's issue: first, giving the readers news about the missions; and second, making readers give money to the missions. Seeing to these two purposes was not necessarily simple, and doing them at the same time could be very hard (Barringer, "What" 48; Jensz and Acke 9).

### **Giving News of the Missions**

Naturally, a periodical was of no use if it had no readers, so it was very important that the periodicals have stories that would be of interest to the churchgoers. But coming up with such stories was sometimes no easy matter. The missionaries regularly sent in accounts of their work, but these were sometimes of little use to the editor. There were a number of reasons for this. Sometimes the material in the missionaries' account was simply too much for the gentle Western reader to take in. Accounts of actions that were, by the Church's system of values, violent or sexual "sins" were sometimes present in the missionaries' writing about their work, but these were kept out of the periodicals. For example, Thomas Barclay, in

one of his letters to the editor of the *Monthly Messenger*, gave an account of one of their theological students being engaged to a woman who was not a Churchgoer:

The girl turned out to be altogether unsuited for a preacher's wife. The mother probably came to know that we would not be sorry to see it broke off, and being a heathen probably urged the young man to intercourse, so as to make drawing back impossible. At any rate he fell, though he continued to deny it until the birth of his child . . . It is the third fall of a student since my return less than two years ago. (letter to Dale)

But in the *Monthly Messenger*, nothing was said about these “falls.” There, if anything bad was said about the Táiwanese churchgoers at all, it was very general, giving no details of the trouble. This way of writing about missions was common in missionary periodicals. As Andrew Porter, writing about Scottish missions to India, says: “the information available at home about the realities of missionary enterprise was sorted, censored and sanitized for consumption by the majority in the churches. Missionary publication became an art form in its own right. It was often bland and comfortable, often remote from reality because of the conflicting interests it attempted to reconcile” (45).

Editors more commonly had a different sort trouble with the accounts that the missionaries sent them — they were not interesting. It was the nature of missionary work to go over the same ground again and again — physically, in their journeys, and mentally, in their teaching about the the Churches’ accounts of the world, for a great amount of this teaching was of “facts” about the world that would have been clear to the youngest Western churchgoer. And quite a lot of the missionaries’ time went to went to the business of keeping accounts, making translations, and other such actions that made for uninteresting reading. These “prosaic accounts of institution building” may have been “true,” but they were of little interest to churchgoers hoping for stories of missionaries bravely doing battle with the forces of Satan (Cox 116–117). Campbell Moody, another missionary to Tái-wan, made note in one of his books that the work of missionaries was not at all like many Western persons’ idea of it, and in some ways was exceptionally *unlikely* to be of interest to them:

As regards news from abroad, it ought to be understood that remarkable events are not occurring every day, and one must not look for an ever-flowing stream of curious facts and fresh ideas . . . People forget the monotony and dreariness and prose of life in a Heathen land, and “the numbing influence of heathenism” and thus they are surprised when Christ’s ambassadors prove tedious in public speech, and even appear to have dull, narrow, stunted minds. (228)

The editors of the missionary periodicals were conscious of this, but they could only make these points to the readers so many times before the readers simply gave up on the periodical. They had, or so it seemed to them, to give the reader what they were after, and they did this in a number of ways. One was to simply take material from other places: if the missionary of one church sent in an interesting enough piece of writing, it might be reprinted in many different Churches’ missionary periodicals. Another, maybe more common, way of getting the right sort of material was rewriting when the missionary had sent in: with the right cuts and additions, even the most “prosaic” account could be made interesting. The missionaries were conscious that this took place, and were not necessarily happy about it. As Emily Moffat, an L.M.S. missionary to the North Ndebele said:

There is so much bosh written and printed . . . so much that is calculated to mislead minds and to give the wrong impressions, that I am disgusted over and over again, while I feel I may do the very same thing myself. The editor’s pencil, identifying those passages that are fit for publication, can still be seen on many letters from the field. On one occasion he even writes “on no account publish this.” (qtd. in Barringer “From *Beyond Alpine Snows*” 170)

But there was little that the missionaries could do about it. Overseas missions were not free: the missionaries had to be given payment, places for living, and material for doing their work; and some Western churches gave other sorts of support to overseas churches too, such as money for schools, hospitals, or workers. The money for these things came from the Churchgoers, and if the Churchgoers had no interest in the work of a mission, then that mission could not do its work for long.

### **Making Money for the Missions**

So this was the other purpose of missionary periodicals — giving readers the feeling that their money was being put to good use. To do this, the missionary and editor had to come up with the right balance of stories about the work of the missionaries, and the needs of the overseas churches. The trouble was this: if the missionaries said that things were going very badly for them — for example, that there was a loss of interest in the Church — the Churchgoers in the West might get the idea that their money was not being put to good use, and not give any more. But if the missionary said that everything was going well for the mission — for example, that there was a great amount of new interest in its teachings — the Western Churchgoers might see no reason to give more money: why should they when the Mission was doing well enough with what it had (Jensz and Acke 10–11)? The editors were clearly in a better position than the missionaries to make decisions about what sorts of stories would keep the Churchgoers giving. And so, as with keeping the missionaries' story interesting, the editors sometimes made changes to the missionaries writing, to make sure that the Churchgoers had the feeling that their money was not going to waste.

The danger here, was that the editors might go farther with their statements than the missionary themselves would have done. For example, the *Presbyterian*, the Presbyterian Church of England's weekly periodical, at one time said that Campbell Moody — he of the “numbing influence of heathenism” — was doing great things in the Jiāng-hoā part of Tái-wan. Thomas Barclay quickly sent a letter saying that it was not so:

I was very sorry to see that the Report of the Synod meeting in the “Presbyterian” makes Mr. Moody say that the Chianghoa region is ‘saturated’ with Christianity. I hope Mr. Moody did not say anything that would give even the appearance of justification to such a report. The reality, of course, is entirely otherwise. (letter to Connell)

But, here again the important thing was to keep the money coming. And not every missionary was as interested in giving the “truth” of their situation as Thomas Barclay. Some of them sent accounts specially designed to be interesting to their readers, even if some “defamatory synecdoche” or other changes were necessary to make them so (Cox 116–117). Even so, and for all the editors’ attempts to make the readers give money, they often did not have enough for the periodical itself to make a profit. In fact, many missionary periodicals were made at a loss to the Churches and mission organisations, so that their missions could be kept going (Barringer, “What”). But at this at least, the missionary periodicals seem to have done well, for the number of overseas Protestant Churches, and the missionaries working at them, kept going up through the nineteenth century.

### **WRITING FOR THE CING**

As noted in the section before last, to get people interested in their ideas, the Cing Churches and their missionaries made use of many tools, such as preaching, teaching, and healing. Another common tool was writing: nearly all Churches gave out tracts and Bibles, and many put out monthly periodicals as well. In some ways these were very like the periodicals of the missionaries’ own churches in the West. This should not be a surprise: few of the missionaries had any experience in publishing, but most of them had seen Church and missionary periodicals in their own countries. But in other ways, the Western and Cing periodicals were necessarily very different. The Western Church periodicals and missionary periodicals were made for persons whose ideas of the world were much the same as the periodical-makers’ — persons who had been part of a Church for many years, and for whom the Church’s account of the world was not an “account,” but “knowledge.” But the Cing periodicals were made for persons who were newly conscious of this account of the world, and may have had little idea of its details.

Another way in which they were different was Western Church periodicals’ and missionary periodicals’ having a far narrower group of interests

than their Cing counterparts. The reason was that there were many other periodicals in the West, and the missionary periodicals were in competition with newspapers and the like for the readers' attention. To get readers at all, the missionary periodicals had to do something that the other periodicals were not doing. But in the Cing Empire, at least at first, there were no other periodicals at all, and the best way to get readers' interest was to do a bit of everything. So it was necessary for Cing Church periodicals to do things that a Western Church periodical would not have done, such as giving accounts of Western science, and of political events in other countries. But the Church and mission periodicals would not have the Cing Empire to themselves for long. Cing and Western business-persons quickly came to see that there was money to be made in periodicals, and by the end of the nineteenth century the missionary periodicals had quite a lot of competition for readers.

### **Church Periodicals, 1807–1838**

Protestant Missionaries made use of periodicals from the very start of their work in the Cing Empire. For some, like Robert Morrison and William Milne of the London Missionary Society, publishing was an important part of their theory of mission. But for others, there was simply little else they could do: as noted above, in the early days of Protestant missions to the Cing Empire, going outside of Ào-mén and a small part of Guǎng-jhou, was unsafe; and openly doing mission work of any sort was unwise. So some missionaries took to printing accounts of their Church's ideas in periodicals, and sending these into the Empire, in the hope that they would make Cing persons interested in the Churches.

But then, in 1812, the Cing government made a law against printing Church material in the Empire. If the missionaries would go on making periodicals, they would have to do it outside the Empire. For this purpose, William Milne went in 1815 to Melaka, which was then under British control. Within a year, Milne had put together a Chinese-language missionary periodical

— the *Chinese Monthly Magazine* (“Chá Shì-sú Tǒng-jì-jhuàn”).<sup>1</sup> When, in 1818, control of the city was given over to the Dutch East India Company, they let Milne go on working, which he did until his death in 1837, at which time the periodical came to an end (Britton 17–21; Daily 71–75, 53–154).

But by this time there were other periodicals. In 1817 the London Missionary Society sent Walter Medhurst to Melaka, where he got experience working with Milne. When, in 1822, Medhurst went to Jakarta (“Batavia”), another city under Dutch control, he quickly made a periodical of his own — the *Chinese Magazine* (“Tè-syuǎn Cuo-yào Měi-yuè Jì-jhuàn”). It was made for only three years, but was the first missionary periodical to do something that would later be common — writing in a sort of Chinese nearer to everyday speech than the “Literary Chinese” (“wén-yán-wén”) of the Cing Empire’s writing.

Other periodicals were started at around this time too, but few were in existence for very long. Robert Morrison, for example, made two attempts at a periodical, first in Melaka, then in Ào-mén; but only a few issues of these were made. Another L.M.S. missionary in Melaka, Samuel Kidd, put out the *Universal Gazette* (“Tian-sià Sin-wén”) from 1828 to 1829. And a missionary for the Netherlands Missionary Society, Karl Gützlaff, made the *Eastern-Western Monthly Magazine* (“Dong-Si Yáng Kǎo Měi-yuè Tǒng jì-jhuàn”) at Guǎng-jhou in 1833. This was against the law, and Gützlaff was taking a great chance, but his relations with the Chinese were unusually good, and in the end, the Cing government did nothing about his periodical (and may not even have been conscious of what Gützlaff was doing). Even so, Gützlaff gave up on the periodical after about a year — it was too much work for one man with other things to do. And last, Walter Medhurst made a second periodical, this one with the help of Charles Batten Hillier, at Guǎng-jhou in 1838. But, again, only a few issues were made (Britton 21–25).

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<sup>1</sup> Sometimes, a periodical’s English and Chinese names had only a loose relation. For example, Milne himself said that the complete English translation of his journal’s Chinese names was “A General Monthly Record, containing an investigation of the opinions and practices of society” (Britton 18). This work makes use of the periodicals’ shorter English names.

In the months before the First British-Cing War, all this came to an end. Many missionaries were sent away from Guǎng-jhou and Ào-mén, which put an end to the small amount of periodical-making in these places, and made it much harder for periodicals made in other places to be sent into the Cing Empire. But when the War was at last over, everything was different: the missionaries could now do their work openly in five Cing cities, and in the new British colony of Siang-gǎng. Quite a number of old missionaries went to these places, some of the missionaries who had been working overseas, like Medhurst, came back to the Cing Empire, and new missionaries were sent to give them help. They did much work in the five “Treaty Ports,” some of it printing. The missionaries could have gone back to making periodicals, but one of the chief reasons for doing so was now gone, and none some to have done so (Britton 34; Zhang 41).

### **Missionary Periodicals, 1853–1895**

Periodical-making was re-started in 1853, when Walter Medhurst, now in Siang-gǎng, came out with another periodical, the *Chinese Serial* (“Siá-ěr Guàn-jhen”). He soon gave control of it to Charles Hillier, who in 1856 gave it to James Legge. By the end of that year it was no longer being made, but by this time many other missionaries in Siang-gǎng and the Treaty Ports had come out with their own periodicals (Britton 34; Zhang 41–43). These had in common the purpose of getting Cing persons interested in the Churches’ work, but they went about it in a number of different ways:

(1) Giving “the good news” — This could be writing from or about the Bible, accounts of theology, sermons, or stories. Whatever the writing was about, its purpose was to give the reader knowledge of a Church’s ideas. Some such writing was in nearly all missionary periodicals, and it was nearly the only sort of writing in some.

(2) Promoting the power and value of Western ways — As noted, some missionaries took the view that the Churches would get nowhere as long as the Cing were unconscious of, uninterested in, or simply against Western ways of

doing things. To this end, they made periodicals giving the reader an education in Western science, medicine, government, and the like.

(3) Giving news of events in the Empire and the world — The Cing had ways of getting news from around the Empire and the world. But these had their limits, and not all persons were able to make use of them. So some missionaries put into their periodicals account of news from other parts of the world, or the Empire itself.

(4) Giving news about Church events — Nearly all the periodicals had a connection to a church, and for some the connection was very close. These had accounts of events in the Church, such as births, deaths, marriages, and news of upcoming church events, like services, meetings, and tests.

Some periodicals did only one of these things. For example, John Kerr's *Western Medical Journal* (“Si-yi Sin-bào”) had only accounts of Western medicine. Others, like the *Church News*, did all of them. That being said, periodicals having more than one purpose did not necessarily give the same amount of space to every sort of writing. For example, Daniel Jerome McGowan's *Chinese and Foreign Gazette* (“Jhong-Wài Sin-bào”) was made by the American Baptist Mission, but had chiefly news of events in the Cing Empire, and little in the way of material about the Church (Britton 56).

The periodicals were in a number of different languages. Some, like Young John Allen's *A Review of the Times* (“Wàn-gúo Gong-bào”) and N.J. Plumb's *Trans-Mountain Messenger* (“Syún-shan Shií-jhě”) made use of Literary Chinese, which was then the most common written language of the Cing Empire (Britton 57). But no more than three to five percent of Cing persons had enough education in Literary Chinese to do reading of any sort, and many of these with only able to make sense of quite simple material (Ramsey 104–106; Smith, *Heritage* 110–112). So, other missionaries made their periodicals in the “Plain Languages” (“Bái-huà-wén”) — “Amoy” (“Ê-mńg-wē”), “Cantonese” (“Guǎng-dong-huà”), “Shanghai” (“Shàng-hǎi-huà”), and so on. Some of these, such as J.M.W. Farnam's *Bible News* (“Shèng-shu Sin-bào”) and George F. Fitch's *Gospel News*

(“Fú-yin Sin-bào”), both in “Guan-huà” (“Mandarin”), were written in Chinese Characters (Britton 57). But the time necessary for learning this way of writing, even if one was already a speaker of Guan-huà, was very long; so other missionaries made use of the Latin Alphabet in their periodicals. Examples of these are G. Reusch’s periodical in the Hak-gá language, Plumb’s and Hubbard’s in the Fú-jhou language, and J.C. Gibson’s in the Shan-tóu language (Britton 56–58).

### **Newspapers in the Cing Empire**

The Cing Empire was not without its own news. Most important of these was the *Jing-bào* (“Capital News”), which was made up of public notices put out by the government. It was printed in Běi-jing, and sent out across the Empire so persons of education could get news of government decisions. Some provincial governments put out such papers too, the *yuán-mén-bào* (“*yuán-mén*” being the house of a government representative; Britton 7–15). But, again, these were made up chiefly of material given to them by the government. Somewhat more like the Western idea of newspapers were the *sin-wén-jhǐ* (“news papers”). These were accounts of interesting goings-on, for example “an earthquake, a famine, invasion, or battle, or the illegal acts of a mob, anything, in fact (save criticism on political or government matters)” (qtd. in Britton 5). They did not come out at fixed times, but were made when a printer got word of some story which would be purchased in printed form.

So the Cing Empire had newspapers, but their uses were very limited. The *Jing-bào* and *yuán-mén-bào* had accounts only of government matters, and then only when these were made public. The *sin-wén-jhǐ* could be about nearly anything, but their makers had no way of regularly getting news from other parts of the Empire, much less overseas. And, as all three sorts of papers were in Literary Chinese, they were of use to only a small part of Cing persons. This gave the first missionary periodicals a great amount of power. Naturally, they were better able than the Cing papers to get news from West and the rest of the world:

their makers were in touch with persons in many places, and could make use of Western newspapers which were sent out East. But, often they were better able to get news from other parts of the Empire too. Not only were the missionaries in touch with other missionaries around the Empire, they could make use of the Western-language newspapers in the Cing Empire, which had news from all over.

The missionaries soon had competition from other Westerners in the Cing Empire, who had more interest in making money than making churchgoers of the Cing. These business-minded Westerners soon made the discovery that periodicals were a good way to do this, and the missionary periodicals came to have competition in the form of for-profit periodicals like R. Alexander Jamieson's *Shang-hǎi News* ("Shàng-hǎi Sin-bào"), and Henry Balfour's *Shàng-hǎi News* ("Hù-bào"; Tsai 150–152). The missionary's competition was not only Western: it did not take the Cing long to come out with their own Western-type periodicals too. The *Sino-Foreign News* ("Jhong-Wài Sin-bào"), for example, was made on George Ryder's presses in Siang-gǎng, but the writing in it was by and for Cing persons. And Wáng Tao's "*Universal Circulating Herald*" ("Syún-huán Rhiì-bào"), which came out in 1873, was completely under Cing control, and made specially as a counterpoint to the Western missionary periodicals (Britton 42–45).

The development of for-profit periodicals in the Cing Empire greatly reduced the power of the missionary periodicals. Many missionary periodicals were quite small organisations, and the editors and writers had to do other sorts of work for the Church. While, they may have been better than the *Jing-bào* and *sin-wén-bào* at getting news from the West and around the Empire, they could not do these things as well as a periodical whose editors did nothing but. What was more, the for-profit periodicals gave all their space to news, which to some readers, this was a great advantage: it was not necessary to make one's way through church material to get to the stories of interest. And so, by the end of the nineteenth century, the missionary periodicals had already had their day, and by the 1920s, their readers were chiefly churchgoers (Zhang 2).

## THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES OF ENGLAND AND TÁI-WAN

To this point, this chapter has been about churches, missions, and periodicals as a group, and so the statements about these have been necessarily general. But arguments of this work are not about missionary periodicals in general; they are about the writings of two Churches' periodicals: the Presbyterian Church of England's *Monthly Messenger*, and the Presbyterian Church of Tái-wan's *Church News*. The rest of this chapter gives more detail on these. This section goes over the histories and relations of these two Churches to 1894, and then goes into more detail about the two periodicals. At the end, it gives an account of these periodicals' purposes, their organisations, and the writings that were common in them before the war.

### The South Formosa Mission

At the end of the nineteenth century, there were a number of Presbyterian churches in the Cing Empire's southeast — in Ê-mńg, Dāi-lám, Shàn-tóu, and Wǔ-jing-fú — having among their workers missionaries from the Presbyterian Church of England.<sup>2</sup> Their relations went back as far as 1847, when the Presbyterian Church in England had first sent missionaries to the Cing Empire. These missionaries did their work well, and by 1849 a number of Cing churches had been started in and around Ê-mńg with their help. Over the next tens of years, more and more churches were started in the Empire's south-east.

The Táiwanese Church had come about in 1865 through the work of three evangelists from the Church in Ê-mńg: Gó Bhūn-sùi, Ng Gā-di, and Tán Zu-lō. They went to work on the island's south-west coast, taking with them a British medical missionary, James Maxwell. The group quickly got the islanders interested in their Church, and on 12 October 1866 the first Táiwanese churchgoers were baptised (Band 1–28). But the young church was quickly in

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<sup>2</sup> This church had come into being in 1876, through the joining of the United Presbyterian Church's "English Synod" and the "Presbyterian Church in England." The second of these had had the relations with the four Cing churches, which had been taken up by the new Church (Drysdale 625–628).

trouble. Tái-wan was opened to Westerners by the 1860 Treaty of Tian-jin, which had come about through the Second British-Cing War, and in the 1860s, many were still angry about this. This came to a head in 1868: there were a number of attacks on Westerners and their trading houses; the Church in Bī-táo was burnt; and two churchgoers were put to death by angry groups. The attacks only came to an end when the British Royal Navy took control of the city of Ān-béng. The Cing government at once gave the Westerners all they were after: much of this had to do with Western traders, but the Church did not go away with nothing. They were given money for their losses; what had been said against the church was publicly taken back; and it was publicly made clear that the missionaries had the right to work in Tái-wan.

To put these developments to good use, at the end of 1868 Gó Bhūn-sùi, Ge Diòng (an Evangelist from Tái-wan), and James Maxwell went to Dāi-lám, the island's capital. By June of the next year, there was a small Church there. From that time, Da<sup>n</sup>-gào and Dāi-lám were the church's bases. From them, evangelists and missionaries would go out into the country, sometimes for days, sometimes for weeks. Where they came across a city, town, or village, they would give an account of the church's teachings. If the village's persons took to these ideas, they would be given more education in them. And when they could give a good enough account of these, they would be given Baptism by a minister, and let into the Church. In places where there were enough such persons, they would be made into a new congregation. Over the next few years, the number of churchgoers went up quickly; by 1875 there were over 900 (Band 47-126).

But all was not well. The church's leaders, all Westerners, were more and more unhappy with the development of the churchgoers knowledge, and their way of living. Their answer, which was put into effect from 1875, was to put more effort into education, and less into getting new churchgoers. They gave up the base in Dā<sup>n</sup>-gào, and made a number of new organisations in Dāi-lám: a Theological College, a Boy's School, a Girls School; and, in 1885 — a printing press.

### ***The Monthly Messenger and Gospel in China***

While this was going on, the missionaries' sending Church was putting out a number of periodicals giving accounts of their work. There was *The Presbyterian*, a weekly periodical for all persons, and *The Children's Messenger*, a monthly periodical for young persons; but the church's chief periodical was the *Monthly Messenger and Gospel in China*. It had been started in 1844 by the Presbyterian Church in England, at which time the periodical's name was *The English Presbyterian Messenger*. There had been many changes to the periodical's name and organisation in the years since, but its purpose was the same: "Reporting church work, mission work, religious movements, and . . . corresponding on our own family matters while at the same time fostering the devotional and studious life of the church" (Carruthers, *Fifty Years* 22).

From its start, the *Monthly Messenger* had carried news about missionaries. At first this had been about other Church's missionaries, but, over time, news of the church's own missions took up more and more space. By the 1890s it was, for persons in the U.K., the chief source of news about the Presbyterian Church of England's missionaries. The periodical was not, though, completely made up of news about the Church's missions. In fact, only two of the eleven sections in most issues of the *Monthly Messenger* had news of the missions. The chart below, giving the organisation of the October 1895 issue (*Monthly Messenger* 595), gives some idea of the periodicals range of interests:

- Calendar
  - *Children's Day*
  - *Call*
  - *Ordinations*
  - *Appointments*
- From Month to Month
- Readings in Practical Religion
- Our Own Missions
  - Personal and General Notes
  - *A Missionary's Holiday (concluded)*

- *Singapore*
- *Singapore: Encouragements*
- *Swatow*
- *Amoy*
- *Chips from the Reports (continued): The Printing Presses*
- *Eng-chhun Region : Light and Shade*
- *Chin-chew: Threatened Riot*
- *The Social Significance of the Advent of Christianity*
- *A Border Puritan*
- *A Home Pastorate*
- *Children's Portion*
  - *"I Believe in Jesus Christ"*
  - *The Impatient Flower*
- *Church Talk*
- *New Books*
- *Contributions Not Previously Acknowledged*
- *Congregational Contributions (from 1st January to 16th September 1895)*

Some of these sections, like "A Border Puritan," had one piece of writing in them. Others, like "Readings in Practical Religion," had many smaller pieces of writing. While some pieces, chiefly the longer ones, gave the writer's name, many did not (likely, many of these were the editor's work).

As can be seen from the above, much of the material in the *Monthly Messenger* had to do with the Church's history and theology, but there were two sections that always had some news of the missions: "From Month to Month," and "Our own Missions." The first was made up of short accounts of goings-on in the church. These were chiefly events in the U.K., but when something specially important to the missions was taking place, like the Sino-Japanese War, there would be accounts of it in this section too. Many of these were editorials, but if a missionary's own writing did go into the periodical, it went into one of these sections. As a rule, these writings were simply accounts of what the missionary had been doing for their church. For example, the January 1895 issue had a letter from John Steele, of the Shàn-tóu Mission:

In the city we have quite outgrown the accomodation at Tiger-tail Lane, our old dispensary. People come every day to the chapel and dispensary for treatment. Some come such distances that they have to remain in the

city overnight. Dr. Cousland is now in the city, superintending the building of the part of the new hospital” (587: 35).

It is from “Our Own Missions” and “From Month to Month” that the accounts in this work come.

### ***The Dāi-lám Capital Church News***

The *Church News* was started in 1885, as part of the missionaries’ attempts to give the Táiwanese churchgoers a better education in the church’s ideas. As noted, the Presbyterian Church of Tái-wan’s growth had been very quick, at least in comparison to the other Cing Churches with which the Presbyterian Church of England had relations. The few evangelists and missionaries in Tái-wan were not enough to see to the education of the many new churchgoers, between whose small churches were many kilometres of bad roads and numerous dangers. The purpose of the *Church News*, then, was to take the church’s teachings to the villages when the evangelists and missionaries could not go to them. It would also give the Churchgoers a feeling of being part of the greater church, in Tái-wan, and the world. For the little groups of churchgoers in the deep mountains, whose neighbours had not entered into in the church, or were even against it, this was an important thing to have. To this end, the periodical was in the island’s commonest “plain language,” the language of Ê-mńg, and made use of an alphabetic writing system.<sup>3</sup> It seems to have been popular with the churchgoers. In 1895, there were 1,297 churchgoers, to whom around 700 copies of the *Church News* went out every month (*Church News* 131: 55, 141: 91).

The periodical itself was simple in comparison to the *Monthly Messenger*. It had no front cover, only a simple banner across the top of the first page, giving the periodical’s name, the date, and a table of contents. Just below this was the start of the first piece of writing. Like the *Monthly Messenger*, the writings were in sections and subsections, which might be made up of one piece of writing, or

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<sup>3</sup> For the history of this writing system, see Klöter (89–130); for the place of the Ê-mńg language in nineteenth century Táiwanese, see Heylen (16–21).

many. This, for example, is the organisation of a September 1894 issue, *Church News* 113:

- News (“Siāo-sīt”)
  - Brother Cīm-hé writes (“Cīm-hō-hia<sup>n</sup> sià”)
  - Deacon Ng Liàn of Ghū-dā<sup>n</sup>-wan writes (“Ghū-dā<sup>n</sup>-wan ế jip-sū Ng Liàn sià”)
  - Diē Sī-hoé of Dō-gūn-êng writes (“Dō-gūn-êng Diē Sī-hoé sià”)
  - Ng Sìn-gí writes (“Ng Sìn-gí sià”)
- Differentiating wisdom and knowledge (“Biān cōng-bhéng dī-hūi”)
- An announcement about benefitting the blind (“Lī-êk cī<sup>n</sup>-mī-láng ế gè-bêh ”)
- Seals (“Hai-gào”)
- The church is like a boat (“Gào-hoē bi-pēng zún”)
- Raising babes (“Boē-yiù<sup>n</sup> Ghin-nà”)
- Sabbath Scripture (“Zu-rit Sīn-lióng”)
  - This month’s questions (“Bun-ghoêh sin ế m̄ng”)
  - The answers to last month’s questions (“Dēng-ghoêh m̄ng ế yìn-dap”)
- Bible Questions and Answers (“Sēng-cēh M̄ng gāp Yìn-dāp ”)
- An invitation to prayer and thanksgiving (“Cià<sup>n</sup> dāi-gê hāp-sim gī-dè siā-yin”)
  - Ask God (“Gī-giú Siong-dê”)
  - Thank God (“Gam-siā Siong-dê”)
- Glad and Sad Tidings (“Sōng-hi-sū”)
  - Deaths (“Goè-òng”)
  - Marriages (“Hūn-yin”)

As can be seen, the greatest part of the writings in most issues, even in wartime, were accounts of church events around the island, and teachings about the Church’s ways and ideas. These writings came from evangelists, missionaries, and even churchgoers, but writing by the missionaries, who were based in Dāi-lám, and oversaw the editing and printing of the *Church News*, was most common.

News of the Cing-Japanese War was in the “News” section, or a special section — “War News” (“Gāo-jiān ế Siāo-sīt”). News of the Japanese-Táiwanesé War was in these sections too, as well as in sections giving news about some part of the island, for example “Bē-ó News” (“Bē-ó ế Siāo-sīt”), which gave news of the islands, or “Church News” (“Gào-hoē ế Siāo-sīt”), which gave news about a

number of Táiwanese churches. And, sometimes very important war matters would get their own special sections, as did the missionaries' translation of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, "Conditions of the Treaty" ("Hē-yēk é Diāo-koà"; *Church News* 122: 46; ). These are the materials of interest here.

### 3 — Taking the measure of the periodicals' writings

In Chapter 1 it was noted that writers in Mission Studies and Media Studies have given some attention to missionary periodicals, and the Cing-Japanese War. As far as missionary periodicals go, this has chiefly taken the form of essays, such as those by Terry Barringer, Felicity Jenz, and Hugh Morrison — all of which can be seen in the bibliography. There are a small number of books putting together a group of such essays, the outstanding example being Felicity Jenz and Hanna Acke's *Missions and Media*, a group of essays on missionary periodicals by leading scholars of mission in history and media studies. Another, older, example is Robert Bickers and Rosemary Seton *Missionary Encounters*, a group of essays on many different sorts of missionary writing, among which are a number of arguments for the value of missionary periodicals. At present there are few book-length works on missionary periodicals in their own right, but periodicals are given a good amount of space in some works on missionary work more generally, such as Jeffrey Cox's *British Missionary Enterprise since 1700* (Chap. 6), Anna Johnston's *Missionary Writing and Empire* (Chaps. 4, 7, 9), and throughout Andrew Porter's *Religion versus Empire?*

As for the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanesé War, here too most of the English-language writing has taken the form of essays, such as those by Alena Eskridge-Kosmach, Judith Frölich, and Weipin Tsai — again, these can be seen in the bibliography. There are, though, no “edited collections” of such essays. The only book-length work about media accounts of the Cing-Japanese War is Sarah Paine's *Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895*, but media accounts are given attention in a number of more general works on the War, such as Jeffrey Dorwart's *Pigtail War* (Chap. 6) and throughout Stewart Lone's *Japan's First Modern War*.

These are the base on which this work is building, and without them it would not be possible. Even so, these works are not without their troubles. Chief among these is that that nearly all the work on missionary periodicals and the

Cing-Japanese War has been qualitative: to the writer's knowledge, there have been no attempts to put quantitative methods to use in making sense of the material in missionary periodicals, or accounts of the Cing-Japanese War. This is somewhat strange, given that qualitative methods are not uncommon in Media Studies. The one which can be of greatest help in making sense of the material in missionary periodicals is *content analysis* — “a research method that uses a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text” (Weber 9). To do this, a group of “coders,” or a computer, put one or more pieces of writing into “units,” then take note of how many are examples of “categories.” Based on the number of units of each sort of category, they can make general statements about the writings; from these, they can make “valid inferences.”

To give a simple example, a researcher might have the idea that the writings in a newspaper give an idea of what is important to its readers at any given time. The researcher might then put together a project to see at what times in the last five years “money” was unusually important to readers. The project might take this form: the researcher would get five years of issues from one or more newspapers, then have coders take note of articles — the “unit” of project — having “money words,” such as “income,” “savings,” “budget,” and so on.<sup>1</sup> The researcher would then make a comparison of the number of examples with the month in which they came out. From this, the researcher would be able to say at what times of the year articles about money were most common — for example, in January. And from this general statement, the researcher could make inferences — for example, that money was of greatest interest to readers when they had little of it — after Christmas.

Naturally, real content analyses can be much more complex than this. For example, Feng Yang and Milton Meuller's content analysis of internet regulation in China take account of four different things: “year of policy issuance,” “issuing government agency,” “type of policy,” and “policy theme.” From these, they

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<sup>1</sup> If it is not possible to go over every issue, the researcher would make use of “sampling,” that is, taking note of the articles in a statistically representative number of issues (Weerakkody 148-149).

make the discovery that the greater part of the regulation were made by the government ministries: only about sixteen percent were the work of the higher-level “National People’s Congress” and “State Council.” But, the regulations made by the last two were some of the first regulations made. Based on this, Yang and Mueller make these inferences:

the Chinese government was more concerned with technology development during the early development of the Internet. Conversely, because the Internet is relatively new in China, numerous legal issues arising from the Internet have not been thoroughly explored. Some of these problems stem from the various conflicts of interest among different ministries and agencies. This disagreement is indicative of an underdeveloped Internet policy regime, in which fundamental laws were the core legislations and administrative regulations served as supplements. (454)

The value of doing this in this way is that after reading a content analysis, it should be possible to go over the materials used in the analysis with the same coding rules, and come up with the same measurements. Arguments between users of content analysis are still possible — for example, about the value of the coding rules, or the inferences based on the measurements — but the measurements themselves should be unquestionable.

But few researchers of missionaries periodicals and the Cing-Japanese War have taken advantage of this tool. The works noted above — and others, which will be noted later — give few, if any, detail about the relations between writer’s general statements about these periodicals, and the writings on which they are based. Yet all of them must at one time have done something like the first steps of a content analysis. At the very least, when taking account of what a periodical said about the War, a writer must make decisions about which pieces of writing are “about the War” and which are not. And having done this, the writer must make decisions about which writings “about the War” are of use in answering the writer’s research question. All of the above writers most have done this, but none give the rules by which they made these decisions. And if the

reader has no knowledge of these rules, they get no sense of how strong the writer's arguments are, and sometimes cannot even make sense of them.

This chapter puts forward a new way of writing about periodicals which does not have these troubles, and which is used in this work. It is to some degree based on content analysis, but different enough that it is not given that name. That is, there are three reasons that it cannot be said to be content analysis:

First, in this work the "units," the "smallest element of the message examined" (Weerakkody 150), are complete pieces of writing. This is possible in content analysis, but in the view of many, it is not a good way of doing things, for it gives a "coarse" analysis (Weber 21–24). In this work though, it was not possible to do things any other way: as the structures of the È-mńg and English languages are very different, it was not possible to make a comparison of units smaller than complete pieces of writings. But, to make the analysis a bit finer, this work makes use of a tool common in older — that is pre-computer — content analysis: "page space" measurements.<sup>2</sup> The details of this tool are given later in the Chapter.

Second, in this work the coding has been done by hand. Today, content analyses are often done by computer. The advantages of this are clear: unlike a human coder, a computer will never get tired, and will always give its complete attention to the work. But, for an analysis which put writings into groups based on their value judgements — as this one does — a computer is not the best tool. A computer programme, can be given a list of "value words" — for example, "good," "bad," and so on — and an advanced programme can even be given directions to take note of units value words near other words of interest — a "keyword in context" search. But, even the best computer is unable to make sense of figurative language, and so will take no notice of many value judgements.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> For other examples of "page space" being used for this purpose, see Broome and Reece's "Political and Racial Interest," Awojobi and Adeokun's, "Content Analysis of Agricultural Issues Reported in Two Nigerian Daily Newspapers," and Granner et al's "Newspaper Content Analysis in Evaluation of a Community-Based Participatory Project to Increase Physical Activity."

<sup>3</sup> For a discussion of the limits of computer content analysis, see Mike Conway's "Subjective Precision of Computers."

Third, there was only one coder — the writer. In the view of many researchers, if coding is done by hand, it is important that more than one coder go over the same material. In fact, the more coders go over the material, the greater the value of their measurements. The single coder may not see something, or more make sense of the coding rules in very different way than most persons would; a group of coders were more likely to see everything, and statistical tests can be done to see if they are making sense of the coding rules in the same way (Stemler). But in this work, the writer has done all the coding themselves. Nothing else was possible: first, there was no budget for a team of coders; second, there were no persons to hand with a reading-knowledge of nineteenth-century Ê-múg. But, the writer has done the next best thing: going over the material many times, in many different orders, and making a comparison of the different measurements.

The first section of this chapter goes into more detail about the trouble with other writings about periodicals and the Wars, and gives some more detailed examples of these. The second section makes clear how the writings in the *Church News* and the *Monthly Messenger* have been put into groups “about the War” and “not about the War” for this work. It then says how the writings “about the War” have been put into smaller groups for the purpose of getting answers to the questions in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. The third section gives details on the size of writings “about the War,” and makes a comparison of the amount of writing about the War in them at different times.

### **THE TROUBLE WITH GENERAL STATEMENTS**

A general statement is a statement about more than one thing — what they do, what they are, or what qualities they have. Statements that are not “general” are “singular statements” — statements about what *one* thing does, is, or what qualities it has. For example, this is a singular statement: “A sentence in *Monthly Messenger* 587 gave a negative opinion of the Cing Government.” And this is a

general statement: “The *Monthly Messenger* gave a negative opinion of the Cing Government.”

General statement may be “weak” or “strong.” This has to do with the number of examples on which they are based. For example, if any statement anywhere in the *Monthly Messenger* gave a negative opinion of the Cing government, then the statement “The *Monthly Messenger* gave a negative opinion of the Cing Government” is true. But if thousands of sentences did this, then it is strongly true, and if only one sentence did, then it is only weakly true.

Nearly all the writers who have said anything about Cing and Western periodicals accounts of the Cing-Japanese War have made general statements about them. But few are clear about the number of examples on which these statements answer based.

A number of troubles are common in accounts of what periodicals said about the Cing-Japanese War, and Japanese-Táiwanesé War. The commonest are: (I) Not saying how the periodicals’ writings were put into the groups “about the War” and “not about the War”; (II) not saying which of the writings “about the War” have to do with the writer’s research questions; and (III) not saying what part of the periodical’s overall output was made up of writings about the War. Below is given more detail about the nature of these troubles, and examples — real and fictional — of why they can give trouble to readers.

### **I. Writings “about the War” and “not about the War”**

Few periodicals were made only for the purpose of giving accounts of the Cing-Japanese War, Japanese-Táiwanesé War, or the two Wars together. The greater part of periodicals that did give accounts of the Wars had been made to do other things, and many went on doing these while the Wars were ongoing. So, when taking account of what a periodical said about the Wars, it is necessary to put its writings into two groups: (1) writings about the Wars; and (2) writings *not* about the War. But, many works about periodicals do not give the rules by which the writer did this. They simply give general statements about the periodicals’

War-writings, without saying what qualities made them “war-writings” in the first place. The trouble with this is that the writer’s rules may not be the same as the reader’s. And if the reader’s idea about the qualities of a “war-writing” are different, then the reader could make sense of the writer’s general statements in the wrong way.<sup>4</sup>

A simple, and fictional, example will make this clear. Say that some writer takes account of the *Pittenweem Weekly*’s opinions about the Cing Empire’s leaders. The writer would put the material into three groups:

1. Writings about the Cing-Japanese War
  - 1.1. Writings giving an opinion of the Cing leaders
  - 1.2. Writings *not* giving an opinion of the Cing leaders.
2. Writings *not* about the Cing-Japanese War

The rules by which the writer puts the material into (1) and (2) have an effect on what can be said about (1.1). Say that for the writer’s purposes, “Writings about the Cing-Japanese War” are only accounts of battles, and that the *Pittenweem Weekly*’s accounts of battles say nothing about the Cing Empire’s government leaders. No account would be taken, for example, of a piece of writing about government leaders far from the front lines putting up taxes as a way of supporting the War. So, the writer’s general statements about Cing leaders will really only be about only the Cing *military* leaders. And if, for example, the *Pittenweem Weekly* had only positive things to say about the military, but only negative things to say about the government leaders, the writer would end up making the discovery that “The *Pittenweem Weekly* had only positive things to say about the Cing leaders.” Now, this does not make the writer’s statements “false”: by *their* narrow understanding of “writings about the Cing-Japanese War,” it is true that only negative things were said about Cing leaders. But, if the reader is not conscious of how the writer put the material into (1) and (2), they will take the writer to be saying something very different than they really are.

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<sup>4</sup> Users of content analysis have given a good amount of attention to this matter. The purpose of content analysis is to do a statistical analysis of a piece of writing, and for this to be possible, it is necessary that there be clear rules, so that no unit can be a member of more than one category (Weber 12–24; Weerakkody 152–153).

This trouble does not exist only in theory. In *The Pigtail War*, Jefferey Dorwart says that as the War went on, there was a change in the interests of American writing about the War: “After early discussions of the people, supplemented by continuous propaganda releases by Japan, coverage of the War turned to a comparison of the military strength of each country” (98). In other words, the first accounts of the War were “cultural comparisons of the combatants,” but later accounts were chiefly comparisons of the two countries’ soldiers and arms. The trouble with this statement is that Dorwart does not say *how* he put the periodicals’ writings into “coverage of the War” and “coverage not of the War.” Say, for example, that there were “cultural comparisons” of Chinese and Japanese from start to end, but at the start of the War they were chiefly of soldiers, and by the end they were of Chinese and Japanese non-soldiers’ feelings about the Wars. If Dorwart’s “coverage of the War” is *only* accounts of the non-soldiers, then he is right: by the end of the War “cultural comparisons” were no longer a part of “coverage of the War.” But if the reader is not conscious of this, they might get the idea that after the fighting’s start, there were no “cultural comparisons” at all in the American periodicals. Without a knowledge of how Dorwart put the periodicals’ writings into “coverage of the War” and “coverage *not* of the War,” it is hard to do very much with his general statement about the change in the American periodicals’ War-writings.

## **2. Putting writings “about the War” into smaller groups**

The reason for taking account of a periodical’s War-writings is normally to make some general statement about them — what they do, what opinions they give, or what qualities they have. The trouble is that many writers do not give clear rules for when a piece of writing “about the War” is an example of one or more of these things: they do not say how they have put the writings into groups. And without a knowledge of how a writer has done this, general statements about the writings in the periodical are of little use to the reader.

Take again the *Pittenweem Weekly*. The writer's purpose is to see what opinion the periodical had of the Cing leaders. So the writer puts this material into these groups:

1. Writings about the Cing-Japanese War
  - 1.1. Writings giving an opinion of the Cing leaders
    - 1.1.1. Writings saying something positive about the Cing leaders
    - 1.1.2. Writings saying something negative about the Cing leaders
  - 1.2. Writings *not* giving an opinion of the Cing leaders
2. Writings *not* about the Cing-Japanese War

Now, say that there are two examples of (1.1), each having one of the following statements:

- a. "The Cing General at Yá-shan was an incompetent coward."
- b. "The Cing General at Pyeongyang was slow to send his soldiers into battle."

The writer, and most users of English, would take (a) as an example of (1.1.2), "Writings saying something negative about the Cing leaders." But for (b), the decision is less clear: to one who is of the opinion that the General should have sent the soldiers in more quickly, it is a bad judgement; but to one who is of the opinion that the General's slowness was simply good sense, it is a good judgement. If it seems to the writer that that statement-maker was of the second opinion, then the writer would take it as an example of (1.1.2), and could say that "The *Pittenweem Weekly* had only bad things to say about the Cing Empire's leaders." But, it is important that the writer give their rule for making decisions of this sort, or better still, an account of why they made the decision that they did. If they do not do this, then readers may get the wrong idea about the *Pittenweem Weekly* opinion of the Cing military leaders.

Now take a real example. In "Pictures of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895," an account of Japanese woodblock prints of the War, Judith Frölich says "The Japanese War prints usually do not explicitly denigrate the foe" (22). Making sense of this statement is hard for at least two reasons. First, Frölich does

not give a rule for putting the prints into the groups “not denigrating the foe” and “denigrating the foe.” They could have been so grouped by taking account of the actions of the persons in the pictures, the writing in the prints, how nearly the prints were like other accounts of the battles, or some mix of these. If it was done by the actions of the persons, or the words in the prints, then it is necessary to have a knowledge of what actions and what sorts of statements Frölich takes as examples of “denigrating the foe.” Second, Frölich does not give a rule for putting the “denigrating the foe” prints into the groups “explicitly denigrating” and “non-explicitly denigrating.” There seem to be at least two degrees of “denigrating,” but it is not clear by what rules prints are put into these two groups. It likely has something to do with the details of the pictures or the language of the statements with them, but without a knowledge of how Frölich put the pictures into groups, her statements about them are of little use.

### **3. Not giving the amounts of writings “about the War”**

Many periodicals having War-writings had writings about other things too. This is especially true of missionary periodicals, whose chief purpose was giving mission and Church news. But, writers about periodicals often do not give the amount of writing “about the War” and “not about the War.” This is an important detail, for how strong their general statements are has to do with the amount of the periodical given over to War-writing: the greater the amount of writing a periodical has about something, the stronger a general statement about what it said will be.

One last time, take the *Pittenweem Weekly*. Say that from the start to the end of the Cing-Japanese War, forty issues of the periodical came out, all of which were ten pages in length. And say that four issues had one-page pieces of writing about the War, but only one issue said anything about the Cing military leaders. The writer could say, “The *Pittenweem Weekly* had chiefly bad things to say about the Cing Empire’s leaders.” This is true, but not the complete story. Writings about the War were only ten percent of the *Pittenweem Weekly*’s output, and

writing about the Qing military leaders was only half this, or five percent of the overall output. In short, the *Pittenweem Weekly* may have said bad things about the Qing military leaders, but these were a small part of its output, and a general statement to the effect that the periodical had chiefly bad things to say about the Qing leaders is a weak one.

Other details are important here too. For example, some parts of a periodical might normally have got more attention than others: nearly all readers take in the first page of a periodical; fewer take in the last pages. If its makers were conscious of this, they could make decisions about how many readers would see a given writing. For example, if the *Pittenweem Weekly*'s editor put their opinions about the Qing military leaders on the front page, then these statements were made more strongly than if they were deep inside the paper. The structure of the pages is important too: a piece of writing with a greater-sized font is more likely to get readers' attention than one with a smaller font. And a picture can make the reader more likely to give their attention to the story with which it has a connection.

But, again, many writers do not give these details when making general statements about periodicals. Take, for example, Sarah Paine's account, in *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895*, of what newspapers said about the Japanese military's putting unarmed persons to death in Lyŭ-shùn-kōu:

The London *Times* was among the first papers to allude to the massacre. On November 26 it published a one-sentence paragraph stating, "Great slaughter is reported to have taken place." In early December *The Pall Mall Gazette* and *Le Journal des débats politiques et littéraires* mentioned a massacre, but the foreign press at home gave the matter little or no coverage. American newspapers gave much more press to the Armenian atrocities being perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire. (213)

Paine is better than most, making note of the amount of writing about the battle in different newspapers, and even giving the length of one piece. But, without knowledge of the size of these periodicals, the value of Paine's statements is still limited. A "one-sentence paragraph" seems like a small part of the London *Times*,

but it would surely be better to say just what part of the newspaper this made up. And to say that the American newspapers “gave much more press to the Armenian atrocities” is interesting, but it would be of more use to say how many pieces of writing there were about these two events, and what their sizes were.

These are very serious troubles, for they make it harder for a reader to make sense of a writers’ general statements about different periodicals’ account of the Wars. Worse, they make building on these accounts nearly impossible. It would be of interest to see if, for example, British periodicals too had more “cultural comparisons” at the start of the War, and more “military comparisons” at the end, but no comparison with *The Pigtail War* will be useful without Dorwart’s definition of “coverage of the War.” And it would be interesting to see if European newspapers too gave more “press” to the Armenian Genocide than the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, but this is of little use without knowledge of how Paine put the American newspapers writings into groups “about the Armenian Genocide” and “about the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu,” and better yet, having some knowledge of these groups sizes.

But there is a way forward, and in the next section is given an account of how these troubles may be at least partly got around.

## **DEFINITIONS AND DIVISIONS**

When giving an account of what a periodicals said about the Cing-Japanese War, the Japanese-Táiwanesé War, or anything else, it is best to give clear rules for putting the periodicals’ writings into groups, and rules for making a comparison of these groups with the other writings in the periodicals. In this section are given the rules for putting the *Monthly Messenger’s* and *Church News’s* writings into “not-accounts” and “accounts,” how these are put into accounts “of the war” and “not of the War,” and how the measurements of the first are taken, so that a comparison between the two periodicals can be made.

## Writings “about the Wars”

The pieces of writing of interest here are “accounts of the War.” So, the first thing to be clear about is how “accounts” are different from other sorts of writing. For present purposes, an “account” is a piece of writing having at least one “statement”: “the utterance by a certain speaker or writer of certain words (a sentence) to an audience with reference to an historic situation, event or what not” (Austin 87–88). For the purposes of this work, an addition is made to this definition: the statements must have a subject and a predicate; it cannot be simply a noun phrase or verb phrase. As such, no account is taken of statements like captions, titles, tables of contents, and so on. And, naturally, the “historic situation, event or what not” must have a connection with one or more of the two Wars — more will be said about the nature of this connection farther down. Take note too that the statement need not be about the past: a statement can be about the present or future, as long as it has somewhere in it a “reference” to a something in the past.

Now it is necessary to be clear about which of these accounts are “about the War.” For present purposes, an account may be “about the War” in one or more of three ways:

(1) *Names for the War* — An account may have somewhere in it the name “Cing-Japan War” or some synonym of this, such as “Sino-Japanese War,” “Chino-Japanese War,” and so on. For example, “Passing to the consideration of the ultimate effects of the *Chino-Japanese War* and the Treaty of Peace, Mr. Shaw remarked that the policy of England in the matter had been one of strict and almost severe neutrality” (*Monthly Messenger* 591: 137–138; emphasis mine). (Naturally, for the Japanese-Táiwanesé War, the writing may have this name or its synonyms.) Take note that these may be as simple as “the War,” if it is clear from the rest of the writing that the “war” in question is the Cing-Japanese War or Japanese-Táiwanesé War.

(2) *Actions having a connection with the War* — An account may have in it a statement giving an account of an action which *was, is, or will be* undertaken for the purpose of putting an end to the War. For example, this statement:

the Japanese soldiers were going to Giām-zùi harbour, but when they got to Rì-dēk-wí village, several hundred people gave a great shout, rushed the Japanese, and began fighting them.

Rīt-bun-pêng bhēh kī Giām-zui-gàng, gao Rì-dēk-wi-zng, bēh-sē<sup>n</sup> dān-lé hoāh-hiu, wū gui-nā bāh-láng dī hīd-tāh gap yin sa<sup>n</sup> tái. *Church News* 128: 109)

Take note that the action's *having* the hoped-for effect is not important; what is important is the *hope* that it would make the War's end nearer. Take note too that the Wars could come to an end in a number of ways: the Cing — and later Táiwanese — could overcome the Japanese; the Japanese could overcome the Cing — and later Táiwanese — or some outside group could put a stop to the fighting.

(3) *States having a connection with the War* — An account may have in it a statement about an state which came into being through one of the actions of the sort given in (2). For example, “At present a regiment of Mandarin-speaking soldiers *is down from Chao-chow-fu* [Cháo-jhou] for the protection of the forts” (*Monthly Messenger* 586: 14; emphasis mine), or even “At present rice *is very expensive* in Hu-siá<sup>n</sup> (“Hian-sí dī Hu-siá<sup>n</sup> bhì jin gui”; *Church News* 127: 93; emphasis mine). Both states came into being through actions undertaken for the purpose of making the War come to an end: the soldiers were sent to Cháo-jhou to keep it safe from Japanese attack; and the price of rice went up from the Japanese not letting new rice be sent to the enemy government in Hu-siá<sup>n</sup>.

### **The Wars' starts and ends**

The accounts of interest here are those that were made while the Wars were taking place. But, there are some questions about the starting and ending times of the two Wars. The Cing Empire made a declaration of War against Japan on 01 August 1894, and the Japanese Empire made its own declaration of War the same day (Sun 68–69). But, the Cing declaration was in answer to a Japanese attack on a

Cing ship, which took place on 25 July. There were arguments even at the time about which of these days was the start of the War. The Japanese position, which was based on British legal theory, was that the attack on the Cing ship was their declaration of War, and the written declaration was simply a restatement of this (Howland, “War” 190–192). This work takes the same position: the start of the War was the Japanese attack on 25 July 1895.

There is trouble too about the time at which the Cing-Japanese War came to an end. The last fighting was on 26 March 1895; the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on 17 April; and its ratification was on 08 May. Any of these dates could be taken as the end of the War. But, Article 00 of the Treaty says, “All offensive military operations shall cease *upon the exchange of the ratifications of this act*” (Kajima 266; emphasis mine). For this reason, 08 May is taken as the end of the War, and accounts of the Cing and Japanese actions before this time, of which the treaty discussions are part, are still writings “about the War.”

The Japanese never made a declaration of War against the Táiwanese Republic. As noted above, they did not see written declarations of War as necessary, and in any case they saw the “Republic” as simply a rebellion, not a real government. The Táiwanese too never made a declaration of War. But, they did make a declaration of independence, which said this:

The Japanese have affronted China by annexing our territory of Formosa, and the supplications of us, the People of Formosa, at the portals of the Thrones have been made in vain. We now learn that the Japanese slaves are about to arrive.

If we suffer this, the land of our hearths and homes will become the land of savages and barbarians, but if we do not suffer it, our condition of comparative weakness will certainly not endure long. . . .

Now therefore we, the people of Formosa, are irrevocably resolved to die before we will serve the enemy. . . . (Davidson 279–280)

This is, in effect, an ultimatum, which in the legal theory of the time was the same as a declaration of War. So, in this work the time of the first Japanese attack on Tái-wan, 29 May 1895, is taken to be the start of the Japanese-Táiwanese War.

The end of this War too is unclear. There was no treaty between the Japanese Empire and Táiwanese Republic: at some point the existence of the Republic simply came to an end. On 01 June the Japanese military took control of Dāi-bak, the capital city of the Republic, and many Táiwanese leaders gave up and went to the Cing Empire. But, another group of leaders made a new capital at Dāi-lám, and went on fighting. The Japanese military took control of this city on 21 October 1895, and more Táiwanese leaders went to the Cing Empire. But still other groups went on fighting against the Japanese until 1902. Again, any of these dates could be taken as the end of the War. But, while some of the groups fighting the Japanese after 21 October had been soldiers of the Republic, and some may even have been fighting in its name, they no longer had a President, a capital, or any sort of island-wide organisation (Lamley 55; Weng 6-7). For the purposes of this work, 21 October will be taken as the end of the Japanese-Táiwanese War.

### **Sizes**

The above rules give a way of putting the periodicals' writings into parts "about the War" and "not about the War." But as noted, a comparison of the numbers of these writings is not of much use. For example, if in an issue of the *Church News* there were four one-sentence pieces of writing about the Japanese-Táiwanese War, and in an issue of the *Monthly Messenger* there were two thousand-sentence pieces, then to say that the first periodical had more pieces of writing than the second gives the wrong idea completely (and even these numbers give no sense of how much of the issues these writings took up). To get an idea of the amount of writing "about the War" and "not about the War," it is necessary to make a comparison not only of the number of writings, but of their sizes, and how much of the issue they took up.

This work makes use of "line numbers" to take the measure of the periodicals and their pieces of writing. The printing presses which made the periodicals could put only a certain number written lines on one piece of paper,

so the product of the greatest possible number of lines on a page, and the number of pages in an issue, gives the greatest possible number of lines in an issue. For example, the *Church News* was printed in two columns of up to forty-eight lines. A page could have up to ninety-six lines, and a twelve-page issue could have up to 1,152 lines. The size of a piece of writing is the number of these lines it takes up. For example, the piece of writing in *Church News* No. 127 giving the price of rice in Hu-siá<sup>n</sup> was five lines in length. By taking these measures, it is possible to give the size of any piece of writing about the War, or all of them together. For example, all fifteen pieces of writing about the War in *Church News* No. 127 together were 130 lines in length. A comparison of the number of lines of writing about the War with the number of possible lines in an issue gives the percentage of lines taken up by writing about the War. *Church News* No. 127 had twelve pages, so the piece of writing about the price of rice took up 0.43 percent of the issue, and all the writings about the War in the issue together took up 11.28 percent. With these numbers, it is possible to make a comparison of the amount of writing about the War in the two periodicals.

It must be said that this way of doing things is not without its troubles. For one thing, “one line” could be a line completely taken up by words, or a line having only one word, when in fact the length of the one piece of writing is many words greater than the other. For another, it was not normal for the *Monthly Messenger* or *Church News* to have writing on every possible line: some of their lines were taken up by pictures, line breaks, charts, titles, and so on. One way around these troubles would be to make a comparison between the number of lines of writing in an issue, and the number of lines of writing about the War. An even better way is to make a comparison of the number of words in the issue, and the number of words in pieces of writing about the War. But, as the two periodicals have not been digitised, at present it is necessary to do all counting of lines, and words, by hand and by eye. So, the better system of measure are not put to use here. The system of “line count” is rough, but good enough for present purposes.

## **THE CHIEF DIVISIONS**

### **The amounts of writings about the Wars**


In the above sections it was said that the writings in the *Monthly Messenger* and *Church News* can be put into “accounts” and “not-accounts” by noting which have statements “with reference to an historic situation, event or what not.” These accounts can be put into the groups “about the War” and “not about the War” by noting which have one or more of these: (1) names for the War; (2) actions having a connection with the War; (3) states having a connection with the War. And the measure of these writings can be taken by noting how many lines they take up. These measures will now be given for the periodicals in question. This section gives the measures of the writing about the Cing-Japanese War and the Japanese-Táiwanesé War in the *Monthly Messenger* and *Church News*. It first goes through the amounts of writing about the Wars in the two periodicals, and then makes sense of why these were different.

### **THE CING-JAPANESE WAR IN THE *MONTHLY MESSENGER***

While the Cing-Japanese War was taking place, ten issues of the *Monthly Messenger* came out: “September 1894” to “June 1895.” The *Monthly Messenger*’s issues came out at the start of the named month. For example, the September issue had news only up to the end of August. The ten issues could have had up to 21,640 lines or writing. In them were twenty-one accounts of the Cing-Japanese War, which together were 888 lines in length — 3.94 percent of the issues, an average of 3.92 percent an issue. But take note too that the amount of writing about the War was different from issue to issue. In issue number 588, there were only nineteen lines of writing about the War, but in number 591, there were 332 lines. If the outliers, numbers 586, 588, and 591, are taken out, then the average amount of writing about the Cing-Japanese War was only 2.50 percent an issue.

ISSUE NUMBER	ABOUT THE WAR	NOT ABOUT THE WAR	PERCENT
582	58	2246	2.52%
583	36	2268	1.56%
584	71	2233	3.08%
585	54	1738	3.01%
586	149	2155	6.47%
587	63	2241	2.73%
588	19	2285	0.82%
589	55	2249	2.39%
590	51	2253	2.21%
591	332	1972	14.41%
	<b>888</b>	<b>21640</b>	<b>3.94%</b>

WRITING ABOUT THE CING-JAPANESE WAR IN THE MONTHLY MESSENGER




### THE CING-JAPANESE WAR IN THE *CHURCH NEWS*

While the Cing-Japanese War was taking place, the *Church News* too put out ten issues: 7 ghoêh Gōng-sū 20 ní (“01 Aug. – 30 Aug. 1894”) to 4 ghoêh Gōng-sū 20 ní (“25 Apr. – 23 May 1895”). In these were thirty-four accounts of the War, which together took up 575 lines. The issues could have had up to 8,958 lines, so 6.42 percent of the War-time *Church News* was taken up by accounts of the War — an average of 6.49 percent an issue.

ISSUE NUMBER	ABOUT THE WAR	NOT ABOUT THE WAR	PERCENT
112	59	727	7.51%
113	12	774	1.53%
114	82	704	10.43%
115	57	1095	4.95%
116	49	737	6.23%
117	45	1107	3.91%
118	53	733	6.74%
119	51	735	6.49%
120	65	721	8.27%
121	102	1050	8.85%
	<b>575</b>	<b>8383</b>	<b>6.42%</b>

#### WRITING ABOUT THE CING-JAPANESE WAR IN THE CHURCH NEWS




#### THE JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR IN THE *MONTHLY MESSENGER*

While the Japanese-Táiwaneese War was taking place, five issues of the *Monthly Messenger* came out: “July 1894” to “November 1895.” But, in the charts below, and in the later chapters, account is taken of the issues up to “January 1896.” The reason for this is that the December and January issues had accounts made just

before the War's end, which did not get to England until some time later. These seven issues could have had up to 16,616 lines of writing. In them were twenty-eight accounts of the Japanese-Táiwānese War, which together took up 926 lines of writing — 5.93 percent of the space, an average of 5.93 percent an issue. But, the amount of space was unusually great in one issue, No. 598, which had the missionaries' accounts of the taking of Dāi-lám. Without this outlier, the average amount of writing about the War was 4.59 percent an issue.

ISSUE NUMBER	ABOUT THE WAR	NOT ABOUT THE WAR	PERCENT
592	99	2205	4.30%
593	125	2179	5.43%
594	81	2223	3.52%
595	104	2200	4.51%
596	85	2219	3.69%
597	109	1683	6.08%
598	323	1981	14.02%
	<b>926</b>	<b>14690</b>	<b>5.93%</b>

WRITING ABOUT THE JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR IN THE MONTHLY MESSENGER




## THE JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR IN THE *CHURCH NEWS*

The *Church News* put out eight issues while the Japanese-Táiwaneese War was ongoing: 5 ghoêh Gōng-sū 21 ní (“24 May – 22 Jun. 1895”) to 11 gāp 12 Gōng-sū 20 ní (16 Dec. 1895 – 12 Feb. 1896). These issues could have had up to 8,064 lines. In them were eighty-six accounts of the Japanese-Táiwaneese War, which took up 2,366 lines. So 29.34 percent of the issues were taken up by accounts of the War. The average amount of writing about the War was 31.76 percent an issue.

ISSUE NUMBER	ABOUT THE WAR	NOT ABOUT THE WAR	PERCENT
122	467	685	40.54%
123	420	348	54.69%
124	136	1016	11.81%
125	325	827	28.21%
126	186	966	16.15%
127	130	1022	11.28%
128	449	319	58.46%
129	253	515	32.94%
	<b>2366</b>	<b>5698</b>	<b>29.34%</b>

### WRITING ABOUT THE JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR IN THE CHURCH NEWS



From the above numbers, it is clear that the amount of space given to writing about the Wars was different from periodical to periodical, and from War to War. The rest of this chapter is a discussion of why this was so.

### **The *Monthly Messenger*: The Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwaneese War**

In the *Monthly Messenger* the Japanese-Táiwaneese War took up an average of 4.59 percent of the periodical's space, but the Cing Japanese War took up an average of only 2.20 percent. For this, there were at least two reasons. First, the Japanese-Táiwaneese War had a much greater effect on the Presbyterian Church of England's missions. The Cing-Japanese War took place chiefly in the Joseon Kingdom and the Cing Empire's northeast. While there were Churches there, and the periodical gave the odd account of the War's effects on these, the Presbyterian Church of England did not have any missions of its own in these places. In fact, their own missionaries even made note of how little effect the War was having on their work in the Empire's south (*Monthly Messenger* 587: 35). But the Japanese-Táiwaneese War was taking place in one of the Church's mission fields. The War was not only having an effect on the Church in Táí-wan, it would be the cause of great changes in that Church's future.

Second, the *Monthly Messenger* could get more detailed accounts of the Japanese-Táiwaneese War than many of the U.K. newspapers. There had been little reason for the periodical to give detailed accounts of the Cing-Japanese War: many U.K. periodicals had writers over there, and their accounts were sent to the U.K. nearly every day. But things were different with the Japanese-Táiwaneese War, at the start of which there was few Western newspaper writers in Táí-wan (Davidson 258). The Church's missionaries not only had a good knowledge of Táí-wan's geography and languages, the churchgoers were sending them accounts of the War's effects from all over the island; these went into the missionaries' own accounts, which were sent to the periodical in London. Not only did the *Monthly Messenger* have very good accounts of the

Japanese-Táiwaneſe War, the War itſelf was important to the Church’s future too. And ſo, more ſpace was given to accounts of it than to the Cing-Japanese War.

### **The *Church News*: The Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwaneſe War**

Accounts of the Cing-Japanese War took up an average of 6.49 percent of the *Church News*, and accounts of the Japanese-Táiwaneſe War took up an average of 31.76 percent. The reaſons there was more writing about the Japanese-Táiwaneſe War are very like thoſe ſeen with a *Monthly Messenger*: the Japanese-Táiwaneſe War had a greater effect on the iſland’s churches, and the *Church News*’ makers had more material for the periodical. Before the attack on the Bē<sup>n</sup>-ó<sup>n</sup> Iſlands, in the laſt days of the Cing-Japanese War, there had been no fighting anywhere near Tái-wan, and the War had ſeemed unlikely to have any effect on Tái-wan at all. So, for the greater part of the War, it was not ſeen as a very important matter, and was given only a ſmall amount of the periodical’s ſpace.

Naturally, the Japanese-Táiwaneſe War was different: not only was the fighting having a great effect on the Churchgoers, the War’s outcome would have a great effect on their futures. So, the *Church News* gave far more ſpace to accounts of the Japanese-Táiwaneſe War. This was ſimple for them, as they had many more accounts of the ſecond War. The periodical did not often ſay from where its accounts of the Cing-Japanese War had come, but they were likely word-of-mouth and accounts from Cing newspapers. With the Japanese-Táiwaneſe War, things were very different. As noted in Chapter 2, one of the periodical’s purpoſes was to give the little groups of Táiwaneſe Presbyterian churchgoers, who ſaw other churchgoers infrequently, a way of having knowledge of each other, and of the Church’s leaders in Dāi-lám. So the *Church News*’ makers had a ſystem in place for getting knowledge of events in Tái-wan, and ſending account of theſe to their readers. When the War came to Tái-wan, they were able to put this ſystem to uſe getting detailed accounts of the War.

### **The Cing-Japanese War: The *Monthly Messenger* and the *Church News***

As seen above, accounts of the Cing-Japanese War were not a great part of the *Monthly Messenger* or the *Church News*. They were, though, a somewhat greater part of the Táiwanese periodical — an average of 6.49 percent — than they were of the English periodical — only 2.50 percent. Likely, there were two things at work here: the relations of the readers to the War, and the numbers of other accounts of the War. To the readers of the *Monthly Messenger*, the Cing-Japanese War was something taking place half a world away, and having next to no effect on them. The readers may have had some idea of the Cing Empire, but the nearest thing they had to a personal connection with it was the missionaries, who were safely away from the fighting.

Likely, few, if any of the *Church News*' readers had much knowledge of the Joseon Kingdom or northeastern Cing Empire — as will be seen, the periodical's makers were certainly of this opinion — but Tái-wan was still a part of the Cing Empire, their home — and so, they too were at War with the Japanese. The *Church News*' makers were conscious of this, and gave their readers more accounts of the War than did the *Monthly Messenger*. Another reason was the different amounts of other reading material for the two groups of readers. Readers of the *Monthly Messenger* could make use of a number of periodicals, some of which had news of War-events only a day or so after they had taken place. The Cing periodicals did the best they could, but as noted in Chapter 2, the greater part of the churchgoers in Tái-wan were unable to make use of reading material in anything but the Ê-mńg language. As will be seen in later chapters, this had an effect not only on the amount of writing that the *Church News* gave its readers, but the qualities of that writing.

### **The Japanese-Táiwanese War: The *Monthly Messenger* and the *Church News***

The *Monthly Messenger* and the *Church News* both gave more space to accounts of the Japanese-Táiwanese War than to accounts of the Cing-Japanese War. But in

the English periodical this was only a little more space, an average of 4.59 percent, while in the Táiwanese periodical it was a great amount more, an average of 31.76 percent. Again, the likely causes were the War's having a greater effect on the Táiwanese readers, and the *Church News*' makers having more material on the War. As noted, the Japanese-Táiwanese War was clearly going to have a greater effect on the Church in Tái-wan than the Cing-Japanese War had. But, to the readers of the *Monthly Messenger*, this made it only a little more important. True, they were likely more conscious of the Church in Tái-wan than of Churches in other parts of the Cing Empire, but the War still had no effect on the readers themselves.

In comparison, the War had a very great effect on readers of the *Church News*. The fighting was taking place near, and sometimes in their houses, and before the end a number of churchgoers would be killed. What was more, their futures would be shaped by the War's outcome: whatever this was, they would be living under a new government. The makers of the periodical were conscious of this, and gave a greater amount of space to accounts of the War. The two periodicals had more material about the Japanese-Táiwanese War than they had had for the Cing-Japanese War. But the makers of the *Church News* had many times the amount of material that the *Church News*' makers had. The *Monthly Messenger* was sent accounts of the War from Tái-wan, but this was only a small part of what the missionaries in Dāi-lám were getting. And so, for these reasons, the two periodicals gave more space to the Japanese-Táiwanese War, but of the two the *Church News* gave much more.

### **Summary**

Many other writers on periodical's accounts of the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War have made general statements about them without giving clear rules for the relations between these statements and the writings themselves. For example, they do not say how they put the periodicals' writings into the groups "about the War" and "not about the War"; they do not say how

they put the writings “about the War” into smaller groups; and they do not give details on the sizes of these groups. Doing things in this way makes it much harder for the reader to make sense of the writer’s arguments, or to make them the base for future work.

In this chapter was put forward a different way of doing things. Clear rules were given for putting the writings in the *Monthly Messenger* and *Church News* into groups “about the War” and “not about the War,” and for taking the measure of their sizes. Then, an account of the sizes of these groups was given. It was seen that the *Monthly Messenger* and *Church News* gave more space to writings about the Japanese-Táiwanesé War than writings about the Cing-Japanese War. But while in the *Monthly Messenger* the amount of space given to the two Wars was quite small, in the *Church News* only the amount of space given to the Cing-Japanese War was small; the space given to the Japanese-Táiwanesé War took up about one third of the periodical’s possible lines. The reason put forward for this was that the Japanese-Táiwanesé War was the more important for the two periodicals, but for the *Monthly Messenger* it was only a little more important, as it was having more of an effect on the missions, but no real effect on the readers. For the *Church News* it was much more important: the Japanese-Táiwanesé War was not only having an effect on the periodical’s writers and readers, it would have a great effect on Táí-wan’s future.

In the next Chapter will be seen just what the periodicals said about the two Wars, and what they said that these effects would be.

## 4 — “Now the Cing will sue for Peace”: the periodicals’ neutrality

This chapter takes up questions of the periodicals’ neutrality. What were the Wars’ best possible outcomes? And, were these outcomes likely? It makes the argument that the *Monthly Messenger* was at first neutral in the Cing-Japanese War, then took the Japanese side after the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu; but in the Japanese-Táiwaneese War, the periodical was with the Japanese from the start. As for the *Church News*, it did not openly take sides in the Wars, but nonetheless made readers aware that a Cing loss was likely in the first War, and that the Táiwaneese Republic had little chance against the Japanese in the second.

### Overview

At the start of the Cing-Japanese War, the *Monthly Messenger* said that the outcome would be a Japanese loss. But the periodical was not on anyone’s side: it said that the War’s best possible outcome was one or more Western countries putting a stop to it. This opinion, though, was quickly changed. The periodical may have been against the War, but its writers had respect for good fighting. As the Japanese got the better of the Cing in battle after battle, the writers’ opinions were changed, and by November of 1894 the *Monthly Messenger* was saying that the War’s outcome would, and should, be a Cing loss.

Meantime, in Tái-wan, the *Church News* was quiet about these things. In most ways, its writing about the War had more detail than the *Monthly Messenger*’s, and from the many accounts of Cing losses, readers could have got the idea that the War would not go well for the Empire. But for a long time the writers themselves did not say anything about the War’s likely outcome. Only after the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, in which the Cing Empire gave up control of the North China Sea, did the periodical come out with a statement about the War’s likely end — a Cing loss.

The *Monthly Messenger*, having come around to supporting the Japanese Empire, went on doing so in the Japanese-Táiwanesé War. In fact, they were even more strongly on the side of the Japanese: the Cing Empire may have been a weak country, but it was a country, while the “Táiwanesé Republic” was a nothing but a rebellion. When the little Republic did what the Empire could not — putting a stop, for a while, to the Japanese attacks — the periodical’s writers were surprised and angry. Even so, they went on supporting the Japanese Empire till it did at last make an end of the Republic.

While the *Monthly Messenger*’s writers were reading about the Japanese-Táiwanesé War in the newspapers, the *Church News*’ writers were living through it. In the pieces that these writers sent to the *Monthly Messenger*, it is clear that they gave the Republic no chance against the Japanese Empire, but they did not openly give this opinion in the *Church News*. Even so, in a way their opinions still got through: as in the earlier War, the *Church News* had many detailed accounts of the fighting, which made much of the Táiwanesé losses. Likely, readers had little doubt about the War’s outcome.

### **Definitions and divisions**

In Chapter 3 was a discussion of the the trouble with making general statements about the writings in periodicals. One of those troubles was with “putting writings ‘about the War’ into smaller groups” — that is, not giving the rules by which a piece of writing is said to be or not be an example of the sort of thing interesting to the researcher. This chapter is about the question of the periodicals’ being neutral about the Wars, and so it is necessary to be clear from the start what sorts of writings are taken as examples “being neutral” and “not being neutral.” The first thing about which to be clear is the possible outcomes of the War. The Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanesé War could, in theory, have had many different outcomes, but this chapter takes account of two: for the Cing-Japanese War, the *Cing overcoming the Japanese*, or the *Japanese overcoming the*

*Cing*; for the Japanese-Táiwānese War, *the Japanese overcoming the Táiwānese*, or *the Táiwānese overcoming the Japanese*.<sup>1</sup>

Take note that these outcomes are are logically contradictory: it is not possible for the Cing-Japanese War to have the outcome “*the Cing overcoming the Japanese and the Japanese overcoming the Cing*.” But, going outside logic, such things are said, and in at least two ways. First, a writer could make use of hypotheticals to say in what conditions “*the Cing would overcome the Japanese*,” and in what conditions the opposite would take place. Second, a writer can say that one side *literally* overcomes the other, but is *figuratively* overcome itself. These sorts of writings were not common in *Monthly Messenger* and *Church News*, and the few of them are given their own discussions below. Take note too that it is possible for a writing to say nothing about the War’s outcome, and or to say something about outcomes of sorts other than the ones given above. For present purposes, such writings are put into their own group.

So, making use of the above definitions, the pieces of writing “about the War” can be put into three groups:

1. Writings about the Cing-Japanese War
  - 1.1. Writings saying the Cing will overcome the Japanese
  - 1.2. Writings saying the Japanese will overcome the Cing
  - 1.3. Writings saying nothing about the War’s outcome
2. Writings *not* about the Cing-Japanese War
3. Writings about the Japanese-Táiwānese War
  - 3.1. Writings saying the Japanese will overcome the Táiwānese
  - 3.2. Writings saying the Táiwānese will overcome the Japanese
  - 3.3. Writings saying nothing about the War’s outcome
4. Writings *not* about the Japanese-Táiwānese War

About these outcomes, many opinions are possible. Here, this opinions are put into two groups: “*good (or better)*,” and “*bad (or worse)*.” There is, in theory, a third

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<sup>1</sup> For present purposes, “overcoming” can take place in two ways. First, one government may send the other a request for an end to the War, or at least for a discussion about putting an end to the War. If this takes place, the government sending the request has been “overcome.” Second, one government can take control of all the land over which the other had control at the start of the War. If this takes place, the government no longer having control over its old lands has been “overcome.”

group, “*not-good and not-bad*”: these writings will be put into the groups “writings saying nothing about the War’s outcome.” This makes the ordering somewhat simpler: normally, “good” and “bad” are contrary qualities – something “not-good” is not necessarily “bad” – but taking away this third group makes them contradictory, so a writing saying “the Cing overcoming the Japanese is a good outcome” is the same as one saying “the Japanese overcome the Cing is a bad outcome.” But take note that it is possible, and even common, to say that some outcome is figuratively “*good and bad*.” When this is said, the writer is normally saying that the outcome is good “from a certain point of view” but bad from another, or that it was good “in some ways” but bad in others. A more complex ordering of the writings would be necessary to take account of these, but, as it is, there were not any writings of this sort in the *Monthly Messenger’s* and *Church News’* writings about the Wars. The complete ordering of writings is given below:

1. Writings about the Cing-Japanese War
  - 1.1. Writings saying the Cing will overcome the Japanese
    - 1.1.1. Writings saying this is good outcome
  - 1.2. Writings saying the Japanese will overcome the Cing
    - 1.2.1. Writings saying this is good outcome
  - 1.3. Writings saying *nothing* about the War’s outcome
2. Writings *not* about the Cing-Japanese War
3. Writings about the Japanese-Táiwanesé War
  - 3.1. Writings saying the Cing will overcome the Japanese
    - 3.1.1. Writings saying this is good outcome
  - 3.2. Writings saying the Japanese will overcome the Cing
    - 3.2.1. Writings saying this is good outcome
  - 3.3. Writings saying *nothing* about the War’s outcome
4. Writings *not* about the Japanese-Táiwanesé War

This chapter is made up of four sections. The first two are about the *Monthly Messenger’s* and *Church News’* accounts of the Cing-Japanese War. The second two are about the periodicals’ accounts of the Japanese-Táiwanesé War. At the start of the sections is a discussion of the numbers and sizes of writings, making use of

the groups given above. There is then a discussion of the details of these writings: when the periodicals took sides in the Wars, what reasons they gave for taking the side that they did, and what is interesting or unusual about the language of these statements.

### **THE CING-JAPANESE WAR IN THE *MONTHLY MESSENGER***

At the Cing-Japanese War's start, the *Monthly Messenger* was not on anyone's side. The periodical's editors and writers were against the War completely, saying that its effects on the two countries would be all bad. They were, though, very sure of how the War would go. It seemed to them, as it seemed to many Western periodicals, that the Cing Empire, having more soldiers and ships than their enemy, was sure to get the better of the Japanese. But it was not so. The Japanese got the better of the Cing at Gasan, then at Pyeongyang, and then at at Ya-lù River. After the Japanese took control of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, opinions at the *Monthly Messenger* were changed: it now seemed to them that the War's most likely outcome was a Cing loss. They were not unhappy about this. From the writers' point of view, the Cing Empire had had everything going for them at the War's start. But the Cing military's leaders had been foolish, and their soldiers had given up too quickly. In comparison, their Japanese opposites have been clever and brave. They had been the better fighters, and it was right that they got the better of the Cing.

### **Numbers**

The chart below gives the amount of writing saying that the Japanese overcoming the Cing (“J. OVCMG C.”) was a good thing. The left-most column gives the issue and page numbers of the writings.<sup>2</sup> The “LINS” column gives the number of lines in the issue; and the “PER” column gives the percent of the periodical's “writings about the War” that the writings taking the Japanese side took up.

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<sup>2</sup> Giving the name of the piece of writing would be better, but many in the two periodicals were nameless.

<b>MONTHLY MESSENGER — CING-JAPANESE WAR</b>		
<b>J. OVCMG C. (GOOD)</b>	<b>LINS</b>	<b>PER</b>
585: 274–275	38	4.28%
586: 15	73	8.22%
590: 22	11	1.24%
590: 23	22	2.48%
590:23:00	22	2.48%
<b>TOTAL: 5</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>18.69%</b>

As can be seen above, the *Monthly Messenger* was at first neutral about the Cing-Japanese War, and did not come out on the Japanese side until issue number 585, in December of 1894. But, once it had done, writings taking the Japanese side were an important part of the periodical's "accounts of the War," taking up 18.69 percent. In the sections that follow, will be given an account of why the periodical took the Japanese side, and what these writings said.

### **Feng Island to Lyŭ-shùn-kǒu**

The *Monthly Messenger* first made note of the Cing-Japanese War in September of 1894, at which time the War was nearly a month old. It had been started on 25 July, by a battle between Cing and Japanese ships near Feng Island. Nothing much had come of the battle, but later that day, the Japanese Navy had sent a Cing troop transport, and 1,000 soldiers, to the bottom of the North China Sea. Then, two days later, the Japanese Army had attacked the Cing-controlled city of Gasan, in the Joseon Kingdom. The Japanese had taken it from their enemies without much trouble, and by so doing, had got control of the Southern Joseon Kingdom. On 01 August, the Cing Empire made a declaration of War; shortly after, the Japanese Empire did the same. For the next month, the two powers made ready their armies on opposite sides of the Joseon Kingdom. Sooner or later, one side would have to make an attack on the other.

The September issue of the *Monthly Messenger* said nothing about the coming fighting, or about any of the fighting to that point. It had one piece of writing about the War, which was chiefly a discussion of the politics that had been its cause. The writer of the piece said that it was hard to be sure of the War's "real cause," but made note of the two Empires' political designs:

China is bent on keeping the Japanese away from the continent; the Japanese are determined not to be pent up in their own islands. The Japanese Government, it is suspected, are not unwilling, besides, to divert popular attention from parliamentary difficulties (somewhat acute at the present time) by plunging into War. (583: 199)

But, if the cause of the War was unclear, its likely end was not. To the writer it seemed that the Japanese had no chance against the Cing Empire: "If the two combatants are left to fight to the end, Japan must suffer defeat. China's immense population and dogged persistence are sure to bring ultimate victory to her forces" (583: 199).

This was not a brave opinion. In September of 1894, many other periodicals were saying the same (Dorwart 98-99). It made sense on paper — the Cing Empire simply had more soldiers and ships than the Japanese. But things were somewhat different in the field, for while the Cing military did have more men than the Japanese, these were all over the Empire, and under the control of different military leaders. In fact the Cing Army keeping control of the Northern Joseon Kingdom was nearly the same size as the Japanese Army that had been sent to take it (Fung 1026-1029). But of this fact, the *Monthly Messenger's* writers had no knowledge. It seemed to them that the little Japanese Army had no chance: the War's only possible end was a Japanese loss, and by making War on the Cing Empire, the Japanese leaders were putting their country in great danger. Even so, the writer said nothing about this outcome's being good or bad. In fact, in the writers' view, the best possible outcome to the War would be the Western countries' not letting things get to that point, and the quicker they did so, the better: "Europe would no doubt intervene to prevent the ruin of Japan; and it seems a pity that such interference should be longer delayed" (582: 198-199).

On 15 September, the Japanese made an attack on Pyeongyang. To the surprise of many in the West, the Japanese did great damage to the Cing army, who quickly took themselves away over the Cing-Joseon line. The Joseon Kingdom was now under Japanese control. Two days later, the Japanese Navy and the Cing Navy's "North Sea Fleet" ("Běi-yáng Jiàn-duè") had a battle at the mouth of the Ya-lù River. This too, went badly for the Cing. Their ships took heavy damage, and had to go back to port; for the time being, the Japanese had control of the North Sea too. The *Monthly Messenger's* October issue made note of "The great battle at Ping Yang [Pyeongyang], north from Seoul, in which the Japanese, by superior discipline and generalship, have apparently annihilated a large Chinese army," but their opinion on the War's most likely outcome was unchanged: "if the War goes on, the hundreds of millions in China must ultimately overcome the thirty millions of Japanese" (583: 222). Again, the *Monthly Messenger* was not alone in their view that the Cing Empire was sure to get the better of their enemy. At this time in the War, many Western newspapers were saying the same. What is more, the Cing losses had kept unchanged their opinion that the War was simply a bad thing for everyone, and that "The thing to be desired is, undoubtedly, the interference of Europe to compel peace" (583: 222).

### **Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu to Shimonoseki**

After the battle of Pyeongyang, the Japanese military was quiet for a month. New soldiers were sent from Japan, and a new army put together to make an attack on the Cing Empire itself. The Cing government had knowledge of this, and sent their own soldiers to the Empire's northeast, across the border from the Joseon Kingdom. But, being unsure if the Japanese had designs on other parts of the Empire, they sent soldiers to the south too. An editorial in the November issue of the *Monthly Messenger* made note of this:

Our missionaries tell us of excitement regarding the War with Japan, even in the far south of China. Reinforcements for Formosa [Tái-wan] are being sent from the mainland, and the recruiting and drilling bring the War

home to the consciousness of Chinamen in Amoy [Ĕ-mńg] and Swaton [sic; Shàn-tóu]. (584: 251)

But it said nothing about the War's likely, or best, outcome. The editor did make clear that there was unlikely to be any fighting in the south:

It was deemed advisable to ask our missionaries (by cablegram) if the return of the ladies should be delayed, or if they might safely go out at once. Mr. Gibson telegraphed in reply that there was no apprehension of danger in Swatow, nor any reason for postponing the departures of the ladies. (584: 251)

This was, in effect, saying that the War might have been going badly for the Cing Empire, but it was not a serious danger.

The next Japanese attack came in November. It was made against the city of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu ("Port Arthur"), a base of the North Sea Fleet, and for that reason an important target. Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu was a fortress of great power, a chain of Western-designed forts armed with the latest weapons, and was said that even a Western Army would have trouble making an attack on it. So, it came as a great surprise when the Japanese got complete control of the city in only two days (Paine 197–199).

It was at this point many Western periodicals made the discovery that the Japanese Empire might get the better of the Cing after all. The *Monthly Messenger* was one of these. Its December issue said "The War between China and Japan has resulted in the collapse of the Chinese forces," and gave a number of opinions on the War's likely outcome (585: 274). Hur Mackenzie, a missionary at the Presbyterian Church of Shàn-tóu, was of the opinion that the War might well be the end of the Cing Empire:

If the Chinese were badly defeated in this War, and if the Japanese were to make a successful advance on Moukden [Shèng-jing] or Pekin [Běi-jing], there is no saying what might happen. All China might then be in a state of rebellion against the present dynasty, and dire confusion might for at time prevail. (585: 274–275)

But he did not say if this outcome was likely, or if it was a good or bad outcome. The *Monthly Messenger's* editor took a happier view of things. He said that the Cing Empire would come out of the War in one piece, and that its loss to the Japanese could even be a good thing. The reason the Cing Empire was doing so badly was simply “the indolence and conceit of advisers at the imperial court,” but this was certainly as clear to the Emperor as it was to the writer, and after the War something would surely be done about it: “when the War ends in a peace humiliating to China wiser councils may (should) prevail in Pekin . . . Her failure to hold her own may give overwhelming force to the party of progress” (585: 274).

The fighting went on through May of 1895. Over four months the Japanese took the city of Wei-hǎi-wèi, made an end of the North Sea Fleet, and did great damage to every Cing army that went up against them. They then took the War South. They took control of the Bē̃<sup>n</sup>-ó<sup>n</sup> Islands in the Strait of Tái-wan, and seemed to be making designs on Tái-wan itself. But in the end it was the editor, not Mackenzie, who was right. The Japanese did not take Shèng-jing; they did not take Běi-jing; and the Cing Empire's existence did not come to an end. In March the Cing Government sent a group of persons to the Japanese Empire with a request for peace. It took two more attempts before the Japanese gave their agreement to discussions, but by April these were at last underway. The two powers made peace with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which would, the *Monthly Messenger's* editor said, “in all likelihood be accepted without much demur by the defeated nation as the inevitable penalty of a wonderful unpreparedness for War” (590: 105).

### **Discussion**

At the start of the Cing-Japanese War, the *Monthly Messenger* was certain that the Japanese Empire had no chance. The Cing Empire was simply too great in size; its soldiers and ships were simply too great in number. In the view of the *Monthly Messenger's* editor, “If the two combatants are left to fight to the end, Japan must

suffer defeat” (583: 199). This opinion was not unusual. At the War’s start, many periodicals in England were saying the same thing. The “superior discipline and generalship” of the Japanese military in its early battles with the Cing had little effect on their opinions. In the view of the *Monthly Messenger’s* editor, numbers were all important, and “if the War goes on, the hundreds of millions in China must ultimately overcome the thirty millions of Japanese” (583: 222). But while the periodical had strong opinions about the War’s likely outcome, it was neutral about the value of this outcome. That is, the *Monthly Messenger’s* editor and writers did not say that the Cing Empire’s overcoming the Japanese would be a good or a bad outcome, and they did not say that the opposite outcome — even if it then seemed impossible — was good or bad. It seemed to them that only good outcome would be for the War to be stopped before anyone had the chance to overcome their enemy. They even had a suggestion about how that could be done: “The thing to be desired is, undoubtedly, the interference of Europe to compel peace” (583: 222).

But all this was changed after the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, in which the Japanese military quickly took over what was said to be one of the best military bases in East Asia. From the first battles, the periodical had been of the opinion that the Japanese military had good generals and soldiers; now it seemed to them that the Cing military was impossibly weak. In view of this discovery, the *Monthly Messenger’s* views on the War were changed. Like many other English periodicals, they now said that the Japanese were certain to get the better of the Cing. The brave Cing fighting at Wei-hǎi-wèi had no effect on this opinion, and to the end of the War, it was the *Monthly Messenger’s* position that the Japanese would overcome the Cing.

What was more, after the battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, the *Monthly Messenger* was no longer politically neutral. Their position was now that the Japanese overcoming the Cing was a good thing. The reason for this was that the War had made clear there were serious troubles in the Cing military, and that the government was in bad condition from “the indolence and conceit of advisers at

the imperial court” (585: 274). Now that these were out in the open, the Cing government could make them right. The editor’s hope was that the War would be a learning experience for the Cing government, and that it might be the cause of “a great and happy peaceful revolution” (590: 105).

### **THE CING-JAPANESE WAR IN THE *CHURCH NEWS***

In the *Church News*, discussions of the War’s likely outcome were not common. And, in the few places where the writers did say something about this, they simply made suggestions, not the strong statements of the *Monthly Messenger*. The suggestions themselves were the same as those made in most Cing and Western periodicals: the Cing would get the better of the Japanese. But, like other Western-made periodicals, the views of the *Church News*’ writers were changed by the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu. After the seemingly impossible Cing loss, they now said that the Japanese would most likely get the better of the Cing Empire. But, in another way, the *Church News* was quite unlike the Western and Cing periodicals. The Cing periodicals said from start to end that the Cing overcoming the Japanese was the best possible outcome. The Western periodicals said different things at the start, but after Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu many said that it was better the Japanese overcome the Cing. But the *Church News* said nothing about these outcomes. From start to end, it said that the War was a bad thing for everyone, and that the best possible outcome would be for it to come to a quick end.

### **Numbers**

Unlike the *Monthly Messenger*, the *Church News* never openly took sides in the War. It never openly said that one side overcoming the other would be a good thing; for this reason, there are no numbers to give. But, as will be seen below, *not* doing this made it different from Western and Cing periodicals, and so what follows is some discussion of what it did say, and why its makers made the decision to keep it neutral.

### Hong Island to Lu-sun-kào

In the *Church News*, writing about the War's outcome was not common, and what little writing there was took the form of suggestions, not the strong statements of the *Monthly Messenger*. But, even these suggestions were not at first a part of the periodical's writing about the War. In fact, the periodical's accounts of the War's start, and the early battles, said nothing at all about War's likely outcome. For example, this is how the *Church News* first gave readers news of the War between the Cing and Japanese Empires:

On 30 July, the Circuit Attendant and Garrison Commander jointly published a notice saying that the Japanese have attacked Cing Warships in the Joseon Kingdom, and the two countries are now at War.  
Lāk-ghoêh 28, Dē-dái cam Dìn-dái wū gōng-gê cut jit diu<sup>n</sup> gè-sī dēh gong-kì hian-zāi Rīt-bun-gēk láng dī Gē-lé dē-hng pāh Diōng-gēk bēng-zún, liong-gēk jia<sup>n</sup> dēh gāo-jian. (112: 74)

This statement was at the end of a long piece of writing giving the history of the events which had been the War's cause. It made note of the the geography of north-east Asia, the relations between the Cing, Joseon, and Japanese, and the two Empire's reasons for going to War. But nowhere in this otherwise very detailed piece of writing was anything said about the War's likely outcome. What was more, the *Church News* did not take sides. The periodical simply said that the War was a bad thing, and the only good end would be a quick one. The writers said that this should be the readers' position too. As the editor put it in "An Invitation to Prayer and Thanksgiving": "Ask God too, that the War might soon be ended, and everyone again at peace" ("Yā giú Siōng-dē hō gāo-jian é sū gīn sōah, dai-gê geh-zài hē-bhek"; 112: 80).

It took time for news of the War's early battles to make its way to Tái-wan, but by November the periodical was at last able to give readers an account of the Battle of Pyongyang:

On the moonlit night of 14 September, the Japanese attacked Pyeongyang successfully. About 20,000 Cing soldiers were stationed there; it is said that over 10,000 are now killed, injured, or captured. Another four or five thousand have scattered in retreat.

Bêh-ghoêh 15 gng-ghoêh mí Rīt-bùn bêng kī pāh Bêng-yōng-yá<sup>n</sup>, wū dek-sêng. Hit-diap dī-hia zak Diōng-gēk bêng cā-but-de 2,0000. Jiao láng dēh gòng hit-sí sīt wū bhan-ghoā láng; wū-é sī, wū-é diēh-siong, wū-é hō yin liah--kī. Gī-wú cun sī-ghō cêng láng dē-zào sī-soā<sup>n</sup>. (115: 106)

From this account, it is clear that the War was not going well for the Cing Empire. But, nowhere does the periodical outright say this; it simply gives the numbers, saying nothing about the cleverness of the Japanese Army and Navy, or the weakness of the Cing. The writers simply gives the reader facts about the battle, and lets them make their own decision about the War's likely outcome. And, the periodical said again that they were neutral in the War, and that that reader should be neutral too. In "An Invitation to Prayer and Thanksgiving," the editor again says that readers should be praying "That the War will soon be ended" ("Hō gāo-jian é sū gìn hé"; 115: 108).

But, in time the *Church News* did make a suggestion about the War's likely outcome. This came at the end of a piece of writing about the Japanese military's making its way into "Manchuria," the Empire's northeastern provinces. The periodical had this to say about them:

Winter has already come to Manchuria; soon the weather will be bitterly cold, and waging War will be much more difficult. It will likely make the Japanese's suffering great.

Dī Bhoan-jiu yi-gêng wū leh dāng-tī<sup>n</sup> é sēh, jiu-sī danger doa-goá<sup>n</sup> é sí gao, so-yì dī-hia sī eh-dit zē gāo-jian. Ga<sup>n</sup>-sī ē hō Rīt-bùn é láng gān-kò doa. (116: 111)

These statements do not openly say that the Japanese will likely be overcome in Manchuria; it simply says that there would be "suffering" ("gān-kò") in their future. Were this statement part of a different piece of writing, it might even been taken as saying that the readers should be feeling sorry for the Japanese soldiers. But coming where it does, at the end of a piece of writing about attacks on Cing cities in Manchuria, it seems to be doing something very different: making the suggestion that the Japanese attempt to take control of Manchuria will go badly for them. Even so, the periodicals position on the War's best

possible outcome was unchanged. Readers were given these directions: “Pray to God:—That the War might soon end. That the two sides might accept the Gospel and submit to God” (116: 120; “Gī-giú Siong-dê:—Hō gāo-jian ẽ sū gìn soāh. Hō liong-gēk siū gà-sī lái hāng-hek Siong-dê”).

### **Lu-sun-kào to Shimonoseki**

After the War was taking place in the Cing Empire itself, the *Church News* at last came out with a suggestion about the War’s likely outcome — a Japanese loss. But then came the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, which was the cause of so many changed minds in the West. Unusually, after the Battle the *Church News* gave two opinions on the War’s likely outcome: they again made the suggestion that the Cing would overcome the Japanese, and they said outright that the Japanese would, even had, overcome the Cing. The suggestion about the first outcome was made after an account of the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu. The *Church News* made note that the Japanese were putting up new houses at An-dong, a city near the Cing-Joseon line. The periodical was of the opinion that this was unwise, saying “The Japanese seem to be planning for a long stay; they really have too high an opinion of themselves” (“Da<sup>n</sup> yin gèng-rián ǎi gu-dńg diam hia kiǎ-kì, zê yā jin bŭt zū liōng lāh”; 117: 121). The aphorism “to have too high an opinion of oneself” (“bŭt zū liōng lāh”) is said of persons who see themselves as more able than they really are — stronger, quicker, cleverer, and so on.<sup>3</sup> The writer did not give any detail about which, or how many, of these things were true of the Japanese, but the suggestion is clear enough: the Japanese will still be overcome. They might have been able to take control of An-dong, but they would not be able to keep it.

This was the position of many Cing periodicals, which went on saying the the Cing would get the better of the Japanese right up till the discussions in Shimonoseki were taking place (Tsai 153–158). But, the next piece of writing in the same issue gave a very different opinion on the matter, much nearer to the opinions being given by the Western periodicals:

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<sup>3</sup> In Guó-yǔ and Pǔ-tong-huà, the saying is “bù zì liàng lì” (Siàng et al. 155).

Based on the foregoing, the Cing Empire appears completely defeated. . . .  
Some say that the Japanese will soon go after Běi-jing. *Now the Cing will sue  
for peace.* . . .

Jiāo an-ni koā<sup>n</sup> Diōng-gēk sng-sī doā-bāi. . . . Wū láng dēh gòng giam-cài  
Jit-bùn bēh sūn-soā kī pāh Bak-gia<sup>n</sup>. *Jit-diap Diōng-gēk ai bēh giū-hé.* . . . (117:  
122; emphasis mine)

This is much stronger than a suggestion. The periodical is openly saying, not only that the Cing are getting the worst of the War, but that they are “completely defeated” (“doā-bāi”). There is, in the writers’ view, nothing left for them to do but send a request for peace discussions. If they do not, the Japanese may take control of the Běi-jing, putting an end to the Empire’s existence.

There are three possible reasons for two opinions being given in the same issue. First, they may have been the work of different writers. The two pieces of writing were in the “News” part of the periodical, which did not give its writers’ names. As such, they may have had different writers, with different opinions about the War’s outcome. Second, the writers may have been purposely giving readers a mix of good and bad news, so that the effect of the bad news would be less; this was how other Cing periodicals gave bad news about the War (Tsai 153–154). And last, the second piece of writing may have been made after the first piece was typeset. The writers’ opinions may have changed as they were making the issue, and so they put in another piece of writing giving their new opinion. This sort of thing was not uncommon in the *Church News*. For example, in issue no. 112, there were writings saying that the two countries “*may soon be at War*” (“but-giù gā<sup>n</sup> ē gāo-jian”), and writings, like the one given above, saying that they were at War right now (74). But whatever the reason, the second piece of writing was the periodical’s “true” opinion. From that point to the end of the War, it said that the Cing Empire would be overcome.

But their opinion on the War’s best possible outcome was unchanged. Even as the Japanese were getting nearer to Běi-jing, the readers’ directions were what they had been from the start: “Ask God too that the War might soon end, that the people of Tái-wan might be preserved from harm, and that God might

continue to protect God’s Church” (Yā giú Siōng-dê be-bi gāo-jiān gìn hé, hō Dāi-wán láng m-biàn gān-kò; soā jiào-gō Yi-é gào-hoē”; 119: 16). This was the *Church News*’ position to the end of the War. It was not good for one side to overcome the other; the War was bad for everyone, and the best thing would be for it to come to a quick end.

### **Arguments**

At the start of the Cing-Japanese War, the *Church News* said nothing about the War’s likely outcome. In this, it was different not only from the *Monthly Messenger*, but the greater part of the periodicals in the Cing Empire too, where “the ‘public opinion’ . . . represented in newspapers prior to the War was that China would win” (Tsai 149–150). The reason for this was that the *Church News*’ writers were against the War, seeing it as a useless loss of men, money, and material. At the War’s start, they, like most, had the idea that the Cing would get the better of the Japanese, and in places they even put in suggestions of this opinion. But they did not say it openly. For one thing, getting up the churchgoers’ fighting spirits was not their purpose. For another, their hope was that Churchgoers would be against the War too. Then, like many Westerners, the writers’ opinions were changed by Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, as was their way of writing about the War: they now said openly that Cing would be overcome by the Japanese. In the West, this would not have been unusual: the *Monthly Messenger* and many other periodicals were saying the same. But it was unlike most Cing periodicals, which went on saying the Cing would get the better of the Japanese in the end. This was likely the reason that the *Church News* now gave its opinion openly. There were no periodicals in Tái-wan giving churchgoers the “truth” — the Cing had been bested — and so the *Church News* had to do this for their readers.

But, at no time, and no matter what opinion they gave, did the *Church News* take sides in the War. As noted in Chapter 1, before the War, many Cing periodicals said that the Cing overcoming the Japanese would be a good thing.

The War's cause had been the Japanese Empire's "coveting gain and neglecting rightness, taking no account of the country's or people's good" ("tan lì wàng yì, wǎng-gù guó-jì mín-sheng"; Lǐ Jin-ciáng 15). What was more, it was "a great opportunity for China to wash away feelings of shame and humiliation that had persisted since the Opium Wars" (Tsai 149–150). After the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, many Western periodicals, even the *Monthly Messenger*, said that the Japanese overcoming the Cing would be a good thing. A Cing loss would make them see the value of Western ways, and get the right persons into positions of power.

But the *Church News* did not say these things. Likely, the *Church News*' accounts of the War were neutral by reason of its being a Church periodical for Cing readers, made by Western editors and writers. It was the writers' hope that the readers would simply be against the War completely, but they could not be sure that this would be so. Their readers may have been churchgoers, but they were still Cing, and it would not do for the periodical to be openly against its readers' own country.

### **THE JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR IN THE *MONTHLY MESSENGER***

From the Japanese-Táiwanese War's start, the *Monthly Messenger*'s writers said that the Japanese Empire would get the better of the Táiwanese Republic. There was sense in this — the Japanese had many more and better soldiers and arms than their enemy — but the Republic gave everyone a surprise: they did some hard fighting against the Japanese, who were even stopped for a time, and had to get in new soldiers. Even so, the opinion of the *Monthly Messenger*'s writers was unchanged. They went on saying that the Japanese were sure to get the better of the Republic, and in the end even had a little part in making this so.

It is no surprise then, that at no time were the writers neutral about the War's outcome. From the first, it was their view that the Japanese overcoming the Táiwanese was the better outcome. What was more, the quicker the Japanese did this, the better. In the writers' view, the longer the War went on, the more Táiwanese lives would go to waste, and the more bad feeling there would be

between the Táiwanese and their new rulers when the Japanese at last got complete control of the island. It was clearly best that the War came to a quick end.

### Numbers

The chart below gives the amount of writing in the *Monthly Messenger* saying that the Japanese overcoming the Táiwanese was a good thing. Again, the percentages are out of the the periodicals' writing "about the War," not the periodical's overall writings.

<b>MONTHLY MESSENGER — JAPANESE-TAIWANESE WAR</b>		
<b>J. OVCMG T. (GOOD)</b>	<b>LINS</b>	<b>PER</b>
592: 153–154	57	6.16%
592: 158	42	4.54%
594: 198	34	3.67%
594: 201	47	5.08%
596: 250	56	6.05%
597: 272	57	6.16%
598: 6	29	3.13%
598: 10	64	6.91%
598: 11–12	148	15.98%
<b>TOTAL: 8</b>	<b>477</b>	<b>51.51%</b>

As is clear from the above numbers, the *Monthly Messenger* was quicker to give their opinion on the best outcome of the Cing-Japanese War, and gave more space to it. They were again on the side of the Japanese and, as will be seen below, for much the same reasons as in the earlier War.

### From San-diao-jiǎo to Tái-běi

Tái-wan had not been a part of the Cing-Japanese War, but it had long been of interest to the Japanese military, who were now in a position to get nearly anything from the Cing government. The “Treaty of Shimonoseki” was signed by Cing and Japanese representatives on 17 April 1895. Article II of the treaty said:

China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon . . .

(b) The island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said Island of Formosa.

(c) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all Islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude. (Kajima 263)

News of this development had got to Tái-wan by the end of April. The greater part of the islanders were unhappy to be made a part of the Japanese Empire. A part of these did something about it. Through the end of April and the start of May, there were meetings of the islanders moneyed and empowered — Cing government representatives, local gentry, and business leaders. Out of these meetings came a plan: Tái-wan would make itself free of the Cing and Japanese empires; it would have a new government — a republican government. On 23 May, they made public the declaration of independence of the “Táiwanesé Republic”:

Now therefore we, the People of Formosa, are irrevocably resolved to die before we will serve the enemy. And we have in Council determined to convert the whole island of Formosa into a Republican State, and that the administration of all our State affairs shall be organized and carried on by the deliberations and decisions of Officers publicly elected by us the People. (Davidson 279)

The Japanese leaders did not take this seriously. They would not give up control of their new island, and they would not have discussions with its new government. The Japanese prepared their military to take control of Tái-wan by force, and the Japanese-Táiwanesé War was started.

The first fighting took place on 29 May when Japanese soldiers were landed at Sām-diāo-gāk, a beach in northeastern Tái-wan. They made short work of the Táiwanese there, and they were soon on their way to Dāi-bāk, the Táiwanese capital. It seemed the Tái-wan military could do little against them. By 06 June, the Japanese had control of the capital, Táng Jǐng-song — president of Tái-wan for less than seven days — was safely back in the Cing Empire, and the best soldiers in the Táiwanese military were giving up their arms. It seemed to many that the Táiwanese Republic would not see the end of its first week.

The *Monthly Messenger* first made note of the new War in the July issue. Again, they were certain about the outcome: the Japanese would get the better of their enemy. An editorial gave an account of the War to this point, and its likely end:

A Republic was proclaimed (the “President” has since fled from Formosa!) and preparations made for resistance to the Japanese invasion. Having had the island formally handed over to them by a Chinese Imperial Commissioner, the Japanese at once proceeded to take possession, and already the Chinese “rebellion,” as it must now be called, is collapsing — but only after some stubborn fighting. (592: 153–154)

It was not only the editor who said as much. In the same issue was a letter from William Ede, an educational missionary in Dāi-lám, giving much the same opinion: “Inferiority in numbers has sometimes been made up for by the inspiration of some great principles. But in Formosa there exists no high-souled enthusiasm to lead men to do and dare what seems impossible. Sordidness and sensuality are current vices. Conquering zeal was never born of such parentage” (592: 158). The periodical did not say outright that the Japanese overcoming the Táiwanese was the better outcome, but it was made clear to readers even so. The editor says that the Táiwanese Republic may have been a government at the start, but now it is simply a “rebellion” — hardly the right group to have control of the island. Ede says that its leaders’ do not have the “high-souled enthusiasm” necessary for a War of this sort; worse, they are not good men: “Sordidness and sensuality are current vices.” In the *Monthly Messenger*’s opinion, the War’s most

likely, and best possible, outcome was a Táiwanese loss. And for this outcome they would not be long waiting. In the view of the editor, the Republic was already near death: “It is not likely that any further serious defence will be made by the Chinese; and peaceful occupation of Taiwanfoo [Dāi-lám], our own centre, may now be reasonably expected” (592: 153-154).

### **From Tái-běi to Tái-nán**

But the Táiwanese did not give up after the loss of Dāi-bāk. The Táiwanese military in the south was under the command of Lióu Yǒng-fú, whose “Black Standard Army” (“Hei-cí Jyun”) was said to be one of the best in the Cing Empire. Having gone over to the side of the Republic, Lióu was not about to give up on it. He made himself its new president, and his base in Dāi-lám the new capital. The Japanese military at once went south to take on Lióu and his army. But to the surprise of many, they did not get there, being stopped by hard fighting in and around the city of Dēk-cām, some 216 kilometres north of Dāi-lám. For the time, the Republic was safe. An editorial in the September issue of the *Monthly Messenger* made note of these developments, but the writer’s view on the War’s likely outcome was unchanged. The Táiwanese could not possibly get the better of their enemy, and by fighting were only making things worse for themselves:

The Japanese are meeting with a good deal of opposition and resistance from the “Black Flags,” on their march to Taiwanfoo [Dāi-lám] from the north. The “Black Flags” even succeeded in driving back the Japanese force — a delay in the advance which is unfortunate, as it may encourage more obstinate resistance: the only result of which would be serious bloodshed and embittered feeling. (594: 201)

In the editor’s view, the best possible outcome was for the Japanese to quickly make an end of the Táiwanese Republic: “It is to be earnestly hoped that Japanese officials may have their hands on the government of the whole islands soon” (594: 201). And in the end, the *Monthly Messenger*’s writers got their wish.

In stopping the Japanese at Dēk-cām, the Táiwanese military had been badly hurt. The Japanese simply sent more soldiers, and at the end of August, the

Táiwānese army was broken completely at the battle of Bat-goā Mountain. By September, the Japanese were making their way south without much trouble. In the November issue of the *Monthly Messenger*, the editor gave readers a list of the cities the Japanese had taken:

Mr. Ede (writing from Taiwanfoo [Dāi-lám] on 2nd September) says that they had just heard that the Japanese had taken Chianghoa [Jiōng-hoā] and Lok-kang [Lēk-gàng] (Lok-kang is on the coast; Chianghoa is inland). The report went on to tell that the Japanese force had reached Taulak [Dao-lak], a good many miles south of Chianghoa, and within three days march of Taiwanfoo. A Hong-kong telegram (18th October) announces what must be at last the beginning of the end: on the 16th the Japanese had captured Takow [Da<sup>n</sup>-gào], a large town south of Taiwanfoo, on the coast. (596: 250)

Better, the Japanese were at last in a position see the War to its best possible outcome, the death of the Republic: “The Japanese advance from the north has been slow and cautious; and evidently after the first check, with a sufficient force. Probably before these lines are being read Taiwanfoo has fallen into their hands and the conquest of the western half of Formosa been completed” (596: 250).

The editor was not wrong. Lióu Yǒng-fú made the decision that there was no point in fighting on. By 21 October he was back in the Cing Empire, and Dāi-lám was in the hands of the Japanese. The Japanese-Táiwānese War was over. The December issue gave readers this news, and made note that the missionaries too, had been hoping the War would be over more quickly:

The long delay in the Japanese advance has been an opportunity for rowdyism, of which full advantage has been taken . . . The hearts of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Ede, who have so courageously stuck to their perilous post through it all, have been greatly saddened, and they have wondered at what seemed to them the inexplicable Japanese tardiness, while thankful to report that the Christians have everywhere continued in a simple and strong faith in God, spite of [sic] alarming rumours and cruel attacks. (597: 272)

And, the January issue made clear, in the end they had done something about this:

Our own missionaries in Formosa—Messrs. Ede and Ferguson, with Mr. Barclay . . . courageously held the fort during the troubled months of the “Black Flag Republic.” They have been graciously preserved from harm, *and have been able to facilitate a peaceful occupation of Taiwanfoo by the Japanese.* (598: 6; emphasis mine)

About just what they did, more will be said in later chapters. For now, it is enough to say that from start to end, the writers of the *Monthly Messenger*, in England and Tái-wan, had seen a Táiwanese loss as the War’s best possible outcome, and even had a hand in making the island a part of the Japanese Empire.

### **Discussion**

At the start of the Japanese-Táiwanese War, the *Monthly Messenger*’s writers were of the opinion that the Táiwanese Republic had no chance against the Japanese Empire. After all, the Japanese had just got the better of the Cing Empire, with its many ships, and its numberless soldiers. Against such a power, what chance had a little island with a new government and an untested military? And at first, the writers seemed right about this. The early battles with the Japanese went badly for the Republic, and it was soon without its president and its capital. At this point, the *Monthly Messenger*’s writers said that the Republic was “collapsing,” and that the Japanese would have complete control of the island in the near future. But, the Republic was not done. It got a new president and a new capital; and it went on fighting. The Japanese were even stopped for a time at Dēk-cām, much to the surprise of the *Monthly Messenger*’s writers. But this made no change to their opinions about the War’s likely outcome. They went on saying that the Japanese would surely get the better of the Republic. And at the end of October it did, with a little help from the Church’s own missionaries.

At no time were the *Monthly Messenger*’s writers neutral about the War’s outcome. From the start they said that the Japanese overcoming the Republic would be a good outcome, and it was their hope that the Japanese would do this quickly. When the Japanese did not do it quickly, the *Monthly Messenger*’s writers

in Tái-wan and England were unhappy about the “inexplicable Japanese tardiness.” Likely, this view had much to do with their opinion of the Republic’s chances against the Japanese. In its War with the Japanese, the Cing Empire had been let down by its leaders’ “impregnable arrogance and ignorance.” But the Cing had at least had enough soldiers and arms that, with better leaders, they would have been a danger to the Japanese. The Táiwanese Republic did not have enough soldiers or arms for this; there was no way for them to get the better of their enemy, and there was no point in fighting a War which could have only one outcome: a loss for the Táiwanese Republic.

So, in a sense, the writers of the *Monthly Messenger* were not against the Republic but on the side of the Táiwanese, or at least the Táiwanese churchgoers. The *Monthly Messenger*’s writers were looking ahead to the day when the Japanese had control of Tái-wan, when the islanders would have a Japanese governor, and be living under Japanese laws. As the Republic’s overcoming the Japanese was simply not possible, fighting an impossible War would only be the cause of “serious bloodshed” during the change in rulers, and “embittered feeling” after the Japanese had control of the island. It was this future that the writers were hoping would not come to be, and for this reason they took the side of the Japanese.

### **THE JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR IN THE *CHURCH NEWS***

The *Church News* never said anything about the most likely, or best, outcome of the Japanese-Táiwanese War. At the War’s start, they said only that there would be great changes in Tái-wan’s future. About the taking of Dāi-bak and the fall of the north, they said only that it had taken place. And about the fighting around Dēk-cam, they said nearly nothing. But from the missionaries’ writings in the *Monthly Messenger*, it is clear that they did not give the Republic any chance against the Empire. And, this opinion does come through in the *Church News*. The periodical gave readers news of the Táiwanese military’s losses against the Japanese, but little news of the Japanese troubles. They made the Republic’s

leaders seem weak. And they had statements from persons saying that the Japanese would overcome the Republic, but nothing from persons saying the opposite. In these ways, the periodical's writers kept their opinions to themselves, while still making the suggestion that the Japanese would overcome the Táiwanese. By doing things in this way, they were able to make their readers ready for the future, without putting them in danger, or seeming to go against the government of the Táiwanese Republic.

### Numbers

The *Church News* said nothing about the Japanese-Táiwanese War, so there are again no numbers to give. But, the periodical again made suggestions about the War's likely outcome. A detailed discussion of what these were, and why they were given, is below.

### From Sām-diāo-gāk to Dāi-pak

In late May, the *Church News* said that Church had before it “two very important issues” (122: 37; “n̄ng hāng doā yào-gìn ế dai-ji”). The first was that a number of churchgoers were to be made pastors, the first Táiwanese pastors in the church's history. The other was the Japanese-Táiwanese War:

Tái-wan has already been given to the Japanese Empire to rule. But, they have not yet begun to rule, because the people, unwilling to submit, have established a Republic.

Dāi-wán yi-kêng sià hō Rīt-bùn lái goàn. Kiēk yin yao-bōe dēh jiang-goàn, yīn-wī bêh-si<sup>n</sup> m-kêng hāng-hek, gā-dī bhēh siat-lip ze Bhīn-zu-gēk. (122: 37)

Unlike the *Monthly Messenger*, the *Church News* said nothing about the Republic's chances in the War. In fact, they said that great changes in Tái-wan's future were the only certain thing — the War's outcome could be a Táiwanese or Japanese loss:

But, no matter whether we end up with Japanese rule or self-rule, things will be changed, and never more as they once were.

Zong-sī bé lūn bhēh gui Rīt-bùn koàn a-sī bhēh gā-dī liào-lì, dēk-gāk  
 bhê-dīt tang yíu-goān cīn-ciū<sup>n</sup> za-zéng ế koan-sīt, gēng-hòng wun-dang  
 bhēh gē-wā<sup>n</sup>. (122: 37–38)

This is very different from the *Monthly Messenger*, where William Ede was saying “in Formosa there exists no high-souled enthusiasm to lead men to do and dare what seems impossible” (592: 158). To their English readers, the missionaries were clear that, in their opinion, the Republic had no chance against the Japanese Empire. But to their readers in Tái-wan, they said that it was unclear which side would get the better of the other. And they said nothing at all about their feelings on this matter.

While the missionaries seem to have kept their true feelings about the Republic’s future from the Táiwanese churchgoers, they did not keep from them that the Táiwanese military was doing badly against the Japanese:

On 31 May the Japanese Empire sent soldiers to attack Tái-wan; they landed at a place 25 km south of Gē-láng. Some of the Táiwanese soldiers there just ran away, but others stayed to fight. The Japanese then advanced as far as the foothills of Gē-láng. . . . On 07 June we received news that Gē-láng had fallen to the Japanese on the 03 June. At this time Governor Táng evidently escaped on a steamer, and his office was burnt. The Japanese soon captured Dāi-bak-hù and Hò-bhòè.

Ghò-ghoēh cê 8 Rīt-bùn wū coā bēng bhēh lái Dāi-wán; yīn dui lí  
 Gē-lāng-táo 50 lì lō ế làm-bēng jiu<sup>n</sup>-soa<sup>n</sup>. Dāi-wán bēng wu-ế zào, wū-ế gāp  
 yīn jian. Yīn dīt-dit jìn-zéng gao Gē-lāng-táo ế soā<sup>n</sup>-ka. Ao-lái gēh wū yīn-ế  
 bēng jiu<sup>n</sup>-soa<sup>n</sup>, hit-wī lí Gē-lang-táo pò-boa<sup>n</sup> lō. [. . .] Ghò-goēh 15 ghoàn  
 jih-dieh siāo-sit dēh gong-kì, bun-ghoēh 11 rit Gē-lāng-táo hō Rīt-bùn  
 ciām--kì. Hit-sí Dng Bhu-dái zē hoe-zún zào--kì, yī-ế ghē-mng soa hō láng  
 siē-lie--kì. Bhé loa-gù Rīt-bùn bēng lái jiam Dāi-bak-hù gāp Hò-bhè. (122:  
 45)

The readers, living far from the places in this account, may have been unclear about the geography of northern Tái-wan, but they were likely clear that Gē-láng and Hò-bhòè were important cities, and that Dāi-bāk was, or had been, the Republic’s capital. Now, the Japanese were in control of these places, and the Táiwanese President, “Governor Táng,” was back in the Cing Empire. And so, the

same issue that gave readers news of the Táiwanese Republic's birth, give them news of what seemed to be its end.

But by the time the next month's issue came out, the Táiwanese Republic was not only still living, but making great trouble for the Japanese at Dek-cām. The periodical gave readers this news, and news of Lióu Yǒng-fú's efforts to take back the island. They still said nothing about the War's likely outcome, or their feelings about its best outcome. But, the readers might have got some idea of this from their account of Lióu's leading the War effort:

That day, Commissioner Lióu published an edict saying that because the Japanese had captured Dāi-bak, he would lead soldiers north to retake it. In the end, he did not go himself, but stayed in Dāi-lám.  
 Hīt-rīt Láo Kīm-cê cūt gè-sī gòng yīn-wī Rīt-bùn lái cīm-hoān Dāi-bāk yi bhēh coā bēng kī hia kēk-hek. Ao-lái yi bun-sin bé kī, yiū-ghoán diām Hu-siá<sup>n</sup>. (123: 53)

This was not quite saying anything against Lióu — as President, he would likely have been more use to the Republic in its capital than on the front line — but it did not make him out to be the mighty general he was said to be in the Cing newspapers (Chén Jhong-cyun 48). But this was a small thing; for the most part, the missionaries were quiet about the War's outcome.

### **From Dāi-bak to Dāi-lám**

The next issue came out in the middle of July. It made note of how slowly the Japanese were making their way south, but said that they would likely get there in the end:

The Japanese have still not attacked southern Tái-wan . . . Some say that they have not come because the south wind has been frequent of late, and the waves in the harbour too large; others claim that they are waiting for their soldiers in the north to come south; at that time they can all attack together.

Gao da<sup>n</sup> Rīt-bùn bēng yao-bhoē lái pāh Dāi-lám . . . Wu-láng gòng yin bhé lái sī yīn-wī jit-diap siōng-sióng wū lām-hong, gang-kào é èng doā; wū-é gòng sī dēh tēng-hāo yīn-é bēng dui back-lō leh--lái gào-jia; hit-sí tang zè-hoè lái pāh. (124: 59-60)

Take note of the surprise in the words, “*still* have not attacked” (“*yao-bhoē lái pāh*”). This was not quite saying that the Japanese would certainly overcome the Táiwanese Republic, but it certainly makes that suggestion. Even so, the writers took care to put some distance between themselves and the suggestion that the Japanese would get the better of the Republic, saying only that “some say . . . others say” (“*Wu-láng gòng . . . wū-é gòng*”). But by the next month, the Japanese still had not come, and the *Church News* at last gave readers news about why:

Regarding the War, it has stopped for now. It is rumoured that the Japanese soldiers in the north retreated when they caught sight the Black Flag soldiers, but we have heard nothing about the outcome of the encounter. For other rumours about the War, see this month’s news from Dao-lak.

Lūn gāo-jian é sū hian-sí cia<sup>n</sup>-téng--dēh. Gān-da dēh hōng-sia<sup>n</sup> gòng dī  
back-lō Rīt-bùn gí<sup>n</sup>-dieh hēk-gí é bēng jiū tē, bhé gong-kì sū-yá<sup>n</sup> é sū. Lūn  
gong-kì gāo-jian é ēng-wē, cià<sup>n</sup> lìn dieh koa<sup>n</sup> Dao-lak bìn ghōēh é siāo-sit.  
(125: 69)

In the *Monthly Messenger*, the writers were very open about that being a bad thing. But in the *Church News* they simply give the news, not saying that Japanese would surely get the better of the Republic in the end. But, they do put into doubt the stories about what the Táiwanese military had done, and was doing, saying that these are simply “rumours” (“*hōng-sia<sup>n</sup>, “ēng-wē*”).

The writers would not give their own opinions on the Táiwanese Republic’s chances against the Japanese Empire, but they were happy enough to give the opinions of persons in agreement with them. The same issue the had news of the Japanese troubles had too a letter from an Evangelist in Jiāng-hoā. In it, he gave an account of his meeting with a person who was sure that the Japanese would get the better of the Republic, and was making plans for this time:

some days ago a scholar sat and talked with me. He claimed to know the Gospel, which he said he loved. He said to me, “If the Japanese come, you Church-folk will not be afraid, eh? Indeed, you will probably profit. Your literate will be their teachers, your capable their mandarins, your strong

their soldiers; all of you will make a fortune. Though you are now slandered for having joined a foreign sect, you are unafraid. I also wish to join your Church; would you be so good as to provide me with an introduction?

zēng-rit wū jit é tāk-cêh-láng gāp ghoà zē gòng wē, de-lì kiēk zai, kòng yi jin ai. Yi wū dui ghoà gòng, Rīt-bùn nā lái, lìn rīp-gāo é láng dêk-kāk kâh m-gia<sup>n</sup>, heh<sup>n</sup>? Yā dêk-kāk wū tào-lō. Nā bhat-rī--é tang ze yin é siān-sê<sup>n</sup>, gháo ban-sū--é tang ze yin é goa<sup>n</sup>, wū kui-lat--é tang dng-bêng, an-ni tang tan zê-zê jí<sup>n</sup>. Sūi-rián jit-diap hō láng hiám rip hoān-a-gāo yā sī bhé yào-gìn, ghoá yā bhêh lái gāp lìn rip gāo, hùi-sín lì tē ghoà gè-jian. (125: 70-71)

The man did not get his introduction, but through his question, a clear message was sent to the readers: the Japanese are coming; the Táiwanese with education have seen that the Republic is done for, and are making ready for life under Japanese rule.

In the next month's issue, there were many accounts from Churchgoers living in Japanese controlled parts of the island. Sure enough, Jiāng-hoā was one of them (126: 81). From this point, things went quickly. The Japanese, with help, took control of Dāi-lám at the end of October, and the next issue of the *Church News* said: "At the beginning of this year, Tái-wan belonged to the Cing, later it belonged to the Republic, and now it belongs to the Japanese Empire" (128: 105; "Dī gīn-ní táo Dāi-wán é bêh-sê<sup>n</sup> siek dī Diōng-gēk, ao-lái siek dī Bhīn-zu-gēk, da<sup>n</sup> wū siek dī Rīt-bun-gēk").

## Discussion

At no time did the *Church News* say openly that the Japanese Empire would overcome the Táiwanese Republic, or the Republic the Empire. At War's start, the *Church News* said that its outcome was not certain, and that "no matter whether we end up with Japanese rule or self-rule, things will be changed, and never more as they once were" (122: 37-38; emphasis mine). Openly, this was its position to the end. But the *Church News*' makers were writers for the *Monthly Messenger* too. And from their writings in this periodical, it is clear that many were of the opinion

that the Táiwanese Republic had no chance in the War. William Ede, for example, said that “Inferiority in numbers has sometimes been made up for by the inspiration of some great principles. But in Formosa there exists no high-souled enthusiasm to lead men to do and dare what seems impossible. . . . Conquering zeal was never born of such parentage” (592: 158). And when the Japanese seemed to be coming South too slowly, the missionaries were “greatly saddened” and “wondered at what seemed to them the inexplicable Japanese tardiness” (597: 272).

But they kept these views out of the *Church News*. Likely, there were at least two reasons for this. One was keeping themselves, and the churchgoers, out of danger. Many Táiwanese had the idea that the Church was working with foreign powers against the Cing, and now the Táiwanese, government. In places churchgoers were even put to death for “communicating with the Japanese” (“tong Rīt-bùn”), or “leading in the Japanese” (“coā Rīt-bùn bêng rīp-lái”; *Church News* 128: 110). It would have been unwise to give any more reason for having these ideas. The missionaries themselves were living in Dāi-lám, the heart of the Táiwanese Republic. They had not been completely safe when Tái-wan had been part of the Cing Empire, which had by treaty to keep Westerners safe. The Táiwanese Republic had no such agreements with the Western powers, and to openly go against Lióu Yǒng-fú’s government could be a very bad thing for them.

The other reason was that some of the Churchgoers might themselves have been friends of the Republic. It was bad enough that the War was making “embittered feeling” between the Táiwanese and Japanese (*Monthly Messenger* 594: 201). It would be no help at all if some in the Church had such feelings for the Western workers. But, the missionaries did not keep their thoughts about the Republic’s future out of the *Church News* completely. Their accounts of the War made much of the Táiwanese losses, but said that the Japanese military’s troubles were only rumours. And their language made the suggestion that the Japanese would certainly make their way to Dāi-lám in the end. They even had statements from persons saying this openly, but nothing from anyone saying the opposite.

The missionaries never openly said that the Japanese would overcome the Táiwanese Republic, but the readers likely got this idea even so.

## 5 — “Chinese and Japanese patriotism are of widely different types!”: Opinions on the Cing, Japanese, and Táiwanese

In the last chapter it was seen that the *Monthly Messenger* and *Church News* were neutral at the start of the War between the Cing and Japanese Empires, but that over time both went over to the side of the Japanese. This chapter goes deeper into the reasons for this change, which had chiefly to do with the periodicals' opinions about the leaders of the Cing, Japanese, and Táiwanese governments and militaries. It gives an account of what the periodicals' writers saw as positive and negative about them, and why these judgements were the cause of the periodicals' taking the side of the Japanese.

### Overview

In the Cing-Japanese War, the *Monthly Messenger* was of the opinion that the Cing Empire's government leaders were foolish, and that its military leaders had little knowledge of their work. As for the Japanese, the *Monthly Messenger's* opinion was that their government and military leaders were clearly better than the Cing leaders. These judgements were in part a result of the Japanese military's doing so well in the Wars, but there was more to it than that. The *Monthly Messenger's* writers saw the Cing leaders as having too high an opinion of their Empire's accounts of the world and ways of living. In comparison, the Japanese had been quick to take up Western ways of thought and living, and for this the *Monthly Messenger's* writers had a positive opinion of them. In comparison, the *Church News's* accounts of the War openly said little about the quality of the Cing and Japanese Empires' leaders. The periodical's writers sometimes gave accounts of the Cing military which made the suggestion that they were doing their work badly, but they never said this outright and about the Japanese, the periodical said nothing positive or negative. More interesting is what it did not say: a number of events from the War which had a great effect on Western writers' opinions of the Japanese were not noted at all in the *Church News*.

The *Monthly Messenger* was against the Tái-wanese Republic from the start. Many times they said it was their hope that the Japanese would quickly take complete control of the island, and put their Western knowledge to work making it better place. As for the Tái-wanese government's leaders, the *Monthly Messenger's* writers made their cause out to be a false one: it was said that they were not a government, but a rebellion, and that their efforts for the cause were weak ones — their fighting and ruling were simply not on the level of the Japanese. The *Church News* was against the Republic too, but more even-handed in their accounts of the War. The Tái-wanese government's troubles were made clear to readers, but so was the damage the Japanese military was doing to the island. Even so, the Japanese came off better in the comparison. As the *Monthly Messenger* had done in the earlier War, the *Church News* made the Japanese leaders out to be good and clever men, who took care of the Churchgoers when they came across them, and would do great things for Tái-wan which they at last had control of it.

### **Definitions and Divisions**

Chapter 3 noted the amount of writing about the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War in the periodicals. But, to make sense of the opinions that they gave on these three countries, it is necessary to put the writings “about the War” into still smaller groups. Here, this is done by taking account of the persons about whom they give opinions, and of the opinions themselves. In this section the rules by which the writings are put into groups. The first division is between writings giving and not giving opinions on different groups. Writings “giving an opinion” are those having at least one sentence in which something is said about the qualities of the Cing, Japanese, or Táiwanese, or any of their acts. There were two groups fighting in the Cing-Japanese War, and two groups fighting in the Japanese-Táiwanese War. So in the Cing-Japanese War, opinions could be given of the Cing, the Japanese, or the Cing and Japanese; and in the Japanese-Táiwanese War, opinions may be given of the Japanese, Táiwanese, or

Japanese and Táiwanese. Writings not giving an opinion on any group are not taken account of here.

The second division is between the sorts of opinions given. Here, account will be taken only of two sorts of opinions: “positive” and “negative.” For a given person or group of persons, this gives three sorts of writings: “writings giving a positive opinion,” “writings giving a negative opinion,” and “writings giving positive and negative opinions.” As will be seen, writings giving two opinions were not common, but the few of them are given special discussions of the possible reasons for their writers’ having had two opinions. Take note that in English and Ê-mńg there are many degrees of “positive” and “negative.” In theory, it is possible to put the writings into many more groups based on these degrees, but here they will be put into only two, based on the end to which they seem nearer. As noted in Chapter 3, to make a decision about some statement’s being a “positive” or “negative” opinion one sometimes has to make guesses about the writer’s views; where this has been done, the reasons for putting writings into one group or another are given. It is possible too to say that one’s opinion is neutral; here such writings are taken simply as examples of “not giving an opinion.”

There are, then, three possible sorts of writing giving opinions about leaders of the Cing-Japanese War, and three sorts giving opinions on the leaders of the Japanese-Táiwanese War. And, there are three possible sorts of opinions on these writings. This gives fifteen sorts of writings giving opinions on the leaders of the Cing-Japanese War, and fifteen sorts giving opinions on the leaders of the Japanese-Táiwanese War. Below are given the different sorts of writings, and their relations.

1. Writings about the Cing-Japanese War
  - 1.1. Writings giving an opinion only on the Cing leaders
    - 1.1.1. Writings saying something positive about the Cing leaders
    - 1.1.2. Writings saying something negative about the Cing leaders
    - 1.1.3. Writings saying something positive and something negative about the Cing leaders

- 1.2. Writings giving an opinion only on the Japanese leaders
  - 1.2.1. Writings saying something positive about the Japanese leaders
  - 1.2.2. Writings saying something negative about the Japanese leaders
  - 1.2.3. Writings saying something positive and something negative about the Japanese leaders
- 1.3. Writings giving an opinion on the Cing and Japanese leaders
  - 1.3.1. Writings saying something positive about the Cing and Japanese leaders
  - 1.3.2. Writings saying something negative about the Cing and Japanese leaders
  - 1.3.3. Writings saying something positive about the Cing leaders, and something negative about the Japanese leaders
  - 1.3.4. Writings saying something negative about the Cing leaders, and positive about the Japanese leaders
  - 1.3.5. Writings saying something positive and negative about the Cing leaders, and something positive about the Japanese leaders
  - 1.3.6. Writings saying something positive and negative about the Cing leaders, and something negative about the Japanese leaders
  - 1.3.7. Writings saying something positive about the Cing leaders, and positive and negative about the Japanese leaders
  - 1.3.8. Writings saying something negative about the Cing leaders, and positive and negative about the Japanese leaders
  - 1.3.9. Writings saying something positive and negative about the Cing leaders, and positive and negative about the Japanese leaders
- 1.4. Writings *not* giving an opinion on the Cing or Japanese leaders
2. Writings *not* about the Cing-Japanese War
3. Writings about the Japanese-Táiwanese War
  - 3.1. Writings giving an opinion on the Japanese leaders
    - 3.1.1. Writings saying something positive about the Japanese leaders
    - 3.1.2. Writings saying something negative about the Japanese leaders
    - 3.1.3. Writings saying something positive and something negative about the Japanese leaders

- 3.2. Writings giving an opinion on the Táiwanese leaders
  - 3.2.1. Writings saying something positive about the Táiwanese leaders
  - 3.2.2. Writings saying something negative about the Táiwanese leaders
  - 3.2.3. Writings saying something positive and something negative about the Táiwanese leaders
- 3.3. Writings giving an opinion on the Japanese and Táiwanese leaders
  - 3.3.1. Writings saying something positive about the Japanese and Táiwanese leaders
  - 3.3.2. Writings saying something negative about the Japanese and Táiwanese leaders
  - 3.3.3. Writings saying something positive about the Japanese leaders, and something negative about the Táiwanese leaders
  - 3.3.4. Writings saying something positive and negative about the Táiwanese leaders, and something positive about the Japanese leaders
  - 3.3.5. Writings saying something positive and negative about the Táiwanese leaders, and something negative about the Japanese leaders
  - 3.3.6. Writings saying something positive about the Cing leaders, and positive and negative about the Japanese leaders
  - 3.3.7. Writings saying something negative about the Cing leaders, and positive and negative about the Japanese leaders
  - 3.3.8. Writings saying something positive and negative about the Cing leaders, and positive and negative about the Japanese leaders
  - 3.3.9. Writings saying something negative about the Japanese leaders, and positive about the Táiwanese leaders
- 3.4. Writings not giving an opinion on the Japanese or Táiwanese leaders
- 4. Writings *not* about the Japanese-Táiwanese War

The numbers of such writings are given in later sections alongside discussions of their details. The other sections of this chapter are accounts of the opinions that the periodicals gave on the Wars. It has not been possible to give a complete account of all opinion-giving writings, but the ones here give a good idea of the

opinions not seen. The sections first go through the amount of space taken up by writings giving opinions on the different groups, and then give details on the opinions themselves. The sections come to an end with a comparison of the opinions given in the two periodicals, and some suggestions about some possible reasons for their giving these opinions.

### **OPINIONS ON THE CING AND JAPANESE IN *THE MONTHLY MESSENGER***

The writers for the *Monthly Messenger* had a negative opinion of the Cing Empire's leaders, but a very positive opinion of the Japanese leaders. There were two reasons. First, the Japanese were getting the better of the Cing in the War. As was seen in Chapter 4, in the writers' view the Cing Empire had every advantage going into the War. But the Japanese still got the better of them, and so the writers had great respect for the Japanese military leaders. Second, the Cing were less open to Western accounts of the world, and Western ways of living, than the Japanese. The missionaries had for years been giving the Cing Empire education in Western geography, astronomy, medicine, and so on; and still the Cing leaders made use of their own "Chinese" accounts of the world. But the Japanese were not only happy to get Western accounts of the world, they frequently sent Japanese persons to the West for the purpose of learning more about these. It seemed to the writers that only the Japanese had seen the value of "Western civilisation." And so, to them the Japanese leaders were "clever and progressive," while the Cing leaders were "embedded in impregnable arrogance and ignorance."

#### **Numbers**

Of the the fifteen possible opinions on the Cing and Japanese, the *Monthly Messenger's* accounts of the War gave only four: "saying something positive about the Japanese leaders" ("J. POS"), "saying something negative about the Cing leaders ("C. NEG"), "saying something negative about the Cing leaders, and

positive about the Japanese leaders (“C. NEG; J. POS”), and “saying something positive and negative about the Cing leaders” (“C. POS & NEG”). There numbers of such writings, and how much space they took up, is given below.

<b>MONTHLY MESSENGER — CING-JAPANESE WAR</b>					
<b>J. POS</b>	<b>LINS</b>	<b>PER</b>	<b>C. NEG</b>	<b>LINS</b>	<b>PER</b>
583: 222–223	20	2.25%	587: 33	22	2.48%
<b>TOTAL: 1</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>2.25%</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>2.48%</b>

<b>C. NEG; J. POS</b>	<b>LINS</b>	<b>PER</b>	<b>C. POS &amp; NEG</b>	<b>LINS</b>	<b>PER</b>
586:15	73	8.22%	583: 227	16	1.80%
590: 102	17	1.91%	584: 254	27	3.04%
590: 105	34	3.83%	585: 274–275	38	4.28%
591: 137–138	169	19.03%	587: 33	17	1.91%
			589: 83	22	2.48%
<b>TOTAL: 4</b>	<b>293</b>	<b>33.00%</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>13.51%</b>

The first thing of note here is that negative comparisons of the Cing to the Japanese was much the most common sort of opinion — a third of the space taken up by the periodical’s accounts of the War was taken up by accounts giving such opinions. The other thing of note is that negative opinions of the Cing were a great part of the periodical’s writings about the War. Nothing positive was ever said about the Cing without something negative being said in the same piece of writings — and many writings did not say anything positive the all. Below is a more detailed discussion of what opinions were given of the Cing and Japanese, and why the periodical’s opinions of the Cing were so negative.

### Opinions of the Cing

In the Cing-Japanese War, nearly every opinion the *Monthly Messenger* gave about the Cing military and political leaders was negative. It was seen in Chapter 4 that the Cing losses came as a great surprise to the makers of the the *Monthly Messenger*. But the writers were quick to give a reason for these losses — the bad quality of the Cing military leaders:

The individual Chinaman is at least as capable and strong and brave as his Japanese foe. And there are 350,000,000 Chinamen against 30,000,000 Japanese. Yet the Chinese are flying in panic; retreating from impregnable fortresses without a blow. . . . Chinese officers have taken no pains to learn how to conduct and handle their troops; on field days, when the soldiers were drilling or manoeuvring, the commanding officers would sit in their marquees drinking tea! (585: 274–275).

Take note that the quality of the Cing soldiers and bases are not in question. The soldiers are “at least as capable and strong and brave” as the Japanese — maybe more — and their bases, Pyeongyang, Lyŭ-shùn-kǒu, and so on, are not simply strong, they are “impregnable.” The trouble is with the military leaders, who have done nothing to make themselves or their soldiers ready for War. They have no knowledge of their work, and so the Cing Empire’s great advantages have all gone to waste. In another issue, William Campbell, one of the missionaries to Tái-wan, gave an example of the trouble with Cing military leaders — an account of a Cing General’s inspecting a fort in Tái-wan:

Although the fort was supposed to have six cannon, it really had only three. But the officer in charge was equal to the occasion. He got three wooden cannon made and neatly hooped with rattan, and painted black, and he actually succeeded in passing them off at the inspection by his superior officer. Charges of loose powder were fired from the wooden guns, and the Brigadier-General complimented the officer on the deafening roar of the cannons. (591: 137–138)

No one comes off well in this account. It is not clear whose work it was to get cannon for the fort, but this was not done before the inspection; it has only half the number it should. The officer in charge of the the fort goes to some trouble to

keep the Brigadier-General from making the discovery that the work has not been done, while making no attempt at all to put things right. And the Brigadier-General has so little knowledge of arms that he is taken in by the officer's false cannon. Campbell did not say if these men took part in the Cing-Japanese War, but it will have been clear to the readers that with men such as these as leaders, the Cing military never had a chance.

The *Monthly Messenger's* opinions on the Government leaders in Běi-jing were no better. Here the trouble was much the same as with the military: the leaders had not enough knowledge of their work. But with the government leaders, this trouble went deeper than having a poor knowledge of drills and cannons. The Cing military made at least some use of Western military arms and organisations; but the Government leaders would have nothing to do with Western "knowledge" of any sort:

the Peking literati (Chinese, not Manchus) seem embedded in impregnable arrogance and ignorance. The highest degrees are conferred only by the Peking Examination Board; "men," says Church at Home and Abroad (American Presbyterian), "who rate fair handwriting far above a knowledge of geography, and skilful rhyming above mathematical attainment. Some of them still assert that the earth is flat, and believe that the sun is eclipsed by being swallowed by a dog in the sky; also that dried scorpions are a potent medicine, and that needle thrust four inches into the abdomen is the standard remedy for Asiatic cholera." (584: 254)

As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, many missionaries were of the opinion that Western accounts of the world, and the ways of living based on these, were better than Chinese ways. And many missions, even the Presbyterian Church of England's own missions to the Empire's southeast, had put in a great amount of work teaching the Cing about Western ways. But they had had little to no effect on the Cing leaders, who went on keeping their own geography, astronomy, and medicine, and keeping the common persons from taking up Western ways too.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In fact, the Cing leaders were more interested in Western accounts of the world than the *Monthly Messenger* let on, and had been for some time. But there were never enough leaders of this mind to make the Cing government take up Western ways as the Japanese government had done (Hsü 261-291).

Keeping to the old ways had, in the view of the *Monthly Messenger*, made the Empire weak, and this was costing the Cing the War. As the *Monthly Messenger* said after Lyŭ-shùn-kǒu, “It is not wonderful that a people, great and vigorous though they be, whose leaders are of such stuff should be beaten at every point by the clever, intelligent, and progressive Japanese” (584: 254).

### **Opinions of the Japanese**

As has been seen, the *Monthly Messenger*'s writers had much to say about the positive qualities of the Japanese military's leaders. They had got the better of the Cing at Pyeongyang through “superior discipline and generalship” (583: 222–223), and their taking of Lyŭ-shùn-kǒu was “another signal proof of the inability of courage and physical strength to contend against discipline and skilled leadership” (585: 275). Even the missionaries in the middle of the War had a positive opinion of them, as in this letter from a missionary to the Joseon Kingdom:

The Japanese army is in a high state of efficiency; the leaders are men of great ability, chiefly educated in European countries. While China was fast asleep and utterly unconscious of Japan's designs, the latter country was awake and pulsating with new life, and busily engaged in preparing for the present conflict. (586: 15)

The periodicals' earlier statements about the Japanese Empire's being “the aggressor” were important no longer. The good quality of their military leaders had put these things quite in the shadows.

The periodical had much good to say about the Japanese government's leaders too. The writers were conscious of the Japanese leaders' strong interest in Western accounts of the world and ways of action. In fact, the Presbyterian Church in England had even had a hand helping the Japanese leaders to get this knowledge. In 1863, the editor said, five young Japanese men had gone to England for this purpose:

They were brought to Mr. Matheson in London and were taken charge of by him. He placed them in the University College School, arranging that they should live with one of the professors. They were most carefully

educated — two of them remaining in London for five years. These are the men, Mr. Matheson said, who have been governing Japan for the last twenty years. One of them, Count Ito [Itō Hirobumi], is now head of the Government, and is directing the conduct of the war with remarkable skill — a remarkable link in the chain of the Providence of God. (584: 251–252)

Even the Japanese Emperor himself was a man of quality. William Campbell, of the Church's mission to Tái-wan, had been to the Japanese islands on his way back to London. The editor gave an account of Campbell's experiences there:

He was in Kobe [Kōbe] when the Crown Prince arrived there, and the very children welcomed H.R.H. with great acclamations. He was also in Hiroshima, to which place the Emperor and his ministers had removed, and he knew that the Emperor was one of the hardest-working of the staff, working from early morning to late every night. The Japanese were a remarkable nation, and there were so many things which indicated their capacity, that it was impossible not to be hopeful regarding them. (591: 137-138).

The *Monthly Messenger* made a comparison of the Japanese and Cing leaders effects on their countries' common persons. In the Japanese Empire, even businesses were doing their part for the War:

Chinese and Japanese patriotism are of widely different types! A large business house in Tokio [Tōkyō], during the severity of the winter, fined any of its employés [sic] who complained of the cold weather, the rule being based on the ground of the privations and suffering which at that time were being endured by Japanese soldiers in Manchuria. The fines were sent to Government as a contribution to the expenses of the war. So much for Japanese feeling! (590: 102)

In the Cing Empire, things were very different:

Chinese lack of a similar sentiment comes well out in an incident which occurred at the Red Cross Hospital in Chefoo [Yan-tái]. The ambulance men were incompetent cowards. They could not be induced to go anywhere near the scene of fighting to look for wounded Chinamen. They were ready, they said, to care for the wounded men in hospital, and they did so in characteristic fashion during the first cold night of the hospital's work. At midnight the ten knights of the Red Cross rose and took off the covering of the wounded men, carrying them away to their own quarters,

and spreading them on their own beds. *No wonder Japan has been the victor in the war.* (590: 102; emphasis mine)

In the eyes of the *Monthly Messenger's* writers, the Japanese leaders were nearly the complete opposite of the Cing leaders. The Japanese military's leaders had a good knowledge of their work. The Japanese government's leaders had an interest in Western ways, and the good sense to put them to work. And for these reasons, the *Monthly Messenger's* writers gave a very positive opinion of them.

### **Discussion**

In the Cing-Japanese War, the *Monthly Messengers'* writers had a positive opinion of the Japanese military's and government's leaders, and a negative opinion of nearly all the Cing leaders. The reason for their having these opinions was partly how well the Cing and Japanese military leaders were doing in the War, for it seemed to the writers that the Cing military's leaders had little knowledge of their work, having "taken no pains to learn how to conduct and handle their troops," while the Japanese leaders were "men of great ability, chiefly educated in European countries." But, it was this education, more than how they were doing in the War, which was the cause of the writers' having such a good opinion of the Japanese, and such a negative opinion of their enemy. From the writers' point of view, Western accounts of the world, and the ways of living that these made possible, were simply better than anything in East Asia: Western geography was a truer picture of the earth; Western astronomy a better guide to the stars; and Western medicine a surer way of overcoming disease. The Chinese and Japanese accounts of the world may have been good enough in the past, but Westerners had long since given them better better accounts. In fact, the Presbyterian Church of England's own missions had made schools and books for the teaching of Western ideas.

The Japanese seemed to see the value of Western ways. For many years, they had sent their best men to Europe for the purpose of learning Europeans ways; the church had even had a hand in helping one such group of learners.

With this knowledge, they had made schools for Western ideas, and remade their government and military along Western lines. But, the Cing leaders had little interest in Western ways. They went on doing things as they had done in the past, and even made it harder for others to get an education in these things; by so doing, great damage was done. The effects of these decisions were clear in the Cing-Japanese War. The Western-educated Japanese were better at fighting and ruling than the Cing leaders. Even the common Japanese in the streets were better at supporting the War than their Cing counterparts. The *Monthly Messenger's* writers took the measure of a leader's value not only by how well they did their work, but also by how nearly their doings were like a European's. And so, it seems to them that the Cing leaders, who kept to their old Chinese accounts of the world, were "embedded in impregnable arrogance and ignorance." But the Japanese leaders, who were making great use of Western ways, were "clever, intelligent, and progressive."

### **THE CING-JAPANESE WAR IN *THE CHURCH NEWS***

The *Church New's* accounts of the War, for all their detail, had little to say about the military and government leaders in the Cing and Japanese Empires. And when these leaders did come up, nothing was said openly about the quality of their actions. This comes across most clearly in the periodicals' account of the events about which the *Monthly Messenger* and other Cing or Western periodicals gave strong opinions. With respect to such events as the death of a missionary at the hands of the Cing military, or a Japanese attack on an unarmed Cing military transport, the other periodicals were quick to give their opinions, but the *Church News* was strangely quiet, giving only the facts of the matters.

Even so, in a few places, the writers' opinions do come through, for while they are nowhere given openly, the language of some accounts still makes a suggestion about their makers' point of view. For example, while nothing was said about the Japanese, or about the Cing government, accounts of the Cing military's actions make it clear that, in the eyes of the *Church News's* writers, the

Cing military leaders were doing their work badly. Likely, the writers did not openly give their opinions to keep from making trouble with the readers or other Táiwanese: they were Westerners living in the Cing Empire, and it would not do to be openly negative about the Empire's military.

### **Numbers**

No opinions were openly given in the *Church News*, so there are no numbers to give here. But, as noted above, some of the writers' language does make suggestions about their opinions. Below the reasons for these readers are given, as is a discussion of why their not giving an opinion on certain events in of interest.

### **No opinion**

For the most part, the *Church News*' accounts of the Cing-Japanese War gave no opinions on the two countries' military and government leaders. But, for some things of which the *Church News* gave accounts, it is possible to make an educated guess about what the writers' opinions were. There are two reason for this. First, the *Monthly Messenger*'s and *Church News*' writers were users of the same languages. It is likely that on many matter, their opinions were the same, or nearly the same, and so their *not* giving an opinion on certain events is interesting. Second, some of the writers, like William Campbell, did give their opinion to the *Monthly Messenger*, and these are all the same as the opinions given by England-based writers. For this reason, it is interesting when the *Church News* did not give an opinion on an event about which the writers' very likely had a strong opinion.

For example, in early August, some Cing soldiers on their way through the city of Liáo-yáng made an attack on Pastor James Wylie, a Presbyterian missionary working there. Wylie was badly hurt in the attack, and dead some six days later (Christie 87). The *Monthly Messenger* was not kind about the Cing

government's part in the matter (585: 274–275). But the *Church News* gave more attention to what the Cing government had done after the attack:

The next day the government opened an investigation. They asked the military to send the soldiers for judgment. But the military refused to cooperate, frustrating the civil government. So the civil government appealed by telegram to the Governor. A few days later an edict arrived instructing the military to hand over the offending soldiers, and the civil government to repair the chapel and pay compensation for the pastor's life. The Emperor issued an edict saying that his heart was troubled, and commanding Lǐ Hóng-jhang to apprehend the offending soldiers and have them beheaded.

Gêh-mí goā<sup>n</sup>-hù láí cā-giām; soa̍ òi bhu-goā<sup>n</sup> tò bêng bhêh láí bān.  
 Bhu-goā<sup>n</sup> jip-yī m-kèng, òi-gao Bhūn-bhù but-hé. Bhūn-goā<sup>n</sup> zêk-sí gong  
 diān-bò kī bìn Zong-dêk. Goê-rit wū bhūn-su gao, jiong hit-é bhu-goā<sup>n</sup>  
 già-déng gêk-jīt; yā hoān-hù bhū-goā<sup>n</sup> siat-hoāt, siū-lì bài-dng, cu-boé  
 Bhêk-su é rīn-bhêng. Yiu-gêh Hōng-dê cut-jiao, gong yi-é sim jin yiū-wūt,  
 têk-lêng Lì Hōng-ciong dang-bān hit-é bhu-goā<sup>n</sup> soa̍ jiong hiah é hiōng-sin  
 liah láí cu-zàm. (114: 92).

Very likely, the *Church News*' writers saw the Cing government's taking the side of the Church against the military as a good thing; but, the account does not give an opinion on the government or military. The Emperor himself took an interest in the matter; but the periodical does not say anything for or against him. And Lǐ Hóng-jhang, one the most important leaders of the Cing Empire — who was in the middle of overseeing the War with Japan — was given the work of seeing that the Church got justice; but the periodical says nothing about Lǐ. The missionaries could not have been unhappy about this turn of events — as will be seen, it was their hope for such government support in Tái-wan — but their account of it in the *Church News* gives no opinions at all.

Another example is the Japanese attack on the *Gao-sheng* — the reason for the Cing declaration of war. In this case, the comparison is not with the *Monthly Messenger*, which said nothing at all about the attack, but with other Western periodicals, which had question about it. In the eyes of many Westerners, the attack on the *Gao-sheng* was a war crime: there had been no declaration of war

before the attack, and the Japanese naval leaders had made no effort to give help to the Cing soldiers from the ship, letting them go to their deaths in the sea (Howland 193–194; Paine 134). But here is what the *Church News* said about the attack:

The Japanese immediately launched their torpedoes and fired their guns, whereupon the *Gao-sheng* began to sink. The foreigners seized their opportunity and fled for their lives; most leapt into the sea, whence they were rescued by the Japanese. Besides these, around 200 people made it to shore. Unfortunately, about 1,000 sank beneath the sea.

Súi-sí p̄ang zui-lúi kūi-cēng, hit-jiah Gē-sēng liām-bi<sup>n</sup> dīm--lēh-kī. Hit-sí ghoā-gek lánng siòng-pún dē-miā wū-é wū tiào-leh hài, hō Rīt-bùn é zūn-à giu--kī. Yi-ghoā geh wū wà 200 lánng yā giu jiu<sup>n</sup>-soa<sup>n</sup>; ke-siēh bhēh gao jiá<sup>n</sup> 1000 lánng dīm-leh hài. (114: 91)

The *Church News* says nothing about the question over the rightness of the attack. It does make note of the fact that the Japanese gave help to the “foreigners” (“ghoā-gek lánng”) from the ship, but does not outright say that help was purposely not given to the Cing soldiers. The *Church News* does say that the deaths were “unfortunate” (“ke-siēh”), but does not give any detail; they may be “unfortunate” simply from their being deaths. In short, while the Western and Cing periodicals were giving negative opinions of the Japanese for what they had done in the attack, the *Church News* was neutral.

### Opinions of the Cing and Japanese

As seen about, the *Church News*’ writing about the War was neutral even when the writers likely had strong opinions. But, in a few places their opinions still come through, for the writers’ decisions about which words to use give an idea of their views on the Cing and Japanese. Unsurprisingly, given their backgrounds, these opinions were very like those given in the *Monthly Messenger*. Take for example, the periodical’s account of the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu:

Last month’s *Church News* explained that Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu was an important stronghold, and that the Japanese were going to attack it. On 20 November they attacked the outer camps. The next day they attacked again, at which point many Cing officers and men did not fight, but scattered, allowing

the Japanese to advance as they pleased; by nightfall they controlled the area.

Zēng-ghoēh é Gào-hoē-bē wū gòng Lu-sūn-gàng sī hiam-yāo é ài-kào, yā dēh gòng, Rit-bùn bēng bēh kī pāh hīt so-zāi. Gāo jīt 10 ghōēh 23, wū kī gong, hīt jīt wū gōng-poā goā-bēng é yā<sup>n</sup>-zē. Geh-mé geh-zai pāh; gāo hit-diap bun-gēk é Bhu-goā<sup>n</sup> gūn-bēng kah-zē bhé gāp yin di-dek, jiam-dé sī-soā<sup>n</sup>, cut-zāi Rit-bùn dīt-dit jìn-zéng; gāo hīt rit am hīt-é dē-gai lòng ho yin jiam--kī. (117: 121)

The writers do not say outright that the Cing military did its work badly: they do not say that the Cing soldiers could, or should, have kept on fighting. But, the name that the writers give to the soldiers' going out of the city, "scattering" ("sì-soā<sup>n</sup>"), makes this suggestion very strongly. For comparison, in the periodical's accounts of the Battle of Yá Mountain, early in the War, it was said that the Cing soldiers "retreated" ("tê") and "withdrew" ("tiu"), and that the Japanese soldiers, in the face of a Cing counterattack, "went south" ("leh lám"; 114: 91). These are three names for the same action, going away from the fighting — the same action that the soldiers took at Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu — but "retreated," "withdrew," and "went south" make the suggestion that the action was done on purpose, and in a orderly way. "Scattering," makes the opposite suggestion — the action was not part of the leaders' design, and was not even orderly. And so, without openly saying anything negative about the Cing, the writers were able to make the suggestion that they were not fighting well.

Farther along in the account of the Battle was another, stronger, suggestion: "Many people are puzzled by how such a strong position could have been taken so easily" ("Zēng lánng dēh gī-goāi hīt so-zāi gāo hiāh yong-zong giān-gō zoā<sup>n</sup>-yiu<sup>n</sup> wū gào-hiāh yōng-yī<sup>n</sup> pāh"; 117: 121). This is nearly saying outright that the Cing gave up too quickly. But, the writers were careful to put distance between themselves and this suggestion. They do not say that *they* are "puzzled" ("gī-goāi"); this has been said by "many people" ("zēng lánng"). Where these persons came from, what their interest in the Battle was, and what about it made them "puzzled," these details are not given to the reader. Importantly, "zēng lánng" is not simply a good-sized group of persons: it is nearer to "the

multitude” or “the masses”; it is a name for the greater part of some very great number of persons, such as all the persons of a country. The writers are not simply saying that some persons, such as military and political leaders, are puzzled by how quickly the Cing gave up Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu; they are saying that nearly *everyone* is puzzled.

In the last days of the War the Japanese took over the Bē<sup>n</sup>-ó<sup>n</sup> — a chain of islands in the Strait of Tái-wan — to put themselves in a better position for taking Tái-wan itself. The *Church News* had an account of the attack on Ma-gêng, the capital of the Bē<sup>n</sup>-ó<sup>n</sup>, which again made the suggestion that the Cing military was doing its work badly: “On Sunday they attacked Ma-gêng; no one opposed them, and they quickly captured the battery” (“Lê-bài-rit soa kī pāh Ma-gêng, bhé sim-mih láng gāp yin di-dēk, pào-dái liām-bi<sup>n</sup> hō yin jiām-kī”; 119: 9). From this account, it seems that the Cing military did nothing at all against the Japanese attack. But Jukichi Inouye, in an official Japanese account of the War, gives the story differently:

On the morning of the 23rd, the column landed at Koching point, on the south-east of Pescadore Island, and after a slight skirmish took possession of the coast fort to the north-east of How Point, and also of Makung Castle. The Chinese then attacked Makung for the forts on Fisher Island; but on the 25th, they fired their magazine and fled from the island. (87)

This is no Thermopylae, but it is not true that when the Japanese made their attack on Ma-gêng “no one opposed them” (“bhé sim-mih láng gāp yin di-dēk”). In fact, the *Church News*’ writers are making the suggestion that the Cing soldiers did their work so badly that there was *figuratively* no fighting at all.

## Discussion

At no time in the Cing-Japanese War did the *Church News* openly say anything about the quality of the two powers’ government or military leaders. This comes across most clearly in its accounts of events about which other periodicals gave strong opinions. For example, when James Wylie, a Presbyterian missionary in the northeastern Cing Empire, was put to death by Cing soldiers, the *Monthly*

*Messenger* was angry about it, but the *Church News* simply gave the facts, and even gave a good amount of attention to what the government was doing to get justice for the Church. Or, take the Japanese military's attack on the *Gao-sheng*, which in many Western newspapers was said to be "wrong." The *Church News* gave all the details about the actions which had made the Western newspapers say this, but gave no opinion of its own.

In a few places, though, the writers' opinion do come through — not as open statements, but through their decisions about the words of their accounts. About the Japanese no suggestions were made, and the same was true of the Cing government. But the *Church News*' opinion of the Cing military was the same as the *Monthly Messenger*'s: the Cing military was doing its work badly. For example, in the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, the Cing soldiers were said to have "scattered", not "retreated," or "withdrawn." And in the Battle of Ma-gêng, the Cing military was said to have done so little, that there may as well have been no fighting at all.

So, the opinions of the *Church News*' writers, at least about the Cing military, were much the same as the opinions of the Presbyterian Church of England's other writers — again, unsurprisingly, for they were shaped by the same languages — but, they kept these opinions out of the *Church News*. This was likely to keep themselves, and the Churchgoers, from danger. As noted, it was the writers' hope that the Churchgoers would take no interest in the War; but some of them surely did, and being openly negative about the Cing military could made trouble with those readers. But, the more important thing may have been keeping out of trouble with the other Táiwanese. In those days it was often said that the Cing Churches were simply tools by which other countries could have power over the Cing Empire (Bays 75). This had been the cause of trouble for the Church in the past (Lài Ying-zé 8–12), and it would give them trouble again before the Cing-Táiwanese War was over. Saying negative things about the Cing military could give persons outside and inside the Church even more reason for taking this view. So, the writers did not openly give their opinion about the Cing

military, but, consciously or not, these opinions still came through in their decisions about what words to make use of in their accounts of the War.

### **THE JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR IN THE *MONTHLY MESSENGER***

In the Japanese-Táiwanese War, the *Monthly Messenger* was again on the side of the Japanese. It seemed to them that the Táiwanese Republic was not a government at all, but a design by the old Cing rulers of the island to keep control of it for as long as possible, which did not even have the support of the Táiwanese. The writers gave no thought at all to what the Republic might do if it had control of Tái-wan: there was simply no chance of that ever taking place. As for the Japanese, in comparison with the earlier War, there was less writing about the them, but what there was was even more positive. It was said that the Japanese Army was very like a Western army in its way of doing things, such as taking care of the Táiwanese and Westerners who came under its control. What was more, the Japanese were going to make Western ways more common in Tái-wan. As noted in Chapter 4, this had been the hope of the writers for some time, and they were happy to see this at last coming true.

#### **Numbers**

Below are the numbers and sizes of the accounts of the Japanese-Táiwanese War in the *Monthly Messenger* which gave opinions on the Japanese and Táiwanese. Again, of the fifteen possible opinions, only four are present: “saying the Táiwanese are good” (“T. POS”), “saying the Japanese are good” (“J. POS”), “saying the Táiwanese are bad” (“T. NEG”), “saying the Táiwanese are bad, and the Japanese good” (“T. NEG; J. POS”).

<b>MONTHLY MESSENGER — JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR</b>					
<b>T. POS</b>	<b>LINS</b>	<b>PER</b>	<b>J. POS</b>	<b>LINS</b>	<b>PER</b>
596: 250	56	6.31%	593: 178–179	111	11.99%
			598: 10	64	6.91%
<b>TOTAL: 1</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>6.31%</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>19.71%</b>

<b>T. NEG</b>	<b>LINS</b>	<b>PER</b>	<b>T. NEG; J. POS</b>	<b>LINS</b>	<b>PER</b>
595: 226	18	1.94%	592: 153–154	57	6.16%
597: 272	52	5.62%	592: 158	42	4.54%
598: 12–14	32	3.46%	598: 11–12	148	15.98%
<b>TOTAL: 3</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>11.02%</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>247</b>	<b>26.67%</b>

In this War, negative comparisons of the Japanese and their enemy were again the most common sort of opinion, and writings saying something negative about the Táiwanese Republic's leaders were very common besides. The reasons for the *Monthly Messenger's* having such a positive opinion of the Japanese, and such a negative opinion of the Táiwanese, are given in more detail below.

### **Opinions on the Táiwanese**

The *Monthly Messenger* had a very negative opinion of the Táiwanese Republic's government and military. In fact, the periodical never once made the Táiwanese Republic out to be a real government at all. In a number of places, the periodical's writers simply gave it another name, "rebellion," but even when the writers did make use of Táiwanese leaders' own names for their state and themselves, inverted commas made the writers' opinions of these clear. For example, here is how the readers were given news of the Republic's birth:

A Republic was proclaimed (the "President" has since fled from Formosa!) and preparations made for resistance to the Japanese invasion. Having had the island formally handed over to them by a Chinese Imperial Commissioner, the Japanese at once proceeded to take possession, and already the Chinese "rebellion," as it must now be called, is collapsing. (592: 153–154)

In this piece of writing, the writers first make use of the Táiwanese leaders name for their country, “republic,” only to give it a new name in the last line — “rebellion.” And the writer does not even take the trouble of giving the Republic’s leader a new name: the inverted commas around “president” make it clear that the writers do not see Táng Jǐng-song as a real president. On its face, this gives readers news of the new Republic, but at the same time it makes sure that they do not take it seriously.

This was said to be the position of the Táiwanese themselves too. The *Monthly Messenger* had a number of accounts of what the “common persons” of Tái-wan were doing, or not doing, in support of their new government. For example, here is the *Monthly Messenger*’s account of the thoughts of Murray Cairns, a medical missionary from the Tái-wan mission, on the question of Táiwanese support for the Republic:

Dr. Murray Cairns expresses the opinion that the cession of Formosa to the Japanese is resented by the governing class in China far more than the many overwhelming defeats on land and sea during the war. . . . Naturally this feeling will be keenest in Formosa itself. It isn’t so, indeed, amongst the common people there, who, as Dr. Murray Cairns told his interviewer, have been crying, “Let the Japanese come, for our own Government is greedy at heart, and grinds the lives out of us.” But the “Black Flags” (“Chinese braves,” Mr. Matheson calls them), instigated by the literati, no doubt, are in arms against the Japanese occupation. (594 :198)

In Cairns’ view, and the *Monthly Messenger*’s, the new state is not of, by, or for the common persons of Tái-wan: it is simply a design by the “literati” — “presidents” Táng and Lióu — to keep themselves in power. In fact, the common persons are not only not interested in the Republic, they, like the periodical, are supporters of the Japanese.

In the above account can be seen too a third sort of attack on the Republic — saying that its military was not even from Tái-wan. In the *Monthly Messenger* the fighting was usually said to be between the Japanese and the “Black Flags,” Lióu Yǒng-fú’s personal army. This was important, as the greater part of the

Black Flags had come across from the Mainland with Lióu. By, saying that the Black Flags were the ones fighting against the Japanese, the writers were saying that the War was not between the Japanese and Táiwanese, but the Japanese and the old Cing leaders, who would not give up control of the island. The *Monthly Messenger's* account of the War's end makes this point again, and gets in another attack on support for the Republic:

Since the capture of Taiwanfoo [Dāi-lám] by the Japanese (about 20th of October) — apparently without serious resistance — it has been announced that 'Kachi' has also been occupied by the Japanese. Probably this is Kagi [Gā-ghī], where Dr. Gavin Russell died, about 30 miles north of Taiwanfoo. The Black Flags were in strong force in Kagi, but Dr. Maxwell says (in *Medical Missions*, which he edits so admirably) that "many of the people in the districts between Chianghoa (farther to the north) and Kagi have white flags with a circle in the middle, within which are the characters 'Tai Jit-pun' [Dāi Rit-bùn] (Great Japan). These are exhibited whenever the Japanese make their appearance." (272: 2)

In this account, the Táiwanese are happy about the Japanese Empire's at last taking control of their island. The *Monthly Messenger* not only gave very negative accounts of the Republic, it made out that these were the same sorts of accounts that the Táiwanese themselves would give. The writers and the Táiwanese were, it seems, of one mind: the Republic was not their government, and the Japanese government's taking control of Tái-wan would be a good thing for the island and its persons.

### **Opinions on the Japanese**

The *Monthly Messenger's* accounts of the War in Tái-wan said little about the Japanese leaders, but what they did say was very positive. For example, in the August 1895 *Monthly Messenger* was an account of "A manifestation of Christian brotherhood . . . in itself delightful, and, besides, a hopeful omen for the future of our Formosan work under Japanese rule" (593: 178–179). The place of the manifestation was the Bē<sup>n</sup>-ó<sup>n</sup> Islands, which had by then been under Japanese control for four months. A number of Japanese soldiers and officers were

Churchgoers, and had been having services with the Presbyterian churchgoers. One of their number, a Japanese Army Lieutenant, sent a letter to the missionaries in Dāi-lám, a copy of which went into the *Monthly Messenger*. In the letter, which was not signed, the Japanese lieutenant gave a defense of the War:

I am sorry that this war broke out. But it was necessary that we should fight. I believe that there is a Divine guidance in this war, which leads Oriental nations to leave their old civilisations and seek the new and spiritual one. I believe firmly in the Divine Mission of Japan, and I fought this war to fulfil my duty. (593: 178–179)

If the Lieutenant had been a reader of the *Monthly Messenger*, he would have been conscious that no defense was necessary. In fact, the writers of the *Monthly Messenger* were happy about what he had done: not only was the Japanese government living up to their greatest hopes — making Western ways more common in East Asia — the Japanese themselves were good sorts. The *Monthly Messenger*'s editor said that the letter was “manly, patriotic, and devout,” and its writer the equal of a Westerner, even saying of him “An army of such men as he would be as invincible as Cromwell’s Ironsides” (593: 178–179). Thomas Barclay, who had sent the letter, was in complete agreement, saying “If many of the Japanese fought in this spirit, it is little wonder that the Chinese went down before them” (593: 178–179).

In October, Barclay and the other missionaries in Tái-wan had the chance to see the Japanese military in more detail. By 20 October the persons of Dāi-lám were conscious that Lióu Yǒng-fú had quietly gone back to the Cing Empire. There seemed little point in fighting on, and the city’s leaders made designs to give the city over to the Japanese. As the missionaries had not taken sides in the War, the city’s leaders went to them and made the request that the missionaries take a note about this design to the Japanese. The *Monthly Messenger* had William Ferguson’s account of this meeting:

We had walked about five miles, and were approaching a village called Ji-chhian-hang [Ri-zàn-háng], when suddenly we heard a peculiar summons. Barclay and I at once know it was the Japanese sentry calling on us to halt. We ran forward with a light, held up our British flag, and called

out that we were English. A lot of soldiers came running forward, fixed bayonets, and stood pointing at us. Soon an officer, who could speak a little English, came forward. We managed to make him understand our mission . . . We were then conducted to another officer. By means of an interpreter he got all of our information about Liu having run off, and the people of Taiwanfoo [Dāi-lám] inviting them to enter in peace. Then we were handed on from one officer to another until 3 a.m. on Monday. We were then told by General Nogii that the army would start at 5 a.m. for Taiwanfoo. (598: 11–12).

Nothing is openly said for the Japanese here, but it is a quite positive account of them even so: in effect, it is a comparison of their military with the Táiwanese military. Unlike the Táiwanese, the Japanese soldiers do their work well and with care; the officers have a knowledge of English; and the General himself takes the time for a meeting with the missionaries. Everything is done rightly, which is to say in the Western way.

The issue had Thomas Barclay's account of giving over the city too. He went farther than Ferguson, openly making a positive comparison of the Japanese and Westerners, and making special note of the way in which the Japanese had taken over the city: "compared with the treatment of conquered cities by heathen nations in ancient and modern times, [it] has been, I should say, marvellously good. Many who know say it would compare favourably with the behaviour of soldiers of European nations" (598: 10). This, in a statement, is the reason for the *Monthly Messenger's* writers having such a good opinion of the Japanese. The new rulers of Tái-wan are not simply good in comparison to other East Asians, they are nearly as good as Westerners.

### **Discussion**

In the War between the Japanese Empire and Táiwanese Republic, the *Monthly Messenger's* writers were completely against the Republic and very much on the side of the Japanese. Unlike in the earlier War, this had little to do with how well the two sides were fighting. As was seen in Chapter 4, the *Monthly Messenger* never gave the Táiwanese a chance against the Japanese, and were unhappy

about how long it took the Japanese to get the better of their enemy. The periodical's supporting one side against the other had everything to do with how "Western" the two sides were. The Táiwanese had given their state the name "Republic" partly in the hope that it would make Westerners more likely to give it their support. But, for the *Monthly Messenger's* writers, this name seems to have had to opposite effect. The Táiwanese state was not simply getting in the way of the better Japanese government, it was falsely making use of a Western name. And so, nearly every time they said anything about the Republic, it made the point that it was not a "real" Republic, but a rebellion. When giving the names of its leaders, the *Monthly Messenger* put their titles in inverted commas, making clear that they were not real ranks. When giving accounts of its army, they said that it was not made up of common Táiwanese fighting for their way of life, but of "Black Flags" from the Qing Empire. And, when giving accounts of the common persons' thoughts on the Republic, they said that there was no support for it, and most persons were hoping that the Japanese would quickly take control.

In comparison, the Japanese government and military were doing things very like a Western country. For example, the missionaries' account of their meeting with the Japanese Army makes very clear that the Japanese military does things like a Western military; one of the missionaries even says that their action in taking the city "would compare favourably with the behaviour of European nations." In their discussion of the Japanese Lieutenant's "manly, patriotic, and devout" letter, the writers not only give their approval to the Japanese Empire's "divine mission," they make a comparison between the Japanese military and an army from England's past — Oliver Cromwell's "New Model Army," the "Ironsides." This is very high praise. In the seventeenth century, Cromwell's army had put an end to the English Kings' rule, and, for a time, the power of the Roman Catholic Church in England. This, in the Presbyterian Church of England's histories, was said to be the birth of English Presbyterianism. By making a comparison between the Japanese Army and the "Ironsides," the writers of the *Monthly Messenger* was saying that the Japanese

military in Tái-wan was not simply on a level with Westerners, but on level with one of English Presbyterianism's greatest fighters and rulers. In short, they were against the Táiwanese for making a state with a Western name but no Western qualities, and for the Japanese for being as Western as Presbyterianism's best.

### **OPINIONS ON THE JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR IN *THE CHURCH NEWS***

The *Church News*' accounts of the Japanese-Táiwanese War were more even-handed than at *Monthly Messenger*'s. There were accounts of the Japanese doing good and bad things to the island's persons, but the writers made it clear that the bad things were being done by the Japanese military's porters and enlisted men. The Japanese leaders were different: they were good and clever men, who were taking care of the Churchgoers where they could, and would go on doing so when they had control of the island. There were positive and negative accounts of the Republic too. Like the *Monthly Messenger*, the *Church News* made it out not to be a real state, but a group of Cing leaders hoping to keep control past their time. The *Church News* gave much attention to how little control the Republic had over its lands and persons, and said too that things were going badly in the the places still under the Republic's control, maybe even worse than in the places under Japanese control. By giving such accounts of the Japanese and the Táiwanese, the *Church News* was able to quietly put follow its writers true opinions: Tái-wan would, and should, be under Japanese control.

### **Numbers**

In the Japanese-Táiwanese War, the *Church News* at last gave opinions on the two sides. But, again, of the fifteen possible opinions, only four were present: "saying something good about the Japs" ("J. POS"), "saying something bad about the Japanese ("J. NEG"), "saying something good and bad about the Japanese" ("J. POS & NEG"), and "saying something bad about the Táiwanese" ("T. NEG"). Below are the amounts of space taken up by these writings.

<b>CHURCH NEWS — JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR</b>					
<b>J. POS</b>	<b>LINS</b>	<b>PER</b>	<b>J. NEG</b>	<b>LINS</b>	<b>PER</b>
122: 45–46	25	1.06%	128: 106	14	0.59%
124: 58	21	0.89%	128: 106	11	0.46%
128: 106–106	6	0.25%	128: 107–108	91	3.85%
			129: 116	12	0.51%
<b>TOTAL: 3</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>2.20%</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>5.41%</b>

<b>J. POS &amp; NEG</b>	<b>LINS</b>	<b>PER</b>	<b>T. POS</b>	<b>LINS</b>	<b>PER</b>
122: 39–40	253	10.69%	123: 53–54	131	5.54%
126: 81–82	56	2.37%			
128: 108–109	91	3.85%			
129: 114–116	150	6.34%			
<b>TOTAL: 4</b>	<b>550</b>	<b>23.25%</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>5.54%</b>

Interestingly, the greatest number of opinion-giving writings, at least by space taken up, were writings giving mixed opinions on the Japanese. There were more lines of writing giving opinions on the Japanese than the Táiwanese, but the amount of writing saying bad things about the Japanese and Táiwanese was about the same — even if there was more writing saying good things about the Japanese. Below are given the details of these opinions and the likely reasons for giving them.

### **Opinions on the Japanese**

For the most part, the *Church News*' writers had a good opinion of the Japanese leaders, but a bad one of the lower ranks. Take for example, this account from the Bē<sup>n</sup>-ó<sup>n</sup> Islands, which gives a different point of view on the “manifestation of brotherhood” noted in the *Monthly Messenger*:

One matter, however, vexes us; that is, Japanese porters occupied our chapel, and destroyed its door, windows, benches, tables, and everything

else within it. However, afterward, a Japanese officer named Gong-diān-diat-zóng, who is also a believer, came and restored order. The chapel has since been cleaned out, and we now meet every week for worship. A high-ranking Japanese officer named Rīt-pit-sìn-liāng, who ardently loves the Lord, a pastor named Nai-sū-ghi-zùn, and a doctor all join us for worship, as well as many soldiers.

M-gù jīt-hāng hō làn tang hoān-lè--é, jiu-sī lê-bài-dng ho Rīt-bùn gēk é gūn-bhu jiam--ki, hia-é mng, tang, yì, dēh, cam lai-bhīn sò wū é mih lòng yit-jīn sng-hoāi bē-lé--ki. Riān-ao wū jīt-é Rīt-bùn é goa<sup>n</sup>, miá Gong-diān-diat-zóng yah sī sìn Zù é láng, yi jiāh lái siat-hoāt gao he-sê. Da<sup>n</sup> sao cēng-ki, mùi lê-bai tang di-hia zu-jip; gēh wū jīt-é Rīt-bùn did doa-goa<sup>n</sup>, miá Rīt-pit-sìn-liāng, jīt é [sic] yah sī riat-sim bai Siōng-dê é láng; yah wū jīt-é Bēk-su, miá Nai-sū-ghi-zùn, yah wū Rīt-bùn é Yī-sēng lái ze jīt-é zu-jip ze lê-bai; yah wū zē-zē é gūn-bēng. (*Church News* 122: 39–40)

Take note that it was the “porters” (“gūn-bhu”) who did the damage, but an “officer” (“goa<sup>n</sup>”) who put things back together. And, while there are some “enlisted soldiers” (“gūn-bēng”) at the church too, unlike the officers their names are not given, and nothing said about their good qualities. Another writer, from northern Tái-wan, was even clearer about the different qualities of the officers and men:

Some of the high-ranking Japanese officers seem excellent fellows, because they have studied abroad; some speak several languages. . . . The ones making trouble are all soldiers and coolies. Ghò koa<sup>n</sup> Japan [sic] é doa-goa<sup>n</sup>, wū é jin hē, yīn-wī wū kī bat gēk tāk-cēh; wū láng bhāt gui-nā kiū<sup>n</sup>-kào. . . . So-wū sī bēng gāp yin é gū-lì gāh lam-sàm zoē. (128: 108–109)

The writers’ mixed opinions on the qualities of the Japanese are clear too in their accounts of the War in southern Tái-wan. There were accounts of the Japanese soldiers making attacks on unarmed persons (129: 114–116), and Japanese officers making “Protection Stations” (“Be-liōng-giek”) to keep them safe (128: 108–109); accounts of Japanese soldiers burning churches (128: 106), and being kept under control by their leaders (127: 94). Even the taking of Dāi-lám was more complex than in the *Monthly Messenger*. The account of Barclay and Ferguson’s taking the

Japanese into the city was much the same, but what came next is very unlike the *Monthly Messenger's* “marvellously good” behaviour:

Once Hu-siá<sup>n</sup> was secure, the Japanese began searching all the houses. Unfortunately, some stole people's things, and some harassed the women. They behaved in this way for several days, and the people of Hu-siá<sup>n</sup> were very afraid. For some ten days no one would open their shops; even now some of the shops remain closed. Many people, afraid of the future, have moved to the Cing Empire. The Japanese officers are good, but the men are a mix of good and bad.

Rīt-bùn bēng dīt-dieh Hu-siá<sup>n</sup> liào, jiū liām-bi<sup>n</sup> ciāo-coē dāk-láng é cū.  
Ke-sieh wū-é ciù<sup>n</sup> láng é mih, yah wū-é zāo-tāt hū-rīn-láng. Yin gui-nā rit  
gù giá<sup>n</sup> an-ni, dī-gao bēh-sē<sup>n</sup> é sim jin doā hoān-lè. Goē zāp-jit é diōng-gan  
láng m-gà<sup>n</sup> kui yin-é diām, yah gao jit-diap doā-kàm é zē-zē yao-bhoēh  
kui. Gēh, wū láng zē-zē yīn-wī bē-ē tūn-lùn gān-kò wū boā<sup>n</sup>-goē-kī  
Dñg-soa<sup>n</sup>. Rīt-bùn é goa<sup>n</sup> sī hò, yah yin-é bēng wū-é sī hē wū-é sī bé. (129:  
114–116).

This, then, was the periodical's view of the Japanese: their leaders were good persons, but their soldiers more mixed. Even so, there was hope for the future; the “bad Japanese” would not be around much longer:

At present the Japanese are ruling Tái-wān with their military; as a result, the local people are suffering greatly. Perhaps in a few weeks they will exchange it for civil administration, in which case the people will be considerably happier.

Hian-gim Rīt-bùn láng dī Dāi-wán wū ēng bhu-bī é goan-hāt, dī-gao zai-dē  
é bēh-sē<sup>n</sup> but-jì zē wū doā gān-kò. Ga<sup>n</sup>-sī gēh gui-nā lê-bai jiāh bhēh wā<sup>n</sup>  
bhūn-sū é hoāt, jiū bēh-sē<sup>n</sup> gā<sup>n</sup> wū tang kāh koā<sup>n</sup>-wah. (128: 106)

The War was over, and the *Church News* was now saying openly that Japanese rule might not be bad. The Japanese who took control of Tái-wan may have been a mix of bad and good, but before long the island would be under the control of the “good Japanese,” and the people would be happy again.

### Opinions on the Táiwanese

There was more balance too to the periodical's writing about the Táiwanese leaders. But, even so, it still came down more against the Republicans than for

them. The *Church News* never said, as the *Monthly Messenger* did, that the Republic was simply a “rebellion,” but by making use of its leaders’ old names, the periodicals made it very clear that the Táiwanese Republic was something less than a real government. Take, for example, this account of the Republic’s birth, which makes note of Táng’s new title, “President” (“Bhīn-zù”):

May 25th, Tái-wan established a Republic. On this day the leaders and gentry of Dāi-bāk presented a document to the Governor. It said, “Tái-wan is now a Republic; the Governor is now the President; the Dragon flag is now a Tiger flag.”

May 25th [sic] (zēk 5 ghoēh cê 2) Dāi-wán siat-lip Bhīn-zu-gēk. Hit-rit Dāi-bāk é Tāo-láng gāp Sīn-sū wū cōng rit-é-ghún é yīn, sang hō Bhu-dái. Hīt é yīn é rī sī gòng, Dāi-wán Bhīn-zu-gēk, Bhu-dái zoe Bhīn-zù, Lēng-gí wā<sup>n</sup> Ho-gí. (123: 53)

Farther along in the same piece of writing, an account of Táng’s going back to the Cing Empire, gives his old title: “June 4th (zēk 5 ghoēh 12 rit), at night the Governor, disguised as a soldier, escaped to Ho-bhè and boarded the steamer Gà-sí” (June 4th (zēk 5 ghoēh 12 rit), mī-sí Bhu-dái cēng bēng-yòng é sa<sup>n</sup> tào-zào gao Ho-bhè, leh Gà-sí é hē-zún”; 123: 53-54; brackets in original). The writer makes very clear that, whatever the declaration of independence says, Táng is not a “president”: he was, and is, simply a Cing governor.

Much the same was done with Liou. In late August the Church sent out notes given to them by Liou, which said that the churches were under his protection. In the *Church News* was a translation of the certificate — its first line was “An announcement from President Lióu, of the Táiwanese Republic” (“Dāi-wán Bhīn-zu-gēk Doa-Zong-tòng, Bāng-bān Láo é gè-sī”; 125: 72). But just above the translations was a short account of how they had come to have it, and this gave Lióu’s old title, in italics no less: “About two months ago we requested certificates from *Commissioner Lióu* to paste on our buildings; on 17 August they finally arrived. (“Cā-but-de nng ghoēh-rit zēng ghoàn wū dui Láo Kīm-cê cēng-hoāt ho-jie tang dāh dī làn jiā gek-wī é bài-dng, gao 6 ghoēh 27 rit jiāh jih-dieh”; 125: 72; emphasis in original). The message is clear: whatever Lióu says his name is, he is in fact what he always was — a Cing commissioner.

Accounts of living in the Republic were mixed too. They did not openly say that the Táiwanese Republic's governments was doing its work badly, but many made note of how little control it seemed to have over the fewer and fewer places that were under its rule. Take, for example, this letter from Ō-ghū-lán:

Lately the people of Pō-siā have been turbulent. The bad characters have seized this opportunity to gang up and go pillaging. It is rumoured that they will come to the villages of Ō-ghū-lán . . . The brethren judge that if bandits come, the church will be difficult to protect. However, we hope that God will protect it from harm. Right now, there are robberies along the road daily and nightly.

Da<sup>n</sup> lun-gào jīt Bō-siā-lāi rīn-bhín é sū jīn loān. Sēng jīt é gī-hoē pai<sup>n</sup>-láng giat-dòng zu-jip, zè-hoè ciu<sup>n</sup>-giāp; yā wū hōng-siā<sup>n</sup> tiā<sup>n</sup>-gi<sup>n</sup> gòng pài<sup>n</sup> láng wū bhēh lái ciu<sup>n</sup>-giap jīt Ō-ghū-lán . . . Siat-sù hiā<sup>n</sup>-dī nā bé diū<sup>n</sup>-dà<sup>n</sup> bī-bān, pài<sup>n</sup> láng [sic] nā lái jiū lān-dit-bè jīt é bài-dng bē siū-hāi. Zong-sī ng-bhāng Siong-dē sī-yin hō jīt é gào-hoē bhiàn siū jīt-hē é ham-hāi. Jīt-zūn rit--sí é--sí wū dēh ciu<sup>n</sup>-láng, giōng-gong ciu<sup>n</sup>-lō lōng wū. (125: 71)

In this account, the Táiwanese Republic seems to have no control over the lands around Ō-ghū-lán: the “bad characters” (“pai<sup>n</sup>-láng”) are free to do what makes them happy, which is “pillaging” (“ciu<sup>n</sup>-giāp”) and robbing” (“ciu<sup>n</sup>-láng”). But even where the Republic did have power, this was not necessarily a good thing for the persons living there, as this letter from Dao-lak makes clear:

Lately the people here have been pitiable, because the government is demanding this year's taxes; those who cannot pay are being sent for judgment. The crops have not yet been harvested, how can anyone have money for taxes?

Hian-sí jia é bēh-sē<sup>n</sup> jin kò, yīn-wī goā<sup>n</sup>-hù bēk gīn-ní é jī<sup>n</sup>-niú. Nā m lái lap, jiū bhēh pài cē kī bān, ngo-gēk yao-bhoē siū-séng, bēh-tai wū jí<sup>n</sup> tang lap jī<sup>n</sup>-niú. (125: 71)

There were many such accounts in the *Monthly Messenger*. To the readers, it likely seemed that the Republic was unable to keep control of its own country, and bad at ruling the few places still under its control. The Japanese may not have been perfect, but it was clear that they were the better rulers.

## Discussion

In comparison with the *Monthly Messenger*, the *Church News*' accounts of the War in Tái-wan were balanced. They had, for example, more negative accounts of the the Japanese military — accounts of damage to churches, harassment of women, and the deaths of unarmed persons. This with very unlike the *Monthly Messenger*, where the only thing negative said about the Japanese was that they were too slow in taking over Tái-wan. But, importantly, in the *Church News* all these thing were said to have been done by the Japanese porters and enlisted men, not the officers, who were said to be “excellent fellows.” In support of this were a number of accounts of the officers putting churches back together, and keeping the Táiwanese safe. What was more, the periodical made clear that when the island was under Japanese control, it would be these leaders, not the soldiers, who would be in charge.

The *Church News*' accounts of the Táiwanese Republic were also more balanced than the *Monthly Messenger*'s, but they still had a bad opinion of the Republic in comparison with the Japanese. The writers made no use of its leaders' new titles: in its pages, Táng Jǐng-song and Lióu Yǒng-fú were still a “governor” and “commissioner.” The use of these names made the suggestion to readers that the Republic was not a real government, but simply a group of Cing leader who would not give up their positions. And, while the *Church News* had a number of writings saying that the Republic was doing things well — like Lióu's giving signs to the Church — there were more accounts of how little control it had over its land, and how bad Republican rule was in the places where it did have control.

As in the Cing-Japanese War, the *Church News*' makers, the missionaries, were likely on the side of the Japanese from the start. As was seen in earlier sections, the missionaries said openly in the *Monthly Messenger* that the Republic had no chance against the Japanese Empire, and that the Japanese would be better rulers of Tái-wan anyway. But here, even more than in the earlier War, they could not be openly in support of the Japanese in the *Church News*, at least not while the Japanese were putting unarmed persons to death, and putting

churches to flame. So the writers did what they could. The *Church News* made clear that the Japanese were doing good and bad on the island: this was clear enough to the readers that to do anything else would have seemed strange. But the *Church News* made clear too that the Japanese leaders, who would have control of Tái-wan in the future, were good men. In comparison, little good was said about the Republic. In the *Church News*' accounts, it was unable to keep control of its lands, and bad at taking care of the lands still under its control. It seems that the *Church News* was quietly giving its readers a push in the direction of the missionaries' opinion: the Japanese would have control of Tái-wan, but this was in the best interests of the island.

## 6 — “The arrival of the Japanese means order and protection”: Hoping for a better future under Japanese rule

This Chapter takes up the periodicals’ views on the prospects of evangelisation in view of the emerging Japanese victory. As was seen in Chapters 4 and 5, the periodicals had a good opinion of the Japanese government and military leaders, and were not unhappy about the Japanese Empire getting the better of the Cing. This Chapter goes more deeply into the reasons for this view: in short, the periodicals’ makers had the idea that the Japanese would make Western ways more common in the Cing Empire and on Tái-wan, and that in the new conditions the Churches would be able to do their work better than ever before.

### Overview

At the Cing-Japanese War’s start, the *Monthly Messenger* said that it would be bad for the Cing Empire’s Protestant Churches. It was the writers’ view that the Cing persons’ anger at the Japanese, and the fall from power of Cing leaders friendly to missions, would make the Churches’ work harder. But, once the Japanese were getting the better of the Cing, the writers’ position was changed: they now said that the War would be good for the Churches, as it would make the Cing persons more likely to take up Western ways of thought and living, which would make the work of the Churches simpler. As seen in Chapter 4, for much of the Cing-Japanese War, the *Church News*’ writers were unsure of its outcome, and for all of it, they had to seem neutral. Unsurprisingly, they had little to say about the War’s likely effects on the Churches, giving their attention completely to fighting and politics. This is most clearly seen in comparison with the *Monthly Messenger*: there were a number of events in the War that had an effect on the Cing Churches, and both periodicals’ makers were aware of these, but, only the English periodical had discussion of these events’ likely effect on the Cing Churches. About them, the Táiwanese periodical was silent.

As soon as news of the Treaty of Shimonoseki was made public, the *Monthly Messenger*’s writers were saying that Japanese rule would be good for the

Presbyterian Churches in Tái-wan. In the earlier War, the Japanese had only been able to make the suggestion, on the battlefields, that the Cing Empire should take up Western ways. In Tái-wan, they would be able to *make* these ways common — by force, if necessary. This would be very good for the Church, whose work could be done better and more quickly in a place where Western ways were more common. The *Church News* did not outright say that the Táiwanese Church's future would be better under Japanese rule, but it made this suggestion very strongly. This was done through accounts of the Japanese officers' taking care of the island's Churchgoers when they came across them, and going to church alongside the Táiwanese. In fact, Church-goers were a small part of the Japanese military, but the *Church News*' writings made them seem like a very important part. Readers likely came away with the suggestion that Japanese control of the island would have a very good effect on the Church's future in Tái-wan.

### **Definitions and divisions**

Here, as in Chapter 4, the writings of interest are those that say something about the future. But, unlike in the earlier chapter, the future of interest here is not that of the War itself, but of the Churches. And, simply saying something about the Church's futures and the events of the Wars is not enough: to be of interest, the writing must make a connection between these events and states. So, the writings of interest in this Chapter have four qualities:

- I. they must be accounts of the War
- II. they must have guesses about the Churches' futures
- III. they must make a connection between (I) and (II)
- IV. they must give an opinion on (II)

These groups can be ordered in a number of ways. Here, the group of writings given in Chapter 3, writings "about the War," are taken as the base level. It is then necessary to put these writings into still smaller groups: writings "*about the Churches' futures*" and "**not** *about the Churches' futures.*" What is of interest here are "guesses," which are somewhat different from statements. For present purposes,

a “guess” is “the utterance by a certain speaker or writer of certain words (a sentence) to an audience with reference to an *future* situation, event or what not.” A guess may be “about the Church” in one or more of these ways:

- A. Having the name of a Church, church, or any group of these
- B. Having the name of a Churchgoer undertaking some action with the idea that it will have an effect on a Church or church

Take note that it is not necessary the action have the hoped-for effect: what is important is that the actor has the idea that it will have this effect. It is then necessary to put the writing into groups “*making a connection between the War and the Church’s futures*” and “**not** *making a connection between the War and the Church’s futures.*” For present purposes, account is taken only of connection which are made openly. That is, if the connection is made openly if it is made by a “conjunctive adverb,” like “therefore” (“so-yì”), or a conjunctive prepositional phrase, like “as a result” (“giat-gè”). If it is simply a suggestion, then it is not noted in the numbers, but given its own discussion in the Chapter.

Opinions on the future are put into two groups: “*the Churches’ futures will be better*” and “*the Churches’ futures will be worse.*” In theory, a third opinion is possible — “*the Churches’ futures will be unchanged.*” But, here, there were no writings giving such an opinion, so no account need be taken of it. Last, it is necessarily to put the writings into groups “*giving an opinion*” and “*not giving an opinion.*” Here, again, accounts will be taken of only two opinions: “*the Churches’ futures will be better*” and “*the Churches futures will be worse.*” Again, in theory, it is possible to say that the Church’s futures will be “*better **and** worse,*” but again, there were no such writings in the periodicals.

The writings are put into these groups by reason of their having or not having four qualities: being “about the War,” “about the Churches,” “about the future,” and “making a connection between the War and the Church’s futures.” The system that comes from these is given below.

1. Writings having accounts of the Cing-Japanese War
    - 1.1. Writings having accounts of the Cing-Japanese War and guesses about the Churches' futures
      - 1.1.1. Writings making connections between the Cing-Japanese War and the Churches' futures
        - 1.1.1.1. Writings saying the Churches' futures will be better
        - 1.1.1.2. Writings saying the Churches' futures will be worse
      - 1.1.2. Writings *not* making connections between the Cing-Japanese War and the Churches' futures
    - 1.2. Writings having accounts of the Cing-Japanese War but *not* guesses about the Churches' futures
  2. Writings *not* having accounts of the Cing-Japanese War
3. Writings having accounts of the Japanese-Táiwaneese War
  - 3.1. Writings having accounts of the Japanese-Táiwaneese War and guesses about the Churches' futures
    - 3.1.1. Writings making connections between the Japanese-Táiwaneese War and the Churches' futures
      - 3.1.1.1. Writings saying the Churchs' futures will be better
      - 3.1.1.2. Writings saying the Churches' futures will be worse
    - 3.1.2. Writings *not* making connections between the Japanese-Táiwaneese War and the Churches' futures
  - 3.2. Writings having accounts of the Japanese-Táiwaneese War but *not* guesses about the Churches' futures
4. Writings *not* having accounts of the Japanese-Táiwaneese War

Like the others, this Chapter has four parts, which take account of the two Wars in the two periodicals. As in Chapter 5, what it most interesting here is that the *Church News*' writers, whose views on the Churches' futures were given in the *Monthly Messenger*, said nothing about these in the *Church News*. Their opinions did come through, but only as suggestions, never openly. And so, the organisation of the sections about the *Church News* are a bit different: the *Monthly Messenger* sections are chiefly about what the periodical said; the *Church News* sections are about what it did not say.

## THE CING CHURCHES' FUTURES IN THE *MONTHLY MESSENGER*

At the start of the Cing-Japanese War, the *Monthly Messenger* was sure that it would have a bad effect on the Cing Empire's Churches and missions. For one thing, Cing persons would take out their anger at the Japanese on the Churches. For another, the War would be bad for Cing leaders with a interest in Western ways. But, once the Japanese were getting the better of the Cing, their opinion was changed: the *Monthly Messenger* now said that the War would be good for the Churches and missions. As noted in Chapter 2, many missionaries and missionary-sending Churches were of the opinion that the growth of the Cing Empire's Churches was too slow. It was said that one of the chief reasons for this was the Cing leaders' being uninterested in Western accounts of the world, and Western ways of living. But now the Japanese, who made use of Western ways, were getting the better of the Cing Empire. The *Monthly Messenger* was certain that this would make the Cing take a better view of Western ways. And, when these ways were more common in the Cing Empire, more persons would take an interest in the Cing Churches.

### Numbers

The chart below gives the numbers of accounts of the War in the *Monthly Messenger* which gave an opinion one Churches' future. Here, the two possible opinions were given: "the Churches' futures would be better" ("BTR FUT"), and "the Churches' futures would be worse" ("WRS FUT").

<b>MONTHLY MESSENGER — CING-JAPANESE WAR</b>					
<b>BTR FUT</b>	<b>LINS</b>	<b>PER</b>	<b>WRS FUT</b>	<b>LINS</b>	<b>PER</b>
585: 274–275	38	4.28%	582: 198–199	58	6.53%
586: 15	73	8.22%	583: 222–223	20	2.25%
588: 59	19	2.14%	583: 227	16	1.80%
589: 82	11	1.24%			

589: 83	22	2.48%			
589: 83	22	2.48%			
590:105	34	3.83%			
591:127-128	163	18.36%			
	169	19.03%			
<b>TOTAL: 8</b>	<b>551</b>	<b>62.05%</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>10.59%</b>

What is of interest here is the clear division between the two opinions: issues number 582 and 583 said that the Churches' futures would be worse, but nearly every issue after these said the opposite. In the end, a much greater part of the *Monthly Messenger's* writings about the War said the Church's futures would be better. Below are given the details of what they said, and the reasons for this.

### **Worse futures**

The September 1894 *Monthly Messenger*, after giving readers an account of the War's likely causes, made it clear that these were not the periodical's chief interest, saying "Our concern in this place, with this useless war, centres round its probable effect on missions" (582: 198-199). These were, it seemed to the writers, likely to be bad all around. In Japan, public interest in the War, which would later give William Campbell so much pleasure, was at first seen by the *Monthly Messenger* as a likely cause of trouble: "The war-fever in Japan is unfavourable to the spread of the Gospel" (582: 198-199). Meantime, in the Joseon Kingdom "The actual outbreak of war has naturally increased the anti-foreign and anti-missionary feeling which had been before making itself perceptible in some parts of the peninsula" (582: 198-199). But, the Church's own missionaries were in the Cing Empire, and it was the troubles of the Cing Churches that were of greatest interest to the periodical.

The periodical said that the War was likely to be bad for the Cing Empire's Churches in two ways. First, the Churches and their missions could come under

attack by Cing persons. The loss of James Wylie had come about in this way, and that was before the Cing military had even seen action. The outcome of the fighting would not make things better, and the *Monthly Messenger* made note that in some places the anger was being taken out on the missionaries: “In China the anti-foreign feeling will, unhappily, be strengthened by her disasters. The missionaries in Manchuria are being compelled to leave their inland stations to be pillaged and burned, and to take refuge in the treaty port of Newchang [Yíng-kǒu]” (583: 222-223). This, to be sure, was a long way from the Presbyterian Church of England’s own missions, but even so, the *Monthly Messenger’s* writers were often afraid for the Missions in the southeast, where “few could distinguish between ‘outside countries’ — Japanese or Europeans are all the same to the great mass of the people” (586: 14).

But second, and more important, was the War’s effect on the “Viceroy of Jhií-lì” (“Jhií-lì Zǒng-du”) — Lǐ Hóng-jhang. He was nearly the only Cing leader of whom the *Monthly Messenger* had a good opinion. It was not that Lǐ was himself a Churchgoer, or even that he was a supporter of the Churches, but that Lǐ, more than most Cing leaders, saw value in Western accounts of the world, and had done quite a lot to make them more common in the Cing Empire. This, in the *Monthly Messenger’s* view, made him a friend of the Churches. As noted in Chapter 2, to take part in the Presbyterian Churches of the southeastern Cing Empire, one had to give up certain common acts, such as giving gifts to the ancestors and other spirits. And by so doing, one could make one’s neighbours into enemies. But these beings and these acts had no place in Western views of the world. It was the hope of the *Monthly Messenger* that if Western accounts of the world were more common, more persons would give the Church a chance. And Lǐ seemed to them nearly the only Cing leader doing anything to promote Western ideas.

But Lǐ had another position — leader of the Běi-yáng Army and Navy. And as they were doing badly in battle with the Japanese, the *Monthly Messenger* had the idea that Lǐ might not be in power for much longer. Even before the Cing Empire’s worst losses, the *Monthly Messenger* said “a serious peril to all missionary

work is already threatened by the disfavour into which Li Hung Chang [Lǐ Hóng-jhang], the enlightened viceroy at Tientsin [Tian-jin], the virtual prime minister of China, has fallen” (582: 198-199). After the loss of Pyeongyang, they gave a more detailed account of what he had done for the Empire, and would danger there would be if he were gone:

The failure of the Chinese fleet and army to rout the Japanese is, it is feared, paving the way for the downfall of the enlightened Viceroy, Li Hung Chang, on whom the Peking [Běi-jing] reactionaries lay all the blame. If they succeed, it will be a calamity for China, and will introduce a period of restriction and difficulty in the conduct of missionary work. The openness of mind Li Hung Chang has long shown to European thought and practice has just received a fresh illustration. He has established a new medical school at Tientsin [Tian-jin], in which Chinese students are being taught Western medicine, so as to become efficient doctors for the army and navy. (583: 222-223)

If Lǐ and his medical schools are gone, then there will be a “period of restriction and difficulty in the conduct of missionary work.” It is not that the military’s having better doctors will necessary be good for the Churches, but that the users of “Western medicine” are less likely to be users of “Chinese medicine,” which is based on Chinese accounts of the world. And so, Lǐ’s making Western medicine more common was a help to the Churches, for at the same time he was making weaker the power of the ideas that kept the Cing away from the them.

But, given the state of the War, it seemed he would not be able to do this for much longer. To the *Monthly Messenger*, it still seemed likely that the Cing would overcome their enemy in the end. But they could do it without Lǐ, the Cing Churches would be in a worse position for it.

### **Better futures**

Then came the Cing losses at Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu and Wei-hǎi-wèi. The *Monthly Messenger*’s writers were now conscious that the Cing might not get the better of their enemy after all – and this gave them hope. As seen in Chapters 4, these writers had a bad opinion of Cing accounts of the world. Missions to Cing Empire

had been for many years working to make Western ways more common there, but had not made much headway. In Japan, Western ways had been common for many years, and the Japanese were now making good use of Western arms, organisation, and medicine in their War against the Cing. It was the hope of the *Monthly Messenger's* writers that the Cing, at last seeing for themselves the advantages of Western ways, might now give them a chance. And this, in turn, would make things better for the Cing Churches.

The *Monthly Messenger* first made this suggestion in an account of the Battle of Wei-hǎi-wèi:

Everybody has been reading the story of the Japanese attacks on Wei-hai-wei, where, for the first time in the war, the Chinese have made a valiant and resolute stand, though in the end their warships and torpedo-boats have been all captured or destroyed, and the great fortress is now in the hands of the Japanese. . . . May it be, as some are hopefully predicting, that a humbled China will be more open to receive the salvation of Jesus Christ! (588: 59).

The connection between Western ways and Church growth is only a suggestion here, but it is made nonetheless. The Cing Empire has been “humbled” by the Japanese military’s arms. If the Cing would keep this from happening again, they must do as the Japanese have done, and take up Western ways. This would at the very least makes it simpler for Cing persons to go to church, and at best might even make more persons take an interest in the Churches. But an account of Lǐ Hóng-jhang’s getting his position back makes the connection between Western ways and Church-going openly:

Better counsels seems to have prevailed at last in Pekin. It is recognised there that Li Hung Chang is the only man to whom the Empire can look for extrication from its present position of humiliating impotence. . . . His real return to power, with increased influence in Pekin, would unquestionably mean more honesty in government, a frank abandonment of hostility to western civilisation, and better days for the people — gains to China in which Christian missions would certainly share (589: 83).

It was not that a “humbled” Cing Empire would necessary see church-going as a way out of their trouble: a Western sort of government, a Western-armed military — and the Western accounts of the world that made these possible — were the way to make the Empire strong again. But, the “abandonment of hostility to western civilisation” necessary for this would be good for the Churches too, for where Western ways were common, there would be fewer things keeping Cing persons from the Churches.

A last example of the *Monthly Messenger’s* view on the connection between “Western civilisation” and the growth of the Cing Churches comes from its account of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. This said, among other things, that the cities of Sha-shü, Chóng-cing, Su-jhou, and Háng-jhou “shall be opened to the trade, residence, industries, and manufactures of Japanese subjects, under the same conditions and with the same privileges and facilities as exist at the present open cities, towns, and ports of China” (Kajima 265) What was more, the rivers between these cities would be made open to transportation. The *Monthly Messenger’s* writers were sure that the coming of the Japanese businesses to these cities would be good for the churches there:

The region which is thus to be thrown open to the civilised world is of a vast extent. It is, perhaps, the most densely-populated, as it is the richest part of the Chinese Empire. It is inhabited by two hundred millions people, peaceful, industrious, cultured, well-to-do, and accustomed even to luxury. What magnificent opportunities for missionary enterprise will be presented to Christendom, if this great territory is really made freely accessible to the civilized world! (590: 105).

It seems from this writing that the cities were being made open to the Churches for the first time. In fact, there had been Churches there for many years. The cities had simply been made open to Japanese business in the same way as the other “treaty ports” had been in the 1840s and 1860s. The reason for the “magnificent opportunity” was that in these places there would now be Western and Japanese business persons: Western goods, actions, and accounts of the

world could now be had more readily. And this, would make things better for are Churches.

### **Discussion**

The *Monthly Messenger's* writers were of the opinion that the Cing leaders' limited interest in Western ways was making things hard for the Cing Churches. To be a Churchgoer, one had to give up doing things that were common in the Cing Empire, like giving gifts to the spirits or one's own ancestors. This could make enemies, which put many persons off going to church. But these things were based on Chinese accounts of the world: if these could be done away with, or at least be made less important, then the Churches' growth would be faster. At first, it seemed to the writers that the War would likely make things worse: there would be more "anti-foreign feeling," and it would be harder to get the Cing leaders interested in Western ways. Worse still was the War's effect on Lǐ Hóng-jhang. He was one of the only Cing leaders working to make Western ways more common, and with him gone from power, this work would come to a stop.

But when it was clear that the Japanese would get the better of the Cing, the writers' views on the War's likely effects were changed. The *Monthly Messenger* now said that the War would be good for the Cing Empire's Churches. The Japanese had been making use of Western ways for years; the writers' hope was that this would make the Cing leaders at last give these ways a chance. The Cing leaders would do what they had to do to make the Empire strong again, and making greater use of Western ways was certain to be a part of this. Once Western ways were common, there would be fewer disadvantages to going to Church. And so it was that the *Monthly Messenger's* writers could say "a humbled China will be more open to receive the salvation of Jesus Christ!"

Even better, it seemed to them that the War had in the end only made Lǐ's position stronger. It seemed to the writers that

His real return to power, with increased influence in Pekin, would unquestionably mean more honesty in government, a frank abandonment

of hostility to western civilisation, and better days for the people — gains to China in which Christian missions would certainly share.

With his position and powers back, Lǐ could now go on with his work of making Western ways more common; even better, other leaders were now more likely to give their support to this work. Even the treaty Lǐ had made with the Japanese would be a help here: new parts of the Empire would be made open to the Japanese and their Western ways, and so the Churches in these places would now have better chances at getting persons interested in their teachings. From the *Monthly Messenger's* point of view, what had at first seemed a bad thing for the Churches was without doubt a good one. The War may have done great damage to the Cing Government and military, but it was a gift to the Churches.

### **THE CING CHURCHES' FUTURES IN THE *CHURCH NEWS***

As seen above, the *Monthly Messenger* had a number of discussions about the Cing-Japanese War's likely effect on the Cing Churches. But, the *Church News* had none at all, even of events which very likely would have an effect. For example, two event of great interest to the *Monthly Messenger's* writers were Lǐ Hóng-jhang's loss of power, and the conditions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The *Monthly Messenger's* writers said that the first would have a bad effect of the Cing Churches, and the second would have a good one. The *Church News* had accounts of these events too, but gave no opinion on their likely effect on the Churches. Likely, the views of the *Church News's* writers were much the same as the views given in the *Monthly Messenger*; but they kept these opinions out of the *Church News*, for the same reason that their accounts of the the Cing-Japanese War said nothing about the good qualities of the Japanese government or military. The *Church News's* writers were living in the Cing Empire, and would, it then seemed, be living there when the War was over. Saying good things about a country at war with the Empire would simply make trouble unnecessarily.

## Numbers

As noted above, the *Church News* said nothing openly about the Cing Churches' futures, and so there are no numbers to give here. But below is a discussion of what what the periodical did *not* give opinions about, and why this is interesting and important.

## The Works of Lǐ

Nowhere did the *Church News* say anything about the likely effects of the Cing-Japanese War on the future of the Cing Churches. But, again, from the writings in the *Monthly Messenger*, it is possible to get sense of their ideas about this future. And, again, it is interesting that certain of these gave no opinion these events which, in the view of their sister periodical, would likely have a great effect on the Churches of the Cing Empire. For example, as seen above, the *Monthly Messenger* saw Lǐ Hóng-jhang's loss of power as a very bad thing for the Cing Churches, but this is what it said about the event in the *Church News*:

The Emperor lately criticised and degraded Lǐ Hóng-jhang for running the War badly, having no strategy, wasting his soldiers' lives, and shaming the Empire.

Gìn-lái Lì Hōng-jiong hō Hōng-dê zêk-zoē gang-jip sī yīn-wī yi jiàn-hoāt bhū-bhó, sit-leh kè-cêk, ò-gao līm-diu bāi bêng, go--dieh gek-ka é sū.  
(115: 106)

Unlike the *Monthly Messenger*, the *Church News* says nothing about Lǐ's helping the missions, directly or otherwise; it says nothing about the truth of what is said about Lǐ, or the rightness of the Emperor's taking his power; and, most importantly, there are no guesses about the effects of Lǐ's loss of power on the Cing Churches. The writers of the *Church News* were surely conscious of what Lǐ had been doing to make Western ways more common in Tái-wan — as will be seen a little later, the missionaries were very interested in seeing them made even more so. True, Tái-wan was a long way from Jhí-lì, and the missionaries had likely seen little of Lǐ's work, but all the Church's mission fields were a long way from Jhí-lì, and the *Monthly Messenger* still said that Lǐ's loss of power would be

bad for them. It seemed very likely that the *Church News*' makers were of one mind with their England-based brothers and sisters on the matter of Lǐ's loss of power, but they put nothing of this opinion into their Táiwanese periodical. The *Church News* simply says what the Emperor had done, and why, letting the readers make up their own minds about the rightness of his actions, and their likely outcome.

Another example is the two periodicals' different accounts of Lǐ getting his power and position back. As noted, the *Monthly Messenger* said that this would have a very good effect on the Cing Church's future. Their hope was that Lǐ, a friend of "western civilisation" even before the War, would now be in a position to make its ways even more common in the Empire, which would be good for the Churches there. The *Church News*' writers likely had the same hope, but of Lǐ's coming back to power, the Tái-wan periodical said only this:

The Cing Empire has looked at the situation, and realised that they have no choice but to sue for peace; and so they have sent Lǐ Hóng-jhang to the Japanese Empire to negotiate.

Diong-gēk koa<sup>n</sup> gao jit-hē sè-bhīn, but-dek-pūt siū<sup>n</sup> ài-bhêh hé; so-yì ce Lì Hōng-jiong goê-kì Rit-bùn gēk gāp yin ghi-hé. (119: 9)

This is to some degree a friendly statement — the Cing government would not send a useless man to be their last hope — but in comparison with the *Monthly Messenger*'s account of Lǐ's comeback, it says very little. Nothing is said of Lǐ's interest in Western ways, or his attempts to make them more common in the Cing Empire; nothing is said about the connection between the commonness of Western ways and the growth of the Churches; and nothing is said about the likely effect on the Cing Church of Lǐ's getting his power back. The *Church News*'s writers may, and likely did, have the same hopes for the Cing Empire after the War as the *Monthly Messenger*'s writers did — in fact, as will be seen later, William Campbell said as much in the English periodical — but they did not give this opinions in the *Church News*. There, they simply gave the facts, and let readers make their own decisions about the future.

## The Treaty of Shimonoseki

Another place where the *Church News*' not giving an opinion is interesting is its accounts of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. As seen above, the *Monthly Messenger* was of the opinion that the Treaty of Shimonoseki would be a very good thing for are the Cing Churches. In the British periodical's view, one of the Treaty's best points was Article 6, which made open new cities to Japanese business: this, in the view of the *Monthly Messenger*'s writers, would make Western ways more common in those cities, which would be good for the Churches there. One account of the Treaty in the *Monthly Messenger*, based on a missionary's speech to the Presbyterian Church of England's General Assembly, said of the new condition made by the article, "It was a vast emergency of opportunity. Not only the gates, but even the highways, of China had been thrown open" (591: 137–138). But when the *Church News*' first took note of the treaty in May, their account of it ways this:

The articles of the treaty have not yet been released to the people. However, we have heard that they are more or less as follows:—

1. Tái-wan will be ceded to the Japanese Empire.
2. A portion of Liáo-dong, which includes the base at Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, will be ceded to the Japanese Empire too.
3. The Japanese Empire will be paid 2,000,000 niu-ghín, which is approximately 3,000,000 ghín.

The treaty has other articles, but we need not print them here. Hē-yek é diāo-koà<sup>n</sup> yao-bhoē tuán hō bēh-sē<sup>n</sup> zai. Zong-sī jiāo láng gòng sī cīn-ciū<sup>n</sup> ê-dē jiāh-é:—

1. Dāi-wán diē hō Rīt-bùn.
2. Liāo-dang diē goāh jīt-dē hō yin, jiōng-diong Lu-sun-kào é pao-dái diē hō yin.
3. Diē boé yin nīng bhān niù ghín (2,0000,0000 niú), jiu-sī cā-but-dē sa<sup>n</sup> bhān ghín.

Lêng-ghoā yā wū gui-nā diāo, zong-sī dijia m-bhiàn gi. (121: 26)

Of the Treaty's eleven articles, this translation gives only Article 5, and part of Article 2. That these are given is not a surprise: they would naturally have been of great interest to the readers of the *Church News*. What is surprising, and interesting, is that that *Church News* says nothing at all about the article of

greatest interest to the *Monthly Messenger*: Article 6. There is no mention of the new Treaty Ports, and nothing is said about the new chances for Japanese and Western businesses in Cing Empire. In the *Monthly Messenger*, these changes were seen as likely to have very important — and very good — effects on the Cing Churches, but the *Church News* not only says nothing about these effects, it says nothing about the Articles at all.

The next month, the *Church News* at last got around to giving a more complete translation of the Treaty. But before the translation was this note:

We have already published some of the conditions from the treaty in our periodical. Here we have not translated the whole thing, but only summarised each condition.

Diōng-gek sò līp ế hē-yēk hiah-ế diāo-koà<sup>n</sup> wū yin dī ghòan ế Sīn-būn-be; da<sup>n</sup> m-biàn long-zòng hoan-êk, gān-day diah-cut dāk-diáo ế daj-liek lái yin dī ê-dê. (122: 46)

The summarised Article VI said this:

6. All of this article has to do with business, so there is no need to give a translation. It opens four places to business: Sha-shiè in Hú-běi, Chóng-cìng in Sì-chuan, Su-jhou in Jiang-su, and Háng-jhou in Jhè-jiang. Jit-koà<sup>n</sup> lòng sī gong-kì ze sēng-lì ế sū, m-bhiàn huān-êk. Jiōng-diōng wū gē siat 4 wī tang ze tōng-siong ế zo-gai. Jiu-si Ō-back ế Sā-cī, Sù-cuān ế Diōng-kêng, Gāng-so ế Sō-jiū, Jiāt-gang ế Hāng-jiū. (122: 46).

This was hardly the *Monthly Messenger*'s "a vast emergency of opportunity." The *Church News* gives only the simplest translation of the article. It says nothing about the sort of business that will now be possible there, nothing about the opening of the rivers, it does not even say that the Treaty, on paper, only makes the cities open to Japanese businesses.<sup>1</sup> The *Church News*' writers were lifelong missionaries, whose language and education were much the same as the makers of the *Monthly Messenger*: they would likely have had very much the same idea about the effect of the Treaty on the future of the Cing Churches. But, in the periodical they say nothing at all about this. In fact, they go so far as to not give a

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<sup>1</sup> In fact, the "most favoured nation" clauses of the Western countries treaties with the Cing made the cities open to them too.

complete translation of the Article at all, saying that it “has to do with business, so there is no need to give a translation.” The *Church News* was a Church periodical made by and for Churchgoers, but it was notably quiet about about the effects of the Cing-Japanese War on the Cing Churches.

### **Discussion**

The *Monthly Messenger* was from the start interested in the Cing-Japanese War’s likely effect on the Cing Churches. But about these effects, the *Church News* said nothing. Their different ways of writing about the War come through clearly in their accounts of two events said to be greatly important to the development of the Cing Churches — Lǐ Hóng-jhang’s loss of power, and the Treaty of Shimonoseki. When some of Lǐ’s powers were taken, the *Monthly Messenger*’s writers were not happy at all, and said that this development would have a bad effect on the Churches. But their account of Lǐ’s loss of power said nothing about the likely effect on the Churches, only that he had been “criticized and degraded for his management of the War by the Emperor” (115: 106). And when the Treaty of Shimonoseki came out, the *Monthly Messenger* said that Article 6 was “a vast emergency of opportunity” for the Cing Churches and missions. The *Church News*’ discussion of the Treaty said nothing of this “opportunity”: in fact, the writers did not even give a complete translation of it, saying only that “All of this article has to do with business, so there is no need to give a translation” (122: 46).

The *Monthly Messenger*’s and *Church News*’ writers made use of the same languages and accounts of the world. Very likely, the two groups of writers had much the same opinions on the likely effects of this events. In fact, as seen, some of the *Church News*’ writers sent material to the *Monthly Messenger* too, and in this material their opinions on the War are little different from the writers in England. But in the *Church News* there is no discussion of the Cing-Japanese War’s likely effects on the Churches in the Cing Empire. In a sense, this is not a surprise. As was seen in Chapter 4, the *Church News*’ writers were slow to say anything about the likely end of the Cing-Japanese War. And as was seen in Chapter 5, their

accounts of the Japanese government and military in the War had far fewer opinions than the accounts in the *Monthly Messenger*.

Likely, it was for much the same reasons as these that the *Church News* said nothing about the relations between event in the War and the future of the Cing Churches. The makers of the *Church News* were workers for the Presbyterian Church of England, but they were Churchgoers and leaders at the Presbyterian Church of Tái-wan too. To the best of their knowledge, they would be living and working in the Cing Empire for many more years. Giving opinions on Cing politics, like Lí's loss of power, was unwise: who could say what opinions the Cing leaders in Tái-wan had of Lí? Still more unwise would have been saying that Cing Empire's loss to the Japanese was, in fact, a good thing for the Churches. So the writers kept their peace. But, they would not have to do so for long.

### **THE TÁIWANESE CHURCH'S FUTURE IN THE *MONTHLY MESSENGER***

From the start, the *Monthly Messenger* had great hopes for the future of the Presbyterian Church of Tái-wan under Japanese rule. While the outcome of the Cing-Japanese War might make the Cing leaders take a greater interest in Western ways, there was no way to be sure that this would take place. But in Tái-wan, the Japanese would be the government, and would surely use their power to make Western ways more common. This, in the eyes of the *Monthly Messenger*, would be good for the Churches of Tái-wan: there would more interest in them, and fewer things in the way of persons going to church.

There was another reason too for the writers' hopes. In the past, a number of Cing leaders in Tái-wan had been unfriendly to the Church: Church leaders, missionaries, and Churchgoers had come under attack; there had even been a number of deaths. The writers were certain that it would not be so under the rule of the Japanese. And so, in the *Monthly Messenger's* accounts of the Japanese-Táiwaneese War were many writings, from missionaries and writers in

England, giving their views on how the Church's future in a Japanese-controlled Tái-wan would be bright.

### Numbers

The chart below gives the *Monthly Messenger's* opinions on the Táiwanese Churches futures in view of the Táiwanese-Japanese War. As can be seen, there is not much to these: from start to end, the periodical said that the Japanese getting the better of the Táiwanese Republic ("BTR FUT") would be good for the Táiwanese Churches. The numbers of such writings, and the amount of space they took up, can be seen below.

<b>MONTHLY MESSENGER — JAPANESES-TÁIWANESE WAR</b>		
<b>BTR FUT</b>	<b>LINS</b>	<b>PER</b>
591: 153–154	57	6.16%
592: 158	42	4.54%
594: 198	34	3.67%
594: 201	47	5.08%
598: 12	32	3.46%
<b>TOTAL: 5</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>22.89%</b>

Writings giving an opinion on the Churches' futures were took up about one fifth of the space that the *Monthly Messenger* gave to writings about the Japanese-Táiwanese War. The reasons that they gave these opinions have a connection with their views on the Chinese and Japanese in general. The details of these are given below.

### Developing the island

Even before the Treaty of Shimonoseki was made public, the *Monthly Messenger's* writers said the Japanese might take control of Tái-wan. They were not unhappy about this, and saw it as likely to be a help to their mission there. One piece of writing said, "It is all but certain . . . that the Japanese will take possession of

Formosa as a material guarantee, if not as an actual possession. But, excepting in the first disturbance, that ought not to be unfavourable to our Missions” (589: 82). When the treaty was at last made public, the *Monthly Messenger*’s writers took great pleasure in it. Their thoughts on its effects in the Cing Empire were seen in an earlier section, but their hopes for its effects in Tái-wan were even higher.

One piece of writing, from a missionary in Tái-wan, said

Japanese rule will not be unfavourable to the progress of Christian work. The Government will be just and firm, and friendly to foreigners. The great natural resources of the island will be rapidly developed. The intelligence of the people will be quickened. The new conditions will further the spread of the Gospel. (591: 127-128)

This is very in keeping with their thoughts on the relations between the commonness of the Western ways and the growth of the Churches. The writer is not saying that the Japanese will give their support to the Church, only that they will make “new conditions” in which the Church will be better able to do its work. What the government *will* do is make Western ways more common: there will be laws like a Western country, so “The government will be just and firm”; there will be logging, mining, and farming organisations like those in Western countries, so “The great natural resources . . . will be rapidly developed”; and there will be schools teaching Western accounts of the world, so “The intelligence of the people will be quickened.”

It was not only missionaries then in Tái-wan who were of this opinion. James Maxwell, the Church’s first missionary to Tái-wan, was by 1895 back in England overseeing his own periodical, *Medical Missions*. Into this he put his thoughts on the future of his old Mission, and an account of these was given in the *Monthly Messenger*:

Dr. Maxwell (in *Medical Missions*) shares the belief of the missionaries now on the field, that Japanese rule will result in the rapid development of the great natural resources of Formosa, and the bettering of the condition of the people, and will, at any rate, not be unfriendly to Christian Missions. If Japan prohibits the importation of opium in its new province, as it does at home, it will, of course, immensely benefit the

island, and remove a great barrier to the progress of the gospel. (592: 153-154).

Again, there is hope for the development of the island's "great natural resources," and for the "bettering of the condition of the people," at least some part of which was making schools for Western ideas. The hope for laws on opium are a good example of the connection between Cing ways of living and the slow growth of the Churches. Opium use was then common in the Cing Empire: in some accounts, as many as ten percent of Cing persons made use of it. But the Presbyterian Church in Tái-wan was completely against its use. In their eyes, would-be Churchgoers had to make a decision between opium and the Church, and too many were making the wrong decision. The Japanese may have had their own reasons for doing away with opium use, but the new laws, by taking away this "great barrier," would be a great help to the Church.

Doing away with opium was not the only way that the new Japanese laws could make conditions better for the Church. George Ede, in the same piece of writing, gave still another hope for the future:

Best of all, Christianity will be acknowledged. Sunday will in Government establishments be observed as a day of rest, open violent persecution will be stopped, and finally, official recognition may be given to Mission work and institutions. Much of this may be external Christianity, but let us hope that concurrently with the outward form there may also by Divine influence spring up the inward grace which shall ere long manifest itself in the true righteousness which alone exalteth a nation. (592: 158)

This is another way in which the Church's way of living, being based on their account of the world, was very different from that of the Cing. The Church in Tái-wan made its Churchgoers keep the Sabbath: they could do nothing on Sunday that would make them money. And this was the cause of some trouble to would-be Churchgoers: not working on the Sabbath seemed foolish to many, and to the very poor could even be a dangerous decision. It made sense once they had taken on the Church's account of the world, but the missionaries or Evangelists might make them keep the Sabbath well before they had got to that level of

“knowledge.” Under the Japanese, things would be different, government workers would get the Sabbath, as they did in Japan, and this would make it simpler to get others to keep it too. If the Japanese did not make Sunday a day of rest for the whole country, then in this, as in so many other things, they would at least be an example for them.

### **Letting the missionaries do their work**

As seen above, one of George Ede’s hopes was that “open violent persecution will be stopped.” He was far from the only writer with that hope. Likely, nearly all of them had in mind the old Cing government of Tái-wan, which had at times been very unfriendly to the Church. In theory, the Cing government could do nothing to a missionary who kept within the law, and little to one who went outside it. But even so, over the years a number of Cing government leaders in Tái-wan had done their best to make the Church go away. For example, James Maxwell, when hoping for the “bettering of the condition of the people” may have had in mind an experience from his missionary days, when there was for a short while open war on the Church:

From a houses in which he took shelter the mob burst in the door, pulled our poor brother out, dragged him a considerable distance along the street, and then, near a tree beside which I have several times stood to speak, and where Cheng-hong [Zng Cēng-hong] doubtless has also stood to read the gospel, they stoned him the stones and beat him with clubs till he died. Their brutality did not even end with his death. One of them with a knife cutting open the poor crushed body. His remains were thrown into a ditch close by, and carried in a bag to the seashore, and there sunk in the sea. (qtd. in Johnston 175)

Maxwell had gone to the Cing government about this, but they had done nothing. Only after the British Royal Navy had taken control of Ān-bēng — saying said that they would open fire on Dāi-lám, the seat of the government — did the Cing put a stop to the attacks.

Things were never again that bad, but to the end of the Cing period, the missionaries were not completely safe. For example, William Campbell, in his

book, *Sketches from Formosa*, gave an account of coming under attack while journeying in the countryside. He went to bed in an Evangelist's house, only to be made awake by the discovery that the house was on fire, and a group of armed men were waiting outside for him:

The place now began to fill with smoke, the dry grass roofing being on fire all around, and the chapel itself enveloped in flames. My own little bedroom was crumbling to ashes, and continually the heated air in the blazing bamboos would become expanded and burst like the report of so many pistols. . . . There was nothing save fire and smoke all over the chapel, and there seemed something fiendish in the determination of that crowd as they stood awaiting my exit with uplifted knives and spears. I once more rushed inside and sorely injured my hand and bare feet in trying to break a way of escape from the back; but, while thus engaged, someone smashed the bars of the window-opening, and cast in a burning torch, which began to set the loose straw of the bed on fire.

It was at this point I quite gave it up, groaned out a prayer that God would surely be near me, and, for the last time, dashed out, expecting nothing but to be stabbed by those glittering spears. (98)

In the end, Campbell got away from his attackers, and made his way to the nearest Cing government representative — who did nothing.

It may have been, at least in part, the memory of that experience that made Campbell say to a group of Churchgoers in London: “Missionaries in Japan were very hopeful as to the work there, and all that was desired in Formosa was that the Japanese should extend to the missionaries there the same privileges that they had extended to the missionaries on the mainland of Japan” (591: 137-138). Campbell, whose who had lately been to the Japanese Empire — see Chapter 5 — was very conscious of the fact that in the nearly thirty years missionaries had been working in the Empire, there had been only a small number of attacks on them, and each time the Japanese government had seen that the Churches got “justice.”

This fact was on the minds of the Church leaders too. In the last days of the Táiwanese Republic, as the Japanese were making ready to take Dāi-lám, a piece of writing in the *Monthly Messenger* gave this message from Hugh Matheson,

the old friend of the Japanese Prime Minister: “I have the highest authority for saying that Admiral Kabiya [Kabayama Sukenori], the High Officer sent from Tokio, and the appointed Resident minister, Mr. Midzuno [Mizuno Jun], have been instructed by their Government to devote their first attention to the welfare of the foreign residents and missionaries” (594: 198).

### **Discussion**

Even before the Treaty of Shimonoseki was made public, the *Monthly Messenger’s* writers had an idea that the Japanese would take control of Tái-wan. And even at this time, they were happy about it. There were two reasons: first, if the Japanese had control of Tái-wan, they would see to the “development” of the island, which would be good for the growth of the Church; second, a Japanese government would be “not unfriendly” to the Presbyterian Church, so the missionaries would be able to do their work more safely.

By “development,” the writers had in mind the making common of Western ways of thought and living. As was seen in Chapter 5, the *Monthly Messenger’s* writers had the idea that certain Chinese ways of living, and the trouble with giving them up, were making it harder to get Cing persons interested in the Church. The writers’ hope was that the Japanese would put in place laws more like those of Western countries, which would do away completely with some of these things, such as opium use. At the same time, the Japanese government’s use of Western science, medicine, geography, and so on would make these more common in Tái-wan, and make less common their Chinese counterparts. In short, the writers were sure that if the Japanese made Western ways more common in Tái-wan, the growth of the Church would be quicker. Hugh Matheson, of the Church’s Foreign Missions Committee, made the connection very clear for his readers: “The Government will be just and firm, and friendly to foreigners. The great natural resources of the island will be rapidly developed. The intelligence of the people will be quickened. The new conditions will further the spread of the Gospel” (*Monthly Messenger* 591: 127–128).

By “not unfriendly,” the writers had in mind the safekeeping of missionaries and Churchgoers. In the thirty years that the Church had been on the island, it had come under attack a number of times: Churches had been damaged; money had been lost; there had even been some deaths. In theory, the Cing government leaders had, by law, to keep the Church safe — but many did nothing of the sort. In fact, some of the attacks had been made with the knowledge of, or even on the orders of, Cing leaders. The Japanese government was different: in the same period of time, the Churches in the Japanese islands had been much safer, the Japanese government having gone to some lengths to keep them so. The writers in England and Tái-wan were well aware of this, and it was their hope that the Japanese government would keep the Presbyterian Church of Tái-wan safe too. It was for a level of safeness like the missionaries in Japan that William Campbell was hoping when he said: “all that was desired in Formosa was that the Japanese should extend to the missionaries there *the same privileges* that they had extended to the missionaries on the mainland of Japan” (*Monthly Messenger* 591: 137–138; emphasis mine).

### **THE TÁIWANESE CHURCH’S FUTURE IN THE *CHURCH NEWS***

The *Church News*’ writing about Tái-wan’s future was different from the writing in the *Monthly Messenger*. For one thing, accounts of the future were a smaller part of the periodical’s war writing. For another, the missionaries’ pleasure at the thought of a Japanese-controlled Tái-wan came through but softly, at least in comparison with the loud and frequent voice it was given in the English periodical. In the *Monthly Messenger*, the writers said that they were hoping for a Tái-wan in which Western ways were more common, and the government was a friend of the Church. In the *Church News*, they did not say these things openly, but got their point across even so. They did this by making note of future changes that, it would have been clear to readers, would be good for the Church. And they gave a great amount of attention to the number of Churchgoers in the Japanese military, and the friendly relations between the Japanese Churches and the

government. The readers likely got the point — in the future, the island would be Japanese, and under the new government, there would be great changes which would likely be a better future for the Church.

### Numbers

Once again, the *Church News* openly gave no opinions on the likely future of the Táiwanese Churches if they came under Japanese control. But, the missionaries, whose opinions were seen in the last section, got their opinions across even so, by the use of quotations from others persons, and suggestions about what the Japanese could do for the Church. Below, there is discussion of the details of these opinions.

### Changes for the better

The makers of the *Church News*, the missionaries, were certain not only that Japan would take control of Tái-wan, but that this would be good for the Church. But for the most part, they kept these opinions out of the *Church News*. In fact, only one piece of writing in the *Church News* openly said anything at all about the Church's future:

no matter whether we end up with Japanese rule or self-rule, things will be changed, and never more as they once were. Some of us believe that the future holds better opportunities to preach the Gospel, and that the Church will quickly expand. Ask for God's protection, and that the Church might not encounter any obstacles, but rather experience good fortune. bé lūn bhēh gui Rīt-bùn koàn a-sī bhēh gā-dī liao-lì, dēk-gāk bhē-dīt tang yíu-goān cīn-ciū<sup>n</sup> za-zéng é koan-sīt, gēng-hòng wun-dang bhēh gē-wā<sup>n</sup>. Ghòan wū láng dēh òng-bhāng āo-lái wū gēh kāh hé gī-hoē tāng tuán dē-lì, gào-hoē kāh gìn kūi-kuāh. Dài-gē diēh giú Siong-dē jiàn-go, bhian-dit gào-hoē du-dieh zo-ghāi, ê dit doā, hēng-ōng é hēk-kì. (122: 37-38)

The first part of the writing, “no matter whether . . .” would have made it unclear to readers under whose rule there would be “better opportunities to preach the Gospel,” and under what conditions “the Church will quickly expand.” The readers were given hope for the future, but no idea about what that future

would be. Had they been readers of the *Monthly Messenger*, things would have been clearer. The “us” (“ghoàn”) in the writings is the missionaries: the Ê-mńg language has a different pronoun — “làn” — for groups made up of the speaker and the listener. In the English periodical the missionaries had been very open about their hope for the island: that Japan would put the island under its control, then make conditions in which the Church would be better able to do its work. But in the *Church News*, they kept this from readers, saying only that the future would — or at least could — be better, but saying nothing about the details of this future, or the reasons for its being so.

In fact, the missionaries never openly said in the *Church News* that Japanese rule would be good for the Church. But, as when giving opinions of the Táiwanese Republic’s leaders, they made this suggestion in at least one place. As seen above, one thing which the missionaries were certain the Japanese would do for Tái-wan was see to its “development.” In a piece of writing for the *Monthly Messenger*, George Ede gave the details of his hopes: “Personally I think the change will be for the better. Good roads will be made, railways constructed, rivers and harbours dredged, factories erected, fresh methods of agriculture introduced” (592: 158). In the *Church News*, the missionaries were not quite so open about this hope; but they still got across to readers that if the Japanese had control of the island, they would make its transportation better:

A Japanese officer tells me that when they control southern Tái-wan, they will immediately begin building a railway to connect the north and the south. This will be a great boon to our church, for I will be able to go to you, and you to come to me, much more quickly.

Japan [sic] ế Doa-goan<sup>n</sup> wū gā goà yin nā kị Dāi-lám goàn so-zāi nā ān-zēng,  
yin sūi-sī bhēh cōng he-yān-cia, bhēh ho Dāi-wán Dāi-bak Dāi-lám ế lo wē  
tong. Zē sī làn gao-hoe ế doā lo- ēng, nā sī lìn ai lái, ghuàn kị jiū jin koai.  
(128: 108–109).

The readers could not have been unconscious of what a great help such a railway would be to the Church. Overland transportation in nineteenth-century Tái-wan was not well developed at all: roads were poorly developed, the rivers unusable, bandits were widespread; going between cities by sea was often quicker than

taking the shorter overland road (DeGlopper 69–70). But this was not possible for the evangelists and missionaries. There were Churches everywhere, and it was it was very frequently necessary for them to go into the countryside and mountains. This had to be done on foot, and over the bad roads. In fact, when the Church had its yearly meeting, the *Church News* had to make the Evangelists conscious of this many months before the day, so that they could get to Dāi-lám in time. But with a railway, and the better roads that the Japanese were sure to make, things would be different. The evangelists and missionaries could make their rounds more quickly and in greater safety. And the Church could have meetings more frequently. The *Church News* was not openly saying that the Japanese would make conditions better for the Church's work, but the readers likely got the suggestion.

### **Churchgoers among the Japanese leaders**

The suggestion that the Church would have a better future under the Japanese was made in other ways too. For example, in places the *Church News* made the suggestion that the Japanese were friends of the Churches in a way that the Cing had not been. Around August, the *Church News* made note of something that had taken place a little before the Cing-Japanese War, and which seemed a good sign for the island's future:

When the Japanese soldiers were preparing for war, the Bible Society prepared Gospels of John for them to read. These were very small books, which were suited for travellers; each was about three cun long, and well printed. They sent out around 10,000 copies. The officers were extremely pleased, and all willing to pass the books along to the men to read. Hīt-sí Rīt-bùn bēng bhēh cūt-jīan, hiāh-é Sèng-cēh-hoê wū bì-bān jīt-bùn Yek-hān Hek-yīm-duān bhēh sang yin koa<sup>n</sup>. Hīt-bùn jīn sè-bùn, du-happy cut-ghoā láng é lo-ēng, dng 2 cun 3, koāh cùn-lak, rī yā bhéng; wū sang kui-nā bhān bìn. Doa-koa<sup>n</sup> yā jin hoā<sup>n</sup>-hì lòng kām-goān ho bēng-dēng siu kī koa<sup>n</sup>. (124: 59-60)

A Church's giving Bibles or part of Bibles to the Japanese military was not necessarily interesting or unusual. The Cing Churches often did things like this:

in fact, before the War the Presbyterian Church in Tái-wan itself had a part in giving a Bible to the “Dowager Empress” (“Huáng-tài-hòu”) of the Cing Empire (*Church News* 115: 108). What was unusual was the Japanese military’s answer: “The officers were extremely pleased, and very willing to pass the books along to the men to read.” This was something very unlikely to take place in the Cing Empire, where, as seen in the accounts of Wylie’s death and Campbell’s near-death experience, the government and military at best had nothing to do with the missions, and at worst were behind attacks on them. The *Church News* did not say that the Táiwanese Church would be better off under a government whose military was happy to get Bibles from Churches, but the readers must have given this some thought.

And it was not only the Japanese government that was friendly to the Churches. After giving an account of the taking of Dāi-lám, the *Church News* gave readers the news that they now had a new group of brothers and sisters:

The General Assembly of the Japanese Presbyterian Church knows that Japan now controls Tái-wan, and has dispatched two of their Japanese pastors to Tái-wan to investigate, and to see how they can be of use here. When they learned that our General Assembly was convening, they hoped to come along so that they could meet with us and talk. We have written to tell them about it, and have invited them to join in us in Dāi-lām-hù. And so, we urge you, Elders and others, to attend the meeting.

Rīt-bùn Diu<sup>n</sup>-le-gào é Dài-hoē yi-gēng zai Dāi-wán siek Rīt-bùn guàn, jiū tek-diōng yin bun-dē é Bek-sū nng lán dieh lái Dāi-wán sún koa<sup>n</sup> hoē-hēk, hō yin ao-lái tang siat-hoāt li-ēk Dāi-wán. Yin nng lán tiā<sup>n</sup>-gi<sup>n</sup> gòng làn Dāi-wán-hu-siek é gào-hoē bhēh siāt Dài-hoē yin zia<sup>n</sup> siū<sup>n</sup> dieh hit-sí lái hù-hoē tang cam làn ze-hoē zu-jip gāo-boē. So-yì ghuàn deh-sia-poē tōng-di yin zai, nng-bhāng yin hit-diap ē lái Dāi-lām-hù. An-ni jiū ciā<sup>n</sup> diu<sup>n</sup>-lè zēng-láng yào-gìn dēk-kāk dieh lái hù-hoē. (129: 116–117)

This was something new — a Japanese Church going out of its way to give help to the Táiwanese Church. True, the *Church News* made sure that readers were conscious of other Churches in the Cing Empire, and the Presbyterian Churches of Shàn-tóu and Ê-mng had quite good relations with the Táiwanese Church. But this was something very different: even as the fighting was still going on between

the Japanese and Táiwanese, a Japanese Presbyterian Church was making an attempt to give support to a group of Táiwanese Churchgoers whom they had never even seen. The Táiwanese Church had been part of the Japanese Empire for only a short time, but it seemed that they had friends there, who would give them help with putting things back together after the War. The *Church News* did not outright say that this was a good thing. Likely, it seemed unnecessary to do so. When the war over, Tái-wan would be under the control of a government that would make it simpler for the Church to do its work. They had friends in government and military, and new friends in the Japanese Empire too. To the missionaries, the Church's future seemed bright indeed, and to the readers of the *Church News*, it must have seemed the same.

### **Discussion**

The *Church News*' editors, and many of its writers, were missionaries from the Presbyterian Church of England. These missionaries often sent writings to *Monthly Messenger*, in which their opinions on the future of Japanese-controlled Tái-wan can be seen. It would, in their view, would be a good future, for the Japanese would make Western ways more common in Tái-wan, and would be friends of the Church. But, this opinion was nowhere openly given in the *Church News*. In the Táiwanese periodical, there was only one piece of writing saying anything about the Church's future: this said it could be better, but was purposely unclear about who had control of Tái-wan in this better future.

The reason for the writers' not giving their opinions freely was likely the same one that kept them quiet in the Cing-Japanese War: it would be bad for the Church to say outright that a future under Japanese control would be a good future. Republic-supporting Churchgoers would not be happy about this, and all Churchgoers would be put in danger from their neighbours, or the government. It could even be the end of the periodical, which was based in Republican-controlled Dāi-lám, and could come under attack at any time.

So the missionaries kept quiet. But, even without openly saying as much, they were able to get across their hope that the Church's future in a Japanese-controlled Tái-wan would be bright. They did this in two ways. First, they put into the *Church News* writings saying what changes the Japanese would make to Tái-wan. That these changes were for the better, the missionaries themselves never said, but it was likely clear enough to the readers. And, when others said that these changes would be good for the Church, the missionaries were happy enough to put this in, as when Pastor Ghiám said of the Japanese designs to make a new railway, "this will be a great boon to our church, for I will be able to go to you, and you to come to me, much more quickly" (*Church News* 128: 109). Second, they put in accounts of Japanese persons' giving help to the Church. There were the accounts from the Bē<sup>n</sup>-ó<sup>n</sup> islands, seen in an earlier chapter, but accounts too from much farther away. There were, for example, stories about the Japanese Bible Society giving Bibles to the Japanese Army, and the officers' being happy to get them. There was even a story about the Japanese Presbyterian Church's sending its pastors to Tái-wan, "to see how they can be of use here" (*Church News* 129: 116–117). So, the missionaries did not themselves say that the Japanese would be friends of the Church, but readers of these stories would likely have got that idea.

In the *Church News* the missionaries were quiet about their hopes for the future, making no open statements about these. But, they were nonetheless able to make readers away of these hopes, and even to give them a push them in the same direction.

## 7 — Conclusion

### INTRODUCTION

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 have given the details of what the *Monthly Messenger* and *Church News* said in their accounts of the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanesé War. In this Chapter, the matter in the earlier chapters is gone through again, in order to make clear the relations between the different parts of this work, and why they are important.

### LANGUAGES AND VALUES

Many writers have put forward arguments saying that a person's experience of the world is shaped at least partly by their "languages" — the system of signs from which their accounts of the world are made — for example, maths, physics, arts, and so on. To the users of some group of languages, the theories go, their experience of the world seems to be of the world as it really is; in fact they have but one possible experience of it (Hall 26–35). These "constructionist" theories of language have been put to use making sense of nineteenth-century Westerners' writings about non-Western persons. Westerners, it is said, taking their own accounts of the world to be "true" and their own ways of living to be "right," necessarily saw non-Westerners' accounts of the world as "not-true" and the ways of living based on these as "not-right." And, in places where Westerners had power over non-Westerners, they were free not only to take their Western accounts of these persons as "knowledge," but to make the non-Westerners themselves take up this "knowledge" in place of their own (Barry 185–187).

This was certainly so in the Cing Empire, where Westerners generally took Chinese accounts of the world as "not-true," and many Chinese ways of living as strange, and even wrong (Mackerras 65). Some Westerners, notably the Protestant missionaries, took upon themselves the work of teaching the Cing about Western ways. For one thing, teaching about the Church's accounts of the world was their very reason for being in the Cing Empire. For another, in the view of some

missionaries the Churches could never do well till Western ideas in general — medicine, physics, political theory, and so on — took the places of Chinese ideas (Bays 67–73). To this end many Cing churches and missions put out periodicals, at least in part as a tool for teaching the Cing about Western accounts of the world.

The Cing quickly made their own periodicals too, from which Cing readers could get accounts of news and Western ways without the Church-matter in the missionary periodicals. These periodicals were popular, and some Cing leaders made good use of them (Zhang, chap. 2); but they still got to only a small part of the Empire. No more than three to five percent of Cing persons had enough education to make sense of the periodicals (Ramsey 104–106), and of the ones who could make sense of them, the greater part saw Western accounts of the world as “not-true” and Western ways of living as “not-right” (Kuo and Liu 166–176). And, unlike in other parts of the world, Westerners did not have enough power over the Cing Empire to make the Cing take up these ideas by force.

Things were different in the Japanese Empire. Westerners took the Japanese accounts of the world as “not-true” too, but had a somewhat better opinion of Japanese ways of living, at least in comparison with the Cing. They were, it seemed, nearer to Western ways, and so “righter” than Cing ways (Lehmann 45–46). What was more, unlike the Cing government, the Japanese government was very interested in Western accounts of the world, and in the military technology that these made possible. So while the Cing leaders went on using their old Chinese accounts of the world, the Japanese sent their young men to the West to get a better knowledge of the theories of Western science and politics, and made schools in the Japanese Empire for building greater knowledge of these more generally. Based on this knowledge, the Japanese remade their government and military too, to be more like those in the West (Beasley, *Rise* 84–101). And in view of these changes, Westerners’ opinions of the Japanese got better and better.

## WRITINGS ABOUT THE WARS

Westerners had a chance to make a comparison of the two countries' developments in 1894, when the Cing and Japanese Empires went to war for control of the nearby Joseon Kingdom. The Japanese military quickly took control of the Kingdom, and then took the War into the Cing Empire itself. By the start of 1895, the Japanese were in a position to take over the Cing capital, and the Cing government had to make a request for peace. The War was ended by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which, among other things, gave control of the Cing province of Tái-wan over to the Japanese Empire. But before the Japanese could take the island, the Táiwanese made a new government, the "Táiwanese Republic" and in May of 1895 made a declaration of independence from the two Empires. They were not free for long though. The Japanese sent their military to the island, and there was fighting between Empire and Republic till the end of the year, when the Japanese at last got complete control of Tái-wan.

The Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War were of great interest to many Westerners, and there was a great amount of writing about the Wars in the Western newspapers and other periodicals. As other writers have said, the degree to which the two sides made use of Western ways and accounts of the world had a great effect on what was said about them in this writing. In general, Western periodicals had a very positive opinion of the Japanese. For one thing, the Japanese military had done very well against the seemingly much greater-sized Cing army.<sup>1</sup> For another, it was somewhat like a Western military in its organisation and way of fighting, and so seemed to them the "righter" of the two. In comparison, the Western periodicals gave a very negative opinion of the Cing. The Cing military had given up the great advantages it had at the start of the War, and while it had some Western weapons, the Cing military's organisation and way of fighting — or, more often, of not fighting — was, to the Western writers, strange and "not-right."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In fact, the two sides' armies were about the same size, but few Westerners were conscious of this at the time (Fung 1026–1029).

<sup>2</sup> Quite a number of writers have made the argument. For examples, see Dorwart, Hough, and Paine.

The Qing periodicals took the opposite position in nearly all matters about the War. Qing persons, if they had any knowledge of the Japanese at all, saw them as lesser persons, whose accounts of the world and ways of living had value only to the degree that they were like Chinese ways. From the point of view of the Qing languages, the Japanese government's taking on Western accounts of the world had only made their position worse in comparison to the Qing (Paine 99-100). What was more, the Japanese attempt to get more control over the Joseon Kingdom was clearly "not-right," and the Qing military was fighting to put the world back in order. And so, in their accounts of the War, the Qing periodicals gave a very negative opinion of the Japanese military and government, and a very positive opinion of their own forces.

The trouble was, the Japanese forces kept getting the better of the Qing in battle. Sometimes the Qing periodicals simply said the opposite, but when they did give news of Qing losses, they often gave some reason that getting the better of the Japanese was not then possible for the Qing — such as the Japanese Army's having far greater numbers. Even when the Qing military had clearly been overcome, the greater part of Qing periodicals said that the reason was their not being good enough examples of the Chinese ways of war and government; nothing was said about the advantages of Western ways (Tsai 148-161).

To date, there has been some work on Western and Qing periodicals' accounts of the Qing-Japanese War and Japanese-Taiwanese War: the above overviews are based on these. But, these writers have given their attention chiefly to the greatest-sized periodicals in different countries, periodicals whose chief purpose was to give accounts of events around the Qing Empire and the world. So, for example, Sarah Paine's *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895* takes account of only *The Pall Mall Gazette* and *The Times* in the U.K., and only the *New York Times* and the *World* in the U.S. As for accounts of the Qing Empire's periodicals, Chén Jhōng-chún's "Research into Newspaper and Public Opinion on the 1895 Resistance to the Cession of Tái-wan" ("Bào-kan Yú-lùn yǔ Yǐ-wéi Fǎn Ge-Tái Dòu-jhēng Yán-jiù") takes account of the *Shen-bào*, the most important

newspaper in Shàng-hǎi; and Lǐ Jin-ciáng's "Hong Kong's Response to the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)" ("Jiá-wǔ Jhàn-jheng Shií-ci [1894-1895] Siang-gǎng dē Fǎn-yìng"; square brackets in original), takes account of *The Chinese Mail* ("Huà-zì Rhì-bào"), one of Siang-gǎng's important newspapers.

But, there were many other sorts of periodicals being made in the Cing Empire and the West. As noted, many Cing Churches and missions made periodicals for the purpose of teaching Cing persons about Western accounts of the world. But, some of these gave news too, and likely all that did had at least some accounts of the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War. Nearly all Cing Churches had relations with Churches and mission organisations in the West, which put out their own periodicals. These Western Church and missionary periodicals were chiefly interested in news from the mission field, and other church matters, but the Cing-Japanese War was important enough that many of the Western Church and missionary periodicals had accounts of it too.

While some attention has been given to the history and purposes of missionaries periodicals, nothing has been said about the accounts of the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War in these smaller, special-purpose periodicals. As such, this work makes an addition to both bodies of work by taking account of what was said about the War in two missionary periodicals — the Presbyterian Church of England's *Monthly Messenger and Gospel in China* and the Presbyterian Church in Southern Tái-wan's *Dāi-lám Capital Church News*.

The reason for taking account of these two periodicals is that they had a number of writers in common. The Presbyterian Church in Southern Tái-wan had got its start with the help of missionaries from the Presbyterian Church of England, and in 1894 the English Church's missionaries still had charge of the *Church News*, for which they, not the Táiwanese, did most of the writing. At the same time, the missionaries regularly sent writings to the Presbyterian Church of England, and from these the *Monthly Messenger's* editor made its accounts of the

mission in Tái-wan. As such, the two periodicals' accounts of the War were from the missionaries' point of view.

The two periodicals were chiefly interested in Church matters: they gave news of past and future Church and mission events — for the Táiwanese Church had its own mission, to the Bē<sup>n</sup>-ó<sup>n</sup> Islands — accounts of important events from the churches history, and simple teaching in theology. But, they sometimes gave accounts too of events which had, on the face of it, little connection to the Churches. The Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War were such events. So, in these two periodicals is a chance not only to see how a Western and Cing Church periodical's accounts of the War were different from other periodicals in their countries, but also to see how the two periodicals' accounts of the War, many of which came from the same writers, were different from each other.

### AMOUNTS OF WRITING ABOUT THE WARS

The first way in which the *Monthly Messenger's* and *Church News's* accounts of the Wars were different, is that the two periodicals had different amounts of writing about the Wars. In Chapter 3, the measurements of their writings sizes were taken by putting the periodicals' War-time writings into two groups, "about the War" and "not about the War" and making a comparison of the number of lines of writing "about the War," with the greatest possible number of lines of writing in the periodical.<sup>3</sup> From these measurements, it was seen that writing about the Cing-Japanese War took up 6.49 percent of the 10 issues of the *Church News* that came out at the time of the War, but only 3.92 percent of the 10 issues of the *Monthly Messenger* that came out in the same time.<sup>4</sup> Writing about the

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<sup>3</sup> A piece of writing may be "about the War" in one or more of these ways: (1) having a name for one or more of the Wars, "Mr. Shaw remarked that the policy of England in the matter had been one of strict and almost severe neutrality" (*Monthly Messenger* 591: 137–138; emphasis mine); (2) having an account of actions undertaken to make the War's end nearer, "several hundred people gave a great shout, rushed the Japanese, and began fighting them" ("bēh-sên dān-lé hoāh-hiu, wū gui-nā bāh-láng dī hīd-tāh gap yin san tái"; *Church News* 128: 109); (3) having an account of a state which came into being through the War, "At present rice is very expensive in Hu-siá" ("Hian-sí dī Hu-siá" bhì jin gui"; *Church News* 127: 93).

<sup>4</sup> Account was taken only of the writings in issues that were made, partly or completely, at the time the Wars were taking place. For the Cing-Japanese War, this is 25 Jul. 1894 to 08 May 1895. For the Japanese-Táiwanese War, it is 23 Jun. 1895 to 21 Oct. 1895.

Japanese-Táiwānese War took up 29.34 percent of the 8 issues of the *Church News* made at the time, or shortly after, the War, and 5.93 percent of the 5 issues of the *Monthly Messenger* that came out in that time.

Likely, the reason for these different amounts of writings is the different relations of the two periodicals' readers to the Wars. The readers of the *Monthly Messenger* were far from the fighting of the Cing-Japanese War, which was having little effect on them besides. What was more, many other periodicals in the U.K. had accounts of the War. The *Monthly Messenger's* readers had many other ways of getting news about it, and the Church periodical likely could not get news to them as quickly as the greater-sized U.K. periodicals, like the *Times*. Things were only a little different when the Japanese-Táiwānese War was taking place. The readers were still safely far from the fighting, and there were still accounts of it in the U.K. newspapers, but the War was having a greater effect on the missions, and the missionaries were sending in accounts from Tái-wan itself; so the *Monthly Messenger* gave more space to news of the Japanese-Táiwānese War, but not much more.

The readers of the *Church News* were in a somewhat different position with respect to the Cing-Japanese War. It was taking place a long way from them, and at the start seemed unlikely to have any effect on Tái-wan. But even so, it was a war between their country and an enemy — something that was naturally of greater interest to the Táiwānese. And they had few other ways of getting news of the War: very few churchgoers — maybe as few as one percent — were able to make sense of the “Literary Chinese” (“wén-yán-wén”) in which most of the Cing Empire's other periodicals were written, and so they had to get all their news of it from the *Church News*, which made use of Tái-wan's lingua franca — the ǂ-mńg (“Amoy”) language (Heylen 16–21). And so, the periodical gave more space to the Cing-Japanese War than did the *Monthly Messenger*, but it was still a small part of its space. In comparison, the Japanese-Táiwānese War was clearly very important to the *Church News* readers: it was a war for control of the island, and its outcome would have a great effect on the Church's future. And so, the *Church*

*News* gave more space to writing about the Japanese-Táiwanesé War than it had the Cing-Japanese War.

This work then made a comparison of the two periodicals' writings "about the War" with an eye to three test questions:

**(I) WERE THE PERIODICALS NEUTRAL IN THE WARS?**

As Paine and others have made clear, the greater part of Western periodicals gave a very negative opinion of the Cing Empire in the Cing-Japanese War. This is no surprise: Westerners, whose languages made them see Cing accounts of the world as "not-true" and Cing ways of action as "not-right," had a negative opinion of the Cing even before the War, and were in general on the side of the more "Western" Japanese military. But the better part of Cing periodicals were on the side of the Empire: they saw the Japanese as a lesser country, whose accounts of the world were "not-true" and whose ways of action were "not-right." A comparison of the two periodicals' views on the Wars' best outcomes was made by putting their writings "about the War" into three groups: (1) "writings saying the Cing/Republic will — and should — overcome the Japanese," (2) "writings saying the Japanese will — and should — overcome the Cing," and (3) "writings saying nothing about the Wars' outcomes."

The measurements of these groups were taken, and from these it was seen that the *Monthly Messenger* was very like the other Western periodicals. At the start of the War it was neutral, saying nothing about which outcome was best, but after the Japanese got the better of the Cing at Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, the *Monthly Messenger* went over to their side. By the War's end, 18.69 percent of the periodical's writing about the War had said that the Japanese overcoming the Táiwanesé was best. The periodical's hope was that seeing the effect of Western accounts of the world and technologies in action would make the Cing more likely to take them up, and maybe give more power to the Cing leaders making attempts to take up Western practices. As the editor said, "when the war ends in a peace humiliating to China wiser councils may (should) prevail in Pekin

[Běi-jīng] . . . Her failure to hold her own may give overwhelming force to the party of progress” (*Monthly Messenger* 585: 274). This had been the missionaries’ purpose for some time, and in their view anything which made it simpler was a good thing.

The *Church News*, unlike the Western and Cing periodicals, was neutral from start to end. The periodical had nothing at all to say about the War’s best outcome, and very little to say about the War’s possible outcome. What the periodical did in a few places was make a suggestion that the Japanese would get the worst of it, as when they said of the Japanese making a base inside Cing lands, “The Japanese seem to be planning for a long stay; *they really have too high an opinion of themselves*” (“Da<sup>n</sup> yin gèng-rián ai gu-dng diam hia kia-kì, zê yā jin bût zū liōng lāh”; 117: 121; emphasis mine). But after a string of Cing losses, the periodical — like the Western periodicals, but completely unlike the other Cing periodicals — did outright say that the Japanese would get the better of the Cing: “the Cing Empire appears completely defeated. . . . Now the Cing will sue for peace (“Jiao an-ni koa<sup>n</sup> Diōng-gēk sng-sī doa-bāi. . . . Jit-diap Diōng-gēk ai bēh giū-hé”; *Church News* 117: 122). Likely, the makers of the *Church News* were of much the same opinion as the makers of the *Monthly Messenger*: the Cing government’s losses could be the Cing churches’ gains. But, they kept their opinion out of the *Church News* in the interest of keeping the peace. Their readers may have been Churchgoers, but they were still Cing, and it would not do to openly go against their government.

In the Japanese-Táiwanesé War, the *Monthly Messenger* was on the side of the Japanese from the start. No less than 51.51 percent of its writing about the War said that the Japanese overcoming the Táiwanesé was the better outcome, while none at all said the opposite. In fact, the writers were unhappy about the “inexplicable Japanese tardiness” in putting down the Republic (597: 272). There were at least two reasons for this. First, the *Monthly Messenger* took the view that the Táiwanesé Republic had no chance against the Japanese Empire, and that all their fighting would only be the cause of “serious bloodshed” while the War was

going on, and “embittered feeling” between Japanese and Táiwanese when it was at last over (594: 201). Second, they were of the opinion that the Táiwanese government was a “Republic” in name only: in fact, it was simply the old Cing government in new clothes — and their feelings for the Cing government should be quite clear from the periodical’s writings about the Cing-Japanese War. But the Japanese had by that time made clear that they could, and were, doing things as Western countries did, and so the *Monthly Messenger* was hoping that the Japanese would take control of Tái-wan.

The *Church News* again did not openly take sides. But, in places they made the suggestion that the Republic was the worse government of the two, and that the Japanese taking control would not be a negative thing. For one thing, they gave news of the Táiwanese Republic’s military troubles, but said nothing about the troubles of the Japanese military. So, for example, the periodical gave a detailed account of the Táiwanese military’s giving up control of the island’s north nearly without any fighting (122: 45), but said nothing at all about the month that the Japanese military could not get past the Táiwanese at Dek-cam. For another thing, the periodical had quotations from other persons saying that it was not a question of if the Japanese took over, but when. This time, there is no question about the missionaries’ true opinions: they were clearly on the side of the Japanese, for they said as much in the *Monthly Messenger*.<sup>5</sup> But, again, it was not safe to openly take the side of an enemy power, and so in the *Church News*, they did not give this opinion openly, but only made suggestions.

## **(2) WHAT WERE THE PERIODICALS’ OPINIONS OF THE CING, JAPANESE, AND TÁIWANESE?**

Lehmann, Spence, Dawson and others have made clear that nineteenth-century Westerners had a negative opinion of East Asian accounts of the world in general, and very negative opinion of the Cing and their ways of living, but a somewhat better opinion of the Japanese, whose ways of living were nearer to those of

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<sup>5</sup> For example, see *Monthly Messenger* 592: 158.

Westerners. And this, as seen above, had a great effect on Westerners writing about the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanesé War. To take the measure of this, the writings “about the War” were put into groups about “Cing leaders,” “Japanese leaders,” and “Táiwanesé leaders,” or any combination of these.<sup>6</sup> These groups were then put into still smaller groups of writings giving “positive,” “negative,” or “positive and negative” opinions on the leaders, and the measurements of these groups were taken.

From this measurements, it is clear that opinions made up an important part of the *Monthly Messenger*'s writing about the War. In the Cing-Japanese War, over half of its writing “about the War” gave an opinion on the Cing or Japanese. The *Monthly Messenger* gave only positive opinions on the Japanese government and military leaders, but its opinions of Cing leaders were mixed. Positive and negative accounts were always together; at no time was anything positive said about a Cing leader without something negative being said about a different Cing leader. The negative opinions of the Cing leaders were very negative, saying that the military leaders “have taken no pains to learn how to conduct and handle their troops” (585: 274–275), while the government leaders “seem embedded in impregnable arrogance and ignorance” (584: 254).

The reason for these opinions was that the Cing leaders seemed to have no interest in Western “civilisation” — that is, Western accounts of the world and ways of action. Notably, the only leader of whom the periodical gave a positive opinion was Lǐ Hóng-jhang, the Viceroy of Jhií-lì (“Jhií-lì Zǒng-du”), and the reason for this opinion was his “friendliness to Western ideas and inventions” (*Monthly Messenger* 582: 198). It is no surprise, then that the *Monthly Messenger*'s opinion of the Japanese was very positive. They were especially interested in how quickly and completely the Japanese had taken on Western “civilisation.” One writer, having seen the Japanese military in action, said:

The Japanese army is in a high state of efficiency; the leaders are men of great ability, chiefly educated in European countries. While China was fast asleep and utterly unconscious of Japan's designs, the latter country was

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<sup>6</sup> Account was taken only of the leaders, as there was little writing about non-leaders.

awake and pulsating with new life, and busily engaged in preparing for the present conflict. (586: 15)

Opinions of the Japanese government leaders were quite as positive. It was said that Japanese Prime Minister, Ito Hirobumi, “is directing the conduct of the war with remarkable skill (584: 251–252), while the Japanese Emperor “was one of the hardest-working of the staff, working from early morning to late every night” (591: 137–138).

Interestingly, the *Church News* never openly gave opinions about the Cing or Japanese military leaders. Even when giving an account of events on which the missionaries very likely had strong views, the periodical did not say anything about the Cing leaders. So, for example, while the *Church News* gave a detailed account of some Cing soldiers putting a Western missionary to death in Liáo-yáng, the account said nothing negative about the Cing leaders, and even gave attention to their attempts to get justice for the Church (114: 92). But, here again, in a number of places the writers language makes suggestions about their views. These were very like the views in the *Monthly Messenger*. For example, the periodical’s account of the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu said that in the face of the Japanese attack, the Cing troops were “scattered, allowing the Japanese to advance as they pleased” (“sì-soa<sup>n</sup>, cut-zāi Rit-bùn dīt-dit jìn-zéng<sup>g</sup>”; 117: 121); this strongly made the suggestion that the Cing military leaders were not doing their work well at all, as did the periodical’s statement that “Many people are puzzled by how such a strong position could have been taken so easily” (“Zêng láng dēh gī-goai hīt so-zāi gao hiāh yong-zong giān-go zoa<sup>n</sup>-yiū<sup>n</sup> wū gào-hiāh yōng-yī<sup>n</sup> pāh<sup>n</sup>”; 117: 121).

Of the *Monthly Messenger*’s accounts of the Japanese-Táiwaneese War, 63.71 percent gave opinions. All gave positive opinions of the Japanese, and nearly all negative opinions of the Táiwaneese. The Japanese leaders were again said to be good and clever men; as ever, things were “good” or “bad” based on how nearly they were like the Western ways of doing the same, and the Japanese leaders were far nearer than the Táiwaneese. Of the Japanese Army’s acts in taking

Dāi-lám, one of the missionaries even said in the *Monthly Messenger* “compared with the treatment of conquered cities by heathen nations in ancient and modern times, [it] has been, I should say, marvellously good. Many who know say it would compare favourably with the behaviour of soldiers of European nations” (598: 10).

The *Church News*’ accounts of the Japanese-Táiwānese War gave more mixed opinions on the Japanese and Táiwānese leaders. The periodical said that while the Japanese were doing a great amount of damage to the country’s persons and buildings, not all Japanese were equal in this respect:

Some of the high-ranking Japanese officers seem excellent fellows, because they have studied abroad; some speak several languages. . . . The ones making trouble are all soldiers and coolies.

Ghoà koa<sup>n</sup> Japan [sic] é do<sup>a</sup>-goa<sup>n</sup>, wū é jin hè, yīn-wī wū kī bat gēk tāk-cēh; wū láng bhāt gui-nā kiū<sup>n</sup>-kào. . . . So-wū sī bēng gāp yin é gū-lì gāh lam-sàm zoē. (128: 108–109).

When the War was over, the periodical said, the soldiers and coolies would go home, and Táiwān would be in the hands of the “good” Japanese. On the other side, the *Church News* made clear that the first and second Presidents of the Republic, Táng Jǐng-song and Lióu Yǒng-fú, were in fact nothing of the sort: by frequent use of the the men’s old titles, “Governor” (“bhu-dái”) and “Commissioner” (“kīm-cē”), the periodical made readers conscious that the “Republican” leaders were simply the old Cing government. They gave much attention too, to the troubles in lands under Republican control. There were many account of bandits making trouble for the Churchgoers, events which were notably less common in places under Japanese control.

### **(3) WHAT EFFECTS DID THE PERIODICALS SAY THE WARS WOULD HAVE ON THE CING CHURCHES?**

One of the chief reasons that the *Monthly Messenger* and *Church News* are of interest is that they were not newspapers, and have a different point of view on the Wars than the periodicals to which other writers have given their attention.

For example, the two periodicals were greatly interested in the effects that the Wars would have on the Churches. To take account of this, the periodicals' writings "about the War" were put into groups which made connections between the events of the Wars and events in the Church's futures, and these were put into three groups: "writings saying the Churches' future would be better," "writings saying the Churches' future would be worse," and "writings saying that the Churches' future would be no different." Once again, the groups' measurements were taken.

From these measurements, it was seen that in the Cing-Japanese War, the *Monthly Messenger* sometimes said that the Churches' futures would be better because of the War, and sometimes said they would be worse. At the start of the War, when the periodical's position was that the Cing would get the better of the Japanese, the *Church News* said that this would be a bad thing for the Churches in the Cing Empire, where "the anti-foreign feeling will, unhappily, be strengthened" (583: 222–223). It could even put the missionaries in danger, as in the Cing Empire "few could distinguish between 'outside countries' — Japanese or Europeans are all the same to the great mass of the people" (586: 14).

But, after the fall of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, the *Monthly Messenger's* position on this was changed. They now said that the War could be a good thing for the Cing Empire. The Japanese, making use of Western ways, had got the better of the Cing military, and the *Monthly Messenger's* hope was that this would at last give the Cing leaders with an interest in Western ways enough power to make these ways more widely used. And this, in turn, would make things better for the Churches. The periodical was specially happy at the thought of Lǐ Hóng-jhang's coming back: "His real return to power, with increased influence in Peking, would unquestionably mean more honesty in government, a frank abandonment of hostility to western civilisation, and better days for the people — gains to China in which Christian missions would certainly share" (589: 83).

The *Church News* gave no opinion at all about the likely effect of the Cing-Japanese War on the Cing Church's futures. It was seen in the discussion of

the two periodicals' views on the Japanese-Táiwaneese War that the missionaries, like the other writers for the *Monthly Messenger*, had the idea that Western ways being more common would be good for the Church in Tái-wan; likely, they had the same idea about the effect of Western ways' being more common in the Cing Empire. But, nothing was said about this in the *Church News*. This is most notable through a comparison of events of which accounts were given in the two periodicals.

For example, when Lǐ Hóng-jhang was given his power and position back, the *Monthly Messenger* said things would be better for the Churches. But about this event the *Church News* said only that he had his position again, without saying anything about the likely effects of this (119: 9). And again, when the conditions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki were made public, the *Monthly Messenger* said that Article VI, which made open a number of cities to Japanese and Western business, had made too "a vast emergency of opportunity" for the Cing Churches (591: 137-138). But of Article VI the *Church News* said only that "All of this article has to do with business, so there is no need to give a translation" (122: 46), and the periodical said nothing about its likely effect on the Cing Churches' futures. Likely, the reason for this was a same reason that kept them from openly giving an opinion on the Japanese: it might be the view of the missionaries that the Cing losses would be good for the Churches, but hearing this opinions would not likely make the *Church News*' readers, or the other Táiwaneese, very happy.

The *Monthly Messenger* said from the very start that the Japanese-Táiwaneese War would have a good effect on the Church. Not only was this said in 22.9 percent of their writing about the War, no other opinion was ever given. One piece of writing gave the reasons for their high hopes:

Japanese rule will not be unfavourable to the progress of Christian work. The Government will be just and firm, and friendly to foreigners. The great natural resources of the island will be rapidly developed. The intelligence of the people will be quickened. The new conditions will further the spread of the Gospel. (591: 127-128)

In other words, the Japanese would make Western ways more common in Tái-wan, and when this was so, the Church would be able to do its work more quickly. There was another reason for their hope too. In the past, there had been a number of attacks on the Church and the missionaries. The Cing government had done little about these, and at times had even been behind them. But the Japanese government did not do these things, and so one of the missionaries said in the *Monthly Messenger* “all that was desired in Formosa was that the Japanese should extend to the missionaries there the same privileges that they had extended to the missionaries on the mainland of Japan” (591: 137-138).

There is no question about the missionaries’ views on the matter: the two quotations in the last paragraph came from the writings of missionaries. Once again, these opinions were not given openly in the *Church News*, but the writers were still able to make suggestions to this effect. For example, they made note of the changes that the Japanese would make to the island:

A Japanese officer tells me that when they control southern Tái-wan, they will immediately begin building a railway to connect the north and the south.

Japan [sic] ʼ Doa-goan<sup>n</sup> wū gā goà yin nā kī Dāi-lám goàn so-zāi nā ān-zēng, yin sūi-sī bhēh cōng he-yān-cia, bhēh ho Dāi-wán Dāi-bak Dāi-lám ʼ lo wē tong. (128: 108-109)

The advantage of this would have been clear to readers: under the Cing, going between the northern and southern Churches had been a long and hard journey; under the Japanese, the Church would far better able to do its work.

Another way of making these suggestions was making a point of how friendly the Japanese were to the Churches. And so the periodical had stories about the Japanese military happily giving out Bibles to their soldiers, and Churches in the Japanese Empire hoping to have friendly relations with the Táiwanese Presbyterian Churches. This, it would have been clear to readers, would not have taken place in the Cing Empire. And so, the writers got their views across without openly saying anything. Likely, this was for the same reason

as in the other accounts: *they* were happy that the Japanese had come, but the Churchgoers might not be, and there was no reason to make enemies.

## LAST THOUGHTS

It was noted at the start of this work that while its interests are very narrow, it nonetheless makes contributions to a number of other bodies of knowledge. Before coming to the end, these will be gone over again, and something more will be said about what work is still to be done there.

It has been seen that the Presbyterian Church of England's missionaries were interested in, and working for, the growth of Western ideas in the Cing Empire, and that they saw the Japanese overcoming the Cing — and later the Táiwanese — as helping the missionaries with their purpose. This is not a surprise: writers of post-colonial history and theory have long said that missionaries had an important part in the West's nineteenth-century "colonisation of consciousness." But what has not been given enough attention, is the part that the missionary periodicals had in this. It is clear that, at least in the Japanese-Táiwanese War, the missionaries put the *Church News* to use making the island ready for the Japanese, under whose rule — it was their hope — Western ideas would be more freely developed. What is not clear are the ways in which the periodical supported this purpose before and after the War. What is still necessary, then is a project which takes account of the writings in the *Church News* over a longer period of time, and how the periodical made Western ideas more common in Tái-wan.

This is true in a sense of the *Monthly Messenger* too. While some attention has been given to the ways in which Westerners' "knowledge" of the non-Western was shaped by books, newspapers, and others periodicals — even missionary periodicals — no attention has been given to the part of the *Monthly Messenger* in this. Yet, as one of the only English-language periodicals regularly having first-hand accounts of Tái-wan, its part in shaping Westerners' knowledge of the island was likely very great. Here too, what is necessary is a broader

project, which takes account of the *Monthly Messenger* over a greater length of time, who was reading it, and how its writings were put to use in making other materials on Tái-wan. Material from the *Monthly Messenger* could even be put through a “discourse analysis,” to see how its accounts of Tái-wan was different from the accounts of the Táiwanese themselves, and how their being so was of use to Westerners.

While there are a number of Chinese-language works on the Presbyterian Church in Tái-wan, and the South Formosa Mission, there are very few modern writings on them in English, and next to none at all on their parent organisation – the Presbyterian Church of England. This is strange, given the important part that these organisations had in Tái-wan’s history, and the history of Tái-wan in the U.K. This work is a start at making this better, but a very small one, and there is a great need for a work that gives a detailed history of the Churches and mission, and the relations between them. Such a work would not be hard to put together: between the mission archives in London, and the Presbyterian Church in Tái-wan’s own archives, there is quite enough material. It is simply necessary for a writer to put these materials to use.

The Church’s periodicals are in need of more work too. While the *Church News* has been given a good amount of attention in Tái-wan, there is very little English-language writing about it. Not only would an English-language overview of the periodical’s history and material be of great use, there are questions still about what it did on the island, how it was put together, what the readers made of it, and so on. Things are no better with the *Monthly Messenger*. Unlike the *Church News*, the *Monthly Messenger* has never been digitised, and maybe for this reason knowledge of it is still very limited. Here too, more work is needed on how it was put together, who was reading it, the changes in its interests over the periodicals’ long history, and in general what sort of effect it had in the nineteenth-century U.K.

The Wars which are of interest here, the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War, are often said to have been greatly important events in

the history of East Asia, marking the start of the Japanese Empire, the end of the Cing Empire, and a change in the government of Tái-wan. Yet, they have been given very little attention in English: while there are a number of works on the details of the Cing-Japanese War, there are no general histories of it, and hardly any histories at all — general or detailed — of the Japanese-Táiwanese War. The three most important modern book-length works on the War — Dorwart, Lone, and Paine — are accounts of the War from the American, Japanese, and media points of view. This work is an addition in giving to a degree the points of view of the Táiwanese. But it is still for some other writer to give the points of view of Cing and Táiwanese persons more generally.

Surprisingly, given how little attention in general the War have been given, the part of missionaries in it has been noted. Yet this is as far as it has gone: there are no detailed accounts of missionaries' experiences of the War. As this work has made clear, missionaries had great hopes for how the War might make things better for them in the Cing Empire, and at least some of them did what they could to make certain that this would be so. Next must come works on other mission groups, to see if they made use of the War in the same way. In fact, one reason for this work's making use of clear definitions and measurements in the way it has, is so that comparisons can be made between it, and any future works on what other missionaries did in the Wars — specially with respect to publishing.

But all of the above is for other times, and other writers. Meanwhile, it is this writer's hope that this thesis has done its work well, not only giving attention to a piece of history which has for too long had none, but making clear what other pieces of history are in need of attention too, and how they can given it.

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