THE LITERARY CAREER AND ACHIEVEMENT OF

ROBERT WALLACE (1697-1771)

by

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Summary

Robert Wallace (1697-1771) would no doubt have fallen into complete obscurity today, had not his association with David Hume brought him to the attention of Hume's biographer, Ernest Mossner. Comparatively little biographical information is available, but this study of Wallace's life and both his published and unpublished works not only throws light on the attitudes of the Edinburgh intelligentsia of the time, but, by taking all his writings into account, offers a new interpretation of his published works and points to the contrast between these and his unpublished manuscripts.

As a minister of Edinburgh and a governor of Heriot's Hospital, he was active in both the religious and political fields and he shared with his contemporaries a concern for improvement and a zest for debate which were reflected in his membership of a number of the Edinburgh Clubs. A moderate clergyman, he was influenced by the Latitudinarians, by Shaftesbury, and by Seneca, and much of his energy was expended in controversy with notable writers of the day, such as Hume and Lord Kames. His interests were extensive, and in addition to airing his views on such topics as economics, population, religious conformity, sexual morality, and the perfectibility of Man, he was an able mathematician and undertook much of the calculation for the Church of Scotland Minister's Widows' Fund which served as a pattern for many subsequent insurance schemes.

His attempt to see the Church in the context of the Enlightenment and his drive to keep abreast of the times included an unpublished prophecy concerning the future of organised religion. His prime

concern, which gives unity to the diverseness of his writings, is the organisation of society for the achievement of the maximum happiness for mankind. It is only by considering his life and works as a whole that we can assess his contribution and appreciate the fact that although he was not as outstanding as his more famous contemporaries in the intellectual sphere, he deserves more attention than he has hitherto been given.

Abbreviations

BM	British Museum
EUL	Edinburgh University Library
NLS	National Library of Scotland
SRO	Scottish Record Office
RSE	Royal Society of Edinburgh
CR	The Critical Review; or, Annals of Literature.
MR	The Monthly Review, or Literary Journal.
DNB	The Dictionary of National Biography. Leslie Stephen & Sidney Lee eds. Published since 1917 by the Oxford Univ. Press.
Halkett and Laing	A Dictionary of Anonymous and Pseudonymous English Literature (Samuel Halkett and John Laing). New and Enlarged ed. by James Kennedy, W. A. Smith and A. F. Johnson, 7 vols. (Edinburgh & London: Oliver & Boyd, 1926-34).

Preface

Robert Wallace achieved eminence in his generation more through the originality and dynamism of his conversation and personality than through the reputation of his published works. He was both overshadowed and stimulated by the intellectual giants of the Scottish "Enlightenment" and his awareness of the rapidity of progress and the growth of knowledge led him to diversify his interests to a degree which left him with a sense of inadequacy and failure.

In this study, Wallace is seen to be representative of the educated professional man of his day, while at the same time holding views that far from tallied with establishment opinion. His unpublished manuscripts illuminate his published works and emphasise the tension between what he privately believed and what he could acceptably profess in public.

Undaunted by the strength of his adversary, he entered into controversy with David Hume in his first major publication, A Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind in antient and modern Times, and few of his writings are entirely free of Hume's influence. Wallace's final answer to Hume is to be found in Various Prospects of Mankind, Nature, and Providence, a book which up to now has been known only for its contribution to the population debate and its views on the perfectibility of Man. His manuscript works are often more interesting than those he published; indeed, the less publishable they were, the more they are of interest, and the fact that they have been neglected for so long is one reason for Wallace's unmerited obscurity today.

CHAPTER I

Biographical

I

The Scotland into which Wallace was born on 7 January 1697 gave little apparent promise of the flourishing expansion that was to take place during his lifetime. The Darien Scheme, which in the course of four years had drained the Scottish economy of around £200,000 and had lost nearly 2,000 men in the attempt to found a trading colony in the New World, ended in disaster in 1700.[1] At home, 1695 heralded the successive years of famine and unemployment that were to cause thousands to die of starvation and reduced vast numbers to beggary.[2] From Sir Robert Sibbald's description, Wallace was fortunate to be alive: "for Want some Die by the Way-side, some drop down in the Streets, the poor sucking Babs are Starving for Want of Milk, which the empty Breasts of their Mothers cannot furnish them."[3] Nor did the Union of Parliaments which these disasters precipitated in 1707 immediately bring the anticipated increase in prosperity, for

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1 William Law Mathieson, Scotland and the Union: A History of Scotland from 1695 to 1747 (Glasgow: James Maclehose, 1905), p.52.

2 Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, in his Second Discourse on the Affairs of Scotland (in The Political Works of Andrew Fletcher, Esq. (London: Bettesworth, Hitch & Davis, 1737), pp.144-45) claimed that over and above the poor families being supported by church-boxes, the number of beggars in Scotland had doubled as a result of the famine, making about 200,000 in all. The extent of pre-famine vagrancy is an additional indication of the country's poverty.

3 Sir Robert Sibbald, Provision for the Poor in time of Dearth and Scarcity 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: James Watson, 1709,) p.3.

this was preceded by higher taxation and the loss of French trade.[1]

The notorious hanging of a twenty-year old student, Thomas Aikenhead on the day after Wallace's birth, for alleged blasphemy,[2] gave little indication that the Church, in only a couple of decades, would be able to tolerate, far less foster the kind of moderatism that was characteristic of Wallace and a number of his contemporaries. Aikenhead, deprived of counsel, was charged under an act ratified in 1695 by the Scottish parliament making blasphemy a capital offence.[3] Despite the weakest of evidence and the pleading and penitence of the victim, Aikenhead was refused even a short reprieve. Only the intercession of the clergy could be of any avail and they, on the contrary, "spoke and preached for cutting him off."[4]

A period of change and improvement was nevertheless beginning and this was to be seen very clearly in the field of education. The Act for Settling of Schools, of 1696, for example, renewed the decree that there should be a school in every parish and that the heritors and minister should assist in the appointment of a

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1 John Clive, "The Social Background of the Scottish Renaissance" (hereafter cited as Clive), in Scotland in the Age of Improvement, N. T. Phillipson and Rosalind Mitchison eds. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1970), p.226. See also T. C. Smout, A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830 (London: Collins, 1969), pp.421ff for Scotland's economic development. (Hereafter cited as Smout).

2 W. L. Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, pp.220-21.

3 David Daiches, The Paradox of Scottish Culture: The Eighteenth-Century Experience (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964), p.41.

4 W. L. Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, p.221.

master.[1] Wallace, who was the only child of the Reverend Matthew Wallace, parish minister at Kincardine, was educated at Stirling Grammar School.[2] The Council of Stirling, in 1698, had banned private schools and had ordained that all boys of the burgh over six years of age must attend the Grammar School.[3] This was the second time the Act had been renewed since 1649 and it was a part of the move towards compulsory education that had begun, in a modified form, in 1496,[4] and which was now making steady progress. From the middle of the sixteenth century the grammar schools began to teach the elements of Latin and Greek, which were first introduced in Stirling in 1625,[5] the teaching of English having started in 1612.[6] Tuition in arithmetic had begun before Wallace attended school and Stirling was one of the first schools to add this to the curriculum.[7] The Grammar School also introduced such subjects as book-keeping, French,

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1 H.M. Knox, Two Hundred and Fifty Years of Scottish Education 1696-1946 (Edinburgh and London: Oliver & Boyd, 1953), p.5. Although this act did not bring immediate and widespread changes (see Donald J. Withrington, "Education and Society in the Eighteenth Century" [hereafter cited as Withrington] in Scotland in the Age of Improvement, pp.170ff), it was at least a step towards improvement.

2 See his son George's memoir in Scots Magazine 33 (1771), 340.

3 James Grant, History of the Burgh Schools of Scotland (London and Glasgow: William Collins, 1876), pp.136 and 310.

4 James Grant, p.307.

5 James Grant, p.332. Criticism of Latin teaching is recorded by Withrington, pp.171-72.

6 James Grant, p.388.

7 James Grant, pp.397-98.

and geography earlier than many other schools.[1] From this period on, there was an increasing concern in Scotland for the improvement of early education, which went side by side with an expanding and more practical curriculum.[2] Edinburgh University, to which Wallace was sent in 1711, was also undergoing reform, under the direction of the distinguished William Carstares, Principal from 1703, whose influence moulded the University on the lines of Utrecht and Leyden,[3] and began the improvements which led, in the late eighteenth century, to the preference of some more "enterprising Englishmen" for the University of Edinburgh rather than for Oxford or Cambridge.[4]

The first major change, by an act of the Town Council in 1708, was the abolition of the Regenting system. During the seventeenth century the Arts teaching had been carried out by Regents, each of whom taught all the subjects of the four-year course,[5] whatever his particular speciality. This militated against high standards of teaching and student specialisation and it was replaced by the establishment of professorial chairs in Humanity, Greek, Logic and

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1 James Grant, pp.396, 403, 404. See also Andrew Bain, Education in Stirlingshire from the Reformation to the Act of 1872 (London: London Univ. Press, 1965), pp.130-133.

2 Cf. Withrington, pp.171ff.

3 Alexander Grant, The Story of the University of Edinburgh During its First Three Hundred Years (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1884), I, 263. Carstares, a clergyman, had himself studied at Utrecht. (H. Trevor-Roper, "The Scottish Enlightenment" [hereafter cited as Trevor-Roper], in Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, ed. Theodore Besterman, 58 [1967], 1648).

4 Trevor-Roper, p.1636.

5 See A. Grant, The Story of the University of Edinburgh, I, 144ff.

Metaphysics, and in Natural and Moral Philosophy.[1] The Faculty of Law developed from the creation of the Regius Chair in Public Law in 1707, followed by the founding of chairs of Civil and Scots Law in 1710 and 1722 respectively. The medical faculty, which was to become internationally famous, stemmed from the Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons and the first Professor of Anatomy was appointed in 1705.[2] The College of Surgeons had opened an anatomical theatre in 1697, and the case of body-snatching from Grayfriars Churchyard in the year that Wallace came to Edinburgh might be regarded as indicative of a fast developing student enthusiasm.[3]

Wallace, we are told, "passed a regular, complete, and liberal course, in Languages, Logic, Metaphysics, Mathematics, Physics, Ethics, and Theology," apparently with considerable success.[4] He excelled particularly in mathematics and in session 1720-21 he taught all the University classes at the request of Professor James Gregory (appointed Professor in 1674), who was absent through ill-health.

Divinity teaching alone remained much the same as in the seventeenth century and is described as "comparatively pedestrian."[5] A Professorship of Hebrew had been established in 1642, when at least

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1 A. Grant, I, 262. Regenting was abolished at Glasgow in 1727, St. Andrews in 1747 and at Aberdeen in 1754. See also Alexander Law, Education in Edinburgh in the Eighteenth Century (London: London Univ. Press, 1965), p.23.

2 A. Law, p.23.

3 A. Grant, The Story of the University of Edinburgh, I, 303.

4 Scots Magazine, 33 (1771), 340.

5 H.M. Knox, Two Hundred and Fifty Years of Scottish Education, p.19.

twenty per cent of Edinburgh graduates entered the ministry,[1] and a Regius Chair in Ecclesiastical History was created in 1702. The dullness of the teaching, however, according to Alexander Carlyle, resulted in the students being all the more intellectually alive and liberal.[2] This is borne out by Wallace, who believed the English students

> to be but bablers & half thinkers compared with a set of students att Edinburgh about the year 1720: these English Divines indeed had more learning and had read more books but were not near so acute as the others, and have been greatly fettered with bigotry and various prejudices.[3]

He and his fellow students, he recalled, had studied and exhausted all the current controversies.

The Church Wallace entered was in fact rather less bigoted and intolerant than Aikenhead's execution might suggest. William III had set the tone in a letter to the first General Assembly of his reign: "Moderation is what religion enjoins, neighbouring Churches expect from, and we recommend to you"[4] and the influence of William

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1 A. Grant, The Story of the University of Edinburgh, I, 212.

2 The Autobiography of Dr. Alexander Carlyle of Inveresk 1722-1805, ed. J. H. Burton, new ed. (London & Edinburgh: Foulis, 1910), pp.63-64. He was speaking of the year 1740.

3 MS. in EUL, La II 620[18] (cover-note on back page). Where quotations from Wallace's works are incorporated in the text, minimum punctuation has been added, but where indentation is used, the original punctuation is preserved. The original spelling is reproduced throughout. Pagination in square brackets is used where the MSS. are unnumbered, beginning from the first page of the text, not from the title-page.

4 Quoted by Ian D. L. Clark, "Moderatism and the Moderate Party in the Church of Scotland 1752-1805" (unpublished University of Cambridge thesis, 1963), p.206.

Carstares on church affairs reinforced this spirit.

The Revolution Settlement of 1690, though ending widespread fanaticism, sectarianism and ecclesiastical strife (the Church of Scotland from the Restoration of Charles II till the revolution of 1688 having been in the sole hands of the Covenanters), laid considerable stress on theological orthodoxy, and a strict adherence to Calvinist theology as expressed in the Westminster Confession was expected of both teachers and clergy. In addition to the pressures from the extremes of unorthodoxy -- from the Deists and free-thinkers -- the Church was threatened also by those within the establishment who tended to a more liberal outlook than was acceptable in the early eighteenth century. There developed a moderatism

> commonly portrayed as a general watering-down of orthodox doctrine, preserving a discreet silence over Original Sin, preaching a cosy "Morality" only loosely connected with the Gospel, ignoring or at least failing to stress the full divinity of Christ, and suggesting that a man who follows the light of his conscience and does his duty in this life will undoubtedly win acceptance in the eyes of his benign and indulgent Maker.[1]

Those who embraced this outlook, along with others who threatened the orthodox Calvinist doctrines, incurred the censure of the majority and were accused of heresy, and of Socinianism and

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[1] Ian Clark, Thesis, p.240.

Arminianism in their pejorative and inaccurate sense.[1] The opponents of moderatism in Ayrshire, for example, termed it "Socinianism," and "Arminianism" was used to describe the tendency

> to ignore the confessional doctrines of election and reprobation, to insist that the Divine sovereignty is compatible with real free-will in man, to suggest that Christ died on behalf of all men and not for the elect only, and above all hold that a man may "earn" salvation by his good works.[2]

It should not be forgotten that the nobility and gentry of Scotland remained largely episcopalian, and therefore, by implication, largely Jacobite. The importance of the Jacobite influence on the cultural life of Scotland has not gone unnoticed,[3] and men, such as Wallace, who exerted a liberal influence in the Established Church, remained a relatively small, though powerful minority even within the Presbyterian Church itself.[4] The rise in episcopalianism after the Union has been put down to its being "an emollient for the painful wound left by a growing awareness of provincialism,"[5] a provincialism the Moderates combated with a "notorious anglicising tendency"[6] and which Wallace attempted to counteract by a passionate loyalty to

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1 See Appendix I, 1.

2 Ian Clark, Thesis, pp.167 and 216.

3 See Clive, pp.236-37 and Trevor-Roper, pp.1643-46.

4 Ian Clark, Thesis, p.4.

5 Clive, p.236.

6 Ian Clark, Thesis, p.4.

the House of Hanover.

Two important points of historical interest concerning the Church of Scotland in the eighteenth century are the issue of patronage and the development of the Moderate Party. In his thesis, Ian Clark has examined in detail the origins and history of the Moderate Party and it is necessary here only to draw attention to his sharp and convincing distinction between "moderatism" and the Moderates. Ministers such as Francis Hutcheson, Wallace and the two Fisharts have been described as belonging to the "First" or "Old" Moderate Party, but this, Clark demonstrates, is a misnomer, as they were by no means an organised and disciplined group, who could be described in any sense as a "party."[1] The Moderate Party emerged, he asserts, in 1752, the direct result of Alexander Carlyle and his friends "concerting a practical policy in response to the specific circumstances of the Torphichen and Inverkeithing cases"[2] and deliberately seizing "the initiative in ecclesiastical affairs from the hands of the group of senior ministers and University professors who had hitherto been regarded ex officio as the proper leaders of the General Assembly."[3]

With many of the Moderate tenets Wallace was in agreement: in the secular sphere, for example, he had long taken part in the philosophical, literary and "improving" aspects of Edinburgh life

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1 Ian Clark, Thesis, pp.53-54.

2 Disputes over presentations to churches. See W.L. Mathieson, The Awakening of Scotland (Glasgow: James Maclehose, 1910), pp. 153-56, A. Morren, Annals of the General Assembly (Edinburgh: John Johnstone, 1838 - 1840), I, 206ff and 265 ff. See also below, p.11.

3 Ian Clark, Thesis, p.60.

that were enthusiastically promoted by the Moderate clergy and were a characteristic part of the "Scottish Enlightenment." Theologically, in his belief that reason must govern man's natural inclinations and impulses, or that the light of nature is not in itself enough to answer our problems concerning the Deity, or again, in his insistence on the futility of faith without works, his views were in accordance with those of the Moderate Party. The real point of divergence, however, lay in his attitude to patronage.

In 1711 an act was passed repealing the act of 1690 which had abolished the system of patronage and had allowed the congregation to accept or reject ministers proposed by the heritors and elders to fill a vacancy in their church.[1] The new act, which was to take effect from 1 May, stated that

> "it shall and may be lawful for her Majesty, her heirs, and successors, and for every other person or persons who have any right to patronage or patronages of any church or churches whatever, in that part of Great Britain called Scotland, to present a qualified minister or ministers to any church or churches whereof they are patrons".[2]

The placing of the power of presentation in the hands of the (often absentee) aristocracy created bitter resentment and the Assembly made a number of attempts to have the act repealed, without

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1 W.L. Mathieson remarks, however, that patronage "had been abolished in 1690 in so ambiguous a manner that it was commonly supposed to have been merely transferred to the heritors and elders." The Awakening of Scotland, p.145.

2 J.B. Marsden, History of Christian Churches and Sects, I. 341.

success. Opposition was so strong, however, that it was some years before the effects of the act were felt. A clause stipulating that the right of presentation should devolve on the presbytery if a patron failed to present a qualified minister within six months was frequently allowed to operate in the case of around one third of the livings, which were in the gift of the Crown, and it is said that for several years presentees were too afraid of public opinion to accept their presentation.[1]

When the patrons began to exercise their right more frequently and without reference to the wishes of congregations, groups of seceders tended to grow up around the ministers of their choice. By the mid-seventeen-forties, however, the number of clergy who had accepted presentations resulted in a considerable lessening of the Assembly's opposition to patronage, and the controversy came to a head over the Torphichen and Inverkeithing cases, in which the presbyteries at churches in Linlithgow and Inverkeithing strenuously opposed the ruling of the Assembly in favour of candidates presented by the patrons. It was at this point that the group of young ministers, including Alexander Carlyle and headed by William Robertson, made a positive stand and published the "Reasons of Dissent" which has been described as "the Manifesto of the Moderate Party."[2]

As "vigourous upholders of the law", Robertson and his colleagues emerged as a dominant party, while the older proponents

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1 W.L. Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, pp.237-38 and The Awakening of Scotland, pp.145-46.

2 D. Horren, Annals of the General Assembly, I, 231ff.

of moderatism "looked with repugnance on patronage as an intrusion of secular, if not of political, influence into the spiritual domain." The Moderates, however, "themselves a product of this system, were humanists rather than divines, citizens rather than Churchmen; and, anxious as they were to eliminate the theocratic element, they had no scruple in enforcing a statute which at the worst could but swell the ranks of tolerated dissent."[1] John Clive reminds us of "Lecky's caution that intellectual currents such as Moderatism in the Church were almost wholly confined to the big cities" and maintains that studying "the genesis of eighteenth-century Edinburgh culture is...really tantamount to studying the origins of the Scottish enlightenment," Edinburgh having remained, even after the Union, "the administrative, legal, ecclesiastical, and intellectual centre of Scotland."[2]

In 1707 only 30,000 of the Scots population of a little over one million lived in Edinburgh,[3] while the vast majority of people lived in rural areas, in a much more even distribution than they do today.[4] Edinburgh was, nevertheless, probably the most highly populated city at that time in Britain apart from London and possibly Bristol,[5] although this was not immediately apparent from the cramped condition of the old town, which extended along a narrow

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1 W.L. Mathieson, The Awakening of Scotland, pp.196-97.

2 Clive, p.227.

3 Douglas Young, "Scotland and Edinburgh in the eighteenth century" in Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 55 (1967), 1973. (Hereafter cited as Young).

4 Smout, p.119.

5 Smout, p.366.

ridge between Holyrood and the Castle. Lawyers dominated Edinburgh society,[1] the Faculty of Advocates and the Court of Session having been established by an act of 1532.[2] The principal Law Courts remained in Edinburgh after the Union, since Scotland retained her own legal system. An extremely high proportion of Advocates at this time came from landed families and many had studied at Leyden and Utrecht where they would have become familiar with Holland's drainage and land-improvement methods.[3] This enabled them to play an authoritative part in the drives towards agricultural improvement, expressed in such bodies as the Edinburgh Society for Encouraging Arts, Sciences, Manufactures, and Agriculture, a mid-century offshoot of the Select Society, and their literary, intellectual and social interests marked them as Edinburgh's cultural élite.[4]

Although the inadequacy of the National Church to provide a focus for Scottish culture has been demonstrated,[5] individual, liberal and enlightened members of the clergy were nevertheless enthusiastic supporters of the arts. The membership of the Edinburgh literary societies was considerably augmented by clergymen, who shared the philosophic, economic and social interests of the rest of the intelligentsia, and the growing moderatism was associated with an

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1 Cf. Clive, p.228.

2 A.J. Youngson, The Making of Classical Edinburgh 1750-1840 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1967), p.xv. (Hereafter cited as Youngson).

3 Clive, p.228 and Young, p.1976. Smout demonstrates that "almost all the judges developed an overpowering interest in agricultural improvement" (p.374).

4 Cf. Smout, p.374.

5 See, for example, David Daiches, The Paradox of Scottish Culture, pp.43ff.

interest in belles-lettres and the embracing of polite culture.[1] While they may not have drawn on specifically Scottish traditions, they were part of a movement that aimed at Scottish self-improvement.

The General Assembly performed the function, heightened by the disappearance of the National Parliament, of providing a platform for the formulation and expression of popular opinion. Many of the local nobility and gentry attended as lay members and thus, in addition to the Assembly's giving its clergy "an opportunity of occasional visits to the metropolis," it "brought them to a level, and mixed them for a time, with gentlemen of the first rank and respectability in the country." The Edinburgh clergy, who, like the majority of their profession, had had a more thorough education than the general populace, "found in that city a circle well adapted to perfect their knowledge, to enlarge their minds, and to foster their genius. They mixed more than...they have done at any subsequent period, with the first and most distinguished persons of the place, distinguished, whether for science, literature, or polite manners."[2]

Those involved in the municipal organisation of the city, however, who were instrumental in appointing the University professors and in calling ministers to Edinburgh -- the Provost and Council -- generally came from a very different background. Under the decree arbitral of James VI (restated with minor alterations by

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1 A point Professor Daiches makes on p.49.

2 Henry Mackenzie, 'Account of the Life of Mr. John Home" in The Works of John Home, Esq. (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable, 1822), I, 9-10.

Lord Islay's decree arbitral in 1730), the Provost, Baillies, Dean of Guild and Treasurer were to be merchants, and the Council, in addition to eight craftsmen, was to consist of ten merchants: the previous Provost, Dean of Guild and Treasurer, along with the four old Baillies, and three others to be elected annually, making a total of eighteen councillors and seven magistrates.[1]

The Edinburgh Presbytery was frequently at odds with the Council over such matters as education and the filling of vacancies in churches, areas in which it was empowered to advise; but co-existent with the petty wrangling and politicking that went on was a steady movement towards improving and enlarging the city itself, which gained much of its impetus from the celebrated George Drummond, six times Provost of Edinburgh.[2] In his capacity as minister, Wallace too, on several occasions, was to come into conflict with the Town Council.

II

It was his love of study and contemplation, his son George tells us, that drew Wallace to the Church, "a profession which suited his speculative disposition, and which he thought would afford him leisure to indulge his natural inclination."[3] Wallace himself

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1 Edinburgh 1329-1929 (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1929), p.281. Details of election procedure are given on pp.282ff. This number fluctuated: in 1716, for instance, there were thirty-three council members (Youngson, p.15).

2 See Youngson, esp. ch.I.

3 Scots Magazine, 33 (1771), 341.

recalls in a note on some early manuscript observations on passages of Scripture, that they "shew what sort of speculations the author had in these early dayes, & that he inclined early to examination and study."[1] His serious attitude to reading, retained throughout his life,[2] is reflected in a reference to "an account of all the books papers and pamphlets; or particular p laces of any &c which I have read with care..." dated 30 November 1717.[3]

With his studiousness went a fondness for solitude:

> I remember when I was young and was studying mathematicks I spent a whole Queen's birthday by my self & in that day I found out a Demonstration for all the operations in Vulgar fractions & I am certain I was much happier than other young men of my age who were seeing the shows of the day.[4]

Solitude was to remain important to him, as his "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles" (1753-57) show, but Wallace reflected the other aspect of the Enlightenment intellectual as well, in his

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1 La II 620[16]. The note is dated Friday 16 November 1764.

2 See, for example, his "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles," Saturday, 30 June 1753: "But there is nothing so unprofitable, nothing by which I have lost so much time as changing my books & studies & rambling from one Author & one subject to another.... To correct this error I am allmost resolved to give up with all vague and Desultrous reading, to read only a few things which tend to make my self wiser & better...." (The MS., of which there is a microfilm in EUL (Mic. M. 1289), is in Victoria State Library, Australia).

3 La II 620[16] ("No.39" at the end of "Some misscellaneous observations cheifly with relation to Divinity").

4 "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles," on Epistle 18, 14 June 1755.

participation in the club life of Edinburgh. In 1717 he became a founder member of the Rankenian Club, whose membership of nineteen included such men as William Wishart, John Stevenson, Colin Maclaurin and Charles Mackie, Sir Alexander Dick, Sir John Pringle and Sir Andrew Mitchell.[1] According to Bower's History of the University of Edinburgh,

> The gentlemen who composed it spent their hours of meeting in literary conversation, making critical remarks on any new works of merit that were published; or on the style, sentiment, or manner, of authors of established reputation. One of their number was appointed to deliver an essay upon some prescribed subject at each meeting; concerning the merits of which, every member was requested to give his opinion.[2]

Wallace later joined other clubs, but the early years of his ministry were spent outwith Edinburgh. In July 1722 he was licensed to preach by the Presbytery of Dunblane, which provided, in the following year, a testimonial of his merit and conduct prior to

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1 A.F. Tytler's Memoirs of the Life and Writings of the Honourable Henry Home of Kames (Edinburgh & London: Creech; Cadell & Davies, 1807), I, Appendix VIII, p.50, gives a list of members compiled by George Wallace.

2 Alexander Bower, The History of the University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh: Oliphant et al., 1817), II, 315. D.D. McElroy's PhD. thesis (Edinburgh University, 1952), entitled "The Literary Clubs and Societies of Eighteenth-Century Scotland, and their influence on the literary productions of the period from 1700 to 1800," and his book, Scotland's Age of Improvement: A Survey of Eighteenth-Century Literary Clubs and Societies (Washington: Washington State Univ. Press, 1969), give further details of the Rankenian Club and of the other clubs of which Wallace was a member.

his being ordained at Moffat on a presentation of James, Marquis of Annandale, on 29 August 1723.[1] "A little treatise against imposing Creeds or Confessions of faith on ministers or private Christians as a necessary term of Laick or Ministeriall Communion,"[2] written, Wallace tells us, before 1720, is evidence of his tendency to depart from theological orthodoxy, and neither this nor his enquiring habit of mind was stifled by his joining the ranks of the clergy.

He apparently caused quite a stir when he preached in Glasgow at William Wishart's first communion in October 1724, and from Robert Wodrow's description of the event,[3] it seems that Wallace had embarked early on the sermon style that John Ramsay of Ochtertyre was to admire as much as Wodrow deplored.[4] The sensation created by this sermon, which was on "Faith without works is dead," drew the

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1 His licence to preach and the testimonial from the Presbytery of Dunblane, the call by the heritors, elders and parishioners, and an extract of the act of ordination by the Presbytery of Lochmaben are to be found in La II 620[1] (private papers 1, 2 and 3).

2 La II 620[18]. It is ironic that thirty or forty Glasgow students were reputed to have left for Edinburgh because of their fellows' open opposition to Confessions of Faith and their avid reading of deists and anti-Confessionists. It was just this kind of controversy that was being aired in the Rankenian Club, as Robert Wodrow realised when he commented that "some of the younger students inclined to have some great freedom of thoughts". (See Clive, p.234).

3 Robert Wodrow, Analecta: or, Materials for a History of Remarkable Providences: Mostly Relating to Scotch Ministers and Christians (printed for the Maitland Club, 1842-43), III, 167-68 (October 1724). See Ch.2 below, p.86.

4 John Ramsay of Ochtertyre, Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century (Edinburgh & London: Wm. Blackwood, 1888), I, 241.

free-thinking Professor John Johnstoun[1] to hear the next. His comment was that Wallace should not be tolerated as a minister in any Protestant Church (a remark which Wodrow allows, coming from Johnstoun, was perhaps a commendation).[2] Wallace was clearly appreciated in some quarters, however, as on 8 April 1725, he was made burgess and guild brother of the Burgh of Glasgow.[3]

In October the following year, Wallace married Helen Turnbull, daughter of George Turnbull, minister of Tynningham, who was to bear him two sons, Matthew and George, and a daughter, Elizabeth.[4] No details of his activities during the next few years are to be found although the way he conducted his early ministry may be inferred from the following passage from "A little treatise against imposing Creeds or Confessions of faith":

> I would wish then that in all Christian countries there were distinct parishes and one or more ministers as was found convenient with suitable salaries living in them: I would have these meet with the people every Sunday and at other times as should be agreed on, and read the scriptures

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1 Professor of Medicine at Glasgow University. Ramsay describes him as "a free liver, and, what was in those days still more rare, a free thinker, at least in his talk." Scotland and Scotsmen, I, 277.

2 Wodrow, Analecta, III, 169.

3 The Burgess ticket is among his private papers in La II 620[1].

4 There is some obscurity as to the dates of their births. See p.60, footnotes 1, 2 and 3.

> with them and assist them in understanding them: Let them also exhort them to the duties required by the Gospell and enforce them by argument, Let them pray to God in their hearing as the mouth of the people, and praise God with them, Let them administer the Sacraments also and tho any of these men had an opinion which perhaps some of the people thought wrong, and had acted agreeably to it in their practice I would have no separation from them, for this does not [at] all argue that I agree with them in all points that I join with them in worshipping God, and I may easily declare my own opinions to the world if any need be....I would also have ministers meet together when and where and as oft as they see meet, and consult together what may be for the the good of the community; but I would not have them make acts requiring to believe so and so, or do so and so under penalties how gentle so ever [last page of text].

In May 1729 he is recorded as being elected Moderator of the Synod of Dumfries and as preaching before the October Synod of that year. The sermon,[1] published in London in 1731 and appearing in a second edition in 1733, was entitled The Regard due to Divine Revelation, and to Pretences to it, considered. To the printed

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[1] Hereafter referred to as the Synod Sermon.

version, Wallace added an introduction which set out to refute the deist arguments put forward by Matthew Tindal, a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, who in 1730 had published a book entitled Christianity as Old as the Creation, or the Gospel as a Republication of Nature. Tindal's argument may be briefly summarised in his maxim that "whoever so regulates his natural Appetites, as will conduce most to the Exercise of his Reason, the Health of his Body, and the Pleasures of his Senses, taken and consider'd together, (since herein his Happiness consists) may be certain he can never offend his Maker; Who, as he governs all Things according to their Natures, can't but expect his rational Creatures shou'd act according to their Natures."[1] With this, Wallace took issue on the grounds that the light of nature alone is not enough and that revelation is a prerequisite to our understanding of the Deity. Leslie Stephen sees Tindal's work as marking "the culminating point of the whole deist controversy"[2] and Wallace's contribution was but one of the many replies.

It was this first publication, however, which helped to bring about Wallace's return to Edinburgh. The sermon was presented to Queen Caroline by James Johnston, who had been appointed joint Secretary of State for Scotland in 1692, and it was as a result of the Queen's ensuing recommendation of the author to Lord Islay, then Minister for Scottish affairs, that Wallace was elected one of the Ministers of Edinburgh, on the death of his former professor,

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1 Matthew Tindal, Christianity as Old as the Creation (London: n.p., 1730), p.17.

2 Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1876), I, 134.

William Hamilton.

Wallace had already visited Edinburgh in 1730, to attend the General Assembly, where he demonstrated, in two sermons described by Wodrow[1] that he had not lost, in his years as parish minister, his intellectual acuity and boldness of opinion:

> Mr. Wallace gave us flings at seal, and attacked Queries, which the Assembly had ordered in some cases, and approven in others; and the prosecutions upon a fama clamosa, though prescribed in our Form of Proces, as rules established contrary to charity.[2]

This occasioned a Mr. Forbes of Deer to move, in the Committee of Instructions, that attention should be paid to sermons on morality that made no mention of Christ and the Gospel, and that the Assembly should take measures to prevent innovation in preaching. The move was waived, but Wodrow doubtless spoke for a proportion of the older ministers of the Church when he expressed the view that Wallace's sermons "gave no good vidimus of a fleece of young men noted to have been students under the Moderator, and of the vitiated tast of the youth, and young Ministry."[3] Further rumours of Wallace's divergence were remarked by Wodrow in 1730 and 1731, when Wallace was reputed to belong to a club of neighbouring ministers whose views smacked of Arminianism and who seemed "to verge towards a latitude

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1 Analecta IV, 125 and 129.

2 Analecta, IV, 125.

3 Analecta, IV, 125.

not consistent with the interests of this Church."[1]

His move to Edinburgh gave the old clergy, who, according to Ramsay, "were very dexterous at spying heresy where none was meant," an opportunity to cross-examine him, and Ramsay tells us that he "was libelled for affirming that the light of nature gave hints of the divine placability, though no certainty, especially as to its conditions and extent."[2] This, of course, was a theme of Wallace's Synod Sermon, and the very argument that he had used to prove the deist contentions wrong:

> in the following Sermon I have shown, that we cannot be easy or happy, but under an endless Anxiety about our guilty State, without a Declaration of the Divine Will...nor can we be easy and happy by adhering meerly to the Light of Nature.[3]

The fact of our inability to use reason to discover the divine plan and the manner in which God will deal with the guilty, in Wallace's opinion disproved the deist view that revelation is superfluous, since without it, "we cannot be sure of our Duty, and the Terms of our Acceptance."[4]

Wallace's sermon had called forth a reply entitled The

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1 Analecta, IV, 165 and 240.

2 J. Ramsay, Scotland and Scotsmen I, 242. There is no record of an official enquiry in either the Acts of the General Assembly or in the "Minutes of the Edinburgh Presbytery."

3 Synod Sermon, p.xxi.

4 Synod Sermon, p.24.

Necessity of some of the Positive Institutions of Ch.....y Consider'd, in a letter to the Minister of Moffat, by William Dudgeon,[1] published anonymously in 1731, to which Wallace responded with A Reply to a Letter Directed to the Minister of Moffat, Concerning the Positive Institutions of Christianity. In which The Arguments in Mr. Wallace's Sermon before the Synod of Dumfries, October 1729, and the Remarks prefix'd to it, are illustrated and defended (1732). Here Wallace pursues his point:

> The utmost length to which the Light of Nature can pretend to go, is to assure us, that we are not to perish wholly at death...Reason leaves us at a loss, and can furnish us with nothing but Guesses and Conjectures. It's only by a Revelation that we are assured, that virtuous Men shall be deliver'd from all Pains and Inconveniencies whatsoever, and that their Happiness shall be perfect and complete (36-37).

Since he was not denying the divine placability, and as his arguments were designed for the very purpose of refuting those of the deists, it comes as no great surprise that he is reported as

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1 Hew Scott, Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1915), I, 144. A full discussion of these publications is to be found in an unpublished Ph.D thesis by H.R. Sefton entitled "The Early Development of Moderatism in the Church of Scotland" (University of Glasgow, 1962), pp.57-71.

answering his antagonists entirely satisfactorily.[1]

Wallace had been translated to New Grayfriars Church[2] on 22 November 1733 and his new responsibilities were considerable:

> there are some things in common amongst the Ministers in Edinbr., which are not so in the Country, such as their preaching by Turns on the Weekdays, having several to hear them on the Sabbath, who cannot conveniently be furnished with seats in their own parish Churches, their meeting together in General Sessions, and having frequently access to visit the Sick and Dying persons throw the whole Toun.[3]

As a Minister of Edinburgh he also automatically became a governor

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1 Ramsay, Scotland and Scotsmen I, 242. It is probable that Wallace was opposed by only a small minority of the Edinburgh clergy. Ramsay may have had in mind the Observations Upon Church-Affairs, Addressed to Principal Smith (Edinburgh: n.p., 1734), attributed by Halkett and Laing to Alexander Webster, in which the author describes Wallace's doctrine, as he sees it, as being "in a diametrical Opposition to that Plan of Divinity contained in the Scriptures" (13). These repercussions were not serious enough to prevent Wallace from being made honorary Burgess and Guild brother of the City of Edinburgh on 27 February 1734.

2 See Appendix I, 2.

3 MS. "Answers for the Session of the North Kirk Parish of Edinbr. To The Bill of Suspension offered by the Magistrats of Edinbr." (1738), in East Register House, Edinburgh, CS 271/14204 Year 1738. In The History and Statutes of the Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh (Edinburgh: Ruddimans, 1749) we are told that: "The Reverend Ministers of the City and Suburbs of Edinburgh are to visit the Sick /in the Infirmary/ each a Fortnight in his Turn" (16).

of Heriot's Hospital, a duty which he was to take seriously (see below, pp.53-59).

He was not too busy, however, to take part in ecclesiastical debate. An unpublished pamphlet, dated "soon after the Year 1734," reveals his early dislike of church patronage,[1] and there is evidence that he took an active interest in Assembly disputes of that period.[2]

The suspicion with which he himself had earlier been regarded was no doubt one of the factors that prompted him to take part in the controversy over some students of divinity who were criticised, though not named, by one of the Ruling Elders in a commission of the General Assembly, for their erroneous opinions, or indecent lives. "On this," wrote Wallace, "some of the students, or the students in Generall would needs cite the Gentleman to answer before the Commissary court: and many of the Clergy were high upon the point: the Author [Wallace] remembers he was of a contrary opinion, and was almost alone in this Cause."[3] While those of the opposite opinion

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1 La II 620[29]: "Some good Hints with respect to Patronages of Churches."

2 See La II 620[32]: "anent Dissents & Recording the Reasons of Dissents by the minority of a supreme court from which there is no appeal" and La II 620[33]: "Answers for the Synod of Lothian & Tweeddale to the reasons of dissent offered by some Ministers & Elders in the affair of Currie from that State of the vote 'Sustain the call to Mr Mercer or not,'" and "Answers for the Synod of Lothian & Tweeddale to the Reasons of Dissent offered by Mr David Plenderleith Minister of the Gospell at Ormistoun."

3 La II 620[35]: "Of the powers of Commissars in scandalls Vented in Courts." Wallace's comment was written in 1764 when he was revising his work. The pamphlet, he says, was written about thirty years earlier. For a description of the Commissary Court, see Appendix I, 3.

feared that there would be no redress for an injured, innocent party unless the case were dealt with directly by civil law, Wallace held that in the interest of convenience and of freedom of speech, a slander made in the presence of the Assembly should first be judged by that body, since it best knew the circumstances, and could decide whether or not to refer the case to the civil courts.

Wallace was outspoken not only in ecclesiastical debate, but also in matters of politics, and Lord Islay, a staunch supporter of Walpole, must have been dismayed to find his protégé not only refusing to comply with the order to read the Porteous Riot Act from the pulpit, in 1737, but exerting himself, "in an open as well as vigorous manner, in encouraging others to act with the same spirited and becoming firmness."[1]

Two pamphlets relating to this controversy have been ascribed to Wallace. Both were published in 1737; one was entitled The Letter to the Learned Author of the Queries, Unmasked: Presented to the Review of the Author and the other, signed "Philo Presbyter," was The Clergy's Plea of Conscience Considered, in an Address to the Author of a Pamphlet, Intitled, The Letter to the learn'd Author of the

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1 Scots Magazine, 33 (1771), 342. The act warned that anyone shielding a murderer of Captain Porteous was liable to the death penalty. Wallace held it to be "no part of the duty of a clergyman, to trumpet from the pulpit sanguinary laws," and indeed, believed the statute to be intrinsically immoral. The high feelings aroused by the episode are skilfully portrayed by R. H. Stevenson in The Chronicles of Edinburgh (Edinburgh: Wm. Whyte, [1851]) pp.196-199 and an account of the trial is given by William Roughead in the Trial of Captain Porteous (Glasgow and Edinburgh: Wm. Hodge, 1909).

Queries unmasked. By the Author of that Letter.[1] It is clear that these are not likely to have been written by the same person, as the second has been written by the author of the letter which the writer of the first is unmasking.[2] The style of The Clergy's Plea of Conscience Considered is certainly not Wallace's, but the first pamphlet presents more of a problem. While the tone and content of some parts of it seem characteristic of Wallace — the view expressed on page 5, paragraph 2,[3] for example, which could well have been written by the author of The Doctrine of Passive Obedience and Non-Resistance Considered published by Wallace in 1754 — other passages are not at all in keeping. The invective displayed on page 2 is one example: "There are several Paragraphs of your Letter I don't meddle with, as they have not so much as the Appearance of an Argument; they only contain Specimens of a licentious Volubility, and Talent of Railery, and betray a sovereign Contempt of the Morals and Understanding of the Clergy."

The most conclusive argument against Wallace's authorship is his note on the cover of a manuscript pamphlet dealing with the reading of the Porteous Riot Act: commenting on it in 1764, he remarks

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1 The BM Catalogue and Halkett and Laing ascribe the first to Wallace and the copy in New College Library, Edinburgh has Wallace's name in pencil on the title-page. EUL catalogue names Wallace as author of both.

2 The BM Catalogue ascribes The Letter to the Learned Author of the Queries to "Lindsay (----) Controversialist" and a copy in New College Library (Pa. 27) names the author, in a pencilled addition, as Patrick Lindsay, M.P. This is presumably the Patrick Lindsay who was Lord Provost of Edinburgh in 1729-30 and 1733-34, became M.P. for Edinburgh and was later Governor of the Isle of Man.

3 Reproduced in Appendix I, 4.

that "there is wit in the piece & it is amusing but it was never printed as indeed the author printed nothing tho he composed severall little pieces on that controversy."[1] It is somewhat disconcerting, therefore, to open this pamphlet and discover that the first paragraph is almost identical with that of the printed pamphlet, and that the printed version follows the manuscript point by point, very often using the same phraseology. The manuscript is incomplete, or unfinished, is much briefer than the pamphlet, and is certainly not the copy-text for the printed version. Several conclusions may be drawn from this. One is that Wallace, when writing in 1764, had forgotten that he published the pamphlet and that the manuscript in existence is an early draft. He clearly approved of the piece and would not from shame or embarrassment have attempted to conceal his authorship. There is no reason to suppose that he was being deliberately untruthful, and he reiterates the fact that he published nothing on this topic in a comment on Pamphlet No.11.

It seems unlikely, however, that a man who had published comparatively little and who clearly took an enormous pride in his writing, should completely forget that one of his works had been printed, especially as he took such an active part in the controversy over reading the act. A second possibility, that Wallace's manuscript version derived from the printed pamphlet, is highly improbable: Wallace was often eclectic and frequently repeated the commonplaces of the day; but he did pride himself on reading critically. This

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1 See La II 620[4]. There are twelve pamphlets in all and I quote from No.1. George Wallace, in his "Memoir", makes no mention of a publication of this sort.

is demonstrated by an analysis of his unpublished "Treatise on Taste," which will be dealt with later. Here Wallace is far from original, but when he makes use of specific authors, he takes issue with them and does not plagiarise, though he may not acknowledge the author of the views he is criticising.

The most likely assumption seems to be that someone else composed the printed version with Wallace's manuscript in front of him. It is probable that while Wallace was content to refute the Tory principles "by simply narrating them,"[1] another writer, more of a pamphleteer, added personal abuse, and expanded and elaborated on Wallace's points, very possibly without Wallace's knowledge.[2] It is significant that while such passages in the pamphlet that are typical of Wallace, such as the paragraph on page 5, have been reproduced with only a few alterations, those that seem uncharacteristic do not appear in the manuscript version. The lines already quoted from page 2, for example, are absent from the manuscript, as is a comment on page 3: "your Title Page...gives the true Picture of your Letter, pride and falsehood." It is not the phraseology alone, however, that points to another hand, but views such as: "'Tis in many Cases a much better Extreme to allow that to be Virtue, &c. which has the Appearance of it, even tho' 'tis not at all times Real" (7-8). This is hardly compatible with Wallace's exhortation: "Let us be pious and virtuous ourselves; and in the whole of our Conduct appear not only free from Crimes, but above the

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1 La II 620[4], No.1, p.1.

2 There is little doubt that Wallace was in the habit of passing round his manuscripts.

Suspicion of them. Let us behave with that Ingenuity that every thing shall appear open and fair, without Trick and Dissimulation," nor with his belief that: "It is not good to...talk deceitfully, even for God himself."[1]

Finally, a demonstration of Wallace's more mild and tolerant approach, even in defence, is given throughout A Reply to a Letter Directed to the Minister of Moffat, and is epitomised on page 2:

> In doing this [replying], I hope you will find nothing but Candour and Ingenuity, and a Disposition ready to hearken to your Objections with Calmness and Impartiality. I am equally liable to Mistakes with the rest of Mankind, and it's reasonable I should attend to every Man, who is so kind as to correct them without Rudeness and Ill-nature.

Whether or not this passage is taken to contain an element of irony, the tone here is clearly very different from that of The Letter to the Learned Author of the Queries, Unmasked.

So many ministers took exception to reading the act, that Wallace, on the advice of some of the clergy and several lay people, notably Colin Maclaurin and Lord Arniston (who had lost his office as Lord Advocate when Walpole came into power, and went into active opposition against him), drew up "An Apology for the ministers of

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1 Synod Sermon, p.38; Various Prospects of Mankind, Nature, and Providence (London: A. Millar, 1761), p.344.

the church of Scotland on account of their not reading an act of Parliament for bringing to Justice the Murtherers of Captain John Porteous as directed by the law."[1] As this was to appear in print only if the government seemed likely to prosecute the clergy who disobeyed the order, however, it was never published.

Wallace's own attitude to reading the Act is summarised in his note on pamphlet No.6:

> as reading Porteois's Act was extremely Dissagreeable to the writer of this piece & to many others: & yet neglecting to do it was very dangerous many Devices were thought off att that time, both to read to avoid the danger & yet do something by way of salvo: this piece contains severall things that were thought of in this view but none of them were ever used by the writer of this for he could not att any rate reconcile himself to reading it or using any stratagems to evade penalties so he neglected it altogether without stratagems.

Wallace's stand on this occasion favourably influenced his future career (see chapter II below). Although age and experience brought greater discretion (he supported Carlyle anonymously, for example, during his trial for attending Douglas in 1756), Wallace maintained throughout his life a fearless independence of thought.

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[1] La II 620[4], No.11.

His translation from New Grayfriars to the New North Kirk in 1738 once again involved him in church politics.[1] In 1720 regulations had been drawn up by the Presbytery of Edinburgh and the Town Council relating to the calling of ministers to the city and placing them in particular parishes,[2] procedures that had been giving rise to a considerable amount of dissention. In an attempt to end present disputes and to forestall future ones, it was agreed that the final appointment, after leets had been drawn up by the sessions and laid before the Presbytery, should be made by an Act of Council. Before this Act was passed, the ministers of the city would be consulted, the consent of the session of the parish to which the minister was going would be obtained, and the intended translation intimated to the session of the parish which he was leaving. When the Council and magistrates reached their decision, they would "lay the Minister before the Presbytery, desiring that they may interpose their Authority to make the Translation effectual."[3] The resolution was carried unanimously and it was ordained that this

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1 H.R. Sefton has gone into this controversy in considerable detail (Thesis, pp.103-106), and so only an outline of events will be given here. Sefton makes extensive use of the "Minutes of the Edinburgh Presbytery," but does not mention the Bill of Suspension, the Reply or the "Answers" (see footnote 2 below, and p.34, footnotes 2 and 3). For Maitland's description of the New North Church, see Appendix I, 5.

2 An extract of these Regulations is appended to the Bill of Suspension for The Magistrates of Edinburgh, 25 September 1738, drawn up by the Town Council during this controversy (referred to hereafter as the Bill of Suspension). There is a copy in the Signet Library (F4: 17).

3 Bill of Suspension, Regulations.

method of presentation "should be practised in all Times coming."

The New North Kirk, therefore, desiring Wallace's translation from New Grayfriars, duly petitioned the Council's agreement.[1] The Council's decision was delayed, however, because of the difficulties arising from this request: Wallace was preaching in New Grayfriars without a colleague, and the Reverend John Glen was also without a colleague at the New North Kirk. If Wallace was translated, New Grayfriars would be left without a minister altogether.[2] William Wishart had recently been appointed a Minister of Edinburgh, but he had not yet been assigned a church; the New North Kirk was small, whereas New Grayfriars was large, and Wishart could be heard in the one, but not in the other. The Council therefore appointed a committee to settle Wishart meantime, and to attempt to move the Presbytery to place him in the New North Kirk.

The Presbytery then took the law into its own hands, and on 30 August translated Wallace to the New North in defiance of the Council. This move resulted in the Council's Bill of Suspension, to which the session of the New North made reply,[3] arguing that it was "indisputedly the Law of the Land, and of all Christian Countrys, that points meerly Ecclesiastical are not Competent to the Civil

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1 "Edinburgh Town Council Records," Vol. 59, p.154 (26 July 1738).

2 Reply to the Answers offered in the Name of the Session of the North-Kirk Parish of Edinburgh, To the Bill of Suspension presented by the Magistrates of the City. 27 September 1738 (also in the Signet Library, F4: 17).

3 "Answers for the Session of the North Kirk Parish of Edinbr." See above, p.25, footnote 3.

Magistrate as such" (4), and quoting the act of the first parliament after the Reformation which, in 1567, laid down that the examination and admission of ministers was in the power of the Kirk alone (5). The Reply to the Answers was consequently drawn up, but the minutes of the Council meeting of 29 September[1] indicate a sudden and unexpected willingness on the part of the Council to cooperate, and the Presbytery had its way.

Meanwhile, Wallace, "knowing the settlement of a minister to be a matter purely spiritual...did not hesitate about the part it became him to take on the occasion; and, without minding the injunction issued by the temporal judge, proceeded in discharging the duties annexed to the office, conferred upon him by the presbytery."[2]

III

Upon the defeat of the Walpole administration in 1742, John, Fourth Marquis of Tweeddale succeeded Lord Islay as Minister for Scottish Affairs, and during his period in office Wallace was chosen to assist him in ecclesiastical matters, particularly those relating to Crown patronage. Wallace's involvement with the Establishment and the moves leading to his election as Moderator of the General Assembly in 1743 are revealed in the Tweeddale correspondence in the National Library of Scotland and will be discussed in Chapter II.

His duties as ecclesiastical adviser entailed maintaining

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1 "Council Records", Vol. 59, p.231.

2 Scots Magazine, 33 (1771), 342.

contact with churches all over Scotland, and he took the opportunity while writing, to ask the presbyteries' views on the projected Ministers' Widows' Fund,[1] a scheme for which he did much of the calculation. Official recognition of his services to the Church came in June, 1744 when he was appointed Dean of the Chapel Royal and Chaplain in Ordinary to George II.

Walpole's resignation, as might be surmised from the stand Wallace took against reading the Porteous Riot Act, was a source of profound satisfaction, and Wallace expressed his opinion of the former ministry in an unpublished pamphlet entitled "An address to a Noble Lord in the ministry which was formed on the Conclusion of Sir Robert Walpole's administration. To inspire to true Patriotism," written when Tweeddale and the Earl of Granville came into power:

> We have now seen the end of an administration which has been extremely careless of the honour & interests of the nation, an administration which well nigh forgetting our forreign affairs, exposing our merchants to be plundered & insulted levying high taxes in time of peace & squandering our treasure in armaments for amusement rather than use or for the political purposes of rewarding their supporters & favourites seemed cheifly intent on securing themselves in power & guarding against all

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1 See correspondence, La II 620[29]. Wallace's involvement in the Widow's Fund is dealt with in Chapter II.

inquiries into their conduct.[1]

Rejoicing in Britain's new-found liberty, and exhorting the "noble lord" to improve the state of the country, Wallace paid no fawning deference to political power or social standing. While the people of Britain were happy and confident in the new ministry, "it is in their own power they cheifly rejoice that they have been able to curb the formidable power of the late administration that they will be able likewayes to getthe better of Your Lordship & the present ministry if you do not answer their expectations," a contingency, he allows, that they believe far from likely.[2]

The spirit of the man who had extolled "Free-thinking...in the true Sense of the Word"[3] had clearly not been extinguished by his new responsibilities and apparent conformity, and his defence of Hume's candidature for the Chair of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh University is another example of this. The friendly relationship that developed between the two men demonstrates the extent to which Wallace was able to put his moderate principles into practice, and was, during their lifetime a subject for literary anecdote.

If they had not met earlier, they must certainly have known

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1 La II 620[7], pp.1-2. John Ramsay comments:
"In common with many other virtuous, well-intentioned men, the Doctor entered keenly into the opposition to Sir Robert Walpole, whom the patriots of those times represented as a wicked, corrupt Minister, while, in truth, his great ambition was to preserve his country in peace and prosperity" (Scotland and Scotsmen I, 239).

2 "An address to A Noble Lord", p.10.

3 Synod Sermon, p.30.

each other in 1751, when Hume became secretary of the Philosophical Society. Wallace had been a member since around 1739, when Colin Maclaurin extended the aims of a society established in 1731 for improving medical knowledge, to the improvement of the arts and sciences as well. The president of the Philosophical Society, as it was re-named, was James, Earl of Morton and the ordinary members "were some of the most distinguished men of letters in Scotland at that time."[1] To this society Wallace read a "Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind," the basis for his first major publication which appeared, with the help and encouragement of David Hume, in 1753.

Wallace was also an early member of the Select Society, which he joined on 19 June 1754.[2] Although he never became one of the chief office-bearers, he served on a number of committees, including the one that chose the questions for debate, the committee for pure and mixed mathematics and the committee for receiving and considering laws, orders and regulations. He was also one of the five (including Gilbert Elliott and Adam Smith) who were elected to choose committees to extend the plan of the society. His colleagues on these committees included Henry Home, Lord Kames, David Hume, Sir Alexander Dick, Sir David Dalrymple, Alexander Wedderburn (future Lord Chancellor), Professor Alexander Monro,

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1 Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (Edinburgh: J. Dickson, 1788), I, 5. During the '45 rebellion the meetings were interrupted, but became regular, according to the Transactions, in 1752. E.C. Mossner, however, dates Hume's secretaryship as 1751. (The Forgotten Hume /New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1943/, p.107).

2 He was No.54 on the Members List ("Minutes of the Select Society," NLS Adv. MS. 23.1.1). These minutes provide the information that follows concerning Wallace's activities in the Society. Further information about the Select Society is to be found in McElroy's thesis (see above, p.3, footnote 5), pp.138ff.

James Burnett (later Lord Monboddo), William Wilkie and John Home.

Among Wallace's papers is a speech entitled "Of naturalising foreign Protestants"[1] which was probably read or intended to be read before the society. The question "Whether a general naturalisation of foreign Protestants would be advantageous to Britain?" was debated in June 1754, July 1757 and again in July 1759. Wallace's speech begins:

> I am on the side of those who believe that it would be a great advantage for Britain to naturalise foreign Protestants in our present circumstances and am sorry it has appeared in a Different light to our Parliaments who have moved very slowly in all schemes of this kind. This opinion I take not only to be true but that it may be established on Principles that may be called incontestible and I shall endeavour to state it in this light to the Society.

He goes on to maintain that while Bills of naturalisation are not suitable for all nations, in countries like Britain, where the natural resources are more than able to support the inhabitants, they are a distinct advantage: "Britain can support many more inhabitants

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1 La II 620[26]. The note on the outside of this bundle reads: "Speeches composed to be delivered in numerous bodies of men on different subjects Some of them were Delivered & others not: these are only rough draughts and these which were Delivered were much altered in the Delivery. They are not of much use but they take up little room and so I do not burn them."

perhaps thrice as many as are in it att present. Now either the fields must be ill cultivated or if well cultivated, the produce must be exported to foreigners. But it is much better to import foreigners to strengthen the nation" [2-3] It is not the case, he argues, that foreigners would deprive Britons of employment or the means of subsistence; indeed, many trades are in need of extra hands. He therefore advocates that the required types of European worker should be located and that pains be taken "to allure and import them & employ them in proper places and work." This would not be a purely selfish policy, since the "oppressed" in their turn, would "feel the sweets of British plenty, security and liberty" [4].

To the objection that foreigners might corrupt our manners, Wallace replies that as we are "neither more frugall nor more religious: foreigners may set before us good examples of both" [5]. He personally sees only advantage in admitting not merely Protestants but Roman Catholics, Jews, Mohammedans and pagans, although he concedes that Britain's political state renders Catholics somewhat dangerous at present. The refusal to mix with strangers Wallace regards as "peevish & narrow": "there is no nation allmost but has habits & customs worth knowing & learning" [5, 6].

The question "whether a standing Army, or a militia properly regulated, be most advantageous for Britain?" was another that was debated in 1755 and 1756 and which may well have inspired Wallace's "Scheme for a militia in Brittain," which he sent to London, to the Lord Advocate for Scotland (Robert Dundas of Arniston) on 27 March

1756.[1] J.R. Western points to the successes of the Pretender in 1745 and to the French moves in 1744 which anticipated her entry into the war between Britain and Spain. Simply by preparing to invade Britain, the French were able to take Minorca by preventing the British from sufficiently strengthening their forces in the Mediterranean. This, and the humiliating fact that for several months foreign troops conducted the British defence, led to "an agitation for the reform of the militia, beginning in 1745, reaching a climax in 1756 and finally victorious in 1757."[2] The call for a new militia was actuated also by "a strong wish for offensive action." It was argued that "with a strong militia in being the fleet would be free to act against the enemy's coast; and that had the militia been able to defend Britain in 1745 the army need not have left Flanders and the navy could have been set to conquering French possessions in the East and West Indies, then in a bad state of defence."[3]

The country could not afford to maintain regular forces and it was suggested that a large number of men should have some degree of military training, but should remain in civil employment "until

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1 La II 620[6] is a copy of this scheme. Robert Dundas of Arniston was the son of Lord Arniston, who was behind Wallace's election as ecclesiastical adviser to Tweeddale and as Moderator of the General Assembly. Lord Arniston died in 1753. Wallace does not appear to have become involved in the Scots Militia issue that exercised the Poker Club in the 1760s.

2 J.R. Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century (London & Toronto: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Toronto Univ. Press, 1965), pp.104-05. For background to the militia question, see ch. VI.

3 Western, p.105.

the moment of danger, when alone the nation would be at the expense of calling them into pay."[1] The alternative proposition was to employ foreign mercenaries, as was done in 1745 and 1756, but, it was argued, these were neither economic nor reliable and their importation had an adverse effect on the national morale.

Wallace advocated compulsory military service for all, which, once established, would obviate the need for a standing army, for which, in common with the militia reformers, he had a profound antipathy (expressed ten years previously in his "Address to a Noble Lord in the ministry" when he deplored "keeping up great numbers of useless & dangerous soldiers in time of peace").[2] In his "Scheme," Wallace optimistically envisaged a system whereby privileges would be conferred "on such as should offer themselves most chearfully to fight for their country & behave best in the war" [12], so that only a small body of troops for garrisons, and the King's guards would be required in peacetime.

The Bill that actually went through the Commons on 10 May 1756, proposed a force of about 60,000 (two-thirds of the size of the old militia), each county being required to levy a specific number of men. On its passage through the Lords, the Duke of Bedford "commended the bill as the nearest they could get to compulsory military service"[3] and public opinion was so much in favour of it that even its opponents had to content themselves with amendment

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1 Western, p.106.

2 La II 620[7], p.27.

3 Western, p.13).

rather than outright opposition. The fall of Minorca in June 1756 made its success inevitable, and an act bestowing £100,000 on the militia was passed for 1757 and 1758, to be followed by similar acts in succeeding years.[1]

That he was a staunch supporter of the House of Hanover is evident from Wallace's writings and his membership of the Revolution Club is additional confirmation.[2] One of the Club songs tells of its inauguration:

"In Edina's fair city, you have heard how of late
A club is erected, no offence to the state, [i.e. in contrast to the Jacobite clubs]
Of clergy and laymen, all Whigs stout and true,
All willing to fight for old Presbit'ry blue."[3]

The membership diploma states that the applicant is only admitted to the club after

> having Declared the gratefull sense he has of the Deliverance of the Kingdoms of Great Brittain and Ireland from Popery and Slavery by King William & Queen Mary of Glorious and Immortall Memory And the further security of our Religion and Libertys by the Settlement of the Crown upon the Illustrious House of Hanover and his Zealous attachment to his Majesty King George the second

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1 Western, pp.135-145.

2 His name appears on a members list, EUL Dc. 3. 37.

3 A Collection of Loyal Songs. For the Use of the Revolution Club (Edinburgh: A. Donaldson & J. Reid, 1761), p.24.

and our present happy Constitution in Church & State.[1]

Wallace's attitude to the Jacobite rebellions, then, is predictable:

> the wiser and more knowing Part of the Nation, who understand the Excellency and Advantages of the Protestant Religion, and the dangerous and pernicious Principles and Spirit of Popery, who have just Views on human Nature and Society, and of the End and Design of Government, and who understand the British Constitution, and have taken Care to be acquainted with the State of England and Scotland before and since the Revolution under the late King James, must acknowledge, That the Revolution was entirely just and lawful, and perfectly agreeable to our Constitution; — That it was a most happy Event, by which we were delivered from the Tyranny of a Prince bigotted to Popery in the highest Degree, who was taking wide and undisguised Steps to destroy the Protestant Religion, and establish Popery, and had asserted and assumed a Power to dispense with all our Laws by his single Authority, by which our Monarchy, instead of continuing limited and legal, must have become

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[1] Quoted from the diploma of George Wallace (1748), La II 694[8].

absolute and arbitrary.[1]

In an unpublished "Address to the Jacobites in Scotland" (La II 97[5]), he presents arguments to prove that Scotland, far from declining in wealth since the Revolution, has actually grown richer, and he reiterates this view in The Doctrine of Passive Obedience and Non-Resistance Considered (1754) and in Characteristics of the Present Political State of Great Britain (1758).

IV

The resignation of Tweeddale in 1746 gave Wallace more time to devote to writing, an opportunity to which he had presumably been looking forward for quite a while.[2] By now, he believed himself on the brink of old age: "ever since I was fifty I have looked upon my self as dying or one who was to live but a few years...till [then]... I had gaity & was as thoughtless as most others."[3] In 1756, he recalled that until he was fifty or so, "I was amusing my self with juvenile studies, with mathematics, perfecting my self in Grammar; I even spent some time in learning Hebrew; I played att chess &c. But after 50 I was struck with the thought that so much time was gone & so little behind; I found I had no more time for the

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1 Ignorance and Superstition a Source of Violence and Cruelty, and in particular the Cause of the present Rebellion. (Edinburgh: R. Fleming & Co., 1746), pp.31-32.

2 Since he had expected his career in the ministry to give him time for study. Scots Magazine, 33 (1771), 341.

3 "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles", on Epistle 12 (n.d.).

trifling."[1]

He began to work seriously on his writings, and a year after the publication of A Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind, he brought out The Doctrine of Passive Obedience and Non-Resistance Considered, which was closely followed by two major works, Characteristics of the Present Political State of Great Britain in 1758 and Various Prospects of Mankind, Nature, and Providence in 1761. In addition to these published works, numerous unpublished manuscripts survive from this period, the most lengthy being "A Treatise on Taste."

He did not become totally cloistered, however, and he took an active, though discreet part in the Douglas controversy in 1757.[2] Alexander Carlyle, in his Autobiography, recalls that during the course of his trial by the Presbytery of Dalkeith for having attended the play,

> I received several anonymous letters from a person deservedly high in reputation in the Church for learning, ability, and liberality of sentiment — the late Dr. Robert Wallace — which supported me in my resolution, and gave

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1 "Meditations," on Epistle 49, 23 October 1756.

2 The reaction of the Church of Scotland to the staging of Douglas and the Church's condemnation of the clergy who attended the play is well known. See, for example, Henry Mackenzie's Account of the Life of Mr John Home, H. Morren, Annals of the General Assembly II, 122-29, J.C. Dibdin, The Annals of the Edinburgh Stage (Edinburgh: Richard Cameron, 1888) pp.85-92, and Scots Magazine 19 (1757), 18-19, 47-48. The play is reviewed in the Monthly Review 16, (1757), 426-29.

me the soundest advice with respect to the management of my cause.[1]

Wallace's unmistakable handwriting was recognised by Carlyle's father, who had attended university with him and the fact that the letters were from Wallace, Carlyle tells us, "prevented my father from wavering, to which he was liable, and even strengthened my own mind."

Again anonymously, Wallace intended to publish "An Address to the Reverend The Clergy of the Church of Scotland. By A Layman of their Communion. On occasion of composing, acting and publishing the Tragedy called Douglass."[2] This work, as Sefton points out,[3] explains the apparent contradiction between Wallace's sympathy for Carlyle, and Ramsay of Cohtertyre's assertion that Wallace disapproved of the members of the clergy who attended the play[4]: "the wiser part of the laity," Wallace writes, "will be of opinion that if you go further than admonish Your Bretheren who have indeed judged weakly and acted inadvertently upon this occasion you will be righteous overmuch & treat them with too much severity, especially as you can

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1 A. Carlyle, Autobiography, p.333.

2 La II 620[2]. This did not appear in print.

3 H.R. Sefton, Thesis, p.157.

4 "Though a liberal-minded man, and fond of reading the best dramatic performances, ancient and modern, he reprobated the conduct of the clergy who went openly to the playhouse when 'Douglas' was acted. He therefore concurred with some of the ablest and some of the most respectable members of the Moderate party who thought these gentlemen worthy of censure, and wished the Church to put an effective stop to such practices in future" (Scotland and Scotsmen I, 240 n.1).

effectually give check to their mistakes by an adequate & milder censure" (67).

The "Address," though repetitive, is witty, and aims chiefly at pointing out to the Presbytery of Edinburgh that in publishing their "Admonition"[1] they have lacked both prudence and judgement and have exhibited "a degree of zeal which is too high for the occasion by which it was excited" (6). In the light of the ridicule the clergy have already received by way of lampoons and ballads, Wallace writes:

> I wish Gentlemen you would reflect seriously on all this & suffer the matter to drop, You would have acted more wisely if you had made less noise att the first You had better Desist now What You have met with already & what has happened hitherto is but a little of what you may most certainly expect if you will pursue your purpose to the outmost (10).

With irony, he says that he will treat the presbytery's "Admonition" "with all due respect" (11) and he begins by pointing out the dangers of claiming that religion is on the decline: "if men would believe you in this they would allmost wonder there is any Religion left att all & might be tempted to ask you what you have been doing & whether you serve for any good purpose" (12). In a more serious tone

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1 "Admonition and Exortation by the Rev. Presbytery of Edinburgh to all within their bounds" (Edinburgh, 5 January, 1757). Printed in Scots Magazine, 19 (1757), 18-19. His remarks apply also to the Presbytery of Glasgow, whose "Resolution" appeared on pp. 47-48.

Wallace later demonstrates the foolishness of representing the times as evil. This plays into the hands of "such as are dissaffected to our happy Constitution [who] are carefull to catch att every opportunity to missarepresent our affairs & make the people believe they are in the most woefull condition imaginable" (51), and gives the Jacobites a chance to "take a handle from these mistakes to render our people uneasy" (52).

One of Wallace's objections to the "Admonition" is the inconsistency of the presbytery's arguments: if they claimed only that the theatre tended to distract students and apprentices, or those who ought to be otherwise employed, this would be reasonable. But it is contrary to our own experience to believe "that there is a mortall poison attending every play" (57).

He reminds the presbytery that since they indulge in their usual diversions it is scarcely becoming to attempt to prevent others from enjoying themselves in their own way (55) and in answer to the presbytery's reminder of the King's exhortation to "Humiliation and prayer"[1] Wallace protests that the King surely did not expect total despondency: "During this whole winter we make no doubt but the Clergy themselves shewed their usuall mirth and Jollity att their Presbytery Dinners" (46) and indeed, the tragedy of Douglas, viewed as it was, "with much weeping & aboundance of tears" (46) could hardly be charged with encouraging levity.

Not only was the presbytery inconsistent, but its arguments were false:

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1 "Admonition", p.19.

> will you give it as your opinion that by reason of the present Dearth every man of substance should purchase no pretty ornament or implement should buy nothing but what may be called mere necessaries & bestow all his money upon the poor....Alas you are not aware of the mischeif you would do & what numerous tribe of poor you would bring upon the publick. You would stop half the trade of the nation att once and reduce both rich & poor to beggary without any possible remedy (53-54).

While believing that it is a curious paradox that plays designed to promote virtue and to discourage vice should ever be thought harmful (25), Wallace nevertheless admits that he would welcome the abolition of the theatre, since on the whole he imagines that "like most of our publick Diversions [plays] do more ill than good" (30). But he is "far from thinking that the stage is the cheif instrument of corrupting the world," and indeed, believes that it has sometimes had a beneficial effect (32).

Since public opinion would not allow the closure of all theatres, the energy of the clergy should be directed towards reforming the stage and not at attempting to achieve the impossible (28, 33). There is no precedent in any case, Wallace argues, for condemning all stage plays. Only those of a lascivious nature are forbidden by the seventh commandment of the larger catechism (29) and the early Church did not hold good plays to be

unlawful.[1]

Wallace is against legalising the Edinburgh play-house on the grounds that Edinburgh is not large enough to support one. To keep the theatre going, the rich and genteel patrons would have to "go too often for their fortunes & spend too much of their time" (59). But the fact that "the richer Gentlemen & more learned part of mankind" are so fond of theatrical entertainment makes it wise for the presbytery to be less militant: "You will never perswade them out of their senses. You will only offend them & render them less Disposed to profit by your solid instructions" (62). Indeed, the extreme attitude of the presbytery has forced a number of the clergy who foresaw the consequence to appear more moderate and to express their views less openly than they might and ought to have done (63).

Wallace's own ambivalence towards the stage is never quite resolved, but the last paragraph of his "Address" emphatically concludes his main argument:

> The British nation in Generall are not very fond of the power of the church the Nobility & Gentry will not incline to be totally Deprived of the entertainments of the theatre which they consider not only as innocent but improving Whatever regard the Laity in Generall have for the pious

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1 He cites Alexander Petrie's Compendious History of the Catholick Church, From the Year 600 until the Year 1600 (The Hague: Adrian Vlack, 1662) /Century XVI, Pt. 3, p.385/ as stating that the General Assembly of 1574 enacted only that "'no comedies nor tragedies or such playes should be made on any history of Canonicall scriptures nor on the sabbath day: If any Minister be the writer of such a play he shall be deprived of his ministry: as for playes of another subject they also should be examined before they be propounded publickly'" (30).

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> and morall instructions of the Clergy, they do not choose to be Dictated to in their amusements & Diversions which they do not believe to be unlawfull In short the season seems to be past for the Clergy to interpose by their Acts and Declarations the calmer and wiser part of them are certainly of this opinion, it is believed the wiser and more powerfull part of the Ruling Elders will be of the same mind and it is hoped notwithstanding the piety or the policy which has given rise to so much zeal all things will be managed with a just temper & moderation (81-82).

The Edinburgh theatre had until this time masqueraded under the thin disguise of "'a concert of music, with a play between the acts'".[1] The Presbyterian clergy had long inveighed against the stage and an act of Parliament supressing play houses in 1751 lent authority to their attack.[2] Applications for a bill to enable his Majesty to license a theatre at Edinburgh were thwarted by the Lord Provost, magistrates and town council, along with the Principal and professors of the University and the Dean of Guild, but the publicity attendant on the clergy's vociferous disapproval, Arnot tells us, made the theatre a particularly popular diversion.[3]

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1 Hugo Arnot, The History of Edinburgh (Edinburgh: Thomas Turnbull, 1816), p.284.

2 Arnot, p.282. (An. 10. Geo. II. c. 28).

3 Arnot, p.282.

It was not until after the staging of Douglas, when the Bill for the extension of the Royalty of Edinburgh was being prepared, that an additional clause was added, to obtain a licence.[1]

Despite the influence of the Moderates, it was some time before the theatre, however legal, was universally acceptable: "A few years ago," wrote Edward Topham in 1775, "plays were not in that repute at Edinburgh they now are. The ministers, zealous for the good of their flock, preached against them, and the poor players were entirely routed: they have now, however, once more taken the field, and the clergy leave them to their ungodliness."[2] Rigid standards nevertheless applied to ministers, who, even then, were "expected to go to no public place whatever: a Play, in particular, is esteemed highly immoral."[3] By 1784, a moderate laxness at last prevailed, and the Assembly of that year found it necessary to carry out its important business on alternate days to those on which the actress Mrs. Siddons (who was on her first visit to Edinburgh), was acting, since "all the younger members, clergy as well as laity, took their stations in the theatre on those days by three in the afternoon."[4]

A few years after the Douglas controversy, Wallace became involved in another public issue in his effort to protect the

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1 Arnot, p.284.

2 Edward Topham, Letters From Edinburgh (London: J. Dodsley, 1776), p.101.

3 Topham, p.237.

4 Alexander Carlyle, Autobiography p.339.

interests of Heriot's Hospital. The plan put forward during Provost George Drummond's third term of office in 1752, for the extension of the Royalty of the City of Edinburgh, proposed that much of the New Town should be built on ground belonging to the Hospital, and in December 1759 the town applied for a feu of some of the lands of Broughton.[1]

Heriot had laid down that the magistrates, the ministers and the town council of Edinburgh should be governors of the Hospital,[2] but as the ministers were vastly outnumbered by the councillors, this meant, in issues where both the city and the Hospital were involved, that the interests of the Hospital tended to come second to the welfare of the town.

A conflict similar to that which arose over the ground for the New Town had taken place in 1737 when Wallace and the treasurer of the Hospital, Thomas Heriot, had protested against the feuing of lands to the city. Their objection was that since there had been a public advertisement, it would be assumed that the land would go to the highest bidder. As the town's offer had been accepted and the highest offer turned down, injustice had been done both to the highest bidder and to the Hospital itself. "The assuming to our selves a power to set off for ever any part of the estate of the hospitall otherwise than at best advantage may be of dangerous

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1 See William Steven, Memoir of George Heriot (Edinburgh: Bell & Bradfute, 1845), p.148-49 (hereafter cited as Steven) and An Address to the Citizens of Edinburgh, Relative to the Management of George Heriot's Hospital. By a Free Burgess of Edinburgh (n.p., 1773), p.12.

2 See Heriot's Last Will and Testament (10 December 1623) in Steven, p.45.

consequence a precedent to our successors to take the same liberty," they argued, and if private bidders assume that the land will go to the city and do not compete, the city might come to feu the entire estate, which would mean that rents accruing from it would be very much lower.[1] They pointed out also that the administrators of the Hospital who were at the same time members of the council should not be judges of their own offer.

Wallace made his initial protest in January 1737 and is recorded as setting out his reasons for it in August. He presented further reasons in October, pointing out the exact loss to the Hospital resulting from the acceptance of the town's lower offer and arguing that it was too great for the Hospital to sustain.[2] He received stronger support in 1759 when he was joined by six other ministers, John Glen, George Kay, Robert Walker, Henry Lundie, John Erskine and Robert Dick, in publishing Reasons of Dissent and Protest...Against An Act of the Council of the said Hospital /Heriot's/, of the 14th of December 1759, granting the feu of certain lands mentioned in the said act to the Magistrates and Town-council of the City of Edinburgh (Edinburgh: n.p., 1760). Their protest, however, met with little success, and it was in vain that "these reverend

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1 MSS. "Records of Heriot's Hospital" in the offices of George Heriot's Trust, Edinburgh, VII,75ff. I am most grateful to the Secretary of the Trust, Mr. David Morris, for access to these Records.

2 "Records of Heriot's Hospital" VII, 57-58, 75-77, 80. The outcome of Wallace's protest is not recorded by Steven and the "Records" note that the council appointed a committee to answer his reasons (VII, 81), but give no further report. The matter was probably dropped quietly.

gentlemen [did] alledge the obligation of their oaths as governors, and their duty as Christians and men, to oppose the giving away so considerable an estate in perpetuity."[1]

At a meeting of the Governors on 14 December 1759, Wallace had made a motion that Heriot's Council in order to give due encouragement to the Scheme for Extending the Town should resolve to subject the lands mentioned in the Report to any plan of Streets Squares Courts nye Streets Lanes and Buildings that shall be thought proper by the Town Council of Edinburgh or any persons lawfully appointed for carrying into execution the said extension. and these lands should be served out in parcels by Heriots Council to the highest offerers for the benefits of the Hospital And that the purchasers shall be bound to build their houses and in every respect to lay out their lands conformably to the above plan mentioned provided always that the said Lands shall remain under the same jurisdiction as formerly To which motion the Reverend Messrs Glen..ay Dick Lundie Walker and Erskine agreed.[2]

It was answered that, however well intended, the motion "was altogether ineffectual for answering the good purposes proposed both for the

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1 An Address to the Citizens of Edinburgh, p.[illegible].

2 "Records of Heriot's Hospital" VIII, 429-30.

benefit of the Hospital and the Town of Edinburgh." The present Governors of the Hospital, it was argued, could not make a precedent for granting feus "upon the conditions and under the limitations mentioned in the motion." Also, the town would not take on the expense and trouble of executing the scheme for the New Town if it were to reap little or no benefit from the proposed plan: if the Hospital was to retain ownership of the land upon which the New Town was built, and was to receive the whole rent from feuing it out after the bridge was built over the North Loch, then "they behoved to fall upon ways and means for building that bridge and to borrow money for paving streets bringing in the water and providing other necessaries for the Inhabitants a work that seemed altogether foreign to the Trust reposed in the Governors."[1]

Wallace and his fellow-protesters then sought a bill to prevent the Governors from granting the feu, which the Lords of Session refused.[2] In a paper read to a committee of some of the Lords of Session, Provost Drummond is said to have argued that Heriot's Hospital was "but too rich already, whereas the low state of the Town's finances requires greatly to be repaired."[3] This

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1 Ibid, VIII, 430. However much the Governors on the Town Council protested that they had the interests of both the Hospital and the City at heart, their strong bias towards the City comes over very clearly in these minutes.

2 Steven, pp.152-53.

3 See A Second Supplement to the "General Heads relating to the intended Enlargement of the Limits of the City of Edinburgh" [1760], pp.5, 8. The Second Supplement was an antagonistic reply to the General Heads.

view, needless to say, was not voiced in the General Heads Relating to the Intended Enlargement of the Limits of the City of Edinburgh, a pamphlet ascribed by the author of the Second Supplement[1] to the Lord Provost and a cabinet-councellor. Wallace and the other ministers were financially unable to continue litigation, but the cause was taken up by the merchants and trades[2] who brought a lawsuit against the Governors for the act of granting the feu. This too was unsuccessful, despite the fact that the merchants and trades were willing to give a considerably greater sum than the council had offered and would have subjected the lands to the royalty and to the town's plans for building.[3] A number of pamphlets, however, condemning the Governors for feuing the Hospital's lands to favourites and for other aspects of mismanagement appeared shortly afterwards,[4] indicating that public opinion, through the initial protests of Wallace and his colleagues, went strongly against the Governors' actions.

In view of the fact that the General Heads is clearly a piece of pro-council propaganda, it is strange that Halkett and Laing have attributed it to Wallace. Their source is the copy in the Advocates' Library, which bears the inscription "By the Reverend

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1 Second Supplement, p.2.

2 Steven, p.153 and An Address to the Citizens of Edinburgh, p.13.

3 An Address to the Citizens of Edinburgh, p.13.

4 Steven, p.153.

Doctor Wallace" in an eighteenth-century hand.[1] It seems certain, particularly in view of the publication of Reasons of Dissent and Protest, that Wallace was not the author and that his views (though not his literary style) were more in accordance with those of the writer of the Second Supplement. Indeed, it is feasible to conjecture that Wallace's name might have been appended to the General Heads in a spirit of humour or irony, or even out of malice.

Wallace's preoccupation with civic and ecclesiastical affairs is much more in evidence than his concern for his family, but the "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles" reveal a strong sense of domestic responsibility. The sight of his family struggling with poverty, he believed, would be unbearable; "I have not Philosophy for this tho they bear it nobly."[2] His only reason for fearing death was that his family might be poorer and this apprehension may well account for the important part he played in the establishment of the Ministers' Widows' Fund. "Old age is agreeable," he wrote, "if the affairs of one's family are settled & one has no more to do in life for his family but when death is approaching & old age renders us unweildy & yet we want many things to our family the prospect is not pleasant."[3]

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1 That this is an eighteenth-century inscription has been verified by Mr. Julian Russell of the NLS.

2 "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles," Saturday 30 June 1753.

3 "Meditations," on Epistle 12. Wallace does not date each meditation. The meditation on Epistle 8 is dated 7 July 1753 and no subsequent date is given until the meditation on Epistle 18 on 14 June 1755.

Assuming that Wallace was writing in 1753, he then had an unmarried daughter of twenty-six on his hands,[1] a son, Matthew, aged twenty-five, possibly of a sickly constitution,[2] and his son George, who was admitted to the bar in 1754. Business for entrants to the legal profession at that time was not brisk, and Wallace, presenting a copy of George's System of the Principles of the Law of Scotland to the Earl of Hardwicke in 1760 remarks that "like all other young Lawyers here not having a great deal of Practise he has employed his vacant hours in composing this Book."[3]

Matthew was still causing Wallace concern in 1759, when, on 28 June, Wallace wrote to Tweeddale on his behalf:

> Tho I am very unwilling to give trouble both on account of what just regard I have had for Your Lordship ever since I had the honour to be known

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1 According to New Register House Parochial Registers: Co. of Dumfries. Moffat B. 1723-1819, "Record of Baptisms", p.14, Elizabeth was baptised on 24 September 1727.

2 Matthew is recorded in the "Record of Baptisms", p.17, as being baptised on 30 October 1728. The Tenterden (Kent) parish register containing an entry for his burial on 19 November 1771, states that he died at the age of 43 years. His death occurred only a few months after his father's.

3 BM Addit. MSS. 35,449 ff. 208-209. Robert Wallace to the Earl of Hardwicke, Edinburgh 21 February 1760. The baptismal register indicates that George was the youngest child. His baptism is recorded as 13 September 1730 ("Record of Baptisms," p.24) and Scott's dating of his birth in 1727 (Fasti I, 144) conflicts with the baptism of Elizabeth recorded in that year. Wallace himself speaks of George as his youngest son: "The Youngest is a Lawer of a few years standing" (NLS Uncatalogued Yester MSS. Acc. 4862 Box 71, F3 Bundle 8).

> to you and because I have allwayes thought it more honourable to be Gratefull for past favours than to be forward in sollicitting new ones Yet as an Event has happened which is of the outmost Consequence to me & my family I cannot be so far wanting to my self as not to lay this affair before you leaving it intirely to Your Lordship to do what your own goodness will suggest on this occasion, but having the pleasure to hope that Your lordship will take a proper opportunity of doing me a favour.[1]

He described his sons, "if a parent may not be presumed partial," as both "of very good parts and capacity," having had "the best education this place can affoord." Matthew, he told Tweeddale, had been asked to be companion to a college acquaintance who was going to Bath on account of his health, and while he was away it was suggested to Wallace that Matthew should become Governor to the Duke of Gordon. Wallace therefore sent him to Paris for eight months, till the Duke was a little older, in order to qualify him further. Matthew stayed in the Gordon family for three or four years until the young Duke was sent to Eton, when he left "with the good-will and esteem both of the Duchess and her sons." After spending a further year in London, he decided to enter the Church of England. Wallace explained:

> Had he choosen to remain in this country &

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1 NLS Uncatalogued Yester MSS. Acc. 4862 Box 71, F3 Bundle 8.

> either have set up for an Office in one of our Universities[1] or entered into the church; By the station in which I have been placed and by my Connexions in Scotland I could have been usefull to him in severall wayes. As he has rather choosen to take his venture in England I can only recommend him to the Patronage of those to whom I have the honour to be known either personally or by my character.

Wallace therefore asked Tweeddale if, through his connections in England, especially with the Earl of Granville, he could procure Matthew a small benefice or living. The problem was not having Matthew admitted to orders, but in finding him a "Title" --"which is either a certainty of a Presentation to some Living or Benefice or perhaps the Presentation it self Directed to him as a Clerc on producing which to the Bishop he is immediately ordained if he is found Qualified."

Wallace seems to have had little response to this request, as he addressed a very similar letter to the Earl of Hardwicke three months later, apologising "for giving trouble on so brief

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1 In a letter to Sir Andrew Mitchell, dated 4 February 1752 (SRO Mitchell Papers, Correspondence, Bundle 1, no.18), Wallace refers to Matthew's hopes of being appointed to one of the Chairs of Philosophy at Marischall College, Aberdeen and asks Mitchell to renew his application in Matthew's favour now that a second Chair has fallen vacant. Matthew was unsuccessful. (This letter is at present in the hands of Patrick F. Doran, to whom I am grateful for a Xerox copy.)

acquaintance" and recommending Matthew to his patronage.[1] Over two months later still, on 1 December, he wrote a further letter to Tweeddale thanking him for all his favours, "especially for the notice you was pleased to take of my son att London." He tactfully reminded Tweeddale of his resolution to recommend his son to the Earl of Granville, and expressed anxiety about the young man and his "fate in England among strangers."[2] The note of anxiety becomes most apparent in the last paragraph:

> That Your Lordship may not be obliged to look out for my last Letter which was written half a year ago I again beg leave to acquaint you that my sons name is Matthew and that he loges in Mistress Mackay's in Panton Square London where he will receive any notice Your Lordship may have occasion to give him.

On the same day Wallace wrote again to the Earl of Hardwicke, thanking him for being willing to see Matthew on his (the Earl's) return to London, and again repeating Matthew's name and address.[3] This letter seems to have met with a more favourable response, and on 21 February 1760 Wallace wrote to the Earl presenting him with a copy of George's System of the Principles of the Law of Scotland "as

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1 BM Addit. MSS. 35,449 ff. 197-198v. Edinburgh 20 September 1759. Wallace had been introduced to the Earl in 1743 when he was commissioned by the Church of Scotland to apply to Parliament for an act establishing the Widow's Fund.

2 As footnote 1 p.61. Edinburgh 1 December 1759.

3 BM Addit. MSS. 35,449 ff. 202-202v. Edinburgh 1 December 1759.

testimony of their regard."[1] On 1 May Wallace wrote again, thanking him for recommending Matthew to be chaplain to the Centaur.[2] "I have recommended my son to his Grace of Canterbury," he added, "and as I think it happy that my son is to go along with so good a man as Captain Forrest I flatter my self he will be in orders in such time as not to lose the advantage Your Lordship has so generously obtained for him."[3]

Memoranda contained in the parish registers of Tenterden, copies by Matthew from a loose page in the register, record his coming to the parish as a curate on 23 May 1761, his institution, on the presentation of the Dean and Chapter of Canterbury on 10 December 1763 and his induction on 26 December.

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1 BM Addit. MSS. 35,449 ff. 208-09. Edinburgh 21 February 1760.

2 A British battleship. There is a record of Matthew having preached on the Centaur in July 1760 (La II 97[7], opposite "Psal. 42. v.3"; see Appendix I, 6). By becoming curate at Tenterden in 1761, Matthew was not chaplain during the siege of Havana a year later. The Centaur's captain, Arthur Forrest, who became the senior sea officer at Port Royal, Jamaica, was directed to return to the Centaur in April 1762, for the siege. In 1782, "after playing a distinguished part in the battle of the Saints /the Centaur/ ran into a hurricane in mid-Atlantic on September 16...and, on the 23rd, sank." See A Narrative of my Personal Adventures (1790-1839) by Sir William Henry Dillon, ed. Michael A. Lewis (Printed for the Navy Records Society, 1953), I, 62 and The Seige and Capture of Havana 1762, ed. David Syrett (Printed for the Navy Records Society, 1970), xvi, 87.

3 BM Addit. MSS. 35,499 ff. 224-25. Edinburgh 1 May 1760. Matthew was ordained deacon on 11 May 1760 and priest on 1 June. (A.H. Taylor, "The rectors and vicars of St. Mildred's, Tenterden" in Archaeologia Cantiana 21 /1915/).

V

In 1764, presumably with the cares of his family weighing less heavily upon him, Wallace embarked on the revision and preparation of manuscripts, and devoted the rest of his life to reading and study.[1] Going through his papers, he was clearly reluctant to destroy any of them, and we find such comments as: "They are not of much use but they take up little room and so I do not burn them."[2] In his assessment of his own work he affects complete impartiality, which is accompanied by an engaging absence of modesty: of "A little treatise against imposing Creeds or Confessions", for example, he remarks, "there are many just observations in this little treatise: which Discover both an early Genius & an aversion to be fettered by Creeds & modern Confessions."[3] He says of the "Address to the Reverend The Clergy of the Church of Scotland" that "Tis a very Decent, modest proper pamphlet....it is stored with instructing & entertaining reflexions,"[4] and "A little treatise on Virtue & merit" has "no great matter in it: it was the production and effort of a young Genius & can scarce be supported free from all mistakes: Yet there is a certain Directness & accuracy in it which might do honour

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1 Scots Magazine, 33 (1771), 344.

2 Cover-note to a bundle of speeches (La II 620^{26}) dated 16 November 1764. It is unfortunate that an essay on the principles and art of dancing, mentioned by George in his memoir (Scots Magazine, 33, 344) seems to be no longer in existence.

3 La II 620^{18}. Comment written on 24 September 1764.

4 La II 620^{2}. Comment written on 15 September 1764.

to many who call themselves philosophers."[1]

Some works such as "Christian piety Illustrated"[2] underwent repeated revisions and, like the "Treatise on Taste,"[3] which Wallace also revised extensively, it never saw publication.

Frequent references to himself as "the author" or "the writer" and comments such as: "The author is not fully Determined what shall be done with them [several treatises] & will perhaps leave them to his heirs,"[4] along with explanations of the pagination and notes as to whether or not a piece was suitable for publication, indicate that Wallace was putting his works in order before his death. "To write for Posterity and the Generall good of mankind is not idleness," he believed, "...Tho our writings perhaps will never come down to posterity, they will att least be useful to our selves & may be usefull to a few, or to our family or friends."[5]

The seriousness with which some of his comments were written contrasts with the flashes of humour which lead one to suspect that in everyday conversation Wallace was not as earnest as much of his writing suggests.[6] There are hints of cynicism, however, as Wallace grows older: as early as 1753, he wrote:

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1 La II 620[19]. Comment written 22 September 1764.

2 La II 97[6]. See Ch. II, p.134.

3 EUL, La II 620[3], Dc.1.55; NLS Adv. MS. 23.3.18.

4 La II 620[35]: Cover note to a non-existent "Bundle 24."

5 "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles" on Epistle 8, 7 July 1753.

6 See his letters to Whitfield (Ch. 2 below pp.141 ff.) as examples of his ability to be humorous.

> I have seen so many friendships contracted in youth turn to no good account & friends either become enemies or indifferent that in my old dayes I have not so high an opinion of friendship as Cicero & Seneca or as I once had my self: and I am extremely sorry that I have had so many occasions of seeing the baseness and viticusness of many men of whom I once conceived better hopes.[1]

Again, having contemplated a second edition of The Doctrine of Passive Obedience and Non-Resistance Considered in 1765, he decided in 1767 that "on considering this matter more maturely I begin to suspect that the time is past for publications of this kind...the great danger now is not of turning out Kings & overturning Governments by violent revolutions; but of the ruin of true patriotism and publick spirit, by bribery corruption & Venality."[2] In a note, also written in 1767, on "Thoughts on altering the Sett of the City of Edinburgh," he deplores once more "the want of publick spirit & the selfishness of mankind."[3]

The appearance of his Characteristics of the Present Political State of Great Britain, an optimistic and patriotic refutation of John Brown's gloomy Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the

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1 "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles" on Epistle 3, 30 June 1753.

2 La II 96^{6} (cover-note).

3 La II 620^{10}.

Times, as late as 1758, and his plans for a new edition ten years later,[1] suggests that Wallace's depression was perhaps temporary, a possibility reinforced by the fact that a scheme for a piece to be entitled "Advices to all true Patriots, Or Proposals to promote the Grandeur and prosperity of Great Britain"[2] was under way in 1767. Wallace believed, nevertheless, that the pamphlet "would be little minded in the main or reform the world."[3] Nor could he decide whether to publish: "I am doubtfull about it: I am not keen about it: I can let it ly by me long enough or during my whole life, & secretly wish well to mankind and my country without publishing my advices & good wishes."[4]

For the public, Wallace appears to have presented an optimistic front. A letter from the publisher William Strahan, dated 7 March 1768, shows that Wallace did eventually decide to publish his "Advices" and suggests that he was then in a far from cynical state of mind:

> I am extremely glad to hear from yourself that you still retain your usual share of Health, Spirits, and Vivacity, all which I hope will attend you to the Grave. — In Political

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1 La II 620[9]: "Some observations on the influence of freedom in a Government to promote commerce & arts; & the bad influence of Despotism in commerce & arts to be read when I make a new edition of my characteristicks this is written February. 6. 1768."

2 La II 96[1a].

3 La II 96[1a] Letter [to David Hume], p.5.

4 P.S. to letter to Hume (footnote 3 above).

> Matters I am entirely of your way of Thinking, and see nothing to hinder us from continuing to be a flourishing People for many Ages to come.[1]

A manuscript entitled "The End of Ecclesiasticall Splendour in the church and of Regal or Monarchicall Authority in the State in all the Christian Nations in Europe" (La II 620[15]), however, written after the accession of George III, probably around 1768, reveals the depth of Wallace's despondency and bears witness to his disgust for the present condition of both the Church and the State.[2] His literary activity continued into his seventies and he produced a number of manuscript pamphlets relating to church matters. There is a fragment of "A Jeux De'Esprit or Romantick Scheme of Ecclesiasticall polity written in the year 1768" (La II 620[35]), of which only one and a quarter pages of the original twenty-three remain, and the same year saw "Conjectures concerning the fall of Ecclesiasticall power Splendour and Dignity" (La II 620[14], reproduced in Appendix V), and "Some Reflections on the expulsion of the 6 students out of the university of Oxford in the year 1768" (La II 620[24]), both of which will be discussed in Chapter II. Other remaining manuscripts from 1769-1770 deal with church patronage.[3]

A lively picture is drawn by John Ramsay, who knew Wallace as

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1 La II 96[1a]. The "Advices" does not seem to have appeared in print.

2 See Chapter III, pp.251-52.

3 See La II 620[27] and La II 620[29].

an elderly man:

> In private life he made a most respectable figure, no man's company being more courted by young and old; for he had a versatility and courtesy of disposition which, joined to his knowledge and vivacity, rendered his discourse exceedingly entertaining and instructive. No man had a greater number of friends, and perhaps the happiest part of his life was spent in conversation. And for more than fifty years of his life, few places of the same extent could boast of such a number of ingenious and accomplished men as Edinburgh. But for this, perhaps we should have had more of his lucubrations....Dr. Wallace was, however, probably of more use to the republic of letters by his discourses, than if he had been a voluminous author. His animation and acuteness, combined with erudition and courtesy, rendered him a delightful companion, from whom much was to be learnt that was not to be had from books.[1]

Good company, Wallace regarded as unbending the mind and

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[1] Scotland and Scotsmen I, 245. This description makes one wonder how far Wallace's avowed love of solitude (throughout the "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles") was merely an expression of his mood at the time. It seems probable that he found equal pleasure in social intercourse.

preventing "too profound thinking" -- a necessary relaxation[1] -- but by the age of fifty-six he was also finding that the "older I grow I love ease, & rest more, it is pleasant to withdraw from the bussiness & bustle of the world easily; it is often a vast pleasure to spend a whole day much alone, free from impertinent company or idle visits."[2] In 1757, with fourteen years still to live, he wrote of Seneca's 69th Epistle:

> I have a high relish of the advice in this Epistle not to be rambling about & changing places for my own part I have seen enough of life & the world not to be fond of going about from place to place. I now wish to be settled for ever in one house never to be on horseback, or only for health, to pay no visits, not to travell I grudge greatly to have a city house and a country house[3] I would allwayes sleep in one bed rise & go to bed in one way, be a great part of the day by my self have nothing to do but read, meditate & write. I wish for agreeable Diversions wise & good natured

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1 "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles", on Epistle 15.

2 "Meditations", 13 June 1753.

3 Wallace died at his country lodgings in Broughton Loan, at the east end of what is now York Place (Scots Magazine 71 /1809/, 593). His town house was at the foot of Libberton's Wynd (see draft letter, La II 620/22/2 dated 3 April 1767 and La II 96/1a, letter from Kenneth Mackenzie, 1 September 1752), which ran from the High Street to the Cowgate, close to the West Bow. Libberton's Wynd was in the New North Church Parish (Maitland, The History of Edinburgh, p.180). See also Appendix I, 7.

> & complaisant & knowing people att Dinner & all my meals walk or ride a little before Dinner for health meet with good & wise people in my walks seldom dine or sup abroad converse now & then with mankind, hear what is passing in the world, but have the greatest part of my time in solitude.

His love of walking in the fields led to the illness that resulted in his death on 29 July 1771. Having been caught in a snowfall, he developed asthmatic complaints, which grew worse:

> His disease increasing, medicines were given, exercise was prescribed, and other remedies were tried; but all was ineffectual: His strength decayed, and he died, in full possession both of his spirits and of his faculties, as well as in perfect tranquillity, with little or rather no pain, and without being confined even a day to bed.[1]

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[1] Scots Magazine, 33 (1771), 344.

Chapter II

Wallace as Churchman

I

The Glorious Revolution secured for Scotland the re-establishment of presbyterianism based on the Golden Act of 1592, which had given legal status to the church hierarchy of Kirk Session, Presbytery, Provincial Synod and General Assembly.[1] Civil penalties for excommunication no longer applied, and religious tests were replaced by the oath of allegiance.[2] The Westminster Confession was ratified, while the act of 1662 making Covenants illegal was not repealed, an omission which resulted in the Cameronians remaining outwith the established church and founding a separate sect of their own.[3] A tiny, but strong minority,[4] they continued without ministers until 1743, when two were found who would lead them and they established the "Reformed Presbytery" dedicated to "the truth and continuing value of the Covenants."[5]

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1 Robert S. Rait, The Parliaments of Scotland (Glasgow: Maclehose, Jackson & Co., 1924), p.58.

2 W.L. Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, p.14.

3 George S. Pryde, Scotland from 1603 to the Present Day (London: Nelson, 1962), p.45. Hereafter cited as Pryde.

4 The Duke of Hamilton, for example, is reported as being unable to "afford to antagonise the Cameronians and at one point was forced sadly to admit that though the people of Lesmahagow were his tenants he had no authority over them whatsoever." (William Ferguson, Scotland 1689 to the Present /Edinburgh & London: Oliver & Boyd, 1968/, p.104. Hereafter cited as Ferguson).

5 Pryde, p.100.

The number and influence of those of the episcopal persuasion in Scotland was a greater threat to the newly-established national church. William Ferguson illustrates their extent, and points out the relationship between episcopacy and the social structure:

> Most of the nobles and a considerable number of the lairds inclined towards episcopacy, whereas tenants and burgesses were more apt to lean towards presbyterianism. It was no accident, therefore, that episcopacy should have been strongest in the conservative north where feudal powers and patriarchal concepts of society proved most durable.[1]

By the time stringent anti-Jacobite measures had been enforced, following the '45 rebellion, however, "many of the nobles and gentry gave up episcopacy, finding congenial enough ministrations in an established church increasingly dominated by the Moderates."[2]

Stewart Kechie has distinguished four theological attitudes within the Church of Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century.[3] There were the Scholastic Calvinists, who adhered strictly and rigidly to the Westminster Confession, placing great emphasis on the doctrine of predestination, or at least (for

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1 Ferguson, p.103. By contrast, David Daiches traces the tradition of democracy in Scottish Calvinism, in The Paradox of Scottish Culture, pp.37-38, hereafter cited as Daiches.

2 Ferguson, p.129.

3 In "The Theological Climate in Early Eighteenth-Century Scotland" in Reformation and Revolution: Essays presented to The Very Reverend Principal Emeritus Hugh Watt, D.D., D. Litt. on the Sixtieth Anniversary of his Ordination, ed. Duncan Shaw (Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press, 1967) pp.267-72.

freedom of the will was not completely ruled out) on salvation by faith through Grace. A second group, the Evangelical Calvinists, amongst whom Mechie includes Ralph and Ebenezer Erskine, were "popular preachers, zealous for free grace, and though unconscious of any deviation from the Westminster Confession they made a warm personal appeal to their hearers and tried to do justice to the broad statements of an offer of salvation to all."

James Hog and the two Erskines were among the better known of the "Marrowmen," whom the Assembly rebuked for upholding what orthodox Calvinism considered to be errors and heresies contained in an English puritan treatise of 1645, entitled The Marrow of Modern Divinity, which was re-issued by the minister of Ettrick, Thomas Boston.[1] It was Ebenezer Erskine who later led the revolt against patronage, as laid down by the Patronage Act of 1712, and who formed the "Evangelical" or "Popular" party, which stood for popular election and finally seceded in 1733, becoming the "Associate Presbytery," with Erskine as moderator. The second "Testimony" issued by the Associate Presbytery exemplifies the current range of church squabbles. It deplored:

> the failure to renew the Covenants or to assert the divine right of Presbytery, the toleration of 'Episcopal hirelings', the uncovenanted union with England, the 'yoke' of patronage, the Yule holidays in the courts, the condemnation of The Marrow,

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[1] There are many accounts of the "Marrow controversy;" Mechie's (pp.264-68) is succinct.

alongside the failure to excommunicate Professor Simson [see below], the sanctioning of such sinful activities as assemblies and balls, and the repeal of the statutes against witchcraft.[1]

The Associate Presbytery became the Associate Synod in 1742, which underwent internal division five years later, forming the Burgher Synod and the Anti-Burgher Synod, the split having occurred over whether they should take the "burgher oath" and swear to uphold "the true religion presently professed within this realm." This clause was intended to be anti-papal, but some of the Seceders doubted whether it was consistent with their Testimony and particularly with the newly-renewed Covenants.[2] The rift that took place lasted until 1820, during which time yet another division had taken place within the Burgher Synod.[3]

Other presbyterians were dissatisfied with the Established Church and among the splinter groups was that of John Glass, who reacted against its legalistic aspects, asserting his belief that the true New Testament church was "subject to no jurisdiction under heaven" and upholding the rights of private conscience.[4]

Professor John Simson and his followers, who comprise Mechie's fourth group, were at the opposite extreme from the Marrowmen, and were accused both of Arminianism and of Arianism. On the latter

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1 Pryde, pp.98-99.

2 W.L. Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, p.272.

3 Daiches, p.48.

4 Daiches, p.48, Pryde, pp.99-100.

count, the Assembly took issue with Simson's alleged leaning toward the "heresy of denying the separate divinity of Christ."[1] His "Arminian" teachings threatened rigid Calvinism by over-stressing free-will, "thus limiting the range of the unconditional decrees of God."[2]

Mechie includes Wallace amongst his third group which contains such men as William Hamilton, George and William Wishart and Patrick Cuming, who have in common moderate and liberal Calvinism. These men

> do not proclaim and defend the full Christian faith; but rather take the line that the divine origin and authority of Christianity may be inferred from its intrinsic excellence and the great benefits it has conferred on mankind....their apologetic is unduly concessive and leaves them defending something scarcely worth defending. Nevertheless they deserve honour, for with a good deal of accommodation to the rationalistic spirit of the age and a good deal of reserve about points of confessional orthodoxy they maintained a measure of earnest and devout piety, trying like liberals of a later century to show their contemporaries that Christianity is intellectually respectable (271).

The emphasis of Calvinism on predestination which co-existed in Scotland with a presbyterianism that stood for national freedom and

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1 Pryde, p.97.

2 Ferguson, p.116.

for democracy, resulted in the paradox demonstrated by David Daiches of extreme intolerance going hand in hand with belief in individual freedom. Calvinism, he points out, "forced the responsibility on to the individual elect while presbyterianism assigned it to the General Assembly," and disruption was the inevitable result of a clash.[1] The situation in England was very different, and G.R. Cragg makes a case for Calvinism having passed its peak by 1660.[2] The close association of religion with politics in the seventeenth century united Calvinism with the puritan party, whose political defeat, says Cragg, brought about the decline of puritan theology as well.

While the fanaticism of the covenanting days in Scotland had resulted in emphasis on the legalistic aspects of church government and the dominance in the early part of the century of Scholastic Calvinism, puritanism in England had given way to latitudinarian moderation, which appears to have been the source of the kind of moderatism practiced by Wallace and his associates. A theology based on reason, which distrusted superstition, enthusiasm and impassioned preaching, reflected a reaction to the religious intolerance which had characterised the previous century.

The enormous influence of John Tillotson on the eighteenth century is universally accepted. His teaching was marked by its stress on reason and free enquiry, its refusal to rely on spiritual

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1 Daiches, p.41.

2 G.R. Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1950), ch.II, "The Eclipse of Calvinism."

intuition.[1] Wallace was obviously deeply affected by Tillotson's thought, and echoed his appeal to common sense and his concern for "works" in addition to faith.

Latitudinarianism provoked two very different reactions: one, based on the belief that reason and common sense was sufficient, discarded the need for divine revelation and raised the question of the relationship between natural and revealed religion, opening the way for the Deistic controversy.[2] The other, the most extreme form of which was methodism, was the evangelical revival. The evangelical movement was stricter in its churchmanship than the methodists and disliked such methodist practices as lay preaching, the prayer meetings associated with it, and itinerancy. Over-exaltation of emotions was also frowned upon, and the evangelical Henry Venn, writing in 1763, remarked that:

> It is much to be lamented that our Christian brethren the Methodists made the ground of their Assurance an inward feeling instead of the faithfulness of Jehovah, the sensation of a fluctuating heart instead of the

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1 A very full discussion of Tillotson's influence and belief is to be found in vol. I, ch. 5 of The English Church in the Eighteenth Century (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1878), by Charles J. Abbey and John H. Overton.

2 The Deistic controversy is dealt with by Abbey and Overton, vol. I, ch. 4.

unchangeable promises of God.[1]

Part of the appeal of such preachers as Whitefield and Wesley lay in their warmth and passion, which contrasted with the unemotional coolness and clarity of the Latitudinarian divines. Wallace, while he stood out against methodism, and against the attempts of his more evangelical colleagues to work on the feelings, rather than on the reason of their congregations, nevertheless saw good in ardent preaching and in extempore prayer.

II Believer

Since we are told that Wallace entered the ministry expecting it to afford him time for study and because it suited his "speculative disposition,"[2] it is reasonable to ask whether he regarded the Church as merely providing leisured seclusion, or if he went into it with religious conviction. His writings leave us in no doubt of his sincerity and piety, although they do reveal, on occasion, a striking unorthodoxy.

Wallace described himself as being "educated by Religious parents and [having] been acquainted from my most early years with

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1 Quoted from an unpublished letter by L.E. Elliott-Binns in The Early Evangelicals: A Religious and Social Study (London: Lutterworth Press, 1953), p.215, from which the preceding summary of the difference between evangelicals and methodists derives. See also James Downey, The Eighteenth Century Pulpit (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), ch.1 for a summary of English eighteenth-century ecclesiastical controversy and the appeal of methodism, and Abbey and Overton vol. II, ch. 2 for the evangelical revival.

2 Scots Magazine, 33 (1771), 341.

many pious and devout people of different capacities."[1] It seems probable that he experienced no sudden conversion, but maintained a steady faith that had been inculcated in childhood. In the spirit of his Latitudinarian predecessors, he rejected the idea "that either great fears & allarms or the most lively sorrow and grief or floods of tears or the warmest joyes are necessary to conversion. You may become wise and good," he maintained, "in another manner. Nor are these things the surest signs of conversion: very lively sorrows, terrours and joyes on Religious accounts as well as others may be found in very vitious men."[2]

He attached a religious importance to study which pervades his writings: preaching on I Timothy IV, 13, 15, for example, he proposes to confine himself

> to this Single advice given by the Apostle "to give Attendance to reading", and to Consider the duty and Character of the ministers of the Gospell in this respect that they ought to be men given to Study, which is not only agreeable to the Idea which has been generally conceived concerning them, but is Evidently founded on the authority of the Apostle in this passage.[3]

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1 La II 97[6], "Christian piety Illustrated And certain mistakes concerning it Detected In an address to the Religious & well Disposed," p.1.

2 La II 97[6], p.48.

3 La II 97[7], Sermon, May 1745 [p.3].

In a sermon entitled Ignorance and Superstition a Source of Violence and Cruelty, and in particular the Cause of the present Rebellion,[1] Wallace attacked Mandeville on the grounds that the latter claimed, in An Essay on Charity and Charity Schools, that "human Society cannot be supported without Ignorance." Here, Wallace combined his sociological and religious tenets and anticipated the views he propounded fifteen years later in his Prospects. Society, he argued, should be organised so that labour, by being evenly distributed, should not become a drudgery, leaving no time for learning and destroying the taste for it completely. By nature, Man has a relish for knowledge, which is "the Glory of Men, as rational Creatures."[2]

As knowledge was vital both to the clergy and the laity, so too was an equal standard of morality and dedication: "In entering into Orders it is not necessary to have more spirituall or morall Intentions than other virtuous men who believe the common Principles of Religion," he believed. To seek honest employment which would benefit society was the duty of all pious and virtuous men: "what higher aims," he asked, could then "be required or expected in the

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1 A Sermon Preached in the High Church of Edinburgh, Monday January 6, 1745-6, Upon Occasion of the Anniversary Meeting of the Society in Scotland for propagating Christian Knowledge (Edinburgh: R. Fleming & Co., 1746).

2 Ibid, p.19.

Clergy?"[1]

Wallace's personal standards were high: "I will try to find out my weaknesses & mark them down & examine whether they are cured or whether they increase or are Diminished," he wrote, and he deplored what in his later years he saw as the corrupted taste of the age: "ambition, sensuality & an admiration of false politeness and of mere trifles engross the attention of the learned and the vulgar."[2] He gives no indication, even in his private writings, of ever being beset by serious doubts: he saw no need, for instance, to spend his last hour in prayer, as he could, "with Confidence & without any immediate prayers trust intirely to nature & the God of nature."[3] Prayer was, after all, an integral part of his devotional life: "Seneca often decries prayers & justly: the superstitious and the Enthousiasticall deal too much in prayers. Yet prayers are good & sometimes I love them much & delight in pouring out my heart unto

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1 La II 97[1], "A letter from a moderate Freethinker to David Hume Esquire Concerning the Profession of The Clergy In which it is showed That their Vices what ever they are are owing to their Disposition and not to the bad influence of their Profession," p.6.

2 "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles," Friday, 27 February 1767. There is evidence throughout the "Meditations" of his concern for self-improvement.

3 "Meditations" Saturday, 23 October 1756. While this may sound deistical, it is more probable that Wallace follows Chillingworth and Tillotson here in emphasizing that preparation for death should be made during life and not on a sudden death-bed repentance. See, e.g. William Chillingworth, The Religion of Protestants A Safe Way to Salvation, 2nd ed. (London: John Clark, 1638), p.361 para. 70 and The Works of Dr. John Tillotson, ed. Thomas Birch (London: Richard Priestley, 1820), II, 55. Hereafter cited as Works.

God."[1]

Repeatedly, Wallace set less store by people's religious beliefs than by their actions. He opposed subscriptions and confessions, as is evident from a number of his manuscript works and he maintained "that evil works wer worse than evil opinion" and that faith without works was dead.[2] In "Christian piety Illustrated"[3] which Wallace intended for publication, and which was almost ready for the press in 1758, he encouraged meditation, recollection, self-examination and prayer as exercises which will cultivate piety:

> Provided allwayes that these devout exercises do not interfere with the performance of our other duties or hinder us from doing other work that is necessary or proper whether in improving our minds by cultivating those arts & sciences which are usefull or serve for the ornament of society or in working with our hands att our lawfull trades and occupations Provided also too closs an attention to these pious meditations does not render us too stiff grave & formal unfits us for the commerce of

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1 "Meditations", Saturday, 2 October 1756.

2 Robert Wodrow, Analecta III, 167. Wallace's opposition to subscriptions and to the doctrine of justification by faith alone, so bitterly resented by Wodrow, is derived from a Latitudinarianism which rejected both high-churchmanship and Calvinism.

3 La II 97[6]. Full title in footnote 1 p.81. It was never published.

> the world or for acting our part with that decency, chearfullness or gaity that becomes us (37).[1]

The somewhat cynical view of the world which we find on occasion in Wallace's private writings is excluded from works intended for a wider audience and, by Ramsay's account, was very ably disguised in Wallace's social life:

> Whether philosophy or belles lettres was the theme, he never failed to throw new light on it; and, what was of the utmost consequence, it helped to abate people's fondness for preconceived opinions, when they found these could not stand the test of examination. The enthusiasm of such a man was catching, and to his exhortations and hints the world owed works which would otherwise never have been attempted. He was during his life exceedingly fond of being the guide and instructor of youth, a task for which he was well qualified, from his philanthropy and zeal to promote the interest of his young friends. He was long regarded by persons intended for the ministry as their Mentor and

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[1] He points out elsewhere that informal prayers, for a sick child, for example, are as efficacious and are less disruptive of the duties of life than formal prayers. (La I. 620, "Part of a piece intended to make Remarks on an Account of Colonel Gardiner" [8]).

Maecenas.[1]

III Preacher

"Perhaps sometimes he was too diffuse, and his Pindaric flights seemed to imply, either that his discourses were not written, or that, warmed by his subject, he gave way to the impulse of the moment. In some cases he could not be acquitted of eccentricity."[2] Thus Ramsay described Wallace in the pulpit, only to qualify his criticism with generous praise. For those who judged preaching by the standards of a rigorous Calvinist orthodoxy, however, Wallace's performances were obnoxious. Wodrow, describing William Wishart's first communion in Glasgow tells us

> Ther was a sermon on the afternoon [of] Munday by Mr Wallace, in Moffat, which hath made some noise, as I hear. It was on "Faith without works is dead", and in the neu haranging method, and pleased some of the young volage sparks, who set up nou nightily for criticks of sermons. For a full half hour he insisted on an introduction about the necessity of trying [enquiring], in matters of religion; and the unaccountableness of being satisfied with education; and left but

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1 John Ramsay, Scotland and Scotsmen I, 245-46. Hereafter cited as Ramsay.

2 Ramsay, I, 241.

> a quarter of an hour for his text, where he gave a cold account of faith, as an assent and crediting testimony; and insisted on an inference or two, of the insufficiency of a profession; and that evil works wer worse than evil opinion, and yet some were so zealouse in prosecuting such as differed in opinion, and overlooked these that wer loose in practise, if they agreed in opinion, with somewhat that was taken by some to be favourable to the Non-subscribing lay, and a fling at Confessions, as "imposed forms of orthodoxy", or words to that purpose.[1]

Wodrow took particular exception to Wallace's attempts to introduce polite culture into the pulpit. The bulk of one sermon, preached by Wallace before the Assembly in 1730, was, says Wodrow, "borrowed from the Spectators, and ill put together....with flings at zeal, very ill-worded."[2]

Those who saw reasons to praise Wallace's preaching did so in terms which underline his affinity to the world of polite culture. The sermons may perhaps have been above the heads of some of his congregation,[3] but they were characterised by "depth of thought, originality of genius, and the art of gaining attention to the most

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1 Wodrow, Analecta III, 167-68.

2 Wodrow IV, 129.

3 Ramsay I, 248.

common and necessary subjects, by new reflections, illustrations and arrangements."[1] Though he was thought somewhat fanciful and lacking in correctness,[2] his liveliness and rare combination of "depth and elevation of thought" with "a plainness of language truly classical"[3] were ample compensation. Wodrow would have regarded such praise as frivolous in the extreme, but these criteria of excellence are manifestly the same as those by which secular literature of this time was assessed.

Wallace's eccentricities were no doubt among his more endearing qualities: he is said, when preaching on a text in which the ends of the world were mentioned, to have set out to prove that, contrary to Hutchinsonian theory, the world, being a sphere, had no ends.[4] His eloquence, too, made a lasting impression. Ramsay tells us that during his funeral sermon for William Wishart in 1753, "the ladies stared at hearing him rap out in a kind of ecstasy the beautiful lines of his favourite poet, 'Hic manus ob patriam,' &c"[5] and Henry Mackenzie recalls his "high encomium" on Gray's Elegy, which Wallace compared favourably with the finest ancient classical

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1 A. Morren, Annals of the General Assembly I, 318 n. (hereafter cited as Morren). Quoted from John Erskine's appendix to his funeral sermon for Principal William Robertson.

2 Ramsay ., 248.

3 Ramsay I, 241.

4 Ramsay I, 241 n.2. See Appendix I, 8.

5 Ramsay ., 241 n.1. From Virgil, Aeneid VI, 660: "Hic manus ob patriam pugnando vulnera passi" — "Here is the band of those who suffered wounds, fighting for the fatherland." To be found also on the title-page of Wallace's Doctrine of Passive Obedience and Non Resistance Considered.

poetry.[1] His prayers, which "breathed a seraphic spirit, without any tincture of weakness or fanaticism," drew praise from the Earl of Huntingdon for the beauty of what he took to be the Scottish liturgy.[2] In "An Address...Concerning Occasionall Conformity" (La II 97[4]) Wallace registers surprise at the implication of the presence of set prayers in the English liturgy, which seems to him to suggest that it is thought more difficult to pray than to preach well. Even his defence of such a touchstone of presbyterian orthodoxy as extempore prayer, acquires a secular colour in his hands. To his mind, repetition bores and extempore prayer can be adapted to the needs of the moment.[3]

Ramsay tells us that Wallace aimed "to make the learned, the rich, and the fashionable part of the community pious and devout without foregoing the pursuits of elegance and eloquence."[4] He would have reached this section of society among the congregation that attended the Wednesday evening sermons preached in rotation by Wallace, George and William Wishart, Patrick Cuming and Alexander Webster, which attained high popularity in the late 1740s.[5] Wallace seems to have entertained some doubts as to the likelihood

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1 Henry Mackenzie, An Account of the Life and Writings of John Home, p.17.

2 Ramsay I, 240 and n.2.

3 The "Address" is discussed below, pp.164-65 and 171-72. The views expressed above are those of the fictional publisher in his "Notes on the Praceeding Address," p.20.

4 Ramsay I, 241-42.

5 Ramsay I, 241 n.2.

of his success, however:

> It may even be called in question if the publick teaching & instructions or the private advices of the Clergy do much service they may possibly prevent some evil but I suspect only a very little and that the character and dispositions of mankind are formed by other circumstances of a more forcible nature.[1]

The tone of Wallace's published works on religious subjects is itself sufficient to place him among the ranks of those "moral preachers," who tended to deal with virtue in the abstract, "presenting it as something to be desired for its own intrinsic excellence and practised either for its social utility, its possible reward in a future life, or simply because it is of the nature of man to be virtuous."[2] They were accused of replacing Christianity with a vague moralism and of being as ready to propound the doctrines of Stoicism as those of the Gospel, which according to Clark, was a European phenomenon and one that was not entirely confined to the moderate sector of the Church. This impression is confirmed, as we shall see, by Wallace's unpublished manuscripts, one or two of which are quite startlingly far removed from the ethos of orthodox presbyterianism. His one substantial concession to the popular religion is his conviction that preaching needs to be "warm & ardent," if only to affect "the Vulgar." Fine "harrangues on the

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1 "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles," on Epistle 29, September 1756.

2 Ian Clark, Thesis, p.272.

beauty & excellency of virtue," he explains, "will have little effect." Even Wallace's ardour had to appear "rational & judicious," however, "for the sake of the Politer sort."[1] We are in the same world here as that of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, where we read that: "The passions are so contagious, that they pass with the greatest facility from one person to another, and produce correspondent movements in all human breasts" (III, iii, 3).

IV Ecclesiastical Adviser and Moderator of the General Assembly

When John, fourth Marquis of Tweeddale succeeded Lord Islay as Minister for Scottish affairs in 1742, he was early reminded of the need to maintain an amicable relationship with the Scottish Church. An ecclesiastical adviser on such matters as presentations to churches under Crown patronage was invaluable and it was of

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1 La II 620[23], "Some thoughts on the conversion of the Indians," penultimate paragraph. Swift was an example of those who dismissed the emotional element in preaching. "I do not see," he wrote, "how this Talent of moving the Passions, can be of any great Use towards directing Christian Men in the Conduct of their Lives" ("A Letter to a Young Gentleman Lately Entered into Holy Orders," in The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift, vol. IX: Irish Tracts 1720-23 And Sermons, ed. H. Davis [Oxford: Blackwell, 1948], p.69). Wallace himself disapproved of the kind of emotions raised by divines "who paint their audience blackest, raise the most dreadful spectres, and speak the worst of the times and of human nature" (Characteristics, 2nd. ed., p.165n.).

considerable importance that a suitable choice be made. As Thomas Hay[1] commented, the clergy "must be managed with some discretion & by right men, which I believe is no easy matter, but a little necessary especially in these turbulent times."[2]

In response to Hay's request to "name the Clergyman you can most depend upon,"[3] Tweeddale sought the advice of Lord Advocate Robert Craigie,[4] who replied that the divisions in the Church made it almost impossible to pick a reliable man, as "the people of greatest abilitys among them have so far lost character, even amongst themselves." He tentatively put forward Principal Tullideph of St. Andrews,[5] but asked for time to think of a suitable candidate in Edinburgh. His attitude to the Church was both more optimistic and

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1 Thomas Hay, later Lord Huntington, son of Alexander Hay, advocate. Became a member of the bar, 3 June 1725. Appointed Keeper of the Signet March 1742. (George Brunton and David Haig, An Historical Account of the Senators of the College of Justice /Edinburgh & London: Clark; Saunders & Benning, 1832/, p.520. Hereafter cited as Brunton and Haig).

2 NLS MS. 7046 f 9 v. 3 April 1742. This and the following letters are among the Yester Correspondence, through which the steps taken to secure Wallace's assistance can be traced. See my article "Clerical Corridors of Power: Extracts from letters concerning Robert Wallace's involvement in ecclesiastical politics, 1742-1743," in Notes and Queries, N.S.20, No.6 (1973), 214-19, in which letters describing the moves leading to his election as Moderator are also reproduced.

3 NLS MS. 7045 f50v. 2 March 1742.

4 Robert Craigie, later President of the Court of Session, son of Lawrence Craigie of Kilgraston. Admitted advocate 3 January 1710. Appointed Lord Advocate 4 March 1742. (Brunton and Haig, p.517).

5 Then Principal of St. Leonard's College, who later, as is evident from Tweeddale's correspondence, also took part in assisting with problems of patronage. See Appendix I, 9.

more cynical than Hay's: "I think it absolutely necessary that the Church should be kept in good humour and I think it's no difficult task," he wrote. "There's no danger at present when some wil fear to lose and others wil expect to get chaplainries."[1]

Craigie in turn consulted with Lord Arniston,[2] who wrote to Tweeddale himself, strongly recommending Wallace, as "a right ministerial honest man, knowing far above most of them, prudent and judicious, and who would be most acceptable to the Clergy."[3] Craigie, confirming Wallace to be "of an unblemished character," was "not so acquainted with his abilitys in the church Judicatorys by reason of his being but new in this place."[4] On making enquiries, Craigie discovered that Wallace was considered "too much in with principal Wishart" and that because of some of his early writings, a number of the clergy regarded him with suspicion.[5] Arniston vigourously denied

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1 NLS MS. 7045 f94v-95. 18 March 1742.

2 Robert Dundas of Arniston, appointed Lord President 10 September 1748, eldest son of Robert Dundas of Arniston, one of the Senators of the College of Justice. Admitted advocate 26 July 1709. Appointed Solicitor-General 14 July 1717. Constituted Lord Advocate 29 May 1720. Made Dean of the Faculty of Advocates 9 December 1721. Elected representative for county of Edinburgh to Parliament 1722. Lost office as Lord Advocate when Walpole came into power (and went into active opposition against him), but retained appointment of Dean of the Faculty of Advocates until his elevation to the bench, 10 June 1737, when he took the title Lord Arniston. (Brunton and Haig, p.507). Wallace's relation with Arniston is discussed at the end of this section.

3 NLS MS. 7046 f48-48v. 13 April 1742.

4 NLS MS. 7046 f7. 3 April 1742.

5 NLS MS. 7049 f45-45v. 14 August 1742. No doubt a reference to the controversy in 1733 arising from Wallace's Synod Sermon.

this,[1] and subsequent correspondence, mainly from Hay to Tweeddale, concerning matters of patronage, as well as some of Wallace's own papers (La II 620[29]), confirm that Wallace did indeed become Tweeddale's ecclesiastical adviser during the years that he was in power.

In the light of Wallace's opposition to the patronage system[2] it seems perhaps inconsistent of him to have accepted such a position. He was of the opinion that elections were safer in the hands of many than of one and that ministers of state who dealt with crown patronage might have little time to consider the merits of the pastor or the needs of his parishioners. Nor was he unaware of the risk of bribery, simony and corruption, and of the danger of a statesman's increasing his political power by this means. A certain attention to the wishes of the people Wallace regarded as desirable, since happy results were not generally achieved by the settlement of an unpopular pastor.[3] On the other hand, he was not in favour of all the people having a say, which could be harmful in degenerate and corrupted times. The multitude was too easily misled by false orators, he believed, and had little discrimination.[4] It would seem that as a younger man he favoured the election of ministers

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1 NLS MS. 7049 f45-45v.

2 Sefton deals with this in his chapter entitled "Robert Wallace as Ecclesiastical Statesman."

3 These views are to be found in La II 620[29], "Some good Hints with respect to Patronages of Churches Written soon after the Year 1734."

4 La II 97[3], "Irenicum", pp.52-54.

by heritors and elders, who should be prepared to take the preference of the parishioners into account, selecting the man of their choice even when the alternative candidate was slightly better qualified.[1] Writing in 1770, however, he allows that a choice as good as or even better than that of the heritors, elders or congregation might be made by patrons[2] and he describes the grievance of patronage as remediless:

> it is in vain to have the law repealled: nor do I think this of so much Consequence as many other things which are wholly neglected in this country & under this government and in truth the opposition given by many of the Clergy to Patronages appears to me to proceed more from faction than Patriotism (note dated 1770 appended to La II 620[29]: "Some good Hints...").

He no doubt felt that in accepting appointment as ecclesiastical adviser, he could make the best of an imperfect system, as indeed he appears to have done with notable success.[3] His task was to ascertain that the royal presentee was acceptable to the

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1 La II 620[29], "Some good Hints with respect to Patronages of Churches".

2 La II 620[29]2, "Some thoughts on the controversy about Patronage as the mode of naming Ministers of the Gospell to the paroches of Scotland."

3 One is reminded here of the passage in "Irenicum" where Wallace discusses the obedience due by inferiors to superiors and advises the good officer to retain his position and carry out orders which he may not believe to be morally right, lest a worse man take his place. See below, p.169.

parishioners, and to ensure a peaceful settlement. A major problem lay in the fact that the number and location of benefices in the gift of the Crown were not fully known,[1] and Wallace had to find correspondents throughout the country in order to amass some basic information.[2] A draft letter among his papers shows how anxious he was not to cause offence[3] and in another his dislike of the Patronage Act comes over when he refers to "the animosities which have happened about the settling of vacant churches" and says that one way of preventing them, "as the law now stands" was to give prompt notice of vacancies and to indicate the preferences of the parishioners as to a replacement.[4] From the replies, Wallace was able to compile "A list of Correspondents with Mr. W.W. according to the order of Synods & Presbyteries" (La II $620^{29^{11}}$), and a table of "Kirks just now Vacant where the Crown is patron" (La II $620^{29^{4}}$).

In all the time that Wallace was ecclesiastical adviser there appears to have been only one occasion on which the congregation actively opposed the Crown presentee,[5] which gives weight to Ramsay's declaration that the "mildness and prudence with which he conducted the affairs of the Church whilst his patron remained in

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1 Wallace believed that the Crown held half the country's benefices, but the figure was nearer one third (Sefton, Thesis, p.85).

2 A list of his correspondents is to be found in La II $620^{29^{5}}$.

3 La II $620^{29^{6}}$.

4 La II $620^{29^{7}}$. Reproduced in Appendix II.

5 At Kettins. The mob prevented the Presbytery from meeting in the parish in order to obtain the presentee in January 1746. (Scott, Fasti V, 264).

office, did him the highest honour."[1]

In April 1743, Arniston wrote to Tweeddale, discussing the Moderatorship and listing the clergymen who seemed, in the eyes of their colleagues, the most likely candidates for the office. Dismissing the others, Arniston asserted that "Most of all those about Edr., and of the most moderat & wise, will be for Mr Wallace and as I have not changed the oppinion I formerly gave of him, I must of consequence think him the most proper, and for what I see yet, endeavour to promote the choice of him."[2]

Not everyone, however, was so sure that Wallace was the man. Thomas Hay, while hoping he would succeed, feared "that some of the young Ruling Elders & perhaps of the bretheren too may oppose him because of his known connections,"[3] his "connections" being, presumably, his acquaintance and political affinity with Arniston and his association with Tweeddale. It was thought that Alexander Webster might stand in opposition to Wallace,[4] though Wallace himself was sure of his support,[5] and it was in fact a Mr. McDermint of Ayr who competed with Wallace for the office. He had been persuaded to stand by a group of Arniston's opponents, led by Lord Drummore,[6] who had made a number of unsuccessful attempts to find an alternative

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1 Ramsay I, 240.

2 NLS MS. 7054 f103v-104v. 5 April 1743.

3 NLS MS. 7054 f131v. 19 April 1743.

4 NLS MS. 7054 f119v. 12 April 1743.

5 NLS MS. 7055 f16. 5 May 1743.

6 NLS MS. 7055 f49. See Appendix I, 10.

candidate.[1]

As May had expected, the competition for the Moderatorship was regarded "as a struggle in which the Ministry interested themselves" and he reported that Mr William Grant, "doubtfull whither he should vote for Mr Modormint, or as he called it, if he should pay the ministry the compliment of voting for Mr Wallace," was persuaded by Drummore "that it was better to vote against Mr Wallace, since...the ministry would not thank him for his vote."[2] Wallace was elected by the 160 or so voters by a majority of around 72, and it was the Earl of Leven, Commissioner to the Assembly, who gave Tweeddale the most revealing account of events:

> I cannot now take upon me to remember all the particulars, or what the different members said, which I could have done very minutely at the time, but I shall let your Lop. in to their low game with relation to their Opposition to Mr Wallace; when I went to town some days befor the Assembly met, I heard Lord Drummore, Mr Grant & the Reverend & worthy Mr Cumming had layed their heads together to Oppose Mr Wallaces being Moderator, Cumming out of resentment at me for exposeing him last year, & out of an Itch to do mischief, Drummore & Grant I suppose chiefly out of pick to Lord Arniston, whom they knew had

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1 NLS MS. 7055 f45v. 12 May 1743.

2 NLS MS. 7055 f59v. 14 May 1743.

recommended Wallace & perhaps too for other motives I shall not mention. None were so blind as to imagine they could succeed, but the way they took to get numbers was, to raise a groundless cry against an innocent man, this they knew would take with the weaker sort, & so it did; their malicious story was that Mr Wallace behoved to be opposed, for he had writ letters throw the Country telling he was to be set up for Moderator, & that it would not be wise to oppose him, for now he was to be employed in disposeing of the Presentations from the Crown: this every member, they thought weak enough to believe it, was told, upon his first coming to town. Here is a strong instance how far humour & prejudice will carry some men, & how the best designs may be turned into ridicule, for the letters bore no such thing as was said, but barely setting forth that he had reason to believe the Crown was determined to use its right of presenting in the gentlest way. Wherever the Crown got proper information that the majority of legal voters were fixed on a right man, the presentation would be given, & for that purpose desired those people he writ to, to correspond with him;[1] when this

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[1] The draft letter in La II 620[29] is probably a typical example of the kind of letter Wallace sent out. See Appendix 2.

> was told many who were imposed upon, were ashamed, & voted with us: it was a little merry to see they could not get a man weak enough to stand in Opposition. They tryed Principal Wishart he told them he had passed his promise to me last year never to stand to be moderator so long as I was Commissioner except with my consent, then they attacked his Brother George, & other two & at length prevailed on one Moderaint Minister at Air, a plain poor man; they were shamefully beat & it took no effect like all other ill concertd schemes without a proper head.[1]

In the light of such political manoeuverings, it is not surprising, perhaps, that Wallace advocated caution in personal relationships. Believing Seneca's notion of friendship to be "too high," he saw "no necessity, wisdom nor advantage in committing all our secrets to any man alive: it is safer to have some reserve & only communicate some things."[2] Ramsay tells us that Wallace came to be regarded as a man who avoided involvement in ecclesiastical politics, and recalls that from 1753-60 when he attended Church courts, Wallace was either not a member of the Assembly, or took little or no part in the debates. He was, of course, busy writing during that period, and he may also have felt disinclined to adjust

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1 NLS MS. 7055 f135-135v. 28 May 1743.

2 "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles," on Epistle 3, Saturday, 30 June 1753.

himself to the power structure that was evolving as a result of the emergence of the Moderate Party in 1752. Sefton's point, however, that Wallace played the part of interested spectator,[1] may be seen as an indication not only that Wallace preferred, in his later years, to avoid theological dispute, but that his private beliefs were such that discretion prevented him from airing his views in public.

Wallace's relationship with Lord Arniston deserves a brief mention. Their friendship probably began around 1737, though they had almost certainly already met, since Wallace's father-in-law, George Turnbull, was Arniston's parish minister. As well as sharing a strong dislike of the Walpole administration and being associated in producing the "apology for the ministers of the Church of Scotland" for not reading the Porteous Riot Act (see ch. I above, p.31) they had both taken part in Assembly debates of that period. During a dispute over the recording of dissents by particular members against decisions of the General Assembly, in which Wallace played a prominent part, Wallace recalls that he "was answered among others by the Late Lord Arnistoun afterwards president of the Court of Session; but with high compliments to the author [Wallace]."[2]

The relationship was such that George Wallace became a protégé of the Arniston family, but 1757 saw the abrupt severance of all friendly communications: Arniston, who was violently opposed to the production of Douglas, took great offence at Thomas

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1 Sefton, Thesis, pp.145ff.

2 Note at end of La II 620[32].

Turnbull's[1] supporting Carlyle in the Presbytery (under Wallace's influence) and Turnbull remained permanently out of favour. Lord Milton, agent of the Duke of Argyle, to whom Arniston was politically opposed, was increasingly influenced by the young Moderates and as a result Arniston did as much as he could to discredit John Home and his followers, refusing to procure a withdrawal of Carlyle's prosecution by using his influence with the Presbytery of Dalkeith, a gesture which did not endear him to the Moderate Party.[2] Wallace incurred such extreme displeasure that George was totally neglected until after Arniston's death, when his son Robert made somewhat dubious amends by giving George a place on the bench of the Commissary Court.[3]

Wallace's reaction to Arniston's active opposition to the 1749-50 Augmentation Scheme, designed to increase ministers' stipends, is not known, but the response of the bulk of the clergy was, not surprisingly, one of enduring dislike.[4] Arniston appears from his letters to have been a man of outspoken and dogmatic opinion and it would indeed have been surprising if Wallace had

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1 Thomas Turnbull, 1701-1786, Wallace's brother-in-law, minister of Borthwick in the Presbytery of Dalkeith. His father, George Turnbull had died in 1744.

2 G.W.T. Omond, The Arniston Memoirs: Three Centuries of a Scottish House 1571-1838 (Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1887), p.159.

3 Alexander Carlyle, Autobiography, pp.333-34. From Arnot's description (Appendix I, 3), the court lacked status. Boswell records distaste at George's "violent resentment against the Arniston family." (Private Papers from Malahide Castle, ed. Geoffrey Scott & Frederick A. Pottle, 15 [privately printed, 1932], 77: Saturday, 4 May 1782).

4 Ian Clark, Thesis, p.85.

found himself always in agreement with him.

V Widows' Fund

1743 was not only the year in which Wallace reached the height of his ecclesiastical career, for it was, fittingly, the Assembly over which Wallace presided as Moderator which resolved to apply for an act of Parliament to establish the Ministers' Widows' Fund.[1] Although an attempt was begun in 1718 to inaugurate an insurance scheme,[2] it was not until 1742 that proposals were successfully put forward, under the direction of Alexander Webster, who was not only the driving force behind the scheme, but who saw it through and made sure it remained in operation. It was, J.B. Dow believes, "almost certainly the first attempt to organise scientifically a widows' fund on an annual premium basis."

From existing records it is plain that Wallace, with the assistance of Colin Maclaurin, did a large part of the calculations, but it appears that once those were complete, Wallace was content to leave the organisation of the fund to others, though he clearly

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1 I am most grateful to J.B. Dow, M.A., F.F.A., former manager of The Standard Life Assurance Company, Edinburgh, for showing me a draft paper on "Early Actuarial Work in Eighteenth-Century Scotland," to which I shall refer in the text. Mr. Dow's paper should appear in the Transactions of the Faculty of Actuaries in 1973, to which I refer the reader for details of Wallace's calculations. The Fund's papers are in [illegible] CH 9. Mr. Dow also outlines the part played by Colin Maclaurin and the letters he refers to are in [illegible] CH 3/1/6 and [illegible] 236.

2 Morren I, 27-28.

exerted himself considerably to have the scheme established.

J.B. Dow draws particular attention to a manuscript by Wallace, written, he judges, in 1741 or 42 (reproduced in Appendix III), which he holds up as a striking example of the manner in which an intelligent man has gone about tackling a completely new problem, to arrive at "eminently sensible conclusions." Wallace's third point, in which he arrived at the belief that "every widow may have the quadruple of what her husband pays in and therefore a triple cannot be too much," Mr. Dow cites as an example of "the intuitive argument by which actuaries still put a rough check on their formal calculations." He also points out that Wallace grasped a number of what are now regarded as the classical problems of widows' funds, such as the health risk, the selective force of marriage, the husband's being older than his wife, and that of later, more elderly entrants. Many of the simple and practical rules Wallace proposed could, with minor alterations, be incorporated in the constitution of a modern fund.

Webster had written to the presbyteries throughout Scotland asking for relevant statistics and Wallace, with the aid of Halley's population tables, produced numerous calculations. The initial plan proposed by Wallace and Webster in 1742, J.B. Dow describes as "a sophisticated one." Four grades of contribution were offered, 2½ guinea to 6½ guinea premiums giving widows' annuities of £10 to £25 per annum.[1] Orphans would receive a capital sum of ten times

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[1] Wallace himself chose the highest grade and his widow received the £25 annuity (SRO CH9/9/5, years 1773-75).

the value of the annuity and the plan incorporated what Mr. Dow believes to be "probably the earliest recorded example of an initial debt" -- "a provision that both annuities and capital sums would be reduced to the dependants of members who died in the early years of membership." This plan was not immediately adopted, and alternative schemes were proposed, the one approved requiring amendment in 1748.[1]

The clergy were watched in their endeavours with a cautious eye by those in political power. "Your Lop hath no doubt heard of their scheme about providing out of their stipends a fund for ministers widows," wrote Arniston to Tweeddale in April 1743: "it would be fit for us to know how such a thing is relished above, since they seem mighty anxious about it."[2] Robert Craigie in May hoped to have the plan "maturely considerd before any application is made to parliament,"[3] and after a meeting in the same month "with the principall projectors of the scheme," he reported that "whatever plan they may agree to no application is to be made to parliament til the Commission or the next assembly are informed by us that are the members of the house of commons that there is a prospect of carrying

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1 Horren 1, 28-32, 37, 107. For a history of the scheme, see also An Account of the Rise and Nature of the Fund established by Parliament, For a Provision for the Widows and Children of the Ministers of the Church, and of the Heads, Principals, and Masters in the Universities, of Scotland. Containing An Abridgement of the Two Statutes, and Copies of Papers relative to the Fund. Published by order of the Trustees, For the use of all concerned. (Edinburgh: Sands, Donaldson, Murray, Cochran, 1759).

2 NLS MS. 7054 f104v.

3 NLS MS. 7055 f56. 1 May 1743.

it peaceably throw the Parliament so that I hope the church wil have no reason to complain of the administration in any event."[1]

Possible political repercussions were indicated by Lord Leven, Commisioner to the 1743 Assembly which approved a rectified scheme:

> This is a project they were so fond of, and indeed so natural a one, that it was impossible to prevent it taking Effect, for my own part I would have wished it cou'd have been prevented, because I see the difficulty it will occasion Your Lop [Tweeddale], for shou'd it not take effect above, Your Lordship at first view will see the handle some people will make of it; however I am now hopefull it is so modelled that it may go through; in which case it will be so far from being unlucky, that it must ingratiate you more with the Clergy than almost any other thing cou'd have done.[2]

In his capacity as Moderator, Wallace himself wrote to Tweeddale in July 1743, enclosing the proposed scheme and applying for his "good offices and kind assistance":

> When we reflect on Your Lordship's Generosity and Your regard for this Church, we cannot but hope for your countenance to so charitable a Design, and that you will most chearfully

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1 NLS MS. 7055 f72v-73. 17 May 1743.

2 NLS MS. 7055 f109v. 24 May 1743.

> consent, that so small a part of the vacant stipends as is proposed in the scheme, be bestowed for such a pious use, which we humbly ask with the greater earnestness, as all Ranks are sensible some such scheme has been long wanting, and must be of considerable advantage not only to the ministers but to the country in General, and should this Design now fail after it has been so long under Deliberation & so Universally approved, we have but little prospect of seeing any other scheme take place.[1]

Tension mounted, and in November 1743 the Commission meeting appointed Wallace and George Kishart to go to London to "make application...for rendering said scheme effectual."[2] A month earlier Robert Craigie had confessed that the scheme gave him "a good deal of pain." He thought the design "in the generall unexceptionable," but as several of the clergy disliked it he feared that "many difficultys may occurr in the Execution." He had agreed to test out public opinion in London on condition that the Commissirn would delay making an application to Parliament if it seemed unlikely that the act would go through.[3]

Arniston also had written Tweeddale in October,[4] telling him of

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1 NLS MS. 7057 f40-40v.

2 Morren I, 45.

3 NLS MS. 7058 f83v. 11 October 1743.

4 NLS MS. 7058 f127-127v. 25 October 1743.

a letter from Wallace which expressed anxiety over the success of the application. Wallace had apparently described the clergy who were not in favour as opposing it "from personal politick and malicious views" and he was particularly anxious to have the support of the present administration. Arniston himself saw "no good reason for not countenancing the scheme upon the main" and wrote again a few days later in gently persuasive tones, renewing his request for an approving letter from Tweeddale to the Commission.[1] Tweeddale complied, and the letter he sent, Wallace told Craigie, gave satisfaction.[2]

Wallace and Wishart remained in London until April 1744,[3] and prior to the act's being passed they received letters from the Edinburgh committee, which Wallace preserved, commenting that

> Messieurs Wallace and Wishart served the church with fidelity & care, they succeeded & they had the thanks of the Generall Assembly & all good men But when they were att London severall peevish & unwise orders were sent them & they learned by Experience how difficult it was to be Directed & advised by a Committee att Edinburgh.[4]

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1 NLS MS. 7058 f147v-148.

2 NLS MS. 7059 f3v. 1 November 1743.

3 SRO CH/9/17/23, cover note to bundle of letters, in Wallace's hand: "Mr Wallace came not to Edinburgh from London till the 15th of April 1744."

4 SRO CH/9/17/23.

The two men were thanked by the Assembly of 1744 "for their faithfulness and diligence" in obtaining the Act of Parliament[1] which had gone through on 2 March,[2] and future reports bore witness to the accuracy of the calculations.[3] An unfortunate repercussion was remarked on in a letter from Craigie to Treeddale in May 1745, where Craigie reported that the Assembly "is the thinnest I ever saw, occasion'd as I am told by the large sums the ministers have advanc'd on the widows scheme and the severe winter which hath distrest the Clergy liveing in the remote parts."[4] A number of adjustments were made to the scheme, but basically, it remains much the same today.

Credit has recently been given to the principles underlying the Widow's Fund by Alexander Mackie, who demonstrates their influence on America's first life insurance business, begun by Francis Alison.[5] Wallace's contribution to the scheme is commemorated by a portrait, painted in 1764,[6] which still hangs in the offices of the Trustees of the Widows' Fund, now in George Street, Edinburgh.

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1 Morren I, 63.

2 Morren I, 45.

3 See, for example, Morren II, 199-200, 261, 308-09.

4 NLS MS. 7066 f32.

5 Alexander Mackie, Facile Princeps. The Story of the Beginning of Life Insurance in America (Pennsylvania: Lancaster Press, 1956), esp. pp.108-09, 129.

6 Morren I, 307.

VI Religious Writings

The large amount of unpublished material still in existence makes a study of Wallace as a writer particularly interesting. Often he seemed content to write and keep manuscripts by him, making no attempt to publish,[1] and the contrast between certain manuscripts he obviously did not intend for publication[2] and those prepared for the press, indicates that works planned for public presentation were designed so that they avoided controversy and did not, by lacking orthodoxy, threaten the good name of the Church or the faith of the readers.

In discussing Wallace's works it is perhaps important to bear in mind the remark at the beginning of his "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles" where he states that "in this and all my other writings (except where I write as a Christian & build a divine revelation & I expressly declare it) I do not write [out of religious p]rinciples

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1 E.g. "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles" which were "never intended for the view of the publick but for sole use cheifly to imprint on my mind a lively sense of the principles of Stoicism" (2). There is in another hand at the end of the "Meditations" a note which reads "Intended to be published but not until this time because it will fall admirably under my miscellaneous speculations July 10 1770," but in view of his earlier comment it seems likely that at the time of writing, Wallace did not have publication in mind. Other papers, such as those on patronage, appear to have been more of an intellectual exercise than items for the press, though Wallace may well have passed them round.

2 The notable example being "Of Memory" (La II 620[12]), which will be discussed in ch. 4 below. Amongst his religious writings, "Conjectures concerning the fall of Ecclesiasticall power Splendour & Dignity" (La II 620[14]) and "An address to Monsieur J. Vernet" (La II 620[13]) are obvious examples.

but purely as a philosopher." Only pieces with a specifically religious content will therefore be discussed in this chapter, and such works as the Prospects which have wider philosophical content will be treated as literary rather than religious.[1]

It is generally accepted that moderate thought in Scotland was influenced primarily by the teaching of Francis Hutcheson, appointed Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow University in 1729[2] and while this may well hold true for the later Moderates, Hutcheson seems hardly the most probable source for the moderatism of Wallace and his contemporaries, particularly as Hutcheson's first published work did not appear until 1725, fourteen years after Wallace began his studies at Edinburgh.[3] The person most likely to have made an immediate impression on Wallace was his professor, William Hamilton, who occupied the Chair of Divinity from 1709-1732. Far from being a model of orthodoxy, Hamilton was thought to have "departed from the Calvinisticall doctrine, and the ordinary doctrine

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1 Such arbitrary divisions are inevitably unsatisfactory: Wallace, for example, planned "a Defence of Religion naturall & Revealed" of which two pieces remain. One, "A Speculation Shewing that death is necessary" (La II 620[25]), he intended for insertion to his Prospects and will be discussed with them. The other, "A little treatise on Virtue & merit" (La II 620[19]) will be dealt with in this chapter.

2 See, e.g., Gerald R. Cragg, The Church and the Age of Reason: 1648-1789 (Penguin Books: 1962), p.89: The immediate origin of moderatism "can be found in the influence of Shaftesbury's ethics, as mediated through the persuasive teaching of Professor Hutcheson of Glasgow."

3 Hutcheson himself entered Glasgow University as a student only a year before Wallace, in 1710.

taught in this Church, though he hath the wisdom to keep himself in the clouds."[1] Most of his students, according to Wodrow, were "very much off the principles of this Church," and Hamilton was clearly "exceedingly big [intimate] with Doctor Calamy and the London Non-Subscribers," and shared a number of their views.[2]

Edmund Calamy (1671-1732) was a dissenting English minister whom William Carstares had invited on several occasions to accept a chair in a Scottish university. During his visit to Scotland in 1709, Edinburgh University conferred on Calamy the honorary degrees of M.A. and D.D., and he doubtless maintained fairly close links with the University. While in Edinburgh he preached in the New Church, and a report of his sermon caused James Webster (father of Alexander Webster), whom Calamy describes as "a man of great warmth, but a narrow spirit," to denounce it publicly as "latitudinarian."[3] Calamy was mildly and prudently defended by Carstares and no more was heard thereafter, but it was not the first time that Calamy had been accused of Latitudinarianism.[4]

Like Tillotson, for whom he expresses admiration,[5] Calamy was profoundly influenced by William Chillingworth's The Religion of

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1 Wodrow, Analecta IV, 139. Hamilton's support for Simson and Glass (see p.159 below) would not have belied this reputation.

2 Analecta IV, 139.

3 Edmund Calamy, An Historical Account of my own Life, London: Colburn & Bentley, 1829, II, 179.

4 Calamy, I, 296.

5 Calamy, I, 111, 355.

Protestants A Safe Way to Salvation,[1] and it seems more than probable that Hamilton's sympathy with views such as Calamy's encouraged his students in the rationalistic tradition that began with the Cambridge Platonists.

Wallace's manuscript works are little read and merit individual treatment. It will be beneficial, however, to place them in context by a brief preliminary glance at his theological predecessors, thereby avoiding constant comparisons throughout the discussion of Wallace's texts.

"The second half of the seventeenth century saw many changes in English religious thought," writes Gerald Cragg, "but none more striking than the overthrow of Calvinism....At the beginning of the century, it had dominated the religious life of England; by the end its power had been completely overthrown."[2] Chillingworth had been a premature advocate of reason in the face of the early seventeenth-century tendency to exclude it from religious matters and he influenced the Cambridge Platonists later in the century:

> Against the party committed to the ideals of Laud, they held that conduct and morality are more important than church polity; against the

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1 Calamy, I, 227-234. Of Tillotson, Louis G. Locke writes: "Tillotson probably received his most important mental stimulus at Cambridge" from reading this work of Chillingworth's. Locke quotes Tillotson's eighteenth-century biographer Thomas Birch as saying that "'this admirable book gave his mind the ply, that he held ever after, and put him upon a true scent.'" Tillotson: A Study in Seventeenth-Century Literature (Copenhagen: Rosenkilde & Bagger, 1954), p.19.

2 In From Puritanism to the Age of Reason, p.13, to which I am heavily indebted in the following pages.

> Puritans who were dominated by the rigidity of the Calvinist theology, they urged that reason must not be fettered; against both they maintained that the legitimate seat of authority in religion is the individual conscience, governed by reason and illuminated by a relevation which could not be inconsistent with reason itself.[1]

Innumerable passages in The Religion of Protestants were taken up by the later writers, such as the assertion that

> I for my part, unlesse I deceive my self, was and still am so affected as I have made profession, not willing I confesse to take any thing upon trust, & to believe it without asking my self why; no, nor able to command my self (were I never so willing) to follow, like a sheep, every shepheard that should take upon him to guide me; or every flock that should chance to goe before me: but most apt and most willing to be led by reason to any way, or from it.[2]

Procalming that: "The Bible...The Bible only is the Religion of Protestants!"[3] Chillingworth allows that reason "is also in some

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1 Ibid, p.41.

2 The Religion of Protestants A Safe way to Salvation, "The Preface to the Author of Charity Maintain'd" para. 2.

3 Chillingworth, p.357 para. 56.

sort Gods word."[1]

Although subsequent writers reiterated Chillingworth's tenets, Wallace may well have had The Religion of Protestants itself in mind when he prepared the sermon described by Wodrow on "Faith without works is dead" (seepp.86-87 above): "If I follow the Scripture," writes Chillingworth, "I must not promise my selfe Salvation without effectual dereliction and mortification of all vices, and the effectuall practice of all Christian vertues" (361 para. 70). "For my part," he later asserts, "I doe heartily wish, that by publique Authoritie it were so ordered, that no man should ever preach or print his Doctrine that Faith alone justifies, unlesse hee joynes this together with it, that universall obedience is necessarie to salvation" (386 para. 32). Chillingworth, too, emphasises the necessity of "trying in matters of religion" in his criticism of the Roman Catholic Church:

> Lastly, if I follow your Church for my Guide, I shall doe all one, as if I should follow a Company of blind men in a judgement of colours, or in the choice of a way. For every unconsidering man is blind in that which he does not consider. Now what is your Church but a company of unconsidering men, who comfort themselves because they are a great company together, but all of them, either out of idleness refuse the trouble of a severe tryall of their Religion,

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[1] Chillingworth, p.20.

> (as if heaven were not worth it,) or out of superstition feare the event of such a tryall, that they may be scrupled and staggered and disquieted by it; and therefore, for the most part do it not at all (361 para. 72).

Wallace's objection to subscriptions seems also to stem from his reading of Chillingworth, who, in a much-quoted passage,[1] rejects man-made doctrines and upholds the Bible as the sole authority, proclaiming the right of individual conscience and freedom of enquiry. In the context of organised religion, Chillingworth is persuaded that the "constant Doctrine" of the Church of England is "so pure and Orthodoxe, that whosoever beleeves it, and lives according to it, undoubtedly he shall be saved...there is no error in it," he holds, "which may necessitate or warrant any man to disturb the peace, or renounce the Communion of it." This, in his opinion, "is all intended by Subscription,"[2] and the same views on conforming to the National Church will be found in Wallace's writings.

While the Cambridge Platonists paved the way for "Enlightenment" rationalism, the Latitudinarians perpetuated their name, but not their mysticism,[3] in an intellectual climate which found neither

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1 Chillingworth, 357 para. 56.

2 Chillingworth, "The Preface to the Author of Charity Maintain'd" para. 40.

3 The term "Latitudinarian" was originally applied (in contempt) to the Cambridge Platonists, but "was soon transferred to a much more inclusive group than a band of teachers from one university and of one philosophic school" (G.R. Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason, p.62).

high-churchmanship nor Puritan Calvinism satisfactory. Overshadowing both these, Latitudinarianism produced the most famous divines of the seventeenth century. In the works of one of the most eminent of these, John Tillotson, are to be found innumerable parallels with Wallace's thought. It should be remembered that while the attempt to replace blind faith with reason was commonplace in Wallace's day, Tillotson had no misconceptions as to the popular reaction in his: drawing attention to the "violent and...unreasonable prejudice which men have received against all those who endeavour to make religion reasonable," he defends "that incomparable person Mr. Chillingworth, the glory of this age and nation," who for his efforts has been branded with the "black and odious character" of a Socinian.[1] All the revelations of God," wrote Tillotson, "as well as the laws of men, go upon this presumption, that men are not stark fools....it is every man's duty, who hath ability and capacity for it, to endeavour to understand the grounds of his religion. For to try doctrines, is to inquire into the grounds and reasons of them....all doctrines are vehemently to be suspected which decline trial" (Works II, 276-77). Similarly, Tillotson held that nothing "ought to be received as a revelation from God which plainly contradicts the principles of natural religion, or overthrows the certainty of them" (Works II, 258).

He, too, stressed the futility of faith without works: "For the Bible plainly teaches us, that unless our faith work by charity, and purify our hearts, and reform our lives; unless, like Abraham's

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[1] Tillotson, Works IX, 270-71.

faith, it be perfected by works, it is but a dead faith, and will in nowise avail to our justification and salvation" (Works II', 65).

Conversion he saw as a gradual process, in most cases (Works I:, 96-97), and Wallace shares with him also a profound mistrust of enthusiasm. Wallace's attitude to Whitefield and Brainerd, for example, is mirrored in the following statement of Tillotson's:

> I cannot imagine how men can do a greater disservice to religion, than by taking it off from the rational and solid basis upon which it stands, and bearing the world in hand, that men ought to believe without reason; for this is to turn faith into credulity, and to level Christian religion with the vilest and most groundless enthusiasms that ever were in the world (Works I:, 271).

Enthusiasm and pretence to inspiration "is calculated only to impose upon the ignorant," Tillotson maintains, "but signifies little among the steady and considerate sort of people" (Works VII., 510). "Turbulent passion and a furious zeal" are more often than not signs of error: "None are so likely to judge amiss, as they whose minds are clouded and blinded by their passions" (Works III, 157.

As Roland N. Stromberg points out, the dislike of enthusiasm and religious fanaticism was political in that it represented a reaction against the civil strife it caused.[1] The quest for peace

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[1] Roland N. Stromberg, "Lovejoy's 'Parallel' Reconsidered" in Eighteenth Century Studies 4, (June, 1968), p.385.

is no less a characteristic of Wallace's work than of Tillotson's. Wallace would certainly agree with Tillotson when he asks:

> Are not the things, about which we differ, in their nature indifferent?...are they not at a great distance from the life and essence of religion, and rather good or bad as they tend to the peace and unity of the church, or are made use of to schism and faction, than either necessary or evil in themselves? And shall little scruples weigh so far with us, as, by breaking the peace of the church about them, to endanger our whole religion?" (Works II, 248).

In Wallace's Scotland it was natural to seek respite from the turmoil of the covenanting days, and Tillotson's warning that diversions encourage popery (Works VI, 267), was even more relevant in the period of the Jacobite rebellions.

The charge against Wallace and his contemporaries as Louis C. Locke indicates, was previously levelled against Tillotson. To place goodness and charity above external displays of piety and worship would seem to the Calvinist either atheistical or plain ignorant: "To minds deeply impregnated with theology and all of its subtilties, he [Tillotson] must have appeared a more moralist, and no Christian at all."[1]

While Tillotson did not reject revelation and the supernatural

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[1] Louis C. Locke, op. cit., p.103.

element in religion, a stimulus to deism and ultimately to scepticism was clearly one consequence of such a strong emphasis on reason, just as Methodism was a reaction against it. That Wallace disputed the Deists' rejection of revelation as unnecessary is evident from the Preface to his Synod Sermon, though he and his Christian contemporaries shared with the Deists "a strong desire to simplify dogmatic requirements, stress moral conduct, and avoid difficult theological questions."[1] With Shaftesbury's distinction between virtue and piety, however, Wallace was in complete agreement. While Wallace would endorse Tillotson's view that the "goodness of every thing is measured by its end and use, and that is the best thing which serves the best end and purpose" (Works I, 326), he did not regard religious faith as the moving force behind virtuous living: with Shaftesbury he would argue that virtue should be valued for itself, independently of belief in God.[2]

In "A Letter...Concerning Submission to the church" (La II 620[17]) Wallace voices his admiration for Shaftesbury: "tho I Differ from my Lord Shaftsbery in his views of Christianity I intirely agree with him in his notions of virtue and a moral character I think his accurate & ingenious Interpreter who enquires so nicely into our Ideas of beauty & Virtue & Criticises so finely on the Passions has for ever silenced his Antagonists on this Score" /87. Wallace

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1 Stromberg, "Lovejoy's 'Parallel' Reconsidered," p.387.

2 It should be remembered that while an "optimistic view of human behaviour replaced the doctrine of total depravity" as a result of the influence of Shaftesbury's ethics (G.R. Cragg, The Church and the Age of Reason, p.89), Tillotson had also laid stress on a benign rather than a jealous God.

adopted these Shaftesburian views early in life, as is demonstrated by his "little treatise on Virtue & merit in the spirit of the Earl of Shaftesbury" (La II 620[19]) which he wrote before 1720, and he subscribes to them also as a very elderly man, in "An address to Monsieur J. Vernet" (La II 620[13]).

In the earlier work, Wallace begins with a general discussion of goodness and virtue, claiming that "nothing can be called good but what answers some good end or other, and that only can be reckoned a good end that tends to the happiness or pleasure of some being that's capable to enjoy it" [27]. Nor can any action be good unless it contributes in some degree to happiness, its degree of goodness being in proportion to the amount of happiness produced. Before we can pronounce any being good, we must first know what we mean by "good." Thus, he maintains, "we must proceed in the judging of the Goodness of God himself":

> we cannot make the merit of actions to be only their consistency with the will of any being till once we know what kind of being this is; if we suppose the being ill natured & malicious the absurdity of doing so appears very plain: if indeed we come at the knowledge of a being who is good in a most sovereign degree, or who is infinitely good then we may safely venture to call that action good that's agreeable to his will and that one bad which he does not approve: but then the reason why we call the action good is not because such a being approves it, but

> because it tends to promote the happiness of rational being/s/ /4/.

Apart from revelation, Wallace points out, our only means of knowing that God has willed an action is that we see it is good. Wallace's indebtedness to Shaftesbury here is evident and there is a particularly close parallel with a passage in "An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit":

> For whoever thinks there is a God, and pretends formally to believe that he is just and good, must suppose that there is independently such a thing as justice and injustice, truth and falsehood, right and wrong, according to which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true. If the mere will, decree, or law of God be said absolutely to constitute right and wrong, then are these latter words of no significancy at all.[1]

Wallace subscribes to Shaftesbury's notion of a moral sense: "who does not see at first sight the beauty of a great many virtues?" /5/, but he regards it as a mistake to think of certain actions as always evil in themselves, whatever the circumstances. The good or evil with which an action is attended should always be taken into

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[1] Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, by Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, ed. J.M. Robertson, The Library of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis & New York: Bobbs Merrill Co. Inc., 1964) I, 264. A footnote states that Shaftesbury probably refers here to Locke, Essay, Bk. I Ch. 3, Sect. 6.

consideration. Certain general rules, such as "that a man should always love God & all good men, & do all the good he can in the world" are always true, but theft, murder and even suicide must be judged according to circumstances. Our assessment of an action must always be related to its consequences, even after any revelation we can have from God:

> for these who have asserted the truth of our revelation against the Deists do very justly observe that before we admit a revelation as coming from God we must know if the Duties it commands & the sins it forbids be agreeable to our natural notions of God, it being impossible for us to believe that that was a revelation from God (even tho' backed with greater miracles than either Moses or our Saviour ever wrought) which commands us to be malicious & revengeful, to kill every man we meet with, or that requires such absurd practices as appear to the clearest reason to be abominable [7].

Wallace's description of the perfect man merits full quotation:

> He may be said to be the most perfect man who has the most comprehensive knowledge of things and by this knowledge promotes most the happiness of mankind: who has a large mind, understands most sciences & especially these

> of the greatest use in the world who has a Generous concern for the good of the world; whose very happiness consists in doing all he can to make every being happy as far as he is able: who regards all rational beings according to their true worth, gives every one his due, both in his thoughts, discourses & actions; who indeed studies to fill his own life with the finest enjoyments refuses himself no pleasure that has no ill consequence to himself or others: but places his main delight in doing good: such a man studies to enlarge his knowledge but loves that best which tends to make the world easy & happy: such an one as this certainly deserves most the esteem of all beings, deserves most the rewards that are prepared for virtue [8-9].

Wallace's emulation of Shaftesbury's style comes over very strongly here, though Wallace lays emphasis on knowledge, consistently with his other writings, to a degree, perhaps, that Shaftesbury does not. While acknowledging the pleasures of speculation, Shaftesbury rates them as vastly inferior to those provided by the beauty of moral action.[1] Understanding of human nature, "the various conditions of mankind: their different dispositions & tempers; their diverse ways of living, their diverse tasts, capacities & humours; & the ways of influencing them for their own good" [10] is, Wallace

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[1] Characteristics I, 296-97.

believes, the most excellent form of knowledge, and the worthiest part a man can take is to act upon it.

There are different criteria of goodness, he continues. Most describe good actions as those that tend towards the greatest happiness, but some add that however much a man benefits humanity or derives his happiness from doing good, unless he has a knowledge of God and performs all his actions in obedience to His commands, his deeds are worthless and he would only "suffer less than the Vitious members of society who were pests and curses to the world" [12]. Others still make belief in Christ a pre-requisite to virtuous action, so that "an Infant if God did not reveal Christ to him before his Death was sure to be damned, tho perhaps his hell was not so hot as an Old Rooted Sinners" [12]. Both these last, Wallace maintains, are mistaken. Relating moral and natural beauty in the manner of Shaftesbury,[1] he reiterates his belief that actions can be evaluated solely on their consequences and that "to judge of the goodness of actions by any other standard is quite contrary to all sense & reason" [14].[2]

A man's religious sentiments are irrelevant by comparison with his "strong desire of doing Good and an enlarged capacity to do it" [16]. If a thoughtful man has come to regard his chief end in life

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1 And again, using Shaftesbury's style, eg: "how beautiful is the rainbow, with its glorious arch & splendid variety of Colours, how finely are the heavens bespangled frequently in the evening with a profusion of different hues..." [13].

2 Wallace here restates his earlier argument at length, which suggests that the tendency to repetition found in so many of his manuscript works was not an accompaniment of old age, but an inherent weakness in his writing.

to be the production of the greatest possible happiness for himself and others, by improving his mind and increasing his useful knowledge, although he does not believe the Christian revelation (and provided "he has no malice at his maker but is ready to hearken to all reasons & desirous to be let into the truth" [17], but answers to the description of Wallace's perfect man, he has all the essentials of virtue and true goodness. Faith, indeed, assists us through life and gives us hope for the future, thus providing a powerful motive for virtue. Nevertheless, Wallace is certain that his virtuous, but unbelieving man will be approved by God, "who is goodness all over [and] who loves his creatures with the most tender concern" [18].[1]

By the time Wallace came to write his "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles" some thirty years later, he had lost some of his youthful optimism, and while he felt one should not withdraw from the world, he believed that

> to be as much alone as Decent is good, & to strengthen our own virtue; as for Doing good to others it is not easy, if we can, let us do it but it is well if we can do good to ourselves & prevent mischief from others...it is good to do good to mankind & to exert ourselves for the

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1 The view that God does not ask too much is to be found in Tillotson (e.g. Works IV, 78, where he says of those of poor intelligence: "if they be led into any dangerous error, by the negligence or ill conduct of those under whose care and instruction the providence of God permitted them to be placed, God will not impute it to them as a fault; because in the circumstances in which they were they took the best and wisest course they could, to come to the knowledge of the truth"), but Tillotson does not go so far as to extend God's approval to unbelievers.

> publick interests but in truth the real interests
> of the publick are so little minded by any party
> & thro mens irregular passions can be so little
> promoted that tho a good man should take every
> opportunity of advancing the publick interest
> yet he may be all most allowed to Despair of
> being able to do any thing of much consequence
> & may be excused tho he retire from the world
> to cultivate Philosophy & his own mind.[1]

Wallace's attitude to suicide remained ambivalent and had he been able to find it totally acceptable, he might have made the transition from Christian cleric to ancient Stoic without marked difficulty:

> The antient Stoicks & modern Christians Differ
> in nothing more than in their opinions about
> the lawfulness of men's putting an end to
> their own life: It is one example among others
> how far the Sentiments of men of Different
> ages sects & Religions may differ: & how ever
> much self murder may now be condemned there is
> some thing great & sublime in the sentiments of
> Seneca on this subject.[2]

But basically, although Wallace could not see what harm or insult

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1 "Meditations," Friday, 6 July 1753.

2 On Epistle 70 [1757].

suicide could do to God or man,[1] he believed that "there is more courage in waiting patiently and chearfully for death than in running to meet it or bringing it suddenly upon ourselves."[2]

He offers an unusual proof of eternal life:

> we ought to be virtuous as long as we can & do our duty in life, if we cannot exist for ever it is not our fault, I shall not say whose fault it is, but if we be virtuous all our dayes & there is a fault any where that we do not exist for ever, then we are not only pares but superiores Diis which as it is absurd, we must exist for ever.[3]

His comment that "if nature has not Destined me to an eternall existence, I can have no redress & will bear my fate like a wise & brave man"[4] suggests, nevertheless, that he was not entirely convinced. It is in keeping with his general outlook that he would like to have thought that rejection of the doctrine of eternal torments was not altogether blameworthy,[5] and while he may not escape the charge of watering down orthodox doctrine to which

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1 On Epistle 12 [1753?]

2 On Epistle 30, September 1756.

3 On Epistle 49, 21 October 1756.

4 On Epistle 77 [1757?].

5 On Epistle 29, September 1756.

moderatism was open,[1] there can be no doubt of his pious and humanitarian principles and a very real faith.

It is the strength of his faith in the face of a growing despair that makes so touching his "address to Monsieur J. Vernet Pastor and Professor of Theology att Geneve: upon his Reflections on manners Religion & the worship of God Printed at Geneve 1769"[2] (La II 620[13]). Referring to Vernet's work, Wallace claims that in Britain, virtue is valued for its own sake and not from hope of a future life. There can be no other motive for virtue than "an inward sense of its worth and excellence." Returning to the standpoint he upheld fifty years earlier, he insists that a regard for virtue is of little value if

> founded on its being agreeable to a Great and powerfull being or because it will be rewarded or protected by him or is commanded by him this may be a sign of caution or prudence but does not shew a sincere regard to virtue if he does not love it cheifly for its own sake: a virtuous man wishes it may be found that there is a God of infinite wisdom goodness and power

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1 Ian Clark, Thesis, p.240: "Moderatism is commonly portrayed as a general watering-down of orthodox doctrine, preserving a discreet Silence over Original Sin, preaching a cosy 'Morality' only loosely connected with the Gospel, ignoring or at least failing to stress the full divinity of Christ, and suggesting that a man who follows the light of his conscience and does his duty in this life will undoubtedly win acceptance in the eyes of his benign and indulgent Maker."

2 Jean Jacob Vernet, Réflections sur les moeurs, sur la réligion et sur le culte (Géneve, 1769).

> & that there may be a future life...but whether this shall be the case or not he loves virtue & will adhere to it att all adventures...a virtuous man's morals need no support from piety but his piety derives its being its strength its support from his lively sense of morals (4).

Wallace queries Vernet's stress on piety to God, which suggests there could be no virtue without piety (5v). According to Vernet's scheme, fear of divine justice is the most successful means of making men dutiful, but this, Wallace points out, cannot apply to the virtuous man, since virtue is not sincere if founded on fear. To Vernet's belief that without faith and worship, vice will take over, Wallace replies that while vice has spread, religious worship and belief can have little effect (6-6v). The majority, he maintains, give religion little thought or attention, but if men seriously reflected on the nature and advantages of good morals, they would need no other incentive to virtue (7). Vernet invests boundless power in religion, but when Wallace considers the nature of religious belief, "the vile and low superstition which is mixed with it, the cruel absurd silly nonsensicall nay impious Doctrines and precepts which the system contains as embraced by the bulk of mankind" (7v), and the manner in which this belief is cultivated in men's minds, he is not surprised at how little influence religion has in making men virtuous:

> our catechisms, confessions of faith creeds and articles of Religion are indeed strange pieces

> & when we consider both the matter & manner can never do good: But if they were much better nay even unexceptionable and of a happy or happyer influence consider only how the belief of them is introduced and maintained (8).

The poor, Wallace argues, have to work too hard for the essentials of life to think of religion, while "ignorance, pride, avarice, debauchery, luxury, ambition" are characteristic of the great (8v). Obviously, few can have just notions of a true sense of religion:

> How natural soever religion may be supposed to mankind, the arguments whether for naturall or Revealed Religion are not so plain, simple & obvious that the bulk of men can have a clear & just & lively sense of them: Religion has been propagated from age to age not in consequence of large & serious & impartial enquiries but by silly & ignorant parents & instructors. Men believe & reason not from clear & Distinct views & solid arguments but from the unsupported tales & assertions of their parents and teacher/s/: they believe as their fathers believed and because they have told them so and so not because they gave them any clear reason or sound argument for Religion and for this reason the publick and established Religions paganism mahometanism

> popery Protestantism Christianity have been equally believed equally foolishly and firmly adhered to and have much the same influence on their votaries (9-9v).

What influence, then, asks Wallace, can religion or religious worship have? The passions, appetites and inclinations of men are far stronger than the appeal of religion (10). While some of the richer born may have the advantages of time and education, there is the powerful temptation of grandeur, luxury and riches, and even the most learned and curious men will find many objections against natural and revealed religion which will weaken their faith and turn them towards scepticism.[1]

Concluding, Wallace writes:

> Religion is the greatest comfort of my soul: but I confess I Despair of ever seeing true and Genuine Religion flowerishing in the world
>
> I send you this address privately I do not publish this to the world because I will do nothing to weaken the influence of Religion or to throw cold water on your endeavours but I should be much obliged if either publickly or by a private letter you would illustrate this

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[1] It is perhaps too great a stretch of the imagination to conjecture that Wallace's despondency was contributed to by his son George, whose scepticism was commented on by Boswell (Private Papers from Malahide Castle, 12 (1931), 74. Monday, 4 November 1776). In view of Wallace's attitude to his family, it would have been surprising if father and son, both in Edinburgh, had not been quite close.

subject further & correct any errors I may have fallen into (11).

Despite his despair of ever seeing true religion flourish, Wallace was able to look forward to the time when piety and good morals would be given the opportunity to replace superstition and enthusiasm: his "Conjectures concerning the fall of Ecclesiasticall power Splendour & Dignity" (La II 620[14]),[1] written in 1768 and based not on scriptural prophesies but "on the appearances of things in Europe and the temper of mankind in the present age" /17, depict the downfall of the corrupt aspect of the Church and prophesy the extinction of enthusiastic clergy and their superstitious doctrines.

Both the "Address to Monsieur J. Vernet" and the "Conjectures" throw light on Wallace's view of the role of visible religious institutions, in the present and in the future. To have voiced his opinions openly would have endangered not only his own position, but the name of the Church, and his public stance was necessarily tailored to what society at that time could tolerate.

These various divergences from orthodox Calvinism required Wallace to employ a policy of extreme caution, and the different authorial guises he adopts are not, as one might at first assume, merely entertaining literary exercises, but are indicative of the tensions inherent in being both a Christian minister and a man of the Enlightenment. Discretion, to the point of wide discrepancy

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1 Reproduced in Appendix V. A pamphlet on the same theme, entitled "The End of Ecclesiastical Splendour in the church and of Regal or Monarchicall Authority in the State in all the Christian Nations in Europe" (La II 620[15]) is discussed in Chapter III.

between private beliefs and public image, characterises Wallace's writing.

"Christian piety Illustrated" (La II 97[6]) is an example of Wallace in his conformist clergyman guise in a manuscript intended for publication. The cover-note indicates how close it came to being published:

> A Treatise Intituled
> "Christian piety Illustrated and certain mistakes concerning it Detected In an address to the Religious & well Disposed"
> October. 1758: It is all most ready for the press and needs only to be read over once or twice
> October 13. 1758 I have read it over once and think it quite right
> July 3. 1761 I have again read it over corrected it and think it good
> Thursday. June. 28. 1764. I have again read over this treatise & still think it good

Down the side of the page Wallace has noted "These papers have been perused & approved by Messieurs Erskine & Kay Ministers of Edinburgh."

His opening paragraph sets the tone: despite the proliferation of books on piety, many are written so obscurely or unwisely that the "weaker and more ignorant" are misled or perplexed. Wallace therefore intends to put forward a simple set of elementary maxims. He hopes, nevertheless, that his book "will be read without Disgust by pious men of higher capacity," despite the fact that it is aimed at

"religious persons of a weaker understanding."[1]

Rather than discuss Christian doctrines, creeds and confessions, on which he held very strong private views,[2] Wallace evades the issue by proposing to deal with things practical and not speculative: "so cautious will I be of entering into any controversy that I will shun all phrases which may lead to it, and express my self in such a manner as will be understood and agreed to by all good Christians" (6). He goes on, accordingly, to encourage "right and worthy apprehensions of the being, perfections, providence & laws of God" and insists on the necessity of "just notions of his morall perfections" (7). Emphasising God's goodness, wisdom, justice and power, he points, as evidence of this to the wonders of creation (10). In addition to the testimony of reason and "the light of nature" to the goodness of God, Wallace cites sacred scripture as describing "the mercy of God to sinners in the eternall councills of heaven concerning mans redemption and in the execution of these wonderfull councills by Jesus Christs coming into the world" (12). He warns against dwelling too little on God's goodness and too much

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1 Wallace informs his readers that he is remaining anonymous, not because he is ashamed of the work in which he is engaged, but "as it is of no consequence who gives advices, provided they are good so I have sometimes wished that you had been less influenced by names and had rather considered what was said than who said it" (5). Wallace's reasons for anonymity here are unlikely to be ones of discretion; he no doubt recalls Chillingworth's hope that the Christian reader will heed "not who speakes, but what is spoken." (Chillingworth, "The Preface to the Author of Charity Maintain'd" para. 29).

2 See "A little treatise against imposing Creeds or Confessions of faith..." discussed below.

on his justice and displeasure at iniquity (16).

Emphasising the difference between morality and piety,[1] in the only passage whose orthodoxy might be questioned, Wallace holds that "before you can conceive the morall perfections of God in a distinct manner you must consider that justice, righteousness and goodness do not depend upon the mere will & command of any being whatsoever but are in their own nature fixed and unalterable" (21, 24). A conception of the moral perfections of God -- a belief that he makes commands because of their innate goodness and usefulness and not that <u>because</u> he commands them they <u>are</u> good and useful -- is essential to prevent piety from approaching terror and superstition (25).

Examining "the beginnings and progress of piety in the heart & affections & the effects it produces in the externall behaviour" (25), Wallace states that piety, which comes from God, is adopted by choice and principle and cannot be acquired by chance. Nor should fear of punishment be ones only motive for becoming pious: piety should be sought for its own intrinsic excellence and goodness (26). A sense of sin, but also belief in God's forgiveness, is a mark of the pious man, whose rational outlook should forestall enthusiasm (30-31). Touching on enthusiasm, Wallace no doubt recalls the effect of George Whitefield, for he goes on to discuss conversion,[2]

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1 A distinction he drew in greater detail in "A little treatise on Virtue & merit" and "An Address to Monsieur J. Vernet".

2 He adds, pp.59-60, that he had observed a great deal of weeping in the churches long before the English itinerant preachers came to Scotland, but "Since These dayes there have been more uncommon appearances of this kind in severall places which have greatly eclipsed any thing I saw in my younger years."

emphasising that it frequently takes place imperceptibly and calmly (32, 46). Regular living rather than great shows of emotion, he emphasises, is a surer indication of piety.

Piety inspires reverence for God and sorrow for our wrong-doings, and prompts us to make daily confession of our sins. We strive towards obedience to God, despite worldly trouble and difficulty and we remain cheerful in adversity. Of providence, death, time and eternity, the pious man has "the most delightfull and comfortable views" (34). It is not our duty, however, to think of God constantly, and an appropriate portion of our time should be devoted to everyday employments.

Wallace next turns to a common problem of conscience: that of whether to attend the sacraments if one is uncertain of ones conversion. Much doubt about conversion is based on the fact that no sudden emotion has been experienced, but this, Wallace reminds his readers, is an unreliable measure in any case. Everyone ought to communicate if, after proper searching, he does not decide that he is not converted. It is better to err with the best intentions than to avoid the sacraments, which were commanded by Christ (64-66).[1]

Concluding his advice with words of discouragement for praying societies or "fellowship meetings", Wallace emphasises the dangers

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[1] Wallace's attitude may be compared with Chillingworth's here, when he states in The Religion of Protestants that "to say that God will damn them for such Errors /of opinion/, who are lovers of Him, and lovers of Truth, is to rob man of his comfort, and God of his goodnesse; it is to make Man desperate, and God a Tyrant" (18).

of errors arising from the young and inexperienced attempting to give one another sound instruction in religious matters (90-91). During the early seventeenth century, as episcopacy increased, a number of people preferred to seek spiritual guidance and strength by forming "societies for prayer, mutual exhortation, and reading the Scriptures"[1] instead of attending church services. Not only practical duties, but "points of doctrine, forms of church government, and modes of ecclesiastical discipline" were the subjects of discussion. Members of these societies (which averaged ten to twelve in number, though there might be as few as three or as many as twenty), found the 1688 Revolution Settlement unsatisfactory, particularly in its lack of provision for the kind of doctrinal instruction they wished, and so they continued in their private groups, though they now commonly also attended their parish church. The more evangelical clergy, such as Ebenezer Erskine, were concerned to publish rules for the societies and as soon as the founders of the Secession had left the Established Church, they sought and received their enthusiastic cooperation. Quite apart from the dangers of unsound instruction, it is clear that Wallace would wish to have little to do with such emotional and intense devotional groups which were clearly in the evangelical rather than the moderate tradition.

His antipathy towards Whitefield is of a similar nature and he speaks out also against this brand of enthusiasm: "instead of saying that you feel the spirit of God, or the workings of the Divine Spirit

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1 W. Mackelvie, Annals and Statistics of the United Presbyterian Church (Edinburgh & Glasgow: Oliphant & Elliot; Robertson, 1873), p.1. The following information about praying societies is taken from pp.1-4 of this work.

it would be more accurate to say that you feel a lively sorrow for sin, a firm hope and faith in God, a transporting joy in the belief of a wisdom & goodness of Providence and in the expectation of eternall happiness" (66-67). Avoid the danger, he warns, of thinking yourself over-weak. This will lead to indolence or enthusiasm. Belief in God does not exempt us from exertion (69).

George Whitefield became connected, at Oxford, with the group of Methodists which formed around John and Charles Wesley in 1729.[1] In 1732, Whitefield, then a servitor, made his first contact with Charles Wesley and entered into the extremes of Methodism, to be ridiculed by the Pembroke undergraduates. The Methodists stood by him, despite his apparent madness in the eyes of the world, and he took Anglican orders in 1736. The fame of his untiring eloquence spread and he frequently preached several times a day, often in the open air, and was reputedly able to bring in hundreds of pounds for charity at a single discourse.[2]

Whitefield's reputation had led the group of seceders in Scotland, formed after the deposition of Ebenezer and Ralph Erskine and six others,[3] to correspond with him, very possibly because they

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1 See C.E. Mallet, A History of the University of Oxford (1924; rpt. New York & London: Barnes & Noble; Methuen, 1968), III, 110ff for a description of the growth of methodism and Whitefield's part in it.

2 See John M'Kerrow, History of the Secession Church (Edinburgh: William Oliphant, 1839), I, 197 (hereafter cited as M'Kerrow). One charity was a home he founded for orphans in Georgia.

3 M'Kerrow I, 174ff. See also p.160 below, footnote 1. The two Erskines were, of the seceders, Whitefield's chief correspondents before his visit to Scotland (John Cunningham, The Church History of Scotland (Edinburgh: Adam & Charles Black, 1859), II, 457).

saw themselves in the same relation to their established Church as Whitefield was to his. In 1741 they wrote inviting him to visit Scotland, to promote a religious revival, and in the hope of working with him in closer cooperation. Whitefield emphasised, however, before he came, that rather than be associated with any particular party, he would come as "an occasional preacher, to preach the simple gospel to all who were willing to hear him, of whatever denomination."[1]

He arrived at Leith on 30 July 1741 and the popularity he achieved in Scotland was unprecedented. The reaction of one of his congregations has been described thus: "Some of the hearers were seized with faintings and bodily convulsions; some of them clapped their hands, and beat their breasts, and cried out, that they saw hell opened for them, and heard the shrieks of the damned."[2] His relationship with the seceding ministers broke down when he made it clear that he would not associate exclusively with them. A number of ministers belonging to the Popular Party held him in high esteem, among whom was Alexander Webster, who accompanied him to Cambuslang, where Whitefield did much of his preaching in 1742. Webster published a defence of the "real" conversions that took place, entitled Divine Influence: The True Spring of the Extraordinary Work at Cambuslang (Edinburgh: Lumsden & Robertson, 1742). Bearing in mind Webster's own renown as a preacher,[3] we may well

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1 M'Kerrow I, 201.

2 M'Kerrow I, 210.

3 A city functionary is reputed to have observed that "it was easier to get a seat in the kingdom o' heivin than i' the Tolbuith kirk" (Scott, Fasti I, 120).

regard Wallace's views on marking the day and hour of conversion as pertaining to him: "certainly some of the most popular Divines have laid too much stress on marks of this kind and greatly perplexed many good people because they could not fix the date of their conversion in this manner."[1]

Wallace's attitude to Whitefield is recorded in a number of manuscript pamphlets which, as the cover-notes indicate, were intended as part of a treatise on enthusiasm. These were two letters to Whitefield (La II 620^{28^4}), some observations on enthusiasm, with further remarks relating specifically to Whitefield (La II 620^{28^2}) and "Some thoughts on the conversion of the Indians On Whitefield and irregular methods of converting and Reforming the World" (La II 620^{23}).

The two letters are in draft form, the second being "an enlargement and correction of the first." Wallace comments ironically that they "were intended to be sent to Mr Whitfield.. when he first came to Edinburgh: they praise him too much (if there is no sneer in them)." Affecting his role of impartial observer, Wallace notes that it "is evident they were written by a Clergyman of the most rationall kind and are adapted to the temper both of Mr Whitfield & his admirers" (La II 620^{28^1}, cover note). The authorial mask that Wallace adopts here is clearly more for entertainment than concealment. Quite evidently adapting his letters to the temper of the discerning anti-revivalist reader, he uses Shaftesbury's technique of ridicule, and implies by his comment that Whitefield's methods are

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[1] La II 97^6, "Christian piety Illustrated" p.48.

as devious as his own. With justification, Wallace can claim that the letter is indeed "written with great mildness, civility and politeness & may be called in many respects a shrewd piece" (La II 620^{28}[1], final page).

Gently ironic, Wallace speaks of the first time he heard Whitefield preach: "I rejoiced to observe so much piety & such a delight in it, as made you so assiduous in preaching & unweariedly dilligent in the work of the ministry, I dare say to the great fatigue of your body & the wasting of your strength & spirits" [1st letter, p.2]. Ingenuously, he asks Whitefield "to give proper cautions when you speak of the influences of the spirit of God on the minds of men either at their conversion or afterwards as when you say that men feel the spirit of God breathing or working upon their souls." Wallace wishes he would explain this more fully, "for I am affraid it may lead some well Disposed persons to mistake the nature of the influence of the spirit, & give them a great deal of trouble concern & anxiety even when they feel them in the true sense because they may imagine they do not: & may cause others to apprehend they feel them when they do not" [3]. Under this misapprehension, those believing themselves possessed of the spirit may well act on impulse, without reference to reason or to the scriptures. The vicious man, believing himself converted, will hold his vices consistent with being in possession of the holy spirit and will therefore not try to correct them. Emphasis on subjective feelings can lead to self-delusion and, Wallace concludes, it is better to stress the virtues of a regular life and a constant and abiding sense of piety.

Returning to his ingenuous approach in the second letter,

Wallace tells Whitefield how glad he would be of his simple yet striking instructions when, for example, Whitefield was preaching on a fine harvest day close to where shearers were working: "I wish you would put such a case, tell them plainly & strongly that it is not the duty of these shearers to leave their harvest & come to attend your preaching" [167. Similarly, while masters may be wrong to forbid servants, apprentices or journeymen to come and hear him, if they surreptitiously "steal away from their work to hear you preach at least unless they resolve to borrow as much time from their sleep & that this time shall be equally convenient for their masters, I wish you would put such cases as these & Direct the people more particularly, lest without any intention you be a means of misleading them" [16-17].

Wallace's pointed query at the beginning of the letter as to how much time and effort a pastor should expend on his ministerial duties (he observes that Whitefield preaches daily or even twice a day and keeps up a large correspondence) is answered at the end. Bounds must be set on the sacred ordinances of religion, he maintains, and it is too much to expect ministers to preach daily. With such frequent services, the labours and business of the world would come to an end, a point Wallace is sure Whitefield appreciates and which he begs him, tongue in cheek, to make clear to the people, so that ministers may not be criticised. Remarking by the way that celibacy is a doctrine of devils, Wallace holds that married ministers may lawfully spend time in family concerns, such as the oversight of their children's education. Nor should the clergy risk their health by overwork: God expects us to conform to the natural order and will

not, if we forsake it, send miraculous cures.

The other two pamphlets depend on reason rather than guile for their effect, although there is marked cunning in Wallace's treatment of Whitefield as a Church of England minister in view of the light in which the latter was regarded by the Established Church. In his observations on enthusiasm (La II 620[28]2) Wallace points out that clergymen may be wicked and selfish, but that God can make use of wicked men. A man may leave his parish and travel throughout the country from good or bad motives, but whatever his reason, if he preaches the truths of religion in a serious manner, he may work for divine providence and effect conversions. Results are no guide, therefore, to such a man's intentions. His motives may be the best, or he may be driven by a desire for money, or fame, or power. He himself may be weak, ignorant or stupid and may be acting from superstition. We must not turn against the common and regular preaching of the gospel, Wallace warns, nor against those who by normal or extraordinary means are inspired by God, but we should guard against giving encouragement to itinerant preachers.

With reference to Whitefield (La II 620[25]2, "Some more observations applicable in particular to Mr Whitfield"), Wallace regards it as very irregular for a parish clergyman to employ any itinerant minister, whatever his pretensions, and particularly if he wants money. His character and motives may be questionable. People of the Church of Scotland complain of the ease by which ignorant and vicious men procure orders in the Church of England. Not all Anglican clergy can be so described, but if once we begin the practice of employing or encouraging Church of England ministers, we

may go too far. Whether or not we believe it unlawful to countenance Church of England ministers, many of our forefathers thought it was and there are many who are still of this opinion. It is uncharitable, therefore, for a Presbyterian minister to have Mr. Whitefield in his pulpit on an ordinary preaching day, as several may feel obliged to leave the church, or, instead, violate their consciences. And "as by law Presbytery is established and all the established clergy are obliged to sign a very strict formula; this may naturally lead the people to think that they shall be secure from such ministers as are episcopall" ["Some more observations," p.2].

Even though it is a mistake to believe it unlawful to accept the administrations of a Church of England minister, Wallace argues that it is an understandable one. The Presbyterian Party is, after all, staunchly behind the Revolution and the civil government. If our forms come to be considered unimportant by those whose attachment to the government stemmed from its support of Presbyterianism, then "they will be riper for the Pretender" [3]. It does not benefit the Revolution, which established Presbyterianism as being preferred by the Scots people, if great crowds of apparently staunch presbyterians flock "after a Church of England Episcopall Minister." Employing Whitefield, Wallace concludes,

> tends to make our people believe that the forms of worship Discipline & government of a Christian church is of little or no value, and that if the Doctrine is sound that is all but our forefathers thought very justly that both the forms of worship

and Government were of great moment.

Att the same time I would never treat this piece of folly & enthousiasm seriously, nor call upon the authority of the church or the help of the secular arm to put a stop to it.

Wallace prides himself on this unruffled attitude, as we can see from the back page of "Some thoughts on the conversion of the Indians" (La II 620[23]) where he remarks that the advantage of the piece is "that the Author goes not too far against Whitfield & Brainard but shews the folly & weakness of those who in opposing enthousiasts & enthousiasm render themselves suspected of want of piety & are half mad against the madness of enthousiasm."

David Brainerd was one of the missionaries to the American Indians supported by the Society in Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge.[1] The Society's minutes of 3 November 1743 record his being sent "amongst the Indians at a place called Kananmuck" and the "surprising success" of his labours is noted on 19 March, 1747.[2] The journal he kept was published in London in

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1 Wallace was one of the fifteen directors of the Society (elected annually) in 1753 and 1756, when he was a member of the sub-committee "For what concerns the Societys Schools and foreign Correspondence" (SRO GD95/2/7, pp.111 and 337). Minutes of the General Meetings record Wallace's election as a director in 1747 (SRO GD95/1/4, p.382), but this is not confirmed by the Minutes of Committee Meetings (SRO GD95/2/6, p.381), nor is there any record of his attendance at committee meetings during that year.

2 Minutes of the General Meetings, SRO GD95/1/4, pp.315, 387.

1748[1] and it is to this work that Wallace refers in his opening lines:

> In an account of Mr David Brainerd's Journall among the Indians printed 1748 with a preface by Dr. Dodderige: and in other relations of this nature I find preaching morality decried & preaching the pure doctrines of our Redemption by Jesus Christ much applauded & represented as being accompanied by a peculiar energy of the Divine spirit & extraordinary success, which has led me to examine what is good sense upon this subject, & where the truth lies.

Wallace does not question the fact that Man is naturally corrupt and is in need of supernatural aid. He allows "all our goodness at first or in its progress to be ascribed wholly to God." The only problem, for him, is "in what way it is most probable that God will exert his grace." Brainerd believes in preaching only the pure doctrines of the fall and of our redemption, and in omitting discussion of morality and doctrines concerning religion or the future state that are founded in nature, or are readily appreciated by the use of reason, Wallace points out. Why, then, should the Indians believe him when he speaks of the fall of Christ?

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1 An Abridgement of Mr. David Brainerd's Journal among the Indians. Or, the rise and progress of a remarkable work of grace among a number of Indians, In the provinces of New-Jersey and Pensylvania ed. Philip Doddridge (London, 1748).

> is he bound to believe the miraculous history of Christ, without reason or evidence or is it probable that a Divine influence will be exerted to make him believe this, could Mr Brainerd reasonably ask that this influence should be exerted or could he expect it: ought we not to go to work agreeably to the nature of things and the faculties of the human mind & in this method ask the help of God As men have naturally some notions of superiour powers and a future life & of virtue & vice is it not better to begin with the easiest things of which men have naturally some notion & give them just notions of morals, the Divine perfections, a future life & its rewards & punishments, & by degrees endeavour to gain upon men, laying a natural & rational foundation of piety & goodness.

Repeatedly throughout his writings Wallace stresses the pre-eminence of reason and the need to work within the natural order which God has designed, without expecting his miraculous intervention. While in this case Wallace is not saying that natural methods are sufficient, he is arguing that, supported by Divine aid, they are preferable to making "men believe without reason or evidence the miraculous story of Christ."

He answers the objection that conventional methods do not

sufficiently raise hopes or fears by stating that we "can paint the goodness, mercy & justice of God, a heaven & a hell as well the one way as the other." Speculations concerning morality and the after-life would conform more closely to the Indian's reason and experience than would the miraculous elements in the Christian story and while Brainerd's methods may produce visible changes in men, men can also be convinced of untruths by the method of working on the passions rather than appealing to reason. Nor need the doctrines preached in this manner be specifically Christian: "no matter whether you talk of Christ or Mahomet or the Deisticall Scheme, all three may be made equally comfortable or terrible." It is to this method that Wallace attributes "Mr Brainerd & Whitfield's conversions and all the enthousiasms of this nature" and while he believes goodness can be awakened in this way, it is often dangerous and "goes too far & is not a genuine, naturall & pure goodness but is accompanied with fierceness & barbarity."

Wallace regards going to preach among the Indians as a whim as strange as Whitefield's itinerancy, but he does not deny that they may effect some good. He remains suspicious of their motives and methods, and doubting that the effects are lasting, he summarises his personal reaction thus:

> When Whitfield & men of his temper come to the place of my residence I will not encourage him both because he may perhaps be a rogue & be he ever so sincere will not probably do either much good or harm, some take too much pains to encourage him that they may be popular, others

> to oppose him. I suspect neither of them are wise enough, the popularity to be got by encouraging him is of little use, I cannot think it a right thing to court it, so I will not go to hear him; but neither will I be zealous against him or for calling him to account, for neither is this worth while, but I'll despise him in my heart, allow he may do good by accident, account for the possibility yea probability he may do some good & yet show why I do not encourrage him, nor trust to these irregular starts and sallies of piety.

Extravagant opposition will, in Wallace's opinion, increase Whitefield's popularity, and he will be more easily defeated by moderation than by zeal.[1]

A near-contemporary indictment of Whitefield is to be found in Richard Graves's The Spiritual Quixote (first published 1773; Whitefield died in 1770). Graves, who reflected a common English view, also adopted the method of ridicule and shared many of Wallace's objections to Methodism. Wildgoose he portrays as irresponsible, thoughtlessly leaving his mother in order to preach, and thus neglecting his first duties. His converts are those of

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[1] Wallace's writing is in distinct contrast with some of the more vindictive works against Whitfield. See, for example, Adam Gib, A Warning against Countenancing the Ministrations of Mr. George Whitefield (Edinburgh: David Duncan, 1742). Gib was not a "moderate"; he joined the seceders and after "the Breach" became a notable "anti-burgher." (Ferguson, Scotland 1689 to the Present, pp.125-26.

meaner intelligence, for whom faith alone is represented as sufficient to salvation: "But, their affections only being moved, and their understandings not enlightened, nor their reason convinced, too many of them soon relapsed into their former dissolute courses."[1] Graves's attitude to the Established Church, as expressed through Mrs. Wildgoose, is also similar to Wallace's. "'If the clergy would but do their duty, as her poor father did, and as the canons of the church required,'" Mrs. Wildgoose is heard to say, "'there would be no necessity for these extraordinary proceedings'" (20). The competitive light in which the Methodists saw themselves in relation to the Established Church, Graves ridicules in the passage where Wildgoose was "impatient to impart some spiritual advice to his poor countrymen: whom, notwithstanding the residence of their good Bishop, Dean, and a whole College of learned Prebends amongst them, he considered [quoting Whitefield] 'as sheep not having a shepherd'" (72).

Of sudden conversion, Graves was as dubious as Wallace, and he mocks the Methodist terminology in Wildgoose's encounter with Whitefield:

> "Well, brother Wildgoose," says Whitfield, "when and where were you converted? when did you first begin to feel the motions of God's Spirit? in what year, what month, what day, and in what manner, did you receive the secret call of the

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1 Richard Graves, The Spiritual Quixote, ed. Clarence Tracy (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967), p.75. Further page references from this ed. will be placed in brackets in the text.

> Spirit to undertake the work of the Ministry? what work of grace has God wrought upon your soul? and what symptoms have you felt of the New Birth?"
>
> Wildgoose, not being prepared for a scrutiny of this kind, began to stare, and could not readily give answer to these questions.

Wallace would doubtless have enjoyed the deflating description of Wildgoose's itineracy, once he had returned home, as a "Summer Ramble" (title and 472), and he rejected with Graves the mass emotionalism and superstition characteristic of Methodism, preferring the stability of the institutionalised Church. He nevertheless retains moderation in his attitude to Methodism, not only in his letters to Whitefield, but also in "Some Reflections on the expulsion of the 6 students out of the university of Oxford in the year 1768" (La II 620[24]). Though he acknowledges that he is "not a friend to Methodism" (R.O/2) he cannot uphold the verdict of expulsion on the evangelical students of St. Edmund Hall.

The Vice-Principal, the Rev. John Higson, was in charge of most of the tuition and disciplime and apparently "'laboured at times under a strong insanity of mind.'"[1] Disturbed by Methodist views prevalent among the students, he made a formal complaint to the Principal, Dr. George Dixon, alleging "that there were several

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[1] S.L. Ollard, The Six Students of St. Edmund Hall Expelled from the University of Oxford in 1768 (London and Oxford: A.R. Mowbray, 1911), p.4. Hereafter cited as Ollard.

enthusiasts in that society who talked of regeneration, inspiration, and drawing nigh unto God." The Principal took the attitude "'that all the incriminated phrases were scriptural, and their use was authorised by the Offices of the Church of England,'"[1] and so Higson appealed to the Vice-Chancellor. As a result, seven students were charged with being of low birth (a category into which Higson himself fell), of having inadequate learning, being enemies to the doctrines of the Church of England and of frequenting illicit conventicles and other such meetings "'contrary to the Statutes of the University and the laws of this realm.'" They were also charged with neglecting or misbehaving at lectures[2] and were cited to appear before the Vice-Chancellor on 11 March to answer the charges, when they underwent a public examination in Latin and Greek. The charges against one, Benjamin Blatch, were dropped, as "'he was represented to be a man of fortune, and declared that he was not designed for Holy Orders'"[3] and the Principal, defending the remaining six, pleaded their high character, maintained that their doctrine was not inconsistent with the Thirty-Nine Articles and urged that it was the prerogative of the Archbishop and not of that Court "'to determine upon matters of faith.'"[4]

Although the charge of illiteracy was proved in only two cases and that of humble birth in three, many of the other allegations

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1 Ollard, p.6.

2 Ollard, pp.7-8.

3 Ollard, p.13.

4 Ollard, pp.14-15.

were demonstrably false, as the twisting of a statute against unlawful conventicles into a law forbidding attendance at prayer-meetings bears out. Expulsion was nevertheless the verdict, and J.S. Reynolds[1] endorses Ollard's view that the crux of the matter lay in the charge of Methodism and the implied rejection of the doctrine and discipline of the Church of England.[2]

During the following year pamphlets flowed from the press, one, by John Macgowan entitled Priestcraft Defended being so popular that a twenty-first edition appeared as late as 1813. Among the more important pamphlets were Sir Richard Hill's Pietas Oxoniensis: or, a Full and Impartial Account of the Expulsion of Six Students from St. Edmund Hall, Oxford (1768 and a fuller second edition in the same year) which Wallace had read and which Hill followed up with Goliath Slain; being a reply to Dr Nowell's "Answer to Pietas Oxoniensis" (1768). Whitefield expressed his views in A Letter to Rev. Dr. Durrell, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford (1768).

Wallace's interest in the affair centred round his objections to subscriptions and confessions of faith required of the clergy. In Wallace's view

> these six students have been condemned for principles and Doctrines that were the old Doctrines of the Church of England att the

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1 J.S. Reynolds, The Evangelicals at Oxford 1735-1871: A Record of an Unchronicled Movement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), p.38.

2 Ollard, pp.13-14.

Reformation, and have never been altered nor repealed by any posteriour law: to condemn students for these Principles is oppression indeed.

But it will be said the Present Clergy of the church of England do not believe these Principles, they openly preach Doctrines quite contrary to them: nor do they understand their articles in the same sense these six students do, they subscribe them in another sense & think the articles capable of this sense nay that this modern sense must be the sense of them if they have any sense att all, & are not absurd nonsensicall and impious & because it cannot be believed that the 39 Articles are without a true sense that they are nonsensicall or absurd & impious; therefore the sense the present clergy put upon them and in which sense only they subscribe them must be the true sense.

But all this is loose, unjust & absurd & even impious reasoning as I could easily Demonstrate: the sense of the methodists is the real sense of the old church of England whether it be absurd or impious or not (RO/2 and following [unnumbered] page).

The situation demonstrates for Wallace the dangers of

formulating subscriptions and articles of religion to which ministers must subscribe, or lose their benefice. Such a condition leads to attempts to twist words and meanings in an effort to believe that the articles are capable of an acceptable sense. Thus "they pervert Grammar, abuse language and explain away the obvious and naturall and proper sense of the articles: and subscribe them in a quite Different sense from that which they really bear & in their sermons they preach quite contrary Doctrines" (unnumbered page between R.O/3 and R.O/4).

The clergy then falls under suspicion of dishonesty, particularly in the English Church, where "the praevarication of the English Clergy is manifest." Scots ministers, Wallace observes, "do not contradict, att least do not contradict their subscriptions so openly, so there are only suspicions against them" (R.O/4). Such a situation, he believes, is enough to ruin the Church and must work to the great advantage of the Methodists. Concluding, Wallace maintains:

> The expulsion of the students from Oxford is one of the most oppressive unwise and foolish measures which ever were taken & I reckon will do much to hasten the downfall of the Clergy and greatly Disturb the peace & quiet of the nation.
>
> I have observed that since this expulsion happened there is a great humour to run down & expose callvinism: if there were no subscription to it this might avail & become usefull but since callvinism is truely the established

> Doctrine & subscribed by the Clergy they can never get the better of it by villany: they ought to reform the church & abolish all subscriptions whatsoever.

Wallace's earliest surviving manuscript against subscriptions is "A little treatise against imposing Creeds or Confessions of faith on ministers or private Christians as a necessary term of Laick or Ministeriall Communion Written before the year 1720" (La II 620[18]), to which the comment that he and his fellow students had studied all the current controversies, is appended.[1] His arguments, briefly, are these: St. Paul's exhortation to "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good" (1 Thessalonians V, 21), Wallace takes to mean that "the Christian religion recommends yea enjoyns a free and impartial examinations of the grounds of our faith and practice" /17. If an intending minister knows he must accept a confession of faith, he will not be tempted to read the scriptures in any way other than that in which they are interpreted by those that have designed the system. An unscrupulous man will have no hesitation in accepting all, and even the conscientious man, "when he finds he must subscribe so many articles or not be allowed to advance Christianity" will try to conform with them /2-3/.

Uniformity in practice and opinion Wallace grants is desirable, but "this is not the way to obtain it — to oblige men under penalty to think so or so, and believe such and such a scheme." The apostles, he reminds us, recommended "love and charity and

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[1] See Chapter I, p. 6.

forbearing of one another under different opinions" [3]. Why should any worldly authority insist, not only that the clergy believe the scriptures to be the word of God, which is reasonable, but also that they "subscribe a great many long articles which men have framed: I speak this with a scornful heart," he adds, "when I see the bleeding State of Christianity" [3-4].[1] In the early ages of the Christian religion, Wallace is convinced that a belief in the divinity of Christ and in the inspiration of scripture was regarded as sufficient [4].

For science or philosophy to expect subscriptions, he points out, would be ludicrous and impeding, "and is there not the same reason for opposing any error in Divinity by reasons and argument only, without an abjuration of it: I'm sure its a rational belief, and conviction of the mind that is required here as well as in philosophy, and nothing else will be accepted by God" [5]. "Racks and gibbets" to bring men to the truth are certainly considerably worse than compulsory subscriptions, but the principle is the same, and neither can be justified.

Without subscriptions, Wallace envisages the flourishing of Christianity, its characteristics of "love, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness [and] meekness" and the advancement of "true piety, and substantial goodness in the world" [7]. The meekness and

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1 Wallace's concern for the Christian religion as expressed in "Conjectures concerning the fall of Ecclesiasticall power Splendour & Dignity" (La II 620[14]) and "An address to Monsieur J. Vernet" (La II 620[13]) discussed above, is evidently not a symptom of old age.

forbearance preached by the early Church[1] are incompatible with subscriptions, and the scriptures have been ousted by the doctrines of men [12-17]. Reason and argument are the weapons to use against heretics, not subscriptions and codes of belief which tend to stifle truth. The scriptures are surely not so dark, Wallace argues, that they cannot be understood [14-16].

In October 1728, Rev. John Glass, minister at Tealing, was deposed by the Synod of Angus and Mearns for preaching against the Covenants,[2] and the sentence was ratified by a Commission of the Assembly in March 1730. At the Assembly of 1728, John Simson, Professor of Divinity at Glasgow, was suspended from the ministry for allegedly holding the Arian views of Dr. Samuel Clarke.[3] These events inspired Wallace's "Letter to a Reverend Clergyman in Scotland Concerning Submission to the church. Published on occasion of the Processes commenced against Professour Simson and the Reverend Mr Glass" (La II 620[17]). This did not appear in print. In a cover-note dated 1764 Wallace comments: "It is a shrewd piece of writing but seems scarce proper to be published as

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1 Such references to the early Church are in line with Tillotson's belief that: "If we would preserve that purity of faith and manners, which our religion requires, we should have frequent recourse to the primitive teachers and patterns of Christianity, and endeavour to bring our belief and lives to as near a conformity with theirs as is possible" (Works IV, 423).

2 John Cunningham, The Church History of Scotland, II, 454-55.

3 Cunningham II, 398ff. The attitude of William Hamilton, Professor of Divinity at Edinburgh, 1709-1732, to the treatment of Glass and Simson is examined by Sefton, Thesis, pp.31-36, and his dislike of ecclesiastical persecution may well have influenced Wallace.

it might cause suspicions & allarms & occasion Disturbance."
Its purpose is

> to show that a minister who once subscribes all the formulas required by the Church of Scotland tho he afterwards (that is after his subscription) alter his opinions concerning the Doctrines in the Confession, may honestly continue in Church & neither needs nor ought to publish his sentiments which woud procure his Deposition (cover-note).

In a speech intended to have been read to the Commission of the General Assembly in March 1730,[1] Wallace deals specifically with Glass's case, criticising him for publishing his views before consulting his superiors, but censoring the Synod and Presbytery much more harshly for their excess of "forwardness" and "warmth" over the matter and for not employing "that tenderness towards Mr Glass that his case deserved" /2/. Wallace condemns the injustice of "putting Queries to a minister upon suspicion when nothing or no great matter can be proven against him" and adds that "this method was the more unjustifiable in the Synod of Angus that the sentence of suspension against Mr Glass proceeded intirely on the answers he gave to these queries: if he had not been so ingenuous as to answer them I cannot see what would have been made out against him" /2/. Distinguishing between two kinds of contumacy, Wallace describes one as proceeding from a perverseness of will, and the other, applicable

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[1] But never delivered. In the same bundle, La II 620[17].

to Glass, as deriving from a weakness of understanding and a scruple of conscience. The last deserved less severe punishment and tender handling.

The points upon which Glass differs in his Independency from the established Presbyterian Church concern government, not doctrine or worship, and in Wallace's view there is little diversity even over discipline. Surely the case of a minister whose beliefs have changed since entering the Church, Wallace argues, is different from the situation where before ordination an intending clergyman cannot conform: "its not every Difference that can justify a sentence of Deposition from the holy ministry....Mr Glasses principles in which he Differs from us are not of such a nature as that he deserves to be simpliciter Deposed, I believe there are many good and faithfull ministers of Jesus Christ who Differ from us in greater points than Mr Glass" [4-5].

"A Letter...Concerning Submission to the church," in addition to stating Wallace's case even more clearly, gives us most interesting insight into his views on the necessity for absolute discretion in matters of private, unorthodox opinions. Significantly, he safeguards himself at the end by stating: "Let none into whose hands this book may come judge of my principles by what they find in this book for in this book I assume Different characters [much deletion] and this piece was written with a particular view and on a particular Design which never was executed & is intirely dropped as I do believe." The tone of his note on the inside front cover, with a touch of humour, is directed toward the anonymity he advocates in the text:

This piece was written long ago as the intended title page shews: it was never published: There are many acute and just sentiments in it: it seems to be written by a wise and prudent man: & one would think there could be very little exception taken to it: it may be a Question however whether the main scheme argument & intention is quite sound.

I take what is to be found in the 3 last pages to be a mere flowerish: as I can support none who can be supposed to have been the writers to have been such great travellers as these pages suppose[1] I observe the language is not so good as it might be made Yet it might easily be corrected & made good with a little trouble; nor does it want spirit or life in the main: I dare say if the Author is alive (and I believe he is still alive) after so many years of experience he could easily make the language very good.

The letter is addressed to a fictional clergyman who has

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[1] Wallace had claimed but slight acquaintance with two or three ministers in Scotland, and intimacy with none but the supposed recipient of the Letter. While Wallace did not know whether any of his imaginary friend's fellow-clergymen differed from the Confession, he assured him that in his own travels and lengthy residence in parts of Europe he had met both Protestant and Catholic clergy, several of whom, "from my own personal knowledge . . . do not believe in all points according to the Doctrines of their respective churches."

evidently changed his belief as regards several of the articles of the Confession. Wallace expresses surprise only in that "you have been fixed so long when the Confession consists of so many articles about so many points of Divinity concerning which so many wise & good men differ so exceedingly and every one of them has so much to urge in behalf of the side he has chosen" /37. A minister is unlikely to change only if he "leaves off all studdy when he is ordained or if he continues his studies exercises his memory rather than judgement and is firmly resolved at all adventures never to alter his mind" /47. A change of opinion does not call for divulgence and consequent deposition: "its better to keep your own secret and disappoint such bigots as are only wanting an opportunity to purge the church of men of your character" /47. Remember, warns Wallace, the case of Simson and Glass.

If you feel you must broadcast your opinions, he continues, expedients such as ridiculing in conversation "the errors in vogue,"[1] anonymous publication, or persuading a layman to write for you may be used: "by these methods you gain your cheif purpose & still reserve your selves to better times. And who knows but ere twenty years you may have a majority even in a General Assembly and then you may venture to act above board" /12/. Wallace does not regard this advice as inconsistent with sincerity and goes further, to argue that it is a common misapprehension that if a minister says nothing to the contrary, he may be assumed to hold with the Confession. There is

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1 This suggestion no doubt derives from Shaftesbury's "Letter concerning Enthusiasm."

nothing implicit or explicit in the Confession, insists Wallace, that requires a minister to make public a change of outlook, and if mistaken inferences are drawn from your silence it is not your fault; people are deceiving themselves. A promise that we will always accept articles laid down in the Confession (which has not the inspiration of scripture) must be conditional, as we are under a prior Scriptural obligation to hold fast to what we believe to be true. A little raillery[1] and evasion can usually daunt the curious, and, Wallace adds, unorthodox views and contradictions of accepted doctrine should obviously not be aired in sermons.

The Toleration Act he believes to be beneficial, particularly in England, where it has effected composure of temper and a calming of passions to a greater extent than in Scotland, and "has quieted mens minds and introduced good humour and a sociable Disposition among the different sects" [12 pp. from end]. Wild and unnatural opinions, which "constantly flourish in gloomy & frightfull times... cannot stand it out against ease & Plenty" [11 pp. from end]. The Church must be reformed in a cautious and calm manner, Wallace concludes, and not by violence. Discretion is essential.

Avoidance of dissent is the keynote of "Irenicum" (La II 97[3]) and "An Address To such of the English Nation as Reside in Scotland And to the more moderate among the Scotch Episcopalians Concerning Occasionall Conformity to a nationall worship By an Englishman who

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1 This no doubt also derives from Shaftesbury: "There is indeed a kind of defensive raillery" which should be employed "when the spirit of curiosity would force a discovery of more truth than can conveniently be told." ("An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour," Characteristics I, 45).

hath long resided in Scotland" (La II 97[4]). As in "A Letter... Concerning Submission to the church," Wallace experiments, less seriously in these works, with the humorous aspects of remaining anonymous. In the "Advertisement by the Publisher" to "An address ...Concerning Occasional Conformity" Wallace describes himself as the publisher's "pious and judicious friend" whose work "contains severall very just observations which deserve our most serious reflection." The "publisher" has added a few notes bringing out differences between his way of thinking and the author's, but not, writes Wallace, tongue in cheek, "from an inclination to Dispute with my friend [the author] whom I love dearly & with whom I live in the greatest intimacy." In his "Advertisement by the Author" he goes on to describe "Irenicum" as if it were by someone else: "Having had occasion to peruse a short manuscript Intituled 'Irenicum or an essay to promote peace and union in Ecclesiasticall matters' and being much pleased with the good temper and design of the Author and with the manner in which he illustrates his subject I have composed the following address..."

Proof-sheets of the first few pages of "Irenicum" were printed at Edinburgh by Hamilton, Balfour and Neill in 1755: "it was once begun to be printed," wrote Wallace in 1764, "But I stopped it att that time. It contains many good sentiments and deserves to be published" (cover-note, La II 97[3]). He revised the essay again in 1767, but does not appear to have made any further attempt to put it into print. Innumerable alterations in Wallace's hand cover the proof-sheets and as the publishers charged for authors' emendations, it may well be that Wallace could not afford to continue. Several

of the errors may have been the result of the type-setter's inability to read Wallace's handwriting, a factor which possibly did not predispose publishers towards accepting any of his manuscripts, but unfortunately this cannot be verified as only the sheets that follow the printed pages remain, the early ones presumably having been discarded by the printer.

Introducing the work, Wallace warns us not to expect discussion of "the truth of the doctrines of religion, or of any particular system of them, or concerning the best models of worship, discipline or government, for a religious society, or 'a national church,'" topics he invariably shuns. He will rather consider "how those who cannot have all things settled according to the models which they think best, may live most happily together, and how the peace of the world may be best promoted" (proof-sheet 10).

Historically, the civil government has, for convenience, designated one particular church as the established church, "providing for its teachers & worship att the publick expence & annexing certain privelleges to its members" (MS. 19). There is wisdom in adhering to the national church, even though one is not entirely satisfied with all its modes of worship or rules of discipline and government (20) since separating churches stir up strife, give occasion to dangerous factions and disturb the peace of society, diverting attention from the more important points of piety and morality (21). While there have been justifiable reasons for separating from certain churches, dissenters are in the main "factious, ambitious, weak, superstitious or Enthusiastical" (22). It was because of heretics arising in the early Church that creeds and

confessions came into being (29) and Wallace makes a plea for confining confessions only to articles essential to true piety and for allowing proper latitude to scrupulous consciences in an attempt to avoid violent dissension (34).

Discipline should be seen as varying in every age and if at one time it is relaxed, this is no reason for separating from the church, thus depriving it and society of support (39). Wallace points out that the strict modern Independents are miserably divided among themselves and have no influence in reforming the age (40-42). Nor is there justification for secession on account of grievance over patronage, even though the early Church seems to have allowed the people a voice in the choice of a pastor. There is nothing in the scriptures to indicate that everyone has a divine right to vote, and there have been many different rules, of varying merit, at different times (45-50). Since the civil government protects our protestant religion, Wallace reminds us, we ought not to object strenuously if we are denied the right of negative or of nomination (65).

Separation is not the answer even when one regards the church as having made erroneous decisions — for example, when we consider a minister to have been unjustly deposed — for on this basis we would continually be separating. Recalling the case of Ebenezer

Erskine's deposition in 1734,[1] he comments:

> If ministers of whom we entertain a favourable opinion shall publickly arraign the church for things which are not sufficient to justify a separation if they shall behave with such indecency as tends to alienate the minds of the members of the church and to lay a foundation for a separation, if in consequence they shall be called to account if they shall be censured or upon refusing to make proper acknowledgements, in declining the authority of the church or actually withdrawing & making a secession shall be Deposed: tho they profess to do all this soley for exonering their consciences tho the members of the church have perhaps formed different opinions concerning the justice or prudence of such a sentence this is far from justifying a separation (68-69).

The danger, Wallace adds, is now over: "The party of the Seceders are but ill formed to make a great figure or to arrive att any great

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[1] Erskine, minister at Stirling, objected to the 1732 Act Anent the Planting of Vacant Churches which gave only the heritors and elders the right to choose ministers. He was censured by the Synod of Perth and Stirling and appealed to the 1733 Assembly, only to be sentenced to admonishment by the Moderator at the bar of the Assembly for using expressions likely to disrupt the peace and order of the Church. Erskine and several other ministers, on refusing to withdraw what was regarded as an irregular protest against this sentence, were suspended from their ministry and finally discharged (Sefton, Thesis, pp.82-83).

degree of strength" (69). Initially, the seceders had appealed largely to those of the lowest rank and fortunes and, being founded on such narrow principles, their party stood little chance of overthrowing the established church.

The next several pages (73ff) Wallace devotes to a discussion of the obedience due by inferiors to superiors, illustrating the proper attitude of the ordinary church member to the authority of the Church. The real question, he maintains, is not whether we may perform an immoral action when this has been ordered by our superiors, but whether there may not be actions immoral or improper for our superiors to command, but which, nevertheless, it is highly proper and moral for us to do by virtue of their command (88). Inferior officers must be employed, as those in command cannot also carry out orders. Inferior officers are not morally expected to make or to judge decisions and therefore in carrying out orders are guiltless in the sight of God and men (97). Conscientious refusal will have no effect, as another officer will be appointed. It is wiser, then, for a good officer to retain his position lest a worse man take his place. The governors of the Church should, in their turn, be considerate and lenient, taking into account the preferences of the majority (77-80).

Returning to the issue of patronage, Wallace refers to pamphlets which argue that it is unlawful to settle a minister in a parish contrary to the wishes of the people. The detriment done to religion by accepting him must be measured, Wallace maintains, against the harm done by defying authority, and he comments on the degree of concern over ecclesiastical elections which contrasts with

the comparative apathy towards others (111-117). Unexpectedly, Wallace points to the danger of introducing reason "where it cannot have a place" and of discarding authority "in cases where authority alone is proper" (124-25):

> It is true nothing is more essentiall in a Protestant church than the right of private judgement than the exercise of reason than the liberty of examining for ourselves & acting in consequence of our own judgement, it is true lenity & forbearance are excellent things & in a peculiar manner are amiable & proper in matters of Religion in which bigottry and persecution have done infinite mischeifs It is true a church is much more concerned to deal with mens Consciences & to convince the mind than either the civil or the military power Yet if a nationall church may lawfully be constituted and if there can be any civil establishment in matters of Religion wherever a church is established by law and has the benefit of civil emoluments sentences must often be past according to the Plurality of Votes in the same manner as in matters of civil jurisdiction (125-26).

Pleas of conscience, however, should not be censured, since both ecclesiastical and civil courts are under God's jurisdiction (127-28). Thus Wallace urges adherence to the national church, for the sake of ecclesiastical unity, by means of tolerance on the part of both the

governors and the people.

Peace in the Church at all costs is a constant theme in Wallace's writings and one which appears again in "An Address... Concerning Occasional Conformity to a nationall worship" (La II 97[4]), where the main argument is that we should adhere to the established church of the country in which we reside, although we consider it less perfect than our own, for the same reasons that dissent is discouraged in "Irenicum": because it disturbs the peace, brings the national church into contempt and encourages divisions among Christians.

Writing in the guise of a lay member of the Church of England, he makes a comparison between his Church and the Church of Scotland, pointing out the similarity between the Thirty-Nine Articles and the Westminster Confession and noting that the discipline of both Churches is good (6). While the author professes to prefer Episcopal to Presbyterian government, he does not believe either form to have been laid down in the scriptures (7). Church government being the only real point of difference, a member of the Church of England may therefore lawfully worship and receive the sacraments in a Presbyterian Church, particularly if not subscription and confession, but submission only, is required of the layman (9-10).

The remainder of the Address is a plea for the avoidance of narrow sectarianism, which threatens Protestantism in the advantage it gives to the Church of Rome. Wallace has criticisms of both the Scottish and the English Church: the English High-Church Party goes too far in praising the liturgy, thus betraying its ignorance,

bigotry and the prejudices of its education (16), while the Presbyterians "have a tedious manner att their sacraments, they have too many sermons by far they oblige their people to too many dayes attendance they give too much encouragement to or aids to leave their paroch churches & resort to those churches where the communion is celebrated" (23). Nevertheless, the author will not quarrel with them on these grounds. Instead, he will take as much of either mode of worship as he thinks good, but no more. Deploring the "extatick Devotion" that has "allwayes been much in Vogue among the Scotch Presbyterians," which has been "much inflamed of late by a renowned Doctor[1] of our church to whom they give the preference above the very best of their own practitioners," he says that for his own part "I choose more regular tho some think less edifying methods of Devotion & instruction" (22), and believes that "much more depends on the temper in which I go to church and the preparation I have made for it before hand than upon the temper & abilities of the preacher" (23).

As a final twist to the fictional aspect of the piece, Wallace appends "Notes on the praceeding Address By the publisher," a staunch Presbyterian, by which means he softens his criticisms of the Scottish Church. "Tho Mr N____ appears to be as free from an unjust Biass as most writers," concedes the "publisher," "Yet either I am biassed my self or he is too much prejudiced in favour of his nationall church" (2).

It is possible that Wallace was prompted to consider the

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[1] Whitefield, presumably.

problem of foreigners' conformity to national worship by reading the Free and Candid Disquisitions relating to the Church of England, and the means of advancing Religion therein, published anonymously by John Jones in 1749, which Wallace mentions in his text (27). Jones had collected passages from the writings of Anglican divines advocating major alterations to the liturgy and his book gave rise to heated controversy. It would perhaps be going too far to suggest that his awareness of such works of specifically English concern denoted a lack of parochialism, but it is at least an indication of his breadth of interest.

An overriding preoccupation with the good name of the Church, as opposed to a rigid defence of the rights of the Presbyterian Church in Scotland, is the hallmark of Wallace's attitude to the furore over the consecration of the West Kirk Chapel on 25 June 1764, by an Episcopal minister.[1] The Rev. John Glen had apparently brought the matter before the Edinburgh Presbytery, who appointed a committee which eventually offered an overture to the Presbytery "for ending this affair." Wallace "thought this overture fitter for the dayes of 1738 than the present and indeed a harsh & invidious overture; he therefore opposed it and inclined that the affair should have been ended by a minute" (cover-note to bundle) in which the Presbytery should "testify their Displeasure att this unwarrantable unreasonable & illegal attempt against the rights and privilleges of the church in Defiance of the laws established att the reformation." At the same time, the Presbytery should express their

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1 See papers in GA II 620[21].

conviction that "this late attempt however it may be considered in its own nature has been in itself so weak, so imprudently managed & been so justly censured by the Generality of all ranks" that it is of no danger to the interests of the Church of Scotland, being more likely to do harm to the Episcopal communion, since it clearly "arose more from inattention & inadvertency than any formed or bad Design." The Presbytery should therefore take no legal steps, however illegal the action, out of compassion for the weaknesses and infirmities of men (Wallace's draft minute).

Wallace was not blind to the dangers of such occurrences, which might lead to the constitution of the national church being seen as defective and inadequate, and represent her clergy as wanting the power to perform all their ministerial functions, and he concluded the minute with a warning that should any Episcopal clergyman subsequently invade the privileges of the Church of Scotland, "he must blame himself if the Presbytery find themselves obliged to have recourse to such legal methods of Defence as are agreeable to the laws & Constitutions of this Kingdom." His plea for moderation over the affair, however, passed unnoticed amid the clamour of "a party who would hear of nothing but a high & illnatured overture & another party who would do nothing att all" and the matter was, to his mind, "dismissed...very ingloriously" (cover-note).

Although Wallace himself maintained lively political interests, he bore a strong resentment, as we have seen from his part in the controversy over the Porteous Riot Act, towards the Church being drawn into politics. In a letter dated 30 May 1746, Alexander Lind, Sheriff Depute of Midlothian, told the ministers of his county

that he had been instructed by the Lord Justice Clerk (Lord Milton) to request lists from the clergy of all those in their parish who had not been concerned in the Rebellion. A post-script added that they were free to send, instead, a list of those who were involved, if this was less trouble.[1] The response of the Edinburgh clergy, pleading loss, through the recent disturbances, of their annual lists of parishioners and an inability to enquire thoroughly into the behaviour of their flock, while courteously reiterating loyalty to the House of Hanover, is recorded in Scots Magazine for June 1746, and the gentle irony of their hope that "those employed in the administration may be happily directed to such prudent, just, and manly measures, as may tend to the safety of his Majesty's person" has not gone unnoticed.[2]

Acutely sensitive to this attempt to hound the rebels, no doubt on account of his own vulnerability in matters of religious orthodoxy, Wallace was for once not content to leave the matter at this polite and diplomatic level, and he wrote in heat "Some Remarks by a Layman," commenting on Lind's letter, which were "never

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1 His letter is reproduced in Appendix IV.

2 Scots Magazine, 8 (1746), 273 (italics inserted). Remarked on by Sir Henry Craik in A Century of Scottish History (Edinburgh & London: Wm. Blackwood, 1901) I, 297. Letters from the Edinburgh ministers to Lord Milton and to Sir Everard Fawkener, Secretary to the Duke of Cumberland are also reproduced in Scots Magazine, 8 (1746), 273-74.

published nor intended to be published."[1] It is unlikely, however, that Wallace, in his indignation did not pass the manuscript round selected members of his group. The hurried terseness of the first paragraph is a measure of his emotional involvement:

> To begin with the Postscript,[2] it is of no authority as it is not signed
> If Mr Lind knows nothing of this postscript, he would do well to enquire who durst presume to add it without his knowledge, if it was added by his command & he intended it should have any weight he ought to have signed it & in omitting this he seems not to know his duty, if he intended it should have no weight he is mistaken in point of Decency & has not used the ministers handsomely & it is altogether improper for any officer of the law to send private letters to any in his jurisdiction which he signs & orders written postscripts to be added which he does not sign.

Recovering some degree of composure, Wallace recalls that when

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1 La II 620[5] "A letter from Alexander Lind Esquire Sheriff Depute of Mid Lothian By Orders of the Lord Justice Clerk to the Ministers of the Gospell within the County To which are added Some Remarks by a Layman." He comments at the end that he had resolved not to put pen to paper until the controversy had died down, for fear of influencing the ministers, which suggests that he perhaps did intend to publish at the time, as does his instruction at the top of the first page of text: "The Letter is first Inserted."

2 See Appendix IV.

he first received the letter he had no cause to doubt Lind's veracity, but he found it so blundering that he concluded that Lind had misunderstood Lord Milton's instructions. Word reached him, however, that the Lord Justice Clerk had indeed ordered Lind and other Sheriff Deputes to send out the letters, of which he had enclosed a copy, without the postscript. Whoever contrived the postscript, Wallace observes, was aware of the ineffectiveness of the letter, and added it in an attempt to reveal the rebels: "indeed its evident from the Letter it self that he who framed it had no view to Discover Rebels but to save such as had not been Concerned in the Rebellion from unjust suspicions" /2/.[1]

Having expounded on the impossibility and unreliability of methods of enquiry open to the clergy, Wallace protests that it is not in any case a minister's place to collect information, but that of the Lord Justice Clerk, the Lord Advocate, the King's Solicitors and other peers of the law. Ministers, he points out, cannot call people before them or take oaths; they can learn only from rumours and reports. It would have been reasonable to ask all loyal citizens to supply information, but why should the clergy alone have been selected "by printed letters...in so publick a manner to give in

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1 This accords with Brunton and Haig's description of Lord Milton in the Senators of the College of Justice: "During the rebellion of 1745, his Lordship was much admired for the mild and judicious manner with which he conducted himself in the exercise of his authority as Justice-Clerk at that unhappy period. He abstained from severe measures, and adopted means either to conceal, or recal, such of the rebels as had been rather misled from the paths of loyalty, than actuated by premeditated designs to overturn the government. Indeed, many informations, which he suspected to have been sent by over-officious and malignant persons, were found in his repositories after his death unopened" (499).

signed lists of such as are not concerned in a rebellion." [6]. Such lack of secrecy and unwarranted discrimination Wallace rejects as "blundering & absurd" [7].

Lind's letter called for information not only on "residenters" but also on "heritors and liferenters, tho' not residing." "Would it not be a very pretty task," retorts Wallace, "for a minister to be going up & down thro all the houses of his paroch after he has got Mr Linds letter & asking who is the heretour of this house or is any part of it liferented" [10]. And how unrealistic is the demand for an answer in a few days. Doubtless the heritors and liferenters of Edinburgh houses were dispersed over the whole kingdom. We cannot meddle with the Lord Justice Clerk's designs, Wallace adds cautiously, as he must answer before the "highest tribunall," but "nothing hinders mankind from observing the tendency of his actions" [11].[1]

Wallace's chief grievance was the injustice of the demand. The loyalty of the Presbyterian ministers to the House of Hanover was indeed, as he claimed, well known: "But when they were hoping to sit down in peace & quiet, & enjoy the fruit of their honest labours, with the applauses of the nation, most extravagant proposalls are made to them by the Lord Justice Clerk," proposals which must brand them either as disloyal subjects or as informers, to be generally condemned and abhorred [12-13]. Private

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1 Milton acted as the Duke of Argyle's (formerly Lord Islay) confidential agent in Scotland. Both had been among Walpole's leading adherents and this alone would pre-dispose Wallace against Milton.

consultation with the ministers and the cooperation of other members of the public, he reiterates, would have rendered the request quite acceptable.

VII Conclusion

Wallace's religious writings, then, show him to be staunch presbyterian, generally conforming to the tenets of a tolerant, moderate Calvinism in works intended for the public, while his private speculations reveal an unexpected degree of unorthodoxy and of humour. Shaftesbury's influence is perhaps greater than might be expected, but the dominant influence on Wallace has been that of the Latitudinarians, whose emphasis on reason has given it a position of supreme importance in Wallace's scheme: as science and philosophy employ reason, so must Christianity. Reason for Wallace, is natural, and we cannot expect miraculous intervention; we must perform God's will within the natural order of things. If we relied on reason he argues, we should no longer require subscriptions and confessions. Received doctrines become dated and subscriptions, therefore, merely provide stumbling-blocks and necessitate false or contrived reasoning.

Wallace's advice is to defeat accepted doctrines, not by violent opposition, but by ignoring them, so that they fall into disuse "like obsolete laws and will be found," he adds with rancour, "no where but in the Confession."[1] He continually sets

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[1] La II 620 [17], "A Letter...Concerning Submission to the church" [16].

doctrines devised by men against the inspiration of the Scriptures and the strength of his opposition to subscriptions and his sense of the impermanence of religious doctrines derives from his belief in the Protestant right of independent enquiry and in the supremacy of reason over blind or unthinking faith. While on this earth perfect Church organisation is not possible, we can at least attempt to achieve unity, and to this end, we must sometimes be prepared to bow to the superior authority of the Church. Since perfection is impossible we must learn to tolerate facets of Church government that we do not think ideal and sacrifice our minor preference for the sake of peace and a united front, from which the Church derives its strength. We must also protect the image of the Church by not voicing our own unorthodox views.

A minister's task, says Wallace, is to

> instruct mankind in the Doctrines & precepts of Religion & morals & exhort & perswade them to become pious wise & good, and as force is intirely improper for the end they have in view they ought never to use it, but only employ prayers & intreaties, reason & argument and all the winning & engaging arts of persuasion, & that they may be able to succeed in this they ought to be men of good characters & obliging in their behaviour for men of bad characters, odious or contemptible to the people can never be expected to have any influence with them, ministers themselves

> ought to be very carefull of their Conduct that they may not only actually be but appear to be good men & above all suspicion of being vitious in particular they should appear to be lovers of their people & desirous of their wellfare that their exhortations and advices may have the greater weight.[1]

It is reason, in Wallace's view, that points to the advantages of a good morality, and we need no other incentive to virtue. Knowledge of mankind will enable us to perform those actions which are most beneficial, their results being the measure of their goodness. The fact that Wallace emphasises the effect of the action and that he ignores the situation where an action does not produce happiness but was intended to, doubtless goes back again to his implicit belief in the power of reason, whereby proper knowledge will inevitably lead to right action. He concedes, nevertheless, that "a man surrounded with Difficulties & overcoming them is in a just sense superior to a higher nature freed from them by his nature"[2] and so in fact the tangible result is not always the only

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1 La II 620[5], "A Letter from Alexander Lind Esquire" /19-29/. This passage bears a distinct similarity with Tillotson on the same topic: the chief governors and ministers of the Church "should be diligent and faithful in their respective stations, 'teaching men to observe all things, whatsoever Christ hath commanded.' And if we would make this our great work, to instruct our respective charges in the necessary doctrines of faith, and the indispensable duties of a good life, we should have far less trouble with them about other matters. And that we may do this work effectually, we must be serious in our instructions and exemplary in our lives." (Works VI, 159).

2 "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles," on Epistle 53, 2 November 1756.

aspect that Wallace takes into account.

As human beings, we must make use of our reason:

> We should exercise & cultivate our minds much & allmost continually & tho we do not read write or study for the world we should Do it for our selves; that whether we publish our thoughts or not or become famous or are able to do good to the world we may att least become wise & good.[1]

This attitude perhaps explains the existence of the manuscripts that Wallace apparently did not intend for publication. He does not underestimate the importance of writing for "posterity and the Generall good of mankind," however, which, he maintains, is "of Greater advantage than to procure some small benefit to a single man or two at present in making them richer or in adding some food or necessary utensil to them."[2] But for this belief, he would doubtless have left fewer manuscripts in the hands of his heirs, and we should be without the insight they have given us into a liberal representative of eighteenth-century moderation.

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1 "Meditations," on Epistle 15 [1753?]. It is a mark of his humility that, referring to the pleasure in repentance, he writes: "One would think there must be a much greater [pleasure] in being actually wise & in living like a wise man for some considerable time but I confess I have never been wise enough & long enough wise together to know this by experience: I have often been wise for an hour or perhaps for a day but some weakness or folly has allwayes got the better which prevented higher wisdom & felicity" (on Epistle 4, 2 July 1753).

2 "Meditations", on Epistle 8, 7 July 1753.

Chapter III

Literary Works

I Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind

Since not only the Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind, but Wallace's other major published works can be examined in the light of the population debate, this would seem a good starting-point from which to explore Wallace's thought as illustrated in his non-theological writings.

The concern during the Tudor period that numbers were too great gave way to a growing belief that an expanding population was desirable. The advantages of a large population, such as military strength and national power, were of course recognized by the late Tudors, but they regarded the possibility of over-population, posited in classical Greek writings and reiterated, for example, by Machiavelli, as a present threat.[1] This pessimistic view was later countered by the optimists who saw an increasing population as beneficial in a world of expanding mercantilism, and who regarded the frequent wars and epidemics as sufficient to prevent excessive population growth.

Political arithmetic, the embryo of population theory, introduced a more sophisticated note into ideas on population, and such writers as John Graunt (1620-74) and William Petty (1623-87) examined its sociological significance in greater detail. While

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[1] For a detailed discussion of theories of population see E. P. Hutchinson, The Population Debate: The Development of Conflicting Theories up to 1900 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), to which this summary is greatly indebted.

Graunt and James Harrington (1611-77), for example, believed in the desirability of a large population from the standpoint of increased national power and riches, it was Petty who laid greatest stress on its economic significance. Sir Matthew Hale (1609-76), on the other hand, adopted the pessimistic view, and ignoring the positive economic aspects, pointed out that poverty was also a concomitant of large numbers. It was he who introduced the term "geometrical progression" to describe population growth. He also embraced the belief in natural and inevitable brakes on population, and his thought provided the basis for the pessimistic theory that was to be developed more fully in the eighteenth century. Graunt, Petty and Hale established population as an important topic in its own right, and by the end of the seventeenth century the differences between the optimistic and the pessimistic theories were fairly clear. Both acknowledged the dependence of population on food supply, but while for the optimists the dangers of over-population were merely theoretical, for the pessimists, they were immediate.

By the eighteenth century the optimists advocated populousness as the basis of economic and national strength: far from being harmful, continued multiplication would provide more labour, which would proportionately increase the food supply. The pessimists laid stress on the power of increase of numbers -- geometric increase -- and perceived a tendency for the population to approach the subsistence limit. While the optimists recognised population checks and aimed at removing them, the pessimists welcomed them as preventing the worst consequences of over-population and therefore as being beneficial in the long term. Such checks as war and

poverty they regarded as the result of over-population. In the course of the eighteenth century, theories current in the previous century were elaborated in terms of the relation between populousness and happiness, the advantages and disadvantages of luxury, and the role of individual responsibility and restraint.

It was with David Hume's assistance and encouragement[1] that Wallace brought out, in 1753, his first major publication: A Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind in antient and modern Times: in which The superior Populousness of Antiquity is maintained. With An Appendix, Containing Additional Observations on the same Subject, And Some Remarks on Mr. Hume's Political Discourse, Of the Populousness of antient Nations. The works of these two men were the most prominent historical studies of the population issue in Britain, but their contributions formed part of a wider European debate. In France the principal figures in the controversy were Montesquieu and Voltaire,[2] Montesquieu believing in the greater populousness of ancient nations, and Voltaire, like Hume, adopting a more sceptical position. Voltaire's main contribution was his article on population in the Dictionnaire philosophique, where he sees fit to wax ironical at Wallace's expense: "Enough, enough, Mr. Wallace, the holy spirit cannot deceive; but its agents and copyists have badly calculated and numbered. All your Scotland would not furnish eleven hundred thousand men to attend your sermons, and the

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1 For a note on the publication of the Dissertation see Appendix VI.

2 See R. Gonnard, "Les Doctrines de la Population avant Malthus" in Revue D'Histoire Economique et Sociale, 17 (1929), 224-26.

kingdom of Judah was not a twentieth part of Scotland."[1]

Wallace himself seems clearly to have been strongly influenced by his reading of Montesquieu's Persian Letters and The Spirit of Laws, and it may be useful, therefore, to outline the ideas about population presented in these works. In both of them Montesquieu maintains that the world is less populated than formerly: "After a calculation as exact as may be in the circumstances, I have found that there are upon the earth hardly one tenth part of the people which there were in ancient times," he tells us in Letter CXIII: "And the astonishing thing is, that the depopulation goes on daily: if it continues, in ten centuries the earth will be a desert."[2] Apart from plagues, such as the venereal disease which overran Europe, Asia and Africa less than two centuries before (Letter CXIV), the reasons which he cites in the Letters for the decline in population are moral ones: "this great difference is the result of a moral change" (Letter CXV).

Population growth, he asserts, is checked by the spread of Mohammedanism and Christianity. While the Roman world prohibited polygamy, the Mohammedans do not. Few children are born in seraglios, and those there are are generally weak and unhealthy. The husband is exhausted looking after many wives, and the women have to be guarded by eunuchs, a double loss of procreative power, as the woman must be continent and the eunuch rendered incapable. The female slaves required in the seraglio are not permitted to

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1 A Philosophical Dictionary. From the French of M. De Voltaire (London: John & Henry L. Hunt, 1824), V, p.275.

2 Persian Letters trans. John Davidson (London: Gibbings & Co., 1899), III, 8.

marry either, and so polygamy significantly reduces propagation (Letter CXV). Catholic Christianity's counterpart of the eunuch, according to Montesquieu, is the priest, and those of both sexes who voluntarily adopt a life of celibacy. Men who enter monastries, he argues, reduce the number of hands in agriculture and industry. They also possess most of the wealth of the state, and instead of circulating it in trade, industry or manufacture, they hoard their income to acquire capital. Christianity also refuses divorce, the consequence of which Montesquieu sees not only as depriving marriage of its sweetness, but as attacking its air:

> Nothing contributed more to a mutual attachment than the power of divorce: husband and wife were induced to endure patiently domestic troubles, knowing that they had the power to end them; and they often retained this power all their lives without using it, from the sole reflection that they were at liberty to do so (Letter CIVII).

Christians now, he maintains, see the discomforts of marriage as everlasting, and years of coldness and private separations take place. The men turn to prostitutes, an unfruitful course, and in cases where one of the married pair is unable to reproduce, the other must remain bound to his partner and his procreative potential is wasted.

Modern slavery, says Montesquieu, is another contribution to depopulation. While the Romans married off their slaves, and the masters looked after the education and upbringing of the children,

thus removing the fear of having too large a family, Mohammedan slaves were not permitted to reproduce. Slaves today are dying in their thousands in the mines and in the foreign climate of the American colonies. In Roman times, by contrast, the number of slaves grew and increased: "Industry and plenty produced them; and they on their side produced plenty and industry" (Letter CXVI).

Colonisation Montesquieu deplored not only because the change in climate led to susceptibility to disease, so that the colonies were not generally better peopled as a result, but also because the mother country was weakened by deportation (Letter CXIII).

Population growth is encouraged, he points out, by the development of agriculture. In savage countries, where men depend on hunting and fishing alone, there is a constant danger of famine, and the animals on which they live disappear as the human population expands (Letter CXXI). But where agriculture is less easy, a mild government may prove equally conducive to populousness. "Nothing attracts strangers more than liberty, and its accompaniment, wealth" (Letter CXXIII). Equality among the citizens gives rise to plenty and vigour, Montesquieu maintains, while in countries subject to arbitrary power, "the prince, the courtiers, and a few private persons, possess all the wealth, while all the rest groan in extreme poverty (Letter CXXIII). For this reason he is against the European law of primogeniture, which destroys equality among citizens by putting wealth into the hands of only one child in the family (Letter CXX).

Generally speaking, a reasonable level of subsistence is necessary before a man will marry, though "the boor or peasant, once

married, will increase the race without any regard to his poverty or wealth; that consideration does not affect him: he has always a safe inheritance to leave his children, and that is his plough; so nothing witholds him from following blindly the instincts of nature" (Letter CXXIII). The resultant offspring, however, either die at birth, or live in feebleness and impotence, prey to the frequent epidemics which stem from poverty and bad diet.

Montesquieu, therefore, like Hume and Wallace, associates population with the prevailing social and political circumstances, and in the Spirit of Laws, he develops his description of population checks in the Letters into an "economicocultural" theory of population.[1] "A rising people," he points out, "increase and multiply extremely. This is, because with them it would be a great inconvenience to live in celibacy; and none to have many children. The contrary of which is the case when a nation is formed."[2] A severe government inhibits propagation. Beggars, and the very poor, as he remarked in the Letters, will have many, but sickly children. But those who are poor because of the severity of the government, will avoid having children in the absence of adequate subsistence (Ch. XI).

Population expansion was favoured in some of the ancient

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1 See Joseph J. Spengler, French predecessors of Malthus: A Study in Eighteenth-Century Wage and Population Theory, (North Carolina: Duke Univ. Press, 1942), pp.215ff.

2 The Spirit of Laws Bk. XXIII ch.X. All quotations are from the translation by Thomas Nugent (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co., 1873). Further references are made to Bk. XXIII, and only the chapter numbers appear bracketed in the text.

republics by an agrarian law, where the land was equally divided and every citizen could live off the land he cultivated. The fact that there were few arts was unimportant, contrary to the present situation where unequal division of the land leads to the production of more crops than are necessary to those who are actually involved in cultivation. If the arts were neglected, and agriculture only were pursued,

> the country could not be peopled. Those who cultivate, or employ others to cultivate, having corn to spare, nothing would encourage them to work the following year; the fruits of the earth would not be consumed by the indolent; for these would have nothing with which they could purchase them. It is necessary then that the arts should be established, in order that the produce of the land may be consumed by the labourer and the artificer. In a word, it is now proper that many should cultivate much more than is necessary for their own use. For this purpose they must have a desire of enjoying superfluities; and these they can receive only from the artificer (Ch. XV).

Ancient Greece, says Montesquieu, is an example of the way in which good government can encourage population. The division into city states with their own government and laws, which were administered with a view to keeping domestic happiness and power abroad at a level equal to that of the surrounding cities, meant that the population increased "to such a degree as to become burthensome" (Ch. XVII). Colonisation and wars were necessary to reduce the numbers.

Other countries before the Roman conquest — Italy, Sicily, Asia Minor, France and Germany, for example — also consisted of small units, and it was when these were swallowed up by Rome that the process of depopulation began (Ch. XIX). As a result of this, Rome had to introduce laws to encourage propagation (Ch. XI), measures that Montesquieu believes necessary for Europe in his own time. Depopulation by wars, pestilence or famine is not irreversible, he holds, but

> This evil is almost incurable, when the depopulation is prepared before hand by interior vice and a bad government. When this is the case, men perish with an insensible and habitual disease: born in misery and weakness, in violence or under the influence of a wicked administration, they see themselves destroyed, and frequently without perceiving the cause of their destruction (Ch. XXVIII).

Courage and industry disappear under these circumstances, and vast areas of land lie uncultivated. The solution, says Montesquieu, is to distribute land to all needy families and supply them with the equipment to clear and cultivate it. "A man is not poor because he has nothing," he continues in Ch. XXIX, "but because he does not work."

Hume's essay "Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations" first appeared in 1752 in his volume of Political Discourses. Early in the essay he takes issue with Montesquieu and Vossius on the grounds that their claim that the population in ancient times was greater than at present can only be a tentative one: "We know not exactly

the numbers of any European kingdom, or even city, at present: How can we pretend to calculate those of ancient cities and states, where historians have left us such imperfect traces?"[1]

In the absence of sufficient established evidence, therefore, Hume offers "reflections" on the problem, drawn from a combination of what could be regarded as facts relating to ancient population and the causes of increase and decrease in numbers. "General physical causes" he excludes straight away, since we are unable to judge whether mankind is advancing to perfection (and consequently to greater health and fertility), or declining from it.[2]

He also passes over particular physical causes, such as disease, and bases his case on "moral causes," examining the influence of the social and political climate in determining population. In general, he argues,

> the question, with regard to the comparative populousness of ages or kingdoms, implies important consequences, and commonly determines concerning the preference of their whole police, their manners, and the constitution of their government....if everything else be equal, it seems natural to expect, that, wherever there are most happiness and virtue, and the wisest

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1 David Hume, Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. T.H. Green and T.H. Grose (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1875), I, 383. Hereafter cited as Essays. Further page refs. to this edn. will be bracketed in text. See also note in Appendix I, 11.

2 This seems to be a reference to and refutation of Montesquieu's theory of degeneration which appears in the Letters, but not in the Laws.

> institutions, there will also be most people (I, 383-84).

The doctrine that the measure of the success of a government is reflected in the degree to which the population expands under it, is also found in Wallace's Dissertation:

> The question concerning the number of mankind in ancient and modern times, under ancient or modern governments, is not to be considered as a matter of pure curiosity, but of the greatest importance; since it must be a strong presumption in favour of the customs or policy of any government, if, caeteris paribus, it is able to raise up and maintain a greater number of people (14n.).

It might be said, indeed, that both works set out not merely to establish the comparative population of ancient and modern times, but to make a case for particular political and social systems.[1]

Both writers agree that the claims of Vossius and Montesquieu regarding the superior populousness of the ancient world were extravagant,[2] and Wallace, like Hume, acknowledges the impossibility of making an accurate estimate of the present-day population (9). But while he accepts that "history affords only imperfect hints" of the movements of mankind in very early times (2), he is far more

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1 Mossner makes this point when he says that: "The question of population in Hume's view...transcended demography to include the total critical evaluation of two civilizations, that of ancient Greece and Rome and that of Europe since the Revival of Letters" ("Hume and the Ancient-Modern Controversy, 1725-1752: A Study in Creative Scepticism" in University of Texas Studies in English, 28 [1949], 139).

2 Though both misquote Montesquieu (see Appendix I, 11, footnote 4).

willing than Hume to place reliance on the accounts of ancient historians. In the MS. Dissertation particularly, Wallace makes a very clear distinction between "facts" and "causes," but instead of minimising the importance or significance of the "facts" as Hume does, he uses "facts" drawn from ancient authorities to prove his contention that the world was formerly more populous. While Hume's case rests mainly on "causes," Wallace in the MS. brings in causes to account for the decline he already believes he has established. His arguments from "causes" therefore carry little conviction unless the reader accepts his prior arguments from the "facts," a pitfall that Hume avoids. The published form of the Dissertation, in which Wallace augments and expands the MS. text, is less sharply divided into sections dealing with facts and causes, and Wallace uses moral causes to prove his case rather than merely to explain it. He nevertheless gives much greater weight than Hume does to evidence derived from "facts" and on these grounds the two writers very obviously diverge.[1]

For Wallace, the accounts of the ancient historians, which he believes indicate a far larger population in past ages, by "appearing to be such as might be expected, if the hypothesis in the dissertation was true, serve both to confirm it, and also to render the testimonies themselves more credible" (280).

Wallace's MS. Dissertation shows very clearly the influence of

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[1] Wallace's published work consists of an expanded version of the MS. Dissertation and an appendix of about the same length "Containing Additional Observations concerning the Numbers of Mankind in antient and modern Ages: With Some Remarks on Mr. Hume's Political Discourse, intituled, Of the Populousness of antient Nations" (161).

Montesquieu. He cites, for instance, as causes of depopulation, polygamy authorised by Mohammedanism, and the associated disadvantages of the seraglio (though he believes polygamy to have been a custom in ancient times as well [20-21]). Christian denial of divorce he also grants as a contributory factor, while adding that although divorce was permitted in ancient Greece and Rome, it was uncommon (21). Unmarried Catholic priests and nuns he agrees are a present cause of the decline in numbers (22), and he supports Montesquieu's claim that slaves in ancient times contributed greatly to the population. While the poor today cannot afford to raise a family, the slaves then were well cared for and were better off than the present poor — the tenants, servants and meaner tradesmen (22-24).

Another factor affecting the decline in numbers today, Wallace acknowledges, is the right of primogeniture. While the Greeks and Romans divided their estates equally, so that the children were equally encouraged to marry and produce families, under the present system of primogeniture usually only the eldest son marries and very often keeps a large number of unmarried servants as well. Less care, he adds, is now taken to encourage marriage (25-26).

Wallace sees trading, especially with the West Indies, in the same light as Montesquieu regards colonisation.[1] While the ancients did not neglect trade, it was more confined, and so there were fewer losses (26, 27, 31). It is Montesquieu's assertion that an

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[1] Montesquieu also regards navigation as adversely affecting the population of Europe (Laws Bk. XXIII, ch. XIV).

agricultural society divided into small political units favours population growth, however, that Wallace takes up and develops as a main point. Too much trade leads to the neglect of agriculture, he argues. It is food, and not trade which supports a people. Crowding into cities to carry on trade, with the resultant neglect of large tracts of land, may indeed lead to an increase in numbers, but not to the extent to which numbers would have increased had all hands been turned to cultivation (27-31). Population, in other words, is directly related to the food supply.[1] Wallace agrees with Montesquieu that the small and independent political units existing in Greece and Rome before the Roman Empire were one of the chief causes of the comparatively larger population that prevailed in these times.

The solution, as Wallace sees it, is to put greater emphasis on agriculture to increase the present population. Longer leases, and more encouragement and education of younger sons in the art of cultivation would help to achieve this. He also recommends the introduction of insurance schemes for those who are able to support themselves, but who are afraid to take on the financial liability of a wife and children (39).

The first part of the published Dissertation expands these points, with more emphasis on simplicity and frugality as aids to population growth, and cites the evidence of ancient authorities at greater length. In conclusion, Wallace observes:

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[1] See the published Dissertation, pp.19-21 for an elaboration of this point.

> Philosophers have been advising, and Divines calling upon mankind to cultivate frugality, temperance, simplicity, contentment with a little, and patience of labour, demonstrating, that these humble virtues are the only means by which they can expect to secure solid, lasting, and independent felicity....But the cultivation of these virtues not only makes individuals happy; but, from what has been maintained in the preceeding Dissertation, appears further to be the surest way of rendering the earth populous, and making society flourish....The decay of these virtues, and the introduction of a corrupted and luxurious taste, have contributed in a great measure to diminish the numbers of mankind in modern days (159-160).

It is here that Hume and Wallace most significantly disagree. While Hume sees the more sophisticated economic system, with its accompanying degree of luxury as being inevitably conducive to an increasing population, Wallace's argument is dominated by his suspicion of "luxury" and his craving for a return to agriculture. He lacks the sense of historical perspective to be found in such writers as Hume and Sir James Steuart and does not take into account the stages of economic development. Hume is able to concede to Wallace his argument that small political units favour population growth, that enormous cities are "destructive to society" and "beget

vice and disorder of all kinds, starve the remoter provinces, and even starve themselves, by the prices to which they raise all provisions" (I, 398). He owns that "the situation of affairs in modern times, with regard to civil liberty, as well as equality of fortune, is not near so favourable, either to the propagation or happiness of mankind" (I, 399), but he nullifies the force of his concession by pointing out that the more developed and sophisticated economy prevailing at present has a greater influence on the increase in numbers than the ancient agrarian economy could have had: "Trade, manufactures, industry, were no where, in former ages, so flourishing as they are at present in Europe" (I, 410).

Hume grants "that agriculture is the species of industry chiefly requisite to the subsistence of multitudes," but argues that it is false reasoning to conclude from the fact that "agriculture may, in some instances, flourish without trade or manufactures...that, in any great extent of country, and for any great tract of time, it would subsist alone" (I, 412). Hume regards the wars of the ancients as being "more bloody and destructive" than those at present, their governments "more factious and unsettled" and "the general police more loose and irregular" (I, 413). This factiousness, so destructive of population, was heightened by a practice which Wallace cites as a stimulus to population growth: the absence of primogeniture. The equal division of property, says Hume, among the brothers in a family,

> must, by a necessary consequence, contribute to unsettle and disturb the state. The universal preference given to the elder by modern laws, though it encreases the inequality of fortunes, has, however, this good effect, that it accustoms men to the same

> idea in public succession, and cuts off all claim and pretension of the younger (I, 407).

Essentially Hume's argument was that the expansion of commerce had provided the basis for a larger population:

> Our superior skill in mechanics; the discovery of new worlds, by which commerce has been so much enlarged; the establishment of posts; and the use of bills of exchange: These seem all extremely useful to the encouragement of art, industry, and populousness. Were we to strike off these, what a check should we give to every kind of business and labour, and what multitudes of families would immediately perish from want and hunger? (I, 413).

Wallace counters this line of reasoning by pointing out that modern society creates its own checks to population in the form of luxury and an unequal distribution of wealth. It is not true, he thinks, that a population of the size found in eighteenth-century Europe could not be maintained by a simpler form of economic organisation. Admittedly a great many hands are employed in manufactures and trade:

> Were we to strike them all off at once, it would give a great check to every kind of business and labour, and cause multitudes of families to perish by want: nor could we all of a sudden supply the place of these later inventions. But this proceeds wholly from our present customs

> and police; if other customs and another taste prevailed, we could gradually supply their places, and employ such hands as would be rendered idle, in a manner much more useful for multiplying our people, viz. in agriculture, and arts subservient to the provision of food, by which means we would both purchase more useful and substantial wealth, and distribute it in a more equitable manner (270).

A synthesis of the theories of Montesquieu, Hume and Wallace is made by the somewhat neglected political economist, Sir James Steuart.[1] As Andrew S. Skinner points out in his edition of Steuart's Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy (first published in 1767), Steuart associates economic change with political and social change.[2] Thus the developments in Europe over the last three hundred years, brought about "by the discovery of America and the Indies, the springing up of industry and learning, the

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1 Steuart's importance is emphasised by S.R. Sen in The Economics of Sir James Steuart (London: G. Bell, 1957): "even in his own country where he was denied recognition for so long the economic policy that is now being pursued is in effect neither Adam Smith's nor Karl Marx's but essentially James Steuart's. And in the realm of theory too there are ample signs, especially since Keynes launched his attacks on classical economics, that Steuart may at last come into his own. Be that as it may, it is time now for us to realize that Steuart deserves greater recognition from the historians of economic doctrines than is customarily bestowed on him" (188).

2 Sir James Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy, ed. Andrew S. Skinner, Scottish Economics Classics (Edinburgh & London: Oliver & Boyd, 1966), p.24, n.8. Further page references will be to this edition and will be bracketed in the text.

introduction of trade and the luxurious arts, the establishment of public credit, and a general system of taxation, have entirely altered the plan of government every where" (24). The "regular progress of mankind" he sees as a move "from great simplicity to complicated refinement" (28). While he accepts Wallace's point that "the most essential requisite for population, is that of agriculture" and that the numbers of mankind are in proportion to the supply of food, (Steuart, p.37), he does not agree that it follows that almost everyone should cultivate the land. On the contrary, he argues that the agrarian economy of the ancient world could only be sustained by slavery, and that the present economy, without slavery, depends on industry and manufacture to maintain an increasing population (49).[1]

At present, says Steuart, in a fertile country where people lived in utmost simplicity under a free government, without trade, luxuries or ambition, encouragement of agriculture would lead to a superfluity of produce; for without trade, the plenty would be retained by those who produced it and the resultant waste in a good year would lead to the farmers immediately giving up work (39). In ancient times slaves were forced to work on the land, and the produce was distributed throughout the population, which proved "an infallible way of multiplying inhabitants, of making them laborious, and of preserving a simplicity of manners" (39). Today, unless industry provides the means by which those not involved in agriculture can purchase the surplus produced, there will be a

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[1] See Appendix I, 12.

return to ancient simplicity: "If mankind be not forced to labour, they will labour for themselves only; and if they have few wants, there will be little labour" (49). An increase in numbers, in other words, is dependent on the incentive to work. And the incentive to work at present depends on the existence of a degree of luxury.[1] Where there is a primitive economy,

> The laziest part of the farmers, disgusted with a labour which produces a plenty superfluous to themselves, which they cannot dispose of for any equivalent, will give over working, and return to their ancient simplicity. The more laborious will not furnish food to the necessitous for nothing: such therefore who cannot otherwise subsist, will naturally serve the industrious, and thereby sell their service for food. Thus by the diminution of labour, a part of the country, proportional to the quantity of food which the farmers formerly found superfluous, will again become uncultivated (41).

An outlet must be provided for the superfluity, Steuart reiterates, and trade, along with industry, must assist in the advancement of agriculture and multiplication.

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[1] This point is similar to Montesquieu's (Ch. XV) quoted on page 190 above. "Luxury" Steuart defines as "the consumption of any thing produced by the labour or ingenuity of man, which flatters our senses or taste of living, and which is neither necessary for our being well fed, well clothed, well defended against the injuries of the weather, or for securing us against every thing which can hurt us" (43-44). He does not mean "the gratification of the animal appetites, nor the abuse of riches" (46).

With Hume, Steuart agrees that "the more free and simple the manners of any country are, *caeteris paribus*, the fewer inhabitants will be found in it" (48). The ancient world, therefore, was undoubtedly less populated, while today, "provided there be a demand for man, whatever use he be put to, the species will multiply; for those who stand in need of them will always feed them, and, as long as food is to be found, numbers will increase" (49).

Without referring to him directly, Steuart qualifies Wallace's view that a maximum population may be obtained if all men are involved in agriculture (*Dissertation*, p.21). "I consider multiplication as no otherwise useful to a state," writes Steuart, "than so far as the additional number becomes [useful] to those who are already existing, whom I consider as the body-politic of the society" (87).[1] He goes further, to add that it is impossible to employ more than a certain proportion of the population usefully in agriculture (91), and that the best proportion is that which is able to supply the whole state with food; the best number of inhabitants is that "which is compatible with the full employment of every one of them" (93).

Our cultural and social progress makes it impossible for us to turn the clock back, he claims, and he may again have Wallace in mind when he notes that

> the sentiments of the ancients, which were founded

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[1] The problem of the multiplying poor, raised by a number of contemporary writers is one that Wallace ignores, presumably because his ideal political and social system is one of equality.

> upon reason and common sense, relative to their situation, have been adopted by some moderns, who have not perhaps sufficiently attended to the change of our manners, and to the effects which this change must operate upon every thing relative to our oeconomy (126).

But while an equal distribution of lands then favoured liberty, equality and an increase in population, today land is not the only source of wealth. We now have trade and industry, and so however we divide our lands, we shall never by this means produce equality (126). Trade is beneficial, moreover, in that it renders "the inhabitants of one country industrious, in order to supply the wants of another, without any prejudice to themselves" (119).

Instead of assuming, as Wallace does, that if all hands were turned to cultivation the population would increase, Steuart asks: "Is multiplication the efficient cause of agriculture, or is agriculture that of multiplication?" He decides in favour of the former, while allowing that, "in the infancy of society, the spontaneous fruits of the earth, which are free to all, are the efficient cause of a multiplication, which may rise to the exact proportion of them," a point he has already discussed (117). The

demand, in other words, creates the supply.[1]

S.R. Sen remarks on the fact that Steuart's attempt at an economic interpretation of history is unusual for the times in which he was writing (op. cit., p.49), and he also touches on one of the most significant differences between Steuart and Wallace when he says that Steuart "dreamt of no Utopia — even as an unattainable ideal" (182-83). That all Wallace's economic writing is coloured by his utopian theories will become increasingly evident as we examine his published works.

II

It is in a later publication, entitled Various Prospects of Mankind, Nature, and Providence (1761), that Wallace examines the possibility of establishing an ideal form of government based on social and economic equality and it is here that he anticipates the Malthusian argument against perfectibility.

In "Prospect I" he expresses the view that all the political and educational systems up to now have been totally incompatible

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[1] The views of Steuart and Wallace are compared by the author of Political Essays concerning the Present State of the British Empire (London: Strahan; Cadell, 1772), in Essay III "Of the present State of Agriculture in the British Dominions" sect. III (reviewed in MR 47 (1772), pp.81-89). The writer disagrees with Stuart's views on the division of land (Inquiry, p.93) and applauds Wallace's proposal that the land should be more or less equally divided into small portions and that the emphasis should be on agriculture, with necessities taking priority over ornamental arts until the earth is as fully cultivated as possible (Dissertation, pp.18-21). He agrees with Wallace that such division of land must increase the population (Political Essays, p.92) and that trade and commerce tend to diminish numbers (ibid, p.95).

with a perfect state of human society:

> The bad correspondence in which mankind live, the struggles for riches and power among the different nations into which society is divided, the jealousies among the great, the ambition of kings and princes, their interfering interests, and their bloody wars, destroy millions, and prevent the earth's being fully peopled (25).

Poverty, intemperance and debauchery prevent the increase of mankind, he writes, warming to the theme of his Dissertation, and peace, security and plenty are pre-requisites for the efficient peopling and cultivation of the earth, along with co-operative endeavour: "Such must be the happy circumstances of the world before human society can reach its highest perfection" (27).

In "Prospect II" Wallace sets up "The Model of a perfect Government, not for a single Nation only, but for the whole Earth." In his desire to return to a more perfect state of existence, he does not go so far as Rousseau, for example, whose preferred cultural stage, the "société naissant" is devoid of laws, government and social

organisation outwith the family.[1] "As mankind can neither purchase nor secure what is necessary for their comfortable subsistence without society," Wallace writes, "so society cannot long continue peaceable and stable without civil government" (33).

Wallace sees mankind ideally united "under governments which shall preserve the same language, maintain an universal correspondence among the most distant inhabitants of the globe, and raise the whole human race to the highest perfection" (37). He lists a number of laws which would operate in the kind of ideal society he envisages (41-45), to ensure the equal contribution and benefit of every member. Under this kind of government, he believes, mankind would multiply faster than under the most successful of previous governments (46).

In "Prospect IV", however, Wallace gives his reason for believing that a perfect government of this kind would be "so far from lasting for ever, that it must come to an end so much the sooner on account of its perfection" (113):

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1 That Rousseau regrets that mankind did not remain in the third cultural stage (not the first, or the "state of nature") is demonstrated by A.O. Lovejoy in his essay "The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality". He describes it as the "patriarchal stage of human society; the only government was that of the family. Men lived in loose, unorganized village groups, gaining their subsistence by hunting or fishing and from the natural fruits of the earth, and finding their amusement in spontaneous gatherings for song and dance." Essays in the History of Ideas (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1948), p.29. Nor was Wallace advocating a return to the idealised view of primitive society Burke was satirising in his Vindication of Natural Society: or, A View of the Miseries and Evils arising to Mankind from every Species of Artificial Society (1756), from which also laws and governments are excluded. Wallace inclines more to the tradition of Harrington and More (see section on the Prospects below).

> Under a perfect government, the inconveniencies of having a family would be so entirely removed, children would be so well taken care of, and every thing become so favourable to populousness, that though some sickly seasons or dreadful plagues in particular climates might cut off multitudes, yet in general, mankind would increase so prodigiously, that the earth would at last be overstocked, and become unable to support its numerous inhabitants (114).

Thus while the inevitable conclusion of writers such as Hobbes, Mandeville and Rousseau is that social development can only culminate in a state of unbearable evil, Wallace rejects perfectibility not on the grounds of social ills *per se*, since he believed that by returning to a simplified agrarian life these would be eradicated, but on the grounds that such a perfect existence can only lead to inevitable over-population.

In his *Dissertation*, Wallace had drawn up tables to illustrate the possible rate of population expansion, and had concluded that if mankind had increased at this rate, the earth would be very much more populous than it actually was. Assuming that everyone who reached maturity married, Wallace estimated that there would be six children of each marriage, four of whom would survive to adulthood (3). In positing moral causes which inhibit population expansion, a limited earth, and the continual increase of mankind,[1] Wallace had

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[1] See *Prospects*, p.122, "A limited earth, a limited degree of fertility, and the continual increase of mankind are three of these original constitutions."

anticipated Malthus sufficiently to call forth William Hazlitt's indictment that "both the principle of the necessary increase of the population beyond the means of subsistence, and the application of that principle as a final obstacle to all Utopian perfectibility schemes, are borrowed (whole) by Mr. Malthus from Wallace's work."[1]

Even Hazlitt, however, grants that Malthus was responsible for introducing geometrical and arithmetical ratios governing the increase of population and subsistence respectively, and as Kenneth Smith points out, despite the fact that the ideas he used were not his own, Malthus, with his Essay on Population (1798), "captured the mind of a generation....Thus, while the paradox of Wallace remained a philosophical speculation, advanced against a hypothesis of his own contriving...the success of Malthus was immediate."[2] Smith demonstrates that, apart from the style of Malthus's Essay which is in itself a source of the book's popularity, circumstances at the time were favourable to its good reception. Wallace, after all, was not the only writer who passed unnoticed on this topic; Joseph Townsend's views, published some twenty-five years later than the Prospects received nothing like the acclaim that Malthus's work produced.[3] But quite apart from the Essay's having appeared at a

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1 William Hazlitt, An Examination of Mr. Malthus's Doctrines in The Complete Works edited by P.P. Howe, Centenary Edition (London & Toronto: Dent, 1932), VII, 333. Further criticism of Malthus on these grounds is to be found in the final four essays in Vol. VII and in Vol. I, A Reply to the Essay on Population by the Rev. T.R. Malthus, pp.176-364.

2 Kenneth Smith, The Malthusian Controversy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951), p.33. Hereafter cited as Kenneth Smith.

3 Kenneth Smith, pp.28-37.

more propitious time, a significant difference between the two works is that in the Prospects, Wallace is primarily concerned to illustrate for "Freethinkers" the "principles of morality and natural religion;" he is not writing a treatise on population.[1]

Malthus's Essay was written in reply to William Godwin's Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793), whose views on the threat of increased population were in turn based on Wallace's reflections in the Prospects. Wallace's ideal of communally owned land in a mainly agrarian society is paralleled in Godwin's vision of men mutually supplying each others' needs,[2] in that in both the population should increase rapidly, resulting in a shortage of food. Godwin, unlike Malthus, agrees with Wallace that this must be a distant possibility: "Three fourths of the habitable globe, are now uncultivated. The improvements to be made in cultivation, and the augmentations the earth is capable of receiving in the article of productiveness, cannot, as yet, be reduced to any limits of calculation." Furthermore, he adds, "it is certainly most reasonable, to commit so remote a danger to the chance of such

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1 "Though the Writer of the following Pieces has made several observations upon civil government, and the constitution of society; yet his principal intention in these Prospects, is to illustrate the principles of morality and natural religion; in particular, to discover whether the present life of man has a relation to any other, and thus to trace the designs of providence with respect to a state after death" (Prospects, p.iii). Wallace says that the book is directed at Freethinkers on p.iv.

2 William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals and Happiness. Photographic Facsimile of the Third Edition Corrected. Ed. F.E.L. Priestley (Toronto: Toronto Univ. Press, 1946), II, 552 (Bk. VIII ch. X). Further page references will be made to this edition.

remedies, (remedies, of which perhaps we may, at this time, not have the smallest idea) as shall suggest themselves, at a period sufficiently early for their practical application."[1] Godwin puts forward in the third edition[2] the argument that moral restraint is inevitable when the standard of living is in danger:

> The price of labour in any state, so long as the spirit of accumulation shall prevail, is an infallible barometer of the state of its population. It is impossible where the price of labour is greatly reduced, and an added population threatens a still further reduction, that men should not be considerably under the influence of fear, respecting an early marriage, and a numerous family.[3]

This last point was designed to oppose the argument which Malthus derived from Wallace: that vice and misery are the only checks on population. Attempts to enforce regulations which would restrict the population (Prospects pp.117-18) Wallace believes would lead to war and violence, and the resultant deaths would ease the problem. Utopian governments would collapse, "war, or cruel and unnatural customs, be introduced, and a stop put to the increase of

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1 Political Justice II, 518-19 (Bk. VIII, ch. IX).

2 See David Fleisher, William Godwin: A Study in Liberalism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1951), p.106.

3 Political Justice II, 517 (Bk. VIII, ch. IX).

mankind, to the advancement of knowledge, and to the culture of the earth, in spite of the most excellent laws and wisest precautions" (119). While Godwin pursues his point further in Thoughts occasioned by the Perusal of Dr. Parr's Spital Sermon (1801), suggesting that men might be expected to impose an equal restraint for the sake of the common good,[1] Wallace applies himself to demonstrating that the present checks on population arising from vice are in fact more "natural" than the artificial restraints arising from a shortage of food, and their inevitable results: "Alas! how unnatural and inhuman must every such expedient be accounted! The natural passions and appetites of mankind are planted in our frame, to answer the best ends for the happiness both of the individuals and of the species. Shall we be obliged to contradict such a wise order?" (118-119). "Such a melancholy situation in consequence merely of the want of provisions," he concludes, "is in truth more unnatural than all their present calamities" (120).

> Supposing men to have abused their liberty, by which abuse, vice has once been introduced into the world; and that wrong notions, a bad taste, and vicious habits, have been strengthened by the defects of education and government,

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1 William Godwin, Thoughts occasioned by the Perusal of Dr. Parr's Spital Sermon,...being a Reply to...the author of 'An Essay on Population,' and others (London: Robinson, 1801). See Fleisher, p.107. In response to the criticism of his reviewers, Malthus, in the 2nd ed. of his Essay (1803, p.11; see Kenneth Smith, pp. 37-38), includes moral restraint as well as vice and misery as a check on population. Fleisher points out that Godwin's argument is thought to have "exerted a significant influence on the restatement of Malthus's position" (107).

> our present distresses may be easily explained. They may even be called natural, being the natural consequences of our depravity (120).

It might appear, then, that Wallace has moved from his position in the Dissertation, where he maintains that "private vices are far from being, what a notable writer has employed the whole force of his genius to demonstrate them to be, public benefits" (160), almost to a Mandevillian position himself. He pursues the argument that vice and death are necessary in a MS. essay (Appendix VII) with the possible intention of incorporating it in the Prospects, but his reason for adopting this line of argument is not that of The Fable of the Bees. Intended as part of "a defence of Religion naturall & Revealed," the speculation is designed "to vindicate the wisdom & order of nature and providence." The fact that Wallace is not in sympathy with Mandeville's thesis is evident from the rather unfamiliar irony he uses in the final paragraph of "Prospect IV":

> Though such ingenious romances [utopian writings] should chance to be read and admired, jealous and selfish politicians need not be alarmed. Such statesmen need not fear that ever such airy systems shall be able to destroy their craft, or disappoint them of their intention to sacrifice the interest of mankind to their own avarice or ambition. There is too powerful a charm which works secretly in favour of such politicians, which will for ever defeat all attempts to establish a perfect government. There is no

> need of miracles for this purpose. The vices of mankind are sufficient. And we need not doubt but providence will make use of them, for preventing the establishment of governments which are by no means suitable to the perfect circumstances of the earth (124-25).

It is the belief in the necessity of vice and misery pursued in Malthus's Essay that provokes Godwin's retort that the "advocates of old establishments and old abuses could not have found a doctrine, more to their heart's content, more effectual to shut out all reform and improvement for ever."[1] This criticism, particularly in view of the foregoing quotation, might equally apply to Wallace. But the Prospects could be placed in the same category as Godwin himself sees his Political Justice: that of "visionary speculations."[2] Wallace is primarily concerned to demonstrate that the inadequacies of this life support his argument for a future state[3] (in which, incidentally, there can be no danger of over-population — Prospects, p.383).

Whatever the implications of Wallace's pessimistic conclusions concerning the possibility of achieving ideal government, it is clear from his writings and from his practical involvement in social issues (such as his work on the Widows' Fund and his membership of the Select Society — and consequently of the Edinburgh Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Sciences, Manufactures, and Agriculture in Scotland) that he was far from apathetic towards social reform.

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1 Thoughts occasioned by...Dr. Parr's Spital Sermon, p.63, quoted by Fleischer, p.107.

2 William Godwin, Of Population. An Enquiry concerning the Power of Increase in the Numbers of Mankind, being an Answer to Mr. Malthus's Essay on that Subject (London: Longman et. al, 1820), p.vi.

3 See, e.g. Prospects, pp.364ff.

The speculations of utopian writers

> enlarge our views, and amuse our fancies. They are useful for directing us to correct certain errors at particular times. Able legislators ought to consider them as models, and honest patriots ought never to lose sight of them, or any proper opportunity of transplanting the wisest of their maxims to their own governments, as far as they are adapted to their particular circumstances, and will give no occasion to dangerous convulsions (Prospects, p.124).

Nor is there reason to suppose that because Wallace regards it as impossible for a perfect government to last, he would not like to see improvements brought about by a return to an agrarian society based on a less sophisticated economic system, without private property, where everyone labours for the benefit of the community (Prospects, p.65). His emphasis on simplicity and agriculture in the Dissertation would bear this out, as would such passages from his Characteristics of the Present Political State of Great Britain:

> Neither government nor trade ought to be managed with the sole view of procuring vast riches to a few, at the expence of grinding the faces of the poor, and of rendering the labouring people, who are the great body of a nation, miserable....We ought to propose more equitable and more merciful schemes (2nd ed., p.38).

His aspirations for mankind as illustrated in "Prospect III" are

very similar to Godwin's, though the utopian constitution he sets out in "Prospect II" is far from Godwinian. Wallace envisages the possibility of laws regulating the kind of trades young people should enter, for example, and the age of (more or less compulsory) marriage, while Godwin abhors the interference of political institutions and laws.[1]

In an age when Montesquieu was held in such esteem, it is only to be expected that other writers would lay similar stress on the relationship between laws and society. William Robertson, for example, believed that in

> every inquiry concerning the operations of men when united together in society, the first object of attention should be their mode of subsistence. Accordingly as that varies, their laws and policy must be different. The institutions suited to the ideas and exigencies of tribes, which subsist chiefly by fishing or hunting, and which have hardly formed a conception of any species of property, will be much more simple than those which must take place when the earth is cultivated with regular industry, and a right of

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[1] See Political Justice II, 228ff (Bk. VI, ch. I, sect. 4), for example, for Godwin's views on political regulation interfering with individuality. His dislike of laws is evident from his description of the evils of political society (I, 6-24 — Bk. I, chs. II and III) and his ideal is a society which can dispense with an institutional form of government (see his distinction between society and government in I, 123-24 — Bk. II, ch. I) and in which "an equalification of conditions...take place, not by law, regulation or public institution, but only through the private conviction of individuals" (II, 548 — Bk. VIII, ch. X, sect. 3). Wallace has less faith in human nature and sees laws as inevitable, both in his utopian scheme (see "Prospect II") and practically, e.g. to bring highlanders from "a state of barbarity and slavery, to a state of civility and independence" (Dissertation, p.156) and in ancient times, to prevent the barbarous treatment of slaves (Dissertation, p.89).

> property, not only in its productions, but in the soil itself, is completely ascertained.[1]

A few years earlier, in his lectures on justice at Glasgow, Adam Smith had drawn the same parallel between civil government and security of property: "Till there be property there can be no government, the very end of which is to secure wealth, and to defend the rich from the poor."[2]

Wallace, of course, was unique among his contemporaries in following More's belief in the abolition of private property, and it is likely that he was less influenced by current ideas when he set up his utopian constitution than he was by More, whose view that good institutions and good education are the main supports of the ideal society was to be taken up and enlarged upon by later radicals.[3]

III

To return to the economic aspects of Wallace's writings: we need only examine such essays as Hume's "Of Commerce" to appreciate the distance between Wallace's outlook and that of his contemporaries.

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1 William Robertson, The History of America (London: Strahan, Cadell; Balfour, 1777), I, 324.

2 Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms, ed. Edwin Cannan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), p.15. (Hereafter cited as Lectures). In the Wealth of Nations (ed. Edwin Cannan /6th ed. London: Methuen, 1950/) II, 207, Smith qualifies this statement by saying that: "Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all" (Bk. V Ch. I Pt. II).

3 The sources of Wallace's work will be examined more closely in the section on the Prospects below.

Broadly speaking, those of the Scottish Historical School — Kames, Adam Ferguson, William Robertson and John Millar, to name the most prominent — shared Smith's view that there were four progressive stages in social development: hunting, pasturage, agriculture and commerce (Lectures, p.107).[1] In the first there was no government because there was no private property. With the introduction of private ownership of cattle and sheep, some form of government came into being; when agricultural land was divided up, government expanded and altered and this agrarian stage was in turn finally superseded by the age of commerce (Lectures, p.108).

Wallace does not see that the introduction of private property was inevitably the stimulus to government:

> Chance must have had a prodigious influence in the first institution of government, and a thousand unknown accidents concurred to turn the attention of mankind either one way, or the contrary. The idea of appropriating particular tracts of the earth, which were originally common to the whole species, though easy and natural to

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1 See John Millar, The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks, 4th ed. (Edinburgh & London: Blackwood; Longman et al., 1806), pp.2-5 (1st pub. 1771), /Henry Home, Lord Kames/, Historical Law-Tracts, 4th ed. (Edinburgh: T. Cadell; Bell & Bradfute, W. Creech, 1792), pp.56-57 (1st pub. 1758) and Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, ed. Duncan Forbes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1966), p.82 (1st pub. 1767). See also Ronald L. Meek, "The Scottish Contribution to Marxist Sociology" in Democracy and the Labour Movement, Essays in honour of Dona Torr, ed. John Saville (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1954), pp. 84-102, and A. Skinner, "Economics and History — The Scottish Enlightenment" in SJPE, 12 (1965), 1-22, esp. pp.8ff.

> us, may be supposed rather to have appeared unnatural at the beginning. Nothing therefore hinders us to conceive that men might have been originally led to a model of society, without any establishment of property. (Prospects, pp. 66-67).

Nor does Wallace share the contemporary view associated with the belief in this progression of economic stages, that the pursuit of luxury is a source of economic development. As soon as men have progressed from the savage state of hunting and fishing, says Hume,

> they must fall into these two classes [husbandmen and manufacturers]; though the arts of agriculture employ at first the most numerous part of the society. Time and experience improve so much these arts, that the land may easily maintain a much greater number of men, than those who are immediately employed in its culture, or who furnish the more necessary manufactures to such as are so employed.
>
> If these superfluous hands apply themselves to the finer arts, which are commonly denominated the arts of luxury, they add to the happiness of the state.[1]

Luxury was not only desirable in Hume's view; it was a necessary function of economic growth:

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[1] "Of Commerce" in Essays I, 289.

> Where manufactures and mechanic arts are not cultivated, the bulk of the people must apply themselves to agriculture; and if their skill and industry encrease, there must arise a great superfluity from their labour beyond what suffices to maintain them. They have no temptation, therefore, to encrease their skill and industry; since they cannot exchange that superfluity for any commodities, which may serve either to their pleasure or vanity. A habit of indolence naturally prevails. The greater part of the land lies uncultivated.[1]

Hume does, of course, distinguish between "innocent" and "blameable" luxury, but he maintains that while "wherever luxury ceases to be innocent, it also ceases to be beneficial," the ages of innocent luxury "are both the happiest and most virtuous."[2] Luxury is vicious only when it "engrosses all a man's expence, and leaves no ability for such acts of duty and generosity as are required by his situation and fortune" (I, 307). Excessive luxury, he concludes, "is the source of many ills; but is in general preferable to sloth and idleness, which would commonly succeed in its place, and are more hurtful both to private persons and to the public" (I, 309).

Private property, then, and luxury, are seen by the writers of

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1 "Of Commerce," Essays I, 293. This view is similar to Steuart's (see pp. 201-202 above).

2 "Of Refinement in the Arts", Essays I, 300.

the Scottish Historical School as the source of economic development. Wallace, as we know, supports More's belief

> "That there should be no private property. That every one should work for the public, and be supported by the public. That all should be on a level, and that the fruits of every one's labour should be common for the comfortable subsistence of all the members of the society. And, lastly, that every one should be obliged to do something, yet none should be burdened with severe labour" (Prospects, p.46).

Within his ideal society, however, he is perhaps more willing than most writers of utopias to allow luxury within certain bounds:

> care should be taken to have always a sufficient number of workmen and artists for the uses of the society, as masons, wrights, weavers, smiths, shoemakers, painters, musicians, statuaries, engravers, and all other persons proper for procuring not only the necessaries of life, but whatever was elegant and magnificent, if it was not fantastick, but agreeable to nature (Prospects, p.42).

Indeed, provided luxury is public and not private, it may be beneficial:

> we may suppose a great deal of elegance and magnificence in a state, tho' plain food and the necessaries of life may be easily

> purchased. This will be the case if the magnificence appears only in what belongs to the publick; as in temples, theatres, or public edifices of any kind, or in the splendor of the magistrates or officers of the state;[1] or, if it descends to some rich men in a private station, it must consist principally in what is durable, and is not daily consumed; for this sort of magnificence will not employ many hands, and a sufficient number will remain for providing food (Dissertation, p.27).

But Wallace's communist ideal is utterly opposed to Smith's view that the purpose of government is to "secure wealth" and protect the rich from the poor (Lectures, p.15). Wallace joins the small minority of eighteenth-century writers such as Francis Hutcheson, who follow Harrington in believing that "there should be such Agrarian laws as will prevent any immoderate increase of wealth in the hands of a few."[2] What Wallace sought was "an equal distribution of labour among mankind" and the "equal enjoyment of the advantages which flow from it" (Prospects, p.76). The kind of luxury that aggravates inequality, he totally rejected. "What are great numbers of the

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1 A view he contradicts in Prospects, p.42, sect. III.

2 Francis Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy (Glasgow & London: Foulis; Millar & Longman, 1755), II, 248. See Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1959), pp.190-192 for Hutcheson's views in relation to Wallace.

poor" he asks, "but slaves and beasts of burthen to the rich....Yet all these unhappy mortals were as much qualified by nature as the most fortunate of their kind, for a more agreeable life and nobler enjoyments" (Prospects, p.51). While for Smith, the division of labour allowed the worker to produce more, he did not reap a proportional benefit.[1]

Far from seeing private luxury, then, as a spur to and a product of economic growth, Wallace sees it as a threat to propagation, by encouraging debauchery (Dissertation, p.19) and by diverting useful hands from the business of agriculture, thereby reducing the food supply, upon which populousness depends (Dissertation, pp.115-117). "It would not be difficult to shew," he remarks, contradicting Hume,[2] "that...a simplicity of life and manners would make a nation more virtuous, and by consequence more happy" (Dissertation, p.268).

> ...it is not the prevalence of luxury, but of simplicity of taste among private citizens, which makes the public flourish....Indeed 'tis ridiculous to condemn elegance and refinement of every kind. If displayed in public works, and things of a durable nature, they contribute to promote happiness, as well as the grandeur of society, and will be no hindrance to populousness. But if displayed in every the least trifle in private life, and employed to

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1 See Priestley's introduction to Godwin's Political Justice, III, 73.

2 See above, p.220.

> satisfy the ridiculous taste and whimsical fancies of each particular citizen, must contribute in a great degree to diminish the number of mankind, as the constant labour, great expence, and vast number of hands, by which luxury is maintained, must make the necessaries of life scarce and dear (Dissertation, p.160).

It is perhaps surprising to find that Wallace's second major published work, which appeared between the Dissertation and the Prospects, in 1758, is a very practical discourse dealing with Characteristics of the Present Political State of Great Britain.[1] More surprising still is Wallace's declared intention to exempt Britain from John Brown's charge of licenticusness, luxury and effeminacy (ii) by giving a reassuring account of the country's economic position. The distinction between Wallace's views on the perfectibility of society and his assessment of society as it was, becomes immediately apparent. Brown's Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times had appeared in 1757, at a time when the war with France was going very badly. His object, in the words of a contemporary reviewer, was "to offer his sentiments on the present state and situation of his country, at a crisis so important and alarming," and "to hold up a true mirror to the public, and let the

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[1] Quotations and page references will be from the 2nd ed. (with Corrections and additions by the author), also pubd. in 1758.

nation see themselves, as the authors of their own misfortunes."[1]
To this gloomy criticism of the British manners and principles, Wallace reacted with patriotic optimism, and deplored the inevitable loss of British confidence arising from such exaggeration of our vices and weaknesses:

> During many years, the writer of the Characteristics has been sorry to read such melancholy and unfavourable accounts of the state of the Public. But, after the dastardising representations given by the author of the Estimate, he could no longer forbear to publish his thoughts, and to draw his pen in the service of his country (xiii-xiv).

As a staunch supporter of the British Constitution, Wallace took exception to a writer who was convinced that "the Happiness and Duration of States depends much less on mere Law and external Institution, and much more on the internal Force of Manners and Principles than hath been commonly imagined."[2]

Brown argued in the Estimate:

> That exorbitant Trade hath produced exorbitant Wealth; that this hath naturally produced a high Degree of Luxury, and a general Attention to pleasurable Enjoyment among the higher Ranks, among whom the Effects of Luxury must

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1 MR, 16 (1757), 430 (a partial quote from Brown's Advertisement).

2 John Brown, An Explanatory Defence of the Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times (London: L. Davis & C. Reymers, 1758), p.4.

> of course first appear. That these natural Effects of Wealth have been naturally attended with public Consequences which tend to the weakening or Dissolution of the State, by turning that general Attention upon pleasurable Enjoyment, which in simpler Times was bent on Views of Duty. That hence, a general Defect of Capacity, Fortitude, and Principle, did naturally rise; such as, in its End, must be fatal, if unchecked in its Progress: and that all leading Ranks were of course infected with these natural Consequences, in some Degree or other, from their very Situation.

Along with the abuse of wealth went the abuse of liberty:

> our Constitution, excellent in its Nature, was liable to an Abuse, which arose even from its Excellence....the principle of parliamentary Influence which was thought or found necessary at the Revolution in Eighty-eight, as a new Principle of Government, had conspired with the Luxury and ruling Manners of the Times, to weaken the national Powers, by raising many Men to Places of the most important Trust, who were in some Respect or other unequal to the Task.[1]

Brown was not the only writer whose opinions Wallace feared

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[1] Ibid, pp.8-9.

were likely to "sour the minds of the people." Others, like Brown, described Britain as both rich and free, but complained that "our liberty has degenerated into licentiousness" which has brought with it an "effeminacy of manners" and has destroyed the moral fibre of the nation, thus exposing us to the "superior genius of the French." Another variety of writer deplored the declining state of the nation since the Revolution, also blaming luxury and effeminacy, but citing paper credit, banks and taxes as both causes and signs of our poverty, along with public debts incurred under a despotic government. They nevertheless claimed simultaneously "that we are swimming in all kinds of foreign luxury" (Characteristics, p.ix).

Wallace therefore set out to show:

> That Britain is in an opulent condition at present, and has been very happy ever since the Revolution: That banking is a very profitable institution, and has greatly enriched the nation: That, tho our taxes are high, we are much richer, than we were when they were much lower; and carry on an extensive and profitable trade: That, tho the greatness of the public debt must be a considerable loss, we are both rich and free at present, and may continue hereafter to be rich, and to enjoy the most perfect liberty and security of any nation in the world: That the proposal to abolish the public debts, without paying them, is neither just nor profitable: That every farthing of them ought to be paid, and may be paid without any distress to

> the nation; and that, notwithstanding the just complaints of our luxury, effeminacy, and corruption, we have sufficient means of self-defence, and are fully able to support ourselves against the French, or any nation whatever (x).

Wallace's economic arguments will be discussed below, but it is important first to examine his reasons for publishing a work of this kind. There is little doubt that, among all the existing political systems, Wallace believed the British to be the best, and therefore worth defending despite the fact that it did not conform closely to his ideal. We know that he was a member of the Revolution Club and that he had an optimistic attitude towards Britain's social and economic progress. We have also seen him adopting authorial roles in order to present a case, not from motives of hypocrisy, but in order to put over an argument by taking up a certain stance and logically following it through. The case he presents when he adopts this other role is then freed from the kind of qualification which he, writing as himself, would feel he had to introduce or consider.

A number of passages in the Characteristics suggest that while Wallace was putting forward arguments in which he believed, given the premises from which he was working, and given, even, the present political situation, he was nevertheless writing for the sake of expediency rather than expressing what he regarded as the truth. Superficially, the author of the Characteristics appears to favour a complex economic system which allows Britain to carry on a flourishing foreign trade, increasing her wealth and power, with paper credit and

banking as essential concomitants of an expanding economy. Wallace's apparent optimism, indeed, may be contrasted with the anxiety of Hume and Adam Smith as regards paper credit, and his arguments are in fact more sophisticated than theirs.[1]

The sharp distinction between Wallace's opinions here and in both the Dissertation and the Prospects may be explained by suggesting that from a sense of patriotism he determined to present the existing economic system in the best possible light, which he could do without emphasising that he was not himself in favour of such a system. On the other hand, his demonstration that paper credit is an inevitable part of the present system might well have been Wallace's way of pointing out its evils in terms that such writers as Smith and Hume would understand. His apparent complacency may indicate simply that he is drawing attention to the logical outcome of an economy for which he has little liking. This surely is the implication of the following passage:

> After all, a poorer State chiefly addicted to agriculture and pasturage, and less employed in procuring the elegancies and ornaments of life by an extensive trade, may be, in many respects, preferable to a richer commercial nation. The inhabitants of such a poorer country may be more numerous, more healthy, and more virtuous. They may, by being more warlike, be more able to defend themselves at home; and likewise be

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[1] See, e.g., Hume's "Of Money" and "Of the Balance of Trade" and Smith, Wealth of Nations, Bk. II, ch. 2. Smith accepts bank-notes provided they can all be paid on demand.

> abundantly provided with the real <u>necessaries</u> and <u>conveniencies</u> of life. In such circumstances they may adopt every frugal scheme. They will not need Paper-credit, and but very little money. At the same time, they may be very <u>happy</u>; happier, perhaps, than richer commercial nations. But, if they will not be satisfied with simplicity; if a people must have <u>delicacies</u> and <u>ornaments</u>, and the trade and manufactures that are <u>necessary</u> to procure them; they must not exclude those maxims, that are suitable to such an end. It is ridiculous to be perpetually extolling trade and manufactures, while we are constantly railing at what is evidently connected with them, or necessary to procure them. This is to act inconsistently, and to aim at impossibilities (<u>Characteristics</u>, pp.45-46).

There are times when Wallace is clearly aiming at impartiality: acknowledging, for example, that bank-notes "raise the prices of labour and goods," he argues that "this is not so properly the effect of the notes, as of that industry which they raise and assist, and which, with all its disadvantages, <u>is confessed to be beneficial to a nation</u>" (30 — italics added). "If we therefore would increase our trade," he says, "we must submit to the disadvantages, or rather natural consequences, arising from credit" (27). At other times, he cannot resist voicing his own opinion:

> But, in truth, neither the riches, nor the happiness of a nation depends so much on foreign trade, as many merchants are apt to imagine.... After all that they have asserted concerning the necessity of foreign trade, it may justly be maintained, that such a nation as Britain, with a large territory, may be great and flourishing, may be more powerful than ever it has been hitherto, by industry and domestic commerce, without an extensive foreign trade; since its lands might be so much better cultivated, than they have ever been, and so many new manufactures might be established, as could support, double, nay, perhaps triple, the number of its present inhabitants (35-36).

It seems possible that Wallace's intentions in publishing the Characteristics were both patriotic and cautionary and it is a tribute to his pragmatical skill that such passages as the ones quoted above generally pass unnoticed by the casual reader.

IV The Characteristics

The Characteristics was the only one of Wallace's works to go into a second edition during his lifetime. Both editions were published in 1758, during which time at least ten reprints of

Brown's Estimate appeared.[1] George Wallace recalls the circumstances of the publication in the Scots Magazine 33 (1771), 344:

> The loss of Minorca threw the nation into uproar; and the general confusion was something increased by an over-charged picture, which the ingenious Dr Brown drew in his Estimate...Dr Wallace, whose ideas concerning the natural strength of his country were extremely lofty, and who did not imagine that a single blow, struck in a distant quarter, ought to consign the nation to despair, wrote at this time an occasional volume...and the opinion which he endeavoured there to inculcate, concerning the national genius, national force, and national capacity of Britain, was signally justified by the glorious successes obtained in 1759, 1760, 1761, and 1762, under the administrations of the Earl of Chatham and the Earl of Bute.

Despite the fact that the publishers Millar and Strahan bought the book for £30, but "did not make £10 of it,"[2] the Characteristics

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1 Despite the condemnation of a reviewer who described it as "one of the most superficial, flimsy, whiffling performances, that ever were countenanced by the public: a performance which ought to serve as a lesson of humiliation to all authors, teaching them what little reason they have to be vain upon the approbation of vulgar readers: a performance, from the success of which we may really estimate the times, as it illustrates, better than all the arguments which the author has offered, our degeneracy in point of taste and judgement" (CR, 5 [1758], 284).

2 Letters of David Hume to William Strahan, ed. G. Birkbeck Hill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), p.283. Strahan to Hume, 9 April 1774.

did not go unappreciated by Wallace's friends. George Ridpath, for example, notes in his diary:

> Read Wallace's work almost to an end. The great design of it is to contend for the advantages of the Revolution and those enjoyed under the present Government against David Hume, Brown, the Disaffected, and the whole class of writers that deal in exaggerating our present distress from corruption, high taxes, public debts, etc. It is an honest, good-natured work, extremely well intended, and there are many very ingenious things in it.[1]

His good nature is also remarked on by E.C. Mossner, who comments that while some of Wallace's references to Hume's works were disapproving, they were characterised always by "a respect that contrasts strongly with Brown's invidious abuse."[2]

One of the "ingenious things" to which Ridpath may have been referring was Wallace's scheme for alleviating the national debt, which engaged the attention of two of his reviewers. Quietly humorous, Wallace suggests that:

> there is no necessity for private persons to

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1 Diary of George Ridpath minister of Stitchel 1755-1761, ed. Sir James Balfour Paul (Edinburgh: T. & A. Constable, for the Scottish History Society, 1922), p.193.

2 E.C. Mossner, The Forgotten Hume, p.123. A contemporary reviewer also comments that Wallace differs from Hume "like a gentleman and a friend, and conducts himself through the whole dispute with a very laudable decorum" (CR 5, [1758], 284).

> advance their money. It would be sufficient, if the richer sort would voluntarily entrust the Government with their plate, and submit to the small inconveniency of wanting the use of it for a season...may a public spirit spread itself among the people, and every one run with his plate to the public treasury, that the public debts may be more speedily paid! What an immense quantity of plate is there in this island! How many millions of the national debt might be swept off by it at once! (160-61).

Lest anyone should have taken this jeu d'esprit seriously, Wallace adds: "Any scheme of offering our plate to the Public may, indeed, be thought romantic. It is so, perhaps; and can hardly be expected to succeed in an age nowise remarkable for public spirit" (162-63). The object of his suggestion was to ridicule other writers who had suggested "inglorious schemes of stopping the credit of public banks" and had endeavoured "to excite opulent nations to defraud their creditors by abolishing the public debts, instead of honestly paying them" (163). He doubtless had a wry smile at the reviewer who introduced a quotation of the earlier passage with the comment that: "To lessen this incumbrance, our Author proposes a scheme which, we are afraid, more will be disposed to admire, than to pursue. However, as we think it cannot be too strongly

recommended, we will give it in his own words."[1] The Critical reviewer also took him seriously and closed with the comment that: "Such a scheme as this might have succeeded in the Roman Republic, where the Amor Patriae universally prevailed to an incredible pitch of enthusiasm: but, we are afraid the present generation is too cold, indifferent, and mercenary, to carry the expedient into execution."[2]

Both reviewers disagreed strongly with Wallace's statements about banks and paper credit, and neither saw the present state of Britain in such a rosy light. One summarised his own appraisal in the words: "Corruption has deluged the land" (MR, p.470), while the other could not help observing "that [Wallace's] work smells strongly of party-zeal" (CR, p.284). His "panegyric on King William and the reigning family...does much more honour to the author's zeal for the Protestant succession, than to his talent for reasoning and his impartiality." His "is not the language of a sedate inquirer, but the effusion of an over-heated partisan" (CR, pp.288, 299). Despite their lack of sympathy with a number of the views that Wallace expressed, they nevertheless had no quarrel with his motives:

> Upon the whole, we cannot help admiring the Writer's ingenuity, though we cannot in general subscribe to his principles. It must be acknowledged, that he abounds with useful precepts, and sagacious observations

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1 MR, 18 (1758), 471.

2 CR, 5 (1758), 292.

upon trade and government: and that he appears to be no less a friend to virtue, than a well-wisher to his country (HR, pp.472-73).

The fact that the Characteristics was obviously a patriotic work was one of which Wallace did not fail to take advantage. In a letter to Tweeddale, for example, asking him for help in obtaining a living in the English church for Matthew, he wrote:

> My Lord It is with Reluctance that I would mention my self It is not to plead merit with a Government which every friend of mankind and of his country is bound to do his outmost to support But as my attachment to our Constitution is very well known not only to Your Lordship but to the world both by my remarks on Lord Dun's "friendly advices" and by the "Characteristicks' of the present state of Great Britain" which I wrote & published out of pure zeal & regard & which have not att all recommended either my self or my family to the Dissaffected I hope this shall be no loss to my son and that Your Lordship & your noble friend the Earl of Granville will not think it unsuitable to procure him a presentation to one of the many Livings which are in the gift of the

crown.[1]

Seven years later, writing to the Duke of Newcastle in the hope of obtaining the office of Dean of the Thistle, Wallace speaks of his loyalty as "manifested by my 'Politicall Characteristicks' in 1758 as well as by severall other occasionall pieces published from time to time and all criticall jealous for supporting Loyalty in Scotland."[2]

It is outwith the scope of this dissertation to approach Wallace's economic doctrines from the standpoint of a specialist, but some general comments can be made. In Part I, "Of Banks, and of Paper-credit," Wallace is largely opposing views such as Hume's in "Of the Balance of Trade." In Hume's opinion, money finds its natural level except where it is sunk below its level by the institutions of "banks, funds, and paper-credit." These raise the price of labour and goods and inhibit or diminish the amount of gold and silver, by making paper money supply its place. An artificial increase in the amount of money circulating will, Hume maintains, "reduce every man, in time, to the same condition as before," and he sees paper money as producing all the ill effects of abundance without any of the advantages.[3] Credit, Wallace regards as useful in "quickening" industry, while Hume believes that this encouragement is only present "during the interval between the encrease of money

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1 NLS Uncatalogued Yester MSS Acc. 4862, Box 71 F3 Bundle 8. Dated Edinburgh, 28 June 1759.

2 Newcastle Papers Vol CCXC. BM Addit. MSS 32,975 f 313. Dated Edinburgh, 31 May 1766.

3 Essays I, 337.

and the rise of the prices."[1] Another disadvantage of paper money in Hume's eyes is the fact that it is not acceptable abroad, to which Wallace replies that: "It is of no consequence that foreign nations will not take our Bank-notes. They will take our goods, which are produced by the circulation of these notes among ourselves" (19-20). He denies, too, that the precious metals are diminished by the circulation of paper credit, since the increase in foreign trade that it stimulates will receive payment in gold and silver (25-26).

While he regards Hume's point that it raises the prices of labour and provisions as the most telling argument against paper credit (27), he declares that since credit is essential to extensive trade, the inevitable consequences must be faced. Since credit is given only "to men of integrity, prudence, and activity, or to men of substance" (28), there are natural limits to it, and as the cost of living rises, not because of the bank notes themselves, but because of the increased trade and industry they produce, this can only be regarded as a good thing. Without notes, industry could not be so great.

Foreign trade was seen by the "historical" economists as being the culmination of a natural progress from an agrarian through a manufacturing society.[2] We have already seen how Wallace's contrasting view of luxury set him in opposition to this approach, and he devotes the latter part of this section to extolling the advantages to Britain of agriculture and domestic commerce over those

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1 See "Of Money" and Essays I, 337 n.2.

2 See, e.g., Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Bk. III, ch.1, (I, 359).

of foreign trade. More people under these circumstances, he argues, may achieve greater happiness. In the last paragraph, however, he seems to recall that he has a practical and patriotic purpose, and concludes:

> But, in truth, England may have abundance of foreign trade, notwithstanding the higher price of labour. An extensive foreign trade is the natural consequence of great domestic commerce; since it is scarce possible, that an industrious nation, consisting of ten millions of people, should not work up many commodities, which they do not want at home, and should not exchange them for the commodities of foreign nations (40).

Wallace's pronouncements on national debts also conflicted with Hume's view that their accumulation was "a practice which appears ruinous, beyond all controversy."[1] To Wallace's mind it was fruitless to store vast quantities of money in the public treasury when it could be used to stimulate trade. In a rich commercial nation, where large taxes can quickly be raised, it is financially more advantageous to run up a national debt in times of emergency or for ambitious schemes of improvement. In some cases, he argued, the increase in trade that circulating rather than hoarding money produced, would yield profits which if moderately taxed should pay the yearly interest and gradually reduce the capital. Nevertheless, there is a limit to the amount of debt that should be allowed to

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[1] "Of Public Credit," Essays I, 361.

accumulate, and on a patriotic note Wallace concludes that "One may be authorized to say, the debts of Britain are high enough at present; since the legislature appears evidently to be of this opinion, and seems anxious to have them reduced" (52).

In his discussion of national debts and national riches, Wallace unwittingly gave great offence to Hume's close friend Patrick Murray, fifth Lord Elibank,[1] by his caustic criticism of the writer of the "Three Essays." These essays were published anonymously in 1755.[2] The first was entitled "On the Public Debt," the second "On Paper Money, Banking &c," and the third "On Frugality." The second had been written by Elibank,[3] but Wallace erroneously assumed that they had all been written by an unknown Englishman. In answer to what he supposed was a calculated attack, Elibank proposed to publish a letter of reply to Wallace, but was dissuaded by Hume, whose correspondence is worth quoting at length both for the light that it sheds on his relationship with Wallace and for the insight it gives into Wallace's status as a man of letters. Assuring Elibank that Wallace was under a genuine misapprehension, Hume wrote:

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1 For a biographical note, see "New Hume Letters to Lord Elibank, 1748-1776," ed. E.C. Mossner in The University of Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 4 (1962), 431-437. Hereafter cited as LE.

2 See LE p.443 n.2.

3 The essay is reprinted in A Select Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts and other Publications on Paper Currency and Banking, from the originals of Hume, Wallace, Thornton, Ricardo, Blake, Huskisson, and Others, ed. J.R. M'Culloch (London: Privately Printed, 1857), pp.65-74.

> I woud fain use the Liberty to interpose, and diswade your Lordship from publishing the Letter, which you do me the Honour of addressing to me. It is indeed very sharp & satirical & pleasant, but is too much so; and will so much the more hurt the old Gentleman, that he professes a very high Regard for your Lordship, and woud be very ambitious of standing well in your Opinion.
>
> Besides, my Lord, all Authors, as well as Poets, are of the genus irritabile. Mr Wallace has his Pen in his hand, prim'd & cockd & charg'd; and is always ready for a Contest....If he were provokd by the Publication of your Letter, he woud reply in an angry & perhaps an abusive Strain; and might descend to Personalities, which, tho' in reality they coud only hurt himself, yet woud be disagreeable to your Lordship (LE, p.444).

Hume then employed a degree of flattery, by reporting Wallace as having remarked that "notwithstanding your great Fire & Imagination, you are certainly the most civil, attentive, and best bred Man in the World." He pleaded with Elibank to sacrifice his passion for his politeness: "Especially as poor Wallace has certainly offended merely from Ignorance, and wou'd have spoke very differently, had he been acquainted with the real Matter of Fact." For a person of his

rank, "who are only an Author by Chance," it would not be proper "to enter into such Altercations as often serve to discredit Literature, nor show as great Jealousy of a casual Production, as appears in Authors by Profession. I shall not answer Mr Wallace," added Hume, "tho' he calls me a Favourer of the House of Stewart"[1] (LE, p.445).

Elibank seems to have granted Hume's request on condition that certain amendments were made in the second edition of the Characteristics. Hume, acting as intermediary, approached Wallace, and sent the following report to Elibank:

> At first, he seem'd reluctant: However, after Reasoning with him, I was so fortunate as to bring him to Compliance; and he only desir'd, that I wou'd leave the Advertisement with him, and give him a Night's time to think of it, and if to morrow, he continu'd of the same Opinion, he would send it me refitted, as was desir'd. Today, he came to me himself; and seem'd very uneasy, that he cou'd not upon Reflection comply with your Lordships Desire: He professes, that he has the greatest Inclination in the World to oblige you, and to be on good Terms with you: But he is extremely averse to the saying such harsh things of a Man whom he knows nothing of, and who has never personally offended him. He

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1 See Characteristics, p.56.

> owns, that you have great Reason, in every respect, to be offended with the Author of these two Essays; but he thinks, that he cannot with a good Grace become a Volunteer in this Quarrel, and it is contrary to his Nature, while he endeavours to make Peace with one, to declare War against another. You may be perswaded I employ'd all the Arguments on the other Side, of which I was Master; but I cou'd not prevail; And he left me with repeating his earnest Desire, that I wou'd endever to satisfy your Lordship of the Reasons of his Conduct, and to convince you, that his Refusal proceeded from no Want of Respect, nor of Desire to comply with your Demand. He returns still to his Promise of giving you entire Satisfaction in a second Edition (446-47).

Wallace did not in fact temper his criticism of the "Three Essays" in the second edition, though he did add a Postscript saying that he understood that they were not all by the same author.

Hume's essays "Of Money" and "Of the Balance of Trade" have been criticised on the grounds that he had not fully grasped the difference between paper money and bank notes payable on demand.[1] Klibank's essay has come under stronger fire:

> Its brevity is its principal recommendation. It is a poor performance, in which the errors of Hume

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[1] J.R. M'Culloch ed., op. cit., p.viii.

> are repeated without any portion of his philosophy, and is chiefly worth notice as showing the crude opinions that were then not unfrequently entertained by well-informed persons with regard to bank-notes.[1]

It is ironic that Wallace, whose section "Of Banks, and of Paper-credit" is reprinted along with these essays, and whose ideal society would "not need Paper-credit, and but very little money" (Characteristics, p.46), is praised as exposing the fallacy of Hume's and Elibank's theories. Contrasting him with Hume, M'Culloch claims that "Wallace entertained more correct opinions than his illustrious antagonist with respect to banks and public credit. The essay...is both liberal and ingenious; and the other essays in the volume from which it is taken are not unworthy of the reader's attention."[2]

It is in the final Part, "Of the National Genius and Capacity for Self-Defence" that Wallace specifically attacks Brown's Estimate. His tone is courteous and he allows that Brown's work contains an element of truth:

> I sincerely lament the impiety of the age. I am sorry there should be such good reason to complain of our bad morals, and of our want of public spirit. I am far from approving many of our methods of education. I much dislike the reigning taste and diversions of many of our men of fashion and

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1 Ibid, p.ix.

2 Ibid, p.x.

> politeness. I most heartily condemn their passion for gaming, their luxury, effeminacy, and false delicacy. I would not affirm, that the national genius and capacity for science, legislation, or war, is the highest of the kind, or that we have philosophers or poets equal to some in former times....In short, our vices and weaknesses are too evident not to be confessed (167-68).

Nevertheless, Brown's assertions are not only unreasonably severe, Wallace argues, but they are calculated to drive the nation to despair and to turn it towards the despotism of an absolute monarchy (203).

This last danger Wallace sees as the most pernicious potential consequence of Brown's writings, but before he makes a case for British liberty and security, he takes issue with some of the points that Brown raises. There may be reasons for defeats, he argues, other than those deriving from the manners and principles of a nation (171). And contrary to Brown's dismissal of the commons as "an ungoverned Multitude" depending on "some superior Intelligence, to give it both Impulse and Direction,"[1] he praises their "natural strength and courage":

> If the love of liberty about a century ago roused them to defend their rights against

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[1] John Brown, An Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times, 7th ed. (London: L. Davis & C. Reymers, 1758), I, 25.

> a powerful party at home, and inspired them with matchless valour, may it not be expected, that the posterity of those men...not enervated by the luxury of the Great, but inured to labour, would, in a time of extremity, be stirred up to defend their country, and all that was dear to them, against any army that could possibly invade them from France (175).

From the point of view of the nobility and gentry, too, there is no reason to suppose that public spirit and military honour flourishes to a greater degree in France than in Britain. The author of the Estimate has, after all, admitted that "the French manners are as vain and effeminate as our own" (177).

Wallace defends British piety and virtue, believing that the social behaviour of the present day may conceal these qualities (180), and he cannot resist making an invidious comparison of Protestantism with Popery, describing the religion of France as tending "so much to superstition and external ceremony," while Britain's leans "to the pure love of God, and to moral virtue." The British, "from the mild spirit of their government, and from the happy moderation of their clergy, enjoy so much religious freedom," he argues, "that in order to determine the force of their religious principles, it is not safe in this, nor indeed, in any other case, to trust solely to external appearances of devotion" (178-79). Brown's pious condemnation of the state of the clergy Wallace humorously belittles by commenting that complaints "of this kind by clergymen ought always to be distinguished by the modesty

with which they are made, as well as by the justice which accompanies them" (189).

Brown's most serious error, however, is that of maintaining "that tho the manners of the French are as vain, as selfish, and as effeminate, as those of the British, the French have greatly the advantage of us in respect of national defence" (191). Wallace disputes the reasons Brown offers and demonstrates that the weight of Brown's claim that "the French are better secured than the British, against the danger of their vain and effeminate manners" rests on his belief that this is caused chiefly by the despotic power of the king (197).

In outlining the advantages of despotic power in France, Wallace notes, Brown fails to realise that "the exorbitant trade and wealth, which he confesses we possess at present, are owing to the security and liberty, which the nation gained at the Revolution above what they had enjoyed in the preceding period" (199). Thus, unintentionally, by arguing that this wealth is the cause of the growing destruction of the principles of religion and of honour and public spirit, and that the despotic power of the king is a major deterrent to the resultant ruin of a nation, Brown is casting aspersions on the Revolution, on the British parliament, and on the liberty of the people (200). His avowed friendship to liberty, therefore, is inconsistent (202).

In support of liberty, Wallace points out that growing effeminacy under a despotic government will have as great an influence on the monarch as on anyone else — and indeed, the court and army officers are among the most susceptible (204). Under the

British constitution, corruption is more easily controlled:

> In France there is nothing that can make head against the wicked intentions, destructive negligence, or fatal stupidity of a wicked and effeminate court. But in Britain the voice of the middle ranks among the people has a mighty influence. These are always the last to be corrupted. In their integrity and activity there is a grand resource (205-06).

The strength of a free government, Wallace considers, lies in the fact that power is not wholly vested in one person. Delegation of power produces greater equality: "general rules, founded on the principles of equity, must be established to regulate the conduct of all the individuals, among whom the administration is distributed." This may then be described as a government "not of men, but of laws" (215).[1] The resultant personal sense of freedom and security, says Wallace, is much more likely to inspire patriotism than the effects of living under an absolute monarchy.

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[1] Cf. Hume's "Of Civil Liberty": "It may now be affirmed of civilised monarchies, what was formerly said in praise of republics alone, that they are a government of Laws, not of Men" (Essays I, 161). Both writers may have had Aristotle and Livy in mind. Harrington, for instance, writes: "Government...is an Art whereby a Civil Society of Men is instituted and preserv'd upon the Foundation of common Right or Interest; or (to follow Aristotle and Livy) It is the Empire of Laws, and not of Men." (The Oceana of James Harrington, and his other Works, ed. John Toland (London: n.p. 1700), p.37. The quotation was much used: see also George Buchanan, footnote 1, p.259 below.

In 1768, he noted on "Some observations on the influence of freedom in a Government to promote commerce & arts; & the bad influence of Despotism in commerce & arts" that they were "to be read when I make a new edition of my characteristicks" (La II 620[9]). He had decided against enlarging on this topic in the published editions because of the fullness of its treatment elsewhere (213), and his reasons for doing so later are not clear.[1] He was evidently influenced, as he acknowledges in footnotes, by Shaftesbury's "Advice to an Author," though he says "I shall not carry this matter so far as an Elegant Modern writer has done or assert That it is impossible for the arts and sciences to arise, att first, among any people, unless that people enjoy the blessing of a free Government" (2).[2] An absolute monarch of genius can achieve "mighty works" and even under despotic government certain brilliant individuals may shine. It was the free states in ancient times which gave birth to and fostered "philosophy and the nobler arts," however, and when liberty was lost and a despotic empire established, "ignorance and darkness overspread the world, and fitted it for the chaos & ruin which ensued" (4).

He notes Hume's observation in "Of Liberty and Despotism" (later "Of Civil Liberty" — I, 158) that despite the tyrannical conditions in modern Rome and Florence, the arts and sciences have flourished, but he sees this as conforming with his previous

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1 The MS. may have been written for inclusion in the published edition, and omitted.

2 Shaftesbury, Characteristics I, 155.

exception: "Great men may arise in every nation &...there may be a favourable conjuncture of circumstances to promote Genius and art under Despotick Governments" (6). Hume's point that absolute government seems inherently prejudicial to commerce (I, 160), Wallace, without Hume's reservation, would like to apply to the progress of the arts and sciences as well (7). Continuing his attack on Hume, he asserts that it "is a prodigious mistake that mens lives or their property are fully as secure in an absolute monarchy as in a Free Government" (7), and compares the French government unfavourably with the freedom and security of the British.

Despite the fact that Wallace used the Characteristics as evidence of his patriotism, it is doubtful whether personal ambition was his motive for publication. Hume was perhaps a little dubious:

> Wallace woud be very much surprisd to find himself treated as a Time-server, and Place-hunter [presumably accusations of Elibank's]: For he valud himself very much to me on his Freedom & his Exemption from Flattery. He said he had not spoke a Word in Praise either of George the 2d, or Mr Pit or the King of Prussia; tho' he professes a great Esteem for the two last Heroes. I told him, that, in order to uphold that Character, he ought not to have mentiond the four Reigns before the Revolution as arbitrary, but the five or six or seven or eight or nine; and that the stopping at that precise Period lookt like casting Reflections

on a certain Family (IE, p.445).

But proof of Wallace's real concern for the state of Britain is confirmed in an unpublished — and unpublishable — essay entitled "The End of Ecclesiasticall Splendour in the church and of Regal or Monarchicall Authority in the state in all the Christian Nations in Europe" (La II 620[15]). He had expressed his disillusionment with the state of the Church in his MS. of 1768 (see ch. II and appendix V) and in a spirit far removed from the optimism of the Characteristics, he turned now denounce what he considered to be the abuse of the monarchical system.[1]

He states at the outset that he values civil government as both useful and necessary to the comfort and happiness of mankind, but his attitude to the monarchy has evidently undergone a marked change since the writing of the Characteristics. Looking at Europe, past and present, he is "more and more perswaded of the Destructive nature & absurd tendency of Monarchicall Government" (E/3). It is a system which has been prodigiously abused: one individual tends to be supported in riches and grandeur "att the publick expence & by the labours of the body of the people much above what they are Intituled to," which is contrary to justice, equity and mercy as well as to wisdom and good policy (E/2-E/3).

His tone is similar to that of his religious "Conjectures" and one cannot ignore the vehemence of his conviction:

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1 La II 620[15] was written no earlier than 1769, since Wallace refers to the fact that "humour does not run so high for Mr Wilks and the bill of rights" (E/44). Wilkes helped to found the Society for the Supporters of the Bill of Rights in 1769 (Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman, p.359 [hereafter cited as Robbins]).

> I comfort my self that the time draws near when Europe shall be happily Delivered & that both Ecclesiasticall splendour and tyranny and all monarchicall authority shall fall into the utmost contempt & the management of religion and Civil Government shall fall into better hands & be regulated in a better & wiser manner.
>
> I shall not live to see so happy a change; I would dy att any time to bring it about: but the change I hope will happen att no very Disstant period: While I live I will offer my views to the world I will order them to be published after my death: indeed such is the tyranny of the time notwithstanding the boasted Liberty of Britain that it would be very inconvenient if not dangerous to publish them: but I conceive this change will happen for the following reasons & let Posterity judge whether I have guessed right or have been altogether misstaken (E/3-E/3v).

In 1767, while he believed it "very difficult to reform either Government or the world"[1] he was nevertheless preparing a work entitled "Advices to all true Patriots, Or Proposals to promote the Grandeur and Prosperity of Great Britain". His table of contents

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1 See the letter, presumably to Hume, in La II 96[1a], which refers to and summarises "Advices to all true Patriots". A MS. of table of contents (5½pp) is also among these papers.

gives page references, which indicates that the book had been completed in MS. form, but all that remains is this and Wallace's summary in his letter to Hume. It is evident that Wallace was in a very different frame of mind from the one in which he wrote his religious "Conjectures" and "The End of...Monarchicall Authority" only a year or two later. He believes, for instance, that the present British government is less corrupt than it is claimed to be, and that there are sufficient patriots to effect the necessary reforms. Those who complain that our constitution is going to ruin are mistaken: it "will last long or rather for ever."

In the Characteristics the practical and realistic aspect of Wallace's outlook is demonstrated in his reiteration that "there is no unmixed happiness on earth" (85, 65). He steps even further from his idealistic viewpoint in the "Advices." The problem of whether civil government is essential for the support of society is a debatable one, and one which he would affirm was true. But argument is superfluous, he maintains, since civil government is instituted and will continue. The question of whether property is necessary or "eligible" in human society is similarly inappropriate, since property has been established and will remain. With a hint of the discouragement that characterizes his later essays, he remarks that even if we were able to decide on which is the most perfect government, we would not be able to establish it: men are too fond of their old laws and customs. Even with Harrington's plan the Commonwealthmen could not establish a republic in Britain. The British government nevertheless provides happiness and freedom and compares very favourably with an absolute monarchy or a feudal

government.

His suggestions for improvements in domestic affairs are not dissimilar to those in the Characteristics: the national debt should be paid off, without distressing the country, gradually but purposefully. Parliament should have a bank of its own instead of borrowing from private banks or from individuals. With "great civility" and without referring to him by name, Wallace apparently refutes some of Sir James Steuart's "schemes about debts and taxes." He continues to value agriculture over trade, and it would be interesting to read the reply he says he has made to the argument that agriculture is increased and improved proportionally to the increase in trade and luxury. More method and organisation he believes, should be employed in the encouragement of agriculture, trade and the arts and in legal and constitutional reforms. Amongst such questions as what should be the size and extent of our farms and what are the best plans for our defences and militia, Wallace does not ignore social issues such as the price of provisions and the treatment of the poor. With a characteristic concern for posterity, he suggests that Latin scholars such as George Buchanan should translate modern books to preserve "what is most curious" in case the present European languages become unintelligible. If a patriot cannot act, he maintains, he can always write: improvements are effected so slowly that patriotic works are always needed.

By the time he came to write "The End of Ecclesiasticall Splendour...and...Monarchicall Authority" Wallace's patriotism was still very much alive, but his loyalty to the House of Hanover had markedly diminished: the Hanoverian kings, like all the German

princes, "know nothing but Despotism." While the first prince of Hanover knew little of our constitution and the second little more, the third (and present) king knows less than either of them, if that is possible. "He seems naturall to be a weak, silly, ignorant, dull and insipid man without sense, judgement or spirit" (E/36). Restricted monarchies are dangerous in that they allow the king to choose ministers who will carry out his wishes: many bishops and judges "have on many occasions been tools of a Corrupted court and been ready to promote all the arbitrary and tyrannicall measures of our Kings" (E/17). Wallace regrets that the opportunity to make Britain a republic has been lost: "if this single man Cromwell had been firm & sincere to any good plan of a Commonwealth, Monarchy would have been abolished att that time and perhaps had not been revived for ages" (E/43-E/44).

He deplores "the management of this reign." Our "very silly or ill Disposed ministers," instead of

> obliging the French to accept of reasonable conditions & give us full satisfaction for the Dammages we had sustained clapt up an inglorious & infamous peace on two Different occasions, gave up our cheif conquests which would have been most usefull; & rather put the French & their allies to get out of the war in a better condition than when they began it excepting only that they had expended so much money that they were allmost broken in their Credit (E/27).

On top of this, our own allies, who were "much more interested in the quarrell than we," contributed financially much less to the war and came out of it better: "We have particularly been dupes to the Dutch, the Hannoverians and other Princes in Germany" (E/28).

In Britain, bribery and corruption has replaced the absolute power of the king (E/31), and George III's greatest mistake has been "the foolish & violent method in which he has attacked and pursued John Wilkes and all his friends and supporters" -- either through his own pride or through the stupidity of his ministers (E/37). Although Wilkes seems defeated, his treatment has "raised a violent Disgust of this King" (E/38). It is perhaps surprising to find Wallace championing a man whose "sentiments and morals" were acknowledged to tend "'to the profligate and debauched',"[1] but he clearly saw him as combatting "the pride, tyranny and arbitrary & illegall measures of this reign" (E/44).[2] All the monarchies of Europe, Wallace concludes, "are so weakly & oppressively governed that the world will att last open their eyes and not suffer themselves to be oppressed and ruined by such a sett of weak & abominable tyrants."

It is sad to see Wallace in old age reduced to a position apparently not so very distant from John Brown's,[3] but the essential difference between them is that Wallace's vehemence is directed less at moral ills, such as luxury, in themselves, than at their social and political consequences. He advocates positive reforms in place

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1 The view of James Harris, quoted by John Brooke in King George III (London: Constable, 1972), p.145.

2 See Appendix VIII.

3 Wallace's MS. recalls such passages as the one in Brown's Explanatory Defence of the Estimate (pp.8-9) in which Brown regards parliamentary influence as contributing to the weakening of the national powers "by raising many Men to Places of the most important Trust, who were in some Respect or other unequal to the Task."

of what he is denouncing and firmly believes that reform will come about. Wallace does indeed deserve a place among the Scottish Commonwealthmen who, looking back to the republican writers such as Buchanan and Fletcher, "derived principles favourable to political liberty", which were likely "to include, as time went on, greater recognition of the rights of a larger proportion of the population." Their chief contribution to the thought of the period," Caroline Robbins believes, "lies in their realization of the injustices of a world where a labourer's toil was poorly rewarded and his stake in the share of land and wealth less than his activities and his rights deserved."[1]

V The Prospects

Wallace's indebtedness to Andrew Fletcher is illustrated by the following paragraph from The Second Discourse on the Affairs of Scotland:

> I know that if to a law prohibiting all interest for money, another were joined, that no man should possess more land than so much as he should cultivate by servants, the whole money, as well as people of this nation, would be presently employed, either in cultivating lands, or in trade and manufactures; that the country would be quickly improved to the greatest height of which

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1 Robbins, p.220.

> the soil is capable, since it would be cultivated by all the rich men of the nation; and that there would still be vast stocks remaining to be employed in trade and manufactures.[1]

The emphasis in the Prospects on agricultural improvement and on the social benefits to be derived from an equal distribution of land suggests that though Wallace praises Harrington's plan in Oceana, he is looking beyond Fletcher not so much at a scheme which aims to preserve political balance by dividing the land so that power is always in the hands of the many,[2] but rather at More's Utopia, for which he also expresses admiration, and which combines to a greater extent the political and the social. Like Fletcher, Wallace's proposals seem to stem rather from an appraisal of the human condition than from the need to find a political solution to the problems of property and power.

Buchanan's influence may be seen in Wallace's views on government: neither, for example, believe that the monarch should have absolute power, and Wallace is in complete agreement that we should "trust the power of government to laws and not to

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1 The Political Works of Andrew Fletcher, Esq; (London: Bettesworth, Hitch, and Davis, 1737), pp.163-64.

2 See, e.g., The Oceana of James Harrington, ed. John Toland p.204: "The Center or Fundamental Laws are, first, the Agrarian...stating Property in Land at such a balance, that the Power can never swerve out of the hands of the Many."

kings."[1] The opening statement in "Prospect II", that: "As mankind can neither purchase nor secure that is necessary for their comfortable subsistence without society, so society cannot long continue peaceable and stable without civil government" falls short of Buchanan's belief that society is not based on utility or expediency,[2] but both hold the "essentially Stoic" view that men "desire governments as the means of securing benefits and the maintenance of justice, which are essential to the development and maintenance of civilized society, for which they are formed."[3] Wallace would certainly endorse Cicero's opinion, which Buchanan cites in support of his argument: "'There is nothing in the world more pleasing to God, who rules the world, than the union of men under a government of law — that is to say, a body-politic'" /De Re Publica VI, 13/.[4]

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1 Buchanan promotes the view that government should be of laws and not of men in The Powers of the Crown in Scotland, Being a Translation, with notes and an Introductory Essay, of George Buchanan's "De Jure Regni Apud Scotos" /1st pub. 1579/ by Charles Flinn Arrowood (Austin: Texas Univ. Press, 1949), ch.18, pp.68ff. (hereafter cited as Buchanan). For above quotation, see p.70.

2 See, e.g., Buchanan, pp.46-47: "There is an impulse which nature implants not only in men, but also in the more tractable lower animals; so that, although the blandishments of expediency may be lacking, they, nevertheless, associate voluntarily with others of their kind....This impulse is so deeply rooted in mankind by nature, that though a person had every possible thing to make him personally secure, and which would contribute to his sensory enjoyment or to delight his mind, he would, nevertheless, find life insupportable without human society."

3 Buchanan, Arrowood's "Essay", p.9.

4 Buchanan, p.48.

An outstanding feature of Utopia is the assumption that the state should exist for all its members: present day commonwealths, More complains, must devise ways of protecting private property, and the rich, whose interests the commonwealth safeguard and promote, live off the poor.[1] Wallace makes the same point (Prospects, p.25), and wholeheartedly endorses More's abolition of private property, a scheme deriving from Plato: "This wise sage...easily foresaw that the one and only road to the general welfare lies in the maintenance of equality in all respects. I have my doubts that the latter could ever be preserved where the individual's possessions are his private property" (Utopia, p.105).

When, in "Prospect I," Wallace regrets that human society has not achieved its full potential, he doubtless has More's commonwealth in mind: "No government can render mankind absolutely perfect. If any one could, such a one as that of Sir Thomas More's Utopia has the fairest claim" (97). If we are tempted to dismiss Wallace as being over-idealistic or unpractical, we should recall that Utopia had sufficient impact to inspire Vasco de Quiroga to attempt to model an Indian community upon it in Mexico in the mid fifteen-hundreds.[2]

Both More and Wallace deplore the idleness of the rich (Utopia,

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1 The Complete Works of St. Thomas More, vol. IV /Utopia/, ed. Edward Surtz, S. J. and J. H. Hexter (New Haven & London: Yale Univ. Press, 1965), p.241. Further refs. are to this edition. In the light of what we know of Wallace's economic views, it is interesting to note that Utopia reflects More's fear and dismay at the emerging economy of his day (J. Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish, The Western Intellectual Tradition From Leonardo to Hegel /1960; rpt. Pelican Books, 1963/, pp.68-70).

2 Bronowski and Mazlish, pp.75-76.

p.63; Prospects, p.82) and More's proposal for abolishing idleness at the other end of the social scale by eliminating brothels, gaming, alehouses and wine shops and his demand that "farming be resumed" and useful employment be provided for those whose poverty had made them thieves, or for vagrants or lazy servants who were likely to turn to theft (Utopia pp.69, 71) were also taken up by Wallace (Prospects, pp.94, 40). "Prospect II," indeed, incorporates many of More's ideas in its outline of a perfect commonwealth: More's maxim, for example, that no-one should have the burden of constant toil and that there should be a six-hour working day (Utopia, p.127) is repeated by Wallace, who allows a three-hour working day where possible (Prospects, p.40). Both men envisage that the resultant leisure will be devoted to intellectual pursuits (Utopia, p.129; Prospects, p.41) and Wallace believes with More that "the happiness of life" is to be found in "the freedom and culture of the mind" (Utopia, p.135): under a utopian government, Wallace predicts, everyone "might have the means of being a philosopher if he pleased" (Prospects, p.105), an occupation to which, we may remember, Wallace himself aspired.[1] The existence of the utopians is, as Edward Surtz remarks, "one of plain living and high thinking" (Utopia, p.clxv).

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[1] Scots Magazine, 33 (1771), 341, and his intro. to the "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles."

The statement that "Utopia is a society under rules"[1] is one unlikely to be disputed. The rules, however, Wallace maintains, merely curb licentiousness: "real liberty, or the liberty of indulging ourselves freely in every thing agreeable to nature and reason, no where flourishes with such security. Where such an equality is preserved, scarce can we suppose liberty to be in danger" (Prospects, p.95). The definition of More's utopians accords with that of the Stoics: virtue is "living according to nature since to this end we were created by God. That individual, they say, is following the guidance of nature who, in desiring one thing and avoiding another, obeys the dictates of reason" (Utopia, p.163).[2]

George Wallace, in his memoir, tells us that Seneca was his father's favourite philosopher, and Wallace's "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles" bear this out. By extending his utopia to include the entire world (Prospects, p.37), Wallace goes even further than More in following the Stoic tradition, which "saw the world as a single great community in which all men are brothers."[3] As we

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1 Bronowski and Mazlish, p.72. Bury's point that in Montesquieu's time "people were under the illusion that legislation has an almost unlimited power to modify social conditions" is born out by Wallace. (See J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its Origin and Growth (London: Macmillan, 1920), p.147. Godwin's principle that "social institutions are entirely pernicious, that they perpetuate harmful prejudices, and are an almost insuperable obstacle to improvement" (Bury, p.225), was to come later.

2 See e.g., Seneca, Moral Essays, trans. John W. Basore, Loeb ed. (London & New York: Heinemann; Putnam's, 1932) II, 117, 119, "On the Happy Life."

3 Seneca, Letters from a Stoic, trans. Robin Campbell (Penguin Books, 1969), p.15. Hereafter cited as Letters.

have seen, the Stoic duty to live "in accordance with nature" involved not only learning to do without everything but the bare essentials, but "developing the inborn gift of reason which marks us off as different from the animal world." By so doing, "the true end of man, happiness" would be achieved.[1] This philosophy is clearly behind the writings of Wallace as well as More, and while they place less emphasis on such aspects as Stoic endurance, they stress the Stoic virtues of just and moral behaviour, the simple, non-luxurious way of life, rationality, and obedience to the state.[2] The fact that living "in accordance with nature" also meant "living according to the spirit which makes the world grow and progress"[3] gives added significance to "Prospect I" in which Wallace reviews the state of society in the light of Man's potential achievements and finds it deficient.

It is the Stoic conception that: "All the world is working together....is all one living whole, with one soul through it"[4] that Wallace illustrates in "Prospect V" though he attributes world harmony to the Christian God. This Prospect's rhapsodic form is reminiscent of Shaftesbury, and it is doubtless the element of

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1 Letters, p.15.

2 See Letters, p.16.

3 Gilbert Murray, The Stoic Philosophy (London: Watts; Allen & Unwin, 1915), p.34.

4 Murray, p.37. Cf. Seneca's Letters to Lucillius, trans. E. Phillips Barker (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), II, 155, letter xcv: "All that you see, wherein things divine and human are comprised, is one: we are members of a mighty body."

Stoicism in Shaftesbury's writings that attracts Wallace to him.[1] Virtue, for the Stoic, was to act in harmony with the will of God; thus, for Wallace, reason is divine (Prospects, p.143).[2] It is "by the study and practice of true philosophy, that the highest dignity of human nature is displayed" (Prospects, pp.146-47). Wallace's description of the philosopher leaves the reader in little doubt that he has Stoic philosophy in mind:

> Among all the characters of mankind, that of the philosopher himself is the most perfect. Distinguished from those of an inferior kind, by clearer and more distinct perceptions; by more comprehensive views both of nature and art; by a more ardent love and higher admiration of what is excellent; by a firmer attachment to virtue, and the general good of the world; by a lower regard for all inferior beauties compared with the

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1 Though aspects of it also distress him: see Prospects, p.403. "The prevailing symbolism of Shaftesbury...is that of the Stoic whole, and of harmony, in the sense of cooperation of the individual with the whole....the dates in the manuscript of the Philosophical Regimen show that from 1695 to 1712...the chief food for Shaftesbury's personal philosophical reflection came from the Stoic philosophers," writes Esther Tiffany in "Shaftesbury as Stoic," PMLA, 38 (1923), 644-45. Stanley Grean argues, in Shaftesbury's Philosophy of Religion and Ethics (Ohio: Ohio Univ. Press, 1967), pp.7; 161, that writers like Esther Tiffany and A. O. Aldridge have over-emphasized the Stoic element, particularly that of Stoic "insensibility."

2 Cf. Seneca's Letters (ed. Barker), I, 216, letter lxvi: "Now reason is nothing else than a fraction of the divine aura embodied in the physical frame of man."

> supreme, consisting in rectitude of conduct and dignity of behaviour; by a greater moderation in prosperity, and greater patience and courage under the evils of life (Prospects, p.147).

The universal setting of Prospects I and V suggests that Wallace's writing is influenced by the Stoic belief that mankind can achieve happiness and harmony only by living according to nature; his concern for individual happiness appears to be secondary, and to a large extent it is this outlook which separates him from the later social reformers who were motivated primarily by social conditions. Given Wallace's approach, certain individual traits must be made subservient to the rules of the state, and in both his and More's utopia such human characteristics as ambition, love of distinction, of ease and of "liberty" have to be eradicated or adapted for the greater good (e.g. Utopia, pp.245, 127; "Prospect III").

Under a perfect government, where there is an equal distribution of labour and an equal sharing of its fruits, Wallace maintains that ambition can be gratified. False goals to which we aspire under imperfect governments are replaced by worthy ones, and distinctions are given for real virtue and excellence. There can be no emulation of the elegance and magnificence of the rich where economic distinction is abolished and where the houses, clothes and tables of all men are equally good. Under the perfect government all useful trades are honoured and all are equally respected. Since no one is exhausted by excessive labour, as the work is shared by all, and since sharing leaves more time for leisure, everyone may be equally wise. Envy disappears where there is a common interest and

where happiness is shared, and idleness vanishes when the benefits of cooperation are felt. Distinction, under an equal government, is awarded for virtue, qualities of character, diligence in acquiring knowledge and wisdom, excellence at work and talent for the arts. The popular idea of liberty Wallace demonstrates is not liberty at all: equality alone brings real freedom, and given this, the human passions and appetites need not be inconsistent with perfect government (Prospects pp.76-97).

The rules set out by More and Wallace which governed, for example, the age at which people should marry and the trades they should undertake, while they restrict individual freedom in one sense, are designed to produce a state which allows a much more significant freedom in the eyes of these writers: that of living agreeably to nature and to reason, in a society where poverty would be "effectually banished": everyone would be on an equal footing and "the numerous impediments arising from an inequality of rank, estates, or other circumstances, would be wholly removed."

> In this situation, according to the original blessing and command, mankind would be fruitful, and multiply, replenish the earth, and subdue it. By the help of such vast numbers living without anxiety, and in a goodly correspondence, they would be able to cultivate every spot that was habitable in the manner most suitable to its nature. By their united labours, they would raise the most magnificent works, and add innumerable beauties to the

> face of the earth. Knowledge would increase wonderfully by experiments made at leisure, and with exactness, in all places of the earth; which would be freely communicated every where, and be regularly transmitted to posterity. An unconceivable progress would be made in discovering the laws of nature. There would be proportionable advances in all sorts of useful, ingenious, and agreeable arts. Every one might have the means of being a philosopher if he pleased....In short, the whole earth would become a paradise, and mankind be universally wise and happy (Prospects, pp.104-105).

We are already aware of the consequences Wallace predicts as resulting from the establishment of a perfect government, which are set out in "Prospect IV":

> It would be impossible...to support the great numbers of men who would be raised up...the earth would be overstocked at last, and the greatest admirers of such fanciful schemes must foresee the fatal period when they would come to an end (116).

Artificial means would be used to control the population, such as war or "cruel and unnatural customs" and advances in knowledge and in agriculture would cease (119). Vice and confusion would replace the former wisdom and happiness and this state of affairs would be, in a sense, more unnatural than the unsatisfactory condition in which Man

lives at present, which is at least the natural result of his depravity. The vices of mankind are therefore used by providence to prevent the establishment of a perfect government, for it would be "wholly unnatural, and altogether disagreeable to the methods of providence" if "such a lovely constitution should be overturned, not by the vices of men, or their abuse of liberty, but by the order of nature itself". This being so, it is not unnatural to set bounds to human knowledge and happiness: that is finite has proper limits (121).

These conclusions are central to Wallace's proof of a future state, as we shall see later, but they did not prevent him from urging practical reforms. His veneration for the philosophy and for the agrarian constitution of the ancients was associated with his views on comparative population and his distaste for the present economy; compared with some of his more progressive contemporaries, therefore, aspects of Wallace's thought appear recidivistic. His work, nevertheless, influenced such writers as Malthus and Godwin and the Prospects were undoubtedly a radical contribution to literature dealing with the perfectibility of Man.

Before leaving the utopian aspect of the Prospects, we should perhaps note certain similarities between Wallace's work and that of Simon Berington, whose Memoirs of Sig^r Gaudentio di Lucca (London: T. Cooper, 1737) were in Wallace's time attributed to George

Berkeley.[1] The fictional di Lucca found himself in "an unknown Country in the midst of the vast Deserts of Africa, as Antient, Populous, and Civilized, as the Chinese" (title-page), where, although there was private property everyone shared public building and expences (214-15) and the people affected "an exact uniformity and equality" (169), regarded themselves as "all equal in Birth" (211) and bartered and exchanged their commodities (214).

The spirit of Wallace's proposals for the election of governors (Prospects pp.41-42) is anticipated in the Memoirs:

> Tho' as I said, the Pophar is in some Sense the Proprietor of the whole Country, as Head of the Government, and chief Patriarch; yet the Paradox of this Government consists in this, that they are Joint Lords, acknowledging no inequality, but merely eldership, and the respect due to dignitaries, which they esteem as their own, or redounding to themselves, because they all give their consent to their Election for the publick Good (214).

The laws of the country were few, but the inhabitants were "prodigious

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[1] See Sir William Forbes, An Account of the Life and Writings of James Beattie LL.D (2nd ed., Edinburgh: Constable & Co.; Longman et al. & John Murray, 1807), II, 252. Berington also wrote a Dissertation on the Mosaical Creation, Deluge, Building of Babel, and Confusion of Tongues (London: 1790) which called forth a reply by Julius Bate: A Defence of Mr. Hutchinson's tenets in Philosophy and Divinity, in answer to the objections of Mr. Berington (London: 1751). Wallace also made a target of Hutchinsonian theory (see above, ch. I., p.88).

exact in the Observance of them" (202). They were, according to di Lucca, "nothing but the first Principles of Natural Justice" (203). Though Wallace's government differed by not being patriarchal, both aimed at "equality of Brotherhood and Dignity" (Memoirs, p.207).

Of all the arts, agriculture in the Memoirs was regarded as "the first in Dignity, next to the liberal Sciences, since that nourishes all the rest" (210-11).[1] The people were industrious and peaceful, working for the common good rather than for themselves, and the land was so fruitful that one "would think the curse of Adam had scarce reached that part of the World; or that Providence had proportion'd the fertility of the Country to the Innocence of the Inhabitants" (182). The necessary arts were those most esteemed and amid peace and plenty all the arts had been brought to "prodigious Perfection" in a community devoid of private interest or ambition for personal riches or power (216-17).

Under such idyllic conditions, the population increased enormously, as Wallace would have predicted, and di Lucca anticipates that "these People must in process of Time encrease to an Infinitum, without Lands sufficient to maintain them" (210). Wallace gives no indication of having read the Memoirs (which do not in fact take a pessimistic view of over-population, as the dangers are dismissed) and it is possible that he was unaware of them. On the other hand, he had corresponded with Berkeley as a member of the Rankenian club,

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[1] Though it is placed next in honour after the liberal arts on p.217.

and he refers frequently in the Characteristics to The Querist,[1] in terms of high approval. If he believed that Berkeley was the author of the Memoirs he may well have read them, and perceived that this almost parenthetical observation was of prime significance.[2]

The Rankenians, in their correspondence with Berkeley, are recorded as pushing his "singular tenets all the amazing length to which they have been carried in later publications" and he is known to have invited them to assist him in setting up a college in Bermuda[3] on the lines of his Proposal.[4] The inhabitants of Bermuda, as Berkeley describes them, would not be out of place in Wallace's utopia: they have less wealth, but fewer vices and expensive follies than their neighbours, and are "contented, plain, innocent Sort of People, free from Avarice and Luxury, as well as the other Corruptions that attend those Vices."[5]

Wallace also shares a number of the views expressed by Berkeley

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1 Robbins (pp.160-161) notes Maynard Keynes's unpublished remark "that Berkeley wrote the shrewdest essays /in the Querist/ of his time. On money, banking and incentive," she adds, "he was in advance of his time."

2 With reference to Wallace's attitude to foreign trade (Dissertation, p.95) it is interesting to note Berington's comment that his "utopians" were protected, having "no Wars, or Voyages at Sea, nor commerce with the Distempers, as well as Vices of other Nations" (203).

3 Scots Magazine, 33 (1771), 341.

4 A Proposal for the better Supplying of Churches in our Foreign Plantations, and for Converting the Savage Americans, to Christianity, By a College to be erected in the Summer Islands, otherwise called The Isles of Bermuda, 1st pub. in 1725 and reprinted in the Miscellany of 1752.

5 A Proposal, in The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (London, etc.: Nelson, 1955), VII, 352.

in An Essay towards preventing the Ruin of Great Britain,[1] where he advocates industry, sumptuary laws, and a return to the simple life. It is impossible for the idle to enjoy the necessaries and comforts of life under any form of government, Berkeley argues: "Industry is the natural sure way to wealth....Money is so far useful to the public as it promoteth industry, and credit having the same effect is of the same value with money" (71). He regards a large population as "both means and motives to industry" and advocates the encouragement of propagation (72). With Wallace, he calls for a revival of public spirit (79), and he asserts that "frugality of manners is the nourishment and strength of bodies politic" (74). He too, sees no inconsistency in believing that liberty "is the greatest human blessing that a virtuous man can possess," and that "just freedom of thought and action...is the prerogative of a rational creature" (70), while wishing to impose severe sumptuary laws (75). "The present age," he proclaims, "aboundeth with injudicious patrons of liberty, who, not distinguishing between that and licenticusness, take the surest method to discredit what they would seem to propagate" (70).

The Prospects, however, do not consist solely of utopian speculations, though the fact that few, if any, of Wallace's critics have discussed the remaining eight Prospects has not helped to stress this. Wallace establishes his purpose at the outset:

> Though the Writer of the following Pieces has made

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[1] 1st pub. in 1721. The version which appeared in the 1752 Miscellany is reprinted by Luce and Jessop, Works, VI and it is to this edition that page nos. in the text will refer.

> several observations upon civil government, and the constitution of society; yet his principal intention in these Prospects, is to illustrate the principles of morality and natural religion; in particular, to discover whether the present life of man has a relation to any other, and thus to trace the designs of providence with respect to a state after death (iii).

His discussion of the possibility of progress and his conclusion that while human perfection is desirable, natural limits are imposed upon it, are therefore part of a larger design in which he aims to remove the prejudices of "the Freethinkers."

"Prospect V" is Shaftesburian in both its rhapsodic form, and in its conclusions. Wallace turns from illustrations of the beauty and magnificence of nature, which provides not only our pleasures, but our necessities as well, to an encomium on the works of Man which, he believes, have been carried to a state of high perfection. Only arrogance would attribute them "to human genius alone" and Wallace prefers, with the ancients, to "ascribe them to the divinity, and derive them from the secret inspiration of the All-wise." In displaying "the capacity of the human mind" they declare also "the perfection of the Creator": "Human art," maintains Wallace, "is nothing but a ray of the divine." The divine wisdom is displayed very much more magnificently in the works of nature, and "the infinite wisdom, goodness, and energy of the great Creator" are to be seen above all, in his "continually raising up, preserving, and supporting, from the beginning of the world to this day, such

immense numbers of animals and rational creatures, whose natures he hath exalted far above the most glorious bodies, which are insensible of life or being."

There is, however, "a mystery in the works of God that we cannot fully comprehend" and such problems as "the distresses of mankind and of the brute animals" arise because we cannot conceive of the divine purpose. In "Prospect VI" Wallace suggests that in this world some of the distresses, far from being the consequences of vice, are unavoidable. The fact that it appears natural to Man to hope for a future existence and that nature seems to have prepared him for such an existence by improving his judgement with age, even though the body is decaying, leads Wallace strongly to suspect "that after death, the soul may exert an independant force, notwithstanding its present connection with the body." Man's potential for improvement cannot be attained in his time on earth, and we under-estimate God if we suppose that earthly happiness is all he can provide:

> can we conceive that a wise and powerful being, capable of raising up such excellent orders of creatures, and of making such ample provision for their happiness in the rich stores of nature, can consider these scanty measures of happiness his creatures actually enjoy, during their short and uncertain abode upon the earth, as an end worthy of all his care and providence? (173).

Wallace's seventh Prospect attempts to establish a hypothesis of considerable importance to the rest of his argument. In answer

to M. Maupertuis, who arrived at the opposite conclusion, Wallace maintains that there is more happiness than misery on earth (an argument which failed to convince James Boswell, who, in a pessimistic state of mind, "was not satisfied with his reasoning").[1] As Wallace expects us to accept such assertions as: "In general, human life is not a life of fear and anxiety, but of hope and confidence," it is little wonder that he fails to reassure the less optimistic reader. His own view of human nature, however, is sanguine:

> imperfect as men are, they discover a high regard to natural justice and benignity, and employ themselves much more in social intercourse in offices of friendship, in innocent, just and beneficent actions, than in a wicked and malicious exercise of their power. There is a great deal of honesty and good meaning among men (211).

He concludes that both the pleasures of the senses and those of the mind, which derive from knowledge and virtue, easily outweigh the distresses, though he grants that not everyone will be convinced of this: "It is not capable of mathematical or metaphysical, but only of moral evidence." The individual's experience will inevitably colour his outlook of life: "Most things have two handles, and may be represented in different lights. Happy is the man who steadily views them in that light, which is not only the clearest, but the most agreeable." Wallace's Prospect. on the magnificence of

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[1] Private Papers from Malahide Castle, XIV (1932), 105.

nature is obviously designed to foster the optimistic view, which is denied to such as Maupertuis, whose views must weaken, though they are not inconsistent with, belief in a wise and good providence.

Demonstrating his own belief that "most things have two handles" and his characteristic facility for arguing from a variety of standpoints, Wallace proposes in "Prospect VIII" to examine the doctrines of both liberty and necessity, "to observe what may be said on either of these systems, to vindicate providence, and to account for those evils which are supposed to cast a blemish on the works of nature." It can be inferred from Maupertuis' doctrine that Man's misuse of liberty has caused his misery, which stems from his own vice and folly; thus providence is vindicated and the importance of the question of whether there is greater happiness or misery in human life is diminished. There are many philosophers, however, who reject the notion of liberty in favour of the "indissolvable chains of an absolute necessity" (222).

On such an over-worked topic, it comes as no surprise to the reader that Wallace has little to add to the debate. Once again his reasons for entering into it are more interesting than his scholarly contribution, ingenious though he is. In vindicating providence, he makes use of his arguments to prove an after-life and creates a coherent system which incorporates his explanation of vice and death and his views on perfectibility and population. Possibly he was attempting a last word in the debate: one which would reduce its importance as a theological issue, not so much in the field of the Calvinist versus Arminian controversy, which he aims to avoid (222), but in areas such as the outcry against Kames's essay "Of

Liberty and Necessity" in his Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, first published in 1751. It does seem that the aim of the Prospects, with its concluding "Advices to certain Freethinkers" was to demonstrate to men like Hume the intellectual respectability of Christianity and its capacity to tolerate a divergence of opinion denied it by the zealots who had attacked Kames (and Hume) in the mid seventeen-fifties (see below, ch.4). The criticism with which he tempers his praise of Shaftesbury, and his attack on the wild free-thinkers in the final Prospect may also indicate a desire to justify the Moderate position against such Evangelicals as John Witherspoon, whose Ecclesiastical Characteristics: Or, The Arcana of Church Policy (1753) began the flow of pamphlets against the two Homes and against the Moderates for befriending them.[1] The whole drift of the Ecclesiastical Characteristics, in the words of Ross, "is an ironic acknowledgement of the subversive effect on orthodoxy of the Shaftesbury-Hutcheson philosophy" (153). In his efforts to promote tolerance without jeopardising the integrity of the Church, Wallace may be seen in the Prospects to defend the Moderate position against Witherspoon's twelfth Maxim:

> As to the world in general, a moderate man is to have great charity for Atheists and Deists in principle, and for persons that are loose and vicious in their practice; but none at all for

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1 See Ian Simpson Ross, Lord Kames and the Scotland of his Day (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), pp.152-53. Hereafter cited as Ian Ross.

> those that have a high profession of religion, and a great pretence to strictness in their walk and conversation.

Wallace endorses Hume's view that the controversy over liberty and necessity "has led philosophers into . . . a labyrinth of obscure sophistry"[1] and he sees no need for nice definitions of "liberty" and "necessity," which "might give occasion to a logomachy":

> It will be sufficient to oppose two schemes which are plainly contradictory: the one, "that it was possible in nature, that many things might have happened differently from what they have done; or, that the world might have been different in many respects from what it actually is." The other; "that this is, and ever was impossible" (222-23).

Hume comes down firmly on the side of necessity as a practical convenience: it is "only upon the principles of necessity," he argues, "that a person acquires any merit or demerit from his actions, however the common opinion may incline to the contrary."[2] If actions are not determined, the "actions themselves may be

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1 An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals by David Hume, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p.81. (Further refs. will be made to this edition and will be bracketed in the text). Cf Prospects p.265: "Thus men may argue, and darken counsel by words, but in truth 'tis all sophistry on both sides."

2 Treatise, II, iii, 2. Philosophical Works (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1874), ed. Green and Grose, II, 192.

blameable . . . But the person is not answerable for them; and as they proceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant, and leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is impossible he can, upon their account, become the object of punishment or vengeance" (Enquiry, p.98). If, in other words, we conceive of actions as having no cause, that is, as not being determined, they must be seen as random and exempt from responsibility. We do not blame people, Hume points out, for actions performed ignorantly or casually, whatever consequences they might have (Enquiry, p.98).

A logical consequence of belief in necessity, he acknowledges, is that the "continued chain of necessary causes" must be traced back to God, "the ultimate Author of all our volitions" (Enquiry, p.99). We must therefore either regard no human action as criminal, since all our actions derive from a perfect God, or we must accept the Deity as "the ultimate author of guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures" (Enquiry, p.101). Hume briskly dismisses the notion of apparent evil being part of a benevolent system, and no doubt with the intention of antagonising the clergy he confesses his inability to solve the problem of God's being the author of sin: "These are mysteries, which mere natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle," and philosophy should be "sensible of her temerity, when she pries into these sublime mysteries; and leaving a scene so full of obscurities and perplexities, return, with suitable modesty, to her true and proper province, the examination of common life" (Enquiry, p.103).

Kames, whose Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion were designed as an answer to scepticism, albeit on a

deistical rather than on an orthodox Christian basis, ignored Hume's criticism of final causes,[1] and in his essay "Of Liberty and Necessity" argued for the operation of cause and effect in the moral as well as the natural world. Moral laws, he attempted to prove, are founded in human nature and are unalterable. He, too, regards the problem of evil as a mystery, but affirms the goodness of providence:

> As to an objection of making God the author of sin, which may seem to arise from our system, it is rather popular than philosophical. Sin, or moral turpitude, lyes in the evil intention of he who commits it: it consists in some wrong or depraved affection supposed to be in the sinner. Now the intention of the Disty is unerringly good. The end proposed by him is order and general happiness: and there is the greatest reason to believe, that all events are so directed by him, as to work towards this end. In the

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[1] Hume argues that "being once convinced we know nothing farther of causation of any kind than merely the constant conjunction of objects, and the consequent inference of the mind from one to another, and finding that these two circumstances are universally allowed to have place in voluntary actions; we may be more easily led to own the same necessity common to all causes. And though this reasoning may contradict the systems of many philosophers, in ascribing necessity to the determinations of the will, we shall find, upon reflection, that they dissent from it in words only, not in their real sentiment." That the mind "can perceive, in the operations of matter, some farther connexion between the cause and effect; and connexion that has not place in voluntary actions of intelligent beings" must be proved by those philosophers who deny free will (Enquiry, pp.92-93).

> present system of things, some moral disorders are indeed included. No doubt, it is a considerable difficulty, how evil comes to be in the world, if God is perfectly good. But this difficulty is not peculiar to our doctrine; but recurs upon us at last with equal force, whatever hypothesis we embrace. For moral evils cannot exist, without being, at least, permitted by the Deity. And, with regard to a first cause, Permitting is the same thing with Causing; since, against his will nothing can possibly happen. All the schemes that have been contrived for answering this objection, are but the tortoise introduced to support the elephant. They put the difficulty a step further off, but never remove it (Essays [1751] p.182, n.).

His ingenious argument for the "deceitful...feeling of liberty"[1] provides an explanation for our common belief that we are free agents, and is designed to allow man "to attain the proper improvement of his nature, in virtue and happiness" (204). Without it, we "could feel no inward self-approbation on doing well, no remorse on doing ill; because both the good and ill were necessary and unavoidable. There would be no more place for applause or blame among mankind" (205). Having stumbled upon this subtle design of providence, Kames

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[1] The views expressed in this essay were modified in subsequent editions because of the violent opposition of the High-flyers. See Ian Ross, Ch. 8.

then has to explain why, if his theory of the deceitful free-will is correct, he has been allowed to perceive the deception. The discovery, he tells us, can do no harm, as we shall inevitably continue to act with a sense of liberty, and indeed, it is a powerful argument for the existence of the Deity, whose wisdom and goodness is set "in the most striking light. Nothing carries in it more express characters of design; nothing can be conceived more opposite to chance, than a plan so artfully contrived, for adjusting our impressions and feelings to the purposes of life" (216).

Wallace, while acknowledging the essay as "most ingenious" (Prospects, p.227 n.), remains unconvinced, and regards the doctrine of moral necessity as inevitably making God accountable "for all the evils which affect the human race" (227). Belief in liberty, he suggests, "is most consonant to our internal feelings, most consonant to the common sense, and common notions of mankind; and most agreeable to the apprehensions of those who first established laws, government, and religion among men" (221). Quoting from the second edition of Kames's essay (Prospects, pp.224-27), he confesses that the "most able patrons of the liberty of rational beings, are far from denying that these arguments are specious" (228); indeed, they allow that the question is mysterious and perplexing. Maintaining the validity of an inner consciousness "of deserved esteem, or blame" (234), however, the proponents of liberty [evidently blind to Hume's argument], argue the impossibility of apportioning blame on the hypothesis that the mind is determined.

In an extended dialogue between a judge and the accused, Wallace illustrates the argument that liberty is the only foundation

of guilt, and it is highly likely that he laboured this point in an attempt to refute what Hume had said in opposition to this view, although Wallace affects an attitude of impartiality throughout his presentation of the debate. Believers in liberty see not only justice, but religion threatened by a scheme of necessity: On what grounds can we praise or pray to God if his goodness is not voluntary and he is not at liberty to respond to our prayers? (254).

Kames, says Wallace, quoting another passage from "Of Liberty and Necessity," is not blind to the fact that the doctrine of necessity "appears unfriendly to the establishment of government and religion" and causes anxieties, particularly with regard to a future state (Prospects, p.260). But by suggesting that we have been kept in ignorance of the fact that we are determined, Kames "candidly confesses, that his favourite scheme of necessity is contrary to the natural and simple feelings and sentiments of mankind; and that it was absolutely necessary for them to have been endued with the feelings of liberty and contingency. In this case," Wallace argues,

> it had been better for him to have abandoned what he calls philosophic truth, and to have confessed, that these feelings were not delusive, but real, since they are so strong, that however much the philosopher may be convinced of the settled necessary train of causes and effects, which leaves nothing, properly speaking, in his power; yet the moment he comes out into the world, he acts as a free agent. If this is the case,

> this is another proof...that there can be no demonstration of the scheme of necessity; for if any one saw a demonstration that he acted in consequence of an incontroulable necessity, and was not free, he could neither believe that he was a free agent, nor act as such. For no man can believe against a demonstration. What therefore he calls a demonstration, cannot be real, but delusive (262-63).

Persisting in his criticism, Wallace maintains that Kames's demonstration amounts to nothing but that we "incline to what we incline, and as we incline, and we do not incline to what we do not incline; nay, we cannot incline at any time, to what at the same time we cannot incline" (263). Hastily donning his near abandoned mask of impartiality, he demonstrates that a play of words is not confined only to the defenders of necessity, and concludes: "Thus men may argue, and darken counsel by words, but in truth 'tis all sophistry on both sides, and we do not sufficiently know how spirits are determined, or determine themselves, and what they really are" (265). He closes his Prospect, nevertheless, with a summary of the arguments of the patrons of liberty.

In "Prospect I." Wallace presents his "Vindication of Providence, on the supposition of the Freedom of rational Beings." The main advantage in a belief in this system, according to its patrons, is that man and not God, is accountable for evil. Only the question of the imperfections in nature remains, and this is equally a problem for the opponents of liberty. Believers in free will argue

that God is clearly the author of nature, that his works are great, beautiful and useful, and demonstrate his wisdom and power. While ample provision has been made for the pleasure and happiness of man and the animals, they do not deny that good and evil are mixed; excessive heat and cold, storms, earthquakes and similar elements of nature outwith man's control can be harmful and destructive. But the earth, they point out, is designed for men in a state of vice and depravity:

> we have no reason to complain that the frame of this earth, which is designed to be a habitation for such creatures, is not wholly adapted to a state of pure innocence. As it is proper there should be a distinction made between virtue and vice; so a corrupted or depraved, must not be on an equal footing with an innocent world (278).

God has therefore "adjusted the frame of nature" so that men's vices can be punished and their follies chastised. To this extent, then, evils do, and should, "arise from the order of nature itself." Corruption and depravity does not merit a habitation fit for wisdom and innocence. "Thus the objections of sceptical philosophers," says Wallace, "may in general be repelled" (280).

The evils, however, are nothing compared with God's beneficence. Nor have we the knowledge and understanding to be sure whether or not adjustments in nature would in fact be for the greater good. The errors of Thomas Burnet are an example of this, for his vision of the original perfect earth in his Sacred History is, in the light of further knowledge, "nothing but an agreeable romance," as is made

"abundantly evident by Dr. Keil" (285).

In a world where man is endowed with liberty, there must be general laws which are rarely broken by miraculous intervention. This point had exercised Wallace in his "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles," where we have confirmation that he himself came down on the side of liberty: "The Prospect of a Divine aid is comfortable and prayer is proper even for a Philosopher: Yet in truth it is hard to say whether God assists us or not whether he hath not laid down general laws from whence he never will Depart or interposes on particular occasions."[1] Anticipating his argument in the Prospects, he adds:

> I do not think it unworthy of him to interpose but if he should not seing [sic] the worst & having provided against the worst in another world whether for men or the Brutes, this cannot be any objection against his wisdom or goodness: God who sees so grand a prospect to come may well Despise as inconsiderable these calamities which we account very great, he may not think it worth while to provide a remedy for them since they will so soon be over & may introduce great benefits.

Without a framework of general laws, rational creatures could not know how to act, far less be able to act with wisdom. It is when man acts unreasonably that evil is produced, since proper use is not being made

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[1] On Epistle 31.

of these general laws. Furthermore, our comparatively inconsiderable ills could well be prevented by industry, prudence and virtue, in a world where all men reasoned properly and were "perfectly wise, innocent, and good," upholding the virtues of friendship, justice and benevolence (289).

There is, of course, the problem of disease and death, "which seizes us at last according to an immutable law." This, Wallace says, is "not merely an effect of the vices of men in any particular age or country, but arises necessarily from the present constitution of nature." It is a mystery whose solution "to the entire satisfaction of the inquisitive and sceptical mind, requires perhaps a deeper insight into nature, than men are capable of in their present state" (292). A number of factors, however, reassure us: firstly, "Prospect VII" has already demonstrated that we experience more pleasure than pain in this life, in spite of calamities produced by vice, which surely does not indicate a malicious or uncaring Deity. Secondly, death is necessary in a limited earth, and indeed, provides room for rapid succession of animal life. Since death "is not an arbitrary, but an unavoidable constitution in nature,"

> it is reasonable for us to leave the period, the manner, the preparations, and the whole contrivance by which animals are cut off, to the superior wisdom of providence. It may justly be deemed arrogance in such imperfect creatures, to imagine they could have contrived the process with greater advantage (295).

We are not concerned with the mode of death in a perfect world, but

in a world where liberty has been abused, and the easy translation to the heavens that we might have wished, is not necessarily suitable to the present constitution of things. Death in itself, however, is "highly suitable to the other great determinations in nature, of a limited fertility, and limited extent of the earth, and of a regular propagation of mankind" (297).

Man's chief unhappiness, then, derives from his own misuse of liberty. A belief that he has liberty solves the problem of the origin of evil, and is more easily conceived than the metaphysical mysteries surrounding a belief in necessity. Under a scheme of necessity it is believed that fixed laws govern the universe and the choice and the will of rational beings are determined; God too is subjected to rational necessity, though it is agreed that "he continually does what is best, according to his eternal and perfect views of wisdom and order" in spite of his having no liberty in acting (310). Upholders of the doctrines of predestination and prescience, however much they ascribe to a belief in free will, also seem to support a necessitarian viewpoint, the chief difficulty of which is to account for the presence of evil.

Wallace's main argument in his "Vindication of Providence, on the Scheme of Necessity" is the one that Hume rejected: we have already seen that there is more good than evil in the world; if God were malicious he would not have produced a greater quantity of good for the sake of obtaining a smaller quantity of evil. A being with perfect understanding must see the excellence of universal order and goodness, and "if he cannot be hindered or restrained from doing what he pleases, he must naturally be inclined to produce

nothing but what is agreeable to his conceptions of order and goodness":

> If we suppose an eternal, independant, and infinitely perfect being, absolutely to dispose of all events, without making any allowances for the liberty of his creatures; so that nothing happens but what he may be said to will, and that his creatures are nothing but what he has made them; we cannot suppose that the evils which have been complained of, could have happened through ignorance or error in the great Creator (315).

These supposed evils, therefore, exist for the sake of good and "actually contribute to the greater perfection of the universal system of beings" (316).

Evil provides a contrast to good, and nature itself "delights in variety" which is imitated by men in works of art. Surprisingly, Wallace employs "psychological" arguments here in a much more positive way than in his treatment of "variety" in the "Treatise on Taste." Let us "carry our views," he suggests, "from sensible objects, and the art employed about them, to that which chiefly relates to the mind, and the passions and characters of mankind." Vice and folly are necessary in poetic composition, he believes, for maximum entertainment and instruction, and heroes are magnified by contrast with monsters and tyrants (321). In tragedy that ends happily, distresses make eventual happiness the more intense. Pleasure and pain, "though contrary to one another, are wonderfully connected in nature. Though we cannot enjoy them together, and the presence of

the one supposes the absence of the other; yet, the higher degrees of either of them, become preparatives for the other" (325).

Art and industry, he stresses, must be employed to put the "abundant materials of happiness" provided by nature to proper use, and seeming evils are often advantages in disguise. One man's loss is frequently another's gain. "Without distress," he asks, "whence could we have had the idea of pity and compassion?" (327). The "highest virtues and joys of human life suppose evil, and without this bitter ingredient, could never have made their appearance; so necessary is it for the perfection of mankind to have tasted evil, or at least to have had the view and knowledge of evil, both moral and natural" (328). This knowledge seems necessary in our present condition, for full knowledge of good, and so it is "natural to conceive that an idea of evil may have a place among the eternal ideas of the Allwise Creator....By means of those disorders which arise from this evil, the most perfect order may at last be established" (329).

Wallace summarizes the defence of the hypothesis of a scheme of necessity thus:

> Since evil. . . actually exists in the world, it has been found suitable to the highest wisdom and goodness to permit it; this will not be denied by the most zealous asserters of liberty. We don't go much farther. . . if for the same reasons for which others assert that it was permitted, we allow that it might have been fore-ordained, and that nature was constituted in

> such a manner as would infallibly produce it (330).

The world must be the judge, he says, of which system is the best, but the advantages of evil proposed by believers in necessity to vindicate providence will be agreed on also by adherents to the principle of liberty: "If the advantage flowing from any evil, was a good reason for predestinating it, it must be a good reason for the bare permission" (331). Characteristically seeking the best of both worlds, Wallace believes that "by joining both systems together, in so far as it is possible; by allowing liberty in one sense, and necessity in another, we shall perhaps be best able to vindicate eternal providence, and justify God to man" (331).

If we leave philosophers and divines to pursue their "intricate debates" and survey the problem from the point of view of the "pious and well disposed man," the fact of man's guilt, of the much greater proportion of pleasure than pain in the world, and the amount of good that comes out of evil, is enough to support the goodness of providence:

> Thus, from the magnificence, wisdom, and goodness which are conspicuous in nature, we infer the existence of an infinitely wise, good, and powerful Creator and Governour. Again, from the idea of such a perfect being, we conclude, "a priori," that all things must have been originally formed, and must always be governed in the best and wisest manner. And, last of all, when we survey and examine the things themselves which have been

> raised up, and consider their necessary connections and relations, we can find a just and reasonable solution of those objections which have been proposed against the workmanship of the Great Creator (332).

If we had entertained the possibility that Wallace was endeavouring to provide an answer to Hume's arguments in An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, particularly those in section XI, "Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State," our suspicions would be strengthened by the discovery that Wallace's eleventh Prospect deals with the "Proof of a future State of Mankind after Death, on the Principles of Reason and Philosophy." Already, Wallace has attempted a reply to the charge that:

> You find certain phenomena in nature. You seek a cause or author. You imagine that you have found him. You afterwards become so enamoured of this offspring of your brain, that you imagine it impossible, but he must produce something greater and more perfect than the present scene of things, which is so full of ill and disorder. You forget, that this superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary, or, at least, without any foundation in reason (Enquiry, p.137-38).

Wallace chooses to ignore the argument that we "can never be allowed to mount up from the universe, the effect, to Jupiter, the cause: and then descend downwards to infer any new effect from that cause

....The knowledge of the cause being derived solely from the effect, they must be exactly adjusted to each other; and the one can never refer to anything farther, or be the foundation of any new inference and conclusion" (137), and he has based his case largely on his attempted proof that the evils "which give occasion to the objections of sceptics" (Prospects, p.281) are so slight that a benevolent Deity can be inferred. Hume would certainly insist that he had "aided the ascent of reason by the wings of imagination" (Enquiry, p.138), and would continue to regard the efforts to account for evil and to justify the benevolence of providence as fruitless in the face of "that evil and disorder, with which the world so much abounds" (138).

Whether Wallace was unaware of the force of Hume's reasoning, or whether he believed it self-evidently false and therefore unworthy of reply, his arguments can hardly have diverted Hume from the statement that

> The Deity is known to us only by his productions, and is a single being in the universe, not comprehended under any species or genus, from whose experienced attributes or qualities, we can, by analogy, infer any attribute or quality in him. As the universe shews wisdom and goodness, we infer wisdom and goodness. As it shews a particular degree of these perfections, we infer a particular degree of them, precisely adapted to the effect which we examine. But farther attributes, or farther degrees of the same

> attributes, we can never be authorised to infer or suppose, by any rules of just reasoning (144-45).

It seems highly probable that Wallace had an additional work of Hume's in mind when he wrote the Prospects, one that he would have read in manuscript, and which was so unacceptable to the public palate that Hugh Blair begged Hume: "For God's sake let that be a posthumous work, if ever it shall see the light."[1] Even if he had not read the unpublished Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (which appeared in print after Hume's death, in 1779), Wallace would undoubtedly have discussed them among the circle that came to the defence of Hume and Kames during the attack of the High-flyers in 1753: such men as Blair himself, William Robertson, George Wishart, and possibly also Wallace's colleague John Jardine, who had inspired a flood of public protest by his reviews of some secession publications for the Edinburgh Review.[2] Kames, Adam Ferguson, Dalrymple, Alexander Wedderburn and Adam Smith were no doubt also among those who exchanged opinions on the Dialogues over a glass of wine.[3]

The Prospects might certainly be interpreted as providing an antidote to the kind of outlook that Hume represented in the character of Demea, who belonged "to the class of orthodox theologians

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1 Quoted by R.H. Schmitz in Hugh Blair (New York: King's Crown Press, 1948) p.34.

2 W. J. Couper, The Edinburgh Periodical Press (Stirling: Eneas Mackay, 1908) II, 92-93.

3 See Schmitz, Hugh Blair, pp.29-35.

who distrust or discredit all attempts to rationalise the existence of God."[1] More emphatically, Wallace may be seen to be defending Christianity against Philo's assertion that:

> there is no view of human life, or of the condition of mankind, from which, without the greatest violence, we can infer the moral attributes, or learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and infinite wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone (202).

Wallace attempts a reply to the four circumstances Philo cites as preventing the inference of a benign Deity.[2] To Philo's first contention, that pain is unnecessary (Dialogues, pp.205-206), Wallace replies that pain is educative, is a means of punishment, is brought upon ourselves by misuse of liberty, and is to some extent a necessary concomitant of our present circumstances. The general laws, to which Philo objects in his second circumstance (206), are necessary, again because of man's freedom, and permit rational action. Philo's third point, "the great frugality with which all powers and faculties are distributed to every particular being" (207) is challenged in Wallace's fifth Prospect, in which he glorifies

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1 David Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, intro. Bruce M'Ewen (Edinburgh & London: Blackwood, 1907) xxxv. (Norman Kemp Smith's edition [2nd ed., New York: Social Science Publishers, 1948] will be used for references and quotations).

2 Wallace appears to miss Philo's point that if God's goodness could be established by a priori argument, the existence of these evils "however untoward, would not be sufficient to subvert that principle; but might easily, in some unknown manner, be reconcilable to it" (211).

man's potential; but too great a perfection in Man, Wallace would argue, would result in abundant fertility and the need for unnatural control of population. Many "will be apt to complain," he writes in "Prospect IX," anticipating Philo's final circumstance,

> that too much of the surface of our globe is covered with water: that the regions under the equator are too much heated: that animals about the pole, are exposed to too much cold: that the more temperate climates, are often rendered uncomfortable by thunders, lightnings, and furious winds; by noxious and pestilential fogs and vapours; by excessive rains and colds; at some seasons by scorching droughts and heats; at others, by earthquakes, eruptions of subterraneous fires and waters, and by inundations of the seas and rivers, which cannot be prevented by the skill or power of men (276-77; see Dialogues, p.210).

These, however, do only slight damage, which might to a large extent be prevented, Wallace argues (289-290), and he could well have ascribed to Philo the arrogance of the assumption that we have a better knowledge than the Deity of how the earth should function, and of our aspiration to live in a world more suited to perfect creatures. The whole tone of the Prospects combats Philo's reaction on inspecting "a little more narrowly these living existences, the only beings worth regarding":

> How hostile and destructive to each other!

> How insufficient all of them for their own happiness! How contemptible or odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children (211).

Hume had argued in the Enquiry, section XI, that it is impossible to infer from the mixture of good and evil in the world that there is a benevolent Deity, and that there are no rational grounds for assuming the existence of a future life. This last point he takes further in the posthumously published essay "Of the Immortality of the Soul," with which Wallace would no doubt have been familiar, either through discussion, or through having seen the manuscript itself. "By the mere light of reason" Hume begins, "it seems difficult to prove the Immortality of the Soul." The gospel alone "has brought life and immortality to light."[1]

Both Hume and Kames dealt with the subject of natural religion: Kames's use of the word "natural" rather than "revealed" in the title of his Essays, emphasises, Ian Ross believes, his intention "to take his stand on Deism rather than Christian orthodoxy."[2] It is surely significant that Wallace, who had opposed, in his Synod Sermon, the Deist contention that revelation is superfluous, should now set out to illustrate in the Prospects "the principles of morality and natural

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1 Essays, ed. Green and Grose, II, 399.

2 Ian Ross, p.98.

religion," (iii), the very wording of Kames's title, and to defend immortality "on the Principles of Reason and Philosophy." What he is attempting here is a proof of a future life which will not only conform with moderate orthodoxy, but will be acceptable to deist philosophy.[1]

Kames had seen the problem of the existence of evil as an insoluble difficulty (see p. 281 above). Wallace, on the contrary, argues that vice and misery are justified if there is a future life: "Mankind are often made wiser by their errors; they are made better by their misfortunes; their views are enlarged; their conceptions of good and evil are rendered more distinct" (367). Calamities, seen in relation to this life only, may be likened to parental punishment, but seen in relation to a future state, they are an example of "the divine wisdom, in bringing good out of evil."

In this eleventh Prospect, Wallace firmly states his allegiance to belief in liberty (381). If God has endowed Man with liberty, he argues, but has created no future state in which to reward virtue and punish vice, then we are unjustly abandoned (373-74): liberty necessarily supposes a life after death, "or a continual miraculous interposition to prevent the abuses of it at present" (380). The fact that Man's natural desire for happiness cannot be fully satisfied in this life also suggests a future state (357), as does the fact that on earth "the divine wisdom shines much more gloriously

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[1] That Wallace had not abandoned his earlier belief in revelation and adopted a deistic outlook himself is confirmed by the fact that he was compiling "Preparatory pieces in order to a Defence of Religion naturall & Revealed" as late as 1764 (title-page, La II 62025).

in the natural, than in the moral world": Unless we believe that the Deity has "some more extensive scheme in view" and that "the affairs of men must run on in a series, and extend themselves to a future life" (366), we may justly accuse providence of having erred. Using the analogy of Man's benevolence, Wallace demands:

> Could a heart overflowing with benevolence, rest contented on beholding nothing greater than the glory of the natural world! Such a benevolent being might have very good reasons to suffer the present state of things to continue; but would a man, even of ordinary goodness, with all this power and skill, project nothing further or greater for mankind! (365).

Hume used the analogy of Man's sense of justice to oppose the idea of eternal damnation, in his essay "Of the Immortality of the Soul," both on the grounds of mercy, and that Man's temporary misdemeanours can hardly merit eternal punishment (Essays II, 402-03). Wallace, no doubt anxious to avoid controversy, prudently does not air the view he expresses in his "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles":

> Some represent the Doctrine of eternal torments so necessary and true that none but vitious men will Disbelieve or doubt of it: However I think it may be allowed that it does not show a bad Disposition to wish it may not be found true (On Epistle 29; Sept. 1756).

Death, as Wallace has already shown, is necessary for mankind on

a limited earth. "No limits," however, "can be set to space," he argues, doubtless bearing in mind Hume's problem of how "to dispose of the infinite number of posthumous existences" and his suggestion that "a new universe must, every generation, be created beyond the bounds of the present universe" (II, 404-05).

Man is endowed with reason, understanding and imagination, says Wallace. He is capable of progress toward perfection; he has ideas of the beauty and grandeur of the universe, and notions of God, religion and morality. He conceives of eternal existence and a future state and entertains hopes and desires of a future life: "To what purpose are such enlarged capacities, and ardent desires, if they are never to be interested in any distant and future scenes, and if they, and all their thoughts, are so soon to perish for ever?" (348-49).

Hume had argued that Man has no innate aspiration towards life after death: "With how weak a concern, from the original, inherent structure of the mind and passions, does he ever look further?" (II, 400). Such hopes as do exist "would quickly vanish, were they not artificially fostered by precept and education," from dubious motives. (II, 401). Wallace protests against the sceptical view "that neither the desire of knowledge, nor the sense of morality, nor a regard for virtue, nor a propensity to religion, nor the love of honour and fame, any more than the desire of immortality, are the work of nature, but of the preceptor and the priest" (Prospects, p.354) and he argues that the desire for immortality, though it is less demanding than such instincts as hunger, is nevertheless just as natural (351). The other desires, he insists, that are latent,

such as sexual passion, a thirst for knowledge, a sense of morality and of religion, are natural to mankind and not taught (353). Speculations as to what a man might suppose concerning the future if he were solitary are invalid, as Man is designed for society, and it would not undermine the supposition of an eternal existence if it were found that isolated man could not, by means of his reason alone, arrive at a conception of life after death. From our social affections we conclude that nature intended us for society, though these affections take some years to develop (352-53). A weakness perceived in the desire for immortality is no different from the weakness to be observed in certain other natural propensities and which is dependent on whether or not we make proper use of the liberty with which we are endowed (355). These arguments, along with the fact that "the desire of immortality is on the same footing with the propensities to virtue and religion, which are generally allowed to be natural to mankind" (355), Wallace presents in answer to the "objections of the sceptics."

He appears to acknowledge Hume's difficulty in reading "providence in disorder" and insists that he himself proves "a providence from what we see of order" in a world where there is more pleasure than pain, and where God "is greatly engaged on the side of virtue" (369). To deny liberty, he concludes, "is contrary to the inward sense and experience of mankind." The suggestion that God has given us liberty, but constantly intervenes, is also "contrary to experience, and is inconsistent with the multiplied abuses of liberty that are visible in the world." Our ideas of justice and goodness prevent us from envisaging a state of liberty without

subsequent retribution, but one of these three assumptions must be made, he maintains, if we deny the existence of a future state (381).

We need, then, have no fears for the future:

> Sceptics, indeed, may endeavour to perplex us, and raise doubts in this, as well as most other questions. It is not possible (may they say) for weak mortals to enter into the councils of him whose ways are unsearchable. But as it is natural for us to conceive of the designs of heaven, as having some remote analogy with what we would propose to ourselves in similar cases, how can it be thought suitable to the beneficent author of nature, to annihilate all such pious and virtuous souls as he hath rescued from death, unless there was no longer any place for them among his works. But this can never be supposed (382-83).

The intellectual ineffectiveness of Wallace's argument beside Hume's, in our eyes, must be seen against the common assumptions of the eighteenth century. Boswell, it will be remembered, drew from Hume on his death-bed very much the same arguments against immortality as are found in Hume's essay. Boswell reacted with

> a degree of horrour, mixed with a sort of wild, strange, hurrying recollection of My excellent Mother's pious instructions, of Dr. Johnson's noble lessons, and of my religious sentiments

> and affections during the course of my life. I was like a man in sudden danger eagerly seeking his defensive arms; and I could not but be assailed by momentary doubts while I had actually before me a man of such strong abilities and extensive inquiry dying in the persuasion of being annihilated. But I maintained my Faith.[1]

Wallace's contribution was an addition to the various defences of the existence of a future life on the grounds of reason: Butler, of course, had argued by analogy, and Berkeley, in his Guardian essay had anticipated Wallace's arguments from design and aspiration.[2] It is probable, however, that Wallace formed his views not so much as a result of his reading of the theologians, as from the exchange of ideas during his early years as a divinity student and a member of the Rankenian Club. His brother-in-law, George Turnbull, who became a regent in Philosophy at Marischal College, Aberdeen, where he taught Thomas Reid,[3] attended Edinburgh University at the same time as Wallace, and is judged to have been one of the strongest intellects amongst the Rankenians at that time.[4]

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1 Private Papers from Malahide Castle, XII (1931), 230.

2 The Works of George Berkeley, ed. Luce and Jessop, VII, 181-84; Essays in the Guardian: "The Future State" (No. 27, Sat. 11 April 1713).

3 See Scott, Fasti, I, 425; Studies in the History and Development of the University of Aberdeen, ed. P. J. Anderson (Aberdeen: Aberdeen Univ. Press, 1906), p.88.

4 Ian Ross, p.70.

Ian Ross regards it as probable that his Principles of Moral Philosophy (London: John Noon, 1740) contained ideas current in the Rankenian Club during his student days.

A brief glance at Turnbull's work reveals similarities with Wallace, though of course his is a much more systematic treatise: Turnbull argues, for example, that death is necessary because of the limited capacity of the earth (I, 242), and that we have every reason to believe in the fullness of nature, which supposes fullness of progress, which in turn necessarily requires Man's immortality: "For otherwise a certain, possible progress would not take place; and so nature would not be a perfectly full, and coherent progress, which we have so good reason from the analogy of nature to think it is intended to be" (I, 247). Given this life only, the scheme of providence would very imperfect (II, 209). "To imagine that we are destroyed at death, is to think worse of the Author of nature than we can of any rational creature" (I, 253), he points out, and the hope of a future state is natural, and is therefore implanted in us by God (I, 271). Both he and Wallace argue that as provision is made for the gratification of all natural appetites (Turnbull I, 271, Prospects, p.350), so God-given aspiration towards immortality implies immortality itself. Turnbull, too, adheres to the scheme of liberty, and insists that a mixture of good and evil must exist to allow moral choice (I, 349), though he presents the argument that "if the Author of the system of which we are a part, be perfectly good, that system must be perfectly good" (I, 403) and it is only our partial view of it that makes it appear imperfect (an attempt not unlike Wallace's to make best use of both liberty and necessity "'to vindicate the ways of God to man'" (Turnbull I, 397). Turnbull

too, sees the universe as governed by general laws, though he allows "special miraculous interpositions of providence on certain occasions" (II, 173), and unlike Wallace, he uses revelation as well as reason to support his thesis.

Wallace, however, deliberately chose to present a case based on natural religion, and his opposition to Kames's belief in necessity may be seen in the light of a friendly rivalry that began in the Rankenian Club days, when Kames and a couple of cronies attended, "to puzzle and make mischief" among the divinity students, and "succeeded but too well with many, making them Deists."[1] Wallace's final prospect, "Advices to certain Freethinkers," however, is surely directed rather at Hume's atheism than at Kames's deism. His description of the doctrines held by sober, as opposed to wild free-thinkers, is most revealing, as it outlines no more than his manuscript works reveal Wallace himself to believe:

> The chief doctrines of the sober Freethinkers, are such as follow; they maintain that none are obliged to embrace any doctrine whatsoever, unless it be accompanied with sufficient evidence; that it is lawful for every man to examine whether the evidence is sufficient; that men ought to divest themselves of all prejudices, and never suffer the authority of any one man, or any body of men, to have an influence upon them in opposition to reason; that it cannot be dangerous to believe

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1 Private Papers from Malahide Castle, XV (1932), 284.

> any doctrine whatsoever, upon an evidence which appears to be sufficient after proper examination; that it should be safe for every member of society to profess his belief of any doctrine whatsoever, which does not destroy the sacredness of religion, give a sanction to vice and immorality, or tend naturally to disturb the peace of mankind; that all religious rites and opinions, which are not of this pernicious kind, should be tolerated; and finally, that every member of society against whom nothing of this impious or immoral nature can be objected, should be trusted and employed, both by private persons, and by the state, in proportion to his abilities and integrity, without enquiring more particularly into his religious principles and practice (389-90).

The "wildest of our Freethinkers," however, "carry their scepticism to the most extravagant length, and discard both revealed and natural religion" (391), representing "every thing in the order of nature in general, and in human nature in particular, in a most contemptible light" (392). Wallace therefore addresses himself in this Prospect to those who "deny, or speak doubtfully of the being or of the perfections of God, and would destroy the force of moral obligation" (393). The arguments for religion and morality, he claims, are conclusive, and need not be repeated. He will therefore examine the importance, rather than the truth of the doctrines of these free-thinkers: "Whatever their principles are," says Wallace, surely

thinking of Hume,[1] "many of them are very good-natured men", and may find "the following proposals not unworthy of their attention" (394).

Firstly, he suggests, it is pernicious to deny virtue, and against the "common, simple, and natural opinions of mankind" (398). If free-thinkers will not renounce their views, "might they not be persuaded to conceal them?" (395). He proposes, secondly, that they should cease their attack on the doctrine of life after death, which comforts the virtuous and effectively checks vice. Finally, he argues, life is enhanced by a belief in the perfection of the Divinity, and there is no good purpose in denying the existence or the goodness of God, especially when there are "remarkable tokens of wisdom and goodness...every there in the course of nature" (401). "The most able sceptics," he asserts, "cannot demonstrate that there is no God, no wise providence, no righteous, good, and merciful government, nor any future life" (402). It is their misfortune that they entertain such sceptical doctrines, but need they inflict them upon others? Virtue can of course be seen as its own reward, but it is greatly supported by belief in a perfectly wise and good Deity and a system of rewards and punishments after death. Referring to the Academics and Stoics, and Shaftesbury's emulation of them, Wallace ends with the regret

> that those wholsome and sublime doctrines, with

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[1] Hume's good nature is eulogised by Adam Smith in his Letter to William Strahan (Essays, ed. Green and Grose, I, 9-14), where he praises Hume's "constant pleasantry" which was "the genuine effusion of good-nature and good-humour" (13).

> which some admirable authors are stored, should be mixed with such doubts and suspicions, as tend only to weaken the influence of reason, and strengthen the party of appetitie and passion; and that persons who meant so well to mankind, should have been so much mistaken about the method of doing them service (406).

As the ancient writers were in no way able to withdraw their opinions, we must assume that Wallace concluded on this note to give as little offence as possible to those who were alive to respond to his proposals. How seriously, we may ask, did he consider the condemnation of the "rash curiosity" of religious philosophers "in trying how far they can establish religion upon the principles of reason," thereby exciting, "instead of satisfying, the doubts, which naturally arise from a diligent and scrutinous enquiry" (Enquiry, p.135).

Chapter IV

Man of the Enlightenment

Although Wallace criticised the views of Hume and Kames, he nevertheless came to their defence on a political and personal level, and with characteristic breadth of mind, was able to combine intellectual opposition with unbiased friendship. On the first occasion on which he defended Hume, indeed, it is possible that the two men were not acquainted, and that Wallace was acting on a purely objective assessment of the situation. The circumstances surrounding Hume's unsuccessful candidature for the chair of Ethics and Pneumatical Philosophy at Edinburgh University in 1745 (popularly, and later officially known as the chair of Moral Philosophy) are well documented.[1] A brief account of events is to be found in an unsigned letter to the London Chronicle of 5-7 November 1776, from someone who had presumably attended the meeting of ministers and Town Council:

> Sir,
>
> In an Account of the Life and Writings of the late David Hume, Esq; inserted in your and several other newspapers, I observe one particular related in the following words. "In 1746 he stood candidate for the chair of moral philosophy in the university of Edinburgh, then vacant by the resignation of the present Sir John Pringle, appointed physician to the

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1 See the introduction to Hume's Letter from a Gentleman to his friend in Edinburgh, E.C. Mossner and John V. Price, eds. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1967), and Mossner's Life, ch. XII.

army. Every one was convinced of Mr. Hume's abilities, and his interest was warmly supported by the nobility and gentry; but the presbytery of Edinburgh, having a right to object to one out of three candidates named by the town-council, they put their negative upon honest David whose sentiments were too liberal for their narrow minds."

The story here told is not entirely destitute of foundation, but full of inaccuracies, and I persuade myself it will not be disagreeable either to its Author or to your Readers to be informed of its mistakes.

The lord provost, magistrates, and council of Edinburgh possess an exclusive right of choosing most of the professors of the university, but every election must be made with the advice (not of the presbytery, but only) of the ministers of that city; cum avisamento tamen ministrorum meorum, words which some people insist amount to a negative, but their legal import has never, that I know, been determined, or even become the subject of a judicial disquisition.[1] A vacancy made in 1745 (not 1746) in the professorship of moral philosophy by the resignation of Dr. Pringle, who had already attended the

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1 A remark corroborated by William Robertson in a letter to Sir Gilbert Eliot dated February 1762: "What the true import of avisamentum may be has never been legally tried, but it was by the authority of it that D. Hume was cut out of the Professorship of Morals..." (NLS EFP 9). The avisamentum was not seriously challenged until the appointment of John Leslie to the chair of mathematics in 1805 (Ian Clark, Thesis, p.318).

army several years in quality of physician, occasioned all the ministers of Edinburgh to be summoned, in terms of the charter of foundation,[1] to give their advice to the common-council about the pretensions of the different competitors who aspired to that chair. Among others proposed for the office was Mr. Hume: his interest I suspect was not warmly supported by either nobility or gentry, but depended chiefly on the influence of his friend Mr. Coutts, the late provost, a spirited man, by whom the corporation was then governed; and it is true that most of the clergy objected to the electing of honest David, grounding their objection on "A Treatise on Human Nature," published in 1739, which had been ascribed to him. All the body, however, did not concur in the measure. The late celebrated Dr. Wallace, faithful to those generous sentiments which he had early imbibed and uniformly professed, with an impartiality as well as dignity becoming them, declared to the councellors in strong terms, that he did not think himself entitled to give his opinion, on pretext too of a juvenile as well as anonymous performance, which had been little read, and which was less understood, against chusing that ingenious

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1 The Charter of Foundation was given by James VI in 1582. It "gave full liberty to the Town Council and their successors, 'with advice, however, of the ministers,' to choose persons most suitable for teaching the said branches; with power of inducting and removing them according as may be expedient" (Alexander Grant, The Story of the University of Edinburgh, I, 123).

> gentleman, more than any of the other candidates. The Doctor's liberal mind was elevated far above, and his philosophic indignation was greatly raised at the inquisitorial zeal discovered on this occasion. I am, &c.

Wallace's support did not go unacknowledged, and Hume wrote in a letter to Henry Home: "I think Mr Wallace's Conduct has been very noble & generous; & I am much oblig'd to him."[1]

While Wallace respected Hume's right to express his opinions in the Treatise, however, he was unable to let pass without protest Hume's "long digressive footnote on the character of clergymen" in "Of National Characters" (which appeared among the Essays Moral and Political in 1748), "an excoriating analysis purporting to show how their peculiar vices are caused by the very nature of their profession."[2]

In reply, Wallace penned "A Letter from a moderate Freethinker to David Hume Esquire Concerning the Profession of the Clergy In which it is shewed That their Vices whatever they are are owing to their Disposition and not to the bad influence of their Profession" (La II 97[1], partially quoted by Mossner, The Forgotten Hume,

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1 NHL p.15.

2 E.C. Mossner, The Forgotten Hume, p.104. This episode is dealt with on pp. 107-111, and in Mossner's Life, pp.260-62. Since reference will be made to Mossner for most aspects of Wallace and Hume's relationship, a few inaccuracies are noted in Appendix IX below.

pp.103-111).[1] Writing as a free-thinker rather than as a clergyman, he says that he has "sometimes wondered why during severall years which have passed since You published Your remarks...none of the Clergy so far as I remember have taken the trouble of Vindicating their Profession" (2). Mossner remarks on the "ironical opening concerning the detachment and candor of the freethinking brotherhood" which, in the light of Wallace's description of the doctrines of sober free-thinkers in the Prospects (309-90) which so resemble his own, is perhaps less ironic than Mossner believes. Certainly no irony invades his statement that: "A freethinker ought to be of no particular party but the party of good sense; he ought to aim att nothing but truth, peace & charity, a sincere Freethinker will have this chiefly in his view, he will not scruple to detect the Errors of a friend & will deal generously with a foe" (3).

There is little to add to Mossner's description of the manuscript, except perhaps to note that we are given some new insight into Wallace's view of the clergy: "Even in the most ignorant & superstitious countries," he writes,

> worldly splendour riches and authority attract the eyes of mankind more and raise a higher regard in the Vulgar for such as are possessed of them than things sacred or spiritual, Or if this is not the case att Rome it is certainly the case in Brittain where regards

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[1] In Mossner's transcription, p.109, substitute "firmest" for /establishing/. On p.110, substitute "unreasonable" for /insuperable/ and "history" for /life/. /Inoffensive/ in the following line does not seem to be correct, but is illegible.

> of this kind are so low that many of the Clergy with a great deal of knowledge good sense and probity have enough to do to save themselves from affronts & procure but a moderate degree of that Respect to which they seem to be Intituled from the Constitution of their Country (16).

Wallace soon returns, however, to tones of humour and expediency: "since it is impossible to get rid of them 'tis much better policy to make a proper use of them & to turn to as good account as possible instead of rendering them insignificant to mankind" (22).

The reasons for the essay's not appearing in print are unknown, though Mossner's surmise that the friendship which developed from at least as early as their meeting at the Philosophical Society in 1751 would have deterred Wallace from publication is plausible, particularly as the two men soon afterwards embarked on the population controversy. Much has been made of the friendly nature of this debate, but surviving correspondence, in addition to the fact that Wallace preserved proof sheets of his Dissertation as evidence of the trivial nature of Hume's amendments, hints at a degree of tension and perhaps a tendency in Hume to patronize Wallace, albeit in an inoffensive and benevolent manner. The fact that Hume did not carry out the promised alterations to "Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations" suggests this, as does Hume's protest that "You almost frighten me for my Argument; you collect so much Learning & Reasoning."[1] On an intellectual level Hume may well (with some justification) have

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[1] NHL p.31.

regarded Wallace as relatively insignificant, and his very brief reply to Wallace's lengthy letter to him and outline of his proposed "Advices to all true Patriots" in 1767 (La II 96[1])[1] certainly suggests this. For the sake of Hume's reputation as a critic we would do well to regard his statement that Wallace's "Treatise on Taste" was "a very good Book"[2] as a piece of sales-talk on George Wallace's behalf rather than as a considered critical opinion.

There was, nevertheless, an obvious personal respect between the two men, though perhaps no great degree of intimacy. In 1764 Wallace was thought well enough acquainted with Hume to be asked by the Leven family to recommend the late Earl's son to Hume in Paris (a request also made to Hugh Blair),[3] but the tone of his letter (in NLS, dated 3 April 1764) betrays a distance as well as a respect: "Dear Sir," he begins,

> It has given me a great deal of pleasure ever since I heard of your being arrived att Paris to find from our News papers and otherwayes how much you are esteemed and respected in France & in England, I do not doubt but as I allwayes had a high regard for you my self the more you are known you will be

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1 Hume's letter is published in HL, II, 173-74.

2 HL II, 289. The "Treatise" is so pedestrian that it has been relegated to Appendix X.

3 See his letter in NLS III, 52, and Hume's reply in HL I, 434-38. Blair knew Hume well enough to rent his house in James's Court, Edinburgh, while Hume was in Paris in 1763 (HL I, 420).

the more regarded and esteemed.[1]

But Hume's question thirteen years earlier: "Why cannot all the World entertain different Opinions about any subject, as amicably as we do?" (NHL p.30) and his concern in 1758 that Elibank should not hurt "the old Gentleman"[2] match the courtesy of Wallace's conclusion to a letter dated 26 September 1751 (La II 96[1a]):[3]

> I will only add that I am not affraid our Correspondence will give any offence, nor do I believe that any with whom I have any great Connexion have such narrow soules. But if they have it would be too great a sacrifice to refuse what is so agreeable, the Compliment of such an ingenious & learned Gentleman as Mr Hume & I hope I shall allwayes have the boldness to do justice to Gentlemen of your character.

It was in response to the charges of heresy against Hume and Kames[4] that Wallace had the opportunity to come to Hume's defence. He and his fellow moderates, in opposition to their evangelical

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1 A comparison of Hume's letters to Wallace with those to some of his other correspondents is sufficient to show that they were not on very intimate terms.

2 LE p.444 (Hume's plea to Elibank to ignore Wallace's criticism of him in the Characteristics).

3 Quoted in full by F. H. Heinemann in David Hume: The man and his science of man (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1940), pp.11-12 and Mossner, Life, p.265.

4 See Mossner, The Forgotten Hume, pp.116ff and Life, pp.343ff for Wallace's part in the defence. Details of the circumstances are to be found also in Life, ch. XXV, Ian Ross, Lord Kames and the Scotland of his Day, ch. VII., and H.W. Schmitz, Hugh Blair, pp.29-35.

brethren, stood for the right to express opinions, misguided or not, and Wallace, in a manuscript pamphlet intended for publication, argued against a formal enquiry into Hume's writings, on the grounds of expediency.[1] The charges raised by the Evangelical Party were based on books which had been published several years before: Hume's Philosophical Essays (1748) and Kames's Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion (1751), the two works that Wallace criticised in his Prospects.[2] Wallace was totally opposed to the kind of public, vindictive attack to which Hume and Kames were subjected, and suggested that an infidel might more probably "be sooner convinced of his errors by the private Conversation of such of the Clergy as chance to be of his acquaintance or by a treatise written cooly with soft words & strong arguments than by authoritative censures and Condemnations,"[3] a view which explains the apparent contradiction between the support he gave in the 1750s and his publication of 1761.

Far from voicing his own objections against the doctrine of necessity, Wallace pointed out to Kames "that the doctrine of Necessity had been maintained by the greatest and soundest divines

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1 La II 97[2], "The necessity or expediency of the churches inquiring into the writings of David Hume Esquire and calling the Author to answer before the Spiritual Courts Considered with some reflections on Christians being occasionally in Compan with scepticall Infidell writers. In which there are some animadversions on the account in the Scotch Magazine for June 1756 of the Debates in the Committee of Overtures of the Generall Assembly 1756 concerning these subjects.

2 In La II 97[2], p.16, Wallace acknowledges Hume's "Philosophicall Essayes concerning Human Understanding" as being "the most exceptionable of his writings."

3 La II 97[2], pp.17-19. Cf Mossner, Life, p.349.

of the Christian church; referring him particularly to St Augustine, Calvin, Turretine, Picet, &c."[1] and he joined forces with a number of moderates, led by Hugh Blair, in composing Observations upon a Pamphlet, intitled, An Analysis of the Moral and Religious Sentiments contained in the Writings of Sopho, and David Hume, Esqr &c. (Edinburgh: n.p., 1755), a defence against the attacks of the Rev. John Bonar of Cockpen.[2] Wallace's manuscript pamphlet is thoroughly discussed by Mossner and need not be examined here. The latter part, in which Wallace defends the right of Christians to be "occasionally in Company with sceptical1 Infidell Writers" invites speculation as to what Hume and Wallace derived from their friendship, but as the pamphlet was intended for publication, it embodies Wallace's characteristic caution and is written in very general terms.

Wallace's part in the controversy over Hume and Kames, including his writing of the Prospects, may be interpreted on three levels: firstly, he seems to be attempting in the Prospects to justify the moderate position against evangelical criticism, epitomised in Witherspoon's Maxims. Secondly, in both his writing and his actions, he goes to the extremes of moderatism to make Christianity intellectually respectable and, hopefully, preferable, to those with a deistical or sceptical viewpoint. Thirdly, his defence of Hume and Kames, and his subsequent attempted refutation of their arguments, may be seen as a move on Wallace's part to keep the Church abreast of

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1 Sir Henry Moncreiff Wellwood, Account of the life and Writings of John Erskine, D.D. (Edinburgh & London: Constable; Longman et al, 1818), pp.205-09.

2 See Ian Ross, pp.154-55, Diary of George Bidgath, p.16 n.3 and Mossner, Life, p.342.

the times and in pace with the "Enlightenment."

The formation of the Moderate Party, as Ian Clark describes it, took place in 1752, when William Robertson, Alexander Carlyle and their supporters secured the deposition of Gillespie, minister at Carnock, and triumphed in the Inverkeithing settlement (see ch. I above, pp.9, 11-12). This had the effect of making Patronage even more distinctly a party issue, and of presenting the evangelicals with a more confident and defined opposition. An ensuing pamphlet, A Just View of The Constitution of the Church of Scotland, and of The Proceedings of the last General Assembly in relation to the Deposition of Mr Gillespie (Edinburgh: n.p., 1753), written by Dr. John Hyndman,[1] upheld the patronage system and made slighting remarks directed at certain ministers whose support of the Presbytery of Dunfermline the author described as "one scene of iniquity" (32). It was this pamphlet, Witherspoon claimed, which "chiefly brought me to a resolution of publishing the Characteristics,"[2] and he devotes

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1 John Hyndman, D.D., was ordained minister at Colinton and was later translated to St. Cuthbert's and then to Lady Yester's, Edinburgh. He "belonged to the Moderate party in the Church, and was what is called Second to Dr Patrick Cumming, the leader of that side, previously to the time when Dr Robertson was recognised in that high capacity." He was unanimously elected Moderator in 1761. Paradoxically, it was he who drew up the libel against Alexander Carlyle for attending Douglas in 1757, though this did not interfere with his friendship with such men as William Robertson, who had given Carlyle their support. (Thomas Murray, Biographical Annals of The Parish of Colinton [Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas, 1863]).

2 A Serious Apology for the Ecclesiastical Characteristics. By the real Author of that Performance, in The Works of John Witherspoon, D.D. (Edinburgh: Ogle & Aikman et al, 1805) VI, 241. Witherspoon became Principal of what is now Princeton, New Jersey in 1768, after being minister at Beith and Paisley. When the War of Independence closed the College, he was elected to represent New Jersey at the Convention which formed the Republican Constitution, and in 1776 he represented New Jersey at the Congress of United America. He was the only cleric to sign the Declaration of Independence.

Maxims VIII, IX and X to deriding the Moderate attitude to patronage.

Wallace, though he in fact favoured Gillespie's deposition was, as we have seen, less enamoured of the patronage system than his colleagues, and in his official role as ecclesiastical adviser he took great care to consult the wishes of the people (see ch. II above, pp.94-97). He must, however, have felt more keenly the force of Maxim XII (quoted in full above, pp.277-78), as his pamphlet in defence of Hume and of the propriety of communicating with sceptics leaves one in little doubt that he was replying to criticism which he felt would jeopardise his own relationship with Hume. He was obviously immune to the accusation of having great charity "for persons that are loose and vicious in their practice; but none at all for those that have...strictness in their walk and conversation," since one of his main arguments was that if Hume were to be disciplined for his writings, how much more should the Assembly censure the "many criminalls in higher & lower life, vitious, immoral and abandoned in their lives, Drunkards, revellers, whoremongers, adulterers, contemnors of Christian Worship, despisers of Christian Piety, open supporters of impious, lewd and immoral Principles" (La II 97^2, p.20). Doubtless he felt that in publishing the Prospects, his position regarding "sceptical Infidell writers" would be clarified and would be justified further. Moreover, a work with such pious intent might illustrate Moderate sincerity while evading other issues raised by the evangelicals and expressed by Witherspoon in Maxims such as:

> All ecclesiastical persons, of whatever rank, whether

> principals of colleges, professors of divinity, ministers, or even probationers, that are suspected of heresy, are to be esteemed men of great genius, vast learning, and uncommon worth; and are, by all means, to be supported and protected.

"All moderate men," Witherspoon continues, "have a kind of fellow-feeling with heresy; and as soon as they hear of any one suspected, or in danger of being prosecuted for it, zealously and unanimously rise up in his defence" (5th ed. [Edinburgh, 1763], p.19). Recalling his MS. pamphlets relating to Simson and Glass, his intended Assembly speech on behalf of Mr. Glass and his early treatise "against imposing Creeds or Confessions of faith on ministers or private Christians..." (see ch. II above, pp.157-64), Wallace was no doubt also stung by the criticism of Maxim III:

> It is a necessary part of the character of a moderate man, never to speak of the Confession of Faith but with a sneer; to give sly hints, that he does not thoroughly believe it; and to make the word <u>orthodoxy</u> a term of contempt and reproach.

Nor would Witherspoon's satire in Maxim IV escape Wallace's notice:

> A good preacher must ...have the following special marks and signs of a talent for preaching. 1. His subjects must be confined to <u>social duties</u>. 2. He must recommend them only from <u>rational</u>

> considerations, viz. the beauty and comely proportions of virtue, and its advantages in the present life, without any regard to a future state of more extended self-interest. 3. His authorities must be drawn from Heathen writers, None, or as few as possible, from scripture.[1] 4. He must be very unacceptable to the common people.

Wallace's admiration for Seneca and Shaftesbury, his emphasis on works rather than faith, and his belief in the supremacy of reason -- all previously abhorred by Wodrow -- come under five here, as do the sentiments he expressed in "A little treatise on Virtue & merit" and in "An address to Monsieur J. Vernet" (see ch. II above, pp.121ff).

His dislike of ostentatious demonstrations of piety and his down-to-earth attitude that prayers are often best accomplished informally (see ch. II above, pp.84-85) are set in their worst light in Maxim VII:

> A moderate man must endeavour, as much as he handsomely can, to put off any appearances of devotion, and avoid all unnecessary exercises of religious worship, whether public or private.

We know from writings such as his "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles" that this was a distortion of Wallace's viewpoint, but for him to have

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1 John Ramsay comes to Wallace's defence on this point: "his love of abstract speculation, or of elegance of style," did not "make him forget his Bible, or the language of his great Master.... When he preached upon moral subjects, he took care to enforce them upon Gospel topics" (Scotland and Scotsmen, I, 246-47).

defended it would have been to descend to the level of petty squabbling. How much more satisfactory to publish a work which not only demonstrated that a moderate man could exhibit a degree of zeal that would do credit to his evangelical brethren, but also took a stand against the infidels whom the Moderates were supposed to support, and confronted them with a powerful case for Christianity? If Wallace's case is to us less powerful than he might have hoped, we must nevertheless acknowledge the ingenuity and energy that went into his presentation of it, and we can perhaps appreciate why he valued the Prospects "more than any of his other performances."[1]

Wallace displays a curious degree of historical perspective in relation to the Church which is absent, by comparison with his contemporaries, from his views on economics, where his sense of history defers to his striving for the ideal. Repeatedly in his writings we find him insisting that the Church must adapt itself to the temper of the times, and we sense a concern that it should not only be able to defend itself satisfactorily in the intellectual sphere, but that it should not be left behind in a world of improvements and of human progress. Only his acute consciousness of progress can explain his extraordinary "Conjectures concerning the

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1 Scots Magazine, 33 (1771), 344.

fall of Ecclesiasticall power Splendour & Dignity" (see Appendix V)[1] and it is surely one reason for his avoidance of church party politics in later life: his manuscripts on taste and venery and his writings on education all indicate a desire to tackle broader issues, both as a churchman and as a man of the "Enlightenment." "Since the Reformation," Wallace observed in his "Conjectures," "the world has been greatly enlightened & this light is still increasing. The eyes of men are daily opening: we are only discovering the errors of our forefathers and the impostures by which the world were deluded in antient times."

While the Church was to adapt itself to the age (and would inevitably decline in splendour) it must still uphold a piety and morality which were threatened by the rapid changes that were taking place. Thus Wallace could on one hand defend the right of Hume and Kames to express their opinions, while he challenged those opinions on the other. One reason for Wallace's public profession of orthodoxy (or at least, moderate orthodoxy) was that he believed that the Independents, in their division, had no influence in reforming the

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1 And "The End of Ecclesiasticall Splendour in the church and of Regal or Monarchicall Authority in the state..." (La II 620[15]; see above, pp.251-52). One wonders if Wallace had read David Hartley's comment on this topic: "The Civil and Ecclesiastical Powers are so interwoven and cemented together, in all the Countries of Christendom, that if the first fall, the last must fall also.

But there are many Prophesies, which declare the Fall of the Ecclesiastical Powers of the Christian World. And though each Church seems to flatter itself with the Hopes of being exempted; yet it is very plain, that the prophetical Characters belong to all. They have all left the true, pure, simple Religion; and teach for Doctrines the Commandments of Men." (Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations /London: James Leake and Wm. Frederick, 1749/, II, 370).

age (La II 97[3], "Irenicum," pp.40-42). He saw education as supremely important in human advancement, and countered Mandeville's thesis in "An Essay on Charity, and Charity-schools," where a case for ignorance was made on the grounds that we require a labouring class:

> as Knowledge is most successfully acquired by united Endeavours, so Mankind cannot cultivate and subdue the earth to so great Advantage separately, as by their joint and combined Labours: For which Reasons, Regard ought to be had to both these Ends in framing and modelling Society, which ought to be constituted in such a Manner, if possible, that the Labours of Mankind may not be so hard, severe and continued, as to become mere Drudgery, and neither leave Time, nor give proper Opportunities for acquiring Knowledge; far less ought they to be so fatiguing and wasting, as to destroy the Taste of Knowledge.[1]

Wallace's reaction to the "severe and constant Labours" to which many were subjected, "rather like Beasts of Burden than rational Creatures," was based less on an abhorrence of the physical conditions of the labouring class than of the fact that they were deprived of the opportunity and "Relish of Knowledge, for which they are so well qualified by Nature."[2] An improvement in their lot would accelerate

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1 Ignorance and Superstition a Source of Violence and Cruelty, pp.19-20.

2 Ignorance and Superstition, p.20.

the improvement of mankind in general. As Elliott-Binns remarks: "The trust in reason which characterized the eighteenth century...was ultimately based on a pathetic belief in the fundamental goodness and rationality of man. If only the truth could be made known to him he would surely respond to it."[1] Whether or not one regards this as a "pathetic" belief, it is certainly one on which Wallace based much of his utopian speculation, and his arguments for equality. He was convinced of the desirability of human progress, despite his conclusion in the Prospects that natural limits are imposed upon it, and the two main defects of the existing system, as he saw it, were social inequality and the "want of a proper education and discipline of the youth" (Prospects, p.90).

His most startling speculative and utopian suggestions for reform are to be found in his essay "Of Venery, or of the commerce of the two sexes" which contains "propos:alls to prevent Debauchery & render marriages more happy."[2] The "many good hints," he continues, are "so contrary to our present notions & manners, that it will be needless & by no means proper to publish them att least att present." The essay was "formerly part of another work," possibly one of the projected "Misscellany Speculations" to which he refers in some of his papers, and the title-page is headed "Number 90." The manuscript is not dated, but its contents suggest that it was a later

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1 L.E. Elliott-Binns, The Early Evangelicals, p.59.

2 See note with the Essay in La II 620[12]. My edition of "Of Venery" will appear, with a brief introduction, in Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 15 (1973), 429-44.

work, written, perhaps, not long after the Prospects.[1]

Wallace proposes new regulations for both marriage and divorce, and the preface to a much more recent work demonstrates that the issue is no less complex today than it was in Wallace's:

> Public and private discussions of divorce are very much out of harmony. The Press reflects the prurience as well as the uncertainties of ordinary people, and marital unhappiness is "news." The pulpit speaks with many voices in an embarassed endeavour to reconcile dogma and reality.[2]

Wallace's lack of embarrassment, in relation to either modesty or church dogma, is one of the more surprising aspects of the piece, and its frankness points up the contrast between published views and private opinion in the eighteenth century as well.

Canon law prevailed in England until Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act of 1753, which for the first time made marriage a public and certain contract and transferred the right to set up conditions for valid marriage from the Church to the State.[3] Prior to this, marriages could be easily entered into, but divorce was obtainable only by Act of Parliament. The new Act was designed to prevent

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1 "Of Venery" is numbered pp.1224-1256. Wallace removed the 83rd of his "Miscellany Speculations" (pp.1205-1262) to the Prospects (La II $620^{22/1}$), and possibly the gap was filled by "Of Venery," though the page numbers could refer to another projected work.

2 O.R. McGregor, Divorce in England: A Centenary Study (London: Heinemann, 1957), p.ix. Hereafter cited as McGregor.

3 McGregor, p.14.

clandestine marriages and the ceremony now had to be performed in a parish church after proclamation of banns. As this Act did not apply to Scotland, Gretna Green came into its own, and William Farr records in the Census of 1851 that

> English parents of property are still afraid...to send their eldest sons to the University of Edinburgh, from the justifiable apprehension that they might succumb before the facilities of the law and the charms of the women of Scotland: against which the breasts of their youthful countrymen, alone, are steeled — by habit probably — as it does not frequently happen that Scottish heirs contract irregular marriages.[1]

William Alexander's comment in the late eighteenth century was no more approving, and rather less polite:

> In England, the marriage ceremony is not to be performed but in the church, and between the hours of eight and twelve o'clock in the forenoon. In Scotland, this is deemed incompatible with morality and sound policy, as it hinders the valetudinarian from doing all the justice in his power to the mistress he has lived with and debauched. He may therefore marry her at any hour, or in any place, and by that marriage legitimate all the children he has by her, whether

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[1] Quoted by McGregor, p.15.

they be present at the marriage or not.[1]

Divorce by Private Act only, prevailed in England until the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857. This was passed largely on the recommendations of a Commission of 1853 which pointed out that divorce costing £20 to £30 in Scotland was at least £700 to £800 in England: "In Scotland...it is not a privilege for the rich, but a right for all."[2] Since 1560 the Common Law of Scotland had granted divorce for adultery. No statutory enactment had been required: with the Reformation the Protestant Church rejected the view that marriage was a sacrament "and professed to be guided in all matters relating to it by canon of Scripture" (Matthew XIX, 9; Mark X, 11; I Cor. XII, 15). According to Lord Patrick Fraser,

> Whether the alteration of the law was made on this ground, or from broad and general views of wordly expediency, it is not now possible to ascertain.... Lord Stair attributes the origin of divorce for adultery, in Scotland, to the determination of the Reformers to conform to the precept of our Saviour; and it appears that there were none more zealous in enforcing the new law than the reforming clergy.[3]

It appears, then, that Wallace was writing against a background of traditional clerical broadmindedness, and it should perhaps be noted

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1 William Alexander, The History of Women, 3rd ed. (London: C. Dilly, 1782), II, 401.

2 Quoted by McGregor, p.17.

3 Treatise on Husband and Wife, According to the Law of Scotland, II, 1139. Hereafter cited as Fraser.

that adultery in Scotland referred to the unfaithfulness of either partner with any person outwith the marriage, married or unmarried. When the courts were enabled to grant divorces in England, from 1057, the husband could sue on the grounds of his wife's adultery, but his adultery had to be combined with incest, bigamy, gross cruelty, or other aggravating circumstances, before his wife could divorce him.[1] After the Reformation, divorce for desertion was also allowed in Scotland, and the Statute (1573 cap. 55) declared that if either party "diverts from the other's company, without a reasonable cause alleged or reduced before a judge, and remains in their malicious obstinacy by the space of four years," refusing invitations to return, then a decree for adherence can be raised and divorce granted on the grounds of "malicious and obstinat defectioun."[2]

Lord Hardwicke's Act may have given rise to speculation concerning marriage and divorce. A few years afterwards, in 1757, the Select Society debated "Whether divorces by mutual consent should be allowed?" and a similar debate was held by the Belles Lettres Society in 1762.

The sacramental conception of marriage, however, still prevalent in England, was uncompromising:

> So then, the End and Reasons of Marriage, is <u>Procreation and mutual Help</u>.../Christian Marriage/ is become the <u>Representation</u> of that Holy Union, Love and Obedience, which is

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1 Fraser, II, 1137.

2 Fraser, II, 1207-03.

> betwixt Christ and His Church, and therefore is accounted now a more honourable Estate than formerly...now the Marriage of two Persons during Life, is enobled and recommended by that Similitude of Christ and his Church; the first owing no other Spouse, the last no other Lord.[1]

Daniel Defoe, in his puritanical Treatise Concerning the Use and Abuse of the Marriage Bed (first entitled Conjugal Lewdness, or Matrimonial Whoredom), defends marriage against the abolitionists, declaring that "the Pleasure of a married State consists wholly in the Beauty of the Union, the sharing Comforts, the doubling all Enjoyments; 'tis the Settlement of Life."[2] The purpose of marriage, however, is procreation, and he waxes vituperative against matrimony between those who know they cannot reproduce:

> Now what can be a lawful or modest Reason for this Matrimony?....To say she does it to avoid Fornication, Modesty, if she Mistress of any, will forbid her talking in that manner.
>
> She has, indeed, nothing to say, but to Blush and look down; to acknowledge that she did it to gratify (as the Poet expresses it modestly) a frailer Part; in short, she ought to say, that she married meerly to lie with a Man. And is not

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1 Two Great Questions Determined by the Principles of Reason & Divinity (London: Richard. Janeway, 1681), pp.22-23.

2 A Treatise Concerning the Use and Abuse of the Marriage Bed (London: T. Warner, 1727), p.97.

this Matrimonial Whoredom? (231).

While it was generally accepted that the object of marriage was to produce children, few other writers can have stressed the point with such vitriolic zeal.

In addition to the teaching of the Church, monogamous matrimony was believed by some to be "an instinct of nature."[1] "Marriage," wrote Buffon, "is the natural state of man after puberty. A man ought to have but one wife, and a woman but one husband. This is the law of Nature, the number of females being nearly equal with that of males."[2] Rousseau was of similar opinion:

> Now, if we consider the human species in its primitive simplicity, it is obvious, from the limited ability of the male, and the moderation of his desires, that it was the design of nature he should be contented with a single female. This is further confirmed, by the numerical equality of individuals of both sexes, at least in our part of the world....children are so long in a feeble, helpless state, that both the mother and they would hardly be able to subsist, without the attachment and

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1 Kames, Sketches of the History of Man (Edinburgh: W. Creech; Strahan & Cadell, 1774), I, 175. (Polygamy, on the other hand, is against "the purpose of nature" /p.177/. For a brief mention of polygamy in relation to Wallace's essay, see my introduction to "Of Venery" in TSLL, 15 (1973), 431-32).

2 Barr's Buffon, Buffon's Natural History (London: Printed for the Proprietor, 1797), IV, 49.

consequential assistance of the father.[1]

Other ideas were of course entertained, and Diderot's Orou, in the Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville (1772), echoed Wallace's belief that "there is no foundation in nature for placing so much happiness in the sole enjoyment of a woman," without sharing his disapproval of promiscuity.[2]

Other enquirers found themselves less able to cope with the complexity of the problem. In asking "whether the Gospel Rule of confining One Man to One Woman during Life, except in the Case of the Woman's Adultery, be calculated to produce the greatest possible Good," David Hartley was led to conjecture that "in many Circumstances Marriage itself is not to be approved." Finding the subject "of too nice and difficult a Nature to be farther pursued," he finally enjoined those "who need particular Information" to "apply to God for it."[3]

Where marriage is regarded as an irrevocable and lifelong contract, serious consideration must be given to the choice of spouse: "Did Men expect Happiness in a married Condition," wrote Defoe, "they would Begin and End it after another manner, prepare for it beforehand with more nicety, and take much greater Thought about it

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1 Emilius; or, An Essay on Education. By John James Rousseau, Citizen of Geneva, transl. Mr. Nugent (London: J. Nourse & P. Vaillant, 1763), II, 313.

2 Wallace, "Of Venery;" Diderot, Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville in Dialogues, transl. Francis Birrell (London: Routledge & Sons, 1927), p.130: "Orou: I find these singular precepts [monogamous, lifelong marriage] opposed to nature and contrary to reason."

3 Observations on Man, II, 230, 233, 235.

before they engaged in it."[1] Kames advocated judgement based on sound qualities, and not on surface attraction: "love will come with marriage; and in that state it makes an illustrious figure."[2] Hutcheson introduced love a little earlier, believing men and women to be "allured" into marriage "by the tenderest sentiments of mutual esteem," and he modified such extreme views as Defoe's by asserting that "there can be no real friendship in a partnership merely entered into for propagation and the rearing of children."[3]

Conjugal infidelity is an inevitable concomitant of monogamous marriage, and a privilege that men have attempted to reserve for themselves. With characteristic perspicacity, William Alexander observes that we are told

> that the hand of severity is held so closely over the incontinence of married women, and so much latitude given to men, because the men generally have the care of providing for the offspring; and it would be hard that a man should be obliged to provide for, and leave his estate to children, which he could never with certainty call his own, were the same indulgence given to the women as to the men. A shorter way of explaining the matter would have been, to have said, that men are

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1 A Treatise Concerning the Use and Abuse of the Marriage Bed, p.97.

2 Loose Hints upon Education, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: John Bell; Geo. Robinson & John Murray, 1782), p.251.

3 Francis Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy, II, 161.

generally the legislators.[1]

The discouragement of "irregular amours" was one of the aims of Wallace's essay, and his attitude to women is extraordinarily enlightened. Both sexes, he maintains, are subject to lust:

> But by a false, unnecessary, & unnaturall refinement some would deney that there is any lust in modest women & virgins, whereas every woman during certain seasons and a certain period of life is incited to lust & would gladly suffer the Venereal commerce with the other sex, unless there is something uncommon in her constitution or she is sickly and under a bad habit of body.

Love and lust, he believes, "are very nearly allied, & the most bashfull virgin or chastest matron has often more lust or inclination to Venery than the greatest prostitute" who is simply earning a living.

According to Wallace, men are not unduly selective in satisfying the demands of lust. Beauty is not essential: "any one who casts up will serve the purpose very well," provided she is not positively disagreeable (ugly, or dirty), and Wallace sees no reason why the women should be any more delicate in this respect than men.

Under his scheme it would not be thought "imprudent or immodest for a woman to make advances," and women, as well as men, could make proposals. Throughout his essay, the willingness of both parties to enter, renew, or dissolve the marriage contract, is strongly emphasised, though Wallace cannot quite emancipate himself

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[1] The History of Women, II, 341-42.

from the view that it is the man's prerogative to make physical advances: couples should sleep in separate beds, and preferably in separate rooms, "except when the husband choosed it for the sake of a more luscious dalliance."

"According to the customs of Britain," wrote Wallace, with the topic of population never very far from his mind, "many of both sexes, especially many women, never can be married: this is a great misfortune & cruelty to the women; & fatall to the nation." Having made use of Halley's tables in his calculations for the Widow's Fund, Wallace had no doubt also read "Some Further Considerations on the Breslaw Bills of Mortality" in which Halley poses one of the problems that Wallace attempts to eradicate in "Of Venery." The "Growth and Encrease of Mankind is not so much stinted by anything in the Nature of the Species," Halley believed, "as it is from the cautious difficulty most People make to adventure on the state of marriage, from the prospect of the Trouble and Charge of providing for a family."[1]

Concern over population was very often expressed in discussions of marriage, and Defoe's views find an odd parallel in Diderot's Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville, where the women of Tahiti wore black veils to indicate barrenness: "She who drops this veil," says Orou, "and mingles with men is a loose woman, and the man who raises the veil and approaches a sterile woman is a libertine" (139-40). In agrarian Tahiti, epidemics and war depleted the population,

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[1] Phil. Trans. Royal Soc. 17 (1693), 665, quoted by G. Chlin, "Mortality, Marriage, and Growth in Pre-Industrial Populations," Population Studies, 14 (1960-61), 190.

and there were "vast fields lying fallow" (144).

In 1783, the quack Doctor James Graham[1] attempted to appeal to such anxieties in his Lecture on the Generation, Increase, and Improvement of the Human Species! Interspersed with Precepts for the Preservation and Exhaltation of Personal Beauty and Loveliness: And For prolonging Human Life, Healthily and Happily, To the very longest possible Period of Human Existence!....And...closed with a glowing, brilliant, and supremely delightful Description of the Structure, and most irresistibly Genial Influences of the Celebrated Celestial Bed! ! ! (London: n.p., n.d.). His concern for the numbers of mankind was, incidentally, not altogether devoid of a degree of self-interest, since we are told that he charged childless married couples £100 a night to sleep in his Celestial Bed, which stood on glass legs and was adorned with the richest hangings, and which he claimed would impart fertility.[2] He nevertheless begins his lecture in altruistic vein: man, he asserts, has a strong propensity to reproduce:

> And such is the nature of man, — such his frailty and his frowardness! that where his propensities, either natural or acquired, are the strongest, there he is the most likely to err, and to run into the most dangerous excesses. It therefore becomes an office of the utmost importance to individuals

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1 For a note on James Graham, see Appendix I, 13.

2 See John Timbs, Doctors and Patients (London: Richard Bentley, 1876), p.158. Some authorities give the charge as £50 a night.

> to instruct them in the arts of exalting, and at the same time, of rendering permanent, the joys of the marriage-bed, -- and to society at large, to teach men and women how to propagate a numerous, -- a healthful, -- a beautiful, -- and a virtuous offspring" (1).

Graham regards insufficient encouragement to matrimony as the principal cause of depopulation and degeneracy, and he therefore advocates state support for marriage and the abolition of "all public, private, and promiscuous Prostitution" (2). It is difficult to imagine two men with such similar ends in view tackling the problem in less similar ways than Graham and Wallace. While Wallace proposes greater flexibility in marriage and divorce, which will allow more women to have the opportunity of bearing children, Graham concentrates on investigating the causes of barrenness, which he attributes to "too early, and...too frequent veneral indulgences" (2). It is interesting that Wallace, when even the more respectable writers were warning against excess, was attempting to find a scheme to make earlier marriage possible for those who felt it to be beyond their means at the very time that "they have the greatest relish for Venery." Kames, for instance, believed "that women who indulge that appetite to excess, seldom have children,"[1] and it was commonly held that the "beaten Paths are always barren, and never productive of any Fruit."[2] Buffon explains the reason for this: A "liquor" was

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1 Kames, Sketches, I, 175.

2 Conjugium Languens: or, the Natural, Civil, and Religious Mischiefs Arising from Conjugal Infidelity and Impunity, by Castamore (London: n.p., 1700), in The Cases of Polygamy, Concubinage, Adultery, Divorce, &c. Seriously and Learnedly Discussed (London: T. Payne, J. Chrichley, & W. Shropshire, 1732), p.222.

believed to be "emitted by females, when they are excited" and it was therefore thought "that the most abandoned women will be the least fruitful, because they emit that liquor which ought to remain in the matrix for the formation of the foetus."[1] Far from preaching restraint in marriage, Wallace lays stress on the "highly Delightfull" nature of the "Venereal Act...when it is performed in obedience to nature," though he does suppose that promiscuity "prevents propagation else perhaps it would not be so unnaturall as we imagine."

If Wallace's description of the adolescent boy's solitary initiation into the "rites of Venus" was autobiographical, as it surely was, he might have been less ready to "cast off all further fear" had he read Dr. Graham's lecture. His apparent lack of guilt is astonishing for his time,[2] although of course "libertine" views enjoyed a wide circulation and open reference was made, for example in the "Prologue to the Wild-Gallant Revived," to the prevalence of masturbation among adolescents, without a suggestion of Graham's anxieties:

> As some raw Squire, by tender Mother bred,
> Till one and Twenty keeps his Maidenhead,
> (Pleas'd with some Sport which he alone does find,
> And thinks a secret to all Humane kind;)[3]

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1 Natural History, III, 202, 203.

2 He does later warn against allowing children to "become guilty of many dangerous and enervating practices."

3 The Works of John Dryden ed. H.T. Swedenberg, Jr. (Berkeley & Los Angeles: California Univ. Press, 1962), VIII, 6.

According to Graham, this youth would risk "debility of body and of mind, — infecundity, — epilepsy, — loss of memory, sight, and hearing; — distortions of the eyes, mouth, and face, — feeble, harsh, and squeaking voice, — pale, sallow, and blueish black complexion, — wasting and tottering of the limbs, — idiotism, — horrors, — innumerable complaints — extreme wretchedness — and even death itself" (10). "Every act of self-pollution," he warned,

> and even every repetition of natural venery, with even the loveliest of the sex, to which appalled or exhausted nature is whipped and spurred by lust, habit, or fiery unnatural provocations; — but especially every act of self-pollution! — is an earthquake — a blast — a deadly paralytic stroke, — to all the faculties of both soul and body!...Thrice happy! supremely blessed! in my opinion, are those young men and women, who live, till they are at least <u>twenty</u> years of age without ever once having had even one seminal emission in their whole life, asleep or awake, voluntarily or involuntary! (10).

The "chastest continence, and the strictest regularity till full maturity, and great moderation afterwards" is required to ensure "a numerous and healthy offspring" (9).

Wallace was also too old to have read John Armstrong's <u>Oeconomy of Love</u> (1736) at an impressionable age, and so was spared the exhortation (had he in his innocence been able to understand it):

But O my Son, whether the generous care
Of Propagation, and domestic Charge,
Or soft Encounter more attract, renounce
The Vice of Monks reclusе, the early Bane
Of rising Manhood. Banish from thy Shades
Th'ungenerous, selfish, solitary Joy.
Hold, Parricide, thy hand! For thee alone
Did Nature form thee?....
Impious, forbear! thus the first general Nail
To disappoint, increase and multiply,
To shed thy Blossoms thro' the desert air,
And sow thy perish'd Off-spring in the winds.
Unhallow'd Pastize![1]

While Graham's volubility on the subject was no doubt commonly regarded as unnecessarily colourful, more reliable medical opinion confirmed his prognosis. M. Tissot, "Fellow of the Royal Society of London, Member of the Medico-Physical Society of Basil, and of the Oeconomical Society of Berne," in a work entitled Onanism: or, A Treatise upon the Disorders produced by Masturbation: or, The Dangerous Effects of Secret and Excessive Venery, cites a daunting list of medical authorities, ancient and modern, in the hope of

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1 The Oeconomy of Love: A Poetical Essay. 3rd ed. (London: T. Cooper, 1739), pp.8-10. In his thesis (in preparation for submission to Edinburgh Univ), entitled "Gavin Hamilton, John Balfour and Patrick Neill: A Study of Publishing in Edinburgh in the 18th Century," Warren McDougall illustrates contemporary reaction to the poem. The Scots booksellers were accused of pirating an edition of it, and their counsel (probably Henry Home, later Lord Kames) not only denied the accusation, but asserted that most booksellers in Edinburgh would be ashamed to have it in their shop, far less print or distribute it.

"stopping the progress of a corruption more baneful perhaps than the small-pox, and the more to be dreaded, as by its working in the shades of mystery, it secretly undermines, without even those who are its victims thinking of its malignity."[1] He believes that the seminal fluid causes changes at puberty, since castration prevents development. It "has so great an influence upon the corporeal powers, and upon perfect digestion, which repairs them, that physicians of all ages have been unanimously of opinion, that the loss of an ounce of this humour, would weaken more than of forty ounces of blood" (2). "Too great a quantity of semen being lost in the natural course," therefore, "produces very direful effects: but they are still more dreadful, when the same quantity has been dissipated in an unnatural manner" (3). The reason for this is not "the special will of God to punish this crime" (72), as some have supposed, but the fact that it is contrary to the laws of nature. Masturbators are importuned by "imagination, habit, and not nature ....They drain nature both of that which is necessary, and also of that which she herself would have taken care to dispose of" (74). Not only are emissions debilitating, but "the frequency of erection, though imperfect, with which they are afflicted, greatly weakens them" (80). Remedies, which include milk diets, mercurial pills, purging salt and cold baths, could not be relied upon to effect a cure, and it was doubtless with the depredations of imagination and habit in mind that Armstrong advocated visits to "Those haunts of public

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1 Onanism, transl. A. Hume, M.D., 3rd ed. (London: For the Translator, 1767), pp.xi.-xii. Further refs. are to this edition.

lewdness" as a less heinous alternative.

But perhaps more startling than Wallace's unselfconscious description of the solitary pleasures of youth is his insistence on the close relation between love and lust. He is sceptical of "platonic" love, and seldom believes that a man can "admire the good qualities of a fine woman's mind and conduct without a secret wish to be familiar with her person." We can appreciate his relief when, at nearly sixty, he was able to write: "Virtue to me appears daily more excellent and being now delivered from the rage of Lust, Despising the madness of ambition, I learn to live happily & to dy contented."[1]

His near-equation of love with lust, and his belief that normal women are also lustful, distinctly contrasts with Hutcheson's view of the matter: for Wallace, "Lust is not nice & Delicate"; Hutcheson, on the contrary, holds that "in all those who are under the restraints of the natural modesty, and of any sense of virtue, the inclination to procreate is excited, or at least generally regulated in its choice of a partner, by many delicate sentiments, and finer passions of the heart of the sweetest kind":[2]

> The esteem of virtue and wisdom, the desire and love of innocence of manners, complacence, confidence, and the tenderest good-will, are the natural incitements and concomitants of the amorous desire; and almost obscure the brutal impulse toward the sensual gratification, which might be had with persons of

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1 "Meditations on Seneca's Epistles," on Epistle 61, November 1756.

2 Francis Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy, II, 151-52.

any character (152).

Wallace is not, of course, advocating indiscriminate gratification of lust, but he does seem to be attempting to free the discussion of sexual appetite from false delicacy, and even dishonesty. While Hutcheson emphasises the importance of friendship and appreciation of the more "spiritual" qualities in marriage, Wallace, while prohibiting promiscuity, would "encourage a much more free commerce of the sexes than is allowed by our customs." Marriage contracts should be made and renewed "by the free consent of each of the parties, from time to time." Couples should marry "wisely and discreetly," but should not be "bound for life": "let them be att full liberty to separate when they please, particularly after the wife has born a child." For Hutcheson, "the aim of all sincere friendship is perpetuity." There "can be none in contracts only for a term of years, or such as may be made void by accidents without any fault of the parties. The marriage-contract therefore must be for life, otherwise all true friendship and love must be banished, and that relation of marriage turned into a more servile bargain for procreation and joint labour" (161-62).[1]

Many of the objections to divorce were based on concern for the children of the marriage. David Hartley, for example, feared that "frequent Divorces would have the worst Consequences in respect of

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[1] Hutcheson does not absolutely deny the possibility of divorce, but it must only take place where the marriage is intolerable, and he lays great emphasis on inflicting penalties on the guilty party, if there is one (System, II, 178-79). Wallace's essay is extraordinary in its omission of any reference to marital "guilt."

Children,"[1] and Hume asked: "Must they be committed to the care of a step-mother; and instead of the fond attention and concern of a parent, feel all the indifference or hatred of a stranger or an enemy?"[2] He, like Hutcheson, argued against voluntary divorce and advocated marriage on the basis of friendship.

Wallace admits that the subsequent care of children is a problem, and suggests that the mother should have custody. The father should pay alimony and the extended family (on both sides) would help to look after their "future care and education." Doubtless he would have welcomed the Tahitian practice of distributing the children amongst the population and putting "aside for their upkeep and as provision for old people one-sixth of all the country's fruits" which was regarded as "a sure way of increasing the population and of interesting it in the respect due to old age and the rearing of children."[3] This would certainly have been in keeping with his utopian principles: his belief in community living and the abolition of private property.

Apart from the encouragement easy separation would be to marriage, and the fact that it would deter people from indulging in irregular or promiscuous relationships, Wallace argues that the possibility of divorce should make some marriages more tolerable: a couple with the power of separation "might be kinder & more complaisant to one another. It is want of complaisance which is one great cause

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1 Observations on Man, II, 231.

2 "Of Polygamy and Divorces" in Essays, I, 237.

3 Diderot, Supplement, p.135.

of the quarrels in marriage; their greater liberty instead of weakening would rather increase their mutuall love." Montesquieu had expressed just this opinion in his Persian Letters,[1] and Montaigne observed that

> We thought we had tied the knot of our marriages more firmly by removing all means of dissolving them; but the bond of hearts and affections has become more loose and slack as that of constraint has been drawn closer. And, on the other hand, what made marriages to be so long honoured and so secure in Rome was the liberty to break them off at will. They loved their wives the better as long as there was the chance of losing them, and, with full liberty of divorce, five hundred years and more passed by before any took advantage of it.[2]

When divorce was prevalent among the Romans, however, according to Hume, "marriages were most rare; and Augustus was obliged, by penal laws, to force men of fashion into the married state (I, 239). Similarly, John Millar maintained that

> The frequency of divorce, among the Romans, was attended with bad consequences, which were felt in every part of their domestic economy. As

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1 Persian Letters, III, 189 (see above, p.167).

2 The Essays of Montaigne, transl. E. J. Trechmann (London: Oxford Univ. Press; Humphrey Milford, 1927), II, 64.

> the husband and wife had a separation constantly in view, they could repose little confidence in each other, but were continually occupied by separate considerations of interest. In such a situation, they were not likely to form a strong attachment, or to bestow much attention to the joint concerns of their family.[1]

But divorce, for Wallace, was also associated with his efforts to facilitate early marriage. His system would allow young people to marry where formerly they waited until their forties or fifties, when they were well-off. When this was the case, women of low rank were debauched and their bastards neglected, and so early matrimony would reduce debauchery and improve the circumstances of the offspring. Realistically, Wallace recognised that permanence was perhaps unlikely to be attendant upon youthful choice, but to his mind the ills of divorce were preferable to the risks and inconveniences of delay. Moreover, Wallace doubted that there was any natural foundation for monogamy. He points out that there is no disgrace in a woman's repeated marriage; "commerce with a former husband is not thought to pollute her. The most squeemish & Delicate among the men can marry her with as much gout, tast, and relish as if she were the purest virgin" and indeed, "a woman's being enjoyed by a Dozen in proper circumstances can never render her less fit or less agreeable to a thirteenth, if proper care is taken of all necessary decencies." Under the present system, he believes, it "would be much better if

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[1] The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks, 4th ed. (1806), p.104.

fornication gave less scandall & there was less jealousy of wives & misstresses." Jealousy he regards as a "foolish passion" and one that is "very little founded in nature," and he comes very close to conjecturing that promiscuity itself is natural. He decides against this on the whole, however, concluding that it "is fit that one woman be appropriated to one man for a time, but not for ever." He does not lay the same totally biological stress on human relationships as Diderot's Tahitians, but the fact that he recommends that all marriages should be "Discharged till either the man or woman had passed a certain age" (perhaps twenty for a woman and twenty-two for a man) affords food for speculation as to the degree to which he shared their belief in adolescent experimentation.

Wallace is noticeably unforthcoming in any area other than the sexual side of marriage. Milton, by contrast, believed that marriage, "if we pattern from the beginning, as our Saviour bids, was not properly the remedy of lust, but the fulfilling of conjugal love and helpfulness" and he inveighs against the "ignorance and iniquity of Canon Law, providing for the right of the body in marriage, but nothing for the wrongs and grievances of the mind."[1] Despite Wallace's emphasis, however, there is no justification for assuming that he attached only physical importance to marriage, or that he was proposing only a thinly veiled scheme for mass promiscuity. He stipulated a year's wait before re-marriage, and more severe punishment of both fornication and adultery in his proposed reforms. One advantage of mutually acceptable separation would be that "when a

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1 John Milton, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (London: n.p., 1645), pp.11, 9.

couple had made a bad choice & found themselves Disagreeably married, they would learn by their experience to make a wiser choice afterwards" — a benefit which indicates a sense of the priority of stability over variety.

Wallace agreed with contemporary opinion that the young should be kept in ignorance as long as possible. Kames decreed that "the animal appetite be retarded" and that a young man should be employed

> in hunting or other violent exercise that engrosses him, and leaves no room for wandering thoughts. But when he cannot longer be restrained, then is the time for discoursing with him of marriage, for displaying its sweets, and for painting the distresses both of mind and body that result from a commerce with loose women.[1]

Such diversion is apparently not necessary for women, who are trained in restraint, and who are "destined by nature to be obedient" (256).

Rousseau also came down on the side of ignorance, though he warned that either "their curiosity must never be excited at all; or it should be satisfied before the time of life, in which it is attended with danger....unless you are certain of keeping him in ignorance of the difference of sex till he is sixteen, let him learn it before he is ten."[2] He recommended slow and certain progress for the young pupil:

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1 Loose Hints upon Education, p.249.

2 Emilius: or, An Essay on Education, I, 324.

> let him not become a man, as soon as nature permits. While the body grows, the spirits designed to give life to the blood, and to strengthen the fibres, are going through a due preparation. If you make them take a different course, and that which is intended for the completion of one human body, be rendered subservient to the formation of another, they both remain in a state of infirmity, and nature's work will be left imperfect (I, 353).

To promote ignorance, Wallace recommended that children of opposite sex should never share a room, and in his plea for separate beds for the married couple, he had an ally in Dr. Graham, who declared that

> there is not, in my opinion, any thing in nature, which is more immediately calculated totally to subvert health, strength, love, esteem, and indeed every thing that is desirable in the married state, than that odious, most indelicate, and most hurtful custom of man and wife continually <u>pissing</u> together, in one and the same bed. Nothing is more unwise, — nothing more indecent, — nothing more unnatural, than for a man and woman to sleep, and snore, and steam, and do every thing else that's indelicate together, three hundred and sixty-five times — every

year.[1]

"Of Venery" represents a speculative re-organisation of society on very much the same lines as parts of the Prospects. There, Wallace advocates a return to agrarian simplicity and cooperative effort; in "Of Venery" he discards the sexual mores of modern civilisation and seeks a morality that is closer to nature. An inevitable result of such a change, as he himself acknowledges, is that it would "naturally lessen great estates and bring mankind nearer to an equality." The care of children by an extended family would again bring society more into line with his utopian ideal. His rejection of monarchical and ecclesiastical splendour fits into this re-modelling of society as well, and it does seem that either Wallace's lack of enthusiasm for church politics and his desire to influence mankind's progress led him to play a less significant part on the ecclesiastical stage, or that a burning interest in human society and its advancement diverted him from all but the broader religious concerns. It is impossible to gauge the uniqueness of the views he propounds in "Of Venery" since no similar documents appear to exist, but it does not seem unlikely that these were ideas current among the Edinburgh intelligentsia, in which case the essay gives us a new and startling insight into the mind of the Enlightenment Scot.

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1 Dr. James Graham, Lecture on the Generation, Increase, and Improvement of the Human Species..., p.11. It was, of course, much more common for even the better-off families in the eighteenth century to share beds than it is today and the Edinburgh Royal Infirmary was praised in the 1750s for allowing each patient a bed for himself. The vigour of Graham's exhortation makes one wonder that he did not create Celestial twin-beds.

Chapter V

Conclusion

A study of Wallace's work has revealed a man who combined the commonplaces of eighteenth-century thought with some degree of originality, a man whose open-mindedness and belief in freedom of enquiry resulted frequently in vacillation, but whose works achieved an unexpected, if not immediately obvious, unity.

As a churchman, his tenets were not those of established orthodoxy, but he believed that change must be effected without violence and that efforts towards reform must be made under the cloak of conformity. Sincerity "does not oblige us to publish all our secret sentiments, by no means: it's enough we never speak or act inconsistently with them."[1] He advocated the anonymous publication of ideas in the belief that the mere fact of their circulation would prepare the way for their acceptance, and his published views on social reform lacked the kind of revolutionary zeal that makes Condorcet's Sketch for A Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind remembered today, while Wallace's Prospects remain in obscurity.[2] The following passage typifies his attitude to reform:

> I have rather been affraid sometimes that Deism and freethinking might so far prevail that in

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1 La II 620[17], "A Letter to a Reverend Clergyman...Concerning Submission to the church," p.[16].

2 The author of "Short Memoirs of Robert Wallace" in Scots Magazine 71 (1809), describes the Prospects as "a work less known perhaps than his other writings" (592).

> time we should have another Reformation from what the men of these dayes would call from Christianity and Superstition to natural Religion reason and good sense. This I fancy if ever it happen will be attended with greater Confusions and more violent convulsions of the state than our Reformation from popery in the sixteenth century or from Prelacy in the year 1638th and as I am a sincere Christian and beside have a great aversion to bloody & violent changes I have been allarmed at some of the quick advances we seemed to be making this way I am perswaded in the temper we are in that new opinions will be daily published and defended.[1]

Wallace saw his era as one of change and tried to advance intellectual and religious positions to enable the Kirk to adjust to it and thus to retain its privileged place in Scottish culture. His defence and criticism of Hume and Kames was a symptom of this, as indeed was his uncertainty over issues such as the staging of Douglas. The disparity between his private thought and outward profession is confirmed by the manuscript material he did not intend for publication, and his predicament bears some similarity to that of George Tyrrell in our own century. The advanced "Catholic modernism" that was expounded in A Much-Abused Letter (1906) was not intended by him for publication, but as "medicine for extreme cases"; in this instance a private letter to a university professor whom intellectual difficulties

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[1] La II 620[17], pp. [11-12]. He goes on to recommend surreptitious dissemination of unorthodox ideas.

had driven near to the point of leaving the Catholic Church. The gap between what Father Tyrrell, S.J., was willing to say in public and what he thought in private was justified by his belief in the need for individual subordination to the visible Church: "The interest and the characteristic policy of an institution must be maintained at the expense of any individual member."[1] He reveals the essential dilemma of the good churchman who is also in close touch with "modern thought": the necessity to remain silent, yet be willing to help those with similar difficulties. Like Wallace, who regards the received doctrines as man-made and impermanent, Tyrrell maintains a loyalty to what he sees as an untransformed church. Like Wallace in his "Conjectures concerning the fall of Ecclesiasticall... Splendour..." Tyrrell dimly foresees the day when the present church will be changed beyond recognition, and believes that

> a man might have great faith in the Church, in the people of God, in the unformulated ideas, sentiments and tendencies at work in the great body of the faithful, and constituting the Christian and Catholic "Spirit"; and yet regard the Church's consciously formulated ideas and intentions about herself as more or less untrue to her deepest nature (56).

Both men felt a duty to support the present institution, imperfect though it might be, and Wallace saw himself doing so in such works as

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1 A Much-Abused Letter (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1906), p.105.

"Christian piety Illustrated..."[1]

Wallace's writing mirrored the popular belief that man's nature is basically good, but that he has been corrupted by tyranny and ignorance. He shared with his contemporaries the conviction that education in the use of reason reinforced by moral instruction would eliminate vice, and he called for tolerance and humanity. But in his concern for man as a social being and in his proposals for the re-structuring of society, he was both behind and in advance of his times.

From the point of view of modern economics, the return to an agrarian way of life was a retrograde step, and yet the vehemence of his prophetic vision was not matched for another thirty years, when Condorcet predicted that

> the time will therefore come when the sun will shine only on free men who know no other master but their reason; when tyrants and slaves, priests and their stupid or hypocritical instruments will exist only in works of history and on the stage; and when we shall think of them only to pity their victims and

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1 Transformation, in areas such as the row over the consecration of the West Kirk Chapel by a episcopal minister (see pp.173-74 above), appears to be little closer today. The Guardian, 27 August, 1973, p.4, reports that: "For the first time in over 300 years, holy communion according to the Anglican tradition was celebrated yesterday in the High Kirk of St Giles in Edinburgh — but not without protest. The Rt Rev Dr Kenneth Carey, Bishop of Edinburgh in the Episcopal Church, preached the sermon and spoke of church unity. But outside Pastor Jack Glass, leader of the Twentieth Century Reformation Movement, and a handful of supporters, gathered to shout slogans condemning the service."

> their dupes; to maintain ourselves in a state of vigilance by thinking on their excesses; and to learn how to recognise and so to destroy, by force of reason, the first seeds of tyranny and superstition, should they ever dare to reappear among us.[1]

Condorcet recognised that population growth might, as man moved towards perfection, exceed the means of subsistence: "There is doubtless no-one who does not think that such a time is still very far from us; but," he asked, "will it ever arrive?" (188). Future knowledge may bring a solution, and it is possible a population limited to the available food supply will not involve "that untimely destruction of some of those creatures who have been given life, which is so contrary to nature and to social prosperity" (189).

Though the works of Wallace and Hume may have been the final word in the ancient/modern population controversy, concern over population size is a continuing issue, as the title of a recent article, "No limit to the growth debate" suggests.[2] Wallace's concern is ours today: "The Government must act to prevent the consequences of population growth becoming intolerable for everyday conditions of life," the first report of the Select Committee on Science and Technology stated in 1971. "The quality of life is crucially dependent on the amount of land and the pressures upon it...on this

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1 Antoine-Nicolas de Condorcet, Sketch for A Historical Picture of The Progress of the Human Mind, trans. June Barraclough (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1955), p.179.

2 By Guy Streatfeild in New Scientist, 8 March 1973.

criterion Britain is already overcrowded, and additional numbers can only diminish the quality of life."[1]

Wallace did not allow his idealism to cloud his assessment of things as they were -- in either Church or State -- or to prevent him from proposing reforms based on what was possible in the present circumstances. The essence of his approach is to be found in More's Utopia:

> If you cannot pluck up wrongheaded opinions by the root, if you cannot cure according to your heart's desire vices of long standing, yet you must not on that account desert the commonwealth. You must not abandon the ship in a storm because you cannot control the winds.
>
> On the other hand, you must not force upon people new and strange ideas which you realise will carry no weight with persons of opposite conviction. On the contrary, by the indirect approach you must seek and strive to the best of your power to handle matters tactfully. What you cannot turn to good you must make as little bad as you can (99-101).

The Characteristics is one example of his pragmatic outlook: he could discuss with optimism "the Present Political State" while

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1 Reported in the Observer, 23 May 1971, pp.6, 9. Wallace's concern for the quality of life is illustrated also in his "Meditations" on Epistle 49, 23 October 1756: "How often do men who have lived long, in reality live a very short time: During their long life they have enjoyed but little good & have had few moments with which they were quite or fully satisfied."

believing "that those political systems...which have prevailed universally hitherto, are altogether inconsistent with a perfect state of human society" (Prospects, p.25). It is a mark of his reputation in this field that the anonymous View of the Internal Policy of Great Britain (London: A. Millar, 1764) is (wrongly) attributed to him.[1]

His combination of pragmatism with utopian idealism is what separates Wallace from the more characteristic writers of the Scottish "Enlightenment," who, as William C. Lehmann points out, displayed "a certain realism or down-to-earthness as distinguished from anything that savored of utopianism." Moreover, says Lehmann, "while Scottish thinkers made much of the idea of progress in the sense of evolutionary naturalism, their belief in progress seldom if ever took on the character of an unrestrained optimism like that of a Condorcet, for example."[2] Wallace's combination of speculation and compromise, utopianism and realism, precluded him from totally "unrestrained optimism," but in some of his writings he was surely closer to Condorcet than most of his contemporaries. He, too, foresaw a time when men will

> approach a condition in which everyone will have the knowledge necessary to conduct himself in the ordinary affairs of life, according to the light of his own reason, to preserve his mind free from prejudice, to understand his rights and to exercise

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1 See Appendix I, 14.

2 W.C. Lehmann, Henry Home, Lord Kames, and the Scottish Enlightenment (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p.xiii.

> them in accordance with his conscience and his creed; in which everyone will become able, through the development of his faculties, to find the means for providing for his needs; and in which at last misery and folly will be the exception, and no longer the habitual lot of a section of society.[1]

While Wallace was very conscious, even in manuscripts not intended for publication, of writing for posterity, his philanthropic ideals underwent a degree of modification later in life and while he believed it good to "take every opportunity of advancing the publick interest" he was doubtful that much could be done. A man might be excused for retiring from the world "to cultivate Philosophy & his own mind."[2] The publisher Strahan's comments confirm that even in his own day Wallace's books were not widely read, and there seems little doubt from John Ramsay's account that his animation found its expression in the spoken rather than in the written word. He believed himself "as much turned for friendship & intimacy as most men: much more, I am certain, than for the bustle of the world & Generall conversation & acquaintance" (on Epistle 5, 30 June 1753), and Ramsay stresses the number of his friends and the quality of the discussion that he stimulated (Scotland and Scotsmen, I, 245-46).

Wallace himself believed that he had not sufficiently concentrated his energies. In 1753, he wrote:

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1 Condorcet, Sketches, p.174.

2 "Meditations," on Epistle 7, 6 July 1753.

> there is nothing so unprofitable, nothing by which I have lost so much time as changing my books & studies & rambling from one Author & one subject to another, I have rambled greatly in my studies & have not sufficiently Digested my Authors To correct this error I am allmost resolved to give up with all vague and Desultrous reading, to read only a few things which tend to make my self wiser & better & in particular the works of this Seneca & such as may assist me in understanding the nature of men & society & in particular the constitution of Great Britain (on Epistle 2, 30 June 1753).

He evidently did not carry out this resolution, for he observes four years later that

> I have often been inconstant & diverted too much to various reading & study: it would be good to correct this would there not be a great advantage in never reading a book but as a part of a plan We lose much time & happiness by being unsteddy, we do not advance so fast nor so surely when we are constantly changing from one study to another by this we know a smattering of many things but few things fully & to the bottom (on Epistle 45, 20 June 1757).

He was known abroad for his <u>Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind</u>, and the French translation would have found favour with

supporters of Montesquieu. This seems to have been his best known publication in Britain, too, and it was certainly read by Steuart and Malthus. His discussions of population here and in the Prospects were probably equally influential, and he would no doubt be disappointed to find that posterity had concentrated on this aspect of his thought to the detriment of his utopian reforms. Locally, his writing was treated with humour in a pamphlet written at the time of the controversy over Douglas:

> When the inhabitants /of Edinburgh/ have an opportunity, three times a-week at least, to hear, and gratis too, the pure gospel of Shakespear, of Sopho, and St David, is it not ridiculous, and contrary to every rule of good policy, to squander away some thousand pounds, in maintaining above a score of pragmatical fellows, merely to retail the antiquated gospel of St Matthew or St John, to speak evil of dignities, and bring a railing accusation against their worthy reforming brethren?....it is not intended to set aside that order of men in general: my proposal comprehends only the parsons of this city and suburbs, whose parishioners can without inconveniency attend the playhouse; and if any deficiency should happen as to the numbers of mankind, from the want of these able-bodied divines, the R____d Mr W____co may be appointed to move in the Edinburgh or select society, that a certain sum should be annually

> given, by way of premium, to the clergyman, married or unmarried, (it being always understood of a sound and wholesome constitution), who shall, on the first day of January, produce to the society, of his own proper begetting during the currency of the preceding year, the greatest number of males, and another premium to the clergyman who shall produce the greatest number of females, under the conditions and provisions above mentioned.[1]

It is difficult to believe, on reading this, that there is no allusion either to Wallace's essay or his views on venery,[2] which suggests that the proposed regulations for marriage and divorce that Wallace outlined may perhaps have been more unusual than I earlier conjectured.

Wallace's distinction between writing as a philosopher and as a divine (see above, pp.110-11) suggests a contradiction or inconsistency that his writings do not really have. The days of Canon Law, which "was devised to make people not happy, but good," have been contrasted with the world today, "which has tacitly adopted the Benthamite thesis that the purpose of the laws is to conduce to human happiness."[3] The essence of Wallace's thought, which unites both his secular and religious writing, is a bridge

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1 The Usefulness of the Edinburgh Theatre Seriously Considered, With A Proposal for rendering it more beneficial (Edinburgh: n.p., 1757), pp.6-7.

2 In which case the essay may have been written slightly earlier than I had estimated.

3 I.D. Willock in his intro. to William Hay's Lectures on Marriage, ed. Monsignor John C. Barry (Edinburgh: Stair Society, 1967), p.xlvi.

between the two: the application of right reason will lead inevitably to virtue and to happiness, and men have an equal right to the use of reason and the pursuit of happiness.

Wallace is an example of a man, outstanding in his generation, who slips into oblivion because history is not equipped to rescue him. In the words of Condorcet:

> Up till now, the history of politics, like that of philosophy or of science, has been the history of only a few individuals: that which really constitutes the human race, the vast mass of families living for the most part on the fruits of their labour, has been forgotten, and even of those who follow public professions, and work not for themselves but for society, who are engaged in teaching, ruling, protecting or healing others, it is only the leaders who have held the eye of the historian.[1]

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[1] Condorcet, Sketches, p.170.

Appendix I

1.

Socinians were opponents of Calvinism from whose principles Unitarianism developed. John Biddle, who formed the only society of Socinians in England, and who was described by his friends as a man of great piety, published a number of articles against the deity of Christ and of the Holy Spirit, and died, after a series of imprisonments, in 1662. (See J. B. Marsden, History of Christian Churches and Sects from the Earliest Ages of Christianity /London: Richard Bentley, 1856/7, II, 336-47).

Arminians derive their name from a Dutch divine who became Professor of Divinity at Leyden in 1603. He rejected certain Calvinist tenets and "became the great teacher of a contrary scheme of doctrine," concerning predestination, free-will, grace and the extent of Christ's redemption. The Arminians were unanimously condemned at the Protestant Synod of Dordt in 1618, and subsequently scattered, their views being later championed in England by John Wesley and countered by Whitefield's Calvinism. (Cf. Marsden I, 66-77).

2.

New Grayfriars Church

"The Churches in Edinburgh proving still insufficient to accommodate the Citizens in the Performance of their religious Duties, the Common Council in the Year 1719, ordered another Place for publick Worship to be erected; and being built contiguous to the Western End of the

Grayfriars Church, was denominated the New or Western Grayfriars Church, which was finished anno 1721, at the Expence of Thirty six thousand five hundred and forty three Pounds Scotish Money....This Church not being collegiate, has only one Minister, whose Stipend is the same with those of his Bretheren. The Seats in this Church, in the Year 1746, amounting to one hundred and forty three in Number (exclusive of those belonging to the Masters and Children of Heriot's Hospital, poor Strangers and Servants) the Rents thereof amounted to the Sum of One thousand Pounds Scotish Money; which, like the others, is employed in defraying the Expenses of the several Churches." William Maitland, The History of Edinburgh (Edinburgh: Hamilton, Balfour & Neill, 1753), p.203.

3.

The Commissary Court

"The Jurisdiction of the Bishops Officials having ceased at the Reformation of Religion in Scotland, Queen Mary, in lieu thereof, instituted the Commissary Court of Edinburgh, which was established in the Month of February, in the year 1563; it consists of four Commissaries or Judges, a principal Clerk, with a Deputy, a Procurator Fiscal, Extractors, &c.; and the Commissaries admit to Trial Proctors who plead before them. This Establishment has been confirmed by divers Acts of Parliament.

To this Court belongs a twofold Jurisdiction, the one private, the other diocesan; the former extending over all Scotland, the latter confined to the Counties of the East, West, and Mid Lothians.

To the private Jurisdiction belong all matrimonial Cases, namely, Actions declarator of Marriage, Legitimacy, Idiotry, Tunosity, Precontract, Nearness of Kin, or other Grounds relevant in Law; and all Actions of Adherence, Divorce on account of Adultery, or malicious Prosecution; of Separation a mensa et thoro; and of Aliment to the Party injured: And Appeals from other Commissary Courts, whose Decrees are subject to be reviewed by this Court in prima instantia. And to the Diocesan Jurisdiction belong all Testamentary Cases; the making of Titles to personal Estates of Defuncts by Confirmations; Questions concerning Executory and Division thereof; Constitutions of the Debts of Persons deceased; Actions of Scandal and verbal Injuries; of Benefices, Tithe or Teynds; the giving Curators to Minors; the authenticating Tutorial and Curatorial Inventories; the registring of Deeds granted by Persons residing within their Jurisdiction, by Virtue of the common Clause of Registration. Likewise other civil Causes and Actions of small Debts are heard and determined; and Sums of any Extent when the Defender prorogates their Jurisdiction. To this Court also belongs the Privilege of confirming the Wills or Testaments of Natives that die abroad; likewise those of such Persons who die in Scotland without a settled Residence." William Maitland, The History of Edinburgh, pp.377-78.

Edward Topham, in 1775, described the Court as "a little room of about ten feet square, and, from the darkness and dirtiness of it, you would rather imagine that those who were brought into it, were confined there. To this Chamber of Justice you ascend by a narrow, dismal, winding stair-case, and where you are in danger of falling every step you take." He adds (a fact corroborated by Hugo Arnot,

History of Edinburgh [1816 ed.], p.379), that the salaries of the judges are paid by those appearing before the Court. (Edward Topham, Letters from Edinburgh [London: J. Dodsley, 1776], pp.299-300, 305). Concerning salaries, Arnot writes: "It is certainly a great impropriety attending the constitution of this court, that the salaries, or to speak more properly, perquisites of the judges, are paid by the litigants before it. This is not only an oppression upon the subjects, but may lead to a very interested conduct on the part of the judges, who have a power of declaring how much the litigants shall pay for the sentence the judges pronounce. Four hundred pounds a-year is equal to the pitiful emoluments of the whole four judges. It ought certainly to be paid out of the public revenues; and should, indeed, be augmented, for their present emoluments are, by no means, an adequate recompense for their trouble" (379).

4.

The Letter to the Learned Author of the Queries, Unmasked: Presented to the Review of the Author, p.5, para. 2:

"When any particular Law appears to be hard, or seems attended with dangerous Consequences, which were neither foreseen or intended; may'nt the Subject represent this in a modest Way; or when the Clergy, or any other Sect of Men are ordained to do something which their Consciences tells [sic] them they ought not to comply with; may'nt they publish the Reasons of this, and shew the Grounds of their Scruples, that they may'nt be looked upon as Fools, and

disaffected to the Government? — If any Man call this Licentiousness, I don't see that the true Meaning of his Scheme can be any other than this, 'That none ought to think, that a Government hath done, or can do any Thing that is wrong, that every Man ought to believe in his Conscience that his Superiors are always in the right; or, at least, he ought to say so to his Neighbour; that the Liberty of the Press should be wholly taken away; and if any Man say there is the least Disadvantage in any of the Laws, he ought to be punished as seditious; that there should be no private Opinion against publick Authority; and that the Subjects should not measure their Happiness by what they feel, but think the Government always good, whatever Hardships they are exposed to.'"

5.

Haddow's Hold Church

"Edinburgh having been still in want of Churches, the Common Council in the Year 1699, judged it necessary to convert a Meeting-house in the Land-Market into a Parish-Church; but this Resolution being petitioned against by the Ministers and Elders of neighbouring Parishes...the said Council, in lieu thereof, ordered the North-western Part of St. Giles's Church to be fitted up for the Use of the new intended Parish; which being accordingly performed; it received the name of Haddow's-Hold Church, from a Part thereof (as 'tis said) having been a Prison, wherein one Haddow, a Person of Distinction, had for a long time been kept in Duress. Be that as it will, the District thereunto belonging is denominated the New

North Church Parish...The Seats in Haddow's-Hold Church, anno 1746, amounted to one hundred and thirty five, which were let for the annual Sum of One thousand two hundred and thirty six Pounds, Scotish Money."

William Maitland, The History of Edinburgh pp.179-80.

6.

On the verso pages of a volume of manuscript sermons (La II 97[7]), Wallace entered dates, texts and places (most frequently Tenterden) at which, presumably, the sermons were preached. Lefton, in his Thesis, p.220, assumes that Wallace preached on these occasions, but this seems highly unlikely: in 1768, for example, he would have been in Tenterden in January, April and July and there are entries for February, April, June, July, August and September of 1769. There is nothing to indicate that Wallace travelled this frequently (the sermons date from 1761), an almost impossible undertaking, nor that he spent long periods of time at Tenterden. It is much more probable that Wallace's notes referred to texts that Matthew was preaching from, or sermons that Wallace sent him. Wallace certainly did not preach those dated September and October 1771, as he died in July of that year. In January and February 1766, three sermons are listed as being preached at the Edinburgh English Chapel, a much more likely place for Matthew to preach than for his father.

7.

The following advertisement from Caledonian Mercury, Saturday, 13 February 1768, describes one house in Libberton's Wynd:

"To be sold in Forrest's coffee house, upon Wednesday the 17th inst. at 5 o'clock afternoon.

The House near the foot of Libberton's wynd, presently possest by Lady Henrietta Campbell, consisting,

The under story,

of kitchen, servants hall, coal and wine cellars, larder and pantry.

The first floor,

Having one entry from the court, and another from the wynd, a large dining-room, two large rooms, and two bed closets.

Second floor,

A large dining-room, two large rooms, and two bed closets.

Third floor,

Three rooms, besides a large lumber garret.

The house is well lighted to the south, and has belonging to it an area to the south, and part inclosed with a stone wall, where stables, or other offices, may be built."

8.

According to the D.N.B. John Hutchinson (1674-1737) "seems to have started from the opinion that Newton's doctrines were of dangerous consequence." His theories were taken up by Duncan Forbes (1685-1747), John Parkhurst, Bishop George Horne and William Jones of

Nayland, "men of greater pretensions to scholarship than himself, and the 'Hutchinsonians' became a kind of recognised party. Their love of scriptural symbolism seems to have been the peculiarity which chiefly recommended him to his followers." They were united, in the words of Leslie Stephen, "in an extreme dislike for rationalism; in a fanatical respect for the letter of the Bible; and in an attempt to enlist the rising powers of scientific enquiry upon the side of orthodoxy." (English Thought in the Eighteenth Century I, 390).

9.

H. R. Sefton in his Thesis (p.89 and n.29) assumes from a draft letter in La II 620[29]7, in which Wallace expresses his sense of awe at having been chosen ecclesiastical adviser and speaks of his correspondent as also having been asked to assist, that his colleague was probably James Ramsay, minister at Kelso. He makes this deduction from Wallace's reference to his correspondent's having been Moderator of the last Assembly. James Ramsay was Moderator in the year 1741, but Wallace was almost certainly writing after May 1742 and the Moderator of the 1742 Assembly, which was then past, was Tullideph. While there are a number of references to the latter's assistance among the Yester papers, no mention is made of James Ramsay.

10.

New Dalrymple of Drummore was the second son of Sir New Dalrymple of North Berwick. He was admitted advocate on 18 November 1710 and was elevated to the bench on 29 December 1726, when he took the title of Lord Drummore (Brunton and Haig, pp.500-501). One reason for Drummore's attempt to thwart Arniston was, of course, that they disagreed politically. A personal animosity also might have stemmed from the rivalry between Arniston and Drummore's uncle, Sir David Dalrymple of New Hailes. "While Solicitor-General, Dundas was more trusted by the Duke of Roxburghe, then Secretary for Scotland, than the Lord Advocate Sir David Dalrymple," writes George W. T. Omond in The Lord Advocates of Scotland (Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1883) I, 311. "Dalrymple's opposition to the policy of Government had deprived him of all influence; and it was Dundas who was consulted by Ministers, who did not attempt to conceal the indifference with which they regarded the opinions or wishes of the Lord Advocate. Even when the Lord Advocate was in London, Dundas was sometimes asked to come from Scotland and give his advice on subjects which had not been mentioned to Dalrymple."

11.

The extent to which Montesquieu influenced Hume has been debated. E. C. Mossner has pointed out that notes Hume made before the publication of the Treatise in 1739 deal with the population issue and call into question the validity of ancient estimates of

population size. He therefore regards as unfruitful a search for specific influences (such as Vossius, Montesquieu or Wallace), on Hume's essay, which, Mossner claims, "would almost certainly have appeared in any event."[1] Hume describes his work, in a letter dated 18 April 1750, as "a very learned, elaborate discourse, concerning the populousness of antiquity; not altogether in opposition to Vossius and Montesquieu, who exaggerate that affair infinitely; but, starting some doubts, and scruples, and difficulties, sufficient to make us suspend our judgement on that head."[2] Roger B. Oake, who comments on Hume's "typical understatement" in the foregoing quotation,[3] compares similarities in the texts of Hume's essay and the Spirit of Laws and suggests that Hume was writing with Montesquieu's text "in very vivid reminiscence, but not physically present."[4]

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1 E. C. Mossner, "Hume and the Ancient-Modern Controversy, 1725-1752: A Study in Creative Scepticism" in University of Texas Studies in English, 28 (1949), 149.

2 The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932) I, 140. Hereafter cited as HL.

3 In a useful article, "Montesquieu and Hume", MLQ 2 (1941), 32.

4 Oake, p.33 n.38. The "error" pointed out by Oake in n.36, where he claims that Hume misquoted Montesquieu as stating that the ancient population was fifty times larger than at present, is also perpetuated by Wallace, both in his MS and in the published Dissertation (35). This could mean that Hume had Wallace's MS in front of him, but Francesco S. Nitti (in Population and the Social System /London & New York: Swan Sonnensobein & Co.; Scribner's, 1894/, p.5) draws attention to the fact that in one edition of the Lettres Persanes Montesquieu estimates the ancient population to be ten times greater than at present, while in another edition he believes it fifty times greater. Oake cannot know of the latter edition.

Slavery is another point upon which Hume and Wallace differ, and Wallace takes up the matter in his Appendix. Hume argues in his essay that the disadvantages of slavery in the ancient economy retarded population growth. Considering first the comparative domestic, and then the comparative political economy, he concludes that the chief difference on the domestic side is that the ancient practice of slavery has now been abolished (I, 385). He points out that to breed slaves in the richer and more populated countries would not have been economically viable, and that births among the female slaves would have been prevented (I, 388). Recruitment from the provinces, which has its parallel in eighteenth-century London, depopulates the state without increasing the rate of population growth in the larger cities. Hume emphasises the cruelty and oppression of ancient slavery and argues that the practice of caring for the children of slaves within the master's family was very uncommon. Wallace's reply (168-210), based on quotations from ancient authorities that supported his view, argues that slaves were not treated as badly as Hume maintains,[1] that while it is possible (though not certain) that slaves were not allowed to breed in the large cities, this did not prevent large numbers being bred in the provinces, and that marriages among slaves were in fact encouraged. Wallace takes issue with some of Hume's interpretation of ancient

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[1] It is indicative of the selectivity in the choice of quotation that both writers cite passages from Seneca to prove that slaves were treated with gentleness (Wallace, p.169) and with cruelty (Hume, I, 387).

authorities, but more significantly in this section he returns to the fundamental basis of their disagreement: simplicity of living, he asserts, encouraged the gentle treatment of slaves (169), and luxury was one of the main causes of the depopulation of Italy, not "because it rendered the breeding from slaves unprofitable, but on account of growing delicacy and debauchery of manners; in consequence of which," he adds, "not only the former general practice of marrying, but the love of agriculture declined" (178).

13.

James Graham (1745-1794) studied at Edinburgh University under Professors Monro primus, Cullen, Black and Whytt, but probably did not qualify. He travelled through America as a doctor, specialising as an oculist and aurist, and returned to Britain, advertising amazing cures. He became fashionable, despite being attacked as a quack, and set up a "Temple of Health" in Royal Terrace, Adelphi, facing the Thames. This was the home of his "Celestial Bed" and the apparatus in this lavishly decorated house was said to have cost at least £10,000 (DNB).

His eccentricities are reported by Robert Southey:

> When J. saw him he was sitting up to the neck in a bath of warm mud, with his hair powdered and in full dress. As he was haranguing upon the excellent state of health which he enjoyed from the practice of earth bathing, as he called it, J. asked him Why then, if there was nothing the matter with him, he

> sate in the mud? The question puzzled him. -- Why, he said, -- why -- it was -- it was to show people that it did no harm, -- that it was quite innocent, -- that it was very agreeable: and then brightening his countenance with a smile at the happiness of the thought, he added, "It gives me, sir, a skin as soft as the feathers of Venus's dove"....Latterly he became wholly an enthusiast, would maddon himself with ether, run out into the streets, and strip himself to cloths the first beggar whom he met. (Letters from England, ed. Jack Simmons [London: Cresset Press, 1951], p.298).

14.

On the front free end-paper of the BM copy of A View of the Internal Policy of Great Britain is a note in the hand of William Temple, of Trowbridge which states:

> In White's Catalogue the author of this interesting work is said to have been Dr. Robert Wallace, one of the Ministers of Edinburgh, the author of "Characteristics of the present Political State of Great Britain," published in 1758. This work is not mentioned among the Doctor's works, in the Memoir of his Life and Writings.

This is presumably the source of the attribution, but a glance at the

work is enough to convince one that Wallace is not the author. The language is uncharacteristic: he refers, for example, to the National Debt as "this terrible Inchantment, or rather this Wen, growing on our political mother" (102) and later states that "it will be infinitely better for some able State Surgeons to cut off this Wen, this tumor that grows on the constitution" (109).

Discussion of trade and commerce, and of the British Constitution relates principally to England (in Book I the "Review of the Affairs of Scotland" is given two and a half pages) though the author is complimentary, and describes Darien, for example, as "a glorious effort" (84). The "Observations on the Church" refer to the Church of England and there is no reason to suppose in a work of this kind that Wallace was adopting the guise of an Englishman. When he does so (in "An Address...Concerning Occasional Conformity to a nationall worship") it is with a view to affecting impartiality and the Scottish Church is far from neglected.

The Characteristics was Wallace's only work, apart from his Synod Sermon, to be published more than once during his lifetime, and it appears to have gone through two editions in French: Coup-d'oeil sur ma Patrie. Traduit de l'Anglois (Amsterdam, 1758), and Caracteristiques de l'état politique du royaume de la Grande-Bretagne sur le pied qu'il est aujourd' hui. Trad. (La Haye, 1759).

Appendix II

La II 620[29]7

R & D.B: I presume to beg the favour that you will let me know what your Presbytery has done in the Scheme relating to the Ministers widows which is to be before the Commission in November, for as this is an affair of great Consequence we are very desirous of knowing soon how its likely to turn

There is also another favour I would ask for as you must often have observed the animosities which have happened about the settling of vacant churches so one probable mean/s/ of preventing these as the law now stands & bringing about settlements in the most comfortable & peaceable method where the crown is concerned is for some who by their situation & connexions have access to such as are concerned in managing for the crown to be able to give them early & just accounts of the circumstances of vacant parochs where the Crown is patron & of the inclinations of those whose interest is likely to have the greatest weight in bringing about comfortable & peaceable settlements for which reason I would beg that as soon as possibly you can after any paroch in your bounds falls vacant where the crown is patron you would be so good as to acquaint me which way you think the inclinations of the principall persons and of the Congregation are most likely to point & particularly how the heretours stand affected & every thing which in your opinion may tend either to make a happy & peacable settlement or to prevent it: the reason why I presume to ask this favour is that by my long acquaintance with some who are now concerned with managing for the

crown I have had an opportunity & the pleasure of hearing them declare since they have been employed for the crown that they have it much at heart to consult the good of the church & the peace & happiness of particular paroches in all the settlements where the crown is patron & that others concerned in the ministry are of the same mind & have the same favourable Disposition in which case it is much to be wished they should have such early & good information from time to time as may prevent their being led into any measure which may prove dissagree/able/ or may occasion any disturbance or embarass the Judicatories of the church. I know well how much your information & opinion in all these cases is to be depended upon & therefore I have begged this favour of you & will be much obliged if you will favour me with an answer by the very first post after this comes to your hand (if you direct for me One of the ministers of Edinburgh I will get your letters regularly by the post & this is the surest & speediest way of sending them) I shall be also much obliged to you if you will let me know any other news of your Presbytery or neighbourhood & any cases that are likely to come before nixt Assembly In return to which I promise to give you the best accounts I can of any thing passing here you may wish to be informed by me.

I am. R. & D. B.

Appendix III

ERO C119/17/10

Proposals for raising a fund for jointures to the widows of such Gentlemen as have not lands estates nor great sums of money but live by their bussiness or yearly income which depends on their lives.

1. It is proposed that a society be formed of the husbands adventurers the contributors to this fund.

2. that every husband pay in yearly to this society what sum he thinks proper during his life & that his widow shall draw after his death a proportionable sum during her life

This method is judged better than that a compleat sum be given in all at once because this proposal is principally intended for Gentlemen who have not great sums of money but may be able to spare something out of their yearly income.

Besides it will be easier to settle a sum for the widow in this manner than if a great sum be given at once

3. its experience alone & a nice calculation that must determine the proportional sum the widow is to have after the husbands death, but a beginning may be made by allowing triple the sum the husband payed in during his life so if a husband payes yearly 10L the widow has 30L if he pay 30L she drawn 90L during her Life

It is judged this proportion will not be too great Considering that the husband has as good if not a better chance to be the survivor so the half or more than the half of the widows will want no jointure which alone makes the Society able to give Double or near to Double of what the husband pays (for by the exactest Calculation the

Society is not to be allowed to be very rich but to depend cheifly on their yearly incomes & not on the rents of Lands or interests of money) But besides this as the ordinary time of marrying & Consequently of entering into this society (as we shall see afterwards) is about 30 years of age & persons at 30 by the bills of mortality may be supposed to live about 28 years, this makes the common time that marryed persons live together about 28 years, & 58 to be the common time when a woman is a widow. but persons at 58 years of age by the bills of mortality have an equal chance to live only 13 years which is not half the time that married persons live together That is to say the Society has only half the number of widows to provide & this half only half the time of their husbands contributing yearly to the Society; that is every widow may have the Quadruple of what the husband payes in, & therefore a triple cannot be too much

But the proportioning of this sum according to the exigencies of the Society must be left either to the Court of Directors or to the annual meeting of the whole contributors as shall be most expedient.

4. Married persons are supposed to be much about an age or they may be supposed to have nearly an equall chance for Living tho the husband be somewhat elder because of the risk of bearing children

It is proposed therefore that if the husband be not above 10 years older than his wife he be allowed to enter into this Society according to the above proposals

5. But if the husband be more than 10 years older than his wife besides the yearly sum he payes, for every year above 10 he must

give a preemium for his privellege of entering into the Society

This preemium is to be payed all at once at entering into the Society or at the outmost at 3 terms the Determination of this preemium depends on a nice calculation. thus suppose a man be 15 years older than his wife had he been 5 years younger than he is he had been free, to make all equal then he must pay 5 years advance, that is 50L of preemium if he is to pay yearly 10L. But this will make too great a sum payable as a preemium, there must therefore be some abatement made by making it only a half or 3d of this sum, but still it must be some proportional part of his yearly income.

6. Tho a man shall dy tomorrow after he enters into the Society his widow shall be entitled to her Jointure & he shall be obliged to the first years payment Provided a man enter into the society within a year of his marriage or the first Constitution of the Society but no man must be allowed to enter upon his death bed or when its visible that he is dying to prevent which, it may be constituted that every man must not only come to transact this with the Directors but that the bargain shall not be finished till 3 months after the first proposal & the man be personally present

7. But if he do not enter within a year of his marriage or Constitution of the Society besides all other regulations concerning him he must live a full year after he enters into the Society without whichhis widow shall not be entitled to her jointure

8. A man is to be allowed to enter into the Society any year of his life but if he dont enter within a year of his marriage or the Constitution of the Society he must besides his yearly payments

advance to the Society a sum equal to all his payments supposing he had entered into the Society within a year after his marriage But because this sum will be too great & equivalent to a total excluding great numbers out of the Society it may be Considered whether any abatement may be made of this & what these abatements shall be.

To show that the Society has the best chance by people entering into it soon & not long after their marriage suppose 2 couple enter into the Society the one couple within a year of their marriage or about 30 & the other couple long after at 60 years of age & that they were both married in one year, the Society must be a much greater gainer by the one than the other for they gain of the one 30 years payments more than the other. But to balance this its said that as they have the chance of gaining then they have the chance too of losing 30 years payments to the widow which is not in the others case and after all if you allow old people to enter within a year after their marriage its the same thing. So this is dubious: or the question comes to this if you will allow men after a certain age 40 suppose to enter into the Society without a preemium & what security the Society shall take to keep out old men that are dying

9. The Society shall be Constituted as soon as there are 20 adventurers.

10. every adventurer shall have an equal vote.

11. the management of the Society shall be in this manner

there shall be 30 Directors (7 to be a Quorum) their office to go by rotation according to their standing in the Society, the Directors to change every year except the one half who shall continue

2 years, the Directors to keep books to ly open to all in the Society, the Old Directors to clear accounts with the new: all the Society to have a meeting once a year upon a fixed day, & nothing to be determined at that meeting as a rule that shall not be carried by two thirds or three fourths of the whole the Directors to serve Gratis; & the Clerks, Cashiers &c only to be payed

12. the Society at first must be voluntary and therefore there must be no compulsitor on any to continue his payments, but in case any man do not pay his annual sum within 6 months after it is due he shall forfeit all praeceding payments and his widow to have no jointure: but the Society is to endeavour to obtain a charter from the Crown or act of parliament as soon as possible

13. No man nor his widow shall have it in his power to transfer his or her right to the jointure: to prevent stock jobbing

14: if a man dy intestate and his widow marry her jointure shall be divided equally among his children, & she shall lose all title: but if he have no children the widow shall preserve a right to her jointure tho she marry

15: a man shall have it in his power by testament to proportion the widows jointure betwixt her and his children as he pleases, or to give it to the children alone & his testament shall be a rule to the Society

16. When a mans wife dies he will doubtless discontinue his payments, and if he marry again he must make a new bargain (if he would enter into the Society again) according to the above rules

17. the Society is not to have a great capital stock but to depend cheifly on their annual payments & not upon rents of land or interests of money but as they must have some capital especially at

first, the securing & disposing of this Capital to be left to the Court of Directors

18. the number of the Society not to be limited

19. If one has once entered into the Society & is to pay so much, & afterwards thinks it fit to pay more that his widow may get a greater jointure he must not be allowed to do this without a great preemium.

Appendix IV

Scots Magazine 8 (June 1746), 272.

A letter from Alexander Lind, Esq; Sheriff depute of Mid-Lothian, to the Ministers in that shire, dated, Sheriff's office, Edinburgh, May 30. 1746.

Rev. Sir,

As you must be best acquainted with those in your parish who have not been concerned in this wicked and unnatural rebellion, that none of them, from any unjust suspicions, may suffer any hardships, I am ordered by the Lord Justice Clerk to desire you will make up lists of all those in your parish who have not been concerned in this rebellion, either by carrying arms, or otherwise; including in that list, not only residenters of all ranks, but likewise heritors and liferenters, tho' not residing.

Send under my cover two several copies of such lists, sealed up; one directed to the lord Justice Clerk, another to the Honourable Sir Everard Fawkener, Secretary to his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland. As you have lists of your parish, an answer will be expected in a few days. I am,

Rev. Sir,

Your most humble servant,

Alex. Lind.

P.S. If it will be less trouble to you, you may send a list of those only in your parish who have been concerned in the rebellion, instead of those demanded.

Appendix V

La II 620[14]

Conjectures concerning the fall of Ecclesiasticall power Splendour & Dignity Written in the year 1768

The writer of this little piece does not found his conjectures on the book of Daniel or the Revelation of St John the Divine or any prophecies in the sacred canon: these prophecies are too Dark to be fully understood without a new Revelation or such a series of Events as may be a key to them: whatever opinion we may be able to form concerning the main scope of them, without further light than we have att present we will never be able to Determine the times and the seasons: I found my conjectures on the appearances of things in Europe and the temper of mankind in the present age

from the consideration of these appearances I am very much of the opinion that Ecclesiasticall power & splendour will be gradually brought down: what /2/ ever is solid and well founded in Religion will remain but what ever is superstitious enthousiastick or the effect of priestcraft & a dangerous policy will gradually come to an end I cannot be sorry for this and am not in pain about the downfall of superstition & Religious tyranny especially when I reflect on the tyranny of the Christian priests over Europe during so many ages

since the Reformation the world has been greatly enlightened & this light is still increasing the eyes of men are daily opening we are only discovering the errors of our forefathers and the impostures by which the world were deluded in antient times there is

a great deal of solid and usefull knowledge, true discerning, just tast & judicious criticism in the present age, which I /3/ hope will not decline there is indeed too high a tast for Luxury and too great love of money att present but along with this & in some sort Connected with it there is a fine tast in other respects instead of imposing new absurd Doctrines on the world the old ones will lose their ground and force and the Ecclesiasticks of modern times who would wish to maintain the superstition & tyranny will pay Dearly for the pride of their forefathers

The effects of this appear daily Great numbers of the Laity in the church of Rome are enlightened that sacred regard which was payed to priests and their superstitious Doctrines and praescriptions is much abated The Great men who have seen thro the tricks of the priests are not so much affraid of the superstition of the vulgar even the vulgar are taught in many things to think justly. Princes and their ministers /4/ who are Desireous of freeing themselves and their Kingdoms from any rivall powers & look with a greedy ey on the splendour & revenues of the Clergy are become bold & are streching out their hands against the Clergy

The first example of this has appeared against the Jesuits who are already Banished out of severall Kingdoms of Europe and will in all probability be soon banished out of the rest: this order will soon come to an end & then great riches and revenues & Lands and houses and convents & Colleges &c employed for other purposes We are not to imagine that the order or their Doctrines are any worse att this time than they were 100 or 150 years ago when they Governed the church of Rome, were the Confessors of most of the

Princes or Great men of Europe & had so great influence in the world: No they are /57 not a bitt worse but Europe is less superstitious and the Civil Rulers know they can venture to act more boldly than formerly

after the Jesuits are quite Demolished & the Roman Catholiques find that Religion suffers nothing by the Destruction of the Jesuits plots will be feigned or pretences found out for putting an end to all other orders of Ecclesiasticks in succession I do not know the nature influence & revenues of these orders so well as to Determine on which of them the Princes of Europe & their ministers will fall first but they will make a proper choice & Demolish them all & employ their revenues & riches to what they will believe a better & more profitable purpose

I have no suspicion that a parochial Clergy will be Dismissed, the world will still find it proper reasonable & even necessary to have /67 an order of men for praesiding att the publick worship and recommending piety & good morals but this order of men will become less numerous and the useless hands be abridged In the Cathedral & collegiate churches there are many idle Drones possessed of large revenues many of these will be Dismissed there will be fewer Deans archdeacons prebends &c & no more will be retained but such as are necessary for the publick worship & exorting the people to piety and good morals

How long the power and splendour & the Revenues of the Bishops may continue I cannot say but I reckon they will be gradually Diminished & even the orders of Bishops and Archbishops will be destroyed & the church be formed somewhat after the Presbyterian

form /7 with only a parochial Clergy much on the footing of parity

But whether the church shall be governed by Bishops or a parochial Clergy meeting in Presbyteries Synods &c It will Gradually be reduced to a very simple form both in Popish countries & in England, the Splendour of the church of England will be abolished & a Lordly prelacy as it was called by the Scotch Presbyterians in the 17th Century be no more heard of

As for the Pope of Rome he sinks apace: the Destruction of the Ecclesiastical orders will be the Destruction of his power & splendour within 50 years or fewer I imagine he will be reduced to his antient state & confined within the limits of the Antient Bishoprick of Rome & have no power jurisdiction or influence In France or Spain or even in Italy beyond the bounds of his Bishoprick /8 The King of France has seized Avignon & the King of Naples some of his territories in Italy it is a chance that they shall never be restored but tho they be restored various pretences will be made use of to lay hold on his revenues privelleges territories and all that he possesses and his Ecclesiasticall power will be quite reduced

As for Religion it self whatever is solid in it will continue but the present modes of superstition & enthusiasm will come to an end. it will be in vain to vend new absurd unintelligible obscure contradictory and cruell Doctrines, the old ones of this sort will Gradually come to be laughed att & Despised

all that which I have conjectured as about to happen is reasonable & just every truly wise & good man ought to pray for & wish the speedy accomplishment: I see none /9 but the politically

ambitious, superstitious, bigotted, high church Clergy, who are inconcerned about the advancement of piety & good morals and are only fond of the power splendour & revenues of the order of the Clergy, can be sorry for such a happy change

To say att what time all these things shall happen and that they shall happen praecisely in the way I have imagined would be foolish but something like the plan which I have laid out will happen within less than 100 or 200 years

It may perhaps be imagind that the Great Ecclesiasticall revenues will be spared by Princes & great men because most of these will be conferred on their sons friends & relations. No doubt this may be supposed to have some influence but there will be a superiour [10] influence on the other side the Princes & Great men will seise these revenues partly for their own use for ever & partly to be Disstributed among persons whom they regard as much & who will be fully as Dependent or rather more Dependent on them than the Ecclesiasticks who tho often tools to great men yet frequently are ambitious of a separate power & are much Disposed to hold the Laity & even Princes in subjection

I am far from thinking that there are no good Clergymen but I do confess from what I have read & seen in my own experience of many of them there is such a mixture of superstition, hypocrisy, & ambition for power in that order that I do not wonder that men of a certain complex[ion] [11] may fancy that the loss of the whole order would not be attended with such calamities as many pious men may imagine

I throw out these Conjectures & my heirs &c may publish them

if they think it proper or make what use of them they please: but 100 years after this if these conjectures shall actually be verified & it could be proved that they were written in the year 1768 the writer would be allowed to have been a man of sagacity

Appendix VI

The only English edition of Wallace's Dissertation published during his lifetime was the anonymous one of 1753, printed for C. Hamilton and J. Balfour at Edinburgh. A second edition, revised and corrected, appeared in 1809 and was again printed in Edinburgh for Archibald Constable and Co. and Constable, Hunter, Park, and Hunter, London. This edition was presumably the result of renewed interest in population after the publications of Godwin and Malthus. Godwin, in Of Population (1820) refers to Wallace as "an able writer on these subjects, whose works have lately engaged in a considerable degree the attention of curious enquirers" (22). In 1754 a French edition was published, translated by M. Joncourt, professor of languages at Paris, and the 1809 English edition has recently been reprinted in the Reprints of Economic Classics series (New York, 1969).

The history of the initial publication is well documented by E.C. Mossner in The Forgotten Hume, pp.111-117 and in The Life of David Hume, pp.262-269. Apart from a brief outline of Mossner's account, only details not included by Mossner will be noted here.

Before the Philosophical Society's meetings came temporarily to an end during the upheavals of the '45 Rebellion, Wallace had read the paper which he later expanded into the Published Dissertation. A MS. copy of the shorter dissertation is among the papers in La II 96[3] and this copy was taken by Lord Morton to France in 1746 and confiscated when Morton was held in the Bastille, as can be seen from the identification mark.

In 1751, David Hume became one of the secretaries of the

Philosophical Society. Since early 1750 he had been working on what was to be the political discourse entitled "Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations." The fact that he and Wallace adopted opposing viewpoints in no way inhibited their developing friendship, and it may indeed have been the shared topic that brought them together in the first place. They exchanged MSS., and Hume probably read Wallace's expanded version of the paper originally presented to the Society.

When Hume's Political Discourses appeared in 1752 they contained a note referring to Wallace's as yet unpublished Dissertation, in the hope that it might go into print.[1] Its success is demonstrated by the following letter which Wallace wrote from Edinburgh, dated 4 February 1752:

> Probably you have heard of or seen David Hume's Politicall Discourses the tenth of which treats of the Populousness of antient Nations. In a Note on the first page he takes notice of my work for which I reckon my self obliged. I intend now to print it & have actually the first sheet in the Press. I am to make an Appendix Containing Remarks on his work I have Considered it pretty narrowly & continue still of my old opinion I am told it will not be right to let slip this Opportunity of printing

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1 See NHL pp.28-29. Subsequent letters (30-35) illustrate the very amicable friendship of the two men in this controversy, at its most strained, perhaps, in the gentle irony of Hume's: "You almost frighten me for my Argument; you collect so much Learning & Reasoning" (31).

> it and a good many Copies will be sent to London
> I print slowly & intend to have it Published only
> against the Beginning of the nixt session of
> Parliament Mr Hume and I have allwayes had a
> friendly Correspondence, & there will be no
> rancour nor ill nature nor any affection of wit
> or Ridicule In the Controversy.[1]

Wallace appears to have made a habit of waiting for proofs before revising his work (and often before adding such punctuation as full-stops and commas), one factor, perhaps, which delayed the speed of printing. At the foot of the title-page of the Appendix among the proof sheets in La II 96[2] is a curt note from the publisher:

> Mr Wallace will please know, that his Corrections
> & Alterations of this half sheet has occupied the
> Compositor since the Return of it; by which
> another half sheet has been retarded and will
> scarce be finished tomorrow.

The Dissertation appeared almost exactly a year after Wallace's letter to Sir Andrew Mitchell quoted above, and was advertised in The Edinburgh Evening Courant of Thursday, 18 January 1753 and in The Caledonian Mercury of Monday, 22 January 1753, to be published on 5 February. The largely descriptive review which appeared in The Monthly Review for March, 1753 (2nd ed. vol. VIII, 192-99) speaks of the question of the comparative populousness of the ancient and modern

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1 Among Letters to Sir Andrew Mitchell, National Register of Archives Scotland/0187 Craigievar Castle MSS., bundle 18. At present in the hands of Mr Patrick Doran, to whom I am most grateful for a xerox copy.

world as being treated "with great judgement and learning." The "ingenious author has shewn much reading, and has produced many strong presumptions in favour of the superior populousness of ancient to modern times." Whether or not Wallace's arguments are satisfactory the reviewer leaves to the discerning reader, though he concludes by saying that throughout the work "there are many judicious observations founded upon an extensive acquaintance both with antient and modern history."

The fame of Wallace's and Hume's amicable controversy soon spread abroad. The Earl of Morton had sent both Wallace's Dissertation and Hume's Political Discourses to Montesquieu with the following note, dated 25 May 1753:

> I have taken the liberty to send you some treatises lately published by four members [of the Society for Improving Arts and Sciences] which Mr. Smith's correspondant [sic] at Boulogne will forward to you.
>
> 1° A Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind in ancient and modern Times. The author has not put his name to it; but they call him Mr. Wallace; he is one of the ministers of the city of Edinburgh, a man of learning and a good mathematician, but his style of writing, not very elegant.[1]

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[1] Correspondance de Montesquieu. Publiée par François Gebelin avec la collaboration de M. André Morize (Bordeaux, 1914), II, 459-60.

Wallace's draft letter accompanying his presentation copy to Montesquieu is among the papers in La II 96[1a]:

> In this Dissertation I have endeavoured to prove that the antient world in its most flourishing times was much more populous than the modern. I formed this opinion long ago from reading the Classics, & from the accounts given of antient times by these authors. I have been confirmed in it by more accurate reflection; & in particular by several judicious observations on the subject, w[h] I met with in your writings. Thinking it therefore one of the most curious & most important Subjects in Literature, I have submitted to public view some observations to illustrate it.

If Montesquieu needed confirmation that the disagreement was friendly, he certainly found it in the following letter from Hume:

> Mr Wallace has honoured me with a very polite, as well as a learned and judicious answer [to "Of the Populousness of antient Nations"], which, he tells me, you have seen. I should be much afraid that I am entirely refuted, had I not, all along, in my essay, kept on the sceptical and doubtful side, which, in most subjects, gives a man so much the advantage of the ground, that it is very difficult to force him....I believe the chief merit of my performance was my forcing Mr Wallace, by a kind of

> challenge, to publish the learned Dissertation which he had, for some time, kept by him. I acknowledge that he has detected me in several errors and mistakes and it is owing to his politeness that he has spared me in many more (HL I, 177-78, 26 June 1753).

From Paris on 13 July 1753, Montesquieu wrote thanking Hume for copies of his works, saying that he had also received Wallace's Dissertation, and commenting on their friendship:

> le public qui admirera les deux ouvrages, n'admirera pas moins deux amis qui font ceder d'une maniere si noble les petits interêts de l'esprit aux interêts de L'amitié; et pour moy je regarderais comme un très grande Bonheur si je puis me flatter devoir quelque part dans cette amitié. (Among Hume's papers in the NSE, IV 48).

Montesquieu wrote to L'Abbé le Blanc in similarly glowing terms, telling him of letters from Hume and Wallace. Despite the fact they hold opposing views, he says, they "parlent l'un et l'autre d'une manière si noble, si désintéressée, et d'eux-mêmes d'une manière si modeste que je ne saurais assez admirer leur candeur"[1] (see Koszner, Life, p.267).

Not only did Hume encourage Wallace to publish, but he actually corrected and made alterations to the proof sheets of the Dissertation, some of which are among Wallace's papers in La II 96[2]. Word of this also spread, and Rousseau received the following comment from George

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[1] Correspondance de Montesquieu II, 537.

Keith, Earl Marischal, probably written in February 1763:

> Je ne me souviens pas si j'ay envoyé deja une estampe de Mr Hume, en voici une. Je vous diray deux traits de cet Philosophe qui m'ont plu particulierement, le 1^er^. d'avoir recontré un nommé Wallace qui écrivit (et bien) contre une de ses essayes, David lui demandoit quand il seroit imprimé; Mr Wallace ayant repondu, qu'il étoit alors si occupé qu'il n'avoit pas le tems de reviser son ouvrage, David se chargea de cet travaille, et l'executa de bone foye...[1]

That this anecdote had become somewhat exaggerated is evident from Wallace's comment at the end of a cover note to a bundle of papers relating to the Dissertation, dated 19 November 1764 (La II 96[1a]):

> And because some were pleased to say that Mr David Hume author afterwards of the history of England had made Mr Wallaces bad language good by his corrections of the press, Mr Wallace has kept many of the proof sheets which he corrected.... These corrections made by Mr Hume are corrected by his own hand; these corrections were both few & of little consequence as may be seen here by

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1 Correspondance complète de Jean Jacques Rousseau ed. R.A. Leigh (Genève: The Voltaire Foundation) XV, 194. (Leigh's footnote b. is clearly mistaken).

inspecting the Corrections themselves & by letters inclosed here in which he acknowlegen that they were but very few;[1] Mr Wallace hearing this calumny kept all he could find but some were lost before he heard that such a thing had been said.

The proof sheets do indeed demonstrate the minor nature of Hume's corrections, and Rosenner gives some examples in Life, p.266.

For assistance in writing the Appendix, Wallace turned to Kenneth Mackenzie, Professor of Civil Law and Charles Mackie, the first Professor of History at Edinburgh University, both of whom answered historical questions and who were clearly not in agreement with Hume's use of the ancient historians. Also among Wallace's papers in La II 96[1a] is a single remaining sheet by "Dr Whytt a professor in the College of Edinburgh" (Robert Whytt, Professor of the Institutes of Medicine, who made his name in the history of physiological science). This page discusses various fatal diseases, and when they became prevalent. Certain Greek and Latin passages were translated by Robert Hunter, Professor of Greek, whose proficiency also as a Latin scholar was well known. Despite Hume's generous acknowledgement of the "errors" pointed out by his antagonist (see HL I, 178 and HHH. p.35, e.g.), he did not in fact make many changes in his

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1 Wallace may refer here to the letter in La II 96[1b], published in HHH., pp.32-33, in which Hume says "I have endeavour'd to correct a few Expressions with regard to the Language; and as to the Argument, I shall only observe to you, what no doubt you have in your Eye, that when I dispute the positive Testimony of antient Authors, it is only or commonly their Testimony of Facts so much beyond their own Time, that there may remain some Suspicion of Mistake."

essay, though in 1756 he altered his note on Wallace, enlarging on the sceptical method and more or less excusing any factual errors as relatively unimportant in the context of the argument as a whole. The note was a fitting conclusion to an episode in which both men retained their dignity and courtesy throughout, and a particularly generous gesture on the part of Hume, to whom belittlement of Wallace's work could have been no difficult task:

> An ingenious writer has honoured this discourse with an answer, full of politeness, erudition, and good sense. So learned a refutation would have made the author suspect, that his reasonings were entirely overthrown, had he not used the precaution, from the beginning, to keep himself on the sceptical side;[1] and having taken this advantage of the ground, he was enabled, tho' with much inferior forces, to preserve himself from a total defeat. That Reverend gentleman will always find, where his antagonist is so entrenched, that it will be difficult to force him. Varro, in such a situation, could defend himself against Hannibal, Pharnaces against Caesar. The author, however, very willingly acknowledges, that his antagonist has detected many mistakes both in his authorities and reasonings; and it was owing entirely to that gentleman's indulgence, that many more errors were not remarked. In this

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[1] An interesting echo of his letter to Montesquieu, quoted above.

edition, advantage has been taken of his learned animadversions, and the Essay has been rendered less imperfect than formerly.

Appendix VII

La II 620[25]

A Speculation shewing that death is necessary fit to be inserted in my Prospects with some alterations

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Saturday. September. 17 1764. this is a very fine and just speculation to vindicate the wisdom & order of nature and providence

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Preparatory pieces in order to a defence of Religion naturall & Revealed

N. 14.

/17 An essay shewing that Death & vice are necessary

We are ready to complain of the order of nature & the morall Government of the world & to quarell with providence because of Death, Diseases, bad government, war & all the effects of vice & the irregular passions of mankind; But all these things are necessary in the present state & the humane nature is capable of much greater happiness & perfection, if men be considered either in their single capacity or as members of society; Yet such happiness and perfection are not consistent with the fundamentall constitution of the earth in its present state.

There are 2 very fundamentall Constitutions att present one is that the earth is of a limited extent Another that a new succession of men & other animalls daily arises by propagation,

& if the scheme is consistent with its self all things with relation to men & other animalls must be consistent with these 2 fundamentall Constitutions

[2] for nothing is more inconsistent with the present order of nature than that the earth should not be limited in its extent or that it should increase in bulk as an animall, this would soon disturb the solar system; & att any rate must have bounds set to it at last & if you suppose animals not formed to propagate, there [sic] nature is intirely altered att once.

Now since the earth is of a limited extent & a new succession of animals is daily raised up, of necessity there must be death that the world may not be overstocked but may be sufficient to maintain its inhabitants. It is necessary therefore that the brute animals be killed in great numbers whether they be eaten or not, for if they were left to propagate as fast as they would they would soon overstock the earth & want food, if no cows, sheep, calves & lambs, goats, kids, swine, pigs or poultry were killed, they would multiply so fast as to overstock the earth tho there were no men in it att all; and therefore since they must be killed att any rate it is the best and wisest constitution that such care be taken of them & they be bred up in such a manner as they may be food for men, thus these brute animals

[3] enjoy more happiness in life, have better pastures & food than otherwise they could have, & greater numbers of men are maintained on earth.

This argument is just if animall food be proper nourishment

for man.

This likewayes shewes if the contrivance & consistency of nature in forming so many animals to prey upon one another, for without this there could not be near so many animals supported, we need not wonder therefore, that cats naturally feed on mice & birds, the hounds suck the blood of the hares & that all the various tribes of the wild creatures devour one another, by this artfull constitution greater numbers are raised up to see the light, death at any rate is naturall to animals, & the the [sic] brutes suffer some pain in being Devoured yet living without the fear of Death or that anxiety that is so naturall to man who can look into futurity, or if they are anxious as the hares, this being soon over upon the whole by means of this death there is the more life, happiness & perfection.

But of all the animals man is the most noble yet he too must dy else the world would soon be overstocked, & death is as necessary for him

[47] as for other animals:

Not only so But he must not live long should the life of man reach to 3 or 4 hundred years the world must be over stocked, at least the life of man must not extend beyond a Determined period.

Again if Death be necessary Diseases must be so too, and the decayes of old age; at least we may easily suppose this is more fit than that men should after a life altogether free from Diseases & decay be translated to another region without death or by falling asleep as it were without pain; I can easily

suppose that Diseases & death after the present mode may not only serve the necessary purpose of preventing the earth's being overstocked but also a great many other excellent purposes, by this means there is a wonderfull variety this seems in all respects more suited to the order of nature; the other gentler & easyer method of leaving this earth looks miraculous & the present method is truly more proportionable

Nor is ther only a necessity for death & Diseases, but we see likewayes how vice & debauchery how injustice violence & war contribute to bring about the great design of nature

/57 suppose men perfectly temperate and regular in their Diet & amours diseases would be much prevented suppose a perfect Government according to Sir Thomas More's or Harrington's plan, & a proper education for children by which means vice & injustice & and /sic/ all the miseries of war would be prevented mankind indeed would be extremely happy, arts & sciences would flourish, navigation & commerce be established among the most Distant nations on a safe footing, the earth would produce in vast abundance & every part of it be like a paradise, But then it would likewayes be overstocked & there would be no room for the vast numbers of men who would be propagated under this equal & just government: & thus such a perfect & happy state of human nature is absolutely inconsistent with propagation & the limited extent of this earth.

Appendix VIII

Wilkes entered Parliament in 1757 as Member for Aylesbury, after unsuccessfully contesting Berwick three years earlier.[1] Between 1757 and his re-election in 1761, at the General Election which followed the death of George II, Wilkes had established his reputation as wit and libertine, and in 1762 he brought out the first number of The North Briton which in no way diminished this fame. With the help of Lord Bute, George III was effecting ministerial changes and shortly before the appearance of The North Briton a weekly paper edited by Tobias Smollett, entitled The Briton, was launched to justify and win favour for Bute's administration. Wilkes's reply took the form of brilliantly satirical attacks on the government, on Bute and on the Scots who, it was commonly believed, had too great a share in the new administration. For the lower middle-classes of London to whom the paper catered, the Scots were scapegoats as were the Jews to other generations.[2]

On 11 April 1763 Bute resigned and was succeeded by George Grenville. The King's Speech to Parliament on 19 April treated the terms of the Peace of Paris in a way which infuriated the Opposition and inspired the 45th number of The North Briton on 23 April. Wilkes

dilated especially upon the abandonment of the King of

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1 A full account of Wilkes's life is given by George Rude in Wilkes and Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962) to which this outline is greatly indebted.

2 John Brooke, King George III (London: Constable, 1972), p.145.

> Prussia, the inadequate terms of the peace, the Cyder Act, the frequent promotion of Scotchmen and Jacobites, and he asserted that "the King is only the first magistrate of this country....responsible to his people for the due exercise of the royal functions in the choice of ministers, &c." "The personal character," he added, "of our present amiable sovereign makes us easy and happy that so great a power is lodged in such hands; but the favourite has given too just cause for him to escape the general odium." The King's speech is, and has always been regarded as, the speech of the ministers, and, judging it in that light, Wilkes pronounced the last speech from the throne to be "the most abandoned instance of ministerial effrontery ever attempted to be imposed upon mankind." "Every friend of his country," he continued, "must lament that a prince of so many great and amiable qualities, whom England truly reveres, can be brought to give the sanction of his sacred name to the most odious measures, and to the most unjustifyable public declarations, from a throne ever renowned for truth, honour, and unsullied virtue."[1]

It is easy to see why Wallace would appreciate these points and also why a general warrant went out for the arrest of the authors, printers and publishers of the paper. Wilkes was arrested on a charge of seditious libel, though there were doubts as to the legality of the

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[1] W.E.H. Lecky, A History of England in the Eighteenth Century (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1882), III, 70-71.

arrest, over whether he could be arrested on a general warrant and whether his privileges as an M.P. should have protected him against it. He applied for a writ of habeas corpus and in court, he addressed the judges in a spirit primarily intended to move his audience in the public galleries:

> The liberty of all peers and gentlemen, and what touches me more sensibly, that of all the middling and inferior set of people, who stand most in need of protection, is in my case this day to be finally decided upon: a question of such importance as to determine at once, whether English liberty be a reality or a shadow.[1]

The writ was granted, and the cry of militant radicalism became "Wilkes and Liberty!"

A few months later, Wilkes disappeared to France to avoid punishment and in his absence he was expelled from Parliament and found guilty of printing the obscene parody of Pope's Essay on Man -- the Essay on Woman, and of reprinting No. 45. As a result of his non-appearance in court, he was formally declared an outlaw, and it was not until 1768 that he returned to England, when he attempted to regain a seat in the House of Commons as Member for the City of London. He was unsuccessful, but was returned for Middlesex, and it was as an M.P. that he submitted to his sentence of twenty-two months' imprisonment and a £1,000 fine.

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1 English Liberty: Being a Collection of Interesting Tracts, From the Year 1762 to 1769, Containing The Private Correspondence, Public Letters, Speeches, and Addresses, of John Wilkes, Esq. (London: T. Baldwin, n.d. [1770?]), I, 87.

Mob riots had broken out after Wilkes's election for Middlesex, and these were repeated during the alternation of expulsion and re-election that followed. But even before Wilkes's return to politics there was under way "a popular movement of considerable proportions" that had arisen because of the economic hardships of 1767-68 (Rudé, pp.38, 39). associated with the industrial disputes of 1768 (Rudé, pp.90ff). The political movement headed by Wilkes was closely connected with these social issues as well as standing for the cause of the freedom of the press and the rights of the electors to choose their Member of Parliament.

Other factors which inclined public opinion to favour Wilkes would also have influenced Wallace:

> The accession of George III, the dismissal of the Old Whig 'undertakers', the resignation of Pitt, the promotion of Lord Bute and his friends, and peace preliminaries with France and Spain had caused a ferment not only among Whig peers but among a substantial part of the country gentry and the citizens of London, Bristol and Liverpool (Rudé, p.185).

While rising food prices can be seen as the immediate cause of the industrial unrest, they cannot entirely explain the "Wilkes and Liberty" movement, which Rudé sees as emerging from "a complex of political, social and economic factors, in which the underlying social changes of the age, the political crisis of 1761, the traditional devotion to 'Revolution principles', and Wilkes's own astuteness, experiences and personality all played their part" (190).

Wallace would not necessarily have distinguished between the

elements in a mob who were shouting for "Wilkes and Liberty" and those who cried "'that bread and beer were too dear & that it was as well to be hanged as starved'" (Rudé, p.53). Both his political and social principles would have prompted him to see Wilkes in a favourable light, and the newspaper reports of Wilkes's early activities would have supported his judgement. The Caledonian Mercury of 19 March 1768, for example, quotes a correspondent as maintaining that

> Though Mr. W____ may have been too incautious in some of his writings, I firmly believe, that such incaution arose merely from zeal and for the honour and service of his country; and that few in this kingdom possess a larger share of real genuine patriotism than Mr. W____ does.

The same paper took the trouble to print Wilkes's election speech to the London Livery, but not those of the other candidates. In the Caledonian Mercury of 21 March 1768 we are told that:

> he proceeded, with the rest of the candidates, upon the Hustings, and was received by the people with loud acclamations. He made the following address to the Livery:
>
> "Gentlemen,
>
> I am happy to find myself once more among the friends and patrons of Liberty. This day makes me glorious amends for the rigours of a long unmerited exile, in which the only consolation remaining to me was, that from my sufferings you had an uninterrupted enjoyment of your most invaluable

rights and privileges: since the exertion of my firmness in an important moment, no Minister has once dared to issue a General Warrant against your persons, or to sign an order for the seizure of your papers; and I trust that such despotism never will be again exercised over the free subjects of this country.

I stand here, gentlemen, a private man, unconnected with the great, and unsupported by any party. I have no support but you: I wish no other support. I can have none more certain, none more honourable. ___ If I have the happiness, gentlemen, of being returned to parliament by your favour, I shall be ready to pay the greatest deference to the sentiments of my constituents on every occasion, and shall dedicate myself to their service, by promoting to the utmost of my abilities the trade and commerce of this great metropolis, by which alone it can maintain the first rank it now enjoys, and I hope, with its liberties, will ever enjoy."

This speech, particularly the condemnation of despotism, would have impressed Wallace, as would the reports of Wilkes's alledged efforts to control the mob. In the Caledonian Mercury of 4 April 1768, Wallace doubtless read that during the Middlesex elections

Notwithstanding the greatest concourse of people, every thing was conducted with regularity and order, owing, it is generally imagined, to the prudent conduct of Mr Wilkes and his friends, who, besides the advertisement in all the public papers, distributed 40,000 hand-bills,

recommending to all the voters to preserve the peace and quiet of the country.

In celebration of Wilkes's victory, it was reported that "Brentford was illuminated...and the utmost joy appeared on the occasion."

The paper continued its support for Wilkes and on 6 April 1768 we are told that

> It is said that Mr. Wilkes has written letters to the noblemen and gentlemen whose windows, &c. were broken by the mob on Monday and Tuesday nights last, expressing his great concern for such outrageous and scandalous behaviour; and assuring them, that his friends and himself took the utmost pains to restrain the intemperate zeal of the populace, previous to, and at the time of election; but that they could not forsee or suspect, that any irregularities would be committed in the metropolis, after it was over.

Wilkes is described as avoiding popular acclaim: "After the election of Middlesex, many were desirous that Mr. Wilkes might be chaired, which he absolutely refused, chusing to retire with the greatest privacy," but the breadth of his esteem is emphasised by the news that Sir Andrew Chadwick, Knt. had left Wilkes £1,000 "as a testimony of my approbation of his intrepid conduct in opposing a wicked, corrupt, and profligate administration."

Whatever Wallace felt about The North Briton, he no doubt appreciated Wilkes's defence in his speech to the Court of the King's Bench reported in the Caledonian Mercury of 25 April 1768.

Referring to the charges made against the ministers in No. 45, Wilkes declared that "I am persuaded they were well-grounded, because every one of those ministers has since been removed. Not one instance of falsehood has yet been pointed out in that pretended libel, nor was the word *false* in the information before this Court."

As we know, Wilkes was imprisoned, and the press became slightly less enthusiastic, including such reports as:

> A correspondent at the west end of the town says, that a gentleman in high office told a certain nobleman, remarkable for quick repartee, a few days ago, that he was much offended at the impropriety of joining *Liberty* with *Wilkes*, as people in general commonly do. "True," replied the nobleman, "considering Mr. Wilkes's present situation, it is using the word Liberty in rather too *confined* a sense.

The same issue — *Caledonian Mercury*, 25 May 1768 — adds that: "Another correspondent says, it is whispered, that one part of the punishment of a certain gentleman, will be banishment to Scotland."

By July 1768, popular opinion had turned against Wilkes and the *Caledonian Mercury* was printing critical letters and articles on the front page. Clearly uncertain for a spell which way the tide was turning, it had contented itself with humourous reports such as: "The Reverend Rector of a parish not far from the palace, preached a most excellent sermon a few Sundays ago, on the 45th verse of the 119th psalm, *I will walk at Liberty, for I keep thy Precepts*" (28 May 1768) and: "We hear that a Clergyman, not far from St. George's

Fields, preached lately on this text, Genisis xviii. 28. And he said, If I find there forty and five, I will not destroy it" (4 June 1768).

It was not long, however, before essays in the following vein were to appear:

J udicious sons of Britain, rouse! awake!
O ur sacred liberty lies at the stake:
H aul back with fortitude your country's laws,
H ow verging on dire Anarchy's rude jaws.

W hat! shall a wretch (abandon'd to all evil)
I nvade the nation's peace, and play the d___l?
L oud tho' he baul, "fair liberty's my claim,"
K now well, licentiousness is the sole aim.
E xpect no good, from freedom in disguise;
S can the initials, and the fiend despise.

(Caledonian Mercury 16 July 1768).

Wallace's loyalties, though, appear not to have been swayed, and he helps to vindicate Rudé's point that "one of the most significant of Wilkes's achievements /is/ that he was able to tap the loyalties and political energies of such varying and distinctive social groups as City merchants, the 'middling' and lesser freeholders of Middlesex, and the small craftsmen, petty traders and wage-earners of the capital" — and that his supporters were not predominantly working-class (183-84).

When in 1769 the House of Commons declared Colonel Lawes Luttrell elected for Middlesex, despite the fact that Wilkes had

polled 1,143 votes compared with Luttrell's 296, innumerable petitions to the King were sent from all over England (see Rudé p.105ff). The Humble Petition of the Freeholders of the County of Middlesex (signed by 1565) was reproduced in the Caledonian Mercury of 3 June 1769 and their list of grievances show how closely the views of the Wilkite supporters tally with Wallace's. They complain of abuses committed under "the unlimited and indefinite discretionary power" formerly and lately called the "Law of State," such as arrests by general warrant, the rifling and plundering of the houses of those arrested and the seizing of their papers and their close imprisonment contrary to the act of habeas corpus. They denounce the corruption and injustice of the courts and the introduction of the military, replacing "the ancient and legal civil police...unnecessarily and unlawfully patrolling the streets, to the alarm and terror of the inhabitants," and the ministry is accused of hiring and raising mobs and riots "in order to justify and recommend their own illegal proceedings" and to prejudice the King's mind "by false insinuations against the loyalty of [his] subjects."

"Repeated endeavours to diminish the importance of Members of Parliament individually, in order to render them more dependant on administration collectively" are deplored, and it is noted that threats have been employed "by ministers to supress the freedom of debate, and the wrath of parliament denounced against measures authorised by the law of the land." Public money they claim to be "shamefully squandered and unaccounted for" and "Public loans perverted to private ministerial purposes." Public honours and rewards have been prostituted to men "who can neither plead public

virtue nor services."

In view of Wallace's ardent belief in the freedom conferred by the British Constitution and his very real concern for the happiness of mankind, it is little wonder that both the political and economic circumstances surrounding the popularity of Wilkes predisposed Wallace favourably towards him. The advantages of the Revolution which he had so effusively numbered in The Doctrine of Passive Obedience and Non-Resistance Considered (1754) must now have seemed to belong only to nostalgic memory. No longer could he write:

> we have good reason to acknowledge, that we are amongst the happiest and most fortunate nations that perhaps ever were under heaven. Scarce can a period be assigned, in all antient or modern history, of such a long continuance as the period of 66 years since the revolution, in which any people have enjoyed such solid and substantial blessings: an entire freedom from all kinds of persecution...security to our persons against arbitrary imprisonments; security of our lives and properties from arbitrary judgements; freedom from all taxes and all penalties or punishments whatsoever without the consent of the Peers of the Realm, and of Gentlemen elected by those who possess property in the nation; liberty of speech and debate, of writing and printing, in the most ample manner we can desire....We know nothing of letters de cachet, or blank warrants for banishment or imprisonment, where the names of the unfortunate sufferers are to be inserted according to the will of the Minister, or inferior governours (34-35).

Appendix II

In the Life of Hume, p.260, Mossner describes Wallace as "the sole clerical defender of Hume at the time of his candidacy for the Edinburgh professorship," a statement that he and Dr. Price amend in the introduction to A Letter from A Gentleman. Alexander Webster and Patrick Cumin also voted for Hume, Cumin albeit under duress (xii-xiii).

The accuracy of Mossner's statement in The Forgotten Hume, p.106, that Wallace was, in "ecclesiastical polity. . . a Moderate and one of the leaders of the group including Hugh Blair, Alexander Carlyle, and dam Ferguson, which kept William Robertson at the helm of the Edinburgh General Assembly from 1762 to 1780" is open to question, in that Wallace appears to have taken a very minor part in ecclesiastical debates after 1752 when the Moderate Party was formed.

According to Mossner (FH, p.106), Wallace was awarded the honorary degree of D.D. by Edinburgh University in 1746, but both the Catalogue of Edinburgh Graduates and Scott (Fasti I, 144) give the date as 1759.

It is misleading, in my opinion, to describe "Of Venery" as "an early excursion into the theory of the trial marriage" (FH, p.107), since Wallace was concerned rather for the institution of marriage and advocated renewable marriage contracts and divorce by mutual consent.

The notion that Wallace was a principal contributor to the Revoux (FH, p.106, Scots Magazine, 49 (1787), 345, W.J. Couper, The Edinburgh Periodical Press II, 69, Caroline Robbins, The

Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman, p.423 n.47, CBEL II, 663 and NCBEL II, 1370) a periodical which ran from 1737-38, is challenged by Alexander Fraser Tytler's note on the flyleaf of the copy in the Edinburgh Room of the Central Public Library, Edinburgh:

> The principal authors of this paper The Revour I have been informed by Mr Geo. Paton the antiquary were a young man of the name of Brodie a Painter, brother to William Brodie Cabinet maker in Edin. & another young man of the name of Learmonth brother to Baillie Learmonth the tanner in Edin. It was said that the Revd Mr Wallace author of a dissertation on the numbers of Mankind &c was one of the authors of this work — I enquired of his son Mr George Wallace one of the Commissaries of Edin. as to the truth of this, but he said he had never heard of it & did not believe it.

Neither the style nor most of the contents of the periodical would lead one to suppose Wallace's authorship.

Appendix I

"Treatise on Taste"

By far the longest of Wallace's unpublished works is his "Treatise on Taste",[1] which was completed by April 1765. He revised it again in February 1767, but not, apparently, entirely to his satisfaction, since in October 1768 he describes it as "in a manner finished" and resolves to "revise [it] ere it shall be published." This he had done by December 1769, when he notes that "I have again read over the treatise on tast and approve of it."[2]

It is not known whether an attempt to publish was made during Wallace's lifetime. He does not appear to have approached the London publisher William Strahan who brought out the Prospects in 1761 and had paid him £30 for the Characteristics,[3] since Hume, in a letter to Strahan three years after Wallace's death assures Strahan that the treatise is "certainly finishd for the Press."[4] Hume was writing on behalf of George Wallace in the hope of having the Treatise published, and was asking £500 for it, a proposition which was rejected by Strahan, who, while he regarded Wallace as "a man of most excellent dispositions, and good abilities," pointed out that he had "never in his lifetime produced anything that was so received by the public,

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1 There are MS. copies in EUL Dc 1 55 and NLS Adv. MS. 23.3.18. Neither is in Wallace's hand.

2 See MS. fragment of Treatise in Wallace's hand in La II 620[3].

3 Letters of David Hume, ed. G. Birkbeck Hill, p.283.

4 HL, II, 289.

as could in any manner justify such a price."[1] He did, however, offer to print the book at his own expense and share half the net profits with George, but this seems not to have met with the latter's approval, since no edition appeared. The existing MS with George's corrections are in the hand of an amanuensis, and only a few fragments in Wallace's hand remain.

While Hume claimed it to be "a very good Book,"[2] his opinions were not shared by all. James Boswell, after reading the first book of the Treatise in manuscript declared that it "entertained me little, as it was just a repetition, somewhat varied, of what I had read in Books on the same subject."[3] This view is unfortunately borne out by a study of the work.

Books on the same subject abounded and many problems relating to taste were raised during this period, some of which should be examined in order to set Wallace's work in context. The very meaning of the word caused controversy and confusion: "the word taste," observed a reviewer in 1759, "though in almost every body's mouth, is used in a very loose and indeterminate sense."[4] In an attempt to clarification, John Lawson, in his Lectures concerning Oratory[5] concluded that it originated in its metaphorical sense in

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1 Letters of David Hume, ed. G.B. Hill, p.233.

2 HL, II, 289.

3 Private Papers from Malahide Castle, I.i, 135.

4 MR, 20 (1759), 534.

5 John Lawson, Lectures concerning Oratory (Dublin: George Faulkner, 1758), pp.16-17.

Renaissance Italy, and had been used only in its literal sense by the ancients. This view has more recently been modified by Benedetto Croce, who describes "gusto" as being regarded in Italy at a very early period as signifying "a judicial faculty, directed to be beautiful, and thus to some extent distinct the from intellectual judgement."[1] It was during the latter part of the seventeenth century in France, Croce maintains, that the word first came into use in a strictly aesthetic sense, soon to become current in England as "good taste". While he agrees with Addison's assertion in Spectator No. 409 that the phrase "the fine taste" might be ascribed to the Spaniard, Baltasar Gracian (1642), he notes that when Gracian described "a man of taste" he meant what we would term "a man of tact" in the conduct of life.

In its early sense good taste was identified with close approximation to the rules of the ancients, particularly those derived from Aristotle's Poetics and Horace's Ars Poetica. Describing the Renaissance as "the revival of the aesthetic consciousness, which had existed in Graeco-Roman times...[and which], reborn into a world already jealous of its Roman traditions, demanded that the arts and literature should immediately put on the vesture of old Roman forms,"[2] F.P. Chambers demonstrates that it was also "in

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1 Theory of Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic, trans. Douglas Ainslie (London: Macmillan & Co., 1909), p.266.

2 Frank P. Chambers, The History of Taste (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1932), pp.28-29 (hereafter cited as Chambers). A discussion of classicism from a more literary standpoint is to be found in From Classic to Romantic (1946; rpt. Harper Torchbooks New York: Harper & Row, 1961) by W.J. Bate, ch. 1 (hereafter cited as Bate).

theory and by its own account...a moral awakening."[1] It was necessary to justify enjoyment of the arts by showing that they were good: noble subject matter became the concern of classic art, whose value rested not on its beauty alone, but on the extent of its moral instruction.

Mimesis was an important element in classicism.[2] In the imitation of nature classic art strove after the ideal, and was characterised by unity, regularity and harmony. In the case of architecture, Chambers points out, or of the proportions of the human body, it was believed that the ideal could be discovered by mathematical calculation.[3] If mathematical laws provided the basis for taste, it followed that taste itself was definable, and rules were therefore formulated to enforce correctness. An example of this was the founding of the Académie française in 1635, which was dedicated "to the giving of certain rules to our language, to rendering it pure, eloquent, and capable of treating of the arts and

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1 Chambers, p.55. J.W. Johnson in The Formation of English Neo-Classical Thought (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1967), p.30 provides a useful distinction between classicism and neo-classicism: "Nowadays, 'classicism' can be conveniently defined as the intellectual disposition to find in ancient culture, particularly Greek and Roman, the values which recurrently appear in human experience. 'Neo-Classicism' may be concomitantly designated that variation of classicism characteristic of English thought and literature between 1660 and 1800."

2 R. Wittkower, in "Imitation, Eclecticism, and Genius," in Aspects of the Eighteenth Century, ed. Earl R Wasserman (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins Press & Oxford University Press, 1965), pp.144-45, lists four interpretations of the nature of mimesis from the theory of the ancients (e.g. Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Horace, Pliny, Quintilian, Marcibus, Longinus).

3 Chambers, p.80.

sciences."[1]

While the rules were far from being ignored by the English critics, writers such as Paul Spenser Wood[2] have been at pains to emphasise the individualism of the English, their consequent resistance of authority, and their antagonism to the idea implied by the extreme formalistic position that, as Wood puts it, "one might become a poet by diligent study and application of the rules" (189). Even in France, however, apart from a few extremists who insisted that the works of the ancients themselves should conform to their newly-formulated rules,[3] there was not a rigid adherence to the authority of the ancients alone, and such critics as Boileau and D'Aubignac reconciled neo-classicism with rationalism by arguing that the classics are the best examples of good sense.

British empiricism was initially in some respects at one with rationalism, as W.J. Bate demonstrates by citing Hobbes's belief

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1 Chambers, pp.96-97.

2 "The Opposition to Neo-Classicism in England Between 1660 and 1700" in PMLA 43 (1928) 182-197. His article in Modern Philology 24 (1926-27), 201-08, "Native Elements in English Neo-Classicism" also brings out the peculiarly English aspects of neo-classical thought in England.

3 In Of Poetry (1690), Sir William Temple writes: "The Modern French Wits (or Pretenders) have been very severe in their Censures and exact in their Rules, I think to very little Purpose; For I know not why they might not have contented themselves with those given by Aristotle and Horace, and have Translated them rather than Commented upon them, for all they have done has been no more, so as they seem, by their Writings of this kind, rather to have valued themselves than improved any body else" (Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century, ed. J.E. Spingarn (1908; rpt. Bloomington & London: Indiana Univ. Press, 1957), III, 83 (hereafter cited as Spingarn).

that imagination is "decaying sense" and is therefore less reliable than active sensation, and Locke's distrust of "enthusiasm" and emphasis on judgement and reason in preference to wit and fancy.[1] Hobbes regarded the law of nature as being identical with "the dictate of right reason,"[2] and the neo-classicists, since they "found in the ancients reason and nature in perfection," consequently "accepted classical practice as a better guide than unaided reason or disordered nature."[3] The School of Sense, however, went further, and in England it was Rymer who, echoing Rapin, maintained that "common sense suffices" in the formulation of rules.[4]

Both the neo-classical and the "common-sense" approach were based on respect for the authority of the rules, however, and empiricism, which accepted only what direct and repeated experience could verify, undermined this respect and assisted in establishing a more subjective and emotional idea of taste. The empirical interest in method and in the reasoning and "methodizing" faculty itself is, as Bate says, essentially unclassical.[5] The empirical approach was also favoured by men of science in the Baconian tradition[6] and the

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1 Bate, pp.56-58.

2 The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London: John Bohn, 1839-45), II, 16.

3 Spingarn, I, lxx-lxxi.

4 See Spingarn, I, lxiii ff. Rymer's critical tenets are set out by E.N. Hooker in his introduction to The Critical Works of John Dennis (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1939), II, lxxvii (hereafter cited as Dennis).

5 Bate, pp.25-26.

6 The influence of the scientific movement is clearly set out by Richard F. Jones in "Science and Criticism in the Neo-Classical Age of English Literature," JHI, (1940), 381-412.

latter part of the seventeenth century is noted as a period when an interest in science and in letters was often combined.

The critical climate, as one would expect, had never been completely neo-classic. Not only were there inconsistences, but signs of revolt against the rules had appeared very early, if indeed they had ever been absent. Edward Phillips, for example, writing in 1675, declared that there is in poetry "a certain Air and Spirit which perhaps the most Learned and Judicious in other Arts do not perfectly apprehend," and denied that this is attainable "by any Study or Industry."[1] Sir William Temple, fifteen years later, considered the possibility of the rules having an inhibiting effect on genius.[2] In Of Poetry he described genius as "a Fire kindled out of some hidden spark of the very first Conception," maintaining that it "can never be produced by any Art or study, by Pains or by Industry...[or] taught by Precepts or Examples."[3] He did not, however, deny the necessity of these factors in the complete fulfilment of genius, but he regarded the rules as at best preventing some men from being very bad poets, rather than as creating good ones.[4] "The Truth is," he believed, "there is something in the Genius of Poetry too Libertine to be confined to so many Rules; and whoever goes about to subject it to such Constraints loses both its Spirit and Grace, which are

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1 Edward Phillips, Preface to Theatrum Poetarum, Spingarn, II, 271.

2 Sir William Temple, An Essay upon the Ancient and Modern Learning (1690), Spingarn, III, 48.

3 Of Poetry, Spingarn, III, 80.

4 Spingarn, III, 84-85.

ever Native, and never learnt, even of the best Masters."[1]

This attitude was stimulated by Boileau's translation of "Longinus" On the Sublime, whose impact is very thoroughly dealt with by S.H. Monk.[2] The popularisation of Longinus' work is believed to have accounted for the developing emphasis on the beauties of a work of art rather than on its defects, which demanded of the critic discrimination in the form of genius or taste rather than a knowledge of the rules or of the works of the ancients. Addison, who defined "a fine Taste in Writing" as "that Faculty of the Soul, which discerns the Beauties of an Author with Pleasure, and the Imperfections with Dislike,"[3] illustrates this trend.

John Dennis was a critic who recognised the dangers of abandoning "rules" in favour of "taste", which with its more emotional and subjective bias, led to the risk of personal whim superseding informed judgement in the evaluation of art. Dennis was far from being a slave to authority — as his praise of Milton demonstrates[4] — but he believed in the basic soundness of the rules

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1 Spingarn, III, 83-84.

2 S.H. Monk, The Sublime (1935; rpt. Ann Arbor: Michigan Univ. Press, 1960), ch. I. He cites Samuel Cobb (p.27) as another early example of one who rejected the rules.

3 Spectator 409. The Spectator, ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965) III, 528 (italicised in original). All quotations from the Spectator are from this edition.

4 See, e.g. The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry (1704) in Dennis, I, 333: ". . . Milton, one of the greatest and most daring Genius's that has appear'd in the World, and who has made his Country a glorious present of the most lofty, but most irregular Poem, that has been produc'd by the Mind of Man. That great Man had a desire to give the world something like an Epick Poem; but he resolv'd at the same time to break thro' the Rules of Aristotle."

which, as E.N. Hooker says, he was convinced "were necessary if poetry was to be an art rather than an expression of purposeless and undigested observation....The alternative to the rules, it seemed to him, was esthetic chaos, a state in which the untutored desires and pleasures of a heterogeneous populace held sway in art."[1]

There was, however, an increasing tendency to regard feeling, sentiment or instinct as being a basis of taste, which had given rise to what Spingarn has termed "The School of Taste,"[2] a label which has been modified by subsequent writers on the grounds that it is too definite a description of what was "not an entirely independent critical current"[3] and whose "chief exponents were generally allied with other movements."[4] Of the French, for example, Spingarn represents Méré and Bouhours as inheriting the traditions of the Précieuses, "more or less purified by classical culture and tempered by good sense," while "the earlier and freer stages of classicism" which are seen in St. Évremond, La Bruyère and others seem "the natural products of the classical spirit itself."[5] What these men shared was a belief that there was in poetry an element that evaded

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1 Dennis, II, lxxxiii. This valuable introduction gives a very clear outline of Dennis's critical position. See especially lxxxiv.

2 Spingarn, I, lxxxviii ff. A Bosker, Literary Criticism in the Age of Johnson (Groningen: J.B. Wolters, 1930), pp.16ff and H.G. Paul, John Dennis: His Life and Criticism (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1911), pp.123ff also include sections on the School of Taste (hereafter cited as Bosker and Paul respectively).

3 Bosker, p.16.

4 Paul, p.123.

5 Spingarn, I, xciv.

explanation by rules and which could not be created by them, an element best elucidated by the concept of taste.

"Je ne sais quoi" was a phrase coined to describe this elusive element, whose characteristic Bouhours outlines in Les Entretiens d'Ariste et d'Eugène (1671): "...it is something so delicate and imperceptible that it escapes the most penetrating and subtle intelligence. The intellect does not know what it is that charms when the heart is touched by a sensible object."[1] Not surprisingly, some thinkers were unhappy with a theory of taste that allowed this emotional capacity to play the principal part in aesthetic appreciation and while the existence of this faculty was acknowledged, the need was felt to establish some kind of objective standard.

At the time Wallace was writing, then, problems such as what taste is and how it should be defined, whether it exists as a faculty in all men, why it is stronger in some than in others, whether there is a standard of taste, whether it can be educated and if so, to what extent, and the degree to which our aesthetic reactions should be influenced by rules or reason, were among those discussed. These matters were of very general interest, as can be seen by the amount of space devoted to them by periodical essayists.

Richard Steele, for example, stressed the need for the critic to be governed by "the restraints of Truth" and by "right Reason." Without reason one's taste may be determined by caprice, but total reliance on the rules leads to the adoption of the standards of others

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1 Quoted by S.H. Monk in "A Grace Beyond the Reach of Art," JHI, 5 (1944), 146.

to the exclusion of ones own. Good taste is the result of a combination of art and nature, he claimed, and while learning cannot create a talent for discernment, it does improve the natural taste, which requires the assistance of experience. "A natural Critick will readily own that he formed his Judgement by Degrees, that he grew wiser and wiser by Experience: One who joins Art to Nature doth the same Thing, but doth it more effectually: He throws himself back into ancient Time, lives a thousand Years of Criticism in a Month, and without stirring out of his Closet, is a Greek, a Roman, a Frenchman, and a Briton." Steele regarded the "Rules of Method, and the Propriety of Thought and Stile" of the ancients as "unerring Maxims of good Sense," but believed that taste can be educated only to a limited extent: "Delicacy alone can discover Delicacy."[1]

This view was still current many years later and we read in The World in 1754, for example, that true taste is difficult to cultivate where it does not grow spontaneously. Nevertheless, "those great geniuses that are perfect models of True Taste, are extremely rare," and a certain degree of taste can be acquired.[2] A contributor to the London Magazine in 1734 had gone even further, denying that true taste can be cultivated "without infinite Toil and Study."[3] More echoes of Steele, slightly modified, are to be found in a 1752 number of the Covent Garden Journal:

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1 The Englishman: Being the Sequel of the Guardian, by Richard Steele. No. 7, 20 October 1713.

2 The World, by Adam Fitz-Adam (1753-56). No. 67, 11 April 1754.

3 London Magazine, 3 (1734), 100.

> Now, tho' it is certain that to the highest Consummation of Taste, as well as of every other Excellence, Nature must lend much Assistance; yet great is the Power of Art almost of itself, or at best with only slender Aids from Nature; and to say the Truth, there are very few who have not in their Minds some very small Seeds of Taste.... This surely it is in the Power of Art very greatly to improve.[1]

An opposite view had been voiced in 1721 by Tamsworth Keresby, however, who dismissed instruction of taste as unnecessary, describing a fine taste as "a natural Sentiment, inherent in the Soul, and altogether independent of the Sciences." It is "a Sort of Instinct of right Reason, which directs us better than all Rules and Arguments whatsoever."[2] A reviewer of Rollin's Method of teaching and Learning polite Literature, writing in 1726, was also adamant in the belief that taste is an innate faculty and cannot be taught:

> Mr. Rollin is not of Quintilian's opinion, who believes that the taste of the mind is not to be acquired by art, no more than the bodily taste and smelling. I think, Quintilian is in the right. Many persons know by their own experience, that some men are not able to

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1 Covent Garden Journal No. 10, February 1752.

2 A Miscellany of Ingenious Thoughts and Reflections . . . by Tamsworth Keresby (London: for the author, 1721), p.371.

> distinguish an excellent thought from a mean one....
> I am therefore of opinion, that taste cannot be
> acquired, no more than judgement.[1]

At one extreme, then, was the belief that taste was a natural, inborn faculty, which can be neither acquired nor cultivated by art, and at the other extreme, art was held to be almost capable of creating it. The more moderate and more commonly held opinion was that a certain amount of natural taste is necessary and indeed is seldom absent, and that this can, or must, be cultivated and improved.

While the notion of taste had obtained wide currency, such protests as the following were commonplace: "It is a great abuse of language, according to Mr. Locke, to make use of words to which we have no fixed and determinate ideas. There is still greater...which is the almost-continually using words to which we have no ideas at all. I shall only instance in the poor monosyllable Taste."[2] Attempts were, of course, made to define "taste." In 1734 a contributor to the London Magazine described it as "the peculiar Relish that we feel for any agreeable Object."[3] Hugh Blair, in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783) shared this attitude, to the disapprobation of a reviewer:

> Taste [Blair] tells us, may be defined, 'the
> power of receiving pleasure from the beauties of
> nature and of art. Is this...a just and adequate

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1 New Memoirs of Literature, 3 (1726), 332.

2 The World No. 12, 22 March 1753.

3 London Magazine, 3 (1734), 180.

> definition of taste? May not a stupid or an ignorant person, totally destitute of this quality, derive a transient and unaccountable pleasure from the beauties of nature and art? Does not taste imply discernment and discrimination, or a power of acutely and accurately distinguishing what is beautiful from what is inelegant, fantastic, absurd, or unnatural?[1]

Increasingly it was stressed that there is more to taste than "the mere power of receiving pleasure" and that a faculty of judgement is involved. Despite Blair's acknowledgement that reason frequently assists taste, for example, his reviewer disagreed that taste is "beyond doubt,..ultimately founded on natural and instinctive sensibility to beauty." Declaring his opposition to the doctrine of innate ideas, he asked: "what is taste, exclusive of understanding and reason? or, where shall we find any instinctive feelings, worthy of being distinguished by the name of taste, where reason does not operate? The truth is, the instantaneous decisions of reason, founded on experience, observation, and reflection, are frequently, but erroneously, considered as feeling and instinct."[2]

A few years earlier an attempt had been made to reconcile the antithesis of reason to sentiment. A writer in the London Magazine, believing that his definition removed "all the difficulties and all the ambiguities which abound in the discussions hitherto made on

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1 CR, 56 (1783), 45.

2 CR, 56 (1783), 46.

this quality of the soul, in confining it sometimes to knowledge alone, and sometimes to sentiment only," described taste as consisting in "discerning the different beauties interspersed in the works of nature and art, so far as this knowledge is accompanied with sentiment." Striving for objectivity, he went on to define taste as consisting of two principles, learning and sentiment, whose unequal distribution results in the diversity of tastes, while supreme taste combines the highest degree of knowledge with exquisite sense.[1]

Further descriptions of taste were formulated to include the imagination as an operative factor. A contributor to the Covent Garden Journal in 1752 believed that taste is derived from "a nice Harmony between the Imagination and the Judgement," neither alone being sufficient, and he wryly commented that this would explain why "so few have ever possessed this Talent in any eminent Degree."[2] A writer in The Connoisseur, quoting what he regarded as the only just description of the term, again described taste as a "nice harmony between the Fancy and the Judgement," and considered that "the most chastised Judgement, without Genius, can never constitute a Man of Taste; and the most luxuriant Imagination, unregulated by Judgement, will only carry us into wild and extravagant deviations from it."[3] A reviewer of John Lawson's Lectures concerning Oratory in 1758, put forward a similar definition: "Taste is a delicate, acute perception,

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1 London Magazine, 47 (1778), 360.

2 Covent Garden Journal No. 10, February 1752.

3 The Connoisseur No. 120, 13 May 1756.

in the powers of fancy, as well as in faculties of the understanding," he wrote, and "imagination seems to be principally concerned in what we call taste."[1]

Another quality which tended to be closely associated with taste was morality. "There is so much depends on a true Taste, with Regard to Elegance, and even to Morality," one writer declared in 1734: "A good Taste is the Heightner of every Science, and the Polish of every Virtue..." and "obliges us to behave with Decency and Elegance."[2] A contributor to The World in 1754 went even further, maintaining that a "just taste of the fine arts and...exquisite delicacy in moral conduct are but one and the same sense, exerting itself upon different objects," and believing that a good heart is essential to the formation of good taste.[3]

The problem that exercised the majority of writers was that of establishing a standard of taste, and accordance with "nature" featured prominently as a yardstick throughout the century. An essay published in the Gentleman's Magazine in 1736 demanded unprejudiced and informed assessment of men and their works. What is new should not be rejected from "a Spirit of Aversion" nor hailed simply because of its novelty. "Nature," the writer directed, "should be the only Rule."[4] A later writer saw nature as forming

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1 CR, 6 (1758), 359 (original in italics).

2 London Magazine, 3 (1734), 180.

3 The World No. 67, 11 April 1754.

4 The Gentleman's Magazine, 6 (1736), 261. From Universal Spectator No. 359, "Of Modern Taste and Novelty."

taste: "I have endeavoured to show that taste is an artificial organ of perception, created in a healthy, temperate, uncorrupted individual, by the contemplation of nature," and incidentally provided another contribution to the debate as to whether or not taste is an innate sense.[1] Simplicity was regarded by a contributor to The World as "a supreme excellence in all the performances of art, because by this quality they more nearly resemble the productions of nature."[2]

A reviewer of George Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric may be quoted as a fitting conclusion to this outline of the views of the periodical essayists, since he ably summed up what was one of the more important critical positions of the century. Supporting his claim for rules in art by stating that "it is most evident that every art, having its foundation in nature, must be capable of being reduced to general principles and laws," he continued:

> Even in the rudest productions of genius, we may discover evident traces of some natural ideas of propriety, order, and grace; which though not digested into a system, guided the pen of the writer, or the hand of the artist. And if that principle, which has obtained such general admiration in modern times under the appellation of Taste, means any thing, it denotes a clear discernment of those relations between the objects

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1 The Mce, 11 (1792), 94.

2 The World No. 26, 28 June 1753.

> of nature and the perceptions and emotions of the human mind, on the accurate investigation of which all true criticism must depend.[1]

2.

During the period from Dryden to the end of the eighteenth century, criticism of the fine arts grew to be recognised as a serious and important activity[2] and the topic of taste featured in major works as well as in popular essays. R.S. Crane makes a valuable effort to bring order to our approach to the vast amount of critical writing by distinguishing six characteristic groups,[3] in the fifth of which are to be found those writers who favoured, as Kames put it, "a philosophic enquiry into the principles of the fine arts"[4] and who sought to put criticism on the level of a "rational science." It would seem to be by these men that Wallace was most influenced, and there are frequent references to Kames and Hume in particular, throughout both parts of the "Treatise."

Elsewhere, Crane divides works of philosophical criticism into

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1 MR, 55 (1776), 236-37.

2 See R.S. Crane, "English Neoclassical Criticism: An Outline Sketch," in Critics and Criticism, ed. R.S. Crane (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1952), p.372 (reprinted from The Dictionary of World Literature, ed. Joseph T. Shipley [New York: Philosophical Library, 1943]).

3 Ibid, pp.372-88.

4 Elements of Criticism, 8th ed. (Edinburgh: Bell & Bradfute et al, 1807), I, 8 (first pub. 1762). Further page refs. and quotations are from the 8th ed.

three principal groups,[1] the first raising questions "relating to the powers of the mind involved in the creation of literature or art or, more generally, in any kind of inventive activity, whether the results are objects or ideas," and giving rise to studies of the psychology of genius and of its various types. "The second major subject matter of philosophical criticism," he describes as "art itself treated in a similarly universal way apart from the particular formal or technical problems of any given art," such as James Harris's writings on art, music, painting and poetry. The third, and perhaps most common variety of philosophical criticism is illustrated, according to Crane, in works which investigate "the natural causes of the pleasures which men feel in contemplating external objects or the products of literature and the fine arts," the key words in which are "taste" and "the pleasures of the imagination." There are two varieties of works in this category, one investigating the workings of the mind in making judgements of taste, such as Hume's "Of the Standard of Taste" (1757), Burke's Essay on Taste (1759) and Gerard's Essay on Taste (1759), and the other concentrating rather on distinguishing the different qualities of taste, such as beauty and novelty — Addison's essays on "The Pleasures of the Imagination" (1712), Burke's Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) and Kames's Elements of Criticism (1762) for example — though these approaches are seldom completely separate.

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1 R.S. Crane, The Idea of the Humanities and Other Essays Critical and Historical (Chicago & London: Chicago Univ. Press, 1967), I, 116-18.

Writers in this last category would be described by Gordon McKenzie as "psychological critics": critics who demonstrate the change in emphasis from the neo-classical attempt to classify and describe "the external work of art," to an evaluation of literary experience based on critical response.[1] That Wallace, though clearly influenced by them, cannot be classed amongst them, will become apparent. Like many critics of the time, Wallace was eclectic and most of his views on taste are to be found in other works. The text of the "Treatise" itself suggests that Wallace revised parts of it after reading Elements of Criticism, for example, and confirmation of this can be found in manuscript fragments in Wallace's hand, which comprise "Remarks on Kames's Elements on [sic] Criticism for my essay on tast," which were begun as early as 21 June 1762.[2] But by contrast with the "psychological critics," Wallace's "Treatise" is intended to be instructive rather than enquiring and his interests are more sociological than psychological.

Part I of the "Treatise," which Boswell read and criticised, is around 30,000 words in length and the contents are as follows:

Introduction.

Terms explained — Tastes compared — Method proposed.

Part First.

Book I.

The principles of Taste

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1 Critical Responsiveness. A study of the Psychological Current in Later Eighteenth-Century Criticism (Berkeley & Los Angeles: California Univ. Press, 1949), p.5.

2 La II 620[3]. Photocopy of fragments of Treatise in Wallace's hand.

Chapter I.

Grandeur.

Chapter II.

Novelty.

Chapter III.

Variety.

Chapter IV.

Uniformity, — Proportion, — Order.

Chapter V.

Propriety, — Congruity, — Symmetry.

Chapter VI.

Similitude and Dissimilitude.

Chapter VII.

Principles of Taste — Their Combination — Their Immutability.

Book II.

The Foundation of Taste, — The influence which Education, Custom, and Habit possess in altering it.

Chapter I.

Taste founded in Nature.

Chapter II.

Changes to which natural Taste is subject — Their Causes.

Chapter III.

Limits, beyond which Education and Custom cannot go in altering natural Taste.

Book III.

That which is entitled to be reckoned a just or good Taste: — Fundamental rules of judging and performing with it.

Chapter I.

A good Taste — Criteria or properties of Things agreeable to it.

Chapter II.

General Maxims.

Chapter III.

Houses and Gardens.

Chapter IV.

Diversions — Salutation — Titles.

Book IV.

Acquision and advantages of good Taste.

Chapter I.

Method of acquiring, preserving, and improving a good Taste.

Chapter II.

Advantages of a good Taste.

It is clear from the contents that Wallace is dealing with problems which were being widely discussed at different levels. The opening lines of his introduction set the tone:

> Most men, at least among those who are raised above the vulgar, are fond of being reckoned to possess a good Taste, but are greatly ignorant of that in which it consists, or which is really conformable to it. In Criticism and in Philosophy authority and fashion maintain an extensive dominion, as well as in life and in manners: vast numbers, precipitate and servile, embrace, without Examination, every foolish notion, which they find sanctified by age or

> supported by particular names; and multitudes still greater comply with all the idle modes that come into vogue among those, whom, on any ground, they are taught to esteem fine people.[1]

Wallace pursues his "plain man looks at taste" approach throughout the "Treatise," and makes clear his intention to do so at an early stage:

> Good sense is always resolvible into intelligible propositions: and the ideas of a writer, who is not able to make his thoughts easily understood, I believe, will generally be found confused and inaccurate. Every thing introduced in my work shall, as much as possible, be both reduced to plain principles and expressed in perspicuous language (4).[2]

The aim of the "Treatise" Wallace outlines on page 2, where he states his belief in the existence of a standard of taste founded in nature, "independant on custom, on prejudice, & on passion," and declares his intention to "ascertain that Standard, to establish its reality, to prove its Independance, and by a few general rules to assist others in forming Opinions agreeable to it in particular cases" (2v).

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1 EUL Do 1 55, p.1 (all page refs. and quotations are from this copy).

2 One is reminded here of Joseph Priestley's opinion that everything "mained, distorted, or redundant, in a person's style, must proceed from the same kind of degree of imperfection in his ideas," with which Wallace may well have been familiar (The Rudiments of English Grammar [London: R. Griffiths, 1761], pp.47-48).

In book I, Wallace is concerned with the principles of taste: "Those circumstances or properties, which render objects distinguished by them immediately agreeable or immediately disagreeable to perceive" (19), the chief of which he discusses in chapters I-VI (see chapter headings). On these principles, he tells us, or on "a skilful combination of them" depends the degree of pleasure deriving from works of art or of nature, and good taste is required both for their selection and their combination (76-78).

Wallace regards grandeur as one of the principal sources of the pleasures of taste, and its chief characteristics he outlines as: diminishing our attention to minute objects, or lesser beauties, overwhelming the mind with a sense of vastness which influences our perception of other qualities, concealing blemishes and sometimes even compensating for lack of beauty and being particularly well adapted to please in description.

This first chapter is markedly influenced by Kames: in their enumeration of objects of greatness, for example, the sky, the ocean, robes, thrones, and large crowds such as regiments, are items common to them both (Wallace, p.20, Kames I, 210, 213) and there are such close parallels as:

> Grandeur, being an extreme vivid emotion, is not readily produced in perfection but by reiterated impressions. The effect of a single impression can be but momentary; and if one feel suddenly somewhat like a swelling or exaltation of mind, the emotion vanishes as soon as felt (Kames I, 209)

and:

> A single action or sentiment, which marks heroism or magnanimity may act on the passions with irresistable power, and give high pleasure: but a single image or expression, however lively or forcible, can hardly rise to the sublime. If quickly succeeded by another different intendency, its influence must be immediately destroyed; and a variety or succession of images is necessary to produce a strong impression on the fancy (Wallace, p.35).

Ironically, it is on one of the few occasions in this chapter where Wallace specifically mentions Kames to agree with him — disagreement is more common — that Wallace has clearly misread him. Citing the infinity of the heavenly bodies as an instance of the pleasure produced by grandeur, Wallace quotes Kames as asserting that "An infinite series...is always delightful" (22), while Kames in fact believes that an "unbounded prospect doth not long continue agreeable." The mind, moving along an infinite series "begins soon to feel an uneasiness, which becomes more and more sensible, in continuing its progress without hope of an end."[1] Wallace's position here is much closer to Addison's in Spectator 412, who claims that a spacious horizon and such "wide and undetermined Prospects are as pleasing to the Fancy, as the speculations of Eternity or Infinitude

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[1] Kames, I, 294. This footnote was also in the 1st ed. Wallace misinterprets this passage again on p.55.

are to the Understanding," on account of the effect on the imagination of their magnificence.

Burke's influence is suggested in a passage in which Wallace asserts that cannons firing, "being accompanied with Terror, strike the soul with an agreeable amazement" (22), but Kames also allies terror with grandeur.[1] He and Wallace disagree over the aesthetic power of magnitude, and while Wallace allows that it "covers blemishes in many cases, & even attones for want of beauty" and insists that its influence is vastly superior to pleasure arising from other sources (21), Kames maintains that a plain object which through size appears agreeable cannot be termed "grand" unless, in addition to size, it has other qualities contributing to beauty, such as regularity, order, proportion and colour (I, 212). They both agree, however, that faults in a long poem are excused more readily than they would be in a short one, although Kames goes on to state that order and regularity should nevertheless be the governing principles in works of art.[2]

Wallace attacks another of Kames's theories, which he claims to quote from the Elements II, part vi:

> "Sounds, by being high or low, they say, raise, as it were, or bring down the mind: A wall or a

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1 Kames, I, 213. A regiment where the horses are of one colour and the men are in one livery "makes a grander appearance, and consequently strikes more terror, than where there is confusion of colours and of dress."

2 Kames, I, 216: "in an epic poem we pardon many negligences that would not be permitted in a sonnet or epigram."
Wallace, p.21: "in long poems. . . we forgive defects, which would be unpardonable in smaller works."

> pillar, that declines, is supposed to produce a painfull feeling, as of a tottering and falling within: a spectator, who sees force exerted without him, they represent feeling like this external Exertion operate within his mind: a large object swells the heart, and makes the beholder endeavour to enlarge his bulk: an elevated one makes him stretch upwards, and as it were, stand erect or a tiptoe: and actions or sentiments, we are told, which raise in the soul emotions, resembling those produced by great or elevated, little or low, objects, are thence denominated grand and sublime, or the contrary" (25-26).

This passage is not in fact a direct quotation, and it is in the Elements Part I ch. IV and not in the section that Wallace acknowledges, that Kames asserts that "A great object makes the spectator endeavour to enlarge his bulk." Wallace's inaccuracies, such as the substitution of "beholder" for "spectator" and his amalgamation of those separate parts of Kames's text suggest that he was working from his own notes or from memory. Wallace finds Kames's theory improbable: there is no similitude, he maintains, "between a bulky or elevated object, and a grand or magnanimous sentiment, which indicates Generosity, Courage, or firmness of mind. The feeling excited by an extraordinary display of disinterested virtue, is entirely different from that felt on beholding any object of sense" (26-27).

Wallace takes issue also with Kames's belief that through identification with a great conqueror we can accept "the grossest acts of oppression and injustice" (I, 248), that we are raised, in other words, by his greatness and sublimity, to a different plane. It is not, Kames wrote, as he had once thought, "a wrong bias originally in human nature" to condone such actions under these circumstances: "the splendour and enthusiasm of the hero transfused into the readers, elevate their minds far above the rules of justice, and render them in a great measure insensible of the wrongs that are committed." Wallace, on the contrary, insists at length that the discerning do not accept gross acts in this way and that there are few whose principles are so perverted "that cruelty and wickedness do not appear to them remarkable blemishes even in a conqueror" (31).

A point of interest in this chapter is Wallace's description of the principles of taste as rendering "objects distinguished by them immediately agreeable or immediately disagreeable" (19). His use of the word "immediately" suggests the writings of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, who believe in an immediate and pre-rational response to beauty by a

> superior Power of Perception [which] is justly called a Sense, because of its Affinity to the other Senses in this, that the Pleasure does not arise from any Knowledge of Principles, Proportions, Causes, or of the Usefulness of the Object; but strikes us at first with the Idea of Beauty: nor does the most accurate Knowledge

> increase this Pleasure of Beauty, however it may superadd a distinct rational Pleasure from Prospects of Advantage, or from the Increase of Knowledge.[1]

Shaftesbury's followers, such as John Gilbert Cooper and William Melmoth, wrote along similar lines: Melmoth, for example, maintained that

> the general principles of taste are common to our whole species, and arise from that internal sense of beauty which every man, in some degree at least, evidently possesses....There are certain forms which must necessarily fill the soul with agreeable ideas; and she is instantly determined in her approbation of them, previous to all reasoning concerning their use and convenience.[2]

James Usher is another who argues, in Clio, that taste does not derive from reason and comparison, but is perceived instantly.[3]

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1 Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue 4th ed. (London: D. Midwinter, A. Bettesworth et al, 1738), p.11.

2 William Melmoth, Jr., The Letters of Sir Thomas Fitzosborne, 5th ed. (London: R. & J. Dodsley, 1758), p.182; Letter 39.

3 See James Usher, Clio: or, A Discourse on Taste, 3rd ed. (London: T. Davies, 1772), pp.35-36: "You are to observe, that I do not call taste a species of judgement, although it is actually that part of judgement, whose objects are the sublime, the beautiful, and affecting; because this kind of judgement is not the issue of reason and comparison, like a mathematical inference, but is perceived instantaneously, and obtruded upon the mind, like sweet and bitter upon the sense, from which analogy it has borrowed the name of taste."

The attempt to reconcile the aesthetic "sense" with reason led, as R.L. Brett points out, to a distinction being made between two kinds of beauty.[1] Addison, for example, in Spectator 412, describes a beauty belonging to imagination, the "very first Discovery" of which "strikes the Mind with an inward Joy, and spreads a Chearfulness and Delight through all its Faculties," and contrasts it with another kind of beauty "that we find in several Products of Art and Nature, which does not work in the Imagination with that Warmth and Violence as the Beauty that appears in our proper Species, but is apt however to raise in us a secret Delight, and a kind of Fondness for the Places or Objects in which we discover it." Hutcheson, too, contrasts an "Original or Absolute" beauty with that which is "Comparative or Relative," the former being immediately apprehended by the aesthetic sense, while the latter, which involves comparisons of imitations with originals, necessarily requires reason.[2] As Brett demonstrates, the two kinds of beauty distinguished by these writers are not identical, but both, nevertheless, describe one which is immediately perceptible and another as requiring reflection. This distinction, he believes, is made by many eighteenth-century critics, including Kames, who differentiates between intrinsic and relative beauty, the first being "an object of sense merely," requiring "but singly an act of vision," while the second "is accompanied with an act of understanding and reflection" (I, 198).

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1 "The Aesthetic Sense and Taste in the Literary Criticism of the Early Eighteenth Century," Review of English Studies, 20 (1944) 204ff.

2 On this point he has a disciple in Gerard. See An Essay on Taste (London: A. Millar, 1759), Pt. I sect. 4.

Burke, on the other hand, argues that a good taste must be rational,[1] and Boulton suggests that in the following passage from his "Introduction on Taste" Burke might have been attacking Voltaire's definition of taste as "a quick discernment, a sudden perception, which, like the sensation of the palate, anticipates reflexion";[2]

> I cannot help taking notice of an opinion which many persons entertain, as if the Taste were a separate faculty of the mind, and distinct from the judgement and imagination; a species of instinct by which we are struck naturally, and at the first glance, without any previous reasoning with the excellencies, or the defects of a composition. So far as the imagination and the passions are concerned, I believe it true, that the reason is little consulted; but where disposition, where decorum, where congruity are concerned, in short wherever the best Taste differs from the worst, I am convinced that the understanding operates and nothing else; its operation is in reality far from being always sudden, or when it is sudden, it is often far from being right....It is known that the Taste (whatever it is)

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1 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, ed. J.T. Boulton (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), p.xxxi. Further refs, will be to this ed. The Enquiry was first published in 1757.

2 In An Essay on Taste, included with Gerard's Essay (1759), p.213. Boulton makes this point on p.xxxi.

> is improved exactly as we improve our judgement, by extending our knowledge, by a steady attention to our object, and by frequent exercise (26).

Voltaire, of course, does not deny that good taste benefits by education, culture and experience,[1] any more than do other writers who conceive of taste as a pre-rational faculty. Even lesser men, such as Melmoth, while giving no alternative to immediate perception of beauty, allow that taste is improved by practice: "the more the soul exerts this her internal sense of beauty upon any particular object, the more she will enlarge and refine her relish of that particular species."[2]

Wallace does not divorce reason from aesthetic judgement: "In Criticism and in Philosophy...Reason is not always consulted, and Nature is not constantly followed. Hence truth and Learning suffer" (1). "Wise men," he observes, "in forming their opinions, proceed on rational grounds, and in their comparisons, like exact Calculators, take duration & number and effects & all circumstances into their Estimates" (13).

Unlike Burke, however, he does distinguish between taste and judgement. Taste, he maintains, is founded in Nature (81): "Every thing has annexed to it a particular agreeableness or disagreeableness, which it is naturally formed to produce" (84-85) and which, Wallace believes, is original and immediate. In following Nature, judgement must, nevertheless, direct taste:

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1 Ibid, p.215.

2 The Letters of Sir Thomas Fitzosborne, p.185; Letter 39.

> we must not yield to first impressions, nor instantly pursue every pleasure which offers itself; but examine and compare, that we may find out where nature has placed the chief delight. Perhaps, this exercise ought to be called Judgement rather than taste: but the judgement exercised here must end at last in exciting a quick relish of that which is best, without which we shall never pursue it steddily, because we shall not pursue it with pleasure. If our taste is not reconciled to that which our judgement pronounces good, if our nature recoils, we shall never be able to follow it with constancy, but, in a secret agreement with our own inclination, shall fall on a thousand refinements to elude the dictates of a sounder understanding (174-75).

Wallace has already noted the intimate connection between taste and judgement, but he draws the following distinction between them:

> Judgement is a perception which arises from reasoning and experience, supposes premises to be compared, and, implying the Idea of a Conclusion drawen concerning their agreement or difference, proceeds more slowly on this account: Taste acts almost instantaneously, on immediate intuition, and signifies an ability to discern easily and quickly that, which is

> beautiful or sublime in any object of sense or of understanding (167-68).

While our original feelings constitute the foundation of a good taste, Wallace believes that this faculty is highly improvable and that "a fine Taste depends greatly on discipline and on cultivation" (144). Knowledge and reason — "that faculty by which Rational Creatures compare the various objects they behold, and observe their minute differences" (145) — he regards as of supreme importance in forming a fine taste.

Wallace also distinguishes, similarly to Kames, between beauty immediately discernible and that which, for sound assessment to be made, requires reflection:

> Beauty of figure, energy of Style, congruity of colouring, sweetness of sound, exactness of resemblance; these and like excellencies cause their force to be immediately felt by all, whose discernment is sufficiently quick from nature, and is duly cultivated by exercise: But in the case of productions, such as historical pieces, philosophical treatises, Rhetorical discourses, and even poetical descriptions of real objects, in which merit is inseparable from truth of facts, justness of reasoning, completeness of parts, & correctness of imitation, qualities which must be scrutinised at leisure, an entire reliance cannot safely be had in the delight immediately yielded by them, and, at pronouncing judgement concerning

their value, we must consider the matter contained in them, as well as their form & composition (161-62).

Wallace does his best to give as broad and coherent an explanation of the relation of taste and judgement as he can, though one of his difficulties (in which he is not alone)[1] is that he sees beauty as residing in the object: "Beauty and deformity...are necessary modes in which these images strike beholders, or additional qualities belonging to objects" (83). We have, he believes, a natural, innate propensity to perceive beauty and deformity with a sense of taste which is a matter of feeling and while judgement can, and often should affect it, it cannot be considered part of it. While "an appeal must ultimately be made to right reason, and that Taste ought ever to be reckoned best, which is able to stand trial at her tribunal" (107), the sense of taste remains for Wallace an emotional quality which, indeed, should be consulted in preference to rules in the case of works addressed to the heart or to the imagination (163).

In Chapter II Wallace acknowledges and gives examples of the appeal of novelty, but characteristically he makes no attempt to analyse the causes of its appeal, but merely lists instances of it. His approach may be contrasted with that of the "psychological critics": in Kames's chapter on the same subject, for example, Kames distinguishes novelty from surprise and goes into whether the emotions arising from them are pleasant or painful. His chapter also examines degrees of novelty and distinguishes its pleasures from those

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1 Ross (p.270), suggests that Kames, in distinguishing between relative and intrinsic beauty, was perhaps attempting an answer to Hume (Essays, I, 268).

of variety. Even Addison, in his few remarks in Spectator 412, accounts for the pleasure novelty creates on the grounds that it relieves monotony and "fills the Soul with an agreeable Surprise, gratifies its Curiosity, and gives it an Idea of which it was not before possest." This tone of enquiry, in contrast with Wallace's catalogue of examples is found again, though briefly, in Burke who sees novelty as awakening curiosity (whose extent and depth as a human passion he explores) and as stimulating the mind (Enquiry, p.31). Wallace introduces a more inquiring note elsewhere in the "Treatise," observing that novelty tends to conceal faults which become evident with familiarity (97) and that it may therefore, by distracting the mind, distort clear judgement (163), but his approach is generally dissimilar to that of the "psychological" writers.

He begins chapter III, on "Variety" in the same fashion as in the previous chapter, by enumerating the various pleasures deriving from it. Here again, Kames's treatment of this principle of taste may be strongly contrasted with Wallace's: "In attempting to explain uniformity and variety," writes Kames, "in order to show how we are affected by these circumstances, a doubt occurs, what method ought to be followed" (I, 305). Wallace, on the other hand, is more concerned to depict "tasteful" variety, and he appears to have drawn some of his material for this and the following chapter from Hogarth's Analysis of Beauty[1] which, if we are to take him at his word, he should have held in high esteem: "On books especially,

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[1] Page refs. to Joseph Burke's ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955) will be given in the text. (First published 1753).

that have proceeded from persons, who have themselves excelled in the art of which they treat," he writes, "particular attention ought to be bestowed" (157). At no time does Wallace mention the Analysis by name, but the contents of chapters III and IV are evidence of his familiarity with the work.

Having described the pleasures of variety in art and nature, Wallace goes on to state that "even in regular figures It is this circumstance [variety], as much as regularity, which renders them particularly striking" (41). He analyses, for instance, the kind of triangle that is most pleasing, preferring the isosceles to the equilateral on the grounds that it displays the maximum amount of variety while retaining its regularity, and discounting the scalene because it lacks uniformity. His comparison of figures is even more detailed than Hutcheson's, but while he accepts Hutcheson's theory that the "Figures which excite in us the Ideas of Beauty, seem to be those in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety,"[1] he treats this as an unspoken assumption rather than directly putting it forward as a theory, until finally, in chapter IV, he allows that "variety...must be restrained within proper limits, and is checked by love of uniformity, or proportion, and of order" (46). It is, indeed, typical of Wallace's expository rather than critical approach, that he will take for granted certain prevalent beliefs without questioning their veracity or acknowledging their source.[2] His use

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1 Inquiry, Treatise I, sect. 2 (4th ed., p.17).

2 It might be argued that Wallace did not wish to introduce the topic of uniformity in ch.3, since he treats it separately in the next chapter, but if so, his sense of organisation is open to question.

of the word "restrained" suggests that he possibly had not Hutcheson, but Hogarth in mind, for Hogarth concludes his introduction by listing the principles of fitness, variety, uniformity, simplicity, intricacy and quantity, "all which co-operate in the production of beauty, mutually correcting and restraining each other occasionally" (31).

An echo of Hogarth again appears on p.43, where Wallace states that "waving are more beautiful than strait lines," and still more reminiscent is the exhortation to artists, on the following page, to introduce into their works "curved and serpentine lines."[1] Very possibly Wallace's observation that a "just statuory never disposes the limbs or the arms of a statue both in the same posture" (45) was prompted by Hogarth's remark that if "uniform objects were agreeable, why is there such care taken to contrast, and vary all the limbs of a statue?" (38).

Chapter IV, entitled "Uniformity -- proportion -- order," opens with the observation that very many different objects in nature "are still found to be constantly fashioned after one form... [and] resemble one another in certain characteristical respects" (45). This sameness is "ever pleasing" and a lack of it is deemed monstrous. Art too, should be characterised by this uniformity, which must therefore be a restraining influence on variety. Wallace's definition of terms is an example both of how conscientious he is in his attempt at clarity and of how verbose he can be in stating what

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1 The "serpentine line" is, of course, Hogarth's own description of his "line of grace" (Analysis, p.56).

is often the obvious: uniformity "consists in a Repetition or a continuation of like objects, and is more or less exact, as that resemblance in all circumstances is greater or less." Proportion "refers properly to magnitude or quantity, and expresses the relation subsisting between different objects considered in that respect" and order, "implying an arrangement in which regularity is observed, signifies a manner in which things or parts, that are related, are disposed or succeed each other" (46-47). Their "influence in matters of Taste," he asserts, "is universally allowed," and he gives examples of their influence and usefulness.

Because of the confusion arising from the absence of these qualities, simplicity is often held in high esteem and has been regarded as "the true standard of fine Taste" Wallace believes, and we are not surprised to find him going on to praise it along the lines of Kames (I, 200). He soon adds, however, that "if we go deep into the question, it may at least be doubted, whether simplicity is not in general more connected with use and fitness, than immediately with Beauty and pleasure" (49), a statement which raises hopes that Wallace will display some originality of thought, or a little of the ingeniousness that characterises so much of his other writing. Unfortunately, the similarity between Wallace's statement that the "utmost, which simplicity reaches, is to give no disgust" (49-50) and Hogarth's assertion that "simplicity without variety, is wholly insipid, and at best does only not displease" (39) is rather too great to suggest mere coincidence, particularly in view of the number of parallels already noted.

Wallace accepts, and regards as a very general maxim the notion

that the "highest Beauty depends on the greatest variety comprehended under the fewest and most simple rules" (54), and this is indeed a commonly held belief. Kames, for example, states that: "General theorems, abstracting from their importance, are delightful by their simplicity, and by the easiness of their application to variety of cases.[1] We take equal delight in the laws of motion, which, with the greatest simplicity, are boundless in their operations" (I, 205).

Intricacy is another topic raised in this chapter, and Wallace again makes use of Hogarth's views, if only to contradict them. "Intricacy," he writes, "...which seems to be confusion produced in an extreme degree by a crowd of objects, ought to be avoided. No doubt, it gives an opportunity of indulging that natural inclination, which men have to exercise and to activity" but, on the grounds that it implies a considerable degree of obscurity, "it appears not to be a proper source of Taste, and love of it ought not to be admitted among the original principles of human nature" (50-51). Hogarth takes a directly opposite view, and lists intricacy as being one of the principles which provide elegance and beauty (31). Wallace's reference to man's natural inclination for exercise no doubt derives from Hogarth's chapter on intricacy, where he describes man's innate pleasure in pursuit and motion. The two writers disagree, as one might expect, over the beauty of gothic buildings, Wallace finding them "commonly overloaded with ornaments, & rendered intricate by

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[1] There appears to be another parallel with Kames in the Treatise, p.55, where Wallace states that the "beauty of general theorems consists in comprehending many different cases under one law."

irregularity," greatness seeming "to be the chief if not only, quality, which makes them esteemed" since, on a small scale, they generally look "deformed and ugly" (52-53), while Hogarth allows that "many gothic buildings [have] a great deal of consistent beauty in them" (62), and argues for more freedom in the ornamentation of buildings provided that fitness is given pre-eminence.[1]

On the topic of utility, Wallace takes issue with the views of both Kames and Hogarth, who believe that an object, though lacking in beauty, can appear beautiful through fitness (Hogarth p.32; Kames I, 198-99 & 207). Wallace disagrees, and referring in a footnote to the Elements chapter III, argues that the "beauty of utility...is an extremely forced metaphor" (57). Persons of taste, he continues, must be able to distinguish between these two entirely different qualities. Objects destitute of beauty will not acquire it by possessing utility: "Few medicines [are] more salutary than rhubarb or Galuber salts: yet no man either thinks or denominates their taste beautifull, and the beauty of utility is an expression little less vitious than a loud smell or a blue Taste" (57-58). By taking this approach, Wallace evades a more searching enquiry into the problem, and had he used as his example a work of art, rather than something whose beauty, or lack of it, affects only the physical sense of taste, he might have drawn different conclusions. While

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1 Elsewhere Wallace's outlook is more similar to Hogarth's and he allows that while convenience should be preferred to ornament in works chiefly intended for use (111), ornaments, unless incongruous, should not be avoided (112).

preferring utility to ornament, however,[1] he consistently maintains that beauty and utility are two separate qualities.[2]

It appears that Wallace regarded the words of his title to chapter V — "Propriety — Congruity — Symmetry" — as synonymous:

> A propriety is discoverable almost in every matter: in conduct and in art. Piety and virtue themselves may be said in a very proper sense to consist in congruity of sentiments, of words and of actions, to the relations in which individuals stand to God, to themselves, and to one another. Indeed, this forms the highest species of symmetry, and is largely treated by moralists and by Divines, But in all other affairs, also, even on trivial as well as on important occasions, congruity ought to be maintained (59-60).

This chapter comprises for the most part examples of propriety in art and behaviour, and Wallace clearly expects any man of sense to appreciate its importance without explanation, which he makes no attempt to give. The short and illustrative nature of the chapter can be contracted with Kames's detailed analysis of the essence and conditions of congruity and its effect on the emotions in the

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1 "It is a good rule therefore, both for Individuals and for Communities, to preferr that which is necessary to that which is ornamental, and things, which are useful, ought to be provided before aiming at such as are showy" (114).

2 See, e.g., pp.93-94: "Utility is different from Beauty, and from every quality which is immediately perceived as soon as objects are presented to view."

Elements I, ch. X.

Wallace's sixth chapter, on "Similitude and Dissimilitude" is very much more ordered, and several allusions to Kames suggest the reason for this. Wallace appears to have had no other work in mind when he wrote the previous chapter, where he employed his own descriptive and non-analytic approach. In chapter VI, however, he deals with points from Kames's chapter on "Resemblance and Dissimilitude" (Elements I, ch. VIII) and his organisation here has almost certainly been influenced by the other writer.

Wallace points out that we derive pleasure from comparison and contrast (62-63) and that even deformity may highlight beauty by acting as a foil (64). Imitation, one of the principle sources of pleasure in many arts, derives its powers of satisfaction from our delight in similitude, although, Wallace points out, the art with which the likeness is created, and its elegance and ingenuity are also contributory factors. Nevertheless, this delight is so great that even an ugly subject will please us by the closeness of the resemblance. Pleasure is always proportional to the similarity between the work of art and the object, provided that the imitation is recognised as such and is not mistaken for the real thing (65).

Kames regards instruction as the chief (though not the only) end of comparison and of contrast (I, 281), while Wallace, though he brings in the element of instruction, applies it rather to contrast than to comparison:

> In artificial works, similitudes and contrasts are chiefly introduced in order to excite lively ideas of other objects. Those by which resemblance is

> expressed, a picture, for instance, or a statue, look no farther than their originals, and are not calculated to afford more Instruction than is implied in producing the same feeling which would be excited by these: But such as mark dissimilitudes, besides double likenesses, are also designed to display oppositions or differences between the originals represented by each copy. More extrinsic instruction therefore seems naturally to be derivable in the latter case, which resembles reasoning, than in the former, as comparisons, by which Judgement and Taste are highly improved, are there made, or an opportunity is given to make them (66-67).

Wallace again qualifies one of Kames's assertions when he states that the perceptions excited by resemblance and contrast are, in most cases, "not clear & full, but imperfect and obscure, perhaps illusive and false. Hence they seem intended more to entertain the imagination than to enlighten the understanding, or to give vivid rather than exact views; and are better suited to poetry and to Oratory than to Philosophy or to argumentation" (67). Kames, on the contrary, while pointing out that "a comparison may be employed with success to put a subject in a strong point of view" (I, 281), concludes that "comparison is subservient to poetry as well as to philosophy" (I, 282) on this account. The two men agree that comparison exerts a considerable influence on the passions and emotions (Kames I, 284; Wallace, p.68).

Wallace sees the principal function of comparisons and contrasts as magnifying or diminishing objects, and he gives practical advice against creating violent contrasts within a work of art: "Nature abhorrs jarring prospects, and consistency must be observed in all imitations of her" (69). General rules, however, can rarely be given for the employment of these devices, and particular circumstances must govern their use. To illustrate this, Wallace recalls Kames's argument that "a garden near a great city ought to have an air of solitude" for pleasing contrast (I, 302) and he points out that a case could also be made for keeping the town well in view, to increase the feeling of peace and security afforded by the garden (70).

Up to now Wallace's rejection of the psychological approach as a satisfactory method has been implied by the absence of it from his own writing. He comes close to direct criticism, however, when he comments, with reference to Kames, that "some Critics, not satisfied with remarking the fact [that comparisons have power to magnify and diminish objects], have started a question concerning the manner in which they operate on the mind, and the causes from which their force is derived" (71). This passage is interesting in that it suggests that Wallace believed that simply to state the facts without inquiring further was perfectly acceptable,[1] and the practical implications of the following paragraph from his introduction become clear:

> In treating this subject, I propose not to explain those arts in which Taste chiefly exerts itself, or to Examine minutely that which ought to be

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[1] A marked contrast to his insistence on enquiry in religious matters.

> deemed a good or bad Taste in any of them. My argument is not particular but general: The observations therefore, which I shall make, will mostly be of the latter kind; but they will also be illustrated by examples, &, being applicable to many particular cases, will serve, I hope, both to throw light on the nature of this sense, & to elucidate that which ought to be most highly relished in several among the elegant arts (18).

Wallace not only looks askance at Kames's method, but takes issue also with his reasoning. Kames (I, 288ff) says that it is evident that when a very large animal is seen close to a very small one, the element of surprise at the comparison, like other emotions magnifies its object, and we see, or think we see the one animal extremely large and the other extremely small. Surprise, he continues (I, 293), is not the only reason for this: man has also a natural inclination to complete what he has begun, the final cause and additional proof of this being the fact that "human works are of no significancy till they be completed" (I, 295). This propensity convinces one that "the resemblance or dissimilitude is complete.... The propensity to advance every thing to its perfection, not only co-operates with surprise to deceive the mind, but of itself is able to produce that effect" (I, 296). Wallace disputes the urge to

finish a work on Kames's reasoning;[1] the motive for wishing to complete enclosing a field, for example, is rather that time, labour and money will be wasted, than that we are by nature inclined to do so. Very often, he argues, men have to force themselves to complete a work that has become tedious. Reason then must impose "a restraint on our fondness for variety" (72). "Changeableness," Wallace believes, "rather than constancy, is our character" (72). Going back to the animal comparison, he argues that

> Visible objects are painted on the bottom of the Eye, and the Ideas excited by them are supposed to depend entirely on these pictures, the things immediately beheld, which are invariable. — A very large animal, therefore, and a very small one, continuing in the same situation, must constantly appear each of the same size, be they viewed separately or presented together: — The rules of opticks permit it not to be otherwayes; and it is hard, if not impossible, to conceive, how, consistently with these, an object, placed at the same distance, can seem larger at one time than at another, unless some change be made on the Texture of the external Organ (73).

Wallace accuses Kames of allocating to affection and passion too great an influence and of underrating the power of reason assisted by evidence and experience, in forming our beliefs (73-74). Returning to the question of surprise, he argues that "instead of disposing men to believe in things which they do not see, /it/ often renders them

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[1] Wallace's use of quotation marks here gives the mistaken impression that he is quoting from the Elements, but his account is not verbatim and his footnote reference to the Elements I ch. I, pt. 5 does not relate to his text.

suspicious, and averse from crediting that which is really before them....Were the accounts, given by these critics, of the operation of comparison just," he continues, "all representations, all descriptions, which were possessed of force sufficient barely to recall the objects intended to be represented by them, ought to be equally powerfull; a supposition contrary to experience (74-75). By way of example, he points out that while Thomson's bead in Westminster Abbey may remind him of the poet's face, he will not be forced "by any Emotion or propensity caused by his Bust to imagine its resemblance more or less perfect than it is in reality" (75). Thomson's very presence would not blind him to either its likenesses or its defects.

To account for the influence of comparison and contrast, Wallace argues that it "arises from the distinction, remarkable between the impressions made by objects which are actually present to sense or feeling, and those ideas of which we are conscious on recalling things to memory or anticipating them by imagination" (75), an opinion he regards as being obvious "on the least attention" and which he footnotes as deriving from Hume's Treatise, Pt. I, sect. 1, "Of the Origin of our Ideas." Thus, the impression received on viewing two animals together is more vivid than if they were presented singly, and their difference is more distinctly perceived. The magnifying or diminishing power of comparison therefore "bears a constant proportion to the vivacity of this perception and real contrasts are more powerful than verbal or descriptive ones" (76). Minuter differences may also be noted when both objects are present, as the mind tends to examine them in greater detail. "In the one case,"

Wallace concludes,". . . a superior completness, fulness, and amplitude or a greater defectiveness, littleness, and contractedness, is derived to them, than in the other" (76).

Summarising his remarks on the principles of taste, and reminding us that our pleasure in works of art and of nature is increased by a combination of those principles, he calls for care in combining them with discretion: "that, which Shakespare [sic] calls the modesty of nature, must never be offended" (77). As we are rational creatures, we perceive that it is better to love than to hate one another: virtue "is in itself an amiable and agreeable object; vice an odious and disagreable one: a being, that sees things as they are, cannot possibly see them in another light: and the inhuman sentiments, sometimes discovered by individuals, are not, more than profligate actions, proofs [sic] of the contrary" (79). If we apply this reasoning to matters of taste, Wallace argues, we find that "it is not from any arbitrary connection, we delight in greatness and those other qualities, which, according to our present constitution, are agreeable" (81).

Taste, then, Wallace believes to be founded in nature, an argument he pursues in chapter I of Book II. When the sense organs are in good order, he points out, sense perceptions, such as the sweetness of sugar, are believed to be universal, and this applies to perceptions of objects of taste, touch, hearing and sight. Less uniform agreement is experienced as to agreeableness and disagreableness, "Beauty and deformity, perceptions totally different from colour, figure, size, solidity, hardness, softness, fluidity, and those other ideas thro' which objects are immediately perceived,

are necessary modes in which these images strike beholders, or additional qualities belonging to objects" (83). While we confidently assert that sugar "is always sweet...we cannot absolutely pronounce, that its sweetness is pleasant to every palate" (83). This is not to say, however, that our ideas of beauty and deformity are purely arbitrary:

> Everything has annexed to it a particular agreeableness or disagreeableness, which it is naturally formed to produce: That pleasure or uneasiness is original & immediate: we are not taught by prompters, and learn not from instruction, to feel or acknowledge it. Nature is our only guide (84-85).

We have an immediate sensation of satisfaction or pain, and the opposite reaction is generally regarded as "unnatural or monstrous."

Nature guides both our moral and aesthetic sense: our liking for elegance and magnificence, our self-love and benevolence toward others, and our immediate approval of virtue and rejection of vice. In some degree we value riches, grandeur, power, authority, praise, and fame, and here, too, we are influenced by nature:

> those original ideas or feelings, which things are naturally found to produce, constitute a real standard, to which men are continually appealing, and which, in their determinations and in their conduct, lays a foundation both of Censure and of approbation. In many cases custom is not thought a sufficient justification; something is acknowledged to be independant on it, and to be founded on nature"

(86-87).

Wallace does not deny diversity of taste, but he rejects out of hand the absurd suggestion that this means no standard of taste exists. "On this supposition," he declares, "disquisitions concerning Taste would be useless, all Enquiries after its degrees or kinds, a good, a better, or a best in it, would be vain; and attempts to form or to correct it would be fruitless, as no original differences are then imagined to subsist among objects, or certain rule & fixed Standard is believed to exist in Nature, by which it can be adjusted" (87).

In the next chapter Wallace discusses the sources of diversity in tastes. Often, where there is equality of merit, the preference for one excellent poet over another, for example, can only be marginal. This view was widely held, and Kames, for instance, believed that differences "about objects of taste. . . are endless; but they generally concern trifles, or possibly matters of equal rank, where preference may be given either way with impunity" (I, 503). Earlier, Hume had expressed a similar view: "where there is such diversity in the internal frame or external situation as is entirely blameless on both sides, and leaves no room to give one the preference above the other; in that case a certain degree of diversity in judgement is unavoidable, and we seek in vain for a standard, by which we can reconcile the contrary sentiments."[1]

Differences in taste also stem from the variation in strength

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1 "Of the Standard of Taste" in Essays I, 230-31 (first published as one of Four Dissertations in 1757).

and speed of the natural, universal, and immediate liking or aversion which "must often exist in different degrees in different persons" (89). A third source of diversity lies in the effect of custom and habit, and with Kames (I, 402), Wallace cites tobacco as something which comes to be enjoyed, though it is initially disagreeable. Custom and habit have "a mighty influence in altering our original feelings or apprehensions" (91), as does association of ideas, "by which we connect objects with one another, and are often brought gradually to conceive very differently of their nature" (92), the imaginary connection between darkness and apparitions being one example.

"The propensity of carrying along agreeable properties from one object to another," writes Kames, "is sometimes so vigorous as to convert defects into properties: the wry neck of Alexander was imitated by his courtiers as a real beauty, without intention to flatter" (I, 67), and while Wallace agrees with him in principle, he rejects this example, maintaining that it "was just art and flattery, employed to gain upon a vain man, whose favour reflected a consequence on themselves, and who could be highly serviceable or hurtful to them" (93).

Wallace's distinction between beauty and utility, as we have seen, is that the one is immediately perceptible while the other is largely discovered by experience. Since utility is influenced by custom and fashion, and it in its turn excites ideas which, "forming a powerful association, have a considerable influence in raising desires and aversions, as well as in determining the Judgement" (94), it too contributes towards diversity of tastes.

Finally, Wallace cites precipitancy and inattention as having considerable influence in producing diversity, despite the fact that an "opinion supposes, or at least ought always to be preceded by an exact survey and complete knowledge" (96). Without this thorough familiarity, novelty may also conceal faults, but closer acquaintance with the object generally leads to closer conformity of tastes. "Tastes are often different in appearance more than in reality," he concludes, though there are "certain limits," he explains in his next chapter, "beyond which custom and Education cannot carry us, and . . . in several cases they are not able to produce a different sentiment from that which is original & untaught" (98).

Objects of sight are most open to the influence of custom and habit, particularly figures and colours, but even so, total deformity can rarely masquerade as beauty. Habit cannot accustom us to pain, though with the aid of courage, it can assist pain to be borne, and the sense of smell is even less influenced by custom and education than the sense of hearing, since habit can never render some smells agreeable.

The understanding is much more strongly influenced by custom and education than are the senses; opinion and belief are more easily altered than feelings. Similarly, Wallace believes, moral principles are open to much variety and corruption, though while there is still reason and feeling, our inborn love of virtue cannot be totally obliterated, and moral beauty must always remain admirable, even to the moral leper.

While it is impossible to determine whether men are endowed

equally with "original feelings, proper to human nature" (103), it is apparent that differing circumstances can affect their responses. But amidst "all the differences, which arise from custom, from habit, & from association of ideas, nature continues to be nature still, and her power remains supreme" (104). What is natural can generally be distinguished and false opinions corrected, nature's "pure suggestions" constituting "the only solid foundation of good taste" (105).

We noted earlier the shift of emphasis from a reliance on rules as a guide to the evaluation of works of art, to an attempt to establish a standard of taste founded in nature. Shaftesbury's influence was important, and Wallace's indebtedness to him can be seen from the following passage from The Moralists:

> Is there then, said he, a natural beauty of figures? and is there not an natural one of actions? No sooner the eye opens upon figures, the ear to sounds, than straight the beautiful results and grace and harmony are known and acknowledged. No sooner are actions viewed, no sooner the human affections and passions discerned (and they are most of them as soon discerned as felt) than straight an inward eye distinguisher, and soon the fair and shapely, the amiable and admirable, apart from the deformed, the foul, the odious, or the despicable. How is it possible therefore not to own "that as these distinctions have their foundation in Nature, the discernment itself is

natural, and from Nature alone?"[1]

While the majority of writers sought a standard of taste in a more limited theory of human nature,[2] others preserved Shaftesbury's broader conception. Kelmoth, for example, held that there is a "regular and precise standard," since it is from truth and nature that each species of composition is derived,[3] and Armstrong opens his essay "Of Genius" by declaring: "There is a standard of right and wrong in the nature of things, of beauty and deformity, both in the natural and moral world."[4]

Nor was Wallace alone in the belief that it is meaningless to discuss the concept of taste unless there is a standard: "if Taste has no fixed principles," wrote Burke, "if the imagination is not affected according to some invariable and certain laws, our labour is like to be employed to very little purpose; as it must be judged an useless, if not an absurd undertaking, to lay down rules for caprice, and to set up for a legislator of whims and fancies" (Enquiry, p.12). Kames, too, argued that a universal standard is implied when we speak of a good or bad taste and that one is assumed

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1 Characteristics, II, 137.

2 That Shaftesbury did not confine himself to such narrow limits is illustrated in a passage from The Moralists which concludes: "How therefore should you prove so ill a naturalist in this whole, and understand so little the anatomy of the world and Nature, as not to discern the same relation of parts, the same consistency and uniformity in the universe!" (Characteristics, II, 62).

3 The Letters of Sir Thomas Fitzosborne, p.183; letter 39.

4 John Armstrong, Miscellanies (1770), Augustan Reprint Society Publication No.30 (Los Angeles, 1951).

whenever we make critical judgements about works of art (II, 490), and Wallace follows him in arguing for a standard of taste from the observed uniformity of our external senses. The universal must have a foundation in nature, Kames believed: "If we can reach that foundation, the standard of taste will no longer be a secret. We have a sense or conviction of a common nature, not only in our own species, but in every species of animals: and our conviction is verified by experience" (II, 490).

Hume, too, assumed that there is an accepted standard[1] and that our sense perceptions are universally shared: "if they fail of their effect in any particular instance, it is from some apparent defect or imperfection in the organ" (I, 271). Burke also starts from the uniformity of the senses: "All men are agreed to call vinegar sour, honey sweet, and aloes bitter; and as they are all agreed in finding these qualities in those objects, they do not in the least differ concerning their effects with regard to pleasure and pain" (14). He later allows "that no one can strictly answer what pleasure or pain some particular man may find from the Taste of some particular thing" (15), a point reiterated by Wallace, but, like Wallace, Burke does not see this as sufficient grounds for assuming that a standard of taste does not exist. He also mentions the influence of custom in altering our natural taste, and cites a liking for tobacco or vinegar as an example, but he emphasizes that "the power of distinguishing between the natural and the acquired relish remains to the very last" (14).

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[1] "Of the Standard of Taste," I, 269.

Boulton, in his introduction to Burke's Enquiry, places Burke in the tradition of the sensationist philosophers — Locke, Berkeley and Hume — who believed that the mind was dependent on the senses for its ideas. Addison, he reminds us, made this principle his starting point from an analysis of aesthetic experience, sight being for him the most important sense (Spectator 411). "From this premise," writes Boulton, "it was argued that aesthetic values are appreciated through the senses. Thus the senses became accepted as the faculties involved in the enjoyment of beauty; beauty was thought to depend on physical properties in objects — properties therefore, apprehended through sensation" (xxxvi).[1] It is clear that Wallace shared this view (see p.83, quoted above), and he comments that in "proper speech the word Beauty is applicable to objects of sight only, and the eye is the sole judge of it" while allowing that "in a figurative sense it is applied to other subjects" such as theorems, histories, poems, and even actions (57).

While it may be argued that eighteenth-century attempts to arrive at a standard of taste were rarely satisfactory,[2] Wallace's chapter seems even less adequate than most. He is unoriginal in his account of the reason for diversity of tastes, and lacks the ingenuity that is a characteristic of a number of his other works. Hume, for example, emphasises the need to be in the right frame of

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1 Boulton also reminds us that John Baillie in An Essay on the Sublime (1747) regarded both the eyes and the ears as being "Inlets to the sublime" and that Burke included all the senses (liv).

2 See, e.g., "Observations on Hume's Theory of Taste" in English Studies, 20 (1938), 193-98 by Stuart Carry Brown, and Boulton, p.xxxix: Burke "indulges, like his contemporaries, in dubious generalisations supported by highly selective evidence."

mind for aesthetic appreciation and recognises that differences can be produced through variation in attention paid to the object. He believes that prejudice or the backing of authority "may give a temporary vogue to a bad poet or orator" (I, 271), and cites a want of delicacy of taste as one of the principal sources of diversity (I, 273). Burke, too, regards variation in attention and habit (22) and a differing degree of natural sensibility, which is necessary to form good judgement (21), as causing diversity, along with "ignorance, inattention, prejudice, rashness, levity, obstinacy, in short, all those passions, and all those vices which pervert the judgement in other matters" (24).

The first chapter of Book III — "A good taste — Properties of things agreeable to it — offers the following definition: "A good taste really consists in an habitude or faculty of perceiving easily and exactly that which is conformable to her [nature's] genuine dictates, and separating it from all false refinements and absurd additions made in consequence of the weakness, prejudices, foolish customs, & irregular passions of mankind" (105). We ought therefore "to follow original and undepraved nature." We must study her,

> endeavour to find out the standard that is in her, search after the agreeable to her, & seek that which, independant on all prejudices and foolish customs or improper associations, is most delightful according to her original, pure, simple, and most common dictates. In other words, we must enquire, what it is that pleases at first, that pleases longest, that pleases most

> men, that pleases them in circumstances most proper for judging, and that is able afterwards to stand the trial of reason, and bear the test of Experience?" (105-106).

Originality, duration of pleasure afforded by an object, and general approbation indicate closeness to nature, and Wallace suggests that the common taste might often be preferable to that which is regarded as more refined.

Good taste, Wallace maintains, requires competent judgement, and the "sensual & the debauched are not, more than the uncivilised and the uninstructed, fittest to be consulted on the matter" (106). He acknowledges that in one sense the common saying "that "tastes are not to be disputed" is just, in that "feelings, which are actually perceived, must always be real, and reason does not frame, but judge of them" (107). Reason's province is to compare and it is by comparison alone that a reliable decision can be reached as to what can be regarded as in the best taste.

Where objects are simple, judgement after careful inspection and comparison generally brings forth universal agreement. More complex objects are less easy to grasp. The principal standard to be applied is whether the work succeeds in attaining its end, and every part of the work contributes towards it. Where pleasure is the only or immediate object, the man of best taste produces a work giving the greatest and most lasting pleasure to the majority of people, or is capable of accurate judgement of a work on these grounds.

Generally, the chief purpose of a work is to produce something

in addition to and other than pleasure. Everything in the work "ought to contribute towards obtaining that end, and none, which does not promote it, is entitled to approbation" (109). The most successful artist, therefore, is the one who combines the greatest immediate delight with the highest achievement of this other end and in the eyes of the majority, complies with the demands both of pleasure and of utility, in the highest degree and the greatest duration.

Wallace's indebtedness to Hume is evident in his emphasis on comparison and freedom from prejudice, and in the importance attached to the work achieving its end (Hume I, 275-77). Hume also associates taste with experience and general approbation (I, 270), and with a sound understanding (I, 278). Most critics, indeed, believed in the importance of education and experience (see, e.g. Kames II, 501). Wallace's "circumstances most proper for judging" (106) might be traced to Hume's insistence that "we must choose with care a proper time and place, and bring the fancy to a suitable situation and disposition" (I, 270-71). As we have already seen, Wallace takes up Hume's point that our judgement takes into account "the durable admiration, which attends those works, that have survived all the caprices of mode and fashion, all the mistakes of ignorance and envy" (I, 271). Nor is Wallace alone in condemning the sensual and debauched as unfit to judge: "Nothing tends more than voluptuousness," writes Kames, "to corrupt the whole internal frame, and to vitiate our taste, not only in the fine arts, but even in morals" (II, 500).

Wallace's second chapter, "General Maxims," is by contrast

unmistakably a vehicle for his own opinions, and although it deals with topics discussed by other writers, it is characterised by Wallace's practical and commonsense approach. He becomes more overtly didactic and the sociological interest he displays in the Prospects is evident here, rather than the psychological slant of his contemporary critics. His first point is that "in works chiefly intended for use, conveniency ought to be preferred to ornament; for this is according to nature" (111), and that it is in bad taste to introduce elegance and splendour that is inconsistent with utility. On the other hand, "ornament ought not to be neglected even in those [things] which are chiefly designed for use, provided they be proper to be adorned" (112), and provided that care is taken that ornament is never crowded. If works are not worth the time and money spent on them, however, they can never be entirely approved. Indeed, "it is not sufficient to justify a work that it possesses beauties, or has uses. If its uses are trifling, if its beauties are of an inferior kind, if many things, more useful and more beautiful, may be got at the same cost, these ought to be preferred" (115-16).

He regrets that objects of magnificence often display the wealth rather than the good taste of their possessors and recommends that the material out of which a work of art is created should be appropriate and durable rather than expensive, since "the fineness of the art is more important than the richness of the matter" (116) in ornamental works. It is absurd, he believes, to lavish much art, expense, or time on perishable materials.

Finally, Wallace distinguishes between works which are totally

artificial, such as cities, and imitations of nature, such as gardens. In the first, he maintains, "art must prevail, and be visibly displayed" (118), but in imitations of nature, the unnatural should be avoided, as beauty here consists in following nature's pattern. Thus he is in agreement with Kames (II, 443) that the clipping of plants into animal shapes is to be deplored as a perversion of nature. It is interesting to note that both writers believe that nature can be embellished: Kames states that "gardening is not an inventive art, but...rather nature itself ornamented" (II, 442), and Wallace warns that in imitating her "care only must be taken, that probability be not transgressed in improving her" (119). Indeed, he maintains that "Nature...requires sometimes to be corrected, and ought to be presented in her most pleasing attire" (120v). "It is a prudish delicacy," he writes, "which condemns every appearance of art in things natural: not only Culture and Improvements would thereby be confined within too narrow bounds but much deformity would be the necessary consequence of a strict adherence to that whimsical principle" (120).

Wallace continues in practical vein in chapter III, where he comments that "it would be happy for mankind, did they employ their industry to add rather to the necessaries than to the ornaments of Life" (122). He deplores the changeableness of taste, which he grants is more excusable in matters of fashion or furnishing, where articles are frequently renewed, and he pleads for a more fixed standard in gardening and in architecture, so that only those alterations need be made that are necessary to correct something discovered to be unnatural and that can be effected at a low cost.

Changes, he believes, ought never to be made solely for the sake of novelty.

He sets down general rules for the building of all grand works, which should give pleasure both in the present and to posterity. Climate is his first consideration and, no doubt speaking from bitter experience, he advises against building in a cold northern latitude a house suited to milder regions. Kames had argued that "the relation between an edifice and the ground it stands on is of the most intimate kind, and therefore the situation of a great house ought to be lofty" (I, 337), to which Wallace replied that by this reasoning, "a poor man, on account of the lowness of his circumstances, ought either to be low in stature or to live in a hollow" (125). He regards conveniency, wholesomeness, beauty and grandeur as the important material circumstances to be taken into account, and he gives practical advice concerning the selection of a site and the design of the house in suitable proportions, avoiding damp and dark, and promoting warmth, strength of construction, and aesthetic pleasure.

He disagrees with Kames's view, when speaking of congruity between an edifice and its surroundings, that those in the Gothic style are suited to wild, uncultivated country, while the Grecian style is better adapted to the fine plains of France and Italy (II, 469). On the contrary, Wallace argues, "a good house . . . ought in all cases to be built in that taste which is in itself best: and this undoubtedly is Grecian" (126). By the cleanness of its line, this style will be all the more striking in a hilly, uncultivated spot and, indeed, the impact of this contrast would be

lost where an irregular Gothic design simply merged with similar irregular surroundings. Clearly, the virtues of the Grecian style outweigh, to Wallace's mind, the disadvantages of an absence of contrast.

After offering practical advice on the layout and contents of grounds and gardens, whose beauty and magnificence he believes is produced principally by the combination of "a spaciousness of green" with stately trees, its "natural ornaments" (132/1), he again takes issue with Kames, who had alleged Alcinous had a mere kitchen garden (II, 430). On the contrary, Wallace argues, it was "filled with vines, & with Trees, whose branches, adorned with blossoms or loaded with fruit, are delightful to view" (132/3).[1] Fruit trees and flowering shrubs should ornament all gardens, which should be the epitome of beauty and grace. He lays great stress on variety and shares the eighteenth-century predilection for ruins, which may incite "serious and humane thoughts" in the breasts of the rich, "calling to remembrance the Havoc effected by time and the destruction of ages," a needful reminder of those who, "amidst pomp and dissipation & pride," are unconscious and forgetful of distress (132/5).

In chapter IV Wallace deals with diversions, a topic that few other writers seem to have discussed in detail. Du Bos, in the

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[1] Both writers have a point here: Wallace rightly argues that the emphasis is on beauty, but Kames could justify his statement by quoting Johnson's Dictionary: "Kitchengarden: One in which esculent plants are produced."

first chapter of his Critical Reflections[1] goes into "the necessity of occupation, in order to avoid heaviness" (4), maintaining that the "soul hath its wants no less than the body; and one of the greatest wants of man is to have his mind incessantly occupied" (5), but unlike Wallace, he does not outline or recommend different types of diversions for the various occupations, but observes merely that the majority of men "are frequently obliged, in order to avoid being tired with the sameness of their occupations, to have recourse to the common amusements of mankind," which he describes as "idle and frivolous" (7-8).

Returning to the tone of his Prospects, Wallace proposes that those whose work produces mental exhaustion should indulge in pastimes that are amusing and exercise the body: "Walking, riding, dancing, tennice, Cricket and the like" (136). Indoor, sedentary games should be avoided. Conversely, those employed in physical labour can benefit from indoor recreation of an entertaining and restful kind, such as card games, since "bodily exertion and a brisk circulation are not their ends" (137). There is little general awareness of this distinction, Wallace believes, either in theory or practice, and, continuing in utopian vein, he deplores public diversions which lead men "to imagine, that amusement and shows, not business or labour, must be the occupation of their lives and principal object of their pursuits" (139). He laments also the "pernicious custom...of devoting much time to Cards [which] has

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1 Critical Reflections on Poetry, Painting and Music, transl. Thomas Nugent, 3 vols. (London: John Nourse, 1748). Page refs. are to this edition.

certainly an unhappy effect on the minds and sentiments, principles and manners, of the age" (139v), and points out the social dangers of instituting public places for which an entrance fee is required: "mankind, seduced by them from their necessary or useful Employments, are made to neglect their familys and affairs," and turn to a life of dissipation (139). These public entertainments are often in bad taste, he believes, and some are foolish and even criminal. His main objection to them is that they are useless and contribute nothing to society, while other, useful arts might be cultivated with less effort than goes into, say, acrobatics or conjuring.

Amongst those entertainments that are criminal, Wallace lists "the artificial distorting of the human body practised by posture-masters, the doughty rencounters of prize-fighters, bull beating, with other entertainments of the bear Garden, Cock-matches, Goose races and the like" (140-41). While wishing to avoid rigid pedantry, he feels that the generous-hearted would agree that diversions that involve the needless torture or killing of helpless animals "derive their Credit from savage manners and an unpolished taste" (141).

He then turns to the topic of "salutation" and makes a plea for a more simple and graceful mode of accosting one another, and for the elimination of ceremony, which can be troublesome and, he implies, lacks sincerity. Calling for a similar simplicity in the giving of titles, Wallace claims the backing of the ancient Greeks and Romans, who in conversation and writing "distinguished one another by their plain names" (142). "It was despotism," he asserts, "which destroyed the independant spirit that prevailed remarkably under the Commonwealth, and which had a fatal influence on every thing generous

and noble, That also rendered servile addresses fashionable . . . . But we have some ground to congratulate our Country," he adds, "that a simpler & a better taste seems to be beginning to prevail in Great Britain, in which law and the constitution render every individual free" (143). Nevertheless, Wallace observes cynically, to consider, before using it, whether a person deserves his title, "might be fatal to many honoured with the Titles your Grace and your Excellency."

In Book IV Wallace returns to the problem of whether a fine taste is innate or can be acquired. Without presenting any of the arguments for or against, he declares that these questions "are important, but seem to admitt of an obvious answer; and, without denying original feelings to constitute its foundation, we may affirm, with considerable assurance, that the faculty, at least in its metaphorical signification, is highly improveable in most cases, both in quickness and in other respects, and that a fine Taste depends greatly on discipline and on cultivation" (144). In a footnote he refers us to "Shaftesbury, III.3.2." — probably with the following passage in mind: "How long ere a true taste is gained....For 'tis not instantly we acquire the sense by which these beauties are discoverable. Labour and pains are required, and time to cultivate a natural genius ever so apt or forward" (II, 129).

While children have the capacity for aesthetic appreciation, it is only gradually that, as they grow more curious and observant, their field of appreciation expands. Reason and knowledge, Wallace again reminds us, are vitally important, reason enabling us to compare and contrast objects, which renders us more familiar with their beauties and defects. These we learn to perceive with greater speed and

appreciation, and adequate experience is essential for comparisons to be made.

Wallace grants that there are probably individual differences "in the Organs and senses and faculties which pertain to taste" (147-148/1), just as there are variations in height, weight and form. Some, he allows, may never attain that perfection of taste that is possible to others because their sensibility is less acute. Nevertheless, it is probable that most depends on our own efforts to acquire a good taste and that there are few whose natural taste is so perfect that they need not strive to improve it, or whose natural taste is so deficient that education cannot better it.

Chapter 1 ("Method of acquiring, preserving, and improving a good Taste") is lengthy and repetitive, and one suspects that Wallace uses it to include all the points he fears he might not have emphasised fully enough already. To effect some kind of order, he divides it into nine sections. In the first he emphasises the need to be free from prejudice (a condition laid down by Hume [I, 276], to whom Wallace is again indebted in this chapter) and from the influence of elevated rank, opulence, power and of small groups which have an influential, though usually temporary vogue.

A refreshing note in this otherwise repetitious section is Wallace's criticism of Ossian:

> Could those silly, pointed pieces, published under the name of Ossian, destitute as they are of incident to engage, of circumstances to interest, of variety to amuse, of passion to move, and of description to please, have met with one hundredth

> part, even of that praise, which was for some-
> time bestowed upon them; could they have
> ventured, in a learned nation, to lay claim to
> a traditionary antiquity of fifteen hundred
> years; or been asserted by some who would be
> mightily offended at being suspected of
> believing in other marvels,[1] to possess a
> probable title to that incredible age, without
> uncommon pains taken to extol them, as well as
> an extraordinary concurrence of favourable
> circumstances, entirely distinct from
> intrinsic merit? (152-53).

In section 2, we are urged to judge and feel for ourselves. Only those who "listen to nature, who judge for themselves, and who are not overborne by the authority of others" (153v) are reliable critics, and those with little literature but a solid understanding, are likely to be better judges than those with book-learning but no sense.

Wallace urges in section 3 a minute acquaintance with nature and illustrates the necessity for creative artists to have knowledge and experience of both the material and the moral world. In section 4, he recommends that circumstances naturally pleasing or naturally

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[1] This seems to be an oblique reference to Hume, whose essay "Of Miracles" was published in 1752 and who, prior to writing "Of the Authenticity of Ossian's Poems," which he did not publish, was known from his letters — and presumably from his conversation — to be enthusiastic about Macpherson's work. (See Teddy Brunius, David Hume on Criticism /Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 1952/, 112ff).

disgusting in objects should be noted, with care and attention. Whoever aspires to good taste "must study that which is conformable to real truth, to good sense, and to pure virtue," an admonition that few eighteenth-century critics would oppose.

Resemblances and differences in objects and in works of art should be noted, we are reminded in section 5, and section 6 recommends the study of rules given by those of approved reputation, mere observation being insufficient in forming a good taste. General rules, he goes on to say in section 7, are not enough. Particular examples are required and the best works of great geniuses must be studied.

In section 8 Wallace repeats his assertion that immediate impressions may be a foundation for sound judgement where a work is directed at leaving "a deep sentiment on the soul" (161), but that first impressions are also erroneous and ought to undergo "strict reflex scrutiny" (160). More complex works require reflection and literary compositions can rarely be judged at only one reading. Decisions such as whether the work achieves its end cannot be made instantly. Referring to the true critic whose characteristics are listed by Hume (I, 278) Wallace claims that it is the judgement of such a person alone, who, after thorough acquaintance with the object, has gained complete knowledge of it, that can be esteemed a reliable standard.

Repeating himself and again echoing Hume, Wallace cites serenity and attention, the sound state of the external and internal organs of sense and favourable circumstances for their operation as prerequisite for sound judgement, and comments that while works must

produce the desired reaction, a work is not necessarily good purely on the grounds that it is moving.

He concludes by urging us to praise and condemn with discernment (section 9), since not every part of a good work will be perfect and few bad works are totally devoid of merit: "a person, whom patience & Curiosity can carry to the end of Cassian," he goes so far as to say, "will find two or three tolerable images even in these jingling volumes" (167).

The final chapter of Part I opens with his distinction between judgement and taste (see p.452 above; "Treatise" pp.167-68). Because taste is instantaneous, it promotes an elegant ease and good breeding, in addition to teaching us how to organize our time, labour and money and affording us "many delicate enjoyments" (169). The more highly our taste is cultivated, the more lively is our appreciation of natural and artificial beauty: "Hence those, endowed with a taste in the fine arts, possess a fund of entertainment, of which the grossor part of mankind are incapable" (170).

"The pleasures of Taste," however, Wallace maintains, "must indeed be owned inferior to those derived from pure Intellect, and a profound skill in morality, in politics, in physics or in mathematics, being more solid & more useful, is greatly preferable to the highest refinement of that faculty" (170v). He goes on to speak of the pleasures deriving from the problems of astronomy, physics and mathematics, maintaining that

> The pure intellectual delight, which mathematical reasonings afford to those who enter deeply into them, is vastly intenser than that which a

> connoisseur enjoys from any common object of taste. And a like observation applies, perhaps indeed in degree something inferior, to accurate argument in other Sciences (172-172v).

Wallace does not deny that the artist or connoisseur can be "transported with the view of masterly workmanship" (172v) but he is highly incensed by Kames's assertions in the passage that begins:

> Mathematical and metaphysical reasonings have no tendency to improve our knowledge of man; nor are they applicable to the common affairs of life: but a just taste of the fine arts, derived from rational principles, furnishes elegant subjects for conversation, and prepares us for acting in the social state with dignity and propriety (I, 9).

Delicacy of taste also moderates the selfish passions, Kames adds, and is a great support to morality. Protesting, Wallace demands: "Is not an influence attributed, in this comparison, to the fine arts, superior to that which fairly belongs to them?" He concedes that the fine arts provide innocent and agreeable entertainment and relaxation, and that they tend to restrain debauchery, but he is unable to understand "how a nice taste in architecture, in Gardening or in any fine art, which is not immediately connected with morals, should have a greater influence than a taste for mathematics to promote morality?" (173). "Any object," he concludes, "which engages attention much, whatever be its nature, even tho innocent in itself, if it is not directly of the moral kind, can

never be conceived immediately to promote virtue" (174).

He ends Part I by claiming a close association of virtue with taste: happiness depends on acting with good taste — in other words, following nature — and virtue is the chief source of happiness. If our taste is just, we shall prefer virtue above all other beauties. The "nicest inspectors of beauty," he concludes, "disdaining to be captivated by inferior forms, chiefly admire and pursue the higher grace of just behaviour and virtuous Conduct; for this can alone give a sincere and lasting Enjoyment. Thus, the finest taste, and a taste for virtue, are at length found to coincide" (177).

It is evident that Part I of the "Treatise" is largely derivative and that where Wallace does not appear to be influenced by others, he contributes nothing very profound. His didactic rather than enquiring approach has been demonstrated, and it remains only to illustrate Wallace's sociological bent which distinguishes his work from most other writings on the subject of taste.

We notice it first in Book III, ch. 2, where Wallace argues that it "is a good rule...both for Individuals and for Communities, to preferr that which is necessary to that which is ornamental, and things, which are useful, ought to be provided before aiming at such as are showy" (114). While he grants that in society's present condition men lack the amicable co-operation to provide everyone with necessities before ornaments, he believes it a defect in society that individuals are permitted to obtain ornaments for themselves before the provision of necessities for others. An advantage of good taste, however, is that, "forbidding a total neglect of others or inconcern about their welfare, [it] requires individuals in many

cases to preferr the necessities of their fellow Creatures to private elegance or magnificence" (114-15).

The fickleness of men's tastes, Wallace associates with advantage to society, although he concedes that the advantages are seldom great enough to justify the inconstancy. Nevertheless, changeableness "awakens attention, increases ingenuity, sharpens invention, and contributes to the advancement of art. Industry, too, and labour are promoted by it, and the vanity, as well as the luxury of the rich, inducing them to an ostentatious prodigality, becomes subservient to the support of the poor" (121).

A constant pursuit of change Wallace criticises on the grounds that for "its gratification much labour is wantonly consumed, which might be both more nobly and more profitably directed" (122). How much more would it benefit mankind and contribute both to the beauty and strength of a country, if men forgot the ornaments and concentrated on "Draining marshes, Cultivating wastes, improving heaths, planting trees, making Inclosures, peopling desarts, and in this way raising vast stores of grain and of Cattle..." (122). A "wise nation," he continues, "as long as its lands, the ultimate source of all plenitude, are not fertilized to the utmost pitch, need never regret the decay of any manufactures, which administer only to luxury" (122v).

In discussing diversions for the young, Wallace lays great stress on their socialising influence and suggests that in addition to encouraging physical fitness, they "ought also to be ingeniously contrived to inspire courage, honour, openness, generosity, & kindness" (136). The passage dealing with public diversions, in which Wallace declares that "men are led to imagine, that amusement

and shows, not business or labour, must be the occupation of their lives" (139), has already been quoted, but he does not make clear here, or when he associates changeableness of taste with the promotion of industry and labour (121), whether he regards work as good in itself or as a benefit to society. His reference to public entertainments seducing mankind from their "necessary or useful Employments," however, suggests that he sees labour as being of practical rather than intrinsic worth and he again stresses usefulness when he deplores the time spent on learning tricks and contortions for public amusement.

We have already noted his attitude to the useless conventions (Book I, ch. 4) and he deplores such fashions as the importance attached to the cock of a hat or the cut of a sleeve, declaring that it "serves gradually to bring a littleness on the soul, introduces a weakness and unmanliness in thought and in sentiment, and leads men to bestow an unmerited consequence on mean objects" (122).

Urging the establishment of a fixed taste in gardening and architecture, Wallace points out that "elegant structures and beautiful Gardens not only furnish a variety of lasting entertainments to their owners, but adorn a Country, promote the fine Arts, and add to the pleasure of every spectator" (124). Palaces, libraries, paintings, gardens and inclosures, he later proposes, should be open to the public in order to promote good taste.

> It is inconsistent with grandeur, as well as with hospitality, for great men either to shut up their houses and parks, or to suffer their servants to take money for admittance. By

allowing easy access to them, their owners display their opulence in a better manner, than by the highest luxury of expensive tables, by vast retinues of idle servants, or by numerous steeds of useless horses, by which immense quantities of provisions, that might feed men, are wantonly consumed, and many active hands are withdrawn from useful labour" (133-34).

Like Kames, Wallace devotes the second part of his work to a discussion of style and rhetoric, as the table of contents demonstrates:

Part Second.

Book I.

Chapter I.

Language and Composition.

Chapter II.

Similes.

Chapter III.

Figures in Language.

Chapter IV.

Figures in Thought — Those derived from Resemblance — Metaphor.

Chapter V.

Personification.

Chapter VI.

Apostrophe.

Chapter VII.

Hyperbole — Other Figures.

Book II.

Didactic and Descriptive Compositions.

Chapter I.

Didactic Works.

Chapter II.

Descriptive Pieces.

Chapter III.

Natural History.

Chapter IV.

Biography.

Chapter V.

Annals.

Chapter VI.

Universal History.

Chapter VII.

Particular History.

Book III.

Poetical Writings.

Chapter I.

Didactic Poetry.

Chapter II.

Descriptive Poetry.

Chapter III.

Pathetic Poetry.

Chapter IV.

Odes — Satires — Elegies.

Chapter V.

The higher Orders of Poetry.

Chapter VI.

Epic Poetry.

Chapter VII.

Dialogue — The Drama — Tragedy.

Chapter VIII.

Comedy.

Chapter IX.

Burlesque.

Book IV.

Rhetorical Composition.

Chapter I.

Eloquence — its State in antient & modern Times.

Chapter II.

Eloquence of the Bar.

Chapter III.

Eloquence of the Senate.

Chapter IV.

Eloquence of the Pulpit.

Part II is no less pedestrian, laboured and derivative than the first and it is needless to impose upon the good will of the reader by giving a detailed account. It continues on the level of a plain man's guide, urging common sense and reliance on personal judgement. It too is characterised by avoidance of system and of extreme opinion (Wallace constantly qualifies even the mildest positive statement) and by eclecticism to the point of absurdity. Ian Ross's defence of the Elements unfortunately cannot be applied here: he counters the

accusation that Kames's book is "a solemn mish-mash of Shaftesburian intuitionism, Lockeian psychology, and sentimental indulgence" arguing on the contrary, that

> Here is the methodological spadework, the spirit of psychological inquiry, the interest in comparative and historical studies, and the social awareness, which the best of modern critics must have at their command. It is a characteristic product of a mind trained in Scots law and with broad humanistic sympathies, to be learned from or quarrelled with by anyone interested in a critical approach to the arts (Ross, p.291).

It is regrettable that Wallace's response to this work did not match it in quality.

Even on the subject of pulpit oratory Wallace is a disappointment. He laments the scarcity of good preachers, and the tendency for the concluding sentence of a sermon to please the hearers most, "infallible proof," he observes, "that these orations are commonly composed in a bad Taste" (603). Intelligibility, avoidance of superstition and enthusiasm, of "laboured pomp of description, & pretty turns of eloquent periods" (615), and the encouragement of virtue and morality should be the aim of the preacher, who ought to emphasise that happiness comes from within, as well as fostering a love of liberty and patriotism and a sense of the importance of democratic government (611).

He ends on a note distinctly contrary to the kind of outlook that Adam Smith later expounded in his Wealth of Nations, an

expression of his utopian values which conflict with belief in the achievement of national grandeur through commercial development:

> The happiness of mankind depends chiefly on the purity of their minds & the rectitude of their conduct, and those are shallow & bungling politicians who imagine the morals of a people little important to their felicity. . . . To render a nation cultivated, rich, learned, powerfull, and victorious, must be owned to be a mighty atchievement, but it is still greater to render a people virtuous, and a fine taste in morals is the noblest boon, which can be bestowed on any of the sons of Adam (615-16).

One wonders why Wallace picked a topic on which he was so manifestly ill-qualified to contribute. Taste, as we have seen, was a highly fashionable subject;[1] the Edinburgh Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Sciences, Manufactures, and Agriculture, for example, had offered a prize for an essay on taste, which was won by Alexander Gerard in 1756 (and published in 1759), and possibly Wallace's production represented an effort to keep abreast of contemporary literary currents. We cannot but wholeheartedly accept George Wallace's statement, however, that his father preferred "truth and science...to language and to composition."[2]

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1 See also W.J. Hipple's thorough survey: The Beautiful, The Sublime, & The Picturesque In Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetic Theory (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1957).

2 Scots Magazine, 33 (1771), 344.

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(* denotes item not referred to in text; prefix La denotes Laing Collection)

"An address to the Jacobites in Scotland. In which among other reasons offered to perswade them to acquiesce in the Revolution and the Settlement of the Crown in the Protestant line it is proved that Scotland has not declined in wealth since the Revolution but is richer att present than att that period" (La II 97[5]).

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"Answers for the Synod of Lothian & Tweeddale to the reasons of dissent offered by some Ministers & Elders in the affair of Currie from that State of the voto 'Sustain the call to Mr Mercer or not'" (La II 620[33]).

* "A ballad on the times to the tune of Strange news att a countrey wake" (La II 620[31]).

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"A Letter from a moderate Freethinker to David Hume Esquire Concerning the Profession of The Clergy In which it is shewed That their Vices what ever they are are owing to their Disposition and not to the bad influence of their Profession" (La II 97[1]).

"A Letter from Alexander Lind Esquire Sheriff Depute of Mid Lothian By Order of the Lord Justice Clerk to the Ministers of the Gospell within the County To which are added Some Remarks by a Layman" (La II 620[5]).

"A Letter to a Reverend Clergyman in Scotland Concerning Submission to the church. Published on occasion of the Processes commenced against Professour Simson and the Reverend Mr Glass" and "A Speech in behalf of Mr Glass of Tealing...1730" (La II 620[17]).

Letters (2) to Mr Whitfield, and some observations on enthusiasm, with further remarks relating specifically to Whitfield (La II 620[28]).

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