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FROM RIGHTS AND PROTECTION TO CARE AND UPBRINGING: A REFLEXIVE ACCOUNT OF CHANGING RATIONALITIES OF RESIDENTIAL CHILD CARE

MARK SMITH

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THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
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ABSTRACT

In this submission I use previously published works, my book *Rethinking Residential Child Care* and two articles 'Reading Bauman for Social Work' and 'Care Ethics in Residential Child Care: A Different Voice', to develop a critical account of changing rationalities of care in the context of residential child care. Much of my writing draws upon professional experience gained over 20 years of residential child care practice and I begin this account by justifying the use of this experience as the basis of professional and academic knowledge. I then go on to explicate some of the discursive influences that have fed into the way that residential child care is currently constituted. Specifically, I locate many current assumptions and practices within dominant neoliberal political systems and assumptions. This has led to the commodification, instrumentalisation and, within an increasingly regulated polity, the bureaucratisation of public care. Against this backdrop, public care is conceived of in narrow and abstract concerns around rights and protection. The concepts of care itself and of upbringing that ought to be at the heart of adult engagement with children are left, largely, unarticulated. I seek to address this gap by developing possible conceptualisations of care and upbringing. I conclude by arguing that residential child care and, indeed, much public care, is governed by the wrong rationalities, by economic and administrative priorities rather than caring and relational ones. Finally, I suggest some directions that future work might take.

Declaration

This is to certify that that the work contained within has been composed by me and (with the exception of the co-authored journal article with Steckley) is entirely my own work. No part of this thesis has been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Signed: 

This submission consists of the book

Smith, M. (2009) *Rethinking Residential Child Care: Positive perspectives,* Bristol: Policy Press.

And two articles:

Smith, M. (2011) 'Reading Bauman for social work', *Ethics and Social Welfare*, 5, (1), pp 2–17.

Steckley, L. and Smith, M. (2011) 'Care ethics in residential child care: a different voice', *Ethics and Social Welfare*, 5, (2), pp 181–95. Relative contribution on the writing of this was around equal. Steckley's name appears first as a result of agreement between us.

Permission from the publishers (and co-author) for the use of the book and articles for this purpose has been granted

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I would like to thank Professor Viv. Cree my supervisor throughout the different iterations of this PhD. Through it all she was always available with valued and sensible advice and consistent in her encouragement and belief that I would get there in the end.

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Thanks to Maura, who in recent months kept the PhD at the front of my thoughts when it would have been easier to find other things to do. When I started on this journey my children were still children. All three are now at different stages of their own academic journeys. I hope they are as well served by education as I have been.

My mum and dad, May and George Smith, have been a persistent influence on my thoughts about education. They will be delighted to have a PhD in the family.

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Critical review

Introduction

This critical review focuses on residential child care, my field of professional practice and academic study. It is, primarily, a reflexive account of my book *Rethinking Residential Child Care* (RRCC) (Smith, 2009). The book falls somewhere between a textbook and a theoretical exposition of residential child care. I have developed some of the book's subject matter in different places and forms and this, inevitably, finds its way, in some shape or form into this narrative[1]. For the purpose of this review, I include two articles, 'Reading Bauman for Social Work' and 'Care Ethics in Residential Child Care: A Different Voice', both published in 2011 in the journal *Ethics and Social Welfare* to support my central argument. I am sole author on the first of these and co-author with Laura Steckley on the second. Relative contribution on this was around equal.

Lofland and Lofland (1995) suggest that the best research is located in the biographies of its creators and reflects their emotional involvement in the process. The writing that forms the basis of this submission is embedded, and arguably embodied, within my own practice experience in residential child care over a period of almost 20 years. My arguments draw on that experience melded with academic knowledge developed over twelve years as an academic. As I acknowledge in the

[1] For example, sections of the chapter on the history of residential child care draw on material in Smith, M. Fulcher, L. and Doran, P. (2013) *Residential child care in practice: Making a difference,* Bristol: Policy Press. I was main originator.
Some of the material on upbringing is to appear in a sole authored article in a forthcoming volume of the *Scottish Journal of Residential Child Care.*

Introduction to the book, my entire career has been spent in Scotland and primarily in residential school settings. “I hope and suspect however that the broad trends I identify and address will, nevertheless, have a resonance across different settings and across the different countries of the UK and indeed further afield”. (RRCC, 2009: xiii)

The first chapter provides a justification for my approach in submitting this thesis for examination. The second seeks to understand recent policy and discursive developments in residential child care, locating these within the context of neoliberal reforms over the course of the last thirty years or so. Chapter Three develops a theoretical exposition of ideas of care and upbringing, concepts that one might expect to be at the heart of state care but which remain largely untheorised. Chapter Four draws together some of the central themes of the thesis, making the case that care and upbringing are value rational and practical rational endeavours rather than the technical rational ones they have become in dominant ways of thinking. I conclude by suggesting some directions for future work.

Chapter One: Aims, objectives and methodology

Aims and Objectives

My aim in this review is to explore a central assertion in my book summarised on its back cover, where I argue that residential child care "needs to move beyond dominant discourses of protection, rights and outcomes to embrace those of care and upbringing".

Methodology

My approach in this proposal is not what might be thought of as research within dominant positivist or 'evidence-based' paradigms. It invites criticism in traditional academic circles where claims to pass off accounts of lived experience as research are typically perceived not to conform to standards of intellectual rigour because of the 'insider's' personal and emotional investment in the setting and their consequent difficulty achieving detachment and objectivity (Alvesson, 2003). This is a legitimate concern; there is no doubt that a degree of subjectivity enters into the way I think about and present my experience. On the other hand, to dismiss the 'lived' dimension of what I bring to the field negates the richness and complexity of insider knowledge. Insiders, according to Brannick and Coughlan "are able to articulate tacit knowledge that has become deeply segmented because of socialization in an organizational system and reframe it as theoretical knowledge" (2007: 60). The same authors argue that, rather than neglecting at-hand knowledge or expertise, researchers should turn familiar situations, timely events or special expertise into objects of study. Such reflection on experience should not be excluded from being considered research and can, I argue, be justified within a broadly hermeneutic tradition. To make this case requires a brief survey of what Flyvbjerg (2001) identifies as the science wars between natural and social scientists.

Ontology

Ontology concerns the nature of the world and what we can know about it. Essentially, ontological stances can assume either objectivist or constructionist starting points. Objectivism (or realism) assumes an external reality, which exists independently of our beliefs about it. Constructionism on the other hand, assumes that knowledge and meanings are socially constructed and that reality is multi-faceted and contingent. Realist research valorises the 'voice from nowhere' - the dispassionate observer of a normative human condition. Within this tradition the ability of the researcher to demonstrate objectivity and value-neutrality is a central measure of the quality of their research. By contrast, constructionist ontological perspectives, which acknowledge a plurality of human realities, deny that a researcher can stand above the object (or subject) of their research activity.

Epistemology

Epistemology concerns the nature of knowledge. Particular ontological views have implications for the epistemological position a researcher might adopt. Ritchie and Lewis (2003) differentiate between positivist and interpretivist positions. The former, deriving from an objectivist ontology, posits that research can be objective and value-free. This draws on the Cartesian duality of the early Enlightenment, which assumes that we can separate our rational, thinking selves from our sentient, emotional selves and that the former be privileged over the latter. This assertion of human rationality was perhaps the predominant feature of Enlightenment thought, finding its apogee in the work of Kant who maintained reason to be the arbiter of truth in all judgments (Williams, 2013).

An interpretivist position starts from the premise that wholly objective research is impossible and that researchers inevitably react with and influence the social world that is the subject of their research. According to Denzin and Lincoln the "concept of the aloof researcher has been abandoned" (1998: 22). Rather, every researcher speaks from within a distinct interpretive community. Vivat argues that knowledge is inevitably and unavoidably produced within a social and cultural context (2002).

Methodology in the positivist paradigm seeks to ensure that research findings can be presented as contamination free and context neutral. Observation, measurement, experiment and theory building are its cornerstones. This fundamentally differs from methodology in the interpretivist paradigm where the task of verification is entrusted to the expertise and insight of the investigator. His or her interpretation is proposed to lead to levels of new understanding. "Knowledge becomes valid only when people find it meaningful to them and want to use it" (Payne and Askeland 2008: 67).

Social Work Research

While qualitative and constructionist methodologies have become more sophisticated and better accepted in the past few decades in the social sciences, much of the focus of social work research has continued to draw, largely, on realist ontological assumptions and positivist methodologies (White, 1997) often designed to support an evidence-based-practice paradigm. To some extent, this tendency reflects social work's journey towards professionalisation and its search for a knowledge base that might be accepted by other 'purer' professions such as law and medicine. This has led it in the direction of method and technique, its mode of consciousness, largely technocratic. As Sewpaul notes:

> Born within the period of modernity ... social work began to take on the omniscient voice of science . . . It is within this culture of cure and control that the discipline has seen its most pronounced development ... Given its birth during the period of modernity with its emphasis on reductionist, logical positivist rationality ... social work took on this dominant discourse in the pursuit of status and professionalism (2005: 211).

Approaches to knowledge construction in social work often fail to address fundamental epistemological questions, a failure closely linked to the anti-intellectual traditions of the professional mainstream (Trinder, 1996). White identifies a tendency in much social work research to render sense-making activities "immune from critical analysis" (1997: 739). Over the course of the 1990s and indeed beyond, most research into residential child care, in the elusive pursuit of 'evidence', sought to apply standard and unimaginative methodologies, which seemed to succeed only in describing what, to most practitioners, was blindingly

obvious. Instrumental answers were applied to complex social problems with little sign of any deeper analysis of what was going on or any wider concern for social justice. Moreover, many social work academics and professionals seemed too concerned in Dingwall's (1997) terms, to be seen to be 'right on' rather than 'right' in what they had to say and as a result failed to subject developments in residential child care to sufficiently critical analysis. Two examples come to mind: the first of these concerns the subject of historical abuse, which I return to; the second to debates around residential care's poor outcomes which, as Forrester (2008) indicates, is based on shaky methodological foundations. Specifically, there is little in the mainstream social work literature that theorises or sets residential child care in wider social scientific context.

The quest by people professions such as social work to achieve recognition and status through an appeal to the precepts of the natural sciences or positivist notions of evidence is, Flyvbjerg argues, fundamentally misconceived. He contends in his case for phronetic social science (of which more later) that:

> 1. We should avoid social sciences that pretend to emulate natural science by producing cumulative and predictive theory. The natural science approach simply does not work in the social sciences. No predictive theories have been arrived at in social science, despite centuries of trying. This approach is a wasteful dead-end.
> 2. We should promote social sciences that are strong where natural science is weak – that is, in reflexive analysis and deliberation about values and interests aimed at praxis, which are essential to social and economic development in society. We should promote value rationality over epistemic rationality, in order to arrive at social science that matters (2006: 38).

Whose side am I on?

My own ontological and epistemological position has over time become decidedly constructionist. Anyone who has worked in social work for any length of time cannot fail to be aware of the plurality of human experience and indeed the damage that can be caused by attempts to impose 'objective' and normative assumptions upon it. Moreover, the claim to speak with a voice uncontaminated by personal and political sympathies is often used in research to shore up the status quo. Becker states the classic case for partisan research, arguing that "there is no position from which

sociological research can be done that is not biased in one way or another" (1967: 245). My particular bias in writing about residential child care derives from my practice experience and a desire to ensure that what comes to pass for knowledge about the field is at least vaguely recognisable to those who worked in it. I also want to contribute to research that does not pretend to be value neutral but, as Flyvbjerg (2006) asserts, is based upon value rationality and seeks to be of some use in its interface with practice.

I now proceed to make a case that lived experience can and indeed ought to be accepted as a legitimate source of knowledge. In seeking to do so, all roads seem to lead back to Aristotle, or at least to writers who draw upon Aristotle (see Dunne, 1993). Prominent among these neo-Aristotelians is Hans Georg Gadamer and his articulation of hermeneutics.

Hermeneutics

The origin of hermeneutic inquiry is in the interpretation of biblical texts. It thus emphasises qualities of interpretation and understanding. To reach a state of understanding is likened to a reflective discovery of sorts (Holroyd, 2007), one that is very different from Enlightenment inspired attempts to attain objectified knowledge and certainty through scientific method. Hermeneutics extend backwards beyond the Enlightenment's quest for rational and objective knowledge and as such challenge this central premise of the Enlightenment project. It is both pre-modern but also, curiously, postmodern. Gadamer's most famous book, *Truth and Method* (2004) explores this tension between truth and how we might reach a passable, if albeit contingent, version of it. We do not do so, he contends, through scientific method.

While the Enlightenment privileges the objective and rational 'voice from nowhere', Gadamer claims that we cannot separate ourselves from what we already know, from tradition. A sense of tradition is implicated from the earliest stages of any research in the choice of topic. According to Bernstein, "(E)ffective historical consciousness

influences what we consider worthy of investigation and how we go about investigating it" (1983: 142). The prejudices or pre-understandings that come along with our being in the world cannot merely be acknowledged then bracketed off as contaminating influences upon our research but are integral to any understanding we might claim.

Understanding, for Gadamer, is the "result of a dialogue between the past and our present which occurs when there is a 'fusion of horizons' between the two" (Bernstein, 1983: 91). Drawing on one's pre-understanding becomes a matter of moving from closeness to distance and back again in a dialectic interplay. Understanding can only come about through this dialectic between past and present but also that operating between the particular and the general; we can only understand the particularities of a situation in their wider cultural and linguistic context. Knowledge construction is, thus, an iterative process, a hermeneutic circle (the term first coined by Heidegger but further developed by Gadamer).

The closest we can come to 'the truth' comes only through "understanding (even mastering) and interpreting our experience" (Poulos, 2013). For Gadamer, however, the best that can be hoped for with experience is not knowledge in an absolute sense but insight (Lawn, 2006). Experience and insight combined lead to wisdom. This kind of understanding, grounded in tradition and experience, yields a distinctive type of practical knowledge and practical truth (Gadamer, 2004).

Experience, however, also teaches us its own limitations, confronting us with what we do not know. "Insight includes insight into the fallibility of human possibilities and their essential limitations" (Lawn, 2006: 63). Experience and knowledge become, in that sense, not fixed stable categories, but ongoing interpretive constructions.

Autoethnography

A hermeneutic epistemology might lend itself to autoethnographic methodology according to Ellis *et al's* description of autoethnography as "an approach to research

and writing that seeks to describe and systematically analyse personal experience in order to understand cultural experience" (2011: unpaginated). A researcher thus has to believe that the study of their own 'I' can shed light on issues of more general importance (Eriksson, 2010). Within autoethnography, writing itself becomes a way of knowing, a method of inquiry and one through which one might challenge canonical stories (Ellis *et al,* 2011). To accomplish this might require comparing and contrasting personal experience against existing research. This, in many senses is what I do with my writing, engaging in an ongoing fusing of horizons between past experience and developing knowledge to reach a deeper understanding of the field.

Insider-outsider considerations

I find myself in an ambiguous position as one who was an 'insider' in the residential child care community who has now broken out of the group to reflect back. My work is well received by the practice community, which recognises the tacit knowledge and understanding it conveys. I am still considered an 'insider' in that community and in this sense my writing might be thought to meet the standards of validity of qualitative research, this being an end-state, the point at which knowledge is accepted (Askeland and Payne, 2001).

On the other hand, I am an epistemic outsider (Doucet, 2008). I am sceptical (or at least I perceive nuance or alternative interpretations) about the canonical stories that have come to define residential child care in recent decades, the subject of historical abuse being an obvious example but nor am I convinced by discourses of rights, protection or outcomes, as will become apparent as this review develops. As a result, my writing can be dismissed within the dominant policy and epistemic communities.

Insider knowledge: a case study of historical abuse

By way of illustration of the importance of insider understanding of professional practice I now turn to the situation of historical abuse in residential care. Over the years I have become increasingly convinced that the discovery of abuse has been the defining moment in the history of residential child care (see RRCC, Chapter 3).

Responses to abuse have defined knowledge about residential child care in a particular way, reflecting a legal ontology largely untouched and untroubled by social scientific imagination or nuance.

The discourse on historic abuse, which took root over the course of the 1990s (see Sen *et al*, 2008) relies on a particular 'master narrative' around how it could occur. Ferguson asserts that ‘it is beyond question that the entire industrial and reformatory regime was an abusive and cruel one’ (2007: 124). The received wisdom may be summarised as follows: individuals harbouring ill intent towards children infiltrated care homes. They did so easily because recruitment policies were lax. Once in employment they were free to identify and target vulnerable children. Abuse remained undetected because abusers were sufficiently manipulative and deceitful to be able to cover up their activities. Management structures and cultures were so loose or corrupt that they either failed to address or covered up reports of abuse.

My initial response to such a narrative was to reluctantly accept it and to reconcile myself that I had been fortunate in my own workplaces of not having come across such happenings. Nevertheless, I went through a period of personal soul-searching. Had residential schools been such bad places? Had people I had worked closely with been pulling the wool over my eyes to abuse children? Then personal experience kicked in. Every year, a team of boys and staff from the school where I worked over the course of the 1980s travelled to play football against an English Community Home with Education (CHE) – (the equivalent of a Scottish List D School) in Merseyside. Towards the end of the 1990s staff there began to be implicated in abuse. In all, nearly 100 staff were investigated for abusing children over previous decades. These developments took me by surprise. I had not been aware of anything untoward but my experience was limited to having spent a number of weekends there.

Matters then reached closer to home. The De La Salle Brothers, for whom I worked, became implicated in the abuse of boys in their care in Scotland. Allegations reported in the press spoke of men in black robes indulging in gratuitous torture. I

knew some of those against whom the allegations were being made. I knew one of those making claims of abuse. He spoke of electric fences, of being forced to climb telegraph poles and falling and of being hit across the head so often that he lost his hearing. In 2003, I witnessed a former shift partner, Brother Ben, being jailed for allegedly electrocuting children in his care. The device in question was the equivalent of a Van Der Graaf generator that he used in an electronics workshop to demonstrate how electricity was generated. That he was prosecuted, far less convicted made me realise that all was not as it seemed within official accounts.

I began to look into the issue of historical abuse more systematically. In doing so I came across the work of Richard Webster (2005) whose book, *The Secret of Bryn Estyn*, forensically deconstructs the Waterhouse Report set up by the Westminster Government to inquire into abuse in North Wales children's homes. I myself and with colleagues have gone on to question the epistemological basis upon which assumptions of widespread abuse are based (Smith, 2010, Smith et al, 2012). I do not dispute that abuse happened in residential child care as it does wherever adults interact with children but I do question its scale and the proportionality of responses.

The reason, it seems to me, that the kind of lurid accounts of abuse in care that have taken hold in the public imagination, but have also become dominant in professional discourse, can do so is through a lack of hermeneutic understanding of the field. 'Insider' knowledge of actual situations and events allows and indeed demands that I question and contest accounts I know not to be true, however one might interpret true. Within metanarratives of abuse and a pre-existing professional ambivalence towards residential care, however, a lack of grounded knowledge can encourage fantasising. This itself may be linked to care itself, which Tronto (1993) identifies as being persistently undervalued in public policy and discourse.

Dominant accounts of historical abuse are constructed around a combination of fact and fantasy and when the two are mixed in unequal proportion, fantasy can overtake fact and can act to generate and intensify a particular web of belief, which becomes very difficult to unravel. When this happens Webster argues, "(T)here is only one

way to undo its influence. This is to document how the narrative which has achieved such power was actually created in the first place. In short, it is to tell another story - the story of the story (2005: 11). This requires a different type of knowledge and understanding of the field.

Phronesis and phronentic social science

I noted, above, a connection from Gadamer back to Aristotle, who identifies three main intellectual virtues: episteme, techne and phronesis. Flyvbjerg defines these, respectively, as follows:

> *Episteme* scientific knowledge. Universal, invariable, context-independent. Based on general analytic rationality. The original concept is known today from the terms 'epistemology' and 'epistemic'.
>
> *Techne* Craft/art. Pragmatic, variable, context-dependent. Oriented towards production. Based on practical instrumental rationality governed by a conscious goal. The original concept appears today in terms such as 'technique', 'technical' and 'technology'.
>
> *Phronesis* Ethics. Deliberation about values with reference to praxis. Pragmatic, variable, context dependent. Oriented towards action. Based on practical value-rationality. The original concept has no analogous contemporary term (2001: 57).

The virtue of phronesis is central to Gadamer's (2004) exposition of hermeneutics. He identifies it as the thoughtful reflection on experience. It is described elsewhere, variously, as prudence or practical wisdom (Whan, 1986). Aristotle associates phronesis specifically with moral knowledge, involving contemplation on Eudaimonia or 'the good life'. It involves acting on our world (praxis) in a value based way as distinct from necessarily producing something (what Aristotle calls poiesis, which might be associated with techne). This is an important distinction and it is according to Flyvbjerg (2001), important to differentiate types of knowledge. This, however, is rarely done in professional discourse. Social work, in its quest for 'evidence' has conflated and confused different types of knowledge and has sought to build a knowledge base, primarily, around an understanding of knowledge as

techne. The result of such technocratic consciousness or technical ratonality is instrumentalisation (Whan, 1986), within which people become objects of interventions done unto them (see also Bauman, 1993; 2000).

Social work, however, ought to involve an element of service. According to Whan:

> Implicit in the act of service, of helping the other, is some version of the good. When asked to account for what one does, when asked to justify one's actions, it is to an idea of the good that we turn. It is by this idea of the good, then, that we describe the practice as what it is (1986: 244).

This notion of the good, with its obvious ethical connotations, leads in the direction of a different form of rationality, practical or value-rationality – phronesis. Flyvbjerg (2001) offers a central contribution to debates about the nature of social scientific enquiry, advocating what he calls phronetic social science, within which, he claims:

> the purpose of social science is not to develop epistemic theory, but to contribute to society's practical rationality by elucidating where we are, where we want to go, and what is desirable according to different sets of values and interests. The goal of the phronetic approach becomes contributing to society's capacity for value-rational deliberation and action. In this scenario social scientists actively ensure that their work is relevant to praxis. The aim is to make the line between research and the world direct and consequential (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 42).

Phronetic social scientists, according to Flyvbjerg "realise that as researchers, their sociality and history is the only solid ground under their feet; and that this socio-historical foundation is fully adequate for their work" (2006: 41). The role of social science, for Flyvbjerg, is not to produce objective 'knowledge' but to engage in dialogue and praxis in the public domain. If academics are to lay claim to be intellectuals then they ought to aspire to be public intellectuals, seeking to achieve an authoritative position within a wider civitas. The basis for their knowledge in their own sociality and history has provoked calls for "self-reflexive modes of qualitative inquiry that grapple with this intersection of biography and history in society" (Riessman and Quinney, 2005).

Moving towards reflexivity

The idea of reflexivity derives primarily from interpretivist traditions. The concept, whereby the researcher seeks to position themself in relation to their research, can be claimed to add an additional layer of rigour to the research process (Fook and Askeland, 2006). It can help deflect some of the criticisms made of 'insider' research by subjecting it to a layer of personal examination and transparency regarding the influence that the positionality of the researcher might have on the researched. Nevertheless, reflexivity can be subject to critique as being solipsistic and overly confessional. More recent literature on reflexivity, however, goes beyond the idea of being merely reflective, described by Woolgar (1988) as benign introspection, to incorporate social critique, which 'offers the opportunity to utilise experiential accounts while situating these within a strong theoretical framework about the social construction of power' (Finlay, 2003: 14). Taylor and White suggest that social workers need to become "aware of the dominant professional constructions influencing their practice" (2000: 35). In this context, constructs such as 'rights', protection, or outcomes must be considered only the products of dominant ideologies, no longer to be taken for granted but contestable and provisional. As such, a critically reflexive stance offers possibilities to destabilise dominant practice paradigms.

The roots of my thinking: a reflexive journey

The literature on reflexivity recognises that we bring a number of positions or 'selves' to the research process and these, inevitably, influence the type of knowledge that we create (see Reinharz, 1997). When I left University in 1981 with a Modern History degree, I wanted to be a teacher. My own parents, out of economic necessity and social expectation, had both left school at 15, my father to become a painter and decorator, my mother an office worker. Looking back, both my parents would nowadays be identified as being 'in need' in some way. My paternal grandfather had been brought up in care, coincidentally, I later discovered, in the Catholic working boys' home run by the De La Salle Brothers I later went on to work for. When my father's mother died when he was 16, my grandfather was unable to care for him and his younger brother and they went to stay with a family

known to them through the Church, what would nowadays be described as informal fostering. On the other side, my mother's father died suddenly when she was a baby, leaving her mother to bring up three children as a single parent. For much of her life, my gran, not surprisingly, was 'bothered with her nerves', what might today be understood as having mental health difficulties.

The painting and decorating trade can call upon a unique political legacy set out in 'the painter's bible', Robert Tressell's socialist tract, *The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists*, which recounts the experiences of painters in Edwardian Hastings on the South Coast of England. My father became involved in the trade union movement. Some of my earliest memories are of trades union or Labour Party Christmas parties. I have considered myself to be a socialist ever since.

Despite their inauspicious starts in life, both my parents returned to further and then higher education to become teachers. Their life-paths, I am sure, instilled in me an ideal of education as being linked with personal improvement but also with social and class advancement. My own desire to teach, however, was not realised at that point. There were few openings for history teachers and, moreover, I felt I should get some life experience before going straight from University to teacher training college. I was working in a bar when I saw a job advertised for a temporary residential social worker in what was then called a List D School. I had no idea what social work might be and little idea of what a List D School was, equating it, erroneously I came to realise, with Borstals or young offenders' institutions. In fact, while most of the boys who attended had offended, List D Schools were, first and foremost, schools. Their task, of course, went wider than teaching to embrace what Kilbrandon (1964) termed 'education in its widest sense, social education'.

The school advertising the job was run by a religious order, the De La Salle Brothers. I had been brought up and remain a Catholic so felt comfortable with that. Around that time I was also becoming aware of Catholic Social Teaching (CST) and with liberation theology, within which solidarity with the poor is a central tenet. I applied for the job and was, initially, offered a one-year appointment. I was kept on and went

on to spend nine years there. This period was foundational in forming my ideas about child care and education. These have developed rather than changed over my years in practice and subsequently academia. As I have written in the book, "There was little sense of hierarchy or positional authority but the Brothers inspired an intense loyalty and followership. Their leadership was rooted in values of human dignity and respect, of discipline but also of forgiveness" (RRCC: x)

I moved on in 1990 to become assistant head in another residential school (by this time no longer called List D as a result of withdrawal of Scottish Office funding). This was a different experience. Whereas the Brothers' approach to boys and staff at St Joseph's had been essentially pastoral, the school I moved to was, on the surface, more professional. Again, I have noted, "I was initially impressed by the sense of order that seemed to prevail. However, I soon became aware that attempts to ensure control through systems and procedures were not as effective as I first thought … procedures could be used by some staff as a substitute for building close and authoritative personal relationships with boys" … "Establishments", I conclude "might have 'i's dotted and 't's crossed but they also needed 'soul'" (RRCC: x). Much of this account seeks to develop what I might mean by this.

After a couple of years there, I was asked to take over as head of secure accommodation in Lothian Region. I then had a short interlude as manager of a small children's home, what was called a Close support unit. This was an interesting period inasmuch as it reflected some of the ideas that were prevalent at that time (the early 1990s). Close support units were intended to either prevent children going into secure accommodation or to provide a bridge back from secure accommodation into the community. The belief was that children would be subject to short-term, targeted 'interventions' then moved back home or into community resources, 'fixed'. Of course, it did not work out that way. The unit was actually successful in working with children but only because we kept them long term, thus subverting the original rationale for such units. After two years there I returned to manage a newly built secure unit and remained there, latterly as Principal for secure accommodation, for the remainder of my time in practice.

The early years of my time as head of the secure unit were among the most rewarding of my professional life. I had set up a unit from scratch with a new staff group, many of whom had never worked in residential child care before. With a small cohort of experienced and committed managers, we set about establishing a culture that was generally progressive and built around good relationships between children and staff – 'a community that cared' was how one of the senior staff remembered it when she came to move on.

Then, in 1996, allegations of historical abuse across a number of children's homes in Edinburgh began to surface, leading to the eventual conviction of two men. Following their conviction, the Council set up an inquiry. A sense of anxiety began to permeate the wider organisational culture, experienced on the ground in excessive scrutiny and suspicion. Many everyday practices that had been taken for granted, such as staff coming in on their own time to take children out on activities, became subject to suspicion. Staff, in turn, lost spontaneity and began to doubt themselves and one another. Children, inevitably, picked up on some of this anxiety.

The subject of child abuse is one that is ripe for managerial responses – who could argue with robust management action to root out and prevent recurrence? Such action became evident in a proliferation of procedures, all of which shifted the locus of control and decision making away from the sites of direct practice towards external managers, most of whom had no experience of residential child care. A more sceptical interpretation might be that the 'discovery' of abuse was used as a catalyst to legitimate a very different way of political engagement with the care sector through what might be understood now as the New Public Management (Pollitt, 2003). The rationale for these changes was posited to be 'safety', although it was difficult even then to determine how much of this concern was based on children's safety and how much that of organisations.

My central question

In 2000, I left practice to develop a new Masters in Advanced Residential Child Care at the University of Strathclyde. I had not lost my love of direct practice and management but I had become disillusioned by what I can now understand and name as managerialism. Ideas of vocation and of close personal relationships became 'subsumed beneath a range of short-term technical rational interventions' (RRCC: xi). This shift was represented in what Loughlin (2002) identifies as the buzzwords of improvement, modernisation and progress. I go on to express a persistent unease that this was not the true picture and that residential child care had, in fact, lost much along the way in its road towards modernisation.

This dissonance between what I had experienced as a practitioner, which was largely positive, and what was promulgated as the brave new world of residential child care, which from my experience was not, is perhaps the central question that has exercised my thinking over the years since leaving practice and developing my academic thinking around residential child care. Much of this dissonance is existential. Within a framework of reflexivity it seems legitimate to say a bit about how such existential essences might be brought to play in my retrospective gaze over my past life in residential child care.

The 'selves' I bring to the research process

Some of the selves I bring to my academic engagement with residential child care are those alluded to above. I am a Catholic, sharing, I think, with Freire (1970) an ontological vocation that comes with this to act upon and seek to transform the world towards a greater humanisation. In this sense, my Catholicism and socialism come together almost seamlessly.

Mollenhauer (1983), to whom I return, claims that adults' understandings of upbringing are gleaned from their own experiences of being brought up. This, I think, is a crucial point though, in a world where we are encouraged to picture some idealised and abstract version of upbringing, one that is rarely acknowledged. In that respect, I am my parents' son and this raises questions for me around how best to

address issues of poverty and disadvantage. In a similar vein, as a father, I can't help but reflect on the disparities between how I bring up my own children and how I might be expected to bring up children in care. I know, obviously, that children in care come with a history but I am not sure that treating them as being invariably traumatised and requiring 'therapy' whatever that may be (I never quite worked this out in all my years of practice) is necessarily helpful. As a result, I strongly incline towards broadly educational means of helping people change and move on in their lives. The efficacy of a social education orientation seem to be given some substance in Gharabaghi's (2012) work in which he points to the shortcomings of treatment models for children in care and the need for a greater focus on education through living and learning.

The final existential self I should declare is as a Scot. Increasingly, I am coming to realise that the cultural and intellectual heritage that this brings with it plays an important part in how I understand the world. Some of this will be touched upon as the review proceeds.

A number of 'professional 'selves' also find their way into my writing. I mention only one. Doucet, (2008) writes of the ghosts that haunt a researcher's understanding. The ghost that haunts mine is that of Brother Ben, who, at 70 years of age, I saw jailed for 'electrocuting' children. This experience has had a major bearing on how I engage with the subject of historical abuse. I am aware that my starting position is to question allegations of abuse and in so doing I may be seen to dismiss accounts that are genuine. On the other hand, because I am swimming against the tide on this issue, I need to make sure that I can show my workings on it and that my arguments are robust. Interestingly, no-one has challenged my position in an academic journal and others who do write on the subject are beginning to reference my work to bring an alternative reading or at least some nuance to the debate.

These 'selves' provide, in Gadamer's terms, the pre-understandings that I bring to my deliberations on residential care. They meld with increasingly broad academic

knowledge to build up a rich picture of the field. Conversely, little of the literature I read in my early years as an academic felt particularly useful in explaining the world of practice that I knew. At another level, these various 'selves' come together to inform what Willis (2011) calls a story to live by, which permeates my engagement with residential child care.

A couple of years into academic life I came across Moss and Petrie's (2002) book, *From Children's Services to Children's Space*s, which proved to be an epiphanic moment. Here was care described as moral, political and practical rather than technical/rational and instrumental. The book also led me in the direction of authors I had not previously heard of, specifically, Zygmunt Bauman and Joan Tronto, whose ideas I develop in the two articles in this submission. Moss and Petrie pose a number of questions, which frame how we might begin to think about notions of care and upbringing. They ask: 1) "what do we want for our children?" 2) "What is a good childhood? and 3) what kind of relationships do we wish to promote between children and adults?" (2002: 4). Questions as to what is a good childhood resonate with wider ideas of what is a good or flourishing life. This wider Aristotelian notion of flourishing, developed by Jean Vanier (2001) in the context of his work with adults with learning disabilities, has been influential in some of my thinking as to how children are brought up. We ought, as a society, be concerned about how children might flourish, not merely whether they are protected or are claiming their rights.

So, to draw this section to a close, my motivation for writing the book and indeed much of my other writing, was, largely, to help me make sense of my own experience and, through this, to hope that my account might strike a chord with others in the field and beyond. At one level it is cathartic, it involves, in a phrase borrowed from Moss and Petrie (2002), putting a stutter into dominant narratives about residential care and seeking to reframe these in more critical and positive ways.

Chapter Two: A history of the present

In this chapter I attempt what Parton, following Foucault, calls a history of present, to outline how care "has been constituted and to make explicit the range of complexities, ambiguities and tensions that have fed into it" (2006: 3).

For much of the 20th Century residential care provision was, primarily, in the hands of the churches or charities. With a focus on basic physical care and moral probity and with little awareness of children's emotional needs, assumptions and practices in such homes might seem anachronistic viewed through a modern day lens. Webb (2010) nonetheless, identifies a sense of moral purpose and vocation among those who ran them. Following World War Two, the 1948 Children Act established local authority Children's Departments, with responsibility for child care, including residential child care. The 1948 Act led to the growth from the 1950s of family group homes, in which live-in 'aunties' and 'uncles' brought up groups of children alongside their own families. A similar model emerged in residential schools where housemasters and housemothers were responsible for and lived attached to cottage units in which children lived. Reflecting wider societal attitudes at that time, gender roles remained well defined, with the 'auntie' or housemother taking responsibility for domestic and nurturing tasks and the uncle or housemaster expected to assume a disciplinary role. Similarly, mirroring wider societal ideas of the family, child care provision operated largely within the private domain, with those providing care left much to their own devices as to what this care might be like. While this was a problem at one level, as subsequent revelations of abuse attest, it was also vitally important, as care needs some boundaries put around it; the panoptical gaze of regulation might be as much a problem as no scrutiny at all (Reeves, 2012). It prevents adults from taking responsibility for children's upbringing.

The professionalisation of social work following legislation in the late 1960s saw residential child care located within the new generic profession. The nature of care changed from what had been a largely domestic task to become a more ostensibly professional one. 'Professionalisation' saw a shift away from the live-in staff who

had been at the heart of previous models of care to what Douglas and Payne (1981) called an 'industrial model' in which the personal and professional selves of carers became separated as a result of the introduction of shift systems, but also by ideas that made particular assumptions of what it was to be 'professional'. The model of the bureau professional within large local authority bureaucracies was premised on qualities of 'objectivity' and 'professional distance' (Meagher and Parton, 2004).
In its quest for professional status, residential child care looked to psychology to provide the kind of 'scientific' provenance that was lacking in mere care. It thus flirted with psychodynamic ideas, behaviourism, social learning theory and more recently, attachment theory (see RRCC Chapter Five). Of course, none of these provided the philosopher's stone leading to 'what works' (Allan, 2011).

Social work, as it developed from the 1960s, drew on two dominant strands of thinking. The first of these was a clinical orientation deriving from the medical roots that formed one thread in the profession's history, focused on individual and family problems. The second strand was an increasingly structural one, drawing on a literature hostile to institutional care. Goffman's (1961) Asylums is perhaps the foremost example of this. Both these strands of thinking – the individual clinical and the anti-institutional – highlight some ambivalence and tensions in conceptualising residential child care within social work (Smith et al, 2013).

Ambivalence towards residential child care was reflected in a strong preference for fostering as the placement of choice for children who could not be cared for at home. The *Children who wait* report (Rowe and Lambert, 1973), commissioned by the Association of British Adoption Agencies and influenced by the growing literature around attachment (Bowlby, 1951) claimed that all children need to be brought up in a family environment. It identified thousands of children in residential care settings who did not need to be there and an absence of planning for their futures.

Children who wait was used to support an ideological case that residential child care could not provide sufficiently strong attachment opportunities or the experience of permanence for children. Alternative family care as the preferred choice for children

became deeply embedded in social work thinking. Changing Lives, the report of the 21st Century Social Work Review in Scotland (Scottish Executive, 2006), reflects a wider social work orthodoxy when it notes, without further explanation or evidence, that: 'While residential child care remains the option of choice for a few children, many more are accommodated in residential provision due to a shortage of foster placements' (2006: 23). Foster care was also considered to be a cheaper option.

Despite such strong professional preference for foster care, there is growing evidence that, as it has been used within local authority social work as a short-term measure, it does not provide stability for many of the children placed there. Indeed, in many cases it can build instability, as children are moved serially between foster placements (Smith et al, 2013).

The 1995 Children (Scotland) Act reinforced shifting conceptions of care, reflecting a move towards more legalistic and contractual approaches to service provision. It replaced the term 'care' with 'looked after'. Children and young people in residential care were described as being 'looked after and accommodated', suggesting an instrumental and short-term conception of care, a hoteling function, rather than the open-ended, if arguably unfocussed, commitment that had gone before.

A combination of ideology and cost contributed substantially to the decline in the usage of residential child care from a high point in the mid 1970s (Bebbington and Miles, 1981). In England, for instance, "placements in community homes fell from over 25,000 to less than 2000 between 1981 and 2000" (Kendrick, 2012: 288). A growing preference for foster care entailed that younger children were most often placed there, with the result that residential care became, predominantly, a service for the most troubled, challenging and hard to place adolescents (Courtney and Iwaniec, 2009), with inevitable implications for group dynamics and behaviour management.

The recent history of residential child care has been a chequered one, characterised

by continuing ideological aversion to its use, assumptions of poor outcomes and the child abuse scandals, which first came to light over the course of the 1990s. Evidence to support such negative views is, in fact, somewhat more nuanced than can be presented. While it is hard to argue that outcomes from residential child care are as good as they might be, this debate needs to be understood against the backdrop of the residualisation of this form of provision, rendering comparison with the wider population of children problematic. Forrester (2008) shows that being admitted into care (both foster and residential) in fact, almost always leads to some improvement in children's personal and social situations. Evidence can be similarly contested regarding the scale of abuse in residential care as I suggest in the book and in subsequent writing (Smith (2010; Smith *et al*, 2012). The result of inadequately thought through beliefs of poor outcomes and of abuse is to reinforce a particularly negative perception of residential child care which, in turn, legitimises a tendency to further restrict its usage. As Webb observes: "in the face of the impracticality of its total abandonment, (organizational responses have) consigned those in what is sometimes now called 'corporate care' to an even more stigmatising experience (Webb, 2009: 1394).

Care in the neoliberal world

In many respects this dynamic of unanticipated consequences resulting from policy decisions might be thought of as falling within the 'cock-up' theory of history or social policy. At another level, however, there may be a more deliberate aspect to policy developments around residential child care. For such an argument to be advanced requires a structural analysis, which locates the sector within the context of the neoliberal project. I begin to locate residential child care within such a wider context in the book (RRCC: Chapter One) where, drawing on Harvey (2005), I set out some of the core tenets of neoliberalism and its handmaiden, managerialism.

Neoliberalism, which might most readily be identified in the UK with the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979, is described by Harvey as a "theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating

individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong property rights, free markets and free trade" (2005: 2).

The imprint of neoliberalism on practice is evident in the doctrine of managerialism (Clark and Newman, 1997). This was based around core principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness and a belief that these aims could be achieved by more and better management (Pollitt, 1993). This created the conditions through which "private sector disciplines can be introduced to the public services, political control can be strengthened, budgets trimmed, professional autonomy reduced, public service unions weakened and a quasi-competitive framework erected to flush out the natural inefficiencies of bureaucracy" (Pollitt, 1990: 49). Managerialism became manifest in ideas of care management, whereby care could be broken down into clean-cut stages of assessment and programmed interventions that would lead to measurable and improved outcomes over specified (preferably short) periods of time (Rose, 2010).

The neoliberal reform of care started with older people's services (Scourfield, 2007). It has spread rapidly, however, to the extent that 76% of children's homes in England are now owned by the independent sector, with only 24% owned by local authorities (AAPG, 2012). A central consequence of this situation is that residential care is now "a commodity . . . there to be traded and exploited for its surplus value like any other commodity" (Scourfield, 2007: 162) and as a consequence "the quest for profitability means that business values, reductions in costs and income generation have been prioritised over and above the quality of care" (Scourfield, 2007: 170).

In addition to eroding qualities of care and relationships, neoliberalism also seeks "to remake work and to alter the aims, aspirations and affiliations of a range of professional groups and fields" (Garrett, 2010). It has injected new forms of insecurity into people's working lives. This is frequently discussed in terms of the notion of 'precariousness', or 'precaricity', reflected in, for example, the growth of short-term contracts and the growth of 'agency' working where wages are pared to a minimum and staff have few employment rights (Garrett, 2010). In the case of

residential child care, this had previously argued to be social work and as such requiring to be staffed by a professionally qualified workforce. This aspiration has been incrementally reduced. Residential work is now ‘social care’, a primarily vocational rather than professional task. The lower level of qualifications required to do care jobs is offset by ‘policing’ the workforce through ever-expanding inspectorial and audit functions (Humphrey, 2003).

Against this backdrop the negative publicity focused on residential child care might be re-framed and understood within a foundational aim of the neoliberal project to maintain a state of perpetual crisis. Garrett (2006) suggests that the whole notion that the 'care system' is 'failing' can be understood as an intensely ideological project, required within the neoliberal frame of reference to reveal failure in order to provide a rationale for privatisation (Garrett, 2006).

At another level, neoliberal ideology is predicated upon a particular understanding of the person as independent, autonomous and competitive. There is, Thatcher claimed, no such thing as society, no collective, only individuals and families looking out for themselves. Neoliberalism constructs care (with its connotations of weakness and dependency) as something to be avoided (Steckley and Smith, 2011).

The task of residential child care shifted:

> away from responding to the needs of the ‘concrete other’ to echo broader, universalising discursive and social policy agendas. Specifically, it is subject to the dominant concerns that have come to frame approaches to children in neoliberal, anglophone societies, specifically those of risk, rights, and protection. (Steckley and Smith: 183/4)

In this account I focus on the place of protection and rights within a neoliberal paradigm. The dominant view of human beings in neoliberalism is, in many respects, a Hobbesian one, presupposing the worst in people and advocating strong government action to keep them in check. If one perceives individuals as being motivated only by their own selfish interests then they need external authority and frameworks to protect them from worst excesses of equally grasping others.

Children, who have a special status, almost a redemptive status, having not yet reached this dystopian end-state, need to be protected, especially from adults who have no sense of a common good. Protection, in this sense, betrays an essentially misanthropic take on human relationships, involving: "a very different conception of the relationship between an individual or group, and others than does care. Caring seems to involve taking the concerns and needs of the other as the basis for action. Protection presumes … bad intentions" (Tronto, 1993: 104).

Similarly, children's rights, as they have emerged in public policy, are premised on "a particular understanding of the subject as a rational, autonomous individual" (Dahlberg and Moss, 2005: 30). By this way of thinking children and adults become linked to one another, primarily, through a series of contractual arrangements, evident in residential care in developments such as the proliferation of information booklets and complaints procedures.

Harvey (2005) notes, however, that despite its monolithic aspirations neoliberalism is in fact shot through with contradictions. In practice, this has led, not to less and leaner government as the doctrine might profess, but to more intrusive and narrowly bureaucratic government, a trend particularly evident following the election of the New Labour Government in 1997.

Care in the Third Way

The New Labour Government adopted what it called a Third Way to policy formulation. This was claimed to be an ostensibly 'modern' and efficient approach to government in which 'what matters was what worked'. Aside from pursuing efficiency, modernization

> offers a particular conception of the citizen (empowered as active, participating subjects), of work (as the source of opportunity for the ''socially excluded''), of community (non-antagonistic and homogeneous), and of nation (setting out Britain's place in the changing global economy) (Newman, 2000: 47).

The 'Third Way', however, is a neoliberal way, perhaps more accurately a specific

and national articulation of neoliberalism (Hall, 2003). Third Way politics placed great faith in regulation. Specifically, New Labour oversaw the introduction of legislation to regulate care introduced across all parts of the UK in 2001. This set standards against which care homes might be inspected and also introduced regulation of the workforce, arguably to improve services and safeguard the public. This was also the era of the 'corporate parent', terminology which, intentionally or otherwise, had the effect of locating responsibility for the care of children, with conglomerates of local authority departments and their inspectorial overseers, rather than with those individuals engaging with them on a day-to-day basis.

McLaughlin (2010) argues that there is little evidence that regulation has improved quality in care services. What these developments, and the way they have been interpreted and enacted, have done is to create an "enormous proliferation of legislation, regulation and guidance … as if by classifying, codifying, monitoring, incentivising and target setting in almost every conceivable sphere of social interaction, government could achieve the complete set of beneficial and positive outcomes' (Jordan, 2010: 3). The problem, however, according to Jordan (2010) is that New Labour introduced the wrong type of regulation, contractual regulation rather than moral regulation. The failure of the Third way, he claims, was ultimately a moral failure. Politicians believed society could be improved by proliferation of contractual regulation rather than deeper consideration of values.

The corruption of care

In an important article, Wardaugh and Wilding (1993) reflect on the 'Pindown' regime in Staffordshire children's homes where children were subject to an extreme form of behaviour management. They formulate a number of propositions which, they argue, contribute to the corruption of care. It is an article that is often quoted in writing about abuse in care. Its basic premise, however, is largely misunderstood and many of the features the authors identify as being implicated in the corruption of care have not only been left unaddressed but have, in many cases, been compounded by managerial responses. In focussing narrowly on avoiding internal management

failures, such responses have actually reinforced other organisational features implicated in the corruption of care, specifically those pertaining to the impact of bureaucratic structures on care practices and the consequences of feelings of powerlessness experienced by those who provide direct care. The authors, in fact, draw on Bauman's work to explicate ideas of social distance and of othering, both of which are likely results of impersonal and instrumental management regimes.

Corruption, according to Wardaugh and Wilding (1993) can be of various kinds. The essential element, however, is that it constitutes an active betrayal of the basic values on which the organisation is supposedly based. The fundamental corruption in the care system over recent decades has been a failure to care. The concept of care was, in the first instance, marginalised in the professionalisation and bureaucratisation of social work. Subsequently, it was re-shaped by neoliberal political and economic policies which, in their concern for the bottom line and for managerial diktat, are incongruent with the provision of nurturing and relational care.

The impact of these various discursive trends brought to bear on residential child care have contributed to a situation whereby:

> the concept of care within public care for children has been rarely seen as visible….a narrowing of what we mean by care, a lowering of expectations of what the state can offer in terms of care. Of particular note is the marked contrast between the potential for care within families as centring on control and love, and the optimum expected from state care which is around safekeeping. Care as used in legislation seems to have been emptied of its potential, a dried up expression for how to manage an underclass of disadvantage (Cameron, 2003: 91-92).

A large part of the problem that confronts care is actually a failure to imbue it with a sense of purpose and to allow adults to feel that they can take responsibility for children's upbringing. Comparing this current state with the sense of moral purpose apparent in earlier manifestations of residential child care, Webb characterises the situation thus:

> Apparently 'progressive', and terrified of censoriousness or of being oppressive, the consequences for practice are permissiveness and laissez-fairism. Under these conditions the psychological and cultural powerlessness of young residents leads

> to the appropriation of their identity as they become swept along by the trivial and everyday. This is where leniency leads us, despite being superficially attractive, 'progressive' and 'democratic'. Far from allowing an identity that is liberated from convention, the child in care becomes subject to the pervasiveness not so much of dominant culture but the mundane everyday culture and its insinuations for young people about their beliefs, being and identity … (2009: 1395/6)

What is missing, I would argue, from present day state care is any appropriate conception of care itself or of upbringing.

Chapter Three: Care and upbringing

This chapter moves towards a conceptualisation of ideas of care and upbringing and to place these at the centre of what state care might offer children.

An ethic of care

Some of the most important work around the nature of care is contained in the expanding literature around an ethic of care, associated, initially, with Carol Gilligan's book *In a Different Voice* (1982). Gilligan was a student of Lawrence Kohlberg, who expounded what has become the standard model of human moral development. She challenged Kohlberg's model as reflecting predominantly male ways of thinking and acting on questions of morality. Men are deemed to speak and act from a 'justice' orientation, where qualities of objectivity, rationality and general principle predominate, women from a 'care' orientation drawing on 'softer' attributes of intuition, connection and compassion in reaching moral decisions. Care ethics have moved on since Gilligan to encompass a growing body of work on moral theory across a range of disciplines.

In recent years care ethics have been the subject of two special editions of the journal *Ethics and Social Welfare* and a book drawing these together (Koggel and Orme, 2013). In the article with Steckley (2011), published in the journal and the book, I develop the literature on care ethics within the particular context of residential child care. The following sections provide a backdrop to the article.

Following from Gilligan's seminal work, Tronto (1993) conceptualised care as a practice describing it as a "specious activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue and repair our 'world' so that we can live in it as well as possible" (1993: 103). A moral person attains that status in the ways in which they respond to the injunctions to care that present themselves in everyday life. Tronto goes on to say that "an ethic of care is a practice, rather than a set of rules or principles… It involves both particular acts of caring and a 'general habit of mind' to care that

should inform all aspects of a practitioner's moral life" (1993: 126/7).
Sevenhuijsen's (1998) work locates care within concepts
of responsibilities and relationships rather than rules and rights.

Elements of an ethic of care

Tronto (1993) identifies four elements to an ethic of care. Carers need to demonstrate *attentiveness* - they need to be available to the other, to convey the sense that they and perhaps only they matter at that particular moment. Caring also demands that carers take *responsibility* for caring. How they do so derives from implicit cultural practice rather than formal rules. Good intentions are not sufficient in the care of others. Tronto's third element of care requires *competence.* The final of Tronto's elements of an ethic of care is *responsiveness.* Carers are to be aware of the vulnerability of others, and respond to their needs in a way that they would want. Importantly, Fisher and Tronto (1990) identify a fifth element of care, incorporated into Tronto's subsequent work and that is *care receiving*. This identifies care, not as something that is one-directional, done unto another out of duty, but as being fundamentally relational and reciprocal and within which the care receiver is an active partner in determining how care might be offered and experienced. The one-caring and the cared for (Noddings, 2002) are thrown together in a care relationship in which power dynamics are complex and non-linear, emotional rather than instrumental.

Caring for and caring about

One of the most accessible expositions of care ethics and, given her roots in school teaching one of particular relevance to residential care, is provided in the work of Nel Noddings (1984, 2002). Noddings (1984) distinguishes between 'caring for' and 'caring about.' 'Caring for' is what residential care workers do. They work at the level of the face to face encounter with children engaging in physical aspects of care such as personal hygiene and in issues of care and control; they soak up the intensity of children's emotions and get involved in the messy bits around intimacy and boundaries. There is an inevitable rawness and unpredictability about 'caring for'.

'Caring about' puts more distance between carers and the objects of their care. It is what people might do when they take a stance on an issue or give to charity; they do not provide care directly but have a general predisposition to see that children are cared for. 'Caring for' and 'caring about' are linked, however; the capacity to care about derives from our experience of being cared for (Noddings, 2002). In this sense, caring about is implicated in a wider desire for social justice. It does not and should not, however, get us off the hook of 'caring for', or responding to the needs of the concrete other. Noddings' distinction between 'caring about' and 'caring for' may help cast some light on the difference between residential workers and social workers. Social workers tend to take a more distant, 'objective' bigger picture view of situations; residential workers derive their knowledge from the intimacy of their everyday 'caring for' encounters.

Koggel and Orme (2010), to some extent, sum up the current state of play as regards care ethics in the following statement:

> Gilligan's uncovering of a 'different voice' has had broad implications in its challenge to mainstream moral theory in the liberal tradition. In contrast to accounts of universal principles and of the significance of impartiality, individual rights, consequences, and justice in consequentialist and deontological moral theories, the ethic of care emphasizes the importance of context, interdependence, relationships, and responsibilities to concrete others (2010: 109).

Caring institutions

In a contribution to the special volume of *Ethics and Social Welfare*, Tronto (2010) addresses the question of what might make for a caring institution. The premise of Noddings' (2002) book, *Starting at Home* is that the best way to think about care institutions is to model them upon the family. Tronto (2010) argues, however, that while we can turn to family life to intuit some elements of good care, to provide such care in an institutional context requires that certain elements of care that go unspoken and are taken for granted in the family setting are made explicit. Care institutions, she argues, need to have an identifiable sense of purpose. Increasingly, I am moving towards an idea of upbringing as the overarching purpose of children's care.

Upbringing

I now turn to the writing of the German social pedagogue Klaus Mollenhauer (1928-1998) to begin to articulate a concept of upbringing. I was introduced to Mollenhauer's work through my involvement in the Centre for Understanding Social Pedagogy (CUSP). Interest in social pedagogy reflects the direction that much of my work is taking (see RRCC, Chapter Ten) and Mollenhauer's explication of upbringing is central to this.

Bringing up children is identified by Mollenhauer as a moral and cultural endeavour, brought about through caring, inter-generational relationships. His book, *Forgotten Connections: On Culture and Upbringing* (1983), is regarded as one of the most important German contributions to educational theory and scholarship in the 20th century. It has been translated into several languages, but has not yet appeared in English. For this summary I am dependent on translated excerpts and articles in English by two scholars, Norm Friesen and Tone Saevi.

What is upbringing?

Paul Natorp (1904), an early social pedagogic writer, identifies the essence of the discipline as being the upbringing of an individual and their integration into society. Man (sic), according to Natorp, can only become man through human interaction; individuals can only develop fully as part of society. Children, thus, need to be brought up as social beings.

Central aspects of upbringing are reflected in the German terms *erziehung* and *bildung*. *Erziehung* can be translated, loosely, as 'education' or 'upbringing', blurring the boundary between school and home, personal and professional. *Bildung* is often claimed not to have an equivalent term in English to convey its scope. It is in essence about moral and social cultivation or formation (Lovlie et al, 2003). It is what Mollenhauer characterised as the 'way of the self', describing how we form ourselves and are formed by others, eventually to become mature individuals within a never ending process of maturation. The context of *bildung* spans both formal and

informal contexts and roles, familial, scholastic or recreational. In this sense, appeals solely to the power of the family or the school in upbringing and education are, according to Mollenhauer, inadequate; the task transcends these boundaries. It involves the cultivation of the inner life or soul of the child and their inauguration to culture, tradition, and humanity (Friesen and Saevi, 2010). Upbringing in this context is not so much something that is learnt in institutions such as schools or children's homes (although both undoubtedly play a role in it) or through methods and techniques such as the latest social skills programme. Rather, it happens all around us, "so general as to be inseparable from basic human realities like language, work and - in the broadest sense - human culture" (Mollenhauer, 1983: 1).

Upbringing is first and foremost a matter of preparing children to face the future, a debt owed by the adult generation to children. As I indicated earlier, adult understandings of upbringing are, by their nature, backward looking; we construct a sense of what might constitute a good upbringing against a backdrop of our own experiences of being brought up. There is not necessarily an unambiguously good upbringing - for most their upbringing involved both good and less good aspects. Mollenhauer draws on autobiographies written over the centuries to bear testimony to the fact that, apart from being grateful to our parents for the upbringing they gave us, we also have reason to find fault with it. Each individual's education and upbringing is at once a process of broadening and enrichment as well as a narrowing and impoverishment. Adults are more than mere midwives to the development of a child's mind and spirit: they also, for whatever reason, through limiting or closing down opportunities, act to censor the adult the child ultimately becomes (Mollenhauer, 1983).

Mollenhauer challenges seemingly progressive or rights based educational philosophies, which might posit that children need to find their own paths in life. Such philosophies, he argues, seek to absolve us from our adult responsibilities to pass on our cultural heritage. They also ignore the fact that adult involvement with children is not neutral. As Winkler puts it, "we cannot not engage in upbringing" (2002, cited in Friesen and Hamelock, 2012: 12). "It is simply unimaginable",

according to Mollenhauer, "for an adult to undertake any educational or child-rearing measure without conveying some aspect of him or herself or the way he or she lives, whether it is deliberate or not" (1983: 14). Thus, in failing to present children with a confident, if albeit contingent, image of what we consider to be the 'good life' we risk presenting them only with a free-floating nihilism. This would seem to constitute the essence of Webb's (2010) critique of residential care addressed earlier. Adults, therefore have to consider the question of what they want for children and specifically whether the lives they lead are ones that contribute positively to children's upbringing.

What do we want for children?

A good starting point in coming to terms with Mollenhauer's conception of upbringing is the German notion of Bildsamkeit, which determines that development cannot be externally forced but that the child is oriented toward development and asks for the help on that journey; it is the nature of the child to *want* to grow and it is the adult's task to recognize and respond to this call and to guide and nurture this growth. Children are not blank slates to be changed and formed. Instead they should be brought up in support of their pre-existing potentiality. This does not happen through method or technique but in reciprocal and dialogical relationship with adults. The relationship between a child and adult might be thought of as a sort of call and response – the child calls and the adult responds. As an adult I might respond to a child's need for upbringing because:

> I want the (perhaps very little) goodness in my life to be perpetuated. This response has at least three implications:
> 1. I would like human history to continue with a sense of optimism or at least of hope that also orients my own actions;
> 2. My own existence can be perpetuated in some small, indirect way through my children;
> 3. The way of life I teach children has some value. (1983: 12)

Mollenhauer's development of these propositions is important and I reproduce it below:

> If these responses, cursory though they may be, make at least some sense, then the next question has to concern what adults bring to children. I refer to this as 'cultural heritage,' and the fitness of this heritage for the future. Anyone who does not have a heritage of some kind to pass on will probably take little pleasure in raising or educating children. … When the desire to see generations born beyond one's own is extinguished, educational and even experiential possibilities are greatly diminished. Conservative excesses threaten to turn upbringing into a ritualized duty. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that adults lose the desire to raise children and only want to interact with them as mirror images of their adult selves (1983: 12).

In the following section I bring together Mollenhauer's ideas on how a valued cultural heritage or a way of life might be passed on to children, addressing his explication of the shift from presenting a way of life to children to that of 're-presenting' it.

Presentation and Representation

Mollenhauer argues that adults and children in pre-modern societies lived their lives in largely undifferentiated ways; adults simply 'presented' to children their grown-up 'way of life' (lebensform) in the course of what might nowadays be thought of as a sharing a common life-space. The manner through which they passed on this way of life was unsystematic and unreflective:

> The essential structures of adult behaviour are there for children to see, and, as they grow, children are able to learn about a very wide range of grown-up behaviours simply by living with them. It is the child's principal educational task to reproduce this image. This manner of upbringing is implicit and habitual … (Friesen and Saevi, 2010: 129).

Representation

Mollenhauer uses illustrations to show how, with the rise of merchant capitalism in the 16th Century and its concomitant growing division of labour, adults' 'work' gradually became separated off from children's 'learning'. This required that, rather than simply 'present' adult ways of life to children, naturalistically, decisions began to be taken around which features of adult life ought to be presented or indeed interpreted as valuable and 're-presented' and which features were to be filtered out.

This led to an increasing emphasis on instructional techniques and methods through which to most efficiently pass on that which was considered culturally valuable, which in turn led to the growth of specialised institutions - schools, orphanages and youth clubs within which the young might be taught.

These specialised institutions served to filter out aspects of adult life and culture from young learners in what Mollenhauer refers to as 'cultural compartmentalisation'. Formal education became separated off from wider processes of upbringing; adult culture was no longer presented to the child as a seamless whole, but only in part. "Whereas processes of presentation are implicit, habitual, and in this sense natural, those of representation are artificial, relying on forethought, planning, testing, refinement, and technical expertise" (Friesen and Saevi, 2010: 132). This poses questions for teachers and carers as to what way of life ought to be systematically represented to children and more technical considerations of choosing how best this might be done within the range of available methods (Mollenhauer, 1983).

The other side of the coin of what is to be represented to children is that of what needs to be filtered out? Parents and carers need to strike the balance between ensuring an age-appropriate 'shielding' of children from some of the harmful aspects of the adult world and helping them reach a 'position facing the world' (Plessner, in Friesen and Saevi, 2010). This negotiation of a 'position facing the world' is an important one in that it involves a necessary delay or 'slowing down' of the impact of adult life upon children. The absence of such a 'slowing down' can give rise, from a pedagogical perspective, to problematic relations (Mollenhauer, 1983). Adults, therefore, have a role in pacing a child's initiation into the adult world. For instance, while they may swear in the company of adult companions, they will not do so in front of children. Similarly, they may drink alcohol while in the company of children, and gradually introduce children themselves to it in a measured and thought-through way.

The interplay between presentation and representation

A dialectic emerges between questions of presentation and representation. While the process of representation involves some systematic decisions around what to present to children, what to filter out and how to go about this, the mistake, Mollenhauer (1983) points out, is to assume that this kind of technical specialisation is what education is about. In everyday pedagogical practice, systematic and deliberate representation is inextricably mixed with reflective and habitual presentation. In fact, messages that are transmitted by direct teaching are of more limited importance than those that unwittingly seep into a learner's consciousness without either the teacher or pupil knowing anything about it. (Friesen and Saevi, 2010). In this process, a teacher's or carer's glance or countenance may be of more import than the latest curricular initiative or anger management programme. The pedagogical relation in this sense precedes educational methods and theories (Saevi, 2011); the task of upbringing is seen as "emerging from a sustained encounter between generations, specifically between a particular adult or teacher and a particular child or student as persons'' (Friesen and Saevi, 2010: 142). Within such encounters "the child is always recognized as a unique, irreplaceable person, rather than being seen in terms of a developmental stage or category, or of a particular psychological diagnosis" (Friesen and Saevi, 2011: 139). Pedagogical practice, rather than looking to procedure or some elusive 'best practice' "speaks in anecdotes, stories, examples and questions that provide opportunity for experience rather than explanation, for listening rather than verification" (Saevi 2010: 2).

Pedagogical relationships

I allude to the centrality of relationships in the introduction to this review and it is a central theme of the book (RRCC, Chapter Eight). Care ethics also foreground relationships. Mollenhauer offers a suggestive account of the particular form of the pedagogical relationship, which, he claims, constitutes a special kind of personal relationship between adult and child. Nohl characterises this as "the loving relationship of a mature person with a 'developing' person, entered into for the sake of child so that he can discover his own life and form" (cited in Spiecker, 1984: 203-204).

Mollenhauer's understanding of the pedagogical relation is marked by a number of characteristics, which I summarise below:

- There is a purpose, and a context to pedagogical relationships, such as upbringing, teaching, guiding or supervising.
- It is grounded in the difference between the generations and the personal and cultural need for upbringing (Saevi, 2011).
- The adult is directed toward the child and wants or intends what is good for the child's future. This relationship is oriented to what the child may become, but this is, by its nature, open-ended and cannot be determined by adult plans or goals; we cannot second-guess the outcomes of our attempts at upbringing.
- The relationship is asymmetrical, unlike many other personal relationships (e.g. friendship). The adult is "there" for the child in a way that the child is not 'there' for the adult. The extent of any asymmetry might vary, depending on the purpose of the relation, the adult's ability to care, the age of the child and their need for care.
- The relationship is dispositional, reflecting personal, physical and emotional elements of who and how an adult is in relation to children.
- In the pedagogical relation the adult is *tactful*, involving holding back and waiting or maintaining a certain distance so that the child may act for him- or herself. This quality might also be described as watchful and thoughtful, working out when to intervene and when to leave be. Inevitably this involves being prepared to take some risks.
- The relationship may at times be conflictual and can require adults to assert a level of authority or control. Kleipoedszus (2011) argues that relationships can be forged through conflict. Children need adults who will not avoid conflict due to fear, but who will work creatively with it. The connection created through genuine engagement and negotiation rather than artificial sensitivity makes it possible in the longer term for child care workers to encourage and nurture change rather than demanding it.
- Crucially, the pedagogical relationship comes to an end. The child grows up and the asymmetry of the relationship (if it is still maintained) dissolves. Indeed, the

pedagogical relationship works towards its own dissolution. Mollenhauer (1983) explains that upbringing comes to an end when the child no longer needs to be 'called' to self-activity, but instead has the wherewithal to educate himself. The grown child may still maintain a relationship with an adult who has acted pedagogically in the past, but this relationship will (or should) no longer be asymmetrical. It is or should instead be mutual and reciprocal, meaning that the pedagogical relation has dissolved and been replaced by one of friendship or mutual attachment.

- The arena for pedagogical relationships is our everyday life with children, where children and adults meet, relate, communicate, and interact.

The aporia and paradoxes of upbringing

Mollenhauer identifies the process of upbringing as being irredeemably aporetic in that it is shot through with perplexity and what might be thought of as paradox. A central aporia, perhaps, revolves around the idea of passing on what is deemed valuable in the present while, at the same time, recognising that the fruits of that endeavour cannot be pre-determined. We do not bring up children merely to live comfortably in our worlds, but to change those worlds for the better. We are, in the words of Oscar Romero's poem, 'prophets of a future not our own'. Yet, and this is the paradox, we need to pass on something that we consider to be of value. So, we pass on what we consider to be valuable in our world, knowing that this might be rejected. An example of this process may be that of parents seeking to bring up children in a particular faith tradition. Ultimately, as adults within liberal western societies, those children may choose to accept, partially accept or reject their religious upbringing, but they, at least, will know what it is they are rejecting and what they might put in its place.

If the future cannot be predetermined then nor can the child. We do not, nor should we seek to, 'know' children. Attempts to 'know' them through ever more elaborate assessment frameworks and recording tools are ethically problematic (Hardy, 2012). The only way we can 'know' children is to make them like ourselves, to impose our adult ways and values upon them, thus 'murdering' their uniqueness and alterity

(Levinas, 2000). Pedagogical practice, by contrast, involves "a thoughtful concern for the child's unique person and for the uniqueness of the situation" (Nohl 1970 cited in Saevi and Husevaag, 2009: 37). Mollenhauer makes a similar point noting that:

> The pedagogical caring and thoughtful relationship between the adult and child gets its intrinsic life and energy from the tension of the opposite: the utter uniqueness and inaccessibility of the child's self and lifeworld. Paradoxically this is the pedagogical opportunity that renders possible the pedagogical relationship (1983: 35).

A further aporia, this time at a more systemic level, is of relevance to the current growth of interest in social pedagogy at political and professional levels. Much of this interest is predicated upon assumptions that outcomes for children are better in societies where social pedagogy underpins child care practice. This belief, however, belies particular assumptions of cause and effect, assuming that if we intervene with a particular proven treatment model we might expect better outcomes. Social pedagogy, however, does not work that way; it is at its most useful when it is not pinned down to positivist assumptions of cause and effect but when it remains elusive and contingent – once brought to heel it loses its potency as a dynamic and potentially unsettling force in society. Or, as Mollenhauer says: "The more finely the net of pedagogical strategies and institutions is woven, the greater a contribution that is expected from pedagogy toward social progress, the more difficult it becomes to validate this" (1983: 88).

Care or upbringing?

Over the course of recent work on Mollenhauer's articulation of upbringing, summarised above, I have sought to understand how the two, care and upbringing might fit together. My initial thoughts were that upbringing ought to be the superordinate construct within which ideas of care with their association with nurture and domesticity might rest; acts of care fit within the wider task of passing on a valued cultural heritage. On reflection I am not sure that this position holds. It assumes a version of care that is limited to activities of care giving and receiving,

whereas more recent contributions to the literature on care ethics (e.g. Noddings' later work; Held, 2006 and many of the contributions to the *Ethics and Social Welfare* special editions) identify care as a moral theory in its own right, with inevitable political and social policy implications. More direct application of care ethics to children, however, is limited. That said, I find Noddings (2002) book 'Starting at Home' convincing in its argument that questions of moral development and political consciousness have their origins in early experiences of care. In fact, much of Noddings' account of education has strong resonances with the German concept of *Bildung*. What, I think, Mollenhauer's work adds to the equation is the cultural dimension, while social pedagogy, more generally offers a well-established intellectual and practice tradition set out in a literature that is beginning to appear in English. What care and upbringing share is that both are decidedly not technical rational. Magnusson reminds us that "development and growth is a mysterious, asynchronous, nonlinear process and dynamic. All child and youth care work aims to further growth and change, yet its pedagogy is not interventionist and direct. … {but} indirect, cooperative, collaborative and invitational" (2003: *XX11-XX111*).

Chapter Four: Some reflections on the nature of care and upbringing

This review has its roots in an existential curiosity to better understand my own experiences of residential child care in the hope that these can contribute to a deeper understanding of the field. In some senses, writing the review constitutes a further turn of the hermeneutic circle identified earlier, involving a reflection back upon what my thinking was at the point of writing the book and the related articles in light of what I have learnt since. A central conclusion is to argue that concepts of care or upbringing need to be articulated around moral rather than an instrumental 'or 'evidence-based' rationalities. I group my thinking in this chapter around the following headings: divergent rationalities of care; social distance; care and upbringing as vocation; a turn to ethics and value rationality and social pedagogy. The final section suggests that many of the ideas contained in previous discussion might find a place within a Scottish philosophical tradition.

Divergent rationalities of care

Tronto (2010) argues that public care needs an explicit sense of purpose to set it apart from less differentiated family care, where this need is diminished by common history. The need for a clear idea as to the purpose of state care is all the more important in the context of growing structural inequalities, which result in children's and families' lives assailed by pressures to obtain the latest, unobtainable, consumerist fads and where resultant disaffection and depression is assuaged by drugs and alcohol. Into this turmoil, public policy offers 'rights' and 'protection', neither of which are realised and both of which feed into what Webb (2010) identifies as the free-floating nihilism of much state care within which adults fail to take responsibility for children's upbringing.

The importance of articulating a concept of care in public services might be thought to assume a heightened importance in the wake of the recent report into standards of care in Staffordshire Hospitals (Francis, 2013) and in Government reports bemoaning the quality of children's residential care in England (AAPG, 2012). Both these sources argue that services need to become more caring but they fail to

articulate a convincing case for what care might involve. Indeed, many of the prescriptions proposed to address failures in care through further technocratic interventions are, arguably, heavily implicated in these failures in the first place. What is proposed is more of the contractual regulation that Jordan (2010) argues has failed, rather than the moral regulation that is required.

Within a dominant technical rational paradigm, policy directions seek increasing recourse to 'scientism'. In child care this is evident in the turn to neuroscience to explain behaviours (see Gerhardt, 2004). This is 'scientific' method writ large, promising that if only we can find the biological roots of a problem and intervene early enough we can then head of difficulties further down the line. It reflects a more general 'biologising' of what is more appropriately social scientific terrain, offering "the comforting possibility of simple solutions to complex problems" (Canter, 2012:112). "The idea that the brain causes behavior" Canter goes on "is easier to get across than the subtler and more complex explanation embedded in learning, interpersonal transactions and culture" (2012: 112). Perhaps in an attempt to manage its irredeemable uncertainty, residential child care seeks to 'biologise' or 'psychologise' and generally instrumentalise the tasks of care and upbringing. These, however, cannot be reduced to technique or procedure. In fact, recourse to technique or procedure or to a range of 'technologies' in work with children avoids "having to ask difficult political and ethical questions about the causes of our problems or the meaning of success" (Dahlberg and Moss, 2005: 58).

There seems to be a conceptual block in public policy. It struggles to move beyond the search for technical rational solutions to policy concerns that are rarely amenable to such. It fails to recognise, or if it does recognise it fails to challenge, the fundamental problem of attempting to provide relational care within a neoliberal political and economic system. Assumptions around care become based upon the wrong rationalities. Caring, relational rationalities are different from the economic rationalities privileged by neoliberalism (Lynch *et al*, 2009). Or, as Brannen and Moss put it

> [N]ew capitalism' calls for individualism, instrumental rationality, flexibility, short-term engagement, de-regulation and the dissolution of established relationships and practices, caring relationships . . . are predicated on an expressive rather than instrumental relationship to others (based on) trust, commitment over time and a degree of predictability (2003: 202).

Lynch *et al* resurrect the term 'love' in relation to caring and bring together ideas of love, care and solidarity. "The development of love, care and solidarity relations", they argue, "involves effort, time and energy" (2009: 38). It is "not possible to produce fast care like fast food. If we go into the McWorld route in caring what we will get is not care but pre-packaged units of supervision" (2009: 52). If we continue to believe that care can be improved by technical and instrumental fixes then we fail to appreciate its value rational nature and consign ourselves to a never-ending cycle of flawed interventions. These serve only to compound the primary problem of neoliberalism by superimposing layers of bureaucratic (largely regulatory) functions to bring some order to its unruly precepts. This constitutes something of a double whammy as neither bureaucracy nor neoliberalism can accommodate notions of love, care or solidarity, or moral impulse more generally. As Bauman observes, "Bureaucracy strangles or criminalises moral impulses, while business merely pushes them aside" (1994: 13). Ethics in both are reduced to rules of conduct - in bureaucracy these are procedural, in business they are contractual.

Social distance

Bauman's writing is persuasive in offering some analytical purchase on the problems of neoliberalism. The idea of responsibility and the command to 'be for' those we work with is a central one. Drawing on a Levinasian account, Bauman argues that responsibility needs to be exercised at a personal level, face to face, without intermediaries. Bureaucracy, however, builds in intermediaries. Critical relationships within neoliberal care are "those between commissioners and providers and regulators and providers, not between providers and residents" (Scourfield: 2007: 171). Locating care within primarily contractual rather than inter-personal relationships has the effect of effacing the face of those social work and social care professions work with, creating distance. "Responsibility is silenced once proximity is eroded ... the fellow human subject is transformed into an 'other' by technical

bureaucracy" (Bauman 1989, p. 184). "By this reckoning the plethora of rules and regulations that increasingly surround practice are not just minor but necessary irritants; they act to dull the moral impulse to care and to 'be for' those we work with" (Smith, 2011: 3).

The fundamental problem is that dominant thinking misconceives care as a technical rational endeavour rather than a value rational one. This takes us back to a Cartesian legacy within which thinking is separated off from feeling and where, in intellectual and professional traditions at least, thinking is privileged over feeling. Yet, notions of care and upbringing involve irredeemably emotional essences. Care is not possible, according to John MacMurray, in terms of duty and obligation but must emerge as an ethic of love (see McIntosh, 2004). It cannot be seen as a discrete set of tasks that can be separated from the relationship in which it is embedded (Lynch *et al*, 2009: 28). It is irredeemably relational. The same authors also pose a challenge to current concerns about the outcomes of care, arguing that qualities of care and solidarity produce outcomes "that can be seen and felt if not always easily measured" (2009: 38).

Care and upbringing as vocation

Neoliberalism is premised on an image of the person as autonomous and self-seeking, requiring that their baser instincts be kept in check by layers of legal injunction and behavioural codes; we need rules to be moral. Bauman (1993) disputes this, arguing that we are not moral because of society. Rather, society exists because individuals are moral; they have the capacity to take decisions and to act in ways that are oriented to 'the other'. Human beings are ethical, committed and emotional as well as economic, political and cultural (Lynch *et al*, 2009). These observations might take us in the direction of care as vocation rather than 'profession'. The call to care requires a purpose other than reward or mere duty. Webb (2010) identifies the sense of moral purpose that motivated those who ran care homes in the Church of England Children's Society. A sense of vocation is exemplified in Mollenhauer's call and response dynamic in his explication of upbringing and his caution that upbringing should not be turned into a ritualised duty

but should be understood as a moral response from adults to children. This is given philosophical substance in Levinas' idea that we are called and reach out to 'the face' of the other. In the practice domain, organisations such as Camphill and L'Arche provide examples of individuals wishing to 'be for' those they work with. Such a call is not rational. For Bauman:

> there is nothing reasonable about taking responsibility, about caring and being moral. Morality has only itself to support it: it is better to care than to wash one's hands, better to be in solidarity with the unhappiness of the other than indifferent (Bauman 2000: 11).

This, of course, might be thought to raise more questions than answers in respect of how a sense of vocation might emerge within a heavily regulated state care apparatus, which in many respects regards such ideas with suspicion. There are, though, movements across Europe where residential child care is offered in intentional communities rather then through state bureaucracies or within the marketplace that might serve as models for a different way of thinking about care.

A turn to ethics and value rationality

Webb calls for a social work that moves away from its current recourse to technical rationality and turns towards ethics claiming that "the legitimacy of social work rests on exhortations that betray an ethical intent rather than a set of empirical or outcome based possibilities" (2006: 8). A turn to ethics might suggest that social work needs to grapple with different forms of rationality, specifically, practical and value rationalities. Drawing on a broadly Aristotelian perspective, scholars have begun to explore the nature of professional knowledge (Dunne, 1993, Carr, 1995, Bondi et al, 2011). A key topic of debate in this connection is whether the knowledge or judgment required for effective practice in the caring professions is reducible to the technical 'evidence-based' rationality to which professions as medicine have aspired (Bondi et al, 2011). The same authors argue that technically rational forms of knowledge are problematic in 'people professions', where deliberation is inevitably implicated in value disputes, taking it into the moral or ethical more than the scientific realm.

I have drawn on Gadamer's writing on hermeneutics to justify my epistemological position in this submission. Bernstein (1983) maintains that a hermeneutic perspective is equally important in praxis-oriented professions where human beings are continually engaged in the social construction and deconstruction of their worlds. As such, hermeneutics might also be thought to bring with it particular implications for the way we might think about social work practice. Clark (2012) proposes that rather than falling back on rules or algorithms (or to use Gadamer's term, method), "resolving ethically problematic situations should better be understood as a hermeneutic process demanding a repeated and progressive quest to reconcile the detailed particularities of the case with complex, competing and evolving moral imperatives" (Clark, 2012: 115).

Social pedagogy

In the sense that it is fundamentally rooted in value rationality, social pedagogy offers a more conducive option than social work within which to consider ideas of care and upbringing. Social pedagogy, in Pestalozzi's foundational writing involves head, heart and hands (see Bruhlmeier, 2010). It is thus intellectual but also ethical/emotional and practical. It also appreciates the divergent rationalities of economy and public goods such as care and education. Brulmeier, in his book on Pestalozzi contends that:

> success in education is determined by different laws than in the economy. If this fact is ignored, all reforms degenerate into activity for its own sake. What is needed, then, is a change of focus, away from purely organisational, legal and financial factors and onto educational aims, practical matters of teaching and real everyday problems (2010: 3).

The Scottish dimension

I mentioned earlier that I am increasingly aware of being influenced by aspects of a Scottish cultural and intellectual tradition. Some of this interest was sparked by Tronto's (1993) discussion of Scottish Enlightenment philosophers as a precursor to her work on care ethics. A feature of Scottish Enlightenment philosophy was its focus on human connections and of man (sic) as a human animal. This is evident in Hutcheson's notion of benevolence, Smith's sympathy and Hume's moral sentiment

(see Tronto, 1993). The emotional component to human nature posed a challenge to Kantian rationality. Hume, for instance argued that "Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals" (Treatise: unpaginated). Bauman's arguments as to the irrationality of moral impulse thus chime with Hume's work.

At another level, that of epistemology, Scottish philosophers considered that the specialisation of knowledge led to excessive compartmentalisation and atomisation in society (Davie, 1991). Knowledge was to be grounded and contextualised rather than abstract and codified. The branch of common sense philosophy, which was influential in 18th and early 19th century Scotland posits that "the basis of knowledge and objective science isn't simply experimentation or observation in regard to bodies and behaviour, but the instinctive and fundamental fact of the conscious intellectual rapport between the members of a given society" (Davie 1991: 65).

These strands of thought stressing, human connection and scepticism towards scientific rationality are continued into the last century. Scottish human relations theorists, Suttie, Fairbairn and Sutherland, understood attachment as being essentially social rather than the primarily biological and ethological drive identified by Bowlby (see Miller, 2008). The presence of the other within human relations thought is identified as an end in itself, rather than a means to an end such as the management of anxiety, as might be interpreted from more biologically based models. Running alongside these identifiably Scottish interpretations of attachment theory, John MacMurray's philosophical writing identifies us as 'persons in relation' (see McIntosh, 2004; Kirkwood, 2012).

These ideas all demand further explication and provide a basis upon which to consider further work. Some initial directions for this are outlined in the next section.

Directions of future work

The process of writing this critical review has been helpful in chrystallising some of my thinking and in setting an agenda for future work.

The concept of upbringing is, I believe, an important and fruitful one and one that is largely unexplored in an English-speaking context. I aim to develop my writing on this, in a UK context but also, through CUSP, in a European context. Having began a theoretical exposition, an obvious next step is to explore the concept of upbringing empirically through seeking research funding to try and work out how carers actually go about the day to day task of bringing up children. A specific focus of this work, applying to a range of care settings including residential and foster care would be to address the question of how the everyday might be rendered or understood as professional?

One avenue for development in this respect might suggest an examination of the nature of professional knowledge in the specific context of care. Much current understanding of care is based on what I would argue is a flawed epistemological premise, which regards knowledge and practice as technical/rational rather than practical/moral. Writing this review has helped me better conceptualise this disjunction. I am intrigued by the manner in which seemingly disparate strands of my interests, on further reading, seem to converge around certain writers and ideas. These, invariably, have some connection back to Aristotle. Thus, Gadamer falls back on Aristotle and Flyvbjerg draws on Gadamer. Gadamer also writes about Bildung, which is, of course, a central concept in social pedagogy. What seems to hold all of these threads together is an understanding of knowledge as being different to the Cartesian and Kantian Enlightenment ideal of it being abstracted from emotion and rooted in reason. And this is where some of the Scottish connections come in. Hume, presciently, identified knowledge as but the slave of the passions. Tronto looks to the Scottish thinkers for an alternative to Kant's predominance in wider Enlightenment philosophy. MacMurray challenges Cartesian dualism, placing the person in relation at the heart of human existence. Recent work on professional wisdom (e.g. Bondi et al, 2011) begins to develop alternative conceptualisations of practical rather than

abstract and objective knowledge while Flyvbjerg's articulation of phronetic social science offers a model through which to bring value rational knowledge to the research endeavour. Education scholars (e.g. Fielding, 2011) are turning to the work of MacMurray. However, social work in general but residential child care in particular is nowhere near even being aware of these major philosophical and epistemological directions and is stuck in unproductive and, I might argue, at times unethical technical rationality. I would want to begin to introduce some dissonance to dominant ways of thinking and knowing about care and upbringing in general but particularly in relation to residential child care. A starting point might be to reprise the Wardaugh and Wilding (1993) article, detailing present day corruptions of care, many of which are rooted in the desire to conceptualise it as technical/rational rather than practical/moral and to seek to identify its emotional dimensions as 'unprofessional'

It will be apparent from this review that the subject of historical abuse both drives me to right what I see as the wrongs of wrongful allegations and convictions but at a more intellectual level it fascinates me how particular stories can achieve such cultural potency in the absence of any convincing evidence. Webster (2005) is instructive on this point. He argues that when a particular cultural narrative takes hold "(T)here is only one way to undo its influence. This is to document how the narrative which has achieved such power was actually created in the first place. In short, it is to tell another story - the story of the story (p. 11). When I set out to do a PhD the intention was to conduct narrative interviews with key players in the Scottish residential schools. I have nine completed interviews and intend to complete more (aiming for a total of around 15). These provide the story of the story of residential care and provide fertile data for writing up that story. The subject of historical abuse is a central one but the wider project is to develop an understanding of care that is rooted in the direct experience of caregivers.

A conundrum for me is how to reconcile the need for structural analysis and action with personal commitment and connection. Bauman is helpful here in his exhortation that social scientists should not be bystanders but should 'be for' the poor and the

dispossessed. This, perhaps, in a spirit of reflexivity, takes me back full circle to my Catholic roots. Catholic Social Teaching (CST), the Church's 'best kept secret', is in the wake of the banking crisis, attracting political and secular interest. Writing this account prompted me to explore CST enough to know that it provides a coherent body of thinking about the human condition meriting further exposition and with much to offer the caring professions. I expect a growth of writing in this field and would hope to be in a position to develop this for social work and social care more generally.

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