

**Imperial Nationalism: Nationalism and the Empire in late nineteenth century  
Scotland and British Canada**

**Kevin Colclough**

**Doctor of Philosophy  
The University of Edinburgh  
2006**

## **Acknowledgements**

I have received considerable support from many people in the preparation of this thesis. Staff at the National Archives in Canada and the National Libraries of Canada and Scotland have been extremely helpful. I am grateful to the Foundation for Canadian Studies for awarding a travel grant that enable me to carry out research in Ottawa. The advice members of the Research in Progress group of the Centre for Canadian Studies at the University of Edinburgh was invaluable. The lunchtime support of Grace Owens and Dr John Harries was gratefully received.

Without supervisory support a PhD is nigh on impossible. I have been lucky enough to have had four supervisors. Professors Colin Coates and Graeme Morton, now at Glendon College, University of Toronto, and University of Guelph respectively encouraged and supported me during the initial stages of this project. It would never have been completed, however, without the fantastic and unfailing support, advice and encouragement of my current supervisors, Dr James Kennedy and Dr Nicola McEwen. Thank you.

The biggest thanks, however, must go to family. To my mother whose unquestioning belief never fails to astound me. I hope I can continue to fulfil it. To my wife Allison without whose love support and encouragement I would have given up a long time ago. And finally, but by no means least, to my dog Jaz whose constant appetite for exercise gave me an excuse for much needed breaks.

## **Declaration of Authorship**

I, Kevin Colclough, confirm that this thesis presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, has

- a) been composed solely by myself,
- b) been solely the result of my work
- c) not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Signed

Kevin Colclough

## **Abstract**

The relationship between imperialism and nationalism has often been portrayed by theorists of nationalism and post colonial discourse theorists as antagonistic. Anti-democratic, aggressive empires impose their will on subject peoples who, in response, form nationalist movements in opposition to this imperialism. These movements, it is claimed, assert the nation's right to self-determination and independence. Whilst this was undoubtedly the case in a number of anti-colonial movements, examples can be found that refute the apparently antagonistic relationship between nationalism and imperialism. Nationalism does not always advocate independence from states or empires. Imperialism can be a vehicle for a national mission or can strengthen minority nations. In certain contexts, these two anti-thetical concepts can be reconciled. The thesis investigates the reconciliation of nationalism and imperialism using the concept of imperial nationalism. This concept is used to denote a variety of nationalism that proposes reform of the state/imperial government for the benefit of the nation whilst simultaneously emphasising the benefits of the reform of the empire. An important element of the nationalist discourse will be the maintenance of the imperial connection as beneficial for the nation.

A comparative historical analysis of nationalist groups in nineteenth century Scotland and Canada is used to highlight the relationship between nationalism and imperialism in the discourse of nationalist groups. Both Scotland and Canada held relatively privileged positions within the British Empire. Yet Scottish and British Canadian nationalist groups argued the existing systems for governing their respective nations were illegitimate. In Scotland, the Scottish Home Rule Association argued for a Scottish Parliament, focusing on the extent to which the United Kingdom state was unable to cope with the work created by the four home nations and the Empire. An important aspect of home rule for Scotland, however, was its extension to the other home nations and the opportunity it would present of reforming the Imperial Parliament for the benefit of the Empire, and by association Scotland. In Canada, the focus of Canada First and the Imperial Federation League in Canada was on reform of the system of Imperial governance. Canada had not been given control over relations with the United States under the British North America Act and British Canadian nationalists felt Canadian interests had not been taken into account in British dealings with the United States. The answer was to provide Canada with a voice in treaties in the short term and, in the longer term, to reform Imperial government in order to provide Canada with a voice in the affairs of the Empire as whole. The thesis investigates the extent to which these movements were nationalist, imperialist and, finally, how these two concepts were reconciled.

## Contents

Acknowledgements and Declaration of Authorship	i
<b>Abstract</b>	ii
<b>Chapter 1 - <i>Introduction</i></b>	p1
• Scotland, Canada and the British Empire	p7
• Implications for the Contemporary Political Landscape	p9
• Hypothesis and Research Questions	p12
• Thesis Layout	p13
<b>Chapter 2 - <i>Methodology</i></b>	p17
• A Historical Method in Political Science?	P18
• Comparative Politics: The Human Method	p23
• Case Choices	p28
• Time Period	p33
• The Nationalist Groups	p34
• Document Analysis	p40
<b>Chapter 3 - <i>Nationalism, Imperialism and Identity</i></b>	p45
• Nation, State and Empire	p46
• Nationalism	p59
• Nationalism and Imperialism	p68
• Identity	p72
<b>Chapter 4 - <i>Nationalist Discourse in Scotland and Canada</i></b>	p86
• Historical Background	p87
• Borders of the Mind – Imagining Nations and Inventing Traditions	p103
• The Politics of Recognition and the significant Other	p115
• Nationalism and Political Legitimacy – Governance and nationality	p134
<b>Chapter 5 - <i>Imperialist Discourse in Scotland and British Canada</i></b>	p153
• Historical Context	p154
• The Nature of Imperial Governance in Scotland and Canada	p163
• The Schemes for Imperial Federation	p173
• The concept of a Greater British Identity – Britannia	p187
• The British Diaspora and Britannia	p198

<b>Chapter 6 -</b>	<i>Reconciling National and Imperial Identities</i>	p210
	• Historical Context	p212
	• Scottish Home Rule as a response to Imperial Problems	p215
	• Solutions for a “Scottish Sort of Empire”	p232
	• British Canada – the British Empire and the trade debate	p235
	• Imperial Federation as a solution to British Canadian Nationalism	p256
	• Reconciling Identities – The Comparisons	p260
<b>Chapter 7 -</b>	<i>Imperial Nationalism in Scotland and British Canada</i>	p266
<b>Bibliography</b>		p283

## **Chapter One**

### **Nationalism v Imperialism – Political Science v History**

Are nationalism and imperialism antithetical concepts or can they be expressed simultaneously in nationalist discourse? This is the question to be addressed by this study. The thesis takes as its starting point the observation of nationalist groups in the British Empire that created a discourse expressing both an imperial and national identity. Yet traditionally empire and nation are seen as anathema. Nations, in post-colonial discourse at least, seek independence from empire. Empire, by definition, removes liberty of action from states and nations that have the right to self-determination. The theoretical understanding of nationalism, largely based on the link between one nation and one state, further compounds the apparent incompatibility of nationalism and imperialism. This was not the case in late nineteenth century Scotland and Canada. Nationalist groups in these cases advocated the maintenance of imperial ties whilst also asserting the right of the nation to manage its own affairs. The focus of this thesis will be what was different about these cases that led to both an imperial and a national identity being expressed.

Primarily this thesis is about the relationship between nationalism, imperialism and identity, particularly the way in which nationalist movements reconciled the articulation of both a national and an imperial identity in their discourses. Our aim is to add to the understanding of the relationship between imperialism and nationalism in the discourse of nationalist groups in general. Using Scotland and Canada as case studies, the nature of nationalism within the British Empire will be examined. In both these cases nationalist movements were formed that advocated reform of the existing system of governance to the benefit of each nation. In addition, however, these groups simultaneously criticised imperial government and demanded reform for the benefit of the Empire. The symbols of the nation and the Empire were used to articulate both a national and imperial identity.

The general argument of the thesis will be that nationalism and imperialism are not necessarily antithetical concepts but, in certain circumstances, can reinforce each

other. In presenting this argument, we will highlight the particular nature of nationalism in Scotland and Canada. Nationalism is a matter of legitimacy and recognition. We will also investigate the nature of imperialism, the reasons they supported the Empire and wanted to remain within its influence. Geopolitical influences were especially important to Scottish and Canadian nationalists' desire to remain within the empire. Finally, the way in which nationalist groups reconciled these two aspects of their discourse will be examined. The key argument will be that national identity mediated and reinforced imperial identity.

The relevance of a study of the reconciliation of dual or multiple identities may well be questioned. The recent reinstatement of a Scottish Parliament, however, along with the growing importance of the European Union and other supra-national institutions provides adequate grounds for such a study. The importance of local, regional, national and supra-national identities in a globalised world should not be under-estimated. The recent visit of the Scottish First Minister to Canada and his celebration of the Scottish Diaspora in Canada offers further evidence of the contemporary relevance of the interaction of dual identities.<sup>1</sup> There has been a plethora of contemporary survey evidence confirming a majority of those living in Scotland identify with both Scotland and Britain in varying degrees.<sup>2</sup> In Canada, the contemporary discussions over the official policy of multiculturalism also highlight the importance of an understanding of the relationship between different identities.

In order to understand how and why an elite, nationalist or otherwise, can articulate dual or multiple identities we need to move beyond the quantitative data provided by contemporary surveys incorporating scales of identity. These surveys are useful in aiding our understanding of the number of people who hold a dual identity but rarely do they provide an insight into the way the two identities interact. An understanding of the nature of Britishness, as portrayed by Scottish nationalists in the late nineteenth century, can illuminate the ways in which dual national and supra-national

---

<sup>1</sup> *The Scotsman*, 27 September 2005- accessed online 9/5/2006  
[http://news.scotsman.com/latest\\_scotland.cfm?id=2154342005](http://news.scotsman.com/latest_scotland.cfm?id=2154342005)

<sup>2</sup> See for example, Bond, R., and Rosie, M., "National Identities in Post-Devolution Scotland" in *Scottish Affairs* Vol.40 (2002) 34-53

identities are reconciled. A comparative historical analysis of imperial nationalist discourses incorporating both a national and imperial identity can aid our understanding of the contemporary political landscape. The theoretical gains made by this study can inform knowledge of the relationship between nationalism and supra-national institutions within nationalist groups.

One may well ask why it would be necessary to provide yet another study of nationalism and identity. Few studies have considered nationalist movements whose discourse argued for the maintenance of ties with an empire. The need for such a study is important to broadening our understanding of nationalism. Whilst many general studies of nationalism have identified post-colonialism as an important area of nationalism studies, few if any, consider nationalism within empires where there is no desire for independence from the empire. John Breuilly, for example, only classifies movements as nationalist when they seek, or hold, control of the state in the name of the nation.<sup>3</sup> The list of nationalist movements he analyses in detail does not include nationalist movements that wanted to increase the autonomy of the nation within a supra-national framework such as empire. Despite his broad review of Czech nationalism and his acknowledgement of Palacky's scheme for Czechs to be part of a federal Austro-Hungarian Empire, Breuilly classifies Czech nationalism as separatist. His analysis emphasises the transition from cultural to political nationalism.<sup>4</sup> Breuilly focuses on anti-colonial movements, such as those in Kenya and India when discussing nationalism in empires.

James Kellas in his review of nationalism acknowledges movements that originated in European settler societies, such as Australia and Canada, but claims these nationalist movements argued for independence from the mother country. Kellas distinguishes this colonial nationalism from the anti-colonial nationalism found in Asia and Africa.<sup>5</sup> Anthony Smith, although recognising the existence of emigrant nations such as Canada and the United States, does not examine the nature of

---

<sup>3</sup> Breuilly, J., *Nationalism and the State 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition* (Manchester, Manchester University Press: 1993): 2

<sup>4</sup> Ibid: 131-4

<sup>5</sup> Kellas, J.G., *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press Ltd: 1991): 76

nationalism these European settler nations displayed when they desired to remain within empire.<sup>6</sup> The inference from these views would be that nations will always seek independence from an empire.

A number of academics have looked at nations and empires from a different perspective. Krishnan Kumar, for example, has argued that English nationalism was characterised by its imperial or missionary element and was based on its superior position within the United Kingdom and the British Empire.<sup>7</sup> The English nation, according to Kumar, provided the legitimacy for pursuing imperial ambitions. There is still no explanation of minority nationalisms that propose to maintain the imperial tie.

These useful studies fail to adequately explain the nationalism of movements formed in late nineteenth century Scotland and Canada. When we consider the mass of colonial and post-colonial nationalist movements that have fought for independence from the metropolis in, for example, Mexico, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Peru and Argentina, we can perhaps understand the omission. Independence movements assert the right of self-determination, the right of the nation to rule itself, with no outside interference. In late nineteenth century Scotland and Canada, nationalist movements also asserted the right to self-determination to argue for more power to be given to the nation. They also demanded, however, a greater voice in matters concerning the whole of the Empire in the belief that this would bring greater recognition of their nation. In relation to the traditional view of colonial and post-colonial movements that nations and empires do not mix, as outlined by Breuilly and Kellas, the situation in late nineteenth century Scotland and Canada presents something of a paradox.

One of the key reasons for this failure to classify minority nationalisms that propose to remain within an empire is theoretical. Nationalism has often been defined in such a way that precludes the possibility of nations wanting to remain part of a larger

---

<sup>6</sup> Smith, A.D., *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism* (London, Routledge: 1998): 194

<sup>7</sup> Kumar, K., "Nation and empire: English and British national identity in comparative perspective" in *Theory and Society* Vol 29 (2000) 575-608

system of governance where the rulers are members of a different nation. In the modernist paradigm of nationalism at least, the concept is defined as a matter of political legitimacy where nations require a state of their own. Gellner's well known definition is the classic modernist view of nationalism. "Nationalism is primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent."<sup>8</sup> If there was any confusion about what was meant by political unit, Gellner clarified it on the following page. "Our definition of nationalism was parasitic on two as yet undefined terms: state and nation."<sup>9</sup> In nationalism the link between nations and states rests on the idea of legitimacy. What gives the state the moral right to govern the people within its territory? For Gellner, "...principles of authority depend for their legitimacy on the fact that the members of the group concerned are of the same culture."<sup>10</sup> Nationalism by this definition is the idea for the purposes of legitimacy the governed and the governors should belong to the same cultural group.

When viewed in this theoretical light we can begin to understand the failure to classify minority nationalisms that seek to remain within an Empire. Empires are defined by a relation of dominance by one state over another for the benefit of the metropolis. In the process of creating an empire, seeking to conquer and control other states, empires become multi-national and therefore potentially illegitimate. Illegitimate in this context means that within the political unit, other nations are controlled by the dominant ruling nation. As Gellner put it, "political systems which combine cultural pluralism with a persisting inequality between cultures are doomed, in virtue of their violation of the nationalist principle..."<sup>11</sup> Multi-ethnic empires in which there is, by definition, inequality between nations, are "in violation of the nationalist principle." In other words, nationalism and imperialism are anti-thetical concepts.

---

<sup>8</sup> Gellner, E., *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell: 1983): 1

<sup>9</sup> Ibid: 3

<sup>10</sup> Gellner, E., *Nationalism* (London, Phoenix: 1997): 4

<sup>11</sup> Gellner *Nationalism*: 104

To further quote Gellner, “if the rulers of the political unit belong to a nation other than that of the majority of the ruled, this for nationalists constitutes a quite outstandingly intolerable breach of political propriety.”<sup>12</sup> If nationalism involves the need for nations to be governed by those of the same culture/nationality as the modernist view would imply, then nationalism within Empires should always seek independent statehood. Yet, there are cases where nationalist movements appear to desire to remain within an Imperial framework, posing a challenge to this accepted definition of nationalism.

Of course most empires in the pre-modern world at least, were multi-ethnic and this was accepted as the norm. There were exceptions to this, most notably in the British settler empire. It will be argued throughout this thesis that Scots and British Canadians shared a British nationality that had the Empire and all that it represented at its heart. Legitimacy was not an issue in the era of divine rule, therefore the multi-ethnic nature of Empires was not considered a threat to the legitimacy of rule. Only in the modern age when the idea of divine rule was abandoned did the issue of legitimacy within multi-ethnic empires arise. Yet in the British Empire, the question of legitimacy of rule arose from those groups who were British and that shared an identity with the rulers. It is in this exception, that Gellner’s definition needs revised and where we see the failure for academics to explore settler nationalism that seeks greater autonomy within the empire.

The importance of geopolitics and international relations must be taken into account when viewing the desire of these nations to remain within an imperial framework. The importance of Britain’s strained relationship with many of her European imperial counterparts to the desire of Scots and British Canadians to remain within the Empire will be an important part of the argument of this thesis. On a theoretical level, the need for security for the nation may outweigh its desire for outright independence.

---

<sup>12</sup> Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*:

## Scotland, Canada and the British Empire

The British Empire was at its peak in the late nineteenth century. Yet as a consequence it also faced several challenges it had not previously had to face, both internally and externally, from nationalist groups in Ireland and Scotland to the newly unified Germany with imperialist ambitions of its own. The British Empire covered a fifth of the world's land area and the British Navy largely controlled the world's oceans. Colonies, dependencies, protectorates and dominions in Africa, Asia and America all played an important part in making the British Empire the envy of other European states.

Scotland, as we shall see in later chapters, had played a vital role in exploring, conquering and maintaining this vast empire. Much of the Empire had been acquired in the post 1707 period, British North America and India being two notable examples. As Tom Devine and Michael Fry have so ably shown, Scots were at the forefront of these acquisitions and Scotland could rightly claim to be a partner in Empire.<sup>13</sup> The Parliament in London also provided Scottish MP's a voice in foreign affairs more generally, as well as the potential for high office.

Despite this privileged position within the Empire, some Scots were unhappy with the lack of attention given to Scottish affairs in the London Parliament, particularly in light of the attention given to Irish affairs from the start of the 1880s. In 1886 the Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA) was formed arguing for a Scottish Parliament as a solution to Scottish legislative problems. The discourse of the SHRA was articulated in such a way, however, that the creation of a Scottish Parliament would be beneficial, not only for Scotland but also for the Empire. Home Rule for Scotland and the more general policy of home rule all round (for Scotland, Wales, Ireland and England) would allow greater amounts of parliamentary time to be devoted to the running of the Empire, reform of imperial government and consolidation of the Empire.

---

<sup>13</sup> Devine, T., *Scotland's Empire 1600-1815* (London, Penguin: 2003); Fry, M., *The Scottish Empire* (Edinburgh, Birlinn: 2001)

Canada, in contrast to Scotland, had only just been created as a formal dominion in 1867, having previously consisted of three separate colonies, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and the United Province of Canada (which itself had only been created in 1840 by the Union of Upper and Lower Canada). The Confederation of the British North American colonies and the award of Dominion status made Canada the senior “colony” in the Empire. Canada was relatively autonomous in political terms having its own federal Parliament with responsibility for most aspects of Canadian domestic affairs. A Governor General acted as the Crown’s representative in Canada and had some powers to veto legislation passed but these were seldom used. Each province in Canada had a legislative assembly which had responsibility for local provincial matters.

The main issue, for British Canadian nationalists in the late nineteenth century was the lack of a voice in foreign affairs, particularly in relation to her powerful southern neighbour, the United States of America. Under the British North America of 1867, the Act which created the Confederation, foreign affairs were seen as an imperial matter and control was, therefore, left with the Imperial Parliament in London. But as will be seen in later chapters, the triangular relationship between Britain, Canada and the United States quickly revealed that Canada’s interests in relation to her neighbour were not being taken into account. This lack of control over its own foreign affairs meant the potential for a nationalist movement to be formed was great.

In late nineteenth century Canada, several related movements formed at various points arguing for greater say in Canadian foreign affairs, particularly in relation to the United States. Again, however, the discourse of these groups contained an articulation of an Imperial identity. The Imperial connection was seen as vital to the future existence and growth of Canada on the North American continent. Without it Canada would quickly fall under the control of the United States and annexation would soon follow. They also saw Canada as a central figure in the British Empire and claimed the right, as British Canadians, to a say in the governance of the Empire.

The nationalist movements in Scotland and British Canada provide the empirical material for this study. Our aim is to investigate how these groups sought to reconcile the apparently antithetical concepts of nationalism and imperialism. By analysing the nature of nationalism within Scotland and British Canada in the late nineteenth century, we will increase our understanding of the relationship between nationalism and imperialism. In addition, a greater understanding of the relationship between national and imperial identity and the circumstances under which they can be reconciled will be gained. The extent to which nationalists drew on nationalist *and* imperial rhetoric and the ways in which the two were intertwined in one discourse will form the basis of this study.

Most studies are approached with expectations of what will be found. The link between theory and empirical material makes this inevitable. We expect to find nationalism when the interests of a particular nation are not being recognised. This lack of legitimacy is usually reflected through the formation of a national movement. In cases where these movements want to remain within an empire, we would expect there to be particular structural reasons, whether economic or geopolitical. We may also expect both nationalism and imperialism to be articulated together when there are simultaneous challenges to both national and imperial identity. Discourse, as will be argued, reflects the context it faces. It is normally a reaction to something. We would, therefore, expect to find either two simultaneous contexts or one context that challenged both identities. If this proves to be the case, nationalist discourses in Scotland and Canada should be different. The national context, whether Scottish or Canadian, should be part of the imperial context. The following chapter will expand these theoretical expectations and the substantive chapters will examine the contexts within which nationalism and imperialism arose and analyse the discourse that was shaped by those contexts.

### *Implications for the Contemporary Political Landscape*

Supra national institutions, such as the European Union, can be seen as the modern day equivalent of Imperial Government. Clearly the motivation for such institutions

is vastly different from the desire of empire to conquer for prestige, power and financial gain. But in one respect, security, the need for nations and their states to cede some aspects of their sovereignty to a supra-national level is just as important in the modern world as it was for nations within empires in the nineteenth century. Any theoretical gains made from this study could therefore be applied to modern day supra-national institutions.

One theoretical lens through which these different political systems can be viewed is the concept of multi-level governance (MLG). MLG can be defined as “a system of continuous negotiation at several territorial tiers.”<sup>14</sup> Whilst this does not necessarily fit well with our definition of a conquering and dominating empire, the British Empire, as was mentioned above, granted substantial autonomy to its settler colonies, such as Canada. Canadian attempts to extend that autonomy were negotiated with the Imperial state in the same way that provincial autonomy within Canada was negotiated between Provincial Governments and the Canadian Federal government. The aim of this thesis is to discover how nationalists saw their respective nations as fitting into this multi-level governance structure. The theoretical knowledge gained from this investigation will naturally have implications for our understanding of the relationship between modern day nations and modern systems of multi-level governance.

If, throughout the course of this thesis, we find that nationalism and imperialism are not necessarily antithetical concepts, nations in general may then be seen as compatible with systems of multi-level governance. It will be claimed in later chapters that nationalism, while certainly a matter of political legitimacy, is about the congruence of the political unit and the national unit, where the political unit is not always the state but some aspect of the state specifically created to appease nationalists, for example, a devolved assembly or administrative division, which is accepted by the nation as legitimate.<sup>15</sup> The important aspect of this definition is that

---

<sup>14</sup> Bache, I. and Flanders, M., “Themes and Issues in Multi-Level Governance” in Bache, I. and Flanders, M., (eds) *Multi-Level Governance* (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2004): 3

<sup>15</sup> On this point see O’Leary, B., “Ernest Gellner’s diagnoses of nationalism: a critical overview, or, what is living and what is dead in Ernest Gellner’s philosophy of nationalism?” in Hall, J.A., (ed) *The*

the system of governance is seen as legitimate because it is in the nation's interests. Should this definition allow us to classify nationalist groups that wanted to remain within an empire, it will also allow us to classify nationalist groups that propose remaining within any system of multi-level governance. After all, Empires, despite the missionary zeal and relationships of dominance which characterises them, are the historical equivalent of systems of multi-level governance.

Whilst it will be made clear throughout this thesis that the cases we are dealing with are historically specific and that generalisations can only be applied to other cases with caution, the theoretical understanding of nationalism that this thesis aims to generate has implications beyond the historically specific cases of Scotland and Canada. By generating a generic explanation for why minority nationalisms wanted to remain within a multi-level governance system such as the British Empire, we may be able to apply that explanation to minority nationalisms wanting to remain within other systems of multi-level governance, such as modern day Scottish nationalists and the EU and the Parti Quebecois and sovereignty association.

Of course, an important aspect of the argument throughout this thesis is that nationalists in Scotland and Canada displayed an imperial identity, the specific reasons for which form part of this investigation. Within a system of Multi-level governance such as the European Union (EU) such an identity will be lacking. The creation of empires involves soldiers, missionaries, traders and administrators each of whom are committed to the Empire through an emotional investment of time, effort and, in some, cases their own lives. The pursuit of Empire can also be about the pursuit of recognition by gaining power and prestige in the international community. Politicians used this prestige to gain popular support among the electorate and the wider public for Empire thus creating a populist Imperial Identity. The creation of modern systems of multi-level government rarely involves anyone other than politicians and civil servants. The emotional investment of the public just does not exist. The only involvement by the electorate is through referenda which fail to capture the imagination in the same way as tales of Dr Livingston's adventures

---

*State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1998): 55

in Africa. Empires provided an opportunity for adventure and fantasy that modern MLGs will never be able to replicate.

This does not mean, however, that the theoretical understanding generated throughout this thesis, in relation to minority nationalists within systems of MLG, cannot be applied to modern systems. Only that caution should be exercised in how that understanding is applied.

### *Hypothesis and Research Questions*

The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between nationalism and imperialism as understood by nationalist groups in Scotland and British Canada. The key question to be answered by this thesis is,

“Why did nationalists in Canada and Scotland articulate a nationalist discourse that incorporated both nationalism and imperialism?”

Without reaching a conclusion prior to completing the study, it is important to have a working hypothesis that directs our research.

### *Hypothesis*

The articulation of both a nationalist and an imperialist discourse by nationalists in Scotland and Canada reflected a mixture of geopolitical concerns and issues of state legitimacy each of which were seen as a challenge to the nation’s position within the Empire and the Empire’s position within the world system.

In order to test this hypothesis fully, there are several secondary questions that must be addressed.

- 1) What was the nature of the nationalism espoused by groups in Scotland and British Canada?
- 2) What was the nature of the imperialism espoused by groups in Scotland and British Canada?
- 3) How did these groups reconcile nationalism and imperialism in their discourses?

Each substantive chapter will address one of these questions. This will allow us to draw conclusions as to the relationship between nationalism and imperialism in Scotland and British Canada.

The hypothesis can also be related to modern day systems of multi-level governance. Thus if our hypothesis is shown to be accurate, we may begin to talk of minority nationalisms articulating a discourse that includes a commitment to a wider system of multi-level governance due to geo-political concerns that would preclude outright independence.

### ***Thesis Layout***

The thesis has been divided into four main chapters, each exploring a different theme which broadly correlates to the research questions noted above with the aim of adding to our understanding of the relationship between nationalism and imperialism in nationalist discourse. Rather than presenting the background historical material separately, each chapter will contain a section presenting the information needed to understand the historical context within which the individual groups operated. Each chapter is comparative, drawing on material from both Scotland and Canada to highlight the theoretical concerns being addressed.

Chapter two will outline the methods used in the preparation of this thesis. In particular the question of whether a historical method exists in political science will be addressed. The argument will take as its premise the fact that most studies in political science treat history as background information rather than as the source of

valuable material in its own right. The remainder of the chapter will focus on the broad benefits of comparative analysis and the methods of document analysis used in the production of the substantive chapters to follow. The chapter will emphasise throughout that restraint will be required when inferring generalisations from any conclusions drawn from the historically specific cases of Scotland and Canada to a wider universe of cases.

Chapter three will outline the theoretical framework of the thesis, developing the idea of imperial nationalism. The key concepts of nation, state and empire will be defined followed by an analysis of the nature of nationalism, its relationship to modernity, statehood and imperialism. The key argument of this section will be that Gellner's definition of nationalism is only useful when political unit is not equated with the state. An investigation of the nature of identity and the role of nationalist elites in the formation of identity will be made. A variety of models of the way dual or multiple identities interact will be examined. The chapter will end with a discussion of the links between identity, nationalism and imperialism. The chapter will create the framework for the analysis of the empirical material to follow in subsequent chapters.

Chapter four will begin the analysis of the empirical material, focusing on the extent to which the groups were nationalist. The chapter will be divided into four sections each presenting material from Scotland and British Canada. The opening section will present the historical background necessary for an understanding of the primary material to be presented. The second section will examine the use of historical symbols by nationalists. The significance of the symbols chosen will be analysed. The third section will investigate the use of the significant other by nationalist elites and the extent to which the *Politics of Recognition* informed their discourse. The final section will look at the specific grievances of the each movement in terms of democratic legitimacy and their critique of the existing systems of governance. The key argument of this chapter will be that failure to recognise national identity reflects back notions of oppression and lack of self worth. As a consequence, an identity is articulated expressing superiority over the other who has failed to recognise their

identity. The symbols of this identity were expressed in a discourse critical of the existing relationship between the nation and state and advocated reform of the system of governance. In both Scotland and Canada, historical symbols were chosen to assert superiority over the other involved in their discourse.

Chapter five analyses the rhetoric of empire as found in the discourse of nationalists in Scotland and British Canada and the extent to which they were imperialist. The chapter will be split into four sections. The first section will examine the historical context necessary for an understanding of the threats and challenges to the British Empire. A theoretical discussion of international relations will be followed by a brief discussion of the decline of the Concert of Europe and its effect on British imperialism. The second section will examine Scotland and Canada's place in the Empire, in particular the nature of the imperial relationship between Canada and Britain and the relationship between Scotland and Westminster. The third section will examine the proposals for reform of imperial government. The aim of these was to strengthen the weak bonds that characterised the imperial relationship with the self-governing colonies. This will set the context for the central argument of this chapter, the existence of a Greater British identity. This identity will be examined in the final section arguing that the levels of British emigration to Canada and the white self-governing dominions meant a British identity was spread around the Empire that formed the main link between the dominions and London.

The final empirical chapter will analyse the ways in which the discourse of the nationalists in Scotland and Canada reconciled a national and imperial identity. The chapter will be organised around the themes of reconciling imperial and national identities, looking separately at the Scottish and British Canadian cases in order to highlight their differences. The first section will briefly provide some historical background necessary for an understanding of some of the issues to be investigated. The following section will examine the Scottish case arguing that Irish Home Rule set the context for Scottish imperial nationalism. The importance of the Empire and therefore the Union, to Scotland will be highlighted, as will Scotland's influence in return. The third section will investigate the British Canadian case. It will be argued

that the influence of the United States in the history of Canada was vital to the discourse of imperial nationalists. This history will be examined in the context of the trade debates carried on in Canada in the 1880s and 1890s. These debates surrounded the issue of Commercial Union with the United States or the pursuit of a preferential imperial tariff. The final section of the chapter will compare the two cases. The different approaches of imperial nationalists in Scotland and British Canada will be highlighted. We will also examine the similarities between the two. It will be argued that the different nature of nationalism in Scotland and British Canada highlights the extent to which national identities mediated imperial identity.

## **Chapter Two**

### **Methodology**

The aim of this chapter is to outline the broad methodology used in the preparation of this thesis. In order to ensure the answers to the theoretical questions posed in the previous chapter are robust it is important to show the methods used to generate those answers. Yet one of the key themes of this chapter will be that the methods used in social and political science will never be capable of achieving the levels of certainty present in the natural sciences which positivist social scientists try to emulate. The experimental method of natural science, where variables are held constant in tightly controlled conditions, is, of course, not possible in political science due to the moral and practical obstacles such a method would present. Politics depends, whatever structuralists might say, on individuals making decisions. Neither side of the structure/agency debate can claim the certainty of the natural sciences. The decisions of an individual, whatever the structural constraints, can never have the predictability of the actions of atoms or the formation of ice, clouds or glaciers in the natural world. The political world's unpredictability is one of its most exciting attributes. This does not mean, however, that an understanding of politics is impossible, only that care should be taken when claims to generalisation are made.

The methods outlined in this chapter will highlight the restraint that should be shown when inferring generalisations to a wider body of cases but will also show that it is possible to generate theoretical knowledge from a comparison of two historically specific cases. The method outlined is the best, perhaps the only, method available for such a study and showing caution in inferring generalisations should not be seen as a weakness of the methodology but rather as a reality in the attempts to make studies of social and political life scientific.

The chapter will be organised into four broad sections. The first section will examine the nature of the relationship between history and political science and argue for a place for history as a method in political science rather than a separate chapter providing context. The second section will investigate the comparative method highlighting its benefits for generating theoretical understanding. The third section will outline the reasons for choosing Scotland and British Canada as case choices.

Some key similarities and differences will be highlighted and key background information on the groups under study presented. The final section will outline the methods of documentary analysis used throughout the thesis, highlighting in particular some aspects of Discourse Analysis that were found to be useful. The key argument of the chapter will be that restraint must be shown when inferring generalisations from a study of this nature due to the large number of potential variables involved in historical cases and the nature of documentary analysis. Despite this qualification, however, it is believed that the method outlined here is capable of expanding theoretical knowledge of the relationship between nations and empires.

### ***A Historical Method in Political Science?***

Given the nature of the research questions outlined in chapter one this study will necessarily be historical in its scope. This in itself raises certain questions as to the validity of any generalisations or theoretical gains that can be made. It will be argued that the interpretive historical method, although not claiming to be scientific, can provide contextual understanding that is important for the development of general understanding.

The distinction between history and social science is often regarded as a grey area by practitioners on both sides of the academic border. The issue essentially comes down to what is history and what is political science. Birch, in an analysis of historical explanation in politics, outlined two broad churches in the discipline of history, the purist and the idealist.<sup>1</sup> In the purists' conception of history, all prejudices and contemporary preoccupations should be put to one side. Value judgements should be avoided. They argue that causes cannot be found for historical events, rather such events can be

followed by another in ways that can be explained, but to say that the first event caused the second would be invalid, partly because it would assume an inevitability which is never present in human affairs and partly because it would assume that events can properly be detached from the whole pattern of life...<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Birch, A.H., "Historical Explanation and the Study of politics" in *Government and Opposition* 4(2) 1969: 221-222

<sup>2</sup> Ibid: 221

This view would leave the political scientist wishing to adopt an historical approach in an impossible position. Thankfully, there are options, one of which is to adopt a broader view of the historical discipline, the idealist approach.

Idealists place a greater emphasis on *verstehen*, or understanding, than purists. This understanding should include,

not only an appreciation of human motives and reasoning but also that of the part played in human affairs by ideas, by modes of communication and by those institutions which form the context within which political actors make their decisions.<sup>3</sup>

This movement from a level of explanation to wider general understanding is the borderline between history and political science. Emphasis is placed on understanding ideology, discourses, rhetoric and institutions and the effect they have on human decision making. This is the move from explaining events to interpreting and understanding action. As Charles Tilly put it, the common ground between interpretative history and social science comes when “we edge over from strictly historical questions into the effort to provide accounts, and even explanations...”<sup>4</sup> The effort to move from determining what happened to explaining cases and inferring general propositions about a wider universe of cases is the effort to move from history to social and political science.

But in describing this grey area it would seem that there is no real historical method in social science other than the simple use of historical material to explain phenomena in political and social science. This theme is found throughout the methodological literature in political science and the social sciences generally. C Wright Mills, for example, argued that to “fulfil their tasks, or even to state them well, social scientists must use the materials of history.”<sup>5</sup> The political scientist Dennis Kavanagh argued in his review of the relations between his discipline and history that “the contribution of history, as the systematic study of the past, to political science has been more as a body of knowledge than as a set of methods.”<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Ibid: 225

<sup>4</sup> Tilly, C., *As Sociology Meets History* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books: 1980): 100

<sup>5</sup> Wright Mills, C., *The Sociological Imagination* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books: 1980): 162

<sup>6</sup> Kavanagh, D., “Why Political Science needs History” in *Political Studies* 39 (3), 1991: 480.

If we accept then that there is no particular historical method in political science and historical situations are merely treated as cases, what particular issues are raised for the possibility of making any theoretical gains? As Seymour Martin Lipset has pointed out any given historical problem could have been caused by a wide and varied number of factors. The difficulty is in finding constants in order that we can isolate the independent variables.<sup>7</sup> If the positivistic goal of political *science* is to explain phenomena in the political world then the isolation of independent variables is the crux of the matter. But it is the level of explanation that is important. Political science is unlike the natural sciences as the political world lacks the order of the natural world. Laws such as Newton's Laws of Motion are virtually absent in political science. Therefore the level of explanation is reduced to probability rather than certainty.<sup>8</sup> So if even the quantitative methodologies of political science cannot generate law like generalisations, where does this leave, in Lijphart's view, the less scientific qualitative historical study?<sup>9</sup>

Lipset argued that although we cannot validate hypotheses with the rigour associated with the natural sciences, we can, when using historical cases, "draw out generalisations that can apply to similar cases."<sup>10</sup> Thus, there is no necessary clash between making theoretical gains and taking historical specificity into account.<sup>11</sup> Skocpol, in a similar vein, argued that placing developments in historical perspective allows a full contextual basis for the better understanding of a topic.<sup>12</sup> Birch argued that whilst this type of analysis would not "pretend to be a scientific law", by giving an account of the reasons why, "it would be far more than a statement of statistical probability..."<sup>13</sup> The use of historical cases in political science involves interpretative understanding rather than scientific analysis. Indeed one of the major benefits of a historical study is that it need not be overly scientific. As Birch asserted, the pursuit of

---

<sup>7</sup> Lipset, S.M., "Some Methodological Considerations" in Lipset, S.M., and Hofstadter, R. (eds) *Sociology and History: Methods* (New York, Basic Books Inc: 1968)

<sup>8</sup> Birch, "Historical Explanation and the Study of Politics": 227

<sup>9</sup> Lijphart, A., "Comparative politics and the Comparative method" in *The American Political Science Review* 65(3) 1971: 685

<sup>10</sup> Lipset, "Some Methodological Considerations": 51

<sup>11</sup> Ibid: 51-2

<sup>12</sup> Skocpol, T., "Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies" in Skocpol, (ed.), *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*: 359

<sup>13</sup> Birch, "Historical Explanation and the Study of politics": 227

an interpretative historical approach in political science “is to pursue a fuller understanding than can be gained from the language of pure narrative without falling into the language of hypothesis and verification.”<sup>14</sup> Care must be taken, however, as generalisations can only be applied to a finite sample of similar cases.

Theda Skocpol identified three approaches to historical analysis. Firstly, a single theoretical model can be thoroughly investigated by application to one or more case studies. Second, alternative hypotheses can be explored to discover causal regularities and thus account for specifically defined historical processes or outcomes. Finally, a meaningful historical explanation approach can be adopted. Concepts can be applied to specific cases to aid understanding of both the case and the concepts.<sup>15</sup> Skocpol has claimed academics using the last of these approaches are sceptical of the value of general models or causal hypotheses.<sup>16</sup> As Lipset claimed, however, there is no inherent incompatibility between the interpretative approach and the application of theoretical gains made to other cases.<sup>17</sup> An interpretative approach can give an in-depth contextual understanding of a topic thus increasing our understanding of concepts which can then be applied to other cases.

Goldstone, in his review of comparative historical analysis, argued this type of interpretive investigation is carried out through “strategic narrative.” The narrative marshals evidence against existing theory and tests our “prior theoretical beliefs.”<sup>18</sup> So in the transition from history to politics a “strategic narrative” will analyse the important aspects of the historical evidence rather than provide a detailed narrative of everything that happened in that particular period. For example, in his study of small nation nationalism in Eastern Europe, Miroslav Hroch did not give us a detailed history of each nation but only told us the important information regarding the social background of nationalists in his cases under examination as they related to his

---

<sup>14</sup> Ibid: 227

<sup>15</sup> Skocpol, “Emerging Agendas...”: 362

<sup>16</sup> Ibid: 362

<sup>17</sup> Lipset, “Some Methodological Considerations”: 51

<sup>18</sup> Goldstone, J., “Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of Revolutions” in Mahoney, J. and Reuschmeyer, D., (eds) *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2003): 51

hypothesis.<sup>19</sup> By relating important evidence to theory or hypotheses we can build more convincing generalisations. The data gathered by this study has not been gathered to shed new light on the historical development of nationalism in Scotland and Canada but to add something to our understanding of the relationship between nationalism and imperialism in nationalist discourse.

The interpretative approach will be adopted throughout this thesis with the aim of developing understanding and making theoretical gains that can be applied to a wider set of similar cases. The interpretative approach pays careful attention to the intentions of the individuals or groups in given historical settings.<sup>20</sup> It deals with people's experience and their understanding of that experience.<sup>21</sup> This study will interpret the actions of nationalists in Scotland and British Canada through the use of modern concepts in political science. The method of interpretation will be outlined later in this chapter.

It is important to remember that these generalisations must be treated with caution, as one of the pitfalls of the use of a historical case is to overemphasise the specific. Detail in historical studies is important as this gives us a fuller understanding of the topic. Indeed the contextual background, as has been mentioned, is one of the benefits of historical studies. But to move from history to political science we need to move to general theory and concepts and develop generalisations from the observed phenomenon.<sup>22</sup> We must avoid degenerating into specificity.

One important way to reduce the emphasis on specifics is to introduce more than one case. By doing this differences between cases can be seen but the similarities highlighted and generalisations inferred. Comparative historical analysis indeed, works entirely from this premise. By fully understanding specific cases, generalisations are inferred by examining the extent of difference and similarity across cases. This similarity and difference is "considered a crucial part of the

---

<sup>19</sup> Hroch, M., *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (New York, Columbia University Press: 2000)

<sup>20</sup> Skocpol, "Emerging Agendas...": 368;

<sup>21</sup> Rueschemeyer, D., "Can one or a few cases yield theoretical gains?" in Mahoney, J., and Rueschemeyer, D., *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2003): 313

<sup>22</sup> Birch, "Historical explanation and the study of politics": 227

investigation.”<sup>23</sup> The key claim of comparative historical analysis is that “generalisation is sought by piecing together *finite* sets of cases, not by sampling and inference to a larger universe.”<sup>24</sup> But comparative politics has specific problems of its own which will now be examined.

### ***Comparative Politics: The “Human” Method***

According to Landman, “to compare is to be human.”<sup>25</sup> Comparison is part of everyday life; “that car is bigger and better, that painting more beautiful, this flower more delicate.” Most everyday comparisons are made against a normative picture of something. Clearly in political science we need to be more specific. The method of comparison in politics, as we shall see, has its roots in a positivistic approach that puts the science in political science. We will argue in this section that a focussed comparison using two cases provides the best balance between contextual analysis and theoretical gains.

Hague et al. claim “comparison is the foundation of any systematic branch of knowledge.”<sup>26</sup> Landman and Hague et al. outline four basic reasons for comparison: classification, prediction, contextual description and hypothesis testing.<sup>27</sup> Classification involves generation of concepts. In the natural sciences, bees and wasps are classifications. In political science, states and nations are classifications. Comparative politics can also allow us to predict what will happen in certain circumstances. If we have observed a certain phenomenon, national revolution for example, in a given set of circumstances, we may predict a similar phenomenon will occur in another case with similar circumstances. The certainty of any prediction, however, must be tempered. No two given sets of circumstances are ever exactly the same. Unlike the natural sciences we can only deal in terms of probability. We have already mentioned the importance of context in the historical method. Context is also important in comparative studies. Comparative context sheds new light on our own

---

<sup>23</sup> Goldstone, J., “Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of Revolutions”: 44

<sup>24</sup> Ibid: 43

<sup>25</sup> Landman, T., *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: an Introduction* (London, Routledge: 2000): 4

<sup>26</sup> Hague, R., Harrop, M. and Breslin, S., *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction* 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press: 1992): 23

<sup>27</sup> Ibid: 24-5 and Landman, *Issues and Methods*: 4

country and our own realms of expertise as well giving us more information from which to generate theory.<sup>28</sup> Hypothesis testing brings us back to the *science* in political science.

According to Lijphart, the comparative method is *one* of the basic methods of “establishing general empirical propositions.”<sup>29</sup> In his positivist look at political science, Lijphart outlined the basic scientific approaches to political study, arguing that the closest political science can get to the experimental method of the natural sciences is the statistical method.<sup>30</sup> He also claimed, however, that the comparative method resembles the statistical method in all ways excepting one. “The crucial difference is that the number of cases it deals with is too small to permit systematic control by means of partial correlations.”<sup>31</sup>

In what has become known generally as “the small-N problem” (where N is the number of cases), Lijphart underlined one of the biggest problems with the comparative method as a scientific method in politics. The basic problem is simply put: “many variables, small number of cases.”<sup>32</sup>

Lipset’s observation regarding the number of variables in historical cases, noted above, is not limited to the historical sphere. In the political and social spheres the number of variables affecting an outcome is almost unlimited. When dealing with problems at a state level as most political science problems do, the researcher is then restricted to a finite number of cases (the total number of states in the world) to compare and isolate (control) the pertinent variables. If we take nationalist groups asserting the right to self-determination whilst wanting to remain within an empire we can find only a small number of cases and most of these within the British Empire. The large number of variables that could cause the formation of such groups, such as prestige, defence, economic reasons and so on makes it very difficult to reduce such variables to the few that are important. As there are a finite number of cases and a large number of variables the small N, large variable problem becomes clear.

---

<sup>28</sup> Hague et al., *Comparative Government and Politics*: 24

<sup>29</sup> Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the comparative method”: 682

<sup>30</sup> Ibid: 683-4

<sup>31</sup> Ibid: 684

<sup>32</sup> Ibid: 685

There are several ways in which the small-N problem can be resolved. One obvious resolution would be to increase the number of cases. Increasing the number of cases is impracticable, however, for the purposes of this study. Other solutions would be to reduce the level of analysis to a sub-state, (i.e. regional) or individual level. The analysis can also be extended over time (i.e., both historical cases and modern day cases can be used.)<sup>33</sup> Resolving the small-N problem in this way means that although the number of variables is still large you have effectively increased the number of cases in which you can control certain variables to find the causally significant variable or variables.

Another solution to the problem is to reduce the number of variables. This can be done using J.S. Mill's Methods of Agreement and Difference. When using Mill's Method of Difference two cases can be selected, one where the observed phenomena exists and one where it does not. In all else the cases share the same variables, save one or two. The variable(s) in which the cases differ must then be the "cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon."<sup>34</sup> The problem, however, in finding cases where there are sufficient similar variables that can be held constant is considerable and was acknowledged by Mill himself.<sup>35</sup> For example, if we take the articulation of a national and imperial identity by nationalists as the observed phenomenon and a large colony within an empire as basic criteria, one could quickly think of Canada and Mexico. Both shared a border with the United States, both were important colonies within their respective empires and yet Mexico desired outright independence, whereas Canadian nationalists wanted to remain within the Empire. The respective positions of power held by the British and Spanish Empires could prove important factors in the discourse of the nationalists but it would be extremely difficult to confirm all other factors were similar.

Mill's Method of Agreement has also been suggested as a solution to the small-N problem.<sup>36</sup> When using the Method of Agreement the cases being compared must be

---

<sup>33</sup> Landman, *Issues and Methods*: 40

<sup>34</sup> Mill, J.S., *System of Logic* (London, Longmans, Green and Co.: 1884): 256

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid*: 258

<sup>36</sup> Landman, *Issues and Methods*: 40

conceptualised as almost totally different whilst the observed phenomenon remains the same. As Mill put it,

If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon.<sup>37</sup>

In other words, cases with different political systems, sizes, geopolitical importance and so on, that exhibit the same observed phenomenon would be used in a research design using the Method of Agreement. To continue using Canada as an example, we would need to look for a case where other nationalist elites articulated both a national and imperial identity but which in many other respects was very different from Canada. Scotland provides such a case. It played an important role in creating the British Empire of which Canada was a part, yet is much smaller, had a very different political relationship with Westminster and a different political system. A comparison of these two cases then would highlight the similarities between the two and hypothesise that these may be important variables, for example, the existence of a large dominant neighbour, in causing the formation of nationalist movements.

One of the problems with the Method of Agreement is selection bias, as the cases are chosen on the basis of sharing the same observed phenomena and not at random as should be the case in a scientific method.<sup>38</sup> Again the main impact on the study will be the strength and reliability of any inferences that can be made to the larger universe. As long as this is accounted for in the conclusions, an awareness of the problem can limit its impact.

In adopting an interpretative approach to our investigation, however, we do not need to control variables. Rather the aim of using the interpretative approach is to provide a meaningful account of nationalism in Scotland and British Canada, and in doing so make theoretical gains that can be applied to other cases. The principles of Mill's methods, however, can still be usefully employed. In order to narrow down the potential number of variables we can select two cases which are as different from

---

<sup>37</sup> Mill, *System of Logic*: 255; cf Guy Peters, B., *Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods* (Basingstoke, Palgrave: 1998): 66

<sup>38</sup> Landman, *Issues and Methods*: 38

each other as can possibly be conceived. This should then reduce the number of potential variables to be identified once our interpretative investigation has been completed. Skocpol argued that comparisons are used in interpretative studies to emphasize differences between cases.<sup>39</sup> But for any theoretical gains to be made from an interpretive approach we also need to investigate what is common to both cases.

If resolution of the small-N problem means increasing the number of cases we would expect greater theoretical gains to be made from a larger number of cases than just two. The utility of a two case comparative study can, therefore, be questioned. When we use more than one case, however, we go beyond the boundaries where causally relevant factors may be held constant. This in itself can bring substantial theoretical gain.<sup>40</sup> The most acceptable trade off between complexity and generalisation is a *focused comparison* of two cases.<sup>41</sup>

Done well this approach has the strengths of both [case study and statistical] techniques but the weakness of neither.

Focussed comparisons remain sensitive to the details of particular countries... while retaining some ability to form, and test, explanations.<sup>42</sup>

Hague et al. argue that the biggest increase in understanding comes when raising the number of cases under comparison from one to two.<sup>43</sup> There would therefore be no benefit in increasing the cases under review as there would be no greater understanding of the relationship between nationalism and imperialism that could be applied to a larger sample of cases.

It is not being claimed here that law-like generalisations can be gained from a two case study. Indeed, the generation of laws is not the intention of this study. Focused comparisons of the type being carried out in this study allow in-depth understanding of the context of each case. This contextual depth will enable us to generate greater theoretical understanding which can then applied to other cases. Only through the

---

<sup>39</sup> Skocpol, "Emerging Agendas...": 369

<sup>40</sup> Rueschemeyer "Can one or a few cases yield theoretical gains?": 322

<sup>41</sup> Landman, *Issues and Methods*: 53 and Hague et al., *Comparative Government and Politics*: 39

<sup>42</sup> Hague et al., *Comparative Government and Politics*: 39-40

<sup>43</sup> Ibid: 40

expansion of knowledge can we begin to attempt to make generalisations to a wider set of cases.

With this in mind, this study aims to use a focused comparison of Scotland and Canada with the aim of increasing our understanding of the relationship between nationalism and imperialism. Using a focused comparison means the study will have the strengths of both the case study method, with its configurative analysis and detailed description, and the scientific method, with the elements of control, wider scope and theory building abilities. Our interpretative approach will allow a meaningful investigation of the substantive material without the scientific jargon associated with statistical analyses. By using this method we also gain the contextual background that can be missing from a more scientific approach. Combined with the historical “strategic narrative” a focused comparison will allow us to fully investigate the background to the relationship between nationalism and imperialism in the discourse of nationalists in Scotland and Canada. Whilst it will be difficult to make generalisations to a wider set of cases, we can increase our theoretical understanding which can then be applied to other similar cases. Our understanding of the relationship between nationalism and imperialism when used by nationalist groups will have been increased. The basis for understanding, having been contextual, will be much deeper. These benefits, it is believed, will give this study a strong methodological basis.

### **Case Choices**

Scotland and Canada have been chosen as case studies since they both show the use of both imperial and national identities by nationalist groups. The Scottish Home Rule Association showed their commitment to the Empire in their statement of aims in 1892.<sup>44</sup> The Canadian National Association did likewise in 1874.<sup>45</sup> As has been noted above the selection of cases in this way will inevitably introduce an element of bias. Care not to make wild claims that any conclusions must apply to the larger universe of cases and an awareness of bias will ensure its impact is restricted.

---

<sup>44</sup> Scottish Home Rule Association, *Prospectus of the Scottish Home Rule Association* (Edinburgh, 1892)

<sup>45</sup> Canadian National Association, “Canada First: Address of the Canadian National Association to the People of Canada” in Morgan, H.J., (ed.) *The Canadian Parliamentary Companion* (Montreal: 1874)

It should be noted that where Canada is used, British Canada is being discussed. British Canada includes all areas of Canada outside the predominantly Francophone province of Quebec. French Canada will not be a focus in this study other than where its influence on British Canada is significant. There are several reasons why only British Canada is being studied. Within the context of Canadian Confederation and westward expansion into the North-West Territories, the vision of nationalists in Canada was of a British Canadian nation that would rival the United States and work in partnership with Britain in the maintenance of the Empire. A good example of this vision is in the immigration policy of the late nineteenth century. The ideal immigrant for Canada and the Canadian west in particular was white, British and Protestant.<sup>46</sup> The cultural battle for control of the North-West formed an important part of the discourse of the early British Canadian nationalists and as such laid the basis for the cultural antagonism that characterised much of the period. There have been relatively few studies of British Canadian nationalism.<sup>47</sup> This study will thus fill the gap in the literature.

Scottish nationalism in this period sparked the idea of analysing the use of an imperial identity in a nationalist context, in particular its use by the Scottish Home Rule Association, formed in 1886. When comparing this movement with the Campaign for a Scottish Secretary of the early 1880s, it was noted that rarely was the latter campaign outlined in imperial terms. Yet it was a distinctively national and nationalist campaign. The change of approach by the later nationalists makes them distinctive in this context. This change will be analysed in depth to discover reasons for the different approaches.

Scotland and British Canada make good cases for comparison when using the Method of Agreement. Both share a few common characteristics, such as relatively privileged position in the Empire, British heritage, large neighbours and so on, but are largely very different entities. Some of these differences will be listed below.

---

<sup>46</sup> Abu-Laban, Y. and Garbiel, C., *Selling Diversity: Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment Equity and Globalization* (Toronto, Broadview Press: 2002): 38

<sup>47</sup> See for example Berger, C., *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1867-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1970); Stewart Wallace, W., *The Growth of Canadian National Feeling* (Toronto, The MacMillan Company of Canada Ltd: 1927); Gagan, D., "The Relevance of 'Canada First'" in *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 1970, Vol. 5 No. 4

### *Size*

The most obvious difference is the difference in size geographically. Even in 1867, before the geographical boundaries of Canada had been settled, Canada was geographically much larger than Scotland.

### *Geographical boundaries*

Related to size is the fluidity of borders in the period under study. From 1867 to 1899 Canada grew from a sizeable Dominion in the North-East of the North American continent to one of the largest countries in the world in terms of geography. Scotland's boundaries on the other hand were much less fluid, having been established by geography and border disputes for a number of centuries prior to 1867.

### *Political Systems*

Whilst ultimately both Scotland and Canada were ruled from Westminster, Canada, to all intents and purposes, was self governing in domestic matters. Scotland, as we shall see, had been self-administered by a number of unelected boards but political decisions were made in London. In the period under examination, there was a successful campaign for more effective local government in Scotland, as well as the creation of the post of Secretary of Scotland. Canada, through its written constitution, had a federal system that saw powers divided between provincial governments and a central federal parliament. These two very different forms of government necessarily affected the strategies adopted by interest groups and social movements.

### *Regional Fragmentation*

Canada's regions, as remains the case today, were much more important politically than the regional differences within Scotland, even between Highlands and Lowlands. The federal political system in Canada from 1867 gave the Provinces a political outlet through the Provincial Assemblies. At the federal level the Provinces competed for patronage and power. The patterns of settlement from the early days of colonisation, the existence of separate colonies prior to confederation with separate histories and the federal constitution all reinforced these regional identities in Canada. There were no corresponding institutions to do so in Scotland.

### *New/Old Nations*

Scotland was regarded as one of the “old” nations of Europe, with a settled civil society that performed many of the functions of the State. Whilst the concept of nation as modern or perennial will be examined in the following chapter, the important point here is that the Scottish nation had been in existence prior to Canadian confederation. The territory called Scotland had been peopled by Scots for much longer. A Scottish identity based on the institutions of the Church, Scots Law and education had been maintained since the Act of Union of 1707. Scottish nationalists, therefore, had a much larger portfolio of historical events from which to select symbols for their discourse. By contrast it could be argued that there was no Canadian nation in existence in 1867. The history of the territory that became Canada was certainly shorter, therefore, myths and symbols had to be adopted or created. Indeed, one of the aims of Canada First, one of the groups under study in this thesis, was to create “a new nationality.”<sup>48</sup> This difference greatly influenced the aims of the respective national movements.

### *Imperial Status*

Canada had only just been promoted from Colony to Dominion by the British North America Act of 1867. With control over most aspects of domestic policy the Canadian confederation had relative autonomy from the Empire, in very similar ways to modern day Scotland in the United Kingdom. The difference, however, was that Canada in the late nineteenth century had little or no voice in relation to foreign affairs, including commercial treaties with the United States. The nature of this relationship will be examined in more depth in later chapters.

Scotland could rightly claim to be an equal partner in Empire with representation at Westminster. Scots provided personnel for the management of the Empire from Africa to Australia. Governors, army regiments and, above all, emigrants were provided by Scotland. A quick glance at the list of Prime Ministers of Canada in the period under question shows the influence of Scots in the political realm in Canada.<sup>49</sup>

---

<sup>48</sup> Foster, W.A., *Canada First: Or Our New Nationality – An Address* (Toronto: 1888)

<sup>49</sup> John A. Macdonald and Alexander McKenzie, the first two prime ministers of Canada following Confederation in 1867 were both Scots. George Brown, editor of the *Toronto Globe* and leader of the reform movement was also a Scot. A number of Scots, or Scots descendants were involved in the Conferences that led to the creation of the British North America Act in 1867.

Scotland, however, had little control over its own domestic policy due to the dominance of English and Irish MPs and the preponderance of Imperial business to be dealt with. The campaign for a Scottish Secretary intended to redress this problem. The difference in Imperial Status was shown in the aspirations of each nation in the Imperial realm.

### *Economy*

Although there is an argument that both Scotland and Canada were peripheries to a larger economic core (England and the United States respectively), they were at very different stages of development. In 1867, industrialisation in Scotland had largely been completed. In Canada it was in its infancy, a legacy of the reciprocity agreements with the United States and Imperial economic policy. The focus in Canada had been on raw materials and it was only with the introduction of Macdonald's National Policy that a native industrial base began to take hold in Canada.

These differences and others will be highlighted throughout the study. The importance of these differences lies in the need to be aware of contextual factors that may have influenced the observed outcomes.

Aside from sharing in common nationalist groups that advocated the maintenance of imperial ties, both Scotland and Canada shared other similarities. Some of these are listed below.

### *British Heritage*

The nature of Canadian settlement and formation gave Canada a large British immigrant population that continued to grow throughout the nineteenth century. Scotland had been part of Great Britain since her Union with England in 1707. Loyalty to the Crown, British political values and a common Imperial history meant that both Canada and Scotland characterised this shared British heritage. This informed much of views expressed in political life in both cases.

### *Larger/More Powerful Neighbours*

Both Scotland and Canada shared borders with much larger neighbours. Fears of Anglicisation and Americanisation, to the extent of Canadian fears of annexation, also

informed many of the issues in political life. The desire for recognition by these neighbours was equally important in the discourse of imperial nationalists in Scotland and British Canada.

#### *Threats to position/existence of nation*

Both Scotland and British Canada faced threats either to their existence or their position within the state or the Empire. The United States was seen as an aggressive neighbour with designs on the annexation of Canada. The recognition of Ireland by Gladstone's Irish Home Rule bill placed Scotland's position within the United Kingdom under threat. Imperial nationalism was in many respects a reaction to these threats.

#### *Relatively Privileged Position in the British Empire*

As has been implied both Scotland and Canada held relatively prominent and privileged positions within the British Empire. Compared to some of the African and Asian colonies their level of autonomy and voice in the affairs of the Empire indicated the privileged position of Canada and Scotland.

An awareness of some of these points of comparison will be important in helping us develop our understanding of the cases. Using the interpretative approach will allow us to examine what was different about the cases and further narrow down the similarities that were significant in causing the observed phenomenon.

#### ***Time Period***

The late nineteenth century was distinctive as a period in which European imperialism was at its height. Russian expansionism to the North of India and the Scramble for Africa in which Germany, France, Italy, Britain and Belgium were all involved renewed interest in Empire in Britain. The importance of these challenges that faced Britain in this period, and what makes it distinctive from any other period in British imperial history, lies in the way in which the British Empire had to adapt to competition from other European powers, where before there had been none. Prior to the 1870s Britain had been pre-eminent in terms of Empire. Few other powers had the financial or military capability to challenge Britain's influence across the world. This changed very quickly with the unification of Germany and the expansion of Russia in

Asia. Britain had to formalise previously informal imperial relationships in order to protect its economic and strategic interests. The approval of the Confederation of the British North American colonies in 1867 was symptomatic of this point.

In order to investigate an alternative view of the relationship between nationalism and imperialism, we must select a time period when groups apparently articulating both a national and imperial discourse were present. In Canada, both Canada First and the Imperial Federation League in Canada were formed in the late nineteenth century. In Scotland the Scottish Home Rule Association was formed in 1886. The period from Canadian confederation through to the Boer War, stands out as an important time for the Empire and for both Scottish and Canadian nationalists.

One issue that will need to be addressed here is the time lag between the formation of movements in Canada and Scotland. When comparing movements across time periods one has to be aware of changes in attitude, values and meaning of concepts. Indeed, the meaning of Empire may even have changed over this time period. It will be important then to identify the meanings that were attached to each concept of nation and empire in these different time periods when comparing Canada First (1868-1873), the Canadian National Association (1874) and the Scottish Home Rule Association (1886). The potential effect of change in meaning over time will need to be borne in mind. Of course, concepts may also mean different things to different groups in separate contexts. This will also need to be addressed in the substantive chapters later in this thesis.

### ***The Nationalist Groups***

There are four main groups that articulated an imperial and national identity in Scotland and Canada in the late nineteenth century. In Scotland, the Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA) articulated a nationalist and imperialist discourse. Elements within the Imperial Federation League in Scotland also advocated imperial and nationalist ideals. In Canada, the Imperial Federation League played the paramount role in articulating nationalism and imperialism. Its predecessor, at least in some respects, Canada First, was primarily a nationalist organisation but upheld the importance of the imperial connection. The Canadian National Association (CNA), a

final political fling of Canada First, had consolidation of the Empire as part of its platform.

### *Scottish Home Rule Association*

The Scottish Home Rule Association was formed in 1886, following the introduction of an Irish Home Rule Bill by Prime Minister William Gladstone. The origins of the SHRA lay in a meeting called by the Honorary Secretary Charles Waddie, an Edinburgh printer.<sup>50</sup> The executive of the SHRA comprised the Secretary Charles Waddie, the Chairman, Professor J.S. Blackie, a Gaelic revivalist and Vice President of the Highland Land Law Reform Association (HLLRA) and the Treasurer, William Mitchell, a lawyer and active member of the Liberal Party in Midlothian.<sup>51</sup> The General Committee of the SHRA showed the wide range of interests Scottish Home Rule attracted. The broad church of Scottish nationalism included Radical Socialists such as R.B. Cunnighame Graham and Kier Hardie, joint founders of the Scottish Labour Party, to MPs concerned withcrofting rights such as G.B Clarke, Tory romantics such as the outlandish Australian born Theodore Napier and Gaelic nationalist Ruaridh Erskine of Mar.<sup>52</sup> The important point here, however, is that although a wide range of people were members of the SHRA, the general tone of the movement was dictated by the centrists in the party such as Waddie and Mitchell.

The SHRA was essentially a pressure group whose main aim was to secure a Scottish Parliament that dealt with purely Scottish matters, leaving common British concerns and imperial matters to be dealt with by Westminster. Branches of the Association were formed across Scotland, including, Galashiels, Fort William, Dingwall, Dundee, Aberdeen and Glasgow.<sup>53</sup> Although there were calls in later years for a wider network of branches to be formed, it was noted by the executive that sufficient members would need to be recruited to fill those branches.<sup>54</sup> The grassroots support for Scottish Home

---

<sup>50</sup> Mitchell, W., *Is Scotland to be Sold Again?* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1893): 8

<sup>51</sup> SHRA, *Petition to Scots MP's, Lords and Lord Provosts of Burghs* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1886) For Blackie's links to HLLRA see Hunter, J., "The Gaelic Connection: The Highlands, Ireland and Nationalism" in *Scottish Historical Review* Vol 54 (1975), 178-204; For William Mitchell see Mitchell, J., *Strategies for Self Government: The Campaigns for a Scottish Parliament* (London, Polygon: 1996): 69

<sup>52</sup> Mitchell, W., *Home Rule for Scotland* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1892) – Membership details taken from back cover.

<sup>53</sup> *The Scotsman*, 21 July 1886: 8

<sup>54</sup> SHRA, *Proof for Private Perusal – Strictly Confidential* – (Edinburgh: 1892/3)

Rule found its outlet in local Liberal Associations. In 1888, home rule supporters had been asked to form a branch of the SHRA only where the local Liberal Association did not support the measure.<sup>55</sup>

The SHRA can best be described as an elite level pressure group. Its clear aim was to change opinion within the Liberal Party in favour of Scottish Home Rule. To some extent it could claim success. The Scottish Liberal Association adopted Scottish Home Rule as policy in 1888.<sup>56</sup> The Liberal leadership in England, however, remained unmoved. Most of the SHRA members were involved in local or national politics. Various methods were adopted by the SHRA including letters to the press, pamphleteering, motions in Parliament, and publication of Parliamentary Division Lists indicating which MPs supported Scottish Home Rule in Parliament. In 1892, electors were asked by the SHRA to use Scottish Home Rule as a test question for candidates. An increasing number of Scots MPs supported Home Rule motions in Parliament after these elections, until in 1894, a majority of Scots MPs were in favour. The movement had effectively come to an end by 1900. A second Scottish Home Rule Association was formed at the end of the First World War.

### *Canada First*

The history of Canada First is complex. It began life as a small group who met in Ottawa in 1868 through a mutual acquaintance, Henry Morgan, a civil servant. The original members included Morgan, Charles Mair, a poet from Lanark, Ontario, George Denison, a lawyer and cavalry officer from Toronto, William Foster, a Toronto lawyer who had written for the *Toronto Telegraph* and Robert Haliburton, an anthropologist from Nova Scotia with business interests in the coal industry.<sup>57</sup> The time the group spent together was short, less than a month, before they went back to their respective homes. In that short time, however, they agreed to “labour for the moderation of political partisanship, the mitigation of localism and sectionalism, the purification of politics and the cultivation of a Canadian national sentiment.”<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>55</sup> Mitchell, W., *Scotland and Home Rule* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1888): back cover

<sup>56</sup> Kellas, J.G., “The Liberal Party in Scotland” in *Scottish Historical Review* Vol. 44 (1965): 13

<sup>57</sup> Morgan, H.J., *Canadian Men and Women of the time: A handbook of Canadian Biography* (Toronto, W. Briggs: 1898): 261; Shrive, N., *Charles Mair: Literary Nationalist* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1965): 27-8

<sup>58</sup> Willison, J.S., *Sir Wilfred Laurier & the Liberal Party: A Political History Volume 1* (George N. Morang & Co, Toronto: 1903): 70.

Within a year Canada First had expanded to around a dozen nationalists that had formed a pressure group representing British Canada's interests during the rebellion against the proposals to transfer governance of the North West from London to Ottawa at Red River in 1869-70. Public meetings were organised and letters sent to the press with the intention of bringing public attention to the plight of Canadians in Red River during the transfer of power from the Hudsons Bay Company to the Canadian Confederation.<sup>59</sup> Following the successful conclusion of the Red River affair and the incorporation of Manitoba into Canadian Confederation, the group turned their attention to encouraging the settlement of the North-West through the formation of the North West Emigration Aid Society. The main aim of this group was to ensure British Canada was the predominant provider of settlers of the North West.<sup>60</sup>

The final stage in the evolution of Canada First was the formation of the Canadian National Association (CNA) in 1873. The CNA was an attempt to formally enter the political arena. Although they never fielded a candidate in any federal or provincial election they gave their support to Thomas Moss, a Liberal Candidate and a Partner in Foster's law firm.<sup>61</sup> Moss won the by-election by a substantial margin.<sup>62</sup> A Manifesto was issued by the CNA in 1874 despite no candidates being put forward for the federal election in that year. The manifesto outlined the programme of the Association, a key policy being the maintenance of the imperial connection and a voice in treaties affecting Canada.<sup>63</sup> A newspaper was formed, *The Nation*, as the mouthpiece of the CNA and support came from future Liberal Leader, Edward Blake. A branch of the Association was formed in New Brunswick.<sup>64</sup>

Canada First is probably best understood as an intellectual movement which took various forms between 1868 and 1874. The movement as an organisation had come to

---

<sup>59</sup> Denison, G.T., "Sir John Schultz and the "Canada First" Party" in *The Canadian Magazine* Vol.8 No. 1 November 1896:19-20

<sup>60</sup> *The Globe*, 4 August 1870

<sup>61</sup> *The Globe*, 8 December 1873

<sup>62</sup> Beck, J.Murray, *Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal elections* (Scarborough (Ont.), Prentice Hall of Canada: 1968)

<sup>63</sup> Canadian National Association, "Canada First: Address of the Canadian National...": 585-6

<sup>64</sup> *The Nation* August 13, 1874: 234

an end in 1875, although *The Nation* continued in print until 1876. The significance of the movement lies in it being the first British Canadian nationalist movement. Electorally it was unsuccessful, but as a pressure group it fared better. Its influence on future British Canadian nationalist groups makes it worthy of inclusion.

### *Imperial Federation League (Britain/Scotland)*

The Imperial Federation League was formed in London in 1884. The formal objectives of the IFL were passed in the form of the following resolutions.

That in order to secure the permanent unity of the Empire some form of Federation is essential

That, no scheme of federation should interfere with the existing rights of local parliaments, as regards local affairs

That any scheme of federation should combine on an equitable basis the resources of the Empire for the maintenance of common interests, and adequately provide for an organized defence of common rights<sup>65</sup>

Federation was in some cases a misnomer as the movement attracted a wide range of politicians and activists, including John A. Macdonald, the Canadian Prime Minister,<sup>66</sup> and the Earl of Rosebery, not all of whom advocated a formal federation of the empire.

Branches of the IFL were formed in Scotland in 1887. The first meeting of the Glasgow and West of Scotland branch was held in private but included J.A Baird MP and the Rev. W.G. Duncan in its attendees.<sup>67</sup> The report of the first annual meeting of the Glasgow Branch showed that the Earl of Glasgow had been elected Chairman of the Branch with a number of MPs being among the Vice Presidents.<sup>68</sup> The Edinburgh and East of Scotland branch of the IFL was given a much grander inauguration, although still a private meeting, with the Chairman of the IFL, the Earl of Rosebery, presiding. The social background of some of the forty members present was varied. Religious leaders, advocates, MPs and academics attended the meeting held in the

---

<sup>65</sup> Imperial Federation League, *Imperial Federation League in Canada – Report of the First Meeting* (Montreal, 1885): 2 – The resolutions are listed in the report of the first meeting of the League in Canada

<sup>66</sup> A number of Colonial/Dominion statesmen were present at the original meetings of the IFL

<sup>67</sup> *Imperial Federation*, 1 March 1887: 58

<sup>68</sup> *Imperial Federation*, 1 March 1888: 56

Royal Hotel in Edinburgh. Indeed, the Principal of Edinburgh University, Sir William Muir, agreed to become President of the Branch.<sup>69</sup> The “cosmopolitan character” of the University was apparently one of the driving factors behind the formation of the Edinburgh branch.<sup>70</sup> Although there were only two branches of the League in Scotland, meetings were held across the country to discuss Imperial Federation, including Arbroath, Greenock, Aberdeen, and Kirkcaldy.<sup>71</sup>

It should be noted here that not all members of the IFL in Scotland were in favour of Scottish Home Rule. The Earl of Rosebery flirted with the idea on a number of occasions, finally conceding its necessity in 1893.<sup>72</sup> Other prominent members of the IFL who supported Scottish Home Rule were Lord Reay and R.C Munro Ferguson, Liberal member for Leith.<sup>73</sup>

#### *Imperial Federation League – Canada*

On 9<sup>th</sup> May 1885 the first meeting of the Imperial Federation League of Canada (IFLC) took place in Montreal. The resolutions of the British League were adopted and it was also resolved that:

to the end that the Mother Country and the Colonies may remain perpetually under a common sovereignty, a United Empire in its foreign affairs and, with constitutional liberty for every part as regards internal administration, a readjustment of the several constitutional authorities of the Empire, should as occasion arises be made in such manner as to increase the practical efficiency of Imperial Unity.<sup>74</sup>

The meeting was attended by a large number of MPs, Senators, merchants, advocates, bankers and religious leaders from across Canada, as well as a number of prominent Montreal citizens. Letters of apology and support were received from a similar social grouping.<sup>75</sup>

---

<sup>69</sup> *The Scotsman*, 17 November 1887: 6

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*: 6

<sup>71</sup> *Imperial Federation*, 1 May, 1893: 118; *Imperial Federation*, 1 December 1891: 280-1

<sup>72</sup> Reported in SHRA, *Home Rule All Round*, (Edinburgh: 1893)

<sup>73</sup> For Reay see quote in Fry, M., *Patronage and Principle: A Political History of Modern Scotland* (Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen: 1987): 114; Confirmation of Munro Ferguson voting in favour of Scottish Home Rule can be found in *Analysis of Division 29<sup>th</sup> April 1892* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1892)

<sup>74</sup> IFL, *Imperial Federation League In Canada - Report of the First Meeting*: 2

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid*: 7-12

A quick analysis of the composition of the General Committee of the Imperial Federation League in Canada at its inception shows that the League was well represented across Canada. Of a total of 123 committee members, 93 were from the heartland of Ontario and Quebec. This is unsurprising given that the original meeting was held in Montreal and the concentration of population in the Central provinces. This also means that around a quarter of the committee were from the other provinces.<sup>76</sup>

But representation of the League throughout Canada grew quite rapidly and within four years twenty-three branches of the League had been formed, with representation in each of the large cities and in most of the provinces. Again it should be noted that fifteen (two thirds) of the twenty-three branches were based in Ontario with only one in Quebec, the original branch in Montreal. Four branches had been formed in Nova Scotia, one in New Brunswick and two in British Columbia (Vancouver and Victoria).<sup>77</sup> Again the prominence of the heartland is shown but this time it is based on Ontario not a combination of Ontario and Quebec. The Toronto Branch of the IFLC was formed in 1888 with just as much imperial zeal as had been apparent in Montreal.

### ***Document Analysis***

Since this study is using historical cases, document analysis will form the backbone of the substantive chapters. This method is arguably the oldest of the political and social science research techniques and is scarcely less important than quantitative or other qualitative methods, although these different techniques are not mutually exclusive.<sup>78</sup> This section will outline the broad method of documentary analysis, along with the potential issues with this method.

Meaning is the crux of any documentary analysis and according to Scott, exists on two levels: literal meaning and interpretative meaning.<sup>79</sup> Literal meaning is the

---

<sup>76</sup> Figures taken from List in *Imperial Federation League In Canada - Report of the First Meeting*, cited above.

<sup>77</sup> These figures are based on a list of branches shown on the cover sheet of Grant, G.M., *The Case for Canada* (London, 1889)

<sup>78</sup> Macdonald, K and Tipton, C., "Using Documents" in Gilbert, N., (ed) *Researching Social Life* (London, Sage Publications: 1993): 187

<sup>79</sup> Ibid: 28

content of the document. What does the document actually say? There can be several problems in ascertaining the literal meaning of a document, however, such as language, date formats, deciphering handwriting and the meaning of technical terms (historically or in modernity.) But as Scott, rightly points out “the literal meaning of the words in a document give only its ‘face value’ meaning; they are the raw materials from which the real significance must be reconstructed.”<sup>80</sup>

Interpretative meaning has undergone some changes in the recent past, with debates over the most productive approach.<sup>81</sup> Three strands of interpretative understanding can be discerned: content analysis, semiotics and textual analysis. Content analysis sprang from a quantitative approach to documentary analysis. The important topics were held to be those mentioned most often. So, for example, in an examination of a pamphlet on Scottish Home Rule, we would expect words and phrases such as, nation, Scotland, Parliament, Home Rule, Union and so on. This gives us an indication of what the document is about but it does not give us any depth of understanding. It is relatively simplistic and unsubtle.<sup>82</sup>

Scott suggests that these attempts by content analysts and semioticians to find the “objective meaning of the text itself, [by] arguing that its cultural significance depends on what messages it actually contains and not on what its author may have intended” have missed the point.<sup>83</sup>

The text as an objective cultural entity, therefore, is ephemeral and must be reunited with the intentions of its author and the perspectives of its audiences. Texts must be studied as socially situated products.<sup>84</sup>

One method which aims to achieve this is discourse analysis. This approach draws its inspiration from interpretative sciences such as hermeneutics, which seek to understand concepts in their context and the relationships between them within the text.<sup>85</sup> Discourse analysts examine the way systems of meaning, or discourses, “shape the way people understand their roles in society and influence their political

---

<sup>80</sup> Ibid: 30

<sup>81</sup> Ibid: 32-35

<sup>82</sup> Macdonald and Tipton, “Using Documents”: 197

<sup>83</sup> Scott, *A Matter of Record*: 33

<sup>84</sup> Ibid: 33-4

<sup>85</sup> Scott, *A Matter of Record*: 31

activities.”<sup>86</sup> The focus of this approach is given to four key concepts: antagonism, agency, power and hegemony.<sup>87</sup> Students of nationalism will be familiar with these concepts from any analysis of a document produced by nationalists. The task of nationalist elites, after all, is to articulate a position critical of the state.<sup>88</sup> In creating this antagonism, a frontier is erected between the subject and the “other”. In using this aspect of discourse analysis, identifying the antagonisms and their signifiers becomes an important task. A key aspect of this approach is the persuasive power of contrast structures in which the subject is compared favourably with the other.<sup>89</sup>

Discourse theory argues that actions of agents are dependent on the discourses with which they identify. The different systems of meaning created by each discourse means that individuals will interpret different situations in different ways.<sup>90</sup> For example, post-colonial discourse claims there is a direct contradiction between the view of empire held by colonisers and colonised. The former articulate an imperial discourse which generally upholds their right to empire based on racial or cultural superiority. The colonised create an antagonistic nationalist discourse based on their negative experience of empire.

Finally, discourse theory gives priority to hegemonic practices, i.e., efforts to become master. Power and hegemony go hand in hand. As Howarth argues, “the concept of hegemony centres on who is going to be master.”<sup>91</sup> In becoming master, the dominant discourse gains power, as it decides the dominant form of conduct. In this sense a discourse becomes politically constructed. Politics in essence is about power. A discourse is therefore a politically constructed system of meaning. In the above example, the discourse would organise behaviour using symbols of oppression and contrasting symbols of freedom to become the hegemonic discourse in the colonial society. Once that status had been achieved the discourse would organise the behaviour of society toward ending the colonial occupation. Once that occupation had

---

<sup>86</sup> Howarth, D., “Discourse Theory” in Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (eds) *Theory and Methods in Political Science 1<sup>st</sup> Edition* (Basingstoke, Macmillan: 1995): 115

<sup>87</sup> Ibid: 115

<sup>88</sup> Guibernau, M., *Nations without States: Political Communities in a Global age* (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1999): 98

<sup>89</sup> Woffitt, R., “Analysing Accounts”, in Gilbert, N., (ed) *Researching Social Life* (London, Sage Publications: 1993): 296

<sup>90</sup> Howarth, “Discourse Theory”: 123

<sup>91</sup> Ibid: 123

ended the colonised would gain power. The discourse would then change given the change in circumstances. It would no longer be necessary to articulate a discourse aimed at ending colonial occupation.

Although this is not a study in discourse analysis, our focus is on the arguments of the groups, some of the principles of discourse theory, as applied in political science, can be used to identify and highlight some of the key concepts used by nationalists in Scotland and British Canada. In particular use will be made of the concept of antagonism. The discourse of the groups will be broken down to examine the nature of the antagonistic frontiers. As we shall argue in later chapters, identity is experiential and relational. Identifying who nationalists were antagonistic towards will aid our understanding of their identity.

As with the historical comparative method in general, document analysts must be careful to moderate their conclusions. The various interpretations of a document opens and closes various doors for audiences and this variety must therefore limit the strength of any claims to generalisations for a study using this technique.<sup>92</sup> Some of the principles of discourse analysis will be used to identify the key themes that can then be analysed in greater depth through textual analysis. But of course the context within which a discourse is articulated is very important. A general interpretive understanding technique situates the documents in the context of the times ensuring the key concepts are understood by the researcher as they would have been by their intended audience. The arguments, themes and style of document will all be important in outlining the strategy used by the relevant groups and this analysis will form the main substantive chapters of the thesis.

### ***Conclusion***

The key theme of this chapter has been the importance of showing restraint when inferring any generalisations drawn from this study to the larger universe, whilst at the same time maintaining the scientific goal of political science. The above summary of some of the issues involved in historical, comparative and documentary research has shown that the use of all three within political science is an acceptable method and not

---

<sup>92</sup> Ibid: 34-5

incompatible with claims of science, despite any weaknesses the approach may have. The research design to be adopted in this study is seen as the most effective in developing a deep understanding of the relationship between nationalism and imperialism in nationalist discourse and why these concepts were articulated together, thus enabling us to address the research questions. The broad method then is a comparative historical analysis using an interpretative approach. The cases, Scotland and British Canada, and time period were chosen due to their exhibiting movements that articulated the particular concepts under study. The basis of comparison will be the discourse of each group. The articulation of their antagonisms creates boundaries which informed both imperial and national identities. The analysis of these antagonisms and the assertions of power that followed is the main approach of this thesis. The key themes of nationalist discourse will be ascertained through analysis of the various documents produced by each movement and its members. These documents will be set in their historical context by providing historical background at the beginning of each chapter. This context allows the discourse to be presented as it would have been understood by the contemporary audience. The key issue with all aspects of the approach is that any inferences to the larger universe will necessarily be restricted in scope. Despite this a deeper understanding of these particular cases should result from a detailed analysis and inferences can be made to a similar sample of cases.

### Chapter Three

#### Nationalism, Imperialism and Identity

The aim of this chapter is to provide the theoretical framework for the thesis. The central theme of this thesis is the relationship between nationalism, imperialism and identity. The starting point for this study was the failure of general studies of nationalism to explain the existence of nationalist groups that simultaneously advocated a nationalist and an imperialist stance. Although typologies such as those of Breuilly and Kellas<sup>1</sup> note the existence of post-colonial nationalisms where nationalists argue for independence from the empire, they have failed to classify or examine nationalisms that desire greater self-government *and* wish to maintain links with the empire. This study aims to fill the gap in the literature.

Before we can begin to examine the substantive material, however, we need to identify and define the concepts that will inform our understanding of that material. Very few areas of social science lack debate over definitions of concepts. Theoretical debates are just as vigorous. Nationalism studies are no exception. Defining the key concepts and developing a strong theoretical framework allows us to interpret and understand the material to be presented in subsequent chapters. The purpose of this chapter is to define the key concepts used in this thesis and to develop a theoretical framework which will guide our investigation of the empirical material.

The chapter will be organised into three broad sections. Firstly the key concepts of nation, state and empire will be discussed. Definitions will be provided following a discussion of the key debates in relation to those concepts. The relationship between nations, states and empires will also be examined. The following section will examine the nature of nationalism. The relationships between nationalism, modernity, statehood and imperialism will be discussed. An understanding of the causes of nationalism and imperialism will also be presented. The final section will investigate the nature of identity, in particular the role of the elite in articulating identity. The links between dual and multiple identities will be analysed. The

---

<sup>1</sup> Breuilly, J., *Nationalism and the State 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition* (Manchester, Manchester University Press: 1993); Kellas, J.G., *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press Ltd: 1991)

relationship between identity, nationalism and imperialism will also be examined.

## ***Nation, State and Empire***

### ***Nation***

The debate over the multitude of definitions of the nation surrounds three distinct but inter-related issues: the age of nations, the organic or artificial nature of nations and whether nations are inclusive or exclusive. The argument of this thesis is that nations are modern, artificial constructs that use the history of their territory to create the impression that the nation is perennial. Although nations can be identified objectively, in terms of territory, values, culture and so on, they are essentially artificial constructs existing in the minds of its members. It will be further argued that nationalists use the materials of history to legitimise the nation and raise consciousness of its “existence.”

One of the main problems in presenting a definition of nation is the balance between objective and subjective definitions. Objective definitions tend to ignore the self awareness element of subjective definitions of the nation. By way of example two contrasting definitions of nation can be presented. Anthony Smith provides a good example of an objective definition.

A named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members<sup>2</sup>

These factors can all be objectively noted by academics. Smith’s definition, however, has limitations. For one, many of these factors can also describe states, which also have common economies, legal rights and duties for citizens or members. States generally also have an historic territory and a mass public culture. We are left then with myths and historical memories to distinguish nations from states. States, however, also have histories, conflicts with neighbours that create borders and establish sovereignty. Another important element missing from Smith’s definition is

---

<sup>2</sup> Smith, A.D., *National Identity* (London, Penguin Books Ltd: 1991): 14

the necessity for members of the nation to be aware of sharing these myths and memories with other members of the nation. Without this there can be no sense of belonging to a community.

Benedict Anderson provides the classic subjective definition of the nation which incorporates this sense of belonging. The nation, according to Anderson,

...is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.

It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.<sup>3</sup>

Anderson's definition stands in complete contrast to Smith's. There is no mention of mass public culture, common economy or even of myths or historical memories. And yet the idea of a large community which is aware of common bonds (whatever nature they may take) provides a clearer sense of the murky nature of the concept of nation. One problem with Anderson's definition is his use of the term "political community." The view presented in this thesis is that nations are not necessarily political entities, although national elites may attempt to mobilise the nation for political ends.

Whilst objective factors, such as language or territory, are undoubtedly important in identifying a nation, it is impossible to understand the nature of a nation without relating the consciousness of belonging to a larger community.<sup>4</sup> As Connor claimed, the essence of the nation is a "psychological bond" that unites the nation and differentiates it from others.<sup>5</sup> In other words members of a nation are aware of objective factors such as territory, language, myths, history and community that bind them to each other and make them different from other nations or communities. Thus

---

<sup>3</sup> Anderson, B., *Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London, Verso: 1991): 6 original emphasis

<sup>4</sup> Hobsbawm, E.J., *Nations and Nationalism since 1870: Programme Myth and Reality* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1992): 73

<sup>5</sup> Connor, W., *Ethnonationalism - The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1994): 196

Connor has defined a nation as a “self-aware ethnic group.”<sup>6</sup> In this sense the nation is not a tangible phenomenon but an artificial construct. The symbols, history and territory of a people are real enough but the nature of a nation is in the sense of belonging that can only exist in the imagination. Nations, in this sense are artificial.

To provide a working definition then, we can say that a nation is a community of people aware of sharing a common heritage, myths, history, mission and culture. This definition opens the door to one of the key debates in defining nation, whether the nation is old or new.

The modernist/perennialist debate is perhaps the main issue in nationalism studies. The basic debate is whether nations have always existed but have only recently been woken from their sleep (the perennialist position) or if they are a modern invention created for the purposes of the modern state. A third element of this debate is the argument of ethno-symbolists, such as Anthony Smith, who claim modern nations are the antecedents of ethnic communities of the middle ages. Briefly, the modernists, such as Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm, claim the nation resulted from the collapse of the medieval structures of society, the rise of industrialisation and urbanisation and the creation of the modern state.<sup>7</sup> Gellner’s classic argument claims the nation is a result of the need for modern states to have a common culture to provide legitimacy for its actions. The nation was created through state sponsored education in a “high culture.” In this way citizens were created who could communicate with each other. The nation was the resultant unit.<sup>8</sup>

Perennialists begin from the premise that nations have always existed in one form or another. Modern nations, they claimed, share much in common with their

---

<sup>6</sup> Connor, W., “A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a ...” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, 1978, cited in Hutchinson, J., and Smith, A.D.(eds), *Nationalism* (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1994): 45

<sup>7</sup> Gellner, E., *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell: 1983); Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*; See also Mann, M., “A Political Theory of Nationalism and its Excesses” in S. Periwai (ed) *Notions of Nationalism* (London, Central European University Press: 1995) and Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*.

<sup>8</sup> For a fuller discussion of Gellner’s argument see also, Gellner, E., *Thought and Change* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson: 1972); Gellner, E., *Nationalism* (London, Phoenix: 1997); Hall, J.A., (ed) *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1998)

counterparts in antiquity and the middle ages. Nations therefore have deep roots in both history and the psyche.<sup>9</sup> There can be little doubt that nationalists use rhetoric displaying notions of the ancestry of the nation. The problem the perennialist position presents this study with is the existence of a separate British Canadian nation which shared its ethnicity with other nations, i.e., Scotland, England, Wales and Ireland. Undoubtedly “older” nations such as England and Scotland have a sense of ancestry handed down through the history of the nation but to claim Scotland was once a homogenous ethnic group would be stretching the point.

Ethno-symbolists, such as John Armstrong and Anthony Smith also claim nations have ethnic origins, but prefer to analyse the symbols used to create ethnic boundaries. Armstrong argued the key to understanding ethnic group identity, and therefore nations, is the symbolic boundary mechanism that differentiates groups from one another.<sup>10</sup> These symbols, such as a territorial name, develop common links between different groups over a long time period. Anthony Smith takes these ideas a step further, arguing the *ethnie*, is a preparatory stage prior to the formation of nations, where the name, symbols and myths of the nation are adopted. The *ethnie* itself is formed from ethnic groups coming together. In Smith’s analysis nations are generally formed around a dominant *ethnie*.<sup>11</sup> Ethno-symbolists avoid the problems the perennialist position creates in relation to new nations such as the United States or Canada. Smith argues that the ethnic roots of the United States were an Anglo-American Puritanism born from a reaction against British colonial policy in the late eighteenth century. Despite the multi-ethnic nature of the modern United States, American national identity still rests on this Anglo-American political community.<sup>12</sup> The American *ethnie* has its roots in the way British identity was adapted in the new world.

The problem of defining nation can clearly be seen from the above discussion. Nations are communities that rely on a mutual sense of belonging expressed through

---

<sup>9</sup> Smith, A.D., *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism* (London, Routledge: 1998): 159-60

<sup>10</sup> Ozkirimli, U., *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke, Palgrave: 2000): 172

<sup>11</sup> Smith, *National Identity*: 38-9

<sup>12</sup> Ibid: 149-50

attachment to a set of symbols that members of the nation identify with and that will differentiate them from other nations. These symbols will generally be historic in nature. Whilst these historical symbols originate from the territory of the nation they can only acquire real significance in the modern age when communication allows the nation to be imagined through print media, widespread travel and regular contact with the agencies of the state. By communing with members of the nation through newspapers, travel and education, an individual becomes aware of belonging to a wider community: a nation.

One final aspect of the nation must be acknowledged prior to moving on. Some theorists have claimed that nations take on two different forms. Nations, according to these categorisations, can either be civic or ethnic.<sup>13</sup> Civic nations tend to be based on territorial political communities to which members or citizens are bound by a common historical territory, a common civic culture and ideology.<sup>14</sup> In this conception of the nation, members could choose the nation they identify with the most. Membership of a nation is not restricted to those born within its borders. By contrast, ethnic nations emphasise the blood ties and common roots that distinguish a particular nation. In this organic conception, the nation is “first and foremost a community of common descent.”<sup>15</sup> France and the United States are commonly held up as the classic examples of civic nations. The principles of the French Revolution and the American Declaration of Independence highlighted the people as a political community. The recent problems in the Balkans and in parts of Africa are generally characterised as ethnic nationalism.

The distinction between the two concepts, however, is blurred and not particularly useful. The idea that civic nations are more liberal cannot be sustained on closer examination. After all when a citizen is welcomed into a new political community they *must* express loyalty to the symbols of the nation. Desecration of the ‘Stars and Stripes’ in the United States is a punishable offence. The recent ban on Muslim head-

---

<sup>13</sup> See for example, Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*; Smith, A.D., *National Identity*; Ignatieff, M., *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (London, Vintage: 1994);

<sup>14</sup> Smith, *National Identity*: 11

<sup>15</sup> Ibid: 11

dress in French schools is another example of the conditions laid down for membership of the civic nation. Whilst in general the contrast between civic nations and ethnic nations is not especially useful it will help shed some light on some of the substantive material to follow.

The distinction between civic and ethnic nations has been developed in recent years by liberal theorists seeking a more satisfactory distinction.<sup>16</sup> This liberal view of the nation sees members as “free and autonomous participants in a communal framework,”<sup>17</sup> i.e., a nation that has no membership restriction. Rather than the distinction being between different types of exclusive nation the distinction becomes one between liberal and illiberal nations. As we noted above many civic nations impose conditions on national membership. They also fail to adequately recognise minority groups within the state.<sup>18</sup> Liberal theories of the nation counter this by arguing that minority identities, incapable of forming a state of their own, should be included in the wider national identity.<sup>19</sup> Not only will this enable them to access state resources but it will prevent them being a potential source of instability for the state.

### *State*

Definitional problems are also an issue when debating the nature of the state. There is no need to examine the debates in great detail here. This study is not about the state but about the relationship between nationalism and imperialism. However, an understanding of the nature of the state is required before we can begin to examine the nature of its relationship with the nation and empire.

There are two approaches to defining the state: the institutional approach, what the state looks like, and the functional approach, what the state does.<sup>20</sup> According to

---

<sup>16</sup> See for example, Tamir, Y., *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1993)

<sup>17</sup> Ibid: 33

<sup>18</sup> Kymlicka, W., *Multi-cultural citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1995): 194

<sup>19</sup> Ibid: 194; see also Miller, D., *On Nationality* (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1995): 188

<sup>20</sup> Mann, M., *States, War and Capitalism* (Oxford, Blackwell: 1988): 4

Mann, the predominant definitions, originating from Weber's classic definition, contain a mixture of both approaches.<sup>21</sup> Mann defined the state as,

*A differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a centre to cover a territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence.*<sup>22</sup>

This definition will be used throughout the thesis. The following discussion breaks the definition into its key elements and develops those relevant to this study.

The state as an organisation, or set of institutions, is *differentiated* to the extent that it performs all and only political activities. It recognises individuals under its rule have interests that are non-political and pursued autonomously from the state.<sup>23</sup> The extent to which any activity is non-political can always be questioned but for the purpose of this discussion the state can be seen as secular and independent of civil society. The state is therefore impersonal.<sup>24</sup>

The state is distinguished from other organisations and institutions by virtue of its territorial centrality. Only states have a centralised authority over a demarcated territory. Other organisations may be centralised but will extend beyond territories, for example multi-national corporations. States are centralised because all political activities must originate from or refer to the state. This raises two aspects of the state. The state has sole control of political activities within its territory and it exists within a system of similarly conceived states.<sup>25</sup> The territorial borders of the state are unified and defensible against other states, thus introducing the notion that the state is the sovereign power within its territory.<sup>26</sup> In order to secure its territory from both internal and external threats the state must centralise its decision making thus

---

<sup>21</sup> Ibid: 4

<sup>22</sup> Ibid: 4 (original emphasis)

<sup>23</sup> Poggi, G., *The State – Its Nature, Development and Prospects* (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1990): 21

<sup>24</sup> Held, D., "The Development of the Modern State" in Hall, S., and Gieben, B., (eds) *Formations of Modernity* (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1992): 88

<sup>25</sup> Poggi, G., *The Development of the State: A Sociological Introduction* (London, Hutchinson and Co.: 1978): 87 & 92; Mann, *States, War and Capitalism*: 3

<sup>26</sup> Poggi, *The Development of the State*: 93

ensuring “flexibility and speed of response” to those threats.<sup>27</sup> The state as sovereign power means the state is the highest level of power.<sup>28</sup> In other words nothing exists above the level of the state.

States hold a monopoly of authoritative binding rule making. In other words, only the state has the authority to make laws within its territory which the citizens of that territory must then follow. The state is the sole source of political power. This raises an important question, the legitimacy of the state to make laws. Ultimately, states can use coercion to enforce laws if and when order breaks down. In Weber’s classic definition, states claim monopoly control of the legitimate use of physical force within their territory.<sup>29</sup> The ideal scenario for a state is for citizens to obey laws, not because of coercion and the threat of violence but because compliance is considered right. The state gains legitimacy by representing the interests and needs of its citizens rather than the interests of a king or the nobility or a property owning class.<sup>30</sup> Power becomes depersonalised through the development of a system of public law creating regulations that guide the functions of the state and the behaviour of its citizens.<sup>31</sup> Laws are made by a central decision making body which is supreme, i.e., it is the only decision making body in its territory capable of making laws, and bureaucracies implement the decisions made. When the state fails to represent the interests and needs of its citizens its claims to legitimately rule the territory are lost. These issues will be examined in some more detail when the relations between nations, states and empires are analysed.

### *Empire*

Definitions of empire have also been the subject of debate among social scientists and historians. To a large extent this has been due to academics approaching the subject in different ways. On the one hand empire has been studied through the lens

---

<sup>27</sup> Mann, *States, War and Capitalism*: 18

<sup>28</sup> Poggi, *The State...*: 24

<sup>29</sup> Weber, M., “Politics as a Vocation” in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* Gerth, H.H., and Wright Mills, C. (eds), (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd: 1948): 78

<sup>30</sup> Held, “The Development of the Modern State”: 88

<sup>31</sup> Ibid: 114; Poggi, *The Development of the State*: 101-102

of international relations, whilst others have looked at the internal workings of empires.<sup>32</sup> The basis of both, however, is the domination, subjection and exploitation of one territory by another.

Dominic Lieven defined empire from a broad functional viewpoint. An empire must be “a great power” that plays “a major role in shaping not just the international relations but also the values and culture of an historical epoch.”<sup>33</sup> In addition, empire implies “possession of widespread territories” and all the problems of control this brings.<sup>34</sup> Finally, empires are generally authoritarian polities enjoying direct administrative control over their territories.<sup>35</sup>

For the most part Lieven’s definition is unexceptionable. Empires are usually authoritarian and have administrative control over large territories which they exploit economically. Generally the British Empire, the focus for this study, followed this model, despite the rhetoric of the Empire claiming its aim was to spread the art of free self-government.<sup>36</sup> Yet Lieven acknowledges that the varied methods of ruling empires make it difficult to give such a general definition. One way to avoid this problem is to look at the relations between empires and colonies, the imperial relationship.

The imperial relationship between metropolis and colony is widely seen as being a power relationship.<sup>37</sup> The sovereignty of the subject peoples, their ability to make and implement decisions on their own behalf, is taken away by the imperial power. Michael Doyle summarises the relationship thus,

---

<sup>32</sup> Doyle, M, *Empires* (New York, Cornell University Press: 1986) is an example of the former, while Eisenstadt, S.N., *The Political Systems of Empires* (London, Collier-Macmillan Ltd: 1963) is a good example of the latter. For further discussion of this distinction see Lieven, D., *Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals from the sixteenth century to the present*. (London, Pimlico: 2003): 25

<sup>33</sup> Lieven, D., “The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as Imperial Polities” in *Journal of Contemporary History* Vol.30 No.4 (Oct 1995) pp607-636: 608

<sup>34</sup> Ibid: 608

<sup>35</sup> Ibid: 609

<sup>36</sup> Hobson, J.A., *Imperialism: A Study* (London: 1905): 114

<sup>37</sup> See for Example, Doyle, *Empires*:19; Reynolds, C., *Modes of Imperialism* (Oxford, Martin Robertson and Co. Ltd: 1981): 1; Lichtheim, G., *Imperialism* (London, Penguin Press: 1971): 9; Lieven, *Empire*: 20; and Porter, B., *The Lions Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-1995 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition* (Harlow, Pearson Education: 1996): 1-27

In sum, the scope of imperial control involves both the process of control and its outcomes. Control is achieved either formally (directly or indirectly) or informally, through influence over the periphery's environment, political articulation, aggregation, decision making, adjudication, and implementation and usually with the collaboration of local peripheral elites. The scope of the outcomes covers both internal and external issues- who rules and what rules.<sup>38</sup>

The essence of the imperial relationship is the exercise of authority or power by one state over another. In losing its sovereignty to another state, the subjugated territory loses its statehood and becomes a colony, at least in the formal colonial relationship. A sovereign state has the ability to protect its territory from conquest and can impose its decisions on the population within its scope.<sup>39</sup> In contrast, a colony is unable to impose decisions or protect its territory and therefore by definition is not sovereign and not a state.

The ability of a state to make its own decisions without the interference or influence of other states would rule out the possibility of an imperial relationship. But as Doyle and others have pointed out, within the context of the state system, the existence of informal relationships of control can be just as important in defining an imperial relationship.<sup>40</sup> Lieven argued the power and influence of the British navy, combined with British financial and economic power, was such that there was no need for formal empire in South America.<sup>41</sup> Indeed this was the case for much of the mid-nineteenth century British Empire. It was only when other states threatened British interests that formal colonisation resulted, for example during the Scramble for Africa in the late 1880s and 1890s.

The imperial relationship can be formal, in the case of a conquered state whose actions are controlled by the imperial power, or informal, in the case of hegemonic relationship between two states, i.e., where the subordinate state is forced by structural constraints created by the imperial power into certain decisions or actions.

---

<sup>38</sup> Doyle, *Empires*: 40

<sup>39</sup> Lichtheim, *Imperialism*: 8

<sup>40</sup> Reynolds, *Modes of Imperialism*: 1

<sup>41</sup> Lieven, *Empire*: 90

It is important to understand, however, that within both of these formal and informal categories, there will be varying degrees of control. For example, both Canada and India were formally controlled by Westminster, but Canada had complete autonomy in domestic affairs, unlike India. The nuances of this relationship will be developed in the substantive chapters to follow.

For the purposes of this study, empire will be defined as a relation of dominance by one state over another, the dominance being used for the benefit of the metropolis, whether economically, strategically, or politically.

### *Relations of nations, states and empires*

The final task of this section is to analyse the ways in which nations, states and empires interact with each other. The key argument of this section is that within the context of empire, the relations of the three are inextricably linked.

The term nation-state is often used by historians and social-scientists, when in fact few nation-states have ever existed.<sup>42</sup> By nation-state we mean a state whose territorial boundaries match those of a nation and whose citizens are also members of that nation. A nation can provide a state with legitimacy; therefore, a nation-state can be seen as an ideal-type. Indeed, the aim of *some* nationalist movements is to obtain statehood for their nation.<sup>43</sup> Montserrat Guibernau uses the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate states to convey the difference between nation-states and states with more than one nation or states containing only part of a nation.<sup>44</sup> The important point to note here is that whatever term is used nations and states do not always cover the same territory. In some cases, a state will contain more than one nation and in others a nation will claim the territory of more than one state. This clearly introduces issues of legitimacy and representation. The competency of a state

---

<sup>42</sup> Anthony Smith claimed that only 9% of the 132 independent states in 1971 were ethnically homogenous, i.e., nations. See Smith, A.D., *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1981): 9

<sup>43</sup> The *Parti Quebecois* in Quebec, Canada and the Scottish National Party are the best examples.

<sup>44</sup> Guibernau, M., *Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1996): 59-62

controlled, or at least dominated, by one nation to represent the interests of another nation will be called into question if representation is inadequate. If the state apparatus is controlled by members of one nation in a multi-national state and the state does not take into account the needs and interests of the other nations the legitimacy of the system will break down.<sup>45</sup> Solutions to the problem of legitimacy revolve around controlling aspects of state power affecting the nation. The focus will be the nation. We will return to this issue later in the chapter.

In the introduction to this thesis, we noted the often troubled relationship between nations and empires. Post-colonial nationalism of the kind found in Latin America, Asia and Africa demonstrates the multi-ethnic nature of many empires, as noted by Lieven.<sup>46</sup> The subjection and exploitation of national territories by empires has often led to national rebellions in which nations have gained statehood. Often these nations have been created by the common experience of living under a particular colonial administration, such as in Latin America.<sup>47</sup> The imperial management of these multi-ethnic territories was vitally important if the empire was to survive, particularly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Various methods of accommodation and repression were adopted to ensure the territories remained under imperial control. In India, for example, British administrators collaborated with Indian elites to maintain order over this vast territory. Without these collaborators, British rule in India would have been impossible.<sup>48</sup> By contrast, Canada was given almost complete autonomy in domestic affairs following Confederation in 1867.

Nations, however, are not always a threat to empire. In many instances the pursuit of empire can legitimise the state in the eyes of the nation. By pursuing imperial ambitions the state can bring prestige to the nation on the world stage or allow the nation to spread its values to new territories and peoples, thus legitimating the state's imperialist policies. An important element of any national discourse will not only be

---

<sup>45</sup> This was the premise for much of Scottish nationalism in the period under study, but also from the mid 1980s to the late 1990s. See for example, Mitchell, J., *Strategies for Self Government: The Campaigns for a Scottish Parliament* (London, Polygon: 1996)

<sup>46</sup> Lieven, "The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as Imperial Polities": 608

<sup>47</sup> Anderson, *Imagined Communities*: 52

<sup>48</sup> Ferguson, N., *Empire: How Britain made the Modern World* (London, Penguin: 2003): 189

its history but its future. The future glory of the nation in nationalist discourse can often turn into claims for imperial conquest. This is particularly important for smaller, weaker nations that may see maintenance of links to an empire as their route to greater power and prestige on the world stage. As we shall see throughout this thesis in both Scotland and British Canada, maintenance of the imperial connection and the pursuit of the imperial mission were important in legitimising Westminster rule. The mission of Britons across the world to spread liberty and freedom was undoubtedly a factor in the expansion of the British Empire. One of the driving factors behind Hitler's invasion of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland was the reunification of German speakers across Europe. In this case the pursuit of Empire was driven by the mission to reunite the Greater German nation.

The relationship between empire and state was noted above when discussing the nature of the imperial relationship. States pursue imperialist ambitions and use the forces at their disposal to conquer territory belonging to other states, thus creating empires. In international relations, as in nature, every action has an opposite reaction. The creation of empire creates antagonism in rival states which challenge the right to empire or pursue their own imperial ambitions. State and national discourse become an imperial discourse where the supremacy of one nation on the world stage takes centre stage. The disputes between the great European powers in the late nineteenth century over various imperial possessions neatly illustrate this point. The ability of other states to prevent the extension of empire is the only constraint on imperialism. In creating forces sufficient to conquer large expanses of territory, the state provokes other states into maintaining sufficient forces for the defence of their own interests. Security becomes a relative matter. The more powerful another state is perceived to be, the greater the need to increase capacity for defence. The result is a competition between states in the form of arms' races, alliances for defence or security and the orientation of the state towards foreign affairs. States need to control the environments in which they operate. This pursuit of power leads to states having rival spheres of influence as they attempt to control other states, hegemonically or directly, in the pursuit of their own security. The pursuit of empire, according to

Reynolds, stems from the need for security by the state.<sup>49</sup>

## **Nationalism**

Central to the discussion of the relationship between nations, states and empires is the concept of nationalism. This section of the chapter will examine the nature of nationalism. Definitions of nationalism will be presented. The relationship between nationalism and modernity will form an important part of that discussion. A chronology of the formation of nationalist movements will be offered. The final part of the section will look at the relationship between nationalism and empire/imperialism and in particular whether nationalism must always seek statehood. The argument of this section will be that nationalism primarily concerns the legitimacy of government expressed in terms of identity and culture. The relationship between nationalism and imperialism is contingent on the form of colonisation, whether formal or informal, settler or non-settler colonies.

The classic definition of nationalism comes from Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*. Gellner argues that "Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent."<sup>50</sup> Whilst on the face of it this could imply national independence (a nation with a state of its own) not all political units are states. The political unit could be an independent state, a federal province, or even an administrative region. The important point is that the members of the nation accept it as a legitimate form of government for that nation. Nationalism, in this sense, is a matter of political legitimacy. Brendan O'Leary has argued that Gellner's theory of nationalism puts political legitimacy at the heart of the phenomenon. Nationalism, he argued, claimed "the governors must be conational with and representative of the governed."<sup>51</sup> This could, of course, still be interpreted

---

<sup>49</sup> Reynolds, *Modes of Imperialism*: 19-24; cf Weber, M., "Structures of Power" in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* H.H., and Wright Mills, C. (eds), (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd: 1948): 160

<sup>50</sup> Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*: 1

<sup>51</sup> O'Leary, B., "Ernest Gellner's diagnoses of nationalism: a critical overview, or, what is living and what is dead in Ernest Gellner's philosophy of nationalism?" in Hall, J.A., (ed) *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1998): 55

as meaning national independence but by introducing the concept of political legitimacy, Gellner's definition can still be applied to situations where independence is not sought by a nationalist movement.

A state gains legitimacy by representing the interests of all citizens within its territory. In multi-national states representing the interests of each nation is essential if the state is to maintain that legitimacy. O'Leary argued this meant the governors must be representative of the governed. In Britain, we should find Scotland, England, Ireland and Wales must each have representation within the government. The small nations achieved this through Secretaries of State who represented the interests of each nation in Cabinet and separate administrative units, such as the Scottish and Welsh Offices, to implement policy. In addition they each had a number of representatives in Parliament. When these representations failed to produce legitimate results, for example when policy did not match the cultural values of the nation, nationalism was the result. This happened in the 1980s when the individualist policies of Margaret Thatcher were seen as being alien to the social democracy of Scottish identity. Broad nationalist support for a Scottish Parliament grew in this period. The important point is that nationalism was a political reaction to perceived illegitimate government.

Guibernau has argued that states that have more than one nation within their borders have the potential to become illegitimate. She contends the state does not equally favour all the nations within its territory. Attempts by the state to homogenise the population will, therefore, inevitably lead to conflict between nation and state.<sup>52</sup> The state thus becomes illegitimate because it fails to effectively represent the interests of all the nations within its territory. The nature of the conflict, however, is the important point. Nationalism is no doubt a political reaction to the state's failure to recognise its interests and identity. But nations can claim recognition of their identity through means other than chasing statehood. Political gains made by nationalists in Spain, Belgium, Canada and the United Kingdom provide ample evidence.<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> Guibernau, *Nationalisms*: 60

<sup>53</sup> See for example, Kennedy, J., "A Switzerland of the North? The *Nationalistes* and a Bi-national Canada" in *Nations and Nationalism Vol 10 No. 4*: 499-518

The discourse of nationalist elites, although not claiming statehood for the nation, can still be nationalism. The expression of national identity, the use of the “other” and boundaries and linking historical symbols with the current crisis all lay the basis for nationalist agitation. When reform of the state becomes the focus for a campaign and the symbols of the nation are used in that campaign to find resolution of a national problem, that campaign takes the form of nationalism. Reform of the state in favour of the nation defines nationalism, not only claims for national independence.

A related aspect of this discussion is the right to self-determination, a key point of nationalist rhetoric. When the legitimacy of government breaks down, nationalists will assert the nation’s right to self-determination, the right to decide the legitimate form of government for the nation. The rhetoric of self-determination is clearly rooted in democratic ideals. The idea that governments, and therefore states, express the will of those who elect them, lays the foundation for different nations to claim the right of their people to elect a government that will express the will of the nation. The right of national self determination is a key element of nationalist discourse. It asks only for the right of the nation to determine its future without undue interference from other nations. It brings us back to the issue of the governed and governors being conational. It not only enables nationalists to claim the existing form of government is illegitimate, is not expressing the will of their nation, but also to propose an alternative form of government which is legitimate, i.e., will express the will of the nation.

The process of deciding the legitimate form of government for the nation must be political. Elites will compete to mobilise the nation behind each differing conception of how to represent the nation’s interests. In other words they will compete for power, which in the modern world is about control of the state, or at least aspects of the state that affect the nation.<sup>54</sup> Nationalists will articulate a discourse proposing reform of the government of the nation and compete against the dominant state discourse for support among the members of the nation. It is through competition for

---

<sup>54</sup> Breuilley, *Nationalism and the State*: 1

power that the nationalist discourse is articulated. Dominant state discourses that have been internalised to such an extent that they are just “common sense” are challenged by a nationalist discourse that seeks to alter that “common sense.”<sup>55</sup> For example the dominant British state discourse in the late nineteenth century had been internalised through Parliament, the Union Flag, the Empire and the Monarchy to such an extent that it was taken for granted. The discourse of the Scottish Home Rule Association challenged this dominant discourse by seeking to alter the power relationship within the United Kingdom state through the creation of a Scottish Parliament.

This competition between discourses is necessarily carried on in the political arena. Thus nationalism is essentially about politics. But the politics of nationalism can only make sense when examined in its specific political context. Nationalism, in the words of John Breuilly, is “a parasitic movement shaped by what it opposes.”<sup>56</sup> This antagonistic element of discourse theory mentioned in the previous chapter is a good place to begin the analysis of nationalist movements and their discourses. To understand how nationalist movements are formed we must examine the context within which they arise.

Many theorists have argued that nationalist movements form as a result of the transition to modernity.<sup>57</sup> Industrialisation breaks down existing social structures of society. The importance of culture, as a form of communication through symbols and practices, becomes more important. Without culture, communication and therefore the role of the individual in society would be impossible. Anthony Cohen has argued that culture only exists in reality at the local level,<sup>58</sup> what Gellner describes as “low-

---

<sup>55</sup> Sutherland, C., “Nation-Building through discourse theory” in *Nations and Nationalism* 11 (2), 2005, 185-202:193

<sup>56</sup> Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*: 396

<sup>57</sup> The classic examples are from Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* and Anderson, *Imagined Communities* but see also Deutsch, K., *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the foundations of Nationality* (London, Chapman and Hall Ltd: 1953) and Taylor, C., “Nationalism and Modernity” in Hall, J.A., (ed) *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the theory of nationalism*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1998)

<sup>58</sup> Cohen, A., “Belonging: The Experience of Culture” in Cohen, A., (ed) *Belonging: Identity and Social Organisation in British Rural Cultures* (Manchester, Manchester University Press: 1982): 9-10

cultures”.<sup>59</sup> Industrial society, however, needs context free communication for its operation. Literacy is a prime requirement for citizenship. States, therefore, cultivate a “high-culture” through state-sponsored education systems. The education system may also use existing high-cultures. According to Gellner, the internalization of this high culture through the nationalism of the state creates the nation.<sup>60</sup>

Other modernists have outlined similar processes whilst emphasising different aspects of the industrialisation process. Anderson, for example, highlights the importance of print capitalism in creating standardised languages, crucial for a “high culture”, that allow the newspaper an important role in imagining the nation.<sup>61</sup> Karl Deutsch claimed in the 1950s that the increased communication between classes and regional centres facilitated by the processes of modernisation led to the formation of nations.<sup>62</sup>

Despite the claim to historical longevity of the nation by nationalists, we have argued that nations are unique to the modern era. Historically speaking nationalism, as a political expression of nationhood and governance, must also be a relatively new phenomenon. There is no doubt that nationalism as a principle of political legitimacy is an outcome of modernity. There was no need for political legitimacy in the pre-modern age when monarchy claimed to rule by divine right. Political legitimacy was seen in the eyes of rulers and ruled to be derived from God, not the people. Nations did not express themselves politically because the concept of rule by the people had not been fully established. It is only in the period since the American Declaration of Independence and the French Revolution that the principle of national self-determination and the link between state and nation could really take shape. In the transition to democratic rule, states began to rule in the name of the nation. Where more than one nation existed within its territory one nation would become dominant. At this stage the legitimacy of rule becomes an issue. The rise of print capitalism, the creation of state education systems, the decline of absolutism and the increased

---

<sup>59</sup> Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*: 50

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*: 48

<sup>61</sup> Anderson, *Imagined Communities*: 37 & 46

<sup>62</sup> Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*: 75

facility for quick communication that resulted from modernity were important in state attempts to homogenise its population. In many cases the state was successful. Where there was a sufficiently strong sense of national identity among members of a minority nation, however, attempts at homogenisation led to nationalist campaigns. Modernity was thus an important condition for the rise of nationalism.

Whilst modernity was the context against which nationalism arose, we must search for its causes in the political arena. In politics the actions of the state have particular importance. Decisions to accommodate, assimilate or ignore nations within the boundaries of a multi-national state will largely determine whether nationalism will appear. Michael Mann has argued nations, and therefore nationalism, "originated as movements for democracy" and the "failure to institutionalise democracy generated exclusionist nationalism."<sup>63</sup> Institutionalising democracy, however, can mean a variety of things. It is widely accepted, for example, that democracy generally means representative democracy.<sup>64</sup> If the sub-state nation's interests, or at least the interests of sub-state elites in that nation, are represented effectively at the state level then system will be seen as legitimate. Failure to institutionalise representation will generate nationalism. Elected representatives may be sufficient if their voice can be heard within the multi-national state. But despite the extension of the franchise in Scotland in 1867 and 1884, and an increase in the number of Scottish MPs in 1885, a nationalist movement still appeared. Even the nationalist agitation leading to the creation of a Secretary for Scotland (an institutional representative) in 1885 was insufficient. When, therefore, the sub-state nation's interests are no longer considered to be represented *effectively* we would expect a nationalist movement to be formed.

Democratization, however, has other effects. The move towards democracy and mass representation resulted in a "direct access society," where everyone became an equal and autonomous citizen of the state.<sup>65</sup> In claiming autonomy and equality for each individual, the democratic ideal maintains that decisions be made by the whole and not just the most influential part. To quote Charles Taylor,

---

<sup>63</sup> Mann, M., "A Political Theory of Nationalism and its Excesses": 53 & 62

<sup>64</sup> Judge, D., *Representation: Theory and Practice in Britain* (London, Routledge: 1999): 7

<sup>65</sup> Taylor, C., "Nationalism and Modernity": 196 & 203-4

... if it appears that in some systematic way, there are obstacles to certain sections of the population being heard, then the legitimacy of democratic rule in that society is under challenge.<sup>66</sup>

In making equal citizens of everyone in its territory the state must recognise everyone's voice. At the heart of this idea lies the concept of dignity. Taylor, in his *Politics of Recognition*, claimed there should be no distinction between first and second class citizens in a modern democracy. Each person within the state must be given equal recognition.<sup>67</sup> Failure to do so will be seen to threaten the worth of an individual's identity and therefore their dignity. Lack of adequate representation of an individual's interests is failure to recognise their identity. By not recognising their identity the state excludes that individual from the state and therefore removes the legitimacy of the system in their eyes.

In modern societies, however, recognition of every single person by the state is impossible, hence the need for groups representing the interests of a number of individuals, such as political parties or pressure groups. The principles applying to individuals are equally applicable to political parties and pressure groups. Within a multi-national democratic state such as the United Kingdom each national identity must be given equal recognition in order to prevent the potential break-up of the state. None should be treated as a second class identity. Direct recognition is sought from the state, which acts as a significant other. Non-recognition or mis-recognition of one national identity "can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted and reduced mode of being."<sup>68</sup> By not recognising the nation's identity the state effectively claims the nation does not exist, thus threatening the self-worth and dignity of the nation. The legitimacy of the system comes into question. The non-existence of the nation becomes a driver for nationalist elites to re-create and articulate a national identity that becomes the focus of the sought-after dignity. This identity claims superiority over the "other," in this case those

---

<sup>66</sup> Ibid: 204

<sup>67</sup> Taylor, C., "The Politics of Recognition" in Gutman, A., (ed) *Multiculturalism* (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1992)": 27

<sup>68</sup> Ibid: 25

influential in the state or recognized by the state. Nationalism, with its roots in the extension of democracy, thus becomes a form of identity politics.

Thus far we have argued that nationalism is a political principle claiming the political unit and national unit should be congruent. As a matter of politics, nationalism has its roots in the extension of democracy. Nationalism has also been seen as a product of modernity. The role of the state in creating the conditions necessary for nationalism, the creation of standard languages, increased literacy and so on has been noted. Actions of the state in recognising national identities are also important. Nationalism, as a political principle, would have been a massive failure without widespread support from members of the nation. The next section will analyse the process through which nationalists attempt to gain support for their political project.

### *Nationalist Elites*

Miroslav Hroch has identified three phases in the formation of nationalist movements: Phase A, the period of scholarly interest; Phase B, the period of patriotic agitation; and Phase C, the rise of a mass national movement.<sup>69</sup> For the purpose of this study the third phase is irrelevant. The rise of a mass nationalist movement never happened in Canada and did not happen in Scotland until well into the twentieth century. What is of interest here is the first two phases and how, in some ways they interacted, particularly in Canada. The ways in which nationalists linked empire and nation is best discovered through analysis of the nationalist discourse created by the groups identified as scholarly groups and political agitators. Hroch's outline, for this reason, will be explored a little more.

For Hroch, the period of scholarly interest defined the beginning of any national revival. Driven by a desire, born of the Enlightenment, to acquire knowledge of every new phenomenon, and by affection for their region, a group of individuals, usually intellectuals, would pursue a passionate "study of the language, the culture,

---

<sup>69</sup> Hroch, M., *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (New York, Columbia University Press: 2000): 23

[and] the history of the oppressed nationality.”<sup>70</sup> At no stage did these individuals develop any kind of organisation and rarely (and without success) did they pursue any kind of agitation. The first phase of the Canada First movement is characterised by this type of scholarly interest.

When considering national or imperial identity, a key role is accorded to nationalist elites in “inventing traditions” and creating the symbols of the group identity. One of the first stages will be an interest in the history of the nation. This period of scholarly interest, or cultural nationalism, as John Hutchinson describes it, pays close attention to the nation’s history using heroes and myths to create the symbols and invented traditions of the nation.<sup>71</sup> The main aim of cultural nationalists is the attempt to find the golden age of the nation and establish its distinctiveness and honour.<sup>72</sup> Once this has been achieved, the myths, traditions and symbols of that nation can then be communicated to the members of the nation through print, education or, in the modern era, radio and television and the internet. This takes us to Phase B in Hroch’s typology.

Phase B, the period of patriotic agitation, or as Hroch described it “the fermentation-process of national consciousness,” is the crucial phase in the development of any national movement and will determine the success or failure of the mass movement. Its success lay in the ability of the group to integrate objective political, economic and other factors into a coherent identity or ideology.

The driving force in this era of national agitation was a group of patriots, already dissatisfied with the limitation of interest to the antiquities of the land, the language and the culture, and saw their mission as the spreading of national consciousness among the people.<sup>73</sup>

The form a nationalist agitation takes will vary depending on the context and strategies available to nationalist elites. According to James Mitchell, the strategy a

---

<sup>70</sup> Ibid: 22-23

<sup>71</sup> Hutchinson, J., *Modern Nationalism* (London, Fontana: 1994): 41

<sup>72</sup> Ibid: 45

<sup>73</sup> Ibid: 23

nationalist group adopts will depend on the type of group that is formed.<sup>74</sup> This can be a circular argument in some ways as the type of group formed depends on the strategy nationalist elites decide has the best chance of success. Access to government circles, financial resources and the nature of the political system are all structural factors affecting the type of movement formed. As Breuille claimed, the movement will be shaped by what it opposes, i.e., the particular form of the state.<sup>75</sup>

The nationalist agitation phase will form the basis of analysis in the substantive chapters to follow. Although nationalists in Scotland and Canada failed in their ultimate aims, the important aspect of their discourse for the purposes of this study was the integration of both national and imperial identities.

### ***Nationalism and Imperialism***

At the basic level imperialism is about the pursuit, maintenance and defence of empire. Imperialism has many faces, economic, moral, religious, and more. The common link between all of them, however, must be the political subjugation of territory and states “independent of their will or consent.”<sup>76</sup> Within those states and territories, nations may exist or, from the administration divisions of empire, nations may be created, as in Latin America. The relationship between nationalism and imperialism will often be contingent on the form of imperial relationship. This section will examine the relationship between nationalism and imperialism offering an alternative view from that prevalent among typologies of nationalism that emphasise anti-colonial nationalism as the typical outcome of imperialism.

The prevailing academic view claims nationalism to be an inevitable outcome of an imperial relationship. Empires impose their political will on colonised territories and nations. Alien cultural values confront the elite of the subjugated nation who adopt some of these alien values, nationalism being one, assert their right to national-self

---

<sup>74</sup> Mitchell, J., *Strategies for Self-Government*: 67

<sup>75</sup> Breuille, *Nationalism and the State*: 396

<sup>76</sup> Reynolds, *Modes of Imperialism*: 1

determination and rebel against the domination of the imperial power.<sup>77</sup> The result of these anti-colonial/nationalist movements was the independence of the colony from the empire, the creation of a state for the nation. Although in many cases colonial boundaries became the state boundaries, often there would be a number of different ethnic groups and nations within these boundaries. The common domination by the imperial power was sufficient to unite these groups in the pursuit of independence.<sup>78</sup> There is no doubt this was the case in a great deal of imperial relationships, particularly in Asia and Africa in the twentieth century. But to focus purely on these areas leads to an overemphasis of the desire for independence from the empire. At the heart of this is the extent to which nationalism inevitably leads to statehood.

Imperialism, as the political subjugation of peoples independent of their will and consent, does not always lead to the same type of imperial relationship. In some cases the relationship will be formal as in the control of India by the British, in others it will be informal as in the economic exploitation of Argentina. We can also distinguish between settler colonies where subjects/citizens of the imperial power occupy the conquered territory and non-settler colonies where the territory is occupied by another nation. The difference between the two types of colony will obviously affect the nature of the imperial relationship. Settler colonies will tend to share the values and culture of the imperial power and are therefore more likely to accept imperial control. The Declaration of Independence by the thirteen American colonies in 1776 is the exception that proves the rule. In non-settler societies, the success of the imperial venture may rely on the co-option of indigenous elites into the imperial project. Failure to achieve this, or the subsequent breakdown of collaboration may lead to anti-colonial nationalism.

Different types of imperial relationship will clearly have an effect on the nature of nationalism found within any given empire. In non-settler societies it is likely anti-colonial nationalist movements will be formed unless indigenous elites can be co-

---

<sup>77</sup> Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*: 156-8; Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*: 74 & 76

<sup>78</sup> Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*: 77-8

opted into the imperial project.<sup>79</sup> In settler societies the imperial ideal may be transported to the “new world.” The acceptance of imperial control as legitimate may hinder the formation of nationalist movements. Nationalism, however, may still materialise if imperial control is no longer seen as legitimate. The independence movements in Latin America are a good example of settler nationalism seeking statehood.<sup>80</sup> Within the British Empire each of these different types of nationalism has existed. On the one hand the independence movements of the non-settler Indian sub-continent claimed statehood. Nationalism could also be found in settler colonies, such as Rhodesia.<sup>81</sup>

Yet in between these two extremes we find settler nationalist movements seeking greater autonomy whilst also maintaining imperial ideals. The term “Imperial Nationalism” will be adopted to categorise the type of nationalism expressed by these groups. Krishnan Kumar has used the terms “imperial nationalism” or “missionary nationalism” to describe English nationalism.<sup>82</sup> His use of the term relates to the extent that the national mission and imperial mission were one and the same thing. This thesis will use the term in a slightly different manner. Imperial nationalism for the purpose of this thesis describes a political movement seeking greater voice for the nation within an empire and claiming this will benefit both the nation and the empire.

Imperial nationalist groups are the movements to be studied in this thesis. It could be argued these movements are not nationalist but are merely arguing for reform of the imperial system whilst maintaining the identity of the imperial power. But this relies too much on a definition of nationalism in which statehood is the goal of nationalists. Nowhere in our definition of nationalism taken from Gellner is statehood mentioned. Rather nationalism claims the *political unit* must be congruent with the national unit. In many cases the political unit will be the state. But the state can devolve political

---

<sup>79</sup> See Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* on issue of indigenous collaboration: 158-161

<sup>80</sup> The Mestizo (mixed Spanish/Portuguese/Native Americans) population has been identified as the source of the independence movement as opposed to pure settler Europeans. See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*

<sup>81</sup> Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*: 76

<sup>82</sup> Kumar, K., “Nation and empire: English and British national identity in comparative perspective” in *Theory and Society* Vol 29 (2000) 575-608

functions and can use this as a method of maintaining legitimacy in multi-national states. Federalism in Canada was used to appease French Canadian fears that their identity would be threatened by the predominant Anglophone culture. For much of the twentieth century Scotland accepted administrative devolution as a legitimate form of government within the United Kingdom, allowing distinctively Scottish implementation of government policy. By contrast, it could be argued the failure to grant home rule to Ireland led to the creation of the Irish Free State in the 1920s. The important point, as has been mentioned previously, is that the political unit is seen by the nation as a legitimate form of government.

Imperialism and nationalism can also interact in other ways. Empire can be pursued for a number of reasons, often combined together. Religious mission, military strength and economic gain often go hand in hand in the imperialist ideal. In the late nineteenth century in particular, the pursuit of empire was seen as essential to the strength of the nation as well as the state. Empires, as well as being economically necessary, were seen as having a mission to bring glory to the nation and spread the values of the nation around the world. In Britain, politicians used the Empire to unite the British people in a common cause and to boost the confidence of the nation in the face of external competition.<sup>83</sup> Stories of daring and adventure in Africa, Asia and North America inspired those lower down the social scale. Soldiers and expansionists such as General Gordon and Cecil Rhodes became national heroes.<sup>84</sup> These attempts brought legitimacy to the state through what Weber described as the “prestige of power.”<sup>85</sup> According to Weber, the prestige of power “means in practice the glory of power over other communities; it means the expansion of power, though not always by way of incorporation or subjection.”<sup>86</sup>

Obviously this is not nationalism as a political principle claiming the political unit and national unit should be congruent. Rather this is nationalism with a small N

---

<sup>83</sup> Judd, D., *Empire: The British Imperial Experience from 1756 to the Present* (London, Fontana Press: 1995): 4-5

<sup>84</sup> Ibid: 9; Pearce, M., & Stewart, G., *British Political History 1875-1995: Democracy and Decline* (London, Routledge: 1996): 160; for a contemporary view see Marquis of Lorne, *Imperial Federation* (London, 1885): 101

<sup>85</sup> Weber, M., “Structures of Power”: 160

<sup>86</sup> Ibid: 160

where the nation claims superiority over other nations. This could be an important factor in the substantive analysis to follow. If the state successfully instils the idea that empire is important for the confidence of the nation it is likely any nationalist agitation will adopt the language of this imperial discourse. The new discourse will incorporate elements of imperial discourse and merge them with a nationalist discourse. The outcome of this integration would be the articulation of an imperial nationalist identity.

## ***Identity***

Central to the material presented in this thesis is the concept of identity. This section will examine the nature of identity, both individual and collective, and the role played by elites in the formation of identity. An analysis of the relationship between dual or multiple identities will also be carried out. The key argument of this section will be that identity is both experiential and contextual and that identities other than local ones are socially constructed and exist, to a lesser or greater extent, in our imaginations.

Identity can be seen as the way people categorise themselves and conceive of their role(s) or position(s) in society.<sup>87</sup> Identities can thus only exist in societies. They do not exist in isolation.<sup>88</sup> Identities can be individual or collective. Someone can be a father, uncle, son and brother and also be working class, Catholic and Scottish. In pre-modern feudal societies identity was an uncomplicated and unimportant concept. Lairds, peasants, Nobles, and Royalty all knew their place in society and how to conduct their relationships with others.<sup>89</sup> The transformative processes of modernity have destroyed these unproblematic identities and made identity a much more important concept in society. These changes have been mirrored in the last few decades of the twentieth century with claims that traditional social structures, such as class, have fractured reducing the importance of “meta-identity.”<sup>90</sup> Whilst people can

---

<sup>87</sup> Smith, *National Identity*: 4

<sup>88</sup> Guibernau, *Nationalisms*: 72

<sup>89</sup> Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”: 30-31

<sup>90</sup> Brown, A., McCrone, D., and Paterson, L., *Politics and Society in Scotland* (London, MacMillan: 1998): 204

have different forms of identity, individual or collective, the important point is the way identity is acquired.

J.G Herder, widely seen as the founder of the romantic movement in nineteenth century Germany, argued identity is gained through language.<sup>91</sup> By learning our language we become aware of our selfhood and our nationhood.<sup>92</sup> Herder's essentialist position regarding language is problematic. The idea that language is not inherited but in some way natural, cannot be sustained, particularly when confronted with the evidence not only of invented languages such as Esperanto but also official languages being adopted by different linguistic groups in nations such as China and India. Hobsbawm argued that national languages are "almost always semi-artificial constructs," attempts to devise a standard literary idiom from a multiplicity of spoken idioms.<sup>93</sup>

If, however, we equate language with culture much of Herder's discussion remains pertinent. The same language can be spoken by different nations. There must, therefore, be some other cultural factors to differentiate between the two. We can argue that it is through our culture, rather than language, that we become aware of our selfhood and nationhood. Culture is the medium through which we become "conscious of our inner self and as the key to the understanding of [our] outer relationships. It unites [us] with, but it also differentiates [us] from others."<sup>94</sup> In this sense we can already begin to see that identity is not generated inwardly. Rather we develop identity through a dialogue with others.<sup>95</sup>

We can develop this theme further. Our day to day cultural experience of life ingrains our way of doing certain tasks, whether in work or leisure. These cultural experiences are part of who we are, part of our identity. When these cultural experiences are compared with those of other cultures we become much more aware

---

<sup>91</sup> Barnard, F., *J.G Herder on Social and Political Culture* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1969): 7

<sup>92</sup> Ibid: 7

<sup>93</sup> Hobsbawm, E.J., *Nations and Nationalism since 1870*: 54

<sup>94</sup> Barnard, *J.G. Herder*: 22

<sup>95</sup> Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition.": 32

of our own identities. Our own experiences of life are inherited from our ancestors who have developed the best way of doing a particular task, or acting a certain way in their own particular environment. When faced with other cultures that act differently from our own, we instinctively defend our own experiences because they have been handed down for generations. This heightened awareness of cultural differences increases our own sense of identity.<sup>96</sup> Through daily life and contact with others we experience our identity.

Linked to this is the creation of boundaries. Armstrong has argued that the creation of boundaries is vital in understanding ethnic identities, and therefore national identities.<sup>97</sup> Our own understanding of who we are is dependent, according to this view, on who we are not. The inability to communicate with other groups “initiates the process of ‘differentiation’ which in turn brings recognition of ethnic belonging.”<sup>98</sup> By differentiating those with whom we can communicate from those with whom we cannot, we create a boundary in our minds. This boundary delineates the group.

An important aspect of the above discussion is the handing on of culture from generation to generation. Culture in this way links us to our past. Herder argued that language served the same function. Through language man is “able to enter into communion with the way of thinking and feeling of his progenitors to take part, as it were, in the workings of the ancestral mind.”<sup>99</sup> But we, as human beings, do not act passively in this “communion” with the past. In the same way that identity is not generated by the self, neither is it taken with blind acceptance. As Taylor, put it “my discovering my own identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others.”<sup>100</sup>

This negotiation with others, and the role of the “significant other” in identity, is fundamental to our understanding of who we are. The “significant other” is important

---

<sup>96</sup> Cohen, “Belonging”: 6

<sup>97</sup> Ozkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism*: 172

<sup>98</sup> Ibid: 172

<sup>99</sup> Barnard, *J.G. Herder*: 22

<sup>100</sup> Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”: 33

in creating or maintaining awareness of identity. They can have two different functions, both based around the notion of recognition. Firstly the “significant other” can be someone from whom we desire direct recognition.<sup>101</sup> Mis-recognition or non-recognition of our identity by a significant other can create notions of oppression, self-hatred and inferiority in the self.<sup>102</sup> At the heart of this is the idea that identity is the focus of our own self-worth. If you fail to recognise my identity correctly then in some way my place in society is perceived by me to be worthless. The second role significant others can play is as a contrast or foil to our own identity.<sup>103</sup> By comparing our identity favourably against another identity we increase our sense of place in society and our sense of self-worth.

Thus far we have looked at identity from a general perspective arguing that identity is negotiated through our experience of everyday life and contact with significant others. As identity only exists within a given society we can see that because there are different levels of society, there must be different levels of identity. For example, local societies will generate local identities. International societies will generate national identities. Before we can begin to examine the relationship between different identities we need to examine the nature of different levels of identity, local, regional, national and imperial.

If we understand identity to be gained through experience of everyday life, i.e., identity is experiential, then the logical conclusion would be that the only culturally grounded identity is a local one.<sup>104</sup> Being in day to day contact with others who share our values, practices and experiences creates a complex cultural reality through which we experience identity. Experience of relationships with neighbours and local shops and experience of the local landscape create a grounded local identity. In other words, there will be no need to create an image of the collective in our minds. By contrast with every increase in the size of a community the relationship becomes less

---

<sup>101</sup> Taylor, “Nationalism and Modernity”: 208

<sup>102</sup> Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”: 25

<sup>103</sup> Taylor, “Nationalism and Modernity”: 208

<sup>104</sup> Cohen, “Belonging”: 10-11

concrete and the collective more “a place of the imagination.”<sup>105</sup> We are unlikely to know all the members of a wider geographical area hence a region, a nation or empire becomes an “imagined community.”<sup>106</sup> Any identity other than a local one then must be seen as an artificial construction. The process of constructing this imagined group then becomes the important part of the discussion.

In general the principles of constructing “a place of the imagination” are similar to formation of local identity. Significant others play a major role. The difference is in the nature of the experience of the wider communities. Rather than day to day contact with those of the local community, we engage in a dialogue with newspapers, novels, teachers, and political institutions. Clearly one can never experience everything that happens in a large territorial unit. We therefore rely on information from this wider range of sources to tell us we belong to a large group sharing a large territory and similar cultural characteristics. These cultural characteristics, however, become simplified as the size of the unit of identity increases. As Cohen argued, “with each ‘ascending’ level I increasingly simplify (and thereby misrepresent) the message about myself.”<sup>107</sup> Identity at “higher” levels is based on a series of symbols which identify people as belonging to a particular group. The symbols create in the mind an impression of the boundaries between different groups.

The concept of “invented traditions” is important in the use of symbols to construct identity. As we discussed above, history and links with our ancestors form an important part of who we are. “Invented traditions” start from this basis. They are, as Hobsbawm put it, “responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations or which establish their own past.”<sup>108</sup> These symbols construct and maintain identity in three ways. First, they establish or symbolise social cohesion, or the membership of real or artificial communities. Second, they establish and legitimise institutions, status or relations of authority. Finally, they socialise and

---

<sup>105</sup> McCrone, D., *Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Stateless Nation 1<sup>st</sup> edition* (London, Routledge: 1992): 17

<sup>106</sup> Anderson, *Imagined Communities*: 6-7

<sup>107</sup> Cohen, “Belonging”: 10

<sup>108</sup> Hobsbawm, E., “Introduction: Inventing Traditions” in Hobsbawm, E., and Ranger, T., (eds) *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1992): 2

inculcate beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour.<sup>109</sup> So for example, tartanry is just one invented tradition that has come to symbolise the cohesion of the artificially constructed community that is Scotland. The key to this concept, one that will be borne in mind throughout this thesis, is that the successful invention of a tradition involved “emotionally and symbolically charged signs of club membership...”<sup>110</sup>, such as flags, anthems, even heroes. For Hobsbawm, the nation itself, as novel and constructed but portrayed as ancient, was an invented tradition. The reduction of the nation and national identity to a series of symbols or invented traditions makes it easier to identify and recognise particular groups. The job of creating these symbols and traditions falls to the scholars and elites we discussed above.

So far we have argued that identity is multi-faceted, experiential, gained through contact with significant others and through dissemination of symbols and invented traditions by elites. National identity on this basis can be defined as a sense of belonging to an imagined community of people occupying a certain territory and identified by a set of symbols and invented traditions which unite the community and differentiate it from other nations.

At a basic level imperial identity is not radically different. It is still imagined as a community and symbolism and invented traditions remain important. The differences arise in the nature of the symbols and traditions, and the pursuit of domination over groups seen as culturally inferior, as we shall see in the empirical chapters. In some ways the link between the two identities can become blurred. The mission of the nation may be to spread the word of their god to the rest of the world or to achieve greatness in relation to another nation. This mission can lead to the pursuit of imperialism and the national identity then becomes imperial. The interaction between national and imperial identities analysed in later chapters will reveal these differences.

---

<sup>109</sup> Ibid: 9

<sup>110</sup> Ibid: 11

## *Multiple Identities*

Identity exists on different levels as we have mentioned above. The interesting point for this discussion is how these different identities interact in one person or group. Anthony Smith has argued that ethnic and more general cultural identities are formed in “concentric” layers, like ripples on a pond into which a stone has been thrown. People may feel loyalty, not just to their family, village, region, or ethnic group, “they may also feel allegiance to different ethnic communities at different levels of identification simultaneously.”<sup>111</sup>

Citing the Ancient Greeks as an example, Smith argued that Dorians and Ionians, to name but two, would feel loyalty to their own ethnic group, as well as to a wider, more general Hellenic culture.<sup>112</sup> This is a good visual model of the nature of multiple identities that gives an indication of the interaction of each layer. Visually we have the impression of one identity made up of many different layers. Each successive layer informs the outer ring which in turn relies on the inner ring for its existence in the same way that the top layer of bricks in a wall cannot exist without the lower bricks. Yet this is not how Smith envisions the working of the model. According to Smith, “at any one time one or other of these concentric circles of allegiance may be to the fore for political, economic or demographic reasons...”<sup>113</sup> In other words, an individual will display a different identity depending on the context.

There is no doubt that as a political actor an individual will select the identity most relevant for the particular task in hand. For example, when voting in the Scottish Parliamentary elections the considerations may be based on a purely Scottish identity. But following Smith’s logic when involved voting in elections for the Westminster Parliament an individual may adopt a purely British identity, as it is the British context in which they are voting. Yet many Scots will vote in British elections in pursuit of Scottish aims. British political parties in Scotland have

---

<sup>111</sup> Smith, *National Identity*: 24

<sup>112</sup> Ibid: 24

<sup>113</sup> Ibid: 24

Scottish identifiers in their names, Scottish Labour Party, the Scottish Conservative and Unionists. Scottish identity informs Britishness.

This is not to say that the idea of identity as contextual is not useful. Clearly we have different identities which we call upon for different reasons and occasions. The critique of Smith's argument is based on his assertion that when we display an identity it exists in isolation. Smith himself argued in his general discussion of identity that "the self is composed of multiple identities and role[s]..."<sup>114</sup> The implication from his use of the term "the self" would be that each individual has one distinct identity, which is then composed of different layers. But in his argument that follows Smith claims only one identity is displayed dependent on context. He effectively implied there is no interaction between the different layers of identity.

To further illustrate this point we can return to the work of the anthropologist, Anthony Cohen. Whilst Cohen argued that local identity is the only identity situated in a cultural reality, he did not rule out the possibility of other identities. Indeed, taking as his starting point the idea that boundaries create cultural awareness, his interpretation of Frederick Barth's work on ethnic boundaries, he argued that cultural boundaries are not natural phenomenon.<sup>115</sup> In a similar manner to Smith, Cohen argued that these unnatural boundaries could be invoked and ignored by those within them for different purposes.<sup>116</sup> We have different identities and these can be used or ignored dependent on the context.

The difference between Cohen and Smith becomes clear with Cohen's emphasis on the locality as the only "real" cultural identity. Higher levels of identity, he argued, are simplified through symbols that aid the imagination of community. Advancing this idea Cohen argued that everyone has a unique identity rooted in the local cultural experience. Far from denying the existence of higher identities, this local cultural experience informed each ascending level of an individual's identity. In other words,

---

<sup>114</sup> Ibid: 4

<sup>115</sup> Cohen, "Belonging": 9; Barth, F., "Introduction" in Barth, F., (ed) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (London, Allen and Unwin: 1969)

<sup>116</sup> Ibid: 10

a “man’s awareness of himself as a Scotsman...has to do with his particular experience as a farmer in Aberdeenshire...local experience mediates national identity.”<sup>117</sup>

In the final chapter of his edited work, *Belonging*, Cohen uses his case study of Whalsay fishermen in Shetland to illustrate his ideas. In a further elaboration of issues of multiple identities, Cohen argued that an individual’s national identity is based on their local identity. When identities are displayed in a specific context, each identity an individual has will inform the other identities, whilst retaining the contextual element of identity. Our experience as an Invernessian or Glaswegian will inform our understanding of Scottishness.

Although people may identify with different elements of their society for different purposes, we do not have to assume that their self-perceptions are wholly inconstant. Rather we should expect to find a strong element of continuity among them such that, for example, an individual brings to his membership of any one collectivity (or to his playing of any one role) his experience as a member (or player) of others.<sup>118</sup>

The Whalsaymen’s collaboration with Scots fishermen studied by Cohen provided an excellent example of this point. Although the Whalsaymen were fiercely proud of their local identity and would normally stress their uniqueness in the face of mainland identity they collaborated with the Scottish National Fleet in order to protect their unique local identity. The islanders felt that without a voice in the National Fleet to protect their uniqueness their local culture would have been eroded.<sup>119</sup> Thus their local experience mediated their national identity

Whilst only being a subtle shift of tone from Smith, the argument of continuity between identities answers the main criticism of Smith’s thesis relating to concentric layers. The imagery of the concentric rings can still be usefully employed, as the idea of each ring successively informing its outer identity is consistent with the approach

---

<sup>117</sup> Ibid: 13

<sup>118</sup> Cohen, A., “Blockade: a case study of local consciousness in an extra local event” in Cohen, A (ed) *Belonging: Identity and Social Organisation in British Rural Cultures* (Manchester, Manchester University Press: 1982): 292

<sup>119</sup> Ibid: 318

taken by Cohen.

Graeme Morton provided further illustration of this idea in his important contribution to the debate on Scottish nationalism in the mid nineteenth century. In his *Unionist Nationalism*, Morton argued that a “dual (if not multiple) identity is part and parcel of being Scottish within the United Kingdom.”

Our realisation is strong: that in the three peripheral nations, and in England also... the idea of ‘Britishness’ is distinct in each, built around a number of competing and intermixed identities. There is, of course, much commonality in the British experience, but it means something unique to each of the four nations.<sup>120</sup>

This is a clear illustration of Cohen’s argument when extended beyond the local arena. The idea of being British was different within each of the four nations because in each the national experience mediated their sense of ‘Britishness’. Thus celebrations of Wallace and Bruce in securing Scotland’s freedom to negotiate Union with England could be made alongside support for Britannia and the Hanoverian monarchy.<sup>121</sup> The Union with England could be celebrated because, thanks to the efforts of Bruce and Wallace, Scotland had voluntarily entered the Union. They were not forced into the partnership through conquest, unlike Ireland. The symbols of the locality were used to celebrate the wider identity.

Hobsbawm argued that identities are not chosen like a pair of shoes where only one pair can be worn at a time.

They had, and still have, several attachments and loyalties simultaneously, including nationality, and are simultaneously concerned with various aspects of life, any of which may at any one time be foremost in their minds, as occasion suggests.<sup>122</sup>

Identities only become prominent in peoples minds when “one of these loyalties

---

<sup>120</sup> Morton, G., *Unionist Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland 1830-1860* (East Linton, Tuckwell Press: 1999): 6-7

<sup>121</sup> Ibid: 193

<sup>122</sup> Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*: 123

conflicted directly with another”<sup>123</sup>, for example between Canada and the Empire. Once again the issue of boundaries in the imagination becomes the important point. This time, however, the boundaries are between different identities held by the individual. Linking ideology with identity, Hobsbawm’s used as examples of these tensions, socialist groups, who should stress the international nature of the working class struggle, but who became national liberators. These groups clearly demonstrated that political “movements could simultaneously express aspirations which we regard as mutually exclusive.”<sup>124</sup>

This tension between identities was clear in both Scotland and British Canada. The Scottish Home Rule Association, a nationalist group, was quick to point out the benefits of a Scottish Parliament to the Empire. They also argued that reform of imperial government would benefit Scotland. In British Canada, the Imperial Federation League argued that reform of the imperial governance was essential for the survival of Canada as a nation. National identity and imperial identity were key parts of nationalist discourse. Throughout the remainder of this thesis we will see further examples of this when reviewing the discourses of nationalists in Scotland and British Canada.

An investigation of the way in which these apparently mutually exclusive identities are reconciled is one of the aims of this thesis. The interaction of imperial and national identity was a key feature of the discourse of Scottish and British Canadian nationalists. If, as we have argued in this section, identity is experiential and contextual, we would expect a discourse that articulates both an imperial and national identity to be a reaction to two different, but related contexts: one imperial and one national. Alternatively, we might find one context which affects both identities. The key point lies in the proposed solution to the contexts. Mutually exclusive identities can be reconciled by arguing that the proposed reforms will strengthen both identities. The proposals of the groups being studied will therefore form an important element of the analysis to follow.

---

<sup>123</sup> Ibid: 124

<sup>124</sup> Ibid: 126

But if identities only come to prominence when they are in conflict, as Hobsbawm indicated, and Barth and Cohen have argued, what happens in between times of conflict. According to Michael Bilig, national identity is instilled through every day life. “The apparently latent identity is maintained within the daily life of inhabited nations.”<sup>125</sup> In other words, the daily reminders of the nation, whether through media, education and so on maintain this latent identity, which in fact “is a form of life” not “an inner psychological state.”<sup>126</sup> Identity is constantly maintained through the use of four symbols or stereotypes: the nation as community (an us), the homeland (national territory), the other, and the nation among a world of nations.<sup>127</sup>

The use of these symbols further emphasises the boundaries that are so important in understanding identity. The nation has a boundary, physical or artificial, that differentiates it from other nations in the worlds. The physical boundaries of the nation are also highlighted. The significant other may be an ancient foe or a dominant neighbour. Either way the boundary between them and us is created through use of historical symbols.

### *Relationship between identity and nationalism*

The importance of the other, boundaries, and history to identity has been noted above. National identity rests on constant reference to significant others, territory, artificially constructed boundaries and history. The artificial nature of national, and imperial, identity means these boundaries are maintained through symbols, whether flags, historical heroes and so on. In the discourse of nationalist elites, these symbols are used as signifiers of the identity to which they are appealing. Thus Scottish nationalists use the Saltire, Robert the Bruce, William Wallace, Bannockburn and so on to highlight that the political project they are proposing revolves around the Scottish nation. It is this link between national identity and the political project that makes a campaign nationalist. Nationalism brings together national identity with reform of the state. In some ways nationalists do not only appeal to national identity

---

<sup>125</sup> Bilig, M., *Banal Nationalism* (London, Sage: 1995): 69

<sup>126</sup> Ibid: 69

<sup>127</sup> Ibid: 70-92

but play a role in maintaining and defining national identity. By constant reference to symbols of the nation, nationalist elites make the nation a part of everyday life. Bilig's *Banal Nationalism* becomes part of the political scenery.

Imperialism has a similar relationship with identity, although it need not be political. Imperialists, those wanting to maintain or extend empire, will use the symbols of imperial identity to appeal for support for their imperialist activities. The mission of the nation is an important factor in imperial identity and provides the link between national and imperial identity. National identities in these cases see themselves as superior to those being conquered. Where the perception of superiority is acted upon the national identity becomes imperial. The British national mission to pacify and civilise the non Western world was based on the superiority of British government and religion. This mission became a key symbol of British imperial identity. In Canada, for example, the Imperial Federation League used the civilising mission of imperial identity to appeal for support for a federation of the British Empire.

### ***Conclusion***

The above discussion of nations, states, empires, the nature of nationalism and imperialism and the relationships between these concepts will situate the substantive chapters to follow firmly in their theoretical context. These concluding paragraphs will bring together the discussion by looking at the nature imperial nationalism from a theoretical perspective.

Nationalism has its roots in modernity and in particular the democratisation of the state. Democracy created equal citizens who expected their interests to be represented by state. In multi-national states, nations also came to expect equal treatment and representation in the state. Failure to provide this representation leads to a crisis in the legitimacy of the state. Nationalism is the result. Statehood, however, is not always sought. Nationalist groups can seek accommodation by the state and recognition of national identity and interests.

Imperial nationalism as a concept identifies nationalism within, but not in opposition to, empire. The nature of imperial nationalism can be similar to nationalism within multi-national states, in that accommodation by the state can be sought by nationalists rather than outright independence. Of course, multi-national states use accommodation as a means to ensure democratic ideals of equality of representation are upheld. Nationalists express their claims for representation in terms of the legitimacy of the state and the right to self determination. Empires by their very nature, despite their rhetoric, are anti-democratic. If the Imperial state, however, accepts the principle of accommodation, as the British Empire did in the nineteenth century, then the principles of democracy are introduced. Failure to institutionalise democracy will then lead nationalists to put forward a discourse critical of the governance of the empire but not of the empire itself. Imperial nationalism is the result.

In the chapters to follow, therefore, the key issues will be recognition, representation, legitimacy and self-determination. Imperial nationalism in this sense is not very different from any other sort of nationalism. But this study, although investigating the nature of imperial nationalism as an alternative form of nationalism, is concerned with the reconciliation of imperial and national identity in imperial nationalist discourse. The discussion of identity, in particular the issue of boundaries, context and experience, will all be important. The boundaries of the Empire and between the nations of the Empire as they were understood by imperial nationalists need to be examined to fully understand the nature of national and imperial identity. The relationship between these two identities and how they were reconciled by imperial nationalist movements will form a key part of the study. If context is important in the expression of identity and the ideas of Cohen and Morton are correct we would expect imperial nationalism to take different forms in Scotland and Canada. Different societies should generate different identities. National identity should mediate and/or reinforce Imperial identity. This issue will be the focus of the final chapter.

## Chapter Four

### Nationalist Discourse in Scotland and Canada

The key aim of this chapter is to identify what was nationalist about the discourse of the nationalist groups in Scotland and British Canada. Later chapters will examine the imperialist element of the discourse and how the two were reconciled. The aims of these nationalist groups were mentioned in the introductory chapter. In Scotland, the Scottish Home Rule Association campaigned for a Scottish Parliament within the United Kingdom framework. In Canada, more control over Canadian foreign affairs, especially commercial treaties, was demanded by Canada First and the Imperial Federation League in Canada. Both of these demands could be seen as an extension of democracy or decentralisation of government. The rhetoric employed by the groups, however, marks the discourse of these groups as nationalist. Reform of the state was to be for the benefit of the nation. This chapter will examine the discourse of these groups, highlighting the extent to which the rhetoric was nationalist. The way in which nationalists conceived their respective nations will also be examined.

The argument of this chapter is that nationalism is not necessarily about statehood but about being able to influence or control the decision making machinery of the state as it affects the nation. The concepts of political legitimacy and recognition, combined with national symbols and “significant others” characterise nationalist discourse. Our expectation is that Scottish and British Canadian nationalists displayed these characteristics.

The chapter will be divided into four sections each presenting material from Scotland and British Canada. The opening section will present the historical background necessary for an understanding of the primary material to be presented. The second section will examine the use of historical symbols by nationalists. The significance of the symbols chosen will be analysed. The third section will investigate the use of the significant other by nationalist elites and the extent to which the *Politics of Recognition* informed their discourse. The final section will look at the specific

grievances of the each movement in terms of democratic legitimacy and their critique of the existing systems of governance.

### ***Historical Background***

Late nineteenth century British and Imperial politics is a complex subject. In order to simplify matters the key themes of the period have been selected as they relate to the movements being examined. The key themes for Scotland will be Irish Home Rule, the Campaign for a Scottish Secretary, Governmental Decentralisation and the Reform Acts. In Canada the key themes were Confederation, the Red River Affair of 1869-70 and the Fenian raids in 1866. The main points of each theme will be presented briefly. The discussion to follow is not intended as an in-depth history of Scotland and Canada in the late nineteenth century but rather as an introduction to the key political issues in the period under study.

#### ***The Scottish Political System and the Campaign for a Scottish Secretary***

For much of the nineteenth century Scotland was governed from London by the Home Secretary with the assistance of the Lord Advocate, Scotland's chief Law Officer. Scotland was represented in the House of Commons by 60 Members of Parliament. Scottish Legislation was initiated, debated and enacted by Westminster. Implementation of policy, however, was left in the hands of a number of ad-hoc administrative boards. The boards were responsible for the administration of a number of policy areas, including administration of the Poor Law, Public health, schools, prisons andcrofting.<sup>1</sup> As the nineteenth century progressed the lack of accountability and the abuse of patronage by these boards made it clear that reform of Scottish government was necessary.<sup>2</sup> As we shall see below the campaign for Scottish local government (not national government) was important in this regard.

There has been some debate over the extent of Scottish autonomy in the nineteenth century. James Kellas has argued that Scotland had its own relatively autonomous

---

<sup>1</sup> McCrone, D., *Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Stateless Nation 1<sup>st</sup> edition* (London, Routledge: 1992): 22; See also Gibson, J.S., *The Thistle and the Crown* (Edinburgh, Her Majesty's Stationary Office: 1985): 15-18 for a good description of the various boards and their responsibilities.

<sup>2</sup> Midwinter, A., Keating, M., and Mitchell, J., *Politics and Public Policy in Scotland* (Basingstoke, Macmillan: 1991): 51

political system.<sup>3</sup> Midwinter et al. argue that politically Scotland was not autonomous in decision making but rather was part of a unitary state where decisions were made in Westminster and Whitehall.<sup>4</sup> Brown et al., however, claim that the administrative boards in implementing policy had a massive impact on Scottish life and reflected Scottish Presbyterian Paternalism in which the Scottish middle classes saw themselves “as natural rulers...”<sup>5</sup> Whilst political decisions may have been made in London, the administrative boards had considerable autonomy in implementing that policy. The extension of the role of the state in social policy in the late nineteenth century and the controversy over the accountability of the administrative boards in part accounted for the agitation for a Scottish secretary in the 1880s.

The position of Secretary for Scotland had been suspended following the Jacobite rebellion of 1745-6. For much of the nineteenth century the Lord Advocate was the central figure in Scottish politics. Demands for the reinstatement of the Secretary for Scotland had been made in the 1850s by the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights but nothing had been achieved when Gladstone came back into office in 1880.<sup>6</sup>

The key figure in the campaign for a Scottish Secretary was the Earl of Rosebery, a leading Scottish Liberal, who had played host to Gladstone during the latter’s Midlothian campaigns. In 1881, Rosebery supported Lord Fife in a debate in the House of Lords where a proposal was made “considering the importance of Scottish affairs and the strong feeling on the subject in Scotland” for the appointment of someone other than a law officer.<sup>7</sup> Rosebery believed the lack of a Scottish Secretary meant the Scots were “mumbling the dry bones of political neglect, and munching

---

<sup>3</sup> Kellas, J.G., *The Scottish Political System 4<sup>th</sup> Edition* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1990)

<sup>4</sup> Midwinter et al., *Politics and Public Policy in Scotland*: 196

<sup>5</sup> Brown, A., McCrone, D., and Paterson, L., *Politics and Society in Scotland* (London, MacMillan: 1998): 11-12

<sup>6</sup> Morton, G., *Unionist Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland 1830-1860* (East Linton, Tuckwell Press: 1996): 140

<sup>7</sup> Hansard Series 3 Vol. 262: 309

the remainder biscuit of Irish legislation.”<sup>8</sup> The debate yielded quick results. Rosebery was appointed as under-secretary at the Home Office with responsibility for Scottish affairs.<sup>9</sup> Once in post, however, Rosebery quickly became disillusioned with the continued control of Scottish affairs by the Lord Advocate and his lack of influence in the House of Commons. He continued to campaign for a Scottish Secretary with a cabinet position.<sup>10</sup> In early 1883, Rosebery finally came to the end of his tether. Having accepted the post of under-secretary on the understanding that the position was temporary, he discovered there were no plans to elevate the post. He resigned from the Gladstone government in June 1883.<sup>11</sup>

Despite the apparent petulance of Rosebery, a scheme for the establishment of a Local Government Board was approved by Cabinet in the spring of 1883. The Local Government Board (Scotland) Bill was thrown out of the House of Lords as it was too close to the end of the Parliamentary session for consideration, although the Lords agreed to consider a similar bill if “Scottish opinion was clearly marshalled behind it.”<sup>12</sup> A massive public meeting was held in January 1884 organised by the Convention for Royal Burghs expressing support for the reinstatement of the post of Scottish Secretary.<sup>13</sup> The meeting represented all shades of opinion in Scotland and was described as the greatest collection of Scots ever seen by the Earl of Dalhousie.<sup>14</sup> There were further delays in the post’s creation due to obstruction by Irish nationalists, the Reform Act controversy of 1884 and the introduction of the Redistribution Bill in 1885, in which Scottish representation at Westminster was increased from 60 MPs to 72. The post of Secretary for Scotland was finally reinstated in 1885.

Whilst the creation of the post was welcomed by most, it did not resolve the legislative blockage at Westminster. Gladstone had claimed in 1881 that he was

---

<sup>8</sup> Ibid: 321

<sup>9</sup> Gibson, *The Thistle and the Crown*: 21-22

<sup>10</sup> James, R.R, *Lord Rosebery* (London, Weidenfield and Nicholson: 1963): 121-123 James provides a detailed account of the work of Rosebery on pressurising Gladstone from inside the government.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid: 149-50

<sup>12</sup> Hanham, H., “The Creation of the Scottish Office 1881-1887” in *Juridical Review* Vol 10 (1965): 210

<sup>13</sup> *The Northern Chronicle*, 23 January 1884: 6

<sup>14</sup> Hansard Series 3 Vol 287: 1665

“extremely anxious to pass a Local Government Bill for Scotland...”<sup>15</sup> in order to relieve the pressure of business at Westminster. Given the pressing nature of foreign affairs and the Irish problem, as well as a lack of consensus in Scotland on the matter, a bill was never introduced. The matter was very much at the forefront of campaigning for the 1885 election. Lord Salisbury, the Conservative leader, Lord Rosebery, the leading Liberal in Scotland, and numerous local candidates made election speeches in favour of local-self government. Rosebery, speaking in Paisley in October 1885, went so far as to claim “the movement on behalf of local government is one of the strongest tendencies of the time...”<sup>16</sup> Lord Salisbury had argued the week before that,

large reforms in our local government, in the direction of increasing the power of that government, were absolutely necessary. They must provide that Local Authorities had sufficient powers, and that they got them by diminishing the exaggerated powers heaped on the central authorities in London. The people in these localities should govern themselves.<sup>17</sup>

The debate over local government rumbled on into the late 1880s. The important point is that in the periods immediately before and after the Reform Act of 1884, which extended democracy and equalised the franchises in the four nations of the United Kingdom, the principle of decentralising power was often discussed in Scotland. It was perhaps only natural that national self government would enter the discussion.

### *The Origins of the Irish Home Rule League*

Had Irish Home Rule not reached the political agenda in 1885, the post of Scottish Secretary may have been sufficient to quell the disquiet in Scotland over Westminster’s inability to legislate for Scotland. The delay in Parliament passing the legislation for a Scottish Secretary was largely due to the tactics of Irish Home Rulers during Gladstone’s ministry of 1880-1885. Gladstone’s decision to adopt Irish Home Rule as government policy in 1885 and his introduction of an Irish Home Rule bill in Parliament in April 1886 altered the position in Scotland. The political

---

<sup>15</sup> *The Northern Chronicle*, 4 May 1881: 6

<sup>16</sup> *Inverness Courier*, 17 October 1885: 6

<sup>17</sup> *Inverness Courier*, 8 October 1885: 6

impetus for the formation of the Scottish Home Rule Association came from Gladstone's decision to propose Irish Home Rule.

The background to the formation of the Irish Home Rule League in 1873 is not only important contextually but also provides some additional comparisons for the purpose of this study. Since the seventeenth century the British monarchy had begun settlement of Catholic Ireland through a system of plantations. Ireland had been colonised and, effectively, run from London for nearly two centuries prior to being brought into a formal Union with Scotland and England in 1801.<sup>18</sup> The initial impetus for bringing Ireland into closer ties with Westminster was an uprising of the United Irishmen, a nationalist group, who had been supported by a small force of French troops. Although the rising was brutally crushed, the strategic importance of Ireland in the defence of Britain was clearly highlighted. An enemy of Britain had supported an Irish rebellion in the Empire's backyard. This could not be allowed to happen again. The Act of Union that came into effect on January 1<sup>st</sup> 1801 can be seen, at least from the British point of view, as a consolidation of the Empire.<sup>19</sup>

Ireland was split over the Union. The Protestants in Ulster were clearly in favour of the Union, being British in origin. But there were also sections of the Catholic south that could see the economic benefits of the Union to Ireland. On the other hand there were significant numbers who remained opposed to the Union. As the prominent Irish historian F.S.L. Lyons has pointed out, as late as 1845, at the beginning of the potato famine, "Irish politics were still the politics of repeal [of the union], not of hunger."<sup>20</sup> These tensions lasted throughout the late nineteenth century.

In the period from 1845 to 1867 various attempts at rebellion by a number of Irish nationalist groups, such as Young Ireland and the Fenian "Brotherhood," were quickly and brutally crushed by the British authorities.<sup>21</sup> The rebellions did nothing to dispel the vicious caricatures that abounded in mid and late Victorian Britain. The

---

<sup>18</sup> Judd, D., *Empire: The British Imperial Experience from 1756 to the Present* (London, Fontana Press: 1995): 40

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*: 40-1

<sup>20</sup> Lyons, F.S.L., *Ireland Since the Famine* (London, Fontana Press: 1973): 104

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*: 109-110, 122 and 125

Irish peasantry were “presented as illiterate and confused louts at best, as subhuman porcine creatures at worst.”<sup>22</sup> These stereotypes inevitably coloured political decision-making and debate and were reinforced throughout the nineteenth century.<sup>23</sup> Matters reached a head late in 1867, following reprisals against the arrests and execution of a group of Fenians. The Manchester Martyrs, as they were known, became symbols of a resurgent Irish nationalism. An attempt by Fenians to blow up the wall of Clerkenwell Prison at the end of 1867 in London killed a number of innocent people and roused anger in Britain.

The political opportunity for the formation of an Irish Nationalist party came with the introduction of the Secret Ballot Act in 1872. Prior to the Act, Irish politics had followed the British pattern; the politicians returned were predominantly Liberals and Conservatives. Irish nationalists had rarely asserted themselves in Parliaments since the Union of 1801, largely due to landlord intimidation during elections. With the introduction of the Secret Ballot Act in 1872, however, the situation changed drastically.

In 1873, the Irish Home Rule League was formed with Isaac Butt as leader. The League had as its aim the creation of an Irish Parliament dealing with purely Irish matters, whilst retaining the connection with Westminster for defence, foreign and imperial affairs.<sup>24</sup> Butt saw Irish Home Rule as a solution for the problems of the Empire as well as for Ireland. The League, however, was divided between republicans and home rulers. Under Isaac Butt there was no concerted action by Home Rulers and only one or two rebels used obstructionist tactics in Parliament. Butt’s preference was to remain moderate and conciliatory in order to gain the respect and attention of the government of the day. With 59 Home Rule MP’s elected in 1874 Butt should have been in a strong position. It was not until after his death in 1879, however, and the accession of Charles Parnell Stewart that the Parliamentary tactics of Irish Home Rulers gained the attention of Parliament.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> Judd, *Empire*: 43

<sup>23</sup> Pearce, M., & Stewart, G., *British Political History 1875-1995: Democracy and Decline* (London, Routledge: 1996): 111

<sup>24</sup> Lyons, *Ireland Since the Famine*: 148-9

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*: 152-8

Parnell's assumption of the leadership of the Home Rule League changed the nature of nationalist politics in Ireland. A concerted campaign of Parliamentary obstruction combined with a land war substantially raised the stakes. In the early 1880s, rent strikes, violence against landlords, the withholding of harvests and boycotting landlords wreaked havoc in the countryside in response to continued evictions. During the 1880 parliamentary session, a total of 14,836 speeches were made, of which 6,300 were by Irish Home Rulers.<sup>26</sup> Nearly half of all speeches were by about a sixth of all MPs. This brought the work of Parliament to a virtual standstill. The combined attack by nationalists put Ireland firmly at the top of Gladstone's agenda following his successful return as Prime Minister in 1880. A new Land Act was introduced in 1881, along with a new Coercion Act. Although the Act met some Irish grievances, such as fixity of tenure and fair rent, it was met with indifference and violence. This violence was laid at the foot of the Home Rule League and Parnell was arrested in October 1881.<sup>27</sup>

Following secret negotiations in 1882 between Parnell and representatives of Gladstone, the Irish leader agreed "to cooperate cordially with the Liberal Party" provided Irish rent arrears were wiped out.<sup>28</sup> In what became known as the Kilmainham Treaty, named after the gaol where Parnell was imprisoned, the Irish leader was released and Irish rent arrears were waived. Parnell's experience increased support for Home Rule and the increase in the Irish electorate following the 1884 Reform Act led to 85 seats being won by the Irish Home Rulers in the 1885 election. Parnell held the balance of power.<sup>29</sup>

Against this backdrop Gladstone concluded the only solution was to offer the Irish home rule. Comparing Ireland with Canada in the 1840s, Gladstone claimed "Canada did not get Home Rule because she was loyal and friendly but she has become loyal and friendly because she has got Home Rule."<sup>30</sup> Gladstone introduced his Irish

---

<sup>26</sup> Pearce and Stewart, *British Political History*: 115

<sup>27</sup> Ibid: 116

<sup>28</sup> Ibid: 117

<sup>29</sup> Ibid: 118

<sup>30</sup> Quoted in Judd, *Empire*: 46

Home Rule Bill into Parliament in April 1886. It proposed an Irish Parliament with an upper chamber of peers and landlords and a lower chamber comprising the existing 103 MPs augmented by another 101. The stumbling block for the bill was the absence of Irish representation at Westminster. Ireland, it seemed was to be treated as a colony. Taxation for imperial affairs and defence would not be accompanied by representation. The bill foundered on this point and was defeated by 343 to 313.<sup>31</sup> Gladstone's ministry gave way to the Conservatives under Lord Salisbury.

### *Irish Home Rule's influence on the Scottish Home Rule Association*

The introduction of the Irish Home Rule Bill in April 1886 was the impetus required for the formation of the Scottish Home Rule Association. The SHRA themselves acknowledged the debt owed to Irish Nationalist politics. In its first Petition to Parliament, the SHRA made clear the influence of Irish Home Rule on the formation of the movement.

...your petitioners embrace the earliest opportunity of expressing their gratification that, by the Bill for the future Government of Ireland, which recently received so much attention from your honourable House, the principle of devolving on a National Legislature, local legislative and administrative powers...has been recognised.<sup>32</sup>

The SHRA Manifesto of 1892 distanced the movement slightly from Irish Home Rule but still acknowledged the debt owed by Scottish Nationalists.

No doubt the success of the Irish agitation in forcing Mr Gladstone to espouse the cause of Ireland was an encouragement to us; but our grievances and our discontent were of longer standing.<sup>33</sup>

The programme of the SHRA also owed much to the Irish Home Rule League. Both movements favoured remaining within the British Empire whilst reforming the United Kingdom state to devolve domestic legislative power to a national parliament.

---

<sup>31</sup> Pearce and Stewart, *British Political History*: 120-1

<sup>32</sup> Scottish Home Rule Association, *Petition to Scots MPs, Lords and Lord Provosts of Burghs* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1886)

<sup>33</sup> Scottish Home Rule Association, *Manifesto of the Scottish Home Rule Association* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1892)

The SHRA used Irish Home Rule debate to attempt to raise motions for Scottish Home Rule. In 1893, by resolution of the SHRA executive committee, Scots MPs were petitioned to raise a motion for Scottish Home Rule during either the committee stage or the second reading of the Irish Home Rule Bill.<sup>34</sup>

The influence of Irish Home Rule on Scottish nationalists will be examined further throughout this chapter. It is clear that Irish Home Rule was a trigger for the formation of the Scottish Home Rule Association. As the SHRA Treasurer William Mitchell claimed, Gladstone's support for an Irish Parliament made home rule "a matter of practical politics."<sup>35</sup>

### ***Confederation of the British North American Colonies***

On 1 July 1867 the colonies of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and the United Province of Canada (to become Ontario and Quebec) came together to form the new Dominion of Canada. A detailed examination of the intricacies of the process of Confederation is not necessary here, except to say it was a carefully negotiated settlement in which each province both gained and lost. The importance of Confederation for the purpose of this study is as a backdrop to Canadian relations with the United States and its effect on the formation of British Canadian nationalist movements. Only a brief discussion of the reasons for Confederation will be given here.

As with any historical phenomenon there was more than one cause for Canadian Confederation. Some causes, however, are more important than others. According to the historian, Kenneth McNaught, the Northern victory in the American Civil War posed real dangers to British North America.<sup>36</sup> Ill-feeling between Britain and the American North threatened to involve the British North American colonies in a war between the two countries, as it had in the War of 1812. The British saw the breakaway of the South as the end of the United States experiment. The Americans

---

<sup>34</sup> Scottish Home Rule Association, *Scottish Home Rule Association to the Scottish Representatives in Parliament* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1893)

<sup>35</sup> Mitchell, W., *Is Scotland to be Sold Again?* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1893): 8

<sup>36</sup> McNaught, K., *The Penguin History of Canada* (London, Penguin: 1988): 116

were angered by British friendliness towards the Southern rebels.<sup>37</sup> Suggestions were made in some quarters of the Union that the British North American colonies should be attacked in revenge.

Two specific incidents brought the threat into perspective and had lasting effects past Confederation. In 1861, two Southern confederate envoys to Britain were seized by a United States warship whilst aboard the British steamship “The Trent.” This attack brought into focus for the British the problems of defending British territory. Ten thousand troops were sent to British North America as reinforcements. The second incident occurred in 1864 when southern confederate refugees to Canada raided St Albans in Vermont. Although the refugees were captured by Canadian officials when they recrossed the border, some Americans felt the punishment they received was insufficient. By the end of the Civil War in 1865 there was a real spirit of resentment between the British in the North and the Americans in the South.<sup>38</sup> Special interests in America pressed for annexation of Canada.<sup>39</sup>

The forces for Canadian Confederation had begun working in 1864 with the Charlottetown conference, initially intended as a meeting to discuss the Union of the Maritime Provinces. The American announcement of the abrogation of the Treaty of Reciprocity in 1865 provided further support for a union in British North America based on the need for greater inter-colonial trade. The final straw, however, was the Fenian invasion of 1866.

The Fenian movement gained substantial support from Irish emigrants in the United States. The movement in America, however, had split into two factions. One believed all resources should be put into planning and implementing insurrection in Ireland. The other faction, known as “the senate wing”, claimed an invasion of Canada “might provoke a favourable setting for an Irish revolt.”<sup>40</sup> By invading Canada, relations between the United States and Britain may have deteriorated to

---

<sup>37</sup> Careless, J.M.S., *Canada: The Story of Challenge* (Toronto, Stoddart: 1970): 237

<sup>38</sup> Ibid: 238-9

<sup>39</sup> McNaught, *The Penguin History of Canada*: 116

<sup>40</sup> Lyons, *Ireland Since the Famine*: 135

such an extent that war was declared, thus committing troops to North America and weakening defences in Ireland. In 1866, Irish veterans from the Northern forces in the Civil War massed on the border of the British colonies in the North. Only at Fort Erie in the Province of Canada did an invasion force actually cross the border but they were quickly defeated by well prepared government forces.<sup>41</sup> The Americans did nothing to prevent the invasion and only made moves to round up the Fenian forces when it realised “The Brotherhood” were in decline.<sup>42</sup>

The Fenian attacks were clearly never a real threat to British North America but they did reveal the existence and extent of American unfriendliness.<sup>43</sup> The raids were important in persuading opponents of Confederation in New Brunswick to support the union of the British colonies. They were also important in persuading Britain to support the confederation idea.<sup>44</sup>

The central idea of Confederation was survival, whether the cultural survival of French Canadians who would secure their own province, the economic survival of Nova Scotia following the abrogation of the Reciprocity treaty or the survival of an emerging British Canadian identity against United States aggression. When the British North America Act was put in place, however, Nova Scotians returned to the Provincial legislature a majority against confederation. Their leader, Joseph Howe, immediately appealed to London to repeal the Act. The request was denied despite persistent calls for repeal. The stage was set for the new Prime Minister of Canada, John A. Macdonald, to use his powers of negotiation that had proved so effective during the Confederation debates in Quebec and London.

### *Canada First's reaction to the Nova Scotian Secession Crisis*

A year after confederation, following the Nova Scotian secession crisis, five men were introduced to each other while on business in Ottawa. George Denison, Charles Mair, William Foster, Henry Morgan and Robert Haliburton spent most of their

---

<sup>41</sup> Ibid: 135; Careless, *Canada*: 240

<sup>42</sup> Careless, *Canada*: 240

<sup>43</sup> Ibid: 240

<sup>44</sup> McNaught, *The Penguin History of Canada*: 129

evenings in Ottawa discussing “the future of Canada, her brilliant prospects, and the duty of her sons to study her interests and to do all in their power to advance her welfare.”<sup>45</sup> The exact nature of what was discussed by the Corner-Room set can only be inferred from Denison’s later recollections in letters and obituaries but the need to find something that would counteract the secession crisis in Nova Scotia must have been at the forefront of their debates.

In his obituary of John Schultz, the sixth member of Canada First and future senator for Manitoba, Denison claimed the early group had two main aims: the expansion of Canada westwards and to foster inter-colonial trade.<sup>46</sup> Both of these aims were actively pursued but the fact that Haliburton had already outlined the inter-provincial trade idea in his article on *The Coal Trade of the New Dominion* and that very shortly after the April meetings he wrote *Intercolonial Trade: Our only Safeguard against Disunion*, may have resulted in Denison mistaking actions taken for aims originally stated. It should be noted that Haliburton was the only one to talk of inter-provincial trade and the only one of the five not from Ontario.

Haliburton’s second pamphlet, according to Denison, was important to the pro-confederation cause in Nova Scotia<sup>47</sup> and was written as a direct response to the threat of secession. The article outlined some very important ideas and it has been argued that it was the forerunner of Macdonald’s national policy of the following decade.<sup>48</sup> The crux of Haliburton’s argument was that Nova Scotia and New Brunswick prior to confederation had very close commercial links with the United States but given the Fenian raids of 1866 and the United States’ attitude to the United Kingdom, political union with the United States was not a valid option. Since the repeal of the reciprocity treaty, the markets for Nova Scotia’s two main commercial

---

<sup>45</sup> Denison, G.T., “Sir John Schultz and the “Canada First” Party” in *The Canadian Magazine* Vol.8 No. 1 November 1896:16; The original members of Canada First were known as the Corner-Room set as their meetings in Ottawa in spring 1868 were held in the Corner room of the Revere Hotel – see Shrive, N., *Charles Mair: Literary Nationalist* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press: 1965): 28

<sup>46</sup> Denison, “Sir John Schultz”: 16

<sup>47</sup> Denison, G.T., “Robert Grant Haliburton” in *The Canadian Magazine* Vol.17 No. 2 June 1901: 126

<sup>48</sup> Berger, C., *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1867-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1970): 54

activities of coal and fishing had been lost.<sup>49</sup> Given the Western and Eastern provinces of Canada saw each other as foreigners, Haliburton argued the only bonds that could unite Canada were "the bonds of commerce."

To suppose that a country so remote from us, which has no share in our trade, and no interest in our prosperity and reserves, can safely be entrusted with the control of our resources and of our destinies, and that we can remain to the end of time as we now are, a mere political tributary of Canada, is to imagine an anomaly which is without precedent in the history of a free people.<sup>50</sup>

Nova Scotia, in the eyes of Haliburton and Canada First, could only be secured for the Canadian Confederation if trade with the rest of Canada, particularly in coal, could be encouraged.

The second aim of Canada First was to secure the North West against French Canada and the United States of America.

### *The Campaign for the North West*

Following the negotiations for the surrender of the Hudson's Bay Company's charter over the North-West territories along with the agreement for their admission into confederation in December 1870, the Dominion parliament passed an act early in 1869 for the temporary government of the region on its admission to the Dominion at the end of that year. This Act allowed for the direct administration of the North-West from Ottawa.<sup>51</sup> In the autumn of 1869, in recognition of his efforts during the negotiations for the transfer of the region, William McDougall was appointed Lieutenant Governor for the North West.<sup>52</sup> In October the Metis set up a provisional government in the North West to prevent the entry of the Canadian party who were advised not to enter in November 1869.<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>49</sup> Haliburton, R. G., *Intercolonial Trade: Our Only Safeguard against Disunion* (1868): 6

<sup>50</sup> Ibid: 16

<sup>51</sup> Morton, A.S., *A History of the Canadian West to 1870-71 2nd Edition* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1973): 848-851

<sup>52</sup> Denison, "Sir John Schultz": 17

<sup>53</sup> Wade, M., *The French Canadians 1760-1967 Volume1 1760-1911* (Toronto, Macmillan: 1968): 402-3

This warning was ignored and by the 2<sup>nd</sup> of November all of McDougall's party were under detention and Fort Garry had been taken. Charles Mair, a member of McDougall's party, managed to escape and fled to Winnipeg. Here, however, he was recaptured along with John Schultz, a recent recruit to Canada First and leader of the Canadians at Red River. The pair were held at Fort Garry.<sup>54</sup> Both of them escaped in January 1870 and independently made their way to Toronto. Before they arrived, however, an Ontarian Orangeman, Thomas Scott, was court martialed and executed by Louis Riel, leader of the Metis, on 4 March 1870.

Canada First organised a welcome meeting for Mair and Schultz that served the dual purpose of expressing British Canadian indignation at the presumption of power by the Metis at Red River. The meeting was also intended to pressurise the government to send an armed force to the region to remove the provisional Metis government and to seek revenge for the execution of Scott.<sup>55</sup> The meeting held in Toronto to welcome Mair and Schultz on April 6 1870 was so well attended that it had to be moved outside.<sup>56</sup> The meeting resolved that,

This meeting expresses the strongest indignation at the cold blooded murder of poor Scott ... and considers that it would be a gross injustice to the loyal inhabitants of Red River, humiliating to our national honour, and contrary to all British traditions, for our government to receive, negotiate, or treat with the emissaries of those who have robbed, imprisoned and murdered loyal Canadians, whose only fault was zeal for British institutions, whose only crime was devotion to the Old Flag.<sup>57</sup>

The resolution clearly showed the symbolism of British Canadian nationalism. The protection of loyal Canadians and British institutions and honour was vital for Canada First. The relative size of the Metis population, however, could not account for the reaction. The support of the United States for the Metis reveals the real reason for the nationalist reaction of Canada First.

---

<sup>54</sup> Shrive, *Charles Mair*: 91-97

<sup>55</sup> Denison, "Sir John Schultz": 19-20

<sup>56</sup> *The Globe*, April 7, 1870, reprinted in Morton, W.L., (ed) Alexander *Beggs Red River Journal and other Papers relative to the Red River Resistance of 1869-70* (Toronto, The Chaplain Society: 1956): 510

<sup>57</sup> Denison, "Sir John Schultz": 20

Canada First perceived the American policy of Manifest Destiny as a threat to the survival of the Dominion. Westward expansion through the prairies without the admission of Manitoba into the Dominion would have been impossible. The “revolt” at Red River, with the advertised support it had from the United States (through the newspaper of the provisional government), was seen, by Canada First, as a massive threat to the future integrity of Canada.<sup>58</sup> This defensive nationalism is one of the causes for Canada First’s reaction to the rising at Red River.

In addition to the public meetings, Foster, on behalf of the Canada First group, used the editorial pages of the *Toronto Telegraph*, whose editor, George Kingsmill, was one of “The Twelve Apostles”, to urge support from the public for these meetings and succeeded in raising Ontario to a fever pitch with spirited and passionate editorials.<sup>59</sup> One such editorial appeared a few days after the public meeting held to welcome back the fugitives. Referring to the government’s intention to receive three delegates of the Metis’ provisional government and hear their grievances, Foster asked if,

Sir John Macdonald proposed to bring the Government and the people of Canada down to the level of Riel and his fellow rebels, to treat with and make himself and his colleagues the equals of murderers and to shake the hands that were red with Canadian blood? ...The country must be opened up to our people, and loyal men must be protected in the enjoyment of their rights for all time to come... What could Sir John Macdonald hope to gain by receiving the rebels? ... Must this be taken as more evidence of the fact that Sir George [Cartier] was the leader and Sir John the follower?<sup>60</sup>

The delegates, however, had been sent to discuss the terms of the Act which had been passed in the previous year for the direct government of the North West from Ottawa. This was, after all, the main reason for the rebellion, despite the perceptions of Mair and the Canada First Committee. After foiling attempts by the Canada First Committee to have the three arrested in Ottawa and convicted of Scott’s murder,<sup>61</sup> the Canadian government met the delegates and negotiations were completed that

---

<sup>58</sup> Willison, J.S., *Sir Wilfred Laurier & the Liberal Party: A Political History Volume 1* (George N.Morang & Co, Toronto: 1903): 180

<sup>59</sup> Ibid: 171

<sup>60</sup> Ibid: 173-4

<sup>61</sup> Denison, “Sir John Schultz”: 20

resulted in the Manitoba Act of May 1870. This act, in effect, created a new Quebec in the North West by giving equal status to the French and English language.<sup>62</sup>

The campaign to send an armed expedition continued and more meetings were held throughout Ontario that showed similar levels of support to previous meetings. An announcement was made to send an expedition under Colonel Wolesley to Red River in May 1870 after the completion of the negotiations for the Manitoba Act.<sup>63</sup> Although the Manitoba Act had ended the rebellion, there are several reasons why an expedition was still sent. Firstly, Sir John A. Macdonald had a dilemma over Ontario's demands for armed force and Quebec's indignation at the demand. Something had to give and Macdonald must surely have known that the expedition would incur little resistance and so Quebec would be satisfied that no blood was shed. Ontarian demands would also have been met. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there was evidence to suggest that the United States would benefit from the rebellion and that they were showing a keen interest that had not been discouraged by Riel or his followers. The United States had sources in the region<sup>64</sup> and the newspaper of the provisional government was openly advocating annexation. Sending an expedition to the North West would have sent a clear message to the United States that Britain was fully behind Canada's westward expansion.

The next few years saw Denison and Foster attempting to build support for "the new nationality", although there would appear to have been little organised activity by Canada First. Not until 1873 and the formation of the Canadian National Association (CNA) did Canada First become a formal political party. Following their support of Thomas Moss, Foster's law firm partner, who stood in the West Toronto by-election in 1873,<sup>65</sup> the CNA issued a manifesto early in 1874 outlining its political programme. Many of the principles revolved around increasing democracy, increasing the franchise, compulsory voting, and representation of minorities. The key point, however, was the first principle. "British Connection; Consolidation of the

---

<sup>62</sup> Wade, *The French Canadians*: 402

<sup>63</sup> Ibid: 402

<sup>64</sup> Ibid: 402

<sup>65</sup> *The Globe*, 8 December 1873

Empire and in the meantime a voice in the treaties affecting Canada.”<sup>66</sup> The CNA never put any candidates forward in the general election of 1874 and faced a ferocious attack from *The Globe*.<sup>67</sup> A combined attack from both Conservatives and Liberals effectively killed the CNA before it could get started, although a branch was formed in the Maritimes.<sup>68</sup> By the end of 1875, the Association had disappeared and its mouthpiece, *The Nation* newspaper, went out of print in 1876.<sup>69</sup> With the end of *The Nation* came the end of the Canada First movement.

In terms of Hroch’s typology of nationalist movements, the groups discussed above are patriotic agitators. The role of these groups was to preach their conception of the nation. In their discussions of the problems of political legitimacy facing the nation, they used various historical symbols to create the imagined borders of the community.

### ***Borders of the Mind - Imagining Nations and Inventing Traditions***

Symbols and invented traditions play an important part in identifying groups. Symbols and traditions are selected or invented by nationalist elites to reflect the identity they are attempting to portray. Symbols are often historic in nature creating an image of a temporal as well as a spatial identity in which we join in communion with both our ancestors and our contemporaries. Given the contextual and experiential nature of identity, symbols will often reflect the context in which they are deployed and reflect the historical experience of the nation, especially in relation to a “significant other.”

Historical symbols in a nationalist discourse usually assert the nation’s right of self determination. Nationalist elites will use examples from history that show the nation enforcing its right of self determination. This achieves two things. Firstly, it establishes the existence of an independent nation in the past. Secondly, it provides

---

<sup>66</sup> Canadian National Association, “Canada First: Address of the Canadian National Association to the People of Canada” in Morgan, H.J., (ed.) *The Canadian Parliamentary Companion* (Montreal: 1874): 577

<sup>67</sup> *The Globe*, 9 January 1874

<sup>68</sup> *The Nation*, 13 August 1874: 234

<sup>69</sup> Canniff, W., *Canadian Nationality its Growth and Development* (Toronto, Hart and Rawlinson: 1875): 13; *The Nation*, September 29, 1876: 459

inspiration for the campaign nationalists are pursuing in the present. These historical examples form part of the symbolic boundary mechanisms of the nation. By establishing the boundaries of the nation in our imagination, historical symbols not only tell us who belongs to the nation but also who does not belong. They also establish the 'significant other' of the nation, allowing us to imagine the nation by creating visual symbols representing its cohesion and status.

The symbols will also reflect the context of the present day. They are used by elites to illustrate the key points of their discourse in shorthand. The symbols chosen will quickly identify the other. They will have been ingrained in the national psyche through education, folklore, myth and tradition. The symbols may show an assertion of power over the other. The antagonism of the present may be highlighted with similar examples of domination in the past which has been overcome by an assertion of power or the success of a nationalist discourse. This links the present problems of legitimacy with historical examples of similar problems. The complexity of the problem is reduced to a few symbols thus making the contemporary issue easier to understand. It also introduces the idea that the problem is not unique to the present day but is recurring and unlikely to be resolved without a nationalist campaign. Thus, linking historical symbols with the current problem helps make sense of the present.

It should be noted that the significant other does not always have to be placed in an antagonistic position. The significant other can be used in several ways, whether as a contrast or an example. It follows from this that assertions of power over the other are not necessary for national identity to be sustained. Sacrifice, defeat and martyrdom are also important in forging collective grievances and maintaining identity. It is contended here, however, that in a political nationalist discourse historical examples are more likely to assert the power of the nation than its weaknesses. Historical examples themselves can act as significant others. By providing a positive example of what can be achieved, we are more likely to follow the example in the modern day.

*Bannockburn and the Scottish Wars of Independence*

The Scottish Wars of Independence, fought in the late 13<sup>th</sup> and early 14<sup>th</sup> Centuries following invasion by Edward I of England, and particularly the success at the Battle of Bannockburn were key symbols of Scottish identity in the discourse of the Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA.) Indeed, there were several pamphlets dedicated solely to Bannockburn itself.<sup>70</sup> As symbols of identity, Bannockburn and the Scottish Wars of Independence were important on several counts: they asserted the right of Scotland to national self-determination, established the “significant other”, emphasised national cohesion (winning wars is impossible without cohesion) and enabled the nation to be imagined as temporal as well as spatial.

The colourful Theodore Napier, resident of Victoria, Australia, for thirty years, and President of the Scottish National Association of Victoria, argued on a number of occasions that the Anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn, 24<sup>th</sup> June, 1314, should be celebrated as Scotland’s Independence Day.

Every American, man, woman, and child knows the date of their Independence Day, but how many Scotsmen could tell the date of their greater Independence Day? ...we want our own feelings revived in regard to our great ancestral struggle for liberty. It is a sacred duty for Scotsmen to hand down to their ancestors the records of their ancestors and religious liberty.<sup>71</sup>

The SHRA, through Napier, wanted to establish (invent) a tradition of celebrating Scotland’s historical past thus creating the impression that Scotland was an ancient nation. The anniversary was to be a ceremonial reminder that Scotland’s status as a nation was independent from England.

Had it not been for Bannockburn, Scotland would have fallen into the same deplorable condition that Ireland is in, and have remained to this day a conquered province of England.<sup>72</sup>

---

<sup>70</sup> Mitchell, W., *Bannockburn – A Short Sketch of Scottish History* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1893); Napier, T., *Bannockburn and Liberty: An Appeal to Scotsmen* (Edinburgh: Undated); Napier, T., *The Anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn, 24<sup>th</sup> June 1314* (Edinburgh, 1896)

<sup>71</sup> Napier, *The Anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn*

<sup>72</sup> Ibid

Scotland had been a conquered province of England during the Wars of Independence but had fought for its right to determine its own future. Bannockburn established Scotland as an independent nation. The use of Bannockburn also reflected the context of the times as seen by the SHRA.

Is not Scotland now virtually ruled by England? Her representatives in the Imperial House of Commons number but 72, while England has 465; consequently Scotland's vote is constantly out-voted by the English and Irish majority in matters that interest Scotland alone. This reduces Scotland to the condition of an *English* province. Was it for this that our ancestors fought?<sup>73</sup>

By giving Scotland the status of conquered province in both the historical and contemporary contexts, the SHRA linked the present problem with the historical past. This enabled them to draw inspiration from the defeat of the English in 1314 and the assertion of Scotland's right to self-determination. If self-determination could be achieved in the middle ages surely Scotland could assert its right to determine her own future in the late nineteenth century. The implication presented by the SHRA was that their generation had a responsibility to ensure the sacrifices of their ancestors in the Wars of Independence were not forgotten.

The comparison of historical battles with present situations inevitably leads to the conclusion that the present state of affairs is also a battle, one which must assert the independence of the nation. The SHRA viewed the campaign for a Scottish Parliament in this light.

The political war of our time is happily conducted in a different manner, but it is the same battle we have to fight, the right of Scotsmen to be masters in their own country.<sup>74</sup>

These assertions lie at the centre of nationalists' understanding of the nation/state relationship. The Union would work if it were not for the domination of the English. But because the Union did not work, i.e., there was interference in Scottish affairs by another nation, the nature of the Union must change. The use of the English as "the

---

<sup>73</sup> Napier, *Bannockburn and Liberty*: 18

<sup>74</sup> SHRA, *Home Rule for Scotland: An Address to the Citizens of Edinburgh by the Scottish Home Rule Association*. (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1895)

other” through Bannockburn not only clearly differentiated Scots from the English but established the antagonism in the shape of a power relationship injurious to Scottish interests. Scotland had been conquered in the fourteenth century and, according to the SHRA, found itself in a similar position in the 1880s. The English dominated the United Kingdom Parliament.

The SHRA claimed the independence won in the fourteenth century enabled Scotland to negotiate Union with England as “coequal partners.”<sup>75</sup> Bannockburn created equality between Scotland and England which the nationalists believed existed through to 1707. Yet, the SHRA believed the Union negotiations had been conducted unfairly. The nationalists echoed Robert Burns’s accusation that the Scottish Commissioners had been “bought and sold for English gold.”<sup>76</sup>

The corrupt nature of the negotiations leading to the Union of 1707 was another important symbol used by the SHRA to justify their proposals for a Scottish parliament. They claimed Scots had wanted a commercial union with England in 1707. The Commissioners who were to negotiate for Scotland had been selected by Queen Anne, which according to the SHRA, meant in reality they had been chosen by her English advisers; chosen for their known sympathy for Union with England.<sup>77</sup>

...the [Scots] Commissioners were bullied or cajoled into agreeing not only to the extinction of the Scottish Parliament but into accepting such a small number of representatives to the British Parliament as placed Scotland entirely at the mercy of England.<sup>78</sup>

Charles Waddie, honorary secretary of the SHRA, went further claiming the Scots were forced to accept the Union:

...the English party yielded nothing; and as they had the army at their back, and a larger force on the border, sent at the instance of the English

---

<sup>75</sup> Waddie, C., *How Scotland Lost her Parliament and What became of it 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition* (Edinburgh, Waddie & Co. Ltd.: 1903) - : 93

<sup>76</sup> Scottish Home Rule Association, *Home Rule for Scotland: What does it mean?* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1896)

<sup>77</sup> Mitchell, *Bannockburn: A short Sketch of Scottish History*: 11

<sup>78</sup> Mitchell, *Is Scotland to be sold Again?*: 16

Government, the Treaty, was, as it were, crammed down the throat of the nation at the point of the bayonet.<sup>79</sup>

Despite having presented Scotland as a sovereign and independent nation using the symbols of Bannockburn and the Wars of Independence, the SHRA, argued the Union was a fraud. The negotiations for Union had been carried out under the threat of invasion, by commissioners who did not represent the interests of the Scottish people. The most famous opponent of Union in 1707, Fletcher of Saltoun, was adopted as the symbol of reform of the Union. Fletcher, the SHRA claimed, was the original home ruler.<sup>80</sup>

In arguing that the Union of 1707 was a fraud, the SHRA claimed the right of Westminster to legislate for Scotland was also a fraud. Despite the vastly different circumstances of the 1880s, the Union of 1707 had not been reformed. The legitimacy of the system was based on a corrupt Treaty. The system itself, therefore, must be called into question. Scotland had been bullied and cajoled by the English into a system of government it had not wanted. The system should be reformed. The critique of the British State in the SHRA's discourse used the historical symbols of Scotland to highlight the claims for Scots' right to self-determination.

The SHRA emphasised the actions of the Scottish people in general and two individuals in particular, in the victory over England. The Wars of Independence could not have been won had it not been for "Our forefathers [who] died bravely that day and to them we owe the place which Scotland holds in the world's Battle-roll of Freedom."<sup>81</sup> Mitchell quoted Sir Walter Scott's eulogy of William Wallace and Robert the Bruce in *Tales of a Grandfather*.

The nation of Scotland was also raised once more from the situation of a distressed and conquered province to that of a free and independent state, governed by its own laws and subject to its own princes. They never afterwards lost the freedom for which Wallace had laid down his life, and

---

<sup>79</sup> Waddie, *How Scotland Lost her Parliament*: 17

<sup>80</sup> Mitchell, W., *Is Scotland to be Sold Again?* : 16/19

<sup>81</sup> Mitchell, *Bannockburn*: 8

which King Robert had recovered not less by his wisdom than by his weapons.<sup>82</sup>

National heroes such as Bruce and Wallace when used in this context, as well as being the “touchstone of nationalism”, provide models of conduct and inspiration for their oppressed descendants.<sup>83</sup> As descendants from these great heroes, Scots were seen as wise as well as warriors. But in imagining the nation as historical, and therefore, temporal, Scots of the late Victorian era were seen as part of an extended family that extended back to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

The Wars of Independence naturally led to the use of the Declaration of Arbroath as another symbol of Scotland’s sovereignty. What else was the Declaration but a nationalist assertion of the right of the Scottish people to rule themselves?

For so long as a hundred remain alive, we will never in any degree be subject to the dominion of the English: since it is not for glory, riches or honour we fight but for **liberty** alone, what no good man loses but with his life.<sup>84</sup>

The use of the Declaration and the Wars of Independence by the SHRA clearly marked out the English as the “other” in nationalist discourse. The significant other plays a key role in any discourse, nationalist or otherwise. In Discourse Analysis, the other is important in identifying the antagonism present within the discourse. The symbols chosen by nationalist elites will represent the principle antagonism in their discourse. Thus, the SHRA selected symbols relating to conflicts with the English, their principle antagonists. This antagonism runs through the discourse of the SHRA. The English were seen as tyrants, both historically and in contemporary times. The SHRA used history as a means of showing there was a tradition of English tyranny that had been fought by patriotic Scots to secure their independence and this hard fought independence was now, once again, under threat. The fight therefore should be continued by the present generation to regain the use of that hard won independence. As Mitchell underlined,

---

<sup>82</sup> Ibid: 8

<sup>83</sup> Eriksonas, L., *National Heroes and National Identities: Scotland, Norway and Lithuania* (Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Land S.A.: 2004): 16

<sup>84</sup> Quoted in Napier, *Bannockburn and Liberty* – original emphasis

We will fight, as our forefathers did “not for glory, riches, or honours, but for liberty”- the liberty “to manage our own affairs by ourselves without the assistance or counsel of any other.”<sup>85</sup>

The use of these symbols was an attempt by nationalists to articulate their conception of Scots national identity, make sense of the political problems they were addressing and to raise national consciousness through aids to imagine the nation. The linkage of the historical with the modern creates themes that run through the nationalist discourse to highlight the extension of the nation into history. For example, the theme of struggling against the tyranny and bullying of the English runs through the historical discussions and, as we shall see, their analysis of the contemporary problem. Bannockburn and the Declaration of Arbroath implicitly showed a legitimate form of rule, one where Scots interests were represented and safeguarded. The corrupt Union of 1707, however, had swung the balance of power too much in favour of the English. The solution was a Scottish Parliament.

### *Defence of Canadian Territory*

If Scotland had its Bannockburn, Canadians could call upon a multitude of invasions by their neighbour, the United States. The War of 1812<sup>86</sup> and the Fenian invasion of 1866 were among the most used symbols of the independence of Canada, although the Canadian Confederation had not existed at the time of the invasions. But as important, particularly for Canada First, was the flight of the United Empire Loyalists in the 1780s following the defeat of British Forces in the American Wars of Independence. The flight of the Loyalists can be seen as a descent myth for British Canada, particularly by Ontarians. As well as being symbolic of the ties and sentiment for empire, an issue that will be addressed in the following chapter, the Empire Loyalists symbolised Canadians as inherently non-American. The loyalists

---

<sup>85</sup> Mitchell, *Bannockburn*: 17

<sup>86</sup> The War of 1812 resulted from increased tensions between America and Britain over a number of issues, including control of the Ohio River area and Naval infractions in the Atlantic. The Americans, with a population of 7,500,000 were repelled by a population of only 500,000, although not before York (Toronto) was sacked. The incompetence of the American generals has been attributed to the American defeat. The loyalty of lower Canada (Quebec) and the well trained United Empire Loyalists veterans from the American Wars of Independence won some important battles. The War was essentially about boundaries and the Treaty of Ghent settled the boundary on the 49<sup>th</sup> parallel from the Great Lakes westward to the Rockies. See McNaught, *The Penguin History of Canada*: 68-74

had explicitly rejected the idea of an independent American Union and thus came to symbolise for Canada First the ideal Canadian, “a body of men possessing the purest loyalty, men who sacrificed self for principle...” who had been left to the mercy of the Revolutionaries and fled to Canada.<sup>87</sup>

As with Scotland the theme of defending Canadian territory against American invasion runs through the examples held out by the nationalist elite. The War of 1812 stands out in particular as a major achievement for Canada. William Foster, one of the original members of Canada First, in his *Canada First* address surveyed the events of the war as an example of Canadians defending themselves gloriously against a much larger enemy.<sup>88</sup> George Denison, however, another of the original members of Canada First, chose to see the War, not just as an heroic effort Canadians should be proud of, but as an expression of confidence by his ancestors, as Canadians, in the future of Canada “the state.”

The War of 1812 has also given us some bright pages in our early history, and shown us an example of our political existence being saved to us by the confidence possessed by our fathers in themselves and in the state.<sup>89</sup>

This was an interesting way of evaluating the importance of the War. Despite the fact that the confederated state of Canada had not even been thought of in 1812, the future of the combatants’ offspring, in the view of Denison, was in that confederated state formed several decades later.

The use of the War of 1812 and the Fenian Invasion of 1866 as symbols of British Canadian identity highlighted two important aspects of the discourse of Canadian nationalists. Firstly, it showed the antagonism towards the United States. As we discussed in our historical review, the American authorities made no effort to prevent the Fenian Invasion. It was therefore taken by Canadians as evidence of American hostility. In Canadian nationalist discourse, therefore, the United States took the form

---

<sup>87</sup> Denison Papers MG29 E29 Vol 43 - Denison, G.T., *The Duty of Canadians to Canada* (1871): 9

<sup>88</sup> Foster, W., *Canada First: Or our New Nationality* (Toronto, 1888): 8-10

<sup>89</sup> Denison, *The Duty of Canadians to Canada*: 9

of the significant other. The War of 1812 and the Fenian Invasion of 1866 also demonstrated the right of Canada to determine its own future.

Despite Canada not being in existence at the time of these invasions, the area that was to become Canada, British North America, was in existence. In their use of history and ancestry as an example of the temporal aspect of the nation, British Canadian nationalists made British North America synonymous with Canada. Everything achieved by the United Empire Loyalists in 1783, the militia in 1812 and in 1866 was done in the name of British North America. Hence, post confederation, it was seen to have been done in the name of Canada. There are several important aspects to this “invention of tradition.”<sup>90</sup> Firstly, it gave the young Canada an air of antiquity. It showed the British Canadians of the post Confederation era that they belonged to a historic nation of British North Americans (the Canadians) who had also struggled and succeeded against threats from the United States. They were not alone. Rather they belonged to a temporal nation that had been perpetually struggling against American aggression. Secondly, it attempted to unite the disparate provinces of the Union, the Maritimes, Quebec and Ontario, each of whom had been affected in some way by these incursions. Foster and Denison’s pamphlets being written in 1871 at a time when the Confederation badly needed something to weld it together, were trying, in a historical sense, to find the cement to hold together the founding provinces of Canada.

The various border conflicts between Canada and the United States provided shorthand symbols by which the audience understood the discourse of British Canadian nationalists. The symbols used reflect the difference in the age of the Canadian nation when compared with Scotland. The earliest historical reference was the flight of the United Empire Loyalists in 1783. The Battle of Bannockburn had been fought nearly 500 years earlier. The symbols established the cohesion of the nation through the creation of boundaries between Canada and their significant other, the United States. Unlike the Scots, however, British Canadians did not share a state with their significant other. Rather the perceived aggression and expansionist desires

---

<sup>90</sup> Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”

of the United States created the antagonism that runs through British Canadian nationalist discourse.

### *Descent Myths – “The Men of the North”*

As Hobsbawm pointed out, one of the paradoxes of the nation is its actual place in modernity against the nationalist’s claim of its place in antiquity.<sup>91</sup> One of the classic “Invented Traditions” of all nations is the creation myth, or descent myth, placing the nation firmly in antiquity. The creation myth is an important element in nationalist discourse. Robert Haliburton’s lecture, *The Men of the North and their Place in history*, is one of the best examples of this kind of invented tradition.

Haliburton reviewed the course of the great Empires of history, Egyptian, Assyrian, Greek and Roman, arguing that the downfall of each was engineered by a Northern race. Northern races, he argued, were “healthy, hardy virtuous, dominant race[s]” because of their colder climates. The cold Canadian climate, whilst potentially being a problem for business, could create a new northern race in Canada – The Men of the North in the New World.<sup>92</sup>

In an attempt to find more than just a climactic basis for the peculiarity of the Canadian nation, Haliburton traced the lineage of Canadians back into pre-history. Searching for evidence to create a myth of Canadian strength, Haliburton saw the answer in the Normans (Norsemen/literally Northmen). The King of the Norsemen, Rollo, overran France and held sway over most of North-western Europe. In the process he acquired the title the Duke of Normandy. Rollo also claimed to be a descendant of the Gods of the North and *Forntjotr* the old Frost Giant. William the Conqueror, who defeated King Harold in 1066, was a Norman and descendant of King Rollo. Therefore the monarchy of Britain, with their Norman ancestry, was descended from the Norse Gods and the Old Frost Giant.

Here in the new world we, who are sprung from these men of the North, are about to form a new dominion in this northern land a

---

<sup>91</sup> Ibid: 14

<sup>92</sup> Haliburton, R.G., *The Men of the North & Their Place in History* (1869): 2

worthy home for the Old Frost Giant and a proud domain for his Royal Descendant.<sup>93</sup>

By linking Canada to the British Monarchy and the British Monarchy to Normandy, through Victoria to William the Conqueror, Haliburton implied that both French and English Canadians were of the same origin. This common origin would allow, it was hoped, both French and British Canadians to imagine a community linked by ideas of kinship, rather than divided by language. It extended the idea of a national timeline to mythical history and the Norse Gods, despite the fact that Normandy did not provide New France with many colonists. It should be noted that this was Canadian nationalism, rather than British Canadian nationalism. A genuine attempt was being made to include French Canadians as a part of the Men of the North.

Haliburton was not the only one to attempt to create a foundation for Canadian nationality on the basis of their Nordicity. In the early twentieth century, the Group of Seven, a group of artists from Ontario, painted the landscape of the Canadian north to achieve similar ends through art. The importance of Haliburton is not his uniqueness but the context within which he was writing, in the immediate post-confederation period, with the threat of Nova Scotian secession. By linking Canadians to the Norse, Haliburton argued Canadians were one big family and should therefore have a sense of responsibility to each other. In other words, given the common ancestry of the Quebecois, Ontarians, Nova Scotians and New Brunswickians, they should remain in a union with each other. The myth of the “Men of the North” symbolised the cohesion of the Canadian nation.

We have seen in this section that nationalist elites assert the right to national self-determination largely through the use of symbols. These symbols reflect the historical experience with the nation’s significant other and as such occupy a central place in the nationalist discourse. The symbols distinguish the nation from other nations by using unique historical examples. These historical symbols create imaginary borders that differentiate the nation from other nations. The creation of a significant other showed not only who did not belong to the nation but also who did

---

<sup>93</sup> Ibid: 9

belong. They clearly highlighted the antagonism central to nationalist discourse and thus allowed sense to be made of the contemporary situation. Ultimately the symbols attempt to provide the emotive force necessary for support for the nationalist discourse to be accepted.

The symbols selected also highlighted the way the two nations had been formed. Scottish nationalists were able to draw on a wider range of material from the middle ages. Bannockburn was fought nearly 500 years before the War of 1812. The creation and maintenance of the boundaries of the territory of the Scottish nation had been carried out in the middle ages. The boundaries of the Canadian nation were still being created after Confederation in 1867. This is not to say that the Scottish nation existed in the middle ages. It merely highlights *la longue duree* process emphasised by ethno-symbolists and perennialists. More importantly, however, they show the use of historical materials by nationalist elites.

The power relationship between nation and state is outlined by comparison with similar historical examples. As we saw in the previous chapter, misrecognition of identity can create notions of inferiority. Nationalist elites will use symbols that counteract this inferiority. The success of Scottish forces over the English at Bannockburn or the defeat of American forces in the War of 1812, reflect the superiority of the national identity over the significant other. In this way the symbols reflect the contexts in which they are used. The remainder of this chapter will analyse these contexts.

### ***The Politics of Recognition and the significant other***

The recognition of identity and significant others are dominant themes in the discourse of nationalist movements. Discourse analysis places emphasis on antagonism towards the other. Non-recognition of identity naturally leads to antagonism. Identity is negotiated through dialogue with the significant other through experience and context. Identity can be negotiated through the significant other in two ways. The other can be seen as a contrast or foil. Direct recognition can also be sought from the other. Part of this dialogue will inevitably involve the non-

recognition or mis-recognition of the nation by the other. Either of these reflects back to the nation certain notions of oppression and inferiority. These notions of inferiority and oppression turn into symbols of superiority and liberty, as we saw with Bannockburn and the War of 1812. Non or mis-recognition thus results in the articulation of an identity claiming superiority over the significant other. These symbols then provide the emotive drive for nationalism. Contemporary problems are discussed with reference to the symbols due to the failure to recognise the nation. The symbols become the focal point of recognition.

But the contextual element of identity is also important. What is the context in which these failures in recognition by the “other” become important? Barth argued that ethnic identity is most forcefully expressed when it comes into contact with other identities.<sup>94</sup> Given the political nature of nationalism it is likely that this contact will come in the political arena, especially in multi-national states.

#### *The influence of Irish Home Rule on Scottish Nationalism*

The biggest political issue of the 1880s and 1890s was Irish nationalism. Gladstone’s decision to introduce an Irish Home Rule Bill in April 1886 was furiously debated, both in the Houses of Parliament and in the outside world. The most contentious aspect of the Bill was the lack of provision for the representation of Irish MPs at Westminster. With the furore the Bill created, it was little wonder it was defeated in the House of Commons in the summer of that year (343 votes against to 313 votes for).<sup>95</sup> Gladstone introduced a further Irish Home Rule Bill in his next administration (1892-4), which included Irish representation at Westminster, but this Bill, although carried by the House of Commons, was defeated in the Lords by a massive margin.<sup>96</sup>

Gladstone’s conversion to the cause of Irish Home Rule had numerous consequences including the complete fracture of the Liberal Party in Scotland. Several academics have argued that the formation of the SHRA was a direct result of the Irish Home

---

<sup>94</sup> Barth, F., “Introduction” in Barth, F., (ed) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (London, Allen and Unwin: 1969)

<sup>95</sup> Kendle, J., *Ireland and the Federal Solution: The Debate over the United Kingdom Constitution, 1870-1921* (Kingston, McGill – Queens University Press: 1989): 56

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid*: 79

Rule Bill being introduced in Parliament.<sup>97</sup> There is no doubt that the Bill made Home Rule a matter of practical politics and speeded up the formation of a Scottish movement. There had, however, been talk of Home Rule for Scotland prior to 1886 but to no effect.<sup>98</sup> The reasons for the formation of the SHRA must be located within the immediate context of its formation.

Irish Home Rule formed a key part of the discourse of the SHRA from its inception. The campaign for Scottish Home rule was inevitably going to be compared with the Irish campaign, in both its good and bad aspects. But the SHRA from the time of its formation used the comparison with Ireland to show that Scotland deserved just as much attention and recognition as Ireland. The decision to adopt Irish Home Rule as policy was seen by Scottish nationalists as creating an illegitimate system of governance. In the aftermath of the Reform Act of 1884 and the Redistribution Act of 1885, democratic principles would have been at the forefront of nationalists' minds. Democracy creates equal citizens in which everyone's identity matters. This argument also extends to groups and therefore to nations. If within a democratic, multi-national state all nations have equality, each must be given equal treatment. As Mann argued, failure to institutionalise this equality/democratic principle would lead to nationalism.<sup>99</sup> This was the key message of the discourse of the Scottish nationalists.

The discourse of the SHRA was expressed in terms of the recognition of identity. Ireland was given direct recognition by the government of the day. It was this direct recognition that Scottish nationalists craved and that led to the formation of the SHRA. Thus the United Kingdom state was the other from whom direct recognition was sought, despite the fact that through the historical symbols of Scottish identity

---

<sup>97</sup> Finlay, R.J., *A Partnership for Good: Scottish Politics and the Union since 1880* (John Donald Publishers Ltd, Edinburgh: 1997); Fry, M., *Patronage and Principle: A Political History of Modern Scotland* (Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen: 1987); Morton, G., "The First Scottish Home Rule Association" in Dickinson, H.T., and Lynch, M., *The Challenge to Westminster- Sovereignty, Devolution and Independence* (East Linton, Tuckwell Press: 2000); Hanham, H., *Scottish Nationalism* (Faber & Faber, London: 1969)

<sup>98</sup> See for example Lord Rosebery's speech re: Scottish Secretary in 1881 at 3 Hansard Vol. 262: 320-1

<sup>99</sup> Mann, M., "A Political Theory of Nationalism and its Excesses" in S. Periwal (ed) *Notions of Nationalism* (London, Central European University Press: 1995): 62

the SHRA used England as a contrast or foil in the traditional manner of the other. If Scotland was to obtain the recognition from the United Kingdom state that the SHRA felt it was due, it had to put across the claim that Scotland was just as much a nation worthy of recognition as Ireland. Thus from the first publication Scottish Home Rule was linked to the Irish movement.

Indeed the very first lines of the first flyer produced by the SHRA referred to the Irish Home Rule debate as “the present grave crisis in the political world, when a readjustment of the whole legislative machinery of the country is likely to be accomplished...”<sup>100</sup> This “readjustment,” they argued, must include Home Rule for Scotland. In the first petition to the House of Commons in 1886, the SHRA set the tone for the discourse that would follow in the next decade or so.

The constitutional changes necessary in the application of this principle, require, in the opinion of your Petitioners, to be considered with the utmost deliberation, and with reference not only to Ireland, but to each of the United Kingdoms...<sup>101</sup>

The decision by Parliament to acknowledge the principle of self-government, which it had done with the colonies, but also in the Irish Home Rule Bill debate, led the SHRA to argue that Scotland should be given her due recognition. Scotland, they argued time and again, was at least equal to Ireland in terms of national status and therefore had the right to exercise the right to self-determination through a national legislature. The British State was being asked to recognise Scotland’s dignity as a nation.

By granting Home Rule to Ireland, the Government was perceived by the SHRA to be committing an injustice to the people of Scotland by giving direct recognition of the existence of the Irish nation, when not recognising the existence of the Scottish nation in similar fashion. Irish Home Rule without a guarantee “that the claim of Scotland to a Legislature and Executive Government will be conceded would be destructive of the National life of Scotland, *an act of treachery towards the Scottish*

---

<sup>100</sup> SHRA, *Scottish Home Rule Association* (Edinburgh, 1886)

<sup>101</sup> SHRA, *Petition*

*people*.”<sup>102</sup> The idea that Scotland’s right to self-determination should not be recognised when Ireland’s was became inexcusable and called into question the legitimacy of the proposed system. The same proposals were described as “an injustice to a loyal, industrious, patient and intelligent people”<sup>103</sup> and “a most monstrous and arrogant assumption.”<sup>104</sup>

Despite the argument above that Scottish Home Rule should be given equality with the Irish, the SHRA was not afraid to put across its case in terms which could appear to be quite derogatory to the Irish, thus making the Irish a contrast to the Scots. Scotland’s claim to nationhood and home rule was presented as being greater than that of Ireland’s claim. The historical aspect of the comparison is one clear example of this. According to the SHRA, the Irish had never possessed a “real parliament which had worked to the satisfaction of the people” unlike Scotland. Instead they “enjoyed in Gratton’s far-famed Parliament a Protestant Council, empowered to govern a Roman Catholic country.”<sup>105</sup> In addition to not having a “real Parliament”, Ireland only lost its “fake” Parliament in 1800. By comparison, Scotland had lost hers in 1707, a “grievance of the first magnitude.”<sup>106</sup> Whilst the SHRA acknowledged the Union with Ireland was brought about by “wholesale corruption,” they sided with Scotland’s national bard that through the Treaty of Union of 1707, Scotland was “bought and sold for English gold.”<sup>107</sup> Thus Scotland’s grievances against the English were just as great as Ireland’s.

One of the most important aspects of this historical analysis was the assertion that Ireland was a conquered province of England, whereas Scotland was “an unconquered nation.”<sup>108</sup> This is a recurring theme within the SHRA’s discourse, as was evident in the use of Bannockburn and the Declaration of Independence as historical symbols of national identity. An Ireland brought into Union as a conquered

---

<sup>102</sup> SHRA, *Protest of the Scottish Home Rule Association Against the Denial or Delay of Home Rule for Scotland* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1890) emphasis added

<sup>103</sup> Ibid

<sup>104</sup> SHRA, *Home Rule for Scotland – What does it mean?*

<sup>105</sup> SHRA, *Protest of the Scottish Home Rule Association Against the Denial or Delay of Home Rule for Scotland*

<sup>106</sup> SHRA, *Home Rule for Scotland – What does it mean?*

<sup>107</sup> Ibid

<sup>108</sup> Ibid

province and Scotland as an independent negotiator in Union was an important comparison. Scotland had voluntarily entered the Union and could, therefore, withdraw from the British State.

As the two nations entered into a bargain for their mutual advantage as co-equal partners, they can cancel the agreement whenever it ceases to be of advantage to either.<sup>109</sup>

On all of these counts of national one-up-man-ship, the SHRA argued that *if* there was to be any precedence given by Westminster, then Scotland, on account of having endured the indignity of losing a “real” Parliament 100 years before Ireland, should be given Home Rule first. But, despite the rhetoric, the discourse of the group was consistent from the start. Both Scotland and Ireland were equal nations and home rule should be given to each of the four divisions of the United Kingdom. If Ireland was to be given direct recognition by the state then so should Scotland.

The financial aspect of home rule was another key theme, and again the comparison with Ireland was important. Unlike the pamphlets that dealt with the financial aspect alone, however, the comparisons with Ireland were concise. The comparisons revolved around taxation and government spending.

Now as to taxation, it is notorious that Ireland contributes to the Imperial Exchequer a very much smaller revenue than Scotland does...If then she contributes so little in comparison to Scotland, the returns to her ought to be correspondingly small. The reverse is the case, however: the returns to Scotland are only about one-fifth of what is given to Ireland.<sup>110</sup>

This is the serious side of the nationalism displayed by the SHRA. None of the nationalist rhetoric of the moral objections and historic antagonism discussed above. Instead we have a genuine financial grievance that could make a real difference to the people of Scotland were it to be rectified. But at the root of this grievance was still the demand for recognition and the rights of Scotland to be vindicated. Scotland was overtaxed compared to Ireland and yet did not benefit from, for example, the

---

<sup>109</sup> Waddie, *How Scotland Lost her Parliament*: 93

<sup>110</sup> SHRA, *Home Rule for Scotland – What does it mean?*

same levels of military spending. Due recognition and equality were demanded by the SHRA through home rule all round.

An altogether more serious issue was the lack of Parliamentary attention to Scottish matters. Whilst this will be discussed at length later in this chapter, the comparison with Irish Parliamentary time again highlights the key issue of recognition.

The time given to Scottish business in the House of Commons is a mere fraction of what is given to Ireland; in other words, for one hour Scotland gets, Ireland gets twelve. The business of Scotland, moreover, being much greater than Ireland's by reason of her varied industries, makes the wrong done to Scotland all the greater.<sup>111</sup>

The Scottish nation, for the SHRA, being more diverse, with the implications of being more useful, or fruitful, to the British State than Ireland, meant that the failure to give parity in home rule was even more of an indignity to the Scottish nation. Irish national identity was recognised by the government but Scotland's was not, thus the campaign by the SHRA.

The national campaign for a Secretary for Scotland, conducted in the early part of the 1880s, had been a similar, and ultimately successful, attempt to gain direct recognition for Scotland and the neglect of Scottish business. But again the despair of the campaigners in the early days led to comparisons with Ireland. Following Gladstone's rejection of his advice to appoint a Scot to a Junior Lordship of the Treasury post, Rosebery wrote to his friend Edward Hamilton,

...I confess I think Scotland is as usual treated abominably. Justice for Ireland means everything done for her even to the payment of the natives' debts. Justice to Scotland means insulting neglect. I leave for Scotland next week with the view of blowing up a prison or shooting a policeman...<sup>112</sup>

This was of course a reference to the Kilmainham Treaty, the Manchester Martyrs and the bombing of Clerkenwell Prison by Fenians in 1867. But with the creation of the post of Scottish Secretary in 1885, the situation in Parliament with regards to

---

<sup>111</sup> Ibid

<sup>112</sup> Quoted in James, R.R, *Lord Rosebery* : 130

Scottish legislation had, from the SHRA's perspective, not improved. Scottish nationalists, in contrast to Irish nationalists, had been peaceful in their protests. This theme was raised on a number of occasions by the SHRA.

In the 1890s indignation was truly aroused on hearing that Gladstone intended, in his second Irish Home Rule bill, for Irish MPs to keep their eighty seats at Westminster. In a letter to Gladstone, the SHRA, withdrawing support for the Liberal Leader, argued that because of his intention to deal with Ireland alone, "the Irish would become masters of the British Parliament."<sup>113</sup> The SHRA, as well as predicting Irish mastery at Westminster, told Gladstone of their indignation "at the neglect with which, although a Scottish M.P., you are treating Scotland."<sup>114</sup> This led to a review of the Scots views of the Irish, some of which we have noted above.

There is undoubtedly a kindly feeling in Scotland towards the Irish ... But it would require an angelic meekness- to which no Scotsman ever pretended- to submit patiently to the provision – now embodied in the Bill, that Ireland is not only to have a fully equipped legislature in Dublin for the transaction of its own domestic business, but eighty representatives in the House of Commons – eight more than Scotland has – who would have the power ... to dominate the domestic business of Scotland.<sup>115</sup>

Essentially this was an Irish version of the West Lothian Question.<sup>116</sup> If Ireland was to be given Home Rule what right did Irish MPs at Westminster have to vote on matters that were the sole preserve of Scotland (or England and Wales). Likewise, however, the removal of Irish MPs from Westminster would result in cries of "no taxation without representation." The legitimacy of the proposed system was not only an issue for Scottish nationalists but also for the Irish.

Again, the rational argument is accompanied by language which could be interpreted as national petulance, or at least nationalist petulance, but which masks a more serious issue: the recognition of Scotland's right to legislation without interference

---

<sup>113</sup> SHRA to the Right Honourable W.E. Gladstone M.P for Midlothian (1892)

<sup>114</sup> Ibid

<sup>115</sup> Mitchell, W., *The Political Situation in Scotland* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1894): 5

<sup>116</sup> The West Lothian Question was raised by Tam Dalyell during the 1970s debate on Scottish Devolution. It questions the right of Scottish MPs sitting at Westminster to vote on purely English domestic legislation when English MPs no longer have a similar right.

from, in this case, the Irish. This time the demand for recognition is accompanied by the assertion of the right of self-determination of the Scottish nation. Each of these examples asserted the superiority of Scots identity over the Irish. The Irish were used as the other in the sense of a contrast or foil in which the superiority of Scottish identity and therefore Scotland's claims to a Parliament were clearly highlighted.

Another aspect of this plea for direct recognition was the comparison with the colonies, particularly pertinent for this study:

Compared with the colonies Scotland is a gigantic weather-beaten oak, having its roots firmly fixed among craggy rocks, and its knotted limbs toughened by exposure to ten thousand gales. Yet the colonies, which are but saplings of a few years growth, are entrusted with greater privileges in the form of self-government than the motherland that planted them, and which is the cradle and nursery of brave and free-men – the land that showed to an astonished world how a small yet brave race, which had determined to be free, could, against the greatest odds, maintain that freedom against one of the most powerful and ruthless nations in Christendom.<sup>117</sup>

Again we see the comparison of the treatment of other “nations” by the state being used in an attempt by Scottish nationalists to gain direct recognition from the United Kingdom state. It was bad enough that Scotland was treated as a province of England but to be given less recognition than the colonies of the Empire it helped form and maintain was a scandal. The legitimacy of the Empire depended on giving Scottish settlers in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and so on, the right to govern their own affairs. Since the loss of the American Colonies in the late eighteenth century, one of the principles of the British Empire was to devolve power to British settlers wherever they may be. The SHRA argued this should also apply to the United Kingdom state and used the point to highlight the problems of legitimacy at home.

A final aspect of the recognition argument regarded the perceived non-recognition by the English of Scotland as part of Great Britain. In the late 1880s, the SHRA issued a Protest against the use of “England” and “English” for “Britain” and “British.” They claimed,

---

<sup>117</sup> Napier, T., *The Arrogance of Englishmen: A Bar to Imperial Federation – Also Remarks on the apathy of Scotsmen* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1895): 12-13

Of late years a custom has sprung up of applying the names England and English not only to Britain, but also to the whole Empire, its Peoples and its Institutions – a custom which practically demands that Scotsmen should cease to be Scotsmen and consent to be Englishmen, that Scotland should be blotted from the map and reappear as the Northern Counties of England and that the Articles of the Treaty of Union, which so carefully provided for the adoption of the common name “Britain” and “British,” should be dishonourably set aside.<sup>118</sup>

The SHRA argued English egotism and inability to consider “the feelings, habits and the ideas of others” as well as ignorance of historical fact had led to the incorrect use of England for Britain. The name Great Britain, they argued, had been established by the Treaty of Union. But continual breach of the Treaty left Scotland as a nation, “being robbed the fame of great names, and the memory of brave deeds.”<sup>119</sup> Scottish nationalists appealed

...to the noble minded to do justice between Scotland and other portions of the Empire- refraining from insult and paying the respect due to Treaty rights and the dictates of honour.<sup>120</sup>

This discourse, one that was carried on throughout the period under study is important in understanding the demand for recognition by the Scottish nationalist elite in the late nineteenth century. On the one hand they are demanding equality with England in the Union, and on the other they are demanding recognition of Scottish distinctiveness and contribution to the Union/Empire. The demands for both are made through the rhetoric of dignity and honour.

The campaign for the correct use of nomenclature when Britain was the subject of discussion carried on throughout the history of the first Scottish Home Rule Association. In 1896 Theodore Napier claimed the misuse of English instead of

---

<sup>118</sup> SHRA, *Protest by the Scottish Home Rule Association Against the Misuse of the terms ‘England’ and English’ for ‘Britain’, the ‘British Empire’, its Peoples and Institutions.* (Edinburgh, SHRA: Undated) – this protest was issued sometime between 1886 and 1892 since it mentions Gladstone as the leader of the opposition.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid

<sup>120</sup> Ibid

British rendered the Treaty of Union *ipso facto* defunct.<sup>121</sup> Indeed it was more than a breach of a contract. Both Napier and John Romans argued it was a slur on the honour of Scots.<sup>122</sup> In 1898, Napier organised a petition containing over a hundred thousand signatures which was sent to Queen Victoria, complaining against the misuse of the National names. Lord Balfour of Burleigh, the then Conservative Scottish Secretary, sent the official reply advising that Her Majesty would pay no heed to the matter. Napier's response clearly showed his anger and irritation.

The cumbrous title "Great Britain & Ireland", though quite correct in official documents, is not suitable for ordinary discourse; but I submit "Britain" and "British" are; and nothing but a hypercritical spirit would object to the words, which to the ordinary subjects of Her Majesty, applies to the whole Empire. Whether this be so or not, certainly "England" and "English" do not convey the same meaning and are only used to gratify the intolerable arrogance of the English people.<sup>123</sup>

On the face of it, this may seem like a petty grievance compared to the decision to give Ireland Home Rule but not Scotland. As David McCrone claims, however, we have noted the "power of/in language" in relation to gender relations.<sup>124</sup> The power of/in language when discussing nations can also be important. The relevance of the nomenclature issue can be gauged from the continued interest in the modern day. In fact it lies at the heart of the recognition argument. Taylor argued that identities are developed in response to a loss of dignity.<sup>125</sup> Failure to recognise the important role Scotland played within the Union and the Empire was a clear insult to Scottish dignity and honour. The response to this breach of dignity was the creation of a nationalist discourse using symbols of Scottish identity that emphasised Scotland's superiority *vis-à-vis* the English.

---

<sup>121</sup> Napier, T., *The Arrogance of Englishmen*: 5

<sup>122</sup> Romans, J., *Home Rule for Scotland* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1893): 34; Napier, T., *Scotland's Relations with England: A Plea for the National Rights of Scotland* (Edinburgh: 1896): 15;

<sup>123</sup> Theodore Napier to Lord Balfour of Burleigh, 2 April 1898.

<sup>124</sup> McCrone, D., "Who Are We? Understanding Scottish Identity" in Di Domenico, C., Law, A., Skinner, J., and Smith, M., (eds) *Boundaries and Identities: Nation, Politics and Culture in Scotland* (Dundee, University of Abertay Press: 2001): 17

<sup>125</sup> Taylor, C., "Nationalism and Modernity" in Hall, J.A., (ed) *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the theory of nationalism* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1998): 207

The formation of the SHRA was a cry for recognition of the Scottish nation by a nationalist elite, in terms of the recognition of Irish national identity had been given by the government of the day. This desire for recognition was articulated through historical comparison of Scotland and Ireland and the symbols of Scottish national identity. But the drive for the creation of the SHRA was a political act by the Gladstone government, the Irish Home Rule bill. The bill proposed to give back to Ireland some of the powers it had lost in 1801. In doing so it made it politically acceptable for a Scottish Home Rule Association to be formed. It also created a situation where the legitimacy of the proposals was called into question on democratic grounds. The SHRA claimed equality of Scotland and Ireland hence there should be equal treatment regarding Home Rule. Here then we have a situation where a political act by the state was the trigger that sparked nationalism.

What was unusual about the formation of the SHRA was the action of the state. Gladstone's first Irish Home Rule Bill would have had no direct impact upon the governance of the Scottish nation. Indeed it had been argued that solution of the Irish problem was the answer to the problem of Scottish legislative blockages.<sup>126</sup> This then leads us back to the argument that the formation of a nationalist group, whilst a response to the action of the state, was at the same time a direct request for equal recognition by the other.

### *The Influence of the United States on British Canadian Nationalism*

National identity, as we have seen, is usually expressed in terms of what we are not. Significant others act as a foil or contrast, as we saw in the use of the Wars of Independence in Scotland. But in other cases the other is someone from whom direct recognition is requested. The "other" will generally have been an enemy of past conflicts and indeed may have invaded the nation's territory, but given the continued existence of the nation, the "other" will always have been repelled and this will become a matter of pride for the nation, in many cases the specific battles will become cultural symbols of the nation's independence and sovereignty, as we saw in the opening section of this chapter, Scotland and Bannockburn being one example.

---

<sup>126</sup> See for example *The Glasgow Herald*, 14 June 1881: 4

These cultural symbols are called upon in times of national trouble in order to rouse the nation in readiness for the next fight.

Canada's significant other was, and still is, the United States of America. Given the length of their contiguous border, the economic success of the United States, and their common colonial origin, it would be surprising indeed if there had not been a few disputes along the way. America's belief in its manifest destiny and the war with Mexico in the mid nineteenth century<sup>127</sup> would have been enough to worry Canadian nationalists had there not already been a history of invasions from south of the Border. These invasions, the fleeing of the United Empire Loyalists in the 1780s, the War of 1812 and the Fenian raids of 1866, were constantly quoted by British Canadian nationalists as critical junctures in Canadian history.

The battles with the United States, however, were not the only concern that British Canadian nationalists had regarding their southern neighbour. Nor was it the only way in which the United States was portrayed as an enemy, contrast or foil. The campaign over the direction of Canada's trade in the late 1880s was seen as an attempt to entice Canada into a political union with the United States and was resisted by a nationalist campaign. The battles that had been fought in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century across the border were oft quoted to show that the Commercial Union movement was just a sneaky attempt to achieve the same goal, the annexation of Canada. George Denison, in his speech at the inaugural meeting of the Toronto branch of the Imperial Federation League in Canada (IFLC), cited the flight of the United Empire Loyalists, the War of 1812 and the Fenian raid of 1866 as examples of the United States being "an aggressive and grasping country."<sup>128</sup> Describing the leaders of the Commercial Union movement as "traitors", Denison argued that the United States

---

<sup>127</sup> Manifest Destiny was the idea that America would rule the continent. The War with Mexico in the 1840s regarded the Texan desire to join the American Union, a move Mexico greeted with fury. The United States inflicted a heavy defeat on Mexico and gained not only Texas but also California and New Mexico – see Colclough, K., *The Development of the Mexican Nation* (University of Strathclyde, 1998) unpublished Masters Thesis 57-67

<sup>128</sup> Imperial Federation League, *Imperial Federation League in Canada – Speeches at the public meeting Held at Toronto on March 24<sup>th</sup>, 1888* (Toronto, 1888)

...wanted to make Canadians believe that an extended market would benefit them. Their real desire, however, was to make Canada a slaughter market for their goods, and by crippling Canadian industries eventually drive the people of the Dominion into such a condition that they would be glad to accept annexation as an alternative to absolute ruin.<sup>129</sup>

As well as being aggressors then, the United States is portrayed here by Denison as underhand and sneaky. But Denison, the British Canadian nationalist, was wise to their ways and fought tooth and nail to ensure the Canadian public knew what Uncle Sam was about.

Denison was not the only British Canadian nationalist to follow this line. J. Hague, in a pamphlet written in response to a continental union speech given in Boston, put forward the argument that the Commercial union movement was a United States conspiracy “to destroy our hopes of national development, and to compel us by force of arms to serve as “hewers of wood and drawers of water” to our conquerors.”<sup>130</sup> Hague saw the reasons for the conspiracy in a slightly different light, however.

The arrogance shown in the present demand that a foreign power shall control our destinies is one result of the subjugation of the south by the North in the late war...<sup>131</sup>

The trade debate will be analysed in more depth in later chapters, but it is important to note here that the debate was not simply about trade with a neighbour. The nationalist response was framed in the rhetoric of the aggressive “other” using underhand methods to wrestle sovereignty away from the Canadian nation. The response was couched in terms that asked the United States for reasonable trade, whilst at the same time demanding recognition for the existence of another nation on the North American continent, Canada. Again we have the “other” being used in two different ways. In the first instance the United States are portrayed as a contrast to the Canadians, disloyal to the crown, weak, and politically unstable, followed by an articulation of an identity that shows the strength, loyalty and stability of the

---

<sup>129</sup> Ibid

<sup>130</sup> Hague, J., *Canada for Canadians: A Royalist” Roland” for the Annexationist “Oliver”* (Toronto, 1889): 23

<sup>131</sup> Ibid: 15

Canadian nation. It was for this strong, loyal, stable nation that British Canadian nationalists sought the recognition of the United States.

The theme of American aggression had been around from the early days of Canada First. Indeed the Campaign for the North West was in large part an attempt to ensure the Americans did not occupy the territory first. Manifest Destiny, whilst with hindsight probably never really threatened Canada, was at the time a perceived threat to the survival of the Dominion and was used as a propaganda tool by Canada First. Westward expansion through the prairies without the admission of Manitoba into the Dominion would have been impossible. Canada First saw the “revolt” at Red River, with the advertised support it had from the United States (through the newspaper of the provisional government), as a massive threat to the future integrity of Canada.<sup>132</sup> Add the interference at Red River to the catalogue of border incursions since the Declaration of Independence and the concerns of British Canadian nationalists were justifiable.

But there were some calls for a mediation of the concerns. William Canniff, writing in 1875, argued

...the United States would not attempt to force Canada into the Union. [But] it is true the attitude that nation has always maintained towards Canada has been uniformly unfriendly, often actually hostile. Indeed the history of the United States is prominently characterised by unswerving efforts to obtain possession of British America....in a multitude of ways, efforts have been put forth to control the destiny of this country by indoctrinating Canadians with the theory of Manifest Destiny.<sup>133</sup>

Canniff, then, argued that there was no real military threat from the south, despite almost constant historical efforts on the part of the United States to invade Canada. Yet, Canniff still portrayed the constant efforts of the United States to annex Canada in terms of the non-recognition of the Canadian nation by the United States. In articulating a picture of a young Canada defending itself against aggression, Canniff used the images of defence from past conflict to instil a belief that Canada had before

---

<sup>132</sup> Willison, *Sir Wilfred Laurier*: 180

<sup>133</sup> Canniff, W., *Canadian Nationality*:18-19

and could again defend itself from the aggressive neighbour, thus protecting its sovereignty.

One key difference between Canada and the United States, according to the Canada First nationalists, was their geographical position on the American continent. Canadians were a Northern people, “the true outcrop of human nature, more manly, more real, than the weak marrow bones superstition of an effeminate south.”<sup>134</sup> This was, of course, a reference to Haliburton’s *Men of the North* creation myth. Whilst the invention of tradition is an important feature of all nationalist discourse, its significance goes beyond the creation myth in this case. In specifically seeing Canada as a northern country, it just as specifically excluded Americans. In arguing that Northern races were strong, hardy and virtuous, the myth implied their southern neighbours were weak, fragile and immoral. Here then we have a classic example of the “other” being used as a contrast with the nation, allowing the nation to be seen in its best possible light.

On a more practical level, the United States was also used to show what was best in the Canadian political system. James Young, one of the few Canadian nationalists to advocate independence, argued that the Canadian political system combined the federal system of the United States, with the “fully matured principles of British Parliamentary government and I know none under which people enjoy truer liberty or so directly control the actions of their representatives.”<sup>135</sup> But Young continues, using the failure of the 1890 election in the States as an example. The Republicans, had been defeated, ostensibly due to the McKinley Tariff, a range of protectionist measures which restricted imports and increased prices, and yet the change over in Congress, which continued to legislate, did not take place for four months.

When the 52<sup>nd</sup> Congress meets, the Executive and the Senate will be at war with the House of Representatives, the former Republican and the latter democratic, and even the McKinley bill, against which the nation so loudly

---

<sup>134</sup> Foster, *Canada First*: 13

<sup>135</sup> Young, J., *Canadian Nationality: A Glance at the Present and Future* (Toronto, 1891): 18-19

protested, will most likely be kept on the statute book in defiance of the overwhelming vote of the people against it.<sup>136</sup>

But of course nothing so tyrannical or absurd could happen in Canada, the land of the virtuous and free. In 1878, the Liberals were defeated at the polls, Alexander McKenzie resigned and John A. Macdonald was asked to form a government “and thus within thirty days the will of the Canadian people as expressed at the polls became the policy of the country.”<sup>137</sup>

Here again we have a classic use of the “other” as a negative contrast to the positive aspects of the nation, in this case the political system. This is a recurring theme throughout the pamphlet literature of the British Canadian nationalists, and was used as a way of instilling pride in Canadian institutions, particularly when measured against a nation as powerful as the United States.

We have seen so far that the other can be used in different ways in a nationalist discourse. In one sense the United States is used antagonistically, the symbols of previous wars clearly marking them out as the other to be concerned about. On the other hand the use of those same symbols where Canada had overcome invasions and border incursions by the United States highlighted the superiority of the Canadian character. The contrasts between the morals, politics and legal system of the United States and Canada showed the use of the United States as a foil to show the superiority of Canadian identity.

Canada also used the British Empire as a significant other, claiming direct recognition of Canada as a key part of the Empire, not just a colony. As with Scottish grievances against the use of English instead of British, the Canadians loathed the use of the “colony” when Canada was being discussed. William Foster and the Canada First movement claimed “Peculiar notions are suggested by the word ‘colony’ so that it requires no great dexterity in intention to use it as an efficient term

---

<sup>136</sup> Ibid: 19

<sup>137</sup> Ibid: 20

of reproach”<sup>138</sup> It is hardly surprising that the term colony was used in such disparaging tones, claimed Foster, when the motherland sends all her criminals, impoverished and religious zealots.

A young country is peculiarly sensitive to outside criticism. A very few words spoken in our favour by a stranger give us pleasure; and a very few malicious words uttered to our detriment irritate sorely.<sup>139</sup>

Although less vociferous in their protests than the Scots, there is still a clear sense that Canada’s dignity was being attacked by the use of the term colony. In this case it was, in Taylor’s terms, a matter of mis-recognition rather than non-recognition.<sup>140</sup> An identity was being projected onto Canadians as Colonists, one that nationalists felt had notions of inferiority and oppression. The nationalists identified this assault on their dignity and responded to it through the use of symbols of identity and invented tradition, in this case by seeking a basis for national sentiment. The invented traditions of loyalty to the state, that Foster contended, would help imagine the social cohesion of the nation, and identify Canada’s status as a sovereign nation.

Canadian nationalists’ ire was clearly directed against the metropolis. Both Denison and Foster argued elsewhere in their speeches that Canada was a senior member of the Empire.<sup>141</sup> As William Canniff, a member of the Canada First Committee and of the Canadian National Association, argued in 1875, British Canadian nationalists would “no longer tolerate imported supercilious mediocrity” as a colony. “They will be satisfied with nothing less than equality with the people of Great Britain.”<sup>142</sup> Dominion status, with the associated responsibility of self-government mattered a great deal to Canadians and to be called a colony and equated with an African colony irritated sorely.

---

<sup>138</sup> Ibid: 19-20

<sup>139</sup> Ibid: 22

<sup>140</sup> Taylor, C., “The Politics of Recognition” in Gutman, A., (ed) *Multiculturalism* (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1992): 25

<sup>141</sup> Denison, *The Duty of Canadians*: 27; Foster, *Canada First*:

<sup>142</sup> Canniff, W., *Canadian Nationality*: 15

But despite these protestations of the 1870s, the situation had not really changed by the following decade. J.D. Edgar, another member of Canada First and an MP in the Federal Parliament, complained in 1885

...that the good people of England know little and care less about Canada. They know all about the United States, all about its institutions and its history, and honor its citizens. Not one in a hundred has any knowledge of our history or institutions. We are received, very properly as *colonists*, and are welcomed by John Bull with patronizing politeness, not unmingled with genuine surprise that we know how to behave ourselves at all.<sup>143</sup>

This is an interesting example of the general trend regarding the nomenclature of Canada by the metropolis. Here we have the introduction of the United States as the “other”, in much the same manner as Ireland was used by the SHRA. The direct recognition given the United States as a nation by the British was seen as the benchmark level of recognition. British Canadian nationalists wanted Britain to give Canada the same level of recognition given to her Southern neighbour. The slight was all the greater when the United States played the traditional role of the other in the British Canadian nationalist’s discourse.

The nature of the nation’s relationship with its significant other is vitally important in any nationalist discourse. National identity is generated from experience of significant others or in dialogue with or against them. Significant others are used as symbols to establish boundaries that signify who belongs and who does not belong to the nation. All discussions that follow the use of these symbols are based on the understanding of the relationship between the nation and the other. The identity expressed by the SHRA emerged from their experience of being neglected by the United Kingdom state in contrast to Ireland. The nationalist response was to demand due recognition of Scottish national identity from the United Kingdom state on the basis that Scotland’s historical position was stronger than Ireland’s, having entered the Union as a partner, not a conquered province. Thus the context of the experience led to the specific formulation of the nationalist discourse. Notions of inferiority and

---

<sup>143</sup> Edgar, J.D., *Loyalty: An Address delivered to the Toronto Young Mens Club* (Toronto, 1885): 8

oppression were compared to differential treatment of others by the state. These notions were converted into historical symbols, Bannockburn, strong Parliaments and healthy nations. An identity was articulated that contended Scotland was anything but inferior or oppressed.

The Canadian reaction to the other was slightly different as Canada and the United States had no formal political relationship. In this case, British Canadian nationalists articulated an identity that used the United States as a contrast, with a poor political system, disloyal to the Crown, and an inherently weak and effeminate population on account of their position in the south of the continent. The experience of repeated invasions, the legacy of the United Empire Loyalists and fact of confederation as a defence against United States expansion led to the articulation of an identity antithetical to American values. The notions of inferiority and oppression in relation to the United States led to the use of symbols to express a superior identity.

### ***Nationalism and Political Legitimacy – Governance and nationality***

Nationalism is ultimately a political discussion about the relationship between the nation and the state. Nationalists want to alter that political relationship in some way, whether through devolution or through complete separation from the existing state. But nationalism does not happen spontaneously. There must be some form of mechanism that sparks the formation of a nationalist movement. Part of this mechanism is the desire for recognition. This is important in two respects. Firstly, as we have seen above, the recognition of identity gives a sense of self worth to an individual or the nation. But more importantly, when an identity is recognised by the state the interests of that particular group are more likely to be represented effectively. Thus recognition of a national identity will lead to effective governance of the nation by the existing state. If the governmental needs of the nation are not satisfied, the legitimacy of the system will be called into question and a nationalist reaction will result. The degree of satisfaction with the existing arrangements needed to prevent a nationalist reaction will depend on context, the historical relations between the nation and state, the issues of the day and so on. The differences between Scotland and Canada highlight the problems states and empires can face

when dealing with nations. For Scotland, the problem was neglect by the state when there were issues to be dealt with. In Canada the issue was too much interference from the Imperial state without taking into account the interests of the Canadian nation. In both instances the failure of the nation/state relationship through neglect or an action of the state prompted the nationalist response.

### *Neglect and Mismanagement of Scottish Affairs*

The key grievance of the SHRA was the neglect and mismanagement of Scottish business at Westminster. Whilst it was noted above that the campaign for Scottish Home Rule was about recognition, this particular aspect of the nationalist discourse revolved around the issue of political power, i.e., who should have control of purely Scottish affairs. The crux of the argument was that Scotland, as an unconquered country, freely negotiated and ceded sovereignty to a **British**, not English, Parliament. The failure of this Parliament to legislate for Scotland's needs raised doubts about the legitimacy of the system. Scottish affairs, they claimed, had to be returned to a Scottish national legislature where there would be sufficient representation of Scottish national interests. The dominance of English and Irish MPs meant Scottish business was both neglected and mismanaged at Westminster.

According to Charles Waddie, honorary secretary of the SHRA, by the late nineteenth century, Parliament looked after the affairs of the Empire and India, all the outlying dependencies, watched over our army and navy, foreign affairs, and the domestic affairs of England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales.

Need it be wondered at that the whole machinery has broken down hopelessly in the attempt to grapple with such a mass of work.<sup>144</sup>

William Mitchell, in much the same vein, blamed Ireland, the Empire and the increasing work of the modern bureaucratic state for the impossibility of Westminster to undertake the work required.<sup>145</sup> But Scotland was not the only nation to lose; English and Welsh legislation also suffered.

---

<sup>144</sup> Waddie, C., *The Federation of Greater Britain* (Edinburgh: 1895): 1

<sup>145</sup> Mitchell, W., *Scotland and Home Rule*, (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1888): 30

This point was acknowledged with the call for Home Rule, not just for Scotland but for each of the four nations of the United Kingdom. The neglect of Scottish business, however, had led, in part, to the formation of the SHRA. Scottish business, not English, was “delayed until past midnight and received little attention when it was reached.”<sup>146</sup> In a letter from Mitchell to his electoral candidate in 1886, he asked why Scots should accept,

...as I suppose you would ask us to do with gratitude – the fag ends of odd nights for Scottish business, in which it gets no assistance but occasional obstruction and many a jeer, from English and Irish members? You must know, as I do well, that Scottish legislation conducted in such hugger-mugger fashion is anything but satisfactory.<sup>147</sup>

The neglect of Scottish business was clear to see for the SHRA. As a result some serious questions had not been addressed despite them having been keenly debated in Scotland. According to one pamphlet, “Land, Law, and Licensing Reform; Game Laws; Police Bill; the Church Question; Educational Improvement...” were all matters in urgent need of attention.<sup>148</sup> All were purely Scottish matters. Indeed the Church question was particularly important for the Scottish nationalists, being one of the Trinity of Scottish institutions supposedly protected by the Treaty of Union.

The disestablishment of the Church of Scotland had been debated among religious groups since the late 1860s, but had only really taken the form of a national and political debate on the election of the Liberals in 1880. Public rallies were held and Dick Peddie, the member for Kilmarnock, raised motions in the House of Commons for the disestablishment of the Kirk.<sup>149</sup> Despite the motions being defeated, they led to the formation of the Church Interests Committee, a Tory pressure group led by

---

<sup>146</sup> Ibid: 34

<sup>147</sup> SHRA, *Letter to A Candidate for a Scotch County from an Elector* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1886)

<sup>148</sup> Reith, J., *Reasons for Home Rule for Scotland* (Edinburgh, SHRA: circa 1892)

<sup>149</sup> Machin, I., “Voluntaryism and Reunion, 1874-1929.” In MacDougall, N (ed) *Church, Politics and Society: Scotland 1408-1929* (John Donald Publishers Ltd: Edinburgh; 1983): 224; Kellas, J.G., “The Liberal Party and the Scottish Church Disestablishment Crisis” in *English Historical Review* Vol. 79 (1964) 31-46: 33

Lord Balfour of Burleigh.<sup>150</sup> The Scottish Liberal organisation had split over the issue and the 1885 election saw the question become a test case as in thirteen of Scotland's constituencies, Church Liberals stood against disestablishers from the radical wing of the Liberal Party. In these cases, the Tory candidate would often stand aside.<sup>151</sup> But the Liberals were unable to form a government in 1885 and handed power to the Tories. Further motions for disestablishment were raised in the Commons in 1890 and 1892, this time with the support of Gladstone. Despite the fact that the 1892 motion was defeated by the Commons, it had been supported by 47 of the 72 Scots MPs.<sup>152</sup>

But for the SHRA, Westminster was not competent to disestablish the Church, even had any legislation been passed. There was no doubt from the strength of feeling that a full debate was required, but the SHRA argued such a debate should be held in a Scottish parliament. The Church had been established by the Scottish Parliament prior to the Treaty of Union, and had been protected as the Established national church by that Treaty. The only body, therefore, competent to disestablish the Kirk was a Scottish legislature.<sup>153</sup> Despite this, however, the United Kingdom state had interfered with the governance of the Church by passing the Patronage Act in 1712, which allowed the Patron of the Parish to select the next minister, an act church rules stated was the province of the Council of Elders in conjunction with the Presbytery. This had led to the first schism in the Kirk, with the formation of the Secession Church, but the SHRA argued the Patronage Act ultimately led to the Disruption of 1843 and the formation of the Free Presbyterian Church.<sup>154</sup> This treatment of the Church by the United Kingdom state had, according to the SHRA, "lamentable effects on the religious and family life of the country..."<sup>155</sup>

The Church is Scotland's *own* property: she owes nothing to England for it. Then why should Englishmen have a finger in her Kirk pie? No, let

---

<sup>150</sup> Kellas, "The Liberal Party and the Scottish Church...": 34

<sup>151</sup> Hutchison, I.G.C., *A Political History of Scotland 1832-1924: Parties, Elections and Issues* (Edinburgh, John Donald Publishers Ltd: 1986): 159-160

<sup>152</sup> Fleming J.R., *A History of the Church in Scotland 1875-1929* (Edinburgh, T&T Clark: 1933): 31

<sup>153</sup> Mitchell, *The Political Situation in Scotland*: 11

<sup>154</sup> Napier, *The Arrogance of Englishmen*: 7/8

<sup>155</sup> Mitchell, *Is Scotland to be sold Again?* : 26

Disestablishment, if it does come, be carried out by Scotland's *ain bairns*... We do not argue that the State Church of Scotland should be above the power and control of the Scottish People, but with the solemn Treaty of Union before us, we hold most decidedly that no Englishman or Irishman has the shadow of a right to touch it.<sup>156</sup>

The disestablishment campaign, whilst one of the key national issues in the late nineteenth century, was important for the SHRA as an example of an issue that was purely Scottish but was being neglected by Westminster, whilst paradoxically arguing that the only competent authority to deal with the issue under the terms of the Treaty of Union was a Scottish legislature.

Here we have a failure by the state to act, despite vigorous debate in Scotland on the matter. This failure to act, not just on one issue, but on a range of issues led the SHRA to call into question the legitimacy of the existing system of government. The United Kingdom state in failing to represent Scottish interests, had created an illegitimate state. Guibernau has argued that illegitimate states tend to have a dominant nation and the state will attempt to homogenise the nations within their territory.<sup>157</sup> But illegitimacy in a multi-national state can also stem not from attempts to homogenise but by a simple failure to recognise each national identity and enact legislation that the nation desires. The lack of a legitimate system of government, combined with the cultural argument regarding recognition of Scottish identity, thus provided the trigger for a Scottish nationalist discourse. In other words, the failure of the United Kingdom state to recognise Scottish national identity led to the failure to represent Scottish political interests. Thus, political context and the failure of recognition led to the articulation of a nationalist discourse critical of the state.

The disestablishment issue is typical of the discourse of the SHRA regarding the neglect of the sovereign duties at Westminster. But more important than Westminster neglect was the implementation of legislation against the wishes of Scots MPs. The Patronage Act of 1712 mentioned above was seen as misuse of

---

<sup>156</sup> Romans, *Home Rule for Scotland*: 18 (original emphasis)

<sup>157</sup> Guibernau, M., *Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1996): 60

power by Westminster. But the SHRA was quick to point to further misdemeanours by the United Kingdom state.

The main theme of their complaint was the manner in which Scots MPs were outnumbered at Westminster. This was noted in the section on Irish Home Rule. If the Government wanted to vote down a motion on a Scottish matter it could generally count on the English MPs to do the job. John Romans outlined the position clearly,

It matters not whether the question is in connection with our Fishing industry, our Mining, our Land, our Church, Education or our Laws, all must be made to conform to the pre-conceived notions of John Bull, whose Parliament is so overburdened with work that he has no time to spare for Scotland. He counts upon a division vote – 465 to Scotland’s 72 – hence we are always at the mercy of our Southern Partner – a position which our heroic ancestors never contemplated, and would only have submitted to when prostrate in death.<sup>158</sup>

We have already seen that English MPs voted down a motion supported by a majority of Scots MPs to disestablish the Kirk, but this was not the only occasion when the English majority overruled Scots MPs on Scottish matters. In 1890, the Local Government Bill was introduced. Some clauses of the bill relating to Police, licensing, rights of way and land use, to name but a few, were supported by a majority of the Scots MPs but opposed by a majority of the House of Commons.<sup>159</sup> This majority was composed of

...Englishmen who neither understood the question nor will listen to the discussion of the Scottish members who do, but on division without hearing the debate, crowd in and outvote them.<sup>160</sup>

The SHRA claimed this position was untenable. They argued the effect of being outnumbered by the English in a joint assembly was to relegate Scotland to a county of England. It meant the “subjection of Scotland to England, and of Scottish rights

---

<sup>158</sup> Romans, *Home Rule for Scotland*:10

<sup>159</sup> Ibid: 11

<sup>160</sup> Reith, *Reasons for Home Rule for Scotland*

and interests, as well as honour, to that of England...”<sup>161</sup> But to some in the SHRA it meant even worse. Scotland, they claimed, was “in her religious, educational, social, and political life, as entirely under the domination of English opinion as if she were a conquered province.”<sup>162</sup>

Here we have a different but related political context from the issue of the disestablishment of the Kirk. The important issue here is not the neglect of Scottish business but the interference in purely Scottish business. The resultant political nationalism is the same, but the political action of the state, the context, is different. Again, the interference is linked with notions of dignity and recognition: Scotland’s authenticity was at stake unless the United Kingdom state, with its English majority, recognised Scotland’s national identity. Failure to recognise Scottish identity led to a further failure to represent Scotland’s interests effectively. Failure to recognise Scottish identity led to a breakdown in state legitimacy.

As a result of this breakdown in legitimacy, the SHRA asserted Scotland’s right to national self-determination. Representatives of the Scottish people had decided on a course of action. According to the principles of democracy and self-determination there should have been no interference from any other nation. But English and Irish MPs ignored the wishes of the majority of Scots MPs. This illustrates the dominance of one nation in a multi-national state mentioned by Guibernau. Not only did England have dominance in numerical terms but in using that dominance to force measures through that Scots did not want, they displayed the lack of recognition of identity that only dominance can bring.

The problem for the SHRA led to the obvious solution of Home Rule, but also led to some theorising by, for example, Waddie on the nature of unions between two or more nations. Particular emphasis was made on the notion of equality and sovereignty.

---

<sup>161</sup> Napier, *Scotlands Relationship with England*: 15

<sup>162</sup> Romans, *Home Rule for Scotland*: 11

When States enter into a Federation, they surrender a portion of their natural rights, but all must surrender alike, for if one has a preponderating voice in the assembly, the others become her vassals.<sup>163</sup>

This was clearly a reference to the problem of Scotland being outnumbered in the Imperial Parliament. The solution of Home Rule all round and an imperial federation, as favoured by the SHRA, would show much greater equality in the Imperial parliament between the four home nations and the Dominions of the Empire.

The presumption on the part of the English that they could ignore and abuse the sovereignty of the Scottish members of Parliament who acted for the Scottish nation in the joint parliament was seen as completely unacceptable. Again the idea that Scotland had not been forced into the Union, but had negotiated her way into the bargain and therefore remained unconquered, became an important symbol of Scottish sovereignty. This symbol, along with the other cultural markers of Scottish independence was constantly referred to in pamphlets discussing the failure of Westminster to listen to the representatives of the Scottish people. Bannockburn in particular was frequently referred to in the fight for Home Rule.

Now let Scotsmen of this generation pause and consider if they are doing their duty to their country, and are they prepared to transmit this priceless boon of public liberty to their children. Are Scotsmen as free now as they were in 1314 to direct the destinies of their country...To be more particular, can Scotsmen pass laws for themselves, or must they submit all their measures to the approval of Englishmen?<sup>164</sup>

The above historical discussion has highlighted the specific political grievances of the SHRA. We have shown why they believed the system of government in the United Kingdom was no longer legitimate, at least for Scotland. This aspect of the discourse relates to who has the power to legislate for Scotland. The state, as the sovereign entity in a territory, must maintain legitimate rule to prevent the possibility of insurrection, rebellion or revolution. The source of this sovereignty is the people, or in the modern world, the nation. Representatives are elected by the nation to a

---

<sup>163</sup> Waddie, *The Federation of Greater Britain*: 5

<sup>164</sup> Waddie, *How Scotland lost her Parliament*: 101

parliament and they must act in the interests of the nation. Failure to do so will result in the representatives being voted out at the next election. But when the nation is in a union with another nation, in our case England, and the power and authority of the Scottish representatives is overridden by another nation or nations the legitimacy of the system has been lost. Multi-national states are not necessarily illegitimate. Rather the importance of the concept lies in their potential for illegitimacy. The dominance by one nation over the other in performing the functions of the state will create the illegitimacy of the system. It is at this point that nationalism will arise.

Nationalism, therefore, is not about the congruity of nation and state but rather the ability of a sovereign nation to obtain legitimate government by a state. If the state carries out the wishes of the nation in the majority of cases, and does not neglect the legislative and administrative needs of the nation then there is no problem. But no other nation should be able to have a controlling voice in matters that affect Scotland alone and Scottish matters should not be neglected. These two different, but related, political contexts were both articulated by the SHRA in the late nineteenth century. The Scottish nation was sovereign. Evidence for this had been provided in the form of the Wars of Independence and the Declaration of 1320. In addition Scotland elected representatives, only 72, to represent Scottish interests, both domestic and foreign at Westminster. These representatives, however, were vastly outnumbered, administration of the state had expanded, the Empire had become more complex and so, the domestic legislative needs of Scotland had been neglected, as well as mismanaged, and the voice of the Scottish representatives had been ignored. Failure to recognise Scottish national identity meant Scottish interests were not represented effectively. Thus the legitimacy of the system was called into question. The sovereignty of the Scottish nation could no longer be entrusted to the United Kingdom state, hence the call for Home Rule for Scotland.

### *Interference in Canadian Foreign Affairs*

Under the Canadian Constitution, embodied in the British North America Act, foreign affairs, including commercial treaties, remained the specific reserve of the

Imperial Parliament at Westminster.<sup>165</sup> Within the space of a couple of years following Confederation, the wisdom of Canadians not having a say in their own foreign affairs was being questioned. In 1871, the Treaty of Washington between the United States and Great Britain was negotiated and signed. The Treaty, according to British Canadian nationalists, showed the low opinion with which British statesmen regarded Canadian interests. Even the Canadian Prime Minister of the time, John A. Macdonald, who had been invited as a British delegate to represent Canadian interests, argued that the British Commissioners seemed “to have only one thing on their minds, that is, to go home to England with a treaty in their pockets, settling everything, no matter at what cost to Canada.”<sup>166</sup>

In 1871, the British and Americans met to discuss some outstanding sources of tension between the two countries, some involving Canada, such as the boundary line between Vancouver Island and the United States, others relating to the American Civil War. In particular, the United States wanted compensation for damage inflicted by Confederate gunboats, such as the *Alabama*, that had been built by Britain. Canada wanted above all a renegotiation of the reciprocal trade treaty that lapsed in 1866 and compensation for the Fenian raids of 1866 and 1870, which the United States government had done little to prevent. The negotiations were tense, but the Americans were seen by many as the winners. The Treaty of Washington granted rights of navigation and carriage on the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes, access to inshore fisheries for both sides and the settlement of the Juan de Fuca boundary dispute.<sup>167</sup> The reaction to the Treaty by British Canadian nationalists is the key to understanding British Canadian nationalism.

One of the first reactions to the Treaty came from Robert Haliburton, an original member of *Canada First*, although at the time of writing the article he was resident in London. He argued that whilst the British government and people believed the “Alabama Treaty”, as he called the Treaty of Washington, was acceptable,

---

<sup>165</sup> Stevenson, G., *Ex Uno Plures: Federal- Provincial Relations in Canada 1867-1896* (Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queens University Press: 1993): 254

<sup>166</sup> Quoted in Denison, G.T., *Canada and her Relations to the Empire* (Toronto, The Week Publishing Co: 1895): 10 – For similar comments see also McNaught, *The Penguin History of Canada*: 149

<sup>167</sup> McNaught, *The Penguin History of Canada*: 148-9

...the fact that it sacrificed the rights of Englishmen abroad, and ignored the minor consideration of national honour was far more likely to be expressed by Canadians, who knew that, as far as they were concerned, it was both a humiliation and an injustice.<sup>168</sup>

In essence, the whole tone of Haliburton's argument, and Macdonald's quote noted above, was that Britain had trampled over Canada's interests in order to obtain a solid and lasting peace with the United States. What other conclusion could there be when Britain compensated the United States for the St Albans incident,

an outrage committed within the United States, in time of war, by American citizens, while repeated Fenian raids, invasions of British territory by American subjects in times of peace, were passed over in silence.<sup>169</sup>

But Haliburton was not really surprised and set the Treaty in the context of a century of mis-management and neglect, especially with regard to Canada's relations with the United States. The Imperial connection was portrayed as wholly one sided, the colonies providing the raw materials and then the market for a mercantilist empire, and then turning into a burden when free trade became the economic policy of Britain. What else could Canadians expect but for their interests to be ignored for the benefit of the mother country? After all "it was *only Colonists* who suffered."<sup>170</sup>

Without any voice in Parliament, or a representative in the Colonial Office, which is merely a useful training-school for young statesmen, where they can try their "prentice hand" occasionally on Colonial subjects, *experimentum in corpore vili*, we have no power even to complain with any chance of being heard.<sup>171</sup>

Again we have a political action by the state that sparked a nationalist reaction. The political context is different but the theme the same as portrayed by the SHRA. The state, in the form of the Empire, was interfering in Canadian affairs. There is no

---

<sup>168</sup> Haliburton, R.G., *A Review of British Diplomacy and its Fruits* (London, Sampson Low, Marston, Low and Searle: 1872): 1

<sup>169</sup> Ibid: 8 – The St Albans Incident was a raid by Southern confederates living in British North America in the town of St. Albans in the United States during the American Civil War.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid: vii (emphasis added)

<sup>171</sup> Ibid: vii

doubt here that the Empire used or, as far as the nationalists are concerned, abused the right of the Canadian nation to have its interests taken into account. The political context of interference in national affairs triggered a nationalist reaction. Failure to recognise British Canadian identity meant a failure to recognise the political interests of Canada. This time, however, to make matters worse, the beneficiary of the Empire's action was Canada's significant other, the United States. The Americans were perceived as coveting Canadian territory and the nationalists saw the gains in the Treaty of Washington in this light.

Other reactions to the Treaty were similar to Haliburton's. Denison, in an unusual foray into electoral politics, told the electorate of Algoma, where he was a candidate for the Federal Parliament, that the Treaty of Washington,

...was a sacrifice of the material interests of Canada, sacrificed not from any high sense of Imperial necessity but huckstered away in a disgraceful and humiliating manner without adequate equivalent.<sup>172</sup>

Again we have overtones of a failure to pay due honour to the Canadian nation in the "huckstering" away of material interests. The rhetoric of the politics of recognition is found in abundance throughout the pamphlets of Haliburton and Denison. Had due attention been paid to Canadian interests and concessions won from the Americans then Canadian honour would have been maintained and the legitimacy of the existing system of imperial relations would have remained unscathed. But the rhetoric implies, and the evidence suggests, there was no attempt even made to pay lip service to Canadian interests. The honour and dignity of Canada had been slighted by the Imperial government's failure to recognise Canadian interests, and the only remedy would be to have a voice in foreign affairs. But when you look past the rhetoric, the trigger for the nationalist response remains the political context.

Even Edward Blake, historically associated with the Canada First network, commented upon the Treaty in his famous Aurora speech.

---

<sup>172</sup> Denison, G.T. *To the Free and Independent Electors of Algoma* (Flier dated 24/7/1872) in Denison Papers Collections Canada MG29-E29 Vol 17-48

Matters cannot drift much longer as they have drifted hitherto. The Treaty of Washington produced a very profound impression throughout this country. It produced a feeling that at no distant period the people of Canada would desire that they should have some greater share of control than they now have in the management of foreign affairs... with reference to local and domestic matters ... you rule yourselves as fully as any people in the world, while in your foreign affairs... you have no more voice than the people of Japan.<sup>173</sup>

Blake's solution, like Haliburton's, was for Canada to have some form of representation at the Imperial level, basically an Imperial federation. Whilst the details of such a scheme were missing, the general idea put forward by Blake, and later by the Imperial Federation League, was that Canada could not claim her full rights and privileges as a nation without having some control over her foreign affairs. In other words, Canada had the right to self determination in all matters not just domestic. Canada had to have input into her affairs with other nations.<sup>174</sup>

But the desire for power, or at least some input, into Canadian foreign affairs had another aspect. A key aspect of Canada First's work in the immediate post-confederation period was the creation of a Canadian national feeling. They were attempting to instil a national sentiment among fellow Canadians. There were different views on what form this sentiment was to take. William Foster and James Edgar, independently, saw the political machinery of the state as the vehicle that would unite the nation.<sup>175</sup> In the same way that Anderson saw the colonial administrations of the units of the Spanish Empire in South America uniting the Creole nations,<sup>176</sup> it was hoped that the federal government of Canada, as a focus for national interests, would become the source of national consciousness. Shared experience of federal government attending to national problems would instil a national sentiment amongst the provinces. Blake took these ideas one step further and argued that it was a specific role of the state, foreign affairs, that would create

---

<sup>173</sup> Wallace, W.S., "Edward Blake's Aurora Speech, 1874" in *Canadian Historical Review* Vol.2 (1921): 255

<sup>174</sup> Ibid: 255

<sup>175</sup> Foster, *Canada First*: 31; Edgar, *Loyalty*: 7

<sup>176</sup> Anderson, B., *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, Verso: 1991): 52

unity and a national sentiment. Blake argued that it “is impossible to foster a national spirit unless you have national interests to attend to...”<sup>177</sup>

These national interests, in focusing the attention of the Canadian public on what was important for Canada as a collection of united provinces, rather than what was important for each individual province, would bind together the nation. The Latin American experience of colonial administration had created nations in Bolivia, Peru and Mexico. In a similar manner, the provinces of Canada had experienced self-government prior to confederation and had strong provincial identities. In order for the idea to take root that the Canadian nation had the right to self-determination, and not the Ontarian people, national sentiment had to take root. For Blake this was to be done by attending to foreign affairs through Imperial Federation. Common Canadian experiences would then overshadow “petty” provincial and domestic matters.

In 1874, fresh trade negotiations were opened between the United States and Canada, although once again Imperial commissioners carried out the negotiations on behalf of Canada. Again Canada was allowed a representative to voice Canadian interests, although this time the representative was George Brown, editor of the *Toronto Globe* newspaper and the leading voice of the Reform movement in Canada. Once again, however, the issue of Canada’s right to carry on her own negotiations were brought to the fore, particularly when the negotiations were ostensibly to provide compensation for the Fishery rights given to the United States in the Treaty of Washington.<sup>178</sup>

The leading nationalist voice at this time was *The Nation*, a newspaper generally accepted by contemporaries and historians as the mouthpiece of the Canada First movement.<sup>179</sup> The paper argued that the “real objection was that in the negotiation of the Treaty [of Washington] Canada had no voice.” The same mistake was being made with the negotiations for a trade treaty.

---

<sup>177</sup> Wallace, “Blake’s Aurora Speech”: 255

<sup>178</sup> *The Nation*, June 18, 1874: 140

<sup>179</sup> Wallace, E., *Goldwin Smith; Victorian Liberal* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press: 1957): 75-76

The negotiation of a new treaty, which concerns Canada alone, is being conducted by Imperial negotiation; for though one of the negotiators is Canadian, he is not the agent of Canada but of England. On general principles negotiators must act in the interest of those from whom they receive their appointment: to do otherwise is to violate the trust reposed in them. Ought Canada to be content to remain in this position?<sup>180</sup>

The answer for *The Nation* was no; Canada must “have a direct voice in the making of Treaties by which her interests are affected.”<sup>181</sup> This was also an important plank of the Canadian National Association.<sup>182</sup> This is a clear example of the relationship between representation of national interests and the legitimacy of rule. Once again, a nationalist response is articulated against undue interference by the state, the British Empire. Canada had no power over negotiations with her southern neighbour. The legitimacy and competency of the Imperial Government to negotiate on Canada’s behalf was at the forefront of Canadian nationalist discourse. Who had the right to attend to the affairs of Canada? The representatives elected by the Canadian public or imperial officials who had not been elected by Canadians. The clear argument from British Canadian nationalists over this issue was that because the British did not recognise Canadian identity they could not represent Canadian interests. The Canadian government, therefore, should be given the powers by the Canadian nation. This is not to claim British Canadian nationalists were anti-colonial in the traditional sense. Rather they wanted to reform the imperial relationship to the benefit of Canada. Representatives of the Canadian nation would have an input into Canadian foreign affairs in a federation of the Empire, as well as having a say in general matters of the Empire. This was the solution British Canadian nationalists proposed to resolve the legitimacy issue.

The issue of foreign affairs continued to rumble on throughout the period under question. Principal Grant, in a speech to the Canadian Club in New York in 1887, argued that “The symptoms of restlessness, on account of our position being merely colonial...shows that we are nearing that point in our history when we must assume

---

<sup>180</sup> *The Nation*, June 18, 1874: 140

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid*: 140

<sup>182</sup> Canadian National Association, “Canada First: Address of the Canadian National Association to the People of Canada”: 577

the full responsibilities of nationhood...”<sup>183</sup> Those responsibilities were foreign affairs and like Blake before him, Grant advocated an imperial federation. Demanding independence in foreign affairs, through an imperial federation, Grant saw Canada gaining “something without which a country is poor in the present and a butt for the world’s scorn in the future...national self-respect!”<sup>184</sup>

Once again the issue comes back to the dignity and honour of the nation. But this time it is put in terms of recognition on the world stage. Without the ability to carry out Canada’s own foreign affairs, the nation can never have the recognition of other nations in the world. Without this recognition, which was being denied Canada by the Empire, the Canadian nation would lose its dignity.

In similar terms to the SHRA, we have actions of the state which, whilst they did not cause the formation of a national movement, certainly sparked nationalist responses which were articulated in the rhetoric of recognition, dignity and the right of self-determination. Not only did Canada want recognition of the right of its people to determine their future in the realm of foreign affairs, which in turn would unite the people of Canada as a common interest, but they also desired the recognition of the world community, that would be gained through involvement in foreign affairs. The Empire, as a multi-national entity, became the source of illegitimate government. Dominance by one nation, however, was not the issue. As with Scotland, failure to properly recognise British Canadian identity led to a failure to take into account Canadian interests in foreign affairs. Failure to recognise identity causes illegitimate government. The solution proposed by British Canadian imperial nationalists was Imperial federation rather than complete independence. This will be examined in the following chapters. For the moment the important point to note is that Canada would have had a direct say, not only in Canadian foreign affairs through Imperial Federation, but also a direct involvement in the foreign affairs of the whole Empire.

---

<sup>183</sup> Grant, G.M., *Canada First* (1887): 251

<sup>184</sup> Grant, G.M., *Advantages of Imperial Federation* (Toronto: 1891): 13-14

## ***Conclusion***

The importance of recognition has been clearly seen in this chapter. Failure to recognise identity reflects back notions of oppression and lack of self worth. As a consequence, an identity is articulated expressing superiority over the other who has failed to recognise their identity. In both Scotland and Canada, historical symbols were chosen to show their superiority over the other involved in their discourse. These symbols provided quick shorthand to understanding the discourse being articulated. They encompassed an expression of antagonism towards the other as well as establishing the transformation of the power relationship between the two nations. These symbols also created boundaries that differentiated the nation from other nations by using the significant other to identify who belonged to the nation and who did not.

We noted in the previous chapter that ideas of legitimacy, democracy, representation and recognition are all important in nationalism. Nationalism is caused by illegitimate states. Multi-national states such as the United Kingdom generally have a dominant nation. This creates the potential for illegitimacy. The trigger, however, for illegitimate government is the failure to institutionalise democracy. Non-recognition of identity leads to a failure to represent interests, which causes a breakdown in the legitimacy of the state. This in turn allows nationalists to claim the right of self determination. Nationalism thus has its roots in problems of democracy in multi-national states. The nature of the nationalism displayed in both Scotland and Canada clearly reflects the importance of these concepts. The failure of Gladstone to include Scotland in any scheme of home rule was a failure to recognise Scotland's perceived democratic right of equality with Ireland. This failure of recognition combined with other failures, such as using England when Britain was being spoken of, led to the neglect of Scottish affairs and the lack of attention devoted to Scottish business. Indeed in some cases the wishes of a majority of Scotland's representatives in Parliament were clearly overridden by English MPs. Thus the failure to recognise Scottish identity led to a failure to represent Scottish interests. The additional failure to democratise the Irish Home Rule Bill was the final straw for Scottish nationalists

who articulated a discourse highlighting these failures and asserted Scotland's right of self-determination.

Nationalism in Canada displayed similar characteristics. Failure to recognise British Canadian identity meant Canada's interests were not represented effectively in treaty negotiations between Britain and the United States. The fact that Canadians had control over domestic policy but lacked any control over foreign relations was seen as a paradox in need of resolution. The current system where Canada was not represented at the Imperial level was seen as undemocratic. The failure to institutionalise democracy was another failure of recognition. The reaction to the Treaty of Washington by Haliburton, Denison and Blake clearly highlighted all these issues. Denison and Haliburton emphasised the rhetoric of recognition, exclaiming their indignation in terms of betrayal. The continued problems in negotiating trade treaties with the United States meant the issue was at the forefront of British Canadian nationalist discourse.

The chapter has also highlighted the extent to which nationalism is a matter of political legitimacy, and not about independent statehood. The critique of state and imperial governance was not followed by calls for an independent Scotland or Canada, yet the rhetoric of both the SHRA and Canada First was clearly nationalist. These groups articulated both a nationalist and an imperialist discourse. For the SHRA, the formation of a Scottish Parliament would not mean independence from the Empire. Rather the SHRA wanted a Scottish Parliament that was subordinate to a reformed Imperial Parliament at Westminster. The importance of the Empire to Scottish nationalism and of Scotland to the Empire will be seen in the next chapter. For now the important point is that Empire and maintenance of the Union with England were central features of the discourse of the SHRA.

Likewise in Canada there were never any serious suggestions by British Canadian nationalists that the imperial connection should be broken. Rather the solution to the problem was Canadian representation in London in some form of imperial federation. The importance of the British Imperial connection to Canada will be seen

in the next chapter. Defence against perceived United States aggression formed a major part of British Canadian nationalist discourse and the maintenance of the imperial connection played an important role in that defence.

## **Chapter Five**

### **Imperialist Discourse in Scotland and British Canada**

The key aim of this chapter is to examine what was imperialist about the discourse of nationalist groups in Scotland and British Canada. Imperialism concerns the pursuit, maintenance and defence of empire. A relationship of dominance by one state over another territory or state characterises empire. We have noted in previous chapters that Canada First, the Imperial Federation League in Canada and the Scottish Home Rule Association all advocated reform of the imperial structure through the inclusion of representation for the white settler dominions in Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa. The motives for reform in Scotland and British Canada of imperial governance shared similarities but were distinct in both groups. Both Scots and British Canadian nationalists saw imperial federation as a strengthening of weak structural bonds that existed between Britain and her self-governing dominions. By strengthening these bonds the Empire would be able to meet the challenges posed by the newly united German Empire, the United States and Russia. The various schemes for imperial unity proposed by these nationalist groups contain the imperialist element of the groups' discourse and will form the basis of analysis for this chapter.

The contexts in which these schemes were proposed were very different. It should be noted here that Scottish nationalists were less explicit in their imperialism than British Canadians. The perceived threat of immediate American aggression lent urgency to the demands of British Canadian nationalists for federation of the Empire. The SHRA seemed to take the Empire as a non-negotiable given. Home Rule all round was their priority and as such imperial issues were rarely mentioned. They consistently argued, however, that one important result of Home Rule all round would be reform of the Imperial Parliament to include representatives from the self-governing colonies. This was seen as beneficial for the whole Empire. In this sense they were imperialists.

In some instances the views of the SHRA have been inferred from their support for the Imperial Federation League in Scotland. Despite the evident hostility toward the

SHRA by the editors of the League's Journal *Imperial Federation*,<sup>1</sup> there was no inherent incompatibility between the ideas of home rule and imperial federation. Indeed, several influential members of the IFL, such as Lord Reay, Lord Rosebery and RC Munro Ferguson, were clearly in favour of home rule.<sup>2</sup> Thomas McNaught, the Honorary Colonial Secretary of the SHRA, was also a member of the IFL.<sup>3</sup> The views of this group of Scottish Home Rulers within the IFL combined with those of the SHRA are the focus of the Scottish material in this chapter.

The chapter will be split into four sections. The first section will examine the historical context necessary for an understanding of the threats and challenges to the British Empire. A theoretical discussion of international relations will be followed by a brief discussion of the decline of the Concert of Europe and its effect on British imperialism. The second section will examine Scotland and Canada's place in the Empire, in particular the nature of the imperial relationship between Canada and Britain and the relationship between Scotland and Westminster. The third section will examine the proposals for reform of imperial government. The aim of these was to strengthen the weak bonds that characterised the imperial relationship with the self-governing colonies. This will set the context for the central argument of this chapter, the existence of a Greater British identity. This identity will be examined in the final section arguing that the levels of British emigration to Canada and the white self-governing dominions meant a British identity was spread around the Empire that formed the main link between the dominions and London.

### ***Historical Context***

Being a maritime empire, as well as an island, meant Britain relied to a remarkable degree on her naval power. Not only was the Navy vital for the defence of the British Isles, but in the context of the Empire, the Navy had to ensure the sea-lanes remained open for trade, commerce and communication. Lord Castlereagh, foreign secretary

---

<sup>1</sup> See for example, *Imperial Federation*, 1 July 1888: 123 and *Imperial Federation*, 1 September 1888: 169 and 174

<sup>2</sup> For Reay see quote in Fry, M., *Patronage and Principle: A Political History of Modern Scotland* (Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen: 1987): 114; Confirmation of Munro Ferguson voting in favour of Scottish Home Rule can be found in *Analysis of Division 29<sup>th</sup> April 1892* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1892) For Rosebery see quote in Scottish Home Rule Association, *Home Rule All Round*, (Edinburgh: 1893)

<sup>3</sup> *Imperial Federation*, September 1888: 169 & 174

during the Napoleonic Wars, used the two-power standard, Britain's navy had to be at least the size of the next two largest navies combined, to ensure British supremacy on water.<sup>4</sup> The efforts to retain communication lines open between the metropolis and the far-flung colonies brought the Empire into conflict with a number of European powers. The Russian empire posed a threat to India through Afghanistan. The attempts to keep the Suez Canal from falling into unfriendly hands brought diplomatic conflict with France. The Scramble for Africa, initiated by the German Empire, brought competition to the world of European imperialism and forced an alteration in British Imperial strategy in Africa. Against this geopolitical backdrop, the Imperial Federation League and the Scottish Home Rule Association were formed. It would, therefore, be surprising if the discourse of these groups did not address these imperial problems.

Max Weber argued that political structures (states) “vary in the extent to which they are turned outward,”<sup>5</sup> i.e., in their attitude toward other states. Weber claimed that all political structures strive for prestige in order to gain status in the society of states.<sup>6</sup> In other words, there is a hierarchy of states which is important to inter-state relations. According to Weber, “big political communities are the natural exponents of such pretensions to prestige.”<sup>7</sup> In practice this prestige of power means “the glory of power over other communities; it means the expansion of power...”<sup>8</sup>

But as every big political community has the potential for prestige it will always be endangered by other states who also want to pursue the prestige of power. In this ‘dynamic of power,’ claims to prestige are seen as “challenges and calls forth the competition of all other possible bearers of prestige.”<sup>9</sup> This competition and the

---

<sup>4</sup> Mann, M., *Sources of Social Power Vol II – The Rise of Classes and Nation States 1760-1914* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1993): 264

<sup>5</sup> Weber, M., “Structures of Power” in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* H.H., and Wright Mills, C. (eds), (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd: 1948): 159

<sup>6</sup> Ibid: 160

<sup>7</sup> Ibid: 160

<sup>8</sup> Ibid: 160

<sup>9</sup> Ibid: 160

power dynamics it creates leads to the Great Powers being “expansive powers.”<sup>10</sup> One result of the competition for prestige is imperialism.

Weber’s geopolitical analysis of imperialism emphasises political aspects of imperialism rather than the economic view put forward by Radical Liberals such as Hobson and some Marxists who argued that the British Empire resulted from excess profit generated from industrialisation.<sup>11</sup> Economics was undoubtedly a factor in acquiring Empire but as we shall see prestige, security and power were all important factors in the discourse of imperialists in the late nineteenth century.

In a similar vein to Weber, Reynolds argued that the “only major constraint on states and their freedom to pursue their own interests is the countervailing force of rival capacities for exercising violence.”<sup>12</sup> The world, therefore, exists as a system of sovereign states responsible for their own security (the preservation of the state and maintenance of territorial integrity). But providing for the defence of the state provides the conditions for aggression. “The condition of security only exists when the state possesses the capacity to fight successful wars against any potential aggressor...”<sup>13</sup> Security becomes a relative matter. The more powerful another state is perceived to be the greater the need to increase capacity for defence. The result is a competition between states in the form of arms races, alliances for defence or security and the orientation of the state towards foreign affairs. States need to control the environments in which they operate. This pursuit of power leads to states having rival spheres of influence as they attempt to control other states, hegemonically or directly, in the pursuit of their own security. Once again, “Imperialism is thus a direct consequence of the security dilemma.”<sup>14</sup>

Mann extends both Weber’s and Reynolds’ ideas by claiming that there are five determinants of geopolitical power: economic power, ideological power, military

---

<sup>10</sup> Ibid: 161

<sup>11</sup> Hobson, J.A., *Imperialism: A Study* (London: 1905)

<sup>12</sup> Reynolds, C., *Modes of Imperialism* (Oxford, Martin Robertson and Co. Ltd: 1981): 19

<sup>13</sup> Ibid: 20-21

<sup>14</sup> Ibid: 24

power, political power and leadership.<sup>15</sup> Each of these must be geopolitically relevant for it to be effective. Economic power, therefore, must be important globally, military power must be relevant to the task in hand (there is no point in using tanks for gunboat diplomacy) and the regime and the administration of a state must supply resources necessary for the quest for geopolitical power.<sup>16</sup> Hegemony in the late nineteenth century, according to these principles, lay with the Western world in general. “Domination [of the world] was Western, Christian and White...”<sup>17</sup> Britain led this hegemony as the leading power in Europe but, according to Mann, could only fix “transnational rules in negotiation with other powers.”<sup>18</sup> In other words, Britain was not an outright hegemon.

### *The Collapse of the Concert of Europe*

For much of the nineteenth century relations between European states were maintained through a “diplomatically negotiated Concert of Powers” that prevented a major continental war.<sup>19</sup> The diplomatic agreements over Belgium, the Low Country boundaries, Hungarian revolts, Greek independence and the Russian incursions into the Ottoman Empire were all meant to achieve two objectives: “to prevent any single power becoming hegemonic in any region of Europe and to preserve order.”<sup>20</sup> The rise of the new German state under Prussian leadership, and Russian expansionism in the East, however, both disrupted the carefully balanced accord, creating fears they would become hegemonic in their respective regions of Europe.<sup>21</sup>

According to Thomson, the legacy of the wars leading to German unification was “recurrent international tensions...”

With uneasy relations prevailing between the six great powers of Europe, the whole nature of the balance of power underwent a transformation. It became a fluid conception, a system of diplomacy conceived as a self-adjusting

---

<sup>15</sup> Mann, *Sources of Social Power Vol II*: 258-261

<sup>16</sup> Ibid: 258-259

<sup>17</sup> Ibid: 264

<sup>18</sup> Ibid: 264

<sup>19</sup> Ibid: 278

<sup>20</sup> Ibid: 281

<sup>21</sup> Ibid: 287

mechanism whereby an equilibrium was constantly re-established by fresh governmental manoeuvres and agreements...<sup>22</sup>

Britain had a new rival power in Europe, although according to Mann, Britain had negotiated her near hegemony of the rest of the world with the other European powers. Britain ruled the waves while Europe remained without a leader.<sup>23</sup> Bismarck's decision to pursue imperial ambitions in Africa, however, altered Britain's negotiated hegemony, as did Russian expansionism in the East. From the early 1880s onward, Britain was no longer able to maintain the informal imperial relationships that had been developed with other states under its influence. In the face of competition from Germany, Russia and France, the British Empire became more formal. The remainder of this section will outline the nature of these challenges to Britain's imperial hegemony. In 1884 the Imperial Federation League was formed with the intention of ensuring the Empire would be able to deal with these international challenges to the Empire.

#### *India and the threat from the Russian Empire*

The jewel in the Imperial crown in the late nineteenth century was undoubtedly India. There were two routes British merchants and the Navy could take to India. One route followed the coast of Africa and rounded the Cape into the Indian Ocean. Another route was through the Mediterranean to the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. The route round the Cape was both long and dangerous therefore the Suez Canal formed an important strategic route not only to India, but also to the Australasian colonies. The maintenance of access to the Mediterranean and the Suez was therefore an important plank of British foreign policy. The importance of the British Navy in defending the Empire was clear. There were only two areas where the Empire could be attacked overland, the Canadian border with the United States and the Indian frontier with Afghanistan.<sup>24</sup> To the north of Afghanistan was the powerful Russian empire. Russian expansionism posed a threat to the British Empire's ability to maintain India on two fronts. The first of these was through Afghanistan.

---

<sup>22</sup> Thomson, D., *Europe Since Napoleon* (London, Penguin: 1966): 322

<sup>23</sup> Mann, *Sources of Social Power Vol II*: 288

<sup>24</sup> Castell Hopkins, J., *Canada and the Empire* (1890): 18/19

During the 1860s and 1870s Russia gradually gained control of the territory to the North of Afghanistan. The possibility of a plot to use the Afghans in an attack against India became an increasing concern.<sup>25</sup> In 1878, following a botched and unauthorised attempt to invade Afghanistan by Lord Lytton, the Indian Viceroy, Disraeli was forced into declaring war on Afghanistan. Although Gladstone withdrew British forces from the area on his accession to Prime Minister in 1880, Afghanistan became a British protectorate with control over Kabul's foreign policy. But the Afghans remained a threat. As the historian Bernard Porter claimed, "ultimately there could be no guarantee that if Russia made it worth their while the Afghans would not still renege and help her invade India."<sup>26</sup>

Trouble continued in the region in the 1880s, with a Russian defeat of Afghan forces in Penjdeh in 1885. Britain proceeded to create further buffers along the northern Indian border, bringing various countries under imperial control, for example Upper Burma. Along the Indian border British influence and control increased and the loose alliances that had been maintained along the northern border turned into formal imperial relationships.<sup>27</sup>

The second threat from Russian expansionism focussed on the decaying Ottoman Empire. The latter contained a large number of Slavs who looked to Russia for support. The Russians saw the Turks as their national enemy. Revolts in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1875 led to a diplomatic crisis which saw Russia, Germany and Austria, the *Dreikaiserbund*, sending an ultimatum to Constantinople. Disraeli supported the Turks in their rejection of the ultimatum gaining an important diplomatic victory. But the Turkish reprisals against the Slavs led to atrocities in Christian Bulgaria. The British Cabinet was split over its response and there were

---

<sup>25</sup> Porter, B., *The Lions Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-1995 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition* (Harlow, Pearson Education: 1996): 85

<sup>26</sup> Ibid: 87

<sup>27</sup> Ibid: 88

massive protests against continued support for the Ottoman Empire.<sup>28</sup> Russia declared War on Turkey in 1877.<sup>29</sup>

The Ottoman Empire was an important strategic buffer separating Russia from the Mediterranean. It also presented an alternative land route to the Persian Gulf and thereby to India. British foreign policy therefore supported the fast decaying Empire for strategic reasons. The Russian invasion of the Ottoman Empire in 1877 created a problem for Britain. Queen Victoria was furious over Disraeli's inaction.. "It is not a question of upholding Turkey;" she claimed, "it is a question of Russian or British supremacy in the world."<sup>30</sup> But the Prime Minister's hands were tied by public opinion, a divided cabinet and a neutrality agreement with Austria. Russian victory brought further diplomatic manoeuvrings. The Treaty forced on the Turks by Russia was totally unacceptable to British interests in the region. Troops were sent to Turkey and the fleet sent to Constantinople. The Treaty was renegotiated peacefully between Austria, Russia and Britain which the Turks had no choice but to accept. This was one example of the workings of the concert of Europe.

### *Egypt and the Suez*

To avoid the need to use the land route through the Ottoman Empire to the Persian Gulf, Britain had to maintain access to the Suez Canal. This meant ensuring the stability of Egypt. North Africa, however, was seen by the French as being within their sphere of influence. When Egypt declared bankruptcy in the late 1870s French creditors stepped in to resolve the situation. Reluctant to leave Egypt in the hands of the French, potentially threatening access to the Suez, Britain also agreed to help. A new leader was installed and reforms put in place to resolve the financial situation. But in 1881 Egyptian nationalists rebelled against the stringent reforms. France invaded to quash the rebellion and was quickly followed by the British. But a change of French government and an escalation of the invasion resulted in a French withdrawal leaving Britain as the sole occupying force. By the end of 1882,

---

<sup>28</sup> Shannon, *The Crisis of Imperialism 1865-1915* (London, Hart-Davis, MacGibbon: 1974): 124

<sup>29</sup> Pearce, M., & Stewart, G., *British Political History 1875-1995: Democracy and Decline* (London, Routledge: 1996): 152-3

<sup>30</sup> Cited in *Ibid*: 153

following defeat of the rebels at Tel-el-Kebir, Egypt became a British protectorate. The extent of British investment, trading and strategic interest in Egypt made it extremely difficult to withdraw.

The occupation of Egypt led to involvement in other North African affairs, thus further antagonising the French. Sudan was under the influence of the Egyptian Khedive. Rebellion in Sudan in 1883 led to Gladstone sending General Gordon to evacuate the Egyptian Force installed at Khartoum. Gordon, however, was a Christian zealot and popular hero. He tried to quash the rebellion and save Khartoum. Unfortunately for Gladstone, his General failed and the Prime Minister was forced by public pressure to send another force to extricate Gordon from his predicament. The rescue force under General Wolesley arrived too late and found Gordon had been slain. Gordon's death led to him being hailed as a martyr and hero of the Empire, meshing together British religious identity and militarism.<sup>31</sup> Popular opinion turned on Gladstone, who had delayed sending the rescue force, claiming he was responsible for Gordon's murder. France remained hostile to Britain's actions in North Africa throughout the period.<sup>32</sup>

Mention should be made here of the different approaches to Empire taken by Gladstone and Disraeli. In principle, Gladstone took a moralistic approach to Empire. During the crisis that developed from the Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria, Gladstone published a pamphlet that highlighted his moral outrage against continued British support for the Ottomans, despite his belief that the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire should guide British policy.<sup>33</sup> Disraeli, on the other hand, was largely unaffected by the massive protests that took place around the country. Disraeli believed the national interest, rather than moral questions, should guide imperial policy.<sup>34</sup> His defeat in the 1880 election, following Gladstone's moral crusade during the Midlothian Campaign, would indicate this view was not shared by

---

<sup>31</sup> Pearce, M., & Stewart, G., *British Political History 1875-1995*: 160; for a contemporary view see Marquis of Lorne, *Imperial Federation* (London, 1885): 101

<sup>32</sup> This section draws heavily on Pearce and Stewart, *British Political History*: 159-161 and Porter, *The Lions Share*: 90-94

<sup>33</sup> Shannon, *The Crisis of Imperialism*: 127-8

<sup>34</sup> Pearce and Stewart, *British Political History*: 152

the electorate. Of course, Gladstone, when in office, was forced into policy decisions he would rather not have made. General Gordon's decision to save Khartoum is a good example.

### *The Scramble for Africa*

The newly formed German empire spearheaded the challenges to the British Empire in the mid 1880s. In 1884, the Germans made a bid for empire in Southern Africa, successfully taking control of South West Africa.<sup>35</sup> Between 1884 and 1886 Germany annexed Cameroon, Togoland and Tanganyika in Tropical Africa.<sup>36</sup> The impetus for the Scramble had come from the Berlin conference of 1884 organised by the German Chancellor, Otto Von Bismarck. The conference had been called to resolve the status of the African Congo following European anger at Britain and Portugal's bilateral agreement over the navigation of the River Congo in Western Africa. The Belgian King, Leopold II, who had dreamed of a colonial empire since the 1860s, came away with the spoils. Germany, however, also encouraged the French to expand their interests in West Africa. British interests in Africa, therefore, quickly came under pressure from France and Germany. Whereas previously British imperialism in Africa would have been conducted on an informal basis, now, under pressure from other European powers, formal colonisation was required to ensure British territory was retained.<sup>37</sup> The result of this 'Scramble' was that by 1898, the majority of Africa had been formally divided between the major European powers.<sup>38</sup> The competition faced by the British Empire in this period is a key point in understanding the imperialism of nationalists in this period. At no other point in the history of the Empire had competition from rival powers been as intense or diplomatic tension so great.

Against this background the Imperial Federation League held its first conference in July 1884 when it was resolved that "In order to secure the permanent unity of the Empire, some form of federation is essential."<sup>39</sup> At the first meeting, W.E. Forster

---

<sup>35</sup> Chamberlain, M.E., *The Scramble for Africa* (Harlow, Longman Group Ltd: 1974): 58-9

<sup>36</sup> Porter, *The Lions Share*: 101

<sup>37</sup> Chamberlain, *The Scramble for Africa*: 59

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*: 81

<sup>39</sup> *The Scotsman*, 30 July 1884: 6

argued that the loss of the colonies would mean the weakening of Britain and “the increased probability of war amongst Christian nations...”<sup>40</sup> In claiming that Britons throughout the Empire should have a say in imperial affairs, the Earl of Rosebery raised the issue of the Suez Canal and hegemony in Egypt, claiming Australians had just as much right to a say in who should be paramount on the banks of the Suez as the Scots and English.<sup>41</sup> Later sections of this chapter will highlight the importance of the historical information presented here to the schemes for imperial unity that were proposed by members of the IFL in Britain and Canada and by the SHRA.

The discourse of both Scots and British Canadian nationalists claimed the links between the various parts of the Empire were weak. The Empire, therefore, was ill-equipped to deal with the changing geo-political order noted above. In order to meet these new challenges and threats and to carry on the mission of the *Pax Britannica*, imperial bonds had to be strengthened. The bonds that existed were largely symbolic and sentimental. They existed in the form of a Greater British identity. Strengthening the bonds of Empire involved providing Britannia, Greater Britain, with a federal state, altering the nature of the imperial relationship between Westminster and the self-governing colonies. This imperial federation would unite the British settler colonies and dominions. Unity meant strength. By uniting Britons throughout the Empire in a federation the challenges posed by other European powers could be met more easily. The following sections will present this discourse as articulated by nationalists in Scotland and British Canada, arguing that their attempts to consolidate the Empire were a response to the threats posed by the changing nature of European diplomacy and politics.

### ***The Nature of Imperial Governance in Scotland and Canada***

The nature of Imperial government varied across the Empire. In some cases, such as Egypt or Afghanistan, the Empire played an informal role as protectorate. In other cases, such as India, the Empire ruled directly with the assistance and collaboration of local elites. But in the case of the colonies where British settlement had taken place, the lessons learned from the loss of the thirteen colonies of the United States

---

<sup>40</sup> Ibid: 6

<sup>41</sup> Ibid: 6

had been put in place. Almost complete control over domestic policy was given to Canada, Cape Colony, the Australian colonies and New Zealand. The relationship between the self-governing colonies and London was much like that of modern day Scotland or Quebec with substantial autonomy over domestic affairs but little control of foreign policy. J.S. Mill described it as the “slightest kind of federal union.”<sup>42</sup> With this relative autonomy, the ties binding the self governing colonies and Canada to London were relatively weak. Conversely the ties between Scotland and London were very strong.

### *Scotland and the Empire*

Scotland held a privileged relationship with the Empire. Scottish representation in Parliament, 60 MPs rising to 72 in 1885, gave Scotland a voice in the running of the Empire. Scots in the Cabinet were in more influential positions. Scots could, when compared with Canadians at least, claim real political influence over imperial affairs. Scottish Parliamentary business was generally left in the hands of the Lord Advocate, who reported to the Home Secretary. This arrangement, however, became increasingly unsatisfactory. The campaign for a Scottish Secretary challenged this situation, finally claiming success in 1885. The post of Scottish secretary created an institutional post for Scots within the government, although it did not become a cabinet post until the twentieth century. The post did not alter the legislative position of Scotland in the United Kingdom. The Scottish Secretary was an administrator with responsibility for overseeing the work of the administrative boards. Scots had a voice in both domestic and foreign affairs but this voice, according to the SHRA, was rarely heard due to the numerical dominance of the English in the House of Commons, hence the calls for a Scottish Parliament. Although a Scottish Parliament would not have increased Scotland’s voice in foreign and imperial affairs, the SHRA believed it was a stepping stone to reform of the imperial system of government. This reform would, they had hoped, lead to a more balanced representation.<sup>43</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup> Mill, J.S., *Considerations on Representative Government* (London, Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green: 1865): 132

<sup>43</sup> Waddie, C., *The Federation of Greater Britain* (Edinburgh, Waddie & Co.,: 1895): 5

Perhaps more important in the running of the Empire was the number of Scots who conquered and administered new territories. Michael Fry has tempered arguments about the level of influence Scotland had on the Empire, claiming Scots were too few to determine its course. Yet his impressive work on *The Scottish Empire* reveals the extent to which Scots were important in the creation and direction of the Empire.<sup>44</sup> Tom Devine is less circumspect, arguing that the “relentless penetration of Empire by Scottish educators, doctors, plantation overseers, army officers, government officials, merchants and clerics” was more important than the Highland emigrants.<sup>45</sup> Scots did have an important influence on the Empire. Scots merchants, Scots soldiers, Scots missionaries and above all Scots emigrants were all important in the creation and maintenance of the Empire.<sup>46</sup> Scotland was at the least a partner in Empire with England. As Linda Colley has forcefully argued, Britain, and therefore the Empire, was forged by the common experience of Scots and English fighting Catholic France in the colonial wars of the mid and late eighteenth century.<sup>47</sup>

Others have seen Scotland in a different light. Michael Hechter, for example, has argued that Scotland was an internal colony within Britain.<sup>48</sup> Using an economic argument based on the dependency theories of Gonzalez Casanova, Hechter argued colonies were condemned to an instrumental economic role by the metropolis, providing raw materials for the core.<sup>49</sup> This produced a cultural division of labour where cultural distinctions were superimposed along class lines.<sup>50</sup> In Scotland, therefore, Hechter claimed that Scots contribution to the United Kingdom was as a producer of raw materials. The heavy industries of West and Central Scotland are certainly supportive of this thesis. But the importance of the Clyde to the Empire was also clear and tied Scotland irrevocably to the Empire. Hechter’s thesis has been widely criticised. The cultural division of labour just did not exist in Scotland. There was no evidence that nationalists gained support from the lower classes or from

---

<sup>44</sup> Fry, M., *The Scottish Empire*, (Edinburgh, Birlinn: 2001): 495

<sup>45</sup> Devine, T., *Scotland’s Empire 1600-1815* (London, Penguin: 2003): xxvii

<sup>46</sup> See Fry, *The Scottish Empire*

<sup>47</sup> Colley, L., *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (London, Pimlico: 1992)

<sup>48</sup> Hechter, M., *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1975)

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid*: 30

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid*: 30

classes whose jobs depended on institutions guaranteed by the Union, such as lawyers and Church Ministers.<sup>51</sup> In addition, Scotland was one of the first nations in Europe to industrialise and shared a vast foreign market with England.<sup>52</sup> Scotland's position in the Empire was not colonial: it was privileged.

Despite this relatively privileged position within the Empire, Scottish nationalists wanted to reform Imperial Government. In the previous chapter we noted that Scottish nationalists wanted to reform the United Kingdom government because obstructionism by Irish nationalists and the volume of domestic and imperial business the Imperial Parliament had to deal with had led to legislative deadlock. Scottish domestic legislation rarely received the consideration it deserved and in many cases was not even introduced.

Scottish imperialists used much the same sort of argument when arguing for reform of imperial government. William Mitchell, treasurer of the SHRA, argued in 1889 that “the British Empire, which Englishmen, Irishmen and Scotsmen have all done their best to extend and replenish, has now outgrown the machinery of Government.”<sup>53</sup> In July 1890, a petition was delivered to Parliament by Gladstone on behalf of his Midlothian electors claiming that “the world-wide interests of the British Empire...demand that the Imperial Parliament should be relieved of domestic legislation.”<sup>54</sup> In their *Prospectus*, of 1892, the SHRA claimed that Scots had the interests of the Empire in mind when advocating Imperial Federation. “Parliament is no longer able to overtake the business of the Empire...”<sup>55</sup> Imperial Federation was the answer and the “only means of preventing the disintegration of the Empire.”<sup>56</sup> The situation had still not improved in 1893. William Mitchell, Treasurer of the SHRA, claimed Imperial interests were “treated with a neglect so great as to endanger the

---

<sup>51</sup> Brand, J.A., “Nationalism and the Non-Colonial Periphery: A Discussion of Scotland and Catalonia” in Tiryakan, E.A., and Rogowski, R., *New Nationalisms of the Developed West* (Boston, Allen and Unwin: 1985): 281-282

<sup>52</sup> Ibid: 282

<sup>53</sup> Mitchell, W., *Home Rule for Scotland – The Opening Speech Read (in part) at the discussion on that subject in the Conference Room of the National Liberal Club on 7<sup>th</sup> May 1889* (Edinburgh: 1889): 9

<sup>54</sup> Cited in Mitchell, W., *Is Scotland to be Sold Again?* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1893): 10

<sup>55</sup> Scottish Home Rule Association, *Prospectus of the Scottish Home Rule Association* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1892)

<sup>56</sup> Ibid

integrity of the British Empire.”<sup>57</sup> In 1895, Charles Waddie, secretary of the SHRA, argued that the increase in imperial matters had stalled the machinery of government. “Need it be wondered,” he asked, “that the whole machinery has broken down hopelessly in the attempt to grapple with such a mass of work?”<sup>58</sup>

According to the SHRA, the Imperial Parliament could no longer effectively manage, not only Scotland, as we saw in the previous chapter, but also the Empire. Imperial affairs were not receiving the attention they required. This in turn led to a fear that the Empire would dissolve unless action could be taken to remedy the situation. For the SHRA, at least, the answer lay in reform of both UK *and* Imperial Government. Home Rule all round would free the Imperial Parliament of the domestic affairs of the home nations and leave it free to manage the British Empire, allowing representatives from the white dominions and colonies to sit in a federal Imperial Parliament. The maintenance of the Empire was clearly important to Scottish nationalists. It is therefore worthy of a brief analysis.

In many ways nationalists could rightly claim the Empire was Scottish. Charles Dilke, in his analysis of the British settler Empire, *Greater Britain*, summed up the importance of the Empire for Scots.

... the fact remains, that wherever abroad you come across a Scotchman, you usually find him prosperous and respected....The Scotch emigrant is a man who leaves Scotland because he wishes to rise faster and higher than he can at home...<sup>59</sup>

The lack of government posts in Scotland following the Union meant that alternative employment opportunities had to be found for the middle and upper classes. The Empire provided that alternative source. As William Mitchell, the SHRA treasurer claimed, the lack of interest in politics caused by the removal of the Scots Parliament “naturally led to the exodus of the more talented and spirited of the Scottish

---

<sup>57</sup> Mitchell, W., *Bannockburn: A Short Sketch of Scottish History* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1893): 5

<sup>58</sup> Waddie, *The Federation of Greater Britain*: 1

<sup>59</sup> Quoted in Harvie, C., *Scotland and Nationalism – Scottish Society and Politics 1707-1994* 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (London, Routledge: 1994): 57

youth...”<sup>60</sup> This exodus proved rather successful. Scots abroad rose to prominent positions in many British colonies. Michael Fry’s epic work on *The Scottish Empire* shows the extent to which Scots were important “men on the spot” extending and consolidating the Empire around the world.<sup>61</sup> Scotland provided missionaries, entrepreneurs, merchants, military personnel and settlers for the Empire. To take Canada as just one example, ten Scots to every twelve Englishmen arrived in Canada between 1815 and 1905 at a time when the ratio of Scots to English in Great Britain was one to seven. The undue influence Scots had in the Empire was recognised by Scottish nationalists. In 1892, for example, William Mitchell commented, “For its size, Scotland has perhaps a larger and more influential connection with the colonies than any of the other home countries.”<sup>62</sup>

One reason the Scots were successful was sheer weight of numbers. But the Earl of Rosebery, President of the Imperial Federation League in Britain, believed there were other reasons for Scots being so influential in the Empire.

Wherever a colony is growing or wherever men were wanted for colonial enterprise, it is Scotsmen that are mainly called for. They happen to have that colonial spirit and those colonising capacities which are the backbone of an Imperial race.<sup>63</sup>

The education of Scots was important to their success. In his rectorial address at Aberdeen University in 1880, Rosebery told his new charges the burdens of the Empire were increasing and “a share of that Empire must devolve upon you.”<sup>64</sup>

Scots were not only important in the formation and administration of the Empire but they benefited through emigration and the possibilities the Empire provided. The Presbyterian paternalism of middle class Scots extended to their view of themselves as the natural rulers of the Empire.<sup>65</sup> Scots were hugely influential in the formative

---

<sup>60</sup> Mitchell, *Home Rule for Scotland and Imperial Federation* (Edinburgh, 1892): 23

<sup>61</sup> Fry, *The Scottish Empire*

<sup>62</sup> Mitchell, *Home Rule for Scotland and Imperial Federation*: 68; See *The Scotsman* 17 November, 1887: 6

<sup>63</sup> *The Scotsman*, 17 November 1887: 6

<sup>64</sup> *Inverness Courier*, November 6, 1880.

<sup>65</sup> Brown, A., McCrone, D., and Paterson, L., *Politics and Society in Scotland* (London, MacMillan: 1998): 11

years of the Canadian confederation. John A. Macdonald, born in Glasgow, was a key figure in Confederation and was the first Prime Minister of the Confederation. He went on to serve from the 1870s to his death in 1891.<sup>66</sup> George Brown, leader of the Canadian Reform Movement and born in Alloa, was also a Father of Confederation and was editor of the *Toronto Globe* until his death in 1880<sup>67</sup>. Alexander Mackenzie, born in Logierait, near Dunkeld, was the first Liberal Prime Minister of the Confederation.<sup>68</sup> In Canada at least, Scots were to a large extent responsible for the direction the Confederation took in its formative years.

### *Canada and the Empire*

Canada's relationship with the Empire was imperial but also quasi-federal, as Mill pointed out. Institutionally speaking, the British North America (BNA) Act of 1867 that established the Canadian Confederation left three key institutions in place that asserted and symbolised British rule over Canada: the Governor General, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) and Westminster. Each of these had powers that could, theoretically, strongly influence the course of Canadian affairs. For example the Governor General, the symbol of the Imperial relationship in Canada, could refer bills of the Canadian Government to London for approval.<sup>69</sup> In fact, the Governor General had the power to control decision making in Canada. Yet despite the enormous opportunities given to the Governor-General to meddle in Canadian affairs, the posts' holders rarely did so, displaying "considerable caution and self-restraint..."<sup>70</sup>

---

<sup>66</sup> Buckner, P., 'Macdonald, Sir John Alexander (1815–1891)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004 [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/17444>, accessed 25 Jan 2006]

<sup>67</sup> St Leger, A., 'Brown, George (1818–1880)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004 [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/3608>, accessed 25 Jan 2006]

<sup>68</sup> Waite, P.B., 'Mackenzie, Alexander (1822–1892)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004 [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/17571>, accessed 25 Jan 2006]

<sup>69</sup> Stevenson, G., *Ex Uno Plures: Federal- Provincial Relations in Canada 1867-1896* (Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queens University Press: 1993): 254 and 259

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*: 269

The JCPC had existed since the early days of the Empire. It provided British subjects living abroad the opportunity to “appeal for justice to the foot of the throne.”<sup>71</sup> Following Confederation in 1867, the legal position of Canada in the Empire was that of a colony. The Imperial Parliament was sovereign and colonial laws were interpreted as “local government edicts and were treated as either *intra* or *ultra vires*.”<sup>72</sup> The JCPC acted like an Imperial Supreme court judging whether or not the Dominion or Provincial legislatures were acting beyond the powers given to them by the Act of the Imperial Parliament.

The power of the Westminster Parliament, however, was the most important. As Westminster passed the British North America Act and Parliament was the supreme power in the Empire, only Westminster could revoke or alter the Act. This remained the case for the remainder of the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth century. Through this power alone the imperial relationship was established. The post of Governor-General and the role of the JCPC were largely symbolic by comparison.

The above powers over Canada constituted a relationship of dominance by the British state and the relationship was therefore imperial. Westminster had the ability to control Canadian decision-making in the domestic sphere not just in foreign affairs. In practice, however, these powers were rarely used. The Governor General acted as an advisor. His suggestions were either taken on board or ignored. The JCPC acted like a court of appeal where the delineation of powers between the provinces and the federal government were being defined. Only one act in the thirty years following Confederation was declared *ultra vires* by the JCPC.<sup>73</sup> The idea that the British government impinged on Canadian autonomy is unsustainable. If anything Canadian autonomy was extended, particularly following the successful negotiations over allowance of the Supreme Court Act of 1875. A more self confident Canada also began to assert herself in foreign affairs in the decades that

---

<sup>71</sup> Ibid: 281

<sup>72</sup> Verney, D., *Three Civilizations, Two Cultures, One State: Canada's political traditions*. (Durham, Duke University Press: 1986): 157-8

<sup>73</sup> Stevenson, *Ex Uno Plures*: 281

followed. Despite this growing confidence and relative autonomy, British Canadian nationalists wanted to reform imperial government.

We noted in the previous chapter a growing desire among British Canadian nationalists for involvement in Canadian affairs with the United States and in imperial affairs more generally. In order to achieve this, Canadian nationalists advocated not independence from the Empire, as the Spanish colonies had done in the early nineteenth century. Canadian nationalists proposed closer institutional ties within the Empire, whether a defence council or a formal federation. In part the choice of closer imperial ties was due to the structural position of Canada. This point is worth exploring further.

Canada, only having been formed in 1867, was a young nation with borders and territory not yet fully settled and dependent upon Britain for military purposes, particularly naval defence. Not only would independence have meant Canada would, overnight, have to create its own diplomatic service, foreign affairs departments, navy, army and so on but it would also have to finance these changes. Although Canadian territory had been largely secured by 1885, the year the Imperial Federation League in Canada was formed, the potential for American involvement in internal disputes had once again been raised during the North-West Rebellion during which Louis Riel made a brief reappearance.

Canada's reliance on British capital, military and diplomatic support meant independence was not an option. The increasing self-confidence of the young nation, however, made the case for Canada remaining uninterested in imperial and foreign affairs abortive. The only solution for British Canadian nationalists was a federation of the Empire in which Canada would have a say in imperial affairs, including relations with the United States.

The latter issue was the most important for British Canadians in the late nineteenth century. The trade disputes between Canada and the United States will be examined in detail in the next chapter. But the perceived aggression and hostility of the United

States throughout the trade debate, during the Fenian invasions and in relation to the North West were all seen as a threat to Canada as part of the Empire. There were many reasons for the creation of the Canadian Confederation in 1867 but one of the most important was to protect against American aggression. The Trent Affair of 1861, in which the British steamship the Trent was boarded and confederate envoys detained, and the St Alban's incident of 1864, had stretched British and American relations close to breaking point. British support for southern confederates during the American Civil war angered the North. The success of the Northern States in the war led to fears of an invasion of British North America in reprisal. The likelihood of any American invasion was small but perception guides policy and actions as much as reality, therefore the perception of American aggression was vitally important in the creation of a Canadian Confederation. The Fenian invasion of 1866, to which the United States government turned a blind eye, was taken as further evidence of American unfriendliness toward Canada and the British Empire.<sup>74</sup>

Canada was a central part of the Empire. From Halifax in the East to Vancouver Island in the West, Britain had excellent naval facilities from which it could patrol the North Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean. Completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway in the 1880s opened up a fast overland route to the Pacific and thereby to the Australasian colonies. This greatly increased the speed of imperial communications with the southern colonies. Canada could rightly claim to be the keystone of the British Empire. Any threat to Canada, therefore, was a threat to the Empire. Canada had to remain within the Empire to protect against this potential threat. Canadian imperialists argued that without the resources of the Empire, Canada could not survive and this would have been a fatal blow to the Empire.

Scotland and Canada had very different relationships with Imperial Government. Scotland was, to an extent, a partner in that government with representation in Parliament and the cabinet where real political influence could be used. The dominance of England in the relationship watered down this influence but it was still important. The economic and military influence of Scots on the Empire was much

---

<sup>74</sup> Careless, J.M.S., *Canada: The Story of Challenge* (Toronto, Stoddart: 1970): 237-9 and McNaught, K., *The Penguin History of Canada* (London, Penguin: 1988): 116

greater. Canada, by contrast, had few ties to Westminster and those ties that existed were weak. The Governor General rarely used his powers and over time became more of a symbolic figure. Westminster did not become involved in domestic affairs and the JCPC acted as a supreme court on interpretation of powers given to the Dominion and the Provinces under the BNA Act.

This weak relationship between the self-governing colonies, in our case Canada, and the Imperial state caused concern among nationalists in Scotland and Canada. The crux of the matter was whether a relationship based on sentiment would be sufficient to ensure the maintenance of the British Empire. They answered in the negative. In order to deal with the challenges faced by the Empire, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there had to be a fundamental reform of imperial government that would include the settler colonies.

### ***The Schemes for Imperial Federation***

Both the speeches and pamphlets issued by nationalists in Scotland and British Canada contained various schemes to unite and strengthen the Empire. It should be mentioned here that only the white self-governing dominions were included. India, the jewel in the crown of the Empire, was specifically excluded on the grounds that it did not have self-government.<sup>75</sup> As has been mentioned, Victorian attitudes to non-whites precluded them from self-government. If they were seen as incapable of governing themselves there could be no expectation of a share in the governance of the Empire.

The schemes put forward for imperial unity were varied but fall into three broad categories: a union for defence, an imperial zollverein and a full political federation. Schemes for an Imperial Zollverein, or free trade zone, can be largely dismissed. A debate over the direction of British tariff policy was conducted towards the end of the nineteenth century but there was little chance of the British Government moving away from its policy of free trade. Within these broad categories there were minor points of difference but each of the schemes give some clues as to why imperial unity

---

<sup>75</sup> See for example speech by J Parker Smith MP to Glasgow and West of Scotland Branch of IFL quoted in *Imperial Federation*, 1 December 1891: 280-281

was desired and why a Greater British identity was articulated. A brief review of the main points to each scheme will be made.

### *Lord Reay's Union for Imperial Defence*

The idea of a union of Britain and the colonies for defence was a common theme among the articles and speeches in the pages of the IFL's journal. The peace of the world was seen as a mission capable of attainment through united efforts by the white dominions of the Empire. It was an extension of the *Pax Britannica* symbol and as such was appropriated and expanded from the existing imperial discourse. This mission had at its heart Britannia's supremacy and recognition as the world power by her rivals.

In 1892, Lord Reay, a Scottish home rule supporter and member of the IFL, outlined his proposals for an Imperial Defence council to the annual meeting of the Hampstead Branch of the IFL. Reay argued, "What the league desires in the first place is the cohesiveness of the Empire for defensive purposes."<sup>76</sup>

The dangers which threaten us, and threaten the colonies may or may not be identical; but one thing is quite certain – that whatever they may be, they will become more threatening if we cannot rely on our united strength. What is the meaning of a united German, a united Italian Empire? That the various States felt that unity was the best safeguard against attack.<sup>77</sup>

Reay proposed that the colonies themselves establish and pay for their own army and navy contingents. This was an idea Charles Waddie of the SHRA also proposed in 1895. He argued the entire male population of the Empire should be trained to arms at school and then as part of their apprenticeship.<sup>78</sup> For Reay, these forces would be overseen by British admirals and generals and be subject to the same regulations for discipline and drill. They would combine for action in time of war. This of course was the sticking point for the colonies. There must be some acceptance of the voice of the Dominions in any decision to go to war.

---

<sup>76</sup> *Imperial Federation*, 1 June 1892: 141

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid*: 141

<sup>78</sup> Waddie, *The Federation of Greater Britain*: 11-12

To appease this view, Reay advocated the formation of an Imperial Defence Council, a “council of the Empire with representatives of all its constituent parts to discuss the international relations of the Empire...”<sup>79</sup> The decisions of the council would not be binding but its advice would be given serious consideration by the Foreign office prior to any decisions being made. The council would thus have achieved three things: it would have given the dominions a voice; prevented unilateral action by a dominion against the general interests of the Empire and strengthened the hand of the Foreign Secretary in his negotiations with foreign powers.<sup>80</sup>

This proposal for a loose union of the Empire for defence and offence with an advisory body at its head was intended to meet the threats to the Empire mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. Europe at the end of the nineteenth century was a system of competing states finely balanced through diplomacy and alliance. German unification in the 1870s had altered the precarious balance of power that had been maintained in Europe and the new state was beginning to be seen as a threat to the Empire, especially following the Berlin Conference of 1884. The threat of the Russian Empire was evident from Queen Victoria’s reaction to the invasion of the Ottoman Empire in the late 1870s. The invasion was seen in terms of a competition between British and Russian supremacy in the world. The Australian colonies were threatened by Russia in any potential war between Britain and the Eastern State.<sup>81</sup> Diplomatic relations with the French were constantly under strain following British involvement in Egypt and the Sudan. As R.C. Munro-Ferguson, a supporter of Scottish Home rule and a member of the IFL argued,

Upon the continent of Europe at the present time the elements of unrest and insecurity were extraordinarily rife. They heard of alliances in favour of peace, and while everyone talked of peace they found countries making the most lively preparations for war.<sup>82</sup>

---

<sup>79</sup> *Imperial Federation*, 1 June 1892: 141

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid*: 141

<sup>81</sup> See Rosebery’s speech to Edinburgh IFL quoted in the *The Scotsman*, 1 November 1888: 6

<sup>82</sup> Speech of Mr R.C.Munro Ferguson MP to Edinburgh and East of Scotland Branch of IFL quoted in *The Scotsman*, 6 October 1891: 7

Rosebery had expressed similar sentiments in 1889. "Every day, every month, every year, those great organisations which we call the military powers of Europe are producing fresh inventions of offence and defence..."<sup>83</sup> The need for the cooperation and support of the Dominions through an Imperial Defence council was clear. By supporting British imperial actions in Africa and elsewhere, the Empire was presenting a united front to the rest of the world, one that demanded recognition of British power in the world.

The ultimate sign of confidence in the Empire's supremacy in the world would have been withdrawal from the politics of European diplomacy altogether. This would allow Britons to focus attention on their mission to civilise Africa and Asia. William Mitchell, treasurer of the SHRA, had proposed home rule all round in the United Kingdom with the Imperial Parliament receiving representatives from the Dominions. Westminster, relieved of local business, could regulate the finances of the Empire to help pay for defences.<sup>84</sup> Interestingly, Mitchell argued that the impetus for the federation of the Empire should come from the colonies. He used the Quebec conference of the British North American colonies prior to Canadian confederation as an example. For Mitchell, a federation of the settler colonies,

So consolidated, and defended by a navy of overwhelming strength, Britannia might withdraw, as the United States has done, from European politics and devote all her energies to the development of her immense resources and the prosperity and happiness of her people, becoming a powerful and peaceful factor in the history of the world.<sup>85</sup>

But by pursuing the imperial mission in Africa and Asia, the British Empire would come into contact and potential conflict with the other European imperial powers, such as France and Germany. Withdrawal from European diplomacy was not, therefore, an option. Seen in this light, the need to unite the Empire was all the more important. Without the moral and logistical support of the self-governing colonies the Empire would be in grave danger. British forces on their own would be

---

<sup>83</sup> Quoted in *The Scotsman*, 16 November 1889: 8

<sup>84</sup> Mitchell, W., *Home Rule for Scotland and Imperial Federation*: 69; See also Grant, G.M., *The Case for Canada* (London, 1889): 8

<sup>85</sup> Mitchell, *Home Rule for Scotland and Imperial Federation*: 68-9

insufficient to cope with all possible threats. The need to unite the Empire for defence, therefore, was vital.

### *Sir John A. Macdonald's Imperial Defence Treaty*

As early as 1886, the Canadian Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, a member of the IFL and defender of Canadian autonomy, had argued for an imperial treaty in order to provide for better defence of the Empire. The threat to Canada and the rest of the Empire was clearly important to Canadians. In 1886, even New Brunswick clergymen were advocating Imperial Federation as a way of protecting and defending the Empire.

The days of war were not yet over. The Eastern Question can never be settled without a gigantic struggle between Russia and Great Britain. France looks coldly upon England and there was not much faith to be put in Germany, and the only guarantee of peace was a confederation of all the colonies and the Mother Country.<sup>86</sup>

The sheer size and extent of the Empire meant that any form of cooperation should lead to increased security. The union of the Empire for the purposes of defence would strengthen the empire “whose territory, the numbers of whose people, the strength of whose armaments would bring almost certain guarantee for the security and peace of all.”<sup>87</sup>

In an interview published in *Imperial Federation*, Sir John proposed the federation of the Australian Colonies and Cape Colonies as a prelude to closer ties with Britain. Once the federation of these colonies had taken place, he proposed a treaty between Australia, Canada, the Cape and Britain for mutual defence, “the maintenance of the empire and the flag of Great Britain.”<sup>88</sup>

In this we should have a guarantee of the peace of the Empire and of the World. There is no nation so strong that she would not hesitate to embark on

---

<sup>86</sup> *Imperial Federation*, 1 March 1886: 73

<sup>87</sup> Imperial Federation League, *Imperial Federation League in Canada – Report of the First Meeting* (Montreal, 1885): 41-2

<sup>88</sup> *Imperial Federation*, 1 February 1886: 43 & 58

a war with England, for she would not be fighting one nation, but three or four. The British race would become the police of the world.<sup>89</sup>

Macdonald's scheme was less formal and lacked the detail of Lord Reay's proposal but the principle was the same. In order to protect the Empire, the settler colonies and the metropolis must stand united against the threats of other powers.

### *Relative Security – A response to threats to the Empire*

Theoretically the defence of the Empire is relatively easy to account for. One of the overriding factors for any imperial power must be the maintenance of empire.<sup>90</sup> Empire establishes trading relationships beneficial to merchants in the metropolis. In addition, imperial possessions are seen as a source of power and prestige in international relations. The radical liberal J.A. Hobson argued that the British Empire was sustained by excess capital gained from profitable trade and business at home.<sup>91</sup> Success at home led to imperial activities generating more excess profit. Empire thus drove success and was caused by success. So, despite the liberal rhetoric of the Manchester School of Cobden, Bright and Goldwin Smith of the mid-nineteenth century,<sup>92</sup> there was no serious attempt by the British State to dispose of its colonial possessions. The reaction to the Indian Mutiny of 1857 provides ample evidence.<sup>93</sup> Rather than withdrawing from the region the East India Company was wound up and a Viceroy appointed thus symbolically strengthening political control in India.

But according to Reynolds, the “only major constraint on states and their freedom to pursue their own interests is the countervailing force of rival capacities for exercising violence.”<sup>94</sup> Security becomes a relative matter. The more powerful another state is perceived to be the greater the need to increase capacity for defence. This pursuit of power leads to states having rival spheres of influence as they attempt to control

---

<sup>89</sup> Ibid: 43

<sup>90</sup> Lieven, D., *Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals from the sixteenth century to the present.* (London, Pimlico: 2003): 39

<sup>91</sup> Hobson, *Imperialism*

<sup>92</sup> For examples of the anti-imperialist thought of this group see Bennett, G., *The Concept of Empire: Burke to Attlee 1774-1947 2<sup>nd</sup> edition* (London, Adam & Charles Black: 1962): 215-243

<sup>93</sup> See Ferguson, N., *Empire: How Britain made the Modern World* (London, Penguin: 2003): 154

<sup>94</sup> Reynolds, *Modes of Imperialism*: 19

other states, hegemonically or directly, in the pursuit of their own security. “Imperialism is thus a direct consequence of the security dilemma.”<sup>95</sup>

But it has been widely recognised by political theorists that Federations can also be a consequence of the security dilemma. In situations where a group of states are incapable of defending themselves against potential aggressors they can combine for mutual defence.<sup>96</sup> We have argued that Canadian confederation was partly a union of defence against the United States. The calls for a federation of the Empire were articulated in this way. Defence of the Empire, and peace in the world, could only be secured by the Federation of the Empire with Britannia at its head.

This is exactly the situation Britain and the British Dominions found themselves at the end of the nineteenth century. Lord Reay himself argued that “no nation can feel a sense of security unless it knows that its armaments are of such a nature that it will not be molested by a neighbour.”<sup>97</sup> In the late Victorian era the need to defend British economic interests abroad and to secure the Dominions was great. The increasing power of Germany following reunification, the power of Russia, the United States, as well as the French, all threatened the existence of the empire, as well as British influence in Europe. The sheer scale of the Empire and its far-flung lands brought the British state into potential conflict with any number of aggressors. The solution to this “security-dilemma” lay in a formal union for defence/offence in the form laid out by Lord Reay and other imperialists.

In securing peace and security for imperial possessions, a federated British Empire would have gained the recognition of the rest of the world as the world power. There was a real sense among nationalists that, not only should the Empire be defensively secure, but that it should be recognised as the great force in the world. “Germany, France, the United States, and Russia among the most formidable of her rivals, are struggling hard for the winning post- the palm of international sovereignty.”<sup>98</sup> But

---

<sup>95</sup> Ibid: 24

<sup>96</sup> See for example, Riker, W.H., *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance* (1964) and Wheare, K.C., *Federal Government* (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1967)

<sup>97</sup> *The Scotsman*, 17 October 1891: 8

<sup>98</sup> *Imperial Federation*, 1 March 1886: 75

with a federation “united in the one common cause they would be the greatest power on the face of the earth.”<sup>99</sup>

In this sense the nationalist rhetoric becomes the Politics of Recognition. Societies see themselves being rated against other societies on the world stage.<sup>100</sup> The aim of communities or nations is to be at the top of this rating. Weber called this the Prestige of Power, “the glory of power over other communities.”<sup>101</sup> Challenges to the British Empire from the powers mentioned are perceived as attempts to displace the British Empire as the foremost power in the world. In the face of this challenge nationalists proposed the formation of some form of federal structure for the white dominions creating a powerful force in the world. The creation of this structure with the support of Britons across the world would result in a platform from which they could pursue world peace, no-one would be strong enough to challenge the Empire, and pursue the national mission of civilisation and liberty. This would bring recognition of the Empire as the world power.

### *The Scottish Nationalists’ View of Imperial Federation*

The first flyer of the SHRA contained the objects of the movement. The first of these objects was “To maintain the integrity of the Empire, and secure that the voice of Scotland shall be heard in the Imperial Parliament as fully as at present when discussing Imperial Affairs.”<sup>102</sup> This reflected both the privileged position Scotland had within the Empire and the SHRA’s strong desire that Scotland should remain within the Empire. As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the SHRA believed imperial affairs were not receiving the attention they were due. Augustine Birrell, the Liberal MP for West Fife and member of the SHRA, in seconding the motion for Scottish Home Rule in 1894, claimed constituents “sent them to Westminster, in the first place to look after the affairs of Westminster, and in the second place to pass laws for Scotland. As a matter of fact they had little time to do

---

<sup>99</sup> Imperial Federation League, *Imperial Federation League in Canada – Speeches at the public meeting Held at Toronto on March 24<sup>th</sup>, 1888* (Toronto, 1888): 15

<sup>100</sup> Taylor, C., “Nationalism and Modernity” in Hall, J.A., (ed) *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the theory of nationalism*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1998): 208

<sup>101</sup> Weber, M., “Structures of Power”: 160

<sup>102</sup> SHRA, *Scottish Home Rule Association* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1886)

either.”<sup>103</sup> One part of the answer was to relieve Westminster of domestic legislation and create a national parliament for Scotland. Yet the SHRA provided little detail on how the Empire should be maintained. Consistently, however, they claimed that home rule would allow representatives of the home nations and the dominions to meet “upon an equal footing in the Imperial Parliament for the management of such affairs as are common to all or Imperial in their nature.”<sup>104</sup> Apart from Charles Waddie, very few in the SHRA gave an imperial federation scheme more than a passing mention. A scheme of political federation can be discerned, however, among the writings of Mitchell and Waddie, the key pamphleteers in the movement.

In 1895 Charles Waddie, secretary of the SHRA, published a pamphlet entitled *The Federation of Greater Britain*. The pamphlet contained a detailed discussion of the form imperial federation would take. As the SHRA had maintained for a number of years the prelude to the federation of the Empire was home rule all round. Only when the home nations managed their own national affairs in the same way as the dominions could a “true British Parliament...be open to receive the concentrated wisdom of the whole British World.”<sup>105</sup>

This “true British Parliament” would be responsible for the greater functions of the state. It would manage the Empire as a whole and deal with foreign and imperial relations. The *new* British Parliament would have exclusive control of the army and navy, of diplomatic relations and of peace and war. It would be guardian of the whole interests of the Dominions and regulate commercial interstate relations. The British Parliament, however, already did all these things. The problem was that imperial affairs were neglected<sup>106</sup> and did not take into account the interests of the Dominions. With representation for the Dominions in the Westminster Parliament,

---

<sup>103</sup> Jalland, P., ‘Birrell, Augustine (1850–1933)’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004 [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/31901>, accessed 26 May 2006]; Scottish Home Rule Association, *Report of the Debate in the House of Commons on Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1894 on Mr Dalziel’s Motion in Favour of Home Rule for Scotland with an Analysis of the Division List and an Address to the People of Scotland by the Scottish Home Rule Association* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1894): 21

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid*: 8

<sup>105</sup> Waddie, C., *The Federation of Greater Britain*: 3

<sup>106</sup> Reith, J., *Reasons for Home Rule for Scotland* (Edinburgh, SHRA: circa 1892); Mitchell, W., *Is Scotland to be Sold Again*: 58

the legitimacy of Imperial Rule would be established. Only one problem would remain: the dominance of English MPs.

If ever such a system as we have sketched out is to work harmoniously, the perfect equality of all the states represented in the British Parliament must be recognised. When States enter into a Federation, they must surrender a portion of their natural rights, but all must surrender alike, for if one has a preponderating voice in the assembly the others become her vassals.<sup>107</sup>

Waddie was concerned that English MPs would overwhelm any Imperial Parliament with their numbers. This issue returns to the nationalist element of the SHRA's discourse. Imperial federation would create a multi-national, and therefore potentially illegitimate, state. In order to eradicate this potential illegitimacy, Waddie argued that the principle of equality of nations should apply. Equal representation meant equal recognition of interests and identity. But democracy is also about numbers. The English were by far the most populous of all the potential nations in a proposed federation.

With representation, however, comes responsibility. Waddie claimed that if "taxation without representation is contrary to the first principles of liberty...then it must be held that representation without taxation is equally unjust."<sup>108</sup> The services provided by the Imperial Parliament had to be paid for. If the Dominions wanted a say in running the Empire, they would have to contribute to its costs, including the Navy and the diplomatic service.

In order to maintain relations between the various parts of the Empire, Waddie proposed a common customs Union, something like the European common market. "There could be no cordial relations between the members of the Federation, no homogenous state, if a war of tariffs was indulged in between them."<sup>109</sup> There had to be free trade within the Empire and a system of protection against foreign goods. Whilst it may have been unreasonable to ask the free traders to relinquish their dream there were at least some benefits.

---

<sup>107</sup> Waddie, *The Federation of Greater Britain*: 5

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid*: 7

<sup>109</sup> Waddie, *The Federation of Greater Britain*: 8

If, then, there was absolute Free Trade in the whole British Dominions, - so vast and so varied is the climate and territory that every product under the sun can be produced on our own estate. We are thus rendered independent of all the world; we are self confined.<sup>110</sup>

The institution of an Imperial Zollverein (free trade within the empire) would assist in uniting the British Federation, which could then turn to the cultivation of the Empire.

With an Imperial Federation of the type advocated by Waddie, the “British Empire would ere long attain a cohesion like that under which the United States have made such marvellous progress and become like them an important factor in preserving the peace of the world.”<sup>111</sup> For Waddie, imperial federation would create a state, but not just any state. “It would create the most powerful state the world ever saw, no foreign power or combination of rivals could ever hope to wage a successful war against us.”<sup>112</sup> The recognition of the Empire as the pre-eminent force in the world was vital for the maintenance of Greater British identity.

#### *The British Canadian Nationalists’ View of Imperial Federation*

British Canadian nationalists were generally more circumspect in making detailed proposals. The main aim was to generate support for the general principle of imperial unity and federation. One of the most in depth analyses of imperial federation, however, was made by a member of the executive committee of the Imperial Federation League in Canada. In a series of articles published in *Imperial Federation*, Jehu Matthews outlined a complete plan of a possible federal system for the management of the empire. Matthews argued that the Empire was to all intents and purposes a federation but lacked the corporate entity demanded of a federation. “In other words the Empire now imposes on itself the risks and responsibilities of Federalism whilst eschewing the increased strength to meet them which complete

---

<sup>110</sup> Ibid: 8

<sup>111</sup> Mitchell, W., *Home Rule for Scotland – The Opening Speech...*: 16

<sup>112</sup> Ibid: 15

union must confer.”<sup>113</sup> He therefore argued that for federation to be accomplished throughout the Empire a federal authority must be formed. The key power of this authority must be in the realm of foreign affairs. “Since all communications with foreign powers occurs through diplomacy, the authority which is to regulate all relations with them must control it.”<sup>114</sup> Because armaments must back diplomacy the federal authority must also have control of the armed forces. Of course this would have cost money. Matthews argued that the most effective way to pay for this would be through federal taxation and that customs revenue is the most effective revenue raiser.<sup>115</sup> The conclusion therefore would be that,

...the Federal authority must at least control diplomacy, armaments, finance and commerce, and that it must be a composite-State Government acting on individuals, I think we may safely conclude that neither at home nor in the Colonies would people be disposed to entrust these prerogatives to any other than a representative Government...<sup>116</sup>

A complete political union of Great Britain and the Dominions was proposed in which each would elect representatives to attend a federal assembly/parliament that would deal with foreign affairs, defence, finance and commerce. This is very similar in style to the federation envisaged by Waddie above and by Alexander Galt, one time Canadian High Commissioner. Galt saw Dominion representatives being sent to Westminster and the Imperial Parliament as serving similar functions to those outlined by Matthews.<sup>117</sup>

Like Waddie, Matthews was aware of the potential illegitimacy such a federation would create. Matthews, however, took the solution in a different direction and argued that population *should* be used as the basis for representation in the federal authority.<sup>118</sup> Although English MPs would by far make up the majority, Matthews

---

<sup>113</sup> *Imperial Federation*, 1 July 1890: 158

<sup>114</sup> *Imperial Federation*, 1 August 1890: 179

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid*: 180

<sup>116</sup> *Imperial Federation*, 1 September 1890: 203

<sup>117</sup> *The Scotsman*, 2 July 1886 – report of Galt’s speech to IFL meeting: 7

<sup>118</sup> *Imperial Federation*, 1 September 1890: 203

argued that the federated imperial state would not be legislating for nations within the Empire but for the entire imperial community itself. The idea of a Greater British community, Britannia, as the focus for Imperial Governance was thus made. The newly constituted legislative body would, in concert with a reformed House of Lords, legislate on purely imperial matters on behalf of the Greater British nation. The interests of the Britannia would be represented, not those of Scotland, England, Canada or the Cape.

The settler nature of the Empire ensured the principles of democratic government, the right to a say in affairs affecting your interests, were exported to the Empire. The extension of responsible and representative government to Canada in the 1840s illustrates this point. By extending democratic government to the colonies, the Imperial Government conceded the right of Britons abroad to a say in affairs affecting their interests. Initially domestic affairs were the focus of these powers. But this extension of powers also laid the basis for Britons across the Empire claiming Imperial Governance of their affairs with other states was illegitimate. Their claims of illegitimacy could be presented as a declaration of the right to self-determination. The symbols and ties that bound Canada and Scotland to the Empire meant Britannia and not Scotland or Canada was the object of self-determination.

There was, however, one other problem: customs duties. Given the British government's adherence to free trade principles there seemed little likelihood they would start to impose customs tariffs on imports. Likewise, the dominions relied heavily on income generated from their customs duties. Since fifty per cent of their imports were from the British Isles it was unlikely that they would adopt free trade. According to Matthews, the only answer was to leave the imposition of customs tariffs with the Dominions and for adjusted payments to be made to the Federal authority.<sup>119</sup>

---

<sup>119</sup> *Imperial Federation*, 1 November 1890: 252

### *Extending and Reinforcing the Imperial State*

Political federation would go further than a defence union in terms of the representation offered to the Dominions. It is clear, at least from Waddie's quote, that the same motives were present in these proposals. Recognition of the political federation as "the most powerful state the world ever saw" was vital if Britain was to maintain its pre-eminent position in the world. Securing the Empire through union with the Dominions would ensure no other state ventured to attack any part of the Empire so solving the "security dilemma."

The schemes described above were intended to alter the machinery of the Empire and give the white dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa a voice in the management of the Empire. The relationship of dominance would be removed and Britons overseas no longer viewed as mere colonists but as Britons participating in the imperial project. It would create a ruling body, a state, to which all the white dominions were eligible to participate. There were several assumptions that underpinned these proposed reforms. Firstly, there was a view that Canada had outgrown its status as a colony and was now ready to be an equal or at least junior partner in the empire. Secondly, that Britons regardless of where they lived had a right to a voice in their own affairs. Finally, that neither Britain nor the Dominions were prepared to give up or leave the Empire.

There was also an underlying assumption of the existence of a white British community that existed beyond the extent of the British Isles. In claiming that "Self-government is the inherent right of the British people, no matter where they might pitch their tents" as Principal Grant did in the 1890s, nationalists were actually calling for recognition of Britannia through the representation of all its members in a reformed imperial government.<sup>120</sup> In other words, regardless of which territory of the empire Britons lived they had the same rights to voice in all affairs that affected the common welfare of Britons everywhere. British Canadians had the same rights to representation in the foreign affairs of the Empire as the Scots because they belonged to the Britannia.

---

<sup>120</sup> *The Westminster*, 6 November 1897: 353

In this sense nationalists saw Britannia as having two roles. Firstly they used the British imperial community to provide legitimacy for their schemes of imperial unity. Britannia existed therefore it needed a state of its own. The state would be strengthened and its actions legitimated by the existence of Britannia. In other ways, however, they saw the role of the imperial state to increase the sense of unity within Greater British community. Without the state Britannia would disappear. The state institutions would instil a greater sense of identity by allowing Britons across the world a say in the running of the Empire. The interests of Britons overseas would be recognised, therefore removing, or at least reducing the likelihood of a schism in Britannia.

### ***The Concept of a Greater British Identity - Britannia***

Both Scotland and Canada were tied into a wider British community with which they identified and that led the nationalists to build a discourse that maintained the imperial relationship. A feeling of community existed between the home nations and the white dominions, largely based on the existence of large numbers of British migrants in Canada and the other self-governing colonies. According to Hyam, around 10 million emigrants left the United Kingdom for the Empire between 1815 and 1912.<sup>121</sup> Scotland's population in this period peaked at just over 4 million.<sup>122</sup> In this sense, it may be more appropriate to consider Canada as a peripheral society of Great Britain and to see a Greater Britain, or Britannia, as a separate imperial community encompassing the British settler colonies and the British mainland.

A distinction was made between self-governing colonies, such as Canada and bureaucratic colonies such as India. This distinction was based on the racial principles of social Darwinism.<sup>123</sup> Coloured people, according to this contention, were incapable of governing themselves. White Europeans on the other hand were

---

<sup>121</sup> Hyam, R., *Britain's Imperial Century, 1815-1914 – A Study of Empire and Expansion 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition* (Basingstoke, MacMillan: 1993): 23

<sup>122</sup> Anderson, M.P. and Morse, D.J., "The People", in *People and Society in Scotland 1830-1914* Hamish Fraser, W., and Morris, R.J., (eds) (Edinburgh, John Donald: 1990): 9

<sup>123</sup> For a brief discussion of Victorian Attitudes to Africa see Chamberlain, *The Scramble for Africa: 17-29*

capable of governing themselves. But the distinction went further than this. The self-governing dominions had been largely peopled by British immigrants who, as subjects of Her Majesty abroad, had the same rights of self-government as those living in the British Isles.<sup>124</sup> These ready made collaborators with the Empire are vital to understanding the position taken by nationalists in the late nineteenth century. The myths of the British Diaspora, as articulated by nationalists, provide evidence for the existence of Britannia, a community distinct from, but linked to, the British Empire. It existed within the Empire but did not constitute the whole Empire. Britannia's mission was to spread civilisation and liberty to the rest of the world.

### *The importance of Empire in uniting Britain*

The nature of British-ness is not a straightforward concept. One of the most comprehensive treatments of the concept of a British nation comes from Linda Colley. In her historical review from the Treaty of Union to the coronation of Queen Victoria, Colley argues that the commitment to a common Protestant religion and its defence against the Catholic French in a succession of wars culminating in the Napoleonic Wars united the English, Scots and Welsh into a British nation.<sup>125</sup> Of course there were differences in the nature of Protestantism within Britain, from the Presbyterian Scots, to the Episcopalian English and Non-Conformist Welsh. Nevertheless the common experience of the Protestant mission against France would have been important in uniting these disparate branches. In addition, the Empire acquired as a result of the victories over the French in the Seven Years War provided opportunities for the non-English Britons to become part of the British ruling class both at home and abroad as the need for imperial administrators grew.<sup>126</sup> The Empire heightened the sense that in some way Britain's destiny was providential. "God had entrusted Britons with Empire, they believed, so as to further the worldwide spread of the Gospel, and as testimony to their status as the Protestant Israel."<sup>127</sup> Colley acknowledged the existence of Scots, English and Welsh identities but saw the new British identity as superimposed over them.<sup>128</sup>

---

<sup>124</sup> Porter, *The Lions Share*: 19

<sup>125</sup> Colley, *Britons*

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid*: 370

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid*: 369

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid*: 7

In this sense Colley saw identity as layered. Scottishness sat beneath a layer of Britishness. This is not to say that she saw British identity as more important than a sense of Scottishness. Rather in geographical terms it was a broader concept. We can relate this to the model outlined in our theoretical framework. Dual or multiple identities exist like concentric rings in which each outer ring relies on the existence of the inner ring. Since the inner ring, our local identity, is the only culturally experienced identity, each outer identity becomes more simplistic and less representative of individuals<sup>129</sup>. Colley's idea that British identity was superimposed over a Scottish identity is compatible with this model.

Colley focused very much on the experiential element of identity formation. The experience of fighting a common enemy and sharing a common religion created British identity. There are problems with this thesis, although they are perhaps more definitional rather than substantial. Morton has argued that Colley's thesis implied the existence of a united British civil society as well as a united British state. Since this civil society did not exist, rather there were separate civil societies for Scotland and England at least, there could not have existed an overarching British nation.<sup>130</sup> Of course, the central aspect of Morton's argument is that Scots national identity used civil society rather than the state as its outlet. This does not mean, however, that all identities only find their expression through civil society or are happy to express themselves through civil society. If a state exists that coincides with a given community then the state will attempt to build a "nation" within its boundaries in order to provide the actions of the state with legitimacy. Guibernau argued for a distinction to be made between legitimate and illegitimate states in this sense. Illegitimate states, those containing more than one nation, attempt to homogenise the population within its territory and thus create a new nation.<sup>131</sup> The focus of that nation's loyalty as a result would be the state not civil society.

---

<sup>129</sup> Cohen, A., "Belonging: The Experience of Culture" in Cohen, A., (ed) *Belonging: Identity and Social Organisation in British Rural Cultures* (Manchester, Manchester University Press: 1982): 9-10

<sup>130</sup> Morton, G., *Unionist Nationalism – Governing Urban Scotland 1830-1860* (East Linton, Tuckwell Press: 1999): 15

<sup>131</sup> Guibernau, M., *Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1996): 60-1

Bernard Crick claimed that Colley had mistaken the British phenomenon as nationalism when in fact she had observed a British patriotism, or loyalty to the state.<sup>132</sup> There may be some merit in his critique. Wars are generally fought for the state, although the rhetoric of nationalism (or religion) will often be used to justify them. But other academics, notably Tom Nairn and James Mitchell have argued that the Monarchy (Nairn) and the Crown in Parliament (Mitchell) have been important in developing a sense of British *national* identity.<sup>133</sup> But in both these arguments the monarchy and parliament are both aspects of the state, if by state we mean a sovereign power. Parliament, symbolically at least, makes decisions in the name of the Queen.

Here we are entering the realm of distinctions between nationalism and patriotism, where the latter is portrayed as loyalty to the state. But states mobilise and represent nations for their own ends and nations use states to ensure representation of their identity. The distinction between patriotism and nationalism seems unnecessary and unhelpful, certainly in this case. Both these concepts have communities that identify with certain symbols. Whether these symbols are created, or adopted, by the state or the nation is not really the point. Identity, after all, is experiential. Both states and nationalist elites promote nationalism. Where there is a potential for illegitimacy, as in multi-national states, the attempts to promote nationalism may conflict with an existing nation. If that state fails to co-opt this nation into its project then nationalism, as a political force, is likely.

There can be no doubt that Parliament and the Monarchy are symbols of a British identity. Both represented the people of Great Britain in domestic and foreign affairs. The experience of living under a common Monarchy and a common Parliament would have been instrumental in creating a British identity, in the same way that Canada First and others tried to use the existence of the federal governmental

---

<sup>132</sup> Cited in Morton, *Unionist Nationalism*: 15

<sup>133</sup> Nairn, T., *The Enchanted Glass: Britain and Its Monarchy* (London, Radius: 1988); Mitchell, J., *Strategies for Self-Government – The Campaigns for a Scottish Parliament* (Edinburgh, Polygon: 1996): 51

machinery to instil a sense of Canadian identity. The religious wars with France and sharing a common religion and economy would have added to the sense of British identity. But the biggest factor for the formation of a British identity by the time of the confederation of Canada was the imperial experience.

As Robbins has claimed, for Britons, Empire “was their ‘common work’ and as such, held a foremost place in forging the national unity of Britain itself.”<sup>134</sup> Others have claimed that as the Empire was only really acquired in the post 1707 period it formed a more important part of a British identity than it did a Scots, Welsh or English identity.<sup>135</sup> Of course, the argument of this thesis is that nations and nationalism are modern phenomena. The Union of 1707 would not have created a British identity over night. The experience of the Jacobite Rebellions and the subsequent inclusion of the Highlanders in the British Army were important in including Scotland in the British project. The success of the Highland Regiments in New France and India also helped instil a British identity among Scots. But British identity only took on great importance during the Napoleonic Wars. As Devine argued, during this time the martial tradition of the Scottish Highlands began to play an important part in a rejuvenated Scottish identity that saw itself on equal terms with the English in the Union and therefore the Empire.<sup>136</sup> The contribution of the Highland regiments in the Napoleonic Wars allowed Scots to see themselves as contributing to the British project. Empire, therefore, could only become an important factor in British national identity in the nineteenth century following the defeat of the French. The important point is that the Empire gave the British (Protestant) nation a mission to spread its religion, liberty and civilisation to the “savages” of Africa and Asia., As Niall Ferguson has argued, in many ways missionaries like Dr Livingstone were the heroes of the age.<sup>137</sup> It was their goal to convert the heathen and bring them civilisation, the rule of law and liberal government. This national mission was as vital in forging a

---

<sup>134</sup> Robbins, K., *Great Britain: Identities, Institutions and the Idea of Britishness* (London, Longman: 1998): 213

<sup>135</sup> Peter Scott, quoted in Morton, G., “What if? The Significance of Scotland’s Missing Nationalism” in Broun, D, Finlay, R.J., and Lynch, M (eds) *Image and Identity: The Making and Remaking of Scotland Through the Ages* (Edinburgh, John Donald: 1998): 162

<sup>136</sup> Devine, *Scotland’s Empire*: 356

<sup>137</sup> Ferguson, *Empire*: 128

British national identity as were the common experiences of monarchy, Parliament and war.

We can take this idea further. The high levels of emigration from Britain to Canada, to take one example, meant British identity was transported to new lands within the Empire. Indeed the unity of the Empire was to be found in the sentiments of Britishness held by those living in the metropolis and the white settlers of the self-governing dominions. Robbins has argued that in many respects the white settlers were more truly British “because there the various peoples of Britain lived more closely alongside each other than they did at home.”<sup>138</sup> The British connection, he claimed, was a, “unifying response in an environment which was still fraught with uncertainty, not least concerning relationships either with indigenous peoples or with French- speakers...”<sup>139</sup> There can be little doubt that the common connection the British experience gave immigrants would have been vital in unifying the new settlements. The pomp and ceremony of imperial occasions, the institutions of government, the symbol of the Governor-General and his Lieutenant Governors and above all the symbolism of the Monarchy helped to maintain a British identity. In the new world, this British identity would be transformed to take account of the new circumstances, thus altering British identity into a British Canadian identity.

This shared British identity existed in both the metropolis and the dominions. We can, therefore, begin to talk of the existence of a Greater British community, Britannia. The extent of that community and its far removal from the national identities of its members meant symbols, such as the monarchy, were vitally important in the imagining Britannia.

Symbols and invented traditions are vital elements of any identity. They establish membership of a group by establishing symbols that differentiate those within the group from those outside the group. They create boundaries between groups that aid in imagining the psychological bond between members of the nation. Only those who identify with the symbols and the manner in which they are expressed can understand

---

<sup>138</sup> Robbins, *Great Britain*: 213

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid*: 214

themselves as belonging to the group. Symbols also establish relations of power and inculcate beliefs and value systems.<sup>140</sup> Both the monarchy and the Protestant mission were important in establishing who belonged to Britannia and the values important to Greater Britain.

### *The Monarchy as a symbol of British-ness*

The power of the Monarchy in the Victorian era is difficult to understand in the modern era when its role is now wholly symbolic and even its symbolic significance has been eroded. It is inconceivable that today's Parliament would debate the motion "that the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing and ought to be diminished" as it did in the 1870s.<sup>141</sup> The diminished power of the monarchy following the Reform Acts, however, meant the symbolic role of the Monarchy grew in importance.<sup>142</sup> Increasing international pressure on Britain's position in world, which had been virtually non-existent since the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, allowed the monarchy to become a symbol of the British community.<sup>143</sup> In the late nineteenth century, with Victoria approaching her Golden Jubilee, the Monarchy's symbolic role was vital to the maintenance of Britannia. Although the supremacy of Parliament or, to be more accurate, the Crown in Parliament, had been established, the Monarchy, as Head of State, remained important as a symbol of Great Britain. But the Monarchy was also a symbol of the Empire. As the Canadian High Commissioner claimed in his speech to the Annual meeting of the IFL in London, the Queen was recognised as the "tie that unites us to the Mother Country."<sup>144</sup> As there were few political links to London, the Queen, through her Royal Officer the Governor-General, embodied the connection between Canada and the Empire. She commanded the navy and army. It was Victoria's name on foreign treaties.<sup>145</sup>

---

<sup>140</sup> Hobsbawm, E., "Introduction: Inventing Traditions" in Hobsbawm, E., and Ranger, T., (eds) *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1992): 2

<sup>141</sup> Cited in Cannadine, D., "The British Monarchy c. 1820-1977" in Hobsbawm, E., and Ranger, T., (eds) *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1992): 109

<sup>142</sup> Ibid: 120

<sup>143</sup> Ibid: 123/125

<sup>144</sup> *Imperial Federation*, 1 August 1886: 207

<sup>145</sup> Ibid: 207

The Queen commanded loyalty, not just as the monarch of Great Britain, but as head of the Empire. In an analysis of the source of sovereignty, James Edgar, a member of Canada First and Liberal MP, argued, that, “Canadians are loyal, just as Englishmen to Queen and Parliament, and that Parliament is the one which makes our laws, the Parliament of Canada.”<sup>146</sup> Here then we have the acknowledgement of the principle of the Crown in Parliament. Canadians were loyal to the sovereign law making body: the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa. But Edgar takes this further. Victoria was Queen of Canada and as such commanded the loyalty of Canadians. “In executive and administrative matters she represents the power and dignity of the Dominion. Her name is the symbol under which our people govern themselves. We are therefore loyal to it.”<sup>147</sup> In essence Edgar’s argument was a nationalist one. Canadian’s did not owe loyalty to the Westminster Parliament but to Ottawa. But there was no discussion of Canada becoming a Republic, as her neighbour to the south had done. In maintaining allegiance to the symbolism of the Crown, Edgar was confirming his allegiance to something bigger than Canada: Britannia.

The monarchy was often used in this sense, as Queen not of Britain but of Canada. Grant exclaimed in an address to the first meeting of the IFLC, “We are Britons. We are the Canadian subjects of Her Majesty!”<sup>148</sup> At the same meeting Edgar Crow Baker, MP, an ex-navy man, claimed that “...wherever the British flag floated there was a strong feeling of loyalty to our Queen and the old Country...”<sup>149</sup> Thus the monarch was seen as neither Canadian, English nor Scots. The Monarchy represented Britannia, Greater Britain.

The tradition of visiting Balmoral, on *Royal Deeside* in Scotland, every autumn raised the profile of the Monarchy, particularly Queen Victoria, North of the English border. The annual visits gave the Crown a Scottish tinge. The tradition began in 1848 and continues to the present day. Highland newspapers, such as the *Inverness Courier* and *The Northern Courier*, carried news of the Queen’s ascent of mountains

---

<sup>146</sup> Edgar, J., *Loyalty An Address delivered to the Toronto Young Mens Club* (Toronto: 1885): 6

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid*: 7

<sup>148</sup> IFL, *Imperial Federation League in Canada - Report of the First meeting*: 50

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid*: 19

in the Cairngorm and Grampian mountains near Balmoral. In the late nineteenth century it was common for Prime Ministers and politicians to visit the Queen at Balmoral on official business. The Queen's obvious affection for Scotland, particularly after the death of Prince Albert who had acquired the estate, certainly developed the Romantic Jacobite and Kailyard myths of Scottish identity. Scottish tourism boomed as a result and the Highlands became a romantic symbol of Scotland.<sup>150</sup> But Queen Victoria's presence also emphasised the importance of British identity in Scotland. It reminded Scots that their Monarch was also the Head of the British State, the British Empire and, therefore of Greater Britain. Scottish nationalists were well aware that the cohesion of the British Empire rested on the "Golden link of the Crown..."<sup>151</sup>

As a symbol of Britannia, the Monarchy united Britons across the Empire, thus providing some cement for the cohesion of Greater Britain. The Crown differentiated Britons from other nations, some of which may have been republics or had their own monarchy. Only those identifying with the Monarchy would have understood themselves as belonging to the imagined community that was Britannia. Yet it is clear from the above discussion that the Monarchy meant something different in Scotland and Canada. The Monarchy was seen not only as British and Imperial but also as Scottish and Canadian. Victoria's annual presence at Balmoral allowed Scots to understand the Monarchy as their own. The Governor General performed a similar function in Canada. In this way the Monarchy as an Imperial symbol was seen through local eyes. The symbolic boundaries of Imperial identity were mediated through Scottish and British Canadian identity. The Empire was firmly placed in its local context.

### *The Protestant Mission as a symbol of British-ness*

We have already noted above the importance of the Protestant religion to British identity, especially its defence against Catholic France. But Protestantism was important in the context of the British Empire for different reasons. The Enlightenment and nineteenth century liberalism both found their origins in the

---

<sup>150</sup> Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition*: 55

<sup>151</sup> Mitchell, *Home Rule for Scotland and Imperial Federation*: 69

Protestant tradition.<sup>152</sup> The rationalism of this tradition laid the way for progress. The benefits of free government and prosperity flowed from these various traditions. The mission of Britannia to spread the benefits of Protestantism, and therefore liberty, progress and prosperity, to inferior races, became a core symbol of Greater British identity.

In reality of course the mission was as much to bring peace to areas considered economically viable as sources of raw materials or trading partners.<sup>153</sup> This is not the important point. By stabilising the region through trade and good government the area became economically viable. Although motives for empire may have been economic, the rhetoric of the mission was to bring peace and Christianity (in its Protestant form) to Africa and Asia.

For example, Frederick Young in the mid 1870s, prior to the formation of the IFL, claimed that it was,

...the mission of Great Britain to be, by the Providence of God, the principle colonising country of the world. With sublime courage and most devoted zeal, her noble army of missionaries are ever going forth with the bible in their hands, penetrating into new regions at the peril of their lives, to preach the gospel of their Divine Master to the heathen, and spread the knowledge of Christian civilization...<sup>154</sup>

Even in the 1870s, twenty years after the publication of Dr. Livingston's celebrated *Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa*, missionaries were being venerated as "Victorian Supermen"<sup>155</sup> But Young's words convey something more than just converting the "heathen" to Christianity. Christian civilisation meant the Victorian view of civilisation: the rule of law, scientific and moral progress, as well as the diffusion of Christianity.<sup>156</sup>

---

<sup>152</sup> Lieven, *Empire*: 98

<sup>153</sup> Ferguson, *Empire*: 139

<sup>154</sup> Young, F., *Imperial Federation of Great Britain and Her Colonies in Letters* (London, 1876): ix

<sup>155</sup> Ferguson, *Empire*: 132 & 123

<sup>156</sup> Fry, *The Scottish Empire*: 149

In the 1890s this sense of mission had not abated. Baillie Macpherson chairing a meeting of the Edinburgh and East of Scotland branch of the IFL claimed that, “God in his providence had entrusted to the British nation, and to the Anglo Saxon race, the privilege of carrying the torch of civilization and Christianity to the greater part of the known and habitable globe.”<sup>157</sup> There was no sense of civilisation and Christianity being separated. The two were inextricably entwined. To be Christian was to be civilised and open to the benefits of liberty and progress. To be civilised was to be open to Christianity and moral progress. The evolutionary theories of Darwin led to the view that White Christians were at the pinnacle of human evolution. Social Darwinism, with the backing of Protestantism, gave the traders and financiers an excuse, if one were needed, to exploit African and Asian territory.

Yet the scepticism of the motives of the late Victorians in their support for Empire may be misplaced. The likes of Principal Grant, a Canadian educator and the man behind the unification of the Canadian Presbyterian Churches, saw in the Empire something grander than capitalist gain. The Empire did not bother itself with the trifling problems of a state.

The work that the British Empire has in hand is far grander than the comparatively parochial duties with which states are content to deal. Its problems are wider and more inspiring; yet at the same time, the white race that alone, so far has proved itself first for self-government, lives by itself...Already our sons are taking part in introducing civilization into Africa, under the aegis of the flag, and in preserving the *Pax Britannica* among the teeming millions of India and South-Eastern Asia...<sup>158</sup>

Not only did Grant implicitly split the empire into Britons (the white race) and the rest, thus confirming that at the head of the Empire was a Greater British nation. He also saw the mission of the empire to bring peace to warring tribes. The *Pax Britannica*, for Grant, was not just a slogan. In Africa, for example, millions of

---

<sup>157</sup> *The Scotsman*, 20 November 1891: 6

<sup>158</sup> Grant, G.M., *The Advantages of Imperial Federation* (Toronto, 1891): 18

square miles “formerly the prey of incessant rapine and war- are now open to the highest forms of colonisation and civilization.”<sup>159</sup> The extension of British rule had brought relative peace to the region. This was the beneficial results of Britannia’s mission.

Grant believed the unity of Britannia through the creation of a federal state was vital for the Christian mission. The “great underlying force” of Britannia, and therefore the Empire, was the cause of humanity and God.<sup>160</sup> The collapse of the Empire would mean the end and failure of this cause. To prevent the collapse of the Empire, Britannia had to be united through an imperial federation.

As a symbol of Britannia and the Empire, the Protestant mission achieved one important result. It established the symbolic boundary between “them” and “us” by differentiating British Protestants from the rest of the world, particularly Africans and Asians. It also established the power relationship between the two. By establishing Britannia’s mission as bringing civilisation to the dark corners of the world, this symbol clearly demarcated Britons as superior to, at the very least, non-Europeans. This assumed superiority allowed Britannia to support the right to rule inferior races throughout Asia and Africa. The assumption of superiority and the right to rule those incapable of liberal rule thus created the conditions for imperial conquest. This view was prevalent in the discourse of nationalists in both Scotland and British Canada.

### ***The British Diaspora and Britannia***

One of the most important aspects of the British Empire was the massive level of emigration to the colonies. Around 10 million emigrants left the United Kingdom for the Empire in the nineteenth century thus legitimising British rule in the white dominions. It was this central fact that allowed politicians in the late nineteenth century to argue that British “emigrants have been engaged in the more arduous task of extending the influence, commerce and civilisation of Great Britain in Canada,

---

<sup>159</sup> *The Westminster*, 6 November 1897: 353

<sup>160</sup> *Imperial Federation*, 1 April 1886: 102

Australia, [and] South Africa...”<sup>161</sup> These emigrants were not only working in their own self interest but were working for Great Britain. The nature of the population and their institutions of government meant these areas were seen as “extensions of the old country”<sup>162</sup> There was no sense of there being an *imperial* purpose. How could there be when Canada had imposed a protective duty on imports of British goods? Rather it was for the benefit of a Greater Britain. This myth of a British Diaspora is the key to arguing the existence of Britannia.

Before analysing some of the rhetoric that surrounded this myth of the British Diaspora and its nature, there is one problem that must be addressed. When a review of nationalist literature is undertaken a definitional problem quickly becomes apparent. The following phrases are all used when discussing what we have described as the British Diaspora: “the Anglo-Saxon race”, “the English people”, “the British race”, “the English nationality” and “Britons”. This is not an exhaustive list but merely serves to indicate an important methodological problem faced by any student of nationalism when looking at this time period. This study aims to deal with the problem by accepting all of these phrases as indicating those who inhabit the British Isles or have migrated from the British Isles or are descendants of those who emigrated from the British Isles for the settler colonies. None of the phrases will be taken as indicative of there being a nation. Indeed there will be no assumption that any of these relate to any conceptual category that social and political scientists would use today. Rather the metaphors used by various writers to indicate the nature of the relationship between migrant and home based Britons will be analysed. It is from these metaphors that the existence of a Greater Britain can be discerned.

The speeches and pamphlet literature of the SHRA and the Imperial Federation League on both sides of the Atlantic are littered with references to this idea of the British Diaspora. At the initial meeting of the League in Canada, George Foster, an M.P. for New Brunswick, echoed the feelings held by most of those attending,

---

<sup>161</sup> Marquis of Lorne, *Imperial Federation*: 37

<sup>162</sup> Young, F., *Imperial Federation...* : 2

...our patriotism reaches further [than Canada] and across three thousand miles of billowing wave embraces the grand old motherland from whose loins we sprang, whose historic past is our heritage, whose present cannot cease to deeply interest us...Canada is not the limit of our patria; it extends to every shore and land over which the British flag waves and British soldiers keep watch.<sup>163</sup>

Here is a clear example of the definitional problems faced when using historical cases. In the modern day patriotism equates with loyalty to the state, its institutions and its territory. But it is clear from Foster's address that he strongly identifies not just with Canada but with the wider British Empire. This is not just loyalty to the state but evidence of something much deeper: a Greater British identity. Foster identified with the British heritage and saw the territory of Britannia as the full extent of the Empire. He also outlined the imperial relationship of dominance over this territory where "British soldiers keep watch."

The Marquis of Lorne, a former Governor-General and secretary to a cabinet minister, claimed it was this Greater British identity that held the Empire together.

We have dislocated the central power so much that it is only by a greater balance of moral and physical strength that any central authority can be said to exist at all, and then only by the free assumption to it on the part of the colonies, of the power it retains.<sup>164</sup>

The Empire, at least the self-governing parts of the settler empire, was held together by sentiment, not a relationship of power. The self-governing colonies accepted the central authority of Westminster because they shared a British heritage based around Parliamentary institutions, the monarchy and the Protestant mission. The focus of this identity was the relationship between the self-governing dominions and the "motherland."

Ernest Renan argued that nations have souls comprising "the possession in common of a rich legacy of remembrances" and "the actual consent, the desire to live

---

<sup>163</sup> IFL, *Imperial Federation League in Canada - Report of the First Meeting*: 41

<sup>164</sup> Marquis of Lorne, *Imperial Federation*: 13

together, the will to continue to value the heritage all hold in common.”<sup>165</sup> The members of a nation have a history of living together and want to continue living together because they value the benefits of having lived together in the past. This was the type of language used by George Foster in his address to the first meeting of the IFLC. Britons, those who came from Britain or were descendants of British emigrants, valued the heritage of living together and wanted to continue living together. In other words the history of the British Isles also belonged to British emigrants in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and so on. George Cockburn claimed at the first meeting of the IFLC, that “We are sharers in the great glories of her [Britain’s] inheritance in literature, science and art...”<sup>166</sup>

The IFL claimed that the dominions still wanted to live with each other not just under the umbrella of the British Empire, but as a Greater British nation, sharing the inheritances of the past and the visions for the future. The Scottish Tory Sir Charles Pearson argued at a meeting of the Edinburgh and East of Scotland Branch of the IFL, that they “should see to it that the nationality of Britain was not only spread over the globe, but the state should follow the nationality and be coextensive with it.”<sup>167</sup> In other words nationalists wanted to ensure all members of Britannia were represented in their own state, a federated state that ruled over the rest of the Empire. By gaining representation for Britons in Canada, the Cape and Australia, the relationship of dominance by Westminster would have been broken. By breaking the metropolis/colony relationship recognition of Britannia would have been achieved. The interests of the Empire would no longer be the narrow interests of merchants or the Colonial Office in the British Isles. Britons across the world, those most affected by Colonial policy, would have a say in running the greatest Empire in the world. As Charles Waddie, Secretary of the SHRA claimed, a true Imperial Parliament would “embrace the concentrated wisdom of the whole British World.”<sup>168</sup> The sentiment holding together the Empire was the sentiment of belonging to Britannia.

---

<sup>165</sup> Renan, E., “Qu’est-ce que’une nation”, (Paris 1882) in Hutchinson, J., & Smith, A.D., (eds) *Nationalism: A Reader* (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1994): 17

<sup>166</sup> IFL, *Imperial Federation League in Canada - Report of the First meeting*: 34

<sup>167</sup> *The Scotsman*, 1<sup>st</sup> November, 1888: 6

<sup>168</sup> Waddie, *The Federation of Greater Britain*: 6

This idea has its roots in the right of national self-determination and the extension of democracy. The imperial relationship is inherently undemocratic, involving as it does subjection, domination and control. But the settler nature of parts of the British Empire meant the ideas of democracy would have spread from the metropolis to Britons across the globe. Once responsible government had been given to these areas, the rights of Britons abroad to a say in matters that affected them had been established. Nationalists were asserting the right of all Britons within the Empire to a say in all matters affecting their interests. They were asserting the right of self-determination for Britannia.

James Edgar, another Canadian M.P. and former Canada First member, took the idea of the Diaspora further. Speaking of “the motherland”, he introduced the idea of race and blood. “One with her in blood and language, one in the civilization of today and in the traditions of her storied past” Britain and Canada share, “the warlike instincts of our race.”<sup>169</sup> Although race and blood provide apt imagery to assist the imagining of the nation they are even more problematic concepts than those of state and nation. These ideas, whilst problematic, stretch the invented tradition of Britannia to a new dimension, that of ethnicity.

Anthony Smith defined an ethnic nation as “first and foremost a community of common descent,” including elements of genealogy, presumed descent ties and customs and traditions.<sup>170</sup> These notions were introduced into the conception Britannia, not just by Edgar, but by numerous other nationalists. The theme was extended to the metaphor of a family relationship between Britain and the dominions. The basic idea of the British Isles as the mother country and the white dominions as her children was a common one. This has two aspects to it. Firstly it was used to justify the use of both nationalist and imperialist rhetoric in nationalist literature. This will be explored in more depth in the following chapter. But it was also used to extend the concept of the ethnic nation. The white dominions were descendants of Britain. Charles Waddie, for example, argued,

---

<sup>169</sup> Edgar, *Loyalty*: 16

<sup>170</sup> Smith, A.D., *National Identity* (London, Penguin: 1991): 12

...hitherto the mother country has treated her children with consideration and indulgence while they have been set up for themselves, she has freed them from burdens that fall to all self-governing states, their prosperity and welfare being very dear to her.<sup>171</sup>

The President of the IFLC, D'Alton McCarthy, argued that with "the consummation of the federation of the Empire would dawn the brightest day in Canadian history when the sons and daughters of the motherland would be united."<sup>172</sup>

Again, the imagery conjured up by this type of language can only have one aim: to aid the imagining of what it meant to belong to Britannia. Like all invented traditions the myth of the British Diaspora and the use of the mother/child relationship established cohesion among the members of Britannia and differentiated them from other groups. It united the white dominions with the metropolis. Canadians were Britons living abroad. But it also united the white dominions with each other. They were brothers and sisters who shared the family heritage handed down from the motherland. This was equally as important as the union with the motherland as without the unity of the white dominions, a federated empire would be much less powerful in the world.

By uniting Britannia through this myth of the British Diaspora and the mother/child metaphor, nationalists created a symbolic boundary of the family that clearly differentiated Britons from all other nationalities. It firmly categorised Britannia as an ethnic nation. As Smith argued the importance of genealogy and origin myths to an *ethnie* is crucial. In the mother/child metaphor it was not only clear where the colonies had come from but the relationship was set to continue.

In the eighteenth century the French Economist A.R.J. Turgot referred to colonies as fruit, "which cling to the tree only til they ripen."<sup>173</sup> Professor Schurman of Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, speaking at the First meeting of the IFLC in Montreal, took this metaphor further.

---

<sup>171</sup> Waddie, C., *The Federation of Greater Britain*: 8

<sup>172</sup> IFL, *Imperial Federation League in Canada - Report of the First Meeting*: 15

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid*: 27

...when the fruit drops, do not seeds strike roots into the soil, and in time, surround the venerable parent stem with a forest of younger growth, whose congregated trunks, and high overarching and interlacing branches, gaining strength by their union, form a massive whole, which is able to defy the winds and blasts of time and circumstance.<sup>174</sup>

This is a variation on the theme of the mother/child nature of the relationship between Britain and the white dominions. The key point to be taken from this metaphor is the idea that when united the family/empire is more capable of defending itself “against the winds and blasts of time” than they would be individually. But again the imagery of the metaphor conjures ideas of blood lines and descent clearly marking Britannia as an ethnic nation. The white dominions were given the essence of Britishness through the fruit of the mother country. They share common characteristics because they share this essence.

At the heart of these metaphors lies the conceptual distinction between civic and ethnic nations.<sup>175</sup> Ethnic nations are based on ties of blood, genealogy, customs and traditions. Civic nations are based more on ideas of citizenship, although customs and traditions are also important. The best distinction is to think of ethnic nations and civic nations as “a sense of tribe” and “a sense of place” respectively.<sup>176</sup> Unlike ethnic nationalism people are relatively able to chose a civic identity, however liberal or illiberal that identity may be. McCrone argues modern Scotland displays a civic nationalism. This is easy to understand. There is a definite landscape that is Scottish. There are clearly marked geographical boundaries. Anyone living within these boundaries can claim to be Scottish. The same could not be said for the nineteenth century Empire, nor perhaps with nineteenth century Scotland. In some cases imperial boundaries had yet to be fixed. The sheer extent of the Empire was difficult to comprehend in an age when transportation was only just beginning to make the world smaller, in the figurative sense. Above all, admitting that anyone within the

---

<sup>174</sup> Ibid: 27

<sup>175</sup> See Smith, *National Identity*: 12 and Ignatieff, M., *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (London, Vintage: 1994): 3-4; Kellas, J., *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (Basingstoke, MacMillan Press: 1991): 52

<sup>176</sup> On this distinction see McCrone, D., *Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Stateless Nation* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) (London, Routledge: 2001): 155

boundaries of the Empire could claim to be a Briton would be to abandon the legitimacy of Britannia's mission and reject the claims of social Darwinism. It would have been completely unacceptable for African tribes to claim membership of Britannia. The only way to conceive of a nation of Britons was to use ethnic and organic metaphors that established membership of the group on racial and genealogical terms.

In trying to provide a theoretical basis of the nation from the metaphors used by nationalists one has to be careful not to impose modern concepts or inappropriate metaphors. There was clearly, however, a sense of a Greater British imperial community among Scottish and British Canadian nationalists. In using organic metaphors in the Herderian sense they clearly chose to establish Britishness based on "a sense of tribe" rather than place. There are obvious geographical, philosophical and religious reasons why this would have been the case. But equally with the benefit of historical hindsight there was no basis for an ethnically homogenous Britannia. Within the British Isles themselves there was a wide mix of ethnic groups. Even within Scotland there was no homogenous ethnic nation. Scottish identity has always been, and still is "firmly embedded in 'a sense of place...'"<sup>177</sup> The conceptions of Britishness that have been put forward by historians are generally based on state identity.<sup>178</sup> Any attempts to symbolically align a wider Britannic community on the basis of a British ethnicity are clearly "invented traditions." The question then must be what purpose did this "invented tradition" serve?

The "invented tradition" of Britannia based on an ethnic conception of Britishness enabled the nation to be imagined and allowed the IFL to frame its arguments in terms of the whole white settler empire, rather than just the British Isles. To paraphrase Walker Connor, it allowed Britons to imagine the psychological bond that joined them and differentiated them in their subconscious.<sup>179</sup> The organic and ethnic symbolism of the mother/child and tree/fruit metaphors provided a basis for

---

<sup>177</sup> Ibid: 155

<sup>178</sup> See for example McCrone, *Understanding Scotland 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition*: 159

<sup>179</sup> Connor, W., *Ethnonationalism - The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1994): 196

understanding the empire and the relationship between the dominions and the homeland. Herder claimed that the nation was as “natural a plant as a family only with more branches.”<sup>180</sup> In using similar metaphors the nationalists were clearly attempting to highlight the existence of a community of Britons in the Empire. Nations, in the primordialist tradition, are a natural unit of human organisation.<sup>181</sup> The nature metaphors used by nationalists put them in the same category.

The organic conception of Britannia achieved several important things. Firstly, organic societies can grow and adapt to their environment, just like trees and plants. Secondly the offshoots of organic societies gain the attributes of the mother society and adapt them to the new environment. Using these metaphors, nationalists argued that Britannia could grow and adapt to its environment. There was nothing, therefore, to prevent this nation creating a federal state of its own at the head of the Empire. They also claimed that Canadians, Australians and South Africans were Britons adapting British principles and culture to a new environment. Having inherited British culture, blood and history from the motherland these new societies deserved to have a say in the running of the Empire. If British-ness could be adapted to Canada then it could be used as the basis for a new federal state. By creating the federal basis for the Empire the relationship of dominance by Westminster would have been altered and British settlers would gain recognition as Britons, not just colonists.

Identity is both contextual and experiential. The articulation of a Greater British identity has to be explained contextually and experientially. The experience of a common Monarch, a common religion and being ruled from Westminster was undoubtedly necessary for the existence of Britannia. The Diaspora and its descendants were also vitally important. British identity was already instilled in Canadians and Scots. Drawing on Michael Bilig’s insights we can argue that the everyday experience of Britishness, whether in the shape of the Governor General, (the monarch’s representative in Canada), the Union Flag, religious behaviour and so

---

<sup>180</sup> Barnard, F., *J.G Herder on Social and Political Culture* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1969): 324

<sup>181</sup> Ozkirimli, U., *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke, Palgrave: 2000): 66

on instilled a “Banal Nationalism” that made Britannic identity a way of life in both Scotland and British Canada.<sup>182</sup>

For this latent British identity to be articulated meant the context must have changed. The historical review at the beginning of this chapter noted the changing European and World situation. The creation of a powerful and assertive German state, the increasing advance of the Russian Empire south and west towards the Ottoman Empire, perceived American hostility across the Atlantic and continuing diplomatic tensions with France all combined to produce a tense atmosphere in which the articulation of a Greater British identity instilled a greater feeling of security across Britannia. The knowledge that Britons in Scotland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa shared a common threat and that those Britons would fight for the honour of Britannia and the Empire was important in reducing the apparent size of the threat. In the same way that the articulation of a superior identity in Scotland justified Scots nationalists claims for recognition, the articulation of a superior Greater British identity laid the basis for claims for recognition of Britannia and the British Empire by politicians in Britain and by Britannia’s ‘others.’ The articulation of this identity accompanied various plans for reform of Imperial government.

But the most important aspect of Britannia was its expression as justification for closer governmental ties and cooperation between Britain and the Colonies. In arguing the existence of Britannia, nationalists were laying the foundations for a federal imperial state that would be better able to defend the whole empire against potential aggressors across the world. The mission of bringing peace to the world was used rhetorically as an argument for the formation of a defence league or a political federation. In both cases the existence of a Greater British nation was used to provide legitimacy for the claims for closer political integration. In this way the rhetoric of nationalists can be compared to the rhetoric of Italian or German unification. The existence of the nation would provide democratic legitimacy for the formation of an imperial federation. In turn the state would reinforce Greater British identity by providing a role for all Britons in the running of the empire.

---

<sup>182</sup> Bilig, M., *Banal Nationalism* (London, Sage: 1995): 69

Representation of all Britons would have entailed the recognition of the existence and importance of Britannia. The discourse therefore returns to the concepts of recognition, representation and the right of self determination. In this case it was the right of Britannia to determine the future of all Britons, not just those living in the British Isles. The relationship of dominance by Britons living in the British Isles over Britons overseas had the potential to cause a rift in the Greater British nation and could have adversely affected the future of Britannia and the Empire. The creation of a federal empire would remove the imperial relationship and secure the future of Britannia and therefore the Empire. The coincidence of Britannia and a federal state at the head of the Empire would strengthen both, thus ensuring the pre-eminent position of the imperial state as the world super-power, securing both its safety from and recognition by the rest of the world.

### ***Conclusion***

The aim of this chapter has been to examine the extent to which the discourse of nationalist groups in Scotland and British Canada was imperialist. As in the previous chapter the concepts of recognition, representation and democracy were important. Recognition of the supremacy of the British Empire on the world stage meant the bonds of the Empire had to be strengthened. The clearest way to achieve this was to ensure Britons across the world were represented at Westminster, thus ensuring there would be no schism in the Empire. The key issue, however, has been the relationship between empire and nation.

The focus of this chapter has been on the existence of Britannia, a Greater British nation formed by the emigration of millions of Britons to various parts of the British Empire. We argued that these emigrants took with them their British heritage, British institutions and British identity, and established these in their new colonial settings. This British identity meant Empire could be maintained through these ready made collaborators in the British Imperial project. The Empire not only created Britannia but used Britannia to legitimise its activities.

Britannia was conceived by imperialists on a purely ethnic basis. Perennialists argue that nations develop over “*la longue duree*” creating and adopting various symbols along the way. Canada, however, for one, was relatively new in the history of nations. Britannia, although also a relatively new nation, could adopt the symbols of an older British identity. The use of various natural metaphors, including the mother/child relationship of the colonies and the British Isles, naturally led to the use of the monarchy and the British imperial mission as symbols of a Greater British nation. The importance of Britannia to the discourse of imperial nationalists in both Scotland and British Canada can be seen in their proposals for the federation of the empire.

Britannia was used by both Scottish and British Canadian nationalists to symbolise the unity of the Empire. The threats posed to the Empire from across Europe and from the United States laid bare the fragility of the Empire and the weak bonds that linked the self-governing colonies with Westminster. Britannia provided the existing bonds but failure to recognise the existence of Britons abroad by ending the relationship of dominance by Britons at home risked a split in the Greater British nation. By not recognising the interests of Britons abroad the collapse of the Empire and, therefore, of the supremacy of the Britain on the world stage was at risk. The use of Britannia was therefore an instinctive form of imperialism aimed at consolidating, maintaining and expanding the Empire.

Having been created in the process of extending and consolidating the Empire, Britannia became the focus for the defence and maintenance of the Empire in the face of a multitude of perceived threats. The various schemes for reforming the governance of the Empire all had the existence of Britannia and the right of Britons across the Empire to representation in an Imperial Parliament as their basis. The relationship between the nation and the empire becomes clear from this analysis. This imperialism may not have been focussed on the extension and acquisition of Empire in the traditional sense but there is no doubt that imperialists used Britannia to argue for the maintenance and consolidation of the British Empire.

## **Chapter Six**

### **Reconciling National and Imperial Identities**

The key aim of this chapter is to examine the way Scottish and British nationalists reconciled the national and imperial identities we examined in the previous two chapters. To the extent that Scottish and British Canadian groups expressed both a nationalist and imperialist identity we can begin to refer to them as imperial nationalists. The interaction of dual or multiple identities is a complex matter. In presenting the theoretical framework for this thesis we argued that identity is both experiential and contextual. In other words, local experience creates local identities. Identities are then expressed in reaction to a given context. The academic debate surrounds the extent to which local identities inform “greater” identities such as national or imperial ones. The visual model of concentric rings was introduced by Anthony Smith. Each ring is dependent on (informed by) the inner ring for its existence. In this way we argued that local identities mediate national identity, or as Morton argued local identity reinforces national identity.<sup>1</sup> If this is indeed the case, we would expect to find that a Scottish or British Canadian identity mediates the imperial identity. In terms of practical politics, we would expect solutions to the imperial problem to also solve a national problem. We would expect national circumstances to be important in the imperial identity expressed in imperial nationalist discourse.

If identity is contextual, as we have argued, then multiple identities should be the result of multiple contexts. The cause of the expression of imperial and national identity by nationalists may just have been the result of a coincidental collision of national and imperial contexts. Alternatively, one context may involve both national and imperial concerns. The aim of this chapter is to analyse these theoretical issues through an investigation of late nineteenth century imperial nationalism in Scotland and British Canada.

---

<sup>1</sup> Smith, A.D., *National Identity* (London, Penguin Books Ltd: 1991): 24 ; Cohen, A., “Belonging: The Experience of Culture” in Cohen, A., (ed) *Belonging: Identity and Social Organisation in British Rural Cultures* (Manchester, Manchester University Press: 1982):13 ; Morton, G., *Unionist Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland 1830-1860* (East Linton, Tuckwell Press: 1999): 77

An important argument of this chapter, one mentioned in previous chapters, is that Scots were implicit imperial nationalists, whereas British Canadians were explicit imperial nationalists. For the Scottish groups being studied here the Empire was taken as a non-negotiable aspect of the United Kingdom. There was never any question that Scotland would leave the Empire. The focus of their discourse, however, was the national question, how to accommodate Scotland's legislative needs within the Imperial framework. For the Canadian groups the opposite was the case. The focus of their discourse was the imperial connection and how to maintain the imperial connection in the face of perceived threats from the United States. These issues will be explored in more depth later in the chapter.

The chapter will be organised around the themes of reconciling imperial and national identities, looking separately at the Scottish and British Canadian cases in order to highlight their differences. The first section will briefly provide some historical background necessary for an understanding of some of the issues to be investigated. The following section will examine the Scottish case arguing that Irish Home Rule set the context for Scottish imperial nationalism. The importance of the Empire and therefore the Union, to Scotland will be highlighted, as will Scotland's influence in return. The third section will investigate the British Canadian case. It will be argued that the influence of the United States in the history of Canada was vital to the discourse of imperial nationalists. This history will be examined in the context of the trade debates carried on in Canada in the 1880s and 1890s. These debates surrounded the issue of Commercial Union with the United States or the pursuit of a preferential imperial tariff. The final section of the chapter will compare the two cases. The different approaches of imperial nationalists in Scotland and British Canada will be highlighted. We will also examine the similarities between the two.

## ***Historical Context***

### *The Threat of Irish Separation*

The strategic importance of Ireland to the defence of Great Britain was highlighted by the support given by the French to an Irish rebellion at the close of the eighteenth century. The uprising of United Irishmen was supported by a small force of French troops. The uprising was unsuccessful being quashed by superior British forces. But such an event in the Empire's backyard could not be allowed to happen again. The uprising provided the impetus for the Union of Ireland and Great Britain in 1801.<sup>2</sup> But the Union did not prevent Irish rebellions or uprising, although when they occurred they were quickly suppressed. Brief risings in 1848 and the Fenian revolt of 1867 were poorly organised and quickly put down. A more serious threat was the continued outrages in the countryside. A question, however, the British government never had to answer, was what would happen if support for an Irish rebellion came from one of Britain's European rivals? The Fenians in the United States had made an abortive attack on Canada in the hope that this would turn the eyes of the British government and allow a full scale Irish revolt.<sup>3</sup> If the Irish could attempt this a European power could use Ireland to turn Britain's attention away from other parts of the world.

There was no shortage of potential enemies capable of giving such support to the Irish either. Britain's interest in various regions of the world brought her into contact with a whole host of potential foes. Four powers in particular stand out as having posed the greatest potential threat to Britain and the Empire, Russia, France, Germany and the United States. These threats have been examined in detail in previous chapters. A brief review will suffice here. In order to maintain communications, and therefore rule, in India, Britain had to maintain access to the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. This brought strained relations with the French who intervened following Egyptian bankruptcy in the late 1870s. Russian expansionism threatened India's northern border and British naval interests in the

---

<sup>2</sup> Judd, D., *Empire: The British Imperial Experience from 1756 to the Present* (London, Fontana Press: 1995): 40

<sup>3</sup> Lyons, F.S.L., *Ireland Since the Famine* (London, Fontana Press: 1973): 135

Mediterranean. German imperial designs, particularly in Africa, were clear following the Berlin Conference of 1884. German success in establishing a colony in South West Africa had been met with British indifference. But the Berlin Conference sanctioned what became known as the Scramble for Africa in which the European powers formally colonised large swathes of Africa. Suddenly, after being the only super-power for the last half century, the British Empire had competition.<sup>4</sup> The informal nature of much of the British Empire had to change in order to maintain British interests in Africa.

It is clear from the above that European powers posed a direct threat/challenge to the British Empire. In particular, there was a real fear that Irish nationalism could be used by one of these powers in an effort to undermine the British Empire. After all, Fenian groups in the United States had already used this idea with their abortive invasion of Canada. The hope that this would distract Britain from a rebellion in Ireland was a vain one. But with more powerful backing from a European power the potential threat of using Ireland was perceived by imperialists and nationalists to be very real. By viewing Ireland in this way it made the problem of Ireland both a nationalist issue and an imperialist one. The context of Irish Home Rule was, therefore, vital to an understanding of the articulation of both imperial and national identity by the groups under study. This will be examined in more detail below.

### *Trade Relations between Canada and the United States of America*

The reciprocity treaty (mutually beneficial trade agreement) that had been signed in the 1850s between the British North American colonies and the United States was abrogated by the latter in 1866.<sup>5</sup> The abrogation of the treaty hurt the British colonies who, with practically no manufacturing industry, saw the United States as both a source and an outlet for manufactures and Canadian raw materials respectively. Several unsuccessful attempts were made by Canada to negotiate a new treaty following Confederation in 1867. One of the complaints of British Canadian imperial

---

<sup>4</sup> Porter, B., *The Lions Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-1995 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition* (Harlow, Pearson Education: 1996):85-103 and Pearce, M., & Stewart, G., *British Political History 1875-1995: Democracy and Decline* (London, Routledge: 1996):148-162

<sup>5</sup> Careless, J.M.S., *Canada: The Story of Challenge* (Toronto, Stoddart: 1970): 240-1

nationalists was the failure of Canadians to secure an independent voice in these discussions. When John A. Macdonald was returned as Prime Minister in 1878, one of his first actions was to introduce a protective tariff policy, the National Policy. Yet attempts to negotiate a new reciprocity treaty continued even after 1878. The National Policy was designed to stimulate native Canadian industry and attempt to halt reliance on American imports. Macdonald also argued that the national policy would “greatly tend to procure for this country, eventually, a reciprocity of trade.”<sup>6</sup> In this respect, however, the policy was a failure. Further attempts to negotiate a treaty with the United States in 1879, 1886 and 1887 failed to produce satisfactory results.<sup>7</sup>

On the other side of the trade debate was the discussion of an imperial zollverein, a customs union between the colonies and dominions and Britain. There was, however, an obvious problem with this proposal. Ever since the repeal of the Corn Laws in the 1840s, Britain had pursued a policy of free trade with the rest of the world. Britain’s powerful economic position and her lead in the drive towards industrialisation meant free trade was a viable policy. Raw materials could be imported without extra costs to merchants and manufacturers. The finished product could then be exported without customs tariffs increasing the price to the consumer abroad, thus making British manufactures competitive. It was unlikely Britain would change this policy when half her trade was conducted outside imperial boundaries.

Against this background the formation of a Commercial Union Club in 1887 by Goldwin Smith and others was seen by some as a step too far in favour of the United States, particularly given some American calls for annexation. The details of the debates for and against Commercial Union will be examined later in the chapter. For now only the key points need be made. Some members of the Commercial Union Club openly, and some covertly, saw commercial union as a stepping stone to a political union with America. Canada, in their argument could not survive on the

---

<sup>6</sup> Canada, House of Commons *Debates*, Volume 1, March 1878, reprinted in Robeson, V.R. (ed) *Debates about Canada’s Future 1868-1896* (Toronto, The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education: 1977): 49

<sup>7</sup> Annett, D.R., *British Preference in Canadian Commercial Policy* (Toronto, The Ryerson Press: 1948): 37

continent once British support was removed. Commercial Union would allow Canada a privileged position, one in which she would be able to negotiate political union with the United States. British Imperial nationalists saw the formation of the Commercial Union Club as a threat to the existence of the Canadian nation. Commercial union, they argued, would inevitably lead to political union. Given the historic differences between the United States and Canada, particularly the founding of British Canada by the United Empire Loyalists, this was an unacceptable option. The perceived aggression of the United States, or at least unfriendliness, seen through the failed Fenian invasions of 1866 gave the debate added spice.

### ***Scottish Home Rule as a response to Imperial Problems***

Scottish imperial nationalists' main purpose was to campaign for a Scottish Parliament that would remain within the Imperial framework. They argued for home rule all round, claiming this would clear the legislative log-jam at Westminster enabling the Imperial Parliament to deal with Imperial affairs, while simultaneously decentralising decision-making to the home nations. Solutions to both national and imperial problems were expressed using symbols of the nation and the empire. They articulated both identities because they wanted to remain within the Empire, and therefore within the Union with England. The Union with England needed reform because the success and challenges of the Empire had left Westminster unable to deal effectively with domestic Scottish matters. Reform of the Union left the way open for reform of imperial government thus consolidating the Empire in the face of external threats.

Thus, Scots wanted to remain within the Union with England because of the economic benefits of the Empire and the recognition the Empire brought Scotland on the world stage. But the Union that gave Scotland the opportunities of the Empire was not working due to both legislative delays and non-recognition of Scotland within the Union, therefore change was required. The impetus given by Irish Home Rule conditioned the discourse of the Scottish movement. The threat of Irish Home Rule to Scottish interests, in terms of equality within the Union, and Imperial

interests, given Ireland's strategic position to potential enemies, led Scottish nationalists to articulate a discourse in which Scottish identity mediated imperial identity. The two were intertwined and reinforcing. On the one hand Scottish nationalists wanted to reform the Union to its benefit whilst remaining within the Imperial fold. On the other hand they wanted to reform the Empire to protect it from external threats caused by the changing nature of European Imperialism. Any potential threat to the Empire was seen as a threat to Scottish interests. This was only natural given Scotland's disproportionate influence in the Empire in relation to the rest of the home countries. A threat to the Empire was a threat to Scotland. Any threat to Scotland was seen as a threat to the nature of the Empire. The two identities were mutually reinforcing.

Most importantly, however, imperial reform was seen as a solution to the Irish problem. The reform of the Empire, according to the nationalists, could not be carried out without reforming the Union into a federal/quasi-federal state where each of the home countries had home rule. The combination of the contexts of Irish Home Rule, European diplomacy, in terms of protecting imperial interests, and the increasing democratisation of the British State led to the articulation of mutually reinforcing national and imperial identities.

This section will analyse the ways in which Scottish imperial nationalists reconciled national and imperial identity. The discourse of Scottish imperial nationalists in relation to the Anglicisation of the Empire will be examined. We will then investigate the influence of the Irish problem on both national and imperial identities in Scotland. Finally, the solutions to the contexts outlined throughout this thesis will be examined to more clearly highlight the relationship between national and imperial identities in Scotland.

### *Recognition of Scots contribution to the Empire and Union*

One of the most important advantages of the Union was the opportunity offered by the British Empire. But as Charles Waddie, secretary of the SHRA, argued, Scotland had played its part in acquiring Empire. "The assertion that Scotland owes her

prosperity from trading with *England's* colonies is untrue, while the part which Scotland has played in the acquisition of the colonies there are few to deny.”<sup>8</sup> The SHRA claimed the expansion of the Empire occurred after the Union of Scotland and England in 1707. The demands for recognition of the Empire as being British, not English, will be analysed below. But Scots’ pride in the Empire can best be seen through the experience of the Scottish Diaspora.

The influence of Scots in the administration and management of the Empire was noted in the previous chapter. Scots provided missionaries, entrepreneurs, merchants, military personnel and settlers for the Empire. The ratio of Scots who emigrated to the Empire far outweighed the proportion of Scots in the British Isles. This numerical advantage was undoubtedly important to the success of Scots abroad. In Canada, the first two Prime Ministers were Scots, and many of the fathers of Confederation were also Scots.

News of the successes of these Scots, and others like them, were symbolic to those at home of the important role Scots played in the Empire. Rosalind Mitchison has argued that emigration was largely caused by the draw of opportunities abroad, whether jobs, places or kin. “It was a cumulative process, assisted by the information provided by the networks of Scottish kinfolk and friends.”<sup>9</sup> But the kinship network did more. As Harvie puts it,

The ‘nation of twenty millions’ was an important myth. It preserved, within the Imperial experience, a cultural continuity that ultimately survived it. It both endorsed the Union, which made colonisation possible, and called it into question: why could Scots govern colonies but not Scotland?<sup>10</sup>

This paradox between endorsing Empire and questioning Union is clearly seen in the literature of the SHRA. At no point did nationalists question the existence or continuation of the Empire. Indeed, they wanted more Empire, or at least more

---

<sup>8</sup> Waddie, C., *How Scotland Lost her Parliament and What became of it 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition* (Edinburgh, Waddie & Co. Ltd.: 1903): 57 – emphasis added

<sup>9</sup> Mitchison, R., *A History of Scotland 2<sup>nd</sup> edition* (London, Routledge: 1982): 401; cf Calder, J., *Scots in Canada* (Edinburgh, Luath Press: 2003)

<sup>10</sup> Harvie, C., *Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics 1707-1994 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition* (London, Routledge: 1994): 65

recognition of Scots' input in the creation and administration of the Empire. Nationalists couched their questioning of the Union in relation to their role in Empire. Are "the people of Scotland qualified to manage their own affairs, without the interference of the English people?" asked John Romans, a prominent figure in the SHRA.

Our answer is to refer to the management by Scotsmen of innumerable institutions involving stupendous responsibility whether at home, *in our colonies, or in America*, or elsewhere. Scotsmen in the past have taken more than their proportionate share of the world's enterprise.<sup>11</sup>

The success of the Scottish Diaspora gave nationalists further ammunition in their campaign for a Scottish Parliament. Indeed the Diaspora itself contributed to the campaign. A branch of the SHRA was formed in Toronto in 1888, *The Globe* commenting that "It is to be presumed that the desire to do something for 'puir auld Scotland's sake' animates her children in Canada to such a degree that they will make a grand success of the proposed Canadian Branch of the Scottish Home Rule Association."<sup>12</sup> In 1892, Theodore Napier, an Australian, formed the Scottish National Association of Victoria and issued *An Appeal to Scotsmen in Australia*. The aims of the Association were taken from the A,B,C of the SHRA Prospectus. Its main object was "to support the great patriotic movement [the SHRA] in Scotland to obtain Local National Self Government."<sup>13</sup> The concluding note that all "Britishmen and persons of Scottish descent are eligible as members" highlighted the way in which the two identities were linked. A British man could be a patriotic Scot. A patriotic Scot was British. The two were mutually reinforcing.

The paradox inherent in the Empire and Union mentioned by Harvie was also evident in the Diaspora movements. Napier's appeal to his fellow Australian Scots asked the familiar question.

Here in Australia and New Zealand we are enjoying all the privileges and responsibilities of self-government...What reason can then exist why the

---

<sup>11</sup> Romans, J., *Home Rule For Scotland* (Edinburgh, SHRA, 1893): 12 emphasis added

<sup>12</sup> *The Globe*, 3 November 1888: 8

<sup>13</sup> Napier, T., *Scottish National Association of Victoria* (Victoria, 1892)

same facilities should not be granted to the nationalities that compose the United Kingdom?<sup>14</sup>

Of course the insult to Scotland being denied home rule was all the worse when the colonies were populated with criminals and miscreants. In Western Australia, Napier claimed,

...we find a colony that has actually been deluged with criminals from the shores of Britain and whose population must still largely consist of such and their descendants, entrusted with local representative government or Home Rule; and this too, while an ancient, tried and trustworthy Country like Scotland is denied the same right.<sup>15</sup>

The clear statement from the Scottish Diaspora was that if the colonies, especially those used for deported criminals, were given home rule, to deny similar status to Scotland, which played such an important role in the Empire, would be contrary to the principles of British liberty.

Australian Scots were not the only ones lending support. Several prominent Scots-Canadians proposed schemes for Home Rule all round in the United Kingdom, including John A. Macdonald and Sir Alexander Galt.<sup>16</sup> Often these schemes drew on the Canadian experience. This was a tactic the SHRA also used. Nationalists argued on more than one occasion that Canada provided an excellent example of how home rule all round could work in practice.<sup>17</sup>

The SHRA appealed to the Scottish Diaspora for support. In 1891, they issued an *Appeal to the Scot Abroad* calling for “pecuniary aid to enable us to fight our battle

---

<sup>14</sup> Napier, T., *Scotland's Demand for Home Rule or Local National Self-Government: An Appeal to Scotsmen in Australia* (Melbourne, 1892): 14

<sup>15</sup> Napier, T., *The Arrogance of Englishmen: A Bar to Imperial Federation* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1895):14

<sup>16</sup> For Macdonald's plan see Pope, J., *Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John Alexander Macdonald* Vol. II (London, Edward Arnold: 1894): 223-225; For Galt (a Scots descendant) see *Imperial Federation*, 1 August, 1886: 207 and *The Northern Chronicle*, 31 January, 1883: 4.

<sup>17</sup> For example Mitchell, W., *Scotland and Home Rule* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1888); Mitchell, W., *Home Rule for Scotland – The Opening Speech Read (in part) at the discussion on that subject in the Conference Room of the National Liberal Club on 7<sup>th</sup> May 1889* (Edinburgh: 1889); SHRA, *To the Members of the Imperial Parliament of 1892* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1892)

for political freedom...”<sup>18</sup> To appeal to the Scot abroad, the SHRA’s argument had to be broadened. They still argued for Scottish Home Rule within a home rule all round framework. But they emphasised the benefits of this to Scots abroad.

The Imperial Parliament thus freed from all domestic legislation, would not only be in a position to attend to the affairs of the Empire, but would be in a condition to invite the Colonies and Dependencies to send Representatives to share equally with all British subjects at home and abroad, in the privileges as well as the responsibilities of the Government of the British Empire.<sup>19</sup>

By linking the two reforms, reform of the Union and reform of the Empire, the SHRA could justify the home rule argument by comparing Scotland to the colonies, while simultaneously commenting on the benefits to Scots abroad within the Empire. In the minds of the nationalists the two reforms were inextricably linked. Home Rule would undoubtedly benefit Scotland but it would also benefit the Empire and therefore Scots in Canada, Australia and across the Empire. And if it benefited the Empire Scotland in turn would gain.

So the Scottish Diaspora was beneficial for Scotland and had itself been a beneficiary of Scotland’s Union with England and the resultant Empire. Through the Diaspora Scots lived the imperial dream. Scots took an interest in what happened to the Diaspora and they in turn took an interest in what happened in Scotland. Here then is one of the ways in which the imperial and national identity was reconciled. Without the Empire, the Diaspora and its success would not exist. Without Scots the Empire, it was argued, would not have been as successful. There was no perception that these two identities were inherently contradictory. In fact they clearly reinforced each other. Scottish national identity mediated Scot’s experience of the Empire and therefore Scottish Imperial identity. Using Smith’s model of concentric circles, Scottish national identity was the inner circle and acted as the foundation for a wider imperial identity.

---

<sup>18</sup> SHRA, *Appeal to the Scot Abroad* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1891)

<sup>19</sup> Ibid

The success and influence of the Scottish Diaspora reflected the glory of the Empire back on Scotland as an imperial partner. Richard Finlay argued the empire was “a means of economic regeneration, a symbol of world power and ...a powerful vehicle of propaganda...”<sup>20</sup> The power of the Empire gave Scotland and the Scots a place in the world they would perhaps not otherwise have had. Charles Taylor claimed that an important aspect of the recognition argument was the perception of a world stage in which nations are gauged against each other, “a world public scene on which people see themselves as standing, on which they see themselves as rated, which rating matters to them.”<sup>21</sup> The Empire gave Scotland a share of world recognition with England in their imperial partnership. The problem was the perception that their partner in Union did not recognise the contribution of Scots to the Imperial project.

An important element of Scottish imperial nationalist discourse, as it had been of the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights in the 1850s, was the use of “England” and “English” instead of “Britain” and “British.” We noted in previous chapters the effect of this in terms of the recognition of Scottish national identity within the British State. But the incorrect use of “England” and “English” also had an effect on the position of Scotland within the Empire. Throughout the period under study the SHRA believed there had been an increasing Anglicisation of the Empire. The publication of Professor Seeley’s *The Expansion of England* in the early 1880s in particular caused great offence. The irrepressible Theodore Napier commenting in the 1890s

...Englishmen arrogantly claim to be the ‘Imperial Race’ – the exalted theory of Professors Freeman and Seeley – and to treat Scotsmen and Irishmen as belonging to inferior races, and ...pompously claim to have themselves created the Empire...<sup>22</sup>

This lack of recognition by the English of Scottish and Irish influence within the Empire was seen as particularly offensive. After all, Scots saw the Empire as a joint

---

<sup>20</sup> Finlay, R.J., *A Partnership for Good: Scottish Politics and the Union since 1880* (John Donald Publishers Ltd, Edinburgh: 1997): 15

<sup>21</sup> Taylor, C., “Nationalism and Modernity” in Hall, J.A., (ed) *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the theory of nationalism*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1998): 208

<sup>22</sup> Napier, *The Arrogance of Englishmen*: 5

effort with the English and it legitimated Scotland's place within the Union. Failure to recognise Scotland's role in the Empire was failure to recognise Scotland's place in the Union. With the problems of democratic legitimacy surrounding Scottish legislation further failures to recognise Scotland within the Empire and Union merely added fuel to the nationalists' fire.

At a lecture delivered to the Imperial Institute in 1893 by W.E.H. Lecky, historian and author of an eight volume *The History of England*,<sup>23</sup> the Empire was claimed to be "the sole possession of England" and the "colonies as having been built up by Englishmen."<sup>24</sup> According to the SHRA, Lecky "ended with this extraordinary sentence; "Again, whatever might be the humiliation of the future, England could not be deprived of the glory of having created this mighty Empire.""<sup>25</sup> The offence taken by the SHRA was compounded by the attendance of the Prince of Wales at the lecture. The letter sent by the SHRA to His Royal Highness highlights well the register of pride and humiliation associated with the politics of recognition.

This language has given the greatest offence in Scotland; our country and countrymen are entirely ignored, although it is notorious that Scotland has contributed far out of all proportion to her population to the building up of the Empire. Scotsmen by their valour and their genius have won for themselves the first rank wherever the British flag flies. To a high spirited people like the Scots, such language as held by Mr Lecky gives more offence than any amount of material wrong.<sup>26</sup>

Lest it be thought that this was a one off incident a number of different pamphlets produced by Scottish nationalists, within and outwith the SHRA, defended the rights of Scots to share in the Empire's "honour and glory."<sup>27</sup> As one nationalist asked, "Blot out the share of Scots and Irishmen in the conquest and Government of India, and pray, how much remains?"<sup>28</sup> In a protest against the practice of using England

---

<sup>23</sup> Spence, J., 'Lecky, (William) Edward Hartpole (1838–1903)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004 [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34461>, accessed 27 Jan 2006]

<sup>24</sup> SHRA, *England Not Britain – Correspondence with His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales* (Edinburgh, 1893)

<sup>25</sup> Ibid

<sup>26</sup> Ibid

<sup>27</sup> Mackenzie, B.D., *Home Rule for Scotland: Why Should Scotland Wait?* (Edinburgh, 1890): 15

<sup>28</sup> Ibid: 15

and not Britain, the SHRA declared the “Highland Regiments which have fought so valiantly in every part of the world did so to maintain the honour – not of England – but of the United Kingdom.”<sup>29</sup>

The language of recognition highlighted in the above discussion is an important part of nationalism in illegitimate states. Guibernau pointed out that in such multi-national states one nation will tend to dominate.<sup>30</sup> In the United Kingdom, the English outnumbered Scots by seven to one. This numerical supremacy meant England was the dominant nation within the state. It is unsurprising that when they comprise such a large part of the state that actions of the state would be taken to have been carried out in the name of England. After all an important part of representative democracy is rule by the majority. Scots nationalists, however, took this as English tyranny, an attempt to Anglicise the United Kingdom, and by extension, the British Empire.

This aspect of the discourse of the SHRA is vitally important. The attack on the rights of Scotland under the Treaty of Union combined both elements of nationalist concerns, the Union and the Empire, in one context. For Scotland, the Union meant Empire. Without recognition in the Empire, the Union would be called into question. Without recognition in the Union the achievements in the Empire were lost. For Scottish nationalists, therefore, the two identities, Scottish and Imperial, reinforced each other. Again we can see the way in which Scottish national identity mediated imperial identity, using the idea of concentric circles. The inner circle was Scottish national identity and it laid the foundation for a wider imperial identity. Scot’s contributed to the achievements of the Empire which in turn reflected glory back on Scotland.

---

<sup>29</sup> SHRA, *Protest by the Scottish Home Rule Association Against the Misuse of the terms ‘England’ and English’ for ‘Britain’, the ‘British Empire’, its Peoples and Institutions*. (Edinburgh, SHRA: Undated) – this protest was issued sometime between 1886 and 1892 since it mentions Gladstone as the leader of the opposition.

<sup>30</sup> Guiberneau, M., *Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1996): 60

Of course Scots had contributed in substantial terms to the Union as well as the Empire. Scotland, the SHRA claimed, had paid more than her fair share of taxes and received less Imperial revenue in return.<sup>31</sup> The genius of Scots, such as James Watt, benefited the whole of the United Kingdom.<sup>32</sup> Scotland's economic contribution to the Union was substantial. According to Smout, the Scottish economy laid its foundations in the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early nineteenth centuries, but grew strongly in the nineteenth century, reaching its peak in 1914.

By 1913, Glasgow, claiming for herself the title 'Second City of the Empire,' made, with her satellite towns immediately to the east and west, one-fifth of the steel, one-third of the shipping tonnage, one-half of the marine-engine horsepower, one third of the railway locomotives and rolling stock, and most of the sewing machines in the United Kingdom.<sup>33</sup>

Lack of recognition of these contributions to the Union and to the Empire by failing to use the correct nomenclature, i.e., British not English, was seen as a slur on the dignity of Scots and therefore of Scottish identity. The mix of Union and Empire in this discussion clearly showed the nature of the relationship between national and imperial identity. The national (British) circumstances (lack of recognition of Scottish identity) impacted on Scots contribution to the prestige of the United Kingdom and of the British Empire. Scottish identity gained from the prestige of the Empire because of the contribution of the Scottish Diaspora. But Scottish identity was not being recognised in the Union. The articulation of both national and imperial identities was a reaction to this non-recognition. Scottish identity was both imperial and national. The one reinforced the other. To be Scottish was to be an Imperialist. National identity mediated the Imperial identity.

One other aspect of the Anglicisation of the Empire was the Tories appropriation of Empire for jingoistic ends in the 1870s. In 1872, Disraeli outlined the basis of his Conservatism in two major speeches in April and June of that year. The Party had three objectives, according to Disraeli. "To maintain the institutions of the

---

<sup>31</sup> SHRA, *The Union of 1707 Viewed Financially* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1888): 8 and 14

<sup>32</sup> Waddie, C., *How Scotland Lost her Parliament and What Became of it* (Edinburgh, Waddie & Co. Ltd: 1903): 85

<sup>33</sup> Smout, T.C., *A Century of the Scottish People 1830-1950* (London, Fontana Press Ltd: 1986): 85

country...to uphold the Empire of England and the elevation of the condition of the people.”<sup>34</sup> Disraeli approached the 1874 election campaign complaining of the Liberals ineffective foreign policy, a campaign that produced the first Conservative majority for 33 years. The Conservatives were portrayed as “the party of Empire and national greatness.”<sup>35</sup>

Salisbury, on assuming the post of foreign secretary and then the leadership of the party following the death of Disraeli in 1881, continued to argue that the Conservatives were the “Imperial Party.”<sup>36</sup> The actions of Disraeli and Salisbury in this period, particularly during the Eastern Crisis of 1878, highlight the way in which Conservative Imperialism lacked the morality of Liberal Imperialism, as perceived by the Scots, resting as it did on religion and freedom. The decision to uphold the Ottomans against the Russians, whilst in the national interest, was a step too far for Scots, particularly when the Ottoman Empire carried out atrocities in reprisal against Christians in Bulgaria. Disraeli’s continued support for the Turks led to mass protests throughout the North of Britain.<sup>37</sup> Gladstone had originally supported the idea of Britain supporting the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. But following publication of his *Bulgarian Horrors* pamphlet the Liberal leader’s successful Midlothian campaign launched a tirade against Conservative imperial policy on this basis,<sup>38</sup> and the Liberals swept to victory.

The importance of the Empire to Scots and the influence of Scots on the Empire is the key to understanding the moralistic attack on Conservative imperialism during the Midlothian campaign and the revulsion against Disraeli’s support for a Muslim Empire against Christians. Scottish Presbyterianism and Liberalism were intertwined in Scottish imperialist ideals.<sup>39</sup> To Scots, the Empire meant freedom, the rule of law, good government, and the general spread of civilisation across the world. The

---

<sup>34</sup> Pearce and Stewart, *British Political History*: 74

<sup>35</sup> Ibid: 73

<sup>36</sup> Ibid:85-6

<sup>37</sup> Ibid: 152; cf Shannon, R., *The Crisis of Imperialism 1865-1915* (London, Hart-Davis, MacGibbon: 1974): 124-9

<sup>38</sup> Shannon, *The Crisis of Imperialism*: 124-9

<sup>39</sup> Brown, A., McCrone, D., and Paterson, L., *Politics and Society in Scotland* (London, MacMillan: 1998): 11

atrocities committed by the Muslim Ottomans against Bulgarian Christians were an anathema to Scottish imperialism. The appropriation of what Scots saw as their Empire by English Conservatives was taken as further evidence of the non-recognition of Scottish identity and its contribution to the Empire. The articulation of an imperial nationalist discourse once again showed that national identity mediated imperial identity. To protect Scottish interests the Empire had to be seen as British not English.

A key argument of this thesis is that national identity mediates imperial identity. The above discussion clearly shows the relationship between the two identities. The perceived attack on Scotland within the Union, through failing to correctly recognise Scotland's contribution to the Union, was also seen as an attack on Scotland's position within the Empire. By claiming that Scotland's financial position had improved through trade with "*England's* colonies", English commentators created the conditions for the articulation of a discourse in which Scotland's contributions both to the Union and to the Empire were emphasised. National context conditioned the articulation of both national and imperial identities.

The important point here is the dominance of the English nation in the United Kingdom State. Dominant nations in a multi-national state are likely to fail to recognise minority identities within the state, although there are exceptions, Canada being the most notable. By failing to recognise these identities they fail to recognise the contribution of the smaller nations to the empire. Where a broad imperial identity exists, both the national and the imperial identity will feature in a discourse critical of the non-recognition of the minority identities. The non-recognition of the minority national identity results in the articulation of minority national and imperial identities both of which are seen as important to the minority nation.

### *Irish Home Rule and Imperial Governance*

The introduction of Gladstone's Irish Home Rule bill in 1886 is crucial to understanding Scottish imperial nationalism. Gladstone's conversion to Irish Home Rule gave the initial impetus for the formation of the SHRA which used the Irish

movement as a model for their actions. The recognition of the Irish cause by Gladstone led to claims for a similar recognition of Scottish identity, as we have seen in previous chapters. This was important within the context of increasing levels of democracy within the United Kingdom, particularly following the 1884 Reform Bill which created equality in the franchises in the four home countries and in the 1885 Redistribution Bill which increased the representation of Scotland in Parliament. If all four home countries were equal why should Ireland be the only one to be given Home Rule? The neglect of Scottish interests by Gladstone was articulated in the language of recognition and seen as humiliating to Scottish national identity.

But Gladstone's conversion to Irish Home Rule was not just seen as a threat to Scotland's position in the United Kingdom state. It was also seen as a threat to the integrity of the Empire. After all, one of the reasons Great Britain wanted Union in 1801 was to prevent an enemy invasion through Ireland. Britain had been involved in the Napoleonic Wars when an attempted invasion by the French through Ireland had been foiled prior to the turn of the nineteenth century. If Ireland posed a danger when outside the Union there seemed little to be gained by letting her leave the Union through a rebellion. Irish nationalists had called for resolution of the land issue and a measure of Home Rule. Meeting their demands may have been the answer.

Yet Scots experience of the Irish, not least in religious terms, made home rule for Ireland seem just as unacceptable as allowing Ireland to leave the Union altogether. In the West of Scotland high levels of Irish Catholic immigrants had given Scots the impression that the Irish were "poor, ignorant, superstitious, and, so far as the natives could see, vicious."<sup>40</sup> This would have reinforced the existing stereotypes of the Irish as "subhuman porcine creatures" that coloured British political decision making throughout the nineteenth century.<sup>41</sup> These were not the type of people that could be trusted with self government. But from the beginning the SHRA had made clear its sympathy with the Irish while claiming that to grant Home Rule to Ireland *alone* would be dangerous. In their first petition to Parliament the SHRA claimed

---

<sup>40</sup> Fry, M., *The Scottish Empire* (Edinburgh, Birlinn: 2001): 357

<sup>41</sup> Judd, *Empire*: 43 and Pearce and Stewart, *British Political History*: 111

Your petitioners, while sympathising with the desire of the great majority of the Irish members that this principle should regulate the future government of Ireland, are of the opinion that *it can only be applied with safety to the Empire and in justice to the United Kingdoms*, by the *simultaneous* creation of a legislative Body for each Kingdom, subject always to the Imperial Parliament, and duly represented therein.<sup>42</sup>

Once again the inter-related nature of the problems of empire and union can be seen. On the one hand, home rule all round will solve the problems of the Union, not least the Irish problem. But at the same time, for the safety of the Empire the Irish should not be the sole nation to be given its own parliament. Rather home rule all round was the answer.

Another reason for linking the two elements through Irish Home Rule was for practical considerations. The furore Irish Home Rule had created in the country and in parliament was hardly likely to benefit Scottish Home Rule. As William Mitchell noted the phrase “home rule” brought with it images of Irish “outrages” and “prejudice.”<sup>43</sup> By introducing the more moderate idea of home rule all round it was hoped that the “misconception” of Home rule could be overcome. By emphasising the benefits of home rule all round to the Empire, the SHRA attempted to broaden the appeal of home rule beyond Scottish nationalists.

But prejudice against the Irish was not the only problem for home rule. The fear of what might result if home rule was granted was very real. The spectres of the attempted invasion of the French via Ireland in the eighteenth century remained and would continue to haunt statesmen until the Second World War.<sup>44</sup> The Canadian Prime Minister, John A. Macdonald made clear the possible consequences in 1871:

Experience shows us what continued agitation will do as to Irish matters. In the long run the English people and Parliament will, from a mere sense of weariness, yield, as they have always done, to Irish turbulence and then would come the severance from England.<sup>45</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup> SHRA, Petition to Scots MP's Lords and Lord Provosts of Burghs (Edinburgh, SHRA:1886) – emphasis added

<sup>43</sup> Mitchell, *Home Rule for Scotland and Imperial Federation* (Edinburgh: 1892): 9

<sup>44</sup> Fry, *The Scottish Empire*: 357

<sup>45</sup> Pope, *Memoirs*: 223

The experience turned out to be very different. Parliament never yielded to Irish demands. This failure led to the Easter Rising of 1916 and the declaration of the Irish Free State in 1922.<sup>46</sup> But Macdonald's comment clearly outlines the claims that were made against Irish Home Rule. If it were granted Ireland would inevitably slide towards independence. William Mitchell offered a contemporary view in 1894, when he claimed,

...the fear of separation, and the proud impossibility of keeping Irish Representatives in the Imperial Parliament and allowing them a legislature of their own for domestic purposes without making them our masters, have all combined to frustrate the solution of the Home Rule question as confined to Ireland.<sup>47</sup>

The key issue was how to ensure the Irish would remain loyal to the Union, thus preventing danger to the Empire without giving them undue influence in the Imperial Parliament. The objections to the first Irish Home Rule bill in 1886 revolved around the separation issue. The 1886 Bill made no provision for Irish representation at Westminster. As Fry pointed out, Gladstone on that occasion treated Ireland like a colony.<sup>48</sup> With nothing to tie the Irish to Westminster and the Empire, and with Irish opinion against the existing Union, Frederick Young's mantra of "federation or separation" took on real meaning. The second Irish Home Rule Bill of 1893 attempted to retain Irish Representation at Westminster. But without Home Rule all round, the Scottish nationalists were unhappy at the prospect of the Irish being masters in Parliament.

How dangerous Ireland outside the Union would have been can only be guessed at. But we have seen above and in previous chapters that there was a plethora of potential threats to the Empire across Europe and in America. The diplomatic tensions with France were particularly relevant given the nature of Ireland's incorporation in the Union of 1801. The common religion of France and the majority of the Irish was an important factor. The Americans had already shown their support,

---

<sup>46</sup> Lyons, *Ireland Since the Famine*: 507

<sup>47</sup> Mitchell, W., *The Political Situation in Scotland* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1894): 7

<sup>48</sup> Fry, *The Scottish Empire*: 355

if implicit, to Fenianism in North America, following the border incursions into Canada in 1866, 1870 and 1871. With these various threats fresh in the memory, Gladstone introduced his Irish Home Rule Bill. The potential threat to the Empire was clear for everyone to see. As William Mitchell claimed, in relation to Irish Home Rule, “[f]or the British Empire the issue is nothing less than Federation or Separation.”<sup>49</sup>

Irish Home Rule posed a threat on two grounds. Firstly the threat to Scotland’s position in the United Kingdom in terms of the politics of recognition argument mentioned in previous chapters. But Irish Home Rule also posed a threat to the Empire. With nothing tying the Irish to Westminster the threat of separation and leaving a flank exposed to potential enemies was unacceptable. But Irish Home Rule’s threat combined these two aspects. As Michael Fry has argued, Gladstone’s 1886 bill had implications for Scotland. “If for example, Gladstone’s plan was to set a precedent for Scots, it would shut them out of Imperial affairs, an unacceptable prospect.”<sup>50</sup> Scotland’s effort and commitment to the Empire in terms of missionary activity and military support, not to mention the Scottish Diaspora, meant that the potential prospect of being shut out of Imperial decision making was unacceptable. The only solution, therefore, to the problem posed by Irish nationalism was Home Rule All Round. Only this solution would protect imperial interests and satisfy the nationalists in Scotland.

One final consideration was taken into account by Scottish nationalists: would the manner in which the Irish problem was handled have an effect on the rest of the Empire? The SHRA claimed the mother country, “still possesses an immense reserve of influence over her colonies in the pride and affection with which colonist regard their old home.”<sup>51</sup> But the bond could be broken if Westminster was seen to mishandle the Irish situation.

---

<sup>49</sup> Mitchell, W., *Home Rule All Round or Federal Union – Letter to the Right Hon H.H. Asquith M.P. for the Eastern Division of Fife* (Edinburgh, 1893): 24

<sup>50</sup> Fry, *The Scottish Empire*: 355

<sup>51</sup> Mitchell, *Home Rule for Scotland and Imperial Federation*: 62

Through maladministration at home or abroad, the Mother Country might easily lower the pride with which the colonies regard her, and if they ceased to regard the mother country with pride the tie of affection would snap if subjected to the strain of opposing interests...The attitude of Great Britain towards Ireland has, for this reason, more importance than a domestic quarrel.<sup>52</sup>

Once again actions of the United Kingdom state in relation to Ireland, and in particular Gladstone's Irish Home Rule proposal, were seen as potential threats to the Empire. If Ireland was allowed to go its own way then Britain would be seen as abandoning pretensions to Empire on her own doorstep. Why then should Canada or the Australian colonies thousands of miles away worry about the Empire? The Irish situation had to be settled with regard to the interests not just of Ireland and Britain but of the whole empire.

The Irish Home Rule debate was an important context for the articulation of imperial nationalist discourse in Scotland. The perceived threats to Scotland in the United Kingdom state and to the Empire were sufficiently great for the formation of the Scottish Home Rule Association. These imperial nationalists proposed reform of both the governance of the state and of the Empire. Again we can see that national identity mediated and reinforced imperial identity. Any threat to the Empire was seen as a threat to Scottish identity. The threat to Scotland's position within the United Kingdom was seen as a potential threat to the Empire. The two issues were practically indistinguishable in the discourse of Scottish imperial nationalists.

The multi-national state and recognition are once again key aspects of the discussion. Democracy and legitimacy in multi-nation states depends on a perception of equal treatment of each nation. Failure to recognise a minority identity will result in the expression of national identity. Where imperial identity is also important to the nation, this identity will also be articulated in the discourse critical of the state. Perceived threats to national identity will result in the articulation of dual/multiple identities.

---

<sup>52</sup> Ibid: 62

The context of the non-recognition is also important. In the first part of this section we argued it was general non-recognition of Scottish contributions to the Union and the Empire that resulted in the articulation of both a national and imperial identity. The Empire legitimised the Union. One context affected both identities. In the case of Irish Home Rule, a different context was perceived as a threat to Scotland's position in the Union and in the Empire. Here again, context affected both identities. Identity as contextual brings us back to our theoretical discussion. Where one context affects more than one identity, those identities will be articulated in the discourse that responds to the context. The relationship between the identities will then depend on the context, but as in the cases above, national identity mediated and reinforced imperial identity.

### ***Solutions for a “Scottish sort of Empire”***

Most discourses have antagonism at their heart. They are shaped by what they oppose. The antagonisms of Scottish imperial nationalists have been reviewed above. But the discourse must also offer solutions to the antagonisms raised. The solutions offered can tell us as much about the identity articulated as can the antagonisms. Solutions solve problems and therefore the solution can tell us much about the perceived nature of a problem. An analysis of the solution presented by Scottish imperial nationalists can help understand the nature of the problem. When considering the benefits of Home Rule all round to the Empire and the associated benefits to Scotland the relationship between Scottish and Imperial identity becomes apparent.

We have argued that national identity mediated imperial identity. We would therefore expect the solution to the SHRA's antagonism to solve imperial concerns as well as national concerns. The creation of a Scottish Parliament would, therefore, have been seen as a solution to Imperial issues. In their manifesto of 1892, the SHRA maintained this was the case.

The Scottish People through the conferences of the Scottish Liberal Association held at Glasgow and Perth last autumn, have demanded Scottish Home Rule in order that a host of imperial questions urgently pressing for attention may be solved...<sup>53</sup>

In solving the Irish problem, home rule all round would have preserved the Empire against potential threats from European competitors. Freeing Parliament of domestic affairs would leave it free to debate important imperial affairs which the SHRA claimed were in much need of attention, such as federation of the colonies, codification of the laws of the Empire and India.<sup>54</sup> Resolution of these problems would ensure the maintenance of the Empire. By preserving the Empire, home rule all round would have ensured the Scottish Diaspora, so important to Scotland's sense of place in the Empire, remained within the imperial fold. By affirming Scotland's place in the Empire, the Union remained legitimate and ensured Scots remained committed to the partnership with England. Home Rule all round as a solution to the problems of the time reflected the mixture of identities articulated by the SHRA. It would have benefited Scotland specifically in domestic terms and it would benefit the Empire specifically by preventing its dissolution. Scotland would also benefit as an imperial partner.

This review of the solution to the Irish problem illustrates the way in which national identity mediated imperial identity. Solution of a national problem, the threat to Scotland's political position in the United Kingdom state also resolved the wider imperial problems caused by the Irish nationalist outrages and campaigning. Scottish interests in the United Kingdom state and in the British Empire were both expected to be solved by home rule all round.

A second benefit for Scotland would have been the reduction in English influence over the minority nations following the introduction of colonial MPs at Westminster in an Imperial Federation. Waddie claimed the equality of all states within the Parliament would have to be recognised and the population principle discarded. "When States enter in to a Federation, they surrender a portion of their natural rights,

---

<sup>53</sup> SHRA, *Manifesto of the Scottish Home Rule Association* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1892)

<sup>54</sup> Reith, J., *Reasons for Home Rule for Scotland* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1892)

but all must surrender a like, for if one has a preponderating voice in the assembly, the others become her vassals.”<sup>55</sup> Again the question of legitimate and illegitimate states became the important issue. With a dominant English nation in the multi-national Imperial Parliament, a nationalist reaction against perceived English tyranny would have been a real danger. The interests of the minority nations must be acknowledged and represented effectively. But to what extent should this override the interests of the majority? Waddie acknowledged the English would find the tyranny of the minority arrangement unacceptable. Even if the population principle was not discarded, however, the increased numbers of non-English members would dilute English influence to an extent. As Fry claimed, the resultant institutions of government would have resulted in “a Scottish sort of Empire,” a “spectacular example of contemporary Scottish self-confidence.”<sup>56</sup>

Scottish self-confidence in proposing the reforms to the Union and to the Empire would have increased further with the greater glory a united Empire would have reflected on Scottish identity. A more cohesive Empire united through an Imperial federation would, claimed Waddie, “create the most powerful state the world ever saw, no foreign power or combination of rivals could ever hope to wage a successful war against us.”<sup>57</sup> The Empire, and by association Scotland, it was hoped, would be recognised as pre-eminent in the world. Scotland with her disproportionate influence, would bask in the reflected glory of the Empire. Max Weber argued that states, and we could argue nations, prefer small neighbours. Power over other states and nations gives prestige to larger states. As the largest Empire of its time, the British Empire held a prestigious position in world affairs. Scotland as a small nation would, imperial nationalists argued, gain prestige from association with a large Empire.

This section has illustrated the way Scottish imperialists and nationalists reconciled national and imperial identity. The Anglicisation of the Empire and Irish Home Rule were seen as a direct threat to Scottish interests in both the British Empire and the United Kingdom state. A discourse articulating both a national and imperial identity

---

<sup>55</sup> Waddie, C., *The Federation of Greater Britain*: 5

<sup>56</sup> Fry, *The Scottish Empire*: 374

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid*: 15

was the result. These identities, however, were not articulated separately rather each one reinforced the other. The solutions were presented as a whole. Home rule all round and imperial federation together would solve Scotland's national problems. By solving the issues presented in their discourse, the groups assumed imperial problems would be automatically resolved. The focus on Scottish national grievances in this way marked the SHRA as implicit imperial nationalists.

Solutions presented as part of a discourse can highlight the way identities within that discourse interact. Reforms to multi-national and/or imperial states that include greater representation for minority nations will clearly highlight the importance of each identity to the nation. If greater focus is given to one aspect of the reform over another, for example home rule all round over imperial federation, we can assume one of two things. Either the national identity is more important than the imperial identity, or vice versa, or the national identity is under greater threat. In the case of Scottish nationalists, the focus was on reform of the governance of the United Kingdom state, not the Imperial structure. Scottish interests were under much greater threat within the United Kingdom, primarily due to Irish Home Rule and non recognition of Scottish identity. The reform of the United Kingdom State was, therefore, the priority.

### ***British Canada – the British Empire and the trade debate***

The key aim of Canadian imperial nationalists in the late nineteenth century was to secure a voice in Canadian foreign affairs. Canada, as a Dominion of the Empire, had no control over its own foreign policy. Diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and the United States rarely, they claimed, took account of Canadian interests. Rather they were designed to maintain friendly relations between the two powers. Through Imperial Federation, Canadian nationalists hoped the fledgling nation would gain a voice in affairs affecting Canadian interests. Imperial federation, however, would also give Canada a voice in the affairs of the Empire more generally. The creation of an imperial federation would also prevent Canada being annexed by the United States. Canada would therefore maintain her status as a nation whilst the

Empire, and by association Canada, would benefit from the maintenance of the Dominion on the North American continent. Both national and imperial symbols were used to articulate a discourse critical of imperial governance but not of the existence of the Empire.

The main argument of this section will be that the maintenance of Canadian institutions against perceived American aggression, particularly in the debate over the direction of trade between the two nations, was the key to understanding the expression of both a national and imperial identity. The formation of the Commercial Union Club in 1887 was seen as a major threat to the integrity of Canada, a precursor to political union with the United States. The historical antagonism of British Canadians towards the southern union was made clear through use of the flight of the United Empire Loyalists in the 1780s, the War of 1812 and the Fenian invasion of 1866 as symbols expressing British Canadian identity as both imperial and Canadian. As compared to the Scots, Canadian nationalists were explicit in both their nationalism and imperialism. Reform of the imperial structure was to be beneficial both for the British Canadian nation and for the Empire. National identity both mediated and reinforced imperial identity.

This section will be split into three parts. The first part will examine the trade debates of the late 1880s and early 1890s. The importance of the imperial connection to Canadian national identity will be examined within this context. The second will examine Canadian antagonism toward imperial governance. The nature of the complaints will be put in the context of the importance of Canadian relations with the United States and their importance for the Empire. The final part will briefly examine the solution of imperial federation as the vehicle for expressing Canadian and Imperial identity.

### *Commercial Union and the threat of Annexation*

For nationalists in Canada one of the biggest threats to Canada and the Empire was the formation of a Commercial Union Club. In 1887, Goldwin Smith and various others, including Henry Darling, President of the Toronto Board of Trade, organised

a Commercial Union Club in Toronto with Smith as President. The objective of the club was “to improve the trade relations and develop the industries of Canada by securing unrestricted reciprocity of trade between this country and the United States.”<sup>58</sup> The movement for commercial union, according to Smith, had its origins “at a convention of farmers, who had grown tired of being forced to sell in the cheapest market and buy in the dearest.”<sup>59</sup> The convention was held by the Farmers Institute in Canada in April 1887. A resolution was passed in favour of Commercial Union.<sup>60</sup> In a letter to the Officers of the Farmers Institute in Canada, the President of the Central Farmers Institute in Ontario, Valancey Fuller, argued that the American Farmer’s position was far superior to the Canadian farmer as he had less debt as a result of having a better market. Canadian Farmers wanted access to this market.<sup>61</sup>

One of the main arguments against Commercial union at the time was that it would be injurious to Canada’s young manufacturing industry. Fuller denied this on two counts. First, it may adversely affect manufacturers but this would only be temporary. Second the interests of manufacturers should not take precedence over the interests of the farmers as their “welfare is so dependent upon the welfare of the farmers, that what aids the farmer still more improves the position of the manufacturer.”<sup>62</sup>

In a similar manner, James Pearson, a member of the Toronto Club executive and a United Empire Loyalist descendant, argued that the manufacturers were in the minority and the policy adopted should be for the greatest good not just for a select few. Pearson went further in his assessment and argued that in opening themselves up to a bigger market with more competition from the Americans it would “make us

---

<sup>58</sup> Commercial Union Club, *Constitution of the Commercial Union Club of Toronto*. (Toronto, 1887)

<sup>59</sup> Smith, G., “Introduction” in Mercer-Adam, G., (ed.) *Handbook of Commercial Union* (Toronto: 1888): x

<sup>60</sup> Fuller, V., “The Canadian Farmers Duty” in Mercer-Adam, G., (ed.) *Handbook of Commercial Union*

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid

more Canadian and independent than ever.”<sup>63</sup> This response to the argument that commercial union would lead to annexation, was a theme which the Attorney General of Nova Scotia, J.W. Longley, took up in a pamphlet dismissing objections to the policy. Longley argued that there was concrete evidence that the reciprocity treaty of 1854 ended calls for annexation and that the same would happen if commercial union were granted. He also believed that Canada had no fear from conquest and that annexation could only happen if desired by the majority of Canadians.<sup>64</sup>

Another aspect of the case against commercial union was that it would end the relationship with the Empire. Longley brushed this aside lightly.

We are practically independent at the moment. We make our own laws, frame our own tariffs, and in no sense accept any interference with our affairs from the British people.<sup>65</sup>

But at the time the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, was on his way to Washington to take part in a Joint High Commission to discuss the fisheries dispute and any possibility for a new reciprocity agreement. Canada, whilst having control over revenue policy could not negotiate foreign treaties. This included a treaty that would result in Commercial Union. One of the aims of nationalists since the days of Canada First had been to gain powers over treaty making through an Imperial Federation. Incidentally, Chamberlain, in a private letter to Goldwin Smith believed that Commercial Union would inevitably lead to Canada’s separation from the Empire.<sup>66</sup> W.H. Lockhart Gordon, a vice president of the Commercial Union Club of Toronto, argued that, on the contrary, Commercial Union was the only way to prevent annexation, especially given the economic problems and threats of secession from Nova Scotia.

---

<sup>63</sup> Pearson, J., “Address on Commercial Union” in Mercer-Adam, (ed.) *Handbook of Commercial Union*: 130

<sup>64</sup> Longley, J.W., “Current Objections to Commercial Union considered” in Mercer-Adam, (ed.) *Handbook of Commercial Union*: 116

<sup>65</sup> Ibid: 120

<sup>66</sup> Chamberlain, Joseph, to Goldwin Smith, 13 September, 1887

If we wish confederation to hold together; if we wish to have peace and prosperity in our midst; if we wish this Canada of ours to flourish, to remain an integral part of the Queen's domain, we must look the present state of affairs fairly and squarely in the face and at once devise some means of restoring contentment, happiness and prosperity to this great country.<sup>67</sup>

Resolution of the economic problems of Canada would, he argued, prevent Nova Scotian secession. Commercial Unionists, such as Lockhart Gordon, claimed only commercial union could resolve Canada's economic problems.

This alternative to an imperialist discourse and the use of the symbol of monarchy showed the importance of the imperial connection to British Canada. If an imperial identity had not been present in Canada there would have been no need to use the monarchy (Canada as the "Queen's domain") to support calls for Commercial Union. Joseph Chamberlain's claim that such an economic agreement would lead to annexation must have been echoed by others in British Canada. Discourses, after all, are shaped by what they oppose.

Whilst the rhetoric of the commercial union supporters may have been Canadian in appeal, as Lockhart Gordon above, the true motives of some of their number at least were substantially different. For example, Longley, despite being Attorney General of Nova Scotia, was in favour of annexation, something that in 1890 he had not been keen to make public.

I am satisfied that the avowal of annexation might injure a man not only as a candidate in his constituency but his usefulness generally as a public man in Canada. Under these circumstances I am pursuing what I conceive to be the most judicious course.<sup>68</sup>

The various calls for secession from the Confederation by some Nova Scotians since 1867 may render this comment unsurprising. Yet despite the history of secessionist movements in Nova Scotia, not everyone in the Province was in favour of

---

<sup>67</sup> Lockhart Gordon, W.H., "The effects of Commercial Union on our Relations with Great Britain" in Mercer-Adam, (ed.) *Handbook of Commercial Union*: 110

<sup>68</sup> Longley, J.W., to Goldwin Smith, 11 September, 1890

annexation. There was, however, a realisation among some politicians that annexation was the real intent behind the support for commercial union. We know from his *Canada and the Canadian Question* that Goldwin Smith, leader of the commercial union movement, was in favour of annexation.<sup>69</sup>

It seemed too that there was awareness among the voting public that there may be hidden agendas involved. In a letter to Goldwin Smith in 1889, Longley complained that “there is too much lethargy among the people and too little confidence in the genuineness of the motives of those who are forwarding the movement...”<sup>70</sup> This was despite the fact that, according to Longley at least,

Nearly every person believes in reciprocity with the United States but few people seem to care enough to take any active measures to bring it about... I have had large and attentive audiences but I have seen no healthy political agitation follow my remarks.<sup>71</sup>

Reciprocity, however, was a much less binding agreement than a full commercial union, although in the minds of the opponents of commercial union the two issues came to be seen as one.

In 1888, a branch of the Imperial Federation League was formed in Toronto, no doubt in part as a reaction to the momentum generated by the Commercial Union movement. The delay in its formation was surprising given the traditionally loyalist views held by some in the city. At the first meeting it was one of those loyalists, the old firebrand, George Denison, who attacked the commercial unionists.

There was a crisis at the moment in the affairs of the country and it behoved every patriotic son of Canada to rally around the old flag which had so often frustrated the evil designs of traitors. They were upon the verge of two roads and would have to choose one or the other. He called them traitors because the movement for Commercial Union was originally designed by traitors... Commercial Union... aimed at the destruction of the national life of the

---

<sup>69</sup> Smith, G., *Canada and the Canadian Question* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press: 1971)

<sup>70</sup> Longley, J.W., to Goldwin Smith, 14 May, 1889.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*

country by subjecting the people to the power and dictates of a foreign country.<sup>72</sup>

Patriotic Canadians, in Denison's view, were British and must fight under the Union Flag to ensure annexation to the United States was prevented. The distinction of the United States as a foreign country leads back to the United Empire Loyalists and their decision to head north to Canada following British defeat in the American Wars of Independence. The United States was "an aggressive and grasping country" according to Denison. Citing expansion through Florida, Louisiana, Alaska, Maine, Texas, California and Mexico as examples of American aggression, Denison claimed the United States "had never evinced a friendly feeling towards Canada."<sup>73</sup> This is typical of the rhetoric that Denison had used since the first days of Canada First and highlighted his view of Canada as a *British* nation protecting itself from an aggressive United States. Denison did all he could to ensure that nothing came between the Empire and Canada.

On a more positive note, Denison echoed a view of Canada George Grant had alluded to at the inaugural meeting of the League in Montreal. Imperial federation, he claimed, "was designed to build up Canada and her industries...It would consolidate the Empire and give the Canadian people greater influence amongst the nations of the world."<sup>74</sup> At the same meeting a resolution moved by Alex McNeill used the same ideas of strength and glory to create a picture of a Canadian nation playing a full part in the greatest Empire the world had seen.

...while having every reason to be satisfied with their position as citizens of the greatest empire the world has ever known, enjoying in the fullest sense the rights of self government, with a large measure of protection from external foes, Canadians now numbering five millions, with their continental territory, rapidly developing resources, growing and far reaching commerce and increasing wealth, have attained a position from which they can contemplate with a high degree of confidence such well matured plans as may be proposed by Imperial and colonial statesmen for a closer union of the component parts of the empire and for an increase in the responsibilities and

---

<sup>72</sup> Imperial Federation League, *Imperial Federation League in Canada – Speeches at the public meeting Held at Toronto n March 24<sup>th</sup>, 1888* (Toronto, 1888): 5

<sup>73</sup> Ibid: 5

<sup>74</sup> Ibid: 6

duties necessarily arising out of a union from which so much may be expected of strength, of prosperity and of glory.<sup>75</sup>

In his speech supporting the resolution, McNeill argued that the imperial federation cause was “a cause of peace and progress and civilisation.”<sup>76</sup> The mission of Britannia, at the head of a federal British Empire, to civilise the world would bring strength and glory to Canada as a senior partner in the imperial project. In the same way that we argued Scotland benefited from association with the Empire, British Canadians also wanted to benefit.

By and large the IFL in Canada saw the imperial connection as the only way of ensuring Canada’s survival as a nation. The opening line of the resolution and McNeill’s comments in his follow up are a clear indication of the enabling factor that the Empire had on Canadians at the time. Most Canadian’s had some link to Great Britain and, although it is difficult to understand nowadays, the Empire was the greatest ‘civilising mission’ the world had ever seen, surpassing in magnitude even the Roman Empire. There was, among some Canadians at least, a sense of missionary zeal attached to the Imperial project, as we examined in the previous chapter. The desire then to be a Canadian nation *and* to remain a part of the Empire must be viewed in this light and not as something paradoxical. These notions of identity are largely the same that we saw in the period of Canada First in the years following Confederation when it was seen that the loss of the imperial connection would have left Canada vulnerable to attack from the United States. The view of Canada First was that independence from the Empire would lead to annexation by the United States. This defensive nationalism is based on the maintenance of the existence of the state to which the nation belongs. Canadian identity mediated imperial identity. The national context conditioned the attitude toward the greater identity. The perceived threat to the Canadian nation resulted in the articulation of both a national and imperial identity. Whilst in the late 1880s there was not the same threat militarily as there may have been in the 1860s the imperialist conception of

---

<sup>75</sup> Ibid: 7

<sup>76</sup> Ibid: 8

Canadian identity used the threat of annexation through Commercial Union in much the same way.

Following the accession of the French Canadian Wilfrid Laurier to leader, in 1887, the Canadian Liberal Party adopted commercial union as a “bold policy” with which to woo the electorate.<sup>77</sup> This was a major setback for British Canadian nationalists. The biggest critic of the policy (albeit in private) was former Liberal leader Edward Blake. He raised several key issues regarding the form of trade agreement adopted by Laurier. Would it not lead to political union? Would the Imperial government not resent and resist it? Would the protected industries be able to endure such a union? And most importantly were the Canadian people ready to accept it? Blake’s answers to all the above questions were negative.<sup>78</sup> Having made his views known to Laurier, however, Blake agreed to keep his misgivings from becoming public for the sake of the Liberal party.<sup>79</sup>

More setbacks were to come for nationalists in Canada. Those in favour of a customs arrangement with the United States had gained support from Provincial Leaders. At the Inter-Provincial Conference in 1887 the following resolution was passed.

This inter-provincial conference, consisting of representatives of all political parties, desires to record its opinion that unrestricted reciprocity would be of an advantage to the provinces of this Dominion; that this Conference and the people it represents cherish fervent loyalty to Her Majesty the Queen and warm attachment to the British Connection...<sup>80</sup>

The conference also argued that the British connection would not be damaged by any reciprocal agreement arranged with the United States. Clearly the conference was trying to avoid the criticisms aimed at the Commercial Union movement and thus were trying to meet the wants of the majority of Canadians. Unrestricted Reciprocity, or free trade, between the United States and Canada would have all the advantages of

---

<sup>77</sup> Underhill, F.H., “Laurier and Blake, 1882-1891” in *Canadian Historical Review* Vol.20, 1939: 400

<sup>78</sup> Schull, J., *Edward Blake: Leader and Exile (1881-1912)* (Macmillan of Canada, Toronto: 1976): 98-99

<sup>79</sup> Underhill, “Laurier and Blake”:404

<sup>80</sup> de T Glazebrook, G.P., *A History of Canadian Political Thought* (Toronto, McLelland & Stewart: 1966): 194

a Commercial Union without the disadvantages of disputes over the common tariff. It would also enable British Canada to maintain the connection with the Empire cherished by so many.

Worse still was to come for the imperialists as the movement for commercial union steamed ahead. In 1888, Benjamin Butterworth introduced a bill to the United States Congress whose intention was,

To provide for absolute reciprocity of trade between the two countries [United States and Canada] as to all articles of whatever name or nature produced in the said countries respectively.<sup>81</sup>

Moreover the Bill was introduced with the aim of resolving the ongoing fisheries dispute between the United States and Canada, for which a Joint Commission had been set up. Butterworth was not the only one to see Commercial Union as a way to resolve this dispute. Robert Hitt, the representative for Illinois, agreed. In 1889, Hitt put forward his own resolution in the House of Representatives. The resolution would have paved the way for discussions over Commercial Union to be opened if the desire was there between the parties.<sup>82</sup>

Hitt's resolution was more successful than Butterworth's Bill, passing the House of Representatives, although rejected by the Senate. Erastus Wiman, a successful businessman who emigrated from Canada to New York, saw Commercial Union as outlined in the Hitt Resolution, as bringing enormous stimulation to Canadian growth. He also believed that the relations formed on an economic and social level by a Commercial Union would lead to political union.<sup>83</sup>

The immediate response to Hitt's resolution was a resolution moved in the Canadian House of Commons by Sir Richard Cartwright, a senior Liberal.

---

<sup>81</sup> "The Butterworth Bill" printed in Wiman, E., (ed) *Commercial Union in North America: Some Letters, Papers and Speeches* (Toronto, The Toronto News Co.: 1890)

<sup>82</sup> Quoted in Wiman, E., *The Feasibility of a Commercial Union* (New York, 1889): 13

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid*: 25

That in the present condition of affairs, and in view of the recent action of the House of Representatives of the United States, it is expedient that steps should be taken to ascertain on what terms and conditions arrangements can be effected with the United States for the purpose of securing full and unrestricted reciprocity.<sup>84</sup>

The debate in Ottawa lasted several days, and towards the end the resolution came under strong attack from Henry Cockburn who argued that his discussions with various American politicians led to the conclusion that Canada could only gain unrestricted access to the United States markets if Canada was prepared to give up the British flag. It was Cockburn's sincere wish that he "never live to see that day."

Canada is not for sale. We love our country dearly sir; we are proud of its past, we are hopeful of its future; and come weal or come woe, we are determined to work out our own destiny and we refuse...to exchange the proud title of citizen of the great British Empire for that of any other nationality under heaven.<sup>85</sup>

Cartwright's resolution was defeated on April 6 1888.<sup>86</sup> The above quote highlights the important links between Canadian identity and imperial identity. Canadians were citizens of the British Empire. They were both British and Canadian. The desire to pursue an independent future, free from American interference was seen as an inherently British Canadian trait, a legacy of the flight of the United Empire Loyalists in 1783. But the prestige to be gained from being an important part of the powerful British Empire was vital to the success of the British Canadian idea. Without the Empire, the threat of annexation to the United States was greater. To maintain Canadian identity, it had to be British. National identity depended on imperial identity for its maintenance.

Once again we see national identity mediating and reinforcing imperial identity. In terms of Smith's concentric circles, Canadian national identity is the inner circle that informs the outer circle of imperial identity. To be British in North America was to be Canadian. To maintain Canadian identity against the threat of the United States,

---

<sup>84</sup> Cockburn, H., *Speech on Unrestricted Reciprocity* (Ottawa, 1889): 7

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid*: 14

<sup>86</sup> Tansill, C.C., *Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911* (Peter Smith, Massachusetts: 1964): 408

Canadian identity had to be British. In a sense the two identities were mutually reinforcing.

The Bills introduced in the United States Congress were reported in the United Kingdom and comments regarding the likelihood of Canada being annexed were seized upon by the SHRA as examples of the threat the Empire faced and used to justify the calls for home rule all round and an imperial federation. “The Secession of Canada would be the end of the British Colonial Empire...Canada has been invited to join a United States Zollverein...”<sup>87</sup> The answer was to clear the Imperial Parliament of the domestic business of the United Kingdom and invite representatives from the Empire to sit at Westminster.

In the latter half of 1888 the Joint High Commission agreed measures to resolve the fisheries dispute and to introduce a measure of reciprocity between Canada and the United States. President Cleveland, a Democrat, approved this treaty but a Republican Senate who believed that Canada would seek annexation if reciprocity was not gained blocked its passage.<sup>88</sup> Goldwin Smith’s frustration was evident in a letter to Dr Francis Wharton, solicitor for the United States Department of State, when he wrote,

...so long as there is a majority in the Senate opposed to the political party to which the President belongs, no foreign power can enter into negotiations with the government of the United States; any foreign power which does so will only be exposing itself to certain rebuffs and insults.<sup>89</sup>

Matters, it would appear, were not long in progressing. In a letter to the Editor of the *St Stephen’s Review*, the Treasurer of The National Association for the Preservation of Agriculture and our other Industries, S.W. Poynter, warned of a danger to the Empire from annexationist support within the United States. The letter quotes correspondence from Erastus Wiman to the *Empire* newspaper in Toronto, advising

---

<sup>87</sup> Mitchell, *Home Rule for Scotland and Imperial Federation*: 68

<sup>88</sup> Tansill, *Canadian-American Relations*: 409.

<sup>89</sup> Smith, Goldwin, to Dr Francis Wharton, 7 September, 1888.

of a measure being discussed by the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. “So far have matters progressed,” he advised,

that it is not at all unlikely that a resolution will be reported for the concurrent action of both Houses, declaring it to be the duty of the President to open negotiations with Great Britain looking to political union between the English speaking nations on this continent.<sup>90</sup>

Poynter’s assessment that “the probability of such a programme being carried out may be quite ‘*in nubibus*,’” was accurate. But the existence of the proposition revealed “most clearly a specific danger which we, as a nation, cannot afford to disregard.”<sup>91</sup> He argued in his letter for an imperial federation, a “binding together of the many component parts of our vast possessions into one great Empire”, and warned that in the near future without a closer union, Britain would find herself once more “a small Island in the North Sea...”<sup>92</sup>

On September 10, 1890, the United States Senate passed the McKinley tariff bill, a measure that raised tariffs, with the seemingly paradoxical aim of reducing revenue from duties.<sup>93</sup> At least on the face of it, this was a major defeat in the United States for the Commercial Union movement. Macdonald had attempted through his agents in Washington to gain some reciprocal benefits for coal and lumber in the Bill but the Senate defeated these amendments.<sup>94</sup> The advocates of Commercial Union, however, remained unsure what the results of the bill would be. Robert Hitt, for example, wrote to Goldwin Smith in June 1890 advising

What the effect of the McKinley tariff when in operation will be upon public sentiment in Canada is a problem, whether it will retard by irritation or advance the cause by more clearly demonstrating where lie the material interests of the Canadian artisan, farmer, fisherman, lumberman and miner.<sup>95</sup>

---

<sup>90</sup> The National Association for the Preservation of Agriculture and our other Industries. *Federation or isolation* (London, 1888)

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> Brown, R.C., *Canada’s National Policy 1883-1900: A study in Canadian-American Relations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1964): 193

<sup>94</sup> For fuller discussion of these issues see Brown, *Canada’s National Policy* or Tansill, *Canadian-American relations* both of whom offer full discussions of the tariff debates.

<sup>95</sup> Hitt, Robert, to Goldwin Smith, June 30 1890

Macdonald argued that the real aim of the tariff was to starve Canada into annexation.<sup>96</sup> Grant, likewise, saw in the Tariff, an opportunity for closer trade links with Great Britain and a further reason for supporting imperial federation. He argued that Canada had wasted 10 years asking for reciprocity with no results.<sup>97</sup> The Liberals argued that there was more need than ever to pursue their policy of unrestricted reciprocity.<sup>98</sup>

The election of 1891 marks the turning point in the debate between Continentalists and Imperialists. In 1890 the Liberals had performed well in Provincial elections and there was a sense of optimism among the Continental Unionists dampened only by concerns over the impact of the McKinley Tariff. Robert Hitt wrote to Goldwin Smith of his “personal satisfaction [of] the result of your recent provincial elections, which shows a general growth of liberal sentiment...”<sup>99</sup> Evidently Macdonald was also concerned and decided to fight the election on the grounds of loyalty to Great Britain. “A British subject I was born, a British subject I will die” he cried. Macdonald came out with guns blazing accusing the Liberals of disloyalty on the basis that unrestricted reciprocity with the United States was really just annexation in disguise. Using his old tricks of blackmail, bribery and sheer skulduggery, Macdonald won the election with only a marginally reduced majority.<sup>100</sup>

The election of 1891 can be seen as an endpoint in the debate over Continental Union. Whilst the Liberals mellowed their policy to more free trade, Macdonald pushed for a plan for Imperial preference that never made the House of Commons, due to his death. The depression in the United States in 1893 took all the heat out of the movement especially as the Canadian economy at this time was doing well. The death of the Imperial Federation movement in Britain in the same year created problems for the Canadian movement that reformed as the British Imperial League in 1894. The Liberal victory in the 1897 election and the Republican Dingley tariff in

---

<sup>96</sup> Brown, *Canada's National Policy*: 194

<sup>97</sup> Grant, G.M., *Advantages of Imperial Federation* (Toronto: 1891)

<sup>98</sup> Brown, *Canada's National Policy*: 194

<sup>99</sup> Hitt to Smith, June 30 1890

<sup>100</sup> Brown, *Canada's National Policy*: 206-211

the United States heralded the offer of imperial reciprocity by Laurier and ended any possibility of commercial ties with Canada's southern neighbour.

The debate over the direction of Canadian trade illustrates the nature of imperial nationalism in British Canada. Commercial Union, even unrestricted reciprocity, were seen potential threats to the existence of the Canadian nation. Closer links with the United States were treated with suspicion because of the historic antagonism between them. Imperial nationalists claimed an inevitable result of any customs union with the United States would be political union. Reliance on the imperial connection therefore was the key to maintaining the Canadian nation. The national issue, maintenance of the territory of Canada against perceived American aggression, mediated the articulation of Imperial identity. But the imperial government generally disregarded the interests of Canada when dealing with America. Reform of imperial government, therefore, in the form of an imperial federation was necessary to obtain a voice for Canada in her foreign affairs. National Canadian identity and affairs, the trade dispute, mediated Imperial identity.

We argued in the previous section that Scottish imperial nationalists emphasised their national identity because it was under greatest threat within the United Kingdom state. The articulation of identity being contextual we claimed that the articulation of dual identities must mean the context affects both identities. The relationship between the two identities is dependent on the context. In the context of the trade debates, the emphasis of British Canadian imperial nationalists was on Canada's connection with the Empire. Maintenance of the imperial connection was vital to the security of Canadian territory and therefore to the British Canadian nation. The national context mediated the imperial identity.

#### *Visions of Canada's place within the Empire*

Aside from the economic and military benefits of being a Dominion in the Empire, one of the key themes articulated by British Canadian nationalists was the reflected glory gained by Canada as senior associate of the empire. At the initial meeting of the Imperial Federation League in Canada, Mr Allen of Owen Sound, argued the

objective of the League was to draw “together more closely the bonds of friendship and alliance between Great Britain and her world wide Colonial Empire in which *this Dominion occupies such a conspicuous if not indeed the foremost place.*”<sup>101</sup>

Canada as senior dominion in the Empire could only benefit by association. Jehu Matthews in moving the second resolution of the meeting argued that Imperial Federation was “the policy under which Canada could enjoy greater financial advantages; a greater local independence; and brighter prospects both economically and morally than by any other path open to her.”<sup>102</sup> D’Alton McCarthy, President of the League in Canada, argued on the evening of the first meeting that “We could have no higher ambition or greater aspiration than to become an integral part of that great Empire...”<sup>103</sup> In a similar vein Alex McNeill, M.P. for North Bruce, asked,

Is there to be dreamed of for any nation, a prouder, a more glorious destiny than that she should become one of the most potent factors in the mightiest and noblest Empire ever known to man?<sup>104</sup>

Principal George Grant asked the evening meeting, “is not the one aim and end of the Federation scheme to raise us out of the merely colonial position, and to make full citizens of the grandest state.”<sup>105</sup>

This is a key theme throughout the debates on the future of Canada in this period. Imperialists carried out a cost benefit analysis, or, to use concepts more familiar to political science, Meadwell’s idea of an “enabling” and “constraining” condition.<sup>106</sup> In this case the Empire was used as both by imperial nationalists. The Empire enabled them to develop as a nation, economically and institutionally with the benefit of protection and assistance from Great Britain. Weber’s ‘Prestige of Power’ argument is useful in this context. Canada, as a small nation, in comparison to the United States, gained prestige and power from being an associate of the prestigious

---

<sup>101</sup> IFL, *Imperial Federation League in Canada - Report of First Meeting*: 15 – emphasis added

<sup>102</sup> Ibid: 15

<sup>103</sup> Ibid: 23

<sup>104</sup> Ibid: 31

<sup>105</sup> Ibid: 49

<sup>106</sup> Meadwell, H., “The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec” in *World Politics* 45 (1992): 203-241

British Empire. But the Empire also acted as a constraining condition as Canada did not have full power over foreign relations. This was a crucial aspect of the desire for Imperial Federation as without this control many, including Grant, were unable to see Canada as being independent.

Historically at least, the key critique, and constraint, of the Empire was Canada's relations with the United States. This was linked to the idea of recognition, in this case a lack of recognition by the Imperial Government. Westminster was characterised as ignoring or disregarding Canada's rights, especially territorially. Canada was thus disadvantaged by the actions of the Empire and imperial nationalists threatened independence as a result. The straw that broke the camel's back was the Treaty of Washington in 1871. Several pamphlets were published as a result, berating the Empire for failing to look after Canadian interests, the most stinging from Robert Haliburton, entitled *A Review of British Diplomacy and its fruits*.

The pamphlet was written as a direct reaction to the Treaty of Washington, a treaty between the United States and Great Britain concerning Canada. The treaty included many important provisions but perhaps the most contentious was the right of navigation of the St. Lawrence, a right given in perpetuity. Haliburton's pamphlet is a massive tirade against the Treaty and Britain's treatment of Canada by agreeing to sign the agreement. It sets the negotiations of the treaty in the context of a century of imperial neglect and mismanagement, especially in relation to Canada's relations with the United States. It is one of the few pamphlets issued by one of the Canada First movement that proposes separation from the Empire. But this is only as a reaction to the treaty and a threat if the wrongs of the Treaty are not redressed. Ultimately the sub-title of the pamphlet *The Dream of the United Empire Loyalists of 1776* tells us the writer's true ambitions for Canada and its relations with the Empire.<sup>107</sup>

---

<sup>107</sup> Haliburton, R., *A Review of British Diplomacy and its Fruits* (London, Sampson Low, Marston, Low and Searle: 1872)

This is an excellent example of identity being experiential and contextual. We have already seen that Haliburton, as a United Empire Loyalist supporter, was a keen Imperialist. Likewise we have seen his love of Canada the nation. In this pamphlet, his Canadian credentials come to the fore, as a result of a lack of recognition of Canada's right to determine her future, especially in relation to the United States. Clearly his experience of Imperial Government increased his sense of belonging to Canada.

Despite these failings one of the key visions of the Empire to the British Canadian nationalist was as a motherland. It may seem fairly obvious but the conception of the Empire as the motherland and Canada as a child is found in much of the literature the nationalists produced.<sup>108</sup> This is important because it was this conception of the relationship between Canada and the Empire as mother and child that allowed Canadian nationalists to dream of a Canadian nation. It also highlights the way in which national and imperial identities were reconciled.

As with the concept of Canada as a child, the Empire as a mother has certain connotations: a nursemaid, a protector, defender and nurturer. The most important of these from the nationalists' point of view was the role of defence. Any argument that Canada was not a nation in the immediate post-confederation period due to the imperial tie, must take into account the way Canadian nationalists conceived of the Empire as a defender. Many pamphleteers and speakers outlined the perceived threat of annexation, citing territorial breaches in 1812 and 1866 as evidence. The debate over the country's economic policy in the late 1880s saw Canada as threatened by the Commercial Union movement, a group led by a self confessed annexationist in Professor Goldwin Smith. The idea of an imperial preference, a key idea of the Imperial Federation League in Canada, set the Empire up as the defender of Canada. Canada would be unable to survive without protection of the Empire. The British Empire, for imperial nationalists, having provided support through confederation would protect (nurse?) the fledgling nation whilst it grew into adulthood.

---

<sup>108</sup> See for example, Canniff, W., *Canadian Nationality: Its Growth and Development* (Toronto, Hart & Rawlinson: 1875); Edgar, J.D., *Loyalty: An Address delivered to the Toronto Young Mens Liberal Club* (Toronto: 1885); Grant, G.M., *Canada First* (1890): 263

The importance of the mother/child metaphor to Britannia was discussed in the previous chapter. But the metaphor was also important to the relationship between national and imperial identity. Individual identity, our local culturally rooted identity, mediates all our other identities. But as identity can only exist within societies which regulate those identities, the first society that regulates our individual identity must be the family. We identify ourselves as having a place within that family, one that changes as the family grows and ages. But our family also has a place within a wider society of families. Our individual identity, gained from our familial experiences, mediates our place in the wider society. British Canada was seen as belonging to the family of Britons, who shared the prestige of the Empire in the wider society of nations. The Empire was seen as the most powerful family in the world.

But the Empire was not just seen in a negative sense as a protector (successful or otherwise). It was also Canada's route to recognition. George Denison in the course of his 1871 lecture tour, argued:

I hope the day will come when the British Empire will be united into one great power of confederation of great nations...And rest assured, if we Canadians are only true to ourselves the day will come when Canada will be not only the largest but the most populous, the most warlike and the most powerful of all the members...<sup>109</sup>

Denison clearly displayed both a British imperial identity and a Canadian identity. In attempting to reconcile the two, he claimed Canada's future was as a cornerstone of the Empire, more powerful than the United Kingdom itself. There was no inherent contradiction in this. The family metaphor highlighted above allowed nationalists in Canada to see the Empire as a family that grew and aged. As the colonies grew up, so their relative positions in the Empire would change. It was inevitable given the resources of Canada that the possibility of being more powerful than the metropolis one day would be mentioned. By being true to themselves Canadians would gain the recognition they desired from nations on the world scene. Being true to themselves,

---

<sup>109</sup> Denison, G.T., *The Duty of Canadians to Canada* (1871)

for Denison and British Canadian nationalists at least, meant the maintenance of the imperial connection.

The way Canadian national identity mediated imperial identity is clear in this view of Canada as a member of the Imperial family. The experience of empire was seen through Canadian eyes. The future strength of the Empire was measured in terms of the future strength of Canada. Despite being *British* Canadians, the foundation of their identity was Canadian. The inner concentric circle was Canadian identity and built upon this was British imperial identity.

Looking at the Empire through Canadian eyes, George Grant, one of the most prolific writers in support of Imperial Federation, spelt out why the prestige of the Empire was so great. Grant's sense of belonging to the Empire was in part a desire to belong to the greatest civilising mission the world has ever seen:

The Empire to which we belong is admittedly the greatest the world has ever seen ...Is it to be thought that we would separate from such a flag, still less place our country in a position of antagonism to it? Think what it has always represented – personal and national freedom; civil and commercial, intellectual and religious freedom; righteousness in private and public affairs and the proclamation of eternal life to every son of Adam.<sup>110</sup>

The tolerance and libertarianism of the Empire highlighted by Grant is typical of the view held of the Empire in the nineteenth century. The British Empire brought tolerance, free trade, civilisation and of course religion to the “savages”. The Empire was depicted as representing “the highest ideals of any political organization the world has known”. Words and phrases such as magnanimous, peace, freedom, righteousness, honourable, “loftiest plane of political action” and so on were all used in connection with the Empire, especially by Grant. Why on earth would Canada want to end that connection?

Admittedly all empires think they are the greatest the world has ever seen. The difference here was that the British Empire was undoubtedly the largest. The sun

---

<sup>110</sup> Grant, G.M, *The Case for Canada* (London, 1889): 16

never set on the British Empire. The mission of the British Race, to spread liberal values throughout the world and bring peace, the *Pax Britannica*, led, in Grants' words, "virile, aggressive, self-governing communities which, though possessing the strength and almost every attribute of youthful nations," to see, "in their unity with each other and the mother country, the prospect of a nobler future than could be expected, were they to form separate states."<sup>111</sup> The Empire was seen as something more than just Britain and Canada. It was a union of the British *race*, Britannia, of the self-governing colonies and dominions that had been born of British imperialism. Something "different from and greater than the United Kingdom."<sup>112</sup> By the end of the century then, in Canada at least, the Empire was conceived of "as allied nations in one indivisible commonwealth."<sup>113</sup>

The key to understanding the desire of the British Canadian nationalists is in the conception of a future federation of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Britain. An Imperial federation would see Canada as an equal to Britain, thus giving Canadian identity the recognition craved by Imperial nationalists. As with the trade debates, both national and imperial identities were highlighted in the above discussion. In this context, however, it was the illegitimacy of the multi-national Empire that was important. Failure to recognise Canadian interests in Imperial dealings with the United States sent a clear signal to Canada's significant other that America was seen as the more important of the two. Independence was not an option for Canada. The threat of annexation without the Empire for support was too great. The only solution, for imperial nationalists at least, was reform of imperial government to allow Canadian interests a voice.

Multi-national empires rely on legitimacy for their continued maintenance. Without legitimacy nationalist challenges to the state are likely. But when a imperial identity exists alongside a national identity, as in Canada, the nationalist challenge will focus on reform of the existing structures of government. A discourse critical of the empire

---

<sup>111</sup> Grant, G.M, "The British Empire Today and Tomorrow: I The Growing Sentiment in Favour of Imperial Unity and the Contributions to its Growth by Canadians." Printed in *The Westminster* 6 November 1897: 353

<sup>112</sup> Ibid: 353

<sup>113</sup> Ibid: 355

will be articulated expressing both a national and imperial identity. The relationship between these identities is context dependent. The context may affect both the national and imperial identity in different measures. In Canada, the context of imperial mismanagement of affairs with America affected both British Canadian and Imperial identity. National interests, Canadian territorial relations with America, mediated imperial identity.

### ***Imperial Federation as a solution to British Canadian Nationalism***

In September 1889, Principal George Grant, continuing the fight against Commercial Union, delivered a lecture in Winnipeg outlining his case for Imperial Federation. In this lecture Grant argued, “The making of Canada into a nation has been a long process and the process is not yet ended.”<sup>114</sup> Grant saw the process ending in one of two ways, a closer imperial relationship or the disintegration of the British Empire.

Canada cannot continue as a mere dependency. Clearly that is impossible. No living organism can continue long in a condition of arrested development. It must grow to its full stature or petrify.<sup>115</sup>

Grant’s vision of the future of Canada revolved around closer imperial ties, i.e., imperial federation. Federation would enable Canada to have her fair share in the management and responsibilities of common affairs.<sup>116</sup> This was a theme that Grant had spoken of at the inaugural meeting of the league. He strongly believed that for Canada to progress to full membership of the Empire she must share responsibility for the running and costs involved.

You may say that Britain does not demand this of us, that at present we gain by her generosity. And these are the arguments of men of honour, of grown men! They are willing to be wards as long as they possibly can, to accept rations as long as they are offered...I demand the privileges of a fully grown man, and first of all the privilege of paying my own way.<sup>117</sup>

---

<sup>114</sup> Grant, G.M, *The Case for Canada*: 1

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid*: 2

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid*: 116

<sup>117</sup> IFL, *Imperial Federation League in Canada - Report of the First Meeting*: 51

This idea of Canada growing into adulthood is a common theme among the writings of the Imperial Federation League and had been used in the past by members of Canada First. Canada was seen here as the child of Great Britain whose maternalistic protection saves her ward from the evil intentions of the United States. Grant in a lecture to the Canadian Club in New York on Canada First outlined this position clearly. “A baby when attacked, runs to its mother apron strings, and though the fault may be wholly its own, the responsibility is principally the mothers”<sup>118</sup> Grant believed that talk of war with the United States was met by the laidback attitude that the Empire would protect the Dominion, but as soon as there was talk of contributing towards the cost of the Imperial defence costs the attitude became one of the Empire only used the Imperial Navy for Britain’s protection and her commercial supremacy. “Is that not the baby’s attitude?” Grant asked.<sup>119</sup> The use of the family metaphor, although negative, again highlights the way national identity mediated imperial identity in Canada. In order for Canada to survive as a nation, the imperial connection had to be maintained, but with Canada taking a place in the government of the Empire.

Grant’s desire was for Canada to attain a place in the history of nations and this could only be done through Imperial Federation.

...by Imperial Federation we would gain full self government, and with it self respect and that only by this method would we gain our rightful place in the history of the world, the place, to which our historical evolution points.<sup>120</sup>

This is typical of the arguments of British Canadian imperial nationalists and highlights the importance of prestige, honour and recognition in imperial nationalist discourse. The general argument of Taylor and Weber, that states and nations see themselves as part of a hierarchical world order and the desire to be recognised as being in the top echelon of nations, is clearly expressed in Grant’s quote. Not only would Canada from imperial federation gain in terms of the legitimacy of imperial

---

<sup>118</sup> Grant, G., *Canada First*: 257

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid*: 257

<sup>120</sup> Grant, *The Case for Canada*: 15

governance but it would also bring recognition of Canada's place as a partner in the British Empire and therefore an important force in the world.

In a similar vein to Grant's *The Case for Canada*, J. Castell Hopkins, outlined the problems of not maintaining closer links with the Empire. In what, at the time, must have seemed a very powerful argument, Castell Hopkins argued that independence would result in annexation. "Independence in our case would mean the most complete isolation from British power, protection, or influence, and as complete dependence upon the will of the United States of America."<sup>121</sup>

Independence, however, would also mean that Canada would need to fully develop the machinery of the state, an efficient navy to protect coastal fisheries, a standing army, not to mention a foreign and diplomatic service. Although the problems of debt, defence and commerce are more related to the state, in modern politics, than the nation, in Castell Hopkins' view the two were intimately related. He argued, like Grant before him, that only through Imperial Federation could Canada achieve her full status as a nation.

The principle we desire to clearly express is that when the people of this Dominion are prepared to assume national burdens and receive national privileges, they should do so in conjunction with the Mother Country, receiving power from her prestige, and giving additional strength to her world wide system.<sup>122</sup>

Canada would benefit from an imperial federation by closer association with the Empire. By the implicit acknowledgement that Canada was an equal of Scotland, Wales, England or Ireland, there would be an increased confidence in Canadian identity. This recognition would increase Canada's standing on the world stage. But the Empire would also benefit from Canada remaining in the Empire. The recently completed Canadian Pacific Railway connected the Pacific with the Atlantic and formed an important contribution to imperial defences.

---

<sup>121</sup> Castell Hopkins, J., *Canada and the Empire* (1890): 16

<sup>122</sup> Ibid : 20

The argument for Imperial Federation existed on established British principles of constitutional democracy, that “where important interests exist there should be some form or other of representation.”<sup>123</sup> Imperial Federation was, therefore, only the logical outcome of the British constitutional development. But one final call to arms was required.

What then, are Canadians going to do? Shall we sacrifice our British principles, our allegiance to a constitutional sovereign, our national birthright and traditions for a spurious and brief independence, or for the privilege of being absorbed by a neighbouring nation? Shall we not rather adhere to the past, preserve its memories and conserve its glories while building up an edifice of national greatness which shall have for its basis imperial unity and equality, and for its final consummation a share in power so great, in prosperity so unprecedented in peace so secure and in an Empire so wide and far reaching in extent...<sup>124</sup>

The series of quotes above clearly outline the way in which Canadian and Imperial identities were reconciled by nationalists in Canada. Without the Empire, Canada would not have the security or the finances required to build a great nation. The border with the United States and the choices that had been made historically to remain British were vitally important to a sense of what being Canadian meant. To be Canadian, for British Canadian nationalists at least, was to be British. The British connection meant the success of Canada. Therefore to be a British North American was to be Canadian. The two identities were mutually reinforcing. There was still an emphasis on being Canadian, as we would expect if the national identity was to be the foundation of nationalist discourse. The success of Canada was the focus. For Canada to be successful, however, meant the Empire had to remain intact. The reform of imperial government was seen as the best way of achieving the success of Canada. National identity and national concerns mediated imperial identity and imperial concerns. The inner circle of national identity was the foundation for the outer circle of imperial identity.

---

<sup>123</sup> Ibid: 28

<sup>124</sup> Ibid: 32

### ***Reconciling Identities – the Comparisons***

The final section of this chapter will bring together some of the key themes from the discussions above of the ways in which elites reconciled the articulation of both a national and an imperial identity. Identity defines our roles in society. But it also informs our judgement of the benefits and drawbacks in belonging to a particular society. The discussions were included to indicate that in some cases what may be taken as a commitment to the Empire, or the Union, was in fact merely a utilitarian decision based on the benefits to the individual or group. Having said that, there is no doubt that over a longer term the combined benefits of the Union and/or Empire would ensure that a stronger commitment would result. The lack of extended discussion by the SHRA of the benefits of the Union and Empire to Scots could be taken to mean there were no benefits. It is argued here, however, that in fact the lack of discussion meant the Union and Empire were not up for discussion. The importance of both the Union and the Empire to Scottish identity was taken for granted. There was no need for the SHRA to tell its audience what was obvious. The discourse of the SHRA showed the extent to which being Scottish and belonging to the Empire was mutually reinforcing. The solution offered to the problems outlined by the SHRA was two-fold, solving both the problems of Scotland and the Empire. To an extent these problems were seen as being one and the same. If the empire faced problems so did Scotland and vice versa.

Imperial nationalists in Canada were more likely to outline the benefits of remaining within the Empire. But rather than them being articulated in the manner of a rational choice argument, the Empire was seen as an integral part of Canadian identity. Canada could not survive outside the Empire, they argued. Some within the United States had made overt moves to tempt annexation, as had some in Canada. Canadian identity historically was based on British principles of government and culture, therefore any attempt to annex Canada to the United States, which had specifically rejected those principles would be an anathema. Being British and being Canadian again was seen as one and the same thing. The Canadian experience of the Empire might not have been perfect but Canadian identity gained strength and prestige from being imperial, i.e., British.

The key theme to emerge from the above discussion of contexts was the threat posed to national and imperial identities. We mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that we would expect to see multiple contexts when multiples identities are displayed. After all if, as has been argued, identity is gained by experiencing the world, context must be important in the articulation of identity. There is no doubt there were multiple contexts at work in the background. But one context dominated in Scotland and another in Canada. In both Scotland and Canada the dominant context still brought both national and imperial identities into imperial nationalist discourse. We highlighted that this was because the context was seen to affect both of these different identities. In our analysis of the solutions presented to imperial nationalist antagonisms, we saw that the emphasis of home rule all round in Scotland and imperial federation in Canada highlighted which of the two identities was most under threat. The relationship between the two identities, however, did not change. National identity mediated imperial identity.

In Scotland, the Irish problem and Gladstone's conversion to Irish Home Rule dominated the writings of the SHRA. Home Rule all round and imperial federation were presented as the solution to the problem. Home rule all round as a solution to the threat to Scottish identity can be understood in the context of the *Politics of Recognition*, as we have seen in previous chapters. Imperial Federation as a solution to the Irish problem, however, requires some more analysis. Ireland outside the Union would have posed a threat to the Empire. Giving Home Rule to Ireland alone would eventually lead to Irish separation. An important element of *being Scottish* in the 1880s was *being imperialist*. Any threat to the Empire was a threat to Scottish identity. Although only one context, the Irish problem provided a threat/challenge to both Scottish and Imperial identity, hence the two-fold response to the threat by the SHRA.

In Canada, the trade debates of the 1880s formed the backdrop to the activities of the IFL in Canada. The proposed solution to the perceived threat of the annexation of Canada to the United States was closer imperial ties through an imperial federation.

This time the solution makes sense when viewed from an imperial point of view. Canada, a key Dominion within the empire, provided a fast communication route to the Australian colonies via the CPR. We know from the Imperial Conference of 1887 that this was an important part of imperial defences.<sup>125</sup> To understand the importance of the trade debates on Canadian identity requires some more analysis. As we argued above, annexation was seen as the subjugation of Canadian national identity under a “foreign” power, the United States. To maintain and strengthen Canadian national identity meant that everything American was seen as immoral, impure and unprincipled. Various defects were noted in American public life, such as Presidential rule, legislative methods, divorce laws and morals, the elective judiciary and a lack of respect for the law.<sup>126</sup> Canadian institutions, laws and institutions, based as they were on British designs were seen as superior in every way. Maintaining Canadian identity on the North American continent meant emphasising the British-ness of Canada. This was done through the Imperial connection. In North America to be British was to be Canadian and to be Canadian was to be British. There was, therefore, no inherent contradiction between the national and the imperial identities.

Both Scottish and Canadian identities shared the commitment to Empire. There was no inherent difference, for the imperial nationalists at least, between being Scottish or Canadian and identifying with the Empire. One key reason for this must be the existence of the Scottish and British Diasporas. It was noted above that the Scottish Diaspora legitimised the Union. The implication of this is that without the Union, Scots would not have had access to Empire. The Empire, therefore, legitimised the Union. The Scottish Diaspora benefited from the Empire which provided opportunity for all classes of Scots. Scots abroad took an interest in events at home and those at home took an interest, and were proud, of their compatriots abroad. In Canada the high numbers of British expatriates tried to ensure Canadian identity remained British. We argued above that the debate over the direction of Canadian trade was

---

<sup>125</sup> IFL in Canada, *Speeches delivered at the Public Meeting held at Toronto*: 9

<sup>126</sup> Castell Hopkins, J., “Canadian Hostility to Annexation” in *The Forum* Vol XVI (November 1893) reprinted in Berger, C., (ed) *Imperialism and Nationalism 1884-1914: A conflict in Canadian Thought* (Toronto, The Copp Clark Publishing Co.: 1969): 39

perceived by Imperial Nationalists as a debate over Canada's survival as a nation. The IFL in Canada saw the Dominion as a British child. The defeat of the Commercial Unionists was seen as a success for the maintenance of British Canadian identity.

The existence of the Diaspora and Canada's status as a Dominion settled largely by Britons meant both Scotland and Canada had a British identity, one essentially based on the existence of the Empire. Both, however, had specific national concerns that were articulated in the rhetoric of nationalism. Scotland had concerns over the failure of Westminster to pass much needed Scottish legislation. Canada had concerns over the absence of a Canadian voice in foreign affairs affecting the Dominion. Both of these concerns were nationalist in character. A British imperial identity prevented these issues developing into movements for separation from the Union or the Empire.

### ***Conclusion***

We began this chapter by claiming that if, as we suggested in Chapter two, identity was experiential and contextual, we would expect to see imperial nationalism take different forms in Scotland and British Canada. Although the symbols, history and future of the Empire would be shared by all Britons, their local experiences would affect the way a dual national and imperial identity were articulated in imperial nationalist discourse.

Our analysis of both cases showed this was the case. Imperial nationalism in Scotland was much more implicit than it had been in British Canada. In Scotland the focus of imperial nationalist discourse was the reform of the United Kingdom state to allow for national parliaments for each of the home nations. There was little discussion of the Empire, save in one or two key pamphlets. The policy of the SHRA and some of the IFL was for the maintenance of the imperial connection and reform of imperial government. This has been taken to show that imperial identity was maintained through what Michael Bilig called 'Banal Nationalism'. The Empire was a way of life, a non-negotiable aspect of being Scottish.

In Canada, the focus of imperial nationalist discourse was reform of imperial government to allow Canada a voice in its own foreign affairs and also imperial affairs. There was no real discussion of Canadian government, other than as a focus for Canadian identity. Canadian identity was non-negotiable. The maintenance of Canadian identity, however, depended on the Imperial connection and Canada gaining a voice in the Imperial Parliament. Without this voice Canadian interests in relation to the United States could not be heard effectively.

Both cases highlighted the extent to which national identity gained in prestige from the Empire. The power of Empire, particularly in Africa and Asia, gave it tremendous prestige in world society. Imperial identity in both Scotland and Canada emphasised the need to maintain that prestige through imperial federation based on Britannia. Weber argued that prestige comes from power. States, and we argued nations as well, prefer smaller less powerful neighbours. As small nations, in relation to their neighbours, both Scotland and Canada would be unable to gain the prestige of power in their own right. The only way they could gain this prestige was through the powerful British Empire. National identity was reinforced by the power gained from belonging to the Empire.

The relationship between national and imperial identities was the same in both Scotland and British Canada. National issues, whether the Anglicisation of the United Kingdom, Irish Home Rule, the Trade debates in Canada, or antagonism of British Canadians towards Westminster, all resulted in the articulation of imperial nationalist discourse. The context for imperial identity was national. Imperial nationalists thus reconciled national and imperial identities by mediating imperial identity through national identity. Imperial identity was used to strengthen national identity.

The visual model of concentric rings that we introduced in Chapter two is particularly useful. The outer ring of imperial identity depends on the existence of the inner ring of national identity. Identities exist within societies. Each larger society regulates the relationship between smaller identities. International relations

provided the context for imperial identity. Imperial relations provided the context for national identity. The joint context for imperial nationalism was found at the point where international relations and imperial relations met.

## **Chapter Seven**

### **Conclusion**

The aim of this final chapter is to bring together the theory of imperial nationalism and the analysis of the substantive chapters. Following a logical review of the argument of the thesis the chapter will outline what we have learned about the two cases and their political and historical contexts, highlighting their historical specificity. It will also examine what this suggests more generally about the legitimacy of nationalisms within complex multi-level political systems. The concept of multi-level governance nationalism will be introduced as the modern equivalent of imperial nationalism. The position of Scotland and Canada today in their European and North American contexts will also be considered.

We began this thesis by asking the following question. Are nationalism and imperialism antithetical concepts or can they be expressed simultaneously in nationalist discourse? Traditionally, we argued academics have seen nations as entities that break away from empires. There have been few investigations of the desire of some nations to remain within an empire but with more autonomy, as was the case in Scotland and British Canada at the end of the nineteenth century. By gaining a better understanding of the relationship between nations and empires we will better understand the relations between nations and supra-national institutions in multi-level governance. The way in which dual identities are reconciled can also inform the contemporary political world. The relationship between nations and supra-national institutions can be illuminated by an examination of the attitude of nationalists toward empire. The concept of imperial nationalism has uses beyond its application to Scotland and British Canada.

#### ***Restating the Problem***

The question of whether nationalism and imperialism are antithetical concepts has its roots in Gellner's assertion that "political systems which combine cultural pluralism with a persisting inequality between cultures are doomed, in virtue of their violation

of the nationalist principle...”<sup>1</sup> Multi-ethnic empires, according to this statement, are incompatible with “a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.”<sup>2</sup> Yet in identifying cases where nationalists wanted to remain within the empire this thesis has sought to revise this traditional view of nationalism and imperialism. Central to this revision lies the issue of legitimacy. What form of government is considered legitimate by the people, by the nation? Under what circumstances is it acceptable for nations to remain within a larger multi-ethnic political system, such as empires? These circumstances were conceptualised through the term imperial nationalism.

### ***Imperial Nationalism – Theory and Practice***

Although the phrase imperial nationalism has been used before by Krishnan Kumar, to name but one, it has been used here in a different context.<sup>3</sup> Kumar used the phrase to indicate the extent to which English nationalism was driven by imperialism. The mission of the English nation was imperial hence the alternative term ‘missionary nationalism’ was also used by Kumar. The term ‘imperial nationalism’ has been used in this thesis to indicate a political discourse that is at one and the same time nationalist and imperialist. In contrast to anti-colonial nationalism, which suggests the break-away of the nation from the empire, imperial nationalism involves proposals to reform imperial government for the benefit of the nation *and* the empire.

The basis of imperial nationalism is the idea that nationalism is a matter of political legitimacy, rather than the simple notion that nations and states should be congruent. Nationalism is a political expression of the relationship between recognition of identity, democracy and the legitimacy of government. Where potentially illegitimate states i.e. multi-national states, exist, the question of legitimate government becomes important to minority nationalists when non or mis-recognition of their identity results in a failure to adequately represent the interests of the nation. Independence is not an inevitable outcome of minority nationalism. Nationalism will only become

---

<sup>1</sup> Gellner, E., *Nationalism* (London, Phoenix: 1997): 104

<sup>2</sup> Gellner, E., *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell: 1983): 1

<sup>3</sup> Kumar, K., “Nation and empire: English and British national identity in comparative perspective” in *Theory and Society Vol 29* (2000)

important when the interests of the minority identity are not recognised. The aim of nationalism in many of these cases will be to reform the existing government in favour of the minority nation, rather than declaring outright independence. Nationalism as a theory of political legitimacy then is not antithetical to imperialism provided the imperial government recognises the interests of its subjects.

Scottish nationalism conformed to this basic model of minority nationalism. Despite the failure of Westminster to adequately legislate for Scotland throughout the early 1880s, there were only vague mutterings of the reinstatement of a Scottish Parliament. The focus of nationalist activity was on the campaign for a Scottish Secretary. Only after Gladstone introduced his bill for Irish Home Rule did Scottish nationalist activity turn its attention to the idea of Scottish Home Rule. The Scottish Home Rule Association acknowledged this debt to Irish Home Rule but consistently argued that Scotland's legislative problems were just as great as Ireland's. Recognition of Irish identity by Gladstone was perceived as not only undemocratic and a potential source of illegitimacy but as an insult to the honour and dignity of Scottish identity. The lack of attention to Scottish affairs and the dominance of English MPs in Parliament were noted as further causes of an illegitimate system of government. This could only be rectified by the creation of a Scottish Parliament.

British Canadian nationalism also followed this model, although the context was very different. British Canadian nationalists perceived their position on the North American continent to be threatened by the United States. The boundary symbols revolved around invasions by their southern neighbour that were repelled by Canadians. The discourse of British Canadian nationalists, such as Canada First, therefore, revolved around imperial recognition of Canada's interests in North America. The reaction to the Treaty of Washington, in which the United States gained important concessions from Britain, at the expense of Canadians, was symptomatic of the general feeling that Britain did not recognise Canadian identity when dealing with the United States. The illegitimacy of the system of imperial government was all the greater given the anomaly between Canadian control of domestic affairs but lack of influence over foreign affairs.

Imperialism, of course, is usually pursued by states seeking to expand their territories through domination and exploitation. The interests of colonists are not always important to imperial authorities, as we can see from the above. In order to maintain empire, however, imperial authorities need to collaborate with colonists. This is all the easier in settler empires where emigrants from the home nation(s) take the values and culture with them to the new territories. In these cases the maintenance of empire rather than being antithetical to the creation of a new nation is sometimes seen by small nations as beneficial. The geopolitical approaches to imperialism taken by Weber and Reynolds, highlight the importance of prestige and security. This can be just as important to small nations remaining within empires as the economic benefits.

Scottish nationalists approach to the Empire reflected these concerns, although they were more implicit in their imperialism than British Canadian nationalists. The desire for recognition of the Empire as the most powerful force in the world was an important factor in the schemes for Imperial Federation. The Empire faced numerous challenges around the world. The Empire, however, had to maintain its superior position in world affairs. The aim was to bring peace by creating the most powerful state in the world. Nationalists used the symbol of the national mission to spread peace, civilisation and the protestant religion to legitimate the various proposals for closer imperial union. As important, however, was the use of this symbol as a signifier of a Britannic identity shared by Britons throughout the Empire. The SHRA discourse claimed imperial government was no longer capable of dealing with the challenges facing Britannia, particularly as the bonds of the imperial relationship among Britons were so weak. The only way to meet the geopolitical challenges faced was to reform the imperial state and allow representatives of the settler dominions to sit in the Imperial Parliament.

The discourse of British Canadian nationalists also reflected these concerns, although once again the context was different. The threat of the United States, highlighted in the nationalism of Canada First and the Imperial Federation League in Canada, lent urgency to demands for reform of imperial government. British Canadian nationalists

were explicit in their imperialism. Again, however, the rhetoric of the mission of Britannia, to spread civilisation and peace was apparent. The recognition of the Empire as pre-eminent on the world stage was also vital to British Canadian nationalists. The shared sense of Britannic identity was expressed in the vision of Canada as a child of the Empire, sharing Britain's fears, hopes and desires. Strength, prestige and protection of the Empire, and therefore Canada, would only come through increased unity between the settler dominions and the mother country. Again the proposals revolved around imperial federation, allowing Canadians a place in the Imperial Parliament and a say in the affairs of the Empire as British subjects.

Nationalists in Scotland and British Canada, then, clearly articulated both a nationalist and an imperialist discourse. Imperial nationalism seeks to reform the internal workings of the empire for the benefit of the nation, whilst maintaining the power and honour of the empire. According to this definition, we can also argue that Scottish and British Canadian nationalists were imperial nationalists. Both wanted to reform imperial government, whether by home rule all round and/or imperial federation, for the benefit of their respective nations and argued that these measures would not only benefit the nation but would maintain and enhance the power and strength of the British Empire. The final piece of the puzzle is how imperial nationalists reconciled the two aspects of their discourse.

### *Reconciling the imperial and the national in imperial nationalism*

An important argument throughout this thesis has been that identity is experiential and contextual. With each increasing level of identity, from local to national and beyond, we simplify these identities through symbols. But each smaller identity informs our understanding of the greater identity. Based on this argument we would expect national identity to mediate imperial identity. Using the visual model of concentric circles we would expect the centre ring of national identity to inform the broader ring of imperial identity. If identity is expressed in response to a certain context, and two identities, national and imperial are expressed in the same discourse, we must argue that there are either two separate contexts simultaneously challenging national and imperial identity, or one context that affects both identities.

In Scotland, Irish Home Rule posed a challenge to Scotland's place within the Union and, therefore, the Empire. Within this context, the importance of the Empire to Scottish nationalists' sense of Scotland's place in the world became apparent. Without the Empire, Scotland would not have the prestige it had belonging to the greatest empire of the age. Yet, Scottish imperial nationalists also valued Scotland's contribution to the Empire, particularly militarily, but also in the work of the Scottish Diaspora. The perception was that giving Ireland home rule alone, as Gladstone proposed, would eventually lead to Irish independence. The potential threat to the Empire this would create was unacceptable. The importance of Scotland's place in the Union, and thereby the Empire, meant the Irish Home Rule proposals created a twin challenge to Scottish national and imperial identity. The resultant discourse focussed heavily on Irish Home Rule in its critique of Westminster rule. The challenge to Scottish identity was still mediated through national identity, hence the reason Scots were implicit imperial nationalists.

In Canada, the threat of the United States was the all important context that challenged both Canadian and Imperial identity. An important part of this discourse was the founding myth of British Canada: the flight of the United Empire Loyalists, although defence against perceived American aggression was also a factor. British Canadians used the United States as a foil and contrast in their creation of the symbolic boundaries that differentiated them from their American cousins. Not only was the United States set up as an "aggressive and grasping country" but their political system, values and origins were contrasted with those of Canadians, "the true men of the North." The threat of the United States, however, was not just seen in terms of a threat to Canada. It was also seen as a threat to Canada's place within the Empire and therefore the Empire itself. Without the Empire, Canada's provinces would only ever be another state in the Union. The Empire, however, provided Canada with the opportunity to develop as a nation and contribute to the greatest Empire of the age. Through the Empire lay Canada's claims to prestige. Through the Empire lay the key to Canada's survival as a nation. Again, national identity mediated and reinforced imperial identity.

### ***The Historical Specificity of Imperial Nationalism***

Although the aim of this thesis has been to gain a general theoretical understanding of why minority nationalisms would want to embed themselves within larger political systems, it has also been made clear that the cases we have examined are influenced by a very specific set of historical and political circumstances. This section will briefly examine what we have learned about these two cases and their political-historical context whilst the following section will analyse what this suggests more generally about the legitimacy of nationalisms within complex multi-level political systems.

Earlier chapters comprehensively examined the reasons for nationalist activity in both Scotland and British Canada, arguing that the lack of recognition of Scottish and British Canadian identity led to a failure by Westminster to recognise national interests which in turn created a system of government that was illegitimate in the eyes of the nationalist groups. In Scotland, the perceived insult to Scottish identity created by Gladstone's proposal for Irish Home Rule and the lack of parliamentary time created by the focus on Irish nationalism was an important context. In Canada, the failure to recognise the interests of Canada in Britain's dealings with the United States created nationalist antagonism toward Imperial Rule. Yet in both cases independence from Westminster rule was neither desired nor mentioned. A further factor, therefore, must have been at work. For this we must turn to the international context.

Following the collapse of the Concert of Europe, tensions between Europe's leading powers increased. The nature of the balance of power in Europe changed as a result of German unification and the subsequent imperial ambitions of both Germany and Russia. Britain until the late 1870s had enjoyed a near hegemonic imperial position. Britain ruled the waves with the tacit acceptance of the rest of Europe. German and Russian threats to that near hegemony in the 1880s meant that Britain was no longer able to maintain the informal imperial relationship it had enjoyed with colonies up to that point. From the late 1870s tensions increased with Russian incursions into

Afghanistan, which threatened India, the jewel in the crown of the British Empire. Diplomatic relations with Russia were also severely tested in disputes over the Ottoman Empire, which Britain supported as a crucial land link to India. Tensions over imperial possessions in North Africa, particularly Egypt, and the need for British control (or at least not French control) of the Suez Canal led to deteriorating relations with France. The Scramble for Africa, spearheaded by the rapidly expanding German Empire, rapidly brought Britain into conflict with Belgium and France as well as Germany. In addition, diplomatic relations with the United States had been strained following British support for the Confederates in the American Civil War. The competition faced during this period is the key to understanding the imperialism of nationalists during this period. At no other point in the history of the Empire had competition from rival powers been as intense or diplomatic tension so great.

The specific form the British Empire had taken following the recognition of the rights to British subjects abroad to responsible government meant that the bonds of Empire had been loosened to a great extent. The idea of imperial federation, supported by nationalists in both Scotland and British Canada, was intended to strengthen those bonds and therefore strengthen the Empire against the challenges posed by America and the European powers. At the same time, however, the nationalism displayed was intended to strengthen the positions of both Scotland and British Canada within the Empire, with the added benefit that their increased strength would enable the Empire to better meet the challenges it faced.

In Scotland, the proposals for Irish Home Rule to the Empire Scots had done so much to create were unacceptable at a time of such diplomatic uncertainty, particularly as Ireland had previously been the arena for a thwarted attempt by French forces to invade Britain. But proposals to grant Home Rule to Ireland alone were seen as attempts to both destabilise the Empire and create an illegitimate system of government within the United Kingdom. Proposals for Home Rule all round and Imperial Federation were put forward as solutions to both strengthen Scotland's position within the United Kingdom and the Empire itself.

In Canada, the nationalist discourse focussed on the bond with Empire and the failure on a number of occasions of the Empire to recognise the rights of Canada when dealing with the United States. Control over Canadian foreign affairs became the key goal of nationalist groups. Yet control was sought through closer ties with the Empire in which Canada would have greater say in all imperial matters, not just those affecting Canadian relations with the United States. The proposals for Imperial Federation were again put forward as of benefit to both Canada and the Empire.

The specific national and international contexts found in Scotland and British Canada were clearly vital in shaping the nature of the nationalist discourse articulated by nationalist groups. Without the challenges the Empire faced there may have been no illegitimate system of government in the United Kingdom. Westminster may have had sufficient time to adequately deal with the Irish problem without Parnell having to resort to obstructionism and land wars. Canadians may have had less need to have control over foreign affairs and the informal nature of the imperial relationship may have been perfectly adequate. But this is speculation. The fact is the Empire for the first time in its history faced multiple challenges from a range of rivals in Europe and America. These challenges certainly contributed to the lack of Parliamentary time available for Scottish and Irish affairs. The decision of Gladstone to pursue Irish matters first merely added to the frustration of Scottish nationalists. They reacted to the contexts they faced at the time and proposed reform of the political system that would benefit both Scotland and the Empire. In strengthening one the other would be likewise strengthened. British Canadian nationalists were more concerned about strengthening the imperial bond between Westminster and the white settler colonies among which Canada was pre-eminent. Strengthening this bond would enable Canada to develop as a nation and, more particularly, secure her position as a nation on the North American continent next to, not annexed by, the United States. Imperial Federation was as much a matter of security for Canada as it was prestige.

The two cases, however, also shared an imperial identity, expressed through the imperial mission of the *Pax Britannica*, the symbols of the Queen and Protestant

religion. The prestige of these small nations belonging to the almighty British Empire was an important element in the contexts mentioned above. The British Empire was worth belonging to because of this shared identity. It was, therefore, worth protecting and strengthening against the new challenges it faced from rival powers.

### ***Moving Beyond Historical Specificity – Nationalism within Systems of Multi-Level Governance***

Throughout this thesis and the above review of the development of the idea of imperial nationalism, the central problem of the apparent theoretical incompatibility of nationalism and imperialism has been challenged. We began by revising Gellner's definition of nationalism. By viewing nationalism as a matter of political legitimacy, who is best equipped to govern the nation and what form of political system is most effective, we were able to argue that nationalism does not necessarily mean independence from the state. In accepting this definition of nationalism, it becomes possible for nationalists within a multi-ethnic system of multi-level governance, such as the British Empire, to argue for reform of the system without asserting independence from that system.

Where nationalists argue a system of government is no longer legitimate the solutions proposed in their discourse will depend on a number of factors, including economic benefits, security, identity, geo-political position, relative strength and so on. The benefits of remaining within the larger political system may outweigh the benefits of declaring independence, yet require reform of the existing system to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of the nation. We saw in our review above that prestige, shared imperial identity and security were key factors in the imperial nationalist discourse in Scotland and British Canada.

The aim of the thesis, however, has been to improve our general understanding of nationalism. We must, therefore, examine the implications of our understanding of these historically specific cases for nationalism in the modern world. Can the principles of imperial nationalism be applied to nationalisms which aim to embed

themselves within supra-national organisations or complex systems of multi-level governance?

Firstly it should be made clear that there are clear differences between complex multi-level political systems in the modern day compared to the Empires of the late nineteenth century. Imperial identity is clearly lacking in a supra-national political system such as the European Union (EU). There is far less populist involvement in the creation of such an institution. The sense of exploration and adventure in the creation and maintenance of Empire is missing. In short, there is far less popular enthusiasm for modern multi-level government than there was for Empire.

The sense of superiority involved in imperial mission is also missing from modern day political systems such as the EU. There is no desire to conquer territory and people, a key aspect of the definition of empire. Take away some of these key elements of empire, such as identity and superiority, and empires, in their essentials, are complex systems of multi-level government. We can apply the lessons learned from our examination of Scottish and British Canadian imperial nationalism to the modern world.

The key to understanding imperial nationalism as it has been presented throughout this thesis is two-fold. The most important aspect is political legitimacy. Failure of a state to ensure legitimate government of the nation will result in a nationalist challenge against the state. The nature of that challenge brings us to the second point of imperial nationalism: the geopolitical position of the nation. Neither Scottish nor British Canadian nationalists desired independence from the Empire. This was largely as a result of the position of each on the global stage. The Union/Empire, gave Scot's the opportunity to gain global prestige. To ensure the Empire survived the geopolitical challenges from Germany, Russia, France and the United States, the Empire had to reform itself. The nationalist reaction to illegitimate government maintained the links with Empire but advocated reform of imperial government to the benefit of both the nation and the Empire. British Canadian nationalists also saw the Empire as a route to prestige and status on the world stage. But the more

immediate threat of the United States was of greater concern, resulting in a more explicit imperial nationalism. Geopolitical concerns were at the forefront of both Scottish and British Canadian Imperial nationalism.

In this respect the modern world is no different. Ceding some level of sovereignty to the supra-national institutions such as the European Union promotes stability within the wider European region, enhances the prestige of smaller nations and enhances economic prospects. The recent entry of a number of Eastern European states into the EU is testimony to the importance of the institution on the world stage. Small nations in particular are likely to gain more from entry into such a supra-national institution than larger nations. Collective bargaining powers are gained which allow smaller nations to negotiate a better deal than would otherwise have been possible had they been independent. Concerns over defence are allayed, thus securing the existence of the state. These benefits generally far outweigh the drawbacks involved in membership of such institutions, especially the loss of some aspects of decision making. If it is deemed legitimate by the nation for some aspects of its sovereignty to be ceded to a higher level, whether a multi-national state or a supra-national institution, and the existing system of government is deemed illegitimate then the modern equivalent of imperial nationalism can be said to be in existence. For the moment the phrase *multi-level governance nationalism* or *MLG nationalism* can be used to categorise this type of nationalism.

Based on our understanding of *imperial nationalism*, we would expect the following characteristics to be found in *MLG nationalism*. A minority nation will already be embedded in a multi-national state. A context must exist in which the existing system of government is considered illegitimate by minority nationalists. At this point there may be a range of options, such as independence from the existing system of MLG and embedding the nation in a further system of MLG or reform of the existing system of MLG. Either way one option which cannot exist in MLG nationalism is outright independence for the nation. The geopolitical position of the small nation will make the feasibility of outright independence for a minority nation extremely doubtful. For nationalism to be considered MLG nationalism, therefore, there must

be a desire for the nation to be embedded in a supra-national political structure which will maintain the existence of the nation and bring some measure of recognition of the nation on the world stage. Some illustrations will help highlight the characteristics of MLG nationalism.

### ***Multi-level Governance Nationalism in Modern Day Scotland***

The policies of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in Scotland and the *Parti Quebecois* (PQ) in Quebec Canada, to take two common examples from the modern day, show the importance of a rational approach to government in the era of globalisation. Both the SNP and the PQ argue for Scottish and Quebec independence respectively whilst simultaneously claiming it is necessary for Scotland and Quebec to remain embedded within supra-national institutions, the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement. (NAFTA)

Scottish nationalism, however, has always been broader than the SNP's independence stance. Indeed, MLG nationalism has been the predominant form of nationalism in Scotland since the formation of the SHRA in 1886. The successors to the SHRA such as the Young Scots, the second SHRA,<sup>4</sup> the National Party of Scotland, the Scottish Party, and the pre Second World War SNP, were all in favour of home rule for Scotland as opposed to independence, although some independentists did exist within some of these groups.<sup>5</sup> The Labour Party in the early part of its history supported Home Rule. The campaign for a Scottish Parliament in the 1970s drew support from a wide range of parties. The Labour Party of the modern era has supported Home Rule for Scotland, as has the Scottish Liberal Democrats. Indeed the campaign for a Scottish Parliament, led by the Scottish Constitutional Convention in the 1980s, was an excellent example of MLG nationalism. The failure of the Conservative Government to recognise Scottish identity led to a rise in Scottish nationalist sentiment, culminating in the SNP's Govan by-election victory in 1987. Both Labour and the Liberals, recognised that the existing system of government, where Scotland regularly voted Labour but had a

---

<sup>4</sup> The first movement reformed at the end of the First World War.

<sup>5</sup> Fry, M., *Patronage and Principle: A political History of Modern Scotland* (Aberdeen, Aberdeen University Press: 1987): 211-214

Conservative government forced upon it, was illegitimate. They were against the SNP's independence policy, however, and advocated the creation of a devolved Scottish Parliament that was still firmly embedded in the United Kingdom's political system. The economic and security benefits of remaining within the United Kingdom were vital to Scotland's place on the world stage. A minority nationalism advocated reform of the system of multi-level government in its favour whilst wishing to remain part of that system.

In response to arguments during the 1980s that Scotland would be unable to survive as an independent nation, the SNP switched from outright separatist nationalism to MLG nationalism using the campaign slogan "Independence in Europe." This policy still lies at the heart of the SNP platform. In their 2004 European Election Manifesto, the SNP leader at the time, John Swinney, argued that the "world is changing fast, Europe is moving on. In such a dynamic international environment our country must move on too. In the great international forums of the world, like the EU, Scotland needs a voice. And we need it urgently."<sup>6</sup> The protection of Scottish national interests, such as fisheries, in the international community is a key part of this argument. Without this voice, the SNP argue, an independent Scotland would be at the mercy of larger nations in Europe. Scotland must take part in the decision making process to ensure this does not happen. The decision then to argue for maintenance of ties to a supra-national institution is based on geo-politics. An independent Scotland, outside of the European Union, would be significantly disadvantaged, so argue the SNP, on the world stage. Influencing the decision making process in the EU, however, would give Scotland an important place in Europe. Again there is a minority nationalist movement advocating removal of the nation from one multi-level government to another.

In Canada, the key challenge has been nationalism within the multi-national state. During the 1960s the Quiet Revolution in Quebec heralded the start of a campaign for Quebec separatism that has continued to the present day. The formation of the Parti Quebecois in 1967 was, unlike the SNP before it, always in favour of

---

<sup>6</sup> Scottish National Party, *Vote for Scotland – 2004 European Election Manifesto* (Edinburgh, SNP: 2004): 3

maintaining some form of link with the Canadian state, despite the party's policy of independence. René Lévesque, the first leader of the PQ had sought to dispel doubts about Quebec's ability to survive as an independent state by linking Quebec sovereignty with the idea of an economic association with Canada. This idea has continued to find favour among Quebec nationalists, although there has been debate over the issue, and in 1994, the PQ Provincial Government issued a draft independence Bill in which the vague idea of an economic association with Canada was mentioned. A 1995 survey of Quebecers showed that nearly three-quarters of those polled agreed association with Canada would be essential to a successful independent Quebec. The 1995 Referendum question was framed around the idea of sovereignty association.

“Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new Economic and Political Partnership, within the scope of the Bill respecting the Future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on 12 June 1995?”<sup>7</sup>

The association idea moved from being purely economic to something more akin to the European Union, where common interests are dealt with by supra-national body. Again, the recognition that complete independence in an era of globalisation would be disadvantageous led to proposals for independence and maintenance of ties with supra-national institutions. Geopolitically, an independent Quebec would have to ensure its interests were not over-ridden by its larger neighbours. Once more we have the idea of a minority nationalist group advocating reform of the relationship with a system of MLG not complete independence from it.

### **Scotland and Canada Today**

The collapse of the British Empire in the aftermath of World War Two and the loss of British prestige that went with it changed the nature of nationalism in Scotland and Canada. Scottish political nationalism had turned towards independence, although it was not until 1967 that it made any electoral headway, whilst Canada had taken control of her own foreign affairs in the inter-war period. As has been noted

---

<sup>7</sup> Roberts, K., *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity* (Toronto, Oxford Polity Press: 1997): 223-6

the last 30 years of the twentieth century in Scotland and Canada have been characterised by strong nationalist parties in favour of independence yet remaining in favour of embedding themselves within a wider supra-national framework.

The contexts that were present at the end of the nineteenth century have all but vanished in the early twenty-first century. The British Empire has gone replaced by a weak British Commonwealth. The European scramble for empire has been replaced by political and economic bonds in the European Union. Britain itself has radically changed with each of the constituent parts (excluding England) having its own Parliament or Assembly, albeit with varying levels of power. Whilst this may be a far cry from the policy of Home Rule all round it has nonetheless been widely welcomed by most. The Scottish Parliament has power over many aspects of domestic policy, including health, education and culture, as well as having tax-varying powers. Political nationalists in Scotland were not completely satisfied, however, and continue their MLG nationalist campaign for Scottish independence within Europe, arguing that without the fiscal autonomy independence would bring Scotland will always be at the mercy of English politicians.

The Irish Question has also been resolved, at least partially. Independence from Britain was gained for the southern provinces of Ireland in the inter-war period. Ulster continued to be a problem for much of the second half of the twentieth century but it did not have the same effect on Scottish nationalism as the Irish Home Rule Association had done in the late nineteenth century. Home Rule has now been granted to Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom framework.

The modern Scottish context then is different in many ways from that which existed at the end of the nineteenth century and the nature of nationalism has also changed. Yet according to Scottish nationalists, Scotland must retain a voice in the wider political system if it was to have any influence on the international context, hence the requirement for independence within the European Union.

The context on the North American continent is also different in many ways. The borders between the United States and Canada have been fully settled. Canadian westward expansion has also been fully achieved. The existence of an independent Canada on the North American continent is no longer an issue. In addition, Canada is no longer reliant on the British Parliament for any material changes to its constitution following the passing of the Constitution Act in 1982. Canada is no longer the senior Dominion in the British Empire but retains links with Britain and her former dominions and colonies through the British Commonwealth. Having full control over her own relations with the United States and no longer feeling the United States poses a threat to its existence has removed the need for British Canadian nationalism of the type found at the end of the nineteenth century. The links with the United States have strengthened, particularly since the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The arguments for and against were reminiscent of the debate over commercial union in the late nineteenth century.

The modern Canadian context then is again very different from that of the late nineteenth century and the nature of British Canadian nationalism has also changed. Now it must respond to threats from within. The main challenge Canada faces today is from Quebec separatism. It is within Canada that MLG nationalism can be found as was discussed above. Quebec nationalists recognise that Quebec would be disadvantaged as an independent state without any connection to the Canadian state and or NAFTA, hence the policy of sovereignty association.

Context clearly conditions politics. As a political principle, nationalism must likewise be affected by the context it faces. Although imperial nationalism is not a force in the contemporary environment, there is a greater need than ever for small nations to gain power and status through membership of supra-national institutions such as the European Union and NAFTA. The ideas behind imperial nationalism, illegitimate governments being faced with nationalist challenges that advocate maintenance of ties to supra-national institutions, still has relevance. The concept of Multi-level governance nationalism can be usefully employed to analyse the anomaly of nationalists wishing to remain within a multi-national political framework.

## **Bibliography**

### ***Primary Sources***

Canada, House of Commons *Debates*, Volume 1, March 1878, reprinted in Robeson, V.R. (ed) *Debates about Canada's Future 1868-1896* (Toronto, The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education: 1977):

Canadian National Association, "Canada First: Address of the Canadian National Association to the People of Canada" in Morgan, H.J., (ed.) *The Canadian Parliamentary Companion* (Montreal: 1874)

Canniff, W., *Canadian Nationality its Growth and Development* (Toronto, Hart and Rawlinson: 1875)

Castell Hopkins, J., *Canada and the Empire* (1890)

Castell Hopkins, J., "Canadian Hostility to Annexation" in *The Forum* Vol XVI (November 1893) reprinted in Berger, C., (ed) *Imperialism and Nationalism 1884-1914: A conflict in Canadian Thought* (Toronto, The Copp Clark Publishing Co.: 1969)

Chamberlain, Joseph to Goldwin Smith, 13 September 1887 in Goldwin Smith Papers, Collections Canada, MG29 D69

Cockburn, H., *Speech on Unrestricted Reciprocity* (Ottawa, 1889)

Commercial Union Club, *Constitution of the Commercial Union Club of Toronto*. (Toronto, 1887)

Denison, G.T., *The Duty of Canadians to Canada* (1871) held in Denison Papers - Collections Canada MG29 E29 Vol 43

Denison, G.T. *To the Free and Independent Electors of Algoma* (Flier dated 24/7/1872) in Denison Papers Collections Canada MG29-E29 Vol17-48

Denison, G.T., *Canada and her Relations to the Empire* (Toronto, The Week Publishing Co: 1895)

Denison, G.T., "Sir John Schultz and the "Canada First" Party" in *The Canadian Magazine* Vol.8 No. 1 November 1896

Denison, G.T., "Robert Grant Haliburton" in *The Canadian Magazine* Vol.17 No. 2 June 1901

- Edgar, J.D., *Loyalty An Address delivered to the Toronto Young Mens Club* (Toronto, 1885)
- Foster, W.A., *Canada First: Or Our New Nationality – An Address* (Toronto: 1888)
- Fuller, V., “The Canadian Farmers Duty” in Mercer-Adam, G., (ed.) *Handbook of Commercial Union* (Toronto: 1888)
- Grant, G.M., *Canada First* (1887)
- Grant, G.M., *The Case for Canada* (London, 1889)
- Grant, G.M., *Advantages of Imperial Federation* (Toronto: 1891)
- Grant, G.M., “The British Empire Today and Tomorrow: I - The Growing Sentiment in Favour of Imperial Unity and the Contributions to its Growth by Canadians.” in *The Westminster* 6 November 1897
- Hague, J., *Canada for Canadians: A Royalist” Roland” for the Annexationist “Oliver”* (Toronto, 1889)
- Haliburton, R.G., *Intercolonial Trade: Our Only Safeguard against Disunion* (1868)
- Haliburton, R.G., *The Men of the North & Their Place in History* (1869)
- Haliburton, R.G., *A Review of British Diplomacy and its Fruits* (London, Sampson Low, Marston, Low and Searle: 1872)
- Hansard Series 3 Volume 262
- Hansard Series 3 Volume 287
- Hitt, Robert, to Goldwin Smith, June 30 1890 in Goldwin Smith Papers, Collections Canada MG29 D69
- Imperial Federation League, *Imperial Federation League in Canada – Report of the First Meeting* (Montreal, 1885)
- Imperial Federation League, *Imperial Federation League in Canada – Speeches at the public meeting Held at Toronto on March 24<sup>th</sup>, 1888* (Toronto, 1888)
- Lockhart Gordon, W.H., “The effects of Commercial Union on our Relations with Great Britain” in Mercer-Adam, G., (ed.) *Handbook of Commercial Union* (Toronto: 1888)

Longley, J.W., "Current Objections to Commercial Union considered" in Mercer-Adam, G., (ed.) *Handbook of Commercial Union* (Toronto: 1888).

Longley, J.W., to Goldwin Smith, May 14, 1889 in Goldwin Smith Papers, Collections Canada MG29 D69

Longley, J.W. to Goldwin Smith, Sept 11 1890 in Goldwin Smith Papers, Collections Canada MG29 D69

Mackenzie, B.D., *Home Rule for Scotland: Why Should Scotland Wait?* (Edinburgh, 1890)

Marquis of Lorne, *Imperial Federation* (London, 1885)

Mitchell, W., *Scotland and Home Rule* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1888)

Mitchell, W., *Home Rule for Scotland – The Opening Speech Read (in part) at the discussion on that subject in the Conference Room of the National Liberal Club on 7<sup>th</sup> May 1889* (Edinburgh: 1889)

Mitchell, W., *Home Rule for Scotland* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1892)

Mitchell, W., *Home Rule for Scotland and Imperial Federation* (Edinburgh, 1892)

Mitchell, W., *Is Scotland to be Sold Again?* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1893)

Mitchell, W., *Bannockburn – A Short Sketch of Scottish History* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1893)

Mitchell, W., *Home Rule All Round or Federal Union – Letter to the Right Hon H.H. Asquith M.P. for the Eastern Division of Fife* (Edinburgh, 1893)

Mitchell, W., *The Political Situation in Scotland* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1894)

Morgan, H.J., *Canadian Men and Women of the time: A handbook of Canadian Biography* (Toronto, W. Briggs: 1898)

Napier, T., *Bannockburn and Liberty: An Appeal to Scotsmen* (Edinburgh: Undated)

Napier, T., *Scottish National Association of Victoria* (Victoria, 1892)

Napier, T., *Scotland's Demand for Home Rule or Local National Self-Government: An Appeal to Scotsmen in Australia* (Melbourne, 1892)

- Napier, T., *The Arrogance of Englishmen: A Bar to Imperial Federation* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1895)
- Napier, T., *The Anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn, 24<sup>th</sup> June 1314* (Edinburgh, 1896)
- Napier, T., *Scotland's Relations with England: A Plea for the National Rights of Scotland* (Edinburgh: 1896)
- Napier, T., to Lord Balfour of Burleigh, 2 April 1898 in *Collection of Pamphlets on Scottish Home Rule* held in Edinburgh University Library Special Collections – SC6827
- Pearson, J., “Address on Commercial Union” in Mercer-Adam, G., (ed.) *Handbook of Commercial Union* (Toronto: 1888).
- Pope, J., *Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John Alexander Macdonald* Vol. II (London, Edward Arnold: 1894):
- Reith, J., *Reasons for Home Rule for Scotland* (Edinburgh, SHRA: circa 1892)
- Romans, J., *Home Rule for Scotland* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1893)
- Scottish Home Rule Association, *Protest by the Scottish Home Rule Association Against the Misuse of the terms ‘England’ and ‘English’ for ‘Britain’, the ‘British Empire’, its Peoples and Institutions.* (Edinburgh, SHRA: Undated)
- Scottish Home Rule Association, *Scottish Home Rule Association* (Edinburgh, 1886)
- Scottish Home Rule Association, *Petition to Scots MP's, Lords and Lord Provosts of Burghs* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1886)
- Scottish Home Rule Association, *Letter to A Candidate for a Scotch County from an Elector* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1886)
- Scottish Home Rule Association, *The Union of 1707 Viewed Financially* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1888)
- Scottish Home Rule Association, *Protest of the Scottish Home Rule Association Against the Denial or Delay of Home Rule for Scotland* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1890)
- Scottish Home Rule Association, *Appeal to the Scot Abroad* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1891)
- Scottish Home Rule Association to the Right Honourable W.E. Gladstone M.P for Midlothian (1892)

Scottish Home Rule Association, *Prospectus of the Scottish Home Rule Association* (Edinburgh, 1892)

Scottish Home Rule Association, *Manifesto of the Scottish Home Rule Association* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1892)

Scottish Home Rule Association, *Analysis of Division 29<sup>th</sup> April 1892* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1892)

Scottish Home Rule Association *To the Members of the Imperial Parliament of 1892* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1892)

Scottish Home Rule Association, *Proof for Private Perusal – Strictly Confidential –* (Edinburgh: 1892/3)

Scottish Home Rule Association, *Home Rule All Round*, (Edinburgh: 1893)

Scottish Home Rule Association, *England Not Britain – Correspondence with His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales* (Edinburgh, 1893)

Scottish Home Rule Association, *Scottish Home Rule Association to the Scottish Representatives in Parliament* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1893)

Scottish Home Rule Association, *Report of the Debate in the House of Commons on Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1894 on Mr Dalziel's Motion in Favour of Home Rule for Scotland with an Analysis of the Division List and an Address to the People of Scotland by the Scottish Home Rule Association* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1894)

Scottish Home Rule Association, *Home Rule for Scotland: An Address to the Citizens of Edinburgh by the Scottish Home Rule Association* (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1895)

Scottish Home Rule Association, *Home Rule for Scotland – What does it mean?* (Edinburgh, SHRA:1896)

Scottish National Party, *Vote for Scotland – 2004 European Election Manifesto* (Edinburgh, SNP: 2004)

Smith, G., "Introduction" in Mercer-Adam, G., (ed.) *Handbook of Commercial Union* (Toronto: 1888).

Smith, G., *Canada and the Canadian Question* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press: 1971)

Smith, Goldwin, to Dr Francis Wharton, Sep 7 1888 in Goldwin Smith Papers, Collections Canada MG29 D69

The National Association for the Preservation of Agriculture and our other Industries.  
*Federation or isolation* (London, 1888)

Waddie, C., *The Federation of Greater Britain* (Edinburgh: 1895):

Waddie, C., *How Scotland Lost her Parliament and What became of it 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition*  
(Edinburgh, Waddie & Co. Ltd.: 1903)

Willison, J.S., *Sir Wilfred Laurier & the Liberal Party: A Political History Volume 1*  
(George N. Morang & Co, Toronto: 1903)

Wiman, E., (ed) *Commercial Union in North America: Some Letters, Papers and Speeches* (Toronto, The Toronto News Co.: 1890)

Wiman, E., *The Feasibility of a Commercial Union* (New York, 1889)

Young, F., *Imperial Federation of Great Britain and Her Colonies in Letters* (London, 1876)

Young, J., *Canadian Nationality: A Glance at the Present and Future* (Toronto, 1891)

### **Newspapers/Journals**

*Imperial Federation*, 1 February 1886

*Imperial Federation*, 1 March 1886

*Imperial Federation*, 1 April 1886

*Imperial Federation*, 1 August 1886

*Imperial Federation*, 1 March 1887

*Imperial Federation*, 1 March 1888

*Imperial Federation*, 1 July 1888

*Imperial Federation*, 1 September 1888

*Imperial Federation*, 1 July 1890

*Imperial Federation*, 1 August 1890

*Imperial Federation*, 1 September 1890

*Imperial Federation*, 1 November 1890

*Imperial Federation*, 1 December 1891

*Imperial Federation*, 1 June 1892

*Imperial Federation*, 1 May, 1893

*The Glasgow Herald*, 14 June 1881

*The Globe*, 7 April 1870

*The Globe*, 4 August 1870

*The Globe*, 8 December 1873

*The Globe*, 9 January 1874  
*The Globe*, 3 November 1888

*Inverness Courier*, 6 November 1880  
*Inverness Courier*, 8 October 1885  
*Inverness Courier*, 17 October 1885

*The Nation*, 18 June 1874  
*The Nation*, 13 August 1874  
*The Nation*, 29 September 1876

*The Northern Chronicle*, 4 May 1881  
*The Northern Chronicle*, 31 January 1883  
*The Northern Chronicle*, 23 January 1884

*The Scotsman*, 30 July 1884  
*The Scotsman*, 2 July 1886  
*The Scotsman*, 21 July 1886  
*The Scotsman*, 17 November 1887  
*The Scotsman*, 1 November, 1888  
*The Scotsman*, 16 November 1889  
*The Scotsman*, 6 October 1891  
*The Scotsman*, 17 October 1891  
*The Scotsman*, 20 November 1891  
*The Scotsman*, 27 September 2005

*The Westminster*, 6 November 1897

### ***Secondary Sources***

Abu-Laban, Y. and Garbiel, C., *Selling Diversity: Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment Equity and Globalization* (Toronto, Broadview Press: 2002)

Anderson, B., *Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London, Verso: 1991)

Anderson, M.P. and Morse, D.J., "The People", in *People and Society in Scotland 1830-1914* Hamish Fraser, W., and Morris, R.J., (eds) (Edinburgh, John Donald: 1990)

Annett, D.R., *British Preference in Canadian Commercial Policy* (Toronto, The Ryerson Press: 1948)

Barnard, F., *J.G Herder on Social and Political Culture* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1969)

- Barth, F., "Introduction" in Barth, F., (ed) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (London, Allen and Unwin: 1969)
- Beck, J. Murray, *Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal elections* (Scarborough (Ont.), Prentice Hall of Canada: 1968)
- Bennett, G., *The Concept of Empire: Burke to Attlee 1774-1947 2<sup>nd</sup> edition* (London, Adam & Charles Black: 1962)
- Berger, C., *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1867-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1970)
- Bilig, M., *Banal Nationalism* (London, Sage: 1995)
- Birch, A.H., "Historical Explanation and the Study of politics" in *Government and Opposition* 4(2) 1969: 221-222
- Bond, R., and Rosie, M., "National Identities in Post-Devolution Scotland" in *Scottish Affairs* Vol.40 (2002), 34-53
- Brand, J.A., "Nationalism and the Non-Colonial Periphery" in Tiryakin, E.A., and Rogowski, R (eds) *New Nationalisms of the Developed West* (London, Allen and Unwin: 1985)
- Breuilly, J., *Nationalism and the State 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition* (Manchester, Manchester University Press: 1993)
- Brown, A., McCrone, D., and Paterson, L., *Politics and Society in Scotland* (London, MacMillan: 1998)
- Brown, R.C., *Canada's National Policy 1883-1900: A study in Canadian-American Relations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1964)
- Buckner, P., 'Macdonald, Sir John Alexander (1815–1891)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004  
[<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/17444>, accessed 25 Jan 2006]
- Calder, J., *Scots in Canada* (Edinburgh, Luath Press: 2003)
- Cannadine, D., "The British Monarchy c. 1820-1977" in Hobsbawm, E., and Ranger, T., (eds) *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1992)
- Careless, J.M.S., *Canada: The Story of Challenge* (Toronto, Stoddart: 1970)

- Chamberlain, M.E., *The Scramble for Africa* (Harlow, Longman Group Ltd: 1974)
- Cohen, A., “Belonging: The Experience of Culture” in Cohen, A., (ed) *Belonging: Identity and Social Organisation in British Rural Cultures* (Manchester, Manchester University Press: 1982)
- Cohen, A., “Blockade: a case study of local consciousness in an extra local event” in Cohen, A., (ed) *Belonging: Identity and Social Organisation in British Rural Cultures* (Manchester, Manchester University Press: 1982):
- Colclough, K., *The Development of the Mexican Nation* (University of Strathclyde, 1998) unpublished Masters Thesis
- Colley, L., *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (London, Pimlico: 1992)
- Connor, W., “A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a ...” *Ethnic and Racial Studies 1*, 1978
- Connor, W., *Ethnonationalism - The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1994)
- de T Glazebrook, G.P., *A History of Canadian Political Thought* (Toronto, McLelland & Stewart: 1966)
- Deutsch, K., *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the foundations of Nationality* (London, Chapman and Hall Ltd: 1953)
- Devine, T., *Scotland's Empire 1600-1815* (London, Penguin: 2003)
- Doyle, M., *Empires* (New York, Cornell University Press: 1986)
- Eisenstadt, S.N., *The Political Systems of Empires* (London, Collier-Macmillan Ltd: 1963)
- Eriksonas, L., *National Heroes and National Identities: Scotland, Norway and Lithuania* (Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Land S.A.: 2004):
- Ferguson, N., *Empire: How Britain made the Modern World* (London, Penguin: 2003)
- Finlay, R.J., *A Partnership for Good: Scottish Politics and the Union since 1880* (John Donald Publishers Ltd , Edinburgh: 1997)
- Fleming J.R., *A History of the Church in Scotland 1875-1929* (Edinburgh , T&T Clark: 1933)

Fry, M., *Patronage and Principle: A Political History of Modern Scotland* (Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen: 1987)

Fry, M., *The Scottish Empire* (Edinburgh, Birlinn: 2001)

Gagan, D., "The Relevance of 'Canada First'" in *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 1970, Vol. 5 No. 4

Gellner, E., *Thought and Change* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson: 1972)

Gellner, E., *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell: 1983)

Gellner, E., *Nationalism* (London, Phoenix: 1997);

Gibson, J.S., *The Thistle and the Crown* (Edinburgh, Her Majesty's Stationary Office: 1985)

Goldstone, J., "Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of Revolutions" in Mahoney, J. and Reuschmeyer, D., (eds) *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2003)

Guibernau, M., *Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1996)

Guibernau, M., *Nations without States: Political Communities in a Global age* (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1999)

Guy Peters, B., *Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods* (Basingstoke, Palgrave: 1998)

Hague, R., Harrop, M. and Breslin, S., *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction* 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press: 1992)

Hall, J.A., (ed) *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1998)

Hanham, H., "The Creation of the Scottish Office 1881-1887" in *Juridical Review* Vol 10 (1965)

Hanham, H., *Scottish Nationalism* (Faber & Faber, London: 1969)

Harvie, C., *Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics 1707-1994* 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (London, Routledge: 1994)

Hechter, M., *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1975)

Held, D., "The Development of the Modern State" in Hall, S., and Gieben, B., (eds) *Formations of Modernity* (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1992)

Hobsbawm, E., "Introduction: Inventing Traditions" in Hobsbawm, E., and Ranger, T., (eds) *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1992)

Hobsbawm, E.J., *Nations and Nationalism since 1870: Programme Myth and Reality* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1992)

Hobson, J.A., *Imperialism: A Study* (London: 1905)

Howarth, D., "Discourse Theory" in Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (eds) *Theory and Methods in Political Science 1<sup>st</sup> Edition* (Basingstoke, Macmillan: 1995)

Hroch, M., *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (New York, Columbia University Press: 2000)

Hyam, R., *Britain's Imperial Century, 1815-1914 – A Study of Empire and Expansion 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition* (Basingstoke, MacMillan: 1993):

Hunter, J., "The Gaelic Connection: The Highlands, Ireland and Nationalism" in *Scottish Historical Review* Vol 54 (1975), 178-204

Hutchison, I.G.C., *A Political History of Scotland 1832-1924: Parties, Elections and Issues* (Edinburgh, John Donald Publishers Ltd: 1986)

Hutchinson, J., *Modern Nationalism* (London, Fontana: 1994)

Ignatieff., M., *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (London, Vintage: 1994)

Jalland, P., 'Birrell, Augustine (1850–1933)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004 [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/31901>, accessed 26 May 2006]

James, R.R., *Lord Rosebery* (London, Weidenfield and Nicholson: 1963)

Jones, P., *The 1848 Revolutions 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition* (London, Longman: 1991)

Judd, D., *Empire: The British Imperial Experience from 1756 to the Present* (London, Fontana Press: 1995)

- Judge, D., *Representation: Theory and Practice in Britain* (London, Routledge: 1999)
- Kavanagh, D., “Why Political Science needs History” in *Political Studies* 39 (3), 1991
- Kellas, J.G., “The Liberal Party and the Scottish Church Disestablishment Crisis” in *English Historical Review* Vol. 79 (1964) 31-46
- Kellas, J.G., “The Liberal Party in Scotland” in *Scottish Historical Review* Vol. 44 (1965)
- Kellas, J.G., *The Scottish Political System 4<sup>th</sup> Edition* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1990)
- Kellas, J.G., *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press Ltd: 1991)
- Kendle, J., *Ireland and the Federal Solution: The Debate over the United Kingdom Constitution, 1870-1921* (Kingston, McGill – Queens University Press: 1989)
- Kennedy, J., “A Switzerland of the North? The *Nationalistes* and a Bi-national Canada” in *Nations and Nationalism Vol 10 No. 4*: 499-518
- Kumar, K., “Nation and empire: English and British national identity in comparative perspective” in *Theory and Society Vol 29* (2000)
- Kymlicka, W., *Multi-cultural citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1995)
- Landman, T., *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: an Introduction* (London, Routledge: 2000)
- Lichtheim, G., *Imperialism* (London, Penguin Press: 1971)
- Lieven, D., “The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as Imperial Polities” in *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol 30, No.4 (Oct 1995):
- Lieven, D., *Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals from the sixteenth century to the present*. (London, Pimlico: 2003)
- Lijphart, A., “Comparative politics and the Comparative method” in *The American Political Science Review* 65(3) 1971
- Lipset, S.M., “Some Methodological Considerations” in Lipset, S.M., and Hofstadter, R. (eds) *Sociology and History: Methods* (New York, Basic Books Inc: 1968)

- Lyons, F.S.L., *Ireland Since the Famine* (London, Fontana Press: 1973)
- Macdonald, K and Tipton, C., "Using Documents" in Gilbert, N., (ed) *Researching Social Life* (London, Sage Publications: 1993)
- Machin, I., "Voluntaryism and Reunion, 1874-1929." In MacDougall, N (ed) *Church, Politics and Society: Scotland 1408-1929* (John Donald Publishers Ltd: Edinburgh; 1983)
- Mann, M., *States, War and Capitalism* (Oxford, Blackwell: 1988)
- Mann, M., *Sources of Social Power Vol II – The Rise of Classes and Nation States 1760-1914* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1993)
- Mann, M., "A Political Theory of Nationalism and its Excesses" in S. Periwal (ed) *Notions of Nationalism* (London, Central European University Press: 1995)
- McCrone, D., *Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Stateless Nation 1<sup>st</sup> edition* (London, Routledge: 1992)
- McCrone, D., *Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Stateless Nation 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition* (London, Routledge: 2001)
- McCrone, D., "Who Are We? Understanding Scottish Identity" in Di Domenico, C., Law, A., Skinner, J., and Smith, M., (eds) *Boundaries and Identities: Nation, Politics and Culture in Scotland* (Dundee, University of Abertay Press: 2001)
- McNaught, K., *The Penguin History of Canada* (London, Penguin: 1988)
- Meadwell, H., "The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec" in *World Politics* 45 (1992) 203-241
- Midwinter, A., Keating, M., and Mitchell, J., *Politics and Public Policy in Scotland* (Basingstoke, Macmillan: 1991)
- Mill, J.S., *A System of Logic* (London, Longman, Green and Co.: 1884)
- Mill, J.S., *Considerations on Representative Government* (London, Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green: 1865)
- Miller, D., *On Nationality* (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1995)
- Mitchell, J., *Strategies for Self Government: The Campaigns for a Scottish Parliament* (London, Polygon: 1996)

- Mitchison, R., *A History of Scotland 2<sup>nd</sup> edition* (London, Routledge: 1982)
- Morton, A.S., *A History of the Canadian West to 1870-71 2nd Edition* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1973)
- Morton, G., “What if? The Significance of Scotland’s Missing Nationalism” in Broun, D, Finlay, R.J., and Lynch, M (eds) *Image and Identity: The Making and Remaking of Scotland Through the Ages* (Edinburgh, John Donald: 1998)
- Morton, G., *Unionist Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland 1830-1860* (East Linton, Tuckwell Press: 1999)
- Morton, G., “The First Scottish Home Rule Association” in Dickinson, H.T., and Lynch, M., *The Challenge to Westminster- Sovereignty, Devolution and Independence* (East Linton, Tuckwell Press: 2000)
- Morton, W.L., *Begg’s Red River Journal and Other Papers 1869-70* (Toronto, The Champlain Society: 1956)
- Nairn, T., *The Enchanted Glass: Britain and Its Monarchy* (London, Radius: 1988)
- O’Leary, B., “Ernest Gellner’s diagnoses of nationalism: a critical overview, or, what is living and what is dead in Ernest Gellner’s philosophy of nationalism?” in Hall, J.A., (ed) *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1998)
- Ozirimli, U., *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke, Palgrave: 2000)
- Pearce, M., & Stewart, G., *British Political History 1875-1995: Democracy and Decline* (London, Routledge: 1996)
- Poggi, G., *The Development of the State: A Sociological Introduction* (London, Hutchinson and Co.: 1978)
- Poggi, G., *The State – Its Nature, Development and Prospects* (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1990)
- Porter, B., *The Lions Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-1995 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition* (Harlow, Pearson Education: 1996)
- Renan, E., “Qu’est-ce que’une nation”, (Paris 1882) in Hutchinson, J., & Smith, A.D., *Nationalism: A Reader* (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1994)
- Reynolds, C., *Modes of Imperialism* (Oxford, Martin Robertson and Co. Ltd: 1981)

- Riker, W.H., *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance* (1964)
- Robbins, K., *Great Britain: Identities, Institutions and the Idea of Britishness* (London, Longman: 1998)
- Roberts, K., *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity* (Toronto, Oxford Polity Press: 1997)
- Rueschemeyer, D., "Can one or a few cases yield theoretical gains?" in Mahoney, J., and Rueschemeyer, D., *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2003)
- Rutherford, *A Victorian Authority: The Daily Press in Late Nineteenth Century Canada* (Toronto, Toronto University Press: 1982)
- Schull, J., *Edward Blake: Leader and Exile (1881-1912)* (Macmillan of Canada, Toronto: 1976)
- Scott, J., *A Matter of Record* (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1990)
- Shannon, R., *The Crisis of Imperialism 1865-1915* (London, Hart-Davis, MacGibbon: 1974)
- Shrive, N., *Charles Mair: Literary Nationalist* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1965)
- Skocpol, T., "Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies" in Skocpol, T., (ed)., *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*
- Smith, A.D., *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1981)
- Smith, A.D., *National Identity* (London, Penguin Books Ltd: 1991)
- Smith, A.D., *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism* (London, Routledge: 1998)
- Smout, T.C., *A Century of the Scottish People 1830-1950* (London, Fontana Press Ltd: 1986)
- Spence, J., 'Lecky, (William) Edward Hartpole (1838–1903)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004  
 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34461, accessed 27 Jan 2006]

- St Leger, A., 'Brown, George (1818–1880)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004 [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/3608>, accessed 25 Jan 2006]
- Stevenson, G., *Ex Uno Plures: Federal- Provincial Relations in Canada 1867-1896* (Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queens University Press: 1993)
- Stewart Wallace, W., *The Growth of Canadian National Feeling* (Toronto, The MacMillan Company of Canada Ltd: 1927)
- Sutherland, C., "Nation-Building through discourse theory" in *Nations and Nationalism* 11 (2), 2005, 185-202
- Tamir, Y., *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1993)
- Tansill, C.C., *Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911* (Peter Smith, Massachusetts: 1964)
- Taylor, C., "The Politics of Recognition" in Gutman, A., (ed) *Multiculturalism* (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1992)
- Taylor, C., "Nationalism and Modernity" in Hall, J.A., (ed) *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the theory of nationalism*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1998)
- Thomson, D., *Europe Since Napoleon* (London, Penguin Books: 1966)
- Tilly, C., *As Sociology Meets History* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books: 1980)
- Underhill, F.H., "Laurier and Blake, 1882-1891" in *Canadian Historical Review* Vol.20, 1939
- Verney, D., *Three Civilizations, Two Cultures, One State: Canada's political traditions*. (Durham, Duke University Press: 1986)
- Wade, M., *The French Canadians 1760-1967 Volume 1 1760-1911* (Toronto, Macmillan: 1968)
- Waite, P.B., 'Mackenzie, Alexander (1822–1892)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004 [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/17571>, accessed 25 Jan 2006]
- Wallace, E., *Goldwin Smith; Victorian Liberal* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press: 1957)

Wallace, W.S., "Edward Blake's Aurora Speech, 1874" in *Canadian Historical Review* Vol.2 (1921)

Weber, M., "Politics as a Vocation" in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* Gerth, H.H., and Wright Mills, C. (eds), (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd: 1948):

Weber, M., "Structures of Power" in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* Gerth, H.H., and Wright Mills, C. (eds), (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd: 1948)

Wheare, K.C., *Federal Government* (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1967)

Woffitt, R., "Analysing Accounts", in Gilbert, N., (ed) *Researching Social Life* (London, Sage Publications: 1993)

Wright Mills, C., *The Sociological Imagination* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books: 1980)