

A thesis by

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on

RECENT PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION

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To

the memory of my wife

MARY EDDA COX BENTON

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FOREWORD

All around the world today, and in many fields of research, there is a growing interest in the scientific study of religion. In the older and more advanced sciences like physics and biology certain fundamental principles have been developed which are very valuable in this study. In recent physics the departure from older mechanistic principles of explanation has been welcomed by religious thinkers as a valuable weapon in their fight against mechanism and materialism. But the application of biological principles in the field of religion has not been so lustily acclaimed. It is true that some sort of harmonization of biological findings with theological doctrines has occupied the philosophers and theologians for many years, but the thought that religion itself has evolved has not been welcomed by believers schooled in the traditional view. However, with the slow acceptance of the view that the mind of man has gradually evolved from very modest beginnings, the conception of the evolution of religion has also gained in favor.

Nowhere is the scientific study of religion more promising than in the field of psychology. Nowhere, however, is there

greater variety of opinion about the nature and especially about the origin of religion. In the psychological study of the origin of religion we have, therefore, a problem of the first importance, concerning which the field of contemporary thought is exceedingly confused. This is partly due to the fact that psychology is itself confused. As Professor Griffith says, "Many of the statements of fact and the formulae of science assume a point of reference or a system of coordinates with respect to which the facts and the formulae are held to be true..... It would be a great thing for psychology if it, too, could find a point of reference (a point of view) or a single system of coordinates with respect to which it could describe all its facts; but up to the present time no such happy discovery has been made. All of the points of view or points of reference which psychology has hitherto used are inadequate in the sense that a change in the point of view changes the intrinsic nature of the materials being described. The survey of the schools of psychology ... shows that psychology has changed its whole complexion with every change of perspective."¹

In the light of this consideration it would be unscientific to attempt and presumptuous to claim a final solution of the problem discussed in this thesis. The writer makes no claim to new discoveries in the field of general psychology and no new system of psychology is set forth to add to the already extensive confusion.

The confusion of contemporary psychological explanations of the origin of religion is not due wholly to divergence of point of

1. Griffith, C.R.: General Introduction to Psychology (1928), pp. 124-125.

view in psychology. It results partly from confusion in the field of religion with respect to what is signified by the term "religion." Suppose a learned psychologist should study an experience genetically, believing it to be religion, and should come to correct conclusions with respect to the origin of that experience. Unless what he studied was really religious experience, his conclusions might be brilliant and true and still have nothing at all to do with the problem of the origin of religion. Some writers on religion, themselves non-religious, are willing to define religion in terms which would be unacceptable to most religious people. Any critical evaluation of their work must, therefore, deal with the question of the nature and meaning of religion so far as that question affects the genetic problem.

The first objective of this paper, then, is the clarification of the field as far as the present progress of psychology and the scientific study of religion give us aid. If it be urged that we have no right, because of the present tentative nature of conclusions, especially in psychology, to make such a study it may be replied that the need is great and a little progress is better than none at all.

We have not tried to make a "defense of religion," but simply to study the facts - to gather them, order them, present them, and explain them, as far as the findings of science permit. However, if our study should be regarded as contributing in some way to a deeper appreciation of the truth and worth of religion the writer would be pleased. And it is well to recognize this fact in

the beginning. Any interest is a bias, and no matter how objective an observer may intend to be in the study of facts, the possession of any interest whatever, will dispose the observer to see in certain situations a significance and importance which another person, without the interest which the observer has, could never see. It may be that some of the pertinent facts in the study of religion would be inevitably missed by an unsympathetic observer. If that is true the most competent student of religion, other things being equal, would be the person who has a favorable attitude toward it. However, it must not be forgotten that the best interests of science and truth, and in the end, of religion itself, are to be served by the student who earnestly seeks objectivity in the ordering of his facts and who welcomes the sobering criticisms of those whose interests are opposite to his own.

So, the second objective of this study grows out of the writer's interest in religion. It is desired not merely, in the interest of truth, to assist in bringing some order into a realm where confusion reigns; but it is hoped that our study may help to provide a more reasonable basis for the appreciation of religion itself.

A third reason for studying the origin of religion is its practical bearing on the theory and practice of religious education. For many years there has been considerable discussion among religious leaders as to what the content and method of instructing the young in religion should be. Many have proposed to teach religion through

instruction in ritualistic practice, or in catechetical or factual Biblical material. Others have said that children need to be brought into an "experience of salvation." Today we are being told that character education is enough. We do not hope to go into this controversy in any exhaustive manner, but surely, a genetic study of religion ought to throw some light on this crucial question.

We have divided the present work into three main parts, respectively presenting (1) the general philosophical, psychological, and religious foundations underlying the study as a whole, (2) the critical examination of recent psychological theories of the origin of religion, and (3) the conclusions reached, and a short statement of their significance for the psychology of religion and religious education.

If the first part seems longer than the requisite introduction for a study of this kind normally is, the only justification is to be found in the desirability of having one's presuppositions explicitly stated. The nature of the subject is such that its discussion involves important presuppositions in philosophy, psychology, and religion. To each of these, therefore, we have devoted a chapter. Of the twenty-two sections which compose the three chapters of Part I, the last two of Chapter I, the last four of Chapter II, and the last three of Chapter III, are regarded by the writer as the most important. Sections 20, 21, and 22 (the last three of Chapter III) more particularly express the point of view from which criticisms of other theories are made.

Perhaps it is desirable to make some explanation of the organization of Part II into the six chapters there presented. In selecting from a great number the theories of religious genesis which were finally chosen to be presented in these six chapters, the following criteria were employed: (1) is the view of religious origins psychological? (2) is it representative of a recent school of thought? (3) does it represent a live issue in the psychology of religion today? (4) was it presented in a recent publication? (The word "recent" as used here was arbitrarily interpreted to mean "during or subsequent to the year, 1910.")

Relatively more space was given to psychoanalysis than to other schools because of its increasing popularity and growing prestige in the field of psychology and because, at the same time, it is most violently opposed to religion.

By way of explanation we wish to call attention to some of the mechanical features of the thesis: (1) both the chapters and the sections are numbered consecutively throughout the work as a whole; (2) a digest of each chapter is included, single-spaced but not indented, at the beginning of the chapter; (3) quotations, unless they are very short, are indented and single-spaced but not enclosed within quotation marks; (4) words are underlined, in quotations, to show that the original was in italics, otherwise, for emphasis or to indicate a foreign word or phrase; (5) in footnotes

the numbers in parentheses following the title of a book indicate the date of publication of the edition to which the writer had access and to which reference is made, but in some cases it is not the original publication date. This is given in the bibliography.

The writer wishes here to express his gratitude to Mrs. Jean Platt and to Miss Elaine Rushmore, both of Madison, New Jersey, U.S.A., for invaluable assistance in the preparation of the manuscript.

J. K. B.

Drew Forest,
Madison, New Jersey,
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Part I

Orientation

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION - EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE NATURE OF MIND

To live is to act; and living organisms are continuously engaged in activities which are objectively observable as behaviour and, in men, introspectively observable as experience. Using the word activity to include both behaviour and experience the problem of psychology is defined as the study of the activities of living organisms as they adjust themselves and their environment in the interest of self-maintenance and self-satisfaction. Although the double-aspect theory is rejected, emergent evolution is accepted and mind is regarded as a supervenient quality of the life and activity of organisms, and varies according to the degree and quality of their integration and their relations to the enviroing world. Man is regarded as a natural entity in a natural world and the study of organisms gives us our most important clue to the nature of the whole. Accordingly the universe is judged to be not static and dead but dynamic, alive, organic, creative and responsive. Mind is not regarded as a function of the body but the word mind is used to signify the integration which conditions the individual's activity as a unit. Mental integration is characterized as dynamic, cumulative, and recapitulative and it is regarded as a scientifically permissible hypothesis that the cosmic evolutionary process is characterized by the same unitary, dynamic, cumulative, recapitulative integration as is found in the mind of man.

Although the problem which we are to study lies in the field of the psychology of religion there are certain basic assumptions of a general philosophical character which we cannot avoid and which in the beginning we desire to make clear. Many of these will arise naturally in a discussion of the meaning of psychology. To that question, therefore, we shall now address ourselves.

1. The Meaning of Psychology

As an empirical science psychology seeks to observe, classify and explain the activities of living organisms. The fundamental observation from which it proceeds has been so well stated by Professor C. R. Griffith that we shall present it in his own words:

It begins with the plain fact that organisms get on in an environment, that every moment of their individual lives is spent in settling accounts, one way or another, with the objects, events, and situations round about. Animals low in the scale, that is, animals simple in structure and humans low in intelligence get on with a limited number of objects in a limited number of ways. Animals higher in the biological scale and humans with greater intelligence get on with a great variety of objects in a great variety of ways. In addition to the differences that belong to the order of "more or less" there are differences that belong to the order of "this kind, that kind." The amoeba gets on with a limited number of objects, and so differs from man, who gets on, in the course of a lifetime, with an almost unlimited number of objects; but the amoeba gets on in its way while man gets on in his. And between these extremes there are innumerable forms of life in which the talents of getting on may be said to look in two directions, viz., back toward amoeba and into the future toward man.¹

This "settling accounts with environment," this "getting on with objects and events," this activity or behaviour of individual living organisms, is the raw material of the science of psychology. This is the widest possible conception of the field of psychology. It includes the study of animals, of children, and of normal and abnormal human adults.

1. Griffith: General Introduction to Psychology (1928), p. 8.

Since other sciences undertake the study of living organisms and of man in particular it is necessary to state more accurately the relation of psychology to other sciences. Professor Woodworth, who defines psychology as a scientific study of the activities of the individual,¹ states its relationship to other sciences in the following words:

Psychology stands between physiology on the one side and social science on the other, since, while they also study human activities, physiology considers the organs that make up the individual, and social science studies groups composed of individuals. Physiology tells of the eye, the brain, the muscles and glands, and their interrelations in the activity of the individual; but psychology takes the individual as a whole, and describes his activities. Social science tells of institutions, ceremonies, customs, and the doings of peoples, while psychology keeps its eye fixed on the individual playing his part in the group.²

Of course, there are no impassable barriers between the domains of these sciences. The lines between them are like boundaries between friendly states, and allow of much traffic across the border. There are no sharp divisions in nature and there can be no absolute lines between related natural sciences.

It may rightly be urged that defining the subject-matter of psychology in terms of activity raises questions of fundamental importance to religion. Unless it be qualified it smacks considerably of behaviourism. Fortunately, Professor Woodworth does qualify his statement so as to leave us in no doubt as to his position. He calls seeing, hearing, and feeling happy or sad, activities.

1. Woodworth: Psychology (1929), p. 3.

2. Ibid, p. 3.

Let this be our criterion: anything that can occur just as well when life has ceased is not an activity of the individual; but any process that depends on life is to be called activity. Unless you are ready to assert that a dead body sees, hears and feels, you will have to admit that these processes are activities, and include them under the definition of psychology.¹

This explanation amounts to the recognition of experience as part of the subject matter of psychology, and is a direct repudiation of behaviourism.² Experience is not merely something "in the mind," nor something which the mind "has," nor a complex mental structure analyzable into simpler elements nor yet some function of the brain; but inner experience and overt behaviour both are examples of the living organism as a whole doing something. They are activities. And these activities are the data which psychology studies, interprets, and explains.

Professor James Drever in defining psychology as "the science which takes as its field of study the behaviour of living organisms so far as it is mentally or psychically conditioned, and can be interpreted in mental or psychical terms,"³ clearly adopts the objective attitude of behaviouristic methodology, but, just as clearly, separates himself from the extreme behaviouristic movement. While defining the field of psychology in terms of behaviour in the biological sense of the action of the organism as a whole in relation to its environment, he thinks it necessary to qualify that definition by reference to the

1. Woodworth: Psychology (1929), p. 4.

2. Professor Woodworth's essay in "Psychologies of 1930," is even more explicit. On page 331, he says, "Since experience is really not passive but depends on the life and energy of the individual we can combine experience and behaviour under the inclusive term, activity, and say that psychology is the study of the activities of the individual as an individual."

3. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), p. 1.

mental or psychical, as shown above. And in justification of this addition he says, "Without some such qualification our study of animal behaviour may be systematically developed as a science, but the science is not psychology. It is either physiology or a new branch of biological science."¹

With this statement it seems that the most representative writers of the present in the field of psychology would be in substantial agreement. The following statement by Professor G. T. W. Patrick is representative:

Of course, the word behavior may be used in a sense sufficiently broad to include all vital activity whatever, visceral and glandular responses, or the stimuli thereto, or even organic modes, for organic modes are often modes of action. But this is neither the common nor the scientific meaning of the word behavior. In biology the term means the action of the organism as a whole in its relation to its environment. The organism acts as a unit in its responses to environmental factors. Behavior is the reaction of an organism to its environment. Evidently, if we use the term behavior in its accepted sense, the instinctive strivings, urges, impulses, and governing propensities are not forms of behavior.²

Surely, no one who will recognize that they exist, can deny that these instinctive strivings, urges, impulses, and governing propensities occupy a position of fundamental importance in the effort to understand human nature or the behaviour of any living organism. Hence they not only cannot be ignored by the science of psychology but their consideration is fundamental to its value and success. Psychology must not be defined in such a way as to exclude consideration of man as a wisher as well as a doer, of those interests which

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1. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), p. 11.
 2. Patrick: What is the Mind? (1929), pp. 71-72.

Professor Patrick recognizes, of those mental or psychical determinants which Professor Drever emphasizes, of those feelings and mental activities which Professor Woodworth allows.

Therefore we may provisionally define psychology as the scientific study of the activities of living organisms as they adjust themselves and their environment in such a way as to maintain their integrity and satisfy their desires.

2. The Living Organism

Our definition assumes that the human being is a living organism. We take the existence of living organisms for granted, "permitting ourselves cheerfully to be classed among the scientists, the poets, the religious teachers, and practical men generally." And while we refuse to be drawn into any epistemological controversies about how we know they exist, we cannot escape the duty of stating what we mean to imply by the term. Professor James Drever's definition of a living organism is enlightening. He says,

We may define a living organism as a self-maintaining system of activities or forces, which is self-determining both in respect of its own development and in respect of its reactions to the external environment.¹

In further elucidating this definition² he emphasizes three characteristics of the living organism: (1) that it is the centre of activity or force; (2) that as a system of activities or forces the living organism is self-maintaining; and (3) that the living organism

1. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), pp. 7-8.

2. Ibid., pp. 8 ff.

is determined from within, even in its reactions toward external conditions. This last characteristic Professor Drever regards as the most important. He holds that it does not mean that the behaviour of the organism is arbitrary and lawless but that both its normal growth and its reaction to outside stimuli are determined from within according to the laws of its own nature. "As a scientist," he says, "the psychologist must assume absolute determination for each and every reaction. The determination, however, which the psychologist postulates, must be rightly understood. It is not the mechanical determination of the physical, determination from without, but the teleological determination of the living, determination from within, self-determination."¹

It seems that the main points of Professor Drever's interpretation of the living organism find wide acceptance among representative writers in psychology. Some minor suggestions and implications, however, may be discussed with profit. In regard to the first point Professor Drever rightly holds that the complexly organized material structure of the living organism is for psychology relatively unimportant compared to the consideration of the living organism as a center of activity or force.² But since the question of the relation of mental factors to bodily organization and neural integration is bound to arise in later discussions it may be well to point out that the structure of the organism is not to be regarded, even in psychology, with indifference. In a recent summary of his life work Professor Raymond Dodge, assuming that some kind of brain action is a condition

1. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), p. 10.

2. Ibid., p. 8.

of our mental life,¹ proceeds to ask the very important question, "Are mental processes correlated with specific kinds of matter or with specific kinds of integration?"² And he later answers this question in the following words: "There is....no evidence anywhere that consciousness is dependent on a given kind of stuff, but rather on its peculiar systematization."³ This view will be considered again and somewhat amplified in discussing the question of mind without brain⁴ but it is here presented in recognition of the importance of the structure of the organism.

Professor Drever's second point, that as a system of activities or forces the living organism is self-maintaining, may be emphasized in explanation of the phrase in our definition of psychology which refers to the activity of living organisms "in such a way as to maintain their integrity." The living organism not only maintains a physiological equilibrium within itself but it normally maintains a dynamical equilibrium between itself as a whole and its environment. The fundamental assumption underlying this concept is, for us, that the living human being as a living organism is a natural entity in a natural world, that he cannot be understood apart from his environment, that, indeed, his very life depends upon his constant interaction with his environment, and that, at the psychological level at least, that interaction is dynamical rather than mechanical.

This does not mean, however, that anything may happen;

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1. Dodge: Conditions and Consequences of Human Variability (1931), p. 155.
 2. Ibid., p. 158.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Vide infra, section 8.

that disorder and destruction may result. The molecule is an orderly result of dynamic interaction of atoms without mechanical arrangements to guide them; of atoms according to their relative properties. The processes studied in psychology are largely if not wholly of this dynamical kind.

The physicist is led by observation, as well as by theoretical calculation, to the conclusion that, generally, undisturbed dynamical interaction will produce a definite and orderly result. And Professor Drever, as psychologist, expresses the same view in his third point by an emphatic distinction between self-determination and mechanical determination.

3. Impulse and Desire

We desire to emphasize the fundamental importance of those impulses, interests and goal-seeking activities which Professor Drever says are characteristic of the living organism as self-determining. The stimulus-response formula simply does not cover the facts. Normal psychology, assuming that action begins in the environment rather than in the actor himself, has too long concerned itself with stimuli and responses rather than with persons. It needed the influence of abnormal psychology to introduce sanity into its procedures by regarding the cause-and-effect relation as starting with the person himself and as terminating in the behaviour that satisfies them. The view that action originates in the actor himself is one of the fundamental principles of psychoanalysis and perhaps its most important contribution to scientific psychology. This shift of interest

from the stimulus-response relation to the wants of the living self marks the fundamental difference between the old and the new psychology.¹

Professor L. L. Thurstone accepts this view and expands the stimulus-response formula into ten stages of the psychological act, beginning and ending in the actor, as follows: energy-source, lowered threshold for stimuli, deliberate ideation, the internal stimulus, imaginal hunt for external stimuli, overt hunt for external stimuli, the external stimulus, the consummatory overt act, overt consequences of the act, and satisfaction to the actor and quiescence at the energy source.² This may be an unnecessary elaboration but it has the merit of showing the hopeless inadequacy of the stimulus-response psychology. In the words of Professor Drever, "So far as the reaction is the response of the organism, the stimulus is not its cause, but merely its occasion."³ Or as Professor Woodworth says, "The stimulus does not exactly produce the response, but it arouses or releases the response, as the blow of the trigger releases the charge in a gun."⁴

4. Purpose

The question whether there is some mysterious purposive energy underlying those causative tendencies which we have variously

1. Cf. Thurstone: The Nature of Intelligence (1924), p. xiii-xiv.

2. Ibid., pp. 28-32.

3. Drever: Introduction to the Psychology of Education (1925), p. 10.

4. Woodworth: Psychology (1929), p. 227.

referred to as impulses, wishes, interests, or goal-seeking activities, and which is the animating force of the body, remains only an interesting speculation. "We hear a great deal about the brain and the nervous system as instruments for the more and more perfect adaptations of the organism to its environment. We seem to know what they are instruments for, but what they are instruments of has never been told. Can they be instruments of the wishes and interests, means for the realization of vital needs?"¹

Professor William McDougall thinks they are. He writes his "Outline of Psychology" from the point of view of the sciences of mind, for which purposive striving is a fundamental category.² And toward the end of the chapter on "the behaviour of the lower animals," (Chapter II) he summarizes this view and, following the suggestion of Professor T. P. Nunn,³ calls it the "hormic theory." "The view that all animal and human behaviour is purposive in however vague and lowly a degree, and that purposive action is fundamentally different from mechanical process, may be conveniently called the hormic theory. The word 'hormic' is from the Greek, 'horme,' which means a vital impulse or urge to action. Schopenhauer's 'will-to-live,' Professor Bergson's 'elan vital,' and Doctor C. G. Jung's 'libido,' are alternative expressions for the purposive or hormic energy that is manifested in human and animal behaviour."⁴

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1. Patrick: What is the Mind? (1929), p. 85.
 2. McDougall: Outline of Psychology (1929), p. vii.
 3. Nunn: Education: Its Data and First Principles (1920), p. 21.
 4. McDougall: Outline of Psychology (1929), p. 72.

In his other writings also Professor McDougall champions the hormic theory but most thoroughly and convincingly in a recent essay in "Psychologies of 1930." In this essay he presents hormic activity as an "energy manifestation" and summarizes the most essential facts as follows: (a) that the energy manifestation is guided into channels such that the organism approaches its goal; (b) that this guidance is effected through a cognition activity, an awareness, however vague, of the present situation and of the goal; (c) that the activity, once initiated and set on its path through cognitive activity, tends to continue until the goal is attained; (d) that when the goal is attained, the activity terminates; (e) that progress toward the attainment of the goal is a pleasurable experience, and thwarting or failure is a painful or disagreeable experience.¹ He then expresses the view that these essential facts characterize the activities of all organisms down to the single living cell. Hormic theory, he says, "necessarily holds that hormic activity can be exhibited only by organisms or natural entities that have a certain complexity of organization, such entities as have been traditionally called monads. And it inclines to the view that the simplest form under which monads appear to us as sensible phenomena is that of the single living cell."²

The hormic theory as interpreted by Professor McDougall is very intriguing, especially to a writer on religious psychology.

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1. McDougall: Essay in "Psychologies of 1930," edited by C. Murchison (1930), p. 15.
 2. Ibid.

But certain difficulties of this theory make the present writer hesitate to accept it as a working hypothesis. They may be summarized as follows: (1) the assumption of a fundamental dualism between mind and body; (2) the championing of vitalism, which is fundamentally a biological question, and the consequent ascription of purpose to unicellular organisms; (3) the adoption of the Lamarckian view of evolution and opposition to emergent theory; and (4) the ignoring of all other causes in the psychological realm except wishes or purposes. Professor McDougall's insistence on the importance of interest and purpose in human psychology is all to the good. The psychologist examining the phenomena manifested by an individual may find them as facts appertaining to that individual. And as facts observed in such inquiry they must be accepted and used in the science. They cannot be ignored. But it is certain that they may receive due recognition in dynamic psychology without acceptance of the hormic theory in toto, and consequently without involving the psychologist in the difficulties mentioned above.

With respect to the hormic theory, therefore, the writer recognizes the importance of its dynamic concepts without accepting Professor McDougall's philosophical elaboration of it. In this attitude the writer follows Professor Woodworth whose view, expressed in the same volume, is as follows:

The various hormic psychologists, exemplified by McDougall and Freud, certainly operate with dynamic concepts, striving, wish-fulfillment, conflict, repression, transference, and a host of others. The difficulty is to bring these concepts down to earth so as to let them work along with stimulus and response, set, association, conditioning, learning, and forgetting. Dynamic psychology would certainly not need to include in its constitution the state-

ment that purpose or striving is ultimate, and outside the realm of cause and effect, nor to take any stand on the biological question of mechanism versus vitalism. Nor would dynamic psychology postulate that all causes in the psychological realm consist of wishes or purposes....Purpose enters dynamic psychology as a cause among causes, but it cannot be permitted to crowd the others out.¹

5. The Relation of Body and Mind

Now we are certainly involved already in assumptions regarding such terms as mind, body, consciousness, soul, self, personality. It may be asked: "Since you define psychology in terms of activity and since you seek to avoid the acceptance of a dualism between body and mind, what is your view of the mind? Is not your definition of psychology in reality a veiled acceptance of a materialism which assumes that what we call the mind is merely a function of the body?"

In reply to this question it is necessary, first of all, to remind ourselves of the unfortunate current confusion with respect to the meaning of the word function.² It is used in two senses. One meaning refers to the peculiar office or work properly belonging to or assigned to any organ or part of a larger whole. Thus, in the economy of a plant the leaves and the roots have each their peculiar function or proper work as parts of the larger whole. In the economy of the body each particular organ has its peculiar physiological function or office as a part of the larger whole. For example, the

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1. Woodworth: Essay in "Psychologies of 1930," edited by C. Murchison (1930), pp. 334-335.
 2. Cf. Patrick: What is the Mind? (1929), pp. 107-109.

function of the heart is to pump the blood, of the lungs to oxygenate it, etc. Moreover, many primary organs have each their peculiar functions in larger systems which in turn have their function or peculiar work in the life economy of the whole organism. For example, it is not the function of the lungs to breathe. Breathing is the function of the respiratory system considered as a unit within the living organism, and the lungs and other divisions of the respiratory system have their proper functions as a part of the respiratory system.

If this is what we mean by function then our question must be changed. It now becomes: "Is mind a function of the brain or nervous system?" It may be well to approach this problem genetically by remembering that the diverse organs which finally arise in the more complex living systems are but crystallizations of certain original properties of protoplasm.¹ The various unspecialized properties of primordial living stuff have their counterparts in extremely highly specialized organs and systems of organs in the more advanced types of living organisms. Among the more important of these original properties may be mentioned sensitivity to stimulating agents, conductivity of excitations from one part of the substance to another, and contractility.² They are respectively represented in the more complex living systems by the receptors, such as the eye, the ear, pain spots, etc., the nervous system, and the effectors or muscles

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1. Cf. Northrop: Science and First Principles (1931), Chap. V, esp. p. 212.
 2. Cf. Griffith: General Introduction to Psychology (1928), pp. 189-192, also pp. 140-165.

and glands. Along with extreme specialization of the receptors and effectors which makes the organism's possible stimuli and possible responses almost limitless in number, we find that living organisms as they move upward in the scale of life achieve a more and more specialized and complicated structural arrangement for integrating the various processes and organs of the body to produce the unitary form and organization of the system as a whole.¹ We have called that complicated arrangement the nervous system. Neural structure makes possible extremely complicated contacts between the various tissues, organs, and systems of the body. We may conclude, then, that the primary function of the nervous system is, by means of its conductive properties, to maintain in living organisms which have reached the higher levels of evolutionary progress that unitary wholeness which is characteristic of all living things and which is manifested in protoplasm as the property of conductivity. But this is very far from the view that mind is a function of the brain or of the nervous system.

In the sense of the word function which we have been discussing, it would not be proper to say that it is the function of a tree to grow or to bear fruit, nor could one say that it is the function of a man to talk, think, or plan for the future.

But there is another meaning of the word according to which function means the specific power or mode of activity of any organism as a whole or any agent or individual. In this sense it is the function of a tree to grow, and of a man to think, of an artist to paint pictures, and of a composer to produce oratorios. In this sense the function of anything is not what it has to do as a part of some machine or larger organism, but what it can do in its own free creative activity. It is its end or fruition.²

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1. Cf. Sherrington: The Integrative Action of the Nervous System (1926).
 2. Patrick: What is the Mind? (1929), p. 108.

From this point of view it would not be incorrect to say that mental activity is the function of living organisms as they adjust themselves and their environment in such a way as to maintain their integrity and satisfy their desires. If it be asked what it is that acts, we reply that it is the integrated living individual as a whole, as a unit. Mind is qualitative. It is not a stuff, an entelechy, a discrete entity to be contrasted with body. But it is a supervenient quality of the life and activity of organisms and varies according to the degree and quality of their integration and their relations to the environing world. As Professor Nunn says, "Man is not to be conceived as Descartes conceived him - namely, an automaton plus a soul, or, as Epictetus put it, 'A ghost in a corpse.' He is, through and through, a single organism, a 'body-mind,' the latest term of an evolutionary process in which living substance has developed ever higher and more subtle functions."¹

6. Emergent Evolution and the Body-Mind Problem

We are so accustomed to think of mind as immaterial contrasted with and interacting with body as material, that it is extremely difficult both intellectually and emotionally to give any other view a fair chance. The fact is, however, that no solution of the mind-body problem in terms of dualism, materialism or psychical monism, is thoroughly convincing or satisfactory. We believe that the basis for a satisfactory solution of this problem is to be found in terms of emergent evolution. In his Gifford Lectures Professor

1. Nunn: Education: Its Data and First Principles (1920), p. 18.

Lloyd Morgan has given us a profound statement of the theory of emergent evolution¹ and, while we wish to assume as the background of this paper the main points of his treatment of emergence and reference, we do not wish to assume unrestricted concomitance of psychical and physical events. In the first series of lectures Lloyd Morgan sets forth three general levels of emergent evolution: A. Matter (with psychical correlates); B. Life (with psychical correlates); and C. Mind (with physical correlates).² Mind in this scheme is regarded as supervenient at the level of prospective reference and below this level are psychical systems which have not reached the status of mind.³ But in the second course of lectures the word "psychical" is dropped and the word mind is used in an unrestricted sense as correlated with both life and matter. This correlation (or concomitance as he now says) is "ubiquitous and universal."⁴ "Reference" is used to cover the ground formerly occupied by "mind," but with this difference that it includes three levels of reference, reflective, cognitive and non-cognitive,⁵ whereas "mind" formerly referred to the cognitive and reflective levels only.

The attribution of mental correlates to physical events would make necessary the conception of physical events in terms of

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1. Morgan: Emergent Evolution (1923); Life, Mind and Spirit (1926).
 2. Morgan: Emergent Evolution (1923), p. 27. Cf. Section V.
 3. Morgan: Life, Mind and Spirit (1926), p. 8.
 4. Ibid., p. 7.
 5. Ibid., pp. 16, 131, 214, 215. Also Morgan: Emergent Evolution (1923), Chapter IV.

vitality since according to the emergent scheme mind is a quality supervenient upon and involving life.¹ This would seem to take from the scheme, as shown above, the level of matter and substitute a new scheme of emergent evolution where emergents arise in two parallel orders of events, namely, physical and mental.² Professor Lloyd Morgan's own words seem to indicate this. For example, he says,

Let it then be understood clearly that the hypothesis of unrestricted concomitance does not imply that occurrences in either attribute emerge from occurrences in the other. The hypothesis is that from the very beginning, so far as we can descry it, mind is concomitant with life.³

A further difficulty, involved in the theory of unrestricted concomitance, arises when we consider the mental integration of an extremely complex character such as we find in man. The acceptance of unrestricted concomitance would here involve us in the attribution of some sort of mind and consciousness to cellular activity in the body and also to elementary neural processes.⁴ This view is characteristic of those who hold to psycho-physical parallelism. It is admittedly theoretical, and it is probably not capable of disproof. Each segment of the spinal cord, each neuron, or even each electron may possess a consciousness of its own. However, such a consciousness is not only inaccessible to us but it is not comprehensible in terms of our consciousness. The special hypothesis of a special kind of inaccessible consciousness to correlate with every kind of neural process would seem defensible only if it could be shown that the various neural

1. Morgan: Emergent Evolution (1923), pp. 15 ff.

2. Ibid. Cf. pp. 222-223.

3. Morgan: Life, Mind and Spirit (1926), p. 12.

4. Cf. Life, Mind and Spirit, p. 223. The author says:

"There is no organ, no tissue in the body, no cellular constituent, no chromosome or chondriosome factor, the action of which is without its mental accompaniment."

processes possess those characteristics which in the cerebrum are the conditions of consciousness as we know it.¹

Not only can this not be done, but there is strong evidence that even in the cortex psychic elements cannot be correlated with physiological units or elementary neural processes. Professor Raymond Dodge, whose many notable researches in physiological psychology give him a peculiar right to be heard on this question, has this to say:

A psychic element, if there is any such thing, always appears as the consequence of complex neural antecedents. That is to say, a color or tone which for consciousness is not further analyzable, is physiologically still highly complex. Beginning in the sense organ and ending in the cortex there are at least three links in the chain of neural happenings. In the case of color the number of links is probably higher, and in none of the links is the process a simple one. In the last link it probably involves more or less widespread cortical disturbances with a complex interplay of excitations and inhibitions. Certainly it is not an unanalyzable event.²

So far, then, the theory seems to be contrary to the facts as we know them. Therefore, we cannot assume unrestricted concomitance of mental and physical events. We shall depart from the theory in two ways. In the first place we shall use the word mind to refer to that kind of integration whose objectively observable aspect is the behaviour of living organisms as a whole and whose introspectively observable aspect is the experience of human beings. And in the second place, we recognize that while mental process depends in a general way upon neural process, we do not assume any point by point correspondence, parallelism or correlation.

1. Cf. Dodge: Conditions and Consequences of Human Variability (1931), pp. 136-137.

2. Ibid., p. 137.

The rejection of unrestricted concomitance does not, however, involve rejection of the concept of emergence as Lloyd Morgan himself says.¹ On the other hand it appears to strengthen the concept of emergence of the mind as a genuine novelty by emphasizing the fact that the simplest element of experience still involves complex physiological process.²

As a second reservation we wish to take exception to the double-aspect or double-knowledge theory as a solution of the mind-body problem. Lloyd Morgan maintains that while man is in life-regard a system of bioses and in mind-regard he is a system of mental events, "substantially he is one being."³ And again he urges that "life and mind are manifestations of Divine Purpose, one and indivisible in God as ultimate Substance."⁴

Resting as it does on the assumption of unrestricted concomitance of psychical and physical events this theory, as Professor

1. Morgan: Life, Mind and Spirit (1926), p. 34.
2. Cf. Sellars: Evolutionary Naturalism (1922). He emphasizes the recent tendency in science to move away from the old emphasis on continuity with its mechanical implications toward the recognition of creative synthesis in nature with resultant novelty. "We are confronted with pluses. Chemical properties are not the same as physical properties. There is a further plus when we examine the functioning of organic tissues. The older properties are transcended and included.... Evolution seems, therefore, to contain two equally real elements. There is continuity, and there is novelty." p. 297.
3. Morgan: Life, Mind and Spirit (1926), p. 11.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 31. Cf. Chapter X.

Drever has clearly shown,¹ is in reality a special form of psycho-physical parallelism, and subject to the shortcomings of that theory. Furthermore its resolution of the difficulty of dualism of mind and body is apparent rather than real. The theory was first advanced by Spinoza who held that reality is not found in two substances, such as thought and extension, but in one substance, God, who is known to us under two attributes, and these attributes are thought and extension. Descartes attempted to solve his dualism by asserting "animal spirits" to mediate between the two; Spinoza by asserting a "substance" to include them. Such a substance may be called God in order to name it, but it is more like a concept than like the God of religious experience.²

If the double-aspect theory could be interpreted as a frank and straightforward recognition of the propriety of studying living organisms with various scientific techniques in order to gain as much information about them as possible, then certainly no fault could be found with it. But then it would no longer be a double-aspect theory but a plural-aspect theory. For it would have to recognize the right not only of psychology and physiology to study the living organism but also of the social sciences, anatomy, chemistry and even physics. Professor Woodworth has expressed this point so convincingly that the writer begs leave to quote him at some length:

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1. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), pp. 16-17.
 2. Cf. Patrick: What is the Mind? (1929), pp. 114-115.

There is no mind-body problem in everyday life, but the problem emerges when the two sciences (Psychology, Physiology) study the organism with their different techniques. The parallelism is not a parallelism between physiological and mental activities, but only a parallelism between two different descriptions of the same activity. Where the psychologist speaks of eating one's dinner, the physiologist, more analytically, speaks of the contraction of certain muscles under the excitation of certain nerves, etc., but he is describing the same identical process as the psychologist. When the psychologist speaks of seeing the color, blue, the physiologist speaks of the processes in the retina, the optic nerve and its brain connections. There is no doubt, to my mind, that seeing blue is identically the same process as that which the physiologist describes. If he were able to give a much more complete analytical description than is possible today, he would not, to be sure, ever find the color blue as an experience, just because that experience is a total process which he is breaking up into parts.¹

7. Taking Evolution Seriously

There are then not "two stories of one evolutionary advance,"² but many stories. And each of them contributes its share toward the understanding of the emergence of man as the flower, so we believe, of the cosmic process.

We believe that any adequate view of the world or any part of it must take evolution seriously. And this means that we must take two main implications of evolution as fundamental to our study. The first is that the world or any particular part of it is orderly and systematic. This assumption is the fundamental basis upon which science works and the success of science demonstrates its validity.

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1. Woodworth: Essay on Dynamic Psychology, from Psychologies of 1930 (1930), p. 335.
 2. Morgan: Life, Mind and Spirit (1926), p. 134.

Of course if one should hold to the point of view of one particular descriptive science, say astronomy, he need only assume that that section of the phenomenal order in which he is interested is orderly. But in the study of man such an isolated view is impossible, as even a cursory examination of the problems of biochemistry, biophysics, physiology, and psychology - to take only a few examples - will readily show. Due to the interpenetration of the various fields of scientific research even the scientist probably will and certainly the philosopher must make the assumption that that orderliness which is seen to be characteristic of any field under investigation is characteristic of the whole phenomenal order and rooted in the very nature of Reality. This means that there are no unrelated details kicking about loose, that any satisfactory account of the whole must do justice to all the details, and that any adequate understanding of any detail will throw at least some light on the nature of the whole.

The second implication of evolution which is fundamental to our study is that the world is a growing world. The life of organisms is not a mere shuffling and reshuffling of atoms and molecules in hit-or-miss chance fashion but a genuine progress toward integration and novelty. This means that we cannot hold on to a mechanistic view of the universe. Our scientists and our philosophers of the present day are turning away from mechanism. Professor Whitehead states the point squarely: instead of trying to interpret biology in terms of mechanical physics, he says it is time to inquire whether biology may not give us the proper cue in understanding physics. If we are to take evolution seriously, as involving real growth, we must, he says,

make the notion of organism fundamental to our view of the world and apply it not only to the individuals in the process of biological evolution but to the total environment in which that evolutionary process takes place. "Science," he says, "is taking on a new aspect which is neither purely physical, nor purely biological. It is becoming the study of organisms. Biology is the study of the larger organisms; whereas physics is the study of smaller organisms."¹

What this organismic view may mean for science and philosophy no one, as yet, seems ready to say. But it is not impossible even now to point out some of the implications which certainly concern us here. In the first place the maintenance of life at any level involves an exceedingly complex give-and-take between each living thing and its environing world. From the unicellular organism up through the intricate scale of living things to man, there is almost infinite variety in the extent, the complexity, and the richness of this give-and-take between living organism and environing world. And when one considers that every living thing has been brought to birth and is constantly nurtured by the environment in which it lives, one realizes the logic of Professor Henderson's insistence that the fitness of the environment is as important as the fitness of the organism.²

In the second place, these intricately integrated centers of energy maintaining amazingly fluid, dynamic equilibrium in constantly changing environments, these living organisms, are stable. But their

1. Whitehead: Science and the Modern World (1925), p. 145.
Cf. pp. 150-164.

2. Cf. Henderson: The Fitness of the Environment (1913), p. 312.

stability is stability of pattern, of form, not of stuff. With every breath, with every movement even, there is interchange of stuff between organism and environment, and streams of electrons constantly sweep through the living body. Stuff changes; pattern remains.

But, again, while the pattern is stable it is not static. It remains, but it does not remain the same. The organism grows, learns, changes its environment, and is changed by its environment. Not only that, but it reproduces itself in offspring, of like kind, but with variations from itself, and the offspring bears in its integrated structure the phylogenetic history of its past. If we trace this phylogenetic history we find that there is order and there is growth in extensiveness, complexity, and richness of interrelatedness and integration. There are now and again, in this movement of life, jumps or mutations, novelties emerging, novelties of form and relatedness.

A fourth implication of the organismic point of view concerns the fitness of the individual to survive. The individual must possess vigor, aggressiveness, a tough resiliency, a capacity for rebound, a persistent organization and unity which resists disintegration when threatened by opposing forces in the environment. The path of evolution is uphill, against resistance. Discomfort, struggle, meeting and transcending difficulties, weathering storm and calm, resourcefulness - these are some of the characteristics of the fit who survive.

And finally, it is never individuals alone that survive, but groups, families, species. Individual fitness and effort are not

enough. There must be social life, cooperative effort, where the individual lives with and to some extent for the group.

All these considerations throw light upon the nature of the world, and upon the nature of man as a part of that world. In particular they serve as a caution against dualistic theories of man which assume interaction or parallel action between mind and body, and against dualistic theories of the universe which assume that the apparent disparity between matter and spirit is fundamental and characteristic of ultimate reality.

Our view is that in the evolutionary process new unitary complexes arise; that each new unitary complex issues in qualitative differences which are not possessed by simpler organisms nor by the elements of which it is composed; that these qualitative differences which are characteristic of the unitary complex could not be inferred from an examination of the elements;¹ and that, consequently, these qualitative differences depend not upon the "stuff" of the complex but upon its organization in a certain way.² We believe therefore that the world cannot be understood in terms of some ultimate substance or substances, whether mind, matter or both; that any effort to do so inevitably misses these "qualitative differences" which make up the world as we experience it and are as real as anything in the world can be. Furthermore, we believe that the study of living organisms gives us a clue to the nature of the universe as a whole. And we

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1. Cf. Patrick: What is the Mind? (1929), Chapter VI.
 2. Dodge: Conditions and Consequences of Human Variability (1931), p. 158. Cf. also Broad: The Mind and Its Place in Nature (1925), pp. 67-68.

conclude that the universe, whatever else it may be, is not static and dead, but dynamic, alive, growing, organic, creative, and responsive.

8. The Meaning of Mind

We call those "qualitative differences" which distinguish normal living human beings from lower orders of life, mental qualities. These qualities are objectively observable only as they characterize behaviour and introspectively observable only as they condition experience. They seem to arise out of an extremely complex systematization or integration of some sort which we shall also describe as mental. Mental integration cannot be directly observed either objectively or introspectively, but must be studied by inference from behaviour and experience, that is, by inference from the activities of the living individual. That is why psychology must study activity.

When we study the behaviour and experience of normal human beings living under wholesome environmental influences we find that their activities may be classified according to a fairly small number of general types. We find that: (1) human beings grow up; (2) they profit by past experience; (3) they observe and discriminate between objects in their environment, selecting certain of these objects for special consideration; (4) they revive and observe past experience; (5) they may insert effective and fruitful delays between the perception of a situation, or the awareness of a suggestion, and the overt response so as to make their response more appropriate; (6) they prepare for the future; (7) in various ways they temper their

responses to the felt needs of the moment; (8) they direct their energies to definite ends; and (9) they organize their responses to total situations.

Most of the problems of psychology arise in attempting descriptions and seeking explanations of these eight types of human, or fewer types of animal, activity. Traditional psychology, however, has not used verbs but nouns to describe its problems. We may list them, in the same order as given above, as follows: (1) maturation; (2) learning; (3) sensation, perception, attention; (4) memory, or conservation, recognition, and recall; (5) thinking; (6) imagination; (7) emotion; (8) motivation, interest, effort, purpose; (9) character, personality. We need these nouns to gather up in shorthand symbols the meanings which the longer descriptions convey. Indeed we can hardly write or talk about psychological problems without some such understood symbols.

Likewise we need a word to gather up in one concept the totality of these descriptions of the individual as he functions as an organic part of his world. That word is mind. By the word mind we shall not mean the functioning of the individual, though we may speak of his activity as mental; but we intend to signify the integration which conditions his activity as a unit. We wish again to emphasize the fact that recognition of the mind as an integration conditioning behaviour and experience is no more to accept a dualism than to recognize that constant breathing also is a condition of activity.

We attribute to the mind of man certain dependable sources of behaviour and experience such as interests, motives, dispositions, capacities, skills, meanings, memories, etc. As to the exact nature of these mental components we have no exact knowledge. Many psychologists conjecture that they exist as neural patterns. But this is a problem for the future.

We know something more definite about the characteristics of mind. We may summarize them as follows:¹ (1) Mind is an integration. The activity of the individual is unitary; it is the activity of a living being as a whole. (2) Mind is an integration that is dynamic in character. It is stable, but it is a stable configuration of energy. It changes and develops, progresses and has direction. It is active with respect to its environment, and its activity is characterized by intelligence and purpose. (3) It is cumulative. This can be seen in the summation of memories to which each new experience adds something which was not there before, in which some trace of each new experience becomes more or less systematized, while, at the same time, it leaves its predecessors more or less intact. (4) Mental integration is recapitulative. This is obvious in personal experience. Each present experience not only leaves a trace to be organized in a system of memories but each new stimulus revives that system more or less completely. It is the individual with all his past experiences which hears a noise in the adjoining room, preaches a sermon, or flies across the Atlantic ocean. Moreover, it is not

1. Cf. Dodge: Conditions and Consequences of Human Variability (1931), pp. 158 ff. In formulating the views expressed in this section the writer has been greatly influenced by Professor Dodge.

merely the individual with his own past experiences who does these things; but each new experience is recapitulative, also, in some degree, of summarized influences of racial experience in the long, complex, evolutionary advance which lies behind him.

We may ask: Where is mental integration to be found? Most obviously one place where mind can unquestionably be found is in connection with living human beings, and perhaps we might be justified in affirming, with somewhat less assurance, that some sort of mental integration characterizes all living organisms which make total responses to their environment in such a way as to maintain their integrity and satisfy their desires. But if we press the question and ask just where, in or near the living individual, mind is to be located, we must acknowledge that in man some kind of brain action is a condition of mental life. For example, suppose a patient responds to the doctor's request to give his name. We can trace the course of the nervous impulse with considerable assurance through the big eighth nerve to the ganglia at the base of the brain, and through the basal ganglia to the appropriate projection area of the temporal convolution. From this point to the transmission of the efferent impulse we are unable to trace with equal assurance the physiological process. But we may be quite certain that fairly widespread cortical activity is involved, that this activity is of an orderly character, and that the peculiar fluid integration which we call consciousness is closely related to this orderly and widespread cortical process.

But let us press our question even further and ask at the various levels whether consciousness resides there. We answer in the words of Professor Dodge:

We shall make the somewhat disconcerting discovery that consciousness resides nowhere in the neural chain. It can hardly be in the ear, for if the ear is isolated from the brain there is no awareness of sounds. For a similar reason it is not in the big eighth nerve, nor in the basal ganglia, nor even in the relevant temporal convolution. Each of these links is essential, but each may be intact without awareness of sounds if it is isolated from the rest of the nervous system. Something occurs in each link of this chain of neural events that is much like what occurred in the preceding one. In no link is consciousness found, yet something happens in the final one that is capable of being included in that form of integration which we call consciousness and in the relatively more permanent and more inclusive integration which we call mind. There is no necessity for this inclusion. It is more or less completely absent in sleep and under the influence of such narcotics as chloroform or ether.¹

Now, refusing to be satisfied with the crude doctrine that mental process is in some way conditioned by brain action, let us be very persistent and ask: What kind of action in the brain actually conditions mental events? Remembering, as shown above,² that even cortical disturbances, if isolated, do not give rise to experience or behaviour we may reply, in the words of Professor Dodge, "Apparently, the answer must be that not the brain itself³ but some form of integration that may go on there is the real condition of mental processes."⁴

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1. Dodge: Conditions and Consequences of Human Variability (1931), pp. 157-158.
 2. Cf. supra, section 6.
 3. Cf. supra, section 2.
 4. Dodge: Conditions and Consequences of Human Variability (1931), p. 160.

If now we have discovered that mental integration depends not upon a particular kind of stuff but upon its peculiar systematization we may ask, as a final question, whether there is any evidence that elsewhere in the universe there are conditions for a similar form of systematization of any factors whatsoever. In reply to this question Professor Dodge states what he calls "the great hypothesis." He says:

Dynamic cumulative integration is a common phenomenon within the limits of our knowledge. Recapitulation is certainly rarer. It apparently recurs in the development of the embryo and possibly in some astronomical events. The hypothesis is not entirely fantastic that each embryo, as it grows and develops, recapitulating the history of its race, represents a conscious moment in some supra-individual mind: and that each developing nebula conditions an idea in some spirit of the universe.¹

Professor Dodge thinks that with our present state of scientific knowledge we may go no farther than this. But we wonder whether in the light of the view of evolution which we attempted to present above, we may not be justified in suggesting that, in the cosmic evolutionary process, viewed as a whole, and of which we are self-conscious parts, we may find that unitary, dynamic, cumulative, recapitulative integration which we find characteristic of the mind of man.

1. Dodge: Conditions and Consequences of Human Variability (1931), pp. 160-161.

Chapter II

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL GROUNDWORK

The role of the instincts in motivating the activity of organisms is recognized, they are defined in terms of urges rather than action-patterns, and Drever's psychological classification of them is adopted. Although in instinct-experience the meaning of an object or situation is at first only affective, with successive presentations it becomes systematized with cognitive and conative elements of experience in such a way that when certain elements of the associative system so formed (signs or symbols) are presented or re-presented in consciousness they tend to re-activate the whole system to which they belong (meaning). Perry's view that interest creates value is rejected and interest is held to be instrumental, at the perceptual level of mind, in apprehending value, but, on the conceptual level its efficacy as an instrument of apprehension is transcended by rational insight. The energies of the organism may be marshalled in support of an impulse which encounters an obstacle in the way of its expression and so give rise to an unpleasant state of tension which, if the obstacle is not surmounted, gives rise to prolonged emotional discomfort, or, if it is, flows off in joyous activity. One or more emotions may be associated with an idea or group of ideas to form a mental disposition (sentiment) of such a character that when the ideational core is re-activated some or all of the associated emotions re-appear. When the object of a sentiment is understood, consciously accepted, and defines for the self a goal it becomes an ideal and as such receives the support of the whole self in its realization. Three levels of mental activity are distinguished: (1) the perceptual level (the level of moment-to-moment existence), (2) the ideational level (the level of memory and imagination), (3) the conceptual level (the level of reflective thought). Personality is the whole mental system, conscious and unconscious while the self is the harmoniously organized and accepted dominant system with which consciousness is associated.

The previous chapter was devoted to the consideration of certain basic assumptions of a philosophical nature which are fundamental to the point of view of our study. The present chapter deals with its psychological groundwork.

9. Native Tendencies

Let us suppose that we are watching a novice as he tries to build up a conditioned reflex in a dog. He brings in his dog, sounds an electric bell and at the appropriate time shows the dog some meat. We notice that the dog appears quite indifferent to the sight of food and the attempt to condition the salivary secretions to the sound of the bell entirely fails. We discover later that the dog had just had his dinner. The stimulus does not seem to be the only important factor. Motivation is necessary. Again and again in Pavolov's writings we come across the phrase "hungry dog." And one has only to look into Thorndike's¹ or Koehler's² writings to realize the tremendous importance of motivation in experimenting with animals. As we have already seen in Chapter I, this motivation comes from within.³ And it is not only the condition of all activity in animals but of all activity and of all experience in men. Professor Drever suggests that if a developed intelligence suddenly fell passionless, moved by no desire, felt no pleasure or pain, hoped nothing, feared nothing, loved nothing, hated nothing, it would surely die, "for it could never cognize a single object, it could never perceive, and it is doubtful how far it could even experience."⁴

These interests and motives can be modified, blended with one another in new combinations which are genuine novelties, and

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1. Thorndike: The Original Nature of Man (1913).
 2. Koehler: The Mentality of Apes (1927).
 3. Vide supra, section 3.
 4. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), p. 133.

perhaps increased or decreased in strength; but they can neither be acquired nor lost. They belong to our inheritance; they are native tendencies. With Professor McDougall¹ and Professor Drever² we may call them instincts; or with the behaviourists³ we may call them habits; or with Professor Woodworth⁴ we may call them dependable motives; or we may select some other name from the long list which Professor Patrick has collected: "Instinctive striving, purposive striving, connotation, will, wish, libido, desire, appetite, craving, impulse, sex, hunger, longing, the drive, the biological interests, the non-reflexional elements of experience, the 'energy influences seething and bubbling in the organism.'"⁵ The very richness of our language in such terms is an indication of the importance of those native tendencies which they more or less inadequately signify.

In recent years a great conflict has raged around the questions of the existence and definition of instinct. There are two meanings of the word which are often confused. It may mean the impulse to a certain type of activity or it may mean an inherited behaviour pattern or action system.⁶ A bird has an impulse which leads to nest-building activity. And the various movements required in the building of the nest are largely determined as to form and

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1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918).
 2. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921).
 3. Watson: Behaviourism (1930).
Allport: Social Psychology (1924).
 4. Woodworth: Psychology (1929), Ch. VI; See pp. 246 ff.
 5. Patrick: What is the Mind? (1929), p. 67.
 6. Ibid., p. 70. Cf. also Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), p. 47.

sequences by inherited behaviour patterns. When the psychologist is discussing the activities of animals low in the scale of life it makes little difference whether he views instinct in terms of impulse or behaviour pattern. But at the human level it makes a great deal of difference. McDougall,¹ Drever,² and Woodworth³ define instinct in terms of impulse; James,⁴ Shand,⁵ and Thorndike⁶ in terms of behaviour pattern, or definite response to definite situations. We believe that this definiteness is illusory and misleading because specific responses are not characteristic of a child's behaviour in the same way as that of a young animal.⁷

We, therefore, take the position that instinct, if it is to be meaningful as a concept in human psychology, is best understood in terms of impulse, guiding cognition and accompanied by interest.⁸ Professor Drever has stated the position squarely:

From the bottom of the scale of life to the top we see unmistakable indications in an organism's behaviour of an impulsion or urge from within, driving the organism towards actions which are biologically essential. It is thus this inner urge that is characteristic of instinct at all levels. It is not a stereotyped series of actions, for which innate provision is made from the beginning, since this shows itself in the vaguest and most fragmentary manner at the higher levels.⁹

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1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 30.
 2. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), Chap. I, Esp. pp. 13-20.
 3. Woodworth: Psychology (1929), Chap. VI.
 4. James: Principles (1890).
 5. Shand: Foundations of Character.
 6. Thorndike: Original Nature of Man (1913).
 7. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), p. 155.
 8. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
 9. Drever and Drummond: Psychology of the Pre-School Child (1930), p. 14.

So long as we keep this distinction in mind there seems to be no good reason for giving up the word instinct.

Naming and classifying the instinctive tendencies of man has been one of the most difficult problems of psychology. James, Thorndike, McDougall and Drever have probably made the most notable contributions toward the solution of the problem. We have just pointed out one clear distinction which separates the point of view of James and Thorndike from that of McDougall and Drever. Drever departs from McDougall in three ways. In the first place he gives a psychological definition of instinct whereas McDougall's original definition is physiological. McDougall defines an instinct as

an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action.¹

In his "Outline of Psychology," written after Drever's "Instinct of Man" was published, McDougall drops the word "psycho-physical" and says in a footnote that one might qualify the word "disposition" by mental, neural, physiological, or psycho-physical and expresses a preference for the latter.² Drever takes a tentative view similar to McDougall's and defines an instinct as

an innate impelling force guiding cognition, accompanied by interest or emotion, and at least partly determining action.³

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1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 20
 2. McDougall: Outline of Psychology (1929), p. 110.
 3. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), p. 20.

This, he contends, is a psychological definition whereas McDougall's, which defines an instinct as a psycho-physical disposition, is physiological. The point is well taken and apparently recognized by McDougall as a just criticism since in later writings he drops the objectionable phrase.

Another difference between McDougall's and Drever's view of instinct depends upon their conception of the relation of instinct to emotion. McDougall says that an instinct has three parts: an afferent part consisting of cognitive activity; a central part consisting of affective activity; and an efferent part consisting of conative activity. The cognitive and conative aspects of the instinct are capable of modification but the affective aspect is not.¹ Therefore emotion is the most fundamental part of instinct. "Each of the principal instincts conditions, then, some one kind of emotional excitement whose quality is specific or peculiar to it; and the emotional excitement of specific quality that is the affective aspect of the operation of any one of the principal instincts may be called a primary emotion."² Drever holds that certain of the most powerful and fundamental human instincts are usually accompanied by emotional disturbances but that this association is not invariable; that generally emotion is greater when the instinct mechanism does not work smoothly; that the central core of instinct is interest which may develop an emotional phase; and that there

1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), pp. 33 ff.

2. Ibid., p. 49. Cf. James: Principles (1890), Ch. XXV.

are some instincts for which there are no accompanying emotions in the true sense of the word.¹ He therefore classifies certain instincts as "emotional" and with regard to these his views are similar to, though not quite the same as McDougall's, since he recognizes the bipolarity of all affective activity. We shall return to this question in the section on emotion.²

A third characteristic which distinguishes Drever's treatment of instinct from that of McDougall, and others, is that he classifies instincts on a psychological basis. Since we accept Professor Drever's view as the basis of our study it remains only to present his list and classifications:³

A. Appetitive Instinctive Tendencies

I. General

1. Unpleasure avoidance
2. Pleasure-seeking

II. Specific

1. Hunger
2. Thirst
3. Rest
4. Exercise
5. Sex
6. Nausea

B. Reactive Instinctive Tendencies

I. General

1. Play
2. Experimentation
3. Imitation
4. Sympathy
5. Suggestibility (?)

1. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), pp. 51-57. Cf. also Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), Ch. VII.
 2. Vide infra, section 12.
 3. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), p. 57.

II. Specific

1. Simple

- a. Prehension
- b. Organ Adjustment
- c. Locomotion
- d. Vocalization, etc.

2. Emotional

- a. Escape¹
- b. Pugnacity
- c. Curiosity
- d. Self-display
- e. Self-abasement
- f. Parental
- g. Gregarious
- h. Hunting
- i. Acquisition
- j. Courtship (sex)
- k. Repulsion (?)

10. Meaning

Professor Drever has clearly shown that meaning in instinct-experience is, on its first appearance, affective rather than cognitive.² This interest, or "feeling of worthwhileness," constitutes primary meaning which may be distinguished from secondary meaning or significance. Significance is a "pointing forward of the present experience to some other coming and related experience or experiences."³ It implies synthesis, involving psychic integration,

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1. We have taken the liberty of substituting the word "escape" here for the word "flight" which appears in the list which is otherwise reproduced without change from Drever's "Introduction to the Psychology of Education." Our reason for making the substitution is the fact that Drever himself does so in a later work. See Drever and Drummond: The Psychology of the Pre-School Child (1930), pp. 24 ff.
 2. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), Ch. VI.
 3. Ibid., p. 131.

and hence past experience. Whereas primary meaning is affective only, secondary meaning is both affective and cognitive, and inclusive of significance. Meaning is a relation,¹ and instinct interest, or primary meaning, is the felt relation of an object to an impulse which it determines. And secondary meaning "is essentially based upon primary meaning, both as regards its affective, and as regards its cognitive aspect, for a whole is a whole and a part a part, in cognitive meaning, only through the fundamental relation to the self, that is, through primary meaning or interest."² We shall have occasion again to note the importance of interest when we come to consider the topic of value.

The phrase "secondary meaning" is a short-hand symbol for the fact that some detail or fragment of an antecedent situation may become adequate to touch off a consequent of the type formerly evoked by the more complex antecedent of which the now potent fragment was then but a part.³ Thus signification or secondary meaning has four factors: (1) the present cue or item which we may call the sign; (2) the instigative potency, stimulus value, or signifying power of the sign; (3) the response or consequent, the significance, which the present cue instigates; (4) the former context, the signified, for which the present sign is a surrogate, and of which it was a partial or concurrent detail.⁴

1. Cf. Morgan: Emergent Evolution (1923); Ch. IV.

2. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), p. 141.

3. Hollingworth: Psychology (1928), p. 5; Cf. also Ch. IX.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 146-147.

Professor Hollingworth points out how the classical theories of meaning have each exalted one or another of these factors.

The 'transcendental' theory noted the very important fact that the present item functions for something larger than itself. The 'fringe' theory noted that the term 'context' is always applicable to a meaningful situation. The 'motor' theory observed that the consequent often is actually an overt movement on the part of an organism. The 'suggestion' theory correctly observed that meaning always does involve sequences, in which one event instigates another. The 'soul structure' theory noted, what is actually a fact, that that which gives the sign its significance is not usually any describable present pattern in nature, and yet it is effectively registered. But this theory located the effective context 'in the soul' rather than in the part.¹

These theories usually proceed as though the one exalted factor described the fullness of meaning. But meaning does not consist of one or another of these factors in isolation. If the mind is a dynamic, cumulative, recapitulative integration, then the presentation of any cue or sign revives the whole past more or less completely and issues in activity which may be preponderantly conative, affective, or cognitive, but never exclusively one nor another. Depending upon the manner of its former organization in the field of experience² a recurring fragment may arouse emotion, suggest an image, or stimulate overt activity of some sort as in the case of sentiments, associated ideas, and habits. And on a still higher level meanings are organized into systems which we call ideals, concepts, and purposes.

1. Hollingworth: Psychology (1928), p. 147.

2. Koehler: Gestalt Psychology (1929), Ch. VIII; esp. p. 300.

Such organization would be impossible without the use of symbols. Any cue or sign possessing instigative potency or signifying power by virtue of its organization as a fragment of previous experience is a symbol. Some symbols act as dynamic centers of growing systematizations of ideas, interests, emotions, impulses, action patterns, etc. Such symbols may be of various kinds, as objects, motions, postures, words, etc. An individual may and usually does have private symbols, understood and used by himself alone to represent systems of meaning which are more or less personal and private.¹ Probably most of our symbols are understood and used by groups. Examples of such socially accepted symbols are ceremonies, flags, languages, etc. Ogden and Richards in an interesting study of the science of the symbolism of language have shown that it has two major functions, namely, the representation of facts and the expression of attitudes.² These are called, respectively, the symbolic and the emotive use of language.³ This is an extremely important distinction in the study of religion and we shall have occasion to return to it more than once in our discussion.

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1. Cf. Hollingworth's description of a general planning a campaign: As he stands before the map, having noted the position of the enemy and of his own troops, "a slow backward movement of the hand conveniently represents a steady retreat." Eye movements and right and left have their various meanings, etc. Psychology (1928), p. 138.
 2. Ogden and Richards: The Meaning of Meaning (1923), pp. 356 ff.
 3. Cf. Wieman: Religious Experience and the Scientific Method (1926), Ch. II, pp. 48 ff.
Cf. also Laird: The Idea of Value (1929), p. 307.

11. Value

There seems to be no doubt at all that primary meaning and primary value, as qualifying experience at the perceptual level, are both rooted in interest or the feeling of worthwhileness.¹ This view is ably defended by Professor Perry² who expands it into a general theory of value and argues that interest constitutes value. He writes:

Interest is not an immediate cognition of value qualities in its object, but is made of the organism, enacted, sensed, or possibly felt, and qualifying the object through being a response to it. To like or dislike an object is to create that object's value. To be aware that one likes or dislikes an object is to cognize that object's value. But this awareness is no more (or no less) an interest than any other awareness whatsoever. And even if it be an interest it is not that interest which is its value-object.³

Or as he phrases his view in a later work, "Value in the generic sense attaches promiscuously to all objects of all interests."⁴

In opposition to Professor Perry's general theory, Professor John Laird raises two pertinent objections.⁵ In the first place, he urges the importance of the principle of non-indifference in nature below the level of consciousness and

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1. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), Ch. VI, p. 133.
 2. Perry: The Definition of Value, Jrnl. Phil. Psych., Vol. II (1914).
Perry: General Theory of Value (1926).
 3. Perry: The Definition of Value, Jrnl. Phil. Psych., Vol. II (1914), p. 153.
 4. Perry: General Theory of Value (1926), p. 28.
 5. Laird: The Idea of Value (1929).

therefore below the level of interest, and he calls this the principle of Natural Election.¹ Then he asks whether, since natural election admittedly provides the context for psychological interest, it may not constitute the value in which psychological interest may indeed participate but which need not be mental at all.²

Mr. Perry thinks that the very meaning of value reveals something notably characteristic of man; and Mr. Prall (also an advocate of the Interest theory)³ has a predilection for values which are notably characteristic of cats. Yet why should either of them stop where he does? If cats why not beetles, and if beetles, why not potatoes, and if potatoes why not magnets and filings? Magnets do concern filings; and if it does not matter whether or not we are aware of our likings, why should it matter whether or not there are any likings at all. If things are consumed with and take account of, one another, is not that enough? So far as I can see it is a mere dogma that values are peculiarly characteristic either of men or of cats.⁴

Professor Laird's second objection to Perry's view is that Perry's standards of value cannot really be derived from a subjective principle of preference without presupposing rational insight into values, or timology.

Clearly, preference is a fact, whether the preference be psychological or in the way of natural election. In considering the undoubted fact of it, however, we are faced with the entire problem with which this book has been occupied. Is the fact of preference mere brute

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1. Laird: The Idea of Value (1929), pp. 92 ff. Professor Laird quotes from Bacon and from Whitehead: Science and the Modern World (1925), p. 52.
 2. Ibid., p. 106.
 3. Prall: A Study in the Theory of Value.
 4. Laird: The Idea of Value (1929), p. 107.

circumstance and nothing more, or can certain preferences be justified in a rational way? Our conclusion was that our preferences are justified if we prefer what is a greater excellence in the timological sense. Otherwise they simply express the brute circumstance of private or racial constitution.¹

Both these objections against the view that interest constitutes value seem to be entirely justified. The appreciative view is a half-way house between natural election and timology, and it cannot be a satisfactory basis for a general theory of value. And yet interest is in fundamental relation to the generic meaning of value. This relation we believe is not understandable apart from the evolutionary standpoint. We had occasion to point out at some length in Chapter I the fitness of the environment, and the importance of the organic view of the universe. At the level of natural election things take account of one another and make a difference to one another in measurably, though not entirely, predictable ways. At the perceptual level² of life interest is emergent and we believe that at this level interest is the means through which an organism becomes aware of values; not that interest constitutes values. Perhaps even at the perceptual level there is not a one to one correlation between values and interests. If there were, what need would there be for evolutionary advancement?

On the reflective level interest is still active but it is supported by an invaluable ally, namely, intelligence or reason. At the perceptual level, affective-volitional experience or interest

1. Laird: The Idea of Value (1929), p. 359.

2. For discussion of levels of mental activity see below, section 15.

is the only means which the organism has of apprehending value. But at the conceptual or reflective level of mind, values are open to apprehension by rational insight. But as everyone knows, when a person is in a situation the values of which he tries to see and to judge objectively by way of reason, he finds that his interests constantly tempt him to prejudicial conclusions and tend to trip him up in his logic. This shows quite clearly that interest is not superceded by reason.

On the other hand, things not interesting in themselves come to possess value as means to an end which is judged as worthwhile; and other things which are interesting in themselves decrease in value because of the harmful results which we learn to associate with them. At the reflective level, according to Lloyd Morgan, objective values have emergent status in the evolutionary advance of reference, and appreciation has emergent status in the evolutionary advance of enjoyment. Furthermore any system which has intrinsic value is said to possess worth, while the items which go together to make up the system are said to possess objective value in virtue of their relation to the worthwhile systems as a whole. And these worthwhile systems may go together with other related systems in the richer unity of a higher synthesis, taking their places as values in the larger worthwhile system. Applying this principle we work up by successive steps to that system of

practical endeavour or of thought which has greatest and most dominant worth.¹

We believe that this view harmonizes the views of timology, psychological interest, and natural election, and supports the view of the universe as possessing a rational and objective system of value.

12. Emotion

Since the publication of William James' famous article on "What is an Emotion?" in "Mind" in 1884² and of the translation of G. C. Lange's physiological study of the emotions³ about the same time, much speculation and some experimentation regarding the nature of emotion has been carried on, and some progress has been made toward the solution of this important question. James says,

The bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and...our feeling of the same changes as they occur is emotion.⁴

Lange argues that emotion consists exclusively of the functional disturbances of the body, that if you take away the bodily symptoms of a frightened person no fear is left, and that emotions can be brought on by physical means, for example by drinking alcohol.⁵

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1. Morgan: Life, Mind and Spirit (1926), Sec. 43, pp. 261 ff.
 2. James: What Is An Emotion? Mind, 1884, Vol. IX, pp. 188-205. Reprinted in Psychology Classics, Vol. I.
 3. Lange: The Emotions, A Psychophysiological Study. Reprinted in Psychology Classics, Vol. I.
 4. James: What Is An Emotion? Psychology Classics, Vol. I, p. 13.
 5. Lange: The Emotions, A Psychophysiological Study. Psychology Classics, Vol. I, p. 67.

If the James-Lange theory were true then emotion could be properly described in terms of sensation, i.e., sensations of an organic state. But certain experiments make the theory seem extremely doubtful. Sherrington found that by cutting certain nerves he could deprive a dog of nearly all sensations from the interior of the trunk but that the dog's emotions after the operation were as evident as ever.¹ Cannon cut the sympathetic nerves in a cat thus rendering impossible the whole organic state dependent upon these nerves and still the cat showed all the evidences of anger just as before.² Furthermore, Cannon and Maranon injected adrenalin into human subjects thereby artificially inducing the organic state which prevails in emotion; but although some of the subjects reported a feeling of excitement, the actual emotion was not produced.³ Cannon has shown that the organic states characteristic of anger and fear also occur in strenuous muscular activity such as running a race, and that the presence of such a state does not condition the feeling of emotion. So the evidence seems to be conclusive that emotion does not depend upon sensation of an organic state, nor upon the existence of the organic state, although the existence of the organic state may "set the stage," so to speak, for the appearance of the emotion.⁴

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1. Sherrington: Integrative Action of the Nervous System (1906), p. 259.
 2. Cannon: Neural Organization for Emotional Expression, Wittenberg Symposium (1928), p. 262.
 3. Cannon and Maranon: American Journal of Psychology (1927), Vol. 39, p. 106.
 4. Cf. Woodworth: Psychology (1929), p. 308.

Claparède has suggested a modification of the James-Lange theory which is very suggestive. He represents four views schematically as follows:¹

- I. Classical Theory
 1. Perception
 2. Emotion
 3. Organic Reactions

- II. James-Lange Theory
 1. Perception
 2. Organic Reactions
 3. Emotion

- III. Modified Peripheral Theory
 1. Perception
 2. Attitude (of flight)
 3. Feeling (of danger)
 4. Organic Reactions
 5. Emotion (fear)

- IV. Flight Without Emotion
 1. Perception
 2. Attitude (of flight)
 3. Feeling (of danger)
 4. Flight

This schematic presentation reveals at once two important points for our theory of emotion. One is that when escape from a dangerous situation is both immediate and entirely successful such reaction may occur without arousing any feeling of emotion at all. The second important point is his view of the relation of emotion to feeling.

Let us discuss these two points in the order given. First, prompt and successful escape may occur without arousing

1. Claparède: Feelings and Emotions, Wittenberg Symposium (1928), p. 133.



fear. The presumption then is that if escape is either delayed or difficult then the emotion of fear will almost certainly develop. This is exactly the view which Claparède maintains: "Emotion occurs only when action is not possible," he says.¹ He then proceeds to criticize McDougall's theory that every instinct has a primary emotion as its core and says that it is more just to say that emotion is the miscarriage of conduct.² Similar views are widely held. In the Wittenberg Symposium, Howard, following Kantor, says, "Emotion means frustration of adaptive behaviour."³ Carr refers to an emotional situation as "one for which there is no appropriate response or one to which we are unable to respond for the time being."⁴ With Carr's view Woodworth,⁵ Drever,⁶ and Cannon⁷ would be in agreement.

Concerning the nature and function of emotion, Cannon, through psycho-physiological experiments, has shown that: (1) The muscular and neuro-visceral arrangement for the display of the emotions has its central control in or near a phylogenetically ancient part of the brain, the optic thalamus; (2) When the cortical government is set aside, the subordinate activities, released from

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1. Claparède: Feelings and Emotions, Wittenberg Symposium (1928), p. 126.
 2. Ibid., p. 127.
 3. Howard: A Functional Theory of the Emotions, Wittenberg Symposium (1928), p. 141.
 4. Carr: The Differentia of an Emotion, Wittenberg Symposium (1928), p. 234.
 5. Woodworth: Psychology (1929), p. 309.
 6. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), p. 157.
 7. Cannon: Neural Organization for Emotional Expression, Wittenberg Symposium (1928), p. 258.

inhibition, become prominent, and the emotion becomes intense; (3) Neural mechanisms for the primitive emotions operate in a region outside the range of consciousness, which is associated with the functioning of the cortical neurons. (This explains emotional seizures, emotional dissociation); (4) Emotion as given in consciousness does not result from sensations received from the viscera but arises by irradiation from the thalamus, or by direct connections.¹

Thus we conclude: (1) that emotion serves as a bodily preparation for activity and a reinforcement of impulse and interest; (2) that this reinforcement is needed (a) where an obstacle is to be surmounted, or (b) where a prolonged course in finding the appropriate reaction is necessary;² and (3) that it may be so intense as to cause dissociation of one impulse from the other impulses and from intelligent guidance of activity.³

We may now return to the second point suggested by Claparède's scheme, viz., that the difference between feeling and emotion is one of degree. If he suggests it, Piéron says it.⁴ This question of the relation between feeling and emotion is one to which much attention has been given by psychologists. Probably no better treatment of it can be found than Professor Drever's.

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1. The Wittenberg Symposium (1928), pp. 263-269. Cf. the much extended evidence also in his second edition of Bodily Changes (1929); esp. Chs. XVIII and XIX.
 2. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), p. 161.
 3. *Ibid.*, p. 271.
 4. Piéron: Emotions in Animals and Man, Wittenberg Symposium (1928), p. 286.

The most elementary form of affective experience, he says, is subjective, bipolar excitement qualified as pleasant or unpleasant. Emotion differs from elementary affective experience: (1) in complexity, because it involves conative elements¹ and sensation elements due to organic resonance (Claparède calls it the gestalt of complicated bodily response);² and (2) in dissociation as distinguished from inhibition by drainage. But emotion is like elementary affective experience in its bipolarity. The instinct-feeling may pass immediately into the emotional phase but is still bipolar, "exhibiting one polarity or the other, according as the conative impulse moves freely and rapidly towards its satisfaction, or is retarded or obstructed." Joy and sorrow are the bipolar forms of affective experience in its emotional phase as pleasure and unpleasure are the bipolar forms of elementary affective experience.³

By way of summary we may present the following schema, which may be compared with Claparède's:

I. Emotional Situation:

1. Perception, involving
 - a. Cognition of significant stimulus
 - b. Impulse (to escape)
 - c. Feeling (of value or worthwhileness)
2. Conflict, delay or difficulty
3. Emotion (of fear), involving
 - a. Tension (reinforcing impulse of flight)
 - b. Dissociation
 - c. Bodily responses

1. Cf. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 387, footnote.
 2. Wittenberg Symposium (1928), p. 128.
 3. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), pp. 269-272.

4. Unexpected escape
5. Relief, or the joy phase of emotion

II. Unemotional Situation:

1. Perception, involving
 - a. Cognition of significant stimulus
 - b. Impulse (to escape)
 - c. Feeling (of value or worthwhileness)
2. Immediate and satisfactory escape

If intelligence entirely fails and emotional dissociation becomes complete, overt activity is turned into a blind struggle. Such an extreme form of emotion is probably always harmful and never valuable,¹ especially in human life. But milder forms of emotion may involve just enough dissociation to keep an important situation in the focus of consciousness,² or to enable a person to throw himself with abandon into overt activity;³ and they may give rise to bodily changes which "are directly serviceable in making the organism more effective in the violent display of energy which fear or rage or pain may involve."⁴ The bodily changes are valuable as preparations even if not properly directed in activity.⁵

But just here is one of the most difficult and important questions of psychology, ethics and religion, viz., the systematization and direction of the emotional life. We shall return to

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1. Piéron: Wittenberg Symposium (1928), p. 291.
 2. Cf. Dr. Morton Prince's remarks, Wittenberg Symposium (1928), p. 148. Also, The Unconscious (1914), pp. 452-454.
 3. Woodworth: Psychology (1929), p. 309.
 4. Cannon: Bodily Changes (1929), p. 226.
 5. Ibid., p. 241.

this question in our discussion of sentiment (section 13). It is only necessary to summarize here some of the more important types of situations in which emotion is likely to appear:¹

(1) during fever or intoxication, when the cortex is partly thrown out of function; (2) when the organic state is strong and lively; (3) when the situation is unclear, so that observation gets no facts to guide action; (4) when the goal has been reached and there is nothing to do but to burst forth in joy; (5) when the situation cannot be handled successfully and failure ensues; (6) where resistance is encountered; and (7) when the object of a complex or sentiment is involved.

13. Sentiment

One of the most important facts of psychology is that emotions with their conative forces become linked with ideas. This association is important with respect to ideas because it gives them power; and with respect to the emotions because it is the means of their organization and control. "Without the impulse of a linked emotion ideas would be lifeless, dead, inert, incapable of determining conduct."² But the force derived from an associated emotion makes for their stronger registration and conservation in memory and gives them intensity and conative influence. At the same time, the organization of emotions is

1. Cf. Woodworth: Psychology (1929), p. 309.

2. Prince: The Unconscious (1914), p. 450.

essential for self-control and regulation of conduct, and becomes a safeguard against mental, physiological, and social chaos.¹

The association of an idea with an emotion arises out of experience and is preserved as a mental system. This disposition born of one or more experiences with a certain object and tending to the arousal of a certain pattern or combination of emotions is termed a sentiment.² Shand first pointed out that the word "sentiment" should be reserved in psychology for mental systems or dispositions involving the association of one or more emotions with an object.³ And he is followed by many psychologists including McDougall,⁴ Morton Prince,⁵ Drever,⁶ and others. Shand does not, however, seem to be clear with respect to one point which the following quotation from Professor Drever clears up: "It is only when it functions in conscious process that any sentiment can be described as an idea associated with emotional tendencies. The emotional idea is function, not structure."⁷ Of course, the sentiment as disposition, giving rise to emotion when activated, is regarded as structural in character. The emotional accompaniment is functional.

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1. Prince: The Unconscious (1914), p. 451. Cf. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 164.
 2. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), p. 55.
 3. Shand: Character and the Emotions, Mind, Vol. V., (1896), pp. 217 ff. Also, Foundations of Character (1914), Ch. IV.
 4. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), pp. 126, 164.
 5. Prince: The Unconscious (1914), p. 449. (Prince says that a sentiment is an idea linked with an instinct, by which he means to emphasize the conative as well as the affective aspect of the system).
 6. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), p. 76.
 7. Ibid., p. 112. Cf. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), pp. 126 ff.

Sentiments may be classified either according to affective and conative tendencies (McDougall¹ and Shand²) or according to the nature of their objects (McDougall).³ In the former classification there are three types of sentiments, namely, the love or approach type, the hate or aversion type, and respect. Sentiments of the first type involve a favorable attitude toward and liking for an object. Sentiments of hate express aversion. And respect is like love except that it includes no tender emotion and is principally composed of the positive and negative self-tendencies. McDougall's classification of sentiments according to the nature of their objects also includes three types: Concrete particular, concrete general, and abstract, illustrated respectively by love of a child, love of children in general, and love of justice or virtue. Later writers on the subject have apparently found the classification of sentiments according to their conative tendencies more useful and our discussion will follow that scheme rather than the second.

As we have already suggested, sentiments have a life history. They arise out of experience. An emotional experience, of fear, for example, may be so violent that afterwards even the thought of the object about which the experience was centered will give rise to the emotion. In such a case we say that a sentiment has been formed by one experience. But the origin of a sentiment

1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 165.

2. Shand: Foundations of Character (1914), pp. 57 ff.

3. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 167.

is normally more gradual and its development requires many experiences in which the emotion and object are associated. The rule is that "when any one of the emotions is strongly or repeatedly excited by a particular object, there is formed the rudiment of a sentiment."¹ A further stage is reached where the mere idea of the object becomes capable of producing the same effects as its presence. Drever holds that it is only at this stage or level (the ideational level) that an emotional complex should be called a sentiment.² Whether we use one name for emotional complexes on the perceptual and ideational levels or use different names, to distinguish between them, is a matter of terminology. But the distinction is valid and important and we shall maintain Professor Drever's usage except where special attention is called to the departure. McDougall himself says that a sentiment will not long exist in its rudimentary state, but tends to develop into a more complexly organized state.³

McDougall's description of the development of the sentiment of parental love has deservedly become a classic and since it is so important in developing our point of view with respect to the development of the religious sentiment, the writer begs leave to quote him at length:

By reason of its helplessness, its delicacy, its distresses, the young child evokes sooner or later the tender emotion of the parent, if he is at all

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1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 168.
 2. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), pp. 75-76.
 3. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 167.

capable of this emotion; and if the parent does not, through laziness or under the influence of a bad tradition, restrain the protective impulse, it finds its satisfaction in a series of tender acts. Each time the emotion and its impulse are brought into operation by this particular object they are rendered more easily excitable in the same way, until the mere idea of this object is constantly accompanied by the emotion, however feeble. This gives the object a special power of attracting and holding the attention of the parent, who therefore constantly notices the child's expressions; and these evoke by sympathetic reactions the corresponding feelings and emotions in the parent. Thus all the tender and attracting emotions are repeatedly aroused by this one object, either singly or in combination - pity, wonder, admiration, gratitude, as well as sympathetic pain and pleasure, and quick anger at injury or neglect of the child by others..... But this is not all: the parent is apt to identify the child with himself in a peculiarly intimate way, for he knows that the world in general regards its qualities and its defects as, in a sense, his own; and so his self-regarding sentiment of respect or of pride becomes directly extended to the child; whatever is admirable about it brings satisfaction to his positive self-feeling; whatever is defective humbles him, excites his negative self-feeling; its shame or disgrace is his shame, its triumphs are his triumphs..... To all this must be added yet another factor - every effort and every sacrifice made on the child's behalf, every pain suffered through it, adds to the strength of the sentiment, for with each such incident we feel that we put something of ourselves into the object of the sentiment, and this sense of the accumulation of our efforts and sacrifices gives it an additional value; we come to regard it as an investment in which we have sunk our capital bit by bit, to lose which would be to lose that which embodies our past efforts. In this way the child becomes identified with ourselves, so that, as with any other thing, such as a work of art, or science, to the shaping of which our best powers have been devoted, approval of it gives us pleasure and disapproval pain, equally with approval or disapproval of ourselves.¹

1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), pp. 170-172.

The parental sentiment, growing thus out of a developing experience which is itself conditioned upon the growing sentiment for and the response of the child which is its object, comes to fruition in its completest form in the fusion of the altruistic and the self sentiments. It may exist, however, as wholly or at least predominantly of one or the other of the two types. McDougall suggests that the mother of a mentally defective child may not be able to take any pride in it and yet may cherish it with an emotion which is almost purely tender.¹ And a father's sentiment for his children may be little or not at all tender but merely or predominantly an extension of his self-regarding sentiment. Sentiments are thus seen to vary according to the different emotions which enter into their composition and according to the relative strength of the various component elements.²

From our study of the function of emotion³ it is clear that when any sentiment is awakened by a stimulus its conative force is discharged in three directions: (1) it tends to reinforce the impulse to a certain kind of activity; (2) it generally excites visceral functions preparing the body for activity; (3) it tends to inhibit the conflicting conative forces of such other emotions as would enforce activity in antagonistic directions. It is probable that rarely does any situation awaken only one impulse to activity without conflicting tendencies. The secondary tendencies are often

1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 172.

2. Conklin: Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), p. 66.

3. Vide supra, section 12.

so weak as to create no serious problem, the rule being stated by Morton Prince as follows: "Any affective state may be suppressed by conflict with another and stronger affective state."¹ Many illustrations of this rule might be given. Even a timid mother has no fear for herself when her child is threatened. Love may be suppressed by jealousy or anger; anger by parental instinct; respect by hatred; fear by anger, curiosity, or wonder; sex by anger or fear; anger, fear, self-assertion, play, etc., by the intense emotions of the religious sentiment. From these observations it can be easily seen that the organization of the emotions into sentiments is of extreme importance in the regulation of our conduct and forms the fundamental basis upon which all our judgments of the character and probable conduct of others are based. Our characters are qualified by the manner in which our instinctive and emotional tendencies are organized and the relative strength of the various components of our many sentiments and mental systems. The questions of conflict and systematization will be further discussed in the section dealing with personality (section 16).

14. Ideals

Take now the ideal. How is it related to the sentiment? It is the sentiment raised to a higher self-conscious level. A sentiment, say, of love of justice - how developed it is not necessary here to inquire - becomes an ideal of justice, when the abstract idea of justice defines for the individual an end, which he consciously accepts for

1. Prince: The Unconscious (1914), p. 455.

himself and identifies with the self in the sense already explained,¹ (i.e., when he has the belief and intention that so far as in him lies he is going to carry out a certain line of action²).

As instincts and crude emotions are operative at the perceptual level and sentiments with their attached affects and conative impulses at the ideational level, ideals with the emotional tone and volitional power of the whole self are operative at the conceptional level.

Professor Charters defines an ideal as "a trait (i.e., a characteristic or quality of character) which has become the object of desire."³ But obviously, one may desire a certain character trait without intending to achieve it and believing that one will do so, i.e., without identifying, in imagination, the self with the ideal desired. To define ideal in terms of desire is to leave it on the ideational level, whereas our conception of an ideal involves the conscious understanding and acceptance of a certain type of activity as desirable and the identification of the self with that activity with the intention to achieve it.⁴ It thus becomes, in Professor Hadfield's words

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1. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), p. 138.
 2. Ibid., p. 136.
 3. Charters: The Teaching of Ideals (1928), p. 33.
 4. Cf. Ames: The Psychology of Religious Experience (1910), p. 285. "That which makes an end or ideal of action moral is the fact that it is accepted with awareness; that it is compared with other ends; that it is analyzed; and that it is voluntarily chosen as good."

"the adequate stimulus of the will, the stimulus which is peculiarly adapted to arouse the self into activity," and at least promises to lead to the satisfaction of the whole individual.¹

By means of the individual's ideals his conscious intelligence becomes operative in his own development, self-criticism and remaking. In them he supplies himself with the solutions of extremely intricate and difficult problems of conduct even before the situations involving these problems are confronted. When highly developed they involve the most complex and profound emotion and command the entire conative power of the whole organized self. When activated they are able to inhibit the activity of un-allied instincts and sentiments and sometimes are in such conflict with native tendencies and emotional complexes that they suppress the latter and even expel them from the organization of the self, giving rise to those conditions of repression which are the sources of the phenomena with which pathological psychology deals. Their satisfaction is the source of that deep and lasting joy, which we call happiness and their failure of the profound sorrow which is unhappiness.

In view of our problem in the next chapter of defining the nature of religion it is necessary here to develop a little more in detail the relation between ideals and sentiments. We may ask whether a sentiment, say, of love for another person, is

1. Hadfield: Psychology and Morals (1923), Ch. XI, p. 76.

capable of development on the conceptual level and whether if it is it should still be called a sentiment; i.e., is love always a sentiment or may it be also an ideal?

It is the view of the writer that love may be an ideal, that its highest form is natural to the conceptual level of life. Just as the sentiment of the love of justice becomes an ideal when the idea of justice becomes a consciously accepted end identified with the self, so the sentiment of love for a person becomes an ideal when the welfare of the beloved person defines for the lover an end consciously understood, desired, accepted, and identified with himself. This is ideal love (conceptual level) as contrasted with sentimental love (ideational level).¹ Sentimental love is blind; it cannot see the faults of the beloved because the perception of them is suppressed by admiration, tenderness and pride. That the beloved one is perfect is a cherished illusion which renders almost impossible any real community of mind or any progress in self-knowledge and development of the partners through mutual understanding and criticism, and which threatens the very permanence of the sentiment itself, since the suppressed criticisms gather force and tend to erupt in a manner which is likely to overthrow the sentiment altogether or to destroy its value.²

Ideal love, on the other hand, cherishes no illusions, but gazes with frank and open eyes at the whole life of the

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1. For discussion of mental levels see below, section 15.
 2. Wieman: Religious Experience and the Scientific Method (1926), p. 92.

beloved - the individual of the past, present and future, of many times and places. In the beloved, love sees the best beneath the apparent worst and has the power to awaken the best and to make it live and grow in recreative power; and in the beloved when he is at his best, love also sees the worst and through sharing its consequences overcomes its power. The standard which ideal love understands, accepts, and works for in the beloved, is the harmony and complete development of the person. Love of persons thus takes on, at the conceptual level, creative and transforming impulse and power. It becomes the way of salvation and of life.

For its fullest and most complete realization ideal love requires the long continued and intimate association of two people living together in personal affection. It requires a life-time of thoughtful and well-disciplined devotion for its perfection. It requires also that two such individuals must share the great problems of life and death in the bonds of affection and active sympathy. And the third requirement for the perfection of ideal love is that two such people in the sharing of the great problems of life and death must have some object which is precious to them both, and to which their lives are committed.¹ Not only the individual but love itself must lose itself in order to find itself.

Ideal love is sentimental love grown intelligent, i.e., raised to the conceptual level. It is the response in

1. Wieman: The Issues of Life (1930), Ch. II.

terms of mature emotion and intelligent conduct to a person regarded as an end in himself, cognized as valuable on the timological level of rational insight. Admiration which appears in the sentiment of love as a blending of wonder and negative self-feeling¹ appears in the ideal of love in the form of active contemplation or worshipful thinking which uses all the results of science but adds something which science does not have. For example, as Wieman says:

The genetic psychologist can never know the child as the parent knows him, unless the psychologist can also love and contemplate. The genetic psychologist may assist the parent to know his own child, but it is the parent and not the psychologist who will know the child most profoundly, providing the parent is willing to learn from the psychologist. And this will not be due to the fact that the parent has more constant association with the child and so will learn much from trial and error. We refer to something very different. We refer to that receptivity to the concrete experience of the child which goes only with the contemplative attitude. We refer, furthermore, to that response of innumerable impulses in the parent to the child, which are not awakened in the psychologist. All this wealth of experience and response in the parent will not necessarily yield correct knowledge. The parent may be subject to the most grotesque illusions concerning the child. But if the parent is willing to learn from the psychologist, to have his errors corrected and his ideas clarified, then he can know the child as the psychologist never can.²

At the sentimental level love is primarily a way of feeling but on the higher level of ideals it is a way of knowing and a way of

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1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 129
 2. Wieman: Religious Experience and the Scientific Method (1926), pp. 72-73.

acting quite equal to or surpassing the importance of its way of feeling.

15. Levels of Mental Activity

The notion of planes or levels of mental development and activity is an extremely important one for the psychology of religion. It should be remembered that the higher level never supercedes the lower level upon which it supervenes, and which is involved in the higher systematization. However, it is equally important to remember that in the higher level there is genuine novelty and that the whole activity of the higher level depends upon this new emergence and synthesis. In this statement we follow the principle of emergence. In emphasis it is slightly different from Professor Drever's view that "nothing emerges at any stage, the germ of which was not present at an earlier stage; nothing that is present at any stage, but is carried on in some form or other into later stages."¹ Otherwise we follow the principles of his discussion.² On the cognitive side the levels may be designated respectively as (1) perceptual, (2) ideational, and (3) rational or conceptual. The affective aspect of mental life may be regarded as involving the levels of (1) immediate feeling or crude emotion, (2) sentiment, and (3) ideal or principle. The levels of conation are (1) impulse, (2) desire, and sentiment-determined impulse, and (3) purpose.

1. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), pp. 61-62.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 61-64.

16. Personality

As we have already seen (Chapter I) "mind" refers to that integration and coordination of the activities and strivings of living organisms, and is directly observable only as it finds expression in behaviour or in experience. Although mind may in some sense be attributed to all living creatures which adjust themselves or their environment in such a way as to maintain their integrity and satisfy their desires, there are different levels of mental life and at the highest level it takes on the characteristics which we signify by the term "personality."

Even at the perceptual level - the level of moment-to-moment experience where ideas are not yet possible - we must assume that there is some sort of psychological entity corresponding to the sentiment of self on the ideational level, and the organized or ideal self on the rational level. Whatever this psychological entity may be, it occupies a privileged position among the mental systems of this level which with Professor Drever¹ we may call complexes. This psychological entity we may call the self-complex, and since a mechanics of complexes interacting with one another is quite inadequate to explain the behaviour of the living being, we ascribe to it a privileged position, from which, by virtue of self-tendencies and self-feelings of a rudimentary sort, it possibly exercises some measure of influence and control over other instinctive

1. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), Ch. VII. The argument in this section follows Drever's exposition except where other references are given.

tendencies and complexes.

When the ideational level is reached the normal self-complex becomes the self-sentiment with the integrating factor of the idea of the self. Whether the self-complex at the perceptual level has power to inhibit or reinforce other tendencies we may not be entirely certain, though the presumption is that it must have some such power. But of the power of inhibition and reinforcement at the ideational level there can be no question. We have already seen (section 13, above) the effect of conflicting tendencies. Tendencies and complexes and even other sentiments may come into conflict with the self-sentiment and either be temporarily suppressed and inhibited or suffer complete and permanent repression. It is only in the latter case when they are completely and permanently expelled from consciousness that they may continue active as subconscious processes and give rise to pathological phenomena.

The normal way for a tendency, complex or sentiment to function is, as it were, with the approval and cooperation of the self - i.e., through the psychological entity, on whatever level, which represents the organized mental life of the organism. It is with this mental organization that consciousness (which may be defined as awareness) is associated as a supervenient quality which makes a difference in the total life of the individual and in the functioning of any impulse or tendency. At the ideational level the

consciousness of self makes its appearance and it is about the idea of the self that the self sentiment is formed.

Something like consciousness and even a rudimentary self-consciousness may accompany the functioning of systems of tendencies and complexes which have been expelled from the normal self organization. Morton Prince has shown that violent emotional complexes may be expelled (i.e. dissociated) from the normal self organization and, consequently, from the influence of consciousness and that they may carry on more or less independent existence, or may serve as dynamic centers for subconscious organization, and may even develop a rudimentary consciousness comparable to the consciousness which is associated with the normal self. Such dissociated factors may find expression in dreams, amnesia and various functional disorders, or if the subconscious organization (the secondary or coconscious personality) is sufficiently strong it may even temporarily or permanently supplant the normal conscious organization and function as the principal consciousness. In this case there is complete amnesia in each coconscious system for the experiences of the other.

But the repression and permanent dissociation of a complex or of a coconscious system does not eliminate it. Instead of functioning normally through the self it functions abnormally and independently of the self, that is to say, it functions outside the limits of recognition by the self in the unconscious in various degrees. So far as it is repressed it cannot determine behaviour directly but gives rise indirectly to projection, rationalization,

defense and compensatory behaviour, or various other sorts of symptomatic expression.

On the rational or conceptual level the self takes on a more complete and rational character than is possible at the lower levels. The transition from the sentiment of self at the ideational level to the rationally accepted or ideal self on the conceptual level is similar to the development of love from a sentiment to an ideal (section 14). Intelligence becomes a factor in the organization of knowledge, emotion, and activity. Self-development of a new order becomes possible. The individual may now understand the situations of life in even wider and more meaningful contexts, to some extent rationally control his emotional associations and responses, and redirect his impulses toward more significant personal and social ends. This possibility is the basis of all culture and civilization, and underlies the achievement of personal and social harmony and happiness. Furthermore, it is the basis of mental therapeutics, underlying such principles as sublimation, analysis and re-education.

A whole lifetime is far too short, at the present state of our knowledge, for the achievement of the complete self. Many people, perhaps most people, get but a little way beyond the ideational level - the level of sentiment - either in love or in self-development, and consequently in religion. There are in most of us many dissociated, unharmonized mental factors and dispositions

which influence our personalities, but which we do not accept as belonging to our selves. And for this reason there is a difference between the self and the personality. The personality is the whole mental system, conscious and unconscious. The self is the harmoniously organized and accepted dominant system within the personality.¹ The ideal is that the complete self and the complete personality should be one, and among all our dispositions there should be harmony and peace.

1. Cf. Hadfield: Psychology and Morals (1923), Chs. VIII to XIII.

Chapter III

THE NATURE OF RELIGION

Although religion may not rightly be regarded as an instinct, it has its roots in that which is generically human. Neither can religion be identified with one particular aspect of experience because religious experience is always cognitive, affective, and conative, all three, and not exclusively one nor another. And it is a mistake to define religion as experience in an inclusive sense because to do so is to neglect the consequences of experience which certainly belong to the concept of religion. But to define religion as an attitude is to make the opposite mistake of neglecting the antecedent experience of which the attitude is the consequence. Both must be included in an adequate conception of religion. It is defined as consisting primarily of the activities of individuals or communities through which they seek a satisfactory relationship to God as they conceive him, and secondarily of the conserved products of those activities, in the individual in the form of religious dispositions, and in the community in the form of social institutions. Existing religious dispositions and institutions at any given moment partly condition the religious experience ensuing and are in turn modified by that experience. Two types of religious disposition are discussed. The religious sentiment as characteristic of the ideational level is relatively uncritical while the religious ideal, which is possible on the reflective level, makes use of reflective thought and is typical of the most advanced religious development.

In the present chapter we shall examine certain typical and current views regarding the nature of religion which from the point of view of psychology appear inadequate, and then formulate, if possible, a more satisfactory psychological conception of religion.

17. Religion and Instinct

From the time of Augustine's classical introspection regarding the restlessness of the man who has not found his rest in God to the present time it has been popular to view religion as a native impulse. Even Starbuck assumes without argument that religion is an instinct.¹ And recently Professor W. P. Paterson, of Edinburgh, in opposition to McDougall who denies that religion is an instinct,² asserts not only that man is endowed with "a moral instinct," but that "man, however he has acquired them, is certainly moved now by religious tendencies of the instinctive sort."³ Thereafter he speaks of the religious instinct.⁴ Accepting McDougall's definition of instinct Professor Paterson says:

In virtue of an innate disposition man has been determined to pay attention to a class of divine or sacred objects, he has experienced a peculiar emotional excitement, and he has been instigated to act in a characteristic way.... Man has a general sense of the existence of a higher world which promises him satisfaction, while the spiritual appetite may also be quickened by the perception of objects possessed of what Otto has called the numinous quality, in which he has recognized the presence or manifestation of the Divine.... There is a religious feeling which contains something more than is found in fear, or awe or reverence..... The conative reaction characteristic of the religious instinct is the impulse to draw near to the divine object for the satisfaction of desire, but as in the case of hunger this primary impulse may be overborne by other influences and the results may be indifference or even repulsion.⁵

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1. Starbuck: The Psychology of Religion (1900), p. 7.
 2. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), pp. 91-92, 309.
 3. Paterson: The Nature of Religion (1928), p. 99.
 4. *Ibid*, Ch. III, section III.
 5. *Ibid*, p. 101.

Professor Paterson quotes Lloyd Morgan to the effect that "the moral and religious sentiments so widely prevalent in mankind, though they assume varied conditions, have an instinctive basis in the human constitution."¹ If Professor Paterson means only to maintain that the religious sentiment (in the accepted psychological usage of the word "sentiment") has an instinctive basis, then certainly we must agree with him. But when he goes on to call religion an instinct of the appetitive sort comparable to hunger, he is taking up a position which can be satisfactory to neither psychology nor religion. From the psychological point of view it is assuming a simplicity in religion which is not substantiated in the observation of experience and from the point of view of religion it makes simplicity and clearness impossible just at the point where they are most urgently needed, i.e., in the understanding of the nature and meaning of religion. Fear is instinctive in character and can be identified in a white mouse or an African bushman or a civilized Anglo-Saxon. But religion cannot be so identified just because it is an exceedingly complex experience which varies with the number, relative strength, and mode of organization of its various components.

When one reads the whole of Professor Paterson's enlightening and inspiring discussion of "The Nature of Religion," however, one feels very uncertain that criticisms offered above

1. Paterson: The Nature of Religion (1928), p. 100.

really touch the main points of his argument. Toward the close of the introductory chapter he writes, "Finally, it may be observed, and the present course of lectures will be largely concerned with sustaining and developing the thesis, that religion has made a many-sided appeal to man, and has laid hold of human nature in the multiplicity and manifoldness of its interests and principles of action."¹ One suspects that in discussing religion as instinct Professor Paterson's language is intended to be more lively and figurative than coldly scientific. For example, he speaks of the religious instinct as a form of appetite akin to hunger and thirst and says that "a want and craving of this appetitive kind is implied" in the following words of Jesus: "He that cometh to me shall not hunger, etc."² And he goes on to speak of "bodily and spiritual appetites."³ One gains the impression that Professor Paterson does not mean the same thing here by the word appetite that, let us say, Drever means by it in "Instinct in Man." For Drever has shown that instead of organizing or being organized with the multiplicity and manifoldness of the interests and principles of action of human nature, the appetitive tendencies are exactly those which are incapable of such organization.⁴ It is unthinkable that Professor Paterson would reduce religion to the level of an appetite and interpret it as a pleasure-seeking principle. If it

1. Paterson: Nature of Religion (1928), p. 28.

2. Ibid., p. 101.

3. Ibid., p. 28.

4. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), pp. 126 ff.

be objected that he intends to indicate a spiritual appetite in contrast to the bodily appetites, the reply is that there is no other kind of appetite but spiritual or mental. Hunger is a psychological experience although it may be an experience of a physiological condition. There are bodily conditions but there are no bodily appetites.

Of course one can acquire an appetite for the pleasurable accompaniments of any intense emotional experience. And, no doubt, many people do cultivate and acquire such appetites, even the appetite for religious excitement. But one does not imagine that Professor Paterson can mean this, and even if he did mean such a thing by the word appetite it would not be instinctive but acquired.

If Professor Paterson and others have used unfortunate terminology in calling religion an instinct, at least all such iterations have the merit of calling attention to the important fact that religion is related to the essential nature of man. Professor Conklin, following Coe,¹ rejects the instinct theory of religion.

He says:

Religion cannot be attributed to a single basic drive coordinate with the others, which is but another way of saying that religion cannot be reduced to an instinct even when instinct is thought of in terms of the drive concept. Certain rather over-ardent analysts of human nature have sought to reduce all these drives to one fundamental drive. Even if that were achieved, it would not justify the assertion that religion is the expression of an instinct, but rather that religion, along with all other human behaviour, would be

1. Cf. Coe: The Psychology of Religion (1916), Ch. XIX.

thought of as one among many manifestations of that one fundamental drive or instinct.¹

It is our belief that religion is not an instinct, that it does not emerge until the ideational level of mind is reached, that it then comes into being as an organization of instinctive responses, and that at that level it exists as a sentiment. The restlessness which impels men to religion is the restlessness of mental disorganization and discord.

Various attempts have been made to define religion in terms of one of the instincts such as sex, gregariousness, self-assertion, etc. These cannot be discussed here but will be dealt with in some detail when we take up the theories of the origin of religion.

18. Religion and Experience

Innumerable attempts have been made to define religion in terms of one or another of the three major aspects of experience, viz., the cognitive, affective, and conative aspects. This is probably due to the fact that the religious experience finds expression (1) intellectually, in theological systems; (2) emotionally, in forms of art; and (3) practically, in strong character and codes of high moral conduct.² Whatever else may be said of religion it cannot be denied that there is in the religious experience an element of curiosity, of wonder, resulting in an effort to under-

1. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), p. 27.

2. Cf. *Ibid.*, Ch. VI, pp. 71 ff.

stand a fundamentally unclear experience. Since the dawn of history man has sought a system of thought in terms of which he could explain his religious perceptions and feelings. No generation has been without its leaders who have pondered the intellectual formulations of the past, and it is only natural that those who were philosophically inclined should come to regard these intellectual expressions of religion as constituting religion.

Religion finds expression, too, in various forms of art - in music, drama, ritual, ceremony, painting, sculpture, architecture, etc. Religious emotion may also find expression in the various phenomena of crude excitement which sometimes accompany religious revivals. The feeling of relief resulting from the dissociating effect of strong emotion has often led to the development of an appetite for the enjoyment of the excitement induced by these forms of religious expression and by emotional mysticism of an extreme sort, and consequently to the valuing of them as ends in themselves and to the conception of religion as essentially emotional in character.

Likewise, the appreciation of character and the development of conduct codes has led on to the development of legalism and definition of religion in terms of the conative side of life.

And it is not only among believers that such misconceptions arise, but also among those who scorn religion. Some of the most vigorous opponents of religion have seen the emptiness of worn-out

theology, or have become satiated with emotional excitement, or have become weary and disgusted with the prudery and hypocrisy of a shallow moralism associated with religion; and they have reacted violently against these experiences in the blind belief that they were opposing religion.

On the other hand, exactly this over-emphasis on one aspect of experience in religion to the neglect of the others has provided the setting in which the reconstructive work of the great prophets of religion has always been carried out. Amos opposing an empty and immoral ritualism with a religion of righteousness, and Hosea's indictment of an impossible legalism in the interest of a religion of love, are examples.¹

These periodic styles in the definition of religion, emphasizing one or another of the aspects of experience, or "departments of the mind," as comprising its essence are not without their parallels in our day. In the eighteenth century the rationalistic view dominated the theology of the West. This period was succeeded by a revival of emotionalism. The Wesleyan revivals, Schleiermacher's writings in the field of theology, the evolutionary hypothesis emphasizing the importance of feeling and conation associated with instinct, and the emphasis on conversion in religious psychology since the publication of Starbuck's "Psychology of Religion," have all contributed at different times and in various ways to the conception of religion in terms of feeling and emotion.

1. Mr. Von Ogden Vogt in his "Art and Religion" (1921), gives a most valuable discussion of the alternation between the periodic emphases of the various aspects of experience in the religions of Judaism and Christianity. See especially Ch. VI.

More recently the writings of Ames, Jevons, Irving King, Durkheim, and others of the same school have drawn attention to the importance of the social or ethical element in religion and even go so far as to define religion in terms of moral ideals or social consciousness.¹ It is probable that the emotional interpretation of religion which we have noticed was a reaction against the cold intellectualism which preceded it and that the social interpretation was a reaction against the individualism of the nineteenth century.

A given experience may be predominantly cognitive, affective, or conative but it cannot be exclusively one nor another of these three. These three phases or aspects of experience are abstractions of qualities of a larger whole and have no existence apart from the whole to which they all belong. They are not elements of experience. An element of experience would certainly have to include cognition of an object or idea, a feeling (at least of interest or worthwhileness) with respect to that object or idea, and some activity (even if only a set or attitude of the organism) as a result.

It is with due regard to the principles of modern psychology that Dr. Kenneth Edward, in his Kerr Lectures, defines religion in terms of experience.² In explanation of his use of the word "experience" he says:

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1. Cf. Ames: The Psychology of Religious Experience (1910). He says that religion "consists in" social consciousness. (p. 168). Again: "If religion is identified with the most intimate and vital phase of the social consciousness, then the distinction between morality and religion is not real."
 2. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 18.

I may say that I select the term experience because of its breadth - because I require a term.... that should include the whole religious life, including its activities, its beliefs, its thoughts as well as its feelings.¹

Whether the word experience is the best word for Dr. Edward's purpose some may doubt, but it seems abundantly clear that any definition which attempts to identify religion exclusively with any one of its expressions, such as theology, ritual, or conduct codes, or with any one phase of experience, such as knowing, feeling, or acting, cannot possibly stand the critical examination of modern psychology. Religion may be thought of as experience, but as experience it is always cognitive, affective, and conative; and not one of these alone without the others.

Of course a given experience may be predominantly intellectual, emotional or conative. For example I may have an experience of a bear as I observe him quietly sleeping in his cage; or, alone and unarmed in the woods, I may experience a bear as he rushes toward me in a furious attack; or again, I may experience a bear as I stand, club in hand, between him and my wife or child. In the first instance my experience would be principally cognitive; in the second, overwhelmingly emotional; and in the third, predominantly conative, though probably highly emotional also. .

The difference between these experiences seems to depend on the relation of the object to our values. Any object which bears an important relation to us or to something which we prize is

1. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 20.

inevitably viewed with increased interest. If the relation grows critical to such an extent that our habitual modes of response are broken down and we can think of no new plan of adjustment to relieve the tension, our emotional response may become extremely violent even to the extent of dissociating cortical influences and our behaviour may become a blind instinctive struggle.

Since the strength of the emotional and conative aspects of experience so obviously depends upon the relationship of an object to our values, it is important in defining religion as experience to say not only what it is an experience of but to indicate whether it may have any important bearing upon our values. Dr. Edward's definition only partly answers this need. He says that religion is "an experience of God and of our relationship with him."¹ But he does not define the concept of the Religious Object in such a way as to indicate how important that relationship may be. Professor Pratt's definition which we take up in the next section serves as a valuable suggestion at this point.

Our serious objection to defining religion as experience is that it gives us no clue to the solution of the problem of religious development. If religion is an experience, then what is the relation of that experience to our sentiments, ideals, habits, character? In what sense may a person be said to be religious? Is it because he had once a religious experience or because he habitually has religious experiences? How is religious experience

1. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 18.

propagated? How developed in the young? How developed in the race? These are fundamental questions of pressing importance which such a definition seems to leave unanswered. And they are questions for the solution of which any adequate conception of religion must certainly provide the basis.

Another objection to this definition is that it seems to draw an unnecessary distinction between religious behaviour and religious experience, between objective activity and subjective activity, and to identify religion only with subjective activity or "inner" experience. This cannot be satisfactory to those who regard both objective activity and subjective activity, or behaviour and experience, as activity of the whole individual in dynamic interaction with his environment. This view we have presented at some length in the introduction and needs no further comment here.¹

19. Religion as Attitude

Among some writers who have sought a new psychological concept adequate to symbolize the meaning of religion without identifying it with one of the traditional departments of the mind the word "attitude" has become popular. For example,

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1. The general objections raised in this section are applicable also to the views of Dr. E. S. Waterhouse as expressed in his admirable volume entitled "The Philosophy of Religious Experience" (1923).

Professor James Bissett Pratt defines religion as

the serious and social attitude of individuals or communities toward the power or powers which they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies.¹

The word attitude is intended to cover the responsive side of consciousness which is found in "attention, interest, expectancy, feeling, tendencies to reaction, etc." Religion

is not a doctrine nor a law nor an hypothesis but an attitude, and essentially an attitude of expectancy. Its real and basal question is not, What is the Cause or the Ultimate Nature of the World? but What is going to become of me - or of us - and what is the attitude of the Determiner of Destiny toward us and our interests?²

Professor Pratt enumerates the advantages of defining religion as an attitude as follows:

It shows that religion is not a matter of any one 'department' of psychic life but involves the whole man. It includes what there was of truth in the historical attempts to identify religion with feeling, belief or will. And it draws attention to the fact that religion is immediately subjective, thus differing from Science (which emphasizes 'content' rather than 'attitude'); and yet it points to the other fact also that religion involves and presupposes the acceptance of the objective. Religion is the attitude of a self toward an object in which the self genuinely believes.³

Defining religion as an attitude is certainly better than calling it an instinct, an emotion, a belief, or an ethics. But there are many kinds of attitudes, favorable and unfavorable.

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1. Pratt: The Religious Consciousness (1920), p. 2.
 2. Ibid., p. 6.
 3. Ibid., p. 3.

Professor Pratt says that religion is a serious and social attitude. By using the word serious he means to contrast the religious attitude with frivolous matters. Religion is important, serious; it deals with the great values, with matters of life and death. By saying that religion is a social attitude Professor Pratt does not intend to suggest that religion must have a personal object; but that it must not be mechanical nor coldly intellectual. "It must have some faint touch of that social quality which we feel in our relations toward anything that can make response to us. It is only in this incipient way that the religious attitude need be social."¹

But even with these qualifications the definition is open to serious objections. In the first place it does not enable us to distinguish religion from magic. One might be ever so serious, and ever so expectant of response from the Determiner of Destiny and still seek to make the superhuman order his slave instead of his ally. In the second place an attitude of avoidance or fear under this definition is as truly religious as an attitude of love. Caliban is religious no less truly than the Christian. Devils also believe and tremble but are they on that account religious? The third objection is that it defines religion in terms which are secondary. An attitude is the consequence of experience, and the best established attitudes are the product of much experience of a particular kind. "One must be cautious about defining religion as fundamentally an attitude lest one define religion in terms of that which is secondary."²

1. Pratt: The Religious Consciousness (1920), p. 3.

2. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), p. 36.

In spite of these shortcomings, however, Professor Pratt's definition is extremely suggestive. It involves five points which deserve careful attention in any adequate definition of religion: (1) it emphasizes the importance of the psychological factor (the "inner life") rather than the objective "content" of experience; (2) it identifies religion with the whole life of the person rather than with an isolated aspect of experience; (3) it represents religion as involving a serious concern for the great values; (4) the religious subject is conceived as believing these values to be related to the nature of the Universe - that is, that they have superhuman significance; (5) the religious subject is thought of as expecting the Universe, the Determiner of Destiny, or Religious Object to make a response to him.

20. A Psychological Conception of Religion

In the preceding sections of this chapter we have examined several conceptions of religion expressed in psychological terms and noted some of their values and shortcomings. We now seek a more satisfactory psychological definition. For such a definition two large sources of data are available, namely, the data obtained by the direct observation of human activities¹ and the data obtained from the study of institutions which are the result of human activities. For the direct observation of human activity two methods

1. It will be remembered that in the writer's usage the word activity embraces behaviour and experience.

have been developed, the introspective method and the objective method. Of these the introspective method is by far the most important in the study of the psychology of religion because the objective method has thus far been applied with so little success in the study of religion that it has yielded practically no material of any importance. A vast amount of data of an autobiographical and psychologically inexact sort is available as a result of the recorded introspections of religious men and women. And this material, as Starbuck, James, Pratt and others have shown, reveals the general trend and nature of religious experience and conduct. The institutional sources of our data are found in theologies, religious writings, rituals, lives of the saints, modes of religious organization, and the expression of religion in symbolism and art of various kinds.¹

The psychologist must form his conception of religion after examination of the data from all these sources, i.e., he must use the data available in the results of the other sciences. The truest conception will be the one which is the most adequate to the interpretation of all the data. Many definitions of religion have been generalizations from only one phase of religion, or one section of the available data. For example, a definition of religion in terms of sacred forms and ceremonies is manifestly erroneous since it ignores entirely the data from religious experience in favor of the

1. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), pp. 40-45.

institutional source. A corresponding error is made in the opposite direction when one defines religion in terms of feeling without due regard to the institutional products of religious activity. Professor Conklin goes so far as to say that "a psychological definition of religion must include both the experiential and the institutional, and it must also include all that is religiously experiential and all that is religiously institutional."¹ He continues:

On the one hand religion involves certain portions of human behaviour and on the other hand it includes all the institutional products of that behaviour. There remains only the determination of that feature which differentiates religious behaviour from other kinds of behaviour. This differentiating feature of religious behaviour is the fact that it centers about belief in some form of concept of God..... In its briefest form then the term religion may be defined as designating that behaviour and those behaviour products which are associated with a belief attitude toward some concept of a God or Gods.²

In the first place, it is necessary to understand what Professor Conklin means by the word behaviour. In a previous chapter he makes his meaning abundantly clear in the following words:

Behaviour is a very convenient term and in its use here there is not the slightest intention of excluding consciousness from its designation. The term religious behaviour well describes that inclusive range of human experience in which are feelings and emotions aroused by worshipful situations, by habits of prayer, by ceremonies elaborate or simple; in which are thoughts of the deity and of properties of conduct motivated by religious feelings; in which are the lives of the saints and the martyrs and the missionary heroes; and in which are the activities resulting in religious architecture, statuary, painting, and music.³

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1. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), p. 46.
 2. Ibid., pp. 46-47.
 3. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

While agreeing with all that Professor Conklin here intends to designate by the word behaviour, according to our usage we should have to substitute for behaviour the word activity, and our reasons have been fully stated in Chapter I. If psychology is the study of activity it seems clear that a psychological definition of religion must be stated in psychological terms and religion must be defined in terms of activity.

It seems that, psychologically defined, religion unquestionably consists of certain activities of individuals or communities. But of what sort of activities? Professor Conklin says of those activities which are associated with a belief attitude toward some concept of a God or Gods. It cannot be doubted that believing a concept is itself an activity (or, in Conklin's usage, behaviour). But it is certainly questionable whether the mere activity of believing in a concept even of a god is necessarily religious activity. Conklin recognizes this and urges that the presence of a god concept in the mind does not mean that any of the behaviour of that individual is religious. "A person may know about the concept of God but there must be the belief attitude toward that concept to engender religious behaviour. Mere knowledge of god concepts does not make religious experience nor religious behaviour any more than a knowledge of ethical standards makes moral conduct."¹

1. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), p. 48.

When we understand all that Conklin intends to signify by the belief attitude the criticism which we are at first tempted to offer is disarmed to a certain extent. His whole point of view is built around the notion of adjustment. But one wonders why he did not use the word in his definition. Religion is man's sensing of a relationship to the Determiner of Destiny and his attempt to achieve a satisfactory adjustment. In religion all of man's most precious values are at stake, and his religious activity is an activity of adjustment in the interest of those values. To say that religion is an activity associated with the belief in a concept of god seems inadequate to suggest the warmth and awful nearness which man feels in the religious experience and the crucial importance of his effort to achieve the right adjustment to the Religious Object.

Professor Conklin's insistence that the conserved products of religious experience and behaviour should receive some recognition in an adequate definition of religion seems justified in the light of almost innumerable attempts to define religion in terms of one or another of these products. But it is equally clear that the products of religious activity are not to be considered equally fundamental with the religious adjustment itself as activity. Religious experience and behaviour are fundamental and primary in the conception of religion; religious products are secondary. But if the view which we sketched, in Chapter I, of man and his relation to the world, is anything like a correct description of the facts, then the adjustment of any individual to any situation is significant as

involving that individual's past and as partly conditioning his future. That is to say, no individual act of a person is to be correctly understood apart from that person's total life. And the same principle seems to hold good of the behaviour of communities. The religious experience of any individual at a given moment has a social and individual background and inevitably leaves its traces in the fundamental character of the individual and to a less extent in the life of the community in which he lives. Religion at its best is therefore not to be understood as an act or an experience but as a continuous and progressively developing experience of and adjustment to the Power or Powers which individuals or communities conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies.

We therefore define religion as follows: Religion consists, primarily, of those activities of individuals or communities through which they seek satisfying adjustment to the Power or Powers which they conceive to have ultimate control over their interests and destinies; and, secondarily, of the conserved products of those activities in the form of mental dispositions and social institutions.

According to this definition religion may be represented schematically as involving on the part of an individual or community:

1. A scheme of values.
2. Belief in a "Determiner of Destiny" conceived as having either a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward the most precious values of the individual or community.
3. Emotional excitement commensurate with the devotion to the values involved and the state of their well-being and security.

4. Plan of adjustment in order to conserve, augment, discover, or create the values most strongly desired.
5. Attempted execution of the plan, resulting in
6. Learning with respect to, or new insight into
 - a. Values, or
 - b. The attitude of the Determiner of Destiny, or
 - c. The method of adjustment.
7. Conservation of the results
 - a. In the individual, in the form of attitudes, sentiments, ideals, or habits.
 - b. In society in the form of institutions.
8. New attempts at religious adjustment influenced by the conserved results of previous religious activity.

So conceived religion is a dynamic procedure directed towards a satisfying adjustment of the whole individual to the total environing situation, to that "something upon which human life is most dependent for its security, welfare and increasing abundance,"¹ to the Universe, to God; religion is man's acute awareness of the realm of unattained possibility and his attempt to get into right adjustment with the most protecting and sustaining behaviour of the universe to the end of escaping the terrible possibilities of evil which have entered his awareness, and to attain the glorious possibilities of good.²

1. Wieman: Religious Experience and Scientific Method (1926), p. 9.
 2. Wieman: The Wrestle of Religion With Truth (1927), p. 135.

If this be the right view of religion it is obvious that progress in the achievement of a satisfactory religious adjustment is exceedingly difficult. It is difficult in the first place because there are so many chances of failure: one may have a very inadequate sense of value, or he may be the victim of habitually unwholesome desires; he may have an inadequate conception of the Religious Object, or an incorrect notion of the relation and attitude of the Religious Object to his values; he may form an inferior plan of adjustment, or an entirely wrong one; he may not be persistent enough in his attempted execution of the plan, or he may be too persistent; he may draw the wrong conclusions from the results of his attempted adjustment and so fail in his next attempt. It is difficult in the second place because, due to the nature of religion, religious experimentation cannot be carried on in the same way as scientific experimentation, or if it can be done no satisfactory methods have yet been devised for the purpose. Professor D. C. Macintosh has written profoundly of theology as an empirical science,¹ but the religious experiment involves the whole person and his whole life and is not open to the ordinary methods of empirical science. Definite and adequate religious techniques therefore have been difficult to establish. A third difficulty in the way of progress is that the essential mystery of the Religious Object, the crucial importance of religious values, and the obvious ease with which men make tragic mistakes, make men extremely anxious to con-

1. Macintosh: Theology as an Empirical Science (1914).

serve any insight which has come down from the past, extremely cautious in venturing after new conceptions of Deity or new programs of adjustment, and extremely distrustful of their own insight into values. And finally the conserved products of previous religious activity serve as bulwarks against innovations.

These considerations need to be kept in mind as we proceed to the discussion of the origin of religion.

21. The Religious Sentiment

We have defined religion as primarily the activity of adjustment to the Religious Object and secondarily the conserved products of that activity. We now turn to the consideration of the secondary factors. The community products of religious activity are social institutions. As we have pointed out in Chapter I, psychology is interested in social institutions only as they are related to the activities of the individual. Psychology studies the activities of the individual while the study of institutions is the work of social science. We shall, therefore, not give detailed attention to the consideration of religious institutions but shall restrict our discussion to those acquired religious dispositions of the individual which are at once the conserved product and the instigating source of his religious experience and behaviour. These are the religious sentiments. Like other sentiments, the religious sentiment grows out of activity and in turn influences future activity. As Professor Conklin says:

Much experience with a believed-in concept of God and its attendant emotions will eventuate in the establishment of a religious sentiment. Any object or situation as thought which arouses the thought of God will thereafter arouse the associated pattern of emotional experience because of this sentiment. At least, there will be a tendency toward such an arousal even though it be temporarily blocked by responses to other thoughts or situations.¹

Like other sentiments, also, the religious sentiment may develop, or decline, both in complexity and in strength. In his "Outline of Psychology," Professor McDougall gives an interesting imaginary sketch showing how a primitive man, whom he calls Mowgli, might develop a religious sentiment. First Mowgli experiences wonder and fear in connection with a certain cave; then subjection is added and these three are blended into a sentiment of awe which is organized about Mowgli's idea of a mysterious power which dwells in the cave; finally, circumstances occur which adds gratitude (made up of subjection and tender emotion) to the sentiment of awe and his sentiment becomes one of reverence.² This is a very good illustration of how a sentiment may develop in complexity on the emotional side. But it may also develop in strength of the emotional dispositions involved and likewise in the number of ideas included within the system of the sentiment. Just as the boy in love has his emotions stirred by the perception of a glove which he recognizes as having been in the possession of his beloved, or by her handkerchief, or by a rose which she has given him or by

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1. Conklin: Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), p. 59.
 2. McDougall: Outline of Psychology (1929), pp. 209-210.

any other thing which he perceives as having been associated with her, so the person who possesses a religious sentiment will have his emotions stirred by such things as Bibles, Churches, certain words and phrases, symbols and ceremonies which he perceives as being associated with the Religious Object or with his experience of religious adjustment.¹ It is in this way that things come to have religious significance.²

It is important that we should indicate clearly the distinguishing characteristic of the religious sentiment. At present we shall do no more than state our point of view and for the time being let it rest upon the authority of such writers on the subject as Pratt,³ Conklin,⁴ Thouless,⁵ Waterhouse,⁶ Edward,⁷ Wright,⁸ Wieman,⁹ McDougall,¹⁰ and others. All of these writers hold that some idea or rudimentary concept of God or Gods is essential to religion. We have accepted this point of view in our definition of religion but have not yet argued for its validity. It will be necessary to do so when we come to the discussion of the origin of religion. Therefore we have provisionally adopted the principle and propose to defend it later. Meantime we desire once more to

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1. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), p. 94.
 2. Cf. our discussion of Meaning, section 10.
 3. Pratt: The Religious Consciousness (1920), pp. 3 ff.
 4. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), pp. 47 ff.; 61 ff.
 5. Thouless: An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion (1923), Ch. III, pp. 100 ff.
 6. Waterhouse: The Philosophy of Religious Experience (1923) Chs. II and III.
 7. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), Chs. I and IX.
 8. Wright: Journal of Religion, IV, (1924), pp. 449-463; esp. p. 453.
 9. Wieman: The Wrestle of Religion With Truth (1927), Part Two.
 10. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), pp. 134 ff.; pp. 317 ff.

make it central in our conception of religion, by stating that what makes the religious sentiment religious is that it is organized about the idea, however crude and fragmentary, of a god or gods. McDougall says that reverence is the religious emotion par excellence.¹ But by this we do not understand him to mean that reverence as such is always religious, but that when exercised toward God it is a very high level of religious experience. He does not deny that reverence may be felt toward other persons but says that human beings who inspire reverence usually owe their reverend character to their being regarded as ministers and dispensers of Divine power.² Professor Conklin quite clearly states that under certain circumstances one person may feel reverence for another and the feeling of reverence in itself is not necessarily a religious experience. "The religious sentiment is one which is activated by consciousness of the presence of God, by thoughts about God, by any symbol of God, or by anything which is perceived as related to God."³ It will be noted that Professor Conklin is writing from the point of view of the Christian religion. From that point of view his definition covers the facts admirably.

We seek, however, a somewhat broader concept which will be applicable to all religions. We find ourselves, therefore, more favorably inclined toward the following definition by Professor W. K. Wright:

1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 136.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 136.

3. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), p. 62.

The religious sentiment is an organization of man's deeper impulses about an object that he believes to be superhuman - an object external to him and to other men, not completely to be identified with physical nature in its purely mechanical aspects.¹

We are concerned in this definition only with Professor Wright's description of the object of the religious sentiment. The Religious Object in Wright's definition is one which the possessor of the religious sentiment believes to be superhuman and in some sense spiritual.


We insist on one other characteristic; that the Religious Object must be, for the religious person, in some sense a Determiner of Destiny. That is to say, for the religious person the superhuman, spiritual object about which his religious sentiment is organized must be one on whom he believes that one, some or all of his most precious values depend. We have discussed this point fully in defining religion.

The religious sentiment may be defined provisionally as a disposition growing out of religious activity and tending to the arousal of a certain pattern or combination of emotions and impulses when activated by the consciousness of the presence of the Religious Object, or by thoughts about, or by any symbol of, or by anything which is perceived as related to, the Religious Object. By the term Religious Object is meant an object which the religious person believes to be external to him and to other men, and not

1. Wright: Certain Aspects of the Religious Sentiment, Journal of Religion, IV, 1924, p. 453.

completely to be identified with physical nature in its purely mechanical aspects, and upon which he believes some or all of his most precious values to depend. By the term religious activity is meant the behaviour and experience involved in seeking adjustment to the Religious Object. By religious person is meant one who possesses a disposition toward religious experience and behaviour, i.e., toward religious activity.

The typical religious sentiment is the sentiment of reverence exemplified in the Christian subject toward the Christian God. The emotions which enter into the pattern of the system which we call reverence are enumerated by McDougall as follows:¹



Reverence is composed of the emotions of gratitude and awe, both of which are complex. Gratitude is a binary compound of negative self-feeling and tender emotion while awe is a binary compound of fear and admiration, the latter of which is compounded of wonder and negative self-feeling.

But while reverence is the typical religious sentiment it is not the only one, as Professor McDougall himself suggests:

The history of religion seems to show us the gradual genesis of this highly complex emotion. Primitive religion seems to have kept separate the superhuman objects of its component emotions, the terrible or awe-inspiring powers on the one

1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), pp. 132-139.

hand, and kindly beneficent powers that inspired gratitude on the other. It was not until religious doctrine had undergone a long evolution that, by a process of syncretism or fusion, it achieved the conception of a Deity whose attributes were capable of evoking all the elements of the complex emotion of reverence.¹

When we look for religious origins therefore we shall be prepared to find them in much simpler experiences and much less complex sentiments than reverence. We shall not be surprised to find very curious systems of emotions centered about the idea of religious objects. And, remembering that religious sentiments will vary according to the emotions and impulses that compose them and according to the relative strength of their various components, we shall be greatly surprised to find anything like a standard quality among them. We shall therefore as consistently refuse to judge the more advanced types of religion by primitive standards as we shall refuse to judge primitive religion by Christian standards.

We recognize that our study involves the observation of religious advancement. What we have is a developing subject, adjusting himself as best he can to the total environment as best he can conceive it, learning from this activity, and on the basis of this improvement beginning a new adjustment. Growing insight may be looked for in the appreciation of values, in the understanding of the nature of those powers upon which man is dependent

1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 139.

and of their attitude toward man and his values, and in the formulation of programs of adjustment which he undertakes as the result of these. This will involve also a gradual development in emotional response and the growth into religious maturity.

22. Religious Ideals

Sentiment is characteristic of the ideational level of mind. At the conceptual level the sentiment may and normally should develop into the ideal. It is not to be imagined that at some given time in the history of the race or in the history of the individual mind suddenly blossoms forth on the conceptual level and sentiments are all done away. It is rather the fact that very gradually both in the individual and in the race does conscious intelligence begin to criticize the concepts which had hitherto been accepted without conscious consideration and to formulate intelligent plans to take the place of the old instinctive ones. To the extent to which conscious intelligence and choice enters into our adjustments, to that extent we live on the conceptual level. In the lives of many, perhaps of most, of us the ratio is not high. It is not so high in the life of the race as a whole as in the life of the most gifted individuals.

But there is a conceptual level and there are ideals which grow up out of and have their roots firmly planted in the soil of sentiment. It is a mistake to suppose that primitive man thought over the mystery of the world about him and decided that the most logical conclusion was that supernatural beings were

responsible for it and since this was so he ought to try to understand them as best he could. The fact probably is that he found himself behaving as if there were supernatural beings about him and so far as he ever thought at all, he wondered why he should behave in this way. We still wonder why. And when we try to think it out we find ourselves tempted at every point by delightful myths of the imagination which would protect what we like to believe.

He who succeeds in examining the concepts about which his sentiments center is making the first step in the direction of ideals. But it is not easy to examine the ideas which form the center of a strong sentiment. The effort to do so results often in the finding of many illogical reasons for what we already believe. Or again, it may turn our love into hate, and result in much unreasoning abuse of our former views. With these results every student of pathological psychology is familiar.

Professor Henry Nelson Wieman says:

With respect to religion there are three classes of people: the religious rationalizers, the irreligious rationalizers, and the religiously inquisitive. The first class may think about religion from the outside to defend it; the second class may think about religion from the outside to destroy it. But only the third class thinks about it from the inside with a view to discovering precisely what may be the good of it. It alone inquires into its validity, its conditions and consequences. Only this third class makes of religion a problem. The other two merely accept it or reject it without examining into it.¹

It would be difficult to find a clearer contrast between religion on the ideational level and religion on the conceptual level than is

1. Wieman: The Wrestle of Religion With Truth (1927), p. 35.

indicated in these words. Wieman does not mention different levels of mind or any contrast between sentiment and ideal. But the facts are looked at in a very enlightening manner.

For example, he describes the first class as follows:

Their religion is for them a very precious and holy thing. They acquired it in childhood or youth or in some profound experience of later years. It is quite complete and finished and they have nothing more to learn about it. They have only to enjoy and use it..... All their religious discussions and exercises are not forms of inquiry but devices for stimulating further religious experience and moral endeavour..... Whatever serves to stimulate the emotional glow and corresponding practical effort they gladly welcome; but anything that turns the light of intellectual investigation upon their religion they bitterly resent, etc.¹

Of the second class he says that they also refuse to examine the merits of religion but for an opposite reason. They have an antipathy for it.

As the first class was blinded by prejudice for, this is blinded by prejudice against. Some of them have studied all about it in Sunday School, but it was presented to them in such a way that they have become sick and weary of it. It is for them a frightful bore, a foolish superstition, an evil influence or a haunting specter, or in some other way distasteful..... They resent intellectual inquiry into religion as much as the religious devotees we described in the first group.²

Everyone will recognize how true are the descriptions of these two classes. Wieman makes no attempt to explain them psychologically. But it will be seen at once, we believe, that the activity of these two classes with respect to religion is carried on almost entirely, or at least predominantly, on the ideational level. With respect to

1. Op. cit., p. 36.

2. Op. cit., pp. 36-37.

religion individuals of the first class possess a strong sentiment of the favorable type, while individuals of the second class possess a strong sentiment of the unfavorable type.

As over against these Wieman describes the third class as intellectually alive in the direction of religion.

Religion is for them a problem - for some of them the greatest problem of all human living. They do not think merely to defend their religion against attack. They think in order to understand. They turn the full light of intellectual inquiry upon the holy of holies. Religion may be no less precious to them than to the first group, but for them the ¹ most precious things are subjects for investigation.

Here we have a description of religion on the conceptual level, where conscious intelligence becomes a factor in the direction of religious activity. On the conceptual level man consciously examines the concepts of his religion, of which he has hitherto been almost unconscious, to discover their conditions and consequences. He examines his values, his concepts, his methods; he reconstructs his concepts; discovers new values; adopts new methods; forms new purposes. Religion at the conceptual level uses the best results of all the sciences, of philosophy and of its own clear insight. It is very disturbing because it is so challenging. It demands the reconstruction of habits of thinking, feeling, desiring, willing, and acting. It is difficult because it requires vigorous self-discipline and a spirit of high adventure to live up to its new discoveries.

1. Op. cit., p. 37.

It is interesting to find Wieman practically excluding the first two classes from religion. He says they think about religion from the outside. It is only those who are intellectually alive to religion who look at it from the inside. Certainly we must agree that the highest type of religion is that of the highest mental level, but we cannot afford to define religion in such terms as will exclude the religious sentiment. Yet many if not most philosophers restrict religion to the conceptual level.

Religion at the conceptual level, which we may refer to as Ideal religion, may be defined as devotion to an ideal regarded as worthy of man's absolute devotion and dependence upon a being regarded as worthy of man's absolute dependence. The highest unity of these two notions would be where the divine ideal is found in the divine being as the divine will, the content of which is the highest good, but whose purposes have not yet been fully realized.¹

1. Cf. Macintosh: Theology as An Empirical Science (1914), pp. 235-236.

Part II
Recent Psychological Theories
of
The Origin of Religion

Chapter IV

INSTINCT-PSYCHOLOGY - REVERENCE

The views of McDougall as the leading exponent of instinct-
psychology are expounded as a basis for the chapter. His
analysis of the emotion of reverence and his exposition of
its gradual development in the life history of the individual
and of the race are accepted. Objections are raised against
his derivation of the gods from the social nature of sub-
mission. It is shown that objects and forces may arouse
submission without being personalized and that they may be
personalized without arousing submission. Some of the short-
comings of rationalistic and subjective theories of religious
origins are pointed out and it is held that the idea of the
religious object has a valid objective reference and that
although it is cognitive in character it is unmediated by
rational inference.

Among the recent writers on psychological subjects none
has been more widely followed in the analysis and classification of
the emotions than Professor William McDougall. In his "Social
Psychology" and other works McDougall takes the position that
reverence is the religious emotion par excellence. He develops the
theory that the origin and development of the religious emotion of
reverence came about through the synthesizing and blending of cer-
tain native tendencies and their natural emotions, and that it may
vary in quality according to the number, kind, and relative strength
of its various components. McDougall has thus given the clearest
exposition of religious origins from the point of view of instinct-

psychology. And since he is also the most distinguished champion of the instincts and their part in individual and social psychology, nothing could be more appropriate than to present his views as the basis of the present chapter.

23. The Development of Reverence in the Individual and in the Race



McDougall analyzes one type of reverence¹ as being a binary compound of awe and gratitude, both of which are complex. Gratitude is composed of two primary emotions, subjection and tender emotion, while awe is made up of the primary emotion of fear and the complex emotion of admiration which is itself a blend of wonder and subjection.

Another analysis of this emotion which McDougall calls a "different kind of reverence"² presents it as a compound of the primary emotion of fear and the complex emotion of tender admiration. Tender admiration is made up of tender emotion and admiration, the latter of which is a blend of wonder and subjection.

In his discussion our author does not actually begin with reverence and proceed to analyze it but he begins with one of the primary emotions or a combination of them and shows how the emotion of reverence may be built up. The following diagrams represent the composition of the two kinds of reverence referred to above.

1. Social Psychology (1918), pp. 132-136.

2. Ibid., p. 138.

FIRST TYPESECOND TYPE

It will be noted that in the first type subjection enters from two sources, as an element of both admiration and gratitude, while in the second type it enters only through admiration. Thus it is seen to vary in degree and so to make enough difference in the total pattern of the emotion for the author to refer to them as different kinds of reverence.

While these diagrams are valuable as showing at a glance the emotions which are blended in the complex experience of reverence it is not meant to suggest by them that this exceedingly complex emotion is often, or ever, evoked by a situation or object on its first presentation to an individual. On the contrary, reverence is likely to be a development, extending over a considerable period of time and involving the synthesis of simpler constituents, in the form of sentiments, into the experience and finally into the sentiment of reverence.

Such a development of the sentiment of reverence in the "natural" man, McDougall has brilliantly sketched in his "Outline of Psychology."¹ He imagines a small community of men grown up together in detachment from all tradition. One of these men, whom he calls "Mowgli" after the hero of Kipling's "Jungle Tales," he describes as follows:

Mowgli would enjoy all the sensory capacities that we enjoy and, in respect of the natural objects with which he was led by his instincts to concern himself, his powers of perceptual discrimination would probably be very highly developed, as we find among many savages. He would be endowed with the instincts which we have seen reason to suppose are common to the higher gregarious mammals. He would be moved, on the perception of various objects and situations, to strive impulsively toward the natural goals of his instincts. He would experience the appetites or cravings of his several instincts and the emotional excitements proper to them. He would feel pleasure or satisfaction on success, pain or displeasure on failure or thwarting of his impulsive efforts. He would have no command of language, beyond a few emotional cries and interjections, aided by expressive gestures.²

Let us imagine Mowgli discovering the entrance to a deep cave.³ Impelled by curiosity, he enters and penetrates cautiously until the light grows dim. Suddenly a very loud rumbling resounds through the cave. Mowgli flees in terror but when he reaches his own abode and many times thereafter he lives again through the experience in imagination. In imagination he depicts the source of the noise as some great agency capable of seizing and devouring him. The thought of this vague agency fills him with fear but at the same

1. p. 209 ff.
 2. Ibid, p. 205.
 3. Ibid, pp. 209 ff.

time arouses his curiosity. One day finding himself near the cave, he approaches nearer still, and, finally, impelled by curiosity and restrained by fear he ventures in, with extreme caution, ready to flee at the least sound. Nothing happens, and he (perhaps with companions) ventures farther than before and finds a spring of cool, clear water, at which he slakes his thirst. After this discovery, when Mowgli dwells in imagination on this place he not only feels fear and curiosity (or wonder) but he feels humble before the power which has given what he needs and values. Mowgli and his companions now frequent this spot and make their home near it. In time of drought the spring does not fail them and they feel gratitude as when a fellow-hunter shares his game with them and place within the cave small objects of value such as they would give to one another in exchange for some gift. Mowgli, the "natural" man, has now developed a rudimentary religious sentiment, a sentiment of awe, developing by the addition of gratitude, into one of reverence. "His imagination would have provided him with an object on which the various impulses of this sentiment are centered; and, whenever he may approach this spot or think of it in any way, these various impulses will be stirred within him, one or another more strongly than the rest, according to the circumstances of the moment."¹

Even in the religious development of the individual of the present day it is hardly possible that any situation would evoke the complex experience of reverence on its first presentation without some

1. Outline of Psychology (1918), p. 210.

basis in sentiment already formed. It takes time to develop the emotion of reverence. In the case of primitive man this is adequately suggested in McDougall's description of Mowgli's experiences.

According to McDougall, the genesis of the religious sentiment of reverence involved a long and gradual development in racial history.¹ As a result of a long period of evolution awe was achieved toward the terrible forces of nature. Gratitude toward the beneficent powers arose later, and much later still these were united in reverence for powers conceived of in such a way as to evoke this complex emotion.

The history of religion seems to show us the gradual genesis of this highly complex emotion. Primitive religion seems to have kept separate the superhuman objects of its component emotions, the terrible or awe-inspiring powers on the one hand, the kindly beneficent powers that inspired gratitude on the other. And it was not until religious doctrine had undergone a long evolution that, by a process of syncretism or fusion, it achieved the conception of a Deity whose attributes were capable of evoking all the elements of the complex emotion of reverence.²

McDougall's exposition, thus far and subject to our previous criticism of his view of the instincts and emotions, we accept. We do not regard sentiment as the highest form of religion, however, and reverence would have to be connected with a religious disposition on the conceptual level before we could call it the religious emotion par excellence.

1. Social Psychology (1918), Ch. XIII.

2. Ibid, p. 139.

24. Origin of Man's Belief in the Gods

Professor McDougall says that the awe-inspiring powers were the first gods to be recognized by man. Fear of the unusual, the mysterious, the threatening, came first. But with the development of language and the capacity for a fuller life of ideas, the instinct of curiosity must have been more and more frequently excited by what had previously been only terrifying. This instinct must have kept man's thoughts on these experiences in awful contemplation of the objects of his wonder and fear, and he began to evolve theories to account for his terrible and mysterious experiences.¹ We must assume that man knew nothing of mechanical causation.

The fall of bodies to the ground, the flowing of water, the blowing of the wind, the motions of the heavenly bodies, the growth and movements of animals and plants, thunder, lightning, rain, fire, and the emission and reflection of light and heat - these are prominent among the things that interest him, and in none of them is there any obvious indication of mechanical operation. The one kind of causation with which the uncultured man is thoroughly familiar is his own volitional action, issuing from feeling, emotion, and desire; and this naturally and inevitably becomes for him the type on which he models his theories of the causation of terrible events.²

Let us note carefully that man's wonder would not likely be aroused by the gentle and beneficent events of nature. He was enthralled only by the terrible things which thoroughly upset his equilibrium: disease and death, pestilence and famine, storm and

1. Social Psychology (1918), pp. 310 ff.

2. Ibid., p. 311.

flood, lightning and thunder, and the powerful beasts of prey. These are apt to come suddenly, irregularly, apparently capriciously. About these man's imagination chiefly played. "Hence it followed that the powers which his imagination created for the explanation of these events were conceived by him more or less vaguely as terrible powers ready at every moment to bring disaster upon him and his community."¹ Therefore he walked in fear and trembling lest he should give offence to them. As soon as he began to regard them as personal he humbled himself in submission.

Or, perhaps, it would be truer to say that as man began to form conceptions of these forces of nature, they evoked in him the impulse and emotion of this instinct, threw him into the submission attitude, characteristic of this instinct, which is essentially a personal attitude, one implying a personal relation; and primitive man, finding himself in this attitude before these powers was thus led to personify them, to attribute to them the personal attributes of strength and anger, which are the normal and primitive excitants of this instinct.²

Thus his emotion took the complex form of awe; he not only wondered at and feared but humbled himself before these powers and sought to gain and to obey the slightest indication of their wills.

McDougall's theory, so far as it deals with the primacy of awe in the developing of reverence, seems incontrovertible. It seems beyond doubt that the terrible events would force themselves on the attention of man and require an adjustment to themselves before the milder powers.

1. Social Psychology (1918), p. 312.

2. Ibid.

The notion that the idea of personal supernatural powers arises out of the social nature of submission and admiration which demands a personal reference for these emotions is not so convincing. Dr. Kenneth Edward questions this point and quite correctly concludes, we think, that the invariably social character of submission (or admiration of which it is a part) requires to be scrutinized and much more firmly established before such a far-reaching conclusion is founded upon it.¹

We do not wish to deny that the feeling of submission often, even generally, has a personal reference. But we feel that submission may be evoked by certain stimuli to which personality would not necessarily be attributed. Things which surpass a man in some quality such as strength or size may evoke the attitude of wonder and submission, we believe, without the feeling of personality. Such objects would probably need to be familiar and friendly or comparatively unrelated to or indifferent to man's values. From his earliest years the writer has admired large sturdy trees. They seemed so strong and so calm in a world which so continuously upset the growing boy's equilibrium that he often gazed at them in admiration, even to the strengthening of his own character, yet never attributed to them personality. Yet he freely attributed personality to those objects and events which bore directly on his values: the crashing thunderstorm that bore down upon his lake, blackening the waters beneath him and tossing his little boat mercilessly as he struggled in vain against

1. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 64.

the mighty wind; the seared, grizzled, old mountain-peaks of the Southern Rockies, vaulted against the sky, their gleaming eyes searching far and near the burning desert sands - these came to the boy with animus and intent, as William James said the earthquake came to him; they menaced his values. It certainly cannot be doubted that submission is often evoked by circumstances which appear as if they possessed intelligence and intention toward the subject. But it would seem that the attribution of personality to these circumstances is the exciting cause of the feeling of submission rather than the result of it. In our view, the original fear experience of Mowgli upon hearing the rumbling in the cave contained the datum out of which an image of its source might easily develop. McDougall himself says, as we have shown above, that in imagination he depicts the source of the noise as some great agency capable of seizing and devouring him. There certainly is no guarantee that that agency will not be depicted as personal, especially since, as we have seen also, primitive man knows nothing of mechanical causation.

In the experience of the boy on the lake battling to make the shore, against the resistance of wind and wave, against the threat of swirling black water and roaring, crashing thunder, there is an almost irresistible tendency to personify the threatening and opposing elements. But the tendency does not arise from an experience of submission. All those fearful aspects of the situation that imply intention, purpose, attitude - these, also, are aspects of the datum which when elaborated by the imagination becomes the terrible object

of the experience. As Professor Koehler says: "All physical events or states which send similar constellations of stimuli to our eyes and ears, as issue from the physical body of another person, will look or sound 'emotional,' 'restless,' 'directed toward something,' 'determined,' and so forth just as a living person does."¹ Now such qualities as "angry," "restless," "opposing me," "powerful," "determined," and so forth even singly are often sufficient to suggest the configuration of "personality." Where several of them are combined it would seem difficult for the primitive man to avoid sensing among the phenomena which possess these characteristics a being similar to himself. When looked at in this way the facts do not seem to warrant the view that such attribution is limited to the results ensuing from the arousal of the emotion of submission.

Our second objection to McDougall's view is that it seems to imply that personality and certain personality traits were attributed by primitive man to the objects of his submission as a result of inference. If this is the right interpretation of McDougall's meaning then he is open to the charge of rationalism and religious subjectivism. Since these problems will be confronted again and again in the discussions which are to follow, we shall give them an extended treatment here and thus early place before the reader our views on these important matters.

1. Koehler: Gestalt Psychology (1929), p. 264.

25. The Objectivity of the Gods

Doctor Kenneth Edward in his Kerr Lectures¹ takes the criticism which Dr. Rudolph Otto² directs against Schleiermacher's rationalism and develops it as a "challenge alike to the conclusions of the whole American school of religious psychology from Hall and James to Leuba and Pratt, and to those of the current general and social psychology in its dealing with religion, as exemplified in McDougall."³

Edward says of McDougall's view, which we have presented above, that although it is a process of association rather than one of complete and formal inference, the principle is the same. "If the human mind does not infer the divine, in this case, it at least jumps 'to the conclusion' of divine beings or a divine being. God is reached, it may be, by a leap of the imagination. But the point is that the idea is subjectively produced from the emotional state."⁴ Very similar to this view is the theory arising from both psychological and historical investigation, that religion is the resultant of fear, wonder, and awe awakened in primitive man by the fearsome and inexplicable in nature. Powers are invoked to account for the latter, and the idea of gods finds birth. Here, again, the idea of the divine is a conclusion, and the origin a subjective process.

Edward maintains that these explanations overlook an important objective factor which he believes that Otto has apprehended,

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1. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), Lecture III.
 2. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923).
 3. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), pp. 65-66.
 4. Ibid, p. 64.

and he points out this factor in Otto's own words as follows:

"Rather, the 'creature-feeling' is itself a first subjective concomitant and effect of another feeling-element, which casts it like a shadow, but which in itself indubitably has immediate and primary reference to an object outside the self."¹ This object is the "numinous" and Edward says that "while the numinous experience is of a highly emotional character it contains a definitely cognitive element. It contains an objective datum. It is, therefore, a form of perception. The numen is felt as objective and outside the self."²

Now if Edward's interpretation of McDougall's meaning is correct we feel that his criticism is justified. And there are some sentences in McDougall's discussion which seem to indicate that Edward's interpretation is correct. For example, consider the following passage: In considering the fact that we admire natural objects, flowers, shells, landscapes, etc., where no known person is called to mind as the object of our admiration, he says,

Just because admiration implies and refers to another person, is essentially, in so far as it involves negative self-feeling (submission), an attitude towards a person, it leads us to postulate a person or personal power as the creator of the object that calls it forth. Hence in all ages the admiration of men for natural objects has led them to personify the power, or powers, that have brought those objects into being, either as super-human beings who have created, and who preside over, particular classes of objects, or as a Supreme Creator of all things; and, if the intellect rejects all such conceptions as anthropomorphic survivals from a ruder age, the admiration of natural objects still leads men to personify, under ³ the name of Nature, the power that has produced them.

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1. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923), p. 10; Quoted by Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 65.
 2. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 65.
 3. Social Psychology (1918), pp. 134-135.

To say that the experience of submission leads us to postulate a personal power, seems like describing a rational process, involving inference. If McDougall means that the idea of gods originated by inference from the emotional experience of submission, then we must disagree with him. It is as though we became frightened in the woods, and came home, thought the matter over and concluded that the particular quality of the fear which we felt indicated that we had met a bear. The fact is that men do not postulate causes for their fear, anger, submission, or any other emotion. They see them. Some configuration in the environment gives rise to the emotional response and normal men usually know what it is that gives rise to their feelings. Mowgli knows very well that it was the "big noise" which frightened him. The boy does not have to go home and wonder about his experience on the lake to account for his fear. He cannot think of the swirling black water without feeling the fear. It looked angry; it seemed powerful; it resisted his efforts to escape. The whole storm situation was after him. If Mowgli could talk we might ask him what sort of noise he heard. He probably would answer that it was a loud, angry voice. The boy would be certain to say that it tried to blow him away from shore and sink him.

Now if any inferences, resulting in the attribution of personality to natural events or to account for natural events, are drawn by primitive man, are we not bound to say that they begin with these perceived qualities - such as "angry," "powerful," "opposing me" - in the environment, rather than with his own feelings which

result from the perception of these qualities? That these qualities are directly perceived in the environment Koehler has conclusively shown.¹ Therefore, in so far as McDougall derives personification from the feelings of the individual which really result from his perception of qualities or attitudes in the environment, his theory does not fit the facts, and we cannot follow him.

But when we read McDougall sympathetically we find many suggestions of the view we have just presented, and we are somewhat uncertain regarding the adequacy of Edward's interpretation. For example take the passage (p. 312) which we have already quoted. He says that as soon as man began to regard the powers as personal he humbled himself before them. Then he changes and says perhaps it would be truer to say that as man began to form conceptions of these forces of nature, they threw him into the submissive attitude and finding himself in this attitude he was led to personify them. Here is a very plain admission of some cognitive element preceding submission - even a statement that the attribution of personality preceded the feeling of submission. The latter is changed immediately and one feels that the author is satisfied with neither of his formulations. Perhaps if he had not already been committed to the social nature of submission he might have arrived at a more satisfactory conclusion.

Again, in another passage² which we have also quoted, McDougall says that admiration has led men in every age to postulate

1. Op. cit., Ch. VI.

2. Social Psychology (1918), pp. 134-135.

a personal power as the creator of the object that calls it forth. The word postulate is unfortunate but when one examines the statement it turns out again that McDougall has not accounted for the gods as inferences from an emotion but he regards them as imagined beings such as might account for the perceived objects which give rise to the emotion.

It must be admitted that McDougall's formulations are ambiguous, and his words can be interpreted in a way which justifies the criticism of his explanation of the origin of religion as a leap from the subjective feeling of submission to the objective idea of a god to account for it. Thus he is to some extent open to the charges of subjectivism and rationalism. But, on the other hand, we feel that the charge of subjectivism is considerably mitigated by the considerations we have suggested above and that the charge of rationalism may not be as serious as Edward makes it.

Edward says¹ that there is an objective datum, a cognitive element, a form of perception in the numinous experience. Let us inquire into the meaning of this statement and try to understand, if we can, what this cognitive element is. We say, "if we can," because there are those who believe that we cannot. Otto is one of these. He says² that the creature-feeling is a subjective effect of another feeling-element, which casts it like a shadow, but which in

1. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 65.
 2. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923), Ch. III.

itself has immediate and primary reference to an object outside the self. By creature-feeling is meant "the emotion of a creature, abased and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures."¹ It is analogous to but is not the same as a feeling of absolute dependence in a natural sense. It differs from such feeling in its intrinsic character and not merely in degree. As to the feeling-element which gives rise to the creature-feeling, casting it like a shadow, its character can only be suggested. Reference is made to a statement of James regarding the origin of the Greek gods in which he says: "It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we call 'something there,' more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed."² Now, says Otto, "This 'feeling of reality,' the feeling of a 'numinous' object objectively given, must be posited as a primary immediate datum of consciousness, and the 'feeling of dependence' is then a consequence, following very closely upon it, viz. a depreciation of the subject in his own eyes."³ "Feeling of dependence" in this sentence is the same as "creature-feeling" and we can now see what it is that makes it "something more than and other than a mere feeling of dependence,"⁴ in a natural sense. It is that it is evoked by the "feeling of a 'numinous'

1. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923), p. 10.

2. James: Varieties of Religious Experience (1922), p. 58.

3. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923), p. 11, footnote.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

object objectively given,"¹ and so in some sense partakes of the numinous character.

Here then is our objective datum, so far as Otto is concerned. It is a "feeling of a numinous object objectively given." Thus expressed it is impossible for psychology to deal with it as with other feelings, because the feelings with which psychology deals are qualities of the individual's activity in response to perceptions or thoughts. It is not their function to apprehend that which is objective, but to qualify that which is subjective. Of course it is possible to speak of numinous feeling, meaning the quality of our feelings as we respond to numinous objects. But that is exactly what Otto calls creature-feeling, and helps us none at all in answering the question, How is the numinous apprehended?

It is evidently this question which Otto desires to give help in answering. We may inquire then whether the "feeling of a numinous object objectively given" is a phrase intended to describe a cognitive state. Edward thinks it is. He says, "It is claimed to be a state of immediate apprehension. Its content is entirely distinctive and is, therefore, apprehended in a distinctive way, with a feeling which characterizes it alone and which is recognizable though naturally not describable in terms of any other content of consciousness."² Then he goes on to point out that this is why Otto insists on the "unspeakable" nature of the numinous experience.

1. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923), p. 11.

2. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 68.

Otto frankly takes the view that it is not the sort of thing that can be dealt with by "natural" psychology.¹ Edward thinks it can be dealt with by psychology in terms of the elements of consciousness known to it.² But the only help he gives us on the question of how the numinous is apprehended is to inform us that it is immediately apprehended and that it can be communicated not in words but by direct induction.³ If we understand Edward's view correctly he supposes that numinous objects are apprehended in some way independent of any known sensory mechanism.

Now if immediate apprehension (i.e., not mediated by any known afferent mechanism) of any object whatsoever can be established it is the business of the psychologist to recognize it and to relate it to the other facts of psychology. And if the psychologist refuses to accept the principle of immediate apprehension in a given case he is obligated at least to recognize whatever facts there are in the case and, having recognized them, either to explain them or to confess his inability to do so. We do not wish to take upon ourselves the burden of proving that there is no such thing as the immediate apprehension of numinous objects. But we believe that the relevant facts regarding the "numinous" feeling and the apprehension of "numinous" objects can be adequately explained without assuming that our apprehension of them is not mediated by any known afferent mechanism, such as the visual and auditory sensory mechanisms.

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1. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923), p. 8.
 2. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 67.
 3. Ibid., p. 182.

We believe that Koehler has adequately demonstrated that our apprehension of certain subjective experiences of other people, such as emotions of fear, anger, etc., attitudes of interest, aversion, etc., and purposes, at the beginning of their execution, of approach, attack, avoidance, etc., is of a direct character in the sense that it is involved in the perceptual process of the organization of the sensory field and that secondary processes such as memory and reflective thought are not involved. That is to say that we perceive other people as "angry," "calm," "excited," "reaching for," "opposing me," etc. We do not perceive certain constellations of stimuli, reflect upon them, and draw conclusions regarding the probable subjective experiences of those whom we are observing. Of course we may learn to do so and we may learn also to hide our emotions by giving expression to them in "unnatural" ways. But animals, very small children, and primitive man would not be expected to do either. Furthermore our own reactions (i.e. the reactions of "natural" man unaffected by the artificial products of culture) are based upon these direct perceptions of the attitudes of others rather than upon inferences.

Let us apply this principle to the problem in hand - let us say, to the problem of the origin of the feeling of submission. McDougall says that the primary excitant of this feeling is the presence of a person bigger and more powerful than oneself.¹ Now let us imagine that we are standing on the brink of the Grand Canyon

1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 134.

of the Colorado at the point where it is eleven miles wide, and more than a mile deep. It stretches away to the right and to the left some forty miles each way. Beneath us are whole ranges of what would be mountains if they were above the line of our regard. There are chasms of awful depth, black and mysterious. The colors are indescribably brilliant in the sun, mysterious, tantalizing in the shadows - altogether beautiful, and terrible. Here, if anywhere, one feels submissive. Standing here one is completely undone, entirely surpassed. It yawns, not in drowsiness but in terrible menace. One draws back, yet one is fascinated, and must approach it again. One speaks in a low voice, for a mighty silence broods over the canyon - a silence borne upon the deep, whispering roar of the rushing torrent far down in its deeps. It is not a silence of the dead - the canyon is decidedly alive, vibrant, with restless energy! Busy with its own affairs, it is magnificently indifferent to man, so long as he stays away from it, yet any man who fails to adjust himself to its dominion and power when he approaches it, it threatens with instant death.

Let us now ask whether we can say what it is in this situation that gives rise to our feeling of submission. We believe that we can. Of course our feeling is not simply submission, but awe which is composed of other emotions blended with submission. This makes our task difficult. And our difficulties are increased by the fact that one emotion and impulse may be stimulated by one aspect of the situation and as our reaction develops, the aspect

of the situation changes and a new emotion and impulse are called into activity either as the sole constituent of consciousness or blended with those already in process. For example, one who, without knowing what to expect, walks rapidly up to the canyon, finds himself having come suddenly upon the very brink of a chasm of such monstrous proportions that he draws back in surprise and fear. From a safer position he begins curiously to observe this extraordinary phenomenon. But it does not easily fit into his scheme of knowledge. He looks across, down, to the right, to the left; he explores the deep chasms, the great boulders, the young mountains beneath him; he observes the colors; he tries to trace the course of the river - heroically he attempts to recognize, to classify, to organize this thing with his other experience. But it is the new wine which bursts the old bottles; it will submit to no category in terms of which he is accustomed to think. Very likely he will say, "It is like nothing else on earth." His attempt to measure it with his mind is baffled. He begins again, drawing nearer, growing more serious. His eyes pass from a great boulder to a dark and deep chasm which he had not noticed before, and he draws back with a start and a slight shudder; in imagination he walks beside the rushing river on those slippery dark ledges of rock but the place is too unfriendly, too treacherous, too terrible; now he lifts his eyes to gaze in rapture at the colors, but soon they begin to take on strange, haunting, fearful, fascinating configurations in his mind. And so on. No matter in what way he may try to master this thing, he is baffled, completely undone,

thoroughly mastered. Even if he goes down into the thing he comes back knowing as little about it as ever. There it is, mysterious, haunting, alive, menacing, baffling, indifferent to those who keep their distance, impelling all to draw near.

Our feeling of submission is bound up with this whole experience and it takes time for the experience to develop. The experience of one who runs jauntily up to the canyon, takes one glance, and comes away is very different from that of one who observes it for some hours and tries to understand it. Perhaps no one really understands it, but the person who observes it for some time knows that he does not, whereas one who merely glances at it may think that he does. To the person who observes it for a long time it becomes a unique moment of experience. Models and pictures of the canyon which enable us to grasp it in one perceptual image do not satisfy those who have seen the original. They do not satisfy precisely because that which makes the canyon unique in experience is not to be found in models and pictures. All those configurations of sound and light and shade and color and movement which in experience are perceived as vastness, mystery, power, restlessness, illusiveness, dazzling brilliance, super-human subtlety, the appearance of being alive, the appearance of awesome gravity, the appearance of having a mouth so deep and a voice so "big" that if it ever spoke it would rend the earth asunder, the appearance of concern with its own affairs, the appearance of infinite power and urgency in the protection of itself from molestation by man - these

and others do not appear in models and pictures. They do not appear because there is not time to develop them in the effort to organize our perception of the whole; because the model is not built on a sufficiently grand scale to baffle our efforts at organizing our perception of it; because it is not vague enough to defeat our efforts to comprehend it and at the same time to be capable of having its various elements organized as constituents of more than one configuration, form, or appearance; because we are not in looking at or reacting to the model compelled to adjust ourselves to it but may adjust it to ourselves; and because there is in the model or picture no possible menace to our values.

We may organize our perception of the model and the picture immediately and to that extent "understand" them without effort. We master them without in the least jeopardizing our values. We never master the original, but we are again and again completely baffled, utterly surpassed, altogether undone in the attempt; and with all our values threatened, at that. The impenetrable mystery of the thing, its apparently omnipotent power of baffling us, its incomprehensible vastness, its awesome gravity, its ponderous silence, its weird hypnotic attraction, its yawning mouth - these are some of the qualities which evoke the attitude of submission. And these are qualities that are directly perceived. And when we come away they are conserved in our memories as integral parts of the total mental system which we symbolize by the phrase "Grand Canyon." When they are experienced as present in perception or in imaginative

recall they give rise to the emotion which we symbolize by the word "submission."

Here, then, is the genesis of the emotion of submission; here the objective datum. It is a constellation of stimuli perceived as a quality of the sort which naturally evokes the emotion. This does not make the quality subjective any more than the tree outside my window which I perceive is subjective. And it is not arrived at by inference from an emotional experience.

As to the other emotions their genesis is the same. They are evoked by a perceived quality in or of the situation. For example, unless we have a fear sentiment with the idea of a bear as the central core, the mere sight of a bear in a cage does not evoke in us the emotion of fear. It is only when he is perceived as "attacking me" or "liable to attack me" that the situation is a fearful one. And so we might go over the whole list of the emotions involved in reverence and show that it is the perception of a quality in the situation or the reproduction of such perception in memory that evokes them.

Now let us press the question, How is it that "natural" man comes to attribute personality to natural objects and events? From the foregoing discussion it may appear to the reader that it would be easy for the writer to attribute personality to the Grand Canyon. Barring the effects of civilization it would likely be difficult not to do so. Why? Because so many personal qualities are organized as integral parts of the total mental configuration

that results from our perceptual efforts. Koehler has shown¹ that, in the perceptual process of organizing the sensory field, certain details not in the objective constellation of stimuli tend to be supplied in the process of organization. Now such qualities as "alive," "occupied with its own affairs," "not to be interfered with," "gravity," "silence," "subtlety," etc., would certainly be capable of furnishing the basis for a sense of personality associated with the total configuration of this extremely complex object. Or if we reject Koehler's conclusions the theory of meaning would give us the same results.² In the experience of primitive man we should no doubt find, if we could examine it, not only a perception of what we may call "something there" but often a perception of what we might call somebody there. The perception of somebody there would necessarily be vague. It would not often be an image, though that would be possible as we well know, in the case of those who see ghosts, etc., and even if an image, not a clear one with distinct features. Normally the somebody would be hidden. The situation would possess personal characteristics. There would be a feeling as if there were a presence. It would be "spooky," eerie, weird, unearthly, mysterious. Such perceptual data would undergo elaboration both on the ideational or imaginative level and to some extent on the conceptual level. On the ideational level it might result in the development of an image of a being whose features would embody and explain the perceived qualities,

1. Koehler: Gestalt Psychology (1929), Ch. VI.

2. Cf. *supra*, section 10.

and on the conceptual level it might result in quite clear statements as to the character of the invisible objects of man's fear and devotion. As the quality of man's thinking advances the concepts become more advanced, more subtle, more universal, in character, while the images gradually diminish in importance until they are given up altogether.

We believe that the experience of the observer at the Grand Canyon is of the sort that Otto and Edward would describe as numinous, and that the feeling which we have called submission, using McDougall's terminology, might equally well be called "creature-feeling" in the sense in which Otto uses the word. We conclude, therefore, that Otto and Edward - and James - are right in insisting on the objectivity of the datum which gives rise to the creature-feeling, but we insist as against the contentions of Otto that the apprehension of this datum is not a feeling-element but a cognitive element of perceptual character, subject like other perceptions to imaginative and rational elaboration and criticism. We feel that the category of the numinous might be valuable in psychology but only if it can be related to the other facts of psychology in some such way as we have suggested. We cannot assume any "numinous consciousness" which is different from ordinary consciousness except in the quality of its contents. In the next chapter we shall compare Otto's analysis of the numinous experience with McDougall's analysis of reverence.

Chapter V

MYSTICISM - THE NUMINOUS

Dr. Rudolph Otto is taken as the spokesman for mysticism on the subject of the origin of religion. The objective character of the numinous and its direct apprehension by man are accepted but it is questioned whether such direct apprehension can properly be called a feeling-element. Exception is taken to the theory that there exists numinous emotions similar to but entirely distinct in kind (though they are recognized as different in quality) from their corresponding natural emotions and with which they are associated in such a way that they can arouse and be aroused by the natural emotions. The superiority of the sentiment over a law of association of the feelings as an explanatory principle is urged and demonstrated. Although the numinous cannot be perceived in its essential nature it can be perceived as something which is mysterious, or awe-ful, etc., or a combination of the numinous elements, and such a perception, contrary to Otto's view, is cognitive in character (though it is not the result of inference) and not emotional. The view of Otto that religion is the offspring of history only in so far as history on the one hand develops our predisposition (not instinct but capacity) for knowing the holy, and on the other is repeatedly a manifestation of the holy is accepted with such substitutions as are necessary for one who accepts emergent theory of development and regards capacity to rest in the total environing situation, including the individual, rather than merely in the individual alone.

Dr. Rudolph Otto has taken the position in a significant psychological study of religion¹ that the essential element of religion is a non-rational (i.e. non-conceptual) or feeling element and he has attempted to isolate and bring into the light this

1. Das Heilige, Breslau, 1917, Translated by John W. Harvey, The Idea of the Holy, Oxford University Press (1923).

essential element which he calls the numinous, and to demonstrate its relation to the development of religion in the individual and in racial history. Dr. Otto is not only a mystic himself but a renowned scholar in the field of the mystical literature of both the East and the West, and in Das Heilige he has given a representative and authoritative exposition, from the point of view of mysticism, of the origin of religion. To the presentation of his view and its criticism we shall now address ourselves.

26. The Numinous

Otto says that we must be on our guard against an error that would lead to a wrong and one-sided interpretation of religion, viz., that the essence of deity can be given completely and exhaustively in rational attributions. Indeed even such rational attributes as Spirit, Reason, Purpose, Good Will, etc., themselves imply a super-rational Subject of which they are predicates. The difference between rationalism and profounder religion lies in a difference of quality in the mental attitude and emotional content of the religious life. "All depends upon this: in our idea of God is the non-rational over-borne, even perhaps wholly excluded, by the rational?"¹

Looking at the matter thus, Orthodoxy has been the mother of Rationalism and this rationalistic bias still prevails not only in theology but in comparative religion in general, and from top to bottom of it. Students in these fields, and especially those who try

1. Op. cit., p. 3.

to reconstruct the 'bases' or 'sources' of religion set as their main problem the 'evolution' of religious concepts and fashion ideas and notions of lower value which they regard as paving the way for them.

It is always in terms of concepts and ideas that the subject is pursued, 'natural' ones, moreover, such as have a place in the general sphere of man's ideational life, and are not specifically religious. And then with a resolution and cunning which one can hardly help admiring, men shut their eyes to that which is quite unique in the religious experience, even in its most primitive manifestations.¹

This unique element Otto says, is suggested in the holy. Holiness - the holy - is a category of interpretation and valuation peculiar to the sphere of religion. It is complex but contains a non-rational element or moment which remains inexpressible. The word holy comes to us freighted with moral significance but in it there is a clear overplus of meaning. Nor is this merely a later and acquired meaning. The original words in the Latin, Greek, Semitic and other ancient languages denoted first and foremost only this overplus. The ethical was not original and never was the whole meaning. As a word to stand for this element in isolation, this extra in the meaning of 'holy' above and beyond the meaning of goodness he coins from the Latin the word numen from which the adjective numinous is derived.

Of the numinous state of mind the author writes: "This mental state is perfectly sui generis and irreducible to any other;

1. Op. cit., p. 4.

and therefore, like every absolutely primary and elementary datum, while it admits of being discussed it cannot be strictly defined."¹ If we desire another to understand, the only way we can help is to try to awaken the experience in him. It cannot be taught; it can only be evoked.

Schleiermacher reaches out toward the numinous in isolating the feeling of dependence. But his formulation is unsatisfactory to the author in two respects. In the first place, while Schleiermacher makes a distinction between the ordinary feeling of dependence and the feeling of absolute dependence which is religion, his distinction is really based on a difference in degree. But Otto holds that the religious feeling is qualitatively different from analogous states of mind.

When Abraham ventures to plead with God for the men of Sodom, he says (Genesis XVIII:27): 'Behold now, I have taken upon me to speak unto the Lord, which am but dust and ashes.' There you have a self-confessed 'feeling of dependence,' which is yet at the same time far more than, and something other than, merely a feeling of dependence. Desiring to give it a name of its own I propose to call it 'creature-consciousness' or creature-feeling. It is the emotion of a creature, abashed and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures. ²

This phrase is not a conceptual explanation. It suggests the self-abasement into nothingness before an overpowering, absolute might of some kind and has to be experienced to be understood.

Our author's second objection to Schleiermacher's formulation is that his religious category is merely a category of self-valuation in the sense of self-depreciation - a feeling concerning

1. Op. cit., p. 7.

2. Op. cit., p. 9.

one's self in a special determined relation, viz., one's dependence. Thus we come upon the fact of God only by inference, by reasoning to a cause beyond ourselves to account for our feeling of dependence. This is opposed to the psychological facts. "Rather the 'creature-feeling' is itself a first subjective concomitant and effect of another feeling-element which casts it like a shadow but which in itself indubitably has immediate and primary reference to an object outside the self."¹ This object is the numinous and the feeling of a numinous object objectively given is the primary immediate datum of consciousness which gives rise to the creature-feeling as suggested above.² For the creature-feeling and the sense of dependence to arise in the mind the 'numen' must be experienced as present.

In the previous chapter we have argued for the direct perception of certain characteristics of the environment which gives rise to what may be called numinous experience and which has reference to what may be called numinous objects or situations. We concluded that Otto is right in his insistence on the direct apprehension of the numinous, in the sense that it is not mediated by reflective thought, and on the objective character of such apprehension. But we seriously questioned the appropriateness of characterizing the apprehension of the numinous, which gives rise to numinous emotional experience such as "creature-feeling," as a "feeling-element," and presented as alternative to this view the view that the apprehension

1. Op. cit., p. 10.

2. Op. cit., Footnote, p. 11.

of numinous characteristics in an object or situation is a cognitive experience of the perceptual variety. It seems to us that Edward is correct in maintaining that the primary character of the numinous perception itself is all that is necessary to Otto's theory.¹

27. Numinous Emotions

But Otto insists that the religious feelings are a distinctly unique class of emotions and that they are primary in character. They cannot be the same as "natural" emotions; neither can they be compounds of the "natural" emotions. They are entirely unique, sui generis, definable through themselves alone.²

However, Otto recognizes that certain of the "natural" emotions are closely analogous to religious emotions. For example, he compares the numinous and the sublime and concludes that "the idea of the sublime is closely similar to that of the numinous, and is well adapted to excite it and to be excited by it, while each tends to pass over into the other."³ He is at great pains to explain the phrases "excite" and "pass over into." It is the self that passes from one feeling to another and not the feeling that makes a transition into another.⁴ The latter would be a transmutation, but he is to be understood as referring to the replacement of one feeling by another. Certain feelings may arouse the numinous because the latter is potentially already there in the mind, but the numinous is not to be derived

1. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 67.

2. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923), p. 9, Ch. VII.

3. Op. cit., p. 43.

4. Op. cit., p. 44.

from any other feeling and is in this sense "unevolvable."¹

Now let us ask how it is that one emotion arouses, or excites, another. Otto supposes it to be due to a law which he calls the "Law of the Association of Feelings."² He says:

It is a well-known and fundamental psychological law that ideas 'attract' one another and that one will excite another and call it into consciousness, if it resembles it. An entirely similar law holds good with regard to feelings. A feeling, no less than an idea, can arouse its like in the mind; and the presence of the one in my consciousness may be the occasion for my entertaining the other at the same time.³

It will be instructive to study an example of how Otto applies this law. In discussing how the notions of "clean" and "unclean" come to have a religious application he shows how the unclean gives rise to the natural and protective feeling of disgust.

Then he continues:

Between this and the feeling of the 'horrible' there is a very close analogy; and from this it becomes apparent, in accordance with the law of the reciprocal attraction of analogous feelings and emotions, how the 'natural' unclean or impure is bound to pass over into, and develop in, the sphere of the numinous. Once, in fact, we have in our hand the key of the problem - the analogy and the law just mentioned - we can reconstruct a priori the actual genetic process involved, by which the one emotion prompts the other. We indeed have ourselves a direct experience of the same thing today in our emotional reaction to the sight of flowing blood, in which it would be hard to say whether the element of 'disgust' or 'horror' is the stronger.⁴

Later when numinous horror comes on the scene numinous objects could become unclean without any substratum of natural impurity

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1. Op. cit., p. 45.
 2. Op. cit., p. 43.
 3. Op. cit., p. 43.
 4. Op. cit., p. 127.

to serve as point of departure.

And we can learn something of the relation involved from the fact that in the reverse direction the feeling of the numinously impure calls up easily by association the 'natural' emotion of disgust.....so that things become disgusting or loathsome which intrinsically were not objects of disgust at all, but of numinous horror. In fact such secondary and derived feelings of disgust can maintain themselves independently long after the original numinous awe which they once evoked has died away.¹

Let us note from the foregoing the following essential points in Otto's theory: (1) the religious or numinous emotions such as awe, horror, etc., are entirely unique in quality, and irreducible to, though they are analogous to, the 'natural' emotions to which we give the same names; (2) these analogous emotions are subject to association because of their similarity so that when one is aroused in the mind it tends to awaken the other also; (3) an emotion often aroused through association by an analogous emotion in connection with some object may be permanently associated with the object so that it may be aroused by the object directly even after the object has ceased to arouse the original emotion to which the derived emotion was due in the first place.

We are inclined to question the first two points and to offer substitute explanations for the facts referred to in all three. First of all, then, are there primary religious emotions which are different from the natural emotions which go by the same names? In

1. Op. cit., p. 128.

one sense, of course, there are. There is every reason to believe that no two experiences of the "natural" emotion of fear, or of wonder, or of disgust, or of any emotion whatsoever, are ever exactly the same. Let us take the emotion of fear. The quality of any experience of this emotion will be influenced by the type of object or situation which stimulates it; the values involved; the degree and kind of hazard perceived; the mental state of the subject; the type and strength of conative tendency aroused; and the whole context of subject-related-to-situation. These elements certainly influence the experience of any emotion. There is an extremely wide variation in the quality of fear experiences. In a sense they are all perfectly unique, individual, sui generis, incommunicable. In this sense the "numinous" experience of fear is different from "natural" fear, because it is different in quality.

Otto is right in maintaining that the difference between the ordinary feeling of dependence and the feeling of absolute dependence is not one merely of degree, as Schleiermacher says, but that there is a real difference in quality. It is very doubtful indeed whether any two emotional experiences can differ from each other merely in degree. The total configuration of the elements - such as perception, impulse, felt bodily changes, direct excitement within the central nervous system, etc., - which contribute to the quality of emotional experience inevitably changes with every change in degree of excitement. Therefore a change in degree of emotional excitement involves a change in the quality of emotional

experience. It is only in abstraction that we can say that one emotional experience is different from another in degree alone.

We are involved here in the extremely difficult question of what constitutes the differentia of an emotion. Does every difference in quality mean a difference in kind or may there be variations in quality within the limits of the various types or kinds of emotional experience? And if the latter be accepted how are we then to differentiate between these various types? It seems clear from our discussion above that if every difference in quality means a difference in kind of emotional experience we shall be hard put to it for names to symbolize them all and, furthermore, the same name would never fit twice. So if we are to have any intelligible discussion whatever of emotional experience it must be on the assumption that such experience is capable of being classified according to types and that within the types the different constituents will be found to vary in degree and quality. Fear and anger are primary types of emotional experience which are distinguished even among the most primitive peoples and yet there are very many varieties of both fear and anger.

How are we able to distinguish between fear and anger? Not by the bodily changes involved, as Cannon has shown,¹ and consequently not by any form of sensation. Not by the nature of the stimulus, for what gives rise to fear in one person may arouse anger or mirth in another. The distinguishing mark of an emotion Woodworth has shown to be the conative impulse with which it is associated.²

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1. Cannon: Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage (1929).
 2. Woodworth: How Emotions are Identified and Classified, in Wittenberg Symposium (1928).

It is possible to have the impulse without the emotion, as we have shown,¹ but it is probably not possible to have emotion without an impulse. We have already seen the reason for this in the fact that emotion develops in situations where for any reason an impulse or impulses fail to find prompt and adequate satisfaction.

Now if it could be shown that in the presence of "numinous" objects man experiences or has a tendency to experience emotional excitement with which entirely unique conative impulses are associated we should be entitled to regard these emotions as unique and irreducible to other emotions. But we believe that Otto has not shown this. He has evidently sought to locate the differentiating element of religious emotions in the object which excites them rather than in the conative impulses which are associated with them. If we grant this fundamental presupposition then Otto's distinction between "numinous" and "natural" emotions is perfectly sound. But the psychologist cannot grant it simply because it does not explain psychological facts. We conclude, therefore, with Edward, though our argument is entirely different from his, that "the factor which makes the difference in feeling between natural fear, awe, wonder, for instance and the religious counterparts of these natural emotions is simply the tone which they receive from the distinctive quality of the numinous element itself."²

1. Vide supra, section 12.

2. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), pp. 68-69.

Let us now examine Otto's law of the association of the feelings. In the first place, it is evident from the way in which Otto applies the law that he has not sufficiently distinguished between primary emotions and their compounds. For example, in the story of his own reaction to the sight of blood he says that his feelings of horror and disgust give rise to one another. If McDougall's analysis of the emotion of horror is correct it is a blend of fear and disgust. In any excitement of the emotion of horror disgust would be an element and evidently in Otto's feeling at the sight of flowing blood it is a prominent element. But this does not mean that the two emotions are associated in such a way that they evoke each other. It simply means that he has a complex emotional experience of horror which is analyzable into other primary experiences. And in this case one of the primary emotional constituents is prominent enough to be easily recognizable while the other is much weaker and consequently vague and not easily distinguished from the complex whole. Consequently disgust and horror alternately become prominent in consciousness and seem to evoke one another. This is suggested as a possible explanation. Of course it is not for us to dogmatize about another's introspections. But one has the feeling that once this distinction is clearly made between primary and complex emotions, Otto's contentions regarding the close similarity between certain emotions and their tendency to arouse one another in the mind because of that similarity lose much of their force.

This is not to deny the reality of complex emotions. When we analyze horror into fear and disgust it is no longer horror. Horror supervenes, emerges, comes into being, as the total emotional configuration of which fear and disgust are elements. But even so, disgust does not necessarily resemble horror unless in a given experience it happens to be a very prominent element in this complex emotion. One might properly speak of disgustful horror or fearful horror according to whether the one or the other element is more prominent. In either case the complex emotion would resemble, or be "analogous" to the more prominent primary constituent. But even so neither one would give rise to the other in consciousness by virtue of any law of association of feeling. Affective experiences are excited not by other affective but by cognitive experiences.

The other objection which we wish to raise against Otto's law of the association of feelings is that the facts which he seeks to explain by this law are more satisfactorily explained by the concept of the sentiment. We have already argued¹ that the apprehension of the "numinous" is cognitive and not affective in character. We have just shown that one emotion does not excite another emotion, but that emotion is aroused by cognition. We have shown in our discussions of sentiment² and the religious sentiment³ that emotional dispositions may be permanently associated with ideas in such a way that when the ideas with which they are associated are present in

1. Vide supra, section 24.
 2. Vide supra, section 13.
 3. Vide supra, section 21.

consciousness the emotions also appear. It is now our contention that, instead of looking for permanent associations between "numinous" emotions and their "natural" counterparts whereby the "numinous" feelings are "schematized"¹ in experience by the "natural," we shall be more successful in our search if we look for relatively permanent associations of emotions with ideas in the form of sentiments.

It is quite evident from what Otto says of his feeling of horror at the sight of flowing blood that the emotions of fear and disgust have in his own experience become associated with this idea to form a sentiment of horror. The emotions are not associated with each other because of some similarity, because fear and disgust really are not very much alike. They are associated with the idea. And even if Otto really means fear where he says horror the concept of sentiment would still give a better explanation of the facts than the idea of feelings associated with one another. It is a fact that they are associated in a complex but the central core of the complex is idea not emotion.

Indeed Otto comes very near admitting this himself. In trying to show² that numinous horror can by association cause the emotion of disgust to become attached to some object which may call out this emotion even after the numinous awe which the object once evoked has died away, he hurls a boomerang. For if there were an association between the emotions of disgust and numinous awe in the first place then when the emotion of disgust is evoked it ought to arouse numinous awe.

1. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923), pp. 46-51.

2. Op. cit., p. 128. Quoted above.

But he not only says that it does not do so but he speaks of the object as evoking both disgust and numinous awe. So far as his contention that disgust was associated with the object through its likeness to numinous horror is concerned it is entirely unconvincing. The emotion might have become associated with the object entirely independently. The concept of sentiment not only explains the original connection of disgust with the object more satisfactorily than Otto's formulation but it enables us to explain completely the continuance of this connection after the object no longer evokes numinous awe, whereas the law of the association of feelings does not in the least help us to explain this fact.

Many other examples might be cited of Otto's application of the "principle of association" where the concept of the religious sentiment would be far more adequate. We shall content ourselves, however, with only one more example. He says:

The mere word, even when it comes as a living voice, is powerless without the "Spirit in the heart" of the hearer to move him to apprehension. And this Spirit, this inborn capacity to receive and understand, is the essential thing. If that is there, very often only a small incitement, a very remote stimulus, is needed to arouse the numinous consciousness.....But where the wind of the Spirit blows, there the mere "rational" terms themselves are endowed with power to arouse the feeling of the "non-rational," and become adequate to tune the mood at once to the right tone. Here "schematization" starts at once and needs no prompting.¹

From our point of view something more is needed than an "inborn capacity to receive and understand." The religious sentiment is

1. Op. cit., p. 63.

necessary in order that words may be religiously evocative. And when the sentiment is present in one's mental integration those words which symbolize the ideas that form the central part of that sentiment are endued with power to arouse the religious emotions.

Our conclusion, therefore, is: (1) that psychology cannot recognize "numinous" fear, wonder, awe, love, etc., as separate primary emotions along with the "natural" emotions which go by the same names, but the emotion of fear, for example, and other emotions likewise, may vary in quality according to the total pattern of the experienced relation of subject to situation. If the experience is of such a character that the subject seeks adjustment to a superhuman power or superhuman powers which he conceives to have ultimate control over that which he greatly values, then the emotions which he may experience in the procedure of adjustment may properly be said to have a religious quality. (2) Emotions are not associated with one another in such a way that when one is activated it arouses similar emotions. Affective experience is awakened not by other affective experience but by cognitive experience. (3) Two or more emotions may be blended into an emergent complex emotion different from any of its components, but in such a blending some one constituent is usually more prominent than the rest. (4) Emotional dispositions may be associated in systems in such a way that when one is awakened all the members of the system will be to some extent activated, usually one more strongly than the rest. But in such systems the emotions are not associated with one another but each one is inde-

pendently associated with an idea or system of ideas which serve as the center and organizing principle of the system. Such a system is properly called a sentiment.

28. Elements of the Numinous

Unlike McDougall, whose analysis of reverence is concerned with the subjective aspect of religious experience, Otto, in his analysis of the "numinous,"¹ quite evidently seeks to keep his discussion directed toward the objective side of religion. We have already examined and supported his argument that the numinous is an objective datum of experience. We have now to inquire whether as an objective datum the numinous admits of any description and if so what are its characteristics.

Otto says that the nature of the numinous is such that it cannot be directly described in rational terms; it can only be suggested by means of the special way in which it is reflected in the mind in terms of feeling.² By adducing feelings akin to these numinous affective states and by the use of metaphor and symbolic expression he endeavours to make these states "ring out, as it were, of themselves." If the numinous is to be characterized conceptually at all only one expression is appropriate to it, mysterium tremendum,³ which may be translated, somewhat inadequately, as awe-ful mystery.⁴ It is a mystery inexpressible and above all creatures.

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1. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923), Chs. III-VI.
 2. Ibid., p. 12.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid., p. 25.

Conceptually "mysterium" denotes merely that before which the eyes are held closed, that which is hidden and esoteric, that which is beyond conception or understanding, extraordinary and unfamiliar. The term does not define the object more positively in its qualitative character. But though what is enunciated in the word is negative, what is meant is something absolutely and intensely positive. This pure positive we can experience in feelings, feelings which our discussion can help to make clear to us, in so far as it arouses them actually in our hearts.¹

Otto quite consistently maintains that the numinous cannot be rationally known but that it can only be felt; that our experience of the numinous as objectively present is essentially affective in character rather than cognitive. We have argued that our direct apprehension of the numinous as an objective datum in consciousness is not affective but cognitive in character.² We must admit, however, that Otto's contention has some justification. Some situations thoroughly defy our most persistent attempts to understand them, to organize them into one perceptual whole. Such a situation we have tried to depict in our description of a young man's experience of the Grand Canyon.³ Such cosmic disturbances as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, eclipses, the appearance of a comet in the sky and such mysterious phenomena as death, birth, deadly epidemics of disease, etc., furnish other illustrations of what for primitive man is not only unspeakable mystery, but mystery that vitally affects his values. He knows nothing of their conditions; only enough of their nature to fill him with awe. They cannot be related to the rest of

1. Op. cit., p. 13.

2. Vide supra, section 24.

3. Vide supra, section 24.

his knowledge. They transcend his powers of perception and conception. They break down all his normal and habitual reaction systems. That an earthquake or a hurricane is vibrant with raging, cataclysmic power, tense and trembling with fury, and bent upon our destruction is not mere imagination. These characteristics can be perceived. Yet the whole, of which these characteristics are mere aspects, cannot be perceived; it is essentially a mystery.

Let us suppose that an individual, or community, is threatened by a mysterious something which he cannot perceive or comprehend as a whole, but which clearly displays transcendent power, angry attitude, and destructive intent. These aspects of the situation are certainly such as we should expect to inspire the impulse to escape. But how shall one flee or hide from a hurricane or an earthquake? Or from death? If one cannot oppose, nor yet flee nor hide from such a power, what can one do? Perhaps propitiate.

If we refer to our discussion of the types of situations which are likely to produce emotion (section 14) we shall see that the situation sketched above has several characteristics, any one of which would serve to characterize it as an emotional situation: (1) it is unclear, so that observation gets no facts to guide action; (2) the situation cannot be handled successfully because of lack of understanding and skill; (3) extreme resistance is encountered; (4) the situation is often the object of a complex or sentiment developed in past experience. As a consequence of the above facts it is possible that the emotion may be so violent as to cause partial, or even total, dissociation of cortical processes and consequently of the more

complicated cognitive aspects of experience. At any rate, since the situation as a whole is incomprehensible and essentially mysterious, and since the emotion is violent, it would be easy in introspection to overlook any cognitive content of consciousness altogether. We do not wish to deny the essential mystery of the "numinous." Indeed it is *mysterium tremendum*. But we wish again to emphasize the fact that the perceptual elements are there as the sine qua non of the emotional elements. We see attitude and intent and magnitude and power, rather than form; we perceive, as it were, the invisible, in terms of the transient and fleeting, rather than in terms of stable and enduring configurations. That which is entirely and wholly beyond us could not attract us. We must be able to perceive something of its nature else we could neither fear nor love the *mysterium tremendum*. It is those perceived qualities of its nature that condition our interest in and form the raw material of our adjustment to the *mysterium tremendum*; and these must also form the basis of any description which we can give of the numinous. As a whole it is a great mystery; but certain aspects of its character can be perceived and to some extent understood and dealt with. It seems to us that it is only on this understanding that we may logically proceed with any discussion of the "elements of the numinous."

According to Otto the numinous has a dual character; it is "at once an object of boundless awe and boundless wonder, quelling and yet entrancing the soul."¹ These daunting and fascinating elements make up the qualitative content of the numinous experience, to which "the mysterious" stands as form.²

1. Op. cit., p. 42.

2. Op. cit., p. 31.

The daunting qualities of the numinous are identified as (1) absolute unapproachability or awefulness,¹ (2) absolute overpoweringness,² (3) energy, urgency, vitality,³ (4) absolute mysteriousness.⁴ The quality of absolute unapproachability or awefulness is reflected in primitive man's experience of daemonic dread which is "a quite specific kind of emotional response wholly distinct from that of being afraid, though it so far resembles it that the analogy of fear may be used to throw light upon its nature."⁵ No natural fear passes over into it, and the difference between natural fear and daemonic dread is not merely one of degree. "The awe or dread may be so great that it seems to penetrate to the very marrow, making the man's hair bristle and his limbs quake. But it may also steal upon him almost unobserved as the gentlest of agitations, a mere fleeting shadow passing across his mood."⁶ The peculiar property of the numen which awakens this numinous dread or terror is illustrated in the Old Testament concept of the wrath of God.⁷ This wrath is of a non-or super-rational, i.e., numinous, quality. "Something super-rational throbs and gleams, palpable and visible, in the 'Wrath of God,' prompting to a sense of 'terror' which no 'natural' anger can arouse."⁸

1. Op. cit., pp. 13-19.

2. Op. cit., pp. 20-23.

3. Op. cit., pp. 23-24.

4. Op. cit., pp. 25-30.

5. Op. cit., p. 13.

6. Op. cit., p. 16.

7. Op. cit., p. 18.

8. Op. cit., p. 19.

The absolute overpoweringness of the numen awakens creature-consciousness in man and this is the raw material of religious humility.¹ The element of overpoweringness may be interpreted primarily as "plentitude of power" and secondarily as "plentitude of being." But man's experience of self-depreciation in the presence of the transcendent object is not a rational apprehension of a causal relation, as Schleiermacher and the rationalists would have it, but the direct result of the felt contrast between the supremacy and absoluteness of the numen and the helplessness and nothingness of the self.²

The element of energy or urgency is apprehended in both the awfulness and overpoweringness of the numen. The philosophic God of rational speculation can be put into a definition but in the numinous experience God is the living God.³ This element of urgency is recognizable in Schopenhauer's daemonic Will; in Fichte's gigantic, never-resting, active world stress.⁴ These and other "ideograms" such as vitality, passion, emotional temper, movement, activity, violence, etc., form symbolic expressions through which this quality of the numinous is signified.

Even the form of the numinous as mysterium is of a daunting nature. The mental reaction peculiar to it is called stupor, signifying blank, staring wonder, an astonishment that strikes us dumb, amazement absolute.⁵ Mysterium is an ideogram signifying that which

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1. Op. dit., p. 20.
 2. Op. cit., pp. 21-22.
 3. Op. cit., p. 23.
 4. Op. dit., p. 24.
 5. Op. dit., p. 26.

is wholly other, outside the canny. It is beyond comprehension not merely because our knowledge is limited but because in it we come upon the "wholly other" whose kind and character is incommensurate with our own.¹

But the numinous consciousness has its fascinating character as well as its daunting qualities. The concepts related to this experience on the rational side are love, mercy, pity, comfort. But there are non-rational elements in religious felicity as well as religious infelicity. And we have no concepts which exhaust the profound element of wonderfulness and rapture which lies in the mysterious, beatific experience of deity.² This mystic beatitude man can neither proclaim in speech nor conceive in thought but can only know in experience.³ At its highest point of stress the fascinating becomes the "overabounding," specially characteristic of mysticism but surviving in all truly felt states of religious beatitude such as grace, conversion, the second birth, etc. Such an experience may pass into blissful excitement, rapture, and exaltation verging often on the bizarre and the abnormal.⁴

If we keep in mind the dangers of summaries and schematic representations and guard ourselves against the falsifications which often accompany the use of symbols, we may make profitable use of a summary diagram of Otto's analysis of the numinous -

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1. Op. cit., p. 28.
 2. Op. cit., p. 32.
 3. Op. cit., p. 34.
 4. Op. cit., p. 37.

Numinous Property	Numinous Experience to which it gives rise	Analogous Natural Emotion
1. Awefulness (Tremendum)	Daemonic Dread	Fear
2. Overpoweringness (Majestas)	Creature Feeling	Subjection
3. Urgency (Vitality)	-----	-----
4. Mysteriousness (Mysterium)	Stupor	Wonder (Amazement)
5. Fascination (Fascinans)	Rapture	Love (Wonder)

It will be seen at once that the first four represent the daunting qualities of the transcendent object and that the analogous "natural" emotions are practically the same as those which compose the complex emotion of awe, according to McDougall's analysis. One feels that these qualities have received at the hands of Otto more thorough treatment than the fascinating qualities of the numinous. For these still seem to be complex. But even so, it cannot be doubted that tender emotion is at least a component element of the "natural" emotion which is analogous to numinous exaltation or rapture. So that although Otto approaches the analysis of religious experience from the objective side and McDougall from the subjective, their results point in the same direction. They both make a distinction between the awe-inspiring and kindly-disposed characteristics of the religious object; they both hold that in the development of religion the apprehension of the awe-inspiring powers comes first in point of time; they both maintain that the religious emotion is a unique

complex of which, on its natural side, fear, subjection, wonder, and tender emotion are components.

If the point of view which we have supported in this and the previous chapters is well-founded we are ready to draw certain conclusions with respect to Otto's analysis. In the first place the properties which he attributes to the numinous object are such as a person may perceive. It may be objected that what is essentially and absolutely mysterious cannot be perceived. It is true that the numinous cannot be perceived in its essential nature as numinous. But it can be perceived as mysterious. We may not be able to understand or to comprehend a given situation or object. But we can see that there is something there which is beyond us. And while the situation or object may entirely baffle our cognitive powers certain aspects of the presentation must be intelligible to us else we could neither know it as "something there" nor be in the slightest degree interested in it. Such aspects of the "something there" as its being alive or active, possessing power, and exhibiting a favorable or unfavorable disposition toward us and our values are certainly intelligible and they are certainly capable of being perceived and referred to that which we do not understand and know that we cannot understand. Otto's analysis then seems to come to this: that in the numinous experience we directly apprehend the presence of a mysterious object so different from the ordinary objects of everyday experience that it seems to belong to an entirely different order;

that this object appears so mighty in power or vast in being (or both) that compared to it we are as nothing; that it seems alive and active in a manner and to a degree that is beyond the ordinary objects of our experience; and that it exhibits a disposition, favorable or unfavorable, toward us of such a character that its displeasure toward us inspires a terror beyond the imagination of anyone who has not felt it and its favor ravishes the soul with such raptures as no symbol can signify to the uninitiated.

As to the distinction between numinous and "natural" emotions we have already argued that the distinction between one emotion and another lies not in the object which awakens it but in the impulse which accompanies it; that no real distinction is possible between numinous and natural emotions on this basis; and, therefore, that the classification of the numinous emotions and their natural counterparts as two different sets of primary emotions is invalid. According to our view, for example, daemonic dread and natural fear are not two primary emotions, but daemonic dread is a particular kind of fear which differs from, let us say, the fear of another person. And one difference between the two is due to the difference in the total configuration of the two perceived situations in which they are evoked. There is a difference in quality but not in kind. All emotions are natural emotions but many of the emotions may possess a quality that can properly be signified by the word "numinous."

As to the adequacy of Otto's analysis it appears that the author in his desire to present the mysterium as entirely non- or super-rational in character has not done justice to the element of

curiosity or wonder. It cannot be doubted that the mysteries of religion have given rise to a very large part of mankind's reflective thought. It is too much to say that the mysterious entirely stupefies the mind. It often stimulates it. There is a haunting and irresistible desire to explain the mysterious by relating it to the rest of our knowledge - to know even as we are known. Indeed worshipful contemplation is by no means the least of religious attitudes, as Otto himself seems to suggest when he says that the numinous is at once the object of "boundless awe and boundless wonder."¹ But from his previous discussion of the fascinating qualities of the numinous it appears that what he means by wonder is not an emotion which reinforces the impulse of observation, or curiosity, but an emotional response to the numinous apprehended as favorably disposed toward the subject. His only real treatment of the impulse of curiosity and the emotion of wonder in the sense in which we use these terms is in connection with his discussion of the "mysterium,"² and there he presents them as completely baffled and outdone by a transcendent object in the understanding of which they are of no avail whatsoever.³ They are merely stupefied and deadened by the presence of the numinous. We have been at some pains to show that in the numinous experience man apprehends that which is essentially mysterious but not altogether mysterious, else it could not possibly hold his interest. We conclude, therefore, that wonder, supporting the impulse of curiosity, is a genuine element in the numinous experience.

1. Op. cit., p. 42.

2. Op. cit., Ch. V.

3. Op. cit., pp. 26 ff.

29. Religious History and the Numinous

According to Otto, religious evolution begins, historically, with the appearance of sundry curious phenomena which are preliminary to religion proper but which deeply affect its subsequent course. "Such are the notions of 'clean' and 'unclean,' belief in and worship of the dead, belief in and worship of 'souls' or 'spirits,' magic, fairy tale, and myth, homage to natural objects, whether frightful or extraordinary, noxious or advantageous, the strange idea of power (Orenda or Mana), fetishism and totemism, worship of animal and plant, daemonism and polydaemonism."¹ These phenomena, standing as they do at the threshold of religion, may be termed as 'pre-religion' but not in the sense that religion and the possibility of religion are explicable by their means. Rather they are themselves only made possible and can only be explained from a religious basic element, viz., the feeling of the numinous,² which in these primitive experiences takes the form of daemonic dread.³ The "daemonic dread" phase of numinous consciousness is in these experiences awakened not by genuine appearances of "the holy" but by an element common to them all which is merely analogous to "the holy."⁴ Such false recognitions of the holy are later rejected and wholly or partly extruded as inadequate or simply unworthy so soon as a higher level of development and a purer religious judgment have been reached.⁵ This religious development on its non-rational side takes place as follows:

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1. Op. cit., p. 121.
 2. Op. cit., p. 128.
 3. Op. cit., pp. 16, 32, 121-135, 137.
 4. Op. cit., pp. 137, 147-148.
 5. Op. cit., p. 148.

"daemonic dread," after itself passing through various gradations, rises to the level of the "fear of the gods," and thence to "fear of God;" daemonic power becomes divine power, dread becomes worship. Shudder becomes holy awe. The feelings of dependence upon and beatitude in the numen, from being relative become absolute; the numen becomes God and Deity.¹ The rational elements come together in the historical evaluation of religions with the non-rational, and serve to "schematize" them. The daunting and repelling moment of the numinous, the tremendum, is schematized by the rational ideas of justice, moral will, and the exclusion of what is opposed to morality, and becomes the "wrath of God;" the fascinans, the attracting and alluring moment of the numinous, is schematized by means of the ideas of goodness, mercy, love, and becomes all that we mean by Grace; and the moment mysteriosum is schematized by the absoluteness of all rational attributes applied to the Deity.²

The whole process may be summarized in the following words of the author:

There are, then, three factors in the process by which religion comes into being in history. First, the interplay of predisposition and stimulus, which in the historical development of man's mind actualizes the potentiality in the former, and at the same time helps to determine its form. Second, the recognition, by virtue of this very disposition, of specific portions of history as manifestations of "the holy" with consequent modification of the religious experience already attained both in its quality and degree. And third, on the basis of the other two, the achievement of fellowship with "the holy" in knowing, feeling, and willing. Plainly, then, Religion is only the offspring of history in so far as history on the one hand develops our disposition for knowing the holy, and on the other is itself repeatedly the manifestation of the holy.³

1. Op. cit., pp. 113-114.
 2. Op. cit., pp. 144-145.
 3. Op. cit., pp. 180-181.

By way of comment we observe, in the first place, that what Otto means by the word predisposition is not instinct, though his usage often suggests this interpretation,¹ but potentiality, faculty, or capacity. As to its origin this religious predisposition, the feeling of the numinous, is a primal element of our psychological nature, which like all other primal psychological elements, emerges in due course in the developing life of human mind and spirit and is thenceforward simply present.² We are not to be led astray by the use of the word emerge. His is not a view of emergent evolution. He recognizes no novelties in the evolutionary process. A thing must already be in order to become. "There is something presupposed by history as such.....which alone makes it history, and that is the existence of a quale, something with a potentiality of its own, capable of becoming, in the special sense of coming to be that to which it was predisposed and predetermined."³ Evolution for Otto is merely potentiality becoming actuality, that which is already there, but hidden, making its appearance. Even in sub-human psychological life there is a "predisposition to form the predispositions or faculties of the actual developed mind, and standing in relation to this as embryo to the full-grown organism."⁴ This holds for the religious predisposition also, for "the predisposition which the human reason brought with it when the species Man entered history became long ago, not merely for individuals but for the species as a whole, a religious impulsion."⁵

We have argued all along that awe is a complex emotion. If it is, and if it is rightly understood as a synthesis of fear,

1. Op. dit., pp. 119-120.

2. Op. cit., p. 129.

3. Op. dit., p. 180.

4. Op. dit., p. 119.

5. Op. dit., p. 120.

wonder, and subjection, then when it first appears in the history of man's development it is a genuine novelty that is more than what we can rightly speak of as the actualizing of a potentiality. It is a true emergent. Furthermore, if religious evolution begins with the experience of "daemonic dread," as we believe Otto is right in maintaining, if "daemonic dread" accompanies the experience of a mysterious power which appears to have ultimate control over some or all our values, which is unfavorably disposed toward us, and to which it is necessary to make some adjustment, and if daemonic dread is the kind of awe inspired by this situation, as we have argued, then it follows that religious awe, "daemonic dread" and, consequently, religion itself are genuine emergent experiences, and not mere potentialities becoming actual. Religion therefore emerges with man's attempt to adjust himself to his total and ultimate environment. And its evolution is through insight, trial and success. This view saves us the necessity of maintaining an outworn view of evolution; of assuming a "bifurcated" universe and consequently of holding to the unscientific view of active intervention of "the holy" in the phenomenal world;¹ and of imagining some law of association of the feelings whereby that which is not really "the holy," but in some strange way like it, arouses certain natural emotions which by an analogy arouse genuine numinous emotions that get diverted in this way to natural objects and result in the judgment that certain phenomena or objects are manifestations of "the holy" when in reality they are not.²

1. Cf. Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

2. Cf. Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

The other observation which we wish to make regarding Otto's theory of origins is concerned with those phenomena which stand at the threshold of religion. The view which we have developed all along is that living organisms are self-directing centers of force that seek to maintain themselves in dynamic equilibrium with their effective environment. The history of evolution is essentially the history of developing organisms becoming sensitive to and making successful adjustment to ever wider reaches of environmental influence, in point of space and time, and ever higher values in the environment. Now when, in the developing life of man, he begins to feel after and find those ultimate forces which underlie and condition the ordinary phenomena of every-day life he has reached the threshold of both philosophy and religion, and the development of these two go hand in hand. Philosophy is criticism and interpretation of results; religion is discovery and active adjustment. On this view we should expect that the daunting and repelling aspects of the wider environment, the equilibrium-disturbing factors, would be the first to attract man's attention to themselves. And, historically, this is exactly what we find. At this point we are in agreement with McDougall, Otto, and Marett, whose views we are to develop in the next chapter.

Chapter VI

SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY - TABU-MANA

Because his views on the origin of religion are essentially psychological in character and because they are so widely accepted in the field of Social Anthropology, Dr. R. R. Marett is chosen as the representative from this field. Marett's view that a primitive supernaturalism existed before animism was developed is supported and accepted. His analysis of the supernatural in its existential dimension into a positive element (mana) and a negative element (tabu) is likewise accepted; but in its moral dimension his analysis of the supernatural into a social element (religion) and an anti-social element (magic) is rejected in favor of Frazer's psychological distinction between religion, which is characterized by submission, and magic, which involves the attitude of self-assertion. Marett's exposition of the psycho-physical basis of humility as a disposition composed of three impulses (flight, cowering, and prostration) organized with one emotion (heart-sinking) is noted and McDougall's analysis of awe is preferred. The essential similarity of the views of McDougall, Otto, and Marett with respect to the character of the religious object and man's response to it are noted as being important.

British anthropologists generally have applied a psychological method in the comparative study of religion, treating psychological elements as fundamental in religious history. Prior to the work of Marett they principally employed the method of individual psychology and so were led to an abstract treatment of religion in so far as religion is a social product. Realizing this shortcoming, Marett, while not abandoning the method of individual psychology, introduces the method of social psychology, and in the

study of rudimentary religion makes social psychology paramount.¹ Marett's theory of the pre-animistic origin of religion is thus at once a psychological theory and perhaps the most notable contribution to the solution of our problem that has been made by any contemporary anthropologist. Furthermore, its wide acceptance in the field of Social Anthropology justifies its presentation as the representative view from this field.

30. Pre-Animistic Religion

In order to understand Marett's theory of pre-animistic religion it is necessary first of all to know what is meant by animism. As a technical term applied to religion, animism is associated with the great name of Dr. Edward B. Tylor, who uses the word to signify "the belief in Spiritual Beings" which he holds to be the minimum definition of religion.² (For a more extended exposition of the meaning of animism, see Appendix I at the end of the present work).

Marett assumes that "animism, the belief in the existence of visionary shapes, whether of the dead or sui juris, became with the savage, at a certain stage in his development, the typical, nay almost the universal, means of clothing the facts of his religious experience in ideas and words, and the typical and all but universal theory on which he based his religious practice."³ But

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1. Marett: Threshold of Religion (1914), Ch. V. Cf. also Karpf: American Social Psychology (1932), p. 172.
 2. Tylor: Primitive Culture (1871), Vol. I, p. 424.
 3. Marett: Threshold of Religion (1914), p. 8.

this being assumed, he asks the question: "Before, or at any rate apart from, animism, was early man subject to any experience, whether in the form of feeling, or of thought, or of both combined, that might be termed specifically 'religious'?"¹

In answer to this question Marett argues that psychologically religion involves feeling and will as well as thought;² that religion may manifest itself on the emotional side even when thought is vague;³ that probably for most persons the emotional side of religion constitutes its more real, more characteristic feature;⁴ that in response to or in connection with such emotions as awe and wonder, wherein emotion seems for the moment to have outstripped reason, "there arises in the region of human thought a powerful impulse to objectify and even to personify the mysterious or 'supernatural' something felt,⁵ and in the region of the will a corresponding impulse to render it innocuous, or better still propitious, by force of constraint, communion, or conciliation."⁶ This complex mental state of feeling, thought, and will dictated by awe of the mysterious is called supernaturalism, and is regarded as the raw material of religion capable of existing apart from animism and of becoming the basis on which an animistic doctrine is later constructed.⁷ The supernatural or supernormal, ngai, wakan, mana, is the common element

1. Marett: Threshold of Religion (1914), p. 8.

2. Cf. *supra*, section 18.

3. *Op. cit.*, pp. 1, 5.

4. *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

5. Cf. *supra*, section 25.

6. *Op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

7. *Op. cit.*, pp. 1, 11.

in ghosts and gods, in the magical and the mystical, the supernal and the infernal, the unknown within and the unknown without.¹ Any supernatural object, i.e., an object toward which awe is felt, is termed a power, and of such powers spirits constitute but a single class among many.² Startling manifestations of nature,³ awe-inspiring objects such as the bull-roarer,⁴ curious stones,⁵ strange, powerful, or gruesome plants and animals,⁶ dead remains,⁷ blood,⁸ etc., all may be objects of awe and so be regarded as possessing mana, belonging to the sacred or supernatural world, and may consequently rank as powers without the agency of spirits being necessarily assumed. Even when they are regarded as alive such "animatism" falls short of animism in Tylor's sense of distinction between the spirit and its vehicle, with the animating principle regarded as independent and separable.⁹

As a minimum definition of religion, therefore, animism is seen to be too narrow because too intellectualistic and a wider conception is needed. This wider conception Marett finds in pre-animistic supernaturalism, or tabu-mana.

This view is also in opposition to the views of another great British Anthropologist, Dr. J. G. Frazer. We have added an

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1. Op. cit., p. 12.
 2. Op. cit., p. 13.
 3. Op. cit., p. 14.
 4. Op. cit., p. 16.
 5. Op. cit., p. 18.
 6. Op. cit., p. 20.
 7. Op. cit., p. 23.
 8. Op. cit., p. 25.
 9. Op. cit., p. 14.

appendix giving more extended treatment of the differences between the views of Marett and Frazer and it is necessary here only to state them.¹ First, Dr. Frazer holds² that an age of magic everywhere antedated an age of religion and that the two are so absolutely different that, like oil and water, they will not mix, while Marett thinks that magic and religion were both differentiated out of a common plasm,³ namely, supernaturalism, and that under certain circumstances magic may develop into religion; and, second, Dr. Frazer regards tabu as negative magic,⁴ whereas Marett believes that tabu is correctly viewed as negative mana⁵ and that tabu and mana, regarded as negative and positive supernaturalism, respectively, compose the common plasm of crude beliefs about the awful and occult out of which both magic and religion were differentiated.

In Marett's conception of pre-animistic religion, we are to note, first of all, that in making the limits of primitive religion coincide with the limits of primitive "supernaturalism,"⁶ Marett is not unmindful of the fact that "supernatural" is our term and not the savage's. "The savage has no word for 'nature.' He does not abstractly distinguish between an order of uniform happenings and a higher order of miraculous happenings. He is merely concerned to mark and exploit the difference when presented in the concrete."⁷ An interesting example of the savage's perception of this difference

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1. See Appendix II.
 2. Frazer: The Golden Bough (1911), Vol. I, p. 233.
 3. Marett: Op. cit., p. xi.
 4. Frazer: op. cit., Vol. I, p. 111 ff.
 5. Marett: Op. cit., Ch. III.
 6. Op. cit., p. 58.
 7. Op. cit., p. 109.

in the concrete is revealed in Marett's story of his interview with the Pygmy chief Bokane. He asked Bokane how his people told whether the sudden death of a Pygmy was due to oudah or not. "He replied that, if an arrowhead or a large thorn were found inside the body, it was an arrow or thorn that had killed the man; but if nothing could be found, then oudah must have done it. If a dangerous animal killed a man, I learnt on further inquiry, it was not oudah, but it was oudah if you cut your finger accidentally. When strange sounds were heard in the forest at night, that was oudah."¹ And Marett concludes, we believe rightly, that "on some such lines as these, then, we may suppose other savages also to have succeeded in placing the strange and unaccountable under a category of its own. It is this category of the strange, the unaccountable, the extraordinary, the wonderful, the miraculous, which we understand Marett to signify by the term "supernatural."

Now given the supernatural in any form, there are always two things to note about it: firstly, that you are to be heedful in regard to it; secondly, that it has power. The first may be called its negative character and the second its positive. Tabu signifies the negative mode of the supernatural; mana the positive mode. Tabu-mana, then, is a formula the limits of which coincide with the limits, on its existential side, of the supernatural.² Tabu means that you must be heedful in regard to the supernatural, not that you must be on your guard against it. "The prohibition to have deal-

1. Op. cit., p. 87.

2. Op. cit., pp. 104-111.

ings with it is not absolute; otherwise practical religion would be impossible. The warning is against casual, incautious, profane dealings.... Under certain conditions man may draw nigh but it is well for him to respect those conditions."¹ Likewise we must shun descriptions of mana that are too specific. "Mana is often operative and thaumaturgic, but not always. Like energy, mana may be dormant or potential. Mana, let us remember, is an adjective as well as a noun, expressing a possession which is a permanent quality.... Hence it seems enough to say that mana exhibits the supernatural in its positive capacity - ready, but not necessarily in act - to strike."²

Tabu and mana apply to the supernatural solely in its existential dimension. With its moral dimension they have nothing to do whatever.³ They are neither moral nor immoral but simply unmoral because these terms of valuation have not yet been superinduced.⁴

In its moral dimension Marett says that supernaturalism has two component elements also, namely, magic and religion. Magic according to Marett is the bad or anti-social kind of supernaturalism and religion the good or social kind.

For scientific purposes at any rate, an evaluatory use ought....to be assigned to this historic disjunction, not merely in view of the usage of civilized society, but as a consequence of that tendency to mark off by discriminative epithets the good and the bad supernaturalisms, the kingdoms of God and of the Devil, which runs right through the hieralogical language of the world.⁵

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1. Op. cit., p. 111. Cf. also Marett: Faith, Hope and Charity in Primitive Religion (1932), Ch. XIII.
 2. Op. cit., pp. 111-112.
 3. Op. cit., p. 112.
 4. Op. cit., p. 114.
 5. Op. cit., p. 114.

But in other passages where Marett discusses the relation between magic and religion he does not distinguish between them on this moral basis. For example, in discussing Dr. Frazer's identification of humility as the distinguishing mark of religion, he says of a quoted passage from Frazer: "In seizing as it does upon humility as the distinguishing mark of the religious spirit, it probably touches the heart of the truth."¹ Again, he says that the spell evolves into prayer,² and offers this fact in proof of his contention that magic may pass into religion. Once more, of a certain incantation he says: "According to our previous conclusions, however, this is no prayer so long as the force which sets the spell in motion is felt by the operator as an exertion of imperative will and an attempt to establish control."³ Again and again in his chapter entitled, "From spell to prayer," Marett treats magic as an "affair between wills"⁴ in which the operator's will dominates the will of his victim. And throughout this chapter he identifies an act as magical or religious according to whether the person performing it acted with an attitude of masterfulness or submission. He is not at all concerned to show that antisocial or immoral, or bad supernaturalism passes into social, or moral, or good supernaturalism; but he does show that the attitude of domination may pass into that of propitiation and invocation.

At any rate, it is certain that from the point of view of psychology it is more satisfactory to draw the distinction between

1. Op. cit., p. 177.
 2. Op. cit., p. 66.
 3. Op. cit., p. 69.
 4. Op. cit., p. 71.

magic and religion on the basis of their psychological rather than their ethical components. We are prepared, therefore, on this point to follow Frazer in making humility the differentiating mark of religion as contrasted with the self-assertive character of magic.¹ If fear, wonder, and subjection compose the religious attitude of awe then the superstitious attitude of magic may be analyzed as a complex of fear, wonder, and self-assertion.² This seems in fact to be the view which Marett generally assumes, although one or two passages quite inconsistently show definite leanings toward the views of Durkheim and the French sociologists. With these we shall be concerned in a later chapter.

It remains in this section only to summarize the advantages of the conception of Tabu-Mana over Animism as a minimum definition of religion:³ (1) Mana is always mana; animism splits up into other concepts, such as soul, ghost, and spirit. (2) Mana is co-extensive with supernaturalism; animism is far too wide. (3) Mana is adapted to express the notion of immaterial, unseen force while leaving in solution the distinction between personal and impersonal; animism tends to lose touch with supernaturalism in its more impersonal forms and is not well-suited to express immateriality and transmissibility.

1. See Appendix II.

2. Cf. McDougall: Introduction to Social Psychology (1918), p. 313. Also, supra, section 23.

3. Marett: op. cit., p. 119.

31. The Birth of Humility

Marett agrees with Dr. Frazer that humility is the distinguishing mark of religion,¹ as contrasted with magic, but disagrees with him when he traces the birth of religion, and of humility, to a change of mind consequent upon the realization by the shrewder intelligences of the race that magic is a failure and that mankind is dependent.² Marett finds Frazer's account of the origin of religion too intellectualistic. And he advances the thesis that "humility and religion are neither the discovery, nor the private possession of a few 'higher intelligences,' but are bound up with the native tendencies and with the social development of ordinary humanity."³ He finds reflected in the religious experience of the savage, which is characteristically mobbish, a predominantly emotional and motor interest which the savage assigns to the object of his religious regard, i.e., to the "sacred" or "supernatural."

Statically viewed, and in its negative aspect, the supernatural is viewed by the savage as more or less uncanny, often more or less secret, and always more or less tabu.⁴ From these qualities attributed to the religious object Marett deduces the subjective experiences of the savage and finds that three instincts and one emotion are involved: the instincts of flight, cowering, and prostration; and the emotion of fear or asthenic emotion, heart-sinking, feeling unstrung. He concludes that "this general type of innate disposition would seem to be the psycho-physical basis of humility."⁵

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1. Marett: *op. cit.*, p. 177.
 2. Frazer: *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 238 ff.
 3. Marett: *op. cit.*, p. 182.
 4. ~~Ibid.~~ *Op. Cit.*, pp. 184-186.
 5. *Op. cit.*, p. 186.

In its positive aspect the savage always attributes to the object of his religious regard mystic potency or mana, and usually views it as ancient, and often as personal.¹ But even when not viewed as personal the spirit of humility is evoked by contact with the supernatural as such and not simply as a consequence of the attribution of personality. The mana attributed to the religious object is such that contact with it according to the accepted forms makes the subject feel "strong," and "wise," and "good," and "glad."²

Now, viewed dynamically, the savage's relations with the supernatural involves just this progress from felt need to renewed strength. "The very expectancy of benefit, the felt need to be improved, carry with them a certain depression, a certain relaxed tension, which is, however, but a prelude to restored innervation and fresh adjustment."³ Humility is thus seen to be but one moment or one step in a complex experience which involves the passage from humiliation to exaltation, from depression to vitality, from tabu to mana. Rites of passage such as those connected with adolescence, matrimony, parenthood, etc., are society's arrangements for socializing and spiritualizing these psycho-physical crises.⁴ The heart-sinking, loss of tone, aloofness, inertia, and disorientation which are all symptoms of psycho-physical crises have been dissociated from their physiological base by a system of religious ritual

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1. Marett: *op. cit.*, pp. 187 ff.
 2. *Op. cit.*, p. 190.
 3. *Op. cit.*, p. 191.
 4. *Op. cit.*, pp. 192 ff.

covering the whole life of primitive man. "The physical means of ministering to crisis that consists in humoring prostration and passivity whilst the recreative processes are coming to a head has been, in the course of social evolution, transferred into the moral sphere, so that spiritual crisis comes to be furnished with an analogous remedy."¹

Marett concludes, therefore, that

it is chiefly the emotional and motor factors that provide the key to the psychological problem. To cease from active life, and consequently to mope, as it were, and be cast down - such during the early and unreflective stages of religion is no subtle device of the "higher intelligences," but the normal tribesman's normal way of reacting in a world that is ever making serious and fresh demands upon his native powers. By sheer force of that vital experience which is always experiment, he has found out - or rather society has found out for him - that thus to be cast down for a season means that afterwards he will arise a stronger and better man. That this happens, or tends to happen he knows; how it happens he also knows, in the sense that the tribal machinery of ritual retreat can be unfailingly set in motion by the tribal experts. But why it happens, that is to say, what the ultimate meaning and purpose may be of this widespread human capacity to profit by the pauses in secular life which religion seems to have sanctioned and even enforced in all periods of its history - such a question lies utterly beyond the range of the Savage.²

With Marett's emphasis on the importance of the emotional and motor factors in the genesis of religion most students of the psychology of religion would now agree. His analysis of

1. Op. cit., p. 199.

2. Op. cit., pp. 199-200.

the emotional and instinctive factors involved they would probably question.

For example, let us examine the following passage:

Three instincts of a highly negative type are observable in the frightened animal. It runs away, or cowers in its tracks, or it prostrates itself in abject self-surrender. Now, it would, perhaps, be fanciful to say that man tends to run away from the sacred as uncanny, to cower before it as secret, and to prostrate himself before it as tabu. On the other hand, it seems plain that to these three negative qualities of the sacred taken together there corresponds on the part of man a certain negative attitude of mind. Psychologists class the feelings bound up with flight, cowering, and prostration, under the common head of 'asthenic emotion.' In plain English they are all forms of heart-sinking, of feeling unstrung. This general type of innate disposition would seem to be the psycho-physical basis of humility.¹

In the first place, we find difficulties with Marett's treatment of the innate disposition to escape. He regards this disposition as a system comprising three instincts and one accompanying emotion. This means that Marett evidently accepts the view of instinct which defines it as an action pattern. We have advanced good reasons however for discarding this view in favor of the concept of an instinct as a drive toward some biological end. So conceived this innate drive to escape is the real instinct which, when frustrated, gives rise to the emotion of fear, which he calls "asthenic emotion." We should like to urge rather strongly that the tendencies "to run away," "to cower in its tracks," and "to prostrate itself in abject self-surrender," are not in fact observable in the frightened animal as it reacts to a given situation. When an

1. Op. cit., p. 186.

animal is frightened it will run away, or hide itself, or follow some other device which subserves the end of escape. Many animals may cower, some may prostrate themselves, but not all animals or insects do either. But all animals when frightened do seek to escape. And, furthermore, they seek to escape by some definite means and when once in progress a particular activity is followed either until its success is achieved or until circumstance favors a different activity as more feasible, or until the cause of the activity is removed. The particular kind of activity in which the instinctive impulse to escape will find expression depends to a very great extent upon the situation in which it becomes, or continues to be, operative. And the activity will change according to the manner in which the situation develops with attempted adjustment. The writer recalls an example of this principle which he recently witnessed on the shores of a mountain lake. Two people had just landed from a canoe when along the shore toward them came a rabbit running at top speed and hotly pursued by a puppy. Suddenly discovering the party, the rabbit sought to change his course but found himself unable to negotiate a high embankment that flanked the shore of the lake. Being hard pressed and not quite daring to approach closer to the people in front of him, he stopped, hesitated, jumped about aimlessly for a second, then leaped into the water. The dog approached the water, hesitated, and plunged in also. But the rabbit now changed his course and seeing nearby a rude pier built very close to the surface of the water, swam underneath it, gained the shore and

hid himself in a pile of logs and rubbish safe from molestation by his enemy. When the animal that is running away finds his course blocked he may turn to swimming or hiding if opportunity presents itself; if every avenue of escape is blocked he may cower or even prostrate himself before his enemy, he may feign death as the opossum does, or he may turn to attack his enemy with extraordinary ferocity. But these activities are all subservient to the one end of escape. And we may lay it down as a certainty that in the frightened animal every reaction pattern of his that subserves the end of escape may be successively called into action if the situation develops in the right way.

Furthermore, the emotional side of the frightened animal's activity is not merely heart-sinking, or "asthenic emotion." Fear is the reinforcement of an impulse, the impulse to escape or to avoid. It is only when the situation seems hopeless, when no plan of escape takes form, or when every plan that is formed is immediately frustrated that the feeling of heart-sinking becomes prominent. Properly speaking, neither the instinct to escape nor the emotion of fear which reinforces it is negative in character. The impulse to escape or to avoid, from the point of view of an observer and with reference to the object escaped from or avoided, is negative. But from the point of view of the individual in whom the impulse is operative - and that is the psychological point of view - the impulse is intensely positive; and its success issues in pleasure, its failure in unpleasure.

It appears therefore that humility cannot be derived from the instinct of escape and the emotion of fear alone. An animal or a person, finding every avenue of escape barred and hopeless, may resign himself, quaking with fear and without a struggle, to destruction by his enemy. But that alone is not humility nor can humility be derived from it. It is well-known that animals must be trained through kindness and not through cruelty. The cowering or prostration of a dog at the sound of his cruel master's voice is not the expression of pure fear, but of fear and affection, the result of cruelty and of kindness. Humility involves the instinct of self-subjection. But subjection is an instinct in its own right and is not dependent upon fear.

We feel that it would be truer to identify Marett's "asthenic emotion" with awe rather than with fear as he does in the passage quoted above. That he would not object to such interpretation, his discussion of pre-animistic religion seems to show. For he there upholds the conception of a "certain religious sense.....whereof the component 'moments' are fear, admiration, wonder, and the like, whilst its object is, broadly speaking, the supernatural."¹

Thus we see that McDougall, Otto, and Marett, approaching the study of religious beginnings from very widely different

1. Threshold of Religion (1914), p. 10.

positions, arrive at conclusions that bear a very close resemblance. If we ask them to tell us what it is that man responds to in primitive religion and how we are to characterize the response, they make answer as follows:

1. McDougall: Man responds to the terrible powers with awe.
2. Otto: Man responds to the numinous with creature-feeling.
3. Marett: Man responds to the supernatural with humility.

Chapter VII

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS - THE FAMILY COMPLEX

Basing their interpretations on widely divergent theories, two leaders of the psychoanalytic school, Freud and Jung, have written extensively on religious origins. The views of both are presented and criticized. Freud conjectures that religion must have arisen in racial history from the sense of guilt felt by a band of brothers in the primal horde of mankind whose incest wishes impelled them to murder the primal father and eat his flesh. At many crucial points Freud's logic is found to be fallacious, many of his basic facts are shown to be at variance with the observations and researches of competent anthropologists, and some of his fundamental psychological principles are shown to be highly questionable; his formulation is, therefore, rejected even as a possible hypothesis. His emphasis on the influence of the family in the development of religion is regarded as an important contribution. For Jung the libido or life-impulse is the final source of religion. Three phylogenetic types of libido manifestation are represented in phantasies which have become the primordial prototypes of important religious conceptions and myths of the past and present: (1) the life-giving power of libido, (2) the longing for immortality, and (3) the desire for independent individuality. Objections are raised against: (1) Jung's disregard of history, (2) his too extensive use of analogy in logic, (3) his inadequate treatment of aesthetic imagination, (4) his unsatisfactory conception of the unconscious. Jung's theory is regarded as being important in: (1) its emphasis on eudo-psychic process, (2) its development of the notion of the family complex, (3) its emphasis on the importance of the instincts and phantasy.

Strictly speaking, psychoanalysis is the name given to a special psychological method. It aims to bring to light the underlying motives and determinants of the symptoms and attitudes of the individual human being, and to reveal the unconscious tendencies which lie behind actions and reactions and which influence development

and determine the relations of life itself.¹ But while psychoanalysis is properly a method, no more evidence than this brief statement of aim need be presented to show that it involves a considerable amount of theory.

The protagonists of psychoanalysis have not been slow to expound and elaborate psychoanalytic theory so that today it is regarded as one of the most important of the modern "schools" of psychology.

Two leaders of the psychoanalytic school, Professor Sigmund Freud of Vienna and Professor C. G. Jung of Zurich, have dealt in their writings with the origin of religion, each explaining it according to his own psychoanalytic theory. Since there is no unity in the school of psychoanalysis it is impossible to choose either of these leaders as the representative of the school as a whole, and so we shall have to consider the theories of both.

Although their views of religious origins are entirely dependent upon their psychological theories, to include an exposition of psychoanalytic theory here would draw out the present chapter to an undesirable length. We have, however, included at the end of the present work expositions of the psychoanalytic theories of Freud (Appendix III) and of Jung (Appendix IV). No claim is made for their comprehensiveness. Only such matters are there dealt with as are important for the understanding of their theories of religious origins.

1. Cf. Hinkle: Introduction to English translation of Dr. C. G. Jung's Psychology of the Unconscious (1916), p. ix.

32. The Oedipus Complex and Religious Origins

From taboo Freud derives morality; from totemism, religion. Observing that savage and semi-savage races show in their psychic life stages which are comparable to early stages in the development of the individual personality of the present, Freud searches the results of the psychoanalytic study of neurotics and children for possible explanatory principles which may shed light upon some of the puzzling problems of the psychology of primitive races. His method is therefore comparable to that of Wundt, who applies the principles of non-analytic individual psychology to the study of racial psychology; and is exactly the opposite of Jung, who examines racial psychology for possible explanatory principles in individual psychology.

Following this method of procedure in the study of racial psychology, Freud attacks the problem of religious origins by attempting to solve the riddle of totemism, and reports his findings in a work entitled, Totem and Taboo: resemblances between the psychic lives of savages and neurotics.¹ It turns out that from this study Freud is able to explain the origin and development of morality and of societal forms as well as the genesis of religion, but we shall restrict ourselves as far as possible to his treatment of the latter.

First of all, what is totemism? Seeking to arrive at the characteristics of original totemism by sifting through everything that may correspond to later development or decline, Freud finds the following essential facts:

1. Translation by A. A. Brill.

The totems were originally only animals and were considered the ancestors of single tribes. The totem was hereditary only through the female line; it was forbidden to kill the totem (or to eat it, which under primitive conditions amount to the same thing); members of a totem were forbidden to have sexual intercourse with each other.¹

Assuming, now, that the principle, basic to psychoanalytic theory, that all activity is unconsciously motivated, is as important in racial psychology as it is in individual psychology, and assuming that among primitive peoples the same sort of unconscious motivation underlies their myths and social practices as gives rise to phantasies and compulsion neuroses in children and neurotic patients, it is easy to conjecture that something corresponding to the Oedipus complex is at the bottom of the four essential characteristics of totemism.² Totem exogamy would prevent group incest³ and totem inheritance through the female line would prohibit the male from having sexual relations with his mother and sisters.⁴ The prohibition against killing the father is very clearly expressed in the taboo against killing or eating the flesh of the totem,⁵ if we are willing to believe that the totem actually stands for the father through the mechanism of displacement or transference.⁶ This in briefest outline is the theory which Freud discloses as his conviction.

We may now reconstruct those events in the life of primitive man that led to the choice of a totem as a substitute for the father and the institution of exogamy and the prohibition against killing and

1. Freud: Totem and Taboo, pp. 177-178.

2. Ibid., pp. 234 ff.

3. Ibid., pp. 3-16.

4. Ibid., p. 8.

5. Ibid., p. 234.

6. Ibid., pp. 210 ff., esp. p. 218.

eating the totem animal. If we are willing to accept the Darwinian
 conception of the primal horde¹ as a true description of the early
 life of man we have the stage set for the development of a most
 astounding theory. We state it in the words of our author:²

There is only a violent, jealous father who keeps all the females for himself and drives away the growing sons..... One day the expelled brothers joined forces, slew and ate the father, and thus put an end to the father horde..... Now they accomplished their identification with him by devouring him and each acquired a part of his strength. The totem feast which is perhaps mankind's first celebration, would be the repetition and commemoration of this memorable, criminal act with which so many things began, social organization, moral restrictions and religion..... The group of brothers banded together were dominated by contradictory feelings towards the father..... They hated the father who stood so powerfully in the way of their sexual demands and their desire for power, but they also loved and admired him. After they had satisfied their hate by his removal and had carried out their wish for identification with him, the suppressed tender impulses had to assert themselves. This took place in the form of remorse..... What the father's presence had formerly prevented they themselves now prohibited in the psychic situation of 'subsequent obedience' which we know so well from psychoanalysis. They undid their deed by declaring that the killing of the father substitute, the totem, was not allowed, and renounced the fruits of their deed, by denying themselves the liberated women. Thus they created the two fundamental taboos of totemism out of the sense of guilt of the son, and for this very reason these had to correspond with the two repressed wishes of the Oedipus complex. Whoever disobeyed became guilty of the only two crimes which troubled primitive society.

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1. Darwin: Descent of Man, Ch. XX. The conception is founded on a description by Dr. Savage of the habits of the gorilla in which he says that only one adult male is seen in a band. When the young males grow up a contest takes place for supremacy. The strongest kills the others off and establishes himself as head of the community. Cf. Boston Jnl. Nat. Hist., Vol. V, 1845-47, p. 423.
 2. Freud: Totem and Taboo, pp. 234-238.

It is with the taboo which protects the life of the totem animal that we are particularly concerned in studying the genesis of religion. The kindly treatment of the surrogate for the father was an attempt to assuage the burning sense of guilt of the sons and to conciliate the father who in return for their subsequent obedience would give his children protection and care.¹ Totemism was not, however, exclusively a manifestation of remorse. The totem feast provided an occasion where "subsequent obedience" was suspended and the crime of parricide was re-enacted thus giving expression to the repressed feelings of defiance and triumph over the father.² The brother clan then took the place of the father horde. Society was based on complicity in the common crime; religion on the sense of guilt and the consequent remorse; morality partly on the necessities of society and partly on the expiation which the sense of guilt demanded.³

In the course of time, under the operation of the new form of society, the brother-clan, men gradually forgot their bitterness toward the father and began to long for him more and more. There was a tendency, therefore, to revive the old father ideal in the creation of gods⁴ through veneration of distinguished men. Thus paternal deities were instituted and the fatherless society then changed to a patriarchal one. The god therefore became a new and more exalted surrogate for the father.⁵ The totem meal became a totem-animal sacrifice to the god and the father appeared twice in the sacrifice, once as god and once as totem-sacrificial animal.⁶ Here we find a perfect representation of

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1. Op. cit., p. 240.
 2. Op. cit., p. 241.
 3. Op. cit., p. 242.
 4. Op. cit., pp. 243 ff.
 5. Op. cit., p. 244.
 6. Op. cit., p. 248.

the ambivalent attitude of the son towards the father as well as the triumph of the tender emotional feelings over the hostile ones. The very commemoration of the great misdeed offered satisfaction to the father.¹

In the further development the animal lost its sacredness and the sacrifice its relation to the totem. Sacrifice no longer commemorated the great misdeed. The rite became a self-deprivation in favor of the deity who was so highly exalted that he could only be approached through a priestly intermediary. Sacrifice was beyond their responsibility. The god demanded it and even slayed the animal which he himself was. This was the greatest possible denial of the great misdeed.

At first it looks as though the hostile impulses which belong to the father complex had entirely subsided but Freud cautions us that those ambivalent emotions which gave rise to the great misdeed were not and to this day have not been extinguished. On the contrary the effort to express these opposing psychic forces in an acceptable manner is the heart of all subsequent forms of religion.²

So with the increased exaltation of God, the father, came a change in the choice of a sacrificial subject. In the social order kings had been substituted for patriarchs in satisfaction of the sons' father-longing. What more appropriate now than that these exalted beings against whom the sons manifested the greatest ambivalence should be sacrificed to God, thereby satisfying both the hostile and

1. *Op. cit.*, p. 249.

2. *Op. cit.*, p. 250; also pp. 252-253.

tender feelings of the father complex? If we are to believe Freud this is exactly what happened among some primitive peoples.¹ Thus human sacrifice was instituted. Later an inanimate imitation (a doll) was substituted for the living person. In the light of these facts the relation of animal to human sacrifice is solved in the following manner:

The original animal sacrifice was already a substitute for a human sacrifice, for the solemn killing of the father, and when the father substitute regained its human form, the animal substitute could also be retransformed into a human sacrifice.²

With the introduction of agriculture the incestuous libido of the son found a symbolic satisfaction in labouring over mother earth. But the endeavour of the son to put himself in place of the father god was not entirely satisfied in this manner for it gave rise also to phantasies regarding youthful divinities, like Attis, Adonis, Tammuz, etc., who were spirits of vegetation and committed incest with the mother in defiance of the father. The son's sense of guilt, however, found expression in these stories. The hero-gods were killed or suffered castration and punishment by the father god appearing in animal form.³

Freud thinks that the sufferings of Christ, however, are of a different order. "He sacrificed his own life and thereby redeemed the brothers from primal sin."⁴ He nevertheless regards the story of Christ as a mythical formulation arising out of the sense of guilt of the Son. The very fact that Christ by sacrificing his own life

1. Op. cit., pp. 250 ff.
 2. Op. cit., p. 251.
 3. Op. cit., p. 253.
 4. Op. cit., p. 254.

redeems mankind from the weight of original sin against God the Father forces us to the conclusion that this sin was murder, thinks Freud, because, according to the law of retaliation, a murder can be atoned only by the sacrifice of another life. And if the sacrifice of one's own life brings reconciliation with God, the Father, then the crime so expiated can only have been the murder of the father.¹

Freud's further elucidation of Christian mysteries we present in his own words:²

Thus in the Christian doctrine mankind unreservedly acknowledges the guilty deed of primordial times because it now has found the most complete expiation for this deed in the sacrificial death of the son. The reconciliation with the father is the more thorough because simultaneously with this sacrifice there follows the complete renunciation of woman for whose sake mankind rebelled against the father. But now also the psychological fatality of ambivalence demands its rights. In the same deed which offers the greatest possible expiation to the father, the son also attains the goal of his wishes against the father. He becomes a god himself beside or rather in place of his father. The religion of the son succeeds the religion of the father. As a sign of this substitution the old totem feast is revived again in the form of communion in which the band of brothers now eats the flesh and blood of the son and no longer that of the father, the sons thereby identifying themselves with him and becoming holy themselves. Thus through the ages we see the identity of the totem feast with the animal sacrifice, the theanthropic human sacrifice, and the Christian eucharist and in all these solemn occasions we recognize the after-effects of that crime which so oppressed men but of which they must have been so proud. At bottom, however, the Christian communion is a new setting aside of the father, a repetition of the crime that must be expiated. We see how well justified is Frazer's dictum that "the Christian communion has absorbed within itself a sacrament which is doubtless far older than Christianity." (Cf. Eating the God, p. 51).

1. Op. cit., p. 255.

2. Op. cit., pp. 256-257.

In "The Future of an Illusion"¹ Freud somewhat expands his idea that the belief in God arose out of the father-longing of mankind. The latter he there explains as due to man's helplessness in defending himself against the crushing supremacy of nature. And he claims that this is in entire accord with his findings in "Totem and Taboo,"² while at the same time he denies that it was his purpose to explain in that volume the origin of religions.³

33. Criticism of Freud's Theory

If Freud's conclusions regarding the origin of religion seem fantastic we should in justice to him recall his modest claims in the preface of "Totem and Taboo." He says:⁴

The problem of taboo is presented more exhaustively, and the effort to solve it is approached with perfect confidence. The investigation of totemism may be modestly expressed as: "This is all that psychoanalytic study can contribute at present to the elucidation of the problem of totemism."

Again, in "The Future of an Illusion," he reminds us of the restricted problem which was his in "Totem and Taboo:"⁵

In Totem und Tabu it was not my purpose to explain the origin of religions, but only of totemism.

We think it pertinent to observe, however, that the reader of "Totem and Taboo" will regretfully find this expression of modesty too largely confined to the preface. Elsewhere, throughout the book, the author's words reveal less uncertainty and the fact that men do

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1. Translation by W. D. Robson-Scott (1928).
 2. Freud: The Future of an Illusion, p. 42.
 3. Ibid., p. 42.
 4. p. vi.
 5. The Future of an Illusion, p. 39.

find his views fantastic is regarded as a strong supporting argument because it reveals the presence in men of the very ambivalent conflicts which gave rise to totemism in the first place.

If Freud's purpose in "Totem and Taboo" was to explain the origin only of totemism and not of religion then all that one can say is that his ardour took him beyond his purpose. For he there clearly states his conclusions as follows:¹

In closing this study, which has been carried out in extremely condensed form, I want to state the conclusion that the beginnings of religion, ethics, society, and art meet in the Oedipus complex. This is in entire accord with the findings of psychoanalysis, namely, that the nucleus of all neuroses as far as our present knowledge of them goes is the Oedipus complex.

Freud not only devoted a large section of "Totem and Taboo" to the origin of religion, but he states his conclusions in unqualified language and he assumes the correctness of those conclusions in later writings.² It is not possible, therefore, for us to admit his plea that in "Totem and Taboo" he does not discuss the origin of religion as he conceives it. He does. And we have stated his arguments and his conclusions.

In making an appraisal of Freud's hypothesis we shall first examine his logic and method; next we shall inquire rather closely into some of the data upon which his hypothesis is constructed; and then we shall investigate some of the fundamental psychological principles which guide him to his conclusions.

1. Totem and Taboo, p. 260.

2. The Future of an Illusion, Ch. IV.

a. Freud's Logic and Method

Freud's method is to work out separately with extreme care the nature, attitude and costume of each character that plays a part in his drama of religious development; then he sets the stage; and finally he turns the light of psychoanalysis on the whole, even as it has guided him in the determination of each part, and the play goes on. We have seen the play. Let us now go behind the scenes.

In the following account we shall state, in barest outline and as though he himself were writing it, Freud's preparatory argument leading up to his exposition of religious origins, and we shall make criticisms and comments on his logic and method in the footnotes.

We can know the mind of primitive man through the remnants of his thinking that survive in our own manners and customs.¹ If this assumption is correct we may use the psychology of the neurotic as revealed through psychoanalysis to explain some of the difficult problems of the psychology of primitive races.² One such problem is that of totemism and we shall proceed by this method to explain its origin and meaning.

"Almost everywhere the totem prevails there also exists the law that the members of the same totem are not allowed to enter into sexual relations with each other; that is, they cannot marry each other."³ This taboo which is associated with totemism is called exogamy.

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1. Totem and Taboo, p. 1. Freud means that with the help of psychoanalysis we can know it.
 2. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
 3. *Ibid.*, p. 6. Freud says here that almost everywhere that totemism prevails it is associated with exogamy. When, without further discussion of this point, he mentions exogamy in the next chapter (pp. 53-54) he calls it one of the basic laws of totemism, and he so regards it throughout the rest of the book.

Totemism is hereditary and is not changed by marriage.

Where it is hereditary through the maternal line exogamy avails to prevent incest between mother and son and between brother and sister but, of course, does not forbid incest between father and daughter.¹ Exactly the opposite condition would prevail in case of paternal inheritance of totem and incest between mother and son could be enjoyed with impunity. "These consequences of the totem prohibition seem to indicate that the maternal inheritance is older than the paternal one, for there are grounds for assuming that the totem prohibitions are directed first of all against the incestuous desires of the son."²

These same incestuous desires form the primary trait of infantile sex life and the core of every neurosis.³ If this fact seems incredible to the reader the very rejection of it proves man's deep aversion to his former incest wishes which he has finally repressed.⁴ Incestuous impulses are still sufficiently conscious in

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1. Totem and Taboo, p. 8.
 2. *Ibid.*, p. 8, footnote. What these grounds are we are not told. One suspects that the Oedipus complex will shortly occupy them. When next maternal inheritance is mentioned it has become one of the four essential characteristics of totemism (p. 178).
 3. This is an assumption based upon psychoanalytic theory and, of course, quite justified from the point of view of method but questionable, we believe, as theory.
 4. *Ibid.*, p. 29. It is nothing short of genius to construct a theory which when accepted by others is corroborated and when rejected by others is strengthened because the very rejection is proof of its validity!

the mind of savage men to be considered worthy of the most severe defensive measures.¹

Exogamy is an example of taboo and since it is not the only prohibition connected with totemism it is now desirable for us to study taboo in a more general way.

Taboo in folk psychology corresponds to the prohibition which is characteristic of a compulsion neurosis in individual psychology.² Of course the similarity may be superficial and may lead to confusion. "We shall bear this warning in mind without, however, giving up our intended comparison on account of the possibility of such confusions."³

And so we shall study taboo as if it were of the same nature as the compulsive prohibitions of our patients.⁴ Studying taboo

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1. Totem and Taboo, p. 29. Freud seems here to indicate that primitive man knows the reason for his incest taboo (exogamy). In the next chapter, however, he plainly says that the savage knows nothing as to the real motivation of their prohibitions. (p. 52).
 2. Ibid., p. 43.
 3. Ibid., p. 45. This quotation speaks for itself. One has the feeling that Freud knows what he is looking for and he is determined to find it.
 4. Ibid., p. 52. This is not a distortion of Freud's views. Between the statement taken from p. 43 and this one four similarities are noted and some illustrations are given. The reasoning is as follows: Taboo has characteristics A, B, C, D. Compulsion neurosis has characteristics A, B, C, D. Therefore Taboo is the same as compulsion neurosis. Again and again we find our author's logic to be faulty. Even the four similarities mentioned (that their origin is unmotivated and enigmatic, that they are maintained on account of an unconquerable anxiety, that they possess an extraordinary capacity for displacement or transference, and that they result in ceremonial actions and commandments, having the nature of permanence, which emanate from the forbidden) are already deeply tinged with psychoanalytic theory.

thus we come to the following conclusions: (1) Savages know nothing of the real motivation of their prohibitions or the genesis of taboo; (2) Taboos are very ancient prohibitions of strongly desired actions forced upon a generation of primitive people from without, probably by an earlier generation; (3) The prohibitions maintained themselves from generation to generation, at first as a result of tradition, but later, perhaps, through heredity; (4) The persistence of taboo shows that the original pleasure to do the forbidden still continues among taboo races, and therefore/assume an ambivalent attitude toward their taboo prohibitions - they would like nothing better but fear to do it and fear because they would like to transgress.¹

Now "the oldest and most important taboo prohibitions are the two basic laws of totemism: namely, not to kill the totem animal, and to avoid sexual intercourse with totem companions of the other sex. It would therefore seem that these must have been the oldest and strongest desires of mankind."²

Of course the assertion that taboo is derived from an original prohibition imposed from without cannot be proven. But we know that neurotic symptoms are derived from ambivalent impulses which result from enforced prohibitions of desired actions imposed from without. And if we could show that ambivalent impulses were characteristic of taboo then our original assumption would be immensely strengthened.³ Here again we cannot demonstrate ambivalent impulses

1. Totem and Taboo, pp. 52-53.

2. Ibid., pp. 53-54.

3. Ibid., p. 60. But it would amount to nothing like scientific proof unless it were also shown that ambivalent impulses could result only from enforced prohibition of desired action imposed from without and that they were imposed by some person or by persons. Ambivalent impulses and feelings may result from difficult natural circumstances that thwart our desires.

in the case of the two fundamental prohibitions of totemism but we can with the help of psychoanalytic interpretation give conclusive proof of ambivalence in the execution of taboos connected with the savage's treatment of his enemies,¹ of his rulers,² and of the dead.³ Hence we conclude that ambivalence is characteristic of all taboos, that it was very strong among primitive men, and that when it declined taboo declined.⁴

We are now ready to proceed with our more direct analysis and explanation of totemism itself.

First of all we wish to make it clear that a totemic culture was at one time the preliminary stage of every later evolution as well

1. Totem and Taboo, pp. 62 ff.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 70 ff.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 88 ff.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 112. This generalization is more comprehensive than the facts warrant. The logic is as follows: All taboos have characteristics A, B, C, D. All compulsion neuroses have characteristics A, B, C, D. Therefore all taboos have all the characteristics of compulsion neuroses. Therefore all taboos have characteristics 1, 2, 3, 4, which are also characteristics of compulsion neuroses. And therefore the two taboos in question (namely, against killing the totem and against incestuous relations with totem companions) have characteristics 1, 2, 3, 4.

Now all ambivalent impulses that characterize neuroses are derived from enforced prohibitions of desired actions imposed from without. Therefore, by analogy, if ambivalent impulses are found in taboo we should expect them to be due to the same cause. They are found in some taboos. Therefore they are characteristic of all taboos, and hence are characteristic of the two taboos that especially concern us. And therefore the taboos against killing the totem animal and against incestuous relations with totem companions are enforced prohibitions of strong desires, and prohibitions originally imposed by someone who was both feared and loved. Comments on the logic are unnecessary.

as a transition stage between the state of primitive man and the age of gods and heroes.¹

And as to the nature of totemism, although reluctant to do so, we must depart in some respects from such authorities as Reinach, Wundt and Frazer and state the essential characteristics of totemism as follows:² The totems were originally only animals and were considered the ancestors of single tribes; totem membership was hereditary only through the female line;³ it was forbidden to kill or to eat the totem animal; members of a totemic clan were forbidden to have sexual intercourse with each other.⁴

Regarding the origin of totemism, the origin of exogamy, and the relation of totemism and exogamy there is so much conflicting evidence and such wide diversity of opinion among authorities that anthropological researches are not only inconclusive but give us practically no help at all.⁵ Into this darkness psychoanalytic experience throws a single ray of light. The psychoanalyst is familiar with the recurrence in young children of totemism in the form of animal phobias. And he recognizes that in boys it is at bottom the fear of the father

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1. Totem and Taboo, p. 167. This is based on a statement from Wundt which Freud quotes. Wundt's statement is qualified but we have represented Freud as making an unqualified statement because he does assume, in the argument that follows it, what we have set down.
 2. Ibid., p. 177.
 3. This is an unqualified categorical statement whereas previously when Freud mentioned totem-inheritance through the female line it was regarded as only probable. (p. 8.)
 4. Exogamy here appears as an essential characteristic of totemism. Freud has only given psychoanalytic evidence of this. He proves his essential facts from his psychoanalytic theory and then uses these facts to justify his psychoanalytic interpretation. This is reasoning in a circle.
 5. Ibid., pp. 181-210.

displaced upon the animal. The phobia presents two important traits of totemism: the complete identification with the totem animal, and the ambivalent affective attitude towards it.¹

If now we apply this suggestion to the problem of totemism among primitive races we are able to take savages literally when they call their totem ancestor and primal father. Furthermore, "if the totem animal is the father, the two main commandments of totemism, the two taboo rules which constitute its nucleus, - not to kill the totem animal and not to use a woman belonging to the same totem for sexual purposes, - agree in content with the two crimes of Oedipus, who slew his father and took his mother to wife, and also with the child's two primal wishes whose insufficient repression or whose re-awakening forms the nucleus of perhaps all neuroses."²

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1. Totem and Taboo, pp. 210-218. This conclusion is based entirely upon psychoanalytic interpretation. It completely ignores the possibility of conditioning.
 2. Ibid., p. 219. As a concluding statement in our discussion of Freud's method and logic nothing seems more appropriate than a paraphrase of Professor Freud's own suggestion of what we might profitably say to ourselves as an antidote for the influence of wishful thinking in religion, (Future of an Illusion, p. 58): It would indeed be very nice if there were an Oedipus complex, and taboo could be explained as a compulsion neurosis, and exogamy were an essential characteristic of totemism, and the original state of human society were correctly described by the Darwinian notion of a primal horde, and a totemic culture were the preliminary stage in the development of human civilization, but at the same time it is very odd that this is all just as Professor Freud would wish it. And it would be odder still if Professor Freud could with one psychological formula (the Oedipus complex) solve all the difficult riddles of the origin of human culture.

b. Freud's Facts

We shall now make inquiry regarding some of the data upon which Freud bases his hypothesis of religious origins.

It is absolutely necessary to Freud's hypothesis to maintain that there was an original and necessary connection between totemism and exogamy and that totemism was a preliminary stage of cultural evolution. No matter what excellencies it may have, his formulation can be no stronger than his contention on these points, for without them the Oedipus complex would not serve as an explanatory principle.

According to the opinion of competent authorities neither is true. Frazer notes that some totemic clans are not exogamous.¹ He says, likewise, that totemism has not been proved to have existed among the Aryan, the Semitic, and the Turanian families of mankind.² He states, furthermore, that totemism seems to have originated independently in several parts of the world,³ and that there is no reason to believe that it is a product of absolutely primitive man.⁴ Dr. Robert H. Lowie reports that there is no escape from the conclusion that the totemic clan evolved at least four times in North America and accordingly has had a multiple origin in the world.⁵ He likewise expresses the view supported by the researches and opinion of Dr. A. A. Goldenweiser that every one of the alleged criteria of totemism, including exogamy,

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1. Totemism and Exogamy, Vol. IV, pp. 8-9.
 2. Ibid., p. 12.
 3. Ibid., p. 14.
 4. Ibid., p. 17.
 5. Primitive Society (1920), p. 129.

the association of totemic taboos with a totemic name for the group practicing them, and descent from the totem, is wanting in even approximate universality.¹ Carveth Read also points out that no one has yet shown any sort of necessity why in certain cases clans should have borne the names of certain animals. Since the practice is not universal he adds that it cannot be necessary and that it may have had several origins.² And Professor Clark Wissler of the Institute of Human Relations in Yale University and Curator of Anthropology in the American Museum of Natural History, in summarizing his discussion of totemism, says: "Because of its limited distribution and because there is no good evidence that it once prevailed among the ancestors of European peoples, and for other reasons, it is generally admitted that totemism is not universal and so need not have arisen as a direct natural response to situations of a single type."³ In view of these facts we cannot escape the conclusion that Freud's definition of totemism, and consequently his conclusions with respect to its origin, is unjustified.

Another fact of importance to Professor Freud's view is the totem feast.⁴ Of this Dr. Goldenweiser gives the following appraisal:⁵

Totemic sacrifice is a phenomenon practically unknown to ethnologists. Robertson Smith's "instances" were all based on reconstructed material. It is thus a highly arbitrary procedure on the part of Freud to accept speculative evidence merely because it meets the needs of his theoretical structure and in the face of the rejection of such evidence by those familiar with early institutions.

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1. Primitive Society (1920), p. 140.
 2. Man and his Superstitions (1925), pp. 227-228.
 3. An Introduction to Social Anthropology (1929), p. 209.
 4. Totem and Taboo, pp. 220 ff.
 5. Goldenweiser: Early Civilization (1922), pp. 395-396.

In denouncing the notion of a "primal horde" as the original state of human society, Dr. Goldenweiser says: "The idea of a primitive Cyclopean family is itself a figment."¹ It seems to us that Dr. Wohlgemuth's criticism of Freud on this question misses the point. He understands Freud to cite Dr. Savage's description of the gorilla band as an explanation of the Oedipus complex.² He does not so use it in "Totem and Taboo"³ and we have not found it so used in other psycho-analytic literature. In "Totem and Taboo" we understand Freud to use this reported observation solely to strengthen the possibility of the notion of a primal horde of humanity such as he hypothecates. And such use we hold to be justifiable; but we do not regard it as convincing. Of course Freud realizes that the anthropologists will not accept his "primal horde" because it has nowhere been observed⁴ but, as usual, he applies the magic of psychoanalytic interpretation to the observations which he does consider, regards the needed facts as having been sufficiently established, and goes blithesomely on his way.

Having killed the father Freud says that of course these cannibalistic savages ate their victim and so established the totemic feast⁵ which explains so many practices in more advanced religions and even avails to unmask the Christian eucharist. On this point we also quote Dr. Goldenweiser's remarks as the judgment of a competent anthropologist:

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1. Op. cit., p. 396.
 2. A Critical Examination of Psycho-analysis (1923), pp. 152-153.
 3. Op. cit., 208-209, 234-235.
 4. Totem and Taboo, p. 235.
 5. Ibid., p. 236.

....the eating of the father by the patricidal brothers is a notion which doubtless would have met with derision in the aboriginal fraternity itself; therefore it does not please the ethnologist. The probable extent of early cannibalism has often been grossly exaggerated. Man has never used man as a regular article of diet. There has been some ceremonial eating of man, victims of a war raid were occasionally consumed (as in Polynesia), here and there human flesh was used in cases of severe famines. But we do not hear of the eating of relatives. To assume a condition which is psychologically improbable and remains unsupported by ethnographic data, is to transgress the bounds of permissible speculation.

To this Freud would probably reply gratefully that this proves his point because the sense of guilt was so strong in the brothers who did the deed that the taboo was extended not only to the flesh of the father-surrogate but in less degree to all of kin.

c. Freud's Psychology

We turn now to the examination of certain psychoanalytic principles which guide our author in the formulation of his hypothesis about the origin of religion. Of course it cannot be expected that we should make a critical examination of the whole of Freudian theory. That were a subject for a whole book in itself. We can only consider certain selected general principles that bear directly on our subject of religious origins.

First of all we should like to mention three guiding principles that Freud uses in the interpretation of observed phenomena. One is that what is prohibited or abhorrent is desired, and the stronger the prohibition or the feeling of horror the stronger the desire. This is a

very important principle in "Totem and Taboo." An example of its use is as follows:¹

What nobody desires to do does not have to be forbidden and certainly whatever is expressly forbidden must be an object of desire. If we applied this plausible theory to primitive races we would have to conclude that among their strongest temptations were desires to kill their kings and priests, to commit incest, to abuse their dead and the like.

Of course, in the next sentence Freud says that this is not very probable but he is there expressing the reader's abhorrence of the idea, as the discussion that follows plainly shows. The quotation above represents Freud's point of view on such matters throughout his writings.

What shall we think of it? If we take this statement to mean that whatever is expressly forbidden in a group must be an object of desire for every member of that group, and this is Freud's usage, then, logically, it seems unjustified, for presumably a prohibition might be established to curb the abnormal impulses of only a few members of the group. Indeed if a thing is universally desired why should it be prohibited at all? It may be replied that not everything that is desired is desirable. True. But may it not be true that what is desirable may also be desired by many people? And furthermore, is it likely that, in a society where nobody desired the desirable, prohibitions would be raised against the undesirable which was universally desired?

Two observations are needed here. One is that there is a difference between the hypothesis that every prohibition of the

1. Totem and Taboo, p. 117.

neurotic patient conceals a desire and the hypothesis that every prohibition recognized by a social group conceals a desire on the part of every member of that group to do the thing prohibited. In the former case the neurotic individual imposes the prohibition on himself because he (consciously or unconsciously) recognizes in himself the desire. But in the latter case the leader, or the elders, or a majority, of the group may impose a prohibition because they recognize in one or more members of the group a tendency (from whatever cause) to perform the forbidden act. This is essentially an argument against the application of the formulas of individual psychology to the problems of group psychology.

Another observation that seems pertinent here is that in either case the strength of the prohibition as indicated by the severity of the punishment does not vary in proportion to the strength of the desire to perform the forbidden act, as Freud says it does, but in proportion to the appreciation of the value which is menaced by the action. It does not matter in the least whether one knows why he loves his flag or his totem. If a strong sentiment of attachment has been developed through experience for his national flag on the part of a civilized modern man, or for his totem animal on the part of a savage, then we may expect that insult to the flag or harm to the totem will arouse resentment, abhorrence, and activity in proportion to the strength of the sentiment and according to the respective customs involved.

Let us call to mind the universal feeling of abhorrence in the civilized world and the widespread strengthening of the laws in America against kidnapping as a result in 1932 of the kidnapping and murder of the infant son of Colonel and Mrs. Charles A. Lindbergh. Will anyone

dare to say that the feeling of abhorrence so universally evident was due to an equally strong and universal desire on the part of people throughout the whole world to kidnap and murder the son of this rich and famous man? Or is such a notion utterly absurd?

Closely related to Freud's principle that what is prohibited is desired is a similar principle that whatever is feared is desired, the fear being a mask for the desire. A typical instance of Freud's use of this principle is as follows:¹

The persistence of taboo teaches.... that the original pleasure to do the forbidden still continues among taboo races.... In their unconscious they would like nothing better than to transgress them but they are also afraid to do it; they are afraid just because they would like to transgress, and the fear is stronger than the pleasure. But in every individual of the race the desire for it is unconscious, just as in the neurotic...

If Freud were content to maintain that in neurotic people over-anxiety for the safety of other persons generally masks a desire to do them harm then we should be inclined to agree. But to say that in the psychology of groups, hospitality to strangers, guarding the life of rulers, and mourning for deceased loved ones² reveal such a desire seems unwarranted. There is no good reason to suppose that one might not develop a sentiment for another person, for example the father, with a strong element of fear in it as a result of conditioning or through the normal process of experience.

Our appraisal of this principle is that, judiciously applied, and particularly in dealing with abnormal people, it may reveal important facts but taken as a universal principle it leads one into many pitfalls.

1. Totem and Taboo, p. 52.

2. Ibid., pp. 61 seq.

A third guiding principle used by Freud in the interpretation of observed phenomena involves more intimately his theory of motivation and his theory of the unconscious. It may be stated as follows: Every wish should be interpreted in terms of the most extreme form in which it might find satisfaction and should be designated by the term signifying such extreme form of expression. The application of this principle is probably most clearly illustrated in Freud's numerous discussions of the formation of the Oedipus complex. First of all the infant son is attracted to his mother as a source of food, tenderness, warmth, etc. Now being in love with a person is an extreme form of the favourable attitude toward that person. Further, sexual union is the most extreme expression of being in love. Hence it is not only justifiable to speak of the infant son as being in love with the mother but in so far as he desires her or is favourably disposed toward her in any sense or degree whatsoever we are justified (according to this principle of Freud's) in saying that she is coveted by the son as a sexual object, that is, that she is the object of the son's incestuous impulses.

Now when the son grows a little older the father becomes the admired ideal. So Freud is able to say (according to the principle noted above) that the infant son's libido (i.e., the psychical energy associated with the sexual impulse) is now transferred to the father. (But this is homosexuality!) As a result the boy identifies himself with his father and seeks in all things to imitate him. Soon, however, he finds that in just one thing he never can take the father's place, namely, he cannot be his mother's husband, because the jealous father

will not permit it. So the boy now develops an ambivalent (favourable and unfavourable) attitude towards his father. Now an unfavourable attitude can find expression either in avoidance or destruction of its object. The father cannot be avoided so the only possibility left is, even while loving him, to desire also his destruction. Freud puts it bluntly by saying that the boy wishes to kill the father and take the mother to wife - murder and incest are the strong words he uses.

And so, following this principle, Freud speaks of death wishes, homosexual impulses, incestuous desires, etc., where the layman, using milder language, might speak of dislike for or being annoyed by another person, of admiration for a member of one's own sex, or of a son's fondness for his mother and sisters, etc. We speak of favourable and unfavourable attitudes or sentiments; the Behaviourist speaks of reactions of approach and avoidance; Freud speaks of sexuality (libidinous impulses) and death wishes.

Freud's defense of what he calls his "nomenclature" is instructive:¹

The majority of "educated" people have regarded this nomenclature as an insult, and have taken their revenge by retorting upon psychoanalysis with the reproach of "pan-sexualism." Anyone who considers sex as something mortifying and humiliating to human nature is at liberty to make use of the more genteel expressions "Eros" and "erotic." I might have done so myself from the first and thus have spared myself much opposition. But I did not want to, for I like to avoid concessions to faint-heartedness.

The writer has no interest whatever in regarding Freud's "nomenclature" as an insult. Neither has he any great concern to appear

1. Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1922), p. 39.

to others either faint-hearted or heroic. But he has considerable interest in scientific formulations concerning these matters which correctly and adequately represent the psychological facts and in a terminology which is serviceable in the communication and valuable in the discovery of knowledge.

Without going into the analysis and criticism of Freudian theory in toto, which would take us too far afield, we wish to make two observations with respect to this third guiding principle which he employs. In the first place, we judge it to be a very inferior tool of communication. This ought to be sufficiently demonstrated by the well-nigh universal misunderstanding of Freud, against which we find in his writings so many expressions of bitterness. But it goes much further than a mere misunderstanding by people who are educated to prejudice. It seems to us that the serious and unprejudiced reader will not only be often mystified himself, but not seldom will he feel that even Freud is baffled in trying to understand his own views after they have been formulated in the terms which this principle dictates. An example of this is Freud's insistence that by the sexual he does not mean the copulative act of adult human beings, when almost all the while he writes as though that is exactly what he means. Our criticism is not here directed against Freud's emphasis on sexuality but on his practice of designating undifferentiated psychological processes having extensive denotation and slight connotation by names of exactly the opposite character having specific denotation and very extensive connotation, and then of reasoning as though the designation were appropriate. This is not just a matter of "nomenclature;" it is a matter of science and logic.

And he who follows a principle that violates the fundamentals of logic must hope neither to be understood by others nor to arrive at dependable conclusions for himself.

Our second observation is that as a tool of discovery this principle is almost entirely unfruitful. Psychoanalytic theory began with the effort to explain transference and resistance. Fundamental in Freud's development of psychoanalysis was this third guiding principle. It led to the formulation of a theory which may be expressed in three words, repressed infantile sexuality,¹ and the essence of which may be expressed in two words, Oedipus complex. There the trail ended. And for Freud the problem of psychology, both individual and social, was reduced to the task of explaining all observed psychical phenomena in terms of this theory.² Consider the works of Freud and see if this is not so. We hasten to add that certain of Freud's ideas, particularly his emphasis on the dynamical character of mental process and his theories of repression and the unconscious, are among the most important contributions made by any one to modern psychology. And we wish to add an expression of our appreciation of his genius. But not one of these contributions is the necessary result of the guiding principle that we have been discussing while those theories that are a necessary result of it are the ones that receive the severest criticism from competent psychologists of today both in and out of the psychoanalytic school.

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1. Freud: History of the Psychoanalytic Movement, p. 9. Cf. also Woodworth: Contemporary Schools of Psychology (1931), pp. 139-143.
 2. Cf. Totem and Taboo, p. 261. In a footnote he speaks of the contributions of psychoanalysis and then adds: "The synthesis of the whole explanation must be left to another. But it is in the nature of this new contribution that it could play none other than the central role in such a synthesis, although it will be necessary to overcome great affective resistances before such importance will be conceded to it."

Having discussed three guiding principles employed by Freud in the interpretation of psychical phenomena upon which his theory of religious origins is based we pass now to the discussion of the Oedipus complex which epitomizes the basic content of Freud's psychoanalytic theory. From the preceding discussion it will be apparent that while we accept repression as a psychological phenomenon we are compelled to reject the theory of infantile sexuality as Freud expounds it. And unless we accept his exposition of infantile sexuality we cannot accept his exposition of the Oedipus complex upon which it is based. We insert here only one or two brief observations to make clear our reasons for the rejection of infantile sexuality. It is our view that the instincts arose out of the process of evolutionary development. Organisms developed in complexity of physical and psychical structure and in responsiveness to the more complex and remote factors in the environment. Concomitantly their organic and psychical needs became increasingly differentiated and complexly organized as innate drives which are now objectively observable in the typical activities that satisfy these drives. One of these organic needs or instincts is sexual union. The sexual function was not the primordial drive in evolutionary development but what Bostock has called the "urge to adjust."¹ If this is true then neither can the instincts of the higher animals and man be all regarded as sexual in character (for they are highly specialized urges to adjustment such as satisfy fairly definite

1. Bostock: The Neural Energy Constant (1931), pp. 34, 46.
Cf. also our discussion above, Ch. I, especially section 9.

organic and psychical needs, and they include the urge to sexual union as one among their number of specialized tendencies) nor can the undifferentiated primordial "urge to adjust" be characterized as sexual because the function of sex arose relatively late in the evolutionary process.¹

Dr. Bronislaw Malinowski has made an anthropological study of the family² in which he compares the European upper-class family life, the European peasant family life and the Melanesian matrilineal family life with a view to testing out Freud's hypothesis regarding cultural origins. In Part I of this study Malinowski presents very convincing evidence in support of his conclusion that the situation in European family life in general was very much as Freudian theory has made it out, including a repressed affection on the part of sons for the mother and an ambivalent attitude toward the father. Equally telling evidence was to the effect that among the Melanesians, where society is ordered on the basis of matrilineal inheritance of membership in exogamous clans, there existed neither a repressed sentiment of affection for the mother nor an ambivalent attitude towards the father.

This evidence further weakens Freud's theory as it bears on primitive society and is all the more important because Malinowski was

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1. Freud is not unaware of this difficulty and he has sought to show against the experiments of Woodruff and others that the immortality of unicellular animals is dependent upon sexual union. (Beyond the Pleasure Principle, section IV, pp. 54 seq.) Freud's contention that the need of these infusoria for fresh nutrient fluid, occasionally, proves their need for sexual union does not seem very convincing. The writer hopes that his inability to see how the need for food and the need for sex are identical does not result from prejudice or repressed complexes.
 2. Malinowski: Sex and Repression in Savage Society (1927).

favorable to Freud's point of view. It tends to support the view that whatever sort of family complex may be established is the result of the social situation rather than the consequence of fixed native impulses of human nature.

Regarding the apparent support given the Freudian formulation by the evidence on the European family we have to report, in fairness to all, that Malinowski, when he wrote these chapters, did not fully understand Freud's doctrine. This he readily admits himself¹ and in one footnote he writes:

Since this was first written in 1921, I have changed my views on this subject (infantile sexuality). The statement that "a young organism reacts sexually to close bodily contact with the mother" appears to me now absurd. I am glad I may use this strong word, having written the absurd statement myself.²

Malinowski was, all the while he thought himself a Freudian, talking in terms of sentiment, substantially in accordance with the views of Shand and of Morton Prince³ and not in accordance with Freud. We find that Malinowski's observations and conclusions are in harmony with the point of view which the present writer has been developing throughout this dissertation. He justly points out the importance of Freud's emphasis on the influence of the family situation in the developing life of the child. He also makes use of such concepts as repression, the unconscious, inhibition, etc., but these are all interpreted in a sense that are out of harmony with Freudian usage. It seems a pity that the most fruitful development of Freud's ideas has been made by non-Freudians.

1. Op. cit., pp. 36, 75; Part IV.

2. Op. cit., pp. 36-37.

3. Cf. supra, section 15.

We have been examining some of the pillars upon which rests the superstructure of Freud's hypothesis of religious origins. Do these pillars rest upon a rock or upon the sand? Freud says:¹

...we base everything upon the assumption of a psyche of the mass in which psychic processes occur as in the psychic life of the individual.

By way of comment on this statement we quote from Freud himself:²

It is very interesting that among primitive men circumcision is combined with or replaced by the cutting off of the hair and the drawing of teeth, and that our children, who cannot know anything about this, really treat these two operations as equivalents to castration when they display their fear of them.

And upon this statement we forbear to make any comment!

d. Summary and Conclusion

We have shown that Freud claims to have solved the problem of religious origins in the origin of totemism and the incest taboo and that he holds these to be necessarily connected through primal parricide, displacement of the father image on to a revered animal, and the establishment of the father's will as the basic law of the tribe in the form of prohibitions or taboos against incestuous relations with totem companions and against taking the life of the totem animal. We examined the logic by which these conclusions were developed and found it at many crucial points fallacious; we investigated some of

1. Totem and Taboo, p. 261.

2. Ibid., p. 254, footnote.

the basic facts presented in support of Freud's theory and found them to be either unsupported by the observations and researches of competent anthropologists or so highly tinged with psychoanalytic theory as materially to reduce their importance as objective observations; we found certain psychoanalytic principles which were used in the interpretation of data and the formation of hypotheses to be highly questionable; and we found that anthropological research by Malinowski did not sustain Freud's conjectures.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that Freud's formulation even by those who are favorably disposed towards psychoanalysis should not be regarded as anything more than a conjecture - a possible hypothesis. Since we have rejected what Freud calls one of the fundamental pillars of psychoanalysis (infantile sexuality), Freud's conjecture no longer remains for us as even a possible hypothesis.

Although we reject Freud's solution as a whole, it is not without its insights. Chief among these we consider to be the importance which it places upon the family situation as it influences the growing life of the child and of the race. This we accept and gratefully acknowledge.

Whether totemism has anywhere an essential connection or whether it has any sort of universal connection, essential or accidental, with religion are questions about which anthropological observations give us no basis for certainty. The evidence seems to support a negative answer to both. In sober honesty nobody knows what the origin of totemism was.

There may be more evidence in support of some connection between the beginnings of incest-taboo and of religion. Marett points out quite convincingly that in primitive society woman was mysterious as a mistress but doubly so as a mother. In the days when mankind was yet unable to put two and two together about the relation of conjugation and parturition every birth was a mystery in which woman had all the responsibility and all the credit.

Thus not merely in a titular sense but literally, the mother stood for the fountain-head of the matrilineal group. The men in their superior way might elaborate a mythology concerning the esoteric reasons why babies are born; but she was bound to get all the benefit of it seeing that was all about her and about her only. Economically considered no doubt the male counted for a good deal; but viewed cosmically he was but as the rainbow in the waterfall - an epiphenomenon in the absence of which the movement of life could proceed just as merrily as ever.¹

Motherhood, then, was certainly a mystery in the days of old; even if it never can be certain that it first became so when, in place of the family, the unit of society was the kin, and the kin was in itself motherhood pure and simple.²

To go back, then, to the question of how exogamy, or rather the incest-taboo, arose, is it not possible that it was no Cyclopean sire of the type imagined by Atkinson and Freud, but some even more revered kin-mother who is to be hailed as the first to bring primal lust under the reign of law? Cherchez la femme..... As I conceive the Eldest of Mothers, she was something of a witch, and, however inarticulate, carried curses in her eye. While she had the girls under her hand, she had the boys under this eye of hers, so that they would be well advised to slink off to their amourettes beyond the range of her dire disapprobations. But, however it came about, somehow within that narrow circle

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1. Marett: Faith, Hope, and Charity in Primitive Religion (1932), p. 83.
 2. .Ibid., p. 85.

of intenser social life lust once for all was stayed. It had been transformed into incest, an accursed thing. Henceforth lust within the kin was as bad as murder or worse. Both were utterly abominable; for both were offences against the blood, the sacred blood, the blood of the mothers, the blood from which men are born.¹

In contrast to this view of one who knows something about primitive society, Freud's treatment of primitive woman as a mere sex-object of superior man is ridiculous. In view of the fact that he recognizes that his view does not explain the existence of the great maternal deities which he admits must have everywhere preceded paternal deities,² we regard this discussion of Marett's as doubly important. We present it as an acceptable substitute for Freud's hypothesis in explanation of the origin of incest-taboo, and of its relation to religion.

34. Libido, The Collective Unconscious, and Religion

Another leader of the psychoanalytic movement, Dr. C. G. Jung of Zurich, has given a very different account of the origin of religion from that advocated by Freud. The differences between the views of these two men are rooted in fundamental differences in psychological theory. We have, therefore, included at the end of the present work an exposition of the psychological views of Dr. Jung that are important for the understanding of his theory of religious origins (Appendix IV).

1. Op. cit., pp. 85-86.

2. Totem and Taboo, p. 247.

We may here present the broad outlines of Jung's theory of the origin of religion in his own words:

One might raise the objection that the mythological inclinations of children are implanted by education. The objection is futile. Has humanity at all ever broken loose from the myths? Every man has eyes and all his senses to perceive that the world is dead, cold and unending, and he has never yet seen a God, nor brought to light the existence of such from empirical necessity. On the contrary, there was need of a phantastic, indestructible optimism, and one far removed from all sense of reality, in order, for example, to discover in the shameful death of Christ really the highest salvation and the redemption of the world. Thus one can indeed withhold from a child the substance of earlier myths but not take from him the need of mythology. One can say, that should it happen that all traditions in the world were cut off with a single blow, then with the succeeding generation, the whole mythology and history of religion would start over again. Only a few individuals succeed in throwing off mythology in a time of a certain intellectual supremacy - the mass never frees itself. Explanations are of no avail; they merely destroy a transitory form of manifestation, but not the creating impulse.¹

This statement which appears near the beginning of "The Psychology of the Unconscious," in which he considers the question of religious origins, clearly reveals several fundamental assumptions in Jung's thinking on this problem: (1) Jung is concerned principally with the origin of religious conceptions and myths such as one might expect to arise out of primordial images and ways of thinking. (2) The origin and explanation of religion is to be sought in subjective motives and their phantastic elaboration rather than in objective conditions and man's intelligent dealing with them. (3) The explanation of the religious phantasies of the individual is to be

1. Jung: Psychology of the Unconscious, p. 30.

sought in the study of racial psychology and its application to these phenomena of individual psychology. (4) Religious ideas and myths have no objective validity and the mature individual will be interested in them only as it helps him to understand the neurotic and immature individual.

When one sifts through the immense amount of psychological, anthropological, and mythological material which Jung employs in the analysis and explanation of the Miller phantasies (Psychology of the Unconscious) one finds just one source of religion - the libido or life-impulse.

And one finds three phylogenetic types of libido manifestation the phantastical representations of which have become the primordial prototypes of important religious conceptions of the past and of today.

The first of these manifestations to be noted is the life-giving, fructifying power of libido. The primordial symbols of sun and fire represent the fructifying strength and heat which are attributes of the libido.¹

The visible father of the world is, however, the sun, the heavenly fire; therefore, Father, God, Sun, Fire are mythologically synonomous. The well-known fact that in the sun's strength the great generative power of nature is honored shows plainly, very plainly, to any one to whom as yet it may not be clear that in the Deity man honors his own libido, and naturally in the form of the image or symbol of the present object of transference.²

God, the Father, thus represents the creative and powerful aspect of libido.

1. Jung: Psychology of the Unconscious, pp. 100-101.

2. Ibid., p. 99.

Another typical manifestation of libido is to be seen in the desire for rebirth and renewal, i.e., for immortality. The sun is the ever-youthful, vigorous, and powerful one who, in the mythology of all races, is reborn each morning from the life-giving waters (womb) of mother-earth and after his fiery journey across the heavens is again swallowed up by those same waters that gave him birth. In the night-time the sun is transported in the belly of a sea-monster (phallic symbol) to the place of his birth and rising. Jung tells us that the meaning of these sun-myths is

the longing to attain rebirth through the return to the mother's womb, that is to say to become as immortal as the sun.¹

Jung calls this an incestuous desire but he states quite clearly that the fundamental basis of the incest wish does not aim at cohabitation but at the special thought of becoming a child again, of turning back to the parent's protection, of coming into the mother once more in order to be born again. Here we come upon the problem propounded to Christ by Nicodemus - how may one re-enter the mother's womb and be born again? Of course, says Jung, the most obvious way would be through cohabitation; but the incest-taboo prevents this, so phantasy is resorted to, and libido becomes spiritualized and flows off in mythology.²

The religious thought is bound up with the compulsion to call the mother no longer mother but City, Source, Sea, etc. This compulsion can be derived from the need to manifest an amount of libido bound up with the mother, but in such a way that the mother is represented or concealed in a symbol.

1. Op. cit., p. 240.

2. Op. cit., p. 251.

Some of the mother symbols are city, source, sea, water, the earth, tree (Christ died on the tree of life - the mother - and so achieved immortality), etc. Even the underground caverns where the early church met (and hence the church today) are symbols of the mother's womb, etc.

Jesus' reply to Nicodemus was, in effect, according to Jung,¹ "Think symbolically." He concludes that

Christianity with its repression of the manifest sexual, is the negative of the ancient sexual cult.²

And the New Testament reveals a system of symbolical thinking on these matters.³

Libido manifesting itself as the desire for immortality gives rise to a widespread and elaborate mythology and symbolism of the Mother. Moreover, it results in the myth of the sun-god who periodically returns to the mother's womb and is born again. This myth occurs in many forms the two most important of which concern Christ and Mithra.

Christ as the "God becoming flesh" has generated himself through Mary; Mithra has done the same. These Gods are unmistakable Sun-gods, for the Sun also does this, in order to again renew himself.⁴

In religion, therefore, says Jung, man has the realization of his incest desires. Heaven is the Father, Earth is the Mother and all men and women are brothers and sisters. Thus man can remain a child for all time and satisfy his incest wish all unawares.⁵

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1. Op. cit., p. 253.
 2. Op. cit., p. 257.
 3. Op. cit., p. 252.
 4. Op. cit., p. 217.
 5. Op. cit., p. 261.

According to our author this state would doubtless be ideal were it not for the unfortunate fact that it is infantile and, as such, in conflict with the tendency of libido to achieve independence. This desire for independence is the third type of libido manifestation which we shall mention as an important source of religious symbol and myth.

At the age of about four years the child begins to have a mind of his own¹ - i.e., the process of individuation begins.² Then he seeks to leave the mother and win the world. This is one aspect of the inner struggle of youth; the other is the incestuous longing to return to the parents. This retrogressive longing must be sacrificed and the libido freed for works of service and self-fulfilment.

The object of psychoanalysis has frequently been wrongly understood to mean the renunciation or gratification of the ordinary sexual wish, while, in reality, the problem is the sublimation of the infantile personality, or, expressed mythologically, a sacrifice and rebirth of the infantile hero.³

Thus libido is to accomplish the rejuvenation (salvation) of the world and the conquest of death, and this manifestation is mythologically expressed in the various hero-myths (of which the Christ-myth is only one among many) where these objects are accomplished by the self-sacrifice of the hero.

1. Op. cit., p. 461.

2. Contributions to Analytical Psychology, p. 315. Also, Psychological Types, p. 561.

3. Psychology of the Unconscious, p. 479.

According to Jung's interpretation the great world religions have no historical basis. Their source is the libido and its manifestations. But how did these mythical formulations arise in history and become so widely accepted among men? In this way: In times of weariness, or stress, or necessity when the conscious rational approach to the world fails, as it must fail in the face of great destroying forces of nature or in periods of social disintegration, these mythological structures take life. Men project their desires upon these creatures of phantasy and they are seen as realities. Thus the gods become real and personal and religious institutions, which are the means by which men deal with the gods, flourish and grow strong and vastly outlive the necessity which gave them birth. Thus Christianity and Mithraism with their splendid moral idealism arose because a sophisticated philosophy had destroyed belief in the old gods, had released the moral restraint of animal impulses, and had left the people vegetating in spiritual darkness. If these old truths seem empty to us it is because they have done their work so well that the necessities which brought them forth have actually been lost, and religiousness has now become a neurosis.

The dynamic appearance of both religions betrays something of that enormous feeling of redemption which animated the first disciples and which we today scarcely know how to appreciate.... Most certainly we should understand it, had our customs even a breath of ancient brutality, for we can hardly realize in this day the whirlwinds of the unchained libido which roared through the ancient Rome of the Caesars. The civilized man of the present day seems very far removed from that. He has become merely neurotic..... The elementary emotions of the libido have come to be unknown

for us, for they are carried on in the unconscious; therefore, the belief which combats them has become hollow and empty.¹

Since religion is the product of phantastic thinking which was very valuable in its day but the need of which men should long ago have outgrown, it should now be supplanted, says Jung, by science which is the product of directed thinking.²

35. Criticism of Jung's Theory

a. Relation to History

The most obvious objection to Jung's theory of the origin of religion is that it ignores history. It is not necessary here to argue the question whether Jesus of Nazareth was an historical person. We can only regard it as an unfortunate circumstance for Dr. Jung that his psychological theories are at variance with the results of historical research.

We do not wish to deny that the phantastic elaboration of subjective motives (i.e., myths) tend to cluster about the great names of history. But that is no proof that the persons about whom mythical stories are told never existed. It merely provides the historian with the fascinating task of deciding what is truth and what is fiction. It is just as uncritical to assume without investigation that all the stories regarding a certain character are fictitious as to assume that they are all true.

1. Psychology of the Unconscious, p. 80.

2. Ibid., pp. 262-263.

b. Logic

We find two difficulties with Jung's logic. The first is that he reasons by analogy to an extent and in a manner that seems to us unjustifiable. As an example we may take Jung's analytical interpretation of Miss Miller's dream-hero.¹ In the vision he appears as an Aztec and his name is Chiwantopel. This name is associated with Popocatepetl which in turn is put through a series of associations connected with anal eroticism, is illuminated by a disgusting story of an insane woman's idiotic behaviour, and is brought to light as the product of the infantile phantastic theory of creation by the anal route. Chiwantopel is now associated with and identified with Ahasver, Chidr, the Sun, Mithra, Christ, Elias (which means Helios, the Sun), Moses, Gilgamesh, and many another, and finally completely revealed as Miss Miller's own libido struggling for independence against the incestuous desire to return to the dependence of childhood. Who can tell whether this is the right interpretation? Jung himself says that there are no established symbols for our guidance.² If this is so, it seems probable that the interpretation would represent the wishes and the associations in the mind of the analyst rather than those in the mind of the patient.

As an example of the extremes to which this sort of reasoning can carry even so great a thinker as Dr. Jung we may cite his assertion that the generation of fire originally occurred as a result of onanistic boring.³ To one who has had experience in producing fire by friction

1. Psychology of the Unconscious, pp. 205 ff.

2. Ibid., p. 249.

3. Ibid., p. 174.

and knows how difficult and complex an art it is, such a statement seems worse than absurd; it is ridiculous.

Our second objection to the logic of Jung is that he explains the psychology of the race by the psychology of the neurotic and then explains the psychology of the individual by reference to the psychology of the race. This does not necessarily mean that he reasons in a circle but that such a procedure is open to the fallacies of composition and division.

c. Psychological Theory

From the point of view of psychological theory Jung's explanation of religious origins involves two dogmas which we must now subject to somewhat more rigorous examination. They are concerned with his theories of phantasy and mythology, and of the collective unconscious.

There is unquestionably a valid distinction between phantasy and directed thinking. The importance of that distinction for psychological theory is indeed very great. And "orthodox" psychology owes psychoanalysis a debt of appreciation and gratitude for the emphasis which the latter has laid upon the significance of the phantastical elaboration of subjective motives.

Our objection to Jung's treatment of phantasy is that his contrast between phantasy and directed thinking does not do justice to some very important facts. We shall try to show that this is so. In brief, Jung says that phantastical thinking gives rise to dreams in

the individual and in the race to myths, while directed thinking results in science. We believe, however, that the situation is not quite so simple as that.

Our problem here, from the point of view of scientific psychology, is to get an adequate view of imagination and see just how mythology and science really fit into the total scheme.

Human beings are able to recall or re-present to consciousness impressions of objects, situations, events and relations which were once present in perception but which are no longer so. And they are able also to construct from elements of such re-presented impressions new impressions or images of possible objects, situations, events, or relations. The sum of these activities we shall designate by the term "ideal representation."¹ We may now divide ideal representations into two classes: (1) reproductive, in which the aim is to reinstate past experience, and (2) constructive, in which the aim is to build up, out of the elements of reinstated past experience, an experience that is, as an integrated whole, essentially new to the subject. We shall use the word "imagination" to designate the activity of forming constructive ideal representation.

We may also divide the second of the above classes, i.e., constructive ideal representations or imagination, into two classes: (1) imitative, in which the aim is, by following the cues given by another, to construct an experience that is representative of an object, a situation, an event, or a system of relations described or suggested by another person; and (2) creative, in which the aim is to construct

1. Our discussion follows the position taken by Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), Ch. X.

an essentially new experience that is representative of a possible object, event, situation, character, or system of relations. An illustration of a constructive ideal representation of the imitative sort would be the activities of a person reading a novel; of the creative sort, the activities of the person writing it.

Creative imagination may be subdivided likewise into two classes: (1) pragmatic, and (2) aesthetic. The pragmatic type of creative imagination has two distinguishing marks: (1) it involves objective control or the feeling of objective control, i.e., its direction is toward an end which is in congruity with objective conditions in the real world, conditions in which or to which adjustment has to be made; and (2) as a result of its nature, the activity itself derives its chief value and significance from the results to be achieved. The distinguishing marks of the aesthetic type of creative imagination are almost the exact opposites of those of the pragmatic type: (1) it is free from the hampering restrictions of conditions in the real world. Whatever conditions may be imposed, consistency and congruity with which may be demanded, they are, in general, and are felt to be, self-imposed; and hence, (2) the value and significance of the activity is derived not from any system of objective values but from the emotional satisfaction which it yields.

Both pragmatic and aesthetic imagination may be further subdivided. Pragmatic imagination may be either: (1) practical, in which the immediate aim is action, and which finds its exemplification in the affairs of practical life and work; or (2) theoretical, in which the immediate aim is understanding, and which is exemplified in mathematics, science, and philosophy. Aesthetic imagination falls into

two types also: (1) artistic, in which the aim is to create beautiful or satisfying forms consistent with self-imposed standards; and (2) phantastic, which is creative ideal representation unrestricted either by external conditions in the real world or by self-imposed standards.

The foregoing analysis may be represented schematically as follows:

Ideal representation

I. Reproductive

II. Constructive (Imagination)

1. Imitative

2. Creative

a. Pragmatic

(1) Practical

(2) Theoretical

b. Aesthetic

(1) Artistic

(2) Phantastic

Jung contrasts phantasy and directed thinking in such a way that either he leaves out of consideration the practical type of pragmatic imagination and the artistic type of aesthetic imagination, or he fails to make a distinction between the theoretical and practical types of pragmatic imagination and between the artistic and phantastic types of aesthetic imagination. In his treatment of this subject in "The Psychology of the Unconscious" he seems to do the former; in his

essay on "Poetic Art,"¹ the latter. In either case he identifies mythology with phantasy.

We wish to center our objection on Jung's inadequate treatment of the aesthetic imagination because this is what concerns us in our study of religious origins. Either to ignore artistic imaginative activity or to identify it with phantasy we regard as a serious psychological mistake. Mythology is not pure fancy. It has its roots in the real world and its creation partakes more of the nature of artistic imaginative activity which involves some degree of critical guidance than of the nature of pure fancy in which the critical powers are relatively dormant. Thus our first objection to Jung's theory of aesthetic imagination as it bears on religious origins is that it cannot sufficiently be interpreted in terms of phantasy, and that if this is so then neither can the origin of mythology nor of religion be adequately so interpreted.

Our second objection to Jung's treatment of the aesthetic imagination is that the distinction between the aesthetic and the pragmatic types is not nearly so clean cut as he makes it out. Most complex activities involve the demand both for consistency with conditions in the objective world and for congruity with self-imposed standards; i.e., they involve both the pragmatic and the aesthetic types of imaginative activity. Even in planning a bridge or designing a motor-car both types are demanded. But in the formation and development of ideals, of religious conceptions and practices, of philosophical systems, etc., how

1. Contributions to Analytical Psychology, pp. 255 ff.

much more true it is! Religion demands adjustment to external conditions, but also it demands that such adjustment shall be made as far as possible in keeping with certain self-imposed standards. Our view is that religion is both pragmatic and aesthetic in its origin and in its present demands. It simply cannot be dug out of the racial unconscious in the form of phantastical imagery of typical libido manifestations, even if there were a collective unconscious of the kind for which Jung contends.

It is very difficult to estimate the value of Jung's doctrine of the collective unconscious for the theory of religious origins. Jung's own writings are not always clear, nor are they free from contradiction. His later works, however, are fairly clear on the following points:

(1) the collective unconscious is nothing but a possibility, that is, it is the inherited possibility, in the form of inherited brain structure, of psychic functioning below the level of awareness; (2) this inherited possibility comes to light in motives and images which, without historical tradition or migration, spring anew in every age and clime; (3) the unconscious contents are active; and (4) they issue in products which are exemplified in dreams and phantasies.¹

With Jung's identification of the unconscious with structure rather than with process we must agree. We are unwilling, however, to identify the unconscious with brain structure, because what the relation between brain structure and mental process is has not yet been told by anyone. But, as Professor Drever says:²

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1. Psychological Types, pp. 613-616. Also, Contributions to Analytical Psychology, p. 246.
 2. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), pp. 22-23.

If the term "unconscious" is to be employed in a specific and technical sense in psychology, it ought to be employed to designate those psychical determinants of experience or conscious process, which from their nature never can become conscious. We should then recognize the two types of mental fact, conscious process, and unconscious determinants of conscious process, or the conscious and the unconscious.

From this point of view it is certainly possible and perhaps desirable to make a distinction between those determinants of experience (such, for example, as sentiments and ideals) which are products of the individual's responses, and those (such as the instincts) which are the inherited products of phylogenetic history. This, as we understand it, is what Jung essentially means to do in his distinction between the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious.

But our view of the nature of the unconscious is incompatible with Jung's absolute cleavage between the personal and the collective unconscious. According to our view the collective unconscious would be equivalent to original nature, and the personal unconscious would consist of the modifications of original nature which result from the activities of the individual. Such modifications are exemplified in sentiments, ideals, habits, prejudices, etc. This means, however, that the personal unconscious mental structure is an extension or development of the original (collective) unconscious mental structure. The latter is, therefore, not unrelated to the former, as Jung holds, but wholly organized with it as its very core.

The inheritance by the individual as part of his original mental structure of certain categories of conception in terms of which he

apprehends the phenomenal world cannot be doubted. And it is conceivable that some sort of structural possibility of symbolical representations of the typical needs and relations of the organism may be inherited as part of the original mental structure of the individual. If this were true we should certainly expect that motherhood would stand as a symbol for creation (as indeed it does in the most primitive society) and the hero phantasy would serve admirably to symbolize the individual's need for independence, achievement, and responsibility. At the present state of our knowledge, however, this is a question upon which the scientific psychologist may not venture with any certainty to render a judgment. Jung's theory of primordial ways of thinking, although not completely convincing, is very interesting and suggestive, and it is deserving of further investigation by those interested in psychological research.

But even if we should grant the existence of the primordial ways of thinking for which Jung contends, our view of the unconscious would make it necessary for us to depart from Jung's interpretation of them at two points. In the first place, we should have to regard them as capable of modification and development, just as the instincts are. Thus they would be organized as constituents of the total integrated mental structure which is signified by the term unconscious. Therefore, they would not be uninfluenced by the products of experience, as Jung holds, but would be influenced by the total dynamical structure of which they are parts. Consequently - and this is our second departure from Jung's interpretation - their functioning would not necessarily be entirely independent of conscious control, as Jung holds, but might

proceed according to consciously accepted standards. This is why we have insisted above that the aesthetic imagination cannot be adequately interpreted in terms of unconscious phantastical formulations. There is no reason on earth to suppose that a personally acquired motive (a sentiment, for example, or an ideal) might not give rise to ideational elaborations varying all the way from the almost purely phantastic to the almost purely scientific.

d. Conclusion

From the foregoing discussion we are now able to draw the following conclusion: Jung's restriction of religion to the phantastical representations of motives which lie in the unconscious and which are unrelated to the products and processes of conscious experience is unacceptable. Religion involves the pragmatic and artistic types of imaginative process as well as fancy. Religion is not merely the formulation of myths but an active effort to get into the right relation to a power which, though mysterious, is perceived as existent and active with respect to important values. It is therefore a very practical matter as well as a problem for speculation and artistic representation. Even if we should accept Jung's theory of primordial prototypes which form the basic structure of our religious conceptions we should still have to maintain that both in the life-history of the individual and of the race they undergo modification as a result of criticism based on conscious experience.

CHAPTER VIII

FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY - THE VALUATING ATTITUDE

The views of Ames, King, Leuba, and Coe are presented. They all agree that religion is functional in the service of some sort of values. King and Ames say that religion is instrumental in the conservation of the highest social values. Leuba says that religion is useful in the preservation and perfection of life as a whole. Coe says that religion is functional in the completion, unification, and conservation of any values whatever. In addition to various difficulties seen in these views, individually, the objection is raised against them all that they are too subjective and utilitarian. It is urged that the Religious Object has an objective reference and that satisfactory relationship with Him in highly developed religions may become an end in itself. The importance of certain facts which the functional school have emphasized is pointed out and a statement of religious origins is attempted that gives adequate consideration to them all.

Arising from the recognized fruitlessness of structural psychology as represented by Wundt, there was, toward the close of the nineteenth century, a growing conviction among psychologists throughout the Western world that the real problem of psychology is the study of mental functions rather than the study of mental structure. In its early stage this movement toward "functionalism" was represented by such men as James, Stout, Hoeffding, Muensterberg, and Kuelpe. In the United States of America it culminated in the development of the so-called "functional psychology" under the leadership of Dewey, Angell, and Judd.

Functional psychology is the result of following the pragmatic attitude in the study of psychological problems. The functionalist

is much impressed by the fact of change, of process. He asks not what the mind is but what it does; and his explanation of mind is formulated in terms of its biological value for survival. Likewise, in the study of any other process he asks what end it serves, what it is good for. And, in the last analysis, its presence is accounted for and its value is appraised by reference to its contribution to the ongoing process of life.

The emphasis on the genetic explanation and social reference of mental functions led naturally, when the functional point of view was employed in religious psychology, to the emphasis on the social nature, origin, and value of religion. The most eminent representatives of functionalism in religious psychology are Irving King, E. S. Ames, J. H. Leuba, and G. A. Coe. While it is impossible to take the opinions of any one of these men as the view of functionalism with regard to a given problem in religious psychology, their views have sufficient similarity to enable us to treat them by topics. In the present chapter, therefore, we shall devote a section each to the psychological source of religion and the origin of the gods and add a concluding statement.

36. The Psychological Source of Religion

The functionalist is not satisfied to explain a conscious state or process by analyzing it into its component structural elements or contents. He wants to know what end it serves. According to the

functional point of view mental process arose in the first place because organisms needed to make responses which without it they could not make. And even now the tendency is for organisms to develop mental activity, particularly at the higher levels, only when spontaneous, habitual, relatively unconscious responses are inadequate. This is the fundamental assumption that underlies Dewey's theory that thinking begins with a problem, i.e., a difficulty, and that it is directed toward the surmounting of the difficulty. Thinking is functional in the solution of problems. For the functionalist every mental process is directed toward some end; it subserves some value. And its explanation must reveal the processes from which it arises and those to which it contributes.

a. Ames - The Consciousness of the Highest Social Values

What then is religion? For the functional psychologist it is a kind of mental process, or consciousness. Ames says that it is the consciousness of the highest social values.¹ It is the desire for individual and social life:

These highest social values appear to embody more or less idealized expressions of the most elemental and urgent life impulses. Religion expresses the desire to obtain life and obtain it abundantly. In all the stages the demand is for "daily bread" and for companionship and achievement in family and community relationships.²

b. King - The Final Meanings of Life

It seems that King would be in perfect agreement with Ames

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1. Ames: The Psychology of Religious Experience (1910), preface, pp. vii-viii, pp. 72, 110, 168.
 2. Ibid., preface, p. vii.

in his conception of what religion is. He begins by saying that religion is concerned with the most fundamental values.

The religious attitude may be said to be a peculiar organization of mental processes about the final meanings of life as they are conceived by the individual or the social group.¹

Religion is an appreciative or a valuating type of consciousness, and its peculiar differentia lies on the side of the functions served rather than on that of intrinsic psychic content.² He says,

The value-judgment is not applied to a content as a thing that exists in and of itself, but with reference to some end.³

Acts and states of consciousness, including the religious consciousness are to be explained by reference to their setting and function in the general life-process.⁴

The religious consciousness is regarded as a valuating attitude,⁵ which means that it "involves an emotional recognition of values of some kind, an intellectual tendency to affirm or deny them, and a positive inclination to act in some way or other with reference to them."⁶ The religious attitude, however, is the result of participation in group activity.⁷

That the social organization is practically the universe, the ne plus ultra of the primitive man's life, is a most important point for the development of religious values out of those of less degree... The social body not only is an agent in enhancing and rendering permanent the simple values brought to consciousness by the growth of intermediate activities, it also raises them to the

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1. King: The Development of Religion (1910), p. 7.
 2. Ibid., p. 15.
 3. Ibid., p. 16.
 4. Ibid., p. 23.
 5. Ibid., p. 30.
 6. Ibid., p. 31.
 7. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

highest power. Psychologically, the values of the group are not only higher than those of the individual, they are genuinely ultimate and universal.¹

Thus we come to see that man's most fundamental values are the social values and that they, by their very importance, produce the religious consciousness.²

We do not see that there is on this point, therefore, any essential difference between Ames and King. For both of them, in the last analysis, religion is to be defined as the consciousness of (or attitude toward) the highest social values.

c. Leuba - The Use of Superhuman Psychic Powers

Leuba finds difficulty with this consciousness of social values as a differentiating mark of religion. King and Ames both recognize other forms of social values besides the religious values. The religious values are differentiated as a group consisting of the highest social values. Leuba's criticism of King on this point is equally valid as a criticism of Ames. He says:

Where then is the line to be drawn between those (values) that are to be called religious and those that are not? Wherever it may be drawn, it will mark only a difference of degree between religion and the rest of life. The experiences on one side of the line will be only of the greater value, more permanent, more inclusive, than those on the other side. It turns out, then, that King has singled out a means of connecting together the whole of life, and not one that can be used to differentiate any portion of it.³

Leuba maintains that the differentiating mark of religion is the kind of power upon which dependence is felt and the kind of

1. Op. cit., p. 68.

2. Op. cit., pp. 210, 214.

3. Leuba: A Psychological Study of Religion (1912), p. 50.

behaviour which is elicited by that power.

Religion is that part of human experience in which man feels himself in relation with powers of psychic nature, usually personal powers, and makes use of them. In its active forms, it is a mode of behavior, aiming, in common with all human activities, at the gratification of needs, desires, and yearnings. It is, therefore, a part of the struggle for life.¹

d. Coe - The Revaluation of Values

Coe gives us three valuable criticisms of Leuba's view of the nature of religion. In the first place, says Coe, Leuba considers that in religion man makes use of the psychic powers, with which he feels himself to be in relation, as mere means toward the achievement of his values² which are determined without reference to the gods, whereas, as a matter of fact, man often adjusts his ends to what he conceives to be the divine will or the divine nature.³

Coe's second criticism of Leuba is that "Leuba's definition presupposes that men have needs, and apparently that these needs are a constant, while the means used to supply them are variable."⁴ Against this view Coe urges the point that it is the constant re-valuation of values that makes us individuals and organizes us into society.⁵

1. Op. cit., p. 52.

2. Op. cit., p. 8. "It is not the needs which are distinctive of religion, but the method whereby they are gratified."

3. Coe: The Psychology of Religion (1916), pp. 63-65.

4. Ibid, p. 66.

5. Ibid, p. 68.

With these two criticisms which Coe directs against Leuba we are entirely in agreement. With his third criticism, although it is valuable in indicating Coe's view, we must disagree. Coe feels that it is unfruitful to define religion by reference to a certain content of belief.¹ But Leuba defines religion by reference to the powers upon which dependence is felt. And although we disagree with Leuba's view as a whole, we shall presently advance reasons in support of defining religion partially by reference to content.

At the present, however, let us take note of an important objection that Coe raises against limiting religion, as King and Ames limit it, to the highest social values.² There are values about which religion is concerned that are not social in the sense in which Ames and King use the word. Furthermore, Coe finds that "in the body of Ames's book, 'highest social values' appear again and again to deliquesce into the social as such."³

Coe explains his own conception of religion as follows:⁴

Any reaction may then be considered as religious to the extent that it seeks "life" in the sense of completion, unification, and conservation of values - any values whatever. Religion does not introduce any new value; it is an operation upon or within all our appreciations. If we are to speak of religious value at all, we should think of it as the value of values, that is, the value of life organizing and completing itself, or seeking a destiny, against the discrete values of impulsive or unreflective existence. The "new life" that is so prominent at different levels of religion gets its material from the life that now is. Tribal initiations introduce the youth to a "new life"

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1. Op. cit., p. 59.
 2. Op. cit., pp. 71-72.
 3. Op. cit., p. 72.
 4. Op. cit., p. 70.

that is new to him as an individual, but not to the tribe. Similarly, Christian regeneration simply enthrones such domestic qualities as love. Heaven is a projection of joys known on earth, and hell merely focuses earthly woes. Even communion with God is an extension of love and friendship as they are experienced among men.

e. Criticism

The functionalist defines religion in terms of its origin and usefulness. His conception of religion is not only fundamental to his theory of religious origins but we may say that it is his theory of religious origins. In defining religion the functionalist points out the psychological source of religion.

The functionalists all agree on the fundamental problem in the attempted solution of which arises the religious attitude. It is the problem of values. Religion, they all say, is functional in some way in the service of some sort of values.

King and Ames say that religion is functional in the conservation of the highest social values.

Leuba says that religion is functional in the preservation and perfection, so far as this depends upon relations with superhuman, psychic powers, of the values of life as a whole.

Coe says that religion is functional in the completion, unification, and conservation of any values whatever.

The view of King and Ames was opposed by two serious criticisms: (1) religion is, as a matter of fact, functional in the service of some values that are not primarily social; and (2) it offers no clear basis of differentiating religion from social values in general.

To Leuba's view, also, serious objections were raised: (1) the gods are not mere means in securing values, but they are often determiners of values; and (2) it is not merely the gods who are variable, but values are also variable.

To these criticisms made by others we shall now add some remarks of our own.

According to Ames's view a person is religious according to his ability to participate in a social life. He says:

To the psychologist it remains clear that the man is genuinely religious in so far as his symbols, ceremonials, institutions, and heroes enable him to share in a social life. It is also psychologically evident that the man who tries to maintain religious sentiment apart from social experience is to that extent irreligious, whatever he may claim for himself; while the man who enters thoroughly into the social movements of his time is to that extent genuinely religious, though he may characterize himself quite otherwise.¹

According to this estimate we are not at all clear that Jesus and the great prophets can be considered religious. They opposed the social movements of their times, and they opposed them because they were loyal to One who, in their belief, was superior to the social group. Religion, today, certainly includes more than social values, unless

1. Ames: The Psychology of Religious Experience (1910), p. 358.

one defines social values in such a way as to include all values. In that case to say that religion serves social values means only that it is useful for something.

It might be well to approach functional psychology itself from a functional point of view, and ask what difficulty gave rise to this view of religion. One does not have far to look to discover that this view was a protest against an over-emphasis on such non-social aspects of religion as is found in rationalism, emotionalism, and mysticism, and the corresponding neglect of religion as functional in the service of social values.

Such a protest is extremely important for religion. The social values should not be neglected. And religion should not be defined in such a way as to leave them out. But why should it be defined in such a way as to leave out the non-social values? To do so is only to repeat the mistake, in the opposite direction, from which one is seeking to escape. And in the end science is no better off.

We conclude, therefore, that Coe is exactly right in maintaining that religion is concerned with some values that are not merely social.

We wish also to emphasize Coe's point regarding the religious revaluation of values. It cannot be doubted that in primitive society man's activities were rigidly circumscribed by custom. But we cannot suppose that there was absolutely no freedom at all for the individual. Even community affairs have a way of reaching crises in which no available custom can be appealed to for guidance. At such times individuals, judging not so much by what is as by what ought to be,

make decisions that become traditions. And the social activities which ensue from the decisions become customs.

Even among primitive men religion to some extent serves a critical and reconstructive function and with the development of society it does so increasingly. So we agree with Coe that religion functions in revaluing values.

This insight also constitutes a valuable criticism of Leuba's utilitarianism in religion. Leuba is right in defining religion by reference to a Religious Object. But the Religious Object is not merely a means to be used in getting what man wants. He is always believed to be in some sense a Determiner of Destiny.¹ In more highly developed forms of religion he is one upon whom some or all of man's most precious values depend; one who revalues man's values, making them, by his approval or disapproval, of supreme value or of no account; one with whom satisfactory relationship may become the dominating value of a man's life - perhaps even of a nation's life.

It is just here that we come upon the distinguishing mark of religion, its psychological source, its real differentia. At this point we take our position against Coe and the whole functional school. Religion is what happens when a person or a group of persons believes that a superhuman Determiner of Destiny has assumed a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward a value (or values) which is prized by that person or group. The business of the Psychology of Religion is to study what happens in this situation, i.e., it should study the

1. Vide supra, sections 20 and 21.

activities (experience and behaviour) of the person or group involved. A great deal that is valuable for psychology and for religion can be learned by analyzing the contents of the experience as well as by observing the usefulness of the resulting attitudes and behaviour. It is nothing short of dogmatism to deny facts and discount problems because the particular method one has adopted is not suited to their treatment.

37. Origin of the Gods

According to the functionalists the gods, also, derive from the valuating attitudes of men.

After describing a spirit as an object, sensation, or image which attracts the attention forcibly,¹ Ames goes on to explain the relation of spirits to religion in the following words:

Religion involves certain spirits, namely, those which signify the most important functions and interests of the group; those in which the group reacts with the greatest solidarity and intensity.²

Divinity, he says, is a symbol for the group spirit.³

King says that the deity is not the product of a supposed faculty of personification but to start with is possibly an actual person who is regarded as closely and actively related to some acute interest.⁴ The process of deification is helped along by: (1) the tendency to associate vital interests with the activity of some person or animal, (2) the tendency to consider the deity as one of the group, (3) the methods of adjustment which are social in character, and

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1. Ames: The Psychology of Religious Experience (1910), p. 106.
 2. Ibid., p. 109.
 3. Ibid., p. 114.
 4. King: The Development of Religion (1910), p. 254.

(4) the development of the concept by the play of fancy.¹

As far as psychology is concerned the deity may be said to be a value-attitude of a certain kind in the consciousness of some individual or individuals.²

For the psychologist God is not a phenomenon. He is not a postulate nor an elementary factor in the production of the religious life; he is one of the concepts of some religious lives.³ Since for primitive man the group is supreme, all the essential elements of the Supreme Being are to be found in the tribal god.⁴ The gradual unfolding of the character of the supreme and all-wise God in human consciousness follows the development of the social consciousness.⁵ The character of Yahweh was built up rather than revealed.⁶

Leuba considers that there are three general types of behaviour in which man may seek to realize his values: (1) he may utilize his knowledge of natural causation, (2) he may coerce some mysterious impersonal power (mana) to do his bidding, or (3) he may cultivate the goodwill of some personal power who thus serves as a valuable instrument in the preservation and perfection of his values. These three types of behaviour may be characterized, respectively, as scientific, magical, and religious.⁷

Leuba contends for independent origin of the impersonal and personal powers. Neither one depends upon the other.⁸ He holds that

1. King: The Development of Religion (1910), pp. 256-257.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 264.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 267.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 269.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 276.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 277.

7. Leuba: A Psychological Study of Religion (1912), Ch. I.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

the idea of non-personal powers arose from the projection of the feeling of effort into natural forces.¹ He says that the original idea of non-personal powers has only one characteristic, namely, it is dynamic, it does things.² Therefore he objects to Marett's concept of pre-animistic supernaturalism, and prefers to call the belief in non-personal powers "dynamism."³ Dynamism is the realm of magic; it is only when belief in personal beings is developed that religion comes on the scene.

Leuba derives the ideas of unseen, superhuman beings from two sources: (1) the need of accounting for observed phenomena (apparitions and various mental aberrations, striking natural phenomena, problem of creation, etc.), and (2) the affective and moral needs of man.⁴ It is only when they become important factors in the struggle for life that these superhuman beings acquire significance as real gods.⁵ Leuba adds, however, that the mere knowledge of unseen agents that are unrelated to life is a fiction. When man learns by science to gain the values for which he previously depended upon a superhuman agent, then the god acquires new powers such as giving comfort to the worshiper, etc.⁶

Coe denies that projection was a factor in developing the idea of God. He says:

The gods are simply realities of experience when it is most vivid. If he (early man) could have phrased his procedure, he might have said something

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1. Op. cit., pp. 78 ff.
 2. Op. cit., p. 83.
 3. Op. cit., p. 84.
 4. Op. cit., Ch. V.
 5. Op. cit., p. 111.
 6. Op. cit., p. 113.

like this: "I feel alive most intensely when with my tribe I wrestle with some sense of common need or rejoice in some common joy. At such moments I realize that our feeling is more than ours; it is something that overwhelms us; it is shared by those beings - ancestors, spirits, nature-powers - that are close to us in our struggle to live. They want what we want; they work with us to obtain it; and they that be with us are stronger than they that be against us."

In short, the genesis of the god-idea is a spontaneous, underived conviction that what is most important for us is really important, that is, respected and provided for by the reality upon which we depend. For early man the world of values is the real world.¹

It is hardly necessary to add anything by way of further appraisal of the views of Ames and King. We content ourselves by reiterating that Divinity is not a symbol for a spirit within, but for an objective element in the situation without, that has a bearing on our values. Such objective element may be present at any mental level; it may exist as a quality of a perceived situation, or it may characterize one's mature philosophy as a reasoned conviction that the Universe is on the whole friendly and in some sense responsive to man.

We shall now briefly consider Leuba's derivation of non-personal powers from the projection of the feeling of effort into natural forces. In a previous section of the present work (section 24, Chapter IV), we have been at some pains to show that man perceives dynamic processes as having direction, that when they persistently menace his values he perceives in them animus and intent, and that such perception of apparent attitudes constitutes the rudiments out of which spontaneous personification may develop. In our view, projection is

1. Coe: The Psychology of Religion (1916), p. 106.

not necessarily involved in any one of these processes and probably is not at all involved in the perception of a dynamic process either as having direction or as expressing intention. As Leuba's view is supported only by inconsequential and unconvincing data from child psychology there is no good reason either for changing our views or for discussing the question at great length.

It has an important bearing, however, upon Leuba's distinction between magic and religion. Leuba holds that it is only when the idea of unseen personal beings is sufficiently advanced for man to use these beings in the pursuit of his values that religion comes upon the scene; when man uses impersonal powers he is engaging in magic. This means, if Leuba is right, that the whole realm of pre-animistic supernaturalism discovered by Marett rightly belongs to the domain of magic and not to that of religion.

We cannot believe that Leuba is right. Throughout the whole of the present work our thesis has been that religion exists whenever and wherever men both believe that a mysterious (hence uncontrollable) superhuman power is thaumaturgically operative either for or against their values, and seek a satisfactory adjustment as a result. Such a power need not be personal, as Leuba claims. The mysterious power which is manifest in pre-animistic supernaturalism would be quite adequate, under the proper conditions, to stimulate the religious experience. From the nuclei of sentiments and group practices arising out of many such rudimentary religious experiences, the gods have grown.

With two reservations we are therefore able to agree with Coe's statement that "the genesis of the god-idea is a spontaneous, underived conviction that what is most important for us is really important, that is, respected and provided for by the reality upon which we depend."¹ Our first reservation is that we must include this cosmic reference and appraisal of our values in our conception of religion, as Coe does not. Our second reservation is that the reality upon which man depends is not by any means always understood to be favorable to the values to which man at a given time finds himself devoted. His conviction that his most important values are respected and provided for by the reality on which he depends, is the result of a long racial experience in which man has, probably more often than not, found his values at a given time in opposition to the real values. And through suffering he has gained a new insight and made progress.

38. Concluding Statement

In spite of the limitations of the functional point of view in the study of the nature and origin of religion, its use has resulted in some notable contributions to our knowledge of these problems.

These contributions have resulted mainly from the emphasis placed by the functionalists upon the importance of the following facts:

(1) Religion is intimately concerned with values. (2) In primitive society practically all the values of which man was conscious were

1. Coe: The Psychology of Religion (1916), p. 106.

values which were shared in common by all the members of a group.

(3) There was no differentiation of the group life of primitive man into functional institutions, such as political, economic, educational, and religious institutions, designed to subserve and conserve specific types of value. (4) In primitive society man was practically without any knowledge of the objective conditions that affected his most precious values. Consequently (5) he had practically no means on his own account of effecting the achievement or conservation of his values. (6) Man gradually developed an increasing knowledge of and control over the conditions affecting some of his values. (7) With this development, institutions dealing with known and controllable values were differentiated out of the common social life and religion took its place as one institution among others. (8) There was also the development in man of new appreciations and values, including the idealization of the self and of society and the tendency to work for the realization of things as they ought to be. (9) For the preservation and perfection of his values man has nearly always sought to employ the assistance of superhuman powers, usually personal powers.

While all these facts are recognized in a general way by the authors whose views we are studying in the present chapter, none of them in framing a definition of religion has given full consideration to all these facts. Ames and King give attention primarily to the first three. Leuba is principally impressed by the importance of numbers 1, 4, 5, and 9. Coe emphasizes numbers 1, 6, 7, and 8.

We shall now attempt a statement that gives due consideration to all these important facts which the members of the functional school emphasize, and some others for which we have contended.

Religion is concerned with values. In primitive societies it is largely concerned with social values. It is active in the revaluation of values. Religious activity (behaviour and experience) arises in a situation in which the values of an individual or group are felt to be appraised, in the sense that an attitude is taken toward them, by a power higher than the individual or group concerned, upon whom the individual or group is dependent. The appraisal by the Religious Object may take the form of disapproval or of approval. In the developing life of man in an imperfect world man is more generally conscious of disapproval than of approval. This consciousness of superhuman approval or disapproval of man's intentions, desires and values, results in activity which aims at appropriate adjustment. This activity of adjustment, according to the values involved and the attitude of the Religious Object, may be directed either inward or outward and thus issue in either subjective or objective results.

If the attitude of the appraising superhuman power is felt to be that of disapprobation or destructive intent, the precarious situation, in which man finds himself or the things which he prizes, normally becomes the stimulus for a subjectively unpleasant state of tension which may be described as the sorrow phase of religious emotion. This state of tension operates as a motive initiating and sustaining efforts on the part of the religious subject to achieve a satisfactory relation-

ship with the Religious Object. These efforts at religious adjustment may be relatively uncritical or critical.

The uncritical attempt at religious adjustment is directed toward changing the attitude of the Religious Object from one of disapproval to one of approval either by objective acts of a propitiatory character or by subjective acts of a renunciatory kind. The opposition of values between the Religious Object and the religious subject may be so intense that the latter's renunciatory activity takes the form of what Marett calls humility, moping, being cast down for a season. Such a conflict may finally issue in relinquishment and extrusion from one's self the offending desire, intention, past deed, or value and the unquestioning acceptance as one's own the values evinced by the Religious Object. The deprivation thus suffered may at its worst lead to self-pity, melancholia, or more serious forms of neurasthenic and psychotic mental illness. The relatively uncritical efforts at religious adjustment are characteristic of the perceptual and ideational levels of mental activity and it is not surprising that we find them prominent in the lives of relatively undeveloped individuals and groups.

The more critical attempt at religious adjustment is inquisitive and appreciative in character. It is the effort to understand what it is that is valued by the Religious Object and how one may achieve, conserve, and enjoy that which is most real and valuable. Such an attitude of searching leads inevitably to new insight: (1) into the character of the Religious Object; or (2) into the relative importance of one's previously accepted values; or (3) into entirely new values; or (4) into the manner in which one ought to seek the achievement of

his values. At its best, the final result of this attitude is the conscious self-realization of one's high destiny as the friend of God - as one who knows, loves, and does the will of God as far as he is able at any given moment but who also seeks more knowledge, more love, and more power.

When the attitude of the Religious Object is felt to be, from whatever cause, one of approbation, the feeling of well-being which this sense of approval arouses may be called the joy phase of religious emotion. Approved by the Religious Object, one feels "strong and wise and glad and good."

Joyous religious emotion also has its critical and uncritical phases. As uncritical it is almost entirely retrospective in character tending to celebrate and exalt the past. If one feels that he has the approval of the Religious Object there is a tendency, at the uncritical levels of mind, to feel that his present ideas, practices, values, and personal worth are exalted and confirmed. At its worst this may take the form of self-righteous complacency, or of dogmatic, unreasoning zeal in persuading or compelling others to accept one's own formulas of thought and standards of action.

Or again at the uncritical level the religious subject's joyous sense of Divine approval may find expression primarily in exalting the goodness of God and the sense of gratitude to him for his goodness. Instead of the self-tendencies being exalted, as in the cases just mentioned, here we have an example of genuine subjection.

The joy phase of religious emotion, when it finds expression at the critical (conceptual) level of mental life, looks forward and

issues in activity of an intelligent sort. Such activity will aim at the realization, conservation, and perfection of the values that one believes to have Divine approval, and it will vary in form according to the necessities of the situation in which it is operative. It may take the form of attempted self-reconstruction and self-improvement in the interest of values understood and loved but as yet unrealized; or of attempted reconstruction of the physical environment in the interest of beauty as when one plants a garden, in the interest of health as when a community drains its swamps, etc., or in the interest of worship as when people cooperate in building a temple or a cathedral, or in the interest of economic well-being in various ways, or in the interest of any value whatever that is of sufficient importance to receive cosmic approval. Another example of intelligent religious activity arising from the Divine approval of values is the attempted education of others, in the sense of influencing them to understand and appreciate the values to which an individual or group is religiously devoted, and of enlisting them in the service of those values. And a final illustration is the effort to reconstruct social institutions, at any level of society, in the interest of the authentic values which have the approval of the Religious Object.

The sorrow phase and the joy phase of religious emotion are but moments in the complete religious experience, as the examination of the ritual of developed religions readily shows. The ritual is intended to guide the worshiper's experience in the following sequence: (1) the consciousness of the Holy God's presence, (2) the sense of his

own unholiness and sin, (3) the sense of God's forgiveness - atone-
ment - thanksgiving, (4) illumination regarding God's will, and his
own values, (5) the dedication of himself to carry out the new
insight, (6) the dedication expressed in activity.

Chapter IX

COLLECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY - THE SACRED

The views of Émile Durkheim as representative of collective psychology are given chief consideration. Durkheim defines religion in terms of beliefs and practices related to sacred things. He regards totemism as the simplest form of religion, the totem being only a symbol for the clan itself, personified and represented to the imagination in the visible form of the animal or vegetable which serves as totem. It is in the effervescence of the clan celebration that the sense of sacredness is aroused and projected upon the totem as visible symbol. Objections are raised against Durkheim's major premise, the social mind, and his identification of the religious object as the symbol for the group. The conclusion is that sharing common activities with other individuals is the chief means by which the developing individual gains new concepts, develops sentiments and attitudes, and forms habits with respect to the objects and powers which his fellowmen have learned to regard as sacred. But the source of the sacred is the mysterious, dangerous, uncontrollable power which concerns the welfare not merely of the individual but of the group as well.

The title of this chapter indicates at once that it is concerned with the French School of Sociology of which Émile Durkheim was the leader. It is not intended to ignore the existence of the German School of collective or folk psychology whose distinguished representative was Wilhelm Wundt. But it has been thought preferable to give the central place in the present chapter to the French School rather than the German School for the following reasons: (1) Wundt's views contribute little, if anything, that is new to the solution of the problem of religious origins; (2) Durkheim more consistently and emphatically represents the collective point of view in explaining the origin of religion than does Wundt who wavers between individual and

collective explanations; (3) although their conclusions regarding religious origins are different, there is a great similarity between their fundamental psychological premises, so that the criticisms which are directed against Durkheim's theory of the collective mind and the compounding of mental states to form more complex psychological entities apply with equal force against the views of Wundt; and (4) Durkheim's influence in current social psychology, including the psychology of religion, is very strong, while that of Wundt is relatively unimportant.

39. The Sacred and the Profane

Among the later works of Durkheim none has received more attention than "Les formes elementaire de la vie religieuse,"¹ first published in 1912. It is here that one finds a systematic presentation of the mature views of Durkheim on the nature and origin of religion and it is with this work that we shall, in the present section, be principally concerned.

Durkheim recognizes two kinds of religious phenomena:

(1) beliefs, which are states of opinion and consist in representations, and (2) rites, which are determined modes of action.² Since rites can be explained only by reference to the fundamental beliefs which underlie them a definition of religious belief is prerequisite to the definition

1. English translation by J. W. Swain under the title of The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915). All references are to the English translation.

2. Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915), p. 36.

of religious rite. Now one characteristic which all religious beliefs have in common is that they all presuppose the division of all things, real and ideal, into two absolutely different classes, the profane and the sacred. And "the beliefs, myths, dogmas and legends are either representations or systems of representations which express the nature of sacred things, the virtues and powers which are attributed to them, or their relations with each other and with profane things."¹ Furthermore, it is not to be supposed that only the gods are sacred; any object, person, rite or belief may have this quality.² And, also, the difference between the profane and the sacred is not to be regarded as only one of degree; it is a difference in kind and it is absolute.³ He says,

In all the history of human thought there exists no other example of two categories of things so profoundly differentiated or so radically opposed to one another. The traditional opposition of good and bad is nothing beside this; for the good and the bad are only two opposed species of the same class, namely morals, just as sickness and health are two different aspects of the same order of facts, life, while the sacred and the profane have always and everywhere been conceived by the human mind as two distinct classes, as two worlds between which there is nothing in common.⁴

This division of the world into two domains, the one containing all that is sacred and the other all that is profane, Durkheim holds to be the distinctive trait of religious thought.⁵ Of course, he says, there are secondary species within these two classes that are incompatible with one another.

1. Op. cit., p. 37.

2. Op. cit., p. 37.

3. Op. cit., p. 38.

4. Op. cit., p. 38.

5. Op. cit., p. 37.

But the real characteristic of religious phenomena is that they always suppose a bipartite division of the whole universe, known and knowable, into two classes which embrace all that exists, but which radically exclude each other.....Religious beliefs are the representations which express the nature of sacred things and the relations which they sustain, either with each other or with profane things.¹

Having thus defined religious beliefs, he defines the other category of religious phenomena, namely, rites, as "the rules of conduct which prescribe how a man should comport himself in the presence of these sacred objects."²

Durkheim considers it possible that a religious belief or a religious rite may exist in comparative isolation; but that by the process of mental fusion beliefs and rites may unite to form a religion.³ He says,

When a certain number of sacred things sustain relations of coordination or subordination with each other in such a way as to form a system having a certain unity, but which is not comprised within any other system of the same sort, the totality of these beliefs and their corresponding rites constitutes a religion.⁴

These are not complete definitions, however, according to Durkheim because they do not enable us to distinguish between magic and religion. Magic too, has its beliefs and its rites and deals with the sacred.⁵ The distinction which Durkheim draws between religion and magic is that religion unites those who adhere to its beliefs and practices into a Church, or sacred group, while magic does not bind

1. Op. cit., pp. 40-41.
 2. Op. cit., p. 41.
 3. Op. cit., p. 41.
 4. Op. cit., p. 41.
 5. Op. cit., pp. 42 ff.

together those who adhere to it. In a word, religion is social; magic is individual. There is no Church of magic.¹

Thus Durkheim arrives at the following definition:

A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden - beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.²

And then he adds the following statement:

The second element which thus finds a place in our definition is no less essential than the first; for by showing that the idea of religion is inseparable from that of the Church, it makes it clear that religion should be an eminently collective thing.³

Rejecting Tylor's animism⁴ and Max Mueller's naturism,⁵

Durkheim seeks the origin of religion by studying what he regards as the most primitive form of the religious life, namely, totemism.⁶

He shows that the idea of force (mana, wakan) underlies the beliefs and practices of totemism, but holds that the totem is a symbol of this force and not its source.⁷ The collective mind of the clan is the real source of mana, the totemic principle, or god. The totem, he says,

expresses and symbolizes two different sorts of things. In the first place, it is the outward and visible form of what we have called the totemic principle or god. But it is also the symbol of the determined society called the clan. It is its flag; it is the sign by which each clan distinguishes itself from the others, the visible mark of its personality, a mark borne by everything

1. Op. cit., p. 44.

2. Op. cit., p. 47.

3. Op. cit., p. 47.

4. Op. cit., pp. 48-70.

5. Op. cit., pp. 71-86.

6. Op. cit., pp. 87 ff.

7. Op. cit., p. 205.

which is a part of the clan under any title whatsoever, men, beasts, or things. So if it is at once the symbol of the god and of the society, is that not because the god and the society are only one? How could the emblem of the group have been able to become the figure of this quasi-divinity, if the group and the divinity were two distinct realities? The god of the clan, the totemic principle, can therefore be nothing else than the clan itself, personified and represented to the imagination under the visible form of the animal or vegetable which serves as totem.¹

Durkheim's analysis does not end, however, with the discovery that the totemic principle and the clan are the same thing. He inquires how the apotheosis of the totem has been made possible and how it happened to take place in this fashion.

In answering this inquiry Durkheim seeks to show, first of all, that "Society has all that is necessary to arouse the sensation of the divine in minds, merely by the power that it has over them." In fact he says that to its members a social group is what a god is to his worshippers.² Evidence of this fact is seen in the moral authority of the society over its members which, like a god, inspires respect and automatically causes or inhibits actions without regard for any consideration relative to their useful or injurious effects.³ Again, it is seen in the strengthening and vivifying power of society which is operative in a man's life through expressions of esteem, sympathy or affection for him on the part of his fellows, and which, like the approval of a god, inspires him to approach the world with confidence and with the feeling of increased energy.⁴ Yet again, the religious

1. Op. cit., p. 206.

2. Op. cit., p. 206.

3. Op. cit., p. 207.

4. Op. cit., pp. 209-211.

quality of a society is seen in its ability to make sacred both men and things which were not so before.¹ Thus it is seen that the clan is able to awaken in its members the idea that "outside of them there exist forces which dominate them and at the same time sustain them, that is to say in fine, religious forces."²

Durkheim's second problem in explaining the apotheosis of the totem is to show how collective action in the clan arouses the "sensation" of sacredness there.³ The every-day, more or less isolated, existence of separate families in the totemic society which we are studying (the Arunta of Australia) is profane. It is when they come together in the great tribal gatherings that the sacred is created and conserved. In the excitement of the clan celebrations the participants feel themselves to be transported into another world, different from the one in which they ordinarily live, the world of the sacred.

It is in the midst of these effervescent social environments and out of this effervescence itself that the religious idea seems to be born.⁴

In explaining the apotheosis of the totem, the only problem now remaining for Durkheim is to show how the external forces which dominate and exalt the members of the clan are thought of under the form of totems, that is to say, in the shape of an animal or plant. This is accomplished by assuming that the clan has come to be known by the name of an animal or plant which also served as its emblem,⁵ and by showing how, granted this, the group experiences tend to organize themselves

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1. Op. cit., pp. 212-214.
 2. Op. cit., p. 214.
 3. Op. cit., pp. 214-219.
 4. Op. cit., p. 218.
 5. Op. cit., pp. 230-234.

in the mind of each clan member around the idea of the totem which thus becomes the objectified symbol of the clan itself.¹ He says,

It is a well-known law that the sentiments aroused in us by something spontaneously attach themselves to the symbol which represents them.....This transference of sentiments comes simply from the fact that the idea of a thing and the idea of its symbol are closely united in our minds; the result is that the emotions provoked by the one extend contagiously to the other. But this contagion, which takes place in every case to a certain degree, is much more complete and more marked when the symbol is something simple, definite and easily representable, while the thing itself, owing to its dimensions, the number of its parts and the complexity of their arrangement, is difficult to hold in the mind.²

Having thus established the identity of the totemic principle and the clan, Durkheim proceeds to strengthen his position by trying to show that the notion of the soul, or sacred part of the individual, is derived from society. Thus the soul is a derivative from instead of being the source of religious ideas.³ It is society incarnated in the individual.

It is through the soul that the idea of personality has entered into religion, the great tribal god being only an ancestral spirit who finally won a pre-eminent place.⁴

As a summary of Durkheim's position on the origin of religion we quote the following:

Since religious force is nothing other than the collective and anonymous force of the clan, and since this can be represented in the mind only in the form of the totem, the totemic emblem is

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1. Op. cit., pp. 219-223.
 2. Op. cit., pp. 219-220.
 3. Op. cit., Ch. VIII.
 4. Op. cit., Ch. IX, esp. p. 295.

like the visible body of the god. Therefore, it is from it that those kindly or dreadful actions seem to emanate, which the cult seeks to provoke or prevent; consequently, it is to it that the cult is addressed. This is the explanation of why it holds the first place in the series of sacred things.¹

40. Evaluation of Durkheim's Theory

a. Durkheim's Position in Social Psychology

Tarde (1843-1904) and Durkheim (1858-1917) stand side by side as the foremost representatives of modern psycho-sociological thought in France. But they represent opposite extremes of sociological theory.

Tarde was so impressed with the reality and importance of the individual factor in the social process that he made the individual his center of operations and kept his attention fixed upon the individual mind to the almost complete disregard of the collective aspect of social life. Durkheim, on the other hand, was equally impressed with the reality and importance of the collective factor. Accordingly, he made the social group the center of his operations, with the result that he came out at the other extreme of having practically ignored the individual factor.²

Prior to the work of Tarde and Durkheim we find the problems of human behaviour studied, on the one hand, by a subjective and individualistic psychology, and, on the other, by an objective and collectivistic sociology, with practically no common ground between them. It was in response to the need of correlating the work of psychology and sociology in their investigations of human activity and human institutions that the science of social psychology

1. Op. cit., p. 221.

2. Karpf: American Social Psychology (1932), p. 108.

was developed. Tarde and Durkheim were both pioneers from the side of sociology in the development of this new science in France, and they occupied respectively the "nominalistic" and "realistic" positions in modern sociology.¹

b. Durkheim's Fundamental Assumption - The Collective Mind

Durkheim's theory of religion is entirely dependent upon the assumption, worked out in his earlier publications,² of the existence of a social mind which is both exterior and superior to the individual mind and furnishes the latter with the great mass of its representations (ideas, concepts), ways of feeling, and ways of acting.

Durkheim pictures the formation of the social mind by means of an analogy drawn from the formation of concepts in the individual mind. He says that sensations are compounded in the brain of molecular modifications, but, once existent, they are not material but psychic and spiritual, and compound themselves into more and more inclusive syntheses:

Car si les sensations, ce fond premier de la conscience individuelle, ne peuvent s'expliquer que par l'état du cerveau et des organes - autrement, d'où viendraient-elles? - une fois qu'elles existent, elles se composent entre elles d'après des lois dont ni la morphologie ni la physiologie cérébrale ne suffisent à rendre compte. De là viennent les images, et les images, se groupant à leur tour, deviennent les concepts, et, à mesure que des états nouveaux se surajoutent ainsi aux anciens, comme ils sont séparés par de plus nombreux intermédiaires de cette base organique sur laquelle, pourtant, repose toute

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1. Karpf: American Social Psychology (1932), p. 109.
 2. Cf., Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives (1898).

la vie mentale, ils en sont aussi moins immédiatement dépendants. Cependant, ils ne laissent pas d'être psychiques; c'est même en eux que peuvent le mieux s'observer les attributs caractéristiques de la mentalité.¹

Now, says Durkheim, just as the psychic life of the individual has a physiological substratum but is not inherent in it, so the social mind has for its substratum a group of associated individual minds but extends beyond them:

Or si l'on ne voit rien d'extraordinaire à ce que les représentations individuelles, produites par les actions et les réactions échangées entre les éléments nerveux, ne soient pas inhérentes à ces éléments, qu'y a-t-il de surprenant à ce que les représentations collectives, produites par les actions et les réactions échangées entre les consciences élémentaires dont est faite la société, ne dérivent pas directement de ces dernières et, par suite, les débordent? Le rapport qui, dans cette conception, unit le substrat social à la vie sociale est de tous points analogue à celui qu'on doit admettre entre le substrat physiologique et la vie psychique des individus, si l'on ne veut pas nier toute psychologie proprement dite.²

Thus the analogy is clearly drawn between the relation of the representation in the individual mind to the functioning brain cells and the relation of the representations in the social mind to the individuals in the social group.

Since the collective representations are not derived from individuals taken in isolation but from their convergence and union they are exterior to the individual mind, and hence cannot be of any one mind.³

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1. Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives, Rev. de met. et de mor., vol. 6, 1898, p. 300.
 2. Ibid., p. 294.
 3. Ibid., p. 295; The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1917), pp. 434 ff.

The nature of the concept...bespeaks its origin. If it is common to all it is the work of the community. Since it bears the word of no particular mind, it is clear that it was elaborated by a unique intelligence, where all others meet each other, and after a fashion, come to nourish themselves.....Every time that we are in the presence of a type of thought or action which is imposed uniformly upon particular wills or intelligences, this pressure exercised over the individual betrays the intervention of the group.¹

Collective representations are thus said to possess the property of "exteriority" because they come to the individual mind from outside it.

We should note, however, that just as images may unite to produce concepts in the individual mind, several collective representations may unite in the social mind into other collective representations of a higher, more purely social kind.² This theory is important for the development of religion as the following quotation will show:

Elles ont le pouvoir de s'appeler, de se repousser, de former entre elles des synthèses de toutes sortes, qui sont déterminées par leurs affinités naturelles et non par l'état du milieu au sein duquel elles évoluent. Par conséquent, les représentations nouvelles, qui sont le produit de ces synthèses, sont de même nature: elles ont pour causes prochaines d'autres représentations collectives, non tel ou tel caractère de la structure sociale. C'est dans l'évolution religieuse que se trouvent peut-être les plus frappants exemples de ce phénomène. Sans doute, il est impossible de comprendre comment le panthéon grec ou romain s'est formé, si l'on ne connaît la constitution de la cité, la manière dont les clans primitifs se sont peu à peu confondus les uns dans les autres, dont la famille patriarcale s'est organisée, etc.³

We have already had occasion to discuss the "superiority,"⁴ or constraining power, of the collective representations. Society

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1. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915), p. 434.
 2. Ibid., p. 424; cf. Gehlke: Émile Durkheim's Contributions to Sociological Theory (1915), p. 32.
 3. Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives (1898), pp. 299-300.
 4. Vide supra, section 39.

is infinitely superior to the individual in extension in time (permanence), in extension in space (size), in number, and, due to its hierarchical position, in authority.¹ Whatever appertains to it is sacred; all other things are profane.²

The collective representations, however, while they come to the individual from the outside, are at the same time internal to the individual mind.³ He says:

The collective force is not entirely outside of us; it does not act upon us wholly from without; but rather, since society cannot exist except in and through individual consciousnesses, this force must also penetrate us and organize itself within us; it thus becomes an integral part of our being and by that very fact this is elevated and magnified.⁴

Even the categories of thought have a social origin.⁵ In fact, as Gehlke shows, Durkheim regards the mind as the collective consciousness incarnated in the individual. For that reason it is opposed to body, which is the basis of individuality, and thus the duality of man, the source and the solution of the mind-body problem, is found in the anti-thesis of society and the individual.⁶ We may summarize Durkheim's view of the relation between the social mind and the individual mind in the following words of Gehlke:

The individual mind furnishes the sensation elements, the impulses to activity, the emotional tendencies, and some representations (though these latter are neither many nor important); the social mind furnishes the great

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1. Gehlke: Émile Durkheim's Contributions to Sociological Theory (1915), pp. 36-39.
 2. Durkheim: The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915), pp. 206 ff.
 3. Durkheim: De la division du travail social (1893), p. 99.
 4. Durkheim: The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915), p. 209. cf. also, pp. 221, 224, 423, 435.
 5. Ibid., pp. 17 ff.
 6. Gehlke: op. cit., p. 44.

mass of the representations, of the ways of feeling and the ways of acting. These social representations must exist within the individual mind, but their origin is outside of the individual mind, to which they come with force, impressive because of the varied superiority of the source whence they spring, over the source of the individual representations. In its most extreme form this view makes of the mind or soul (ame) of the individual merely the incarnation of the social mind in the individual.¹

c. Criticism

Our criticism is directed, in the first place, against Durkheim's doctrine of the existence of a collective mind and its pre-eminence over the individual mind.

This doctrine is based on the theory that the more complex mental contents are formed by the compounding of simpler mental states. William James calls it the "mind-stuff theory" and devotes a chapter in the "Principles" to its criticism.² Against it he raises two objections: first, he says, in effect, that any given mental state or process is an immediate psychic fact which corresponds simply and totally to complicated cortical activity as a whole.³

There are no unperceived units of mind-stuff preceding and composing the full consciousness. The latter is itself an immediate psychic fact and bears an immediate relation to the neural state which is its unconditional accompaniment.....We cannot mix feelings as such, though we may mix the objects we feel, and from their mixture get new feelings.⁴

But a second and still more fatal objection to this theory is, James says, that it is illogical, because it leaves out the essential feature

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1. Gehlke: op. cit., p. 54.
 2. James: Principles of Psychology (1890), p. 157.
 3. Ibid., pp. 155-158.
 4. Ibid., p. 157.

of all the combinations that we actually know, namely, that they are effects upon some entity other than themselves.¹

No possible number of entities (call them as you like, whether forces, material particles, or mental elements) can sum themselves together. Each remains, in the sum, what it always was; and the sum itself exists only for a bystander who happens to overlook the units and to apprehend the sum as such; or else it exists in the shape of some other effect on an entity external to the sum itself.²

James's protest against atomistic associationism in psychology and his emphasis on functional relationships has borne fruit in recent psychological theory. Psychology today is interested not in the compounding of mental elements but in an organism as a whole responding to a situation as a whole.

But unless the fusion of mental elements is possible the existence of the social or collective mind in the way in which Durkheim conceives it is impossible.

Our second objection to Durkheim's doctrine of the collective mind is that the analogy which he draws between the collective mind and the individual mind is not real. By the aid of the following schematic summary let us recall the essentials of that analogy.

Within the individual mind:

By their interaction, many brain-cells produce a sensation.

By their interaction and combination, many sensations produce an image; many images produce a concept; many concepts produce a representation.

Within the social mind:

By their interaction and combination, many individual

1. Ibid., pp. 158-162.

2. Ibid., pp. 158-159.

representations produce a social representation of a higher, more purely social kind.¹

We have seen, however, that, in Durkheim's thought, the individual mind is actually the incarnation of the collective consciousness. Even the categories of thought such as space, time, and causation are social representations. But, says Gehlke,

if the scope of the individual mind be confined to the narrow limits given by our author, where are the individual representations out of which, by the process of fusion and blending, the social representations are to be compounded? Is it fair to call such an elementary complexus of psychic processes a "mind," in the sense of a system of representations?²

Again, when the brain-cells interact to produce a sensation, presumably the sensation is perceptible as sensation only to the mind as a whole and not to the individual brain-cells. But the collective representation, although it is the result of the interaction and combination in the social mind of individual representations, is yet present in the consciousness of the individual and only there. The only real likeness between the individual and social representations is in the fact that they are both combinations of less inclusive elements.

Finally, the analogy is based on a view which is too intellectualistic. Levy-Bruhl points out that a representation is generally thought of as an intellectual or cognitive phenomenon, but the collective representations of primitives also have emotional and motor accompaniments which have to be taken into account. In order to

1. Adapted from Gehlke: *op. cit.*, p. 32.

2. Gehlke: *op. cit.*, p. 45; cf. p. 97.

retain the term in the study of primitive life, therefore, its accepted meaning has to be modified accordingly.

The representation is, par excellence, an intellectual or cognitive phenomenon. It is not in this way that we are to understand the collective representations of primitives.....By this state of mental activity in primitives we must understand something which is not a purely intellectual or cognitive phenomenon, but a more complex one, in which what is really "representation" to us is found blended with other elements of an emotional or motor character, coloured and imbued by them, and therefore implying a different attitude with regard to the objects represented.¹

If this view of Levy-Bruhl's is correct, as it certainly must be, it is very difficult to see how collective representations of this character could be formed by the compounding of purely cognitive individual representations.

The third and final objection which we shall urge against Durkheim's doctrine of the collective mind is its inadequate treatment of the individual as a causative factor in the social process.

Durkheim regards everything that is not individual in the biological sense as social. Therefore while the necessities for social change are mediated to the collective consciousness by means of the sensations of the individuals who compose its substratum, all social change and social control are derived from the collective consciousness and not from the individual. The doctrine of instinct is thus opposed because it negates Durkheim's principle of the exteriority of social representations.² The other characteristic of social representations, namely, their constraint over the individual, is regarded by

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1. Levy-Bruhl: Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures (1910), tr. Clare, How Natures Think (1926), p. 36.
 2. Durkheim: Les règles de la méthode sociologique (1895), pp. 124, 128; cf. also, Gehlke: op. cit., pp. 66-68.

Durkheim as inconsistent with the notion of self-control, and hence the latter is interpreted by him as only a means whereby the social constraint acts in the individual.¹ Thus the individual is eliminated as an originative center of social phenomena, and the collective or social mind is left as the single psychic source of the new in social life.²

In refutation of this view the results of the psychological study of individual differences seem to be conclusive. As Gehlke says:

The strongest case against a purely social causation theory is that presented by the study of the genius. Whether we accept the Durkheimian major premise or not, the genius is an unanswerable argument against barring the individual as a causal factor in the social life..... The genius, is, consistently with Durkheim's most recent statements, only a superior kind of mould for the reception of social representations...His mental content is entirely derived from the social mind of the group... This view...is for practical reasons untenable. To admit that a "genius" exists, means nothing unless it means that he has originative power in society.³

Where shall we find the social group that incarnated its tendencies in Gallileo, or Plato, or the prophets, or Jesus?

Of course all these persons possessed certain representations, ways of feeling, and ways of acting, in common with other men of their times. But to say that they added nothing new is to deny them genius.

Furthermore, to deny the existence in the individual of inherited tendencies, and of inherited powers of self-restraint is simply to deny the existence of elementary, observable facts which are basic to the science of psychology and the existence of which the success of scientific psychology puts beyond question.⁴

1. Durkheim: *ibid.*, p. 125.

2. Durkheim: *ibid.*, pp. 124-125. cf. also Gehlke: *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

3. Gehlke: *op. cit.*, pp. 98-99.

4. *Vide supra*, sections 2, 3, 9, 13.

We do not wish to deny, but on the contrary we are ready to affirm, that, even in the most primitive societies of human beings, the developing personality of every individual is immensely influenced by the ideas, sentiments, and customs held in common by other members of the social group. We do, however, reject the hypostatization of these ideas, sentiments, and customs, thus converting them into a social mind which is the exterior and superior source of all that can be rightly called the individual mind.

In our criticism of Durkheim's theory of the origin of religion we have thus far been occupied with his fundamental doctrine of the social or collective mind. We now turn our attention to the antithesis which he draws between the sacred and the profane and his identification of religion with the sacred.

In the first place, the difference which Durkheim professes to find between the sacred and the profane is vastly overdrawn. He himself says that while there is an absolute difference between the categories of the sacred and the profane, at the same time there are, within the category of the sacred, all degrees of sacredness.

It must not be lost to view that there are sacred things of every degree, and that there are some in relation to which man feels relatively at his ease.¹

If this is the case, then, presumably, there are all degrees of profaneness within the category of the profane and there must be some things in this category in relation to which man feels relatively ill at ease.

1. Durkheim: The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915), p. 48.

Durkheim does not say that this is so but he does not deny it. Reason, however, dictates it and, so far as the writer is concerned, introspection confirms it.

Now if by saying that the difference between these two categories is absolute, Durkheim means that between the most sacred and the most utterly profane things there is a very wide - even an absolute - difference we should not urge any serious objection. But there does not seem to be any absolute distinction in kind between the least sacred and least profane things. To divide the whole universe, known and knowable, into two absolutely disparate realms of the sacred and the profane seems not only unjustifiable but unintelligible. For if the distinction between these two categories is as clear and certain as Durkheim says it is then one should be able to identify any object, without hesitation and with perfect certainty, as belonging to one or the other of these categories. But one has only to read the history of the disputes incident to the formation of the canon of sacred writings which compose the Bible to learn that this is not so. If it be objected that this was due to the influence of conflicting groups then we can only resort to introspection. In that case, at least so far as the writer is concerned, there simply does not exist any absolute difference in kind between the least sacred and least profane things.

Let us suppose that it may be different in primitive societies. Levy-Bruhl tells us that there is a great difference between the mind of the primitive and the mind of the civilized, white

man.¹ Karpf argues convincingly that this difference is one of degree rather than a difference in kind.² Now it must either be or not be a difference in kind. If it is and the distinction between the sacred and the profane is for the primitive absolute, then Durkheim's definition of religion is valid for the primitive but not for the civilized, white man. If the difference between the mind of the primitive and that of the civilized man is not a difference in kind then Durkheim's definition is valid for neither.

Our second objection to Durkheim's identification of religion with the sacred is that it practically ignores the distinction between magic and religion. It is true that he distinguishes between magic and religion by the fact that religion binds together those who adhere to it while magic does not.³ But this distinction is really fruitless as far as Durkheim's researches go. He practically ignores it and regards as the characteristic mark of religion the fact that it is derived from an exterior and superior sacred group and not that it creates such a group.

We have already supported a psychological distinction between magic and religion⁴ as against a sociological one such as this of Durkheim's. The psychological distinction is based on the attitude of the worshipper rather than on the social results of his practice.

The third and final objection that we shall urge against Durkheim's theory of the identity of religion and the sacred is concerned

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1. Levy-Bruhl: How Natives Think (1926), Part I.
 2. Karpf: American Social Psychology (1932), pp. 132-133.
 3. Durkheim: The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915), pp. 42 ff. cf. supra, section 39.
 4. Vide supra, section 30, pp. 175 ff.

with the origin of the idea of the sacred in the mind of the individual.

Durkheim says, in effect, that in the effervescent social environment of the clan celebration the social mind becomes incarnate in the individual in the form of a renewed respect for and loyalty to the clan-symbol, the totem. The totem, the god, and the clan are one. What we are really face to face with here is a philosophy and psychology of education. And the crucial point at issue is whether through interaction with his physical and social environment the individual grows and develops as an individual or whether he merely shares in the processes of an exterior and superior group mind.

Here we must choose sides. We have given our reasons for rejecting the social mind; we take our stand with those who hold by the reality of the individual and his possibilities for development in accordance with his native endowment and the opportunities offered by his physical and social environment.¹

When it is said, therefore, that the totem, is the symbol for both the clan and the god of the clan, we do not draw the conclusion, as Durkheim does, that the clan and the god are one and the same thing. We say rather that the idea of the totem is the central core of a sentiment and that around it are gathered the feelings of the individual for his group and for some mysterious and respected power which others believe in and in the presence of which they walk circumspectly. There is not a single fact in Durkheim's "Elementary Forms of the Religious Life" which cannot be satisfactorily explained from this point of view.

1. Vide *supra*, Chapter II.

d. Conclusion

Our conclusion may be stated briefly: the group is not the source of the sacred, but, in the developing life of the individual, the experience of sharing common activities with other individuals is the chief means (1) by which the individual becomes aware of the discoveries that have been made with regard to the things and powers which his fellowmen regard as sacred; (2) by which the individual develops emotional dispositions (sentiments or attitudes) toward these sacred objects and powers; and (3) by which the individual forms habits of dealing with these objects and powers or of behaving in their presence.

In a sense, it is true that the group is the source of the individual's ideas, sentiments, and habits - in a word, of the individual's mind. It is true in something like the same sense that it is true to say that the individual's physical environment is the source of his body. That is to say that the environment supplies the material for our bodies, and society, which is our mental environment, supplies the larger part of the content of our minds. But each physical body, although it is modified by its chemical and physical relations with the physical environment (by eating, states of tension in work, etc.), forms itself more or less according to its own pattern. And each individual mind also forms itself according to its own pattern of interests, values, etc. It is recognized that in primitive society individual interests have small chance of expression but even where custom is most rigid not all men are alike. Thus through individual

differences changes arise in the social institutions that mould individuals and in turn are moulded by individuals. Potentiality is exclusively possessed by neither the individual nor the group. The oak is not wholly in the acorn; but it is also in the soil, and moisture, and sunlight, though not in these, either, without the acorn. Likewise the adult member of the clan is not created by the group, nor by the child without sharing the life of the group. The potentiality is in the total situation. The child brings with him the capacity to respect the sacred and society teaches him what to respect.

But from this fact we have no right to draw the conclusion that society can only teach respect for itself. In fact it is not the case that the social is always the sacred. Language is not regarded as sacred; neither are the thousand and one skills and sentiments that fill the daily life in the profane world. Yet these all come from the group. It is only the ideas, sentiments, and practices that have to do with a power that is mysterious, dangerous, uncontrollable, that the feeling of sacredness enters the mind. Thus we come back again to the primitive supernaturalism of Marett.

The group mediates the knowledge of the sacred; but it does not create it. The sacred has to do with man's relations, as he conceives them, to his total environment - not merely the individual's environment but the environment of the group as well.

Part III
Interpretation

Chapter X

CONCLUSIONS AND APPLICATIONS

41. Conclusions

Having come to the end of our study it is worth while to inquire whether the data that we have discovered may justify some conclusions regarding the following problems:

1. For the purposes of religious psychology, how is religion most adequately conceived?
2. What is the most primitive form of religion?
3. When, where, from what sources, and under what circumstances did this primitive form of religion first appear in the history of the human race?
4. What place had the individual in the origin of religion in the race?
5. What distinguishable trends are noticeable in the development of religion in the race?
6. What is the most elementary form of religion in the individual?
7. What is the source of religion in the individual?
8. What trends are noticeable in the developing religious life of the individual?

a. The Definition of Religion

In Chapter III we defined religion as consisting primarily of the activities of individuals or communities through which they seek a satisfying adjustment to a Religious Object, and secondarily, of the conserved products of those activities in the form of mental dispositions and social institutions.¹ The term Religious Object was interpreted as meaning an object which the religious person believes to be external to him and to other men and not completely to be identified with nature in its purely mechanical aspects, and upon which he believes some or all of his most precious values to depend.²

It is possible to raise the objection that this conception of the religious object is too animistic to escape the criticism which Marett directs against animism in supporting his theory of pre-animistic supernaturalism.³ It must be admitted that the terms "Determiner of Destiny" and "Religious Object" may be interpreted in such a way as to open our definition to this objection. However, no such animistic interpretation is stated or implied by the writer, but on the contrary the explicit interpretation given above is entirely in accord with Marett's theory of pre-animistic religion, or tabu-mana. It was intended in the definition of religion and throughout the report of the study which has been made to emphasize the objective element in the situation in which religious experience and behaviour take place.⁴ This objective element must be powerful, it must be to some extent mysterious and hence inescapable,

1. Vide supra, p. 93.

2. Vide supra, pp. 100-101.

3. Vide supra, pp. 169 ff.

4. Vide supra, section 25, pp. 120 ff. Cf. p. 252.

and it must at least appear to maintain for some appreciable time a directly favorable or unfavorable bearing on some important value of the person or community who is, for the time being, the religious subject. Given these qualifications the religious object may be a stone, or a storm, or a vaguely conceived supernatural power such as mana, or a spirit of almost any kind, or the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore, this conception of religion is not inconsistent with primitive supernaturalism. In fact it gives us the basis on which the origin of the concept of mana itself might possibly be explained, since the notion of mana is, presumably, an abstraction from much experience with concrete situations in which various elements seemed to have a powerful bearing on important values.

With these qualifications in mind we are ready to re-phrase our definition in somewhat simpler terms, but without changing it in any essential way, as follows: religion consists primarily of those activities of persons or communities of persons through which they seek a satisfactory relationship with a Religious Object, and secondarily of the conserved mental and social products of those activities.¹

b. The Most Primitive Form of Religion

In the light of our research it is probable that the most primitive form of religion was a community activity rather than the experience and behaviour of some individual person isolated from his group.² The evidence seems to be fairly conclusive that the individual

1. Vide supra, p. 93.

2. Vide supra, pp. 283 ff.

with his own set of values and responsibilities distinct from those of the community whose life he shared emerged rather late in the phylogenetic history of man. It therefore seems logical to suppose that the earliest form of religion that ever existed involved some sort of social community of human beings as a group.

The religious activity of such a group would conform to either one of two general types depending upon whether the welfare of the group was threatened or served by some mysterious power which man could not control and from which he could not escape. Religious activity of the first type¹ would involve the consciousness that all was not well with the community because some element of the environment, on which the group welfare partially or wholly depended, had set in motion thaumaturgic evil influences in the direction of actual or impending group disaster; and, in such a case, the community would give themselves up, in solemn assembly, to some sort of propitiatory behaviour to express their emotions of sorrow and fear in the face of present and prospective affliction and of hope for the mitigation of evil or avoidance of destruction. In religious activity of the second type² there would be the group consciousness of some extraordinary good fortune conceived of as resulting from the favorable influence of some mysterious and powerful element of the environment; and in this case the community would give themselves up to such acts of celebration as might express their emotions of elation and gratitude.

1. Cf. supra, pp. 256 ff.

2. Cf. supra, pp. 258 ff.

The most primitive form of religion, then, would be either (1) a community activity of propitiation motivated by the consciousness that the community welfare was threatened by some mysterious, uncontrollable power from which (or whom) no escape was possible, or (2) a community activity of celebration motivated by the experience of some extraordinary good fortune.

These represent, respectively, the sorrow phase and joy phase of emotion,¹ the states of tension and release, humility and exaltation. It is possible that in certain rare situations they might be connected together as integral parts of one community religious activity and such a form of religion would be as primitive as either one of its component parts considered separately. For example, a total eclipse of the sun might stimulate a community of primitive men to propitiatory activity. But, since an eclipse lasts only a few minutes, relief from the unpleasant situation would soon follow, and sorrow would be turned into joy, propitiation into celebration. In general, however, this would not be the case, but the consciousness of impending disaster would continue for a considerable length of time and relief would come so slowly, as, for example, in the advent of Spring, that it would be regarded as an entirely different experience and the result of the advent of some new influence of a beneficent type.

1. Cf. *supra*, pp. 54, 259 f.

c. The Origin of Religion in the Race

The activity of any organism depends upon both subjective and objective factors;¹ upon the state of the organism itself, and upon the influences in the organism's effective environment. Thus it is obvious that in order to understand the primitive forms of religion which we have just described it is necessary to inquire with some care into the nature of the subjective and objective factors upon which they depend.

The subjective factors upon which the most primitive form of religion would depend are the native and acquired dispositions of primitive man. That is to say that they are his instincts, sentiments, attitudes, habits. Each of these dispositions has for its object the achievement or conservation of some value and is represented in consciousness at the perceptual level as an impulse, at the ideational level as a desire.²

The objective factors are the conditions in the environment which thwart primitive man's efforts to achieve and conserve the values which operate as the goals of his impulses and desires. Or else they are conditions which facilitate far beyond his hopes the achievement and conservation of his values. Such conditions require an adjustment to the emergency which they create. And if the conditions are regarded as the result of the influence of a religious object such as we have described above, the activity of making the adjustment demanded by the circumstances is religious.

1. Vide supra, p. 6 ff.

2. Vide supra, p. 68.

Our view is, in essence, that religion in its most original and primitive form arose out of an emergency in which a community of persons found it necessary to come to terms with mysterious, powerful, inescapable forces which menaced or served the goals of their native or acquired dispositions in such extreme fashion that their habitual modes of response no longer availed to gain them satisfaction. The community life was in progress along ordinary lines when it was interrupted by the influence of some mysterious, inescapable power in such a way that the attention of the community was shifted from the matter in hand to the source of the interruption and the activity changed into an attempt to achieve a satisfactory relationship with the mysterious intervening power - such was the situation in which the most primitive form of religion must have come into being.

The values involved might have been of any kind whatever, such as food, health, security, etc. It is only necessary that they should have been regarded as of great importance.

The nature of the emergency might have been equally varied, ranging through a great number of possibilities such as famine, pestilence, an earthquake, an eclipse of the sun, a hurricane, the change of the seasons, birth, death, the discovery of an intoxicating liquid, the discovery of an oasis in the desert, the sudden appearance of game in great abundance in the vicinity, the beginning of seasonal rains, etc. The only requisite is that it must have been of sufficiently mysterious and impressive character to make impossible its attribution to ordinary influences.

The mysterious and powerful influence to which the presence of the emergency was attributed likewise might have been conceived of in one of many possible forms. Almost certainly it would be associated with and symbolized by some unusual element of the environment, or some strange event that had recently happened. Thus any strange or uncanny object or animal might easily come to be regarded as a source of mysterious power of great consequence to the primitive community and hence occupy the position of religious object in the most primitive form of religion. Whether motherhood and birth were sufficiently mysterious and impressive to stimulate the primitive community to religious activity with the mother regarded as the religious object it is difficult to say, but there is no good reason to deny that in some communities the most primitive form of religion might have developed in this way.¹ It is not impossible, either, that in some communities of primitive men a vaguely conceived, supernatural, spiritual being might have served as religious object in the most primitive form of religion.² A situation in which this might possibly have happened would be a severe thunderstorm in which members of the community were killed by lightning, while their companions were unharmed. This is a very remote possibility, however, and the most primitive form of religion might never have involved such a religious object. Likewise, it is not probable that an unattached, generalized idea of power such as mana or wakan was the religious object in the most primitive form of religion. Such an idea of mysterious, wonder-working power was certainly present and directed

1. Vide supra, p. 219 f.

2. Vide supra, section 20, esp. p. 122.

toward man or his values, but probably always objectified in something which was regarded as its source. The religious object in the most primitive form of religion was probably always concrete.

While we can give concerning the most primitive form of religion no accurate account of the values threatened, or the nature of the threatening situation, and no description of the religious object beyond the fact that it was mysterious, powerful, and directly concerned with the most precious values of primitive man, we can describe with some assurance and accuracy the subjective dispositions involved in man's response to the religious object. Where the emergency which gave rise to the most primitive form of religion was unfavorable to man's values his attitude toward the religious object would be that of awe, and would involve the dispositions of escape, observation, and self-abasement, with corresponding tendencies toward the emotions of fear, wonder, feeling small (negative self-feeling), and sorrow because of present or prospective loss.¹ Depending upon the relative strength of the several component parts this complex disposition would lead to propitiatory behaviour of various kinds. If the emergency were of a favorable kind the attitude toward the religious object would be that of gratitude, and would involve the dispositions of service (parental instinct) and self-abasement, with the corresponding tendencies toward the emotions of tenderness, feeling small (negative self-feeling), and elation because of unexpected good-fortune. And this complex disposition would lead naturally to activities of celebration.

1. Vide supra, pp. 101, 111 ff., 159, 184.

In answer to the question when and where the most primitive type of religion first appeared among men the only reply is that it appeared whenever and wherever in the developing life of man the conditions described above were fulfilled. That is to say that there was no one great beginning of religion in the race before which religion was not and after which religion forever was,¹ but religion in the primitive form described above must have originated independently in many places in the world and at many times during the racial history of man. Propitiation as a type of religious activity might have preceded celebration, but of that there is no certainty.

d. The Place of the Individual in the Racial
Origin of Religion

In its most primitive form religion was probably not the discovery of some gifted individual who in turn shared the discovery with his group, but it probably was, in the first instance, a spontaneous group activity such as we have described. This is not to deny that in the overt activities of propitiation and celebration one person might have taken the initiative. But it is to affirm that the most primitive form of religious activity was a community activity in the sense that the values involved were shared in common by a community of persons, and the religious activities were participated in by the members of the community. This does not mean that there was in operation any group mind² that was exterior and superior to the individual minds involved,

1. Cf. supra, pp. 172 ff.

2. Cf. supra, section 40b, pp. 270 ff.

but simply that the most primitive form of religion was a cooperative activity. The two possible opportunities for individual initiative would have been in identifying some element in the environment as the religious object and in taking the lead in the activities of propitiation and celebration.

e. Trends in Racial Religious Development

Activity such as we have described as the most primitive form of religion would inevitably leave its traces in the community life¹ in the form of dispositions in the members of the community to repeat the activity in subsequently encountered situations that were identical or similar. The activity being often thus repeated, the disposition would be strengthened and the activity would become established as a community rite or ceremony.

Chance or intentional variations in religious rites would inevitably occur and, if they proved to be more satisfactory than the hitherto prevailing customs, would be perpetuated. Chance variations might occur as a result (1) of differences between the situations stimulating the religious dispositions of the community members, (2) of differences between the moods of the community at different times, or (3) of contact with other communities with different practices. The stamping in of successful chance variations is due to trial and success, and is subject to the psychological laws which apply to learning at this level. By far the most significant advances in the development of

1. Vide supra, pp. 92 ff., 96 ff.

religion have not been due, however, to chance learning at the level of trial and success, but to creative learning at the higher levels of insight and reflective thought.¹ At these levels intentional variations have been introduced into the development of religion, and they have always involved the leadership of influential individuals² who have shared the results of their superior insight and creative thought with the other members of the community. Thus the great advances in the developing religious life of man have been due to the men of insight, the prophets, who knew by intuition and cried, "Thus saith the Lord," and to the men of creative thought, the philosophers and scientists, who have laboriously puzzled out some of the riddles of the universe, thus enabling men to order their lives more nearly in accordance with reality.

If we should compare a relatively primitive form of religion with a highly developed form such as Christianity we should find many great differences between them and these would serve to indicate some of the most important trends of religious development in the race. In the following summary we shall attempt such a comparison, classifying the trends of religious development under five general headings according to their relationship to the five elements of religion.

I. Trends in the development of the conception of the religious object.

1. Many religious objects → One inclusive religious object.
2. Power having direction → Person having purpose.
3. Wonder-worker, periodically active in intervention → Law-abiding, constantly active in sustaining the universe.
4. Local and transcendent → Omnipresent and immanent.
5. Limited in power → All-powerful or self-limited.
6. Imperfect and fragmentary knowledge → Perfect wisdom.
7. Arbitrary and inconsistent → Morally dependable, good.
8. The all-terrible → The all-loving.

1. Cf. supra, pp. 62 ff., 103 ff.

2. Cf. supra, pp. 277 f.

II. Trends in the developing conception of values involved in religion.

1. Material → Spiritual.
2. Immediate → Ultimate.
3. Objects of impulse (perceptual level) → Objectives of Purpose (conceptual level).
4. Recognition of intrinsic values only → Recognition of instrumental values also.

III. Trend in the development of religious emotions.

1. Disconnected awe and gratitude → Reverent devotion.

IV. Trends in the development of plans of achieving right relationship to the religious object.

1. Giving up things, sacrifice → Giving up desire, holiness.
2. Conformity with custom → Self-directing morality.
3. Fear, involving separation, taboo → Love, involving mystical union.
4. Wonder, issuing in revelation → Investigation, issuing in discovery.
5. Inactive dependence upon God → Active cooperation with God.
6. Communication through mediation of priest → Direct communication through prayer.

V. Trends in the development of the conserved products of religious activity.

1. In society:
Spontaneous, undifferentiated ceremony → Social institution with a definite program and executive officials.
2. In the individual:
Sentiment → Ideal.

f. The Most Elementary Form of Religion
in the Individual

The kind of experience and behaviour that we have described as the most primitive form of religious activity was, presumably, in the beginning, also the most elementary form of religion in the individual. In even the most primitive society today, however, it would be impossible for any normal individual to engage in religious activity of such pristine

character. His religious experience and behaviour could not be unaffected, as the most primitive form of religion must of necessity have been, by religious ideas, sentiments, and habits, previously acquired by sharing the life of the group. Consequently, there is a very great difference between the most elementary form of religion in a normal individual today and the most primitive form of religion in the race. The difference is due to the fact that the patterns of the present-day individual's religious ideas, feelings, and actions are derived, through formal or informal education, from society.

In learning a language and through informal communication with other persons a child in any society becomes acquainted in some degree with the conceptions of the religious object that are prevalent in that society. Likewise, by means of suggestion, he shares the emotional responses of others to the religious object. And, through imitation, he learns to behave as others about him behave in their religious activities. For this reason, religious experience and behaviour on their first appearance in individuals living in contemporary society may be extremely complex, or quite simple, according to the kind of religious environment in which the individuals develop them.

The most elementary form of individual religious activity in contemporary society, therefore, while conforming to the general pattern of adjustment to a religious object, differs, nevertheless, from the most primitive form of religion in the race because it always represents a considerable, and may represent a very great, social development in the concept of the religious object, the values involved, the complexity of

emotional response, and the plan of adjustment to the religious object.

g. The Origin of Religion in the Individual

We shall first call attention to two important differences between the conditions underlying the first appearance of religion in the individual member of a relatively primitive society and those underlying the beginnings of religion in the individual member of contemporary Western society, and afterwards we shall restrict ourselves to the discussion of the latter.

In a primitive tribal society where religion has undergone some development, a child is almost certain to be awakened to his first religious experience and to engage in his first religious behaviour by sharing the religious activities of his tribe. In such a case the religious experience will be largely if not wholly determined by the operation of suggestion and sympathy, and the religious behaviour by imitation.¹ In a word, the tribesman "gets" religion by sharing in its social expression. Furthermore all the persons who share in the tribal ceremonies probably "get" religion. But it is very different in contemporary Western society. Some children are awakened to religious experience and are stimulated to religious behaviour by participating in the ceremonies of worship carried on by their respective churches. But our worship is often so far removed from the experience of children that, although it is impressive, it does not actually awaken the consciousness of God's presence and the need for getting into a more

1. Cf. supra, p. 40.

satisfactory relationship with him. The more complex religion becomes the less efficient becomes traditional ceremony to generate it. Thus, while the tribal ceremony is a highly effective means of reproducing the primitive religion which it represents, the traditional ceremonies of Christian worship in the West are not nearly so efficient in reproducing the religion of which they purport to be the social expression. Of those who participate in them, therefore, many are not by them introduced to religion, or if to religion, then to religion of a very elementary sort.

A second difference between the beginnings of religion in the individual member of primitive society and in the contemporary Western individual is that while the primitive tribesman is introduced to religion by an official ceremony of the tribe, the Western individual may be introduced to religion by another individual, for example, a parent, or teacher, or friend. Or having failed of introduction by either the church or another individual he may encounter alone some situation which stimulates in him the sense of God's presence and in turn leads on to the kind of experience and behaviour which his conception of God and the fitness of the situation demand.

In contemporary Western society an individual may be awakened to his first religious experience and engage in his first religious behaviour by participating in the religious activities of some group of Christian people. In such a case the objective factors underlying the

beginnings of religion in the individual are largely social in character.¹ The consciousness of the presence of the religious object is not mediated, as in the most primitive form of religion in the race, by some great emergency in which one's psychological equilibrium is upset and one's values are threatened, but by the ideas and attitudes of one's companions, the symbols used in worship, the behaviour in which the realization of values is sought. Where the sense of the reality of God's presence is absent from the consciousness of the more experienced participants the religious activity degenerates to empty formality and becomes ineffective in awakening religious experience in those who are strangers to religion. This, of course, is not to affirm that such activities or observances are unimportant. They may indeed mediate a fine appreciation of some social values. But the point to be insisted upon is that unless they stimulate in consciousness the sense of God's presence and the need for a more satisfactory relationship with him they are not genuine religious observances and they cannot serve to introduce religiously inexperienced persons to religion.

In groups of Christian people the religious activities, which we have just described as possible objective factors in the beginnings of religion in individual members of contemporary Western society, may take many forms. One form, following the priestly tradition, may consist mainly in ritualistic observances of worship. Or another form may exalt the prophetic function of preaching. Or a third may be principally made up of emotional excitement. Or a fourth may emphasize the

1. Cf. supra, pp. 282-284.

obligations of Christianity with respect to social service. But, whatever the program of adjustment to the religious object may be, the situation in which a group attempts to carry out that program furnishes the objective factors which may stimulate the beginnings of religion in a religiously inexperienced member of the group.

The subjective factors in the beginning of religion in an individual are the native tendencies, the sentiments, the ideals, the knowledges, and the habits - in a word, the whole mental equipment, native and acquired - of the person in whom it begins. But it is possible to be much more specific than this. We shall therefore proceed, in more analytic fashion, to point out, (1) the principal subjective factors which set the stage, as it were, upon which religious experience and behaviour appear for the first time, and (2) the most important subjective factors that are involved in the actual religious experience and behaviour themselves. Of the former, certain factors, principally cognitive in character, are partly derived from past experience, and partly mediated by the situation presented to consciousness at the time. These may be indicated as follows: (1) conception and appreciation of values (this may involve sentiments, ideals and purposes); (2) conception of the nature of the religious object, and of his attitude toward the worshiper and the worshiper's values; and (3) conception of some plan or means by which the worshiper may effect a more satisfactory relationship with the religious object.¹ In addition to these cognitive factors, certain other subjective factors of a preparatory kind are operative in setting the stage for the appearance of religion. We refer to critical

1. Cf. *supra*, pp. 93-94.

insight and the tendencies of suggestion, sympathy, and imitation. It is by means of these that the cognitive factors just mentioned are in part mediated by the situation present in consciousness at the time of the religious awakening.

The subjective factors that are involved in the actual religious experience and behaviour are those dispositions which make up awe, humility, exaltation, gratitude, love, and dedication. These may be blended in many ways, according to the way in which God's character and religious values are interpreted, thus making possible among different Christian groups an almost infinite variety of results.¹ In Christian worship at its best, however, all these elements are generally to be found harmoniously organized and succeeding one another according to the following order of experience and behaviour:

(1) the consciousness of God's presence (awe); (2) the sense of man's shortcoming and spiritual inadequacy (humility); (3) the sense of God's forgiveness and renewal of man; (4) the feeling of gratitude and joyous exaltation in God's favor; (5) enlightenment regarding God's will; (6) a more complete dedication of the self to the will of God; (7) conduct in accordance with the foregoing experience.

Many persons are not awakened to their first religious experience and behaviour by participation in the religious activities of some group of Christian people, however, but by some personal crisis which demands an adjustment of the religious kind. The sudden death

1. Cf. supra, p. 61.

of a loved one may serve as an example. The crisis may be faced alone or with a friend. The subjective and objective factors would be about the same in either case. The objective factor would be the total emergency situation. The subjective factors would be different from those analyzed above in two principal ways: (1) critical insight would probably become relatively more important while sympathy, suggestion, and imitation would play relatively minor roles; (2) the sense of loss and profound sorrow would color the whole of one's experience. But if the crisis stimulated the beginnings of real Christian religious experience and behaviour some organization of the subjective elements which we have discussed above would be inevitable.

And these same subjective factors, at whatever level of development they may have attained, are involved in the introduction of a small child to religion by the mother who teaches him to pray, and in the awakening of religion in some older person by a severe moral conflict that results in conversion.

h. Trends in Individual Religious Development

Religious experience and behaviour leave their traces in the individual in the form of mental dispositions which make it easier for subsequent similar situations to awaken in the individual similar experience and behaviour. The religious disposition in its simplest form is the rudimentary sentiment¹ which is the conserved product of the individual's first religious activity. Such a rudimentary sentiment

1. Cf. supra, section 21, pp. 96 ff.

develops in strength by being repeatedly activated under favorable conditions and ensuing in satisfactory results, i.e., according to the laws of learning. It grows in quality by the reinterpretation of its ideational core, the reorganization of its associated emotions, and the redirection of its conative impulses. That is to say that it develops in quality by ceasing to be merely a sentiment and becoming, through the guidance of conscious intelligence and choice, an ideal,¹ having at its command the cognitive resourcefulness, the emotional richness, and the conative power of the whole organized self.

42. Applications

Concerning the study which we have now completed there remains only the necessity of setting forth in the briefest manner its significance for the psychology of religion and for the theory of religious education.

a. Religious Origins and the Psychology of Religion

The problem of religious origins cannot be studied in isolation because any satisfactory theory of the origin of religion must rest upon a satisfactory conception of religion and must serve as the basis of a satisfactory theory of religious development. Taken together these problems make up no inconsiderable part of the

1. Cf. supra, section 22, pp. 103 ff.

psychology of religion. Thus, if our conclusions are sound, we may justly lay claim to modest contributions toward the solution of the following problems in religious psychology: (1) the psychological conception of religion; (2) the origin of religion in the race; (3) the origin of religion in the individual; (4) the development of religion in the race; (5) the development of religion in the individual. Of course, we have hardly dealt even in the most general way with some of the specific problems of religious psychology, such as the psychology of the various Christian beliefs and the psychology of mysticism, but we believe that the point of view which has been developed would prove to be as fruitful in illuminating these problems as it has been in the study of the problems of religious origins and development.

b. Religious Origins and Religious Education

If our emphasis on the objectivity of the religious object is sound, and if we are right in defining the essence of religion as the activity of seeking a satisfactory relationship with the religious object, then the religious education of the young will consist in preparing them for this activity and arranging their environment in such fashion as is most likely to stimulate its occurrence. In Christian education this means: (1) progressive and continuous training in Christian conceptions (a) of values, (b) of God, (c) of the way in which one finds the most satisfactory relationship with God; (2) providing the opportunity for children to share in Christian worship and Christian service of a kind that is meaningful to persons of their

age and stage of development; (3) providing wise counselors for growing children so that when the children are baffled by problems beyond their powers they may appeal to their counselors for Christian guidance; and (4) encouraging older children gradually to assume responsibility for and control of their own religious development.

APPENDIX I

ANIMISM

Since a part of Chapter VI (section 30) of the present work is devoted to the discussion of pre-animistic religion and includes a criticism of Dr. Edward B. Tylor's theory of animism as the earliest form of religion, it is desirable to add here a more complete statement of Dr. Tylor's views than was possible in the seventh chapter.

Animism is defined by Tylor as "the belief in Spiritual Beings."¹ He says that animism, so understood, embodies "the very essence of Spiritualistic as opposed to Materialistic philosophy,"² and has the same meaning as Spiritualism in its wider acceptation.³

The two great dogmas of animism (concerning souls and spirits) are stated by Tylor as follows:

Animism divides into two great dogmas, forming parts of one consistent doctrine; first, concerning souls of individual creatures, capable of continued existence after the death or destruction of the body; second, concerning other spirits, upward to the rank of powerful deities. Spiritual beings are held to affect or control the events of the material world, and man's life here and hereafter; and it being considered that they hold intercourse with men, and receive pleasure or displeasure from human actions, the belief in their existence leads naturally, and it might almost be said inevitably, sooner or later to active reverence and propitiation.⁴

As to origins, the notion of souls seems to grow out of man's interest in two groups of biological problems, namely, (1) what is it

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1. Tylor: Primitive Culture (1871), Vol. I, p. 424.
 2. Ibid., p. 425.
 3. Ibid., p. 426.
 4. Ibid., pp. 426-427.

that makes the difference between a living body and a dead one? and (2) what are those human shapes which appear in dreams and visions? In answer to these questions "the ancient savage philosophers" probably, as a first step, concluded that man has belonging to him a life and a phantom, and, as a second step, combined the life and the phantom into the notion of a ghost-soul.¹ This ghost-soul Tylor defines as follows:

It is a thin unsubstantial human image, in its nature a sort of vapour, film, or shadow; the cause of life and thought in the individual it animates; independently possessing the personal consciousness and volition of its corporeal owner, past or present; capable of leaving the body far behind, to flash swiftly from place to place; mostly impalpable and invisible, yet also manifesting physical power, and especially appearing to men waking or asleep as a phantasm separate from the body which bears its likeness; continuing to exist and appear to men after the death of that body; able to enter into, possess, and act in the bodies of other men, of animals, and even of things.²

And, having derived the notion of soul from its prototypes the dream-image and trance-image, primitive man, reasoning by analogy, proceeded not only to attribute souls to animals, plants and things, but also to people his world with unembodied spirits.

It seems as though the conception of a human soul, when once attained by man, served as a type or model on which he framed not only his ideas of other souls of lower grade, but also his ideas of spiritual beings in general, from the tiniest elf that sports in the long grass up to the heavenly Creator and Ruler of the world, the Great Spirit.³

1. Op. cit., p. 428.

2. Op. cit., p. 429.

3. Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 110.

APPENDIX II

MAGIC, MANA, AND TABOO

A Critical Comparison of the Views of Frazer and Marett

In "The Golden Bough" Dr. J. G. Frazer expresses the view that magic and religion are absolutely different and that an age of magic everywhere antedated an age of religion. In opposition to this view Dr. R. R. Marett maintains that magic and religion were both differentiated out of a common plasm, supernaturalism, and that under certain circumstances magic may develop into religion.

Dr. Frazer regards taboo as negative magic. Marett believes that taboo (tabu) is rightly regarded as negative mana and that tabu and mana, regarded as negative and positive supernaturalism, compose the common plasm of crude beliefs about the awful and occult out of which both magic and religion were differentiated.

Dr. Frazer's view of magic may be stated briefly as follows: Magic is fundamentally based on the laws of association of ideas, namely, the law of similarity and the law of contact. Charms based on the law of similarity are called homoeopathic or imitative magic; those based on the law of contact, contagious magic.¹ But although these laws underlie the origin and development of magic the primitive magician knows magic only on its practical side; "he never analyzes the processes on which his practice is based, never reflects on the abstract principles involved in his actions."² For him magic is always an art, never a

1. The Golden Bough (1911), Vol. I, p. 52.

2. Ibid., p. 53.

science. As an art practical magic takes two forms, positive magic or sorcery and negative magic or taboo.¹ Both sorcery and taboo follow the sympathetic principle, whereby things are assumed to act on each other at a distance through a secret sympathy,² and each may accordingly be subdivided into homoeopathic and contagious types of magic practice. The fatal flaw of magic lies in its mistaken application of the "two great fundamental laws of thought, namely, the association of ideas by similarity and the association of ideas by contiguity in space and time."³ Legitimately applied they yield science; illegitimately applied they yield magic, the bastard sister of science. The main differences between magic and religion are: (1) magic, like science, assumes the uniformity of nature⁴ while religion assumes the order of nature to be elastic and variable;⁵ (2) magic aims to control⁶ while religion seeks to propitiate;⁷ (3) magic regards nature as impersonal,⁸ while religion deals with superhuman personal agencies or spirits.⁹ An age of religion has everywhere been preceded by an age of magic when religion was not¹⁰ and the change from magic to religion was brought about by the realization on the part of the superior intelligences of the failure of magic and through the substitution for it of a faith in higher powers upon whom man is dependent, and whom he is bound to reverence and propitiate.¹¹

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1. Op. cit., p. 113.
 2. Op. cit., p. 54.
 3. Op. cit., pp. 221-222.
 4. Op. cit., pp. 220-221.
 5. Op. cit., p. 224.
 6. Op. cit., p. 225.
 7. Op. cit., p. 222.
 8. Op. cit., p. 220.
 9. Op. cit., pp. 222 ff.
 10. Op. cit., pp. 234, 237.
 11. Op. cit., pp. 237 ff.

If the great world went on its way without the help of him (the primitive philosopher) or his fellows, it must surely be because there were other beings, like himself, but far stronger, who, unseen themselves, directed its course and brought about all the varied series of events which he had hitherto believed to be dependent on his own magic..... To these mighty beings, whose handiwork he traced in all the gorgeous and varied pageantry of nature, man now addressed himself, humbly confessing his dependence on their invisible power, and beseeching them of their mercy to furnish him with all good things, to defend him from perils and dangers by which our mortal life is compassed about on every hand, and finally to bring his immortal spirit, freed from the burden of the body, to some happier world, beyond the reach of pain and sorrow, where he might rest with them and with the spirits of good men in joy and felicity forever.¹

When one reads such words as these (and they are typical of Frazer's treatment) one is not surprised that the objection is made to his account of magic and religion that it is too intellectualistic. It would seem that Marett is nearer the truth when he says that man does not think out his religion but dances it out instead. That is to say, we must take some account of the emotional factor in religious origins. Of Frazer's theory Marett says:

Pure ratiocination seems to be credited with an effectiveness without parallel in early culture. Almost as well say that, when man found he could not make big enough bags with the throwing stick he sat down and excogitated the bow-and-arrow.²

Again, it is only to be expected that Marett might justly object to Frazer's theory of the associationalist origin of magic. This type of psychology has so long been discredited among scientists the world over that no one today would think of accepting the view

1. Op. cit., pp. 237-238.

2. Marett: Threshold of Religion (1914), p. 34.

that magic is deducible from the so-called "laws of association." Those who inquire into the origin either of magic or of religion will do well to follow Marett's working principle of expecting theory to grow out of practice and not the other way about.¹

Besides these objections, Marett points out that while Frazer's classification of magic is convenient for analysis it does not directly subserve genesis, because certain types of magic that do not fit into Frazer's classification are nevertheless of connate psychological origin with "imitative" and "contagious" magical practices.²

Furthermore, mere imitativeness, for example, is not magic but the spell or uttered "must" tends to embody the very heart and soul of the magical transaction.³ Since the spell involves an occult projection of will that somehow finds its way to another will and dominates it, magic is seen to be not the primitive equivalent of natural science, as Frazer claims. Magic is not natural science but occult science;⁴ and the efficacy of magic is due not to mechanical causation but to the operation of non-mechanical power - a psychic force, a manifestation of personal agency, mana.⁵

The projective act which is the heart of magic is by the operator perceived to be no ordinary act of willing but the process is manifestly occult and super-normal. Now the "historical genesis of religion should be sought in the awe caused in man's mind by the

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1. Marett: Threshold of Religion (1914), p. 39.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid., pp. 47-54.
 4. Ibid., p. 49.
 5. Ibid., p. 50.

perception of the supernatural, that is, supernormal, as it occurs within him and about him."¹ Of course the occult as revealed in magic is not the only form of supernatural manifestation known to man, but magical occultism colors primitive supernaturalism to a marked extent by its contribution of the notion of mana, which on its inner side is just this seemingly mysterious power of putting the magical act through, and which is attributed by way of explanation to supernatural agencies of every kind. In this way magic readily passes into religion since supernaturalism provides a raw material common to them both.²

Again, the mana may be transferred from its true vehicle, the spell, to the symbol or instrument and the latter personified and deified. And concurrently with this process of personification and deification of the instrument the spell evolves into prayer.³

Finally, the end that is ordinarily ordered to accommodate itself to the desire prefigured in the magical act may be personified and supplicated instead of commanded.⁴

We may conclude, then, that "because it equally belongs to the sphere of the occult and supernatural,⁵ and because it tends to be conceived as an affair between wills, magic, though distinct, has

1. Op. cit., p. 58.

2. Op. cit., pp. 54-62.

3. Op. cit., pp. 63-68.

4. Op. cit., pp. 68-71.

5. Cf. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923). "The point at issue is not by means of what class of powers the magical effect was produced....but by means of what quality or character in the powers.... The quality can be only suggested through that unique element of feeling, the feeling of 'uncanniness,' of which we have already spoken, whose positive content cannot be defined conceptually, and can only be indicated by that mental response to it which we called 'shuddering'." pp. 122-123.

something in common with religion, so that interpenetration and trans-
fusion are possible between them."¹

We now turn to the brief examination of the views of Frazer and Marett regarding the nature of taboo.

Seeing that Frazer, as we have already shown, regards taboo as negative magic and subject to the sympathetic principle of association by similarity and contiguity, the same psychological objections may be rightly urged against his treatment of taboo as have been raised against his discussion of magic. As against Frazer's doctrine of taboo as a system of abstinences based on the avoidance of certain imaginary evil consequences incorrectly calculated on the sympathetic principle, Marett advances the view that taboo implicates a feeling of the supernatural and mysterious, which as such abounds in indefinite and incalculable effects. Even when the penalty is apparently determinate and specific, which is by no means always the case, an infinite plus of awfulness will be found, on closer examination, to attach to it.

Taboo, on my view, belongs, and belongs wholly, to the sphere of the magico-religious (i.e., the supernatural). Within that sphere, I venture to assert, man always feels himself to be in contact with powers whose modes of action transcend the ordinary and calculable. Though he does not on that account desist from attempting to exploit these powers, yet it is with no assurance of limited liability that he enters on the undertaking. In short, dealings with whatever has mystic power are conducted at an infinite risk; and taboo but embodies the resolution to take no unnecessary risks of this indefinite kind.²

1. Marett: *op. cit.*, p. 30.
2. *Op. cit.*, p. 79.

Strengthening his argument with many illustrations, Marett argues convincingly that taboo is a mystic affair and shows the failure of the sympathetic principle.¹ To break a taboo is to set in motion against oneself mana or mystic wonder-working power in one form or another; but the particular form it will take remains mysterious and incalculable. The taboo on contact with women, strangers and kings is not due to the fear of the transmission of weakness, contagious from without, or kingliness, respectively, but because these persons have mana. "Thus instead of terming taboo a negative magic, it would be truer to describe it as a negative mana."²

1. Marett: *op. cit.*, Ch. III.
2. *Op. cit.*, p. 74.

APPENDIX III

PSYCHOANALYSIS

A Brief Sketch of Freud's Psychological Theory

In the present work we have been interested primarily in theories of the origin of religion. But since there are important differences between the opinions of two leaders of the psychoanalytic school (Freud and Jung) regarding this problem and since these differences of opinion are traceable to fundamental differences between them in psychological theory it is desirable to add supplements treating of their respective theories. In the present essay we shall attempt to sketch Freud's general psychological theory as it bears on his theory of religious origins. Criticism is reserved for the main body of the work, Chapter VII.

Psychoanalytic theory began to take its present form as a result of investigations into hysteria made by Dr. Josef Breuer and Dr. Sigmund Freud of Vienna. They found that some abnormal symptoms could be cured by reviving by means of hypnosis emotionally colored memories of a painful character which were generally inaccessible to the normal waking self. This fact suggests several theories which later psychoanalytic investigations have supported and elaborated. It suggests that possibly no experience is ever forgotten but that all of a person's experiences are preserved in memory even though they may

be temporarily or permanently inaccessible to consciousness except by the use of a special method of revival (the unconscious). It suggests that experiences may be and often are forgotten because of their painful character (repression, the pleasure principle). It suggests that an emotionally-toned memory (complex) may express itself unknown to and independent of the conscious self through the surrogate form of symptoms (resistance, censor). And it suggests that such abnormal symptoms may be cured by bringing into consciousness the emotionally-toned ideas which give rise to them and the redirection of their energy into normal and fruitful channels (transference, sublimation, re-education).

Further investigations by Freud revealed the possibility of reviving forgotten experiences without resorting to hypnosis. If the patient was led to assume a non-critical attitude and freely speak whatever came to his mind, holding nothing back, it was found that again and again in the course of a long conversation regarding his life and conditions he would make indirect references to these emotional experiences which formed the basis of his disturbing symptoms. To this method of revival is given the name free association. The results of the method suggest that the affective element (later, psychic energy, libido) of an emotionally-toned, painful memory (complex) because of its strong tendency to enforce attention from consciousness compels these revelations while the tendency of the self to deny entrance of painful ideas into consciousness (resistance) constrains these revelations to take the form of indirect allusions.

Taking a hint from Charcot, Freud evidently looked for, and certainly believed that he found, the repressed complexes of his hysterical patients to have an erotic or sexual basis. It was somewhat surprising, however, to find that these repressed complexes generally arose out of experiences which could be dated in very early childhood. This fact suggested that, contrary to generally accepted theory, the behaviour of children even in their early years is motivated and characterized to a remarkable extent by the sexual motive. It also pointed to the possibility of an infantile sexual trauma of sufficiently painful character to account for its repression and the formation of the complex.

The theory of the infantile sexual trauma was later given up in favor of the more general theory of infantilism of sexuality itself and it was conjectured that the sexual traumas referred to early childhood by the patient were not actual occurrences but existed only in the phantasies of the patient. These interesting inductions stimulated Freud to make a more thorough investigation into the nature of the child's sexuality the results of which he published under the title of, "Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex."¹ In his investigations Freud found an amazing variety of infantile activities which although not comparable to the expressions of normal adult sexuality he nevertheless regarded as essentially sexual in character and because in many ways they resembled perversions found in abnormal adults he sometimes refers to them under the collective name of the "polymorphous perverse."

1. Tr. A. A. Brill (1930).

It should be noted here that it is not possible to understand Freud unless one keeps in mind his peculiar, and many think unfair, usage of the word sex. He makes no essential distinction between sexuality and love. Whatever we love or love to do is loved or enjoyed because of the operation of the sexual motive. All tender feelings and emotions, all sensuous and spontaneous pleasure, have an erotic origin. Sexual character is ascribed to every experience of which these form even but a component part. In fact it is a fundamental assumption of Freud's that all activity is motivated from within, and in his earlier works he recognizes just two types of motivation, namely, the self-instincts, which he calls ego, and the sexual instincts, to which he gives the name libido. This primary polarity does not satisfy his later speculative tendencies, however, and apparently for two reasons: the self can and often does become the object of love as in narcissism, and it does not account for death. In his later works, therefore, Freud enlarges the libido conception by including in it the self-preserving instincts and in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle"¹ rechristens this expanded conception, giving it the name "Eros, the all-sustaining." He then gives up the dualistic polarity of ego and libido as a comprehensive conception of human motivation in favor of even a sharper dualistic conception of life-instinct (eros) and death-instinct. It is not to be understood, however, that the life-instinct has lost its essential character of sexuality. Nor is it to be supposed that Freud has given up the fundamental dualism of ego and libido when these concepts are employed in the properly restricted fields of their application.

1. Tr. C. J. M. Hubback (1922).

Libido in the service of reproduction is only one form of sexuality, and a very extensively developed form at that. There are many more primitive forms (sucking is the most primitive) and it is possible for some components of libido to be arrested in an early stage of development, while others work themselves out to completion. This arrest of a partial impulse in an early stage of development is called a fixation. It is also possible for even those components which have achieved a high degree of progress to turn backward to earlier stages. This second danger of development by stages is called regression.

When libido is attached to an idea and is expelled from consciousness through repression or when through repression libido is denied entrance into consciousness, such frustrated motive being guided by unconscious psychological processes tends to find expression by means of phantasies, dreams, or irrational activities called symptoms.

The most important of such repressed complexes is called by Freud the Oedipus complex, after the hero of Greek tragedy who was destined by fate to kill his father and marry his mother. Freud contends that infantile sexuality generates the incestuous desire in the infant son to displace the father in the affections of the mother, or, more crudely, to murder the father and take the mother to wife. Freud recognizes the Oedipus complex as the nuclear complex of every neurosis and it is also from this surprising psychological source that he derives not only art and philosophy but morality and religion as well.

The extreme importance of the Oedipus complex in Freud's theory can be seen from the following summary of his views on the unconscious. In his early works he assumes a polarity between the conscious and unconscious, which was practically parallel with the polaristic conception of ego and libido. But that the ego was at least partly unconscious became evident from the observation that, while resistance was a function of ego, patients undergoing analysis were unconscious of their resistances. Thus the contrast between conscious and unconscious was seen to be an antithesis between what may be called the surface of the psyche which is in touch with the environment and the interior of the psyche which has no direct contact with the environment. To the interior depths of the psyche is now given the name the it or id while the ego, though it has developed out of the id and so far as it is unconscious still remains merged with it, is primarily conceived as comprising the surface of the psyche which is in touch with the environment. The id includes the underlying motives (life-instincts and death-instincts) of all activity whatsoever. Whenever these motives become conscious they take the form of particular desires, and when for any reason they are repressed by the ego they return to the id. The ego is the mediating agent of adjustment between the id and the world. Its function is to initiate such changes in the environment as will release the instinctive drives of the id in a pleasurable manner and, where that is not possible, to control the id in compliance with the world's demands. The id is governed by the pleasure principle and the ego by the reality principle. The ego, very weak at first, is often thwarted in its efforts to carry

out the urges arising out of the id. But its defeats are the source of its progress for when the ego is forced to give up some love-object it identifies itself with the preserved image of that object and thus achieves its organization and adjustment to reality by appropriating the character of what it has to renounce. The id remains forever primitive and unorganized.

One important fact does not seem to fit very well into this scheme. It is the extreme sense of guilt felt by many of the psychoanalyst's patients. This sense of guilt suggests some sort of psychological dictator above the ego that issues commands and establishes prohibitions. Such an entity would correspond roughly to what we generally call conscience. Freud assumes the existence of this governing principle and to it gives the name super-ego or ego-ideal. Consistently with his fundamental assumption of unconscious motivation of all activity Freud holds that these categorical imperatives are not derived by the super-ego from observation and judgment of the environment but that they issue from the inscrutable interior depths of the psyche. They are derived from the id and its internal conflicts. Unlike the ego which is developed to some extent in animals by their contest with environment, the super-ego is to be found only in man. As might be expected of a tendency of recent phylogenetic origin only its archaic rudiments are inherited. And, again in contrast with the ego, its individual development is the outcome not of a contest with environment but of a prolonged human infancy and childhood with the consequent delay and frustration which the libido must undergo in its

progress from infantile sexual forms to its proper function in adult sexual life of motivating reproductive activities.

From this point it may be well to glance once more at the concept of the Oedipus complex. The male infant's libido attaches itself to the mother and receives encouragement for a time until weaning, correction and punishment bring on difficulties. By this time, however, the child will have become attached to the father also so that he now regularly identifies himself with the father, takes the father as an ideal, and seeks in all things to imitate him. But now he finds that he cannot and must not do everything which the father does. Particularly he must not love the mother as his father does. Thus the father comes to be at one and the same time both adored ideal and hated rival, and the son, denied his love-object and ravaged by ambivalent and contradictory emotions with respect to his father, passes through the fires of terrible inner conflict. Freud thinks this conflict generally comes to a head about the fourth or fifth year, when the libido having passed through several infantile stages becomes concentrated on the genital organs. Now in the face of stern opposition from both parents the only course left open to him is renouncement and repression. This he heroically accomplishes by a more complete identification with the father in which his desire to be like his father is strengthened while at the same time he accepts as his own the prohibition not to slay the father nor covet the father's wife, i.e., his mother. These three laws, identification

with the father, and the prohibitions against patricide and incest, adopted by the boy are the core of his super-ego.

This very simple scheme is immensely complicated by the introduction of the notion of the bisexuality of the child. Freud believes that the boy's libido may choose the father as love object along with the mother. In this case the mother becomes to some extent the ideal and rival and has a part to play in the super-ego. It may and sometimes does turn out that the boy's identification with the mother is stronger than his identification with the father. Wherever this happens his character develops a feminine quality.

With suitable substitutions the same diagram may be used to show the development of the Electra complex and the super-ego in female children.

APPENDIX IV

THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS

Some Important Differences Between the General Theories
of Freud and Jung

Another leader of the psychoanalytic movement, Dr. C. G. Jung, head of the Zurich school, has given a very different account of the origin of religion from that advocated by Freud. The differences between the views of these two men are rooted in fundamental differences in psychological theory. In Appendix III we have sketched Freud's general psychological theory. In the present essay we shall confine ourselves to the statement of some important differences between the general psychological views of Freud and Jung.

The first of these important differences between the psychological theories of Jung and Freud concerns the conception of the libido. Libido as a dynamic concept denoting the perceived manifestations of "psychic energy" is accepted by both Freud and Jung. And although Freud uses the term "instinct" along with the term "libido" he confines himself exclusively to sexuality, as we have shown, and we regard Jung's statement that "the sexual definition of energy as a specific instinctive force is quite sufficient for his purpose,"¹ is quite justified. Jung, however, is unwilling to

1. Jung: Contributions to Analytical Psychology, p. 31.

define libido exclusively in terms of sexuality.

In general psychological theory....it is impossible to use sexuality, that is, one specific instinct, as an explanatory concept, since psychical energy-transformation is not merely a matter of sexual dynamics.¹

In fact, Jung not only refuses to describe psychic energy, which is the fundamental concept in his dynamic theory of mind, as sexual in character but ascribes to it no quality whatever.² He regards it as only quantitative like the concept of energy in physics. It is merely energy, not force, nor purpose. But he realizes that its perceived manifestations will always have direction, i.e., they will be regarded as forces. And to these forces or manifestations he gives the inclusive name of libido.

Since the applied theory of energy immediately becomes hypostasized on perceptual grounds into the forces of the mind (instincts, affects, and other dynamic processes), the perceived manifestation of psychic energy is in my opinion excellently characterized by the word 'libido'; inasmuch as similar perceptions (Anschauungen) have always made use of like terms, as, for example, Schopenhauer's 'will', the horme (ὁρμή) of Aristotle, the eros ('hate' and 'love') of the elements, or the élan vital of Bergson.³

A second divergence of Jung's psychological theory from that of Freud follows logically from the first; he rejects the dogma of infantile sexuality.⁴ In those manifestations of libido in childhood to which Freud gives the name of "polymorphous perverse" Jung

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1. Jung: Contributions to Analytical Psychology, pp. 31-32.
 2. Jung: Psychological Types, pp. 571-572.
 3. Jung: Contributions to Analytical Psychology, p. 32.
 4. Ibid., pp. 339-340.

sees only the forerunners of later developed sexuality.¹ He divides the life of the individual human being into three stages. The pre-sexual stage of the child extends from birth to the third or fourth year; the pre-pubertal stage next ensues extending to puberty; and at puberty the stage of maturity begins. During the first stage libido is occupied chiefly in the function of nutrition and gradually moves from exclusive service in this function into new avenues which successively open up until the final appearance of the sexual function at puberty.² If libido is retarded or arrested in any stage of its manifestation a "fixation" may result which leads to a neurosis or at least to a weakness of character.

One of the most important of these childish manifestations of the libido takes the form of phantasy-making by which the child can create a world that yields the satisfaction and enjoyment which the real world denies.³ But normally, too, he passes out of this stage into maturity where the libido is fully directed toward the adaptation to reality.

But it often happens that this phase of phantasy-making is not relinquished, so that when, in later life, difficulty is encountered by such retarded persons, satisfaction is sought in a world of phantasy rather than in successful adjustment to the actual situation which is being inadequately faced. This condition is called "introversion." When libido is introverted it is concerned with the past and its reminiscences.

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1. Contributions to Analytical Psychology, p. 58.
 2. Psychology of the Unconscious, pp. 148-149.
 3. Ibid., pp. 21-25.

Of all the past influences which introverted libido utilizes in the creation of phantasy the most powerful and important is that of the parents. In the explanation of their influence upon the child's life we come upon a third important difference between the views of Freud and Jung. Unlike Freud who insists that an emotional tie with the real parents (the Oedipus complex) is all-powerful in the developing life of the individual, Jung holds that not the real parents but only a subjective and distorted image (imago) of them and of actual past situations concerning them forms the center of man's phantasy-creating activities.¹ Consequently Jung sees in Freud's "Oedipus complex" only a symbol for (1) the childish longing to revert to the love and protection of the parents, and (2) the conflict which this craving evokes. The jealousy so often exhibited regarding the mother is at first connected only with his dependence upon her as the source of food, of comfort, and of protection. It is only with the development of the sexual powers that the child's devotion to the mother (or, in the case of girls, to the father) takes on sexual characteristics.

Concomitantly with the attainment of maturity the child is normally freed more or less gradually from domination by and dependence upon the parents and achieves independence both in governing his life and in making his way in the world. But this is not done without severe inner conflict.² His attempt to achieve an inde-

1. Psychology of the Unconscious, pp. 335-336. Cf. also p. 463.

2. Ibid., p. 196.

pendent existence in the world of reality is not without its difficulties, and, rather than face them, he is often sorely tempted to retreat to his former state of dependence upon his parents. This condition sets the stage for the severest of subjective struggles where one's budding independent self is in mortal conflict with one's infantile dependent self and where only the sacrifice of the latter makes possible the life of the former.¹ This struggle often gives rise to the unconscious phantasy of self-sacrifice which symbolizes the sacrifice of childish tendencies (or self) in order to free libido for the fulfilment of the mature self in the real world.²

Jung suggests that there is a parallel between the phantastical, mythological thinking of antiquity and the similar thinking of children.³ Contrasting directed thinking which gives rise to science with phantastical thinking which creates dreams and myths, he shows how the former is a recent modern acquisition of mankind while the latter represents the immature soul life of the people. Ontogenesis corresponds to phylogenesis in psychology as well as in biology.⁴ Not satisfied with demonstrating a rough correspondence between the psychological development of the individual and the sane life of the race, however, Jung insists that the unconscious of the present-day man coins its symbols as was done in the most remote past.⁵

Here we come upon a fourth difference between the psychology of Jung and Freud which it is necessary for us to recognize. Freud

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1. Psychology of the Unconscious, pp. 390-391.
 2. Ibid., pp. 478-479.
 3. Ibid., p. 27.
 4. Ibid., p. 28.
 5. Ibid., p. 202.

describes the psyche as including the conscious, the foreconscious or preconscious, and the unconscious. Jung distinguishes three mental levels: consciousness, the personal unconscious, and the collective unconscious. Freud and Jung agree in defining consciousness as awareness. Jung's concept of the personal unconscious, however, includes all that Freud means by the foreconscious with some considerable additions.

The personal unconscious consists of all those contents that have become unconscious, either because, their intensity being lost, they were forgotten, or because consciousness has been withdrawn from them, i.e., so-called repression. Finally, this layer contains those elements - partly sense perceptions - which on account of too little intensity have never reached consciousness, and yet in some way have gained access into the psyche.¹

The subliminal impressions indicated above are not taken account of by Freud, while material repressed from consciousness, which is here identified by Jung with the personal unconscious, is regarded by Freud as belonging not to the foreconscious but to the unconscious. So with one slight exception we may say with Northridge² that

Jung's personal unconscious, therefore, may be said to contain (1) all that is involved in the Freudian fore-conscious; (2) all that is involved in the Freudian unconscious.

Our exception has to do with the instincts, and we shall speak of it again in our discussion of Jung's conception of the collective unconscious. He says:³

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1. Contributions to Analytical Psychology, p. 110.
 2. Northridge: Modern Theories of the Unconscious (1924), p. 144.
 3. Contributions to Analytical Psychology, p. 110.

The collective unconscious, being an inheritance of the possibilities of ideas, is not individual but generally human, generally animal even, and represents the real foundations of the individual soul.

This whole psychic organism corresponds exactly to the body, which, though constantly showing individual variation, is none the less in all essential features the general human body, which in its development and structure still preserves those elements that connect it with invertebrate animals and finally with protozoa. Theoretically it should be possible to shell out of the collective unconscious not only the psychology of the worm, but even that of the individual cell.

The collective unconscious, therefore, contains primordial ways of acting, which is the way he defines instincts, and primordial ways of thinking, i.e., primordial images, archetypes.

Whether this represents an essential departure from Freud's views is not clear from the literature - not nearly so clear as Northridge indicates. Freud certainly speaks of instincts along with libido and in "Totem and Taboo" he bases his whole conclusion on the assumption of a sort of racial memory as we pointed out in our discussion of that volume.¹ Fortunately, however, a conclusion on this question is not necessary for our investigation and we shall pass on with the observation that at least it is to Jung and not to Freud that we must go for an explanation and development of the concept of the collective unconscious.

It is the notion of archetypes or primordial images that concerns us most in Jung's theory of the collective unconscious.

1. Vide supra, section 33, c.

Archetypes are symbolical ways of apprehending objects or of visualizing situations and as such are part of the general inheritance of men from their most remote ancestors.

The primordial image or archetype is a figure, whether it be a daemon, man, or process, that repeats itself in the course of history wherever creative phantasy is freely manifested. Essentially, therefore, it is a mythological figure. If we subject these images to a closer investigation, we discover them to be the formulated resultants of countless typical experiences of our ancestors. They are, as it were, the psychic residua of numberless experiences of the same type. They depict millions of individual experiences in the average, presenting a kind of picture of the psychic life distributed and projected into the manifold shapes of the mythological pandemonium.¹

I term the image primordial when it possesses an archaic character. I speak of its archaic character when the image is in striking unison with familiar mythological motives..... A personal image has neither archaic character nor collective significance, but expresses contents of the personal unconscious and a personally conditioned, conscious situation. The primordial image.... is always collective, i.e., it is at least common to entire nations or epochs. In all probability the most important mythological motives are common to all times and races.²

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1. Contributions to Analytical Psychology, p. 246.
 2. Psychological Types, pp. 555-556.

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