

THE EVOLUTION OF THE REPUBLICAN STUDY COMMITTEE

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I, Edwin John Feulner, Jr., hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by myself, and that the work is my own.

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ABSTRACT

THE EVOLUTION OF THE REPUBLICAN STUDY COMMITTEE

The Republican Study Committee (RSC) is an ideological faction within the U.S. Congress which was formed in 1973 and consists of conservative Republican members of the U.S. House of Representatives. This thesis analyzes the purposes for which the group was formed and the impact which it has had in the Congress. The RSC was not formed before 1973 because the need for a distinct ideological faction was not recognized by conservatives prior to that time. The RSC was patterned after the Democratic Study Group (of liberal Democrats), and its importance quickly surpassed the Wednesday Group (of liberal Republicans) in the structure of the House.

The Republican Study Committee plays several roles in Congress, each of which is examined in this thesis. It acts as a legislative coordinating and strategy group providing staff resources to its members for joint activities. This allows junior members of the House, who do not have access to other forms of research staff assistance, to use policy staff on specific legislative issues. It provides the opportunity for academic conservatives to participate in the public policy process. It functions as the "inside" vehicle in the House of Representatives where it works with "outside" organizations on legislative activities, including its Senate counterpart, the Senate Steering Committee, and the Executive Branch of the federal government. It performs an electoral function, participates in national Republican party activities, publishes works through its related RSC Campaign Fund, and it works as a service bureau for conservative Republican congressmen who support the staff of the RSC through their individual staff allocations.

The Republican Study Committee has become a recognized faction in the U.S. House of Representatives. It has developed a larger membership base in the party, and most recently, it has shifted from an "entrepreneurial" organization to a "managerial" organization. The author of this thesis served as the executive director of the Republican Study Committee during much of its formative period. This position has allowed the author to interview the principal participants in the RSC's formation, discuss their perspectives on the RSC and consider a substantial body of literature pertaining to Congress in this light. This thesis analyzes the RSC's development as a new body in the institutional framework of the U.S. House of Representatives and projects its future.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The House of Representatives in Political Theory

The U.S. House of Representatives has changed substantially in recent years. This thesis will describe some of these changes and how they came about, and it will then analyze the results of these changes. No description or analysis of the modern Congress can be undertaken in a vacuum, but instead must rely on the work of previous scholars who have studied the Congress during the past century. Certain strands of thought have emerged from these studies beginning with the pioneering work of Woodrow Wilson published in 1885 entitled Congressional Government.¹ Wilson was concerned with the structure of Congress and its principal actors. Wilson and other early scholars concentrated on normative and biographical narratives of Congress as a political institution, and they often described the historical development of different congressional structures such as the committee system or the party leadership.²

The second school of congressional studies evolved through quantitative methods. These studies of Congress began with the publication of Professor Stuart Rice's classic volume Quantitative Methods in Politics.³ This work, the first to give a quantitative framework to congressional scholarship, represented an important move away from the institutionalist approach. Professor Rice was a precursor of the behavioral school which emerged after World War II in the United States focusing attention on the attributes of individuals and the aspects of their behavior in social situations. This was a different approach from the earlier theorists since the emphasis moved from the institution per se to the behavior of individuals and the interaction of different groups within the institution's structure. In essence, it represented a change from the macro- to the micro-sopic, from the historical-narrative to the socio-psychological.⁴

The behavioral school was further divided into "inside" and "outside" theories. "Insiders" observed specific activities and frequently conducted interviews for their basic data. "Outsiders," on the other hand, tended to rely on the compilation of statistics which often took the form of studies of either the electoral process or theories about voting behavior. Thus, generally, the insiders tended to employ qualitative and descriptive methods

while outsiders tended to use quantitative techniques more frequently. As Kenneth Shepsle and David Rohde note,⁵ the distinction was not absolute, and in fact, the two overlapped.

Another distinction between "inside" and "outside" has also developed. Professors Jewell and Patterson state that much of the recent analytical literature about legislatures has focused on its policy process.⁶ In this regard, the analysis concerns not only the internal operations within the legislature, but also the impact of "outside" forces on the legislative decision-making process. This emphasis will play an important role in this analysis of the Republican Study Committee.⁷

From these diverse approaches, there has evolved what Shepsle and Rohde describe as the "new institutionalism." This is an approach which combines the institutional role and its effect on the behavior of the individual participant on the one side, and the effect of the individual on the structure of the institution on the other. While combining an institutional examination of this type with the observations of an active participant in the process, this thesis considers a *sub-group* of the Congress, the Republican Study Committee, using a case-study method. This thesis is not a theoretical contribution to the literature about legislatures, but rather is an examination of the evolution of an ideological faction within the House of Representatives. While it is not theoretical, it is based on a set of organizing concepts which permit certain conclusions to be made about the Republican Study Committee. These concepts include the institutionalization of a faction within the Congress,⁸ the role of specific members of the Republican Study Committee as participants in the faction, the role of the staff of the Republican Study Committee; and it then projects the evolution of the RSC away from an "entrepreneurial" faction⁹ toward a "managerial" one.

Combining interviews with role analysis, it is argued that from the perspective of some congressmen, certain goals and objectives emerged which were not being met within the existing institutional structure of the Congress. Differences over policy questions, staff resources, and influence on legislative strategy forced a number of Republican members to admit the inadequacy of the existing formal structure. The Republican Study Committee grew to meet needs which neither the existing structure within the House, nor the

national Republican party was able to meet. The era of the 1970s-1980s has been described as an era of special interests. The advocates of "single-issue" viewpoints have advanced their views in the political process through the vehicle of special interest pressure groups. The two primary American political parties, which had earlier been responsive to many of the special interest groups, are now only pale shadows of what they had been. The Republican party's influence on the evolution of the Republican Study Committee is discussed in this thesis.¹⁰

The Republican Study Committee is primarily a congressional institution, rather than a party-related organization. As a conservative congressional organization, the RSC was not the first of its type, but it was different from its predecessors.

The primary difference between the Republican Study Committee at this time and earlier conservative coalitions was its emergence as a formal institutional structure within the Congress. In effect, the RSC was the first self-designated conservative congressional faction: it became a new element within the traditional structure of the House of Representatives.

The crucial element within the RSC was its research staff capability. The role of professional staff in the House has attracted considerable attention from scholars.¹¹ This dependence on staff has been an outgrowth of the specialization throughout the legislative process in the Congress. Originally staffs assisted the members of Congress in performing their duties,¹² however, the U.S. Congress, unlike other national parliaments, has also developed a policy analysis which plays a substantial role in the legislative process. Michael Malbin considers the significance of this development when he says:

"Most other national legislatures do not give individual members similar staff resources; most depend on their cabinets for almost all policy initiatives. Congress is not so passive today, thanks largely to its staff."¹³

In addition to its immediate role, the staff enables the member to extend his own time horizon. As Shepsle and Rohde point out, the customary behavior of the individual legislator is:

"myopic -- he attempts to accomplish his goals within a fixed set of institutional arrangements, has a selectively short time horizon (normally not much beyond his next election), and, therefore,

heavily discounts long-term objectives and potential changes in structural arrangements in calculating his behavioral practices."¹⁴

The development of an organization such as the Republican Study Committee, which was established to overcome the short time horizon of the individual legislator, altered the formal structure of the institution of the House of Representatives. It altered, likewise, the role perceptions of individuals within that structure.

The structure of the Congress is not unchanging; it evolves as different pressures are brought to bear and as different individuals change roles in the Congress. Consequently, the relationships among Republican members of the House, with the Republican Administration, and with the Democratic majority, were all affected by the evolution of the Republican Study Committee. Additionally, the relationships of members in their own districts to party officials, to local interest groups and to constituent concerns were factors affecting the RSC's growth. Yet, the primary judgment of the RSC's effectiveness was within the Congress of the United States.

As Shepsle and Rohde point out, there is an increased awareness that "the realization that the minutiae of institutional structure should not be relegated to the legalistic treatises on the Congress."¹⁵ Changes in the institution are too important for such arid treatment. Furthermore, it is not enough to study quantitatively the impact of elections or the analysis of roll call votes. Analysts of the Congress must also describe the institutional framework as it evolves in different time periods, and that is what this thesis does with respect to the Republican Study Committee.

A change in the institutional framework of the Congress can be brought about by a number of factors. Changes throughout the congressional leadership and electorate, conflicts within the legislature, and the emergence of new pressure groups within the Congress can all lead to changes in the institution of the House. For example, in 1975, votes in the Democratic Caucus of the House of Representatives overthrew 3 committee chairmen. This change in chairmen not only altered the committee leadership, but more significantly the seniority system of selecting committee chairmen. An electoral change occurred in the 1980 U.S. Senate elections which also altered the institutional framework of Congress: Republican victories shifted the majority to the Republican party, and with that the

control of committee chairmanships. The legislative agendas were substantially shifted, committee staffs were reduced, and the past pressure to amend Senate Rule XXII governing the use of the filibuster were abated.¹⁶ Legislative conflicts, such as the battle over federal land use which furthered the evolution of the Republican Study Committee,¹⁷ have provided groups with an opportunity to enter into the policymaking framework of Congress. And, the pressure groups which have entered into these legislative conflicts have proved to play an important part in the legislature, as shown in the role of the Conservative Democratic Forum of the House of Representatives in the passage of President Reagan's economic package of 1981.¹⁸

Thus, the history of the Congress is one of change and adaptation. The framework within which individual members are legislators, ombudsmen, and candidates constantly changes. It is argued in this thesis that the institutional acceptability of the Republican Study Committee has been a response to the needs perceived by a substantial bloc within the Congress. In other words, the existing institutional framework was inadequate to meet the perceived needs of individual members, and in the case of the Republican Study Committee, institutional change came in response to those needs. The change was gradual and evolutionary. Trial and error shaped the RSC with advances and setbacks characterizing its history. By late 1976, the RSC had altered substantially the institutional framework of the U.S. House of Representatives, and become a viable faction within that framework.

This is the first analysis of the Republican Study Committee as an element within the House of Representatives. While analyzing the relationship of the goals of the RSC and behavior of individual members and staff as well as the changing institutional organizations and their procedures, this author describes critical events in the evolution of the RSC. This thesis shows that members are more independent of the party leadership than in earlier times, i.e., the established, traditional, formal leadership of the House has been weakened, and ad hoc groups have been formed to help fill a perceived vacuum.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the organizations within Congress, particularly among Republicans, tended to be social or fraternal. A "class" of congressmen, such as those elected in 1952, would form a group and maintain social

contact with each other on a regular basis. Although these groups were primarily social, sometimes policy actions would be taken as an indirect result of members meeting socially. In the 1950s, the Democrats formed a policy group designed specifically to bring the liberal Democratic members together for legislative cooperation. This group, the Democratic Study Group (DSG), was the first unofficial group within the House devoted to policy matters. During the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, other groups were formed which were mainly devoted to furthering the legislative interests of a special interest group, such as environmentalists, blacks, women, or farmers.¹⁹ The Republican Study Committee is one such group and should be understood in the context of this growing trend toward ad hoc special interest groups which were formed by congressmen who were more and more independent of traditional party leadership. These members were seeking new ways to achieve their objectives in a changing environment.

In this thesis, the RSC is traced from its early beginnings through the 1976 election. The 1976 election is used as the terminal date for two reasons:

1. By 1976, the Republican Study Committee had passed through its early evolution and become part of the House's institutional framework. And,
2. The Carter victory over Ford meant that the Republican Study Committee's role in relation to the Executive Branch and to the House Republican leadership would be altered substantially.

It should be noted that the author of this thesis served as the full-time executive director of the Republican Study Committee from January 1974 through March 1977. Prior to 1974, he also served as the first part-time executive director and as the full-time administrative assistant to Congressman Philip M. Crane (R-Illinois). This perspective presents the author with both advantages and disadvantages. Among the advantages are:

1. An intimate knowledge of the organization, its members and staff.
2. Complete access to the written records of the RSC. And,
3. Access to current and past members of the RSC for personal interviews.

The principal disadvantages are:

1. The possibility that the author will not be objective in his analysis of the organization and its personnel. And,
2. The need to chart a fine course between Scylla and Charybdis: the danger of becoming immersed in minor details of only peripheral interest and the temptation to gloss over the unsuccessful activities of the RSC or give credit for greater influence than the RSC legitimately earned.

The drafts of this thesis have been revised to minimize these drawbacks.

B. A Summary of the Development of the Republican Study Committee

The Republican Study Committee was organized in 1973. By 1981, it has grown into a group of 150 dues-paying Republican members of the House of Representatives. As the self-proclaimed "conservative conscience" of the Republican party in the House, it has played a major role both in responding to Democratic legislative proposals and in developing its own legislative initiatives. The Republican Study Committee was not organized until fourteen years after its counterpart among the liberal Democrats, the Democratic Study Group, had been established. This delay was caused by a number of factors:

1. The conservative Republicans were unwilling to band together for coordinated action.
2. The conservative Republicans believed in "gut instincts" to come out on the "right side" of issues; no need was perceived to coordinate activities or philosophy different from the broad outlines of the Republican party. And,
3. The formal Republican leadership in the House shared the rank and file members' perspectives on most major issues. This reduced the need for an ideological faction to assist the members in expressing their views effectively.²⁰

By the beginning of the second Nixon Administration in January 1973, there was a perception among some Republican House members that the current method of working with the Republican leadership and "voting right by voting no" was inadequate. Frustrated by the Nixon Administration's movement to the left on a number of issues, the conservative Republicans

within the House of Representatives began to look for alternative ways to express their views. The formal Republican House leadership was not a viable outlet for these frustrations.

As allies of Nixon from their days together in the House of Representatives in the 1950s, Gerald Ford (R-Michigan), House Minority Leader; Les Arends (R-Illinois), House Minority Whip; and John Rhodes (R-Arizona), chairman of the Republican Policy Committee, carried Nixon's legislative agenda to the Congress on Capitol Hill. John B. Anderson (R-Illinois), chairman of the Republican Conference, sometimes disagreed with the Administration, but when he did, his position was almost invariably more liberal than Nixon's or the other members of the Republican leadership.

With the Republican President and a Democratic-controlled House, compromises in policy had to be negotiated in the legislative arena. Because of the substantial Democratic majorities in the Congress, these compromises by Nixon were usually made with the most important ideological group among the Democrats, i.e., the liberal majority in the House Democratic party. The Republican President was proposing legislative objectives with which a number of the conservative Republican members in the House substantially disagreed.²¹

Traditional analyses had maintained that conservatives did not need "an elaborate organization to hold them together"²² as a counterpart to the liberal Democrats with their Democratic Study Group. By 1972-1973, the political balance made it more essential than ever for the group to be formed. This was not only a change from earlier political circumstances, it had also become a practical possibility. As Congressman Edward J. Derwinski (R-Illinois), one of the founders of the Republican Study Committee, noted:

"A Republican Study Committee was not formed earlier because we Republicans were united under [President Lyndon] Johnson, largely tolerant during the first Nixon Administration, the Democrats hadn't been radicalized by McGovern yet, and Nixon was just starting to take nonconservative positions."²³

The time was right for a major initiative among the House conservatives, despite unsuccessful earlier attempts to form such a group either among the Republicans or on a bi-partisan basis.²⁴

The eventual success of the group depended on a number of independent factors coming together. In retrospect it is clear that these included:

1. The legislative initiatives from the Administration which were strongly opposed by most conservative Republican members of the House. For example, conservative Republicans were opposed to President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan and the Child Development Bill, as discussed in Chapter II.
2. The election of a large class of freshman Republicans in 1972, including 30 identified conservatives, which provided a new base of potential support for such a group. These freshmen owed no formal allegiance to the Republican leadership in the House, and they could act independently of any commitments to the leadership. The bringing together of the existing conservative Republicans who had battled their own party's White House on issues such as the Family Assistance Plan and the Child Development Bill, with the newly-elected Republicans to form the embryonic Republican Study Committee is examined in Chapter IV below.
3. The cooperation of several senior Republican members with the newly-elected members. Their commitment was critical because they brought their experience to bear on the situation. As "cue-leaders" to the freshmen,²⁵ they provided a legitimacy for the freshmen to become involved in a new activity.
4. A maturing relationship between the members and several key staff aides who played an important role in the organization of the group. The staff relationship to both the newly-elected members and the senior members set the mood for staff-member relationships within the Republican Study Committee in years to come.

The RSC staff served as a model of how members could employ staff resources in the legislative arena more effectively than they had in the past. The use of staff resources was usually reserved for Republicans who held the senior position of ranking Republican member on a committee. In addition, Republicans had fewer staff aides than the Democratic majority. While the Republicans held approximately one-third of the seats in the House from 1965-1973, they had unsuccessfully battled for proportional committee staffing since the mid 1960s.²⁶ Consequently, on the House Banking and Currency Committee where 52 professional staff members were apportioned

with 49 chosen by the Democrats only 3 were allotted to the Republicans. In addition, the 3 Republican staff aides "owed their allegiance to the ranking minority member rather than to all Republicans....It was not unusual to be arguing with the minority staff on your own committee."²⁷

The first major break with the Republican Administration of Richard Nixon on a policy issue developed over welfare reform. The House Ways and Means Committee was the legislative committee which considered Nixon's Family Assistance Plan. In the battle over that bill in 1971 and 1972, Congressman John Byrnes (R-Wisconsin), the senior Republican on the Ways and Means Committee, worked on a specific bill with President Nixon and the White House staff as well as with Wilbur Mills (D-Arkansas), chairman of the committee, and his senior Democratic aides from the Ways and Means Committee. The junior Republicans on the Ways and Means Committee had no access to the minority staff which reported directly to Byrnes. Therefore, Byrnes and Mills were able to negotiate legislative compromises with the Administration which were unsatisfactory to the junior Republican members. Then, when conservatives wished to oppose the arguments of the Administration/Mills/Byrnes position, these other members on the Ways and Means Committee found themselves without committee staff assistance, relying on whatever resources they could find.²⁸

The senior Republican members had worked long and hard for the election of President Nixon. Some of them viewed his legislative deviations as the necessary price of compromise with the Democrats in order to achieve meaningful "reform" programs which would be acceptable to the Democratic leadership but which would also improve the status quo. These arguments were rejected by the more conservative members. As political analyst Paul Weyrich noted:

"Nixon divided the Republican party in the House. He came up with proposals which traditionally had been opposed by Republicans. It separated the real conservatives from the pragmatists."²⁹

Thus, the need for an organization was evident: the timing was right, and the key actors -- incumbent members, members-elect, and staff aides -- were all in place to bring the organization together in early 1973. Yet, as chapters IV and V show, it was not an easy or smooth process to convert these ingredients into a functioning organization. As an embryonic organiza-

tion, the RSC achieved a number of legislative accomplishments in the 93rd Congress. Additionally, its foundation was laid, its structure established, and its role both in the U.S. House of Representatives and in the Republican party affirmed.³⁰ The RSC did not involve itself in the most important issues of the 93rd Congress, which were the debate over U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the question of presidential involvement in the Watergate scandal.³¹ Other significant legislative issues occupied the attention of the RSC. Where common ground could be found, it managed to build a base of support and establish an institutional role as the conservative voice of the Republican party.

During this time, relations between the RSC and the Republican leadership in the House ranged from blatant hostility to grudging acceptance and occasional cooperation with the RSC's legislative activities. Oftentimes the cooperation was expressed only when the RSC's legislative activities coincided with those of the leadership. These phases are described in detail in the legislative case studies which appear in Chapter V. The activities of the organization to establish an identity, to work as an effective voice for conservatism among the House Republicans, and to fill an unique role, are recounted in Chapter IV. The formation of the Republican Study Committee preceded the formation of most of the single-issue caucuses by several years.³² Because of the late arrival of single-issue caucuses and their "single-issue" emphasis, these caucuses did not have a major impact on the RSC.

The structure of the Republican Study Committee was patterned after the Democratic Study Group³³ because it had been a successful organization for fifteen years. The DSG is the prototype for most of the factions in the House because it has proven to be such an effective voice for its members, the liberal Democrats within the Congress.³⁴ It was hoped that if the RSC could become even partially as effective, it would have achieved its basic objective. Thus, a staff structure was established which paralleled that of the Democratic Study Group; a staff director was appointed; research and clerical staff hired; and an office within the House Office Building Complex was secured.

Some changes from the DSG pattern were necessary. The DSG membership was able to rely more heavily on formal committee staff input than

was available to the RSC. Of the committee Democrats, many were liberals who arranged to share their resources with the DSG since they were working toward common objectives. Active members of the DSG included several middle-level Democrats, like Morris Udall (D-Arizona) and Frank Thompson (D-New Jersey), who had some influence in the Democratic Caucus and later became committee or subcommittee chairmen. Because of these connections, these members were able to take DSG initiatives and ideas directly into the formal committee process.

The RSC members tended to be junior members. These RSC members belonged to the minority party and battled not only the Democratic majority, but frequently their own senior members and the Republican Administration. Unlike the DSG members, the RSC members had no effective access to the committee agendas. Therefore, the need for effective staff resources was crucial to the embryonic RSC.

The means of building an RSC staff evolved during 1973-1974. Early efforts to form a "shared staff" proved ineffective because of the conflicting claims on the staff member from both the executive director of the RSC and from the member of Congress who shared his time.³⁵ It became necessary for the key members to request additional support from their colleagues for a professional staff which was working exclusively for the RSC. This staff would owe its primary allegiance to the Executive Committee and their delegate, the executive director of the Republican Study Committee. This, however, proved to be a difficult problem.

The Republican members involved in the RSC had little experience in the effective use of professional staff, especially research staff, and at the same time were reluctant to place employees on their payroll for whom they would be responsible, but over whom they would have little direct control. The relationship of staff and members evolved from legislative case to legislative case throughout the time of the RSC's development. The staff's duties included: supplying information to the members, keeping them informed of legislative initiatives, assisting the members in coordinating their activities, and encouraging them to be more aggressive in legislative battles. At the same time, the staff could not be perceived to be giving direction on policy to the members. Professors Jewell and Patterson describe the demeanor of the ideal congressional staff:

"The norm of deference to congressmen is very strong and is often reflected by staff comments about how staff members must "be on tap, and not on top," that they must not "try to run the show," or that "you must remember that staff is staff, and members are members."³⁶

This complicated role which the staff was to play required not only tact and diplomacy, but also a maturity which was not always evident in the young staff aides who were hired by the RSC. A sense of legislative timing was even more difficult to gauge since the Republicans did not control the legislative agenda or the legislative schedule either on the House floor or in the committees or subcommittees. The development and effectiveness of the Republican Study Committee staff are discussed in the case studies in Chapters V and VII below.

By the end of 1976, the RSC had a research staff of eleven which produced more than one hundred studies annually. But, in looking at the example of the Democratic Study Group, this did not ensure that the staff would maintain its value indefinitely. The staff of the Democratic Study Group was less important in the late 1970s than it was in the 1960s for several reasons. Firstly, through the process of seniority, activist members of the Democratic Study Group who were formerly outside the power structure of the Democratic party and the Democratic leadership, had been able to use the resources which were available to the majority party, particularly in the case of chairmen of subcommittees or full committees. More importantly, however, the members of the DSG in the late 1960s and early 1970s successfully promoted a series of reforms which helped individual activist members of the Democratic Caucus, while at the same time, they decreased the need for a formal organization such as the Democratic Study Group.³⁷

Ironically, while the legislative agenda of President Nixon caused conservative Republicans in the House to become concerned about his concessions to the liberals, it also caused consternation on the part of the liberals. As Michael Malbin, an astute observer of the Congress, noted:

"Members of the ten year old (sic) Democratic Study Group (DSG), an organization of liberal Democrats in the House, became concerned that unaccountable committee chairmen would use their positions to cut policy deals with the 'enemy'."³⁸

Because of this concern, further reforms were enacted following the 1976 elections, and as a result of these 1976 reforms, the number of subcommittee chairmanships which were allocated to junior members was increased. This move assured each of these junior members access to their own legislative staff resources.

This shift created still more power centers within the structure of the House of Representatives, and it also increased the individual Democratic member's legislative capacity. The resulting increased number of power centers within the House as an institution made it more difficult for either the Executive Branch (with a President of either party) or the formal leadership of the Democratic party to negotiate a legislative program which was acceptable to the different blocs within the majority party. Morris Fiorina summarized the situation as "Congress now has a surfeit of Chiefs and a shortage of Indians."³⁹ To carry this analogy further, it could also be asserted that tribal loyalty is decreasing as the new chiefs try to lead their warriors into battles.

Whether this could become a problem for the Republican Study Committee is difficult to project. Clearly, it did not during the period under review (through 1976). However, the Republican members of the House have obtained additional staff resources in the subsequent period. By the time these resources became available to the members, the Republican Study Committee, as an established organization with expertise in specific legislative areas, had carved out its own role as an independent faction within the House.

C. Activities of the Republican Study Committee

The activity areas of the Republican Study Committee include:

- legislative activities;
- academic outreach;
- electoral involvement; and
- Executive Branch relationships.

Each activity is considered at various points throughout this thesis.

Legislative Activities

The primary reason for the formation of the Republican Study Committee was for conservatives to have a more timely and coordinated impact on the legislative activities of the U.S. House of Representatives. As is detailed in Chapters II, V, and VII, this impact included opposing initiatives proposed by the Executive Branch, such as the Family Assistance Plan, the Child Development Bill, the common situs picketing bill, and the Legal Services Corporation. It also included opposing initiatives being proposed by the Democratic leadership in the House of Representatives. Thus, RSC members opposed such bills as land use planning, the Consumer Protection Agency and federal surface mining regulations. While these measures were also opposed by the formal Republican leadership in the House of Representatives, as detailed below, it was the willingness of the activist members of the RSC to take on these particular legislative battles which often encouraged the Republican leadership to oppose the Democratic power structure. This reaction meant that the Republican Study Committee issue leaders would sometimes offer their own legislative alternatives, and at other times, would simply urge a "no" vote on the pending bill. A third category of bills included those which the members of the RSC were promoting as their own initiatives. These included welfare reform and food stamp reform.

The RSC members who led the legislative battles for the Republican Study Committee were represented by members as diverse as Sam Steiger (R-Arizona), Philip Crane (R-Illinois) and Edward Derwinski. Sam Steiger led the battle for land use. Steiger, from a relatively safe Republican seat with eight years seniority, was admittedly not a "team player." He was impatient with the status quo. The principal House advocate of the private ownership of gold was an ideological conservative activist, Phil Crane. The RSC's spokesman on several foreign policy issues was Edward Derwinski. A senior member of the House International Relations Committee, Derwinski brought a pragmatic political dimension to his detailed understanding of foreign policy issues. These three members represented the diversity of the members who became active in the Republican Study Committee's legislative projects. The role of the key member's leadership is discussed in each of the case studies below.

Not all of the information which the RSC staff provided to the members was directly related to legislative activities. The staff frequently provided data to members' offices dealing with constituent inquiries or with member legislative interests outside the RSC's agenda. These inquiries were burdensome to the staff, but the staff's work on these matters was seen as a part of maintaining good relations with the voluntary members who were not only paying dues, but also staff salary allotments.

A discussion of the legislative role of the RSC necessarily involves the RSC's relationship with the national news media. In this aspect of the RSC's activities, and in others, the relationship was complicated. As is shown in Chapter VI, the RSC's staff was more concerned with national media attention than were most of the members. The staff pushed hard for a more aggressive national media relations program, but the members resisted, and this program never developed. The members' primary media concern continued to be with outlets in their home districts, rather than national media on major legislative issues.

Forecasts of the categories of future activities for the Republican Study Committee are made in the concluding chapter VIII. But specific issues which are likely to be encountered in the years ahead are not discussed in detail. This author has learned the lesson from a 1964 study which projected future issues to be confronted by the Democratic Study Group. In that study, Mark Ferber discussed three: civil rights questions, automation and church-state relations.⁴⁰ While Ferber correctly foresaw that civil rights would sustain the continuing interest and attention of the DSG, automation and church-state relations did not. Thus, forecasts of coming issues are hazardous and distracting -- hazardous because they could be incorrect; distracting because they tend to cloud the analysis of the group under consideration.

The final chapter includes projection of future activities across the broad range of RSC involvement. The institution of the Congress has evolved further since 1976. The future activities and influence of the Republican Study Committee will be built on the early foundation of the organization and its cumulative impact since then. Thus, the prospects for the future are projected in this context.

Academic Outreach

Because several staff members had scholarly backgrounds with ties to the academic community, the Republican Study Committee staff aides also developed academic relations. This was reinforced by the view of several senior members of the RSC that the Republican Study Committee could play a useful role in bringing academics and members of Congress together. These members, particularly Phil Crane and Jack Kemp (R-New York), believed that ideas work their way into the public policy arena and become fashionable only after a lengthy process. This process involves not only exposure to the ideas of academics, but also its popularization through constituency groups and then its eventual incorporation into the agenda of Washington's policymakers. The members saw the need to be exposed to these individuals and their ideas. On a practical and immediate level, this exposure could give the members academic credibility and intellectual arguments for the positions which they espoused rather than just instinctive opposition to new liberal programs.

Interaction with the academics also helped the embryonic organization gain respectability within the institutional framework of the House. The academics were pleased to participate in the RSC efforts because it provided the opportunity to be a part of the Washington public policy process. Meetings and forums with Nobel Laureates were held for members of the Republican Study Committee and other invited members, both Republican and Democrat. Staff briefings were held on a regular basis, and seminar sessions were conducted on aspects of House procedure. All of these educational meetings were in addition to the weekly legislative strategy meetings. The role of the RSC in these educational efforts was not merely one of good public relations, but it provided a useful and needed service. As 1976 RSC Chairwoman Marjorie Holt (R-Maryland) said, "No one else was doing it, so we decided to fill the vacuum."⁴¹ Chapter VI shows that the transmission of these academic ideas to influence the legislative process was a significant activity of the Republican Study Committee's staff.

Electoral Involvement

While the electoral involvement of the Republican Study Committee was not its highest priority, it became an activity of the RSC, both directly and indirectly. During its early stages, the RSC was cloaked in anonymity which, according to Ed Derwinski, its initial chairman, was caused by:

"the skittishness of members who were reluctant to be identified as upsetting the status quo in the House or with their own Administration by joining rump organizations."⁴²

That is to say, members did not want to be viewed as party mavericks by the Republican leadership in the House, by party officials in their home districts, or by the Nixon White House. The senior members who had personal ties to the Republican leadership were unwilling to take high profiles in the RSC. Congressman Derwinski noted that he was "the only senior member who was willing to have the group meet in his office in those early days."⁴³ Even though John Rhodes, then chairman of the House Republican Policy Committee, admitted that "the dominant trend of the GOP is more conservative,"⁴⁴ this was not enough for him or his leadership colleagues to welcome an unofficial group like the RSC.

Membership in the Republican Study Committee, at least in its early days, would not necessarily be viewed as a positive activity in the home district of most of the RSC's senior members. The interested constituents were largely local party officials with a relatively unsophisticated view of the legislative process. With a lack of understanding of the House Republican relationship with the White House, these constituents found it difficult to understand why members needed to join together to form a new organization outside the formal party structure.

This was not the case, however, with the younger members, particularly those elected in 1972 who pledged to "do something about the mess in Washington." These newly-elected members rejected the view which was expressed by the formal Republican leadership that "Republicans are essentially without any congressional power."⁴⁵ They also rejected the alternative: to accept their status within the system and react to other power centers. In earlier times, these new members might have been frustrated both because of their Republican minority status and because of their status as freshmen. However, as Professors Jewell and Patterson note, the role of "apprenticeship" in the Congress had diminished significantly by the late 1960s.⁴⁶ These freshmen were in a hurry. Their objective was to use the system to form coalitions for legislative goals and to create issues which could be used in future political campaigns. These members would convince their local party officials that effective representation might involve new institutional arrangements such as the Republican Study Committee. Typical of

this new breed was Steve Symms (R-Idaho) who noted: "As long as the RSC was viewed as an effective means of achieving legislative objectives, it could be justified to my constituents."⁴⁷

In its early years, the RSC played an active role in the congressional elections. With help from outside the Republican Study Committee, the RSC was able to build its conservative support. Larry Pratt, former Executive Director of the American Conservative Union and the Conservative Victory Fund, played an active role in the 1972 election effort of the RSC. The American Conservative Union was a grass roots organization of conservatives, and its related political action committee which provided conservative candidates with election support, was the Conservative Victory Fund.⁴⁸ At that time, Pratt was one of the handful of conservative activists who was convinced of the desirability of forming an organization of conservative House members to counteract the activities of the Democratic Study Group and to steer House Republicans in a more conservative direction. Pratt made campaign contributions from the Conservative Victory Fund in 1972 contingent upon the willingness of the prospective recipient to actively work with the conservatives in coordinated legislative strategy if elected.⁴⁹ This commitment was an important factor in making these members receptive to a conservative organization in the House after their election and arrival in Washington.

The RSC's relationship with other elements in the Republican party continued after the organization had been established. Following the RSC's success in the legislative battle over federal land use planning in 1974, members of the RSC admitted their involvement with the group, and the RSC dropped its mantle of secrecy. The RSC's image was further enhanced in early 1975 when Bob Michel (R-Illinois) was elected Minority Whip in the Republican leadership. Michel was also elected to the Executive Committee of the Republican Study Committee at this time and announced that he was financially supporting the RSC shared staff. These moves proved to strengthen the position of the RSC within the House of Representatives.

Emulating the DSG, the members of the RSC established the RSC Campaign Fund to help in the election of conservative Republicans. This Fund also became the financing vehicle for the RSC's book The Case Against the Reckless Congress which was designed to present conservative views on

current legislative topics.⁵⁰ The combination of descriptive essays together with key votes for all incumbent members was never before attempted by a group of congressmen. In addition, the Campaign Fund's resources were used to mail information packets to key congressional candidates at regular intervals.

It was realized from the beginning that neither The Case Against the Reckless Congress nor the information packets could take the place of direct financial assistance to candidates, but a financial aid program was not implemented. Operating indirectly and within legal limitations, the staff of the RSC did direct some contributions from various organizations, political action committees, and individuals to both incumbents and non-incumbent challengers on an ad hoc basis. The manner in which this was done required tact and diplomacy on the part of the staff. Members who did not receive assistance and others who disagreed with the RSC's selection of recipients might resent this action. The lack of direct financial assistance on the part of the RSC's Campaign Fund remains one of the weak points of the RSC to this day.

Executive Branch Relations

The Republican Study Committee was not designed to fill an information or service role with regard to the Executive Branch "bureaucracy." Instead, the RSC role included:

1. battling with the bureaucracy over waste,
2. cooperating with high-level political appointees under the Nixon and Ford Administrations, and
3. presenting to the Republican President a conservative legislative viewpoint.

For example, the first role led to meetings with middle-level bureaucrats from Health, Education and Welfare over civil rights regulations.⁵¹ In the second case, the Republican Study Committee made frequent use of Executive Branch officials. Meetings were arranged with members to give guidance and discuss matters of mutual concern.⁵² While these meetings permitted individual members to become more familiar with policy issues and operations within certain departments, at the same time, they enabled the Executive Branch spokesmen to build support from their logical base within the Congress. These meetings also gave the RSC a measure of

respectability within the party structure by allowing the group practical impact on day-to-day affairs of the legislative process or the future direction of the party. Meeting with the President gave the RSC members the opportunity to press their own legislative initiatives and to express their opposition to or support for the President's programs. These meetings countered the pressures which were being applied to the President by the liberal wing of the Republican party and by the Democrats, and it gave the RSC institutional credibility within the House, in the members' districts, and in the national news media.

These relationships are different from those expressed by Professor Morris Fiorina.⁵³ According to this prominent congressional scholar, the Congress, the bureaucracy, and the constituency in the home district form an integral and unique triangle which re-elects the Congress, perpetuates the bureaucracy, and institutionalizes the service role of the member of Congress, thus assuring his re-election. An individual member of the Republican Study Committee may have a relationship such as Fiorina develops, but it was not implemented through the mechanism of the RSC. The RSC relationship with the Executive Branch was primarily policy related rather than constituency related.

D. Conclusion

The Republican Study Committee's success can be measured in several ways. Its existence through a tumultuous political period was a healthy sign for the organization. The RSC was carefully assembled from elements which had not previously cooperated in activities of this type. Many of the key members were defeated in the 1974 "Watergate" election, but the organization, itself, survived and maintained its position within the party structure both in the House and in the national Republican party as evidenced in its presence at the 1976 Republican National Convention.⁵⁴ The RSC has grown and prospered beyond the closing date of this thesis.⁵⁵ This existence has occurred at a time when other congressional factions -- like the Democratic Research Organization and the National Security Research Group -- have come into being, flourished briefly, and then passed from the scene. These groups lacked the actively committed members, clear statement of purpose, and staff members who had the confidence of the members themselves. The RSC, on the other hand, has these vital ingredients, and

thus, its continued existence is a measure of success in a structured organization like the U.S. House of Representatives.

Secondly, it should be noted that the organization increased its membership, while simultaneously maintaining its principled position within the party. About 80% of the Republican members of the House are now members, and its immediate past chairman, John Rousselot (R-California), has been one of the leading conservative members of the House. The organization has managed to expand its base and to shed its image as a fringe group, while at the same time, expound the conservative viewpoint on public policy issues. The delicate balancing act of maintaining a viable relationship with such a broad membership has not led to any noticeable changes in the conservative tone of the RSC publications. However, the broader membership has had an effect on the operational emphasis of the RSC. Because of this broader membership, the demands for specific research products from individual members has increased substantially. This has caused the research staff to spend a greater proportion of its time on research projects for individual members. At the same time, both the emphasis of the most recent executive director and the broader membership have also resulted in a reduced role for the RSC as an innovative force in major conservative legislative initiatives. It will be shown in Chapter VIII that the role of the RSC has shifted substantially toward a service bureau, and away from a source of major legislative initiatives. As Congressman Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia) explains it: "the entrepreneurial role isn't visible, but they turn out good papers."⁵⁶ Congressman Philip Crane, one of the founding members, expressed his view even more blatantly: "The RSC just isn't at the cutting edge anymore."⁵⁷

Of the new members, some have joined the RSC because of the information the organization provides. However, the majority have become members because they view the RSC as being an advocate of conservative principles within the mainstream of the Republican party. The Republican Study Committee has become a part of the institutional framework of the House in both its membership role and its acceptance by the House Republican leadership.

During the late 1970s, the political trend in the United States shifted substantially to the right. Campaign rhetoric, public opinion surveys, legislative proposals and election returns all confirm this assertion. It is argued in this thesis that the Republican Study Committee is a manifestation of this shift in public sentiment. The issues which it helped to popularize, the early members of the RSC who have gone on to other offices, and the voting records which it helped to establish, have all been elements in this ideological shift. Of course, the primary manifestation of it was the presidential and senatorial elections of 1980 which saw Ronald Reagan replace President Jimmy Carter and which saw the Republicans take control of the Senate for the first time since 1952.

Having made this assertion, however, it is difficult to measure the RSC's specific impact; measuring the impact of any political entity is difficult with large numbers of variables involved.⁵⁸ It will be shown that the RSC had a major influence on a number of legislative issues during the Nixon-Ford Presidencies. Its specific influence from 1977-1981 on the Democratic Administration was less noticeable. Because of its minority position within the House, it had little to offer an Administration controlled by the opposition party which also had control of both Houses of Congress. In retrospect, the formation of the Republican Study Committee during the Republican control of the White House was a fortunate move, its base was then established before the Democrats took over the Executive Branch. This is different from the Democratic Study Group which was organized during the Eisenhower (Republican) Presidency. By the late 1970s, both organizations were recognized as the primary factions which represented the mainstream positions of liberal (DSG) and conservative (RSC) thought within the House. During the period 1972-1976, the Republican Study Committee functioned in many different ways. The RSC worked with the Administration, in opposition to the Administration, and on other occasions, the RSC took the lead on issues and was eventually followed by the Administration.

Although the Republican Study Committee's direct influence on the national Republican party has not been substantial, it has exerted a conservative influence on the Republican leadership in the House. The RSC has played the role of being a transmitter of conservative ideas into the mainstream of the party. The Republican Study Committee was a vehicle

for Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, Peter Bauer, Russell Kirk and others to participate in sessions with Republican House members. It provided an opportunity for conservative books, monographs and articles to be delivered directly to member offices and to reach members' legislative staffs. The RSC also provided an opportunity for academics who visit Washington to testify formally before committees and also to meet informally with the RSC staff and members and discuss key issues. In acting as this catalyst for the transmission of ideas, the RSC is in a position to play an important role -- a role which is too often overlooked in the realm of legislative battles. That is, while elected individuals might advocate certain positions, unless they have adequate intellectual and institutional support, the effect of their advocacy will be minimal. On some occasions this RSC support might be merely clerical. On others, it might encompass sophisticated research data and key operational roles for major legislative initiatives.

With regard to the members of the Republican Study Committee, specific assistance from the RSC has been given to them for legislative battles, re-election campaigns, recruitment of personal staffs, and other member concerns. When a member is willing to become a leader on a specific issue, the RSC support staff is ready to brief him, prepare supporting material, alert him to the pitfalls which he might face, notify his colleagues of important votes, and help him to prepare arguments to answer charges from his colleagues, interest groups or the Executive Branch. This is particularly important because, as Les Aspin (D-Wisconsin), a liberal member of the House of Representatives, has noted, "The Congressman is painfully aware that the 'experts' (scientists, economists, generals) are working for the Executive Branch."⁵⁹

In an economic sense, the RSC staff has proven to be an efficient investment for the individual member. For example, fact sheets prepared by RSC staff aides on pending bills provide the member's staff with much needed information while the staff remains available to perform its other tasks. This also does away with the member's need for an expert on every subject.

To make a member into an instant expert on an issue involves more than providing passing knowledge on a subject. He must be aware not only of the arguments which support his point of view, but also of those

arguments which are likely to be marshalled against him by individuals holding opposing views. All of these arguments are likely to be used against him, and the research capability and support staff which the Republican Study Committee can provide for those major issues in which it is involved remains one of the key benefits for the members. The full ramifications of the member's bill and the alternatives which might be offered must be within his purview. Additionally, the numerous meetings, seminars and other support activities which the RSC conducts help not only to assure the continued viability of the RSC, but also to upgrade the staff competence within the member offices.

The work that the staff has done through the RSC has also proven beneficial to the staff members themselves. The opportunities for professional growth by meeting experts in their own fields, and the close relationships which they develop with members of Congress have led a number of these staff members to take more senior positions in the House and Senate, elsewhere in the government, and in the private sector.⁶⁰

The Republican Study Committee has been established as an institution. From a model patterned after the Democratic Study Group, it has survived and was adopted into the House's institutional framework. It is an important faction formed by a group of House members who have become more independent of the traditional party leadership and who are seeking new ways to achieve their objectives in a changing environment. As this analysis is developed it will be shown that the members of the RSC and the RSC collectively behaved in certain ways in response to the political environment in which they were operating:

1. They were more independent of party leadership.
2. They were more independent of White House pressure.
3. They effectively used a shared research staff.
4. They acted more effectively as a group to avoid being individually discriminated against.
5. They worked on certain projects with their conservative Democratic colleagues.
6. They coordinated activities with their conservative Senate colleagues.
7. They increased their liaison with external pressure groups to work on common legislative objectives.

Of course, not every legislative case illustrates all of these changes in behavior by members of the Republican Study Committee, and even when the RSC caused a change in the members' behavior, it was not necessarily successful in achieving its objectives. However, changed ways of interaction are shown in this thesis. In summary, the RSC has changed the operations of the Congress. The changes which it has affected within the Congress and the Congress' relation to the Executive Branch may not be apparent, but as Robert L. Peabody has noted, "Most important political choices are made at the margins."⁶¹ The RSC was established in the House at the ideological margin. It created its own unique niche in the House structure as a service, research and strategy faction for conservative Republicans. Professors Rohde and Shepsle made a vital point:

"Policy change, for whatever purpose, cannot be ensured in a complex arena like the Congress by simple changes in rules, personnel, or circumstances. Sometimes these factors may conspire to produce change; sometimes they will fail....[P]olitical change is a messy business; it is often difficult to understand and almost always challenging to engineer."⁶²

This engineering provided a formidable challenge for the RSC's leaders.

The Republican Study Committee operated within the minority party in only one House of Congress, with the political milieu overwhelmingly against it. However, the Republican Study Committee caused changes in the focus of debates, and more importantly in congressional voting, and it has activated individuals both inside and outside of the legislative arena to move in its conservative direction. The manner in which this movement was directed is analyzed below, and the author's perspective on the Republican Study Committee and its role into the 1980s are outlined in the concluding chapter.

II. EARLY CASE STUDIES LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF THE REPUBLICAN STUDY COMMITTEE

A. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the two major legislative issues, the Family Assistance Plan and the Child Development Act, which led to the formal establishment of a bloc of Republican conservatives in the House of Representatives. In Chapter III the House itself is examined. Its institutional resources are considered, and the alternative ideological and non-ideological organizations are reviewed. As will be seen, nothing in existence in 1972 met the requirements of the conservative Republicans in the House. Therefore, as Chapter IV analyzes, several key members of the House, together with several congressional staff aides, worked on the establishment of a conservative Republican group patterned after the liberal Democratic Study Group.

The early 1970s marked a new phase for conservative Republican House members. On the major issues, they had either been pre-empted by the Nixon Administration, or they were disenchanted with what they perceived as Nixon's shift to the left. As Daniel Moynihan said, "From the right, Nixon's record looked consistently left."¹

In one broad category of positions, the Administration's call for party regularity overcame ideological inhibitions. It was argued that Richard Nixon had always been in the mainstream of the Republican party -- clearly he would not promote programs which were out of character for him. Thus, the argument continued, if the Family Assistance Plan wasn't to the conservatives' liking, they could hardly blame Nixon. He had to work with the Democratic majorities in both the House and the Senate. And, after all, the conservatives had never understood welfare reform anyway. Perhaps Moynihan and his allies were right -- perhaps a radically different approach to the problem was needed. Besides, one could hardly accuse Wilbur Mills (D-Arkansas) and John Byrnes (R-Wisconsin) of being radicals or even liberals. So what were the conservatives complaining about?

The issue was more complex than this line of reasoning might indicate. In fact, opposition to Nixon's Family Assistance Plan would become a major rallying point for conservative Republicans in the House. Most of these conservatives were junior members with no seniority and little influence in the party, so they had little to lose if they opposed the leadership in their own party. Under Lyndon Johnson's Democratic presidency, this factional opposition had not been necessary. The Republicans in the House were united in opposition to Johnson's Great Society. But now with their "own man" in the White House, the conservatives were being ignored, or even worse, they were expected to support programs which they would have outspokenly opposed if advocated by a Democratic President. The most significant of these programs was the President's Family Assistance Plan which would have federalized the welfare system and instituted a guaranteed annual income for all citizens. Conservatives also opposed the Child Development Act. Both of these measures are discussed in detail in this chapter because they played crucial roles in leading to the establishment of the Republican Study Committee.

The battle over the Family Assistance Plan (FAP) has been told by both its liberal and conservative White House adversaries.² But, the perspective of the congressional opponents to the FAP has not been assembled. The conservative opposition in Congress began with this single legislative issue, developed and extended to other policy issues, and led to further joint House and Senate activity. The Child Development Act represented a different kind of challenge to the House Republican conservatives. Again the conservative members tended to have less seniority and a smaller stake in the status quo. From their Family Assistance Plan activities, they had learned how to cooperate within the House. The Child Development Act taught them how to work with outside pressure groups. These conservatives reasoned that if the liberals had cooperated with the anti-Vietnam War activists, the conservatives should be able to work more closely with their allies who were outside the Congress.

These two cases convinced several of the members and their key staff aides that closer collaboration, and possibly even a formal organization, could be useful in advancing their conservative legislative goals. As will be shown in Chapter III, no organization existed within the House to fill this role. It would be up to these members and their staff aides to form such a group.

B. The Family Assistance Plan

During the 1968 presidential campaign, "welfare reform" had achieved the status of a major campaign issue. A candidate for President had to be able to present a welfare reform package. As Martin Anderson commented:

"Second nature to Democrats, it was a somewhat treacherous issue for a Republican candidate. Nixon knew this and decided to confound his opponents -- and the press. Rather than sidestepping the issue, he made it one of his major campaign planks."³

Anderson spoke with authority on the subject because he was candidate Nixon's principal domestic policy adviser. As Anderson noted, as a candidate, Nixon had not had an opportunity to devise a program for meaningful welfare reform. Like most observers of the public policy process at that time, Nixon was convinced that the existing arrangement of multiple programs with overlapping jurisdictions, irrational benefit levels which varied from political boundary to political boundary, and disincentives to join the productive sector of the economy were issues which had to be dealt with. According to Anderson, "Within weeks after taking office, he made it known that he was willing to entertain radical thoughts about welfare reform."⁴ Moynihan and others conceived that such a radical welfare reform proposal would replace many of the categorical welfare programs with a uniform national level of benefits to be paid on a need basis without a related work requirement.

Radical welfare proposals were not proposed by Anderson or his allies on the White House staff, but rather by a former high-level Democratic official, Daniel P. Moynihan. Moynihan's previous service in the Democratic Administrations of Kennedy and Johnson had enabled him to build relations with career civil servants in both the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Department of Labor where he formerly served as an assistant secretary. Based on these contacts, Moynihan was in an advantageous position to develop a welfare reform proposal shortly after he was installed in the White House as a senior member of Nixon's presidential staff.

At a White House meeting held on March 24, 1969, Moynihan unveiled a radical welfare reform proposal. This was the first version of a guaranteed annual income program. As Moynihan pointed out later:

"If liberals outside the Administration could never quite come to see the dimensions and the implications of the Family Assistance Plan, conservatives within did so instantly. The March 24 meeting had scarcely begun when Martin Anderson, representing Arthur Burns, declared that the committee was being presented with a negative income tax."⁵

The idea of a negative income tax was anathema not only to Anderson and his colleague, Roger Freeman, who also worked under Presidential Counselor Arthur Burns, but to Burns as well. As Anderson summarized later, "As far as the general conservative public is concerned, there has been little support for radical welfare reform."⁶ The strongest conservative argument against a guaranteed annual income program was that it would formalize the premise that individual citizens are entitled by right to receive federal government support payments without a requirement to attempt to find work. Part of this was later answered in FAP provisions which involved "work fare,"⁷ but still, this basic conservative objection was never fully met. Additional conservative objections centered on the imposition of federal payment levels, rather than permitting the states to set their own levels based on a cost of living formula, and a substantial reduction in the local controls which the states could exercise in this major area of public policy.

Despite the distaste with which conservatives viewed the program from its announcement, it was enthusiastically endorsed by President Nixon in a national television address on August 8, 1969. As Moynihan points out in his book, "The new President was not strident, and was not right wing."⁸ The enthusiasm with which Nixon endorsed the Family Assistance Plan was proudly emphasized by Moynihan when he said:

"Whenever the matter was raised, he [Nixon] would assert without reservation that FAP was his 'flagship,' the pride of his legislative program, the warship from which his colors flew."⁹

Yet, Moynihan's enthusiasm for the plan was probably greater than Nixon's. A scholarly observer noted:

"His [Nixon's] embrace of FAP was partly an aberration from his long-held welfare attitudes, attributable to the extraordinary persuasiveness of presidential adviser Daniel Patrick Moynihan."¹⁰

The Family Assistance Plan was basically a tax measure. Therefore, when the bill was submitted to the Congress on August 11, 1969, as H.R. 16311, it was referred to the House Ways and Means Committee. The

chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee was Wilbur D. Mills. Most Washington observers, including Moynihan, noted that Mills was "generally held the second most powerful man in Washington, following only the President."¹¹ The Ways and Means Committee was considered one of the most important committees in the Congress. It was regarded as being a more conservative committee than its counterpart in the Senate, the Finance Committee. Nonetheless, it was not a citadel of conservatism, even under Mills:

"Its Democrats were liberal, but not fervid; its Republicans were conservative, but not unyielding; its Southerners were moderate by standards of the racially aroused South."¹²

This membership pattern on the Ways and Means Committee followed an established pattern. As Professors ~~H~~itt and Peabody maintain in their standard work on the Congress, when appointments of new committee members are being considered for the major House committees the leadership looks "above all for Congressmen who are 'responsible,' that is, members who have a respect for party leaders, fellow members, and the rules, procedures, and customs of the legislative process."¹³

One of the unique aspects of the Ways and Means Committee at this time was the partnership which had developed between the chairman, Mills, and his ranking Republican colleague, John W. Byrnes. Byrnes was "an experienced and humane man, a Catholic with six children and no fortune, [he] was also very much of (sic) the center of his party and a legislator as gifted as Mills."¹⁴ The Byrnes-Mills combination was considered by other observers of the Congress as one of the "dual limited monarchies" of the congressional committee system.¹⁵ It was to this committee that President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan was referred.

While the committee had grappled with various welfare reform proposals in the past, welfare remained an enormously complex subject:

"The committee members and the Administration officials were united in the awareness that they both knew a great deal more about welfare than almost anyone else, and also that they did not know much."¹⁶

The Ways and Means Committee began a long series of hearings on the bill. Administration and special interest and academic witnesses were all

called before the Ways and Means Committee to express their views. The members of the committee realized the importance of these hearings. Professor Dahl has noted:

"The American system is unlike England's, and more like France's in the central importance given to the committee. It is no exaggeration to say that in the United States effective legislative power lies with the committees."¹⁷

The "effective legislative power" was particularly found in the members of the Ways and Means Committee. Their capability was seldom challenged on the House floor:

"In a legislative body 'capability' may include many things besides familiarity with and understanding of the problems within the committee's jurisdiction. But surely these are among the more important qualities."¹⁸

To serve on the Ways and Means Committee was to be considered a serious student of complex public policy issues.¹⁹ The capability of members in dealing with welfare was established by these extensive hearings. After this study period, the committee moved into closed sessions where the pending bill was discussed among the members and where amendments could be offered, negotiations would take place, and a final version of an acceptable bill would be hammered out. Mills and Byrnes took the Family Assistance Plan to such a mark-up session of their committee.

By this time, FAP had already been denounced by most conservative commentators including James J. Kilpatrick and William F. Buckley. The conservative Republican members of the House of Representatives who did not serve on the committee were similarly disenchanted with the Nixon Administration's approach toward welfare reform. John M. Ashbrook (R-Ohio), the chairman of the American Conservative Union, was one of the outspoken opponents of welfare reform throughout the debate.²⁰ However, Ashbrook lacked "credibility" on this issue. He had not become an expert, as the Ways and Means Committee members had. Furthermore, Ashbrook was considered an ideologue of the right and his opposition was expected. Moynihan himself admitted that "The problem always was assumed to be that of keeping conservative support."²¹ Ashbrook was viewed as a maverick who would not necessarily lead other conservatives automatically to his position. Byrnes had carefully included all of the Ways and Means Republicans in the mark-up sessions in order to receive their ideas, include them

when possible and hold their support for Nixon's program. Thus, there was no Republican opposition within the Ways and Means Committee.

On March 5, 1970, the Ways and Means Committee passed H.R. 16311 by a vote of 21-3. It had not been substantially altered during the committee's deliberations. While many of the Republican members of the Ways and Means Committee were unenthusiastic about the bill, the election of Richard Nixon had limited their choices on this and on many other issues. Bibby and Davidson noted how the 1968 election had changed the situation in this regard:

"The options open to him [Gerald Ford] and his minority party were more restricted. As long as the Democrats had control of both Congress and the Executive Branch, House Republicans had enjoyed maximum flexibility in their strategy on every given issue. The 1968 election had changed this situation."²²

The three dissenting votes in the Ways and Means Committee were all Democrats, two of them southern conservatives (Landrum of Georgia and Burlison of Texas) and the third a senior Democrat from Oregon, Al Ullman, who was later to succeed Mills as the chairman of the committee. Their main concern was the provision of a guaranteed annual income:

"It ultimately establishes the basis for a guaranteed annual income through a negative tax formula. We do not concur that the case incentive approach to welfare is either proven or sound, or that it would ever attain its purported objective of reducing the welfare rolls."²³

With this overwhelming vote of support from their own committee, Byrnes and Mills prepared to take the bill to the floor. They were coming to the floor in a powerful position. They had the base of the Nixon Administration, and broad bi-partisan support in the House. Because of the specialization of the committee process, it was assumed that the measure would have a good opportunity for passage on the House floor. Many members would defer to their colleagues who served on Ways and Means to lead them in this complicated area. In addition, the basic technique of log-rolling would help. As Froman describes, it is a "principle of reciprocity:"

"Reciprocity means that committees, and committee members tend not to interfere with the work of other committees.... If the committee is cohesive in its recommendations (especially if it is bipartisanly cohesive), and if the bill does not involve conflicting ideologies, then few amendments will be offered and few will be successful."²⁴

While the battle over FAP certainly did involve a conflicting ideology, it was still assumed that the Ways and Means Committee's "bipartisan cohesiveness" would help to pass the measure. The hearings and mark-up sessions had set the stage for the Ways and Means Committee's leaders to move the bill through the Rules Committee and then to the House floor.

It was at this time that several conservative Republican members of the House who did not serve on the Ways and Means Committee became aware of the implications of the Family Assistance Plan. Philip Crane (R-Illinois), who had been elected five months earlier, met with his personal friend, Edward J. Derwinski (R-Illinois), who had served in the House for more than a decade. Crane expressed some of his concerns about the bill to Derwinski who suggested that several conservative members get together in his office and discuss the issue. Among those who participated in what became a series of meetings were John Ashbrook, Del Clawson (R-California), Barry Goldwater, Jr. (R-California), Bill Scherle (R-Iowa) and Floyd Spence (R-South Carolina).

At the first of these meetings the consensus of the members was to oppose the bill. Several legislative strategies were discussed which would possibly lead to the bill's defeat on the House floor. One of the problems facing these members was that none of them served on the Ways and Means Committee. Therefore, none of them had access to minority or majority staff aides who dealt with these kinds of technical issues. This was a practical disadvantage as Michael Malbin points out:

"When the chairman and ranking minority member agree to support a bill, the staff will defend their agreement, but no one presents the other side to non-committee members who might want to hear it."²⁵

Because of this deficiency, Crane asked several of the members if they had any research staff aides who might perform specific research projects on aspects of the bill. Goldwater volunteered his administrative assistant, Jack Cox; Spence contributed his legislative assistant, Jerry James; and Crane offered his administrative assistant, Ed Feulner. The three staff aides held several meetings of their own and included Paul Weyrich who worked for Senator Gordon Allott (R-Colorado) and Jim Lucier from the staff of Senator Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina). The House staff aides had become acquainted with these Senate staff aides through the

Conservative Luncheon Group which they had been attending for some months. This small group entered the FAP battle at a late stage. Their analytical resources were meager, and they lacked the specialized expertise of the Administration/Byrnes-Mills forces. However, as Allen Schick has pointed out:

"The very fragmentation of Congress offers the analyst multiple points of access. While all Members do not hold equal power, the skillful use of evidence by even a junior congressman can have an impact on the legislative outcome."²⁶

Thus, even at this late stage, the members and staff aides began to outline specific assignments which they would undertake.

Members of Congress met four times between March 5 and April 16, 1970. Participation of staff aides Cox, James and Feulner began with the second meeting where specific research projects were assigned. Goldwater and Cox contacted state welfare directors to find out what the impact of the Family Assistance Plan would be on their state programs. In the House hearings and report, this subject was not addressed. Cox pointed out that if damaging quotations could be obtained, they could be used in the debate to oppose the passage of the bill.²⁷ Crane took it upon himself to work out a floor statement which would discuss the level of prospective benefits to his own personal situation. Admittedly, Crane's situation was exceptional in that he and Mrs. Crane had seven children. Crane would have to earn more than \$7,400 a year in order to be better off working than receiving welfare payments, including the proposed Family Assistance Plan.²⁸ Crane stated:

"It is thus readily apparent that my family's income, on welfare, would not only exceed the poverty level but the earned income indeed, of nearly half of our population including a sizable number of our postal workers. I submit that this nation for all of its vast resources cannot and more importantly should not afford such a standard of living for its 'poor' families."²⁹

However, these research projects were only one element of the strategy which included a possible fight over the rule on the House floor. Also, speeches in opposition to the FAP were written by Jerry James and provided for the debate.

The House Rules Committee is the traffic warden for the House floor. Virtually every significant piece of legislation has to come before the Rules Committee for time allocations, as well as a decision as to what amendments will be permitted. The Rules Committee had established the

custom of granting "closed rules" to Ways and Means for tax, tariff, and welfare bills. A closed rule prohibits floor amendments to the bill under consideration. David Mayhew says that:

"A closed rule acts as a shield against the hundreds of interest group demands that would be articulated if not fulfilled if the bill appeared naked on the floor."³⁰

The idea for a fight on the rule was put forward by Derwinski. He proposed that the liberals should be encouraged to oppose the closed rule because the benefit payment level was too low. The Democratic Study Group or the Black Caucus might oppose the closed rule to achieve their own goal of attempting to increase the level of benefits. If they won and the bill came to the House floor under an open rule, the liberals could put forth an amendment to increase the level of benefits. Derwinski and Crane also discussed their plans with Joe Waggoner (D-Louisiana), who was an unofficial spokesman for the conservative Democrats in the House. Waggoner indicated that many of his conservative Democratic colleagues would be willing to vote against the rule. As Congressman Les Aspin (D-Wisconsin) said, "Procedural votes, because they generalize issues, often make for surprising allies."³¹ Derwinski argued, if the liberals combined with the conservatives who were opposed to the basic concept of a guaranteed annual income, the rule might be defeated. If the closed rule were defeated, the bill would probably be pulled off the House floor by Mills and Byrnes who did not want to see the entire package opened up to amendments from either the left or the right.

In April of 1970, Philip Burton (D-California), as chairman of the Democratic Study Group's Task Force on Health and Welfare, issued a task force report recommending approval of FAP as a "sound step toward the elimination of poverty."³² Derwinski met with the representatives of the Black Caucus and the DSG and found support among the DSG members for opposition to the rule, despite Burton's earlier report. Similarly, the Black Caucus members were generally opposed to the bill because of its "low level of benefits."³³

Derwinski also believed that the White House was ignoring the conservative rank and file Republicans:

"There was a communications gap, Nixon's White House staff tended to tell us what they wanted us to do rather than consult with us."³⁴

It was generally thought that this attitude on the part of the White House might lead to defections by conservative members to the rebels' position.

As Moynihan recounts, the role played by John Byrnes within the Republican party was a key element to the House passage of the bill. It was largely through his intervention that Ford and the members of the Republican leadership became supporters of FAP. It was also through Byrnes' intervention that the House Republican Policy Committee endorsed the Family Assistance Plan on April 7.³⁵ While "FAP aroused little enthusiasm among some House Republicans and in many instances provoked outright opposition, the Policy Committee was used to help gain support among more conservative members of the President's party."³⁶

Another component of the battle being waged by the conservatives was a "Dear Colleague" letter which Paul Weyrich composed for Sam Devine's (R-Ohio) signature. Devine, a senior Republican then serving as vice chairman of the Republican Conference, asked his Republican colleagues to oppose this rule. Derwinski had approached Devine for his support because he wanted the most senior "establishment" individual he could find to be the opposition spokesman on the issue when the FAP came to the House floor.

During the floor debate, Goldwater quoted extensively from the state welfare directors of New York and Texas. Crane, Derwinski, Devine and Ashbrook all participated in the debate on the rule. As another conservative congressman noted about a different bill before the Rules Committee:

"I know some of the Members who voted for the legislation in the [Rules] committee said they were going to oppose it on the floor. Well, I do not happen to believe we should vote for legislation in committee which we cannot support on the floor. I vote to kill bad legislation at every opportunity."³⁷

Despite the support of the Democratic leadership and the Republican leadership, with the exception of Devine, the motion to give the Family Assistance Plan a closed rule barely passed the House. The vote on April 15, 1970, was 205 in favor to 183 opposed. Thus, FAP cleared the House, but the margin in favor of the FAP rule was only 22 votes. Of the Republican members, 12 more opposed the rule than supported it. This was a substantial rebuff to the Minority Leadership which had endorsed the bill and lobbied actively for it.

On April 16, 1970, the House passed the Family Assistance Plan by a vote of 243-155. On the final passage of the bill, the Democrats delivered one-third of the entire votes from the House. The remaining votes had come from Republicans and only did so because of pressure from the leadership supporting the President's measure.

Derwinski, Crane, Spence and Goldwater were convinced that their coordinated activities had made an impact on the rule battle. Despite the considerable pressures from the White House and the Republican leadership, a majority of House Republicans voted against the Republican leadership and the Administration's position on the rule. This was evidence that their efforts to enlist conservative support had been successful. With so many Republicans voting in opposition to the leadership position, it also became clear that no sanctions could be applied to those members who had opposed the Administration on this issue.³⁸ Thus, if opposition could be solidified and extended to a large number of members, the rebels could act with virtual impunity.

Following the passage of the Family Assistance Plan in the House of Representatives, it moved to the Senate for consideration. The assumption from the outset in the White House had been that the Senate would be the friendlier body. The question now was how to stop the bill. Because of the staff contacts which had been made during the House battle, Crane and Derwinski called Senator Carl Curtis (R-Nebraska) and suggested a meeting. Curtis was a senior member of the Finance Committee, who had expressed reservations to Weyrich and Lucier about the Family Assistance Plan. The House members were willing to talk to their senate colleagues, because they were learning how to directly affect the legislative process. One of these points was made by James Robinson who noted:

"Perhaps the most noticeable characteristic of the prescription stage of decisionmaking as practiced within Congress is that it is easier to defeat a bill than to pass one. That is, of course, a feature of any institution that makes decisions by recorded votes and by complicated parliamentary procedures."³⁹

The members of the House were not willing to give up at this stage simply because the bill had passed out of their own immediate domain. Rather, they wanted to help defeat the measure by working with their Senate colleagues. A meeting like this might not appear to be unusual. Actually,

it was a remarkable achievement for conservatives. While the liberals long had groups which coordinated legislation and public policy issues between the two Houses, it was relatively unheard of for the conservatives to do the same thing.⁴⁰ In most cases, conservative members of one body would assume that as soon as the bill had been completed in their chamber, their job was over. Because of the seriousness with which these members viewed FAP, they were willing to battle beyond the usual parameters on the Family Assistance Plan.

Derwinski and Crane met with Curtis who suggested that an alternative program to the Family Assistance Plan should be developed. Specifically, he suggested a new approach to welfare reform which would give members of the Senate an alternative to the Administration's bill. The primary emphasis should be to curb the widespread abuses of the existing welfare system rather than to adopt a radical new approach to welfare, such as a guaranteed income. The House members agreed to assign Jerry James from Congressman Spence's staff to work with Tom Nelson on Senator Curtis' staff to draft a bill.⁴¹ At James' suggestion, Curtis agreed to invite Dr. Roger Freeman to meet with members of the Senate Finance Committee. Freeman, who had served on the staff of Arthur Burns in the White House, and his colleague, Martin Anderson, had strongly opposed FAP. In fact, Freeman had resigned from the White House staff over the issue and had returned to the Hoover Institution at Stanford University where he was a Senior Fellow. In addition to Freeman's formal testimony, Curtis arranged for informal meetings with the Senate Finance Committee members. These meetings took place in late 1970 in Curtis' office.⁴² At Curtis' suggestion, Freeman was invited back to meet with the members again and he was commissioned to write a rebuttal to the Family Assistance Plan and supporting documentation for the concept of a block grant program for welfare reform. Freeman wrote his study, which was later issued as a Senate Finance Committee's "Committee Report."⁴³ Freeman's role in the battle was critical. As Allen Schick says, "Congress can more easily exploit work done by others than carry the main burden of analysis by itself."⁴⁴ Freeman was an expert, and also a man of principle. He had given up the status and prestige of a major White House position because of his strong beliefs on this issue. Thus, his credibility was great, and the members of the Senate Finance Committee listened to him.

In the meantime, the formal hearings before the Senate Finance Committee began. The chairman of the committee, Russell Long (D-Louisiana), had his own view of real welfare reform: "the term 'reform' applied to the subject of welfare had but one meaning: the curbing of abuse."⁴⁵ Curtis, working with Freeman and his staff aides, compiled a bill which would deal with welfare reform from this approach. Senator John Williams (R-Delaware), the committee's ranking Republican, emphasized the disincentives which FAP would bring to the nation's welfare recipients and worked with Curtis to show the extent of fraud and abuse under the current system.

On November 20, 1972, following months of inaction and delay, the Family Assistance Plan was defeated in the Senate Finance Committee by a vote of 10-7. Thus, with only modest staff resources, the conservatives, under the leadership of John Williams and Carl Curtis, had delayed the "keystone of the Nixon Administration's legislative agenda" for more than 18 months. The final vote reflected not only the work of Curtis and his staff group, but also the leadership of John Williams.⁴⁶ Yet, it was Curtis who "was appalled by the FAP initiative, and determined to see it fail."⁴⁷

By that time, enthusiasm within the Administration for the Family Assistance Plan had been diffused, and the program was floundering. In order to make sure, however, Weyrich and other staff aides who continued to monitor the bill, knocked it down whenever the Administration attempted to bring it up again. For example, more than a year later, on December 13, 1973, an article appeared in the Washington Post indicating that a new Family Assistance Plan would be presented to the Congress in 1974.⁴⁸ At this time, Jerry James, who had become a member of the shared staff of the recently formed Republican Study Committee, worked with Weyrich to make sure that the proposal was killed immediately. James prepared detailed letters for the signatures of members of both the House and the Senate. The Senate letters were passed to Weyrich to obtain signatures and were then sent to Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, and Roy Ash, Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The letters indicated that the signers were dissatisfied that such a program would even be considered again because

"It is a step backward rather than forward in the effort to resolve the complex problems which have existed with the present welfare program. It will cost more, cover more people, and provide less incentive to work than the plans which Congress has already rejected."⁴⁹

The most important aspect of the Senate letters was that they were signed by 9 of the 15 members of the Senate Finance Committee, including Chairman Long and ranking minority member, Wallace Bennett (R-Utah). With a majority of the Senate Finance Committee recorded against the bill, the Administration was warned that it could not pass the measure successfully.

The Republican Study Committee eventually had the opportunity to present a welfare reform program⁵⁰ which they viewed as a viable alternative to FAP. The issue of welfare reform remains an unsolved problem. Martin Anderson wrote long after the FAP battle:

"The lesson that comes from 15 years of radical welfare reform plans -- from massive computer simulations of every conceivable combination of welfare payment levels, tax rates, and costs, from hundreds of hours of congressional testimony and from countless academic studies -- is a gradually spreading awareness that radical welfare reform cannot be accomplished without incurring intolerable political costs."⁵¹

Even Moynihan admitted that serious problems had developed in the pilot FAP program. These pilot programs had been initiated with experimental funds appropriated to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The advocates of FAP had assumed that the experiment would provide a positive test which would permit a FAP-type guaranteed annual income to be introduced and passed later. The problems which Moynihan noted were similar to the problems which conservatives had foreseen in the Family Assistance Plan:

"I've had a week here, reading and fussing with a great mound of research reports on the guaranteed income experiments which we started in the late 1960s in the expectation that no government would propose one until the case was proven....Were we wrong about a guaranteed income! Seemingly it is calamitous. It increases family dissolution by some 70%, decreases work, etc."⁵²

The tone of the Moynihan apologia in 1978 is very different from his views in his book The Politics of a Guaranteed Income published in 1973. At that time, he anticipated that a guaranteed income would be back and would eventually receive approval of the Congress.⁵³

The House conservatives learned a number of lessons from the battle over the Family Assistance Plan. Not only did they learn the value of working together in coordinated action, knowing the procedures in both the House and Senate, and working with their colleagues in both bodies, but they also learned the basic law of politics -- congressional style:

"The politics of a capital in which power is systematically fractionated by the Constitution, and randomly diffused by a party system that exerts a minimum of discipline, such that majority coalitions in Congress are typically across rather than within the parties."⁵⁴

Thus, by working with Democrats such as Joe Waggoner and his colleagues in the House, and with Russell Long and others in the Senate, a handful of Republican conservatives were able to stop their own Administration which had the original support of the most powerful committee in the House of Representatives as well as the formal leadership of both parties in the House.

C. The Child Development Act

As a result of a promise he made at the 1970 White House Conference on Children, Senator Walter Mondale (D-Minnesota) introduced a bill calling for comprehensive child care in the United States. The bill was eventually incorporated into the Office of Economic Opportunity Extension Act (S. 2007) as Title X under the title "The Child Development and Child Advocacy Programs." The bill, including Title X, passed the Senate on September 9, 1971, by a vote of 49-12.⁵⁵ Following passage of that bill with only limited opposition led by Senators Taft, Jr. (R-Ohio) and James Buckley (R-Cons.-New York), it was anticipated that the measure would pass the House with equal ease.

On September 27, Daniel Joy, an attorney who served part-time on the staff of Congressman Edward Derwinski, asked for a meeting with Congressman Philip Crane and Ed Feulner, Crane's administrative assistant. At that meeting, Joy reviewed the proposed Child Development Act and the new ground which would be broken by its enactment. Specifically, the program would extend long-term federally designed and controlled programs for training, rehabilitation and education to the entire school and pre-school age population. The day care centers funded under the proposal could be private, public or non-profit and would offer "comprehensive educational, nutritional and health services to preschool children."⁵⁶ Other programs would involve child advocacy, child

rights programs, and other provisions which Joy and other conservatives believed were incompatible with the traditional American educational and family structure. For example, some of these provisions would permit children to seek redress in the courts from corporal punishment administered by their parents. "Children's rights" could be asserted against parents and teachers in other areas as well. The earlier OEO extension bill in the House did not have a child care provision in it. However, John Brademas (D-Indiana), the chairman of the Select Subcommittee on Education of the House Education and Labor Committee, had introduced a separate bill (H.R. 6748) which dealt with child development. With the passage of the Senate bill, Brademas and his colleagues on the Education and Labor Committee combined the child development measure with the OEO extension bill.

In anticipation of the debate on the subject, Joy requested a memorandum on the current status of child care and the nature of the Senate-passed bill as well as information on the House proposals from the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. The Education and Public Welfare Division of the CRS provided him with this memorandum on September 27, 1971.⁵⁷

These meetings of Joy, Feulner and several other staff aides did not lead to any concrete activities by members. While Crane was opposed to the bill, he was not a member of the appropriate committee to question this program. In addition, the bill's opponents were hampered by a practical problem. The floor manager of the bill did not make copies of the bill available for analysis and review. Because neither the report nor the child care amendment was available until the day before the debate on the issue, there was no organized opposition to the amendment, and it passed by a vote of 203-181. A later vote on final passage resulted in the passage of the OEO Extension Act by a vote of 186-183.⁵⁸ The closeness of this vote was due not only to the child care provisions, but also to the other portions of the OEO Extension Act, such as provisions for legal services, which were distasteful to conservatives.⁵⁹ Thus, the child care measure passed both Houses without a coordinated opposition effort either in the House or the Senate. Although the senior Republican members on the Education and Labor Committee had opposed the bill, the conservative objections were not raised in the floor debates. Their staff limitations, along with the unexpected combination of the two measures, caught the Republican opposition off-guard.

Following the passage of the bill in both Houses, an alternative strategy was developed. Weyrich called a meeting of Jim Lucier, Dan Joy, and Ed Feulner to discuss the issue. Feulner was enthusiastic about opposing the measure because Crane had been outspokenly opposed to the bill. They decided to mount an effort to secure a presidential veto. It was assumed that technical differences between the two bills would be resolved among the House and Senate conferees, and that the substantive issues could be used to mobilize the White House, provided appropriate House and Senate spokesmen emphasized the right issues.

These staff aides realized they needed a spokesman to act as the opposition leader on the bill. He would have to inform his colleagues on the details of the bill, as well as sway the White House. He would enter the fray with the obvious advantage that the votes were present in the House to kill the bill by sustaining a presidential veto.

These staff aides decided to form a separate committee to mobilize outside opposition to the bill. This organization which became known as "The Emergency Committee for Children" acted as the spokesmen arguing against the proposal. The staff aides wanted leaders from the religious community as well as professional educators to serve on the committee. The name was chosen because "we didn't want to give up the moral high ground to the liberals, and let them portray us as being opposed to children,"⁶⁰ according to Weyrich. Feulner was assigned to enlist Crane's support for the effort. Specifically, Crane was asked to hire a part-time staff aide to work solely on this issue. Because of his contacts with academics, Crane was also asked to enlist members for the new committee. Crane's third assignment was to enlist enough House members who opposed the bill to pledge to sustain a presidential veto. It was necessary to obtain these pledges because the Nixon Administration was unwilling to even consider a veto if it was unlikely to be supported in one House or the other. In this case, the prospects of sustaining the veto were good since 183 members had voted against the bill on final passage. Thus, Crane became the de facto leader of the opposition to the Child Development Program.

Following these strategy meetings, Joy contacted the editor of Human Events, the most broadly circulated conservative newspaper in the United States,⁶¹ and enlisted their support for the campaign against the program.

The first results of that meeting occurred when the Human Events lead story encouraged a presidential veto of the measure.⁶² The Emergency Committee for Children distributed information packets to conservative columnists around the country which resulted in syndicated columns by Russel Kirk, William F. Buckley, and James J. Kilpatrick all opposing the bill.

Joy assumed the role of executive director of The Emergency Committee for Children. He quickly built a list of academics from throughout the country as members of its council. Among these members were Philip Crane's brother (Dr. David Crane, a psychiatrist) and Crane's father (Dr. George Crane, psychologist, columnist and author). The other names on the committee were identifiable conservatives, including columnists Kirk, Stanton Evans, and Fulton Lewis, III. A handful of friendly academics helped lend credibility to the effort. The committee published several analyses, "Child Development Summary Analysis,"⁶³ "Questions About the Child Development Act,"⁶⁴ and "A Review and Report of the Proposed Federal Program of Child Development."⁶⁵ These reports were written by Joy and Connaught Marshner who had joined Crane's staff for this battle. They were sent to the news media, and to members of the House and Senate and their key staff aides.

Joy wrote to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget expressing the committee's concern about the bill and its budget implications. In a reply, dated December 6, 1971, the Deputy Director, Caspar Weinberger, responded stating:

"I share, to a considerable extent, the views you express, and you may be sure that the persuasive arguments you have made in your letter will be taken into consideration when the President considers this bill should it come before him with these provisions about which you wrote."⁶⁶

Additionally, efforts were made to bring these concerns to the attention of the President and the Vice President. Joy contacted his friend, David Keene, who then served on the staff of Vice President Agnew. Keene talked to Agnew and drafted a speech for him which criticized the child development proposals. Agnew delivered the speech before the Illinois Agricultural Association on November 17, and in it he condemned the bill.⁶⁷ This statement by Agnew was taken as a signal that the Administration was seriously

contemplating a veto. Weyrich contacted Pat Buchanan who worked as a speech writer for President Nixon and informed him of the conservative objections to the bill. Connaught Marshner also drafted a "Dear Colleague" letter dated November 17 which was sent to every Republican and Democratic member of the House over the joint signatures of Sam Devine and Joe Waggoner. As Waggoner was a senior Southern Democrat and Devine was a conservative Republican with close ties to the leadership, both were viewed as more effective signers of that letter than Crane and Ashbrook.⁶⁸ The pressure now had shifted to the advocates of the Child Development Act to explain the charges which Agnew and The Emergency Committee for Children had been raising.

The conference report on the OEO bill, S. 2007, was completed during the first week of December. At that time, Mondale spoke on the floor of the Senate to rebut the conservative charges that the Child Development Act would have the negative effect which the conservatives were alleging.⁶⁹ Similarly, Congressman Brademas spoke in support of the Conference Report on the floor of the House on December 7. Brademas reiterated his support of the bill and decried the charges of the conservatives as "thoroughly irresponsible, even, indeed, absurd."⁷⁰ By this time, four of the five House Republican conferees opposed the Conference Report. Only Ogden Reid (R-New York), the original advocate of the bill, remained in favor of it. The switch of the four House Republican conferees had two causes: opposition to the child development program, and dissatisfaction with the legal services provision of the bill. The Child Development Act had been raised as a partisan issue by Agnew, and by the majority of House Republican conservatives. Thus, Minority Leader Gerald Ford could say that the other four conferees were:

"not opposed to a child development program -- but they cannot swallow this program and, therefore, I think we ought to be guided by their observations and by their comments."⁷¹

Crane and other conservative members from both parties, such as Ashbrook, LaMar Baker (R-Tennessee) and Edith Green (D-Oregon) took exception to the Brademas viewpoint and opposed it during the floor debate on December 7. The Conference Report carried with a vote of 211 in favor and 187 opposed.⁷² Since only one-third plus one of the membership of either the Senate or the House is required to sustain a veto, the stage was set for

such a response. With 186 members opposing the bill, it was likely that the 146 votes required to sustain the veto could be obtained.

The pressures which were brought on the White House for President Nixon to veto the bill came from conservatives in both the House and the Senate, including John Ashbrook who was considering a race for the Republican nomination for the presidency against Nixon. Ashbrook was the chairman of the American Conservative Union at this time, and his race against Nixon in the 1972 Republican primary became a factor in the White House's decision not only to veto the measure, but to "veto the bill for the right reasons."⁷³ On December 9, the President sent his veto message to the House and Senate criticizing all the aspects of the Economic Opportunity Amendments with particular emphasis on the revised Title Five, the "Child Development Programs." Nixon stated:

"The intent of Title Five is overshadowed by the fiscal irresponsibility, administrative unworkability, and family weakening implications of the system it envisions. We owe our children something more than good intentions."⁷⁴

Because the legislation originated in the Senate, that body had the first opportunity to either uphold or override the presidential veto. In a substantial shift of Senate sentiment on the Child Development bill, caused partly by dissatisfaction with the provisions of the bill, and partly by party loyalty, the Senate voted to uphold Nixon's veto.

The veto was not the end of the battle, as Crane found out. At the start of the Second Session of the 92nd Congress in 1972, Crane's staff reviewed the revised OEO Extension Act (H.R. 12350). They drafted a letter for Crane to write to Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Elliott Richardson that Project Head Start had a one billion dollar authorization request, whereas in the prior fiscal year's budget, it was \$376,317,000. Crane and his staff believed that the \$1 billion authorization was proposed by Brademas and his colleagues to obtain a new funding authorization for a child development program. Thus, if this one authorization bill were to pass, the Head Start program would be tripled; and Crane argued that there might be a back-door Child Development Act.⁷⁵ In responding to Crane, Richardson noted that:

"The administration is requesting for fiscal year 1973 the sum of \$393,642,000 for Project Head Start, an increase of \$17,325,000 over the amount actually appropriated by the Congress for fiscal year 1972."⁷⁶

Thus, Crane had the Administration oppose the committee members and indicate that it was not their intention via the OEO Extension Bill in 1972 to advocate a new child development program. Despite this effort and the Administration's opposition, on June 20, 1972, the Senate passed a new bill for child development by a vote of 73-12. The bill's advocates argued that the objections of the conservatives had been taken into account and that the new bill was more carefully drafted. Crane and his staff aides continued to monitor the bills and kept both his House colleagues and the Administration alerted to the problems in the bill. With the 92nd Congress coming to an end, and a Presidential election imminent, Child Development never reached the House floor in 1972.

The conservatives in the House and Senate learned from their activities on the Child Development battle not only that the Administration was susceptible to pressures from the conservatives and that individual Republican members, even those lacking leadership or committee positions, could affect the flow of legislation, but more importantly the value of combining operations within the Congress with pressure from outside lobbying groups. The Emergency Committee for Children was a new approach for conservatives. It was unusual for conservatives to build an outside constituency for their position. But, it was not a new technique; liberals in the Congress had employed it on a number of occasions, including their position on Vietnam.

In addition, the entire operation received virtually no assistance from the traditional conservative allies, namely the organized business community in Washington. Their assistance had been solicited in both legislative efforts, but the business community responded that they could not become involved in social issues such as these. Despite this lack of cooperation, the members and their staff aides showed they could offset the legislative agenda by reaching out to new allies, such as academic experts like Roger Freeman, and by building outside coalitions.

D. Conclusion

Dr. Frantzich makes the argument that "power is not identifiable until it is manifested."⁷⁷ Whether the conservative Republicans in the House of Representatives could have exercised this power earlier or not, is an interesting, but futile, question. The combination of circumstances was right by the time the first Nixon Administration was in progress. The first steps in combining into an effective faction within the party are shown in these two case studies.

The two bills had originated in two very different committees. Ways and Means had a reputation as a prestige committee which was seldom challenged successfully on the floor of the House. On the other hand, Education and Labor was considered to be a "breeding ground for extreme liberal proposals,"⁷⁸ which was occasionally rebuffed on the House floor. Despite this distinction, in both cases the opposition of the conservatives could have been dismissed as a futile effort beforehand. Dr. John Lees has noted the difficulties in challenging committee decisions on the floor of the House:

"It is often difficult and unrewarding to challenge committee decisions on the floor of the House even if attempted by a cohesive group of Representatives. Such opposition conflicts with the accepted ^{patterns of} behaviour in the House, is generally of moderate electoral value, and can be costly in terms of time, as it is difficult to get precise and accurate information on which to base such challenges. It is much easier to go along with committee recommendations in general. Not all committees, however, have the same prestige and influence, and some can expect considerable floor opposition."⁷⁹

The conservative Republicans had challenged the committee decisions and indirectly affected one issue, and led to the defeat of a second issue. The members were not a part of an organized faction, which made their success even more significant. Professors Milnor and Franklin note the difficulty which confronted these House members:

"The actual internal structure of the Congress, however, militates against the effectiveness of individual members, particularly those who do not have either seniority or a key position of power with which to bargain effectively."⁸⁰

In both cases, the conservative Republicans lacked these advantages.

To an outside observer, the coordinated activities of the conservative Republican House members might appear to be small steps. But to a group of individuals who had always been Republican "team players" and "loyal party men," they were giant strides in a new direction. The fact that several staff aides were pushing them all the way, does not lessen the significance of their actions. They had broken with the traditional patterns of activity in several ways:

1. They utilized staff resources for substantive legislative projects.
2. They allied themselves with outside academicians and journalists.
3. They had opposed their own Administration on a major legislative initiative, thus putting ideology above party.
4. They had worked together, where the traditional pattern had been either "go along" or "go alone." In other words, individualist conservatives were coordinating with each other and no retribution had been applied to them because of their split with Nixon and the House Republican leadership over FAP.
5. They had led the Administration to veto the Child Development Act, despite the fact that they had no formal organization within the House to provide a base.
6. They could claim some success since neither the Family Assistance Plan nor the Child Development Act had become law.

All of this was out of character for these members. They had not been legislative activists. They tended to resent too much staff involvement. They didn't usually ally themselves with outside individuals, unless it was on economic issues which were "safe" for their business constituents in their home districts. They were team players, unaccustomed to opposing their own President. Most importantly, they were unaccustomed to winning. Admittedly, Ed Derwinski did marshal a Post Office Reorganization bill through the 92nd Congress. But this was a bi-partisan effort of no particular ideological or even partisan importance. To have succeeded on two major issues with clear ideological dimensions was a new experience. It was especially new because the issues were in the "social" category. They were not national security questions or economic issues on which the Republicans had traditionally waged their battles.

Social battles would occupy a large portion of the attention of the Republican Study Committee in the years ahead. These two conservative

victories on Family Assistance and Child Development could be considered the beginning of the end of the Johnson-type Great Society programs. Of course, that a new trend was evolving in the American political process was not apparent at that time. However, these victories with the operational lessons which had been learned, provided the basis for the formation of the Republican Study Committee. The efforts of these members and staff aides were not imposed on the House without alternative resources being available.

In the formal structure of the Congress, there were research resources available. In addition, there were also ideological groups already in existence in the House. While none were adequate for the House Republican conservatives, the structure and resources within the House will be examined in the next chapter.



III. THE SETTING IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

A. Introduction

The conservative Republican members who had fought their party's President on the Family Assistance Plan, and then enlisted his support to veto the Child Development Act, were not analyzing policy in a vacuum. In theory, at least, they had a number of staff resources available to them. Some of these were provided on a non-partisan basis within the House. Others were external to the House, such as the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress and the General Accounting Office.

In addition, the institutional framework of the Congress was not alien to the establishment of ideological factions. An organization of liberal Democrats had been in place for more than a decade, and even the liberal Republicans had been organized into a formal group.

Neither the Republican committee staff, nor the Minority Leadership's staff, nor the Executive Branch resources had been of any assistance to the conservative Republicans in their FAP and Child Development battles. Yet, their resources were considerable and worthy of note in relation to the formation of a new group of conservative Republicans. These institutional structures had proven to be inadequate to the conservative Republicans in the House. If the Congress were to be viewed as a complex "law-making machine," all of these component parts would offer at least a potential opportunity for conservative Republicans to have a major input and to utilize the various parts of the machine. To understand why this did not happen, and why the conservative Republicans in the House decided to create an entirely new cog in the machine, we must review these components. Thus, at this point, we stop the machine, at a definite time as it existed in the early 1970s, and we examine, in turn, each of the parts which might be of help in meeting the specific research and legislative policy objectives of a number of conservative Republican House members. The activities of their colleagues in forming other complementary and competitive ideological groups, for example the liberal Democratic Study Group, are also examined. These other groups can also be labeled as cogs in the "law-making machine" which interact, sometimes very directly, with the new conservative Republican group.

These are the patterns and pieces which are examined in Chapter III, with the intention that they will give the proper perspective to subsequent events.

B. An Overview of the U.S. Congress

The American governmental system has been specifically designed around a system of checks and balances which includes separate Executive and Legislative Branches. The President may be of the same party as the majority of the Congress, but he is elected with a different constituency base than are the individual members of the House and Senate. So, the discipline which can be exerted by the party leadership on dissenting congressional members who vote against the leadership is minimal.¹

The decline in voter participation and the increased mobility of the American people have brought about a change in the nature of the political party. Members of Congress have become less dependent on party organizations in their congressional districts or states. Especially in the last decade, men and women who have never held public office at a lower level before, and who may not have even participated in party activities before, have run for federal office and won. They have put together their own organizations, starting with their friends and reaching out to various special interest groups. A liberal candidate, for example, might put together a coalition consisting of labor unions, environmental groups, welfare groups and others. On the other side, the conservative candidate would build a coalition of taxpayer groups, anti-abortion activists, right-to-work people² and defense advocates such as veterans' groups. Typically, these personal campaign committees raise the bulk of their own campaign funds, and the candidates rely on the regular party for only a small share of their campaign income. When these new members of Congress arrive in Congress via this "amateur route," they have little reason to be grateful to, or feel dependent upon, the formal leadership of their own parties.³

With the weakening of the party's structure, rewards and punishments are increasingly difficult to administer.⁴ The opportunity to reward regular party members in the legislature is also minimal. On only a few occasions have the party's campaign committees withheld funds from incumbent members' re-election bids because of their vote against the party line. Thus, some members of the U.S. Congress are independent not only of the Executive, but also of their formal party leadership.

A second factor which has reinforced the independence of the individual members of Congress is the growth of congressional staffs. Michael Malbin, who has studied the Congress for many years, states that the power of the Congress is directly related to the fact that it has a substantial staff of its own. He notes that:

"Without its staff, Congress would quickly become the prisoner of its outside sources of information in the executive branch and interest groups."⁵

In another way, Allen Schick comes to a similar conclusion:

"The present situation is distinctive in that Congress is moving to match its independence with analytic independence from the executive branch."⁶

Malbin specifically refers to the influence of staff on the party process:

"Staff influence extends well beyond the housekeeping functions familiar to most of us...the way staffs can substantially affect every step in the legislative process may be less familiar."⁷

The policymaking function of Congress has been the subject of many major studies. Some of these have examined the committee structure,⁸ while others have looked into the leadership,⁹ the electoral relationship of members,¹⁰ the ad hoc coalitions,¹¹ and the role of the two major parties in the Congress.¹² In addition, literature on congressional staffs has grown considerably.¹³

This growing literature has accompanied the growth of staffs themselves. In 1960, most members of Congress had a staff of three or four people; they now have 18 or more. Senate and House committee chairmen frequently have a staff of fifty or more. Many of these staff aides are involved directly or indirectly with promoting the re-election of their boss. These staff aides include the "case workers" in Washington and in the district office who try to assist constituents in resolving the problems they are having with the federal bureaucracy. Additional "press aides" will publicize the member in his home district media and deal with legislative inquiries on behalf of the member. The contribution of additional staff resources makes incumbent congressmen virtually invulnerable to electoral defeat¹⁴ and further reinforces the member's independence from the party leadership.

The critical role of the staff in the legislative process is a recurring theme throughout this thesis and one which is emphasized by economists James T. Bennett and Manuel H. Johnson. Bennett and Johnson assert that

"the congressional staff is the medium through which the public will is either actualized or thwarted."¹⁵ The effectiveness of the legislative policy groups such as the Democratic Study Group (DSG) and the Republican Study Committee (RSC) also depends largely on the effectiveness of their operating staff, a point which is made by Mark F. Ferber in his study of the DSG¹⁶ and examined in this thesis with regard to the RSC.

C. Differences Between the House and the Senate

The U.S. Congress is a bicameral institution made up of the complementary House of Representatives and Senate. Each jealously guards its prerogatives in relation to the other. While a major review of the differences between the two Houses of the U.S. Congress is beyond the scope of this thesis,¹⁷ some basic differences should be noted.

The structures of these two congressional bodies differ. The Senate with its smaller membership (2 from each state with a total of 100), less frequent elections (every 6 years as opposed to every 2 years in the House of Representatives), broader constituency (representing up to 44 House seats), and staggered terms of office, experiences a greater continuity and acts as a more generalist body than does the House. The House of Representatives is the originating body for all tax and appropriations bills and provides "for a measure of deliberation...because of its specialization and expertise" at the committee and subcommittee level.¹⁸

It is within this context of congressional activity that the Republican Study Committee has come to play an important role. The House with its more formal procedures, limited debate, germaneness requirements, and increased specialization, encounters increased demands for specialized sources of information. The Senate also has a significant requirement for staffing. Because there are fewer senators, each senator is assigned to more committees and consequently, is more likely to become either a committee or subcommittee chairman if he serves in the majority party, or a ranking minority member of a committee or subcommittee if he serves in the minority party. Once in this role, the senator can build a professional staff to serve his legislative needs and political ambitions. This personal staff is more crucial to the senator's work because he serves on more committees. As a result, the senator's ability to develop his own expertise is more limited than that of his House colleague.

The different roles of the House and Senate lead to different professional staff needs in the two bodies. Both have established a strong reliance on professional staff resources which have been provided by a number of sources, including specialized agencies under the control of the Congress, committee staffs within Congress, personal staffs of members, and the official party of the member. Each is examined in turn in this chapter with particular emphasis placed on their availability to conservative members of the Republican party in the House of Representatives.

D. Specialized Agencies Serving the Congress

There are four specialized policy agencies of the Congress: the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress. The GAO, OTA, and CBO were specifically designed to either monitor the Executive Branch or to offset the resource capabilities of the Executive Branch. The CRS has a different background because it was designed as a research arm for the Congress and never offset any particular advantage which the Executive Branch was perceived to possess.¹⁹ The GAO and the CRS are evaluated in some detail at this point. The CBO and OTA are considered briefly.

In early 1973, as the Republican Study Committee was being formed, neither the CBO nor the OTA were institutional factors which might affect the policy analysis capability of the conservative Republicans in the House. In fact, the CBO's and the OTA's role in the Congress was just being established at that time. The next two subsections consider the GAO and the CRS. A brief concluding section which discusses the OTA and CBO as they affected the Republican Study Committee will follow.

The General Accounting Office

The General Accounting Office, established in 1921, is directed by the Comptroller General of the United States. Its basic purpose is to:

"assist the Congress, its committees, and its members in carrying out their legislative and oversight responsibilities, consistent with its role as an independent non-political agency in the legislative branch; to carry out legal, accounting, auditing, and claim settlement functions with respect to federal government programs in operation as assigned by the Congress; and to make recommendations designed to provide more efficient and effective government operations."²⁰

The most important role of the General Accounting Office for the individual member of Congress or the congressional committee is to respond to their requests to investigate specific government programs. In addition, the GAO is charged with supporting the Congressional Budget Office and providing oversight assistance for specific committees in both the House and the Senate. It is important to note that while the GAO is responsive to the majority party, the facilities of the GAO are only available to members of the minority party under unusual circumstances. Senior Republican members on an oversight subcommittee, for example, could direct the GAO to aid them in their duties to review a specific program. In this case, however, the request is generally made on a bi-partisan basis together with the Democratic subcommittee chairman.

A traditional role of the General Accounting Office has been one of auditing. The GAO audits most programs of federal government agencies. It also provides accounting advisory services to different offices of the government. When a government program is audited by the General Accounting Office, prior to the release of the study to the Congress, a draft report is made available for comment to the audited agency, and the agency's comments are included in the final report. Thus, the GAO performs its function much like a commercial auditing firm would perform a "client review."

The General Accounting Office also provides legal advice to the Congress, reviews reports from regulatory agencies, and attempts to verify data such as energy reserves information in conjunction with the Department of Energy. Some members of the staff of the General Accounting Office work closely with professional staffs of House and Senate committees, especially the Appropriations Committee, and are on loan to these committees. Such professional staff aides are not available to individual members of the House, nor are they usually available to the minority members on a committee.

In practice, the General Accounting Office receives mixed reviews from its congressional critics:

"...while several congressional staff members, in conversation, have waxed enthusiastic about the accuracy and care of GAO's investigative reports to Congress, they have complained that these reports were often so out of date as to be irrelevant to the mis-spent past of terminated programs."²¹

The GAO has been helpful in overseeing the performance of specific government programs, but it does not provide analysis on pending proposals or independent judgments on the policy successes of existing programs. In other words, an efficiently run program is not necessarily successful in meeting the policy objectives of its legislative authors.

The Congressional Research Service

The Library of Congress, established in 1800, is one of the oldest arms of the Legislative Branch. The head of this organization, the Librarian of Congress, is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The primary statutory obligation of the Library is to serve the Congress in the form of the Congressional Research Service. The activity of the Library of Congress has expanded far beyond service to the Congress and the government and is considered the national library of record for the United States. It is responsible for maintaining copyrights, and it provides numerous other services to non-congressional users.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) at the Library of Congress is the most important division of the Library of Congress in terms of policy assistance for the Congress itself. The senior specialist department within CRS provides individual staff personnel with particular expertise covering the range of domestic and national security policy issues. The CRS assists specific committees of the House and Senate. Their work can range from major research projects which are eventually published by House or Senate committees or private organizations, to advice on computer applications in the Congress. CRS also compiles specific bibliographic inquiries in response to member requests and monitors legislation for congressional committees and individual members of the House and Senate.

The senior specialists of the Congressional Research Service can be asked to write speeches for members of Congress and otherwise act as if they were an extension of the member's personal policymaking staff. However, service such as this is not relied on by the majority of members except on the basis of personal contacts who are known to members of Congress and/or their senior staff aides.²² Part of the inevitable problem is that with the limited staff resources of the CRS and 535 members of Congress calling for assistance, the backlog of pending assignments is large. However, senior specialists are

often available for answering specific limited inquiries on relatively short notice. As Malbin notes:

"CRS is now terribly overworked and understaffed. Although it does good work for the most part, it cannot realistically be asked to do more with its present staff."²³

The senior specialists in the CRS tend to have close working relationships with civil servants whose policy areas coincide with their own. This closeness of contact has tended to make many conservative Republican House members suspicious of the political bias of the CRS personnel. While these professional research personnel may have no ideological bias within their own work product, the perception of the conservative Republicans is that they do,²⁴ which limits their usefulness.

Other Specialized Agencies

The Office of Technology Assessment is a recent addition to the policy-making support organizations within the Legislative Branch. It began operations in January 1974, following the passage of the Technology Assessment Act of 1972. The 1972 Act was primarily advocated by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) and his staff. The concept was developed in response to their inadequacy in dealing with various counterpart agencies in the Executive Branch, such as the Science Advisor to the President. Senator Kennedy has been the Chairman of the Board of OTA since its inception and exercises the single most pervasive influence over it. The OTA has been described as an extension of his personal staff, full of his "political cronies."²⁵ The basic function of OTA is to provide congressional committees with:

"assessments or studies that identify the broad range of consequences, social as well as physical, which can be expected to accompany various policy choices affecting the use of technologies."²⁶

While the role of OTA is supposedly limited to scientific matters, it has considered many social issues as well. Because OTA was established at the same time as the RSC, it did not provide a source for research analysis for conservative Republican members of the House.

The newest policy organization established within the Congress is the Congressional Budget Office. It is designed to support the House and Senate budget committees, and like many organizations, there were varied ideas about the role of the CBO. Political scientist Thomas Cronin writes:

"Some members of Congress hoped the CBO would provide hard, practical economic data to guide the drafting of specific legislation. Others viewed it as a potential 'think tank' that might provide Congress a more philosophical approach to spending and help restore national priorities. In fact, the CBO is most frequently used to provide routine cost estimates for spending and tax bills and to keep track of the overall budget level."²⁷

Like the OTA, the CBO was a new institutional component within the congressional complex of 1973-74. Because it was created in response to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344), it was not fully operational until 1975, and by that time, the Republicans in the House were becoming acquainted with the congressional budget process and how they might use it to help bring the federal budget under control.²⁸ The CBO has evolved into an office which provides forecasts and analyses of economic trends and alternative fiscal policies. Among the functions of the CBO is developing five-year cost estimates for implementing bills reported by congressional committees. These estimates give the CBO an opportunity to inject itself directly into the policy process. But, because the CBO's economic projections are based on Keynesian models, they are considered controversial by some scholars,²⁹ and the conservative Republicans in Congress who support monetarist or "supply-side" economic models cannot utilize the CBO for their policy work.

At the same time as the establishment of the Republican Study Committee, none of the four specialized policy agencies of the Congress were able to serve as a legislative research arm for individual minority members of the Congress. If they produced a study which reinforced the position of a conservative member, it would be useful supporting documentation. But, most conservative members of the House were not in a position, through party or seniority, to commission studies or to even capitalize on them when they were in the process of completion. As Richard Cohen notes in reviewing the four support agencies' performance on a specific project:

"In the end, the support agencies probably can hope to accomplish little more than to provide information and analysis to buttress opinions that Members of Congress already hold."³⁰

Malbin makes the additional point that it is as difficult for the Congress to evaluate the biases in the information from its own staff as from sources outside the Congress.³¹ While it is relatively easy for conservatives to criticize Kennedy appointees at OTA, this criticism does not take the place of useful analysis to buttress the conservative position, as Cohen points out.

These four support agencies provide substantial analysis for Congress, but as Samuel C. Patterson has noted: "Whether congressional leaders and committees use policy analysis effectively is another question."³²

Because of the perceived biases of the agencies and the limitations of the requestor, these organizations do not fill the need for professional research staff support for minority members. Even if the analysis were available, the utilization of it would still require an institutional mechanism to get the analysis directly into the legislative process. What is clear is that in 1973, these organizations did not meet the needs of the conservative members of the House.

E. The Staffs of Congressional Committees

The development of professional committee staffs for the Congress is relatively recent. "By the time of World War II only the two Appropriations Committees and the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation had well-developed professional staffs."³³ Under the terms of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, the hiring of professional staff aides for all committees was encouraged. The first steps under the Legislative Reorganization Act were modest, and the effect was viewed as an experiment. As Professor Dahl said at the time:

"The growth of committee staff has both dangers and possibilities. Until Congressmen learn the proper scope and the limitations of the expert, there are two contrary dangers. One is the inability to use the staff -- a waste of the expertise, and a continued substitution of amateurs for expert judgments on technical questions. The other is that professional staff members will develop far more policy influence than they ought to have. Nevertheless, there are factors which guard against this danger: the professional staffs are small (the Legislative Reorganization Act fixes the limit at four); and they can be controlled, once the committee members understand fully what ought and what ought not to be expected of the expert."³⁴

Since that time, the staff size has grown substantially, and has been substantially directed away from a professional basis toward a partisan basis. The formal authority for selecting committee staff members rests with the committee chairman. Most chairmen jealously guard their appointment authority and in some cases their approval is required even for the hiring of minority staff who report directly to the ranking minority member.

"In 1962, for example, out of a total of 504 staff persons for all House committees (both standing and select), only 43 were assigned to the minority; only 54 of 508 staff members for all Senate committees were assigned to the minority. The joint committees had only 2 out of 72 assigned to the minority."³⁵

This approximate ratio was still in effect at the time of the establishment of the Republican Study Committee. As Ben Blackburn (R-Georgia), a senior member of the House Banking and Currency Committee commented:

"A minority committee member couldn't ask the regular minority committee staff to do anything for him. There were only three minority committee staff professionals on the House Banking and Currency Committee and they all owed their allegiance to the ranking minority member rather than to the whole minority membership. The ranking minority member was a liberal Republican from New Jersey. Besides, they were outnumbered by 52 professional staff members reporting to the majority."³⁶

The problem of minority committee staff representation is one which has been of long-standing concern to the formal Republican leadership. A book of essays was edited by James Cleveland (R-New Hampshire) in 1966 entitled We Propose: A Modern Congress.³⁷ One of the major recommendations made in this book was for one-third minority staffing to represent the one-third of the House which was Republican. Stephen Frantzich summarized the situation well when he said: "The wailings of frustration^{expressed} by junior members and those from the minority party find manifold justification."³⁸ Professor Robinson points out the practical disadvantage under which the House Republicans were laboring:

"The controversy over minority staffing is not surprising in view of a Congressman's natural ambition for power. Information is a source of power, and the majority understandably wishes to restrict the minority's chances to acquire power, even though it knows that it may itself someday be in the minority."³⁹

While the requirements for professional staff consultation vary from member to member, there is a requirement for access to some professional staff advice on the merits of legislation which is considered in the member's committee and on the House floor. As Professor Dechert notes, the needs vary from member to member:

"Each Congressman has varying information requirements beyond the common minimum needed to participate in corporate decisions. His individual information needs vary according to his particular constituencies, his interests, his committee assignment(s), and his own personal expertise."⁴⁰

This review should make it clear that for a minority member who was not a senior member on a committee, the opportunity for obtaining staff assistance was severely limited:

1. because the number of minority staff aides was limited, and
2. because the minority staff was responsive to the ranking minority member, rather than to all the minority members.

Thus, for aggressive junior members in the Republican party, the need for "expert" advice was not provided by the committee staff. This limitation has already been seen in the battle over President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan,⁴¹ and will be seen in several later legislative case studies.⁴²

A senior Republican House member said:

"The key guys [on a committee staff] reflect the chairman. Therefore, I do my own work. You can't even use minority staff if you want to do something which is against the ranking minority committee member who controls it."⁴³

F. The Member's Personal Staff

Members of Congress have a number of perquisites available to handle the affairs of their office and to serve their constituents. In addition to a suite of offices in one of the House Office Buildings in Washington, the typical member will have one or more constituent service offices in his congressional district. He receives an official staff allotment of 18 individual employees, the majority of whom are involved in constituent services. Because of the growth of the service role, most of these personal staff employees are not involved in legislative issues. Professor Robinson said more than a decade ago:

"Few Members of the House of Representatives have professional staffs because the daily demands of answering mail, caring for constituents' Washington problems, and managing ordinary office duties exhaust most of the financial resources."⁴⁴

The limitation of resources is not the only reason for this heavy emphasis on district-related matters. Emphasizing the service role of the legislator focuses attention away from his voting patterns. Morris Fiorina states that "Policy voting displeases as many voters as it pleases in the district."⁴⁵ Therefore, according to Fiorina, members tend to place heavy emphasis on their constituency service role.

The policy input for members on issues coming from staff does not emanate from their own personal staffs. A survey conducted in the 89th Congress showed the average office workload division as follows:

25% of its time in direct constituency service,
41% of its time in mail inquiries,
10% of its time in education and publicity, and
only 14% of its time on legislative support.⁴⁶

The direct policy staff available to a member of Congress usually consists of his legislative assistant (LA). A legislative assistant, however, has a substantial workload. In 1977, 28% of the offices surveyed by authors Harrison W. Fox, Jr. and Susan Webb Hammond had no legislative assistants.⁴⁷ They note that:

"In most offices, one LA handles legislative matters in all issue areas: briefing, drafting floor statements, researching data, and drafting amendments. He often also handles legislative mail, i.e., letters from constituents about pending legislation or current issues."⁴⁸

As a consequence of this workload, most legislative assistants do not have the opportunity to review their member's committee work, track major legislative issues, or concentrate on legislative initiatives. Their primary workload almost inevitably revolves around processing constituent mail dealing with legislative issues. This workload leaves little time for even a creative LA to work with his member or his colleague on major legislative initiatives.

G. Official Party Staff in the House

The official party staff reports to the party leadership. While the party staff performs certain functions for all party members, these are limited. For example, among House Republicans the Whip Notice is a useful service provided by the office of the Minority Whip. It is published weekly and serves to notify members and staff aides of forthcoming floor activity. Similarly, the Republican Conference Legislative Digest reviews major bills for the next week, and excerpts arguments from the official committee reports on them. The official party staff helps the leadership set agendas, prepare for their press conferences, and negotiate with counterparts in the other party on floor schedules and related logistical questions. But there is virtually no help provided to individual members.

Added to this is the ideological division within each party. As Fox and Hammond note:

"The ideological split in the Republican Party has resulted in perhaps more reliance on groups within the party, the (liberal) Wednesday Group, the (conservative) Study Group (sic), than on the leadership."⁴⁹

Another potential source of Republican information is the ad hoc groups of Republicans which gather weekly in a social environment to discuss legislative or policy matters or other issues of potential concern, but their policy influence is minimal.

The limitation is again apparent: party leadership staff is not available to rank and file members for assistance on their legislative agendas.

H. Ideological Groups in the House

The context in which the Republican Study Committee was organized included not only relationships within its own party, both in the Administration and in the Congress, but also with the dominant Democratic party. The House Republicans, accustomed to working in the minority, lagged behind their Democratic colleagues in forming ideological factions within the House. There are two reasons for this: 1) the House Democrats were more diverse ideologically and they tended to be more divided in their political perspectives than were the Republicans and 2) opposition status both within the Congress and during the Kennedy-Johnson Administration tended to unite the Republicans in negative positions which were acceptable to the overwhelming majority of Republican members of the House.

However, beginning with the Nixon Administration and the advocacy of policies which were opposed to what many Republicans believed, Republican conservatives felt the need for greater unity, especially since the senior Republicans who had long been considered "regular conservatives" were now in positions of influencing public policy decisions. They remained senior members of the minority party, but as the ranking minority members on committees, they became the chief contact points with high-level officials in the Nixon Administration. Their views were being heard. As they met and negotiated with the Nixon Administration spokesmen, they tended to

accept the Administration's views as partially their own. They then altered their legislative objectives to coincide with the Administration's. In effect, they became spokesmen for Administration bills, relying on Administration drafting, staff, witnesses and other resources to pass "their" new legislative program. The Nixon Family Assistance Plan, which was discussed in Chapter II, is a good example of this situation. This change was not well received by some of the younger conservative Republican members, who were unhappy with specific proposals emanating from the first Nixon Administration.

The effectiveness of ideological factions in the House of Representatives had already been established. The Democratic Study Group had been formed in 1959 and was a formidable force to be reckoned with, particularly since the demise of the Conservative Coalition.⁵⁰ It is argued in this section that the DSG had become the dominant ideological faction within the House. This was the result of the acceptance of the basic DSG-liberal legislation agenda by the Democratic Administration of Lyndon B. Johnson. Thus, the DSG provided much of the impetus for these social welfare legislative proposals. At this same time, the concept of conservatism was at its nadir. Barry Goldwater, (R-Arizona) the personification of conservatism, had been trounced in the 1964 presidential election, and the national mood was inclined to accept a major new emphasis on social programs to fight the war on poverty at home, along with the fight against Communism in Southeast Asia.

The Democratic Study Group has played a vital role in the legislative process in the House of Representatives since its formation more than two decades ago and has become the prototype for ideological factions in the House of Representatives. Because of this important role, it is analyzed in detail in this section. Other organizations and factions within the Congress are also reviewed. The Wednesday Group of Republican liberals, the Democratic Research Organization of Democratic conservatives, the Senate Steering Committee of conservative Senators, and other minor groups and organizations all play a role in the modern Congress. An understanding of their roles is essential for an understanding of the role of the Republican Study Committee. Ideological groups have become very important in the modern Congress, as Harvey Mansfield notes:

"Because effective action is usually group action, a number of more or less durable though loosely knit blocs have emerged in Congress. The anti-New Deal Coalition...had negative goals and disinte-

grated in defeat in the 1960s. More lately the Democratic Study Group, the Congressional Black Caucus, the Women's Caucus...have embodied efforts to consolidate strength for the advancement of positive, if perhaps, parochial goals."⁵¹

These are the groups which are reviewed in detail in this section.

The Democratic Study Group

The Democratic Study Group is considered to be the most important prototype of all the ideological support organizations in the Congress. For example, Michael J. Malbin writing in the National Journal has noted "the success of the Democratic Study Group (DSG) has made it the organization others try to copy."⁵² The DSG is an organization of liberal Democrats in the House of Representatives. While it was officially formed in 1959, it traces its origins to the election results of 1958, the off-year congressional election in the second Eisenhower term. That election expanded the Democratic majority in the Congress to produce an overwhelming margin of votes in opposition to Eisenhower's programs. On the day following the election in 1958, Eisenhower attacked the congressional "budget busters," thus, setting a more conservative tone than the liberal Democrats hoped he would follow.

The animosity that Eisenhower engendered came about during a period of liberal activism and followed earlier attempts at coordination of liberal legislative efforts. Immediately after the 1956 election and Eisenhower's enormous win over Stevenson, a number of Democratic members of the House agreed to return to Washington to discuss ways to improve communication among liberal Democrats in the House and to advance their own legislative goals in the 85th Congress. This took the form of a "Counter-State of the Union Message" to be delivered in early 1957. The resulting statement was promptly dubbed the "Liberal Manifesto" by the press. It covered a broad range of issues, including foreign policy and national defense, immigration, civil rights, civil services, education, health, housing, taxes, labor, business and industry, agriculture, public works, resources, atomic energy, veterans' benefits and governmental operations.⁵³

The primary author of this "Liberal Manifesto" was Congressman Eugene McCarthy (D-Minnesota) who, with the cooperation of Congressmen Lee Metcalf (D-Montana), Chet Holifield (D-California) and John Blatnik (D-

Minnesota), produced a draft which was widely circulated to House Democrats. The paper was originally released to the press on January 8, 1957, prior to Eisenhower's State of the Union Message. In a short period of time, more than 80 of the 435 members of the House had signed the program. All of them were Democrats. The majority came from industrial states, and approximately three-quarters of them represented heavily urban constituencies.⁵⁴ The authors of the Liberal Manifesto expected commitments from the signers to support the comprehensive liberal program of legislation rather than their more established system of trading votes on an issue-by-issue, local or regional basis.

Shortly before the 1958 election, Frank Thompson (D-New Jersey), secretary of the ad hoc group of Democrats who advocated the Liberal Manifesto, claimed on the floor of the House, "In my opinion, a statement that we have accomplished about 90% of our program is not unrealistic."⁵⁵ Despite Thompson's claim, certain political realities were imposed on the liberal program. Some Democratic incumbents were unwilling to sign the program despite the fact that they might have agreed with 90% of it. One or two specific proposals might have been anathema to their constituents which precluded their participation in the entire program. In addition, the Republicans added the costs of the programs being advocated by their liberal Democratic colleagues and accused them of profligacy with their excessive spending proposals.

The publication of the Liberal Manifesto was accompanied by internal attempts to improve communication among liberal House Democrats through informal discussions, frequently held in McCarthy's office, and by a rudimentary whip system conducted by the leaders of this early bloc.⁵⁶ This loosely structured group of liberal activists took the name of "McCarthy's Marauders." There were no formal officers, and participation in the ad hoc steering committee depended almost exclusively on one's willingness to commit time and effort to the activities. So, members who showed up routinely for meetings or who volunteered for specific activities would find themselves becoming more influential in the inner circle of the group.

The McCarthy group also held educational meetings with academics, small dinner meetings to discuss issues of concern, and various other legislative activities which would later be formalized by the Democratic Study Group and eventually emulated by the Republican Study Committee.

A major landmark occurred when the group hired George Frain as a staff researcher on June 1, 1957, and provided him with clerical assistance to handle the staff work. Frain's salary, paid out of the clerk-hire allowance allotted by the government, was jointly covered by Congressmen Metcalf, McCarthy, George McGovern (D-South Dakota), John E. Moss (D-California) and Frank Thompson. Frain worked for the group for one year until July 1958, when he returned to Thompson's office full-time but still continued in an informal association with the McCarthy group.

McCarthy's leadership activity declined in late 1957 because of his 1958 campaign for the Senate from Minnesota, and the mantle of leadership then fell on Metcalf and Thompson. In preparation for the 1958 elections, the ad hoc group enlisted staff aides from member offices to prepare memoranda rebutting Republican charges and lauding Democratic achievements in the 85th Congress. The group generally assisted the members of the liberal bloc who had committed themselves to the Liberal Manifesto one and a half years earlier.

In addition, research material was sent to other Democratic candidates who were thought to be sympathetic to the liberal perspective. A letter signed by 12 members was written on Metcalf's stationery. More than 50 of the 90 candidates who received letters accepted the group's offer of information, and 35 of these were elected to the 86th Congress in 1958. Upon election, a number of these new members of Congress visited with Metcalf and Thompson and expressed their appreciation for the assistance offered by the group. Thus, the groundwork was laid for substantial legislative efforts in 1959 with the start of the 86th Congress.

One of the most important of these early efforts was an attempt to curb the power of the Rules Committee in the House. This committee acts as the "traffic cop" for all legislation. That is, it plays the critical role of scheduling legislation, deciding which amendments may or may not be offered, if any, and occasionally pigeonholing legislation which had already passed a substantive committee. The Rules Committee, long dominated by its conservative chairman Howard "Judge" Smith (D-Virginia) and the equally conservative ranking Democratic member William Colmer (D-Mississippi), had thwarted action on many liberal measures during the 85th Congress. This additional roadblock was frustrating to the liberals in the Democratic party.

Also, recent changes in the makeup of the committee threatened to make it even more conservative at the very time that the liberals had scored major victories in the House. Consequently, the liberals decided that an early joint effort in 1959 was needed. Changes in the House rules would allow the majority to work its will by permitting the originating committees' bills to reach the House floor.

The ad hoc group decided to consult with Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-Texas) about the Rules Committee problem. The results of the meeting on January 3, 1959, were not totally satisfactory although Rayburn did indicate that he was sympathetic to the group's problem. Rayburn agreed to support procedural steps to obtain consideration by the full House if bills reported by legislative committees were delayed in the Rules Committee for an unreasonable length of time. The Rayburn agreement was confirmed with then Minority Leader Joe Martin (R-Massachusetts). Martin was subsequently displaced from his Republican leadership position by Charles Halleck (R-Indiana), and as a consequence, the Rayburn-Martin agreement was nullified. Further problems arose for the embryonic organization.

As the new Congress began, the group continued to evolve. Attendance at meetings increased, written notices for briefing sessions were used and by April 1959, the group was called "The Congressional Study Group." This name was adopted because it was considered noncontroversial. It was thought that a more ideological name might constitute a threat of insurgency which would be frowned upon in the higher policymaking circles of the Democratic party.

Despite their election successes which gave them a majority of the majority party in the Congress, the liberal Democrats were unable to marshal their forces in critical votes as the Congress progressed. The activist liberal members were becoming increasingly convinced that action had to be taken in order to assure the country that the constituencies which had voted them into the Congress had not misplaced their confidence and that positive legislative action would result. Their frustration stemmed from several factors. The more senior Democrats tended to be more conservative. While the liberals could outvote them in committees, the seniority system assured the senior members of a disproportionate influence with the Speaker of the House. There was also a belief that the senior members were not

as concerned with meeting the demands of their constituencies as were the newly-elected members. These factors combined with the conservative position of the Rules Committee to thwart the liberals' action.

By the summer of 1959, there had been no substantive legislative measures enacted, and it became apparent that Speaker Rayburn would not be in a position to honor the commitment he had made earlier to push matters through the Rules Committee.⁵⁷

The passage of the Landrum-Griffin Bill to correct excesses of labor union mismanagement was widely regarded as a rebuff to the liberals and a conservative victory, again, despite the apparently powerful position of the liberals in both the House and the Senate.⁵⁸ With these and other legislative setbacks, the ad hoc leaders of the group determined that they had to formalize their operations. The liberal leaders were frustrated by their lack of performance:

"Yet what was especially grating was the failure of liberals to marshal the potential forces that they did have. Many decisions simply did not reflect the numbers they perceived to be sympathetic."⁵⁹

Organizational meetings were held on September 5, 7, and 9, 1959, resulting in a letter of September 12 being sent to more than 150 Democrats inviting them to join the Democratic Study Group.

These early meetings, recounted in detail by both Mark Ferber and Kenneth Kofmehl, pointed out several major lessons the liberals had learned. The newly-appointed Executive Committee selected a name which specifically avoided words like "liberal" or "action" because of their adverse connotations. Their party loyalty was stressed in order to avoid problems with the Democratic party leadership. By late December, a press statement was released announcing the organization and stressing its willingness to "supplement and assist the leadership to further our party's program."⁶⁰ The Executive Committee tried to minimize any impression of being mavericks or insurgents.

In early 1960, the formalization of the Democratic Study Group began. An agenda was discussed and ratified which included major policy legislation in virtually every area of concern, although the precise statement of these legislative objectives was left intentionally vague in order to avoid the type

of problem which the Liberal Manifesto had presented to some possible recruits. The group established specific task forces in each broad area and authorized the temporary chairman, Lee Metcalf, to appoint the task forces. By May 1960, the Democratic Study Group hired a full-time staff director, Bill Phillips. A press release was issued which noted that Phillips would be hired for \$780 a month and would serve on the clerk-hire payrolls of 8 members of the House.

With the assumption of the presidency by John Kennedy in 1961, the Democratic Study Group changed its focus. The DSG began its role in opposition to the Republican Administration of Eisenhower by proposing liberal alternatives. During the 1960s, the DSG researched and promoted efforts in civil rights legislation, increasing the minimum wage law, promoting medicare, and establishing federal aid to education.

The DSG began its active fundraising efforts in the congressional campaigns of 1968. By 1970 with breaks coming in the Democratic party between hawks and doves on Vietnam, the DSG chairman, James O'Hara (D-Michigan), held the view that "it was more important to keep the DSG together on those issues where we did agree than to break it up on issues where we differed."⁶¹ So, O'Hara avoided divisive issues such as those relating to Vietnam.

By 1961, the published output of the DSG included dozens of issue papers and fact sheets on major legislative issues, and its constantly evolving whip system. The DSG publications were used to "provide the congressman with 'shortcuts' toward gaining the information he needs."⁶²

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to recount all of the major legislative activities in which the Democratic Study Group engaged between its formation in 1959 to the time of the founding of the Republican Study Committee in 1973, however several of these activities are of particular interest. During the Kennedy Administration, the DSG worked intensively on civil rights legislation, and by the time of Lyndon Johnson's accession to the presidency in 1963, the DSG was firmly in place as an established faction within the House of Representatives. The 1964 Johnson landslide substantially increased the Democratic majority in the Congress resulting in the "Great Society Congress" of 1965-66. During this time, the DSG members worked closely with the House Democratic leadership, particularly Speaker John McCormack

(D-Massachusetts) and with its partisan colleagues in making discrimination illegal, and substantially increasing federal governmental programs for education, health care, poverty elimination and other social projects. As the chief ideological rallying point for the liberals, the DSG and its members were a key element in promoting the passage of all of these programs.⁶³

In addition to its emphasis on specific legislative policies, it is noteworthy that a continuing area of interest to the DSG staff and leadership has been reform of the House rules of procedure. This included changes in the House seniority system, which were eventually adopted by the early 1970s,⁶⁴ the evolution of the House Democratic Policy and Steering Committee and other House rules and policies. The seniority system was eventually modified to require that every standing committee chairman be subject to the approval of the Democratic Caucus in a recorded vote at the beginning of every Congress. This changed the earlier policy of strict seniority determining each chairman. This reform was adopted at the start of the 93rd Congress in January 1973, largely due to DSG pressure. Besides reforming the seniority system, the Democratic Study Group pushed reforms to open to the public all committee hearings, empower the Democratic Steering Committee to appoint members to vacancies on all the standing committees and to elect Ways and Means Subcommittee chairmen, and to limit the number of subcommittee chairmanships one individual could hold.

An interesting aspect of the DSG emphasis on reform should be noted. As additional DSG members achieved the position of committee chairmen within the House, the committee staff began to play a more important role to the member. The reliance of these senior members on material from the Democratic Study Group and, it could be said, the influence of the Democratic Study Group on legislative issues, were reduced. As Washington Post reporter Mary Russell noted:

"The reform era it was organized to initiate is largely over, and some of the missionary zeal that infected its members is gone.

Its founding fathers, such as Reps. Morris K. Udall (Ariz.), Frank Thompson, Jr. (N.J.), and Richard Bolling (Mo.), are now part of the power structure as committee chairmen. They need the DSG less, and are less active in it."⁶⁵

Although the DSG's initiatory legislative action decreased, the consistent pattern of DSG support for House reforms is amply documented. In supporting the Democrats reforms the members of the DSG vote together on the floor of the House. As Ripley noted:

"A study by the DSG staff of voting in the Ninetieth Congress (1967-68) concluded that DSG members voted together 91% of the time in support of Democratic programs and policies. An academic study also reached the conclusion that DSG members voted quite cohesively."⁶⁶

He continues, however:

"This is hardly surprising since ideological agreement is the basis for self-selected memberships."⁶⁷

The Democratic Study Group was recognized as part of the congressional structure by the time of the formation of the Republican Study Committee.

Some of the circumstances surrounding the DSG's formation were different from those of the Republican Study Committee. The Democratic Study Group was formed primarily to advocate certain changes in domestic policy.⁶⁸ At the time of the formation of the Democratic Study Group in the late 1950s, there was a bi-partisan foreign policy. Some DSG members eventually led the opposition to American involvement in Vietnam, but the organization never became formally involved in the anti-war activism of some of its key members. It should be noted, however, that by 1969, the DSG cohesion on foreign affairs voting was substantially diminished. Stevens, *et. al.*, attribute this to internal dissension over U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.⁶⁹ The Republican Study Committee, on the other hand, was formed out of dissatisfaction with both domestic and foreign policy issues.

The Democratic Study Group was formed while the opposition party occupied the White House. The DSG was attempting to exercise power in the Congress while the Administration was controlled by the other party. It was hoped that the formal Democratic party leadership would lead the opposition to the Administration's policies but, largely because of the liberal-conservative split within the Democratic party, it was unable to do so.

The Republican Study Committee was formed during a Republican Administration largely to enable members of the President's own party, particularly those who were without issue-oriented staff resources, to be

heard in the public policy process. Mark Ferber notes that if Harry Truman had been succeeded by another Democrat instead of Eisenhower, the DSG would never have been formed.⁷⁰

The DSG was formed while the Democrats were a majority in the House. Because the majority party is the majority, and it controls the committee activity and legislative agenda, the factions within the majority party are more likely to have direct legislative influence. The RSC, on the other hand, was described in its early days as being a "majority of a minority" because the Republican party was in a minority position in the House of Representatives. Partially offsetting the RSC's disadvantage was the presence of a Republican Administration.

As Chapter II has stated, in the first Nixon Administration the House Republicans were playing a major role in the legislative process. The formation of the RSC was hastened because the members wanted to make certain that their legislative input would not be limited solely to the leadership and senior members.

The similarities between the Democratic Study Group and the Republican Study Committee should also be noted.

By the time of the "institutionalization" of the Democratic Study Group (the mid-1960s), the liberals were the predominant wing of the House Democratic party. Similarly, at the time that the Republican Study Committee was institutionalized within its party (1974), the conservative wing was dominant in the Republican party in the House. The dominance of the RSC and DSG was emphasized by the feeble counterpart ideological organizations. These included the Democratic Research Organization of conservative Democrats, and the Wednesday Group of liberal Republicans. Both organizations can be described as smaller, weaker, and less effective than the DSG in the Democratic party or the RSC in the Republican party.

The basic premise on which both organizations were formed remained the same: the leaders of the organization were frustrated by the lack of staff support and lack of cohesion and effectiveness in dealing with major public policy issues. The organizations were designed to correct these deficiencies.

The Wednesday Group

The Wednesday Group is the organization of liberal House Republicans. It was established in 1963 and has its own staff and research capability. Like the Democratic Study Group, the Wednesday Group was formed during an opposition presidency. The Wednesday Group was a part of the minority congressional party, however, and, the DSG was a faction of the majority party. As one commentator described it, the Republicans in the House

seemed forced into the position of saying either 'no' or 'me too' to Democratic initiatives, some of which came from the DSG. In this situation there was a need for an entity to develop 'constructive alternatives'.⁷¹

The Wednesday Group leaders viewed themselves as the promoters of these "constructive alternatives."

The organizers of the Wednesday Group were leaders of the liberal bloc of the Republican membership in the House, including former New York City Mayor John Lindsay, Senators Charles Mathias (R-Maryland) and Robert Stafford (R-Vermont), and Congressman Stanley Tupper (R-Maine). During the 1964 presidential campaign of conservative Senator Barry Goldwater, the majority of the members of the newly-formed Wednesday Group, numbering about 15, opposed the Goldwater nomination.

Following Goldwater's defeat in November 1964, the House leadership elections were hotly disputed in January 1965. While the main contest developed between the incumbent Minority Leader Charles Halleck (R-Indiana) and his insurgent opponent, Gerald R. Ford (R-Michigan), members of the Wednesday Group were approached by all sides seeking support. However, Svend Groennings has stated that their impact in that particular election was not obvious.⁷²

Despite their divergent views on the Halleck-Ford race, most Wednesday Group members believed that the leading candidate for the position of chairman of the House Republican Conference, Melvin R. Laird (R-Wisconsin) was unacceptable because he had served as chairman of the 1964 Republican Platform Committee. However, it took some time for them to decide on a candidate to oppose Laird. Their candidate did not emerge until the eve of the election when they agreed to support Peter H.B. Frelinghuysen (R-New Jersey). Frelinghuysen came from an old and distinguished Republican family.

He was not widely known to be a member of the Wednesday Group, and it would have been disadvantageous for Frelinghuysen to be so identified. The conservatives would have attacked his liberal ties because of the outspoken opposition of several Wednesday Group members to the Goldwater campaign. Despite Frelinghuysen's late start, he came within seven votes of defeating Laird, which proved, at least to the liberals' satisfaction, that they could be serious contenders for leadership positions within the party.

By early 1965, several members of the Wednesday Group attempted to hire a research staff person for the Wednesday Group to formulate position papers for the members. Other members of the group believed that such an activity might develop into an ideologically-divisive element within the Republican party and this led to a dispute between the two factions. Those favoring the hiring of the research person took it upon themselves to hire their researcher from their own clerk-hire accounts. That person was Dr. Douglas Bailey who was to play a major role in establishing the Wednesday Group as the first Republican legislative faction with a research staff of its own. Bailey's research activities eventually focused in two areas: short critical papers which dealt with the Johnson Administration's programs, and longer research papers which were often presented to the public through major press conferences.

The hiring of Bailey in 1965 was considered divisive by many liberal Republicans and not necessarily in the best interest of the party. However, since the time of this hiring dispute, numerous ad hoc member coalitions being formed on Capitol Hill found it necessary to hire their own staff personnel. The staff was hired on a basis of a commonly-perceived need and issues such as party loyalty were seldom raised.

The membership of the Wednesday Group expanded slowly. It grew from 20 members in 1965, to 26 members by the end of 1967, and 28 members in 1970. This growth meant more members of Congress were being contacted by the Wednesday Group and that the range of viewpoints presented was slightly broader. From a practical viewpoint however, because the Wednesday Group's staff was listed on House members' clerk-hire accounts, it also meant that there was a greater potential base of support for the salary of the research staff. Unlike the Republican Study Committee and

the Democratic Study Group, the Wednesday Group adopted a policy to expand its membership by invitation. The Wednesday Group decided in the late 1960s that the group should not grow larger than about 30 members. When additional vacancies occurred, candidates were considered by the group's membership committee with the view toward broadening the geographic base, and House committee base, while still assuming an ideological position at the center or to the left within the Republican party.

The Wednesday Group also differed from other ideological groups within the Congress because it had early problems with the funding of its staff. Specifically, some of the members continued to view the Wednesday Group as a discussion forum for members rather than as an organization to promote an ideological position within the Republican party. Consequently, the payroll support from the membership was erratic, and the payroll requirements were not always met by congressional sources. Because of this shortfall, the group established the Committee for Republican Research, largely for the purpose of meeting Bailey's payroll. This newly established committee raised several thousand dollars from outside individuals and from "Republicans for Progress," an external organization which promoted the liberal wing of the Republican party. The immediate financial crisis which arose in the 1965-66 period was met, and by 1967, an annual solicitation enclosing Wednesday Group research products which had appeared in the Congressional Record was mailed. The Wednesday Group's financial resources have always been limited, and until it began relying more heavily on clerk-hire contributions in the early 1970s, employment by the Wednesday Group was somewhat precarious, particularly since the organization ran deficits in both 1966 and 1968.⁷³

The formation of the Republican party's official Republican Research Committee in 1965 compelled Minority Leader Gerald Ford to request that the Wednesday Group change the name for their outside funding committee to avoid confusion. The Committee for Republican Research thereafter became the Institute for Republican Studies.

The Wednesday Group has continued to meet over the years, usually on Wednesday. Each member makes a brief statement on matters of concern, and the staff will occasionally present the results of research papers

which are compiled by an ad hoc task force of members. In recent years these research areas have included Title IX Education Act Amendments, racial discrimination, U.S.-Canadian relations, small business concerns, congressional redistricting reform, and civil service reform. The Wednesday Group's papers are usually longer and more detailed than those issued by the Republican Study Committee. The topics dealt with in these papers are those which are longer-range rather than those dealing with the day-to-day legislative schedule. These long-range legislative objectives are admittedly unrealistic. In the Wednesday Group's view, these objectives provide jumping off points for further discussion rather than final legislative solutions -- appropriate concerns for an organization which has never viewed itself as being a powerful force for affecting legislation on the House floor.

The Wednesday Group's primary means of communication has remained the weekly member meetings. The group's former staff director, Patricia Goldman, noted that the members of the Wednesday Group see the weekly meetings as the most important part of the organization.⁷⁴ In 1970, the Wednesday Group began publication of a weekly legislative summary discussing major points of forthcoming legislation for use by the members.⁷⁵

Wednesday Group members tend to be involved in one or more of the organization's projects. New projects are undertaken only if there is the staff capability either from the regular staff of the Wednesday Group or from the individual member staffs. According to Goldman, the Wednesday Group would prefer to delve into a number of varied issue areas rather than concentrate on two or three specific areas.⁷⁶ This approach is counter to the one followed by the legislatively-oriented factions which concentrate their primary activities on a limited number of major issues rather than scattering their attention among a larger number of issues.

The Wednesday Group has maintained a low profile similar to that of their conservative Republican colleagues in the early stages of the Republican Study Committee. Because the members of the Wednesday Group considered their organization to be primarily a discussion group consisting of members with a similar outlook, they did not see any advantage in gathering publicity for the organization. Until recently, the Wednesday Group's name did not even appear on the office door, and the telephone was answered by the extension number rather than the organization's name.

The Wednesday Group's legislative impact has been small, and its impact on the House Republican party has been minimal. This was confirmed by Professor Ripley who noted:

"The Club (sic) differs from the DSG in an important sense: while the DSG represents a majority of the Democrats and cooperates with the formal party leaders, the Wednesday Club represents a relatively small minority of the Republicans in the House and frequently disagrees with the Republican leaders on a number of issues."⁷⁷

In many ways it has functioned more as a social club for the minority of Republicans who hold liberal viewpoints on the issues, and in this regard, it is really closer to the SOS and the Chowder and Marching social groups of House Republican members. The impact of the Wednesday Group should then not only be measured in terms of its legislative record, but also in terms of the social relationships which have been fostered by the contact through the group.

By reinforcing the philosophical outlook of its members, who are in the minority within the Republican party, the Wednesday Group provides a comfortable haven for liberal congressmen. It has been the prototype Republican ideological group, and it has helped to pave the way for the conservative Republican Study Committee.

The Wednesday Group has also spawned a Senate counterpart organization, the Senate Wednesday Club. The Senate group, like the House, takes no formal position on legislative matters but acts as a social or information-sharing organization for its membership. Despite the liberals' minority position within the Republican party, there now exists a liberal Republican organization in both Houses of the Congress, and the Wednesday Group is largely responsible for this.

While both the Wednesday Group and the Republican Study Committee are ideological factions within the Republican party, the Wednesday Group differs from the RSC in a number of ways:

- The Wednesday Group considers itself a discussion group rather than a legislatively-oriented faction. The RSC has taken the opposite role as its primary mission.
- As a consequence of this, the Wednesday Group avoids publicity. The RSC, on the other hand, attempts to attract as much publicity as possible.

- The Wednesday Group's membership is from the ideological minority within the Republican party. The RSC's conservatism represents the dominant strand of thought within the party.
- The Wednesday Group's membership policy is exclusionary. The RSC's membership policy is open.

There are, however, similarities between the two groups: both organizations use a shared research staff, and both organizations have a formal counterpart in the Senate. The Wednesday Group's counterpart is the Senate Wednesday Club, and the RSC's Senate equivalent is the Senate Steering Committee.

The Democratic Research Organization

At the same time that the conservative Republican Study Committee developed among the Republicans, a new group of conservative Democrats was also organized. This organization evolved from the "Conservative Coalition" dating back to the 1930s.⁷⁸ The Southern Democrats or "Boll Weevils" as they became known, had met since the end of World War II,⁷⁹ and then, in the late 1960s, references to a "Southern Caucus" led by Joe Waggoner (D-Louisiana) and Jamie Whitten (D-Mississippi) began to appear in the media. The Southern Caucus was concerned with the school desegregation issue and attempted to formalize the Southern conservative Democratic House members in a formal organization.⁸⁰ It was not until the early 1970s, however, that conservative Democrats actually organized themselves in a formal grouping around the leadership of Waggoner, a senior member of the House Ways and Means Committee. In early 1972, the staffs of Waggoner, Robert L.F. Sikes (D-Florida), David Satterfield (D-Virginia) and Republican conservatives began meeting on an informal basis to consider issues of mutual concern. The issues which brought them together included foreign policy and domestic and social issues.⁸¹

Until the Democratic Research Organization began its formal operations on October 1, 1973, two staff aides, one in Waggoner's office and one in Sikes' office, were contributed as members of the staff. In addition, Gray Armistead, the administrative assistant to Satterfield, used his outside contacts with research organizations and business lobbyists to complete research for the members. When the formal operations of the DRO began, an executive director and one secretary were hired.

In an interview with James Williams, policy analyst of the Democratic Research Organization, it was noted:

"The DRO is out of the mainstream of Democratic party thinking. It has the problem of being in opposition within the majority party. This problem of being a minority within the majority party also explains why the DRO is less aggressive in pursuing issues than are the conservatives within the Republican Study Committee."⁸²

The Democratic Research Organization began issuing research papers in late 1973. These papers were written by Robert Pitner, the first staff director; Williams, the DRO policy analyst; or outside experts, all of whom contributed their time on a voluntary basis. Besides research papers, some of the activities in which the Republican Study Committee and the Democratic Study Group had been routinely engaged were tried by the Democratic Research Organization but without any success. Williams gave the example of whip calls:

"Conservative Democrats resent whip calls from anyone, and will not respond to the official Democratic Leadership whip calls, let alone to an unofficial whip call to ask for support on a particular amendment."⁸³

While the DRO was formally existent, its presence was not noticed in the legislative process, and its impact was slight. A keen observer of the Congress noted:

"In 1973 there was some discussion of reinvigorating the southern conservative group by providing for regular meetings and also by opening the meetings to conservative southern Republicans, when numbers had grown considerably. But to date [mid-1974] nothing has happened."⁸⁴

The DRO has chosen to maintain its formal structure. While it has an elected Executive Committee, according to Williams, the Executive Committee "never meets."⁸⁵ The first DRO chairman, Joe Waggoner, was succeeded by David Satterfield in February 1975. Satterfield served until October 1977 when he was succeeded by Richard White (D-Texas).

According to Williams, the DRO's primary contribution to the legislative process was the series of hearings which it held in 1976 and 1977 on how the federal budget could be balanced.⁸⁶ These hearings were called by an ad hoc task force of the DRO headed by Richard Ichord (D-Missouri),

and the staff aide for these hearings was Dr. Carl Knoller whose salary was funded by Ichord. Among the witnesses which the ad hoc task force called were former Treasury Secretary William Simon and various academic economists. The hearings were transcribed and inserted in the Congressional Record over a period of several months by Congressman Ichord. No legislation, however, was introduced on the basis of these hearings.

The DRO remained a loose organization throughout the period under consideration without whip calls, formal meetings or legislative activities. The staff has never grown beyond a total of four. It claims to have about 60 members within the Democratic party, some of whom admit they only subscribe at the annual dues of \$100 because of the publications which are provided. The DRO is less formally structured than the RSC, and it has had no noticeable direct impact on legislation during its formal existence.

The Senate Steering Committee

The beginnings of the Senate Steering Committee can be found in two separate Senate staff groups. The first of these groups was the Conservative Luncheon Club, a social organization which began meeting on a monthly basis in the late 1960s to hear various conservative speakers. There was no legislative business discussed or other action taken, and in most respects, it was a social club rather than a substantive organization.⁸⁷ The second organization was the Senate Whip Group. This group included key staff aides from both Republican and Democratic Senate offices, as well as a representative of the Republican Study Committee as liaison to the House. Meetings of the Senate Whip Group began in mid-1973 on a weekly basis when the Senate was in session.⁸⁸ The core members of this organization came from offices whose senators would later become active in the Senate Steering Committee. These included staff aides of Senators James Allen (D-Alabama), Dewey Bartlett (R-Oklahoma), James Buckley (R-Cons.-New York), Carl Curtis (R-Nebraska), Bob Dole (R-Kansas), James McClure (R-Idaho) and John Tower (R-Texas) and Vice President Spiro Agnew. The Whip meetings dealt with the range of legislative issues of general interest to conservative members of the Senate. In addition, the Republican Study Committee reported to the Whip Group on House activities of specific interest to the RSC membership.

With the Whip Group in operation and with regular reports of the RSC activity from the House side, two key Senate staff aides began discussions with Ed Feulner, the executive director of the Republican Study Committee, regarding the formation of a comparable Senate group. These two staff aides were Paul Weyrich, then special assistant to Carl Curtis and Richard Thompson, administrative assistant to James McClure. Weyrich was a long-time activist with both Curtis and Gordon Allott (R-Colorado). Weyrich's particular area of expertise was mass transit on which he had worked with Congressman Philip Crane (R-Illinois). It was while working on this issue that he and the RSC's executive director became friends and later worked together to establish the Republican Study Committee in the House. Thompson had been the founder of the Senate Whip Group and had worked with McClure in the House prior to McClure's election to the Senate in 1972. After their meetings with Feulner, Weyrich and Thompson talked to their senators about the prospects of forming a group comparable to the RSC in the Senate.

Thompson asked Weyrich to meet with Senator McClure on March 5, 1974. At that meeting, McClure asked Weyrich how the Republican Study Committee had begun and why it had been effective in the House. Weyrich answered a number of detailed questions about the new RSC, and he pointed out the difficulties in funding such an organization on the Senate side. Unlike the House, senators could not jointly hire the same individual. At this meeting, Senator McClure suggested that a senior senator -- such as Carl Curtis -- should take the lead in the formation of such a group, and Weyrich reported this to Curtis. With Thompson and Weyrich working closely together, a meeting was held on March 27, 1974, with Weyrich, Thompson, Curtis and McClure in attendance.

The two staff aides had individually briefed their senators, and Weyrich later recounted that the meeting "went like clockwork." McClure was willing to organize the operation. But, because he was a junior member of the Senate, it would be inappropriate for him to be the chairman of the group. Curtis admitted he would like to be chairman, but someone should be involved who was able to relate directly to the younger members. So, Curtis and McClure appointed each other the chairman and vice chairman respectively. They agreed to invite a number of other senators to a private luncheon in Senator Curtis' suite to tell them about the idea. The

first members of the group were Senators Buckley, Cotton (R-New Hampshire), Curtis, Dole, Dominick (R-Colorado), Fannin (R-Arizona), Goldwater, Hansen (R-Wyoming), Helms (North Carolina), Hruska (R-Nebraska), McClure, and Thurmond (R-South Carolina). The original meetings took place during the next several weeks and the first formal meeting was held on April 30, 1974. At that meeting, Buckley, Cotton, Curtis, Fannin, Hansen, Helms, McClure and Thurmond were present. The group adopted "Senate Steering Committee" as its name in order to identify with the House Republican Steering Committee and avoid identification with Republican in the hope that at least one or two Democrats might occasionally participate in its activities. The senators present agreed to meet on a weekly basis; elected Curtis as chairman and McClure as vice chairman; and decided that the senators could bring one staff aide to the regular weekly meetings.⁸⁹ In addition, the group "agreed not to publicize its formation, preferring to let people just gradually find out it had been formed."⁹⁰ This reticence was similar to what the RSC had encountered among its members in the House.

Collaboration between the embryonic Senate Steering Committee and the Republican Study Committee was close, as shown in a letter from Senator McClure to the executive director of the RSC:

"It is my sincere hope that we in the Senate will one day have a mechanism of our own for producing this kind of material for our use [referring to a summary work on the Secondary Education Bill]. In the meantime, I hope you won't mind if Senate Republicans take advantage of the splendid information coming out of the House Steering (sic) Committee."⁹¹

While a paper organization was created four days later, it was obviously going to be some time before the Senate Steering Committee could play as important a role as the Republican Study Committee played in the House. At this point in time, the RSC already had a staff of 12 including 9 professionals, and had the ability to pool staff resources from different members.⁹²

The Senate Steering Committee was publicized in conservative publications beginning with a report in the June 3, 1974 Right Report which commented on the formation of the organization and on the fact that:

"The birth of the Senate Steering Committee was undoubtedly aided by the continuing success of the 70-member Republican Steering (sic) Committee in the House presently headed by Rep. LaMar Baker (R-Tenn.)."⁹³

This article was arranged by Weyrich who believed that the group should be known to the public:

"There was nothing sinister about it, and once its existence was admitted the mystery, and hence, the news value would disappear."⁹⁴

The senators, on the other hand, had been apprehensive about unfavorable media attention. Weyrich's analysis had been correct, no damaging stories appeared.

Informal advice was also forthcoming from members of the Republican Study Committee. Philip Crane, for example, wrote to McClure about the characteristics of an executive director for a group such as the new Senate Steering Committee. He cited the lesson that the Republican Study Committee had learned: "we cannot fight every battle that comes along."⁹⁵ He stressed the need for member involvement and direction but also indicated that the staff had to be given a free rein to carry out the directives of the members. He went on to note:

"The Republican Steering (sic) Committee is no longer a theoretical think tank, but rather the essential link between the think tanks of our side, and the members and their individual staffs who have to deal with these issues on a day-to-day basis."⁹⁶

Curtis and McClure hired Tom Cantrell from the staff of Senator Dewey Bartlett as the first executive director. The Senate Steering Committee immediately became active in legislative battles on such subjects as the Consumer Protection Agency, the Cargo Preference Act and other items of legislative importance to the Senate in the remaining days of 1974. In several of these legislative efforts, the Senate Steering Committee would coordinate its activities closely with those of the Republican Study Committee. This bicameral relationship was a new element in conservative cooperative efforts.

Other Organizations

Other unofficial organizations of members of Congress may be multi- or single-issue oriented. They are described at this point because they indicate the wide-spread multiplication of ad hoc interest groups within the structure of the House of Representatives.

Members of Congress for Peace Through Law has 137 House and Senate members and is funded partially by staff allowances through the clerk-hire system and partially by outside contributions. Members of Congress for Peace Through Law generally supports liberal foreign policy positions on a broad range of subjects including foreign assistance, arms control, defense spending, and general U.S. foreign policy issues.⁹⁷ A counterpart organization of conservatives which went through an embryonic stage as the "National Security Research Group" has now been retitled "The Committee for the Common Defense." This group is a bi-partisan organization of conservatives and moderates who favor a strong national security policy.⁹⁸

The only group in the Congress organized along racial lines is the Congressional Black Caucus. This unofficial group consists of the entire black membership of the House of Representatives, all of whom are from the liberal wing of the Democratic party.⁹⁹ On virtually every issue, the Congressional Black Caucus membership votes with the liberal Democratic bloc in the House. And, its early attempts at fact sheets and issue bulletins were soon discarded because they duplicated the product of the DSG. The Congressional Black Caucus has turned down membership applications by non-blacks.¹⁰⁰ The primary role of the Congressional Black Caucus has become that of a national voice on issues of concern to blacks.¹⁰¹

The Environmental Study Conference is a single-issue organization which began in 1975. It is bicameral and supported by both members' dues and clerk-hire allocations by House members. The Environmental Study Conference produces a weekly bulletin of environmental legislation, tracking it from the introduction of bills through floor action. It also publishes fact sheets with pro and con arguments on pending issues.¹⁰²

In 1973, a short-lived attempt was made to organize the moderate Democrats in their own faction. A meeting was held under the leadership of Congresswoman Edith Green (D-Oregon) to "organize a policy group of those who represent the moderate position within the party."¹⁰³ According to political analyst Kevin Phillips, the group included "a sizeable group of Northern ethnic moderates."¹⁰⁴ The group held several meetings, but disappeared within a year of its original meeting.

The Congressional Rural Caucus consists of a single staff director and secretary who are devoted to discussing rural development issues. The organization is composed primarily of rural Democrats from the farm belt of the Midwestern United States and the South, although several Republicans who represent rural districts are members of it.

The Congressional Clearing House on the Future was the brainchild of Congressman Charles Rose (D-North Carolina) and others. The CCHF was an ad hoc organization interested in the longer-range issues which might eventually demand the attention of the Congress. It has a staff of three. Among other services, the Congressional Clearing House on the Future annually holds a "futures fair" and has established a talent bank of volunteers who might be available for meetings with members or comments on legislation on a wide variety of social and foreign policy and economic issues.¹⁰⁵

In addition, regional caucuses such as ones for the "Snow Belt," the "Sun Belt," and another for the District of Columbia areas have been established.¹⁰⁶ These groups have a parochial purpose of interest to members from their particular geographic region.

The Steel Caucus is not bound to a particular ideology although its membership tends to consist primarily of Democrats from steel-producing districts. Its primary objective is to assist the U.S. domestic steel industry by advocating higher tariffs for steel producers, easier pollution standards for domestic steel producers, and tax benefits for the industry. Other industry groups have been formed around major economic interests, for example, the Textile Caucus, in the larger industries and the Mushroom Caucus, in the smaller industries.

In addition, numerous special interest organizations have sprung up. These include: the Blue Collar Caucus, the Port Caucus, the Irish Caucus, the Congresswomen's Caucus, the Suburban Caucus, and the Vietnam-Era Veterans Caucus. Some have only met once or twice, and are viewed as advancing the political ambition of the chairmen rather than making an impact on the legislative process. The minor special interest caucuses are mentioned briefly at this point because of their potential implications

on the structure of the House of Representatives, and because one or more of them may become institutionalized factions within the House of Representatives.¹⁰⁷

I. Early Attempts at Organizing the Conservative Republicans

Conservatives by their nature are difficult to organize and coordinate in the legislative arena. At least in the U.S. Congress, unlike their ideological opposites, conservatives tend to resist both group activities of Congress and pressure on them to conform to someone else's theory of how to vote or what position to take on an issue.

Early informal groupings among the House Republicans centered on social groups such as the Chowder and Marching Club (established in 1949), SOS (established in 1953), ACORNS (established in 1957), and the Wednesday Group (established in 1963). However, these organizations were primarily social rather than ideological. Most conservatives in the 1960s had ample opportunities to discuss pending issues with their colleagues on an informal basis in the Congress.

Chowder and Marching, SOS and ACORNS tended to have substantial membership from among the conservative members of the Republican party. The Chowder and Marching group was probably the most elite of the three because it included such members as Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Melvin Laird and other members of the Republican establishment. SOS and ACORNS are also elite groups of Republican members of the House. In all of these cases, membership is by invitation; the meetings are informal, only the members are present; staff resources are not available to be called upon; meetings are held routinely in different offices; and no group legislative action results from the meetings.¹⁰⁸

Because these groups did not include all of the Republican members of the House, another group was established in the 1960s by Larry Winn (R-Kansas). Known simply as the "Monday Luncheon Group," the members routinely met in one of the private dining rooms in the Capitol on Mondays. Attendance would range from 8 to 20 or more, and discussion would center around the week's forthcoming legislative activities. There was no formal

agenda, and members were congressmen who were not members of the Chowder and Marching, SOS or the ACORNS.¹⁰⁹ The membership of the Monday Luncheon Group was flexible and often included other individuals who might be invited on the spur of the moment by one of the regular Winn participants. These ad hoc groups were by their nature more social than policy-oriented. With the Democratic Study Group leading the pro-Johnson Administration forces in the House, and with the Republican members primarily united in opposition to the Democratic Administration/DSG position, there was no need for an ideological organization of conservatives since the formal Republican leadership played that role.

An additional constraint which a number of members expressed on regular occasions over the years was their reluctance to commit staff funds from "their" clerk hire allowance to the use of joint efforts by staff members on joint research projects. Without such resources, all of the major groups including the DSG, DRO, Wednesday Group, the Congressional Black Caucus and others, would be unable to function. The experience of borrowing staff from members' individual offices had been unsatisfactory.¹¹⁰

Joint Republican and Democratic activities are usually traced back to the Conservative Coalition. The Conservative Coalition in the U.S. House of Representatives had its genesis in the anti-New Deal movement of the 1930s. Congressional Quarterly has recorded the Conservative Coalition's voting impact for the last twenty years. Through the Nixon and Ford presidencies, it was present as a measurable factor on about 25% of the votes in the House.¹¹¹ But, the effectiveness of the coalition, and the formal nature of the group has long been a subject of dispute:

"The basic reason behind the conflicting opinions on the coalition is that the coalition is an informal organization which, given its existence in the no-man's-land between the two major parties, operates in subtle hard-to-observe ways."¹¹²

The coalition was an effective but informal "group" of conservative members of the House from both parties. But it had no organization, and, in fact, denied the need for one:

"Sharing a common outlook on policy, they do not need an elaborate organization to hold them together; as Joe Martin said, the major task is finding issues on which they agree, and, once this is accomplished, coalescence is to some extent automatic."¹¹³

While an informal management without any structure might have been adequate through the 1950s, the establishment of the DSG in 1959 provided a new counterforce for the Conservative Coalition.

During the 1960s, several efforts were made at establishing coordinated factions of conservatives in the House of Representatives. Occasional references appear in literature in the 1960s^{of attempts} to organize conservatives into groups. Congressional observer Paul Weyrich noted that several attempts were made to organize the conservatives in the House in the early 1960s:

"It was tried by Don Bruce (R-Indiana) in 1962-63, and by John Ashbrook (R-Ohio) after the Goldwater loss in 1964. In both cases they were unable to succeed because the leaders pushing it were considered too hard right."¹¹⁴

Weyrich noted that these members were considered the most strident conservatives among the House Republicans. Senator McClure added that the "old timers (pre-1972 House and Senate Republicans) were pragmatic because of the 1964 debacle."¹¹⁵ Later, an organization called "The Constitutional Patriots" briefly appeared. This group led by Congressmen Durwood G. Hall (R-Missouri) and Walter S. Baring (D-Nevada), consisted of conservative members of both parties. When Congressional Quarterly inquired of Hall's office about the organization, they were informed that the organization was "defunct" and had not met for at least a year prior to the 1969 mention of it.¹¹⁶

Former Congressman Ben Blackburn, elected in 1966, summarized the pre-Nixon situation as follows:

"The Republicans in the House united on an anti-Johnson platform and when then Minority Leader Jerry Ford would lead the troops, he would get good support; but he didn't do it very often.

We Republicans found it easy to oppose the other guy's programs and easier to unite in opposition to a program than in support of a program."¹¹⁷

This unified opposition accounted for the lack of a formal organization of conservative Republicans prior to the Nixon Administration.

In the early days of the Nixon Administration, attempts were made by some senior members of the Republican establishment to keep the lines of communication open among their colleagues in the House and the recently-

elected Republican Administration. These attempts took the form of the "Good Guys Dinner Group" headed by Sam Devine (R-Ohio). This group was considered the direct forerunner of the more formalized Republican Study Committee which was organized in 1973. Devine regularly invited 35-40 conservative members of the House to hear speakers such as Vice President Agnew, Presidential Counselor Donald Rumsfeld, and other Administration spokesmen. There was no legislative agenda discussed at these meetings. They were seen as an opportunity for members to get together and "reinforce their own spirits." The Administration also used these meetings to gather support for its programs among what seemed a logical constituency in the House. The dinner group served as an encouragement to the members to meet together, albeit in an informal, unstructured setting. The "Good Guys Dinner Group" ran concurrently for several years with the Republican Study Committee, and many of the formal members of the Republican Study Committee, including Devine, continued their participation in the dinner group.

The success of the "Good Guys Dinner Group" can be attributed largely to its informal nature and its chairman, Devine. Congressman Devine was the vice chairman of the House Republican Conference and therefore, a member of the Republican leadership. As chairman of the "Good Guys," Devine had considerable prestige not only with his conservative colleagues in the House, but also with the leadership. When it came to substantial issue questions, the Republicans with lesser seniority in the House had to rely on these ad hoc resources, rather than the minority committee staff or the Administration. Chapter V discusses several specific legislative cases in this category.

J. Conclusion

As can be seen from this overview of specialized service agencies, congressional staff resources, and ideological factions in the House of Representatives, not only were the conservative Republicans late in organizing, but they also began without staff resources. The limitations which this existing structure placed on the conservative Republican members of the House can be summarized as follows:

- The staff of the specialized policy agencies of the Congress were not available to them.
- The Committee staff of the majority or minority party was not of any practical assistance to them.
- Their personal staff was overworked in handling constituent relations, and understaffed with regard to performing policy-related functions on legislative issues.
- The official Republican party staff was basically responsive to the leadership, not necessarily to the members. Particularly in situations where the leadership worked closely with the Republican Administration, the official party could be at odds with conservative Republican members.

Thus, there were no effective professional staff resources available to conservative Republican members of the House. At the same time that the independence of individual members from party structures was growing, their availability to perform effectively in the policy arena was limited by their lack of resources. The newer members among the House Republicans handled this situation differently from their senior colleagues. Charles Mosher, a former senior Republican House member who later served as the Chief of Staff of the House Committee on Science and Technology said:

"New members are much younger and better educated. They're inclined to seek good advice and have the ability to use it, skills that many older members haven't had."¹¹⁸

The conservatives within the Republican party, through the early 1970s, did not have research support to make an impact on the major public policy issues. Although none of the formal service agencies had adequately provided analytical resources to the conservative Republicans, and the committee staff resources were not made available to these members, the liberals in both the majority party and within the Republican party, had organized themselves into legislative factions. This time lag in organizing conservative Republicans can be explained. The Conservative Coalition had been a force into the 1960s. By the late 1960s, roles dramatically changed with the Republicans having their man in the White House. When these broad trends were combined with the natural disinclination of conservatives to organize themselves, it was not surprising that the Republican Study Com-

mittee came into being only in 1973. By that time, other coalitions, such as the Democratic Research Organization, were also being formed. It is in this overall context that still another faction -- the Republican Study Committee -- was formed. During this time, a myriad of groups was organized. Some of these groups were transient, but others were permanent. Few, however, played a significant role in the legislative process. The Republican Study Committee became both a permanent and significant force in the legislative process.

IV. CREATING A FACTION (1972-1974)

A. Introduction

The analysis in Chapter III of the staff resources available to conservative Republican House members shows the severe limitations under which these members operated. Without access to the formal research facilities of the Congress, the members had not developed any significant research ability of a continuing nature. Chapter II explained the preliminary steps which were taken in 1971-72 to bring conservative Republican House members together for joint activities on specific issues like the Family Assistance Plan and the Child Development Bill. These efforts were successful but they did not occur through any formal mechanisms. The liberals in both parties had their formal organizations, but the conservative Republicans did not. The absence of such a group with appropriate staff resources to specialize in particular issue areas was a noticeable deficiency. Several of the members realized that specialization was one of the key ingredients to waging a successful battle. As Stevens, Miller and Mann note:

"There is no argument among observers of Congress that specialization is the defining characteristic of the manner in which the House conducts its business."¹

Robinson goes even further in discussing the need for specific expertise:

"Effective and influential legislators who are successful in obtaining passage of their bills are those who carve out for themselves a particular subject on which they become expert."²

While this refers to the positive process of passing legislation, similar reasoning applies to the negative role of stopping bills. The conservatives usually found themselves in this negative role. The members also realized that their degree of specialization could only be increased with professional staff resources. This was a major adjustment in the thinking of most conservative members. Their perspective was similar to the one expressed by former Congresswoman Edith Green (D-Oregon):

"When we formed the DSG in 1959, I only had four people on my personal staff. They all worked on constituent relations. We needed a research organization to provide us with information."³

Thus, in her analysis, the DSG was established as a research aid to the members. To either advocate positive proposals or defeat other initiatives,

research specialization was required. The conservative Republicans had none available to them.

John Rhodes (R-Arizona), the former Minority Leader in the House, summarized the Republican problem when he said "The minority party has no positive power. Its chief influence is negative."⁴ Whether negative or positive, the House Republican conservatives had learned several lessons from the Family Assistance Plan and Child Development Bill. They had entered the legislative fray late; their staff research assistance was inadequate; and no coordinating mechanism existed to provide an operations base for their legislative activity.

The conservatives within the House functioned at a further disadvantage. The view of most senior Republican members was that the Nixon Administration was advocating a conservative legislative agenda. Professor Ripley states a common perception among House Republicans with regard to staff resources:

"The Republican capture of the White House in 1969 had resulted in an increase of more sympathetic employees in the executive branch for Republican congressmen to turn to, hence their concern for minority staffing has lessened."⁵

Congressman Edward Derwinski (R-Illinois), an activist conservative Republican, shared this view:

"A Republican Study Committee was not formed earlier because we Republicans were united under (President Lyndon) Johnson, largely tolerant during the first Nixon Administration, the Democrats had not yet been radicalized by McGovern, and Nixon was just starting to take non-conservative positions."⁶

As a party loyalist, Derwinski was willing to give Nixon the benefit of the doubt during his whole first term, despite the policy thrust of many of Nixon's proposals. As Daniel Moynihan points out:

"When, as was inevitable, the record began to sink in, it became clear to ideological conservatives that Nixon was not going to be anything like the President they had hoped for."⁷

The Republican conservatives had been given short-shrift not only by the Administration and by their own leadership, which "carried the Administration's water to the Hill,"⁸ but also by the senior Republican members in the House. A handful of them controlled the House Republican staff, which made these resources unavailable for the less senior members in the

party. This was a pattern which was to be repeated time after time. Whether the battle was over a social issue -- the Family Assistance Plan; an economic issue -- land use planning; or a national security issue -- the Byrd Amendment on Rhodesian chrome, the younger conservative members within the House Republicans were frozen out of the minority's committee staff resources. In effect, they had no research capability on which they could rely.

The Democratic conservatives were in a declining state and not able to offer any meaningful support to their Republican ideological colleagues. The liberals were in the ascendant :

"The power of the southern Democrats in the House and Senate Democratic caucuses had been declining steadily for several yearsFurther aggravating the southern Democratic decline, House liberals have become increasingly well organized (though still imperfectly organized) through the Democratic Study Group."⁹

The answer to the quandry was obvious to Philip M. Crane (R-Illinois). The solution was to establish a faction among the House Republicans which could do for the Republican conservatives what the Democratic Study Group had done for the Democratic liberals. How the group was established is described and analyzed in this chapter.

B. Preliminary Meetings

By late 1972, a small group of conservative Republican House members was working together on issues such as welfare reform, and the child development bill. However, there was no institutional arrangement at the member level to work in concert to achieve common objectives. At the staff level, this was beginning to happen through groups such as the Conservative Luncheon Club¹⁰ and the House Whip Group.

The House Whip Group was an informal gathering of staff aides from Republican offices who shared a conservative perspective on legislation and who realized that concerted action on specific legislation would more likely lead to success than would their independent activities. The first meeting of the House Whip Group was held in late 1971. By mid-1972, the meetings were being held bi-weekly with legislative reports being offered by staff

aides from different member offices. The key staff aides worked for Philip Crane (R-Illinois), John Ashbrook (R-Ohio), Floyd Spence (R-South Carolina) and Ross Adair (R-Indiana). The group also included the offices of Senators Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina), Carl Curtis (R-Nebraska) and Gordon Allott (R-Colorado). At the second meeting, it was decided to regularize the sessions and Fred Smith, the administrative assistant to Ross Adair, was appointed the chairman. Smith's background was in national security affairs, and his member was a senior Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.¹¹ Among items which were frequently discussed were Nixon's detente policy, including trading with the Soviet Union; the situation in Vietnam and Southeast Asia; and the Administration's policy toward Rhodesia.¹²

At the member level, legislative activity was initiated on an individual basis. One of the most involved members was Philip Crane. Crane bridged the gap between the younger newly-elected members of the class of 1970 on the one hand, and the more senior members. Additionally, Crane's role as a member of the board of the American Conservative Union, combined with his academic background, set him apart from his colleagues, most of whom had come from the legal world. Crane's academic discipline had been history. In 1962, he wrote a book entitled The Democrat's Dilemma.¹³ In it, Crane recounted the story of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, the growth of the Fabian Society and its American collateral organization, the League for Industrial Democracy. His understanding of ideas and how they made an eventual impact on the public policy scene -- whether in Britain or the United States -- provided an unique perspective for a newly-elected member of the House of Representatives.¹⁴

Crane reflected later that a conservative organization could not be formed in the House without an unique combination of ingredients.¹⁵ It required several activist younger members of the House, several senior members with stature on the floor, and a staff capability to conduct independent research. While there were a number of conservative House members who could be catalysts, the right combination of ingredients had not yet been put together.

Red Fox I

In May 1971, Crane discussed his ideas with two key staff aides -- Ed Feulner, his administrative assistant, and Paul Weyrich of Senator Allott's staff. They agreed to meet for two days away from the Washington milieu where the problems of organizing conservatives in the Congress could be discussed and analyzed candidly. Among those invited to the meeting were several senior staff aides on the Hill, the executive director of the American Conservative Union, and several businessmen who had been political supporters of Crane. The gathering was called the "Red Fox" meeting because it was held at the Red Fox Inn in Middleburg, Virginia in July 1971.

Weyrich and Feulner drew up a carefully-constructed agenda for the meeting. It included discussions of legislative issues, electoral politics, and the structure of the House. The political discussion was led by Weyrich. He advanced the argument that conservatives should concentrate their House political activities not just on electing a large number of new conservatives, but also on electing a handful of key Republican conservatives who would be activist leaders in legislative issues once they came to Washington. This became his concept of "Five and Thirty." Weyrich believed that five activist, articulate leaders could be as valuable an addition to the conservative forces as thirty more votes because these leaders could help set the legislative agenda and could shift the focus of debate toward the conservative side of the argument. Additionally, if the right five individuals were elected, eventually they could move into positions of prominence in the formal Republican structure. This would ensure that the party's leadership positions were held by members with a conservative philosophical commitment. Additionally, it would serve as a catalyst in the party structure toward providing an alternative to the Democratic majority in the House. In effect, Weyrich was unknowingly elaborating upon Randall Ripley's distinction between passive and aggressive members of Congress: Passive members are interested only in the work of their committee, while the aggressive member has interests beyond his committee and is not willing to compromise on those issues about which he feels strongly.¹⁶

If the group could agree on the "Five and Thirty" concept, it would also provide opportunities for targeting staff and financial resources to key districts by the conservative activists in the Congress and at the staff level. Identification of the key electoral races would not be difficult.

With the counsel of current members of the House and Senate, the candidates could be pinpointed by the Red Fox group. This did not mean that the Red Fox participants would involve themselves in the Republican primaries. Rather, it meant that the group would choose from among the Republican candidates to direct their support more precisely. If the business representatives who were present could target their own financial contributions and those of their friends to these key races, the pattern of aid would be complemented. Their financial resources were not great but even modest additional contributions frequently were of considerable significance. Carrying the argument to its conclusion, Weyrich noted that newly-elected members who had been assisted by the Red Fox group would feel an obligation to participate in conservative activities after they came to Washington. In effect, this plan could help tie the newly-elected members into future conservative activities in the House. Weyrich's plan was discussed in detail. The staff aides pointed out the impact which Crane had already made because of his activist leadership. The dream of increasing that effectiveness was an exhilarating one. The Red Fox group agreed to this concept as a target for their 1972 election activities.

Among the key seats which were targeted for the 1972 general elections was that of Trent Lott of Mississippi. Lott had been a member of the Conservative Luncheon Group when he served as administrative assistant to Congressman William Colmer (D-Mississippi). Colmer, a long-time Democrat, had been the chairman of the House Rules Committee. When Colmer announced his retirement, Crane urged Lott to run as a Democrat. Lott chose the hard road and decided to run as a Republican from the Fifth District of Mississippi. He was elected to succeed Colmer in 1972. The second key seat was Steve Symms. Symms was an articulate libertarian¹⁷ who ran a successful family business in the agricultural area of Idaho. The third member of the group was Bob Huber. Huber came to Washington with a successful small business background and a willingness to stand up in the Michigan State Legislature against both the Democratic majority, and the liberal bloc in the Michigan Republican party. John Conlan of Arizona also came to the Congress via the state legislature where he was known as an articulate conservative. The fifth candidate was Harold Froehlich of Wisconsin who was a State Representative attempting to succeed the retiring John Byrnes who had been the senior Republican on the House Ways and Means Committee. David Treen had served as the Republican State

Party Chairman in Louisiana and had been identified as an articulate conservative spokesman. Treen was the sixth potential conservative leader in this category.

Weyrich's Five and Thirty concept was more than a grandiose scheme. Weyrich and several other staff aides ran an organization called the "Committee of Nine" which had been established by several U.S. senators to help elect non-incumbent Republican challengers. These tended to be conservative candidates primarily from western states, although James Buckley (R-Cons.-New York) was also assisted by the Committee of Nine. Because Weyrich was the committee's volunteer staff head, he could also provide research assistance to Republican challengers in key House races. The staff of the Committee of Nine consisted of volunteers from congressional offices and conservative groups in Washington. The organization maintained regular duty rosters and office hours during the period from early September to the general election in November 1972. During this time contact was maintained with the campaign headquarters of candidates who were contesting key target races. Information on issues and vote ratings were provided, speakers from among the incumbent members were contacted, and a close liaison was established between these campaigns and this group of Washington staff aides.¹⁸ Thus, in these targeted districts, a network of assistance was available to help the candidates in their election bids.

Regarding issues, the Red Fox participants discussed welfare reform, child development, legal services and several national security questions. On all of those issues, the Nixon Administration had adopted non-conservative positions. As Crane noted at the time, "We get all the rhetoric and Jake Javits gets all the action."¹⁹ Or as William Safire, the noted political commentator, told Daniel Moynihan regarding the Family Assistance Plan, "You miss Richard Nixon's main point, which is to make a radical proposal seem conservative."²⁰

Feulner and Harold Eberle, a long-time Capitol Hill staff aide, discussed House structure. The Democratic Study Group was examined in detail. Its important role within the Democratic party was elaborated. The Red Fox participants decided that it provided a good pattern for a possible conservative group within the House to follow. The cases of welfare reform and child development were discussed, as were the short-

comings of the conservatives' reactive strategy.

The Red Fox group wanted to build on the existing organization within Washington. Thus, it was decided that the House Whip Group meetings should be given a more formal role. Assignments should be made to share research projects, and members should be encouraged by their staff aides to take more active roles on questions like détente, SALT (I) and Vietnam.

Recounting the history of the Conservative Luncheon Club, Jim Lucier of the staff of Senator Strom Thurmond noted that it had begun to function as a bi-partisan senate staff social gathering in the late 1960s. In 1971, Weyrich and Eli Howell from the staff of Senator James B. Allen (D-Alabama) and Lucier became active in it. They supplemented the guest speakers' remarks with reports on pending legislation for "the good of the order." These issue-type reports were frequently planned ahead so as to elicit a positive response from other participants. This involvement could be to ask their members to co-sponsor bills, to volunteer for the Committee of Nine, or to otherwise become more active in conservative activities on Capitol Hill.²¹

The Red Fox meeting provided the opportunity to draw up the strategic framework to organize the conservatives on Capitol Hill. However, it was only effective because it could utilize the skeletal organizations which were already in place. These were the Conservative Luncheon Club, the House Whip Group, and the Committee of Nine. In a rudimentary way, they brought the electoral politics, the issue concerns, and staff aides from both the House and the Senate together.

Conference with New Members Following the 1972 Elections

One of the results of the Red Fox meeting was the decision to hold another meeting shortly after the November election with the prospective conservative leaders from the new class of Republican Representatives. This "Red Fox II" meeting was scheduled for early December, 1972. The objective of the meeting was to meet with these newly-elected members and give them a conservative perspective on the operations of the House. Orientation programs for newly-elected Members of Congress are an established tradition. In 1959, 1963, and 1965 they were conducted on a bi-partisan basis in cooperation with the American Political Science Association.²²

Since 1966 however, the Republican leadership had conducted its own meeting to orientate the newly-elected members. The Red Fox meeting would supplement this official orientation program. It would give the newly-elected members a conservative rather than a Republican perspective and, hopefully, convince them of the value of conservative activities outside of the formal party structure.

1972 was a good year for House Republican candidates. Forty-three Republican House members were elected and thirty of them were conservatives. In addition, all six of the projected conservative leaders were elected. Crane's staff prepared invitations to Red Fox II to Representatives-elect Steve Symms (R-Idaho), Hal Froehlich (R-Wisconsin), Bob Huber (R-Michigan), Trent Lott (R-Mississippi), David Treen (R-Louisiana), and John Conlan (R-Arizona). The other newly-elected conservative Republicans were not invited because the group had a limit on its optimal size, and because those who were invited had worked most closely with Red Fox personnel through the Committee of Nine. Crane explained the idea of Red Fox II to several of his colleagues and they expressed their willingness to participate in the event. Thus, the invitations were signed by Blackburn, Crane, Derwinski and Rousselot. Fourteen House and Senate staff aides were invited, as well as Tom Winter, the editor of Human Events, and Larry Pratt, the director of the American Conservative Union.²³ All except Treen accepted; he apologized for his inability to attend because of a scheduling conflict. Pratt's participation was particularly important because his organization had financially supported these candidates in their election races. He reinforced the Crane group's invitation by personally urging all of the members-elect to participate.

The one and a half day conference included a discussion, chaired by Ben Blackburn, on the legislative agenda for the new Congress with individual presentations by staff aides on foreign policy and defense, domestic and economic issues. An entire session was devoted to the nuts and bolts of office organization so as to assist the newly-elected freshmen in establishing the most efficient office operation as quickly as possible.

The agenda also included a session on electoral politics and the political outlook. Kevin Phillips, the conservative political commentator, made this presentation. He was very cautious in his presentation, urging

the newly-elected members to use the advantages of incumbency to help establish their base. He pointed to the historical pattern of congressional losses to the President's party during the mid-term elections and cautioned them on being overconfident. At this time Watergate was still only a minor nuisance to the White House and was not perceived to be a subject that would affect the House Republicans in 1974.²⁴

During the issue discussion session, the group reviewed a number of issues. They came to the basic conclusion that "anything that cuts the revenue off from Washington is good,"²⁵ and that a comprehensive tax reform package ought to be proposed by conservatives. The staff aides present at the meeting agreed to work on this project with some of their academic contacts. This was important because it showed the new members that these aides had resources which could be called on to implement their legislative agenda. As a direct result of that discussion, the staff aides prepared a letter signed by Crane to be sent to twenty-three academic economists indicating that:

"A number of conservative Members in the House of Representatives are planning on introducing a comprehensive tax reform package in early 1973. The package would, we hope, redirect the tax reform question toward our point of view."²⁶

On the basis of the Red Fox meeting, Crane took the initiative in speaking for a group which was not yet formed. The names of the economists were assembled by the staff aides and by Crane. Crane had been a history professor at Bradley and Indiana Universities. He was interested in involving academics in the legislative process, while at the same time showing the other members, both senior and newly-elected, the value of building contacts of this type. The discussion on issues also gave those new members in attendance an opportunity to get ahead of their colleagues who were not included in the Red Fox group.

Other results of Red Fox II included the leadership roles which John Conlan, Steve Symms, Bob Huber and Trent Lott were to play later. Within a month of Red Fox II, Conlan was elected President of his class of freshmen Republicans. Conlan was an aggressive individual who did not hesitate to request support for himself for this position. While the role of class president was largely honorary, it was Conlan's ability to call on his early Red Fox contacts for support that elected him. Lott, Huber and Symms were all to be elected to the Executive Committee of the newly-

formed Republican Study Committee at the first regular election in 1974.

Follow-on Meetings

At Red Fox, Blackburn, Crane and Rousselot encouraged the freshmen to become involved in the conservative activities which were taking place in the House. They recounted conservative legislative activities dealing with the Family Assistance Plan and the Child Development Bill. The impression Crane and Rousselot tried to convey to the new members was that the conservatives were already organized into an ad hoc coalition. Then, in private discussions, Crane convinced his senior colleagues--Blackburn and Derwinski--that they had to take the lead to channel the activities of these new members into a useful direction. Crane argued that they would be organized and that the more senior members should be the leaders rather than letting the freshmen form their own group. The newly-elected members who attended the Red Fox II meeting were the ones who had been targeted at Red Fox I for special campaign help. Additionally, the senior members who were involved in Red Fox II were the ones who would be playing key roles in the formation of the Republican Study Committee.

Shortly after their return to Washington, Derwinski agreed to Crane's suggestion to host a series of meetings in his office to encourage the members to participate in a new conservative group in the House. It was important that Derwinski host the meetings because his seniority would give the sessions automatic credibility. Additionally, his office had been the meeting site for members who discussed the conservative response to President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan and the Child Development Bill. Furthermore, members considered Derwinski a sharp political spokesman who was an effective legislative tactician on the House floor. It must be remembered that the conservative Republican members of the House had not previously engaged in any formal ideological organizations. Therefore, the group could not be perceived to be strident, or to be working at odds with the House Republican leadership.

Five of these meetings were held over the next six weeks. The invitation list was carefully designed to include some senior and some junior members. In addition, Crane, Blackburn, Rousselot and Barry Goldwater, Jr. (R-California) attended each of these sessions as did several key staff aides. These meetings were designed to involve more members in a formal alliance

on the major issues. Derwinski made the political case at a meeting when he said:

"As Republican House Members, we have set our own independent course. After all, I can even imagine circumstances under which Spiro Agnew will not be our Presidential *nominee* in 1976."²⁷

Crane recounted conservative activities in welfare reform and child development. Blackburn talked about the Legal Services battle. Barry Goldwater, Jr. mentioned the Democratic Study Group, which happened to be located across the hall from his office. He would graphically describe the arrivals and departures of their many staff members, and the range of publications they were producing for the liberals in the Democratic party.

The senior members projected a low profile image to the new members. They stated that the purpose of the group was to provide research capabilities in specific areas of common concern. The group would not be too formal, and certainly did not have any intention of usurping the leadership's prerogatives. While the minority leadership did not exercise a great deal of authority, the newly-elected members were dependent on it for their committee assignments and certain other dispensations of patronage.

At the meetings, the members were asked to make voluntary staff contributions to a common pool of legislative talent to develop constructive initiatives. Crane made the first commitment to share his administrative assistant to coordinate the activities and to provide the full payroll support for a secretary for the group. Other early financial commitments were received from Congressmen Blackburn, Clawson, Collier (R-Illinois), Derwinski, Goldwater and Rousselot. Commitments from the freshmen were received from Marjorie Holt (R-Maryland), Huber, Lott and Symms. Their commitment usually took the form of a block of time from a legislative staff aide already working for a member. Acting under the direction of Edwin Feulner, Crane's administrative assistant, part-time contributed staff personnel were recruited in energy, economic policy, foreign affairs, the federal budget, housing, trade and social issues.

Derwinski became the chairman of the embryonic group, although no formal election was held. The selection took place in an informal manner. At one of the meetings, Crane said, "We need a chairman," to which

Del Clawson replied "Obviously, it should be you, Ed,"²⁸ referring to Congressman Derwinski. Derwinski remained chairman until late October 1973 when he indicated that the chairmanship ought to be rotated among other members. Then he and Crane met with Del Clawson to ask him to be chairman. At this time, the job primarily involved raising funds for payroll, maintaining oversight on the staff, and keeping the membership informed of the staff's activities. Clawson served as chairman for a brief period from October 1973 through the first formal general meeting in February 1974. Thus, the Republican Study Committee was launched with a minimum of specific structure, personnel or goals.

C. Conflicting Views of the role of the Republican Study Committee

Because of the nebulous form which the early meetings took, different members expected different results from the embryonic group. Some wanted it as a supplementary information source for forthcoming floor activities, others anticipated that it would be an in-house "think tank" for conservative ideas, a third group wanted it to replace committee staff to which they did not have access, and a final group viewed it as an adjunct to their personal staff. These different perceptions of the role for the organization placed a great burden on the staff and it became clear that not all of the members could be satisfied. Still, as Michael Malbin notes, "Congress can be changed only if Members think their individual political needs are not being ignored in the process."²⁹ The delicate balancing of these needs occupied the attention of the executive director, the chairman, and the active members.

These conflicting views revolved around the different perceptions of the shared staff and how it would be used by the group. The literature on congressional staffs has grown substantially in recent years. Along with the growth of the literature, there has been a growth in the number of theories about the function of staff, its relation to members, and its impact on the institution of the Congress.

The traditional justification for staff has been analyzed by author Allen Schick:

"Staff brings independence. Access to staff enables a member to participate more independently in committee and on the floor. A member might campaign for more staff of his own in order to free himself from a committee staff beholden to the chairman or to expand his legislative range beyond his committee assignments."³⁰

However, there is a negative argument against increased congressional staff. Political analyst John Walsh sees it largely as a matter of control:

"Increased staff numbers mean the staffer has a less direct and personal relationship with his boss than in the past. Those hired because of their professional credentials have been trained to have confidence in their expertise and to assume responsibility. And in doing what they see as their jobs, they are more likely to cross the line and infringe on the legislator's domain than staff members of the past, who were acutely mindful of their patronage status."³¹

The traditional role of staff, as stated by Professors Salisbury and Shepsle -- "ties that bind mean staffers stay or leave with their member"³² -- has become less true as the congressional staff has become increasingly professionalized. This professionalization has resulted from the increased number of staff aides dealing with legislative issues as distinguished from those dealing with constituent-related concerns. For example, political scientist Stephen Frantzich says that:

"Congressmen desiring to improve their electoral futures would be well advised to stay away from legislative activity and pursue other behavior patterns that constituents will reward."³³

This was a concern of many of the Republican Study Committee members, but the role of the staff and of the leadership of the committee was to involve as many members as possible in the activities of the RSC, which were geared to legislative activities.

The members and the key staff aides shared a view that the RSC had to have its own professional staff. As Paul Weyrich noted, "If the members hadn't had a staff at the RSC to do things, they wouldn't have been done."³⁴

Another issue was the concern which was expressed by those who worried about the organization having "high visibility." As Congressman Ed Derwinski noted:

"The senior Members were worried about what the leadership would think, the freshmen were worried about what the senior Members in their state delegation would think, and everybody was worried about how the press would label the operation."³⁵

The first mailings of the group were made in anonymous orange envelopes with only the Derwinski frank³⁶ appearing on the outside of the envelope. The orange envelope was used to indicate to the congressman's staff

that the material was "time urgent" and was to be delivered immediately to him without being opened by the staff. As the group developed self-confidence, by late 1973, the orange envelopes were discarded and the staff of the members was encouraged to participate in RSC activities.

An area of concern which receded in time was the reaction of the minority leadership. While the embryonic RSC was not consciously trying to antagonize it, the RSC was not particularly concerned about it either. The leadership actually holds little power over the party members in the House. David R. Mayhew, one of the most astute observers of Congress, notes that the role of the party leadership in terms of "vote whipping" is limited:

"Party leaders are chosen not to be program salesmen or vote mobilizers, but to be brokers, favor-doers, agenda-setters, and protectors of established institutional routines."³⁷

Of course, an RSC could upset the perceived balance of the institutional routine. Additionally, there would be favors which the members would ask from the leadership for themselves or for the group at various times. For these reasons, the RSC moved with care, while not being overly concerned about possible retribution from the minority leadership.

Some members used the RSC staff as an extension of their own staff to perform minor projects such as answering constituent correspondence which their own staff could not handle. At the same time, the executive director and the active members had established a major legislative agenda for the staff to work on. The 1973 legislative efforts centered on the Legal Services Corporation, the private ownership of gold, and efforts to avoid a federal land use act. The agenda represented a consensus covering specific pending bills of particular interest to the members. It changed from meeting to meeting, although these were the primary long-range issues. Despite this heavy agenda, many random requests for information were received. A case which Daphne Miller, the Legislative Counsel of the Republican Study Committee, has cited was an inquiry from a staff aide in a member office asking "What is the population of mainland China?" Miller said she would be back with an answer within two minutes, after she consulted with the RSC China expert. By checking an almanac in the RSC office, she was able to determine the best estimate of China's population and call the office back with that information.³⁸ Of course, not all requests were handled that easily, but many staff

aides were not acquainted with either the research capabilities available to them elsewhere, or how to use the most basic research tools which were available in their own office. These nuisance requests were diversions from the important policy work of the staff. Yet, the staff was constantly aware of the source of their payroll support, and the conclusion that they had to be helpful whenever possible.

Most of the members involved in the RSC at this time believed it had an ideological role to play relating to major issues. The activities of the Democratic Study Group were monitored so that if the DSG was actively interested in a bill, the members knew the RSC should be interested in it. Crane and a few others were convinced that concentration on several specific projects would be the best route to follow. The staff resources were limited, the party's committee staff dealt with many issues in a manner which was satisfactory for the majority of the RSC members, and other bills were non-controversial, and hence of no ideological importance. However, the need for concentrated resources was based more on the successful Family Assistance Plan experience, than on a conscious decision to employ the committee's staff resources in the most efficient manner. As Walter Dean Burnham said in 1970:

"Intense and focused minorities with well-defined interests exert influence on legislation and administrative rule-making out of all proportion to their size."³⁹

The exercise of influence was the goal for the conservative coalition to work toward.

The legislative issues were readily agreed upon. Again, the RSC found itself in a similar position to its older ideological rival, the Democratic Study Group:

"On substantive issues, either the DSG position is 'obvious' (e.g., civil rights), necessitating no formal decision before action is begun, or the issue is sensitive enough to divide DSG opinion (e.g., funding the supersonic transport aircraft). Hence, generally no formal DSG positions on legislation are taken."⁴⁰

At the same time, however, the role of constituent service was demanding still more attention from the staff.⁴¹ The reconciliation of these roles using the limited staff resources of the Republican Study Committee was a balancing act for the executive director and the staff members.

D. Early Organizational Issues Concerning the Republican Study Committee

The success of the Republican Study Committee depended to a large extent on the interest and good will of a key group of people. The small group of involved members of the RSC had to support the staff and to give it direction. Simultaneously, the staff had to produce effective research projects and non-duplicative services for the members. Trust and confidence in the Republican Study Committee staff had to be established. Harrison Fox and Susan Hammond have written a major work on congressional staffs.⁴² As Fox and Hammond stated:

"Channels of information are developed primarily through informal contacts, facilitated in some instances by existing groups such as staff aides of the Democratic Study Group (DSG), members or AAs (Administrative Assistants) of a state delegation. But exchange of information that extends to strategy, content, and mutual accommodation, appears to occur only after an investment of trust on both sides and some experience."⁴³

As they rightly state, trust must be built on the basis of experience. Walsh states:

"The buildup of staff may compensate in some degree for legislators' lack of experience, but a troubling corollary is that staff, in the process, may exercise undue influence."⁴⁴

Since the conservative Republicans traditionally had been less inclined to use research or legislative staff than their liberal colleagues, their suspicion -- or at least caution -- regarding the use of staff was even greater. Thus, a situation similar to the one in the Senate Small Business Committee, which Michael Malbin outlines in his book, would not be likely to be replicated by a group of conservative Republicans. Malbin recounts how Senator Nelson became the chairman of this committee and placed a trusted aide from his personal staff in the position of staff director. This aide then "played a pivotal role in the transmission belt on the committee."⁴⁵ Since the Republican Study Committee was a new venture for everyone, all were learning, and the interaction of these key members and staff aides would determine the success or failure of the new organization.

These questions became delicate issues in inter-personal relationships among the participants in the Republican Study Committee. The evolution of an effective working relationship between the RSC staff and the members was

a difficult process. It included compromises and changes in its basic structure before it finally developed along an effective pattern. Aspects of this developmental process are discussed in the following sections of this chapter.

Efforts with "Contributed Staff" versus "Shared Staff"

A staff capability was the sine quo non for the Republican Study Committee. Without it, the organization would be just another member discussion group without any discernible impact on the legislative process. This lesson was learned from the Child Development Bill and the fight against the Nixon Family Assistance Plan. Thus, the role of its staff would determine the ultimate effectiveness of the Republican Study Committee.

The initial idea advanced by Derwinski and several other senior members was that staff expertise should be shared among the members. With this plan, under the ideal circumstances, one member's staff expert on foreign policy would contribute his policy papers to the group effort. Those papers would be distributed to the entire group. Other members who had need for work in foreign policy would be able to call on Derwinski's staff for assistance with the understanding that Derwinski could call on their person for expertise in banking, agriculture or other matters. While the theory sounded good, this arrangement of "contributed staff" did not work with the RSC. There were several reasons for this. Some of the staff aides who were enthusiastic about committing time to the joint effort were overworked. Others had conflicting duties between their member and the RSC. When these conflicts arose, the staff aide inevitably would first meet the member's needs. The staff aide worked in the member's personal office and was paid by him. In most cases, the staff aide reported to the administrative assistant in the member's office rather than to the director of the RSC. As Paul Weyrich said, "If the Member of Congress felt it was 'his' person rather than the 'group's' person, he would load the person with 'his' work."⁴⁶ Even if the member didn't do this as a matter of policy, as John Rousselot said, "The time-shared guy didn't work because he would always choose the member over the Study Committee."⁴⁷ Therefore, the executive director did not have effective control over "his" staff. Within several months, it became clear that the "contributed staff" concept did not provide sufficient staff resources for the RSC's staff to perform the tasks which the members expected from it.

The next stage in the staff development process was suggested by John Rousselot. It was that members contribute their staff aide on a half-time basis to the RSC. That is, they would work 20 hours a week for the member and 20 hours a week for the RSC. The RSC time would be assigned by the RSC's executive director who would oversee the projects and assure that they were completed on time. After a trial period, it was learned that this alternative did not work either because the staff aides still worked out of the members' offices where they were under the constant scrutiny and pressure of the member's staff. In several cases, the members were becoming disturbed because it seemed whenever they needed the services of their staff aide, his reply was that he was "working on an RSC project." At the same time, the RSC executive director was frustrated because when he asked for his product for the RSC, he was advised, "I'm sorry, I'm working for Congressman Smith."

The third and final step in the evolution of the staff assignment system came when Derwinski, Crane, Symms, Clawson and the other active members asked their colleagues to contribute funds to support staff aides in specific research areas. In this system, two, three or more members would be asked to support a research assistant in social issues, economic issues, national security problems, or another issues area. Or, salary support for secretarial help was solicited from those members who were concerned about the possibility of research aides not under their direct control. Under this plan, the individual staff member would be on the payroll of the group of members, but would report directly to the executive director of the RSC. He would be housed in the RSC office, and his duties would be assigned by the RSC. Thus, an individual working on land use might be paid by three or four members who were not particularly interested in that subject. Instead, these members might be working closely with a staff expert on energy issues for whom they were not supplying any direct support. The evolution of the entire staff from contributed to shared status took almost a year. It was not until the fall of 1973 that the entire RSC staff was available on a full-time basis to the RSC executive director rather than being shared with member offices.⁴⁸

With its own professional staff in place after September 1973, the RSC was able to provide real assistance to its members. By their contributions to the staff, the members expanded their own capabilities without adding new research aides to their personal staffs. In addition to working in their own issue areas, the RSC staff had a specific charge to develop close links with academic experts, lobbyists with issue expertise and conservative Capitol Hill aides in member offices. As Michael Malbin noted:

"The advantage of a good staff is not in coming up with new proposals, but in expanding the pool of resources upon which Congress draws."⁴⁹

The RSC staff tried to perform both roles. That is, both drawing on outside resources and coming up with their own new proposals.

Additionally, the RSC staff took the place of committee staff in several cases like the Atlantic Union Resolution, energy legislation, and the land use bill. As Congressman Derwinski pointed out, it was impractical even for senior members like him to utilize the congressional committee staff:

"Formal committee staff are inherited from your predecessors. They are inward looking toward their own committee. In many cases, they are not sufficiently ideological or Republican in their outlook, but rather more concerned about the turf of their own committee."⁵⁰

The Executive Director

The members of the Republican Study Committee combined their resources to make themselves more effective. While there was no assigned quota to each member, the leading active members contributed salary in the amount of \$12,000 to \$35,000 per year. Crane was the largest contributor, and the most effective salesman for the group. Derwinski and Clawson also helped in the continuing struggle to meet the group's salary requirements. Many of the members were reluctant to solicit payroll support from their colleagues. Mrs. Holt expressed the view of most of the members when she said, "Payroll solicitation was embarrassing. I was always embarrassed to ask for dollars."⁵¹

Theoretically, the members realized it would be up to this joint staff to carry out their legislative agenda. What was lacking in this period was an accurate evaluation of how much administrative attention was required to run such an organization. The administrator's job description was complex: massaging the member's ego; obtaining salary support; meeting legislative

and publication deadlines; and disciplining a staff which was located in different offices and which had conflicting priorities with its member offices. The administrative role quickly became a full-time job for Ed Feulner, the executive director. When these duties were added to his job of administrative assistant to Philip Crane, an activist member of the House, it proved to be too much. Feulner and Crane both perceived that Crane's congressional office was suffering and that the most sensible alternative was to locate a full-time staff director for the Republican Study Committee. In May 1973, Crane, Derwinski and Feulner discussed the problem and Crane agreed to fund the entire salary requirement for a full-time executive director. They discussed various candidates who might fill the key position. The selection would be a critical decision because the director was the primary link between the members and the staff. They considered a number of current congressional staff aides but decided that Dr. Albert Gilman would be the best candidate for the job. Gilman and Crane had been graduate students together at Indiana University a decade earlier, and since that time, Gilman had become Administrative Vice President of Western Carolina University in North Carolina. Thus, Gilman had both academic credentials of his own and the substantial administrative experience important to cope with the myriad of details that the job of executive director involved. In addition, he was conservative politically and had been active in local Republican politics in North Carolina, and he enjoyed Crane's personal confidence. After visiting Washington, and meeting with Crane, Derwinski and Feulner, Gilman was hired as the RSC's executive director. Gilman joined the staff of the Republican Study Committee in June 1973, but by September 1973, disenchantment began to set in from both members and staff aides in member offices. Derwinski had contributed a room to serve as the group's headquarters. Crane had raised substantial payroll support from the members. And Feulner's role was to have kept members' staffs involved and enthusiastic about the group. However, they did not receive the necessary follow-up help from Gilman. Their primary criticism was that Gilman's method of operation was too slow for the fast-paced life of Capitol Hill. Gilman had been thrown into a difficult position. The RSC was an embryonic organization trying to carve out its own niche in the House of Representatives. He was totally unfamiliar with the ways of Washington and Capitol Hill. His life at Western Carolina University was a leisurely one compared with the pace which he was expected to maintain at the Republican Study Committee. Yet on paper

and from the preliminary interviews, the appointment of Gilman appeared to be a perfect choice for the group.

Crane assumed full responsibility for the appointment of Gilman and later admitted the mistake he had made. As he wrote to Senator James McClure (R-Idaho):

"After his [Gilman's] arrival, it became apparent that we had made an error in our selection criteria. Instead of emphasizing academic background, we should have looked for an individual who, while still possessing the required philosophical commitment and educational background, was well-versed in the operation of the Hill on a day-to-day basis. Quite frankly, the theoretical discussions which consumed much of the staff's time was (sic) not nearly as important as the production of legislative issue area papers, bills, press contact, etc."⁵²

Gilman's tenure as director of the RSC almost resulted in the organization's collapse. By late October 1973, the payroll support for his staff of 7 had fallen off substantially. A research analyst gave a case in point: when Gilman was asked about the half of the analyst's pay which was uncovered for that month, Gilman replied "It's o.k. -- if I don't raise it, you can take half of next month off."⁵³ This was no consolation to the staff member who had financial obligations to meet. Rambling ideological discussions had replaced productive work on specific legislative issues, and with the exception of the new legislative briefing series, few new or helpful ideas were forthcoming from the RSC's staff.⁵⁴

It fell to Crane to discharge Gilman if the organization was to survive. Crane was notoriously unwilling to handle personnel problems, and he looked for an easy way to convince his friend to leave the RSC and return to North Carolina. Gilman did in January 1974 when he became the Republican candidate against Roy Taylor, the incumbent Democratic member of the House. To encourage that decision, Crane and several other members of the RSC agreed to speak on Gilman's behalf in his district and to help him raise the funds necessary to finance his 1974 general election campaign.⁵⁵

Thus, in January 1974, a vacancy occurred in the top staff job. Chairman Clawson appointed a selection committee to find a new director. The committee interviewed candidates for the job. As Clawson stated in his annual report to the members of the RSC on February 19, 1974:

"The committee was chaired by Mr. Baker and served by Messrs. Blackburn, Crane, Derwinski and Rousselot. They considered three men for the job: Ed Feulner who had served as acting staff director during the formative days of the Steering (sic) Committee, Lou Ingram who has been serving as Special Counsel on energy for the past nine months, and Dan Joy who has held various positions in Washington and on the Hill.

The Executive Committee confirmed the recommendations of the Selection Committee naming Ed Feulner as Executive Director and Lou Ingram as Legislative Director with the additional responsibility of Deputy Director."⁵⁶

Thus, the first acting director became the full-time director in February 1974. The brief period under Gilman had reduced the RSC's effectiveness to such a point that it had to reestablish its credibility in the eyes of the members, and to rebuild the morale of the shared staff.

Feulner did this by first assuring his employees of the solidity of their pay. He instituted a policy of paying the executive director last, on the theory that it was good for staff morale to know that they would receive their pay before the boss. This would also insure that the director kept up his search for payroll support. He began a series of courtesy calls on members to determine their perspectives on the RSC. In addition, he insisted that every staff aide at the RSC call on all the administrative assistants of their employing members at least twice a month. These efforts were supported by Crane and LaMar Baker (R-Tennessee), the new chairman. They provided the impetus to put the organization back on its track.⁵⁷

The Published Work Product

During this time period, the staff worked closely with several members on major issues. Legal services, land use and other domestic policy questions were high on the priority list. At the same time, weekly "fact sheets" were produced on major bills which had ideological significance. Few of these bills were covered by the regular publications of the Republican party in the House. In some cases, they were not considered of broad interest. In others, the party's analysis looked only at local considerations rather than the basic philosophical implications of the issue. Thus, an analysis of mass transit subsidies by the Republican Conference might examine the amount of subsidies distributed to each district, while the RSC interest was in the underlying structure and philosophy of the proposal.

The RSC fact sheets followed the basic DSG pattern:

"A typical fact sheet is approximately five to ten pages long. It contains the legislative history of a bill, the background of the substantive problem, an outline of the major provisions of the bill, the views of the Administration, probable amendments, and arguments for and against."⁵⁸

The RSC fact sheets were indexed, hole-punched for binding, and distributed in a weekly packet. Special emphasis was placed on RSC-member initiatives related to pending bills. Thus, member amendments were highlighted in the fact sheets. In addition to providing information in a new format to member offices, the fact sheets kept the RSC name before the members and their legislative staff aides. Special written products were also produced in response to member requests. For example, floor speeches and legislative amendments were prepared. In addition, "Dear Colleague" letters were frequently drafted for members who were active on various issues.⁵⁹ These publications were later supplemented by others as discussed in Chapter VI.

Weekly Staff Briefings

During 1973, Gilman tried different means of communicating with the staff in member offices. At first, the RSC was secretive. The Derwinski meetings were exclusively for members with the exception of two or three staff aides who had helped organize the RSC and who acted as liaison with the contributed staff. However, the RSC was moving away from this method of operation. One of these new forms of communicating with the member's office began with Gilman's first staff briefing on December 3, 1973. The first briefing dealt with energy. The featured speakers were several industry experts and Lou Ingram, staff counsel on energy for the RSC. The subject was President Nixon's forthcoming energy bill. Members' staff aides were invited. The response was encouraging with 74 participants, including 11 members attending. This meeting format was a new role for the RSC, and one which no Republican organization in the formal party hierarchy was performing. As a consequence of this successful meeting, the series was institutionalized early in 1974 as a regular Monday morning feature beginning at 8:30 a.m. The time of the sessions was a compromise, since it would involve staff members arriving before the normal starting hour (9:00 a.m.) and would give the staff aides a head start on the week's legislative agenda. The Minority Leader was informed of the meeting series; however, there was no reaction from his staff to the plan.

The entire research staff of the RSC routinely attended the Monday briefings. They met with their counterparts from member offices and exchanged information between the RSC staff and the member office staffs. As the meetings were formalized, participation from various sources was encouraged. In March 1974, when the subject of the briefing was the instant voter registration proposal,⁶⁰ the speaker was Congressman Bill Frenzel (R-Minnesota). Frenzel had led the Republican opposition on the House Administration Committee to this bill, so it was not unusual that he would be invited to participate. What was unusual was that Frenzel was an active member of the Wednesday Group.⁶¹ However, instant voter registration was a partisan issue rather than an ideological one.

Occasionally, special staff meetings were held, such as a luncheon meeting on March 29, 1974, with legislative assistants from member offices. This meeting was held to give the legislative assistants an opportunity to air any grievances they might have with the RSC and also to determine their specific issue areas so that they might coordinate their activities more closely with the research staff of the RSC. The good will of the members' staff was a continuing concern. This meeting was not held to answer a specific problem, but rather to establish a close relationship between the member offices and the RSC's new executive director. By keeping these avenues of communication open, the RSC staff hoped to avoid any problems before they had the opportunity to develop.

Adoption of a Statement of Purpose

From its inception, the Republican Study Committee had described itself as a group of "conservatives," who generally agreed on policy issues; they did not always reach those conclusions for the same reason, nor did they agree in every specific. Members within the group defined the group's role on a consensus basis and expected general agreement on most of the issues from any prospective member. In this way, the RSC was differentiating itself from those social Republican organizations such as the Chowder and Marching Society and SOS which had no ideological basis for membership. In addition, the RSC was identifying itself as the counter organization to the Wednesday Group which advanced the liberal ideology.

After their election, Baker and Symms spoke about the desirability of drafting a broad statement of what the group stood for. Such a "Statement of Purpose" had to reach several audiences. It had to be both conservative and Republican. It could not be so specific as to be of only transitory interest, nor could it be so philosophical as to lose the attention of the pragmatic politicians. It had to set a cooperative tone with the Republican leadership and the Republican Administration, and yet set an independent course.

Chairman LaMar Baker appointed a drafting subcommittee to come up with a working document. The drafting committee directed the staff to prepare the first draft. The first draft of the Statement of Purpose was prepared by the RSC staff and circulated at the Executive Committee meeting on Monday, February 25, 1974. Following a brief discussion of it at that time, each member in attendance took a copy to review prior to the next meeting on March 4, 1974. That entire meeting dealt with the redrafting of the Statement of Purpose. After some discussion, the different perspectives of the members were incorporated. Crane was particularly interested in emphasizing the philosophical basis of conservatism. Other members minimized the importance of the effort. For example, Derwinski said, "The Statement of Purpose was important to some of the members who were ideologically inclined, and it didn't hurt anything."⁶²

The two subsequent meetings on the 11th and 18th of March also dealt with the Statement of Purpose. Finally, at the March 25th meeting, a version was hammered out which included general references to conservative issues and a differentiation of the RSC from other Republican organizations. At the insistence of Derwinski and Baker, it was stated emphatically that the RSC had as its purpose "To persuade rather than to divide."⁶³ The sentence was basically a verbal concession to the party structure and the minority leadership. While the leadership had not exerted any pressure on the senior members to draft the Statement of Purpose in a certain way, the members were aware that the document would label the group for some time. The avowed purpose was to lead the House Republican members in a more conservative direction. The Statement went on to indicate that the group was willing to cooperate closely with the Republican leadership in the House of Representatives, but also to "insure that conservative alternatives are given

a full and fair hearing on the floor of the House and in the councils of the Administration."⁶⁴

The evolution of the draft statement also showed compromise among the different individuals who were involved in preparing it. For example, in the second draft which bore the primary imprint of Crane, the word "progressive" was inserted in the first paragraph at the insistence of Baker. The point being, as Baker said, "The liberals are always stealing good language and we ought not to let them get away with it."⁶⁵ Thus, the Statement of Purpose opens with:

"The Republican Study Committee is a group of conservative Republican Congressmen who favor progressive measures within the framework of constitutional government and who have pooled their resources to provide themselves with more effective research and legislative support."⁶⁶

In the opening paragraph, the RSC describes itself as being conservative and yet favoring progressive measures. The opening paragraph emphasizes immediately the shared staff concept for achieving the group's objectives. This, plus the exclusive membership within the House, differentiated the Republican Study Committee from other non-congressional conservative groups such as the American Conservative Union.

The Statement of Purpose was adopted on March 25, 1974,⁶⁷ and circulated to the Republican leadership with a letter from LaMar Baker to Minority Leader John Rhodes (R-Arizona) indicating that "We look forward to working closely with you."⁶⁸ By emphasizing its complementary role to the formal party structure, the group attempted to minimize any concern that the leadership might have about the new group. At the same time, the statement called for independent positions from both the Administration and the party leadership in the House.

The Statement of Purpose indicated that the Republican Study Committee had become more mature. It was willing to become more visible in its dealings with the party's leadership and with the general public. The Statement set the group apart from the social groups, while indicating that its basic purpose was not to divide, but rather to reinforce the conservative position within the Republican party in the House. The Statement also acted as a convenient explanation for the members to respond to questions about the Republican Study Committee and what its role was.

Intern Lectures

In the summer of 1974, the staff of the RSC instituted its intern lecture series. "Interns" have become an established part of the Washington summer scene, particularly on Capitol Hill. In most intern programs, students work in congressional offices for all or part of their vacation. The programs are many and diverse. Some are administered by a specific college or university. Others are run by a congressional or senate office to benefit their own constituents. Some interns are paid, others are not. In a memorandum to the Executive Committee, the RSC executive director noted that:

"The past several summers a number of liberal and radical groups (environmentalists, peace groups, etc.) have taken advantage of the presence of the large number of politically interested students on the Hill to indoctrinate them in their point of view and enlist them in their causes in the future. I believe there would be several advantages to the RSC if we were to initiate a program along similar lines."⁶⁹

At a subsequent meeting of the RSC's Executive Committee, the program was approved, and during the summer of 1974, eleven lectures were offered by 14 members of the RSC. Attendance was encouraged from interns who served in RSC member offices, as well as other Republican offices. In addition, interns from several senate conservative offices were invited. Senator Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina) who hosted groups of 25 interns for two-week periods in his office all summer long, helped provide a good attendance base for the RSC lecture series. Attendance ranged from as many as 150 to as few as 30 during the course of the series. Each member of the Executive Committee was asked to talk on an issue of particular concern to him.

The lectures helped offset both the liberal intern programs and the formal intern program established by the "Bi-partisan Intern Program." It also served to show the conservative interns on both sides of the Hill that the members for whom they worked had allies who were able to express an articulate viewpoint on specific policy issues.

Membership Dues

In 1973 the financial requirements of the Republican Study Committee consisted almost entirely of payroll for the shared staff. Nonetheless, finances were required for other purposes. Office machines -- typewriters

and a used mimeograph machine -- were borrowed from member offices. They were the rejects from those offices and as Chairman Clawson noted in his annual report to the membership on February 19, 1974:

"The staff does not even have its own copying facility. Its typewriters all have different type faces which greatly impedes the physical handling of rush work."⁷⁰

An even more pressing problem, however, was the provision of office supplies. Typewriters need ribbons and mimeograph machines require ink and paper. Crane had permitted the RSC to charge up to \$150 a month at the House Stationery Room. But this was a major commitment and it was using a substantial amount of Crane's office funds. Rather than making another round of efforts to meet the office supply needs, Clawson and Crane asked a number of members if they would object to an annual dues fee. Very little resistance was encountered and Clawson made the formal proposal at the annual meeting:

"In general these housekeeping inadequacies result from the fact that the Committee has no formalized and dependable budgeting system. We are not the only shared staff operation on the Hill. Our conservative counterpart among the Democrats, Mr. Waggoner's Democratic Research Organization, and the grand-daddy of all shared staff, the Democratic Study Group, have solved this problem by requiring annual dues of \$100 per Member. This amount can be withdrawn from the stationery account and, in view of the increase of \$750 in that account available as of January 1, this year, I believe that the time is right for us to face this problem squarely and adopt similar dues."⁷¹

Under "new business" in the general meeting, the proposal for dues passed without any opposition. This gave the RSC's staff the basic financial support which it required.

Annual General Meeting

The first general meeting of the Republican Study Committee was held on February 19, 1974. Thirty-four members attended. For that meeting, the staff had prepared by-laws, which were adopted; an election of a full slate of officers and a board known as the "Executive Committee" took place; a membership committee was appointed; and membership dues were established at \$100 per year.

The newly-elected chairman of the Republican Study Committee was LaMar Baker. Baker was first elected from Chattanooga, Tennessee in the 1970 general election. He was less ideologically rigid than some of the other younger members like Crane, Huber and Symms, and yet was an active conservative.

In summary, the RSC had advanced a long way in just over a year since the preliminary meetings in Congressman Derwinski's office. As outgoing Chairman Clawson pointed out:

"Given the operational problems of getting a shared staff organized and the inherent independence of conservatives in relation to providing such a staff direction, the Steering (sic) Committee has chalked up accomplishments that have exceeded what our expectations a year ago should have been."⁷²

The group had sorted out its staff problems, become more visible both within the Congress and to the general public, and developed a long-range basis for financial support. Its office was open, the staff was consolidated within that office, and meetings were being held. Where it saw a possible opening to influence the House Republican party in a more conservative direction, it was prepared to act. The structure was in place to exercise an impact on the legislative process.

E. Acceptability within the Congress, the Party, and Washington

It must be emphasized that conservative rank and file members in the Republican party in the House were at a strong disadvantage. The majority of the minority party is not in a powerful position in a legislature. In combination with a presidential veto, or with all of their own party allied on a straight partisan issue, the RSC membership could have an impact, although slight. On its own, however, the RSC's senior members realized that, if the group was to do more than act as a fringe operation for the conservatives within the minority party, it would have to have credibility with individuals in the formal Republican leadership. Thus, a degree of respectability could be achieved by effective cooperative efforts with the Republican leadership. This cooperation was not easy. Minority Leader John Rhodes later admitted that:

"Any leadership would rather not have any of them [ad hoc factions], but if you have to have one, better to have them all."⁷³

Thus, no one in the RSC expected the minority leadership to greet the arrival of a new ad hoc group enthusiastically. John Mackintosh asked a rhetorical question which is apropos of this situation: "Why should ministers made rods for their own backs?"⁷⁴ If the RSC could convince the leadership that it could make a positive contribution, its reception could be more favorable. Yet, everyone in the RSC assumed that the road to respectability would be long and arduous. In the ultimate test, the only way that the institutional base of the House could be altered to include an ad hoc coalition of conservative Republicans would be through the RSC's playing an unique role and exerting an impact on a major issue. This institutionalization process of the RSC was begun with the legislative leadership of the Republican Study Committee on the federal land use bill in July 1974.⁷⁵

In the meantime, however, small steps had to be taken by the staff and members of the Executive Committee to gain respectability for the organization. For example, on April 2, 1974, letters were sent from the chairman of the Republican Study Committee, LaMar Baker, to every member of the House Republican leadership. The letter noted that while the leadership was invited to join the RSC, it would not be expected to do so "in order not to compromise your position in the leadership."⁷⁶ This avoided the possibility of a rebuff to the group while formally advising the leadership of the RSC's existence. Baker also offered to make the publications available to the leadership if they requested it. Responses were received from several members of the leadership, including the chairman of the Republican Conference, John Anderson (R-Illinois). Anderson indicated "I would be happy to receive your reports."⁷⁷ In reply to an identical letter, Barber Conable, Jr. (R-New York), chairman of the Republican Policy Committee, wrote Baker that:

"I do not feel that any association with the Steering (sic) Committee would compromise my relationship to the leadership of the Republican party since it is important as chairman of Policy Committee that I have all avenues of communication open with significant groups of Republicans. Needless to say, I consider the Steering Committee a significant group."⁷⁸

Conable requested that a copy of the RSC mailings go both to his staff director on the Republican Policy Committee and to his personal office. By the spring of 1974, these small steps made the RSC an organization which was tacitly recognized by the leadership. The relationship with

Minority Leader John Rhodes' office was more complex since Rhodes was relatively new in the Minority Leader's role. In addition, the RSC potentially could interfere with his role of leading all the Republicans in the House. In an overture to the RSC, Dennis Taylor, the legislative director to the Minority Leader, invited the executive director of the RSC to participate in meetings of the "Nameless Group." The Nameless Group is an organization of Republican staff counsels on the House standing committees which meets on a bi-weekly basis to discuss legislation and activities in each committee. Since the Wednesday Group of liberal Republicans had been represented by its director at these meetings for some time, Taylor decided to include the RSC as a counterpart in the meetings. This was a breakthrough since it gave credibility to the RSC after only a year's existence. Similar recognition had come to the Wednesday Group after six years. The staff and members also worked with Rhodes on more mundane matters. Rhodes' assistance was essential to expand the physical facilities for the RSC. In a series of letters from Baker to Rhodes, the problem of inadequate space was raised. Rhodes repeatedly requested space from the Speaker, but was consistently turned down. It was not until after the RSC had stopped the federal land use bill that the RSC obtained further space from the House Office Commission via Rhodes.⁷⁹

By the summer of 1974, the number of members in the Republican Study Committee leveled off. This was due to anticipated difficulties in the fall elections about which many members expressed serious concern. For example, Bob Mathias (R-California), who had one of the most conservative voting records in the House, declined membership in a letter to Del Clawson, the membership chairman of the RSC, with the following comment:

"With the tough race I face this year and my work on two major committees, I feel that I would not be able to attend many of the Steering (sic) Committee meetings. Therefore, let me think about it next year and hopefully I will have more time."⁸⁰

Mathias lost in the 1974 general election.

The Republican Study Committee also had to be credible to the business community. The business lobbyists would be allies with the RSC on many occasions and this relationship needed to be cultivated. The executive

director had already met with the legislative director of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the vice president of the National Association of Manufacturers. After several meetings, the U.S. Chamber officials suggested that Baker address the U.S. Chamber's breakfast group. This meeting took place on August 15, 1974. In his remarks, Baker told of the history and evolution of the Republican Study Committee, and areas in which it could cooperate with the business representatives.⁸¹ It was significant that an outside organization with the prestige of the U.S. Chamber would invite the head of the RSC to address it. This represented a breakthrough in expanding relationships between the RSC and the business lobbyists in Washington. Closer collaboration followed on major legislative issues such as land use and the Agency for Consumer Protection.

After the 1974 general election which resulted in substantial losses for the RSC, Minority Leader Rhodes forced the RSC to change its name from Republican Steering Committee to Republican Study Committee.⁸² Furthermore, he questioned the wisdom of the RSC cooperating with non-Republican political action groups such as the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (CSFC) in orientation sessions which he thought conflicted with the formal programs that the leadership held for newly-elected members. Specifically, Rhodes expressed concern that the CSFC-RSC program might be considered officially sanctioned, despite the fact that the invitations quite clearly identified the sponsors of the program. Rhodes expressed these two ideas to make sure that the RSC did not step out of line with the party. As Philip Crane noted later:

"We changed our name, which was easy to do. But when it came to cutting off contacts with outside groups, there was no way [we would comply]. After all, many of us in the RSC had close ties to CSFC and to ACU [the American Conservative Union] and other groups. Besides, we thought of Rhodes as a 'toothless tiger'."⁸³

Thus, when bending to pressure did not involve problems of major principle, the RSC was flexible. Despite the mild objection of Rhodes, the RSC maintained its relationship with other groups without any adverse consequences since the cost of imposing any sanctions on the RSC by the Minority Leader would be too great.

F. Conclusion

If the 92nd Congress was the time of gestation for the Republican Study Committee, the 93rd Congress saw its birth and early development. It survived the perils of childhood in a hostile environment and emerged humbled but unbowed in 1975. The years 1973 and 1974 saw the House Republican conservatives mature in their attitudes toward cooperation with each other and toward the effective use of shared staff.

Starting with a flimsy base of support, the incumbent members helped the members-elect in the "socialization" process⁸⁴ which is vital to a new member's acceptance as a member of the legislature. That is, they introduced the newly-elected members to the intricacies of the system and made them receptive to the concept of a new conservative Republican faction within the structure of the House.

With this new base of support, new and old members agreed on the need for a joint research staff. Many of the RSC's contributing members had originally supported the shared staff only with reluctance. These reluctant members were the traditional members. Their legislative role had been limited, and their continuing concern was with their re-election. Stephen Frantzich cites Mayhew's theory in an accurate description of these RSC members:

"According to the electoral theory ^{suggested by} Mayhew, insecure congressmen use bill introduction as a method of advertising their good points, position-taking on positively evaluated issues, and claiming credit for what was expected of them."⁸⁵

Contrasted with this perspective, by the end of the 93rd Congress, the RSC was almost at the same status as the DSG regarding its staff:

"In practice, virtually all of the DSG's activities are generated and executed by the staff, which has assumed an independent leadership in recent years....The institutionalization of the DSG has left the staff director a good deal of discretion in initiating and overseeing DSG operations."⁸⁶

This independent professional staff was a new asset for the conservative Republicans. For conservative members who were lacking in seniority, the new organization provided them with an institutional base which they would not have had otherwise: "House members find it more difficult to develop

a base of power from which to operate [than do senators]."⁸⁷ Adding a lack of seniority to the disadvantage of being in the minority party, the RSC presented an unique opportunity to members like Crane and Sam Steiger (R-Arizona). Paul Weyrich commented on the changed attitude:

"There was a feeling in 1973-1974 that the RSC was divisive. By the 1974 election, this feeling had changed to 'we have to have it'."⁸⁸

This was partly a change in the attitude of the members toward the staff. The RSC members had learned the value of professional staff working on legislative issues. At this time, Malbin's evolving pattern was becoming apparent: "even the most traditionally styled conservative members of the House are choosing increasingly to rely heavily on their staffs."⁸⁹ Of course, the change did not occur without encountering difficulties. In the British context, the late Professor Mackintosh said that:

"The House of Commons has no independent sources of power, and why should any government in its right mind concede authority to a body that cannot exact it..."⁹⁰

Similarly, the Republican Study Committee was not able to simply move into the House structure and begin to operate with its own niche clearly defined. Every step of its development and every small gain in status, prestige, size, power or influence was achieved with difficulty since many of these steps were at another organization's expense. The group was not welcomed within the House, nor should it have expected to be. But its positive impact on the legislative scene, as well as its contributions to party-wide activities helped it become established with a relatively small number of complications in a relatively short time.

By late 1974, the RSC's original members' objectives of forming a viable faction were realized. Richard Rose has defined a political faction as:

"a group of individuals based on representatives in Parliament who seek to further a broad range of politics through consciously organized political activity....Factions are thus distinguished from other influence groups by having membership based in Parliament, rather than in the civil service or elsewhere. Because they persist through time, factions can be distinguished from ad hoc combinations of politicians in agreement upon one particular issue or at one moment in time. Factions may be distinguished from pressure groups because the former are concerned with a wide range of political issues....Factions may be distinguished from exponents

of a political tendency because factions are self-consciously organized as a body, with a measure of discipline and cohesion thus resulting."⁹¹

Rose has listed the chief features of an organized political faction as not only nationally recognized leadership, but also an adherence to ideological principles to help justify the faction's action; a limited knowledge of technical matters to help influence valuations; the support of cadres to help implement the faction's program; a network of communication to stimulate private conversations and combinations; and a system of rewards whether material or psychological.⁹²

In this chapter the structure and organization of the Republican Study Committee have been considered. The issues with which the RSC was concerned are analyzed in Chapter V. This broad range of interests combined with the independent continuing existence of the RSC to make it a faction by late 1974.

V. CASE STUDIES (1973-1974)

A. Introduction

The emphasis in Chapter IV was on the form, administration and structure of the Republican Study Committee. Yet, the RSC's main purpose was to promote conservative views on pending legislative issues. The RSC's involvement in legislative issues would determine its usefulness and ultimate political viability. A series of legislative activities is described and analyzed in this chapter. The issues in which the RSC became involved had to be carefully selected. If the RSC were to promote only hard right-wing issues like opposition to East-West trade, its base would be narrow. With a narrow base, its influence on the Republican leadership would be marginal. Earlier attempts to establish an ideological caucus had floundered. They were viewed as being merely right-wing fringe groups, of no particular consequence to the congressional party. After a brief mention, and even briefer lives, they had faded away. The question of issue focus was a lesson which the conservatives had learned from their liberal colleagues in the Wednesday Group and from earlier attempts at organizing the conservatives.

At the same time, the Republican Study Committee faced another limitation. It could not become the source of "instant experts" exerting leadership on major issues of broad concern to the Republican members of the House. Neither the party's House leadership nor the senior Republican members of the standing House committees would permit the self-appointed RSC activists to become their leaders on issues which these senior members had studied, debated, and fought over for many years. The RSC members also learned that other areas were off-limits. These were decisions which individual members made based on their own district interests or on personal relationships with other Washington power centers. The vice-presidential nomination of Nelson Rockefeller and the member's individual position on Water-gate indicated these limitations.

After all these areas of focus were excluded, the primary areas which remained for the RSC concentration were either special amendments or narrower issues. These could either be carved out of broader issues, or could be special bills on behalf of a narrow-based constituency. An example of the

amendment approach was the committee's battle over the Legal Services program. While this initiative represented a frontal attack on part of President Johnson's Great Society, it began as an issue of limited interest to a few conservative members. Gradually, it became a party position, and the senior committee members worked with the RSC members to achieve shared objectives. The second type of RSC activity was represented by the restoration of the right of private citizens to own gold. This was a deep ideological issue, but only of direct interest to a small, but vocal, national constituency. A third category was the federal land use bill. The RSC could intervene, in this case, because the committee members were either concentrating on other committee issues or else indifferent to the specific land use bill, and the RSC's leadership was eventually followed by both the House Republican leadership and the White House in its action.

In most cases, for the RSC members to take the lead, the tacit support of their senior colleagues was required. For example, the senior Republicans in the House eventually supported the RSC position on the battle over federal land use planning. This support was given after the early RSC work on the issue proved that it could be an issue on which to oppose successfully the Democratic majority. On the other hand, the House Republican leadership did oppose the RSC's efforts in support of the Byrd Amendment to permit the importation of Rhodesian chrome. On other issues, the RSC membership remained constant while the Administration shifted its views. For example, the Administration changed its position on mass transit operating subsidies while the RSC maintained their negative position.

Members sometimes used the Republican Study Committee to express their traditional political views on issues of general concern, such as the Kemp Special Order which dealt with government spending. Neither the Republican Study Committee nor Congressman Jack Kemp were the first Republicans to oppose excessive federal spending, but a coordinated floor discussion of an issue of this type was unusual. The Republican Study Committee staff and members also introduced the new concept of tax indexing. While it did gain some bi-partisan support, it also met resistance from some members who viewed it as heretical.

The case studies in this chapter are selective. They do not represent all of the legislative activity of the RSC during the 93rd Congress. Other

legislative activities included attempted amendments to occupational safety and health laws, amendments to the Clean Air Act, and opposition to aspects of electoral reform. Each of the cases discussed in this chapter is representative of the successes and failures of the Republican Study Committee. The cases illustrate the activities of the RSC in committees, on the House floor and in the electoral arena. Sometimes working with, other times opposing, their own party leadership and the Republican Administration during 1973 and 1974, the legislative leaders of the RSC carved out a specific role for their organization.

B. Atlantic Union Resolution

The first legislative measure in which the Republican Study Committee staff became engaged on a formal basis was the Atlantic Union Resolution. This bill called for an eighteen-person delegation to participate in a convention comprised of North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries to explore the possibility of establishing an "Atlantic Union" of member countries on federal principles. Similar resolutions had been introduced in prior Congresses but had never before come to the floor for a House vote. Then, on April 2, 1973, the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported H. Res. 205 by a 21-8 roll call vote.¹ The supporters included the chairman and most of the Democratic members, as well as several Republicans. One of the outspoken negative votes on the Atlantic Union Resolution was Edward J. Derwinski (R-Illinois). Derwinski then was a middle-ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and strongly opposed the Atlantic Union Resolution for several reasons:

1. Because if it were enacted, it would substantially dilute U.S. sovereignty.
2. More pragmatically, he realized that the likelihood of such a resolution becoming law and instituting a supranational government of Canada, the United States, and the major western countries of Europe was very remote.
3. Additionally, he also feared that such a delegation would reduce the status of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). Derwinski was the treasurer of the IPU, which frequently met in Europe, Asia and elsewhere to discuss matters of mutual concern with parliamentary delegations from other nations.

At Derwinski's request, the shared staff of the Republican Study Committee prepared and distributed a fact sheet on the Atlantic Union Resolution which was circulated to the members.² After its passage in the Foreign Affairs Committee, the battle moved to the House Rules Committee. The resolution was then reported out of the House Rules Committee with a letter of endorsement from President Nixon to its principal House sponsor, Rep. Paul Findley (R-Illinois). The Nixon letter endorsed the concept and Findley used it to enlist Republican support for his resolution. By this time, Derwinski decided to actively oppose the measure. In addition to the reasons cited above for his opposition, Derwinski had a personal motive in opposing the passage of his Illinois colleague's bill. Findley and Derwinski were in the unusual position of both serving on the same committee from the same state. While Findley was an active member of the House Wednesday Group, he had not been included in Derwinski's IPU meetings. Thus, personal rivalry led Derwinski to particularly oppose this initiative of his junior Illinois colleague.

During this time, the Republican Study Committee had begun pressing Derwinski to help it obtain a headquarters office for its staff operation. Because of the office situation, Feulner, the part-time executive director and Jane Craft, general secretary, had the difficult task of overseeing a number of staff members located in different member offices. Feulner and Craft had complained to Crane and Derwinski about the lack of a central room. Derwinski mentioned to Minority Leader Ford that he would like to have a room in the House Office Building Annex I; some of these rooms had already been given to other senior Republican members who were not ranking on committees. Therefore, Derwinski pleaded with Ford on the basis of his seniority and his position as head of the Nationalities Division of the Republican National Committee.³ Although Derwinski mentioned the need to Ford on several occasions, there were no results. Then, the matter of the Atlantic Union Resolution came along.

At a meeting of the Republican Study Committee, Derwinski argued against the bill and asked his colleagues to help him oppose it. Derwinski asked the executive director to prepare a "Dear Colleague" letter for Derwinski's signature opposing the resolution. The RSC staff prepared the "Dear Colleague" letter. Then, Derwinski contacted Sam Stratton (D-New York) who was one of the original co-sponsors of H. Res. 205. Stratton

signed the "Dear Colleague" letter with Derwinski and later admitted his change of viewpoint on the House floor:

"Confession is good for the soul. I am listed in the report, and properly so, as a cosponsor of this resolution. However, I have become convinced from the developments that have occurred, particularly this year, and from what I have learned from our situation in Europe as a result of my membership on a NATO subcommittee, and from a visit recently to a NATO Defense Conference in Munich, that this is not the proper time to take up this resolution and talk about some form of federal union in the Atlantic."⁴

Stratton realized the political liability of advocating a reduction of U.S. independence or sovereignty. His support of the Derwinski position enabled him to avoid these political charges. It was a reasonable move for Stratton, particularly because there were no strong lobbying efforts on behalf of the bill. From Derwinski's perspective, Stratton was an ideal ally, because he was a Democrat who had defected from the other side.

Derwinski did not participate in the floor debate on the resolution, although he was the acknowledged leader of the opposition. The RSC fact sheet was the only analysis of the bill which mentioned both the advantages and the disadvantages of the proposal. The floor debate was carried by a group of his RSC colleagues including John Ashbrook (R-Ohio), H.R. Gross (R-Iowa) and J. Herbert Burke (R-Florida). Both Burke and Ashbrook were then members of the embryonic Republican Study Committee, and Gross eventually became one. The effort to provide the measure with a rule on the House floor was defeated by a 197-210 record vote. The three senior members of the Republican leadership (Gerald R. Ford (R-Michigan), the Minority Leader; Les Arends (R-Illinois), the Minority Whip; and John B. Anderson (R-Illinois), the chairman of the Republican Conference), all voted for the resolution and for the Findley position which was supported by the Administration.⁵

Following the record vote on the Atlantic Union Resolution, Derwinski again approached Ford about the possibility of securing a room in one of the House Office Building Annexes.⁶ In this conversation with Ford, he admitted that his prior request for space in the House Office Building complex was inaccurate. Derwinski told Ford:

"The real reason why I want the room is so that a number of us can get together with our pooled legislative staff in order to be more effective. We beat you and Findley today and we are going to do more of the same."⁷

Ten days later, Ford assigned a room for the Republican Study Committee to Derwinski. As Derwinski recounts "if you show them muscle, they will give you what you want."⁸ This room was to be the RSC's first headquarters. Prior to that time, the staff of the RSC was housed in member offices, scattered throughout the House Office Building complex.

While the substance of the Atlantic Union Resolution was minor, the success gave the leadership of the embryonic group considerable satisfaction. The RSC members had beaten their own party leadership, which was acting in unison with the Republican Administration and with a leading member of the House Wednesday Group. The coordinated action of the RSC fact sheet produced by the shared staff, followed by the "Dear Colleague" letter, showed them that they could work together effectively. The granting of the room also gave Derwinski satisfaction. The Wednesday Group had an office assigned to it for several years. Now the RSC had parallel status. Practically speaking, with the staff combined in one room, supervision was easier, and productivity increased. When the room was assigned to the RSC, it enabled the staff to become more effective because they were all consolidated into a single location which eliminated some of the problems outlined in Chapter IV above.

C. Government, Economy and Spending Issues

A long-time objective of conservative Republicans in the Congress has been cutting the size of the federal budget. This position has substantially changed in recent years with the popularity of so-called "supply side economics." Supply side economic policy encourages tax rate reductions to increase investment, jobs and eventually income. But the traditional attempts at budget cutting have taken a number of forms including voting against appropriations bills, or recommending cuts in them; voting against the periodic increases in the federal debt ceiling; and voting against specific authorization programs as an economic measure.

The Republican Study Committee was actively involved in several different aspects of this "economy in government" issue. These included studies of the projected costs of legislation which had been introduced in the Congress but not yet enacted, and new ways of combatting inflation such as indexing the federal income tax brackets.

Each of these activities drew from different elements within the RSC membership. The RSC staff developed themes with which the RSC membership was comfortable. More importantly, these coordinated efforts enabled the members to speak with a coordinated voice on specific matters of concern. The RSC role as a research source and a speech-writing mechanism available to its members to act together on joint projects was brought to the fore. The staff offered the members the opportunity to participate in specific projects which might be outside the member's committee expertise. This proved helpful to the RSC because it showed how the RSC could expand the member's ability to speak authoritatively on major issues.

Kemp Special Order

Congressman Jack Kemp (R-New York) took the lead in calling the attention of his House colleagues and other readers of the Congressional Record to the excesses of projected government spending. This took the form of a Special Order on April 10, 1974 which was participated in by Kemp and six of his RSC colleagues.⁹ A Special Order is a device used after the regular legislative business has been completed on the House floor. With the agreement of the Speaker, members of the House are recognized to discuss any topic of concern to them. On appropriate occasions, the member who has requested the time for the Special Order can use the opportunity to engage in a colloquy with his colleagues, either by prior arrangement, or at the time of the Special Order.

Svend Peterson, an RSC staff member who concentrated on federal budget issues, conceived a plan for listing prospective legislation by total dollar authorization. This work involved a listing of all of the spending legislation introduced by members of the House in various issue areas. These bills were then categorized by cost. It was planned that each of the participants in the Special Order would list and discuss the spending proposals in a defined spending category. As the project developed, Sam Devine (R-Ohio) discussed spending proposals in the \$25 million-\$50 million category;

Del Clawson (R-California) discussed programs in the \$50 million-\$100 million range; Phil Crane (R-Illinois) examined the \$100 million-\$500 million range; Harold Froehlich (R-Wisconsin) reviewed programs in the \$500 million-\$1 billion range; Ed Derwinski listed programs that would cost at least \$1 billion but under \$10 billion; and Ben Blackburn (R-Georgia) cited programs in excess of \$10 billion a year.

The division of the bills into dollar categories was agreed upon for two reasons:

1. It would dramatize the need to look at the totality of federal spending and the need to establish priorities among the competing demands for the limited resources of the government.
2. Each member would share the responsibility for attacking the sponsors of the spending proposals. That is, if one Democratic member had introduced six new spending bills in the field of education, it was highly unlikely that they would all fall into the same category. Thus, no individual RSC member would be accused of attacking an individual in the Democratic party who was regarded as being especially in favor of federal aid to education.

While the data was being compiled by Peterson, it was discussed at an Executive Committee meeting. The executive director asked members to participate, and Kemp agreed to coordinate the effort. The Kemp introductory remarks summarized governmental revenue, expenditure and debt projections and included a call for balanced federal budgets and a reduction of spending.

Kemp argued that federal spending was already too high. Additionally, Kemp said, "Congress now has before it 450 measures which, if they all become law, will cost the taxpayers \$871,363,307,000 between the current fiscal year and fiscal 1977."¹⁰ The staggering level of this additional spending which approached one trillion dollars, became the common theme of all of the participants. Regarding the specific programs, they said:

"Each one examined alone appears to have some merit when judged on its objective of making life easier for the American public. Lumped together, they are a frighteningly costly package."¹¹

Other RSC activities in connection with the Special Order centered on specific legislative battles. This effort concerned itself with a united stand on the general theme of government frugality and was not geared to a specific bill. The individual members issued press releases to their local media outlets. The RSC staff called several reporters at other newspapers. These efforts resulted in some national news media exposure, including a lengthy article in Phoenix, Arizona. Phoenix was far distant from the home cities of any of the participants in the Special Order. The participating members were not accustomed to being noticed outside their own congressional districts or, at most, their own states. To be quoted in a distant city gave them attention which they had seldom received in the past. This was a tentative first step toward working with the national media which would occupy their attention on subsequent occasions. Beyond this limited media attention, however, the effort had no measurable impact. It did not affect the legislative process or result in any cuts in government outlays. However, it was a preliminary step toward coordinated action through an ad hoc group, rather than through the formal party structure or the arrangement of an individual member's personal staff.

Constitutional Amendment to Balance the Budget

A balanced federal budget has been a long-time objective of congressional conservatives. The effort to amend the federal Constitution to achieve this objective was led by Congressman Floyd Spence (R-South Carolina), a member of the Republican Study Committee's Executive Committee. Spence's committee assignment on Armed Services did not provide a logical base for his efforts. Hence, he called on a member of the RSC's professional staff, Jerry James, to aid him. James was well-suited to this effort because he had extensive experience in studying congressional budget minutiae. The major portion of James' salary came from Spence, and their collaboration in this project was very close.

The Spence bill was first introduced in 1973 as H. Res. 332 with 17 co-sponsors. A number of similar resolutions were introduced prohibiting deficit spending except in a time of war or national emergency. The Resolution included a second section which mandated a system for repayment of the national debt.¹² Much of the preliminary research done for the study was published in a monograph written by James entitled Federal Spending

and Budget Control: An Analysis and Review. ¹³ While the James monograph was a starting point, the subject required further extensive research. His original monograph dealt with the so-called "uncontrollable" portions of the budget, and how they might eventually be reduced.

At the instigation of the executive director, the James monograph was distributed at an RSC meeting where James presented his findings to the members. Spence spoke about his bill and enlisted supporters for his measure. The supporters of the Spence Amendment were his RSC colleagues plus a handful of conservative Democrats. The conclusion of these members was that a Constitutional Amendment was required because the Congress was incapable of controlling its own profligate spending. This argument had been made by James in his monograph which he had produced while on the staff of the RSC. The monograph was helpful to Spence because he referred to it in debates on the House floor whenever the subject was discussed. The members of the Republican Study Committee were comfortable in supporting the bill. It agreed with their basic fiscal frugality, and would reinforce their image as responsible representatives both in Washington and at home. The basic effort, however, was not a serious legislative initiative. There had been no contact with the Minority Leadership or the White House about the bill, no hearings were held since the Democrats controlled the committees, and it was not viewed as a serious effort to enact legislation.

Neither of these efforts achieved success, but both the Kemp Special Order and the Spence bill helped set the stage for later activity in the House and in the Senate. They were the precursors to the call for a Constitutional Convention to mandate a balanced federal budget, limitations on federal taxing and spending, the impact of California's Proposition 13 throughout the nation, and the Kemp-Roth Bill. While the eventual form of the amendments would be different, some of the basic research was conducted and some of the member leadership was generated through these early RSC coordinated research efforts. They were not accompanied by effective lobbying or publicity activity. These other dimensions only came later.

Indexing the Income Tax System

Indexing is adjusting the income tax rate schedules by an automatic factor to account for inflation. The concept was a new one to Members of Congress in 1974. The idea was introduced by Milton Friedman who advocated

it in his Newsweek column. As Friedman explained, indexing involves built-in adjustments so that government would not profit from individuals being forced into higher income brackets because of government-caused inflation.¹⁴ The concept was brought to the fore after Friedman visited Brazil and witnessed the practical implementation of indexing in a large economy. As the original concept evolved following his trip to Brazil, Friedman was anxious to expose the concept and develop it into a major public issue.

When Friedman advised the RSC's executive director that he was coming to Washington for a speaking engagement, the executive director asked him to meet with the RSC members. This meeting occurred on May 7-8, 1974. In a private dinner meeting, followed by a luncheon meeting with members from both Houses and both parties, Friedman advocated a specific bill on indexing. Among the Democrats in attendance was Phil Landrum (D-Georgia). Landrum was a senior member of the Ways and Means Committee which would have legislative jurisdiction over changes to the tax code such as indexing. Initial questioning from the conservative congressmen was largely hostile. But the questions were handled deftly by Friedman. Eventually, the hostility gave way to considerable enthusiasm for the concept from a majority of the members present. The opposition of some of the members stemmed from their belief that indexing tax rate brackets would be conceding that the war against inflation was unwinnable. Friedman's simple response was that "a world of zero inflation would obviously be better. Yet, given the inevitable, if temporary, costs of reducing inflation without such a measure as indexing, we should adopt it to protect ourselves from government profiting from inflation."¹⁵

Following the discussions at this meeting, enough interest was established in the concept for the bill to be drafted and introduced. The draft of the bill and accompanying floor statements were prepared by Senator James Buckley's (R-Cons.-New York) legislative director and the staff of the Republican Study Committee. The bill first appeared on the Senate side under the title of the "Cost of Living Adjustment Act," and was introduced by Buckley.¹⁶

Following the introduction of S. 3396, Friedman returned to the theme in his Newsweek column. As he noted, "The changes (as incorporated in the Buckley bill) would largely immunize the income tax from inflation."¹⁷ The

bill was subsequently discussed in the Republican Study Committee White Paper,¹⁸ and introduced on the House side by a number of Republican members. The RSC staff actively solicited co-sponsors and the bill attracted eighteen of them from both parties.¹⁹

This bill was important for many members of the RSC. As the political climate became chillier because of Watergate and inflation, the RSC members looked for positive measures to support which would deal with the problems of the economy. Indexing was one, although its technical nature made it a difficult concept to convey to the electorate.

The indexing bill did not pass in the 93rd Congress. However, it gave the conservatives a tax program to support and advocate in their districts. The alternative arrangement, advocated by the Democratic leadership, was a series of election year tax cuts. These tax cuts were barely adequate to maintain an individual's relative tax position as it existed prior to the inflation which had pushed him into a higher income tax bracket. To effectively advocate indexing, on the other hand, required an electorate educational process. In subsequent books and articles and in the Congress it has been reintroduced and continues to be discussed in public policy circles.²⁰

The issues of fiscal prudence were basic questions which united the membership of the Republican Study Committee. Staff aides provided the basic documentation and member involvement was enlisted on these broad issues. Their own innate conservative attitudes were reinforced by intellectual arguments and staff support which extended their individual capabilities. They were broad issues which brought conservative members together, rather than splitting them apart. Additionally, the RSC was perceived by the members' staffs as filling a useful role. This was helpful to the RSC staff which had to depend on members' (and hence, members' staffs) good will for their salary requirements. The economy, taxes and government spending were unifying issues for building the Republican Study Committee, even though they did not lead to legislative victories, or even serious consideration in the legislative process.

D. The Battle Over Federal Land Use Planning

The legislative role of the Republican Study Committee was more important than preparing Special Orders and performing other "service" roles. If the RSC was to play a significant role in the House of Representatives, it would have to make a direct and visible impact on the legislative process. It was necessary not only to play the role, but also to be perceived as playing the role. Mayhew describes this as "credit claiming":

"[A]cting so as to generate a belief in a relevant political actor (or actors) that one is personally responsible for causing the government, or some unit thereof, to do something that the actor (or actors) consider desirable."²¹

Mayhew describes "credit claiming" in terms of the individual member and the benefits which accrue to him. But for a young organization, generally viewed with some skepticism by most of the outside political actors, credit claiming is an essential element in establishing credibility. The elements, whether for an individual member or a faction, are clear: "it becomes necessary for each congressman to try to pull off pieces of governmental accomplishment for which he can believably generate a sense of responsibility."²² This meant active leadership in the passage or defeat of a specific bill. The legislative battle over federal land use provided such an opportunity.

While the concept of governmental regulation of the use of privately owned land is an old one in United States history, the advocacy of comprehensive land use planning at the federal level is recent. The traditional governmental control in this area had been exercised by city or county governmental officials. Local zoning boards, usually elected but occasionally appointed, were the forums in which citizens could participate in the designation of uses to privately-owned land. Zoning decisions affect the value of land. A higher use zoning decision for, say commercial purposes, would give a tract of land substantially greater value than a comparable plot designated for single family residential use. This was the long-established local pattern of land regulation.

The first attempt to enact a federal land use policy act through the Congress was made in January 1970. At that time, Senator Henry Jackson

(D-Washington) introduced a bill which was referred to the Interior Committee of the Senate, of which he was the chairman. Four days of hearings were held on his bill, and his committee reported the bill favorably. However, no vote was taken on the Senate floor and the House Interior Committee also failed to take any action on the House companion measure.

Following the 1970 elections, in January, 1971, Senator Jackson introduced S. 632 which was identical to the bill reported by the Interior Committee the preceding year. At the request of the Nixon Administration, Jackson introduced another bill, S. 992. S. 992 was the Nixon Administration's response to federal land use planning and was basically a milder version of the Jackson bill. By January, 1972, an amendment was introduced to S. 992 at the request of the Administration which provided sanctions against states that did not develop a comprehensive land use system. Finally, the Jackson bill, S. 632, was reported out of the Senate Interior Committee. That is, the committee endorsed the bill and sent it to the floor of the Senate for action. However, the committee had substantially amended it before sending it to the Senate floor. The bill passed the Senate by a vote of 60-18 on September 19, 1972, but again no vote was taken in the House on a companion measure. The 1972 election prevented final action from taking place, and the bill died again.

In January, 1973, Senator Jackson again introduced a bill. This one was virtually identical to the Senate-passed version of the previous year, S. 632. The Nixon Administration's bill was again introduced on request, this time by Senators Fannin (R-Arizona) and Jackson. The Jackson bill, S. 268, was marked up in the Senate Interior Committee in April, 1973. With the exception of vocal opposition from Senators Clifford Hansen (R-Wyoming) and Fannin, Senator Jackson was given virtually a free hand in shaping this legislation. Committee mark-up of the bill was completed in May, 1973 and the bill passed the Senate by a vote of 62-21. With this overwhelming vote, the momentum for passage of federal land use legislation had begun and it seemed assured of early action in the House. If, as Froman and others maintained, even though the Senate was a more liberal legislative body than the House,²³ its early action, the overwhelmingly favorable vote, the Administration's support, and the substantial House support, made the prospects for passage very bright indeed. Jackson was strongly supported by Congressman Morris Udall (D-Arizona) who headed the House Subcommittee

on Environment. Udall had already completed hearings on a companion bill. The opposition in the House Interior Committee seemed limited to members of the Republican Study Committee who were outnumbered in both the subcommittee and in the full committee. The member who became the leader of the opposition, Sam Steiger (R-Arizona), had already expressed his outspoken opposition to the bill despite the fact that there was no plan to stop it in the subcommittee.

In early June, 1973, Phil Truluck, who was on the payroll of Congressman Ben Blackburn (R-Georgia) assigned to work on the staff of the RSC, discussed the pending bill with the RSC's executive director, Albert Gilman. Gilman arranged for Truluck to brief the Executive Committee about the bill, its provisions, and the likelihood of its passage. The Executive Committee expressed concern and authorized Gilman and Truluck to try to help defeat it. Therefore, Truluck and Gilman met with Steiger about the land use bill. They offered him and the other minority members of the committee the assistance of the Republican Study Committee to fight the bill. Shortly thereafter, Truluck wrote and distributed a fact sheet on the Senate-passed bill to RSC members of the House.²⁴ In it, Truluck noted that the House Subcommittee on Environment of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee would begin mark-up of the committee bill on July 12 with completion expected by July 27.

The members of the Republican Study Committee objected to the bill both because it offended their concept of federalism and because of the specific provisions of the bill. Pressure from local interests, both elected and those representing real estate developers, industry, and others expressed their concerns about still more federal regulations. On the philosophical issue of federalism, the viewpoint was expressed that even if there were problems with the use of the land, adding another layer of bureaucracy would not solve them. Rather, to require additional permits from the government would substantially lengthen the period to complete a construction project, increase costs, and remove the decision-making process from the local citizens to distant offices of the federal government which could be out of tune with local conditions and requirements.

After the publication of the fact sheet, Gilman assigned Truluck to full-time work in conjunction with several members of the minority committee

staff. As on every committee, the senior minority members on the Interior Committee were responsible for the hiring of the minority staff. One of these members was Philip Ruppe (R-Michigan) who was a principal co-sponsor of the Udall bill. Ruppe was the ranking Republican on Udall's subcommittee. Consequently, his minority staff was more responsive to the Udall position than to the view held by Messrs. Steiger, Ketchum (R-California), Bauman (R-Maryland), Symms (R-Idaho) and the other Republicans on the committee who opposed the legislation. Because of this vacuum, Truluck became an ad hoc staff member of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on the Environment working for the minority members who were deprived of staff representation because the ranking minority member's view coincided with that of the chairman.

The Nixon Administration continued to express support for a comprehensive land use planning bill. The Secretary of the Interior, Rogers C.B. Morton, himself a former House member from Maryland, was an enthusiastic supporter of some form of federal land use planning. Privately, Steiger and others questioned his motives. The Jackson/Udall bill would enhance the size and power of the Department of Interior in Washington. Thus, the bureaucrats in the Interior Department strongly supported the bill and applied pressure on the Secretary to support it as well. Whatever his motives, Morton's support gave the bill a bi-partisan cast which made opposition even more difficult.

Despite Truluck's assistance in the preparation of amendments, during the mark-up sessions in the Subcommittee on the Environment, Steiger was unsuccessful in having any of them adopted. His fellow Arizonan, Udall, was unyielding. Udall suggested that the provisions which Steiger found obnoxious should be left in the bill and that they could be taken out when the bill reached the full committee. This reversed the usual theory which was that the subcommittee stage was for drafting, amending and perfecting proposed legislation before it reached the full committee. The bill was finally reported from the Subcommittee on the Environment in late September. It was a Jackson/Udall bill without any attempt at compromising with the Steiger forces. Truluck maintained his full-time relationship with Steiger and the other members of the Interior Committee who were also members of the Republican Study Committee. During the last quarter of 1973, he gave briefings to members and staff, wrote speeches which were inserted in the Congressional Record opposing the Udall comprehensive land use approach,

arranged for a Special Order on the House floor which included speeches by more than twenty members on the subject, and worked on language for a substitute land use bill which would be introduced by Steiger.²⁵ The Steiger substitute gave incentives to the states to adopt their own plans and made the federal role simply an advisory one. Truluck and Steiger frequently reported on their progress to the Executive Committee. This was helpful because it kept the members informed, and more importantly, they could see that the RSC staff was playing a role in the legislative process. The Executive Committee strongly supported Steiger in his efforts, and worked with him on projects like the Special Order. Truluck outlined provisions of the Steiger alternative bill in a section-by-section analysis which was distributed to all members of the Republican Study Committee.²⁶ At the same time, Steiger sent a "Dear Colleague" letter to all members of the House in which he indicated that he would be introducing his alternative bill and inviting them to co-sponsor it with him.²⁷ The timing was crucial because Chairman Udall had planned to report the bill from the Interior Committee in order to have a vote on the House floor before Christmas. However, Steiger and his colleagues planned to offer a number of amendments to the Udall bill on the House floor. This and the introduction of the Steiger substitute bill delayed Udall's timetable.

The Steiger substitute (H.R. 11325) played a vital role in his strategy. Considering that the Administration basically supported a Udall-type compulsory approach to land use planning, and that the environmental movement was at the height of its political power, it was politically impractical for some members to be in a position of outright opposition to federal land use. The Friends of the Earth and other environmental groups were very powerful at this time. They had active allies on the committee including Chairman Udall. However, there was some dissatisfaction from the environmentalists with the younger liberal members of the committee:

"[T]hey seem to skimp on their homework. There is this comment by an official of Friends of the Earth, a preservationist group: 'They (pro-environment younger committee members) are usually preoccupied with their other committee assignments. So they don't provide any leadership. They vote with us, but they won't take the time to learn about the subject matter'."²⁸

On the other side of the issue, Steiger and Truluck were trying to educate their supporters on the complicated provisions of the bill. Despite these

flaws, however, the balance of power on the committee clearly resided with Udall and his allies. It was politically difficult to be labeled "anti-environment" by the organizations which supported the Udall bill. Therefore, many members had the desire to "hang their hat on another peg" -- in this case, a milder bill in the form of the Steiger substitute. An important factor was the support of John Rhodes, Steiger's Arizona Republican colleague in the House, as the principal co-sponsor of the bill. Rhodes' credentials with the Republican establishment were impeccable, and they would offset Morton's appeal to his former House colleagues.

Truluck also served as the contact man for outside interest groups which opposed comprehensive land use planning. For example, on November 28, 1973, he accompanied Messrs. Steiger, Symms and Ketchum to a meeting with representatives of approximately 30 trade associations which opposed the Udall approach to land use. This was a session to discuss not only the contents of the Udall bill, but also the likely scenario if the Udall bill went to conference with the Jackson bill. The presumption of Steiger and Truluck was that the worst provisions of both Udall and Jackson (*i. e.*, the least conservative) would be merged into the final version of the bill. They argued that any industry lobbyist who believed that his amendment might be adopted in the House but who did not realize that his amendment would be deleted in conference was being unrealistic. They strongly urged the industry lobbyists to help them fight the Udall bill. Because of these external and internal pressures, the full Interior Committee continued its mark-up sessions after the Christmas holiday recess and did not complete them until late January, 1974.

At the completion of the mark-up sessions, Steiger again relied on the Republican Study Committee, this time to write the Dissenting Views. At the same time, Ketchum requested that the minority committee staff prepare an official minority report. This official report was written by Bruce Driver who had been appointed by Congressman Ruppe and, as such, was a leading advocate of the Udall bill. The Driver report was not acceptable to the minority, and Ketchum signed the RSC-prepared Steiger Dissenting Views. Eventually, the official minority report died for the lack of any signatures at all. The Steiger-Truluck views gathered eight of the eleven opposing members as signators.²⁹

The report on H.R. 10294 together with these Minority Views was filed on February 13, 1974.³⁰ With the bill having been reported officially from the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, attention now moved to the battle on the House floor. However, in RSC meetings and strategy sessions among Steiger, Truluck and others, their attention focused on the Rules Committee. A preliminary count of the Rules Committee membership indicated that 5 of the 15 members would oppose granting a rule for the bill. Because the Rules Committee functions as the clearinghouse for all legislation before it reaches the House floor, with three additional votes, the rule could be killed and a more difficult fight on the House floor would be avoided. The Rules Committee operates under unusual procedures. The only witnesses who are permitted to testify before the committee are other members of the House. It is customary for the chairman and possibly one or two senior members from the originating committee to testify on the merits (or lack thereof) of a bill originating in their committee of original jurisdiction.

Steiger and Truluck worked out a strategy to gain three more votes in the Rules Committee to oppose the bill. They met with the Executive Committee, and the members made the defeat of the land use bill their top legislative priority. With this decision having been made, the entire RSC staff began working closely with Sam Steiger and in support of Truluck. The staff began a concerted effort to line up as many members as possible to oppose the bill in testimony before the Rules Committee.

Simultaneously, attempts had been made to convince the White House to change its position. In February, 1974, several RSC members paid a visit to President Nixon to discuss some of the issues coming before the Congress. Among these was Steiger discussing land use. The President indicated that he would certainly look into the land use issue because he didn't realize that there were the problems with this bill that Steiger had outlined to him. During the following week, three White House staff members visited Steiger's office to review his objections to the bill. Steiger was out of town and it fell on Truluck to present the Steiger objections to the bill. H.R. 10294 -- the official version of the Udall bill -- was reviewed page-by-page and the RSC objections were raised. While no commitment was made by these White House emissaries, they said they would review

their position and reconsider it if necessary. The Truluck objections, combined with Rhodes' support of Steiger, and the strong views of the RSC leadership, convinced the White House staff to change its position. Two weeks later, the White House sent word to Minority Leader John Rhodes that the Administration was withdrawing its support for the Udall bill and would instead support the Steiger substitute on land use. When Rhodes testified in opposition to the Udall bill before the House Rules Committee on February 26, 1974, he was able to announce the switch in the White House position. This change came as a surprise to Udall and his colleagues. Because of this announcement and the testimony of more than 15 members of the Republican Study Committee, the Rules Committee voted to defer action indefinitely by the strong vote of 9-4. The strength of the opposition to the rule was much greater than Udall or the other supporters had expected. Both the White House opposition, and the fact that fifteen members were sufficiently concerned to testify against the bill had an impact on the committee. But the battle was far from over.

Udall then began his own series of negotiations with key members of the Rules Committee to have his bill reconsidered. Private assurances were made to Udall that if additional hearings were held, the Rules Committee would bring the bill back up for consideration. Udall scheduled further hearings in late April. By this time, the Republican Study Committee staff had been able to contact a number of trade and industry organizations from throughout the country to urge them to coordinate their local affiliates to testify in opposition to the Udall bill. The message of these grass roots witnesses was simple: oppose the Udall bill and call for full hearings throughout the United States. The Washington hearings were originally scheduled for two days, but they had to be lengthened to three days because of the large number of witnesses desiring to testify. Of the more than 70 witnesses who testified, 56 opposed the bill and called for field hearings on it. This strong showing was a direct result of Truluck's efforts to work with the business community. Even with this evidence of opposition, Udall changed nothing in the bill and continued to press the Rules Committee to consider his bill again.

The Democratic leadership joined him in pressuring the Rules Committee Democrats who had previously opposed the rule to switch their position.

Consequently, Chairman Ray Madden (D-Indiana), James Delaney (D-New York) and Morgan Murphy (D-Illinois) switched to favor the granting of a rule for H.R. 10294. On May 15, the Rules Committee met again and passed a rule by a vote of 8-7. Steiger and the RSC had lost in the Rules Committee and the next stage of the land use battle would move to the floor of the House of Representatives.

In a strategy session at an RSC Executive Committee meeting, Steiger and his colleagues decided to attempt to defeat the rule on the floor of the House rather than wait and vote against the bill or in favor of the substitute. This strategy was adopted because Steiger believed if the bill came up for debate on the floor of the House, Udall would probably accept enough Steiger-type amendments to convince some of the swing votes to support his bill. Then, when Udall and his House colleagues went into the Joint House-Senate Conference with Jackson and the other Senate conferees to reconcile the two measures, the House would recede from its position and accept the Senate version of the bill. Thus, Udall would achieve his objective anyway.³¹

Therefore, the attention of the Steiger forces focused on the rule. This was a crucial decision because defeating an open rule on a major piece of legislation is difficult. Most rules battles evolve around closed rules (those which fail to permit amendments) to legislation such as tax bills. However the land use bill's opponents believed that with the original Rules Committee vote, the additional hearings which overwhelmingly opposed the bill, the availability of a substitute, and the new White House opposition to the bill, there was a strong base to oppose the granting of the rule on the House floor.

At Steiger's request, the RSC made a whip call. This preliminary RSC headcount indicated a firm 190 votes in opposition to the Udall bill in its current form, but it was uncertain how many of these votes could be transferred into opposition to the rule on the Udall bill. The Udall bill was scheduled for action on Tuesday, June 11, 1974. Under House procedures, the debate and voting on the bill is preceded immediately by the discussion and vote on the rule to accompany the bill. In the Congressional Record appearing on Monday, June 10, the opponents of the bill received a major

surprise by Udall who published 21 amendments that would be offered on the floor to his bill.³² These amendments were ones which Steiger and his colleagues had been trying to have adopted since the beginning of the land use battle in subcommittee and which Udall and his proponents had been rejecting. The adoption of these Steiger amendments would weaken Steiger's hand for the subsequent floor vote on the bill. The amendments indicated that the Steiger strategy was right and that the vote on the rule was all-important. Steiger was convinced that Udall would accept these amendments on the floor, and then recede from them in the conference with the Senate. In addition, these Udall amendments gave the Steiger forces extra evidence that the bill was not ready for action on the floor of the House because Udall, himself, admitted many changes needed to be made to his bill. Truluck and others on the Republican Study Committee staff prepared a number of floor statements which stressed this point during the debate on the House rule. The Republican Study Committee not only provided speeches in opposition to the rule, it also made a series of whip calls to member offices urging a no vote on the rule and explaining the rationale for it. Their whip calls indicated that the RSC had a good chance to prevail, but that the vote would be very close. On the critical vote on the House rule on June 11, 1974, the Steiger forces did prevail and the rule to accompany the bill, H.R. 10294, was defeated by a vote of 211-204.³³

The stunning victory on land use for Steiger and his colleagues in the Republican Study Committee not only was a reassurance to the RSC Executive Committee that the activities of the RSC were meaningful and important, it was also vital to giving the organization credibility in the eyes of the formal power structure of the House. Because its staff resources had been substantially committed to the efforts, and because Steiger had kept the RSC members involved in formulating his strategy, the RSC achieved important credibility by winning the seemingly impossible battle on the House floor against the rule. The RSC's role as the leader on this major issue which had originally been considered in 1970 was widely recognized. As Mayhew notes:

"The single fact that Congress records a roll call, whether close or one-sided, supplies no evidence that anyone has engaged in any mobilizing activity."³⁴

It was clear to Udall, the White House, Rhodes and all of the other participants that the RSC had mobilized the opposition on this bill and that they had succeeded. As John Rousselot (R-California), the treasurer of the RSC, was to point out later:

"The RSC victory on land use was an accomplishment recognized even by the liberals in the party. Alan Steelman (R-Texas) told me 'You guys really did your homework'."³⁵

Other members also recognized the role of the RSC, and they attended a victory party in the Caucus Room of the Cannon House Office Building which the staff had arranged for the late afternoon of the vote. In all, more than 300 people attended. The party was important because it provided psychological recognition that the RSC was now a major participant in the House legislative process. The RSC had become a significant force both theoretically and practically in the House. Theoretically because the leadership was now forced to take formal notice of the organization and discuss the organization's concerns on major issues of interest to it. On the practical side, three days after the victory on the House rule, John Rhodes, the House Minority Leader, and the only Republican member on the House Building Commission, called LaMar Baker (R-Tennessee), the RSC chairman, and advised him that the Building Commission had just met and the RSC had been given the use of Room 134 in the Cannon House office Building. The room had formerly been occupied by the Executive Liaison Office, but their use of it had been terminated. The room itself was approximately three times larger than the RSC's headquarters on the third floor of House Office Building Annex I. In addition, the prestige of being located in one of the main House buildings with vote bells, meant the RSC was a serious legislative organization on a par with the Democratic Study Group. It was the symbolic fulfillment of the efforts of many of the individuals who had supported the embryonic RSC.

E. Legal Services Corporation

Of all the public policy issues which confronted conservative Republicans in the House during the Nixon Administration, few faced as much innate hostility as did the component programs of Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty. According to conservative analysis, the Johnson-type massive social welfare programs had been judged a failure. It was argued that these programs were spending vast sums of money which were not aiding the poor, but rather

aiding the poverty bureaucrats. Even more importantly to the conservatives, they were upsetting the established social order. For example, in the case of legal services, rather than concentrating on legal assistance for the poor, it was said that the legal services lawyers were involved in class action suits, political activity, divisive social activities, such as setting children against their own parents, and other para-legal actions which the conservatives considered outside the original scope of the 1966 charter of the Legal Services Corporation. These activities were seen as a different concept of Legal Services, which had been to provide basic access to the legal system to poor citizens in their everyday lives. The proponents of Legal Services had justified the program on the basis of the need to protect the poor from usurers, assist them with small claims, help in divorce settlements and other civil proceedings. The implementation of the Legal Services program was very different, according to conservatives.

In this battle, the conservative members of the House were completely united. They found a ready ally in Richard Nixon who had always been skeptical of the Legal Services Corporation. In 1971, President Nixon vetoed a Legal Services expansion bill because the compromise version provided for the Presidential appointment of only 6 of the 17 members of the board. In 1972, a provision to transfer the legal services function to a separate corporation out of the Office of Economic Opportunity was dropped because of a threatened Presidential veto.

By 1973, Nixon had announced his plans to dismantle the Office of Economic Opportunity of which the Legal Services Corporation was an integral part. He would parcel the various elements of OEO out to older, established federal agencies. In the budget accompanying his message, it was also provided that Legal Services would be established as an independent corporation. The conservatives had hoped that Nixon would abolish the program. Failing that, a complete restructuring provided the opportunity to at least rein the program in substantially. Thus, in the fiscal year 1974 budget, there was no money included for the Office of Economic Opportunity.

With the advent of the 93rd Congress in 1973 and the newly formed Republican Study Committee, a number of its members expressed renewed concern about Legal Services. The outspoken wrath of the conservatives received a new impetus through the appointment of Howard Phillips as

Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity.³⁶ Phillips served in this capacity for a stormy six-month period from January 1973 to June 1973. During his service, Phillips was to have presided over the abolition of the Office of Economic Opportunity at the expressed direction of the President. But his venture at OEO was more a public relations success for him and his conservative allies than it was a substantive victory over the allies of the Office of Economic Opportunity. Phillips later became the founding director of the Conservative Caucus. His stormy tenure at OEO was marked by outspoken exchanges with senior congressional Democrats, other governmental agency heads, and some of his own subordinates who had the protection of the Civil Service Commission and could criticize their nominal superior.

On May 11, 1973, President Nixon announced his decision to support a Legal Services Corporation. This position was being advocated by a number of his personal White House advisors, the "legal establishment" in the form of the American Bar Association, and the Democratic leadership of the Congress. Opposing them was Acting Director Phillips who advocated a revenue sharing type approach which would have established 50 separate entities to administer a legal aid program, a different one being set up in each state. The revenue sharing alternative presumably would have been under the tighter restrictions of state supervisory agencies. Additionally, Phillips maintained that advances in providing real services would have a better opportunity to flourish in a decentralized program. Phillips had the enthusiastic backing of conservatives in both the House and the Senate who could point to substantial abuses in the federally funded and federally directed program.³⁷

Following the President's indication of support of the bill, the House Education and Labor Committee reported a bill (H.R. 7824) on June 4 which would establish an independent Legal Services Corporation. While there were some differences between its version and that offered by the Administration, the bill embodied the corporation concept with little to mollify the House conservatives. During his tenure at OEO, Phillips maintained a close relationship with the staff of the RSC. He met with the RSC Executive Committee on two occasions and helped feed "horror stories" to his congressional allies. These became the basis for two Special Orders on the House floor.

The Special Orders were taken on May 31, 1973 on the Legal Services issue and on June 5, 1973³⁸ on the general question of the continuation of the Office of Economic Opportunity. While the two issues were closely interrelated, it was clear from the outset that the Legal Services program would engender most of the opposition of the conservatives. The question of which agency would be the home for an OEO program was not as politically important a question as was the involvement of the Legal Services Corporation in local political issues. Some of President Nixon's advisors encouraged him to support an independent corporation. Others leaned toward the RSC viewpoint. Thus, the question was open and the RSC members had a reasonable expectation that they might influence the results toward reining in the legal services activists.

The Legal Services bill, H.R. 7824, was reported to the House from the House Education and Labor Committee on June 4, 1973.³⁹ The committee bill called for an eleven-member board for the corporation with all members appointed by the President. All members would be subject to Senate approval and no more than six could be in any one political party and at least a majority had to consist of attorneys. Thus, Nixon's earlier objection to the lack of executive control over the board was met by permitting the President to nominate all the members. Despite this concession to the White House, the members of the Republican Study Committee continued their active opposition to the bill. Earl Landgrebe (R-Indiana) objected to the bill because no hearings were held on it and because the provisions against political activity and lobbying by legal services attorneys were weakened. He also objected to the committee deleting the language barring frivolous appeals and negating the ban on grants to public interest law firms. All of these matters were to become the subject of amendments when the bill reached the House floor on June 21. Similarly, John Ashbrook and Robert Huber (R-Michigan) objected to the committee bill because they claimed it had stretched "gaping holes [in the Administration's proposals] so as not to provide effective defenses against political abuse of the corporation."⁴⁰ Ashbrook was a member and Huber was one of the four vice chairmen of the Republican Study Committee.

The House passed H.R. 7824 on June 21 by a 276-95 record vote. But it did so only after adopting 24 amendments sharply restricting the activities of the Legal Services Corporation.⁴¹ At the beginning of the debate, a

number of amendments were offered and accepted, such as those by Albert Quie (R-Minnesota), the ranking member on the committee. Quie was a liberal Republican member of the Wednesday Group. An early Quie amendment prohibited Legal Services Corporation employee participation in referenda or political matters and from engaging in boycotts or illegal activities. But the first major floor battle was the question of backup research centers for the Legal Services Corporation. As Congresswoman Edith Green (D-Oregon) asked when she introduced an amendment to provide legal aid for the poor:

"Does it mean that we should also finance, using millions of dollars, research centers aimed solely at changing social policy? That is, unless my amendment is adopted, precisely what will you be doing by this legislation?"⁴²

Green's leadership, as a moderate Democrat, was a key element in achieving success on many of these key amendments. Among the participants in the debate on the Green Amendment on backup centers was Minority Leader Gerald Ford who pointed to the local situation in his home town of Grand Rapids, Michigan. Ford noted how the local members of the bar had a common library which they mutually supported and which was able to provide research capabilities to any of the subscribers. As Ford stated:

"I do not know of any lawyers who practice who have the benefit of the massive backup in their private practice. Why should we give to the corporate attorneys an extra capability through backup centers when we do not do it for the lawyers generally."⁴³

Thus, Edith Green, representing moderate Democrats, was joined by the leader of the Republican establishment, Gerald Ford, in opposing the backup centers. Other speakers included a number of members of the Republican Study Committee, including future chairman, David Treen (R-Louisiana). Their involvement had been solicited by the RSC staff. The staff had briefed them and prepared their statements. The Green Amendment overwhelmingly⁴⁴ carried by the vote of 245-166.

The next recorded vote on an amendment was that offered by RSC Vice Chairman David Dennis (R-Indiana), which provided that in the interest of citizens, they could bring suits against the Legal Services Corporation for non-compliance with their charter. The amendment, floor speeches and preparatory work on the Dennis Amendment had been prepared by the RSC staff. The motion was defeated by a vote of 159-237. The supporters

of Dennis included the majority of members of the Republican Study Committee, conservative Democrats, and some establishment figures including Congresswoman Green. Arrayed against him were Minority Leader Ford, as well as the party leadership which carried with it a number of moderate members of the Republican party.

Another major ideological battle was the amendment offered by Quie to prohibit lobbying activities by employees of the Legal Services Corporation. He cited the activities of past legal services attorneys on lobbying both in the Congress and in the state legislatures. The Quie Amendment specifically banned lobbying unless the legislative body issued a formal invitation for them to testify. This Quie Amendment carried by a vote of 200-181.⁴⁵ While Quie was not a member of the Republican Study Committee, the amendments which he and Mrs. Green offered in the legal services battle were supported overwhelmingly by the membership of the RSC. The numerous RSC members who participated in the floor debate all had their statements prepared by the RSC staff. The RSC staff had briefed these members individually to prepare them for the debate. The next Quie Amendment prohibited participation in partisan political activities. It carried by a vote of 207-171.⁴⁶

Other votes on sensitive subjects included one offered by RSC member Wilmer Mizell (R-North Carolina) to forbid the Legal Services staff from engaging in activities regarding busing of school children to achieve racial balance in the schools. In the past, legal services attorneys had used their position to contravene the stated congressional position on social issues -- such as busing -- by supporting activities which the Congress had strongly opposed. The Mizell Amendment carried 221-150.⁴⁷ Two amendments dealing with federally funded abortions also carried overwhelmingly.⁴⁸ These amendments were offered by two other RSC members, Harold Froehlich and Larry Hogan (R-Maryland).

The motion to recommit the bill, and thus kill it, failed by the very narrow margin of 191-189. The bill itself carried on a vote of 276-95 with the 95 opposition votes including sixty members of the Republican Study Committee, four liberal Democrats who were upset with the local political involvement of the Legal Services Corporation, and twenty-five conservative

Democrats led by their traditional leader, Joe Waggoner (D-Louisiana).⁴⁹ Despite this apparent weak showing on final passage, the "Vote was a major victory for conservatives, containing provisions sharply restricting the activities of Legal Services lawyers and eliminating existing legal research backup centers."⁵⁰

While Congressional Quarterly considered the results a "major victory" for conservatives, the RSC membership only considered it a partial victory. The RSC's amendments had not carried. The successful amendments were offered by Edith Green, a moderate Democrat, and Al Quie, a liberal and leading member of the Republican establishment. While it was the support of the Republican conservatives who backed their amendments during the floor debate and on the votes, on RSC substantive amendments, like David Dennis', the Republican establishment was not supportive. While Mizell, Froehlich and Hogan had their restrictive amendments adopted, they were of a prohibition type rather than dealing with the structure of the Corporation. The results were not as good as they might have been, particularly since the conservatives were dealing from a position of strength including the President's two prior refusals to sign the Legal Services bill. The conservative RSC members provided Quie and Green with the necessary support during the debate on the House floor. The RSC staff briefed the members, conducted whip calls for the votes and generally coordinated the position of the opposition to the Legal Services bill. RSC members also provided the necessary votes to pass the amendments, thus making the bill less objectionable than it otherwise would have been. Every officer of the RSC actively participated in the general debate and RSC Vice Chairman Ben Blackburn was the group's coordinator for activities on the bill. Despite the 24 major amendments which were adopted with the RSC member support, they were not sufficiently attractive for the RSC members to support the bill on final passage.

The issue was later carried to the Senate floor where it was filibustered by a group of conservative Republican senators led by Jesse Helms (North Carolina), Bill Brock (Tennessee) and conservative Democrat James Allen (Alabama). Blackburn met with Helms, Brock and Allen to advise them of the House activities and to offer the RSC's staff help in the Senate battle. The filibuster attempt in the Senate survived two December 1973 cloture votes and carried over to the 1974 session. Following the Christmas recess

and the institution of the Second Session of the 93rd Congress, the Senate passed the Legal Services Corporation Act on January 31, 1974. While the Senate-passed version was given the designation S. 2686, the entire substance of the bill was that of H.R. 7824 which failed to include any of the restrictive amendments which the House had so painstakingly put into their version the previous June. The RSC members had learned the value of coordinating their activities with the Senate allies in this instance. The RSC members observed how their House adversaries were working closely with their Senate counterparts and thus able to use the intricacies of the legislative process to their own advantage. In an RSC fact sheet issued shortly after the Senate passage of the bill (on February 8, 1974), the legislative recommendation was:

"The only way to keep an unrestricted bill from becoming law is to defeat the Conference Report. That is an unusual step to advocate, but the gravity of the consequences of having an independent fully-financed, totally unaccountable federal Legal Services Corporation justifies such a strategy."⁵¹

At this stage, the decision on Legal Services shifted to the Conference Committee between the House and Senate. The national news media, including most political commentators, had related decisions on subjects such as this and virtually all others to "impeachment politics." As commentators Rowland Evans and Robert Novak noted in the Washington Post:

"...the President also might veto a bill for a new Legal Services program (formerly lodged in OEO) if the Senate-House Conference now devising the final form persists in the present trends."⁵²

That is, according to Evans and Novak, Nixon might give in to the conservatives on Legal Services with the hope it would win him support from the RSC members. Legal Services was discussed at virtually every weekly meeting of the Executive Committee. In May, a new RSC fact sheet was published. This updated fact sheet on the results of the Conference Report was distributed on Tuesday morning, May 14 and inserted in the Congressional Record by Ben Blackburn on that date.⁵³ The next day, Al Quie rebutted the fact sheet stating, "In the scope of its misrepresentations, omissions, and mistakes, it is incredible."⁵⁴ The matter was subsequently debated in the House Republican Conference where Rousset and Blackburn from the Republican Study Committee led the debate among their colleagues. The senior staff of the RSC and Howard Phillips met with the RSC members to keep them current on the intricacies of the bill. Blackburn opened the Republican Conference discussion with the rhetorical question: "I'd like to

see everybody raise his hand who believes that a majority of his constituents favor this bill." According to Blackburn, only two members -- William Steiger (R-Wisconsin) and Quie -- raised their hands.⁵⁵

The Conference did not unify the Republican position. The White House opposed the bill because of the backup centers, but Quie and other liberal Republicans supported it. The RSC opposed it for a wide range of reasons. On May 16, the floor debate began on the Conference Report. RSC member John Ashbrook moved to recommit the report to the Conference Committee with instructions to delete provisions for the legal backup centers. Ashbrook was defeated by the narrow margin of 183-191.⁵⁶ The next vote was on final passage of the Conference Report when 143 members voted against the bill. This was just three short of the necessary one-third of the entire House membership which would be required to sustain a Presidential veto of the bill. The White House had indicated that with the backup centers still in the bill, a Presidential veto was almost certain.

With the political reality of a possible veto and a strong opposition House vote, the Senate conferees reclaimed the bill and deleted the backup center provisions in order to save the rest of the Legal Services Corporation. The Senate sent the President the revised bill and on July 25, 1974, President Nixon signed into law the Legal Services Corporation.

This battle was a legislative failure for the RSC. It was a bitter pill to swallow because the RSC staff had provided the members with resources which they could not have allocated from their personal staffs. The staff had monitored the issue during the entire legislative process for more than a year. The issue had been discussed at numerous Executive Committee meetings, and outside experts had provided the members and the staff with arguments and amendments.

Still, the RSC did not have the full cooperation of the Republican leadership (as it had on the land use battle), and the Administration did not support its efforts. Despite a year's efforts, the RSC activists' battle over Legal Services was unsuccessful.

F. Reinstating the Private Ownership of Gold

The legislative battle to legalize the private ownership of gold was basically the crusade of a single man, Congressman Philip M. Crane. One of the first bills that Crane introduced in 1970, after his initial election in November 1969, was legislation to allow American citizens to buy, hold, sell or otherwise deal in gold. Private ownership of gold had been declared illegal in the Roosevelt Administration as one of his means of dealing with the Great Depression. By the 1970s, Crane and his allies no longer argued for the return to the gold standard. Rather, they adopted the Administration's rhetoric that gold was a commodity which had been demonetized by President Nixon in August 1971. Thus, it was merely a commodity, and as such the ownership of it by private citizens should not be proscribed. Despite this semantic concession, Crane was considered a "hard money" man, who had a national constituency which would like to be able to own gold again. Despite Crane's service on the House Banking and Currency Committee which had legislative jurisdiction over the subject area, Crane could not secure hearings on his bill because of the outspoken opposition of the committee's chairman, Wright Patman (D-Texas), and other senior Democrats on the House Banking and Currency Committee such as Henry Reuss (D-Wisconsin) and Henry Gonzalez (D-Texas). Crane's position as a junior Republican worked against him, as did the prevailing philosophy against the private ownership of gold.

He made a futile attempt to introduce appropriate language in 1971 to the Par Value Modification Act. On his second attempt on a similar bill in May 1973, Crane enlisted the aid of the Republican Study Committee. The RSC staff produced a fact sheet in support of his amendment. Then Crane achieved a modest victory when Henry Reuss agreed in committee to an amendment which would permit the private ownership of gold on a future date to be set at the discretion of the President. Crane pushed further with an amendment to reinstate a date certain. This Crane amendment was voted on when the bill reached the House floor. His position was defeated by a tie vote of 162-162. The bill carried with it the compromise provision of a date to be determined at the discretion of the President.⁵⁷

Crane continued to advocate a date certain. The legislative vehicle which he next used came about via unusual circumstances. On the floor of

the House on January 23, 1974, the House voted down H.R. 11354, the bill to expand the U.S. commitment to the International Development Association. IDA is the soft loan window of the World Bank making congressional loans to underdeveloped nations. H.R. 11354 specified that the United States together with other countries should agree to a fourth replenishment of funds in order to insure IDA's continuing ability to make loans on a concessionary basis. This bill was defeated in the House by a vote of 155-248. The Nixon Administration had carefully worked out the agreement with the other major World Bank members. The Administration could not let the matter rest. When it came before the Senate in the form of S. 2665,⁵⁸ the primary advocates of private ownership of gold, Senators James McClure (R-Idaho) and Peter Dominick (R-Colorado), joined together to sponsor an amendment to the IDA replenishment which called for private gold ownership on September 1, 1974. The amendment was introduced on the Senate side because the germaneness rules in that body are less stringent than they are in the House of Representatives. That is, in the House, the Parliamentarian could rule such an amendment out of order because it was not directly related to the subject under consideration.

After considerable debate, the McClure-Dominick Amendment carried and the Senate passed the bill including reinstatement of private ownership of gold on May 29, 1974 by a vote of 55-27.⁵⁹ Immediately afterwards, the House Banking and Currency Committee's Subcommittee on International Finance, under the chairmanship of Henry Gonzalez, began another series of hearings to try to pass the IDA bill again. Crane utilized the RSC staff to prepare questions for Treasury Secretary Simon, and to check with his colleagues about their position on a compromise bill.

In the one day of public hearings held on June 11, 1974,⁶⁰ Secretary Simon was specifically asked by Subcommittee Chairman Gonzalez as to the desirability of establishing a specific date for reinstating the private ownership of gold. Simon's response was:

"I do not believe, on the other hand, that it would be wise for the Congress to legislate removal of the existing gold restriction on a certain date. Such legislative inflexibility could hamper the U.S. representatives [to the IMF meetings] in renegotiating the reform which is now underway."⁶¹

At the same appearance, Simon went on to say:

"My own desire is that I would be able to recommend that... the President [exercise] the authority to remove the gold restrictions when this step can be taken without serious disturbance."⁶²

Simon objected to the September 1 date adopted by the Senate because it fell in the middle of the IMF Special Meetings and Simon believed that this could hamper those delicate negotiations. But he was also a political realist who then requested that the date at least be put back to December 31 if there was going to be a date certain.

In a colloquy between senior Republican, William Stanton, and Philip Crane, the following exchange took place:

Mr. Stanton: Mr. Crane, I would ask you directly -- this subject, I know, is very important to you. It is going to be changed some time or another. But would you and your friends vote for IDA legislation if we put this gold amendment in it or would you not?

Mr. Crane: I would vote for it. I would accept the compromise on the December 31 date as well. I have polled some of my colleagues who voted against IDA and who also are for gold ownership and there are somewhere in the neighborhood of 18 thus far, I have found, who would do likewise. Now there are 80 who voted for gold and who simultaneously voted against IDA but I cannot vouch for all of them, because as I said, I have only had responses, favorable responses, from about 18. That would be a turnaround vote of 36 votes.

Mr. Stanton: I thank you for your honesty.⁶³

Crane had used the RSC staff to poll its members to see how many would be willing to trade their votes. With Crane's indication of 18 certain switches already, a division within the Republican Study Committee became clear. Serving on the Banking and Currency Committee with Crane was his equally conservative colleague, John Rousselot. Rousselot expressed dismay to Crane that he had been using the staff of the Republican Study Committee to pursue this goal. Rousselot demanded that the matter be put to a vote of the Executive Committee. He objected to Crane's position because he opposed the IDA replenishment under any circumstances. Rousselot wanted

RSC staff assistance to be discontinued immediately until the Executive Committee had voted on its position on the bill.

Crane responded to Rousselot that the RSC's staff involvement had been minimal. He agreed that unless the Executive Committee of the RSC supported involvement, he would stop using the RSC staff resources for this project. At the next meeting, the Executive Committee discussed the issue, but it was never brought to a formal vote. The Rousselot pressure forced the staff to limit its involvement because of the conflicting positions. In retrospect, Rousselot's opposition was based on his belief that the RSC had defeated IDA. Rousselot stated later:

"I urged Crane to put the gold amendment on another bill -- not one which we had defeated. But he resisted because he said, 'we know the White House will sign this one.' It was a disagreement on strategy, that's all."⁶⁴

On June 18, the Committee voted 15-6 for the IDA replenishment together with the private ownership of gold effective December 31, 1974. By this time, Crane had exchanged views with the Under Secretary of the Treasury, Paul Volcker, on a number of other issues,⁶⁵ including IDA assistance to Vietnam, the U.S. position on continued membership of the Republic of China in the IMF/IBRD, and the use of IDA loans for countries which had purchased military hardware from non-IMF/IBRD members.⁶⁶ Crane brought in these other issues because he wanted to make the trade-off as attractive as possible for his conservative allies. Volcker reassured Crane of the Administration's support on these issues. The exchange of letters was designed by Crane to be a part of the legislative history on the bill although he had no intentions of requesting a vote on every issue. The Crane views in support of IDA with the gold ownership provision were stated in the Supplementary Views to H.R. 15465 accompanying the report on the bill.⁶⁷

By this time, Crane had obtained the additional support of two of his colleagues on the Banking Committee, Lawrence Williams (R-Pennsylvania) and Ben Blackburn. Williams supported Crane basically on the merits of the issue and his belief in the private ownership of gold. Blackburn recognized the adroit manner in which conservatives in the House were obtaining some of their legislative goals by this legislative compromise and also supported Crane. Blackburn, at that time, served as one of the four vice chairmen

of the Republican Study Committee. When Crane enlisted Blackburn, Rousselot again stated his opposition to RSC staff involvement in the bill. At this point, Crane's strategy was well on track and he refrained from overtly using RSC staff support for his goal. As he said later, "I didn't want to divide the Committee. It was still too fragile, and couldn't stand a confrontation like this."⁶⁸

Despite his attitude, the split within the RSC was further complicated by Frank van der Linden of the Nashville Banner. In one of his columns, van der Linden made the point that Crane and Blackburn were receiving not only the end of the 40-year old government ban on the private ownership of gold but

"...he and his associates want more. They demand a clear commitment that IDA loans will go to the Republic of South Vietnam, to the new anti-Marxist government of Chile, and other non-communist countries; and that the Republic of China on Taiwan won't be kicked out of the International Monetary Fund as it has been ousted from the United Nations."⁶⁹

Because van der Linden was a highly respected conservative columnist whose column was read by the members of the RSC, this article heightened the rivalries between Rousselot and Crane.

In the debate on the House floor on July 2, 1974, the RSC split in an interesting pattern. Two of its vice chairmen (Crane and Blackburn) were among those taking the lead in favor of the bill, while the treasurer (Rousselot) and another of the vice chairmen (Steve Symms) were active in the opposition to the bill saying that the price was too high to pay.⁷⁰ Despite these divisions, the bill together with private ownership of gold carried by a vote of 225-140 on July 2, 1974. Thus, the vote on July 2 represented a net increase of 70 votes from the 155 who had supported IDA on January 23, 1974.

Of the switches involved in this gain of 70, Crane could take credit for more than one-half of them. A comparative evaluation of the two votes indicates that of the switches from "No" in January, to "Yes" in July, 38 of the 82 switches were from among Crane's fellow members of the Republican Study Committee. An additional 9 switches were philosophical allies of Crane who were convinced that this was a worthwhile vote with the added

inducement of private ownership of gold. They were either conservative Democrats or Republicans who were not members of the Republican Study Committee.⁷¹ While some could maintain that the single-mindedness of Crane on the issue was enough in itself to assure the eventual private ownership of gold in some form, it should be borne in mind that until he was able to muster the support of his colleagues in the Republican Study Committee, the actual numbers were never present to pass the bill with a specific date for private ownership.

Regarding the Republican Study Committee's role in this specific debate, it focused the attention of the members on the staff of the RSC and its relationship to the members.⁷² The fact that the staff was now viewed as an asset to have on one's side in legislative battles was a positive step for the organization, although its divisiveness on this occasion had been obvious. While the staff efforts had been concentrated in two people -- the executive director and the staff economist -- they proved to be a considerable asset for Crane. He later admitted that the RSC staff work had been invaluable to him in his battle. While it began as a high-profile project for Crane, after the Rousselot encounter, it was used in a more discreet way. Whip calls were not made by the RSC, but floor statements were prepared and Crane's committee views were written by the RSC staff.

In one sense, Crane had the right to call on the RSC staff for its support since he was the largest single payroll supporter of the group. At the same time, he did not want to pull the group apart over this or any other issue when it was just becoming established. Thus, he looked for a prudent way to utilize the staff resources without increasing tensions between the members of the group. On the gold issue, both sides had strong opinions, but their differences were limited to this bill and they were back working together soon after the gold battle was completed.

The RSC involvement in this issue came at the same time as the major effort on federal land use was reaching its peak. These two simultaneous efforts were legislative initiatives which the House Republican conservatives could not have mounted without a coordinated staff resource like the RSC. In addition, the weekly Executive Committee meetings provided an opportunity to enlist the support of other members and also to discuss differences of legislative strategy in a private forum.

G. The Byrd Amendment on Rhodesian Chrome

Congressional conservatives occasionally expressed their concern about relations between the United States and Rhodesia. President Lyndon Johnson had imposed economic sanctions against Rhodesia in conformity with the U.N. Security Council Resolution which stated that Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) represented a threat to world peace. Conservatives considered this an insult to the sovereignty of the United States, and an attempt to apply a double standard to one of the few relatively stable areas on the continent of Africa. Rhodesian advocates asked: every other British possession in Africa has been given independence, why not Rhodesia? Conservatives also opposed the U.N. sanctions because the only alternative source of chrome was the Soviet Union. Chrome was a vital raw material for all high-technology industries. Finally, the habitual mistrust of the United Nations by most conservative members of the House and Senate meant that the issue was not simply a bilateral one between the United States and Rhodesia or the United States, the United Kingdom and Rhodesia, but rather, it provided an opportunity to display their lack of enthusiasm for the United Nations. Thus, in 1971, Senator Harry F. Byrd (I-Virginia) introduced an amendment to the Military Procurement Act which prohibited the President from adhering to any trading ban on strategic materials from a western nation when the United States was importing the same strategic materials from a communist nation. The Byrd Amendment passed and became law. Since the United States was importing chrome from the Soviet Union, the Byrd Amendment had the practical effect of opening U.S. markets once again to Rhodesian chrome. The Byrd Amendment was passed as much as an anti-Soviet amendment as it was a pro-Rhodesia or anti-United Nations amendment. While chrome from Rhodesia began to flow into the United States, the Byrd Amendment also had the effect of arousing the ire of member states of the United Nations and their supporters in the House and Senate. Opponents of the Byrd Amendment who controlled the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a bill on October 1, 1973 to repeal the Byrd Amendment.⁷³ A filibuster against repealing the Byrd Amendment was overturned after several attempts by a December 18, 1973 vote. The repeal bill then passed the Senate on the same day by a vote of 53-37.

In the House, Congressman Donald Fraser (D-Minnesota), one of the leading liberal members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the former chairman of the Democratic Study Group, introduced a companion bill.⁷⁴ That bill quickly passed the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Foreign Affairs Committee on October 17, 1973. The opponents to repealing the Byrd Amendment were primarily Republicans and included a senior member, Edward Derwinski, who was then the chairman of the Republican Study Committee. In an RSC Executive Committee meeting, he urged the members to oppose the repeal of the Byrd Amendment when it came to the House floor. Derwinski and his colleagues had time to plan their activities. After the subcommittee vote in October, the bill was held up, pending final action in the Senate. Under Derwinski's direction, the RSC staff developed fact sheets for the use of members. The RSC staff role was critical because the Administration and several of the senior Republican committee members favored the Fraser position. Thus, the Foreign Affairs Committee staff was not available to Derwinski and he had to rely on the RSC for staff support. On July 9, 1974, the full Foreign Affairs Committee favorably reported this bill by a vote of 25-9. The battle moved to the House Rules Committee where Derwinski and his RSC colleagues had developed a strategy similar to the one used on federal land use legislation. This strategy was to pressure the five swing Democratic votes to oppose the rule. Because of the date of final passage from the Foreign Affairs Committee, due to the precedence of other committee bills, and the anticipated debate on the impeachment of President Nixon, the delay at the Rules Committee stage would be a critical element in putting off the repeal of the Byrd Amendment for 1974. If the bill came back in 1975, the entire legislative process would have to start all over again. This preliminary assessment by Derwinski and the RSC staff proved to be accurate. The strategy was discussed in an RSC Executive Committee meeting and a follow-up meeting in Derwinski's office. At the follow-up meeting, Derwinski, RSC senior staff analyst, Bob Schuettinger, and Washington attorney and lobbyist representing the U.S. specialty steel industry, Donald deKeiffer, were present. The specialty steel industry had a vital stake in the Byrd Amendment since they utilized the bulk of the chrome imported into the United States. deKeiffer agreed to lobby specific members who might be sensitive to employment issues in steel producing districts, and to coordinate his efforts closely with Derwinski and the Republican Study Committee staff. Later, deKeiffer led an RSC staff briefing on Monday, July 1, 1974. At that meeting, the strategy was outlined

to members' staffs in detail. Despite the House Foreign Affairs Committee's positive vote in July 1974, pressure from Derwinski and others delayed the repeal bill in the Rules Committee. It was not acted on by the House of Representatives in 1974. This failure to act was due largely to DeKeiffer's effective lobbying however, the leadership of Derwinski and his colleagues provided the basis of the anti-repeal forces within the Congress. This was a slightly different pattern for the RSC. The usual fact sheets, member leadership, and strategy had an extra dimension in this issue, namely the presence of an effective, articulate lobbyist. The RSC's staff had worked with outside groups earlier, including their allies in the battle over federal land use legislation. Because these other efforts had shown that the RSC had the ability to influence a group of members in the House, the representatives of the business community were willing to work with the staff and the members in developing and implementing coordinated legislative strategies. Thus, with the RSC working within the Congress and deKeiffer outside of the Congress, action on the bill was delayed. While the battle over the Byrd Amendment was temporarily derailed, it continued to occupy the attention of Derwinski and his RSC colleagues in the 94th Congress.⁷⁵

H. Mass Transit Operating Subsidies

A battle for several members of the Republican Study Committee revolved around the issue of federal operating subsidies for urban mass transit systems. The principle of federal grants for the construction of subway systems and intra-city buses (capital grants) had long been established.⁷⁶ But, the proposal for federal funding to maintain low subway and bus fares in major metropolitan areas (operating grants) had never been enacted into federal law. Conservative opposition to it was based on several points:

1. The suburban and rural members resented the idea that their constituents would have to subsidize \$.25 or \$.35 fares for the residents of big cities like New York and Chicago. This was particularly annoying when referenda to subsidize low fares were rejected by local voters in the urban areas; and
2. the operating subsidies were considered to be direct subsidies to the big city Democratic political machines.

For example, the Boston MBTA subway routinely carried extra employees on every train in operation. Congressman Philip Crane maintained that the employment of these personnel was under the patronage of the Boston Democratic

political machine and was a major form of its political largesse.⁷⁷ Thus, Crane contended that to subsidize operations of urban mass transit regions would be to subsidize both the inefficiency of local systems, and also the local political machines in those cities.

The legislative issue was complex because jurisdiction was shared between the Public Works Committee and the Banking and Currency Committee with its newly-formed Mass Transit Subcommittee. The Public Works Committee had traditionally exercised jurisdiction over capital grants for mass transit systems. The Banking and Currency Committee exercised jurisdiction over federal housing programs which led to the committee's general concern with urban affairs and allowed it to claim legislative jurisdiction to form a Mass Transit Subcommittee.

One of the early leaders in opposition to operating mass transit subsidies was Crane who served as a member of the Banking and Currency Committee and was on its new Mass Transit Subcommittee. The Mass Transit Subcommittee had been specifically formed by the Democratic majority to enact operating subsidies for mass transit systems. Because of the alleged "pro-highway bias" of the Public Works Committee, no operating subsidies had ever been reported from that body. Crane's staff assistance came from members of the RSC staff who were called on to perform research and speech writing services for Crane on this issue. The votes on operating subsidies to mass transit took a number of different forms in one of the most complicated pieces of legislation to be considered during the 93rd Congress. RSC fact sheets kept the members informed of the bill's progress and it was discussed at several Executive Committee meetings.⁷⁸

The first key vote was on the amendment to H.R. 6452 offered by Chalmers Wylie (R-Ohio)⁷⁹ to strike out operating subsidies to urban mass transit systems. Wylie had taken the lead in the full committee and on the floor because he was the ranking Republican on the subcommittee. The House supported the Wylie position on operating subsidies by the close vote of 206-203. In the debate on this vote, Crane's remarks were particularly pointed. He enumerated a number of objections to the operating subsidies, including the lack of local willingness to subsidize the low cost fares.⁸⁰ His arguments were based on the Dissenting Views which Messrs. Blackburn, Rousselot and he had filed on the bill in committee.⁸¹ Their views had been prepared by the

staff of the Republican Study Committee, and they included an alternative funding proposal drafted by the RSC staff at Crane's request. The alternative proposal⁸² was offered by Crane but was defeated overwhelmingly in the committee. It would have given funds on a 90 (federal) - 10 (local) ratio to be dispensed as determined in the local area. Although Crane and the other RSC members in the Banking Committee had supported Wylie as having the best position, the Crane amendment provided the RSC members with an alternative approach to the issue. This fallback was a second attempt to gain support. However, after an RSC whip call, it was clear that H.R. 6452. would not gather significant support on the floor, and it was not presented there.

A whip call was then made by the RSC staff on behalf of Wylie's amendment, the results of which indicated an overwhelming support of Wylie's position. Seventy-three RSC members voted with Wylie, while only two opposed him and three were absent.⁸³ Later in the day, however, Wright Patman, the chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee, asked for reconsideration of the Wylie Amendment. This was possible because the Wylie Amendment had passed while the bill was being considered in the Committee of the Whole.⁸⁴ His request for reconsideration came when the chairman of the Committee of the Whole, John McFall (D-California), was presiding. McFall called for the vote and the Wylie Amendment lost by a vote of 205-210.⁸⁵ On this vote, one member of the RSC who formerly opposed Wylie switched to support him, and only two RSC members were absent. Thus, only one remained opposed to the Wylie position.⁸⁶ However, pro-subsidy forces gained five members to carry the vote. With the defeat of the Wylie Amendment, the House supported operating subsidies for the first time. This followed passage of a similar bill⁸⁷ in the Senate in September. This had been the fifth time in four years that the Senate had passed operating subsidies. However, the battle was not over with the defeat of the Wylie Amendment. The threat of a Presidential veto still remained a possibility.

The matter was discussed at another Executive Committee meeting. Crane, Blackburn and Rôusselot all asked for continued staff and member support to contest the issue. The Executive Committee agreed. As a result, the staff drafted a letter which Crane sent to Roy Ash, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in late November 1973, to determine the Administration's position on the issue. The reply supported the Wylie-Crane position. When

Crane received the reply on December 5, 1973, he delivered it to the RSC staff and appropriate introductory remarks were drafted to be inserted by Crane in the Congressional Record of December 12. He noted that Ash said "The Administration continues to oppose operating subsidies, and if legislation comes to the White House, we intend to recommend to the President that he veto the legislation."⁸⁸ While this was a restatement of the Administration's prior position, it had never been stated as forcefully as Ash did in his letter.

Following the House passage of the bill, it went to the Joint House-Senate Conference where it languished with the threat of a veto hanging over it. Then the energy crisis erupted on the scene. President Nixon submitted his own bill, the "Unified Transportation Assistance Program."⁸⁹ The UTAP proposal consisted of a huge authorization of \$16 billion for capital grants over a six-year period. The capital grants would enable the cities to update equipment and facilities. The Nixon plan involved a large expenditure level, but only for capital projects, the traditional jurisdiction of the Public Works Committee.

The Senate-House conferees filed their report on S. 386 (H.R. 6452) shortly after this time. The report contained a new provision enabling the \$800 million to be used for capital grants as well as operating subsidies. Crane and several other conferees dissented. The RSC staff immediately drafted a memorandum updating the situation. The next day, Crane sent this memo to his colleagues in the RSC urging them to oppose S. 386, and assuring his colleagues that the Administration continued to stand firm with its veto threat: "I repeat, I have assurances that this bill will not be signed."⁹⁰

At this time, Crane's concern was premature. Because of the new provision in the bill which permitted the use of funds for capital grants, the Rules Committee would accept a point of order against the conference report. (The House rules are substantially tighter on questions of germaneness, and a single member could have raised a point of order to the consideration of the conference report because it contained a new provision not originally considered by the House in its bill and because the capital grants for mass transit systems are under the jurisdiction of the Public Works Committee.)

Several months after the filing of the Senate-House Conference Report, on July 24, 1974, the Rules Committee reversed itself, and permitted a bill to come to the House floor which allowed for local discretion between capital and operating subsidies. However, on July 30, the House recommitted the bill to conference, both because of the threat of a veto and because the Administration's own bill, the "Unified Transportation Assistance Program," was still in mark-up in the Public Works Committee. Finally, on August 15, 1974, the amended Administration bill came before the House from the Public Works Committee. Even though this bill came on the heels of Nixon's resignation, it still generated considerable controversy on the operating subsidy issue. The key vote came on a Shuster (R-Pennsylvania)-Milford (D-Texas) amendment to delete the operating subsidies added by the conferees' provision. Debate was once again centered around the same issues.

The RSC staff again prepared an analysis of the bill for its members restating many of the earlier objections to operating subsidies, and the staff made one of its whip calls to the RSC member offices urging them to support the Shuster-Milford Amendment. These whip calls were of an informational nature only. They were made to the legislative aide in the Member's office so that the aide could communicate the contents of the pending issue to the member. While the RSC had no authority to actually "whip" a member on a vote, the ability to rapidly inform member offices of the legislative floor activity of their conservative colleagues was a service.

Despite the lack of seniority of the amendment's co-sponsors, both were freshmen, their position received substantial support. However, the Shuster-Milford Amendment lost by a vote of 197-202 with a number of the RSC members having changed sides. Of the RSC membership, 66 supported their colleague, Shuster, while 9 opposed him. The opposition votes were clustered among suburban members whose reelection bids looked particularly perilous.⁹¹ While Shuster did not rely on RSC assistance as heavily as Crane, he did utilize the staff research facilities, and an RSC whip call was made on behalf of his amendment. In addition, he discussed his amendment at an RSC Executive Committee meeting.

Later that year, on November 26, President Ford signed the bill,⁹² thus authorizing operating expenses for mass transit systems for the first time, and reversing the position of his predecessor's Administration. The issue was lost

by the RSC, but its loss could be attributed to external forces: "If there had not been an energy crisis, we could have held firm," according to Crane.⁹³ The other complicating factor had clearly been the local pressures which were brought to bear on vulnerable, suburban conservative Republican congressmen. Despite the loss, the RSC staff and leadership did utilize the technique of exposing the Administration's position to make sure that what had started as a private conversation, OMB Director Roy Ash's letter, became a public commitment inserted in the Congressional Record. This technique proved useful in other legislative battles where the Administration's position became a critical factor.

I. Stumbling on Watergate and the Rockefeller Nomination

During the 93rd Congress, the members of the Republican Study Committee agreed on coordinated action regarding most of the major public policy issues. However, when it came to political questions, a consensus was more difficult to develop, as can be seen from the reaction to the Watergate situation and the subsequent nomination and confirmation of Nelson Rockefeller as Vice President of the United States. The Republicans on Capitol Hill had already suffered a major political jolt caused by the resignation of Vice President Spiro Agnew. The appointment of Gerald Ford as his successor was a reassuring move by President Nixon. While Minority Leader Ford had become less conservative than most RSC members, he was still well known to the House Republicans who were comfortable with him as the Vice President. This became an important factor as the Watergate scandal unfolded.

Watergate immediately affected a number of Republican Study Committee members who served on the House Judiciary Committee. These members ranged from individuals who were staunch supporters of Nixon (Charles Wiggins of California and David Dennis of Indiana) to others who broke with him early and opposed his continuing in office (Larry Hogan of Maryland). While Watergate was discussed at the weekly Executive Committee meetings, it was brought up as an "information" item rather than an "action" item. Conflicting pressures on the members made their position on Watergate a personal one, which could only be decided on an individual basis. The local politics, the reading of the evidence, and the unfolding of the drama on a daily basis, made it impossible for a newly-organized group like the Republican Study Committee to offer anything other than a forum for discussing the question.

To try to impose the will -- or even the guidance -- of members on each other during this period would have split the organization apart.⁹⁴ This might be considered "shirking its duty" to some observers, but the fragility of the group, combined with its novelty, led the key participants to avoid substantive decisions on political issues like this. In addition, during the summer of 1974, the staff was occupied on a full complement of issue areas, including land use, mass transit operating subsidies, Rhodesian chrome, and the reinstatement of the private ownership of gold. Public policy issues were the forte of the staff, not political questions like Watergate.

In August 1974, Richard Nixon resigned, Gerald Ford ascended to the Presidency and the Vice Presidency again became vacant. Within a week, Ford nominated Nelson Rockefeller as his Vice President. Rockefeller had long been considered anathema to the conservatives in the Republican party and his nomination should have united the conservatives in the House against it. Remembering his lackluster support of Nixon in 1960, his outspoken opposition to Goldwater in 1964, and the allegations of his maneuvering to deny Nixon the nomination in 1968, it was natural that many Republican Study Committee members of the Congress would not support his nomination. Thus, immediately following Nixon's resignation, the chairman of the Republican Study Committee, LaMar Baker (R-Tennessee), called a special meeting of the RSC members to discuss the vacancy in the Vice Presidency.

The meeting was held while rumors circulated throughout Washington that Rockefeller would be the next Vice President. In an effort to head off this possibility, the RSC executive director attempted to arrange a meeting between the new President and the RSC members. As reported in the Los Angeles Times:

"Our people feel that they are Jerry Ford's oldest friends and supporters....They want to sit down and talk to him and see that attention is paid to their views. The members still mistrust Rockefeller because of his liberal past, despite the former New York Governor's recent shift toward the right. They would vastly prefer Gov. Reagan or Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater as the new Vice President."⁹⁵

A meeting between President Ford and the RSC members was scheduled for August 13, 1974 but it was cancelled by the White House. Instead, Ford asked every Member of Congress to submit names of possible candidates to

him. By taking this approach, Ford avoided bloc pressures on him to select any specific candidate.

RSC Chairman Baker circulated a memo to the RSC membership on the 13th noting:

"Consistent with our policy of avoiding Committee positions, the RSC will not recommend anyone for Vice President. Our members, however, are encouraged to make their individual suggestions.

I have talked to more than 50 of our RSC members about Vice Presidential recommendations and have found throughout the House, strong first choice support for Rockefeller. We have also found first choice for Goldwater, Reagan, Howard Baker and George Bush. Among all of the individuals who listed these first choices, we found a general acceptance of George Bush."⁹⁶

Although Baker had contacted a number of members of the RSC, his memo had been confusing:

"Upon later clarification, Baker noted that the Rockefeller support to which he referred had been throughout the House and not particularly among members of the RSC."⁹⁷

This explanation of the political complexion of the House only came after the Baker memo had been circulated by Rhodes to the White House. The Ford White House staff used this memo as an indication that the Republican conservatives would support Rockefeller. In accordance with the White House procedures, the suggestions from members were to be delivered to Minority Leader John Rhodes by that afternoon for his submission to Ford. Against this background, the uncoordinated lists by the RSC were submitted to Rhodes. While some senior House Republican members directly advised Ford, the RSC input followed channels through Rhodes' office to the White House.

In reviewing the memorandum later, Baker severely criticized the legislative director who had drafted it. The executive director, who had been on holiday when the event occurred, accepted the responsibility for the misimpression it had created, but the damage had already been done. Baker and several other members contacted the White House to try to correct the misimpression which the memorandum had given. However, their calls were made several days later when the White House had already used the RSC memorandum for their own purposes, and the issue had been fairly well decided.

President Ford nominated Nelson Rockefeller on August 20. The nomination was greeted initially by a hostile reaction from most RSC members. There was a distinct contrast in the conservative ranks between this nomination and that of Ford himself a year earlier. At that time, the genial, friendly Jerry Ford, who had led the Republican band in the House for so many years, was enthusiastically welcomed as Nixon's Vice Presidential choice to succeed Spiro Agnew. A year later, however, when Ford was able to make the decision, his choice did not prove nearly as popular.

The House Judiciary Committee hearings on the nomination dragged on for more than three months. During this time, the Democratic leadership subjected Rockefeller to intense scrutiny of his personal and financial affairs. The longer the nomination was kept on the public agenda, the more the public would be reminded of Watergate. Thus, some Republicans accused the Democrats of delaying the nomination "to stop Rockefeller from participating in the 1974 [congressional] elections."⁹⁸ The extended hearings had the effect of compounding the political difficulties of the Republicans in this already difficult political year. By the final vote in December, the lines had been pretty well drawn, and the ranks of the Republican Study Committee were split. A number of hard right members, including Chairman Baker, Vice Chairmen Phil Crane, Ben Blackburn and Bob Huber, voted against the nomination. Vice Chairman David Dennis, who participated in the hearings as a member of the Judiciary Committee, voted in favor of Rockefeller. He theorized that it was not his place to judge Rockefeller as if he had made the appointment, but rather to judge if Rockefeller met the constitutional qualifications for the position. Party loyalty played an important role, and such usual conservative stalwarts as former RSC Chairman Sam Devine supported Rockefeller's appointment despite his comment in his floor speech that "the name Nelson A. Rockefeller was not on the list I submitted to the President."⁹⁹ The final vote tally for Rockefeller was 287 to 128. Of the opposition votes, 26 were members of the Republican Study Committee, while 54 RSC members supported the nomination.¹⁰⁰ The support was largely on the basis of Republican party loyalty, combined with a belief among some of the members that the 1974 elections had repudiated their conservatism.

The role of the RSC in this whole issue had been relatively minor. The White House had solicited input for the nomination from all congressional sources. Ford used the formal Republican leadership structure to receive the

data, and the Baker memo became a useful tool to reinforce the decision of the new President. As Philip Crane noted later:

"The Baker memo really put us on the spot. It didn't reflect our views at all. But beyond that, the choice showed us that on major political decisions, we were not in the driver's seat."¹⁰¹

Crane's comment was harshly accurate. While the group had made some major inroads in legislative matters, it was not a major factor in important political decisions. In addition, the personal relationship of their former House colleague, Jerry Ford, with the House Republicans, overrode the ideological concern of many of the RSC members. This relationship, combined with the dismaying election results, forced many RSC members to rethink their position. A number of their conservative colleagues had been defeated at the polls. One Republican President had been forced to resign, and another had just ascended to the Presidency. To insult this new leader by challenging his appointment for Vice President would be considered disloyal to the party and divisive to the nation. Those who followed this line of reasoning supported the Rockefeller nomination. Thus, Rockefeller was confirmed handily, with substantial RSC support.

J. Setback in the 1974 Elections

The RSC members were concerned with the 1974 congressional elections long before the beginning of the campaigns that fall. The Republican members of the House of Representatives knew that this would be one of the most difficult elections of their career. The party holding the White House traditionally lost seats in a non-Presidential election year, and while the Republicans were not in power in the House, they did control the White House. Added to this likelihood, the overwhelming burden of the Watergate affair and the months of extended TV exposure of Nixon -- the Republican President -- and his misdeeds, meant that the elections would be more difficult than ever.

The direct role of the Republican Study Committee in the 1974 elections began on March 14, 1974. On that day, the RSC sponsored a "special event" program. The program was a "members only" seminar including three panelists. These were Lyn Nofziger, who formerly served as Deputy Chairman of the Republican National Committee, a former White House aide to President Nixon, and former Press Secretary to Governor Reagan. The second panelist was Dick Wirthlin, President of Decision Making Inc. (DMI), one of the most highly

regarded Republican polling organizations in the United States. The final panelist was Jim White, direct mail expert who formerly served on the Republican National Committee staff. The suggested theme struck by these three men was that disenchantment with the President and the Watergate affair developed because of big government.¹⁰² The Democrats advocated big government. The mistrust of elected officials who abused power could not be solved by concentrating still more power in the hands of the same or other elected officials. For example, Nofziger stated:

"The trouble with Republicans is that they all go out and act individually. There is never any unity of purpose, unity of campaigning or unity of issues, and even more importantly, there is never any repetition....You now have an organization (Republican Study Committee) supplying you with information that will enable you to go out wherever you are campaigning to make a unified theme. That theme ought to be big government and morality."¹⁰³

Thus, the challenge was laid down in March 1974 that the Republican members of the House should combine and run against the entrenched interests in Washington. This advice was hard to follow since the members were all incumbents. They could place a distance between themselves and the majority party (Democratic) in the House. They could also try to separate themselves from Nixon and Ford, but to do both of these at the same time would prove to be a very difficult political task.

This advice was never followed, however. During the ensuing months, the preoccupation with the Watergate hearings in the House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Select Committee detracted from the common theme which Republicans might have struck. The resignation of Nixon in August was followed by the appointment of Nelson Rockefeller as Vice President, a decision which was not enthusiastically supported by the Republican party rank-and-file workers. Rockefeller's confirmation hearings were dragging out becoming yet another albatross to hang around the Republican House members' necks. On domestic issues, facing a 13%-14% inflation, President Ford called for a national campaign to "Whip Inflation Now" and circulated his WIN buttons. Along with this, Ford pardoned Nixon, and then, a month before the election, he announced major cuts in various federal programs which would certainly not either help "Whip Inflation Now" in the short range, or help elect Republicans to the House and the Senate.

Because of these factors, the November 1974 elections were not a setback for the Republicans -- they were a rout. The Democrats gained a total of 40 seats in the House, and the Republican Study Committee itself suffered a severe loss; its chairman, LaMar Baker, three of its vice chairmen (Ben Blackburn, David Dennis and Bob Huber), and 15 of its dues-paying members lost their bids for reelection. The losses were cited widely in the news media beginning with a newspaper column on November 13 by the highly-regarded Washington columnists, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. In that article, they stated that "The dominant right wing was hurt much worse than other Republicans, casting implications far into the future for both the party and President Ford." Citing the specific loss of LaMar Baker, they noted:

"He is now president of a well-disciplined private club of conservative House Republicans known as the Steering Committee (sic) (labeled in previous incarnation as the 'Republican regulars' and 'the good guys'). Baker was not alone. The election massacre claimed no fewer than three of the Steering Committee's vice presidents -- Reps. Ben Blackburn of Georgia, David Dennis of Indiana and Robert Huber of Michigan....The Steering Committee thus can be written off as an effective force in the House."¹⁰⁴

Evans and Novak admitted that much of their material came from the office of John Anderson who had long been opposed by members of the Republican Study Committee. Anderson was chairman of the House Republican Conference and ranked number three in the party's leadership. While he had an articulate manner, his outspoken liberalism had made many enemies in the RSC. Evans and Novak described the loss as being particularly severe for conservatives within the Republican party. According to Evans and Novak:

"A subjective analysis by Anderson's staff shows 51 hard right-wing Members out of a total of 144 Republicans in the next Congress, compared with 83 out of 187 today."¹⁰⁵

In an immediate reply, the executive director of the RSC took issue with the Evans and Novak figures and analysis by pointing out that the Republicans in the House lost 23.5% of their membership, and that the RSC members and associates lost 23.1%, not a statistically significant difference.¹⁰⁶ These figures were repeated in a memorandum which was circulated by Executive Committee member Trent Lott (Mississippi) to all RSC members.¹⁰⁷ The objective of this memorandum was to maintain the morale of the remaining members, who were despondent over the negative election results, and particularly over the loss of so much of their leadership.

The executive director also pointed out to Evans and Novak that:

"Since Conservatism is the Republican mainstream, it is only to be expected that many Republican losses will be sustained by Conservatives. But this falls far short of attributing a selective electoral defeat for Conservatives which you manage to impute."¹⁰⁸

Evans and Novak replied by criticizing the RSC for its refusal to reveal the list of its members and restated their claim that "The percentage of Steering Committee losers is significantly higher than the percentage of all Republican Members."¹⁰⁹

The data on RSC losses extended beyond this single Evans and Novak column. Additional letters disputing the media's claims were sent to CBS television, TIME magazine, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal. In a reply from TIME's editorial offices, the response was:

"Our problem as you know is that the Republican Steering Committee (sic) does not make the names of its members public....For our November 18 reference we used figures which came to us from a senior aide to a member of the House leadership."¹¹⁰

This comment confirmed the executive director's opinion that Anderson's staff had been actively spreading reports among the media that the Republican conservatives had suffered a disproportionate loss in the elections.

Offsetting these reports, Kevin Phillips, the editor of The American Political Report, suggested to readers to:

"Discount floated analyses arguing that the conservative Steering Committee dropped from 70 to 40 members while the liberal GOP Wednesday Group lost only 1 of 36. Steering Committee officials claim that of their 95 dues-payers and associates, they lost 28 (22 defeated, 6 retirees); and of the 65 dues-payers, they lost 19 (17 defeated, 2 retirees). About 10-12 of the 17 new Republicans are expected to opt for the conservative group. These numbers sound more or less in the ballpark, which means that they should have 50-55 dues-payers and 70-80 dues-payers and associates in the 94th Congress."¹¹¹

As the 1974 House election has been viewed by scholars, the consensus is that the conservatives did lose a disproportionate share of seats:

"Very clearly, Republican losses were concentrated at the conservative end of the party's political spectrum....This suggests the existence of policy voting among some 1974 voters."¹¹²

Samuel Patterson has a different emphasis, but the same problems led to his conclusion:

"But the evidence indicates a profounder weakening of partisan cues to congressional election voting, and a tendency for congressional elections to be more responsive to national forces (such as the state of the economy and the perceived performance of the President), although local forces continue to have a great impact on voting."¹¹³

The battle over these numbers was not merely a theoretical problem. The perceived victors would enter the pending party leadership elections from a position of enhanced strength. Thus, if the conservative mainstream was viewed as having suffered a substantial setback, the liberals and moderates who backed John Anderson for Republican Conference chairman would have a psychological advantage in the early December election for leadership positions where the votes of the newly-elected members would be particularly critical.

On the day of the election for chairman of the Republican Conference, Anderson handily defeated the conservatives' chosen candidate, Charles Wiggins, an articulate defender of Nixon in the Watergate hearings of the House Judiciary Committee. Wiggins' campaign had been low-key as he was a somewhat reluctant candidate for the job. His stature among House Republicans was high but he did not want to be accused of leading a public fight within his decimated party.

While Anderson was a liberal, he was also one of the party's most articulate spokesmen. The maintenance of Anderson in the Conference chairmanship, however, was not the end of the problems for the newly-organized Republican Study Committee. Late in 1974, the Minority Leader, John Rhodes, had expressed some dissatisfaction privately to several of the senior members of the RSC about the name of the group. He specifically objected to the idea that this organization was supposed to be "steering" the Republicans, despite the fact that it had no official position within the party structure. The members who had already had their ranks substantially reduced did not want to make a major issue of the name of their group. Therefore, at the first meeting of the group on January 16, 1975, they examined a variety of combinations, "as if we were choosing from a Chinese menu,"¹¹⁴ and picked a name (Republican Study Committee) that maintained the same initials as

the old name (Republican Steering Committee), while also reflecting a close affinity to the Democratic Study Group after which the RSC had been patterned. The actual choice also reflected a viewpoint which their Democratic adversaries in the DSG had discussed some fifteen years earlier. That is, in order to be effective and not antagonize the established power structure in the House, do not wear your ideology as a prominent label.¹¹⁵ Therefore, options which included words such as "conservative" were quickly discarded for the more innocuous Republican Study Committee.¹¹⁶

K. Conclusion

In a series of case studies like the eight preceding legislative battles, instructive lessons can be drawn. Besides learning how to employ professional staff more effectively, the RSC members proved to themselves that they could be an effective legislative force on selective issues. The RSC members' use of professional staff gave them a new independence. In the past, they had found it necessary to rely either on personal staff, committee staff, the leadership or the Administration for analytical help. In these case examples, all of the usual sources were inadequate. In the land use battle, for example, the minority committee staff was committed to the majority's position. Congressman Sam Steiger had no personal staff resources to help, the Minority Leadership's position had to be changed and the Administration began on the wrong side of the issue. The relationship with the Administration on this issue was complex. The Nixon Administration was devoid of a consistent ideology.¹¹⁷ It could be swayed by bureaucrats within its agencies, by political pressures from either the left (which initially led it to support a Jackson-Udall type of bill) or the right (which finally convinced the Administration to support the Steiger-Rhodes substitute). John Lees notes that the bureaucracy which Nixon inherited from Johnson had been "dominated by Democrats."¹¹⁸ During his tenure, Nixon did little to change this, which was why a cabinet member, like Rogers Morton, was a supporter of a Jackson-Udall type bill. It fit into the bureaucrats' pattern of objectives for their agency. Former Ambassador Laurence Silberman notes the problem which confronts a new high-level appointee:

"That co-optation [by the bureaucracy] is inevitable if an appointee has no independent, preappointment view of desirable agency goals, closely connected with overall administration policy....Issues brought to the appointee by civil servants will

rarely call into question the fundamental aims of the agency; typically, they will instead be marginal or incremental questions which assume the propriety and wisdom of all that has gone before."¹¹⁹

In the land use case, a coordinated, "inside-outside" opposition with a clear objective became a significant battleground. Effective opposition to the bill required more than the leadership of Sam Steiger. As Senator James McClure commented:

"The other members of the [Interior] Committee hadn't listened to Sam. They dismissed him as a maverick. But once he started working with the RSC, he became a legislative leader with respect from other members."¹²⁰

That is, the RSC provided Steiger a research and operating base which made him credible. This point is vital, because there is a common perception that:

"The nature of the process by which legislation is considered in Congress provides many opportunities for individual Congressmen to exercise influence on the fate of a particular bill."¹²¹

Indeed, an individual member can influence a bill at various points during the legislative process. But, such a member can be substantially more influential if he represents more than just himself. Thus, when a congressman such as Steiger represents a faction like the RSC in the House, and utilizes its resources in his effort, he will be more effective than when he acts independently.

This was a new discovery for the conservative legislators whose reputation as negative voters did not include active strategy sessions on pending bills. Coordinated action took different forms and sometimes members who were party "regulars" were asked to oppose their own Administration.

The cases described above were not all successes. Even when they were successful, the full measure of the success was not due solely to the role of the RSC. But, they do represent the traits of a faction.

For many of the members who were team players, accustomed to following their party leaders, the idea of being "out front" of them on a specific issue was uncomfortable. It was a conflict situation with which they were unfamiliar:

"In the absence of conflict it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish power relationships, since power involves the notion of getting someone to do something he would not otherwise do."¹²²

The land use case is again significant. The RSC exercised power in a conflict situation. The potential impact of this new power source presented a complication to the Minority Leadership. Many congressmen "do not believe that re-election depends on their strong support of their party."¹²³ A new faction tends to further decrease party cohesion and to make the members more independent from the leadership's control.¹²⁴ Power was exercised in a new way from a new source, and all of the actors had to adjust to it.

On the basis of influencing legislation, a success/failure measure of the RSC's major legislative activities can be shown. Land use, Rhodesian chrome, and gold ownership were clear successes. Mass transit was a clear failure. The economic issues were raised, but the RSC impact was negligible. The Atlantic Union Resolution and the Legal Services Corporation battle could have had similar outcomes without an RSC input.

Even with its failures, the Republican Study Committee's results were impressive for a new organization: during the summer of 1974, the small staff of the RSC was engaged in intensive work on five major issues simultaneously: land use, legal services, private ownership of gold, mass transit operating subsidies, and the Byrd Amendment on Rhodesian chrome. It had not done everything successfully, but it had engaged in a number of serious efforts, and it had made an impact. Furthermore, the organization had survived its first Congress in one of the most tumultuous periods in American politics. Its role of working with individual members had been challenging. Common legislative goals came from different sources, and involved different priorities for the members. The staff acted as the common bond to keep the members moving in the same direction on the same priority bills. The bills were not the most important ones debated during this Congress, but they were specific areas where a group of conservative members of the minority party in the House of Representatives could have a real impact.

The Republican Study Committee had proven to be a viable faction in the U.S. House of Representatives. However, with its reduced membership, and decimated leadership, its future role was uncertain.

VI. REBUILDING, REGROUPING AND EXPANDING

A. Introduction

In this chapter the institutional role of the Republican Study Committee in the 94th Congress is examined. The RSC performed various service functions for its members and their staff aides. At the same time, the members were asked to provide the RSC with administrative and financial assistance.

These activities could be considered unnecessary if all of the members of the RSC were either compulsory members or if they unanimously viewed the RSC solely as a legislative support organization. However, membership in the RSC was not like membership in the Republican Conference. If you are elected a member of the House as a Republican, you are automatically a member of the Conference. On the other hand, membership in the RSC was voluntary. Furthermore, with alternative demands competing for members' time, finances and attention, it was necessary to promote the unique role and services of the Republican Study Committee for its own members. Regarding the role of the RSC as a legislative support organization, its value was clear to the legislative activists like Phil Crane (R-Illinois), John Rousselot (R-California) and Sam Steiger (R-Arizona). However, to reach out to other conservative Republican House members who were not legislative leaders, it had to provide other services to its membership. This chapter will discuss these service functions and supporting relationships.

Chapter VII reviews the same period but considers specific legislative case studies in which the RSC played an active role.

After the setback in the 1974 elections, it became clear to the surviving members of the Republican Study Committee that they would have to review their operations and re-examine the RSC's role vis-a-vis its own members, the party leadership, and the Republican Administration.

While the embryonic organization had a measurable legislative impact in 1973 and 1974, the outlook was not good for 1975 and 1976. The RSC's leadership had been depleted in the 1974 election and the group's institutional role was in serious question to its own members, the leadership and the

new Ford Administration. The electoral defeats have been described in Chapter V, but the losses presented an additional difficulty for the RSC. With reduced Republican numbers in the House, it would be necessary to be perceived as positive participants in party-wide activities. The old mentality of "rally round the flag" came to the fore, and the weakened RSC could not afford to be cast as a divisive element within the party. Careful action by the remaining members of the Executive Committee would be required to insure the survival of the RSC. The first opportunity to exhibit this leadership was made at the Republican Study Committee's 1975 Annual Meeting.

At the Annual Meeting on January 16, 1975, a slate of officers was presented by the Nominating Committee. Congresswoman Marjorie S. Holt (R-Maryland) was nominated and elected the new chairwoman. The remainder of the officers included Phil Crane, Steve Symms (R-Idaho), Barry Goldwater, Jr. (R-California) and freshman Tom Hagedorn (R-Minnesota) as vice chairmen, and John Rousselot as treasurer. The new chairwoman was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1972. She served on the Armed Services Committee where her diligence had won the admiration of her senior Republican colleagues. Her leadership in 1973 and 1974 in opposition to mandatory school busing had gained the attention of conservative members in both parties. In addition, it was candidly admitted that it would be a "publicity coup" if the conservative Republicans would be the first group in the House to elect a woman as its chairman. The Holt nomination was also advantageous because it avoided having a high-profile ideological conservative leading the organization. Philip Crane, Steve Symms or John Rousselot -- the three ranking officers who had survived the 1974 election setback -- were all publicly identified as being hard-core ideological Republicans, and had any of them assumed the chairmanship at this time, the image of the organization would have been very different. The more conservative leadership would have appealed to a smaller number of Republicans in the House, and it would have almost certainly meant that the effectiveness of the group in the legislative arena would be greatly reduced. Mrs. Holt had an almost perfect voting record, and she was widely respected within the Congress. Thus, her election would be an asset for the RSC rather than a problem within the group. She was a member who was relatively less controversial, and yet highly regarded by other members. Both RSC and non-RSC Republicans respected her, and the Nominating Committee believed her election would avoid unnecessary problems.

The RSC took to heart the words of Evans and Novak in their post-election analysis. At that time, Evans and Novak argued that President Ford and Minority Leader Rhodes would have to redirect their programs in order to gain support from the liberals within the Republican party in the House.¹ Presumably, they would do this by proposing programs further to the left. Through the Holt election, the new RSC Executive Committee hoped it could work with Ford and Rhodes and be considered a major participant on the House Republican scene. Admittedly, its role would be conservative, but members hoped it would be respected within the House. As Rhodes admitted later, his role as the Minority Leader was complicated by the presence of ideological factions. At the same time, while "any leader~~s~~ would rather not have any of them,^{but} if you have to have one, better to have them all."² The task of the new RSC leadership would be to work within these constraints and to provide an unique opportunity for its members.

B. Expanded Member Services

The staff of the Republican Study Committee realized after the 1974 elections that it would be necessary to redefine its role in order to maintain the viability of the organization. It was clear that some of its earlier legislative victories or near victories would be more difficult to repeat because of the smaller number of Republicans in the House and the smaller number of members in the RSC. Thus, there would have to be other ways to ensure the viability of the RSC as an institution. The RSC service role would be more important than ever if it was to fill part of the legislative gap. The base of its support had to be consulted, and a new method of operation had to be developed in a number of areas. Both substance and appearance would prove to be important. It had to both perform specific unique services, and be seen as filling a vacuum. The following specific examples show how it attempted to do both.

Meetings with Outside Experts

Among the services which the Republican Study Committee could provide were meetings of long-range interest to the members. The organizations within the formal party leadership -- the Conference, the Policy Committee, and the Research Committee -- were primarily involved in day-to-day legislative activities and unable to look at longer range programs. The RSC, on

the other hand, had a staff which included several former academics.³ Additionally, several of the professional staff members were pursuing graduate degrees. Even those staff members who did not come from the academic community were comfortable in the realm of ideas. The weekly briefings were balanced between legislative discussions and long-term policy questions. Thus, it was a logical role for the RSC staff to propose meetings between prominent academics and the RSC members.

The staff of the RSC called on their contacts in the academic world for these sessions. Specifically, Nobel Laureates Friederich von Hayek and Milton Friedman met with the members to give them advice and counsel. The Hayek meeting was held on April 10, 1975.⁴ As an extra service for the members who participated in that meeting, the staff arranged for the Republican staff photographer to be present from 9:45-10:00 to take photos of the members with Professor Hayek. These photos could then be used in members' newsletters and for release to newspapers back home. Local headlines of "Congressman John Doe meeting with Nobel Laureate in Economics F.A. von Hayek" were the objective. The Hayek meeting only attracted 12 members, whereas when Milton Friedman met with members of the Republican Study Committee on May 25, 1976, more than 60 were in attendance.⁵ Friedman was more widely known to American politicians and attracted a larger audience. These hour-long meetings were more than photo opportunities. Professor Hayek covered a range of economic topics including inflation, unemployment and labor unions. In addition, he discussed his ideas for a new constitution. While the latter idea did not attract much enthusiasm from the members, his observations from his European perspective on common problems were of interest to them. The Friedman meeting was held in conjunction with his advocacy of "indexing" the income tax system.⁶

An additional purpose of these meetings was to give the conservatives intellectual ammunition. The background of RSC members was similar to that of the entire House membership. That is, the majority of the RSC members was attorneys. Few of them had any formal economics training. Therefore, to meet with noted economists who generally shared the member's perspectives on major issues was a broadening experience. Appearance as well as substance was important. Congressman Robert Michel (R-Illinois), then the Minority Whip, described this from his perspective:

"The RSC gave a little bit of an academic aura to the Republicans, and elevated the conservative cause from just guys who came in here prepared to vote against everything."⁷

Among other academics who met with the members of the RSC were Professors Allen Meltzer and Karl Brunner of Carnegie-Mellon University and the University of Rochester, respectively. Meltzer and Brunner are the co-chairmen of the "Shadow Open Market Committee," which is a group of monetarist economists which meets quarterly. Its primary purpose is to audit the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Board and to criticize the policy if it deviates from their strict monetarist standard. This was a technical meeting and only eight members attended, several of whom would hear the two guests later that day when they appeared before the House Banking and Currency Committee.⁸

The second group of speakers to participate in the RSC programs were representatives of the Ford Administration. While the members who specialized in certain areas would meet frequently with Administration experts, other members whose areas of specialization were different would not have the opportunity to do so. Thus, the RSC held private meetings with Frank Zarb, Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration;⁹ Howard H. "Bo" Calloway, Secretary of the Army;¹⁰ William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury;¹¹ and George Bush, Director of the CIA.¹²

The content of these meetings usually related to pending bills of particular concern to the Executive Branch speaker. The informal opportunity for discussions was helpful to the members. The objective of the spokesmen for the Administration was to advance its own proposals. Any reasonable opportunity to meet with groups of House members was welcomed. From the RSC side, its staff was pleased to arrange the meetings because they provided another service to the members. More importantly, it helped establish the RSC as a credible organization within the Congress.

Chairwoman Holt commented on the value of both series of meetings:

"Regarding Friedman and the other academics, no one else was doing it, so we decided to fill a vacuum..."

The meetings with the Executive Branch people were important not only for us but also for our influence on the Administration

because they showed that the Republican Study Committee was a group to be reckoned with."¹³

Publications and Distribution

The format and combination of RSC publications changed frequently. For example, the weekly legislative tracking sheet was added. While Congressional Quarterly and other publications tracked major legislation, they were not always tracking bills of interest to the RSC. Hearings on the food stamp program or welfare reform which might be of particular interest to RSC members were frequently not listed in the Congressional Quarterly tracking sheets. While some issues of interest to the RSC were monitored, others were not. The RSC tracking sheet filled this gap. This single sheet was appended to the publication package which was distributed to all the members at the weekly member meetings. It was instituted in January 1976 as a companion to the weekly project sheet.

Another new publication was the project sheet which came about in the following way: In early 1975, several of the new members of the Executive Committee questioned the RSC staff as to what research projects were being carried out for other members. A partial response was that the staff performed many minor projects which never resulted in published material but were responses to member or staff inquiries. Mrs. Holt suggested that these projects should be listed and made available to the members so that they were aware of the full range of responses which were being made to member inquiries. Thus, another routine attachment -- the project sheet -- was prepared for the package of material to be distributed to the members. The project sheet included all staff activities, ranging from simple telephone responses to member offices to detailed projects, speeches or analyses which were assembled on their behalf.¹⁴

In 1975 the RSC staff began to distribute all of the material published during the preceding week at the weekly meetings of the membership. This included BULLETINS and fact sheets which had already been sent to the member offices. Frequently, members expressed interest in the formal published works of the RSC because they had not seen them previously in their office. Presumably, the material had been sorted by their staff member who opened the mail, sent on to another staff member, or discarded, but had never

reached the member's personal attention.¹⁵ The "paper explosion" meant that RSC material as well as other research material was not always used by members or their staff. However, it was to the RSC staff's advantage that the members at least be made aware of what the staff was producing.

To increase its usefulness to the RSC member offices, the RSC staff reorganized its printed material during the recess between the 93rd and 94th Congresses. The staff instituted a cumulative numbering system together with an index. Then, looseleaf binders were obtained for all the members so that the material could be kept in one place. The RSC staff hoped that this would make the material more useful over a longer period of time. An additional psychological advantage was that all of the RSC's material bound together would be more impressive to the staff aides and members than the individual papers which had been issued on a weekly basis. Thus, the staff and members would be more conscious of the services offered by the RSC and, it was hoped, more sympathetic to it.

Member Meetings

The weekly meetings of members were expanded to include all members of the RSC in early 1976. This was a means of assuring participation of as many members as possible. It also enabled the rank-and-file dues-paying members to express an opinion about the affairs of the organization. In 1974 and 1975, the weekly meetings were described as being meetings of the "Executive Committee." In fact, other members who were not on the Executive Committee frequently attended these sessions. But the designation tended to exclude other members of the RSC, even though they were all implicitly invited on a routine basis. By designating the meetings as "member meetings," the staff hoped that a larger number of members would participate. As Mrs. Holt commented, "The Executive Committee meetings were expanded to member meetings to broaden the base and expand the interest in the issues."¹⁶ This was particularly crucial because as the 94th Congress progressed, attendance from the Executive Committee would decrease to as few as four or five members because of conflicting meetings, and the lack of particular interest in the substantive issues being discussed at that week's meeting.¹⁷ The RSC staff had expected this diminution of interest in its activities. The time pressures on members of Congress are considerable, and the priority of the individual members frequently shifts away from issues to other roles. Morris Fiorina notes:

"Along with the expansion of the federal presence in American life, the traditional role of the Congress as an all-purpose ombudsman had greatly expanded....Constituents respond rationally to this modern state of affairs by weighing nonprogrammatic constituency service heavily when casting their congressional votes."¹⁸

This problem of declining interest was exacerbated by the losses in the 1974 election. Prior to that time, the embryonic Republican Study Committee had made some legislative progress. But now, in view of its depleted membership, it was in a more difficult position to offset the Democrats' or the Administration's legislative initiatives. As Minority Leader John Rhodes commented about this period, "We were mainly hanging on by our fingernails, in defensive actions."¹⁹

Beyond this defensive action, however, as Paul Weyrich notes, there was the need for coordinated action:

"By the time of the '74 election, there was loyalty to the RSC. It had worked. Since the conservative members had been reduced, they were even more convinced to hang together to fight off the worst the congressional Democrats might throw at them."²⁰

Thus, any efforts which could be used to emphasize that sense of unity and common purpose would be helpful to the common objective.

C. Member and Member Office Relations

Among the most delicate tasks of the Republican Study Committee staff was maintaining a close relationship with member offices. Because each staff member of the RSC technically served on the payroll of one or more members of the House, the RSC staff served at the pleasure of those members on whose payrolls they were placed. For example, during the month of February, 1976, 28 members of the RSC supported 13 members of the staff. Some staffers received all of their payroll support from one member of Congress, while others were supported by four or five members of the House.

The annual dues trickled in over the whole year and were contributed toward office supplies and operation. While about 70% of the members would pay their dues promptly without further dunning, the remainder would be difficult to obtain. To solve this problem, lists of these non-payers would be circulated to the members of the Executive Committee, and these

members would encourage their colleagues to pay their dues. Similarly, routine announcements which invited other members to join or renew were sent from the RSC over the signature of its treasurer.²¹

Raising the salary support, however, was a constant burden to both the chairman of the RSC and the staff director with the ultimate responsibility falling to the chairman.

Each month, the staff would attempt to raise as much support as possible. The salary requirements had to be reviewed monthly, not only because of staff changes, but because members could change their payroll expenditures once a month. Thus, a phone call from a supporting member's office indicating that he was withdrawing his support, would result in a shortfall which would have to be met quickly. Fortunately, only 25%-30% of the dollars required on a monthly basis had to be raised anew, and of this 25%-30%, about one-half could be obtained by the staff who could contact staff in member offices. The balance was raised by the chairman from his colleagues in the House.

While the staff resented being subjected to the whims of members, they had to maintain a positive attitude for public appearance. Member loyalty would not tolerate disparaging remarks about other members, no matter how arbitrary their actions. A kind of "market test" came to be used, that is, if the staff produced useful research products for the members, the members would support the staff. This theory was sometimes noted with bitterness as some of the members who had been most conscientiously served, would drastically cut their contributions at the last moment. But, because of several stalwart members who had always come through in difficult times, no payrolls were ever missed, although some checks were occasionally late.²²

Conservative members of Congress frequently have taken the viewpoint that the maintenance of large staffs was an unjustified expenditure of taxpayers' funds. Those who argued in favor of the RSC staff held the opposite position. The RSC position was phrased:

"The question of budget frugality is often raised by Members of the Republican Study Committee. In reply several Members had noted that the salary of one specific research assistant in the 93rd Congress, at an annual salary rate of \$18,000, was one of the key

ingredients in saving the taxpayers from the \$800 million land use bill. This type of investment certainly represents a prudent investment of taxpayer funds."²³

The RSC staff examined the payroll records of the individual members in the Clerk of the House's office. All of these salary records are open to inspection by members, the press, and the general public. When members were found to have funds available, they were asked to support the RSC staff. These approaches could either be made at the staff level or at the member level, with the burden frequently falling on the chairman of the RSC. When salary support was obtained from one of the members of the RSC, it was immediately necessary for the staff person who was being supported to introduce himself to the member's congressional staff in order to avoid confusion and embarrassment to the member or his office staff. For example, during the Wayne Hays scandal in 1976, the Legislative Director of the Republican Study Committee, Daphne Miller, was accused in the Detroit News of being a "ghost" employee on the payroll of Congressman Bud Shuster (R-Pennsylvania), Sam Steiger, and David Treen (R-Louisiana). Since the news media was full of stories about Wayne Hays' mistress, Elizabeth Ray, being funded by the House payroll, "ghost" employee stories were a major news item. The reason for Miller's inclusion in the article was that several staff aides in Shuster's office were unaware of Miller's position at the RSC or who she was.²⁴ The Detroit News story dealt with the story of Rep. Charles Diggs who was subsequently investigated and convicted of accepting payroll kickbacks from his congressional staff employees. This article asserted that Miller and her RSC staff colleagues had written the book The Case Against the Reckless Congress, using the names of the conservative congressmen who hired them as their pseudonyms.²⁵ Michael Malbin stated the concern of the RSC staff in this regard:

"...The members delegate enormous authority to their staffs and cannot possibly keep track of all or even most of what goes on in their name. But one thing they can do is to react instantly when they hear of something they do not like."²⁶

Such incidents occurred only infrequently but they created serious complications for the executive director who was attempting to obtain member support. Every contributing member had a vision of his hometown newspapers carrying similar stories about his RSC employee. The problem went beyond the issue of payroll support. The RSC staff was effective only as

long as the members had confidence in its judgment and maturity. Michael Malbin notes that "congressional decisions are ultimately acts of faith -- prudential judgments based upon the ^{Members'} acceptance of others' opinions."²⁷ If the members' confidence in the RSC staff diminished, it would impact adversely on their efforts in legislative activity.

The public relations problem of the RSC staff was exacerbated when the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee's bulletin entitled "Congress Today!" accused Congressman Philip Burton (D-California), the chairman of the Democratic Study Group, of improprieties. These alleged improprieties included the employment of staff personnel who were on the staff of the DSG and who appeared on more than one member of Congress' payroll at the same time. In an immediate response to this article, Chairwoman Holt of the RSC pointed out to the Executive Director of the Campaign Committee:

"these charges with regard to multiple employment and the alleged impropriety of research people working on the staff of the Democratic Study Group while on Members' payrolls are inaccurate and groundless."²⁸

Actually, the fact is the article was accurate, but the implication that this was an improper procedure was incorrect. Her letter continued:

"The rules of the House have provided, since the late 1950's, for the multiple sponsorship of House personnel....The group of which I am chairwoman (the Republican Study Committee) operates in a similar manner with shared staff many of whom are employed by more than one Member. A number of other research groups in the House of Representatives use the multiple employment system. They include the Wednesday Group, the Democratic Research Organization, the Black Caucus, the Rural Caucus, and the Environmental Study Conference. They cover the political spectrum from left to right and include among their members a majority of Members of the House."²⁹

While this case was attributed to the eagerness of the Campaign Committee's staff to tarnish the Democrats, it also could have had a negative psychological impact on the RSC contributors thereby encouraging the members to withdraw support and concentrate more fully on their constituent-related activities. After all, some observers of the Congress have maintained that the House was moving substantially in that direction:

"Explicit acceptance of the idea that legislation was not its primary function would, in large part, simply be recognition of the direction which change has already been taking. It would legitimize and expand the functions of constituent service and administrative oversight which, in practice, already constitute the principal work of most congressmen."³⁰

A related problem which had to be dealt with on a continuing basis was rivalries between the RSC shared staff member and the member's office staff. Because the shared staff person often worked with members of the House on major legislative issues, he was in close contact with the member on a day-to-day basis on the House floor. This close working relationship meant that jealousy could occur between members of the RSC staff and the staff in the individual member offices. The member has only a limited amount of time and it was perceived that any time he spent on RSC activities was time diverted from other activities. This was a particularly sensitive problem if the member chose an RSC activity over one dealing with his own constituents. A program was initiated to avoid this kind of problem. The first of these programs was a series of meetings with administrative assistants in member offices. These meetings were first held on December 11, 12, and 18, 1974. Later meetings were held occasionally during 1975 and 1976. The idea was to build the rapport between the RSC staff and the staff in the member offices. In these informal sessions, the RSC staff discussed their range of activities and how these could be helpful to the member's staff in performing its duties. The purpose of the meetings was to build personal contact and reduce the tension which might develop between the RSC staff members and their office counterparts.

In addition, special meetings were held for members' staff aides. For example, when Professors Hayek and Friedman came to town, in addition to meeting with the members, staff meetings were also arranged. Similarly, briefings were held on such subjects as building and maintaining a computer mailing list.³¹ Occasional newspaper articles or other items of administrative interest were sent to administrative assistants, press releases were sent to press aides, and the regular Monday legislative briefings were held for the legislative staff of member offices.

The relationship with member offices was complex. Some involved requests, others offered services or assistance and still others were procedural.

From the RSC staff's viewpoint, they were all important because they gave the RSC staff an opportunity to prove the worth and value of the organization. Rather than being viewed as a nuisance which demanded the attention, time and money of the member, the RSC wanted to be projected as an extension of the member's own staff, performing legislative and service functions which his staff could not do on its own. Even though the RSC staff viewed its role as substantially legislative, sometimes in order to engage in these activities, it had to perform other services.

All of these efforts were undertaken in an effort to further involve the RSC membership and member offices in the joint legislative activities of the RSC, and also for the members' staff to view the staff of the RSC as an extension of and a complement to the member's own district-oriented staff rather than as a competitor.

The meetings and the publications of the Republican Study Committee served as a regular reminder to the members that they were engaged in a common legislative effort. Some of the implications of this were routine. As Mrs. Holt noted, "The RSC publications are important because they stop my staff from reinventing the wheel."³² In addition, these publications joined the members in a common legislative crusade.

By the same token, the RSC staff did not envision itself as the sole source of legislative or public policy data but, instead, it wanted to play the role of clearinghouse and key contact point on specific issues. As Allen Schick said in a slightly different context:

"The case for indigenous legislative resources should not be grounded on aspirations for self sufficiency. This status is neither necessary nor desirable. Rather, Congress should give itself enough resources to keep in touch with developments outside."³³

When the RSC staff was perceived as providing a major portion of these resources, its role was generally accepted by the members' staffs.

Particular office relations evolved not only among the research staff members of the RSC, but also with the staff director, Ed Feulner. For example, the staff director's relationship to Philip Crane, vice chairman of the RSC, had always been close, since he had formerly served as Crane's legislative assistant and subsequently his administrative assistant, as well as

his campaign manager in 1972. Despite this close relationship, the executive director's successor as Crane's administrative assistant, Richard Williamson, wrote him shortly after the 1974 election as follows:

"It seems to me that it is a natural outgrowth of the increasing maturity and viability of the Republican Steering (sic) Committee and your role as its Executive Director, as well as Phil Crane's growth as a legislator, that the separation between yourself and this office now come to pass. Furthermore, I deem such a separation absolutely essential for the reinvigoration of Phil Crane's staff, the new effectiveness I envision this office developing, and my role as Administrative Assistant with responsibility for and authority over the office."³⁴

Williamson had been newly-elevated to the position of Crane's administrative assistant. He wanted to prove to the executive director that he was in charge of Crane's office and that the old special relationship was over. Coming, as it did, on the heels of the 1974 election setback, it was another headache which the RSC did not need. In fact, it was a rebuke to the RSC. While the executive director realized that this was not necessarily Crane's personal attitude, he also realized the futility of a confrontation with Williamson which the RSC would almost inevitably lose. In a case like this, a member's personal staff had virtually unlimited access to the member. Thus, it was almost impossible for the RSC staff to compete for the member's attention. A sympathetic conversation in an RSC meeting between the executive director and the member could be undercut by hours of antagonistic commentary from the member's own office staff. Crane's central role as a primary founder of the RSC was well-known. His salary support was the largest of any member, and he had frequently cooperated with the staff in enlisting other members in the RSC activities. After a "cooling off" period between the Crane office and the RSC, a new relationship developed. While it was not as close as it had been in the past, Crane remained actively involved. His salary contribution was cut, but he remained one of the largest supporters to the RSC staff.

Specific cases such as this could be resolved, but more difficult questions arose from group confrontations. For example, a meeting was held on October 22, 1975, between Ed Feulner and Phil Truluck of the Republican Study Committee staff with Rich Williamson and Peter Braithwaite (representing Phil Crane), Bruce Rickerson (representing Marjorie Holt), Joe Overton (representing Barry Goldwater, Jr.), Chris Lay

(representing Steve Symms), Larry Bowles (representing Jim Martin from North Carolina), Don Senese (representing Bill Archer from Texas), and Steve Markman (representing Tom Hagedorn). The meeting was instigated by Overton and Lay and was to deal with their disappointment with the Monday morning briefing sessions of the RSC. The group confrontation was a powerful signal. Part of the motivation of the meeting was later described by Phil Truluck as:

"...simply complaining because we were losing more battles now. For some reason, we bore the brunt of their frustration."³⁵

The fact that the chairwoman and all four vice chairmen were represented at this particular meeting, and that the members represented at the meeting contributed 60% of the combined salary of the RSC, resulted in prompt and serious attention to the concerns of these aides. The group argued that the briefing sessions should be strategy meetings talking about specific amendments to pending bills. They objected to the general presentations of broad issue material as being too vague to be useful. They also had other objections to the format and contents of some of the RSC publications. Some of their specific ideas were helpful, and out of this meeting came a number of changes to the briefing sessions and the RSC publications. The first change presented by the group concerned an addition to the weekly BULLETIN of a listing of Congressional Record speeches and inserts by conservative members of both the House and Senate for the prior week. This information would enable the staff aides to quickly index major subjects and pull out the material when it was required instead of monitoring the Record on a daily basis themselves. This proved to be a useful service because the Congressional Record is an indispensable tool for a professional staff aide on Capitol Hill. But to review its 200-500 pages daily was a chore that every staff aide constantly tried to avoid. The RSC listing would provide the staff aides with a handy reference guide to speech material and other useful research data.³⁶ Additionally, the Monday briefings were restructured to include a regular section discussing legislative initiatives on pending bills.³⁷

A problem arose among the members who were pressured into participating but not wholly enthusiastic. Mayhew notes that:

"Of course, congressmen must at all times generate an impression that they are interested in winning victories, but there may not be much behind the impression."³⁸

Safe constituent-related services help to build a solid base back home. But, a visible role in a legislative battle is likely to make as many enemies as friends. Thus, some of the more timid members were reluctant to commit themselves beyond the annual dues to the RSC activities. The young Republican Study Committee experienced many problems not only in dealing with the constituent-oriented members. The RSC's work was also complicated by its public relations problems, staff personality conflicts and the counterpressures experienced by the members with respect to time and clerk allowances. It was the delicate balancing by the staff which kept the organization alive during the difficult period when the membership was generally dispirited and frustrated both by its Administration and by the majority party.

D. Relations with the House Republican Leadership

Following Gerald Ford's selection as Vice President in 1973, Congressman John Rhodes was unanimously elected Minority Leader of the Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives. Rhodes' earlier relations with the RSC have been discussed in previous sections, but the changed composition of the House following the 1974 elections brought about an altering of Rhodes' perceptions of both his role as Minority Leader and the role of the Republicans in the House.

Since the time of the federal land use victory in 1974, Rhodes had been urging the RSC to change its name to something that sounded less official. In fact, he maintains that the agreement was made with LaMar Baker to change the name when Rhodes made Room 134 available as an office to the group.³⁹ And so, the name was changed at the first members meeting in 1975. Rhodes' view of the RSC had become more cordial; he admitted some years later, "Actually, I'm not unhappy that it's [the RSC] there."⁴⁰

The second ranking leader among the House Republicans was the Minority Whip Bob Michel. Michel joined the Republican Study Committee in late 1974, and was elected to membership of the Executive Committee at the January 1975 general membership meeting.

With the active involvement of the Whip in the affairs of the RSC and the soothing of Rhodes' ego by the name change, it was hoped that the Republican leadership would accept the RSC and cooperate more actively with it. This cooperation was seen to be an achievable goal because of the frequent identity of interests between the formal leadership and the RSC activities. Michel's role on the RSC's Executive Committee did not affect Rhodes directly, who later indicated that he was unaware that Michel even served in this position.⁴¹ On the other hand, Michel recalls that he discussed the matter with Rhodes, but that "Rhodes had no real reaction to my being in it [the RSC]."⁴² Whether the Minority Leader knew of the Whip's membership or not, it did not affect his attitude toward the RSC.

Cooperation with the Minority Leader on Positive Proposals

Following the 1974 election setback, Rhodes decided to present a positive package of Republican legislative proposals to the American people. Some RSC members had suggested an independent legislative agenda for the House Republicans too; this appeared to be an arena in which the RSC could cooperate with the Minority Leader. For example, in early 1973, Ed Derwinski had advocated the "imperative need to establish an identity independent of Nixon.... After all, I can even imagine circumstances where Spiro Agnew will not be our Presidential nominee in 1976."⁴³

The need to move away from the party's titular leader -- President Ford -- was driven home after the 1974 losses. The surviving Republicans partially blamed Ford for their major losses: although they candidly admitted Watergate had been the primary problem, his WIN program had not been helpful. With the announcement of Rhodes' intention, Mrs. Holt and the other members agreed that the RSC should make its input into the Rhodes package to insure that the conservative viewpoint on major issues would receive substantial attention.

The RSC executive director was directed by the Executive Committee to prepare a series of proposals for the Executive Committee to review at its March 17 meeting.⁴⁴ The staff assembled the package which dealt with nine general issue areas, several of which had been of interest to the RSC such as welfare reform, food stamp reform and land use. The package was circulated to the Executive Committee in advance of the meeting.

Also at this time, former Republican Congressman Richard Shoup (Montana) had been retained as a consultant by Rhodes following his 1974 defeat with the specific assignment of preparing the Rhodes alternative package. In this role, Shoup was invited by the Executive Committee to participate in the RSC meeting on March 17, 1975.⁴⁵ Shoup reviewed the RSC proposals, and discussed them with the members in detail. Although there were broad areas of general agreement, the staff was directed to provide more data to Shoup. And, Shoup agreed to meet with the RSC Executive Committee again. Shoup also met with other Republicans who were not members of the RSC.

Despite the fact that he received input from many sources, the RSC proposals provided a substantial part of the final Rhodes document. In his cover letter for the "Republican Legislative Agenda," Mr. Rhodes referred specifically to the Buckley-Michel food stamp reform bill:

"Some of the specifics have already been presented. For example, the Republican program calls for a 'drastic revision of the run-away food stamp program.' Certainly the far-reaching proposal recently introduced by the Republican Whip fits this category."⁴⁶

Members of the RSC could take satisfaction from the fact that their key joint proposals in welfare and food stamp reform were now part of the entire party's program in the House, even though their input was not acknowledged by Rhodes.

In his 1976 book, The Futile System,⁴⁷ Rhodes discussed the House Republican Legislative Agenda of 1975 noting that it was "authored by a cross-section of GOP House Members," and that it "identifies the basic legislative goals of a Republican-controlled Congress."⁴⁸ However, by his own admission, the 1975 Rhodes legislative agenda was not a set of realistic legislative objectives. In an interview, Rhodes summarized his dissatisfaction: "We could put a good legislative agenda together, but we just didn't have the votes to enact it."⁴⁹

Rhodes also expressed his own frustration as the leader of a minority. Because he was outnumbered and working in an hostile environment, Rhodes consistently maintained that the House "Republicans are essentially without any congressional power." Rhodes continued:

"Because it doesn't have the votes, the minority has no positive power. Its chief influence is negative. The current Republican minority, for example, has had some success in sustaining presidential vetoes, but that is because there happens to be a Republican President."⁵⁰

Rhodes' attitude that the minority party could not get positive proposals onto the legislative agenda frustrated the RSC leadership who considered themselves "dedicated to a philosophy and dedicated to getting some things changed in Washington."⁵¹ Rhodes' attitude renewed the determination of the activists within the Republican Study Committee to pursue their own legislative goals and to attempt to work closely with conservative allies within the Democratic party to coordinate bipartisan ad hoc coalitions to influence specific votes. The Minority Leader seemed to be worn out and negative in his attitude. As John Rousselot said of Rhodes:

"When you're a Minority Leader, you're working on consensus so much you lose sight of some of the opportunities."⁵²

The RSC had a different role in the House. It was not dedicated to compromise and consensus:

"It constantly reminds House Republicans of what the traditional Republican position is even when the leadership of the White House deviates....I like to think we have an influence in keeping our party more conservative."⁵³

Problems with the "Anderson Oath"

John B. Anderson (R-Illinois), chairman of the Republican Conference, had been a leading representative of the liberals within the House Republican party for many years. Anderson attempted to use his leadership within the party to gain a voice for the liberal position equal to the more popular conservative position.

A case in point was "A Republican Statement," which was issued in March 1975. This statement, circulated by Congressman Anderson among his House Republican colleagues, repudiated third party efforts which were being discussed in political circles after the Republican debacle in the 1974 congressional and senatorial elections. At the same time, the signers

"acknowledged that within our own party there is a wide range of views on particular issues, yet we feel that this competition of views and ideas can be healthy in terms of broadening our base of support and strengthening our party in the long run. That to fail to

broaden our base -- to exclude any section of our society -- would be not only morally wrong, but politically stupid."⁵⁴

Anderson obtained 110 signatures from House Republican members. The other 34 Republican members did not sign. Of the 34, 30 were members of the Republican Study Committee, many of them members of the Executive Committee, including Chairwoman Holt, Vice Chairmen Crane and Symms, Treasurer Rousselot, and past chairmen Devine (R-Ohio) and Derwinski. The members' stated reason for not signing the statement included the emphasis of the statement on the Republican party "being all things to all people," rather than an adherence to the conservative principles of the last Republican party platform.

Activities like this by Anderson led to difficulties between the RSC and the Republican leadership: Anderson had obtained the signatures of the House Minority Leader, the Minority Whip, and the chairmen of the Policy Committee and the Research Committee. The members of the Republican Study Committee learned that the Republican leadership usually stood together, even when that meant agreeing with the liberal position.

While the Anderson statement was only a minor news story, it emphasized the difficulties confronting the conservatives within the RSC. They learned that not only the leadership but also many of their colleagues could be led into signing a statement with which they may not have agreed, but which "party unity" required. This was a particularly difficult lesson considering that in retaining his leadership post, Anderson had recently defeated the conservative candidate.

Leadership Assistance to Maintain Facilities

The RSC was constantly in danger of losing Room 134 in the Cannon House Office Building. For example, a letter was received on June 30, 1975, addressed to Chairwoman Holt from Elizabeth Holtzman (D-New York), the chairwoman of the "Task Force on Facilities and Space Utilization" of the House Commission on Information and Facilities. The Holtzman letter asked Mrs. Holt to:

"...provide the commission with your assessment of the use now being made of space under your control....If you would identify the functions now being carried out in this space, indicate whether such functions could be handled without loss of efficiency in alternative

locations at a greater distance from the House floor, or specify reasons you feel these functions should remain in their present location. Your views will be given every consideration."⁵⁵

While the RSC was not the only group receiving an inquiry on its use of space, the RSC was in a particularly vulnerable position. This vulnerability was based both on the organization's status as a Republican body and as an ad hoc group.

A move from Room 134 would present serious difficulties. To be moved to one of the House Office Building Annexes, which were located several blocks further from the Capitol, would make the RSC less accessible to the legislative process by denying the RSC legislative staff the ability to contact and influence their members in an effective way. Thus, the RSC staff drafted a reply for Mrs. Holt to send directly to Mrs. Holtzman. They also drafted a strong reply on behalf of John Rhodes, to whom Room 134 had formally been assigned before he allocated it to the RSC. In Congressman Rhodes' response, it was noted that Room 134 was the permanent headquarters of the RSC which was occupied by 10 senior research people.⁵⁶ She stated that the staff was in frequent contact with the members on their legislative business and that such support activities as mimeographing and mailing were carried out in a borrowed office in one of the annexes further from the Capitol. The Rhodes response emphasized the same points. As the Minority Leader, Rhodes was the only Republican on the three-person House Office Building Commission, the commission with permanent responsibility for allocating all space.

The Holtzman task force -- which was an ad hoc body -- met sporadically throughout the 94th Congress. Philip Crane, one of the RSC vice chairmen, served as a member of the Holtzman group, and represented the interests of the RSC in these negotiations. It was not until the conclusion of that Congress that Rhodes informed the RSC that it was being given the "opportunity" to move to the slightly larger Room 433 of the Cannon House Office Building, directly above the former office. Even if the room had not been slightly larger, the staff would still have moved. As long as the office was in the primary House Office Buildings, the RSC would stay in the physical mainstream of the legislative process. Rhodes' intervention on behalf of the RSC was indispensable in keeping the group in its prime location. Although Rhodes was reluctant to acknowledge the input of the RSC, it began to force itself into the legislative process.

E. Relations with the Republican White House

The opportunities for the RSC members to meet with the President, despite the fact that he was a Republican, were not as frequent as might be expected. Because the RSC was an ad hoc group rather than an official part of the party organization, its requests to be included on the President's schedule were often delayed by the White House staff, and by the import of other business. By granting access to an unofficial group in his own party, the President could be suspected of undercutting the formal leadership with which he had to work closely, but to ignore the group would be to alienate a major part of his voting support. It was impossible however, for Ford to give too much legitimacy to one ad hoc Republican faction, even though the RSC was the strongest within his party. In another context, Rose notes "the need to balance factions, tendencies and individuals against one another."⁵⁷ President Ford had to be particularly deft in his "faction balancing" because it involved philosophical, structural and substantive issues. Access to the President was not the only issue. The RSC members would have their own agenda for which they would like to gain Ford's support -- possibly pressing the President on some issues and limiting his range of options. Rose continues his analysis noting that this balancing requirement "acts as a major restraint upon the power of the party leader, whether in opposition or as Prime Minister."⁵⁸

The substance of the issues was not in dispute. On most occasions, the President, the Minority Leadership and the Republican Study Committee were on the same side of an issue. But, the appearance of "legitimizing" a group which was outside the formal structure was of concern to the White House. Thus, the RSC was in a comparable position to the Democratic Study Group under the Kennedy Administration:

"From the White House point of view, there was a recognition of the fact that the [Democratic] Study Group represented the strongest source of support for the President's program in the House of Representatives. At the same time, however, there was an equal recognition of the need for dealing with the established power centers in the House, the Committee Chairmen and the elected leadership."⁵⁹

An opportunity did present itself in April 1975 for the Executive Committee to meet with the President. The purpose of the meeting was to

discuss legislative concerns of the RSC membership directly with Ford. Although the meeting with the President had been arranged by the executive director, and its agenda had been discussed by the Executive Committee during several meetings, the request for inclusion of the executive director was denied. The White House staff did assure Mrs. Holt that minutes would be available to the RSC to assist in following up the meeting.

A specific agenda was worked out at the regular member meetings, and it was agreed that five legislative topics were to be discussed by Mrs. Holt and Messrs. Burgener (R-California), Symms, Bauman (R-Maryland), Kemp (R-New York), Armstrong (R-Colorado) and Dickinson (R-Alabama). Each participant had agreed to speak on one key issue: Burgener on welfare and food stamp reform; Symms and Bauman on land use; Kemp about the economy; Armstrong on energy; and Dickinson on political issues and federal appointments.

Ford's regular meetings with Rhodes, Michel and Anderson from the House, together with their Senate counterparts, proved to be pep rallies for the Administration's programs with discussion centered around how congressional support could be built for Ford's programs. The RSC Executive Committee, on the other hand, wanted to convey their legislative concerns to the President, rather than merely support the executive branch's proposals. The meeting enabled the members to express their frustration with the White House because as Mrs. Holt stated, "Poor communications between the President and Republican conservatives contributed to a lack of understanding."⁶⁰ The general tenor of the meeting was to be friendly however, rather than antagonistic. While commentators like Thomas Cronin noted that Ford "had to contend with a strong attack from the right wing of his own minority party,"⁶¹ that attack usually manifested itself over specific issues in the committee or on the House floor rather than in meetings with the President.

This first meeting took place on April 23, 1975.⁶² The RSC agenda items were covered in detail. The President agreed with the RSC's basic position on welfare and food stamp reform, but indicated that he "had been clobbered" the last time he tried to reduce the food stamp program.⁶³ Regarding energy, he outlined the options available to him and indicated that he would be deciding shortly which way he would go on this issue. Responding

to Bill Dickinson's inquiry on federal postcard registration of voters, Ford stated his emphatic opposition to such a measure. On political appointments, he heard the members' grievances without making any commitments regarding specific appointments. As the exchange continued

"He [the President] became more responsive. His changed mood may have resulted from his awareness that we were not there simply for the purpose of criticizing him."⁶⁴

In the formal part of the meeting, other questions were also discussed. For example, in response to an inquiry from John Rousselot, the President reiterated his opposition to the Consumer Protection Agency. He said he would re-emphasize his opposition throughout the cabinet departments and elsewhere in his Administration.

Following the meeting, Mrs. Holt wrote to Max Friedersdorf, Special Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations, restating the RSC position on its legislative initiatives, specifically the National Welfare Reform Act of 1975 and the forthcoming National Food Stamp Reform Act of 1975. In addition, she endorsed the Kemp Jobs Creation Act and stressed the desirability of giving RSC members the opportunity to submit names for top-level appointments within the Ford Administration.⁶⁵

The second opportunity for the Executive Committee to meet with the President occurred on Wednesday, October 8, 1975. Again, the staff and members drew up a detailed agenda to discuss with the President. A last minute change by the White House rescheduled the meeting from a morning session to one which took place at 4:30 and decreased the attendance at the meeting -- recorded votes were taking place on the House floor and many members of the RSC refused to leave.⁶⁶ The reduced attendance at the October meeting was not surprising because most members have tightly drawn schedules which do not readily adapt to major changes. At the same time, the White House had been using political and social opportunities to court many members of the House on an individual basis. But, by October, Ford had vetoed bills and taken strong stands on several issues, and with these positive signs, the RSC members were not as concerned about Ford's policies as they had been six months earlier.

Similarly, the RSC's relationship with Rhodes had improved. They had worked with him on his "legislative agenda" and on several other issues. Furthermore, as the memory of the 1974 elections faded, the RSC's need to gain stature by meeting with the President was reduced.

Several important items were discussed at the October meeting: the first of these was the Buckley-Michel Food Stamp Reform Bill discussed by Congressman Burgener. The President responded that the Administration would be coming out with its food stamp reform proposals very soon and that they would incorporate much of the Buckley-Michel bill.⁶⁷ This was an encouraging response for all of the members who had been working hard on this bill.

The second item concerned the Common Situs bill and the Dunlop "compromise." Former Chairman Del Clawson stressed that members of the RSC were strongly opposed to the so-called compromise. The response from the President was that Secretary Dunlop had consulted with some people in corporate management who had indicated that they could live with his two-part package. Clawson noted that RSC contacts within the business community indicated that grave reservations about the bill remained. Ford assured that he would take a further look at the situation as it evolved and keep his options open. This was one of the first signs of presidential flexibility on this major bill.⁶⁸

On the subject of postcard voter registration, Bill Dickinson supported the President's position in opposition to the bill and pledged RSC help to sustain a veto if necessary.

Mrs. Holt ended the meeting by expressing the hope that the Republicans in the House and Senate would not be confronted by any "surprises" during the time from then until the November 1976 election. Her specific reference was to some of President Ford's activities before the 1974 election when the President introduced his "Whip Inflation Now" (WIN) policy.⁶⁹ The Administration's policy had been a negative factor for the House Republicans in their re-election efforts. The RSC wished to avoid the electoral trend observed by Morris Fiorina:

"As the electoral fates of congressmen and their president have diverged, their incentives to cooperate have diverged as well."⁷⁰

Mrs. Holt expressed the hope that they could work together with the President. At this time, the RSC's relationship with the White House was cordial although the White House considered the input from the RSC to be secondary to that which it received from the formal leadership, an understandable view considering the President's former position as House Minority Leader. Ford chose to emphasize the more formal relationship, rather than work through new and unofficial channels.

As 1975 moved into 1976 and election activities increased, the RSC membership was divided on the presidential race. Some members of the Executive Committee were active supporters of Ford, while others supported Reagan. At several meetings of the Executive Committee, the staff was directed not to take a position and to provide its material to both candidates and their staffs.

While it might seem that the RSC membership would have supported Governor Reagan unanimously, this was not the case. Ed Derwinski pointed out:

"I'm a practical politician. I don't throw away the incumbency and all of the advantages that gives to us for a further degree of ideological purity."⁷¹

The pragmatism of Derwinski was offset by the ideological conviction of Phil Crane who strongly supported Governor Reagan. With these strong feelings, the requirement for the staff to maintain neutrality was confirmed. If the membership could be held together on RSC issues and in support of its commitments to the RSC, the group could work together. Like the Watergate battle of two years earlier, the best role for the RSC was to maintain strict neutrality in the presidential race.

Several of the senior members of the staff participated in the drafting of the 1976 Republican Platform at Kansas City. In fact, the staff was selected on such a basis that either candidates' representative could veto any of the proposed staff, evidence of the truly neutral role of the RSC at this time.

With the work of the Platform Committee, policy relationships between the RSC and the White House decreased after 1975, but political contacts both with pro-Ford supporters and pro-Reagan supporters increased. The RSC

Executive Committee had directed the staff to stay away from presidential politics and concentrate on areas where RSC members could agree. Thus, the role of the RSC staff on the Platform Committee was one which would help to enhance the role of the RSC, no matter which candidate would win the nomination.

F. Vote Justifications and Response to Vote Ratings of Campaign Groups

Anti-war groups in the late 60s and early 70s began a trend toward single issue politics. In addition to the Vietnam issue, political activists were concerned about the environment. Later, areas such as consumer activism and education also emerged.

As organizations developed around these issue areas, they established political committees. One of the ways for the political committees to obtain instant media attention was to "rate the Congressmen." As Mayhew points out, the concept of vote ratings is not new, going back at least to the ratings of the "drys" through their Anti-Saloon League.⁷² Ideological groups of both the right and the left -- Americans for Constitutional Action and Americans for Democratic Action -- began rating the Congress in 1959 and 1947 respectively, and the newer political groups began with the Environmental Action rating in the 1970 elections, better known as the "dirty dozen rating." This was an attempt to pick selected individuals who combined an unacceptable environmental record with particular vulnerability in their re-election campaigns. Additional resources could be invested in these races in the form of money and volunteers, and pressure through the media could be applied to them for their "anti-environmental" stand.

Members of the Republican Study Committee worried about these ratings. Bill Armstrong, for example, indicated that one of his priorities when he came back to Washington after his 1974 election, would be to organize the conservatives to establish counter rating groups throughout the United States. Armstrong was receiving hostile media attention in Colorado because he was portrayed as being opposed to senior citizens and a clean environment. The problem was becoming serious for the conservatives because as Charles Lindblom notes: "Almost every interest has its watchdog."⁷³

Prior to the 1974 election, the RSC staff issued a set of "Vote Justifications." The purpose of these Vote Justifications was to supply specific information in a convenient format to the RSC members who traveled through their districts facing hostile questions. The response to the Vote Justifications from the members in 1974 was very positive, and they were expanded substantially by the time of the 1976 elections. The first 1976 set appeared in May containing 46 key bills or amendments from January 1975 to May 1976,⁷⁴ and was later updated at the close of the second session in September 1976, to include 82 key votes and amendments from the 94th Congress.

Both volumes included justifications for supporting the most important of the President's vetoes. It was noted in the cover letter from Marjorie Holt to her Republican Study Committee colleagues that:

"Not every member will agree with all the positions defended here; many will not agree with all of the particular reasons cited. This booklet is an effort on the part of our staff to supply useful information to members who may use and adjust these facts and arguments to fit their own particular needs. In several cases, the members of the RSC were split down the middle. Because conservatives could regard these bills from differing points of view, we have supplied justifications for voting either way."⁷⁵

Because of the underlying need for accountability to one's own constituents, neither the RSC staff nor the key members of it ever expected their members to vote against their constituents' interests on a bill. Of course, the members tended to be on the same side of issues, or they would not have voluntarily joined the organization. Yet, their immediate objective was re-election. Mayhew put it well:

"The electoral role has an attractive universality to it. It has to be the proximate goal of everyone, the goal that must be achieved over and over if other ends are to be entertained."⁷⁶

While the disclaimer and the presentation of both sides of certain bills showed that the RSC membership was not completely unified on all of the issues, this deviation was relatively small. Only seven of the 82 individual vote justifications found the RSC membership substantially divided. The full range of arguments for the pro-RSC position stretched from philosophical arguments to parochial concerns, with the knowledge that all of the members could tailor the arguments to their own style and their own district concerns.

However, while these volumes were useful in giving an overview to the campaigning incumbent and his key volunteers, they were not the timely response which Armstrong was looking for to offset the accusations that he or his colleagues were anti-environment, or against senior citizens.

The single issue groups were issuing their ratings on an irregular basis, but the response had to be almost instantaneous to be effective. Therefore, in 1976, the RSC undertook a companion project to respond immediately to ratings from different pressure groups.

As Chairwoman Holt said later:

"The RSC had to make the effort to destroy their [the liberal rating group's] credibility. We were excelling in a certain set of areas -- the budget and economics and national defense -- but not in social policy. We had to fight back."⁷⁷

The RSC's Vote Responses were an effort to "fight back."

The first Vote Response was published on February 4, 1976. In it the ten votes used by the National Council of Senior Citizens were analyzed. The RSC position, usually against the National Council of Senior Citizens, was justified for the use of members of the RSC. Billed as a "rebuttal or response," this brief document was made available to members within three days of the release of the National Council's rating.⁷⁸

Similarly, when the liberal Consumer Federation of America published its ratings on 13 votes, the RSC responded with its own rebuttal.⁷⁹ And, when the Environmental Action Committee published its ratings, the RSC rebuttal contained editorial comments on the methodology of the Environmental Action tabulation:

"It is striking to note that approximately 1200 environment-related measures were introduced in the 94th Congress and only 14 of them were examined by the Environmental Action group.

Ratings such as this, which are long on rhetoric and short on fact, add little to the political debate so necessary to solving the problems we face today not only in the environment, but in energy, jobs, defense, inflation and government growth."⁸⁰

The RSC introduction reminded members that their political response should include reference to the impossibility of looking at environmental issues in a vacuum.

While these RSC justifications were useful in home districts, ratings like those of the dirty dozen had a national impact. The counterratings from other business organizations,⁸¹ or from conservative political action committees,⁸² did not have the press appeal which the "dirty dozen" and other ratings had attained from the news media.

In all of these activities, Vote Justifications and Responses, the staff of the RSC was fighting defensive battles. The agenda was established by the liberal organizations, and the conservative activity within the Congress was still basically responsive rather than initiatory.

G. Republican Study Committee Campaign Activities

At this point we consider the activities of the Republican Study Committee in the electoral arena. The prior section illustrated the concerns of the members regarding their own election prospects. Since they had seen a number of their colleagues defeated in the 1974 election, they were particularly concerned about their own electoral prospects in 1976. The Republican party was still recovering from Watergate, and the party was divided between Ford and Reagan as its standard-bearer. This caused many members who had formerly taken their re-election bids for granted, to be more personally involved in this re-election bid.

These considerations were shared by the members with the staff of the Republican Study Committee. Once again, the RSC staff had a model to follow in the form of the DSG's campaign activities. An early activity of the Democratic Study Group had been the establishment of its Campaign Fund. The DSG's campaign organization raised campaign funds which were subsequently disbursed to both incumbent and non-incumbent candidates. While the RSC Campaign Fund was modeled after the DSG counterpart, it would come to play a very different role for the RSC in the short-term future. The RSC Campaign Fund would serve as a publishing vehicle, and an information disseminating service, but it would never really function as a political action committee dispensing campaign funds to candidates. A summary of how the Republican Study Committee decided to follow the lead of their Democratic colleagues in establishing a campaign organization for the RSC follows.

Congressman Melvin Laird edited a volume of essays entitled Conservative Papers in 1964.⁸³ This volume provided a major source of the intellectual framework for the 1964 Goldwater election effort. In 1968, ~~after~~ Laird served as Chairman of the Republican National Platform Committee, he edited a second volume entitled Republican Papers.⁸⁴ Laird had brought a number of prominent academics together with Republican House members to produce these volumes. They were released by a major New York publisher, and widely reviewed in the national news media. This second volume concentrated solely on domestic policy and included chapters which eventually found their way into Nixon's legislative agenda and became law. Ed Feulner, the RSC executive director, had worked for Laird during the production of Republican Papers so, with models like these in mind, he suggested to the members that the Republican Study Committee publish a book of its own in anticipation of the 1976 election. If a new volume could be as successful, it would make a major contribution toward the national legislative agenda and would help identify the Republican Study Committee as the best source for new conservative ideas and initiatives.

The volume would include chapters on major public policy issues, both foreign and domestic. Additionally, Feulner's proposal suggested that the book include positive legislative proposals which had been introduced by RSC members and a full listing of key votes for every member of the House. These positive proposals included RSC legislative goals like welfare and food stamp reform, and in addition to discussing these issues in the text of the book, the co-sponsors of the bills would be indicated in a table at the back of the book. Among the reasons put forth for the publications was the idea that the conservative congressional candidates should run on a common theme:

"It will provide the common theme that is needed by our conservative Republican candidates running throughout the nation. Voters will be made aware that their congressmen, working with like-minded Members all around the country, can make a difference and get things done."⁸⁵

The financial attractiveness of this venture was outlined in a memo to the members which noted how a member-participant could use 3,000 copies within his district, at the modest cost of \$1,500. It was also pointed out that if all 3,000 copies were sold at the suggested price of \$2.00 each, the candidate

would earn \$4,500 for his re-election campaign fund. It was suggested that the book be distributed to campaign workers, donors of \$25.00 or more, district media, and to various interest groups, as well as to individual supporters.

An additional advantage to the book, which had been tentatively negotiated between the RSC staff and the publisher, related to the book cover. While the books would all have the same copy content, they would feature individualized banner headlines on the front cover with the name and title of the chapter of each individual member on his own front cover and his picture on the back. Thus, the chapter on "Welfare Reform Featuring Clair Burgener" would be purchased by Burgener and distributed in his California district. The memo regarding the book was initially distributed to several members of the RSC who then tentatively committed themselves to participate in the project. Among these members was the chairwoman, Marjorie Holt, who would write the foreword to the book and whose name would appear on the cover of every copy.

The subject of the book consumed the entire meeting of the Executive Committee on December 17, 1975. Several members of the House expressed strong reservations about the viability and benefits of the project, as well as the propriety of the Republican Study Committee, per se, publishing the book.⁸⁶ It was decided at this meeting that the title had to be more provocative than "The Republican Study Committee Papers." Congressman Ed Derwinski made the suggestion of "The Case Against the Reckless Congress" as an alternative title. Derwinski specifically warned against using the word "conservative" in the title for fear that it would offend some potential readers who considered themselves "liberal." This point was accepted by both the other members and the RSC staff. An objective of the book was to reach beyond the districts of the participants into non-incumbent districts, and any tactics which would ensure greater exposure in these new areas were encouraged.

After the Executive Committee gave its approval, additional participants were enlisted by the RSC staff. Their chapters were chosen during the next several months, and the writing of the chapters began. The actual writing was done by the RSC in some cases, but by the members and their staffs in most cases. The other Executive Committee members were approached by

the staff as well as members whose interests in particular subjects were known to the staff and who might be interested in participating in the project. This was a delicate process, because some of the non-Executive Committee members who were not approached might resent being excluded from the project. The negotiations among the publisher, the various co-authors, and the editor occupied several members of the RSC staff for the next several months. Because this was a new project each potential participant had to be approached individually with a detailed presentation of the package.

Several members insisted that a disclaimer be inserted in the front of the book so that the coauthors were not bound by what each other stated. While the staff was concerned that this would dilute the impact of the book, it was agreed that such a statement would be made.

The disclaimer proved a useful mechanism for several reasons. Some of the members would not agree with all of the reasons cited by their colleagues for taking a specific position on an issue. The disclaimer gave them an easy way out of collective responsibility. In addition, occasionally, a member would have taken a public position which was out of step with his colleagues.⁸⁷ Actually, the members agreed completely with each other on more than 95% of the votes cited. These were areas of general agreement and the staff was concerned that by having the disclaimer, the reader's impression would be that there was more division than was really the case. However, without the disclaimer, the participants would be open to media and Democratic criticism with charges of inconsistency. Broad agreement on most issues bound the RSC together, but the added disclaimer accepted occasional deviation for local or special interests. In any event, the disclaimer never became a major issue with the members.⁸⁸

The decision to publish The Case Against the Reckless Congress through the mechanism of a newly created campaign fund was made on December 17. The coauthors were enlisted, and the new venture was undertaken. As John Roussetot said later:

"The Study Committee did it, first, because we thought of it; and second, because the Republican National Committee and the Republican Campaign Committee would have to make too many compromises to produce anything like it."⁸⁹

The campaign fund idea had previously been raised by the RSC staff with several members of the Executive Committee, however, for others it was a new concept, and one that required considerable elaboration. The executive director explained the concept of the RSC Campaign Fund to the members relying heavily on the DSG model. This in effect gave the new RSC venture instant credibility, since it was not a totally new concept within the informal congressional structure.

The first role of the RSC Campaign Fund was to be the publishing of the book The Case Against the Reckless Congress. Chairwoman Holt and Feulner were enthusiastic about the book. They both believed, however, that it would be inappropriate for the RSC itself to publish the book. The RSC was a legislative organization serving all of its members, not an electoral organization, and the book had an acknowledged electoral purpose. Because the book would be used extensively during the 1976 political campaigns as a political tool by the incumbent members, as well as by challengers, the executive director advised against co-mingling funds from the sale of the book with funds that the RSC would receive from dues or subscriptions.

Once this argument was accepted, it became clear that an alternative publishing and financing vehicle had to be devised. This was particularly critical because of the disclosure provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. The RSC Campaign Fund was advocated by Crane, Holt, and several others. They argued that any profits which might accrue to the RSC Campaign Fund should not go to the participants in the book project. As Congressman Phil Crane mentioned, "If it were to happen, it would look like we were feathering our own nest."⁹⁰ In lieu of that, the staff suggested that each of the contributing authors would be able to designate a proportionate share of any profits to a non-incumbent candidate of his choice. The coauthor's share would be determined by the number of books which he and his campaign committee purchased. Thus, incentives were established for members to increase the number of books which they purchased so that they could allocate more funds to their allies. In addition, the non-incumbent candidates would appreciate the active support which they were receiving from the RSC's campaign arm, and it was hoped that this would encourage them to become actively involved in the RSC after their election. This suggestion was adopted by the members, and the staff was directed to establish the RSC Campaign Fund.

With the adoption of these suggestions, the challenge became one of technical preparation of the book which was carried out by the RSC senior staff with the assistance of the outside editor and publisher. This was especially important because of the very short deadline for publication of the book and the complications arising from producing different quantities of books with each of the 19 member's own covers. Most of the chapters as well as the key votes and positive programs section were edited by the staff of the Republican Study Committee. Then, these sections were all submitted to an independent editor, under contract to the publisher, to examine the continuity and style of the work.

The voting section was to be of special interest to the members. They knew that the Democrats had been embarrassed by a number of record votes which the conservatives had demanded. In fact, Democratic members of the House had complained about the ability of the Republicans to demand roll call votes on politically sensitive issues. The Republican members of the House, usually led by RSC stalwarts like Rousselot and Bauman, would obtain record votes in increasing the federal debt ceiling, congressional pay raises, and other measures which could have a negative political impact in the Democrat's home district. The political implications of these votes were realized by several liberal members of the House who circulated a "Dear Colleague" letter in June 1975 which stated:

"There should be a decision prior to each day's session as to those votes on which the Democrats will demand a roll call vote (in addition to any roll call requested by a Member). The Republicans seem to know exactly the issues on which to call for a roll call, and those are generally geared to future political use. We should do the same."⁹¹

The Case Against the Reckless Congress provided a good opportunity to make these votes more readily available to the general public.

The book was written, edited, type-set and printed in less than three months. On March 16, a major press conference was held for the book's publication. All of the coauthors participated. Extensive press coverage resulted, including television network news coverage and a four-column story in the Washington Post together with a large picture of Chairwoman Holt and Treasurer Rousselot holding up a copy of the book.⁹² Other stories concerning the book appeared by nationally syndicated columnists John

Chamberlain and Jeffrey St. John. The staff of the RSC made an intensive effort to both market specific chapters geographically, and trade publications dealing with the specific issue area. For example, several gun magazines ran reviews or excerpts from the chapter entitled "The Disarming of the Citizens" by William F. Goodling (R-Pennsylvania). The Rocky Mountain News in Denver, Colorado carried a wire service story about Congressman Bill Armstrong stressing the local theme of Armstrong's involvement in the book. Although the book was conceived and produced in Washington, its success would be determined by its acceptance and use throughout the country as the fall elections approached.

The book proved to play a role in the 1976 congressional campaigns. This can be confirmed from several perspectives. In the first place, the Democratic Study Group bought 300 copies of the book for distribution to their members presumably so they could counter the arguments. A number of Republican challengers bought large quantities of the book for distribution in their own districts.⁹³ Yet, as the final memo on the subject said:

"It was disappointing that more single copies of the book were not purchased as a result of the coupon in the back, and because of the individual appearances and advertisements that we generated on behalf of the book."⁹⁴

Based on advance orders from the members and from conservative political action committees, one hundred and sixty thousand copies of the book were printed. The majority of these copies was distributed for a fee or free by the contributing authors. Only a small number was sold individually, although Congressman Rousselot indicated that he had sold his copies whenever possible "in order to try to recoup the costs."⁹⁵ The financial returns never became as attractive as first projected because single copy sales were small. Occasional radio-talk show appearances or mentions in trade publications would result in a flurry of orders. In all, however, only 2,700 single copies were sold by the RSC Campaign Fund.

After the election, the National Conservative Political Action Committee bought five thousand copies of the book. This enabled the RSC Campaign Fund to make its final payment to the publisher, and thus eliminate its debts. The RSC Campaign Fund ended with a surplus of less than \$1,000 and several boxes of books. The NCPAC staff distributed copies to their donors in December 1976 as a token of the appreciation for their support during the

campaign. And, the 2,700 individual donors who purchased the book became the mailing list for the RSC Campaign Fund.

In retrospect, the idea was considered successful by the participating members. The first book in 1976 has been succeeded by Can We Afford This House?⁹⁶ and View from the Capitol Dome: Looking Right.⁹⁷ The majority of the authors has participated in all three volumes, and the format has remained basically unchanged. The Case Against the Reckless Congress was a new ingredient on the congressional election scene, and it has been useful in some races. However, the initial volume required a great deal of time and effort from the staff and a major commitment from each of the coauthors. While the volume was circulated extensively within the participants' districts, its audience was still limited. It was a useful device for reminding the conservative campaign workers that their congressman was part of the conservative movement in the Congress, but it never successfully reached beyond the already converted to a wider audience. Congressional candidates were selected either in district caucuses or primary elections, therefore, the RSC could not play a role in their selection. However, when incumbent members made the staff aware of conservative candidates, the candidates were contacted and RSC assistance was offered.

During the campaign, the RSC Campaign Fund issued nineteen packages of material for the non-incumbent candidates on pending issues on the House. These weekly packets between May and late October included specific references to votes which occurred the previous week on the House floor. The research for these "Campaign Memorandums" was done by the staff of the RSC. There are restrictions on the use of government facilities for partisan political activities, therefore, the printing and mailing portion of the project was carried out in volunteer quarters located near the federal building complex in order to avoid accusations that it was an improper activity.

These packets of material differed substantially from those distributed by the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee and other campaign organizations. The RSC Campaign Memorandums were useful to candidates because they specifically included House votes on particular issues immediately after they occurred. The official party material was less specific and was not tailored to specific votes.

An additional advantage of the RSC Campaign Fund in the election process of potential members was that it would introduce them to the activities of the RSC. The staff hoped that the candidates would join the group if they were elected. Another means of introduction was to meet with candidates when they visited Washington. Incumbent RSC members were helpful in arranging these sessions. The information packets and meetings prepared the successful candidates for the RSC involvement in member briefing sessions after their election and before their installation as members of the House.⁹⁸

The potential impact of the RSC Campaign Fund can be shown by the success of the DSG and its related campaign fund. The 1974 elections resulted in a number of Democratic successes in what traditionally had been Republican seats. Both the Democratic leadership and the leadership of the DSG realized this. Therefore, in 1976 they launched a "get re-elected" campaign. The DSG's campaign committee sponsored seminars for the newly-elected members which would be used for workshops on how to produce newsletters, along with media coverage and other self-promotion.

"The DSG's Chairman, Rep. Bob Eckhardt (D-Texas) and Executive Director John (sic) Conlan emphasized that the Congressmen not only work hard but appear to do so. This might mean that they must show up for as many of the 1800 votes per session as possible."⁹⁹

Measured on a financial basis, the activities of the RSC Campaign Fund were not as successful as the members wished. While the Campaign Fund did not end up in debt to the publisher for the cost of producing the books, its goal of distributing funds to non-incumbent challengers was never met, and the amount of funds which was carried forward to 1977 was not enough to make the RSC a credible force in the election process. But, a number of newly-elected members expressed their appreciation for the information packages and for the copies of the book which the Campaign Fund had sent them.

In a structural sense, the Campaign Fund was successful because it was established after three years of the RSC's existence, while it took the Democratic Study Group eight years to establish its campaign committee.¹⁰⁰

H. Relations with Outside Organizations

After the 1974 election, the role of the RSC with regard to outside organizations changed. In 1973-74, the RSC had worked on individual legislative battles with specific lobbying groups, but its contacts with outside organizations had never been formalized.

Now that the RSC had received some press attention for its activities, it also received inquiries from outside organizations and companies about its activities and publications. Outside lobbyists were encouraged to learn that there was an organization within the Congress which shared their views on many of the issues. Because of the setbacks which the pro-business representatives had suffered in the 1974 elections, these lobbyists welcomed any opportunities to cooperate with the depleted ranks of their allies in the Congress. The staff perceived that there was a need to formalize the RSC relationship with outside organizations. Until early 1975, the RSC's relationship with outside organizations had been casual.

Based on these earlier contacts, an exchange of publications with several organizations in Washington was arranged. For example, the major business lobbying groups -- including the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce -- made their material available to the staff of the RSC. In turn, they received the RSC publications. Regular meetings were established between the RSC senior staff and the NAM and Chamber's staff. These meetings took place in the downtown headquarters of the business groups. Priority lists of legislative goals were discussed, and specific strategy was worked out where interests coincided with these groups. During these meetings, the business representatives learned of the members' concerns, and the RSC staff explained the amendment strategy which was being considered in the House by the RSC members. Target lists of non-RSC members were also examined to determine where additional votes might be gained for the pro-business viewpoint.¹⁰¹

Based on these casual attempts to reach out to the business representatives, several Washington representatives of major companies asked to buy a subscription to the RSC publications. After brief discussions on two occasions, it was decided by the Executive Committee to allow these outside subscriptions. As the Treasurer of the RSC stated later, "As long as we don't have to sub-

sidize them, and as long as they don't try to order us around, I don't see anything wrong with it."¹⁰² The adoption of this policy gave the staff clear guidelines to follow when requests came in. By the end of 1976, about 65 subscriptions had been sold at \$100 per year to private companies, trade associations, and former members. This list of "outside subscribers" was kept separate from the main membership list. The subscribers were not included in meeting invitations, nor were they given any voice in the operations of the RSC. Their financial support was helpful but it did not play a major role in the Executive Committee's thinking. Rather, the RSC's objective was to share its members' strategy and outlook with others who might cooperate with the RSC in the legislative arena.

The RSC was interacting with its outside allies. While the group might be criticized for accepting business subscriptions, it was viewed as a routine method of cooperation in areas where there was common agreement. In addition, the RSC members were already allied with the business community on most issues. They were not changing their position to suit the business community. As Edith Green, a former Democratic member of the House, said in this context:

"It's popular to say a Member of Congress is owned by a corporation, but this isn't the real problem. If the welfare or legal services people get organized they can swing a congressional election. There are enough of them in every congressional district to swing it."¹⁰³

I. Higher Public Profile

At the time of its founding, the RSC was characterized by both mystery and secrecy. The fear existed that the Republican leadership might consider the members of the Executive Committee as upstarts who were dissatisfied with the status quo. Thus, the RSC Executive Committee specifically prohibited the staff of the RSC from discussing the organization, its officers or related questions with the news media. This policy became impractical after the major involvement of the RSC in legislative issues in 1974, such as the land use battle. In addition, by that time, the RSC had become more respectable enjoying the tacit acceptance of Minority Leader Rhodes and several others. The national media attention which discussed the losses of the RSC in the 1974 elections made it clear that the group could not continue to operate within these media constraints. Therefore, the Executive Committee decided that it was time for the group to seek a higher public profile.

At the member level, almost every individual member of the RSC maintains a staff aide either in his Washington office or district office for relations with the press. This "press assistant" usually works with local media outlets in the congressman's home district on items of local concern. They are seldom involved with national political issues, unless the member has a specific role of influence or importance in the legislative process or is an expert on a pending critical issue. Thus, a Keith Sebelius (R-Kansas) would frequently be quoted in the Kansas media on issues relating to his senior position on the Agriculture Committee. His district was composed of wheat farmers. However, seldom did the Kansas media ask about the land use issue in which Sebelius was also involved because of his position on the Interior Committee. Michael Robinson has described the elements of the press which confront a member of the House as follows:

"...One must remember that the congressional media are a mixture of the national, local and regional press, an in-house press, and an ever growing campaign media."¹⁰⁴

The majority of the members focused on the local press, which left the national and regional media untended. It was this role which the RSC tried to carve out for itself. This could provide helpful local publicity to individual members as leading authorities on national issues. More importantly to the RSC, it would encourage members to run on a common theme and to stand together on some of these issues so as not to be isolated by local opposition.

By early 1975, some national conservative publications were paying attention to the Republican Study Committee as an entity in its own right, as well as to its individual members. For example, The Right Report is a biweekly conservative newsletter. A 1975 issue featured an article on the Republican Study Committee and the Senate Steering Committee outlining the history of the two groups.¹⁰⁵ Articles like this enabled the RSC to build a reputation with outside organizations who would be aware of this availability to work with them on matters of mutual concern. In addition, favorable press attention like this tended to make the members less skeptical about the desirability of increasing the press visibility of the organization as a whole.

The staff of the RSC attempted to convince the members of the desirability of adding a full-time press aide to the staff of the RSC. They argued that legislative initiatives such as the National Food Stamp Reform Act and

the National Welfare Reform Act required coordinated press attention to publicize the work which senior research aides such as David Swoap were carrying out. After several favorable articles about her early tenure at the RSC, Mrs. Holt became convinced that this might be a good direction in which to move. One of these articles was a feature piece on Mrs. Holt entitled "an area legislator emerging as conservative spokesman."¹⁰⁶

Other members continued to take a more traditional view. They had seen a number of their conservative colleagues defeated in 1974 on the "national issue" of Watergate. Most of them had been exempt from criticism by the national news media. Robinson conducted a survey of the House members and the results are apropos:

"In my mail survey of the House, I asked members how fairly they had been treated by the New York Times, the Washington Post, newsweeklies, the wires and the networks. The overwhelming majority, about 75%, said that the national media never seemed to cover them at all."¹⁰⁷

Thus, they perceived that there would be political costs if they were to be linked with other members in ideological issues. Robinson concurs with this evaluation:

"With no news about members getting through other than that which the members themselves control or influence -- with no unfavorable information reaching the public -- House members stay safe."¹⁰⁸

Paul Weyrich, who was instrumental in forming the RSC, has little sympathy with this viewpoint:

"Those members are not good at playing for high stakes. They didn't push for an RSC press man. Thus, they missed opportunity after opportunity to drive their message home. They don't have a positive mental attitude."¹⁰⁹

The favorable press attention surrounding the introduction of the National Welfare Reform Act and other legislative initiatives also assisted in convincing the members of the desirability of moving in this direction. A press person was finally added in June 1975. However, after missing several deadlines, the aide was relieved of his duties.¹¹⁰ He was not immediately replaced because it was difficult to locate qualified individuals for this position. Persons with extensive experience required too great a salary. Those without experience were hard to sell to the members as possessing an unique set of qualifications.

In May 1976, the press aide issue was again raised by the staff to the members. At that time, the staff suggested that press conferences be held in the House press gallery whenever members had items of interest to the press. Thus, if Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) and "Judge" Richard Kelly (R-Florida) would be interested in meeting with the press on the New York City "bail-out" legislation, the RSC staff would be in a position to help make arrangements for them to meet with the press in the House press gallery. Several press conferences like this were arranged with mixed results. The members' staff aides remained unconvinced, particularly because they were unfamiliar with these facilities. The facilities were used by a relatively small number of House members who made themselves available to the electronic media, usually congressmen from major urban areas who had local radio and television crews permanently stationed in Washington. Furthermore, because these were urban stations, they were usually represented by Democratic members of the House.

Of course, the Senate press aides had a different situation. Any senator is news for several reasons: there are fewer of them, areas of expertise are more readily identified, and they are better known nationally. As Senator Jim McClure (R-Idaho), the chairman of the Senate Steering Committee points out:

"The press doesn't bother to identify the important people in the minority. They decide 'who is news.' This rules out the House and especially the House minority members."¹¹¹

While the primary objective of these efforts was to build credibility in the news media for conservative legislative initiatives, occasional feature stories appeared about the RSC itself. One of these was a major feature article in Congressional Quarterly entitled "Right Wing Power." It drew some of the internal Republican differences to the attention of the public. RSC members like Bill Armstrong said, "The Republican Study Committee is the Republican regulars; we are the essence of the party."¹¹² Several others agreed with Armstrong but their view was countered by other Republicans who strongly disagreed with the RSC's ideological emphasis. One of these was Albert Quie (R-Minnesota) who said, "They're out tilting at windmills."¹¹³ A leading Republican moderate, Barber Conable, Jr. (R-New York), said:

"Our right wing is generally the most negative group. They're the party's ideological hard core and nowhere near as large as many people think."¹¹⁴

This was a telling comment because Conable was a senior member on the Ways and Means Committee and because he had been elected as Rhodes' successor to chair the Policy Committee. Yet, Conable's view contrasted with that of another unnamed source:

"The RSG's (sic) members weren't depleted as seriously as some thought two years ago....It's ironic but the group that's getting hardest hit now is the Wednesday Group, the antithesis of the RSG. They've lost 9 of their 36 members to retirements so far this year."¹¹⁵

Thus, in grudging comments by some of the liberals in the party, the expanding role of the RSC was admitted. More importantly, none of the RSC members were as concerned about the appearance of news articles about the RSC as they would have been three years earlier.

Efforts to build press relations were constantly frustrated. As the RSC has continued to grow and expand, it has never developed a coordinated press role for its members. The RSC members have continued to pay primary media attention to their local outlets in their home districts.¹¹⁶ This is partially explained by the large number of House members. In addition, however, it is caused by the strong ties of the member to his congressional district. The member of Congress is primarily a representative of his constituents rather than a representative of an ideological group. As Professor Burnham notes:

"American political parties are essentially constituent parties. That is to say, the political party subsystem is sited in a socio-economic system of very great heterogeneity and diversity....[The American parties are] not a mass movement in the European sense."¹¹⁷

These problems reinforced each other. While a House member might have greater detailed knowledge about the fiscal affairs of New York City, the television interviewer is not looking for great detail. Rather, as Jeffrey St. John said, "I want an expert who can paint with broad brush strokes and make a convincing case without too many numbers which will confuse the viewer."¹¹⁸ This definition tended to exclude most rank and file members of the House. Senator James McClure, chairman of the Senate Steering Committee, summarized the problem for the RSC with less charity:

"The press is basically lazy and they don't ferret out the good people in the House who are experts. House members have to make an extraordinary effort to get press attention compared to the senators."¹¹⁹

McClure's perspective is telling because he served three terms in the House before his election to the Senate in 1972. Even the House Minority Leader finds press coverage difficult to obtain:

"It's a matter of the free press choosing what's news. It's very frustrating for me even now in the leadership."¹²⁰

It was even more frustrating for the rank and file members of the minority party who had to be encouraged to seek out the national media, but then received minimal attention once the effort was made.

J. Respectability as an Institution with its Own Niche Carved Out

The staff of the Republican Study Committee was concerned with the organization's role in the House. While some of its members primarily viewed it as an occasionally helpful speech-writing service, the staff's primary working relationship was with the more active members who believed that the RSC had a substantial role to play in the legislative process. While these members remained a relatively small nucleus of the entire RSC membership, it was their vision and their willingness to cooperate with the staff that would enable the RSC to be viewed as a serious participant in the legislative arena. This search for legislative influence was achieved only slowly. One of the standard reference works on the Congress, Congress: Process and Policy by Professor Ripley,¹²¹ did not even mention the Republican Study Committee in 1975. However, by 1977, Hammond and Fox¹²² listed the Republican Study Committee as a counterpart organization to the Democratic Study Group and the Wednesday Group.

In order to be viewed as a part of the House's institutional structure, the RSC staff sought to perform services which other groups had not already undertaken. Thus, the RSC instituted a series of service programs to other Republican members such as offering cosponsorship opportunities on major RSC legislative initiatives like the RSC food stamp reform bill. Since this bill had Minority Whip Michel as its primary House sponsor, it could draw cosponsors from all elements within the party. Of course, the cosponsorship of the RSC's food stamp reform bill not only helped the individual members.

It helped mark the RSC as a participant in the legislative process, since it enjoyed the active participation of the second most senior member of the party's House leadership.

Besides working with the party on common objectives, the RSC conducted staff seminars. These efforts were undertaken both for their intrinsic merit and because they helped the RSC gain a credible identity in the legislative process. This was an important step toward recognition for the Republican Study Committee. It was a continuing process which attracted the attention of the senior staff and members when press relations, officer selection and many other questions arose. Mrs. Holt, the RSC's chairwoman from 1975 to 1976, said in retrospect:

"When I started as chairwoman, there seemed to be a need to provide respectability. By the end of my two-years [as chairwoman], the RSC was probably the strongest force in the Republican party."¹²³

While this may be an overstatement, there is substantial evidence that the RSC was stronger in late 1976 than in early 1975. Some of the steps in the movement seemed small when viewed in isolation. However, as a pattern, they showed the many efforts which were undertaken to make the RSC a "respectable" organization within the framework of the highly structured House of Representatives.

Budget Process Seminar

The implementation of the Congressional Budget Reform Act was to give the Congress a new mechanism of control over federal spending. The law provided for a new Congressional Budget Office and for new Budget committees in both the House and the Senate. A new set of procedures was imposed on the Congress with specific target dates set by the law and a complicated set of relationships with the other congressional committees.¹²⁴ With the enactment of these new procedures, it was important that both the Republican members and their staff aides understand how the new process worked. As the new process began, the RSC provided information to the staff in their member offices. On April 5, 1975, at the regular legislative briefing, Hyde Murray, the Minority Counsel of the Committee on Agriculture, spoke on "The Budget Process and How We Should be Using it."¹²⁵ As a result of that meeting and because of the positive response from staff aides, Murray was invited to meet with the RSC's Executive Committee the following week.

After that meeting several RSC members noted that neither they nor their staff possessed the expertise for dealing with the new process. This problem was discussed with the RSC senior staff who in turn spoke with Murray and suggested that he conduct a series of meetings for the benefit of minority staff aides both in RSC member offices and in the formal committees.

After making phone calls to leadership offices, it was determined that no element of the official party structure was willing to sponsor and organize such a series of meetings. The minority staff on the Budget Committee was teaching the committee's own Republican members the process. No one else in the leadership wanted to take the time to prepare a schedule, arrange the speakers, and extend the invitations. Therefore, a senior research associate of the RSC, David Swoap, circulated a notice to the RSC member offices and senior staff aides on the committee about a seminar series on the budget process. This was to be:

"a course to be offered by the Republican Study Committee for minority legislative assistants and committee personnel wishing an in-depth understanding of the new budget process and its implications for legislative decision making."¹²⁶

The four regular members of the "faculty" were Swoap, Murray, Melvin Miller, the Legislative Counsel to Minority Leader Rhodes, and Tom McMurray, the Legislative Director to the Minority Whip. In addition, a group of eight visiting lecturers from the Budget Committee, the Congressional Budget Office, the Library of Congress and other offices participated in the 10-day seminar. The seminar was well-attended with 32 participants. Of these, only 12 were from RSC member offices, 5 from the RSC staff, and 15 from minority committee staffs. As the legislative director of the RSC noted later:

"We were pleased to offer the course to all of the Republican offices within the House because it cast the RSC in a new role. We were no longer invading their turf; we were now giving them practical assistance."¹²⁷

The attendance at the weekly seminar sessions remained high, and the entire series was well-received by the "students." At the conclusion of the seminar in July 1975, the participants received certificates. Personal letters from Chairwoman Holt were sent to each of the employers commending them for having their staff aides participate in the program.

Besides increasing the awareness of the budget process, this series also increased the stature of the RSC's role in dealing with the minority staff counsels of the House committees.

Research Directory and Research Guide

During the congressional recesses, the senior staff of the Republican Study Committee occasionally had time available to engage in longer-range projects. Articles for general circulation magazines could be written, preliminary work on major issue papers for the next congressional session could be instituted, or projects of a long-range nature could be undertaken for the RSC. During the post-1974 election break the Republican Study Committee published A Research Guide in Public Policy¹²⁸ for the RSC member offices and subscribers. In addition, key conservative media personnel and members of the Executive Branch were given copies of the guide which included not only a bibliography of articles, but also a listing of institutions, public policy texts, and journals in politics, economics, and national security affairs. The project was undertaken because of the critical role which outside documentation could play in the legislative process. As Allen Schick wrote, "As the most pluralistic of institutions, Congress must draw analytic sustenance from many sources, most of which will continue to be non-legislative."¹²⁹ The annotated bibliography, edited by senior research associate Robert Schuettinger, took many months to prepare. The volume provided a useful introduction to the scholarly literature with which most members and their staff aides were not familiar. While this project was well received, it was never again updated. The time constraints on the staff, together with other more immediate projects, prohibited the RSC from revising it.

A related but more successful project was the Research Directory.¹³⁰ Again, the RSC filled a need which had previously been unmet. The Directory was designed to be a companion to the Research Guide. It contained the names of 400 Washington-based individuals who had expertise in particular areas. They were listed not only by their formal affiliations (place of employment), but also cross-indexed according to subject. The names included conservative congressional staff aides in the House and Senate, Washington lobbyists, and academics in the Washington area. Because many members' staff aides submitted a listing of their own areas of expertise, and because some of these individuals were known to be modestly knowledgeable, these listings were not entirely accurate. The Research Directory did prove to be

a useful document though, and it was updated and expanded in June 1976. The new version consisted of 31 pages with a more detailed index and an additional number of experts listed. The areas of expertise were reviewed more carefully and spurious claims were eliminated. A third edition appeared in February 1977, with 50 additional names. Many changes were made between each edition because of the high rate of personnel turnover in Washington. Members' staff aides would frequently tell the RSC staff about additional personnel who should be included in the Directory. This publication was useful to the members and their key staff aides, as well as to the RSC staff in arranging their Monday briefing series and in expanding contacts on specific issues.

These occasional publications not only helped the RSC build an identity as an unique source of information about people, books, and issues, it also helped to enhance the credibility of the entire organization within Congress.

The Republican Platform Committee at the Republican National Convention

The Platform Committee of the Republican National Convention meets one week before the formal opening of the convention. During that time, a committee of the elected delegates to the national convention also serves as members of the Platform Committee. They are designated as committee members by their state delegations, and one man and woman from each state and territory serve on the committee.

The 1976 Republican Platform was a new approach to writing a party platform in several respects. Firstly, there was no working draft. The Platform Committee staff had prepared background papers for the subcommittees' consideration, but there was no common base from which to start. Secondly, all of the drafting in the subcommittees was held in open rather than closed sessions. Finally, with both the incumbent President, Gerald Ford, and his challenger, former Governor Ronald Reagan, in a close contest to lead the Republican ticket, the make-up of the Platform Committee and the final platform that would emerge were of concern to both factions.

The split within the Republican Study Committee between Reagan and Ford supporters was not principally an ideological question. Both candidates were at least moderate conservatives.¹³¹ Practical politics dictated the

choice to some members. Ed Derwinski expressed the strong view that you do not abandon an incumbent leader. Phil Crane actively campaigned around the nation for Reagan. Bill Armstrong waited until the last minute in Kansas City before he became the only Colorado delegate to support Ford. Marjorie Holt and David Treen supported Ford, while Bob Bauman and Bill Ketchum opted for Reagan. In all, the majority of the RSC members stood with their former House colleague, Ford. Clearly, the Ford team was better organized in Kansas City. For example, Platform Chairman Ray was a Ford supporter as were the majority of subcommittee chairmen.

As a companion effort to The Case Against the Reckless Congress and the RSC's activities with regard to the "Republican Legislative Agenda," several Republican Study Committee members attempted to make a major input in the Platform Committee process. In prior years, the Platform Committee has been chaired by House members. Melvin Laird (1964) and John Rhodes (1972) preceded Governor Ray in 1976 as chairman. Active involvement in the platform process was a prestigious national forum for House Republican members.

Several members of the RSC were advised by the appointed chairman, Ray, that they would be appointed to subcommittee chairmanships on the Platform Committee. The RSC chairwoman, Marjorie Holt, was appointed chairman of the "Subcommittee on Governmental Concerns and the Consent of the Governed." This broad subcommittee considered general issues like privacy legislation and federal-state relations, and was considered the closest the committee came to dealing with philosophical issues. RSC Executive Committee member David Treen was elected vice chairman of the Subcommittee on Peace, Security and Foreign Policy, and several other RSC members served on economic and social subcommittees.

At Platform Committee meetings early in 1976, Mrs. Holt and other RSC members volunteered the services of senior staff of the RSC to participate in drafting the platform. This offer was made with the concurrence of other members of the RSC who realized that much of the critical work on the party platform would be done by staff, who would prepare working papers on behalf of the subcommittees.

Thus, both Ed Feulner, the executive director, and David Swoap, the senior research associate in welfare issues, were officially designated as staff members of the Republican Platform Committee. Swoap served as the assistant director of the Human Resources Subcommittee, while Feulner served as staff director for the Subcommittee on Conservation, Energy and Environment. A third subcommittee staff director was Richard Prendergast who served as Mrs. Holt's administrative assistant. He served as the staff director of her Subcommittee on Governmental Concerns. As a result, the RSC had substantial direct input into three of the seven platform subcommittees. The staff was responsible for drafting the final document as well as arranging for witnesses to testify, insuring that press contact for the subcommittee was maintained and that a unified document would be hammered out.

Publication of the Republican Platform followed the Democratic Platform by several weeks. It was to be presented as a contrast to the Democratic document. The Republican Platform was generally more pro-development and more free-market oriented than the Democrats' platform. The impact of the RSC staff was evident throughout the platform. The environment and natural resources section included statements referring specifically to land use planning directly attributable to the involvement of the RSC executive director and his knowledge of this matter. The Human Resources section endorsed the basic premises of the Curtis-Duncan Welfare Reform measure, a bill drafted by RSC staff aide David Swoap. In addition, planks in favor of tax reduction rather than tax increases to eliminate the federal deficit -- the Kemp bill -- were key to the platform, again largely as a result of initiatives brought about either through the Rhodes package of alternatives, or by earlier RSC members' proposals.

The platform was written and adopted before the delegates made their decision between Ford and Reagan and consequently had to be acceptable to both groups within the party. This did not mean major compromise to special interest pressure groups. As Jeffrey Pressman notes in his discussion of the 1976 Republican Convention, "The Republican Party is not an interest group party."¹³² Thus, the accommodations which had to be made or the trade-offs which had to be exchanged were relatively minor. As another observer said, the 1976 platform "was a fairly conservative document, quite representative of the conservative leanings of the convention delegates."¹³³ The RSC staff was among the sources of input for the platform, but their role did not make the document conservative. As Professor Weinberg points out,

the platform was a reflection of the delegates themselves. However, the activities of the RSC staff in support of its members at Kansas City were helpful in two ways. Firstly, it showed the members the professional caliber of the staff. That the RSC staff members were placed in key positions of responsibility for this major effort when the RSC was an unofficial organization, helped enhance the organization's stature within the House. Secondly, it helped make other Republicans from all over the United States aware of the RSC.¹³⁴ The staff moved to further reinforce this by sending a copy of The Case Against the Reckless Congress to each delegate after the convention closed.

K. Attempts to Establish the National Security Research Group

One of the projects which the staff of the RSC and several of its members attempted to develop was to establish a counter group to the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law (MCPL).

Members of Congress for Peace Through Law had been established as an ad hoc group of liberal members interested in national security affairs. MCPL members actively opposed U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, favored cutbacks in military spending, and generally supported positions opposite those of the members of the Republican Study Committee. Since MCPL was both bi-cameral and bi-partisan, it played a unique role which neither the Republican Study Committee nor the Senate Steering Committee could play. A number of senior staff aides and members hoped to emulate the success of the MCPL by establishing their own counter group among conservative members. Such a group would coordinate the efforts of the conservative members in this arena who were in disarray since the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Modelled after MCPL, such a group would be constructed on a bi-partisan basis. While domestic issues were frequently fought along partisan lines, foreign policy concerns were primarily ideological rather than partisan. Thus, the members believed that their activities in this regard would more appropriately be conducted in a bi-partisan organization.

The preliminary discussions took place among the staff and the Executive Committee members of the RSC at a meeting on March 26, 1976.¹³⁵ When the groundwork had been laid by Mrs. Holt and the senior staff, Robert Schuettinger of the RSC staff contacted appropriate House Republican and

Democratic members to determine their interest in joining such a group. Among those interested were Congressmen Jack Kemp and Sam Stratton (D-New York). These two members of the House jointly signed a Dear Colleague letter, together with Mrs. Holt and Congressmen Ed Derwinski, David Satterfield (D-Virginia) and Joe Waggoner (D-Louisiana). This was an invitation to a group of members of the House to participate in an informal breakfast meeting with Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. The invitation list included members of the Republican Study Committee and the Democratic Research Organization, the ad hoc group of conservative Democrats. Congressman Satterfield was the current chairman of the DRO, and Congressman Waggoner was its past chairman.

The meeting with Secretary Schlesinger was scheduled to take place on April 6, 1976. However, at the last minute, his attendance was cancelled. Since the members were already assembled, Kemp and Stratton took this opportunity to discuss their plans for the National Security Research Group. They informed the members of the extent of MCPL activities, and indicated their desire to coalesce in a counterpart group. There was generally a positive response from the members, although they did not elect officers, offer salary support or otherwise commit themselves to participate in this meeting. Kemp and the RSC staff decided to move ahead with the basic requirements for the new group.

The RSC staff paid for letterhead to be printed, and loaned the NSRG a staff person and office space in the House Office Building Annex. The embryonic organization began by preparing fact sheets on the defense budget. Stratton and Kemp agreed to serve as co-chairmen of the group which "hoped to fill a role similar to, though different from, Members of Congress for Peace Through Law."¹³⁶ Areas of concern included the size of the defense budget, U.S.-Soviet relations, especially in the strategic arena, and the future of the NATO alliances.

Early publications from the NSRG included those published by outside organizations. For example, the first was Arms, Men and Military Budgets, Issues for Fiscal Year 1977, edited by William Schneider, Jr. and Francis P. Hoerber.¹³⁷ Included with this publication was the announcement:

"The NSRG hopes to alert members and their staffs to the variety and nature of studies from experts who share our concern with recent trends in U.S. and foreign defense policies."¹³⁸

Other smaller scale meetings were held on subjects such as an analysis of the Italian elections by an Italian newspaper correspondent. And later, Secretary Schlesinger appeared before members of the organization with more than 40 members of Congress participating in the meeting. In addition to its meetings, the NSRG began to publish a newsletter each week when the Congress was in session. It included a section on current foreign policy and another section analyzing the major long-range studies being issued by various groups.

The NSRG issued its own series of vote justifications on 34 key bills in the 94th Congress. This volume was distributed on September 26, 1976, to each "member" of the NSRG and to every member of the RSC and DRO who had not yet attended an NSRG meeting or briefing. A "member" of the NSRG was considered to be any congressman who signed a sheet indicating his interest in the group and no obligation was incurred by receiving the NSRG material. Despite the lack of any bylaws, dues, or formal structure, the NSRG staff was in place with the NSRG staff director still being funded through the Republican Study Committee.

However, during the course of 1976, both Kemp and Stratton lost interest in the NSRG activities, and the other members did not rank it as a high priority in their range of activities. Their own re-election efforts, together with an emphasis on domestic issues, combined to cause interest in the NSRG to wane. In addition, personality issues were a frequent source of tension. As Ed Derwinski said:

"The Democrats just didn't want to take a strong stand. On our side, Kemp wanted to be the quarterback on every play....We had a few temporary alliances but it just didn't stick."¹³⁹

Derwinski further noted that "MCPL was more active because it was easier to organize the liberals."¹⁴⁰

Retrospectively, the NSRG was formed two years too early. By 1978, a new group was formed, the "Coalition for Peace Through Strength" with the support of the American Security Council. The ASC is a private non-

governmental organization which advocates a strong national defense to its several million voluntary members. With the support of the ASC, the Coalition quickly enlisted 240 congressmen and 35 senators from both parties as its members. Structured even more loosely than the NSRG had been, the Coalition issues occasional press releases but does little to influence members directly.

L. Briefing Sessions for Newly-Elected Members

The 1976 elections did not mark a major comeback for the House Republicans. Walter Dean Burnham recounts:

"Of the 74 supposedly vulnerable Democratic freshmen elected in the Watergate landslide of 1974, only 3 lost their seats. Indeed, of all 267 incumbents in the non-Southern states, only 11 (4.1%) lost their seats."¹⁴¹

However, with new Republicans replacing the Republican retirees and the handful of Republicans who succeeded Democrats, the decision was made to conduct another orientation for the newly-elected members. Under the leadership of Paul Weyrich's Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, a conservative political action committee, a two-day program was planned for November 30-December 1, 1976. All of the new members were invited by the heads of a number of conservative organizations both inside the Congress and outside to attend and participate in the program. A joint telegram of invitation was dispatched on the day after the elections. The two principal signers of the telegram were Marjorie Holt, chairwoman of the Republican Study Committee and James McClure, chairman of the Senate Steering Committee. The RSC portion of the program was to be a key element including the principal discussion on "How the Hill Really Operates."¹⁴²

The program was designed to precede the official Freshmen Republican Orientation Conference which was being held immediately following the conservative conference. The original agenda for the official Republican conference had included a brief opportunity for the RSC and the Wednesday Group to make a presentation to the newly-elected members. However, after the election, the Wednesday Group declined to participate. Its staff director noted that membership in the Wednesday Group was by invitation only, and that the organization did not need to solicit members in the same manner as the Republican Study Committee. Because the Minority Leadership did

not want to give the conservative RSC an "unfair advantage" over the liberal Wednesday Group, this part of the program was cancelled. Thus, the independent conservative program became even more important. It would provide the only opportunity to emphasize the importance of the ad hoc ideological legislative groups within the House to the new members.

The RSC staff was concerned that the Freshmen Republican Orientation Conference would include only heavy messages from the leadership which still tended to be somewhat skeptical of the overall value of factions such as the RSC. It could be expected that the leadership meeting would encourage party loyalty among the new members rather than ideological activity through the RSC.

The invitations which the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress extended were sent to all 22 newly-elected House Republicans. Even though three of them were liberals who undoubtedly would not come, it was thought that they should be offered the opportunity to participate in this program if they desired to do so. The conference attracted half of the new members. Both the chairwoman and the executive director of the Republican Study Committee gave presentations and met informally with the newly-elected House members.

In related activities, a joint letter was sent to all of the newly-elected Republican members of the House and Senate from Senator McClure and Congresswoman Holt urging them to use the facilities of the Senate Steering Committee and the Republican Study Committee to interview potential employees for their staffs and to take advantage of the prescreened resumes which the RSC staff had available. Since these groups depended on the good will of the member offices for their existence and payroll funding, it was particularly important that the groups have friends in the member offices who were sympathetic to their objectives. As a companion effort, a memorandum was addressed to existing members of the RSC alerting them to the availability of these prescreened resumes for filling staff vacancies. A difficulty in hiring staff was that the constant flow of job seekers possessed uneven skill levels and held varying philosophical beliefs. By interviewing candidates, and verifying office skills such as typing, the RSC staff made the preliminary sorting process much easier for both the members-elect and the incumbents. Both competence and philosophy were examined in these interviews. While the selection process

of the political structure meant that liberal staff aides tended to seek employment with liberal members, it was not unheard of for individuals to de-emphasize their political preference if they were seriously seeking employment in an office with a different orientation.

The personnel services were used to different degrees by the member offices. The RSC senior staff attempted to make contact through current members who were likely to be in contact with the newly-elected members. All other means to assure that the staffs of the new members would be sympathetic to the objectives of the RSC were also used. Individuals who had been referred by the RSC were hired by nine of the new members. This attention to staff detail would help recruit the new members as dues-paying members of the RSC as soon as they were sworn in early in 1977.

M. The RSC as a Stepping-Stone

With the conclusion of the 94th Congress, Marjorie Holt announced her intention to retire as chairwoman and instead to run for chairwoman of the Republican Research Committee.

The Republican Research Committee is the lowest ranking group of the official House Republican party structure. The election of its chairman was held as part of the other party leadership elections which were held on Monday, December 8, 1976, immediately following the leadership's formal orientation conference for new members. The importance of the ad hoc conservative briefing was significant to maximize Mrs. Holt's exposure to the new members. Her efforts to gain this position included the circulation of two "Dear Colleague" letters by her RSC colleagues on her behalf.

Mrs. Holt was defeated in her efforts by William Frenzel (R-Minnesota), a moderate member of the Republican party. While Frenzel had occasionally worked with the RSC on specific issues, his voting record was not as conservative as Mrs. Holt's. The reason put forth for the Holt defeat was "the need for balanced leadership."¹⁴³ The majority of the House leadership positions were occupied by conservatives, and the only other moderate or liberal in the party leadership was John Anderson who served as chairman of the Republican Conference. It was understandable that the leadership

preferred Frenzel to Holt. Frenzel was a team player within the Republican party who had led the House party on several issues relating to the election process. Mrs. Holt, on the other hand, was a renegade who had served as the leader of the group which occasionally was an annoyance to the formal leadership. For her to use the RSC as a stepping stone to gain entry into the formal leadership would have been unacceptable to Minority Leader Rhodes. Holt's coming to power through an "unofficial route," the RSC, did not involve working with the current leadership, and this path to a formal leadership position would have established a dangerous precedent. With these factors in mind, it was not surprising that the leadership informally expressed their preference for Frenzel. But when Bob Michel, a dues-paying, salary-supporting member of the RSC's Executive Committee, took the rostrum of the Republican Conference to second Frenzel's nomination, the intensity of the leadership's viewpoint became apparent to all of the members.

The Holt-Frenzel election was reminiscent of the 1962 battle between Carl Albert (D-Oklahoma) and Richard Bolling (D-Missouri) for the position of Majority Leader. In that race, Bolling had a more liberal voting record than Albert. Yet, many members of the DSG supported Albert for other reasons. As Mark Ferber states:

"It is fairly clear that in this instance the Study Group did not relate the outcome of the race for Majority Leader to its own power position within the House nor to the possibilities for moving legislation favored by the Group."¹⁴⁴

The result of the Holt-Frenzel election and Bob Michel's role in it was a setback to Mrs. Holt. Michel minimized the ideological factor in his pro-Frenzel speech:

"Margie [Mrs. Holt] never asked for my help. She never even asked me to vote for her. I believe every candidate for party office should make a pitch to everyone. Besides, Frenzel called and asked both for my vote and for me to support him with a seconding speech."¹⁴⁵

Some Republican members had viewed the RSC as helpful to the leadership. One member said:

"We play a useful role for Rhodes and Michel in their dealings with the White House. It gives them an out for taking a more conservative line, especially on social issues."¹⁴⁶

While Michel discounted the philosophical split by noting that "Frenzel wasn't that bad...,"¹⁴⁷ his activity gave the RSC members a signal that they were not completely accepted by the party establishment.

N. Conclusion

The years 1975 and 1976 were difficult ones for the Republican Study Committee. Membership had decreased because of the 1974 elections, and the members who did return tended to be more concerned with constituent problems. This was understandable considering that the members who returned did so with reduced electoral support. This was combined with the member's own view that the House Republicans, in general, had been rendered less effective by the election results. With regard to the RSC, Ed Derwinski expressed the universal view of its members and staff aides when he said, "The RSC would have done a lot better in 1975 and '76, if we had done better in November 1974."¹⁴⁸ The re-election of individual House members was not separated from the top of the ticket in 1974.¹⁴⁹ The impeachment of the Republican President, Richard M. Nixon, was a major issue for the conservative Republican candidates in many of their races. The addition of this negative factor caused those members facing a re-election bid to concentrate on their electoral activities and to treat the party's policy activities with a great deal of skepticism. Schick says that the "Congress is not a natural habitat for policy analysis."¹⁵⁰ This viewpoint is reinforced by other political scientists who emphasize the concern of the incumbent on re-election even when considering legislative issues. For example, Mayhew believes that:

"re-election underlies everything else, as indeed it should if we are to expect that the relation between politicians and public will be one of accountability."¹⁵¹

Yet the RSC's role was not primarily electoral, but was rather policy-related.

If the momentum which the young organization had established in 1973-1974 was not to be lost, it became clear to the staff and the handful of involved members that the RSC had to change the psychological perception which faced the Republican House members. This was done on a multi-track basis. Closer relations were established with the formal leadership and the Republican White House. New services were provided, and new contacts were developed with outside organizations. Interest groups play an important role in the U.S. political process,¹⁵² and the ability of the Republican Study Committee to relate more directly to these groups expanded the RSC's influence. This influence was later developed in a more formal manner.¹⁵³

While the legislative agenda was being established to an even greater extent by the Democratic leadership, the threat of a presidential veto made the House Republicans into a credible force. The pressures which the RSC provided on both the House Republican leadership and their own President enabled the Republicans to act cohesively to thwart many of the legislative goals of the liberals. This was the same role which the Democratic Study Group had played for the liberal ideology in the Kennedy era:

"By articulating liberal goals in the most forceful manner possible, they [the DSG members] provided leverage for the President and Speaker when those two were negotiating with more conservative forces."¹⁵⁴

At the same time that the RSC worked with the Republican President, House leadership and party, it also had to carve out its own unique niche. This involved a delicate act of probing, filling vacuums when they appeared, and cooperating. Some of the efforts succeeded; others did not. As one of the founders of the RSC noted:

"Every group pulls for its own interests and marshals whatever support it can at whatever cost. The RSC didn't establish this or even contribute to it -- rather the RSC recognized the current reality."¹⁵⁵

In many of these non-legislative activities, the staff of the Republican Study Committee was attempting to build a base of support among its members. This would be helpful when a commitment was required by the RSC in a legislative battle. This role is discussed by Professors Jewell and Patterson when they note that "the responsiveness of the legislature to demands is likely to be in some measure proportional to the support offered or expected."¹⁵⁶ The RSC's assistance was only one form of support which the members received, but it was designed to be a significant one. The rise of the Republican Study Committee from the setback of 1974 did not gain the approval of all elements within the Republican party:

"The growing size and assertiveness of the Study Committee worry some moderate Republicans, who believe that some of its members place greater pride in their conservative credentials than their Republican label."¹⁵⁷

As one reporter commented:

"House and Senate conservatives are unquestionably far better organized on an extra-party basis than they have been in the past, but they face a situation in which the liberals are

also well organized on a extra-party basis and in which, with the passing of the senior Southern Democrats from the scene, doctrinaire liberalism has seized the ideological ascendancy within the Democratic Caucus."¹⁵⁸

In conjunction with the services and activities discussed in this chapter, the RSC also carried out a full-scale legislative agenda in 1975-1976 as detailed in Chapter VII. Despite their organizational efforts and legislative activities, by the 1976 elections, the RSC was facing an even more formidable challenge than it had when it was formed. Although the Democrats had gained only one seat in the House, the liberals remained in control of the House Democrats, and the Republican President, Gerald Ford, had been defeated by the Democratic candidate, Jimmy Carter. By this time, the RSC had passed beyond the stage of an experiment and become a part of the institutional framework of the House of Representatives.

VII. CASE STUDIES (1975-1976)

A. Introduction

The legislative activities of the Republican Study Committee during the 94th Congress were primarily limited and primarily defensive. Having suffered substantial losses in the 1974 general elections, the legislative strategy was no longer an objective of assembling a coalition of 218 votes (218 is the majority of the House's 435 members). Instead, holding actions were required. These often depended on Presidential vetoes and close work with the Republican White House which usually meant a close relationship with the Republican leadership in the House. As has been shown in Chapter VI, the relationship of the new group to the leadership was slowly evolving. This was exhibited on projects of mutual interest to both groups.

For several reasons, the tensions between the Republican leadership and the RSC exhibited in 1973-1974 were largely gone. Firstly, the RSC had proven that it could work responsibly with the leadership on issues and projects of mutual interest. Secondly, the leadership was generally on the same side of the issue as the RSC's Executive Committee. This "pressure from the right" was helpful in offsetting the more vocal but less representative pressure from the Wednesday Group on the left. Thirdly, the Ford Administration was less likely to propose major programs of a radical nature -- like the Family Assistance Plan -- which had been the hallmark of much of the Nixon Administration. And finally, with Republican numbers so depleted, it was clear that efforts had to be undertaken for the good of all the minority members.

Despite these circumstances, the Republican Study Committee did attempt to carry out positive legislative activities when it could develop the expertise to do so. Specifically, the National Welfare Reform and Food Stamp Acts of 1975 were trend-setting measures which the RSC's staff capability enabled it to carry out effectively. These positive alternative legislative programs were an indication that the RSC was maturing. Specifically, the shared staff was developing what Michael Malbin has called "entrepreneurial" characteristics:

"The entrepreneurial staff is partisan by definition....[Its purpose is] to seek new legislative issues, or new approaches to old issues.... [They are entrepreneurial] suggesting that they develop a 'product,' which is then 'marketed' to a potential 'buyer'."¹

As will be shown in this chapter, the addition of a senior staff aide to work on food stamp and welfare reform measures injected a heavy emphasis of entrepreneurial activity into the Republican Study Committee's operation.

That the years 1975-1976 did not bring major legislative victories to the RSC should not be a surprise. On the contrary, what is noteworthy is that the RSC did play a major role in a number of legislative battles which stopped "bad" legislation from being enacted. This negative role was caused by the smaller number and limited capabilities of the RSC, yet it was an important role for the embryonic group which had managed not only to survive its severe losses in 1974, but also to rebound in 1975 and 1976.

B. National Welfare Reform Act of 1975

The introduction of the National Welfare Reform Act of 1975 highlighted the positive programs of the Republican Study Committee during the 94th Congress. This represented coordinated activities between the House and Senate, and marked the emergence of the RSC as a serious legislative resource with new ideas and credible staff expertise. It provided the membership with services which none of them could have performed on their own. Finally, it enabled the membership to be "in favor of something," rather than being cast in the role of opposition to virtually every pending bill. All of these were justifications for a major RSC initiative at any time. But none were achieved as successfully in other legislative efforts as they were in the National Welfare Reform Act of 1975.

The first necessary ingredient in the process of introducing the National Welfare Reform Act of 1975 was the addition of the right staff person to the RSC to carry out the appropriate research. This was made possible through a meeting which Congressman Clair Burgener (R-California) arranged between Ed Feulner, the executive director of the RSC, and David Swoap. Swoap had previously served as the Director of Benefit Payments in the State of California's Welfare Department under Governor Ronald Reagan. Following Reagan's retirement in January 1975, Swoap was offered several opportunities to pursue his specific area of expertise. With the Republican White House, and with Reagan having been succeeded by a Democrat in California, he decided to leave Sacramento and come to Washington. While

looking in Washington, he had interviews with and was eventually offered jobs from both the Executive and Legislative Branches of the government. Swoap was the personification of the entrepreneurial staff member. As David Price has introduced the term, it involves a shared set of interests between the member and the staff aide. The role of the entrepreneurial staff aide is to work with well-chosen issues which key members can make "their own" in the legislative process. Swoap's expertise made him an ideal entrepreneurial staff member for the Republican Study Committee.²

In discussions among the executive director and several senior members of the RSC, the possibility of adding Swoap to the staff was considered. Swoap would bring the RSC recognized expertise in specific areas. Clair Burgener was among the most enthusiastic members for hiring Swoap. As Swoap later recounted, "The RSC wanted to gain recognition in a specific issue area where the members would be in substantial agreement. I thought I could help."³ Indeed, he would help. As Malbin points out in his recent book on congressional staff: "The trick around here is (1) hiring good people and (2) unleashing them."⁴

Despite Swoap's large salary requirement, and with the encouragement of Congressmen Burgener, Rousselot (R-California) and Goldwater (R-California) who had worked with him during his Reagan administration days, the RSC offered Swoap the position of senior research associate. Although he had received several other offers, he accepted the RSC position because "I hoped it would give me the flexibility to work on specific projects, and I would not have to track too many bills of only marginal significance."⁵ He joined the staff of the RSC in late January 1975. In meetings with the staff of the RSC and the Executive Committee, it was decided that Swoap's first activity should be to prepare a complementary bill which would achieve significant savings and reallocation of welfare to the truly needy. This bill, once presented on a federal level, would complement the work which had already been done by Ronald Reagan in California, Nelson Rockefeller in New York, Arch Moore in West Virginia and others on the state-wide level.

Savings and program improvement could be achieved in a number of different programs, including AFDC (Aid for Dependent Children), the Food Stamp Program, Medicaid, and Supplementary Security Income. Swoap was assigned the task of developing alternatives in these four broad areas.

Swoap began working on the first measure -- AFDC -- before he arrived permanently in Washington on February 18, 1975. He met with the Executive Committee at its regular weekly meeting to give a status report on his welfare reform suggestions on February 24.⁶ By February 26, draft legislation was being prepared in the Office of Legislative Counsel, based on Swoap's specific recommendations. On that same date, a letter was sent from the chairwoman, Marjorie Holt (R-Maryland), to all of the RSC members enclosing a basic information packet about the "National Welfare Reform Act of 1975."⁷ She also invited the members and their staff aides to a series of four briefings in late February and early March on the provisions of the bill.

The basic objectives of the legislation were as follows:

1. To provide assistance only to those entitled by need to receive it. This was to be determined by a specific "means test" which would be more stringent than the existing standards.
2. To provide sufficient aid to the truly needy by reallocating funds to those at the lowest end of the income scale.
3. To operate the system within the limits of public resources by cutting back the total level of expenditures.
4. To prevent fraudulent abuse of the system.
5. To implement a work program which would provide incentives for recipients to find employment and leave the system.⁸

Swoap held the four briefing sessions, and more than 50 Republican members were in attendance; more than 25 became co-sponsors of the bill.⁹

The specific language of the bill was made available to the members on March 10 at the legislative briefing and at the Executive Committee meeting. By March 13, a meeting of the members' press aides was held in order to encourage their active participation in the forthcoming major press conference.¹⁰

At the Executive Committee meeting on March 10, 1975, the executive director was asked to arrange a meeting between Mrs. Holt and the leading conservative Democrats, including Joe Waggoner (D-Louisiana) and David Satterfield (D-Virginia). As a result of their meeting on March 12, 1975, both Waggoner and Satterfield joined as co-sponsors of the National Welfare

Reform Act. They directed Bob Pitner, the staff director of the Democratic Research Organization of which Satterfield was the chairman, to send out briefing notices for a special Friday, March 14, meeting for the DRO members and staff on the National Welfare Reform Act. It was the hope of the Republican members that with two leading conservative Democrats already signed up, a number of others would follow.

At this same time, a meeting between Governor Reagan and the Senate Finance Committee was held. This meeting held on March 10 drew 13 senators, including the chairman, Russell Long (D-Louisiana). Swoap and HEW Welfare Commissioner Robert Carleson, who formerly held a comparable position in Reagan's California administration, accompanied Reagan for the technical briefing of the committee on the California approach to welfare reform. The objective of this briefing was to interest some members of the Senate in introducing a companion bill in the Senate. By a mutual decision of the Executive Committees of the Senate Steering Committee and the House Republican Study Committee, it was decided that the March 18 press conference would include only House members, rather than include members from both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

The Executive Committee decided that the March 18 press meeting would have as its primary speakers co-sponsoring members from the Ways and Means Committee including John Duncan (R-Tennessee), Skip Bafalis (R-Florida), Philip Crane (R-Illinois), James Martin (R-North Carolina) and Joe Waggoner, along with Marjorie Holt, chairwoman of the RSC, and David Satterfield, chairman of the Democratic Research Organization. Also participating was Clair Burgener who was familiar with the subject from his days as floor manager for Reagan's state proposal in the California legislature.

On March 18, 1975, thirteen House members met with representatives of the press to unveil the National Welfare Reform Act of 1975. The press conference was well-attended including radio, television and both the AP and UPI wire services.¹¹ In addition, follow-up press packets were hand-delivered to the House and Senate press galleries. These included press releases, bill summaries and other explanatory material. By this time, the co-sponsorship had increased to 62 members of the House. This included 8 Democrats and 54 Republicans. Duncan, as the senior Republican member of the Ways and Means Committee, became the primary House co-sponsor of the bill, which was designated H.R. 5133.¹²

Among the material given to the member offices was a draft press release which could be amended when appropriate and issued on the member's own press release letterhead. This was in addition to a general press release distributed by the RSC staff at the press conference. That release included statements from all of the principal speakers. With this, one of the objectives of Swoap's employment had already been achieved. A major bill was introduced to solve a substantial problem, and all of the RSC members were in full accord with it.

Shortly afterwards, news stories began to be received, and related activities were mounted. On March 21, 1975, Philip Crane led a Special Order on the House floor to discuss the National Welfare Reform Act.¹³ After the introduction of the bill, Swoap began preparing a series of specific state analyses for each of the co-sponsors on how much the bill would save in their own state. Because of the complex nature of U.S. welfare legislation, portions of each of the welfare laws include both federal and state funds in different ratios. Thus, while one title of a specific law could be amended to save a state a small amount of money, the next title might save a state a much larger sum, or vice versa. In an attempt to strengthen the support for the bill, particularly in the local area, Swoap began his special series of studies with the state of Tennessee, since this included the main co-sponsor of the House bill, John Duncan. The saving estimate for Tennessee ranged from \$5-\$9 million per year.¹⁴

Duncan circulated a "Dear Colleague" letter to all of the other members of the House and Senate inviting them to join in co-sponsoring the National Welfare Reform Act of 1975.¹⁵ The effects of that letter resulted in an additional 14 co-sponsors of the bill in 1975.

Swoap also continued meeting with the staff and members of the Senate Finance Committee. His long and patient work paid off. On May 18, 1975, the chairman (Russell Long), ranking Republican (Carl Curtis, R-Nebraska), and seven additional members of the Senate Finance Committee introduced an identical bill, S. 1719, in the Senate. Swoap worked closely with the Senate Finance Committee's staff to explain provisions of the bill, provide floor speeches, and meet with staff aides on the measure.

During the ensuing months, under Swoap's guidance with the use of the RSC facilities, letters were sent to trade associations in Washington, inviting their endorsement of the bill. Speeches were prepared for members' use in their own districts, briefings were arranged on specific aspects of the issue such as the one by Bennett Moe of the Los Angeles County Committee to Review Public Social Services, and lectures were given by Congressmen Duncan and Burgener on the bill in order to win over various groups.

The activities continued through 1975, utilizing all available opportunities, including meetings with the President, to stress the seriousness with which the RSC members viewed their welfare reform initiatives. By mid-1976, the RSC Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income bills had not been introduced because of the burden of the welfare reform and the food stamp reform measures on Swoap's time. While SSI received committee and floor attention,¹⁶ welfare reform did not. The Duncan-Curtis bill set the framework for the public discussion of welfare reform. While officials at the Department of Health, Education and Welfare would have preferred to liberalize the federal welfare program, the concerted opposition of a substantial body of Republicans in the House, together with the united position of the Senate Finance Committee, made a liberalized measure unlikely to succeed. Additionally, by this time, the major impetus for a guaranteed income program had passed. Moynihan was no longer at the White House and the Senate Finance Committee remained opposed to this approach. While it has been the customary view of the American legislative process that "the executive proposes and the Congress disposes,"¹⁷ the RSC was now contributing to the national agenda with a positive proposal. The Duncan-Curtis approach was basically an incremental one, rather than an entirely different program. This incremental approach would later be adopted by academic experts on social policy.¹⁸ In fact, some observers believed that Nixon and Ford had achieved a modicum of success in their efforts to trim and adjust the welfare bureaucracy.¹⁹

Swoap's activities on welfare stood him in good stead for his role on the staff of the Republican Platform Committee in Kansas City in 1976.²⁰ His ability to argue persuasively and to present the case as to why the current welfare system should be reformed rather than replaced with a guaranteed annual income, had an impact on the public policy process. It resulted in the Republican Platform endorsing a Duncan-Curtis type welfare

reform approach as opposed to a Family Assistance type approach as had earlier been proposed by President Nixon and some of his advisers.²¹ By the closing days of the 94th Congress, most co-sponsors of the National Welfare Reform Act were more concerned about winning their own re-election. Consequently, the prospects of passage of the National Welfare Reform Act were not too bright.

In these closing days of Congress, Russell Long did manage to take several of the key provisions of the National Welfare Reform Act and enact them into law. This was done with the assistance of David Swoap working closely with the staff of the Senate Finance Committee with whom he had worked the year before on the introduction of these concepts.

Because of the Democratic control of the Congress, the bill never had committee hearings and was not completely enacted into law. Nonetheless, it was significant because it represented a positive proposal from the RSC. It also showed that the group could bounce back after having suffered the serious defeats it did in the 1974 elections, and it attracted bi-partisan support in both the House and Senate. This case again proved the need for having highly professional, well-trained senior staff aides available to work with member offices and their staffs. Swoap clearly fell into this category and quickly gained the reputation among his new congressional staff colleagues as one of the most knowledgeable experts in this area. In fact, during his tenure at the RSC, he had the luxury of turning down offers from several senior members of the House to join their personal or committee staffs to work for them. Finally, he did succumb to a more lucrative position, and in October 1976, he joined the staff of the Senate Finance Committee under the patronage of the senior Republican, Carl Curtis. He occupied the position of the senior Republican staff member working in the public assistance arena on the Senate Finance Committee. By that time, both the National Welfare Reform Act and the National Food Stamp Reform Act served as monuments to his legislative creativity. In addition, because he was working for Curtis, who also served as the chairman of the Senate Steering Committee, he was able to work closely with the RSC staff.

The Republican Study Committee's role in this welfare effort was substantially more than merely providing Swoap's payroll. The RSC provided clerical support and college students who acted as research assistants to

Swoap. The senior staff supported Swoap in his dealings with members, and arranged for him to make speeches and presentations, to give briefings and to meet members, staff aides, lobbyists and academics who were involved in aspects of welfare reform. The RSC staff expanded press relations, made calls to member offices, and generally provided support for all of Swoap's efforts.

Swoap's activities marked a new role for the RSC's staff. The credibility of the staff was enhanced. The availability of Swoap to take a major role at this time was an important asset for the RSC. The earlier mistrust of staff had given way to a new perception of the usefulness of staff. As Malbin says in a broader context:

"The new role of the staff results from the interests of the members and does not initiate, ex nihilo, from the staff itself."²²

The original impetus for significant activity in this area had come from Congressman Clair Burgener, who had made the contact with Swoap. However, it was the joint activity of the RSC which enlisted its own staff resources as well as member support for the effort. Swoap's role was much more effective as an RSC staff member than it would have been working for an individual member. And, the RSC had built an initiative in a major public policy issue of interest to many of its members.

C. Reform of the Food Stamp Program

The first national Food Stamp Program was initiated as a war-time measure from 1939-44. In 1964, the current program was enacted on a national basis as part of President Johnson's "Great Society" program. At that time, two major justifications were offered for the program. The first goal was to alleviate the alleged hunger and malnutrition in the United States and the second was to reduce the mounting surpluses of agricultural products. Each of these elements could be used to solve the other. According to the members of the Republican Study Committee, these objectives had been distorted to other purposes which were far from the intent of the original sponsors, or of sensible public policy. For example, the eligibility requirements for food stamps had been broadened to include such categories as college students, striking workers and other groups which were "voluntarily unemployed." The minimum income requirement of food stamp recipients was raised so that

many lower middle-class individuals were eligible for food stamps. A black market in food stamp coupons flourished in some cities, and the coupons had taken on the characteristics of alternative currency.

An attempt to draft a comprehensive food stamp reform bill by the Republican Study Committee had to await the arrival of staff expertise. Prior to that time, the only individuals who understood the intricacies of the food stamp program were a few staff aides and a small number of members of the House Agriculture Committee. Members of the Agriculture Committee almost exclusively represent rural congressional districts. Their interests were served by extending food stamp eligibility since this increased demand for farm products and consequently increased farm income which helped their constituents. Thus, rural interests would not have been served by reducing the size of the food stamp program. Some of these members were expected to join with their conservative colleagues in opposing food stamp excesses such as food stamp availability to striking workers and college students. But, they were not about to lend their staff experts to other members to reduce the scale of the program.

Until David Swoap²³ joined the staff of the RSC, there was no resource person available for the conservatives to develop an alternative program to reform the food stamp program. Swoap's objective was to introduce the food stamp reform bill as a companion to his welfare reform bill. The two bills were to be thought of in tandem, although the actual introduction of the food stamp program was delayed for a substantial period of time. While food stamp reform occupied the agenda of the RSC as early as January 27, 1975, the first date scheduled for its introduction as a specific bill was May 13. This date slipped further. Swoap kept the members of the Executive Committee informed of his progress. At a meeting of the Executive Committee, the members decided to ask Congressman Bob Michel (R-Illinois) to be the primary co-sponsor of the bill. Michel would be particularly helpful as the principal co-sponsor of the bill since he was the Minority Whip in the House and because he was a senior member of the Appropriations Committee where he was a vigilant watchdog of excesses in government programs. Michel later commented on his role in the food stamp effort:

"I had watched food stamps begin as a pilot program which just grew out of control. I thought it was an important effort to get involved in."²⁴

The RSC staff arranged with the Senate Steering Committee for a companion bill to be introduced in the Senate at the same time under the primary sponsorship of James L. Buckley (R-Cons.-New York).

The bill which Swoap drafted included not only reform of the existing system as outlined in his comprehensive paper,²⁵ but also included a prohibition of food stamps for strikers, a long-time project of conservative members of the House.²⁶ The bill included a block grant rebate to states to cover their administrative expenses. Presumably, this would give the states an incentive to cut their administration because the savings could go into the state's treasury. Identification cards would be issued to food stamp recipients, the coupons would require countersignatures both at the time they were issued and when they were used, and strikers, college students and other "voluntarily unemployed" groups would not be eligible for the program. This outline of the provisions was agreed upon by Mrs. Holt and David Swoap of the RSC, Bob Michel and his staff, and Senator Buckley and his staff. Following the meeting of these individuals on May 5, 1975,²⁷ Swoap noted that technical problems would create a delay in drafting the master bill. For example, if the wrong method for computing the "Poverty Index" were used, it could result in the addition of thousands of new persons being eligible for food stamps and other welfare programs. This first delay prevented the bill from being introduced until the week of June 2.

The legislative briefing for staff aides to the RSC members was scheduled for May 12, 1975. The RSC staff prepared a draft press release for use by possible co-sponsors. The date of the introduction slipped again, and the bill was the primary subject of the June 9, 1975 meeting of the Executive Committee. A week later, on June 16, the bill again was the only item on the agenda.

As in the case of the National Welfare Reform Act, Swoap conducted a series of briefings for members and their key staff to explain the 41 specific proposals contained within the bill. A summary of the provisions of the bill, together with a detailed analysis of it, were distributed at these meetings.

The press conference concerning Food Stamp Reform and introduction of the bill took place on Monday, June 23, 1975, with Congressman Bob Michel and Senator Jim Buckley as the principal sponsors. The House Food Stamp Reform Bill, H.R. 8145, was co-sponsored by 59 House members, and Buckley attracted 14 co-sponsors to his bill in the Senate. Among the co-sponsors were a number of moderate to liberal members of the House and Senate, including Paul Findley (R-Illinois), Barber Conable, Jr. (R-New York) and Senator Bill Roth (R-Delaware). In his "Dear Colleague" letter of June 24, 1975, Bob Michel indicated that the proposed Food Stamp Reform Act had two basic purposes. The first was to put a cap on the program and save the taxpayers \$2-2.5 billion per year. Additionally, he noted:

"[B]y weeding out those with high incomes, the bill generates savings which will allow us to base the food stamp allocation on the 'low-cost diet plan,' which is 29% higher than the 'economy plan,' currently being used and which should meet recent court criticisms."²⁸

The provisions of the Michel-Buckley bill were advocated in the Senate by the Senate Steering Committee. When Senator Herman Talmadge (D-Georgia), chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, and Jamie Whitten (D-Mississippi), chairman of the House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee, called for meaningful food stamp reform, Talmadge specifically commended the sponsors of the Michel-Buckley bill for introducing a "very thorough, carefully considered reform bill."²⁹

On July 25, President Ford asked the Congress to hold hearings at the earliest possible date on the legislation. The support of Ford was helpful, but not surprising, since he and Michel had been long-time House colleagues, serving on the House Appropriations Committee together for many years,³⁰ and the White House staff became concerned about the rapidly escalating costs of the food stamp program. However, like other bills, "nothing in Washington happens by accident." The White House endorsement was the result of continual pressure from Michel and from members of the Republican Study Committee for such an endorsement. Because Michel was the Minority Whip, he persuaded the Republican Policy Committee in the House to adopt a position in favor of the comprehensive reform bill. Both Michel and Swoap met with this committee, and on the Senate side, Senator Buckley received a commitment from Senator Talmadge, the chairman of the Agriculture Committee, for hearings to be held on October 7-10.

In addition, Swoap wrote to the co-sponsors of the National Food Stamp Reform Act that the Administration was moving swiftly to adopt changes in the food stamp program. He noted that:

"President Ford met two weeks ago with the task force headed by Jack Venneman (Under Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare) and discussed four options. Of these, the President chose #3, which was the Buckley-Michel approach of tightening the existing program."³¹

While the Domestic Council inside the White House and certain segments of the Department of Agriculture continued to press for watering down the measure "in order to present a bill that would pass in Congress," this was viewed by Swoap and his colleagues as being premature. They thought that negotiations like this shouldn't take place before the committee hearings, but after the hearing stage when bill drafting would take place and compromises might have to be made.

Swoap also noted that Senators McGovern (D-South Dakota) and Dole (R-Kansas) were planning to introduce a food stamp reform bill in the first week of October. This would prove to develop into one of the major problems confronting the co-sponsors of the Michel-Buckley bill during 1976.

Following considerable negotiations between the Republican Study Committee and the White House, Congresswoman Holt was invited to meet with President Ford on Friday, October 3, to discuss the President's position on food stamp reform and the influence of the Domestic Council in the White House over the pending Administration bill. Prior to that meeting, Holt was briefed intensively by Swoap and other RSC staff aides. By the second week in October, the White House finally introduced the Administration's bill. It contained 12 provisions which were identical to the Michel-Buckley bill. The President further endorsed 8 other provisions of Michel-Buckley which could be implemented by executive fiat. However, 8 specific provisions among the 35 reforms introduced in the comprehensive Food Stamp Reform Bill were totally omitted by the President, and 7 others were substantially altered.

In the meantime, Swoap continued a series of meetings with groups as diverse as the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Conference of Catholic Charities. By the beginning of the Second session of the 94th Congress in 1976, the forum moved to the Senate Agriculture Committee where mark-up would proceed on four alterna-

tive food stamp bills, including Michel-Buckley, the Administration bill, McGovern-Dole, and a fourth minor bill introduced by Lawton Chiles (D-Florida). By March, 1976, the Senate had voted out of committee its own comprehensive reform bill. Although there were substantial references to Michel-Buckley provisions within it, a spread sheet between the final reported bill and the original Michel-Buckley bill showed that in the majority of cases, the Michel-Buckley provisions were violated.³²

While the RSC staff, particularly Swoap, was working closely with the Talmadge staff on the Senate Agriculture Committee during these mark-up sessions, it was the McGovern-Dole reform bill, modified and reintroduced on the floor of the Senate on April 6, 1976, which caught the RSC and its allies off-guard. Swoap was able to analyze the costs of the McGovern-Dole bill within 24 hours pointing out that this alternative, instead of saving taxpayer funds as the co-sponsors had claimed, would cost \$1.4 billion in additional expenditures, figures which were later used extensively in debate. Both Senators Dole and McGovern were from leading agricultural producing states; Dole was considered a conservative and McGovern a liberal. So, although the McGovern-Dole bill did contain phrases which were identical to the Michel-Buckley bill, complex changes in the technical formulae effectively increased, rather than reduced, expenditures on the food stamp program. And, because the bill was labeled "Food Stamp Reform" it received substantial bi-partisan support on the Senate floor. Passage of a Senate bill was further insured by Senator Talmadge's agreement with Dole and McGovern to support the basic provisions of their bill. The House Agriculture Committee finally reported its companion bill (H.R. 13613) on September 1, 1976, following three months of mark-up sessions and more than 20 committee roll call votes on individual provisions.³³

On September 10, the threat of a Presidential veto and a full legislative calendar caused the Majority Leadership to drop the committee's food stamp reform bill until the 95th Congress.

The ability of the minority party to take a major initiative like this was recognized by their political opponents. For example, Arnold Meyer, Legislative Director of the Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen of North America and coordinator of the union drive to liberalize the food stamp bill, commented, "the program's proponents had been caught off base

by the Republican campaign against the food stamp program."³⁴ While the Republican Study Committee did not manage to enact its own version of food stamp reform in the 94th Congress, neither did their opponents manage to pass their McGovern-Dole bill. David Swoap played a crucial role for the RSC in the reform of the food stamp program. His efforts on the House program included a review of the Minority Views of the committee report and the writing of major sections on "fiscal implications," "purchase requirements," and "fraud" of the report. Swoap's role had been critical not only in the consideration of the bill, but also in the establishment of the RSC as a source of meaningful legislative material.

As Morris Fiorina commented, food stamp reform "had no easy time of it in the 94th Congress."³⁵ The Republican Study Committee was responsible for this in both a negative and a positive way.

D. The Consumer Protection Agency

The battle between liberals and conservatives over the establishment of an independent Consumer Protection Agency predates the formation of the Republican Study Committee by several years. The first vote on establishing this unit as an independent agency of government took place in 1971. At that time, the Consumer Protection Act passed by a vote of 74-4 in the Senate, however, the House bill died in the House Rules Committee. By the 92nd Congress, a similar bill was able to pass the House, but this time it failed to survive a filibuster in the Senate. The House vote on that bill was significant because it carried by a majority of 344-44. In the 93rd Congress, the House bill carried by a slightly smaller margin of 293-94. Thus, while the opposition had doubled its vote, it was still significantly outnumbered. Some of the credit for the increased opposition could be taken by the Republican Study Committee.

The RSC Executive Committee met with opposition leader, Congressman Clarence J. Brown (R-Ohio), on April 1, 1974, to hear about the bill and its serious implications. The bill had been reported from the House Government Relations Committee and would soon be on the House floor. RSC members were urged to speak and vote against it. However, they realized that the likelihood of a straight defeat was remote. Thus, the RSC Executive Committee decided that their chairman, LaMar Baker (R-Tennessee), should

check with the White House on the possibility of a Presidential veto.³⁶ Mixed signals were received from the White House, but by the end of the Congress, the bill had been stopped by the Senate filibuster.

The newly-organized Senate Steering Committee led the opposition to the bill and coordinated the successful filibuster. These activities helped insure the success of the Senate filibuster and the defeat of the cloture votes to close the debate. The organized opposition to the Consumer Protection Agency in the Senate in 1974 was particularly aroused when the Majority Leadership called for a fourth cloture vote on the bill. That is, on a fourth occasion, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Montana) asked his colleagues to vote on stopping the debate on the pending issue. Traditional senatorial procedures had limited cloture votes to three per major bill. So, the calling for a fourth vote was highly unusual.

The primary advocate of the Consumer Protection Agency was Ralph Nader who had been actively supporting a new independent federal agency since the idea was first introduced in the 91st Congress. The agency's initial role was to "represent the consumer" before other government agencies. This was the most narrow interpretation of the agency's role and was subsequently expanded in later versions of the bill. The opponents of the bill pointed out that the government agencies which were to be overseen by the Consumer Protection Agency were originally established to protect the consumer. So, for one agency to watch another agency was to admit the failure of the original agency and to admit that there was no logical reason why a new agency would better represent the consumer than the prior ones had.³⁷

With the substantial House Republican losses in 1974, the pro-Consumer Protection Agency forces assumed they would have a much easier time enacting their bill in the new 94th Congress.

The primary sponsors of the new bill were Benjamin Rosenthal (D-New York) and Frank Horton (R-New York). Horton, a member of the Wednesday Group, served as the senior Republican member and Rosenthal was chairman of the Consumer Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations. This committee would have initial jurisdiction over the proposed agency. The support of these two members made the committee vote a mere formality on the way to floor consideration of the bill. The

House version of the bill (H.R. 7575) was reported out of the House Government Operations Committee on July 18, 1975, by a vote of 30-10,³⁸ and was then scheduled to go to the House floor in September 1975.

The second ranking Republican on the House Government Operations Committee was John Erlenborn (R-Illinois). Erlenborn was a member of the Republican Study Committee and was willing to work with the RSC and others who opposed the bill. President Ford indicated to Erlenborn and other minority members of the committee that he opposed the bill: "It is my conviction that the best way to protect the consumer is to improve the existing institutions of the government, not to add more government."³⁹ In order to maintain the credibility of Ford's veto threat, 145 votes against the bill on final passage would be the minimal requirement.⁴⁰

In opposition to the Consumer Protection Agency, the carefully coordinated work of outside interest groups, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and The Business Roundtable, relied heavily on the Republican Study Committee and its membership in coordinating the battle on the House floor. The RSC provided the business lobbyists with the names of members whose positions might be changing so that the lobby groups could apply pressure to these members. Another more specific tool which the Chamber of Commerce developed at the RSC's suggestion was a collection of local newspaper editorials on the CPA bill. These editorials were divided by congressional districts and distributed by local Chamber of Commerce members to their own members of Congress. At the same time, the RSC worked closely with the Senate Steering Committee on this issue.

Because of the loss of Senate Republicans in the 1974 elections, the Senate was unable to maintain its filibuster, and the Consumer Protection Agency Act was passed by a vote of 61-28 on Thursday, May 15, 1975. The following Monday, Senator James McClure (R-Idaho), vice chairman of the Senate Steering Committee, met with the RSC Executive Committee to discuss how the Consumer Protection Agency Act might be stopped in the House. This meeting with McClure was held immediately after the Senate defeat because it was anticipated that the bill would reach the House floor by early June. However, with the delay in reporting the bill from committee until mid-July, it became clear that no action would transpire on it until after the August recess.

Also during this time, the RSC issued several publications on the bill. Their early 1975 Fact Sheet⁴¹ was followed by a summary talking paper entitled "Arguments Against the Consumer Protection Agency."⁴² In addition, after the Senate action, the RSC updated its fact sheet on the Consumer Protection Agency quoting extensively from the Minority Views of the committee and from the President's letter in opposition to the Consumer Protection Agency.⁴³

The Republican Study Committee then arranged for Congressman Erlenborn to meet with the legislative staff of the RSC member offices to discuss the bill immediately before it was voted on in the House. This meeting, as well as a discussion in the Executive Committee meeting, took place on Monday, November 3, 1975. The Executive Committee stood in opposition to the bill and the RSC staff moved to implement this stand. For example, background material and speeches were prepared for members of the RSC, many of whom used them during the course of the floor debate. The RSC staff made a whip call on the bill and reported to its chairman that the membership was unified in their opposition to it. The final vote in the House on November 6, 1975, was 208-199. Of that number, no members of the Republican Study Committee supported the bill, although 18 non-RSC Republicans did support it.⁴⁴ Eventually, the sponsors of the bill decided not to go to a Joint House-Senate Conference to resolve their differences because of the substantial opposition vote and the continuing threat of President Ford's veto of the measure. Thus, with the combined effectiveness of the business community's lobbying against the bill and the growing public resentment at government bureaucracies, passage of the measure was deferred once again.

The RSC's work on this particular issue proved to the Minority Leader, John Rhodes (R-Arizona), the value of having the RSC in place when his Republican troops were divided on an issue. While Congressman Horton and some of his more liberal Republican colleagues in the House could pressure Rhodes, the RSC could also provide pressure in the opposite direction by pointing out to Rhodes that only 18 Republicans had supported his bill. Thus, Rhodes could support his own President and the majority position of the party without having to yield to pressures exerted from those members who held the minority viewpoint within the party. The RSC had become a spokesman for the majority of the party, and it was also cooperating closely with the business community on a major bill of mutual interest.

E. Common Situs Picketing Bill

The classic confrontation between business and organized labor in the 94th Congress occurred over the Common Situs Picketing Bill. The bill, H.R. 5900, would have permitted unions to picket an entire construction site even though their dispute was with only one of the contractors working on that site. Thus, H.R. 5900 would have overturned the 1951 Supreme Court ruling which held that such picketing constituted an illegal secondary boycott. The Supreme Court ruling had rankled the building trades unions since the Court handed down this decision. However, the AFL-CIO did not push for its repeal by specific legislation until 1975. In the 1974 elections, the liberal Democrats received substantial support from the unions. So, with many newly-elected Democrats, it was believed that the 94th Congress would be the ideal time to achieve their objective.⁴⁵ Furthermore, President Ford had promised to sign a common situs picketing bill if it incorporated certain safeguards which he and his Labor Secretary, John Dunlop, wanted.

The primary opposition to common situs picketing legislation did not develop in the House of Representatives. While the Executive Committee of the Republican Study Committee discussed it,⁴⁶ and the staff issued a fact sheet in opposition to it, the House passed the bill on July 25, 1975, by a vote of 230-178. This was a substantial victory for the trade unions. After House passage, the bill moved to the Senate. There, the conservatives, through the activity of the Senate Steering Committee, mounted an aggressive filibuster against it. While the vote in the Senate was close, the bill passed on November 19 by a vote of 52-45.

At that point, the bill went to a Joint House-Senate Conference. It was at this time that a coordinated program began among the opposition forces to the Common Situs Picketing Bill. Both the House and the Senate had enough votes to sustain a President veto. The problem was that the President had indicated his intention to sign the bill, if it were accompanied by certain changes in the body of labor law regarding construction companies and union relations. Those provisions had been met in this bill.

Pressure on the President to veto the bill began to mount after the Senate passage of the bill in November. A letter writing campaign organized largely by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the contractors'

associations, deluged the White House with an estimated 750,000 pieces of mail opposing the bill. This contrasted with 26,000 letters in support of the bill.⁴⁷

Members of the House Republican Study Committee and the Senate Steering Committee met with the President and assured him of their opposition to the bill and their support should he choose to veto the bill. At the same time, presidential candidate Ronald Reagan came out strongly against the bill which applied still further pressure on Gerald Ford. In December, both Houses of the Congress cleared the Conference Report which had ironed out the minor differences between the two bills. The House vote in favor of the Conference Report on December 11 was 229-189, and on December 15, the Senate followed suit on a 52-43 vote. These two votes again indicated to President Ford that both Houses would be willing to sustain a veto. In the House, Minority Leader Rhodes indicated that the President had not promised to sign H.R. 5900 unless it had the support of both labor and management. This warning signal was read by the bill's opponents, and the outside pressure mounted from grassroots lobbying. In announcing his decision to veto the bill on December 22, President Ford said "Unfortunately, my earlier optimism that this bill provided a resolution which would have the support of all parties was unfounded."⁴⁸

Shortly after the Christmas recess, when the House reconvened on January 2, 1976, the Democratic leadership determined that attempts to overturn the President's veto would be fruitless, and, therefore, no attempt was made to override the veto.

Thus, the Common Situs Picketing Bill defeat represented a victory for conservative forces. While the role of the RSC in the House was useful, it was not a vital factor. The RSC served as strategic advisers to the bill's main opponents in the business community. By providing those opponents with advice and by keeping the Minority Leadership and the White House informed of their views, the RSC helped gain a Presidential veto on the Common Situs Picketing Bill.

F. National Security Concerns

Most members of the House realize that their constituents are much more concerned with domestic and economic issues than they are with foreign policy questions. As Manley notes:

"Members of the House and Senate have a host of pressing parochial demands with which they must cope, demands they see as far more pressing than abstruse foreign policy questions."⁴⁹

Nonetheless, every member of Congress is interested in foreign policy. It is understandable then that the staff of the Republican Study Committee concerned itself with a number of foreign policy questions. Concern with these questions, however, is a long way from effective action with regard to them. Foreign policy expertise is often lacking among House members, but more prevalent among senators, and the relevant Executive Branch officials. As liberal representative Les Aspin (D-Wisconsin) explains:

"Rarely, however, does a member of Congress turn into an expert on defense or foreign policy, much of which is either highly technical, or exotic or both....The Congress is painfully aware that the 'experts' (scientists, economists, generals) are working for the executive branch."⁵⁰

The following selective incidents relating to foreign policy reflect these limitations. The RSC's role primarily evolved around one activist member on the International Relations Committee -- Edward J. Derwinski (R-Illinois). The RSC members were further restricted because their opposition was frequently directed toward "their" Republican Administration which was in power. The foreign policy activity of the RSC did occupy a considerable amount of their attention and resources, however, and did result in some victories.

Military Assistance to Korea

Following the fall of Vietnam, several liberal members of the House, led by Donald Fraser (D-Minnesota), began an intensive attack on the U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea. Their hope was that our economic and military aid to that country would be substantially reduced, and that eventually we would withdraw our troops from Korea.

Fraser operated from a key position as chairman of the International Relations Subcommittee on International Organizations. However, with Ed Derwinski as its ranking minority member, his actions were monitored

carefully. Fraser, a former chairman of the Americans for Democratic Action, was recognized as a national liberal leader. During the course of 1975-1976, his subcommittee held hearings on the question of human rights in South Korea and the Philippines. The majority of the witnesses had been anti-government Koreans, retired U.S. officers supporting Fraser's position, and professors and clergymen opposing the governments in Korea and the Philippines. During this process, the RSC staff suggested two additional names to Congressman Derwinski: Professor Richard L. Walker, Dean of the School of International Relations at the University of South Carolina, and Professor Franz Michel, Director of the Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. Both of these scholars asked to testify and did so ably, although their statements received virtually no press attention.

During this time, various liberal organizations began supporting Fraser's call to cut aid to Korea. While Fraser had been rebuffed several times by his colleagues in the International Relations Committee, he introduced an amendment for a vote when a number of pro-Korean members of the International Relations Committee were absent. In this way, his amendment became part of the committee bill by a vote of 11-9.

Derwinski and his colleagues countered Fraser's position with strong minority views in the House Report.⁵¹ U.S. relations with Korea were particularly sensitive at this time not only because Korea held a strategic location near Japan but also because of the low credibility of the United States deterrent in Asia after the fall of Vietnam. Derwinski was able to call on staff resources of the RSC who were not only intellectually committed to his side of the battle, but also had firsthand knowledge of the situation from their earlier visits and meetings with Korean leaders.

Working in tandem with several senior members of the House, including Charles Wilson (D-California) and John Murphy (D-New York), Derwinski took the lead in the debate while stressing that vital interests of the United States were involved in preserving our relationships with Korea. This was expressed in a number of Congressional Record inserts which were prepared by the staff of the RSC prior to the actual floor debate and supported by an amendment sponsored by Derwinski. This amendment was designed to lift the International Relations Committee's \$290 million fiscal 1976-1977 ceiling on military assistance to Korea to \$488 million, the level requested by the Ford Administration.

On June 2, 1976, the Derwinski Amendment to restore full funding to Korea carried 241-159. Chairwoman Holt, Vice Chairman Crane and several members of the Executive Committee strongly supported Derwinski during the floor debate. Of the 73 members of the RSC, only 1 voted against Derwinski, 7 did not vote and 65 supported him. It was a bi-partisan vote; 118 Republicans and 122 Democrats supported Derwinski. The success of this amendment was due not only to the leadership of the RSC's former chairman, but also to senior Democrats on the International Relations Committee (Chairman Morgan of Pennsylvania, and members Zablocki of Wisconsin and Hayes of Ohio) who strongly supported the Derwinski Amendment. Members of the House in both the Republican and Democratic parties took part in the RSC's activities to express the House's will in this matter.

The aid of the RSC in preparing statements,⁵² holding strategy sessions,⁵³ and being involved from start to finish was an integral element in supporting Derwinski and leading to the success on his amendment. This assistance was valuable to Derwinski even though he was the second most senior Republican on the International Relations Committee. His access to minority committee staff was limited because they had to work on all of the sections of this omnibus bill which involved many issues and different countries. Robert Schuettinger, the RSC senior research associate who was handling this issue, noted that:

"The RSC staff kept in close touch with Everett Biermann, Minority Counsel of the International Relations Committee, throughout the evolution of the bill. On the date of the vote he requested a few pro-Korea speeches in case any members requested them from him."⁵⁴

These speeches were used as part of the floor discussion. In the case of Korea, the RSC staff worked in close harmony with its own former chairman, the committee staff and its Executive Committee to support their position and increase military assistance.

Military Assistance to Turkey

When Turkey invaded Cyprus in July 1974, her military forces used weapons supplied in violation of U.S. foreign aid laws. Consequently, the Congress ordered a cut-off of military aid to Turkey. This was imposed on February 5, 1975, in accord with the requirements of the 1974 Foreign Aid Act.⁵⁵

The aid cut-off was viewed as a setback to Secretary of State Kissinger who had relied on Turkey to protect the southern flank of NATO. Additionally, the U.S. had installed a number of intelligence listening posts close to the Soviet border in Turkey, and a U.S. aid cut-off could lead to Turkish demands that the U.S. posts be closed.

The Turkish aid question was a major issue of national security policy for President Ford. The national interest was implicit, but U.S. political forces made the Ford-Kissinger position more difficult to advocate on Capitol Hill. This was a manifestation of an old conflict of priorities, as Professor Dahl stated a generation earlier:

"Modern international politics is a rigorous testing ground for the survival of the classic instruments for securing consent in a democratic society."⁵⁶

Both Korea and Turkey were major tests. Korea, however, was decided on its inherent strategic merits, while the question of Turkey became embroiled in domestic politics.

Derwinski who had led the Administration's battle on behalf of Korean aid opposed the Administration on this issue. Derwinski was a successful ethnic politician who pointed out that "there are a lot more Greek-Americans than Turkish-Americans."⁵⁷ This domestic political issue was unusual for a foreign aid issue. Publicly Derwinski argued that opposition to Turkish aid would be a chastisement for Henry Kissinger with whom he disagreed on detente, African policy, the Helsinki accords, and the Panama Canal Treaty negotiations.

The Ford Administration lobbied intensively to repeal the cut-off of military aid. The Senate approved lifting the ban in a 41-40 vote on May 19, 1975. By July 16, the House International Relations Committee reported a companion bill after amending it to make it more acceptable to Turkish aid opponents. Despite these amendments which were designed to placate the so-called "Greek lobby," the House rejected the Administration's position on July 24 by a vote of 206-223. This vote came after major White House lobbying in favor of the bill and included approaches by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs to the staff and members of the RSC.

Despite the State Department plea that a continuation of the cut-off would result in a weakened NATO, a number of members of the Republican Study Committee repudiated their own President and voted with Derwinski against the repeal of the aid ban. Thus, while Kissinger assiduously courted the Democratic freshmen, 39 Republicans voted in opposition to their own Administration and 27 of those were conservatives. Evans and Novak stated in the Washington Post:

"Voting against the President was the vanguard of the right wing, including Reps. John Ashbrook of Ohio, Robert Bauman and Marjorie Holt of Maryland, John Rousselot of California, and Philip Crane of Illinois."⁵⁸

The leader of the conservative Republican opposition was Ed Derwinski.

The vote was not a permanent setback to the Administration because on October 2, the House reversed itself and voted 229-187 to partially lift the embargo.⁵⁹ This was achieved with a shift of 17 votes of the RSC members who had opposed the action in July. Because of the divided opinion in the RSC, the staff refrained from publishing analyses of the issue. Similarly, the Executive Committee did not discuss the issue because of its divisiveness. The RSC staff tended to support the Administration because of the European security dimension of the issue. Of course, the RSC staff was less inclined to be responsive to local political pressures than were some of the members. After all, the RSC staff did not have to run for re-election, nor did they have to face angry constituents of Greek descent. The White House and the State Department lobbied intensively and changed the RSC members' votes.

The Turkish aid votes served as a warning to the White House that the base of support of the Administration in the House of Representatives would not continue to support those foreign policy objectives with which they were in disagreement. As Allen Schick has stated with regard to some liberal Democrats:

"An independent supply of analysis can stimulate members to diverge from the policies of their leaders, which is precisely what has happened on defense legislation."⁶⁰

Kissinger's African Policy

As we have seen in Chapter V,⁶¹ the importation of Rhodesian chrome had been an issue of significance to the members of the Republican Study Committee. After the conservative defeat in the 1974 election, it was expected that liberal members like Donald Fraser would again attempt to repeal the Byrd Amendment in the new 94th Congress.

The repeal bill was jointly referred to both the International Relations and the Armed Services Committee by the Speaker. On July 15, 1975, it was passed by the International Relations Committee as H.R. 1287, but on July 26, the Armed Services Committee reported the bill unfavorably.

The bill was carried over during the summer recess. When the Congress reconvened, the RSC issued a fact sheet⁶² which brought the situation up to date and restated the pro and con arguments on the repeal of the Byrd Amendment.

Opposition to the bill was led by Ed Derwinski of the RSC. The RSC staff prepared speeches for members of the House; the issue was discussed at two meetings of the Executive Committee; and more than twenty RSC members participated in the fifty pages of Congressional Record debate. In the vote on final passage, no member of the RSC voted in favor of reimposing the ban; only 22 Republicans supported the bill and 108 (including the entire RSC membership) opposed it.⁶³ The bill was rejected by the House in a 187-209 vote.

In April 1976, Henry Kissinger made a tour through Africa, including a stop in Lusaka. While in Lusaka, he called on the Congress to repeal the Byrd Amendment, and he offered economic assistance of \$12.5 million to Mozambique which had recently installed a Marxist government. Kissinger knew, even if his audience did not, that the American process meant that a pledge made by a Secretary of State would have to be implemented by the Congress. But, convincing the Congress would prove to be a formidable task for Kissinger. Professor Zeidenstein has elaborated the formal restrictions which the Congress has placed on the Executive Branch's conduct of foreign policy.⁶⁴ Beyond these formal restrictions such as the War Powers Act, Congress has the opportunity to vote on specific pledges, like those of Kissinger made in Lusaka.

It did not take long for the RSC leadership to express its opinion on Kissinger's proposals. On May 6, 1976, both Marjorie Holt, the chairwoman of the Republican Study Committee, and Steve Symms (R-Idaho), one of its vice chairmen, took the floor of the House to denounce Secretary Kissinger's plans.⁶⁵ Both of these statements were prepared by the RSC staff. They signaled the opening salvo of a counter-offensive against Kissinger's new African policy. The first element of this was an amendment offered by Philip Crane, another RSC vice chairman. The RSC staff prepared the amendment and supporting floor speeches. His amendment would apply to both the foreign military assistance bill and the foreign economic assistance bill. It prohibited the use of any funds in the bill to aid Angola or Mozambique. The Crane amendment for the two countries carried by voice votes.

The RSC staff continued to monitor the status of the Byrd Amendment. The staff prepared speeches in opposition to its repeal, maintained a current headcount, and supported the proponents of the status quo. Despite Kissinger's pledge and the International Relations Committee's action, the final bill was not brought before the House in 1976. The RSC's efforts had insured the defeat of the repeal once again.

Relationship with Secretary Kissinger

It should be apparent from these specific cases that members of the RSC disagreed with the foreign policy positions of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in several significant instances. While some of the RSC members could express their grievances to Secretary Kissinger through the formal House committee structure, most of them could not because they did not serve on the International Relations Committee. To these members, Kissinger remained as much of an enigma as he was to many of the American people. For many RSC members, the first opportunity to voice their concerns to Secretary Kissinger arose on March 25, 1976, when he met with 39 members of the RSC at a breakfast meeting at the Capitol Hill Club.

The meeting was arranged by the RSC staff, and an information packet including several critical articles about Kissinger and his performance as Secretary of State was sent to all members. The research staff was excluded from the breakfast meeting, and only the members and the executive director of the RSC were able to participate in it.

Mrs. Holt chaired the meeting and called on a number of her colleagues who had asked to be recognized on specific subjects. These included Phil Crane on Taiwan, Jack Kemp (R-New York) on Salt II, Bill Ketchum (R-California) on southern Africa, Ed Derwinski on detente and the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine, and Henson Moore (R-Louisiana) on the Panama Canal. The meeting was conducted in a question and answer format, in order to avoid long harangues either by the members or by Kissinger. Despite this format, the lengthy exchange between Kissinger and Kemp on Salt II consumed so much time that many of the later questions were unanswered.

The most newsworthy question asked that morning was by Ed Derwinski regarding the "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine." State Department official Helmut Sonnenfeldt had given a private, off-the-record briefing in London to the U.S. Ambassadors posted to various nations in Europe. The Sonnenfeldt Doctrine held that Soviet control over the nations of Eastern Europe was not only a recognition of the status quo, but also that it gave stability to the area. Sonnenfeldt also argued that the United States should avoid any actions which might be interpreted as encouraging independence or movements away from Soviet hegemony in the region. Copies of the notes of the briefing had reached Kissinger's Capitol Hill critics including Derwinski and they were ready to advise Ford that he "might seriously consider firing Kissinger or at least putting greater distance between the President and his beleaguered Secretary of State."⁶⁶ At the breakfast meeting, Kissinger vigorously defended Sonnenfeldt and claimed that his remarks had been misinterpreted in the press. Derwinski remained unconvinced, and he told Kissinger so.

Shortly after the meeting, Sonnenfeldt attempted to repair the State Department's relationship with Derwinski by visiting him in his office. From the Korean aid battle, the State Department realized that Derwinski could be a valuable ally. Similarly, they recognized him as a formidable foe from some of his other activities. Evans and Novak reported:

"After Sonnenfeldt claimed his remarks were misinterpreted, Derwinski asked to see the official State Department account of his London briefing. But Sonnenfeldt demurred with an astonishing claim of executive privilege."⁶⁷

This was not only astonishing, but also ironic since Derwinski, at that time, had his own copy of the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine in his desk.⁶⁸ He did not tell Sonnenfeldt this, but instead later used his copy of the notes in meetings with

Ford to convince him that Kissinger's interests and Ford's did not necessarily coincide. Kissinger was generally popular in the nation, although not with most conservatives. Although President Ford had placed high confidence in him, because Derwinski had been an early Ford delegate to the Kansas City convention, he also had to take Ed Derwinski's criticism seriously.

The RSC staff role on foreign policy issues was clearly circumscribed by the wishes of the members. There was no room for legislative initiatives (such as food stamp and welfare reform), nor was there an opportunity to counsel the members when they saw foreign policy questions in domestic political terms. Because the House has always had a subordinate role to the Senate in treaty matters, the members of the House tend to be ignored in other foreign policy questions. This, combined with the problem of fighting a Republican Administration, meant that considerable efforts were expended on foreign policy issues but with a minor return for the time and effort expended.

G. Surface Mining Bill

A bill closely related to the land use bill in 1974-75 was the bill to regulate surface mining. It came before the same House and Senate committees, and had as its principal House sponsor the same Morris Udall (D-Arizona) who was the primary advocate of the land use bill. And, his principal antagonist was again Sam Steiger (R-Arizona), an active member of the Republican Study Committee.

The bill would have set minimum federal standards to be followed by the states for surface mining control and reclamation programs. If the states did not adopt the standards, a compulsory federal program would be imposed. One of the primary objections from the coal mine operators was the reclamation provision. The bill specifically provided that land which had been surface mined had to be returned to its original contour. Mine operators and their allies argued that often this was not the best use of the land: to take rocky mountains and return them to that contour would be far less desirable than converting them into rolling wooded and grass covered pasture lands. Other areas of dispute involved the tax level to be imposed on mined coal, and the effect that the new bill would have on the production of coal in the United States. The Department of the Interior and the Federal Energy Administration

estimated that the bill would reduce coal production as much as 187 million tons in 1975. By 1980, a loss of up to 271 tons per year was projected.⁶⁹ This compares with the total U.S. coal production of 600 million tons per year. Thus, the lines were drawn between those who opposed the surface mining of coal without extensive mandatory federal standards being set for the reclamation of the land, and those whose primary concern was meeting the energy needs of the country. The first version of the Surface Mining Bill passed both Houses of the Congress in 1974. However, that bill was "pocket vetoed" by President Ford.⁷⁰

In 1975, a new bill was introduced which was identical to the previously vetoed bill. The environmental lobby strongly supported the new bill.⁷¹ Following one day of hearings in the House committee on February 27, 1975, and several minor changes, the new bill passed the committee.

Under Steiger's direction, the RSC staff had helped prepare the Minority Views for Steiger and his 5 Republican and 5 Democratic conservative colleagues. Despite their opposition, it appeared virtually certain that the bill would pass due to the changed composition of the House after the 1974 elections. The only way of stopping the measure would be a presidential veto.

When the bill came to the House floor, the RSC staff emphasized the veto strategy. However, the Steiger-led opposition to the bill was not well organized as they fought seemingly overwhelming odds. In fact, Steiger indicated this when he said:

"I have no illusions about trying to defeat this bill on the floor. Sustaining the veto -- that's the only way we can go now."⁷²

Steiger's analysis was correct. The bill passed on the House floor on March 18, 1975 by a vote of 338-86. And, its companion bill passed the Senate on March 12, 1975 by a comfortable vote of 84-13. This opposition vote was not enough to ensure that the presidential veto could be sustained.

Following the bill's passage, surface mining was one of the subjects discussed at the RSC meeting with President Ford at the White House on April 22, 1975. Steiger argued that major changes had not been made to the bill. He also pointed out that the majority of the states which were involved in the surface mining had already taken action to deal with this problem at the local level, and a federal bill would simply add an extra layer of bureau-

cracy and retard the quality of coal produced domestically. Ford had also met with mineowners and energy officials who agreed with the RSC's evaluation. Following these discussions, the President decided to veto the bill. In gathering support for the veto, the President and the White House staff concentrated on House Republican members who were personal friends of the President. If the President were to veto the bill, a number of his Republican supporters would have to change their vote from supporting the bill to opposing it.

Besides preparing background material for their members, the RSC staff worked closely with Steiger in taking a headcount of members who might switch their positions. While this was not a regular RSC "whip call," it provided useful leads both for Steiger and for the White House staff to target their efforts.

Steiger led the battle both against the bill and for the veto. His June efforts to stop the surface mining bill were more successful than the attempts in March for three reasons: In March, the conservatives in the House were still reeling from their November 1974 electoral defeat. Because of their reduced numbers, some of them believed that its passage was inevitable. Secondly, the Administration was not opposed to the bill until after it passed and the full implications of it were realized. And thirdly, the RSC became actively involved in the battle only after the veto strategy had been decided upon. Steiger again made extensive use of the RSC staff, since the minority staff of the Interior Committee was committed to the bill. But again, this did not happen until after the bill passed the House and White House support for the veto was certain.

As a result of their efforts, 24 Republican members who originally had supported Udall on final passage of the bill reversed their position and supported the President's veto three months later. Of these 24 switches, 16 were members of the RSC. On the veto override vote, only 10 RSC members voted to override the President's veto.⁷³

H. The Continuing Battle Over Federal Land Use

The June 1974 floor vote to defeat the rule on the land use bill was not the end of that issue. Following the 1974 election setback for Republicans, Morris Udall again introduced a land use bill in 1975.⁷⁴ Senator Henry Jackson

(D-Washington), the chairman of the Senate Interior Committee, indicated that since the Senate had passed bills on several occasions only to have them either ignored or rebuffed in the House, he would not take any action in the Senate until the House had passed its own land use bill.

With the changed makeup of the Congress in 1975, Sam Steiger and the Republican Study Committee's Phil Truluck held an early strategy session. They decided that the best chance to defeat the bill in the new Congress was in the Interior Committee. Steiger and Truluck then met with the outside lobbying groups with which they had worked in the past. This group compiled a target list of members of the committee who might be convinced to oppose the bill. While only 11 members of the 43 members of the full committee had voted against the bill in 1974, some of the new members on the committee might have reservations about supporting a federal land use bill. If these individuals could be targeted early, the lobbyists could apply pressure from their constituencies and Steiger could work on them in committee.

In March and April of 1975, the House Interior Committee's Environment Subcommittee chaired by Udall again held hearings on the Udall bill. The RSC staff called on several of its academic contacts to testify in opposition to the bill. Among these was Dr. Bruce Johnson of the University of California. Because of Steiger's senior position on the committee, he was able to obtain committee funds to pay Johnson's travel expenses to testify. This action represented one of the practical advantages of the staff's efforts to contact and establish working relationships with academics on behalf of the RSC membership. While Johnson was in Washington, he also addressed the RSC legislative briefing on March 24, 1975, and later, a fact sheet and a detailed background paper were written by Truluck to be distributed to the RSC membership.⁷⁵

The lead witness before the Udall committee was Secretary of the Interior, Rogers C.B. Morton, who stated that the Ford Administration now opposed the land use planning bill despite their support for it in earlier years.

Another new element in the land use battle was the publication of a study entitled "The Current Status of Land Use Policy,"⁷⁶ which was published as a result of Truluck's efforts. He had discussed the issue with representatives of several research institutions in Washington. He noted that the majority of states had already taken action on land use planning and that the

claim of the Udall supporters that the states were inactive was false. When he discussed the subject with Mark Tanger, the research director of The Heritage Foundation, that group agreed to analyze the regulations and laws in the states and publish the results. The publication was based on a survey of all 50 states and included 12 separate categories of land use planning such as power plant siting, surface mining regulation, flood plain regulation, authorization of the counties to engage in comprehensive land use planning, and others. The publication filled a research need of those opponents of the Udall bill who maintained that federal action was unnecessary and redundant. The study, which effectively refuted one of Udall's key arguments, was sent to every member of the committee and the key committee staff aides during the hearings.

After a series of other witnesses was heard, the subcommittee began marking up the legislation in May. The subcommittee approved the bill and sent it to the full committee. Steiger and Truluck were uncertain about the effect of their concerted efforts to move the swing votes. Therefore, they decided to call for a test vote, and at the first meeting of the full committee, Steiger demanded a record vote to determine the accuracy of his headcount. On May 14, 1975, Steiger moved to table the bill losing by two votes, 20-22.

While this was nominally a loss for Steiger, it was a substantial increase from the 11 votes he had received for a similar motion a year earlier. More importantly, the vote gave both sides a small target group which might be swayed by political pressure from their constituents. The RSC staff and its key members had learned to work closely with outside lobby organizations. If the Washington representatives of these groups could mobilize public opinion back home in the member's district to support the RSC position, the conservatives would be operating in an effective manner, much as the liberals had been doing for many years. If a swing member could be convinced that his district opposed a specific bill, such as federal land use planning, it would be much easier for him to oppose his own chairman and vote against the bill.

Steiger and Truluck drew up a list with five prime targets. The outside groups began to apply pressure from the home districts, and Steiger reinforced this effort in the committee. When specific technical questions were raised, Steiger called on Truluck of the RSC staff to provide the answers. Of the five targets who voted against the Steiger tabling motion in May, three

Democrats switched and voted with Steiger on Monday, July 14, 1975, when the vote on the bill was taken.⁷⁷ Thus, the bill was defeated in the Interior Committee by a vote of 19-23. The effort to articulate grassroots opposition to the measure was successful, and the bill languished in committee for the remainder of the Congress. The Steiger-Truluck combination had effectively mobilized the outside forces who pressured the swing members into switching their votes.⁷⁸ The 1975 land use victory was very important for the RSC for several reasons:

1. The group had built a reputation on this issue in 1974. And, by winning on it again in 1975, the committee emphasized its effectiveness to the Republican leadership, and to the Administration.
2. It was assumed that victories would be scarce in 1975 and 1976 because of the decreased number of Republicans in the House, and a victory on a major issue like this would be a boost to the morale of the RSC membership and staff. The membership's commitment was still a worthwhile investment, even though many RSC members had lost in 1974. The members also were reminded that the staff was still of a high professional caliber, capable of winning major legislative battles.

I. Concerns with the Federal Budget

Again in the 94th Congress, questions concerning the federal budget received considerable attention from the members of the Republican Study Committee.

For example, Republican Study Committee staff prepared a comparison of the different economic programs proposed by President Ford and by the Jim Wright (D-Texas) Task Force (on behalf of the Democratic House leadership) as well as other economic alternatives.⁷⁹ This comparison enabled the members to see the major provisions side-by-side, and it provided for a ready reference. However, the primary activities of the RSC remained major Special Orders on specific fiscal subjects,⁸⁰ as well as the "battle of the budget."

The first of these activities took the form of a Special Order on the floor of the House led by Congressman Jack Kemp. The discussion covered economic issues including budget control, wage and price controls, indexation of the tax system and energy. The Kemp Special Order developed from a

meeting which he had arranged with a group of economists at the American Enterprise Institute, a public policy research organization in Washington, D.C. That meeting took place on January 15 and 16, 1975, and included nine of the senior economists from AEI. They were making recommendations and suggestions over a broad range of issues, including health care, social security, government regulation and federal expenditures.

Two members of the RSC senior staff participated in the meeting. The AEI presentations were directed at the six members of Congress who attended the meeting and who were cooperating with Kemp to speak out on these economic issues. The role of the RSC on this project was directed by Kemp. He asked the Executive Committee for staff help in preparing the Special Order, and four of the nine statements used by RSC members in the Special Order were written by the staff. While this specific effort was not a continuing one, the staff helped Kemp, a member of the RSC's Executive Committee, exert his leadership on this issue.⁸¹

Another RSC Special Order was led by Congressman Bill Armstrong (R-Colorado), a member of the Executive Committee of the Republican Study Committee, and supported by 17 other members of the RSC. This Special Order was entirely coordinated by the staff of the RSC and largely based on a recent study entitled An Other Budget Toward a Reordering of National Priorities by Professor Charles Moser.⁸² Moser maintained that claims that the federal budget was uncontrollable were overstated. Moser indicated that substantial cuts could be made in the federal budget, and he showed where and how he would do it. Among the participants in this Special Order was Floyd Spence (R-South Carolina) who pointed out that this study was helpful to him because it made references to a legislative proposal he had introduced,⁸³ namely, his own constitutional amendment to balance the federal budget. Other members took up specific areas of the budget, including specific cuts which might be made in each cabinet-level department, and wage and price controls.

The role of the RSC in this endeavor was to permit its members to speak with a coordinated voice on these subjects of national concern by producing raw material for the speeches, and coordinating these arrangements. Armstrong's Special Order was put on the Executive Committee agenda the day before the Special Order was scheduled to take place so that as many

members as possible would hear about his plans and be encouraged to participate with him in the Special Order. The RSC staff was available to provide additional speeches and to tailor specific research projects to the needs of individual members with their own particular styles and forms.

While the Kemp and Armstrong Special Orders were efforts at raising public awareness of the issue, John Rousselot, treasurer of the RSC, took the lead in proposing actual cuts in the budget. This began in the Spring of 1975 when he received 94 votes in favor of his position, as opposed to 31 who voted against him. The Washington Star noted, "The vote was a chapter meeting of the Congressional equivalent of the Flat Earth Society."⁸⁴ Rousselot responded in a "letter to the editor" by stating that:

"It would appear to me to be more appropriate to equate the vote on my amendment with a chapter meeting of the Round Earth Society. When Columbus first returned from his 1492 voyage, only a few recognized the truth and were willing to let go of false beliefs and superstitions that had been tested and were proven wrong."⁸⁵

Rousselot gained votes on the second budget resolution garnering a total of 127 supporters. But, by the Spring of 1976, the vote for Rousselot's position had declined to 105.

Rousselot's interest in this amendment was outside any decision of the RSC. But as an active member of its Executive Committee, he was eager to utilize the facilities of the RSC to implement his objectives. For example, he appeared before a number of Executive Committee meetings to explain his amendments in detail and presented briefings to the staff members at their Monday morning legislative sessions. The RSC staff supported him indirectly as well. Among the fact sheets published by the RSC was "The Economic Impact of the FY1976 Budget"⁸⁶ and analyses of the various budget resolutions. Rousselot's continuing involvement in the battle over the budget resulted in his chapter of The Case Against the Reckless Congress.⁸⁷

In a related effort, the Republican Study Committee attempted to reach out on a bi-partisan basis on this issue. Carl Nowler, staff counsel of the conservative Democratic Research Organization, was invited by the executive director of the RSC to speak on Monday, May 16, 1976, to both the Executive Committee and the Monday briefing participants about a balanced federal budget and the hearings which the DRO had been conducting. The meetings,

chaired by conservative Congressman Richard Ichord (D-Missouri), investigated the problems which were faced in balancing the federal budget. Ichord commented later that:

"The balanced budget hearings were the most important thing DRO ever did. We heard from everybody who was anybody in the field of government finance."⁸⁸

Efforts to mobilize the arguments and the concerns of the members on these broad issues were a significant part of the RSC's activity. If the members could be brought together to express their concerns in a unified way, they might be more effective than a single voice calling in the wilderness. The RSC helped to mobilize this coordinated effort. However, the quality of the floor speeches was not always high. Full of technical jargon, charts, and numbers, frequently prepared by staff aides, and delivered to an empty chamber after the day's legislative calendar, they were a far cry from the great debates of old. As Gerhart Loewenberg stated:

"When complex twentieth-century political issues appeared on the agenda of parliaments, and the burden of work moved to specialized committees, observers criticized the declining frequency and quality of great debates on the floor of the House."⁸⁹

Nonetheless, they did provide a concerted voice on these issues. In years to come, they would disprove Congressman Ichord's view at that time, "I didn't used to think balancing the budget had much political mileage."⁹⁰

J. Kemp-McClure Jobs Creation Act of 1975

Jack Kemp was an active member of the Republican Study Committee and its Executive Committee who had been fascinated with economic issues. His concern about budget balancing can be seen from his earlier activities.⁹¹ In the Special Order referred to in Section I above, Kemp indicated his intention to "propose the enactment of capital formation inducing laws at the earliest opportunity."⁹² Kemp's opportunity occurred on May 21, 1975, when he and 47 colleagues, including 42 members of the RSC, introduced the "Jobs Creation Act of 1975."⁹³ This bill was significant because it moved the House Republicans away from the traditional position of cutting federal spending in order to cut taxes. While the original Kemp Jobs Creation Act included several different concepts, its primary thrust was a substantial tax reduction for both individuals and businesses in order to encourage savings and create jobs

in the private sector of the economy. It was offered as an alternative to various federal job programs which were being advocated by the liberals. At the same time, a companion bill was introduced in the Senate by James McClure.

While Kemp was an active member of the RSC who utilized the services of the RSC staff to advance his measure, the bill itself was drafted in his office and by outside academic experts with whom he had made direct contact. Kemp's bill was publicized to the members of the Republican Study Committee both via the printed "BULLETIN"⁹⁴ and the meetings of the Executive Committee where it was discussed extensively. Most importantly, the RSC staff solicited co-sponsors for his bill and assisted other members in preparing their speeches for Kemp's Special Order to introduce the bill.

As the 95th Congress continued, Kemp introduced new data which amplified his original statements.⁹⁵ The RSC staff continued to solicit their members to support the bill, which by May 1975, had 80 co-sponsors. Of these, 69 were members of the Republican Study Committee. The bill became a useful rallying point for conservatives, but its impact in 1975-76 as an alternative to either public employment jobs or to the liberal Humphrey-Hawkins bill, was minimal.

The Humphrey-Hawkins bill received major media attention, and fairly broad support throughout the Congress. The RSC analyzed the Humphrey-Hawkins bill in detail.⁹⁶ By the time the Education and Labor Subcommittee on Manpower Compensation, Health and Safety reported out the Humphrey-Hawkins bill in April 1976, the RSC held a special Executive Committee meeting to discuss their response to this bill. The leading speakers at the session were John Erlenborn, a senior Republican on the Education and Labor Committee, to which the Humphrey-Hawkins bill had been referred, and Jack Kemp the principal sponsor of the conservative alternative.

The Republican Study Committee played a useful role in extending the efforts of Kemp's activities on his bill. It also helped to establish Kemp and his conservative allies in a more positive light in the national news media. RSC press releases on the Kemp bill, and his chapter in The Case Against the Reckless Congress helped portray Kemp as one of the positive influences on the national conservative scene. Kemp was a national figure because of his prior position as quarterback on the Buffalo Bills football team. He was young,

handsome and articulate, and thus an effective media spokesman for his viewpoint. As Michael Malbin writes,

"New-styled conservatives, raised in the age of media politics, are every bit as active as their liberal colleagues in the pursuit of their legislative ends."⁹⁷

The Kemp bill and Kemp's personal leadership gave the RSC members a positive alternative to the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill.

During the 94th Congress, neither the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill nor the Kemp Jobs Creation Act passed. The Kemp Act was reintroduced in 1976 as the Kemp-Roth bill and eventually became the basis of President Reagan's tax program in 1981.

K. Task Force on Regulatory Reform

Congressman William Ketchum pointed out the problem of the growth of the independent regulatory agencies in his chapter in The Case Against the Reckless Congress:

"Over time, increasing power has been usurped by what has become known as the fourth branch of government. While Congress turned its back, the regulatory agencies -- a power group unforeseen by our nation's founders -- came to occupy a position of unparalleled power and influence in the United States. With a work force of over 63,000 employees, in 30 agencies, and with literally trillions of rules and regulations in its control, this fourth branch of government has largely become a sad fact of the American way of life."⁹⁸

While Ketchum may have overstated the number of specific regulations, the RSC membership shared a perspective that the independent regulatory agencies were not under the control of either the Legislative or the Executive Branch. A number of RSC members had expressed their concern over these developments, but the RSC member activities were uncoordinated.

Congressman Bill Archer (R-Texas) approached the chairwoman of the Republican Study Committee, Marjorie Holt, about the possibility of establishing a task force on regulatory reform within the structure of the RSC. The matter was discussed at Executive Committee meetings in June and July of 1975. The RSC had never had an ad hoc task force on a particular subject before. Archer committed salary support to a task force staff director, who would report to the RSC's executive director. The task force would use the

RSC offices, secretarial help, and support capability. The Executive Committee agreed to the idea and Mrs. Holt announced Archer's appointment as chairman in a press release dated July 31, 1975.⁹⁹ Archer's background was appropriate to this role as he had previously served on President Ford's White House Commission on Regulatory Reform, and had seen how executive action would not be enough to curb the abuses of most of the regulatory agencies. Archer's commitment to fund a staff director resulted in the hiring of attorney Terry Reed in August 1975.

In the meantime, Archer and Holt jointly selected the members of the task force based on their expressions of interest, as well as their salary commitments to the Republican Study Committee. Appointment to a task force like this could be a useful device to a member in his own district. It would give him "instant credibility" with the local media as an expert on an important area of constituent concern. Thus, the membership was dispensed as a favor as well as on an interest basis. In effect, the task force gave the RSC a series of patronage-like positions which it could dispense to its members.

While the task force was being formed, the RSC continued to issue papers on aspects of regulatory reform. These included "Amendments to FDA Limiting Power to Regulate Vitamins,"¹⁰⁰ and other fact sheets which dealt with transportation regulatory agencies, including the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the environmental and social regulatory agencies such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency.

It should be noted that the task force structure was not an unique idea to the Republican Study Committee. The Republican Research Committee, a formal part of the party structure in the House of Representatives, had used task forces in the mid-1960s on subjects such as East-West trade, crime and education. These party task forces were also of the ad hoc variety and their chairmen were given complete independence by the chairman of the Republican Research Committee. Archer, on the other hand, coordinated his task force's activities closely with the RSC and Reed functioned both as the staff director of the task force and a regular member of the staff of the Republican Study Committee.

The task force also worked closely with the Republican White House. Archer and other Republicans were involved in various Administration initiatives on regulatory reform which Archer could then carry through via the task force. Within the House, Reed prepared Special Orders including a general overview on regulatory reform,¹⁰¹ energy development,¹⁰² and occupational safety and health.¹⁰³ Bills relating to increased congressional oversight and reform of specific agencies such as OSHA and the CAB were drafted by Reed and introduced by Archer. Co-sponsors were solicited from the RSC. All of the staff work involved in both the Special Orders and the bills was implemented by Reed working with other members of the RSC staff. Members were repeatedly advised that "an adequate supply of speech material is available for your use."¹⁰⁴

The task force enabled the members who became involved to speak in a coordinated way on important issues. Because of the formal committee structure in the House, regulatory reform crossed the committee's jurisdictional lines. Thus, without an instrument like the RSC task force, no vehicle existed to take a broad view of the issue in a coordinated fashion. Additionally, the task force provided the members with a public relations outlet in their home districts. By raising these issues, the members were also finding fault with big government, at a time when many of their colleagues in the Democratic party were advocating more governmental programs. Although the task force did not achieve any specific legislative goals, it did serve to focus efforts and provide the concerned members support in the many aspects of this issue.

L. Other Domestic Issues

The interests of the members in constituent concerns, or in concerns of major issues not on the RSC agenda, presented the staff with difficult choices. Clearly, it was in their own interest to be helpful to the members. Simultaneously, they could not become so involved in parochial tasks that their work on major projects for the group was neglected. Several of these domestic issues are mentioned in this section.

Civil Rights Regulations

Occasionally during the course of the 94th Congress, a member of the Executive Committee would utilize the resources of the Republican Study Committee for a narrow project which became of interest to the entire group.

The question of civil rights regulations regarding primary school inspections from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was a case in point. As with other legislative enactments, the Congress had left the original legislative language vague. Thus, it was up to the Executive Branch to interpret and implement it. Malbin has argued that this vagueness is intentional "...because specificity might have endangered the chances for getting any thing through Congress."¹⁰⁵ This vagueness gave HEW the opportunity to conduct what was considered "harassing" interviews with administrators, teachers, and in some cases, students, over allegations of discrimination. In a District Court decision,¹⁰⁶ the presiding judge directed the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to review their procedures and use appropriate due process in the future.

The HEW procedures which were sent down, however, were objectionable to Marjorie Holt, whose district includes Anne Arundel County, Maryland, where the original case was first tried. Thus, she circulated a letter to the President among the members of the RSC for signatures which stressed their objection to the proposed draft regulations.¹⁰⁷ The letter was eventually signed by 25 members of the Republican Study Committee who shared her concerns.

Upon receipt of that letter, President Ford referred it to David Mathews, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. The RSC Executive Committee met with Mathews on October 7, 1975. Mathews was accompanied by Peter Holmes, the Director of the Office for Civil Rights in HEW. As a result of that meeting, Mathews suggested that Holmes meet with a staff group from the RSC to discuss the concerns of the RSC members. A subsequent meeting was held with Holmes on October 30, 1975 to submit a proposed set of minimum standards for HEW to follow.

The second set of regulations handed down by HEW in the Spring of 1976 were less restrictive, but still far from perfect according to the RSC members. So, on June 22, 1976, Congresswoman Holt again circulated a letter to the membership of the RSC giving Secretary Mathews six basic premises for due process in HEW's dealings with the local agencies. More than 30 members of the RSC signed this letter which was dispatched in late June, and the RSC staff met with Holmes again to reiterate the conservative position on this question. After this RSC effort the new regulations, released several months later, proved to be more acceptable to the members of the RSC than the initial regulations of 1975.

Social Security

Some major issues which confronted the Congress were of such magnitude and importance that the staff attempted to generate member interest in them. This type of staff initiative was used occasionally because the members had not expressed an interest in leading an initiative on a certain issue. Some major issues intimidated the members, either because of their complexity, or because of the seeming intractability of the problems. Staff initiatives to the members did not occur often because the staff was still sensitive to the possible charge that members should direct staff rather than vice versa, but an instance of staff initiative was the question of social security. Robert L. Schuettinger, a senior staff member of the RSC, completed an RSC background paper on the social security system.¹⁰⁸ This was later expanded into a book entitled Saving Social Security.¹⁰⁹

Social Security has always been considered to be a tax, and has come under the jurisdiction of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. The vice chairman of the RSC, Philip Crane, joined the Ways and Means Committee in 1975 after giving up his membership on the Banking and Currency Committee. Thus, Schuettinger sent a memorandum to Crane detailing his study and alternative proposals on February 18, 1975.¹¹⁰ This memo included copies of the Schuettinger study and references to other major studies which had been published on this subject. Proposals were made to Crane on how the study might be publicized and on which academic experts might be brought in to meet with members of the RSC. If these meetings were successful, Schuettinger argued that the academics could be invited to testify before the Subcommittee on Social Security on which Crane served. The RSC arranged several informal meetings, and two academic experts were invited to testify. But, because of the party ratio on the Ways and Means Committee, the impact of the RSC meeting was insignificant. This also meant that the Republicans had very little input into the committee in the 94th Congress.¹¹¹

In addition, Crane had long considered national health insurance and income tax reduction of greater interest to him than social security, which "never won political points for anyone."¹¹² Crane's reluctance to deal forthrightly with social security was not a politically unique situation for a conservative Republican. The problems of the social security system had been exposed in the academic press for many years, but no politician, of any

ideological hue, had been willing to confront it because of its explosive nature in the constituency. As a result of these circumstances, the social security issue was not one in which the members of the RSC were actively involved. This pointed up a general limitation which the staff of the RSC faced. That is, the members were clearly in charge. Since the RSC staff did not have access to the House floor (like their formal House committee counterparts and their counterparts on the staff of the Senate Steering Committee), they had to depend on the members to take initiatives. Consequently, even if the best package of data were assembled, with all of the arguments put forth in salient fashion, if no member were willing to use it, the whole exercise would be wasted. As Dick Dingman said later:

"In the final analysis, we are here to do the members' bidding. They sign our payroll checks, they vote in committee and on the floor, and they are responsible to their constituencies. We aren't."¹¹³

Dingman's comments recall the limitations under which even entrepreneurial staffs must work. The staff itself could encourage the members to act within the RSC, but ultimately it was up to the members to act on an issue.

M. Conclusion

The House Democratic leadership assumed that the 94th Congress would be a major move forward for their liberal members. Having greatly increased their numbers, they were going to enact many legislative programs which the conservatives had long thwarted. However, actions proved otherwise. This can be attributed to several factors:

1. The liberal members who had been elected to represent conservative constituencies did not vote for all of the liberal bills. If they had, they might have suffered retribution at the polls in 1976.
2. The presence of a Republican in the White House gave the Democratic leadership serious problems. If the Democrats passed bills, President Ford could veto them.
3. The Republican Study Committee in the House and the Senate Steering Committee in the Senate were in place and reasonably effective. They had learned to work with outside pressure groups on issues of common concern. In addition, the RSC and SSC provided pressure on both President Ford and the Republican leadership in the House and Senate to move in a conservative direction.

4. The conservatives had introduced major bills which were gathering media attention and which were becoming an alternative part of the national agenda.

As the RSC operated during this period, it learned several lessons concerning the legislative process. On a number of bills like the Consumer Protection Agency, the common situs picketing measure, land use planning and surface mining control, they learned that they were fighting the same battle over again. This confirmed Professor Ripley's perspective:

"It should be noted that successful defensive lobbying in one year does not necessarily remove an item from the congressional agenda for future years."¹¹⁴

The RSC also became more sophisticated in its operations within the House committee system. When Sam Steiger decided to push for a vote in the Interior Committee on federal land use, he worked effectively with the external pressure groups on the bill. Steiger knew that some of his colleagues on the committee might be swayed by pressure from their home districts.¹¹⁵

In other legislative battles the presence of the RSC staff gave the Republican conservatives a new role in the House. The RSC staff was basically what Malbin describes as an "innovative" staff.¹¹⁶ That is, they had no assigned responsibility for either deliberation or oversight. While this could create problems for the system as a whole, for the RSC membership it meant new opportunities and new vistas. John Rhodes had proposed a general Republican legislative agenda, and with the addition of professional staff aides of the caliber of David Swoap, the RSC could help set that agenda. This positive input was seen in the RSC initiatives regarding both welfare reform and food stamp reform. As Allen Schick has said, "An independent supply of analysis can stimulate members to diverge from their leaders..."¹¹⁷ Malbin's entrepreneurial theory extends this argument further. He argues that staff entrepreneurs result in:

"not only more work but increased decentralization, as non-chairmen have the resources to pursue their interests in not letting committee or party leaders set the terms of floor debate."¹¹⁸

In effect, the RSC became an independent base for positive legislative proposals. With these bills, admittedly in limited areas, it was "leading the leaders." In addition, the RSC's legislative activities had established the RSC as a center with which members would freely associate on legislative projects. Frantzich points out:

"For the congressman, the decision to expend effort proposing and promoting legislation stands as a resource allocation problem. The time and effort required of the congressman and his staff must be balanced against the expected personal, political and public relations payoffs. Numerous other activities subsumed under the multi-faceted congressional job title may well assure more rewards."¹¹⁹

For RSC members, the staff tried to demonstrate that their involvement led to a positive, political payoff, both in the House and in their home districts. Despite this caveat, the RSC staff did lead its members in these specific issue areas. A positive incentive for conservative Republican members of the House to follow the lead of the RSC was the maturing of the RSC's issue leadership. Its primary spokesmen were perceived by their colleagues as credible cue-givers in their areas of specialization. Professors Milnor and Franklin comment on this vital role:

[T]here is evidence that MPs will trust the judgment of certain members to the extent that particular signatures will legitimate a motion for other members. The groundwork is laid for a highly specialized form of intra-elite opposition capable of building a network of linkages within the political system."¹²⁰

It was just such a role which the RSC, as an integral part of the House of Representatives was developing. The credibility which the RSC had developed with regard to a carefully defined set of issues had earned the confidence of the members to lead them in those areas.

On a practical level, the RSC staff also dealt more effectively with different types of members. As the late Professor John Mackintosh said about his colleagues in the British Parliament:

"...most Members of Parliament, ambitious or not, are very jealous lest any colleague should steal a march on them."¹²¹

The individual sensibilities and idiosyncracies of individual members sometimes became overriding factors in who would support whose bill, or who would participate in whose Special Order. These individual characteristics

are not open to quantification or even to specific description. But, they are key factors in the individual relationships which were established between the members and the RSC staff and among the members themselves. The members of the RSC also made effective use of external academic resources. In the case of land use, one study was commissioned, and several others formed the basis of Special Orders about major public issues.

The majority of the major issues of concern to the RSC were of broad ideological interest. Again, because of the numerous access points to the legislative process, the Republican Study Committee enabled its members to fill a specific role. Norman Ornstein had commented on the increasing ideological input into the legislative process, especially in the House:

"During the floor debate and amendment process, making ideological points for national groups or constituencies, protecting the interests of particular groups, asserting an individual prerogative, or altering a broader policy direction (without deep regard for the specific piece of legislation under consideration) are all competing priorities of significant rank."¹²²

The RSC staff enabled its members to contribute to the national debate in each of the ways Ornstein mentions. Other major items occupied the attention of the House. For example, the Congress passed an Emergency Farm Bill, tax cuts, an increase of the debt limits and other measures. In these cases, the RSC provided information to its members and their staffs, and held briefing sessions about the bills. However, the RSC's primary emphasis was on a limited number of bills. By concentrating their scarce resources, they had the opportunity to mobilize their influence in an effective way.

VIII. POSTSCRIPT AND CONCLUSION

A. Introduction

The analysis of the Republican Study Committee in this thesis concludes with the 1976 elections. In the House of Representatives, the Republicans lost only one seat, and in the Senate, the partisan ratio was unchanged. A major partisan change did occur, however, with the presidential election. Republican President Gerald Ford was defeated by the former Georgia Governor, Democrat Jimmy Carter. The election of a Democrat to the presidency caused an ideological shift to take place among the Republicans. The party united now in a formal opposition to the new Democratic Administration.

The results of the 1976 elections also brought about a change in the Republican Study Committee's legislative objectives. The successful development of the RSC up to the time of the 1976 elections was partially attributable to the presence of an ally in the White House: by working with the Administration, the members of the RSC had exerted conservative pressure within the Republican party, influenced the legislative process within Congress, and established their own ad hoc faction within the framework of the U.S. House of Representatives. But, with Carter's defeat of Ford the opportunity to work with the Administration was lost. The entire Republican membership in the House of Representatives united in opposition to the Democratic Administration, and the RSC now moved to service this opposition. The new Administration soon began working closely with the Democratic leadership in the Congress to enact its own legislative programs, a situation not unlike the pattern of events which marked the earlier Democratic Administration of Lyndon Johnson.

The next section of this chapter presents an overview of the RSC's activities from 1977-1980. This overview includes a discussion of the personnel, programs, legislative activities, and leadership of the group during that time period. Following this "Postscript," conclusions are drawn from this study of the evolution of the Republican Study Committee. Finally, the author projects the future role of the RSC in the last section entitled "Prognostications."

B. Postscript

The accession of Jimmy Carter to the presidency in January 1977 led to a number of changes in the RSC. Congresswoman Marjorie Holt (R-Maryland) announced that she did not intend to stand for re-election as chairwoman of the Republican Study Committee, and in January 1977, Congressman Clair Burgener (R-California) was elected chairman. Burgener had played an active role in the RSC, particularly through the hiring of David Swoap and through his participation in the RSC's welfare reform activities. Burgener's membership on the House Appropriations Committee gave him a broad perspective of the legislative concerns which would be of interest to the RSC. The remainder of the Executive Committee was essentially unchanged: the vice chairmen and treasurer were re-elected and several retiring members of the Executive Committee were replaced by newly-elected members.¹

In March of 1977, a major change confronted the RSC. Ed Feulner, the executive director, announced that he was leaving the Republican Study Committee to become the president of The Heritage Foundation. Feulner's entrepreneurial leadership together with his intimate knowledge of the House and many RSC members had been "one of the glues that held the RSC together."² Because of his role as the principal staff aide for the Republican Study Committee since its founding, Feulner had a personal as well as a professional interest in selecting a suitable successor. Philip Crane (R-Illinois) and a number of other RSC members emphasized that the new executive director should perform two roles: (1) he should keep the organization functioning; and (2) he should stress an innovative and substantive approach toward the legislative process in the period ahead. In other words, "The RSC had become important as a service organization and as a provider of legislative initiatives,"³ and the new executive director should keep both objectives in mind.

Chairman Burgener established a selection committee to fill the executive director's position. This committee included Philip Crane, John Roussetot (R-California), Bill Armstrong (R-Colorado), Marjorie Holt, Edwin Feulner, and Burgener. After several weeks of meetings and interviews with three candidates, the selection committee reported to the Executive Committee which offered the position of executive director to Richard B. Dingman, former administrative assistant to John Conlan (R-Arizona) and Edward

Forsythe (R-New Jersey). Dingman accepted the position in March, and he and Feulner then worked together to ensure a smooth transition.

With a new executive director and a Democratic Administration in power, it was inevitable that the Republican Study Committee would also undergo a change. The RSC became oriented toward servicing the requests of members and producing fact sheets rather than initiating new and innovative legislative programs. Richard Dingman noted:

"(Feulner) left a very full agenda for us to follow. We had a paperback book to produce every two years, a campaign committee to try and push ahead, and a membership base which needed substantial broadening particularly in view of the fact that we no longer had an ally in the White House."⁴

During subsequent years, the Republican Study Committee moved to expand its membership base.⁵ By 1981, the RSC encompassed 80% of the Republican membership in the U.S. House of Representatives. Two additional paperback books were produced through the RSC Campaign Fund, Can You Afford This House⁶ and View from the Capitol Dome: Looking Right.⁷ But, the most notable of the changes in the operations of the RSC after 1976 were its diminished direct leadership of major legislative initiatives during the period 1977-1980 and its active role in the development of the "New Right."

Although the RSC staff and members took the lead on several key issues in Congress including opposition to postcard voter registration, to the National Consumer Cooperative Bank, to the common situs picketing bill, and to a Consumer Protection Agency, "the RSC just (wasn't) at the cutting edge anymore of the major issues which confronted conservative Republicans in the House."⁸ The RSC was no longer presenting positive legislative proposals, such as its earlier food stamp and welfare reform bills.

One of the factors which contributed to the movement of the RSC away from the "cutting edge" of legislative issues in the House was the increased number of Republican members in the House who joined the RSC. A number of individuals were now welcomed not only as dues-paying members of the RSC, but also as occasional salary contributors and active members of the group. A desirable increase in membership can also bring about unfortunate side-effects, however, including: a dilution of principles to achieve a consensus among the larger number of members, and even an ideological split within

the group. Such a dilution occurred when Bill Frenzel (R-Minnesota), Tom Railsback (R-Illinois), and Barber Conable (R-New York) joined the RSC in 1978. The addition of Railsback to the RSC was of particular note because of his active membership in the liberal Wednesday Group since his election to the House in 1966 and because of his opposition to the RSC on a number of major initiatives including public financing of congressional campaigns. Railsback and liberal David Obey (D-Wisconsin) were the two principal co-sponsors of the Obey-Railsback Bill which would have provided such public financing. However, the presence of Railsback as a dues-paying member did not stop the RSC from becoming actively involved in the battle against the bill, as Dingman pointed out:

"We were happy to receive his dues money, but he was certainly not going to call the shots for the more conservative members who were our primary constituency."⁹

The voluntary nature of the RSC became vital to its effectiveness. Railsback and others who joined the RSC did so on a voluntary basis; they received its publications but participated only in those activities with which they agreed.

The post-1976 RSC began to emphasize new areas of interest. The four major areas of interest to the evolving RSC were detailed in Chapter I. RSC involvement was continued in these areas of legislative activities, academic outreach, electoral activities, and Executive Branch relationships, but with a different emphasis on programs which was compatible with the new RSC legislative approach.

During the 1977-1980 period the congressional legislative program remained the heart of the RSC's activities. As the production of legislative fact sheets, bulletins, and backgrounders occupied the attention of the RSC staff members, major legislative initiatives declined in number. The basic pattern of publications, staff assignments and activities which had been implemented by the Executive Committee under the chairmanships of LaMar Baker (R-Tennessee) and Marjorie Holt, and executive director Feulner was continued.

The academic outreach program of the RSC declined into disuse after the departure of Feulner as the RSC executive director. In part, this decline was caused by the increasing number of outside organizations which provided

this service after 1977. Data, speakers, and academic programs were provided to the Congress by organizations such as The Heritage Foundation, the Institute for Contemporary Studies in San Francisco, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Institute for Research on the Economics of Taxation. If other groups were supplying this service, the RSC reasoned that their limited resources could be used in other activities. A new emphasis on external relations, particularly Richard Dingman's involvement with the conservative Kingston Group, helped to offset the lack of an academic outreach program under the post-1976 Republican Study Committee.

The electoral activities of the RSC did not develop beyond their 1976 level. The RSC Campaign Fund continued to publish biennial paperback books co-authored by RSC members. Packets of voting data were distributed to non-incumbent challengers, vote justifications were issued, and companion publications were also produced. Because of the growth of many other political action committees (PACs), the RSC Campaign Fund never became an effective PAC. Other conservative organizations made direct financial contributions, provided volunteer training programs, polling assistance and other "in-kind" services to the campaigns of conservative candidates.

The Executive Branch relation program which had been implemented prior to the 1976 elections was not used during the Carter Administration. This was a predictable result of the election of a Democratic President who had virtually no common objectives with an ad hoc group of conservative Republicans. However, with the accession of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1981, relations between the Republican Study Committee and members of the Executive Branch were renewed. RSC meetings with the President, the Vice President, Secretaries of the Cabinet departments, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other key Reagan aides became integral parts of the 1981 RSC agenda.

This brief overview outlines the general thrust of the RSC's activity during the period 1977-1980. A recurring theme of this thesis has been that the House of Representatives and its institutional organizations undergo a continuing process of change and adaptation. Because of this change, it is essential to examine an organization within Congress to determine if it has met the objectives of its founders. The changes in Congress and their implications for the RSC, and the evolving role of the RSC are examined in the next section of this chapter.

C. Conclusions

The basic structure of American politics has tended to be non-ideological. Both the Republican and Democratic parties have developed as broad umbrellas which embraced differing perspectives. The rise of a conservative ideological movement within the Republican party in the Congress has been the theme of this thesis.

The RSC was formed as a counter to a liberal ideological group, at a time when conservatism in the United States was re-emerging as a national political force, and the formation of the Republican Study Committee as a vehicle for the elected conservative members in the House of Representatives to express their viewpoint was a relatively new idea.

In the words of Russell Kirk, "The American intellectual renewal of conservative ideas...[had been] perfectly unorganized and undirected."¹⁰ Work was done by isolated individual scholars and men of letters. Kirk further stated:

"So far as we conservative writers had anything in common, it was this: we were social critics, innocent of any design for assuming personal power. For one thing, we set our faces against political centralization, so that a cushy appointment in Washington would have been a repudiating of our own convictions....Of course this haphazard intellectual revival of conservative thought affected American elections only a little. In this land...it takes a long while for a new or revived political concept to supplant in citizens' conscious and subconscious minds accustomed political loyalties and prejudices."¹¹

The ideological factions such as the DSG and the RSC in the House of Representatives play several unique roles in the political process: (1) they serve as a catalyst for "new" or "revived" political concepts within Congress, (2) they give the members themselves an outlet to express their ideological viewpoint and (3) they keep pressure on the party leadership to move the party in the ideological direction of the group. Both the past Minority Leader, John Rhodes, and the current Minority Leader, Bob Michel, have expressed this view.¹² Organizations like the Wednesday Group and special interest groups which are affected by specific government programs provide counter-pressures. These liberal groups, according to Michel and Rhodes, are offset by the internal and external pressures from the conservatives.

The successful application of political pressure depends on two key ingredients: (1) staff to perform the research work and prepare the material and (2) members of the House willing to take the lead on the ideological issues.

The staff has continued to function as a collection center for conservative ideas, some of which have been formulated into conservative proposals. The RSC professional staff has remained at a constant size from 1973 to 1981. This staff has been large enough to monitor most issue areas and to consider those questions which have been of major concern to the members themselves. The maximum size of the staff was determined in part by a number of external factors: availability of office space for additional staff, supervision of a larger staff, salary support for the larger staff, and to some degree by the desires of the members. But, this staff limitation has not limited the RSC's research input in the policy arena. The RSC staff is used as a conservative filter to digest and analyze policy materials and information from various sources, a role which becomes even more important as conservative ideology becomes more central to the national political scene.

These issues on which the RSC concentrated during the mid-1970s have become more politically popular in recent years. For example, Milton Friedman's concept of indexing the federal income tax brackets was reintroduced in subsequent years by Senator William Armstrong (R-Colorado). The Armstrong indexing measure passed both the Senate and the House in 1981. The constitutional amendment to balance the federal budget which Floyd Spence (R-South Carolina) had first introduced in the House of Representatives in 1973, passed the Senate Judiciary Committee in May 1981.

The Republican Study Committee was a vehicle for bringing new ideas into the legislative process. The RSC called these ideas to the attention of the RSC members, refined them, and pursued them on behalf of the members. Michael Malbin says, "There is a connection between the world of ideas, the size of the government's agenda, and the way Congress does its work."¹³ The Republican Study Committee's staff served as a catalyst in this regard.

An examination of the areas of interest to the RSC permits one to draw conclusions from the emerging patterns of earlier RSC activities. For example, a clear pattern of success and failure exists among the RSC's legislative initiatives. The RSC was often successful in supporting and opposing legislation introduced by the other institutionalized power centers in the House.¹⁴ However, it was seldom successful in advocating its own legislative proposals.¹⁵ This pattern is not surprising for several reasons:

1. The RSC was a faction in the minority party of the Congress, and therefore, it had virtually no influence on establishing the legislative agenda.
2. Legislative initiatives have usually come from the Executive Branch of the government, a situation which made RSC initiatives even more difficult when the Democrats regained the presidency in the 1976 election.¹⁶
3. It is easier to effectively oppose a bill in the House than to pass one.¹⁷

It has been argued throughout this thesis that both creative staff professionals and involved members have been crucial elements in the evolution of the Republican Study Committee. The role of the professional staff in the Congress varies substantially, but a vital aspect of the staff role is to assist in determining members' legislative agendas. Some members of Congress have given broad discretion to the staffs in this area. These creative staffs provide items for legislative agendas and then fulfill these agendas themselves. This role raises the issue of control of professional staff. The Republican Study Committee staff has always been controlled by the RSC Executive Committee. Because the RSC staff was "entrepreneurial" it did proceed in substantive areas without day-to-day supervision from the members. However, this did not mean that the staff was able to act on its own. The RSC members retained control over the staff not only via their payroll support, but also through the regular reporting system which occurred at the member meetings. As long as the members had confidence in the executive director and his ability to direct the staff, the routine operations were left in his hands. In the past, when conflicts arose among members themselves over the use of staff resources, such as between Rousselot and Crane on the gold ownership bill,¹⁸ the members themselves have resolved these differences.

Although the RSC staff was hired to perform legislative research and coordination for the RSC members, it tended to be more independent from the members than was the staff in the members' individual offices. There are two reasons for this: (1) individual members were not repaying political obligations by hiring these RSC staff aides. That is, the staff had no home or constituent connection with the members which would bind them to the members or which would convince the members that they had a long-term obligation to support the RSC staff. Consequently, the RSC staff could be hired, and discharged, on the basis of merit, rather than political favor. This also produced a high level of professionalism among staff aides employed by the RSC. (2) Since the professional staff consisted of highly trained personnel, individuals leaving the RSC staff found little difficulty in obtaining positions elsewhere on Capitol Hill, or in Washington.

The role of the RSC as a starting point for talented professionals is clear. For example, David Hoppe (research analyst at the RSC from 1976-1978) is now the Executive Director of the Republican Policy Committee in the House. Phil Truluck, a former senior research analyst of the RSC, has become the Executive Vice President of The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank in Washington, D.C.

As Michael Malbin notes, "congressional staffs increasingly have been filled with people who see their jobs in Congress as stepping stones to somewhere else."¹⁹ The "somewhere else" to which Malbin refers is frequently elsewhere in the Washington political community. Certainly that has been the case with the Republican Study Committee staff over the years. The RSC was a conservative institution in place at the time of the 1980 election. The new Reagan Administration had been encouraged to hire its political appointees from among those who were both familiar with the Washington scene, and who had conservative credentials. Thus, a number of former Republican Study Committee staff professionals now serve in high-level positions in the Reagan Administration:

- John Tierney, who served as senior research associate for national security affairs, has been appointed Assistant Administrator of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
- David Swoap, who came to the Republican Study Committee with outstanding professional and ideological credentials, has since moved on to the most senior position of all former

RSC staff aides. In 1981, he was appointed Under Secretary of Health and Human Services, the second highest position in the largest department of the federal government.

- Donald Senese, a RSC research analyst in educational and social issues, was appointed the Assistant Secretary of Education for Policy by President Reagan.
- Willa Johnson, who served on the professional staff of the Republican Study Committee during 1976, was appointed Deputy Director of Presidential Personnel in the White House.

It could be argued that these individuals would have been appointed to these positions even if they had not worked for the RSC in the past. That is possible, but it is fair to argue that their roles in developing conservative policies in the Republican Study Committee in the House of Representatives were a helpful stepping stone to them in moving into these new positions.

With regard to the leadership requirements for members on specific issues, Richard Dingman believes that the RSC's task in meeting its legislative objective is "finding the leader among the members and then helping the leader orchestrate the battle."²⁰ Dingman cites the RSC work with Congressman Bill Young (R-Florida), who led the RSC battle on the National Consumer Cooperative Bank during 1979-1980, and Congressman Robert Dornan (R-California), who led the battle on postcard voter registration during 1977-1978.

A pattern of leadership began to emerge among the Republican Study Committee members. In virtually every successful RSC legislative effort, the pattern of leadership criteria included:

1. Appointment to the right committee. The conservative members who later formed the RSC had an impact on the Family Assistance Plan in the early 1970s without the participation of any members from the Ways and Means Committee. However, by the time the RSC was organized in 1973, its legislative initiatives were led by a member who was familiar with the issue from his formal committee assignment. This was true across the board:
 - On land use and surface mining, Sam Steiger led the battle in the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee;

- On mass transit and gold ownership, Crane was the leader in the Banking and Currency Committee;
- On foreign policy issues, Derwinski was the leader from the International Relations Committee.

2. Knowledge of the workings of the political system. This leadership was made up of members who wanted to take the lead on an issue on the House floor, however, they lacked sufficient seniority to direct their own staff resources from within the committee structure or to rely on the minority committee staff for research to buttress their position. The RSC staff filled this gap.

During the last several years, it is also noteworthy that a number of members of the Republican Study Committee have moved to higher elected positions. For example, David Treen (R-Louisiana), former chairman of the RSC was elected Governor of Louisiana in 1978. William Armstrong (R-Colorado) was elected to the Senate in 1978, and was followed by James Abdnor (R-South Dakota), Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), and Steve Symms (R-Idaho) who were elected to the Senate in 1980. In the cases of Armstrong, Abdnor, Grassley, and Symms, the House members defeated liberal Democrat incumbents for these Senate seats.²¹ Within the House itself, several members who had close associations with the Republican Study Committee, moved into formal party leadership positions in 1981. Trent Lott (R-Mississippi) was elected the Minority Whip and Jack Kemp (R-New York) was elected chairman of the House Republican Conference. They joined Bob Michel (R-Illinois) who succeeded the retiring John Rhodes (R-Arizona) as the Minority Leader at the close of the 1980 session. Michel, Lott and Kemp had all served as members of the RSC Executive Committee. All three were identified as active RSC members who had coordinated various legislative initiatives through the Republican Study Committee.²²

Not all RSC members' quests either for re-election or for election to higher office were successful, however. Philip Crane ran a spirited but unsuccessful race for the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1980. Two members of the Republican Study Committee were not re-elected to their House seats because of personal scandals: "Judge" Richard Kelly (R-Florida) who was involved in the "Abscam" scandal in 1980 and Bob Bauman (R-Maryland) who pleaded guilty to a charge of "sexual solicitation" in 1980.

In 1976, Sam Steiger (R-Arizona), another RSC member, ran successfully for the Republican nomination for senator, but lost in the general election to Dennis DeConcini (D-Arizona).

With regard to the members of the Republican Study Committee in their races for higher office or return to the Congress, it can be said that their involvement with the RSC did not determine their success or failure. This is a positive factor for the RSC, ie., the involvement of members in issues of national policy need not have a negative impact on their attempts to run for higher office. Thus, there exists the opportunity for the RSC to involve its members in major issues with little risk to the members in their home constituencies.

The Republican Study Committee was established as a legislative information and coordination organization within the House of Representatives, and since that time the RSC has succeeded remarkably well in this role. In July of 1974, the RSC became the catalyst which successfully brought together the opposition to a federal land use planning bill. This measure had already passed the Senate and appeared headed toward certain victory in the House. Also at that time, the RSC advanced the legislative proposal of one of its key members which provided for the private ownership of gold; the RSC had an impact on the liberals' attempt to repeal the Byrd Amendment regarding the sale of Rhodesian chrome; and it was active in the issue of operating subsidies for mass transit. The cumulative impact of these diverse efforts helped the RSC to become a full participating faction within the U.S. House of Representatives.²³

In servicing the conservative members within Congress, the RSC has become an established faction within the House of Representatives. This group of House members is no longer seen as an ad hoc coalition, but instead as an unique, self-consciously organized body which has persisted through time advocating a broad range of conservative policies, attributes which fulfill Richard Rose's description of a faction.²⁴

Samuel Huntington has described the criteria of an institution: "Institutions are stable, valued, recurring patterns of behaviour."²⁵ The RSC has established itself as an existing stable organization, with a continuing voluntary membership which values its services by supporting it financially, and it has developed a recurring pattern of formal conservative behaviour.

The RSC also possesses the faction's characteristics as described by Nelson Polsby:

1. It is differentiated from its environment. It has an independent staff, governing board, budget and office.
2. It is relatively complex. Its meetings, briefings, publications, and method of operation all combine to make it a complex organization. And,
3. It tends to use universalistic rather than particularistic criteria for conducting internal business. Its agenda is prepared, officers are elected, minutes are kept, and dues are collected according to established procedures.²⁶

The role of the Republican Study Committee within the Republican party is not a formal one. In fact, its relationship to the formal institution of the Republican party -- the Republican National Committee -- is marginal.²⁷ Rather the RSC's role vis-a-vis the Republican party has been to move the Republican party, particularly in the House of Representatives, in a more conservative direction. Professor Norman Ornstein commenting on the House of Representatives in 1981 says that:

"more and more the House is an ad hoc institution, without firm control over its own schedule or priorities -- much like the Senate...."Leadership" on specific issues can come from any of 400 or more different sources."²⁸

Ornstein's comments on multiple decision centers, and the declining importance of hierarchial, formal positions is an accurate representation of the House of Representatives today. In this context, the RSC performs a useful role for conservative Republicans. It brings together diversity within the Republican conservative membership in the House, reconciles priorities on the issues, and trades participation among the members for the different issues being advocated by their colleagues. With power diffused, as Ornstein notes, the RSC has to pull together diverse, smaller elements. This gives the Republican Study Committee and other ideological factions the opportunity to exercise additional influence over the legislative agenda. Of course, the RSC is a different organization from the other ideological factions in the Congress.

When speaking of the RSC's effectiveness, comparisons with both the Democratic Study Group and the Senate Steering Committee are inevitable.

The RSC is different from both the DSG and the Senate Steering Committee. By the mid-1970s, some of the activist members of the DSG, such as Morris Udall (D-Arizona), had become chairmen of major committees. At that point, their involvement with the Democratic Study Group became less important to their own efforts in launching major legislative initiatives. Similarly, the conservative Senate Steering Committee became less relevant in 1981 when the Republicans gained control of the Senate and early Steering Committee members were now full committee chairmen.²⁹ The RSC has not found itself in the same position as either of these groups. The Republicans in the House are still in the minority and the Republican members have limited access to committee staff, thus the role of the RSC's staff remains a vital one to the House conservative Republicans.

There is a disadvantage in the RSC's role, particularly since conservatives are now perceived as being in control of the political agenda in Washington. In the past, the RSC has been able to fashion political amendments to embarrass the liberal majority in the House. Sinclair commented on this ability:

"Given the skill of the right in fashioning politically embarrassing amendments with considerable constituency appeal, the 'safe' course for many members was to vote against the [Democratic] leadership's position."³⁰

While the conservative Republicans could lead this activity in the past, their success is now less likely, because conservatives are perceived by the public as being in the majority in Congress.

The Republican conservatives in the House of Representatives have come a long way toward making their own agenda the national political agenda. But, this means that they will have to change their tactics with regard to some of their floor activities, now that they, together with the conservative Democrats, form an effective majority in the House.

Richard Dingman has stressed one of the RSC's new interests in "framing the issues in a more conservative manner,"³¹ to provide a form of conservative pressure. An example of this framing involved the 1981 congressional battle over reductions in the federal budget. President Reagan's budget proposal called for cuts of \$50 billion for fiscal year 1982, while the Republican Study Committee's proposal called for cuts of almost \$100 billion.

When Reagan's budget cuts were compared to the RSC proposal, Reagan's cuts were shown to be quite moderate. The lack of nation-wide press attention, however, caused the impact of the RSC's more conservative option on this issue to be relatively minor. With adequate media attention, the RSC expects this type of action to prove more decisive in future issues.³²

While the RSC's role has changed, it has helped the conservative movement evolve toward maturity. It has provided the vehicle through which legislative battles have been waged by conservative elected officials. In this context, the RSC has played a role in the rise of conservatism. Both John Rhodes and Robert Michel have cited the RSC's role in countering the pressures from the liberal factions in Congress.³³ Yet, most recently as Ronald Reagan, a conservative Republican President, negotiated with members of the House over legislative issues, several conservative Republican members of the House grumbled that "he takes us for granted,"³⁴ and "we don't get the attention that the conservative Democrats get because they are the marginal people that he has to win over. I wonder if he is really worried about his base of support."³⁵ In the process of functioning as President of the United States, Ronald Reagan has had to expand his base from that of a factional leader to a coalition leader.³⁶ As this is done, the RSC will find itself in a difficult position since on the one hand, the RSC should support its ideological and partisan ally in the White House, but on the other hand, some of the RSC members think that in building this coalition, various policies will lose their basic conservatism. These complaints are reminiscent of the same problems which the RSC faced in its dealings with former Presidents Nixon and Ford: allies of the President tend to be taken for granted while the President and his staff reach out to build a majority coalition.

According to Philip Crane, the function of a group like the Republican Study Committee is to introduce new and dramatic ideas into the policy process. After they are introduced, one of the major parties will co-opt the idea and bring it into the mainstream of political thought. This is Crane's definition of how the RSC should be functioning at the "cutting edge" of the congressional public policy process. He points to the RSC-led initiatives on tax indexing and balanced federal budgets which were later adopted as policy by the Republicans and finally by the majority of the Congress. Crane believes that the RSC is now overly concerned with "legitimacy within

the Republican structure."³⁷ To take the lead on a "cutting edge" initiative is to risk that it will find no support on the floor and possibly lose respectability for the organization or the leader. In this context, Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia) expresses the viewpoint that "the RSC can't take risks; it has more to lose than to gain if it gets too far out front."³⁸ He asserts that the RSC now spends 90% of its resources on managerial or maintenance functions rather than on entrepreneurial ones. Gingrich notes that the RSC lacks strategic drive, but admits that the RSC does play a useful role. It has "hygienic effects" on the party. It pressures the leadership to keep the party broadly conservative. This pressure role is an important one -- "It makes it easier for the leadership to do the right thing," according to Gingrich.³⁹ He has also noted, "If the organization were not in existence, we would probably have to invent it."⁴⁰

Richard Dingman's view of the RSC differs substantially from both Philip Crane and Newt Gingrich. Dingman maintains that the RSC is certainly "not just a service bureau. Ask any moderate or liberal and they'll tell you that the Republican Study Committee is still very conservative."⁴¹ At the same time, however, Dingman concedes that the RSC is now viewed more as a support organization than as an entrepreneurial vehicle through which the members will accomplish their legislative agenda. This is a substantial shift in emphasis from the RSC's earlier role as an entrepreneurial organization which brought conservative alternatives into the public policy arena. In this different role, the RSC is still an important legislative participant in the House of Representatives. It provides voting cues to its members through its publications, whip calls and briefings; pressures the Republican leadership from the right; and presents the conservative option as an alternative. Its leadership on specific major legislative agenda items has decreased substantially. Of these positive roles, none could be performed without an RSC-type organization as a distinct faction with an ideological perspective in the House. In summary, the RSC has maintained a separate identity in the House, and has exerted a conservative influence on the Republican party.

The Republican Study Committee has begun to play a new role as a coalition leader for organizations of the so-called "New Right."⁴² In its earlier days, 1973-1976, the allies of the Republican Study Committee were

most frequently representatives of the business community. Coalitions were formed on subjects like federal land use and the Consumer Protection Agency with lobbyists from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and other business organizations. During the 1977-1980 period, it was more likely that the Republican Study Committee's allies would be formed from among the politically active organizations of the New Right, particularly considering Richard Dingman's chairmanship of the Kingston Group whose primary participants have been the leaders of the New Right. Groups such as the Moral Majority, the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, and Coalitions for America, many of which were not in existence five years earlier, frequently worked with the RSC on specific bills during the 1977-1980 period. The business community continues to hold meetings and strategy sessions for their own members, and a few business representatives also participate in the Kingston Group. But, the Kingston Group is an action coalition with its own agenda:

"Action items are discussed, assignments are made and the participants are expected to report both on their recent activities and on the assignments they have undertaken for past Kingston agenda items."⁴³

John Lees notes the legitimate role which interest groups play in the political process: "In a pluralistic society with a diffuse political system dependent on popular control, interest group activity has become a necessary part of political activity."⁴⁴ It is not unusual that these interest groups which share broad common values meet together and build coalitions toward common objectives. However, it is unusual that the chairman of the coalition is an employee of a significant group of the legislators who will be subject to pressure on the issues. Professor Lees questions whether these interest groups could become too institutionalized under certain circumstances.⁴⁵ However, the diversity of their agenda and the presence of countervailing liberal pressure groups which are organized in an analogous manner makes this event unlikely.

An intriguing aspect of the election of Ronald Reagan as President and the popularity of conservative alternatives in the public policy arena is the rapidity with which they have been accepted by large blocs of the electorate. This is due, in some measure, to the articulation of these issues by various candidates. It is also due to the infrastructure of New

Right organizations which have been established, and which have been coordinated through the Kingston Group chaired by Dingman. As Paul Weyrich notes:

"Through the Kingston Group and other means of informal exchange, we have helped many organizations become fully operational in less time than it would have required without our help."⁴⁶

Weyrich also noted the New Right organizations were patterned after the liberal organizations of an earlier era:

"Just as the Study Committee copied much from the DSG, many of our other organizations are also patterned after the Common Cause, Ralph Nader complex of the late 1960s and early 1970s."⁴⁷

Dingman plays a valuable role as the neutral chairman of the Kingston Group. While he is a known conservative leader, as executive director of the RSC, he represents the "inside" operation of Washington's Capitol Hill. If he were a representative of only one of the pressure groups, the New Right coalitions could run the risk of jealousy and rivalry from other "outside" pressure groups. The range of organizations involved in these coalition building efforts is very broad. For example, the subsidiary coalition which concentrates on national security issues is called the "Stanton Group." Its membership ranges from a New Right organization called "The Committee for a Free Afghanistan" to such sturdy pillars of the Washington establishment as the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion.

The role of the Kingston Group, then, is to act as the outside vehicle for mobilizing grassroots support behind legislative initiatives generated either within the Republican Study Committee (such as the 1980-1981 battle against renewed funding for the Legal Services Corporation), or major coordinated strategies to defeat liberal initiatives in other areas such as the 1977 battle over the Panama Canal treaties, and the 1979-1980 opposition to the Senate ratification of the SALT-II Treaty.

In this role, the Kingston Group brings together a network of pressure groups which reinforces the internal efforts of the RSC and its members. Since the Kingston Group has its own agenda which is different and distinct from the RSC's agenda, clashes could occur if participants in the Kingston meetings took positions which key members of the RSC consider extreme or

politically unpalatable at home. This has not happened to date, although not all Kingston Group agenda items are of high priority to the RSC. Dingman asserts that "at no time have any of the chairmen under whom I have served encouraged me to reduce my visible presence as head of the Kingston Group."⁴⁸ This role is a recent development for coalitions in the U.S. Congress.

D. Prognostications

To a significant extent, the future of the Republican Study Committee depends on the success of the presidency of Ronald Reagan. For many conservatives, Ronald Reagan has personified the ideal President for more than a decade. His political rhetoric and his ideology are closer to the RSC's position on issues than any other President of recent times. This identity of views brings both positive and negative aspects to the RSC's role. The limiting factors include:

- It will be more difficult for the Republican Study Committee to oppose President Reagan. Opposition efforts may be mounted, for example, to "out-Reagan" Reagan by proposing substantially greater budget cuts than the President himself offers, thereby framing the issue in a more conservative manner. However, proposals like this will not be viewed as serious alternatives by most other Republican members or even most RSC members; these proposals could be perceived as divisive by many RSC members who believe victory for the President's own proposals is attainable.
- It will be more difficult for the RSC to take positions in opposition to the Republican party. Because the results of the 1980 congressional elections raised the possibility of a Republican majority in the House of Representatives in 1982, independence from the Republican party has been difficult to maintain for groups such as the Republican Study Committee, particularly considering the presence of three former RSC Executive Committee members in the official House Republican leadership.

The positive factors include:

- The election of conservative Ronald Reagan has unified the Republican party and particularly the members of the RSC

in a common conservative legislative agenda. If the President's proposals are successful, the 1982 congressional elections may mean victory for the Republicans which would result in a Republican majority in the House of Representatives. In that event, senior Republicans including many RSC members would assume formal committee and subcommittee chairmanships in the House. This would enable the Congress to pass still more conservative legislation.

- An original reason for organizing the Republican Study Committee was that the Nixon Administration had been adopting non-conservative positions on major issues. The Reagan Administration is less likely to do this because Reagan and his advisers are more conservative than Nixon and his advisers were and because the Senate is controlled by the Republicans who apply a conservative pressure on the Reagan Administration.

Also, conservative groups outside of the Congress will continue to lobby both the Republican Administration and the House Minority Leadership from the right for their conservative political agenda. The RSC's broader membership base means that it is less likely to take "extreme" or "cutting edge" positions now than it did during either the Ford or Carter eras. Various commentators, such as Charles Lindblom, have argued that, "Democracies change their policies almost entirely through incremental adjustments. Policy does not move in leaps and bounds."⁴⁹ The Crane view, on the other hand, is that an ideological faction must be willing to take unpopular or "extreme" positions to make the smaller (and more realistic) changes more politically palatable. The RSC's broader base, together with its desire, as Richard Dingman says, to make "conservative ideas respectable in the political process,"⁵⁰ points to the likelihood that the RSC will continue to emphasize its managerial function rather than its entrepreneurial function. Given the legislative pattern which has been established thus far, the bulk of the initiatives in the next several years is likely to be coming from the Executive Branch rather than the Congress. This would lead to fewer major RSC initiatives on public policy issues.

If the Republican Study Committee maintains a modicum of independence, it will continue to play a useful role as the conservatives' pressure group on both the House Minority Leadership, and on the conservative Republican President. The independence of the RSC would further serve as a reminder to the conservative leaders of their basic conservative constituency by channeling conservative input into the political system and exerting political pressure from the right.

If, on the other hand, the RSC's role becomes one of merely supporting the President's legislative proposals without advocating its own alternatives, and without objecting to the ideological deviations which inevitably occur in recommendations from the Executive Branch, the Republican Study Committee will sink into an ill-defined political posture where it will become less relevant. If that were to happen, it is plausible that a new group of ideologically-committed conservative House members and staff aides would establish a new conservative ideological faction -- similar to the original concept of the Republican Study Committee -- to help them implement their conservative legislative agenda.

APPENDIX A

Republican Study Committee

Statistical Comparisons

Republican Study Committee
Statistical Comparisons

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	June 1, 1981
Dues-Paying Members	78	80	55	63	75	91	115	123	150
Professional Staff	6	9	10	10	11	10	10	11	13
Clerical Staff	1	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	3
Outside Subscribers	N.A.	N.A.	34	65	75	82	86	89	95

N.A. -- Not Applicable

SOURCE: Records of the Republican Study Committee

APPENDIX B

Statement of Purpose

REPUBLICAN STUDY COMMITTEE

Statement of Purpose

The Republican Study Committee is a group of conservative Republican Congressmen who favor progressive measures within the framework of constitutional government and who have pooled their resources to provide themselves with more effective research and legislative support.

- Our purpose is to persuade rather than to divide; we will continue, as we have in the past, to cooperate closely with the Republican Leadership in the House of Representatives. At the same time we want to ensure that conservative alternatives are given a full and fair hearing both on the floor of the House and in the councils of the Administration.

- We believe that the preservation of individual liberties is the purpose of our constitutional system of government.

- We believe that our liberties are dependent upon a strong national defense second to none and upon a foreign policy that always places the just interests of the American people first.

- We believe that both spiritual and material prosperity are enhanced when government intrusion in the social, political, and economic lives of our citizens is strictly limited.

- We believe that the power of a strong central government, when increased at the expense of state and local government, is a threat to individual liberties.

- We believe that the American system of free, competitive, private enterprise best energizes the creative talents of our people and best serves the interests of consumers, workers, farmers and businessmen.

- We believe that unlimited government spending is the main cause of inflation which erodes the savings of our citizens and levies on them a heavy tax without their consent; accordingly, we believe in a balanced budget and frugal, efficient public services.

- We believe that most of the federal government's social policies have not significantly contributed to the general welfare of the people they were intended to help, and accordingly, we believe that reforms are needed in our domestic programs.

- We believe that the councils of "pragmatism" or "expediency" would set us adrift on the political seas without a compass; we believe finally that principle makes good politics.

To implement these principles in practice, we have combined our resources to establish a research and information center with a shared staff of specialists who will provide us with the facts we need to serve our constituents as informed legislators, and who will aid us in coordinating support for the bills and amendments introduced by our members.

APPENDIX C

Sources

1. Bibliography
2. Interviews

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- Jack Cox, former Administrative Assistant to Honorable Barry Goldwater, Jr. Republican Member of Congress (20th District, California), Washington, D.C., May 14, 1980.
- Honorable Daniel B. Crane, Republican Member of Congress (22nd District, Illinois), Washington, D.C., June 15, 1981.
- Honorable Philip M. Crane, Republican Member of Congress (12th District, Illinois), Washington, D.C., April 15, 1980 and March 4, 1981.
- Honorable Edward J. Derwinski, Republican Member of Congress (4th District, Illinois), Washington, D.C., February 4, 1980.
- Richard B. Dingman, Executive Director, The Republican Study Committee, Washington, D.C., January 28, 1980 and May 21, 1981.
- Honorable Roger A. Freeman, former Special Assistant to President Richard Nixon, Stanford, California, September 9, 1980.
- Honorable Newt Gingrich, Republican Member of Congress (6th District, Georgia), Washington, D.C., May 21, 1981.
- Honorable Edith Green, former Democratic Member of Congress (3rd District, Oregon), Portland, Oregon, September 5, 1980.
- Honorable Marjorie S. Holt, Republican Member of Congress (4th District, Maryland), Washington, D.C., January 23, 1980.
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- Michael O. Ware, former research associate, The Republican Study Committee, Washington, D.C., June 15, 1979.
- Paul M. Weyrich, former Assistant to Honorable Carl T. Curtis, former Republican United States Senator (Nebraska) and to Honorable Gordon Allott, former Republican United States Senator (Colorado), Washington, D.C., October 16, 1979.
- James Williams, former policy analyst, The Democratic Research Organization, Washington, D.C., December 12, 1978.

APPENDIX D

Table of Abbreviations

Table of Abbreviations

AA	-	Administrative Assistant
ACU	-	American Conservative Union
AFDC	-	Aid for Dependent Children
ASC	-	American Security Council
CBO	-	Congressional Budget Office
CCHF	-	Congressional Clearing House on the Future
Cons.	-	Conservative
CPA	-	Consumer Protection Agency
CRS	-	Congressional Research Service
CSFC	-	Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress
CVF	-	Conservative Victory Fund
D	-	Democrat
DRO	-	Democratic Research Organization
DSG	-	Democratic Study Group
FAP	-	Family Assistance Plan
GAO	-	Government Accounting Office
I	-	Independent
IBRD	-	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
IDA	-	International Development Association
IPU	-	Inter-Parliamentary Union
LA	-	Legislative Assistant
MCPL	-	Members of Congress for Peace Through Law
NCPAC	-	National Conservative Political Action Committee
90th Congress	-	1967-1968
91st Congress	-	1969-1970
92nd Congress	-	1971-1972
93rd Congress	-	1973-1974
94th Congress	-	1975-1976
95th Congress	-	1977-1978
96th Congress	-	1979-1980
97th Congress	-	1981-1982
NSRG	-	National Strategy Research Group
OEO	-	Office of Economic Opportunity
OTA	-	Office of Technology Assessment
PAC	-	Political Action Committee
R	-	Republican
Rep.	-	Representative
RSC	-	Republican Study Committee
SOS	-	"Save Our Souls" (Republican House Members' social group)
SSI	-	Supplemental Security Income
UDI	-	Unilateral Declaration of Independence

APPENDIX E

Footnotes

CHAPTER I

¹Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1885.

²See, for example, DeAlva Stanwood Alexander, History and Procedure of the House of Representatives, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1916, and Robert Luce, Legislative Assemblies, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1924. An overview of this evolution is presented in Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, eds., The Legislative Process in the United States, Third Edition, New York: Random House, 1977, part I.

³Stuart A. Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928.

⁴See, for example, Robert Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1950.

⁵Kenneth J. Shepsle and David W. Rohde, Taking Stock of Congressional Research: The New Institutionalism, St. Louis: Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, September 1978, pp. 11-12.

⁶Op. cit., Jewell and Patterson, p. 1.

⁷Throughout this thesis the Republican Study Committee is referred to by its final name, however, it was first called the Republican Steering Committee. The name used in a cited quotation or passage will be retained in this text.

⁸Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, Third Edition, Chicago: Rand-McNally College Publishing Company, 1977, and Richard Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain," Political Studies, Vol. XII, No. 1, 1964, pp. 33-46.

⁹As described by Michael J. Malbin, Unelected Representatives, New York: Basic Books, 1980, esp. ch. 10.

¹⁰See Chapters VII and VIII, infra.

¹¹Op. cit., Malbin; op. cit., Jewell and Patterson, Chapter 9; and Harrison W. Fox, Jr. and Susan Webb Hammond, Congressional Staffs the Invisible Force in American Lawmaking, New York: The Free Press, 1977.

¹²Op. cit., Jewell and Patterson, p. 208.

¹³Michael J. Malbin, "Delegation, Deliberation, and the New Role of Congressional Staff," in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, The New Congress, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981, p. 170.

¹⁴Op. cit., Shepsle and Rohde, p. 24.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁶Margo Carlisle, "Changing the Rules of the Game in the U.S. Senate," Policy Review #7, Winter, 1979, pp. 79-92.

¹⁷See Chapter V, infra.

¹⁸Martin Tolchin, "Reagan Used Legislative Shortcut to Slash Budget; Stockman Plan Bore Fruit," The New York Times, June 28, 1981, p. 28.

¹⁹"The 1970s was a period of explosive growth for ad hoc groups. DSG was the only such group in existence before 1960. Two others were formed during the 1960s, seven between 1970 and 1974, and thirty-four from 1975 to 1979." Op. cit., Malbin in Mann and Ornstein, p. 148.

²⁰See Chapter IV, infra.

²¹See Chapter II, infra.

²²Op. cit., Peabody and Polsby, p. 106.

²³Interview with Honorable Edward J. Derwinski, Washington, D.C., February 4, 1980.

²⁴See Chapter III, infra.

²⁵Andrew J. Milnor and Mark N. Franklin, "Patterns of Opposition Behavior in Modern Legislatures," in Allan Kornberg, ed., Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, New York: McKay, 1973, p. 445.

²⁶Mary McInnis, ed., We Propose: A Modern Congress, New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1966. This situation is described in Chapter III, infra.

²⁷Interview with Honorable Ben B. Blackburn, Washington, D.C., December 28, 1978.

²⁸See Chapter II, infra.

²⁹Interview with Paul M. Weyrich, Washington, D.C., October 10, 1979.

³⁰See Chapters IV and V, infra.

³¹With regard to Vietnam, the conservative Republicans relied on the Administration for guidance. And, the Watergate issue had divided the RSC membership into supporters and opponents of President Nixon. The organization was not an established organization and the key members had determined that if the RSC became involved in Watergate, the organization could be torn apart internally. See Chapter V, infra.

³²These single-issue caucuses are discussed in Chapter III; they include the Rural Caucus, the Textile Caucus, the Steel Caucus, and the Suburban Caucus, among others.

³³See Chapter III, infra.

³⁴Roger Davidson asserts that: "Many groups model themselves after the highly successful Democratic Study Group..." in "Subcommittee Governments," in op. cit., Mann and Ornstein, pp. 99-133 at p. 129.

³⁵See Chapter IV, infra.

³⁶Op. cit., Jewell and Patterson, p. 221.

³⁷See Chapter III, infra.

³⁸Michael J. Malbin, "House Reforms -- The Emphasis is on Productivity, Not Power," National Journal, December 4, 1976, p. 1731.

³⁹Morris P. Fiorina, Congress, Keystone of the Washington Establishment, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, p. 64.

⁴⁰Mark F. Ferber, "The Democratic Study Group: A Study of Intra-Party Organizations in the House of Representatives," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, Inc., 1964, pp. 351-360. Civil rights issues were high on the agenda of the DSG throughout the remainder of the 1960s and into the early 1970s. The DSG's active role in promoting a number of major civil rights bills during this period has been cited by commentators as being a critical factor in the passage of this legislation. Automation became a "non-issue" which simply passed away as the growth of the American economy produced more jobs than automation eliminated. By the mid-1970s, the Humphrey-Hawkins bill became a vehicle to promote full employment policies, but it was in a far-different context from what Ferber had projected. The question of church-state relations occupied some of the debate in Congress surrounding such issues as abortion, but it, too, was not the major question which Ferber anticipated.

⁴¹Interview with Honorable Marjorie S. Holt, Washington, D.C., January 23, 1980.

⁴²Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Edward J. Derwinski.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴John J. Rhodes, The Futile System, Garden City, New York: EPM Publications, Inc., 1976, p. 113.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Op. cit., Jewell and Patterson, p. 333.

⁴⁷Interview with Honorable Steven D. Symms, Washington, D.C., December 20, 1980.

⁴⁸The Conservative Victory Fund's Executive Committee consisted of two conservative House Republicans: John Ashbrook (R-Ohio) and Phil Crane (R-Illinois). Both of these men proved to be active members of the RSC. The third member was Maryland Republican State Senator Robert Bauman who was later elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in August 1973.

⁴⁹See Chapter IV, infra.

⁵⁰Because the essays and voting records were compiled in the same volume, the RSC was an inappropriate sponsoring vehicle. Since The Case Against the Reckless Congress was considered an electoral project and since

the RSC Campaign Fund was an electoral committee, the financing of the book was handled through the RSC Campaign Fund.

⁵¹See Chapter VII, infra.

⁵²See Chapters IV and VI, infra.

⁵³Op. cit., Fiorina.

⁵⁴See Chapter VI, infra.

⁵⁵See Chapter VIII, infra.

⁵⁶Interview with Honorable Newt Gingrich, Washington, D.C., May 21, 1981.

⁵⁷Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane, Washington, D.C., March 4, 1981.

⁵⁸The measurement problem is not unique to the Republican Study Committee. With regard to the DSG, Professors Jewell and Patterson state: "It is difficult to measure the impact of the Democratic Study Group, just as it is always difficult to measure the effect of legislative initiatives." Op. cit., Jewell and Patterson, p. 171.

⁵⁹Les Aspin, "Why Doesn't Congress Do Something?", Foreign Policy, No. 15, 1974, pp. 70-82 at p. 73.

⁶⁰For example, David Hoppe who was a policy analyst in the RSC from 1973-1978, was hired by Congressman Trent Lott as the staff director of the Republican Research Committee when Lott was elected chairman in December, 1978. When Lott was elected Minority Whip in 1980, Hoppe was appointed his Legislative Director. (This point is discussed further in Chapter VIII.)

⁶¹Robert L. Peabody, Leadership in Congress, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., Inc., 1976, p. 9.

⁶²David W. Rohde and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Thinking About Legislative Reform," in Leroy N. Rieselbach, Legislative Reform the Policy Impact, Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath & Co., 1978, p. 21.

CHAPTER II

¹Daniel P. Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income: The Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan, New York: Random House, 1973, p. 375.

²See Ibid., for the liberal perspective. And, Martin Anderson, Welfare, the Political Economy of Welfare Reform in the United States, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1978, for the conservative viewpoint.

³Op. cit., Anderson, p. 4.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Op. cit., Moynihan, p. 144.

⁶Op. cit., Anderson, p. 79.

⁷The basic concept of "work fare" was that able-bodied welfare recipients should register for community work before their eligibility for welfare benefits was granted.

⁸Op. cit., Moynihan, p. 368.

⁹Ibid., p. 373.

¹⁰Ronald Randall, "Presidential Power versus Bureaucratic Intransigence: The Influence of the Nixon Administration on Welfare Policy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, 1979, pp. 795-810 at p. 797.

¹¹Op. cit., Moynihan, p. 399.

¹²Ibid., p. 401.

¹³Ralph K. Huitt and Robert L. Peabody, Congress Two Decades of Analysis, New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 24. Malbin makes a similar argument: "The House expected the committee when it was chaired by Wilbur Mills (1958-1974) to be a 'responsible' body whose judgment would end up more or less a carefully compromised reflection of the will of the whole House." Michael J. Malbin, "Delegation, Deliberation, and the New Role of Congressional Staff," in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., The New Congress, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981, pp. 166-167.

¹⁴Op. cit., Moynihan, p. 399.

¹⁵David R. Mayhew, Congress the Electoral Connection, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974, p. 104; op. cit., Malbin, pp. 167-168; and Roger H. Davidson, "Subcommittee Government," in op. cit., Mann and Ornstein, p. 106.

¹⁶Op. cit., Moynihan, p. 403.

¹⁷Robert A. Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy, New Haven: Yale Institute of International Studies, February 10, 1949, p. 9.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁹Op. cit., Malbin, p. 168.

²⁰See, for example, his House floor speech on March 4, 1970, Congressional Record, p. 5908.

²¹Op. cit., Moynihan, p. 374.

²²John F. Bibby and Roger H. Davidson, On Capitol Hill, Studies in the Legislative Process, 2nd edition, Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, Inc., 1972, p. 153.

²³Report of the Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 16311, Dissenting Views, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970, p. 84.

²⁴Lewis A. Froman, Jr., The Congressional Process, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., Inc., 1967, p. 17.

²⁵Michael J. Malbin, "Congressional Committee Staffs: Who's In Charge Here?", The Public Interest, No. 47, Spring, 1977, pp. 16-40 at p. 31.

²⁶Allen Schick, "The Supply and Demand for Analysis on Capitol Hill," Policy Analysis, Vol. 2, Spring, 1976, pp. 215-234, at pp. 219-220.

²⁷Interview with Jack Cox, Washington, D.C., May 14, 1980.

²⁸Statement of Honorable Philip M. Crane, Congressional Record, April 16, 1970, p. 12075.

²⁹Press Release from Honorable Philip M. Crane, April 16, 1970.

³⁰Op. cit., Mayhew, p. 155.

³¹Les Aspin, "Why Doesn't Congress Do Something?", Foreign Policy, No. 15, 1974, p. 70-82 at p. 78.

³²Op. cit., Moynihan, p. 436.

³³Interview with Honorable Edward J. Derwinski, Washington, D.C., February 4, 1980.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵House Republican Policy Committee, "Statement on H.R. 16311, The Family Assistance Plan Act of 1970," April 7, 1970, Statement #4.

³⁶Op. cit., Bibby and Davidson, p. 155.

³⁷Remarks of Delbert Latta (R-Ohio), Congressional Record, April 10, 1973, p. 11696.

³⁸Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane, Washington, D.C., April 15, 1980.

³⁹James A. Robinson, "Decision Making in Congress," in Alfred deGrazia, ed., Congress: The First Branch of Government, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1966, p. 286.

⁴⁰Interview with Paul M. Weyrich, Washington, D.C., October 16, 1979.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Interview with Roger A. Freeman, Stanford, California, September 9, 1980.

⁴³U.S. Congress, Senate Finance Committee, Welfare Reform and the Family Assistance Plan, "Statement of Roger A. Freeman, Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California," 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, U.S. Senate, pp. 1511-1619.

⁴⁴Op. cit., Schick, p. 228.

⁴⁵Op. cit., Moynihan, p. 460.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 534-535.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 499.

⁴⁸Washington Post, December 13, 1973.

⁴⁹Joint Senate and House letters to Honorable Roy Ash and Honorable Caspar Weinberger, December 20, 1973.

⁵⁰Curtis-Duncan Welfare Reform Bill of 1975; See Chapter VII, Section B, infra.

⁵¹Op. cit., Anderson, pp. 144-145.

⁵²Letter from Daniel Patrick Moynihan to William F. Buckley, September 4, 1978, quoted in National Review, September 29, 1978, p. 1196.

⁵³Op. cit., Moynihan, p. 557.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 485.

⁵⁵1971 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1972, p. 507.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 504.

⁵⁷Education and Public Welfare Division Memorandum entitled "Child Care Information," to Honorable Edward J. Derwinski, September 27, 1971, 2 pages and attachments.

⁵⁸Of those supporting the bill, 177 were Democrats, 26 were Republicans, while the 181 in opposition were 46 Democrats and 135 Republicans. The liberal Republicans supported the bill while the conservative Republicans opposed it, vice versa for the Democrats. On the final passage, of the 183 negative votes, 36 were Democrats and 147 were Republicans.

⁵⁹See Chapter V, Section E, infra.

⁶⁰Op. cit., Interview with Paul M. Weyrich.

⁶¹Human Events has a circulation which varies from 85,000-120,000, but it reaches many conservative leaders throughout the country.

⁶²"Nixon Must Veto Child Care Law," Human Events, October 9, 1971, p. 1.

⁶³"Child Development Summary Analysis," The Emergency Committee for Children, not dated.

⁶⁴"Questions About the Child Development Act," The Emergency Committee for Children, not dated.

⁶⁵"A Review and Report of Federal Program of Child Development," The Emergency Committee for Children, not dated.

⁶⁶Letter from Daniel F. Joy, Emergency Committee for Children, November 15, 1971, to Caspar W. Weinberger, Deputy Director of Office of Management and Budget. Response from Caspar W. Weinberger, Deputy Director of Office of Management and Budget to Daniel F. Joy, December 6, 1971.

⁶⁷Address by the Vice President of the United States, Illinois Agriculture Association Dinner, November 17, 1971, reprinted in Congressional Record, December 2, 1971, pp. 20277-20279.

⁶⁸"Dear Colleague" letter from Sam Devine and Joe Waggoner on child development, November 17, 1971; interview with Connaught Marshner, Washington, D.C., January 21, 1980.

⁶⁹Congressional Record, December 6, 1971, pp. 44838-44839.

⁷⁰Congressional Record, December 7, 1971, p. 45069.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 45076.

⁷²Ibid., p. 45101.

⁷³Op. cit., Interview with Connaught Marshner.

⁷⁴"Veto of Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1971," message delivered to Senate on December 9, 1971, cited in Weekly Compilations of Presidential Documents Washington, D.C.: General Services Administration, December 13, 1971, p. 1615.

⁷⁵Letter from Honorable Philip M. Crane to Honorable Elliott Richardson, Secretary, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, January 31, 1972.

⁷⁶Letter from Honorable Elliott Richardson to Honorable Philip M. Crane, February 7, 1972.

⁷⁷Stephen Frantzich, "Who Makes Our Laws? The Legislative Effectiveness of Members of the U.S. Congress," Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 3, August 1979, pp. 409-428 at p. 411.

⁷⁸Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane.

⁷⁹John D. Lees, The Political System of the United States, London: Faber and Faber, 1975, p. 200.

⁸⁰Andrew J. Milnor and Mark N. Franklin, "Patterns of Opposition Behavior in Modern Legislatures," in Allan Kornberg, ed., Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, New York: McKay, 1973, p. 443.

CHAPTER III

¹See, for example, Thomas E. Mann, "Elections and Change in Congress," in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, The New Congress, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981.

²The "right to work" movement in the United States opposed the union or closed shop, and espouses the individual's right to join -- or refrain from joining -- a trade union.

³Op. cit., Mann, pp. 47-48.

⁴An interesting discussion of this point is found in Morris P. Fiorina, The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics, St. Louis, Missouri: Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, Working Paper #59, 1980.

⁵Michael J. Malbin, "Congressional Committee Staffs: Who's In Charge Here?," The Public Interest, No. 47, 1977, pp. 16-40, at p. 19.

⁶Allen Schick, "The Supply and Demand for Analysis on Capitol Hill," Policy Analysis, Vol. 2, 1976, pp. 215-234, at p. 225.

⁷Op. cit., Malbin, p. 17.

⁸See, for example, Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., Inc., 1973; and Roger H. Davidson, "Representative and Congressional Committees," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 411, January 1974, pp. 48-62.

⁹Of specific relevance to this study is John J. Rhodes, The Futile System, Garden City, New York: EPM Publications, Inc., 1976.

¹⁰See, for example, David R. Mayhew, Congress The Electoral Connection, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1974; Morris P. Fiorina, Congress, Keystone of the Washington Establishment, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1977; and Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Home Style: House Members In Their Districts, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., Inc., 1978.

¹¹Arthur G. Stevens, Arthur H. Miller and Thomas E. Mann, "Mobilization of Liberal Strength in the House, 1955-1970: The Democratic Study Group," reprinted from American Political Science Review in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., New Perspectives in the House of Representatives, 3rd Edition, Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1977; Mark F. Ferber, "The Democratic Study Group: A Study of Intra-Party Organization in the House of Representatives," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ann Arbor: University Microfilm International; and John F. Manley, "The Conservative Coalition in Congress," American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1973, as reprinted in op. cit., Peabody and Polsby, pp. 97-117.

¹²Op. cit., Mann.

¹³Op. cit., Malbin; Harrison W. Fox, Jr. and Susan Webb Hammond, "The Growth of Congressional Staffs," in Harvey C. Mansfield, Sr., ed., Congress Against the President, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1975; Harrison W. Fox, Jr. and Susan Webb Hammond, Congressional Staffs: the Invisible Force in American Law-making, New York: The Free Press, 1977; and Michael J. Malbin, Un-elected Representatives, New York: Basic Books, 1980.

¹⁴Since 1968, the incumbency re-election rate among members of Congress has averaged greater than 94%.

¹⁵James T. Bennett and Manuel H. Johnson, "Why Conservatives Should be Big Spenders," Policy Review, No. 11, 1980, p. 5

¹⁶Op. cit., Ferber.

¹⁷A useful introduction to the subject is found in Benjamin I. Page, "Cooling the Legislative Tea," in Walter Dean Burnham and Martha Wagner Weinberg, American Politics and Public Policy, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1978, ¹⁷⁻¹⁸ See Also, Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, 3rd Edition, New York: Random House, 1977.

¹⁸Op. cit., Page, p. 186.

¹⁹Allen Schick has reviewed the role of these four agencies in his paper. See op. cit., Schick.

²⁰U.S. Government Organization Manual, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 53.

²¹Charles R. Dechert, "Availability of Information for Congressional Operations," in Alfred deGrazia, ed., Congress: The First Branch of Government, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1966, pp. 167-212 at pp. 176-177.

²²Dissatisfaction with the Congressional Research Service is a continuing problem with the organization. For example, Mayhew quotes former Senator Mike Monroney (D-Oklahoma) on the limitations of the Congressional Research Service's predecessor organization almost two decades ago. See op. cit., Mayhew, p. 125.

²³Op. cit., Malbin, p. 40.

²⁴Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane, Washington, D.C., April 15, 1980.

²⁵William Safire, The New York Times, May 26, 1977.

²⁶Op. cit., Government Organization Manual, p. 69.

²⁷Thomas E. Cronin, "A Resurgent Congress and the Imperial Presidency," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 95, No. 2, 1980, pp. 209-237, at p. 221.

²⁸See Chapter VI, infra.

²⁹See David Meiselman and Paul Craig Roberts, "The Political Economy of the Congressional Budget Office," Rochester, New York: University of Rochester, 1978, (mimeo).

³⁰Richard E. Cohen, "The Watch Dogs for Congress Often Bark the Same Tune," National Journal, September 8, 1979, p. 1484.

³¹Op. cit., Malbin, p. 19.

³²Samuel C. Patterson, "The Semi-Sovereign Congress," in Anthony King (ed.), The New American Political System, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978, pp. 125-178 at pp. 166-167.

³³Randall B. Ripley, Congress Process and Policy, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1975, p. 158. Polsby notes the lack of staff more than sixty years ago. See Nelson W. Polsby, "The institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1968, pp. 144 - 168 - at p. 158.

³⁴Robert A. Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Institute of International Studies, 1949, pp. 5-6.

³⁵Op. cit., Ripley, p. 162.

³⁶Interview with Honorable Ben B. Blackburn, Washington, D.C., December 28, 1978.

³⁷Mary McInnis, ed., We Propose a Modern Congress, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1966.

³⁸Stephen Frantzich, "Who Makes Our Laws? The Legislative Effectiveness of Members of the U.S. Congress," Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 3, 1979, pp. 409-428 at p. 427.

³⁹James A. Robinson, "Decision Making in Congress," in op. cit., deGrazia, p. 273.

⁴⁰Op. cit., Dechert, p. 170.

⁴¹See Chapter II, Section B, supra.

⁴²See Chapters V and VII, infra.

⁴³Op. cit., Fox and Hammond, Congressional Staffs, p. 90.

⁴⁴Op. cit., Robinson in deGrazia, pp. 270-271.

⁴⁵Op. cit., Fiorina, Congress, Keystone, p. 37.

⁴⁶The remaining 10% is accounted for in miscellaneous activities. John Saloma, Congress and the New Politics, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., Inc., 1969, p. 184.

⁴⁷Op. cit., Fox and Hammond, Congressional Staffs, p. 90.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Conservative caucus. See Chapter III, Section I, infra.

⁵¹Op. cit., Mansfield, p. 19.

⁵²Michael J. Malbin, "Where There's a Cause, There's a Caucus on Capitol Hill," National Journal, January 8, 1977, pp. 56-58 at p. 56.

⁵³The text of the program can be found in the Congressional Record, January 30, 1957, pp. 1325-26.

⁵⁴For a detailed discussion of the Liberal Manifesto, see Kenneth Kofmehl, "Institutionalization of a Voting Block," The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1964, pp. 256-272 at pp. 258-260.

⁵⁵Congressional Record, August 23, 1958, p. 19702.

⁵⁶A further discussion of this appears in Kofmehl, op. cit., pp. 260-62, and Mark F. Ferber, op. cit., Chapter 2.

⁵⁷For example, the role of the Rules Committee in refusing to grant a rule to the Omnibus Housing Bill is discussed in Ferber, op. cit., p. 64f.

⁵⁸Op. cit., Ferber, pp. 104-147, and op. cit., Kofmehl, p. 265.

⁵⁹Op. cit., Stevens, et. al., p. 72.

⁶⁰Op. cit., Kofmehl, p. 269.

⁶¹"Democratic Study Group: A Winner on House Reform," Congressional Quarterly, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., June 2, 1973, pp. 1366-1372 at p. 1368.

⁶²Op. cit., Stevens, et. al., p. 73.

⁶³A provocative essay on the political climate and activities of the 1960s is Samuel H. Beer, "In Search of a New Public Philosophy," in Anthony King, op. cit., pp. 5-44.

⁶⁴For an account of this issue, see Congressional Quarterly, February 27, 1970, pp. 642-43.

⁶⁵Mary Russell, "Liberal House Democrat Contest: Loyalist vs. Independent," The Washington Post, February 26, 1979, p. A-8.

⁶⁶Op. cit., Ripley, p. 163.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Op. cit., Ferber, p. 8.

⁶⁹Op. cit., Stevens, et. al., pp. 94-95.

⁷⁰Op. cit., Mark F. Ferber, p. 20.

⁷¹Svend Groennings, "The Clubs in Congress: The House Wednesday Group," in Svend Groennings and Johnathan P. Hawley, eds., To Be a Congressman: the Promise and the Power, Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1973, p. 77.

⁷²Ibid., p. 65.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Op. cit., Malbin, "Where There's a Cause," p. 57.

⁷⁵Op. cit., Groennings, p. 92.

⁷⁶Op. cit., Malbin, "Where There's a Cause."

⁷⁷Op. cit., Ripley, p. 153.

⁷⁸Op. cit., Manley, and Charles A. Moser, The Speaker and the House, Washington, D. C.: Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, 1979.

⁷⁹Op. cit., Ripley, p. 151.

⁸⁰Congressional Quarterly, Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., October 10, 1969, p. 1943.

⁸¹Interview with James Williams, Washington, D.C., December 12, 1978.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Op. cit., Ripley, p. 151.

⁸⁵Op. cit., Interview with James Williams, December 12, 1978.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷The Conservative Luncheon Club is also mentioned in Chapter IV, infra.

⁸⁸Interview with Paul M. Weyrich, Washington, D.C., October 16, 1979.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Minutes, Senate Steering Committee, April 30, 1974.

⁹¹Letter from Honorable James McClure to Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., April 25, 1974.

⁹²The evolution of the Republican Study Committee to this point is recounted in detail in Chapter IV, infra.

⁹³The Right Report, Washington, D.C.: June 3, 1974, pp. 1-2.

⁹⁴Op. cit., interview with Paul M. Weyrich.

⁹⁵Letter from Honorable Philip M. Crane to Honorable James McClure, May 1, 1974.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷For detailed description of Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, see William T. Poole, "Members of Congress for Peace Through Law," Institution Analysis, Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, April, 1977.

⁹⁸For an early description of this group, see Malbin, op. cit., "Where There's A Cause," pp. 57-8. The evolution of this group is also discussed in Chapter VI, Section K, infra.

⁹⁹Former Senator Edward Brooke (R-Massachusetts) was never a member of the Congressional Black Caucus.

¹⁰⁰Marguerite Ross Barnett, "The Congressional Black Caucus," in Harvey Mansfield, ed., Congress Against the President, New York: Academy of Political Science, 1975, p. 34.

¹⁰¹Op. cit., Malbin, "Where There's a Cause," p. 58.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Kevin Phillips, The American Political Report, July 2, 1973.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵See Congressional Clearing House on the Future letter from Marilyn Gadzuk, not dated, (1979).

¹⁰⁶For example, the "Snow Belt" organization is actually entitled "The Northeast-Midwest Economic Advancement Coalition."

¹⁰⁷A discussion of several of these organizations occurs in Sarah E. Warren, "The New Look of the Congressional Caucuses," National Journal, April 29, 1978, pp. 677-8.

¹⁰⁸Op. cit., Malbin, "Where There's a Cause."

¹⁰⁹Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Benjamin B. Blackburn.

¹¹⁰See Chapter IV, supra.

¹¹¹Op. cit., Patterson, p. 171.

¹¹²Op. cit., Manley, p. 103.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 106. The Manley article gives a useful overview of the Conservative Coalition. A recent monograph by Charles A. Moser, op. cit., also provides a useful background for understanding the role of the Conservative Coalition.

114^{Op. cit.}, interview with Paul M. Weyrich.

115^{Op. cit.}, interview with Honorable James McClure.

116^{Op. cit.}, Congressional Quarterly, October 10, 1969, p. 1943.

117^{Op. cit.}, interview with Honorable Benjamin B. Blackburn.

118^{Op. cit.}, Fox and Hammond, Congressional Staffs, p. 90.

CHAPTER IV

¹Arthur G. Stevens, Jr., Arthur H. Miller and Thomas E. Mann, "Mobilization of Liberal Strength in the House, 1955-70: The Democratic Study Group," in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., Third Edition, 1977, p. 72.

²James A. Robinson, "Decision Making in Congress," in Alfred deGrazia, ed., Congress: The First Branch of Government, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1966, p. 265.

³Interview with Honorable Edith Green, Portland, Oregon, September 5, 1980.

⁴John J. Rhodes, The Futile System, Garden City, New York: EPM Publications, Inc., 1976, p. 23.

⁵Randall B. Ripley, Congress, Process and Policy, New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1975, pp. 162-163.

⁶Interview with Honorable Edward J. Derwinski, Washington, D.C., February 4, 1980, (emphasis added).

⁷Daniel P. Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income: The Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan, New York: Random House, 1973, p. 368.

⁸Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane, Washington, D.C., April 15, 1980.

⁹John F. Manley, "The Conservative Coalition in Congress," in op. cit., Peabody and Polsby, p. 242.

¹⁰The Conservative Luncheon Club is described in Chapter III supra.

¹¹Interview with Connaught Marshner, Washington, D.C., January 21, 1980.

¹²Interview with Paul M. Weyrich, Washington, D.C., October 16, 1979.

¹³Philip M. Crane, The Democrat's Dilemma, Chicago: Henry Regnery & Co., Inc., 1962.

¹⁴Crane was in every respect the archetypical conservative "activist member." This phrase is used throughout this thesis. It has a fairly precise meaning. Crane was an "activist" because he had no particular ties to either the senior House Republicans or to the Republican White House. He was willing to use his staff for policy research -- something which most senior Republicans had been unwilling to do. He was willing to work with other members and staff aides who shared his conservative perspective. And he considered himself a conservative first, and a Republican party loyalist second. He also had the ability to learn how to work through the political process whenever possible. His predecessors had too frequently given up the

struggle before beginning to wage it. While not every activist had all of these qualities, Crane did and, thus, he personifies the activist who is discussed herein.

¹⁵Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane.

¹⁶Op. cit., Ripley, p. 8.

¹⁷"Libertarian" in this context does not refer to a member of the Libertarian party. Rather, Symms was an outspoken advocate of the free market system. He described himself as a libertarian because he "tended to emphasize the value of the market system, rather than those of traditional conservatives," according to his close friend, Philip Crane. Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane.

¹⁸"Memorandum to Activists," from Paul Weyrich and Jerry James, November 20, 1972. In 1972 "We worked in over 30 campaigns handling over 300 projects ranging from vote analysis and issue paper preparation projects to five minute tasks of looking up the answer to a question."

¹⁹Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane. Jacob Javits was the Republican-Liberal United States Senator from New York from 1956-1980.

²⁰Op. cit., Moynihan, p. 218.

²¹Op. cit., Interview with Paul M. Weyrich.

²²Donald G. Tacheron and Morris K. Udall, The Job of the Congressman, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966, p. vi.

²³Human Events is a conservative weekly Washington newspaper. The ACU is a "grass roots" conservative organization.

²⁴Op. cit., Interview with Paul M. Weyrich.

²⁵Memorandum to the Files from Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., December 9, 1972.

²⁶Letter from Honorable Philip M. Crane to 23 economists, January 15, 1973.

²⁷Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Edward J. Derwinski.

²⁸Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane.

²⁹Michael J. Malbin, "Congressional Committee Staffs: Who's in Charge Here?", The Public Interest, Spring, 1977, No. 47, New York, pp. 16-40 at p. 39.

³⁰Allen Schick, "The Supply and Demand for Analysis on Capitol Hill," Policy Analysis, Vol. 2, Spring, 1976, pp. 215-234 at p. 226.

³¹John Walsh, "With Shorter Stays for Legislators, Bigger Staffs, Who'll Run Congress?", Science, Vol. 203, January 19, 1979, pp. 245-247 at p. 247.

³²Robert H. Salisbury and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congressional Staff Turnover and the Ties-That-Bind: Congressman as Enterprise, St. Louis: Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, Working Paper #54, April, 1980, pp. 4-5.

³³Stephen Frantzich, "Who Makes Our Laws? The Legislative Effectiveness of Members of the U.S. Congress," Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 3, August, 1979, pp. 409-428 at p. 425.

³⁴Op. cit., Interview with Paul M. Weyrich.

³⁵Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Edward J. Derwinski.

³⁶The congressional frank is a printed or rubber stamped reproduction of the signature of a Member of Congress. The frank takes the place of postage stamps for congressional mail.

³⁷David R. Mayhew, Congress the Electoral Connection, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974, p. 100.

³⁸Interview with Daphne Miller, Washington, D.C., July 16, 1980.

³⁹Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics, New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1970, p. 182.

⁴⁰Op. cit., Stevens, et al., p. 76.

⁴¹Morris P. Fiorina, Congress, Keystone of the Washington Establishment, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, p. 27.

⁴²Harrison W. Fox, Jr. and Susan Webb Hammond, Congressional Staffs the Invisible Force in American Lawmaking, New York: The Free Press, 1977.

⁴³Harrison W. Fox, Jr. and Susan Webb Hammond, "The Growth of Congressional Staffs," in Harvey C. Mansfield, ed., Congress Against the President, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1975, pp. 120-121.

⁴⁴Op. cit., Walsh, p. 245.

⁴⁵Michael J. Malbin, Unelected Representatives, New York: Basic Books, 1980, p. 32.

⁴⁶Op. cit., Interview with Paul M. Weyrich.

⁴⁷Interview with Honorable John H. Roussetot, Monte Rio, California, July 21, 1979.

⁴⁸Appendix A contains a table of membership and staff sizes at different times during the evolution of the Republican Study Committee.

⁴⁹Op. cit., Malbin, The Public Interest, p. 35.

⁵⁰Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Edward J. Derwinski.

⁵¹Interview with Honorable Marjorie S. Holt, Washington, D.C., January, 23, 1980.

⁵²Letter from Honorable Philip M. Crane to James A. McClure, May 1, 1974, p. 2.

⁵³Interview with Michael O. Ware, former research analyst, Washington, D.C., June 15, 1979.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Gilman was unsuccessful in his attempt to unseat Taylor and returned to his post at Western Carolina University.

⁵⁶Remarks of Congressman Del Clawson, Acting Chairman, Annual Report, February 19, 1974.

⁵⁷This account is based on personal recollections but has been independently confirmed in interviews with Paul Weyrich, Daphne Miller, Michael Ware, and Honorable Philip M. Crane.

⁵⁸Op. cit., Stevens, et al., p. 77.

⁵⁹Michael Scully's explanation of the "Dear Colleague" letter in the Senate is illustrative of the House as well: "In most cases a 'Dear Colleague' letter is circulated to other offices, soliciting the cosponsorship of favorable Senators. To a large extent, both the floor statement and the 'Dear Colleague' letter are intra-staff communications -- because as with much Senate business, the Record is mostly read by staff members, who screen legislative proposals and 'Dear Colleague' letters, passing along the more agreeable ideas to the Senators." Michael Andrew Scully, "Reflections of a Senate Aid," The Public Interest, No. 47, Spring, 1977, pp. 41-48 at p. 43.

⁶⁰H.R. 8053.

⁶¹See Chapter III, supra.

⁶²Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Edward J. Derwinski.

⁶³Republican Study Committee Statement of Purpose.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane.

⁶⁶Op. cit., Statement of Purpose.

⁶⁷The Republican Study Committee Statement of Purpose appears at Appendix B.

⁶⁸Letter from LaMar Baker to Hon. John Rhodes, April 2, 1974.

⁶⁹Memorandum from Executive Director to Executive Committee, June 20, 1974.

⁷⁰Op. cit., Annual Report by Honorable Del Clawson.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Interview with Honorable John J. Rhodes, Washington, D.C., August 19, 1980.

⁷⁴John P. Mackintosh, "Reform of the House of Commons: The Case for Specialization," in Gerhard Loewenberg, Modern Parliaments, Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1971, p. 54.

⁷⁵See Chapter V, infra.

⁷⁶Letter from LaMar Baker to the members of the Republican leadership, April 2, 1974.

⁷⁷Letter from Honorable John B. Anderson to Honorable LaMar Baker, May 1, 1974.

⁷⁸Letter from Honorable Barber Conable, Jr. to LaMar Baker, April 4, 1974.

⁷⁹See Chapter VI, infra. The relationship between the Republican Study Committee and the Minority Leader is a recurring point of interest in the evolution of the RSC.

⁸⁰Letter from Bob Mathias to Honorable Del Calwson, May 1, 1974.

⁸¹Remarks by Honorable LaMar Baker, August 15, 1972.

⁸²See Chapter V, infra.

⁸³Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane.

⁸⁴See Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, New York: Random House, 1977, p. 16, and chapters 3 and 13 for an extended discussion of the socialization process.

⁸⁵Op. cit., Frantzich, p. 414.

⁸⁶Op. cit., Stevens, et al., p. 76.

⁸⁷Lewis A. Froman, Jr., The Congressional Process, Boston: Little, Brown & Company, Inc., 1967, p. 12.

⁸⁸Op. cit., Interview with Paul M. Weyrich.

⁸⁹Op. cit., Malbin, Unelected Representatives, p. 75.

⁹⁰Op. cit., Mackintosh, p. 54.

⁹¹Richard Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain," Political Studies, Vol. XII, No. 1, 1964, pp. 33-46 at p. 37.

⁹²Ibid., pp. 39-40.

CHAPTER V

¹ House Report 93-102.

² Fact Sheet, "Atlantic Union Delegation Resolution," April 3, 1973.

³ The Nationalities Division attempted to build ethnic support primarily among the descendants of Eastern European emigrants for the Republican party.

⁴ Honorable Sam Stratton, Congressional Record, April 10, 1973, p. 11697.

⁵ Congressional Record, April 10, 1973, pp. 11701-11702.

⁶ See Chapter IV, supra.

⁷ Interview with Honorable Edward J. Derwinski, Washington, D.C., February 4, 1980.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Congressional Record, April 10, 1974, pp. 10646-10649.

¹⁰ Ben Cole, "450 bills before Congress carry tag of \$871 billion," Arizona Republic, Phoenix, Arizona, April 10, 1974.

¹¹ Honorable Sam Devine quoted. Ibid.

¹² H. J. Res. 332 with 9 co-sponsors and H. J. Res. 374 with 8 co-sponsors.

¹³ Jerry P. James, Federal Spending and Budget Control: An Analysis and Review, Washington, D.C.: Schuchman Foundation Center for the Public Interest, 1973.

¹⁴ Milton Friedman, "Economic Miracles," Newsweek, January 21, 1974, p. 80.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ S. 3396.

¹⁷ Milton Friedman, "Inflation Proofing the Income Tax," Newsweek, May 13, 1974, p. 120.

¹⁸ Louis W. Ingram (Legislative Director of the RSC), "White Paper on 'Indexing' and Analysis of the Buckley Bill," Washington, D.C.: Republican Study Committee, May 16, 1974.

¹⁹ H.R. 16735. By the 95th Congress, 47 co-sponsors had introduced tax indexing measures; H.R. 818 et. seq.

²⁰Donald J. Senese, Indexing the Inflationary Impact of Taxes: The Necessary Economic Reform, Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1978. The across-the-board tax cut which had been discussed at the Red Fox II meeting was not developed further. Other legislative activities pre-empted the time of the shared staff.

²¹David R. Mayhew, Congress The Electoral Connection, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974, pp. 52-53.

²²Ibid., p. 53.

²³Lewis A. Froman, Jr., The Congressional Process, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., Inc., 1967, pp. 3-4.

²⁴Phil Truluck, "Land Use Policy," RSC Fact Sheet, Washington, D.C., June 27, 1973.

²⁵Interview with Phil N. Truluck, Washington, D.C., January 3, 1979.

²⁶Phil Truluck, "Federal Land Use," RSC Fact Sheet, Washington, D.C., November 5, 1973.

²⁷"Dear Colleague" letter from Honorable Sam Steiger, October 31, 1973.

²⁸Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., Inc., 1973, p. 286.

²⁹The signers of the Steiger views were: Sam Steiger (R-Arizona), Steve Symms (R-Idaho), John N. "Happy" Camp (R-Oklahoma), Don Young (R-Alaska), David Towell (R-Nevada), Bob Bauman (R-Maryland), William Ketchum (R-California), and Harold Runnels (D-New Mexico).

³⁰"Report of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Together with Additional Dissenting and Minority Views to Accompany H.R. 10294," Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974, House Report No. 93-798, pp. 73-80.

³¹Op. cit., Interview with Phil N. Truluck.

³²Congressional Record, June 7, 1974, pp. 18368-18369.

³³Congressional Record, June 11, 1974, p. 18824.

³⁴Op. cit., Mayhew, p. 115.

³⁵Interview with Honorable John H. Rousselot, Monte Rio, California, July 21, 1979.

³⁶Interview with Howard Phillips, Annapolis, Maryland, August 9, 1980.

³⁷Richard E. Cohen, "Justice Department/Congress Weigh Legal Services Expansion to Benefit Low, Moderate Income Groups," National Journal, May 26, 1973, pp. 766-775.

³⁸The first Special Order was led by Rep. Earl Landgrebe (R-Indiana) who was joined by eleven of his conservative Republican colleagues. (Congressional Record, May 31, 1973, pp. 17504-17510.) The second Special Order was led by Rep. Ashbrook (R-Ohio) who was joined by nine of his conservative Republican colleagues. (Congressional Record, June 5, 1973, pp. 18170-18180.)

³⁹House Report No. 93-247, "Legal Services Corporation," Minority Views, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 25.

⁴¹Congressional Record, June 21, 1973, pp. 20685-20758.

⁴²Ibid., p. 20717.

⁴³Ibid., p. 20719.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 20723.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 20740.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 20741.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 20747.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 20751-20752.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 20758. (The other 6 opposition votes were non-RSC Republicans.)

⁵⁰1973 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1974, p. 581.

⁵¹RSC Fact Sheet, "Legal Services," February 8, 1974.

⁵²Washington Post, April 9, 1974.

⁵³Congressional Record, May 14, 1974, pp. 14626-14628.

⁵⁴Congressional Record, May 15, 1974, p. 14729.

⁵⁵Interview with Honorable Ben B. Blackburn, Washington, D.C., December 29, 1978.

⁵⁶Congressional Record, May 16, 1974, p. 15013.

⁵⁷A detailed discussion of these earlier efforts by Congressman Crane to obtain private ownership of gold can be found in Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., "How the Gold Bill was Passed," Euromoney, November 1974, pp. 47-48.

⁵⁸See "Report Together with Supplemental and Additional Views to Accompany S. 2665," No. 93-834, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

⁵⁹Congressional Record, May 28, 1974, pp. 16677-16725.

⁶⁰See "To Provide for Increased Participation by the United States in the International Development Association" hearing before the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Committee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 15231, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 3.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Ibid., p. 10.

⁶⁴Op. cit., Interview with Honorable John H. Roussetot.

⁶⁵The exchange of correspondence between Crane and Volcker appears in the Congressional Record, July 2, 1974, pp. 22022-22023.

⁶⁶A discussion of the trade-off aspects of the private ownership of gold can be found in Edwin J. Feulner, Jr. and Robert L. Schuettinger, "Liberalism and Compromise in the U.S. Congress," Il Politico, Vol. XLI, No. 4, 1976, pp. 652-664.

⁶⁷"Amending the International Development Association Act," Report No. 93-1142, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., June 25, 1974, pp. 17-18. Reprinted in the Congressional Record during the debate, July 2, 1974, p. 22023.

⁶⁸Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane, Washington, D.C., April 15, 1980.

⁶⁹Frank van der Linden, "GOP Steerers May Decide IDA's Fate," Nashville Banner, June 26, 1974.

⁷⁰The entire debate appears in the Congressional Record, July 2, 1974, pp. 22000-22039.

⁷¹See votes on p. 481, January 23, 1974, and pp. 22038-22039, July 2, 1974 of the Congressional Record. The differences in vote totals are due to switches against the bill by former supporters, led by Gonzalez, and by members who were absent for the January vote but were present for the July vote.

⁷²See memo dated June 19, 1974 from Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.; op. cit., interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane; op. cit., interview with Honorable John H. Roussetot.

⁷³"Senate Repealed Rhodesian Chrome Import Ban," op. cit., 1973 CQ Almanac, p. 855.

⁷⁴H.R. 8005.

⁷⁵See Chapter VII, infra.

⁷⁶The original authority for capital grants was contained in the Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964.

⁷⁷The Boston case is cited in the remarks of Honorable Philip M. Crane, Congressional Record, October 3, 1973, p. 32747.

⁷⁸Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane.

⁷⁹At the time, Wylie was not a member of the RSC although he would join in the 94th Congress.

⁸⁰Congressional Record, October 3, 1973, pp. 32796-32798, at p. 32798.

⁸¹"Dissenting Views of Mr. Crane, Mr. Blackburn, and Mr. Rousselot," to H.R. 6452, Report No. 93-141, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, U.S. House of Representatives, 1973, pp. 33-36.

⁸²H.R. 6432.

⁸³Congressional Record, October 3, 1973, pp. 32814-32815.

⁸⁴The customary procedure under the House rules is for all bills to be considered for amendments in the "Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union" stage. The requirements for a quorum are substantially less, and the regulations on debate are generally tighter than when the House is formally in session. The Speaker presides over the House but does not preside when it is sitting as the Committee of the Whole. In the Committee of the Whole, the presiding officer rotates among senior members of the majority party.

⁸⁵Op. cit., Congressional Record, pp. 32823-32824.

⁸⁶Derwinski (R-Illinois) switched, Goldwater (R-California) voted and had been absent on the earlier vote and only Stanford Parris (R-Virginia) continued his opposition to Wylie.

⁸⁷S. 386.

⁸⁸Congressional Record, December 12, 1973, p. 41185.

⁸⁹H.R. 12589, S. 3035.

⁹⁰Memorandum to Steering Committee Members from Congressman Philip M. Crane, February 27, 1974.

⁹¹Congressional Record, August 15, 1974, p. 28436. Of the nine who voted against Shuster, five would lose their seats later in 1974.

⁹²P.L. 93-503.

⁹³Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Robert Shogan quoting Edwin J. Feulner, "Skirmishing Begins on Political Makeup of Ford Administration," Los Angeles Times, August 9, 1974, p. 1.

⁹⁶Memorandum to Members of the Republican Steering Committee, from LaMar Baker, dated August 13, 1974.

⁹⁷Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Ben B. Blackburn.

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Congressional Record, December 19, 1974, p. 41475.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., pp. 41516-41517.

¹⁰¹Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane.

¹⁰²John Lees has commented on this trend: "Some observers saw in these events confirmation of their views about the importance of presidential character, the [Watergate] crisis being the predictable consequence of the accretion of executive authority." John D. Lees, The Political System of the United States, London: Faber and Faber, 1975, p. 331.

¹⁰³Memorandum to the Republican Steering Committee from Congressman Ben B. Blackburn, May 1, 1974.

¹⁰⁴Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "With a Weakened Republican Right," Washington Post, November 13, 1974.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Letter from Edwin J. Feulner, Jr. to Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, November 13, 1974.

¹⁰⁷Memorandum to the Republican Steering Committee from Congressman Trent Lott, November 13, 1974.

¹⁰⁸Op. cit., Letter from Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.

¹⁰⁹Letter from Robert D. Novak to Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., January 3, 1974.

¹¹⁰Letter from Maria Luisa Cisneros to Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., January 3, 1974.

¹¹¹Kevin Phillips, The American Political Report, Vol. IV, No. 4, November 15, 1974.

¹¹²Walter Dean Burnham, "Insulation and Responsiveness in Congressional Elections," Political Science Quarterly, Fall, 1975, pp. 411-436 at p. 418.

¹¹³Samuel C. Patterson, "The Semi-Sovereign Congress," in Anthony King, ed., The New American Political System, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978, p. 147.

¹¹⁴Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane.

¹¹⁵See Chapter III, supra.

116See Chapter I, supra., footnote #7, for the usage of the name in this thesis.

117See Chapter II, supra.

118Op. cit., Lees, p. 322.

119 Laurence H. Silberman, "Policy Analysis: Boon or Curse for Politicians?", in Robert A. Goldwin, ed., Bureaucrats, Policy Analysts, Statesmen: Who Leads?, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980, p. 38.

120Interview with Honorable James A. McClure, Washington, D.C., January 11, 1980.

121Op. cit., Lees, p. 205.

122John F. Manley, "The Rise of Congress in Foreign Policy-Making," The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, September, 1971, pp. 60-70 at p. 65.

123Op. cit., Lees, p. 220.

124Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, 3rd edition, New York: Random House, 1977, p. 208.

CHAPTER VI

¹ See Chapter V, supra.

² Interview with Honorable John J. Rhodes, Washington, D.C., August 19, 1980.

³ For example, Robert L. Schuettinger was a visiting lecturer in political science at Yale University; Donald J. Senese had taught undergraduate history at Radford College; and John Tierney had taught undergraduate and graduate political science at Catholic University.

⁴ RSC Meeting Notice, "Members Coffee to Meet Friedrich von Hayek, Thursday, April 10, 1975," (mimeo).

⁵ RSC Meeting Notice, "Milton Friedman on Foreign Policy, May 25, 1976," (mimeo).

⁶ See Chapter V, supra.

⁷ Interview with Honorable Robert H. Michel, Washington, D.C., April 3, 1981.

⁸ RSC BULLETIN, March 8, 1976, p. III-17.

⁹ February 4, 1975.

¹⁰ March 6, 1975.

¹¹ May 7, 1975.

¹² May, 1976.

¹³ Interview with Honorable Marjorie S. Holt, Washington, D.C., January 23, 1980.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Morris P. Fiorina, "The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics," St. Louis: Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, Working Paper No. 59, 1980, pp. 24-5.

¹⁹ Op. cit., Interview with Honorable John J. Rhodes.

²⁰ Interview with Paul M. Weyrich, Washington, D.C., October 16, 1979.

²¹ Interview with Honorable John H. Roussetot, Monte Rio, California, July 21, 1979.

²² Ibid.

²³Memorandum from the RSC, "Clerk Hire for Republican Steering Committee," December 13, 1974, (mimeo). For an extended discussion of this issue, see James T. Bennett and Manuel H. Johnson, "Why Conservatives Should be Big Spenders," Policy Review No. 2, Winter, 1978, pp. 51-58.

²⁴Seth Kantor, "Capitol Payrolls Hide 'ghosts'," Detroit News, June 13, 1976, p. 19A.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Michael J. Malbin, "Delegation, Deliberation, and the New Role of Congressional Staff," in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, The New Congress, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981, p. 151.

²⁷Michael J. Malbin, "Congressional Committee Staffs: Who's in Charge Here?", The Public Interest, No. 47, Spring, 1977, p. 30.

²⁸Letter from Honorable Marjorie S. Holt to Mr. Steve Stockmeyer, July 22, 1976.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Samuel P. Huntington in David B. Truman, ed., The Congress and America's Future, 2nd edition, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1973, pp. 6-38, at p. 30.

³¹RSC Staff Briefing, April 23, 1975.

³²Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Marjorie S. Holt.

³³Allen Schick, "The Supply and Demand for Analysis on Capitol Hill," Policy Analysis, Vol. 2, Spring, 1976, pp. 215-234 at p. 229.

³⁴Letter from Richard S. Williamson to Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., November 27, 1974.

³⁵Interview with Phil N. Truluck, Washington, D.C., January 3, 1979.

³⁶RSC Memorandum to the Files, October 23, 1975.

³⁷RSC Memorandum to the Participants in the meeting on October 22, 1975 from Ed Feulner, November 10, 1975.

³⁸David R. Mayhew, Congress The Electoral Connection, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974, p. 115.

³⁹Op. cit., Interview with Honorable John J. Rhodes.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Robert H. Michel.

⁴³Interview with Honorable Edward J. Derwinski, Washington, D.C., February 4, 1980.

⁴⁴Op. cit., Interview with Phil N. Truluck.

⁴⁵Agenda to the Members of the Republican Study Committee from Marjorie S. Holt, March 12, 1975, (mimeo).

⁴⁶John J. Rhodes, "Dear Friends" letter, September 8, 1975, reprinted in Republican Legislative Agenda--A Program for Progress, Washington, D.C., 1975, p. 3.

⁴⁷John J. Rhodes, The Futile System, Garden City, New York: Doubleday for EPM Publications, Inc., 1976.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 83.

⁴⁹Op. cit., Interview with Honorable John J. Rhodes.

⁵⁰Op. cit., John J. Rhodes, The Futile System, p. 23.

⁵¹Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane, Washington, D.C., April 15, 1980.

⁵²Op. cit., Interview with Honorable John H. Rousselot.

⁵³Unnamed Member, "The Republican Study Group: Right-Wing Power," Congressional Quarterly, June 26, 1976, p. 1636.

⁵⁴"A Republican Statement," March 13, 1975, (mimeo).

⁵⁵Letter from Elizabeth Holtzman and Jack Brooks (Chairman, Commission on Information and Facilities) to Marjorie S. Holt, June 26, 1975.

⁵⁶See Appendix A.

⁵⁷Richard Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain," Political Studies, Vol. XII, No. 1, 1964, pp. 33-46 at p. 44.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Mark F. Ferber, "The Democratic Study Group: A Study of Intra-Party Organization in the House of Representatives," unpublished dissertation, Ann Arbor, Michigan: Microfilm International, 1964, p. 323.

⁶⁰David Treen, "Summary of President Ford's Responses at Meeting with Executive Board (sic) of Republican Study Committee at the White House," April 30, 1975.

⁶¹Thomas E. Cronin, "A Resurgent Congress and the Imperial Presidency," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 95, No. 2, Summer, 1980, pp. 209-237 at p. 227.

⁶²The meeting was held in the White House Cabinet Room. The members of the President's staff who were present were Donald Rumsfeld, Bill Seidman, Bob Hartman, Jim Lynn of the Office of Management and Budget, Jim Cannon, and Max Friedersdorf.

⁶³Op. cit., David Treen Summary.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Letter from Honorable Marjorie S. Holt to Hon. Max L. Friedersdorf, May 8, 1975. The only major nomination which attracted the continuing attention of the Executive Committee members was the appointment of former RSC Vice Chairman Ben Blackburn to the Chairmanship of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. This appointment became mired in extraneous issues in the Senate Banking Committee and was never acted on by the Committee.

⁶⁶The RSC members took their floor responsibilities seriously. Several of them, such as Bob Bauman, had perfect attendance records which they would not jeopardize under any circumstances.

⁶⁷RSC Memorandum to the Files from Phil Truluck, October 10, 1975.

⁶⁸See Chapter VII, section D, infra.

⁶⁹Op. cit., Truluck Memorandum.

⁷⁰Op. cit., Fiorina, p. 27.

⁷¹Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Edward J. Derwinski.

⁷²Op. cit., Mayhew, pp. 66-7.

⁷³Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'," Public Administration Review, Vol. 19, Spring, 1959, pp. 79-88 at p. 85.

⁷⁴Republican Study Committee Vote Justifications, May, 1976, 58 pages, (mimeo).

⁷⁵Marjorie S. Holt Cover Letter in Republican Study Committee Vote Justifications, September, 1976, 103 pages, (mimeo).

⁷⁶Op. cit., Mayhew, p. 16.

⁷⁷Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Marjorie S. Holt.

⁷⁸Republican Study Committee, "Rebuttal to National Council of Senior Citizens, Inc.," February 4, 1976, 3 pages, (mimeo).

⁷⁹Republican Study Committee, "Response to 1975 Voting Record of Consumer Federation of America," March 22, 1976, 10 pages, (mimeo).

⁸⁰Republican Study Committee Introduction to "Rebuttal to Environmental Action Vote Analysis of 1975," March 25, 1976, 6 pages, (mimeo).

⁸¹The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers both have rated members of Congress on their pro-business stand for many years.

⁸²The Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress has the only rating system which uses all of the House and Senate votes and grades each member according to his conservative position.

⁸³Melvin R. Laird, Conservative Papers, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1964.

⁸⁴Melvin R. Laird, Republican Papers, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1968.

⁸⁵RSC Memorandum, "The Republican Study Committee Papers: 1976," July 7, 1975.

⁸⁶The executive director explained that an alternative was available if the members were agreeable. This alternative would be to create an RSC Campaign Fund.

⁸⁷For example, Bill Dickinson had voted in favor of the congressional pay raise which Marjorie Holt severely criticized in her introduction to the book. Dickinson had taken his position because he served as the senior Republican on the House Administration Committee which had legislative oversight for pay raises.

⁸⁸Interview with Richard B. Dingman, Executive Director, the Republican Study Committee, Washington, D.C., January 28, 1980.

⁸⁹Op. cit., Interview with Honorable John H. Rousselot.

⁹⁰Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane.

⁹¹"Dear Colleague" letter from Paul H. Tsongas and Timothy Wirth, June 17, 1975.

⁹²"Fighting Conservative Chic," Washington Post, March 17, 1976, p. A4.

⁹³Op. cit., Interviews with Honorables John H. Rousselot, Edward J. Derwinski and Philip M. Crane.

⁹⁴Memorandum from Ed Feulner to Co-authors, The Case Against the Reckless Congress, December 21, 1976.

⁹⁵Op. cit., Interview with Honorable John H. Rousselot.

⁹⁶David C. Treen, ed., Can We Afford This House?, Ottawa, Illinois: Green Hill Publishers, Inc., 1978.

⁹⁷Richard T. Schulze and John H. Rousselot, eds., View from the Capitol Dome: Looking Right, Ottawa, Illinois: Green Hill Publishers, Inc., 1980.

⁹⁸See Section J, infra.

⁹⁹Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, "House Election Setbacks Upset G.O.P.," Washington Post, November 17, 1976, p. E3.

¹⁰⁰Memorandum from the Executive Director to the RSC senior staff, October 28, 1976.

¹⁰¹Phil Truluck of the RSC staff gained the reputation among the Washington business community as one of the best vote-counters of the House. As he explained it: "For most lobbyists, dealing with the Senate was fairly easy. But with 435 members in the House, many of them just gave up. With the RSC whip calls and input from lobbyists on certain large state delegations like California, New York and Texas, the whole process became more manageable and we became pretty good at it." Op. cit., Interview with Phil N. Truluck.

¹⁰²Op. cit., Interview with Honorable John H. Roussetot. The subscription price was set at \$100 per year. The marginal cost of servicing the subscription was approximately \$65, thus no question of subsidy was involved.

¹⁰³Interview with Honorable Edith Green, Portland, Oregon, September 5, 1980.

¹⁰⁴Michael Robinson, "Three Faces of Congressional Media," in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., The New Congress, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981, p. 58.

¹⁰⁵The Right Report, Vol. IV, No. 3, Washington, D.C., June 9, 1975.

¹⁰⁶Tom Copley, "Rep. Holt: New Right Leader," Evening Capitol, Annapolis, Maryland, May 9, 1975, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷Op. cit., Robinson, p. 87.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 90.

¹⁰⁹Op. cit., Interview with Paul M. Weyrich.

¹¹⁰Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Marjorie S. Holt.

¹¹¹Interview with Honorable James A. McClure, Washington, D.C., January 11, 1980.

¹¹²Op. cit., "Republican Study Group: Right-Wing Power."

¹¹³Ibid.

¹¹⁴Ibid.

¹¹⁵Ibid.

¹¹⁶Op. cit., Interview with Richard B. Dingman.

¹¹⁷Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1970, p. 9.

¹¹⁸Interview with radio and television commentator and syndicated columnist, Jeffrey St. John, Washington, D.C., January 15, 1980.

¹¹⁹Op. cit., Interview with Honorable James A. McClure.

¹²⁰Op. cit., Interview with Honorable John J. Rhodes.

¹²¹Randall B. Ripley, Congress, Process and Policy, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1975.

¹²²Harrison W. Fox, Jr. and Susan Webb Hammond, Congressional Staffs the Invisible Force in American Lawmaking, New York: The Free Press, 1977.

¹²³Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Marjorie S. Holt.

¹²⁴Reviews of the budget process and its effectiveness are found in Eugene McAllister, "Congress and the Budget: Evaluating the Process," Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1979; and James Thurber, "New Power of the Purse: An Assessment of Congressional Budget Reform," in Leroy N. Rieselbach, ed., Legislative Reform, the Policy Impact, Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath & Co., 1978.

¹²⁵RSC Meeting Announcement, "The Budget Process and How We Should Be Using It," (mimeo).

¹²⁶Interview with David B. Swoap, Washington, D.C., October 5, 1979.

¹²⁷Interview with Daphne Miller, Washington, D.C., July 16, 1980.

¹²⁸Republican Study Committee, A Research Guide in Public Policy, January 30, 1975, Washington, D.C., 96 pages, (mimeo).

¹²⁹Op. cit., Schick, p. 229.

¹³⁰Republican Study Committee Research Directory, December 27, 1975, 27 pages, (mimeo).

¹³¹Walter Dean Burnham argues that "The choice at Kansas City was between conservative and far right." See Walter Dean Burnham and Martha Wagner Weinberg, American Politics and Public Policy, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1978, p. 6.

¹³²Jeffrey L. Pressman, "Groups and Group Caucuses," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 92, No. 4, Winter, 1977-78, pp. 673-682 at p. 682.

¹³³Martha Wagner Weinberg, "Writing the Republican Platform," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 92, No. 4, Winter, 1977-78, pp. 655-663 at p. 661.

¹³⁴Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Marjorie S. Holt.

¹³⁵Meeting Announcement of the Republican Study Committee, March 26, 1976.

¹³⁶RSC BULLETIN, June 21, 1976, p. III-59.

¹³⁷William J. Schneider and Francis P. Hoerber, Arms, Men and Military Budgets, Issues for Fiscal Year 1977, New York: Crane Russak & Co., 1976.

¹³⁸"Dear Colleague" letter from Jack Kemp and Samuel Stratton, June 11, 1976.

¹³⁹Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Edward J. Derwinski.

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

¹⁴¹Op. cit., Burnham, American Politics and Public Policy, p. 14.

¹⁴²Agenda, "The 95th Congress Orientation Seminar," Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, Washington, D.C.

143 Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Robert H. Michel.

144 Op. cit., Ferber, p. 317.

145 Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Robert H. Michel.

146 Op. cit., "The Republican Study Group: Right-Wing Power."

147 Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Robert H. Michel.

148 Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Edward J. Derwinski.

149 Op. cit., Fiorina, p. 80.

150 Op. cit., Schick, p. 216.

151 Op. cit., Mayhew, p. 16.

152 See, John D. Lees, The Political System in the United States, London: Faber and Faber, 1975, pp. 155-157, and Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, 3rd edition, New York: Random House, 1977, chapter 12.

153 See Chapter VIII, infra.

154 Op. cit., Ferber, p. 326.

155 Interview with Honorable Ben B. Blackburn, Washington, D.C., December 28, 1978.

156 Op. cit., Jewell and Patterson, p. 19.

157 Richard E. Cohen, "House Republicans Under Rhodes -- Divided They Stand and Fret," National Journal, October 29, 1977, p. 1689.

158 Charles A. Moser, The Speaker and the House, Washington, D.C.: Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, 1979, p. 64.

CHAPTER VII

¹Michael J. Malbin, "Congressional Committee Staffs: Who's In Charge Here?", The Public Interest, No. 47, Spring, 1977, pp. 16-40 at pp. 31-32.

²David E. Price, "Professionals and 'Entrepreneurs': Staff Orientations and Policy Making on Three Senate Committees," Journal of Politics, Vol. 33, May 1971, pp. 316-336.

³Interview with David B. Swoap, Washington, D.C., October 5, 1979.

⁴Michael J. Malbin, Unelected Representatives, New York: Basic Books, 1980, p. 39.

⁵Op. cit., Interview with David B. Swoap.

⁶Republican Study Committee Agenda, dated February 20, 1975.

⁷Letter from Marjorie S. Holt, to Republican Study Committee Colleagues, February 26, 1975, with 3-page background paper attached.

⁸Republican Study Committee background paper on welfare reform proposals, dated March 3, 1975, p. 1, (mimeo).

⁹Memorandum from the executive director to Co-sponsors of the National Welfare Reform Act of 1975, dated March 6, 1975.

¹⁰Material distributed in addition to the text of the bill included the background paper on "The National Welfare Reform Act of 1975," consisting of 33 single-spaced pages on specific problems and solutions encompassed in the bill, a summary of the proposal, and other related memoranda.

¹¹Memorandum to the Republican Study Committee and other co-sponsors of the National Welfare Reform Act of 1975 from Ed Feulner, dated March 18, 1975.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Congressional Record, Honorable Philip M. Crane, et. al., March 21, 1975, pp. 7969-7973.

¹⁴Memorandum from David B. Swoap to Hon. John J. Duncan, "Effect of the Welfare Reform Bill in Tennessee," dated March 18, 1975.

¹⁵"Dear Colleague" letter from Honorable John J. Duncan, dated March 25, 1975, (mimeo).

¹⁶H.R. 15080.

¹⁷James A. Robinson, "Decision Making in Congress," in Alfred deGrazia, ed., Congress: The First Branch of Government, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1966, pp. 262-263.

¹⁸Frederick Doolittle, Frank Levy and Michael Wiseman, "The Mirage of Welfare Reform," The Public Interest, No. 47, Spring, 1977, pp. 62-87.

¹⁹See Randall who argues that Nixon's people and policies "in response to administration desires for a more restrictive welfare policy, came to have a profound impact" on the programs. Ronald Randall; "Presidential Power versus Bureaucratic Intransigence: The Influence of the Nixon Administration on Welfare Policy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 3, 1979, pp. 795-810 at p. 802.

²⁰See Chapter VI, supra.

²¹See Chapter II, supra.

²²Op. cit., Malbin, Unelected Representatives, p. 32.

²³See Section B., supra.

²⁴Interview with Honorable Robert H. Michel, Washington, D.C., April 3, 1981.

²⁵"The Food Stamp Reform Act of 1975," RSC Fact Sheet, dated June 15, 1975, pp. II-130-181, (mimeo).

²⁶See House debate on July 19, 1973, Congressional Record, pp. 24921-24933.

²⁷Memorandum to the Files, dated May 6, 1975.

²⁸"Dear Colleague" letter from Hon. Robert H. Michel, dated June 24, 1975.

²⁹Republican Study Committee draft press release for use by co-sponsors, dated July 27, 1975.

³⁰Congressional Record, "Food Stamp Reform -- Message from the President of the United States," July 28, 1975, pp. 25279-25280.

³¹Memorandum to Co-sponsors of the National Food Stamp Reform Act from David B. Swoap, dated September 15, 1975.

³²"Four Food Stamp Reform Measures: A Summary," RSC Fact Sheet, dated March 9, 1976, pp. II-1-11, (mimeo).

³³One of the few test votes on Food Stamp Reform in the 94th Congress occurred in November 1975, when the House rejected an amendment offered by Paul Findley which would have eliminated households with gross incomes above the poverty level from the food stamp program. This move, a key provision of the Buckley-Michel bill, failed in a vote of 159-230.

³⁴1976 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1977, p. 12.

³⁵Morris P. Fiorina, Congress Keystone of the Washington Establishment, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, p. 43.

³⁶RSC Memorandum to the Staff from the Executive Director re: Executive Committee meeting, April 1, 1974, dated April 2, 1974.

³⁷Republican Study Committee Fact Sheet, "The Consumer Protection Act of 1975 (H.R. 7575)," August 1975, p. I-109, (mimeo).

³⁸Of the ten opposing the bill, nine were Republicans, but three Republicans had voted in favor of the bill.

³⁹Letter from Gerald R. Ford to John W. Erlenborn quoted in House Report 94-425, p. 27 and cited in *op. cit.* RSC Fact Sheet, "The Consumer Protection Act of 1975 (H.R. 7575)."

⁴⁰There are 435 voting members of the House. A presidential veto can only be overridden by a positive vote of two-thirds of the members of the House present and voting.

⁴¹"The Consumer Protection Act of 1975 (S. 200)," RSC Fact Sheet, dated April 28, 1975, pp. I-57-58, (mimeo).

⁴²"Arguments Against the Consumer Protection Agency," RSC Fact Sheet, dated May 21, 1975, (mimeo).

⁴³"The Consumer Protection Act of 1975 (H.R. 7575)," RSC Fact Sheet update, dated August 27, 1975, pp. I-108-111, (mimeo).

⁴⁴Congressional Record, Roll No. 672, November 6, 1975, p. 35412.

⁴⁵For a description of the AFL-CIO's political machine, see Harry Holloway, "The Political Machine of the AFL-CIO," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 94, No. 1, Spring, 1979, pp. 117-134.

⁴⁶Meetings of the Executive Committee of the Republican Study Committee, July 14, 1975.

⁴⁷1975 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1976, p. 481.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹John F. Manley, "The Rise of Congress in Foreign Policy-Making," The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, September 1971, pp. 60-70 at p. 65.

⁵⁰Les Aspin, "Why Doesn't Congress Do Something?" Foreign Policy, No. 15, Summer, 1974, pp. 70-82 at p. 73.

⁵¹House Report 94-848.

⁵²See, for example, "The Republican Study Committee BULLETIN," dated June 1, 1976, which offered a sample press release for members' use in their home districts, as well as speeches for the floor debate.

⁵³The Executive Committee discussed at their meeting on May 25, 1975, this issue as the lead subject. In addition, the RSC's senior research associate assigned to foreign policy issues, Robert Schuettinger, met with Derwinski several times immediately before the vote to work on specific tasks for Derwinski.

⁵⁴Interview with Robert L. Schuettinger, Washington, D.C., May 15, 1979.

⁵⁵P.L. 93-559.

⁵⁶Robert A. Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy, New Haven: Yale Institute of International Studies, 1949, p. 42.

⁵⁷Interview with Honorable Edward J. Derwinski, Washington, D.C., February 4, 1980.

⁵⁸Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Kissinger: A Capitol Problem," Washington Post, August 6, 1975.

⁵⁹Congressional Record, Roll Call No. 579, October 2, 1975, pp. 31491-31492.

⁶⁰Allen Schick, "The Supply and Demand for Analysis on Capitol Hill," Policy Analysis, Vol. 2, Spring, 1976, pp. 215-234 at p. 224.

⁶¹See Chapter V, supra.

⁶²Republican Study Committee Fact Sheet, "Halting the Importation of Rhodesian Chrome," September 2, 1975, pp. I-114-121, (mimeo).

⁶³Congressional Record, Roll Call No. 549, September 25, 1975, p. 30235.

⁶⁴Harvey G. Zeidenstein, "The Reassertion of Congressional Power: New Curbs on the President," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 93, No. 3, Fall, 1978, pp. 393-410 at p. 395.

⁶⁵Congressional Record, Hon. Marjorie S. Holt, "Kissinger's African Policy Statements Disquieting," May 6, 1976, pp. E-2400-2401; Steven D. Symms, "Kissinger Would Repeal Byrd Amendment," May 6, 1976, pp. E-2422-2423.

⁶⁶Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "The Sonnenfeldt Doctrine: Deflecting the Ruckus," Washington Post, March 30, 1976.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Edward J. Derwinski.

⁶⁹"Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1975 (H.R. 25)," RSC Fact Sheet, March 6, 1975, p. I-32, (mimeo).

⁷⁰A "pocket veto" means that the bill passed the Congress during the last days of its session. After the Congress adjourns, the President has 10 days to either sign a bill into law, or let it languish and die for lack of a signature. Ford made the latter choice.

⁷¹For a discussion of external lobbying on the surface mining bill, see Randall B. Ripley, Congress Progress and Policy, New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1975, p. 212.

⁷²Op. cit., 1975 CQ Almanac, p. 183.

⁷³Congressional Record, Roll Call No. 275, June 10, 1975, p. 18008. The roll call on final passage appears in Congressional Record, March 18, 1975, p. H-1908, (Daily Record).

⁷⁴H.R. 634.

⁷⁵"Federal Land Use," RSC Fact Sheet, May 9, 1975, pp. II-128-129, (mimeo); "Opposition: National Land Use Legislation," RSC background paper, May 9, 1975, (mimeo).

⁷⁶Ronald K. Stich, The Current Status of State Land Use Policy, Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1974.

⁷⁷Allen Howe (D-Utah), John Melcher (D-Montana) and Roy Taylor (D-North Carolina).

⁷⁸Interview with Phil N. Truluck, Washington, D.C., January 3, 1979.

⁷⁹"Comparison of Economic Programs," RSC Fact Sheet, January 15, 1975.

⁸⁰For example, the Kemp Special Order, detailed in Chapter V, Section C.

⁸¹Congressional Record, Honorable Jack Kemp, et. al., "Alternative Solutions," February 5, 1975, pp. 2380-2386.

⁸²Charles Moser, An Other Budget Toward A Reordering of National Priorities, Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1975.

⁸³Congressional Record, March 25, 1975, p. 8519.

⁸⁴Martin F. Nolan, "Congress on its Own," Washington Star, May 12, 1975.

⁸⁵Letter to the Editor, Honorable John H. Rousselot, Washington Star, May 29, 1975.

⁸⁶RSC Fact Sheet, April 28, 1975, p. I-61, (mimeo).

⁸⁷John H. Rousselot, "The Bloated Budget," The Case Against the Reckless Congress, Ottawa, Illinois: Green Hill Publishers, Inc., 1976, Chapter 3.

⁸⁸Interview with Honorable Richard Ichord, en route from Washington, D.C. to Tokyo, Japan, August 25, 1980.

⁸⁹Gerhard Loewenberg, Modern Parliaments, Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1971, p. 2.

⁹⁰Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Richard Ichord.

⁹¹See Chapter V, supra.

⁹²Congressional Record, February 5, 1975, p. 2383.

⁹³Congressional Record, Hon. Jack Kemp, "Jobs Creation Act of 1975," May 21, 1975, pp. 15735-15739.

⁹⁴Republican Study Committee BULLETIN, dated May 19, lead notice.

⁹⁵Congressional Record, "Econometric study shows the Jobs Creation Act is the free enterprise alternative to both recession and inflation," October 20, 1975, pp. 33035-33040.

⁹⁶"Equal Opportunity Full Employment Act," RSC Fact Sheet, January 26, 1976, pp. I-1-16, (mimeo).

⁹⁷Op. cit., Malbin, Unelected Representatives, p. 75.

⁹⁸William M. Ketchum, "Who's That Looking Over My Shoulder -- and Why?", op. cit., The Case Against the Reckless Congress, p. 51.

⁹⁹Press release from the office of Honorable Marjorie S. Holt, "Archer to Head Congressional Effort to Reform Bureaucracy," dated July 31, 1975.

¹⁰⁰"Amendments to FDA Limiting Power to Regulate Vitamins," RSC Fact Sheet, July 18, 1975, pp. I-100-101.

¹⁰¹Congressional Record, Honorable Bill Archer, "Regulatory Reform -- Rekindling of the American Economic Spirit," July 1, 1976, pp. H-7234-7251, (Daily Record), including statements by 13 Republican Study Committee members.

¹⁰²Congressional Record, Honorable Bill Archer, "Federal Regulations Stifle Energy Development," March 9, 1976, pp. 5919-5931.

¹⁰³Congressional Record, Honorable Bill Archer, "Reform of OSHA Crucial to Economy," December 10, 1975, pp. 39764-39776.

¹⁰⁴"Dear Colleague" letter (to members of the Republican Study Committee) from Honorable Bill Archer, dated June 16, 1976.

¹⁰⁵Michael J. Malbin, "Delegation, Deliberation and the New Role of Congressional Staff," in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., The New Congress, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981, page 173.

¹⁰⁶United States vs. Board of Education of Anne Arundel County, Maryland.

¹⁰⁷Letter from Honorable Marjorie S. Holt to Gerald R. Ford, dated June 27, 1975.

¹⁰⁸"Background Study on Social Security: the Need for Reform," RSC Fact Sheet, February 14, 1975, pp. II-54-83, (mimeo).

¹⁰⁹Robert L. Schuettinger, Saving Social Security, Washington, D.C.: Council on American Affairs, 1977.

¹¹⁰Memorandum to Honorable Philip M. Crane from the executive director, regarding Social Security, dated February 18, 1975.

¹¹¹The ratio had been changed in early 1975 to provide for a "two-to-one-plus one," 25 Democrats/12 Republicans, majority for the Democrats.

¹¹²Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane, Washington, D.C., April 15, 1980.

¹¹³Interview with Richard B. Dingman, Washington, D.C., May 21, 1981.

¹¹⁴Op. cit., Ripley, p. 213.

¹¹⁵An extensive discussion of this point is contained in John D. Lees, "The Role of Interest Groups," The Political System of the United States, London: Faber and Faber, 1975, Chapter 6.

¹¹⁶Op. cit., Malbin, The Public Interest, p. 32.

¹¹⁷Op. cit., Schick, p. 224.

¹¹⁸Michael J. Malbin, "Delegation, Deliberation, and the New Role of Congressional Staff," in op. cit., Mann and Ornstein, p. 156.

¹¹⁹Stephen Frantzich, "Who Makes Our Laws? The Legislative Effectiveness of Members of the U.S. Congress," Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 3, August 1979, pp. 409-428, at p. 412.

¹²⁰Andrew J. Milnor and Mark N. Franklin, "Patterns of Opposition Behavior in Modern Legislatures," in Allan Kornberg, ed., Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, New York: McKay, 1973, p. 445.

¹²¹John P. Mackintosh, "Reform of the House of Commons: The Case for Specialization," in op. cit., Loewenberg, p. 39.

¹²²Norman J. Ornstein, "The House and the Senate in a New Congress," in op. cit., Mann and Ornstein, p. 369.

CHAPTER VIII

¹Burgener served from January 1977 until January 1978 when he was succeeded by David C. Treen (R-Louisiana). Treen served until January 1979 when he was succeeded by Richard D. Schulze (R-Pennsylvania). Schulze served until January 1980 when he was succeeded by John H. Rousselot (R-California). Rousselot served until January 1981, when Schulze was re-elected chairman.

²Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane, Washington, D.C., March 4, 1981.

³Ibid.

⁴Interview with Richard B. Dingman, Washington, D.C., January 28, 1980.

⁵See Appendix A.

⁶David C. Treen, ed., Can We Afford This House?, Ottawa, Illinois: Green Hill Publishers, Inc., 1978.

⁷Richard T. Schulze and John H. Rousselot, eds., View from the Capitol Dome: Looking Right, Ottawa, Illinois: Green Hill Publishers, Inc., 1980.

⁸Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane.

⁹Op. cit., Interview with Richard B. Dingman.

¹⁰Russell Kirk, "The Conservative Movement: Then and Now," The Heritage Lectures 1, Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1980, p. 2.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 3-5.

¹²Interviews with Honorable Robert H. Michel, Washington, D.C., April 3, 1981, and Honorable John J. Rhodes, Washington, D.C., August 19, 1980.

¹³Michael J. Malbin, "Delegation, Deliberation and the New Role of Congressional Staff," in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., The New Congress, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981, p. 174.

¹⁴For example: the RSC supported the Legal Services battle, see Chapter VII, supra and opposed the Nixon Family Assistance Plan, the Common Situs Picketing Bill and federal land use planning, see Chapters II and VII, supra.

¹⁵For example, the National Welfare Reform Act of 1975 and the reform of the food stamp program, see Chapter VII, supra.

¹⁶Eric M. Uslaner notes: "With the loss of the Presidency in 1976, the incentives for policy innovation among Republicans became even fewer." Eric M. Uslaner, "Policy Entrepreneurs and Amateur Democrats in the House of Representatives: Toward a More Party-Oriented Congress?" in Leroy N. Rieselbach, ed., Legislative Reform the Policy Impact, Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath & Co., 1978, p. 113.

¹⁷Richard F. Fenno makes this case clearly: "Since a House decision is a composite of several formal (and countless informal) decisions, and since at each stage in the decision-making a different cluster of House leaders may prevail, supporters of a given bill must build a series of majorities -- in the substantive committee, in the Rules Committee, on the floor, and in conference, -- if they are to be successful. Opponents of a bill, however, need to build but a single majority at any one stage in the process -- to achieve their ends....House rules make it easier to stop a bill than to pass one." Richard F. Fenno, "The Internal Distinction of Influence: The House," in David B. Truman, ed., The Congress and America's Future, 2nd Edition, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973, p. 73.

¹⁸See Chapter V, supra.

¹⁹Op. cit., Malbin, p. 149.

²⁰Op. cit., Interview with Richard B. Dingman.

²¹Armstrong defeated Floyd Haskell (1972-1978), Symms defeated Frank Church (1958-1980), Grassley defeated John Culver (1974-1980), and Abdnor defeated George McGovern (1962-1980). However, in none of these cases could the election of the RSC members to a Senate seat be attributed to their role as active members of the Republican Study Committee. They were all ambitious members of the House, and very likely would have run for the Senate seats.

²²Michel had led the RSC food stamp reform effort in 1976; See Chapter VII, supra. Kemp had been the leader of several economic initiatives; and Lott had participated in a number of issues including those on economic policy. Lott had been one of the early candidates selected for special attention in the "Five and Thirty" program before his first election to the House in 1972; see Chapter IV, supra.

²³As Peter Gerlich notes: "Institution must first be established; there must be a point in time from which it is possible to identify an institution that previously did not exist." Peter Gerlich, "The Institutionalization of European Parliaments," in Allan Kornberg, ed., Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, New York: McKay, 1973, p. 94. Such a point in time occurred in July 1974 for the Republican Study Committee.

²⁴Rose states, "A political faction may be defined as a group of individuals based on representatives in Parliament [Congress] who seek to further a broad range of policies through consciously organized political activity." Richard Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain," Political Studies, Vol. XII, No. 1, 1964, pp. 33-46 at p. 37.

²⁵Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 12.

²⁶Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, March, 1968, pp. 144-168.

²⁷Several members of the Republican Study Committee, such as David Treen and Marjorie Holt, have served as members of the Republican National Committee.

²⁸Norman J. Ornstein, "The House and the Senate in a New Congress," in op. cit., Mann and Ornstein, p. 367.

²⁹James McClure of the Energy Committee; Jake Garn of the Banking and Housing Committee; Orrin Hatch of the Education and Human Resources Committee; and Jesse Helms of the Agriculture Committee come to mind.

³⁰Barbara Sinclair, "Coping with Uncertainty: Building Coalitions in the House and the Senate," in op. cit., Mann and Ornstein, p. 215.

³¹Op. cit., Interview with Richard B. Dingman.

³²Ibid.

³³Op. cit., Interviews with Honorables Robert H. Michel and John J. Rhodes.

³⁴Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane.

³⁵Interview with Honorable Daniel B. Crane, Washington, D.C., June 15, 1981.

³⁶For a distinction between the factional versus the coalition leader, see John D. Lees' discussion of the difficulties which faced George McGovern in evolving from one role to the other within the Democratic party. In John D. Lees, The Political System of the United States, London: Faber and Faber, 1975, p. 327.

³⁷Op. cit., Interview with Honorable Philip M. Crane.

³⁸Interview with Honorable Newt Gingrich, Washington, D.C., May 21, 1981.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Interview with Richard B. Dingman, Washington, D.C., May 21, 1981.

⁴²The "New Right" has been used as a political term for some years. For example, Robert Dahl in Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966, pp. 66-67, discusses the New Right but notes, "Attempts to locate the new Right in particular social, economic or educational strata have on the whole proved unsuccessful. What distinguishes the new Right most sharply is not its social-economic position but simply its dissenting ideology; and its alienation stems from a total inability to win national elections or, until 1964, even to secure presidential candidates who would espouse its obviously defiant minority views." Contrast that perspective with Richard A. Viguerie's description of the New Right in 1980: "What do we in the New Right stand for? We believe in God and the importance of the traditional family. We believe the way to have peace is to be stronger than the country that wants to conquer us. We believe in fiscal prudence and helping only those who cannot help themselves. We believe in and hold dear the spiritual convictions and moral foundations which made and continue to make America great....Our first

commitment is to political principles, not political parties....We are aggressive, committed, confident. We don't give a darn about yesterday's defeats. We're interested in tomorrow's victories." Richard A. Viguerie, The New Right: We're Ready to Lead, Falls Church, Virginia: The Viguerie Company, 1980, pp. 16-17. It is in the Viguerie context that the phrase "New Right" is used in this thesis.

⁴³Op. cit., Interview with Richard B. Dingman, May 21, 1981.

⁴⁴Op. cit., Lees, p. 155.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 157.

⁴⁶Interview with Paul M. Weyrich, Washington, D.C., October 16, 1979.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Op. cit., Interview with Richard B. Dingman, May 21, 1981.

⁴⁹Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review, Vol. 19, Spring, 1959, pp. 79-88 at p. 84.

⁵⁰Op. cit., Interview with Richard B. Dingman, May 21, 1981.