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**Migration Old and New: Accepting Diversity in Creating a
Catholic Community in Younknak Presbyterian Church**

Chung Yoube Ha

**A Thesis Presented to the University of Edinburgh
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
May 2009**

DECLARATION

This dissertation is in fulfillment of the requirements established by the University of Edinburgh, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, in the School of Divinity. I declare that this thesis is my own composition and constitutes the results of my own research.

Chung Yoube Ha

15 May 2009

DEDICATED

to

My beloved mentor, Rev. Chul-shin Lee, D.D., and
his most gracious Youngnak Church
for their support and encouragement
and above all
for their love.

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Most of all, I am grateful to my Father in heaven who is always with me, helping and inspiring me to accomplish this thesis with his wisdom, love, and grace.

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Table of Contents

Declaration	1
Dedication	2
Acknowledgements	3
Table of Contents	5
Abstract	11
Abbreviations	12
Tables and Diagrams	13
Introduction	14
1. Description of the Study	14
2. Migrants Old and New	16
3. Crucial Definitions	21
3.1. Power	21
3.2. Ethnic Identity	22
4. Limitations	23
5. Necessity of Research	24
6. Methodology	27
7. Theoretical Frames and Approach	33
8. Structure and Sources of the Study	35
8.1. Structure of the Study	35
8.2. Sources	37

Part One

The Emergence and Evolution of the Contrasting Ideologies in Relation to the Formation of Ethnic Identity of Migrants Old and New

Introduction	39
1. Theoretical Frame	39

Chapter I The Emergence and Development of Anti-Communist

Ideology and its Effect on the Formation of Ethnic Identity of Christian Wolnammin

Introduction	43
The Emergence of an Anti-Communist Standpoint (1874-1945)	43
1. The Early Missionaries' Two Theological Tendencies	44
2. The Significant Growth of Christianity	48
2.1. Various Factors Related to the Growth of Northwestern Conservative Christianity	48
2.2. The Beginning and Result of the Significant Growth of Northwestern Conservative Christianity	51
3. Two Perspectives toward the Attitude of Missionaries	54
4. Various Reasons for the Emergence of the Anti-Missionary Movement	56
The Migration of Northern Christians into South Korea	59
1. The Establishing of Youngnak Presbyterian Church	60
2. Reorganization and Assimilation	62
The Formation of Characteristics of Anti-Communist Ideology	63
1. The Post-Liberation Period	64
2. During the Korean War	69
3. The Post-Korean War Period	71
3.1. The National Evangelical Campaign	72
3.2. Anti-Communist Education	78
Conclusion	85

Chapter II The Emergence and Development of the Juche Ideology and its Impact on the Life of the North Koreans

Introduction	87
1. The definition of Juche	87
2. The Emergence of Juche in the Korean Peninsula	90
3. The Emergence of Socio-Political Juche in North Korea	93
3.1. The Official Emergence of Juche	96
4. The Development of Juche Ideology	98
4.1. Juche Ideology of Kim Jong-il	99

4.2. Ideological Remoulding	102
5. Juche Ideology and Christianity	105
5.1. Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il's Encounter with Christianity	107
5.2. Similarities Between Juche Ideology and Christianity	109
6. Influence of Juche on the North Korean Life	115
6.1. The Power of Juche Ideology	119
Conclusion	120
Conclusion to Part One	122

Part Two

The Explanation of Ethnic Identity among Old and New Migrants

Introduction	125
1. Ethnic Identity	127
1.1. Perspectives on Ethnic Identity	127
1.2. Two Contrasting Perspectives in Korea Regarding Ethnicity	129
2. Theoretical Frame	134

Chapter III Christian Saeteomin Identity Expressed in Material, Verbal and Behavioural Symbols

Introduction	137
1. Material Symbols	138
1.1. Clothing	139
1.2. Flowers	141
1.3. Colours	144
2. Verbal Symbols	145
2.1. 'I Can Do It' (Naneun Hal Su Issda)	145
2.2. Attitude Toward Foreign Words and Variants	147
2.3. Intonation and Accent	150
2.4. Relational Designations	151
2.5. Words Used Exclusively to Refer to the Leader	153
2.6. Address	155

2.7. Words Expressing Tenderness and Affection	157
2.9. Expressing Body Weight	158
3. Behavioural Symbols	159
3.1. Smiling, Praise and Greetings	159
3.2. Marital Roles	160
3.3. Cooking	162
3.4. Making Promises	164
3.5. Acting Simply and Expression Style	164
Conclusion	169

Chapter IV The Explanation of Wolnammin's Different Ethnic Identity in Interaction with Saeteomin

Introduction	172
1. Material Symbols	176
1.1. Preferred clothing	176
1.2. Wine and Tobacco	177
2. Verbal Symbols	178
2.1. Jaju (Independence)	178
2.2. Dongmu (Friend)	179
2.3. Migun Cheolsu (Withdraw of the United States Army)	179
2.4. Hancha (Chinese Characters)	180
3. Behavioural Patterns	181
3.1. The Nuclear Family and Individualism	181
3.2. The Conflict of the CW and the CS	183
3.3. The Firm Faith System	186
3.4. Forming Personal Relationships	189
3.5. Reproduction of Distrust	190
3.6. Choices	192
3.7. Self-Sufficiency	194
3.8. Different Tradition	196
Conclusion	198
Conclusion to Part Two: Rejection and Exclusion	199

Part Three

A Construction of a Catholic Community in Youngnak Presbyterian Church

Introduction	206
1. Toward a Catholic Community in Diversity	208
2. The Principle of Analogy and Otherness and Their Implication	210
3. A Concept of Tong-i	215
4. Approach	218

Chapter V Attitude and Missiological Position Towards Religious Juche Ideology

Introduction	221
The Fulfilment Theology of the 1910 World Missionary Conference	223
1. Background of Edinburgh 1910	223
2. Missionary Attitude towards Other Religions and to Christ	225
Responses to the Commision IV of Edinburgh 1910 and and its Critics	
1. Radical Discontinuity	229
2. Anonymous Christianity	230
3. Faith and Beliefs	233
Fulfilment Theology and the Text Book of BSCFP	236
1. The Missionary Attitude of the NSTCL toward Juche Ideology	236
2. Stepping Stones Emerging from Juche Ideology Towards Christ	237
Conclusion	243

Chapter VI Embracing the Other and Its Application in the Context of the Korean Peninsula and Youngnak Presbyterian Church

Introduction	245
Embrace in Miroslav Volf's Work	247
1. Definition of Embrace	247
2. A Summary of Embrace According to Volf	248
3. Evaluation of Volf's Stance	253

The Embrace Policy of Lim Dong-won	259
1. Brief Background	260
2. The Definition of Embrace Policy	262
3. A Summary of Lim’s Embrace Policy	263
4. A Biblical Perspective of Lim’s Sunshine Policy	267
5. Evaluation of Lim’s Policy	269
Embrace in Younknak Presbyterian Church	272
1. The Response of Younknak Presbyterian Church to the Embrace Policy	276
2. Repentance and Forgiveness of Younknak Presbyterian Church	276
3. Embrace Cases in Younknak Presbyterian Church	279
Conclusion	287
Conclusion to Part Three	290
Conclusion	293
Bibliography	304

Abstract

This thesis examines the attempts of the Christian Wolnammin and Christian Saeteomin to construct a catholic community within Younghak Presbyterian Church, Seoul. Both groups come from the same region in the Northern territory, yet have different identities based on the fact that their exodus to South Korea took place during different periods of the last half century.

Both before and since their arrival in South Korea around 60 years ago, Christian Wolnammin were socialized in the context of a deep-rooted anti-Communist ideology. In sharp contrast, recent Christian Saeteomin were socialized by Juche (self-reliance) ideology (the official government ideology of North Korea) prior to leaving North Korea in the last decade. The contrasting ideologies cause tension and even hostility between the groups in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, posing significant difficulties for creating a space for mutual fellowship and respect.

Members of the two groups did not perceive the extent of differences between them until they met each other in the church. Prior to coming together, both communities desired unification, including the sharing of what they assumed was an ethnically homogeneous identity. The serious misinterpretation of symbols and behaviour patterns caused disappointment and tension. Consequently, examples of exclusion began to emerge in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, with at least some Christian Saeteomin wanting to return home.

The present study is a response to their difficulties. It locates, describes and analyses the conflicts, reflects on the place of ideology in Christian practice evident in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, and outlines a route towards a practical and prophetic resolution based on the theological concept of reconciliation and embrace.

Abbreviations

BSCFP	Bible Study Class for Free People
CS	Christian Saeteomin
CW	Christian Wolnammin
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FLPH	Foreign Languages Publishing House
NCKK	The National Council of Churches in Korea
NSTCL	New Starting: Toward the Changing Life
PCTS	Presbyterian College and Theological Seminary

Tables and Diagrams

1. Tables

Table 1: The number of North Korean Saeteomin arriving in South Korea
(11.10.2008)

Table 2: Distribution of PhD Theses on the studies of the North Korean Saeteomin in
South Korea, 1997-2005

Table 3: The Statistical Table of In-Depth Interviews with 21 Christian Saeteomin

Table 4: The Statistical Table of In-Depth Interviews with 16 Christian Walnammin

Table 5: Communicant Membership of the Major Protestant Church in Korea in 1938

2. Diagrams

Diagram 1: Christian Wolnammin and Christian Saeteomin

Diagram 2: The Perspective of Three-Dimensional Power to Analyze Patterned
Behaviour.

Diagram 3: The Perspective of Thick Description for the Analysis of Symbolic
Structure

Diagram 4: The Methodology in Relation to Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation

Migrants Old and New: Accepting Diversity in Creating a Catholic Community in Younknak Presbyterian Church

Introduction

1. Description of the Study

The conflict between North and South Korea has been a dominant concern for Koreans since the division of Korea, which began after the end of the Japanese occupation in 1945.¹ North and South Korea, divided at the 38th parallel, established their own governments. The gap between the two governments widened as the ideological battle between them became intense, and eventually the Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950. The ceasefire agreement was finally made on 27 July 1953. The three-year war resulted in the death of over two-and-a-half million soldiers and three-and-a-half million civilians. Three million refugees were created and over ten million families were separated as a result of the conflict. During the brief period when one side occupied the other's territory, both parties committed killings, torture and kidnapping of civilians, accusing them of being either 'communist aggressors' or 'collaborators of the American imperialists'.²

The war caused a deep scar of resentment in the hearts and minds of Koreans. Since the war, the two Koreas have remained divided for 60 years. The two nations currently have a total of more than one-and-a-half-million troops in arms, and bitter

¹ Sebastian C.H.Kim, 'Reconciliation Possible? The Churches' Efforts Toward the Peace and Reconciliation of North and South Korea,' Sebastian C.H.Kim, Pauline Kollontai and Greg Hoyland, ed., *Peace and Reconciliation In Search of Shared Identity*, England: Ashgate, 2008, p. 161.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 162-163.

conflict and mutually hostile propaganda has continued until recently.³Up to the present day the profound anti-communist ideological socialization nurtured during the Cold War era and reinforced by the South Korean government, continues to thwart attempts to create space for a positive reconciliation of Korean citizens.

In studying something as vast as North-South antagonism and the possibility of reunification in Korea, the scholar has three options, following the views of E.H. Carr on writing of history. The first concentrates on the deeds and actions of leaders and empires, in either an intentionally moralising or more generally descriptive history. The second looks at the process of events and trends based frequently on class conflict or economic change. The third relies on detailed analysis at the micro-level of processes set within a wider picture which may have the capacity to challenge aspects of “received history.”⁴ This thesis, in focusing on a small group of North and South Koreans, follows the third mode, challenging both general assumptions about a Korea uniting as one homogeneous people, and particular assumptions in the church about the place of politics and ideology in religious identity.

Between the years of the liberation from Japan (1945) and the ceasefire of the Korean War (1953) many Korean Christians from the northern territory migrated South in search of freedom of their faith, establishing their churches in South Korea. One of the churches is Youngnak Presbyterian Church which was established in South Korea by Rev. Han Kyung-chik and other 27 old migrants on 2 December 1945. Unexpectedly, new migrants began to enter South Korea from North Korea on a massive scale since 1998 due to the very poor circumstances of North Korea.

The new and old migrants began to encounter each other in Youngnak Presbyterian Church in 1998. While there were a few new migrants in the church

³ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

⁴ E.H. Carr, *What is History?*, London: Penguin, 1961

before 1998, the old migrant Christians in the church only began to perceive the existence of the new migrant Christians from 1998 because the number of the new migrant Christians started to significantly increase in the church.

It was assumed that the two communities would live together as a reconciled community because both of them not only came from the same Northern territory but had been one people, one nation and part of the same culture before Korea was divided. However, the two communities underwent considerable change as a result of different ideological systems embedded in their different social and political situations. Over fifty years, these ideological differences have significantly shaped the identities of the people in their respective contexts. Both communities simply expected to recover their lost identity as one people and one culture once they re-encountered each other. Not surprisingly, however, after a few years together, the two populations began to find that they had significant differences. After initially embracing one another as an apparently reconciled community, over time these differences have caused divisions, creating mutual exclusion of the two groups from one another. The tension is so acute that it has led me to question the reality of constructing a catholic community inclusive of diverse understanding of Korean identity within the one church.

2. Migrants Old and New

This thesis will examine concepts related to the identity of old migrants and new migrants. The old migrants are those who had been born, grown up and become Christians in the Northern territory before they migrated to South to search for freedom of their faith after partition (1945) or during the Korean War (1950-1953).

Since migrating they have lived as citizens of South Korea and as Christians. In this thesis this community will be identified as Christian Wolnammin. *Wolnammin*⁵ is a combination of the three Chinese characters *wol*, *nam* and *min*. *Wol* may be translated as ‘migration’, *nam* as ‘the South’ and *min* as ‘people’ or ‘person.’ Thus, Wolnammin literally means ‘people migrated to the South.’ The number of North Korean Wolnammin who emigrated to the South is estimated to be approximately 800,000 (1945-1950) and 600,000 (1950-1953), making a total of 1,400,000. It has been argued that 5.15 % of the total number of migrants from North Korea between 1945 and 1953 came to South Korea to be free from the “religious persecution” of the Communists.⁶

On the other hand, in this thesis new migrant Christians will be identified as Christian Saeteomin. *Saeteomin*⁷ is a combination of three Chinese characters *sae*,

⁵ Wolnammin are defined as “Refugees displaced from North Korea to the South due to the Korean Division and the Korean War.” See Kim Gwi-ok, “The Identities of *Wolnammin* in Resettlement Villages of South Korea: The cases of “Abai Village” at Sokcho and “Yongji Farmland” at Kimje.” Ph. D. Sociology, Seoul: Seoul National University, 1999. Gwi-ok Kim, *The Identity and Life Experiences of Wolnammin*, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1999. Gwi-ok Kim, *A Korean Community of Internal Diaspora: The Identities of Wolnammin in Sokcho, South Korea*, Development and Society, Volume 30 Number 1, June 2001, pp. 27-50.

⁶ Jo Hyeong and Bak Myeo-seon, “*Bukhan Chulsin Wolnammin wa Jeongchak Gwajeong eul Tonghaeseo Bon Nambukhan Sahoegujo eui Bigyo*”, Bundansidae wa Hanguksahoe, (“A Comparison of Social Structure of North and South Korea in light of the process of resettlement of migrants from North Korea”, The Partition Era and the Society of Korea), Seoul: Kkachi, 1985, pp. 150-151.

⁷ It is worth noting how the South Korean people have perceived Saeteomin, calling them “*Kuisun Yongsa*”, “*Talbukja*” and *Saeteomin*. In fact, *Saeteomin* have been allotted different identities according to the changing external contexts around them. J. Kang categorizes *Saeteomin* into several periods, each of which is signified along with the concurrent support laws and titles. This identifies *Saeteomin*’ changing identities based on Kang’s timeframe.

Image of heroic defectors (1962-1993). The image of the first generation of *Saeteomin* can be recapitulated as “*Kuisun Yongsa*” (this means heroic defectors). These defectors were a remnant of the Cold War between the two Koreas. They were mostly soldiers.

North Korean “escapees” (1994-2002). A large number of defectors who were mostly labourers crossed the borders to China and chose South Korea as their final destination due to the increased instability in the North Korean regime. They were and are still called “*Talbukja*” (this means “people who escaped from the North”).

Residents in a new land (2003-present). Contemporary *Saeteomin* have increasingly diverse reasons for defection, including a longing for a new life and a curiosity about capitalism. The

teo and *min*. *Sae* may be translated as ‘new’, *teo* as ‘land’ and *min* as ‘people’ or ‘person.’ Thus, *Saeteomin* literally means people who live in a new place. This name was introduced to refer to these new migrants by the government in 2005.⁸ The *Saeteomin* share many things in common with the *Wolnammin* because they come from the same geographical area and belonged to the migrant category; but, significantly, in terms of ideological background, they are diametrically opposed.

Table 1: The number of North Korean *Saeteomin* arriving in South Korea (11.10.2008)⁹

Year	1954~1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total
Total	876	71	148	312	583	1,139	1,281	1,894	1,383	2,019	2,544	12,250
Male	778	53	90	180	294	514	468	626	422	510	569	4,504
Female	98	18	58	132	289	625	813	1,268	961	1,509	1,975	7,746

Christian *Saeteomin* had been born, grown up and lived in North Korea¹⁰ until they escaped from North Korea. They were not Christians when they lived in North Korea and took refuge in South Korea via various countries such as China, Cambodia and other Asian countries after 1998. A significant number of these *Saeteomin* now living

influx continued from the mid 1990s. See, J. Kang, *The Distinction from South Korean Society on North Korean minority in South Korea*, unpublished Master Dissertation, 2002, Seoul: Hanyang University, See, Lee Romee, Locating “Refugees” in the “Elite” Place: Analysis of Experiences of North Korean Defectors in South Koreans Universities, *Thinking Beyond Borders: Global Ideas, Global Values*, 27th National Conference 2008 at the University of British Columbia, Janet Groen and Shibo Guo, ed., p. 220. Available from; <http://www.oise.utoronto.ca>; accessed on 5th of November 2008.

⁸ North Korea Defectors, available from;

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korean_defectors; accessed on 5th of November 2008.


⁹ The Index of South Korea, available from; <http://www.index.go.kr>; accessed on 11 October 2008.

¹⁰ Politically, North Korea was born on 15 August 1945 when Korea was liberated after thirty-six years of Japanese colonial occupation. The Korean peninsula was divided by the 38th parallel according to a secret agreement between the USA and the former USSR as part of the Yalta Treaty. Northern Korea indicates also the territory of North Korea before partition of Korea in 1945. See, Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947*, vol.1, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 109-110.

as citizens of South Korea became Christians while in other countries or when they arrived in South Korea. The number of Saeteomin from North Korea is shown in the above table; over 80 % of the Saeteomin are Christians, perhaps influenced by the great help they received from Korean missionaries working in the various Asian countries when they were escaping to and entering South Korea.

Until 1997, only a few dozen Saeteomin from North Korea entered South Korea annually. In 1998 the number increased to 71 and more sharply to 148 in 1999. The pace of entry has accelerated in the past seven years: 312 Saeteomin entered in 2000, 583 in 2001, 1,139 in 2002, 1,281 in 2003, 1,894 in 2004, 1,383 in 2005, 2,019 in 2006 and 2,544 in 2007. The total number surpassed 10,000 in February 2007 and was 12,254 by the end of 2007.

Diagram 1 Christian Wolnammin and Christian Saeteomin



The reason for the significant increase is that the North Korean Saeteomin desperately tried to enter South Korea because they feared repatriation while staying in China, Cambodia and other Asian countries. They lived in hiding in order to avoid

being discovered by authorities linked to the North Korean government.¹¹

Although Christian Wolnammin and Christian Saeteomin had a common background before the liberation from Japan (1945), this changed dramatically during the post-liberation period socio-politically, ideologically, and culturally.

On the one hand, Christian Wolnammin followed a staunchly anti-communist ideology informed by the theological conservatism of the Northwestern territory. They have adhered to an anti-communist ideology during the Korean War (1950-1953) and the Cold War. On the other hand, the Christian Saeteomin used to live under the political system of Communism and Juche (self-reliance)¹² ideology in North Korea and they had been influenced by Juche ideology until they escaped from North Korea.

The two Christian groups thus have a common background but lived in a very different context for over half a century. The perception both groups had of their common historical background leads them to expect little difficulty when re-united.

However, they were disappointed by the conflict discovered during their encounter. The objective of this study is to examine the effect of identity on the encounter of members of the two communities in Youngnak Presbyterian Church. The theological implications will also be demonstrated and a solution for a harmonious coexistence will be proposed based on critical reflections upon the theology of Juergen Moltmann, fulfilment theology, Miroslav Volf and Lim Dong-won.

¹¹ Ha Chung-yoube, *The Visit to Pyongyang and the Observation of the Route of Escape's Circumstance*, unpublished, 2007, pp. 33-35. Current Situation of North Korean Saeteomin, available from; <http://www.northkoreanSaeteomin.com>; and <http://hangenie.com>; Accessed on 11 October 2008.

¹² The word literally means subject, or self-reliance. The definition of Juche will be dealt with in detail in chapter 2.

3. Crucial Definitions

3.1. Power

The term *kratophany* literally rendered is “the appearance of power.”¹³ In common understanding, as clearly we all affect each other in countless ways all the time, power is said to mean that A in some way affects B, and the underlying concept of power is “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests.”¹⁴ However, Steven Lukes criticizes such a definition of power as being mistaken because it confines the discussion to binary relations between actors assumed to have unitary interests and fails to consider the ways in which everyone’s interests are multiple.¹⁵ He defines power as the imposition of *internal* constraints by which people “are led to acquire beliefs and form desires that result in their consenting or adapting to being dominated in coercive and non-coercive settings.”¹⁶ Andre Droogers points out that power emanates from the system and it is used in both the structure and process approaches,¹⁷ which means not that one exercises power over the other but that one acts and thinks according to the system in the structure. In this thesis the notion of power which should be emphasized is that A may exercise power over B not by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but by influencing,

¹³ Mircea Eliade, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, vol., 11, 1987, p. 467.

¹⁴ Steven Lukes, *Power A Radical View*, Published in association with the British Sociological Association, 2005, pp. 12, 37.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 30.

¹⁷ Andre Droogers, Religious Reconciliation: A View from the Social Science, Jerald D. Gort, Henry Jansen, Hendrik M. Vroom, ed., *Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation: Multifaith Ideals and Realities*, Amsterdam-New York: Rodopi, 2002, p. 12.

shaping or determining his very wants.¹⁸

3.2 Ethnic Identity

The word ethnic, comes from the Greek: *ethnikas* means nation. *Ethos*, in Greek, means custom, disposition or trait. *Ethnikas* and *ethos* taken together therefore can mean a band of people (nation) living together who share and acknowledge common customs. The second part of the phrase, identity, has Latin origins and is derived from the word *identitas*; the word is formed from *idem* meaning *same*. Thus, the word is used to express the notion of sameness, likeness, and oneness. More precisely, identity means “the sameness of a person or thing at all times in all circumstances; the condition or fact that a person or thing is itself and not something else.”¹⁹ Combining the definitions and interpretations of identity and ethnicity it can be concluded that they mean, or at the minimum imply, the sameness of a band or nation of people who share common customs, traditions, historical experiences, and in some instances geographical residence.

In common understanding, ethnic identity is the product of deep-seated values and ethnicity “refers to aspects of relationships between groups which consider themselves, and are regarded by others, as being culturally distinctive.”²⁰ It is not, however, fixed, for the crucial point which must be stressed is that ethnicity is a social process shaped both from the inside and the outside: by self-definition of the members of the ethnic population and by ascription of other groups. In other word, ethnic identity is changeable in accordance with mutual interactions.

¹⁸ Steven Lukes, *Op.Cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁹ J.A. Simpson, & E.S. Weiner, *The Oxford English Dictionary* (2nd ed., Vol. VII), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 620.

²⁰ Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism. Anthropological Perspectives*. London: Pluto Press, 1993, p. 4.

4. Limitations

Although seeking to be comprehensive this thesis will be limited in the following ways:

- As regards Christian Wolnammin this thesis does not attempt to cover the whole northern territory, but will rather focus on the North-western territory, since the founder and its early congregation of Youngnak Presbyterian Church came from this region.

- It will also focus on the Presbyterian denomination, because the North-western territory was originally predominantly controlled by the North American Presbyterian Mission, under the 'Comity Arrangement.'²¹ This research will not cover all the South Korean churches established by Christian Wolnammin,²² but limits its scope to Youngnak Presbyterian Church and its founder Han Kyung-chik²³.

²¹ This speaks of the division policy of the mission area between the missionaries in Korea. See H. A. Rhodes, ed., *History of the Korea Mission, Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., volume 1, 1884-1934*, Seoul: The Presbyterian Church of Korea Department of Education, 1984, pp. 440-443.

²² According to Kang In-cheol, in case of the Korean Presbyterian Churches, Youngnak Presbyterian Church of Han Kyung-chik, Baul Presbyterian Church of Song Chang-keun and Kyoungdong Presbyterian Church were established in Seoul in December, 1945. More 48 Presbyterian Churches were established in Seoul or Incheon from 1946 to 1948. See, Kang In-cheol, *Hankukui Kaesinkyowa Bankongjuui* (An Anti-Communism and a Protestant of Korea), Seoul: Jungsim, 2007, pp. 435-436.

²³ Here is a summary of chronology of Kyung-chik Han's life

- 1902: Born in Northwestern territory, in Korea.
- 1925: Graduated from Soongsil College, Pyongyang in Korea (BS)
- 1926: Graduated from College of Emporia in Emporia, Kansas (BA).
- 1929: Graduated from Princeton Theological Seminary in New Jersey (BD).
- 1933: Ordained by Euisan Presbytery, Presbyterian Church of Korea.
- 1933-1942: Pastor, The Second Presbyterian Church in Shinuiju, North Korea.
- 1945: Migration from North Korea to South Korea.
- 1945-1973: Founder and Pastor of Youngnak Presbyterian Church in Seoul.
- 1973-2000: Pastor Emeritus, Youngnak Presbyterian Church in Seoul.
- 1992: Templeton Award.
- 2000: Passed away

See, *May the Words of My Mouth*, Seoul Korea: Youngnak Presbyterian Church of the Korean Presbyterian Church & Sun Media Publishing Co.Ltd.,2002, pp.372-376, published in honor of him by the Memorial Committee of Rev. Han Kyung-chik's 100th Birthday Anniversary,

- As regards Christian Saeteomin this thesis does not attempt to include all the Saeteomin after the ceasefire of the Korean War, but will focus on Saeteomin students attending the Bible Study Class for Free People²⁴ in Younknak Presbyterian Church who came to South Korea in or after 1998 when the significant increase in the number of Saeteomin began.

5. Necessity of Research

There is one PhD thesis in South Korea on the Wolnammin. It is written from the perspective of sociology and is entitled *The Identities of Wolnammin in Resettlement Villages of South Korea: The cases of “Abai Village” at Sokcho and “Yongji Farmland” at Gimje* (*Jeongchakchon Wolnamminui Saenghwalgyeongheomgwa Jeongcheseong: Sokcho ‘Abaimaeul’ kwa Gimje ‘Yongjinongwon’eul Jungsimeuro*), written by Kim Kwi-ok at the department of sociology in Seoul National University, 1999. The thesis examines the process of identity formation of Wolnammin in resettlement villages through field research and in-depth interviews. It argues that the identity of an individual is formed by their experiences with their social conditions. In the case of Wolnammin, they forged their particular identities in the resettlement villages. This thesis reveals that the Wolnammin’s everyday experiences and identities are not monolithic, but heterogeneous. In addition, it sheds new light on the unknown and forgotten stories of Wolnammin in South Korea.

However, the thesis does not deal with the identities of Christian Wolnammin and

²⁴ Saeteomin have been called ‘Free People’ by Younknak Presbyterian Church since 1998. The Bible Study Class for Free People began in 1999 in Younknak Presbyterian Church in order that the CW teach the Bible to the CS. This class has been gathered in the church every Sunday since then. See, The Centre of Mission Toward North Korea, *Jayuui Saram Seongkyeongban 7nyeonui Baljachwi* (7 Years’ Traces of the Bible Study Class), Seoul: Younknak Presbyterian Church, 2007, p. 17.

Christian Saeteomin. Instead, it focuses on “Abai village,” where those who came from the North-Eastern territory lived. In contrast my study focuses on those who came from the North-Western territory, and focuses more on ‘religion’, although my research shares some of the methodology with Kim Kwi-ok.

In South Korea there have been excellent achievements in the field of North Korean studies in particular in sociology, Korean literature, Korean history, politics and economics despite the “government-controlled Cold War ideology.”²⁵ However, in the case of North Korean Saeteomin there have been few studies conducted in South Korea. The number of articles written between from 1990 to 2005 is just 24,²⁶ covering political, psychological and economical aspects of settlement and adjustment in South Korea. None of them cover theology or identity, and all develop their argument on the assumption that North Koreans are essentially the same as South Koreans. While the number of North Korean Saeteomin entering South Korea has increased sharply, the number of PhD theses on the studies of the North Korean Saeteomin in South Korean universities from 1997 to 2005 was just 13; not a single one of these was in the field of religion at the time of writing.

Table 2: Distribution of PhD Theses on the studies of the North Korean Saeteomin in South Korea, 1997-2005²⁷

Field	Politics	Psychology	Education	Sociology	Religion
Theses No.	6	4	2	1	0

²⁵ Ryu Seong-Min, “A Study of Religion in North Korea”, in Society of North Korean Studies ed. *Bundan Bameki Bukhan Yeongusa*, (A History of North Korean Studies during the Half Century of Division), Seoul, Hanul, 1999, p. 483.

²⁶ Jeong Eun-mee, *Bukhanyeongubangbeopeuroseo Tarbukja Josai Hwalyonggwa Yeongudonghyang*, (Application and Trend of Researches on North Korean Saeteomin as a Method of North Korea Studies), Seoul: Modern North Korea studies, vol.8, no.3, 2005. pp. 151-152.

²⁷ This distribution of PhD theses is the result of reference which the researcher searched for PhD theses in the Website of the National Assembly Library on the 2nd of April 2005.

Among the 13 PhD theses, it is worth touching briefly on the one sociological thesis. The title of the thesis is *A Synthetic Comparative Study on the Adaptation Patterns of North Korean Adolescent Saeteomin in South Korea* (*Bukhanitalcheongsonyeonui Namhansahoe Jeokeungyuhyeonge Kwanhan Tonghapjeok Bigyoyeongu*), written by Kim Hyung-tae at the department of Social Work in Soongsil University in 2004. He studied the relationship between geographical characteristics, characteristics which existed before (e.g. motivation for leaving) and after resettlement (e.g. relationship patterns with South Koreans) and adaptation patterns (psychological, social, adaptive, maladaptive) in Saeteomin adolescents. Kim Hyung-tae found that comprehensive efforts need to be made to eradicate prejudice and discriminatory practices towards North Korean Saeteomin in South Korea because having positive psycho-emotional experiences in South Korea seemed to help North Korean adolescent Saeteomin's social adaptation. Therefore, it is important to accept North Koreans as natural members of society and assist them to integrate as quickly as possible. Even though Kim's thesis did not cover the identity of Saeteomin, it supports the necessity for my study insofar as I propose a theological-biblical strategy aimed at the smooth integration of Saeteomin based on acceptance.

Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the number of Christian Saeteomin has increased significantly in South Korean churches and that there are serious misunderstandings between Christian Saeteomin and other believers in the churches, there has been no research on them in the form of a PhD thesis at all in Korea. On a practical level, the lack of research on Christian Saeteomin has contributed to the failure of their settlement and adjustment in the churches, resulting in their leaving the churches which helped them, sometimes setting up churches of their own. This lack of theological studies on North Korean Saeteomin underlines the necessity for this

research. In other words, a plethora of books and articles are published every year on the issue of unification from political, economic, military etc. aspects while the difficulties between Christian Saeteomin and other believers in South Korean churches is totally neglected. This thesis will be the first to deal with the identities of Christian Wolnammin and Christian Saeteomin, and their role in intra-church relations.

6. Methodology

This study will utilize a social anthropological methodology in order to analyze the content and meaning of the identities of Christian Wolnammin and Christian Saeteomin and will utilize a theological approach to reflect on potential exclusion and embrace in order to find a practical solution for the construction of a harmonious catholic community.

First of all, this study will have to consider a critique of postmodern anthropology when writing ethnography. Postmodernists reject both grand theory in anthropology and the notion of completeness in ethnographic description. In a wider sense, postmodern anthropology criticizes the creation of the ‘other’ and the consequent definition of the ‘self’. In other words, a postmodern anthropologist would claim that there is no true, complete statement that can be made about a culture. In *Writing Culture*²⁸, a number of contributors examine the intrusion of power relations in the ethnographic process. James Clifford, in the introduction to the book of which he was the editor, attacks the idea of ethnography as a representation of the wholeness of culture and stresses the incompleteness of ethnographic expression, even in the hands

²⁸ This book is anthropology’s premier classic postmodernist text, based on a conference on ‘The Making of Ethnographic Texts’, held in Santa Fe, New Mexico in 1984, see, James Clifford and George E. Marcus, ed. *Writing Culture The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1986.

of indigenous scholars, arguing that ethnography is a kind of ‘poetry’. His article entitled ‘Ethnographic Allegory’ is decidedly literary in character, and focuses on ‘the *narrative* character of cultural representations’.²⁹

Postmodernists have pointed out that ethnography in the colonial era represented a tool in the hands of oppressive colonial governments and multi-national corporations. However, some of their opinions appear to be difficult to accept. For example, Ernest Gellner challenged postmodernism because of the postmodernists’ misplaced attacks on the stated objectivism of European colonial ethnography.³⁰ Alan Barnard also criticizes James Clifford who insists on the recognition of ethnography as a kind of ‘poetry’, declaring that anthropology should not dissolve into literary criticism.³¹ Whatever the anthropological debate, one outcome is clear; the researcher needs to place him/herself before the reader.

I am an indigenous Korean researcher and a descendant of Christian Wolnammin. My father and mother made a sudden escape from the city of Pyongyang in North Korea when bombs were being dropped during the Korean War, leaving my seven-year old eldest brother at that time in my uncle’s house in the countryside which was located in Shinuiju town and migrating from the North to the South. I was born in South Korea and grew up socialized as an anti-communist, expecting the North Korean people to have horns on their heads. I worked, as an ordained pastor, in Youngnak Presbyterian Church from 1998 for 5 years.

It must be admitted that, to begin with, I was afraid the first time that I met a Saeteomin in South Korea in 1998 but I realized that he was a human being like myself. On the other hand, as an assistant pastor of Youngnak Presbyterian Church,

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.100.

³⁰ Ernest Gellner, *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion*. London: Routledge, 1992, pp. 22-79.

³¹ Alan Barnard, *History and Theory in Anthropology*, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 173.

when I officially visited them to assist in a children’s hospital in North Korea on 10 November, 2000, I also was afraid of visiting North Korea and meeting the North Koreans. However, I came to repent my sin of being afraid of making friends with them and then I embraced them and made friends with them in North Korea. After that I visited North Korea four more times. Since that first meeting in 1998, I have met more over 1,700 Saeteomin in South Korea up to 2002, sharing the Gospel with them and hugging many of them. The visits to North Korea and the experiences of meeting the Saeteomin made me change my attitude toward the North Korean people and Saeteomin.

In October 2006 I began to undertake field work in South Korea, North Korea and China until April 2007. As a participant observer, I joined the Bible Study Class of over 80 Christian Saeteomin on Sundays for six months in order to observe issues associated with the content and meaning of identity and its acting out in church life. During this period I did not preach at all in order to distance myself from the subject of my research and I tried to treat the Christian Saeteomin and the Christian Wolnammin teachers equally.

I carried out in-depth interviews with 21 Christian Saeteomin living in South Korea and China and with 16 Christian Wolnammin in Younknak Presbyterian Church.

Table 3: The Statistical Table of In-Depth Interviews with 21 Christian Saeteomin

Age	20-50 Years Old	Over 50 Years Old
	17	4
Gender	Male	Female
	11	10
Education	Semi-Literate	Educated
	0	21
Baptism	Baptism	Not Baptism
	20	1

Table 4: The Statistical Table of In-Depth Interviews with 16 Christian Walnammin

Age	20-50 Years Old	Over 50 Years Old
	5	11
Gender	Male	Female
	10	6
Education	Semi-Literate	Educated
	0	16
Baptism	Baptism	Not Baptism
	16	0

It was still difficult for South Koreans to visit North Korea during that time. However, I was able to visit North Korea again with the permission of the two governments to support the North Korean hospital, to collect materials, and to observe the identity background of the North Korean people.

Most importantly, I visited North Korea between 24 February to 28 February 2007 to scrutinize Juche ideology in order to understand the identity formation and background of the North Korean Saeteomin. I visited places where the North Korean people go for a Juche study visit: Kim Il Sung Square, Grand People’s Study House, *Mansudae* Grand Monument, *Chollima* Statue, Tower of Juche Idea, Arch of Triumph, Monument to Three Chapter of National Reunification, and Old Home in Mangyongdae etc., buying and collecting over 40 books and other relevant research materials. Essentially, I was able to meet with many North Koreans to help understand first hand the impact of Juche ideology in their lives. Clearly, this is not long enough for detailed field-work: it was the maximum length of visit possible.

Moreover, I followed their escape route from North Korea, via China, to understand their circumstances and their experiences. At the border between China and North Korea I was able to meet a Christian North Korean female. She crossed to China to obtain food and was kidnapped and was sold by traffickers to a farm worker in rural China. After three years escaped to the border of North Korea, longing to be

reunited with her husband and son who live in North Korea. I was able to interview her for two days in a secret location. The interview has proved to be immensely helpful in understanding the background of the North Korean refugees through her description of her remarkable circumstances and experiences.

It is important to note that any selection of respondents are based primarily on theoretical considerations, in particular keeping in mind that the purpose of ethnographic interviews was to obtain a variety of interpretations rather than to seek consistencies in responses in order to develop statistical generalizations, as Charlotte Aull Davies points out.³² After conducting these in-depth interviews, I returned to Edinburgh, carried out an in-depth analysis of the ethnography, and put them into each chapter of this thesis.

According to Davies, there are three types of interview: unstructured interviewing, structured interviewing and semi-structured interviewing. I combined semi-structured interviews with participant observation in my research. The interviews were formally bracketed, and set apart in time and space. I made sure that the interviewee was aware that I was there as an ethnographer and he or she as an informant. Furthermore, I had previously decided on interview schedules consisting of a set of written questions and a very informal list of memorized topics. However, in contrast to structured interviews, I sometimes had to alter the wording and order of these questions, omitting some that seemed inappropriate during the interview. On other occasions informants introduced new topics and asked questions not included on the list. Respondents were encouraged to expand on a response, or digress, go off topic or introduce their own concerns. Most importantly, their responses were open-ended, in their own words and not restricted to preconceived notions of the ethnographer.

³²Charlotte Aull Davies, *Reflexive Ethnography A Guide to Researching Selves and Others*, London and New York: Routledge. 1999, pp. 98-99.

According to Davies, research based primarily on semi-structured interviewing has become very popular, providing an important form of qualitative research across the social sciences, especially in anthropology, sociology, psychology and various applied social sciences.³³

Charlotte Aull Davies spells out ethical issues in qualitative research and the researcher's obligations to research participants, including informed consent, confidentiality and avoiding harm to the participants.³⁴ It was important to keep in mind the ethical issues involved in research. Research is powerful and can harm or exploit people. It was important that the researcher has kept the highest ethical standards in carrying out his research and in publishing data. I followed Davies' model of practical ethical responsibilities, one of which is assurances of anonymity to guard privacy and personal information and assurances of confidentiality of the informants regarding the use of the data.³⁵

Since the Christian North Korean Saeteomin live in fear of exposure of their real name and private information, I, as an ethnographer, have an obligation to protect the privacy of interviewees and so invented names for my interviewees.

Furthermore, I, as an indigenous Korean researcher and simultaneous writer of ethnography, have to consider the critique of James Clifford for the complete statement of ethnography. Since I am a descendant of Christian Wolnammin I have to take into account my bias while writing ethnographic description. This is not an easy task, especially striking a balance between being a detached observer and being an integrated participant. I need to apply this to myself in escaping from subjectivity to a position of objectivity. In this sense, I must listen attentively to the voice of Elizabeth

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 94-95.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-73.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

Koepping, she states that “*until researchers have worked through an unsure position and come out on side or the other, they are still in thrall to the data,*” placing emphasis on the equality and openness.³⁶ She points also out, in terms of her reflection on her field work, that if she had refused to open up and share or if she had refused to be focus of the Other’s interest and questions or if she had coolly kept her ideas out of the exchange as she stayed on her academic high-horse, her ethnographic description would have been a manipulative sham.³⁷ This indicates that becoming an integrated participant and escaping from being a detached observer are of significant importance to ethnographic researchers. In addition, I must heed the suggestions of Charlotte Aull Davies who outlined the task of the interviewer as follows: it is 1) to direct revelations to topics of interest, 2) to avoid unduly influencing their narrative, 3) to adopt *a neutral position* and to refrain from expressing an opinion or assisting in interpretation.³⁸

7. Theoretical Frames and Approach

Alan Barnard says anthropologists have shown more and more that they are happy to mix approaches and utilize different theoretical traditions.³⁹ While considering the postmodern perspective of James Clifford, the present study will combine three approaches: first, the three dimensional power analysis of Steven Lukes will be used to shed light on the formation of the different identities in the target population in Part One; second, the thick description method by Clifford Geertz in order to understand

³⁶ Elizabeth Koepping, *Food, Friends and Funerals: On Lived Religion (Antropology of Religion)*, Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008, pp. 195-196. Italics are Elizabeth Koepping’s

³⁷ *Ibid*, p. 198.

³⁸ Charlotte Aull Davies, *Op.Cit.*, p. 96. Italics are mine.

³⁹ Alan Barnard, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 174-175.

the content and meaning of identities in Part Two; third, the metaphorical lens of exclusion and embrace of Miroslav Volf in order to offer a theological solution out of exclusion in the context of Youngnak Presbyterian Church in Part Three. At this point it is worth describing the three approaches briefly. This will be done in greater detail in each Part.

Three dimensional power is not the normal exercise of power by which you can exercise power over others by getting them to do what they do not want to do, but the supreme exercise of power by which you can get others to have the desires you want and through which you can secure their compliance by effectively controlling their thoughts and desires.⁴⁰ On this perspective, the formation of identity of the CW and the CS which has stemmed from the two contrasting ideologies for half a century will be analyzed.

The two groups socialized by the two contrasting ideologies have mutual different material, verbal and behavioural symbols, one result of which is to create exclusion of each other unless the symbols are interpreted. A **thick description** of a human behaviour is one that explains not just the behaviour,⁴¹ but its context as well, by which the verbal and the behavioural symbols of the CW and the CS become meaningful to each other.

The two groups need a solution of the problem of exclusion to create a catholic community in Youngnak Presbyterian Church because exclusion has been triggered by their different identities within Youngnak Presbyterian Church. This thesis will use the metaphorical lens of exclusion and embrace which is a theological analysis of the process of **exclusion** that leads to contempt and violence and the process of

⁴⁰ Steven Lukes, *Power A Radical View*, Published in association with the British Sociological Association, 2005, p. 26.

⁴¹ Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, London: Hutchinson of London, 1975, p. 207, pp. 7, 208-212.

acceptance and **embrace** that leads to forgiveness and reconciliation.⁴²

8. Structure and Sources of the Study

8.1. Structure of the Study

This thesis will be divided into three parts and each part will be sub-divided into two chapters as follows:

Part One analyzes the emergence and developments of the contrasting two ideologies, anti-communist ideology and Juche ideology, which influenced the formation of the different ethnic identities of the two groups. These ideologies were imposed on the communities by their respective states.

Chapter I will describe the emergence and socialization of an anti-communist ideology of the CW with reference to the process and formation of identity of Christian Wolnammin, which made the CW negative toward North Korea, its regime, its people, and consequently the CS.

Chapter II will investigate the emergence and development of Juche ideology which influenced the formation of identity of North Koreans, in order to understand the contemporary identity of Christian Saeteomin living in South Korea.

Part Two will move on to 1998 when the two groups first encountered each other in Youngnak Presbyterian Church. The two groups expected to overcome their differences soon because they firmly believed that they were unified on the grounds

⁴² Miroslav Volf, *Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation* Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996, p. 29.

of one ethnicity. However, they began to discover that it was very difficult for them to live together. The consequence for the two groups was mutual disappointment and misunderstandings about the acceptability and interpretations of their different identities, which produced potential exclusion in their community.

Chapter III will analyze the Christian Saeteomin's material and verbal symbols and behaviour patterns seen in Youngnak Presbyterian Church and the impact of these on both communities.

Chapter IV will describe the Christian Wolnammin's material and verbal symbols and behaviour patterns seen in Youngnak Presbyterian Church and the impact of these on both communities.

Part Three is concerned with finding a theological solution for exclusion and will offer a practical strategy to create a harmonious catholic community.

Chapter V will investigate the missiological position of the text book used for teaching Saeteomins in the Bible Study Group for Free People run by Youngnak Presbyterian Church. It will be demonstrated that the textbook is based on fulfilment theology and as such, reveals a more favourable Christian Wolnammin attitude toward the Christian Saeteomin.

Chapter VI will describe the fundamental necessity for creating space by repentance and forgiveness as described by Miroslav Volf. Once there is space in the minds of the members of the two communities for acceptance they will be able to embrace each other and form a harmonious catholic community in Youngnak Presbyterian Church.

8.2. Sources

Investigative approaches included library and internet research, as well as organizing and processing data. The researcher has gathered data from various institutions and sources for the review of literature. Information regarding the nature of Juche ideology is more difficult to gather than information related to South Korean anti-communism. In fact, previous research of Juche ideology has been a restricted subject for South Koreans because of both national security and the lack of original data from North Korea. However, the South Korean government has recently encouraged scholars to study Juche ideology in preparation for the future reunification of Korea. Consequently more sources are available now. In addition the researcher has gathered books on North Korean studies during his six visits to North Korea. In particular, he could gather various materials through the help of North Korean officials during a 2007 visit.

The researcher's main sources of literature include the National Assembly Library of South Korea, the Library of the Presbyterian College and Theological Seminary, the Library of University of North Korea Studies, the Sejong Institute, and the Research Institute for National Unification and other sources in South Korea.

More data was collected through the nationwide interlibrary loan (ILL) system. Besides obtaining print media data, the researcher accessed information electronically including North Korean internet sites for review of literature. The internet is one of the most powerful research methods today, offering up-to-date data. It is arguably the best source from which to obtain the most recent news of North Korea. In addition to the Daily South and North Korean News sites for the research of Juche ideology, the

researcher has also collected the latest data through various the internet sites related to Juche ideology in both English and Korean.⁴³

⁴³ <http://www.cnet-ta.ne.jp/Juche>; <http://www.dprkorea.com>; <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; <http://www.kimsoft.com>; <http://www.korea-up.co.jp>; <http://www.koreascope.org>; <http://www.okf.org>; <http://www.fas.org>; <http://www.darkwing.uoregon.edu>; <http://www.nkhumanright.or.kr>; <http://www.rini.hally.ac.kr/>; <http://www.nis.go.kr/>; <http://www.onekorea.org/>; <http://www.unikorea.go.kr/>; <http://www.geocities.co.kr> <http://www.myhome.netsgo.com>; uni21.dgu.ac.kr/sharing.net etc.

Part One

The Emergence and Evolution of the Contrasting Ideologies in Relation to the Formation of Ethnic Identity of Migrants Old and New

Introduction

In Part One I will analyze the emergence and development of the two contrasting ideologies, anti-communist ideology and Juche ideology, which influenced the formation of the different ethnic identities of the two groups, the CW and the CS.

The North Koreans have been controlled by Juche ideology of the state, while the South Korean people have been socialized by an anti-communist ideology of the state. The formation of self- identities created by the state ideology leave no space to accept the other.

This Part is important to this study because it is necessary that we should understand the origins and development of the two ideologies in the society of the two groups to understand the background of the formation of the heterogeneous ethnic identity of the two groups with which next Part will deal.

1. Theoretical Frame

On the one hand, Christian Saeteomin were indoctrinated with Juche ideology until they left North Korea, which influenced their patterned behaviour and perception of identity while they lived in North Korea, before they converted to Christianity. The patterned behaviour and perceptions are still demonstrated in the everyday life of

Christian Saeteomin in spite of the fact that they became Christians and citizens of South Korea.

On the other hand, Christian Wolnammin have their structured behaviour influenced by the fact that they have remained anti-communist, which influences their stance towards North Korea and its people. Their structured behaviour and perceptions are revealed while encountering Christian Saeteomin.

In order to analyze how the structured behaviours of the two groups were formed, I will utilize Lukes' perspective of three-dimensional power.

Steven Lukes, in his book *Power: A Radical View*, points out what effects power has on actors within the system. The three-dimensional power concept⁴⁴ is the supreme exercise of power which secures the compliance of others by controlling their thoughts and desires. Accordingly, the socially structured, culturally *patterned* behaviour of groups and practices of institutions leads people to automatic action when facing certain circumstances.⁴⁵ The three-dimensional power concept represents an almost insidious exercise of power.

to prevent people from having grievances by shaping their perception, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial.⁴⁶

From the perspective of three-dimensional power, I shall describe and analyze how

⁴⁴ According to Steven Lukes, there are pluralists, which he calls the one-dimensional view, the view of their critics he calls the two-dimensional view, and a third view of power he calls the three-dimensional view. The pluralists see their focus on behaviour in the making of decisions. This definition of power is that A can or does succeed in affecting what B does. Two-dimensional power involves examining both decision-making and *nondecision*-making. See, Steven Lukes, *Power A Radical View*, Published in association with the British Sociological Association, 2005, pp. 18-22.


⁴⁵ Steven Lukes expresses it as 'individuals' inaction'. See, Steven Lukes, *Op.Cit.*, p. 26.

⁴⁶ Steven Lukes, *Op.Cit.*, p. 28.

the patterned behaviour of the CS was formed by Juche ideology before they left North Korea. Their patterned behaviour derived from the North Korean government achieving the obedience of North Korean people through Juche ideology. The way of thinking of the North Korean people was imbued with the principle of Juche ideology.

For example, when North Korean women who accompanied their football team came to South Korea and found Kim Jong-il's photograph on the ground when it was raining, they began to cry because their leader was in the rain. The power of Juche ideology makes people conform to the wishes of their leaders. According to the testimony of Hwang Jang-yeop,⁴⁷ one of the most famous North Korean Saeteomin, North Korean people worried about their leader even when they were dying of starvation.

Diagram 2 The Perspective of Three-Dimensional Power to Analyze Patterned Behaviour.



On the other hand, the Cold War ideology of the dictatorial South Korean government encouraged inflexible anti-communism among the people. The government controlled and mobilized people with a national security anti-communist ideology. The concepts of freedom of thought and expression were seen as threats to

⁴⁷ He was the former chancellor in Kim Il-sung University, who stated that he became Christian when I met him in South Korea in 2001. His sister was a Christian in North Korea before the Korean War, and influenced him at that time.

national security. This led the South Koreans to having a static perception toward the North Koreans. For instance, when one of the women members of the church met a Christian Saeteomin, she told me that she was surprised at the fact that he did not have a horn on his head: she had been socialized by anti-communist ideology to regard North Koreans as monsters.

It is also true that the CS have tried to adjust to the circumstances of South Korea. It is still difficult for the CW to understand the patterned behaviour of the CS, and conversely it is not easy for the CS to understand the structured behaviour of the CW. Therefore, this study will analyze how the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of the two groups were formed by the state ideologies, utilizing the perspective of the three-dimensional power.

Chapter □ The Emergence and Development of Anti-Communist Ideology and its Effect on the Formation of Ethnic Identity of Christian Wolnammin

Introduction

In this chapter I will describe the formation of the identity of the CW before the liberation from Japan (1945), and will explore the process of identity formation of the CW with reference to the origin of their anti-communist ideology, which was formed by 1) motivation behind the migration from North to South, 2) the experience of the Korean War (1950-1953) and 3) the sociological interaction in resettlement in South Korea (1954- the present).

The hypothesis of this chapter is that anti-communist ideology was an influential factor in the formation of ethnic identity of the CW, and the anti-communist identity of the CW created a negative affect on their perception of the other Christian group, the CS, in Younknak Presbyterian Church.

The Emergence of an Anti-Communist Standpoint (1874⁴⁸-1945)

The ethnic identity of the CW is the articulation of their experiences resulting from the social conditions that construct their ethnic identity. It is not only the product of cultural ideas from their experiences in the Northern territory, but also is a developing

⁴⁸ This study starts from 1874 because John Ross (1842-1915) began to meet Koreans at the border between Korea and China that year. He translated the New Testament into Korean, which significantly influenced the establishment of the first congregation in the Northwestern territory where is today in North Korea. See, Ha Chung -youbé, *John Ross and Fulfilment Theology as His Missiological Position: Comparative Study of the Theological Understanding of John Ross and the Fourth Commission of the 1910 World Missionary Conference, and its Relevance for the Missionary Policy of the Younknak Presbyterian Church, Seoul*, MTh Dissertation, The University of Edinburgh, 2005.

ethnic identity that they actively construct from the social relationships they have engaged in throughout their whole life. Before the CW migrated from North to South after the liberation from Japan (1945), they belonged to Northwestern Conservative Christianity.

In this section I will first examine why Northwestern Conservative Christianity had an anti-communist standpoint, through investigating the viewpoints of Christian conservatives and communists on this matter and also approaching the question of national independence.

Where did the theological tendency of Northwestern Conservative Christianity derive from? Why did Northwestern Conservative Christianity grow rapidly theologically, culturally and socio-politically? During the rapid growth of Northwestern Conservative Christianity, why was it criticized by communists? How did Northwestern Conservative Christianity cope with such critique and ensuing conflict?

1. The Early Missionaries' Two Theological Tendencies

In order to understand where the theological tendency of Northwestern Conservative Christianity derived from, I will describe briefly the socio-political circumstances of Northern Korea and identify two different theological tendencies of Western missionaries which existed there.

Northern Korea⁴⁹ forms a bridge between the Korean peninsula and China, and

⁴⁹ The Northern territory in Korea, geographically, comprises the *Pyongan and Whanghae* provinces in the North-West and *Hamkyung* province in the North-East.

has therefore been an important place of passage. For instance, all historical religions in Korea, except *Tonghak* (an indigenous religion) came through the Northern route. This is also true for Christianity.

From the mid 17th century, Northern Korean traders travelled to China, and regular markets were developed near the northern borders and harbours in order to overcome marginalization in a Korean economy dominated by the South. In the early 19th century many poor peasants in Northern Korea fled to Manchuria or to Russia across the Korean border, because the domestic socio-political and economic situation of the Chosun dynasty seemed hopeless to them. For these reasons, Northerners developed social mobility, and were generally much more open to engagement with foreign civilization than the Southerners.

Furthermore, politically, the central government closed the borders of Chosun, especially after the Opium War (1839-1842). In addition to Western colonial competition in China, the earlier spread of Catholicism in Chosun made the government fearful of Western colonial powers and so it developed the 'Closed Door' policy, as a means of protecting Chosun despite continuous pressure from colonial powers to open its markets. The policy resulted in several naval collisions. Finally, the government locked the door. The 'Closed Door' policy was an economic blow to Northern Korea, destroying its prospects for international trade.

In these circumstances, there were two missiological positions-exclusivism⁵⁰ and inclusivism⁵¹-of the Western missionaries who worked in China or Korea. On the

⁵⁰ This study chooses the classification of Alan Race among various classifications. He defined exclusivism as follows: "It counts the revelation in Jesus Christ as the sole criterion by which all religions, including Christianity, can be understood and evaluated." See, Alan Race, *Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology of Religions*, London: SCM Press, 1983, p. 11.

⁵¹ According to Race, "Inclusivism in the Christian theology of religions is both an acceptance and a rejection of the other faiths, a dialectical 'yes' and 'no'. On one hand it

one hand, with regard to ancestral reverence at that time most missionaries working in China regarded it as an infringement on the rights of God. However, John Ross⁵² consistently acknowledged the ancestral ritual, denying that idolatry is an essential constituent of ancestral reverence, through both accepting the good in it and denying the idolatrous elements in it.⁵³ This indicates that the missiological position of John Ross was inclusivism in terms of the definition of inclusivism of Alan Race⁵⁴ that is both an acceptance and a rejection of the other faiths. Furthermore, Ha Chung-yoube insisted that the missiological position of John Ross was inclusivism in comparison with Commission IV of World Missionary Conference of 1910 Edinburgh.⁵⁵ However, Ross could not have a very strong theological influence on Christianity in the northern territory because he failed to enter Korea due to the 'Closed Door' policy before the missionaries of the United States came to Korea.

On the other hand, conservative Presbyterianism dominated Korea because the Presbyterian Church in the USA sent many conservative missionaries to Korea from 1884.⁵⁶ Most of the early American Presbyterian missionaries, including Horace G.

accepts the spiritual power and depth manifest in them, so that they can properly be called a locus of divine presence. On the other hand, it rejects them as not being sufficient for salvation apart from Christ, for Christ alone is saviour." See, Alan Race, *Op.Cit.*, p. 38.

⁵² John Ross (1842-1915), a missionary of Scotland, the father of Protestant churches in both Korea and Manchuria, deserves to be remembered as one of the most effective missionaries of his generation. Serving as an overseas missionary for almost four decades (1872-1910), Ross was fluent in several languages; made significant contributions to translating the Bible into Korean; was a pioneer in the theory and practice of missions; and possessed an in-depth knowledge of the history, culture and religions of China and Korea. See, Bae Ahn-ho, *Three-Self Principle and the Mission Method of John Ross: A Study of the Formation of Early Korean Presbyterian Church (1874-1893)*, PhD Thesis, Aberdeen University, 1995, p. 6.

⁵³ *Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China*, held in Shanghai, May 7-20, 1890, Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1890, pp. 631-700.

⁵⁴ Alan Race, *Christian and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology of Religions*, Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1983, p. 38.

⁵⁵ *The Missionary Message in Relation to Non-Christian Religions*, World Missionary Conference, 1910, Report of Commission IV, pp. 39-47.

⁵⁶ Before 1910, there were 49 Presbyterian (38 missionaries from U.S.A, 8 from Canada, 1 from Switzerland and 1 from Australia, 1 from Britain), 25 Methodist, 6 Salvation Army's and 6

Underwood (1859-1916),⁵⁷ were conservative.⁵⁸ They were trained in conservative theological seminaries: Underwood at the New Brunswick Theological Seminary, and other early Presbyterian missionaries, S. Moffett, C. Clark, and G. Lee at McCormick Theological Seminary. Most American seminaries in the second part of the 19th century placed a profound emphasis on personal piety over social responsibility, insisting, for example, that “ancestor worship” is idolatry and must be destroyed completely. In that sense, the missiological position of the early American Presbyterian missionaries was exclusivism in terms of the perspective of Alan Race. Their theological position remained dominant in Northwest Korean Christianity until they left Korea in 1942. This resulted in a significantly different theological approach to mission between the American Presbyterians in Northern Korea, and John Ross from Scotland in the border region between China and Korea.

It is clear that the theological tendency of John Ross who worked in the North was more flexible. However, he did not influence the northerners in spite of his numerous achievements. Rather, the conservatism of North American Presbyterian missionaries influenced the northerners while the missionaries were there from 1885 to 1942. This gives a hint that the theological tendency of Northwestern Conservative Christianity was conservative, which is related to an element of Christianity’s growth in Northern Korea.

Anglican missionaries in Korea. See, Sung-tae Kim ed., *The List of Foreign Missionaries in Korea, 1884-1984*, Seoul, Institute for Korean Church History, 1994.

⁵⁷ Gerald H. Anderson, ed. *Biographical Dictionary of Christian Missions*, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Cambridge, U.K: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998, p. 689.

⁵⁸ “The typical missionary of the first quarter of the century after the opening of the missionary work was a Puritan. He kept the Sabbath as our New England forefathers did a century ago. He looked on dancing, smoking, and card playing as sins in which no true follower of Christ should indulge. In theology and biblical criticism he was strongly conservative, and held as a vital truth the premillennial view of the Second Coming of Christ”. A. Brown, *The Mastery of the Far East*, London: G. Bell and Sons, 1919, p. 540.

2. The Significant Growth of Christianity

In this section I will examine how various factors in Korea's history influenced the growth of Korean Christianity and the resulting growth of Northwestern Conservative Christianity, in order to understand the background of the emergence of anti-missionary hostility.

2.1. Various Factors Related to the Growth of Northwestern Conservative Christianity

This section will show how the four Korean religions linked with Christianity in the Northwestern territory. The Northwestern territory has long been a border zone in the cultural interchange with China as mentioned above. It was marginalized politically, and the disaffected intelligentsia resisted the exploitation and pressure of the central government.⁵⁹ They were also linked to *Tonghak* and the Korean traditional religions of Shamanism, Buddhism and Confucianism.

Firstly, Shamanism is a religion which acknowledges many types of invisible spirits and employs special exercises performed by the *mudang* (a Korean-style shaman), in order to heal sickness related in a way acceptable to invisible spiritual forces.⁶⁰ Shamanism uses a term of *Han'ulnim*⁶¹ or *Hananim*⁶² for a supreme being.

⁵⁹ Kim Sang-tae, "*Geunheondaee Pyeongando Chulsin Sahoe Jidocheung Yeongu*" (The Social Leaders of the Korean Society who hailed from the Pyeongan-do province during the 20th century), (Ph.D. Thesis., Seoul National University, 2002), pp. 13-19.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁶¹ The transcendent dimension of Ruy Young-mo's understanding of God is emphasized in the second part of the compound, 'u, which he later wrote as 'uh, to indicate 'that which is above', or heaven. This is connected with the Shamanistic and Confucian concepts of Heaven which the Protestant missionaries were unwilling to embrace for fear of pantheism. See Myung-woo Park, "*Building a Local Christian Theology in the Context of Korean Religious Pluralism: A Critical Analysis of the Theology of Ryu Yongmo(1890-1981)*", (Ph.D. Thesis., The University of Edinburgh, 2001), p. 117.

⁶² *Hananim*(하나님) is the term most widely used by Korean Protestants to convey the

Christianity retained the term *Hananim* to refer to ‘God’.⁶³ For centuries Korea had been ploughed by Shamanistic efforts to communicate with higher beings, and when the seeds of Christianity were placed in this rich, ploughed soil, they flourished and produced the numerous fruits of Christian disciples.⁶⁴ In this sense, we can say that Shamanism actually prepared the way for Christianity.

Secondly, Buddhism came from China to the Korean peninsula in about 300 A.D. From 935 A.D. to 1392 A.D., during the Koryo era, it flourished to such an extent that the period is called “the Golden Age of Buddhism.” As Buddhism began to pervade politics and control it, this priest-ridden government became thoroughly corrupted. In 1392, when the Yi Dynasty came into power, it overthrew the Koryo government, curbing the power of Buddhist priests and taking over much of the property held by the great temples. Buddhism never recovered from the blow⁶⁵ and then retreated from the world of politics into monasteries, and planted conservatism into the underlying structure of Korean consciousness.⁶⁶ When Protestant Christianity arrived in Korea, the conservative nature of Korean Buddhism affected the character of Korean Christianity.⁶⁷

Thirdly, Confucianism was the favoured ideology of the Yi Dynasty in 1392. Its high ethical system deeply influenced the culture of Korea, but more as a philosophy than as a religion. One of the chief religious aspects of Confucianism was the governmental sacrifice which has been offered to heaven and earth at the *Sajik* shrine in Seoul. The King was to fulfil the demands of Heaven as a vicegerent of God.

concept of ‘the One’. See, *Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁶³ Lee Byong-sun, “*Chogi Hanguk Gaesin Gyohoe Seongjang eui Munhwa, Sahoejeokgchal*” (Socio-Cultural Accounts of Growth of the Early Protestant Church in Korea, Department of Theology) (Ph.D. Thesis., Hoseo University, 1999), p. 56.

⁶⁴ Shearer, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 30-31.

⁶⁵ Shearer, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 26-27.

⁶⁶ Baek Nak-jun, *Hangukgaesingyosa* (The History of the Korean Protestant Christian), Seoul, Yonsei University Press, 1973, pp. 13-15.

⁶⁷ Lee Byong-sun, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 56-57.

Before undertaking any important business, he would sacrifice to the Supreme Ruler. In the event of a national crisis, he always acknowledged in public that he caused it by his sinfulness and by neglecting some of his duties, which provoked the anger of Heaven. The King was God's representative on earth, whose purpose was to carry out His justice and mercy among mankind. Hence the king was named *the Son of Heaven*. There was the continuity between Confucianism and Christianity.

The other religious aspect of Korean Confucianism is its doctrine of filial piety. The Korean tradition has especially emphasized the filial piety of the eldest son who is responsible for the reverence to his family's ancestors.⁶⁸ This "ancestor worship" in Confucianism is still present today. Confucianism led the Korean people to have a profound ethical philosophy of filial piety.⁶⁹ The ethical philosophy is similar to the fifth Commandment in the Old Testament to honour one's parents, which made it easier for Korean people to accept Christianity in a natural way.

Finally, *Tonghak* which literally means "Eastern Learning," was founded by Choi Jae-woo (1834-1863) in the South and developed as a revolutionary movement in the 1890's. Its aim was to strengthen an eastern tradition of learning against the "Western Learning" that was advocated by Roman Catholic elites. Its main ideas were the coming of a heavenly utopian kingdom and that humanity is heaven. It provided a utopian vision of an equal society, leading to social innovation and teaching the equality of human beings. The religious discourse of the *Tonghak* combined a form of Korean messianic Buddhism and Christian theism.⁷⁰ The *Tonghak* was rapidly popularized among the marginalized people in the late 19th century. However, it was

⁶⁸ Shearer, *Op.Cit.*, p. 27.

⁶⁹ Lee Byong-sun, *Op.Cit.*, p. 57.

⁷⁰ For details concerning *Tonghak*, see, Kim Yong-bock, *Historical Transformation, People's Movement and Messianic Koinonia: A Study of the Relationship of Christian and Tonghak Religious Communities to the March First Independence Movement*, PhD Thesis, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1969.

not strong in the Northern territory because its peasant army had been defeated by the Japanese Army before it spread into the Northern part of Korea. The serious social fragmentation in the late 19th century Chosun, which was the cause of the *Tonghak* Rebellion, formed a fertile soil for Protestant mission in Korea even in the Northern part of Korea. Furthermore, such a mental awakening linked to the ideas of Christianity, emphasizing the equality of people in the love of God. These various religious factors of Northwestern part of Korea prepared many people to embrace Christianity. Besides, the brutal Japanese colonialism led the Korean people to have favourable attitudes to the Western missionaries.

This background is important for my study because the successful settlement and growth of Northwestern Conservative Christianity had a great influence on Korean Christianity. As a result, Northerners expected Northwestern Christianity to participate in the national issues concerning the independence movement against the Japanese occupation, which will be dealt with in the next sections. This section is also important because the fact that the four Korean religions influenced the process of Christianity in the North can be linked to the later development of religious Juche ideology. This influences the acceptance of Christianity by the North Korean Saeteomin which will be dealt with in Part three.

2.2. The Beginning and Result of the Significant Growth of Northwestern Conservative Christianity

There are two perspectives from which one can look at the growth of Northwestern Conservative Christianity. Kim In-su⁷¹ insists that the Great Revival of

⁷¹ He is former professor at the Department of Korean Church History in the Presbyterian College and Theological Seminary in Korea and the president at Presbyterian Theological Seminary in America.

1907 marked the beginning of growth. Through the wave of the Revival which swept over the whole Korean Church, churches began to grow through the believers' earnest endeavours to spread the Gospel.⁷² This perspective is widely known in Korean Christianity.

However, Roy E. Shearer⁷³, in his book *Wildfire: Church Growth in Korea*, insists that soon after the Chinese-Japanese War of 1894, the Presbyterian Church in Korea began to grow rapidly.⁷⁴ He adds that the Revival did not herald the start of great church growth; rather it was in the centre of a period of amazing church growth.⁷⁵ Yet if we look at the figures carefully, we can see a significant change in the rate of church growth around 1907. Comparing the statistics of 1906 with those of 1910, the number of communicants increased from 12,500 to 32,500 and the total number of adherents from 44,000 to 110,000, which was about a 150% increase.⁷⁶

Both perspectives may be right, but what is more significant and surprising is that both the China-Japan War of 1894 and the Revival of 1907 took place in the same Northwestern territory. After the War broke out, the percentage of Presbyterian adherents in the Northwestern territory was 79.3% out of the whole Korean Presbyterian adherents in 1898.⁷⁷ 6 out of 7 pastors of the first pastors in Korea came from the Northwestern territory. Furthermore, when the first Presbytery was held in Korea in 1907, 64% of the elder representatives came from the Northwest.⁷⁸ When

⁷² Kim In-su, *Hanguk Kidokgyo eui Yeoksa* (A History of Korean Christianity), Seoul: Presbyterian College and Theological Seminary, 1997, pp. 225-256.

⁷³ Roy E. Shearer was an American Presbyterian missionary in Korea.

⁷⁴ Roy E. Shearer, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 33-34.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

⁷⁶ H.A. Rhodes, *Op.Cit.*, p. 288.

⁷⁷ Hanguk Kidokgyo Yeoksa Yeonguso, *Hanguk Kdokkyo eui Yeo I* (A History of Korean Christianity I), Seoul: Gidokkyomunsa, 1989, p. 258.

⁷⁸ Hanguk Gyohoe Baekjunyeon Junbiwawonhoe Saryobuwawiwonhoe, *Daehan Yesugyo Jangrohoe Baeknyeonsa* (A History of the Centennial Anniversary of Korea Presbytery), Seoul: The Educational Department of the General Assembly of Korea Presbyterian, 1984, p. 242.

the first Presbyterian General Assembly was held in 1912, 62.4% of the representatives were from the Northwestern territory.⁷⁹ The growth continued until the Japanese colonial government forced the entire population to worship the Shinto shrines in 1938.⁸⁰

Table 5: Communicant Membership of the Major Protestant Church in Korea in 1938⁸¹

Church T	Presbyterian Church		Methodist Church		Church of England		Holiness Church		Salvation Army	
	C	R	C	R	C	R	C	R	C	R
Middle	9,576	4.5%	31,384	64.5%	4,762	76.1%	4,052	48.7%	2,649	52.9%
S.E	39,928	18.9%	-	-	243	3.9%	1,033	12.4%	1,394	27.9%
S.W	29,442	13.9%	105	0.2%	267	4.3%	262	3.2%	178	3.6%
N.W	116,263	55.0%	16,166	33.2%	982	15.7%	1,342	16.1%	437	8.7%
N.E	16,233	7.7%	999	2.1%	-	-	1,627	19.6%	345	6.9%
(% Total 279,669)	211,442 (76%)	100%	48,654 (17%)	100%	6,254 (2%)	100%	8,316 (3%)	100%	5,003 (2%)	100%

[Abbreviation: C: Communicant, T: Territory, R: Rate, S.E: Southeastern, S.W: Southwestern, N.W: Northwestern. N.E: Northeastern]

The above chart shows that in 1938 the Presbyterian communicants made up about three quarters (76%) of all Protestants in Korea. Looking at the distribution of these Presbyterians, more than half of them (55%) were concentrated in the northwestern territory. This was in contrast to all the other Protestant churches whose main congregations could be found in the middle territory. Because of their number, Northwestern Conservative Christianity had an effect on the entire Korean Church. Their influence prevailed until Shrine Worship was pressed on the Koreans in 1938. The Northwestern Conservative Christianity adhered to their strong conservative theology which regarded such an act as idolatry: this curtailed their growth.

⁷⁹ Kim Gwang-su, *Hanguk Gyohoe Seongjangsa* (A History of the Korean Church) (Seoul: Gidokgyomunsa, 1979), pp. 209-210.

⁸⁰ The 1938 General Assembly, which was held in September 10, decided to follow Shinto shrine worship which the Japanese government began to press in 1903. Services were prohibited and many churches were closed.

⁸¹ Hanguk Gidokgyo Yeoksa Yeonguso, *Hanguk Gidokgyo eui Yeoksa II* (A History of Korean Christianity II), Seoul: Gidokgyomunsa, 1990, p. 163.

Having outlined the rapid growth of Northwestern Conservative Christianity both in number and influence which began with the War against China in 1894 and the Revival of 1907, I will now investigate how the Korean people understood the great growth of the Northwestern Conservative Christianity under the influence of Western missionaries in the Japanese occupation period. This saw the emergence of the anti-missionary hostility because it is closely related to the emergence of anti-communism of Northwestern Conservative Christianity .

3. Two Perspectives toward the Attitude of Missionaries

There are two perspectives from which one can understand the missionary influence: political and national ideology vs. a religious and missionary perspective.⁸²

The political national perspective focuses on the change of the attitude of missionaries under Japanese colonialism. When the *Eulmisabyeon*⁸³ took place in 1895, the missionaries tried to rescue the Korean King and find an alternative residence for him outside the royal palace because he was threatened. This shows that the King trusted missionaries very much in that he relied on them for his security.⁸⁴

On the other hand, missionaries adhered to the principle of separation between state and church. When Japan strengthened its control over Korea after defeating Russia in 1905, missionaries visited Japanese leaders and explained that they did not want to be involved in the political problems of Korea but attempt to promote spiritual

⁸² Park Jong-hyun, *'Hanguk Gyohoe eui Sinang Naeyeon gwa geu Oeyeon Gujo eui Sanggwan Gwaye Yeongu – 1903-1910 Buheungundong gwa Iljemal Hanguk Gyohoe Jeohangeul Jungsimuro* (A Study on the Relationship Between the Form of Internal-Combustion and the Outreach of the Korean Church: the Relationship between the Revival Movement from 1903 to 1910 and the Resistance of the Korean Church at the end of the Japanese Rule), PhD Thesis, Yonsei University, 1999, p. 30.

⁸³ Japan killed the Queen of Korea in her royal palace in 1895.

⁸⁴ Min Gyeong-bae. *Hanguk Gidokgyohoesa* (A History of Korean Christianity), Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1998, pp. 211-215.

and moral revival. In that sense, from the political national perspective, the missionaries covered up the misbehaviour of Japan's colonizing Korea.⁸⁵

At that time, Koreans were not sure whether the missionaries stood loyal to them or to the conquering Japanese. Most of the missionaries came from the United States, which showed no critical or aggressive attitude towards the colonizing Japan. This neutral attitude of the U.S. raised some doubts in the hearts of the Korean intellectuals. The indifference of the missionaries to any revolutionary movement against Japan led the common Korean people to be dubious as to whether the missionaries could be their real friends.⁸⁶

In reality, the religious missionary perspective emphasized that the ultimate objective of missionaries was the mission of Christianity and they were ready to compromise or cooperate with any governments within the principle of separation between state and church as they saw it.⁸⁷ They felt able to ignore any orders of the Japanese government in order to accomplish their missionary aims but they were not in a position to decide and nor, as foreign nationals, did they have to bear the full consequences of opposition to the state.

For example, when Korea was annexed into Japan in 1910, missionaries started the "Million Souls to Christ" movement, describing 'mission without getting involved in the political situation'. However, when in 1930 the Japanese government began to impose the worship of the Shinto shrines upon the Church, the missionaries strongly resisted because they claimed that it was a religious act. Many Korean Christians took the Shinto shrine according to the Japanese rulers' declaration that bowing to the state shrine was not a religious act. However, when students and teachers of all Korean

⁸⁵ Lee Man-yeol, *Hanguk Gidokgyo Suyongsa Yeongu* (A Study of the acceptance of Christianity in Korea), Seoul: Duresidae, 1998, pp. 193-200.

⁸⁶ Park Jong-hyun, *Op.Cit.*, p. 29.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

schools, including Christian schools, were required to go and bow before a state Shinto shrine, conservative missionaries chose to close their schools rather than to follow it. They preferred to let their seminars be closed than engage in the worship of the shrines. Their resistance proves that they were not pro-Japanese, but nor does their support suggest they were against Japan.

In sum, from the religious missionary perspective, the missionaries behaved consistently towards the Japanese rule. Nevertheless, their neutrality regarding any revolutionary anti-Japan movement made the common Korean people hostile to them.

4. Various Reasons for the Emergence of the Anti-Missionary Movement

In this section I will also investigate the reasons why the anti-missionary movement was prevalent among the communists in order to understand how Christianity reacted against it. This is important because it will help us to understand the emergence of anti-communist standpoint within Northwestern Conservative Christianity.

Kang In-cheol emphasized that the socialists were behind the anti-missionary movement because the missionaries rigidly adhered to a conservative faith which did not emphasize socio-politic issues.⁸⁸ On the other hand, Kim Sang-tae stressed that socialists resented a capitalist America and believed that the recession of the world

⁸⁸ Kang In-cheol, *“Hanguk Gaesingyo Gyohoe eui Jeongchi Sahoejeok Seonggyeoke Gwanhan Yeongu:1945-1960”*(A Study of the Socio-political Character of the Korean Protestant Churches: 1945-1960), PhD Thesis, Seoul National University, 1994.

economy of 1929 would bring the end of capitalism.⁸⁹

Initially, as mentioned in the previous section, through a politically neutral policy, the missionaries tried to avoid friction with Japan in order to freely carry out their mission. However, Korean Christians who suffered from the colonialism of Japan would have welcomed a religious message that prioritized the ‘independence of the nation.’ Such a confrontation of two different views became the cause of the feud as long as Korean Christians expected foreign missionaries to speak out on national issues.⁹⁰

Through the March First Independence Movement,⁹¹ Protestant Christianity in Northern Korea emerged as a sign of hope for national independence and modernization. In the same period, Communism was introduced to Korea from China and Russia.⁹² Both Protestant Christianity and communism were attractive to the suffering Korean people and spread rapidly among them.

However, the emergent Chosun Communist Party in Korea (1925) espoused a very dogmatic interpretation of Communism influenced by the Chinese communist party in the mid-1920s.⁹³ Most Communists in this period were atheists and took the Marxist view that “religion is the opium of the people.”⁹⁴ As a result, a serious anti-

⁸⁹ Kim Sang-tae, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 63-76.

⁹⁰ Kang In-cheol, “*Wolnam Gaesingyo, Cheonjugyo eui buri*”(The Root of Migration of Protestant Church and Roman Catholic Church), *Historical Criticism*, vol. 5, 1992, Seoul: The Institution of the Issues of History, 1992, p. 97.

⁹¹ The Independence of Korea was declared on 1st March 1919. A crowd gathered in the heart of Seoul and heard the Declaration of Independence. Then the crowd began to march through Seoul, waving Korean flags and shouting “Long live the Korea independent!” Protestant Christians led the March First Independence Movement. See, Keum Joo-seop, *Remnants and Renewal: A History of Protestant Christianity in North Korea, with Special Reference to Issues of Church and State, 1845-1994*, PhD Thesis, Edinburgh University, 2002, p.58.

⁹² Concerning the history of Communism in Korea, see, Dae-sook Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964; R. Scalapino and C. Lee, *Communism in Korea*, vol. 2, Berkley, University of California Press, 1972.

⁹³ B. Commings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 159.

⁹⁴ Myung-sook Kang, “The Anti-Christianity Movement in China and Socialist Movement in colonial Chosun in the 1920s”, *Journal of History of Christianity in Korea*, vol. 7, 1998, 143-

Christianity movement was organized from 1924 onwards. At the assembly meeting of the Seoul Communist Youth Association (*Kyungsung Shinhing Chungnyun Dongmaeng Hoe*), the delegates officially announced their anti-Christian position.⁹⁵ In 1925, the Young Communists organized a programme of anti Christianity lectures. The National Conference of Sunday School Leaders in Korea, Seoul, 22nd-28th October 1925, was confronted by a counter-conference, the Communist Conference on Anti-Christianity.⁹⁶ Amidst the heightening of tensions between Christians and Communists, the latter declared the 25th of December as “Anti-Christian Day”.⁹⁷ The Northwestern Conservative Christianity was thus threatened not only by Japanese colonial rule, but also by the atheist ideology of Marxism. As a result of this polarization, most Christians in the Northwest developed or adhered to an anti-communist standpoint.

Furthermore, Japan tried to get over the effects of the world economic crisis of 1929 by invading China, while it exploited masses of Koreans by putting the burden of its economic troubles on Korea. Against this backdrop, the Japanese colonial rule in Korea was at its worst. The Japanese owned about 85 percent of the industries, 25 percent of the best land in the country, and took over 10 million *seom* (a rice bag equivalent to 5.12 US bushels) of rice to Japan every year. In its place, minor foodstuffs such as beans produced in Manchuria were given back to the Koreans. The Japanese Governor-General ruled with an iron fist. No voice of opposition was permitted. On average, the number of prisoners convicted of “thought crimes” grew by a thousand every year.⁹⁸ The situation of Korea in the early part of the 1930s went

171.

⁹⁵ Institute of Korean Church History, ed., *A History of Christianity in Korea*, vol. 2, p. 48.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁹⁷ *Gaebyuk*, (New Heaven), vol. 63, 1945, p. 40.

⁹⁸ The Rev. Han Kyung-Chik Memorial Foundation, ed, *Just Three More Years To Love, The Story of Rev. Kyung-Chik Han*, Seoul: The Rev. Kyung-Chik Han Memorial Foundation p. 97.

from bad to worse. That is when Korean socialists made a declaration to fight against capitalism. They believed that Korean Christianity was part of imperialism. They built up an anti-Christian and anti-missionary movement, insisting that religion does not disappear unless it is knocked down.⁹⁹

In sum, Northwestern Conservative Christianity faced both internal criticism for being dependent on and, thus, accepting of American capitalism, and external criticism by socialists and communists for not getting involved in the independence movement. Furthermore, Communists started a serious anti-Christianity Movement. These factors resulted in the fact that the Northwestern Conservative Christianity embraced an anti-communist standpoint.

The Migration of Northern Christians into South Korea

North Korean Christians migrated to South Korea between 1945 and 1953 with their faith shaped by the Japanese occupation and their experience of communists' persecution following the liberation of 1945.¹⁰⁰ The migrating Christians were known as the Christian Wolnammin in South Korea. 5.15 % of the total number of migrants from North Korea between 1945 and 1953 claimed to have suffered religious persecution by the Communists.¹⁰¹ One researcher estimates that the number of

⁹⁹ Kim Sang-tae, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 63-76.

¹⁰⁰ As Hanciles said, "Most significantly, when people move, they carry their ideas, beliefs, and religious practices with them. It is central to their way of life and a crucial means of preserving identity as well as homeland connections. Even the less religious among immigrants often renew or revive their religious commitment as a vital part of dealing with uprootedness and alienation." See, Jehu J. Hanciles, *Migration and Mission: Some Implications for the Twenty-first-Century Church*. International Bulletin of Missionary Research, Vol. 27, No. 4. October 2003, p.146.

¹⁰¹ Jo Hyeong, Bak Myeo-seon, "Bukhan Chulsin Wolnamin gwa Jeongchak Gwajeong eul Tonghaeseo Bon Nambukhan Sahoegujo eui Bigyo", Bundansidae wa Hanguksahoe, ("A Comparison of Social Structure of North and South Korea in light of the process of

immigrant Protestants was approximately 61,200~100,000.¹⁰² The Protestant refugees gathered again into church communities in South Korea. Youngnak Presbyterian Church was a typical case and was established by Christian Wolnammin.

1. The Establishing of Youngnak Presbyterian Church

On 2 December 1945, the inaugural worship service of Youngnak Presbyterian Church¹⁰³ was attended by 27 refugees from the North. The church records show that within three weeks, the size of the congregation doubled. It continued to grow faster than any other church in the country.¹⁰⁴ From 1946, the second wave of refugees reached the South, in the wake of the Shineiju Student Uprising.¹⁰⁵ Most nationalists who could not tolerate the regime of Kim Il-sung sought their freedom in the South. Faithful Christians who abhorred atheism and becoming entrenched in the Soviet zone crossed over to the South to enjoy religious freedom. Youngnak Presbyterian Church became and remained a very important spiritual home for the CW.¹⁰⁶ More and more of them flocked to the church, which began to hold two Sunday morning services, the

resettlement of North Korean migrants”, *The Partition Era and the Society of Korea*), Seoul: Kkachi, 1985, pp. 150-151.

¹⁰² Kang In-cheol., *Op.Cit.*, p. 134.

¹⁰³ At the first service, the topic of the sermon delivered by Rev. Han was “the Incense Burner” based on Luke 10:38-42. Insofar as this event took place in Bethany, what Rev. Han had in mind was to call the church “Bethany Church”, to spread the fragrance of Jesus to all corners of the peninsula. He also loved the meaning of Bethany—“beth” means “house” and “any” means the “poor”. He wanted to make the church a spiritual home for the North Korean refugees, so that they would be filled with the new fragrance of Jesus. In the latter part of 1946, the church, however, was renamed Youngnak Presbyterian Church in compliance with the regulation of the General Assembly that each church should take its name from the geographical area where the church was located. Youngnakdong was the name of the city district. But that name was also suitable for a Christian church, for “young” meant “long or forever” and “nak” meant “pleasure and joy.” See, Lee Won-sul, Lee Seung-joon, Han Joong-sik, ed., *Op.Cit.*, p. 129.

¹⁰⁴ Youngnak Presbyterian Church, *Youngnak Gyohoe 50 Nyeonsa* (A History of 50 years in Youngnak Presbyterian Church), Seoul: Youngnak Presbyterian Church Press, 1998, pp.66-69.

¹⁰⁵ Over 5,000 students clashed against the Communist Party in Shineiju city of North Korea in 1946. See, section 3.1. in this chapter.

¹⁰⁶ Lee Won-sul, Lee Seung-joon, Han Joong-sik, ed., *Op.Cit.*, p. 129.

first time this had happened in all of Korea.¹⁰⁷ The church had one thousand members by the early part of 1946.¹⁰⁸ They had to establish a ‘Tent Church’ since the number of attending members was over two thousand by 1947.¹⁰⁹

In the society of South Korea there was a serious political realignment as the conservative sect was gaining more and more strength. Since Youngnak Presbyterian Church served as the home for North Korean refugees, many of its young members were very active in right wing organisations¹¹⁰ such as “The League of North Korean Students” and “the Northwest Youth Association.” These organisations were involved in violent physical fights which often occurred between the Communist youth and the conservative groups.¹¹¹ In the South at that time, there was a radical political realignment of the extreme camps of the right and the left. In the conservative camp, the Korean Democratic Party emerged as the strongest rallying point of the well-to-do segments of the society. In the left-wing camp, the South Korean Communist Party was advocating drastic reform policies to win the poor segments of society. The moderate forces tried to unite their group into a strong progressive political force. However, violent physical fights often broke out between the Communist youth and those of the conservative groups. The CW were reorganised and assimilated into South Korean conservative Christianity; politically they belonged to the conservative camp linked to the Korean Democratic Party. In short, Youngnak Presbyterian Church also collaborated socio-politically with anti-Communist conservative groups.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

¹⁰⁸ Youngnak Presbyterian Church, *Youngnak Gyohoe 50 Nyeonsa Op.Cit.*, p. 68.

¹⁰⁹ Subsequently, they built a big stone church from offerings in 1950. They firmly believed that only Christianity could save their nation from Communism. As a symbol, they established a big stone church in the heart of Seoul in South Korea. *Ibid.*, pp. 85- 93.

¹¹⁰ Lee Won-sul, Lee Seung-joon, Han Joong-sik, ed., *Op.Cit.*, p. 125.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

2. Reorganization and Assimilation

Our question here will be how the CW were reorganized and assimilated into Southern Korean Christianity, in order to keep and develop their faith and succeed their resettlement in South Korea.

First, 20 pastors from the North who were living in Seoul at the time started ‘The Representative Association of Northern Christians’ (Chairman Han Kyung-chik) in August, 1947. The establishment of the ‘Refugee Church’ rapidly progressed with the help of huge finances from the North American Presbyterian Mission. The Association made the CW the most powerful group, with a lot of churches and numerous members, 180-190 pastors, run their own theological seminary, educational institutions, all generously financed by the North American Presbyterian Mission.¹¹²

Second, in April 1947, the second Southern Division of the General Assembly agreed that pastors originally from the North could be admitted to the Presbytery and serve churches on the recommendation of three pastors of the local Presbyteries. As a result, a great many refugee pastors joined each Presbytery and by enthusiastic evangelism founded many new churches.¹¹³ Most of the ‘Refugee Churches’ established by Northwestern pastors in Seoul or Inchen in South Korea after independence but before the Korean War belonged to the *Kyunggi* Presbytery which was the largest Presbytery in Korea. They, along with pastors belonging to the Seoul Presbytery, represented two major powers.¹¹⁴ The CW criticized the liberal *Han-Sin* Seminary,¹¹⁵ and started the movement to establish a conservative Presbyterian

¹¹² Kang In-cheol, “*Namhan Sahoe wa Wolnam Gidokgyoin*” (Society of South Korea and Christian immigrants), *Historical Criticism*, vol. 5, 1993, Seoul: The Institution for the Issues of History, 1993, pp.75-76.

¹¹³ Kim Yang-sun, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 53-54.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 272,285.

¹¹⁵ *Han-Sin* Seminary which was established in April 1939 called Chosun Seminary and was

Seminary.¹¹⁶ Consequently, the CW not only dominated *Kyunggi* Presbytery but also the Seminary, *Chang-Sin* Seminary, which as PCTS, has remained at the heart of conservative Protestant Christianity, clearly linked to Youngnak Presbyterian Church.

Third, the 37th General Assembly in 1952 passed an emergency act recognizing the existence of Northern Presbyteries that migrated to South Korea from North Korea. The General Assembly members accepted as full members several hundred thousand Northern Korean Christians and about 400 Northern pastors who came to the South. Accordingly, some Presbyteries were called ‘Refugee Presbyteries.’¹¹⁷ After the Liberation the significant church growth of South Korea was influenced by the activities of the CW. Over 90% of new churches were established by them in the 1950s, a development to which Youngnak Presbyterian Church contributed.¹¹⁸

The Formation of Characteristics of Anti-Communist Ideology

In this section, I will not discuss in detail the national division through the partitioned occupation by the United States and the former Soviet Union and the subsequent establishment of two separate governments. Rather, I will focus on how the characteristics of the ethnic identity of CW were formed after the liberation related to their past experience of injuries by the Communists, the South Korean anti-Communist education and their conservative-evangelical faith.

Kwon Hyeok-beop insists that anti-Communism has been embedded in South Korean people and automatically acts inside the mind of South Koreans.¹¹⁹ Those

led by liberal groups. See, available from; <http://www.hs.ac.kr/campus/history.html>; accessed on the 9th of December 2008.

¹¹⁶ Kim Yang-sun, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 214-253.

¹¹⁷ This was not an official title but an informal expression.

¹¹⁸ Kim Yang-sun, *Op.Cit.*, p. 100.

¹¹⁹ Kwon Hyeok-beop, “Reading the circuit of anti-communism in my body,” edited by

whom I interviewed are from the generation who personally experienced harm at the hands of Communists and received an anti-Communist education in South Korea. This section will deal with their persecution by the Communists, focusing in particular on the suffering experienced by Rev. Han, the founder of Youngnak Presbyterian Church, who influenced the anti-Communist attitudes of the CW. It will be divided into three periods: first, the post-liberation; second, the Korean War; third, after the War.

1. The Post-Liberation Period

In moving back to liberation of 1945, there emerged two political parties ‘the Christian Socialist Democratic Party’ and ‘the Communist Party’ in Shineiju city, North Korea, where Rev. Han lived. There was a power struggle between them.

On the one hand, the Communist Party appealed to the people in the lower strata of society. The Communists insisted on a society of perfect equality in which nobody would be rich or poor, and in which everybody would have an equal opportunity to receive an education and enjoy the same quality of life.¹²⁰ On the other hand, the Christian Socialist Democratic Party¹²¹ also emerged. When it announced its policies, many young Christians flocked to join including the Rev Han, who took part in its establishment.¹²²

Dohanaeuy Munhwa, *People preparing Reunification in Korea*, Seoul: Dohanaeuy Munhwa Press, 1999.

¹²⁰ Lee Won-sul, Lee Seung-joon, Han Joong-sik, ed., *Op.Cit.*, p. 125.

¹²¹The original name of the Party was ‘Christian Democratic Party’. The Communist Party tried to attract people’s interest by propagandising that they were more for equality than freedom. The poor folks were more attracted to the word “equality” than “freedom.” So in the end, the name of the Christian Democratic Party was renamed as the Christian Socialist Democratic Party. Rev. Han did not become directly involved in this party, but he was its spiritual patron behind the scene. See, Lee Won-sul, Lee Seung-joon, Han Joong-sik, ed., *Op.Cit.*, p. 112-113.

¹²² Han Soong-hong, *The Life and Thought of Han, Kyung-Chik*, Seoul: PC & TS Press, 1993,

Kim Il-sung's primary target for elimination was the Christians. Detaining church leaders was the first step, which began around this time. Kim Il-sung had quickly taken political power in North Korea, taking advantage of Russian support, and he became the First Secretary of the North Korean Communist Party after the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was officially proclaimed on September 9, 1948.¹²³ He organised local Communist Parties in the country, knowing that the Christian church was a bastion of anti-Communist forces, and the Christian Socialist Democratic Party was in direct competition to the Communist Party. In this circumstance, the rapid growth of membership of the Christian Socialist Democratic Party alarmed Kim Il-sung and his party and he began suppressing Christian leaders in order to consolidate his position in the northern territory of the Korean peninsula.¹²⁴ The press was under tight government control, and any religious group which had had a history of links to foreign churches or missionaries was suppressed, as was any religious group which attempted to interfere in or even comment on political affairs. In this situation, Rev. Han escaped from Communist persecution just before he was due to be arrested.¹²⁵ The conflict between communists and the Christian Socialist Democratic Party resulted in the massacre of students in the city of Shineiju in North Korea. Although the Soviet Command did not close down the church immediately in the North, they rapidly tightened their grip on ecclesiastical affairs. On 16 November 1945, there was a convention of the Christian Socialist Democratic Party at Yongampo. The Communists attacked the meeting with stones and clubs, injuring many Christian youths and killing one of the party leaders on the spot.

Furthermore, the Communists broke into the churches in the area and destroyed

p.123. (in Korean)

¹²³ Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History*, Basic Books, 1997, p. 7.

¹²⁴ Lee Won-sul, Lee Seung-joon, Han Joong-sik, ed., *Op.Cit.*, p. 113.

¹²⁵ Youngnak Presbyterian Church, *Youngnak Gyohoe 50 Nyeonsa Op.Cit.*, p.52.

the pulpits and windows. This news infuriated both Christian and anti-Communist students and on 23 November in the city of Shineiju, where anti-Communist sentiment with a Christian influence was exceptionally strong, over 5,000 students rose up and attacked the head office of the Communist Party, the Police Station, and the HQ of the People's Committee.¹²⁶ This resulted in over 70 high school students being killed in one day by Communists. Many Christians escaped to the American zone, leaving behind their homes and families.¹²⁷ Most students and Christians who fled to the South during this time later became members of Youngnak Presbyterian Church. It is not surprising, then, that the foundation ideology of Youngnak Presbyterian Church was based on strong anti-Communism.

The CW who serve with the Bible Study Class for Free People after 1998 had also experienced persecution by Communists in the post-liberation period. Two prominent Youngnak Presbyterian Church members talked about that period. The grandfather of Elder Goh Jong-taet, the former head of the Mission Centre for North Korea, who served at the Centre for seven years (1999-2006), was executed by communists at Haeju Prison in 1948 because he opposed the placing of his own nation under the trusteeship of Soviet Union. After that, his family left the North and his father joined the South Korean Army in order to take revenge for the execution of his grandfather.¹²⁸ The father of Kim Nae-young, the head of the Mission Centre for North Korea from 2006 to 2007, had to hide in an underground room with his colleagues and was repeatedly arrested. Eventually he fled to the South with his

¹²⁶ Lee Won-sul, Lee Seung-joon, Han Joong-sik, ed., *Op.Cit.*, p. 118.

¹²⁷ Kim Yang-sun, *Hanguk Gidokgyo Haebang 10 Nyeonsa (1945-1955)*(A History of the Korean Church during the Ten Years after Liberation (1945-1955)). Seoul: The Religious Department of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Korea, 1956, pp. 63-64.

¹²⁸ Interview with CW13, Seoul, 19 March 2007.

family.¹²⁹

In the North, a Communist state was built, which largely tried to purge the northern half of Korea of all who had possessed lands. The northern regime had also immediately implemented a social revolution. In 1946, as part of a land reform all the land which had been held by the Japanese Government or Japanese landowners or corporations, together with the land owned by Korean landlords, was confiscated. Many of the dispossessed took the opportunity to flee to the South. Three of the sixteen families interviewed experienced direct persecution by Communists during this time. One is the family of the team leader of the BSCFP.

My grandfather was suddenly dispossessed of his land by the leaders of the Communist Party and their relatives. He died of a nervous disorder caused by his unexpressed resentment. My grandmother suggested that my family should leave the North for the South because the North was dangerous. Following her recommendation, all the family except for mother moved to the South.¹³⁰

Another is a teacher at the BSCFP saying that “My grandfather was a landowner, a Christian and a collaborator with the Japanese occupation. Due to these factors the People’s Army of Communists put him in prison. The Army set fire to the prison, where he died. The rest of my family left for the South.”¹³¹ Another team leader in the BSCFP said that “When the Communists killed and persecuted landowners, they killed my pregnant younger grandmother while she was trying to stop her husband being beaten by the Communists.”¹³²

The Communists faced strong opposition from Christians when they insisted to

¹²⁹ Interview with CW03, Seoul, 9 February 2007.

¹³⁰ Interview with CW11, Seoul, 12 March 2007.

¹³¹ Interview with CW07, Seoul, 15 February 2007.

¹³² Interview with CW04, Seoul, 12 February 2007.

hold the election a Sunday, a result of which was another exodus.¹³³ The senior minister of Youngnak Presbyterian Church described the main members of the church as ‘victims of the Communists’:

In North Korea most Christians rejected a Sunday election. Nevertheless, the Communist Party conducted the election on Sunday. It was the Sunday Election which brought the North Korean Christians to a realisation of the hopelessness offered by Communist government. So, many Christians escaped from the Communist persecution by going to the South and later joined Youngnak Presbyterian Church. They were victims of the Communists. Personally, my father was shot by Communists while trying to escape the North; it was an experience of direct persecution.¹³⁴

One of the interviewees says that “Since my Christian aunt did not vote on Sunday, her son was victimized by the Communists and was unable to go to primary school. So he migrated to the South.”¹³⁵

Consequently, the CW memory of the persecution and suffering which they experienced in North Korea - caused by conflict between the Christian Socialist Democratic Party and the Communist Party, land reform, and the Sunday election - led them to migrate to the South and resulted in their adherence to an anti-Communist viewpoint. The interviewees may think that they need to defeat an enemy so that they can regain the land which they lost,¹³⁶ which may motivate their anti-Communist activities: they may just still be bitter. Be that as it may, these experiences have influenced and strengthened their anti-Communist consciousness and have been carried over into their attitude to the CS.

¹³³ Youngnak Presbyterian Church, *Youngnak Gyohoe 50 Nyeonsa*, *Op.Cit.*, p. 53. Roy E. Shearer, *Op.Cit.*, p. 209.

¹³⁴ Interview with CW12, Seoul, 9 March 2007.

¹³⁵ Interview with CW06, Seoul, 15 February 2007.

¹³⁶ Kim Gwi-ok, *The Identity and Life Experiences of Wolnammin*, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1999. (in Korean)

2. During the Korean War

Before dawn on 25 June 1950, the North Korean Army launched an all-out attack on the South. This is presented as the most tragic event in Korean history,¹³⁷ in the martyrdom monument to Elder Kim Ung-nak in Youngnak Presbyterian Church grounds which again reminds us of the anti-Communist standpoint of the CW. Had the North Korean army defeated South Korea, the sector of the South Korean population to suffer most would have been the Christians, for the Kim Il-sung regime regarded Christians as its arch enemy. At the outbreak of the war, Christian leaders in the north were executed or put into labour camps as American collaborators. After capturing Seoul, the Communist forces tried to create a group of apostates among Christian leaders, and anyone who opposed them was put into prison or executed.¹³⁸

At the same time, an Elder of Youngnak Presbyterian Church, Kim Ung-nak, was executed by the Communists while resisting the use of the church as an armoury. When the Communist police arrested him, he pleaded with them to give him five minutes so that he could offer his last prayer to God in the church sanctuary before being executed.¹³⁹

The memorial stone of Kim Ung-nak still stands at the front of the main building of the sanctuary in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, reminding people of the communist persecution. Furthermore, leaders of the BSCFP have strong memories of how their families suffered during the Korean War. Elder Koh Jong-taek, the former head of the Mission Centre for North Korea in the church, said:

When I was in my second year at primary school, the Korean War broke out one

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

¹³⁸ Lee Won-sul, Lee Seung-joon, Han Joong-sik, ed., *Op.Cit.*, pp.144-145.

¹³⁹ Youngnak Presbyterian Church, *Youngnak Gyohoe 50 Nyeonsa*, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 112-119.

Sunday. A private came to call my father who was a military officer. After my father left for the battle field, we had to avoid my house as it belonged to an officer and would be dangerous for my family. Commies came to the house to capture my father and my family. If we had been in the house, we would have been executed. Unfortunately, some of my relatives were executed.¹⁴⁰

An interviewee who serves at the BSCFP as a teacher as well as a team leader in 2006, says that “When the Communist Army came to my town to catch my father, he escaped to the mountains and stayed there.”¹⁴¹

Another team leader of the BSCFP says:

My father was a South Korean soldier when the War broke out. At that time those who married to men serving in the South Korean Army were regarded as reactionary elements. My mother tore up the wedding photographs before she escaped to her mother’s house.¹⁴²

When members of the church see the martyrdom monument of Elder Kim Ungnak they are reminded of the sufferings inflicted upon their fellow Wolnammin from the liberation onwards. Many prominent elders and church members, as I have shown, directly experienced the ruthless persecution of the Northern regime, which affect to this day their feelings about communism.

There are three other churches whose function strengthens their anti-Communist views. These churches, which were established by members of Youngnak Presbyterian Church, provided shelter for the refugees of the Korean War. Rev. Han

¹⁴⁰ Interview with CW 13, Seoul, 7 March 2007.

¹⁴¹ Interview with CW 02, Seoul, 12 February 2007.

¹⁴² Interview with CW 11, Seoul, 12 March 2007.

and his fellow believers undertook relief work for refugees. They established churches such as Busan Youngnak Church, Daegu Youngnak Church, and Jeju Youngnak Church which not only to provide shelter for the refugees, but also to strengthen their faith because they enthusiastically believed that, in order to defeat Communism, Korea had to become a Christian nation through the establishment of churches in every nook and cranny of the country.¹⁴³

In short, the anti-Communism of CW was heavily influenced by Communist persecution, by the martyrdom monument of Elder Kim Ung-nak and the three churches Youngnak members established during the Korean War.

3. The Post-Korean War Period

In the post-Korean War period, there are two significant elements which strengthened the Christian Wolnammin's anti-Communism.

Members of Youngnak Presbyterian Church participated in the expansion of the national evangelical campaign initiated by Rev. Han in order to curb any influence communism may have had. The wider political backdrop was also in favour of strong anti-communist sentiment which was reflected in South Korea's education policies as well. It is worth describing these in more details because both the evangelical drive based on curbing communism and the government's anti-communist education policy impacted heavily the way on the CW relate to the later refugees, that is, the CS. Indeed it might be suggested the strength of Youngnak Presbyterian Church as an anti-communist bastion paralleled (or risked outweighing) its existence as a stronghold for Christ.

¹⁴³Youngnak Presbyterian Church, *Youngnak Gyohoe 50 Nyeonsa, Op.Cit.*, pp. 122-136.

3.1. The National Evangelical Campaign

Rev. Han declared that Korea will be unified when it becomes a Christian nation.¹⁴⁴ This argument implies that nobody in a unified Korea will be communist, because communism is antithetical to Christianity, as evidenced for him by the efforts of the former to eliminate the latter. Evangelism is necessary in order to defeat communism and this thought was the driving force beneath Rev. Han's campaign.

The first huge assembly of the 1970s was part of such a revival campaign. The organisers invited Billy Graham in 1973. The campaign was held under the slogan of 'Fifty Million to Christ' with 516,000 participants, led by Rev. Han.¹⁴⁵ The campaign was a response of conservative Christianity to 'The 7.4 Joint Statement'.¹⁴⁶ When the principle of peaceful reunification was proclaimed at first, it was natural that the CW should express 'shock' and 'fury,' and respond with such a Christian (and therefore for them anti-communist) campaign.

The new situation was summarised by Rev. Han as follows: "Before the 7.4 statement we were in an era of confrontation without dialogue, whereas after the statement we are faced with an era of confrontation along with dialogue", and he warned as follows: "If the 38th parallel¹⁴⁷ is pierced, we will collapse and die if our ideological arms are reckless."¹⁴⁸ This sense of reality adequately represents the anti-Communist view of the CW, repeated in the revival campaign in 1973. On the first day of that campaign Rev. Han paradoxically spoke in his opening address as follows:

¹⁴⁴ *May the Words of My Mouth*, Published in honour by the Memorial Committee of Rev. Kyung-chik Han's 100th Birthday Anniversary, p. 35.

¹⁴⁵ Kim In-su, *Hanguk Kidokgyo eui Yeoksa* (A History of Christianity in Korea). Seoul: Presbyterian College and Theological Seminary, 1997, pp. 665-666.

¹⁴⁶ Both North and South Korean government issued officially a joint statement in which they agreed on the principle of peaceful reunification on the 4th of July 1972.

¹⁴⁷ The 38th parallel indicates the partition line between South Korea and North Korea.

¹⁴⁸ Hanguk Gidok Gongbo (The News of Christianity in Korea), 16. 9. 1972. In Cheol Kang, Op.Cit., p.522.

“The fifty million Korean people love each other and try to begin a new history of the Spirit through this campaign in order to establish the beautiful reunification of Korea.”¹⁴⁹ What did ‘the beautiful reunification’ mean? It seemed to mean a reunification achieved by Christianity fighting against and overcoming Communism and is consistent with his response to the statement in 1972. This address shows us that the campaign was imbued with and depended on anti-Communism. Rev. Han claims that if South Korea is to achieve stability as a democratic nation, it is necessary for over fifty percent of the South Koreans to be Christians:¹⁵⁰ for it to achieve unity, Communism must be eliminated and Christianity become the faith of all. This echoes pre-millennial thinking in the early church.¹⁵¹ This is not an attribute of Presbyterianism, though it is present in some American Evangelicalism.

The CW and Rev. Han established not only three churches during the Korean War but they also planted 150 churches after the Korean War as part of the national evangelisation mission,¹⁵² aimed at fighting Communism as well as spreading the Gospel. The two are not coterminous, but Rev. Han’s writing comes close to conflating them. The national evangelical campaign brought about continuous church growth. In 2004, Youngnak Presbyterian Church had about 50,000 members, 16 active departments, 10 auxiliary facilities, 4 church affiliated educational institutes, many small groups involved in various activities, 19 parishes and 1,090 house groups,¹⁵³ and was the largest church in Korea for 20 years. In other words, Youngnak

¹⁴⁹ Kim In-su, *Op.Cit.*, p. 666.

¹⁵⁰ *May the Words of My Mouth, Op.Cit.*, p. 86.

¹⁵¹ Premillennialists believed that the resurrected saints would enjoy 1,000 years of paradisaical life on earth before being translated to eternal life in heaven. However, it was the materialistic nature of this millennialism which made it objectionable to others of the fathers whose highly influential rejection of it led to virtual disappearance of premillennialism until the 17th century. See, Sinclair B. Ferguson, David F. Wright, ed., *New Dictionary of Theology*, Leicester: InterVarsity press, 1973, p. 428.

¹⁵² Youngnak Presbyterian Church, *Youngnak Gyohoe 50 Nyeonsa, Op.Cit.*, pp. 124-348.

¹⁵³ Youngnak Presbyterian Church, *Youngnak Gyohoe Sogae (A Introduction of Youngnak Presbyterian Church)*, Seoul: Youngnak Presbyterian Church Press, 2004.

Presbyterian Church, established by those who migrated from North to South to escape from the communist persecution, gained strength through the national evangelical campaign during and after the Korean War in order to defeat Communism.

Koh Jong-taek, the former head of the Mission Centre, also testified as follows:

Anti-Communism was naturally embedded in the congregation's mind if people attended the church. Most members were refugees from North Korea. The atmosphere of the church was anti-Communist. Rev. Han fundamentally hated Communism because he had experienced it. The mainstream of the church is anti-Communist and is of conservative faith.¹⁵⁴

Rev. Han argues that the ideological threat of the Communist philosophy is rooted in materialism, nihilism and atheism. For the sake of true peace, Christians must fight against these evil forces.¹⁵⁵ They regarded the Communist ideology as the embodiment of Satanic power, and Kim Il-sung as the iconic figure representing the Devil. For those who live in South Korea, he says, the greatest adversary is the Communist ideology and its devotees because people believe that it would take away their freedom.¹⁵⁶ However, evil is in our heart while we are pointing out other's evil.

Rev. Han also insists that South Korean Christians must spread the gospel to the people in North Korea.¹⁵⁷ For him, there is no freedom of belief, speech, association, residence and occupation in North Korea, for North Korea is one big prison. The ordinary people of North Korea, he continues, are the prisoners of the Communist party and Kim Il-sung.¹⁵⁸ A few churches operate in the larger cities but they are just shop window churches pretending to convince the few tourists of the evidence of

¹⁵⁴ Interview with CW 13, Seoul, 19 March 2007.

¹⁵⁵ *May the Words of My Mouth, Op.Cit.*, p. 92.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 144,178.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

“religious freedom.”

However, the faithful remnants among the ordinary North Koreans are hidden underground as in Nero’s time. Rev. Han and others were confident that if and when pressure on the church by the Communist government is removed, a large and devoted body of believers would emerge. He believes that when Korea is unified, Korea will certainly be a Christian nation.¹⁵⁹ Therefore, in order to remove the pressure of the Communist government and to become a Christian nation, South Korean Christians must try their best to preach the gospel to the North Koreans.¹⁶⁰

Moreover, he depicts ordinary North Koreans as slaves, “who have mouths, yet they cannot speak, who have ears, yet they cannot freely listen...Therefore, we must spread the gospel to the people in North Korea”.¹⁶¹ One of the practical implementations of this imperative was the “Rice of Love Movement.” The two Koreas, up until the early part of the 1960s, were among one of the poorest nations on earth. Until that time, many people suffered from starvation. Toward the end of the 1980s, the South Korean economy improved remarkably, so much so that there was a large amount of rice surplus every year. On the initiative of Rev. Han, the Christian Council of Korea inaugurated the Rice of Love Campaign and started sending a large amount of rice to North Korea.¹⁶²

Rev. Han ministered and preached to the congregation of Younknak Presbyterian Church for over half a century, and he deeply influenced the perspective of the CW.

Since the church has placed emphasis on the National Evangelical Movement, I have firmly perceived that the Communist ideology had to be completely destroyed, whereas ordinary North Koreans are to be shown compassion to because they have

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

¹⁶² Lee Won-sul, Lee Seung-joon, Han Joong-sik, ed., *Op.Cit.*, p. 184.

been exploited.¹⁶³

Kim Chang-mae, one of the teachers of the BSCFP argues:

The North Korean Saeteomin had no human rights in North Korea. In addition, they were hungry and without hope. I feel compassion for the ordinary people of North Korea in spite of the fact that I dislike the system of North Korea as well as the leaders of North Korea. It is Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and the People's Army who exploited the ordinary people of North Korea. I am sure that they are really bad. However, we should welcome those who believed that Kim Il-sung was able to do everything for them; I mean the ordinary North Koreans, not the leaders, not the Army.¹⁶⁴

These statements indicate that those Wolnammin who are involved with the BSCFP hated the leaders of North Korea while they had compassion for the ordinary North Koreans including the CS. In addition, the CW regarded the North Korean Saeteomin as targets for evangelism, and tried to spread the gospel among them. They also firmly believed that the power of the gospel can truly change the North Korean Saeteomin. Lee Chul-shin, the senior minister of Youngnak Presbyterian Church, believed that the spirit of the North Korean Saeteomin should be changed to the spirit of Christianity¹⁶⁵ as understood by the CW. All interviewees shared the same hope.

However, if the “spirit of Christianity” is solely that envisaged by the CW in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, that is, “anti-communist,” the likelihood of the “replacing” being done in the CW’s image, as early missionaries tended to make Koreans in their own image, may still be a problem.

Despite their great effort to differentiate between the CS and the ruling elites of the

¹⁶³ Interview with CW02, Seoul, 12 February 2007.

¹⁶⁴ Interview with CW07, Seoul, 15 February 2007.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with CW12, Seoul, 9 March 2007.

regime of North Korea, between poor brethren and core communists, the CW may have demonstrated negative feelings towards the CS when they interacted with each other. In his book *Stigma*, Erving Goffman points out that there are blemishes of individual character perceived as weak will.¹⁶⁶ The routines of social intercourse in structured settings, he says, lead us to categorize others without reflecting on them individually. Their appearance, or other external attributes, leads us to certain automatic conclusions which may be incorrect. He continues, when a stranger is present before us, we may assume he possesses an attribute that makes him different from us. For example, because we have decided all North Koreans are two-headed devils, when we meet one, we interpret his speech or appearance in a way which fulfils our pre-existing assumption. This is stigmatization.¹⁶⁷ These are not his actual attributes but only his attributes which are in line with our stereotype of what a given individual of that “type” should be.¹⁶⁸ In the context of Youngnak Presbyterian Church, when the CS possesses a trait that can obtrude itself upon attention, the CS possesses a stigma, undesired differences from what the CW had expected. It is very easy for the CW to stigmatize the CS as spies, liars, domineering, treacherous and rigid belief, and dishonesty etc., when the CW encounter the CS. One of the teachers of the BSCFP had doubts about the CS and was afraid that he might suffer harm through them.

One of the most important Communist strategies is to conspire to infiltrate our society and to set up cell organisations. North Korean spies used to come to the South through foreign countries and across the 38th parallel. Nowadays, however, they can spread out amongst the North Korean Saeteomin. I am wondering why so many young North Korean Saeteomin come to the South. If one of them died while demonstrating against

¹⁶⁶ Erving Goffman, *Stigma: Note on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, Penguin Books, 1990, p. 14.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

the South Korean government, the cell organisations will appear. That will be their revolution.¹⁶⁹

In addition, in 2005 the New York Times commented on South Koreans working with North Koreans at a South Korean owned industrial park at Kaesong in North Korea: “Some South Koreans say they may have trouble working with the North Koreans because South Korea's fiercely anti-Communist education taught them for decades that North Koreans were dangerous and evil.”¹⁷⁰

In short, the memories of the CW combined with anti-communist education made it very difficult for the CW to maintain that actual ordinary North Koreans are honest and decent people, despite a shared faith. They seem to feel threatened even by the CS, a problem which needs to be addressed within the church.

3.2. Anti-Communist Education

Rev. Han's anti-Communist approach was underlined by that of the government of South Korea, which used education to reinforce the anti-Communist position. In the post 1953 context, the urgent task of the South Korean society was to cope with the ever-possible threat of invasion of the Communists. Immediately after the cease-fire, there was a widely developed idea that the South needed strong leadership in order to cope with the threat. Consequently, Rhee Syng-man's¹⁷¹ government placed emphasis

¹⁶⁹ Interview with CW01, Seoul, 22 October 2006.

¹⁷⁰ New York Times, January 5, 2005.

¹⁷¹ Syngman Rhee or Lee Seungman or Yee Sung-man (March 26, 1875-July 19, 1965) was the first president of South Korea. His presidency, from August 1948 to April 1960, remains controversial, affected by Cold War tensions on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere. Rhee was regarded as an anti-Communist and a strongman, and led South Korea through the Korean War. His presidency ended in resignation following popular protests against a disputed election. He died in exile in Hawaii; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syngman_Rhee; accessed on 14 November 2007.

on anti-Communist policies up to 1960.¹⁷² An anti-Communist law was promulgated and all socialist countries, North Korea most especially, were declared to be enemy states. At the same time, a programme of anti-Communist education began in schools, aimed at fostering an anti-Communist attitude in the students.

In March 1960, the Liberal Party managed to reelect Rhee and to elect Yi Ki-bung vice president by the blatant use of force. Rhee was reelected by default because his principal opponent had died while receiving medical treatment in the United States just before the election. The fraudulent election touched off civil disorders, known and celebrated as the April 19 Student Revolution, during which at least 115 students were killed and nearly 1,000 were injured by the police.¹⁷³ As a result, Rhee resigned on April 26, 1960. During the revolution, conservative leaders of the Korean churches were silent, preaching that we must fight communists with the National Evangelical Campaign.¹⁷⁴ Rev. Han also was silent in spite of the fact that one of the students killed was Kim Chi-ho who was a leading figure among college students at Youngnak Presbyterian Church.¹⁷⁵ The churches said nothing. That is the outcome of anti-communist thinking. To be silent when sin is committed is to collude in it: that means sharing responsibility for sin. If killing “communists” is not counted as sin, the faith has been hijacked by society. “Giving into culture” is usually, in theologically conservative circles, counted as sin. In this context, drinking and smoking are counted incompatible with Christian faith, but killing “communists” is not. This is a fundamental problem for the conservative Korean Christian.

¹⁷² Lee Wan-beom, "Mikunjeongkwa Minjokjueui, 1945-1948(1945-1948, American Military Administration and Nationalism, 1945-1948)," *Keunhyeondaesa Kangjwa (Modern and Present History Lecture)* Vol. 8. No. 8., (December, 1996), p. 77.

¹⁷³ Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A morden History*, New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997, p. 344.

¹⁷⁴ Kang In-cheol, *Hankukui Kaesinkyowa Bankongjuui (An Anti-Communism and a Protestant of Korea)*, Seoul: Jungsim, 2007, pp. 72-74.

¹⁷⁵ Lee Won-sul, Lee Seung-joon, Han Joong-sik, ed., *Op.Cit.*, pp. 170-171.

Park Chung-hee¹⁷⁶ who ruled from 1961 to 1979 banned all political activity, dismissed the parliament and adopted a truculent official anti-Communism. He continued the implementation of an anti-communist curriculum,¹⁷⁷ which Rhee Syng-man had already used.¹⁷⁸ The primary schools used text books issued by the Ministry of Education to promote anti-Communism explaining the reasons for unification. The content emphasised that children should understand the reasons for the war and the anti-Communist point of view and should fully participate in supporting the Cold War. The book contained pictures and illustrations to aid understanding. Anti-Communist education ran throughout schooling, with monthly poster assignments demonizing the North.¹⁷⁹ Koh Jong-taek¹⁸⁰ testified as follows:

During my school days, unification was hoped to be achieved through *Seunggong* (a victory over Communism). When I became a business man, I produced the textbook named '*Seunggong Tongilui Gil*' (it means '*The Way of Unification Through a Victory over Communism*'). I sold millions of copies annually.¹⁸¹

North Korea, its leaders, and its political system were demonized. From the mid 1950's to 1970's primary school students had to attend anti-Communist education

¹⁷⁶ Park Jeong-hee (November 14, 1917-October 26, 1979) was a former ROK Army general and the dictator of the ROK from 1961 to 1979. He has been credited with the industrialization of the Republic of Korea through export-led growth, but is also heavily criticized for his authoritarian way of ruling the country (especially after 1971), sending troops to support to the United States in the Vietnam War, and alleged pro-Japanese activities. He was named one of the top 100 Asians of the Century by Time Magazine (1999).

¹⁷⁷ Bruce Cumings regarded Park Jeong-hui as a strong anti-communist. He claims, "Brief acquaintance with General Park revealed a strong anti-communist and a determined man." Bruce Cumings, *Op.Cit.*, p. 355.

¹⁷⁸ Kwon In-suk, "Jinbo, Kwonwi, Keurigo Seong Chabyeol (Progress, Authority, and Sexual Discrimination)," *Woori Aneui Fascism (Fascism in Us)*, Lim Ji-hyeon ed., Seoul: Samin, 2003, p. 141.

¹⁷⁹ Martin Fackler, "South Koreans are wary of shunning the North", *The New York Times*, October 24, 2006.

¹⁸⁰ He served the Centre for Missionary of North Korea as a director (1999-2006) in Youngnak Presbyterian Church.

¹⁸¹ Interview with CW 13, Seoul, 19 March 2007.

classes. The content made reference to how the children in North Korea were required to report their parents to the security police if they rebelled against the “Dear Leader”. Young students must have imagined the North Koreans as monsters sporting large horns. Indeed one of the teachers in the BSCFP testified as follows: “The content of anti-communist education seemed accurate to my mind because I accepted it positively and ideologically, so I regarded North Koreans as Commie monsters sporting large horns.”¹⁸²

The team leader of the BSCFP states,

I was taught that North Koreans were liars, sporting large horns, whom we could never trust and who were bent on the invasion of South Korea. When we drew posters, North Koreans were depicted as monsters sporting large horns and South Koreans as very good men and women.¹⁸³

The unordained pastor of the BSCFP speaks about the same content.

For me, nothing but evil existed in North Korea. While I was at primary school, disastrous scenes of North Korea were painted. Those made the strongest impression on my mind. North Koreans were embedded in my perception as monsters and I believed that human qualities did not exist in the Communist Party.¹⁸⁴

One of the teachers of the BSCFP states,

I regarded North Koreans as my enemies. I read the textbook of my school days which was talking about the story of Lee Seung-bok, a boy, who was killed by Communists.

¹⁸² Interview with CW 06, Seoul, 15 February 2007.

¹⁸³ Interview with CW11, Seoul, 12 March 2007.

¹⁸⁴ Interview with CW05, Seoul, 13 February 2007.

Communists tore up his mouth when he said that he disliked Communism. Furthermore, I remember that North Korean spies would throw bombs at the area where I lived, near the Korean Presidential residence. I began to think that I might be killed by North Koreans unless I killed them when I met them.¹⁸⁵

Lee Chul-shin, the senior minister of the church, spoke about witnessing an attack by Communist spies, which formed part of his anti-Communist education.

Of course, anti-Communism was embedded in my mind through anti-Communist education during my school days. When I was in primary school, I saw the bodies of some spies, of our policemen and of our military men together which were covered by worn-out straw bags. The spies came to the Korean Presidential residence called ‘the Blue House’ from North Korea to kill the president. I realised that North Koreans such as these killed people and the Communist Party was thoroughly inhuman. I recognised that Communists were violent and uncivilized. I came to believe that it would be difficult for us to form good relationships with them.¹⁸⁶

The government never stopped emphasising the importance of ideological education and the effects have been substantial on the formation of South Korean consciousness. Furthermore, anti-Communist education in particular was perverted by the authoritarian regime's exploitation of it as a form of political socialisation to perpetuate their grip on power. For example, in the past, the so-called “North Wind,” which denotes the impact of an abrupt North Korean action on a major South Korean election, worked to the advantage of conservative candidates because a majority of voters were more concerned about the security threat from the North than other issues such as democratization.¹⁸⁷ The Presidential Election campaign was used by the South Korean authorities for the fabrication of the “North Wind” case— the

¹⁸⁵ Interview with CW10, Seoul, 22 February 2007.

¹⁸⁶ Interview with CW12, Seoul, 9 March 2007.

¹⁸⁷ Available from <http://www.korea.ac.kr>; assessed 8 January 2008.

conservative power's strategy to use the military threat from North Korea to its advantage. The "North Wind" was believed to have been effective in helping the election of conservative candidates in the South's presidential polls. The intention to use North Korea as a tool in South Korean politics was wrong; yet we must admit that the South's attitude toward the North in the past made Northern Wind effect possible. The former team leader of the BSCFP explains:

Much of the anti-Communist education I received was through movies and news. For me North Korea was entirely evil. This was embedded in me through the experience of migration, anti-Communist education and negative stories about North Korea. When the presidential election came, I worried about the invasion of North Korea and used to vote for the candidate who was able to keep this country safe.¹⁸⁸

So far the anti-Communism of conservative Christians who were originally from the North has been explained by personal experience of the Communist regime in the North and the Korean War both of which produced the martyrdom of many and led to mass migration from the North to the South. To this mix is added the Southern state's anti-Communist education and its misuse, which was extensively promoted through the education system. The role of these factors in the lives of Christian Wolnammin was made obvious through the interviews presented. Their anti-communism was continually reinforced and strengthened, and was used to fuel the national evangelical campaign which could be seen by others as an unholy alliance of religion and politics.

Yet the formation of a strong anti-Communist conviction seems inevitable in light of both their personal experience and the governments' effort to demonize North Korea through the education system.

¹⁸⁸ Interview with CW09, Seoul, 19 February 2007.

In the post-liberation period (1945-1950) many Christians experienced persecution and suffering in North Korea as a result of the pre-war conflict between the Christian Socialist Democratic Party and the Communist Party, land reform, and the Sunday election. Most of them migrated to the South and developed a trenchant anti-Communist viewpoint. The CW who had escaped from Communist persecution to the South not only built up Youngnak Presbyterian Church ecclesiastically but also collaborated socio-politically with the anti-Communist conservative side. This indicated how strong atmosphere of anti-Communist feeling was in the church's early period.

During the Korean War (1950-1953) the anti-Communism of CW was further intensified by Communist persecution, one martyr being the Elder Kim Ung-nak, whose large statue is visible in Youngnak Presbyterian Church to every one who goes to church each Sunday. Youngnak members planted three more churches to help the refugees.

In the post-Korean War Period (1953- the present) the anti-Communism of conservative Christian Wolnammin has been continually strengthened by the state through ideological education against Communism, and propagated in the National Evangelical Campaign.

These factors act inside the mind of the CW in encounters with the CS. In other words, this anti-Communism has considerable self-perpetuating capability in any interaction between the CW and the CS. It has become a power of its own. As the CW has experienced injuries by Communists and has received heavy anti-Communist education for over half a century, it is understandable that some consider anti-Communism normal and proper for a South Korean Christian. In the context of long-standing division and hostile confrontation, the CW has consolidated their own self-

perpetuating structure. The place of Christ in all this would need to be demonstrated.

Conclusion

In this chapter I investigated the hypothesis that anti-communist ideology was an influential factor in the formation of the ethnic identity of the CW, and that this created a negative effect on their perception of the other Christian group, the CS in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, whom they stigmatised either consciously or unconsciously.

The first hostilities between Northwestern Presbyterian Christians and communists began during the Japanese rule. The apolitical stand of the missionaries was resented by ordinary Koreans who expected the missionaries to take part in the independence movement. When they refused, they were labelled as uncooperative and were criticized by the Korean socialists and communists. When Korea was liberated, the communist party became dominant in the North, backed by the Soviet Union.

The Christian in the Northern Korea pushed their social and political agenda which resulted in their persecution by Communists. A lot of them escaped to the South but with bitter memories. The Korean War was a further catalyst: by the end of the war many who escaped to the South, who are now the CW, hated communism and communists. When they established Youngnak Presbyterian Church a key principle was to spread the gospel in order to defeat communism. This stand can be seen clearly from the speeches of the founder, Rev. Han. Moreover, during the dictatorship times, the CW consistently supported the state whatever it did and welcomed anti-communist education and the government's emphasis on the North Korean threat. Amid these intensely hostile feelings towards Kim Il-sung and his regime, Youngnak Presbyterian Church viewed ordinary North Koreans in theory from a Christian

perspective as equally good people as themselves. However, as soon as the CS began to arrive among them, they could not view the newcomers with an open mind. The CW believe some CS to be spies or agents and have a very hard time accepting them as will be shown in subsequent chapters. Over fifty years of division, memories of suffering and lack of contact has led to a situation in which the CS are treated “differently,” revealing the CW assumptions distorted by state and church reinforced anti-communism.

Steven Lukes pointed out the three dimensional power concept which makes people act and think automatically because power controls their thought and desires.¹⁸⁹ In looking at the context through his perspective, the role of anti-communist ideology of the CW is the supreme exercise of power which secures the compliance of the CW to view the CS negatively or dangerously, even to regard them as spies or agents, and even to act in ways which conflict with their Christian faith.

In quest of the characteristic of the ethnic identity of the CW, it has been established that the CW see themselves as conservative Christians and strongly anti-communist. Their theological tendency, far from favouring inclusivism, is influenced by the founding American missionaries and their anti-communism is influenced by their place of origin, the Northwestern territory where Christianity was first brought and where communism became especially strong following the end of the Second of World War and the liberation of the Korean Peninsula. The persecution of Christians instilled in the CW the belief that Christianity is the antidote to communism and the reunification of the Korean Peninsula can only be achieved through the faith. Christianity is seen as the sole means of defeating communism, though we might wonder what form such a politically motivated Christianity is really taking.

¹⁸⁹ Steven Lukes, *Op.Cit.*, p. 26.

Chapter II The Emergence and Development of the Juche Ideology and its Impact on the Life of the North Koreans

Introduction

The Christian North Korean Saeteomin interviewed were very familiar with Juche ideology, the monolithic official system in which all North Koreans were required to participate on a daily basis. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the evolution of Juche ideology made the North Korean people act and think in accordance with the instructions of the leader in order to maintain a state of mobilization. Juche was devised as a means to counter foreign powers, to purge Kim Il-sung's political rivals,¹⁹⁰ and to mobilize the North Koreans. It evolved from the simple requirement of autonomy into philosophical, religious ideology. As a result, this process created a monolithic ideological system, which has resulted in no space in the life of North Koreans for otherness.

1. The definition of Juche

First of all, Juche (주체 in Korean; 主體 in Chinese) is the official government ideology of North Korea,¹⁹¹ set out in Article 3 of North Korea's Constitution 'Juche is an official system of thought or belief.'¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ Thomas J. Belke, *Juche: A Christian Study of North Korea's State Religion*, Bartlesville, OK: Living Sacrifice Books Co, 1999, p. 173.

¹⁹¹ "The DPRK activities are guided by the Juche ideology, a world view centred on people, a revolutionary ideology for achieving the independence of the masses of people." This is Article 3 in Chapter 1 Politics in Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which was adopted on the 5th of September 1998 by the first session of the 10th Supreme People's Assembly. See, <http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/>, accessed 10 October 2007.

¹⁹² See, Article 3 in Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The literal meaning of the word Juche is often translated as ‘self-reliance’ or ‘self-determination.’ When the word is broken into its two Chinese character, the meaning of the first character *Ju* (주 in Korean, 主 in Chinese) is ‘owner,’ ‘master,’ ‘lord,’ ‘the main principle,’ ‘subject,’ or ‘the self as actor’ and the meaning of the second character *che* (체 in Korean, 體 in Chinese) is ‘the body,’ ‘the whole,’ ‘the substance,’ ‘object,’ ‘thing,’ or ‘material.’¹⁹³

Juche can be viewed as the expression of being in charge of one’s own self or the system that one is part of¹⁹⁴ and further, the sense of being in charge of one’s own destiny or being the subject rather than the object of it.

According to Kim Il-sung’s explanation, the meaning of Juche is as follows:

Juche is a Korean word. The revolution in each country should be carried out responsibly by their own people, the masters, in an independent manner, and in a creative way suitable to the country’s specific conditions. It raises the fundamental question of philosophy by regarding humans as the main factor, and elucidates the philosophical principle that humans are the masters of everything and they decide everything.¹⁹⁵

According to the above quote, Juche proclaims that man is the master of everything, decides everything and is the master of his own destiny. Kim Il-sung created Juche ideology from a pre-war term in order to emphasize the importance of developing the nation’s potential in using its own resources and reserves of human creativity, for the

¹⁹³ Suh Dae-sook, *Kim Il-sung: The North Korean Leader*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, p. 301. Geir Helgesen, Political Revolution in a Cultural Continuum: Preliminary Observations on the North Korean Juche Ideology with Its Intrinsic Cult of Personality, *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring-Summer, 1991, p. 189.

¹⁹⁴ Danton R. Ford, “Democratic Capitalism and Juche: Common Values and Challenges,” Kyungnam University, p. 355.

¹⁹⁵ Kim Jong-il, *On the Juche Idea of Our Party*, Pyongyang, DPRK: FLP, 1997, p. 12.

achievement of *Jajusong* (sovereignty).

Kim Jong-il, according to his father Kim Il-sung's words, cultivated the seed of Juche into a forest of trees bearing fruits. He explained the meaning of Juche ideology as follows: "The Juche ideology defined man as the master who dominates the world, not merely as part of it, and thus established a new world view which, unlike preceding ones, regards man as being in the centre of the changes and progress made in the world."¹⁹⁶ According to Kim Jong-il, Juche ideology contains two basic elements: world and human being. Human being transforms the world with the new world view of Juche because humans are the masters of society, and masters over their own destiny.

Interpretively, according to Cheong Seong-chang¹⁹⁷, the basic core of Juche has come from Stalinism, while the Juche idea has been traditionally interpreted as a "Marxist-Leninist political ideology."¹⁹⁸ However, Shin Eun-hee insists that, although Juche idea captures some essential elements of Marxist-Leninist concepts, Juche deviates from Marxist-Leninist philosophy through its alternative interpretation of history in which people's subjectivity is placed in a higher category than class-struggle.¹⁹⁹ The two scholars give us a hint that the interpretation and application of the Juche idea have varied depending on the historical context.

¹⁹⁶ Kim Jong-il, *On the Juche Idea*, Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1982, pp. 74-75.

¹⁹⁷ Interview with Seong-chang Cheong, 14 February 2007, in Sejong Institute in Seoul. He is a professor in the institute.

¹⁹⁸ Cheong Seong-chang, *Stalinism and Kimilsungism: A Comparative Analysis of Ideology and Power*, *Asian Perspective*, vol. 24, no.1, published quarterly by the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University and Portland State University, 2000.

¹⁹⁹ Shin Eun-hee, *Life and Communitarianism: A North Korea Juche Perspective*, International Conference on Peace for Life in North East Asia, Korea Christian Faculty Fellowship, 15-19 May 2005 at Roman Catholic Retreat Centre, Uiwang, Korea, p. 2.

In sum, the core idea of Juche is thoroughly based on a human-centred view of the world from Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, as well as developed from ideas prevalent in the colonial period.

2. The Emergence of Juche in the Korean Peninsula

The term Juche was initially used as a term supporting Korean independence against foreign powers in the Korean Peninsula.

First of all, it is necessary to review briefly the history of Korea during the last century; especially the division of the North and the South in 1945, in order to understand the origin of Juche ideology in the Korea Peninsula, and to demonstrate the significance of the concept of Juche, of self-reliance and self-determination. Korea's modern socio-political history, marked by the interventions of foreign powers in Korea, has been one of the most influential factors in the emergence of Juche ideology. The Korean people's desire for self-reliance became extremely strong as the Japanese rule tightened its grip on the nation, disregarding the needs of the Korean people. During the oppressive period of the 1930s and 1940s, Juche or the spirit of independence became a socio-political concept.²⁰⁰

The world powers made the Korean Peninsula their arena of competition, agreeing that Japan occupied Chosen, that is, Korea. When Korea was finally annexed by Japan in 1910, some Koreans committed suicide to express their ultimate spirit of independence as people of Korea, an independent country from Japan. The Korean people's struggle to regain their country's political independence from Japan continued throughout the whole occupation period. One very distinctive example of

²⁰⁰ Kim Seok-hyang, *The Juche Ideology of North Korea: Sociopolitical Roots of Ideological Chang*, 1993, University of Georgia, PhD Thesis, pp. 18-23. Thomas J. Belke, *Op.Cit.*, p. 168.

this struggle was Korea's Declaration of Independence on 1 March 1919. The declaration, proclaimed by 33 national leaders who were largely Christian and Tonghak, stated as follows: "We herewith proclaim the independence of Korea and the liberty of the Korean people. We tell the world to witness the equality of all nations and we pass it on to posterity as their inherent right...The old world of force is gone and the new world of righteousness and truth is here."²⁰¹ All the 33 leaders voluntarily subjected themselves to arrest after the declaration. Massive demonstrations broke out all over Korea, and Korean flags were displayed openly. This was a shock for the Japanese people because the whole incident broke out at the very height of Japanese military rule. The Japanese people expected that Koreans would become obedient after a decade of the militant occupation. Numerous Korean people were killed, beaten, burned to death, arrested, tortured, imprisoned, executed, or forced to leave their own country permanently.²⁰²

Organizations, mostly secret groups, were formed among Koreans to fight for the country's independence. Though most of them were independent of one another, these organizations almost unanimously supported the Korean Provisional Government-in-Exile. In April 1919, immediately after the declaration, the Korean Provisional Government had been established in China. In December 1941, it declared war on Japan. During the Pacific War, the Korean army under the provisional government fought along with the Chinese army against the Japanese army.²⁰³

The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of China had a conference in Cairo, Egypt in November 1943. Japan's future after the war was one of the main issues of the conference. This was a historically significant meeting for

²⁰¹ Cho Chung-kyung, *Korea Tomorrow: Land of the Morning Calm*, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1961, p. 176.

²⁰² Kim Seok-hyang, *Op. Cit.*, p. 21.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

Korea, because the future of Korea after the war was discussed for the first time. Delegations from the three countries agreed to grant Korea its liberation without further specification. In February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, the United States proposed a multi-power trusteeship and the Soviet Union concurred. No further commitments were made at the meeting. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had another meeting in Potsdam in July 1945 where they decided to divide Korea into two regions, North and South, 38 degrees north latitude being the dividing line. "For purposes of military operations," reads a later statement of James Byrnes, U.S. Secretary of State, "the occupation of Korea was divided north and south of latitude 38 into Soviet and American areas"²⁰⁴.

A few days before Japan surrendered, on 2 August 1945, 125,000 troops of the Soviet Union under Colonel General Ivan Chistyakov entered the northern part of Korea. On 8 September, 72,000 U.S. troops, under Lieutenant General John R. Hedge, landed in the southern part of Korea.²⁰⁵ In December 1945, delegations from the three countries met in Moscow and decided to put Korea under a UN trusteeship for the following five years which would have been "a provisional step for Korea to prepare to rule its own territory as an independent country."

The Korean people took a stand against the trusteeship, they expressed their desire by using the concept of *Juche* or the spirit of independence which opposed outsiders who deemed Koreans as not mature enough to rule a country by themselves. The idea of a trusteeship was directly opposed to the Korean people's wish for their future. In no time, massive demonstrations broke out all over the Korean peninsula. Demonstrators insisted that Korea should have its political independence back after the long period of Japanese occupation, and that Koreans must never give it up again.

²⁰⁴ Cho Chung-kyung, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 184.

²⁰⁵ Kim Seok-hyang, *Op. Cit.*, p. 23.

The demonstrations were so serious that the decision was withdrawn by the same international delegation almost immediately. As Koreans protested against the trusteeship, the word Juche or the spirit of independence could be heard repeatedly in the Korean Peninsula.

In short, the concept or the word Juche itself was first used in protest against the world powers who interfered with the establishment of an independent country in the Korean Peninsula. However, the intent behind the use of Juche changed in accordance with the socio-political circumstances in North Korea.

3. The Emergence of Socio-Political Juche in North Korea

Juche emerged from the result of two socio-political experiences in North Korea. On the one hand, Juche was a reaction to past political subjugation, economic dependence, and the need for military assistance from China and the former Soviet Union, which impacted on the North Korean people's consciousness. On the other hand, Juche was a product of struggle for political power in North Korea. These two elements combined to create a state ideology following the communist history in the North.

Initially, Kim Il-sung's political power as leader of North Korea was unstable. First, people were suspicious of him. Everybody knew about the great hero, who fought bravely against the Japanese occupation, but people did not know what he looked like.²⁰⁶ Consequently, the authenticity of Kim Il-sung's identity was widely questioned in the public sphere. According to Nam Koon-woo, if Kim had not had the Soviet Union's support, he might never have become a political leader in North

²⁰⁶ Suh Dae-sook, *Hyeondae Bukhanui Jidoja (The present North Korea Leader: Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il)*, Seoul: Eulyu Munhwa Sa, 2000, p. 61.

Korea.²⁰⁷

Second, Kim Il-sung, who had many political rivals, removed some significant political opponents and eliminated the native communist group. Nevertheless, the political situation was not yet totally favourable for him because the two political groups in the ruling party and in the government still identified themselves either as Soviet returnees or Yenan Koreans,²⁰⁸ rather than as Kim Il-sung's followers. They did criticize Kim Il-sung's policies.²⁰⁹ Most importantly, in terms of the background of the political powers, they relied on foreign powers, that is, the Soviet Union and China.

Third, Kim Il-sung's economic policy for the post-war reconstruction was controversial. On the one hand, he promoted heavy industry, disregarding the fact that Korea did not have enough resources to sustain a heavy industry. He presented a basic policy of economic reconstruction as soon as the Korean War ended. The main goal of the policy was "the priority development of heavy industry with the simultaneous development of light industry and agriculture."²¹⁰ However, for the North Korean people the practical meaning of the policy was the development of heavy industry without importing foods, consumer goods, and the necessary production facilities because North Korea had virtually no production facilities due to the Korean War. In other words, this policy was not feasible unless Kim Il-sung's regime could force people to produce more and consume less at the same time. Understandably, the policy met with widespread dissatisfaction among the public and Kim Il-sung's rivals

²⁰⁷ Nam Koon-woo, *The North Korean Communist Leadership, 1945-1965: A Study of Factionalism and Political Consolidation*, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1974, p. 15, Suh Dae-sook, *Kim Il-sung: The North Korean Leader*, *Op.Cit.*, p. 61.

²⁰⁸ The Yenan group was a group of pro-China communists in the North Korean government after the division of Korea, which was involved in a political power struggle with pro-soviet factions. However, Kim Il-sung eventually defeated the two factions. See, Dae-sook Suh, *Hyeondae Bukhanui Jidoja*, *Op.Cit.*, pp.59-68.

²⁰⁹ Suh Dae-sook, *Hyeondae Bukhanui Jidoja*, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 93-122.

²¹⁰ Nam Koon-woo, *Op.Cit.*, p. 101, Dae-sook Suh, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 139-140.

blamed him for its failure.

The promotion of heavy industry was coupled by the nationalization of small farms and private businesses which Kim Il-sung launched in early 1954. In fact, he had already nationalized big farms and businesses during the Democratic Reform (1945-1948). The nationalization of small business and farms was the last step in the establishment of the socialist economic system. Kim's regime was especially eager to mobilize small farmers to join the cooperative farm movement.²¹¹ The availability of food was the most urgent matter after the war. However, Kim Il-sung's hasty mobilization eventually turned out to be a serious source of resistance among the small farmers, who were once his main support.

The Soviet returnees argued that the cooperative farm movement was moving too swiftly compared to the Soviet Union's 1920-30 revolution, and it needed to be slowed down. The Yanan Koreans also argued that Mao's China compensated those who voluntarily joined the nationalization movement, and argued that Kim's regime should do the same thing for its small farmers.²¹² From their point of view, Kim's mandatory policy, without proper compensation, did not take into account the people's wellbeing.

The important point here was that the Soviet returnees and the Yanan Koreans not only criticized Kim's policy of nationalization but also highlighted the deterioration of Kim's formerly well-managed relationship with farmers and workers. Considering the regime's limited popularity, this was a serious threat to Kim and his followers.

Finally, internationally, after the death of Stalin during the aftermath of the Korean War (1950-1953), the de-Stalinization movement started to rage within the Soviet Union. Criticism of Kim Il-sung was growing in North Korea because Stalin had

²¹¹ Kim Seok-hyang, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 46-48.

²¹² Suh Dae-sook, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 123-138. Kim Seok-hyang, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 48-49.

helped Kim Il-sung seize power and Kim failed to win the Korean War.²¹³ These added a heightened sense of instability to Kim Il-sung's rule.

In sum, the domestic socio-political and international circumstances led Kim Il-sung to face criticism from the Soviet returnees and the Yanan Koreans for failing to secure popular support, for his rushed nationalization movement and his enthusiasm for heavy industry.

3.1. The Official Emergence of Juche

Kim Il-sung was alert enough to separate people in North Korea from his opponent groups and gave a flat warning to those inner-party factions in a plenum of April 1955. Kim stressed that both the Soviet returnees and the Yanan Koreans had to realize that they were already in North Korea, which means North Korea was, according to Kim, neither the Soviet Union nor China. On 28 December 1955, Kim gave a speech, entitled "*On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche In Ideological Work*," to the propagators of the ruling Korean Workers' Party.²¹⁴

Most importantly, he used the word Juche for the first time in his speech.²¹⁵ He declared the idea of Juche as an indigenous expression of the Korean way of sovereignty and autonomy. Kim's speech set forth the core idea of national self-reliance and pride, emphasizing that a person without Juche is worthless; a state without Juche is a colony. Juche in this period is primarily directed against the political influence of the Soviet Union and China. The aim of the speech signalled the

²¹³ Suh Dae-sook, *Op.Cit.*, pp.101-106.

²¹⁴ Kim Il-sung, "Sasang Saeop-eseo Kyojojuui-wa Hyeongsikjuui-rul Twochihago ;Juche-rul Hwakrip-hal te Taehayeo" (On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work), in Paektu Yonguso, ed., *Juche Sasaug-ui Hyeongseong Kwajeong (The Process of the Formation of the Juche Idea)*, Seoul: Paektu, 1988, pp. 42-61.

²¹⁵ Suh Dae-Sook, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 305-309.

beginning of Kim's campaign to purge his political rivals, especially those in the Soviet and Chinese factions of his party. Marxism-Leninism was regarded as imported and in contrast with the authentic communism. Ideographs such as formalism, dogmatism, and revisionism originated outside of North Korea. This formulation might have been influenced by the ideological battle between the Soviet Union and China that was going on around that time: The Soviet Union called China "dogmatist" in the early 1950s. China then called the Soviet Union 'revisionist.'²¹⁶

However, Cheong Seong-chang insists that North Korean leaders not only considered Stalinism the only and unique orthodox Marxist-Leninist line but emphasized that Juche ideology was just as "creative" in applying Stalin's version of Marxism-Leninism in the Korean context. According to him, Juche began acquiring independent albeit superficial features that distinguished it from the imported Stalinism and Kim Il-sung himself was claimed to be "the great Marxist-Leninist of our time" after the official emergence of Juche.²¹⁷ However, Shin Eun-hee maintains that the early ultra-nationalist quality of Juche served Kim's regime well during the Soviet-Chinese rivalry. According to Shin, Kim Il-sung not only strongly criticized the imitation of foreign ways which eventually led the people into a slavish culture but attempted to create a Korean nationalism in his own way.²¹⁸

Nevertheless, Cheong continues to insist that the understanding of even the nationalism of North Korea was influenced for a long time by the Stalinist.²¹⁹ According to him, the new Soviet constitution symbolized the restoration of the state in 1936 and the rehabilitation of the nation was another essential feature of Stalinism. Compared to Stalin, Kim Il-sung demonstrated even less flexibility in regard to the

²¹⁶ Suh Dae-Sook, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 93-122. Kim Seok-hyang, *Op.Cit.*, p. 51.

²¹⁷ Cheong Seong-chang, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 138-139.

²¹⁸ Shin Eun-hee, *Op.Cit.*, p. 2.

²¹⁹ Cheong Seong-chang, *Op. Cit.*, p. 143.

problems of the state and the dictatorship of the proletariat.²²⁰ In addition, according to him, the first amendment to the official definition of ‘nation’ in North Korea was made when “shared bloodline” was added to the list of elements that constitute the nation.²²¹ This indicates that North Korea regarded itself as a homogenous nation.

It is obvious that there is a debate on origins of the the Juche ideology, Cheong placing much emphasis on the influence of Stalinism upon the emergence of Juche ideology while Shin emphasising the Korean nationalism Kim created. Kim Il-sung proposed the Juche ideology officially first in order to eliminate the political rivals and ideologies of foreign powers. As a result, a monolithic ideological system inside the Korean Workers’ Party was created, leaving no room for those who believed in any alternative. After Kim Il-sung had established the ideological system inside the party, his son, Kim Jong-il significantly developed and reinforced it.

4. The Development of Juche Ideology

Following the normalization of relations between South Korea and Japan in 1965 the content of Juche changed dramatically. In accordance with the analysis of Nodong Sinmun in Kim Seok-hyang’s thesis, the annual number of articles on Juche in North Korea dramatically increased between 1965 to 1970,²²² which resulted from the following fact among others: when Park Chung-hee’s regime (1961-1979) and his

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 142-143.

²²² Annual Number of Articles on Juche 1952-1970 in Nodong Sinmun.

Year	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70
Number	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	16	19	62	34	81

Years before 1956 had no article on Juche. The number suddenly dropped from 62 in 1968 to 34 in 1969 in spite of the fact that it bounded back up to 81 in 1970. The reason was that the year of 1969 brought a certain change in North Korean political domain. About ten of the partisan generals quietly disappeared from the public scene, who were not only high party officials but also key members of Kim’s anti-Japanese querrilla unit in the 1930s. See, Suh Dae-sook, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 238-242. Kim Seok-hyang, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 68, 69-92.

ministries signed a treaty with Japan in 1965, North Korea interpreted the treaty as a sellout of the southern half of the Korean Peninsula to Japan and demonstrated that Park Chung-hee could not be self-reliant (e.g. Juche) unlike Kim Il-sung. The treaty also reinforced the belief of North Korea that they could only count on themselves. In order to remain an independent power, Kim Il-sung expressed the urgent need for more workers, including women.²²³ Juche ideology was recruited once again in order to mobilize the nation in the quest for economic and political self-reliance independent of foreign influence. From 1970 to 1980s, according to Shin Eun-hee, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il made Juche a more distinct ideology and philosophy, different from the Marxist-Leninist social ideology in spite of the fact that the initial meaning of Juche as a political ideology remains a philosophy of pre-war Korean humanism.

In spite of the fact that there is a debate between Chang and Shin regarding the origin of the philosophical foundations of Juche ideology, it is clear that diplomatic development between South Korea and Japan impacted on the reinforcement of Juche ideology in North Korea, which made Juche not simply a political ideology but a philosophy of North Korea. This philosophical shift will be described in the next section. The philosophical underpinnings of Juche followed the treaty between South Korea and Japan, just as the evangelising crusades of South Korean Christians followed the 7.4 agreement of 1972.

4.1. Juche Ideology of Kim Jong-il

As shown in section 2 of this chapter Juche originally applied to the whole of the Korea people. Once the South was seen to be betraying this principle by making

²²³ Suh Dae-sook, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 242-243.

peace with Japan, Kim Jong-il restricted loyalty to the North Korea state and its leaders only.

Kim Jong-il, in his book *On the Juche Idea*, points out that the philosophical principle of the Juche ideology is that man is the master of everything and decides everything.²²⁴ The four socio-historical principles of the Juche idea are as follows: 1) the masses of the people are the subject of social history, 2) human history is the history of the people's struggle for *chajusong* (independence), 3) the socio-historical movement is a creative movement of the popular masses, 4) the people's consciousness of independence plays the decisive role in revolutionary struggle. These are called "philosophical and socio-historical principles" by Kim Jong-il.

The three guiding principles of the Juche idea are as follows: 1) the stand on independence must be maintained; Juche in ideology, independence in politics, self-sufficiency in the economy and self-reliance in defence, 2) creative methods should be applied, depending on the popular masses and appropriate for the actual situation, 3) the main stress should be placed on ideology, giving priority to ideological remoulding and giving precedence to political work.²²⁵

The high regard for "human being" and "the masses" was applied not to the individual, but the community. Kim Jong-il describes the leader, the party and the masses in his theory of the socio-political organism of Juche ideology as structurally one body.

The core of this theory of socio-political organism is that the leader, the party and the masses share one inseparable integrity. First, the leader is understood as the brain of the organism which controls all thoughts and activities. Next, the party functions like blood vessels in the body to deliver the leader's guidance from the centre. It is the

²²⁴ Kim Jong-il, *Kim Jong-il On The Juche Idea*, *Op.Cit.*, p. 9.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-71.

nervous tissue of the organism. Finally, the masses, i.e. the people, who are the subject of revolution, receive life through their loyalty to the leader. As the body they faithfully carry out their duties.²²⁶The instructions of the leader provide the North Koreans with criteria for their thinking and acting. Paradoxically, the most unique characteristic of the North Koreans was their loyalty to Kim Il-sung.

A noble revolutionary spirit to fight for the freedom and liberation of the people, boundless loyalty to the party and the leader, a peerless self-sacrificing spirit and mass heroism which are expressed in willingly giving up one's youth and life for the sake of the country and revolution, revolutionary comradeship between men and officers, their inseparable links with the people, and voluntary military discipline—these are the characteristics of politico-ideological superiority peculiar to a people's army, a revolutionary army.²²⁷

According to this logic, the only genuine subjects of North Korean politics were the party and the leader, while the masses merely represented the object of their politics. In other words, the “philosophical and socio-historical principles” of Juche ideology can be understood as a proposal addressed to the “popular masses” to automatically participate in the campaigns set up by the party and the leader.

This can then be taken as a fundamental substitution of the dictatorship of the party for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Such distinctive features of the Juche ideology demonstrate that the proletariat is subject to the party and its leader. This, importantly, may represent “the supreme and most insidious exercise of power”²²⁸ if it prevents the North Korean people from even considering discontentment by so shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences that acceptance is unquestioned. In this way, they accept their role in the existing order of things because they see it as

²²⁶ Suh Dae-sook, *Hyeondae Bukhanui Jidoja*, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 210-216.

²²⁷ Kim Jong-il, *Kim Jong-il On The Juche Idea*, pp. 61-62.

²²⁸ Steven Lukes, *Op.Cit.*, p. 28.

natural and unchangeable. There is no way for the North Korean people to accept anything other than their loyalty to the leaders on the ground of the philosophical and socio-historical principle of Juche ideology.

In sum, the philosophical Juche ideology moulded the North Korean people into one inseparable integrity in order to strengthen loyalty toward the leaders of North Korea, causing them to act and think automatically in accordance with the system of integrity. The next section will go on to describe ideological remoulding in order to show how it encouraged the North Korean people to hate their enemies as means of strengthening their integrity.

4.2. Ideological Remoulding

The theory of ideological remoulding is one of many theories which form the basis of society of North Korea, significantly impacting on the lifestyle of North Koreans and on the formation of “no space for otherness.” According to Kim Jong-il, his major revolutionary task in modelling the whole society on Juche ideology caused him to set the objective of revolutionizing all members of society for the purpose of transforming them into communist human beings of a Juche type.²²⁹

The transforming of human beings in essence means ideological remoulding because thoughts define a human being’s worth and quality. Ideological remoulding is more difficult than changing people’s conditions of material life or the enhancement of their cultural and technical standards. It is a struggle to eliminate the remnants of the old society and arm all the working people with North Korea’s communist ideology. The most important goal of ideological remoulding is the establishment of a

²²⁹ Kim Jong-il, *Op.Cit.*, p. 70.

revolutionary world view: what the Party members and working people in North Korea should possess is the Juche outlook whose core is loyalty to the party and the leader and hatred of the enemy. According to Kim Jong-il, those who display burning hatred for the enemies of the revolution become genuine revolutionaries themselves.²³⁰ Kim Chang-ha, a North Korean writer, wrote *The Immortal Juche Ideology*, dealing with the ideological remoulding.

The behaviour of all men are (sic) dictated by their ideological consciousness. Whether a man acts the patriot or the quisling is determined by his ideological consciousness. Those who love the country and the people will be patriots, whereas those who have no thought of the country and the people but only seek a life of comfort will turn traitors.²³¹

Ideological consciousness based on binary thought classifies people into only two types: patriots and traitors, genuine revolutionaries and enemies. There seem to be no intermediate possibilities. It is all or nothing; you are either with me or against me. That kind of extreme thinking is used in wars for dehumanizing other people or those who are different from us. Kim Jong-il says whether one has a correct outlook on the revolution or not is revealed particularly at a time of severe trials.²³² According to his book entitled *Kim Jong-il On The Juche Philosophy*, there are three ways to strengthen true revolutionaries in North Korea: revolutionary studying, revolutionary organizational life and revolutionary practice.

There are three processes underlying the formation of a communist revolutionary with a correct revolutionary outlook. Studying equips people with revolutionary ideologies, theories, strategy and tactics. The revolutionary organizational life means

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

²³¹ Kim Chang-ha, *The Immortal Juche Idea*, Pyongyang: FLP, 1984, p. 270.

²³² Kim Jong-il, *Op.Cit.*, p. 73.

the training of people to be ardent communists in the crucible of ideological struggle. Revolutionary practice makes a revolutionary hardened ideologically and in will power who in turn acquires revolutionary qualities and traits. In the course of class struggle people heighten their class consciousness, become able to tell friend from foe correctly and acquire an uncompromising fighting spirit against class enemies.²³³

The more the Party members and working people of North Korea are trained through revolutionary studying, revolutionary organizational life and revolutionary practice, the more they become revolutionary fighters who view people dichotomously as either friend or foe. One Christian *Saeteoin* explains that “North Korea’s logic is one of black and white. North Koreans must hate bad things and must take revenge on enemies ten million times. The brain of the North Korean is filled with the logic of black and white so they can never accept diversity and strangers.”²³⁴

Furthermore, Juche ideology is considered as politico-ideologically superior to the imperialist war while the North Korean people are convinced that imperialism is a continual source of war. This conviction leads them to identify themselves as revolutionaries to counter the imperialist war of aggression.²³⁵

In fact, in order to defeat imperialism, North Korea set up an all-people, all-nation defence system, arming all the people, fortifying the whole country with the cadre army and modernizing the whole of the army: as the DPRK Constitution puts it: “arming the populace and turning the entire country into a fortress.” In a citizenry of 23 million, one million are in the military, six million in the reserves, and almost all adult men and women have significant military experience.²³⁶

²³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 70-74.

²³⁴ Interview with CS05, Seoul, 12 December 2006.

²³⁵ Kim Jong-il, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 59-60.

²³⁶ Bruce Cumings, *North Korea*, New York and London: The New Press, 2004, p. 1.

That indicates that the North Koreans have been educated to identify themselves as fighters and armed revolutionaries. Juche ideology has helped the North Korean people maintain hostility not only against the Japanese and the United States, outsider powers but also against South Korea.

The ideological remoulding resulted in a dichotomous view of people: patriots versus traitors or friend versus foe. North Koreans are trained as fighters against enemies such as the United States, Japan and South Korea, creating no room for accepting persons of these three nations. This finds an echo in the attitude of these nations, especially South Korea, towards both North Korea and Juche ideology, ignoring the fact (though admittedly with more choices) that all systems of education limit perceptions of self and otherness.

5. Juche Ideology and Christianity

“North Korea achieved to become a nation of monotheism.”²³⁷

The socio-political Juche ideology has a religious character; in particular, Kim Il-sung irreversibly committed himself to the transformation of Juche from a Marxist-Leninist ideology into a new embryonic religion. In this section I will investigate how the religious character of Juche ideology emerged.

It is useful to understand why North Korea put its people in quarantine from the world. There were at least three important socio-political factors that affected Kim Il-sung’s regime during the 1980s and early 1990s. First, this era was marked by a long-term economic stagnation in North Korea. The structure of Juche functioned to articulate some immediate socio-political issues including the economic slowdown for

²³⁷ Bamber Gascoigne, *The Christians*, New York: William Morrow & Co., 1977, p. 290. Thomas J. Belke, *Op.Cit.*, p. 88.

the North Korean people, providing them with a significant motivation for hard work. They had become used to the non-competitive economic system that Kim Il-sung's regime manufactured for a long time. However, the North Korean economy was slowing from the late 1960s,²³⁸ which made Kim Il-sung mobilize the people by providing another type of motivation. Second, the international system underwent profound changes from the late 1980s. The Soviet Union disintegrated into fifteen separate countries and the demise of the bipolar structure signalled the end to the Cold War.²³⁹ These changes made North Korea promote strong national solidarity. Third, Kim Il-sung needed to give Kim Jong-il heirship. In particular, the issue of Kim Jong-il's heirship seemed another motive for Kim's regime to develop a facet of Juche ideology,²⁴⁰ and Kim Jong-il himself assumed a significant role in the Juche theory of revolution.

In these circumstances, North Korea needed something stronger than before in order to integrate the North Korean people and to mobilize them. It is interesting that Juche ideology was newly associated with "our style of socialism"²⁴¹ in 1991, considering the ever-growing economic gap between the North and South. "The superiority of our style of socialism" has been constantly emphasized since then. Wherever I visited in North Korea, I found the slogan "The superiority of our style of socialism" written on the streets or on the walls inside or outside of buildings.

The very notion of "ours is superior" may function as a foundation for the North Korean people to maintain self-pride in a situation of economic slowdown, especially compared to the South Koreans' remarkable economic progress. The well-established

²³⁸ Kim Seok-hyang, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 136-139.

²³⁹ The Cold War Museum, "Fall of the Soviet Union", <http://www.coldwar.org>, accessed 07 October 2008.

²⁴⁰ Kim Seok-hyang, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 139-145.

²⁴¹ Suh Dae-sook, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 277-280.

Juche strongly supported the notion of “the superiority of our society” by manufacturing a contrasting characterization between the North and the South. Viewed from the notion, I heard it several times from those whom I met in North Korea that North Korea was a society that sticks to each person’s political independence whereas South Korea was a corrupted society of the rich-get-richer and the poor-get-poorer. In spite of the fact that the notion of “the superiority of our society” does not seem to be related to the religious aspect of Juche ideology, it signalled the change toward a religious ideology of deification with both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il as its heart, indeed its saviour.

5.1. Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il’s Encounter with Christianity

It is necessary here to consider the experiences of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in order to understand links between Juche ideology and Christianity.

Kim Il-sung was born in Mangyongdae²⁴² on 15 April 1912 as the eldest son of Kim Hyong-jik and Kang Pan-sok. His father seemed to be a Christian because, according to Kim Il-sung’s reminiscences, he had attended Soongsil Middle School where the Bible was taught and had many Christian friends whom Kim Il-sung had opportunities to meet.²⁴³ His mother’s father was an elder of a church and she was his second daughter and a Christian. Her first name *Pan-sok* is unusual in Korea because it came from Peter’s nickname,²⁴⁴ meaning ‘the rock.’ This implies that Kim Il-sung grew up in a Christian family. Moreover, he attended a church which his mother would go to in Songsan in Northern Korea. He recalled in his book that her mother often dozed off

²⁴² Situated in Mangyongdae-dong, Mangyongdae district about 12 Kilometres west of the heart of Pyongyang.

²⁴³ Kim Il-sung, *Kim Il Sung With the Century*, vol. 1., Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1992, pp. 106-107.

²⁴⁴ Park Won, *Hankukgidonkgyo Paeknyeosa (100 Years of Korean Christianity)*, vol.4., Seoul, Jomunchulpansa, 1971, p. 347.

during prayers and he would shake her to tell her that the prayer was over when she did not wake even after the amen.²⁴⁵

Furthermore, he received great help from Rev. Son Jong-do while in prison in China. He visited Rev. Son Jong-do's house to express his gratitude after he was released in 1929.²⁴⁶ According to his reminiscences, he frequently went to the chapel in which Rev. Song worked as a minister in order to play the organ and guide the activities of the choir as a director.²⁴⁷ He confessed that "the minister loved me as if I were his own son."²⁴⁸ It is obvious that Kim Il-sung experienced and learnt about Christianity: whether he was baptised is unclear. He says that his father was an atheist and that even his mother did not believe in God despite attending Sunday service. He also confesses that he seldom went to church because he became tired of the tedious religious ceremony and the monotonous preaching of the minister.²⁴⁹

Nevertheless, he received a great deal of humanitarian assistance from Christians even though he insists that he was not affected by religion. Yet he took that faith to some extent as a yardstick, stating: "I do not think that the spirit of Christianity which preaches universal peace and harmony contradicts my idea of advocating an independent life for man."²⁵⁰

It is said that Kim Jong-il was affected by Kim Il-sung's attitude toward Christianity, in terms of the relationship between the two leaders. He mentioned briefly in his article titled *Juchesasangui Kibone Daehae* (About the Basis of Juche Idea) that "*su-ryong* (leader or head) did not denounce religions and its believers but only the machination of imperialists who abuse religions. Religion is not totally

²⁴⁵ Kim Il-sung, *Kim Il Sung With the Century*, vol. 1., *Op.Cit.*, p. 107.

²⁴⁶ Kim Il-sung, *Kim Il Sung With the Century*, vol. 2., Pyongyang: PFLP, 1992, p. 4.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁴⁹ Kim Il-sung, *Kim Il Sung With the Century*, vol. 1., *Op.Cit.*, pp. 106-107.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.107.

wrong but has good elements. It is good to teach that human beings love each other and live in peace.”²⁵¹

These indicate that the experiences of Christianity of both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il could have influenced the development of religious Juche ideology.

5.2. Similarities Between Juche Ideology and Christianity²⁵²

Kim Byoung-lo points out three common essential elements of religions: doctrines, rituals and community.²⁵³ In the case of North Korea, Juche ideology satisfies all the three essential religious requirements: 1) doctrines of deification of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, provided by the two Kim’s writings, teachings, and on-the-spot guidance; 2) enshrined rituals and behaviour patterns concerning the veneration of these two leaders; 3) one inseparable integrity of the leader, the party and the masses as one socio-political organism. Indeed, despite the fact that Juche ideology does not seem to be deeply rooted in religion, Kim Jong-il and the deceased Kim Il-sung are effectively worshipped as God incarnate in the Juche religion.²⁵⁴

Immortality

North Korean people believe that Kim Il-sung will be with them forever, giving his followers eternal life: he, as God in Christianity, is immortal. Human beings are not naturally immortal, immortality belonging to God alone (1 Tim 6:16).²⁵⁵ With

²⁵¹ Kim Jong-il, *Juchesasangui Kibone Daehae* (About the Basic of Juche Idea), p. 53.

²⁵² Some scholars argue that Juche ideology resembles Confucianism. However, this study focus on similarities between Juche ideology and Christianity.

²⁵³ Kim Byoung-lo, *Bokhansahoeui Jonggyoseong: Juchesasanggwa Gidokgyoui Jongguoyangshik Biguo* (Religion of the Society of North Korea: A Comparative Study of Religious Way between Christianity and Juche Idea), Seoul: Institute of Unification, 2000, p. 1.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 83. Kim Byoung-lo, Op.Cit., p. 3.

²⁵⁵ Sinclair B. Ferguson, David F. Wright, ed., *New Dictionary of Theology*, Leicester: Inter-

North Korea's 1998 revised constitution, the late Great Leader Kim Il-sung, after his death, was anointed "eternal President of the Republic."²⁵⁶ I observed at various places in North Korea the slogan "*Kimilsung Dongjineun Uriwa Yongwonhui Gyesida*" (Comrade Kim Il-sung is with us forever).

Salvation

"Kim Il-sung is indeed the saviour who revived our nation and led the Korean people in a sacred revolutionary struggle."²⁵⁷ The religious Juche ideology holds that North Korea's ultimate salvation will arrive after Kim Jong-il has brought about the eventual defeat of their enemies: the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Spreading Juche across the world will mark the subsequent arrival of paradise on earth.²⁵⁸ In other words, the two leaders are saviours who have defeated the enemies of North Korea, bringing salvation to North Korea and paradise. Moreover, the arrival of paradise will be on earth when Juche spreads across the world. This is clearly a millennial movement with Kim Jong-il and his father as Messiahs.

In Christian theology, 'salvation' is the most widely used word to express the provision of God for our human plight. It can be used for any kind of situation in which a human being is delivered from enemies (Ps. 44:7) or from some danger etc. In particular, in the Old Testament the verb 'save' expresses God's actions in delivering his people. In this sense, there is strong if restricted similarity between Juche and Christianity, although in the New Testament, the sense of rescue or deliverance is still uppermost, but the reference is to deliverance from sin (Rom. 5:9-

Varsity press, 1973, p. 230.

²⁵⁶ DPRK'S Socialist Constitution.

²⁵⁷ Kim Jong-il, "On Establishing the Juche Outlook on the Revolution," Jong-il Kim, *On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea*, Pyongyang: FLPH, 1995, p. 203.

²⁵⁸ Paul French, *North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula-a Modern History*, London: Zed Books, 2007, p. 49.

10).²⁵⁹ This is not found in religious Juche ideology. It would be interesting to explore further the extent to which the premillennial leanings of Youngnak Presbyterian Church echo this aspect of Juche ideology. On the one hand, as described in the previous chapter, Youngnak Presbyterian Church is very much influenced by premillennial ideology with a belief that spreading the Gospel and defeating Communism by means of the “National Evangelical Campaign” will lead Korea to become a good Christian nation, in the expectation that there will be only Christianity in the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, religious Juche ideology has also strong premillennial ideology with a belief that after Kim Jong-il defeats all his enemies, paradise on earth will arrive, in the expectation that there will be only communists on earth. Both appear to have a premillennial and messianic tendency.

Eternal life

The leader is likened to the brain and heart of an individual person, the Korean Workers Party as the leader’s organization is likened to the backbone and blood vessels, and the masses, i.e. populace to the body. In terms of this theory, the leader gives the masses life. It is eternal life or immortal life of socio-political organization as Kim Jong-il describes:

Great Leader Kim Il-sung clarified for the first time in history that there is *eternal socio-political life* distinct from the physical life of the individual. Just as a man’s brain is the centre of his life, the leader is the top brain in the socio-political community because he is the focal point which directs the organism...we must understand that and believe that the leader is the centre of life of the socio-political community and it is only when we are linked to the leader organizationally, ideologically, and as comrades can we acquire *eternal socio-political life*. Uniting around the leader into one organization with a single ideology...the masses form a socio-political organism which

²⁵⁹ Sinclair B. Ferguson, David F. Wright, ed., *Op.Cit.*, p. 610.

is eternal as an independent being. The physical life of a person is finite, but the life of the masses rallied as an independent organism is eternal.²⁶⁰

The eternal socio-political life is given to those who are in a strong relationship with and united with the leader. This is similar to Christianity. In the biblical view, eternal life means ‘the life of the age to come,’ it implies not only everlastingness but a quality of life derived from relationship with Christ (Rom. 6:23; Jn. 17:3).²⁶¹

In terms of the similarity of these doctrines of immortality, salvation and eternal life, it can be viewed that the religious character of Juche ideology has echoes of Christianity which may derive from it, given the background and experiences of Christianity of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.

Rituals

Juche ideology has unique ritual such as Sun Day, Kim Il-sung’s birthday and the practice of Juche Era, Kim-Il-sung’s birthplace etc.

First of all, when Juche ideology became a religion, Kim’s 1955 speech faded into insignificance together with his guerrilla past activities in the 1930s. Instead, Mangyongdae, a small village near Pyongyang, where Kim Il-sung was born in 1912 was defined as a special place. Kim Il-sung’s birthplace became the birthplace of Juche and subsequently became a holy site. When I visited Mangyongdae, I heard the following from a North Korean female guide in 2007: “this is the place where our leader Kim was born and grew up for the future of our fatherland. Many foreign visitors and North Koreans visited Mangyongdae to learn about the root of Juche ideology.” Kim Il-sung began to transform Juche ideology into a personality cult to

²⁶⁰ Kim Jong-il, “On Some Problems of Education in the Juche Idea,” Kim Jong-il, *On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea, Op.Cit.*, pp.156-157. Italics are mine.

²⁶¹ Sinclair B. Ferguson, David F. Wright, ed., *Op.Cit.*, p. 230.

strengthen his authority. This process culminated in Kim Il-sung declaring himself and his family to be divine.

Kim Il-sung's deification was a long-term process. In spite of the fact that it is difficult to identify an exact line of demarcation, the full-scale deification of Kim Il-sung seems to have started around 1966, when his birthday was made a national holiday.²⁶² 15 April is the most important public holiday in North Korea, and is commemorated as the "*Taeyangjeol*" ("*Day of the Sun*").

According to my interviewees, North Koreans celebrate Kim's birthday with extra food rations and new clothes, gifts given by both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. This is analogous with the Christmas tradition of giving gifts to loved ones, though that exchange usually assumes both donor and recipient are alive. Furthermore, North Korean people consider 1912 to be the first year of Juche Era since Kim Il-sung was born in 1912.²⁶³ Kim Il-sung's birthday marks North Korea's indigenous modification of Anno Domini: the year of the Lord Kim Il-sung. North Korean computation of time and date is based on the eternal President's birthday. This calendar was used so extensively that I never once came across dates denoted according to the Christian calendar alone during my visits, contrary to South Korean practice.

Kim Il-sung's pictures and statues are another symbol of his successful deification. Everyone wore a portrait of the round-faced, unsmiling Kim Il-sung on a gold-framed, enamelled badge. Larger portraits and statues of the leaders were everywhere. Every room had a picture of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, implying a devotion which on the face of it seems much stronger than that of Christians.

²⁶² Suh Dae-sook, *Kim Il-sung: The North Korean Leader, Op.Cit.*, p.204.

²⁶³ Philo Kim, 'An Analysis of Religious Forms of Juche Ideology In Comparison With Christianity,' *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies* 11, no. 1, 2002, p. 128.

Community

The doctrines and rituals endow Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il with super-human and semi-divine attributes. Subsequently, there is a strong community termed the socio-political body or organism or the socio-political community, which strives for socio-political integrity and socio-political immortality.

According to Kim Jong-il, the North Korean socio-political body is familial.²⁶⁴

It is a true feature of our society that all its members form a large harmonious family. In our country, everyone regards and supports the leader as they would their own father. They trust and follow the Party, regarding its embrace as that of their own mother's. The leader, the Party and the people form one socio-political organism, and share the same destiny. The whole of the society overflows with communist morality.²⁶⁵

The society of North Korea is viewed as one big family led by a benevolent father to whom unconditional respect and gratitude are owed. *Su-ryong* is revered like parents by the whole society. Kim Jong-il says that

children love and respect their parents not because their parents are always superior to those of others or because the children receive benefits from them, but because the parents are benefactors of their lives who gave birth to them and have brought them up...All the communist revolutionaries of Korea have been accorded immortal political integrity by the fatherly leader...Therefore, the loyalty of our party members and working people to great leader is unconditional.²⁶⁶

This became crystallized to me as I sat in a restaurant watching a North Korean's performance singing. "...as your mother I am proud of my son keeping the big family

²⁶⁴ Some scholars argue that this familial aspect derives from Confucianism. See, Chan-II Ahn, *Juchesasangui Jongeon* (The End of Juche Ideology), Seoul: Eulyumunhwasa, 1997, pp. 223-288. Helgeson Geir, "Political Revolution in a Culture Continuum; Preliminary Observations on the North Korean Juche Ideology with its Intrinsic Cult of Personality," *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring-Summer, 1991, pp. 187-213. Shin Eun-hee, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 6-8.

²⁶⁵ Kim Jong-il, "Socialism as Science" *Carrying Forward the Juche Idea*, *Op.Cit.*, p. 409.

²⁶⁶ Jong-il Kim, "Socialism is a Science," *Nodong Shinmun*, November 1, 1994.

of our nation beyond a fence of a family...I am the happiest as my son is called to be a soldier of our leader...”²⁶⁷ One Korean scholar notes that “Nowhere in the history of political theory has this level of rationalization for collectivism been articulated.”²⁶⁸ It is possible for the North Korean people to perform the *Arirang* stadium spectacles or mass games in which tens of thousands of participants march and twirl in precise harmony. Thousands of persons lining the stadium bleachers lift colour placards in perfectly timed unison, displaying symbols of praise to Great Leader Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. It is clear that religious Juche ideology has created a large familial community which can be mobilized to praise their Leader. Thomas J. Belke stresses that North Korea is not a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship in which religious practices are virtually non-existent but Juche’s has approximately 23 million adherents who worship their visible and less visible leaders.²⁶⁹

Juche ideology as a religion leads the North Korean people to accept Kim Il-sung as divine. They value the instructions of the leader as divine, ordinances which are naturally to be obeyed. This is the expression of strong power in terms of Lukes’s concept: “they accept their role in the existing order of things because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial.”²⁷⁰

6. Influence of Juche on North Korean Life

All kinds of theories maintaining the current society of North Korea are based on the core of Juche ideology, impacting on the life style of the North Koreans. As the

²⁶⁷ Ha Chung-yoube, *The Visit to Pyongyang and the Observation of the Route of Escape’s Circumstance*, unpublished, 2007, pp. 23-24.

²⁶⁸ Han S. Park, *North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2002, p. 47.

²⁶⁹ Thomas J. Belke, *Op.Cit.*, p. 1.

²⁷⁰ Steven Lukes, *Op.Cit.*, p. 28.

supposed creation of Kim Il-sung himself, Juche has taken on defining roles in virtually every aspect of North Korean life.²⁷¹ Kim Jong-il is claimed to be the legitimate interpreter of the Juche system and its implementation in all areas of state function, for it applies in every possible area in North Korea: Juche education, Juche science, Juche medical science, Juche philosophy, Juche architecture, Juche farming methods, Juche poultry, Juche fisheries, Juche art, Juche movies, Juche literature, Juche gymnastics, and Juche athletics etc.

Every nation holds a socio-political ideology but its flavour is unique to each one of them. However, a crucial difference between Juche and most other religious systems at the present time is that Juche is proclaimed by the state as a monolithic value system whereby diverse interpretations of socio-political events are strictly prohibited.²⁷² Kim Jong-il explicitly proclaims that nothing except for Juche ideology can be tolerated in North Korea, and pluralism can never be acceptable.²⁷³ The monolithic doctrine of Juche ideology leaves little room for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. In the contemporary world, some Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia prohibit any other religious practices other than Islam. In European history, particular versions of Christianity were insisted upon, all other traditions being prohibited. 15th century Spain expelled all Jews and Muslims and so the insistence on total uniformity is not new. However, the capacity to demand and achieve uniformity is not common.

Suh Dae-sook points out that the political socialization process to indoctrinate the North Korean people with Juche ideology seems to have been so intense that a self-

²⁷¹ Yoo Young-ock, *The Unification Policy of Korean Peninsular*, Seoul Korea: Han Mun Publishing, Inc. 1996, p. 29.

²⁷² Han S. Park, *Op. Cit.*, p. 171.

²⁷³ Kim Jong-il, "The Historical Lesson in Building Socialism," *Carrying Forward the Juche Idea*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 299.

reliant attitude toward each other and the outside world appears to have become a part of the culture. The stronger they have been armed by Juche ideology, the more difficult they accept those who are socialized by other ideologies. The converse of this we shall see in the following chapter on the CW learning in South Korea.

It is not surprising that Juche ideology is such a pervasive part of North Korean life and thinking when one realizes the extent to which citizens are required to study and even memorize authoritative teachings and messages. Officially, North Koreans are on a daily schedule to work for eight hours, study messages sent by the authorities for eight hours and sleep for eight hours.²⁷⁴ Although this regimen may not be strictly followed by the average citizens, there is still a daily requirement for children and adults to have political study sessions in which Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il's works are read and discussed. Such study sessions begin at the kindergarten level and continue throughout the rest of one's life. In particular, Party-led weekly obligatory small group discussions are held either at work or in residential neighbourhoods that were called "Summation of All Daily Life" (*Saenghwal Chonghwar*) and "mutual or reciprocal self-criticism" (*Hosang Bipan*), through which the population would be kept on the correct path of revolutionary thought. All North Koreans have to conduct such reviews of their life once or twice a week, based on the instructions of the leader. As religions have sacred books, so North Koreans have the instructions of the leader which are used by them as criteria for their thinking and acting. Wherever I stayed at places in North Korea, I could see the core words of the instructions of the leader, which are either carved in stone or framed, in full view on the inside and outside of buildings in North Korea.

²⁷⁴ Kim Hak-joon, *Nature of the North Korean State*, Ilpyong ed., Two Koreas in Transition, Rockville, MD: The Washington Institute Press, 1998, p. 22.

6.1. The Power of Juche Ideology

It is clear that Juche is a mechanism by which the North Korean leadership maintains legitimacy and demands strict obedience from the people. The following example demonstrates the extent of loyalty felt by another person called Kim:

Kim's work unit decided to finish an electric railroad before the 15th of April, the birthday of the fatherly leader. A few days after the unit started to work, Kim had a sore finger on his right hand. Kim may have needed surgery for the finger. Kim's boss ordered him to rest and not to work. Nevertheless, Kim sneaked into the work place. The boss found Kim and scolded him for not resting. Kim replied, "I am doing what I really want to do. If I take a rest today, what would I say to the fatherly leader when my friends finish the electric railroad on the coming on 15 April and present their loyalty to the fatherly leader? Shall I report to the fatherly leader that I took rest because of my sore finger? You know I can not do that...Do not worry about me. I will find something I can do without using my finger." The boss was deeply touched by Kim's loyalty toward the Leader Kim and reluctantly permitted Kim to return to work. Then Kim pulled a cart, full of soil, up a steep slope by using his shoulder. This was the attitude of *Juin* who was full of the Juche blood.²⁷⁵

It was neither because they needed to earn money nor because someone forced them to work. They wished to work hard because they wanted to work for the fatherly leader Kim Il-sung. The North Koreans are obliged, and feel committed, to understand Juche, and think and act strictly in accordance with its requirements. Through the socialization, Juche ideology exercises power over the North Korean people leading them to obey the instruction of the leader automatically. It is the supreme exercise of power to secure the compliance of the North Korean people by controlling their thoughts and desires in the light of the three dimensional power of Steven Lukes: "A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or

²⁷⁵ Nodong Shimun, on the 31st of March 1975.

determining his very wants.”²⁷⁶ Thought control takes more mundane forms through the processes of socialization, he says, and the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent any conflict from arising in the first place.²⁷⁷

Conclusion

The hypothesis with which this chapter began is that the evolution of Juche ideology made the North Korean people act and think in accordance with the instructions of the leader who could mobilize them any time. In conclusion we must return to this hypothesis and ask whether or not it is confirmed by the evidence that has been examined that the evolution of Juche ideology led to a socio-political, philosophical and religious ideology. When the word or concept Juche first entered the common consciousness, it referred to the desire of the Korean people to become independent and self reliant as opposed to being subjected to outside political powers.

The socio-political characteristics of Juche ideology emerged officially in 1954 in order to strengthen Kim Il-sung’s political power, using it to purge his political rivals, in particular, Soviet returnees and Yanan Koreans who were dependent on foreign powers. It also eliminated ideologies of foreign Marxist powers such as formalism, dogmatism, and revisionism. As a result, a monolithic ideological system inside the Korean Workers’ Party was created, leaving no room for those who have other ideologies.

The philosophical aspects of Juche were developed and brought very clearly to the fore following South Korea’s establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan. Kim Jong-il declared North Korea to form one inseparable integrity consisting of a single

²⁷⁶ Steven Lukes, *Power; A Radical View*, Palgrave MacMilan, 2005, p. 27.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

socio-political organism instructed by the brain i.e. the leader who provides the North Koreans with criteria for their thinking and acting. This strengthens the hypothesis of this chapter, that Juche had become a quasi-religious system in the light of the working definition of James L. Cox: “*Religion is a varied, symbolic expression of that which people (the I-We) appropriately respond to as being of unrestricted value for them.*”²⁷⁸

In particular, it was shown that ideological remoulding significantly impacted on the life style of North Koreans: the leader of North Korea set the objective of revolutionizing all members of society for the purpose of transforming them into communist human beings of a Juche type. North Korean people learnt to distinguish friend from foe, and to maintain a burning hatred for their enemies such as Americans, Japanese and South Koreans.

In turning Juche ideology into religion, Juche ideology was proclaimed to originate from Mangyongdae where Kim Il-sung was born in 1912. Through the comparison of Juche ideology and Christianity, similarities in the doctrines of immortality, salvation and eternal life and in the community of the socio-political organism have been identified. In particular, eternal socio-political life is given to those who are firmly united with the leader in a strong relationship. The North Korean people are obliged to act, think and obey in accordance with the instructions of their Saviour in order to receive salvation from their leader.

In demonstration of the influence of Juche ideology on the North Korean life, all kinds of theories establishing the society of North Korea based on the core of Juche

²⁷⁸ James L. Cox, *Expressing The Sacred: A Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, Zimbabwe: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1992, p. 15. Italics are James L. Cox's. In his book, Cox summarized the definitions of religions which John Ferguson listed in five categories: theological, moral, philosophical, psychological and sociological definitions of religion. This is one of sociological definitions: “Religion, in this view, is described as a conservative force within society which defines the fundamental values of the group and then maintains and enforces those values by an appeal to supernatural powers.” See, *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

ideology impact on the formation of a patterned life style of the North Korean people. These not only made North Korea's system to be a monolithic ideological one but the features of Juche were used as criteria for the thinking and acting of its citizens, who, as far as can be ascertained, automatically follow the leader's instructions.

Conclusion to Part One

The purpose of Part One of this thesis was to describe the emergence and development of two contrasting ideologies, anti-communist ideology of the CW and Juche ideology of the CS, which influenced the formation of the ethnic identities of the two groups.

The anti-communist ideology of the CW began in Northern Korea as a reaction to the emergence of a serious anti-Christianity Movement of communists which was in turn related to the anti-missionary movement. The anti-missionary movement originally arose against these missionaries who rigidly adhered to a conservative faith which excluded socio-politic issues in the period of the Japanese occupation although there was an anti-missionary movement in China at the same time with a solely anti-Western orientation.

On the other hand, while the word Juche emerged after the liberation in 1945 as an expression of yearning for independence from foreign powers, socio-political Juche ideology emerged officially in 1954 to strengthen Kim Il-sung's power against his foreign backed rivals, developing into a fully-organized religio-philosophical system in the years following.

In considering the development of the two ideologies, Northwestern Conservative Christians were persecuted by communists and migrated to South Korea. Since then the anti-communist ideology of conservative CW developed further and was made

stronger by various factors: the suffering caused by communists in post-liberation years and during the Korean War. In particular, anti-communist education by the South Korean state and the national evangelical campaign continually strengthened the anti-communist ideology of the CW. Conversely, in North Korea, Juche ideology developed a philosophical aspect. Its main elements were the creation of one inseparable integrity through the concept of a socio-political organism which consists of the leader, the Party and the masses. Later on Juche transformed North Korea into a nation of monotheism that had its own doctrines, rituals and community, which created the monolithic ideological system.

With regard to the formation of the unique behaviour and perception of the two groups formed by contrasting ideologies, the CW, fully socialized by anti-communist ideology to perceive the CS automatically as monsters, liars etc. and stigmatize them, assuming them to be spies, unfaithful persons and so on. Similarly, the CS, indoctrinated by socio-political, philosophical and religious Juche ideology, were fully socialized to act and think automatically in accordance with the principles of Juche ideology. In particular, the practice of “ideological remoulding” impacted on their perception of fellow human beings, teaching them to distinguish friend from foe, and maintaining a burning hatred for their enemies such as South Koreans etc.

It may be concluded that the contrasting ideologies created two unique sets of perception patterns and behaviours among an originally similar people as they lived in different societies for over half a century. Moreover, the differences between the identity of the two populations seem extremely stark. However, the CW assume that the CW and the CS still share homogeneity and if there appears to be heterogeneity, the CW assume the recovery of homogeneity will be completed soon. However, all the CS interviewed think that their identity is significantly different from the CW one

and feel that it is tremendously difficult to unlearn their world-view which is deeply embedded in all aspect of their lives. This makes it difficult for the CS to live together with the CW and adjust in Youngnak Presbyterian Church when the two groups encounter each other. Therefore we should understand how much both differ profoundly different from each other, which will be the focus of Part B, and how they can be integrated harmoniously, which will be proposed in Part C.

Part Two

The Explanation of Ethnic Identity among Old and New Migrants

Introduction

There has been a general consensus that the people of both North and South Korea form one ethnic group. The South Korean churches have also been in no doubt that the people of the two Koreas form one ethnicity, expecting them to welcome each other when they come together. However, if the perception of Korea's myth of homogeneity will create difficulties for both North Koreans and South Koreans were the two Koreas ever to be reunified, the relations between the CW and the CS in Youngnak Presbyterian Church can perhaps be seen as a foretaste of those problems.

The aim of Part 2 is to demonstrate that the ethnic identity of both the CW and the CS is not homogeneous but heterogeneous and it affects their interaction with each other in Youngnak Presbyterian Church. The differences are most marked with reference to material symbols, verbal symbols and behavioural symbols.

The use of these symbols in encounters points to the differences between the two communities although the existence of these differences has not fully been acknowledged by the church. Thus, the CW and the CS tend to exclude each other from their smaller social circles as they are unable to bridge the gap between them, for they did not expect to exist in the first place. However, as shown in Part 1 the differences in their experiences are indeed significant: the CW have learnt by experience or education to be anti-communists, and the CS have learnt to follow the state ideology of Juche and be anti-capitalist.

Moreover, these differences would be just as marked if a reunification of the Korean Peninsula happened; therefore instead of wishing them away it is paramount that these differences are dealt with, preferably by superseding them, finding a common ground that both groups are willing to stand on. The dangers of inaction are apparent even at present as the CS might even consider leaving the church whose primary aim is to help them adapt to life and church in South Korea. Evidence was presented in Part one which shows that the CW were not ready to receive the CS in light of their apparent difference. Is it possible, then, that the two communities can still maintain the same ethnic identity, even after living under the circumstances of different ideologies for a period lasting over half a century? Surprisingly, no academic thesis on this issue has yet been published.

North and South Korea shared the same 5000-year history up to the last century. From partition in 1945 to the present, the two Koreas have essentially taken divergent paths politically, ideologically, economically and socially. The contrasting two ideologies occurring in the two Koreas because of the imposition of Juche ideology in the North and anti-communist ideology in the South highlights that each country in fact is evolving to a different kind of ethnic identity from that are described in Part One. With the development of North Korea's unique Juche ideology, a unique set of behaviours were learnt and exhibited by North Koreans, which they could not simply unlearn just by crossing into the South and becoming Christians. Further, South Korea's anti-communist ideology established behaviour patterns and perceptions which made it difficult to accept new migrants from the North.

I will not attempt here to deal with all the Korean Christians who attend Youngnak Presbyterian Church. I will focus my attention on Christian Saeteomin and Christian Wolnammin, who attended BSCFP in the church at the time of my field work. As

discussed earlier in the methodology section of this thesis, I will evaluate data which I collected in South Korea and North Korea, including both in-depth interviews and participant observation in the BSCFP run by Youngnak for Christian Saeteomin.

Having presented the argument for dissimilar identities through describing the state ideologies in Part 1, it is now time to turn to the evidence collected during the research period.

1. Ethnic Identity

1.1. Perspectives on Ethnic Identity

Frederick Barth, in his book *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, argues that ethnic identity is malleable and strongly emphasizes the fact that the primary feature of an ethnic group is that this is a category of ascription by others *and* identification by the members themselves.²⁷⁹ According to Barth, the word ethnic group in the anthropological sense is generally understood as a population which: ‘1. is largely biologically self-perpetuating 2. shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms 3. makes up a field of communication and interaction 4. has a membership which identifies itself, and it is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order’.²⁸⁰

For Barth the crucial term in examining the phenomenon of ethnic groups is ethnic boundaries. The boundaries define the group, not a culture that it encloses.²⁸¹ Firstly, they establish the internal criteria of membership in order to recognize insiders and outsiders; secondly, the social life of the group takes place within the ethnic

²⁷⁹ Fredric Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries; The Social of Culture Difference*, London: George Allen & Unwin, Bergen-Oslo: Universitets Forlaget, 1969, p. 13. Italics are mine.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

boundaries, which define the relations and the patterns of behaviour of the fellow members. In other words, ethnic boundaries help to identify a person as an insider of a particular ethnic group (a fellow member), and at the same time, they constitute the barriers to distinguish the others as strangers (outsiders, members of another ethnic group). From this perspective, if the CW and the CS have differing self-recognized patterns of behaviour, against which they measure each other, this means that there are two distinct groups with distinct identities.

Boundaries are not fixed, or unchanging, and there will usually be a variety of practices and attitudes within a given group. Moreover, as Anthony Cohen stressed in his book *'The Symbolic Construction of the Community'*, the group boundaries may have different natures:

some like national or administrative can be statutory and enshrined in law, some may be physical, expressed, perhaps, by a mountain range or sea, some may be racial or linguistic or religious. But not all boundaries, nor all components of any boundary, are so objectively apparent. They may be thought of, rather, as existing in the minds of their beholders.²⁸²

Cohen's main argument is that whether or not the structural and territorial boundaries have influence, the reality of the community lies in its members' perception of the vitality of its culture. People construct community mainly symbolically and the consciousness of community is, therefore, strictly related to the perception of these boundaries. In this perspective, if the CW can recognize their verbal and behavioural symbols as properly Korean whereas the CS cannot, and each sees the symbols of the other as wrong, the two groups do not share the same identity.

The concept of ethnic boundaries, therefore, effectively indicates lines, or perhaps less sharply defined fissures, which distinguish populations, allowing us to contrast

²⁸² Cohen, A., *The Symbolic Construction of Community*, Chichester, London and New York: Ellis Horwood Limited, Tavistock Publications, 1985, p. 12.

the two and assess the relations between them. It is against this basis that the verbal and behavioural differences of the two groups will be analyzed in this study, focusing on interaction between the CW and the CS.

The CW and the CS strongly believe that South Korean and North Korean are one ethnicity-at least thought so before living together in Seoul. This is because they assume that 1) they share the same blood, fundamental language, and traditional culture etc. 2) they have similar emotions 3) they still keep a strong sense of unity 4) they are still closely related by family ties: father and son, brother and sister ready to burst into tears when they meet each other.

However, I argue that there is a different ethnic identity between both in terms of the definitions and interpretations of ethnic identity by Anthony Cohen and Fredric Barth. I contend that the differences are due to recent history. The two groups have a drastically different ethnic identity formed over half a century of limited or no contact. Only when they meet in church do they begin to realize that they are not the same. Their identity was modulated and moderated while they were divided for half a century. The theory of the two anthropologists is very relevant as it explains how this can happen.

1.2. Two Contrasting Perspectives in Korea Regarding Ethnicity

In analyzing the contributions to *Hankuksa Siminkangjwa*²⁸³ (*The Citizen's Forum on Korean History*) two contrasting perspectives become apparent with regard to the

²⁸³ Lee Ki-baik is the editor of the book. He is not only an author of *Hanguksa Sillon* (A New History of Korea) but also a member of 'The Institute of Korean History Studies' (1967). *Hanguksa Sillon* is noteworthy for its treatment of cultural history of Korea and the Institute consisted of the historians who have led and fixed Korea's historical viewpoint. Those who have contributed their research results to the book "*The Citizen's Forum on Korean History*" (Vol. 32.) are all professors of history departments. The contributions of the Institute have been put into historic textbooks for middle and high school students.

understanding of Korean ethnicity.

One view, by Lee and Han, argues that Koreans have been and still are homogeneous, using words and phrases such as ‘the history of five thousand years,’ ‘one descent,’ and ‘one race.’ These have been used both as symbolic and realistic expressions among Koreans. The myth of homogeneity means not only that Korea has been one nation from the old ages without amalgamating with any different nations but also that Koreans belong to a tribe of one lineage.²⁸⁴

In contrast, the other texts, by Lee and Ahn, argue that ‘one stock’ and ‘one race’ are modern concepts and no nation could have survived and exist as a genuinely homogeneous nation without cultural and racial mixture with other cultures and nations. Thus notions that Korea is a “biological kinship community” coming from one ancestor are historically unsupported.

Lee Ki-dong and Han Woo-keun both insist that Koreans follow the production and reproduction of historical narratives of continuity and homogeneity. Lee Ki-dong says that Korea is one of the very rare homogeneous nations,²⁸⁵ adding that the “Korean nation can be proud of the fact that it was formed before the modern era, maintained over 1,300 years after the formation of national consciousness by Shilla’s²⁸⁶ three nations unification.”²⁸⁷ Blood and language are the main shared components in the Korean nation. Han Woo-keun, in his book *The Korean Full History*, insists that blood

²⁸⁴ Noh Tae-don, "Hankukminjok Hyeongseong Sikiron (The Theory of the Formative Period of Korean Nation)," *Hankuksa Siminkangjwa (Citizen's Forum on Korean Nation)*, Vol. 20., Lee Ki-baik, ed., Seoul: Ilchokak, February 1997, p. 159.

²⁸⁵ Ki-dong Lee, "Kiwon Yeonkueui Heuruem (Flow of the Origin Study)," *Hankuksa Siminkangjwa (The Citizen's Forum on Korean History)*, Vol. 32., Lee Ki-baik, ed., Seoul: Ilchokak, February 2003, p. 25.

²⁸⁶ Korean history can be divided into 7 periods; Old Chosen (B. C. 2333-) with Three Han period. Three Kingdoms(B. C. 57-, Three nations are Koguryo, Baikje, Shilla). United Shilla period(A. D. 676-). Korea Period(A. D. 936-). Chosen Dynasty(A. D. 1392-). Japanese Regime Era(A. D. 1910-). The Republic of Korea(A. D. 1945)

²⁸⁷ Lee Ki-dong, "Preface," *Hankuksa Siminkangjwa (The Citizen's Forum on Korean History)*, Vol. 32., Lee Ki-baik, ed., Seoul: Ilchokak, February 2003, iv.

and language were treated as unchangeable components because there has been no immigration on a massive scale to the Korean Peninsula from outside since the three kingdom period.²⁸⁸

On the other hand, Lee Seon-bok and Ahn Seong-mo insist that Koreans can be characterized as producing and reproducing historical narratives of discontinuity and heterogeneity. Lee Seon-bok says that “it can be neither scientific fact nor a historic one if we Koreans believe that we are one nation that has the history of 5,000 years as an offspring of Tangun in spite of the fact that it inspires historical and national consciousness for Koreans.”²⁸⁹ The myth is a falsehood imparted with education, claiming that “that kind of genuine nation has not existed up to the present in Korean history, and it is meaningless to argue the time and extent of immigration and mixing of races.”²⁹⁰ Ahn Seung-mo also insists that no nation can survive and exist as a genuine homogeneous nation without cultural and racial mixing with other cultures and nations.²⁹¹

According to the latter historians, the insistence on continuity and homogeneity has been used as a means both to teach Koreans to forge a national consciousness and to plant pride in Koreans when they were victims and became weak such as the period of Japanese occupation etc. The frequent usage of words such as ‘one race’, and ‘one people’ is the product of modern times, especially from the late 1800s, states Ahn.²⁹²

In other words, the reason why the idiomatic expressions such as ‘one stock’ and

²⁸⁸ Han Woo-keun, *Hankuk Tongsa (Korean Full History)*, Seoul: Eulyumunwhasa, 1977, pp. 32-35.

²⁸⁹ Lee Seon-bok, "Whaseokingol Yeonkuwa Hanminjokeui Kiwon (The Research for the Human Being's Fossil Brain and the Origin of Korean Nation)," *Hankuksa Siminkangjwa (The Citizen's Forum on Korean History)*, Vol. 32. Lee Ki-baik, ed., Seoul: Ilchokak, February 2003, pp. 64-65.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

²⁹¹ Ahn Seung-mo, "Kokohakeuro Bon Hanminjokeui Kyetong (Genealogy of Korean Nation from the Archaeology's Point of View)," *Hankuksa Siminkangjwa (The Citizen's Forum on Korean History)*, Vol. 32., Lee Ki-baik ed., Seoul: Ilchokak, February 2003, p. 103.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 164-169.

'homogeneous nation' were reemphasized in the Korean Peninsula was to fight the invasions of neighbouring countries. Lim Hyeon-jin also points out that the idea that Korea has been a "homogeneous nation since the pre-modern era" is still a problem because the word homogeneity has been used by politicians and is strongly linked to rulers' ideology.²⁹³

Eric Hobsbawm points out in *The Invention of Tradition*, that 'invented traditions' are related to the 'nation' with its associated phenomena such as nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols etc.²⁹⁴ He says that 'invented traditions' have three overlapping types: 'a) those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or artificial communities, b) those establishing or legitimizing institutions, status or relations of authority, and c) those whose main purpose was socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour.'²⁹⁵

Hobsbawm's clarity is echoed by Park Cheol-hui, who insists that the textbooks for Primary Schools in South Korea were expressly written on the basis of '*Danil Minjokjueui*' (Homogeneous Ethnicity).²⁹⁶ In other words, this indicates that an 'imagined community' has been created in South Korea, which has encouraged the Korean people to firmly believe that they are 'one race' and 'one people.'

Benedict Anderson points out, in his book '*Imagined Communities*', using the term 'nation-ness' in place of the terms 'ethnicity', the following definition of nation:

²⁹³ Lim Hyeon-jin, "Sekyewha Sidae Hankukeui Kil, (The Way for Korea in the Period of Globalization), *Sekyewhaeui Dojeonkwa Hankukeui Deaeung(The Challenge of Globalization and the Response of Korea)*, Kim Kyeong-won and Lim Hyeon-jin eds., Seoul: Nanam, 1995, p. 542.

²⁹⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions,' *The Invention of Traditions*, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 13.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

²⁹⁶ Park Cheol-hui, "Damunwha Kyoyukeui Kwanjeome Kichohan Chodeung Sahoe, Dodeokkyokwaseo Naeyonge Daehan Bipanjeok Kochal (A Critical Study on the Contents of Primary Social Studies and Moral Textbook in the View of a Multicultural Education)," *Kyoyuk Sahoehak Yeonku* Vol. 17., No. 1., March 2007, p. 109.

‘it is an imagined political community that is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.’²⁹⁷ It is imagined because members will never know most of their fellow-members, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. It is limited because it has finite, though elastic boundaries beyond which lie other nations. It is sovereign because it came to maturity at a stage of human history when freedom was a rare and precious ideal. And it is imagined as a community because it is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.²⁹⁸ According to him, nationality, nation-ness, and nationalism are cultural artifacts whose creation toward the end of the 18th century was the spontaneous distillation of a complex “crossing” of discrete historical forces; but, once created, they became “modular,” capable of being transplanted to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a variety of political and ideological constellations.²⁹⁹ This well reflects the Korean context, where many in the South at least still feel that both Koreas are one people in spite of all the differences that have come about over the past forty years. They firmly believe that unification will recover Korean cultural and national identity and homogeneity which were ruptured by the years of division. This means unification is often glossed over as the “recovery of homogeneity.”³⁰⁰ This is bound to lead to a disappointment, given the socio-cultural divergence of the last sixty years.

Most importantly, the expectation of homogeneity hinders progress in the construction of community shared between the CW and the CS, because they are ill-prepared for difference and even alienation. Both groups suffer from the problems of misinterpretation of their verbal symbols and behavioural symbols during interactions.

²⁹⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, London, New York: Verso, 1991, p. 6.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-7.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.4.

³⁰⁰ Roy Richard Grinker, *Korea and Its Futures: Unification and the Unfinished War*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000, p. x iii.

This chapter will propose that there is a need for both groups to understand one another's verbal and behavioural symbols, moving beyond the myth of homogeneity, 'invented traditions,' and 'imagined community.'

Nothing has been published about this subject in South Korea. Roy Richard Grinker points out in his book *Korea and Its Futures*, 'no one has yet figured out a way to talk about north-south differences without appearing to somehow justify the status quo of division or being accused of offering justification for those who might want to keep divided.'³⁰¹

2. Theoretical Frame

In Part 2, I will utilize Clifford Geertz's 'thick description', in order to describe and interpret the symbolic structure formed by the respective ideologies among the CW and the CS. There can be different material symbols, verbal symbols and behavioural symbols among them, which mark the boundary of their identities.³⁰² Symbols without a shared interpretation can often lead to misunderstandings.

In *The Interpretation of Cultures*, Geertz criticizes scholars working in various traditions who propose numerous answers to the question of how ideology forms complex social conditions. According to him, the main defect of the traditional theories of ideology is that they go directly "from source analysis to consequence analysis without ever seriously examining ideologies as systems of interrelating symbolism, as patterns of interworking meanings"³⁰³ Ideology for him is rather an

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*

³⁰² Erving Goffman defines symbols as some signs that "convey social information may be frequently and steadily available, and routinely sought and received." See, Erving Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, Penguin Books, 1990, p. 59.

³⁰³ Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, London: Hutchinson of London, 1975, p. 207.

independent science called “symbolic action”.³⁰⁴ Studies of ideology for Geertz, therefore, must deal with the question of how symbols symbolize, how they function to mediate meanings. Geertz’s approach does not focus either on causes of ideology or on symptoms of ideology. Rather, it focuses on the symbolic structure of the ideology itself. The intent of Geertz’s theory, in other words, is to examine shared meaning at a societal level. Without shared meaning, to use Geertz’s famous example,³⁰⁵ one cannot tell a wink, which is a meaningful action, from a twitch, which is a meaningless motion. The “symbolic structure of ideology” conveys meaning through analogy, irony, ambiguity, etc.

Furthermore, he insists that the sociology of knowledge ought to be called the sociology of meaning, for what is socially determined is not the *nature* of conception but vehicles of conception. On this point, it is worth quoting Geertz at length:³⁰⁶

In a community that drinks its coffee black, Henle remarks, to praise a girl with “You’re the cream in my coffee” would give entirely the wrong impression; and, if omnivorousness were regarded as a more significant characteristic of bears than their clumsy roughness, to call a man “an old bear” might mean not that he was crude, but that he had catholic tastes. Or, to take an example from Burke, since in Japan people smile on mentioning the death of a close friend, the semantic equivalent (behaviourally as well as verbally) in American English is not “He smiled,” but “His face fell”; for, with such a rendering, we are “translating the accepted social usage of Japan into the corresponding accepted social usage of the West.”

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 208.


³⁰⁵ “But the point is that between what Ryle calls the “thin description” of what the rehearser (parodist, winker, twitcher ...) is doing (“rapidly contracting his right eyelids”) and the “thick description” of what he is doing (“practicing a burlesque of a friend faking a wink to deceive an innocent into thinking a conspiracy is in motion”) lies the object of ethnography: a stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures in terms of which twitches, winks, fake-winks, parodies, rehearsals of parodies are produced, perceived, and interpreted, and without which they would no (not even the zero-form twitches, which, *as a cultural category*, are as much nonwinks as winks are nontwitches) in fact exist, no matter what anyone did or didn’t do with his eyelids.” See, *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 212. Italics are mine.

In similar way, for example, on the one hand, the CS recognize the word ‘grace’ as something that the political leader gives because they had been systematically socialized by Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il into the Juche ideology. On the other hand, for the CW ‘grace’ comes from God because they have established everything upon the ruins left by the Korean War by relying on the help of God. In another example, when the colour of a publicity poster was chosen as a material symbol, the CS liked the colour red whereas the CW hated it. This was because the CS regarded red as a positive symbol of revolution, whereas the CW who adhered to anti-communism regarded it as a communist symbol. The notion of grace and the meaning of the colour red are two examples of the misunderstandings present in Youngnak Presbyterian Church between the CW and the CS.

Therefore, in Part 2, I will use the method of Geertz’s thick description in order to highlight the differences in identity brought about by Juche ideology and anti-communist ideology respectively. The analysis will focus on material symbols (artifacts), verbal symbols (myths and discourse) and behavioural symbols (rituals and practices).

Diagram 3 The Perspective of Thick Description for the Analysis of Symbolic Structure.



Chapter III Christian Saeteomin Identity Expressed in Material, Verbal and Behavioural Symbols

Introduction

Both the CW and the CS express their ethnic identity in various forms, but the CW, as the more powerful group in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, assume their approach is “normal Korean” and anything different is “deviant behaviour.” By discussing details of the CS life, it may seem as if I am also taking the CS ways as normative for Korean life. Certainly it is for South Korean life, but, as I shall argue, where the CS behaviour differs, it does not mean (as so often expressed by the CW) that the CS are rude, crude, crass and vulgar by their own intentional decision, but rather they express the socialized norms of their North Korean ethnic group.

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the CS ethnic identity is very different from the CW ethnic identity in terms of material, verbal and behaviour symbols which evolved under non-shared political systems and ideologies. While the ancestors of the CW and the CS communities lived in Northwest Korea they were influenced by the same political systems and ideologies. Following the partition and the arrival of the CW to South Korea, however, different conditions were created for those who stayed in and those who left North Korea. After the partition two distinct political systems evolved which caused tension and hostility between the two nations. One of them was a communist collectivist regime while the other went through a period of non-democratic leadership and industrialisation before democracy was established. It would be very difficult to accept that these conditions left the communities immune to change. What happened instead, in fact, was the contrary. In the following I will highlight the extent and depth of changes through analysing

symbols, supporting and strengthening the argument of Frederick Barth and Anthony Cohen who maintain that ethnic identity is a fluid and changing phenomenon,

The expression of the ethnic identity will be analysed based on 1) interviews with twenty Christian Saeteomin, 2) participant observation in the BSCFP in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, 3) material collected during trips to North Korea.

In the following section I will present results of a pilot study which demonstrate that the ethnic identity of the CS and the CW is not monolithic but heterogeneous. The meaning of a selection of material, verbal and behavioural expressions of identity will be explored in order to illustrate the chances for misunderstanding and misinterpretation when members of the two communities interact in Youngnak Presbyterian Church.

There are many kinds of symbols (signs, indices or symbols proper), and this section will deal with these in order to demonstrate that the ethnic identity of the CS is different from that of the CW. First, material symbols will be described followed by verbal symbols and finally behavioural ones.

1. Material Symbols

Juche ideology prohibits the use or possession of items or materials that are devoid of national character and/or are capable of infecting the people with bourgeois ideology.³⁰⁷ In North Korea, if some items or materials appear not to suit the national feelings of the country, the National Security Board immediately points it out. For example, North Korea does not tolerate such items so defined from the United States

³⁰⁷ Kim Jong-Il, "On Some Task the Youth Thoroughly Into the Reliable Successors to the Revolutionary Cause of Juche" Speech Delivered to the Senior Officials of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, January 17, 1990, *Kim Jong Il Selected Words*, no. 10, Pyongyang: FLPH, 1999, p. 42.

and from South Korea³⁰⁸ because North Korea perceived that these two nations are enemies of North Korea. The CS bring whatever possessions they can when arriving in the South. Some of them keep using these items of which the most obvious is clothing.

1.1. Clothing

The North Korean government provides clothing for the people. These clothes look like uniforms and are symbols themselves: symbols of the Socialist way of living as prescribed by the Leader. To be specific, men wear so-called Lenin jackets or overalls while women wear Korean traditional costume (white upper garments and black skirts). In the early 1990s, some young North Koreans including university students began to wear blue jeans and mini skirts due to an influx of Western culture. However, the authorities cracked down on these young people for fear of the spreading of capitalist ways of thinking.³⁰⁹

Visiting North Korea, I saw a lot of North Koreans wearing some hats or head scarves. This is an extract from my daily record: “Pyongyang city centre is 24 km from Sunahn Airport. Through the window I can see men on the road wearing dark brown Lenin hats and women wearing head scarves.”³¹⁰

While I was observing approximately 80 Christian Saeteomin and 15 teachers in the BSCFP in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, I noticed that some Christian Saeteomin men still wore Lenin hats in the BSCFP although no Christian Saeteomin

³⁰⁸ Kim Jong-il, “Let Us Compose Revolutionary Musical Pieces Which People Love to Sing”, Talk to the Senior Officials of the Musical Art Sectors, February 25, 1990, *Ibid.*, p. 57.

³⁰⁹ Koreascope, *Clothing*; available from <http://www.koreascope.org>; accessed 12 September 2007.

³¹⁰ Ha Chung-yoube, *The Visit to Pyongyang and the Observation of the Route of Escape's Circumstance*, unpublished, 2007, p. 3.

women wore head scarves. I asked one Christian Saeteomin man the reason for this.

He replied:

North Korean men like wearing the Lenin hat and women like head scarves. I told my wife, though, that she should not put on a head scarf because South Korean women do not wear it. In North Korea women do not wear a cap at all, and actually I cannot stand the sight of women wearing caps in South Korea.³¹¹

It is still comfortable for him to wear the Lenin hat as he did in North Korea. However, he is uncomfortable seeing women putting on a cap in South Korea because he associates it with the style of western countries.

Second, Christian Saeteomin females thought that their clothes were unfashionable compared with the South Korean females. The reason for this is that the North Koreans were accustomed to dressing in accordance with the taste of Juche ideology, which linked clothes and appearance to the wearer's ideological and mental state. This is important in order to repel the enemies' manoeuvres to infiltrate the country with their corrupt capitalist ideas and lifestyles and also for establishing the socialist lifestyle.³¹² The verbal evidences of females of the CS are follows:

Other people look at me as a stranger when I dress according to North Korea style. I cannot walk in high heels like the South Koreans. Wearing blue jeans feels strange to me. So the hardest thing for a woman is to buy shoes and clothes in South Korea. I try to adapt and I want to wear fashionable clothes and shoes the way most people do in South Korea.³¹³

South Koreans buy beautiful clothes whereas I do not like them. If I buy them, they seem to me like unfashionable clothes, in terms of my style.³¹⁴

³¹¹ Interview with CS20, Seoul, 13 February 2007.

³¹² BBC NEWS, *N Korea wages war on long hair*; available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4157121.stm>; accessed 12 September 2007.

³¹³ Interview with CS15, Seoul, 05 February 2007.

³¹⁴ Interview with CS06, Seoul, 22 January 2007.

Minju Choson, a North Korean government daily newspaper, writes that hair style is a very important issue in that it shows people's cultural standards, mental and moral state. For party papers such as Nodong Sinmun, the struggle against foreign and anti-communist influence is being fought out in the arena of personal appearance. The Nodong newspaper says that people who dress differently adapting the styles of others (i.e. not North Koreans) are fools and that nation will come to ruin because of them.³¹⁵

The verbal evidence of a Christian Saeteomin female is as follows:

In South Korea the clothes which I used to wear in North Korea feel unfashionable, so I have changed my style...North Koreans could not wear clothes in a way they wanted and even hair style was controlled. Those who chose the wrong way were criticized at reviews in North Korea. However, I am not in North Korea; I can change.³¹⁶

As far as the CS are concerned, items such as stilettos and blue jeans are labelled as enemy materials. This still affects their thinking in spite of the fact that they have already become citizens of South Korea.

On the other hand, the CW females teaching the Bible to the CS in the BSCFP said that the CS could be easily distinguished by what they wear, even when they try to dress like CW: it is not just matter of the clothes, but how they wear them, how they carry themselves when they walk.

1.2. Flowers

In Pyongyang city, flowers symbolise certain aspects of the Juche ideology. I visited Pyongyang city in North Korea between the 24th and 28th of February 2007 in order to observe the background of the CS. I only saw six types of flowers in

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*

³¹⁶ Interview with CS18, Seoul, 06 February 2007.

Pyongyang city: 1) *maehwa* flower, 2) common sunflower, 3) azalea, 4) magnolia, 5) a hybrid cultivar of orchid, 6) a hybrid cultivar of begonia.

First, many flowers adorned the walls of the Nation Restaurant. Members of staff explained to me that all the flowers had a specific meaning: *maehwa* flower, which is a kind of apricot, is the symbol of patriotic pride. Sunflower is the symbol of people looking at their leader. Kim Jong Il's flower, called *Kimjongilia*,³¹⁷ is the symbol of the sun.³¹⁸ There was a stage located at the front of the restaurant, on which these symbolic flowers lay. A *Kimjongilia* lay in the centre surrounded by sunflowers looking up to it.

Second, many potted azalea blossoms were seen in the lounge of Yanggakdo International Hotel where I stayed and also at Pyongyang Sunahn Airport. The azalea blossom symbolises the liberation of Korea,³¹⁹ because the flower blooms in spring after winter in Korea. Spring means the liberation of Korea and winter means Japanese occupation period.

Third, the Arch of Triumph is situated in front of Kim Il-sung Stadium at the foot of Moran Hill. The dates 1925 and 1945 refer to Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese struggle which culminated in the liberation of Korea in 1945. The four pillars contain carved images, one showing a little girl holding a bunch of azalea blossoms. When I asked a

³¹⁷ *Kimjongilia* (Korean: '*Kimjŏngirhwa*') is one of two national flowers of North Korea, named after the leader Kim Jong-il. It is a hybridcultivar of begonia, *Begonia x Tuberhybrida*.

To commemorate Kim Jong-il's 46th birthday in 1988, Japanese botanist Motoderu Kamo cultivated a new perennial begonia named "*Kimjongilia*" (literally, "flower of Kim Jong-il"), representing the Juche revolutionary cause of the 'Dear Leader'. According to North Korean sources, the flower symbolizes wisdom, love, justice and peace. It is designed to bloom every year on Kim Jong-il's February 16 birthday. The North Korean government claims that *Kimjongilia* has spread widely throughout North Korea from the Korean Central Botanical Garden; available from; <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kimjongilia>; Internet; accessed 20 July 2007.

³¹⁸ Ha Chung-yoube, *Op.Cit.*, p. 25.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*,p. 14.

guide why the girl held flowers, the guide explained it to me that the girl was waiting for Kim Il-sung as the emancipator who defeated Japanese imperialism.

Fourth, when visiting Pyongyang University of Medicine, I saw *Kimjongilias* on the desks of all the doctors and nurses. In fact, *Kimjongilias* could often be seen on the roads in Pyongyang city. Before I came to the United Kingdom to study, I made five visits to Sinuiju city³²⁰ in North Korea between the 10th of November 2000 and the 31st of May 2002 to help with a children's hospital. In my accommodation I saw *Kimjongilia* placed below a large painting depicting Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il and also on the desk of doctors and nurses in the hospital.

Fifth, magnolia is the national flower of North Korea. While travelling to various places: Mansudae Grand Monument,³²¹ Tower of Juche Idea,³²² Kim Il Sung Stadium,³²³ and Oknyu Restaurant³²⁴ are decorated with magnolia blossoms drawn on the gates, walls, stones. Even on the streets in Pyongyang city there are lamps shaped like magnolias which remind the people of their own nation.

³²⁰ It is the capital of North Phyongan Province and a border city. Lying in the lower reaches of the Amnok River in the northwest of the Korean peninsula; the city is linked with Dandong, China by a bridge. Sinuiju is 230 kilometres from Pyongyang. Covering an area of 189 square kilometers, the city is an important gateway for tourists. It is a base of modern light industry and has developed agriculture and fisheries. See, Pong-hyok Hwang, Jong-ryol Kim, *DPR Korea Tour*, Pyongyang: National Tourism Administration, 2002, p. 176.

³²¹ The grand monument is a big statue around which the artistic depiction of the history of the North Korean revolution led by Kim Il-sung and his exploits is. See, Hwang Pong-hyok, Kim Jong-ryol, *Op.Cit.*, p. 40.

³²² The tower is a grand monument built to eulogize Kim Il-sung who authored the Juche Idea, the guiding idea representing the era of independence, and ensured its victory. Tower of well-dressed white granite, it was designed in Korea's unique traditional fashion of stone tower construction. The body of 150-metre tall tower is crowned with a 20-metre tall torch." See, *Ibid.*, p. 47.

³²³ This is the oldest stadium in Pyongyang. On its site immediately after liberation was a public playground, where Kim Il-sung gave his first address to the people in the homeland on October 14, 1945 after his return. Later the Moranbong Stadium was built there, and in April 1982 the Moranbong Stadium was expanded into a stadium accommodating 100,000 people and renamed Kim Il-sung Stadium." See, *Ibid.*, p. 83.

³²⁴ The restaurant, a Korean style building standing on the Oknyu Rock on the River Taedong, serves traditional Korean food, of which Pyongyang cold noodles are most famous.

Finally, there were special flower arrangements depicting *Kimjongilias* and *Kimilsungias*³²⁵. In one of them, a *Kimjongilia* and a *Kimilsungia* were situated in the centre-top of the pictures surrounded by sunflowers looking up to them. This arrangement reminds the people of the Juche ideology in which Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung are understood as the brain of the socio-political organism who control all thoughts and activities of North Koreans.

In North Korea the most important national holiday is the Day of the Sun (*Taeyangjeol*) which is the 15th of April, the birthday of Kim Il Sung. If a common sunflower is given to a South Korean, he would see it as simply a flower; however, a North Korean would see it as himself and his homage towards his leader.

In short, the six flowers are symbolic of patriotic pride, the leaders of North Korea, the liberation and reverence for the CS. These flowers are present everywhere in North Korea among other powerful symbols (such as pictures of the leaders) to constantly remind people of their leader, the organism they share and the driving ideology. The association between symbol and meaning stays with the CS even when they leave the North for the South: none of these meanings are known in any way in South Korea, and would be rejected if they were known.

1.3. Colours

The CS and the CW have conflicting concepts of the meaning of the colour red and the colour blue. Red is the symbol of Communism and is widely used in North Korea as a symbol depicting something good or positive as opposed to bad or negative.

³²⁵ *Kimilsungia* is a hybridcultivar of orchid, *Dendrobium* 'Kim il-sung', and one of the national flowers of North Korea. When Kim Il-sung visited to Indonesia to meet with his counterpart, Sukarno, Kim was taken on a tour of the Bogor Botanical Garden. Sukarno named the flower after Kim Il-sung. *Kimilsungia* flower shows are held every year in Pyongyang; available from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kimilsungia>; 20 July 2007.

The CV of a North Korean is written with red and blue ink. The positive things were red and the negative things blue. If one has a lot of blue in their CV they aren't allowed to join the Army. My CV is generally in red ink, so I could join the army. On the map of military operations the army of North Korea is coloured red but the army of South Korea is coloured blue.³²⁶

Shim Ju-il, one of the CS, wrote it in his book titled *Bukhanui Bunggoe Sigan (The Time of Collapse of North Korea)* that all things under the sun are given a class characteristic in the philosophy of *Kimilsungism* in North Korea.³²⁷ According to him, things must manifest a revolutionary class character; otherwise they are eliminated.

In the above sections I demonstrated the deep seated differences of meaning of objects and materials between the two groups. In some cases the differences are so profound, and the two opinions are antithetical despite the fact that the North Korean Saeteomin left North Korea and wished to live in the South.

2. Verbal Symbols

Every verbal symbol evokes meaning in people who encounter it. The meaning is shaped by experience and education. Since the education and life experience of the CW and the CS are very different (see Part A) it is expected that a number of verbal symbols contain different meanings and speaker's intent for the different groups.

2.1. 'I Can Do It' (Naneun Hal Su Issda)

In South Korea "I can do it" means that I know how to do something and I will do it, whereas in North Korea "I can do it" means that, even though I do not know how to

³²⁶ Interview with CS01, Seoul, 22 November 2006.

³²⁷ Shim Ju-il, *Bukhanui Bunggoe Sigan (The Collapse Time of North Korea)*, unpublished, 2006, p. 69.

do it, I will still try my best. The latter meaning of “I can do it” is the expression of an indomitable will which knows no barriers.

In North Korea if someone gives this order ‘do it’ you must immediately respond by answering ‘I can do it’, which means that you try to do it and you do not question whether you are able to do that thing or not. However, in South Korea the Wolnammin may have a condition or questions in that situation. The Wolnammin seem to think that the North Koreans are lying when they say ‘I can do’. In North Korea there is an unshaken faith that ‘*Dangi gyeolsimhamyeon naneun handa*’ (‘당이 결심하면 나는 한다’, ‘I do if the Party decides’). North Koreans have become accustomed to respond ‘I can do’ to any requirement of the Party.³²⁸

When I visited North Korea I often saw the slogan of ‘*I do it if the Party decides*’. This expression of an indomitable will cultivated by Juche ideology causes the CS trouble when encountering those who have been brought up in South Korea:

In North Korea people always say ‘I can do it’ whenever the Party orders them to do something. However, due to that phrase I was in trouble in South Korea. I got a job and went to my work. The head of the department intended to teach me how to do my work and asked ‘can you do it?’. I immediately answered it to him “I can do it”. He said, “Really? It took me ten years to learn this skill, but you obviously won’t need tuition,” expressing his disapproval toward me. I did not intend to say that I could do the work as well as him, I just automatically responded with the expression of ‘I can do it’ because I was very used to saying that. But he did not understand me, he just told me that then he won’t have to teach me the skills. It would have been very difficult for me to restore the relationship between me and him. I thought at that time that I would not say even one word any more to the South Koreans in the style of North Korean speech. That day, I was going to give up my work first but instead I bore hardships with patience.³²⁹

The CW do not know that North Koreans never say no when ordered to do a task and the CS find it very hard to break out of the North Korean mindset.

³²⁸ Interview with CS20, Seoul, 13 February 2007.

³²⁹ Interview with CS17, Seoul, 05 February 2007.

When James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of the State Department of the United States, went to Pyongyang in October 2002, he tabled evidence of renewed nuclear activity of the North Korean regime. The United States believed that North Korea had a uranium enrichment programme with the view to developing nuclear weapons. According to him, the North Koreans at first denied it and then admitted it, while asserting a sovereign right to develop nuclear weapons and more powerful weapons as well.³³⁰ However, the United States misunderstood certain bellicose and belligerent words of the North Koreans, interpreting these words in their literal sense. The North Koreans later denied that they had said anything about building a programme to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons; rather they suggested that Kelly misunderstood (or even fabricated) what Kang Sok-ju, First Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of North Korea, had told him, which they rendered as follows. “The DPRK made itself very clear to the special envoy that the DPRK was entitled to possess not only nuclear weapons but any type of weapon more powerful than that so as to defend its sovereign right to existence from the ever-growing nuclear threat by the U.S.”³³¹ The officials of the Korean government insisted that James A. Kelly’s misunderstanding caused the nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula.³³²

2.2. Attitude Toward Foreign Words and Variants

It is said that words of foreign origin in a language are the inevitable products of world-wide economic and cultural exchange among nations. However, in North Korea foreign words are rejected and eliminated in accordance with Juche ideology.

³³⁰ *Peacemaking*; available from <http://findarticles.com>; Internet; accessed 9 September 2007.

³³¹ Koh Byong-chul, “Is North Korea Changing?” *Institute for Far Eastern Studies*, Kyongnam University, March 5, 2003.

³³² Lim Dong-won, *Pismeikeo* (Peacemaker), Seoul: Jungang books, 2008, pp. 664-671.

Kim Il-sung instructed that in Juche ideology North Koreans were only allowed to use the pure Korean Language. His point of view is that South Korea is wrong. Even though globalization makes people use foreign words, I think using our own words is more important than using foreign ones.³³³

He not only testified that North Koreans obey their leader's instructions in using only pure Korean language, but he also criticised South Korea's use of foreign words. Visiting Pyongyang city, I observed the use of the pure Korean language which is no longer used in South Korea. There are two examples as follows: 1) Menus written using pure Korean expressions are prominent. The South Korean *Omeuraiseu* (오므라이스, that is, omelette with fried rice) is denoted as '*Dalkal ssuiunbap*' (‘닭알 씌운밥’), which means ‘fried rice covering an egg of a chicken’. *Dalkal ssuiunbap* is not a foreign word, however, the CS do not understand '*Omeuraiseu*' whereas the CW do not understand '*Dalkal ssuiunbap*.'

Most North Koreans never learnt English because it is considered to be the language of the enemy, whereas the Korean language spoken in the South adopted foreign expressions because since the liberation in 1945 the South Korean government in general has been pro-American. These differences between the Southern and the Northern versions of Korean create difficulties for the CS when they settle in South Korea:

The boss said to me "*Cabinet eseo key gajyeowara*" ("cabinet에서key 가져와라", that is, "Bring the key from the cabinet"), I could not understand 'key' and 'cabinet' at all. I was just standing there. He said to me that "You are deaf", so I left the company after having an argument with him about it.³³⁴

When I first started university, I could not understand what the lecturer said, because he used too many foreign words. I could not try to understand it and listen to the

³³³ Interview with CS03, Seoul, 07 February 2007.

³³⁴ Interview with CS03, Seoul, 07 February 2007.

lecture at the same time. I thought to myself “what did that word mean?” I asked some of my friends and they explained it to me and then I could understand it.³³⁵

Furthermore, it was known that Kim Jong-il only understood 80% of what the former president of South Korea, Kim Dae-joong said during the First Inter-Korea Summit in 2002. According to Malicheba, Kim Jong-il said to Konstantin Pulikovsky plenipotentiary that “There is a difference between the North Korean dialect and South Korean dialect. I could only understand 80% of what he was saying. There are a lot of words that were coined from English.”³³⁶

On the other hand, the CW do not understand words in the Northern dialect language which the CS use which makes them feel uneasy. For example, they do not know the meaning of ‘*Inchagalge*’ (‘인차갈께’) which means ‘I will go very soon’ because in South Korean the expression is ‘*Gumbanggalge*’ (‘금방갈께’).³³⁷ The meaning of both ‘*Incha*’ and ‘*Gumbang*’ is ‘soon’. However, the CW do not use ‘*Incha*’ and they think it is strange when the CS use it. The differences affect every day expressions, even as common ones as “I’m fine.”

I felt uncomfortable and offended when I heard South Korean people say that they misunderstood the meaning of my speech. For example, North Koreans say ‘*Il eopsda*’ (‘일없다’) meaning ‘I am fine’ but the South Korean people interpreted it as ‘there is nothing to do.’³³⁸

Not only while visiting North Korea but also when meeting the CS in South Korea, I often heard ‘*Incha*’ and ‘*Il eopsda*’ and it felt alien to me. On my observation visit to

³³⁵ Interview with CS06, Seoul, 22 January 2007.

³³⁶ Park Hyun-min, “*Kim Jong Il, Only Understood 80% of DJ's Statements during the 2000 Summit*”; available from <http://www.dailynk.com>; Internet; accessed 3 October 2007.

³³⁷ Interview with CS19, Seoul, 08 February 2007.

³³⁸ Interview with CS14, Seoul, 04 February 2007.

Pyongyang city, I could not understand some words in spite of the fact that these words are constituents of the Korean Language:

I often saw the word ‘*namsae*’ on the signs of shops in Pyongyang city, but none of my South Korean companions knew its meaning. I asked a North Korean guide to tell me the meaning of the word. The guide told us that ‘*namsae*’ (‘*남새*’ in Korean) means vegetables.³³⁹

South Koreans do not use the word ‘*namsae*’ but ‘*chaeso*’ for vegetables. In spite of the fact that both ‘*namsae*’ and ‘*chaeso*’ are both part of the Korean vocabulary, the North and the South have assigned to them different meanings. As a result they are not able to understand each other without interpretation. In reality, half a century of separation has created significant differences between the languages in the two Koreas. Words that are commonly used in the daily lives of Southerners are rarely found in North Korean.

North Korea believed that language was another tool of the revolution so North Korean authorities shaped the language to fit Kim Il-sung's Juche Ideology. The leadership started to purge Chinese and other foreign words from Korean replacing them with Korean words in 1966 in order to create the “Cultural Language”. As a result, at least 50,000 new words have been introduced. This policy leads to a fundamental change of language³⁴⁰ and resulted in a deep division of the two Koreas.

2.3. Intonation and Accent

Intonation and accent may be very significant factors in the effectiveness of any communication. If one’s intonation and accent patterns are non-standard, one’s

³³⁹ Ha Chung-yoube, *Op.Cit.*, p. 11.

³⁴⁰ Park Hyun-min, *Op.Cit.*

meaning may not be conveyed correctly. The CS who were brought up as fighters and revolutionaries produce a restricted range of Korean strong sounds, word stress and basic high intonation patterns.

My little daughter has made a number of new friends. Once when she was talking, she compared me with their mothers. She said to me “the mums of the South Koreans speak smoothly but why does not my mum speak like them.” I thought that I should change the style of my speaking, but it is not easy. I felt uncomfortable and offended when I hear it from a South Korean that my accent was too strong.³⁴¹

The CS recognise that their intonation is too high-pitched compared with the residents in Seoul.³⁴²

2.4. Relational Designations

Relational designations are sometimes presented to form an intimacy with the other when a person wants to feel friendship toward the stranger. South Koreans use ‘Aga’ (baby) to express an intimacy when a senior male refers to a young female. However, it is not acceptable in North Korea, even making North Korean females feel embarrassed. In the same way, North Koreans use ‘Abai’ (father) to express intimacy, but it is unacceptable in South Korea, making South Koreans feel uncomfortable. In Pyongyang, I was aware of conflicts arising from designations.

We (some South Koreans who were visiting North Korea with me) and two North Korean waitresses named Yeom Mo-lan, Kim Gyeo-hui, were having a conversation in a restaurant on the 47th floor in the Yanggakdo International Hotel. Mr. Geon, the director of the Severance Hospital in South Korea, called them ‘Aga’,(baby’). Miss Yeom said (with a serious face), in North Korea “Aga” is not a designation for adults

³⁴¹ Interview with CS08, Seoul, 25 January 2007.

³⁴² Interview with CS18, Seoul, 06 February 2007.

but babies aged 5-6 years or 1-4 years. Mr. Geon explained that South Koreans call a young daughter-in-law 'Aga'. However, she did not accept it.³⁴³

One Christian Saeteomin female stated:

The North Koreans call an aged person 'father' and call those who are older than my husband 'one's father's elder brother', but the South Korean people refer to both as 'uncle'. We mean 'father' when we say 'Abai' ('아바이'). When I said to a South Korean 'Abai sugohasyeo' ('아바이 수고하셔' 'Father, good-bye'), he said to me that he found the phrase strange. I did not know that "Jal gaseyo" ("잘 가세요", good-bye) is less polite than "Annyeonghi gaseyo" ('안녕히 가세요'), in South Korea. I became aware of it when somebody told me about it. However, in North Korea "Jal gaseyo" is a very nice expression. Even if a young man is an unrelated person, the North Koreans refer to him as 'uncle', which makes him feel welcome in North Korea. However, when I spoke in such a way in South Korea, I was regarded as a fool.³⁴⁴

Relational designations are sometimes given when a person names a name of another nation. It is a legal requirement that for South Koreans who visit North Korea they should go to the Seoul Board of National Unification to be educated. South Korean calls North Korea 'Bukhan' (North Korea). However, those in North Korea hate it because literally 'buk' means 'the North' and 'han' means 'South Korea,' that is, the word 'Bukhan' implies that North Korea is part of South Korea. In accordance with the education, in North Korea, South Koreans should call North Korea 'Bukcheuk' (the north side). On the other hand, North Koreans calls South Korea 'Namjoseon,' however, the CS who call South Korea 'Namjoseon' are regarded as spies. I call North Korea 'Bukhan' in South Korea, however, I call North Korea

³⁴³ Ha Chung-yoube, *Op.Cit.*, p. 4.

³⁴⁴ Interview with CS18, Seoul, 06 February 2007.

‘Bukcheuk’ or ‘Bukjoseon’ while staying in North Korea.

2.5. Words Used Exclusively to Refer to the Leader

As a result of the personal cult of the North Korean leader there are some phrases that are only used when he is addressed or referred to.

Firstly, ‘Thank you, Father Kim Il Sung’ is the first phrase North Korean parents are instructed to teach to their children.³⁴⁵ In South Korea the word of ‘*gomapseupnida*’ has the same meaning as the word of ‘*gamsa*’, meaning ‘thanks’. However, in North Korea the two words must be used only for the leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.

Three interviewees spoke about this:

In North Korea the words of ‘*gomapseupnida*’ (‘고맙습니다’, ‘thanks’) was not used between ordinary people but used only for their leader. However, in South Korea it is used very much between people. I think South Koreans have better manners than the North Koreans.³⁴⁶

In North Korea I did not use ‘*gamsa*’ (it means ‘thanks’) at all with ordinary people, but Wolnammin use it too much in South Korea.³⁴⁷

The word ‘*gamsa*’ does exist in North Korea. When the North Korean Saeteomin first heard it in South Korea, some of them misunderstood the word as ‘*gami eodiseo sandago geuraeyo*’ (‘감이 어디서 산다고 그래요’, ‘where can one buy a persimmon’).³⁴⁸

The word ‘*gamsa*’ consists of the syllables ‘*gam*’ and ‘*sa*’. ‘*Gam*’ and ‘*Sa*’ have other meanings; ‘*Gam*’ can mean ‘persimmon’, ‘material’ or ‘pattern’ and ‘*Sa*’ can mean ‘buy’.

³⁴⁵ United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, “*Thank You Father Kim Il Sung*”: *Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in North Korea*, 2005.

³⁴⁶ Interview with CS15, Seoul, 05 February 2007.

³⁴⁷ Interview with CS06, Seoul, 22 January 2007. So, this person implies that South Koreans are superficial.

³⁴⁸ Interview with CS12, Seoul, 30 January 2007.

Secondly, ‘to hold in esteem,’ in Korean ‘*ureoreo batdeulda*’ (우러러 받들다), literally means ‘to look up to and revere,’ and is used for the leaders in the North and a gesture accompanies its use.

When I visited Pyongyang city, I pointed at the picture of the leader hanging on the wall in the hotel. A North Korean man explained that the picture of the leader must be pointed at not by a finger but by the palm of the hand held straight with the palm upwards. To anyone who identifies with the modern liberal idea, that can be instinctively repellent. However, in North Korea it is extremely important.

The words in North Korean translate “to hold Kim Il-sung in high esteem” (Kim Il-sung eu *ureoreo batdeulda*) is literally the same word used religiously to “look up and receive” Christ.

Thirdly, from cradle to grave, North Koreans are surrounded by the all-encompassing presence of the “Great Leader” Kim Jong-il. The Kim dynasty is much more than an authoritarian government; it also presents itself as the ultimate source of power, virtue, spiritual wisdom, and truth for the North Korean people. For instance, when the experimental opening of the *Kyunghui* Train Lines and East Sea Lines between North and South Korea, which was shut for half a century, took place on the 16th of May 2007, there was a conversation between representatives of North and South. The Unification Minister of South Korea Mr. Lee said, “I think connecting the rail between North and South is a historical and *great* victory for both South and North.” A secretary of North Korea Mr. Kwon complained about the word ‘*great*’, saying “Do not attach the word ‘*great*’ to the present event”, which made Lee disheartened.³⁴⁹ Mr. Lee could not understand why Mr. Kwon had made such a complaint. He did not know that the word ‘*great*’ could be used only for the leaders

³⁴⁹ Kim Song-a, *South-North Cooperation, a Bit Early for "Self-Appraisals"*; available from <http://www.dailyink.com>; Internet; accessed 9 September 2007.

Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il. If Mr. Kwon had not complained to Mr. Lee, he might have been in trouble in North Korea.

2.6. Address

Koreans derive their identity from a variety of sources. Depending on the situation, a person may, for instance, be identified primarily as a man or woman, an elder or a youth, a manager or a peasant. These and many other forms of identification are embedded in the Korean language as used in South Korea, which possesses verb and noun suffixes that structurally force a speaker to denote specific hierarchical relationships in all verbal interactions. The North Koreans eradicated some of these aspects of Korean culture.

The North Koreans call each other '*dongji*' ('동지', 'comrade') without any honorific title. They do not use '*sida*' ('시다') which is a verb representing honour in North Korea. After eating a meal, the North Koreans usually say '*Abeojiege mul gassda jura*' ('아버지에게 물 갔다 주라' 'Give father some water') in North Korea but that is impolite speech in South Korea. The North Koreans say '*Abeoji siksahaessseupnikka?*' ('아버지 식사했습니까?' in Korean, it means 'Did father have a meal?') but the South Koreans say '*Abeoji siksahasyeosseupnikka?*' ('아버지 식사 하셨습니까', did father have a meal?). The North Koreans use the expression '*gapnikka?*' ('갑니까?' in Korean, it means 'Do you go?') but the South Koreans use '*gasipnikka?*' ('가십니까?'). At first it was very difficult for me to find appropriate words when speaking to the South Koreans.³⁵⁰

Inserting the syllable '*si*' or '*syeos*' in the middle of the word represents respect. In South Korea the expression of '*gapnikka?*' and '*haessseupnikka?*' are impolite,

³⁵⁰ Interview with CS15, Seoul, 05February 2007.

'*gasipnikka?*' and '*hasyeossseupnikka?*' are polite. According to the interviewee above, '*si*' and '*syeoss*' are not used even between son and father in North Korea. This stems from the principle of equality among the people according to which there is no need to express honour towards each other. '*Dongji*' represents equality and 'being of the same mind' and it is a perfectly adequate designation.

2.7. Words Expressing Tenderness and Affection

Regarding relationships there is a tendency in the CS to avoid tender expressions because it is considered a weakness. North Korean people have been taught not to show forgiveness towards their enemies. This is revealed when the CS come into contact with the CW in the church.

I have heard the word of 'love' used between man and woman in South Korea. However, North Koreans do not say '*Neoreul johahanda*' ('너를 좋아한다', in Korean, it means 'I like you') or '*Neoreul saranghanda*' ('너를 사랑한다', in Korean, it means 'I love you') but say '*Neo maeume deunda*' ('너 마음에 든다', 'You are acceptable to me') or '*Neo maeume issda*' ('너 마음에 있다', 'You are on my mind'). It is important for North Koreans to speak and act strongly. North Korean women also like their men to speak and act strongly. In church, when a Wolnammin says 'Love your enemy', I think that they are making fun of me more and more. In addition, Wolnammin emphasise 'sharing' in the church. However, it is very difficult for us to accept 'sharing' because the word '*nanum*' ('나눔', 'sharing') does not exist in North Korea.³⁵¹

The noun '*nanum*' does not exist in the dictionary published in North Korea named *New Korean-English Dictionary* but the noun of '*nanumjil*' ('나눔질' in Korean)

³⁵¹ Interview with CS12, Seoul, 30 January 2007.

which means ‘sharing’³⁵² does. However, in South Korea ‘*nanum*’ and ‘*nanumjil*’ do not have the same meaning. The meaning of ‘*nanumjil*’ is very negative whereas the meaning of ‘*nanum*’ is very positive in South Korea. The CS share possessions with their close neighbours but they do not understand why South Koreans make donations to people they do not know such as flood victims etc. through appeals on television. This suggests that they like living with their comrades like brothers and sisters within a restricted organisation but they see no obligation at all to peers outside that group.

When I joined the BSCFP in Younngak Presbyterian Church as an observer, I heard the word ‘*Teuleojwinda*’ (‘틀어쥌다’)³⁵³ frequently during my interviews with the CS. When I asked one of the CS a question about the word’s meaning, he answered me that the meaning was ‘*Jangakhanda*’³⁵⁴ (‘장악한다’), ‘control’ or ‘strongly hold’. The word ‘*Teuleojwinda*’ is hardly used in South Korea. The word of ‘*Teuleojwinda*’ is a compound word composed of two verbs: ‘*teuleo*’ means ‘twist’ and ‘*jwinda*’ means ‘grasp’, which means ‘twisting and grasping’ like ‘holding something with force.’ The CS tend to use words which seem very direct and even harsh to the CW listeners and can easily give a negative impression of the CS speakers as being an aggressive, or even potentially violent person.

2.8. Same Words Different Meanings

³⁵² *Pyongyang Oegukeodaehak Yeongeohakbusajeon Pyeonchanjipdan* (Pyongyang University for Foreign Studies), *Op. Cit.*, p. 382.

³⁵³ ‘*Teuleojwinda*’ (‘틀어쥌다’) verb 1) hold, 2) seize, 3) take(get) hold of, 4) take (something) in hand, 5) have (something, somebody) at one’s disposal, 6) take it into one’s helm (to do), 7) clench, 8) grasp, 9) clasp. See, *Ibid.*, p. 2196.

³⁵⁴ Interview with CS14, Seoul, 04 February 2007.

Significantly different meanings of words between the South Koreans and the CS can result in dangerous situations. For example, regarding ‘*Daejunda*’ (‘대준다’) ³⁵⁵ a female Saeteoin had the following unpleasant experience:

We (*North Korea and South Korea*) have a different language. I was embarrassed because of this, in spite of the fact that we share a common language. In North Korea we say ‘*Daejunda*’ (‘대준다’) meaning ‘*Ilreojunda*’ (‘일러준다’ in Korean, it means ‘let a person know; tell a person something’). For example, when one says ‘*Neone nampyeonhante daejwo*’ (‘너네 남편한테 대줘’ in Korean) it means ‘*Neone nampyeonhante ilreojunda*’ (‘너네 남편한테 일러준다’ ‘I will let your husband know’). However, I did not know that in South Korea its meaning is completely different; it means ‘I will have sex with your husband’. Before I recognised this, I nearly found myself in trouble. While working in the restaurant I said to the boss ‘*Sajangnim naega daejwo*’ (‘사장님 내가 대줘’), ‘boss, I will let your wife know’. However, he replied to me “*Ya! Hwakkeunhaguna*” (‘야! 화끈하구나’ ‘wow! you are hot’). I soon came to realise that it had a different meaning in South Korea. Since that time, I have never used the sentence. I said “do not say such a word to me” to those who said it to me jokingly, ‘Miss Park, ‘*Daejwo*’.³⁵⁶

2.9. Expressing Body Weight

The expression for obesity is different between the North and the South. When I visited North Korea, I was accompanied by three South Korean professors from Yonsei University of South Korea. We had dinner with four North Korean officers in a restaurant one day.

³⁵⁵ □ supply [provide, furnish (a person with a thing); find (a person with something); give (ration to) □ teach; show; tell; inform (a person of a thing).

See, *Pyongyang Oegukeodaehak Yeongeohakbusajeon Pyeonchanjipdan* (Pyongyang University for Foreign Studies), *Op.Cit.*, p. 668.

³⁵⁶ Interview with CS18, Seoul, 06February 2007.

Mr. Park, one of the professors, said to Mr. Lee, the head of the Union of National Economic Committee of North Korea, that 'after visiting North Korea last time *'Naneunsaljyeosdda'* ('I got fat'). Mr. Lee pointed out that in North Korea *'Saljyeosdda'* is never used for human beings only for animals like pigs etc. North Koreans say *'Momi joha jyeosdda'* (it means 'the body looks good').³⁵⁷

In short, in light of the above nine examples, both South Korea and North Korea have become verbally heterogeneous which leads to the unsuspecting speaker from one being misunderstood, humiliated and embarrassed in the other.

3. Behavioural Symbols

In spite of the fact that the CS became citizens of South Korea and Christians in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, there has not been much change in their patterns of behaviour to which they were accustomed in North Korea which given the effectiveness of socialisation in both the CS and the CW systems, is not surprising. Their different behaviour aspects of which have already been alluded to, does not derive from something biologically inherent in human nature, but is a socialized variable that depends crucially on the use of symbols.

3.1. Smiling, Praise and Greetings

The CW in Youngnak complain that their North Korean counterparts hardly ever smile. When in Pyongyang city I noticed that people's faces were unmistakably scornful, or worn and blank. Nobody smiled. The following responses are indicative of the interviewees' perceptions of a smile.

³⁵⁷ Ha Chung-yoube, *Op.Cit.*, p. 4.

A woman smiling in North Korea is a sign that she intends to lead a man into temptation and when a man laughs it means that he is a fool. The perception of a smile between South Korea and North Korea seems to be different.³⁵⁸

I saw the South Koreans smiling; it seemed to me that they are covering their inmost heart. However, the CS always expose their inmost heart: if they could not do it, they would die.³⁵⁹

Smiling in North Korean communication is not a sign of politeness but of attraction. On the other hand, in terms of South Korean communicative behaviour it is a sign of politeness. Smiles are necessary when greeting or having a polite conversation in South Korea. The CS have pointed out many times that the typical South Korean smile seems unnatural and false to them. They think that a smiling person likes you and is very friendly to you. The CS smiles only to fellow workers because they feel that they should not favour strangers.

Kim Gyeong-suk, one Christian Saeteomin who studied theology in Youngnak Women's Theology Seminary, said that she needed three years to realise that when she was praised it was not a sign of ridicule.³⁶⁰ North Koreans are less ready than South Koreans to exchange greetings.

Park: North Koreans do not greet each other, they do not say, '*Annyeonghasipnikka?*' (it means 'How are you?'). Even though I thought I was well-mannered in North Korea because my job was to stand before crowds, I did not greet my fellow North Koreans.³⁶¹

Ha: Why do North Koreans not greet each other?

Park: The society of North Korea itself does not make people respect each other. There is no routine for greetings in North Korea. However, I was accustomed to greet people on a routine basis while working in a propaganda squad team in North Korea.³⁶²

³⁵⁸ Interview with CS05, Seoul, 12 December 2006.

³⁵⁹ Interview with CS03, Seoul, 07 February 2007.

³⁶⁰ Interview with CS05, Seoul, 12 December 2006.

³⁶¹ Interview with CS18, Seoul, 06 February 2007.

³⁶² Interview with CS07, Seoul, 24 January 2007.

3.2. Marital Roles

There is a difference of marital roles between North and South. The CS' family is based on a more patriarchal system than the South Korean family pattern. One of the Christian Saeteomin males stated that man's authoritarianism is strong in North Korea but South Korea is the opposite of North Korea.³⁶³ One of the Christian females also testified as follows:

A husband beats his wife black and blue very often in North Korea and then the wife still has to cook dinner. When North Korean Saeteomin enter to South Korea they first stay at *Hanawon*.³⁶⁴ They are taught there that in South Korea a husband should not beat his wife, which made the North Korean males laugh. When I told my brother, he also laughed.³⁶⁵

While marital violence certainly does occur in South Korea, it has recently been declared illegal. This is the experience of one of the Christian Saeteomin females who married a South Korean male.

In North Korea, the marital relationship is exactly the same as written in the Bible 'wives submit to your husbands as to the Lord...now as the church submits to Christ, so also wives should submit to their husbands in everything.' North Korean wives

³⁶³ Interview with CS14, Seoul, 04 February 2007.

³⁶⁴ Hanawon opened on July 8, 1999, and is the government resettlement center for North Korean Saeteomin. It is nestled in the South Korean countryside, in Anseong, Gyeonggi Province, about three hours south of Seoul. Originally built to accommodate around 200 inmates for a 3 month resettlement program, the government extended the center in 2002 to double its original size and cut the program from three months to two months because of the increase in the number of North Korean Saeteomin per year. In 2004, to mark the fifth anniversary of the program, a second facility opened south of Seoul. Hanawon can now feed, house, and train 400 people at one time. At Hanawon, the curriculum is focused on three main goals: easing the socioeconomic and psychological anxiety of Saeteomin; overcoming the barriers of cultural heterogeneity; and offering practical training for earning a livelihood in the South. Hanawon imposes heavy restrictions on the travel of Saeteomin because of security concerns. In addition, security is tight with barbed wire, security guards, and cameras. The threat of kidnap, or personal attacks against individual North Koreans, by North Korean agents is ever-present; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korean_Saeteomin; Internet; accessed 30 August 2007.

³⁶⁵ Interview with CS18, Seoul, 06 February 2007.

should submit in everything to their husbands. When I lived in North Korea, I used to carry the shopping home on my back from the market. I cooked delicious dishes for my husband every day. While living together with a South Korean male, I acted towards my husband as I did in North Korea. I carried the heavy shopping items, washed the clothes, washed the dishes and did everything without any help from my husband. However, after marrying him, I wanted this to change. I asked my husband to share the burden with me. He told me that I had changed a lot. I said to him, “I do not wish to rely on you but I find it so hard that I need your help, please do what you can.” Since then we have accepted that we would help each other. It is a significant change for me.³⁶⁶

A Christian Saeteomin couple expressed their feelings about marital roles as follows

Han (wife): “Christian Saeteomin females wish to be raised to a higher status than they had when they lived in North Korea and wish to be treated with respect at home. However, the CS males would find difficult if the CS females insisted on such a thing.”

Jong (husband): “North Korean males demand absolute submission from females. This expectation was formed by the system of the totalitarian state in North Korea. This may be problematic and it would also be difficult for South Koreans to understand North Korean marital roles. However, I think that the life style of South Korean males is also problem in terms of the perspective of North Korean males. I saw South Korean males carrying the heavy shopping, cooked and picked their babies up onto their backs. These things made me feel strange very much.”

Han (wife): “The father of my baby does not do these things but he will adapt.”

Jong (husband): “There is hardly any conversation between a husband and a wife in North Korea. A wife should submit to the orders of her husband. However, in South Korea married couples seem to have too many conversations.”³⁶⁷

3.3. Cooking

There is a difference in cooking styles between South Korea and North Korea. A Christian Saeteomin told me that he does not go to restaurants in South Korea because

³⁶⁶ Interview with CS11, Seoul, 27 January 2007.

³⁶⁷ Interview with CS15, Seoul, 05 February 2007.

South Korean food tastes salty, spicy and sweet.³⁶⁸ Another Christian Saeteomin said “North Korean food tastes delicious. I grew up, eating local food only, and no western food at all. In South Korea I had South Korean pork porridge. The first time I went to South Korea, I was offered tomato juice on the plane. It made me sick.”³⁶⁹ Three other Christian Saeteomin explained their experience:

At first South Koreans seemed to be like another nation...the language of South Korea is mixed with English...food in South Korea is significantly different from that of North Korea...my South Korean friends did not eat the meal I cooked. Also, I was unable to enjoy South Korean food. I feel a sense of alienation, thinking that I will be ignored when I do not eat their food and they do not eat what I cook. After this, I shut my mind toward South Koreans. I dislike staying with them for any length of time and I dislike South Koreans visiting me in my room.³⁷⁰

South Korean food which is too sweet does not suit my taste. I remembered eating sweet things when I was a child during Japanese imperialism. The food in South Korea contains sweet ingredients. I do not like sweet things. Just salt, soya and *toenjang* (soybean paste): these three things are enough in North Korea. I have made more of an effort now but, well, I still eat meals that are North Korean at home.³⁷¹

North Korean cooking is still based on local, traditional methods but South Korea has changed to a modern, Western style of cooking. They use too much monosodium glutamate. South Koreans eat less rice cake than us. South Korean *Naengmyeon* (iced noodles) is different from North Korean. South Koreans use too many additives.³⁷²

Naengmyeon, literally iced noodles, is a Korean dish. Originally a wintertime delicacy in what is now North Korea, it has become an extremely popular summer dish throughout Korea. South Koreans use scissors to cut the noodles before eating

³⁶⁸ Interview with CS17, Seoul, 05 February 2007.

³⁶⁹ Interview with CS12, Seoul, 30 January 2007.

³⁷⁰ Interview with CS13, Seoul, 02 February 2007.

³⁷¹ Interview with CS20, Seoul, 13 February 2007.

³⁷² Interview with CS15, Seoul, 05 February 2007.

them. When I had dinner in a restaurant in North Korea with Mr. Han who is a secretary of the Committee of the National Economic Cooperation of North Korea, he told me that it took his breath away when he was suddenly given scissors with his *naengmyeon*. The North Koreans do not cut the noodles.³⁷³

3.4. Making Promises

The CS need time for adaptation to perceive the notion of a promise as a social contract indicating a transaction between two persons. A promise may also refer to any kind of vow or guarantee. In the same way, the CW need to understand the notion of a promise from the perspective of the CS rather than criticize the CS for not keeping promises. A Christian Saeteomin stated:

A promise made to an individual hardly exists in North Korea because North Korea is a totalitarian system. In North Korea we make a promise when the Party mobilizes the masses to carry out a specific task. The kind of promise I experienced in North Korea was actually an experience of obedience to the Party. A promise is between me and the masses, unrelated to any individual benefit...I mean that the individual's well-being is not affected in any way, whether or not the promise is kept or whether one neglects one's duties or not.³⁷⁴

Many CW who encounter the CS criticized the CS for not keeping promises, which will be dealt with further in chapter 4.

3.5. Acting Simply and Expression Style

Expression Style

³⁷³ Ha Chung-yoube, *Op.Cit.*, p. 10.

³⁷⁴ Interview with CS15, Seoul, 05 February 2007.

North Koreans enjoy describing themselves as a society ‘dyed in one colour’. Magnificently choreographed mass marches and visual displays express this sentiment. North Koreans act simply and directly. One of the CS spoke about the reason why they express their feeling in a direct manner.

As Kim Il-sung said that apples are either red or blue, so the good thing is good, the bad thing is bad. There is nothing in between good and bad. North Korean Saeteomin speak directly when they are offended. Those who restrain themselves are not true North Koreans.³⁷⁵

This thinking resulted in the formation of dichotomous expression which makes the CS difficult to communicate with for the South Koreans. The CS compared their expression style with the South Koreans, which I cite from the excerpts of my interviews:

South Koreans do not express their feelings using words but the North Koreans Saeteomin have to express themselves directly. South Koreans seem to be introspective. They do not express themselves directly. It seems to me that they may be calculating something in their minds.³⁷⁶

Acting Simply

I conducted an in-depth interview with a Christian Saeteomin male.³⁷⁷ He mentioned one of North Korea’s slogans which illustrated the principle of dichotomous thinking: ‘be careful not to be shot by two bullets’ which warns of the

³⁷⁵ Interview with CS20, Seoul, 13 February 2007.

³⁷⁶ Interview with CS15, Seoul, 02 February 2007.

³⁷⁷ He was born in 1950 and grew up in Pyongyang city and worked for the People’s Army for a long time. He entered South Korea in 1998 and became one of the first students in the BSCFP in Younknak Presbyterian Church. He was the first North Korean Saeteomin to graduate from the Presbyterian College and Theological Seminary in 2002. After his graduation he worked, as full time lay pastor, for two years in Younknak Presbyterian Church, then planted a new church in 2006, and was ordained in 2007.

dangers of switching sides. This dichotomous thinking stops him from understanding the beneficial role of mediation between conflicting groups.

When I worked as a full time evangelist in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, I saw that Park Chun-tae, one of the pastors, worked between the pastors and the elders. He seemed to me that he prepared for this loophole. This kind of man is called 'a turncoat' in North Korea, a bad man. We say in North Korea 'be careful if you do not want to be killed by two bullets' which means that you must 'certainly stand only on one side'. The worst people in the world are those who are shot by two bullets, one from our forces and one from the enemy.³⁷⁸

He misunderstood the role of Park Chun-tae who, as an administrative pastor of the senior minister of Youngnak Presbyterian Church, tried to reconcile two groups with the different agendas in the church. The very idea of reconciliation, rather than elimination, seems contrary to Juche thought.

Difficulty in Making Friends

The principle of ideological remoulding of Juche ideology influenced the North Korean people to distinguish friend from foe, which impacts on forming of friendships. I conducted an in-depth interview with a Christian Saeteomin female who is a student in BSCFP in Youngnak Presbyterian Church and studies theology in Youngnak Women Seminary. She said that she could not accept diversity or alternative ways of thoughts, in the South Korean society because she lived in a very strong either-or society in North Korea.

North Korean Saeteomin think that South Koreans put on a facade and hide their real self from North Koreans. There is no such thing as forgiveness in North Korea,

³⁷⁸Interview with CS01, Seoul, 28 October 2006.

which means that I must beat you if you beat me. North Koreans can never accept the culture of South Korea. Since I was a child I have learnt to hate intensely and was taught that 'I must take revenge.' In my mind others became my enemies. For three years in South Korea... I thought that the South Koreans were lying or holding something back whenever they did not express their feelings directly.³⁷⁹

The flames of hatred formed in North Korea against the U.S. and the South Koreans are still embedded in the minds of the CS as enemies, which may make it difficult for them to establish good relationships with Americans and South Koreans in South Korea. Mr. Ham, a Christian Saeteomin, spoke about the hatred against the U.S.:

Ham: "The reunification of two Koreas should be accomplished by communism which will repel the imperialism of the United States!"

Ha: "Do you feel uncomfortable when you see Americans in South Korea?"

Ham: "Yes, I do."³⁸⁰

Conversely, while the CS assume that the CW do not particularly like them, they have a firm belief that the CW actually hate them when they blame the CS for something. According to Shim, the motivation for his joining the People's Army of North Korea was to take revenge on the armies of both South Korea and the United States. Even though he became a South Korean citizen and a Christian, he is still prejudiced against the CW members of Youngnak Presbyterian Church. He thinks that the South Koreans are full of hatred towards North Koreans and the CS, and that they look down on them. He is unable to change his perception and judgement on South Koreans because in the North they are regarded as enemies and enemies must be hated passionately.

³⁷⁹ Interview with CS05, Seoul, 12 December 2006.

³⁸⁰ Interview with CS20, Seoul, 13 February 2007.

The North Korean Saeteomin, when they lived in North Korea, were educated to hate Wolnammin who will eagerly look out for a chance of aggression against North Korea. I am sure that Christian Wolnammin in the church think that the North Korean Saeteomin are descended from those who previously went about begging in their own land.³⁸¹

He refers to the fact that after 1953, the elite in North Korea were eliminated and the lower classes (“the beggars”) supported and advanced. This prejudice against members of the church influences his ability to relate to the CW in the church in South Korea. There are three crucial issues for him in regarding CW. First, they were landlords in pre-war Korea, and thus the object of Communist hatred. Second, they abandoned the country of their birth, and are therefore traitors. Thirdly, they may be interested in re-union in order to get their old lands.

Although I cannot ask the CW whether they hate me, I think they hate me. I have heard that an elder in the church regarded me as a spy and all North Korean Saeteomin as spies. Furthermore, I feel a sense of distance when I see the rich CW coming to the church to worship in their own cars with drivers. I think that almost all the CW were landlords in North Korea before they migrated to South Korea.³⁸²

Jung Hyang-jin³⁸³ also noticed that North Korean Saeteomin themselves acknowledge that their emotional style is different from South Koreans’. In addition, they assume that strong emotional ties exist among themselves while South Koreans are “superficial.”³⁸⁴ Her research deals with the psychological and behavioural

³⁸¹ Interview with CS01, Seoul, 28 October 2006.

³⁸² Interview with CS01, Seoul, 28 October 2006.

³⁸³ She is an assistant professor, Department of Anthropology, Seoul National University.

³⁸⁴ Jong Hyang-jin, Talbuk Cheongsonyeondeului Gamjeongseonggwa Nambukhanui Munhwasimrijeok Chai (North Korean Saeteomin’ Emotionality and Its Social Implications: A Perspective from Cultural Psychology), Cross-Cultural Studies, vol.11-1, Seoul: The

characteristics of North Korean Saeteomin living in South Korea and the implications for their social adjustment. Even though her article did not deal with ethnic identity in relation to Juche ideology the findings of the present research are supported by Hyang-Jin's. Saeteomin indeed hold a polarized view about their South Korean neighbours, and they do find it hard to soften their stand on South Koreans even as South Korean citizens and Christians. Their upbringing and everyday existence was determined by the Juche principle which influenced their behaviour, language and customs to such a deep extent that unlearning and adapting becomes very difficult. Moreover, the behaviour that was encouraged in North Korea is not useful in South Korea: black and white thinking and looking at fellow citizens suspiciously, never quite believing their intentions, make it very hard for North Koreans to make friends and form meaningful, close relationships with South Koreans.

Conclusion

The hypothesis with which this chapter began was that the CS ethnic identity is very different from the CW ethnic identity. The aim of Chapter 3 was to demonstrate these differences at the level of material, verbal and behaviour symbols.

In the following table I summarise the material and verbal symbols as well as behavioural patterns that emerged from my analysis of the CS ethnic identities in Youngnak Presbyterian Church in Seoul. This method follows the paradigm of anthropological research laid down by Geertz. Data was obtained through in depth interviews and participant observations in both North and South Korea.

High-heels and blue jeans are considered enemy fashion in North Korea and the CS find it hard to get used to seeing them, let alone wearing them. Also six flower species have symbolic meanings attached to them by the state. The difference in meaning attached to these symbols indicates that the identity of the two communities is not fully shared. It is important to highlight these differences in order to avoid misunderstanding and lessen the possibility of conflict.

Material symbols	Verbal symbols	Behavioural symbols
1. Clothing 1) unfashionable 2) blue jeans Leninhats High-heels 2. Flowers 1) <i>maehwa</i> flower 2) common sunflower 3) azalea 4) magnolia 5) <i>Kimjongilia</i> 6) <i>Kimilsungia</i> 3. Colours (red and blue)	1. Different interpretation of the phrase 2. Words and phrases of both foreign origin & pure Korean language 1) fried rice covering an egg of a chicken & <i>dalkal ssuiunbap</i> 2) bring key from the cabinet & <i>cabinet eseo key gajyeowara</i> 3) <i>Inchagalge</i> (I will go very soon) 4) <i>Il eopsda</i> (I am fine) 5) <i>namsae</i> (vegetables) 6) abbreviations 3. Intonation and accent 4. Designations 1) <i>Abai</i> (father) 2) <i>Aga</i> (baby) 5. Reserved words 1) <i>Gamsa</i> (Thanks) 2) <i>ureoreo batdeulda</i> (to look up to and revere) 3) Great 6. Honorific address 1) <i>dongji</i> (a comrade) 2) Attaching the syllable 'si' and 'syeoss' 7. Harsh Expressions 1) <i>nanumjil</i> (sharing) 2) <i>teuleojwinda</i> (strongly hold) 8. Different meanings of words 1) <i>daejunda</i> (let (a person) know) 9. The expression for obesity	1. Smile, Praise, Greetings 2. Marital relationship 3. Cooking style 4. Promise 5. Prejudices stemming from 1) Expression style 2) Acting in a direct manner

Second, it has been demonstrated in this chapter that verbal communication between members of the two communities can often break down due to changes in the Korean language that occurred in both North and South in the different direction. In the North, some expressions were only allowed to be used in relation to the leader, including words that are used every day by Southerners like “thank you”, “look up to

somebody” or “great”. The CS may be offended when these special words are used in relation to any person. Moreover, the meaning of some expression might have completely changed during the decades of partition. We saw the example of a Christian Saeteomin woman, who was ridiculed for using an innocuous expression. It may be concluded that shared language does not entail shared meaning at every level.

Third, the CS believe that their Southern neighbours hate them and despise them. They were taught in North Korea to hate South Koreans. Even when they become South Korean citizens they find it very hard to feel accepted. There is a residual assumption of class difference and class war, the CW being equalled with landlordism, and the CS assuming they are regarded as outcasts.

Fourth, the CS themselves acknowledge that their abrupt speaking style and direct conduct stems from the expectations placed on them by Juche ideology, which cultivated black and white thinking and discouraged forgiveness.

The ethnic identity of the two populations is still Korean. However, that single Korean identity is gone, which means that practically, Koreans no longer share the same identity. In other words there is a South Korean identity and a North Korean identity in the Korean Peninsula.

Chapter IV The Explanation of Wolnammin's Different Ethnic Identity in Interaction with Saeteomin

Introduction

In Chapter 3 I analysed a number of material and verbal symbols as well as behavioural patterns that highlights the differences between the CS and the CW. The primary focus was on the CS experience, the symbols they grew up with and the effect of Juche ideology on maintaining symbolic meanings and resultant behaviour even when North Korean refugees become South Korean citizens and choose Christianity. Their experience of interacting with the CW was shown to be less than satisfactory for them. The CS became very aware of the differences that divide the two communities. Moreover, the CW (and to some extent the CS) ignorance leads to embarrassing situations, suspicion and argument. From the conversations I had with the Christian Saeteomin members of Youngnak Presbyterian Church I concluded that they feel isolated and misunderstood. They found the CW rude and some of their behaviour was unacceptable to them. For instance they did not recognise mediation as a positive role one can take on; they could not easily rid themselves of dichotomous thinking that regards every single act as either black or white. They also found it very hard to forgive and as a result of an argument or insult they tended to step out of the situation, making it very difficult to form friendships and be in fellowship with the CW.

In this chapter, I switch the focus to the CW and examine the extent to which their ethnic identity is different from that of the CS with reference to material, verbal symbols and behavioural patterns. Regarding the lifestyles of the CW, most said that they tended to follow the cultural style of their former home towns in the North, where they were brought up. For example, their accents or manner of speaking or eating habits often reflect their particular place of origin. However, after living in South Korea for half a century, there have been many changes. In the course of observing the CW ways of life in the church community, especially their contacts with the CS, I discovered some interesting examples of cultural difference, in spite of the fact that originally both populations came to the church from the same provinces of North Korea 50 or more years apart. The ongoing ideological competition between the two Koreas was inevitably reflected, either directly or indirectly, in all the sixteen interviews. The degree of sensitivity expressed by the participants in their approach seemed to play an important role in determining how much differences would be allowed to exert a negative influence on the course and atmosphere of the developing relationship between the CW and the CS. This factor can be affected considerably by both the interviewees' personal feelings and views of North Korea, which were formed by the experience of their or their family's possible communist persecution and the definite anti-communist education to which every South Koreans were subjected. Due to three factors, memory of hell, scapegoat for anger and focus of paranoia towards the CS as well as North Korea, the CW have not formed strong relationships with the CS in the BSCFP section in Youngnak Presbyterian Church and any communication between them is characterised by difficulties.

In this area, the conflict and closeness of relationships among the two populations plays a considerable role in determining how the people of North and South Korea get

on in more limited context of a Seoul Church-and may give an indication of how they might react during the reunification of the two Koreas. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that it is not easy for the two populations to understand each other as their differing material symbols, verbal symbols and behavioural symbols, shown in chapter 3, points to distinct identities. I will present evidence for these distinct identities as revealed by the CW interview data. First, material symbols will be discussed; second, some examples of verbal symbols will be presented; finally, behavioural patterns will be described. The same methodology will be used as in Chapter 3. The identity of the CW will be investigated in two ways: 1) it will be found in the Christian Wolnammin's material and verbal symbols, and also their behavioural patterns, 2) by reflecting upon the deserved and reported interaction between the CW and the CS. In particular, I will focus on the responses of the CW towards the CS.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to deal with all the CW, but rather to deal with those only who are involved with the BSCFP. The BSCFP participants, among whom I conducted most of my research, are part of a small community of North Korean Saeteomin within Youngnak Presbyterian Church, all of which are taught by CW. The work of the BSCFP with the North Korean Saeteomin is organised into four areas of responsibility as follows: 1) the senior minister, a guidance pastor, a full time unordained guidance pastor, and a part-time guidance lay pastor, 2) the head of the Centre, 3) a team leader and a financial aid team leader, 4) regular teachers and volunteers. The chain of command is as follows: 1) the senior minister is in charge of the guidance pastor, who issues advice and guidelines to the teachers, 2) the guidance pastor discusses the work with the head of the Centre, 3) the head of the Centre supervises the team leader who oversees the regular teachers and volunteers with regard of the administration of the classes, 4) the teachers meet with the North Korean

Saeteomin, providing both teaching and pastoral care. The two unordained guidance pastors assist the guidance pastor. Among the 50,000 members of the church, these are the only people who render services to the CS in the BSCFP. My data collection methods consisted of participant observation and sixteen in-depth interviews with Christian Wolnammin members of the church who are involved with the BSCFP.

1. Material Symbols

1.1. Preferred clothing

Until 1945 clothing styles were quite traditional except for some modern styles preferred in the larger cities. There was very little difference between styles worn in the north and south.

Historically, the colours of the clothes reflected social class in Korea. Common people wore mostly white and royal persons wore yellow. Koreans usually wore traditional clothing in the first half of the 20th century. The traditional costume is called as *hanbok* which is a two-piece outfit for men and women. Women wore a *chogori* (jacket) with long rectangular sleeves, which was accompanied by a *chima* (wrap skirt) made from a large rectangular piece of fabric with long sashes attached to the skirt to form a waistband. The traditional costume for Korean men was a *chogori* jacket similar to the one worn by women, accompanied by *paji* (trousers).³⁸⁵

However, after Korea was liberated from Japan, distinct clothing styles began to appear. The differences became increasingly apparent after the 1960s when South Korea began to develop economically. Today the CW wear Western clothes and follow the latest European and American fashion. However, they wear traditional Korean outfits on holidays such as on *Seol* (New Year's Day) and *Chuseok* (the Harvest Moon Day) etc.

Nevertheless, the CW generally enjoy wearing modern Western-style clothing most of the time. On the contrary, North Koreans wear socialist style clothing, Western

³⁸⁵ Government Information Agency, *Facts about Korea*, Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, 2003, pp.152-153. *South Koreans*, available from: <http://www.everyculture.com/wc/Japan-to-Mali/South-Koreans.html>; accessed 4 February 2008.

style garments were not generally available because they symbolised capitalist ways of thinking, which would corrupt the minds of the people (see Chapter 3 for more details).

Therefore, the CS could be spotted easily in church even if they try to dress and use makeup like their South Korean counterparts.³⁸⁶ Only a few CW interviewees said that it was difficult for them to distinguish the CS from the CW regarding appearance, even if a Christian Saeteomin had lived in South Korea for four or five years.³⁸⁷

1.2. Wine and Tobacco

W.W. Rockwell, the formal American consul in Seoul, remarked that Koreans were the nation with the most smokers.³⁸⁸ They also enjoyed drinking alcoholic beverages.

However, ten years after the Methodist Episcopal missionary proclaimed teetotalism in Korea in August 1893,³⁸⁹ the Methodist Episcopal Church prohibited its members to smoke and drink.³⁹⁰ The conservative evangelical denominations including Korean Presbyterians had the same position at that time which has prevailed to this day.

There are no such prohibitions in North Korea and the CS have continued to enjoy drinking alcohol and smoking very much. In the eyes of the CW tobacco and alcohol are symbols of secularism. “The CS smoke in front of the teachers in the church. Moreover, one of them gifted kaoliang wine to me for Christmas. I refused the gift and told him that Christians shouldn’t drink wine at all, or smoke tobacco. His face

³⁸⁶ Interview with CW02, Seoul, 29 October 2006.

³⁸⁷ Interview CWG01, Seoul, 31 October 2006.

³⁸⁸ J.S. Gale, *Korea in Transition*, New York: Layman’s Missionary Movement, 1909. In-su Kim, *Hanguk Kidogkyoui Yeoksa (The History of Korean Christianity)*, Seoul: PCTS Press, 1997, p. 468.

³⁸⁹ Kim In-su, *Ibid.*, p. 465.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 469.

turned red at this.”³⁹¹ However, for the North Korean Saeteomin, wine is an appropriate gift showing their warm feelings towards their teachers; therefore, they feel hurt when such a gift is refused and may even leave the church.

In short, although the ethnic identities of the two populations used to be indistinguishable, differing attitudes towards clothes after partition, and towards wine and tobacco for religious reasons, opened up a gulf between them over time.

2. Verbal Symbols

It has been pointed out that South Koreans produce symbols with reference to anti-Communist ideology. The following are three examples of verbal symbols.

2.1. Jaju (Independence)

The CW object to the words ‘*uri minjok*’ (‘our ethnic Koreans’) and ‘*jaju*’ (‘independence’ achieving reunification without the assistance of a foreign power). The North Korean government used the words *uri minjok* and *jaju* in relation to the policy of reunification. The CW do not want to use these words in connection with the reunification policy because they consider it as part of Communist discourse.³⁹² One of the elders of Youngnak Presbyterian Church regarded those who use the word ‘*uri minjok*’ as Communists. He criticized both his brother, who lives in the United States, and even Noh Mu-hyeon, the ex-president of South Korea, as Communists on the grounds that they prefer to use these words in the same way as North Koreans.

³⁹¹ Interview with CW06, Seoul, 15 February 2007.

³⁹² Interview with CW01, Seoul, 22 October 2006.

2.2. Dongmu (Friend)

The CW no longer use the word '*dongmu*' ('comrade,' or 'friend'). The most popular monthly student magazine was named '*Eokkae Dongmu*' (it means 'friends putting their hands around each other's shoulders') when I was in primary school. However, since then the word '*dongmu*' has disappeared because it is how North Koreans call each other. Those who use the word in South Korea nowadays might be regarded as North Korean spies. The word has a powerful communist connotation. However, the unsuspecting Saeteomin cannot help but use this word and they do not like the fact that it is somehow unacceptable in South Korea.

2.3. Migun Cheolsu (Withdraw of the United States Army)

Those who persist in using the phrase '*migun cheolsu*' (it means 'withdrawal of the United States Army') might be regarded as Communists. A mentality of dependence on the United States for security remains deep-rooted in the South Korean psyche, and CW are firmly convinced that the maintenance of peace, freedom and prosperity is due to the government's firm defence stance based on a South Korea–United States military alliance that has successfully deterred aggression from the communist North. When a person insists on the withdrawal of the Army of the United States, he will be regarded as someone who wishes that South Korea becomes part of the Communist North. In other words the CW perceives him as Communists or spies of North Korea.

When I was serving in the Vietnam War, a Vietnamese said to me “Why don't you get out of here? Our country would be reunified if you left”. They were Commies. The situation is the exactly same in South Korea where some people insist on the

withdrawal of the United States Army. They are Commies. If, in accordance with their wishes, the United States withdraws their troops from South Korea, South Korea will become a Communist country.³⁹³

In spite of the fact that phrases like *'uri minjok'*, *'jaju'*, *'dongmu'* and *'migun cheolsu'* are integral to the Korean language, they are not used in South Korea and those who use them may be regarded as spies or Communists. The reason is that the words have taken on a symbolic meaning. One could indeed see echoes of the North Korean “black and white” thinking in these verbal usages of the CW.

2.4. Hancha (Chinese Characters)

Finally, as part of the Cultural Language Movement in North Korea, Chinese and other foreign words were purged and replaced by Korean words. At the same time the language in the South embraced many American expressions. In addition, one of the verbal differences between the two Koreas is the status of Sino-Korean vocabulary and characters (*hancha*). In the north the use of *hancha* was abolished altogether because it was perceived as the privilege of the elite. In the South, there had been a gradual decline in the use of *hancha*. Purists and pragmatists used to hold heated debates on the fate of *hancha*; nowadays, however, it is actually experiencing a revival due to the emergence of China as a powerhouse.

North Korea purged foreign words and replaced the Chinese-Korean vocabulary with a pure Korean one in accordance with the requirements of the Juche ideology. Conversely, South Koreans have a tendency to regard those who use English and Chinese-Korean vocabulary as more intellectual because of their pro-America outlook. While North Koreans perceive the use of foreign words and *Hancha* as a

³⁹³ Interview with CW01, 22 October 2006.

characteristic of reactionary elements and therefore negative, South Koreans see this as the mark of an intellectual.

The CS cannot understand foreign words and *Hancha* phrases which are widely used in the CW circles but when they use words like ‘*uri minjok*’, ‘*jaju*’, ‘*dongmu*’ and ‘*migun cheolsu*’ etc. they are regarded as suspicious. It seems that more evidence for different identities has been uncovered by looking at verbal expressions.

3. Behavioural Patterns

3.1. The Nuclear Family and Individualism

The family used to be regarded as rock-solid in Korea, with strong social ties based on shared norms and values, in which mutual support and assistance was a matter of course. The family had traditionally been the main guardian of stability. It was by its nature one of the most important mainstays of a harmonious and close-knit society.³⁹⁴

However, since the partition of Korea, the social development of the two Koreas has been different: North Koreans have lived in a society of collective organisation³⁹⁵ and South Koreans have lived in a society in which the nuclear family has become the norm, bringing about individualisation within the family. These different social circumstances mean that the CW were affected by the sight of family unity displayed by the CS.

³⁹⁴ Cornelius Osgood, *The Koreans and Their Culture*, New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1951, pp. 37-53.

³⁹⁵ A Korean scholar, Lee Moon-woong, describes North Korea as a new Confucian society or family-state that is well integrated as an extension of filial piety, expressed through strong loyalty to its leader. See, Moon-woong Lee, *Rural North Korea Under Communism*, Rice University Special Studies, 1976, p.120. A American scholar, Bruce Cumings, also describes North Korea as North Korean corporatism that three great themes—hierarchy, organic connection, and family—and three great images that corresponded to it—political fatherhood, the body politic, and the great chain. See, Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997, p. 399.

The solidarity within their family is much stronger than in ours ... it seems to me that they are not individualists like South Koreans. Family solidarity still remains with them. They pay their entire fortune to bring the rest of their family to South Korea from North Korea.³⁹⁶

These days the family relationships of CS are stronger than ours. The families of South Koreans are breaking down more and more as a result of individualism. Through observing their daily life, I changed my thinking about the value and importance of the family. I was sometimes challenged when I saw their family love.³⁹⁷

One of the CS apologised in public to his elder brother for fighting with him. He is a younger brother who supports his elder brother financially, respecting his elder brother in place of his father who was left behind in North Korea. It would be hard for South Koreans to understand this.³⁹⁸

However, a minister at Younknak Presbyterian Church whom I met during the time of my field work and who was a second generation Wolnammin told me that he hardly regarded the CS as human beings because they left their family behind in North Korea and chose to live alone in South Korea. Nevertheless, most of the Christian Wolnammin interviewees were not only sympathetic to the predicament of the CS when they escaped on their own from North Korea, but also were impressed by their great efforts to bring the rest of their families to South Korea. Those Christian Wolnammin realised that they themselves had become individualists in their capitalistic system.

Human fellowship is still a part of the CS personality, whereas it is something that we are gradually losing. Even though they are poor, not only do they sometimes

³⁹⁶ Interview with CWG021, Seoul, 12 November 2006.

³⁹⁷ Interview with CW05, Seoul, 13 February 2007.

³⁹⁸ Interview with CW09, Seoul, 19 February 2007.

bring rice cake to the BSCFP to share but also they make buns and cook North Korean food and eat together, even inviting members of Youngnak Presbyterian Church. However, even though I am comfortably off, I have not done such a thing. I am always impressed whenever I see such behaviour. This always challenges me to make me help others.³⁹⁹

Since the partition of Korea the CW have lived in a capitalist system and the CS in the collectivist system before they came to the South. This has resulted in the formation of a different identity of the two populations. The more the CW became individualistic the more they feel that they have lost human fellowship. On the contrary, the CS kept the family relationships important in line with the expectations of a collectivist society. The Juche idea of revenge and antagonism does not extend to relations within the family. The CW felt there to be more humanity in the behaviour of the CS than in that of the CW.

In sum, it would have been difficult for the CS to consider themselves as individualists because they used to live in the collectivist social system of North Korea. Also they did not leave North Korea in order to live alone because they try very hard to bring their family to join them where they are.

3.2. The Conflict between the CW and the CS

First, it is difficult for the CW to understand that the CS feel a sense of inferiority when the CW are thoughtful and considerate towards them. In fact, the CS think they are being treated unfairly in a situation like that.

One of the CS started to attend one of support groups in the church. The monthly membership was five pounds. Out of consideration for him, he was not asked to pay it

³⁹⁹ Interview with CW11, Seoul, 12 March 2007.

because we thought that the fee might be a burden. In fact, the group does not require new members to pay the subscription unless they choose to pay it voluntarily. However, he phoned two teachers of the BSCFP late at night while under the influence of alcohol, complaining that the group did not ask him to pay the fee and that he was being treated in a discriminatory way. I tried to explain everything but he could not understand. At that time I thought that he had an inferiority complex.⁴⁰⁰

It may not have been a sense of inferiority arising from conflict between the desire to be noticed and the fear of being humiliated, but might have been more a problem of equal treatment because the CS were accustomed to cooperating with each other in their communities on an equal basis. Bruce Cumings noted that “there is an egalitarian sameness about most people in the DPRK, at least to an external observer.”⁴⁰¹ However, the CW interpreted the man’s discontent as a sense of inferiority. The reason for such an interpretation might stem from an anti-communist point of view which is accustomed to seeing anything from North Korea in a negative light. This misunderstanding resulted in the CS member leaving the church.

Second, in order for Kim Il-sung to take absolute authority, he had to first teach that Niccolo Machiavelli’s premise that the end justifies the means,⁴⁰² which has influenced the perception of North Koreans while they are socialized by the teachings of their leader. However, believing that the end justifies the means is a feature of the modern history of South Korea, for example, as described in chapter one, over 115 students were killed by South Korean police on 19 April 1960 so that president Rhee could consolidate the regime of the South Korean government.

Kim Seoung-min, the director of the Free North Korea Radio and one of the CS, and Kim Nae-young, the head of Mission Centre who is one of the CW, are members

⁴⁰⁰ Interview with CW03, Seoul, 9 February 2007.

⁴⁰¹ Bruce Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun*, p. 413.

⁴⁰² Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, a new translation by Peter Bondanella, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

of Younknak Presbyterian Church. A conflict arose between them over the progress of the establishment of Missionary Radio broadcast to North Korea. Kim Seoung-min applied for £ 10,000 grant available from Younknak Mission Centre in order to establish the Missionary Radio outside the church in an effort to spread the Gospel to North Koreans. Kim Nae-young supported the application; however, in the end, this missionary project was not implemented. They explained their reasons to me during the interviews. Kim Nae-young told me the following:

First of all, I asked Kim Seoung-min for details of the plan for the establishment of the Missionary Radio so that I could show them to people who were authorised to sign the bills of expenditure. When he did this I realised that his proposals were not sufficiently prepared for presentation. I told him that he had to work on the weak points of the plan and that I would help him if he found it difficult to do it by himself. He then brought the upgraded plan to me but it was still unsatisfactory. I asked him who should be receiving the money, according to the procedures of the Missionary Radio. My reason for that question is that the church could not pay the 10,000 pounds into Kim Seoung-min's own account, but only to the director of the organisation. It was important for the church to follow appropriate procedures and processes. If the correct procedure were not followed we would both be criticised if something went wrong. However, he has not responded to my requests at all.⁴⁰³

Kim Seoung-min told me the following:

I thought that Kim Nae-young did not trust me. Even though it was true that funds from the church had to be paid into the organisation's account, I thought that it was more important to get the Radio project established first than setting up an organisation. I wanted to show people the result first. *One of Kim Il-sung's principle was that the final results were the most important and not the steps we need to take to get there.* The way Kim Nae-young spoke to me, he seemed to look down on me. I was hurt when he told me that if I could not do what was necessary he would do the whole thing instead of me. I just gave up trying to establish the Missionary Radio after that.⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰³ Interview with CW03, Seoul, 9 February 2007.

⁴⁰⁴ Interview with CS03, Seoul, 7 February 2007. Italics are mine.

In sum, a Christian Wolnammin who focuses on the rightness or wrongness of actions as opposed to the rightness or wrongness of the consequences of those actions conflicted with a Christian Saeteomin who believes that a morally right action is an action that produces good consequences. The Christian Wolnammin insisted on working through an official organisation when providing public funds for the establishment of the Missionary Radio because they could not pay these to a private individual. He also had to bear in mind who would take responsibility if something went wrong. For the Christian Saeteoin this was a matter of trust. In fact, he thought and acted in accordance with the teaching of Kim Il-sung that ‘the final result was more important than any other element.’ Clearly accounting rules had to be kept-but with understanding and forethought, the problem could have been avoided.

The CW live in a society in which it is normal to consider various aspects of any issue before deciding on a course of action whereas the CS come from a society conditioned by consequentialism, providing further evidence for the existence of non-shared identities.

3.3. The Firm Faith System

The CW believe that the CS can settle successfully in South Korea if they become committed Christians which corresponds with their or their parents experience of settling in South Korea after the partition. As depicted in chapter 1, the CW who escaped from North Korea had a firm conservative faith of Christianity in the Northern territory and have maintained their faith after their migration to South Korea.

Article 68 of the DPRK Constitution states that “citizens have freedom of religious beliefs.”⁴⁰⁵ However, Article 68 also has provisions on drawing in foreign forces and harming the state or social order, provisions that could lead to potentially severe limitations resulting in the arbitrary application of the constitutional provision on “freedom of religious beliefs.” According to Suh Dae-sook, Kim Il-sung’s most comprehensive biographer, “One of Kim Il-sung’s most difficult tasks after the establishment of the state was the handling of Christians,”⁴⁰⁶ who confronted the Communist regime. Eventually his regime prevailed: Christianity was totally suppressed by the 1960s. The North Korean regime constructed and substituted Juche ideology which also replaced Christianity and the other existing belief systems. According to the experience and perspectives of forty North Korean Saeteomin in a written report named “*Thank You Father Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in North Korea*”⁴⁰⁷, North Koreans were taught that religion was nothing more than “opium.” Virtually all interviewees used that very term. Although the phrase “religion is opiate of the masses” is typically attributed to Karl Marx, numerous respondents attributed its sentiment directly to Kim Il-sung.⁴⁰⁸ One of interviewees said that Communism and the belief in Juche ideology are all that exist, and religion is considered the biggest crime and is to be dealt with in the harshest manner, and if one believed in

⁴⁰⁵ Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Article 68, “Citizens have freedom of religious beliefs. This right is granted by approving the construction of religious buildings and the holding of religious ceremonies. No one may use religion as a pretext for drawing in foreign forces or for harming the State and social order.” This text was adopted on Sept. 5, 1998 by the first session of the 10th Supreme People’s Assembly. See, *The People’s Korea*, available from; <http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/>, accessed 6 February 2008.

⁴⁰⁶ Suh Dae-sook, *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, p. 399.

⁴⁰⁷ United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, *Op.Cit.*

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

religion he or she would be politically ostracized.⁴⁰⁹ Furthermore, public executions of Christian believers in North Korea were carried out. Two interviewees mentioned that they personally witnessed the execution of people because of their religious beliefs, affiliation, or practices. Another mentioned that her brother, a pastor, had been executed.⁴¹⁰ This means that in spite of the fact that the CS may go into a church in South Korea, it is not easy for them to become Christians with a firm faith. Nevertheless, the CW expect the CS to switch from Juche to a firm Christian faith.

Furthermore, the CW emphasized that Christians should be self-sufficient by the grace of God, expecting the North Korean Saeteomin to be Christians just like them.

The CS are poor. Avarice knows no bounds. I hope that the North Korean Saeteomin will accept a firm faith so that they can realise that the things of the world are not the most important in their lives but it is enough just to be happy living with their families. That is self-sufficiency. If they keep on comparing themselves with South Koreans, they would be discontented with their lives, their health, their relationships. However, if they encounter God and change the purpose of their life, they would be happy.”⁴¹¹

In addition, in the name of the love of Christ, the CW have made available a grant-in-aid which was regarded as a means of evangelism, in spite of the fact that the South Korean government also provided subsidies to the CS. The church supplied basic essentials of life to the CS when they came to South Korea. However, the CS who had been accustomed to the Public Distribution System (PDS)⁴¹² of North Korea did not regard the grant-in-aid and the basic

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁴¹¹ Interview with CW08, Seoul, 16 February 2007.

⁴¹² The PDS has been a quintessential feature of North Korean life for many decades which reflect a peculiarity of centrally planned economy. In North Korea, ration was first introduced in 1946, initially only for the employees of state companies. By the mid-1950s, this group of

essentials provided by the church as tokens of the church's love and as a means of evangelism: to them it was normal provisioning by the central organisation. Nonetheless, the CW did expect the North Korean Saeteomin to understand the church's purpose in doing this and to feel appropriately thankful. In short, the CW's expectations in the church based on a conservative-evangelical faith resulted in their disappointment with the CS.

3.4. Forming Personal Relationships

The CW have grown disillusioned over time as the CS do not meet their expectations. One of the CW argued that the CS do not trust South Koreans because they had been taught that South Koreans were bad people and enemies. They do not open themselves up to the CW,⁴¹³ though of course the CW do not often recognize that they do not trust the CS.

It seems that the main difference about the CS is that they are too competitive. I myself do not have a competitive personality. Of course, competitiveness is necessary for sportsmen, but the CS seem to always desire to beat others at all costs. Such behaviour seems forced and unusual. In particular, they have a tendency to divide people into two types: the good and the bad. If I tried to treat them kindly, they regard this as the behaviour of an untrustworthy man with a duplicitous personality. They also expressed their feelings directly, which hurt me. They have no consideration for others.⁴¹⁴

The CW said that it was extremely difficult for them to form good relationships with the Christian Saeteomin members. The difficulty stems from a lack of factual

beneficiaries included three million to 3.4 million people, a majority of the entire population at that time. The PDS has been carried out. See, available from; *North Korea's antique food ration*, by Andrei Lankov, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GA15Dg01.html>; accessed 6 February 2008.

⁴¹³ Interview with CW07, Seoul, 15 February 2007.

⁴¹⁴ Interview with CW05, Seoul, 13 February 2007.

information about the identity of the CS. In fact, Kim Il-sung's perspective on the world was defined by his experience as a guerrilla fighter with the Chinese Communists against the Japanese in Manchuria.⁴¹⁵ He emphasized that "that the guerrilla ethos was not only supreme, but also the only legitimate basis on which to reconstitute a reunified Korea."⁴¹⁶ In his view, economic activity produced the means to wage war, education produced soldiers to wage war, and ideology convinced the people of the sociological and historical inevitability of war.⁴¹⁷ That impacts on the character, personality, and the way of life. The perception of North Koreans cannot be understood apart from Kim Il-sung's teachings and his influence remains dominant in it. In other words, North Koreans firmly think and act in the knowledge that they must defeat their enemies and win all wars with a guerrilla spirit. Their mentality was cultivated by the teachings of their leader to whom they had to be loyal at all cost and they cannot instantly switch their thoughts and behaviour patterns to suit the CW expectations.

3.5. Reproduction of Distrust

Distrust between the CW and the CS is deeply rooted. The anti-communist education taught South Koreans that communist North Koreans are liars and security threats. In this section I will explore the basis for understanding how distrust is reproduced in interaction.

First of all, we have already seen in Chapter 3 and here that the CW tend to attribute the behaviour and attitudes of the CS to an inferiority complex. They do not

⁴¹⁵ Adrian Buzo, *The Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea*, London. New York: I.B.Tauris, 1999, p.239.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁴¹⁷ Stephen Bradner, "North Korea's Strategy," in *Planning for a Peaceful Korea*, ed. Henry D. Sokolski, Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2000, p. 24.

understand that North Koreans were not allowed to admit that they were unable to do something or they lacked some knowledge in a particular area. As far as the CW interviewees were concerned the CS were simply lying when they said “I can do this” when they obviously could not. The CW had no idea that these responses were automatic and have their origin in the ethos of North Korea.

The CS told worthless lies to us. They really don't need to lie, we understand that they face difficult circumstances. They are obviously very defiant and respect themselves a lot. They did not say at first whether or not they knew some of the things I asked, but it turned out later that they did not know them at all. However, they lied and pretended to know. I wanted them to be honest. They disliked being treated by others as people who come from a poor country. They seemed to have a sense of inferiority, so they tried to show us that there were good things in North Korea. I think that these were the motives behind their lies.⁴¹⁸

We know that the Christian faith of the CS lacks doctrine but we cannot tell them that they do not have a firm faith because they might be hurt. We would understand them if they spoke honestly to us. However, they themselves think that they have to have a faith and that they have to know everything, so they do not ask any honest questions and so we can not help them. It is only natural that they are not mature in their faith because they have been believers for such a short time.⁴¹⁹

Besides the inferiority complex, the CW suspected that the CS were ready to deceive them⁴²⁰ because they had a hidden agenda or motive, such as avoiding punishment or obtaining some benefit.⁴²¹ Many CW also insisted that the CS wear masks to deceive.⁴²²

⁴¹⁸ Interview with CW08, Seoul, 16 February 2007.

⁴¹⁹ Interview with CWG011, Seoul, 31 October 2006.

⁴²⁰ Interview with CW06, Seoul, 15 February 2007.

⁴²¹ Interview with CW11, Seoul, 12 March 2007.

⁴²² Interview with CW11, Seoul, 12 March 2007, interview with CWG011, Seoul, 31 October 2006.

In the North Korean system it seems normal for a man to be a liar. One of the CS told me that he could paint very well and was a painter who had even made a portrait of Kim Il-sung. I found a job for him but he was a liar. Not only does he not paint very well but also his job involved painting billboards for films and he was not a portrait painter of Kim Il-sung.⁴²³

The CS hid behind masks they made for themselves. It seemed to me that they experienced too much dishonesty within the structure of their society before they came to South Korea, even within inside their own families... I cannot trust the CS at all. They wear a variety of masks to suit their various circumstances. I do not know who they really are.⁴²⁴

To add insult to injury, suspicious Christian Wolnammin were likely to regard those who lie as Communists, in order to maintain their perception formed by anti-communist indoctrination that North Korean Communists are liars. This easily leads to becoming that all the CS are liars unless proved honest each time. This is another example of stigmatization. The CW judge the CS by appearances, and they interpret these in a way which magnifies any negative impressions. This indicates that CW need to learn about and understand the behaviour patterns of the CS if they aim to coexist with them harmoniously.

3.6. Choices and Promises

“Choice is the power, right, or faculty of choosing,” and choice consists of the mental process of thinking involved with the process of judging the merits of multiple options and selecting one of them for action.⁴²⁵ For the CW, “choosing behaviour” is central to their existence and is driven by fundamental psychological needs such as

⁴²³ Interview with CW06, Seoul, 15 February 2007.

⁴²⁴ Interview with CWG011, Seoul, 31 October 2006.

⁴²⁵ James, A. H. Murry, ed., *A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles; Founded Mainly on the Materials Collected by the Philological Society*, vol. ii .c., Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1893, p. 369.

love, significance, freedom, responsibility, fun, learning etc. In contrast, the CS behaviour is driven by the fulfilment of basic survival such as access to food, clothing, shelter, and ensuring personal and others' safety.

The CW assume that the CS choose to tell lies, and choose do not keep their promises, leading a Christian Wolnammin to assume that promises are not as significant for the CS. "The CS break their promises thoughtlessly and this reflects badly on them in South Korean society. As a result the CW do not trust them at all," said one Christian Wolnammin.⁴²⁶

In North Korea the CS did not seem to be accustomed to keeping their promises. In South Korea there would be no problem to phone if it was difficult to keep an appointment. However, they did not do this, in spite of the fact that they have their own cell phones. For example, a group invited ten Christian North Korean Saeteomin and they accepted it. However, there were only two who came as arranged. Both ourselves and the group were embarrassed that day.⁴²⁷

The CW believe that a Christian who makes an oath to God is responsible for it, and if he breaks it he commits a sin and those who do not keep a promise are irresponsible. As a result, they find it extremely difficult to form a relationship with the CS.

However, it may be necessary that the CW should consider the CS situation when they utter a promise to the CW. Whatever the background, it would in fact be difficult for the CS to refuse the CW's suggestions to make promises because of their own feelings of powerlessness. If the CS are unwilling to make such promises, or in the manner and with the outcome the CW might expect, it would still be very difficult for the CS to find a polite way of declining. We saw in chapter 3 that according to the CS they had no experience of making promises to their fellows before they came to South

⁴²⁶ Interview with CW09, Seoul, 19 February 2007.

⁴²⁷ Interview with CW08, Seoul, 16 February 2007.

Korea, because these hardly existed in North Korea. One was to make a promise to the leader or the masses, but not to individuals. Any promises so made were worthless.⁴²⁸

3.7. Self-Sufficiency

The CW expect the CS to successfully settle in South Korea and become self-sufficient depending only on God's grace. It is very hard for them to accept the dependent life style of the CS and they often feel disappointed. Upon entering South Korea, the CW faced many difficulties. Most of them were much poorer than the residents of Seoul. They had to settle down when virtually no support facilities existed. However, they managed to fit in the mainstream of South Korean life successfully and the second and subsequent generations eventually became successful in the wider world. They take a great pride in having risen from one class to another through their own resources. Therefore, they expect the same level of self-sufficiency when it comes to the CS and when faced with the special benefits received by the CS and with their dependent life style CW may become disappointed and critical.

I thought that the North Korean Saeteomin were poor and that they found it hard to live. Even entry into South Korea was very hard. However, I found out that some of the resettlement funds provided by the South Korean government have been used to bring family members to South Korea. Besides, the North Korean Saeteomin students have been given places at high-ranking universities without any entry exams. This is unfair. From the perspective of a self-made man these kinds of benefits are unfair.⁴²⁹

Some Saeteomin do not work even though they are perfectly capable. They think that it is easier for them to receive government benefits than to work for a

⁴²⁸ Interview with CS15, Seoul, 05 February 2007.

⁴²⁹ Interview with CWG02, Seoul, 12 November 2006.

company. Or they only work part time because the government stops the benefit if the North Korean Saeteomin has a full time job. I want to beat them when I see this happening.⁴³⁰

However, the CW argument is not totally valid, because he did not take into account that social circumstances after the Korean war were very different from those of the 21st century. The king, the bureaucracy, the royal clan, landed aristocrats, local potentates and the country magistrates: all this civilized order had been broken up by the Western and Japanese impact, and then the Korean War. Japanese policies left Korea with a tiny middle class. After the liberation in South Korea, the effective opposition to the developing southern system was almost wholly on the left, a mass popular resistance from 1945 to 1950 included raw peasant protest and organized labour union activity and, finally, armed guerrilla resistance. In contrast, a numerically small class on the right which virtually monopolized the native wealth and education of the country and which could not acquire and maintain its favoured position under Japanese rule without a certain minimum of collaboration was forced to support imported expatriate politicians.⁴³¹ The rightists controlled the overt political structure in the US zone, completely suppressing leftist activity with the help of the National Police. The class system of South Korea descended into extreme chaos after the Korean War. Amid such chaos, the process of settling down for the CW in South Korea went along with the settling down of the entire country. However, it is very difficult for the CS to settle because the present class system of South Korea is rock solid. Furthermore, during the half-century before they came to South Korea, they lived in a system where resources were organised and distributed centrally by the Korean Workers' Party.

⁴³⁰ Interview with CW03, Seoul, 9 February 2007.

⁴³¹ Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History*, p. 202.

To sum up, the CW arrived in South Korea empty-handed and settled down independently. The nature of their own experience make them automatically expect the CS to settle in South Korea in the same way and the CW are critical of benefits given to the CS by the government and the church. The CW do not seem to realise that the CS were used to a life style dependent on the distribution system of the Party.

3.8. Different Tradition

The CW emphasize that the CS come from exactly the same geographical area as themselves called Kokuryeo.⁴³² There was a general agreement that the people of Kokuryeo had an enterprising outlook on life which made them successful.

The national characteristics and the spirits of Northern people of Kokuryeo are so strong they survive even if they are put in Siberia. In this sense, after the CW came from the Northern territory to the South, the majority of those who succeeded in Seoul's Namdaemun market were the CW. The CS also came from the same Northern territory, so they should have been able to settle down successfully like the CW.⁴³³

My parents are first generation of the CW and they told me that the Northern people used to be very diligent, men of strong faith and a strong will to succeed, as you would expect from descendents of Kokuryeo. I believe that, since the CS are also descendents of Kokuryeo, they should rediscover for themselves their country's identity.⁴³⁴

In reality, both the CS and the CW have been educated by the stories of an invented tradition. In North Korea there is myth, fairy tale, implausible story, or

⁴³² This was an ancient country (B.C 37-A.D 668) that occupied the territory which is now North Korea and parts of northeastern China.

⁴³³ Interview with CW01, Seoul, 22 October 2006.

⁴³⁴ Interview with CW11, Seoul, 11 March 2007.

unlikely miracle⁴³⁵ whose core is based on Kim Il-sung's struggle during Korea's colonization and his restoration of the people after the liberation. Eric Hobsbawm defined 'invented traditions' as follows: "'Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past."⁴³⁶ The CW 'knowledge' of Kokuryeo is likewise post hoc and idealized to the point of invention of the tradition.

After the partition and liberation, the political situation of both South Korea and North Korea was chaotic. Since then the two Koreas have changed from traditional to modern societies but the driving force behind the change was not shared, South Koreans growing up under the influence of an anti-Communist ideology and North Koreans being taught the tradition of Kim Il-sung's revolutionary Juche ideology. Eric Hobsbawm also argued that invented traditions occurred more frequently at times of rapid social transformation when 'old' traditions were disappearing. He therefore expected an especially large number of 'new' traditions to be invented.⁴³⁷

The CW and the CS operate within the framework of differing imagined traditions which lead to the establishment of two separate, non-shared identities. The crucial issue, however, is that in Seoul, South Korean ways are the only ones accepted by that ethnic group and the same goes for interaction between the CS and the CW in Youngnak Presbyterian Church: the Christian faith has not actually enabled them to be equal.

⁴³⁵ Bruce Cumings, *North Korea*, p. 107.

⁴³⁶ Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, ed., *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 1.

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I investigated the hypothesis that the CW ethnic identity is very different from the CS one as evidenced in material symbols, verbal symbols and behaviour symbols.

First, clothing, and the use of tobacco and alcohol are material symbols for both groups. Southerners wear Western clothes and Northerners wore uniform like garments. The CW regard alcohol and tobacco consumption sinful, while the CS regard these as part of socialising.

Second, concerning verbal symbols, or more accurately language, the connotations attached to some words changed in the South as the population suffered the aggression of the North, while a positive meaning of these words was retained in the North. For Southerners previously neutral words like *Minjok*, *Jaju*, *Dogmu* and *Migun Cheolsu* evoked the persecution of communism they suffered before migrating to the South. The CS have been accustomed to using these words and still like using them. This incongruence highlights the different ethnic identity of the two groups which is further enhanced by the use of foreign expressions and the *Hancha*.

Third, there is a variety of evidence in section 3 to suggest that the hypothesis has been strengthened in terms of behavioural symbols as follows: 1) the CW embraced individualism which led to looser family ties and weaker solidarity, whereas the CS' families are strong because they are used to live in the circumstances of collective organisation; 2) the CW who tried to make allowances for the CS were disappointed because the latter were accustomed to equal treatment and regarded these gestures of goodwill as discrimination; 3) the CW helped the CS to become Christians so that they could adapt to South Korea successfully. They expected the CS to be self-

sufficient and they supported grant-in-aid as a means of evangelism, in accordance with their conservative-evangelical faith. However the CS, being accustomed to the distribution system of North Korea, did not perceive this in the same way as the CW; 4) the CW and CS differ in their level of competitiveness, the latter being perceived by the former to be extremely competitive; In spite of the fact that the whole basis of South Korean socio-political life is, of course, one of extreme competition; 5) the CW held strongly to anti-Communism and automatically tended to regard the CS as liars and were convinced that they wore masks in order to deceive; 6) the CW criticised the CS for not keeping promises whereas the latter had no experience of individual promises in North Korea; 7) the CW expected the CS to emulate their successful settlement in South Korea, supported only by their faith. However, they were disappointed with the dependent life style of the CS who were accustomed to dependence on the distribution system of the Party. Since the partition of Korea, the CW lived under a capitalist system while the CS had lived under a collective system before coming to the South; 8) the CW expect the CS to have inherited what they imagined as the common characteristics of Kokuryeo's spirit but the latter do not understand this expectation because the two groups were educated by different invented traditions. These eight points make a compelling case to accept that the CW and the CS, despite their shared geographical origins, do not share the same ethnic identity.

Conclusion to Part Two: Rejection and Exclusion

I have investigated the hypothesis that the ethnic identity of the CW and the CS is heterogeneous. The evidence came from the analysis of material, verbal and behavioural symbols. The result is that the two populations began to mutually exclude

each other in Youngnak Presbyterian Church as they were not aware of how significant the difference of identities is. Their premise according to which they share the same ethnic identity set them up for disappointment.

First I examined the perspectives of Frederick Barth and Anthony Cohen on ethnic identity and found that ethnic identity is not the product of primordial values but changeable. North and South Korea has gone down a very different political path since the partition, which I expected to significantly impact on the identity of the two communities who initially shared the same geographical origin. I proposed, therefore, that their ethnic identity has been modulated and moderated while the two groups lived in separate societies of contrasting ideologies for half a century. The political circumstances and the driving ideologies were described in detail in Part One in order to demonstrate the extent of the political and resulting social intra-community level differences that have emerged during the decades of partition.

Looking to literature, I cited the two contrasting views of Koreans historians on the ethnic identity of Koreans inhabiting the Korean peninsula. One argues that the ethnic identity of Koreans has been homogeneous while the other recognises and emphasises the role other cultures and races play in the formation of identity. This latter view breaks with the 'myth of homogeneity of identity' whose emergence they attribute to education during a period of weakness, such as the Japanese rule during which the self-determination of people was lost.

Nevertheless, many still expect that the CW and the CS are one ethnicity despite of all the differences that have come about over the past sixty years. I maintain that the expectation of homogeneity hinders progress on the construction of single community consisting of the two groups, and even creates exclusion. In order to demonstrate the depth of the differences between the two groups I analysed material and verbal

symbols and behavioural patterns whose interpretation cause great difficulty for both groups when they interact in Yougnak Presbyterian Church.

I shall now briefly highlight some of the areas of contention, within Youngnak Presbyterian Church, keeping in mind not only the nature of the differences but also how when faced with these the CW and the CS react.

First, *material symbols* were reviewed. I found that the CS continued wearing simple clothing after their arrival to Youngnak Presbyterian Church. Even when they attempted to emulate South Korean styles they could be distinguished of which they were aware. They also continued smoking and consuming alcohol. These two habits are not only frowned upon among the CW but also prohibited. That being the case, at least one Christian Wolnammin refused a gift from a Christian Saeteomin. Another case was the colours red and blue. They symbolise the exact opposite: for the CS red is the colour of goodness and blue the colour of failure and bad deeds while the CW preferred blue at all times over red. This difference led to at least one conflict. The above cases may only be resolved when the two communities understand and reflect on the source of the problems, some of which derive from religious ideas specific to Protestantism in Korea, and others from issues outside religion.

Recognising the differences in verbal symbols are more difficult if one assumes a homogeneous identity based on a shared language. It was demonstrated that basic phrases such as 'I can do this' expressed different intent: for North Koreans this is a standard reply any time the party makes a request. It expresses their intention to please the Party and further the revolution with the totality of their being regardless of ability. The CW would only say that they can do something when they know they are able to carry out a task. The inability to recognise this difference led to suspicion and offence on numerous occasions. I learnt from an interview that a Christian Saeteomin

left his job as a result of this. On a broader linguistic level it is worth noting that the CW embraced many foreign words while in North Korea every word had to have a North Korean equivalent and foreign words were banned. Decades of separate language evolution lead to comprehension difficulties and differences in intonation and expressing subtleties. Further, there are certain phrases the CW do not tolerate such as 'comrade,' 'withdrawal of the U.S. Army', 'our ethnic Koreans' because these evoke anxieties regarding the security of South Korea. This sentiment is so strong that the CW interviewees could not help but be suspicious of the intentions of those Christian Saeteomin who use these phrases. Some of them would actually accuse the CS in question of being a spy, a communist with an agenda. At the same time, the CS have expressions they only use in relation to their leaders and when they hear it in another context they find it offensive and profane. North Koreans grew up to be tough fighters and it is evident from their abrupt and direct speech. South Koreans on the other hand are polite and more subtle which makes the CS wonder whether there is a hidden agenda behind the kind words. In this atmosphere it is almost impossible to establish trust until these differences are acknowledged.

Another area that jeopardizes the building up of mutual respect and trust is behaviour. As opposed to South Koreans, North Koreans are not used to make and keep promises to individuals as the only kind of promise they encountered was made to the masses at the request of the party and were more like pledges of allegiance with no consequences if they failed to deliver. The CW interpreted these failed promises as deceit or at least as signs of an inferiority complex. The abrupt and direct communication style of the CS was wrongly interpreted as lack of politeness because the CW failed to recognise the extent of black and white thinking (dividing people into friends and enemies) and constant readiness to face the enemy which was a result

of Juche indoctrination. They did not, of course, recognise the extent of their own black and white thinking. Last, but not least the CW expected the CS to settle in South Korea successfully just like their parents and grandparents did following their arrival after the partition or the Korean War. The CS perceived failure to become self-sufficient is a cause for great concern and much criticism among the CW who do not understand that in the North wealth was redistributed centrally.

It is also obvious that the contrasting socializations created rejection and exclusion within the community of BSCFP. The CW expected the CS to completely rid themselves of their former North Korean identity and become just like them.⁴³⁸ The reason is that the North Korean identity was formed by the principles of Juche ideology which was regarded as evil by the CW conservative evangelical faith.

On the other hand, the CS had to face the fact that their identity was completely different from that of South Koreans.⁴³⁹ One Christian Wolnammin interviewee realized that North Koreans and South Koreans do not share the same ethnicity.⁴⁴⁰ The CW felt “a sense of infidelity,”⁴⁴¹ “chaos,”⁴⁴² “a sense of disappointment,”⁴⁴³ and “a sense of distance”⁴⁴⁴ when encountering with the Christian Saeteomin members in the church. One female Wolnammin admitted that her community was not ready to welcome the CS.⁴⁴⁵ One male Wolnammin told the CS to “go back to North Korea immediately.”⁴⁴⁶ Some Christian Saeteomin thought that they would actually be happier in North Korea.

However, the CS tried to become like South Korean Christians, fearing being

⁴³⁸ Interview with CW04, Seoul, 12 February 2007.

⁴³⁹ Interview with CWG01, Seoul, 31 October 2006.

⁴⁴⁰ Interview with CW13, Seoul, 19 March 2007.

⁴⁴¹ Participation Observation of the BSCFP, Seoul, 18 February 2007.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴⁴³ Interview with CW03, Seoul, 9 February 2007.

⁴⁴⁴ Interview with CWG 01, Seoul, 31 October 2006.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁶ Interview with CW061, Seoul, 15 February 2007.

pushed out of South Korea and the community of the church if they remained true to their identity. They carried out a programme in order to change which pervaded their inner and social lives. One of the interviewees put it this way:

It was extremely difficult for me to be a slave to the idea that we must learn the history of South Korea, to be regarded as people who experienced everything completely wrong in North Korea and to hear that the South Korea is right. The South Koreans look down on us because we behave differently even as we try to mimic their speech, dress sense and behaviour to avoid their gaze. However, I realized that it is a disgusting way to live as I am unable to change my identity that was formed in North Korea. I am aware of the fact that I am who I am. It is true that I was born in North Korea and am obviously different from the South Koreans. I asked myself why I tried to be South Korean. It was because I live in South Korea as a North Korean Saetomin and a Christian North Korean Saetomin and I want to feel comfortable. I will keep my identity until I die. I am sure, in spite of the fact that I am a South Korean citizen my identity will never become the same as those who were born in South Korea. Rather, it seems wrong to try to be South Korean.⁴⁴⁷

A Christian Saeteomin told me that university students spoke badly of North Korea, and they even said that North Korea had to be destroyed as soon as possible. Since then he has hidden his origin.⁴⁴⁸ Another Christian Saeteomin told me that reunification must not happen soon because South Koreans are completely different from North Koreans socio-politically, culturally, even linguistically.⁴⁴⁹

In this aspect, a construction of community in Younknak Presbyterian Church and even reunification in the Korean Peninsula seems to be an ambivalent and dangerous venture insofar as it assumes the creation of a homogenous community and nation. The CW cannot take even one step toward solving the exclusion in the community because they believe that the ethnic identity of the CS was formed by Juche ideology that is rooted in materialism, nihilism, atheism and personal cult of Kim Il-sung and

⁴⁴⁷ Interview with CS02, Seoul, 31 October 2006.

⁴⁴⁸ Interview with CS07, Seoul, 24 January 2007.

⁴⁴⁹ Interview with CS19, Seoul, 08 February 2007.

Kim Jong-il. In terms of their conservative evangelical faith, the CW must fight against the evil forces of Juche ideology and must destroy the North Korean identity. The CW do not recognise that the political nature of their Christian faith may be as “contaminated” as the CW see the faith of the CS.

My argument is that the identity of the CS should not be destroyed to fit the requirements of a community which dominates them, the CW. Instead the differences need to be recognised and one way of achieving a peaceful and equal satisfactory coexistence is to construct a catholic community in which everyone maintains their own identity and are still full members of the community.

There are two significant elements with which the two groups can construct a catholic community in which they live together in harmony. One is a courteous attitude toward Juche ideology rather than regarding it as evil. Part of this would necessitate the CW reflecting on their own non-religious ideological trappings. However, just as North Koreans in North Korea could not readily reflect critically on Juche ideology given the political demands of the regime, so too it demands strength for the CW to reflect critically on their views given the political ideology of the South Korean regime. The second would then be that individuals of the two groups ought to repent from their animosity toward each other, forgive each other as Christians, and embrace each other. In order to make this exploration clear there are two research questions: How can the CW come to respect Juche ideology theologically? How can the CW embrace the CS? These significant issues will open up a new direction. I will offer a theological reflection on exclusion and embrace and the understanding of the attitude toward Juche ideology in Part Three.

Part Three

A Construction of a Catholic Community in Youngnak Presbyterian Church

Introduction

In part three, in order to solve the problem of exclusion in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, a theological way will be proposed which I believe could allow the two groups to construct a harmonious catholic community. I will describe the courteous attitude of the '*New Starting: Toward the Changing Life*' (hereafter NSTCL)⁴⁵⁰ towards Juche ideology through fulfilment theology as discussed in the Fourth Commission of the 1910 World Missionary Conference to clarify the missiological position of the NSTCL in chapter 5. I will then examine the principle of embracing the other and its application in the context of the Korean Peninsula and, in particular, Youngnak Presbyterian Church through Miroslav Volf's metaphorical lens of exclusion and embrace in chapter 6.

I will not attempt here to deal equally with attitudes of the two groups, but to focus rather more on the attitude of the CW towards the CS because the CW are relatively stronger than the CS in terms of the dominant-subordinate relationship. Moreover, it is rather easy for the CW to require the CS to follow their way and to become people in the image of the CW. However, that does not mean that the building of a community can be a one way process. The construction of a community in Youngnak Presbyterian Church essentially requires relevant input from the CS. Study of the role

⁴⁵⁰ This is the abbreviation of the book titled *New Starting: Toward a Changing Life* which the teachers of the BSCFP use. The Missionary Centre toward North Korea, ed., *Saeroun Chulbal: Byeonhwahaneun Salmeul Wihayeo (New Starting: Toward a Changing Life)*, Seoul: Youngnak Presbyterian Church, 2001.

and contribution of the CS in this process, while certainly not ignored, requires further examination beyond the scope of this thesis, allowing more scope for the CS voices to speak for themselves.

The CW and the CS in Youngnak Presbyterian Church believed that their ethnic identity was homogeneous and assumed that even if differences were found they would overcome them easily. However, given that they had lived in two countries with contrasting ideologies for over half a century, their ethnic identity had been modulated and moderated before they began to meet each other face to face in the church. On encountering each other, and misinterpreting or rejecting material, verbal and behavioural symbols, the two groups realized that their heterogeneity is so acute that they cannot live together in harmony. Members of the two groups became disillusioned and disappointed, which led to isolationism on both sides. The CW, indoctrinated by anti-communist ideology, demanded the CS give up their identity and become like them because the CW regarded Juche ideology as an evil ideology which must be destroyed (see chapter 4). The CW were unable to accept that the CS identity stems from Juche, rather than the presumed intentional evil of the other. It is necessary, therefore, that the CW find a new theological orientation toward Juche ideology in order to create a catholic community. In other words, in Part three the focus of the thesis will be concerned with a possible new theological orientation of the CW towards the CS.

My argument is that, at the moment, the CW refuse to see anything positive in the life of the CS. It would of course be better if the CW's appreciation of and respect for the CS as people would come from the CW spontaneously as part of their Christian life. This, however, will not happen given the overriding strength of anti-communist ideology of the CW. Given this situation, there needs to be some top-down teaching of

the CW in Youngnak Presbyterian Church. First, the CW need to be shown how they can see some positive Confucian aspects in Juche ideology which helped the CS to become Christians. Second, the CW should recognize the unChristian nature of their animosity toward the North Korean people, which was formed by the socialization of anti-communist ideology, and embrace them. Thirdly, the relationship between Christian faith and praxis in this endeavour needs to be clarified as a basis for movement among the CW.

1. Toward a Catholic Community in Diversity

The term catholic is an adjective derived from the Greek adjective καθολικός (*katholikos*), meaning “whole” or “complete.”⁴⁵¹ As catholic points to wholeness, it includes “all that which Christ, in and by the Spirit, wants to share with, and pour into, his body, in terms of the fruit and gifts of the sanctifying and liberating Spirit.”⁴⁵² Catholicity is “a ‘note’ (or mark) of the church, along with unity, holiness and apostolicity.”⁴⁵³

According to Miroslav Volf, every church is catholic as long as it has the whole Christ along with all means of salvation. The meaning of catholicity to him is “the wholeness of a congregation or church based on the presence of the whole Christ.”⁴⁵⁴ An ecclesiological whole which is “the eschatological indwelling of the triune God in God’s whole people” transcends a local church. He lays emphasis upon an anticipation of the still outstanding gathering of the whole people of God rather than

⁴⁵¹ Catholic, available from; <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catholic/>; accessed on 23rd of November, 2008.

⁴⁵² Sinclair B. Ferguson, David F. Wright, ed., *New Dictionary of Theology*, Leicester: InterVarsity press, 1973, p. 131.

⁴⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁴ Miroslav Volf, *After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity*, Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1998, p. 271. *After Our Likeness* is based on Volf’s *Habilitationsschrift*, which was supervised by Juergen Moltmann.

the realization or concretization of the already existing universal church, in spite of an anticipation in which communal eschatological salvation is experienced concretely.⁴⁵⁵ That is, according to him, the catholicity of the local church lies in a historical anticipation of the eschatological catholicity of the people of God in the totality of God's new creation.⁴⁵⁶ Most importantly, he insists that one of the external marks of catholicity of a local church is "the *openness* of each church to all other churches."⁴⁵⁷ In this sense, in case of the community consisting of both the CW and the CS members in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, the community seems to be uncatholic because the two groups remained separate. There are, in a real sense, two churches within the Youngnak Presbyterian Church community, but only one, that of the CW, is regarded as the "proper" church. This may not be expressed openly, but I suggest it influences the CW's attitudes. In Volf's sense, however, the CW act of rejecting and excluding the CS almost disqualifies them from being part of the catholic, that is whole, church which shares the fruits of the Spirit. Youngnak Presbyterian Church has been an anti-communist ideological bastion since the church was established as described in chapter 1. Its members feel that they have no need to repent because they have been coloured by their ideology, which lead them automatically to think that Juche ideology is evil. This is a real three dimensional power in the view of Steven Lukes, which has operated on the CW. The very existence of the church is based on an anti-communist ideology, which means that these two things have become inseparable. This is a fundamental problem. In a sense this is syncretism on a large scale.

This indicates that in order that the community of the two groups be catholic, the two groups must become open toward each other. My argument is that in order to open

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 275. The italic is mine.

toward each other, the two groups would need to change both their theological and sociological approach which they show toward others. In particular, the CW would need to show openness toward Juche ideology.

2. The Principle of Analogy and Otherness and Their Implication

In this section I will briefly describe Juergen Moltmann's perspective on how we understand the other, before dealing with Volf's theological approach on a solution of exclusion. I follow this order in discussing the two scholars because Moltmann was Volf's supervisor.

Juergen Moltmann deals with the problem of like and unlike in relation to creating a community in diversity. First, he established the relationship between knowledge and community, saying that there is no community without knowledge and no knowledge without community. Thus, in order to enter a community one has to make contact with 'the others', perceive them and acknowledge them. Initially, one sees only the reflection of one's own self in 'the others', and one embraces them as in one's image so that one may subject them to one's own idea.

Groups do settle on the basis of similarities: this avoids challenge and comes easily to a Christian community. In general, any self-selecting Christian community risks excluding others either intentionally or because the outsiders do not feel accepted in the same way. This is a fundamental problem with self-selecting. Of course, if you have church which is attended by everybody who lives within the same boundary or in the neighbourhood, it is not self-selecting. When people have a wide choice of places to go, we find churches which are self-selecting. Therefore it is generally found that Christians assemble in groupings where they will meet others like themselves and where they will not be faced with uncomfortable challenges. For example, people

easily become Christians based on a common anti-communist ideology or a shared Korean nationalism. But it is risky.

One's perception of 'the others' is also shaped by one's social relationship to them. This means that one should know the differences of 'the others,' which is knowledge related to community. Here Moltmann criticizes the principle of Aristotle according to which 'Like is only known by like' and 'Like draws to like,' which is called by Moltmann "the principle of analogy and homogeneity."⁴⁵⁸ He insists that we must establish the principle of "Other is only known by other" or "the acceptance of others creates community in diversity", which he calls "the principle of difference and diversity of kind,"⁴⁵⁹ which is the antithesis of the principle of likeness. Taking this perspective, it is right that the CW and the CS should not assume that they share a homogeneous identity but they should be able to understand each other by the principle of difference and diversity of kind; that is, they have to know the others through this way that the CS know themselves and the CW know themselves, but in order to create a catholic community in diversity to live together they have to know the others. However, the problem is that, in contact with others, like will automatically choose to go with like. In particular, those who are socialized by anti-communist ideology will associate with those who are socialized in the same way. We should not overlook the operation of three dimensional power here.

Second, Moltmann observes that Western Christianity is dominated by the 'likeness' principle or "Eros principle". The principle of likeness that "Like is only known by like" proposes that one cannot perceive "the others" who are not the same as them. Moltmann says that early Greek philosophy expanded this principle to the

⁴⁵⁸ Juergen Moltmann, "The Knowing of the Other and the Community of the Different", *God For A Secular Society: The Public Relevance of Theology*, SCM Press, 1997, p. 135.

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

principle that 'Similar is known only by the similar.' Moltmann describes the principle as the principle of Eros: that like seeks like in order to be united with it, which leads to the knowing of like by like, creating the universe by the power of Eros.⁴⁶⁰ Moltmann points out that the 'likeness' principle or Eros principle has dominated the Western world, Christianity and the activities of its mission since the so-called discovery of America by Columbus of 1492.

The Europeans never really 'discovered' America at all in its unique character and difference. The Conquistadores saw nothing, and 'discovered' only what they were looking for – gold and silver. The Indian kingdoms were never known. They have never been understood, right down to the present day. They were subjugated, destroyed and exploited, and were missionized and colonized according to European blueprints. The 'other' people were accommodated to the rulers, as their subjects. The Christian missionaries too, as their diaries show, understood only what they could make the same as themselves through conversion. Spaniards, Portuguese and the Protestant Pilgrim Fathers failed to perceive the difference in kind and unique character of the Indians. Because they could only recognize what was like themselves, and because it was only that which they had the will to understand, they were bound to destroy the alien culture, and level down 'the others' to be like themselves. The sorry result was the uniform colonial culture, the uniform imperial religion, and the uniform, all-levelling language.⁴⁶¹

The analysis conducted in Part Two reveals a very similar picture: the CW only accept the components of the CS identity that they share and are impatient, to say the least, when they discover the 'otherness' of the CS. Being convinced that the CW thinking is the correct one and the CS is somehow distorted they strive to assimilate the CS. Their view of successful resettlement stems from their own experience, not taking into account the vast differences in the outside circumstances of resettlement. The CW socialized by an anti-communist ideology and their own experience think

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

⁴⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

automatically that their thinking is right and the CS's is wrong, demanding that the CS follow the CW's life style; the CW automatically act to lead the CS to be like them. In this sense, on the view of Steven Lukes, we can say that the three dimensional power operates on the CW's perception, cognition and activity.⁴⁶² They encourage the CS to take on the uniform South Korean culture, the uniform South Korean Christianity, and uniform aspects of language, e.g. accent etc. almost forcing them to give up their own identities. It is extremely dangerous. I criticize the CW perspective because they ignore the CS own identity and want to conquer it and destroy it as the Western missionaries did in America.

Third, Moltmann insists that the antithesis of the principle of likeness can form a community in diversity and the diversity in the community to the extent that we can love our enemies.

It forms community in the diversity and the diversity in the community. The basic law of a society like this is 'recognition of the other' in his or her difference. Societies which develop according to this principle are not closed societies. Nor are they uniform societies, where people are brought into line. They are 'open societies'. They can live not only with different and dissimilar people, but also, ..., with 'their enemies' too; for they can even make the enmity of their enemies fruitful for the things that are of concern to them...While the foundation of a society consisting of people who are like each other is normally the love of friends, the foundation of the society made up of the different is, if the worst comes to the worst, the love of enemies.⁴⁶³

Most importantly, Moltmann lays emphasis upon creating community based on the love of enemies. Following his argument, the CW should also be open to the CS and they should love even their enemies while they meet in the church as sisters and brothers in Christ so that they can create a catholic community in diversity. It is true that Jews and Samaritans had their differences and conflicts.

⁴⁶² Steven Lukes, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 29-30.

⁴⁶³ Juergen Moltmann, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 146.

The relationship of Jews and Samaritans to each other seems to be quite similar to that holding between South Koreans and North Koreans and between the CW and the CS. Since Jesus demolished all boundary expectations by depicting a Samaritan as the hero of the story, social position, race, religion, or region all count for nothing,⁴⁶⁴ the CW must go along the path of Jesus because they are Christians.

Moltmann is in pursuit of ‘a unity in diversity’ as Jesus was. As Jesus was ‘unlikeness’ to human being, he identified himself with the children, sinners, tax collectors, the poor, women, the disabled, the ill etc. becoming likeness to them. Eventually, he constructed the community in which all the people of God dwell. The CW and CS, by following Christ’s love of the other may be able to create a shared community in which they can accept the differences between them without destroying their own identities. Surely, a community in which everyone is the same means no challenge, no space for the prophetic voice, and a high chance of self-satisfied pride, rather as the New Testament (not always fairly) describes the self-elected Pharisees who excluded the “unlike.” It is not just a Christ issue but it is an issue for Christians who are expressly told “in Christ there is no Jew, Gentile, slave or free” etc. Pharisees were a self-elected group; they failed to live according to the Law and excluded anybody who was not of their point of view. In the context of Youngnak Presbyterian Church, however, the CW might appear to be Pharisees if they excluded the CS. However, they are not Pharisees but Christians. In this sense, they must be open to the CS as their brothers and sisters in Christ as they should be living by the fruits of the Spirit.

⁴⁶⁴ R. Alan Culpper, *Interpreter’s Bible*, Nashville: Abingdon, vol. 9, 1994, p. 229.

3. A Concept of Tong-i

Having set out theological issues which relate to Younknak Presbyterian Church, I shall now move into a more positive mode by looking at unity.

In terms of Korean phrases it is necessary to first establish tong-i before one can contemplate a successful tong-il of Koreans. Let me explain. Tong-il (統一) means unification and is a powerful concept in Korean thinking. There is a song that the whole nation of South Korea knows by heart which expresses their yearning for the unification of the Korean Peninsula in a language both the youngest and the oldest can understand.

*Our desire is unification
In our dreams, our desire is unification
With all our efforts, unification
Oh, come, unification!*

*Unification which saves our people
Unification which saves this nation
Come, unification!
Oh, come, unification!*

This sentiment involves a strong vision and assumption of homogeneity permeating both North Korea and South Korea which portrays the division of the peninsula as a temporary disruption of Korean identity and assumes that unification will eventually recover the lost national unity.⁴⁶⁵ There has been a general consensus by South Koreans that unification of the two Koreas will bring forth one nation, one culture and

⁴⁶⁵ Roy Richard Grinker, *Korea and Its Future: Unification and the Unfinished War*, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1998. Roland Bleiker, *Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation*, London, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.

one language as it used to be before the division of the Korea Peninsula. This is the meaning of *Tong-il* (reunification). The issue of reunification between North and South Korea in diversity is relevant to the Christian community in Youngnak Presbyterian Church.

However, in Part Two it was shown that the identities of the two populations are not homogeneous but heterogeneous. The two populations did not begin to perceive their heterogeneous identities until they encountered each other in the church. Their disappointment resulted in exclusion and refusal to create a community in which people live together in harmony.

The Missionary Policy of Youngnak Presbyterian Church concerning the North Korean Saeteomin has not only focused on making them become Christians but also on training them for mission toward North Korea.⁴⁶⁶ This policy has failed to integrate the two communities because of identity conflicts—to the point of ideological confrontation between Juche ideology and anti-Communist ideology. The CW have hated Juche ideology, regarding it as the evil ideology. They firmly believed that they must destroy it. They claimed that it was necessary to eliminate the CS identity because it was formed by Juche ideology. We can see the same process at work when we look at the image of the native missionary sent by western missions to do “their civilizing work.” If the CW see the Juche element of the CS as evil and anti-Christian, this follows the same pattern with the same problems as western mission: a) the native missionary experiences internal alienation and their identity is rejected by their employer or supervisor: b) the native missionary, when working, is seen as a traitor. If the CW made the CS become like them and become missionaries towards North Korea, the CS will no longer share an identity with the North Koreans. When

⁴⁶⁶ The Missionary Centre of Mission Toward North Korea, *The History of the Bible Study for the North Korean Refugees 1999-2006*, Seoul: Design Press, 2007, p. 21.

the CS are able to go to North Korea as missionaries in a reunited Korea, they may be rejected by the North Korean people and regarded as traitors due to the CS's different identity from the North Korean identity. In the long run, Younknak Presbyterian Church will have failed.

As long as the CW thinking remains the same, the two communities cannot take even one step toward the construction of a catholic community to live together in harmony. I contend that the two groups should construct *Tong-i* before they move on to *Tong-il*.

Tong-i is a combination of the two Chinese characters *tong* (통, 統) and *i* (이, 異). *Tong* may be translated as 'unity', *i* as 'differences.' Thus *Tong-i* literally means 'unity in differences.' The message of *tong-i* is very simple. The two communities can only create a harmonious catholic community if they embrace and respect their differences and give up on trying to assimilate one group into the other.

In comparing *Tong-i* with *Tong-il*, the meaning of '*Tong-i*' is different from that of '*Tong-il*' (통일 in Korean, 統一 in Chinese, unification) because literally '*Tong*' (통, 統) may be translated as 'unity', '*il*' (일, 一) as 'one' and '*i*' (이, 異) as 'differences.' As described above, *Tong-il* means that people of the two Koreas become one nation, one culture and one language as it used to be before division of the Korea Peninsula, but *Tong-i* means that people of the two Koreas is united with their differences and based on respect. In Part Three, I will offer a theologically based account of establishing *tong-i*, unity in diversity.

In Chapter 5 I will investigate why exclusion happens in the church and what theological responses there are to the exclusion in order to create *Tong-i* in the church.

Chapter 6 will suggest how *Tong-i* of the two populations will be constructed in the everyday church context in the future.

4. Approach

Having used two sociological concepts as the basis for a description and analysis of the cases in Youngnak Presbyterian Church in Part One and Two, in Part Three I will use a theological concept in order to give an account for the construction of a catholic community; Miroslav Volf's metaphorical lens of exclusion and embrace.

Volf draws heavily on Moltmann's theology, as illustrated in *The Crucified God*, in developing his own idea of God's solidarity with the victims of violence.⁴⁶⁷ However, Volf further expands on it by elaborating on the idea that Christ's death on the cross was a divine self-donation and a reception of the other (i.e. humanity or, in fact, the enemy). He asserts that we, as Christians, must try to emulate this self-donation through solidarity with those who are suffering while embodying the divine act of receiving (not ingesting) each other in our humanity. The identity must become that of Christ, one of self donation, solidarity, and forgiveness. Volf further explains what this self donation that leads to embrace means: "The will to give ourselves to others and "welcome" them, to readjust our identities to make space for them, is prior to any judgment about other, except that of identifying them in their humanity."⁴⁶⁸

The three elements are interrelated: 1) repentance and forgiveness will create a space for the adjustment of one's identity to embrace the other, 2) reconciliation will enable the construction of a new community, 3) new identity can be created based on embrace and mutual respect. The process stems from Miroslav Volf's description of the interrelatedness of the cross and the Trinitarian God: a) the mutuality of self-giving love in the Trinity (the doctrine of God), b) the outstretched arms of Christ on


⁴⁶⁷ Juergen Moltmann, *The Trinity and the Kingdom of God: The Doctrine of God*, New York: Harper and Row, 1981, p. 200.

⁴⁶⁸ Miroslav Volf, *Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation* Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996, p. 29.

the cross for the ‘godless’ (the doctrine of Christ), c) the open arms of the ‘father’ receiving the ‘prodigal’ (the doctrine of salvation).⁴⁶⁹

God’s reception of a hostile humanity into divine communion is a model for how human beings should relate to each other. As God acts, human beings must welcome each other, each adjust their identity and thus construct a catholic community in the church. For this human beings must make space by repentance and forgiveness moving from exclusion to embrace. As a result human beings can be reconciled with each other.

Diagram 4 The Methodology in Relation to Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation



With regard to Christian Wolnammin and Christian Saeteomin they have no capacity to embrace each other due to the fact that for over half a century they have been indoctrinated by sharply contrasting ideologies that make them enemies of each other: they do not recognize their own bias, their own politicized attitudes, as needing repentance and reconciliation.

This chapter will place a particular emphasis on the necessity of creating space by

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

repentance and forgiveness in order to embrace each other. In the view of the relation between power and sin of Mary Grey, the responsibility for sin “changes according to whether one is landless, a property-owner or an invader crossing into neighbouring territory.”⁴⁷⁰ One man may have power (which is not in itself a sin) and another may have less power, (which is also not a sin), but the powerful one is more responsible than him who has less power. For example, if a person has no money and takes money from somebody else to buy bread, that person cannot feel guilty of sin in the same way as somebody who has a lot of money and takes more money from somebody else. In this sense, we can think that, in relation to sin, the powerless person carries less responsibility for sin than the one in power in respect of certain acts. Nevertheless this is not a signal for the powerless to abuse others.

The CW do not recognise that they need to repent and forgive, so in a real sense they live in continual sin. If sinfulness is related to the power not to sin, then surely the powerful CW carry a far more sinful burden than the CS. The CS grew up in a context where they risked going without food if they disobeyed the instructions of the North Korean government ideology. This means their power to reflect upon their own context was limited. The CW have also lived in a context where their power to reflect critically was limited, in their case by the anti-communist socialization. However, if we think critically or reflectively, we can see that the CW were not going to be without food and that they were not in most cases going to be put in prison. We would say that the CW are actually, morally and theologically more sinful than the CS who did not have the same capacity or opportunity of making choices.

⁴⁷⁰ Mary Grey, *Falling into Freedom: Searching for New Interpretations of sin in a Secular Society*, A.I.C. Heron, I.R. Torrance, ed., *Scottish Journal of Theology*, vol., 47, no., 1, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994, p. 225.

Chapter V Attitude and Missiological Position Towards Religious Juche Ideology

Introduction

One way in which the CW can be encouraged to regard the CS and Juche ideology more positively (essential if they are to recognise their sin in rejecting the CS as full brothers and sisters in Christ) is to consider Juche as a religious tradition. Youngnak Presbyterian Church have traditionally had a negative exclusivist attitude to other religions, whether other forms of Christianity or Confucianism, Shamanism or Buddhism, dating from the time of the early missions. Such a sweepingly dismissive attitude is not necessarily part of Christian witness, as the development of fulfilment theology in the 19th century and its presentation at Edinburgh 1910 showed. Indeed, the teaching text for the CS used at Youngnak Presbyterian Church, NSTNL, is based very clearly on fulfilment theology, seeing the positive in Juche as the basis for Christian growth. However, this aspect of NSTNL has never been shared with the CW members of the wider Youngnak Presbyterian Church congregation, who remain largely negative towards fulfilment theology or any move to inclusivism. Moreover, even if they did accept Confucianism and Buddhism, for example, as foundational for Christian faith in Korea, and not religions to be totally eliminated, they would still find it hard to see anything positive in Juche. The need, therefore, is to deal with the overriding strength of anti-communism in the CW's thought and faith and then enable them to look more calmly at Juche. Given their socialization, this will be difficult.

In this chapter, I will, therefore, set out the missiological position of the book titled

*New Starting: Toward the Changing Life*⁴⁷¹ which the teachers of the BSCFP use for the CS is based on fulfilment theology. I shall use Alan Race's definition of fulfilment theology, which he suggests is a form of inclusivism. He defined inclusivism as follows: as opposed to exclusivism, or pluralism, inclusivism entails, 'both an acceptance and a rejection of the other faiths [...] On the one hand it accepts the spiritual power and depth manifest in them [...] On the other hand, it rejects them as not being sufficient for salvation apart from Christ [...]'⁴⁷² In other words, although there are various fulfilment theologies, one commonality can be found in the typical fulfilment theology: God does operate in the non-Christian world to prepare for people's eventual salvation to be fulfilled in Christ.

In order to make clear that the NSTCL is not a new idea coined for the purpose, I will relate the missiological position of the NSTCL to the fulfilment theology of the Fourth Commission of the 1910 World Missionary Conference.

The contemporary missionary approach of Youngnak Presbyterian Church towards religious Juche ideology is exclusivist as has been evidenced multiple times in Part One and Two. The CW maintain their hostile attitude toward religious Juche ideology: only by the destruction of Juche ideology can people be set free. On the other hand, analysing the content of the NSTCL, I found that a part of the CW's leadership takes a more inclusivist stance regarding the integration of the CS into Youngnak Presbyterian Church. The NSTNL made attempts at finding good elements in Juche ideology such as the notions of 'immortality'⁴⁷³ and 'grace' etc., and use them for

⁴⁷¹ The Missionary Centre toward North Korea, ed., 2001.

⁴⁷² Alan Race, *Christian and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology of Religions*, Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1983, p. 38.

⁴⁷³ Juche theory maintains that man have a physical life as well as a socio-political life. While the physical life means a life of man as an organic body, the socio-political life refers to social existence. This socio-political life is given by the Suryung (the Leader, Kim Il-Sung). The physical life has a limit, however, the socio-political life is of immortality. See, Kim Chang-

leading the CS toward Christianity.

When Youngnak Presbyterian Church began the Bible Study Class for Free People⁴⁷⁴ in 1999, the church needed a text book. The church entrusted the Educational Institute of Christianity⁴⁷⁵ with writing the text book,⁴⁷⁶ which was published before I began interviews. The text reflected the intention of strategic purpose of the writers without clarifying the concept of inclusivism. My interviewees also recognized only the strategic purpose without the knowledge of the concept of inclusivism, but the text influenced their attitude toward Juche ideology to move toward a more courteous attitude. Before describing the NSTCL, I shall briefly discuss the missiological development of fulfilment theology.

The Fulfilment Theology of the 1910 World Missionary Conference

1. Background of Edinburgh 1910

There are three reasons why fulfilment theology eventually emerged from the World Missionary Conference of 1910 Edinburgh: the rise of the science of religion, growing concern over nationalism in the non-Western world and critical reflection on the effects of colonialism.

Firstly, the rise of the science of religion, initiated by Friedrich Max Muller (1823-

ha, *The Immortal Juche Idea*, PFLPH, 1984, pp. 350-369.

⁴⁷⁴ ‘Free People’ means North Korean Saeteomin in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, which defines that “they come to South Korea to search for socio-political and religious freedom, they will live according to free will that God gives us and they will be responsible for the free will.” Lee Cheol-shin, “Longing for the Power of the Holy Spirit to Gospelize”, The Missionary Centre toward North Korea, ed., *Saeroun Chulbal: Byeonhwahaneun Salmeul Wihayeo (New Starting: Toward the Changing Life)*, Seoul: Youngnak Presbyterian Church, 2001, p. 17.

⁴⁷⁵ This institute is located in Presbyterian College and Theological Seminary, Seoul.

⁴⁷⁶ Ha Chung-yoube, “The Retrospective History; God began the BSCFP,” The Missionary Centre toward North Korea, ed., *Op.Cit.*, p. 23.

1900), was closely linked with the birth of Fulfilment Theology. The bases of science of religion were historical criticism and religious evolutionism.⁴⁷⁷ Muller held that since divine revelation is at work in all religion, all must contain some truth. Ultimately, the science of religion brought about a more tolerant attitude towards non-Christian religions and provided an evolutionary concept for fulfilment theology.

Secondly, John R. Mott⁴⁷⁸ indicated that the rise of nationalism leads to political perils. The Japanese victory over the Russians at Mukden in 1905 encouraged nationalism in all parts of the non-Christian world. In Asia, especially, this national spirit had been growing in association with a spirit of racial pride and antagonism. Mott went on to give examples of rising nationalism in India and Africa.⁴⁷⁹ This meant that the awakening of a national spirit in the non-Western world tended to close the minds and hearts of people to everything connected with Western missionaries. In Korea, at that time, even though the Korean church grew rapidly, nationalism emerged under Japanese Colonialism, although given the different colonial context, this was less anti-Western than in other parts of Asia.

Thirdly, Hiebert stated that fulfilment theology was born during the heyday of British Imperialism in the 19th century, thus its exponents were influenced by colonialism, which sought to demonstrate cultural superiority over subordinate nations. It was the task of the West to bring the benefits of this civilization to the world. Old systems had to be replaced by modern systems. For Christians, the parallel

⁴⁷⁷ Eric J. Sharpe, *Not to Destroy But to Fulfil: The Contribution of J.N. Farquhar to Protestant Missionary Thought in India before 1914*, Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri AB, 1965, p. 41

⁴⁷⁸ John R. Mott (1865-1955), missions and ecumenical statesman. He led the planning for the World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh in 1910, served as its chairman, and headed its continuation committee. Works by Mott include *Evangelization of the World in This Generation* (1900), *The Decisive Hour of Christian Mission* (1910) etc. See, Gerald H. Anderson, ed. *Biographical Dictionary of Christian Missions*, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Cambridge, U.K: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998, p. 476.

⁴⁷⁹ Kenneth Cracknell, *Justice, Courtesy and Love; Theologians and Missionaries Encountering World Religions, 1846-1914*, London: Epworth Press, 1995, p. 183.

was the superiority of the gospel.⁴⁸⁰ However, practical as well as missiological deeds demanded a new missionary attitude in the mission field and a new theological understanding towards other religions, one seeing a convert's previous religious tradition as a preparation for evangelism.

2. Missionary Attitudes towards Other Religions and to Christ

In this section, I will explore how Edinburgh respondents and missiologists understood the relationship of the Gospel to other religions.

With the rise of nationalism in the non-Christian world, a change in the missionary attitude towards other religions was considered essential. This can be clearly seen from the answers of some Edinburgh respondents.⁴⁸¹ One respondent indicated that he largely gave up “sledge hammer condemnation style” preaching, and thought the missionary attitude had to be persuasive rather than needlessly aggressive.⁴⁸² The Chinese YMCA leader C.T. Wang demonstrated that two or three decades earlier the attitude of most missionaries was that Christianity alone was the true religion while all others were false. Wang concluded that this was wrong,⁴⁸³ and unhelpful to mission. This was the pragmatic approach.

On the other hand, this new missionary attitude towards other religions was

⁴⁸⁰ Paul G. Hiebert, “Critical Contextualization,” *International Bulletin of Missionary Research*, Vol.11, No.3, 1987.

⁴⁸¹ With the view to discovering the realities of the situation, the Commission issued a list of questions to a large number of missionaries in all parts of the world. These correspondents represented practically all branches of the Christian Church, with the exception of the Eastern Churches and the Church of Rome.

The 11 questions were sent out. The response to this enquiry was most generous. Nearly two hundred sets of answers were sent in from all fields and from men and women representing the most different types of Christian faith. See, *The Missionary Message in Relation to Non-Christian Religions*, World Missionary Conference, 1910, Report of Commission IV, Edinburgh: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1910, pp. 1-5.

⁴⁸² Kenneth Cracknell, *Op.Cit.*, p. 242.

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 242-243.

connected with the theological understanding of many missionaries at that time. Such Edinburgh respondents spoke of God's activity within other religious traditions as the working out of salvific purposes, seeing that great leaders of all other religions must have been sent by God for certain purposes.⁴⁸⁴ Kenneth Cracknell demonstrates, in his book *Justice, Courtesy and Love*, that the Edinburgh respondents, in search of a theological understanding of the place and purposes of other religious traditions, used ancient ideas like the universal working of the Logos, or Divine Wisdom, or Holy Spirit.⁴⁸⁵ Missionaries and theologians recognising God's activity within other religious traditions as the working out of salvific purposes laid the foundations for the interfaith dialogues of our times.

They felt the missionary should adopt a conciliatory attitude, as Dr. Dodd, one of the respondents, commented:

The Christian preacher is the intruder into his hearers' country, an innovator as to social and religious matters, and, humanly speaking, has all the odds against him. He will lose nothing, and he has everything to gain, by recognizing the good in the religion of the region, in order to take advantage of any points of contact with Christianity, and preparations for it.⁴⁸⁶

The Fourth Commission established that Christianity was the fulfilment of other religions, though these were not seen as a preparation for Christianity in the same way that the Old Testament was: they were on a par with Hellenism and thus less important. Their view was that justice, courtesy, and love were essential to the proper attitude of the missionary towards other religions. In more detail, the Conference set

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 215-216.

⁴⁸⁵ Kenneth Cracknell, *Op.Cit.*, p.215.

⁴⁸⁶ *The Missionary Message in Relation to Non-Christian Religions*, World Missionary Conference, 1910, Report of Commission IV, p. 20.

out three points.

Firstly, the view of the majority of the respondents allows at least some parallels with other religions. Donald Fraser, one Edinburgh respondent, wrote that animists believed in one Supreme God. “He is fierce. He is the Creator... He brings death into the home. And when a dear one is taken away, they say, God is fierce.”⁴⁸⁷ While Animism is imperfect, missionaries emphasised its importance in suggesting a line of approach to the animistic mind, which could be more easily filled with a rich Christian content.⁴⁸⁸ They felt that the missionary should look for the element of good, foster it, and build upon it, gently leading on to the full truth. Christianity should not be antagonistic to the other religions, but a fuller revelation of what the people instinctively yearn after.

Secondly, Edinburgh respondents thought that the missionary should condemn evil and false elements courteously but definitely, though he should prefer to labour points which illuminate Christian truths.⁴⁸⁹ This means that the missionary does not accept all elements within other religions. If some of the elements are not sufficient for leading on to the Christian truth, the missionary should reject them. According to this view, the missionary must never attempt to combine other religions and Christianity because syncretism is unacceptable.⁴⁹⁰

Thirdly, the missionaries were to adamantly adhere to the finality of the Christian Gospel. The theology of religion implied or fully spelt out in the Edinburgh correspondence should be Christocentric. In relation to Christ, they believed all other religions were teleological, and moved toward their fulfilment in the Christian

⁴⁸⁷ Kenneth Cracknell, *Op.Cit.*, p. 25.

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-24.

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

revelation.⁴⁹¹ Most of the missionaries responded to the Commissioners in terms of fulfilment, and indeed Edinburgh 1910 fully reflected this idea. The idea of fulfilment was developed most extensively by J.N. Farquhar⁴⁹², in his book *The Crown of Hinduism*, where he refers to the words of Jesus Christ which summarizes His whole relationship to Israel: "I have not come to destroy but to fulfil."⁴⁹³ As in the case of Farquhar, the key text for many other respondents was Matthew 5:17.⁴⁹⁴ In his book, he contends that Christ fulfils the highest and deepest spiritual aspirations of the Hindu, suggesting that Christianity should be presented 'as the fulfilment of all that is aimed at in Hinduism, as the satisfaction of the spiritual yearnings of her people, as the crown and climax of the crudest forms of her worship as well as of those lofty spiritual movements which have so often appeared in Hinduism but have always ended in weakness.'⁴⁹⁵ Yet if other religions did not even have the status of the OT, this was actually a more limited view than it appears

On the whole, the mission atmosphere of the World Missionary Conference of 1910 was less optimistic than the Ecumenical Missionary Conference in 1900 due to the emergence of nationalism in the non-Western world. Acknowledging the changing situation, Edinburgh respondents reached out towards other religions by recognising God's activity within other religious traditions as the working out of salvific purposes while they firmly emphasised the finality of Christ as the ultimate fulfilment. It may

⁴⁹¹ Kenneth Cracknell, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 219-220.

⁴⁹² Farquhar, John Nicol(1861-1929), Scottish educational missionary and orientalist. In 1902 he joined the staff of the Indian YMCA, first as national student secretary and later as literary secretary, a post he held until 1923. During these years he wrote several important books, notably *The Crown of Hinduism*(1913) and *Modern Religious Movements in India*(1915), and edited many more. See, Gerald H. Anderson, ed. *Biographical Dictionary of Christian Missions*, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Cambridge, U.K: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998.

⁴⁹³ J.N.Farquhar, *The Crown of Hinduism*, Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, London, Edinburgh, Glasgow, New York, Toronto, Melbourne and Bombay, 1913, p. 53.

⁴⁹⁴ Kenneth Cracknell, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 221-222.

⁴⁹⁵ Eric J. Sharpe, *Comparative Religion: A History*, London: Duckworth, 1986, p. 153.

be concluded that they tried to underline both the particular importance of Christ and the importance of universal truth in other religions. While this was a difficult balancing act in itself, it ignores the implicit denigration of other religions, despite the appearance of acceptance, implied in fulfilment theology

Responses to the Commission IV of Edinburgh 1910 and its Critics

1. Radical Discontinuity

In the period following the end of the first World War, which eventually witnessed the increasing menace of fascism in Europe, the optimistic assessment of human nature evidenced in fulfilment theory was again replaced by a more negative evaluation of other religion. This occurred under the influences of the German theologian, Karl Barth, and the most influential exponent of his views within missionary thinking, the Dutch missiologist, Hendrik Kraemer.⁴⁹⁶ He regarded fulfilment theology as erroneous, rejecting the term on the basis of what he termed Biblical realism. This view regards non-Christian religions as human attempts to find God that are flawed as a consequence of the fallen nature of the human condition. He

⁴⁹⁶ Hendrik Kraemer(1888-1965), Dutch Reformed lay theologian and missiologist. In 1936, he was invited to write a book in preparation for the meeting of the International Missionary Council at Tambaram(Madras) in 1938. That book, *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World*(1938), distinguished sharply between what he called “biblical realism” and non-Christian religious experience. After Kraemer worked as a missionary in Indonesia (1922-1937), he became a professor at Leiden University (1937-1947), and finally served as the first director of the World Council of Churches’ Ecumenical Institute at Geneva (1948-1955). His theology, which reflects the work of Karl Barth and Emil Brunner evoked strong opposition in liberal circles and among Indian theologians. From 1938 to 1961 Kraemer dominated the scene in mission theology. See, Gerald H. Anderson, ed. *Biographical Dictionary of Christian Missions*, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Cambridge, U.K: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998.

held that other religions lack genuine revelation from God, and are merely rebellious efforts to reach God. True faith is the human response only to God's saving self-revelation in Jesus Christ, the truth that Christianity alone proclaims, even as it remains under the judgment of Christ as a religion. It is meaningless, he argued, for Christians to look for points of contact between Christianity and other religions because the Gospel stands in judgment, not fulfilment, of all religions, and it is the task of the Christian missionary to bring the saving news of Jesus Christ to people of all religions. His theology dominated the Tambaram Missionary Conference in 1938.

If Kraemer's statement is accepted, no contact points can be found to relate the Gospel to the people of non-Christian religions: people have either to accept or reject the whole Christian package. He did not accept that the non-Christian religions would eventually, in their own time, attain Christ through the operation of diffused reason (*logos spermatikos*) in the non-Christian world. For Kraemer, that was a denial of the dynamic character of Biblical revelation.⁴⁹⁷

While Kraemer's idea that Biblical revelation is the full revelation from God may be acceptable, his total denial of divine presence in the world's religions must be challenged. The weakest point of Kraemer's theology is that Biblical realism limited God's revelation within too narrow a range.

2. Anonymous Christianity

Although it is often overlooked in discussions of missionary theology, partly because of the importance attributed to Kraemer in missiology, a new view, with some of the same faults and benefits of fulfilment theology, was espoused after Vatican II

⁴⁹⁷ H. Kraemer, *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World*, London: The Edinburgh House Press, 1938, pp. 114-115, 123.

by leading Roman Catholic theologians such as Karl Rahner. Kraemer is on the pessimistic side because he experienced the horror of World War I. Conversely, Rahner insists that Christians should think optimistically about the possibilities of salvation outside Christianity. He wants to focus on God's love and grace.⁴⁹⁸ He said that Christian must learn to look upon adherents of other faiths as 'anonymous' Christians in their unconscious mind, beneath their own religion. Rahner insists that Grace is offered to all men and all creation: it is not given as an extrinsic addition to human nature. Rather, grace infuses and becomes part of human nature. He says, "a non-Christian religion... does not merely contain element of natural knowledge of God...It contains also supernatural elements arising out of grace which is given to men as a gratuitous gift on account of Christ."⁴⁹⁹ This means that every time non-Christians reach out beyond themselves to what is true and good, they are experiencing and responding to grace; they are experiencing and truly knowing God. Such an encounter with revealing grace can be experienced in a variety of real-life situations.

Secondly, those non-Christians who respond to the divine revelation this way are "anonymous Christians." Rahner insists that "Christianity does not merely confront the member of an extra-Christian religion as a mere non-Christian but as someone who can and must already be regarded as an anonymous Christian."⁵⁰⁰ In showing that other believers can be called anonymous Christians, Rahner tries to break through Christian exclusivism. Further, to call believers in other religions anonymous Christians disposes Christians to approach them with the realization that the Gospel

⁴⁹⁸ Karl Rahner, "Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions," in *Theological Investigations*, vol.5., Baltimore: Helicon, 1966, pp. 123-124.

⁴⁹⁹ David Kerr, *Christianity and World Religions Lecture 12: Christian Theologies of Religion: Inclusivism(1) The Christological Approach of Karl Rahner*, Lecture given at New College in Edinburgh University, 10.03.2005, p. 2.

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

does not necessarily bring them anything essentially new. Anonymous Christians already know the one God of love who is active in their midst. Rahner's view seems entirely consistent with the Logos Christology of the early church. This seems to allow Christians to enter the authentic dialogue with other religions with the expectation that other believers have experienced the one God.

Rahner emphasises the importance of the universal truth in other religions, building his theory of the anonymous Christian. Rahner's view can be briefly epitomized thus: Christians can begin dialogue with other religions by recognising the presence of the anonymous Christian.

Thirdly, Rahner underlines the particular importance of Jesus Christ, emphasising Christ as the finality of salvation. Rahner says, "God desires the salvation of everyone. And this salvation willed by God is the salvation won by Christ."⁵⁰¹ This means that there is no such thing as pure grace; it is always grace won by Christ. Even though other religions may contain all the supernatural elements, they are incomplete until they come to know and embrace Christ. Only in Him can they find true identity and the fullness of salvation. Rahner affirms that Christ must be proclaimed as the fullest revelation and the definite saviour. He states not only that there is saving grace within other religions but also that this grace comes from Christ.

When the theological understanding of Rahner is compared with that of Edinburgh 1910, we can say that, despite respect for the anonymous Christian, Rahner's understanding of Christ as the finality of salvation is similar to Edinburgh respondents' understanding of Christ as the fulfillment. Therefore, we can assert that Rahner stresses the particular importance of Christ, by describing Him as the finality of salvation. Both he and fulfillment theologians have a similar theological position.

⁵⁰¹ Karl Rahner, "Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions", in *Theological Investigations*, vol.5., Baltimore: Helicon, 1966, p. 122.

3. Faith and Beliefs

Nowadays Christians see indeed a resurgence of missionary zeal among other religions. As for Christianity, other religions send their own missionaries to compete in the mission field. Thus, Christianity can be confronted with other religions in the mission field. They, however, must meet each other and relate to each other, not in order to obliterate each other but to learn from and help each other.⁵⁰²

Some contemporary Christian theologians began to develop a new method for a global or world theology. John Hick proposes and describes a ‘global theology’⁵⁰³ in his book *Death and Eternal*, having emphasized the importance of a universal ‘faith’ with various religions. Paul F. Knitter suggests, in his book, “*No Other Name?*”, the need for a ‘global theology’. He insists that global theology requires the theologian to know something about what the major world religions have experienced and said about the nature of the Ultimate and the value of this world.⁵⁰⁴ On this basis, we can suggest that the ultimate purpose of religious pluralism would be a world religion in which all religions can coexist in peace. Hendrick Kraemer insists on an exclusive uniqueness, affirming that only Jesus is true revelation. Karl Rahner, dissatisfied with such blatant exclusivity, proposes that God’s revealing action in Jesus includes all other religions even though individuals will not finally be fulfilled until they realize Christ. Knitter criticizes both theologians for claims which are insufficiently sensitive in that they contradict or impede authentic dialogue with believers of other faiths.⁵⁰⁵ He proposes a theocentric model which offers a relational uniqueness of Jesus. It

⁵⁰² Paul F. Knitter, *No Other Name?: A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes toward the World Religions*, New York: Orbis Books, 1985, pp. 4-6.

⁵⁰³ John Hick, *Death and Eternal Life*, New York: Harper and Row, 1976, esp. pp. 29-34.

⁵⁰⁴ Paul F. Knitter, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 223-226.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

affirms that Jesus is unique, but with a uniqueness defined by its ability to relate to other unique religious figures.⁵⁰⁶ He regards the uniqueness of Jesus Christ as a trait of confessional language. According to him, all the “one and only” adjectives used to describe Jesus Christ in the New Testament belong to the language of confession.⁵⁰⁷ Knitter’s purpose appears to allow for interreligious dialogue. He says, “even if some of the details in this selective summary of New Testament Christology are debatable, the general picture is clear enough to provide some insights into the task of interpreting Jesus Christ’s uniqueness with a view to interreligious dialogue.”⁵⁰⁸ He seems to believe strongly that the uniqueness of Jesus Christ impedes authentic dialogue with believers of other faiths.

Wilfred Cantwell Smith argues that ‘faith can be distinguished from ‘beliefs’, which define the doctrinal positions within the various religions and thus operate at the intellectual level. This same distinction was discussed at length earlier in the twentieth century by a Scottish missionary to India, A.G. Hogg.⁵⁰⁹ He argues that a vital relationship exists between faith, understood as trust in the highest and best that we know, and beliefs as the intellectual articulations whereby faith is achieved, interpreted and maintained.

Hogg has also been known as a chief and serious critic of Farquhar’s fulfilment theology. However, he did not express wholesale condemnation against fulfilment theology, but acknowledged some good points in it, although they were extremely limited. Nevertheless, he criticized fulfilment theology. One of his criticisms is the

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 171-172.

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 184-185.

⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p.180.

⁵⁰⁹ He was Professor of Philosophy in the Madras Christian College until his retirement in 1939. See, James L. Cox, *Changing Beliefs and an Enduring Faith*, Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1993, pp. 103-107.

similarities on which fulfilment is grounded are ‘superficial’ and ‘unhelpful.’⁵¹⁰ Furthermore, morally speaking, the attitude of fulfilment is arrogant, since it assumes the obvious superiority of Christian over other beliefs, although it cannot assume as such.⁵¹¹

In sum, Kraemer accused the 1910 Edinburgh Fourth Commission of denying the power of the Bible as God’s full revelation. However, Kraemer’s Biblical realism is weakened on account of his hostility towards non-Christian religions. Although the Bible does not explicitly say that there are seeds of truth in other religions, it cannot be proved that fulfilment theology is wrong especially in light of the concept of *logos spermatikos*. Whatever the theological argument, the practical outcome of Kraemer’s view can easily be a wide gap between Gospel and people, rules and praxis.

It may well be that the CW and to an extent some NSTCL teachers of the CS at Youngnak Presbyterian Church share Kraemer’s view (as well as their own fierce anti-communism). However, it is also the case that the NSTCL text and some, if not most, teachers of the CS share a more fulfilment view.

Pragmatism has papered over this deep difference, but the issue may need to be addressed if reconciliation between those who are equals in the sight of God can be achieved.

⁵¹⁰ Hogg’s Edinburgh paper, p. 25. James Leland Cox, *The Development of A.G.Hogg’s Theology in Relation to Non Christian Faith: Its Significance for the Tambaram Meeting of the International Missionary Council, 1938*, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1977, pp. 107, 150.

⁵¹¹ James L. Cox, *Ibid.*, p. 106.

Fulfilment Theology and the Text Book of BSCFP

In this section I will analyze the text book of the BSCFP titled NSTCL to tease out its missiological position. The NSTCL has a student and a teacher edition. I will focus on the latter in order to demonstrate that the text moves toward a more inclusivist outlook in relation to the teaching of the CS, while recognising that this may not impinge on the CW understanding of inclusivism at all. All in all, the CW in Youngnak Presbyterian Church are not likely to move towards an inclusivist position merely because the CS are using a text written by the PCTS which uses that approach. However, at least the CW teachers who serve in BSCFP may be influenced by the text book because they use it for teaching to the CS.

1. The Missionary Attitude of the NSTCL toward Juche Ideology

The NSTCL lays emphasis upon three aspects: 1) the system of North Korea (Juche ideology) has ethical similarities to Christianity; 2) it is cautious about condemning Juche ideology, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il; 3) emphasises the necessity of *Juchejeokin Sinang*⁵¹²(a self-reliant Christian faith).⁵¹³ It is evident that the attitudes expressed in the teacher edition are markedly different from those emerging from the interviews cited in Part 2 with the CW.

In chapter 4, titled *We Are Glorious And Invaluable Human Beings*, we can read the following: “The concept of self-respect as expressed in Juche ideology must be maintained in the CS;”⁵¹⁴ in chapter 6 titled *Human Beings Were Seduced into Tasting the Fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil*, we can read: “Teachers must

⁵¹² The word Juche was used in this phrase.

⁵¹³ NSTCL, pp.7-9.

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

deal with the personal cult of Kim Il-sung respectfully if they have to do it, saying that the cause of its existence is because human beings are intrinsically religious.”⁵¹⁵ In fact, this level of possibly pseudo-acceptance goes against the anti-communist sentiments evidenced in chapter 3.

2. Stepping Stones Emerging from Juche Ideology Towards Christ

In this section, I will investigate how the NSTCL regards certain elements within Juche ideology as stepping stones towards Christ.

The Image of God

As Kim Byeong-ro says that the understanding of the essence of human being is similar in Juche ideology and Christianity,⁵¹⁶ the NSTCL places emphasis on the essence of the human being. In accordance with the philosophical principle of Juche ideology, according to the NSTCL, humans are masters of everything and decide everything. Thus, human beings are valuable and glorious.⁵¹⁷ The NSTCL explains that the reason why human beings are so valuable and glorious is that human beings are created in the image of God (Genesis 1:26-28) being made to reflect the divine nature, but in a bodily way. Col. 1: 15-20 declares that Christ is the image of the invisible God; As God’s image, Christ manifests God, reflecting his nature.⁵¹⁸ The text book used the Juche concept of ‘valuable human beings’ to help the CS understand the image of God and through that learn about Christ.

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁵¹⁶ Kim Byeong-lo, *Bokhansahoeui Jonggyoseong: Juchesasanggwa Gidokgyoui Jongguoyangshik Biguo* (Religion of the Society of North Korea: A Comparative Study of Religious Way between Christianity and Juche Idea), Seoul: Institute of Unification, 2000, p. 51.

⁵¹⁷ NSTCL., p. 53.

⁵¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 64-71.

While clearly the NSTCL ignores issues such as the Fall and humility, it does politely condemn the system of North Korea in which the entire population is graded into 47, some say 67, ranks according to their class background. This determines everything right down to the monthly food rations. The NSTCL places emphasis upon equality because everybody is equal before God,⁵¹⁹ an aspect of theology which the NSTCL stresses. However, the NSTCL ignores some very fundamental issues or fundamental issues of Youngnak Presbyterian Church. It can be accused of a pragmatic cherry-picking, which means that it uses some bits and ignores others.

Salvation

The NSTCL regards also Kim Il-sung's figure as a stepping stone. According to the NSTCL, Kim Il-sung is a prominent figure who liberated the North Korean people from Japan's and the United States' imperialism: he is the Suryeong, the saviour who defeats the devil. The NSTCL recognized the analogy between Christ and the Suryeong and actively used it to teach about Salvation. The book points out, however, that only Christ can liberate humans from sin.⁵²⁰

While there is Christology in Christianity, there is the theory of Suryeong (Leader) in Juche ideology. Jasper Becker points out that Kim Il-sung is a Christ-like saviour of Korea.⁵²¹ According to the "Theory of the Immortal Socio-Political Body," as described in chapter 2, the Suryeong (Leader) is the supreme brain of a living body, the Party are the nerves and the masses are endowed with life when they offer their absolute loyalty. The theory states that the masses will remain dead without the Suryeong which means that only the Suryeong can give the masses life. The Suryeong

⁵¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 56-60.

⁵²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

⁵²¹ Jasper Becker, *Rogue Regime*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 67.

can understand and coordinate the desires of the masses and unite them into one socio-political organism. Only the masses guided by the Party and the Suryeong are the “masters of history.” According to this theory, if an individual submerges himself entirely in the being of the Suryeong, then he will achieve immortality,⁵²² immortality being achieved through Suryeong. Furthermore, Lee He-sang states that the Party openly describes Kim Il-sung as a god: Sun of Love (Kim Il-sung) is superior to Christ in love, superior to Buddha in benevolence, superior to Confucius in virtue and superior to Mohammed in justice.⁵²³ The Juche ideology teaching about the Leader, however different in approach and practice, offers a stepping-stone, which can be used to make Christ more accessible to the CS.

Church

The notion of the socio-political organism can be viewed as similar to the concept of church. The NSTCL took similar elements from the concept to explain the role of the individual in the church (chapter 13, *Church Life*). 1) The centre of life for the individual is the church: 2) Individuals should make efforts to become a member of the congregation just like they were expected to become Party members: 3) Individuals should sacrifice themselves for the church after obtaining membership as they sacrificed themselves for the Party.⁵²⁴ It also points out the difference between the nature of the sacrifice: in church efforts and sacrifice are done not by demand on force but by *Juche*-based (subjective) personal decision.⁵²⁵

The NSTCL also explains the differences between a church meeting and a Party

⁵²² *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

⁵²³ Lee Hye-sang, *North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress*, Westport: Praeger, 2001, p. 10.

⁵²⁴ NSTCL., p. 163.

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*

meeting.⁵²⁶ Taking part in Party meetings was compulsory even at the height of the famine. During the meeting the members were quizzed about the Juche ideology⁵²⁷ and were expected to praise the leaders.⁵²⁸ Article 63 of DPRK's Socialist Constitution, North Korea depicts its society almost like a church community, the rights and duties of citizens being based on the collectivist principle, "One for all and all for one,"⁵²⁹ against the background of the body. In moving to the doctrine of the church, Paul describes the church as the body of Christ.⁵³⁰ When I visited North Korea first in 1999, I met a North Korean Juche scholar, Kim Cheol-su. In Kim Il Sung University, he wrote his dissertation titled *The Comparative Study: Juche Idea and Christianity*. He told me that Juche ideology and Christianity was very similar because in the theory of Juche, the 'individual' does not exist but only the community of North Korea; in the same way, in the church, the 'individual' does not exist but only the body of Christ. Not all theologians may agree with his concept but he, as a North Korea Juche scholar, placed emphasis on the similarity between the two sides in his perspective. And it certainly gives a metaphorical basis for discussion in teaching the CS.

Worship

The NSTCL explains worship using the activities of the political meeting with which the CS are familiar (chapter 16: *The Worshiping Human Being*).

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

⁵²⁷ David Hawk, ed., *Thank You Father Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in North Korea*, 2005, unpublished, p. 38.

⁵²⁸ Jasper Becker, *Op.Cit.*, p. 74.

⁵²⁹ DPRK's Socialist Constitution, available from: <http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/>; accessed on the 20th of November 2008.

⁵³⁰ Sinclair B. Ferguson, David F. Wright, ed., *Op.Cit.*, p. 140.

The activities of the political meeting of Juche ideology are similar to the worship in the church. Through the activities the North Korean people are enthusiastic about and praise the Suryeong. One Christian Saeteomin said that when he saw the CW worshipping, praising and praying he found that he felt similarly during Party meeting activities. The CS misunderstood what worshipping God was about. Nevertheless, we can find the similarity between Juche ideology and Christianity in the various aspects of the activities of the North Korean people, which would be either a useful element or a stumbling block to teach the gospel to the CS.⁵³¹

Furthermore, the NSTCL places emphasis on replacing the Suryeong, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong Il, with God in relation to the object of the worship.⁵³² When I led the BSCFP in Youngnak Presbyterian Church in 1998, I experienced a significant point through Shim Shin-bok, a Christian Saeteomin who joined the BSCFP. While reading Genesis chapter 1-2, he realized that the theory of the Suryeong in Juche ideology was borrowed from the Genesis chapter 1-2, replacing the position of God with the Suryeong. Shim became a passionate reader of the Bible. Then he became the first Christian Saeteomin student in the PCTS and then the first Christian Saeteomin minister of Youngnak.

Kim Byeong-ro points out that the North Korean worship of the Suryeong is like a religion in appearance. There are specific places of worship or shrines e.g. *Kimilsung Hyukmyeong Hakseupgwan* (Kim Il-sung Revolutionary History Institute).⁵³³ Christian Saeteomin interviewees told me what these look like. There is a portrait of Kim Il-sung hanging on the wall in front, and also a plaster sculpture of him on a platform. There are pictures from Kim Il-sung's childhood on the walls. There is a special storage area for dust cloths and soap to clean the portrait of Kim Il-sung.

⁵³¹ NSTCL., p. 197.

⁵³² *Ibid.*, pp. 204-205.

⁵³³ Kim Byeong-ro, *Op.Cit.*, p. 93.

There are lectures and discussions.⁵³⁴ While staying in Shinuiju city in North Korea in 2000, I visited one *Kimilsung Hyukmyeong Hakseupgwan* (Kim Il-sung Revolutionary History Institute). I listened attentively to what the female guide said about Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il for five hours while looking around rooms displaying various materials related to the life of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. The guide was excellently well-trained and impressed me: after viewing and listening I could easily see myself becoming a new believer in Juche ideology. There I understood for the first time the North Korean people's faith in the personal cult of the Leaders. The function of the Kim Il-sung Revolutionary History Institute is similar to that of a church of Christianity. The teacher's book explains these to the Christian Wolnammin teachers, who in turn can utilize the material to help the CS understand the structure of Christian practice.

The NSTCL uses the similarities between the Christian Church and a personality cult when teaching about the person of God, immortality, salvation and worship but it is careful to highlight the differences. The success of this method can be seen in the example of Shim Shin-bok, who not only became the first Saeteomin minister in Youngnak Church but was also planning to become a missionary in the China-North Korea border region, a highly dangerous place. Yet if the CW are not aware of the underlying fulfilment approach-if this pragmatic comparison can truly be called that-then the tensions between the CW and the CS may not be ameliorated by the programme.

⁵³⁴ David Hawk, ed., *Op.Cit.*, p. 39.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I demonstrated that the missiological position of the NSTCL is based on fulfilment theology or inclusivism. First, I described inclusivist theology based on the 1910 World Missionary Conference respondents' contribution. The respondents emphasized the importance of moving from an aggressive to a more courteous manner when presenting Christianity to non-Christians, highlighting the similarities between the indigenous religion and Christianity when contact is made between the missionaries and the people. Some respondents endorsed fulfilment theology which holds that there are seeds of the Logos (i.e. Christ) in many religions, with the Gospel filling the gaps, so to speak. Missionaries were encouraged to foster the good elements of the indigenous religion, build on these and lead people toward the Gospel. Second, they were to politely but firmly and definitely condemn evil and false elements in order to avoid syncretism. Finally, they are to tie in appropriate good elements with Christ.

The textbook used by Christian Wolnammin teachers in the BSCFP utilized this concept and adapted the teaching to highlight similarities between Juche and Christianity. It employed the idea of a "*Jucheistic faith*" which emphasizes self-reliance but puts it in the Christian context. Incorporating the word Juche was a big step toward the recognition of the Christian Saetomin life experience and identity and demonstrates that the CW teachers are able to move beyond their own anti-communism. It is, however, possible that this "moving beyond" is a mere device, and in that sense a dishonest representation of self.

Despite the fact that the contemporary missiological position of the NSTCL as fulfilment theology is in its early stages, the more it is will be developed beyond the

CS the more the Youngnak Presbyterian Church community could find good elements within Juche ideology. As a result, the hostile attitude of the CW toward Juche ideology could be reduced and a minimally courteous attitude could develop.

In the next chapter I will argue that besides adopting elements of fulfillment theology, recognition of the problem, repentance and forgiveness are also necessary elements in creating a community in diversity.

Chapter VI Embracing the Other and Its Application in the Context of the Korean Peninsula and Youngnak Presbyterian Church

Introduction

In this chapter I will describe the fundamental necessity for *making space through repentance and forgiveness by the CW to embrace the CS* in order that *Tong-i* may be constructed in the church.

As described in the previous chapters, the CW were steeped in anti-communist ideology through the political circumstances and education and as a result they came to perceive North Koreans as evil. At the same time, North Koreans are indoctrinated by Juche ideology to regard South Koreans as their enemies. These produced the heterogeneous identities of the two populations, which led to mutual exclusion in Youngnak Presbyterian Church. In order to approach the problem, I proposed the adoption of fulfilment theology as a theological basis for approach. I analysed the teacher's edition of the textbook used in Youngnak Presbyterian Church for introducing Christianity to the Saeteomin. I found that the authors indeed apply the concepts of fulfilment theology: the content of the textbook deal with Juche ideology, but instead of condemning it outright they highlight points of similarity with Christianity and build on those. Despite the fact that this was a significant change, it is not enough unless the CW enmity is eliminated by repentance and forgiveness in order to create space to embrace the CS to construct a harmonious catholic community.

This chapter will deal with the context of embrace in the writing of Miroslav Volf

and Lim Dong-won.⁵³⁵

Volf's book entitled *Exclusion and Embrace* indicates that God's reception of hostile humanity into divine communion is a model for how human beings should relate to the other. Volf explicates his analysis in four central sections: "repentance," "forgiveness," "making space in oneself for the other," and "healing of memory," so as to move from exclusion to embrace. Then he describes the drama of embrace as the key structural element of a successful embrace. In this chapter I will not attempt to deal with the four central sections equally. Rather I will place primary emphasis on the section of "making space in oneself for the other," relating this to the other sections in order that the aim of this chapter be fulfilled.

The concept of embrace in the context of North and South Korea was first advocated by Lim Dong-won who is one of the architects of South Korea's Sunshine Policy. He is also a Protestant Christian Wolnammin. Lim Dong-won had significantly contributed to reconciliation and cooperation between South Korea and North Korea since 1993 before he left the government in 2003.

⁵³⁵ Here is a summary of chronology of Lim Dong-won's life

- 1934: Born in northwestern territory, in Korea
- 1957: Graduated from Korea Military Academy, Appointed as a second lieutenant.
- 1980: Left the Army as a Vice-Marshal.
- 1981-1985: Ambassador of Nigeria.
- 1985-1988: Ambassador of Australia.
- 1988-1992: Chancellor of Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security.
- 1993-1994: Vice-Minister of Unification.
- 1995-1998: Secretary-General of Asia-Pacific Peace Foundation.
- 1998: Advisor of Kim Dae-jung's administration.
- 1998-1999: Minister of Unification.
- 1999-2001: Director of National Intelligence Service.
- 2001-2002: Minister of Unification
- 2002-2003: Chief Negotiator with North Korea.
- 2004-the present: Chairman of Sejong Foundation.

He was the architect of South Korea's "Sunshine Policy," which calls for engaging with North Korea rather than isolating it, in hopes of reunifying the Korean Peninsula. Before joining Kim Dae-jung's administration he had served as head of Kim's Asia-Pacific Peace Foundation: deputy chief of the unification board under President Roh Tae-woo; and as ambassador to Nigeria and Australia in the 1980s. Available from; <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/won.html>; accessed on 7 June 2008.

This chapter consists of three sections: first, Miroslav Volf's concept of embrace and the importance of creating space; second, the embrace policy of Lim Dong-won in the Korean peninsula; third, the response of Youngnak Presbyterian Church to the embrace policy and cases of embrace experienced in the Bible Study for Free People in the church.

Embrace in Miroslav Volf's Work

1. Definition of Embrace

The definition of embrace is terminologically "*To clasp or hold close with the arms, usually as an expression of affection.*"⁵³⁶ In Volf's book, the notion of embrace stands in opposition to exclusion. In order to explain what embrace is, he begins his discussion of exclusion through the development of the themes of distance and belonging.

Exclusion is created when persons distance themselves from one another and close themselves to the possibility of belonging to and with other persons. Instead of distancing ourselves from the other, Volf argues that we must distance ourselves from our particular culture and membership in it, in order to make room for the other and accept otherness. This is a crucial issue, especially for the CW who see Christianity as inseparable from anti-communism. Embrace would take place if this could be achieved.⁵³⁷

Significantly, Volf claims that the embrace model is found on the cross which is the ultimate symbol of self-giving: the outstretched arms of Christ are open to embrace all

⁵³⁶ Available from; <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/embrace>; accessed on 20 June 2008.

⁵³⁷ Miroslav Volf, *Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation* Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996, pp. 99-166.

of humanity and welcome all. An embrace has doctrinal implications for Volf. It calls to mind the mutuality of self-giving love that exists in the Trinity and therefore, implies a doctrine of God. The embrace reminds us of Christ's embrace of the "godless" on the cross and therefore, the doctrine of Christ. And finally, the outstretched arms of Christ herald the doctrine of salvation in the outstretched arms of the father receiving his prodigal son.

In short, the notion of embrace for Volf is that one can embrace the other, which stems from the self-giving of Jesus on the cross: to refuse to embrace the other as they are is surely a judgement which an imperfect human is not entitled to make.

2. A Summary of Embrace According to Volf

In this section, I will describe Volf's emphasis upon the task of responsible theology and the importance of repentance and forgiveness to make space to embrace the other.

First of all, we must recognize not only that God is the final grantor of reconciliation, but also we, as God's agents, can not escape our responsibility to embrace the other and to love the other as Jesus did. The central thesis of Volf's chapter on embrace is that "God's reception of hostile humanity into divine communion is a model for how human beings should relate to the other."⁵³⁸ Returning to the divine self-giving of Christ on the cross, Volf argues for the primacy of love. Furthermore, Volf is not content that the kingdom of love is purely an eschatological hope. He believes that "authentic human freedom consists in being a friend of God and partaking in the glory of the triune God who is nothing but pure

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

love” in the struggle for liberation.⁵³⁹ According to him, enabling us to live in peace in the absence of final reconciliation is the purpose and task of developing a “responsible theology.”⁵⁴⁰

A theology of embrace has four basic elements: repentance, forgiveness, space, and forgetting: a) “repentance implies not merely a recognition that one has made a bad mistake, but that one has *sinned*,”⁵⁴¹; b) forgiveness is the only way out of the irreversibility of acts of exclusion;⁵⁴² c) space is created when forgiveness “heals the wounds that the power-acts of exclusion have inflicted and breaks down the dividing wall of hostility”⁵⁴³; d) a redemption of the memories involves a “certain kind of forgetting” in order to heal.⁵⁴⁴ Victims and oppressors need to repent⁵⁴⁵ and need to forgive each other with the power of the Holy Spirit.

Jesus grounds his radical message in the message of God’s unconditional love and the people’s need to repent. This repentance is a call to *all*. According to Volf, victims cannot claim purity because they can readily bear hatred against oppressors, and in other context are oppressors themselves. All must repent and claim citizenship in the kingdom of love. Victims and oppressors may need to repent from different sins, but all must repent if they wish to become true social agents in the kingdom of love. Volf recognizes that “Genuine repentance may be one of the most difficult acts for a person, let alone a community, to perform.”⁵⁴⁶ However, Volf overlooks the need to repent of the sin that violence stems from “the socially structured and culturally patterned

⁵³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁵⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁵⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 113. Italics are Volf’s.

⁵⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 133, 135.

⁵⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 111-119.

⁵⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

behaviour of groups”⁵⁴⁷ by which people act without “*the probability of individuals realizing their wills*”⁵⁴⁸ which is called the three dimensional power by Steven Lukes. Indeed, it would not be easy for Christians to perceive such sin of violence and they would need time to realize that it is not compatible with Christ. The CW socialized by strong anti-communist ideology may too easily stigmatize the CS when the CW encountered the CS’s different verbal or behaviour aspects from their own, by which they may violate the CS. To take another example, the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCCK) issued the ‘Declaration of the Korea National Council of the Churches toward the unification and peace of Korean people’ in 1988, which “acknowledges and confesses past and present sins: the sin of mutual hatred, the sin of justifying the division of Korea, and the sin of accepting each ideology as absolute, which is contrary to God’s absolute authority.”⁵⁴⁹ This provoked severe criticism from the conservative sections of the Korean church.⁵⁵⁰ In spite of the fact that this positive Declaration, as Sebastian Kim evaluates, “has challenged many conservative sections of the church to rethink their traditional approaches toward the North, moving from evangelism or relief to partnership for the common goal of peace and reconciliation,”⁵⁵¹ it was refused acceptance by the General Assembly of the denomination to which Youngnak Presbyterian Church belonged.⁵⁵² Indeed, it would be difficult for those who have been socialized by anti-communist ideology to realize

⁵⁴⁷ Steven Lukes, *Op.Cit.*, p. 26.

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid.* Italics are Lukes’

⁵⁴⁹ Sebastian Kim, Reconciliation Possible? The Churches’ efforts toward the peace and reunification of North and South Korea, Clare Amos, Kirsteen Kim, and Sarah Middleton, ed., *Rethinking Mission*, vol. 3, Number 3, London: The Methodist Church, UCA, USPG, 2005, p. 10.

⁵⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁵⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵² Daehanyesukyojangrohoehonghoeeyeoksawiwonhoe (A Committee of History of the General Assemble of Korean Presbyterian Church), *Daehanyesukyojangrokyohoesa* (The History of the Korean Presbyterian Church), Vol.2, Seoul: The Press of the Korean Presbyterian Church, 2003, p. 332.

this to be sin and confess “the sin of accepting each ideology as absolute, which is contrary to God’s absolute authority.”

Christians, according to Volf, affirm the ability to repent as a gift from God, but repentance is only half the formula. Forgiveness is the other half and it may be even more difficult. Persons caught in the polarity of conflict draw a line between evil and good. They struggle over who is most wrong or most right and the fact of the irreversibility of actions. However, according to Volf, forgiveness is the only route to get human persons out of these struggles and perceptions, and forgiveness creates space in their minds.⁵⁵³ This does not necessarily mean forgetting. Again, if God could forgive humanity and embrace the godless on the cross in the suffering of Christ, we are called to do likewise for each other, especially those who we perceive to be our greatest enemies. It is important that reciprocal forgiveness can potentially negate the power imbalance between the weak and the strong and between the poor and the rich. As Steven Lukes points out in his three dimensional power by which people accept their role in the existing order of things because they can imagine no alternative to it,⁵⁵⁴ the weak or the poor can pretend to participate in forgiveness when the strong or the rich demand forgiveness in the context of the dominant-structure. For example, in the context of Youngnak Presbyterian Church, the CW support the CS financially and spiritually, Christian Wolnammin ordained pastors demand that the CW teachers and the CS in the BSCFP should repent and forgive each other for the Korean War during which South and North Koreans killed each other. The CS can pretend to pray for repentance and forgiveness because they can not imagine any alternative to their past, and may feel ‘repentance’ is the price of support. On the other hand, the CW do not like admitting complicity in or sin over for the War and its aftermath because they

⁵⁵³ Miroslav Volf, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 119-125.

⁵⁵⁴ Steven Lukes, *Op.Cit.*, p. 28.

believe that the War broke out because of the action of North Korea. They tend to think that only the CS must repent and then the CW would be able to forgive them. In this sense, false repentance and forgiveness take place. Paradoxically real reciprocal forgiveness can happen in the dominant-free structure.

In addition, Volf points out the function of prayer in the process of forgiveness; when one forgives the other, it is not through the human will but through pure reliance on the power of God's grace. The essential connection between God's forgiveness and human forgiveness of each other is the prayer, "Father, forgive them; for they do not know what they are doing" (Luke 23:34).⁵⁵⁵ Walter Wink also says "we must pray for the power to forgive so that we can reach across the divide that separates us from our enemies. Nonetheless, we are not bridge builders so much as bridge crossers."⁵⁵⁶ It is obvious that it is a matter of faith for us that the Holy Spirit can empower us to forgive anyone. Forgiveness is the boundary between exclusion and embrace.⁵⁵⁷

Volf notes that there are four "acts" in the "Drama of Embrace". Act one is *opening* the arms, Act two *waiting*, Act three *closing* the arms and Act four *opening* the arms again⁵⁵⁸. He draws these acts from the parable of the Prodigal Son which demonstrates both embrace and exclusion. The physical act of embrace makes space for the other and welcomes them.⁵⁵⁹ It mirrors God's action on the cross where God stretched open the divine arms to embrace humanity. "Embrace is grace," says Volf.⁵⁶⁰ Volf takes the metaphor of embrace one step further, saying that God's embrace of humanity on the cross was an act of covenant with humanity.⁵⁶¹ According to him, it

⁵⁵⁵ Miroslav Volf, *Op.Cit.*, p. 125

⁵⁵⁶ Walter Wink, *When the Powers fall; Reconciliation in the Healing of Nations*, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998, p. 16.

⁵⁵⁷ Miroslav Volf, *Op.Cit.*, p. 125.

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 140-147. Italics are Volf's.

⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 141-144.

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁵⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 148-156.

was a covenant not only which bound God to humanity, making space for a sinful humanity in the embrace of God, but which also demonstrated God's self-giving and unconditional love towards humankind. It was a covenant because it is about the relationship between God and human persons, as well as the relationships between human persons. Covenants bind humanity to God and other humans in a steadfast bond no matter what happens. One breaks a contract, but one does not easily walk away from a covenant. Paradigmatic of this relationship is the story of the prodigal son in Luke 15:11-32. Just as the father welcomes the son, despite all the evil things he has done, God welcomes each of us and we should welcome one another.⁵⁶²

In brief, Volf puts an emphasis on taking part in the Kingdom of love, requiring repentance and forgiveness to make space to embrace the other, as God received a hostile humanity into divine communion.

3. Evaluation of Volf's Stance

First, the demand for each to make room to embrace the other, Volf argues, can be criticized by the weak as an unfair requirement in terms of the circumstances of dominant structure. Let us consider the power relations within the communities of Youngnak Presbyterian Church. There is still a dominant-subordinate relationship between the communities of the church: the Christian Saeteomin position is clearly weaker than that of the CW not only because the former is an often despised minority in the church but also because they are recipients of financial and spiritual support provided by the CW. The CW may require that in return for their support, the CS become like them, leaving their past convictions and cultural practices behind,

⁵⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 156-165.

remaking themselves in the CW image. This is a risk of idolatry. In fact, anti-communism and Christianity become merged, that is, proper Christians are anti-communists. This is a statement of belief not a fact. If the CW say that their way is the only correct way so that the CS must follow their way, then the CW set themselves up as a godlike image. The CW are asking the CS to create a space in themselves to accept the Christian Wolnammin identity, but they themselves will accept nothing of CS identity. Clearly, this expectation cannot lead to embrace and final reconciliation.

In practical terms embrace is the fulfilment of the biblical principle according to which in Christ all are equal before God and should be equal to one another. Making room in oneself for the other must be required of both parties. Walter Wink states that the followers of Jesus are to maintain domination-free relationships in a discipleship of equals that includes women,⁵⁶³ insisting that “*the churches of the world have never yet decided that domination is wrong.*”⁵⁶⁴ The implications are such, that if the CW do not regard the CS as their equals, i.e. equal objects of God’s love, they are theologically on dangerous ground, in which they risk setting themselves up as the image of God, so that the CS model themselves on the CW instead of on Jesus.

Secondly, to make reconciliation which must come from the considered intention of all without consideration of the domination system can lead to false reconciliation. Volf places emphasis on the fact that the repentance of the victim is crucial to the success of reconciliation. However, Volf’s stand applies to situations in which there has been physical violence. Most reconciliation happens where violence is done to the moral or spiritual *integrity* of the other. For this, we need to recognize what is invisible, i.e., inner pain, which is done by reflection, after perceiving the damage and one’s possible contribution to it. Therefore, reconciliation should take place in a

⁵⁶³ Walter Wink, *Op.Cit.*, p. 7.

⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11. Italics are Wink’s.

domination-free structure: not all parties to a conflict recognise their position or indeed their contribution to the problem.

Walter Wink points out that true reconciliation can be subverted by government propaganda apparatus that equates reconciliation with compromise.⁵⁶⁵ This is pertinent to the Korean context. In the contemporary context of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea is poor whereas South Korea is not; the former is isolated from the outside world whereas the latter is not. In fact, neither side have acknowledged publicly that the significant number of casualties suffered by the Korean War was committed by both sides. When parts of South Korea were under North Korean control, political killings took place in the cities and villages. South Korean forces executed in turn tens of thousands of leftist and alleged communist sympathizers.⁵⁶⁶ It is important that both sides recognize their fault, repent and reconcile together. Perhaps more important is that both sides should not blame each other for the war; in particular, the strong should not blame the weak for the war, in order to make genuine reconciliation.

In considering that the CW are South Koreans and tend to perceive the CS as irredeemably North Koreans in spite of the fact that the CS became citizens of South Korea and Christians, the CW should not blame the CS for the war. In terms of the structure of power in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, with the CW holding power as provider of financial and spiritual support to the CS, this is especially relevant.

Thirdly, it is very difficult for an entire population collectively to make space for embracing otherness in a multi-religions context. Volf cites John Howard Yoder at the outset for his insistence on the centrality of Jesus as example for Christian today. His key claim is that “All sufferers can find comfort in the solidarity of the crucified; but only those who struggle against evil by following the example of the crucified will

⁵⁶⁵ Walter Wink, *Op.Cit.*, p. 26.

⁵⁶⁶ Korean War, see, available from; <http://en.wikipedia.org>; accessed on 21 October 2008.

discover him at their side.”⁵⁶⁷ Self-giving love, in radical obedience to God, is the way of Christ.

However, there is a limitation in bringing this principle to the current context of the Korean Peninsula which houses various religions and where there is a clamour of contemporary dispute over incompatible ideologies. It is estimated that Christians comprise 29.3% of the whole population in South Korea, of which 18.3 % profess to be Protestants and 10.9%, Catholics.⁵⁶⁸ This means 70.7% of the people are non-Christians in South Korea. In terms of the socio-political ideological perspective, as we have seen, there is a tension between anti-communist ideology and Juche ideology in the Korean Peninsula and between anti-North Korea and pro-North Korea in South Korea. In particular, it is extremely difficult for a government official of South Korea, as a Christian, to apply Volf’s principle to the context where Christians are mixed with non-Christians, especially given that non-Christians are the majority working towards reconciliation. If anti-North Korea propaganda is still taught in schools, reconciliation has surely some political and patriotism aspects. Issues of security are an added problem. It is obvious that non-Christians cannot be required to be obedient to God in order to make space for accepting the North Korea’s regime and its people. This indicates that the embrace of Volf cannot be applied to a population collectively in a non-Christian society, only individually among Christians. This will be dealt with in detail in the next section.

Paradoxically, the principle of Volf can be applied to Youngnak Presbyterian Church because 100% of members in the church are Christians. The church can be required to be obedient to God in order to embrace North Korea’s people. However,

⁵⁶⁷ Miroslav Volf, *Op.Cit.*, p. 24.

⁵⁶⁸ Available from: <http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/South-Korea>; accessed on the 20th of October, 2008.

given the CW's ideological opposition to the communist outlook which they see represented in all the CS, difficulties in this process may suggest that the CW's acceptance of an anti-communist and anti-Juche position is stronger than their acceptance of the equality of all before God and the divine embrace. This is not uncommon in church life. Churches form social groups based on interest, class etc., which tend easily to override the relationship of equality within the Trinity.

In the ministry of reconciliation a distinction is being made between individual and social reconciliation. The prominent Catholic theologian Robert Schreiter describes best the distinction between *individual reconciliation*, which refers to the victim's damaged humanity restored by God and by a supportive community offering safety, companionship and hospitality, and *social reconciliation*, defined as the process of reconstructing the moral order of a society.⁵⁶⁹ The transition between these two types of reconciliation is inherent in God's work of restoration in the hearts of the victims of exclusion. This restoration should be continued by these reconciled individuals who could be in a better position to bring about social reconciliation.

Social reconciliation should neither be regarded as an abstract mode of viewing and addressing exclusion in a society, nor as another form of public apologizing. Schreiter is again illuminating when he warns that social reconciliation "...is not only a matter of healing memories and receiving forgiveness, it is also about changing the structures in society that provoked, promoted and sustained violence."⁵⁷⁰ In studying reconciliation, it is important to pay attention to the power because reconciliation can be enforced as well as contested by the use of violence, either by the strong or the rich. Andre Droogers points out that reconciliation can be "the result of the wielding of

⁵⁶⁹ Robert J. Schreiter, *Reconciliation: Mission and Ministry in a Changing Social Order*, Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1997, pp. 111-112.

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

power, either through the structures themselves or through the efforts to erode and replace them,”⁵⁷¹ stating that reconciliation could be either a structural given or provisional result in an otherwise dynamic, vulnerable and ongoing process.⁵⁷² This indicates that reconciliation not only includes at least two parties coming together in mutual respect—one may forgive and yet not be reconciled—but also changes “the structures in society” by which cause violence: the dominant-free structure should be created to enable each other to be reconciled equally. Consider two opponents, one the CW, a powerful group in Youngnak Presbyterian Church taking the initiative in supporting the CS financially and spiritually, the other the CS a weak group, unable to live according to their own identity. In order to bring about true reconciliation and embrace of each other on equal terms. The CW must be obedient to God who reconciles human beings, creates the dominant-free structure in this world to make friends with tax-collectors and sinners etc., and requires us to love our enemies.

In sum, Volf’s concept of embrace is limited to Christians which makes it very hard to apply this concept in a non-Christian or non-religious setting such as the conflict between North and South Korea. Also, Volf does not specifically address the difficulties that arise when two groups within a Christian community are not equal, i.e. when there is a dominant structure. Volf places emphasis on creating space for embracing the other, following the divine self-giving of Christ on the cross and God’s reception of hostile humanity into divine communion. In particular, forgiveness and repentance create space to embrace the other, even one’s enemy. However, Volf’s concept may be criticized by the weak in a dominant-weak structure. In addition, the act of embracing is limited insofar as it cannot be applied to an entire population, only

⁵⁷¹ Andre Droogers, *Op.Cit.*, p. 14.

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*

to an individual or self-defined community such as Younknak Presbyterian Church. In the next section it will be demonstrated how Lim Dong-won attempts to extend the scope of embrace to the population of the Korean peninsula.

The Embrace Policy of Lim Dong-won

It is worth understanding and evaluating the embrace policy in order to analyze how the principle of embrace applies to the context of the Korean Peninsula. It is simple to say that the policy which South Korea attempted was to embrace North Korea. In considering the significant negative response of Younknak Presbyterian Church to the policy, it is firstly important to understand the policy.

The embrace policy (1998-2007) was the South Korean doctrine towards North Korea until Lee Myung-bak's election to presidency (2008). It is clear that this study needs to deal with the embrace policy because this was the first time that it has been applied to the context of the Korean Peninsula since the division. Above all, the policy has led the society of South Korea to be divided into two groups: its supporters and its objectors. The supporters believe that the policy has resulted in greater political contact between North and South Korea, Korean summits in Pyongyang (the first in 2000, the second in 2007), and meetings of separated family members. On the other hand, the objectors believe that the policy helped the fundamentally repressive and belligerent North Korea by sending aid which has predominantly been used to strengthen the North Korean military.⁵⁷³

These two perspectives on the embrace policy exist within Younknak Presbyterian Church. It is necessary, therefore, to analyze the embrace policy in order to understand how embrace can be applied in the context of over 70% non-Christians in

⁵⁷³ Sunshine Policy, available from; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunshine_Policy; accessed on 26 October 2008.

South Korea as a policy of a nation. And then next section will analyze the responses to the embrace policy in the 100% Christians of Younknak Presbyterian Church

1. Brief Background

The international political milieu has undergone profound changes since the late 1980s. We have witnessed the reunification of Germany, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, i.e. the dissolution of the Cold War structure. However, the Korean peninsula is still divided, and there is still military tension. Nevertheless, the two Koreas have made efforts to reconcile with each other since the 1990s, producing two significant agreements: (1) the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Cooperation and Exchange⁵⁷⁴ (the Basic Agreement hereafter) and (2) the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration.⁵⁷⁵ Lim Dong-won was significantly engaged in the

⁵⁷⁴ The Basic Agreement was signed on 13 December 1991 by two delegates: Chung Won-shik who was Prime minister of the Republic of Korea and Yon Hyong-muk who Premier of the Administration Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This document consists of 25 articles, designed promote reconciliation and nonaggression through the work of four joint commissions: 1. South-North Economic Exchange and Co-operation, 2. Cultural and Social Exchange, 3. Reconciliation, 4. Military Affairs.

⁵⁷⁵ The Declaration was signed on 15 June 2000 by President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea and National Defence Commission Chairman Kim Jung-il, which consists of five articles as follows:

“1. The South and North have agreed to resolve the question of reunification on their own initiative and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the country; 2. Acknowledging that there are common elements in the South's proposal for a confederation and the North's proposal for a federation of lower stage as the formulae for achieving reunification, the South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction;

3. The South and North have agreed to promptly resolve humanitarian issues such as exchange visits by separated family members and relations on the occasion of the August 15 National Liberation Day, and the question of former long-term prisoners who had refused to renounce Communism;

4. The South and North have agreed to consolidate mutual trust by promoting balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and by stimulation cooperation and exchanges in civic, cultural, sports, public health, environmental and all other fields;

5. The South and North have agreed to hold a dialogue between relevant authorities in the near future to implement the above agreement expeditiously.”

See, Kim Dae Jung Peace Centre, June 15 South-North Summit, <http://www.kdjpeace.com>, accessed on 27 August 2008.

creation of the Basic Agreement as a Delegate of Inter-Korea Talks and the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration as the Director of the National Intelligence Service. He is one of the major architects of reconciliation and cooperation applying the embrace policy. He is the only person, among the South Korean delegates, who took part in producing both historic agreements in South Korea.

In the Korean Peninsula, the Basic Agreement led to the thawing of tension within the inter-Korean relations in 1991. In the aftermath of the Basic Agreement, however, the North Korea nuclear issue arose and political leadership was transferred to Kim Jong-il following the death of Kim Il-sung. Although the Geneva Agreed Framework⁵⁷⁶ contributed to averting a major military crisis in the Korean Peninsula, North and South Korea have not been able to overcome the vicious cycle of mutual distrust and hostile interactions. Furthermore, Kim Jong-il's pledge to build a 'strong and big nation (*kangsongdaekuk*)' and his hard line adventures such as the launch of the *Tapodong* missile in August 1998 have further complicated the process of inter-Korean confidence building and reconciliation.

Surprisingly enough, this was the first time that political power was transferred peacefully in South Korea in 50 years as Kim Dae-jung⁵⁷⁷ became the president in 1998. The unification policy of the previous governments for half a century was based on the absorption of North Korea. However, the government of Kim Dae-jung made it clear from the outset that the old policy of unification by absorption was to be abandoned in favour of co-operation and friendly exchanges with the North. The embrace policy was introduced and became prevalent in Korea and the world. Most

⁵⁷⁶ Agreed Framework was signed between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Delegations of the two nations held talks in Geneva from 23 Sep. to 21 Oct. 1991, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. They decided to take the four actions for resolution of the nuclear issue.

⁵⁷⁷ He is 15th President of South Korea from 25 February 1998 to 25 February 2003. See, Kim Dae-jung, available from; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Dae_Jung; accessed on 26th of October 2008.

importantly, Kim Dae-jung appointed Lim as Chief Secretary of Foreign Security of the Presidential Residence, in order to push the embrace policy forward.

2. The Definition of Embrace Policy

The South Korean government labelled its new North Korean policy “*Poongyo Jeongchaek*” which means ‘engagement policy’ or ‘embrace policy’ and was defined by them as opposite to ‘containment,’ which effectively meant rejection. The policy was also called “*Haetbyeot Jeongchaek*”: sunshine policy. The word ‘*Poongyo*’ means accepting and embracing others with an open mind⁵⁷⁸ and ‘*Jeongchaek*’ means “a plan of action agreed or chosen by a political party, a business, etc.”⁵⁷⁹ The widely used English translation of ‘sunshine’ or ‘engagement’ fails to reflect the comprehensiveness of Lim’s North Korean policy because engagement represented only a segment of his policy: the fact that its dimensions extended to mutual meetings, especially summits, has often been overlooked. During the Summit Meeting in North Korea in 2000, the leaders embraced each other. This event impressed the Koreans and the world. Moreover, the members of a significant number of separated families could embrace each other as a result of the policy. Therefore it is appropriate to refer to this policy as the ‘embrace policy,’ whatever the terms used by the international community. In this chapter, ‘sunshine policy’, ‘engagement policy’ and ‘embrace policy’ will be used interchangeably according to appropriate contexts.

The word sunshine refers to a well-known Aesop's fable about the competition between the wind and the sunshine to get a man take off his coat. The gentle sunshine made the man take off his coat whereas the harder the wind blew the harder the man

⁵⁷⁸ *Gukeosajeon (The Korean Dictionary)*, Seoul: Geumsungchulpansa, 2001, p. 1215.

⁵⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1012.

wrapped the coat around himself. The main aim of the policy was to soften North Korea's attitude towards the South by encouraging interaction and by providing economic assistance. Lim argued that sunshine and embrace is more effective than the strong wind of hostility in making North Korea come out of isolation and ease confrontation.⁵⁸⁰ Lim delivered a speech for senior officials of the Ministry of Unification on 9 February 1999 in which he stated that

The sunshine policy can be seen as a proactive policy to induce incremental and voluntary changes in North Korea for peace, opening, and reforms through a patient pursuit of reconciliation, exchanges, and co-operation. But as shall be discussed below, the sunshine policy goes beyond simple engagement. It comprises several components such as military deterrence, international collaboration, and domestic consensus. Nevertheless, its objective is crystal clear: to lay the foundation for peaceful Korean unification by severing the vicious cycle of negative and hostile actions and reactions through peaceful co-existence, peaceful exchanges and co-operation.⁵⁸¹

To sum up, the embrace policy was a new policy in which South Korea pledged to accept North Korea with a broad mind in the hope that North Korea will soften its attitude towards South Korea in order to promote reconciliation, exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas. However, if it was an embrace with the intention of softening the other and not also softening oneself, that is, seeing faults in both, it falls short of Volf's understanding.

3. A Summary of Lim's Embrace Policy

The sunshine policy was based on three fundamental principles as outlined by Lim. The first is the principle of non-tolerance of military threat or armed provocation by

⁵⁸⁰ Lim Dong-won, "The Way to Make for Peace and Reconciliation," in Korean, a speech delivered at the College of Unification Missionary, 2 May 2005, p. 10.

⁵⁸¹ Lim Dong-won, "The Government of People's North Korean Policy," (in Korean, mimeograph); Ministry of Unification, *Policy Towards North Korea for Peace, Reconciliation, and Cooperation*, Seoul: The Ministry of Unification, 1999.

North Korea. The second is the official abandonment of the idea of unification by absorption and the negation of any other measures which would undermine or threaten North Korea. The final component was the promotion of exchanges and co-operation through the resumption of the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges, and Co-operation.⁵⁸²

The operating principle was flexible dualism, which was predicated on major changes in the sequential order of inter-Korean interactions. It was the separation of politics and economics. In practice, this means that the South has loosened restrictions on its private sector to invest in North Korea, limiting its own involvement essentially to humanitarian aid. This was initially meant both to improve the North's economy and to induce change in the North's repressive government, though the latter goal was officially de-emphasized. Lim summarized the new rules of engagement with North Korea as follows: 1) Easy tasks first, and difficult tasks later (先易後難); 2) Economics first, politics later (先經後政); 3) Non-governmental organizations first, government later (先民後官); 4) Give first, and take later (先供後得).⁵⁸³ It represents a profound paradigm shift in managing inter-Korean relations. Past governments failed to overcome the inter-Korean stalemate precisely because of their rigid adherence to the principles of 'government first, civil society later, politics first, economy later or political-economic linkage, and the primacy of mechanical reciprocity.'⁵⁸⁴

Nevertheless, some argue that the sunshine policy was not different from the old

⁵⁸² Moon Chung-in, "Understanding the DJ Doctrine: The Sunshine Policy and the Korean Peninsula," Asian Studies Program, Georgetown University, *Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges*, ed., Moon Chung-in and David I. Steinberg, Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999, p. 38.

⁵⁸³ Lim Dong-won, "North Korean Policy under the Kim Dae Jung Government," a speech delivered at a breakfast meeting with the National Reconciliation Council, 11 March 1999, p. 3.

⁵⁸⁴ Moon Chung-in, *Op. Cit.*, p. 39.

soft-line policies under the previous governments such as the July 4th joint communiqué⁵⁸⁵ under Park Chung-hee (president 1961-1979), Roh Tae-woo's (president 1988-1993) "Northern Policy"⁵⁸⁶ and Young Sam Kim's (president 1993-1998) engagement policy during the first part of his administration. They too advocated the importance of peaceful co-existence with the North through the promotion of exchanges and co-operation. However, the sunshine policy is profoundly different because it created far more space in the Korean Peninsula for inter-Korean encounters and embrace than the previous policies. Moreover, its scope was far more comprehensive than the previous ones by favouring all-out interactions with the North. On top of that, its time framework was substantively different. While the previous governments were opting for immediate gains, the sunshine policy aimed at achieving medium and long-term gains encouraging patience and endurance.

The first implementations of the Sunshine Policy included North-South cooperative business developments. Part of the business initiative was a stretch of railway and the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region, where several thousand South Korean citizens still travel every year. Though negotiations concerning them were difficult, three reunions among members of divided families were held. In 2000, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il held the first summit meeting. The two leaders embraced each other at Pyongyang Airport. In the same year, Kim Dae-jung was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize as a result of the Sunshine Policy.

Roh Moo-hyun (president 2003-2008) continued the policy of his predecessor. However, in 2003, the issue of the North's possession of nuclear weapons surfaced

⁵⁸⁵ Available from; <http://www.nautilus.org>; accessed on 15 July 2008.

⁵⁸⁶ Northern Policy was the signature foreign policy of South Korean president Roh Tae-woo, which guided South Korean efforts to reach out to the traditional allies of North Korea, with the ultimate goal of normalized relations with China and Soviet Union, both to improve the South's economy and to leave the North so isolated that it would have no choice but to open itself up and reduce military tensions. Available from; <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nordpolitik>; accessed on 29 July 2008.

again and both North Korea and the United States accused the other of breaching the Agreed Framework. Nevertheless, Roh stayed committed to the policy and his government continued to supply the North with humanitarian aid. The two governments continued co-operation on projects already under way and also established the Kaesong Industrial Park. In Pyonyang the second summit meeting was held in 2007 between Roh and Kim Jong-il. Roh travelled from Seoul to Pyongyang by car and crossed over the Military Demarcation Line by foot to express hope in the future reunification of Korea.⁵⁸⁷

Since the beginning of the embrace policy, hundreds of separated families have been able to get in touch with each other and exchange news. Later the number of reunited families reached 4000, meaning that 20000 people had a chance to meet each other more than a dozen times. Previous to the Sunshine Policy the number stood at a mere 200 over 50 years. The number of mutual visits reached 430,000 people compared to 3000 before the first summit meeting.⁵⁸⁸ The number of South Korean tourists who visited Mount Kumgang in North Korea reached 1.3million and the number is continuously growing. Many companies from the South have advanced into the North. Especially in the Kaesong Industrial Complex near the DMZ, 6,000 North Korean workers are already employed by South Korean companies and this figure will increase to 700,000 in the future as planned. Exchanges in academia, culture and sports between the two Koreas have increased.⁵⁸⁹

In short, the embrace policy of Lim made far more space in the Korean Peninsula for inter-Korean encounters than the policies of past governments.

⁵⁸⁷ AsiaNews.it, South Koreans president to cross northern border with North on foot, January 10, 2007, Available from; <http://www.asianews.it/index>; Accessed on 08 August 2008.

⁵⁸⁸ Lim Dong-won, *Peacemaker, Op.Cit.*, pp. 728-729.

⁵⁸⁹ Kim Dae-jung, At the Opening Ceremony of the “2006 Gwangju Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates,” 15 June 2006, at the Kim Dae-Jung Convention Centre, Gwangju.

4. A Biblical Perspective of Lim's Sunshine Policy

In this chapter I examine why Lim adopted the embrace policy. Several factors explain the shift. The most salient factor, I suggest, was his biblical background. He was born in 1934 and grew up in a Christian family in the northern territory. He left the North for the South during the Korean War. He attends Kwanglim Methodist Church⁵⁹⁰ in South Korea. In terms of political tendency Lim was in the conservative position and Kim Dae-jung was in the liberal position. Kim Dae-jung, who was labelled as 'communist'⁵⁹¹ by the conservative side, sent a message to Lim twice in 1994 asking that they should work together but Lim rejected the offer. After the second rejection Kim Sun-do, the senior minister of Kwanglim Methodist Church, preached a sermon which influenced Lim to meet Kim Dae-jung, saying in a Sunday Service, "do not adhere to the past, hold on to a vision pointing to the future, which is not negative and passive but positive and progressive, and live as an adventurer."⁵⁹² In spite of the fact that the church has the same anti-communist background as Youngnak Presbyterian Church⁵⁹³ and the senior minister of the church also is a Christian Wolnammin,⁵⁹⁴ the church spoke prophetically to Lim.

Lim has developed his own unique biblical perspective for the national unification of the Korean Peninsula and applied it to establish the embrace policy toward North

⁵⁹⁰ The American South Methodist Association sent missionaries to Korea and worked to spread the Gospel in Seoul and Gaesung. "Kwangheemoon Church was the second church set up in Seoul by the Association which became the origin of Kwanglim Church. Christians gathered in Kwangheemoon Church to praise and worship God before and after the Korean War...In 1953 the members of Kwangheemoon gathered at the Goga temple to hold an inauguration service for the establishment of the branch church." It was Kwanglim Methodist Church. See, available from; http://www.klmc.net/eng/sub6_1.asp; accessed on 19 January 2009

⁵⁹¹ Lim Dong-won, *Peacemaker, Op.Cit.*, p. 309.

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 310-311.

⁵⁹³ Kang In-Cheol, *Hankukui Kaesinkyohoewa Bankongjuui* (The Korean Protestant Church and Anti-Communism), Seoul: Jungsim, 2007, p. 497.

⁵⁹⁴ See, available from; http://www.klmc.net/eng/sub6_1.asp; accessed on 19 January 2009.

Korea during the dissolution of the structure of the Cold War world.

First of all, he used to be a ‘peacekeeper’ and a strong anti-communist while he served in the Army of South Korea for 27 years. However, he became ‘peacemaker’ at the end of the Cold War era. In particular, while he anticipated the full process of high-level talks between the two Koreas in the early 1990s, he received a new calling when reading Matthew 5:9, “Blessed are those who are peacemakers, for they will be called sons of God.”⁵⁹⁵

As he became a ‘peacemaker’ under biblical influence, his biblical perspective influenced the creation of the embrace policy toward North Korea. He said that the four key elements of the embrace policy, known as the ‘reconciliation, cooperation policy’ came from Romans 12:17-21: a) “Do not take revenge, but leave room for God’s wrath”; b) “If your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he is thirsty, give him something to drink”; c) “Do not repay anyone evil for evil, but overcome evil with good”; d) “Live at peace with everyone.”⁵⁹⁶

The phrase ‘do not directly take revenge but leave room for God’s wrath’ for him meant that the two Koreas must make peace with each other rather than judge each other. Since the Korean War the two Koreas have become enemies, hated each other and engaged in a zero sum game. They had treated each other with distrust and hostility for over 50 years. However, Lim realised from the biblical verses that ‘leaving revenge to me, I will repay,’ and that ‘forgive your enemy and love him,’ mean that victory comes when you make your enemy a friend and change him: changing yourself in the process would be the only basis for honest embrace.

However, the word ‘victory’ he used is an ambiguous expression. It can be spiritual,

⁵⁹⁵ Lim Dong-won, *Peacemaker, Op.Cit.*, p. 163.

⁵⁹⁶ Lim Dong-won, “The Way to Make for Peace and Reconciliation,” in Korean, a speech delivered at the College of Unification Missionary, 2 May 2005, p. 3. See, Dong-won Lim, *Peacemaker, Op.Cit.*, p. 446.

national, individual or collective. If the strong requires the weak to change, it can be a power game, leading the two Korean people to a false reconciliation at best. The two Korean people, according to him, must 1) stop their hatred toward one another, 2) forgive each other, 3) accept and respect each other, 4) become partners in the unification process.⁵⁹⁷ Most importantly, they have to admit that they had sinned and repent. Acceptance and respect will take up the space created by forgiveness and turning away from hatred. To be partners in the reunification process means that they have to turn round to encounter each other. This is what Lim refers to as 'reconciliation,' which is also the starting point of his embrace policy toward North Korea. Nevertheless, he did not take account of inequality of power which exists between North and South Korea, and it is not clear the extent to which he himself is therefore aware of the implications of this omission.

Comparing these four factors of Lim's with Volf's, surprisingly, three factors coincide in the thought of Volf and Lim: repentance, forgiveness and making space for the other. As with Volf, no attention is paid to unequal power.

5. Evaluation of Lim's Policy

There are some major critiques regarding the limitations of the embrace policy of Lim. First of all, Lim failed to prepare space in the South Korean people for accepting the North Korean people and Kim Jung-il's regime as he placed emphasis on making space to accept the other from his biblical perspective. One unsatisfactory aspect of his embrace policy is 'give first, and take later' because it is not unconditional love but clearly conditional love. His embrace policy would have made more space in the Korean Peninsula if it had excluded 'take later,' following the model of the self-giving

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.4.

love of Jesus Christ on the cross, since the concept of ‘take later’ eventually made the South Korean people demand the return of the aid in other ways.

However, it would have been extremely difficult for the embrace policy to have excluded ‘take later’ because the South Korean people do not like giving unconditionally *anything* to the North Korean people and Kim Jung-il’s regime.⁵⁹⁸ As it was, the embrace policy produced three negative responses from the South Korean people: a) they immediately expected reciprocity from North Korea,⁵⁹⁹ b) the policy ensured Kim Jong-il regime’s survival through the aid given by South Korea’s government,⁶⁰⁰ c) it created a trade-off between the embrace policy and national security.⁶⁰¹ These negative responses stemmed from the legacy of anti-Communist ideology, which indicated that Lim did not prepare room in the minds of the people for the North Korean people and Kim Jong-il’s regime, nor did he pay enough attention to the deep-seated ethnic differentiation which has taken place.

Most importantly, it should be noted that there is a profound incompatibility between the embrace policy and its opponents. Lim mastered the virtue of patience and prudence which originates from his biblical perspective, and has a firm belief in the possibility of North Korea’s voluntary openness to change and reform as well as peaceful co-existence with the South, while his critics have not. Nevertheless, he overlooked the fact that the South Korean people had no room yet to embrace the North Koreans and the regime. They were educated by an anti-Communist ideology

⁵⁹⁸ Italics are mine.

⁵⁹⁹ Baik Jin-hyun, “There should be a complete re-examination of the Kim government’s North Korean policy,” a column in *Chosun Ilbo*, December 21, 1998. Also refer to editorials in *Chosun Ilbo*, January 6, 1999 and December 19, 1998.

⁶⁰⁰ Lee Se-gi, “Debates on the Mt. Kumkang Tourist Project” *Chosun Ilbo*, September 10, 1998.

⁶⁰¹ Lee Ki-jong, “The Second Nation-building should start with national security,” *Kukmin Ilbo*, September 17, 1998; Sohn Jai-sok, “The Engagement Policy Ignoring National Security Is Risky,” *Sekye Ilbo*, November 21, 1998; Park Jae-kyun, “The Sunshine Policy Undermined Effective Handling of the Submarine Penetration,” *News Plus*, July 9, 1998.

and still believed that the North Koreans, and in particular Kim Jong-il's regime, were evil. Youngnak Presbyterian Church is Christian, yet exemplifies opposition to Lim. When I invited Lim, who was a minister of unification in the government, to Youngnak Presbyterian Church in 1999 as a lecturer, some prominent elders of the church demanded that I cancel his lecture in the church.

In terms of the change of political power, South Korean politics has long been dominated by vested interests framed around and depending on conservative Cold War ideology. Transfer of political leadership and a shifting North Korean policy threatens the very foundation of these interests' ideology, concerns, and power. Thus, opposition from the conservative camp seems natural, but it is irreconcilable with the embrace policy and, arguably, also with Christian witness.

Nevertheless, the government should have found a way in which those who belong to the conservative camp were able to prepare for the acceptance of North Koreans. They might need another half a century to feel comfortable about accepting the North Korean people because they had been educated by anti-communist ideology for so long, through the policy and practice of successive governments. On the other hand, the South Korean people need to repent of their sins that they have not loved North Korea, its people and its regime, they need to forgive them, they need to make space to embrace them equally, and they need to support any kind of aid to North Korea unconditionally. However, the South Korean people consist of over 70% non-Christians who cannot be required by the South Korean government to repent and forgive. The next section will deal with embrace in the context of Youngnak Presbyterian Church consisting of 100% Christians.

In conclusion, the embrace policy of Lim is that South Korea should embrace North

Korea to promote reconciliation, exchanges and co-operation. These principles result from Lim's particular biblical perspective. It is true that the embrace policy made far more space in the Korean Peninsula for inter-Korean encounter than the policies of past governments. However, the embrace policy faced criticisms from its objectors who have no space for embracing the North Korean people and Kim Jong-il's regime.

Embrace in Youngnak Presbyterian Church

This section will investigate the negative response to the embrace policy in the church, the necessity of a new direction of mission toward North Korea, and embrace cases experienced in the Bible Study Class for Free People to show evidence that the two populations can construct a harmonious catholic community.

1. The Response of Youngnak Presbyterian Church to the Embrace Policy

The founder of the church, together with his congregation, firmly believed that the communist ideology which is rooted in materialism, nihilism and atheism, fundamentally threatened Christianity as well as national security. For the sake of true peace, Christians must fight against these evil forces.⁶⁰² Youngnak Presbyterian Church firmly believed that North Korea must be totally absorbed into the South, its state destroyed, and its people assimilated. In fact, the Korean War in 1950 embittered both South and North Korean governments and their people. Since then, the South Korean unification policy has grown, rooted in the eagerness to see the downfall of Communism.

⁶⁰² *May the Words of My Mouth*, Seoul Korea: Youngnak Presbyterian Church of the Korean Presbyterian Church & Sun Media Publishing Co.Ltd.,2002, p. 92, published in honor of him by the Memorial Committee of Rev. Kyung-chik Han's 100th Birthday Anniversary.

However, the policy seemed to be unrealistic until recently. In 1998, the Kim Dae-jung government announced the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea in order to realize the concept of reconciliation, and cooperation between the two Koreas.⁶⁰³ To achieve this, the Korean government pursued a basic but continuous South-North dialogue, provided economic development and advice, and assisted North Korea in its hunger crisis, which resulted in unprecedented favourable exchanges among South and North Korean people and political leaders. Especially, the historic summit meeting between two leaders of Korea was more than a surprise to the Korean people as well as to the world.

Furthermore, the Roh Moo-hyun government in 2004 tried to abolish the Anti-Communist Law, which had been enacted on the first day of December 1948 in order to remove leftist organizations and other political opponents in South Korea. According to the Law, contacts with North Koreans and exposure to communist ideologies became strictly forbidden. Roh Moo-hyun's government believed that the Law was an obstacle to reconciliation and co-operation between the two Koreas. All these certainly made a great impact on Youngnak Presbyterian Church.

Youngnak Presbyterian Church protested against the government. The Conservative Christian circle including Youngnak Presbyterian Church held a huge demonstration at the heart of Seoul attended by approximately 120,000 people on 4 October, 2004, to publicly protest against the abolition of the anti-Communist Law and complain about the Sunshine Policy. Through this demonstration, the conservative Christian circle divulged the contradiction inherent in it.

Society in general severely criticized the demonstration, pointing out that some

⁶⁰³ Moon Chung-in, *Understanding the DJ Doctrine: The Sunshine Policy and the Korean Peninsula, Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges*, ed. Chung-in Moon and David I. Steinberg, Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999, p. 38.

pastors who co-operated with the past dictator regimes were again exercising their influential power⁶⁰⁴ and yet again contributing to problems in South Korea. Korean Christianity was warned that it may be confronted with a crisis.⁶⁰⁵ Moreover, the demonstration did not receive full support even within the conservative Christian circles, not only because it failed to present a new direction for Evangelism, but also because it did not fit in the new Korean Peninsula context of love, peace, and reconciliation.⁶⁰⁶

This indicates that the conservative circle of Korean Christianity, definitely including Younknak Presbyterian Church, could not take even one step toward reconciliation in mission toward North Korea because for them the campaign against Communism, so easily translated into opposition to North Korean people as they are, was just and should prevail. Despite the fact that the government was making steady progress toward reconciliation with North Korea, the Cold War had ended, and the leaders of the two Korea shaken hands with each other, Younknak Presbyterian Church still adhered to the idea that North Korea should collapse and that the Church and the government must not help North Korea at all.

Christians with a humanitarian view claim that the Churches in South Korea, especially Younknak Presbyterian Church, should help North Korea and overcome their anti-Communist ideology. North Korean people are our brothers, sisters, and close relatives: they need food, medical treatment and clothes and so on as we do. As a nongovernmental organization, the churches support North Korea in terms of mission, hoping to realize the love of Christ in North Korea.

On the other hand, those Christians who emphasize the justness of anti-

⁶⁰⁴ “*Gyokye Naepu eseo Bipan Haksan*”(“Diffusion of Criticism inside Christianity), *Hangyeo Sinmun* (The Newspaper of Hangyeo), 7 October 2004, p. 1.

⁶⁰⁵ ‘The mission’s 120th anniversary, is the Korean Church in crisis?’, television programme, KBS(The Korean Broadcasting System), 10 February 2004.

⁶⁰⁶ “*Gyokye Naepu eseo Bipan Haksan*,” p. 3.

communism criticize the humanitarian view, insisting that the humanitarians fail to realise how menacing Communism is. I had first hand experience of the popularity of anti-communist attitudes. A speaker gave a lecture asking the audience to help North Korea in Younknak Presbyterian Church. After the lecture one person raised his hand and asserted that North Korea should receive no help because it is a dangerous communist state that we cannot trust. The audience applauded loudly.

There are tensions and collisions between anti-Communists and humanitarians in Younknak Presbyterian Church on account of the anti-Communist ideology which has painted the North Korean people as evil. Both anti-Communists and humanitarians need a new direction in their understanding of Evangelism relating to reconciliation and co-operation and resolving the legacy of anti-communist ideology.

In a new context of reconciliation and co-operation, Younknak Presbyterian Church should embrace the North Korean people and aim for reconciliation in the dimension of mission toward North Korea, making space in people by repentance and forgiveness to embrace the North Korean people as their brothers and sisters in Jesus Christ.

To sum up, Younknak Presbyterian Church, devout Christians though they feel they are, believed in defeating Communism and making North Korea collapse.⁶⁰⁷ However, the anti-Communist ideology of Younknak Presbyterian Church is faced with the government policy of reconciliation with North Korea. The church recognizes that they need to find a new dimension for mission toward North Korea, making space in itself for embracing the North Korean people beyond anti-communist ideology.

⁶⁰⁷ Such an intention does not perhaps sit well with fundamental Christian principle.

2. Repentance and Forgiveness of Youngnak Presbyterian Church

Following Volf's argument, it is necessary that the CW should repent their sins and forgive the CS in order to make space to embrace the CS. In my opinion, there are three sins in Youngnak Presbyterian Church from which the CW need to repent.

First, the church leadership needs to repent of their hatred toward North Korea, its people and its regime, and the congregation of the church also needs to forgive them. Volf mentions that space is made by mutual repentance and forgiveness to embrace the other as Jesus' self-giving love on the cross made space and calls us for reconciliation.⁶⁰⁸ In fact, Volf begins his study with a description of a conversation with Juergen Moltmann following a lecture in which Volf had stressed the importance of embracing our enemies as God has embraced us in Christ. "But can you embrace a *cetnik*⁶⁰⁹?" asked Moltmann.⁶¹⁰ Volf replied to the question of Moltmann, "No, I cannot, but as a follower of Christ I think I should be able to."⁶¹¹ *Exclusion and Embrace* is an investigation of the tensions and difficulties thrown up by Moltmann's question and the implications for the identity of a victim who embraces an enemy.

The CW firmly believe that the North Korean Army launched an all-out attack on the South on 25 June 1950 as they have been taught that the Korean War was initiated by North Korea. Conversely, the CS were taught that Republic of Korea Army troops under the "bandit traitor Rhee Syng-man" crossed the border first.⁶¹² The CW regard themselves as victims of the war because they lost their family and

⁶⁰⁸ Miroslav Volf, *Op.Cit.*, pp.111-140.

⁶⁰⁹ According to Volf, the Serbian fighters called *cetnik* raped women, burnt down churches and destroyed cities in his native country. See, *Ibid.*

⁶¹⁰ Miroslav Volf, *Op.Cit.*, p. 9.

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁶¹² Korean War, available from; <http://en.wikipedia.org>; accessed on 27 October 2008.

property at the hands of the communists. The CS claim the same victim status based on the same evidence. This indicates that the CW and CS communities are needed in repenting from regarding each other as evil perpetrators of the Korean War.

Second, the church, especially the leaders, following Volf's theology, is in need of repentance for having been silent on the criminal guilt of the state. Walter Wink points out that:

Granted that criminal guilt applies only to those individuals who actually commit human right violations, torture, and murder; nevertheless, all the members of a state are responsible for what their nation does in their name. Thus the individual members of a nation are judged collectively by God on the basis of how they treated "the least of these"(Matt. 25:31-32)...All of the citizens of a nation share political guilt for its wrongful acts, but most do not bear criminal guilt and should not be brought to trial.⁶¹³

During the period of military dictatorship of South Korea, thousands of students and police clashed at university campuses throughout Seoul. In the midst of the demonstration the students demanded the democratization of Korea and the removal of the United States' troops from South Korea. During the clashes Youngnak Presbyterian Church remained silent. Moreover, they labelled the students as "north Korean sympathizers," "communists," and "supporters of the enemy." The point is that political dissenters at that time were almost invariably branded as communists, which led to the intensification of the existing anti-communist propaganda. Understandably, the biggest and the most crucial discourse penetrating the church was on the subject of anti-communism.

The 'Kwangju Minjuwha Woondong' (Kwangju Democratization Movement) took place between 18 May and 27 May 1980 in Kwangju, South Korea. During this period, citizens rose up against Chun Du-hwan's military dictatorship and took control

⁶¹³ Walter Wink, *Op.Cit.*, p. 20.

of the city. Kwangju citizens who cried for democratization were killed, although there is still no exact death toll. According to the May 18 Bereaved Family Association, at least 165 people were killed and another 65 are still missing, whilst 23 soldiers and 4 policemen were also killed. During the period of Chun Doo-hwan's reign, the incident was denounced as a rebellion inspired by communist sympathisers.⁶¹⁴

In the following years of the Movement, at least during Chun's regime, the church remained silent or put the blame on the people who took part in the movement. For this stance the church has been criticized by the Korean people. Generally speaking, Youngnak Presbyterian Church, which had played a role of the leadership of the Korean Church, was no exception: it must accept blame.

Third, the CW are in need of repentance regarding the unequal relationship they continue to exert over the CS. According to Walter Wink, Jesus does not reject power as such, but its use to dominate others. Jesus does not reject greatness, but finds it in identification and solidarity with the needy at the bottom of society (Matt. 5:3-12, Luke 6:20-23). He also says, "I do not call you servants any longer, because the servant does not know what the master is doing; but I have called you friends" (John 15:5). According to Jesus, the hierarchical relationship of master and slave, teacher and student, is not to persist. Jesus' own actions embody his words, according to the Fourth Gospel, Jesus washes the disciple's feet, a task considered so degrading that a master could not order a Jewish slave to perform it (John 13:1-20).⁶¹⁵

In terms of the dominant-weak relationship between the communities of the church, the position of CW is relatively stronger than that of the CS because the

⁶¹⁴ Kwangju Democratization Movement, available from; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gwangju_Massacre#Casualties; accessed on 27 October 2008.

⁶¹⁵ Walter Wink, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 7-8.

former provides the financial and spiritual support and the latter is the recipient. In this situation it is nearly inevitable that the dominant party will require that the weaker party give up their identity in favour of the dominant one unless they are prepared for their attitudes to undergo a revolution. Missiologically speaking, it is obvious that this kind of mission is to be avoided for it is both potentially arrogant, given to pride and may do violence to the identity of the subordinated other. The CW should treat the CS equally as their brothers and sisters in Jesus Christ.

In short, both groups can make individual space by repentance and forgiveness in order to embrace each other.

3. Embrace Cases in Youngnak Presbyterian Church

I have come across cases of forgiveness and resulting embrace among the Christian Wolnammin and Saeteomin members in Youngnak Presbyterian Church during my research. In the following I will describe such cases in order to provide these as examples for Tong-I, i.e. unity in diversity

Case 1: Lee and Shim

Lee is the senior minister of the church and Shim is a Christian Saeteomin. Shim was a high-ranking officer of the People's Army in Pyongyang in North Korea. He escaped from North Korea in 1998 and entered South Korea in the same year via China. In spite of the fact that the church and the senior minister of the church have the strongest anti-Communist ideology,⁶¹⁶ Youngnak Presbyterian Church welcomed him as a member of the church. The church began to call him and other Christian

⁶¹⁶ Interview with CW12, Seoul, 09 March 2007.

Saeteomin as Free People and the church organized Bible Study Class for the Free People. For a few years Shim had studied the Bible in the BSCFP before he became the first Christian North Korean Saeteomin student in the Presbyterian College and Theological Seminary in Seoul. Through the recommendation of the senior minister of the church he was allowed to enter the Seminary without entry exams. During his seminary time the church and its senior minister accepted him as a part time lay pastor and then after the graduation he became a full time lay pastor.

However, he suddenly disappeared from the church. A few months later the church heard that he was in China to rescue his family, left in North Korea, to bring them to South Korea. It turned out, however, that he had been conned and lost a great deal of money by bad brokers who led him to believe that they were able to bring his family to China. He returned to Youngnak Presbyterian Church with no money and no family.

However, he hid this fact before the church and claimed that his family members were in South Korea staying in Hanawon and were going to come to Youngnak Presbyterian Church soon. When he was unable to lie any longer, he suddenly disappeared again leaving behind only a memorandum of resignation. Nobody in the church was aware of the reasons for his disappearance.⁶¹⁷ Lee, the senior minister of the church, said:

I employed him not because he had the ability to work according to the appropriate way befitting South Korean Christians but because the church has a duty to cultivate his abilities. I expected him to become a minister, to be able to learn the traditional way of South Korean ministers and work accordingly. However, I cannot believe that he told a fantastic lie to the church. In addition, he suddenly disappeared without an apology. Things cannot be done in this manner. It is true that his wrong behaviour significantly negatively affected the work of the North Korean Saeteomin in the church.

⁶¹⁷ Interview with CS01, Seoul, 28 October 2006.

Decision makers of the church started to doubt Christian North Korean Saeteomin again wondering whether the Saeteomin were communists, spies and their defection was only a disguise. However, I said to the decision makers that we must not treat them as such but keep an open mind when evaluating what happened and see them in our pure minds. Even though we are victims of the affair we must continue to support him and other North Korean Saeteomin until they stand well by themselves.⁶¹⁸

However, the phrase of ‘I expected him to become a minister to be able to work in accordance with the traditional way of South Korean ministers’ can be criticized. It implies that he expected Shim to change to become like a South Korean Christian and put on a South Korean’s identity which means that Mr. Shim must give up his own identity that had been formed in North Korea.

Nevertheless, when he says that “we must not treat them as such but keep an open mind when evaluating what happened” he reveals his ability to readjust his identity to make space to embrace Shim, emphasizing his support for him. Yet he still sees Shim as part of a collective “them.”

This embrace did not result in separation between Shim and Lee and between Shim and the church. Recently, with the help of Shim, Youngnak Presbyterian Church was able to hold the first united conference for North Korean Saeteomin ministers in Youngnak Prayer Retreat Centre on 15 January 2007. Furthermore, the church has supported financially Changjo Church which was planted by Shim in 2007. The two churches still have a good relationship based on the good relationship between Shim and Lee.

This case shows us the possibility that Christian anti-communists are able to embrace a Christian North Korean Saeteomin and to form good relationships between them.

⁶¹⁸ Interview with CW12, Seoul, 09 March 2007.

Case 2: Yang and Kim

Kim is a Christian Wolnammin teacher and Yang is a Christian North Korean Saeteomin student in the BSCFP. Yang Shin-ok is a North Korean Saeteomin female who was born in North Korea in 1970 and escaped from North Korea in 2001 and then entered South Korea in 2002 via China. She has attended Youngnak Presbyterian Church since 2004. She says:

I joined the BSFP at this church in February 2004. Young Suk Kim was my teacher in the class. My child became very sick and lost a lot of blood. At that time I was very fearful. I phoned Kim to ask for help. Kim came to my house to help as soon as she received my call. Since then I called her whenever my child was sick or whenever I found it hard to live in South Korea. Kim always accepted my demands. I needed to be loved. Kim visited and embraced me no matter when I asked at dawn or at night. To be honest I phoned and cried to my brother to help me, however, he said it to me later that he was unable to help me any longer because he is also a North Korean Saeteomin and found it hard to settle down in South Korea. I assumed that she might have been disappointed with me and other North Korean Saeteomin but she showed no sign of it. It is difficult for me to change my identity because I like it and even can not change it because North Korean Saeteomin had been socialized to fit into the North Korean social life of Juche ideology. However, I felt that I changed my mind toward South Koreans whenever Mrs. Kim has helped, visited and embraced me.⁶¹⁹

Yang was educated in Juche ideology since she had been born and was taught that South Koreans were her enemies. Kim was taught that North Koreans were evil and must be destroyed. However, Kim repented for her sin in regarding Yang as an untruthful person and then she embraced Yang. This has made Yang's attitudes change toward South Koreans. Yang says:

When my first daughter had an ear operation, some teachers of the BSCFP visited there

⁶¹⁹ Interview with CS08, Seoul, 25 January 2007.

in the first place to take care of my daughter. At that time I could not pay hospital bills for my first daughter's operation because of my failing multilevel sales but they paid for everything. When my first daughter was operated on for the second time the CW paid everything again. Furthermore, they always warmly embrace me whenever I go to the church to join the BSCFP, which makes me feel comfortable. In fact, I intended to commit suicide because I failed in my business and my daughters were seriously sick, what's worst, and I had no money for the hospital. Nobody else inquired after my welfare. However, whenever I met them in the church they not only inquired after my welfare but also embraced me and consoled me. I would have committed suicide unless they had embraced, consoled and helped me in the church.⁶²⁰

Kim's embrace saved Yang's life. Recently Yang met another North Korean Saeteomin female who has leukaemia. Yang invited her for dinner several times and encouraged her not to lose hope and kept taking care of her. She has led her to the BSCFP. It is something Yang had never experienced before. This indicates that Yang has begun to make room in her mind for the other, overcoming her CS socialization which regarded non-family as of no regard. In so doing, she is not becoming a CW, but a fully Christian Saeteomin.

The two persons used to perceive each other as evil or enemies. However, when one embraces the other they make space in the other's mind for being able to help. This results in a community, which can live together in peace. More similar cases to the above one have been found in the BSCFP.

Case 3: Hwang Gwang-sung

Hwang Gwang-sung is a Christian Wolnammin male and a teacher in the BSCFP. He has been attending Younknak Presbyterian Church since 1976 and met about 20 North Korean Saeteomin during the eight years since he volunteered for the BSCFP.

⁶²⁰ Interview with CS08, Seoul, 25 January 2007.

He states,

It is only by the love of God that North Korean Saeteomin are changed. It is impossible for human beings to be able to change them. The North Korean Saeteomin I met have disappointed me. I might have given up teaching them but I tried to follow Jesus on the cross. It is they who had lived in the society in which Christianity was not allowed at all for over half a century before they came to South Korea. Conservative Christians are anxious about the enormous expenses of unification which South Koreans would have to pay when the two Koreas are unified. They do not like that the number of North Korean Saeteomin has sharply increased because of the tax burden. This brings about rejection toward North Korean Saeteomin, which makes South Koreans difficult to accept them. Frankly I used to have the same perspective as they have. However, the love of God is not a deal but unconditional love. It influenced me to accept North Korean Saeteomin. I firmly believe that Christians who know they are loved by God are able to embrace them without any conditions. On a personal level, I was in tears when I washed their feet with my hands. At that time I repented for my sin in not trusting them, I really forgave them and then I was able to embrace them. They also were impressed with my washing their feet and embracing them. In fact, encountering them made my mind wider than before...⁶²¹

This statement shows the creation of space in Hwang's mind for accepting the CS under the influence of Jesus' love, which has made him volunteer for the CS.

Case 4: Kim Gyeong-suk

Kim Gyeong-suk is a Christian North Korean Saeteomin female. She was born in North Korea in 1961 and escaped North Korea in 1998 and entered South Korea in 2003 via China and Cambodia. In 2003 she joined the BSCFP and she studied theology in Youngnak Women's Seminary for two years. She wrote a sermon titled *Salangui Neungryeok (The Power of Love)* based on James 2:1-13.

In North Korea, I suffered from the destructive power of discrimination because my

⁶²¹ Interview with CW02, Seoul, 12 February 2007.

family descended from a purged class in the social system of North Korea. The discrimination brought about violence rooted in resentment and anger in my mind, which led me to deep spiritual darkness. I hated and discriminated against others more than I suffered. It was natural that I should discriminate against others according to wealth or social class or academic ability etc. At that time I had no pangs of conscience at all. However, after I came to South Korea, one day I began to feel that God touched my mind and approached me with His unlimited love. When I stood before the presence of the Lord for the first time I realized that I was able to confess that I am a sinner. I came to know the afflicted sinner and came to see my mangled and emaciated mind. However, God accepted me and embraced me. He made me know how much God loves me and how much I have been loved so far, filling my mind with his love fully. In fact, I had a favourite proverb which I learnt in North Korea; ‘Be cautious of your close friend, stop her/his speech because she/he deprives of your liver.’ I had kept the proverb in my mind for over forty years. However, I was able to very slowly carefully open my mind to other schoolmates in Youngnak Women’s Seminary and have a real relationship with them...⁶²²

She encountered the love of God, which had a significant influence on her change of attitudes toward others. At last she was able to embrace others. Bang Su-ja who was a teacher of Kim in the BSCFP witnessed that Kim began to accept Bang as if Bang was her mother. This happened after Kim began to perceive and accept the Love of God.⁶²³

Bang asserts that her personality significantly changed after accepting the Lord, which resulted in opening up to others, which indicates that she began to make space in her mind for others.

Kim wrote another sermon titled *Yongseoui Jinjeonghan Uimi (The True Meaning of Forgiveness)* based on Genesis 50:15-21:

⁶²² Kim Gyeong-suk, *Salangui Neungryeok (The Power of Love)*, unpublished, pp. 2-3.

⁶²³ Interview with CWG01, Seoul, 31 October 2006.

...the hardest thing is forgiveness. In North Korea I was educated by the principle of 'Revenge is as good as your struggle,' and had lived in accordance with it before I escaped from North Korea. However, when I became a Christian I had extreme difficulty in understanding the commandment 'Love your enemy.' I struggled with bitter anguish. I thought that I might as well leave the church than forgive enemies. I was never able to forgive them at all. I consulted a pastor about the matter and defied the pastor's teachings of Jesus. However, the pastor held my hands and embraced me, whispering into my ear that judgment would be by God. Moreover, the Christians who knew me continued to embrace me whenever I struggled with this commandment. Under the influence of their embrace I was able to get out of the difficulty more and more. ...My burning thoughts of revenge dissipated, making space in my mind to accept others, even enemies ... True forgiveness gave me a sense of belonging and intimacy in relation to the community of the church...⁶²⁴

The confessional substance of her sermon represents significant evidence for the possibility of repentance, forgiveness and making space for the other even if they are enemies, which results in establishing a community in which the CS can live in peace with the CW.

These four cases of embrace open up the obvious possibility for constructing a community which can live in harmony. The people interviewed experienced God's love which leads to tremendous change in their outlook brushing aside decades of indoctrination and were able to see the other for the first time as brothers and sisters in Christ.

⁶²⁴ Kim Gyeong-suk, *Yongseoui Jinjeonghan Uimi (The True Meaning of Forgiveness)*, unpublished, pp. 2-4.

Conclusion

The hypothesis with which this chapter began was that there is the fundamental necessity for *making space by repentance and forgiveness of the CW to embrace the CS* in order that *Tong-i* (unity in diversity) of the two communities may be constructed in the church. In conclusion we must return to this hypothesis and ask whether or not it is confirmed by the evidence that has been examined in our application of the concept of embrace of Volf to the context of the Korean Peninsula and Youngnak Presbyterian Church.

First of all, Volf places emphasis on creating a space for embracing the other by being obedient to the self-giving of Jesus on the cross and God's reception of hostile humanity into divine communion. This chapter described the concept of embrace according to Volf. A space for embracing others is created not only when persons distance themselves from their culture and their membership in it (without rejecting either) but also when one forgives the other. The outstretched arms of Christ are a symbol of the creation of this space into which all of humanity is welcome. Second, Volf insisted that victims and oppressors need to repent from *different* sins and forgiveness is the only route to get humans out of struggle in order to make a space for embracing the other. Finally, he placed emphasis on the fact that God's embrace of humanity on the cross was an act of covenant with humanity.

However, the hypothesis was weakened by criticisms: obedience to make room for otherness was considered an unfair requirement of the weak in the partial social structure and it is difficult to apply 'making space for embracing otherness' to a group.

As a response to the criticisms I presented the embrace policy of Lim Dong-won and demonstrated how embrace can be applied to a multi-religious context. Lim Dong-won moved the concept of embrace to the community level when he constructed South Korea's famous Sunshine Policy toward North Korea. The Policy brought about exchanges, co-operation, assistance and family reunions. The core of flexible dualism of the embrace policy is in the separation of politics and economy. This resulted in an operation in which a space for embracing the North widens, creating far more space in the Korean Peninsula for encounter and embrace than previous policies. This policy is based on the biblical perspectives of Lim. He produced the principles of the embrace policy based on Romans 12:17-21: reconciliation and cooperation comes from repentance, forgiveness, respecting the enemy, and accepting the enemy as partner.

However, the embrace policy faced criticism in South Korea, which weakened the hypothesis once more. I demonstrated that criticism came from people who were not prepared to make space in the South Korean people for accepting the North Korean people and Kim Jong-il's regime because they grew up within an ideology of anti-communism and thus do not trust the North Korean people and Kim Jong-il's regime. In a paradoxical sense, it shows us that the embrace policy cannot succeed in South Korea unless people are ready to create space by repentance and forgiveness. It represents the importance of the necessity of space and this realisation actually strengthens the hypothesis of this chapter.

While lack of willingness to embrace may be not contrary to other religious traditions, embrace should be part of the Christian tradition. However, negative response to the embrace policy appeared in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, as in

others. The church still adheres to the anti-communist ideology and refuses to help the Northern regime. This indicates that there is no room for the other: spiritually speaking. On the other hand, in terms of the dimension of the humanitarian view, the church contributed to support for North Korea, a support based still on the assumption the other must change and, moreover, a support which may elevate the giver in his/her own eyes. These two sides co-exist within the church, which not only creates tension but also points to the necessity of a new dimension of mission toward North Korea. If the church continues to adhere rabidly to anti-communism, the church will be unable to make room to embrace the CS, and those who adhere to anti-communist ideology will continue to criticize the humanitarian aid to North Korea. This critically challenges the thesis in this chapter.

This chapter has suggested that the church should repent from its sins: it failed to love the North Korean people as brothers and sisters in Jesus Christ; it remained silent on the big social issues; it has inequitably forced the CS in a dominant-weak structure. Repenting from these will enable the church to create space to embrace the CS. This chapter also shows us that the CS should repent from regarding the CW as their enemies.

Most importantly, this chapter attempted to show cases of embrace experienced in the BSCFP in the church. These cases reveal that being confronted with God's love is a powerful experience and through struggle, repentance and mutual forgiveness becomes possible. Describing and publicizing this process, it will certainly affect people's thinking and hopefully changes will begin to occur more frequently. The personal accounts of embrace strengthened the hypothesis.

Conclusion to Part Three

In part three, I investigated the hypothesis that the CW can construct a catholic community in diversity with a courteous attitude towards the Juche ideology. By applying the principles of fulfillment theology together with Miroslav Volf's concept of embrace the construction of a harmonious catholic community becomes possible in Youngnak Presbyterian Church.

First of all, Volf puts emphasis upon openness as an external mark of catholicity of any Christian community. I pointed out that the CW need an open attitude in place of hostility toward Juche ideology. Second, we saw Moltmann's arguments for "Other is only known by other" or "the acceptance of others creates community in diversity." I pointed out that the CW should regard the CS by these principles and learn about the Christian Saeteomin identity from the CS. Then they could more easily accept the differences without destroying the Christian Saeteomin identity as Jesus Christ identified himself with children, sinners and tax collectors etc. The examples of individuals who experienced embrace points to the possibility of the application of Volf and Moltmann's argument in the church.

In addition, I introduced the concept of Tong-i, which I suggested should replace the concept of Tong-il based on Moltmann's ideas. Tong-il refers to unification, but Tong-i specifies the main characteristic of unification: it is unification in diversity, through accepting the diverse identities of the two communities. Tong-i is achieved when the two communities are able to form a harmonious community.

I demonstrated in Chapter 5 that some CW reveal a more open attitude toward Juche ideology seen in the textbook used at special Bible classes attended by the CS. The theological basis for this more inclusive approach lies in fulfillment theology and

its missiological application. According to fulfillment theology every religion has a kernel of truth which points to and can be built on by the Christian Gospel. Indigenous religious ideas similar to Christianity may be amplified and cultivated by the missionary before leading the people to the full knowledge of the Gospel. Thus, the textbook uses examples from religious Juche ideology which are compatible with Christian doctrine. In turn, Saeteomin feel that their identity is less threatened.

According to Volf humans are able to create space for embrace by repentance and forgiveness, following the divine self-giving of Christ on the cross. Those three elements of repentance, forgiveness and making space to embrace the other are also the key principles of Lim Dong-won, the architect of the Sunshine Policy. Lim, through this biblically based policy, was able to achieve a previously impossible level of openness between North and South Korea. He was admired by Koreans and the wider world alike.

However, there was a limitation to the application of the concept of embrace in a multi-religious society in which biblical standards cannot be enforced and also to its application in Younknak Presbyterian Church whose leadership finds it hard to shed their anti-communism. These limitations challenge the hypothesis put forward in this thesis according to which it is possible to create a harmonious catholic community comprising of members of diverse identity. Rather, it indicates the method but accepts that, unless the will is there, this step to a full Christian life for all concerned will not be taken.

Nevertheless, the individual cases of embrace described in Chapter 6 show that the hope for achieving a harmonious catholic community should not be cast aside just yet. The personal accounts of acceptance and embrace made possible by God's love points to the profound attitude change among Christian Wolnammin and Saeteomin

members, who were able to repent and forgive and embrace the other. Taking this into account, the thesis of this study is supported by Volf, Moltmann and Lim, as well as those Wolnammin and Saeteomin individuals who were able to transcend the boundaries of their own socialized identity in order to engage in a relationship with members of the other group.

Future research should focus on how these successful embrace stories of the church can be built upon in order to change the attitude of the whole congregation of Youngnak Presbyterian Church and then even the people of the Korean Peninsula.

Conclusion

In Part one it was demonstrated that in spite of the fact that both groups share the same geographic origin i.e. Northern Korea, due to the political circumstances of the Korean peninsula they lived in societies of contrasting ideologies which influenced their perception regarding each other as enemy or monster. Essentially they have become two ethnic groups with different ideology, language use and inter-personal relations. In Part two, I described what happened when members of the two communities encountered each other in Youngnak Presbyterian Church: while they would not see the issue of ethnic identity as one of homogeneity or heterogeneity, that was the basis of the problem. The difficulties they experienced led to disappointment and exclusion. In Part three the content of the NSTCL textbook was analysed. The author of the textbook took the missiological position of fulfilment theology evident in their courteous attitude towards Juche ideology but not all members agreed with this approach. Finally, evidence was obtained regarding the ability of the CW to create space by repentance and forgiveness to embrace the CS.

Examples of personal stories of embrace were also cited to demonstrate the hypothesis of the thesis. There is indeed a way in which North and South Korean Christians can harmoniously coexist in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, embracing each other unconditionally as brothers and sisters in Christ. Although the present study was limited insofar as it only sought to explore possibilities within Youngnak Presbyterian Church there is a chance that the method for which I argue may be applied to other communities whether outside the church in the Korean Peninsula or elsewhere. The following summary sets out crucial issues.

First, the emergence and development of two contrasting ideologies, anti-communist ideology of the CW and Juche ideology of the CS, influenced the formation of the ethnic identities of the two groups. The research data (interviews and historical overview) back up this argument well, though the implications of this, that any reunification (as in the two Germanies) would be rather more different on the ideological level than the economic, cannot be discussed further here. The onset of the anti-communist ideology of the CW occurred when they lived in Northern Korea and was a reaction to the emergence of a serious anti-Christianity movement led by the communists which partly stemmed from the reaction to the missionaries' behaviour of avoiding socio-political issues during Japanese rule. Since then the anti-communist ideology of the conservative Christian Wolnammin developed further and was made stronger by various factors, including the suffering caused by communists during the post-liberation period and the Korean War. Later on, anti-communist education and the national evangelical campaign continually strengthened the anti-communist ideology of the CW.

In contrast, the emergence of the word Juche after liberation was an expression of yearning for independence from foreign powers. The socio-political aspect of Juche ideology emerged officially in 1954 to strengthen Kim Il-sung's power against his foreign backed rivals. Once Kim Il-sung secured power, Juche ideology developed a philosophical aspect. The main elements of it were the creation of a 'socio-political organism' which consists of the leader, the Party and the masses. Finally, Juche ideology transformed North Korea into a nation of monotheism with its own religious doctrines, rituals and community, which made Juche ideology a monolithic ideological system.

With regard to the unique behaviour and perception of the two groups formed by

contrasting ideologies, the CW perceive the Saeteomin automatically as monsters, liars etc. and stigmatize them, suspecting them to be spies, unfaithful and so on. For their part, the CS indoctrinated by the socio-political, philosophical and religious Juche ideology, were socialized to act and think automatically in accordance with the principles of Juche ideology. In a society of one organism, the instructions of the leader provided them with criteria for their thinking and acting. In particular, the theory of ideological remoulding impacted on their perception of fellow humans: distinguish friend from foe, burning hatred for their enemies such as South Koreans etc. It was concluded that the contrasting ideologies created two unique sets of perception patterns and behaviours while communities lived in different societies for over half a century.

Second, the heterogeneous ethnic identity of the CW and the CS became obvious when material, verbal and behavioural symbols were analysed.

The expectation regarding the interaction of the two groups which was initiated in Youngnak Presbyterian Church from 1998 with fraternal love was that the two communities would be able to construct a homogenous community because they came from the same territory. They thought that by being together again in Youngnak Presbyterian Church they would be able to recover their lost identity as one people and one culture.

However, the difficulties they faced once together in Youngnak Presbyterian Church discouraged them from seeking each other's company and they blamed the other group for the failure. They were unable to interpret each other's material and verbal symbols and behaviour patterns. For instance the CS found it hard to wear Western clothes because they had been taught that it corrupts them. At the same time

the CW regarded the consumption of alcoholic beverages and cigarettes as corrupting. The two communities ended up hurting members from the other group by refusing to accept their customs and the rationale for their existence. Consequently exclusion ensued.

Regarding verbal symbols it turned out that decades of separation affected language and many expressions were used in a different register or became extinct. Moreover, conventions evolved differently: North Koreans spoke abruptly and had a very direct manner, which bemused the CW who were taught to be polite and reserved. They did not realize that decades of military mobilization required by the North Korean state would leave its mark on the communication style of the CS. Instead the CW concluded that the CS were simply rude. Moreover, when the CS expressed their disapproval in their direct manner of the American military presence in South Korea many Christian Wolnammin believed that only spies and communist could say such terrifying things. At the same time the CS found the CW to be irreverent because the latter liberally used expressions which North Koreans use only in relation to their leader. The CS were also expected to learn all the many foreign words and informal expressions incorporated in the South Korean vocabulary during the decades of division, while their favoured word of address was dismissed by the CW. It became clear as the study progressed that the two communities faced serious linguistic problems despite sharing the same “mother tongue” which only added to mutual disappointment and discouragement.

Differing notions of acceptable behaviours exacerbated the already tense atmosphere. While the CW regard smiling, praising and greeting as appropriate polite behaviour, the CS preferred to show their strength and straightforwardness by not doing these things. Another area of contention was promises. These the CS did not

feel obliged to keep because they were not familiar with the concept. At the same time, they easily accepted Christian Wolnammin assistance be it financial or spiritual because they had already been used to be dependent on the Party's handouts and 'ideological' wellbeing. The ease with which the CS accepted help was interpreted by the CW as the CS' inability to succeed independently.

Most importantly, the CS socialized by the principle of the ideological remoulding of Juche ideology, regarded South Koreans as enemies and found it difficult to make friends with the CW, let alone Americans in South Korea. In contrast, the CW regarded Saeteomin automatically as monsters, liars etc. and stigmatized them because of the influence of anti-communism. Consequently, members of the two communities became suspicious of each other's motives. The misinterpretations of verbal or behavioural manifestations invariably originate in the contrasting ideological background of the two communities.

The greatest obstacle of mutual understanding, however, was that the CW demanded and expected the CS to give up their identity and become just like the CW. For the CW Juche ideology was the ideology of the devil which needed to be fought and defeated at all costs. This thinking is evidenced by their stance on the reunification of the Korean Peninsula: they expect it to happen through crushing the Northern Regime and advancing the Gospel of Jesus Christ among the people, replacing evil Juche ideology with the Gospel in the hearts and minds of the nation. To the CS this seems to be a Gospel of violence to their soul.

However, the CS felt unhappy with giving up their identity and becoming like the CW or South Koreans: they realized in South Korea that their Northern identity was completely different. The depth of desperation was uncovered in one of the interviews in which the Christian Wolnammin interviewee expressed his wish to send all

Saeteomin back to the North and some Christian Saeteomin expressed the feeling that they would actually be happier in North Korea. The recipe for mutual exclusion was followed and the meal was almost ready even though nobody would have regarded it tasty. Something had to be done, something with a good theological basis that enables the two communities to come together and exist in harmony. It seems that the CW had to find a way to embrace their Saeteomin brothers, which certainly involves a more accommodating attitude toward Juche ideology. But how can the ideology of “the devil” be made at least a little bit acceptable?

In Part three I attempted to answer this question and to outline a plan of action based on the ideas of Moltmann and Volf who gave a theological account of a successful embrace within the church community.

The implications of Moltmann’s principle of “Other is only known by the other” and “the acceptance of others creates community in diversity” is that the CW have to get to know the CS by engaging with them and by putting aside their own anti-communism.

The author of NSTCL textbook used to teach Saeteomin in Youngnak Presbyterian Church about Christianity took an inclusive stance in accordance with the theological position of the Fourth Commission of the 1910 World Missionary Conference. I expect that the more the CW accept and cultivate the fulfilment theology as their missiological position, the less antagonistic their attitude towards religious Juche ideology may be.

Volf’s theological reflection on exclusion and embrace consists of four stages: repentance, forgiveness, space and embrace. His concept of embrace was modelled on Jesus Christ’s self giving on the Cross. However, this principle cannot readily be applied in a multi religious context because one cannot require non-Christian

repentance and forgiveness based on a religion they do not know or accept. Moreover, Volf expects both the oppressor and the victims to repent from their sins and forgive, which victims might find difficult. He insists, however, that space for embrace can only be created by completing all the stages. However, Volf has a problem if the violence is ideological and socialized, related to the integrity of the other: Christians need time to realize that the socialized violence is incompatible with Christian life and they should begin to repent when they realize it. Steven Lukes points out socially and culturally patterned behaviour of people who are socialized to have to act and think automatically as they face certain circumstances, defining that it is the three dimensional power.⁶²⁵ For example, the CW would too easily regard the CS as spies or agents when they found the CS' verbal or behaviour patterns to be different from theirs, which offended the CS's minds. Volf overlooked this particular aspect of violence. Erving Goffman also explains a stigma which is produced when observers assume a person possesses an attribute that makes him/her different from them, purely because they belong to a category of persons thought to be thoroughly bad, or dangerous, or weak.⁶²⁶ Stigmatizing the stranger may do violence to him because it can offend him, and it certainly does not treat him as an individual. According to Goffman, the stigma stems from perception socialized by "the means of categorizing persons and the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories."⁶²⁷ The CW tended too easily to regard the CS as spies and agents when the CS acted differently from the CW or used words that the CW have not used, such as Dong-mu (comrade) etc., by which the CW automatically stigmatize the CS. In order to escape any identity conflict, the CW need to be

⁶²⁵ Steven Lukes, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 26-28.

⁶²⁶ Erving Goffman, *Stigma, Op.Cit.*, p. 12

⁶²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

changed: they must understand the CS's identity socialized by Juche ideology: they must interpret the CS's socialized, structured and patterned verbal and behaviour symbols in the light of "Thick Description" of Clifford Geertz.

Lim Dong-won who constructed South Korea's renowned Sunshine Policy toward North Korea attempted to apply the embrace policy to the multi-religious context of Korea. His attempt succeeded insofar as he was able to create the conditions for reunions of divided families, business cooperation and tourism. The pinnacle of his efforts was reached when the leaders of North and South Korea met for the first time and then once more. However, the embrace policy faced criticism from those who were not prepared to accept the North Korean people and Kim Jong-il's regime unconditionally.

Predictably, the conservative and anti-communist Youngnak Presbyterian Church responded negatively to Lim's embrace policy because they believed that Juche ideology had to be defeated before any plans of reunification could go ahead. They were unable to begin the stages of repentance and forgiveness. I believe that Youngnak Presbyterian Church needs to repent from their hatred toward North Korea, its people and its regime, from not treating the Saeteomin as their equals, which created a dominant-weak power structure in which the weak were expected to conform, and from remaining silent on social and political matters during the years of anti-democratic rule in South Korea. The CS need to repent from the hatred toward South Koreans.

However, in neither Volf nor Lim's scheme is the space for social, personal and theological reflection before the process begins, that is, the issue has surely to be named before it is worked through. However, as long as the South Korean government anti-communist education makes such discussion seem "unpatriotic", even

approaching the issue becomes difficult. In the Youngnak Presbyterian Church context, it would be possible to appeal to the Christian core of the community life but even this can be seen as a political challenge.

In chapter 6 I described a few cases of individual efforts toward acceptance and reconciliation. In all cases both parties, of their own volition, were able to repent from their past sins and forgave their counterpart. We witnessed a transformation in attitude and behaviour which the interviewees contributed to their experience of God's unfailing love. The CW and the CS involved embraced each other creating a catholic community. I believe that each time individuals embrace each other this catholic community grows.

Therefore, it could be concluded that a) it was extremely difficult for the two groups to embrace each other because they had lived in societies of contrasting ideologies for over half a century and their respective identities were influenced accordingly; b) in reality, both groups created potential exclusion in their community while encountering each other in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, realizing that it was difficult to live together in the same place; c) however, some Christian Wolnammin' hostile attitude towards Juche ideology changed and as a result they became able to embrace Saeteomin by repentance and forgiveness. The only possibility for a catholic community lies in the embrace process and the more members get involved in it the larger this community becomes.

This study could contribute to Youngnak Presbyterian Church and other Korean churches who face the same issues as Youngnak Presbyterian Church. The creation of a harmonious catholic community is possible when

1. the two communities can escape from the myth of homogeneity and admit their

heterogeneity; this would also be the case in a caste, class or colour context of shared nationality.

2. the South Korean members can put aside their hostility toward Communism and Juche ideology and focus on the similarities between Juche ideology and Christian doctrine in order to lead Saeteomin to Christ; this involves moving beyond the “letter of the Law”, the given text, to the spirit of Christ.

3. In addition, it may necessary that all the churches, as victims and oppressors, should repent from their sins committed as a result of ideologies and should forgive each other in order to be able to embrace each other.

The findings and results of this study could assist South Korean Christianity to approach the North Koreans in a non-threatening way if and when the two Koreas are reunified in order to reduce the conflict among Koreans arising from their use and interpretation of symbols and behaviour. Besides, they could help over ten million divided families in Korea to reduce the shock caused by differences when they meet each other. On a personal level, the findings of the present study will help me when I encounter my own eldest brother whom I have never met and who still is alive.

Further research is needed in describing how the cases of embrace in Youngnak Presbyterian Church can extend to other churches and even to the multi-religious context of Korea and indeed to observing and recording the process of “coming together as equals” in Youngnak Presbyterian Church itself, and other churches of its persuasion.

Future investigation may focus on exploring ways of facilitating and managing a reunification process in Korea by looking at the example of Germany. A justification for that research is that the issue of inter-Koreans’ integration is more important than the issues surrounding political unification. A plethora of academic outcomes are

published on the issue of unification from political, economic, military aspects whereas the research of different ethnic identity of the people of two Koreas is weak due to difficulty of access to North Koreans, and to unexamined assumptions about homogeneity.

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