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THE MATERIALS IN THE WORKS OF AL-FĀRĀBĪ
AND IBN-SĪNĀ ON WHICH THE METAPHYSICAL
SECTION OF AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S MAQĀSID IS BASED.

by

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Thesis presented for the Degree of Doctor
of Philosophy of the University of
Edinburgh in the Faculty of Arts.

October, 1966.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

It gives me a great pleasure to record thanks and gratitude to those who have rendered help in the writing of this study. My greatest indebtedness is to the Rev. Professor William Montgomery Watt, M.A., B.Litt (Oxon), M.A., Ph.D. (Edin), who was my supervisor. It is mainly due to his confidence in me, encouragement and guidance that I took up this interesting and difficult subject. His comments and suggestions on the first draft of this thesis were extremely helpful and illuminating. Not only did he kindly help me in solving intricate problems, but also he spent much of his valuable time in going through this work with considerable patient observation. Moreover, I have had from him and his family the type of hospitality which may be associated with that of the Arab and Far East traditions.

I am very grateful to the Rev. James A. Gardiner, M.A. (Aberdon and Cantab), B.D. (Edin), Lecturer in the Religious Studies, Moray House College, for his generous and unstinted assistance.

I express my thanks and gratitude to the Director of Public Instruction, Government of East Pakistan for awarding

the Scholarship and sponsoring this programme.

I thank the Librarians and staffs of the Libraries of Edinburgh University, National Library of Scotland and London School of Oriental and African Studies for providing me every possible facility.

M. M. R.

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

- Afnan = Afnan, S.M., - Avicenna His Life and Works.
- Arberry = Arberry, A.J., - Avicenna on Theology.
- Boer., Hist. = Boer, T.J. De, - The History of Philosophy in Islam.
- Diet., Abh. (Text) = Dieterici, F., - Alfārābī's Philosophische Abhandlungen.
Arabic title: Ath-Thamarat al-Mardiyya fī ba^cd ar-Risālat al-Fārābiyya.
- Diet., Must. (Text) = Dieterici, F., - Alfārābī's Abhandlung: Der Musterstaat. Arabic title: Risāla fī Ara'Ah al-Madīnat al - Fādila.
- Dunlop, "Categories" = Dunlop, D.M. - "Alfarabi's Paraphrase of the 'Categories' of Aristotle." The Islamic Quarterly.
- Dunlop, "Eisagoge" = Dunlop, D.M. - "Al-Fārābī's Eisagoge." The Islamic Quarterly.
- Dunlop, Fuṣūl. = Dunlop, D.M., - The Fuṣūl al-Madani of al-Fārābī.
- EI. I = Encyclopaedia of Islam. - First Edition.
- Far., Da^cawī = Al-Fārābī, - Ad - Da^cawī al - Qalbiyya.
- Far., Siyāsa = Al-Fārābī, - Al-Fārābī's the Political Regime. (Al - Siyāsa al - Madaniyya: also known as the Treatise on the Principles of Beings.)

- Far., Tal. = Al-Fārābī, - At - Ta^cliqāt.
- Far., Zīnūn = Al-Fārābī, - Sharḥ Risālat Zīnūn al - Kabīr Yunānī.
- Ghaz., Maq. = Al-Ghazālī, - Maqāṣid al - Falāsifa.
Also known as
Muqaddamat Tahāfut al-Falāsifa. Edited by
Dr. Sulaymān Dunyā.
- IS., Arsh. = Ibn-Sīnā, - Ar - Risālat al -
Arshīyya fī Tawhīdī-
hi Ta^cālā wa Ṣifāti-hi.
- IS., Ilah. (I) = Ibn-Sīnā, - Al - Ilāhiyyāt. (I)
From ash - Shifā'.
Text established and
edited by G.C. Anawati
and Sa^cid Zayed.
- IS., Ilah. (2) = Ibn-Sīnā, - Al - Ilāhiyyāt. (2)
From ash - Shifā'.
Text established and
edited by Moḥammad
Youssef Moussa, Solay-
man Dunya and Sa^cid
Zayed.
- IS., Ish. (N.I-I) = Ibn-Sīnā, - Al - Ishārāt wa t -
Tanbīhāt. New Edition.
Al - Ilāhiyyāt - Ishāra.
- IS., Ish. (N.I-Th) = Ibn-Sīnā, - Al - Ishārāt wa t -
Tanbīhāt. New Edition.
Al - Ilāhiyyāt - Tanbīh.
- IS., Ish. (N.I-Tb) = Ibn-Sīnā, - Al - Ishārāt wa t -
Tanbīhāt. New Edition.
Al - Ilāhiyyāt - Tadhīb.
- IS., Ish. (O.M-I) = Ibn-Sīnā, - Al - Ishārāt wa t -
Tanbīhāt. Old Edition.
Al - Manṭiq - Ishāra.

- IS., Ish. (O.M-Th) = Ibn-Sīnā, - Al - Ishārāt wa t - Tanbīhāt. Old Edition.
Al - Manṭiq - Tanbīh.
- IS., Ish. (O.M-Tb) = Ibn-Sīnā, - Al - Ishārāt wa t - Tanbīhāt. Old Edition.
Al - Manṭiq - Tadhniḅ.
- IS., Ish. (O.T-I) = Ibn-Sīnā, - Al - Ishārāt wa t - Tanbīhāt. Old Edition.
Aṭ - Tabī^ca - Ishāra.
- IS., Ish. (O.T-Th) = Ibn-Sīnā, - Al - Ishārāt wa t - Tanbīhāt. Old Edition.
Aṭ - Tabī^ca - Tanbīh.
- IS., Ish. (O.T-Tb) = Ibn-Sīnā, - Al - Ishārāt wa t - Tanbīhāt. Old Edition.
Aṭ - Tabī^ca - Tadhniḅ.
- IS., Naj. = Ibn-Sīnā, - An - Najat.
- IS., Shifā' = Ibn-Sīnā, - Shifā'. Arabic Manuscript.
- Nasr, Cosmological Doctrines = Nasr, S.H., - An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines.
- Quadri, Philosophie = Quadri, G., - La Philosophie Arabe dans l'Europe Médiévale des Origines a Averroès.
- Saliba, Étude = Saliba, D., - Étude sur la Metaphysique d'Avicenna.
- Watt, Philosophy = Watt, W. Montgomery, - Islamic Philosophy and Theology.
- Wickens, Avicenna = Wickens, G.M. (Ed.), - Avicenna: Scientist and Philosopher. A Millenary Symposium.
-

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Islamic Philosophy seems essentially to be a response to the challenge that reached the Muslim world from Greek thought. Various conflicts arose in early Islam from time to time with respect to certain principles in different sects and everyone adapted whatever new form seemed to be conducive to his thought. The conflict between the Mu^ctazilite tradition influenced by rationalism and Ash^carite tradition dominated by 'faith' was virtually set at naught by the chief of the Ash^carites, Abū-Ḥamid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (1058-1111 A.D.), who found the culmination of tradition in mystical awareness. From the time of al-Ash^carī down to that of al-Ghazālī the Arabs assimilated the fundamentals of Hellenism, and Greek culture caused a vigorous philosophical renaissance represented by Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (died A.D. 950) and Abū-^cAlī al-Husayn ibn-^cAbd-Allāh ibn-Sīnā (A.D. 980-1037). Under the influence of their philosophical thought theology was shaken once more when confronted by the ideas of the Mu^ctazila. Facts and phenomena had no ultimate significance beyond what they presented in experience. Men who were concerned with the refinements of philosophical speculations and the intricacies of metaphysical abstractions were greatly needed to work to the support of the dogmas of Islam and to nullify the conclusions of a philosophy inconsistent with it.

When this colossal task appeared to be imperative, the Muslim world found their leader in al-Ghazālī who was capable of withstanding Hellenism and attacking its representatives. In addition to his being a philosopher who wished to counteract the unorthodox tendencies of his hellenising predecessors, al-Ghazālī was an eminent mystic, sufi and original thinker. In the Muslim world he was the great bridge between traditionalism and mysticism, activism and intuitionism. From the days of his youth he possessed an intense thirst for knowledge which persuaded him to study every form of philosophy and religion and to question all whom he met with regard to the nature and significance of their belief. He discussed problems of understanding, value of knowledge, learning, instruction, efficiency and duty. The ruthless iconoclasm practised by al-Ghazālī in destroying the revered images of Greek Philosophy which then held sway over the mind of many Muslims and his efforts to bring about a reconciliation between mysticism and orthodoxy crowned him with the title of Ḥujjat al-Islam.

As for the problem of the origin of the world both al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā had maintained the Aristotelian position that the world was eternal. They conceived of matter as existing

though continually taking different forms. According to them God was the eternal creator, and He produced matter with forms. Similarly, time proceeded from Him. Their chief arguments were incorporated in al-Ghazālī's Maqāṣid in which he took much care first to understand their position and to represent them in a plausible manner.

The present work is a study of materials collected from the writings of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā with which the metaphysical section of al-Ghazālī's Maqāṣid may be compared. Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa or Muqaddamat Tahāfut al-Falāsifa as it is called, is a work in which al-Ghazālī briefly noted the principal views of the "philosophers" by whom he presumably means al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā. In this connection Professor W. Montgomery Watt states that "he first wrote an exposition of their philosophy without any criticism, Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa, which was much appreciated in Spain and the rest of Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries".

(1) Prior to providing a refutation of the philosophers by making explicit the inconsistency and ambiguity of their doctrines al-Ghazālī deemed it necessary to present their system of ideas and beliefs, so that, these might be adequately known by other theologians. Thus he noted their essential views in Maqāṣid without distinguishing between what was right and wrong in them.

1. El² ... Art. "al-Ghazālī"

On the contrary he aimed at making the essentials of their philosophy understood without introducing what seemed irrelevant to this purpose.

Therefore, the main objective of his writing this book was to expound the primary views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā in a clear and concise way. Doctrines and principles of philosophy propounded by al-Fārābī were not found at all well-arranged with definite itemization under proper headings. For this reason it is very difficult to derive comprehensive understanding of a particular subject from varied and uncertain source materials. Ibn-Sīnā, however, made an attempt to arrange his views methodically under a definite title, though indeed, more specific itemization was necessary. At times Ibn-Sīnā based his argument upon what al-Fārābī had previously propounded. At other times he set out the latter's views in greater detail, and sometimes he argued with a new object in view. Al-Ghazālī, therefore, stated in this book their views by compressing their lengthy discussion without making any comment whatsoever. The chief merits of this in my opinion may be described in the following ways:

1. The Maqāṣid incorporates certain hellenistic ideas that had been previously noticed in the philosophy of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā.
2. It gives a clear and concise exposition by representing their views under adequate headings.

3. It helps to achieve maximum benefit from minimum labour through the reduction of time and difficulties in the apprehension of their elementary principles.

4. It serves as an introduction to the methodology such that we may discern how al-Ghazālī brought together the essentials of their philosophy from various writings without distorting their significance.

5. It assists in overcoming the difficulties of learning the trend of thought in early Eastern Philosophy and in determining the position of its masters not only in their period but also in the subsequent period of history.

I believe that the aim of the Maqāṣid is not only to interest scholars or an élite, but apparently also a wider circle of readers, and al-Ghazālī writes in such a way that the views should be perfectly intelligible to the general public. However, before we can accept this suggested view it is essential to venture upon a comprehensive study to discover how far this Maqāṣid is to be regarded as an abridged account of the views pertaining to al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā or whether it is something more. This investigation is particularly important because in many cases it is found that new things may come out of so-called pre-established dogmas and that

this "new knowledge" fits appropriately in the new setting. With this object in view I have endeavoured to discover in general terms the way in which al-Ghazālī's aims are worked out in his Maqāṣid.

Of the three sections, Logic, Metaphysics and Physics, Metaphysics is vitally important, since certain aspects of Logic and Physics are treated by al-Ghazālī in this part. My investigation concentrates on the important parts of this metaphysical section. Thus what I have taken for investigation out of its five chapters are chapters I (four doctrines), II, III and V; and each of them is discussed in a separate chapter. This arrangement has been clearly indicated in the table of contents at the beginning of this work.

Similarly, in treating the contents of each chapter, I have concentrated on the main points in each. Furthermore, I have ignored his introductions to chapters (where applicable), his theological parts and epilogues.

Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa edited by Dr. Sulaymān Dunyā, Cairo 1961 has been taken as a basis for my research. In different places in each chapter and section various captions frequently preceded by 'wa fī nuskha "... ' have been noted.

When quoting al-Ghazālī's passages in this work these are found to be unnecessary and are not inserted.

As regards the collection of materials in the works of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā I am dependent upon the materials available to me at the moment. Arabic passages from them which after careful study have been found to correspond either directly or indirectly to al-Ghazālī's accounts are regarded as main sources. It would be extremely difficult to claim an exhaustive investigation into all relevant materials owing to the complexities inherent in the development of Islamic Philosophy over centuries and, consequently, the multifarious factors necessarily involved in research into sources. In reference to the problem of the general background of Islamic Philosophy Dr. R. Walzer has remarked: "Too many facts are still unknown, too many works have been neglected for centuries and remained unread and are only gradually being rediscovered in Eastern and Western libraries and edited and studied." (2)

There is still a possibility of new works of the Muslim philosophers being available from this or that source.

2. Walzer, Greek into Arabic ... 1

Their manuscripts are in such disorder that nobody can be sure of having a proper text unless he can spend much time in going through them very carefully for proper identification. In this connection Professor W. Montgomery Watt has rightly remarked:

"The consequence of these features of the material is that anyone who writes about Islamic philosophy and philosophers in a general way is taking a large risk. All kinds of things may happen which make his wider statements false. The text of a crucial passage may be proved to be erroneous; a new work by the author in question may be discovered; or a work supposed to be his may be shown to be by someone else. Thus most of the general statements about Islamic philosophy made at the present time must be regarded as in part provisional. The scholar, then, who would write about Islamic philosophy is in a dilemma. If he is very careful, he will hesitate to say anything at all. If he is concerned to try to meet the world's desire to know a little about Islamic philosophy, he will give some account, while knowing that what he says is based on inferior editions and does not refer to all the relevant passages." (3)

3. Watt, Philosophy ... xi

Keeping all these difficulties in mind I have made a serious attempt to engage in an intensive and extensive search for the component materials from the works of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā and to compare them with al-Ghazālī's accounts. Later on I have ventured upon an impartial judgement about the correspondence of al-Ghazālī's accounts with those of his two predecessors.

Strenuous efforts have been made to ensure that all the works by al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā, which are readily available for research, have been studied and quoted where necessary. Materials other than Arabic and Persian are noted in connection with the discussion.

After writing this Maqāṣid al-Ghazālī wrote Tahāfut al-Falāsifa where he selected twenty problems for investigation and exposed contradictions in varied philosophical theories. In this way he notices that there is not any purely intellectual basis for life. We have been driven back to the realm of faith and revelation, and all of our rational knowledge may accordingly be derived from these sources. He has smitten the philosophers hip and thigh, he

has turned as previously al-Ash^c arī did, their weapon against themselves and has pointed out that, with the premises which they postulated and the methods they adopted, no certain knowledge could ever be attained. His philosophic aim is to prove the insufficiency of reason as the real guide to truth. With this chief object in view he made an effort to achieve an universal criterion by invalidating the so-called conclusions of reason in the prevalent philosophical works. Most scholars agree that al-Ghazālī's Tahāfut al-Falāsifa rendered a death-blow to philosophy in the Muslim world.

CHAPTER ONE

METHODS AND TECHNIQUES.

Before I proceed to investigate the metaphysical section of al-Ghazālī's Maqāṣid, I deem it necessary to describe the methods and techniques adapted throughout this research. It has seemed appropriate to devise a method involving four elements in order to assess findings and to arrive at definite characterization. This method consists in an initial indication of the precise limits of the subject-matter under consideration, the setting out in full of relevant primary sources, a comparative study of these sources, and, finally an assessment of the results obtained.

The application of these elements is uniformly maintained in all chapters. This uniformity of assessment throughout the research is regarded as a fundamental criterion. The ways in which it is effectively carried out are shown by grouping these elements under the following headings:-

1. Brief introduction
2. Analogous Views
3. Comparative study
4. Result

Each of these headings must now be discussed for purposes of clarification. In each discussion I shall be concerned with the implications of each element in relation to the investigation.

1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION.

Prior to taking up a particular chapter, the nature and disposition of the subject under consideration are stated. This statement deals with the topic merely in an elementary way.

An attempt is made to present the topic being discussed in the simplest possible manner and thereby prepare for the more detailed discussion that follows. This attempt is of necessity theoretical throughout. It implies a recourse to experience gained through observation and an endeavour to discover thereby the meaning and significance of the subject in hand.

This introduction is stated in close conformity with the text and dispenses with needless details. Considerable stress is laid upon important aspects of the discussion and care is taken to be as concise as possible when one is concerned with the divergent factors in each section.

With regard to the similar arguments which reappear frequently in the subsequent sections of the same chapter it is sufficient to indicate them only initially.

Areas of investigation concerning the collection of materials for al-Ghazālī's each chapter have been briefly indicated.

2. ANALOGOUS VIEWS.

Major themes in the metaphysical section of al-Ghazālī's Maqāṣid are stated in this work point by point and headed by a particular title under his name. Every context in which each theme is treated in Arabic is noted exhaustively here.

The works of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā have been carefully studied for metaphysical elements which may have provided the materials for al-Ghazālī's Metaphysical section. Whenever any part of their work has been found to be similar, much attention has been given to the selection of these portions which exhibit conformity

between the views of al-Ghazālī and those of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā. Subsequently, those Arabic or Persian passages (as the occasion arises) have been taken out and noted under the names of their authors.

The views of al-Fārābī are listed first and those of Ibn-Sīnā are listed next under each theme of Maqāsīd. Where relevant views are not available either in the works of al-Fārābī or of Ibn-Sīnā with respect to a particular theme in Maqāsīd, no material can be listed.

In certain cases themes in Maqāsīd are found to be out of correspondence with the metaphysical views propounded by al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā. In these cases a vigorous search has been made beyond their metaphysical findings into their fields of Logic, Physics and Mathematics. Whenever any part of them appears to form a background for al-Ghazālī's collection of materials, it has been listed accordingly.

In addition to the Arabic and Persian materials

in the works of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā, references are also available in other languages, such as, French, German, English etc. These are considered as secondary sources and later on included in the comparative study. Furthermore, these passages have been quoted with double inverted commas ("...") in the original form.

At the conclusion of each theme a number is placed within brackets and is used for the identification of the relative sources. Then at the bottom of the page the names of texts and articles have been listed in abbreviated form together with the page numbers. Details of these abbreviations have been mentioned at the beginning of this work in the 'Table of Abbreviations'. But it may be noted that only the works which are frequently used and quoted have been included in this table. However, prior to the study of the texts indicated in this manner, care and precision have been given to a survey of numerous texts, and also articles in various journals dealing with the subjects in question, and these have been listed in the bibliography

according to the alphabetical order.

In some of the sections the views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā are found to be more numerous. Under such circumstances, these are noted in numerical order.

Although themes in Maqāsid are stated in different ways, in certain cases it is observed that they appear to originate from a common source. When this is the case, references are quoted on the first occasion and then referred to in those that follow by the words: "compare the context of ... on the point no. ...".

At times dots (e.g. ...) are placed at the beginning or in the middle or at the conclusion of different quotations. When used either at the beginning or at the conclusion, they indicate that some other aspects of the quotation included may be considered as the occasion arises. However, the dots

used in the body of a passage indicate that certain aspects considered to be of minor importance are omitted.

3. COMPARATIVE STUDY.

Each of the titles of al-Ghazālī's accounts in the ANALOGOUS VIEWS is firstly stated with its accompanying number. Before the process of comparison accounts of al-Fārābī, Ibn-Sīnā and al-Ghazālī are discussed in sequence and their chief objects in view are clearly indicated. Whenever English materials are available as translations of the passages of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā, these have been noted with single inverted commas (e.g. '...') and their sources have been indicated in abbreviated form at the bottom of the page as I have shown in the study of the ANALOGOUS VIEWS. Moreover, these are stated along with discussion. Whenever more than one account is available from either al-Fārābī or Ibn-Sīnā, the entire subject in question has been considered at some length but in a concise manner.

References from sources other than Arabic and Persian have been quoted at the end of the discussion of its author and put in the similar way of usual discussion but within double inverted commas (e.g. "...") and with a little space at the left side.

In this study while discussing each point I have maintained uniform forms of expression throughout. Thus I have generally begun with "Al-Fārābī propounds ...", "Ibn-Sīnā asserts ..." and "Al-Ghazālī states ...". This uniformity of expression though of minor importance, avoids confusion at the beginning of each point. Similarly, when more than one reference is available from al-Fārābī or Ibn-Sīnā, I have uniformly stated as: "such and such references are quoted from so and so". At the end of discussing each point I have shown in the same way: "Al-Ghazālī's accounts corresponds closely to ..." in the case of his direct agreement at some length with a philosopher; and "his account corresponds to

or is closer to ..." in the case of his partial or indirect agreement with a particular philosopher.

At the conclusion of the discussion the views which seem to correspond to those of al-Ghazālī have been clearly pointed out in a concise manner and the extent of correspondence has been indicated. Moreover, the areas in which direct and indirect correspondences are observed have also been shown. This process clearly establishes the criteria which al-Ghazālī is believed to follow.

During the course of discussion of these views, comments have also been made about the harmony or discord between the opinions of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā with respect to a particular theme of al-Ghazālī.

Cases of repetition of views which have been initially noted and subsequently referred to are considered necessary to make the comparison as complete as possible. Although al-Ghazālī appears to summarise

certain views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā in his Maqāsid, some of his assertions are made repeatedly by him and their material is later found to have originated from the same source.

In the course of comparison, when disagreement between al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā has been observed, this has been assessed on the basis of the particular view held by al-Ghazālī.

Furthermore, certain minor, accessory themes have also been discovered in addition to the major themes in Maqāsid. However, considerable research has failed to locate their component sources. These are primarily auxiliary aspects used in association with his important views and illustrated by concrete instances. The possibility that they may have originated from al-Ghazālī himself remains, although it may be still possible that they are derived from either al-Fārābī or Ibn-Sīnā. While referring to these auxiliary views or instances, they are termed "additions" and thus presented in the transliterated form. Important Arabic technical

terms are shown in transliteration and noted with English equivalents. For this transliteration the table of the Muir Institute, University of Edinburgh, has been followed.

Throughout this study care has been taken to select passages from al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā from fields which appear to be analogous to those of al-Ghazālī.

While evaluating the standard of resemblances, both intrinsic and extrinsic, implications of views have been brought into consideration. Moreover, a constant uniformity is maintained throughout this process of comparison.

4. RESULT.

Al-Ghazālī's agreement with a particular philosopher has been clearly identified by means of numerals. In how many points his accounts appear to

correspond to or be closer to those of a particular philosopher have been indicated. Sometimes remarks have also been made about the form of his agreement with the views maintained by al-Fārābī or Ibn-Sīnā.

Whenever al-Ghazālī's findings extend beyond metaphysical aspects, their references have been accordingly shown. Similarly, the "additions" which are marked out in the comparative study have been exhibited with their relative points. .

CHAPTER TWO

PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE.

1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION.

This chapter deals with the problem of existence as taken from the first chapter of the Metaphysical section in Al-Ghazālī's Maqāṣid.

He divides existence into substance and accident, and states that this division is based on the fact that man can realize the existence of a thing by means of his intelligence alone without requiring any definition or description.

He lists existences of things under two categories, one of which depends upon a place for its subsistence, and the other is not so dependent. Moreover, he divides the first category into two groups. The first occurs in a place which subsists in itself. The second occurs in a place in such a way that the essence of the place is constituted by it and that essence is subject to change owing to this occurrence.

He illustrates the concepts of definition, description, eternity, creation, accident, subject, matter and form. Moreover, he describes how form is treated as substance and substance is divided into four groups.

Lastly, he mentions by way of elaboration the controversy of theological sects and shows how opinion differs from one group of thinkers to that of another.

My investigation in this chapter is concerned with (a) the division of existence, (b) the significance of those concepts, (c) form as substance, and (d) classification of substances.

2. ANALOGOUS VIEWS.

AL - GHAZĀLĪ

I. DIVISION OF EXISTENCE.

الوجود ينقسم الى

الجوهر والعرض - (١)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

ما لا يمكن ان لا يوجد هو

في جوهره و طبيعته كذلك - وما يمكن
ان يوجد و ان لا يوجد هو ايضا في جوهره
و طبيعته كذلك ، فانه لا يمكن ان يكون
ما لا يمكن ان لا يوجد صادرا و انما صار
كذلك لاجل ان جوهره و طبيعته غير
ذلك و عرض له ان صار كذلك ، وكذلك
ما يمكن ان يوجد و ان لا يوجد - و اجناس

الموجودات الثلاثة : البرية من المادة
والاجسام السماوية و الاجسام
الروحانية - (2)

IBN - SĪNĀ

فنقول ان الموجود لا يمكن
ان يشرح بغير الاسم لانه مبدأ اول لكل
شرح فلا شرح له بل صورته تقوم في
النفس بلا توسط شيء - وهو ينقسم نحواً
من القسمة الى جوهر و عرض - (3)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

2. DEFINITION.

اما الحد : فلانه عبارة عن

الجمع بين : الجنس ، و الفصل - (4)

- | | | |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|
| 2. Dunlop, <u>Fusūl</u> | ... | I47 |
| 3. IS., <u>Naj.</u> | ... | 200 |
| 4. Ghaz., <u>Maq.</u> | ... | I4I |

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و الحد كلي مركب يؤلف من جنس وفصل، كقولنا في الانسان انه حيوان ناطق - واذا اتفق في حد ما ان يكون فيه جنس و فصول اكثر من واحد كما في حد الحيوان انه جسم متخذ حساس، فينبغي ان تعلم ان الفصل المقوم لذلك النوع هو الفصل الاخير، وما قبل ذلك من الفصول المقرونة بالجنس حد لجنس ذلك النوع اخذ حده مكان اسمه - و ذلك الجنس اما ان لا يكون له اسم فيكون حد ذلك يجعل ايضا مكان اسمه، او يكون له اسم فاخذ حده وترك اسمه - (5)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

الحد قول دال على ماهية الشيء، و لا شك في انه يكون مشتقاً على مقوماته اجمع، و يكون لا محالة مركباً من

جنسه و فصله ' لان مقوماته المشتركة
هي جنسه ' و المقوم الخاص فصله - (٦)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

3. DESCRIPTION.

و أما الرسم : فهو عبارة
عن تعريف الخفي بالواضح ، و لا شيء اوضح
من الوجود ، و اعرف و اشهر منه ، حتى
يعرف الوجود به - (٧)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و الرسم يؤلف من جنس
و خاصة كقولنا في الانسان انه حيوان ضحاك
و من جنس و عرض او اعراض كقولنا انه
حيوان كاتب و حيوان يبيع و يشتري - (٨)

6. IS., Ish (O.M-I) ... 56.
7. Ghaz., Maq. ... I4I
8. Dunlop, "Eisagoge" ... I27

IBN - SĪNĀ.

و اما اذا عرف الشيء بقول
مؤلف من اعراضه وخواصه التي تخصه
جملتها بالاجتماع ، فقد عرف ذلك الشيء
برسمه -

و اجود الرسم ما يوضح فيه
الجنس اولا ، ليفيد ذات الشيء - مثاله ما
يقال للانسان ؛ انه حيوان منشاء على
قدميه ، عريض الازفار ، ضحاك بالطبع - و
يقال للمثلث ؛ انه الشكل الذي له ثلاث
زوايا -

و يجب ان يكون الرسم
بخواص و اعراض بيّنة للشيء ، فان من عرف
المثلث بان الشكل الذي زواياه مثل
قائميتي لم يكن رسمه الا للمهندسين - (و)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

4. ETERNITY AND CREATION.

فان الحادث : عبارة عن
موجود بعد عدم - والقديم : عبارة عن
موجود غير مسبوق بعدم - (١٥)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(i) يقال قديم للشيء اما بحسب
الذات واما بحسب الزمان فالقديم بحسب
الذات هو الذى ليس لذاته مبدأ هى به
موجودة : والقديم بحسب الزمان هو الذى
لا اول لزمانه - والمحدث ايضا على وجهين -
احدهما هو الذى لذاته مبدأ هى به موجودة -
والاخر هو الذى لزمانه ابتداء وقد كان
وقت لم يكن وكانت قبلية هو فيها معدوم
وقد بطلت تلك القبلية - و معنى ذلك كله
انه يوجد زمان هو فيه معدوم وذلك لان

كل ما لزمان وجوده بدايةً زمانية دون
البداية الابداعية فقد سبقه زمان و
سبقته مادة قبل وجوده لانه قد كان لا
محالة معدوما - فاما ان يكون عدمه قبل
وجوده او مع وجوده - و القسبي الثاني محال -
فبقى ان يكون معدوما قبل وجوده فلا يخلو
اما ان يكون لوجوده قبل او لا يكون : فان لم
يكن لوجوده قبل فلم يكن معدوماً قبل وجوده
وان كان لوجوده قبل فاما ان يكون ذلك
القبل شيئاً معدوماً او شيئاً موجوداً فان
كان شيئاً معدوماً فلم يكن له قبل موجود
كان فيه معدوماً وايضا فان القبل المعدوم
موجود مع وجوده فبقى ان القبل الذي كان
له شئ موجود وذلك الشئ الموجود ليس
الان موجوداً فهو شئ قد مضى وكان
موجوداً - وذلك إما ماهية لذاته وهو الزمان -
و إما ماهية لغيره وهو زمانه فيثبت الزمان
على كل حال . (١١)

(ii) الحوادث بعد ما لم يكن له
قبل لم يكن فيه: ليس كقبلية الواحد التي
هي على الاثنين، التي قد يكون بها ما هو
قبل وما هو بعد، معا، في حصول الوجود؛ بل
قبلية قبل لا تثبت مع البعد - مثل هذا
ففيه أيضا تجدد بعدية بعد قبلية
باطلة؛ و ليس تلك القبليّة: هي نفس
العدم، فقد يكون العدم بعد ولا ذات
الفاعل، فقد تكون قبل، ومع، وبعد فهي
شيء آخر لا يزال فيه تجدد و تصرف على
الاتصال - (12)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

5. ACCIDENT.

فمعنى (العرض) على هذا
الاصطلاح، هو الذي يحل في (موضوع) - (13)

I2. IS., Ish (N.I-Th) ... 499

I3. Ghaz., Maq. ... I42

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

الكليات ضربان ' ضرب يعرف
من موضوعاتها كلها ذواتها ' ولا يعرف من
موضوع اصلا شيئاً خارجا عن ذاته ' وهو كلي
الجوهر ' وضرب يعرف من موضوعات له
ذواتها ومن موضوعات اخر اشياء خارجة
عن ذواتها ' وهو كلي العرض - ... و العرض
بالجملة هو الذى يعرف من موضوع ما شيئاً
خارجا عن ذاته - (14)

IBN . - SĪNĀ.

(14) وكل ذات قوامها في موضوع
فهو عرض - (15)

(15) ان العرض هو الموجود في
الموضوع فيكون الموضوع مقدما عليه و لا
يمكن وجوده دون الموضوع - (16)

- I4. Dunlop, "Categories" ... I69
I5. IS., Naj. ... 200
I6. IS., Arsh. ... 4

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

6. SUBJECT.

و معنى (الموضوع) هو الذى
يتقوم بنفسه، دون المعنى الحال
فيه - (17)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و ارسطو طاليس يسمى
المحمول الكلى الذى يعرف ذات الموضوع
المقول على موضوعه، و الذى يعرف من
موضوع شيئاً خارجاً عن ذاته المقول فى
موضوع - فيكون الاثنى عشر منها ما هو على
موضوع لا فى موضوع اصلاً، و هو كلى الجوهر،
و منها ما هو على موضوع و هو فى موضوع ما،
و هو كلى العرض، و منها ما هو فى موضوع
لا على موضوع اصلاً، و هو شخص العرض، و

منها ما ليس هو في موضوع ولا على موضوع
اصلاً وهو شخص الجوهر - (18)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(i) و الموضوع بالحقيقة ...
قائم بنفسه - ...
و ان الموضوع يعني به ما
صار بنفسه و نوعيته قائماً ثم صار سبباً
لان يقوم به شيء فيه ليس كجزء منه ...
و كان الموضوع ما يكون فيه انشئاً و ليس
كجزء منه - (19)

(ii) ثم اذا كان المحل مستغنياً
في قوامه عن الحال فيه فانما نسميه
موضوعاً له - (20)

- I8. Dunlop, "Categories" ... I69
I9. IS., Shifā' ... I89
20. IS., Naj. ... 200

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

7. MATTER AND FORM.

و اما ما يجرى مجرى
الانسانية ، فيسمى (صورة) - و يسمى
محلّه (هيولى) فالخشب موضوع لصورة
السريّر، و هيولى لصورة الرماد ، فانه يبقى
خشبا مع صورة السريّر، و لا يبقى خشبا
مع صورة الرماد - (21)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

(أ) ان الاجسام منها صناعية و
منها طبيعية ، فالصناعية مثل السريّر و
السيف و الزجاج و ما اشبه ذلك ، و
الطبيعية مثل الانسان و سائر الحيوان -
وكل واحد منها يلتئم من شيئين احدهما
مادة والاخر صورة المادة ، فالمادة مثل
الخشب في السريّر و الصورة مثل الشكل

في السرير وهو تربيعه او تدويره او
غير ذلك - فالمادة هي بالقوة سرير و
بالصورة تصير سريرا بالفعل - (22)

(ii) وكل واحد من هذه قوامه
من شئيين احدهما منزلته منزلة خشب
السرير و الاخر منزلته منزلة خلقه السرير
ثما منزلته الخشب هو المادة و الهيولى
و ما منزلته خلقته فهو الصورة و الهيئة و
ما جانس هذين من الاشياء - (23)

(iii) و الصورة هي في الجسد الجوهري
الجسماني، مثل شكل السرير في السرير، و
المادة مثل خشب السرير - فالصورة هي التي
بها يصير الجوهري المتجسد جوهرًا بالفعل، و
المادة هي التي بها يكون جوهرًا بالقوة - فان
السرير هو سرير بالقوة من جهة ما هو خشب،
و يصير سريرا بالفعل من حصول شكله في
الخشب - (24)

22. Dunlop, Fusūl ... I05

23. Diet., Must. (Text) 20

24. Far., Siyāsa ... 36

IBN - SĪNĀ.

ثي اذا كان المحل ... لم يكن
مستغنيا عنه لم نسمه موضوعا بل ربما
سميناه هيولى ... وقد يكون الشيء في
المحل و يكون مع ذلك جوهر اعنى لا في
موضوع اذا كان المحل القريب الذي هو فيه
متقوما به ليس متقوما بذاته ثي يكون
مع هذا مقوما له ونسميه صورة - (25)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

3. FORM IS SUBSTANCE.

و الصورة تسمى جوهرًا اذ
وصفوا الجوهر عبارة عن كل موجود لا في
موضوع - والصورة ليست في موضوع كما
سبق - (26)

25. IS., Naj. ... 200

26. Ghaz., Maq..... I43

IBN - SĪNĀ.

قبيّن ان بعض ما في المحل
ليس في موضوع - واما اثبات هذا الشيء الذي
في محل دون موضوع ، فذلك علينا الى
قريب -

و اذا اثبتناه ، فهو الشيء
الذي يخصه في مثل هذا الموضوع باسم الصورة
وان كنا قد نقول لغيره ايضاً صورة باشتراك
الاسم - و اذا كان الموجود لا في موضوع هو
المسمى جوهراً ، فالصورة ايضاً جوهر - (27)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

9. CLASSIFICATION OF SUBSTANCES.

فانقسم الجوهر الى اربعة
انواع: الهيولي ، والصورة ، والجسم ، والعقل
المفارق - وهو القائم بنفسه -

وكل جسمي فالجواهر الثلاثة
الأول ، موجودة فيه ، فالماء ، مثلاً ، جسمي
مركب من : صورة المائية ، ومن الهيولي
الحاملة للصورة - (28)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

فأولى الاشياء بالوجود هي
الجواهر ثم الاعراض و الجواهر التي ليست
باجسام أولى الجواهر بالوجود الا الهيولي لان
هذه الجواهر الثلاثة - هيولي و صورة و مفارق
لا جسمي ولا جزء جسمي ولا بد من وجوده لان
الجسمي و اجزاءه معلولة وينتهي الى جوهر هو
علة غير مقارنة بل مفارقة البينة - فأول الموجودات
في استحقاق الوجود الجوهر المفارق الغير
المجسم ثم الصورة ثم الجسمي ثم الهيولي - وهي
و ان كانت سببا للجسمي فانها ليست بسبب يعطى
الوجود بل هي محل لنيل الوجود - (29)

3. COMPARATIVE STUDY.

1. DIVISION OF EXISTENCE.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'What cannot not exist is so in its essence and nature, and what can exist and not exist is also so in its essence and nature. For it is impossible that what cannot not exist should come into existence and only becomes so because its essence and nature are otherwise and it is an accident that it becomes so, and similarly what can exist and not exist. The kinds of existents are three: (a) the creation from matter; (b) the heavenly bodies; (c) the spiritual bodies.' (1)

Ibn-Sīnā asserts that existence cannot be explained without a name; because it is a fundamental principle (mabda') for every explanation. Thus it has no explanation, rather its form (ṣūra) subsists in mind without the mediation of anything else. And 'All existing beings can be seen 'in a manner of division into substance and accident'.' (2)

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1. Dunlop, Fuṣūl ... 58
 2. Afnan ... 109

In this connection Dr. D. Saliba says:

"D'aucuns ont dit que la réalité de l'être et son fondement, c'est d'être agent ou agi, et ils ont cru par là donner une définition de l'être. Mais nous savons que l'idée d'être est antérieure à celles d'agent ou d'agi qui ne peuvent être acquises que par la déduction. Donc la représentation de l'être est première.

L'être se subdivise en substance et en accidents." (3)

Al-Ghazālī states that existence may be divided into substance (jawhar) and accident (ʿarāḍ).

In this respect al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. The views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā in relation to the account of al-Ghazālī have been found to be on dissimilar lines; because al-Fārābī deals with the problem of existence and asserts that whatever exists or does not exist is so because of its essence and nature; whereas Ibn-Sīnā discusses the criterion of existence and its division into substance and accident. Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully with this.

3. Saliba, Étude ... 65

2. DEFINITION.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'The definition is a compound universal made up of genus and differentia as when we say of man that he is a rational animal. When it happens in a particular definition that there are in it a genus and more than one differentiae, as in the definition of animal as 'a body taking nourishment, sentient', you must know that the differentia which constitutes that species is the last, and the preceding differentiae joined to the genus are a definition of the genus of that species, whose definition was taken in place of its name. That genus either has not a name, and its definition also is put in place of its name, or it has a name, and its definition is taken and its name left'. (4)

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that definition (ḥadd) is an [explicit] statement which indicates the connotation of a thing. Indeed, it includes all essential qualities of the thing and is composed of genus (jins) and differentia (faṣl); for its common qualities by which it is constituted are its genus, while the particular

quality is its differentia.

Al-Ghazālī states that definition consists in the compresence of genus and differentia.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that definition is composed of genus and differentia. Moreover Ibn-Sīnā clarifies the nature of definition and relation of genus and defferentia to it. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this.

3. DESCRIPTION.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'The description is made up of genus and property, as when we say that man is a laughing animal, and of genus and accident, or accidents, as when we say that he is an animal which writes and an animal which buys and sells.' (5)

5. Dunlop, "Eisagoge" ... 137

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that whenever a thing is characterized by a statement consisting of genus, property (khāṣṣa) and accident the totality of which ascertains the reality of a thing, it is known as description (rasm). The best description is the one in which genus is placed at the beginning to indicate the essence of a thing. For example, a man may be described as an animal that walks on two feet and has broad fingernails and a laughing nature; and a triangle may be described as a figure which has three angles. Ibn-Sīnā further adds that the description should be characterized by properties and accidents distinct from the thing. In this respect whoever characterizes a triangle as a figure whose three angles are equal to two right angles, cannot describe it to anyone except a geometrician.

Al-Ghazālī states that description consists in characterizing the latent qualities in terms of what is evident. Nothing can be more evident, comprehensible and manifest for its proper characterization than the existence of a thing, so that, its existence characterizes it. Here he apparently uses

"... ta^c rīf al-khafī bi l-wāḍih ..." in place of genus, property and accident which have previously been used by both al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that description consists in characterizing a thing by genus, differentia and accident. Moreover, Ibn-Sīnā illustrates the nature and functions of these terms with examples. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to correspond indirectly to this. On the other hand, his use of "... ta^c rīf al-khafī bi l-wāḍih ..." seems to be an "addition".

4. ETERNITY AND CREATION.

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He asserts that 'A thing may be eternal according to essence, or it may be eternal with respect to time. According to the former it is 'that whose essence has no origin from which it exists'; and with respect to the latter 'it is that for whose age there was no beginning'. And the word 'created' also has two distinct

meanings that should not be **confounded**. In one sense 'it is that for whose essence there was an origin by which it exists'; and in the other 'it is that for the age of which there was a beginning, and there was a time when it did not exist. A prior-period (qabliyya) during which it was non-existent, and that prior period was terminated'. Hence there is a notion of time involved in the whole matter. Let us follow this argument. Everything that had for its existence a temporal beginning aside from a creative beginning, must have been preceded by time and matter; and previous to that was altogether non-existent. Its non-existence could not have been together with its existence. It must have been earlier, which means that there was a period prior to its existence which has expired and is no more. And what constitutes that period is 'either a quiddity to itself' which in this case is time, 'or a quiddity to something other than itself, which is its time'. In both cases it is a proof of the existence of time'. (5)

Creation after no previous existence is not analogous to

the priority of a thing where two meanings are involved, one concerning what is prior and the other what is posterior. For a thing which is prior cannot be established with what is posterior. "To be created everything must needs have been a possible being in itself; and it has been stated that the possibility of being is the potentiality of being. It does not depend on the ability or inability of the agent to create. The two things are entirely distinct, and the agent cannot create unless the thing is in itself possible. Now the notion of the possibility of being can exist only in relation to what is possible to it. It is not a substance in itself, it is a notion present in a subject and an accident to it.

. . .

'Creation means nothing except existence after non-existence'. The non-existence of the thing is not a condition, it is just an attribute and an accident. And after coming into existence, it becomes either a necessary or a not-necessary being. So a thing in so far as its existence is said to have been from non-existence, need not have a cause in itself". (6)



Al-Ghazālī states that the created (ḥādith) thing consists of existence after non-existence and the eternal (qadīm) thing consists of existence not preceded by non-existence.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā asserts that 'creation means nothing except existence after non-existence', and eternity consists of 'that whose essence has no origin from which it exists' and 'it is that for whose age there was no beginning'. He illustrates this view in greater detail with examples. Al-Ghazālī's short account corresponds fully with this.

5. ACCIDENT.

Al-Farābī propounds the view that 'The universals are of two kinds. One kind affords knowledge of the essences of all its subjects, and affords no knowledge outside its essence of any subject. It is the universal of the substance. The other kind affords knowledge of the essences of some of its subjects and of other subjects things outside their essences. It is the universal of the accident.

. . .

The accident in general is that which affords knowledge of something outside the essence of a particular subject'. (7)

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He asserts that every essence whose subsistence is in a subject (mawḍūʿ^c) is called accident. 'An accident is a being in a locus. The locus is precedent to it and its being is not possible without the locus'. (8) In the connection Dr. S. Saliba says:

"L'accident est, au contraire, ce qui est dans un sujet". (9)

Al-Ghazālī states that accident is that which occurs in a subject. It is incapable of subsisting in itself and as such it depends upon a subject for its subsistence.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. The views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā seem

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7. Dunlop, "Categories"...183
 8. Arbërry ... 28
 9. Saliba, Étude ... 65

to have concerned two different approaches. For al-Fārābī divides universals into (a) that which affords knowledge of the essences of all its subjects, and (b) that which affords knowledge of the essences of some of its subjects and of other subjects outside their essences. In respect of this second kind al-Fārābī brings in that the accident affords knowledge of something outside the essence of a subject. On the other hand, Ibn-Sīnā asserts that accident consists of every essence whose subsistence lies in a subject, that is to say, the subject precedes it. Al-Ghazālī's short account corresponds fully with this.

6. SUBJECT

Al-Fārābī refers to the view that Aristotle calls the universal predicate which affords knowledge of the essence of the subject what is said of its subject, and that which affords knowledge of anything outside the essence of a subject what is said to be in a subject. Some things are of a subject, not in any subject, viz. the universal of the substance. Some are both of and in a subject, viz. the

universal of the accident. Others are in a subject, not of any subject, viz. the individual of the accident. Others again are neither in nor of any subject, viz. the individual of the substance'. (10)

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He asserts that subject in reality subsists by itself. It may refer to a place which is independent of its subsistence. Furthermore, it may be a cause by which something in it which is not a part of it becomes subsistent with it. Therefore, subject is what contains the thing and not as a part of it. It has an independent subsistence of its own on the one hand and by its species on the other.

Al-Ghazālī states that subject subsists by itself apart from the abstract form inhering in it.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. The views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā appear to be based upon dissimilar stand-points; because

10. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 184

al-Fārābī uses the term 'subject' in connection with predicate which is mostly concerned with relational proposition, where subject loses its independent being apart from the predicate, for the total relation requires both these concepts. On the other hand, Ibn-Sīnā's subject manifests itself without any support whatsoever. It is concerned with a position which is capable of independently subsisting on the one hand and of becoming a cause for something else on the other. Al-Ghazālī's short account appears to correspond fully with this.

7. MATTER AND FORM.

Three references are quoted from al-Fārābī. He propounds the view that 'Physical objects are either artificial or natural. Examples of the artificial are a couch, a sword, glass and the like. Examples of the natural are man and the other animals. Each is made up of two things, matter and form. The matter is, for example, the wood of a chair, and the form is, for example, the shape of the chair, i.e. its squareness, roundness, etc. The matter is

potentially a chair, and by the form it becomes a chair actually'. (11) Al-Farābī further asserts that the subsistence of each of them requires two things: ~~one is~~ ~~its position~~ corresponding to ~~that of~~ the wood in the chair; and the other ~~is its position~~ corresponding to ~~that of~~ the making of the chair. Here ^{what corresponds to} ~~the position of~~ the wood is the matter (mādda), and ^{what corresponds to} ~~the position of~~ the making is the form.

Ibn-Sīnā does not basically differ from al-Farābī. He asserts that whenever a place cannot be independent of subsistence, we do not call it a subject, rather we term it 'matter (hayūlā)' instead. On the otherhand, a thing may exist in a place and be a substance along with it : if the proximate place where it exists becomes subsistent with the substance, it does not subsist with its essence; thereupon it has a ^{cause of} subsistence which we call form. In this connection S. H. Nasr says:

"Form according to Ibn-Sīnā, is "the quality or quiddity (māhīyah) by which a body (jism) is what

11. Dunlop, Fuṣūl ... 28

it is," whereas matter "is that which supports (ḥāmil) the quality or form". Matter can only exist by the form imparted to it by the Intellect; without form it would be pure receptivity deprived of being. That is why prime matter cannot be found by itself. Moreover, "matter is [created] for form and its purpose is to have form imposed upon it, but form is not [created] for matter". (12)

Al-Ghazālī states as regards man that what pursues the course of humanity is called form and its place is termed matter. Wood, for example, is a subject for the form of chair and matter for the form of ashes. For it remains as wood when it assumes the form of chair, but loses its being with the form of ashes.

Here al-Ghazālī's account involves two aspects, one dealing with the nature of form and matter, and the other comprising examples. Now with respect to the first aspect al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā, and with respect to his second aspect, his account corresponds closely to that of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī

in that a thing manifests itself in a place and with a form. Moreover, Ibn-Sīnā asserts that if a place is not independent of its subsistence, we sometimes call it matter; and form is a quality by which a body is what it is. If the place subsists with the reality of a thing, it manifests itself through form. The first aspect of al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this. In this respect Ibn-Sīnā's use of mahall may be compared to al-Fārābī's manzila. On the other hand, al-Fārābī uses the examples of khashab and sarīr in order to demonstrate his views on matter and form. The second aspect of al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully with these.

8. FORM IS SUBSTANCE.

Ibn-Sīnā asserts that something can exist in a place apart from its being in a subject. He describes it as form and demonstrates it to be substance as well. For an existent which is not in a subject is called substance. Here his argument is based on giving prominence to form. "Yet in the scale of existence form is superior to matter. It is more

real. Bodily matter cannot divest itself of material form and so remain separate. Its very existence is that of one disposed to receive, just as that of an accident is an existence disposed to be received. Form is what gives unity to a portion of matter, and form is dependent upon disposition. Under Platonic rather than Aristotelian influence Avicenna may be thought to give to form a superior reality which is somewhat degraded when united with matter. Thus in his view intelligible reality is superior to sensible reality." (13)

Al-Ghazālī states that form is called substance, because substance consists of every existent which is not in a subject, while form is not in a subject.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā asserts that there is something which exists in a place without being in a subject, and he calls it form and considers it to be substance; for an existent which is not in a subject is termed substance. Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully with this. Moreover,

he arranges Ibn-Sīnā's view in the order of syllogism; and we may demonstrate its various forms in the following ways in order to test the validity of the reasoning:-

1. All substance is that which consists of every existent not in a subject.

All form is that which consists of every existent not in a subject.

- ∴ All form is substance.

2. All substance consisting of every existent is not in a subject.

All form is substance.

- ∴ All form is not in a subject.

3. All substance consisting of every existent is not in a subject.

All form is not in a subject.

- ∴ [No conclusion].

4. All existent which is not in a subject is substance.

All form is the existent which is not in a subject.

- ∴ All form is substance.

In the first form of syllogism 'which consists of every existent not in a subject' is the Middle term; and as predicate in both the premises it remains undistributed. Hence the conclusion involves a fallacy which is technically known as the Fallacy of Undistributed Middle.

On the other hand, if 'that which consists of every existent' is omitted from the Minor premise, then it would be a negative proposition. Consequently, the conclusion would be negative and therewith negate the affirmative conclusion. Thus this method also is defective.

In the second form the syllogism appears to be valid in the form of 'CELARENT'. But the main fallacy lies with the transfer of the given conclusion to the Minor premise, since 'All form is substance' is al-Ghazālī's conclusion. However, it has been taken here in the Minor premise for which it is basically wrong.

In the third form both the Major and Minor premises are in negative forms. Thus according to the syllogistic rules no conclusion can be inferred from two negative premises. Therefore, the affirmative conclusion

'All form is substance' cannot be proved.

In the fourth form the Middle term 'existent which is not in a subject' in both of the premises suffers from ambiguity and involves the Fallacy of Ambiguous Middle.

It follows, therefore, that all these forms of syllogistic reasoning lack material validity. However, al-Ghazālī simply states Ibn-Sīnā's view in a methodical way without pointing out any inconsistency whatsoever.

9. CLASSIFICATION OF SUBSTANCES.

Ibn-Sīnā asserts that the primary things in existence are substances. The next grade of being is concerned with accidental things. The substances which do not have bodies in existence, pertain to the primary substances with the exception of the grade of matter. These substances are of three kinds, viz. matter, form and separate substance which is neither a body nor a part of it. For body and its parts are caused, and ultimately imply

substance which is cause. Thus he arranges the order of existents in the following way:

1. Separate incorporeal substance
2. Form
3. Body
4. Matter

Although they may be a cause of body, they are incapable of providing the existence of things; rather each of them is a place for the attainment of existence. In this connection Dr. D. Saliba says:

"La première substance qui ait droit à l'existence, c'est la substance séparée; la seconde, c'est la forme; la troisième, c'est le corps; et enfin, la quatrième, c'est la matière. Il est vrai que le corps est composé de matière et de forme qui sont ses causes; or, comme la cause est antérieure à l'effet, la matière qui est une cause par rapport au corps doit précéder en quelque sorte le corps. Mais on peut répondre à ceci que la matière n'est pas la cause de l'existence du corps.

Non seulement la matière n'est pas cause de l'existence et à ce titre est dénuée de tout effet actuel, mais son rôle est réduit à celui d'un simple réceptacle. La matière n'est pas la cause de l'existence du corps, elle est simplement le lieu qui reçoit l'existence. La preuve en est, qu'elle n'existe que par la forme qui compose avec elle l'individualité du corps. La matière est donc quelque chose d'inférieur en degré, dans l'échelle ontologique, non pas seulement à la forme, mais au composé de matière et de forme; à savoir, le corps." (14)

Furthermore, in connection with the order of substances S.H. Nasr remarks:

"The separate substances themselves form the first class in the list of beings which "have a right to exist," that is, which possess a rank in the hierarchy of Being.

The order of this scale may be given as follows:

1. Separate substances
2. Form
3. Body
4. Matter.

As the separate substances, or angels, stand highest in this scale, matter stands lowest in the hierarchy and possesses an inferior degree of reality with respect to form, contrary to the view of Aristotle." (15)

Al-Ghazālī divides the substance into four groups, viz. matter, form, body and separate intelligence. Each body consists of the first three of the above substances. Water, he states, is a body composed of the form of a liquid thing, and matter is a support of it.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā classifies substances into four kinds and al-Ghazālī's account of division corresponds fully with this. But it has been observed that al-Ghazālī changes Ibn-Sīnā's order of substances and places matter first, form second, body third and separate intelligence fourth. Moreover, he gives the definite name of 'separate intelligence' to that which Ibn-Sīnā called 'separate incorporeal substance (al-jawhar al-mufāraq al-ghayr al-mujassam)'. This Ibn-Sīnā defined as a separate substance which is neither a body nor a part of it, and to this

indefinite character al-Ghazālī clearly ascribes a definite name. Furthermore, al-Ghazālī introduces the example of water in connection with this classification of substances and describes it as a kind of body. Thus his instance of "Fa l- mā', mathalan, jism murakkab min: šurat al-mā'iya, wa min al-hayūlā al-ḥāmila li s-šura" appears to be an "addition".

4. RESULT.

Al-Ghazālī's accounts correspond to those of Ibn-Sīnā in all points considered in this chapter. But with respect to examples his account corresponds to that of al-Fārābī in point no.7.

In addition to his materials available in Metaphysics, al-Ghazālī depends upon both of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā in their Logic in points 2 and 3. Moreover, some "additions" have been observed in points 3 and 9.

CHAPTER THREE

DOCTRINE OF THE REALITY OF BODY.

1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION.

In this chapter al-Chazālī deals with the doctrine of the reality of body, and ascertains its nature by geometrical methods. Body, he states, is substance in respect to which three dimensions can be postulated to have intersected at right angles, and more than three cannot be so ascribed.

He discusses the nature and prerequisite of right angles and their relation to acute and obtuse angles.

He demonstrates the absurdity of defining body as a long, wide and deep thing for the reason that a thing may be characterized as a body not because of its length, width and depth; but it would be so described in respect of the content indicated by these three-fold dimensions.

He illustrates how dimensions can simply be regarded as transitory phenomena, whereas the corporeal form remains unalterable. In this connection he shows that dimensions

existing in the body are accidental phenomena which may, of course, be necessary and inseparable.

Therefore, the primary essential of body is corporeal form, and it may accept a postulate of dimensions which is not the actual existence of them, but concerns the dimensions which are actually present as accident.

My investigation is concerned with the collection of materials relevant to al-Ghazālī's four fundamental points in this chapter; ~~each is~~ (a) body has three dimensions, (b) nature of angles, (c) nature of body and (d) corporeal form is the essential of body.

2. ANALOGOUS VIEWS.


AL - GHAZALI.

I. BODY HAS THREE DIMENSIONS.

فالجسم هو كل جوهر يمكن
ان يفرض فيه ثلاثة امتدادات متقاطعة
على زوايا قائمة - ...

و لا يوجد شيء ينقسم من
ثلاث جهات الا الجسم، فكل ما يمكن ان
يفرض بالوهم فيه ثلاث امتدادات
متقاطعة، على زوايا قائمة، فهو الجسم -

و انما خصصنا الزوايا



بالقائمة؛ لان ذلك ان
لم يشترط فكل جسم يمكن
ان يفرض فيه امتدادات
كثيرة متقاطعة، لا على
زوايا قائمة مثل هذا -

فاذا فرضت الزوايا قائمة ،
لم تزد على الثلاث : وهو الطول ،
والعرض ، والعمق - (1)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

... انا لا نعرف حقيقة
الجوهر بل انما نعرف شيئاً له هذه
الخاصة وهو انه الموجود لا في
موضوع وهذا ليس حقيقته و لا
نعرف حقيقة الجسم بل نعرف
شيئاً له هذه الخواص وهي الطول
والعرض والعمق - ... (2)

1. Ghaz., Mag. ... I44

2. Far., Tal. ... 4

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(ز) ان الجسمي هو الجوهر الذي
يمكنك ان تفرض فيه بعدا كيف شئت ابتداءً
فيكون ذلك المبتدأ هو الطول ، ثم يمكنك
ان تفرض ايضا بعدا اخر مقاطعا لذلك البعد
على قوائمي ، فيكون ذلك البعد الثاني هو
العرض ، ويمكنك ان تفرض فيه بعدا ثالثا
مقاطعا لهذين البعدين على قوائمي تتلاقى
الثلاثة على موضع واحد ، ولا يمكنك ان
تفرض بعدا عموديا بهذه الصفة غير هذه
الثلاثة - (3)

(زا) انما هو جسمي لانه بحيث
يصح ان يفرض فيه ابعاد ثلاثة كل واحد
منها قائمي على الاخر ولا يمكن ان تكون فوق
ثلاثة فالذي يفرض او لا هو الطول و القائم
عليه هو العرض و القائم عليهما في الحد
المشترك هو العمق وليس يمكن غيره - (4)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

2. NATURE OF ANGLES.

و الزاوية القائمة هي التي

تحصل بقيام خط منتصبا على وسط آخر بحيث

لا يميل الى احد الجانبين ؛


و بحيث تتساوى الزاويتان

الحاصلتان من الجانبين ؛

فاذا تساويتا سميت


كل واحدة قائمه مثل

هذا -



فاذا ميل به الى جانب اليمين

مثلا مثل هذا -



صارت الزاوية من

الجانب الذي اليه

الميل اضيق من مقابلتها فتسمى (حاده) وتسمى

الواسعة المقابلة (منفرجة) - (S)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(أ) و اذا قام خط على خط فصيير
الزاويتين اللتين عن جنبتيه متساويتين
فالقائم عمود على الاخر و الزاويتان كن
واحدة منهما قائمة - و المنفرجة زاويته
اعظم من القائمة - و السحادة اصغر من
القائمة - (٤)

(ب) و الزاوية القائمة هي التي
تحدث من تقاطع بعد قائم على بعد ليس
ميله الى احدى الجهتين اكثر من ميله الى
الاخرى - فهذا معنى كون الجسم ذا اقطار
ثلاثة - (٦)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

3. NATURE OF BODY.

وقد قيل في حد الجسم؟ انه

6. IS, Shifa' ... I

7. IS., Naj. ... 98

الطويل، العريض، العميق. وهذا فيه نوع
تساهل؟ فان الجسم ليس جسما باعتبار ما فيه
من الطول والعرض والعمق، بالفعل، بل
باعتبار قبوله للطول والعرض والعمق، و
الابعاد الثلاثة؛ بدليل انك لو اخذت شمعة
فشكلتها بطول شبر، وعرض اصبعين، وسمك
اصبع واحد، فهي جسم، لا لما فيه من الطول
والعرض؛ اذ لو جعلته مستديرا او على شكل
اخر، زال ذلك الامتداد المعين، وذلك
الطول المعين، وحدث امتدادان اخران
بدلا عنهما و الصورة الجسمية لم تتبدل
املا -

فاذن المقادير الموجودة في
الجسم اعراض خارجة عن ذات الجسمية، و
قد تكون لازمة لا تفارق، كشكل السماء،
و لكن العرضي قد يكون لازما - وكذا العرض،
كالسواد للحبشي - (8)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(١٤) وكون الجسم بهذه الصفة
هو الذى يشار لاجله الى الجسم بانه طويل
عريض عميق، كما يقال : ان الجسم هو
المنقسم في جميع الابعاد - وليس يعنى انه
منقسم بالفعل مفروغ عنه بل على انه من
شأنه ان يفرض فيه هذا القسمة -

فهكذا يجب ان يعرف الجسم
وهو انه الجوهر الذى كذا صورته و هو
بها هو ما هو، ثم سائر الابعاد المفروضة
فيه بين نهاياته ونهاياته ايضا وانشكاله و
اوضاعه امور ليست مقومة له بل هي تابعة
لجوهره - وربما لزم بعض الاجسام شئ
منها او كلها ، وربما لم يلزم بعض الاجسام
شئ منها او بعضها -

ولو انك اخذت شمعة
فشكلتها بشكل افترض لها ابعاد بالفعل بين
تلك النهايات معدودة مقدرة محدودة، ثم

اذا غيرت ذلك الشكل لم يبق شئ منها بالفعل
واحدا بالشخص بذلك الحد وبذلك القدر،
بل حدثت ابعاد اخرى مخالفة لتلك بالعدد،
فهذه الابعاد هي التي من باب الكمي - (٩)

(ii) ... لكنه ربما اتفق في بعض
الاجسام ان تكون هذه الابعاد المتجددة لازمة
لا تغارق ملازمة اشكالها وكما ان الشكل لاحق
فكذلك ما يتجدد به الشكل وكما ان ملازمة
الشكل لا يدل على انه داخل في تحديد
جسميته كذلك ملازمة هذه الابعاد
المتجددة - (١٥)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

4. CORPOREAL FORM IS THE ESSENTIAL OF BODY.

فاذن الذاتى للجسم الذى
هو الصورة الجسمية، كونه بحيث يقبل

9. IS., Ilah (I) ... 63

10. IS., Naj. ... 202

فرض الامتدادات ، لا وجود الامتدادات بالفعل ،
بل المقدار الحاصل بالفعل عرض ؛ ولذلك
يجوز ان يقبل جسم واحد مقدارا اكبر و
اصغر . فيكبر مرة و يصغر اخرى من غير
زيادة من خارج ، بل في نفسه ، من حيث ان
المقدار عرض فيه - و ليس بحض المقادير
منعينا له لذاته و يدل على كون المقدار
غير حقيقة الجسم ان الاجسام متساوية
في الصورة الجسمية لا يتصور بينها فرق ،
وهي مختلفة في المقادير لا محالة - (١١)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

وقال - الصورة الجسمية و هو
البعد المقوم للجسم الطبيعي ليس قوامها
بالمحسوسات فتكون محسوسة بل هي مبدأ
المحسوسات فهي عارضة للموجود بما هو
موجود وكل ما يكون داخل في علوم كثيرة

كالوحدة والكثرة و غيرهما فانهما يدخلان
في الطبيعيات والتعليميات و غيرهما - (12)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

فالجسمية بالحقيقة صورة
الاتصال القابل لما قلناه من فرض الابعاد الثلاثة -
وهذا المعنى غير المقدار و غير الجسمية
التعليمية - فان هذا الجسيم من حيث له
هذه الصورة لا يخالف جسما اخر بانه اكبر او
اصغر، ولا يناسبه بانه مساو او محدود به
و عاقل له او مشارك او مباين، وانما ذلك له
من حيث هو مقدر و من حيث جزء منه
يعدده - وهذا الاعتبار له غير اعتبار الجسمية
التي ذكرناه - ...

ان صورة الجسمية من حيث
هي صورة الجسمية محتاجة الى مادة، و لان
طبيعة الصورة الجسمية في نفسها من حيث هي

صورة جسمية لا تختلف - فانها طبيعية واحدة بسيطة ' ليس يجوز ان تتنوع بفصول تدخل عليها بما هي جسمية ' فان دخلتها فصول تكون امورا تنضاف اليها من خارج ' وتكون ايضا احدى الصور المقارنة للمادة ' ولا يكون حكمها معها حكم الفصول الحقيقية - ...

و أما صورة الجسمية من حيث هي جسمية فهي طبيعة واحدة بسيطة محصلة لا اختلاف فيها ' ولا تخالف مجرد صورة جسمية لمجرد صورة جسمية بفصل داخل في الجسمية ' وما يلحقها انما يلحقها على انها شئ خارج عن طبيعتها - (13)

(ii) و أما الصورة الجسمية فلانها إما ان تكون نفس الاتصال او تكون طبيعة يلزمها الاتصال حتى لا توجد هي الا والاتصال لازم لها - فان كانت نفس الاتصال فقد يكون الجسمي متصلا -

ثم ينفصل فيكون هناك لامحالة شئ هو
بالقوة كلاهما فليس ذات الاتصال بما هو
اتصال قابل للانفصال لان قابل الاتصال لا
يعدم عند الانفصال والاتصال يعدم عند
الانفصال فاذاً شئ غير الاتصال هو قابل
للانفصال وهو بعينه قابل للاتصال فليس
الاتصال هو بالقوة قابلاً للانفصال - ولا
ايضا طبيعة يلزمها الاتصال لذاتها - فظاهر
ان ههنا جوهر غير الصورة الجسمية هو
الذى يعرض له الانفصال والاتصال معا
و هو مقارن للصورة الجسمية وهو الذى
يقبل الاتحاد بصورة الجسمية فيصير
جسماً واحداً بما يقومه او يلزمه من
الاتصال الجسماني - (14)

3. COMPARATIVE STUDY.

1. BODY HAS THREE DIMENSIONS.

Al-Farābī begins by referring to the opinion that we cannot have any knowledge of the reality of a thing except through properties, accessories and accidents. In this connection he mentions as an example that we do not know the reality of substance. On the contrary, we are only capable of knowing a thing through its property (khāṣṣa) which does not exist independently in a substratum, that is to say, it is not its reality. Accordingly, we do not know the reality of body, but we simply know a thing which has the properties of length, width and depth. In this connection Dr. Muhsin Mahdi says:

"Then, after that, he proceeded to inquire into them. He found that each of the things he called substance extends in all directions, having length, width and depth. He called them, insofar as they are endowed with the property of extending in all the directions, at times bodies and at times bodily substances. Hence natural beings become **bodies**

and attributes, and bodily substances (or substances that admit of assuming a bodily form) and attributes in them". (1)

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He asserts that body (jism) is substance in respect to which three dimensions (ab^cād) can be postulated in such a way that each of them is perpendicular (qā'im) on the other; but more than three cannot be ascertained in this manner. In this respect Ibn-Sīnā demonstrates that the first dimension may be postulated in any way one likes and be described as length. Then the second dimension can intersect the initial dimension at right angles and is called width. Lastly, the third dimension can intersect both of the above dimensions at right angles and is termed depth. "A body is supposed to have three dimensions and no more. It is first supposed to have length, and if so then breadth, and if so then depth". (2)

Al-Ghazālī states that body is substance in respect to which three dimensions (imtidādāt) can be postulated intersecting at right angles (zawāyā qā'ima). Al-Ghazālī further adds that body is the only thing which can be divided from three directions. On the other hand a right angle is

1. Mahdi, Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle ... 98.

2. Afnan ... 110.

specified for the reason that if any condition is not imposed, then in each body manifold dimensions can be postulated which do not intersect at right angles. But whenever right angles are postulated, they do not exceed three dimensions: length, width and depth.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. The views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā are not of very similar nature. According to al-Fārābī we are incapable of knowing the reality of body, rather instead of it we can simply know its properties. Moreover, "each of the things he called substance extends in all directions, having length, width and depth ...". On the other hand, Ibn-Sīnā asserts that body is substance where three dimensions can intersect at right angles. Furthermore, any number exceeding three cannot be capable of doing so. Al-Ghazālī's account fully corresponds with this. But it has been observed that al-Ghazālī uses imtidādāt in place of Ibn-Sīnā's ab^cād; both terms, however, have been translated in this investigation by "dimensions".

2. NATURE OF ANGLES.

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He asserts that whenever one line stands [perpendicularly] upon another, it produces two equal angles on its sides. Then the perpendicular is vertical upon the other, and each of the two angles is a right angle. Ibn-Sīnā describes the nature of the obtuse (munfarija) and acute (ḥadda) angles in this connection; and states that the obtuse angle is greater than the right angle, whereas the acute angle is smaller than it. Furthermore, he asserts that the right angle is produced by drawing a perpendicular upon a dimension, so that, it does not incline to either of the two directions. This is the meaning of body's being endowed with three dimensions.

Al-Ghazālī states that a right angle is that which is produced by drawing a straight line as perpendicular in the middle of another in such a way that it does not incline to anyone of the two sides, so that, two angles thus produced on both sides are equal. Whenever the line is made to incline to the right-side, then the angle of the side to which the inclination is, becomes narrower than its opposite and is called acute; whereas the opposite wider angle is termed obtuse.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā illustrates that right angle can be produced by erecting a perpendicular on a dimension in such a manner that two equal angles are produced. But whenever the line inclines to one side, two unequal angles are produced, one being greater than the right angle and the other being smaller than it. Al-Ghazālī's account fully corresponds with this.

3. NATURE OF BODY.

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He asserts the view that body is long, wide and deep. It is divisible in all dimensions. But Ibn-Sīnā clarifies that by this division it is not meant that body is actually divided "exhaustively", rather this division may simply be postulated.

Thus it is necessary to perceive a body by the fact that it is a substance that has a form which subsists with it. Then all postulated dimensions within its extremities, forms and positions can simply be things which are not its constituents, rather they are only subordinate to its substance. At times some or all of them may attach to some of the bodies, whereas at

other times nothing or any of them may attach to some of the bodies.

In order to explain this assertion Ibn-Sīnā introduces the example of wax and argues that if you take a piece of wax and mould it into a shape, dimensions would actually be postulated for them. You may in fact give certain definite and calculated dimensions within certain limits. On the other hand, if you change that form, no dimension would actually be characterized in that particular limit and measure. Rather new dimensions would arise which are distinct from the others. These dimensions belong to the category of quantity.

With reference to the dimension Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that at times it may so happen that in some of the bodies these new dimensions appear to be as necessary and inseparable as the adherence of their forms. On the otherhand the form is subsidiary; as such the adherence of form does not indicate that it is included in the definition of its corporeality. Same is the case with these particular dimensions.

Al-Ghazālī begins with the statement that body is long, wide and deep, but shows that this definition appears to be

inaccurate; because body is not a body on account of what it contains actually by way of length, width and depth but on account of its capacity for the acceptance of length, width and depth. The three dimensions can be demonstrated by the fact that if you take a piece of wax and form it into the length of the span of the hand, the breadth of the two fingers and thickness of one finger, then it is a body not because of what it contains in length and width, since if you make it round or another form, that definite dimension and length cease to exist and two other dimensions are produced instead of them and the corporeal form (as-sūra al-jismiyya) is not changed at all.

Therefore, the dimensions existing in the body are accident outside the essence of corporeality. They may be necessary and inseparable (like the form of the sky) but something which is accidental may be necessary, *as* may be the accident (like the blackness of the Abyssinian).

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā asserts that body is long, wide and deep.

All postulated dimensions, forms and positions are not constituent parts of it, rather they are subordinate to its reality. He introduces the example of wax and explains how changes occur in bodies under the varied conditions of them. Al-Ghazālī's account fully corresponds with this. Furthermore, he notes that the definition of body as being long, wide and deep is inaccurate; and this may be treated as an "addition".

4. CORPOREAL FORM IS THE ESSENTIAL OF BODY.

Al-Fārābī refers to the opinion that while the corporeal form is the dimension which gives subsistence to the natural body, its subsistence cannot be perceptible through the senses. It may be perceptible, [or] be a principle of the things perceptible through the senses. But it is accidental to the existent in that it exists and [it is accidental] to all that is included in numerous aspects of knowledge; such as, unity, multiplicity and the like. Moreover, these are included in Natural Sciences, Theoretical Sciences and the like.

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. According to him, corporeal reality is a form of continuity (ittiṣāl) which is capable of accepting a postulate of three dimensions, which we have mentioned above. This means neither the measure nor the

corporeal quantity; for this body, in as much as it has form, does not differ from another body in that it is greater or smaller, and it does not correspond to a thing in that it is similar or calculable or equivalent or associated or dissimilar. On the other hand, it has these properties on account of its quantity and on account of an aspect which defines it. Thus the aspect of body is distinct from that of its corporeality.

On the other hand, corporeal form, in as much as it is corporeal, requires matter for its manifestation. The nature of corporeal form is such that it does not differ in itself, for it consists of one simple nature; as such it cannot make specific differences. Because if any difference enters into the reality of corporeal form, it involves things which are added from outside, while one of the forms would be connected with matter. That is why its aspect cannot exist with that of the reality of the difference.

Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that corporeal form may either be continuity itself or a nature necessitating continuity, so that,

the corporeal form cannot exist without the continuity which is requisite to it. In this respect if it is the continuity itself, the body may be continuous and then discontinuous; in such a case there must be something which has the potentiality for both cases. Ibn-Sīnā further argues that the essence of continuity, because of its being continuous, does not accept discontinuity (infisal); for that which accepts continuity does not cease to exist at the time of discontinuity, whereas continuity would cease to exist at the time of discontinuity. Therefore, there is something other than continuity which accepts discontinuity, and moreover, this very thing accepts continuity also. So continuity is not capable of accepting discontinuity, nor is it a nature necessitating continuity because of its essence.

It is evident, therefore, that there is a reality other than the corporeal form which accepts both continuity and discontinuity while it is joined to the corporeal form. This is the thing which accepts unison with the corporeal form, thus becoming a single body because of bodily continuity which constitutes it or adheres to it.

Al-Ghazālī concludes this chapter by stating that the essential of body is corporeal form, and it has ability to accept a postulate of dimensions not as an actual existence of them but as an accident actually present. For this reason one body can accept greater and smaller measurement, so that, it increases at one time and decreases at another time without any addition from outside, since measurement here is an accident. Furthermore, some of the measurements are not specified for the essence of body, while existence of the measurement is distinct from the reality of body. However, all bodies are equal with respect to corporeal form and no differences between them can be imagined. They are only different in respect of measurement.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to the views of Ibn-Sīnā. The approach of Ibn-Sīnā appears to be dissimilar to that of al-Fārābī. According to al-Fārābī, the corporeal form while concerning dimension which gives subsistence to the natural body cannot be perceptible through the senses. It is accidental to a thing and to all that is included in numerous sciences. But Ibn-Sīnā makes his assertion in a different way. Corporeal reality according to him, is a form of continuity which is capable of accepting the postulate of the aforesaid three dimensions. Body,

in as much as it has form, does not differ from another of its kind in that it is greater and smaller in extent. On the other hand, the nature of corporeal form consists in one simple continuity for which it does not differ in itself. He further adds that corporeal form is either continuity itself or a nature which the continuity follows. If it concerns the very continuity, the body maybe continuous and discontinuous, and if it is so, there must be something capable of potentiality for both cases. Thus there is a reality other than the corporeal form which accepts continuity and discontinuity, and establishes a unison with the corporeal form. Al-Chazālī's account appears to be closer to the detailed views of Ibn-Sīnā. It may further be said that Al-Chazālī has clearly systematized materials derived from varied presentations of Ibn-Sīnā's views.

4. RESULT.

Al-Ghazālī's accounts correspond to those of Ibn-Sīnā in all points. In addition to his agreement with Ibn-Sīnā's metaphysical works al-Ghazālī's accounts correspond to his Physics and Mathematics in point 2.

Further more, a certain "addition" has been observed in point 3.

CHAPTER FOUR

DOCTRINE OF THE INSEPARABLE

RELATION BETWEEN MATTER

AND FORM.

1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION.

In this chapter al-Ghazālī states the doctrine of the inseparable relation between matter and form. He begins by describing their invariable relation and then gives two proofs for this relation.

In his first proof al-Ghazālī clearly points out that if matter exists without form, then one of two things must be true: either it would be perceptibly indicated by hand, or it would not be so perceptible. In the former case, it involves two aspects resulting in division of the thing which in fact manifests itself through corporeal form. In the latter, it implies an absurd statement, since form must settle somewhere for its manifestation.

In his second proof al-Ghazālī shows that if matter is postulated to be free from form, it would be either divisible or not divisible. Then he demonstrates that in either of the cases matter cannot be isolated from form.

While indicating this inseparable relation

al-Ghazālī refers to various opinions and uses them to substantiate the body of his proofs.

The present investigation is concerned with the collection of materials from this chapter relating to (a) the inseparable relation between matter and form, (b) and (c) the two proofs and, (d) the conclusion of this relation.

2. ANALOGOUS VIEWS.

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

I. INSEPARABLE RELATION BETWEEN MATTER AND FORM.

الهيولى ليس لها وجود
بالفعل بنفسها دون الصورة ' البتة ' بل يكون
ابدا وجودها مع الصورة - وكذلك الصورة
لا تقوم بنفسها دون الهيولى - (1)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و الصورة قوامها بالمادة '
والمادة موضوعة لحمل الصور - فان الصور
ليس لها قوام بذواتها وهي محتاجة الى
ان تكون موجودة في موضوع ، وموضوعها
المادة - والمادة انما وجودها لا جل
الصور - (2)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

فقد صح ان المادة
الجسمائية انما تقوم بالفعل عند وجود
الصورة ، وايضا فان الصورة المادية
ليست توجد مفارقة للمادة - (3)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

2. FIRST PROOF : MATTER IS NOT DEVOID OF FORM.

والدليل : على ان الصورة (a)
لا توجد خالية عن الصورة امران :

الاول : انه لو وجدت لكان
لا يخلو - إما ان تكون مشارا اليها والى
جهته باليد اشارة حسية - او لم تكن -

فان كانت مشارا اليها فلها
اذن جهتان - فما يأتيه من جهة يلقي منه تميز الذي

(a) Read ... الهيولى

يلقى ما يأتيه من الجهة الاخرى - فتكون منقسمة - فيكون فيه صورة الجسمية إذ لا معنى للصورة الجسمية وحققتها ، الا قبول القسمة ، وان لم تكن مشارا اليها :

فهو باطل من حيث انه اذا حلت بها الصورة - فإما ان تكون في كل مكان - او لا تكون في مكان أصلا - او تكون في مكان دون مكان -

والاقسام الثلاثة باطلة :

فالمفضى اليها باطل - أما بطلان كونها في كل مكان ، او لا في مكان ، فظاهر ، وأما بطلان اختصاصها بمكان دون مكان ، فمن حيث ان الصورة الجسمية ، من حيث انها جسمية ، لا تستدعي مكانا معيناً بل سائر الاماكن بالنسبة اليها واحدة - فيكون الاختصاص بامر زائد على الجسمية - (4)

AL - FARĀBĪ

فالمادة موضوعة ليكون بها قوام الصورة والصورة لا يمكن ان يكون لها قوام

و وجود بغير المادة فالمادة وجودها لاجل
الصورة ولو لم تكن صورة ما موجودة ما كانت
المادة والصورة وجودها لا لتوجد بها المادة بل
ليحصل الجوهر المتجسّم جوهرًا بالفعل فان
كل نوع انما يحصل موجودا بالفعل وبأكمل
وجودية اذا حصلت صورته وما دامت مادته
موجودة دون صورته فانه انما هو ذلك النوع
بالقوة - (5)

IBN - SINA

(أ) و نقول ان تلك المادة ايضا
لا يجوز ان تفارق الصورة الجسمية و تقوم
موجودة بالفعل لانها ان فارقت الصورة الجسمية
فلا يخلوا إما ان يكون لها وضع و حيز في الوجود
الذى لها حينئذ او لا يكون فان كان لها وضع و
حيز و كان يمكن ان تنقسم فهي لامحالة ذات
مقدار و قد فرضت لامقدار لها هذا خلف و
ان لم يمكن ان تنقسم و لها وضع فهي لامحالة
نقطة و يمكن ان ينتهي اليها خط و لا يمكن ان

تكون منفردة الذات منحايتها لان خطأ اذا انتهى اليها لاقاها بنقطة أخرى غيرها ثم ان لاقاها خط اخر لاقاها بنقطة أخرى غيرها - (6)

(ii) فاذا الصورة الجسمية بما هي

الصورة الجسمية لا تختلف فلا يجوز ان يكون بعضها قائما في المادة و بعضها غير قائم فيها فانه من المحال ان تكون طبيعة لا اختلاف فيها من جهة ما هي تلك الطبيعة و يعرض لها اختلاف في نفس وجودها لان كونها ذلك الواحد متفق و ايضا فان وجودها ذلك الواحد لا يخلو إما ان يكون قائما في مادة او غير قائم في مادة او بعضه قائما فيها و بعضه غير قائم و محال ان يكون بعضه قائما فيها و بعضه ليس لان الاعتبار انما تناول ذلك الوجود من حيث هو واحد غير مختلف فبقي ان يكون ذلك الواحد إما كله غير قائم فيها او كله قائم فيها و لكن ليس كله غير قائم فيها فبقي ان يكون كله قائما فيها - (7)

6. IS. Naj. ... 203

7. Ibid ... 203

AL - GHAZĀLĪ

3. SECOND PROOF.

الدليل الثاني : ان الهيولى اذا

فرضت مجردة عن الصورة ، فلا تخلو ؛

إما ان تنقسم - أو لا تنقسم - فان

كانت تنقسم فاذن فيها الصورة الجسمية - وان

كانت لا تنقسم فلا تخلو ؛

إما ان تكون نبوتها عن قبول

القسمة ، طبعا لها ذاتيا ، او عارضا بخربيا

ينافيه - فان كان ذاتيا استحال ان تقبل

الانقسام ، كما يستحيل ان ينقلب العرض

جسما ، والعقل جسما -

وان كان ذلك عارضا بخربيا فيها

فاذن فيها صورة ، وليست خالية عن الصورة ، و

لكن تلك الصورة مضادة للصورة الجسمية - (8)

AL - FARĀBĪ.

و قال - قالوا ان الهيولى من حيث
هي هيولى شئ و من حيث هي مستعدة شئ
فالا استعداد صورتها - و ليس كذلك فان الاستعداد
هو نفس الهيولى و هذا التحديد وهو انه امر
مستعد لاكثرها - (٩)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(١٠) هذا الحامل انما له الوضع من
قَبْد اقتران الصورة الجسمية به. و لو كان له في حد
ذاته وضع :
وهو منقسم؟ كان في حد ذاته ذا
حجم - او غير منقسم؟ كان في حد نفسه 'مقطع
منتهى اشارة : نقطة' ان لم ينقسم البتة - او
خطا' او سطحا؟ ان انقسم في غير جهة
الاشارة - (١٥)

(١١) و كيف تكون ذات لا جزء لها
بالقوة ولا بالفعل تقبل الكم و تساويه فبين ان
المادة لا تبقى مفارقة بل وجودها وجود قابل
لا غير كما ان وجود العرض وجود مقبول لا
غير - و ايضا فانها لا تخلو إما ان يكون وجودها
وجود قابل فتكون دائما قابلة للشئ و إما ان
يكون لها وجود خاص متقوم - ثم تقبل فتكون
بوجودها الخاص المتقوم غير ذات كمي و قد
قامت غير ذات كمي فيكون المقدار الجسماني
عرض لها و صير ذاتها بحيث لها بالقوة اجزاء
و قد تقومت جوهر في نفسها غير ذي جزء
باعتبار نفسها البتة لعدمها الاستداد في حد
نفسها فيكون ما هو متقوم بانه لا جزء له
يعرض له ان يبطل عنه ما يتقوم به بالفعل
لورود عارض عليه فتكون حينئذ للمادة منفردة
صورة غير عارضة بها تكون واحدة بالقوة و الفعل
و صورة اخرى عارضة بها تكون غير واحدة بالفعل
فيكون بين الامرين شئ مشترك هو قابل للامرين
من شأنه ان يصير مرة ليس في قوته ان ينقسم

ومرة في قوته ان ينقسم اعنى القوة القريبة
التي لا واسطة لها - (11)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

4. CONCLUSION OF THE INSEPARABLE RELATION BETWEEN
MATTER AND FORM.

فلاح ان الهيولى لا توجد دون
الصورة - وان الصورة الجسمية و الهيولى ايضا
لا يوجدان دون ان يضاف اليهما الفصل المتمم
لنوع ذلك الجسمي؛ لان كل جسم اذا خلى وطبعه
طلب موضعا يستقر فيه، و ليس ذلك له لكونه
جسما، بل لزائد :

و كل جسم فإما ان يكون :
سريع الانفصال او عسرة او ممتنعه - وكل ذلك
ليس بمحض الجسمية، بل لزائد عليه - فاذن
لا بد من الزائد ايضا حتى يتم الوجود - (12)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(i) فاحدِس من هذا ؛ ان الهيولى لا

تتجرد عن الصورة الجسمية - (13)

(ii) و الهيولى قد لا تخلو ايضا

عن صور اخرى - وكيف !!! ولا بد من ان تكون :

إما مع صورة توجب قبول الانفكاك و الالتئام
و التشكل ، بسهولة - او بعسر - او مع صورة

توجب امتناع قبول تلك - (14)

(iii) و ايضا فان كل جسم يختص لا

محالة بحيز من الاحياز ، و ليس له الحيز الخاص
به بما هو جسم ، و الا لكان كل جسم كذلك ، فهو

اذن لا محالة مختص به بصورة ما في ذاته ، و

هذا بين - فانه إما ان يكون خيّر قابل للتشكيلات

و التفصيلات فيكون بصورة ما صار كذلك لانه

بما هو جسم قابل له، و إما ان يكون قابلا لها
بسهولة او بعسر - وكيف ما كان، فهو على
احدى الصور المذكورة في الطبيعيات - فاذن
المادة الجسمية لا توجد مفارقة للصورة -
فالمادة اذن انما تتقوم بالفعل بالصورة،
فاذن المادة اذا جردت في التوهم، فقد فعل
بها ما لا يثبت معه في الوجود - (15)

3. COMPARATIVE STUDY.

1. INSEPARABLE RELATION BETWEEN MATTER AND FORM.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that subsistence of form is with matter and matter is a substratum for the support of forms. But forms have no subsistence by themselves, rather for their existence, they require to be in a substratum, while their substratum is matter. That is why, existence of matter is for the sake of forms. In this connection Dr. F. Dieterici says:

"Der Stoff ist die letzte und geringste aller Wesenheiten. Hätte derselbe nicht die Annahmefähigkeit zur Form, so hätte derselbe keine actuelle Existenz. Er war also potentiell nichtseiend. Dann aber nahm der Stoff die Form an und wurde Substanz, diese nahm dann Hitze, Kälte, Trockniss und Feuchtigkeit an, und ward zu Elementen. Dann erzeugten sich aus diesen letzteren die verschiedenen Producte und Zusammensetzungen." (1)

1. Diet. Abh. (Text) ... 162

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī and asserts that corporeal matter (al-mādda al-jusmāniyya) actually subsists with the existence of form. On the other hand, material form (aṣ-ṣūra al-mādiyya) cannot be separate from matter. Thus Dr. D. Saliba remarks:

"La matière n'existe que par la forme, elle ne peut pas en être séparée ni exister en même temps en soi et en acte, car c'est la forme qui actualise la matière." (2)

Al-Ghazālī states that matter has actually no existence apart from form, rather its existence is always with form. Similarly, form cannot subsist by itself without matter.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that the relation between form and matter is inseparable and one cannot exist without the other. Al-Fārābī further asserts that form can only subsist with matter, and this

2. Saliba, Étude ... 68

matter, on the other hand, may be called a substratum for the support of form. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this.

2. FIRST PROOF : MATTER IS NOT DEVOID OF FORM.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that matter is a substratum for the subsistence of form; and form, on the other hand, cannot in fact subsist or exist without matter. Because, existence of matter manifests itself through form; that is to say, unless form is existent, matter cannot exist. Al-Fārābī further asserts that the existence of form is not for the purpose of producing matter, but for the sake of actually deriving corporeal reality. Thus each kind can be actually existent and perfect if its form is attained. Furthermore, matter cannot continue to be apart from form.

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. According to him, matter can not be separate from corporeal form, nor can it

actually subsist alone. If it is separate from corporeal form, then one of two things may be true. Either it has a position (wad^c) and place (ḥayyiz) for its existence, or it has neither of these. If it has a position and place and can be divided, then it undoubtedly involves a quantity, while to postulate that it has no quantity is self-contradictory. If it is not divided and has a position, then it is a point (nugṭa) to which a line may be drawn. It cannot be an isolated essence, because when a line is drawn to it, it meets another point besides it. Then if it meets another line it meets another point besides it.

Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that corporeal form does not differ in itself. Thus it cannot be held that some of it should subsist in matter and some of it should not. For it cannot have such a nature in which there is no difference and at the same time a difference should appear in its very existence. Since its existence is one, there are three possibilities: (a) it subsists in matter, or (b) it does not subsist so, or (c) some of it subsists in it and some of it does not. But it is inconceivable that some of it should subsist in it and some of it should not. Because

existence in so far as it is. one cannot be different in itself. Therefore, there are only two possibilities: either one is wholly not subsistent, or wholly subsistent in it. Since the whole of it is not not-subsistent there, it follows that the whole of it subsists there.

Al-Ghazālī lists two ways of proof for the inseparable relation between form and matter. If matter exists without form, there are two possibilities: either matter and its direction would be perceptibly indicated by hand, or it would not be so. If it were indicated perceptibly, it would have two directions. What meets from one direction is different from another. As a result it would be subject to division; and thus it would involve corporeal form, while the possession of corporeal form and its reality simply point out admissibility of division.

On the other hand, if matter is not capable of being indicated, that also involves an absurdity. For whenever matter occurs in a form, it may be in every place, or it may not be anywhere at all or it may be in one place and not in another. Strictly speaking, each of the three

divisions becomes invalid and what is attributed to them is untenable. It is self-evident that we may not validly speak of its being in every place or in no place; but as for the invalidity of speaking of its being specifically in one place and not in another, the corporeal form, in so far as it is corporeal, does not require any definite place; rather all places in this respect are one. Hence specification to one place is made by something which is additional to corporeality.

Here al-Ghazālī's account indirectly corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that matter cannot manifest itself without form. Moreover, Ibn-Sīnā asserts that if matter is separate from corporeal form, then it would have a position and place or it would have nothing of this kind. In either of the cases matter can only be conceivable in and through form. Furthermore, Ibn-Sīnā points out how matter is inseparably connected with form at the time of division and otherwise. He also demonstrates how corporeal form cannot differ in itself. However, it appears that al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā in an indirect way. Moreover, his

account is seen to be a systematic rearrangement.

3. SECOND PROOF.

Al-Farābī refers to a view concerning matter and form. According to this view, matter in itself is one thing and in so far as it is prepared, it is another thing. Preparation [appears in] its form. But it is not in fact like this; for preparation is [involved in] matter.

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. According to him, matter can be viewed in terms of position which is connected with corporeal form. If it had position in its essence, it would either be divisible in which case it would have a body; or it would not be divisible, and as such it would be a point or a line or a surface.

Ibn-Sīnā further explains how an essence that has no part either potentially or actually can accept quantity and becomes equal to it by making it manifest that matter does not exist as a separate entity. But on the other hand, the existence of matter is only receptive and nothing else, just

an existence which is
as, the existence of accident is, ~~received~~ and nothing
else. Furthermore, it can only be that its existence is
either receptive, thus making it always receptive of a
thing, or else it has a special subsistent existence - then
it receives, thus becoming, by virtue of its special
subsistence existent with no quantity, while it subsisted
as having no quantity. Thus corporeal measure (miqdār)
becomes an accident to it in such a way that it has
potentially several parts. It subsists as a reality in
itself which has no parts in view of its lack of extension
in itself. Thus it comes about that what has subsisted as
having no part is subjected to the accident of that which
nullifies the quality by which it actually subsists due to
the occurrence of an accident in it. Accordingly, matter by
itself has a form which is not accidental to it, but which is
one potentially and actually; and it has another form which
is accidental to it and which is not actually one. Thus
between the two things arises common thing which is
receptive to both, and is capable of becoming, at one time
incapable of dividing and at another capable of dividing,
meaning the near power which has no mediator.

Al-Ghazālī states that whenever matter is postulated to be free from form, it would be either divisible or not divisible. If it is divisible, it must have corporeal form. If it is not divisible, one of two things may be the case: either its opposition to accepting division implies a nature essential to it, or it is accidental, external and inconsistent with it. If it is essential, it would be impossible for the accident and intelligence to become a body. If the opposition to division is accidental and external, it must have a form and can never be devoid of it. But that form appears to be contrary to corporeal form.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. The views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā are on dissimilar lines. Al-Fārābī makes the distinction that matter in itself is different from that of its prepared state; whereas Ibn-Sīnā asserts that matter is inseparably connected with corporeal form. It has position and place, and as such it implies quantity and division. Moreover, he

argues that existence of matter is always receptive and is connected with corporeal reality. Matter manifests itself through form which is not accidental to it. Al-Ghazālī's account indirectly corresponds to this, and and it appears to me that he systematizes the views without distorting the basic concept put forward by Ibn-Sīnā.

4. CONCLUSION ON THE INSEPARABLE RELATION BETWEEN MATTER AND FORM.

Three references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. According to him, matter can not be without form. It would either be with a form which involves acceptance of separation, association and formation, easily or with difficulty; or it would be with a form which makes it impossible to accept them.

In concluding the subject of the inseparable relation between matter and form Ibn-Sīnā asserts that

each body must have a specific place, but it does not have a place which is specially applicable to it on account of its being a body, otherwise each body would be like this one. It must therefore be specific to it because of some form in its essence. However, a body is either not receptive of formations and particularization in which case it becomes so on account of its association with a form, because as a body it is receptive of form; or it is receptive of form whether easily or with difficulty. Whatever the case maybe it must be in one of these forms.

Therefore, corporeal reality cannot be separate from form, that is to say, matter actually subsists with form.

Al-Ghazālī concludes this chapter by stating that matter cannot be found without form. On the otherhand, corporeal form and matter cannot exist unless a complete ~~differentia~~ is attributed to them for a particular kind of that body. For everybody if left to its nature, seeks for

a place to settle there. It involves that, not because of its being a body, but because of something further to this.

Each body is capable of being disjoined, which may be easy or difficult or impossible. Each of them is not with pure corporeality, but it is on account of something additional to it. So the additional thing which is indispensable also completes the existence.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā asserts that matter cannot be isolated from corporeal form. Along with form it necessitates the acceptance of association and dissociation either easily or with difficulty. Furthermore, he advocates that a body must have a specific place for its manifestation and must receive form easily or with difficulty. Al-Ghazālī's account indirectly corresponds to this. Moreover, his account appears to be a systematic arrangement of the detailed views advocated by Ibn-Sīnā.

4. RESULT.

Al-Ghazālī's accounts correspond to those of Ibn-Sīnā in points 2, 3 and 4; and his account corresponds to that of al-Fārābī in point 1.

Al-Ghazālī's accounts correspond to Ibn-Sīnā's Physics in points 3(i) and 4(i) & (ii).

It has been observed that al-Ghazālī's accounts indirectly correspond to all points in those of Ibn-Sīnā.

CHAPTER FIVE

DOCTRINE OF ACCIDENTS.

1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION:

In this chapter al-Ghazālī gives an account of the doctrine of accidents, and starts at the very outset by dividing accidents into two groups, one requiring nothing external in its essence, and the other requiring it.

The first group includes both quality and quantity. The former neither needs anything external for the manifestation of its essence nor can it be divided; while the latter implies mensuration in determining the reality of a thing. The second group which involves the necessity of something outside the essence of a thing for the completion of its nature consists of seven categories, viz. relation, place, time, position, possession, action and passion.

Each of these categories necessarily involves an external thing in view of its finding expression there; as such apart from this prerequisite it can never manifest itself nor can it be identified.

Al-Ghazālī briefly states the nature of both groups of accidents and methodically discusses their roles with examples without going into much detail.

My investigation chiefly concerns the collection of materials in respect to (a) al-Ghazālī's first group, viz. quality and quantity, and (b) his second group, viz. the seven categories, as taken from his account in Maqāsid.

2. ANALOGOUS VIEWS.

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

I. QUANTITY.

أما الكمية : فهي العرض الذي
يلحق الجوهر بسبب التقدير والزيادة و
النقصان والمساواة مثل : الطول و العرض ، و
العمق ، و الزمان - (1)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و الكم هو كل شئ يمكن ان
يقدر جميعه بجزء منه مثل العدد و
الخط و البسيط و المصمت و مثل الزمان
و مثل الالفاظ و الاقاويل - فانه ان أخذ اى
عدد اتفق وجد له جزء يقدر او ما هو مساو
لجزء منه ، مثل الخمسة ، فان الواحد

يقدرّون خمس مرات ' و مثل العشرة ' فان
الاثنين يقدرّون خمس مرات - (2)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

ومنها (الكبر) وهو الشيء
الذي يقبل لذاته المساواة والامساواة
والتجزى - (3)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

2. QUALITY.

الكيفية ' وهي التي لا يجوز
تصورها الى الالتفات الى امر خارج ' ولا يقع
بسببها قسمة للجواهر -

و مثالها من المحسوسات
المدركات بالحس : كاللون والطعم

2. Dunlop, "Categories" ... I7I

3. IS., Naj. 80

و الروائح و الخشونة و الملاسة ، و اللين ،
و الصلابة ، والرطوبة و اليبوسة ، و الحرارة ،
و البرودة -

ومن غير المحسوسات : ما
هو استعداد لكمال ، او نقيضه ، كقوة
المصارعة ، و المصاحبة ، و كالضعف و
المهراضية - و منها ما هو كمال ، كالعلم ،
و العقل - (4)

AL - FARĀBĪ.

الكيفية هي بالجملة الهيئات
التي بها يقال في الاشخاص كيف هي ، و هي التي
بها يجاب في المسئلة عن شخص شخص كيف
هو - و اشترط في رسمها قولنا في الاشخاص
ليفرق بينها و بين الفصول ، فالفصول كيفيات
ايضا اذ كانت هيئات بها يقال في الانواع
كيف هي - ...

والتي يقال بقوة طبيعية ولا
قوة طبيعية فان النوعان متضادة ، يدخل احد
الضدين منهما فيما يقال بقوة و الاخر فيما يقال
بلا قوة - و ذلك مثل الصلابة واللين ، فان
الصلابة تحت القوة الطبيعية و اللين تحت
ما هو لا قوة طبيعية - فما يقال بقوة طبيعية
هو الاستعدادات الطبيعية التي بها تفعل
الاجسام بسهولة و تنفعل بعسر ، وما يقال بلا
قوة طبيعية هو الاستعدادات الطبيعية التي
بها تفعل الاجسام بعسر و تنفعل بسهولة ، و
ذلك مثل الشدة و الضعف ، فان الشدة استعداد
طبيعي لان يفعل بسهولة و ينفعل بعسر ، و
الضعف استعداد طبيعي لان يفعل بعسر و
ينفعل بسهولة - ...

و الكيفية الانفعالية ضربان ،

ضرب في الجسم ، وهو المحسوسات ، مثل

الالوان و الطعوم و الروائح و الملموسات

كالحرارة و البرودة ، و ضرب في النفس ،

و هو عوارض النفس الطبيعية ' مثل الغضب
و الرحمة و الخوف و اثنباة ذلك - (5)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(وأما الكيف) فهو كل هيئة
قارة فى جسم لا ففجب اعتبار وجودها ففبه
نسبة للجسم الى خارج و لانسبة واقعة فى
اجزائه و لا لجمالته اعتبار ففكون به ذا جزء
مثل البفاض و السواد و هو اما ان ففكون مختصا
بالكم من جهة ما هو كم كالترفبع بالسطح و
الاستقامة بالخط و الفردفة بالعدد - و إما
ان لا ففكون مختصا به و ففغير المختص به
اما ان ففكون محسوسا ففنفعل عنه الحواس و
ففوجد بانفعاله الممنزجات فالراسخ منه مثل
صفرة الذهب و حلاوة العسل ففسمى كفففات
انفعالات و سرفع الزوال منه و ان كان كفففة
بالحقيقة فلا ففسمى كفففة بل انفعالات
لسرعة استبدالها مثل حمرة الخجل و صفرة

الوجل - ومنها ما لا تكون محسوسة - وهذا إما ان يكون استعدادات انما تتصور في النفس بالقياس الى كمالات فان كان استعدادا للمقاومة و اباء للانفعال سمي قوة طبيعية كالمصاحبة و الصلابة وان كان استعدادا لسرعة الاذعان و الانفعال سمي لا قوة طبيعية مثل المراضية واللين - و إما ان يكون في انفسها كمالات لا يتصور انها استعدادات لكمالات اخرى و يكون مع ذلك غير محسوسة بذاتها فما كان منها ثابتا سمي ملكة مثل العلم و الصحة و ما كان سريع الزوال سمي حالا مثل غضب الحليب و هرض المصباح - (6)

AL - GHAZALI.

3. RELATION.

فأما الاضافة : فهي حالة للجوهر تعرض بسبب كون غيره في مقابلته ،

كالابوة ، والبنوة ، والاخوة ، والصداقة ،
والمجاورة ، والموازاة ، وكونه على اليمين
والشمال - اذ الابوة ليست للاب ، الا من
حيث وجد الابن في مقابلته ، (7)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

والاضافة هي نسبة بين شئيين
بها بعينها يقال كل واحد منهما بالقياس الى الآخر -
وهذه النسبة تؤخذ للاول منهما فيقال بها
بالقياس الى الثاني ، و تؤخذ بعينها للثاني
فيقال بها بالقياس الى الاول - والشئان اللذان
يقال كل واحد منهما بالقياس الى الآخر لاجل هذه
النسبة ، وهما الموضوعان لها ، يسميان المضافين
والمتضائفين - ويستعمل عند قياس كل واحد
منهما الى الآخر احد حروف النسب ، مثل من
و الى ومع وما اشبهها ، وينبغي ان يكون لكل
واحد منهما اسم يدل عليه ، من جهة ما هو
مضاف الى قرينه بنوع ما من انواع الاضافة

مثل الاب والابن ، فان بينهما نسبة واحدة
يقال بها كل واحد منهما بالقياس الى الآخر ، فان
الاب اب الابن و الابن ابن الاب - و تلك النسبة
بعينها اذا اخذت صفة لاحدهما سميت
أَبُوَّةٌ ، و اذا اخذت صفة للآخر سميت بِنُوَّةٌ ،
و اسم احدهما من حيث يوصف بها اب ، و اسم
الآخر من حيث يوصف بها بعينها ابن ، و هما
اسمان متباينان ، و كذلك العبد و المولى - (8)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

و من المقولات العشر (الافافة)
و هو المعنى الذى وجوده بالقياس الى شئ اخر
و ليس له وجود غيره مثل الابوة بالقياس الى
البنوة لا كلاب فان له وجودا يخصه كالانسانية - (9)

8. Dunlop, " Categories " ... I79

9. IS. , Naj. 80

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

4. PLACE.

وأما الايين : فهو كون الشيء في
المكان مثل كونه فوق ، وتحت - (١٥)

AL + FĀRĀBĪ.

و ايين هو نسبة الجسم الى
مكانه ، و ليس هو بالمكان و لا تركيب الجسم
و المكان - و بالجملة هو الشيء الذي سبيله
ان يجاب به السؤال عن الشيء ايين هو
كقولنا في البيت ، فان الاين ليس هو البيت
لكن ما يفهم من قولنا في البيت ، فان حرف
في دال على النسبة الى البيت - وكل جسم
طبيعي فله نوع من انواع الاين ، من ذلك
الانس ، ثم باقى انواع الحيوان و انواع النبات
و الحجارة ، ثم اخر العالم - ...

وما هو اين باضافة فهو فوق
وتحت و اعلى و اسفل و يمينه و يسرة و
قدام و خلف و حول و وسط و فيما بين و ما
يلى و عند و مع و على و ما اشبه ذلك " الا
انه ليس للجسيم اين مضاف او يكون له
اين بذاته - (11)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

ومن جملة العشرة (الايين)
وهو كون الجوهر في مكانه الذي يكون فيه
ككون زيد في السوق - (12)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

5. TIME.

و أمامتي : فهو كون الشيء في

II. Dunlop, " Categories " ... 22

I2. IS. , Naj. ... 81

الزمان ككونه في الامس و عام اول و
اليوم - (13)

AL- FĀRĀBĪ.

و متى هو نسبة الشيء الى
الزمان المحدود الذي يساوق وجوده
وجوده ' و تنطبق نهايته على نهايته وجوده '
او زمان محدود يكون هذا جزءا منه - وليس
معنى متى هو الزمان ولا شيء مركب من
جوهر و زمان ' على ما ظنه قوم - ...

و الزمان المحدود هو
الذي حد بحسب بعده من الان ' إما في
الماضي وإما في المستقبل ' و ذلك إما بأسر
له مشهور يدل عليه من الان في الماضي و
المستقبل ' اما في الماضي فكقولنا امس و
اول من امس و عاما اول و اول من عام اول
و منذ سنة و منذ سنتين ' و اما في

المستقبل فكقولنا غدا او بعد غد و العام
المقبل و الى سنة و الى سنتين و اما بحادث
فيه معلوم البعد من الان ، كقولنا على عهد
هرقل الملك ، او في زمان الحرب الفلانية - (14)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(ومتى) وهو كون الجوهر
في زمانه الذي يكون فيه مثل كون هذا الامر
امس - (15)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

6. POSITION.

و اما الوضعية : فهو نسبة
اجزاء الجسم بعضها الى بعض ككونه جالسا
ومضطجعا ، وقائما اذ باختلاف وضع الساقين

14. Dunlop, " Categories " ... 21

15. IS., Naj. ... 81

من الفخذين يختلف القيام والقعود - (16)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

والوضع هو ان تكون اجزاء
الجسم المحدودة محاذية لاجزاء محدودة
من المكان الذى هو فيه، او منطبقة عليها،
و ذلك يوجد لكل جسم لان كل جسم فله
اين على وضع ما - و ذلك مثل ما للانسان، فان
له انواعا كثيرة من الوضع، كالقيام والقعود
والانتصاب والاضطجاع والانتكاع والانبطاح
والاستلقاء، فان اجزائه المحدودة مثل
الرأس والظهر والكتفين وسائر اجزائه
يكون كل واحد منها فى كل واحد من هذه
الاعراض محاذيا لجزء من المكان الذى فيه
او منطبقة عليه، فاذا تغير وضعه تصير تلك
الاجزاء باعيانها محاذية لاجزاء اخر من
اجزاء المكان - (17)

I6. Ghaz., Mag. ... I64

I7. Dunlop, "Categories"... 23

IBN - SĪNĀ.

روالوضع) وهو كون الجسم
بحيث تكون لاجزائه بعضها الى بعض نسبة
في الانحراف والموازاة بالقياس الى الجهات و
اجزاء المكان ان كان في مكان مثل القيام والقعود
وهو في المعنيين غير الوضع المذكور في باب
الكم - (١٨)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

7. POSSESSION.

وأما الجدة : وتسمى (الملك)
ايضا فهو كون الشيء بحيث يحيط به ما
ينتقل بانتقاله ، ككونه منطلسا ، ومنعهما
ومتقهما ، ومتعللا ، وكون الفرس ملجما
ومسرجا - (١٩)

I8. IS., Naj. ... 8I

I9. Ghaz., Mag..... I64

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و له هو نسبة الجسم الى
الجسم المنطبق عليه او على جزء منه ' اذا
كان المتطبق ينتقل بانتقال المحاط به '
مثل اللبس و الانتعال و التسليح ' فان اللبس
يدل على نسبة الجسم الى جسم اخر ينطبق
على سطحه ' اذا كان المحيط ينتقل بانتقال
المحاط به ' و الانتعال ايضا يدل على
تشبيه هذا المعنى ' غير انه في جزء من
الجسم ' وكذلك التسليح - (20)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(و الملك) و لست احصله
و يشبه ان يكون كون الجوهر في جوهر
اخر يشمل و ينتقل بانتقاله مثل التلبس
والتسليح - (21)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

8. ACTION.

وَأَمَّا ان يَفْعَلُ : فهو كون
الشيء فاعلاً في حال كونه مؤثراً في الغير بالفعل
ككون النار محرقة ، في وقت حصول الاحراق
بالفعل ، وكونها مسخنة - (22)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و اما ان يَفْعَلُ فهو ان ينتقل
الفاعل باتصال على النسب التي له الى اجزاء
ما يحدث في الشيء الذي ينفعل حين ما
ينفعل - فان الفاعل هو الذي عنه يحدث
في الجسم الذي ينفعل شيء بشيء و جزء
جزء على اتصال من الامر الذي اليه يصير
المنفعل - فالفاعل تسبته الى كل جزء حادث
غير تسبته الى الجزء الاخر ، اذ كان فاعلاً
لكل واحد من تلك الاجزاء ، فالفاعل ينتقل

على نسبة الى جزء جزء مما يحدث في
المنقول قليلا قليلا على مثال مسلك الجسم
الذي ينفعل على جزء جزء مما يحدث فيه -
مثال ذلك ان المتسخن في حين ما يتسخن
المتسخن ' له نسبة الى جزء جزء من
الحرارة التي تحدث فيما يتسخن ' فكما
ان المتسخن ينتقل من جزء من الحرارة الى
جزء اخر على اتصال ' كذلك المتسخن
ينتقل من نسبته الى الجزء الاول من
الحرارة الى نسبته الى الجزء الثاني ' فهو
ينتقل من نسبة الى نسبة على اتصال '
قد يكون انقطاع سلوكه على النسب التي
له الى اجزاء الحرارة مع انقطاع سلوك
المتسخن على اجزاء الحرارة - (23)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(و الفعل) و هو نسبة
الجوهر الى امر موجود منه غير قار الذات

بل لا يزال يتجدد و يتصرم كالتسخين
و التبريد - (24)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

9. PASSION.

و أما الانفعال : فما يقابله
و هو استمرار تأثير الشيء بغيره ، كتسخن
الماء ، وتبرده ؛ و تسوده و تبيضه ، و
التسخن غير السخونة ، و التهود غير
السواد ؛ فان السخونة و السواد من
الكيفية التي لا تحتاج في تصورهما الى
الانتقالات الى الغير -

وانما نعى بالانفعال ، التأثير
و التغيير و الانتقال من حال الى حال ، حيث
تتزايد السخونة ، او تنقص -

فان كان مستنقرا كان منكيفا

بالسخونة ، ولم يكن منفعلًا - (25)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

وان ينفعل هو مصير الجوهر
من شئ الى شئ وتغيره من امر الى امر وما
دام سالكا فيما بين الامرين على اتصال يقال
فيه انه ينفعل - وقد يكون ذلك من كيفية
الى كيفية مثل مصير الجسم من السواد الى
البياض ، وهو التبييض ، ومصيره من البرودة
الى الحرارة ، وهو التسخين ، فانه جنس ما
ينفعل ، فيخسر عنه ما كان فيه او لا قليلا
قليلا او شيئا شيئا على اتصال حتى الى ان
ينقطع سلوكه فيقف - فهو في كل وقت
حين ما ينفعل على جزء مما يحدث فيه
غير محصل ، و على جزء مما يخسر عنه
غير محصل - فان الذي يتسخن فهو عند
سلوكه الى الحرارة يحدث فيه اولا فاولا

على اتصال جزء جزء من اجزاء الحرارة ويخسر
عنه جزء جزء من اجزاء البرودة ، الا انه لا يمكن
ان يحصل ما دام لم ينفعل اى جزء حدث فيه من
الحرارة ، ولا كى مقدار ما حدث منها فيه ، و
لا اى جزء بطل من البرودة ولا كى مقداره ،
فانك كلما اردت به ان تحدث جزءا قد حدث
فيه من الحرارة او تحدث جزءا قد بطل من
البرودة او مقدارا منها ، تحدث قد زال عن
ذلك الجزء وعن ذلك المقدار ، الى ان
ينتهى الى اخر ما اليه بتلك فيقف - فحينئذ
يمكن ان تحدث اى جزء حدث و كى مقدار
ما حصل فيه - (26)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

لوالانفعال) وهو نسبة

الجوهري الى حالة فيه بهذه الصفة مثل

التقطع والتسخن - (27)

26. Dunlop, " Categories " ... 24

27. IS., Naj. ... 82

3. COMPARATIVE STUDY.

1. QUANTITY. (KAMMIYYA).

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'Quantity is everything of which the totality can be measured by a part of it, e.g. a number, a line, a surface, a solid, and time, and expressions and utterances. For if any number whatever be taken, it possesses a part which may be measured or the equivalent of a part, e.g. five, for they measure one five times, and ten, for they measure two five times.' (1)

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī and asserts that quantity is something which in its essence is capable of accepting equality, inequality and division.

Al-Ghazālī states that quantity is an accident which attaches to substance in respect to measurement (increase, decrease and equality, such as, length, width, depth and time).

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā.

1. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 186

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that quantity refers to certain measurement of things, and then he systematically arranges al-Fārābī's account by clearly pointing out that quantity indicates a certain amount of a thing in order to determine it. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this.

2. QUALITY. (KAYFIYYA).

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'Quality is in general the forms by which it is said of the individuals how they are. These are used in answer to the question concerning each separate individual, How is it? In describing them our saying 'of the individuals' is a necessary condition to distinguish between them and the differentiae, for the differentiae are also qualities, since they are forms by which it is said how the species are.

. . .

As for (the qualities) which denote natural power and the absence of natural power, their species are mutually opposing, one kind entering into what denotes power, and the other into what denotes the absence of power, e.g. hardness and softness, for hardness comes under natural power, and softness under its absence.

What denotes natural power are the natural dispositions by which bodies act with ease and are acted upon with difficulty, and what denotes absence of power are the natural dispositions by which bodies act with difficulty and are acted upon with ease, e.g. strength and weakness, for strength is a natural disposition to act with ease and be acted upon with difficulty, and weakness is a natural disposition to act with difficulty and be acted upon with ease.

. . .

The passive quality is of two kinds, one in the body, viz. the sense-perceptions, like colours, tastes, scents, and sensations of touch, like heat and cold, and another kind in the soul, viz. the passions or affections of the natural soul, such as anger, pity, fear and the like.' (2)

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. According to him, quality indicates every fixed form in a body, the mere existence of which does not necessitate any relationship of the body to the outside nor any actual relationship within its parts nor does its totality have an aspect by which it should consist of parts, such as whiteness and blackness.

It is either specific to the quantity in respect of its being a measurable thing like squareness of the surface, straightness of the line and oddness in number; or it is not specific to it in which case it would either be perceptible in such a manner that the senses are affected by it and mixtures are created as its effects. So the thing which is firmly established (such as yellowness of gold and sweetness of honey), is called a responsive quality, but that which quickly passes away even if it is really a quality, is not called a quality, rather it is called a response because of the quickness of the change (like the redness of blushing and yellowness of fear).

Or it is such that one of them is not perceptible. This would either consist of capacities which can however be imagined in mind with reference to entelechies. If it is a capacity for withstanding and resistance to response, it is called a natural power (as are the cases of healthiness and hardness.). If it is a capacity for quick surrender and for response, it is not called a natural power (as are sickness and softness). Or these could be entelechies in themselves, that is, they cannot be imagined as the capacities for other entelechies,

and despite that they are not perceptible in themselves by the senses. Now out of them whatever is established is called a [stable] disposition (such as knowledge and sound health); and whatever quickly passes away is called a [variable] state, (such as, the anger of a forbearing person and sickness of a healthy individual).

Al-Ghazālī states that quality is that which does not require "turning to an external thing". Moreover, nothing can be brought under division because of it. His examples, from things perceptible through the senses, are colours, tastes, odours, roughness, smoothness, softness, hardness, moisture, dryness, heat and cold.

And the things which are not perceptible through the senses are those which have a propensity for entelechy or its contrary (like the power of wrestling and sound health, and weakness and sickliness).

It is from these that is derived entelechy, such as knowledge and intelligence.

Here al-Ghazālī's account appears to correspond to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā's account is seen to be a re-arrangement of al-Fārābī's detailed views and as such is in basic agreement with al-Fārābī. However, al-Ghazālī's account appears indirectly to correspond to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Moreover, he divides the course of his discussion in two ways, one dealing with examples from things perceptible through the senses, and the other with things not perceptible through the senses. This methodical division of examples has no clear relationship to Ibn-Sīnā here, and as such, it would appear to be an "addition".

3. RELATION. (IDĀFA).

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'Relation is a connexion between two things by which in itself each of them is spoken of with reference to the other. This connexion is taken for the first of them and is spoken of with reference to the other. The same connexion is taken for the second, and is spoken of with reference to the first. The two things, each of which is spoken of with reference to the other on account of this connexion, they being its subjects, are named relatives and correlatives, and there is employed in referring each one of them to the other one

of the particles of connexion, such as *min* 'from', *ilā* 'to', *ma^ca* 'with', and the like. Each one of the two must have a name which indicates it qua related to its counterpart by one of the kinds of Relation, e.g. father and son, for there is between them a single connexion, by which each is spoken of with reference to the other, for the father is the father of the son, and the son is the son of the father. The identical connexion when taken as a description of one is called paternity, and when taken as a description of the other is called sonship. The name of one of them as described by it is father, and the name of the other as described by the same thing is son. They are opposite terms, and similarly servant and master.' (3)

Ibn-Sīnā basically agrees with al-Fārābī, and asserts that relation is one of the ten categories; and its existence arises in the comparison of one thing with another. Apart from this it cannot have any existence at all; just as fatherhood with reference to sonhood is not like the father. For the father has an existence which specifies him in the capacity of human being.

3. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 193.

Al-Ghazālī states that relation is a mode of substance which happens accidentally because of other elements being in its counterpart, (as in the cases of fatherhood, sonship, brotherhood, friendship, "neighbourship", parallelism and ~~its~~ "being on right and left"). Because fatherhood cannot be attributed to a father until ^{there is a son corresponding to him.} ~~sonship is found in its counterpart.~~

Here al-Ghazālī's account appears to correspond closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī on the one hand and summarises his detailed views on the other; and with this al-Ghazālī's account fully corresponds.

4. PLACE. (AYN).

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'Where? [Place] is the relation of the body to its place, but it is not place, nor the combination of body and place. In general, it is the thing which is such that it answers the question concerning where the thing is, as when we say 'In the house', for the Where? is not the house but what is understood from our saying 'In the house', the particle *fī* [= 'in'] pointing to the relation to the house.

Every natural body possesses one of the species of Where?, for instance, mankind, then the remaining species of animal, the species of plants and stones, then the rest of the world. ... and Where? relatively is 'above', 'below', 'higher', 'lower', 'right', 'left', 'infront', 'behind', 'round', 'in the middle', 'between', 'near', 'at', 'with', 'upon', and the like, except that a body does not have a relative Where? unless it has Where? essentially.' (4)

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that place is the existence of substance in a particular place where it manifests itself, (such as, Zaid is in the market).

Al-Ghazālī states that place is an existence of something in a particular place as is the case of its being above and below.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. The views of Ibn-Sīnā appear to be a summary of al-Fārābī's detailed account. So al-Ghazālī's brief account is found to be closer to that of Ibn-Sīnā. On the other hand, his example of

4. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 38.

'above and below' is in direct agreement with that of al-Fārābī.

5. TIME. (MATĀ)

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'When? [Time] is the relation of the thing to the definite time whose existence synchronizes with its existence and whose two limits coincide with the two limits of its existence, or a definite time of which this is a part. The meaning of When? is not time as such nor anything composed of substance and time, as some think. In ordinary use this expression is employed to ask concerning the definite time of a thing. The logicians make it a name pointing to a thing, such that it is used in answer to the question concerning when the thing was or will be. The definite time is that which is defined according to its remoteness from now, either in the past or in the future, and that either by its having a well-known name pointing to it in relation to now in the past and future, in the past as when we say 'yesterday', 'the day before yesterday', 'last year', 'the year before last', 'a year ago', 'two years ago', and in the future as when we say 'to-morrow' or 'the day after to-morrow', 'next-year', 'till this day year', 'till this day two years', or something occurring in it, the distance of which from now is known, as when we say 'in the time of King Heraclius' or

or 'during such and such a war'.' (5)

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī and asserts that time implies an occurrence of something at the particular time in which it is, (as is the occurrence of this thing yesterday).

Al-Ghazālī states that time is the occurrence of something at a particular time (as is the case of its occurring yesterday, last year, and to-day).

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā's account appears to be a summary of al-Fārābī's views, and as such al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully to this brief statement. On the other hand, his examples of last year and to-day are in direct agreement with those of al-Fārābī.

6. POSITION. (WAD^c)

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'Position is that the definite parts of the body match definite parts of the place in which it is or coincide with them. That applies to everybody,

5. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 37.

because everybody possesses a Where? according to a certain position. [Take,] for example, the case of man. He has many kinds of Position, such as standing, sitting, rising up, lying on his side, leaning back, lying prone and supine. His definite parts, such as his head, back, shoulders, &c. are each of them in each of these positions matching a part of the place in which he is or coincident with it, and when his position alters, those same parts come to match other parts of the place.' (6)

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī and asserts that position implies the existence of a body in such a way that any relationship of its parts with each other is concerned with inclination and parallelism in comparison with the dimension and parts of any place whatever, (such as, standing and sitting).

Al-Ghazālī states that position indicates a relationship of the parts of a body with each other (like its being in the state of sitting, lying, and standing; for with a difference of position of two things ^{with regard to two (lower)} ~~at~~ legs the state of standing ^{differs from that of} sitting.)

~~Al-Ghazālī states that position indicates a relationship of the parts of a body with each other (like its being in the state of sitting, lying, and standing; for with a difference of position of two things at legs the state of standing differs from that of sitting.)~~

6. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 39.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā's account appears to be a summary of al-Fārābī's views, and with this al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully. But his examples are found to be in direct agreement with those of al-Fārābī.

7. POSSESSION. (MILK).

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'State is the relation of a body to the body which coincides with it or with part of it, when that which coincides is transferred by the transference of that which is included by it, e.g. being clothed, wearing sandals and being armed, for being clothed points to the relation of the body to another body which coincides with its surface, when that which includes is transferred by the transference of that which is included by it. Wearing sandals also points to a similar meaning, except that it applies to a part of the body, and similarly being armed.' (7)

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī and asserts that possession (or property) implies the existence of one substance which includes another and moves with its transfer, (such as clothing and armament).

Al-Ghazālī states that possession implies the existence of something in such a way that it is surrounded by what moves in its transfer, (as are the cases of being ~~hooded~~, turbaned, clothed with a shirt, furnished with shoes, ^{or of a} horse ^{being} bridled and saddled).

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that possession implies the existence of one reality including another and coinciding with it. Moreover, it moves with its transference. Ibn-Sīnā systematically arranges al-Fārābī's views in his brief statement. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this. On the other hand, his examples of 'Ka-Kawni-hi mutataḥḥiṣṣan, wa muta^cammiman, wa mutaḥammisan, wa mutana^cilan, wa kawn al-faras muljaman wa musrajan' appear to be "additions".

8. ACTION. (FI^cL).

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'Action is that the agent should be transferred continually over the relations which it has with the parts of what is coming into existence in the thing which is acted upon, when it is acted upon. For the agent is that from which came into existence one after another continually, in the body which is acted upon, the several parts

of that towards which tends what is acted upon. Thus the relation of the agent to every part coming into existence is different from its relation to the other part, since it is agent for every one of those parts, and the agent is transferred over its relation to the several parts of what is coming into existence in what is transferred, gradually, like the course of the body which is acted upon over the several parts of what is coming into existence in it. For example, that which warms, during the time when it warms that which is being warmed, has a relation to the several parts of the heat which is coming into existence in what is being warmed, and just as that which is being warmed is transferred continually from one part of the heat to another, so that which warms is transferred from its relation to the first part of the heat to its relation to the second part. It is thus transferred from relation to relation continually, [and] sometimes the cessation of its course over the relations which it has with the parts of the heat coincides with the cessation of the course of what is being warmed over the parts of the heat.' (8)

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī and asserts that action is the relation of substance to a thing existent out of it whose essence is not permanent, rather it is continually renewed and interrupted, (e.g. heating and cooling).

8. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 42.

Al-Ghazālī states that action implies the existence of something as active while its existence actually affects other things, (e.g. occurrence of fire in the state of burning at the time of getting combustion and being heated).

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that action indicates the relationship of something with that which is acted upon. Al-Fārābī further asserts that action implies that the active element is continually transferred in the relationship, for things come into existence one after another through the active element and its relationship to every part coming into existence is different. Hence, al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this.

9. PASSION. (INFI^CAL).

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'Passion is the transition of the substance from one thing to another and its change from something to something else. What continues to move between the two things without interruption is said to be in this Category. [The movement] is sometimes from quality to quality, as the transition of the body from blackness to whiteness, i.e. the

whitening process, and its passage from cold to heat, i.e. the warming process, which is a kind of Passion. There is lost from it gradually or piecemeal without interruption what was in it at first, till its movement ceases and it stops. All the time when it is acted upon, it is made up of indeterminate parts of what is coming into existence in it and what is being lost from it. For in the movement towards heat of something being warmed there come into existence in it imperceptibly without interruption successive parts of heat, and there are lost from it successive parts of cold, but it is not possible to determine, as long as the process is not complete, what part of heat has come into existence in it nor what amount of it, nor what part of cold has been lost nor what amount. For whenever you wish to define a part of heat which has come into existence in it or to define a part of cold which has been lost or an amount of it, you find that it has passed from that part and from that amount, till it reaches the last stage and stops. Then it is impossible to define what part has come into existence, and what is the amount of what has accrued in it.' (9)

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī and asserts that passion is the relation of a substance to an inherent disposition of this quality, (e.g. being interrupted and becoming hot ;).

Al-Ghazālī states that passion is opposite to action. It represents continuity in being affected by something other than itself, (e.g. ~~heating~~ the water's ~~and its~~ becoming^{hot or} cold, or black,^{or} white - ~~while heating~~ ^{becoming hot} is not heat and ~~making~~ ^{becoming} black is not blackness, for heat and blackness are ~~not~~ qualities which do ~~not~~ require "turning to other things").

However, passion implies sensitivity, change, transformation from one state to another where heat increases and decreases. If it continues, it becomes qualitative with the heat, and it can no longer be affected.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that passion is the relation of a substance to a disposition for being affected. Moreover, al-Fārābī asserts that "What continues to move between two things without interruption is said to be in this Category. [The movement] is sometimes from quality to quality, as the transition of the body from blackness to whiteness, i.e. the whitening process, and its passage from cold to heat i.e. the warming process which is a kind of passion ..." Al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this.

4. RESULT.

Al-Ghazālī's accounts correspond to those of al-Fārābī in points 8 and 9, and to those of Ibn-Sīnā in points 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Moreover, his examples are found to be in direct agreement with al-Fārābī in points 4, 5, and 6.

On the other hand, certain "additions" have been observed in al-Ghazālī's points 2 and 7.

CHAPTER SIX

GOD.

1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION.

In this chapter al-Ghazālī discusses the problem of God. He begins this discussion by dividing existence into two kinds. One is what is dependent upon another thing for its existence. The other is what is not so dependent; rather it forms an absolute which requires nothing for the completion of its nature and is necessary by its essence alone. The latter kind belongs to the Essence of God whose nature is analyzed and described by the following twelve characteristics:-

(i) God cannot be an accident, for the accident is dependent upon body on the one hand and is contingent on the other.

(ii) He cannot be a body, for the body is quantitatively divisible into parts, and is composed of matter and form.

(iii) He is not like any form of a particular thing connected with matter. Similarly, He is not like matter which is the place of form.

(iv) His Being is not other than His quiddity, and His identity and quiddity form a unity.

(v) He is not dependent upon another thing in the same manner as that thing is dependent upon Him; that is, the existence of each of them being the cause of the other.

(vi) He is not related to any other thing as that other is related to Him by way of reciprocity.

(vii) There cannot be two things each of which is equally necessary and independent by itself without any dependence on the other.

(viii) There is no attribute which can augment His Essence.

(ix) His nature is unchangeable, for any change consists in the coming-into-being of a new quality.

(x) Nothing can proceed unmediated from Him

except one thing, and multiplicity results successively.

(xi) As He is not called an accident, He is not called a substance either even though He subsists with Himself apart from any place.

(xii) All that is other than He emanates from Him in proper succession. He is only one and He is not more than one, for whatever can be enumerated is simply contingent.

All contingent beings require causes which necessarily ascend to Him who is the single and pure Being. He is the source of existence for all things and His Being is the most perfect one. His relation to the world is similar to that of the sun which shines upon all bodies and spreads its beams over them out of its essence and not from any other thing.

My investigation in this chapter is concerned with the materials of the above twelve points.

2. ANALOGOUS VIEWS.

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

I. GOD IS NOT AN ACCIDENT.

الاول: انه لا يكون عرضا؛

لانه يتعلق بالجسم، ويلزم عدمه بعدم
الجسم. ونحن عبرنا بواجب الوجود عما لا
علاقته له مع غيره البتة -

فالعرض ممكن، وكل ممكن
موجود بغيره - و ذلك الغير علتة، فيكون
معلولا، لا محالة - (ا)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و كذلك عظمته وجلاله و
مجده وان العظمة والجلالة و المجد في الشيء

انما يكون بحسب كماله اما في جوهره و اما
في عرض من خواصه و اكثر ما يقال ذلك فينا انما
هو لكمال ما لنا في عرض من اعراضنا مثل اليسار
والعلم و في شيء من اعراض البدن و الاول لما
كان كماله باينا لكل كمال كانت عظمته و
جلاله و مجده باينا لكل ذي عظمة و مجد و
كانت عظمته و مجده الغايات فيما له من
جوهره لا في شيء اخر خارج عن جوهره و ذاته
و يكون ذا عظمة في ذاته و ذا مجد في ذاته
اجله غيره او لم يجله عظمه غيره او لم
يعظمه مجده غيره ام لم يمجده ، و الجمال و
البهاء و الزينة في كل موجود هو ان يوجد وجوده
الافضل و يحصل له كماله الاخير و اذ كان الاول
وجوده افضل الوجود فجماله فائت لجمال كل
ذي الجمال و كذلك زينته و بهاؤه - (2)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(1) اعلم ان الموجود اما ان يكون

له سبب في وجوده او لا سبب له فان كان له سبب فهو الممكن سواء كان قبل الوجود اذا فرضناه في الذهن او في حالة الوجود لان ما يمكن وجوده فدخوله في الوجود لا يزيل عنه امكان الوجود وان لم يكن له سبب في وجوده بوجه من الوجوه فهو واجب الوجود فاذا تحققت هذه القاعدة فالدليل على ان في الوجود موجود الا سبب له في وجوده ما اقله -

فهذا الوجود اما ممكن الوجود او واجب الوجود فان كان واجب الوجود فقد ثبت ما طلبناه وان كان ممكن الوجود فممكن الوجود لا يدخل في الوجود الا بسبب يرجح وجوده على عدمه فان كان سببه ايضا ممكن الوجود فهكذا تتعلق الممكنات بعضها ببعض فلا يكون موجود البتة لان هذا الوجود الذي فرضناه لا يدخل في الوجود ما لم يسبقه وجوده ما لا يتناهي وهو محال فاذا الممكنات تنتهي بواجب الوجود - (3)

(ii) و بيان انه ليس بعرض ان
العرض هو الوجود في الموضوع فيكون
الموضوع مقدما عليه ولا يمكن وجوده دون
الموضوع وقد ذكرنا ان واجب الوجود لا سبب
له في وجوده - (4)

(iii) و بيان انه لا يجوز ان يكون
واجب الوجود من وجه ممكن الوجود من وجه
انه من الوجه الذي هو ممكن الوجود يكون
متعلق الوجود بالغير و يكون له سبب و من
الوجه الذي هو واجب الوجود يكون منقطع
العلائق فيكون الوجود له و لا يكون له و
هذا محال - (5)

4. IS., Arsh. ... 4

5. Ibid ... 5

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

2. HE IS NOT A BODY.

الثاني : انه لا يكون جسما ' من

وجهين -

احدهما ان كل جسم منقسم
بالكمية الى اجزاء فتكون الجملة متعلقة
بالاجزاء ، فلو قدر عدم الاجزاء ، لزم عدمه ،
كالانسان الذي يلزم عدمه ، بتقدير عدم
اجزائه -

و قد ذكرنا ان كل جملة فهي
معلقة بالاجزاء ؛ فلهذا لا يجوز ان يكون
واجب الوجود مركبا من اجزاء -

فانه اذا قيل لنا : لم كان الحبر
موجودا ؟ قلنا : لانه كان الماء والعفص ، والزاج ،
والاجتماع ، فحصل من المجموع الحبر - فهذه
الاجزاء علة الجملة ، وهكذا اجزاء كل مركب
علة للمركب -

والآخر: ان الجسيمي قد ثبت
انه مركب من الصورة والهيولي، فلو قدر عدم
الهيولي انعدم الجسيمي، ولو قدر عدم الصورة
انعدم -

و نحن عبرناه بواجب الوجود
و نعني بواجب الوجود ما لا يلزم عدمه بعدم
غير ذاته - وانما يلزم عدمه، اذا قدر عدم
ذاته فقط - (6)

AL - FARĀBĪ.

(أ) و لاما هية له مثل الجسيمي اذا
قلت انه موجود فكذلك الموجود شيء و حد الجسيمي
شيء سوى انه واجب الوجود و هذا وجوده - (7)

(ii) ... ولا يجوز ان يكون جسما و
سطحا و خطا و نقطة لان الجسيمي مركب من المادة
و الصورة فالمادة و الصورة علتان للجسيمي و قيام

6. Ghaz., Mag. ... 210

7. Diet., Abh.(Text) ... 57

السطح و الخط و النقطة بالجسمي و قوام الجسمي
بالمادة و الصورة و كل ذلك ينافي وجوب الوجود
بذاته فهو واحد من جميع الوجوه و قد عقل
ذاته بل عقل ذاته هو بذاته لا بشيء آخر
سوى ذاته يكون ذلك الشيء سببا في تعقله
ذاته بل عقل ذاته بذاته و كان من حيث انه
عقل عاقلا و من حيث انه معقول ذاته معقولا
و من حيث انه عقل ذاته بذاته لا بشيء آخر
خارج و مباين عقلا - (8)

(iii) و انه واحد بمعنى انه غير
منقسي انقسام الاعظام و سائر الكميات فيلزم
ان يكون لا كمية له و ان يكون لا اين له و لا
متى و انه ليس بجسمي و انه واحد بمعنى ان
وجوده الذي هو في ذاته وجود ليس هو غير
وجوده الذي به ينحاز عن الموجودات الاخرى و
انه لا ضد له و انه خير محض و هذه الثلاثة فيه
بمعنى واحد - (9)

8. Far., Zinūn ... 5

9. Far., Da'awī ... 3

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(أ) قد صح لنا فيما قدمناه من القول ان الواجب الوجود بذاته واحد ، وانه ليس بجسمي ولا في جسمي ولا منقسم بوجه من الوجوه ، فاذن الموجودات كلها وجودها عنه ، ولا يجوز ان يكون له مهذاً بوجه من الوجوه ولا سبب له الذي عنه ، ولا الذي فيه او به يكون ، ولا الذي له ، حتى يكون لاجل شيء - (١٥)

(ب) و نقول ايضاً ان واجب الوجود لا يجوز ان يكون لذاته مبادئ تجتمع فيقوم منها واجب الوجود لا اجزاء الكمية ولا اجزاء الحد والقول سواء كانت كالمادة والصورة او كانت على وجه اخر بان تكون اجزاء القول الشارح لمعنى اسمه فيدل كل واحد منها على شيء هو في الوجود غير الاخر بذاته - و ذلك لان كل ما هذا صفته فذات كل جزء منه ليس هو ذات الاخر ولا ذات المجتمع فاما ان يصح لكل واحد

من جزئية مثلا وجود منفرد لكنه لا يصح
للمجتمع وجود دونها فلا يكون المجتمع
واجب الوجود او يصح ذلك لبعضها ولكنه لا
يصح للمجتمع وجود دونه فما لم يصح له من
المجتمع والجزاء الاخرى وجود منفرد فليس
واجب الوجود و لم يكن واجب الوجود الا الذي
يصح له و ان كان لا يصح لتلك الاجزاء مفارقة
الجملة في الوجود ولا للجملة مفارقة الاجزاء
و تعلق وجود كل بالآخر و ليس واحدا قدم بالذات
فليس شئ منها بواجب الوجود (فقد اوضحت
هذا على ان الاجزاء بالذات اقدم من الكل)
فتكون العلة الموجبة للوجود توجب اولاً
الاجزاء ثم الكل ولا يكون شئ منهما واجب
الوجود و ليس يمكننا ان نقول ان الكل اقدم
بالذات من الاجزاء فهو إما متأخر وإما معاً وكيف
كان فليس بواجب الوجود -

فقد اتضح من هذا ان واجب

الوجود ليس بجسمي و لامادة جسمي ولا صورة

جسمي ولا مادة معقولة بصورة معقولة و لا

صورة معقولة في مادة معقولة ولا له قسمة
لا في الكم ولا في المبادئ ولا في القول فهو
واحد من هذه الجهات الثلاث - (ii)

(iii) واما برهان انه لا علة له
صورية ان العلة الصورية الجسميه انما تكون
و تتحقق اذا كانت له مادة فتكون للمادة
شركة في وجود الصورة كما ان للصورة حظا في
تقويم المادة في الوجود و بالفعل فيكون
معلولا و يظهر من انتفاء هذه العلة عنه
انتفاء جميع العوارض الجسمانية من الزمان
و المكان و الجهة و الاختصاص بمكان و على
الجملة فكل ما يجوز على الاجسام يستحيل
عليه -

و اما بيان انه لا علة له غائية
و كمالية ان العلة الغائية ما يكون لاجلها الشيء
و الحق الاول لا يكون لاجل شيء بل كل شيء لاجل
كمال ذاته و تابع لوجوده و مستفاد من وجوده
ثم العلة الغائية و ان كانت في الوجود متأخرة

عن سائر العلل فهي في الذهن متقدمة على
سائر العلل و العلة الغائية تصير العلة الفاعلية
علة بالفعل اعني فيما يكون علة غائية - (12)

(iv) ... فيلزم ان لا يكون الصادر
الاول عنه جسما لان كل جسم مركب من الهيولى
و الصورة و هما محتاجان الى علتين او الى علة
ذات اعتبارين و اذا كان كذلك استحال
صدورهما من الله تعالى لما ثبت انه ليس فيه
تركيب اصلا فاذا الصادر الاول منه غير جسمي
فهو اذا جوهر مجرد و هو العقل الاول - (13)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

3. HE IS NOT LIKE FORM AND MATTER.

الثالث: ان واجب الوجود لا

يكون مثل الصورة ؛ لانها متعلقة بالهيولى ،

I2. IS., Arsh. ... 6

I3. Ibid ... I5

و لو قدر عدم الهيولى التى معها ، لزم عدوها -

ولا يكون ايضا مثل الهيولى ،
التى هى محل الصورة ، التى لا توجد الا معها ؛ لان
الهيولى توجد بالفعل مع الصورة ، ويلزم من
عدم الصورة ، عدم الهيولى فلها تعلق بالغير - (14)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

(14) . ولانه ليس بمادة ولا مادة
له بوجه من الوجوه فانه بجوهرة عقل بالفعل
لان المانع للصورة من ان تكون عقلا وان تعقل
بالفعل هو المادة التى فيها يوجد الشئ فمتى
كان الشئ فى وجوده غير محتاج الى مادة كان
ذلك الشئ بجوهرة عقلا بالفعل وتلك حال
الاول فهو اذن عقل بالفعل وهو ايضا معقول
بجوهرة - (15)

I4. Ghaz., Mag. ... 2II

I5. Diet., Must. (Text) 9

(ii) فانه ليس بمادة ولا قوامه في مادة ولا في موضوع اصلا بل وجوده خلوصا من كل مادة ومعنى كل موضوع ولا ايضا له صورة لان الصورة لا يمكن ان تكون الا في مادة ولو كانت له صورة لكانت ذاته مؤتلفة من مادة وصورة ولو كان كذلك لكان قوامه بجزئيه اللذين منهما ائتلف ولما كان لوجوده سبب فان كل واحد من اجزائه سبب لوجود جملته وقد وضعنا انه سبب اول ولا ايضا لوجوده غرض وغاية حتى يكون انما وجوده ليتم تلك الغاية وذلك الغرض والا لكان يكون ذلك سببا ما لوجوده فلا يكون سببا اول ولا ايضا استفاد وجوده من شيء اخر اقدم منه وهو من ان يكون استفاد ذلك مما هو دونه ابعد - (16)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(i) ان واجب الوجود واحد

بالعدد، و بان ان ما سواه اذا اعتبر ذاته كان
ممكنا في وجوده، فكان محلولا، و للاح انه
ينتهي في المحلولة لا محالة اليه، فاذن كل شيء
الا الواحد الذي هو لذاته واحد، و الموجود
الذي هو لذاته موجود، فانه مستفيد الوجود
عن غيره، و هو ايس به، و ليس في ذاته؛ و
هذا معنى كون الشيء مبدعا اي نائل الوجود
عن غيره، و له عدم يستحقه في ذاته مطلق،
ليس انما يستحق عدم بصورته دون مادته،
او بمادته دون صورته، بل بكليته، فكليته اذا
لم تغترن بايجاب الموجد له، و اختسب انه
منقطع عنه و جب عدمه بكليته، فاذن
ايجاد عن الموجد له بكليته، فليس جزء منه
يسبق وجوده بالقياس الى هذا المعنى، لا مادته
و لا صورته، ان كان ذا مادة و صورة - (17)

- (ii) Compare the ~~last~~ last paragraph of
Ibn-Sīnā's point no. 2(ii) in page I76.

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

4. HIS BEING IS QUIDDITY.

الرابع: هو انه لا يكون وجوده غير ماهيته، بل ينبغي ان تتحد ايته وماهيته، اذ قد سبق ان الانية غير الماهية، و ان الوجود الذي هو الانية عبارة عن عارض للماهية -

و ان كل عارض فمعلول، لانه لو كان موجودا بذاته، لما كان عارضا لغيره - و اذ ما كان عارضا لغيره، فله تعلق بغيره؛ اذ لا يكون الا معه -

وعلة الوجود لا تخلو:

إما ان تكون هي الماهية - او غيرها - فان كانت غيرها، فيكون الوجود عارضا معلولا، ولا يكون واجب الوجود -

و باطل ان تكون الماهية، بنفسها،

سبباً لوجود نفسها ؛ لان العدم لا يكون
سبباً للوجود - والماهية لا وجود لها قبل هذا
الوجود، فكيف تكون سبباً له ؟

و لو كان لها وجود قبل هذا
الوجود، لكانت مستغنية عن وجود ثان - ثم
كان هذا السؤال لازماً في ذلك الوجود ؛ فانه
عرضي فيها - فمن اين عرض له ، ولزم ؟

فثبت ان واجب الوجود أنيته ،
ماهيته ، و كان وجوب الوجود له ، كالماهية
لغيره - (18)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

(i) هو الموجود الاول وان الواجب
الوجود بذاته متى فرض غير موجود لزم منه
المحال وانه هو السبب الاول لوجود سائر

الموجودات فيكون وجوده اقدم الوجود و
انه برىء من جميع انحاء النقص فيكون
وجوده اكمل وانه لا علة له فاعلية و
لا غائية ولا صورية ولا مادية وان
وجوده ليس لاحقا لماهية غير الوجود
وانه لا ماهية له غير انه واجب الوجود
وهي اثبته - (19)

(ii) فوجوده افضل الوجود و
اقدم الوجود ولا يمكن ان يكون وجود
افضل ولا اقدم من وجوده وهو من
فضيلة الوجود في اعلى انحاءه ومن كمال
الوجود في ارفع المراتب ولذلك لا يمكن
ان يشوب وجوده وجوهرة عدم
اصلا - (20)

(iii) فان الاول منفرد بوجوده
لا يشتركه شيء اخر اصلا موجود في نوع

19. Far., Da^cawī ... 3

20. Diet., Must.(Text) ... 5

وجودة فهو اذن واحد وهو مع ذلك
منفرد ايضا برتبته وحده فهو ايضا واحد
من هذه الجهة - (2)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

بيان انه لا تكرون ماهيته
غير اثبته بل يتعد وجوده في حقيقته
انه اذا لم يكن وجوده نفس حقيقته
فيكون وجوده (1) نفس حقيقته و كل
عارض فمعلول و كل معلول محتاج الى
السبب فهذا السبب اما ان يكون خارجا
عن ماهيته او يكون هو ماهيته فان كان
خارجا فلا يكون واجب الوجود ولا يكون
منزها عن العلة الفاعلية وان كان السبب

(1) كذا و لعله فيكون وجوده غير نفس الخ -

هو الماهية فالسبب لا بد وان يكون
موجودا تام الوجود حتى يحصل وجود
غيره منه والماهية قبل الوجود لا وجود
لها ولو كان لها وجود قبل هذا لكان
مستغنيا عن وجود ثان ثم كان السؤال
عائدا في ذلك الوجود فانه ان كان عرضيا
فيها فمن اين عرض و لزم فثبت ان
واجب الوجود انيته ماهيته وانه لا
علة له فاعلية و كان وجوب الوجود له
كالماهية لغيره ومنه يظهر ان واجب
الوجود لا يشبه غيره بوجه من الوجوه
لان كل ما سواه فوجوده غير ماهية - (22)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

5. HE IS NOT (CAUSALLY) RELATED TO ANYTHING AS THAT
THING IS (CAUSALLY) RELATED TO HIM.

الخامس: انه لا يتعلق

بغيره على وجه يتعلق ذلك الخير به - على
معنى كون كل واحد منهما علة الاخر - فان
هذا في غير واجب الوجود محال - وهو ان
يكون :

ر ب (ب) علة (ج)

و (ج) علة (ب) -

لان (ب) من حيث انه علة -

فهو قبل (ج) - و (ج) من حيث انه علة

فهو قبل (ب) -

فيكون قبل ما هو قبله ، و

هو محال - و يكون كل واحد منهما قبل

صاحبه ، من حيث انه علة - و بعده من

حيث انه محلول - و ذلك ظاهر

البطلان - (23)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

(أ) فالواجب الوجود متى فرض
غير موجود لزم منه محال ولا علة لوجوده
ولا يجوز كون وجوده بخيره وهو السبب
الاول لوجود الاشياء - (24)

(ii) (ان كان) كل شئ في عالم
الكون و الفساد مما لم يكن فكان قبل الكون
ممكناً الوجود اذ لو كان ممتنع الوجود لما
وجد و لو كان واجب الوجود لكان لم يزل و
لا يزال موجوداً و ممكن الوجود يحتاج في
الوجود الى علة تخرجه من العدم الوجود فكل
مائه وجود لا عن ذاته فهو ممكن الوجود و
كل ممكن الوجود فوجوده عن غيره و ذلك
الغير ان كان ممكن الوجود فالكلام فيه
كالكلام فيما نتكلم فيه فلا بد وان يكون

وجود ما هو ممكن الوجود يستند الى الواجب الوجود بذاته ولا يجوز ان يكون الشيء علة نفسه لان العلة تنقدم على المعلول بالذات و ذلك اذا قلنا (1) علة (ب) فانما نعني بذلك ان وجود (ب) من وجود (ا) بالفعل و قضية هذا تقتضي ان يكون وجود العلة متقدما على المعلول ولا يكون للشيء وجود ان احدهما متقدم و علة و الاخر متأخر و معلول حتى يكون الشيء علة نفسه -

(و بهذا) الطريق يعلم انه لا يجوز ان تكون ماهية الشيء سببا لوجوده العارض للماهية لان وجود العلة هو سبب في وجود المعلول و ليس للماهية وجود ان احدهما مفيد و الاخر مستفيد و لا يجوز ان يكون شيئا من كل واحد منهما علة للاخر مثلا (ا) و (ب) فيكون (ا) علة لوجود (ب) و (ب) علة لوجود (ا) فان وجود (ب) اذا كان من (ا) و يجب ان يكون وجود (ا) متقدما على وجود (ب) فلا

يكون معلوله و ذلك يقتضى ان يكون (ا) من حيث هو علة (ب) متقدما في وجوده على (ب) و من حيث هو معلول (ب) متأخرا في وجوده عن وجود (ب) فيكون في اعتبار واحد موجودا معدوما و يكون (ب) علة نفسه لان علة العلة علة فاذا كان (ب) علة (ا) و يكون (ا) علة (ب) كان (ب) علة نفسه و يؤدى ذلك الى ان وجوده متقدم على وجوده و ذلك باطل - (25)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(أ) و الشئ الواحد لا يكون متقدما و متأخرا بالنسبة الى وجوده و ايضا لو فرضنا عدم ذلك الاخر فهل هذا يكون واجب الوجود ام لا فان كان واجب الوجود فلا تعلق له بالآخر و ان لم يكن واجب الوجود فهو ممكن الوجود فيحتاج الى

غير واجب الوجود فاذا واجب الوجود واحد
غير مستفيد الوجود من واحد فهو واجب
الوجود من كل الوجوه و غير مستفيد الوجود
من الاخر - (26)

(ii) فنقول : ان الواجب الوجود
بذاته لا علة له ، و ان الممكن الوجود بذاته
له علة ، و ان الواجب الوجود بذاته واجب الوجود
من جميع جهاته ، و ان الواجب الوجود لا يمكن
ان يكون وجودة مكافئا لوجود اخر ، فيكون كل
واحد منهما مساويا للاخر في وجوب الوجود و
يتلازمان - و ان الواجب الوجود لا يجوز ان
يجتمع وجودة عن كثرة البتة - و ان الواجب
الوجود لا يجوز ان تكون الحقيقة التي له
مشتركا فيها بوجه من الوجوه ، حتى يلزم من
تصحيحنا ذلك ان يكون واجب الوجود غير
مضاف ، و لا متغير ، و لا منكثر ، و لا مشارك في
وجودة الذي يخصه -

اما ان الواجب الوجود لا علة له ، فظاهر - لانه ان كان لواجب الوجود علة في وجوده ، كان وجوده بها - وكل ما وجوده بشيء ، فاذا اغتبر بذاته دون غيره لم يجب له وجود ، وكل ما اذا اغتبر بذاته دون غيره ، ولم يجب له وجود ، فليس واجب الوجود بذاته - فبين انه ان كان لواجب الوجود بذاته علة لم يكن واجب الوجود بذاته - فقد ظهر ان الواجب الوجود لا علة له - وظهر من ذلك انه لا يجوز ان يكون شيء واجب الوجود بذاته ، وواجب الوجود بغيره ، لانه ان كان يجب وجوده بغيره ، فلا يجوز ان يوجد دون غيره ، وكلما لا يجوز ان يوجد دون غيره ، فيستحيل وجوده واجبا بذاته - ولو وجب بذاته ، لحصل - و لا تأثير لايجاب الغير في وجوده الذي يؤثر غيره في وجوده فلا يكون واجبا وجوده في ذاته - (27)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

6. HE IS NOT RELATED TO ANOTHER THING AS THAT
OTHER IS RELATED TO HIM BY WAY OF RECIPROCITY.

السادس: هو انه لا يتعلق

بغيره ، على وجه يتعلق ذلك الغير به ، لا
بمعنى العلية ، و لكن على سبيل التضاييف ،
كما بين الاخوين ؛ لانا نقول : ان لم يلزم
عدمه لعدم ذلك الغير ، فلا علاقة له مع
ذلك الغير -

و نحن تجاوز ان يكون لغير

واجب الوجود علاقة بواجب الوجود ؛ فان
المعلول يتعلق بالعلة ، والعلة لا تتعلق
بالمعلول -

و ان كان يلزم عدمه بعدم

ذلك الغير ، فهو ممكن لا واجب ؛ فان كل ما
يتعلق بغيره فهو ممكن ؛ لانه لا يخلو ؛

اما ان يكفي في وجوده

ذلك الغير، فيكون ذلك الغير وحدة علته
و هو معلوله -

و اما ان يحتاج مع ذلك
الغير الى شيء اخر، فيكون هو معلول الجميع -
و كل ذلك يناقض وجوب الوجود - (28)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

(أ) (و ليس) كذلك حال
المتضايقين فان لهما ثالثا اوقع علاقة التضايق
بينهما ولا يجوز ان تكون علل ممكنة لا
تهاية لها لان لكل واحدة منها خاصية
الوسط فتكون معلولة باعتبار وعللة باعتبار
و كل ما يكون له خاصية الوسط فله بالضرورة
طرف و الطرف نهاية فيكون استناد الممكنات
الى وجود واجب الوجود بريئا عن العلل
المادية و الصورية و الغائية و الفاعلية - (29)

28. Ghaz., Mag. ... 212

29. Far., Zinūn ... 4.

(iz) ... ويلزم ان يكون وجوده
اول وجود و ان ينزه عن جميع انحاء النقص
فوجوده اذن تام ويلزم ان يكون وجوده اتم
الوجود ومنزها عن العلل مثل المادة و
الصورة و الفعل و الغاية - (30)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(ā) و لا يجوز ان يكون شيء
واحد واجب الوجود بذاته و بغيره معاً فانه
ان رفع غيره او لم يعتبر وجوده لم يخل اما
ان يبقى وجوب وجوده على حاله فلا يكون
وجوب وجوده بغيره - و اما ان لا يبقى وجوب
وجوده فلا يكون وجوب وجوده بذاته و كل
ما هو واجب الوجود بغيره فانه ممكن الوجود
بذاته لان ما هو واجب الوجود بغيره فوجوب
وجوده تابع لنسبة ما و اضافة : و النسبة و
الاطافة اعتبارهما غير اعتبار نفس ذات

الشيء التي لها نسبة و إضافة : شيء وجوب
الوجود الما يتقرر باعتبار هذه النسبة
باعتبار الذات ودها لا يخلو إما ان يكون
مقتضياً لوجوب الوجود أو مقتضياً لامكان
الوجود أو مقتضياً لامتناع الوجود ولا يجوز
ان يكون مقتضياً لامتناع الوجود لان كل ما
امتنع وجوده بذاته لم يوجد ولا بغيره -
(ولا ان يكون موجوداً معاً وإما ان لا يكون
موجوداً معاً فان لم يكن موجوداً معاً غير
المتناهي في زمان واحد و لكن واحد قبل الآخر
او الآخر - و لنؤخر الكلام في هذا) [1] و اما ان
يكون موجوداً مقتضياً لوجوب الوجود فقد قلنا
ان ماوجب وجوده بذاته استحالة وجوب
وجوده بغيره فبقي ان يكون باعتبار ذاته ممكن

[1] اعلم ان ما بين الهلايين جملناه

كذلك لانه حشو في وسط الكلام المنتظم المنتهي
بعضه ببعض فليتنامل -

الوجود وباعتبار إيقاع النسبة الى ذلك
الغير واجب الوجود وباعتبار قطع النسبة
التي الى ذلك الغير ممتنع الوجود وذاته
بذاته بلا شرط ممكنة الوجود - (31)

- (ii) Compare the context of Ibn - Sīnā on
point no. I(iii) in page I72.

(iii) و برهان انه لا علة له
مادية وقابلية ان العلة القابلة هي
العلة لحصول المحل المقبول له اي هو
المستعد لقبول وجود او كمال وجود
فواجب الوجود كمال بالفعل المكض لا
يشوبه نقص وكل كمال له ومنه ومسبوق
بذاته وكل نقص و لو بالمجاز منفي عنه - (32)

31. IS., Naj. ... 225

32. IS., Arsh. ... 5

- (iv) Compare the context of Ibn - Sīnā on point no. 5(ii) in page I92.

(v) ... ثم يعرض شيء آخر وهو

انه اذا كان امكان وجود ذلك هو علة ايجاب وجود هذا لم يتعلق وجود هذا بوجوبه بل بامكانه - فوجب ان يجوز وجوده مع عدمه و قد فرضا متكافئين، هذا خلف - فاذن ليس يمكن ان يكونا متكافئ الوجود في حال ما لا يتعلقان بعلة خارجة بل يجب ان يكون احدهما هو الاول بالذات او يكون هناك سبب خارج اخر يوجبهما جميعا بايجاب العلاقة التي بينهما او يوجب العلاقة بايجابهما - والمضافان ليس احدهما واجبا بالآخر بل مع الآخر، والموجب لهما العلة التي جمعتهما، وايضا المادتان او الموضوعان او الموصوفان بهما - و ليس يكفي وجود المادتين او الموضوعين لهما وحدهما بل

وجود ثالث يجمع بينهما - و ذلك لانه لا
يخلو إما ان يكون وجود كل واحد من الامرين
وحقيقته هو ان يكون مع الاخر، فوجوده
بذاته يكون غير واجب، فيصير ممكناً،
فيصير معلولاً، و يكون كما قلنا ليس علته
مكافئة في الوجود، فتكون اذن علته امراً
اخر، فلا يكون هو والاخر علة للعلاقة التي
بينهما بل ذلك الاخر - واما ان لا يكون،
فتكون المعية طارئة على وجوده الخاص
لاحقة له - و ايضا فان الوجود الذي يخصه
لا يكون عنى مكافيه من حيث هو مكافيه، بل
عن علة متقدمة ان كان معلولا - فحينئذ
اما ان يكون وجوده ذلك عنى صاحبه، لا منى
حيث يكافيه، بل منى حيث وجود صاحبه
الذى يخصه، فلا يكونان متكافئين، بل علة
ومعلولا - و يكون صاحبه ايضا علة للعلاقة
الوهمية بينهما كلاب و الابن - واما ان
يكونا متكافئين منى جملة ما يكون الامر ان ليس
احدهما علة للاخر، و تكون العلاقة لازمة

لوجودهما، فتكون العلة الاولى للعلاقة هي امر خارج موجد لذاتيهما على ما علمت، و العلاقة عرضية، فيكون لا تكافؤ هناك الا بالعرض المباين او اللازم. وهذا غير ما نحن فيه، ويكون للذى بالعرض علة لا محالة، فيكونان من حيث التكافؤ معلولين - (33)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

7. HE HAS NO PARTNER.

السابع: هو انه لا يجوز ان يكون شيئان، كل واحد منهما واجب الوجود حتى يكون للواجب ند و يكون كل واحد مستقلا بنفسه لا يتعلق بالآخر؛ لانه لا يخلو:

اما ان يتشابهها من كل وجه -

او يختلفا -

فان تشابهها من كل وجه ، بطل

التعدد ، و لم تحقل الاثنينية ، كما ذكرنا

من استحالة سوادين في محل واحد ، في

حالة واحدة ، ببيان ان الكلي لا يصير حاصل

الا بفصل ، او عارض يختص به لامحالة -

و ان كانا مختلفين بفصل او

عارض فهو محال ايضا ؛ اذ قد سبق ان الفصل

والعارض ، لا مدخل لهما في حقيقة ذات

الكلي ، و ان لا مدخل للانسانية في كون

الحيوانية حيوانية

و انما يدخل في كونه موجوداً ،

و ذلك فيما يكون الوجود عارضاً على الماهية ،

و غيرها -

فاما ما انيته و ماهيته واحدة

و الفصل لم يكن داخل في ماهيته ، لم يكن

داخلا في اثبته فيكون دون الفصل واجب
الوجود، فيكون الفصل و العارض لغواً -

وان كان لا يكون واجب
الوجود دون ذلك الفصل، فقد صار الفصل
داخلا في حقيقة المعنى، اعنى معنى وجود
الوجود -

وقد سبق ان ذلك محال،
وانه انما يدخل في وجود الماهية والحقيقة،
اذا كانت الماهية غير الوجود - (34)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و هو مباين بجوهره لكل ما
سواة ولا يمكن ان يكون الوجود الذى له
لشئء اخر سواة لان كل ما وجودة هذا الوجود
لا يمكن ان يكون بينه و بين شئء اخر له
ايضا هذا الوجود مباينة اصلا ولا تغاير

اصلا فلا يكون اثنان بل يكون هناك ذات واحدة
فقط لانه ان كانت بينهما مباينة كان الذى
تباينا به غير الذى اشتهركا فيه فيكون الشئ
الذى باين به كل واحد منهما الاخر جزءا مما
به ثوام وجودهما و الذى اشتهركا فيه هو الجزء
الاخر فيكون كل واحد منهما منقسما بالقول و
يكون كل واحد من جزئيه سببا لثوام ذاته فلا
يكون اولاه بل يكون هناك موجود اخر اقدم
منه هو سبب لوجوده و ذلك محال -

و ان كان ذلك الاخر هو الذى
فيه ما باين به هذا ولم يكن فى هذا شئ باين
به ذلك الا بعد الشئ الذى به باين ذلك
لزم ان يكون الشئ الذى به باين ذلك الاخر
هذا هو الوجود الذى يخص ذاك و وجود هذا
مشترك لهما فان ذلك الاخر و وجوده مركب
من شيئين من شئ يخصه و من شئ يشترك
به هذا فليس اذن وجود ذاك هو وجود
هذا بل ذات هذا بسيط غير منقسم و ذات

ذلك منقسي فلذلك اذن جزءان بهما توامه
فلوجوده اذن سبب فوجوده اذن دون وجود
هذا وانقص منه فليس هو اذن من الوجود
في الرتبة الاولى - (35)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(أ) ولا يجوز ان يكون اثنان
يحدثك منهما واجب وجود واحد ولا ان يكون
في واجب الوجود كثرة بوجه من الوجوه ولا
يجوز ان يكون شيئان اثنان ليس هذا ذلك
ولا ذلك هذا وكل واحد منهما واجب الوجود
بذاته وبالآخر فقد بان ان واجب الوجود بذاته
لا يكون واجب الوجود بغيره ولا يجوز ان يكون
كل واحد منهما واجب الوجود بالآخر حتى يكون
(أ) واجب الوجود (ب) لا بذاته (ب) واجب
الوجود (ب) لا بذاته وجملتها واجب وجود
واحد وذلك لان اعتبارهما ذاتين غير

اعتبارهما متضايقين و لكل واحد منهما وجوب
وجود لا بذاته فكل واحد منهما ممكن الوجود
بذاته و لكل ممكن الوجود بذاته علة في
وجوده اقدم منه لان كل علة اقدم في وجود
الذات من المعلول وان لم يكن في الزمان
فلكل واحد منهما في الذات شئ اخر يقوم
به اقدم من ذاته و ليس ذات احدهما
اقدم من ذات الاخر على ما وصفنا فلهما اذا
علل خارجة عنهما اقدم منهما فليس اذا
وجوب وجود كل واحد منهما مستفاداً من
الاخر بل من العلة الخارجة التي اوقعت
العلاقة بينهما و ايضا فان ما يجب بغيره
فوجوده بالذات متأخر عن وجود ذلك الغير
و متوقف عليه؛ ثم من المستحيل ان
نتوقف ذات في ان توجد على ذات توجد
بها فكأنها نتوقف في الوجود على وجود نفسها-
و بالجملة فاذا كان ذلك الغير يجب به كان
هذا اقدم مما هو اقدم منه و متوقف على
ما هو متوقف عليه فوجودهما محال - (36)

(ii) أعلم ان واجب الوجود تعالى
لا يجوز ان يكون اثنين بوجه من الوجوه و
برهانه انه لو فرضنا واجب الوجود اخر فلا بد
ان يتميز احدهما عن الاخر حتى يقال هذا او
ذاك اما ان يكون بذاتي او عرضي فان كان
التمييز بينهما بعرضي فهذا العرضي لا يخلو اما
ان يكون في كل واحد منهما او في احدهما فان
كان في كل واحد منهما عرضي يتميز به عن
الاخر فكل واحد منهما معلول للن العرضي ما
يلحق الشيء بعد تحقق ذاته وان كان العرضي
من قبل ما يلزم الوجود و يكون في احدهما
دون الاخر فيكون الذي لا عرضي له واجب
الوجود والاخر لا يكون واجب الوجود وان
كان التمييز بينهما بذاتي فالذاتي ما يتقوم
به الذات وان كان لكل واحد منها ذاتي غير ما
للاخر تميز به عنه فيكون كل واحد منهما
مركبا والمركب معلول فلا يكون كل واحد
منهما واجب الوجود وان كان هذا الذاتي
لاحدهما والاخر واحد من كل وجه لا تركيب
فيه بوجه من الوجوه فالذي ليس له ذاتي

هو واجب الوجود والاخر لا يكون واجب الوجود فاذا ثبت بهذا ان واجب الوجود لا يجوز ان يكون اثنين بل كل حق فانه من حيث حقيقته الذاتية التي هو بها حق فهو متفق واحد لا يشاركه فيه غيره فكيف ما ينال به كل حق وجوده به - (37)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

8. NO QUALITY CAN AUGMENT HIS ESSENCE.

الثامن : انه لا يجوز ان يكون له صفة زائدة على الذات ، لانه ان كان يتقوم وجوده بتلك الصفة ، حتى يبطل وجوده بتقدير عدمها ، فقد تعلق بها ، وصار مركبا من اجزاء لا تلتئم ذاته الا بمجموعها .

وكل مركب من اشياء محلول

كما سبق -

و ان كان لا يلزم عدمه منى
تقدير عدم تلك الصفة 'فهي عرضية فيه'
كالعلم في الانسان مثلاً 'و ذلك محال؛ لان
كأن عرضي فمعلول كما سبق -

و علتته؛ ان كانت ذات
واجب الوجود 'كان الذات فاعلا و قابلا - و
كان كونه فاعلا 'غير كونه قابلا - لانه يقبل
لا من حيث يفعل - و يفعل لا من حيث يقبل -
فتكون فيه كثرة بوجه ما -

و قد بينا ان الكثرة في
ذات واجب الوجود محال؛ لانه يوجب
تعليل الجملة بالاحاد -

فهو واحد من كل وجه - (عق)

AL - PARĀBĪ.

فلهذا هو ازلي دائمي الوجود
بجوهره وذاته من غير ان يكون به حاجة
في ان يكون ازليا الي شيء اخر يمد بقائه
بل هو بجوهره كاف في بقائه ودوام وجوده
ولا يمكن ان يكون وجود اصلا مثل وجوده
ولا ايضا في مثل مرتبة وجوده وجود يمكن
ان يكون له او يتوقف عليه وهو الوجود
الذي لا يمكن ان يكون له سبب به او عنه
او له كان وجوده - (39)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

و اذا ثبت انه لا علة له
قابلة فلا يكون له شيء بالقوة ولا تكون له صفة
منتظرة بل كماله حاصل بالفعل ولا تكون له
علة مادية وقولنا بالفعل لفظ مشترك اي
كل كمال يكون لغيره معدوم ومنتظر وهو

له موجود حاضر فذاته الكاملة المتقدمة على
جميع الاعتبارات واحدة و بهذا يظهر ان
صفاته لا تكون زائدة على ذاته لانها لو كانت
زائدة على ذاته لكانت الصفات بالنسبة الى
الذات بالقوة وتكون الذات سبب تلك
الصفات فان تلك الصفات تكون متقدمة
عليها فتكون من وجه فاعلة ومن وجه
قابلة و كونها فاعلة خير جهة كونها قابلة
فتكون فيها جهتان متباثتان وهذا مطرد في
كل شيء فان الجسمي اذا كان متحركا فيكون
التحريك من وجه و التحريك من وجه
اخر -

فان قيل ان صفته ليست

زائدة على الذات بل هي داخلية في تقويم
الذات و الذات لا يتصور وجودها دون تلك
الصفات فتكون الذات مركبة فتنخرم
الوحدة - (40)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

9. HIS NATURE IS UNCHANGEABLE.

التاسع : ان واجب الوجود
يستحيل ان يتغير ؛ لان التغير عبارة
عن حدوث صفة فيه لم تكن -

وكل حادث فيفتقر الى
سبب - ويستحيل ان يكون غيره ، كما
سبق - وان يكون ذاته ؛ لان كل صفة تلزم
من الذات ، تكون مع الذات لا تتأخر عنه -
وقد ذكرنا ان الفاعل لا يكون قابلاً فلا
يفعل شيئاً في ذاته البتة - (41)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و يلزم من هذا ان لا يمكن ان
لا يكون ولا حاجة به الى شيء يمد بقائه ولا

يتغير من حال الى حال وهو واحد بمعنى ان
الحقيقة التي له ليست لشيء غيره - (42)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

و يظهر ايضا من نفي العلة
القابلة انه يستحيل عليه التغير لان التغير
معناه زوال صفة وثبوت اخرى فيكون فيه
بالقوة زوال وثبات وهذا محال فتبين منه
انه لا ضد له كما لا ندله لان الضدين هما
ذاتان متعاقبتان على متحل واحد بينهما غاية
الخلافا وهو تعالى غير قابل للاعراض فضلا عن
الاضداد و ان جعل الضد عبارة عن المنازع
في الملك فتبين ايضا انه لا ضد له وتبين
انه يستحيل عليه العدم لانه لما ثبت
وجوب وجوده استحال عدمه لان كل ما يكون
بالقوة لا يكون بالفعل فيكون فيه جهتان و
كلما يكون قابلا لشيء فاذا حصل القبول لا

يرتفع القابل فيؤدى الى ارتفاع الوجود و
العدم وهو مطرد - (43)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

10. NOTHING CAN PROCEED FROM HIM EXCEPT
ONE THING.

العاشر: ان واجب الوجود لا
يصدر منه الا شئ واحد، بخير واسطة و
انما يصدر منه اشياء كثيرة، على ترتيب،
وبوسائط وذلك لانه ثبت انه واحد لا
كثرة فيه بوجه؟ اذ الكثرة :

اما ان تكون بكثرة اجزاء
يستقل احادها ككثرة الجسم المؤلف - او
بكثرة المعنى بان يقسم الشئ الى امرين لا
يستقل احدهما دون الاخر - كالصورة و

الهيولى - او كالوجود والماهية - وقد نفينا
كل ذلك عنه ، فلا يبقى الا الواحد من كل
وجه - والواحد لا يصدر منه الا واحد -

و انما يختلف فعل الواحد :

اما باختلاف المحل : او باختلاف الالة - او
بسبب زائد على ذات الفاعل الواحد - (44)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

الموجود الاول هو السبب
الاول لوجود سائر الموجودات كلها وهو
برئ من جميع انحاء النقص وكل ما سواه
فليس يخلو من ان يكون فيه شئ من انحاء
النقص اما واحد واما اكثر من واحد ، واما
الاول فهو خلو من انحاءها كلها - (45)

44. Ghaz., Maq. ... 216

45. Diet., Must. (Text) 5

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(i) فواجب الوجود واحد لا
يشترك في رتبته شيء، فلا شيء سواه
واجب الوجود؛ واذ لا شيء سواه واجب
الوجود، فهو مبدأ وجوب الوجود لكل شيء،
ويوجبها ايجاباً اولياً او بواسطة، واذ كان
كل شيء غيره فوجوده من وجوده فهو اول-
ولا نعى بالاول معنى ينضاف الى وجوب
وجوده حتى يتكثر به وجوب وجوده، بل
نعنى به اعتبار اضافته الى غيره - (46)

(ii) و نقول ايضاً: ان واجب الوجود
يجب ان يكون ذاتاً واحدة - و الا فليكن كثره
و يكون كل واحد منها واجب الوجود، فلا يخلو
اما ان يكون كل واحد منها في المعنى الذى
هو حقيقته، لا يخالف الاخر البتة او
يخالفه - فان كان لا يخالف الاخر في المعنى
الذى لذاته بالذات، ويخالفه بانه ليس

هو، وهذا خلاف لامحالة، فيخالفه في غير المعنى - وذلك لان المعنى الذي هو فيهما غير مختلف، وقد قارنه شيء به صار هذا او في هذا، او قارنه نفس انه هذا او في هذا، ولم يقارنه بهذا المقارن في الاخر، بل ما به صار ذلك ذلك، او نفس ان ذلك ذلك، وهذا تخصيص ما قارن ذلك المعنى، و بينهما به مباينة -

فاذن كل واحد منهما يباين

الاخر به، وليس يخالفه في نفس المعنى،

فيخالفه في غير المعنى - (47)

(iii) ونحن اذا قلنا هذا الفعل

صادر عنه بسبب و السبب منه ايضا

فلا نقص في فاعليته بل الكل صادر منه وبه

و اليه فاذا الموجودات صدرت عنه على

ترتيب معلوم و وسائط لا يجوز ان يتقدم

ما هو متأخر ولا يتأخر ما هو متقدم وهو
المقدم والمؤخر معا - (48)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

II. HE IS NOT A SUBSTANCE.

الحدادي عشر: ان واجب
الوجود، كما لا يقال له عرض، كما سبق، فلا
يقال له جوهر، و ان كان قائماً بنفسه، وليس
يكن في محل، كما ان الجواهر كذلك.

و لكن الجواهر في اصطلاح
القوم عبارة عن حقيقة وماهية وجودها لا
في موضوع، نعني اذا وجد، فوجدها لا في
موضوع لا انه موجود وجوداً بالفعل،
حاصلاً؛ فانك تحكي ضرباً للمثل بان التمساح
جوهر ولا تشك فيه - وتشك في انه هل هو

في الحال حاصل في الوجود ، ام لا ؟ وكذا
جملة من الجواهر -

فاذن الجوهر يطلق على
حقيقة و ماهية ، اذا عرض لها الوجود ، عرض
لا في موضوع ، فيكون عبارة عما تكون ماهيته
غير انيته -

فما ماهيته و انيته واحدة
لا يسمى جوهرأ بهذا الاصطلاح ، الا ان يخترع
مخترع اصطلاحاً ، فيجعله عبارة عن وجود
لا محل له فلا يمنع ان ذلك من إطلاقه
عليه - (49)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

(أ) و ايضا خانه غير منقسم بالقول
الى اشياء بها تجوهره و ذلك لانه لا يمكن
ان يكون القول الذي يشرح معناه يدل على
جزء من اجزائه او على جزئيه يتجوهر به

فانه اذا كان كذلك كانت الاجزاء التي بها
تجوهره اسبابا لوجوده على جهة ما تكون
المعاني التي تدل عليه اجزاء حد الشيء اسبابا
لوجود المحدود وعلى جهة ما يكون المادة
والصورة اسبابا لوجود المتركب منهما و
ذلك غير ممكن فيه اذ كان اولا وكان لا
سبب لوجوده اصلا فاذا كان لا ينقسم
هذه الاقسام فهو من ان ينقسم اقسام
الكمية و سائر انحاء الانقسام ابعد فمن
هنا يلزم ضرورة ايضا ان لا يكون له عظم
ولا يكون جسما اصلا فهو ايضا واحد من هذه
الجهة وذلك ان احد المعاني التي يقال
عليها الواحد هو ما لا ينقسم فان كل شيء
كان لا ينقسم من وجه ما فهو واحد من تلك
الجهة التي بها لا ينقسم فانه ان كان من جهة
فعله فهو واحد من تلك الجهة وان كان من
جهة كفيته فهو واحد من جهة الكيفية و
ما لا ينقسم في جوهره فهو واحد في جوهره
فاذن كان الاول غير منقسم في جوهره - (50)

- (ii) Compare the context of al - Fārābī on point no. 3(i) in page I80.

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(i) فنقول برهانه انه لاعلة له
فاعلية وهو ظاهر لانه لو كان له سبب في
الوجود لكان هذا حادثا و ذلك واجب الوجود و
اذا ثبت انه لاعلة له فاعلية فبهذا الاعتبار
لا تكون ماهيته غير انيته اى غير وجوده و
لا يكون جوهره و لاعرضا و لا يجوز ان يكون
اثنان كل واحد منهما مستفيد الوجود من
الاخر و لا يجوز ان يكون واجب الوجود من وجه
و ممكن الوجود من وجه اخر - (51)

(ii) ... و لقائل ان يقول : انكم
ان تحاشيتي ان تطلقوا على الاول اسمي الجوهر
فلسطيني تتحاشون ان تطلقوا عليه معناه ، و

ذلك لأنه موجود لا في موضوع، وهذا المعنى هو الجوهر الذي جنستوه له - فنقول : ليس هذا معنى الجوهر الذي جنسناه، بل معنى ذلك انه الشيء ذو الماهية المنفردة الذي وجوده ليس في موضوع كجسم او نفس؟ والدليل على انه اذا لم يعن بالجوهر هذا لم يكن جنسا البتة، هو ان المدلول عليه بلفظ الموجود ليس يقتضى جنسيته، والسلب الذي يلحق به لا يزيده على الوجود الا نسبة مباينة : وهذا المعنى ليس فيه اثبات شيء محصل بعد الوجود، و لا هو معنى لشيء بذاته، بل هو بالنسبة فقط، فالموجود لا في موضوع انما المعنى الاثباتي فيه الذي يجوز ان يكون لذات ما، هو الموجود؛ وبعده شيء سلبي ومضاف خارج عن الهوية التي تكون للشيء - فهذا المعنى ان اخذ على هذا الوجه لم يكن جنساً - ...

وقد علمت في المنطق ايضا
انا اذا قلنا: كل "ا" مثلا، عنيئا كل شيء موصوف

بأنه "أ" ولو كانت له حقيقة غير الالفية"
فقولنا في حد الجواهر: انه الموجود لا في
موضوع، معناه انه الشيء الذي يقال عليه
موجود لا في موضوع، على ان الموجود لا في
موضوع محمول عليه، وله في نفسه ماهية
مثل الانسان والحجر، والشجر، فهكذا
يجب ان يتصور الجواهر حتى يكون جنساً.
و الدليل على ان بين الامرين فرقاً وان
الجنس احدهما دون الاخر، انك تقول
لتشخص انسان ما مجهول الوجود: انه لا
محالة هو ما وجوده ان لا يكون في موضوع،
و لا تقول: انه لا محالة موجود الان لا في
موضوع، وكأننا قد بالغنا في تعريف هذا حيث
تكلما في المنطق - (52)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

I2. EVERY THING EMANATES FROM HIM IN SUCCESSION.

الثاني عشر: ان كل ما سوى
واجب الوجود ينبغي ان يكون صادراً عن
واجب الوجود، على الترتيب، و ان يكون
وجود كل ما سواه منه -

برهان: انه اذا بان ان
واجب الوجود، لا يكون الا واحداً، فما عداه
لا يكون واجباً، فيكون ممكناً، فيقتصر الى
واجب الوجود - (53)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

(أ) الموجودات كثيرة وهي من
كثرتها متفاضلة وجوهره جوهر يفيض منه

كل وجود [كيف كان ذلك الوجود] كان كاملا
او ناقصا و جوهره ايضا جوهر اذا فاضت منه
الموجودات كلها بترتيب مراتبها حصل
عنه لكل موجود قسطه الذي له من الوجود
ومرتبته منه - (54)

(ii) فنقول ان الموجودات على
ضربين احدهما اذا اعتبر ذاته ليرتبط وجوده
ويسمى ممكن الوجود و الثاني اذا اعتبر ذاته
وجب وجوده و يسمى واجب الوجود و ان كان
ممكن الوجود اذا فرضناه غير موجود ليرتبط
منه محال فلا معنى بوجوده عن علة و اذا وجب
صار واجب الوجود بغيره فيلزم من هذا انه
كان مما لا يزل ممكن الوجود بذاته واجب
الوجود بغيره وهذا الامكان اما ان يكون
شيئا فيما لا يزل و اما ان يكون في وقت
دون وقت، و الاثنى عشر الممكنة لا يجوز ان
تمر بلا نهاية في كونها علة و معلولا و لا يجوز

كونها على سبيل الدور بل لا بد من انتمائها
الى شيء واجب هو الموجود الاول - (55)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(أ) ... واجب الوجود واحد بالكلية
ليس كأنواع تحت جنس ' و واحد بالعدد
ليس كاشخاص تحت نوع ' بل معنى شرح
اسمه له فقط ' و وجوده غير مشترك
فيه - ... فهذه الخواص التي يختص بها
واجب الوجود -

و اما الممكن الوجود ' فقد
تبين من ذلك خاصيته وهو انه يحتاج
ضرورة الى شيء اخر يجعله بالفعل موجودا -
وكل ما هو ممكن الوجود فهو دائما '
باعتبار ذاته ' ممكن الوجود ' لكنه ربما
عرض ان يجب وجوده بغيره ' و ذلك اما
ان يعرض له دائما ' و اما ان يكون وجوب

وجودة عن غيره ليس دائما، بل في وقت
دون وقت - فهذا يجب ان يكون له
مادة تتقدم وجودة بالزمان - (56)

(ii) و هو فاعل الكل بمعنى انه
الموجود الذي يفيض عنه كل وجود فيضانا
مباينا لذاته - (57)

(iii) و اذا قيل اول فهو باعتبار
ذاته هو الذي لا تركيب فيه وانه منزلة عن
العلل و باضافته الى الموجودات هو الذي
يصدر عنه الاشياء - (58)

(iv) Compare the context of Ibn - Sīnā on
point no. IO(iii) in page 217.

56. IS., Ilah.(I) ... 47

57. IS., Ilah.(2) ... 403

58. IS., Arsh. ... 13

3. COMPARATIVE STUDY.

1. GOD IS NOT AN ACCIDENT.

Al-Fārābī attributes greatness, exaltedness and magnificence to God and states how His qualities are different from those of finite things. The perfection of a thing in those qualities lies either in its essence or in one of its accidents. Most of the qualities ascribed to us are due only to some form of perfection in one of our accidents; such as, gentleness, knowledge or accidental qualities of body. But the perfection of God is apparently distinct from that of other things in the world. Similarly, His greatness, exaltedness and magnificence are different from things having those qualities. On the contrary, these noble qualities of God are derived from His Essence alone and not from any other thing outside His Essence. It does not matter at all whether anybody glorifies His Being with those attributes. But He possesses them in His Being. Thus in His nature nothing is 'awaited'. On the other hand, beauty, splendour and adornment in every other being are the best qualities which are derived from His Being. Since His existence is the best of all, His beauty, splendour and

adornment also transcend all qualities of the finite things in the world.

Thus God's providence is exercised over all existents, and perfection can be attributed to Him eminently, namely, whatever positive being it expresses belongs to Him as its cause. Thus Dr. T. J. De Boer says:-

"The first Existence, one alone, and of a verity real, we call God; and since in him all things are one, without even difference in kind, no definition of his Being can be supplied. Yet man bestows upon him the noblest names, expressive of all that is most honoured and esteemed in life, because in the mystic impulse thereto, words lose their usual significance, transcending all discrepancy. Some names refer to his essential nature, others to his relation to the world, without prejudicing, however, the unity of his essence; but they are all to be understood metaphorically, and we can interpret them only according to feeble analogy. Of God, as the most perfect Being, we ought properly to have also the

most complete idea." (1)

Here the position of al-Fārābī is mystic. With him as with all mystics, contemplation dominates action. He prefers to study the relation between God and the World, and endeavours to arrive at the knowledge of one Being. His philosophic system is a form of spiritualism and his method deduction. But with regard to mysticism some distinction has been observed between the works of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā. In this connection B. Carra De Vaux remarks:-

"I have pointed to a difference between Fārābī and Avicenna as regards the position of Mysticism; in Avicenna mysticism appears only at the end of the system to crown his work, as it were; it is quite distinct from the other parts of it and Avicenna treats mysticism - and very artistically-as a chapter in philosophy which he would study in an objective fashion. On the contrary in Fārābī mysticism penetrates

1. Boer, Hist. ... 114

everything; the terms of Ṣūfīsm are scattered throughout his works and one clearly feels that with him mysticism is not a theory but rather a subjective state. This point of view further contributes to make his system somewhat obscure.

It has been said that Avicenna is clearer, better arranged and more methodical than Fārābī; Muslim Scholasticism has clearly a more finished form in Avicenna." (2)

Three references have been quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He asserts that 'Whatever has being must either have a reason for its being, or have no reason for it. If it has a reason, then it is contingent, equally before it comes into being (if we make this mental hypothesis) and when it is in the state of being - for in the case of a thing whose being is contingent the mere fact of its entering upon being does not remove

2. EI.¹ ... Art. "Al-Fārābī".

from it the contingent nature of its being. If on the otherhand it has no reason for its being in anyway whatsoever, then it is necessary in its being. This rule having been confirmed, I shall now proceed to prove that there is in being a being which has no reason for its being.

Such a being is either contingent or necessary. If it is necessary, then the point we sought to prove is established. If on the other hand it is contingent, that which is contingent cannot enter upon being except for some reason which sways the scales in favour of its being and against its not-being. If the reason is also contingent, there is then a chain of contingents linked one to the other, and there is no being at all; for this being which is the subject of our hypothesis cannot enter into being so long as it is not preceded by an infinite succession of beings, which is absurd. 'Therefore contingent beings end in a Necessary Being.' (j)

Having thus established that all categories of

contingent beings end in Necessary Being or God, Ibn-Sīnā aims at ascertaining His nature, and asserts that 'He is not an accident: An accident is a being in a locus. The locus is precedent to it, and its being is not possible without the locus. But we have stated that a being which is necessary has no reason for its being.' (4)

Then Ibn-Sīnā wants to prove that the nature of God cannot be confounded with that of the contingent being. Thus according to him, 'Proof that He cannot be a Necessary Being in one respect and contingent being in another respect: Such a being, inasmuch as it is a contingent being, would be connected in being with something else, and so it has a reason; but in as much as it is a necessary being, it would have no connexions with anything else. In that case it would both have being and not have being; and that is absurd'. (5)

Al-Ghazālī states that God cannot be an

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|------------|-----|----|
| 4. Arberry | ... | 28 |
| 5. Ibid | ... | 28 |

accident, and he advances two reasons for this argument. Firstly, an accident is dependent upon a body, and its non-existence invariably follows from the non-existence of a body. Secondly, an accident is a contingent thing. Since every contingent thing is capable of being existent through another thing which may be its cause, it would be caused. Both of these lines of thought are sound. That is why God cannot be an accident, for His is the necessary existence which has no connection with anything else. His demonstration of absurdity also can be tested by the syllogism in the following ways:-

1. All accident is that which has connection
with a body.

God is not that which has connection
with a body.

∴ God is not accident.

2. All contingent thing is that which is
existent through another thing.

God is not that which is existent
through another thing.

∴ God is not a contingent thing.

The conclusion of each of the syllogisms is valid in the form of 'CAMESTRES'. His absurdity, therefore, is proved by the way of thought and practice.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to the views of Ibn-Sīnā. The views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā appear to be on dissimilar lines. For al-Fārābī attributes certain noblest qualities to God and asserts that these qualities transcend the finite beings possessing them. In this connection he brings in the term 'accident' and illustrates it as one of our qualities. Ibn-Sīnā, on the other hand, categorically asserts that God cannot be an accident which can only manifest itself in a subject and thus it becomes a contingent being. Moreover, he divides being into two kinds, one being necessary and the other being contingent. Thus according to him, God is Necessary Being which has no connection with anything else. So He cannot be an accident which is connected in being with something else. Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to the detailed view of Ibn-Sīnā.

Moreover, al-Ghazālī's account appears to be a systematic arrangement, where the contexts of jism, and ^carad as mumkin seem to be "additions".

2. HE IS NOT A BODY.

Three references from Al-Fārābī and four from Ibn-Sīnā have been quoted. God, according to Al-Fārābī, is pure Being whose Essence does not manifest itself in a body, surface, line and mathematical point. For body is composed of matter and form which, on the other hand, may be stated to be its causes. Moreover, subsistence of the surface, line and mathematical point is with body, and that of body is with matter and form. All of these corporeal adjuncts are opposed to the Essence of God. For He is one in all respects. This means that His Being concerns His Essence alone apart from other existents, and His reality is not quantitatively divisible. Therefore, quantity, space and time cannot be ascribed to Him. Furthermore, He comprehends His existence, and this apprehension is possible by His Essence only and not from any other thing. From this simplicity of His existence and

incorporeality of His Essence are derived.

This indicates that the concept of His existence coincides with that of unity, truth and goodness. Thus the nature of God is made an absolute criterion in comparison with the differences and diversities, plurality and individuality with which our universe teems. So De Boer says:-

"If we now take a general survey of Farabi's system, it exhibits itself as a fairly consistent Spiritualism, or, to be more precise, - Intellectualism. The Corporeal, - that which appeals to the Senses, - as it originates in the imagination of the Spirit, might be designated "a confused presentation". The only true existence is Spirit, although it assumes various degrees. God alone is entirely unmixed and pure Spirit, while those Spirits, which eternally proceed from him, already have in them the element of plurality. The number of primary Spirits has been determined by the Ptolemaic cosmology, and corresponds to the celestial hierarchy.

The farther anyone of them is removed from the first, so such the less part has it in the Being of the pure Spirit. From the last World-Spirit Man receives his essential nature, that is - Reason. There is no gap in all the system; the Universe is a beautiful and well-ordered whole. The Evil and the Bad are the necessary consequence of finiteness in individual things; but the Good which characterizes the Universe is set thereby in bolder relief." (6)

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that God is simple and pure Being. There is no principle for His subsistence apart from His Essence. Neither has He quantitative parts in His Essence nor is He dependent upon form and matter, because they depend upon the essence of other things. He is one, and He is neither with a body, nor in a body, nor divisible in any respect. Rather existence of all things emanates from Him. There is no cause and nothing else in His Essence

6. Boer, Hist. ... 124

except His will for a thing. ' ... He has no formal cause: A formal, corporeal cause only exists and is confirmed when a thing is possessed of matter: the matter has a share in the being of the form, in the same way that the form has a part in the disposition of the matter in being in actuality; such a thing is therefore caused. It is further evident as a result of denying this cause to Him, that He is also to be denied all corporeal attributes, such as time, space, direction, and being in one place to the exclusion of all other; in short, whatever is possible in relation to corporeal things is impossible in relation to Him.

Proof that He has no final cause: The final cause is that on account of which a thing has being; and the First Truth has not being for the sake of anything, rather does everything exist on account of the perfection of His Essence, being consequent to His Being and derived from His Being. Moreover, the final cause, even if it be posterior in respect of being to all other causes, yet it is mentally prior to them all. It is the final cause which

makes the active cause become a cause in actuality, that is to say in respect of its being a final cause.' (7)

On the contrary, God is Necessary Being. He contemplates His Essence as well as the order pervading all things. Consequently, the order of existents emanates from Him. 'It follows necessarily that the first thing to emanate from God was not a body; for every body is compounded of matter and form, and these require either two causes, or a single cause with two aspects; this being so, it is impossible that these two should have emanated from God, it having been established that there is no compounding in God whatsoever. Since the first thing to emanate from God was not a body, it follows that it was an abstract substance, namely the First Intelligence.' (8)

Thus God is pure Being. He never depends upon any corporeal reality. Rather He is above all determinate

7. Arberry	...	31
8. Ibid	...	36

qualifications. In this connection Dr. D. Saliba says:

" ... Et ensuite, de ce que Dieu est pur de toute puissance et de toute matière, il suit qu'il est absolument simple.

L'être nécessaire est simple, parce que son essence ne peut pas avoir des principes réunis par les quels il subsiste. En effet, l'essence d'une partie n'est ni l'essence de l'autre partie, ni l'essence du tout qui est le composé des parties; mais chaque partie par essence est antérieure au tout. Et comme les parties sont inséparables du tout et que le tout est inséparable des parties, leur existence dépend de leur réunion. La cause de l'existence doit donc nécessiter l'existence des parties avant celle du tout, qui serait pour ainsi dire causé par ses parties. D'où il suit qu'aucun être composé ne peut être nécessaire par lui-même.

Il s'ensuit immédiatement que l'être nécessaire n'est pas un corps; car le corps est, par définition,

divisible en parties. Or, nous venons de voir que l'être nécessaire ne peut pas être composé; car, s'il l'était, il cesserait d'être nécessaire par lui-même. Il suit également de là que l'être nécessaire n'est ni matière de corps, ni forme corporelle, ni matière intelligible d'une forme intelligible, ni forme intelligible d'une matière intelligible." (9)

Furthermore, Ibn-Sīnā explains that God is the First Being, and He has no relation with material adjunctions. "God, he says, 'is not a body, nor the matter of a body, nor the form of one; nor an intelligible matter for an intelligible form, nor an intelligible form in an intelligible matter. He is not divisible, neither in quantity, nor in principle, nor in definition, he is One'. Hence as a transcendental being God is, in accordance with the tenets of his Faith, strictly one. He

is complete in himself, and no state in him is to be 'awaited'. He is a Necessary Being in essence as well as in all other respects. He could not be a necessary being in one sense and possible being in another. He could not be both at the same time, because that would involve contradiction. And if he is necessary in everyway, and everything that is possible has already become necessary in him, there remains nothing incomplete or lacking in him to be awaited - neither will, nor nature, nor knowledge, nor any of his attributes. Furthermore, he who is a necessary being in his essence, is pure Good and pure Perfection. The Good is what every being keenly desires in order to perfect its existence; it is a condition of perfection, and evil does not exist in essence. 'Existence is a goodness, and the perfection of existence is the goodness of existence'. Thus a being that does not suffer any evil in the form of the absence of a substance, or of any undesirable state of it, is pure Good. This could not apply to what is in essence a possible being. Good in the sense of useful and profitable is only with the object of attaining perfection in things. God as a source

of help becomes a source of Good and free of all defect or evil." (10)

It follows, therefore, that Ibn-Sīnā merely depends on pure reason. Thus Dr. J. L. Teicher says:

"The type of knowledge ascribed by Avicenna to God, although super human, is in fact, rationalistic, and it coincides exactly with the description of a hypothetical super human intelligence which scientists like Huxley, Laplace, and others have offered, and which Bergson justly rejects as being rationalistic. It is a symptom of the confusion in philosophical thought at the present day that certain philosophical schools still apply to God the term "intuitive knowledge" in the Avicennian - Thomistic sense without troubling to reply to Bergson's criticism of it". (11)

Al-Ghazālī lists two reasons why God cannot be a body. Firstly, every body is quantitatively divisible into

10. Afnan ... 169

11. Wickens, Avicenna ... 41

parts and their totality is dependent upon parts. Then non-existence of that totality invariably follows from the non-existence of those parts. For example, a human being may be taken as a sum-total of all his organs; in that his non-existence is determined by the non-existence of them. Furthermore, every totality is caused by different parts. Since God is pure Being, His Essence cannot be constituted by parts.

Secondly, body is composed of matter and form; and non-existence of anyone of them eventually causes the non-existence of the body. On the other hand, the existence of God is with His Essence alone. Thus His non-existence, if one could imagine that, would follow from the non-existence of His Essence only. Al-Ghazālī's argument here is like Bosanquet's implication of proposition by "This and Nothing". For Bosanquet says:-

"There is a given complex as starting-point, whether fact or supposition makes no difference. Construed along with the ordered whole of our

experience, it affirms a certain result, and this result, its implication, you must admit as its implication, so long as you affirm the ordered whole to be real. You cannot escape from the implication as such by pointing out that you do not affirm as a fact the complex which is your starting-point. On the contrary, you may decide to deny it as a fact just because its implication is inevitable. If the joint system has been rightly read, which we must assume, you could only annul the implication by ceasing to affirm the system of reality within which you are judging it to hold. If you have judged the relation rightly, you would in the end, in attempting to annul your judgment, have to deny the Law of Contradiction. That is to say, an implication rightly judged is guaranteed by the whole system of reality. If you deny it, you leave nothing standing." (12)

Al-Ghazālī states that the existence of God

wholly concurs with His Essence. This is most adequately expressed by the word 'implication'; that is, within a given nature, a system of terms and relations, so far it possesses the unity of a true universal, the presence or absence of certain terms in certain moditions enables us to be sure that certain other terms in certain determinate forms will be present or absent.

Here al-Ghazālī's account has got two aspects. Now with respect to his first aspect his account corresponds to the views of Ibn-Sīnā, whereas with respect to his second aspect his account corresponds to the views of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that God is One. He is neither with a body nor is divisible in any respect. In addition to their basic agreement, it has been observed that in the philosophy of each of them a particular aspect has been emphasized. Ibn-Sīnā asserts that God is neither with a body nor in a body. Moreover, the first thing to emanate from Him is not a body, rather it is known as abstract intelligence. Then Ibn-Sīnā shows that body is quantitatively divisible into parts for which

it cannot be ascribed to the nature of God. Al-Ghazālī's first aspect appears to be closer to this. On the other hand, al-Fārābī asserts that body cannot be ascribed to the nature of God, for body is composed of matter and form; and as such it negates the necessary character which has no connection with anything else. Al-Ghazālī's second aspect appears to be closer to this. Furthermore, his "Fa-innahu idhā qīla lanā : l^umakāna al-ḥibr mawjūdan? ... fa-hādhihi al-ajzā' cillat al-jumla, wa hākadhā ajzā' kull murakkab cillat li l-murakkab." appears to be an 'addition'.

3. HE IS NOT LIKE FORM AND MATTER.

Two references from Al-Fārābī and two from Ibn-Sīnā are noted. According to Al-Fārābī God can not be with matter nor can His subsistence be in matter nor can He be in a substratum. On the contrary, the Essence of God is intelligence as opposed to form and matter. For whenever a thing does not require matter in respect to its

existence it is called intelligence with respect to its essence. So He is intelligence and intelligible by His Essence. Furthermore, His Being is free from matter, form and substratum. Form cannot exist without matter. On the otherhand, if He has any form, His Essence would be composed of matter and form. Then if there are two principles in His Being, He concedes a cause in Him, for each of them becomes a cause for the existence of totality. He is the First Cause. No aim and standard are needed for the completion of His Being. There can neither be the first cause for His Being, nor can His Being be derived from another thing which is prior to Him. In this connection Dr. R. Walzer says:-

"The world was ruled by the First Being, the First Cause, which was eternal and perfect, without matter and without form, the absolute One without any other specification or qualification. This had been, in all essentials, the upshot of Al-Kindi's metaphysics as well. Centuries of unquestioned

philosophical tradition had given to a highly controversial and hypothetical postulate like this the appearance of self-evidence, and it had been eagerly accepted by Christian theologians and, to a large extent, by their Muslim counterpart, the Mu^ctazila. Al-Fārābī's philosophy is connected with the last Alexandrian philosophers, whose thought shows a growth in the influence of Aristotle; hence to the definition of the Godhead as one indivisible substance he adds, probably like his Christian Greek predecessors, that God is thought, thinking and object of thought in one, nous, noōn, noumenon, ^caql^c aqīl ma^c qūl." (13)

God, therefore, does not require matter for the support of His Being. Thus B. Carra De Vaux adds:-

"The matter which is in question here is the substratum of the world which contains its possibility. The world is produced by coming from

this matter, not created directly from nothing. The celestial spheres, animated by their respective soul, are put into motion by the prime mover; the latter is not God himself but rather the primary intelligence which emanates from him." (14)

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that God is one in number. Whatever is other than He is contingent and caused. Everything except God who is one in His Essence and except the existent which derives its existence from its own essence, derives its existence from something else. This means that the existence of a thing implies a creation through which it acquires its being from another thing. Non-existence can be ascribed to its essence, but it applies to the whole of matter and form, and not to form alone without matter. Therefore, its creation comprises both form and matter. Furthermore, "God, he says, 'is not

14. EI.¹ ... Art. "Al-Fārābī"

a body, nor the matter of a body, nor form of one; nor an intelligible matter for an intelligible form, nor an intelligible form in an intelligible matter. He is not divisible, neither in quantity, nor in principle, nor in definition, he is one."

Matter, according to Ibn-Sīnā, is possible being; and creation consists in granting actual existence to this possible being. However, in the nature of God being and existence are one. Of course, in all that is not the nature of God, existence is called by Ibn-Sīnā an attribute of being. On the other hand, matter is pure passivity and it appears to be the subject upon which celestial influences act. In this connection S. H. Nasr states:

"In his doctrine of matter Ibn-Sīnā implicitly assumes the "original matter" of Ikhwān al-Ṣafā without, however, mentioning it. He considers the hylé as the subject of corporeality and that to

which corporeal form (ṣūrah jismiyyah) is added to
make a general body ... " (15)

Al-Ghazālī states that God is not like form
and matter, because form is dependent upon matter and
its non-existence invariably follows from the non-
existence of matter. Similarly, matter is a place of
form and it cannot manifest itself except through form.
For matter actually exists with form and ceases to be
owing to the non-existence of form.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to the
views of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in
that God is not ~~matter~~ matter and form. But al-Fārābī's
views appear to be developed. For he teaches that God
is not matter nor can this subsistence be in matter, nor
can He be in a substratum. Furthermore, the relation
between form and matter is inseparable: thus if He had
any form, His Essence would be composed of matter and

15. Nasr, Cosmological Doctrines... 220

form; and this is inconceivable. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this.

4. HIS BEING IS QUIDDITY.

Three references have been quoted from al-Fārābī. He propounds the view that God is the First Being. He is single, and no other thing can ever be His partner. His Being is the most excellent and perfect of all categories of beings. His existence cannot be postulated to be non-existent. For He is the First Cause of all existents. Furthermore, His is the best and prior existence, and no other thing can ever be prior and better than He on the scale of existence. Consequently, His existence and Essence can never be conceived non-existent, as non-existence involves imperfection. On the contrary, He is free from all types of imperfection. That is why, no efficient, formal, material and final causes are needed for His Being. Moreover, His existence does not follow a quiddity which is other than the existence. And He has no quiddity other than that He is Necessary Being, and this is His

identity.

On the other hand, His identity, quiddity and necessary existence, broadly speaking, manifest His Essence. This implication within such an order not merely establishes a connection of the terms having a relative necessity, but over and above it confirms their existence and establishes their true character. Observation establishes their bare existence as something, but apart from insight into the order it gives us no support that we are apprehending the constituent members as they really are. The proposition 'God's essence is His existence' identifies the predicate with the subject. Our common convictions are inferences from implications within a system. They are inferences from a character which we presume in some groups of terms and relations presented to our constructive apprehension.

However, according to Al-Fārābī " ... existence is a grammatical or logical relation, but not a category

of actuality which makes any assertion about things. The existence of a thing is nothing but the thing itself." (16)

Ibn-Sīnā does not differ in principle from Al-Fārābī and he asserts that His quiddity, identity and Necessary Being are one. '... His Quiddity is not other than His Identity, but rather that His Being is unified in His Reality: If His Being were not the same as His Reality, then His Being would be other than His Reality. Every accident is caused, and everything caused requires a reason. Now this reason is either external to His Quiddity, or is itself His Quiddity: if it is external, then He is not a necessary being, and is not exempt from an active cause; while if the reason is itself the Quiddity, then the reason must necessarily be itself a complete being in order that the being of another may result from it. Quiddity before being has no being; and if it had being before this, it would not require a second being. The question therefore returns to the problem of

being. If the Being of the Quiddity is accidental, whence did this Being supervene and adhere? It is therefore established that the Identity of the Necessary Being is His Quiddity and that He has no active cause; the necessary nature of His Being is like the quiddity of all other things. From this it is evident that the Necessary Being does not resemble anyother thing in any respect whatsoever; for with all other things their being is other than their quiddity'. (17)

On the otherhand, everything which has a quiddity is postulated to be existent in its essence and imagined in the mind by having its part present with it. If it has a reality other than the fact that it exists in one or other of these two forms, and that is not constituted by it, existence would then be a concept which would be added to its reality as a concomitant or otherwise. However, according to Ibn-Sīnā Being in itself is the cause of all particular existents. He is above

all distinctions and polarization and yet the cause of the multiplicity, casting its light upon the different quiddities of all things.

"Thus Avicenna's comprehension of essence does not differ much from that of Aristotle as found in Book Z of the metaphysica. What was necessary and important for his chief argument was to stress its distinction from the notion of existence. Modern philosophers may think that the idea of essence is 'purely linguistic', and that 'a word may have an essence, but a thing cannot', yet at that early stage the conception was real and helpful. ... 'All true being is true according to its essential reality. And it is agreed that He is One and cannot be pointed out. How then could what through Him attains all the truth of its existence'..." (18)

On the other hand, existence derives its principle from Being and His Essence is the same as His existence. Thus S. H. Nasr says:-

"There are two major distinctions which underlie the philosophy of Ibn Sīnā, one an ontological distinction between quiddity, or essence (māhīyāh), and existence (wujūd), and the other the tripartite division between the Necessary (wājib), possible (mumkin) and impossible (mumtani^c) being. Only in the Necessary Being (wājib al-wujūd), or God, are essence and existence inseparably united, while for all other beings unity and existence are only accidents added to their essence or quiddity. The Necessary Being whose essence and existence are one is pure Truth as It is pure Goodness; It is the source and origin of all existence." (19)

Necessary Being is an unbending unity which involves no multiplicity in its essence. A thing may be caused in relation to its quiddity and reality, or it may be caused in its existence. Thus Dr. Kenelm Foster, O.P. says:-

"I have said that existence, for Avicenna, is

something that happens to, or is added to, **essence**. It follows that, if essences do exist, they must derive existence from outside themselves, and ultimately from some First Being who is not strictly an "essence" at all, but pure existence ... God is utterly one both as undivided in Himself and as unique. A stress on the Divine unity was accepted as characteristically Avicennian: "the first being cannot be other than a unity ... and this is Avicenna's position". Now this stress seems to have found an eager and somewhat unguarded welcome, in the last decades of the 12th century, with certain inheritors of the strong tradition, more or less neoplatonist, which derived from Boethius, had been fed by Denys and Scotus Erigena and developed by the great 12th century School of Chartres. This "tradition De Unitate", as it has been called, laid a particular stress on form as the principle of intelligibility and unity in being; and saw this formal principle of oneness and stability as realized perfectly in God and participated, variously, by creatures; each

creature deriving from God and returning to God according to the measure of its unity, stability and intelligence. It is a very intellectual view of the world, but also mystical and religious." (20)

Al-Ghazālī states that the existence of God is not different from His quiddity. Generally, the concept of identity is distinct from that of quiddity and its existence is accidental to quiddity. But while considering the Essence of God, both identity and quiddity form the unity of His Being.

Every accidental thing is caused. For if it were existent by its essence, it would not be accidental to something else. Wherever it is accidental to some/other thing, it is dependent upon it, Since it cannot be except along with it. The cause of its existence must be one of the following two things. Either it is the quiddity or something else. But if it is something else, the existence would then be accidental and caused.

On the other hand, quiddity by itself is incapable of becoming a cause for its existence, because non-existence cannot be the cause for existence, and quiddity has no existence prior to this existence. How would it be a cause? If it had an existence before this existence, it would be independent of the second existence. But then the same series of questions would follow, i.e. whether this existence is accidental or not.

However His quiddity and identity form the unity of His Being which does not resemble anything else. For whatever can be enumerated, is simply a contingent thing which derives its being from Necessary Being.

Al-Ghazālī discusses the role of the finite and determinate qualities and points out that these ideas can be true, in that they have a reference beyond mental experience. But they point to a system organised by other finite qualities in

interrelation with them. Al-Ghazālī calls them contingent factors whose existences can simply be derived from God.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that His Essence and existence cannot be non-existent; and His identity, quiddity and necessary existence manifest His Essence. Moreover Ibn-Sīnā adds from his own. He describes how His quiddity is not different from His identity and His Being is unified in His reality. Furthermore, he illustrates the nature of accident as contingent factor. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to correspond closely with this detailed view.

5. HE IS NOT (CAUSALLY) RELATED TO ANYTHING AS THAT THING IS (CAUSALLY) RELATED TO HIM.

Two references from Al-Fārābī and two from Ibn-Sīnā are noted. Al-Fārābī asserts that the Necessary Being cannot be supposed to be non-existent.

There is no cause for His Being. Moreover, His Being cannot be with anything else. He is the First Cause of all things.

Everything in the world is contingent. It requires another thing for its existence and that thing, on the other hand, is in need of something else for its coming into being. The process of one contingent thing's coming into being pursues an upward trend till it reaches Necessary Being. Thus the thing, according to al-Fārābī, cannot be a cause for itself. Similarly, its quiddity is incapable of being a cause of its existence. Furthermore, one quiddity cannot have two existences, one deriving something and the other having something derived. On this basis there cannot be two things, each of them being the cause of the other. For example, A is the cause of B, and B is the cause of A. If the existence of B is derived from A, then the existence of A is necessarily prior to the existence of B. So B is not an effect. On the otherhand, A in view of its being a cause of B, comes before the existence of B and in view of its being effect of B, it follows from

the existence of B. Thus in one respect, it is existent and in another it is non-existent. Consequently, B becomes a cause of itself. For a cause of a cause appears to be a cause. In this connection, if B is the cause of A, and A is the cause of B, in reality B is its own cause. This is inconceivable.

Ibn-Sīnā does not differ from Al-Fārābī in principle. God, according to him, is necessary existence and there is no cause for Him, nor can His existence correspond to another existence where each of them is equal to the other. Furthermore, no partnership, multiplicity, change or becoming can be ascribed to Him.

Ibn-Sīnā demonstrates that God has no cause. For if there is a cause for His Being, He would exist by means of that cause, and would not be necessary by His Essence. That is why the Necessary Being has no cause.

God is Necessary Being and He does not depend upon anything else for His existence, '... one and the

something cannot be both precedent and subsequent in relation to its being. Moreover, if we assume for the sake of argument that the other is non-existent: would the first then be a necessary being, or not? If it were a necessary being, it would have no connexion with the other: if it were not a necessary being, it would be a contingent being and would require another necessary being. Since the Necessary Being is One, and does not derive Its being from any one, it follows that He is a Necessary Being in every respect; while anything else derives its being from another.' (21)

Al-Ghazālī states that God is not related to anything as that thing is related to Him in such a way that each of them is the cause of the other. For instance, B is the cause of C and C is the cause of B. Here B in view of its being a cause is prior to C; and C in view of its being a cause, on the other hand, is prior to B. Thus one is prior to the other which

precedes it and this is an absurd statement. For in respect of its being a cause each of them occurs before its associate and in respect of its being effect it follows the other. Consequently, each of the phenomena appears to be a cause of the other and this is absurd.

Thus his views consist of two aspects. One deals with the principle that God is not (causally) related to anything else as that thing is (causally) related to Him. The other is concerned with a concrete example. However, in respect to his first aspect al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to the views of Ibn-Sīnā. On the otherhand, in his second aspect his concrete example is found in agreement with that of al-Fārābī. Thus his 'Annahu lā yuta^Callaq bi-ghayrihi^C alā wajh yuta^Callaq dhālika al-ghayr bihi' appears to be closer to Ibn-Sīnā's 'Fa-in kāna wājib al-wujūd, fa lā ta^Calluq lahu bi l-ākhar'. On the other hand, al-Ghazālī's statement with the examples of 'B is the cause C and C is the cause of B' corresponds closely to al-Fārābī's instance of 'A is the cause of B and B

is the cause of A.'

6. HE IS NOT RELATED TO ANOTHER THING AS THAT OTHER IS RELATED TO HIM BY WAY OF RECIPROCITY.

Two references from al-Fārābī and five from Ibn-Sīnā have been quoted. Al-Fārābī propounds the view that as in the cases of two phenomena each of them cannot be equally a cause of the other, so a reciprocal relation between two phenomena cannot be ascertained. On the contrary, a third relation between them is established, but there cannot be infinite and contingent causes for them. For each of them has a peculiar medium which becomes an effect in one respect and a cause in another. Furthermore, whatever has a peculiar medium, has a finite extremity. Consequently, ^{the dependence of} contingent things ~~have no recourse to~~ ^{on} the existence of Necessary Being ~~who~~ is free from material, formal, efficient and final (gha'iya) causes. Therefore His Being is most perfect and exalted; and moreover, He is free from all inadequacies and determination.

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from

al-Fārābī. He asserts that nothing can be necessary by means of its essence and at the same time of something else. For if the other thing is excluded or its existence is not taken into consideration, then one of two things must be true. First of all, if its necessary existence remains in one condition, it cannot be necessary by means of other things. Secondly, if its necessary existence is not so, then its existence cannot be necessary by its essence. All that is necessary in association with other things, can simply be a contingent thing by its essence. For whatever is considered to be necessary to other things, its necessary existence is subordinate to a relation and addition. Later on, necessary existence is confirmed by this relation. Moreover, the essence of a thing determines necessary or possible or impossible existences. But it is to be noted that this is not required for the impossible existence. For all that opposes its existence by its essence, can neither exist by its essence nor by something else. That is why whatever becomes necessary by its essence, cannot simultaneously be necessary by other things.

In this connection Ibn-Sīnā emphatically remarks that Necessary Being cannot be compared to contingent being which is connected with something else. 'Demonstration that He has no material and receptive cause: The receptive cause is the cause for the provision of the place in which a thing is received; that is to say, the place prepared for the reception of being, or the perfection of being. Now the Necessary Being is a perfection in pure actuality, and is not impaired by any deficiency; every perfection belongs to Him, derives from Him, and is preceded by His Essence, while every deficiency, even if it be metaphorical, is negated to Him.' (22)

Thus His Being can be related to no other thing except His Essence. Things are contingent and caused. That is why they cannot be equated with the universal nature of Necessary Being. For example, between two phenomena if one is the cause of the other, it can be related to the other only by possibility and not by necessity. They can in no way be equal nor can they be connected with any external cause. Rather one of them should be taken as first by dint

of its existence. Then the reciprocal relation of one of them cannot be necessitated by the other, rather it may be so regarded in company with the other and a cause is required for putting them together. They consist of two distinct matters or subjects or descriptions, and the existence of a third thing unites them together. This, on the otherhand, consists of two factors. One of them implies any one of the two things and its reality is compresent with the other. Thus its existence cannot be necessary; it is merely contingent and caused. Similarly, its cause cannot be equal in existence. Hence its cause turns out to be another thing; as such it and the other thing cannot be a cause of the relation between them, rather it becomes that other thing. The other does not have the same implication. For the concomitance becomes accidental to its particular existence. Furthermore, the existence which specifies it cannot be equal in respect of that to which it corresponds, but is derived from a precedent cause if it is an effect. Thus it has two possibilities. Firstly, the existence is derived from its associate not in the way it corresponds, but in the manner

the existence of its associate specifies it. So they cannot be equal; yet they can be understood as cause and effect. In this connection one of their associates appears to be a cause for the imaginative relation between them as are the cases of father and son. Secondly, they can not be equal in respect of two things where each of them cannot be cause of the other, but the relation is necessary for the existence of both of them. Thus the first cause for the relation is an external thing which produces the essence of both of them. All relations are accidental and they can not be equal unless they accidentally happen to be so.

Ibn-Sīnā is concerned to demonstrate that the reality of God is isolated from the objective world. His reality refers to an ideal content beyond the objective reference. It is recognized as such. It is not an empirical fact but an adjective. Thus in the act of our assertion we may simply transfer this adjective to and unite it with a real substantive. We comprehend at the same time that the relation thus set up is neither

constituted by the act, nor merely holds within it, but is real, both independent of and beyond the objective world.

Al-Ghazālī states that God cannot be related to any other thing as that other is related to Him; [this] not [only] in respect of causality but [also] in respect of reciprocity such as is between two brothers. For, if the non-existence of one does not follow from that of the other, no relation can be established.

On the otherhand, existence which is different from necessary existence can have a relation with Necessary Being. But it is to be noted that this form of relation is similar to that of the effect to its cause, where effect is related to cause, but cause may not be so related. In other words, if non-existence of one follows from the non-existence of the other, it can simply be contingent and not necessary. Moreover, whatever depends upon another thing, can be merely contingent. For there are two alternatives: either that other (thing) would be sufficient in its existence, or that would require

another thing. However, either of these cases would be contrary to the nature of Necessary Being.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to the views of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that as between two phenomena each of them can not be equally a cause of the other, so a reciprocal relation cannot be ascertained. On the other hand, Necessary Being is most perfect, and is above all contrary and all determinate qualities. In addition to this, Ibn-Sīnā asserts that God is Necessary Being and He does not depend upon any contingent being, because the latter is caused and is incapable of having any necessary existence. Moreover, His Essence does not have necessary existence and contingent being together. The reciprocal relation between two things can simply be regarded as a possibility, and as such it cannot be necessitated by each of them, while a cause is required for putting them together. Moreover, Ibn-Sīnā asserts that Necessary Being is not impaired by any deficiency; every perfection belongs to Him, derives from Him and is preceded by His Essence. He has no cause for His

own and no relation can ever be ascribed to Him. Al-Ghazālī's account seems to be closer to Ibn-Sīnā's detailed view and appears to be a systematic arrangement.

As for the difference between points 5 and 6, it may be manifestly shown that the former deals with causality, while the latter is concerned with reciprocity. But in both points al-Ghazālī states that neither can anything ever be causally related to God, nor can any reciprocal relation be attributed to Him, indicating thereby that all finite categories fall far short of actual characterization of the nature of God.

7. HE HAS NO PARTNER.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that God has no associate. He is different by His Essence from all that is other than He. Nothing else can have the existence which is His. For everything whose existence is this existence cannot differ from another thing which

has that existence also. So there cannot be two things, rather there should be one essence only. Because if one thing differs from the other, that in which they share will be other than that in which it differs. Consequently, each of them is divisible and each of those parts becomes a cause for the subsistence of its essence. But it cannot be the first, rather another existent comes before it which is the cause of its existence. This is inconceivable.

If the other were different from this and is not in this thing, then it follows that the thing which is different from that other concerns this existence specifying that, while existence of this is common to both of them. As a result existence of that other is composed of two things, one specifying it and the other associated with this. Therefore existence of that cannot be the existence of this. For the essence of this is simple and indivisible and on the other hand, the essence of that is divisible. Because of this, the subsistence of essence is divided into two parts.

It follows, therefore, that two things cannot be ascribed to His Essence. He is one in every respect. If there were two things, they would have to be partly alike and partly different, in which case the simplicity of each of them would be destroyed. In otherwards, if He had a partner, there would necessarily have to be some difference and some identity between them. Thus the differential and common element would constitute the essence of each of them, and these parts, in turn, would appear to be the cause of all things. If this is true not God but His parts would be the first being. This argument also is misleading. Thus it is manifest that God should be one to the supreme degree.

Two references have been quoted from the works of Ibn-Sīnā. He agrees with the views propounded by Al-Fārābī. God, according to Ibn-Sīnā, is a single Being. As Necessary Being He is pure truth, since the reality of every thing is the particularity of its existence, and there can be nothing more true than He. Similarly, in His

Essence no duality nor plurality of things can be ascribed. Moreover, there cannot be two things which are identical, while each of them is necessary by its essence and by something else. On the contrary, neither of them can be a cause of the other nor can the existence of one be derived from the other.

Thus it follows that 'It is not possible in anyway that the Necessary Being should be two. Demonstration: Let us suppose that there is another necessary being: one must be distinguishable from the other, so that the terms "this" and "that" may be used with reference to them. This distinction must be either essential or accidental. If the distinction between them is accidental, this accidental element cannot but be present in each of them, or in one and not the other. If each of them has an accidental element by which it is distinguished from the other, both of them must be caused; for an accident is what is adjoined to a thing after its essence is realized. If the accidental element is regarded as adhering to its being, and is present in

one of the two and not in the other, then the one which has no accidental element is a necessary being and the other is not a necessary being. If, however, the distinction is essential, the element of essentiality is that whereby the essence as such subsists; and if this element of essentiality is different in each and the two are distinguishable by virtue of it, then each of the two must be a compound; and compounds are caused; so that neither of them will be a necessary being. If the element of essentiality belongs to one only, and the other is one in every respect and there is no compounding of any kind in it, then the one which has no element of essentiality is a necessary being, and the other is not a necessary being. Since it is thus established that the Necessary Being cannot be two but is All-Truth, then by virtue of His Essential Reality, in respect of which He is a Truth, He is United and One, and no other shares with Him in that Unity: however the All-Truth attains existence, it is through Himself.' (23)

Al-Ghazālī states that in the Essence of God there cannot be two things, each of which is necessary and independent. For this would consist of two possibilities, one of resemblance in all respects and the other of difference. If they appear to resemble in all respects, then plurality is nullified and dualism cannot be realized, just as the cases of two black colours having been in one place with one condition are impossible.

If they were to differ in respect to differentia or accident, an impossibility would again arise; because neither differentia nor accident can actually enter upon the reality of the universal nature. However, they may indeed exist in their being, but their existence would in fact be accidental. On the other hand, as His identity and quiddity are one, neither differentia is included in His quiddity nor can it come into His identity. That is why differentia and accident cannot be ascribed to the nature of God. They are simply ineffectual. In other words, if the nature of God is not complete without

differentia, then the differentia is included in His reality; but it loses its ground owing to the fact that the differentia enters into the existence of quiddity and reality where the quiddity is actually not existence. So this argument is fallacious.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to the views of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that God is one, and there cannot be two things in His Essence. Ibn-Sīnā further shows that God does not have two things in His Essence, each of which is necessary by His Essence. He clearly demonstrates how there should not be two things equally necessary. To these detailed views al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer. On the other hand, it has been observed that his uses of faṣl, māhiyya and anniyya seem to be "additions".

8. NO QUALITY CAN AUGMENT HIS ESSENCE.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that God is the eternal and everlasting Being with His Essence,

and His Essence does not require anyother thing which can extend His permanence. Rather He is sufficient in His permanence and perpetual existence by virtue of His Essence. No existence can be like His Essence, nor can any being be equated with the grade of His Being. Moreover, there is no cause for His existence.

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that 'Since it is thus established that He has no receptive cause, it follows that He does not possess anything potentially, and that He has no attribute yet to be awaited; on the contrary, His Perfection has been realized in actuality; and He has no material cause. We say "realized in actuality", using this as a common term of expression, meaning that every perfection belonging to anyother is non-existent and yet to be awaited, whereas all perfection belonging to Him has being and is present. His Perfect Essence, preceding all relations, is One. From this it is manifest that His Attributes are not an augmentation of His Essence; for if they were an augmentation of His

Essence, the Attributes would be potential with reference to the Essence and the Essence would be the reason for the Attributes. In that case the Attributes would be subsequent to a precedent, so that they would be in one respect active and in another receptive; their being active would be other than the aspect of their being receptive; and in consequence they would possess two mutually exclusive aspects. Now this is impossible in the case of anything whatsoever; when a body is in motion, the motivation is from one quarter and the movement from another.

If it were to be stated that His Attributes are not an augmentation of His Essence, but they entered into the constitution of the Essence, and that the Essence cannot be conceived of as existing without these Attributes, then the Essence would be compound, and the Oneness would be destroyed.' (24)

It follows that there could not be any quality which may be an addition to His Essence. So

De Boer says:-

"This first One is the God of Ibn Sīnā,
of whom many attributes may of course be
predicated, such as thought &c., but only in
the sense of negation or relation, and in such
a way that they do not affect the Unity of his
essence." (25)

Al-Ghazālī states that there can not be any
attribute which can augment His Essence. Because if
He subsists with that attribute, He is connected with
it and is composed of different parts. But it may be
noted that all that is composed of things is caused. If
its non-existence does not follow from the implication
of the non-existence of that attribute, it may be
treated as an accidental phenomenon, (as is the case of
knowledge in man). However, this is inconceivable,
since every accidental phenomenon is caused. But if its
cause is the Essence of God, then the Essence would imply
two aspects, one being active and the other being

receptive; but His being active is different from His being receptive. As a result multiplicity would occur in the Essence of God; which is absolutely inconceivable because He is one in every respect.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to the of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that the Essence of God does not require anyother thing and there is no cause for His Being. Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that there cannot be any attribute which augments His Essence. For if there is an augmentation of His Essence, then the attributes would be subsequent to a precedent. Thus they would be active in one respect and receptive in another. Consequently, His Essence would be compound on the one hand and would thereby imply a multiplicity in His Essence on the other. This is absurd. Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully with this.

9. HIS NATURE IS UNCHANGEABLE.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that God is the self-sufficient Being. Nothing is needed for the

completion of His nature, nor can He require anything else for the extension of His permanence. Furthermore, His nature is not changed from one state to another. He is one in the sense that the reality of His Being can not be derived from anything other than His own.

Ibn-Sīnā does not disagree with the basic idea of Al-Fārābī. But he adds more from his own standpoint. According to him, the nature of God is unchangeable. 'It is also evident, as a result of denying the existence of a receptive cause, that it is impossible for Him to change; for the meaning of change is the passing away of one attribute and the establishment of another; and if He were susceptible to change, He would possess potentially an element of passing-away and an element of establishment; and that is absurd. It is clear from this that He has no opposite and no contrary; for opposites are essences which succeed each other in the occupation of a single locus, there being between them the extreme of contrariety. But He is not receptive to accidents, much less to opposites. And

if the term "opposite" is used to denote one who disputes with Him in His Rulership, it is clear too on this count that He has no opposite. It is further clear that it is impossible for Him not to be; for since it is established that His Being is necessary, it follows that it is impossible for Him not to be; because everything which exists potentially cannot exist actually, otherwise it would have two aspects. Anything which is receptive to a thing does not cease to be receptive when reception has actually taken place; if this were not so, it would result in the removal of both being and not-being, and that is untenable.' (25(a))

From this it is evident that the idea is generally associated with transcendental being divested of all concrete contents and beyond all categorical determinations. Such transcendental being is abstract, universal, unchanging, not an object of thought or discursive reason, but one of unique experience. It is

either an indeterminate unity which discourages all plurality and differentiation or harbours, we know not why, contents within itself not as they empirically are but only as transformed and transmuted in the whole.

Al-Ghazālī states that the nature of God cannot be subject to change. All categories of change consist of the creation of a quality which did not exist before. It becomes a new reference. However, everything which is created necessarily requires a cause and in no way can it be possible without it and be its essence. In other words, every quality follows from the essence and exists with it, but it never comes after it. This leads us to believe that the Essence of God is the absolute criterion of truth which is unconditional, invariable and eternal principle transcending all finite relations and references. Moreover, as we have already discovered that agent is not receptive, nothing can be added to His Essence; for the act of doing and that of receiving imply two distinct phenomena; as such it causes a duality in His Essence which is impossible.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that the nature of God cannot be changed. But Ibn-Sīnā teaches that change is the passing away of one quality and the establishment of another. Consequently, it gives rise to being and not-being. That is why the nature of God is unchangeable. Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully with this detailed view.

10. NOTHING CAN PROCEED FROM HIM EXCEPT ONE THING.

Al-Fārābī teaches that as the First Being God is the First Cause of all existents. He is isolated from all kinds of imperfection. All that is other than He cannot be free from a certain amount of imperfection of one kind or more than one. But God is free from all determinate relations. In this connection De Boer says:-

"We are able to see God better in the regular gradation of Beings which proceeds from him than in himself. From him, the One alone, comes the All,

for his knowledge is the highest power: In his cognizance of himself the world comes into being:" (26)

Three references have been quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He does not differ from Al-Fārābī in principle. According to him, God is one and nothing can be associated with His grade. Similarly, anything which is other than He cannot be considered as a necessary existence. Since nothing other than He can be necessary, He becomes a principle of the necessary existence of all things and causes them to be necessary either from the beginning or through a mediator. In other words, Necessary Being should have one essence only, otherwise a multiplicity would result. Thus it involves two possibilities. One is that each essence has a meaning of its reality which does not differ from another. The other possibility is that it would differ. Now if it does not differ in one respect and differs in another, then the argument would involve a contradiction. However, each of the things is clearly distinct from the

26. Boer, Hist. ... 115

other. It differs not only in the very meaning of the thing, but also in other respects besides its meaning.

It, therefore, follows that the nature of God is unique and all other things emanate from Him in succession. 'So when we say that this Act emanated from Him through a reason, and that that reason was of Him also, this implies no imperfection in His Activity; on the contrary, totality emanated from Him, through Him and unto Him. Therefore all things having being emanated from Him according to a known order and known media: that which came later cannot be earlier, and that which came earlier cannot be later, for it is He Who causes things to be earlier and later.' (27)

Al-Ghazālī states that nothing can emanate unmediated from God except one thing. Then various things come out of it mediately and successively. Thus

He is one without any multiplicity whatsoever. According to al-Ghazālī, multiplicity of things may be of two kinds. Either it consists of different parts of things of which each of their units is independent, as is the multiplicity of a composite body; or it consists of the multiplicity of a concept where the thing is divided into two groups, one of which can not be independent without the other; such as, form and matter or being and quiddity. Al-Ghazālī clearly excludes all types of the above multiplicity and rejects them as a constituent part of His Essence. For God is one, and nothing can proceed from Him except one. Then he discusses that the act of the one may be different in three ways owing to the difference of the place, or that of the appliance, or that of a cause augmenting the essence of one agent.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to the views of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that God is the First Cause of all existents. He is one and is free from imperfection. Ibn-Sīnā further

asserts that God is the principle of things and things proceed from Him in proper succession. As He is Necessary Being He causes the things to be necessary either through beginning or through a mediator. His Being should always have one essence, otherwise multiplicity would result. Al-Ghazālī's account seems to be closer to this detailed view. Moreover, it has been observed that al-Ghazālī states the implication of Kathra in detail and this context appears to be an "addition".

11. HE IS NOT A SUBSTANCE.

Two references from Al-Fārābī and two from Ibn-Sīnā are noted. Al-Fārābī propounds the view that we are incapable of defining the nature of God. His nature cannot be divided into different things by which He becomes substance. For it can not be demonstrated by one of those parts. If this is the case, the parts with which He becomes substance are

likely to be the causes for His existence. But this is inconceivable, because God is the First Being, and there is no cause for His existence. Thus the nature of God cannot be divisible either qualitatively or quantitatively. He is immaterial Being and His Essence is nothing but abstract intelligence which does not require any matter.

Ibn-Sīnā asserts that 'He has no active cause: This is self-evident: for if He had any reason for being, this would be adventitious and that would be a necessary being. Since it is established that He has no active cause, it follows on this line of reasoning that His Quiddity is not other than His Identity, that is to say, other than His Being; neither will He be a subsistence or an accident. There cannot be two, each of which derives its being from the other, nor can He be a necessary being in one respect, and a contingent being in another respect.' (28)

Ibn-Sīnā quotes a reference to a view about substance which deals with the question whether or not it can be applied to the nature of God. Generally speaking, a substance is primarily concerned with space. But according to the reference of Ibn-Sīnā, it implies an abstract thing which is not existent in any substratum. It has a permanent quiddity apart from being existent in a particular place as are the cases of body or soul. For example, if we refer to every phenomenon as A, we mean that every thing is described by the term A, even though it has reality without identity. Thus in the definition of substance, it must be held that it is not existent in any particular place. It has a quiddity in itself like man, stone, and tree. In this connection 'man' indicates an unknown individual whose being can not subsist in a place.

This may refer to the Platonic doctrine about the distinction between the world of Ideas and that of sense or reality. While referring to a man we generally

mean a particular man who exists in the world of realities, but this is a particular manifestation of 'man-ness' out of the world of Ideas. In this connection W. T. Stace remarks:-

"We have seen that the Ideas are absolute Being, and that things of sense are half real and half unreal. They are partly real because they participate in Being. They are partly unreal because they participate in not-being. There must be, therefore, a principle of absolute not-being. This, in Plato's opinion, is matter. Things of sense are copies of the Ideas fashioned out of, or stamped upon, matter. But Plato does not understand by matter what we, in modern times, understand by it. Matter, in our sense, is always some particular kind of matter. It is brass, or wood, or iron, or stone. It is matter which has determinate character and quality. But the possession of specific character means that it is

matter with the copy of Ideas already stamped upon it. Since iron exists in great quantities in the world, and there is a common element in all the various pieces of iron, by virtue of which all are classed together, there must be a concept of iron. There is, therefore, an Idea of iron in the world of Ideas." (29)

However, Ibn-Sīnā's reference appears to be concerned with the world of Ideas, where a thing exists in abstract form; and as such it does not require any substratum for its subsistence.

Al-Ghazālī states that God is not a substance even though He subsists with Himself without being in a place just as [an ordinary] substance. According to this technical term, substance consists of reality as well as quiddity whose existence is not in a substratum. In this respect substance applies to reality and quiddity alone.

Whenever their existence is taken into consideration, it may be conceivable apart from any substratum. Since His quiddity and identity are stated to be one, He is not called a substance.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to the views of Ibn-Sīnā. The views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā appear to be on dissimilar lines. For al-Fārābī asserts that the nature of God cannot be divided into different parts by which He becomes substance. If one supposes that, then the parts with which He becomes substance are likely to be the causes of His existence. But this is a sheer absurdity, for God is the First Being, and there is no cause for His existence. On the other hand, Ibn-Sīnā's views consists of two aspects. Firstly, he categorically asserts that substance or accident cannot be ascribed to the nature of God. According to the general view, substance occupies a space, and has extension and solidity. In this respect Ibn-Sīnā denies the possibility of God's being identified with substance. Secondly, he refers to an ~~ancient~~ ^{held by some} opinion, and states

that God's substance (if one supposes so) indicates an abstract reality which does not subsist in a particular substratum for its manifestation. Its nature is full of quiddity and we know not what it is. Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully with these detailed views. Furthermore, it has been observed that Ibn-Sīnā took 'man, stone and tree' as examples for his demonstration of the view, whereas al-Ghazālī brings in the example of 'crocodile' whose context is very brief; as such it requires clarification.

12. EVERYTHING EMANATES FROM HIM IN SUCCESSION.

Two references from Al-Fārābī and four from Ibn-Sīnā have been quoted. Al-Fārābī propounds the view that there are various kinds of existents. The nature of some of them may be complete or incomplete in comparison with that of the other. However, all of them emanate from the Essence of God in succession. Furthermore, an existent may be of two kinds, necessary

and contingent. The contingent thing cannot be independent of a cause for its being nor can it continue ad infinitum in its being cause and effect. On the contrary, at the end it requires a necessary thing which is the First Existent.

Al-Fārābī, therefore, asserts that all categories of existents successively emanate from the First Existent or God. In this connection Professor W. Montgomery Watt says:-

"In the centre of his metaphysics is the First Being or absolute One, which was understood to be identical with God as proclaimed in Islamic doctrine. From him emanated all other existent things in hierarchical order." (30)

Ibn-Sīnā does not basically differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that God is one in number.

He is pure Being which is different from contingent being. For the latter requires necessarily another thing for its coming into being. Moreover, contingent being may be existent with respect to its essence, but its being may be necessary in association with other things.

God is the agent of all things in the sense that He is the existent from which every distinct existent emanates. But it is to be noted that there is no compound element in His Essence, and He is free from all sorts of causes. With regard to His relation with other existents, it is shown that all of them emanate from Him according to known order and media. There is no imperfection in His acts. Rather the totality emanates from Him, through Him, and unto Him; that is to say, He causes things to be earlier and later.

Al-Ghazālī states that all that is other than Necessary Being emanates from Him in successive order. In other words, the existence of all other things is

derived from Him. In order to demonstrate this view al-Ghazālī states that Necessary Being is one in number. What is subject to enumeration cannot be necessary; rather it must simply be a contingent thing which requires Necessary Being for its coming into existence.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to the views of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that there are various kinds of existents which successively emanate from God. An existent may be necessary and contingent, while the latter requires Necessary Being for coming into being. Moreover, Ibn-Sīnā asserts that God is one and pure Being; as such there is no compound element in His Essence and He is free from causes and imperfection. Things other than He derive their being from Him in proper succession. In respect to this detailed account of Ibn-Sīnā's views al-Ghazālī is in more substantial agreement.

4. RESULT

Al-Ghazālī's accounts correspond to those of al-Fārābī in points 2 (partial), 3 and 5 (partial) and of Ibn-Sīnā in points 1, 2 (partial), 4, 5 (partial), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12.

On the other hand, some 'additions' have been observed in al-Ghazālī's points 1, 2, 7 and 10.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION:

This chapter is largely about the attributes of God. Al-Ghazālī begins with an introduction and briefly states that multiplicity cannot be ascribed to the Essence of God. A great deal of difference lies between two types of qualities: one leads towards multiplicity in essence and the other does not. He lists five distinct qualities and clearly points out which of them, strictly speaking, could be conceivable for attribution to God.

Al-Ghazālī chiefly deals with the attributes of God, and discusses them in eleven sections with analysis and examples. He vividly describes how God is living, knowing and happy Being; and He has will, providence and omnipotence. Moreover, His Knowledge of particulars can never be realized in the realm of temporal phenomena. On the other hand, His knowledge of all categories of beings does not augment His Essence, and nothing can remain far from His knowledge.

In the last part he turns his attention to certain

theological issues and ignores strictly metaphysical problems.

At the end of this chapter al-Ghazālī states certain views in question and answer form; the fundamental problems these raise, have already been considered in the discussion of the nature of attributes.

Only the sources involved in the main eleven sections concerning attributes have been the subject-matter of this investigation.

2. ANALOGOUS VIEWS.

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

I. GOD IS LIVING.

قاولها : ان المبدأ الاول حى

فان من يعلم ذاته ' فهو حى ' والاول يعلم ذاته ' فإذن هو عالم حى -

و برهان كونه عالما بذاته :

ان تعرف معنى قولنا : ان الشيء عالم - ما هو ؟
و ان معنى قولنا : انه علمي و معلوم - ما هو ؟ ...

و معنى كونه عالما انه موجود

برىء عن المادة - و معنى كون الشيء محقولا و معلوما ' انه مجرد عن المادة - فمهما فرض حلول مجرد في برىء ' كان الحال علما ' و كان المحل عالما ؟ اذ لا معنى للعلم الا انطباع صورة مجردة من المواد ، في ذات هي برية عن المواد ' فيكون المنطبع علما ' و المنطبع فيه عالما '

ولا معنى للعلم الا هذا - فمهما وجد هذا صدق
اسم العلم و العالِم و مهما انتفى لا يصدق - و
المراد بالبريء و المجرد و واحد ؛ ولكن خصمنا :
المجرد ، بالمعلوم - و البريء بالعالِم - حتى لا
يلتبس في ترديد الكلام - (1)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و كذلك في انه حي و انه
حيوة فليس يدل بهذين على ذاتين بل على ذات
واحدة فان معنى الحي انه يعقل افضل معقول
بافضل عقل او يعلى افضل معلوم بافضل علم كما
ان انها يقال لنا احياء او لا اذا كنا ندرك
احسن المدروكات باحسن ادراك فانا انما
يقال لنا احياء اذا كنا ندرك المحسوسات و
هي احسن معلومات بالاحساس الذي هو احسن
الادراكات و باحسن القوى المدركة و هي
الحواس فما هو افضل عقل اذا عقل و علم
افضل المعقولات بافضل علم فهو اخرى ان

يكون حيا لانه يعقل من جهة ما هو عقل ، و انه
عقل و انه عقل و انه عالم و انه علي هو فيه معنى
واحد و كذلك انه حي و انه حيوة معنى واحد ، و
ايضا فان اسم الحي قد يستعار لغير ما هو حيوان
فيقال على كل موجود كان على كماله الاخير و على
كل ما بلغ من الوجود و الكمال الى حيث يصدر
عنه ما من شأنه ان يكون منه كما من شأنه
ان يكون منه فعلى هذا الوجه اذ كان الاول
وجوده اكمل و جود كان ^{ايضا} احق باسم الحي من
الذي يقال على الشيء باستعارة و كلما كان
وجوده اتم فانه اذا علم و عقل كان ما يعقل
عنه و يعلم منه اتم اذ كان المعقول منه في
نفوسنا مطابقا لما هو موجود منه فعلى حسب
وجوده الخارج عن نفوسنا يكون معقوله في
نفوسنا مطابقا لوجوده و ان كان ناقص الوجود
كان معقوله في نفوسنا معقولا ناقص - (2)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(i) كونه حيا قد ثبت انه واحد
وانه لا علة لذاته واذا عرفت ان حيوته
ليست صفة عارضة لذاته بل معنى الحى هو
العالم بنفسه على ما هو عليه واذ قد ذكرنا
انه واحد لا تعزب ذاته عن ذاته فاذا هو
حى لانه العالم بذاته لذاته وكل ما سواه و
ان كان عالما به فعلمه به بواسطة علمه تعالى
بذاته تقديس وايضا الحى يعبر به عن المدرك
والفاعل فمن له علم وادراك وفعل فهو حى
ومن يكون له جميع المعلومات وجميع
المدركات وجميع الافعال فهو اولى بان يكون
حيا - (3)

(ii) اعلم انه عالم بذاته و ان علمه
ومعلوماته وعالميته شئ واحد و انه عالم
بغيره وجميع المعلومات و انه يعلم الجميع
بعلم واحد و انه يعلمه على وجه لا يتغير
علمه لوجود المعلوم وعدمه -

و بيان انه عالم بذاته ما
ذكرناه انه واحد و انه منزه عن العلل فان
معنى العلم هو حصول حقيقة مجردة عن
الغواشي الجسمانية و اذا ثبت انه واحد
مجرد عن الجسم و صفاته فهذه الحقيقة على
الوجه حاملة له و كل من تحصل له حقيقة
مجردة فهو عالم و لا يقتضى ان يكون هذا
ذاته او غيره و لانه لا تغيب عنه ذاته فهو
عالم بذاته - (٤)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

2. HIS KNOWLEDGE IS NOT ADDITIONAL TO HIS ESSENCE.

الدعوى الثانية: ان علمه
بذاته ليس زائدا على ذاته ، حتى يوجب فيه
كثرة ، بل هو ذاته -

و بيانه : بان نقدم عليه

مقدمة ، وهي ان كل ما يعرفه الانسان إما ان يكون معلوما له بمشاهدته في نفسه ، بحس ظاهر او بحس باطن - وإما ان لا يكون معلوما ، و لا سبيل الى إعلامه الا بالمقايسة الى شيء مما ثبت في مشاهدته في نفسه ، فإن لم يشاهد من نفسه له نظيراً ، بوجه ما ، لم يمكن تعريفه -

فاذا ثبت هذا فنقول : لا يعرف الانسان هذا في حق الإله الا بمقايسته الى نفسه - فانه يعطي نفسه ، فمعلومه غيره ؟ او هو عينه ؟

فان كان غيره ، فهو اذن لا يعطي نفسه ، بل يعطي غيره - وان كان معلومه هو عينه ، فالعالم هو نفسه ، والمعلوم هو نفسه - فقد اتحد العالم والمعلوم -

فنتقيي الدليل على ان العلم هو المعلوم ايضاً ، حتى اذا جعلنا المعلوم اصلاً ، و بينا ان العلم هو عين المعلوم ، وان العالم ايضاً

هو عين المعلوم، كما سبق، لزم منه بالضرورة
ان لكل مبدأ واحدا لا كثرة فيه - (5)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و كذلك الحال في انه عالم
فانه ليس يحتاج في ان يعلم الى ذات اخرى
يستفيد بعلمها الفضيلة خارجة عن ذاته ولا
في ان يكون معلوما الى ذات اخرى تُعلمه بل
هو مكنت بجوهره في ان يعلم ويُعلم و ليس
علمه بذاته شيئا سوى جوهره فانه يعلم و
انه معلوم و انه علم فهو ذات واحدة و جوهر
واحد - (6)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(أ) و بيان انه يعلم الاشياء
يعلم واحد و انه يعلمها على الوجه الذي لا

5. Ghaz., Maq. ... 226

6. Diet., Must.(Text) 10

يتغير بتغير المعلوم انه قد ثبت ان علمه لا يكون زائدا على ذاته وهو يعلم ذاته و هو مبدء لجميع الموجودات وهو منزلة عن العرض والتغيرات فاذا يعلم الاشياء على الوجه الذي لا يتغير فان المعلومات تتبع لعلمه لا علمه تتبع للمعلومات حتى يتغير بتغيرها لان علمه الاشياء سبب لوجودها - (7)

(ii) و بيان انه علمي وعالمي و معلوم ان العلم عبارة عن الحقيقة المجردة فاذا كانت هذه الحقيقة مجردة فهو علمي و اذا كانت هذه الحقيقة المجردة له وحاضرة لديه و غير مستورة عنه فهو عالمي و اذا كانت هذه الحقيقة المجردة لا تحصل الا به فهو معلوم بعبارات مختلفة و الا فالعلمي والعالمي والمعلوم بالنسبة الى ذاته واحد -

و نفسك قابل فانك اذا

علمت نفسك فمعلومك خيرك او اثنت

فان كان معلومك غيرك فما علمت نفسك
وان كان معلومك نفسك فالعالم والمعلوم
هو النفس واذا كانت صورة نفسك
مرتسمة في نفسك كانت النفس هي العليم
فانك اذا راجعت نفسك بالتأمل فلا تجد
من نفسك ارتسام حقيقتها وماهيتها
فيها مرة اخرى حتى يحصل لك الشهور
بتعددتها فاذا ثبت انه يعقل ذاته و
عقله ذاته لا يزيد على ذاته كان عالما و
علما ومعلوما من غير تكثر يلحقه بهذه
الصفات ولا فرق بين عالم وعافل لانهما
عبارتان عن سلب المادة مطلقا. (8)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

3. HE KNOWS ALL TYPES OF EXISTENTS, AND NOTHING IS
FAR FROM HIS KNOWLEDGE.

الدعوى الثالثة: ان الاول

عالمٍ بسائر أنواع الموجودات و اجناسها ، فلا
يجزب عن علمه شيء -

وهذا الان أدق و اغمض

من الاول -

وبيانه: انه ثبت انه يعلم

ذاته ، فينبغي ان يعلمه على ما هو عليه ؛ لان
ذاته مجردة لذاته ، مكتشوفة له على ما هو عليه ،
بحقيقته -

و حقيقته انه وجود محض ،

هو ينبوع وجود الجواهر والأعراض ، والماهيات
كلها ، على ترتيبها ؛ فان علم نفسه مبدأ لها ، فقد
انطوى العلم بها في علمه بذاته - و ان لم يعلم
نفسه مبدأ ، فلم يعلم نفسه على ما هو عليه ،
وهو محال ؛ لانه انما علم ذاته ؛ لان ذاته
ليس غائبا عن ذاته ، وهما مجردان - اعني
ذاته بالاعتبارين و هو كما هو عليه مكتشوف
لذاته - (٩)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

وهو عالم لا يتغير علمه لانه
يعلم الاشياء بالاسباب العقلية و الترتيب
الوجودى لا بالحواس والعلم العقلى لا يتغير و
المستفاد من الحس يتغير - (١٥)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(أ) و بيان انه عالم بغيره ان كل من
يعلم نفسه فبعد ذلك ان لم يعلم غيره فيكون
لمانع و المانع ان كان ذاتيا فيجب ان لا يعلم
نفسه ايضا وان كان المانع خارجيا فالخارج
يمكن رفعه فاذا يجوز ان يكون عالما بغيره بل
يجب - ...

و بيان انه عالم بجميع
المعلومات انه ثبت انه واجب الوجود و
انه واحد وان الكل منه يوجد وعن وجوده حصل
وانه عالم بذاته و اذا كان عالما بذاته فعلمه

على الوجه الذى هو عليه و هو انه مبدأ لجميع
الحقائق و الموجودات فاذا لا يعزب عن علمه
شئ فى الارض و لا فى السماء بل جميع ما يحصل
فى الوجود انما يحصل بسببه و هو مسبب
الاسباب فيعلم ما هو سببه و موجودة و
مبدعه - (ii)

(ii) ... واجب الوجود انما يعقل
كل شئ على نحو كلى، ومع ذلك فلا يعزب عنه
شئ، شخصى، و لا يعزب عنه مثقال ذرة فى
السموات و لا فى الارض، و هذا من العجائب
التي يحوج تصورها الى لطف قريحة -

... قلانه اذا عقل ذاته و
عقل انه مبدأ كل موجود، عقل أوائل
الموجودات عنه و ما يتولد عنها، و لا شئ
من الاشياء يوجد الا و قد صار من جهة ما
واجب بسببه، و قد بينا هذا، فتكون هذه

الاسباب يتأدى بهصادماتها الى ان توجد عنها
الامور الجزئية - و الاول يعلم الاسباب و
مطابقتها - (12)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

4. THERE IS NO MULTIPLICITY IN HIS ESSENCE
AND KNOWLEDGE.

الدعوى الرابعة : ان هذا ايضا
لا يؤدي الى كثرة في علمه ، و في ذاته - وهذا
اغض من الاول : فان المعلومات على كثرتها
تستدعي علوما كثيرة ، فعلم واحد بمعلومات
مفصلة ، محال وجوده اذ معنى الواحد انه ليس
فيه شئ غير شئ ، وانه لو قدر عدم بعضه ،
لزم عدمه ، اذ لا بعض له -

والعلم اذا فرض بالجواهر و الاعراض
واحداً ، فلو قدر زوال تعلقه بالاعراض ، بقى شئ
غير ما قدر زواله ، وهو تعلقه بالجواهر ، وكذا

كل معلومين -

و هذا يناقض معنى الوحدة
و لكن بيانه بالمقايضة بمشاهدة النفس ؟
فان النفس نسخة مختصرة من كل العالم
يوجد لكل شئ فيها نظير - وبها يتمكن من
معرفة الكل - (13)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

... و ليس يلحقه تكثر في
ذاته لتعقله للكل والكثرة وانه علة لوجود
الكل على معنى انه يعطي الكل وجودا دائما و
يمنع العدم مطلقا لا على ان يعطي الكل
وجودا جديدا بعد تسلط العدم عليه (a) الا
العدم الذي يسحقه الكل بذاته - (14)

عليه ... Read (a)

I3. Ghaz. Mag. ... 228

I4. Far., Da^cawī ... 4

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(أ) و اعلم اننا اذا قلنا بل بينا
ان واجب الوجود لا يتكثر بوجه من الوجوه،
وان ذاته وحداني صرف محض حق، فلا نعلم
بذلك انه ايضا لا يسلب عنه وجودات، و
لا تقع له اضافة الى وجودات، فان هذا لا
يمكن - وذلك لان كل موجود فيسلب عنه
انحاء من الوجود مختلفة كثيرة، و لكل
موجود الى الموجودات نوع من الاضافة و
النسبة، و خصوصا الذي يفيض عنه كل وجود،
لكننا نعلم بقولنا انه وحداني الذات لا
يتكثر انه كذلك في ذاته، ثم ان تبعته
اضافات ايجابية وسلبية كثيرة فذلك لوازم
للذات محلولة للذات، توجد بعد وجود
الذات، وليست مقومة للذات و لا
اجزاء لها - (١٥)

(ب) و ايضا فهو تام الوجود لان
نوعه له فقط فليس من نوعه شيء خارج

عنه واحد وجوه الواحد ان يكون تاما فان
الكثير و الزائد لا يكونان واحدين فهو
واحد من جهة تمامية وجوده و واحد من
جهة ان حده له و واحد من جهة انه لا
ينقسم لا بالكم ولا بالمبادئ المقومة له
ولا باجزاء الحد و واحد من جهة ان لكل شئ
وحدة تخصه وبها كمال حقيقته الذاتية و
ايضا هو واحد من جهة اخرى و تلك الجهة هي
ان مرتبته من الوجود وهو وجوب الوجود
ليس الا له - (16)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

5. HE IS AWARE OF CONTINGENT BEINGS.

الدعوى الخامسة : هو ان
الله تعالى كما يعلم الاجناس و الانواع ، يعلم
الممكنات الحادثة ، وان كنا لا نعلمها ؛ لان

الممكن ما دام يعرف ممكنا، يستحيل ان
يعلم وقوعه او لا وقوعه؟ لانه انما يعلم منه
وصف الامكان، ومعناه انه يمكن ان يكون،
و يمكن ان لا يكون - (17)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و لكل موجود من وجوده قسم
ومرتبة مفردة ووجود الاشياء عنه لا عن جهة
قصد منه يشبه قصودنا ولا يكون له قصد
الاشياء ولا مصدر الاشياء عنه على سبيل
الطبع من دون ان يكون له معرفة ورضاء
بمصدرها و حصولها، وانما ظهر الاشياء عنه
لكونه عالما بذاته - (18)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

و من ههنا ظهر ان العلم نفسه

I7. Ghaz., Maq. ... 232

I8. Diet., Abh. (Text) 58

قدرة وهو يعلم الممكنات كما يعلم الموجودات
و ان كنا نحن لا نعلمها لان الممكن بالنسبة
الينا يجوز وجوده و يجوز عدمه و بالنسبة
اليه يكون احد الطرفين معلوما له فعلمه
بالاجناس و الانواع و الموجودات و الممكنات
و الجلي و الخفي واحد - (١٩)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

6. HIS KNOWLEDGE OF PARTICULARS IS NOT SUBJECT
TO TEMPORAL DISTINCTIONS.

الدعوى السادسة : هو ان
الاول سبحانه و تعالى ، لا يجوز ان يعلم
الجزئيات علما يدخل تحت الماضي و المستقبل
و الان ،
حتى يعلم ان الشمس لم
تنكسف اليوم ، و انها ستنكسف غدا -

ثم اذا جاء الغد ' فيعلم انها
الان مكسوفة ' و اذا جاء بعد غد فيعلم انها
كانت بالأمس ' مكسوفة -
فان هذا يوجب تغييرا في ذاته؛
لاختلاف هذه العلوم عليه ، وقد سبق ان
التغير محال عليه -

و وجه لزوم التغير ، ان المعلوم
يتبعه العلم ، فمهما تغير المعلوم تغير العلم ، و
مهما تغير العلم تغير العالم ؛ اذ العلم ليس من
الصفات التي اذا اختلفت ، لم يتغير العالم ،
ككونه يمينا و شمالا ، بل العلم صفة للذات
يوجب اختلافه اختلاف الذات ، وليست نسبة
العلم الى المعلوم ايضا نسبة لا يوجب اختلاف
المعلوم ، اختلفا فيه حتى يفرض علم
واحد - (20)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

فالواجب الوجود يجب ان لا

يكون علمه بالجزئيات علما زمانيا ' حتى يدخل
فيه :

الآن .

والماضى .

والمستقبل .

فيعرض لصفة ذاته ان
تتغير، بل يجب ان يكون علمه بالجزئيات
على الوجه المقدس العالى عن الزمان و الدهر .

و يجب ان يكون عالما بكل
شئ؛ لان كل شئ لازم له ' بوسط ' او بغير
وسط يتأذى اليه بعينه قدرة الذى هو
تفصيل قضاؤه الاول تأديا واجبا؛ اذا كان ما لا
يجب لا يكون كما علمت - (21)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

7. HE HAS WILL AND PROVIDENCE.

الدعوى السابعة : ان الاول مريدو له ارادة و عناية و ان ذلك لا يزيد على ذاته -

وبيانه : ان الاول فاعل ، فانه ظهر ان كل الاشياء حاصلة منه ، فهي فعله -

والفاعل اما ان يكون فاعلا بالطبع المكلف او بالارادة و الطبع المكلف هو الفعل المنفك عن العلم بالمفعول ، و بالفعل - و كل فعل لا يخلو عن العلم ، فلا يخلو عن الارادة ، و الكل فائض من ذات الله تعالى مع علمه بانه فائض منه ، و فيضانه منه غير مناف لذاته ، حتى يكون كارها ، فلا كراهة فيه له ، فهو اذن راض يفيضانه منه -

و هذه الحالة يجوز ان يعبر عنها بالإرادة - و مبدأ فيضان الكل منه ، علمه بوجه النظام في الكل ، فيكون علمه سبب وجود

المعلوم - فاذن إرادته علمه - ...

و تكون معنى عنايته بالخلق ،
انه علمي مثلا ان الإنسان يفتقر الى الة باطشة ،
لو لم تكن له لكان ناقصا ، و لكان سرا في حقه -
وان اللة الباطشة ينبغي ان تكون ، مثل اليد
و الكيف - ...

فتمت العناية بتمام الخير ، و
تمي الخير بالهداية بعد الخلق - (22)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

(أ) وهو مرير لانه ليس فيه

ضدية للانشياء - (23)

(ب) وانه ليس في ذاته ما يضا

صدور الكل عنه فهو بهذا المعنى مرير لوجود
الكل في انه لا يجوز ان يتجدد له ارادة لم

22. Ghaz., Mag. ... 235

23. Far., Zinun ... 6

تكنى له في الازل - (24)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(i) و اذا قال له : مرید ، لم یعن الا
كون واجب الوجود مع عقليته - اى سلب
المادة عنه - مبدأ لنظام الخیر كله وهو یعقل
ذلك ، فیکون هذا مؤلفاً من اضافة و سلب - (25)

(ii) ... فیجب ان یعلم ان العناية هی
كون الاول عالماً لذاته بما علیه الوجود فی نظام الخیر ،
وعلة لذاته للخیر والکمال بحسب الإمكان ، و
راضياً به على النحو المذكور ، فیعقل نظام الخیر
على الوجه الأبلغ فی الإمكان ، فیفیض عنه ما
یعقله نظاماً وخیراً على الوجه الأبلغ الذى یعقله
فیضانا على أنه تأدیة الى النظام ، بحسب الإمكان ،
فهذا هو معنى العناية - (26)

24. Far., Da^cawī ... 4
25. IS., Ilah.(2) ... 368
26. Ibid ... 4I5

(iii) كونه مريدا فقد ظهر انه واجب الوجود و انه واحد و ان اليه تنتهي الموجودات في سلسلتى الترقى و التنزل فمنه وجود الكل و اليه رجوع الكل و به قوام الكل - فاذا كل ما سواه فهو فعله و هو فاعله و موجدة و الفاعل لا يخلو اما ان يكون له بالفعل الصادر منه شعور او لم يكن فان لم يكن له شعور فلا يخلو اما ان يكون فعله مختلفا او متفقا فان كان فعله متفقا فذلك المبدء و السبب هو الطبع و ان كان فعله مختلفا فذلك المبدء و السبب هو النفس النباتي - ...

فاذا عرفت هذا فتعرف ان فعل الله تعالى صادر عن العلم الذي لا يشوبه جهل و لا تغير و كل فعل صادر عن العلم بنظام الاشياء و كمالاتها على احسن ما يكون فذلك يكون بارادة فاذا هو من ذاته عالم بوجود الاشياء الصادرة عنه على احسن النظام و الكمال و ذلك الاختلاف الذي فيها لازم لذواتها اذ لو فارق

و الطبع طبعه لم يكن ذلك طبعاً وهو له ذاتي - ... فاذا اول الاشياء فارق الاشياء بعلمه الذي هو سبب لوجود جملة تامة كاملة على احسن النظام من احكام و اتقان و دوام و استمرار وهو المسمى بالارادة لان صدور هذه الافعال من اثار كمال وجوده فيلزم ان يكون صريدا لها -

و من ههنا يعلم معنى الغاية من انها لا تحتاج الى ميل و قصد بتخصيص واحد من الخلق لخير دون غيره فان ذكرنا انه منزّه عن العلة الغائية فاذا العناية تصور نظام الخير في الكل فيدخل في الوجود على حسب ما علم فذلك التصور المتعالي عن التغير هو العناية و تلك الكمالات من اثار عنايته و ارادته - (27)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

8. HE IS OMNIPOTENT.

الدعوى الثامنة : كونه

قادرا -

و برهانه : أن القادر عبارة

عمن فعل ان شاء ، و لم يفعل ان شاء - وهو
بهذه الصفة ؛ فإننا قد بينا ان منبئته علمه
و ان ما علم ان الخير فيه فقد كان ، وما علم
ان الأولى به ان لا يكون ، لم يكن - (28)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

(أ) وهو حكيم و حى و عالم و
قادر و مرید و له غاية الجمال و الكمال و البهاء
و له اعظم السرور بذاته و هو العاشق الاول
و الممشوق الاول و وجود جميع الاشياء منه
على الوجه الذى يوصل اثر وجوده الى الاشياء

فتصير موجودّة و الموجودات كلها على
الترتيب حصل من اثر وجوده - (29)

(أ) وانه حكيم وحى وقادر وانه
على غاية الكمال والهاء وانه اجل مبتهج
بذاته وانه العاشق الاول والمعشوق الاول
وانه عنه توجد سائر الموجودات على
جهة فيض وجوده بوجودها وعلى ان وجودها
فائض عن وجوده وانه يترتب عنه الموجودات
الفائضة عنه مراتبها - (30)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

كونه قادرا انا بينا انه عالم
وان الفعل الصادر عنه على وفق العلم فيه و
ان العلم بنظام الخير على وجه يعلم انه من
اثر كمال وجوده هو الارادة -

فاذا عرفت ذلك فتعلم ان

29. Diet., Abh. (Text) ... 58

30. Par., Da^cawī ... 3

القادر هو الذى يصدر منه الفعل على وفق
الارادة وهو الذى ان شاء فعل وان لم يشأ لم
يفعل ولا يلزم من هذا انه لا بد ان تكون
مشيئته و ارادته مختلفة حتى يشاء تارة
ولا يشاء اخرى لان اختلاف الارادات
لاختلاف الغراض وقد ذكرنا انه لا عرض له
في فعله فاذا مشيئته و ارادته متحدة و
لان هذه القضية شرطية ولا يلزم من قولنا
ان شاء فعل وان لم يشأ لم يفعل انه لا
بد (1) و ان يشاء و ان يفعل و ان لا يشاء
و ان لا يفعل لانه على نظام الخير على الوجه
الابليغ الكمل فلا تتغير ارادته ومشيئته - (3)

(1) ن صف - لا بد و ن لا يشاء

و ان لا يفعل كما يلزم من قولنا ان شاء فعل
انه لا بد و ان يشاء و ان يفعل -

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

9. HE IS WISE.

الدعوى التاسعة: ان الاول

حكيم؛ لان الحكمة تطلق على شئئين :

احدهما: العلم، وهو تصور
الاشياء بتحقق الماهية والحد، والتصديق
فيها باليقين المكفؤ المحقق -

والثاني: الفعل بأن يكون

مرتبا محكما جامعا، لكل ما يحتاج اليه من
كمال وزينة -

والاول عالم بالاشياء على ما

هى عليه علما هو اشرف انواع العلوم -

فان علما ينقسم: الى ما لا

يحصل به وجود المعلوم، كعلمنا بصورة
السماء والكواكب، والحيوان والنبات - و
الى ما يحصل به وجود المعلوم، كعلم النقاش

بصورة النقش ، التي يخترعها من تلقاء نفسه ،
من غير مثال سابق يحتذيه - فيوجد النقش
منه ، فيكون علمه سبب وجود المعلوم -

فاذا نظر اليه غيره وعرفه ،
كان المعلوم في حقه سبب وجود العلي - و
العلمي الذي يفيد الوجود اشرف من العلمي
المستفاد من الوجود - (32)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

وكذلك في انه حكيم : فان
الحكمة هو ان يعقل افضل الاشياء بافضل
علمي ، وبما يعقل من ذاته ويعلمها يعلم افضل
الاشياء و بافضل علمي - و العلمي الافضل هو
العلمي التام الذي لا يزول لما هو دائمي لا يزول -
فلذلك هو حكيم لا بحكمة استفادها بعلمي
شيء اخر خارج عن ذاته ، بل في ذاته كفاية

فى ان يصير حكيما بان يعلمها - والجمال
والبهاء والزينة فى كل موجود هو ان يوجد
وجودة الافضل ويبلغ استكماله الاخير - و
اذ كان الاول وجودة افضل الوجود ، فجماله اذن
فأثنت لجمال كل ذى جمال - وكذلك زينته
وبهاؤه وجماله له بجزهره وذاته ، وذلك
فى نفسه وبما يعقله من ذاته - (33)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(أ) فتعلم كيف يعلم الغيب ، و
تعلم من هناك ان الاول من ذاته كيف يعلم كل
شئ ، وان ذلك لانه مبدأ كل شئ ، و يعلم
الاشياء من حالها ؛ اذ هو مبدأ شئ او اشياء
حالتها وحركانها كذا ، وما ينتج عنها كذا ،
الى التفصيل بعده ، ثم على الترتيب الذى
يلزم ذلك التفصيل لزوم التعدية والتأدية ،
فتكون هذه الاشياء مفاتيح الغيب التى لا

يعلمها احد الا هو، فالله اعلم بالغييب و هو
عالم الغيب و الشهادة و هو العزيز
الحكيم - (39)

(ii) فالواجب الوجود له الجمال و
البهاء المحض، و هو مبدأ جمال كل شئ و بهاء
كل شئ - و بهائه هو ان يكون على ما يجب له،
فكيف جمال ما يكون على ما يجب في الوجود
الواجب؟ و كل جمال و ملاءمة و خير مدرك
فهو محبوب معشوق، و مبدأ ذلك كله
إدراكه - ...

فالواجب الوجود الذي هو في
غاية الكمال و الجمال و البهاء الذي يعقل
ذاته بتلك الغاية و البهاء و الجمال، و يتمم
التعقل، و يتعقل العاقل و المعقول على انهما
واحد بالحقيقة، تكون ذاته لذاته اعظم

عاشق و معشوق و اعظمي لاذ و ملتذ - (35)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

10. HE IS BENEVOLENT.

الدعوى العاشرة: انه جواد؛

لان افادة الخير و الانعام به ينقسم الى ما
يكون لفائدة و غرض، يرجع الى المفيد - و
الى ما ليس كذلك -

و الفائدة تنقسم: الى ما هو
مثل المبدول، كمقابلة المال بالمال - و الى
ما ليس مثلاً، كمن يبذل المال رجاء الثواب
او المحمدة، او الحنساب صفة الفضيلة و
طلب الكمال به -

و هذا ايضاً معاوضة و معاملة،
و ليس بجود، كما ان الاول معاملة، و ان
كان العوام يسمون هذا جوداً - بل الجود

هو افادة ما ينبغي من غير عوض : فإن واهب
السيف ممن لا يحتاج اليه ، ليس
بمنعمي - (36)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و الاسماء التي تدل على الكمال
والفضيلة في الاشياء التي لدينا منها ما يدل على
ما هو للشئ في ذاته لا من حيث هو مضاف الى
شئ اخر خارج عنه مثل الوجود والواحد و
الحى ومنها ما يدل على ما هو للشئ بالاضافة
الى شئ اخر خارج عنه مثل العدل والجواد ...
وامثال هذه الاسماء منى نُقلت و سُمي بها الاول
قصدنا ان يدل بها على الاضافة التي له الى غيره بما
فان منه من الوجود فينبغي ان لا نجعل الاضافة
جزءاً من كماله ولا ايضاً نجعل ذلك الكمال
المدلول عليه بذلك الاسم قوامه بتلك الاضافة
بل ينبغي ان تدل به على جوهر وكمال يتبعه

ضرورةً تلك الاضافة وعلى ان قوام تلك الاضافة
بذلك الجوهر وعلى ان تلك الاضافة تابعة
لما جوهره ذلك الجوهر الذى دل عليه بذلك
الاسم - (37)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(i) و به يظهر انه جواد محض
وكمال حق - (38)

(ii) و اذا قال له: جواد عناه منى
حيث هذه الاضافة مع السلب، بزيادة سلب
اخر، وهو انه لا ينكح غرضا لذاته - (39)

(iii) و اذا قيل انه جواد فمعناه
انه يفيد الوجود منى غير محض ولا غرض منى
المدح و التخلص من الذم و لا يقصد به نفع
الخير - (40)

37. Diet., Must.(Text) ... I8
38. IS., Arsh. ... 7
39. IS., Ilah.(2) ... 368
40. IS., Arsh. ... I3

(iv) أتعرف ما الجود ؟

الجود هو إفادة ما ينبغي لا لعوض - فلعل من يهب السكين لمن لا ينبغي له، ليس بجواد - و لعل من يهب ليستحيض معامل، و ليس بجواد - و ليس العوض كله عينا، بل وغيره، حتى الثناء، والمدح، والتخلص من المذمة، و التوصل الى ان يكون على الأحسن، او على ما ينبغي -

فمن جاد ليشرف، او ليحمد، او ليحسن به ما يفعل، فهو مستحيض غير جواد -

فالجواد الحق هو الذي تفيض منه الفوائد لا لشوق منه، و طلب قصدي، لشيء يعود اليه -

واعلم أن الذي يفعل شيئاً، لو لم يفعله قبئح به او لم يحسن منه، فهو بما يفعله من فعله متخلص - (41)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

II. HE DELIGHTS IN HIS ESSENCE.

الدعوى الحادية عشرة : ان
الاول مبتهج بذاته ؛ و ان عنده من المعنى
الذى يعبر عن نظيره فى حقنا ، باللذة والطرب
والفرح والسرور بجمال ذاته وكماله ، ما لا
يدخل تحت وصف ووصف - (42)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و [اذا كانت] اللذة والفرح
والسرور والغبطة انما تتبع وتحصل اكثر
بأن يدرك الاجمل بالادراك الأتقن و اذا
كان هو الاجمل على الإطلاق و الأبهى و الأزين و
إدراكه لذاته الإدراك الأتقن والعلم الأفضل ،
فاللذة التى يلتذ بها الاول لذة لا نفهم نحن
كنهها و لا ندري مقدار عظمها الا بالقياس و

الاضافة الى يسير ما نجده نحن من اللذة
عندما نظن اننا أدركنا ما هو عندنا أجمل و
أبهى إدراكاً أتقن ، إما باحساس / او تخيّل او
بعلم عقليّ - ...

فانه بين ان الاول يعشق
ذاته ضرورةً ويحبها ويعجب بها عشقاً و
اعجاباً نسبتاً الى عشقنا لما نلتزّ به من
فضيلة ذاتنا كنسبة فضيلته هو وكمال
ذاته الى فضيلتنا نحن وكمالنا الذي نُعجب
به من انفسنا - والمحبة منه هو المحبوب
بعينه والمُعجّب منه هو المعجّب بعينه
فهو المحبوب الاول و المعشوق
الاول - (43)

IBN - SĪMĀ.

اجلّ مبتهاج بشيء هو
الاول بذاته؟ لأنه انشد الاشياء ادراكاً

لأنشد الأشياء كمالاً الذي هو برئ عن
طبيعة الإمكان والعدم -

و هما منبعنا الشر -

ولا شاغل له عنه -

والعشق الحقيقي هو الابتهاج

بتصور حضرة ذات ما -

و الشوق هو الحركة الى

تتميم هذا الابتهاج ، اذا كانت الصورة -

متمثلة من وجه ، كما تتمثل في الخيال -

غير متمثلة من وجه ، كما يتفق ان لا

تكون متمثلة في الحس - حتى يكون

تمام التمثيل الحسي ، للامر

الحسي - (44)

3. COMPARATIVE STUDY.

1. GOD IS LIVING:

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that God is living and He is life. By these two qualities al-Fārābī asserts that His Being should not be denoted with two distinct essences, rather He remains with one essence. The meaning of living (ḥayy) is that He comprehends the best intelligible things with His best intelligence. In other words, He is aware of the known with His best knowledge. In this respect since He comprehends all things with His supreme knowledge, it is proper to realize that He is Living. Al-Fārābī, however, tries to justify that this apprehension of things is communicable through His intelligence and asserts that God is intelligent and intelligence, knowing and knowledge. But al-Fārābī takes them to be of one meaning. Similarly, His being living and [His being] life appear to have one significance.

On the other hand, the ḥayy is a metaphorical term for that which is other than ḥayawān. For this is applicable

to every existent of extreme perfection and to what attains a high degree of existence. Furthermore, it implies that the perfection of a thing brings out another thing of its nature. Since the existence of the first is the most perfect, it is more appropriate to ascribe living to it. Because when one knows and comprehends a thing, it corresponds to actual existence which is external to our mind.

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He agrees with al-Fārābī and adds that God is one; and there is no cause for His Essence. His life is not a quality which is accidental to His Essence; rather the meaning of ḥayy is that He is knowing by His Essence. Since He is one, His Essence is not separate from Himself, ~~which is to himself~~ 'God has Knowledge of His **Essence**: His Knowledge, His Being Known and His **Knowing** are one and the same thing.. He **knows** other than Himself, and all objects of Knowledge. He knows all things by virtue of one knowledge and in a single manner. His Knowledge does not change according to whether the thing known has being or not-being.

Proof that God has knowledge of His Essence: We have

stated that God is One, and that He is exalted above all causes. The meaning of knowledge is the supervention of an idea divested of all corporeal coverings. Since it is established that He is One, and that He is divested of body, and His Attributes also; and as this idea as just described supervenes upon Him; and since whoever has an abstract idea supervening upon him is possessed of knowledge, and it is immaterial whether it is his essence or other than himself; and as further His Essence is not absent from Himself; it follows from all this that He knows Himself.' (1)

Al-Ghazālī states that God is living. For whosoever knows his essence is living. Since God knows His Essence, He is knowing and living. Al-Ghazālī demonstrates how He is knowing by His Essence. The meaning of His being knowing is that He is an existent which is free from matter; that is to say, the meaning of (being) the thing, intelligible and known lies in its being free from matter. Whenever an occurrence of the object of knowledge in ^aknower is postulated, then the

1. Arberry ... 33.

occurrence is knowledge and the repository is knower. Because there cannot be any knowledge except impressing a form abstracted from matter. So the thing which is impressed is knowledge and that which is impressed into becomes knower.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā does not differ in principle from Al-Fārābī, rather he agrees with ^{him} that God is living, and by His knowledge He comprehends all things. But he adds that God is knowing by His Essence. All things other than He are known by means of His knowledge. His knowledge is divested of all corporeal coverings. Al-Ghazālī's account fully corresponds to this. Thus his first assertion corresponds to Ibn-Sīnā's context under point (i) and his demonstration corresponds to Ibn-Sīnā's point (ii). But it is to be noted that in his demonstration al-Ghazālī emphatically states that the meaning of His being knowing lies in His being free from matter, whereas Ibn-Sīnā asserts that "The meaning of knowledge is the supervention of an idea divested of all corporeal coverings." Furthermore, Al-Ghazālī states that when the object of knowledge in the knower is taken into consideration,

then the occurrence becomes knowledge and the repository turns to be knower. So his 'Fa-mahmā furīda huḷūl ... bi-l-^calim' appears to be an "addition."

2. HIS KNOWLEDGE IS NOT ADDITIONAL TO HIS ESSENCE.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that God is knowing. He does not require any essence which is external to His Essence in order to know a thing. Rather He is complete with His Essence in the respect that He knows and is known. In other words, His knowledge itself cannot be a thing other than His Essence. For He knows, He is known and He is knowledge - all signify one essence and one reality.

Two references have been quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He agrees with the views of al-Fārābī, and wants to prove them from his own standpoint. So according to him, 'He knows all things by virtue of one knowledge, in a manner which changes not according to the change in the thing known: It has been established that His Knowledge does not augment His Essence,

and that He is the Origin of all things that have being, while being exalted above accident and changes; it therefore follows that He knows things in a manner unchanging. The objects of knowledge are a consequence of His Knowledge; His Knowledge is not a consequence of the things known, that it should change as they change; for His Knowledge of things is the reason for their having being.' (2) Ibn-Sīnā further adds, 'He is Knowledge, Knowing and Known: Knowledge is another term for an abstract idea. Since this idea is abstract, it follows that He is Knowledge; since this abstract idea belongs to Him, is present with Him, and is not veiled from Him, it follows that He is Knowing; and since this abstract idea does not supervene save through Him, it follows that He is Known. The terms employed in each case are different; otherwise it might be said that Knowledge, Knowing and Known are, in relation to His Essence, one. Take your own experience as a parallel. If you know yourself, the object of your knowledge is either yourself or something else; if the object of your knowledge is something other than yourself, then you do not know yourself. But if the object of your knowledge is yourself, then both the

2. Arberry ... 35.

one knowing and the things known are yourself. If the image of your self is impressed upon yourself, then it is your self which is the knowledge. Now if you look back upon yourself reflectively, you will not find any impression of the idea and quiddity of your self in yourself a second time, so as to give rise within you to a sense that your self is more than one. Therefore since it is established that He has intelligence of His Essence, and since His Intelligence is His Essence, and does not augment His Essence, it follows that He is Knowing, Knowledge and Known without any multiplicity attaching to Him through these Attributes; and there is no difference between "one who has knowledge" and "one who has intelligence", since both are terms for describing the negation of matter absolutely.' (3)

Al-Ghazālī states that God's knowledge does not augment His Essence. For such augmentation would bring plurality into His Essence, which is inconceivable. Al-Ghazālī introduces the example of man in order to prove his assertion. Thus according to him the process of man's

knowing has two aspects. Firstly, he knows by intuition i.e. by internal and external perception. Secondly, he does not know a thing except by comparing it to a thing he perceives in himself. If there is no correspondence with such a thing, no acquaintance is possible.

Al-Ghazālī further states that with respect to God man cannot perceive anything except by comparison to his own state. For he has a clear knowledge of his self. If he knows something other than himself, he knows that and not his own self. On the otherhand, if the object of knowledge is his self, then both knowing* and 'known' become one; that is to say, knowing and known form a unity. Consequently, it follows that knowledge is identical to the thing known; and similarly, knowing is also identical to the thing known. Hence there is necessarily one principle for all of them and multiplicity does not arise.

In this respect Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with Al-Fārābī in that

* That is, the knowing one or knower.

God is knowledge, knowing and known. Moreover, he gives the meaning of each term. The knowledge of God, according to Ibn-Sīnā, does not augment His Essence. He is the principle of all things, and He knows things in an unchanging manner. To cite an example, he takes your experience as a parallel, and shows that knowing yourself involves two possibilities: either it concerns yourself or something other than your own. If it is other than your own, you do not know yourself. If it is in respect to yourself, both the knowing and the known concern yourself. Al-Ghazālī's account fully corresponds to this. But it is to be noticed that in place of Ibn-Sīnā's demonstration with nafsuka al-Ghazālī brings in the reference of insān, and shows two ways of his knowing. Therefore this reference appears to be an "addition!"

3. HE KNOWS ALL TYPES OF EXISTENTS, AND NOTHING IS FAR FROM HIS KNOWLEDGE.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that God is knowing, and His knowledge is unchangeable. For He is aware of things by means of the intelligible causes and existential order,

and not by senses. He distinguishes intelligible knowledge from perceptive knowledge by the fact that the former is unalterable, whereas the latter is derived from perception; as such it is subject to change.

Two references have been quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He does not basically differ from al-Fārābī. But his account appears to imply numerous facts and instances. However, according to Ibn-Sīnā, 'He has knowledge of other than Himself: Whoever knows himself, if there~~after~~ after he does not know other than himself this is due to some impediment. If the impediment is essential, this implies necessarily that he does not know himself either; while if the impediment is of an external nature, that which is external can be removed. Therefore it is possible - nay, necessary - that He should have knowledge of other than Himself, ...

Proof that He has knowledge of all objects of Knowledge: Since it is established that He is a Necessary Being, that He is One, and that the universe is brought into being from Him and has resulted out of His Being; since it is

established further that He has knowledge of His Own Essence, His knowledge of His Essence, being what it is, namely that He is the Origin of all realities, and of all things that have being; it follows that nothing in heaven or earth is remote from His Knowledge - on the contrary, all that comes into being does so by reason of Him: He is the causer of all reasons and He knows that of which He is the Reason, the Giver of being and the Originator." (4)

Moreover, He comprehends everything; as such not even the smallest particle can remain far from His knowledge. He is the principle of all existents, and the knowledge of the existents is derived from Him. Nothing can be produced except it becomes necessary through Him. Consequently, He is aware of all causes and their correspondence with things.

Al-Ghazālī states that God has knowledge of all existents pertaining to both genus and species. As a result nothing remains far from His knowledge. Then al-Ghazālī proves his assertion in the following way:-

4. Arberry ... 34.

God has knowledge of His Essence and His Essence is an abstract thing. He is pure Being, and He causes the existence of all substances, accidents and quiddities in successive order. Thus if He knows Himself as a principle of them, then ~~his~~ knowledge ^{of them} would be implied in His knowledge by His Essence. On the other hand, if He does not know Himself as a principle, He has no knowledge in respect of what He is. This argument is misleading, because His Essence cannot be absent from Himself.

Here al-Ghazālī's account appears to correspond to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Farābī in the sense that God has knowledge of all things. But he adds more materials of his own. Thus according to him God comprehends everything in the world, and even the smallest particle cannot remain far from His knowledge. 'Whoever knows himself if thereafter he does not know other than himself this is due to some impediment. If the impediment is essential, this implies necessarily that he does not know himself either.' Moreover, He is the prime cause of all causes and origin of

all realities. Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds with this. Furthermore, it has been observed that al-Ghazālī's "Fa-lā ya^c zib^c an^c ilmi-hi shay'" is a direct use from the account of Ibn-Sīnā,

4. THERE IS NO MULTIPLICITY IN HIS ESSENCE AND KNOWLEDGE.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that multiplicity cannot be ascribed to the Essence of God. He is the cause for the existence of all things. This means that He provides continuously existence for all of them and hinders total non-existence but not in the sense that He gives them renewed existence after non-existence prevails over them.

Two references have been quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī, rather he adds more things of his own. Thus according to him, no multiplicity can be ascribed to the nature of God. On the other hand, His **Essence** is unique, absolute and pure truth. Since He is the most perfect Being, He is single; because cases of

multiple and additional things cannot be single. So He is single with respect to His perfect nature, unique definition, indivisible character and grade of Being. In reference to this Ibn-Sīnā brings the categories of existents and asserts that they are not deprived of His Being; because all of them emanate from Him in successive order.

Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that each of the existents may have some form of relation with Necessary Being. In other words, everything proceeds from Him in proper order. He has only one essence, and multiplicity can never be added to it. If any affirmative or negative relation is ascribed to His Essence, then that would be accessory only and not a constituent part of it.

Al-Ghazālī states that multiplicity can neither be ascribed to His Essence nor to His Knowledge. For the objects of knowledge in their multiplicity require many 'knowledges'. One knowledge for distinct objects of knowledge cannot possibly exist, for the meaning of one is that there are not in it distinct things. If one supposes the non-existence

of part of a thing, then the non-existence of the whole of it would necessarily follow, since it has no part. If the knowledge of substances and accidents is supposed to be one and if the connection (of the knowledge) with accident is postulated to cease there must remain something other than what is postulated to have ceased, and this is the connection (of knowledge) with substances. Similarly with each pair of objects of knowledge. This contradicts the meaning of singularity. But it is explained by comparison with intuition (or observation) of the soul. For the soul is an abridged copy of the world, in which there is something corresponding to each item in (the world). In this way knowledge of everything is possible.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in the sense that multiplicity cannot be ascribed to the nature of God. Then he states that His Essence is the unique principle, absolute and pure truth. Nothing can augment His Essence. All affirmative and negative relations are simply finite phenomena which can never be referred to His Essence as a constituent

part of it. However, al-Ghazālī agrees with Ibn-Sīnā in principle. But his account in fact appears to be a re-organized characterization, and more particularly, his contexts of ma^clūmayn and nafs are "additions".

5. HE IS AWARE OF CONTINGENT BEINGS.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that all kinds of existents have their being from God. Each of them belongs to a particular group and simple order. But in reference to the derivation of being from God it should not be held that He has any intention which might resemble our intentions. Thus God has no prior "intention of things". Furthermore, the origin of things cannot be possible by way of nature apart from His knowledge and approval. Here al-Fārābī refers to the problem of beings which are subordinate to the will of God. Thus the origin of things and their achievement can only happen whenever He wishes. Thus things come about from Him because He knows His Essence.

Generally speaking, Ibn-Sīnā does not differ from

al-Fārābī. But his account here appears to be concerned with the specific itemization of things. God has supreme knowledge over all things in this world. 'Hence it is manifest that Knowledge is itself Omnipotence. He knows all contingent things, even as He knows all things that have being, even though we know them not; for the contingent, in relation to us, is a thing whose being is possible and whose not-being is also possible; but in relation to Him one of the two alternatives is actually known. Therefore, His Knowledge of genera, species, things with being, contingent things, manifest and secret things - this Knowledge is a single knowledge.' (5)

Al-Ghazālī states that as God has knowledge of all genera and species, so He is fully aware of all contingent beings of which we have no knowledge at all. Al-Ghazālī defines the scope of contingent thing and shows that a contingent thing, as long as it is known to be contingent, is incapable of being known to occur or not to occur.

It is simply known to have the quality of possibility; that it is possible for it to be or not to be.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that God has knowledge of all things. But he makes a specific statement rather than a general one as al-Fārābī does, that God has clear knowledge of all contingent beings, even as He is aware of all categories of beings. On the other hand, "the contingent, in relation to us, is a thing whose being is possible and whose not-being is also possible." Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully with this. Moreover, it has been observed that al-Ghazālī states the role of the contingent thing explicitly in greater detail.

6. HIS KNOWLEDGE OF PARTICULARS IS NOT SUBJECT TO TEMPORAL DISTINCTIONS.

Ibn-Sīnā asserts that God's knowledge of particulars (juz'īyyāt) is not subject to temporal distinctions, such that it includes any reference to past, present and future; because if it included references to various times the

quality of His Essence would vary. But Ibn-Sīnā does not allow any change in the nature of God. Rather His knowledge of particulars necessarily pertains to His holiness which is above Time and Era; that is to say, it must not be compared to a specified characterization of finite phenomena. On the other hand, God is fully aware of everything. For everything follows from Him either mediately or without any mediation. As a result, nothing can manifestly exist without having its being in some form from Him. That is why, all that exists derives its necessity or otherwise from His omnipotence.

Al-Ghazālī states that God does not know particulars which are subject to temporal distinctions, such as, past, present and future. Because this would necessarily involve variations which cannot be referred to His Essence. Al-Ghazālī takes the particular example of an eclipse of the sun and states that if the sun is not eclipsed to-day, it would be to-morrow. Then it takes place to-morrow. Thus when the day after to-morrow comes, it would be that the eclipse took place yesterday. This necessarily implies a variation

in its essence owing to those diversities of knowledge. In reference to change al-Ghazālī further states that the object of knowledge follows knowledge and varies with the variation of the latter. Moreover, as knowledge varies, knowing is subject to variation. On the other hand, the relationship of knowledge with the known is not a relationship which necessitates a difference in the known unless one item of knowledge is postulated.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā categorically asserts that God's knowledge of particulars is not conceivable in terms of temporal phenomena; because if it manifests itself through a definite time, it would be subject to variation in another aspect, that is to say, the quality of the Essence would necessarily change. Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely with this. Moreover, it has been observed that al-Ghazālī introduces the example of an eclipse and then shows a concomitant variation between knowledge and the known. The context of these instances appears to be "additions".

7. HE HAS WILL AND PROVIDENCE.

Two references have been quoted from al-Fārābī. He propounds the view that God wills. There is nothing in His Essence which is contrary to the origin of all things. On the other hand, things have their being through Him. In this respect He is said to will them.

Three references have been quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He deals with the role of will (irāda) and providence (^Cināya) in respect to God. According to him, God has will. The concept of His willing implies that He is Necessary Being with purely intellectual nature isolated from matter. His is the single Being from which all existents are derived and to which all of them return, that is, they are subsistent with Him alone. Whatever is other than He is His act, and He is its Agent (fa^Cil). The state of being fa^Cil involves one of two aspects: either he has knowledge of the origin of things proceeding out of him, or he has no knowledge of this kind. On the other hand, the state of his being devoid of any knowledge consists of two possibilities: either his

act would be similar, or it would be dissimilar. If his act is of similar form, that principle pertains to nature. But if his act is of dissimilar type, then that principle belongs to vegetable soul (an-nafs an-nabātī).

The act of God originates from His knowledge which is entirely uncorrupted by ignorance and variation. Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that God is the principle of the best order (aḥsan an-nizām) of things: as such every act comes out of His knowledge in compresence with the best order that ever could be. This comprises His will. His Essence is capable of knowing the existence of things proceeding from Him successively through the best order and perfect condition. In the process of this emanation certain differences creep into one category of existent from that of another; and this is vitally essential. However, with regard to creation in the world and to primary things being inseparable from His knowledge (which is the cause of the total existence in the best form), the entire process implies His will.

On the other hand, providence lies in the state of His knowing things in the best form. He comprehends the

best order of things in respect of what can possibly come into being. Thus providence primarily deals with the best order in all, and consists in an exalted and unabated perspective apart from variation. Therefore, traces of this perfection may apparently be postulated to be the product of His will and providence.

Al-Ghazālī states that God has will and providence; but they do not augment His Essence. He proves this assertion by the fact that God is Agent, and all that proceeds from Him is His act. The agent would either be active by dint of pure nature or by will. The act which issues from pure nature is an act not associated with knowledge. So every act which is not destitute of knowledge cannot be devoid of will. All things emanate from the Essence of God with His knowledge, and this flux is not incompatible with His Essence; rather this state may express His will. He is the principle of overflow, and His knowledge sets an order in all things. Therefore, His knowledge is virtually the cause of existence of the thing known, that is to say, His will is His knowledge.

The providence of God is also knowledge. It is fundamentally concerned with the best order in things. Moreover, providence indicates the accomplishment of a thing by dint of complete goodness. It may also express the accomplishment of goodness with guidance after creation.

Al-Ghazālī introduces the example of man and states that a man is in need of forceful organs, as are the hand and palm. If he does not have them, he would be defective and imperfect in that respect.

Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that God has will, and he adds more materials of his own. According to Ibn-Sīnā, God is Necessary Being and He is the fundamental cause of the origin of all things. What is other than He is taken to be His act. As every act is performed through His knowledge it implies His will. Furthermore, God is the principle of Supreme Order in the world, and His Essence is knowing the existence of things proceeding from Him. On the other hand, the providence of God comprises the state of

His being cognizant of the thing in the best order by virtue of His Essence. Al-Ghazālī's account fully corresponds with this. Moreover, his account appears to be a simple abridgement of Ibn-Sīnā's diversity of views. But it is to be noted that his instance of man appears to be an "addition" to clarify the thought.

8. HE IS OMNIPOTENT.

Two references have been quoted from al-Fārābī. Both of them appear to be of similar nature. Al-Fārābī propounds the view that God is wise, living, omnipotent and willing. He has supreme beauty, perfection and magnificence on the one hand, and the greatest happiness and joy in His Essence on the other. He is endowed with the qualities of being lover and beloved. As for the creation of all categories of existents al-Fārābī further asserts that they emanate from His Being in successive order.

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with the basic principle of al-Fārābī. According to him, God is omnipotent. Ibn-Sīnā repeats his assertion that God is All-Knowing and acts come from Him in pursuance of His cognizance. Moreover, His knowledge of the best order of things is concerned with the

traces of perfection mentioned above. Ibn-Sīnā asserts all of these traces to be of His will.

Then he explains that the omnipotent being is he from whom the act proceeds in accordance with his will; that is to say, if he wishes he does, and if he does not wish he does not do. It does not necessarily follow from this that his volition (mashī'a) and will should be different in such a way that at one time he wishes and another time he does not. Because difference of volitions is due to the difference of purposes. But in the act of God there is no purpose. Therefore, his volition and will appear to be one thing. On the other hand, Ibn-Sīnā points out that this proposition is an hypothetical one. Now it does not follow that he must wish or that he must do; and that he must not wish or that he must not do. For he knows the best order of things, in the most perfect way. Therefore, his will and volition remain unalterable.

Al-Ghazālī states that God is omnipotent. Then he demonstrates this assertion by the fact that the omnipotent being is one who does what he wishes, and refuses to do that

which he does not wish. Al-Ghazālī further adds that God has this quality and His volition is His knowledge. Moreover, whatever He knows to be good, becomes so, and whatever He prefers should not exist, can never come into being.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that God is omnipotent. But he expounds this view in greater detail. The implication of omnipotence is shown by him in the following way:-

Whatever He wishes He does and if He does not wish, He does not do. This implies that God has supreme power to do each and everything according to His will. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to correspond fully with this. But it should be noted that he uses 'fa^cala in sha'a wa lam yaf^cal in sha'a' in place of Ibn-Sīnā's 'in sha'a fa^cala wa in lam yasha' lam yaf^cal.' This implies an emphasis on 'doing' which probably should be seen as corresponding to Ibn-Sīnā's use of "omnipotence".

9. HE IS WISE.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that God is wise. This wisdom, according to him, implies that God comprehends the best things by His best knowledge. Such apprehension is possible by His Essence alone. Al-Fārābī analyses the content of God's knowledge and asserts that His knowledge is the most perfect form of knowledge and is everlasting and unending. God is wise not because of the wisdom which is derived from the knowledge of another thing external to His Essence, but because of the fact that He is sufficient in His Essence to become wise ^{by knowing His Essence .} ~~in respect of what He knows~~

On the other hand, beauty, magnificence and embellishment in every existent are the qualities by which its existence is made best of its kind and is capable of reaching ultimate perfection. However, since the existence of God is the most perfect of all, His beauty, magnificence and embellishment transcend the existent possessing those qualities. Moreover, His Reality and Essence are full of beauty which He comprehends out of His Essence.

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. Here he firstly deals with the problem of God's knowledge about things and their movements in the world. Secondly, he speaks of certain noblest qualities of God and their relation to the finite qualities of similar kind. In the former he asserts that God is the principle of all things. He is fully aware of them, their occurrences and movements. There are a great deal of diversities and accomplishment of things in the world, the mystery of which no body knows except God. Keeping this view in mind Ibn-Sīnā emphatically remarks that God is conscious of the hidden thing and cognizant of the visible and invisible, since He is omnipotent and wise.

In the latter, he asserts that God has pure beauty and magnificence and He is the principle of those qualities. Ibn-Sīnā considers the possibility of how beauty would be requisite in Necessary Being, and then asserts that God is the most perfect, beautiful and magnificent Being; and His Essence comprehends them with the fullest understanding and thought. He is for Himself the greatest lover and beloved, and enjoyer and enjoyed.

Al-Ghazālī states that God is wise. Wisdom, on the other hand, comprises two different aspects. One of them is the knowledge which conceives ~~imagining~~ things by ascertaining the quiddities, ^{and} definition and believing them with indubitable pure certitude. The other is the ^{ordering} act ^{is} of all that ^{needed} of perfection and embellishment.

God knows things by the best form of knowledge. In this connection al-Ghazālī brings up the problem of human knowledge and divides it into the following two groups:-

One of them is that existence of the object of knowledge cannot be attained, as is our knowledge of the form of the sky, stars, animals and plants.

The other is that existence of the object of knowledge can be attained, as is the case of a painter's knowledge of the form of painting that he invents by himself without any previous example which he imitates. For the painting is done by him. As a result his knowledge

becomes a cause for the existence of the object of knowledge. But if somebody looks at it and perceives it, then the object of knowledge with respect to it becomes a cause of the existence of knowledge. Thus the knowledge which bestows existence is better than the knowledge acquired from existence.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that God is wise. He is aware of things by virtue of His best form of knowledge, and He has beauty, perfection and magnificence for all things. But al-Fārābī's account consists of two vital aspects. God's wisdom implies apprehension of things by His best knowledge. His knowledge is most perfect and everlasting. Furthermore, His wisdom includes some form of act. Every existent derives from Him certain beauty, magnificence and embellishment in order to attain some form of perfection. God has these qualities in His Essence which transcend the finite things possessing them. God has full acquaintance with all states of existents. In this sense some form of act is implied. Al-Ghazālī's account

corresponds with this. His categorical assertion of two-fold aspects in wisdom is a clear itemization from al-Fārābī's indeterminate account. Moreover, he explains both of those aspects of knowledge and act; and lastly divides our knowledge into two groups. These two sorts of division appear to be "additions".

10. HE IS BENEVOLENT.

Al-Fārābī speaks of certain names which may be attributed to God. Two kinds of names are cited by him, one of which indicating perfection and excellent quality in things is primarily concerned with the essence of them. They should not be in anyway related to external things, as are the cases of existent, the one and the living. The other kind of names has some form of relationship with external things, such as, justice and benevolence.

However, al-Fārābī is more concerned about the names which can be ascribed to God. Whenever these names pertain to Him, we should not consider that relation as a

part of His perfection, rather we may infer a relation from His reality only.

Four references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. According to him, God has pure benevolence (jud) and true perfection. His benevolence implies that He renders benefit to being without any compensation whatsoever. In other words, God never does anything to others with the intention of being praised and distinguished or of escaping blame. This kind of benevolence involves negating any purpose for doing good and includes the content of doing for the sake of doing only.

Ibn-Sīnā introduces certain concrete examples in order to illustrate his assertions. Thus a man cannot be benevolent by giving his knife to someone who should not have it. Similarly, benevolence cannot be ascribed to a man who receives some kind of compensation for entering into a mutual relationship. However, the idea of benevolence should not be generalised on the basis of doing 'like for like'. Thus the true benevolent is he from whom benefits proceed without any intention of getting anything in return.

Al-Ghazālī states that God is benevolent. He divides the giving of good and benefaction into two groups. One of them pertains to benefit and objective (gharaḍ); and the other involves nothing of this kind. Again al-Ghazālī divides benefit into two ways. Firstly, it is like an exchange of wealth for wealth, secondly, it is not this sort of exchange. In this connection al-Ghazālī points out that whoever sacrifices wealth in the hope of reward or praise or acquisition of a moral quality and claims perfection thereby, should not be called benevolent (even though the common people claim so). Thus al-Ghazālī states that benevolence is exemplified in the giving of a thing to someone without any hope of getting a benefit out of it. In reference to this he mentions that the donor of a sword, when he does not require it, should not be called a benefactor.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. The account of Ibn-Sīnā, on the other hand, appears to be different from that of al-Fārābī. For al-Fārābī uses the term 'benevolence' in connection with an example which is not of much importance. However, Ibn-Sīnā

specifically asserts that God is benevolent. This quality implies doing something to somebody without any compensation. If a man renders any benefit to someone in the hope of getting anything in return, he should not be called benevolent. Al-Ghazālī's account fully corresponds with this. Moreover it is observed that he shows two divisions in his account, one dividing ifāda al-khayr wa l-in^cām into two groups, and the other dividing fā'ida into two ways. He has to do this in order to make his statement quite explicit. On the other hand, he demonstrates the example with sayf where Ibn-Sīnā used the context of sikkīn.

11. HE DELIGHTS IN HIS ESSENCE.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that the noble qualities of God transcend the similar qualities which are possessed by us. More particularly, whenever pleasure, joy, delight and happiness are taken into consideration, they arise in that God apprehends them. In this connection when qualities are attributed to Him, we cannot understand anything about them except by comparing them with our own by means of feeling, imagination or intellectual knowledge.

Al-Fārābī further asserts that God loves His Essence

and likes it most. Furthermore, He is highly pleased with His Essence. In this respect a comparison may be made with our love for our essence. Similarly, we may have some form of comparison for the perfection of His Essence with our excellent qualities. For example, we are pleased with our perfection. In this connection al-Fārābī draws an analogy with the fact that a lover appears to be beloved exactly in the same way and similarly a pleaser is pleased. Thus God is the First Lover and Beloved.

Ibn-Sīnā basically agrees with al-Fārābī. According to him, the highest "being with" a thing is God alone "with" His Essence. He is the strongest of all in His perception of the most perfect things isolated from the nature of possibility and non-being. On the other hand, both possibility and non-being are the sources of evil or imperfection. Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that real love is happiness in the imagining of the presence of a certain essence, whereas desire is a motion for the accomplishment of this happiness. In other words, since the form is

imagined in one way - just as it takes shape in imagination - it arises in perception in order that the completion of perceptive imagination may give effect to the thing perceived.

Al-Ghazālī states that God delights in His Essence. He has the noblest qualities which no describer can describe; but they have some form of correspondence with our own. Thus pleasure, joy, merriment, and delight may subsist in relation with His beauty and perfection.

Here al-Ghazālī's account consists of two aspects. Firstly, he states that God delights in His Essence. Secondly, he discusses how God has the noblest qualities which have in some form certain correspondence with our own. Now with respect to the first aspect his account fully corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā, whereas with respect to the second aspect his account corresponds to that of al-Fārābī.

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that God is pleased with His Essence. Thus his 'ajall mubtahij bi-shay' huwa al-awwal bi-dhāti-hi,' is a developed idea in place of al-Fārābī's ' ... yu^cjab bihā'. However, al-Ghazālī's first aspect is found to be in direct agreement with

that of Ibn-Sīnā. On the other hand, al-Fārābī propounds the view that God has excellent qualities in His Essence and they transcend the similar qualities possessed by us. Thus joy, pleasure, and delight may exist in relation with those of the transcendental qualities of God. Al-Ghazālī's second aspect of his account corresponds with this.

But it is observed that al-Ghazālī's account is very brief and the second aspect of his account appears to be a tacit derivation from al-Fārābī.

4. RESULT.

Al-Ghazālī's accounts appear to be closer to those of al-Fārābī in points 9 and 11 (partial), and to those of Ibn-Sīnā in points 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11 (partial). Moreover, certain "additions" have been observed in points 1, 2, 4, 6, 7 and 9.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THEORY OF EMANATION.

1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION.

In this chapter al-Ghazālī discusses the nature and role of various existents in this world, and states how they proceed from God in proper succession. First of all one thing comes from Him which is abstract intelligence and which is the matrix of all multiplicities in the world. Then the gradual process of creation continues till ten intelligences and nine celestial spheres follow one after another.

After the completion of those intelligences and spheres, existence of the lower beings begins firstly with four primary elements whose natures are different from each other. Later on, other bodies are created by mixtures of those elements; but this process of creation, on the other hand, starts from the lowest grade of being and passes through the upward grades of vapours, mineral, plant, animal and man respectively. Each of these grades of being results from certain degrees of mixture of the primary elements. The forms proceed from the giver of the form and

arise out of the preparation of things.

The heavenly bodies remain in one condition and all things in the world ascend at the end to the motion of the heaven.

Lastly, al-Ghazālī deals with certain theological aspects and states how the theory of emanation is treated to be applicable to them.

My investigation into materials concerns only the fundamental points of al-Ghazālī's metaphysical part; such as (i) one thing emanates from God, (ii) abstract intelligence emanated from God has two aspects, (iii) emanation of ten intelligences and nine celestial spheres, (iv) creation of lower beings, (v) creation of other bodies by the mixture of primary elements, and (vi) ways of upward trend in creation.

2. ANALOGOUS VIEWS.

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

I. ONE THING EMANATES FROM GOD.

الاول صدر منه شئ واحد -
يلزم ذلك الواحد، لا من جهة الاول حكم اخر،
فيحصل بسببه فيه كثرة، ويكون ذلك
مبدأ لحصول كثرة - (1)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و اول المبدعات عنه شئ
واحد بالعدد وهو العقل الاول و يحصل في
المبدع الاول الكثرة بالعرض - (2)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

I. Ghaz., Mag. ... 288

2. Diet. Abh.(Text) 58

... يجوز ان يكون الواحد يلزم عنه واحد؛ ثم ذلك الواحد يلزمه حكمي و حال، او صفة، او معلول؛ و يكون ذلك ايضا واحدا؛ ثم يلزم عنه بمنشأركة ذلك اللازم شئ، فيتبع من هناك كثرة كلها يلزم ذاته (3)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

2. ABSTRACT INTELLIGENCE EMANATED FROM GOD HAS TWO ASPECTS.

قيل : هو ان يصدر من الاول عقل مجرد، فيه اثنييتية كما سبق - احدهما؛ له مني الاول - والاخر؛ له مني ذاته - فيحصل منه ملك، و فلك - فالملك العقل المجرد - و ينبغي ان يحصل الاشرف مني الوصف الاشرف - والعقل اشرف - والوصف الذي له مني الاول وهو الوجوب اشرف - (4)

3. IS., Ilah.(2) ... 406

4. Ghaz., Maq. ... 290

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

(i) وان اول المبدعات عنه يكون
واحدا وهو العقل الاول وانه يجب ان
يحصل في هذا المبدع كثرة عرضية على
سبيل انه بذاته ممكن الوجود وبالاول
واجب الوجود وعلى انه يعقل ذاته ويعقل
الاول وان الكثرة التي فيه تلزمه من الاول
فان امكان وجوده هو امر له بذاته للسبب
الاول بل له من الاول وجوب الوجود - (5)

(ii) ... فهو يتعجب من ان العقل
المجرد اذا عقل شيئا يحدث في الوجود
من تعقله اثر وفي المبدع الاول اثنيبية - (6)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(i) فقد علمت ان الواحد من
حيث هو واحد انما يوجد عنه واحد فالحرى

5. Far., Dāwī ... 4

6. Far., Zinūn ... 6

ان يكون عن المبدعات الاول بسبب
اثنييته يجب ان يكون فيها ضرورة او
كثرة كيف كانت ، ولا يمكن في العقول
المفارقة شيء من الكثرة إلا على ما اقول :
ان المعلول بذاته ممكن الوجود ، وبالاول
واجب الوجود ، و وجوب وجوده بانه عقل ،
وهو يعقل ذاته ، ويعقل الاول ضرورة ، فيجب
ان يكون فيه من الكثرة معنى عقله لذاته
ممكنة الوجود في حيزها ، وعقله وجوب
وجوده من الاول المعقول بذاته ، وعقله
للاول ، وليست الكثرة له عن الاول ؛ فان
امكان وجوده امر له بذاته لا بسبب الاول ،
بل له من الاول وجوب وجوده - (7)

(ii) وهذا هو الذي نسميه

العقل المجرد ؛ ونجعل صدور ما بعده عنه ، و
لكن هذا غير المنفصل عن الجسمي و غير
المشارك اياه ، والصائر صورة خاصة به ، والكائن
عن الجهة التي حدثنا عنها حين اثبتنا هذه النفس (8)

7. IS., Ilah.(2) ... 405

8. Ibid ... 408

(iii) فبين ان اول الموجودات عن

العلة الاولى واحد بالعدد و ذاته و ماهيته موجودة لاني مادة فليس شئ من الاجسام و لا من الصور التي هي كمالات الاجسام معلولا قريبا له بل المعلول الاول عقل محض لانه صورة لاني مادة و هو اول العقول المفارقة التي عدناها و يشبهه ان يكون هو المبدأ المحرك للجرم الاقصى على سبيل التشويق - (9)

(iv) فالوجود اذا ابتدأ من عند

الاول ليريز كل تال منه أدون مرتبة من الاول و لا يزال ينحط درجات؛ فالول ذلك درجة الملائكة الروحانية المجردة التي تسمى عقولا ثم مراتب الملائكة الروحانية التي تسمى نفوسا، و هي الملائكة العملية، ثم مراتب الاجرام السماوية، و بعضها اشرف من بعض الى ان يبلغ اخرها - (10)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

3. EMANATION OF TEN INTELLIGENCES AND NINE
CELESTIAL SPHERES.

فيحصل منه عقل ثانى باعتبار
كونه واجبا - و الفلك الأقصى باعتبار الامكان
الذى له كالمادة -

و يلزم من العقل الثانى 'العقل
الثالث و فلك البروج - و من العقل الثالث 'رابع'
و فلك زحل - و من الرابع خامس' و فلك المشتري -
و من الخامس سادس و فلك المريخ - و من
السادس سابع' و فلك الشمس - و من السابع
ثامن' و فلك الزهرة - و من الثامن 'تاسع' و
فلك عطارد - و من التاسع عاشر' و فلك
القمر - (1)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

(i) و يحصل من العقل الاول بانه واجب الوجود و عالم بالاول عقل اخر ولا يكون فيه كثرة الا بالوجه الذى ذكرناه و يحصل من ذلك العقل الاول الثانى بانه ممكن الوجود و بانه يعلى ذاته الفلك الاعلى بمادته و صورته التى هى النفس و المراد بهذا ان هذين الشئيين يصيران سبب شئيين اعنى الفلك و النفس -

و يحصل من العقل الثانى عقل اخر و فلك اخر تحت الفلك الاعلى و انما يحصل منه ذلك لان الكثرة حاصلة فيه بالعرض كما ذكرناه بديا فى العقل الاول و على هذا يحصل عقل و فلك من عقل و نحن لا نعلم كمية هذه العقول و الافلاك الاعلى طريق الجملة الى ان تنتهى العقول الفعالة الى عقل فعال مجرد من المادة و هناك يتم عدد الافلاك - (12)

(ii) و يفيض من الاول وجود الثانى

فهذا الثاني هو ايضا جوهر غير متجسّم اصلا ولا هو في مادة فهو يعقل ذاته و يعقل الاول و ليس ما يعقل من ذاته هو شئ غير ذاته فيما يعقل من الاول يلزم عنه وجود ثالث و بما هو متجوهر بذاته التي تخصه يلزم عنه وجود السماء الاول و الثالث ايضا وجوده لا في مادة و هو بجوهره عقل و هو يعقل ذاته و يعقل الاول فيما ينتجوهر به من ذاته التي تخصه يلزم عنه وجود كرة الكواكب الثابتة و بما يعقله من الاول يلزم عنه وجود رابع و هذا ايضا لا في مادة فهو يعقل ذاته و يعقل الاول فيما ينتجوهر به من ذاته التي تخصه يلزم عنه وجود كرة زحل و بما يعقله من الاول يلزم عنه وجود خامس و هذا الخامس ايضا وجوده لا في مادة فهو يعقل ذاته و يعقل الاول فيما ينتجوهر به من ذاته يلزم عنه وجود كرة المشترى و بما يعقله من الاول يلزم عنه وجود سادس و هذا ايضا وجوده لا في مادة و هو يعقل ذاته و يعقل الاول فيما ينتجوهر به من ذاته يلزم عنه وجود كرة مريخ و بما يعقله من الاول

يلزم عنه وجود سابع وهذا ايضا وجودة لاني
مادة وهو يعقل ذاته و يعقل الاول فيما
يتجوهر به من ذاته يلزم عنه وجود كرة الشمس
و بما يعقل من الاول يلزم عنه وجود ثامن وهو
ايضا وجودة لاني مادة و يعقل ذاته و يعقل
الاول فيما يتجوهر به من ذاته التي تخصه
يلزم عنه وجود كرة الزهرة و بما يعقل من
الاول يلزم عنه وجود تاسع وهذا ايضا وجودة
لاني مادة فهو يعقل ذاته و يعقل الاول فيما
يتجوهر به من ذاته يلزم عنه وجود كرة عطارد
و بما يعقل من الاول يلزم عنه وجود عاشور وهذا
ايضا وجودة لاني مادة وهو يعقل ذاته و يعقل
الاول فيما يتجوهر به من ذاته يلزم عنه
وجود كرة القمر- (13)

IBM - SĪNĀ.

(١٣) فيكون عدد العقول المفارقة
بعد المبدأ الاول عدد الحركات فان كانت افلاك

المتحيرة انما المبدأ في حركة كرات كل كوكب
منها قوة تفيض من الكوكب لم يبعد ان تكون
المفارقات بعدد الكواكب لهما لا بعدد الكرات
وكان عددها عشرة يعد الاول اولها العقل
المحرك الذي لا يتحرك وتحريكه لكرة الجرم
اللاقص في الذي هو مثله لكرة الثوابت في
الذي هو مثله لكرة زحل - وكذلك حتى ينتهي
الى العقل الفائض على انفسنا وهو عقل العالم
الارضى : ونسميه نحن الفعال - (14)

(14) وهذا يعد استتمام وجود
السمويات كلها فيلزم دائما عقل بعد عقل حتى
تتكون كرة القمر - ... فقد بان و اتضح ان
كل عقل هو اعلى في المرتبة فانه لمعنى فيه وهو
انه بما يعقل الاول يجب عنه وجود عقل اخر
دونه و بما يعقل ذاته يجب عنه فلك بنفسه
وجرمه و جرم الفلك كائن عنه ومستبقى بتوسط
النفس الفلكية فان كل صورة فهي علة لان تكون
مادتها بالفعل لان المادة بنفسها لا قوام لها - (15)

I4. IS., Naj. ... 273

I5. Ibid ... 280

(iii) ... پس طبیعت بتدبیر نفس
بر حکم تسخیر، همچنان معین بود بتحریر
جسمی تا انرا بکمال خریش رساند و کمال «ان»
شکل «کوئی» بود که او «ادوم» الا شکل است
تا در دیمومت نوعی «محاکات» کرده باشد عالی
نفس را، چه شکل «کری» بسیط جمله شکلهاست،
و اول اشکال شکل «کریست» که در نهایت «وجه»
است، و پس مثنی که انرا مقوس خوانند و پس
مثلث و پس مربع و همچنین متکثر میشود،
پس از صفوان جسمی جرم فلک «اعلی» حاصل شد
[و] بحسب صفای [وی] جرم عقلی و نفسی بوی
پیوست، و دیگر از صفو کدر و جرم فلک اعلی
«فلکی» دیگر حاصل شد، [و] بحسب صفای وی
(جرم) عقلی و نفسی بوی پیوست، و همچنین
تا پآخر فلک قمر، جمله نه فلک چنانکه بر صدر
معلوم کرده آمد - نخست فلک تاسع که فلک
الافلاکست، و دیگر فلک ثامن که فلک البروجست
و دیگر فلک سابع که فلک زحل است و [دیگر]
فلک سادس [که] فلک مشتری است

[و دیگر فلک خامس که فلک مریخ است و
دیگر فلک رابع که فلک شمس است و
دیگر فلک ثالث که فلک زهره است و دیگر
فلک ثانی که فلک عطارد است و دیگر] فلک
اول که فلک قمر است، [و] هرچه عالی تر،
صفوان زیرین تر و ان [که] زیرین تر، کدر
ان عالیتر - ... (۱۶)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

4. CREATION OF LOWER BEINGS.

ثم بعد ذلك يبتدئ وجود
السفليات، وهي العناصر الأربعة أولاً، ولا
شك في أنها مختلفة؛ لأن أماكنها بالطبع
مختلفة؛ فيطلب بعضها الوسط، وبعضها
المحيط - ...
ولأنه لا يتصور أن يكون جسيماً،
عن جسي لا يجوز أن يكون سبب وجودها

الاجسام السماوية وحدها، و لاجل ان مادة
الاربعة مشتركة، لا يجوز ان يكون علة
وجود مادتها كثيرة -

ولاجل ان صورها مختلفة، لا
يجوز ان تكون علة صورها الا كثيرة مختلفة،
محصورة في اربعة اشياء او في اربعة انواع؛
لانها اربع صور - (17)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

(17) و الصور المحتاجة الى المادة
هي على مراتب: فادناها مرتبة هي صور الاسطوانات
الاربع، وهي اربع في اربع مواد - (18)

(18) و اشتراك الاجرام السماوية
في معنى واحد و هو الحركة الدورية الصادرة
عنها يصير سبب اشتراك المواد الاربع في

17. Ghaz., Maq. ... 291

18. Far., Siyasa ... 38

مادة واحدة و اختلاف حركاتها يصير سبب
اختلاف الصور الاربع و تغيرها من حال الى حال
يصير سبب تغير المواد الاربع - ...

و الحركات السماوية و وضعية
دورية و الحركات الكائنة الفاسدة حركات
مكانية و حركة الكمية و الكيفية و الحركات
المستوية لازمة للبساط و هي على ضربين
احدهما من الوسط و الاخر الى الوسط و
حركة الاشياء المركبة بحسب غلبة
البساط من المواد الاربع عليها - (١٩)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

فاذا استوفت الكرات
السماوية عددها ، لزم بعدها وجود اسطوانات ؛
و ذلك لان الاجسام الاسطقسية كائنة فاسدة
فيجب ان تكون مبادئها القريبة اشياء تقبل
نوعا من التغير و الحركة - ...

و لهذه الاسطوانات مادة
يشارك فيها ، و صور يختلف بها ؛ فيجب
ان يكون اختلاف صورها مما يعين فيه
اختلاف في احوال الافلاك ، وان يكون اتفاق
مادتها مما يعين فيه اتفاق في احوال
الافلاك - ...

وان تكون هذه المادة التي
تحدث بالشركة يغيض اليها من الاجرام
السماوية ، إما عن اربعة اجرام ، وإما عن
عدة منحصرة في اربع جمل ، عن كل واحد منها
ما يتنها لصورة جسر بسيط - (20)

AL - GHAZALI.

5. CREATION OF OTHER BODIES BY THE MIXTURE OF
THE PRIMARY ELEMENTS.

ثم يحدث بامتزاج هذه
العناصر اجسام اخر:

أولها : حوادث الجو من البخار

والدخان ، والشهب و غيرها -

وثانيها : المعادن -

وثالثها : النبات -

ورابعها : الحيوان -

وآخر ترتيبها الانسان -

وكل هذا يحصل بامتزاج

العناصر - فمن امتزاج صورة المائية والهوائية

يحدث البخار - ومن امتزاج النارية والترابية

يحدث الدخان - فيحصل بالاختلاط الاول

حوادث الجو -

و يكون سبب اختلاطها

حركات تحصل فيها من الحرارة والبرودة الصادرة

من الاجسام السماوية ، فستفيد الاستعداد

منها - (21)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

(أ) فيحدث أولا الأسطقسات
ثم ما جانسها و قارنها من الاجسام مثل
البخارات واصنافها مثل الغيوم والرياح و
سائر ما يحدث في الجو و ايضا مجانساتها
حول الارض و تحتها و في الماء و النار و يحدث
في الاسطقسات و في كل واحد من سائر تلك
قوى تتحرك بها من تلقاء نفسها الى
اشياء شأنها ان توجد لها او بها بغير محرك
من خارج و قوى يفعل بعضها في بعض و قوى
يقبل بها بعضها فعل بعض ثم يفعل فيها
الاجسام السماوية و يفعل بعضها في بعض
فيحدث من اجتماع الافعال من هذه الجهات
اصناف من الاختلاطات و الامتزجات كثيرة و
المقادير كثيرة مختلفة بغير تضاد و
مختلفة بالتضاد فيلزم عنها وجود سائر
الاجسام - (22)

(ب) و ترتيب هذه الموجودات

هو ان تقدم اولا اخسها ثم الافضل فالافضل
الى ان ينتهى الى افضلها الذى لا افضل منه
فاخسها المادة الاولى المشتركة و الافضل
منها الاسطقتسات ثم المعدنية ثم النبات
ثم الحيوان غير الناطق ثم الحيوان الناطق و
ليس يعد الحيوان الناطق افضل منه - (23)

IDN - SĪNĀ.

(أ) هذه يُخلق منها ما يخلق
بامزجة تقع فيها، على نسب مختلفة، معدة
نحو خلق مختلفة، بحسب المعدنيات و
النبات و الحيوان؛ اجناسها وانواعها - و
لكل واحد من هذه صورة مقومة، منها
تنبعث كيفياته المحسوسة - و ربما
تبدلت الكيفية و انحفظت الصورة؛

مثل ما يعرض للماء ان

يسخن، او ان يختلف عليه الجمود و

المبعان؟ ومائته محفوظة - (24)

(ii) ... ثم من بعدها يبتدىء

ووجد المادة القابلة للصور الكائنة الفاسدة
فتلبس اول شيء صورة العناصر - ثم تتدرج
يسيراً يسيراً فيكون اول الوجود فيها اخص
و ارحل مرتبة من الخى يتلوه فيكون اخص
ما فيه المادة ثم العناصر ثم المركبات الجهادية
ثم الثاميات و بعدها الحيوانات و افضلها
الانسان و افضل الناس من استكملت نفسه
عقلا بالفعل و محصلا للاخلاق التي تكون
فضائل عملية و افضل هؤلاء هو المستعد
لمرتبة النبوة - (25)

24. IS., Ish. (O.T-Th) ... 277

25. IS., Naj. ... 299

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

6. WAYS OF UPWARD TREND IN CREATION.

ثم تفيض الصور من واهب
الصور - فاذا حصل امتزاج اقوى من ذلك ، واتي
وانضاف اليه شروط ، حصل استعداد لصد (٥)
الجواهر المعدنية ، فتفيض تلك الصور ايضاً
من واهبها -

فان كان الامتزاج اتم من
ذلك ، حصل النبات - فان كان اتم حصل الحيوان
و اتم الامتزاجات مزاج نطفة الانسان ، الذي
له استعداد لقبول صورة الانسانية - (26)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

(أ) فبعض الاجسام يحدث عن
الاختلاط الاول وبعضها عن الثاني وبعضها
عن الثالث وبعضها عن الاختلاط الاخر ، و

(a) Read ... صور

26. Ghaz., Mag. ... 294

المعدنيات تحدث باختلاط اقرب الى
الاسطقسات و اقل تركيبا و يكون بعدها
عن الاسطقسات برتب اقل و يحدث النبات
باختلاط اكثر منها تركيبا و ابعد عن
الاسطقسات برتب اكثر و الحيوان غير
الناطق يحدث باختلاط اكثر تركيبا من
النبات و الانسان وحدة هو الذى يحدث
عن الاختلاط الاخير - (27)

(ii) ... و باقى الصور هي صور
الاجسام الحادثة عن اختلاط الاسطقسات و
امتزاجها ، و بعضها ارفع من بعض - فان صور
الاجسام المعدنية ارفع مرتبة من صور الاسطقسات
و صور النبات على تفاضلها ارفع مرتبة من
صور الاجسام المعدنية - و صور انواع الحيوان
غير الناطق على تفاضلها ارفع من صور النبات -
ثم صور الحيوان الناطق ، و هي الهيئات الطبيعية
التي له بما هو ناطق ، ارفع من صور الحيوان غير
الناطق - (28)

27. Diet., Must. (Text) ... 29

28. Far., Siyāsa 38

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(ز) فيجب ان تكون هيولى
العالي العنصرى لازمة عن العقل الاخير - ...

وأما الصور فتفيض ايضا من
ذلك العقل ، و لكن تختلف في هيولاها ،
بحسب ما يختلف من استحقاقها لها ،
بحسب استعداداتها المختلفة -

و لا مبدأ للاختلافاتها الا
الاجرام السماوية بتفصيل ما يلي جهة المركز
ما يلي جهة المحيط ، و باحوال تدق عن ادراك
الاوهم تفاصيلها ، و ان فطنت لجملتها - و
هناك توجد صور العناصر -

و يجب فيها : بحسب
نسبها من السماوية - و من امور منبعثة من
السماوية - امتزاجات مختلفة الإعدادات
لقوى تعدها - و هناك تفيض : النفوس
النباتية - والحيوانية و الناطقة من الجوهر

العقلى الذى يلى هذا العالم - (29)

(ii) الفعل النفسانى فى الجسمانى
فكثاثير القوى النفسانية فى العناصر الاربعه
من امتزاج بعضها ببعض لتحدث المركبات
المعدنية و النباتية و الحيوانية ثم تأثيراتها
فى تلك المركبات من تغذيتها وتنميتها و
تربيتها و اتمامها الى غير ذلك - (30)

(iii) وقد يتكون من هذه العناصر
أكوان ايضاً بسبب القوى الفلكية اذا
امتزجت العناصر امتزاجا اكثر اعتدالا اى اقرب
الى الاعتدال من هذه المذكورة واولها النبات.
فمنه ما يكون مبررا يفرز جسما حاملا للقوة
المولدة - ومنه كائن من تلقاء نفسه من
غير بزر - (31)

29. IS., Ish.(N.I-I)... 66I

30. IS., Al-Fi^ol wa l-Infi^oāl ... 2

3I. IS., Naj. I57

3. COMPARATIVE STUDY.

1. ONE THING EMANATES FROM GOD.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that the first creation from God is one thing in number. He calls it first intelligence and teaches that multiplicity can accidentally result from the first creation. In this connection De Boer says:-

"We are able to see God better in the regular gradation of Beings which proceed from him than in himself. From him, the One alone, comes the All, for his knowledge is the highest power: In his cognizance of himself the world comes into being:" (1)

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī and expounds his view in the following way: one thing comes from God. That one thing, on the other hand, will necessarily have a different aspect or state or effect or quality which will

1. Boer, Hist. ... 115

also be one. Later on, multiplicity of things follows in association with that necessary thing and the totality of them follows from His Essence. In this connection Dr. D. Saliba says:-

"Un premier principe admis par Avicenne est que: de l'un ne peut sortir que l'un.

Nous savons que l'être nécessaire est absolument un, parce qu'il n'a rien de commun avec ce qui est en dehors de son essence. Or, de ce que l'un ne peut produire que l'un, il suit que l'être nécessaire qui est absolument un, ne peut produire qu'un seul et même être également simple." (2)

Al-Ghazālī states that one thing emanates from God. That one thing necessarily has a different aspect, and consequently multiplicity results and that becomes a principle for derivation of all kinds of multiplicity in the world.

2. Saliba, Étude ... 128

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that one thing emanates from God and multiplicity results from that thing. Moreover, he asserts that the one thing which comes from God involves different aspects, and as such multiplicity of things arises in compresence with that necessary thing. Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully with this.

2. ABSTRACT INTELLIGENCE EMANATED FROM GOD HAS TWO ASPECTS.

Two references from al-Fārābī and four from Ibn-Sīnā have been quoted. Al-Fārābī propounds the view that the first of the creations is one abstract intelligence (ʿaql mujarrad). It involves two aspects; one having the knowledge of its essence and the other comprehending the First. Then multiplicity accidentally happens there in the respect that, on the onehand, it is contingent being in consideration of its essence and, on the otherhand, necessary being with respect to its derivation from God.

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that one thing emanates from God which is purely abstract intelligence, and the essence and quiddity of which do not exist in matter. It is one of the separate intelligences in the world, and it causes movement of the farthest (aqṣā) body. Moreover, in reference to creation Ibn-Sīnā describes the first grade which is chiefly concerned with the intelligences as being abstract spiritual angels. Then the grade of spiritual souls follows on and this pertains to world-soul. Then follows the grade of heavenly bodies of which some are quite excellent in comparison with others.

Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that the first intelligence implies two distinct aspects. It has knowledge of its own essence on the one hand and that of God on the other. Furthermore, it is a contingent being by its essence and a necessary being in respect of its derivation from God. Thus multiplicity arises from the first intelligence itself and not from God.

Thus G. Quadri says:-

"L'intelligence est ainsi la première émanation, le premier causé. Elle est pure, c'est-à-dire forme n'existant absolument pas dans la nature. Et avec cela Avicenne obéit au principe néoplatonicien: de l'un ne procède que l'un. Elle est née des réflexions de l'être nécessaire sur soi-même. Possible en soi, elle est nécessaire par rapport à l'être nécessaire dont elle procède nécessairement." (3)

Al-Ghazālī states that abstract intelligence emanates from God. It has two aspects. Firstly, it has knowledge of the First and, secondly, it has knowledge of its essence. However, out of it angel and celestial sphere result, while angel is abstract intelligence. Al-Ghazālī further states in a syllogistic way that excellent things are produced from excellent quality. Intelligence is the most excellent of all things, since the quality which it has had from God is necessarily excellent.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that abstract intelligence emanates from God, and multiplicity arises from this intelligence. Furthermore, it has knowledge of its own essence on the one hand and that of God on the other. In reference to this it may be noted that De Boer's remark about the difference between al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā deserves serious consideration. Here B. Carra De Vaux remarks:-

"T. J. de Boer has also pointed out as a difference between Fārābī and the other philosophers of his school that Avicenna does not, like him, derive matter from God. According to this writer, Fārābī conceived matter as having emanated from God by passing through several spiritual intermediaries. I do not think that this statement is quite correct. It is in the treatise on "the principles of beings" of which we possess a Hebrew translation by Moses ibn Tibbon ... that Fārābī gives the chain of principles in a way which makes

it resemble an emanation: the primary intelligence or first cause comes from God; from it come in their order the intelligence of the spheres; the last is the active intelligence; above it are placed the universal soul, then form and lastly matter. Avicenna's metaphysics are really quite comparable to this system." (4)

However, in addition to the above agreement Ibn-Sīnā asserts that the grade of abstract intelligence pertains to angels. Then the grades of souls and celestial spheres follow. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to that of Ibn-Sīnā.

3. EMANATION OF TEN INTELLIGENCES AND NINE CELESTIAL SPHERES.

Two references from al-Fārābī and three from Ibn-Sīnā have been quoted. Al-Fārābī propounds the

4. EI.^I ... 55

view that the first intelligence is necessary being and it has knowledge of God. From the first, second intelligence emanates which is incorporeal reality having the capacity of knowing its essence and the first. Moreover, it does not exist in matter. It is a contingent being which is aware of the higher sphere by its matter and form that is soul. Third intelligence emanates from the second and the celestial sphere of the fixed stars follows with the above aspects. The process of creation continues in a similar way, and the existences of Saturn (zuḥal), Jupiter (mushtarī), Mars (mirrīkh), the Sun, Venus (zuhara), Mercury (ʿuṭārīd) and the Moon follow from the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth intelligences. Dr. S.M. Afnan states this view in the following way:

"From the first being there emanate successively ten different intellects or intelligences; and from each of these when 'substantially constituted in its proper essence', there results a sphere. The intelligences are absolutely incorporeal substances

and in no way reside in matter. And the spheres that come into being from them are: the first sphere, the sphere of the fixed stars, the sphere of Saturn, the sphere of Jupiter, the sphere of Mars, the sphere of the Sun, the sphere of Venus, the sphere of Mercury, and the sphere of the Moon. This comprises all the beings that in order to exist in this fashion have no need whatever of matter in which to reside. They are separate beings, intelligences and intelligibles in their substance. And the sphere of the Moon is the last of those in which heavenly bodies move by nature in a circle. From the Moon there proceeds a pure intelligence called 'the active intelligence' which bridges the gap between heaven and earth. We thus have God as the First Being, a species by himself, governed by the principle of complete unity. From him emanate the ten intelligences with their nine spheres as a second species of being which represent plurality. Then comes the active intelligence as a third, and none of these species are corporeal themselves. Finally, in the last

stage, come Soul, Form and Matter". (5)

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī and asserts that separate intelligences are ten in number. Every intelligence is a higher grade of being and it comprehends the first and necessitates the existence of another intelligence. When it comprehends its essence, it necessitates a sphere. However, first intelligence is the mover being itself unmoved, and it causes movement to the farthest body. This process continues in succession and with each intelligence a bodily sphere follows. Thus the spheres of the Zodiac, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury and Moon follow respectively from the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth intelligences. This process of creation ends in the intelligence of the terrestrial world which we call active intelligence (al-^caql al-fa^{cc}-āl). In this connection S.H. Nasr says:-

"The First Intellect (al-^caql al-awwal) is possible in essence and necessary by virtue of the

"Cause of Causes", (^cillat al-^cilal) or the Necessary Being itself. But because the First Intellect is possible, it generates multiplicity within itself. By intellection of the Divine Essence, it gives rise to the Second Intellect, and by intellection of its own essence to two beings which are the Soul of the first heaven and its body. One may say that the First Intellect has three forms of knowledge:

- (1) Knowledge of the Essence of the Necessary Being.
- (2) Knowledge of its own essence as a being necessary by virtue of another being (wājib bi'l-ghair).
- (3) Knowledge of its own essence as a possible being.

It is these three forms of knowledge which give rise respectively to the Second Intellect, the Soul of the first heaven, and its body. The Second Intellect through intellection generates in a similar manner the

Third Intellect, the Soul of the second heaven and its body. This process continues until the ninth heaven and the Tenth Intellect, which governs the sublunary region, are generated. This scheme corresponds to the planetary spheres in the following manner:

TABLE VII. THE HEAVENS AND THEIR GENERATING INTELLECTS ACCORDING TO IBN SĪNĀ.

No. of Heavens	Name of Heaven	No. of Generating Intellect.
9	"Heaven of heavens" (falak al-aflāk)	1
8	Heaven of signs of Zodiac (falak al-burūj)	2
7	Saturn	3
6	Jupiter	4
5	Mars	5
4	Sun	6
3	Venus	7
2	Mercury	8
1	Moon	9

The heavens, therefore, are generated by a series of intellections, each Intellect actually giving being to

that which it generates." (6)

Al-Ghazālī states that, with respect to its being necessary, ^asecond intelligence emanates from the in respect of the possibility which is, as it were, its matter, first, and ^aa distant sphere follows. Thus the spheres of the Zodiac, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury and the Moon follow respectively from the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth intelligences.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that nine spheres follow from ten intelligences. But it is to be noticed that about his reference from Risālah dar haqīqat wa kaifiyat ... S.H. Nasr remarks:

"The authenticity of the Risālah dar haqīqat wa kaifiyat ... has been doubted by some authorities, but there is no question that it summarizes Ibn Sīnā's

views on the chain of Being found with greater elaboration in the Shifā' and other works." (7)

However, al-Fārābī gives a systematic account of the theory of emanation for nine celestial spheres and ten intelligences; and with this al-Ghazālī's account appears to correspond closely.

4. CREATION OF LOWER BEINGS.

Two references are quoted from al-Fārābī. He propounds the view that forms require matter which may be of different grades. [Firstly], ^{the lowest is} a grade consisting of the forms of four elements ~~apparently~~, and these elements are [primarily] four in different kinds of matter. On the other hand, the partnership of the heavenly bodies remains in one condition, that is, it has circular motion which becomes a cause of the partnership of four elements of matter into one, and then the difference of their motion becomes a cause of the differentiation of four forms.

Their change, on the other hand, causes a change in the four elements.

Al-Fārābī further asserts that the motions of the heavenly bodies are circular and those of "corrupt" beings pertain to a place. Thus motion of quality and quantity, and regular motion are necessary for simple elements. But they are of two different kinds, one moving from the centre and the other moving towards the centre. Moreover, motion of compound things is derived from the matter of four elements.

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that whenever the number of the heavenly bodies is [made] complete, the existence of the [primary] elements necessarily follows, but the elementary bodies are, properly speaking, corrupt (fāsida) beings. That is why their proximate origin implies change and motion.

On the other hand, there is a common matter for these elements. But their forms may be of different

kinds. Furthermore, the diversities of their forms specify those of spheres; and similarly, the concurrence of their matter specifies that of the spheric conditions.

Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that matter which is derived from heavenly bodies pertains to one of two sources: either they emanate from four bodies or from a number confined to four totalities where each is prepared for a form of simple body.

Al-Ghazālī states that [after the completion of the celestial spheres] the existence of lower beings begins, and these beings are firstly concerned with four primary elements (anāsir). They are different in nature with respect to their places, and as such some of them move to the centre and others move from the centre. Al-Ghazālī further states that a body cannot be derived from another body, nor can it be caused by the heavenly bodies alone. In this respect, matter of the four common elements cannot be cause for the existence of manifold

matter. Their forms are different and thus are incapable of being cause of their forms except in respect to diverse multiplicity confined to four things or kinds. For they are four in number.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that primary elements are four in number and they are by nature different with respect to their places. All of them are derived from the heavenly bodies. Al-Fārābī further asserts that the heavenly bodies which remain in one condition consist in circular motion which in fact causes association and dissociation of the four elements. Moreover, the elements are of two types, one moving towards the centre and the other moving from the centre. Al-Ghazālī's account seems to be closer to this.

5. CREATION OF OTHER BODIES BY THE MIXTURE OF
PRIMARY ELEMENTS:

Two references from al-Fārābī and two from Ibn-Sīnā have been quoted. Al-Fārābī propounds the view that

first of all, [primary] elements are created. Then the things which resemble them and are associated with them proceed. In this connection al-Fārābī asserts that there are vapours, their species like clouds, rain and all that is created in the air. Moreover, the things which concern diversities on earth, in water and fire are also produced. In reference to the process of creation al-Fārābī teaches that there is a power in each of the elements which evokes things. The power of some of them influences other, whereas some of them receive the act of others. Moreover, the heavenly bodies influence some of them and through [them] the others. Consequently, things with varied natures, as well as other bodies, follow.

As regards the order of existents al-Fārābī asserts that the lowest of them comes first and the better thing follows. Then the better thing continues with an upward trend till it attains the best, ~~as is~~ which has no higher degree. So primary common matter is the lowest of all, and ~~is~~ ^{than it are the} better elements, then the minerals, then the plants, then the ^{without speech} ~~speechless~~ animal, and

then the animal with the faculty of speech, i.e. man, follow.

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that after the grade of heavenly bodies, the existence of matter which receives the forms of the corrupt beings begins with the creation of the primary elements. By their mixture various creations are prepared, such as, minerals, plants and animals - their genera and species. Perceptive qualities arise out of each of these subsistent forms. At times qualities change, while forms remain, (such as, what happens to water when heated or when it varies in respect to solidity and fluidity, while the watery substance continues). Ibn-Sīnā, moreover, deals with the gradation of beings. The process of creation, according to him, undertakes a gradual upward trend. The first existent is the lowest and the most inferior grade of being, and then compounds of inanimate being, the lower levels of plant life, animals and man respectively follow, while man is the best of them. Then the best kind of man by acquiring excellent qualities and perfection attains the grade of prophethood. In this connection S. H. Nasr says:-

"Moreover, all beings in the world of generation and corruption are made from the four elements (^canāṣir), fire, air, water and earth, each of which possesses a pair of the fundamental natural qualities. Fire is warm and dry, air, warm and moist, water, cold and moist, and earth, cold and dry. Other properties of objects derive from the four basic qualities, for example, softness from moisture and hardness from dryness.

The four elements out of which all sublunary beings are composed consist basically of the same matter which on different occasions accepts different forms. They are therefore transformed into each other continuously. This transformation is accomplished by the rejection of one form and the acceptance of a new one." (8)

Al-Ghazālī states that other bodies are created

by mixture of the primary elements. First of these are the creation of air out of vapour, smoke, flame and the like. Secondly minerals, thirdly plants, fourthly animals and then the grade of man follow. All of them are created by mixture of the primary elements. Moreover, by the mixture of the form of water and air vapour is created, and by that of fire and clay smoke is created.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that from the mixture of primary elements various things are created and the process of creation continues with an upward trend; and accordingly, plants, animals and man respectively follow. But al-Fārābī further shows how air and the vapours, their species like cloud, rain and all else that is subsequently created follow. Furthermore, he speaks of the diversities on the earth, in the water and fire, and teaches that there is a power in each of those elements which is capable of evoking things. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this detailed view of al-Fārābī.

6. WAYS OF UPWARD TREND IN CREATION.

Two references from al-Fārābī and three from Ibn-Sīnā have been quoted. Al-Fārābī propounds the view that the nature of bodies differs with respect to the mixture of elements. Some of them are created by the first mixture, some by the second or the third or some other mixture. In this connection al-Fārābī asserts that the minerals are created by a mixture which is the nearest to the elements and simplest in composition. Their distance from the elements is in smaller degree. The plants are created by a mixture which is greater than these in composition and farther from the elements. Then speechless animals are created by a mixture which is greater in composition than the plants, and then man alone is created from the best mixture.

On the other hand, forms of the bodies are created from the mixture of the primary elements. Some of them are higher in grade than the others. Thus forms of the mineral bodies are higher in grade than those of

elements. Similarly, the grade of form continues with an upward trend, and passes through the grades of plants, speechless animals and animals with the faculty of speech. Thus according to al-Fārābī, the form of man is higher in grade than that of animals.

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that matter of the elemental world necessarily follows from the ultimate intelligence. Similarly, forms emanate from that intelligence, but they differ in respect of their matter in such a way that they vary in merit and preparation. There is no principle for such difference except in respect to the heavenly bodies in the distinction which they show between what is near the central region and what is near the peripheral region. Thus the details of dispositions are too subtle to be perceived. Here the forms of the primary elements are produced; and their relations to the heavenly bodies and the things sent forth from them necessarily consist in the mixture of different

preparations produced by such powers as dispose them. Thus the souls of plants, animals and man emanate from the intellectual reality which rules this world.

Furthermore, Ibn-Sīnā illustrates that mental act with respect to corporeal thing is like the influence of psychical powers in the four primary elements. Some of their mixtures are used with others for the creation of mineral, vegetable, and animal compounds. Their influences in those compounds follow from nutrition, growth, development and completion. In reference to this Ibn-Sīnā further adds that 'When the elements are mixed together in a more harmonious way, i.e. in a more balanced proportion than in the cases previously mentioned, other beings also come into existence out of them due to the powers of the heavenly bodies. The first of these are plants. Now some plants are grown from seed and set aside a part of the body bearing the reproductive faculty, while others grow from

spontaneous generation without seeds.' (9) In this respect Dr. A. M. Goichon remarks:

"Voici le dernier échelon de la création: une matière, où se retrouvent quatre éléments, sur laquelle agissent les influences célestes, pour la préparer et lui donner déjà une certaine diversité. Cette préparation obtient, pour ainsi dire, à la matière la forme qui lui convient, car lorsque la préparation de la matière est achevée "déborde de l'intelligence séparée une forme particulière, propre, et elle s'imprime dans cette matière". Comme l'intelligible est donné du dehors à l'esprit humain, ainsi la forme est donnée du dehors à l'être composé de matière et de forme. L'un et l'autre viennent du Dator formarum, ce Donateur des formes n'étant autre que l'Intellect actif.

Les formes ainsi données sont reçues, telle dans une matière, telle dans une autre. Si les

préparations subies par ces matières, ou plus exactement ces parties de la matière, sont très diverses, les formes seront d'espèces différentes. Si les préparations, sans être absolument semblables, sont voisines, les formes seront de même espèce Ici, l'être est composé; il n'est pas fait uniquement de la forme ou quiddité; c'est pourquoi il peut y avoir plusieurs individus, distingués par leur matière et par ce qu'elle impose à la forme." (10)

Al-Ghazālī states that forms emanate from the giver of the forms. Whenever a mixture becomes stronger and more complete under certain conditions, mineral substances result and those forms come from the giver of them. Then if the mixture becomes more complete than that, plants result. Similarly, if it is still more complete, animal results, and yet more complete mixtures consist in the sperm of the human being which involves preparation for accepting the form of man.

10. Goichon, La Philosophie d'Avicenne ... 46

Here al-Ghazālī's account consists of two aspects, one of which indicates how forms emanate from the donor of them, and the other shows how different mixtures produce various grades of being beginning from the lowest grade to that of the highest. Now in reference to his first aspect al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā; whereas in respect to his second aspect, his account corresponds to that of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that by the mixture of different elements various grades of beings along with respective forms are produced. This process of creation undertakes an upward trend of development beginning with the lowest being and continuing till the highest of its grade. In this respect al-Fārābī clearly shows how minerals, plants, animals and man are created with their forms from different degrees of mixtures. Al-Ghazālī's second aspect of the account appears to be closer to this. On the other hand, Ibn-Sīnā asserts that forms emanate from the ultimate intelligence and they differ in respect of the preparation of matter. Ibn-Sīnā further shows how

forms of the various grades of beings consist of the mixture of different preparation of things. The first aspect of al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this.

4. RESULT

Al-Ghazālī's accounts correspond to those of al-Fārābī in points 3, 4, 5 and 6 (partial), and to those of Ibn-Sīnā in points 1, 2, and 6 (partial).

In addition to his references available from Ibn-Sīnā's metaphysics al-Ghazālī's accounts corresponds to Ibn-Sīnā's Physics in points 5(i) and 6(iii).

CHAPTER NINE.

CONCLUSION.

At the end of careful investigation the result obtained prompts us to believe that the Metaphysical section of al-Ghazālī's Maqāṣid is indeed a short account of the essential views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā; but, because of other factors which have crept into this work and been discerned in the course of this research, it cannot simply be indentified as a mere summary. Furthermore, it indicates that al-Ghazālī was in more substantial agreement with the writings of Ibn-Sīnā than those of al-Fārābī.

The metaphysical section comprises some of the views held by them. Others of their views al-Ghazālī did not attend to for the reason that when collecting materials from their writings for the preparation of his accounts his attention to different aspects was determined by his own principles of selection. But there is no denying that the aspects which he has noted in the body of this section, are in fact the fundamentals of their philosophy.

In order to develop fully the section he made use

of their works in Logic and Natural Sciences in addition to what might be described as chiefly metaphysical writings; thus some of his accounts correspond with such sources. He had to incorporate these contents out of their varied fields with a view to rendering the accounts as comprehensive as possible. Furthermore, in order to keep a constant uniformity of thought and homogeneity of expression he frequently used their technical terms and conceptual phrases where appropriate, thereby making some of his accounts correspond with their views to a considerable degree. On the other hand, where only indirect agreement is concerned, his accounts are observed to correspond with them in principle only, since his main object appears to have been to characterize uncertain and ambiguous ideas with determinate description. At times he seems to have laid stress on rearranging their views in a balanced way and took a great deal of care and accuracy of thought in systematizing their varied ideas into a harmonious form without distorting their actual significance.

He brought in various opinions and instances to substantiate exhaustively the representation of their views.

For this purpose he had to go through all sorts of works available under their names to make his work more comprehensive. In other words, both intensive and extensive search made his system in practice simpler and more illuminating. His approach to each of the problems appears to be methodical, well-organized and concise; and at certain places he presents his conclusion of a theme in what seems to be syllogistic form.

No criticisms or comments whatsoever have anywhere been clearly identified. But it should be noted that his treatment of a particular theme may be so brief as obviously to require elaboration for the reader to grasp it fully without ambiguity.

With reference to his assimilation of their synthetic judgements, his rearrangement of their materials where necessary his methodical setting out and logical conclusion, it appears that al-Ghazālī's was the first attempt to show them a priori possible. He presumably deemed it necessary to impart a priori character to certain of their views, with analysis and examples,

in such a way that the entire system thus moulded appears to be consistent and significant. Considering the heterogeneous elements necessarily involved in his accounts to produce clear understanding of the intricate metaphysical problems, this work, even taking Maqāṣid as a whole, may be regarded as equally important with other comprehensive works of that time. Moreover, the work conveys a uniformity by penetrating through a diversity of uniformities. Thus one may describe it as holding an independent position.

It is important to notice that the Eastern Philosophers, particularly in the mediaeval period, hardly distinguished Philosophy from Religion, and as such they thought theology as a component of metaphysical studies. But perhaps al-Ghazālī was the first to initiate by this work a kind of bifurcation of theological aspects from metaphysical principles proper.

Anyone who is curious to learn about Arabic metaphysical philosophy will find this work of great value for acquiring knowledge of its basic ideas and ideals.

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Tehran, 1333 A.H.
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It comprises the following:-

Fī t-Tabī^c iyyāt min^c Uyūn
al-Hikma.

Fī l-Ajrām al-^cUlwiyya.

Fī l-Quwā al-Insāniyya wa
Idrākāti-hā.

Fī l-Hudūd.

Fī aqsām al-^cUlūm al-
^cAqliyya.

Fī Ithbāt an-Nubuwwāt wa
Ta'wīl Rumūzi-him wa
Amthāli-him.

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Hurūf al-Hijā'iyya.

Fī l-^cAhd.

Fī ^cIlm al-Akhlāq.

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