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**Tanzanian Christianity and Socio-Political Thought in the
Nyerere Years:
A Comparative Study of the Chagga of Kilimanjaro and the
Haya of Kagera, 1954-1985**

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the ways in which Christianity interacted with socio-political thought in Tanzania between the late colonial period and the end of Julius Nyerere's presidency. It focuses primarily on the Chagga people of the Kilimanjaro Region and the Haya people of the Kagera Region, tracing constantly developing ideas concerning tradition, culture, ethnicity, nationalism, development, and African Socialism in Catholic and Lutheran communities. In these areas, religion was an important part of daily life, and there was for many Chagga and Haya people a strong link between Christianity, education, social philosophy, and commerce.

The thesis builds on a growing body of literature in two strands of African history, namely the history of African Christianity and African intellectual history. At the same time, it aims to address the relatively understudied topic of religion within the better-studied history of Tanzanian social and political thought in the period between 1954 and 1985, when Julius Nyerere led the independence movement and then served as the country's first president. During this time, most of the socio-political foundations of the modern Tanzanian state were laid; a strong national identity emerged, and a socialist policy known as *Ujamaa* (Swahili for 'familyhood') was implemented whilst, at the same time, an adherence to religious and ethnic identities was discouraged, and opposition to the ruling party and its philosophies was repressed.

Previous analyses of religion's place in Nyerere's Tanzania have focused primarily on Church-State relations and the history of religious institutions, and so this thesis supplements the existing scholarship by focusing on socio-political thought amongst Chagga and Haya Christians. It does this by placing a particular emphasis on the value of oral testimonies and memory; whilst it utilises a range of archival sources, it also incorporates information obtained in interviews with Chagga and Haya Catholics and Lutherans, allowing for a discussion of people's personal politico-religious philosophies during a period of great change.

Lay Summary

This thesis examines the relationship between Christianity and ideas about politics, society, and identity in twentieth-century Tanzania. Tanzania is one of the best studied countries in Africa, partly due to the unique way it developed, both socially and politically, under the leadership of Julius Nyerere. From 1954, Nyerere led the movement calling for independence from the United Kingdom, and after independence was achieved in 1961, he went on to serve as Tanzania's first president until his retirement in 1985. Nyerere and his government were fervent 'nation-builders', attempting to forge a new identity for a young country composed of many different ethnic groups, and in 1967, they introduced a socialist system known as '*Ujamaa*', a Swahili word meaning 'familyhood' or 'communalism', which claimed to draw on traditional aspects of African societies.

The aim here is to analyse how the many ideas that developed in Tanzania between 1954 and 1985 were understood and talked about in Christian communities where religion played an important part in daily life and in local society. Christianity and religion in general remain relatively understudied in Tanzanian socio-political history, and this is particularly true where the attitudes of lay Christians are concerned. This thesis addresses this weakness in the existing scholarship by focusing on two ethnic groups, the Chagga who live around Mount Kilimanjaro, and the Haya who live in the Kagera Region to the west of Lake Victoria. The Chagga and the Haya are amongst the most Christian peoples in Tanzania, and Christianity's role in the relatively advanced economic and educational development of both Kilimanjaro and Kagera has been significant. As this thesis shows, in both regions, ideas concerning identity, tradition, culture, development, modernity, nationalism, and socialism constantly interacted with Christian beliefs and were shaped through Christian institutions and networks. The thesis also looks at how conformist Christian communities in Kilimanjaro and Kagera remember the Nyerere years, and how this memory is used to talk about modern-day politics and society.

Declaration of Own Work:

I declare that this thesis was composed by myself, that the work contained herein is my own except where explicitly stated otherwise, and that this work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification except as specified.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	II
Glossary of Terms	III
List of Abbreviations	V
Introduction	1
The Chagga, the Haya, and Christianity.....	3
Literature Review.....	8
Methods and Sources.....	17
Oral History and Historical Memory.....	24
Chapter Summary.....	31
Chapter 1: Culture, Tradition, and Kinship	35
Christianity and Traditional Practices.....	38
Kinship and Authority.....	49
Chapter 2: Chiefs, Kings, and Power	65
Chagga Chiefs.....	68
Haya Kings.....	81
Chapter 3: <i>Maendeleo</i> through Christianity	98
<i>Maendeleo</i> : Chagga, Haya, and Christian.....	100
Education.....	104
Healthcare.....	115
Hard Work and Commerce.....	120
Chapter 4: Associational Life	134
Coffee and Associational Life.....	137
Women’s Associations.....	146
Christian Youth.....	157
Chapter 5: Secularism, Nationalism, and Nation-Building	173
Tanzanian Secularism.....	177
The Rise of Nationalism and the Road to Independence.....	187
Nation-Building Following Independence.....	199
Chapter 6: African Socialism and <i>Ujamaa</i>	216
The Foundations and Philosophies of <i>Ujamaa</i>	219
<i>Ujamaa</i> in Practice.....	236
Chapter 7: The Past in the Present: Nyerere in Christian Memory	258
The Late Nyerere Presidency and Beyond.....	260
Nyerere in the Post-Socialist State.....	264
Nyerere and Magufuli.....	277
Conclusion	295
Bibliography	304

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Glossary of Terms

<i>Baba wa Taifa</i>	‘Father of the Nation’ (Swahili): honorific used to refer to Julius Nyerere
<i>Bailu</i>	‘Commoners’ (Haya)
<i>Balangila</i>	‘Nobility’ (Haya)
<i>Bashomesha</i>	‘Those who make others read or pray’ (Haya): term used to refer to female catechists
<i>Chama cha Vijana</i>	‘Youth Association’ in the Lutheran Church
<i>Chama cha Wanawake</i>	‘Women’s Association’ in the Lutheran Church
<i>Kujenga Nchi</i>	‘To build the nation’ (Swahili): slogan used by Tanzanian nationalists to promote nation-building
<i>Kujitegemea</i>	‘Self-reliance’ (Swahili): slogan used by Tanzanian nationalists to promote hard work and self-sufficiency
<i>Maendeleo</i>	‘Progress’/‘Modernity’/‘Development’ (Swahili)
<i>Mangi</i>	‘Chief’ (Chagga)
<i>Mangi Mkuu</i>	‘Paramount Chief’ (Chagga)
<i>Mukama</i> (plural: <i>Bakama</i>)	‘King’ (Haya)
<i>Mulagilwa</i> (plural: <i>Balagilwa</i>)	‘Sub-chief’/‘Deputy Chief’ (Haya)
<i>Mwalimu</i>	‘Teacher’ (Swahili): honorific used to refer to Julius Nyerere

<i>Mwami</i> (plural: <i>Bami</i>)	‘Chief’ (Ganda): introduced by the British in Kagera
<i>Mwitori</i> (plural: <i>Waitori</i>)	‘Divisional Chief’ (Chagga)
<i>Nchi</i>	‘Country’/‘Land’ (Swahili)
<i>Ndugu</i>	‘Relative’/‘Comrade’ (Swahili)
<i>Nkungu</i> (plural: <i>Bakungu</i>)	‘Parish Sub-Chief’ (Haya)
<i>Omushomi</i>	‘Readers’ (Haya): term for Christian converts
<i>Omushubiro</i>	‘Hope’ (Haya)
<i>Oluganda</i>	‘Brethren’/‘Siblings’ (Haya): Term used by Haya Christians to refer to their fellow Christians, particularly following the East African Revival
<i>Raia</i>	‘Citizen’ (Swahili)
<i>Shamba</i>	‘Farm’ (Swahili)
<i>Uhuru</i>	‘Independence’/‘Freedom’ (Swahili)
<i>Ujamaa</i>	‘Familyhood’/‘Communalism’ (Swahili): term for the period and programme of African Socialism instituted in Tanzania following the Arusha Declaration in 1967.
<i>Umoja</i>	‘Unity’ (Swahili)
<i>Uraia Mwema</i>	‘Good Citizenship’ (Swahili)
<i>Vijana</i>	‘Youth’ (Swahili)

List of Abbreviations:

AA/TAA	African Association/Tanganyika African Association
AMNUT	All-Muslim National Union of Tanganyika
ASP	Afro-Shirazi Party
BBU	Bukoba Bahaya Union
BCPA	Bukoba Coffee Planters Association
BNCU	Bukoba Native Cooperative Union
BNCB	Bukoba Native Coffee Board
CCM	<i>Chama cha Mapinduzi</i> ('Party of the Revolution')
CCT	Christian Council of Tanganyika/Tanzania
CDP	Chagga Democratic Party
Chadema	<i>Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo</i> ('Party of Democracy and Progress')
ELCT	Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanganyika/Tanzania
ELCT-ND	Northern Diocese of the ELCT
ELCT-NWD	North-Western Diocese of the ELCT
KCCU	Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union

KNCU	Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union
KNPA	Kilimanjaro Native Planters' Association
MCU	Meru Cooperative Union
MNCB	Moshi Native Coffee Board
NCCR- <i>Mageuzi</i>	National Convention for Construction and Reform – <i>Mageuzi</i> ('Reform')
NGA	Native Growers Association
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TNA-UK	The National Archives of the United Kingdom
TNA-TZ	Tanzania National Archives
UWT	<i>Umoja wa Wanawake Tanzania</i> ('Union of Tanzanian Women')

Introduction

This thesis analyses the role of Christianity in the development of socio-political thought in mid-twentieth century Tanzania. It argues that, in the regions of Kilimanjaro and Kagera, Christianity provided Chagga and Haya people with the institutions, education and moral language through which politics and culture at both the local and the national level could be discussed, debated, and reworked, with religion becoming central to Chagga and Haya identity. Moreover, it shows that Christian institutions in these regions developed into, and have been remembered as, sites of development, exchange, and local resistance against both traditional elites and successive colonial and post-colonial governments.

Tanzania is one of the best studied countries in Africa, largely due to the nation's social and political evolution under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, who led its independence campaign and subsequently served as its first Prime Minister and President. When Tanganyika, the former United Nations Trust Territory which today constitutes the Tanzanian mainland, gained independence from Britain in 1961, it embarked on an ambitious nation-building project, first uniting with Zanzibar in 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanzania and then, with the Arusha Declaration of 1967, instituting a system of African Socialism known as *Ujamaa* ('familyhood'). *Ujamaa*, the imposition of one-party rule, and Nyerere's political philosophies have attracted much scholarly attention, and histories of Nyerere's Tanzania are thus abundant.

Religion, however, has not received the attention it deserves in much of this work. Where religion has been discussed, it has often been within temporally and thematically constrained analyses which either do not focus on religion as a primary topic beyond church-state relations, or else treat it in a reductive manner as a veneer for other, 'more profound' issues. Consequently, comprehensive pictures of the role of religion in the socio-political

evolution of Tanzania remain rare, particularly where popular discourse and ideas are concerned. This is a significant oversight, given that the link between Christianity, education, and commerce is well documented in regions of Tanzania which have had complex, and often strained, relationships with the administrative centre. Nowhere is this more evident than in Kilimanjaro and Kagera amongst the Chagga and Haya people, respectively. These two regions, amongst the most Christian in Tanzania during the Nyerere years, share similar religious and economic histories, and both the Chagga and the Haya have played a prominent part in the Tanzanian story.

This thesis therefore investigates how Christianity informed, and was itself shaped by, communal identity, culture, development, and nation-building in Tanzania, particularly in the Kilimanjaro and Kagera regions, during Nyerere's time both as the leader of the anti-colonial movement in Tanganyika and later as the first leader of independent Tanzania. Focusing on local communities, it illustrates the ideas in circulation amongst conformist Christian Chaggas and Hayas (that is, Christians who are lifelong communicants of a major church and who comply with the standard practices and beliefs of their congregations), and shows how these ideas have been preserved in the oral record. In the process, it describes how Christian beliefs and practices interacted with regional, national, and highly politicised notions of *maendeleo* ('modernity/development/progress'), and what effect this had on both support for and resistance to Nyerere's vision.¹ Whilst the thesis focuses primarily on the period between 1954, when Nyerere became leader of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) party, and

¹ The decision to focus on religion here, as well as to compare the Chagga and the Haya, was influenced primarily by interviews conducted for my MPhil dissertation on the memory of dissent and *maendeleo* on Kilimanjaro. Older Chagga interviewees highlighted Christianity as an important factor which shaped local political philosophy and identity, and many compared the Chagga to similarly 'developed' groups such as the Haya; N. Brice-Bennett, 'Kilimanjaro as a Centre of Political Opposition: *Maendeleo* and the Evolving Memory of Dissent' (MPhil Thesis: University of Cambridge, 2017).

1985, when he resigned as President, these years are not analysed in isolation. To contextualise the evolution and impact of socio-political thought in the Nyerere years, the history of Chagga and Haya Christianity and society in the lead up to 1954, as well as Nyerere's legacy in Christian Chagga and Haya communities since the end of his presidency, is also assessed. Finally, it should be noted that this investigation focuses on Catholic and Lutheran communities, since most Haya and Chagga Christians belong to one of these two denominations.

The Chagga, the Haya, and Christianity:

The Chagga and the Haya are two of the best-studied peoples in Tanzania, partly because of their conspicuous role in the country's political, social, and economic evolution over the last century and a half, and partly due to their long relationship with European missionaries and settlers, which in turn has meant that documentary source material for these groups is relatively rich. Of course, both Chagga and Haya society have changed significantly in this time, and it is true that, to a certain extent, it is somewhat reductive to talk of a unified 'Chagga culture' in the early colonial period, or indeed of a single 'Haya culture' before the arrival of Europeans; cultural practices likely varied amongst individuals and communities, and both groups underwent significant re-organisation and ethnic entrenchment in the colonial period. Nevertheless, it is still possible to reconstruct a basic history of both peoples which helps to contextualise the research presented in this thesis.

The Chagga have lived on the southern and eastern slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro in north-eastern Tanzania – in what today is the north of the Kilimanjaro Region – for several centuries and are believed to be the descendants of disparate migrant groups from surrounding

regions.² Attracted by the fertile volcanic soil and easy access to water which the mountain provided, these groups eventually came to share the land to which they migrated, and in the process established common political institutions and cultural practices.³ As Sally Falk Moore has noted, the fact that these people settled in an area with permanent supplies of water and food meant that, relative to many other pre-colonial societies in East Africa who had to periodically relocate to more arable areas, the Chagga developed a complex relationship with their land, with Chagga culture and identity becoming closely linked to the mountain and their family homesteads.⁴ Prolonged settlement in one place and the development of shared political and cultural institutions and practices allowed the Chagga to construct an identity whereby individuals understood themselves in relation to other Chagga within tight kinship networks, to the other groups on the plains which surrounded Kilimanjaro, and to a wider East African trading network stretching from the interlacustrine region to the coast.⁵

Haya culture was also grounded in land and in their locality. Like the Chagga on Kilimanjaro, the Haya had occupied the same land west of Lake Victoria for several centuries prior to the arrival of Europeans, as this region, which today forms the eastern and northern parts of the Kagera Region, was suitable for crop production and the grazing of cattle. Here, just as it was in Kilimanjaro, land was controlled and passed on through lineage networks

² For general histories of the Chagga, see: K.M. Stahl, *History of the Chagga People of Kilimanjaro* (London: Mouton, 1964); S.F. Moore, *Social Facts and Fabrications: "Customary" Law on Kilimanjaro, 1880-1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); See also: M.V. Bender, 'Being "Chagga": Natural Resources, Political Activism, and Identity on Kilimanjaro', *Journal of African History*, 54 (2013), 199-220.

³ A. Stambach, "'Too Much Studying Makes Me Crazy": School-Related Illnesses on Mount Kilimanjaro', *Comparative Education Review*, 42:4 (1998), 500; S.F. Moore, 'From Tribes and Traditions to Composites and Conjunctures', *Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice*, 49:3, The Manchester School: Practice and Ethnographic Praxis in Anthropology (Winter 2005), 262.

⁴ Moore, 'Tribes and Traditions', 262.

⁵ Moore, *Facts and Fabrications*, 21-25.

which tied individuals to kin and their locality.⁶ The Haya, who lived in one of the most densely populated and politically dynamic regions of Africa, were exposed to the cultural influences of various nearby societies. Consequently, as the first two chapters of this thesis explore, the Haya had developed a strong, locally defined, socially stratified political system with an established cosmology, similar in many ways to the structures seen in the nearby Toro and Ganda societies, well before Europeans arrived in the region.⁷ Thus, like the Chagga, the Haya had a relatively well-established pre-colonial culture which revolved around land, kinship, and localised structures of authority.

Christianity came to Kilimanjaro and Kagera earlier than it did to most parts of German East Africa. By 1890, both regions were firmly under German control, and European missionaries began settling soon afterwards, likely attracted by the relatively well-developed Chagga and Haya societies and the favourable environments for the establishing of mission stations. In both regions, Catholic missions were established first. The Spiritans, or Holy Ghost Fathers, arrived in Kilimanjaro in 1890, establishing their first mission station at Kilema in 1892.⁸ 1892 was also the year that Kagera was first evangelised by the Catholic Missionaries of Africa, or White Fathers, who were led to Bukoba from neighbouring Buganda, where Christianity was already well established, by Bishop Joseph Hirth.⁹ Lutheran missions followed shortly after the Catholics in Kilimanjaro, with the Leipzig Mission opening a station

⁶ P. Seitel, *The Powers of Genre: Interpreting Haya Oral Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 22-23.

⁷ For general histories of the Haya, see: F.X. Lwamgira [translation by G.B. Kamanzi, edited by P.R. Schmidt], *A History of Kiziba and its Kings* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2020); R.A. Austin, *Northwest Tanzania Under German and British Rule: German Colonial Policy and Tribal Politics, 1889-1939* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

⁸ M.V. Bender, 'The Holy Ghost in the Highlands: The Spiritans on Kilimanjaro, 1892–1953', *Spiritans Horizons*, 3:3:12 (2008), 75-76.

⁹ M. Kilaini, *The Catholic Evangelization of Kagera in North-West Tanzania: The Pioneer Period 1892-1912* (Rome: Tip. Leberit, 1990).

at Kidia, near Old Moshi, in 1893.¹⁰ In Kagera, a permanent Lutheran presence was not established until 1910, when the Bethel Mission opened a station in Bukoba.¹¹ Unlike their Catholic counterparts, the Lutheran missions in Kilimanjaro and Kagera were run by German societies, and the majority of their European staff were likewise German. Consequently, both the Leipzig Mission and the Bethel Mission were eventually replaced when, following the Second World War, German missionaries were expelled from Tanganyika, which had been under British administration since the end of the First World War.¹² In Kilimanjaro, Lutheran institutions became the responsibility of the American Augustana Mission, whilst in Kagera they were taken over by the Church of Sweden Mission, who were later assisted by the Danish Missionary Society.

The coming of Catholic and Lutheran missionaries fostered widespread conversion and the spread of Christianity, with multiple mission stations, schools and dispensaries opening on Kilimanjaro and around Bukoba. Whilst it is difficult to say for certain when Islam first came to either Kilimanjaro or Kagera, it is likely that Muslim traders from the coast encountered Chagga and Haya people increasingly often during the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and there were certainly small Muslim populations in both regions under the Germans.¹³ However, there was no institutional or missionary presence to rival the Catholic or Lutheran churches. Thus, by the mid-twentieth century, most Chaggas and Hayas had converted to

¹⁰ There had been earlier contact between the Chagga and Protestants from the Church Missionary Society, though no permanent mission was established: T. Fisher, 'Chagga Elites and the Politics of Ethnicity in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania' (PhD Thesis: University of Edinburgh, 2012), 72-74.

¹¹ Protestantism had already reached the Haya prior to the coming of Lutheran missionaries, with small numbers of converts, mostly traders, practising their new faith in secret after encountering Christians from Buganda: J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 223.

¹² C. Sahlberg, *Historia ya Kanisa la Tanzania: Kutoka Krapf Hadi Rugambwa* (Moshi: Safi, 2017), 48-57; B. Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba: Church and Community in Tanzania* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1980 [first published 1974]), 31-33.

¹³ L. Wimmelbücker, *Kilimanjaro – A Regional History: Volume One: Production and Living Conditions, c. 1800-1920* (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 103-142; Austen, *Northwest*, 14-18.

Christianity, almost all to Catholicism or Lutheranism, and Kilimanjaro and Kagera had become two of the most Christian regions in Tanganyika.¹⁴ In Kilimanjaro, the Catholic Church and the Lutheran Church, which competed from the beginning for influence, were – and still are – of roughly equal size, whilst Catholics significantly outnumbered Lutherans in Kagera. In Tanzania more generally, Catholicism became the dominant Christian denomination and Lutheranism the second largest, and it is estimated that Christians slightly outnumbered Muslims by the mid-twentieth century, though exact figures are hard to ascertain.

Chagga and Haya Christians of both denominations quickly proved to be trailblazers. The first black African Cardinal, Laurean Rugambwa, was a Haya Catholic from Bukoba who went on to serve as Archbishop of Dar es Salaam, whilst Josiah Kibira, the first Haya and African to serve as the Lutheran Bishop of Bukoba, was also the first ever African elected as President of the Lutheran World Federation in 1977. The Lutheran Chagga Stefano Moshi, meanwhile, was one of the first Tanganyikans to be made a Lutheran bishop, going on to be elected as the President of the Federation of Lutheran Churches of Tanganyika in 1962. When, in 1963, these previously separate churches merged to form the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanganyika (ELCT), Bishop Moshi was chosen to lead it.¹⁵

As the following chapters show, in both Chagga and Haya society more generally, Christianity played a major role in the solidification, dismantling, and reformulation of aspects of local culture, and by the mid-1950s – the beginning of the ‘Nyerere years’ – both Haya and Chagga identity and culture had a significantly Christian dimension which was open to politicisation. Moreover, Christian institutions influenced the development of local economies,

¹⁴ M.T. Thazhathukunnel, ‘A Pastoral Theological Approach to Interreligious Dialogue: An Empirical Study of Christian-Muslim Dialogue in Tanzania’ (PhD Thesis: University of Graz, 2011), 40.

¹⁵ Following the formation of the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964, the ELCT became the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania.

education, and political activism, and Kilimanjaro and Kagera subsequently became two of the wealthiest, best educated and most politically important regions in the country. As this thesis shows, the development which Christianity fostered in these regions would come to have significant socio-political ramifications throughout the Nyerere years.

Literature Review:

The history of secular African political thought is very well-researched, and in the case of Tanzania, where Julius Nyerere was a pioneer of African Socialism, an extensive body of scholarship has developed over the past sixty years which analyses the philosophical underpinnings of his political vision. Whilst early scholarship often focused on political elites, scholars including Emma Hunter, James Brennan and Thomas Burgess have also begun increasingly to analyse political thinking at the public level amongst Tanzanian citizens.¹⁶ Post-colonial Tanzanian Christianity, meanwhile, has been studied in some detail by scholars such as David Westerlund and Frieder Ludwig.¹⁷ However, as is noted below, such histories have generally focused on church-state relations rather than the attitudes of the Christian laity; consequently, the history of public political thought and the history of Christianity have seldom

¹⁶ E. Hunter, 'Revisiting Ujamaa: Political Legitimacy and the Construction of Community in Post-Colonial Tanzania', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 2:3 (2008), 471-485; E. Hunter, 'Dutiful Subjects, Patriotic Citizens, and the Concept of 'Good Citizenship' in twentieth-century Tanzania', *The Historical Journal*, 56:1 (2013), 257-277; E. Hunter, *Political Thought and the Public Sphere in Tanzania: Freedom, Democracy and Citizenship in the Era of Decolonization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); E. Hunter, 'Languages of Freedom in Decolonising Africa', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6:27 (2017), 253-269; J.R. Brennan, 'Blood Enemies, Exploitation and Urban Citizenship in the Nationalist Political Thought of Tanzania, 1958-75', *Journal of African History*, 47 (2006), 389-413; J.R. Brennan, *Taiifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2012); T. Burgess, 'Introduction to Youth and Citizenship in East Africa', *Africa Today*, 51:3 (2005), vii-xxiv.

¹⁷ D. Westerlund, 'Christianity and Socialism in Tanzania, 1967-1977', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, XI (1980), 30-55; D. Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini: A Study of Some Aspects of Society and Religion in Tanzania, 1961-1977* (Motala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1980); D. Westerlund, 'Freedom of Religion under Socialist Rule in Tanzania, 1961-1977', *Journal of Church and State*, 24:1 (1982), 87-103; F. Ludwig, *Church and State in Tanzania: Aspects of a Changing Relationship, 1961-1994* (Leiden: Brill, 1999).

been comprehensively or extensively analysed together, particularly in studies looking at the late colonial and early post-colonial periods.¹⁸ Thus, this study builds on these two rich bodies of literature and, in the process, interlinks them.

That politico-religious dynamics in Tanzanian communities remain relatively understudied is likely the result of both the inconspicuous development of religious institutions in the strictly secular country and a historiographical tradition which has generally focused on Tanzania's unique socio-political development. Consequently, the history of Tanzanian Christianity has often been presented within the confines of studies of early missionary activities or church-state relations, or else as a subtopic within socio-cultural and political histories. For example, in the two decades following Tanganyikan independence, historians worked to illuminate the religious situation in the colonial era, producing useful studies which hinted at Christianity's socio-political reach, albeit ones foregrounding missionary agency, particularly during upheavals such as the Maji-Maji Uprising in southern Tanganyika.¹⁹ Yet, much of the work produced in this era focused on political developments in the lead up to, and in the period immediately following, independence, charting the rise of the nationalist movement and the activism of Nyerere and TANU. Thus, where the church and religion were mentioned, it was often within the context of a narrative of TANU's history, rather than as topics of study in and of themselves. Likewise, in the work of scholars such as Goran Hydén, Joel Samoff and Rachel Samoff, the subject of religion and its link to politics, including in

¹⁸ Klaus Fiedler's work on the history of German protestant missions in Tanzania has touched on this topic in the early colonial period and has thus been an indispensable resource for the first two chapters of this thesis; K. Fiedler, *Christianity and African Culture: Conservative German Protestant Missionaries in Tanzania, 1900-1940* (Leiden: Brill, 1996).

¹⁹ See, for example: M. Wright, *German Missions in Tanganyika, 1891-1941: Lutherans and Moravians in the Southern Highlands* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); P. Hassing, 'German Missionaries and the Maji Maji Rising', *African Historical Studies*, 3:2 (1970), 373-389; G. Gwassa, 'Kinjikitile and the Ideology of Maji-Maji', in T. Ranger and I. Kimambo (eds.), *The Historical Study of African Religion* (London: Heinemann, 1972), 202-217.

regions such as Kilimanjaro, is generally mentioned only within the context of a more in-depth discussion of the complex class dynamics which formed and endured during the socialist era.²⁰ Thus, detailed discussions of lay Christianity are noticeably lacking in most early academic assessments of the country's political development in the lead up to and following independence.

This is not to say that no academics writing in the period between 1961 and 1985 analysed religion's relationship with politics. David Westerlund's various works provide useful insights into the complex relationship between the churches – particularly the Catholic Church – and the state during *ujamaa*, highlighting the perceived link between churches and the 'foreign' capitalist colonial system which *ujamaa* sought to replace, and noting the precarious position churches occupied in Nyerere's new state.²¹ At the same time, he shows how the Catholic Church was able to realign itself in support of the collectivist values of socialism, becoming a powerful, but ultimately subordinate, ally of the state.²² However, Westerlund's analyses focus heavily on church-state relations, largely neglecting how Christianity had the potential to affect people's personal political philosophies and interpretations of socialism.²³ Moreover, much of Westerlund's work fails to properly assess potential regional and

²⁰ G. Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); G. Hyden, 'Ujamaa, Villagisation and Rural Development in Tanzania', *Development Policy Review*, A8:1 (1975), 53-72; J. Samoff, 'Crises and Socialism in Tanzania', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 19:2 (1981), 279-306; J. Samoff, 'The Bureaucracy and the Bourgeoisie: Decentralization and Class Structure in Tanzania', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 21:1 (1979), 30-62; J. Samoff, 'Education in Tanzania: Class Formation and Reproduction', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 17:01 (1979), 47-69; J. Samoff and R. Samoff, 'The Local Politics of Underdevelopment', *Politics and Society*, 6:4 (1976), 69-97.

²¹ Westerlund, 'Christianity and Socialism', 34-36; Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini*, 49-79; 108-136; Westerlund, 'Freedom of Religion', 87-103.

²² Westerlund, 'Christianity and Socialism', 40-49; Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini*, 57-77; 108-122.

²³ This problem is seen elsewhere in studies of African Christianity as well; see, for example: J. Bayart, 'La Fonction Politique des Eglises au Cameroun', *Revue Francaise de Science Politique*, 3 (1973), 514-536; I. Phiri, *Proclaiming Political Pluralism: Churches and Political Transitions in Africa* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001).

denominational variations, though he does briefly acknowledge that the ‘more Lutheran’ north did not accept *ujamaa* as readily or as completely as did the rest of the country.²⁴ Such a broad approach is equally problematic for an appropriate assessment of Christian-Muslim relations, which have developed differently in different regions. As the following chapters demonstrate, analysing local interfaith relations in Tanzania is important for understanding how various ideas came to be shaped in specific ways by and through religious ideas and institutions.

Following the introduction of multiparty democracy in Tanzania in 1992, academics began to place greater importance on the interaction between politics and religion. Much of this scholarship was concerned with identity and with religion’s place in a new polity where competition for economic resources and political support was amplified. Consequently, this literature highlights the potential for religion to be used for political mobilisation.²⁵ It also focuses more than earlier work on Christian-Muslim relations, acknowledging the risk of religious division which the new political situation had the potential to foment. However, regional assessments remained rare and the focus on division and competition meant that religion was often treated superficially, regularly presented as a veneer for ‘more profound’ divisions in Tanzanian society, such as wealth, class, race, and ethnicity.²⁶ Moreover, in some

²⁴ Westerlund, ‘Christianity and Socialism, 50-51.

²⁵ See, for example: B.G. Brents and D.S. Mshigeni, ‘Terrorism in Context: Race, Religion, Party, and Violent Conflict in Zanzibar’, *The American Sociologist* 35:2 (2004), 60-74; J. Campbell, ‘Nationalism, ethnicity and religion: fundamental conflicts and the politics of identity in Tanzania’, *Nations and Nationalism*, 5:1 (1999), 105-125; B. Heilman, ‘Who Are the Indigenous Tanzanians? Competing Conceptions of Tanzanian Citizenship in the Business Community’, *Africa Today*, 45:3/4 (1998), 369-387; B. Heilman, N. Kamata and L. Ndumbaro, ‘Corruption, Politics, and Societal Values in Tanzania’, *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 31:4 (2000), 497-506. More recent work has also touched on this subject. See: F. Wijssen, *Religious Discourse, Social Cohesion and Conflict: Studying Muslim-Christian Relations* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2013); F. Wijssen, *Seeds of Conflict in a Haven of Peace: From Religious Studies to Interreligious Studies in Africa* (Amsterdam, 2007).

²⁶ This is not a phenomenon which is limited to the study of Tanzania. In both Kenya and Nigeria, overt political violence between Christians and Muslims has been described in a similar manner as a mask for ethnic competition: D. Anderson, ‘Why Mpeketoni Matters: Al Shabaab and Violence in Kenya’, *NOREF Policy Brief* (August 2014), 1-4; M.O., Sodipo, ‘Mitigating Radicalism in Northern Nigeria’, *Center for Strategic Studies: Africa Security Brief*, 26 (2013), 3-4.

of this literature, such as Ronald Aminzade's work on race and the politics of exclusion in Tanzania, religion's role was almost entirely glossed over in favour of these more visible divisions.²⁷ Fortunately, as this scholarship developed, it became increasingly focused on the nuances of individual identity formation, and scholars were thus able to explain the failure of ethno-religious mobilisation efforts in the 1990s, arguing that links to multiple identity groups actually worked to stabilise the country and prevent the divisions which had previously been expected.²⁸ However, an unfortunate repercussion of this reassessment of identity is that religion's importance in contemporary Tanzania is now often brushed over.

On the other hand, historical studies have, since the 1990s, increasingly touched on religion's role in the national story. For example, Susan Geiger's work, which assesses how women – particularly Muslims – influenced the development of TANU's nationalist ideology, highlights the contributions of Islamic socialistic thought to early *ujamaa* philosophy.²⁹ Tom Molony, meanwhile, notes the likely influence that Nyerere's devout Catholicism had on his political thinking.³⁰ In the cases of Kilimanjaro and Kagera, Emma Hunter and Kenneth Curtis have also hinted at the role of religion and Christian-Muslim relations in the historically significant political activity of associational organisations.³¹ However, such contributions

²⁷ R. Aminzade, 'From Race to Citizenship: The Indigenization Debate in Post-Socialist Tanzania', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 38:1 (2003), 43-63; R. Aminzade, 'The Dialectic of Nation-Building in Postcolonial Tanzania', *The Sociological Quarterly*, 54 (2013), 335-366; R. Aminzade, *Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

²⁸ See: B. Heilman and P. Kaiser, 'Religion, Identity and Politics in Tanzania', *Third World Quarterly*, 23:4 (2002), 691-709; M. Kadende-Kaiser and P. Kaiser, 'Identity, Citizenship, and Transnationalism: Ismailis in Tanzania and Burundians in the Diaspora', *Africa Today*, 45:3/4 (1998), 461-480.

²⁹ S. Geiger, *TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955-1965* (Oxford: James Currey, 1997).

³⁰ T. Molony, *Nyerere: The Early Years* (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2014).

³¹ Hunter, *Political Thought*; Hunter, 'Languages', 253-269; K.R. Curtis, 'Cooperation and Cooptation: The Struggle for Market Control in the Bukoba District of Colonial Tanganyika', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 25:3 (1992), 505-537.

notwithstanding, historical assessments focusing on local Tanzanian Christianities remain rare and, despite a welcome readdressing of questions of identity in the colonial and socialist periods, religion is still too often relegated to a supplementary topic. Moreover, even in the few histories which specifically look at the politico-religious situation in the socialist period, such as the important and influential work of Frieder Ludwig and Mohammed Bakari, the focus has largely returned to church-state relations, thereby continuing to neglect regional assessments of religion's role in socio-political thought and identity formation at a personal level.³² This may be partly due to a conspicuous lack of African Independent Churches and charismatic movements in Tanzania, as well as the difficulty of researching a topic which, both historically and in the present day, has been deliberately hidden from public discourse.³³ Elsewhere in East Africa, where religion's political influence is arguably more visible, its longstanding impact through institutions and religious movements is increasingly well studied.³⁴

There are, however, some notable exceptions to the trends in the recent historiography of religion and politics in Tanzania. For example, Felicitas Becker's studies of Islam in south-eastern Tanzania show how religion has been important in shaping and negotiating local

³² Ludwig, *Church and State*; M.A. Bakari, 'Religion, Secularism, and Political Discourse in Tanzania: Competing Perspectives by Religious Organizations', *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion*, 8 (2012), 3-31.

³³ Lloyd Swantz noted that, compared with Kenya and Uganda, Tanzania had 'practically no such movements': L. Swantz, *Church, Mission, and State Relations in Pre and Post Independent Tanzania (1955-1964)*, Maxwell Graduate School, The Program of Eastern African Studies, occasional paper no. 19 (Syracuse, New York, 1965), 14-15. The Tanzanian theologian Laurenti Magesa highlighted an issue associated with this phenomenon by suggesting that most Catholics (who comprise the majority of Tanzanian Christians) simply 'think and behave as they are told by their leaders' in matters where Christianity is concerned: L. Magesa, 'Contemporary Catholic Perspectives on Christian-Muslim Relations in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Tanzania', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, 18:2 (2007), 166.

³⁴ See: T.O. Ranger (ed.), *Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); B. Knighton (ed.), *Religion and Politics in Kenya: Essays in Honour of a Meddlesome Priest* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); H.B. Hansen and M. Twaddle (eds.), *Religion & Politics in East Africa* (London: James Currey, 1995).

generational and socio-economic dynamics.³⁵ Becker's semi-ethnographic research, which combines oral and written sources, provides useful methodological tools for reconstructing similar histories of Christian communities, and her work has thus informed the approach taken in this thesis. Another study which has influenced this dissertation is Derek Peterson's work on the East African Revival.³⁶ Peterson assesses Christianity and conversion as an organic channel of activism in the late colonial period, rather than as a veneer for, or reaction to, secular socio-political dynamics, thus demonstrating the interactions between Christianity, dissent, and changing understandings of morality in the interlacustrine region, including among the Haya.

Similar approaches are taken in the earlier works of Birgitta Larsson, Anza Lema and Thomas Spear. Larsson's work details how Christianity and conversion worked as a channel of emancipation for Haya women, whilst Lema reconstructs the emancipatory power of Chagga Christianity amongst the poor and the young in the face of opposition from older elites.³⁷ Spear, meanwhile, describes how Christianity was a defining characteristic of an entire class of capitalistic Meru and Arusha people who opposed government attempts to control commerce, land and education in the region around Mount Meru.³⁸ In addition, he notes that Christianity itself was shaped by local conditions and cultural norms into distinct Arusha and Meru forms

³⁵ F. Becker, 'Rural Islamism During the 'War on Terror': A Tanzanian Case Study', *African Affairs*, 105/421 (2006), 583-603; F. Becker, 'Commoners in the Process of Islamization: Reassessing their Role in the Light of Evidence from Southeastern Tanzania', *Journal of Global History*, 3 (2008), 227-249.

³⁶ D. Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival: A History of Dissent, 1935-1972* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 105-126; 152-177.

³⁷ B. Larsson, *Conversion to Greater Freedom: Women, Church and Social Change in North-Western Tanzania under Colonial Rule* (Uppsala, 1991); B. Larsson, 'Haya Women's Response to Revival' in K. Ward and E. Wild-Wood (eds.), *The East African Revival: History and Legacies* (London: Routledge, 2012), 119-127; A. Lema, 'Chagga Religion & Missionary Christianity on Kilimanjaro: The Initial Phase, 1893-1916', in T. Spear and I. N. Kimambo (eds.), *East African Expressions of Christianity* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 1999), 39-62.

³⁸ T. Spear, *Mountain Farmers: Moral Economies of Land & Agricultural Development in Arusha & Meru* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 158-169.

of the religion.³⁹ However, much of this work remains focused on the colonial period, and so how independence and socialism affected these complex socio-political dynamics remains understudied. Moreover, there have been few attempts to analyse the long-term impacts which religion may have had on public consciousness. The use of oral historical sources in this thesis, as well as the focus on both colonial and post-colonial Tanzania, thus aims to further our understanding of Tanzanian Christianities over the *longue durée*.

It is worth briefly noting that people working in disciplines other than history have also provided useful studies for understanding religion's place in Tanzanian history, with scholars noting the mutually shaping links between Christianity, ethnic identity, and differing conceptions of development and modernity in various Tanzanian communities.⁴⁰ In Kilimanjaro's case, Moore's work hints at the links between religion and traditional authority amongst the Chagga, and at the links between Chagga Lutheranism and national opposition parties, whilst Claire Mercer touches on Christianity's place in Chagga women's conceptions of development and political activism.⁴¹ Meanwhile, archaeologists like Timothy Clack and theologians such as Severin Mafikiri discuss the symbiotic relationship between Christianity and traditional Chagga religion, as well as religion's importance in local understandings of

³⁹ Ibid., 169-172.

⁴⁰ R. Marsland, 'The Modern Traditional Healer: Locating 'Hybridity' in Modern Traditional Medicine, Southern Tanzania', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 33:4 (2007), 753-755; A. Stambach, 'Education, Religion, and Anthropology in Africa', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 39 (2010), 363-365; M. Green, 'The Construction of 'Religion' and the Perpetuation of 'Tradition' Among Pogoro Catholics, Southern Tanzania' (PhD thesis: London School of Economics, 1993); M. Green, 'Participatory Development and the Appropriation of Agency in Southern Tanzania', *Critique of Anthropology*, 20:1 (2000), 78-80; M. Green, 'Why Christianity is the "Religion of Business": Perceptions of the Church among Pogoro Catholics, Southern Tanzania', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 25:1 (1995), 26-47; M. Green, 'Remembering Christ's death or the promise of salvation: Reinterpreting communion in Southern Tanzania', *Culture and Religion*, 3:2 (2002), 179-199; M. Green, *Priests, Witches and Power: Popular Christianity after Mission in Southern Tanzania* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

⁴¹ S.F. Moore, 'Post-socialist micro-politics: Kilimanjaro, 1993', *Africa*, 66:4 (1996), 589-605; C. Mercer, 'The Discourse of *Maendeleo* and the Politics of Women's Participation on Mount Kilimanjaro', *Development and Change*, 33 (2002), 115-124.

individualism.⁴² In Kagera's case, archaeologists like Peter Schmidt and anthropologists such as Brad Weiss have shown not only that Haya religion is a topic worthy of close study, but also that the oral record is a crucial, robust source for scholars hoping to construct histories of this region.⁴³ Additionally, though his study is not regionally specific and focuses heavily on discourse amongst political elites and academics, Per Frostin's work builds on the research of numerous Tanzanian theologians to argue that it is possible to construct an 'Ujamaa theology' which demonstrates the importance of Christian thought both to the foundations of *ujamaa* as an abstract philosophy, and to its implementation and adoption in regions including Kagera.⁴⁴ However, even in most non-historical scholarship, local Tanzanian Christianities are seldom a primary topic of investigation amongst non-theologians, with the notable exception of Maia Green's work on Pogoro Christianity. Moreover, Christian-Muslim relations and regional comparisons continue to be relatively unexplored in this literature, as is religion's place in personal and communal memory.

Thus, certain patterns have emerged which leave avenues for further investigation in the study of Tanzanian Christianities and politics. Firstly, more analysis of lay religion before the introduction of multiparty politics is needed, as this was when many of the ideological foundations of the modern Tanzanian state were laid. More local-level assessments of religion are also needed, with greater utilisation of oral sources. Additionally, Christian-Muslim

⁴² T. Clack, 'Protective Memoryscapes of the Chagga of Kilimanjaro, Northern Tanzania', *Azania: Archaeological Research in Africa*, 40:1 (2005), 101-107; T. Clack, 'Re-Africanizing the African: indigenization of Christianity on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro', *Indilinga: African Journal of Indigenous Knowledge Systems*, 4:2 (2005), 471-482; S.A. Mafikiri, *Christ as the Mangi: Ideal King of Christian Transformation for a Deeper Evangelisation. A Christology from the Chagga Perspective* (Nairobi: CUEA Press, 2010), 72-73.

⁴³ P.R. Schmidt, *Historical Archaeology in Africa: Representation, Social Memory, and Oral Traditions* (Rowman Altamira, 2006); B. Weiss, 'A Religion of the Rupee: Materialist Encounters in North-West Tanzania', *Journal of the International African Institute*, 72:3 (2002), 391-419.

⁴⁴ P. Frostin, *Liberation Theology in Tanzania and South Africa: A First World Interpretation* (Lund: Lund University Press, 1988), 29-81.

relations need to be analysed from a non-instrumentalist perspective to reconstruct the effects which they may have had on socio-political thought before the democratisation of the political system allowed divisions to become more visible. Lastly, more regional comparisons between different parts of the country may shed light on the effects which subtle differences in socio-religious dynamics over the past century may have had on the production and expression of ideas and historical memory.

Methods and Sources:

This thesis combines the analysis of archival and missionary documents and publications with oral sources in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. For chapters focusing on the period prior to Tanganyikan independence, much of the information cited was collected in government files at the UK National Archives (TNA-UK) in Kew, London. In Tanzania, government, missionary and church documents were consulted at the Tanzania National Archives (TNA-TZ) in Dar es Salaam and at the archives of the Northern Diocese of the ELCT (ELCT-ND) in Moshi. A particularly useful source in this latter archive was past copies of the diocese's monthly newspaper, *Umoja*, which often touched on social and political issues in Kilimanjaro and Tanzania more generally; the preservation of almost every *Umoja* issue from 1948 onwards thus makes it invaluable for studying Chagga society and Tanzanian Lutheranism in the latter half of the twentieth century. In Kagera, the North-Western Diocese of the ELCT (ELCT-NWD) did not have a dedicated archive when this research was being conducted – although there were reportedly plans to establish one at a nearby university – but I was able to consult semi-catalogued files at the diocesan headquarters in Bukoba.

The recording of Chagga and Haya history has been shaped significantly by the writings of missionaries – particularly Lutherans – working in Tanganyika in both the colonial and post-

colonial periods. Missionaries often spent more time with local communities than did other outsiders, and their interest in tribal histories, cultures, and traditions, both from a scholarly viewpoint and as avenues for conversion and religious inculturation, resulted in historical and anthropological studies focused on the societies in which they worked. In scholarship on Kilimanjaro, the influence of the Leipzig missionary Bruno Gutmann is particularly pronounced, especially on work investigating the early colonial period and the relationship between Christianity and Chagga culture.⁴⁵ In Kagera, Bengt Sundkler, a Church of Sweden academic and missionary who served as Bishop of Bukoba, produced similarly influential accounts of Haya history and religious life. Consequently, Sundkler's *Bara Bukoba*, in which he wrote about Haya tribal history, colonial history, and the history of the local churches, has shaped much of the scholarship on Haya Christianity and society; indeed, this thesis also relies on *Bara Bukoba* quite heavily in its first two chapters, largely due to a dearth of other sources which deal so comprehensively with early Haya Christianity.

Catholic records were, unfortunately, much more difficult to find, as was material from district and regional archives. In Kagera, there seemed to be confusion amongst local diocesan administrators about the existence – and location – of any records open for consultation, and I was similarly told that local government archives, such as those in Rwamishenye, outside Bukoba, were no longer accessible. In Kilimanjaro, I was informed church records could only be consulted with the Bishop of Moshi's permission; unfortunately, the seat of the Bishop of Moshi was vacant at the time, and I was thus advised that the only person who could grant

⁴⁵ Emma Hunter and Matthew Bender have both noted the potentially skewed historical picture which the often-unavoidable reliance on missionaries like Gutmann has created for historians of Kilimanjaro and Tanzania more generally. See: E. Hunter, 'In Pursuit of the "Higher Medievalism": Local History and Politics in Kilimanjaro', in D.R. Peterson and G. Macola (eds.), *Recasting the Past: History Writing and Political Work in Modern Africa* (Athens, OH., 2009), 163; Bender, 'Being "Chagga"', 207-208.

access did not exist. Consequently, where church records and publications are concerned, Lutheran documentary sources are unavoidably more prominent in this thesis.

The difficulties accessing archives were likely influenced by the political situation in Tanzania in 2019. Under John Magufuli's presidency, the country had seen four years of increasingly authoritarian rule, marked by a rise in violent suppression of political dissent and the erosion of free speech and democratic rights. Meanwhile, Tanzania's past had become highly politicised, and Nyerere's legacy was central to Magufuli's attempts to legitimise his regime. The impact of Magufuli's presidency on historical memory and political attitudes is discussed in more detail in the following section and in the final chapter of this thesis, but it is worth noting here that the political climate in Tanzania during his presidency significantly shaped this thesis and the gathering of source material. Indeed, this project initially proposed to focus on Christian-Muslim relations and political attitudes in the present day but, on the advice of contacts in Tanzania who doubted research clearance would be granted by the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) for such a politically sensitive topic, it was altered both to prevent such an eventuality and to protect interviewees.

Even with COSTECH clearance, however, research was not straightforward. In Dar es Salaam, most of the files I requested at the National Archives were reportedly misplaced, whilst in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, getting permission from regional, district and municipal authorities to conduct research was a lengthy process that required multiple meetings with officials who wanted to know what questions would be asked and what topics would be covered. I was informed by members of the communities I worked with that local government departments had become particularly sensitive during Magufuli's presidency to researchers and institutions – especially if they were not Tanzanian – getting involved in Tanzanian affairs, and so I was fortunate that I had contacts in each region who could assure the authorities that my research

was primarily historical in focus and unlikely to foment disorder. Yet local archival evidence was difficult to gather even once government clearance was granted. Whether or not these records were deliberately withheld by religious organisations and branches of government which were worried about the increasingly insular nature of Magufuli's Tanzania is impossible to say for certain, but this was certainly the view of multiple individuals with whom I spoke – including senior members of both the Catholic and Lutheran clergies.

It is also worth stating here that the gathering of archival material in both Tanzania and Europe was significantly hindered by the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and by personal circumstances which necessitated my taking over a year away from my research. Had more time been available, the project could perhaps have benefitted from time spent consulting publications in the East Africana Collection at the University of Dar es Salaam, as well as the various archives of Catholic and Lutheran missionary societies in Rome, Mwanza, Leipzig, and Uppsala.

However, the most important source material for this thesis came from semi-structured, participant-led interviews in Kilimanjaro and Kagera with Catholic and Lutheran laity and clergy. Whilst no two interviews covered identical topics, all participants were asked how, in their opinion, religion and local socio-political thought were connected; topics covered in these interviews included Christianity's contribution to local identity formation and power dynamics within both the family and society, as well as the interaction between religion and local notions of *maendeleo*, nationalism, and socialism. The relationship between Nyerere and the churches was also discussed, as was Nyerere's legacy in present-day Tanzania. Additionally, interviewees were asked about the perceived differences between Catholic and Lutheran communities and individuals, as well as the local and national influence of Christian-Muslim relations throughout the Nyerere years. Including these oral testimonies allows for an

assessment of the memory of religion's place in Tanzania's socio-political history in these communities, and of how these memories either vary or converge. However, these interviews, whilst reflective of views in different parts of Christian Chagga and Haya society, are not treated in this thesis as a statistically representative sample of these communities. The intention is not to make claims about widespread trends in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, but rather to qualitatively illustrate individuals' experiences and to explore how certain beliefs and understandings of the past have developed into local narratives in certain circles.

So that participants could speak as freely as possible, interviewees' identities were kept confidential. Consequently, only their denomination, ethnic group, sex, vocation, and year of birth was recorded, and only these details are provided here. Where members of the clergy are concerned, years of birth have also been omitted to ensure anonymity. This decision was influenced primarily by the political climate in Tanzania when the fieldwork for this thesis was being conducted. An environment had developed wherein discussions of politics, religion and development were actively discouraged, and views critical of either Magufuli or the ruling party could result in people coming to serious harm. Consequently, ensuring interviewees' safety and anonymity was of paramount importance.

In total, 104 interviews were conducted in both Swahili and English between December 2018 and August 2019, half in Kilimanjaro and half in Kagera. Interviewees were divided into the following groups: 10 Chagga Catholic women, 10 Chagga Catholic men, 10 Chagga Lutheran women, 10 Chagga Lutheran men, 6 Chagga Catholic priests, 6 Chagga Lutheran pastors, 10 Haya Catholic women, 10 Haya Catholic men, 10 Haya Lutheran women, 10 Haya Lutheran men, 6 Haya Catholic priests, and 6 Haya Lutheran pastors.⁴⁶ Half of the Chagga

⁴⁶ Although the aim here was not to carry out a dedicated study utilising only data from interviews, but rather to use interviews alongside other source material in a wider historical study, the number of interviews conducted was nevertheless influenced by the desire to achieve a degree of qualitative data saturation. The initial interviews in Kilimanjaro amongst lay Christians were thus stopped when no significant new topics or talking points were

Lutheran pastors were male and half were female, whilst four of the Haya Lutheran pastors were male and two were female. The oldest interviewee was born in 1920, the youngest in 1957, and most in the 1930s and 1940s; consequently, most were adults or in their late teenage years at Tanganyikan independence. However, younger individuals were also consulted to get an idea of childhood and education in the early post-colonial period.⁴⁷

All these interviewees were local to Kilimanjaro and Kagera, spending most of their time in these regions and regularly attending church services in the villages and towns in which they resided. They came from a range of educational, economic, and vocational backgrounds, though none grew up in particularly wealthy families, with most reporting that their parents were employed as either domestic workers, labourers, or farmers. Nevertheless, like many older Christians in these two regions, most were relatively well educated by Tanzanian standards, and some had gone on to professional work in sectors such as education, local government, law, and medicine, whilst others ran their own local businesses. A couple of interviewees were also relatively well-connected, in that they knew some political leaders personally, but this was not the case for the vast majority. Many individuals, particularly Lutherans in Kilimanjaro, chose to describe themselves as ‘businesspeople’ when asked about their work; this term encompassed a variety of jobs, from small shopkeepers to carpenters and the owners of local garages. ‘Businessman’ and ‘businesswoman’ have been used in this thesis to further ensure anonymity, but it should be noted that these were in all cases small and medium-sized local businesses, not the nation-wide empires owned by people such as the

raised by interviewees, and an equal number of interviews were then conducted in Kagera. For an in-depth overview and discussion of qualitative saturation and research into ideal sample sizes, see: G. Guest, E. Namey and M. Chen, ‘A Simple Method to Assess and Report Thematic Saturation in Qualitative Research’, *PLoS ONE*, 15:5 (2020), 1-17. See also: B. Saunders *et al.*, ‘Saturation in Qualitative Research: Exploring its Conceptualisation and Operationalisation’, *Qual Quant*, 52 (2018), 1893-1907.

⁴⁷ Care was also taken to ensure that the interview process conformed to the research ethics of the School of Divinity at the University of Edinburgh.

Chagga magnate Reginald Mengi. Likewise, the farmers interviewed here all worked on small family farms, whilst the doctors and lawyers – several of whom were married to individuals employed as unskilled labourers – worked locally, either in small private practices or in regional and district government institutions.

Thus, as far as their socio-economic and educational statuses and backgrounds were concerned, almost all the interviewees could probably be described as either ‘working’ or ‘middle class’. However, the concept of ‘class’, particularly one stratified along socio-economic lines, is itself arguably rooted in European and American thought and does not necessarily translate well to other parts of the world where social relations and obligations developed differently. Consequently, scholars have increasingly questioned its use in Africanist literature and have sought instead to better understand these communities on their own terms. This is not to say that class does not exist in Africa or is not worth studying, but rather that other forms of categorisation may better reflect the social bonds and obligations governing people’s relationships. Dieter Neubert and Florian Stoll, for example, suggest using socio-cultural ‘milieus’, thereby emphasising the ‘attitudes, norms, and values’ of a given group and rejecting the idea that such traits necessarily align with socio-economic class.⁴⁸ They give the example of the Kenyan ‘middle stratum’, arguing that instead of forming a distinct class, it is best understood as a combination of the following six milieus: Neo-Traditionalists, Committed Christians, Young Professionals, Social Climbers, Liberal Cosmopolitans, and apolitical Pragmatists.⁴⁹ Following this example, it is possible to see the people interviewed for this thesis as members of a milieu of ‘Conformist Christians’; interviewees were connected to

⁴⁸ D. Neubert and F. Stoll, ‘The Narrative of “the African Middle Class” and Its Conceptual Limitations’, in L. Kroeker, D. O’Kane and T. Scharrer (eds.), *Middle Classes in Africa: Changing Lives and Conceptual Challenges* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 68.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 71.

one another in a socio-cultural sense through their membership of a major Tanzanian denomination, experiencing similar upbringings in the Catholic and Lutheran churches and sharing social bonds within their congregations and the religious institutions of which they were members. That these individuals also considered themselves ‘conformists’ in the sense that they followed the established beliefs, practices and lifestyles promoted by their churches is particularly important and leads neatly into the following discussion on historical memory.

Oral History and Historical Memory:

Understanding the place of the past in the present, and of the present in readings of the past, is important. Whilst this subject is analysed in the final chapter of this thesis where Nyerere’s legacy is concerned, it is worth including a more general discussion here to contextualise the narratives discussed throughout this thesis. Since the growth, from the mid-twentieth century onwards, of oral history as a methodology in the Western academy, the place of memory and its reliability has been repeatedly questioned. Originally, as Alistair Thomson notes, much of this criticism came from ‘traditional documentary historians’, who relied on sources written and recorded in the past.⁵⁰ These individuals doubted the value of memories which may have changed over time, and which were likely a product not only of the past, but also of the present in which they were articulated and collated. Consequently, they drew a line between ‘rational’, ‘objective’ history based on written source material on the one hand, and ‘subjective’ memory on the other.

However, this argument has been increasingly questioned by scholars of memory and oral history. They have noted that written and archival material is itself subjective, dependent

⁵⁰ A. Thomson, ‘Four Paradigm Transformations in Oral History’, *The Oral History Review*, 34:1 (2007), 53.

not only on the views of its creator but also on the motivations of its preserver, and that histories written using this material are influenced by their own methodological assumptions and constraints.⁵¹ Meanwhile, they have reinforced the need for including oral sources in the writing of history, demonstrating that memories are useful not just as sources detailing what happened in the past, but also for an understanding of what these events meant to the people who experienced them and of their long-term implications. Thus, as Thomson emphasises, oral sources illustrate *meanings* of the past which might otherwise be overlooked, and which facilitate the construction of *longue durée* histories in local communities.⁵²

The study of memory has always been a dynamic field, with debates over how and why individuals, cultures and societies have created and handed down particular understandings of the past. Some scholars have approached these questions in highly theoretical ways, and terms such as ‘collective memory’, ‘cultural memory’, and ‘communicative memory’, amongst others, have become contested and constantly redefined by individuals working in various academic disciplines.⁵³ Whilst such theoretical approaches constitute an important area of study where memory itself, as an abstract notion, is the subject of investigation, it is important

⁵¹ Ibid., 53-57.

⁵² A. Thomson, ‘Making the Most of Memories: The Empirical and Subjective Value of Oral History’, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 9 (1999), 291-301.

⁵³ For example, see: A. Funkenstein, ‘Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness’, *History and Memory*, 1:1 (1989), 5-26; J. Assmann and J. Czaplicka, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural Identity’, *New German Critique*, 65, Cultural History/Cultural Studies (1995), 125-133; J.K. Olick J. Robbins, ‘Social Memory Studies: From “Collective Memory” to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices’, *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24 (1998), 105-140; J.K. Olick, ‘Collective Memory: The Two Cultures’, *Sociological Theory*, 17:3 (1999), 333-348; G.M. Spiegel, ‘Memory and History: Liturgical Time and Historical Time’, *History and Theory*, 41 (2002), 149-162. Much of this work builds on earlier theories proposed by Maurice Halbwachs – see: M. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, edited by L. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992 [first published 1925]); M. Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, edited by M. Douglas (New York: Harper and Row, 1966 [first published 1950]). For good overviews of these debates, see Alon Confino’s work: A. Confino, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method’, *The American Historical Review*, 102:5 (1997), 1386-1403; A. Confino, ‘History and Memory’, in A. Schneider and D. Woolf (eds.), *The Oxford History of Historical Writing: Volume 5: Historical Writing Since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 36-51.

to remember that this thesis is not a memory studies PhD; rather, it uses oral sources alongside documentary evidence to build a picture of the past, the meanings of that past, and how it has been remembered. In research utilising oral testimonies in this way, a preoccupation with precisely defined, abstract theoretical approaches risks artificially compartmentalising discussions of the memories articulated within a given community and can gloss over the different ontological and epistemological factors at work in different societies. Thus, where words and phrases such as ‘memory’, ‘collective memory’, and ‘popular memory’ are employed throughout the following chapters, this is not done within the confines of a particular theoretical framework which has precise, circumscribed definitions for these concepts.

Nevertheless, it is important to understand the context in which interviewees’ memories were articulated, and to discuss how these narratives might have evolved. Historical memory is constructed over time in complex, varying ways, and its articulation is reliant on multiple factors, including the experiences – both past and present – of the interviewee, and the questions and positionality of the interviewer. Often, academics have been particularly interested in the question of rupture, and of how and why people have remembered the past differently. Yet, as the following chapters demonstrate, the oral record presented in this thesis is one displaying a striking degree of consensus, not just amongst members of the same congregations, but amongst Christians of both denominations and in both regions. Whilst divisions in historical memory between individuals and communities did exist and are discussed in later chapters, they were generally minor, and the testimonies relayed by individuals – usually unknown to each other – were consistently very similar, even if individual opinions and experiences varied.

At the same time, it is necessary to understand that where there is consensus, there is also the question of silence. As Sandra Greene notes, silence – that is, what is left unsaid or

‘forgotten’ – is a particularly complex aspect of memory which historians must keep in mind when constructing oral histories.⁵⁴ Indeed, what people choose not to say can be just as important to understand as the narratives that are voiced. This topic has been explored most fully in histories of conflict, with scholarship on the Spanish Civil War, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany being particularly conspicuous examples, but many of the ideas developed in this literature are pertinent to investigations such as this one. Perhaps most importantly, as scholars such as Jo Labanyi have shown, silence and consensus does not necessarily indicate agreement at a personal level.⁵⁵ Rather, it is often the result of complex personal, community, and national influences, pressures, and narratives. Thus, whilst members of a group might remember and describe events very similarly in public, or indeed amongst friends and family, memory at a personal level can often remain much more contested.

The level of consensus expressed by interviewees in this thesis, as well as the silences inherent in this consensus, is partly explained by the fact that these individuals all belonged to the same broad milieu of conformist Christianity mentioned in the section above, with similar upbringings and experiences influenced heavily by their membership of and support for the Catholic and Lutheran churches. Indeed, that historical memory amongst the laity so closely mirrored that of the clergy suggests that these understandings of the past have developed into well-understood, broadly accepted – at least publicly – narratives in conformist Christian circles in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. That almost all the interviewees were members of older generations should also be borne in mind since, as research I conducted in Kilimanjaro for my master’s thesis indicated, generational divides in Chagga society are one of the key factors

⁵⁴ S.E. Greene, ‘Whispers and Silences: Explorations in African Oral History’, *Africa Today*, 50:2 (2003), 41-53.

⁵⁵ J. Labanyi, ‘The Languages of Silence: Historical Memory, Generational Transmission and Witnessing in Contemporary Spain’, *Journal of Romance Studies*, 9:3 (2009), 23-55.

influencing communal memory concerning politics, dissent, and religion.⁵⁶ Interviewees' conformism, as well as their ages, could thus go some way to explaining why divisions in historical memory or a focus on internal partisanship and rupture were not important to these interviewees' narratives in the same way that they might be for non-conformist Christians such as the East African Revivalists studied by Peterson. That being said, it is also worth noting that Jason Bruner has questioned the methodological focus on rupture and dissent even in work such as Peterson's and has emphasised the need to locate agency in non-dissent as well.⁵⁷

However, interviewees were also likely influenced by the socio-political developments of the Magufuli era, and of the places of Kilimanjaro, Kagera, and Christianity in the wider national polity. As noted above, Magufuli's Tanzania was a space where political dissent was violently repressed, and where the past had become highly politicised. As the final chapter of this dissertation explores in more detail, Magufuli attempted to legitimise this slide into autocracy in part using the example of Nyerere. Meanwhile, Christian institutions, including the Catholic Church and Lutheran Church, openly criticised the government for harming Tanzanian democracy and endangering human rights. Thus, conformist Christians' memories recorded during this fieldwork should be understood alongside a contemporary public discourse in Tanzania in which Nyerere's legacy had become increasingly politicised and contested, and in which the government and the churches were at loggerheads.

This environment meant that discussions of politics, identity, development and Nyerere's legacy had become particularly sensitive topics. Indeed, increasing silence on these subjects from those not in positions of power was actively, and forcefully, encouraged and maintained. However, interestingly, Magufuli's Tanzania had become a backdrop against

⁵⁶ Brice-Bennett, 'Maendeleo', 31-77.

⁵⁷ J. Bruner, *Living Salvation in the East African Revival in Uganda* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2017).

which memories of the Nyerere years were articulated and explored by many interviewees. Indeed, as the following chapters show, these memories were flexible and dynamic; this is not to say that they were contradictory or unreliable, but rather that they served different analytical purposes according to context. For example, chapters 5 and 6 illustrate how individuals' memories of the Nyerere period could often be quite negative, with local resistance to central government policies and socialist thought a feature of the oral record amongst both Haya and Chagga Christians. However, Chapter 7 discusses how interviewees also expressed nostalgia for the Nyerere years when comparing them with Tanzania in 2019; indeed, in some instances, Nyerere's example was utilised explicitly to criticise the Magufuli regime. As Rijk van Dijk has argued using the example of Pentecostal memory in Malawi, nostalgia and silence are intertwined, and selective readings of the past are often linked to a yearning for a more stable future.⁵⁸ A couple of observations concerning silence as a dimension of historical memory can thus be made here. Firstly, silence, like memory itself, can be dynamic, with its application contextually dependent. Secondly, historical memory can serve as a vehicle to navigate and even circumvent the imposed silences of the present, and to contextualise that present against the past.

However, it would be a mistake to think that the situation in 2019 was the only political influence on historical memory in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, particularly where the legacy of Nyerere is concerned. Since the end of his presidency, and particularly since his death, Nyerere has become central to public memory in Tanzania, especially to the 'official' view of the country's history promoted by the government and the press. This topic is covered in depth in Chapter 7, but it is important to note here that, as the *Baba wa Taifa* ('Father of the Nation')

⁵⁸ R. van Dijk, 'Pentecostalism, Cultural Memory and the State: Contested Representations of Time in Postcolonial Malawi', in R. Werbner (ed.), *Memory and the Postcolony: African Anthropology and the Critique of Power* (London: Zed Books, 1998), 155-181.

and *Mwalimu* ('Teacher'), Nyerere served as a moral exemplar to politicians and citizens alike long before the Magufuli years. Increasingly, the more controversial elements of his rule became expunged from the record, and successive governments promoted themselves by claiming to be his ideological descendants. Thus, interviewees' memories must be understood within a wider national context where Nyerere's legacy has been continuously celebrated, politicised, and edited.

That said, Nyerere's legacy is more complex than the official record would suggest. In regions like Kilimanjaro and Kagera, as the following chapters show, memories of his presidency and philosophies remain controversial and contested; such regions have long histories of resistance against the administrative centre, whether for economic or religious reasons, and this history has influenced how Nyerere is remembered. Many politically active Chagga and Haya individuals – mainly Christians – were opposed to the visions of nationalism and socialism that Nyerere and his followers promoted, arguing that they would hold back more developed, predominantly Christian regions of the country to allow other areas to 'catch up', whilst at the same time weakening local cultures and institutions. Additionally, since the early colonial period, the churches and their institutions in these regions functioned as sites of *maendeleo* and resistance against both traditional elites and successive colonial and post-colonial governments. Thus, a long history of dissent and ideas of regional exceptionalism, as well as the position of the churches in this history, has likely fed into the attitudes and degree of consensus seen in conformist Christian communities in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. This is not to say that all interviewees had identical opinions of Nyerere – indeed, at a personal level, memories of his rule and ideas were sometimes contested and often highly individualised, as chapters 5 and 6 note. However, such contestations did not detract from the consensus concerning the effects of Nyerere's government on local communities and the churches.

Therefore, whilst Magufuli's presidency might have amplified the salience of these narratives, they were by no means new.

Finally, it is important to mention my own positionality here. I grew up in Kilimanjaro, where my family has lived since the 1920s. Whilst an agnostic myself, I regularly attended the local Catholic Church – a church built by my Irish Catholic grandmother across the road from our family home – in my childhood, whilst at the same time living in a rural, predominantly Lutheran area. Moreover, though I am not Chagga, many of my relatives are, as are the majority of Tanzanians I know and with whom I grew up. Consequently, not only are my own biases likely influenced by this familiarity with Kilimanjaro, but I also benefit from a level of access that I cannot replicate in Kagera. Indeed, although I only knew some of my Chagga interviewees personally, all of them knew relatives of mine and of our links to the mountain and local churches. In Kagera, I was much more of an outsider, and so my experience was likely much more akin to that of a white, male, foreign researcher, albeit one raised in Tanzania. It is therefore unsurprising – and important to keep in mind – that Chagga Christians were generally somewhat more open with me, and more likely to express controversial or dissenting opinions and memories in our discussions, than were their Haya counterparts, an imbalance which was particularly noticeable amongst the laity.

Chapter Summary:

The seven chapters of this thesis follow a thematic structure; however, the order in which themes are explored also allows for the reconstruction of a chronological history, with earlier chapters exploring subjects linked to the colonial period, and later chapters analysing topics more relevant in the post-colonial period. Whilst the years between 1954 and 1985 are the primary focus, understanding the socio-political and politico-religious dynamics of the Nyerere

era can only be achieved by framing this period between what preceded it and what came after it. Consequently, some chapters discuss pre-colonial and early colonial developments which influenced society in the Nyerere years, whilst the final chapter is dedicated to analysing the legacy of Nyerere following his resignation.

The first six chapters can be divided into three sections, each containing two chapters. The first two chapters explore the interaction between Christianity and Chagga and Haya culture, traditions, and authority, with Chapter 1 focusing on traditional practices and kinship, and Chapter 2 providing an analysis of traditional leadership in each society. Focusing primarily on the colonial period, these chapters show how Christianity shaped local identities and power structures in the lead up to and during the early years of Nyerere's leadership of TANU in the 1950s. This was a time of immense social and political upheaval in Africa; across the continent, independence movements and local political associations were gathering supporters and impetus much faster than colonial administrators had expected, and increasingly people were beginning to question and realign their identities as colonial subjects and as Africans. However, many people, including the Chagga and Haya, were also grappling with what it meant to identify as a member of an ethnic group. In the decades leading up to independence, both groups had developed strong ethnic identities through which power, modernity, and their relationship with other groups were negotiated and expressed. As these two chapters argue, these were identities which displayed a significant Christian dimension, both in construction and in expression, and they had a significant effect on local politics and notions of authority. An analysis of Chagga and Haya socio-political philosophy in the Nyerere years therefore requires an understanding of these ethno-religious identities. As such, it is necessary to track the relationship between religion and ethnicity from the early colonial period onwards, as the identities on show in the 1950s were the result of a half century of intense social and politico-religious reorganisation and expression.

Following on from the discussion of Christianity, culture, and traditional authority, the third and fourth chapters straddle the colonial and post-colonial periods, exploring how religion influenced local notions of *maendeleo* and associational life. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the relationship between Christianity and development, particularly in the spheres of education, healthcare, and economics, arguing that, in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera, concepts such as ‘modernity’ and ‘progress’ have become intricately linked to Christianity because of this relationship, with Christian institutions serving to facilitate the exchange of ideas from around the world. Chapter 4 then shows how Christianity and the *maendeleo* it fostered influenced the development of associational life in the form of agricultural co-operatives, women’s groups, and youth associations. These sorts of associations affected how Chagga and Haya individuals, both Christian and non-Christian, related to one another and to various social circles, influencing how people spoke about issues such as morality, citizenship, and belonging. Consequently, the chapter argues that, through these associations, Christianity played a significant role in the development of socio-political thought not only in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, but in Tanzania more generally. Moreover, these chapters show that the history of Christianity and *maendeleo* was a topic which was remembered very similarly in Kilimanjaro and Kagera in both Catholic and Lutheran conformist circles in 2019 – even more similarly than subjects discussed in other chapters.

In Chapters 5 and 6, attention turns to Tanganyika and Tanzania during the nation-building era. Chapter 5 analyses religion’s role in the construction, understanding, and negotiation of nationalist ideology, before and after both independence in 1961 and the unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964. Whilst some attention is paid to developments in major parties like TANU and to discourse amongst political elites, the primary aim of the chapter is to shed light on conformist Christian socio-political thought in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, showing that religious ideology and institutions, as well as Christian-Muslim relations,

influenced both support for and opposition to various forms of nationalism in these communities. The chapter also looks at how Christians and Christian institutions negotiated top-down nation-building and debates concerning Africanisation. In chapter 6, how Christianity and Christians influenced and reacted to the philosophy of African Socialism is assessed. Whilst the chapter focuses mostly on the *ujamaa* period following the Arusha Declaration in 1967, when Nyerere and TANU officially instituted a socialist system, it also looks at how ideas concerning socialism and communism had developed in Chagga and Haya Christian communities in the colonial and early post-colonial period. The chapter shows that conformist Christians in Kilimanjaro and Kagera discussed and rationalised *ujamaa* within a moral framework shaped by their religion, and that local rejection of elements of *ujamaa* was often tied closely to people's faith.

The final chapter of the thesis analyses Nyerere's legacy in Tanzania since the end of his presidency in 1985, and particularly since his death in 1999. Prior to my fieldwork, the previous chapter on 'African Socialism and *Ujamaa*' was originally intended as its final one. However, interviewees often wanted to talk about the present as well as the past, particularly by using memories of the past to understand and critique that present. Consequently, discussions of Nyerere's post-*ujamaa* legacy became important parts of the interviews. As such, the use of sources in the final chapter is somewhat distinct. In earlier chapters, people's memories are primarily used to build an oral history of the Nyerere years alongside documentary sources. Conversely, the final chapter places more emphasis on the uses of memory – specifically those associated with the Nyerere years – in contemporary Tanzanian society.

Chapter 1

Culture, Tradition, and Kinship

Introduction:

The introduction to this thesis briefly discussed how Chagga and Haya identities were tied to longstanding ideas of land, kinship, and tradition, which were further reworked and formalised during the colonial period. This chapter and the next argue that Christianity played a vital role in this process of reorganising and solidifying cultural and ethnic identities in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, whilst also showing that Christian movements such as the East African Revival have shaped historical memory. Utilising Christian institutions and influenced by the moral framework provided by the churches, Chagga and Haya converts were quickly able to reassess and remould their cultures, in the process making changes which reinforced some aspects of traditional life whilst simultaneously undermining others, with the churches coming to represent sites of change and resistance. This intertwining of Christianity and tradition from the earliest days of missionary activity meant that, by the mid-1950s – the beginning of the ‘Nyerere years’ – an ethno-religious reordering had taken place in Chagga and Haya society.

The interaction between Christianity and culture is one which, in an African context, has received a lot of scholarly attention. Some have argued that Christian missionaries and Africans were often in conflict because of a ‘clash of cultures’, with the former wishing to stamp out the ‘heathen’ traditions of the latter which they saw as having no place in the new religion and the colonial society it aimed to promote.¹ Likewise, other scholars have suggested that Christianity was able to take hold in some African societies only by ‘colonising the

¹ G.Z. Kapenzi, *The Clash of Cultures: Christian Missionaries and the Shona of Rhodesia* (Washington DC: Univ. Press of America, 1979); E. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London, 1993), 128; 131.

consciousness' of indigenous peoples.² However, analyses such as these often falsely limit the power of African agents in the construction of their own, locally-inspired Christianities. Fortunately, other scholars have identified this weakness and have attempted to address the issue in a way which centres African Christians. For example, J.D.Y. Peel's analyses of the conversational process of conversion and the resultant nature of African Christianity and identity demonstrate the importance of analysing localised forms of Christian thought and identity shaped primarily by African Christians.³ Similar approaches are also evident in the work of Andrew Porter and John Lonsdale, where African Christians have been shown to have reshaped cultural norms and identities with the tools introduced by European missionaries.⁴

In Tanzania, these themes have been explored in the works of people such as Dorothy Hodgson, Klaus Fiedler, Peter Pels, Maia Green, and Mwita Akiri.⁵ These scholars have

² Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff are well-known proponents of this theory. See: J. Comaroff and J. Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution, Volume 1: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991 [2nd Edition]); J. Comaroff and J. Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution, Volume 2: The Dialectics of Modernity On A South African Frontier* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997 [2nd Edition]).

³ J.D.Y. Peel, *Religious Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000); J.D.Y. Peel, 'Conversion and tradition in two African societies: Ijebu and Buganda', *Past and Present*, 77 (1977), 108-141; J.D.Y. Peel, 'The Christianization of African society: some possible models', in E. Fasholé-Luke, R. Gray, A. Hastings and G. Tasié (eds.), *Christianity in Independent Africa* (London: Indiana University Press, 1978), 443-454; J.D.Y. Peel, 'Syncretism and religious change', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 10:2 (1968), 121-141; J.D.Y. Peel and R. Horton, 'Conversion and confusion: a rejoinder on Christianity in Eastern Nigeria', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 10:3 (1976), 481-498.

⁴ A. Porter, '“Cultural Imperialism” and Protestant Missionary Enterprise, 1780-1914', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 25:3 (1997), 370-388; J. Lonsdale, 'Kikuyu Christianities', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, XXIX:2 (1999), 206-229; J. Lonsdale, 'Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism,' in P. Kaarsholm and J. Hultin (eds.), *Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Denmark: Institute for Development Studies, Roskilde University, 1994), 131-150.

⁵ D.L. Hodgson, *The Church of Women: Gendered Encounters Between Maasai and Missionaries* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005); K. Fiedler, *Christianity & African Culture: Conservative German Protestant Missionaries in Tanzania, 1900-1940* (Leiden: Brill, 1996); P. Pels, 'Kizungu Rhythms: Luguru Christianity as Ngoma', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 26:2 (1996), 163-201; P. Pels, *A Politics of Presence: Contacts Between Missionaries and Waluguru in Late Colonial Tanganyika* (Routledge, 1999); M. Green, 'The Construction of “Religion” and the Perpetuation of “Tradition” Among Pogoro Catholics, Southern Tanzania' (PhD Thesis: London School of Economics, 1993); M. Green, 'Remembering Christ's death or the promise of salvation: Reinterpreting communion in Southern Tanzania', *Culture and Religion*, 3:2 (2002), 179-199; M. Green, *Priests, Witches and Power: Popular Christianity after Mission in Southern Tanzania* (Cambridge: Cambridge University

discussed how both Protestantism and Catholicism allowed for various Tanzanian peoples to construct new identities for themselves whilst renegotiating the power structures at play in their societies. Of particular importance to the spread of Christianity in Africa, according to many of these analyses, was the translation of the Gospel into local vernaculars, as this allowed for the inculturation of Christian thought within indigenous epistemological and cultural parameters. Amongst Catholic missionaries, Swahili became the primary language of Christianity in Tanganyika, whilst Protestants – particularly Lutherans – initially favoured ‘tribal’ languages. Lamin Sanneh’s *Translating the Message* is centred around this concept of the centrality of vernacular languages and argues that an understanding of local cultures by missionaries was therefore critical to the success of Christianity.⁶ The most important suggestion that all these assessments make, however, is that ‘culture’ should always be conceived of as something which is in flux, constantly being developed by interactions between different peoples, norms, and philosophies.

From the earliest days of mission activity, Christians were active in the socio-economic and political development of Kilimanjaro and Kagera; Christian individuals and institutions thus became central to cultural change more generally, and religion played an increasingly important part in constructions of Chagga and Haya ethnic identity, affecting not only cultural and traditional practices, but also social relations and the nature of traditional networks of power. The approaches of Lutheran and Catholic missionaries were not, in general, hugely different in Tanzania, with both denominations promoting many aspects of the cultures they encountered, whilst discouraging other practices which they could not reconcile with Christian

Press, 2009); M. Akiri, *Christianity in Central Tanzania: A Story of African Encounters and Initiatives in Ugogo and Ukaguru, 1876-1933* (Carlisle: Langham, 2020).

⁶ L. Sanneh, *Translating the Message: The Missionary Impact on Culture* (Orbis Books, 2009). In an analysis pertinent to later chapters of this thesis (particularly Chapter 5), Sanneh’s work also looks at the influence of Christian translations on ethno-nationalism, thus linking Christianity with nationalism on the African continent.

teaching. However, it is necessary to recognise that the resulting Chagga and Haya cultures and identities these policies inspired, whilst introduced by Europeans, were primarily the result of African action. This chapter analyses the relationship between Christianity and local cultures by focussing on two aspects of Chagga and Haya society, with the first section looking at traditional practices such as storytelling, dances, and the slaughter and sale of meat, and the second section analysing kinship and traditional authority within lineage structures.

Christianity and Traditional Practices:

The ways in which Chagga and Haya culture were remoulded by and through Christianity were multiple, varied, and complex. There was a strong focus on local cultures from the very beginning of Christianity in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, particularly where traditional practices and power structures could either help or hinder the Christianising mission. This was true not only of Lutheran missionaries such as Bruno Gutmann of the Leipzig Mission in Kilimanjaro, whose German romanticism-inspired approach to missionary work was designed to create local folk churches, but also of Catholics such as the White Fathers in Kagera, who were concerned that young Haya men should not lose their connections with their homes and communities.⁷ Consequently, local ideas surrounding cultural traditions such as storytelling and dance, as well as those concerning kinship, were exposed to a philosophical reimagining, on the part of both European missionaries and African converts.

Of course, there were significant differences between the Christianities and cultures on display, not only between Kilimanjaro and Kagera, but also within Chagga and Haya society.

⁷ B. Weiss, 'A Religion of the Rupee: Materialist Encounters in North-West Tanzania', *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 72:3 (2002), 391-419; Fiedler, *African Culture*, 3-48. For a good discussion of Gutmann's views on a wide range of socio-political topics, see: E. Jaeschke, *Bruno Gutmann: His Life, His Thoughts, and His Work* (Arusha: Makumira, 1985).

Different missionaries followed different philosophies and thus had different approaches, even within the same denominations.⁸ Moreover, different African actors wanted, and managed to construct, different sorts of Christianised ethnic identities. Another major difference between Kilimanjaro and Kagera which needs to be borne in mind from the outset is the influence of the East African Revival. This movement, which started in the late 1920s in modern-day Rwanda and Uganda, soon spread to neighbouring parts of East Africa. It is important to recognise that the East African Revival was not monolithic, particularly at the peripheries of its geographical reach, and it has consequently been interpreted in a variety of ways since its inception. As Brian Stanley noted in the late 1970s, some academics, particularly African scholars, chose from the start to focus on the elements of traditional African life and belief which some Revivalists promoted.⁹ More recently, scholars such as Derek Peterson have shown that the Revival allowed, through Christianity, for a reworking of local ideas of morality and belonging in various interlacustrine societies.¹⁰

In Kagera, the ripples of the Revival were certainly felt. Louise Stevens notes that, in general, Haya Christianity was less prone to independency movements or the kinds of schisms the Revival caused in other Protestant congregations in the region, potentially due to local missionary acceptance of certain traditional Haya practices.¹¹ Nevertheless, the impact of the Revival on Protestant churches in Kagera, including where Haya tradition was concerned, was

⁸ See: Fielder, *African Culture*, 49-73; 136-165; Bruno Gutmann's many disagreements with other missionaries, both Catholic and Lutheran, are well recorded.

⁹ B. Stanley, 'The East African Revival: African Initiative Within a European Tradition', *Churchman*, 92:1 (1978), 9-10.

¹⁰ D. Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival: A History of Dissent, 1935-1972* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 105-126; 152-177.

¹¹ L. Stevens, 'Religious Change in a Haya Village, Tanzania', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 21:1 (1991), 5.

significant, albeit perhaps not as pronounced as it was in Christian circles outside Tanganyika.¹² Meanwhile, churches further away in Kilimanjaro were largely unaffected by the Revival and this led to certain identifiable differences in the Christianities on display in these two regions, as well as to differences in how the interaction between religion and tradition have been remembered in conformist Haya and Chagga Christian circles.

Traditional practices were elements of Chagga and Haya culture which received close attention from European missionaries, and they were consequently particularly influenced by the Christianising mission. Whilst certain practices were discouraged, missionaries and the churches they established – particularly Lutheran churches – also worked to strengthen the role of some traditional practices in an attempt to relate the message of Christianity to local life. Amongst all interviewees, though particularly amongst Lutherans, it was common for people to recall that missionaries and church leaders encouraged the retaining and promotion of indigenous traditions which were compatible with Christian teaching, particularly where these traditions touched on family, community, generosity, and morality.

One example of this was the role of stories in both Chagga and Haya society, and how they served as avenues where Christianity could be both promoted and remoulded into a local form. In Kilimanjaro and Kagera, stories, songs, myths, riddles, and folktales were important channels through which morals, customs and identity were transmitted to younger generations and reinforced at public gatherings.¹³ Some missionaries picked up on this feature of Chagga

¹² For a more in-depth study of the Revival in the Lutheran Church in Kagera, see: S.K. Kabigumila, 'Conversion and Revival: A Critical Analysis of the Revival Movement Among Lutheran Christians in the North Western Diocese of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania' (PhD Thesis: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, 2005).

¹³ For Kilimanjaro, see: B. Gutmann, *Poetry and Thinking of the Chagga: Contributions to East African Ethnology*, translation by G. Drivdal and S. Tucker (Oxford: Signal Books, 2017 [1909]), 39-46; 155-164; 187-201; O.E. Raum, *Chagga Childhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), 212-225; P.I. Marealle, *Maisha ya Mchagga hapa Duniani na Ahera* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2002 [first published 1947]); Fiedler, *African Culture*, 29-39; 133; 147; 170-173. For Kagera, see: P. Seitel, *The Powers of Genre: Interpreting Haya Oral Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), particularly 83ff; J.M. Ishengoma, 'African Oral Traditions:

and Haya culture and recognised that it could be useful. For example, as early as 1909, Gutmann encouraged missionaries and converts to listen to and familiarise themselves with Chagga stories, and to emphasise the Christian messages which could be seen in them.¹⁴ There does not appear to be any indication that missionaries deliberately altered Chagga tales, but it is likely that Chagga Christians began to change them themselves because of this emphasis on stories in Chagga Christianity. One male interviewee described how ‘our ancestors saw parallels between Christianity and traditional belief, but they also adapted our traditions to fit a Christian narrative. New stories were told, and old stories were re-imagined’.¹⁵

Other interviewees recalled how stories which were considered to promote particular Christian teachings were also told increasingly often in order to reinforce certain Christian ideals. This could explain why Charles Dundas, the District Commissioner (DC) of Moshi, wrote in 1924 about the overt Christian parallels in Chagga mythology.¹⁶ To Dundas and his Chagga sources, these stories appeared genuinely Chagga in construction, rather than the result of missionary attempts to reconstruct Chagga folktales. Whilst Dundas believed this displayed an ancient link to Christianity amongst the Chagga, it is arguably more likely that Chagga mythology had, as the interviewee quoted above suggested, been consciously reimagined and internalised by Chagga individuals in response to missionary teaching. This is significant for

Riddles Among the Haya of Northwestern Tanzania’, *International Review of Education*, 51 (2005), 139-153; F. Kashaga, ‘African Indigenous Knowledge and Social Security of the Elderly in Rural Tanzania: The Case of Bukoba Rural District’, *The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs*, 40:1 (2013), 127.

¹⁴ Gutmann, *Poetry and Thinking*, 187-201.

¹⁵ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, businessman, born 1934.

¹⁶ C. Dundas, *Kilimanjaro and Its People: A History of the Wachagga, Their Laws, Customs and Legends, together with Some Account of the Highest Mountain in Africa* (Oxford: Frank Cass, 1924), 106-157; Similar claims were made by amateur anthropologists about other societies throughout Africa; for a critique of colonial epistemologies in Ganda society, see: B. Ray, *Myth, Ritual and Kingship in Buganda* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). For similar discussions, particularly concerning South Africa, see also: D. Chidester, *Empire of Religion: Imperialism and Comparative Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).

two reasons. Firstly, it displays the agency of the Chagga in the construction of their own form of Christianity. Secondly, however, it demonstrates a move by the Chagga explicitly to link their identity and culture to the new religion.

In Kagera, local storytelling traditions were also central to Christianity. Here, however, missionaries and early converts do not appear to have used stories in the same way as Christians in Kilimanjaro. Nevertheless, Christian Hayas certainly utilised stories from the 1930s onwards. Amongst Haya interviewees, the importance of storytelling was emphasised by Lutheran respondents far more than it was by Catholics, with one woman describing how ‘traditional stories allowed us to bring our culture and our home into the Church.’¹⁷ Even Bengt Sundkler noted how, by the 1940s and 1950s, Christian morals were often quoted to him by lay Haya Christians in the context of traditional stories or value systems, particularly amongst women.¹⁸ Moreover, he was struck by how much more emotive and persuasive these stories could be than the versions he had heard in the West, as well as by how evidently ingrained they had become in Haya philosophy.

Another aspect of Haya Christianity related to the culture of storytelling can be seen in baptismal practices and the importance of name choice amongst converts. For Haya Christians, the choice of what Christian name to adopt at their baptism was often informed by traditional notions of heroism. Sundkler describes how converts were eager to adopt the names of Christian saints or biblical figures whose exploits were well known and whose lives were both impressive and worthy of emulation.¹⁹ Likewise, a Catholic man in Kagera described how ‘Stories of heroes and their actions are central to Haya culture and oral history, so much so that

¹⁷ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, doctor, born 1936.

¹⁸ B. Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba: Church and Community in Tanzania* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1980 [first published 1974]), 58; 130-134.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 58-60; 80-83.

the children of Haya parents were often named after mythical heroes.’²⁰ So important was the desire to be named after outstanding historical individuals that some Haya Christians would abandon names which they had originally favoured if they could not find sufficient evidence that their namesakes had led impressive lives. When this is considered in the context of a society where, as Peter Seitel’s work shows, historical stories of powerful, mythical heroes were an integral aspect of communal identity and the relationship between the spirit world and the lived world, as well as between the past and the present, these accounts make sense.²¹ Thus, it is possible to see how in Kagera, as in Kilimanjaro, traditional stories, primarily in the hands of Africans, both helped to spread, and determined the local nature of, Christianity. In so doing, they contributed to the construction of a strong ethno-religious identity which was both Haya and Christian.

A further example of the cultural effect of Christianity in Tanzanian societies can be seen in the evolution of dances and associated beliefs surrounding performance and authority. In his analysis of Luguru *ngoma* (traditional dance) rituals, Peter Pels describes how traditional dances served both to reinforce cultural norms and to negotiate power dynamics, with young Christians reshaping Luguru cultural identity by incorporating new rhythms in their dances in defiance of their non-Christian elders.²² It is possible to see similar processes of Christian-influenced cultural reworking through dances in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, although this process followed completely different trajectories in each region. Amongst the Chagga, ‘traditional’ dances were an integral part of the Christian life promoted by some missionaries, particularly

²⁰ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, former government worker, born 1937.

²¹ Seitel, *Genre*, 83-173; For a discussion of the continued importance of name choice in Haya society, see: B. Weiss, ‘Good-for-Nothing Haya Names: Powers of Recollection in Northwest Tanzania’, *Ethnos*, 64:3-4 (1999), 397-420.

²² Pels, ‘Kizungu Rhythms’, 166-197; Pels, *A Politics of Presence*, 115-125.

by cultural-conservative Lutherans such as Gutmann.²³ Prior to Gutmann's arrival on Kilimanjaro, traditional dances had been banned by missionaries and converts in Christian communities. However, Gutmann became concerned by the number of young men who were left idle following church services on Sundays; eager to avoid alcohol use and deviancy, he therefore reintroduced 'traditional' dances as part of Christian life in an attempt to keep young men occupied and to foster a spirit of community.²⁴ The dances were supervised and managed by church elders, and they were clearly considered by both the youth and Gutmann to form an integral part of their lives as young Chagga Christians.²⁵

However, the reintroduction of dances also met with a lot of resistance from some Chagga church elders. One reason behind this was that, as amongst the Luguru, dances were associated with the young, warrior class of the Chagga, who had been the dominant social group backing the Chagga chiefs in the pre-colonial period. As Fiedler argues, Christianity had changed this order, entrenching elders as the dominant individuals in Christian communities.²⁶ Consequently, the reintroduction of dances, where the once dominant young men could again bond and express their shared identity, posed a direct threat to the new social order. At the same time, some young Chagga Christians considered traditional dances outdated and anti-modern and resisted them just as they resisted attempts by some missionaries to stop them from adopting Western styles of dress. As one interviewee put it:

What some missionaries failed to realise was that Christian converts here on the mountain did not necessarily want to preserve Chagga customs, even the supposedly good ones.

²³ Fiedler, *African Culture*, 116-130; Gutmann, *Poetry and Thinking*, 75. Dances had been important sites of cultural exchange even before European Christians arrived in Kilimanjaro, with many Chagga dances adopted from their Maasai neighbours in the nineteenth century: J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 79-80.

²⁴ Fiedler, *African Culture*, 124.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 123-125.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

We wanted to move forward, away from what that represented, to something more modern.²⁷

Whilst it is also necessary to recognise the fact that what happened in the communities in which Gutmann worked was not necessarily mirrored all over Kilimanjaro, it is nevertheless possible to see how the development, adoption, and rejection of Christianised dances in some Chagga communities was intricately linked to negotiations of power and modernity, and how Chagga actors were using Christianity to navigate these divisions. Whilst dances themselves would not continue to be an issue of contention in the Nyerere years, the same debates surrounding the power relations between different age groups would continue in Chagga society, as later chapters of this thesis highlight.

Amongst the Haya, the interaction between Christianity and dances was noticeably different, at least initially. In Haya society, dances were also an important aspect of pre-colonial, pre-Christian life. Warrior dances, ‘twin dances’, and many others were, as amongst the Luguru and the Chagga, a public display of shared identity and ethnic norms. However, dances were discouraged by early missionaries and African converts of all denominations. Speratus Kamanzi and Josephat Rweyemamu suggest that this was because Haya dances were considered ‘pagan’, ‘devilish’ customs which were incompatible with Christianity.²⁸ Rweyemamu’s argument is that all traditional practices, including dances, were targeted by European missionaries and African converts in Kagera for removal from public life. However, a more likely explanation for early missionaries’ reluctance to employ Haya dances is that their social uses, rather than the dances themselves, were incompatible with Christian teaching. For example, the ‘twin dance’ was performed to cleanse new-born twins – who were considered,

²⁷ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, lawyer, born 1939.

²⁸ J.A. Rweyemamu, ‘Conversion in Missionary Christianity, Northwest Tanzania: A Critical Assessment of Methods and Their Impact on Haya Christian Life’ (PhD Thesis: Stellenbosch, 2012), 3-4; 141; 178; S. Kamanzi, ‘Twin phobia among the Haya of Northwestern Tanzania: Interpreting it within the mimetic theory’, *Religion*, 37:1 (2007), 60-61.

as in some other Bantu societies, harmful to society – of the evil which they might bring with them.²⁹ It is unlikely that early missionaries to the region wanted to associate themselves with these sorts of practices, and so it is unsurprising that dances were treated with more suspicion in Kagera than in Kilimanjaro. As one Haya Catholic priest explained: ‘Some of our ancestors’ traditions were thought of as pagan and backwards, and they could not be reconciled with what the missionaries wanted to teach and how they wanted us to act.’³⁰ Of course, it is also important to remember that most early missionaries in Kagera were Catholics, and Catholic missionaries were generally less accommodating than were their Lutheran counterparts of many traditional practices. Early interactions between Christianity and Haya tradition would thus have been shaped by this denominational imbalance, and this has likely influenced historical memory of the subject in Haya Christian communities as well.

However, attitudes towards dances and other traditions evidently changed over time, particularly in growing Lutheran communities, with Haya Christians and some European missionaries increasingly coming to promote aspects of Haya culture in Christian worship, especially following the East African Revival. On the surface, this may seem surprising, since Revivalists themselves have traditionally been seen as iconoclasts committed to a transnational view of Christian fellowship which rejected contemporaneous ethno-nationalist discourse. However, the Revival was a multifaceted phenomenon which meant different things to different people, and which influenced the beliefs not only of Revivalists, but of the other Christians and non-Christians in their communities. As interviewees indicated, although Revivalists believed in forming links with the wider Christian world, many Lutherans were also influenced by the Africanisation of the churches which Revival facilitated. As one

²⁹ Kamanzi, ‘Twin phobia’, 56-59.

³⁰ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest.

Lutheran pastor put it: ‘We wanted to create a local Christian community which was reflective of the ordinary people’.³¹ The importance of tradition to the Haya Lutheran Church between the 1940s and the 1960s was highlighted by Sundkler, who recorded how dances, music, traditional group meals, and the incorporation of Haya colours all formed a normal and community-oriented part of Lutheran Haya life.³² Sundkler’s successor, Josiah Kibira, was also keen to meld tradition and Christianity where possible, calling in 1967 for Bukoba’s new cathedral to incorporate a traditional Haya-style door to ‘satisfy those who like to see a Haya characteristics (sic) in the Church’.³³ Tradition, therefore, was not necessarily considered to be anti-Christian, particularly in this period of increasingly pro-African discourse, and traditional practices were, as amongst the Luguru and the Chagga, used as a way to ‘perform’ social relations in a Christian context.³⁴ The nature of Haya Lutheranism was thus increasingly determined by the extent to which Christian ideals could be reconciled with traditional practices, as well as the extent to which each could be remoulded by the other.

It is worth ending this section by investigating how traditional practices, and the conversations and debates they prompted amongst Tanganyikan Christians, were also influenced by Christian-Muslim relations in the country and the efforts of colonial and local authorities to balance the interests of followers of the two religions. The debate in Kilimanjaro over the traditional practices surrounding the slaughter of animals and selling of meat, which was played out in the pages of *Umoja*, the monthly newsletter of the Lutheran Church of

³¹ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, pastor.

³² Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 127-131; 180-185; The display of colours, as Seitel suggests, was an important aspect of traditional Haya life, particularly where they were associated with power, life, and death: Seitel, *Genre*, 106-107.

³³ Richard Mutembei, Bishop Kibira’s Administrative Secretary, to Richard Hughes, Chartered Architect (14/04/1967), ELCT-NWD: 2/100.

³⁴ For more on the incorporation of tradition in the Revival, see: D.W. Kling, *A History of Christian Conversion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), ch. 23.

Northern Tanganyika (LCNT), is a good example of this.³⁵ In 1957 and 1958, one of the main topics of debate in this publication was who should be allowed to slaughter animals for the meat sold at market on the mountain. As a February 1958 article in *Umoja* by Donald C. Flatt, then the President of the Lutheran Church in Northern Tanzania, explained, tradition on Kilimanjaro dictated that meat sold at market could only be slaughtered by Muslim butchers.³⁶ This policy was an early move to prevent religious friction, ensuring Muslim Chaggas did not accidentally buy meat which had not been slaughtered in a manner compatible with Islamic law.

However, Christians on the mountain began to question this policy. In an article in June 1957, an anonymous writer quoted both Lutheran and Catholic publications and organisations to remind readers that God had given animals to all men, not just Muslims, and that Muslims slaughtered meat according to only their own customs, without regard to Christian belief. Why, then, the article asked, should Christians worry about slaughtering their own meat according to Muslim customs, and would doing so not prioritise the worship of Mohammed over the worship of Jesus?³⁷ Likewise, a Lutheran man named Isack Shilefanwa pleaded with his fellow Christians not to allow the teachings of Mohammed to pollute their own practices.³⁸ He reminded readers that nowhere in the Bible did it say that Christians could not slaughter their own animals. He ended his argument by imploring people not to break the First Commandment purely to satisfy Muslims. This debate was brought all the way to the DC, who was clearly unwilling to get involved in a religious dispute, and he instructed the Chagga Council and the

³⁵ In 1963, the LCNT merged with other Lutheran churches in Tanganyika to form the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanganyika (and, the following year, The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania) – the ELCT. *Umoja* has continued as the monthly newsletter of the ELCT's Northern Diocese to the present day.

³⁶ D. Flatt, 'Mkuu wa Kanisa Anaeleza Shauri La Uchinjaji Uchaggani', *Umoja*, 118 (February 1958), 1.

³⁷ 'Uchinjaji wa Wanyama', *Umoja*, X:110 (June 1957), 1.

³⁸ I. Shilefanwa, 'Maoni ya Bw. Isack Shilefanwa ya uchinjaji wa wanyama', *Umoja*, 114 (October 1957), 3.

Paramount Chief to sort it out themselves. Ultimately, the primarily Christian council decided to uphold the old law, arguing that it would preserve ‘unity’ and avoid ‘conflict’ in the land.³⁹ Christians were permitted to slaughter their own meat at home for personal consumption, but to protect Muslims, the old practices at market were necessary. Thus, as this example demonstrates, the construction of certain traditional practices was influenced by the religious makeup of Chagga society and the relationship between Christians and Muslims. Moreover, customs designed to protect a Muslim minority could be imposed and upheld not just by the secular colonial state, but also by local elites in overwhelmingly Christian regions. Most significantly, however, lay Christians were themselves using the teachings and, through *Umoja*, the institutions of their religion to question and critique the relationships between tradition, religion, and authority.

Kinship and Authority:

One of the most important effects of Christianity in Kilimanjaro and Kagera was its influence on local philosophies of kinship. For most Chagga and Haya Christians and non-Christians, kinship was originally one of the most important factors governing daily life in the lead up to the Nyerere years. Patrilineal clans policed the actions and relations of all Chagga and Haya people, something which was done largely through the distribution of land from clan heads to their kin. Indeed, the control of land was one of the key sources of friction in Chagga and Haya society, leading to particularly fierce debates where religion, tradition and kinship were concerned; that Christian missionaries were often given land by Chagga and Haya leaders, in

³⁹ Flat, ‘Uchinjaji’, 1.

societies where land was such an intrinsic part of ethnic identity, only added to these tensions.⁴⁰ As this section shows, kinship networks were complex and varied systems of obligations which offered communities security, and were avenues through which Christianity could both permeate and alter Chagga and Haya society. However, they were also systems of power, particularly over women and young men, and it was on this aspect of kinship that Christianity arguably had its most significant impact.

On Kilimanjaro, as Sally Falk Moore has shown, Chagga society in the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial eras relied, albeit increasingly less heavily, on lineage networks as the basis of social organisation.⁴¹ At the head of each lineage was a man who could make economic and material demands on his kin. In return, lineage heads were expected to provide for and protect their kin, and to mediate between lineage members. Separate lineages were, as is discussed in the following chapter, grouped under territorial chiefs (*mangi*), particularly from the early colonial period onwards, a structure which allowed them to interact and live with other lineages in their locality. Most disputes were originally settled within these lineages, and disputes between members of separate lineages were likely arbitrated by the chiefs.⁴² Chagga identities in the early twentieth century were thus tied up in, and developed within the parameters of, these networks, with individuals connected to those in their lineages and the other lineages in their locality through a web of mutual obligations.

During the colonial period, these kinship networks were changed by, but were also part of the development of, local Christianities on Kilimanjaro. Missionaries who were keen to maintain aspects of traditional Chagga culture believed that good Christians needed to live not

⁴⁰ S.F. Moore, *Social Facts and Fabrications: "Customary" law on Kilimanjaro, 1880-1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 231; Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 67.

⁴¹ Moore, *Facts and Fabrications*, 59-91; 310-315.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 88-91.

as individuals, but as members of a community with which they shared ‘primal’ ties.⁴³ To establish a true folk church in Kilimanjaro, Christianity needed to incorporate ‘the clan’, the basic unit of social organisation amongst the Chagga, into its practices and teachings. This idea of a clan-oriented church was extended in Gutmann’s designs for ‘Christian neighbourhoods’ where, he hoped, religion could be taught, practised, and organised into very local settings.⁴⁴ In this way, in some parts of Kilimanjaro, Christianity was being consciously interwoven with local traditions to create a system which was both genuinely Christian and genuinely Chagga.

Further evidence of the importance placed on traditional communities in pre-independence Chagga Christianity can be found in the fact that it was emphasised by several older interviewees in Kilimanjaro, particularly amongst Lutherans. One man described how:

Pastors were members of the community, not foreigners from outside. They lived as examples of what a Christian should be amongst their own kin and ensured that traditional morals and family relations were upheld and protected in our society.⁴⁵

However, it was not only amongst Lutheran congregations that this focus on the family was prevalent. Catholic Chagga interviewees, particularly women, also remembered the importance placed on kin and community. As one woman recalled: ‘The priests and the sisters reminded us to always be good to our parents and relations, and to practise the parts of our traditions which strengthened our ties to our kin.’⁴⁶ Thus, whilst Lutheranism was considered to be the more family-focused of the two main denominations on Kilimanjaro amongst interviewees, it is nevertheless evident that family played an important role in Catholic teaching as well. The fact that it was primarily female Catholic interviewees who remembered this teaching could

⁴³ Fiedler, *African Culture*, 28-29.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 40-41; 115-117; 124-125; 146-148.

⁴⁵ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, doctor, born 1944.

⁴⁶ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, former nurse, born 1940.

also indicate a gendered approach to the teaching of ‘Christian morals’ in Catholic communities, with the importance of family and community promoted more strongly amongst young girls.

However, other missionaries and Christian converts also diminished the power of the clans in identity formation and limited their control over the youth. For example, as Anza Lema has argued, some missionaries picked up on certain elements of Chagga culture which they saw as individualistic and emphasised this individualism over collective identity and group values.⁴⁷ In so doing, they hoped to instil in Chagga Christians a belief in the value of the self which, counter to Gutmann’s philosophy, was divorced from ‘primal’, or ‘primordial’, social ties. According to Lema, the actions of the missionaries broke down traditional kin networks and removed converts from their communal identity groups. Young men, particularly those who had fallen out of favour with lineage heads and chiefs, were targeted for conversion and given an education, and thus the power of the clan to police the actions of the youth was undermined. As one particularly amused Lutheran interviewee put it: ‘The local *wahuni* (thugs/rogues) became some of our first teachers!’⁴⁸ Likewise, Iliffe notes that early converts were often second or middle sons unlikely to inherit land or status.⁴⁹ As such, Christianity offered a path of social emancipation and self-improvement for those whose prospects were constrained within traditional frameworks. The emphasis on individuality which this process

⁴⁷ A. Lema, ‘The Impact of the Leipzig Lutheran Mission on the People of Kilimanjaro 1892-1920’ (PhD Thesis: University of Dar es Salaam, 1973), 21-30; 42-55; A. Lema, ‘Chagga Religion & Missionary Christianity on Kilimanjaro: The Initial Phase, 1893-1916’, in T. Spear and I. N. Kimambo (eds.), *East African Expressions of Christianity* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 1999), 39-62.

⁴⁸ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, businessman, born 1935.

⁴⁹ Iliffe, *Modern History*, 222-223.

promoted has endured in Chagga society, and individualism is today considered by both Chaggas and non-Chaggas to be an important aspect of Chagga identity.⁵⁰

What Lema's analysis ignores, however, is that the Chagga were already redefining their own kinship networks from the early twentieth century onwards. Indeed, because of this, Gutmann's attempts to promote the clan system met with little success amongst Chagga converts.⁵¹ As Fiedler and Moore both note, by the time Gutmann and most other missionaries were active in Kilimanjaro, colonial systems of authority had already changed society significantly.⁵² The Chagga themselves, now under the jurisdiction of German-backed chiefs, no longer found kin to be the most politically expedient form of social organisation. Instead, they increasingly looked to institutions which were outside the lineage networks, in the form of both the local government and the Christian churches, to settle internal disputes.⁵³ The majority of interviewees supported this assessment, describing the important job which pastors and priests carried out – and continue to carry out – as mediators in Chagga society, with one Catholic man referring to the parish priest as 'the absolute moral authority' of the local community.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, one Lutheran woman described their role in disciplining children in the following way:

The pastor was an important local policeman who upheld Christian and traditional values, particularly when it came to children. If a naughty child could not be disciplined by their mother or father, they were taken to the pastor ...

⁵⁰ This was a common belief amongst Chagga and non-Chagga people whom I interviewed as part of the research for my MPhil dissertation and amongst Chaggas and Hayas interviewed for my PhD fieldwork. Interviewees described this individualism as a focus on self-improvement through education and entrepreneurship, for the benefit of oneself and one's immediate family. This was contrasted with the 'communal' nature of peoples whose priority was their community or ethnic group. Chapters 3 and 4 go into more detail about how these ideas influenced local understandings of *maendeleo* ('modernity'/'progress').

⁵¹ Fiedler, *African Culture*, 40-43.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 42; Moore, *Facts and Fabrications*, 59.

⁵³ Moore, *Facts and Fabrications*, 88-91; 262-263.

⁵⁴ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, banker, born 1939.

[And] that always worked, because the pastor was a man of God, and so to disobey him was to disobey God.⁵⁵

Missionaries, who often had a better knowledge of local communities than those in the colonial administration, also regularly acted as mediators between the government and the local people, who often saw them as occupying a half-way point between Africans and other Europeans.⁵⁶ Thus, rather than relying on lineage networks, the old arbiters of authority and stability, Christians were instead turning to the churches, apparently voluntarily, for political and moral guidance, as well as to help police the actions of their children and kin.

Interestingly, whilst the importance of the immediate family was paramount in Christian teaching, sometimes even the power relations between parents and children could be affected by religion. One particularly interesting example is demonstrated in a series of letters exchanged in 1957 between a Lutheran man named Grayson Christopher and the local authorities concerning his daughter Flora, who had run away from home to stay at the Catholic mission in Kilema. In a letter to the *Mangi* (chief) of Kilema, Christopher wrote:

The above named (Flora) is my daughter who had gone away from home at Mamba since the 24th January, 1957. After a very long search I now understand that she is staying at one Daniel Shayo's House at Kilema.

I request you please to call Daniel to bring Flora before you and explain why she is there.

I would request also to see that Flora is taken back to Mamba and be handed over to the *Mangi*. Flora should be well informed that if she has any complaint or grudge against anything, it will be settled between us with the *Mangi* of Mamba who is a relative. She should know that I am not hindering her from following her religions [sic].⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, former government worker, born 1936.

⁵⁶ P. Fleisch, *Lutheran Beginnings Around Mt. Kilimanjaro*, edited by E. Jaeschke (Makumira, 1998 [first published 1936]), 45-58.

⁵⁷ G. Christopher to Mangi of Kilema, 'Flora d/o Grayson' (15/05/1957), TNA-TZ: 5/41/2/23.

This letter is significant in that it reflects several of the power relations which were evolving in Chagga society in the early Nyerere years after half a century of cultural reordering. Appeals to familial, kin, and tribal authority and customs were being made in the face of perceived Catholic interference in domestic matters. It also hints at an existing tension between Catholics and Lutherans, both within the same family and between different parts of the mountain, which was complicating the situation further. The other letters relating to Flora demonstrate that nobody was entirely certain where authority was or should be, and, as the next chapter highlights, situations such as this were considered important enough to take to the *Mangi Mkuu* (Paramount Chief) of the Chagga and the British DC in Moshi.

The authority of parents, lineage structures, and, as discussed in Chapter 2, chiefs, was thus being deconstructed by Chagga Christians just as much as by European missionaries, even where missionaries were trying to prevent this from happening. It is important to point out, though, that kin networks did not stop being an integral part of Chagga identity. Links to kin remained important throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods; as Moore puts it, Christianity and colonialism ‘lay on top of [but] did not destroy or replace the pre-existing territorial and social divisions at the lowest level’.⁵⁸ The reality was simply that Chagga Christians were constantly adapting to a changing socio-political environment, utilising and living within the confines of both church and colonial structures.

In Kagera, kinship was equally – if not, in some ways, more – important to the Haya than it was to the Chagga in Kilimanjaro. Bengt Sundkler recorded that, in Haya cosmology, man cannot be understood as an isolated individual, ‘apart from clan, family and God’.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Moore, *Facts and Fabrications*, 313.

⁵⁹ Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 47.

Likewise, Iliffe argues ‘Haya states were composed of clans, not individuals’.⁶⁰ This is a viewpoint supported by Haya interviewees, as well as by the work of Peter Seitel and Sylvester Kahakwa, and is demonstrated by the fact that even in Haya mythology, heroic characters were defined in relation to their kin networks.⁶¹ In Kagera, though, in a way reminiscent of the treatment of traditions such as dances in this region, early missionaries do not appear to have promoted kinship within the church in the same way that Gutmann and others did in Kilimanjaro. Indeed, initially in this area, to quote Iliffe, ‘Christianity harnessed the energy released by generational conflict’ to gain an early foothold, being picked up first by those wanting to break free of traditional networks of authority.⁶² One reason for this might be that the clan system in Kagera was intricately linked to strong traditional religious beliefs which the missionaries did their best to discourage. All clan leaders, just like the Haya kings, had important religious duties, as did certain women in each clan and village.⁶³ As one Haya Catholic priest put it:

In the past, Haya kings were seen as close to the gods, and important men were both the secular and spiritual leaders of their kin. The missionaries did not like this aspect of our culture ... It went against the religious instruction that they were trying to bring with them into the communities here.⁶⁴

Moreover, certain clans were known for producing particularly gifted diviners.⁶⁵ By the 1950s, Europeans such as Sundkler were conscious that these priest-diviners were in fact considered

⁶⁰ Iliffe, *Modern History*, 25.

⁶¹ Seitel, *Genre*, 22-23; 128; 167; S.B. Kahakwa, *A Haya-African Interpretation of the Christian Concept of God: A Study of an Invocation of the Deity in a Threefold Form for Indigenising and Understanding the Christian Trinitarian Model* (Berlin, 2010), 56-69. These assessments mirror arguments made by the Catholic priest Placide Tempels in his book *Bantu Philosophy*, as well as the testimonies of Haya interviewees when asked about the acceptance of African Socialism in Kagera. Both Tempels’ work and these interviews are discussed in Chapter 6.

⁶² Iliffe, *Modern History*, 228.

⁶³ Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 44-52; 115.

⁶⁴ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest.

⁶⁵ Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 57.

to be mediators between the living and spirit worlds, but earlier missionaries – who had been eager to present themselves and their message as a clear break with traditional belief systems – had denounced them as individuals who were in contact with the devil.⁶⁶ Since the clan structure was so closely linked to this ‘devilish’ religion, its use in the church was complicated and, importantly, demonstrates how the local philosophy of an aspect of tradition such as clanship and its associated cosmological parameters could have an influence on its adoption by European missionaries.

However, clan allegiance and the philosophy of clan organisation remained strong throughout the first half of the twentieth century in Kagera. This could lead to divisions in Christian communities and had the potential to frustrate the Christianising mission. For example, Haya Lutherans often refused to receive instruction from pastors who were from rival clans.⁶⁷ Amongst Catholics, too, this could be a problem, with one Catholic priest describing how: ‘Evangelisation and unity within the Church could be very tricky around Bukoba in the early days ... when certain clans were feuding with each other.’⁶⁸ Moreover, as one local land dispute from 1957 in Bugabo, an area north of Bukoba, demonstrates, it could often be difficult to distinguish between religious, clan, and community divisions in Haya society. Following a complaint made to the Bukoba authorities about the Catholic ownership of traditional lands and the restriction of access to these lands by a Catholic Haya catechist named Cesar Igirakwazo, the priest in charge of the Catholic Mission had the following to say in a letter to the DC in Bukoba:

As far as our Catechist is concerned, the accusation made against him of detaining both Kishoju and Kalegu, not allowing other people to cultivate in these grounds, is – it would seem – inspired by the Village Headman Celestini

⁶⁶ Ibid., 44-52.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 67.

⁶⁸ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest.

of Bwende, a man detested by the bulk of the population for his insolence and vengeance on all supporters and proteges of ex-Mukama (chief) Gallicani Rwegerera. This Celestini has a personal grievance against our catechist Cesar, because Cesar refused to condemn a catechuman (sic) who was accused by the Headman for having insulted him. The case was dropped for lack of witnesses, much against the Headman's intents. This case was assisted by over 40 people, as the Headman had insisted on dealing with it in public.

The Headman's supporters in the Gombolola [Parish] Council Meeting ... were all Protestants; he himself, however, is a Catholic.⁶⁹

As this letter shows, religious divisions between different Christian denominations, who had been in competition with each other for influence since the early colonial period, had the potential to combine with local politics and tribe-church relations to sow discord in Christian Haya society.

As another land dispute from the previous year demonstrates, these conflicts also arose between Christians – primarily Catholics – and Muslims. In 1956, a dispute broke out between Catholic priests from Kabashana, another parish north of Bukoba, and Muslims in nearby Bubuga, who were attempting to build a mosque. The Catholics claimed the mosque was being built on mission land, and wrote to the local headman and the DC in Bukoba to demand that they be stopped, arguing that Muslims were prone to violence and that Christians and Muslims could not live together without fighting.⁷⁰ When the headman rejected these arguments, a Catholic priest named Father Desire Kashangaki accused him of taking Muslim bribes.⁷¹ Eventually, the DC became so frustrated at the intransigence of the Catholic priests that he wrote a damning letter to their superior, stating: ‘these disputes could have been settled easily

⁶⁹ Van Waesberghe of Bumai (Kishanje) to DC Bukoba (10/06/1957), TNA-TZ: 71/708/979, 1.

⁷⁰ Desire Kashangaki to DC Bukoba (08/06/1956), TNA-TZ: 71/708/908; Mwawi of Ndwaniilo to DC Bukoba (22/06/1956), TNA-TZ: 71/708/918.

⁷¹ Mwawi of Ndwaniilo to DC Bukoba (22/06/1956), TNA-TZ: 71/708/918.

in a spirit of Christian charity instead of bringing in all the confusion of lies, false allegations and misunderstandings which are so typical of pagan Bahaya land disputes.⁷² Clearly, the authorities in Kagera were keen to quell religious disputes, and, by accusing them of acting in a way not in keeping with religious teaching, they were appealing to Christian values to ensure that these conflicts did not get any worse. However, the assertion that ‘pagan’ Haya attitudes towards land were ultimately to blame is very significant. It suggests that long-standing philosophies in Haya society, particularly those concerned with land, and which were so interlinked with local understandings of kinship and authority, continued to play a role in Christian Haya communities and influenced how Christian-Muslim relations developed in the region.

Clan dynamics also allowed for the emergence of an extra dimension to the idea of kinship in Protestant Haya congregations which developed in the context of the East African Revival. From the late 1940s onwards, Sundkler noted that Lutheran and Anglican Hayas increasingly saw their community as the ‘Clan of Christ’, and the term *oluganda* (variously translated as ‘clan’, ‘brotherhood’, and ‘siblings’) was employed to describe teams of women and men who went out to spread the word of God.⁷³ Whilst Kibira argued that Revivalists themselves felt this way, Peterson has questioned this assessment.⁷⁴ Regardless, it is evident that for many Haya Lutherans at this time, traditional thought systems and power structures were increasingly expressed in a Christian context. That said, this process did not simply allow for the inclusion of all tradition; rather, the ripples of the Revival interacted with contemporaneous socio-political ideas about community and belonging, facilitating a kind of

⁷² DC Bukoba to Modesti Rwiza, Rutabo Diocese, Kamachumu (07/11/1956), TNA-TZ: 71/708/957, 2.

⁷³ Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 122-131.

⁷⁴ J. Kibira, *Church, Clan, and the World* (Uppsala: Gleerup, 1974), 46-58; Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism*, 66.

cultural auditing in Haya communities where local ontologies and epistemologies could be re-examined.

It is important to remember, however, that Revivalists also openly opposed many Haya traditions. Perhaps the best example, highlighted by both interviewees and multiple scholars, was the place of women in Haya society. Haya women and girls originally inhabited a highly patriarchal power structure which subjected them to the authority of their husbands, fathers, and kings. However, with the introduction of Christianity, and particularly with the Revival, these power structures were challenged and increasingly dismantled, albeit not entirely. As one female Lutheran pastor recalled:

The East African Revival shook everything up in this part of the country. Beforehand, in traditional Haya society, women were property. They belonged to their fathers and husbands and served them as masters. But the Revival freed us, both intellectually and physically. Not only in the churches, but in secular life, too.⁷⁵

An illustration of the Revival's emancipatory power can be seen in the debate over the paying of bride wealth. The practice had been ignored by both Catholic and Lutheran missionaries in Kagera, probably out of a desire to avoid conflict with Haya elites. However, it was openly opposed by Revivalists.⁷⁶ As a Lutheran interviewee argued: 'Bride wealth was a form of ownership which was at odds with Christian teaching. It had to end if we were to be equal.'⁷⁷ Moreover, it was not just in Protestant denominations that the Revival had an emancipatory effect on women. Whilst it was not articulated in the same way in the Catholic Church, several

⁷⁵ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, pastor. For more on women and the Revival, see: B. Larsson, 'Haya Women's Response to Revival' in K. Ward and E. Wild-Wood (eds.), *The East African Revival: History and Legacies* (London: Routledge, 2012), 119-127; B. Larsson, *Conversion to Greater Freedom: Women, Church and Social Change in North-Western Tanzania under Colonial Rule* (Uppsala, 1991).

⁷⁶ Stevens, 'Change', 10-18.

⁷⁷ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, businesswoman, born 1938.

Catholic women spoke of how seeing the effect of the Revival in other parts of Haya society had a profound impact on them. One woman had the following to say:

The Revival may have been Protestant in church, but it affected Catholics in a social sense. When we were young, we saw Protestant women standing up for themselves, throwing off traditional shackles. For Catholic girls, the Church was just like the old Haya society. There was no role for us, either in its leadership or even in the daily services ... Boys could be altar boys, members of the choir, or train for the priesthood. We were there just to follow and be told what to do ... [But] things changed with the Revival. Some Catholic women had had enough. Some converted, either to Protestantism or to Islam. Many left Bukoba and made lives in Mombasa, Nairobi, and Dar [es Salaam] ... They worked as prostitutes and started businesses. And when they came back, they were often very rich – much richer than the men they left here!⁷⁸

It should be noted here that the history of Haya women working in prostitution throughout East Africa is very complex, a point which this interviewee also made, and it would be a mistake to associate the phenomenon entirely with the effects of the Revival.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, the testimony above is important, not only because it shows how the Revival was understood and how it has come to be remembered in certain communities, but also because the effect of the Revival on Catholic communities has often been ignored or dismissed, with scholars like Stevens arguing that it did not ‘influence the majority Catholic population’.⁸⁰ Showing that this viewpoint potentially ignores the thinking of some Catholic Hayas, the woman interviewed here went on to describe how the women returning to Bukoba further undermined the power of men in Haya society in much the same way that the churches often had. They sheltered and sponsored young men and women who had been ostracised or abused by traditional leaders

⁷⁸ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, businesswoman, born 1942.

⁷⁹ For more on this subject, see: Larsson, *Greater Freedom*.

⁸⁰ Stevens, ‘Change’, 5.

and their kin, providing new avenues for individuals to make lives for themselves outside of traditional systems.

As the examples above demonstrate, the social ramifications of the Revival, even in communities not necessarily composed of Revivalists, could have a very significant effect on kinship and traditional authority. More generally, Haya Christians were actively developing their own, localised Christianity which was sensitive to local values, whilst simultaneously grounding it in both traditional and modern epistemologies of the self, community, religion, and the link between the three. As the following chapter demonstrates, this would influence ideas concerning authority in other sections of Haya society as well.

Conclusion:

From the earliest missionary contact with Chagga and Haya people, Christianity, and the institutions it brought with it, became a way for concepts of kin, tradition, authority, and modernity to be redefined. As this chapter has shown, these elements of Chagga and Haya culture were reimagined in a Christian context by both European missionaries and African converts. In so doing, the chapter builds on a body of scholarship which emphasises the importance of understanding culture and the debates surrounding it in early Christianising efforts on the African continent. In Chagga and Haya society, elements of traditional culture which supported the teachings of Christianity were promoted, whilst those which were deemed to go against Christian values were attacked. At the same time, and as later chapters discuss further, Christian philosophy, institutions, and secular education were utilised for internal issues both by those who saw how they could reinforce traditional power structures such as kinship networks, and by those who envisaged changes in their societies, such as women and young converts. Meanwhile, the importance of the individual, not only in the Church but also

within tribal structures, became more prominent in Chagga and Haya communities, whether or not missionaries intended for this to happen. Thus, from the earliest days of mission activity, it is possible to see how the churches quickly developed as sites of both change and resistance, where divisions in local societies – such as between the old and the young, or between women and men – could be negotiated and arbitrated, and where cultural and political frameworks could be challenged and remoulded.

Importantly, whilst the churches functioned as sites to negotiate social divisions and progress, it is also evident that cultural frameworks could be used to navigate religious divisions. As this chapter has shown, tensions between Christian denominations and between Islam and Christianity, though often quite trivial, were being played out by Chagga and Haya individuals in various aspects of local culture and through complex, intersectional networks of authority and belonging, whether this was in arguments concerning kin, land, or the slaughter of meat. Thus, by the early Nyerere years, strong ethno-religious identities had emerged in Kilimanjaro and Kagera where religion, lineage, tradition, and gender all had a part to play. This contributed, possibly unintentionally on the part of many Chagga and Haya Christians, to a socio-political environment in the late 1940s and early 1950s which could be appropriated by the nationalist ideology of Julius Nyerere, the African Association (AA), and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), as later chapters in this thesis will explore.

Whilst there were some differences between the approaches of missionaries in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, between Catholics and Lutherans, and indeed between individual missionaries of the same denomination, by the 1950s, Christians of all denominations had experienced a similar cultural and ethno-religious reordering. That said, how these changes unfolded, and how the process has been remembered, depended on context, with both denomination and gender influencing how interviewees recalled the interaction between

tradition and Christianity. Moreover, the East African Revival has evidently shaped the memory of this interaction in conformist Haya Christian circles in a way not mirrored in Kilimanjaro, with both Catholic and Lutheran Hayas emphasising its impact even in non-Revivalist congregations.

Finally, it is important to emphasise that the identities which emerged in Kilimanjaro and Bukoba in the first half of the twentieth century were not simply imposed by Christian missionaries. Neither were they the result of a process of either rejection or adoption of foreign Christian traditions on the part of Africans. Rather, these identities were increasingly ‘glocal’ in nature, relying on primarily traditional systems to reconceptualise Christianity and ethnic identity in communities increasingly subject to both local and global influences. Throughout this process, African converts largely shaped their own versions of Christianity using the moral frameworks and institutions provided by their new religion, rebelling against some missionary teachings whilst embracing others. Indeed, there was evidently a concerted effort on the part of Chagga and Haya individuals to determine their own ethno-religious approach to culture and identity from the very start of the Christianising mission. Consequently, this study rejects the argument that missionaries, as arms of the colonial state, simply ‘colonised the consciousness’ of African converts, and instead supports academic work on African Christianity which emphasises Africans’ agency. This is not to say that there was nothing completely ‘new’ about the identities which emerged in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. Christian women, particularly in Kagera, certainly experienced the effects of developments which were decidedly novel, as did disenfranchised youths. However, after a half century of cultural editing and reordering, most Chaggas and Hayas in the early Nyerere years still lived in communities which were simultaneously traditional and modernistic, rooted in the past but focused on the future. What is significant is that this cultural editing was one facilitated and shaped by the tools and teachings of the Catholic and Lutheran churches.

Chapter 2

Chiefs, Kings, and Power

Introduction:

In the previous chapter, the relationship between Christianity and power was explored within the confines of kinship and lineage structures in Chagga and Haya society, as well as through the nuanced power dynamics underpinning certain traditional practices, showing how local Christianity both reshaped and was itself moulded through these complex networks of authority. In this chapter, the focus is on Christianity's influence on power dynamics at a higher level, amongst Chagga chiefs and Haya kings. It argues that, as was the case with traditional practices and kinship, understandings of authority associated with chiefs and kings were re-worked in the first half of the twentieth century through the moral teachings and institutions of the Catholic and Lutheran churches. Once again, Christianity's influence was varied and complex; certain aspects of traditional leaders' authority were emphasised by the religion, partly because missionaries relied on them for access and safety, but churches, missionaries, clergy and converts also developed as sites and agents capable of facilitating localised resistance against these leaders. Thus, Christianity served as an avenue through which understandings of authority could be re-ordered, and the nature of Chagga chiefship and Haya kingship were by the early Nyerere years inextricably intertwined with this process of cultural editing.

The nature of traditional leadership in Africa, as well as its relationship with both religion and colonialism, is a well-studied topic. The idea of the 'invention of tradition' in colonial Africa, as proposed by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, is a prominent feature of these discussions, which have often questioned the extent to which pre-colonial power

structures were re-imagined in the colonial period, in part as a way to reinforce indirect rule and to support rigid ideas of hierarchy and subservience.¹ At the same time, the relationship between African traditional leadership and Christianity has been studied since the early post-colonial period by scholars focusing on societies all over the African continent.² For example, Lamin Sanneh has illustrated the interaction between West African chiefs and Christian missions and the effect that this had on local power dynamics, whilst others have touched on similar issues in central and southern Africa.³ Likewise, in Tanzania's case, Terence Ranger's research provides an assessment of Matola chiefship, whilst Anne Marie Stoner-Eby analyses

¹ E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 [First published 1983]). See in particular chapter 6: 'The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa' by Terence Ranger; on page 220, for example, Ranger touches on early German contact with the Chagga chief Rindi, and how his status was deliberately and performatively celebrated by the Europeans. For a discussion of invention being used to facilitate indirect rule in British colonies and territories, see: M. Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (London: James Currey, 1996), 35-138. For some examples of more recent scholarship which counters the somewhat reductive idea of 'invention', instead arguing that, in the majority of cases, colonial regimes actually reinforced and politicised pre-existing political systems, patron-client structures, and kinship networks, making them less permeable and more defined, see: T. Spear, 'Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa', *The Journal of African History*, 44:1 (2003) 3-12; 19-26; B. Berman, 'Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism', *African Affairs*, 97 (1998), 305-341; J. Lonsdale, 'Soil, Work, Civilisation, and Citizenship in Kenya', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 2:2 (2008), 306-312.

² For studies which focus on Africa generally, see, for example: V. Pawliková-Vilhanová, 'Christian Missions in Africa and their Role in the Transformation of African Societies', *Asian and African Studies*, 16:2 (2007), 249-260; C.J. Korih and R.C. Njoku, *Missions, States and European Expansion in Africa* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

³ L. Sanneh, *West African Christianity: The Religious Impact* (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1983). For examples of these other works, see: B. Garvey, 'Bemba Chiefs and Catholic Missions, 1898-1935', *The Journal of African History*, 18:3 (1977), 411-426; J. McCracken, *Politics & Christianity in Malawi, 1875-1940: The Impact of the Livingstonia Mission in the Northern Province* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); D. Maxwell, *Christians and Chiefs in Zimbabwe: A Social History of the Hwesa People c. 1870s-1990s* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999); S. Fretheim, 'Early Central African Christian History: Prophets, Priests and Kings', in E.K. Bongmba (ed.), *The Routledge Companion to Christianity in Africa* (New York: Routledge, 2015), chapter 6; R.L. Cope, 'Christian Missions and Independent African Chiefdoms in South Africa in the 19th Century', *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory*, 52 (1979), 1-23; F. Nkomazana and S.D. Setume, 'Missionary Colonial Mentality and the Expansion of Christianity in Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1800 to 1900', *Journal for the Study of Religion*, 29:2 (2016), 29-55.

the relationship between traditional leaders and Anglican missions in the same region.⁴ Meanwhile, Mwita Akiri has investigated the interaction between Gogo and Kaguru chiefship and the Church Missionary Society in the early colonial period.⁵

As this chapter shows, in Kilimanjaro and Kagera amongst the Chagga and Haya, discussions of chiefship and kingship have likewise featured in the writings both of Christians who were active in the two regions and in the work of various academics. One of the aims here, therefore, is to supplement this rich body of literature with previously unexplored oral testimonies on, and local memories of, Chagga and Haya traditional leadership in conformist Christian communities. This chapter also shows that differences between Kilimanjaro and Kagera, especially surrounding the roles of traditional elites in pre-colonial religious and political thought systems, affected not only how the interaction between Christianity and traditional leadership developed in each region, but also how this subject has been remembered by Chagga and Haya conformist Christians.

Rather than following a thematic approach like the previous chapter, this chapter analyses traditional authority in each region in isolation, thus allowing for a deeper understanding of the highly localised nature of authority in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. Consequently, the first section of this chapter covers Chagga chiefs and their relationship with Christianity, whilst the second section analyses the interaction between Christianity and Haya kings. It is worth noting here that Haya leaders have been referred to in scholarly literature as both ‘kings’ and ‘chiefs’; this latter term has probably been employed due to its initial use by

⁴ T. Ranger, ‘European Attitudes and African Realities: The Rise and Fall of the Matola Chiefs of South-East Tanzania’, *The Journal of African History*, 20:1 (1979), 63-82; A.M. Stoner-Eby, ‘African Leaders Engage Mission Christianity: Anglicans in Tanzania, 1876-1926’ (PhD Thesis; University of Pennsylvania, 2003).

⁵ M. Akiri, *Christianity in Central Tanzania: A Story of African Encounters and Initiatives in Ugogo and Ukaguru, 1876-1933* (Carlisle: Langham, 2020), ch. 4.

colonial officials when organising the ‘Native Authority’ (NA) of the area around Bukoba, as well as by missionaries in their correspondence and personal memoirs.⁶ However, the oral testimonies presented below suggest that ‘kings’ is probably the more appropriate term for the *Bakama* (singular: *Mukama*), those who sat at the very top of Haya society, with interviewees highlighting the importance of ‘royal’ status and the ritualistic separateness of the *Bakama* from their subjects. The term ‘chief’, according to these interviewees, was more suited to those who occupied positions below the *Bakama*, such as the *Bakungu* (singular: *Nkungu*; ‘parish sub-chief’) and *Balagilwa* (singular: *Mulagilwa*; ‘senior sub-chief’), as well as the British-introduced *Bami* (singular: *Mwami*; ‘chief’/‘headman’), who largely replaced the *Balagilwa*.⁷ Consequently, whilst this chapter refers to Chagga traditional rulers as ‘chiefs’, it uses the term ‘kings’ when discussing Haya leaders.

Chagga Chiefs:

Much of the information available on the history of Chagga chiefship comes from the work of Sally Falk Moore, as well as the earlier research of Kathleen Stahl.⁸ Stahl’s history of the Chagga pays little attention to missions or Christianity, and whilst Moore’s work touches on how religion and Chagga chiefship interacted, studies focused more closely on Christianity, such as Klaus Fiedler’s book on German Protestant missionaries in Tanganyika, unsurprisingly

⁶ For an analysis of a similar phenomenon elsewhere on the African continent, albeit at an earlier time, see: T. Farrar, ‘When African Kings Became “Chiefs”’: Some Transformations in European Perceptions of West African Civilization, c. 1450-1800’, *Journal of Black Studies*, 23: 2 (1992), 258-278.

⁷ R.A. Austen, *Northwest Tanzania Under German and British Rule: Colonial Policy and Tribal Politics 1889-1939* (London: Yale University Press, 1968), 11; 133.

⁸ S.F. Moore, *Social Facts and Fabrications: “Customary” law on Kilimanjaro, 1880-1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); S.F. Moore and P. Puritt, *The Chagga and Meru of Tanzania* (London: Routledge, 1977); K.M. Stahl, *History of the Chagga People of Kilimanjaro* (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1964).

discuss this more extensively.⁹ Both Moore and Fiedler, however, are reliant on the writings of missionaries who worked on Kilimanjaro, such as Bruno Gutmann and Otto Raum, demonstrating that Christianity's role in the recording and preservation of elements of Chagga culture, tradition, and history has been significant, with early Christian understandings of Chagga society permeating into both the written and oral record.

In Kilimanjaro, Christianity was crucial to the development of traditional authority, particularly when considering the form it took in the early Nyerere years. The German Lutheran scholar Paul Fleisch, when writing in the 1930s his history of the Lutheran church in the region, suggested that one of the main reasons for the success of Christianity amongst the Chagga was the strong social structures and powerful chiefs which missionaries could work with to spread their message.¹⁰ Some of the Chagga people interviewed for this thesis supported this argument, with one Catholic man calling the chiefs 'the gateway to Chagga society.'¹¹ Fleisch compared the Chagga with the Kamba, a group who occupied the coastal land in Kenya east of Kilimanjaro, amongst whom missionaries faced great difficulty in maintaining allegiance to Christianity. The main reason for this, according to Fleisch, was that the Kamba had no real organisation or authority figures with whom the missionaries could negotiate.¹² In time, they were forced to abandon their work in Kamba territory, and they focused instead on communities such as the Chagga where their successes had been more pronounced.

However, it is likely that Fleisch overestimated the authority of pre-colonial Chagga chiefs. Indeed, as Moore's extensive work shows, it is more likely that real authority originally

⁹ K. Fiedler, *Christianity & African Culture: Conservative German Protestant Missionaries in Tanzania, 1900-1940* (Leiden: Brill, 1996).

¹⁰ P. Fleisch, *Lutheran Beginnings Around Mt. Kilimanjaro*, edited by E. Jaeschke (Makumira, 1998 [first published 1936]), 45-50.

¹¹ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, shopkeeper, born 1944.

¹² Fleisch, *Lutheran Beginnings*, 13-20.

lay in the lineage structures discussed in the previous chapter, in which individual Chaggas related to and interacted with their kin.¹³ Similarly, John Iliffe notes that Germans who visited Kilimanjaro in the early colonial period recalled encountering a Chagga society where chiefs' authority was constrained by the warrior class and powerful kin networks to which even chiefs had obligations.¹⁴ This does not mean that Chagga chiefs, who certainly existed prior to the colonial period, had no power, or that they were incapable of making evangelisation easier and, importantly, safer for early missionaries. However, it is arguable that the pre-colonial position of the chiefs should actually be understood as that of a headman in an extension of the lineage structure, with chiefs simply being able to draw on the warriors, members and resources of multiple lineages, where other lineage heads could only rely on their own.¹⁵ Indeed, Gutmann noted that traditional chiefs, whilst powerful, had to rely on and listen to the elders of the lineages to which they were themselves tied.¹⁶ Whilst chiefs therefore had a greater level of access, and thus more power, than other men in their communities, they were nevertheless constrained by the same source of real authority in Chagga society, namely, the lineage structures.

Under the colonial system, the models of authority at play in Chagga society changed significantly. However, it would be reductive to argue that this represented an altogether new 'invention of tradition'; rather, the Germans, and later the British, reimagined the system which they encountered in Kilimanjaro to rule the Chagga and surrounding peoples more easily, adopting, remoulding, and strengthening existing structures to the benefit of the colonial state.

¹³ Moore, *Facts and Fabrications*, 59. For an in-depth history of various Chagga chiefdoms, see also: Stahl, *Chagga People*.

¹⁴ J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 59-60.

¹⁵ Moore, *Facts and Fabrications*, 59.

¹⁶ B. Gutmann, *Poetry and Thinking of the Chagga: Contributions to East African Ethnology*, translation by G. Drivdal and S. Tucker (Oxford: Signal Books, 2017 [1909]), 11-17.

The German administration increased the power of Chagga chiefs extremely quickly after conquering Kilimanjaro, ensuring that the government had loyal local agents who could administer effectively on their behalf.¹⁷ Following World War One, the British administration, too, continued this process, using Chagga chiefs and the NA to facilitate indirect rule. Increasingly, administrative and judicial authority came to lie in the hands of chiefs and their NAs within the confines of semi-artificially entrenched chieftaincies. Different ranks of chief were also introduced by the British at various times; by the early 1950s, when Julius Nyerere and the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU) became active in national and local politics, three *Waitori* (Divisional Chiefs; singular: *Mwitori*) had been appointed to oversee the ordinary Chagga chiefs (*Mangi*), whilst one Paramount Chief (*Mangi Mkuu*) had been chosen to head the whole system. Thus, by the early Nyerere years, the power structures at play on Kilimanjaro bore only a passing resemblance to those of pre-colonial Chagga communities.

The role of missionaries in this evolution and development of Chagga chiefship was very mixed. It is difficult to know if missionaries consciously supported a reimagining of Chagga tradition where authority figures were concerned. Certainly, as Emma Hunter argues, Gutmann, the most prominent Lutheran missionary in the region for much of the early twentieth century, was opposed to increasing the power of the chiefs outside of their clan structures in the colonial period.¹⁸ Gutmann, as has been discussed, was very concerned to preserve what he saw as the ‘traditional culture’ of the Chagga, a culture which he saw as being closer to the Kingdom of God than were those of many of the European peoples back on his home continent.¹⁹ For this reason, whilst he did not disagree with the authority of the chiefs, he

¹⁷ Moore, *Facts and Fabrications*, 103-105.

¹⁸ E. Hunter, ‘Languages of Freedom in Decolonising Africa’, *Transactions of the Royal History Society*, 27 (2017), 262-264.

¹⁹ Fiedler, *African Culture*, 28-35.

supported it only within the constraints of ‘traditional’ clan systems. Yet, as Moore illustrates, by the time Gutmann and other Christian missionaries – particularly Lutherans – became a major force amongst the Chagga, it is probable that the nature of Chagga society and the role of the chiefs had already changed significantly from its pre-colonial form.²⁰ So fast and so effective was the German conquest of the Chagga between 1884 and 1890 that Gutmann, who arrived in Kilimanjaro in 1902, and his contemporaries would almost certainly have been totally reliant on Chagga people’s memories of the pre-German political system for their own understandings of it. Even the earliest Catholic missionaries in the region, who arrived a decade before Gutmann, were entering a place firmly within the realm of German East Africa, where local ideas of authority were already undergoing significant change.

What must also be questioned is the effect which missionaries’ targeting of Chagga chiefs for conversion and collaboration must have had on the image of the chief in local thought. Whilst the chiefs were not the first Chagga to convert, they were certainly amongst the first to work closely with the missionaries on large-scale educational and economic programmes.²¹ Additionally, Gutmann’s writings suggest that Lutheran teaching in Kilimanjaro may have sometimes drawn on local images of God as a kind of supernatural chief in order to spread the Gospel in the context of a local epistemology.²² At the same time, chiefs were quick to ask missionaries, first Catholic and later Lutheran, for coffee seedlings, which would come to be economically very important.²³ The full extent of the introduction of coffee will be discussed in the following two chapters, but it is worth mentioning here that the chiefs

²⁰ Moore, *Facts and Fabrications*, 103-105.

²¹ The history of the relationship between religion and development is explored in the next two chapters.

²² Gutmann, *Poetry and Thinking*, 187-211. For a more in-depth analysis of this point from a theological perspective, see also: S.A. Mafikiri, *Christ as the Mangi: Ideal King of Christian Transformation for a Deeper Evangelisation. A Christology from the Chagga Perspective* (Nairobi: CUEA Press, 2010).

²³ Moore, *Facts and Fabrications*, 103.

who first adopted it as a cash crop greatly increased their local influence on the mountain as a result. Thus, Fleisch's anachronistic assertion that the power of Chagga chiefs was what made conversion amongst the Chagga so easy may, in fact, be more accurate when reversed; early missionary collaboration with Chagga chiefs is likely one of the factors which initially helped to strengthen the position of the chiefs in colonial-era Chagga communities.

Towards the middle of the twentieth century, the Christianity of the Chagga themselves also both bolstered and chipped away at the authority of the chiefs. For example, chiefs eventually came to symbolise the authority, and determine the direction, of the church in Kilimanjaro, particularly in Lutheran areas. This was due in large part to the effect of the Second World War on the running of the Lutheran Church in Tanganyika. During the war, German missionaries who had been active in Tanganyika were initially interned alongside other German nationals, and in the mid-1940s they were expelled from the territory altogether. The British, concerned that the German missionaries might be pedalling Nazi ideology to their African congregations, originally planned to replace these individuals with British missionaries whose political ideology they did not need to be so concerned about. However, they were also keen to maintain the Lutheran nature of the congregations so as not to cause unrest amongst Chagga Christians, and when they discovered that there were no British missionary societies with both the resources and the correct theological teachings to take on this role, they were forced to look elsewhere for a replacement. They eventually settled on allowing the American Augustana Mission – which had briefly run abandoned Leipzig mission stations on Kilimanjaro following a similar exodus of German missionaries after the First World War – to run the Lutheran missions in Tanganyika, partly on the basis that missionaries from an English-

speaking, allied country were the most conducive to maintaining British authority and promoting pro-British attitudes in the territory.²⁴

The problem with the solution which the administration came to, however, was that the Augustana Mission did not have the resources to take over from the Germans. There appears to have been surprise at the sheer number of German missionaries and mission staff who had been active in the territory, particularly on Kilimanjaro, and the American mission soon realised that they could not commit the same numbers to the job. In part, they dealt with this shortcoming by inviting missionaries from neutral European countries such as Sweden to help them in Tanganyika. This is how Bengt Sundkler came to be a missionary in Bukoba amongst the Haya, where the Church of Sweden became the mission in charge of the local Lutheran Church.

However, on Kilimanjaro, as Elaine Christian points out, the American Lutherans were also forced to collaborate even more closely with the Chagga chiefs than they had done prior to the war.²⁵ Whilst the German missionaries had been interned, the chiefs and African pastors had stepped in to maintain the running of Lutheran churches, schools and mission stations, in a way reminiscent of a similar African takeover of Leipzig missions during the First World War.²⁶ When the Augustana missionaries arrived, a lack of manpower, coupled with the fact that Lutheran missions had been forced to hand back to the Chagga a large amount of land following the Wilson Report into land usage on the mountain in 1948, meant that the missionaries became increasingly dependent on men such as Petro Itosi Marealle of Marangu

²⁴ For more on the chronology of mission reorganisation in this period, see: C. Sahlberg, *Historia ya Kanisa la Tanzania: Kutoka Krapf Hadi Rugambwa* (Moshi: Safi, 2017), 48-57; B. Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba: Church and Community in Tanzania* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1980 [first published 1974]), 31-33.

²⁵ E. Christian, 'Shepherds, Servants, and Strangers: Popular Christianity, Theology, and Mission among Tanzanian Lutheran Ministers' (PhD Thesis: Columbia University, 2017), 217-219.

²⁶ Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 154-155; Fleisch, *Lutheran Beginnings*, 30-36.

and Abdiel Shangali of Machame in order to carry out their work effectively.²⁷ As one Lutheran interviewee described the situation after the Second World War, ‘the *Mangi Mkuu* and the *Waitori* were all involved in the Church, not just living as Christians ... but supporting it with men and materials.’²⁸ Tellingly, the British administration was also clearly conscious of the power which the Augustana Mission had surrendered to Chagga elites.²⁹

This locally-shaped development of Lutheranism in Kilimanjaro helps to explain why Sundkler, writing of his trip in 1955 to Marangu, where the issue of episcopacy in the Lutheran Church in Tanganyika was being discussed at the All-Africa Lutheran Conference, said that Thomas Marealle II, by then the *Mangi Mkuu* of the Chagga, was considered by both the Chagga and the Tanganyikan Lutheran clergy to represent the wishes of both the Chagga people and the Lutheran Church.³⁰ Sundkler was very clearly of the opinion that the Chagga chiefs, and in particular Marealle, were responsible for the strength of the Lutheran Church amongst the Chagga and for rescuing and directing it during the war.³¹ He recorded how some Chagga people themselves interpreted and described the wishes of the *Mangi Mkuu* alongside those of the Lutheran Church, and how these wishes were in turn understood to be those of the Chagga as a whole.³² An excerpt from the opening paragraph of Thomas Marealle’s speech demonstrates his devotion to the Lutheran Church, and explains why other Chaggas may have believed what Sundkler recorded:

All over Africa, the name of Jesus is being made welcome
in thousands of new hearts and hundreds of new homes.
The message of his love has drawn together men of many

²⁷ Christian, ‘Shepherds’, 217-219.

²⁸ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, former schoolteacher, born 1935.

²⁹ Tanganyika Political Intelligence Summary, August 1953, TNA-UK: CO 822/379/40, 8.

³⁰ Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 154-155.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

ances and outlook and bridged many gaps. The spread of Christianity on this mountain has been almost phenomenal. Thousands of my people have embraced Christianity because it has offered them something new, something precious, namely spiritual security. Individual lives have been disrupted and homes have been broken up where each or all lack that security; that feeling, that you are not alone if you truly accept Him as your guide, Philosopher and Friend.³³

Thus, by the early Nyerere years, Chagga chiefship had become intricately linked with Christianity, particularly in Lutheran areas of the mountain and in the person of the Paramount Chief of the Chagga himself.

It is worth briefly examining why the Catholic Church on Kilimanjaro does not appear to have been influenced by chiefship in the same way as the Lutheran Church. To begin with, far fewer Catholic missionaries were affected by internment, as the Catholic missions in Tanganyika mostly had their headquarters in countries such as France and the United States, whilst many of their priests and teachers came from countries such as Ireland. Since these countries were either neutral or allied to Britain during the war, Catholic missionaries such as the Holy Ghost Fathers in Kilimanjaro and the White Fathers in Kagera were not deemed to pose a significant threat to British interests in Tanganyika. However, another possible reason for the relative immunity of Catholic missionaries during the war might be the fact that some in the British administration believed that Catholic missions were more influenced by Vatican, rather than nationalist, direction and ideology.³⁴ Consequently, in neither the First World War nor the Second World War had the Catholic missions in Kilimanjaro needed to rely on Chagga elites and teachers to fill a gap left by European missionaries. Thus, it is arguable that by the

³³ Speech by Mangi Mkuu for the All-Africa Lutheran Conference (13/11/1955), TNA-TZ: 5/41/1/24, 1.

³⁴ The idea that the Catholic Church was protected by the Vatican was also a concern. See introductory notes to file on 'Surrender of Catholic Mission Lands in the Moshi and Arusha Districts of Tanzania' (1953), TNA-UK: CO 822/522.

late 1940s, the Catholic Church had retained a greater level of detachment from local influence. This is further illustrated by the fact that the Catholic Church was able to refuse the demands of the Wilson Report, which called for the return of mission land to the Chagga, despite the desire of the Tanganyikan government that they comply with the request.³⁵

The Lutheran Church, which had agreed to surrender much of its substantially smaller land holdings, was also furious at the actions of the Catholics, and made it very clear in letters to the local Catholic bishop that they considered it to be an attempt to extend Catholic influence over the Chagga people.³⁶ Interestingly, however, Chagga Catholics and their chiefs do not appear to have been particularly concerned by their Church's refusal to return their land, despite the fact that land ownership was such a contentious issue in Kilimanjaro at the time. Instead, conformist Catholic Chaggas were likely influenced by the fact that they could live and work securely and productively on the mission land. As one Catholic priest recalled: 'The congregation benefitted from the land and facilities of the Church. It fed people, educated them, housed them, and kept them safe.'³⁷ It is therefore possible that Chagga chiefs did not see the Catholic Church as an organisation whose land and institutions were as open to African influence or appropriation. These factors may explain why the link between Chagga chiefship and Christianity was expressed far more strongly through the Lutheran Church than it was through the Catholic Church.

How Christianity undermined Chagga chiefship is also a significant factor to consider in the socio-political development of the region. Whilst Christianity, particularly Lutheranism, had a significant effect on the increasing authority of Chagga chiefs in certain ways, Christian

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ E.R. Danielson to Bishop Byrnes (15/01/1953), TNA-UK: CO 822/522/4, 1-2.

³⁷ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, priest.

institutions were not beyond criticising powerful Chaggas when they felt that their actions were at odds with religious teaching. For example, in the early colonial period, chiefs who engaged in polygamy were not admitted into the church. However, the criticism and undermining of Chagga leaders was not limited to the early period of missionary activity in Kilimanjaro, or indeed only to less powerful chiefs. In a series of letters from 1957, a Lutheran leader named Epafra Msanjo came into conflict with the *Mangi* of Usseri, a Catholic area in Rombo, effectively accusing the *Mangi* of making it difficult for Msanjo and his associates to build a new Lutheran church.³⁸ Although it appears that Msanjo may have been exaggerating the *Mangi*'s crimes, he very effectively made life difficult for the tribal authorities in Usseri, copying his letters to the Catholic *Mwitori* of Rombo, the Lutheran *Mangi Mkuu* of the Chagga, and the British District Commissioner (DC) in Moshi. Consequently, both the DC and the *Mangi Mkuu* himself intervened, with the latter warning the *Mangi* of Usseri to respect freedom of religion as 'despising others on the basis of religion has brought great danger to the world and has even split the Indians in two, and we ask God that that does not happen here.'³⁹ Thus, in this way, a Lutheran man was able to challenge the authority of a local chief by citing religious discrimination. Moreover, the response of the more senior authorities suggests that they were very careful to quell any suggestions of religious conflict. Whilst Marealle's Lutheranism may also have influenced his own intervention, his words nevertheless display an appreciation of the fact that religion had the potential to cause dangerous rifts in Chagga society, and that traditional rulers could not be involved in any such conflicts.

³⁸ Series of letters, TNA-TZ: 5/41/1/28-35.

³⁹ *Mangi Mkuu* to *Mangi* of Usseri (24/04/1957), TNA-TZ: 5/41/1/33. The violence experienced in India and Pakistan was a common example cited by Tanganyikan leaders when warning against religious division; for example, as chapters 5 and 6 discuss, Nyerere and his TANU compatriots used the India-Pakistan turmoil to explain the necessity of secular politics.

In another example of the challenging of chiefs' power by Christian institutions, one interviewee described how:

I came into conflict with our local chief in Mwika. He was nothing more than a bully, with very little education, and he disliked my views on how things were being run in the village. The local pastor was who I went to for protection and guidance as he was able to rebuke the chief and keep him from getting to me.⁴⁰

In addition, every Chagga interviewee supported the argument that, by the 1950s, priests, pastors and bishops were local authority figures on a level with, and often superior to, the majority of the chiefs, mostly because they had largely assumed the mediating role which chiefs had traditionally held in Chagga society, as well as the guardianship of local understandings of morality. Moreover, they were often seen as further removed from the colonial administration than were the government-backed chiefs, affording them a position free from the suspicion and resentment which the colonial state regularly attracted. Of course, it is important to remember that interviewees often stressed the importance of churches as sites of resistance for conformist Christians – that is, those people who subscribed to the values and norms of the churches and whose social circles comprised many similar individuals – against successive governments in both the colonial and post-colonial periods, and indeed in the present day. As such, their opinions of the relative importance of religious and traditional leaders should be interpreted alongside this feature of local historical memory. Moreover, whilst the aforementioned tying of Lutheran chiefship to Christianity might appear to go against this narrative somewhat, it also feeds into a broader story in which both traditional and religious institutions – especially Lutheran ones – are remembered amongst conformist Chagga Christians to have been systematically oppressed by Nyerere's nationalist vision and *ujamaa*, as well as by Nyerere's successors including John Magufuli.

⁴⁰ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, businessman, born 1934.

However, archival evidence certainly supports the idea that even the most powerful Chagga chiefs struggled to contain the authority of the churches in the early Nyerere years. As Hunter notes, the *Mangi Mkuu* himself was publicly reprimanded by the Lutheran Church in 1956 when his support for ‘traditional’ clan meetings threatened to interfere with church attendance on Sundays.⁴¹ This example, as well as that described by the interviewee in the preceding paragraph, are interesting, and significant, not only because they display a conflict between Christianity and tradition, but also because all of the actors were African. It is possible to see in these conflicts the thinking of Lutheran Chaggas who, unlike their European teachers, rejected Chagga ‘tradition’ where it did not align with their conceptions of either Christianity or modernity. Marealle also came into conflict with the Catholic Church, as the case of Grayson Christopher and his runaway daughter Flora, which was discussed in the previous chapter, highlights. When news of the case reached Marealle, he had the following to say in a letter to the DC in Moshi:

The girl became a Catholic through the machinations of African Father Lelo of Makomu acting via her mother. She was enticed away from home (Mamba) by a Roman Catholic Church elder and put in the charge of the Priest without reference to or approval from her father.

...

There has been too much interference by Roman Catholic Fathers with Roman Catholic daughters of Non-Catholic parents and Catholic wives of Non-Catholic husbands that I feel we should both decide what to do in these cases.⁴²

Marealle’s anger over this case is telling. Most obviously, his open criticism of Catholic leaders might suggest that, as previously discussed, traditional leaders found the Catholicism on Kilimanjaro more difficult to control or appropriate than Lutheranism. Perhaps more importantly, however, his appeal to the DC that these sorts of things should be handled in

⁴¹ E. Hunter, *Political Thought and the Public Sphere in Tanzania: Freedom, Democracy and Citizenship in the Era of Decolonization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 169.

⁴² Mangi Mkuu to DC, ‘Flora Grayson’ (21/02/1957), TNA-TZ: 5/41/2/17.

conjunction with the colonial authorities suggests that he was conscious of the fact that ‘traditional’ authority had been so undermined by religious institutions and the individuality which they promoted – in this example Flora’s right to convert and live away from home – that even he, the *Mangi Mkuu*, was unable to manage such situations without the assistance of the British.

Haya Kings:

Haya kingship is quite well studied in academic literature, perhaps due to the attention that interlacustrine societies more generally – along with their conspicuous epistemologies surrounding royalty and its associated cosmologies – have garnered. As early as 1945, Hans Cory and M.M. Hartnoll wrote about the structures and laws of Haya society, whilst more recently, R.G. Carlson has given more focused attention to the nature of Haya kingship.⁴³ Other scholars, such as Brad Weiss, Peter Seitel, and Sylvester Kahakwa have also explored Haya kingship, including its interaction with missions and Christian thought, within their own work focusing on subjects as diverse as the epistemology of lived space, songs and storytelling, and localised Christian theologies.⁴⁴ Just as with the Chagga, however, Christian missionaries provided much of the information on Haya society and kingship that academics now draw on. This is particularly true of the writings of Bengt Sundkler, whose *Bara Bukoba* is an important source for most histories of Haya Christianity, the present thesis included.

⁴³ H. Cory and M.M. Hartnoll, *Customary Law of the Haya Tribe, Tanganyika Territory* (London: Frank Cass, 1971 [first published 1945]); R.G. Carlson, ‘Hierarchy and the Haya Divine Kingship: A Structural and Symbolic Reformulation of Frazer’s Thesis’, *American Ethnologist*, 20:2 (1993), 312-335.

⁴⁴ B. Weiss, *The Making and Unmaking of the Haya Lived World: Consumption, Commoditization, and Everyday Practice* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996); P. Seitel, *The Powers of Genre: Interpreting Haya Oral Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); S.B. Kahakwa, *A Haya-African Interpretation of the Christian Concept of God: A Study of an Invocation of the Deity in a Threefold Form for Indigenising and Understanding the Christian Trinitarian Model* (Berlin, 2010).

In Kagera, missionaries were faced with a very different sort of traditional leadership system from the one their colleagues encountered in Kilimanjaro. Here, amongst the Haya, society was administered by kings in several historically established kingdoms, rather than by chiefs in more artificially constructed chieftaincies. Whilst lower-level Haya society appears to have been much more like the kin-oriented, patrilineal structures of most Chaggas, the Haya also had a class of nobility who administered the kingdoms alongside the kings. Unlike the Chagga chiefs, who were part of the same lineage structures as their subjects, the Haya kings and nobility formed a separate power structure above that of the commoners. Indeed, in many ways, as might be expected, Haya society was more similar to that of the Ganda and other interlacustrine peoples than it was to those of other ethnic groups in Tanganyika. To this day, this is something that is felt in the region, with one Haya interviewee saying that ‘Culturally, we are like the people who live by the lake in Uganda. Our history, language and culture are not like those of other Tanzanians’.⁴⁵ The divisions between nobles and commoners, and between the kings and their subjects, were entrenched in Haya society, both culturally and psychologically. This was a division with which missionaries had to contend from the time of their earliest contact with the Haya, and which shaped the nature of the Christianity which emerged in Kagera.

One reason for this was the complex nature of kingship in Haya society. To the pre-colonial Haya, kings were more than secular lords. Rather, they were themselves semi-divine, and were considered by many to be the descendants of divine beings who formed part of the epic mythology of the region.⁴⁶ Moreover, kings also carried out important religious functions,

⁴⁵ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, former schoolteacher, born 1941; This viewpoint was supported by the majority of the people interviewed in Kagera.

⁴⁶ Carlson, ‘Kingship’, 312-325; Seitel, *Genre*, 80-86; Kahakwa, *Haya-African*, 58-64; Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 12; 53-55.

and were vital to the spiritual life of their subjects.⁴⁷ Although the ‘divine’ perception of interlacustrine monarchs is one which has been increasingly questioned in anthropological literature, a number of interviewees in Kagera supported the idea that they were regarded – and remembered – in this way, speaking of how kings ‘were seen like Gods’, ‘untouchable by common peasants.’⁴⁸ This view of kingship resulted from the complicated historical development of the region. Amongst the Haya, the common people, or *bailu*, were the descendants of horticulturalists sometimes known as the Iru, whilst the kings and nobility, or *balangila*, were the descendants of a separate ethnic group of pastoralists who had arrived in the region later.⁴⁹ These pastoralists, known as the Hima, were led by the Hinda and Bito clans in the various Haya kingdoms, and had invaded the land around Bukoba several hundred years before the arrival of European missionaries. Interestingly, in a reference to the pastoralist – and separate – nature of the Hima nobility, who provided fertiliser for *bailu* in return for crops, the Haya word for ‘king’, *Mukama*, can be translated as ‘chief milker’.⁵⁰

According to Sundkler, the Hima invaders brought with them a belief system where kings were equated with divine mythical heroes, and imposed it on the common people of the region.⁵¹ In contrast, Sylvester Kahakwa and Peter Schmidt argue that the Hinda and Bito actually appropriated local hero worship amongst the Haya commoners, claiming that the new kings were in fact related to the mythical figures of the Chwezi cult.⁵² Whilst it is unclear

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former nurse, born 1937.; Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, company director, born 1939.

⁴⁹ Cory and Hartnoll, *Customary Law*, 287-289; Carlson, ‘Kingship’, 316-317; Iliffe, *Modern History*, 24-25.

⁵⁰ Carlson, ‘Kingship’, 316.

⁵¹ Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 11-13.

⁵² Kahakwa, *Haya-African*, 137-139; P.R. Schmidt, ‘Cultural Meaning and History in African Myth’, *International Journal of Oral History*, 4:3 (1983), 167-183.

whether or not both the Hima and the people they conquered were already working within a similar cosmology, Sundkler was probably right when he suggested that the ‘foreignness’ and evident military might of Haya kings and their nobility reinforced the idea of them as being separate from the common people.⁵³ One woman in Bukoba backed up this idea by saying that ‘people here are used to being run by outsiders. First the nobles and kings, then the Germans and British, then the nationalists and politicians in Dar es Salaam’.⁵⁴ Thus, the divine nature of kings, and their crucial role in Haya cosmology and epistemology, needs to be understood within the context of a society which had already by the colonial period been subject to disruptive foreign invasions, and where elements of the legacy of the Chwezi cult were rearticulated in new power structures.

What the nature of Haya kingship meant for the development of Christianity in the Kagera region was, historically, very complex. The earliest Catholic and Protestant missionaries to Kagera, like their earlier Arab Muslim counterparts, were initially treated with a degree of suspicion by the *Bakama*, who were likely worried about the effect which this new religion would have on their spiritual role in society.⁵⁵ As Iliffe notes, they were likely well aware of the ‘disruption’ caused by Christianity just across the border in Buganda, where missionaries had been active for some time and religion and politics had a divisive, interconnected history.⁵⁶ However, they were also keen to embrace the ‘modernity’ of these world religions, and the economic and educational benefits that Christianity brought to the region were welcomed.

⁵³ Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 53-54.

⁵⁴ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, doctor, born 1946.

⁵⁵ F.X. Lwamgira [translation by G.B. Kamanzi, edited by P.R. Schmidt], *A History of Kiziba and its Kings* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2020), Part XXV.

⁵⁶ J. Iliffe, *Tanganyika Under German Rule, 1905-1912* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 173.

Consequently, in the decade following the British takeover of the region in 1916, eight of the nine *Bakama* converted to Christianity, half of them to Catholicism and the other half to Lutheranism and Anglicanism.⁵⁷ That Christianity was adopted by the kings when Islam had not been was, according to Sundkler, likely due to the influence of British policy in Uganda. The Uganda model, where religion and traditional royal authority had been intertwined for several decades, was implemented in Kagera, and the Haya kings were encouraged to follow the example of the *Kabaka* ('King') of the Ganda, to whom they were culturally and ethnolinguistically related.⁵⁸ Ugandan missionaries, themselves from similar cultural backgrounds, were also active in the process of evangelisation and conversion around Bukoba, and several interviewees mentioned this fact as one of the reasons why Christianity penetrated Haya society so easily. Older Catholic and Lutheran interviewees in Kagera also pointed out that the conversion of Haya kings took place at a time when, following the war, African rulers and societies were conscious of the need to engage with the 'modern', globalising world, with one Catholic man stating: 'Christianity brought modernity, and the kings needed modernity to maintain power'.⁵⁹ Iliffe, meanwhile, suggests that the kings may also have converted simply because they believed that the British would not work with non-Christian leaders.⁶⁰

The significance of these royal conversions cannot be overstated. Unlike the Chagga, where Christian conversion was from the beginning a largely individual – if kin-influenced – affair, Haya concepts of religious identity were tied up in the person of the king. So important was the king's role in Haya society that, according to Sundkler, the conversion of the kings to Christianity was, in collective Haya philosophy, considered to be equivalent to the conversion

⁵⁷ Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 63-65; Iliffe, *Modern History*, 254.

⁵⁸ Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 63-65.

⁵⁹ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, former schoolteacher, born 1936.

⁶⁰ Iliffe, *Modern History*, 254.

of Haya society as a whole.⁶¹ As Sundkler put it, in his description of the conversion of *Mukama* Edward Lwajumba, ‘As a king he was the embodiment of his realm. He thought that when the king had been baptised, his people ought to follow suit ... Not to follow the king’s pious example was a crime similar to incest.’⁶² Almost every Haya interviewee, both Catholic and Lutheran, agreed with the idea that the conversion of their traditional rulers was what allowed Haya society to become Christian. As one Catholic woman put it:

The missionaries needed the Haya kings. Without the kings and sub-chiefs, they would have had no access to the people and no land to build on. The ordinary people would not have trusted them if the kings had not accepted them and their new religion. Going against the kings would have been dangerous, and people trusted their judgement. So, the conversion of the kings was the key to bringing Christianity to Buhaya.⁶³

The royal adoption of Christianity paved the way for sub-chiefs and commoners to convert in greater numbers, and Christian congregations grew substantially in the two decades following the First World War. Whilst some elders, who had historically been the demographic most opposed to Christianity, still warned against conversion, their authority and message had been severely curtailed by the kings.⁶⁴ To doubt Christianity was now dangerous, as it meant to doubt the Haya kings in a society which had undergone a seismic shift in just a few years. Ultimately, it was the conversion of the kings which initially allowed for Christianity to flourish in Kagera. Importantly, as the rest of this section illustrates, ideas surrounding the ‘separateness’ of pre-colonial Haya traditional authority and the place of kings in local religion continue to affect how the topic of Christianity’s interaction with these thought systems has been remembered in Kagera. Indeed, where the Chagga interviewees above focused mostly on

⁶¹ Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 63-65.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 64.

⁶³ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former government worker, born 1938.

⁶⁴ See: Lwamgira et al, *Kings*, 395-396; Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 71-72.

how Christianity changed the secular influence of chiefs and acted as an avenue of resistance, Haya interviewees were much more likely to talk about the complex philosophical and spiritual changes that took place in local society and how these affected understandings of authority.

To a certain extent, early Haya Christianity reflected the hierarchical divisions in Haya society. The politics of space and its utilisation was very important to the Haya, as it was to other interlacustrine peoples, particularly where the understanding of authority was concerned.⁶⁵ Kings and the nobility maintained their status, in part, by occupying and living in a space which was noticeably distinct from that of the common people, particularly at communal events. Similar practices were initially carried over into church worship. The king and queen were segregated, spatially and symbolically, from their subjects in church; they were seated at the front, on thrones, whilst other conformist Christians were required to sit on the floor behind them.⁶⁶ Another example of the carrying over of royal authority into the churches can be seen in designs for early Haya education. Ernst Johanssen, a Lutheran missionary who wanted to start educating Haya girls, needed to ask the king in his region for permission to start a girls' school, demonstrating the authority which traditional rulers still had over the development of the church in the 1920s.⁶⁷ However, Johanssen was also clearly mindful of local concerns about power, segregation, and education, and so his proposed school was intended for the education of the daughters of the nobility only. The first few decades of Haya Christianity, particularly in the way it was practised, were thus intricately tied up with local understandings and ontologies of traditional authority.

⁶⁵ See B. Weiss, *Sacred Trees, Bitter Harvests: Globalizing Coffee in Northwest Tanzania* (Portsmouth, BH: Heinemann, 2003), 4-45; 50-75; 130-169; Weiss, *Lived World*; Carlson, 'Kingship', 316-321.

⁶⁶ Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 69.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

Even as late as the 1950s, when Nyerere and TANU were becoming more visible in Haya society and political debates, pre-colonial notions of power were still at play in the Haya Church. As one Catholic man put it: ‘Haya society was always concerned with status and hierarchy, in every aspect of people’s daily lives. At home, in the market, in church, in government buildings, everywhere’.⁶⁸ Likewise, Sundkler noted that, in the Lutheran Church of the 1950s, and in Haya society more generally, the philosophy of hierarchy and a preoccupation with the nature of individual authority endured, in spite of the determinedly equalising forces of the East African Revival and Protestant missionary teachings.⁶⁹ He describes how, despite his efforts to integrate with people in his diocese, Haya Christians insisted on maintaining a certain symbolic distance from him and on treating him with a degree of reverence. Sundkler theorised that this was due to both his ‘foreignness’ as an educated European, and to his official position of authority within the church hierarchy. Since, as has been shown, ‘foreignness’ and authority were so closely linked in Haya socio-political philosophy, Sundkler’s hypothesis makes sense.

Yet, the continuation of Haya ideas of power and hierarchy were illustrated in Haya Christians’ views on African leadership in the church, too, even after Tanganyikan independence. Whilst Sundkler was working in Kagera, he recorded how African pastors negotiated and instituted traditional notions of authority in the church. For example, there was a belief that the most effective African pastors and people in positions of authority in Christian institutions were those who came from noble families.⁷⁰ As one of Sundkler’s Haya colleagues put it when discussing the election of a prefect in a church school, ‘I was very uncertain whether the boy appointed by the majority would manage to lead others, for he came from a very lowly

⁶⁸ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, businessman, born 1945.

⁶⁹ Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 129; 145-146.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 145-146.

clan which was not used to leadership.’⁷¹ This belief that leadership was ‘in the blood’, as this same colleague described it to Sundkler, was likely shared by many Haya Christians.⁷² Similarly, one interviewee, a Lutheran pastor, recalled how ‘teachers and pastors were chosen in part for their status in the clan structures’.⁷³ Importantly, Catholic interviewees recounted similar memories, with a Catholic woman describing how ‘the noble families produced many of the best missionaries and intellectuals’.⁷⁴ Meanwhile, Sundkler himself admitted that his most effective pastors were those who had ‘a combination of clan consciousness and an authority founded on spiritual experience.’⁷⁵ Therefore, whilst Haya traditions may seem less evident in the nature of local Christianity in the 1950s and 1960s than in the preceding decades, it is nevertheless possible to see a continuation of local notions of power.

However, traditional Haya kingship and the authority of the nobility were also ultimately unable to survive a mass conversion to Christianity without a significant degree of diminishment. This was particularly true where colonial administrative practices were already undermining traditional authority. In some ways, under both the Germans and the British, the Haya kings retained much of their pre-colonial power over their subjects. They became, like the Chagga chiefs, the actors through whom indirect rule was implemented in the region, and so it was in the European administrations’ interests to support them.⁷⁶ Under the British, the previously separate Haya kingdoms were organised into a federation in 1926, and the kings acted as the leaders of the NA.⁷⁷ However, where indirect rule had proved to be a promotion in

⁷¹ Ibid., 145.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, pastor.

⁷⁴ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former nurse, born 1937.

⁷⁵ Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 146.

⁷⁶ Austen, *Northwest*, 62-81; 147-177; Iliffe, *Modern History*, 121.

⁷⁷ Kahakwa, *Haya-African*, 80-81; Iliffe, *Modern History*, 329.

power for the Chagga chiefs, in many ways it represented a demotion for the Haya kings. No longer were they sovereign lords entirely segregated from their subjects by status and tradition. Rather, they had become the local agents of a new foreign power, still authoritative and somewhat removed from the commoners, but ultimately subordinate to a higher political and military power. Moreover, as Ralph Austen notes, the *Bakama* increasingly lost influence over their sub-chiefs, the *Bami* and the *Bakungu*, through whom the British administered local parishes and collected taxes.⁷⁸

Christianity further added to this diminishing power of Haya royal authority. Where colonial policy reduced the secular status of kings and brought them down to the level of local government agents like chiefs in other regions of Tanganyika, Christianity was responsible for removing important aspects of the spiritual and mythical mystique which surrounded them. Sometimes, the authority of Haya kings was directly challenged by the churches. It was in this aspect of the division between royal authority and the teachings of Christianity – at least in the early colonial period – that denominational divisions became most apparent. In the 1920s, the kings were the dominant actors in the various Catholic and Protestant parishes of the area around Bukoba.⁷⁹ However, whilst Catholic missionaries do not appear initially to have been troubled by this, Protestant missionaries became increasingly concerned at the social divisions which the kings had been able to institute in their churches. They were worried about the level of influence which the nobility had amongst Christian converts, and about the limited access to full participation in Christian life for the common people. They therefore began to refuse to support practices which reinforced the authority of the kings and the nobility in Protestant

⁷⁸ Austen, *Northwest*, 133-134.

⁷⁹ Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 67-69.

congregations, and they insisted on democratising their congregations.⁸⁰ As one Lutheran pastor put it:

The Lutheran missionaries were less likely to support traditional rulers than the Catholics. It was completely against Lutheran teaching for ordinary people to be kept out of the life of the Church, or to be subject to the power of other men in the House of God. The Church was there for everyone – man or woman, rich or poor, chief or peasant. Missionaries were not there to prop up traditional leaders.⁸¹

That the kings considered their influence in Christian communities to be critical to their authority and place in society, and that they took this move on the part of Protestant missionaries as a threat to their power, is reflected in their decision to convert to Catholicism. By 1940, only two Haya kings remained Protestant.⁸²

However, even Catholic kings would increasingly come to find their authority challenged by the teachings and structures of Christianity. Like the German and British administrations, Christianity can be seen to have presented a new ‘foreignness’ which held an important place in local conceptions of power. Moreover, whilst Christian practices, as has been noted, did initially acknowledge the social divisions in the Haya kingdoms, they also removed many of the barriers between the kings and the nobility and clergy, as well as between the nobility and the common people. For example, prior to their conversion to Christianity, Haya kings, like their Toro neighbours, always ate alone, and would never have allowed others to see them consume food. This was a spiritually significant extension of the complex socio-religious customs which governed the consumption of food and the visibility of this

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, pastor.

⁸² Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 68.

consumption in traditional Haya society.⁸³ However, after their conversion, kings, especially Protestant kings, became increasingly comfortable consuming food in front of other noble church elders and the local pastors and members of the clergy.⁸⁴ They were now brothers in the same church, and no longer could they present themselves as the divine descendants of mythical heroes. Likewise, communal worship and social events in Christian congregations meant that the nobility and the common people began spending more time together.⁸⁵ Catholic interviewees suggested that, by the 1950s, a similar reduction in the status of kings had occurred in their congregations, with one Catholic priest stating: ‘In the Church, the kings could not simply rule over other Haya Christians’.⁸⁶ Thus, this process of social levelling, which began in Protestant communities in the late 1920s and later spread to Catholic communities, had a significant effect on Haya society. By the mid-twentieth century, kings and the nobility had lost much of their mystique and ‘foreignness’. Instead, they were now members of a wider identity group which was both Christian and Haya, and which was increasingly open to direction both from above and from below.

In other instances, the kings themselves helped to deconstruct their own mystique in favour of Christianity, in both the Lutheran and Catholic Churches. An example of this can be seen in the new role which drums came to occupy in Haya society. For the pre-Christian Haya, the drum, like the spear, was a symbol of royal political and spiritual authority.⁸⁷ The kings’ messengers carried the royal drums, and they were considered to be sacred objects which were imbued with the power of the monarch. However, with the introduction of Christianity, drums

⁸³ Weiss, *Lived World*, 51-149; Carlson, ‘Kingship’, 316-321.

⁸⁴ Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 69.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest.

⁸⁷ Carlson, ‘Kingship’, 321-322; Seitel, *Genre*, 144.

took on a new role, largely due to the actions of the kings themselves. Early missionaries who had gained favour with the kings were given drums of their own.⁸⁸ In a society where these objects had such symbolic importance in local socio-political philosophy, this represented a significant development in conceptions of power. Increasingly, drums, and the philosophy of unquestionable power which came with them, became the symbol of Christianity in Kagera, calling people to venerate the King of Kings.⁸⁹

Thus, Sundkler noted that, by the 1950s, the sound of the churches was not, as in most places, the bell ringing, but the drum beating. Several interviewees backed up this observation, with one Catholic woman saying that ‘drums were used for everything in the church when we were young ... They were a traditional part of Haya culture which had been brought into the church’.⁹⁰ This is significant not only because it represents a localised form of Christianity amongst the Haya, where traditional practices had been rearticulated in a Christian context, but because it demonstrates a complete shift in the ideas surrounding power and veneration in both Protestant and Catholic communities. Of course, it is probable that the authority and symbolism of the drums had by the 1950s changed significantly from their pre-colonial nature, but the fact that they were realigned into a Christianised power structure in the first place cannot be ignored. The kings, perhaps intending to link their image and authority to that of the educated, modernising missionaries, had instead delinked from themselves an aspect of their own power which was then tied explicitly to Christianity.

⁸⁸ Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba*, 66; 79.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former secretary, born 1951.

By the 1950s, priests, pastors, and bishops in Kagera had come to be regarded as the best educated, most morally upstanding members of Haya society by many Christians, as had happened amongst the Chagga in Kilimanjaro. One Catholic man described how:

When I was growing up, the priests were the most important local leaders. They were better educated than most of the chiefs or kings, and they represented an organisation which promoted development, both of the individual and of society ... They could talk to the authorities on the behalf of ordinary people, and they wanted to help their communities, not just themselves.⁹¹

Most other Haya interviewees supported the view that religious leaders held a lot of authority and had a large influence in local societies, particularly in rural areas away from the administrative centre of the region. Thus, partly through Christian thought and institutions, the traditional rulers of the Haya had lost much of their pre-colonial authority by the years leading up to Tanganyikan independence. Their status by the end of the 1950s relied heavily on the support which the British administration gave them, since many of their pre-colonial roles – as well as the mystical image which surrounded the early kings – had been usurped by the churches and Christian leaders.

Conclusion:

Much like the relationship between religion, kinship and traditional practices explored in the previous chapter, the interaction between Christianity, power, and traditional leadership amongst the Haya and the Chagga was complex and multifaceted. It drew on both pre-colonial norms and colonial constructions, and it was influenced by the actions of both European and African Christians and non-Christians. Ultimately, it would come to be rearticulated through localised Christianities, so that the power structures at play by the end of the colonial period

⁹¹ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, former government advisor, born 1940.

bore only a passing resemblance to those encountered at its start. In many instances, missionaries and Christianity initially propped up the power of Chagga chiefs and Haya kings, particularly where Christian teaching and practices promoted traditional deference and respect for authority, and where local leaders were able to employ the power of the church. However, features of traditional authority structures in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera were also weakened significantly by the introduction of Christianity, primarily where missionaries and converts disagreed with colonial and traditional practices, and where the symbolic power of traditional leaders was transferred to Christian churches.

Thus, this chapter, like the previous one, shows that the development of local understandings of culture and authority in Kilimanjaro and Kagera were inextricably tied to local Christianities. Through the teachings, agents, and institutions of the Catholic and Lutheran churches, and through the actions of Chagga and Haya Christians, the roles of Chagga chiefs and Haya kings in local society were constantly edited and challenged, and tensions between the traditional and the modern, the local and the foreign, Catholics and Lutherans, and the community and the individual all played a part in how these developments unfolded. Ultimately, by the early Nyerere years, traditional rulers had lost much of their power as a direct consequence of the cultural editing that the Christian faith influenced and facilitated. At the same time, however, Haya kingship and Chagga chiefship were, as institutions, shaped significantly by local Christianities.

Understanding and acknowledging the interaction between religion and local socio-political thought is important because, by the 1950s, traditional authority – particularly where it was expressed in the person of a chief or king – was one of the primary issues with which Nyerere and TANU had to contend. As the next four chapters discuss, in order to construct a national identity which was still sensitive to local political considerations, TANU needed to

find a way to undermine the authority of chiefs, kings, and local forms of identity and belonging, whilst at the same time being careful not to completely discredit or disregard the local contexts and cultures in which they were situated. Consequently, Nyerere and TANU were forced to confront traditions and networks of authority intricately linked to Chagga and Haya Christianities. Whether or not individuals in these regions identified as Christians themselves was, to a certain extent, irrelevant. To be a Chagga or a Haya in the 1950s meant to be a member of a culture and identity group whose concepts of power, belonging and individuality had been significantly reshaped through Christianity. That this reshaping had been done primarily by African Christians themselves arguably made its cultural and socio-political impact all the more powerful.

Finally, whilst broad trends in the historical memory of this topic were similar amongst Chagga and Haya conformist Christians, some regional and denominational differences also clearly affected how these narratives were articulated. For example, as noted above, the complex cosmology associated with pre-colonial Haya kingship shaped the memory of Christianity's interaction with traditional leadership in Kagera in a way not mirrored in Kilimanjaro. At the same time, both archival and oral evidence presented in this chapter and the last suggest that the relationship between Christianity, power and tradition appears to have been somewhat more turbulent in Lutheran congregations than in Catholic ones in both Chagga and Haya society, and the idea of the churches as facilitators of political and cultural resistance has endured in conformist Lutheran memory, especially in Kilimanjaro. The localised, universalist, grassroots activism which Lutheranism promoted, coupled with the greater involvement of Africans in the church hierarchy from an earlier period, likely contributed to this denominational imbalance. Of course, Lutheran sources from the first half of the twentieth century in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera are more readily available than Catholic sources, and so building a comprehensive picture of the development of the Catholic Church is more

difficult. Moreover, as the following chapters illustrate further, the importance of local resistance, Christian modernity, and political activism in conformist Lutheran memory, especially in Kilimanjaro, is particularly pronounced, and is partly influenced by the perceived repression of Lutheranism and its associated philosophies by Nyerere and his successors. Nevertheless, it is evident that in both regions, amongst conformist Catholics and Lutherans, understandings of tradition, culture, and authority are inseparable from the institutions and philosophies of Christianity.

Chapter 3

***Maendeleo* through Christianity**

Introduction:

The previous two chapters explored how Chagga and Haya culture and notions of authority were changed by and through their engagement with Catholic and Lutheran forms of Christianity. In this chapter and the next, this constant process of change remains a focus, with attention turning to the mechanisms through which Christian communities pursued *maendeleo*, a Swahili word which can be variously translated as ‘development’, ‘progress’, or ‘modernity’. This chapter argues that, in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, the concept of *maendeleo* is intricately tied to the teachings and institutions of Christianity; the relatively high levels of education, healthcare provision, and commercial development seen in these regions are largely the result of a holistic developmental approach promoted by the Catholic and Lutheran churches, with religious institutions functioning as sites for the exchange of ideas. Consequently, how conformist Chagga and Haya Christians think and talk about *maendeleo* has, from the early colonial period to the present day, been heavily influenced by this association. The chapter also shows that the memories of this subject amongst Chaggas, Hayas, Catholics, and Lutherans are strikingly uniform, whilst also highlighting how regional and denominational variations are believed to have influenced local *maendeleo*.

The link between Christianity and *maendeleo* is an important aspect of the history of Tanzanian Christianity.¹ On the African continent more generally, the relationship between the Christian faith, development, and modernity, both historically and in the present day, has been

¹ *Maendeleo*, a word which shares a root with the Swahili verb *kuendelea* (‘to carry on/to proceed’), is difficult to translate into English without losing some of its meaning, and so for the purposes of this analysis the original Swahili word will be used.

the topic of a substantial body of academic work, much of which emphasises the links between Christian missions, schools, hospitals, and Western notions of capitalism.² The provision of western education and medicine became one of the defining characteristics of the Christianising mission in Africa, with missions often providing these services long before colonial governments had either the capacity or desire to do so. Consequently, in many areas, including Tanganyika and Tanzania, governments became heavily dependent on Christian institutions. Meanwhile, the modernity which Christian education brought with it was often understood to be at odds with traditional beliefs and customs, leading to a reorientation and ‘Westernisation’ of African societies.

In Tanzania, *maendeleo* has a complex and highly politicised history. Scholars including Emma Hunter, Felicitas Becker, and Priya Lal have shown how the term, which had diverse roots amongst various Tanganyikan communities, was appropriated by both the colonial government and the Nyerere regime in a drive for ‘development’, but they have also hinted at the Christian undertones in much of the rhetoric surrounding *maendeleo*, particularly amongst the common people and in spheres where central government influence was more limited.³ Anthropological and human geography literature focusing on contemporary Tanzania has similarly highlighted the link between Christianity and *maendeleo*; some examples include

² For an overview of this subject paying particular attention to African scholarship, see: E. Chitando, M.R. Gunda and L. Togaresei (eds.), *Religion and Development in Africa* (Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press, 2020); For another comprehensive collection of work emphasising the agency of African Christians, see: T. Falola (ed.), *Christianity and Social Change in Africa. Essays in Honor of J.D.Y. Peel* (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2005). See also: B. Bompani, ‘Religion and Development from Below: Independent Christianity in South Africa’, *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 40 (2010), 307-330; P. Gifford, *Christianity, Development and Modernity in Africa* (London: Hurst, 2015).

³ E. Hunter, ‘A History of Maendeleo: The Concept of ‘development’ in Tanganyika’s late colonial public sphere’, in J.M. Hodge, G. Hödl, and M. Kopf (eds), *Developing Africa: Concepts and Practices in Twentieth-Century Colonialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 87-110; F. Becker, *Becoming Muslim in Mainland Tanzania, 1890-2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), especially chapters 2 and 4; F. Becker, *The Politics of Poverty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), chapters 4-6; P. Lal, ‘Self-Reliance and the State: The Multiple Meanings of Development in Early Post-Colonial Tanzania’, *Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute*, 82:2 (2012), 212-234.

Claire Mercer's work on Chagga women and *maendeleo* and Katherine Snyder's analysis of development in Iraqw society, as well as Mercer, Maia Green and Simeon Mesaki's research on Pogoro Christianity.⁴

This chapter focuses on three features of 'Christian *maendeleo*' in Kilimanjaro and Kagera: education, healthcare, and commerce. These three topics have been chosen because they are the ones which interviewees identified and most associated with Christian *maendeleo*. As the following pages illustrate, the development of these aspects of Chagga and Haya society was seen as necessary for promoting a holistic version of Christianity, one in which the minds and bodies of converts could be protected, nurtured, and cultivated. However, it is necessary to state from the outset that *maendeleo* was by no means limited to these three sectors. Nor is this chapter designed to analyse the concept of *maendeleo* in its entirety. Indeed, the rhetoric and beliefs associated with *maendeleo* and its evolving meanings are important to all of the following chapters in this thesis.

Maendeleo: Chagga, Haya, and Christian:

'The *maendeleo* of the tribe depends upon the changing of people's lives.'⁵

- Chagga Chief Petro Itossi Marealle

Before exploring the links between Christianity and education, healthcare, and commerce, it is useful to briefly discuss contemporary understandings of *maendeleo* amongst Chagga and

⁴ C. Mercer, 'The Discourse of *Maendeleo* and the Politics of Women's Participation on Mount Kilimanjaro', *Development and Change*, 33:1 (2002), 101-127; K.A. Snyder, *The Iraqw of Tanzania: Negotiating Rural Development* (Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 2005), 123-142; M. Green, 'The Construction of 'Religion' and the Perpetuation of 'Tradition' Among Pogoro Catholics, Southern Tanzania' (PhD Thesis: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1993); M. Green, C. Mercer, and S. Mesaki, 'Faith in Forms: Civil Society Evangelism and Development in Tanzania', *Development in Practice*, 22:5-6 (2012), 721-734.

⁵ P.I. Marealle, *Maisha ya Mchagga hapa Duniani na Ahera* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2002 [first published 1947]), 121.

Haya conformist Christians. It is particularly important to note how these understandings have fed into local identities which promote the idea of Chagga and Haya exceptionalism within Tanzania, especially when these two groups are compared with communities with a stronger Islamic influence. Amongst interviewees in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, the link between Chagga and Haya Christianities and the concept of *maendeleo* was one of the most common – and most important – topics of discussion.⁶ Indeed, *maendeleo* was brought up without prompting by almost every interviewee and was particularly important to the testimonies of Chagga Christians.

In both regions, a drive for *maendeleo* was also linked closely with ethnic identity, defining the peoples who pursued it in contrast to other groups in Tanzania for whom it was not a priority. This ‘ethnic’ focus on *maendeleo* was also understood by many people in both regions to be one of the things which linked the Chagga with the Haya. One Lutheran man whom I interviewed both for my master’s thesis and during my PhD fieldwork viewed *maendeleo* as so crucial to the Chagga that he articulated it in this way:

There are three things which you have to remember about the Chagga: they are essentially individualist, they are essentially capitalist, and they are focused on *maendeleo* ... this distinguishes them from just about everyone else in Tanzania, though people say the Haya and the Nyakyusa are similar.⁷

Tellingly, the third group mentioned here, the Nyakyusa, were considered by many interviewees in both regions to have a similar religious and economic history to the Chagga and the Haya.⁸ Another man in Kagera argued that because both the Chagga and the Haya had

⁶ For a discussion of the link between *maendeleo* and Christianity elsewhere in Africa, see: E. Wild-Wood, *Migration and Christian Identity in Congo (DRC)* (Leiden: Brill, 2008).

⁷ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, businessman, born 1935, quoted as ‘Interviewee A’ in: N. Brice-Bennett, ‘Kilimanjaro as a Centre of Political Opposition: *Maendeleo* and the Evolving Memory of Dissent’ (MPhil Thesis: University of Cambridge, 2017), 35.

⁸ Thomas Fisher has also noted the perceived links between these three peoples. Whilst Fisher argues the advantages these groups enjoyed were due to ‘colonial’ policies, he also notes that their development was linked

always sought *maendeleo*, particularly prior to independence, they had become the most ‘successful’ ethnic groups in Tanzania in terms of education, commerce, and political influence.⁹ As this chapter illustrates, it was the developments in education, healthcare, and agriculture which the churches brought to these regions that fostered the *maendeleo* these interviewees were speaking of, and which laid the foundations for significant political activity amongst the Chagga and the Haya.

It should be noted that *maendeleo* was not simply seen as an objective of the Chagga and Haya amongst interviewees. Instead, it was understood as a central feature of Chagga and Haya identity. On Kilimanjaro, there was a belief that Chagga society and its enduring influence in Tanzania had grown out of collaboration and alliance-building between different peoples for the sake of *maendeleo*, and that this was a self-repeating process bringing further *maendeleo*. Likewise, in Kagera, Haya interviewees believed a preoccupation with primarily intellectual development was ingrained in their communities since they had first settled in the region and begun trading with outsiders, leading to what one Catholic priest described as a ‘tribe of technocrats’.¹⁰ *Maendeleo* was thus understood as something of a cyclical, self-replicating process in both communities, and one which could incorporate both ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ ideas and practices.¹¹ Christianity’s role in this process, as the following pages detail, was crucial in both regions. However, as will be shown, *maendeleo* meant different things to people in each place, with a more entrepreneurial philosophy developing in Kilimanjaro whilst a more academic type formed in Kagera. This division arguably contributed

to Christianity by Nyerere: T. Fisher, ‘Chagga Elites and the Politics of Ethnicity in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania’ (PhD Thesis: University of Edinburgh, 2012), 129.

⁹ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, businessman, born 1943.

¹⁰ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest.

¹¹ For more on the cyclical understanding of *maendeleo* among the Chagga, see: Brice-Bennett, ‘*Maendeleo*’, 32-42.

to the slightly different directions taken by the two regions in the post-independence era, as outlined in the following chapters, as well as to the formation of marginally different memories of the Nyerere years and the influence of Nyerere's policies on Chagga and Haya Christians.

Central to many interviewees' ideas of Chagga and Haya *maendeleo* was a belief that other peoples in Tanzania were significantly less advanced than those in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. This was considered especially true of majority-Muslim regions of the country, particularly in central and southern Tanzania. A growing body of literature has analysed the relationship between Islam, development, and modernity, particularly in the so-called Global South. Some of this literature looks at the activities of Muslim development agencies in Africa, whilst also assessing the reasons for the relative underdevelopment of Muslim societies when compared with Christian ones, suggesting a range of factors, from the discouraging of investigation, change, and innovation in Islamic doctrine, to the underdevelopment by colonial regimes of non-Christian communities.¹² Whilst, with the notable exception of Becker's work, there is very little scholarship dealing specifically with Islam and the term '*maendeleo*' in Tanzania from a historical perspective, the relationship between Islam and development – be it economic, social, or political – is nevertheless discussed or alluded to by a number of academics.¹³ For many interviewees, however, *maendeleo* and Islam were incompatible. One Lutheran Chagga man described how:

¹² For a good introduction to this topic, see: R. Hasan, *Religion and Development in the Global South* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 41-78. See also: H. Weiss, 'Muslim NGOs, *Zakat* and the Provision of Social Welfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Introduction', in H. Weiss (ed.), *Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 3-4; M.R. Platas, 'Islam and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa', in M. Cammett and P. Jones, *The Oxford Handbook of Politics in Muslim Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 697-718; F. Becker and J. Cabrita, 'Introduction', in F. Becker, J. Cabrita, and M. Rodet (eds.), *Religion, Media and Marginality in Modern Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2018), 1-37.

¹³ M.A. Bakari, 'Religion, Secularism, and Political Discourse in Tanzania: Competing Perspectives by Religious Organizations', *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion*, 8:1 (2012), 1-34; F. Becker, 'Obscuring and Revealing: Muslim Engagement with Volunteering and the Aid Sector in Tanzania', *African Studies Review*, 58:2 (2015), 111-133; F. Becker, "'Bad Governance" and the Persistence of Alternative Political Arenas: A Study of a Tanzanian Region', in G. Blundo and P. Le Meur (eds.), *The Governance of Daily Life in Africa* (Leiden: Brill,

People here see Islam as very backward. It is a religion which is associated with old-fashioned ideas and traditional customs amongst peoples elsewhere in the country ... There is very little *maendeleo* in Muslim tribes because Islam does not promote it as Christianity does, and never did. The only thing the Islamic schools taught was the Qur'an, and even that was all in Arabic, so none of them understood it!¹⁴

Whilst this characterisation of Muslim education in Tanzania does not reflect the opportunities it has historically provided, as discussed briefly in the following section, it was nevertheless characteristic of conformist Christian beliefs in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. *Maendeleo*, for interviewees, was inherently Christian-Chagga and Christian-Haya, an endeavour which drew on elements of both the world religion and the culture and social philosophies of the local people.¹⁵ By contrast, Islam was associated with the very opposite of *maendeleo*. This idea of 'ethno-Christian' *maendeleo*, and its importance to conformist Christian understandings of local and national socio-political history, should be borne in mind when interpreting the oral testimonies presented not only in this chapter, but throughout the remainder of this thesis.

Education:

The importance of education and healthcare was a prominent feature of many interviewees' beliefs concerning the historical links between Christianity and *maendeleo*. When asked how

2009), 73-100; M.A. Leichtman, 'Transnational Networks and Global Shi'i Islamic NGOs in Tanzania', in H. Weiss (ed.), *Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 203-216; M. Haron, 'Africa's Muslim Non-Governmental Organizations: Competitive Charities, Altruistic Allies?', in E. Chitando, M.R. Gunda, and L. Togaressi (eds), *Religion and Development in Africa* (Bamburg: University of Bamberg Press, 2020), 154-155; Becker, *Becoming Muslim*, chapters 2 and 4; Becker, *Politics of Poverty*, chapters 4-6.

¹⁴ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, lawyer, born 1939.

¹⁵ Hunter notes similar comparative thinking about *maendeleo* in colonial-era publications: Hunter, 'A History of Maendeleo', 98-99.

maendeleo manifested itself in the Christianising mission in Tanganyika, a Catholic priest in Kilimanjaro stated:

Christianity here was always about more than just the Church. It was not just about turning people into Christians so that the congregations were larger. You cannot develop people spiritually if you do not develop them mentally; and you cannot care for people's minds if you do not care for their bodies.¹⁶

It is therefore unsurprising that perhaps the most significant way missionaries and Christianity changed local communities in Tanganyika, and promoted *maendeleo* in the process, was through the introduction of 'Western' educational institutions. The idea that Christianity was associated with learning, particularly literacy, was widespread in both Chagga and Haya society from early in the twentieth century, to the extent that in Kagera, Christians were known as *omushomi* (readers).¹⁷ Amongst interviewees in both regions, too, the most commonly referenced form of *maendeleo* which Christianity brought with it was education. This relationship between Christianity, learning, individualism, and development is also well established elsewhere in Tanzania.¹⁸ It therefore makes sense to analyse the history of Christian education and how it influenced daily life in both Chagga and Haya society.

¹⁶ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, priest.

¹⁷ B. Sundkler, *Bara Bukoba: Church & Community in Tanzania* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1980 [first published 1974]), 127; translation is that provided by Sundkler. A similar point is made by Lesley Stevens: L. Stevens, 'Religious Change in a Haya Village, Tanzania', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 21:1 (1991), 4; See also: N. Bengtsson, 'Catholics versus Protestants: On the Benefit Incidence of Faith-Based Foreign Aid', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 61:3 (2013), 484-487; Becker and Cabrita, 'Introduction', 9; T. Clack, 'Re-Africanizing the African: indigenization of Christianity on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro', *Indilinga: African Journal of Indigenous Knowledge Systems*, 4:2 (2005), 471-482; T. Clack, 'Protective Memoryscapes of the Chagga of Kilimanjaro, Northern Tanzania', *Azania: Archaeological Research in Africa*, 40:1 (2005), 101-107; Mercer, 'Discourse of *Maendeleo*', 115-124.

¹⁸ R. Marsland, 'The Modern Traditional Healer: Locating 'Hybridity' in Modern Traditional Medicine, Southern Tanzania', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 33:4 (2007), 753-755; A. Stambach, 'Education, Religion, and Anthropology in Africa', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 39 (2010), 363-365; M. Green, *Priests, Witches and Power: Popular Christianity After Mission in Southern Tanzania* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); M. Green, 'Why Christianity is the "Religion of Business": Perceptions of the Church Among Pogoro Catholics in Southern Tanzania', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, XXV (1995), 26-47; M. Green, 'Remembering

Whilst the aim here is not to trace in detail the foundation of religious educational institutions in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, it is necessary to recognise that by the early Nyerere years, the education system in Tanganyika was heavily reliant on the churches, with 75% of education in the territory ‘administered by Christian missions’ in the 1950s.¹⁹ By 1961, government and Native Authority (NA) schools cared for 29% of pupils, whilst the churches cared for the remaining 71%.²⁰ The dominance of Christian educational institutions was particularly conspicuous in Kilimanjaro and Kagera where, over the preceding half-century, the Catholic and Lutheran churches had established schools for boys and girls, as well as vocational training centres, women’s groups, and teacher training colleges. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and even in some cases during the socialist era after 1967, new schools continued to be built by the churches, many of which are still active to this day. Consequently, the churches played a key role in Chagga and Haya society by providing education alongside other institutions administered by the government and NAs.

Thus, to quote Michael Jennings, the churches in Tanganyika had firmly established themselves as ‘surrogates of the state’, filling in for the central government in much the same way that NGOs would come to do following the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s.²¹ Indeed, some scholars have noted that, to this day, the lines between religious organisations

Christ’s death or the Promise of Salvation: Reinterpreting Communion in Southern Tanzania’, *Culture and Religion*, 3:2 (2002), 179-199; Green, ‘Participatory Development’, 78-80.

¹⁹ L.W. Swantz, *Church, Mission, and State Relations in Pre and Post Independent Tanzania (1955-1964)*, Maxwell Graduate School, The Program of Eastern African Studies, occasional paper no. 19 (Syracuse, New York, 1965) 8.

²⁰ Ibid., 36-37; Swantz’s figures taken from: Tanganyika Government Publication, *Ministry of Education Annual Summary for 1961* (Dar es Salaam, 1961).

²¹ M. Jennings, *Surrogates of the State: NGOs, Development, and Ujamaa in Tanzania* (Bloomfield, C.T.: Kumarian Press, 2008), 65-90.

and NGOs in Tanzania are often blurred, such is their continued role in national development.²² One Haya Catholic priest described the situation prior to the 1967 Arusha Declaration in the following way: ‘For most people here, Christianity’s main role was in education ... The Church, not the government, was what originally brought learning to ordinary people’.²³ The repercussions of the education which Christianity brought to these regions were immense. By the time of independence, Kilimanjaro and Kagera were generally considered to be two of the best educated regions of Tanganyika. That they were also two of the ‘most Christian’ regions and were amongst the most politically active is no coincidence. As the following paragraphs illustrate, interviewees in both regions recalled how their formative years in religious schools – even if their experience was limited to religious primary schools – would have a lasting influence on their lives and how they interpreted their societies.

Christian education was holistic and gendered, focusing on both academic and technical skills. Catholic and Lutheran interviewees in both regions recalled that, for boys, subjects studied alongside normal academic topics included woodwork, civics, and agricultural lessons, whilst at girls’ schools, subjects included sewing and home economics. Prior to the nationalisation of the schools by the post-Arusha Declaration government during Julius Nyerere’s presidency, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, religious instruction was also given to Christian students, and daily prayers were generally observed. Following the nationalisation of the schools, religious studies remained on the curriculum, but was treated as a secular topic of study. Importantly, as the following chapter shows, the type of education

²² Green, Mercer, and Mesaki, ‘Faith in Forms’, 721-734; C.J. Kaunda and S.F. John, ‘Religion and Development in Africa – A Critical Analysis’, in E. Chitando, M.R. Gunda, and L. Togaressi (eds), *Religion and Development in Africa* (Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press, 2020), 62.

²³ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest.

which girls and boys received fed into associational forms of life within the churches and the community.

Some important educational themes which Chagga and Haya Christians remembered were the ideas of inclusivity, care, and morality. It was common for interviewees to recall their schooldays very fondly, with one Catholic woman in Kilimanjaro recounting: ‘We felt truly loved. We knew our teachers cared about our well-being and our academic development. Honestly ... those days were the happiest of my life’.²⁴ The suggestion that the nationalisation of the church schools and teacher training colleges led to a decline in the pastoral support which students experienced was common. Similarly, interviewees who experienced the post-nationalisation curriculum lamented the decline in both academic standards and moral values amongst schoolchildren and teachers following the nationalisation of the schools. As one Lutheran man in Kagera put it: ‘The government could not run the schools like the Churches. Before, we were taught good morals by the pastors and the teachers. Then with *ujamaa* the youth didn’t get those teachings.’²⁵ Thus, the contrast identified between church-run education and the later state-run education shows how the association between Christianity, quality education, moral values and inclusivity was experienced in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. Importantly, these testimonies also feed into the broader historical narrative in conformist Chagga and Haya Christian communities, as discussed in the preceding chapter, wherein Nyerere and his successors – especially John Magufuli – are believed to have damaged the churches and their institutions. The salience of this feature of historical memory in both regions is especially pronounced in the next four chapters.

²⁴ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, former schoolteacher, born 1943.

²⁵ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, former farm manager, born 1953.

As the previous chapter outlined, traditional power structures were often altered through the teachings and institutions of Christianity in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, and one of the primary ways this happened, albeit often unintentionally, was through the education that students received. In Kilimanjaro, as Anza Lema notes, the earliest converts to Christianity, many of whom had fallen foul of local authority figures, were able to escape the power of their chiefs and clan heads by gaining a missionary education.²⁶ Christian education and inclusion in the religious community, as Sally Falk Moore argues, gave many Chaggas their first experience of participation in a community where people were considered to be equals.²⁷ It would appear that this idea was particularly encouraged by Lutheran missionaries, who originally chose to teach in Kichagga and Luhaya rather than in Kiswahili, which was the language of choice for Catholic missionaries. Yet, whilst this idea of equality most obviously threatened traditional structures of authority, the church itself was not immune from its effects. Some Chagga Christians, particularly in Lutheran congregations, resisted missionary attempts to promote aspects of Chagga culture such as traditional dress and a commitment to lineage relations.²⁸ Similarly, a Catholic Haya woman recalled how missionary education ‘enabled our elders to question what they were told, even by the priests’.²⁹

For these individuals, Christian education was tied up with modernity, development, and globalisation, and for some this included the ability to challenge the status quo and consequently effect change. As such, even missionary teachings which countered this

²⁶ A. Lema, ‘Chagga Religion & Missionary Christianity on Kilimanjaro: The Initial Phase, 1893-1916’, in T. Spear and I. N. Kimambo (eds.), *East African Expressions of Christianity* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 1999), 44-49.

²⁷ S.F. Moore, *Social Facts and Fabrications: “Customary” law on Kilimanjaro, 1880-1980*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 312-314.

²⁸ K. Fiedler, *Christianity & African Culture: Conservative German Protestant Missionaries in Tanzania, 1900-1940* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 124-135; 146-148.

²⁹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, businesswoman, born 1942.

viewpoint were to be resisted. That Chagga elites, who were themselves mostly Christian, were concerned at the effect which Christian education was having on traditional norms can be seen in a memorandum from Chief Petro Itosi Marealle, in which he criticised mission schools for working to dismantle Chagga society.³⁰ At the same time, colonial officials were careful to caution missionaries against getting involved in local politics, demonstrating that the administration was worried about the effect which their teachings were having.³¹ British administrators were concerned not only that traditional authority was being undermined, but also that missionaries from neutral countries in Europe or from ‘anti-colonial’ countries such as the USA and Ireland would foster anti-colonial sentiments amongst their students in a period when movements towards African independence were beginning to gather steam. They were no doubt conscious that Christian education and mission staff brought people in regions such as Kilimanjaro and Kagera into a new sort of contact with the outside world, introducing them to new concepts of modernity and individuality. This point is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

Indeed, a main feature of Christian education which several interviewees highlighted was that of exchange with the outside world, and how this differed from the education system following the nationalisation of the schools.³² As one Lutheran man in Kilimanjaro put it:

Through the Church we had contact with teachers and visiting students from all over the world; from Germany, America, Scandinavia. Students and teachers from here also got sent on scholarships and trips to Europe and America. We learned about those countries and those societies and could compare them with our own. Before

³⁰ P.I. Marealle, ‘A Memorandum on the Development of African Education to be Submitted to the Chairman of the Development Commission’ (10/09/1948), TNA-UK: CO 691/202/5/1, 7-12.

³¹ A.J. Grattan-Bellew to F. Birkeli (06/03/1957), TNA-UK: CO 822/1485/1, 2; Governor of Uganda to Governors of Tanganyika and Kenya, ‘African Greek Orthodox Church’ (18/07/1959), TNA-UK: FCO 141/17848/13A.

³² Interestingly, Petro Marealle also wrote about the importance of exchange, both with Christian Europeans and with Muslim Arabs and the Asians who moved to Tanganyika under the British, for the evolution of Chagga and wider African *ustaarabu* (‘civilisation’): Marealle, *Maisha*, 118-122.

that, people here didn't know about anything outside of Kilimanjaro.³³

Another Lutheran woman in Kilimanjaro recalled how, following the nationalisation of the schools, these avenues for cultural exchange were curtailed, albeit never closed: 'It became much harder to organise things with churches outside Tanzania after 1967. The government turned it into such a rigmarole that it wasn't worth trying.'³⁴ A Catholic woman in Kagera added that: 'During *ujamaa*, the government sent students all over the country. They wanted Tanzanians to mix with other Tanzanians, not with outsiders.'³⁵ However, such memories are also likely influenced by the aforementioned narrative of church institutions being weakened by Nyerere's political project, particularly given the fact that archival evidence suggests contact and exchange through the churches and their institutions with the non-Tanzanian Christian world occurred well into the socialist years of Nyerere's presidency, albeit probably at a more constrained level. For example, documents held by the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania (ELCT) in Bukoba show that, throughout Nyerere's presidency, students and church members from Sweden and Germany continued to travel to Bukoba either to work in schools or to visit church projects.³⁶ Thus, whilst nationalisation and the ethos of *ujamaa* may have reduced the capacity of religious schools to foster exchange with the outside world, it is evident that they were never truly cut off from the institutions abroad to which they were historically linked. The following sections of this chapter will demonstrate this fact further, and the importance of these links will be explored more in the next two chapters.

³³ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, former office manager, born 1938.

³⁴ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, businesswoman, born 1938.

³⁵ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former schoolteacher, born 1952.

³⁶ Series of letters, ELCT-NWD: File 24 (Church of Sweden General Correspondence File: dated 1977-1982); Series of Letters, ELCT-NWD: Uncatalogued File (General Correspondence File: dated 1960-1970).

Whilst the many benefits which Christian education brought to these two regions is evident, it is also worth briefly discussing here the problems – both real and perceived – which it either produced or exacerbated. Perhaps the most obvious such issue was the perceived lack of educational opportunities afforded to Muslim students when compared with their Christian contemporaries. This was a problem throughout Tanganyika by the 1950s, the result of over half a century of Christian educational development in the territory.³⁷ However, it would be a mistake to ascribe the relative underdevelopment of Muslim educational facilities in the country to purely religious factors. As Becker, Mwita Akiri, and Jörg Haustein have shown, in the early German colonial period, African Muslims in receipt of Islamic education – particularly that offered on the Swahili coast – often excelled.³⁸ Indeed, as Haustein notes, the German administration employed Tanganyikan Muslims in its administration and army partly due to their superior education when compared with early Christian converts.³⁹ Moreover, as one of Becker’s interviewees explained to her, early Islamic education was associated with the same sorts of benefits of exchange that Christian education was thought to provide in Kilimanjaro and Kagera.⁴⁰

However, by the 1950s, Christian and Christian-educated individuals had become the favoured employees of the administration.⁴¹ Whilst it is impossible to identify a main cause for

³⁷ See: L. Mbogoni, *The Cross Versus the Crescent: Religion and Politics in Tanzania from the 1880s to the 1990s* (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota, 2004), ch. 6.

³⁸ M. Akiri, *Christianity in Central Tanzania: A Story of African Encounters and Initiatives in Ugogo and Ukaguru, 1876-1933* (Carlisle: Langham, 2020), 91; J. Haustein, ‘Provincialising Representation: East African Islam in the German Colonial Press’, in F. Becker, J. Cabrita, and M. Rodet (eds.), *Religion, Media and Marginality in Modern Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2018), 73; Becker, *Becoming Muslim*, 119-139.

³⁹ Haustein, ‘Provincialising Representation’, 80.

⁴⁰ Interview with Mohamed Athuman Mwindi, quoted in F. Becker, ‘Freeborn Villagers: Islam and the Local Uses of Cosmopolitan Connections in the Tanzanian Countryside’, in D.N. MacLean and S.K. Ahmed, *Cosmopolitanisms in Muslim Contexts: Perspectives from the Past* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 15-16.

⁴¹ Becker, *Becoming Muslim*, 210-220.

how Christian institutions came to overshadow Muslim ones, it seems likely that it was a combination of greater economic resources in inland Tanganyika for the establishing of educational institutions, greater collaboration with later governments, and the locations of Christian missions in regions such as Kilimanjaro and Kagera which were well-suited to agriculture and the production of cash crops. This last point is one which will be explored in the final section of this chapter.

The educational disparities between Christians and Muslims were attributed to two things amongst interviewees in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera. Firstly, most interviewees held the view that Islam was, from a philosophical perspective, less focused on education than was Christianity, and many supported the idea that where Islam did promote education, it did so for the purposes of reading and understanding the Qur'an and nothing more, as noted above. Lloyd Swantz' 1965 analysis would appear to back this up, stating that: 'The majority of Muslim children until very recently either went to Koranic schools which gave extremely poor instruction and were not recognized by the government, or did not go to school at all.'⁴² Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, interviewees also suggested that Muslims were often uneasy about sending their children to Christian and government schools because they did not trust the teachers to respect their beliefs. Certainly, archival documents from the late 1950s support this viewpoint in Kilimanjaro. In a series of letters from 1957 between Donald Flatt, a missionary with the Augustana Mission and Vice-President of the Lutheran Church of Northern Tanganyika (LCNT), and various regional authorities, the LCNT had to defend itself against accusations by Muslim parents and the Muslim Association that it was attempting to convert

⁴² Swantz, *Church*, 32.

their children to Christianity in its school in Mwika by distributing copies of the Gospel of John.⁴³

Some Muslims on Kilimanjaro also felt that the authorities were preventing them from starting their own educational institutions because of their faith. This problem was compounded by the fact that, unlike Christian missions which received a lot of staff and funding from abroad, Muslim associations relied chiefly on locally sourced funding and government grants.⁴⁴ For example, in 1959, the Muslim Association complained to the Paramount Chief's office that the government had removed a grant given to the Muslim-run Kiyungi School. Though Marealle's secretary assured the association that this was 'for reasons of poor attendances, lack of sanitary facilities and lack of efficiency at the School' and that the money had been redirected to another Muslim school in Uchira, the perceived discrimination of such cases clearly endured in Muslim communities.⁴⁵

In a subsequent letter to the Provincial Education Officer in Arusha entitled 'Muslims Not Given Educational Rights', members of the Kilimanjaro Muslim Association lamented the lack of educational opportunities open to Muslims on Kilimanjaro. In it, they stated: '... our government knows that Muslims have no education ... they are behind everyone else in Tanganyika', before saying that: 'Muslims in Tanganyika number approximately 5,000,000 and they have not even fifty schools'.⁴⁶ The letter went on to warn that Muslims would be 'lost' without access to education, and accused the government of 'raising many ignorant Muslims'

⁴³ Muslim Association Branch Secretary, Makuyuni Mwika, to Lutheran Primary School Headteacher, Makuyuni Mwika, 'Injili Kama Alivyoandika Yohana Mtakatifu' (03/09/1957), TNA-TZ: 5/41/1/38; D.C. to Muslim Association Branch Secretary, Makuyuni Mwika (04/09/1957), TNA-TZ: 5/41/1/39; D.C. to Assistant Provincial Education Officer, Northern Province, (07/09/1957), TNA-TZ: 5/41/1/42.

⁴⁴ Swantz, *Church*, 32.

⁴⁵ *Mangi Mkuu's* Secretary to Education Secretary, Muslim Association, Moshi (03/03/1959), TNA-TZ: 5/9/9/73.

⁴⁶ Kilimanjaro Muslim Association to Provincial Education Officer, Arusha, (03/04/1959), TNA-TZ: 5/9/9/76.

as a result of its educational policies.⁴⁷ The signatories, who called themselves ‘your citizens on behalf of the Muslims of Kilimanjaro’, appealed to the equal rights of all tax-paying Tanganyikans in their argument, as well as the duties of the government towards its ‘children’, ending their letter by saying: ‘Therefore we hope that the Government will continue to teach us as it does other people, because we are payers of taxes and tariffs under the law [which applies to] all people’, before adding that ‘[we] don’t believe that a father would throw out an ignorant child without giving them food, and no carer would tire of caring for a child’.⁴⁸

The concerns of the Muslim Tanganyikans living in regions where education was so dominated by Christian and secular institutions was thus made clear in letters such as these, as was the belief amongst Muslims themselves that they were falling behind other Tanganyikans in the drive for *maendeleo*. As later chapters will show, such concerns would go on to have an impact on the debates surrounding nationalism, independence, and the nationalisation of educational institutions following the Arusha Declaration; Muslim Tanganyikans and Tanzanians, as well as Christian politicians who wished to erase social disparities, would demand that independence policies worked in favour of all citizens, and not just Christians. At the same time, a new interpretation of *maendeleo*, where Islam and Christianity could act as equals, would be promoted at a national level.

Healthcare:

Healthcare was another area where religious institutions dominated in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. Indeed, in many ways, healthcare was even more reliant on the churches than was education, a fact highlighted by the post-Arusha Declaration regime’s inability to effectively nationalise the

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

hospitals, as well as by the continued dominance of religiously owned and run hospitals in both regions to this day. Many of the current hospitals in these regions started out as dispensaries, before being upgraded to hospitals with dedicated wards throughout the twentieth century. In some places, Christian-run dispensaries began caring for local people as early as 1893, and so by the mid-twentieth century the association between Christianity and healthcare was well-established. As one Lutheran woman in Kilimanjaro put it: ‘It didn’t matter if you got sick in Kilimanjaro; the church had dispensaries everywhere! You were never more than an hour away from medical assistance if you needed it.’⁴⁹

By the time of independence, the Catholic and Lutheran churches in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera owned and ran several hospitals, and more would continue to be built throughout the Nyerere years. However, the example of the Lutheran hospital at Rwantege in Kagera also illustrates how the building of church institutions – even those dedicated to healthcare – could lead to disputes in the local community, particularly where land was concerned in the pre-independence era.⁵⁰ In 1954, the Church of Sweden Mission wanted to extend the size of the hospital, but the two men who owned the land necessary for this expansion were unwilling to sell it. Following a complaint from the Mission, the DC of Bukoba wrote to *Mukama* Ntare III of the local NA to instruct him that the land should be compulsorily purchased from the two men on the basis that ‘the Mission Hospital is a purpose which will be of assistance to the tribe generally, [and so] the two occupants of the narrow strip to be acquired cannot be allowed to object’.⁵¹ Ultimately, however, the DC was overruled by the Provincial Commissioner in Mwanza who, on the advice of the Secretariat in Dar es Salaam, wrote that:

⁴⁹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, former schoolteacher, born 1945.

⁵⁰ For more on Catholic healthcare in colonial Kagera, see: J.C. Kaiza and O.M. Kapinga, ‘Curative and Preventive Roles of Catholic Missionaries in Kihanja and Ihangiro Bukoba District from 1904-1961’, *Journal of Humanities and Education Development*, 2:5 (2020), 308-315.

⁵¹ DC Bukoba to *Mukama* Ntare III (12/11/1954), TNA-TZ: 71/706/Vol. I/103.

It is clear ... that Government is not prepared to override the objection to the alienation by the two holders of the customary tenure, and unless the Council is able to persuade these two men to withdraw their objection and to receive the agreed amount of compensation, it would appear that the application must fail.⁵²

As cases such as this show, not only was the building of mission hospitals closely coordinated with local government, but it had to be carried out with a sensitivity to local concerns and within the parameters of customary law. Moreover, where disputes occurred, it is evident that the colonial authorities took the matter very seriously, with the central government getting involved even in seemingly minor cases such as this one. However, significantly, it is evident that despite the importance of church-fostered healthcare to the memory of *maendeleo* in conformist Haya communities, the reality is that people in mid-century Kagera were sometimes split on how exactly this *maendeleo* could be achieved.

In Kilimanjaro, like in Kagera, both the Catholic and Lutheran churches ran a multitude of hospitals, with the earliest Catholic dispensary opening in Machame in 1893. Additionally, in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera, the locations of Christian hospitals generally showed a correlation with administrative boundaries, meaning each denomination had small hospitals or dispensaries in different NA and government administrative units. However, the Lutheran Church on Kilimanjaro also played a role in the foundation of the much larger Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre (KCMC) in Moshi. Opened by the Good Samaritan Foundation in 1971, the KCMC is today one of the four main referral hospitals serving different corners of Tanzania, alongside the Catholic-run Bugando Hospital in Mwanza, Mbeya Zonal Referral Hospital in Mbeya, and Muhimbili National Hospital in Dar es Salaam. The KCMC's history is closely intertwined with the political and religious history of Kilimanjaro, established as it was at a time when the political and religious spheres in Tanzania were undergoing seismic

⁵² Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province, to D.C. Bukoba, (7/10/1955), TNA-TZ: 71/706/Vol. I/125.

shifts. The government in Dar es Salaam agreed to support the building of the KCMC on the understanding that it would serve as the main hospital in north-eastern Tanzania, but the authorities were also keen to make clear the limits of Christian control of the institution.

In a speech made to the Lutheran Bishop and other guests at the KCMC's cornerstone laying ceremony, Nyerere was careful to pay attention both to the KCMC's religious background and to its role in a secular, religiously pluralistic society.⁵³ He began by acknowledging the input of Christian organisations in the foundation and construction of the hospital, before describing its role in northern Tanzania, where it would serve both nomadic peoples and some of the wealthiest, best-educated parts of the county. Finally, he addressed potential concerns about the religious background of the institution, appealing to the 'philosophy of Christianity' to stress – and perhaps warn – that no discrimination against patients following non-Christian religions could be tolerated:

... it would be absolutely contrary to the philosophy of Christianity and to the intentions of the founders that there should be any discrimination in the services provided for people of different faiths. I know that I speak for you all when I make it clear that Muslims, Hindus, animists and others will be as welcome to use this Centre as Christians will be, and that all of them can rest assured that their religious scruples will be respected while they are under treatment here.⁵⁴

From the perspective of many interviewees, hospitals were seen not only as places of healing, but also, like schools, as places of contact and exchange. Of course, so closely linked were education and healthcare through the churches that this is unsurprising. Interviewees in both regions spoke of how doctors, like teachers, came from all over the world, and how

⁵³ Speech by President Nyerere at KCMC Cornerstone Laying Ceremony, (08/06/1965) TNA-TZ: 549/TIS/KR/72/9.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

Tanzanian medical students were often sent abroad to get an education. To quote one Lutheran woman in Kilimanjaro: ‘The doctors working here were from Europe and America and they were invited by the Church to come and share their knowledge’.⁵⁵ Likewise, a Catholic Haya doctor described how: ‘There were many scholarships for well-educated Christians to go to Europe to train as doctors so that they could come home and help their people’.⁵⁶ Archival evidence, too, shows that Christian medical centres such as the KCMC were set up with foreign involvement in mind. In response to a question from the Kilimanjaro Regional Information Officer (RIO) in 1969 asking where the doctors at the KCMC were expected to come from, Irvin Mortenson, the project’s Development Director, answered: ‘Tanzania, Germany, Scandinavia, U.S.A. and Canada.’⁵⁷ That the doctors were to come from countries in which the Lutheran Church in Tanzania had close institutional contacts is no surprise. Mortenson added in his letter to the RIO that: ‘The KCMC will have qualified specialists and specialized equipment in each of its departments ... offering the most modern treatment with qualified specialists and modern equipment.’⁵⁸ Thus, a focus on modernity and development, the sort of *maendeleo* which interviewees stressed the churches were responsible for fostering, can be seen in the conversations that religious bodies were having with the secular authorities.

As this section and the last have shown, *maendeleo* was facilitated by the churches primarily through the ‘lived’ aspects of Christianity in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. The Christian mission in both regions was holistic, aiming to develop and care for minds, bodies, and souls. The last of these aims was to be fostered primarily in the houses of worship themselves, though as the following chapter will show, it was also addressed in the moral teachings imparted

⁵⁵ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, former schoolteacher, born 1945.

⁵⁶ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, doctor, born 1946.

⁵⁷ KCMC Development Director to RIO Kilimanjaro (11/02/1969), TN-TZ: 549/TIS/KR/72/13, 2.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

through Christian associations, particularly amongst the youth. Through educational and medical institutions, meanwhile, the churches focused on the first two of these aims, becoming the primary provider of both education and healthcare not only in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, but in Tanganyika and Tanzania more generally. In so doing, churches encouraged a notion of self- and community-improvement in Chagga and Haya society. At the same time, they fostered the idea of belonging to a Catholic or Lutheran community which cared about the individual person as a whole, and about their relation to society more generally. In the process, Christianity influenced power dynamics in the two regions, with the focus on *maendeleo* being used to both support and denounce certain aspects of local society, whilst educational and medical institutions became avenues for contact and exchange, acting as conduits through which peoples, cultures and ideas could interact well into the *ujamaa* years. At the same time, of course, these developments took place against a backdrop of division and debate, most notably between Christians and Muslims and between nationalists and those who opposed their policies, with Christian *maendeleo* exacerbating socio-economic disparities between different religious groups and influencing modern-day opinions of both Islam and post-independence politics in conformist Christian communities.

Hard Work and Commerce:

Alongside education and healthcare, the aspect of Christian *maendeleo* which most interviewees spoke of was commerce. Central to this idea was the concept of ‘hard work’ and the emphasis on self-improvement and self-reliance which Christian missionaries had brought with them. The link between Christianity and commerce, as well as the idea of ‘hard work’ in Christian – and particularly in Protestant – teaching, is well established in the academic literature on Christian missions in Africa. For example, in his study of David Livingstone’s

work with the London Missionary Society in Central Africa, Fidelis Nkomazana argues that ‘Livingstone believed that Christianity, commerce and civilization had interests in common, and could therefore unashamedly support one another’.⁵⁹ As Nkomazana demonstrates, for missionaries like Livingstone, African people needed a holistic version of Christianity which equipped them with the tools to live independently and prosperously in the modern world. However, as Brian Stanley notes, this vision of ‘commerce and Christianity’ also deliberately promoted an idea of mutual dependency between peoples and places, working against notions of self-sufficiency as a result.⁶⁰ It is important to recognise, though, that Stanley’s analysis is focused on Christianity ‘of a fundamentally evangelical variety’, one which, he argues, was the type associated with the ideal of ‘commerce and Christianity’ and which was associated with philosophies of British imperialism.⁶¹ As this section will show, however, ‘commerce’ was important to various types of Christianity and Christian communities, in places evangelised by missionaries of numerous nationalities and denominations.⁶² Moreover, it was not always understood in the way espoused by people such as Livingstone and his contemporaries.

It is important to note that the link between Christianity and commerce – particularly where commerce was linked to western notions of capitalism in the era of European colonialism – is a matter of some debate amongst academics. Andrew Porter argues that some missionaries were sceptical of capitalism’s ability to help the Christianising mission, and

⁵⁹ F. Nkomazana, ‘Livingstone’s ideas of Christianity, commerce and civilization’, *Pula: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 12:1/2 (1998), 44.

⁶⁰ B. Stanley, “‘Commerce and Christianity’: Providence Theory, The Missionary Movement, and the Imperialism of Free Trade”, *The Historical Journal*, 26:1 (1983), 75.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 72.

⁶² As Maia Green and Brad Weiss show, in Tanzania, even Catholicism came to be associated with commerce: M. Green, ‘Why Christianity is the “Religion of Business”’: Perceptions of the Church Among Pogoro Catholics in Southern Tanzania’, *Journal of Religion in Africa*, XXV (1995), 25-47; B. Weiss, ‘A Religion of the Rupee: Materialist Encounters in North-West Tanzania’, *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 72:3 (2002), 391-419.

indeed sometimes believed that it worked against the interests of Christians.⁶³ Of course, the reality is that the situation was highly variable. To quote Terence Ranger, ‘one cannot really talk just about “missionaries” and “Africans”, nor about a dialogue between them ... Cultural agents and brokers were multiple’.⁶⁴ Whilst Ranger is here referring to the situation in Southern Africa, the same can be said of East Africa, or indeed anywhere where colonialism, Christianity, and the spread of capitalism intersected.

It is also worth remembering that ‘commerce’ and ‘capitalism’ are distinct terms; for many interviewees in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, the link between Christianity, *maendeleo*, and commerce was one which promoted hard work and self-sufficiency, without necessarily leading to the extractive pursuit of profit or material gains. At the same time, there was a belief that Christian communities which had developed more ‘capitalistic’ versions of *maendeleo* through their relationship with commerce were better insulated from outside political forces. For example, in Kagera, interviewees suggested that, unlike the Chagga in Kilimanjaro, the Haya had inherited a philosophy of learning which prioritised *maendeleo* in an intellectual, rather than a material, sense. This, in turn, was understood to have left Haya society less focused on regional and personal enrichment, and more susceptible to the policies of post-independence governments in Tanzania and the allure of opportunities outside of Kagera. One Catholic businesswoman in Bukoba had the following to say:

I really despair when I look around Bukoba. Nobody has any drive to do anything to improve their home. All the educated people moved to Dar es Salaam after independence because Nyerere offered them jobs, and they rarely come home to their families ... Just to bury people in the traditional way, then they leave again ... The Chaggas send all their money home, just like they always have – even during Nyerere’s time ... [That’s why] all the

⁶³ A. Porter, *Religion versus Empire? British Protestant Missionaries and Overseas Expansion 1700-1914* (Manchester University Press, 2004).

⁶⁴ T. Ranger, ‘Christianity, Capitalism and Empire: the state of the debate’, *Transformation*, 23:2 (2006), 70.

businesses are run by Chaggas and all the money is in Kilimanjaro! Before independence, we were like Moshi. But now there's just too much apathy.⁶⁵

Several interviewees attributed this differing philosophy to two main factors: a 'Haya mentality' which prioritised intellectual development over material gains, which was believed to predate colonial contact; and a strong Lutheran influence on Kilimanjaro which was not mirrored around Bukoba, where the Catholic Church was more influential. As one Haya Catholic priest put it: 'We always prioritised academic knowledge over practical knowledge here. The Haya are a tribe of technocrats; the Chagga are a tribe of entrepreneurs'.⁶⁶ It is noteworthy that a Chagga Catholic priest in Kilimanjaro, commenting on a commonly perceived lack of entrepreneurial development in Catholic areas of the mountain when compared with Lutheran areas, made a similar point: 'Lutherans were always more focused on the individual and advancing his prospects than we were. The Catholic Church has historically not had that same capitalistic philosophy'.⁶⁷ The perceived links between Protestantism and capitalism have long been the subject of academic study in various fields and in many parts of the world, and so it is noteworthy that in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera, a widespread belief in this link and its influence on the types of *maendeleo* seen in different parts of the community is evident amongst conformist Christians.⁶⁸ In particular, interviewees stressed the relatively high number of Lutheran-educated people running large businesses in Kilimanjaro and elsewhere in Tanzania, the dominance of wealthy Lutheran Chaggas in local politics, and the various entrepreneurial ventures of the Lutheran Church itself throughout Tanzania.

⁶⁵ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, businesswoman, born 1955.

⁶⁶ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest.

⁶⁷ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, priest.

⁶⁸ For a critique of this link in the context of the East African Revival, see: M. Winter, 'The Balokole and the Protestant Ethic: A Critique', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 14:1 (1983), 58-73.

Whilst commerce encompassed a great many things, particularly for the Chagga who came to be known throughout Tanzania for running small and large business ventures all over the country, probably the most significant example of the relationship between Christianity, commerce and socio-political thought was to be found in the production and selling of coffee. Without a doubt, coffee was the most important agricultural product in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera throughout most of the twentieth century. Indeed, no history of Christianity and socio-political thought in Chagga and Haya communities, particularly one hoping to understand the ethnically charged politics of 1950s Tanganyika, can be written without an analysis of the pivotal role of coffee. The enduring importance of the crop to identity, power, and socio-cultural exchange in Kilimanjaro and Kagera is well-documented, and, as the discussion below illustrates, several scholars working in a variety of academic disciplines have written on the subject. Amongst other things, how the control of coffee affected chiefly and kingly power, the use of coffee as a link to the wider world, and the production of coffee for economic and developmental benefits have been highlighted. Importantly for the present analysis, the link between missionaries and coffee, and therefore between Christianity and a vital socio-political commodity, is also well-established in both regions. However, the specific nature of the interaction between Christianity and coffee is one which requires further exploration, particularly given its apparent variation when comparing Chagga and Haya society. To understand these communities in the Nyerere years, and to reconstruct the role of Christianity, it is therefore necessary to trace the history of coffee.

In the Haya society surrounding Bukoba, coffee has a longer, and in many ways more complex, history than it does in Kilimanjaro amongst the Chagga. By the time Nyerere first rose to prominence in Tanganyika, coffee had already been central to many aspects of Haya society for well over a century. Indeed, so conspicuous was coffee's role in the daily life of interlacustrine societies near Lake Victoria in the precolonial period that explorers such as

Richard Burton and John Hanning Speke commented on it.⁶⁹ In Kagera, its importance, politically and religiously, in a region which became increasingly reliant on it for economic and social advancement, made it integral to Haya identity itself.

Some of the best studies of coffee in this region are Brad Weiss' anthropological assessments of the long-established yet constantly evolving place of the crop in Haya society. Weiss' work demonstrates that how the Haya historically identified, both in relation to their kin and to outsiders, was intricately linked to their relationship with coffee.⁷⁰ For example, before the start of German rule in the region, coffee beans of the *robusta* variety were used as a trade good in the interlacustrine region, as well as in traditional politico-religious ceremonies which were of vital importance to Haya kings' ability to project their power.⁷¹ Of particular importance, according to both Peter Seitel and Weiss, was the role of *robusta* beans in the ceremonial establishing of 'blood-relations', a politico-religious tradition whereby two men would become 'blood brothers'. Each of the two beans produced by the *robusta* cherry would be coated in the blood of one of the two men, before being consumed by the other man.⁷² At the end of this ceremony, blood brothers were deemed to be linked as if through family relations, a connection which therefore bound them to each other whilst constraining the social – particularly marital – relations available to both them and their kin. In this way, Haya men could both establish a connection with, and police the actions of, other men and their kin. Consequently, this ceremony, which is even reported to have been practised with the earliest

⁶⁹ B. Weiss, *Sacred Trees, Bitter Harvests: Globalizing Coffee in Colonial Northwest Tanzania* (Heinemann, 2003), 20; 48-51.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 4-45; 50-75; 130-169.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 15-46.

⁷² B. Weiss, 'Northwestern Tanzania on a Single Shilling: Sociality, Embodiment, Valuation', *Cultural Anthropology*, 12:3 (1997), 335-361; P. Seitel, *The Powers of Genre: Interpreting Haya Oral Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 145-146.

Europeans encountered by the Haya, demonstrates how coffee was integral to how the Haya identified and interacted with others, at both a philosophical and a practical level.

With the introduction of colonialism and the spread of Christianity, coffee's place in Haya society remained crucial, but changed. Under both the Germans and the British, coffee, its production, and its regulation became a central feature of the local colonial administration and economy. One important development in this era was the introduction of the *arabica* species of the crop in the late nineteenth century, an initiative implemented by the missionary White Fathers who settled in the region. It was the growing of this variety of coffee by the missionaries which ultimately led to the more widespread production of coffee as a cash crop for export and international consumption in the early twentieth century. It should be noted that the White Fathers initially attempted to ban 'engaging in commerce in the village' in Kagera, arguing that it led to materialism which detracted from Christian life.⁷³ Yet, though the missionaries were eager to avoid this perceived materialism amongst Christian converts which the growing and sale of coffee might foster, their own teachings and economic examples can nevertheless be seen to have promoted the industry. The 'love of work' was considered by the missionaries to be an important aspect of the life of a good Christian, and the income and financial independence which the sale of coffee brought to mission stations likely had an influence on many Haya converts who went on to grow coffee, with one woman recalling that: 'missionaries told us that to work hard was important, and that philosophy was central to Haya coffee production'.⁷⁴

⁷³ *Diare du Poste de Rubya [Ihangiro]* (July 1906), quoted in Weiss, 'Rupee', 391.

⁷⁴ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former domestic worker, born 1935; *Rapports annuels, Rubya, (1907-08): 139*, quoted in Weiss, 'Rupee', 399.

The trade in coffee, which was becoming increasingly important to the local economy, had also developed other religious features, independent of the Catholic missionaries. Firstly, the sale, distribution, and commodification of coffee in Kagera had come to be dominated by a small group of Muslim middlemen, mainly Arab but some African, who had links to the coast and to exporters in Mwanza, on the opposite shore of Lake Victoria.⁷⁵ Christians and the followers of traditional religions were the main producers of the crop, but the people who benefitted most from its sale, and who were most associated with the vices of materialism, were ‘outsiders’, both religiously and ethnically. The term *mswahili*, variously used to mean a Swahili person, a Muslim, or a trader from the coast, thus came to be used in a derogatory manner to refer to people who were considered immoral.⁷⁶ At the same time, the increasing production of coffee by non-royal Haya was a threat to the spiritual and economic power of the kings, who had monopolised the growing and use of *robusta* plants.⁷⁷ Since the kings’ political authority was so closely linked to their spiritual authority, as well as to their ability to control the economic fortunes of their subjects, this represented a significant shift in power. As one Lutheran man put it: ‘when the missionaries taught ordinary Christians to produce and sell coffee, the old rulers began to lose their economic power’.⁷⁸ Whilst colonial governments originally tried to limit the growing of coffee in Kagera for this reason, and whilst Haya kings did attempt to control the early farming of coffee amongst their subjects, the economic power of the crop eventually proved too great for either of them to curtail. Whether or not the Catholic missionaries liked it, therefore, coffee, as it had done for centuries, was providing yet another way for Haya Christians to position and understand themselves in relation to others, both in

⁷⁵ K.R. Curtis, ‘Cooperation and Cooptation: The Struggle for Market Control in the Bukoba District of Colonial Tanganyika’, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 25:3 (1992), 511-513; Weiss, ‘Rupee’, 407-414.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Weiss, *Sacred Trees*, 30-37.

⁷⁸ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, farmer, born 1938.

their own communities and in the increasingly large territorial and global networks of which they were becoming a part.

In Kilimanjaro, by contrast, coffee's importance was linked to commerce and Christianity from the beginning. On the mountain, coffee was a firmly 'colonial' development amongst the Chagga, but its role in Chagga society was no less significant than it was amongst their Haya countrymen. As Moore has put it, 'Coffee, settlers, missions, and Chagga politics were interwoven from the early days of the century'.⁷⁹ Coffee was first farmed by European settlers in Moshi in 1892, but it was not until it was adopted by missionaries a short time later that it caught the interest of the Chagga. The Holy Ghost Fathers at Kilema began farming *arabica* coffee to generate an income for their mission station, and soon Chagga chiefs asked missionaries for seedlings of their own.⁸⁰ To this day, the communal memory of coffee being introduced to Kilimanjaro by the Catholics at Kilema is both widespread and very important in Chagga society. Indeed, almost every interviewee in Kilimanjaro, be they Catholic or Lutheran, mentioned the growing of coffee at Kilema, with many stating that this event represented the start of a Christian version of *maendeleo*.

Lutheran missions, too, began to farm coffee, though it is noteworthy that they were initially more hesitant than their Catholic counterparts. Moore argues that, like the White Fathers in Kagera, the Lutherans were worried about the distraction from Christian life which this materialistic venture could foster.⁸¹ Eventually, however, the economic value of coffee production led to its adoption all over the mountain, particularly after the First World War, when the new British administration promoted its growth to aid in economic self-reliance and

⁷⁹ Moore, *Facts and Fabrications*, 103.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 105-106.

recovery.⁸² At the same time, the importance of hard work and individual responsibility, which many missionaries considered to be traditional aspects of Chagga identity, were promoted in Christian teaching.⁸³ Very quickly, the production of coffee became a widespread practice in Chagga society, and the shape of the local economy was completely transformed.

Coffee, never subject to many of the philosophical constraints in which it was encased in Kagera, would prove to shift the balance of power in Kilimanjaro much more quickly. Whilst its early production was monopolised by the chiefs and missions, Chagga smallholders were soon able to farm it as well. Land, which was already in short supply on the mountain, became an increasingly valuable resource, and the ability of traditional elites to control it quickly diminished. Moore's work shows that Chagga concepts of land ownership at the turn of the twentieth century were tied up in development and utilisation. As soon as a Chagga planted bananas or, increasingly, coffee, on undeveloped bush land, they automatically gained a life interest in that plot.⁸⁴ However, particularly with coffee's introduction, these rules became far more entrenched in Chagga socio-political philosophy, and chiefs and clan heads became much more apprehensive about encroaching on individual Chaggas' property rights.⁸⁵ As one interviewee put it: 'When we began to farm coffee, our *shambas* (farms) became our most important possessions, and we defended them against anybody'.⁸⁶ Chagga coffee growers were thus becoming increasingly independent, economically and politically, from traditional power structures.

⁸² S.M.L. Seimu and M. Zoppi, 'The Influence of Settlers' Community in Shaping the Colonial Agricultural Marketing Policies in Tanzania', *African Economic History*, 49:2 (2021), 53-76.

⁸³ Ibid.; P. Fleisch, *Lutheran Beginnings Around Mt. Kilimanjaro: The First 40 Years*, edited by E. Jaeschke (Arusha: Makumira, 1998 [first published 1936]), 20-35; 74-84.

⁸⁴ Moore, *Facts and Fabrications*, 111.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, lawyer, born 1939.

In large part, the examples set by, and education promoted by, missionaries, converts and Christian institutions were responsible for this. Many Chagga interviewees, particularly Lutherans, mentioned the fact that the churches helped to provide their parents and grandparents with the education – both academic and technical – they needed to start growing and selling coffee. Somo Seimu and Marco Zoppi note that this sort of knowledge was being passed on as early as the 1890s.⁸⁷ Likewise, a Chagga Catholic priest recalled how in the 1950s and early 1960s:

[The Catholic Church] went to the villages with the coffee experts and told people how they should look after their crops. The aim was to enable communities to develop themselves economically, so that they could develop themselves socially ... Coffee production was what allowed the average people in the village to drive *maendeleo* for themselves, under the guidance of the Church.⁸⁸

Here, then, it is possible to see how the education provided by Christian institutions, specifically where it related to coffee production, was remembered to have fostered a particular type of *maendeleo* amongst Chagga Christians. As the next three chapters illustrate, the *maendeleo* which Christian institutions and education fostered through coffee production would go on to have significant social and political ramifications in Chagga, Haya, and wider Tanganyikan and Tanzanian society.

Conclusion:

This chapter has shown how notions of *maendeleo* were continuously promoted and shaped through the institutions and teachings of the Catholic and Lutheran churches in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. In the process, it has expanded on a body of scholarship which has linked

⁸⁷ Seimu and Zoppi, 'Marketing Policies', 60.

⁸⁸ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, priest.

Christianity with notions of progress, development, and modernity in Tanzania more generally, and has shown how this link has endured in the memory of Chagga and Haya conformist Christians. Indeed, for the people in these communities, the relatively advanced *maendeleo* achieved in Kilimanjaro and Kagera is inseparable from the institutions of the churches. Concerned from the outset with development and modernity, and eager to cultivate Christians' minds, bodies and spirits, the churches established educational and healthcare facilities alongside houses of worship soon after their foundation in both regions. Consequently, Christian education in Kilimanjaro and Kagera was responsible for many of the socio-political developments which took place amongst the Chagga and Haya. Not only did it allow for the emancipation of oppressed groups from traditional structures of power and obligation, but it led to high levels of literacy, economic development, and opportunities for social mobility. Consequently, by the time of independence, Kilimanjaro and Kagera were two of the best-educated, most developed regions in Tanganyika, with multiple religious institutions that facilitated the exchange of ideas with the outside world. This holistic approach to developing local communities was a feature that Catholic and Lutheran churches shared in both regions, and so Christians of different denominations shared in its benefits and remember it very similarly.

Through coffee, these dynamics were expressed particularly strongly, with the development of the cash crop in Kilimanjaro and Kagera becoming one of the primary factors driving *maendeleo* in the twentieth century. Due to the economic benefits of coffee farming in both regions, they were amongst the wealthiest in Tanganyika during the early Nyerere years and, as the following three chapters show, this would go on to shape the nature of socio-political philosophy, ethnic identity, and political action in the decades to come, with Chagga and Haya Christians playing a conspicuous role in the nation's development. With these developments in mind, it is no wonder that the concept of Christian-fostered *maendeleo* came to be so

important in both regions, to the extent that it became enmeshed in ideas of what it meant to be a Chagga or a Haya.

However, Christianity's relationship with *maendeleo* also exposed and exacerbated deep inequalities in Tanganyikan society, particularly between Christians and Muslims. Not only were the 'most Christian' regions generally the best developed, but Christians also generally benefitted the most from this development. Consequently, as Chapters 5 and 6 explore further, national leaders and citizens had to grapple with significant regional and religious disparities when discussing independence, nation-building, and the merits of various socio-economic and political models. These divisions, as well as the actions of Nyerere's government which were partly designed to address such imbalances, have continued to shape how conformist Chagga and Haya Christians talk about the history of *maendeleo* in Kilimanjaro and Kagera; as the interviews quoted in this chapter demonstrate, the idea of Chagga and Haya *maendeleo* as incompatible with Islamic ideology, and the narrative of Nyerere and his successors repressing Christian *maendeleo*, are widespread. Indeed, it would be inaccurate to speak of 'contestations of memory' where interviewees' views on the aspects of *maendeleo* discussed in this chapter are concerned, so strikingly uniform were their recollections. That said, it is also true that regional, gendered, and denominational differences are remembered to have shaped both education and commerce, and the linking of Lutheranism – especially Chagga Lutheranism – to capitalism and political dynamism and resistance is an important aspect of historical memory in both regions.

Christianity's role in Chagga and Haya *maendeleo* was not simply causative; it did not simply lay the foundations for future development. Rather, it was dynamic and self-replicating, with the churches and Christians continually adapting to the evolving socio-political situation in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, in Tanganyika, and in the wider world. Moreover, Christians often

decided for themselves what *maendeleo* should lead to, pushing back against missionary, traditional and societal teachings and pressures which were not conducive to the new modernity to which they aspired. In the following chapter, the initiatives of Chagga and Haya Christians to mould their own visions of *maendeleo* through the associational structures which grew out of the churches and coffee farming is explored further.

Chapter 4

Associational Life

Introduction:

A defining feature of both Chagga and Haya society, which interviewees associated closely with the local notions of *maendeleo* discussed in the previous chapter, was the presence of a form of associational life and, later, politics in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. Voluntary associations could inhabit many different forms, from more formal organisations like agricultural co-operatives and political clubs, to less formal social and religious groups. This chapter argues that the Catholic and Lutheran churches facilitated and promoted the growth of associational life in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, enabling Chagga and Haya Christians and non-Christians to organise themselves into groups with significant social and political influence in the early Nyerere years. Christianity's role in this process was both institutional and philosophical; secular agricultural co-operatives were founded and led by church-educated individuals who were often active members of their local congregations and were influenced by religious moral teachings, whilst religious groups for women and youth were set up through the churches themselves. At the same time, in the Lutheran churches, local religious publications developed alongside these groups and served as avenues for dialogue and debate. The chapter also shows that, in conformist Christian communities, the testimonies associated with associational life, like those concerning *maendeleo* more generally, display a great degree of consensus. That said, these narratives also highlight certain divisions in Chagga and Haya society during the Nyerere years, with the more dynamic and politically influential *maendeleo* associated with Lutheranism, as well as divisions between Christians and Muslims, once again affecting how people talked about this subject.

It is important to note that voluntary associations were by no means a wholly Christian development and they are not being presented as such in this chapter. Indeed, there is a significant body of scholarship showing that, in Tanzania and elsewhere in Africa, voluntarism was actively promoted by colonial governments and other secular institutions and citizens in the wake of the First World War, when traditional and imported ideas of self-sufficiency and community development became combined with an economic need to reorganise colonial and global markets.¹ This scholarship demonstrates the vital role that voluntary associations – which often occupied social and economic gaps left by an under-resourced government – played in the processes of socio-political change which characterised colonial and post-colonial African states, mediating between centres of power and the populace whilst simultaneously fostering local forms of knowledge and authority. As Emma Hunter notes, these associations were often largely ethnically exclusive, in part because the hierarchical colonial state deliberately made pan-ethnic, national, and pan-racial associations difficult to establish in order to facilitate indirect rule.² At the same time, however, beyond the reaches of the colonial state, ideas of liberty, equality and self-determination, associated with a growing awareness of transnationalism and developments elsewhere in the world, also fed into the evolution of

¹ For Tanzania, see: K. Dodworth, 'Negotiating the Public: Voluntarism and its Work in Tanzania', *African Affairs*, 118/470 (2018), 125-146; E. Hunter, 'Voluntarism, Virtuous Citizenship, and Nation-Building in Late Colonial and Early Postcolonial Tanzania', *African Studies Review*, 58:2 (2015), 43-61. See also: M. Jennings, 'Doing Good While They Can: International Volunteers, Development & Politics in Early Independence Tanzania', in R. Prince and H. Brown (eds.), *Volunteer Economies: The Politics & Ethics of Voluntary Labour in Africa* (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2016), 119-139. For Africa more generally, see: E. Ben-Zadok and L. Kooperman, 'Voluntary Associations in West Africa: A Political Perspective', *Community Development Journal*, 23:2 (1988), 74-85; G.B. Kerr, 'Voluntary Associations in West Africa: "Hidden" Agents of Social Change', *African Studies Review*, 21:3 (1978), 87-100; R. Prince and H. Brown, 'Introduction: The Politics & Ethics of Voluntary Labour in Africa', in R. Prince and H. Brown (eds.), *Volunteer Economies: The Politics & Ethics of Voluntary Labour in Africa* (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2016), 1-27.

² E. Hunter, 'Modernity, Print Media, and the Middle Class in Colonial East Africa', in C. Dejung, D. Motadel, and J. Osterhammel (eds.), *The Global Bourgeoisie: The Rise of the Middle Classes in the Age of Empire* (Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2019), 105-122.

associational life and systems of philosophical exchange.³ Other scholars have also shown how, particularly following Tanganyikan independence, Muslim institutions also played their part in the growth of voluntarism and the development of ideas of ‘good citizenship’ such as the ones explored in this chapter.⁴

Nevertheless, it is difficult to discount the Christian influence on the development of associational life, and this chapter will analyse this relationship by focusing on three examples from Kilimanjaro and Kagera: coffee co-operatives, women’s groups, and youth groups. In both regions, the politicisation of associational life beyond its traditional ‘tribal’ parameters – at least amongst men – was encouraged primarily by the development of coffee co-operatives; as the previous chapter explored, the history of coffee was itself inextricably linked with the history of Christianity in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, and an analysis of the continuing development of this relationship forms the first part of this chapter. The second and third parts of the chapter analyse the development of associational life amongst women and youth, respectively, showing how, for these groups, it was the institutions of the church itself which initially provided the avenues for *maendeleo* and social exchange with the world outside of Chagga and Haya society.

³ M. Hilton and R. Mitter, ‘Introduction’, in M. Hilton and R. Mitter (eds.), *Transnationalism and Contemporary Global History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 7-28.

⁴ F. Becker, *Becoming Muslim in Mainland Tanzania, 1890-2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); M.A. Leichtman, ‘Transnational Networks and Global Shi’i Islamic NGOs in Tanzania’, in H. Weiss (ed.), *Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 203-216; M. Haron, ‘Africa’s Muslim Non-Governmental Organizations: Competitive Charities, Altruistic Allies?’, in E. Chitando, M.R. Gunda, and L. Togaressi (eds.), *Religion and Development in Africa* (Bamburg: University of Bamberg Press, 2020), 154-155; A.M. Nguyahambi and T. Kontinen, “‘A good believer is a good citizen’: Connecting Islamic Morals with Civic Virtues in Rural Tanzania”, in K. Holma and T. Kontinen (eds.), *Practices of Citizenship in East Africa: Perspectives from Philosophical Pragmatism* (Oxford: Routledge, 2020), 121-138; R.G. Kilonzo, B.N. Matunga, H. Chang’a and T. Kontinen, ‘Habits of Contributing Citizenship: Self-help groups in rural Tanzania’, in K. Holma and T. Kontinen (eds.), *Practices of Citizenship in East Africa: Perspectives from Philosophical Pragmatism* (Oxford: Routledge, 2020), 139-145.

Coffee and Associational Life:

In the previous chapter, the links between Christianity and well-developed educational institutions was explored. From a political and economic perspective, the extent of the impact of Christian education in Kilimanjaro and Kagera was arguably most apparent – at least amongst Christian men – in the associational bodies which it helped to foster. Nowhere was this more significant than where communal action interacted with coffee production. As previously discussed, the cultivation of coffee was central to the development of local Christian ideas about community, commerce, hard work and *maendeleo*. However, politically speaking, coffee's most important role in Kilimanjaro and Kagera was in its fostering of co-operative unions which were set up in both regions to control its sale and distribution. Whilst the development of co-operatives and other voluntary associations was widespread in Tanganyika from the 1920s onwards, in part because of colonial policies, as alluded to in the introduction to this chapter, the role of Catholicism and Lutheranism in this process, particularly in regions such as Kilimanjaro and Kagera, cannot be ignored.⁵ As Sally Falk Moore has suggested, the example which the Church had first set in these communities of an organisation in which all people mattered as individuals was now being emulated by Chaggas and Hayas who had experienced this new form of belonging.⁶ Moreover, in both regions, missionary-educated teachers and activists were largely responsible for the setting up of the new associations and the more overtly political ones established in their wake.

In Kilimanjaro, the Kilimanjaro Native Planters' Association (KNPA) was set up in 1925 as the first African-run coffee co-operative by Joseph Merinyo, one of Bruno Gutmann's

⁵ For an overview of co-operative development in Tanganyika and Tanzania, see: F.F. Lyimo, *Rural Cooperation in the Cooperative Movement in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2012).

⁶ S.F. Moore, *Social Facts and Fabrications: "Customary" Law on Kilimanjaro, 1880-1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 312-314.

closest Chagga associates and most promising Lutheran students. Despite Gutmann's promotion of cultural conservatism, Merinyo was steadfastly focused on modernity, and believed the traditional practices which some missionaries and the administration promoted were hindering the development of the Chagga people.⁷ The KNPA set out to bring the production of coffee in Kilimanjaro under Chagga control, cutting out all non-native traders in the process, and allowing Chaggas to control their own new links with the outside world. In just six years, the organisation caused such resentment amongst European coffee growers and such a political headache for the administration and the chiefs that, accusing him of embezzlement, the authorities imprisoned Merinyo on spurious charges and replaced the KNPA with the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU) in 1931.⁸ Arthur Bennett, an English agricultural expert, was employed to manage the KNCU, and the government likely hoped that having a European in a position of authority would give them more influence in the organisation.

The KNCU's initial policies caused some discontent in Kilimanjaro. In 1937, the 'Coffee Riots' broke out across the mountain. Chagga peasants, angered at the price of coffee which the KNCU had fixed, attacked the Union's facilities in Moshi, and the administration was forced to deal with the riots using force.⁹ Importantly, Christian affiliation appears to have influenced involvement in the riots. Firstly, it is notable that most regions on the mountain which rioted were Lutheran, with Catholic areas remaining relatively peaceful. Why this was

⁷ S.G. Rogers, 'The Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association: Administrative Responses to Chagga Initiatives in the 1920's', *Transafrican Journal of History* 4:1/2 (1974), 94-114; K. Fiedler, *Christianity & African Culture: Conservative German Protestant Missionaries in Tanzania, 1900-1940* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 131-134.

⁸ S.M.L. Seimu and M. Zoppi, 'The Influence of Settlers' Community in Shaping the Colonial Agricultural Marketing Policies in Tanzania', *African Economic History*, 49:2 (2021), 53-76; Rogers, 'Planters Association', 108; K.R. Curtis, 'Cooperation and Cooptation: The Struggle for Market Control in the Bukoba District of Colonial Tanganyika', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 25:3 (1992), 514.

⁹ Curtis, 'Cooperation', 516.

the case is unclear, though interviewees suggested it was due to greater Lutheran involvement in coffee production on Kilimanjaro by the late 1930s, with the familiar ideas of Lutheran capitalism and individualism affecting how these narratives have been preserved in conformist Christian historical memory. However, at the same time, Gutmann, who considered co-operatives to be a threat to the churches and tradition, was able to dissuade his own parishioners at Old Moshi from becoming too involved in the co-operative movement, suggesting that the influence of individual Christian leaders could play an important role in the level of unrest which was experienced.¹⁰ Importantly, over the next couple of decades, and particularly following the Second World War, the KNCU again became dominated by mission-educated Chaggas, meaning that by the 1950s, it was not always the partner which the government had hoped it would be.

In Kagera, the coffee co-operatives followed a more disjointed historical narrative. In 1924, the Bukoba Bahaya Union (BBU) was formed by Klemens Kiiza, a mission-educated member of the Kiziba aristocracy, to improve literacy and development in the region, with the Union focusing much of its attention on coffee production.¹¹ However, the BBU was resisted by local elites who feared economic competition, and it struggled for popular support throughout the 1920s. In 1934, a new, more successful body, the Native Growers Association (NGA), was formed, which by 1936 had nearly 1000 members.¹² The NGA was led by Kiiza and Herbert Rugizibwa, and whilst the government was concerned by Rugizibwa's position as an officer in the anti-colonial African Association (AA), it came to support the NGA's position

¹⁰ Fiedler, *African Culture*, 133-135.

¹¹ A. Okoth, *A History of Africa: Volume Two: African Nationalism and the De-Colonisation Process* (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 2006), 48-49. See also: R.A. Austen, *Northwest Tanzania Under German and British Rule: Colonial Policy and Tribal Politics 1889-1939* (London: Yale University Press, 1968), 163-165.

¹² Curtis, 'Cooperation', 517-518.

in Bukoba.¹³ This contributed to both racial and religious tensions in the region, and the importance of Christian-Muslim divisions in Kagera to the memory of this subject amongst Haya conformist Christians is notable. The Asian and Muslim traders who had originally controlled the trade of coffee in Kagera protested at the government's support for the NGA, an organisation which was largely Christian and was closed to 'non-natives'.¹⁴ To quote one Catholic interviewee: 'The Muslims were upset that the Christians had taken control of the coffee and the money'.¹⁵ For this and other reasons, the government realised that it could not, as in Kilimanjaro, take over this bottom-up association and turn it into a local co-operative, and things soon fell apart. The NGA collapsed during the Second World War due, in part, to the competing aims of its founders, and the sale of coffee had to be administered by a temporary board. In 1947, this was replaced by the Bukoba Native Coffee Board (BNCB), which was likely modelled on the Moshi Native Coffee Board (MNCB) that had been established in 1937. However, the BNCB was originally subject to much administrative interference and became very unpopular amongst Haya coffee growers and the elites, who saw it as a top-down association which did little for most growers.¹⁶ Acting with little administrative oversight, the complaints against the Board led to its being reprimanded by the government in 1950.¹⁷

Consequently, with government backing, the Bukoba Co-operative Union was set up as a grassroots, bottom-up association. Modelled on the early KNCU and with Arthur Bennett being sent from Kilimanjaro to act as an advisor, it was renamed the Bukoba Native Co-

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, doctor, born 1936.

¹⁶ Curtis, 'Cooperation', 523-525.

¹⁷ Ibid., 526.

operative Union (BNCU) ‘at the insistence of members’.¹⁸ It quickly grew to be the largest co-operative union in Tanganyika, with 51,437 members in 1954; the KNCU, which was the second largest co-operative union, had 34,996 members that year.¹⁹ According to Kenneth Curtis, by 1955, the BNCU had taken over most of the functions of the BNCB. However, though the Union’s executive committee was completely African, it was also originally subject to the sort of government control that the KNCU had resisted in the 1930s. This, along with accusations of corruption levelled against its Haya leaders and a widespread dislike of the monopoly over the purchase of African-grown coffee that the BNCU had inherited from the BNCB, was to lead to a growing local resentment of the organisation.²⁰

As Curtis suggests, the BNCU was established in part because colonial administrators were conscious following the Second World War that there were a large number of mission-educated Africans outside the traditional structures of power who, if not allowed into positions of authority in regional government-backed organisations like the BNCU, would soon set up their own organisations or join the AA.²¹ However, the society quickly became unpopular amongst non-Africans, non-Christians, and most producers, since literate Christian Hayas ran the committee and had largely replaced both the Muslim middlemen and the coffee growers ‘as dispensers of jobs, favors, and credit in the countryside.’²² Increasingly, the BNCU came to face opposition from a number of local and territorial associations, many of which were led by other mission-educated Hayas or disgruntled Muslim traders. As the next two chapters will

¹⁸ Government of Tanganyika, *Report on Co-Operative Development for the Year 1952* (Moshi: KNCU Printing Press, 1953), 6.

¹⁹ Government of Tanganyika, *Report on Co-Operative Development for the Year 1953* (Moshi: KNCU Printing Press, 1954), 6; 10.

²⁰ Curtis, ‘Cooperation’, 529.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 528.

²² *Ibid.*

touch on, the rise of nationalism was also to prove particularly challenging for the Union and other agricultural co-operatives. Nevertheless, it is evident that a similar movement to the one in Kilimanjaro had taken place in Kagera by the late 1950s, with the emergence of a co-operative type of politics which was influenced in part by Christian education and associational life, and which led to a renegotiation, through coffee production, of local ethno-religious and political identity.

Other agricultural co-operatives had also emerged elsewhere in Tanganyika by the early 1950s, a number of them organised along ethnic lines, but none of these societies was anywhere near as large or as wealthy as the KNCU or the BNCU, both of which were able to begin funding scholarships for students to study both at home and abroad.²³ The KNCU even managed to build the Lyamungo Secondary School in the Kilimanjaro region from funds it had raised for education.²⁴ Indeed, the ability of the co-operatives to provide educational opportunities in the 1950s is well-remembered in these communities, particularly in Kilimanjaro. As one woman put it: 'The KNCU had so much money that it funded scholarships, just like the churches and the government. It brought *maendeleo* not just in economic terms – not just in money.'²⁵

Despite their uneven development, there was nevertheless a large degree of contact and exchange between the various 'indigenous' associations in Tanganyika, and the KNCU

²³ Tanganyika Government, *Report on Co-Operative Development for the Year 1951* (Moshi: KNCU Printing Press, 1952); *Co-Operative Development 1952*; *Co-Operative Development 1953*.

²⁴ Lyimo, *Rural Cooperation*, 48.

²⁵ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, businesswoman, born 1938. Thomas Fisher's Chagga interviewees similarly remembered Chagga *maendeleo* as coming in large part from coffee and the KNCU: T. Fisher, 'Chagga Elites and the Politics of Ethnicity in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania' (PhD Thesis: University of Edinburgh, 2012), 143.

was clearly seen by the colonial authorities as the leader of the group. In one report on coffee production, it was noted that:

The Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union, the oldest established Union and a leader in such matters, during their financial year ended in 1953 enabled a majority of their committee to make a tour by road to visit the Rungwe Co-operative Union, the Ngoni-Matengo Co-operative Marketing Union, and Societies affiliated thereto and neighbouring unaffiliated societies for the purpose of exchanging ideas and gaining experience of other parts of the country. This visit is to be reciprocated.²⁶

The KNCU also ran its own printing press which provided materials and stationery for all the other African co-operatives.²⁷ At the same time, members of other associations were regularly sent to Moshi for training and events, with the Kilimanjaro capital becoming a major centre of development in Tanganyika. Significantly, one Catholic interviewee in Bukoba recalled how this idea of Moshi as a place of *maendeleo* was not only limited to coffee:

We were always looking at Moshi, at the Chagga. Innovation and *maendeleo* in many parts of life – economic, political, even in church – often came from Kilimanjaro. Whatever they were doing, we wanted to do. We wanted to show that we were as good as the Chagga.²⁸

The scholarships which these organisations funded also allowed students to experience non-Tanzanian societies, cultures, and ideas. It is unsurprising, then, that many interviewees stressed this facilitation of interaction with the outside world when talking about coffee co-operatives. This sort of contact and exchange was similar in many ways to the previously discussed avenues and initiatives provided by the churches through educational institutions, a parallel which more than one interviewee pointed out, and the more capitalistic influence of

²⁶ *Co-Operative Development 1953*, 6.

²⁷ *Co-Operative Development 1951*, 5.

²⁸ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, businesswoman, born 1942.

the Lutheran Church in Kilimanjaro was believed by many people in both regions to have been a major factor in the KNCU's dominance.

The opinions of the KNCU and BNCU, as well as of coffee producers more generally, were important to colonial administrators. Indeed, an intense focus on coffee and the socio-political repercussions of its sale is evident in government records from the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s and, as will be seen in following chapters, co-operatives such as the KNCU, as well as the people associated with them, would continue to have an influence in Chagga, Haya, and national society well into the post-independence Nyerere years. Crucially, organisations like the KNCU and BNCU would also help to set an example for the development of other co-operative and political associations through which local politics was debated and developed in the 1950s, often under the leadership of mission-educated men. This guiding role of the coffee co-operatives remains a part of local memory, with one Chagga woman stating:

The KNCU was supposed to be about coffee, but it became a model for other organisations around the mountain. Even political ones. Often the same people were involved in both the KNCU and other associations ... Sometimes they were set up by non-KNCU people following the example of the KNCU and other associations. In other situations, it was people from the same churches and schools who were educated with KNCU leaders ... By the 1950s, we Chaggas were very associational in our politics.²⁹

One such example was the Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union (KCCU), an influential organisation which was led by another of Gutmann's students, Petro Njau.³⁰ In Kagera, organisations such as the Bukoba Coffee Planters Association (BCPA), whose leaders included a former president of the AA, Suedi Kagasheki, emerged in direct opposition to the BNCU.

²⁹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, former schoolteacher, born 1935.

³⁰ More information on the KCCU and its important role in Chagga and Tanzanian history can be found in E. Hunter, *Political Thought and the Public Sphere in Tanzania: Freedom, Democracy and Citizenship in the Era of Decolonization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), Chapter 4.

Another leader of the BCPA was Herbert Rugizibwa of the original NGA, who also happened to be the provincial chairman of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).³¹ As Curtis's work suggests, organisations like the BCPA provided other mission-educated and some Muslim Hayas a public platform and associational space which was not tainted by the corruption, ineptitude, or perceived elitism with which the BNCU had become associated.³² Although a detailed exploration of the activities of all these organisations is not directly relevant to this study, the following chapter will touch on how they had come to shape the political sphere in the regions where they were active in the 1950s, and how they were subsequently forced to compete with, and ultimately eclipsed by, TANU and the nationalising project. What is important to emphasise here, however, is that Christian-infused philosophies of associational life, as well as the academic and agricultural education provided to Chagga and Haya Christians by the churches, were, along with a range of local and international forces, crucial to the development of these organisations. Where historical memory is concerned, it is evident that the importance of Christian *maendeleo* and the exchange of ideas it fostered remains central to how this subject is remembered in conformist Christian Chagga and Haya circles. At the same time, narratives explored in previous chapters, such as divisions between Christians and Muslims and the dynamism of Lutheran Capitalism, continue to affect how these memories are constructed and articulated. Finally, it is also worth noting that the *maendeleo* which agricultural co-operatives fostered, like that of the schools and hospitals, was ultimately believed by almost every interviewee to have been damaged by the post-independence government in an attempt to equalise the level of development between Christians and Muslims and between less developed and more developed regions. Thus, the great benefits that

³¹ Curtis, 'Cooperation', 534.

³² Ibid., 528-534.

agricultural societies are remembered to have brought to Kilimanjaro and Kagera must be understood alongside what is remembered to have come after them.

Women's Associations:

The history of coffee co-operatives and political associations in Tanzania, particularly in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, is well-studied in academic literature, due largely to the significant economic and political influence they exercised. However, the history of such organisations is also an almost exclusively male history, and the men on whom these histories usually focus tended to be from an educated elite in their respective societies. This is obviously problematic for academics wishing to reconstruct a picture of Chagga and Haya society more generally in the mid-twentieth century, both from the perspective of gender and the perspective of class and age.

The role of other groups in Tanzanian history, such as women and youth, has tended to be a topic of scholarly study in the country more generally. For example, women's contributions to the nationalist project and to the development of TANU as an institution have been the focus of academics such as Susan Geiger, whilst the importance and activities of the TANU Youth and other youth associations in Dar es Salaam and elsewhere in East Africa has been similarly well-studied by scholars including James Brennan and Thomas Burgess.³³ However, regional studies of the history of the associational life of women and youth, whilst not non-existent, are not so common, particularly any that focus exclusively on religious

³³ See: S. Geiger, *TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955-1965* (Oxford: James Currey, 1997); S. Geiger, 'Specificities: Citizens and Subjects Engendering and Gendering African Nationalism: Rethinking the Case of Tanganyika (Tanzania)', *Social Identities*, 5:3 (1999); 331-343; J.R. Brennan, 'Youth, the Tanu Youth League and Managed Vigilantism in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, 1925-73', *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 76:2 (2006), 221-246; T. Burgess, 'Introduction to Youth and Citizenship in East Africa', *Africa Today*, 51:3 (2005), vii-xxiv.

groups. One notable exception is Claire Mercer's work on Kilimanjaro, which has looked at the relationship between 'women's participation', *maendeleo*, and politics, and how community participation has sometimes been used by women for social and economic gain.³⁴ In the process, she demonstrates how women's participation could also be used to reinforce social stratification on the basis of money and class. However, one likely reason for the relative lack of analyses like Mercer's – particularly those assessing the subject from a historical perspective – is a dearth of written and archival evidence to draw on to reconstruct these histories in many parts of Tanzania. Thus, one of the benefits of including oral testimonies in historical studies such as this is that commonly undervalued histories can be articulated and explored.

One of the best places to study the associational lives of women and youth outside of major national organisations is in the religious bodies which were established to accommodate them. In Kilimanjaro and Kagera, the Catholic and the Lutheran churches established educational and social groups for both women and the youth in their congregations. In the Lutheran Church in particular, the *Chama cha Wanawake* (Women's Party) and the *Chama cha Vijana* (Youth Party), were highly active from their establishment in both dioceses, and they often remained active well after independence and the Arusha Declaration, at a time when more visible associations such as the KNCU were increasingly side-lined by the government.³⁵ The importance of religious associations and groups to society more generally cannot be

³⁴ C. Mercer, 'The Discourse of *Maendeleo* and the Politics of Women's Participation on Mount Kilimanjaro', *Development and Change*, 33:1 (2002), 115-124.

³⁵ It could be argued that the fact that women's groups and youth groups existed in the church necessarily calls into question Moore's idea of the 'equality' of all Christians in local churches. However, it could equally be argued that such groups were designed to promote in a dedicated manner the interests of groups who had traditionally been left out of decision-making in local societies. In a socio-political environment where women's groups and youth groups were being set up elsewhere, it could also be that this sort of framework was simply a reflection of developments outside of Kilimanjaro and Kagera.

overlooked. In a number of studies, albeit none conducted in Tanzania, significant correlations have been found between participation in church services, church-related activities, and voluntary associations on the one hand, and participation in social welfare projects and the regular carrying out of 'civic duties' such as voting on the other hand.³⁶ Moreover, the link between participation in voluntary associations and churchgoing is seemingly more pronounced amongst women than it is amongst men, and more pronounced amongst Protestants than it is amongst Catholics.³⁷ Whilst it would be rash simply to assume that the same trends have historically been mirrored in Chagga and Haya society, interviewees in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera certainly indicated that participation in the groups facilitated by the churches lead to stronger social-consciousness and community cohesion and, once again, the greater dynamism of Lutheran associations was a notable feature of these memories, as explored below. That present-day voluntary associations in both regions such as Rotary International are often perceived to be dominated by older Catholic and Lutheran individuals who often went to schools run by the church is therefore unsurprising. The social, political, and religious roles of these associational groups in Chagga and Haya society thus constitute an important topic of academic study.

Christian women's groups and institutions have a long, active history in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, with formal and informal groups being established between the early and mid-twentieth century to support women's educational, vocational, and healthcare needs. The point

³⁶ C.A. Cassell, 'Voluntary Associations, Churches, and Social Participation Theories of Turnout', *Social Science Quarterly*, 80:3 (1999), 504-517; N. Kwak, D.V. Shah, and R.L. Holbert, 'Connecting, Trusting, and Participating: The Direct and Interactive Effects of Social Associations', *Political Research Quarterly*, 57:4 (2004), 643-652; N. Babchuk, and A. Booth, 'Voluntary Association Membership: A Longitudinal Analysis', *American Sociological Review*, 34:1 (1969), 31-45; M.A. Jones-Correa, and D.L. Leal, 'Political Participation: Does Religion Matter?', *Political Research Quarterly*, 54:4 (2001), 751-770; Pui-Yan Lam, 'As the Flocks Gather: How Religion Affects Voluntary Association Participation', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 41:3 (2002), 405-422.

³⁷ Babchuk and Booth, 'Membership', 43; Lam, 'Flocks', 415.

of such institutions was not only to bring Western perceptions of ‘modernity’ or ‘development’ to these women, but also to instil in them a sense of ‘lived Christianity’, in which their domestic lives and social relations served as a reflection of their faith. One of the main features of this Christian education was the domestic skills that Catholic and Lutheran women were expected to learn, as well as the ‘Christian family’ which they were expected to support. As one Catholic woman put it: ‘We were taught to be good Christian wives and daughters ... we learned how to keep a home properly; to keep it clean and to cook; to raise children with a good moral character.’³⁸ Indeed, to a certain extent, it could be argued that Christianity and the teachings it brought with it was partly responsible for increasingly confining women to the domestic sphere in Kilimanjaro and Kagera during the colonial era. By extension, it contributed to their distancing from the agricultural production in which they had once partaken, particularly on Kilimanjaro. The situation in these two regions of Tanganyika mirrors that found elsewhere on the African continent in the twentieth century. For example, Deborah Gaitskell has described how the downplaying and forgetting of women’s ‘traditional’ roles in Johannesburg as a result of contact with missionaries and Christian education in the early twentieth century led to a re-positioning of genders that saw women – who had previously been active agricultural producers – becoming ‘angels’ of homeliness.³⁹ The point of this, as Gaitskell argues, was to stress the fact that Christianity was about more than just spirituality; it was also about a ‘specific family form’ and a model household, of which women, as wives and mothers, were the guardians.⁴⁰ As such, women’s education was geared towards upholding this fundamental Christian unit whilst also preparing them to raise the next generation of the Church.

³⁸ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, businesswoman, born 1943.

³⁹ D. Gaitskell, ‘Housewives, Maids or Mothers: Some Contradictions of Domesticity for Christian Women in Johannesburg, 1903-39’, *Journal of African History*, 24 (1983), 241-256.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 242.

However, it is necessary to appreciate that different mission stations and missionaries employed different approaches, and women in Kagera and Kilimanjaro were able to take advantage of and repurpose many of the opportunities that were open to them. The Lutheran Church, in particular, was seen by female interviewees to provide a space for Christian women to socialise, support one another, and contribute to their churches and communities. The main role of these groups which Lutheran Chagga women spoke about was their promotion of health and educational standards amongst other women. One woman, a teacher who completed her tertiary education abroad, said:

The women's groups were our main source of social contact when I was young. Even now, most of my socialising is done in the church, mainly with the women's groups with the other elders ... The group had many social responsibilities; it organised classes, promoted domestic skills ... and female members of the church used to go to women's houses to check on things ... We would check that houses were being cleaned properly, that there were no health concerns, that they were properly educated on different matters.⁴¹

Similar accounts of the importance of women's groups were given by other Chagga Lutheran women. Importantly, Chagga Lutheran pastors writing in *Umoja* also expressly rejected the idea of women as purely 'domestic beings'.⁴² In Kagera, where the Lutheran Church was less dominant, Haya women generally had less to say about the roles of these groups. This is not to say that they did not exist, but rather that they were potentially less influential due to the dominance of the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, some interviewees spoke of similar activities

⁴¹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, former schoolteacher, born 1945.

⁴² In an article from November 1957, Pastor K. Ephraim Amos wrote that the Chagga word for a woman, '*mkaa*', was related to the verb '*kukaa*', meaning 'to sit' or 'to stay'. He explained that the word referred to women's 'traditional' role of staying in the home, but celebrated the fact that Lutheran women – particularly those at the Lutheran World Federation meeting in Minneapolis – were no longer confining themselves to this ideology: 'Mjumbe Wa Kanisa Letu, Mchg. K. Ephraim Amos, Anatufurahisha Toka Mkutano Mkuu Wa Lutheran World Federation, Minneapolis, Amerika', *Umoja*, X:115 (November 1957), 3.

amongst Lutheran women's groups, suggesting that they could still have an impact on the lives of Lutheran Haya women.

Additionally, in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera, Lutheran women also reinforced the idea of a link between Lutheranism and capitalism, with many noting how Christian education, participation in church associations, and the examples set by male students and entrepreneurs in their communities encouraged them to pursue educational and economic opportunities of their own. As one female Haya Lutheran pastor put it: 'The Lutheran Church gave women here many opportunities that they did not have in the old days. They could learn, they could do business – things that were originally reserved for men ... [women] could be independent. Eventually, we even became pastors!'⁴³ Thus, women's associational life within the Lutheran Church was tied up with the politics of participation and 'glocal' notions of *maendeleo*, applying Western and local understandings of development and modernity to local contexts in an increasingly globalising world. At the same time, it promoted a sense of belonging to a community, reinforcing women's ties to those in their locality who shared their religion and affording some of them with a sense of equality that in many situations was a novelty.

Whilst these sorts of associational activities may have been more prevalent and visible in Lutheran congregations, it is important to recognise that Catholic women also spoke of the social support systems which grew out of women's groups in the church, albeit with less information about the formal structures and activities of such groups. For example, Catholic interviewees in both regions, but primarily in Kilimanjaro, noted how they were able to care for those in their local communities through their involvement with formal and informal church associations. As one Catholic woman in Kilimanjaro put it:

Because of the Church, we were able to organise ourselves to care for the less fortunate ... We would collect

⁴³ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, pastor.

donations, prepare food ... we would go to the poor people and the homeless people and provide for them ... We provided clothes which had been donated by members as well.⁴⁴

Moreover, as Birgitta Larsson's analysis of the Catholic Church in colonial Kagera demonstrates, the power structures governing gender relations were affected in no small part by the introduction of Catholic institutions.⁴⁵ As previous chapters have discussed, prior to the arrival of missionaries, women in Haya society were tied to their fathers, husbands, and kings; younger women in particular had very little scope for participation in the intellectual life of the community. With the introduction of Christian sanctuaries and schools for women in Kagera, men began to lose much of their control over women in society. Women started to seek refuge in mission stations, such as with the White Sisters, often to escape from pre-arranged marriages or from the royal court.⁴⁶ Missions mediated between women and the men who sought to control them, and a variety of educational opportunities became available to these women. Some learned domestic skills such as sewing, whilst others became catechumens and even, eventually, catechists.⁴⁷

Female Haya catechists, who followed the example of Ganda women who were aiding the White Sisters, were known as *bashomesa* ('those who make others read or pray'), and their influence in society was considerable from the 1930s onwards.⁴⁸ Not only did they teach in schools and care for the old and sick, but they were also able to baptise uneducated people who

⁴⁴ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, former schoolteacher, born 1943.

⁴⁵ B. Larsson, *Conversion to Greater Freedom: Women, Church and Social Change in North-Western Tanzania under Colonial Rule* (Uppsala, 1991).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 35-55

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 62-69; 169-179.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 71; Translation of *bashomesa* is that provided in Larsson's work.

were dying and who expressed a desire to become Christian.⁴⁹ Women's opportunities and roles in society had thus changed significantly due to the education and networks available to them. Larsson's study is very similar to the work of Dorothy Hodgson amongst the Maasai and Margaret Donaldson in South Africa, both of whom demonstrate that women across sub-Saharan Africa were often drawn to Christianity for similar reasons of community and social emancipation.⁵⁰ It is therefore possible to see how Christian associations and education provided Chaggas and Hayas of all social positions a way to reshape their roles in society, and in the process reorient how they interacted with their communities.

It is also important to mention the significance of women and women's associations to the religious development of the congregations of which they were a part, particularly in the Lutheran Church. Although, the example of *bashomesha* aside, women's spiritual roles in the Catholic Church were often limited, Lutheran women played a very active role in supporting the activities of the Lutheran Church long before any Chagga or Haya women were ordained as pastors. As several interviewees noted, women were responsible for supporting much of the domestic, pastoral, and spiritual work of the Church. They were the members of the congregations tasked with raising a disciplined younger generation imbued with Christian morals, as well as being the group responsible for maintaining domestic and community standards. However, it is evident that they were also important to the evangelisation effort and the building of churches and church institutions, particularly around Kilimanjaro. As one female Chagga Lutheran elder put it: 'Women were very active in developing the church here

⁴⁹ Ibid., 70-73.

⁵⁰ D. Hodgson, *The Church of Women: Gendered Encounters between Maasai and Missionaries* (Indiana University Press: 2005); M. Donaldson, 'Missionaries and the Liberation of Women: A Case Study from South Africa', *Journal of Theology for Southern Africa*, 53 (1985), 4-12.

... [they] raised money and donated it to the projects and helped to build churches all around the mountain.’⁵¹

The same woman stated that: ‘Women learned the Bible just like men, and they were involved in the message of spreading the Gospel.’⁵² It is worth mentioning here that the Northern Diocese of the ELCT in the mid-twentieth century had established its own missionary theatres in the lands to the west of Kilimanjaro amongst the Sonjo and Maasai people. Most of the missionaries and activists working to spread the Gospel and establish churches in this region appear to have been Chaggas, rather than Europeans, and news from the region was a regular feature of the pages of *Umoja*, the monthly newsletter of the diocese. Unsurprisingly, therefore, perhaps the best written evidence of women’s involvement in the social and spiritual life of the Lutheran Church can be found in this publication. Throughout the volumes of *Umoja* from the Nyerere years, the activities of Lutheran women are the focus of many articles and commentaries, many of which tell similar stories to those recounted by interviewees. Women’s representation in these publications increased from the 1950s onwards, so that by the 1970s, well into the *ujamaa* period, their contributions to the development of the church were regularly celebrated. In October 1970, for example, an article was devoted to reporting on a trip made by women from all over the diocese, including both Chaggas and non-Chaggas, to Naverera-Namalulu, whilst an article from 1971 celebrated their contribution of 50,000 bricks to a project to ‘build for God a house’ at Uraa-Shari in Machame.⁵³ Thus, women evidently had an important role in the development of the Lutheran Church and its missionary work on and

⁵¹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, accountant, born 1950.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ B. Kniest, ‘Safari ya Wanawake Naverera-Namalulu’, *Umoja*, XXII:263 (October 1970), 1-2; ‘Wanawake Wafyatua Matofali 50,000 – Uraa-Shari’, *Umoja*, XXII:265 (October 1971), 3.

around Kilimanjaro, and it appears that their influence and visibility became more conspicuous as time went on.

A final aspect of women's associational life in the churches, which relates to themes explored both in the previous chapter and in this one, and which was a feature of both the archival and oral evidence, was that of contact and exchange, both within and outside Tanzania. As was the case for the coffee co-operatives, Kilimanjaro again served as a centre of exchange in the Lutheran Church in particular, with Lutheran women and girls from all around the country coming to study on the mountain. Particularly in the 1950s, when the Northern Diocese – at that time the Lutheran Church of Northern Tanganyika (LCNT) – was responsible for a much larger area and more ethnic groups than it currently is, Lutheran parts of Kilimanjaro effectively served the educational needs of many of the peoples living near the Chagga.⁵⁴ However, as the words of one Lutheran pastor in Kagera suggest, Kilimanjaro's role in the Tanzanian Lutheran world was not limited to the Northern Diocese: 'The Northern Diocese was always leading the way in Tanzania ... men and women from Bukoba went to Kilimanjaro and Makumira to study and learn many types of skills.'⁵⁵ At the same time, Christian women from Kilimanjaro were also sent to other parts of the country for educational purposes; in 1958, for example, over half of the women at the Tanga Nurses Training School in the coastal town of Tanga were Lutheran women from the LCNT.⁵⁶

Amongst Catholic women in both regions, there was little sense of regional leadership. Rather, these interviewees spoke about how centralised Catholic girls' schools in various parts

⁵⁴ Evidence of this can be found in various volumes of *Umoja*. For example, in an issue from April 1959, statistics concerning the number of students from different regions such as the Usambara and Uzaramo studying at Mwika can be found: Milan de Lany, 'Skuli Zetu Fulani Zimetuzwa', *Umoja*, XII:131 (April 1959), 4.

⁵⁵ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, pastor.

⁵⁶ 'Habari Fupifupi Ya Kanisa Letu', *Umoja*, XI:120 (April 1958), 3.

of the country facilitated contact and exchange between Catholic students from all over Tanzania, in the same sort of way that nationalised schools provided this sort of exchange following the Arusha Declaration. This arguably helps to explain why both male and female interviewees in Kilimanjaro and Kagera believed that the Catholic education system was less affected by Nyerere's policies than was the Lutheran system, and why narratives of Lutheran resistance – and the greater levels of political dissent seen in the more Lutheran Kilimanjaro Region – are prevalent features of historical memory amongst conformist Christians. Interviewees in both regions also spoke about how women's groups in the churches – though particularly in the Lutheran Church – facilitated exchange with the world outside Tanzania, in much the same way as schools and hospitals did. Further evidence of this from Kilimanjaro can once again be found in the pages of *Umoja*, with articles detailing relationships between the Lutheran women's groups on Kilimanjaro and those from other countries around the world.⁵⁷ Significantly, these relationships and processes of exchange endured well into the *ujamaa* period. However, it is noticeable that, as the political situation in the country developed, women's religious groups also began having more to do with political associations such as the *Umoja wa Wanawake Tanzania* (UWT; 'Union of Tanzanian Women'), a women's wing of TANU established by Nyerere's colleague Bibi Titi Mohammed in 1962.⁵⁸ The dynamics and significance of these emerging relationships will be explored in more detail in the following chapters. What is important to stress here is that Christian women's educational, social, and vocational institutions provided spaces for individuals from different regions, communities, and organisations to come together and exchange knowledge and ideas, and this

⁵⁷ See, for example: 'Mwl. Daniel Mfinanga anamaliza kifungu chake cha nne Mkutano wa Maendeleo', *Umoja*, X:110 (June 1957), 2; 'Ephraim Amos', (November 1957), 1-3; 'Habari Fupi Fupi za Huko Na Huko', *Umoja*, XXII:273 (June 1972), 3-4.

⁵⁸ 'Habari Fupi Fupi Za Huko na Huko', *Umoja*, XXII:263 (October 1970), 4; 'Uhusiano wa U.W.T. na Idara ya Wanawake', *Umoja*, XXVI:314 (December 1975), 4.

aspect of the history of *maendeleo* has continued to play an important role in the historical memory of conformist Christian Chagga and Haya communities, even if these memories vary somewhat along denominational lines.

Christian Youth:

No analysis of socio-political thought in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, or indeed in Tanzania or Africa more generally, is complete without an exploration of philosophy amongst youth. Unfortunately, scholarship on Christian youth, like that on Christian women, is lacking in the historiography of Tanzania, especially where regional Christianities are concerned. Yet, as this section aims to demonstrate, neglecting these demographics risks losing sight of an important and dynamic element of the evolution of Tanzanian society. A particularly good justification for the study of youth culture in Africa has been made by the anthropologist Deborah Durham, who points out that youth ‘[enter] into political space in highly complex ways.’⁵⁹ She goes on to summarise astutely the important role of youth studies to academic analyses of wider social movements, stating that:

To pay attention to youth is to pay close attention to the topology of the social landscape—to power and agency; public, national, and domestic spaces and identities, and their articulation and disjunctures; memory, history, and sense of change; globalization and governance; gender and class.⁶⁰

In this section, it will become clear that several of these themes were indeed explored and expressed amongst youth in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. As the previous chapter showed, the churches and missionaries in these regions were particularly concerned with the lives of

⁵⁹ D. Durham, ‘Youth and the Social Imagination in Africa: Introduction to Parts 1 and 2’, *Anthropological Quarterly*, 73:3 (2000), 113.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

Chagga and Haya youth. A desire to stamp out ‘idleness’, as well as a preoccupation with maintaining ‘traditional’ ways of life which were deemed to be in line with Christian teachings meant that the Catholic and Lutheran churches devoted much time and energy to the next generation of Christians in both regions. Consequently, Christian youth associations were set up to support young members of the churches, and it was primarily through these groups that young Catholic and Lutheran Chaggas and Hayas interacted with those their own age and with the elders in their churches and communities. In both regions, many interviewees from both denominations spoke of the importance of these groups during their adolescence and young adulthood, with one Lutheran woman describing how ‘all our socialising was done in the church, in the youth groups and [later] the women’s groups’.⁶¹ Although it is not the focus of this section, it is worth noting that archival and oral sources show that the youth groups which were established in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera shared many of the features of women’s associations discussed in the previous section, particularly in the Lutheran Church. Like women’s groups and voluntary associations, youth groups were active in fundraising for the church and providing help to building projects, as well as providing a social group and source of support for individuals. Likewise, as was the case in schools, hospitals, women’s groups, and co-operative associations, it is evident that youth groups in the churches were often sites of contact and exchange, particularly with foreign youth groups and students.⁶²

For the purposes of this analysis, perhaps the most significant aspects of associational life amongst Christian youth during the Nyerere years are to be found in discussions concerning

⁶¹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, businesswoman, born 1947; It is worth noting, however, that a minority of both Lutheran and Catholic interviewees also stated that their own interactions with local Christian youth groups were limited, suggesting that the situation varied between communities even within the same dioceses.

⁶² This was made clear in multiple interviews in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera, where people spoke of the significance of cultural and intellectual exchange with visiting youth from Europe and North America, as well as through written correspondence.

morality, unity, social responsibility, and *maendeleo*. These themes were important both in the moral teachings that church leaders attempted to pass on to the younger generation and in the discussions that the youth were having amongst themselves. Generally speaking, moral teachings could be divided between those which addressed behaviour in the home, and those which addressed behaviour in the community. Where the home was concerned, moral teaching promoted the fostering of a good Christian family in both the Catholic and the Lutheran Church. As one Catholic priest stated: ‘The churches in this area spent a lot of time educating the youth about marriage and family. The Church relies on Christian households for strength and for unity, and it was important that every aspect of domestic life was in accordance with Christian teaching.’⁶³ Most moral guidance for the youth – particularly where it was published – was aimed at those in their late teens and early to mid-twenties. Consequently, both Catholic and Lutheran interviewees noted that the teachings which younger children received, such as to be good to their parents and obedient in the home, tended to be spoken, whilst those for older youth who were expected to be starting families were more often published and circulated. It is therefore unsurprising that the issues of *Umoja* from throughout the Nyerere period contain articles providing moral guidance on the correct etiquette for courting, the importance of marriage in Church, and the necessity of maintaining morally good Christian households.⁶⁴

However, it is interesting that just as much, if not more, attention was paid to the morality of youth in the community. Church leaders in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera were very concerned with how younger Christians acted in society. This was particularly true when it

⁶³ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, priest.

⁶⁴ The worry that not enough youth were attending or marrying in the Lutheran Church was a recurring theme in *Umoja*. The Church was conscious that many young Lutherans felt the costs of contributing to collections during services or paying for weddings were too high, and so young couples were encouraged to attend and marry in church regardless of personal wealth; See, for example: ‘Kwa nini kutoroshana’, *Umoja*, XXVII:315 (January 1976), 2.

came to the topic of alcohol and drunkenness, especially in Kilimanjaro. Interviewees, both Catholic and Lutheran, noted the strict teachings around alcohol which church elders imparted in both regions. Alcohol and drunkenness were believed to lead to crime, adultery, idleness and the breakdown of Christian households, and the sale of alcohol by businesses was criticised by the churches. Likewise, where traditional, pre-Christian ceremonies placed an emphasis on the consumption of home-brewed alcohol, the churches could come into conflict with local customs. However, a few interviewees also suggested that one of the reasons the warnings about alcohol were not particularly well-heeded in the community was that junior pastors and priests would regularly partake in community drinks when their superiors were not present. So concerned was the Lutheran Church with this issue throughout the Nyerere period that drunkenness and the immorality and crime it fostered was probably the most common topic in articles aimed at youth in *Umoja*. In one article from 1954, the anonymous author stated that ‘These twins, alcohol and drunkenness, have the agenda of taking control of the country and of sending it backwards.’⁶⁵ Pastor Mesiaki E. Kilevo, meanwhile, writing sixteen years later, argued that drunkenness would lead to a rise in the number of illegitimate children, who in turn would cost the nation much more money than it could possibly raise in alcohol licences.⁶⁶

The key to solving the problems associated with alcohol and idleness, and to combatting moral failings such as untruthfulness and crime, was, according to the churches, to emphasise education, unity, good leadership and *maendeleo*. Education was particularly important,

⁶⁵ ‘Pombe na Ulevi Adui wa Watu’, *Umoja*, VII:70 (February 1954), 1; Note that the word ‘country’ is translated from the Swahili ‘*nchi*’, a word which was used to mean both the lands of particular groups and the wider state. Thus, ‘country’ in this context could refer to either the lands of the Lutheran Church around Kilimanjaro or to Tanganyika more generally, or indeed to both.

⁶⁶ Mch. Mesiaki E. Kilevo, ‘Kanisa na Wajibu Wake wa Kinabii Katika Jamii ya Leo’, *Umoja*, XXII:261 (August 1970), 3; further examples of the Lutheran Church’s concerns over alcohol, partying and drunkenness from even later in the Nyerere period can be found at: ‘Vuta Macho ya Vijana’, *Umoja*, XXII:289 (October 1973), 2; Mch. M.F. Shao, ‘Ulevi’, *Umoja*, XXVIII:340 (February 1978), 2.

according to interviewees, because it led to stable employment and good moral character. One Catholic man from Kagera stated that: ‘Attending school gave pupils skills and morals, and enabled them to get good jobs ... it stopped people from becoming idle in their youth and causing trouble.’⁶⁷ Durham argues, in common with a number of scholars, that the rhetoric of a ‘lost generation’ has often been used as a way to galvanise and radicalise youth movements, particularly at moments of immense social and political change, and it is arguable that the churches in Kilimanjaro and Kagera were conscious of such a danger.⁶⁸ Clearly aware of the potential risks of an aimless youth, and keen to avoid generational conflict which might threaten stability, they ran a range of seminars for older youth who had finished school which were designed to address their specific needs and to train future leaders. This was particularly true in the post-independence and socialist eras.⁶⁹ The provision of church-facilitated seminars became an integral part of the nation-building project and the notion of ‘*kujitegemea*’ (‘self-sufficiency’), which is explored further in the next two chapters. The Lutheran Church also established associations for younger children who had completed their primary education but had failed to gain places at middle schools, arguing that it was the responsibility of the Christian community to support youth whose prospects were challenging.⁷⁰

In addition, interviewees highlighted the fact that the churches and Christian leaders were keen to stress the importance of unity and good leadership. The first of these – unity –

⁶⁷ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, businessman, born 1945; Similar arguments were published in *Umoja*: ‘Maoni ya Komiti ya Kanisa: Sababu za Uhalifu Kuzidi’, *Umoja*, VI:59 (March 1953), 3.

⁶⁸ Durham, ‘Youth’, 118.

⁶⁹ Almost all interviewees from both denominations mentioned the running of youth seminars, and there is an abundance of references to them in *Umoja*. See, for example: ‘Habari Fupi Fupi za Huko na Huko’, *Umoja*, XXII:260 (July 1970), 4; ‘Semina ya Vijana-Shia’, *Umoja*, XXII:263 (August 1971), 4; ‘Viongozi wa Vijana wahudhuria Semina’, *Umoja*, XXIV:294 (March 1974), 2.

⁷⁰ ‘Mwl. Daniel Mfinanga anamaliza kifungu chake cha nne Mkutano wa Maendeleo’, *Umoja*, X:110 (June 1957), 2.

was to be found in the congregation at large as well as in the women's and youth associations affiliated with the churches. As one Catholic Chagga woman put it: '*Umoja* (unity) was a main part of the church which kept it strong ... We were strong because we were together and could guide one another.'⁷¹ Where leadership was concerned, churches emphasised the need for individuals who could guide communities both morally and intellectually. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, interviewees recounted how pastors and priests came to replace chiefs and lineage heads as the moral guides of their communities. However, they also spoke of the increasing importance of lay leaders, particularly teachers and church elders. Indeed, teachers became major players throughout Tanganyika and Tanzania in the years leading up to independence and in the nation-building era following it. One Catholic priest from Kagera summarised their position in the following words: 'Teachers were very important members of the community. They were well-educated, they had sometimes studied abroad ... they understood *maendeleo* and were active leaders in many areas of society.'⁷² In Kilimanjaro, the pages of *Umoja* were also careful to highlight the important role of teachers in community leadership, especially amongst the youth. For example, in one article from 1956, Shedrack E. Ngowi argued that:

The teachers of this church are examples for Christian citizens and other people in the country, thus they must be mindful to maintain their dignity and act in good faith to promote Christian knowledge.⁷³

Well-educated Christians, regardless of profession, were also called on to guide their communities, in both spiritual and secular matters. Three years before Ngowi's article, *Umoja* had encouraged Christians to pray for 'our Christian friends who live and study in distant lands so that when they return home they can instil Christian leadership in their church and their

⁷¹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, former secretary, born 1937.

⁷² Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest.

⁷³ Shedrack E. Ngowi, 'Lutheran Teachers League (LTL)', *Umoja*, IX:102 (October 1956), 3.

country'.⁷⁴ At all times, *maendeleo* in various forms was being promoted as a way of supporting the youth, the church, the community and the country. Moreover, it was believed that *maendeleo* would not only foster education, unity, and good leadership, but would also be strengthened and renewed through these virtues.

Importantly, both oral and written sources make it clear that moral guidance and good leadership was not just about enabling the youth to be good Christians, but also about ensuring that they grew into and inspired their peers to be good *raia* ('citizens'). This, in turn, would ensure *maendeleo* continued. However, church elders also believed that this was a reciprocal phenomenon, and that the teaching of good citizenship would help to promote better morality in communities.⁷⁵ It should be noted here that the linking of good citizenship with associational life was not limited to youth organisations. As various scholars note, and as the previous section of this chapter touched on indirectly, 'good citizenship' and what it entailed, as well as how this could be fostered within voluntary associations focused on *maendeleo*, was an important part of socio-political discourse amongst all social groups.⁷⁶ However, in Christian circles in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, it is certainly true that overt discussions of 'good citizenship' were particularly conspicuous in youth associations and publications. As one Catholic woman in Kilimanjaro stated: 'We were taught to be clever, good and respectable ... for ourselves and our families, for the Church, but also for our communities and the nation.'⁷⁷ Similarly, in one

⁷⁴ No Title, *Umoja*, VI:64 (August 1953), 1.

⁷⁵ In one *Umoja* article, the lack of '*Somo la uraia*' ('study of citizenship') was listed as a contributing reason for a growth in crime in the early 1950s: 'Maoni ya Komiti ya Kanisa', *Umoja*, VI:59 (March 1953), 3.

⁷⁶ See: E. Hunter, 'Dutiful Subjects, Patriotic Citizens, and the Concept of 'Good Citizenship' in Twentieth-Century Tanzania', *The Historical Journal*, 56:1 (2013), 257-277; Hunter, 'Voluntarism', 43-61; Hunter, *Political Thought*; R. Marsland, 'Community Participation the Tanzanian Way: Conceptual Contiguity or Power Struggle?', *Oxford Development Studies*, 34:1 (2006), 65-79; P. Lal, 'Self-Reliance and the State: The Multiple Meanings of Development in Early Post-Colonial Tanzania', *Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute*, 82:2 (2012), 212-234.

⁷⁷ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, shopkeeper, born 1951.

passage from an article addressing alcohol and drunkenness, the unnamed author exhorted his readers to ‘fulfil the good citizenship (*uraia mwema*) of our countries’ to combat poor morals and improve the situation in Tanganyikan communities.⁷⁸ However, it is important to note that the pages of *Umoja* and other newspapers show that the word ‘*raia*’ (‘citizen’) was versatile and applied differently in different contexts. Several scholars have noted the dynamic use of the word from the early 1950s onwards. Hunter, for example, has shown that the term was a matter of significant debate, particularly in Kilimanjaro amongst politically active members of the Chagga Council and the KNCU.⁷⁹ For some, *raia* was a term of subservience closer to ‘subject’ which was no longer appropriate following independence.⁸⁰ However, even amongst those who understood the word to mean ‘citizen’, there was debate over what sort of citizenship this was; some favoured a ‘Chagga citizenship’, whilst others favoured a Tanganyikan – and later Tanzanian – citizenship.⁸¹ In Lutheran circles, it is arguable that the definition of *uraia* (‘citizenship’), which was so central to discussions about youth and morality, was deliberately left open to interpretation in order to allow for a dynamic understanding of the term. Certainly, in the examples given here and throughout the pages of Christian publications from the era under investigation, it is evident that being a good *raia* was not simply limited to ideas of national citizenship. Rather, it entailed local, regional, national, international, religious, and secular responsibilities and ways of belonging. However, it would be simplistic to call this a ‘hybridised’ or ‘syncretic’ form of citizenship. Instead, it is arguable that the *uraia* spoken of in Christian publications often, though not always, displayed what Devaka Premawardhana

⁷⁸ ‘Pombe na Ulevi Adui wa Watu’, *Umoja*, VII:70 (February 1954), 1.

⁷⁹ E. Hunter, ‘Dutiful Subjects, Patriotic Citizens, and the Concept of ‘Good Citizenship’ in Twentieth-Century Tanzania’, *The Historical Journal*, 56:1 (2013), 257-277.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 271.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 270.

terms ‘polyontological mobility’.⁸² In his exploration of Christianity amongst the Makhuwa people of Northern Mozambique, Premawardhana argues that Makhuwa Christians move easily between different beliefs and ways of being which are distinct and compartmentalised. In a similar way, the forms of citizenship amongst many Chagga and Haya Christians could be expressed as distinct and whole ways of belonging in and of themselves, rather than as separate parts of a single identity. These ways of belonging were in turn reinforced and moulded through the frameworks for unity and exchange provided to youth and other groups by the churches.

Whilst it is clear from the examples above that Christian elders were keen to pass wisdom on to the Christian youth, it is also true that the youth were discussing many of these topics amongst themselves. Like Christian women’s groups, it appears that youth groups associated with the Lutheran Church were generally far more visible and active than were youth groups associated with the Catholic Church. In Kagera, where the Catholic Church was and is more dominant, interviewees reported that both churches had strong youth communities, but that the youth in the Lutheran Church had more of a voice. As one woman put it: ‘The Lutheran youth were always much louder than the Catholics’.⁸³ So active were the Lutheran associations that by the mid-1950s, in both regions, newsletters aimed exclusively at the youth had been established. Both publications were written in Swahili, though it is interesting that the youth newspaper in Kilimanjaro was called simply *Vijana*, the Swahili word for ‘Youth’, whilst the newspaper in Kagera employed a Luhaya name: *Omushubiro*. This was also the name of the local youth union. According to Bishop Abednego Keshomshahara, the current head of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania’s (ELCT) North-Western Diocese, ‘*Omushubiro*

⁸² D. Premawardhana, *Faith in Flux, Pentecostalism and Mobility in Rural Mozambique* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018).

⁸³ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, former secretary, born 1944. It is also worth noting that only the Lutheran Church had accessible archival records detailing youth associations and their activities, both in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, when the fieldwork for this project was undertaken.

literally means “Hope”. In this context it meant Christian youths as hope of the church and community.⁸⁴ Here, then, the idea that the youth needed to be guided, and their ideas properly cultivated, to enable them to lead the churches and their communities was made explicit in the naming of a youth union and its newspaper. That it was named *Omushubiro*, rather than *Tumaini*, the Swahili word for ‘Hope’, further reinforced the idea that the youth were an integral part of the local Haya church and community, even if the local Lutheran Church included some non-Haya members. *Vijana*, by contrast, was most likely given a Swahili name because the LCNT originally catered to a greater number of ethnic groups, where the Chagga were merely the most visible in the church and its associations.

Vijana and *Omushubiro* followed slightly different formats. *Vijana*, arguably the more cultivated of the two newspapers, particularly in the 1950s, was very similar to *Umoja*, as might be expected given that they were published by the same diocese. There were sections reporting on news and developments in the diocese, articles by pastors and youth leaders, and published letters from student members of the youth associations. Topics such as courting, marriage, employment, education, and morality were very common in *Vijana* articles, as they were in *Umoja*, but the key difference here was that the youth took part in discussing them. To give an example, a particularly striking window into the thinking of Lutheran youth in Kilimanjaro in the early 1960s comes from a letter published in *Vijana* in October 1961 written by a young Chagga woman called Y.K. Justo Sway. In it she had the following to say:

Often young people do not understand the details of our lives and how we destroy them in the fires of hell. We are often ruled by evils such as falsehood, drunkenness, adultery, robbery, childish folly, dances that arouse evil desires and other things that are contrary to God's great commandments. These sins have ruled almost everyone, from young to old.

⁸⁴ Correspondence with Bishop Dr. Abednego Nkamuhabwa Keshomshahara, 03/04/2020.

...

What is an antidote to evil? I believe the remedy that will heal us of this illness of the fires of hell is *to study the Word of God in the Bible* [and to seek] the support of our pastors.⁸⁵

Sway's letter is a demonstration of the contributions which youth – including women and girls – could make to the conversations and teachings of the Lutheran Church in Kilimanjaro, contributions which could be shared through the associational structures and publications provided by the Church.

Omushubiro, meanwhile, devoted most of its space to reporting on news from around the diocese, educating readers in matters pertaining to the Church such as the meanings of different hymns, and publishing letters from students studying abroad. The newsletter was particularly concerned with schools and development, as well as with community events such as school sports days. However, it also published pieces touching on serious issues such as the role of youth in mission. One article written by a Lutheran youth from Bukoba named Andrea Shumbusho, for example, called on youth to make themselves available to help God as a worker on his '*shamba*' ('farm'), as Jeremiah had done.⁸⁶ Unity and leadership were also important topics of discussion. In one article from late 1961, for example, readers were encouraged to help the needy, with the paper reminding them that 'Omushubiro of Buhaya is a union of great people together with little people, who want to serve Lord Jesus however they can'.⁸⁷

In another article published in February 1963 titled 'The Strength of Parties is the Members Themselves', Willison Lugakingila stressed the need for individuals to follow the

⁸⁵ Y.K. Justo Sway, 'Barua na Maoni ya Waandishi wetu...: Unakubali kuangamiza Roho yako Jehanum?', *Vijana*, 33 (October 1961), 2-3.

⁸⁶ A. Shumbusho, 'Yesu ana Mahitaji nasi Vijana', *Omushubiro* (no month, no year), 1.

⁸⁷ 'Yanayowapasa wa Umoja wa Omushubiro', *Omushubiro*, 22-23 (November-December 1961), 2.

rules and work towards the goals of *Omushubiro* since ‘the good and the bad of a party depends on the party members themselves.’⁸⁸ Lugakingila also highlighted the need for strong, effective leadership, *maendeleo* and Christian education, whilst rebuking members for neglecting their responsibilities to the party. The article is quite striking in tone, and its rhetoric possibly alludes to the political situation elsewhere in the newly independent Tanganyikan state. Indeed, perhaps the most interesting feature of *Omushubiro* more generally is the much more noticeable politicisation of its content following independence when compared with *Vijana* and *Umoja*. The reason for this is unclear, though it may have something to do with the fact that Haya conformist Christian interviewees generally considered independence and Nyerere’s leadership to have represented a greater break with the past than did Chagga Christians, as the following chapters discuss further.

For the purposes of this chapter, however, it is evident that in Kagera, as in Kilimanjaro, Lutheran youth were actively participating in discussions concerning morality, Christianity, and associational life. Unfortunately, the surviving issues of *Vijana* and *Omushubiro* which were accessible when the fieldwork for this thesis was undertaken were limited to the period between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s. However, interviews with Chagga and Haya individuals indicated that these discussions amongst the youth carried on well into the socialist era of the 1970s, not only in Lutheran communities, but in Catholic ones too. One Catholic woman, for example, stated: ‘We were always talking amongst ourselves, very seriously, about what it meant to be a good Christian and a good Tanzanian’.⁸⁹ The main difference between Catholic and Lutheran youth, according to this interviewee and others, was that the Catholic youth were generally ‘less political’, and that they also had much less influence with church elders and leaders. Nevertheless, it is evident that the networks provided by the churches

⁸⁸ W. Lugakingila, ‘Nguvu za Chama ni Wanachama Wenyewe’, *Omushubiro*, 33 (February 1963), 1-2.

⁸⁹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former schoolteacher, born 1952.

facilitated the exchange of socio-political discourse amongst youth of both denominations at a time of great change and political dynamism. However, once again, it is important to remember that, like agricultural co-operatives, women's groups and youth groups, along with the moral values and *maendeleo* they promoted, were ultimately believed by most interviewees to have been damaged by Nyerere's nationalist project and the governments which followed, as the following chapters explore. As such, the fact that themes such as morality, the free exchange of ideas, and high levels of local development were central to interviewees' testimonies, as well as the great degree of consensus seen in these interviews, need to be understood within the context of a broader narrative in conformist Christian memory where Christian values were contrasted against the moral decline not only of Nyerere's presidency, but also – and, indeed, particularly – of John Magufuli's Tanzania. Thus, there remains in these communities great nostalgia for the 'more Christian' past depicted in these sorts of memories, as well as a focus on the resistance that the churches, especially the Lutheran Church, provided against ideas imposed from outside.

Conclusion:

This chapter has explored how Christianity, through its institutions, resources, and teaching, contributed to the evolution of associational life in Kilimanjaro, Kagera, and Tanzania more generally. The chapter builds on the theme of Christian-influenced *maendeleo*, showing that Christian institutions and thought systems were vital not only to the development of education, healthcare, and commerce, as outlined in the previous chapter, but also to how people organised themselves and pursued their own versions of progress and modernity. Thus, in much the same way that Christianity provided the tools through which Chagga and Haya culture could be edited, it also facilitated the economic and social development of these regions, shaping ideas

concerning modernity and relationships with other peoples, religions, and regions in the process. As such, this analysis echoes the work of Sally Falk Moore in illustrating how Christianity provided a framework for voluntarism by establishing communities for all members of the churches in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, where individuals could belong to a larger, mutually supportive community which was more egalitarian than traditional society. At the same time, however, it is necessary to situate this analysis within a wider body of scholarship which has also shown the important secular influences behind the growth of local associations in Tanzania and Africa more generally. This study, then, aims to supplement these studies by focusing on the importance of Christian influences in this movement.

In the secular coffee co-operatives that developed in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, it is possible to see a number of Christian influences. Firstly, the Christian missions were responsible for developing coffee as a cash crop in both regions, setting an example for Chagga and Haya producers. Secondly, in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera, these co-operatives were administered primarily by mission-educated men, many of whom had close links with local religious leaders. Thirdly, it could be argued that the leaders of these co-operatives drew, at least in part, on the ontological and development-focused teachings of Christian missions in their societies, promoting the idea of belonging as equals to a community and encouraging *maendeleo*. This Christian-influenced collective ontology, one in which individualism could be harnessed in a community-oriented manner for the benefit of society at large, is a prominent feature of historical memory amongst conformist Christian Chaggas and Hayas, as is the idea of well-educated Christians becoming increasingly involved in religious and secular associations and co-operatives. It is thus clear that coffee could not be separated from Christianity, either in its origin as a cash crop or in the associational politics which grew up around it. As the following chapters demonstrate, the links between co-operative leaders, Christian leaders, and emerging political leaders in Kilimanjaro and Kagera would go on to

have a lasting impact on regional and national society. However, these chapters also explore how, because influential voluntary associations tended to be dominated by well-educated Christians from particularly well-developed parts of the country, they exacerbated religious and regional disparities, with non-Christians and certain ethnic groups left at a significant disadvantage in the pre-independence and immediate post-independence eras. The societal tensions which such inequalities helped to foment would contribute to significant shifts in Tanzanian educational, development and political policies, and a reimagining of the meaning of *maendeleo*, which in turn would shape how these subjects were discussed in Christian communities.

This chapter has also shown the importance of analysing associational life outside of well-studied co-operatives, and how this allows for a better understanding of groups which have sometimes been neglected in academic literature. Associational life was just as important in the churches themselves, which were particularly concerned with the involvement of women and youth, perhaps because these groups were arguably more susceptible to the sort of social discord that Christian leaders wanted to avoid than were the older men in Chagga and Haya communities. Moreover, for many women and youth before independence and the socialist era, the associational life offered by the churches was often the main form of collectivism available to them, since non-religious associations tended to be dominated by established men. For both women and youth, associational life thus offered avenues for social mobility and emancipation, education, and national and international exchange. It also allowed these groups a voice in the discussions concerning the direction of their faith and communities, though this was truer in the Lutheran Church than in the Catholic Church. The provision of moral guidance and practical life skills, as well as the promotion of a type of lived Christianity which would shape every facet of Christians' public and private lives, were aspects of women's and youth groups which were designed to cultivate 'good citizens' focused on the need for *maendeleo* in wider

society. These good citizens, who could belong simultaneously to a range of communities and places, could in turn be relied upon to uphold and spread Christian teachings.

Finally, it is worth concluding here with a comment on the features of historical memory in Kilimanjaro and Kagera associated with *maendeleo* and associational life. Just as was the case in the last chapter, memories of this subject across both regions and denominations were strikingly uniform, with no significant contestations in the oral sources utilised. However, where historical memory in conformist Chagga and Haya circles is concerned, this chapter and the last have nevertheless highlighted three important trends amongst interviewees. Firstly, *maendeleo* is inextricably tied to Christianity in both regions and in both denominations, and it is often contrasted with ‘anti-*maendeleo*’ understandings of Islam and remembered alongside divisions between Christians and Muslims. Secondly, the *maendeleo* associated with Lutheranism – both in its capitalistic nature and in its greater capacity for building associations composed of equals – is presented by people in these communities as more dynamic and political than Catholic *maendeleo*, and thus more likely to facilitate debate and dissent. Finally, memories of *maendeleo* in the Nyerere years are tied up in broader, long-standing ideas concerning the fortunes of the churches and their relationship with the state since independence, as well as the fortunes of the Chagga and Haya. As such, consensus and nostalgia must be contextualised against a general narrative of government repression, moral decline, and church-facilitated resistance.

Chapter 5:

Secularism, Nationalism, and Nation-Building

Introduction:

Previous chapters explored regional developments in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, and their relationship with Christian institutions and teachings. In this chapter and the next, the focus shifts to socio-political ideas at the national level, using Kilimanjaro and Kagera as case studies to understand how Christians engaged with the emergence of nationalism and associated philosophies. This chapter argues that Christianity was central to socio-political thought in the late-colonial and early post-colonial Nyerere years, showing that Christian ideology influenced how people discussed and interpreted nationalist philosophy prior to the 1967 Arusha Declaration, and illustrating how Christian institutions played an important role in facilitating discussion and debate on this subject. It also shows that Christian-Muslim relations, as well as denominational and regional differences, influenced both how this debate was conducted, and how it has been remembered in conformist Christian Chagga and Haya circles.

Whilst contestations of memory in these communities are perhaps more evident on this topic – and on the topic of African Socialism discussed in the following chapter – than they were on the subject of Christian *maendeleo*, as explored in the previous two chapters, it should be stressed that such contestations at a communal level were also minor, and that differences in individual experiences were often more evident than differences between denominational or ethnic groups. That said, even different opinions and experiences at a personal level did not detract from the level of consensus concerning communal history and how wider society in Kilimanjaro and Kagera experienced and thought about nationalism. Thus, the tensions between personal memory and communal memory, as outlined in the introduction to this thesis, must be borne in mind when interpreting the oral sources quoted below.

Following the Second World War and the establishment of independent states in Asia and North Africa, nationalist movements gained prominence in sub-Saharan Africa. Led primarily by educated African men who had often worked in administrative roles for colonial governments, many of whom attended mission schools and overseas universities, nationalism seized on increasing dissatisfaction with colonial rule and a renewed focus on egalitarianism, whilst simultaneously building on pan-nationalist philosophies.¹ Consequently, by 1970, most French, Italian, Spanish, British, and Belgian territories in Africa had become independent. Portuguese colonies achieved independence following the Carnation Revolution in 1974, whilst smaller French and British island territories like the Comoros and Seychelles also saw their independence delayed until the mid-1970s. The pace at which nationalist movements developed surprised colonial administrators who, even after accepting the inevitability of decolonisation, had expected the process to take significantly longer. Partly, this was because they had not realised the extent to which colonial subjects were increasingly amenable to unified national identities and the idea of independence. They also underestimated charismatic leaders like Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah, Léopold Senghor and Sékou Touré, who utilised grassroots activism and pre-existing associational structures to reinforce the nationalist message and to construct powerful personal followings. Thus, as hard as colonial powers fought to slow the tide of nationalism, they were unable to counter what had become an unstoppable force all over the continent.

However, independence was not the end goal of nationalism. Indeed, in some ways, the socio-political philosophies of these movements were developed most fully in the two decades after independence. The focus of nationalism shifted from independence to ‘nation-building’,

¹ For more on earlier pan-nationalism, see: C. Aydin, ‘Pan-Nationalism of Pan-Islamic, Pan-Asian, and Pan-African Thought’, in J. Breuilly (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 672-693.

a series of projects designed to strengthen, maintain, and protect the ‘national unity’ which had been built, whilst also attempting to create distinct national and political identities in states which were ethno-linguistically and religiously diverse and, often, polarised. Whilst the philosophies, tactics and actors involved varied significantly across Africa, nation-building often consisted of similar elements.² Some countries, like Tanzania, became single-party or dominant-party states, and increasingly authoritarian regimes, often centred around the figures who had led independence campaigns, became commonplace. Political freedoms were curtailed, whilst any forms of opposition which were judged to be threatening to the nation-building project were repressed. Moreover, nationalism faced increasingly fierce competition from the other forms of identity it had faced prior to independence, such as religion and ethnicity. Consequently, a conscious attempt was often made to deconstruct ethnic identities in favour of national ones.

African nationalism has, perhaps unsurprisingly, been the focus of much of the scholarship concerning the continent, particularly in the fields of history and political science. Whilst some of this work is discussed in the analysis below, it is worth outlining some of its primary themes and drawbacks here. It is arguable that scholarship on nationalism has suffered, to a certain extent, from a theoretical homogenisation due to the speed at which a large proportion of Africa became independent at roughly the same time; there was – and often still is – a tendency to assess nationalism thematically across the continent, drawing interesting parallels but simultaneously obscuring crucial differences. Where the study of religion in politics is concerned, similar methodologies have often been taken, with scholars attempting

² B.J. Berman and J.M. Lonsdale, ‘Nationalism in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa’, in J. Breuilly (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 308-317; B.J. Berman, ‘Nationalism in Post-Colonial Africa’, in J. Breuilly (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 359-376; J. Lonsdale, ‘Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa’, *The Journal of African History*, 9:1 (1968), 119-146.

to devise theoretical models to understand the phenomenon at a continent-wide – or even global – level.³ Whilst such scholarship provides important insights into the relationship between religion and nationalist movements in Africa, it nevertheless compounds the issue of a dearth of focused regional histories. In the study of Tanzanian history, particularly by non-Tanzanians, religion's role in the nationalist movement has not been given the same level of attention as it has received elsewhere in Africa, and in the few analyses which have examined the history of religion and Tanzanian nationalism, the focus has generally been on church-state relations and the history of Christian institutions, most often at a national level. Subaltern and grassroots studies for this period are thus noticeably lacking, and the voices of lay Christians in socio-politically distinct regions have been neglected.⁴

Consequently, this chapter gives a space to these voices, analysing Christianity and Tanzanian nationalism in three parts. The first discusses Tanzanian secularism and how it has been remembered by conformist Christians, showing that it has become associated with the nationalising project of the Nyerere regime despite having more complex foundations. The second section looks at the rise of nationalism during the period before independence, when Nyerere and his followers attempted to create a unified, anti-colonial movement throughout Tanganyika. The final section assesses the nationalist project in the early post-independence years, during the initial part of the nation-building era of Nyerere's presidency. Christians and

³ For example: J. Haynes, *Religion and Politics in Africa* (London: Zed Books, 1996); A. Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Hastings' book is particularly ambitious, attempting to present a unified analysis of nationalism at the global level, using 'England' as the prototypical nation. See also: S. Ellis and G. ter Haar, 'Religion and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36:2 (1998), 175-201; S. Ellis and G. ter Haar, 'Religion and Politics: Taking African Epistemologies Seriously', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45:3 (2007), 385-401.

⁴ A notable exception is the work of Derek Peterson, who has shown how East African Revivalists in north western Tanganyika could offer a non-nationalist vision of society in the face of increasingly powerful nationalism: D. Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival: A History of Dissent, 1935-1972* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

religious institutions interacted with nationalism and nation-building in complicated yet important ways which have often been overlooked. Thus, how these processes affected and were influenced by Christian institutions, practices and thinking in Kilimanjaro and Kagera will be the focus of this section. However, some attention will also be given to how religion – both Christian and non-Christian – and nationalism interacted at the national level.

Tanzanian Secularism:

Secularism has a complex history in Tanzania but is remembered by many in the country as a legacy of the Nyerere years and the nation-building campaign. Discussions about Tanzanian religion and politics often emphasise the strictly secular nature of the Tanzanian constitution and the drive – led by the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and its successor *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM: ‘Party of the Revolution’) – to reinforce the idea of Tanzania as a secular nation. This is partly because, both before and after independence, Nyerere and his followers were vocal in their promotion of a secular political system. For example, at a public TANU meeting in Dar es Salaam in 1958, Nyerere told the crowd that he had expelled Selemani Takadiri from his position in TANU ‘because Takadiri had raised a religious dispute within the Party’, warning that he and other TANU leaders would not tolerate the mixing of religion and politics.⁵ Nyerere used the example of India and Pakistan to illustrate the potentially fatal consequences that such a mixing could provoke. Thus, in the same way that he and TANU wanted an independent Tanganyika to be non-racial and non-ethnic, it also had to be non-religious, at least at a structural level. Nationalism had been built on cooperation between

⁵ Factel, DSM, to Secintel, DSM, ‘T.A.N.U. Dar es Salaam’ (12/10/1958), TNA-UK: CO 822/1362/E230/1, 7.

peoples of varying faiths and ethnicities, and the new nation needed to ensure the continuation of this cooperation.

However, Tanganyikan secularism actually predated TANU. The colonial British administration did not promote any religion or denomination, and though there was a small Anglican community which included many British officials, most African and European Christians in Tanganyika were Catholic or Lutheran due to the missionary foundations laid under German rule. As preceding chapters showed, British officials were also keen to downplay the potential uses of religion to influence politics, whilst care was taken to uphold the rights of peoples of different religions and to quell disquiet between faiths and denominations. This pre-independence promotion of secularism has been noted by scholars like Emma Hunter, who shows that public uses of religion were discouraged long before the British withdrew from Tanganyika.⁶ At the same time, Hunter argues that religion's 'unofficial' public role was pervasive and important, stating that religion was 'both everywhere and nowhere' in political thought and discourse.⁷ As is shown below, this continued following independence. Thus, secularism was not new at the time of independence, but was in fact a continuation of a precedent established under European rule.

The true origins of Tanzanian secularism aside, it is nevertheless significant that a belief that it was Nyerere and his government who turned Tanzania into a secular nation continues to be prevalent in the country. This argument is expressed by Tanzanian scholars like Salvatory Nyanto and Evaristi Magotti, who have suggested that both Islam and Christianity – particularly Anglicanism – enjoyed a status similar to state religions under the German and

⁶ E. Hunter, *Political Thought and the Public Sphere in Tanzania: Freedom, Democracy and Citizenship in the Era of Decolonization* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 30-31.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 30.

British administrations respectively, and that it was not until independence that true secularism and religious freedom became government policy.⁸ However, more importantly for the current analysis, this belief was also shared by the majority of people interviewed for this study. Moreover, it was a view expressed both by interviewees who were broadly supportive of Nyerere and his policies and by those who were more critical of him and the nationalist project, and it was presented by members of each of these groups as both a good and bad legacy of his rule. Two key factors can explain this phenomenon. Firstly, the public memory of Nyerere as the '*Baba wa Taifa*' ('Father of the Nation') tends to ascribe to Nyerere and his leadership the foundations of much of the modern Tanzanian state, particularly where these are deemed to be positive. Following Nyerere's death, this process was reinforced, so that an official memory of Nyerere as a benevolent father-figure was fed into the public realm.⁹ A second reason for the perceived novelty of secularism following independence was the very successful self-promotion of TANU and CCM. Nation-building relied heavily on informing the people of the party's philosophies and achievements, and the belief that Tanganyika, and later Tanzania, should be a country where religion played no overt part in politics was regularly stressed by Nyerere and his followers. Thus, secularism has become part of the memory of Nyerere, nationalism, and nation-building in the public mind.

To understand Tanzanian secularism and people's perceptions of it, two key questions must be addressed. Firstly, the nature of the secularism which developed in Tanzanian society must be established. In much the same way that global religions vary in their nature according

⁸ S. Nyanto, 'Religion and State in Tanzania: A Historical Perspective with Reference to the White Fathers in Buha and Unyamwezi, 1878-1990s', in T. Ndaluka and F. Wijzen (eds.), *Religion and State in Tanzania Revisited: Reflections from 50 Years of Independence* (Zurich/Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2014), 31-46; E. Magotti, 'Relationship between the State and African Religion in Tanzania', in T. Ndaluka and F. Wijzen (eds.), *Religion and State in Tanzania Revisited: Reflections from 50 Years of Independence* (Zurich/Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2014), 149-170.

⁹ F. Becker, 'Remembering Nyerere: Political Rhetoric and Dissent in Contemporary Tanzania', *African Affairs*, 112:447 (2013), 238-261. The final chapter of this dissertation will analyse this phenomenon in more detail.

to local contexts, secularism is a phenomenon shaped by its surroundings. Fundamentally, the word ‘secular’ refers to that which is separated from the spiritual, and so secularism as a political philosophy aims to separate the government, its institutions, and its representatives from theological or spiritual influence. However, in practice, the separation of law, politics, and procedure from culture, society, and tradition is not so easy. By extension, the definition of secularism in any community requires an understanding of the religious backdrop against which it has been established. In some situations, as Gil Anidjar argues, secularism has been established as the result of a reaction to or reflection on the public role of religion, and so ‘[the word *secular*] has operated in a differential relation with, indeed, in opposition to, the word *religious*, doing so within a specific religious *tradition*’.¹⁰ Yet even where the relationship between the secular and the religious is not perceived to be one of overt opposition or rupture, the former cannot be understood without reference to the latter. Consequently, Talal Asad, whose work constitutes some of the most important scholarship on this topic, has argued for an ‘anthropology of secularism’ which is holistic in its approach.¹¹

The importance of looking at secularism in this way is demonstrated well in Tanzania, where the form of secularism present, and people’s understandings of it, are best understood as a reflection of the nation’s mostly ‘Christian and Muslim’ makeup. Many interviewees displayed the belief that Tanzanian secularism did not mean that the country had no religion, but rather that it was neither ‘officially’ Christian nor Muslim whilst at the same time being unofficially both. This idea was summed up particularly well by a Catholic priest in Kilimanjaro:

¹⁰ G. Anidjar, ‘Secularism’, *Critical Inquiry*, 33:1 (2006), 57.

¹¹ See: T. Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford, 2003); T. Asad, ‘Religion, Nation-State, Secularism’, in P. van der Veer and H. Lehmann (eds.), *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 178-196.

We say that Tanzania has no religion, but it is not true. What Nyerere wanted was to make sure the Christians and the Muslims had peace, so he found a middle road between them ... This secularism we have is a compromise; we are neither Christian nor Muslim – officially. But of course, most of us are practising Christians and Muslims ... Other religions did not even come into the discussion – they were unimportant in most places.¹²

Thus, for many conformist Christians, Tanzanian secularism was in its foundation one of Christian-Muslim heritage. Other religions in the country, including traditional beliefs, Hinduism, and Sikhism, were generally considered by interviewees not to have had a significant part in its formation. Likewise, in documents dating from the colonial period, discussions concerning religious neutrality amongst British officials primarily reference Christians and Muslims, with very little regard for other groups. The existence of a Christian-Muslim secularism before independence helps to explain why TANU leaders with different religious backgrounds, such as Nyerere, a committed Catholic, Paul Bomani, whose family included several Adventist preachers, and Bibi Titi Mohammed and Rashidi Kawawa, both of whom were Muslim, all, at various times, felt able to appeal to ‘God’ in their speeches; in them, they noted that God did not discriminate between different peoples or design any race to rule any other, and urged Tanganyikans to pray in the churches and mosques to support their nationalist vision.¹³ Clearly, ‘God’ was accepted as an important element of political

¹² Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, priest.

¹³ Factel, DSM, to Secintel, DSM, ‘T.A.N.U. Dar es Salaam’ (12/10/1958), TNA-UK: CO 822/1362/E230/1; A.J. Grattan-Bellew to W.A.C. Mathieson (19/04/1958); TNA-UK: CO 822/1362/203; Commissioner of Police to Chief Secretary (27/08/1955), TNA-UK: FCO 141/17758/30; Commissioner of Police to Chief Secretary (15/04/1958), TNA-UK: FCO 141/17759/326; Special Branch Director to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Security & Immigration, ‘Philemon Paul Muro, National Executive Committee Member, TANU, Northern Province’ (12/04/1960), TNA-UK: FCO 141/17761/164; Commissioner of Police to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Security & Immigration, ‘Post Elections Committee: Activities of TANU Representatives in the Northern Province’ (25/07/1959), TNA-UK: FCO 141/17761/155; TANU pamphlet, *Tangazo Ndugu Zetu* (no date, but probably early 1958), TNA-UK: FCO 141/17949/61. For more on the Christian backgrounds of TANU leaders such as Nyerere, Bomani and Oscar Kambona, see: F. Ludwig, *Church and State in Tanzania: Aspects of a Changing Relationship, 1961-1994* (Brill, 1999), 31-34. For the contributions of Anglican Tanganyikans, see: M. Mndolwa and P. Denis, ‘Anglicanism, *Uhuru* and *Ujamaa*: Anglicans in Tanzania and the Movement for Independence’, *Journal of Anglican Studies*, 14:2 (2016), 192-209.

mobilisation and struggle, provided ‘God’ was not associated exclusively with any one religion. Likewise, TANU leaders explicitly rejected racialised and colonial ideas associated with religion, a point emphasised by Cephas Lucas Mbuta Milando, Provincial Secretary of TANU in the Southern Highlands Province, when he criticised European Christians and missionaries who supported the colonial state by saying to his followers that: ‘Their bibles show pictures of a white God and a black Devil’.¹⁴ Thus, even before independence, the Christian-Muslim, non-racial character of this particular sort of secularism was being developed. It is also important to note at this point that this form of secularism, a ‘compromise’ between Christianity and Islam, feeds into much of the academic discourse on religion in Tanzania – the current analysis included – with Christian-Muslim relations and the public roles of the two religions dominating these discussions. This is not to say that this scholarship displays a methodological weakness, or indeed that scholars should focus their attention elsewhere, since it is indisputable that Christianity and Islam are the two most important religions in the lives of most Tanzanians. However, it is important that scholarship on Tanzanian religion should be conscious of the wider epistemology and tradition from which it draws and into which it feeds.

The second question that must be addressed when attempting to understand Tanzanian secularism relates to its effectiveness, and the extent to which secularism was – and is – accepted by Tanzanians. This was a particularly interesting topic to explore with interviewees, many of whom expressed viewpoints which on the surface appeared contradictory, but which on further inspection provided important insights into the complex way religion informed socio-political thinking in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. On the one hand, over three-quarters of

¹⁴ Tanganyika Intelligence Report Extract (February 1958), TNA-UK: CO 822/1362/196, 6. For more on the use of civil religion in TANU rhetoric, see: Ludwig, *Church and State*, particularly chapter 5. For more discussion of Nyerere’s personal Catholic faith and its possible influence on his political philosophy, see also: T. Molony, *Nyerere: The Early Years* (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2014), 295-310.

interviewees stated that, particularly following independence, religion played no overt role in Tanganyikan or Tanzanian politics. For example, it was generally agreed that, whilst Christians might have preferred the leadership and guidance of fellow Christian politicians, this feeling was not strong enough to affect their interactions with or perceptions of non-Christians. As one woman put it: ‘Of course we preferred having Christians leading us, but nobody would rebel against a Muslim official simply because of [their religion]’.¹⁵ However, it was also stressed by many people that officials’ religions were always known by the public, and it is worth noting that on a visit to Babati in 1965, Bishop Stefano Moshi was similarly careful to note the religions of different officials and how they interacted with people of other religions.¹⁶ Nevertheless, most interviewees approved of the strict secularism which Nyerere’s government promoted. Many credited the policy with keeping peace amongst Christians and Muslims whilst also limiting the potential influence of religious leaders, particularly those of religions or denominations other than their own. A Chagga Catholic woman, for example, said: ‘Secularism was needed so that individuals could not simply manipulate the poor and uneducated into voting for them on the basis of religion’.¹⁷ Others argued that, in the modern, multi-cultural state which independent Tanzania wanted to be, politics openly led by religious leaders or ideals was outdated, in much the same way that the politics of ethnicity had become following the end of the colonial period. It was better, therefore, to relegate religion to the private sphere, as Nyerere’s abolition of tribal chiefs had done with ethnicity, and to have the public sphere reserved for national identity alone. Significantly, Tanzania’s diverse – or, more specifically, distinctly Christian-Muslim – religious makeup was the most commonly referenced reason for the need to maintain an overtly secular system. In the words of one

¹⁵ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, former schoolteacher, born 1936.

¹⁶ ‘Safari ya Mheshimiwa Askofu Stefano R. Moshi – Babati’, *Umoja*, XXVI:205 (August 1965), 3-4.

¹⁷ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, former nurse, born 1940.

Lutheran man in Kilimanjaro: ‘You cannot allow religion to affect politics if we do not all have the same religion’.¹⁸ However, it is also worth noting that, when these interviewees were speaking, Christian institutions and leaders in Tanzania were increasingly being warned to stay out of politics by President John Magufuli, as discussed in Chapter 7. Thus, people’s opinions on the importance of secularism for peace and stability must be understood alongside the politics of 2019.

However, most interviewees, whether Lutheran or Catholic, Chagga or Haya, also expressed doubt in secularism’s ability to significantly alter the influence of religion at a more fundamental level. As the previous chapter showed, a pre-colonial preoccupation in the churches concerning social morality endured into the post-colonial period, and it evidently had a significant effect on how conformist Christians thought about nationalist politics and their communities. People noted that their opinions of political leaders, nationalism and development could not be separated from Christian teaching, especially where they were forced to grapple with ideas of morality and equality. One Catholic woman in Kagera expressed this sentiment in the following way:

How can we be truly free of religion in any aspect of life if we also want to follow our religion? I cannot switch off my beliefs like a light. It is not like a shirt which I put on and take off. Separating religion from politics or from any other thing is impossible when people’s lives revolve around faith and when faith touches every part of life.¹⁹

Moreover, interviewees believed that politicians would have been similarly unable to separate entirely their beliefs from their jobs in government. Nyerere’s own Catholicism was referenced by almost every interviewee, and the idea that his political philosophy could be unaffected by his faith was generally dismissed. Indeed, several Catholic interviewees, including most

¹⁸ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, government worker, born 1941.

¹⁹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former secretary, born 1951.

priests, supported the argument, made by Adrian Hastings amongst others, that Nyerere's personal socio-political philosophy was fundamentally a form of 'radical Catholicism'.²⁰ Indeed, the importance of Catholic teaching to the 'good' aspects Nyerere's political vision was one of the primary differences between Catholic and Lutheran memories of nationalism, with Lutherans more likely to focus instead on how Nyerere's Catholicism undermined ideas associated with Lutheranism, as noted below.

The applicability of secularism as understood in a 'Western' philosophical tradition to societies in the non-Western world has been the focus of much scholarly debate. John Mbiti, whose work explores this question in Africa, argues that, to Africans, religion is inseparable from other elements of daily life, including politics and social relations.²¹ He suggests, therefore, that a secularism born of 'Western' rationalism cannot easily be applied to African societies, a view shared by other African scholars of religion. This argument is perhaps somewhat reductive, both in its homogenisation of African culture and in its separation of an imagined 'rational West' from a more holistic African ontology. However, it is significant that this West versus non-West distinction was repeated by several interviewees, particularly by members of both the Lutheran and Catholic clergies. This is interesting because one criticism which has in the past been levelled at Tanzanian secularism, primarily by Tanzanian Muslims, is that secularism by its very nature is more aligned with the philosophies of Christianity than it is with those of Islam. As such, not allowing religion an official public role has sometimes been presented as an attack by Nyerere and his successors on Islam.²² Yet the testimonies of

²⁰ A. Hastings, *A History of African Christianity, 1950 – 1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 151, 185.

²¹ See: J. Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy* (Heinemann, 1969); J. Mbiti, *Introduction to African Religion* (Heinemann, 1991).

²² See: T. Ndaluka, "'We are Ill-treated': a Critical Discourse Analysis of Muslims' Social Differentiation Claims in Tanzania", in T. Ndaluka and F. Wijsen (eds.), *Religion and State in Tanzania Revisited: Reflections from 50 Years of Independence* (Zurich/Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2014), 81-94; S. Maghimbi, 'Secularization and the Rise of

Christians in Kilimanjaro and Kagera suggest that such arguments rely on an understanding of Christian philosophy which does not necessarily correlate with the beliefs of Christian communities in different parts of Tanzania. Instead, to conformist Christians in these regions, the idea that religion could fully separate itself from temporal affairs was considered equally as problematic as it might have been amongst Tanzanian Muslims.

The history of Tanzanian secularism, then – at least in the memory of conformist Christian communities in Kilimanjaro and Kagera – is one of multiple complexities. This is true of both the foundations and consequences of secularism. Evidently, Tanzanian secularism is tied strongly to the memory of Nyerere, and to a national desire to keep peace between Christians and Muslims. Consequently, though the roots of Tanzanian secularism and its Christian-Muslim foundations predate the Nyerere years, it has nevertheless become in these communities a legacy of the nation-building era. It is, moreover, remembered as a secularism of two parts. On the one hand, at an official level, religious influence was banned from politics and the public sphere, and lay Christians did not display overt dedication to their religion in the political realm. On the other hand, unofficially, religion's role remained strong, with socio-political philosophy at both individual and community level continuing to be shaped by religious beliefs and affiliations. As the following two sections demonstrate, the continued importance of religion in these communities would have a significant effect in the era of nationalism and nation-building.

Religious Fundamentalism in Tanzania', in T. Ndaluka and F. Wijzen (eds.), *Religion and State in Tanzania Revisited: Reflections from 50 Years of Independence* (Zurich/Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2014), 181-196.

The Rise of Nationalism and the Road to Independence:

In Tanganyika, nationalistic philosophy spread rapidly over the course of the 1950s. For several decades prior, members of the African Association (AA) in the territory had been involved in discussions concerning the future of Tanganyika, Africa and colonialism, often drawing on the philosophies of African American thinkers and Pan-Africanists.²³ However, it was not until the early 1950s, and particularly after the establishment of TANU under Nyerere's leadership in 1954, that the nationalist project which would shape the next sixty years of socio-political thinking and participation would take form. In the years leading up to independence, TANU gathered momentum and grassroots support partly through its involvement with local politics. In Kilimanjaro and Kagera, for example, nationalists were able to utilise local associational politics, becoming involved in local debates and then re-orienting the attention of those who had come to support their activism into a focus on Tanganyika as a whole. Even before 1954, the British were concerned by the interactions between the AA on the one hand, and Chagga and Haya individuals and organisations on the other.²⁴ Meanwhile, Christians and Christian institutions in both regions were forced to evaluate their own places in the nationalist discourse, negotiating multiple and often conflicting relationships with colonial, national, and local elites. Thus, as this section shows, Christian responses to and interactions with nationalism and the nationalist project prior to independence were diverse even within individual communities, ranging from cautious opposition to vocal support.

Studies of Christianity and politics in Africa have often approached the question at an institutional level, assessing the relationship between churches and the state and between

²³ For more on the African Association and global influences, see: E. Sanders, 'The African Association and the Growth and Movement of Political Thought in Mid-Twentieth Century East Africa' (PhD Thesis: University of Cambridge, 2012).

²⁴ East African Political Intelligence Summary (June 1951), TNA-UK: CO 537/7227/20/5.

religious and political leaders. Isaac Phiri, for example, has produced a framework for understanding religious involvement in African politics and socio-political change which relies heavily on analysing the actions of churches and church leaders.²⁵ Analyses of Tanzania, such as those of David Westerlund and Frieder Ludwig, follow a similar framework in thinking about religion and politics, focusing primarily on how Christian institutions and church leaders reacted to and interacted with the government.²⁶ However, whilst this work provides important insights into the role of churches and other institutions, grassroots Christianity in local communities has often been neglected, perhaps due to a lack of non-oral sources.

Neglecting to study lay Christians at the regional level in different parts of Tanzania is a significant oversight. As James Brennan notes, ‘TANU had no monopoly over the production of nationalist thought’, which was instead produced at all levels of society and in very varied circumstances.²⁷ The same is true of religious communities, where churches had no monopoly over Christian socio-political thought. For example, an understudied but important aspect of the nationalist movement in the years leading up to independence was the role of religion outside of the churches’ structures and institutions. One form which this took was in the co-opting of the associational life explored in the previous chapter. The 1950s was a decade of great political change in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera, with ostensibly economic organisations such as the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU), the Bukoba Native Cooperative Union (BNCU) and the Bukoba Coffee Planters Association (BCPA) becoming more politically involved and important. Interviewees recalled how many of the big men in these

²⁵ I. Phiri, *Proclaiming Political Pluralism: Churches and Political Transitions in Africa* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001).

²⁶ D. Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini: A Study of Some Aspects of Society and Religion in Tanzania, 1961-1977* (Motala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1980); Ludwig, *Church and State*.

²⁷ J. Brennan, ‘Blood Enemies: Exploitation and Urban Citizenship in the Nationalist Political Thought of Tanzania, 1958-75’, *Journal of African History*, 47 (2006), 390.

organisations, who were usually mission-educated and often active members of their churches, were also involved with local TANU organisations. For example, Nsilo Swai, a Lutheran Chagga who led the Meru Cooperative Union (MCU), was a regional TANU leader who went on to become a minister in Nyerere's government, as did the devout Catholic George Kahama, who had managed the BNCU.²⁸ Meanwhile, Herbert Rugizibwa, the head of the BCPA, was another regional TANU leader who, as Derek Peterson notes, went on to be one of the architects of socialism in Kagera.²⁹ At the same time, as Emma Hunter's work has detailed, new, openly political associations such as the Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union (KCCU) also developed.³⁰ As such, throughout Tanzania, local identities were being redefined and reasserted throughout the 1950s, and questions about citizenship, belonging and civic rights became a more prominent feature of public life. In Kilimanjaro, this would ultimately lead to the removal of Thomas Marealle as Paramount Chief of the Chagga in 1960, and to the election of Solomon Eliufoo, a Lutheran teacher and one of the leaders of the Chagga Democratic Party (CDP), as the first President of the Chagga people. Throughout this period, TANU, eager to embed itself in rural communities, became increasingly involved in these discussions at the local level all over Tanganyika, establishing itself as a political force in Kilimanjaro largely due to its support for the anti-Paramount Chief movement.

It is important to recognise that, as has been shown in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, the associations which developed prior to and during the 1950s were also distinctly Christian in their foundation and character. The idea that associational life was influenced by religious teaching was not unique to these two regions – or indeed limited necessarily to Christianity –

²⁸ K.R. Curtis, 'Cooperation and Cooptation: The Struggle for Market Control in the Bukoba District of Colonial Tanganyika', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 25:3 (1992), 535.

²⁹ Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism*, 167.

³⁰ Hunter, *Political Thought*, 106-134; 158-186.

and was in some instances illustrated by TANU leaders themselves. For example, when TANU was refused permission to register a branch in Shinyanga in 1957, the party's local District Secretary wrote, without reference to any particular religion:

The refusal, as such violates Moral Law itself in that man is a social being. It reduces us below the human dignity and takes away from us the true human personality, value and dignity. It is necessarily anti-God.³¹

The previously discussed importance of an unspecified 'God' to TANU's political struggle thus extended to its attempts at capturing local associational life. What is most important in regions like Kilimanjaro, however, is that many of the primary actors in this new political space were themselves active members of Christian churches. Older men such as Petro Njau and Joseph Merinyo, as well as younger men such as Solomon Eliufoo and Thomas Marealle, had been brought up within the institutions of the Lutheran Church, with many of them training as teachers before entering local politics. Indeed, when Eliufoo spoke out against Njau and Marealle at the first public meeting of the CDP in 1959, criticising the office and history of the Paramount Chief and his backers, he was coming into conflict with two fellow members of his own church.³² In Kagera, meanwhile, Peterson has shown how one of the first things TANU did when it gained a foothold in the region was to get involved in local concerns and debates about Haya women and morality that had come to the fore in the wake of the East African Revival, with one of the primary actors in these conversations being Herbert Rugizibwa of the BCPA.³³ Thus, when TANU came into regions like Kilimanjaro and Kagera and reoriented associational life in support of independence, it was coming into direct contact with individuals,

³¹ TANU District Secretary, Shinyanga, to Governor, 'Memorandum of Appeal against Registrar's Refusal to Register a Society Known as the Tanganyika African National Union, Shinyanga Branch' (26/12/1957), TNA-UK: FCO 141/17758/289, 1.

³² See: Introductory Notes to f. 8, re: First Public Meeting of the Chagga Democratic Party, TNA-UK: FCO 141/17864.

³³ Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism*, 166-169.

ideas and structures shaped in large part by Christian education, institutions, and movements. Significantly, in Kilimanjaro, interviewees of both denominations stressed the importance of Lutheran men in these developments, whilst in Kagera both Catholic and Lutheran actors were important to local memory. Thus, the more politically engaged Chagga Lutheranism explored in previous chapters is also a noticeable feature of the historical memory of nationalism in these communities.

It is, however, important to remember that associational life in these regions, as shown in the previous chapter, was not solely the preserve of older men, and that TANU encountered women's associations and youth groups it could co-opt as well, further strengthening its support base. In the words of one Catholic woman in Kilimanjaro, 'Nyerere could use the people in the local parties and associations ... because they were educated by the churches and they had knowledge of politics and *maendeleo*'.³⁴ Here, then, the idea of Christianity as the foundation of education and *maendeleo* laying the groundwork for the local adoption of nationalism was made explicit. Similar sentiments were recounted by many other participants in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera, many of whom also described how youth and women's associations in their communities were captured by nationalist philosophy. It is worth mentioning that these memories were recounted by noticeably more people in Kilimanjaro. The reasons for this imbalance are unclear, but it is possible that it has something to do with the more significant Lutheran presence in Kilimanjaro; as previously discussed and as will be shown again later in this chapter, Lutherans appear to have been somewhat more interested in and involved with politics than were Catholics in regions where the Lutheran Church had a significant following. Paradoxically, however, as discussed below, Haya interviewees were

³⁴ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, former secretary, born 1937.

more likely than Chaggas to express the belief that independence itself represented a significant break with the past.

Associational life and Christian education, as the previous two chapters highlighted, also brought connections to the outside world, and exposed Christians in the country to ideas which ran against colonial ideology. That TANU was reliant on the individuals who came out of these Christian institutions is evident, as a 1955 political intelligence report shows:

... the Union is able to draw strength from the adherence of teachers from the missions who, as the voluntary agencies of Government, in fact provide in a large measure the territory's educational system. Unless the Church generally follows the example of the Lutheran Church of Northern Tanganyika in forbidding its servants from taking part in political associations, this is likely to be the Union's main source of educated leadership.³⁵

Tanganyika, subject as it was to a dearth of British missionaries and denominations, was in the days prior to independence heavily reliant on foreign employees in its churches, and British administrators were evidently concerned at the influence which missionaries from anti-imperialist countries such as the USA might have over Tanzanian Christians. Indeed, American missionaries were considered to 'produce a type of African particularly prone to anti-Government activity'.³⁶ One Colonial Office official, writing in 1955, stated:

My impression in Tanganyika this summer was that the Missions were turning out a good deal of dubious characters: the worst emanate from the African Inland Mission and the Seven Day Adventists, both under American auspices. I am sure we should do everything we

³⁵ Secretariat, DSM, to W.L. Gorell Barnes, Colonial Office, London, 'Tanganyika African National Union' (26/11/1955), TNA-UK: CO 822/859/37, 3. The prohibition on political involvement in the Lutheran Church of Northern Tanganyika – the church to which most Lutheran Chaggas belonged – only applied to individuals directly employed by the missions at that moment in time. Thus, past employees and other Lutherans were free to join. Nevertheless, TANU challenged the legality and morality of this ban, suggesting that they were keen to stop churches from limiting their potential recruitment amongst educated Christians: Secretariat, DSM, to W.L. Gorell Barnes, Colonial Office, London, 'Schedule of Resolutions Passed at Tanganyika African National Union's Annual General Meeting, 1955' (26/11/1955), TNA-UK: CO 822/859/37, 4.

³⁶ Tanganyika Political Intelligence Summary (1953), TNA-UK: CO 822/380/44, 1.

can to keep American missionaries out of any part of the colonies whenever, however and wherever possible.³⁷

Moreover, such suspicions were not limited to the African Inland Mission and the Seventh Day Adventists, or indeed to Protestants. In Musoma, the region to the East of Lake Victoria where Nyerere was from, the government was particularly concerned by the activities of the American Catholic Maryknoll Mission, whose influence on the thinking of Nyerere himself was suspected to be undermining colonial authority and fostering in Nyerere an ‘anti-Colonial and anti-European attitude’.³⁸ Thus, in areas such as Kilimanjaro, where many American – and Irish – missionaries were active in both the Lutheran and Catholic Churches, the government kept an eye on the activities of religious institutions. Areas like Kagera, where there were more missionaries from countries like Sweden and fewer from ‘anti-colonial’ nations, appear to have caused less concern for the authorities, though even here they kept track of visiting church groups and individuals who showed an interest in TANU and its activities.³⁹

When asked whether or not foreign missionaries or local pastors ever became explicitly involved in discussions about nationalism, the answers from interviewees were, perhaps unsurprisingly, varied, thus highlighting contestations in the memory of this topic. Again, however, such memories should be understood alongside the 2019 political climate where the involvement of religious actors in political debates was an increasingly sensitive subject. Some interviewees recalled no involvement at all, whilst others remembered the promotion of African

³⁷ J.M. Kisch, Introductory notes to f. 37 (14/12/1955), TNA-UK: CO 822/859.

³⁸ A.J. Grattan-Bellew to Barry Gidden, UK Delegation to the UN, New York (July 1955), TNA-UK: CO 822/859/26, 2. See also: Commissioner of Police to Chief Secretary, ‘Julius Nyerere’ (28/05/1955), TNA-UK: FCO 141/17762/205, 1. For more on the Catholic Church’s response to Tanganyikan nationalism, see: A. De Jong, ‘Church, Colonialism and Nationalism in Tanzania’, in F. Wijzen and P. Nissen (eds.), *Mission is a Must’: Intercultural Theology and the Mission of the Church (Church and Theology in Context 40)* (Brill, 2002), 61-77.

³⁹ For example: Commissioner of Police to Chief Secretary (23/06/1955), TNA-UK: FCO 141/17791/22, 1; This letter shows that the Catholic Church in Bukoba was facilitating exchanges between local nationalist groups and visiting Catholics from Europe with an interest in their activities, and that the government was careful to keep an eye on proceedings.

nationalism and independence for all Africans. Significantly, and in keeping with the theme of Lutheran political activism, the group who remembered the most politically involved missionaries and teachers were Chagga Lutherans in Kilimanjaro. Lutherans in Kagera, where the Church of Sweden ran the mission, also recalled some involvement, with one woman stating: 'Our teachers promoted independence for all people as part of our religion ... and so they were in favour of independence for the nation as well'.⁴⁰ However, it is important to note that there were significant differences in the answers given to this question even within the same denomination in individual regions, and so it is logical to conclude that the involvement of foreign missionaries and teachers in discussions of nationalism and independence varied according to the individuals and local communities concerned.

A particularly telling example of the British fear of growing nationalist and anti-colonial sentiment in circles with links to foreign religious groups comes from the case of George Mills Houser in 1957. Houser, an American Methodist minister, had made arrangements to travel to Tanganyika on the invitation of an American coffee grower in Arusha. An outspoken activist who promoted racial harmony in the United States and abroad, as well as an end to colonial rule in Africa and Asia, he had been in touch with TANU for some time prior to his planned tour of the territory, which was to include a meeting with Nyerere in Dar es Salaam and a visit to Lutheran Missions and local TANU and Native Authority officials in the Northern Province. So concerned about this visit was the Tanganyikan administration that Houser was classified as a Prohibited Immigrant before he could even leave the USA.⁴¹ Whilst the purely religious elements of Houser's trip do not appear to have been a concern of the

⁴⁰ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, former secretary, born 1944.

⁴¹ TNA-UK: FCO 141/17744/55; 56; 129; 134; 136; 146; 151; 161; 165; 342b/6; Houser's case is discussed in detail throughout this file, and the authorities pointed to the fact that he was already a Prohibited Immigrant in several other African colonies to justify his prohibition in Tanganyika.

administration, his planned visit is nevertheless telling in the social dynamics it highlights and in the sorts of connections between nationalist and religious thinkers that it demonstrates. As the previous chapters have shown, Kilimanjaro and Kagera, like the rest of Tanganyika, were increasingly ‘glocal’ in their socio-political thinking, and the relationship between nationalism and religion was shaped heavily by this.

There is some debate over what Tanganyikan Christian institutions thought of nationalism – particularly the sort of nationalism that would lead to independence. For example, Ludwig has argued that, in general, missionaries were sceptical of both TANU and independence, due to their good relationship with the colonial state.⁴² However, reports in *Umoja* from the late 1950s make it clear the Christian Council of Tanganyika (CCT) promoted the involvement of lay Christians in politics, as well as home rule in Tanganyika. The CCT had been established to represent a range of Protestant churches in Tanzania, the largest of which was the Lutheran Church. Moreover, whilst the Catholic Church was not a member, it worked closely with the CCT on many issues. Thus, CCT announcements from the period under consideration can reasonably be seen to express ‘official’ Christian attitudes to contemporaneous issues.

Following one meeting of the CCT in 1957, Bishop Stefano Moshi reported that the council had agreed that Christians should be encouraged to join political parties and take part in political discussions, and that the churches should work to combat injustice, bad governance and discrimination.⁴³ Additionally, whilst the council had also been keen to stress that ‘although the church should not isolate itself completely from politics, it should also not be used as a political tool’, it nevertheless made it clear that ‘The Church must not be mute, instead

⁴² Ludwig, *Church and State*, 29-31.

⁴³ ‘Kanisa na Siasa Toka Mkutano wa Makanisa ya Afrika Nzima’, *Umoja*, XI:119 (March 1958), 3.

it should speak with its conscience on the rights of citizens, the government, and the leaders.⁴⁴ Likewise, in 1959, the CCT reiterated the importance of Christian citizens taking part in politics, stating that: ‘a Christian, like any other citizen, will not be able to separate himself from the affairs of the state and politics of his country just as he cannot separate himself from the affairs of his Church.’⁴⁵ The statement went on to stress the importance of treating people of all races as equals before God, mirroring much of the language used by nationalist leaders: ‘it is the Church's responsibility to help Africans in Tanganyika achieve the goal of self-government. All human beings have equal rights before God; so forcing Africans always to be ruled by a foreign nation is to deprive them of the right that applies to all human beings before God.’⁴⁶ The statement ended by applying this same logic to the church: ‘there should be no discrimination of power and leadership in the Church. Any restrictions arising from nationality or race that prevent an African from occupying any Church authority should be removed.’⁴⁷ Thus, whilst the CCT did not openly support TANU or any other political party, its approach to nationalism and independence was very explicit in its support for the overall cause. This is significant because religious institutions seldom got so involved in major political debates, either before or after Tanganyikan independence. Moreover, the concerns highlighted by the CCT here, particularly those concerning Africanisation, unity, and the equality of races, would go on to be major features of nation-building in the early post-independence years, as the following section explores.

When it came to conformist lay Christians in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, interviewees suggested that the picture was mixed, with people in their communities divided for a number

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ ‘Taarifa Toka Umoja wa Wakristo wa Tanzania’, *Umoja*, XII:134 (July 1959), 1.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

of reasons. Overall, they remembered people being broadly in favour of independence, but not necessarily overly supportive of Nyerere and TANU, or of their version of nationalism. As one Lutheran woman in Kilimanjaro put it: ‘Aspects of nationalism were agreeable to local communities; others were not. Different people found different things to accept, either for personal or political or religious reasons.’⁴⁸ Similarly, a Catholic woman in Bukoba noted that: ‘Many of us supported independence, but some of the older people at my church were worried about it as they believed we were not ready to run a country ourselves.’⁴⁹ This second quotation points to a trend that was mentioned by interviewees in both regions, that of a generational divide. People remembered older Christians being more likely to be worried about Nyerere’s possible dismantling of local traditions and the potential decline of strong regional economies, and younger Christians being more likely to support TANU and a new ‘Tanganyikan’ identity which rejected overt forms of regionalism. Whilst no very significant differences were reported between different denominations or between the two different regions, Lutheran Chaggas were again remembered as being somewhat more involved in political discourse than the other groups, and certainly the idea of opposition to the nationalism of TANU and Nyerere was more important to Chagga Lutheran interviewees’ testimonies. That said, people’s opinions on this subject were also formed largely on an individual basis, according to personal circumstances. Overall, however, Christian individuals in Kilimanjaro and Kagera evidently remembered their communities as being broadly in favour of the primary aims and philosophies of Tanganyikan nationalism, even if they sometimes rejected some of its elements.

In Muslim circles, attitudes towards independence could be quite different. In 1959, a group of Muslims, some of whom had previously been active in TANU, formed the All-Muslim

⁴⁸ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, businesswoman, born 1947.

⁴⁹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, businesswoman, born 1942.

National Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT). AMNUT quickly established itself as an anti-TANU and anti-Nyerere voice in the country, arguing that Nyerere was quickly becoming a dictator who discriminated against Muslims, and that independence needed to be delayed until Muslims could be adequately protected and represented in the absence of British mediation between the different faiths. To support their point, AMNUT pointed to the educational and professional gaps between Christians and Muslims in the territory and accused Nyerere of removing older Muslims from his inner circle in favour of younger Christians. The organisation also claimed that Tanganyika was a majority-Muslim country and that AMNUT therefore represented most of the population in its opposition to Nyerere.⁵⁰ Colonial officials rejected this last argument both because there was no evidence that Muslims outnumbered Christians and because AMNUT had very few members. However, they were nevertheless clearly concerned enough to keep a close eye on AMNUT's actions as they were conscious that similar sentiments were being expressed elsewhere amongst Tanganyikan Muslims. Whilst some officials believed AMNUT to have very little influence, others noted that educated Muslims – particularly those who were members of TANU – were influenced by its ideas, since many believed that they had been passed over for jobs in the organisation in favour of Christian members.⁵¹

AMNUT was clearly a thorn in the side of TANU, with individuals such as Bibi Titi Mohammed feeling the need to stand up for Nyerere, telling her fellow Muslims that the accusations of Christian favouritism made against him and TANU were nothing more than lies.⁵² Likewise, a striking letter to TANU from its supporters amongst Tanzanian students

⁵⁰ Information from a series of documents contained in files on AMNUT, TANU and political developments in Tanganyika, TNA-UK: FCO 141/17927; FCO 141/17791; FCO 141/17912; CO 822/1375; CO 822/2130.

⁵¹ See: Special Branch police report on AMNUT (03/12/1959), TNA-UK: FCO 141/17927/27A, 5.

⁵² Police report, 'General Meeting of the Tanganyika African National Union at Mnazi Mmoja, DSM, 25th September 1955' (25/09/1955), TNA-UK: FCO 141/17916/72.

studying abroad was highly critical of AMNUT and of any other organisations which mixed religion and politics, stating: '[We] condemn those who try to defile religion by adulterating it with politics. To HELL with AMNUT and any other political organizations based on religion!'⁵³ Importantly, divisions between Christians and Muslims have also evidently influenced the memory of nationalism in conformist Christian Chagga and Haya communities. One Catholic woman in Kagera, whose memories mirrored those of most interviewees, recalled how: 'The Muslims were scared of what would happen if the British left. They were worried that Nyerere would employ only Christians in his government, and that Muslims with less education would be ignored'.⁵⁴ Of course, the situation was varied, and Nyerere also had a lot of support from Muslim nationalists.⁵⁵ Moreover, as the following section and Chapter 6 show, many of the concerns which Muslims had were actively addressed by the TANU government in the years immediately after independence, and the legacy of these developments have continued to influence historical memory in Kilimanjaro and Kagera.

Nation-Building Following Independence:

In some respects, it is the legacy of the post-independence stage of the nationalist movement, that of the nation-building era, which has had the most enduring effect in Tanzania. In common with the leaders and ruling parties of many African countries, Nyerere and TANU quickly reoriented the populist support they enjoyed into a force to construct the new Tanganyikan – and later Tanzanian – nation and its national identity. The nation-building project, whilst not

⁵³ Memorandum of Tanganyika Students in Liberia to TANU (02/06/1960), TNA-UK: FCO 141/17830/110A, 3.

⁵⁴ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, farmer, born 1939.

⁵⁵ For more on the Muslim contribution to Tanganyikan nationalism, see: M. Said, *The Life and Times of Abdulwahid Sykes (1924-1968): The Untold Story of the Muslim Struggle Against British Colonialism in Tanganyika* (London: Minerva Press, 1998).

overly violent when compared with other African regimes, was nevertheless increasingly repressive. Any other forms of identity or allegiance were strongly discouraged, whilst the state increasingly explored avenues to promote nation-building in all sectors of society. TANU extended membership to non-Africans in 1963 and had turned Tanganyika into a one-party state by 1964, and CCM, the party which formed in 1977 following TANU's merger with Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), went on to govern unopposed until multiparty elections were reintroduced in 1992.⁵⁶ Interestingly, TANU leaders had, even before independence, used the language of religion to describe the total commitment to TANU that nation-building would require. For example, in 1955, Bibi Titi Mohammed had stated that 'Africans must be prepared to believe in and obey TANU just as they believe in and obey in Jesus or Mohamed, and just as they obey God who they have not even seen'.⁵⁷

Threats to nation-building in Tanzania, as in other African countries, were deemed to come not only from political parties, but also from bodies such as businesses, religious institutions, voluntary agencies, and international organisations. Nyerere's government outlawed tribal chiefs shortly after independence, whilst the secularism of the colonial state was also reinforced in Tanzania's various constitutions during the 1960s to dampen religious involvement or the utilisation of religious identity in national politics. However, religion would continue to shape socio-political thinking in places like Kilimanjaro and Kagera. This was particularly true following the unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar to form the United

⁵⁶ For more on the development of and debates concerning one-party politics in Tanganyika, see: J. Brennan, 'The Short History of Political Opposition and Multi-party Democracy in Tanganyika, 1958-1964', in G. Maddox and J. Giblin (eds.), *In Search of a Nation: Histories of Authority and Dissidence in Tanzania* (Oxford: James Currey, 2005), 250-276; A. Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013 [first published 1982]), ch. 16; Hunter, *Political Thought*, ch. 7. See also: T. Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals* (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2001), especially 114-120 on the increasing authoritarianism of newly independent African states in response to the perceived threats posed by different identities and allegiances.

⁵⁷ Police report, 'General Meeting of the Tanganyika African National Union at Mnazi Mmoja, DSM, 25th September 1955' (25/09/1955), TNA-UK: FCO 141/17916/72, 2.

Republic of Tanzania in 1964, when the inclusion of the religiously traditional, Muslim-majority communities of Zanzibar in the Tanzanian polity brought into question the state's ability to be truly secular.

One of the most profound, long-lasting consequences of this attempt to control potential opposition and to create modern, national identities was the effect on educational institutions in many African countries. Schools and vocational training colleges were often utilised by nation-building architects – particularly in Tanzania – to educate the younger generation of the necessity of the nationalist project before they could enter potentially subversive political spaces as adults. In Kilimanjaro and Kagera, where education was so dominated by Catholic and Lutheran institutions prior to independence, this was to lead to complex interactions between Christians, churches, and the government. Whilst the nationalisation of schools during the *ujamaa* period and the memory of it is explored in the following chapter, the discussion below nevertheless touches on how educational institutions interacted with the nation-building project.

Perhaps the most important feature of nation-building after 1961 was the fostering of a national identity for all peoples in Tanganyika and, from 1964, Tanzania. For the nation to make a success of independence, a common identity in which disparate ethnic, religious, and racial groups could be unified was needed. As was the case elsewhere in Africa and the colonised world, the construction of a national identity in a territory artificially demarcated by European colonial powers required a renegotiation of existing forms of identity. The two most overt of these in Tanganyika in 1961 were ethnicity and race. At independence, there were three primary racial groups of political and economic significance in the country: Africans, Asians - primarily South Asians – and Europeans. The African group, who comprised most of

the population, could further be divided into over one hundred distinct ethnic groups, of which the Chagga and the Haya were two of the largest.

Nyerere's outlawing of tribal chiefs not only served to centralise power in the government at Dar es Salaam, but also worked to deconstruct ethnic identity as a political force that could be mobilised, something that was further reinforced by the promotion of the 'non-tribal' Swahili language as the official language of the nation and the banning of vernacular languages from educational institutions.⁵⁸ However, tribal leaders were not removed from the political arena entirely. Conscious of the need to maintain the loyalty of different ethnic groups, Nyerere and TANU worked to absorb traditional leaders into the party and government. Even individuals like Thomas Marealle, who had already lost his position as Paramount Chief of the Chagga through internal Chagga politics, was given a government role. The effect of these developments on Christian communities in Kilimanjaro and Kagera was subtle but significant. Unlike the chiefs, the authority of religious leaders was largely unaffected by the early nation-building project. Since the authority of religious leaders did not rely on the support of the central government, several interviewees noted that, following independence and the loss of chiefs' and kings' authority, the influence of religious leaders in local communities became even more pronounced.⁵⁹ A Catholic man in Bukoba explained that 'when the chiefs lost their power, the only people left in a position of authority who were not TANU people were the priests'.⁶⁰ There was also a sense that, unlike tribal leaders who had been absorbed by the

⁵⁸ Susan Geiger suggests that the non-tribal identity which "'Swahili' culture' brought with it also worked to attract women all over Tanganyika who rejected the 'traditional' identities solidified by colonial regimes: S. Geiger, 'Tanganyikan Nationalism as "Women's Work": Life Histories, Collective Biography and Changing Historiography', *Journal of African History*, 37 (1996), 469. Adrian Hastings, meanwhile, suggests that Nyerere's decision to adopt Swahili as the language of the new nation was a direct result of the Catholic Church's decision to use Swahili in its Tanganyikan missions: Hastings, *Nationhood*, 165.

⁵⁹ This phenomenon of religious leaders remaining relatively uncaptured by political philosophy, often to the annoyance of African regimes, is a central aspect of Phiri's work: Phiri, *Proclaiming Political Pluralism*.

⁶⁰ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, former driver, born 1937.

TANU machine and given roles in government, religious leaders continued to be independent of the nationalists. Moreover, in the Lutheran Church, vernacular languages continued to be used, a fact which prompted one Chagga man to state that ‘The only reason our language survived Nyerere’s time was that the Church continued to use it and publish books written in it.’⁶¹ This memory of the churches protecting local culture from the nationalists, and thus acting as sites of cultural resistance, was particularly pronounced amongst Lutheran interviewees in both regions. Thus, in multiple, denominationally coloured ways, churches and religious leaders represented and upheld a link with the past and with local community values and customs which traditional leaders no longer could.

Nation-building also required an addressing of race, a form of identity which had been responsible for the greatest social divisions in the colonial era. Under the British, a tiered system had been developed, whereby Europeans enjoyed the most rights and representation and Africans the least. Asians, who occupied the middle ground, had also gained an economic advantage during the colonial era and so controlled a disproportionate share of the economy. As Ronald Aminzade shows, race therefore became a major focus of the nation-building project.⁶² Officially, the new nation was non-racial, with equal rights granted to all citizens regardless of skin colour. However, the reality was that nationalism was led by black Tanganyikans, a group comprising most of the population which had been the most disenfranchised prior to independence. Consequently, although Nyerere had been conscious of

⁶¹ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, businessman, born 1950.

⁶² See: R. Aminzade, ‘The Dialectic of Nation Building in Postcolonial Tanzania’, *The Sociological Quarterly*, 54:3 (2013), 335-366; R. Aminzade, *Race, Nation and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania* (Cambridge University Press, 2013); For the continued politicisation of race after the Nyerere period, see: R. Aminzade, ‘From Race to Citizenship: The Indigenization Debate in Post-Socialist Tanzania’, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 38 (2003), 43-63.

the need to keep well-educated and experienced Europeans in the government and civil service in the early years of independence, pressure mounted on him to Africanise the government.

The philosophy of Africanisation had significant effects on Christian communities in Kilimanjaro and Kagera.⁶³ The most visible of these was a drive in the churches to Africanise their own leadership and institutions. This process had actually begun after the Second World War and gained pace in the 1950s.⁶⁴ However, Africanisation in church leadership, mission schools and other institutions accelerated after 1961. In part, this was due to an exodus of European and American missionaries from the country, but there was also a clear push from congregations and religious leaders for greater African involvement in running the churches. Issues of *Umoja* from the late 1950s and early 1960s carry articles supportive of the Africanisation of the Lutheran Church, whilst a Catholic man in Kilimanjaro recalled how ‘we wanted to manage our own affairs and to carry on bringing African priests into the hierarchy’.⁶⁵ Similar memories were expressed by people of both denominations in Kagera.

Christian communities in Kilimanjaro and Kagera were also affected by Tanganyikan Africanisation in another way. To bring black Tanganyikans into government, Nyerere required individuals who were well-educated to occupy roles left vacant by departing European officials. Because of the high level of education that had developed through mission schools in the two regions, many Chagga and Haya Christians joined Nyerere’s administration or the civil service, leading to the Chagga and Haya becoming the two most well-represented ethnic groups

⁶³ For an analysis of this phenomenon in Tanzania more generally, see: Ludwig, *Church and State*, chapter 4.

⁶⁴ The desire to Africanise Christian churches had existed on the continent from the very earliest years of the colonial period and had developed alongside ideas about African identity and pan-Africanism, as Toyin Falola has noted: Falola, *Nationalism*, 34-42.

⁶⁵ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, lawyer, born 1944.

in the administration shortly after independence.⁶⁶ Thus, in both regions, interviewees remembered the movement of educated people from local communities to the coast. From Kagera, individuals like the Catholic George Kahama were recruited by the new government, with Kahama becoming Minister for Social and Cooperative Development.⁶⁷ In Kilimanjaro, it is noteworthy that the majority of Chaggas who took up government positions appear to have been Lutherans, something that may seem contradictory given the importance attached to political dissent in Chagga Lutheran memory. A Catholic priest in Moshi believed that this was due to two factors: a lack of interest in politics amongst educated Catholic Chaggas, which contrasted with the political dynamism of Chagga Lutheranism, and Nyerere's desire to show that he did not favour Catholics in his administration.⁶⁸ Several Lutheran interviewees also suggested that educated Lutherans in the region were more likely to enter politics due to the individualistic and 'revolutionary' nature of their faith. This idea of Lutheranism as a 'revolutionary' faith was mentioned by both Lutheran and Catholic interviewees in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, many of whom argued that since its foundation it was a denomination which promoted renewal and progress, as previous chapters have touched on.

One Lutheran who became very important in Nyerere's administration was Solomon Eliufoo. Whilst several individuals from both Kilimanjaro and Kagera who had been politically active in the 1950s joined the government, Eliufoo's example is perhaps the most important to explore. A teacher by training like so many Tanganyikan politicians, Eliufoo was a very active member of the Lutheran Church in the 1950s, contributing to many issues of *Umoja*. After

⁶⁶ See: C.K. Omari, 'Ethnicity, Politics and Development in Tanzania', *African Studies Monographs*, 7 (1987), 68-71.

⁶⁷ Curtis, 'Cooperation', 535.

⁶⁸ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, priest. The fear of 'Catholic favouritism' under Nyerere, who was a devout Catholic himself, was also noted by many Lutheran interviewees in both regions, though it does not appear to have influenced to any significant extent how people thought of nationalism itself.

independence, he was appointed Minister for Education, and it is possible to see in his speeches in this capacity the same sort of rhetoric that Lutheran leaders had employed in the pages of *Umoja*. For example, he spoke of the need for schools to uphold morality, for students to avoid idleness, and of the need to foster good citizens in educational institutions who would help to build the nation.⁶⁹ Eliufoo, like many government officials, was also keen to stress the importance of working to better the prospects of all of Tanzania's multi-ethnic and multi-religious population, stating in 1963 that the government was working to ensure that Muslim children's prospects improved and that no children could be discriminated against if they went to schools run by religious organisations other than their own.⁷⁰ Additionally, Eliufoo worked to promote Africanisation, though it is telling that his fervour for this subject appeared to change according to his audience, a fact which was likely influenced by his background. In a speech given in English at the opening of the ELCT's Ilboru Secondary School in Arusha in 1963, he stated:

Another point about this school which pleases me is that it has an African Headmaster. Please do not take this to mean that expatriate staff are not wanted. They are exceedingly welcome, indeed we could not possibly manage without them. But it is Government policy that offices and positions that are sensitive to national policies should be occupied by citizens and African citizens in particular. So I hope that other Voluntary Agencies are following the example of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanganyika and training suitable Africans to become Heads of Schools.⁷¹

Whilst the desire to promote Africanisation is clear in the passage above, it is nevertheless tempered by Eliufoo's wish not to offend Europeans active in his church. However, in a speech

⁶⁹ See: ELCT-ND: 198/003: Government Circulars (Education), 1960-1966.

⁷⁰ Government Press Release, 'Places for All in Dar es Salaam Primary Schools', (19/12/1963), TNA-TZ: 593/CB/12/1/78, 1-2.

⁷¹ Speech by Eliufoo at the opening of the New Buildings at Ilboru Secondary School, Arusha (2/11/1963), TNA-TZ: 593/CB/12/1/70, 2.

given in Swahili the previous month at the opening of the Mzumbe Secondary School in Morogoro, Eliufoo was much more forceful in his message:

Teachers in every school must be permanent if we want to get good results from schoolwork. Our schools must have local teachers from this country. This is something we all need to think about very carefully. Those hired teachers from abroad are just filling up spaces.⁷²

Eliufoo, then, was typical of a generation of young, educated Christians who left their home regions to help to build the nation in government. However, it is also arguable that his faith and background affected how he acted in his new role. That his beliefs, and his connection to his church, were important to how he conceived of his national duty can be seen in his taking part in the General Assembly of the Lutheran Church in 1967, where he told the assembled conference that ‘the Gospel is a great path to prepare a new generation of Tanzanians’.⁷³ Thus, his example demonstrated the complex nature of the relationship between religion and nation-building in the early years of independence, when important actors in the nationalist project balanced faith, local connections and religious upbringing with national, secular duties and philosophies.

However, how nation-building and the question of national identity was interpreted back home, amongst conformist Chagga and Haya Christians, was often very different from how political elites in Dar es Salaam grappled with the question. In a slight reversal of the memories of the more abstract discourse surrounding nationalism prior to independence discussed above, Haya people remembered their communities to have interacted with the post-independence nation-building movement more than their Chagga counterparts did. One

⁷² Speech by Eliufoo at the opening of Mzumbe Secondary School, (16/11/63), TNA-TZ: 593/CB/12/1/75, 3; N.B. The last word, ‘spaces’, has been translated from the Swahili word ‘*nafasi*’, which could also mean ‘vacancies’, indicating that Eliufoo may have been decrying a lack of local applicants for positions, rather than simply blaming foreigners for taking up space.

⁷³ E.N. Mangowi and H.H. Lyatuu, ‘Mkutano Mkuu wa Dayosisi ya Kaskazini Masama West – 26/11 – 2/12 66’, *Umoja*, XXI:219 (February 1967), 1.

example of this is the more politicised language published in *Omushubiro* when compared with *Vijana* and *Umoja*, as discussed in the previous chapter. Both Lutherans and Catholics in the two regions also suggested that more Christians of both denominations in Kagera saw independence as a bigger break with the past than did people in Kilimanjaro, and that more Haya Christians saw a greater change to their daily lives in the early 1960s than did Chagga Christians. As one Haya Catholic man put it: ‘When Nyerere took control and removed the traditional rulers, people were suddenly confronted with a new system where we could all take part, and for some people it was very enticing’.⁷⁴ However, whilst such opinions do point to slight contestations of memory between the two regions, it is important to note that even in Kagera, the majority of interviewees stated that the first few years of independence were not, for most people, significantly different from the late colonial period, in part due to the many continuities seen in the churches and Christian communities.

Indeed, in general, national politics was seemingly not a priority for most people in either Chagga or Haya Christian communities before unification with Zanzibar and the *ujamaa* period, and certainly religious publications from the early 1960s have noticeably little to say on the subject, with a few exceptions.⁷⁵ Most people, especially in Kilimanjaro, reported that, in many ways, life remained quite unchanged despite independence and early nation-building, despite the ever-present discourse of nationalism. As one Lutheran Chagga woman put it:

Here in the village, nothing changed with independence. The TANU government was not that different from the British. Just another government far away. We kept to ourselves, and life continued as usual. Independence was not a big thing for us. The chiefs lost their positions, but they had already been losing their power. The Church stayed the same, the priests and the bishops were the same,

⁷⁴ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, doctor, born 1936.

⁷⁵ For example: ‘Mwaka wa Bwana 1962’, *Umoja*, XV:163 (January 1962), 1-4; this issue of *Umoja*, published the month after independence, is significantly more political in tone than most issues published in the early 1960s.

the village stayed the same. So, for ordinary people, life stayed the same.⁷⁶

This resonates with the argument put forward by both John Campbell and C.K. Omari that, prior to the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere's ideology of nation-building was still relatively weak and ill-defined.⁷⁷ It is therefore important to realise that for many people – at least in very Christian regions like Kilimanjaro and Kagera – independence did not necessarily represent the rupture with the past or the source of renewal that nationalist leaders portrayed it as. Instead, there was a significant sense of continuity amongst lay Catholics and Lutherans in both regions.⁷⁸ However, political developments from 1964 onwards would lead to this situation changing quite markedly.

Following the unification of Zanzibar and Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964, the question of national identity became more complicated. As Campbell notes, Zanzibar's unique 'racial and ethnic tensions' presented a problem for Nyerere.⁷⁹ Zanzibar's path to independence from Britain had been distinct from Tanganyika's, and only three months prior to Unification, the island territory had experienced a violent revolution in which a disenfranchised black majority overthrew the ruling Arab minority. The revolution brought an end to the Sultanate of Zanzibar, a sovereign state which had already been significantly reduced in size by Kenyan independence the previous year, and led to the installation of Abeid Karume of the ASP as the first president of the People's Republic of

⁷⁶ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, businesswoman, born 1938.

⁷⁷ J. Campbell, 'Nationalism, ethnicity and religion: fundamental conflicts and the politics of identity in Tanzania', *Nations and Nationalism*, 5:1 (1999), 106; Omari, 'Ethnicity', 67-68.

⁷⁸ This example supports Emma Hunter's point that 'oral history provides one way to explore questions of continuity and rupture across the independence divide': E. Hunter, "'The History and Affairs of TANU': Intellectual History, Nationalism, and the Postcolonial State in Tanzania', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 45:3 (2012), 368.

⁷⁹ Campbell, 'Nationalism', 106. See also: I.G. Shivji, *Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism? Lessons of Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2008), 69-100.

Zanzibar and Pemba. However, whilst the immediate events of the revolution resulted in relatively few casualties, militias loyal to John Okello, the Ugandan leader of the armed revolution in Zanzibar, continued to carry out reprisal attacks against Arab and Asian people for several weeks. Consequently, though accurate figures are hard to ascertain, it is estimated that several thousand people were murdered.⁸⁰ Tellingly, no white civilians were harmed on the islands; the revolutionaries targeted Arabs and Asians specifically. Thus, although Okello was quickly exiled from Zanzibar by the more moderate Karume, black Zanzibari identity – at least in its new political manifestations – was built in part on elements which were distinctly anti-Asian and anti-Arab.

According to interviewees, black Zanzibari identity was also believed by many in Tanzania at the time of Unification to place a greater emphasis on religion than was the case amongst most black Tanganyikans. Unlike most of the mainland, the islands of Unguja and Pemba were overwhelmingly Muslim, and so a level of religious dominance existed in Zanzibar which was not mirrored elsewhere in the Union. Moreover, Islam had been present in Zanzibar and the rest of the Swahili coast for many centuries, and Swahili and Shirazi cultural and political identity were heavily influenced by Islam in a way that ethnic identities further inland were not.⁸¹ Whilst the Swahili and Shirazi were themselves of diverse ethnic origin, a society shaped by Islam was considered by the time of Unification to be something which tied them together as a people who were distinct from other Tanzanians. Thus, a socio-political identity which was seen not only to violently target specific races, but also to prioritise

⁸⁰ T.G. Burgess, 'Memories, Myths and Meanings of the Zanzibari Revolution', in T. Falola & R. C. Njoku (eds.), *War and peace in Africa* (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 429-450; A. Clayton, *The Zanzibar Revolution and its Aftermath* (London: Hurst and Co. Ltd, 1981); M. Lofchie, *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); Shivji, *Pan-Africanism?*, 41-68.

⁸¹ See: A. Sheriff, 'Race and Class in the Politics of Zanzibar', *Africa Spectrum*, 36:3 (2001), 301-318; Lofchie, *Background to Revolution*, 23-98; 127-182.

and work through Islam, was unsurprisingly viewed unfavourably in more Christian parts of the Tanzanian mainland. This appears to have been true even before unification, with one Haya interviewee noting that the newly emancipated and wealthy women who returned to Bukoba from coastal areas like Mombasa in the 1950s, whose story was discussed in Chapter 1, were sometimes seen as dangerous influences because of their conversion to Islam.⁸² It appears that these sorts of worries only intensified following Unification. One Lutheran woman from Kilimanjaro stated the following:

Many people up here were very scared when Nyerere welcomed the Zanzibaris. We knew the Zanzibaris did not like Arabs and we had heard that they did not like Christians. We didn't like to think that these people were joining us – these violent people who disliked our religion and killed people because of the colour of their skin.⁸³

Interviewees also remembered concern over the influence that Zanzibari Muslims had in the Tanzanian government. Following Unification, Karume became Nyerere's second in command as Vice President of Tanzania, and in 1977 TANU and the ASP united to form CCM. Interviewees, whose memories of this subject were very uniform, recounted the worries this prompted in Christian communities far away from the coast, and the feelings of inequality that arose through Zanzibar's influence and special constitutional status as an autonomous region.

As one Catholic man in Kagera explained it:

Zanzibar was given a special status following Union Day. It was treated differently from the other regions. It had its own powers but also it had a lot of influence on the government for such a small place. People here and elsewhere did not like that – they were scared that the Zanzibaris and other Muslims would be able to influence Nyerere and TANU too much.⁸⁴

⁸² Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, businesswoman, born 1942.

⁸³ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, former schoolteacher, born 1945.

⁸⁴ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, lawyer, born 1945.

Thus, Zanzibar's arrival in the new nation reinforced the issues with race and ethnicity that the country was already attempting to tackle. Constructing a Tanganyikan national identity was a complex process which required the absorption, re-articulation and, in some instances, repression of other forms of identity which had developed, and sometimes been artificially reinforced, before and during the colonial period. To forge a Tanzanian national identity, it was also necessary to contend with the legacy of a new, distinct pre-colonial and colonial history, where race, ethnicity and religion worked differently in the public and the private spheres. By extension, the secularism of the Tanzanian state discussed at the start of this chapter was for many conformist Christians thrown into question by the union with Zanzibar, as the quotations above demonstrate. Moreover, it is evident that Unification with Zanzibar, just like the previously discussed activities of organisations such as AMNUT prior to independence, continues to feed into narratives concerning divisions between Christian and Muslim communities in the mid-twentieth century, and these narratives have consequently shaped the memory of nationalism in conformist Christian Chagga and Haya communities.

Conclusion:

Religion played a complex role in the history of Tanganyikan and Tanzanian nationalism. At the national level, religious teaching and affiliation fed into debates and the rhetoric concerning the nature and direction of the movement, with mission-educated individuals and leaders navigating a political space where Christian-Muslim relations were particularly sensitive. In Kilimanjaro and Kagera, meanwhile, Catholic and Lutheran institutions and ideas were central to how Chaggas and Hayas, particularly conformist Christians, discussed and understood nationalism, as well as to how it has been remembered in these communities. Thus, this chapter builds on an existing body of academic literature tracing the links between Christian institutions

and leaders, Nyerere, and TANU/CCM at the national level by providing a more regional, grassroots focus utilising the memories of conformist Christians in Kilimanjaro and Kagera.

In the years before independence, regional political, agricultural, and social associations which were run primarily by mission-educated Chaggas and Hayas became co-opted by TANU and the nationalist project. Meanwhile, anti-colonial philosophies became a part of the cultural and ideological exchanges that religious institutions experienced with the outside world and with foreign missionaries, in both the Lutheran and the Catholic churches. Towards the end of the 1950s, Christians became much more vocal in their support for independence, as well as in their championing of certain elements of the nationalist cause such as Africanisation. Following independence, in the early nation-building era, the relationship between Christianity and nationalism continued to be important; Nyerere's early administration relied very heavily on educated Christians from Kilimanjaro and Kagera, and so individuals who had been active in their church communities back home and in local political associations suddenly became important to the nation-building project more generally. At the same time, the national re-negotiation of ethnicity and race would influence regional religious communities, with Africanisation in particular becoming a feature of Christian churches.

Unification with majority-Muslim Zanzibar would only serve to complicate nation-building even further, largely due to the islands' religious makeup and, as this chapter has shown, divisions between Christians and Muslims have had a significant effect on how nationalism has been remembered in conformist Christian communities. Both before and after independence, a nationalism which aimed to represent all people in the territory had to contend with significant educational and economic disparities between large Christian and Muslim populations. One way in which this problem was navigated was by reinforcing the secularism which had developed in the colonial era. This was a secularism which was distinctly Christian-

Muslim in foundation, in that it was deliberately crafted so that Tanzania would be officially neither Christian nor Muslim. Thus, with Zanzibar's addition to the Union and the arrival of a new Islamic political identity with the Zanzibari people, religion's importance to the renegotiation of socio-political philosophy in Christian regions of Tanzania in a time of rapid political change was again reinforced.

Certain contestations in the memory of nationalism can be discerned from the testimonies of Chagga and Haya conformist Christians explored in this chapter. There existed a greater focus on the abstract and revolutionary ideals of nationalism in Lutheran communities and on how these differed from the nationalism offered by TANU, whilst Catholics were more likely to focus on Nyerere's faith and its role in his political vision. This fed into slight, but noticeable, regional differences, with those in the more Lutheran Kilimanjaro Region remembering greater engagement with nationalist ideology in the contested pre-independence period and those in the more Catholic Kagera Region remembering more engagement with the nationalism promoted by Nyerere and TANU following independence, when debate was increasingly stifled. However, it is very important to stress that differences in memory between groups were relatively minor, and that one of the most important things this chapter has highlighted is the variation in individual's experiences and memories. Indeed, it is at the personal level that contestations – and even disagreements – were more noticeable, for example concerning subjects such as secularism and Nyerere's faith. Overall, however, even individuals with differing personal opinions and experiences supported communal memories concerning the reception and consequences of nationalism in their communities. Such memories feed into general narratives about the treatment of Kilimanjaro, Kagera and different Christian groups and institutions by both Nyerere and his successors, as the following two chapters explore further.

Finally, and importantly, this chapter has shown that independence in Tanganyika did not always represent a significant rupture with the past for certain people, including conformist Christians in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. Instead, the early 1960s were, for many, characterised by the continuities experienced by local society. This was particularly true in Christian communities, where leaders and elders remained in place and where traditional values and forms of authority became concentrated following the removal of traditional leaders shortly after independence. The sort of rupture which a phenomenon as seemingly significant as independence might have been expected to produce would in fact become more associated with the subject of the following chapter: African Socialism and the policy of *Ujamaa*.

Chapter 6:

African Socialism and Ujamaa

Introduction:

Postcolonial Tanzania is perhaps best known, and most studied, for the period of African Socialism known as '*ujamaa*' ('familyhood') which characterised the last two decades of Julius Nyerere's presidency and his nation-building campaign. The previous chapter showed that Christianity was central to how Chaggas and Hayas thought about and discussed early nationalism, whilst also illustrating how Christian institutions and philosophies affected the development and rhetoric of nationalism amongst political leaders. This chapter argues that Christianity had just as important a role in shaping *ujamaa*, and that the teachings and institutions of the Catholic and Lutheran churches in Kilimanjaro and Kagera influenced how Christians understood and reacted to socialist philosophy and practice. Where historical memory amongst conformist Christians is concerned, the chapter demonstrates that a plurality of experiences and opinions at the personal level, as well as contested understandings of the meanings of *ujamaa* as an ideology, existed alongside a great degree of consensus concerning *ujamaa*'s primarily negative real-world impact and legacy in Chagga and Haya society more generally. Moreover, subtle differences between Catholic and Lutheran beliefs and practices, as well as differences between Chagga and Haya thought systems, have shaped these narratives.

For Christians in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, *ujamaa* presented a unique and profound change in the post-colonial period. Its policies caused huge upheaval in Tanzania, with land, businesses, and educational institutions nationalised and millions of citizens forced into *ujamaa* villages, tasked with tending communal farms '*kujenga nchi*' ('to build the nation'). For the conformist Catholics and Lutherans in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, for whom land, commerce, and individual freedom were important parts of local life, and in whose communities

educational institutions established by the churches were ubiquitous and highly valued, *ujamaa* had a deep, long-lasting effect. As this chapter shows, the consequences and legacy of *ujamaa* in these communities was and is complex and contested. Religious, denominational, ethnic, and regional factors meant that people understood both the underlying philosophy and the real-world effects of *ujamaa* in different ways. Nevertheless, certain trends in the historical memory of this subject in conformist Christian communities are discernible and discussed below.

This chapter builds on a wealth of academic research on *ujamaa*, a topic which has occupied scholars ever since the 1960s. Earlier scholarship tended to approach the matter from a developmental or Marxist perspective, analysing the ways in which *ujamaa* ideology and policy affected economic and educational outcomes, class formation, and central government authority.¹ Moreover, where *ujamaa* philosophy was concerned, more often than not it was the ideology of TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) elites whose ideas were addressed in this scholarship. More recent scholarship on *ujamaa* has moved away from analyses of class and government or TANU elites and has begun to focus on the public space for moral and cultural discourse which the ideology fostered. Emma Hunter, for example, has looked at the discourse of *ujamaa* in peripheral regions like Kilimanjaro, showing how the language of *ujamaa* could be used to talk about local concerns.² Others, such as James Brennan and Andrew Ivaska, have focused on primarily urban areas, where the romanticisation of rural communities

¹ G. Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); G. Hyden, 'Ujamaa, Villagisation and Rural Development in Tanzania', *Development Policy Review*, A8:1 (1975), 53-72; P.L. Raikes, 'Ujamaa and Rural Socialism', *Review of African Political Economy*, 2:3 (1975), 33-52; J. Samoff, 'Crises and Socialism in Tanzania', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 19:2 (1981), 279-306; J. Samoff, 'The Bureaucracy and the Bourgeoisie: Decentralization and Class Structure in Tanzania', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 21:1 (1979), 30-62.

² E. Hunter, *Political Thought and the Public Sphere in Tanzania: Freedom, Democracy and Citizenship in the Era of Decolonization* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 210-226; E. Hunter 'Revisiting Ujamaa: Political Legitimacy and the Construction of Community in Post-Colonial Tanzania', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 2:3 (2008), 471-485.

during the *ujamaa* period interacted with ideas about modernity, westernisation, and exploitation.³

Where Christianity is concerned, the focus of scholars – many of them from Africa – has generally been on the reception and interpretation of *ujamaa* by Christian institutions and theologians, and on the opinions of senior clergy towards the ideology, as well as on Julius Nyerere’s personal faith and his relationship with religious leaders.⁴ This chapter therefore aims to expand on this rich work on Christianity and *ujamaa* by employing a similar methodology to those utilised by scholars like Hunter, Brennan, and Ivaska, looking at the reception, memory and discourse associated with *ujamaa* amongst lay conformist Christians in Kilimanjaro and Kagera.

The relationship between Christianity and *ujamaa* is addressed here in two sections. The first section will look at the foundations and philosophies of *ujamaa*, tracing its development and meaning both amongst the political elites who designed it and in wider society. The second section will assess *ujamaa* in practice, and how the effects of the policy on things such as education, religious life, democratic ideals, and the economy were interpreted and understood by Chagga and Haya people. Whilst the established literature on *ujamaa*,

³ J.R. Brennan, ‘Blood Enemies: Exploitation and Urban Citizenship in the Nationalist Political Thought of Tanzania, 1958-75’, *Journal of African History*, 47 (2006), 389-413; J.R. Brennan, ‘Youth, the Tanu Youth League and Managed Vigilantism in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 1925-73’, *Africa*, 76:2 (2006), 221-246; A.M. Ivaska, ‘“Anti-Mini Militants Meet Modern Misses”: Urban Style, Gender and the Politics of “National Culture” in 1960s Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’, *Gender and History*, 14:3 (2002), 584-607.

⁴ D. Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini: A Study of Some Aspects of Society and Religion in Tanzania, 1961-1977* (Motala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1980); P. Frostin, *Liberation Theology in Tanzania and South Africa: A First World Interpretation* (Malmö: Lund University Press, 1988); E. Magoti, ‘A Critical Analysis of Nyerere’s Ujamaa: An Investigation of its Foundations and Values’ (PhD Thesis: University of Birmingham, 2012); P.A.S. Kijanga, *Ujamaa and the Role of the Church in Tanzania* (Arusha: Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania, 1978); C. Lyimo, ‘An Ujamaa Theology’, in A. Shorter (ed.), *African Christian Spirituality* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1980), 126-129; L. Magesa, ‘Reflections on the Church and Ujamaa’, *Pastoral Orientation Service*, 1 (1972), 2-7; C. Mwoleka and J. Healey (eds.), *Ujamaa and Christian Communities* (Nakuru: Gaba Publications, 1976); P. Soka, ‘An Ujamaa Theology in the Making’, *Mbiu ya Chauta*, 3 (1977), 29-37.

particularly as it relates to religion, will be touched on, and whilst Nyerere's personal writings and contemporaneous religious publications will be referenced, the primary focus in both sections will be on the understandings of *ujamaa* recorded in the oral record in Christian communities in Kilimanjaro and Kagera.

The Foundations and Philosophies of Ujamaa:

Before assessing the nature of *ujamaa* in Tanzania, it is necessary to understand the context in which it developed. The concept of 'African Socialism', out of which *ujamaa* was born, developed rapidly in the late colonial period, as African intellectuals and leaders sought to develop a socio-political framework which could aid in the socio-economic development of the post-colonial state.⁵ In West Africa, individuals such as Léopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia of Senegal, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Sékou Touré of Guinea were amongst the most well-known proponents of the movement. In Central and East Africa, it found its most vocal champions in Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Tom Mboya of Kenya, and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. At its heart, African Socialism distinguished itself from other forms of socialism and communism by claiming to be based on pre-colonial African social philosophies, rather than western understandings of class and production. As Nyerere put it, in his *Essays on Socialism*:

We, in Africa, have no more need of being "converted" to socialism than we have of being "taught" democracy. Both are rooted in our own past – in the traditional society which produced us. Modern African socialism can draw from its traditional heritage the recognition of "society" as an extension of the basic family unit.⁶

⁵ For general overviews of African Socialism, see: C.G. Rosberg and T.M. Callaghy (eds.), *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment* (Berkeley: University of California, 1979); C. Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa* (New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press, 1982).

⁶ J.K. Nyerere, 'The Basis of African Socialism – Ujamaa', *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1973), 12.

As such, African Socialism was seen as a way to reclaim and rebuild what colonialism had destroyed, drawing on the past to address the challenges of the future.⁷ As Siri Lange argues, it was to be the basis of a new national identity, in the same way that religion had been used in Europe.⁸ Thus, African Socialism could be presented as a revolutionary endeavour, one which was at once both traditional and modern.

Yet, whilst African Socialism was a continent-wide movement which drew on shared beliefs, it was also loosely defined and highly varied both in how it was understood and how it was implemented. Where individuals in some countries, such as Tom Mboya in Kenya, called for hybridised systems where free markets could function alongside and within traditional socialist values and frameworks, others, including Nyerere, favoured a less liberal approach.⁹ For Nyerere and the other architects of *ujamaa*, socialist economic development could only be achieved through a complete reorganisation of Tanzanian society, which had become corrupted by Western theories of ownership, individualism, and power. Nyerere's early thinking on this matter was quoted in the *New York Times Magazine* in March 1960:

Having come into contact with a civilization which has over-emphasized the freedom of the individual, we are in fact faced with one of the big problems of Africa in the modern world. Our problem is just this: how to get the benefits of European society – benefits that have been brought about by an organization based upon the individual – and yet retain African's own structure of society in which the individual is a member of a kind of fellowship.¹⁰

⁷ Toyin Falola notes that many African leaders, including Kwame Nkrumah and Sékou Touré, employed this sort of 'nationalist socialist' ideology which was focused on 'imperial disengagement'. See: T. Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals* (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2001), 125.

⁸ S. Lange, 'How the National Became Popular in Tanzania', in M. Palmberg (ed.), *National Identity and Democracy in Africa* (Capture Press, 1999), 40-58.

⁹ For more on Mboya's interpretation of African Socialism, see: T. Mboya, 'African Socialism', *Transition*, 8 (1963), 17-19. See also: D. Speich, 'The Kenyan Style of "African Socialism": Developmental Knowledge Claims and the Explanatory Limits of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History: The Journal of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations*, 33:3 (2009), 449-466.

¹⁰ J.K. Nyerere, 'Africa Needs Time', *The New York Times Magazine*, CIX (27/03/1960), 19.

Consequently, any government which hoped to institute such a paradigm shift would require full control of the country's economy and social institutions. Thus, when *ujamaa* was officially instituted in the 1967 Arusha Declaration, TANU's control of Tanzanian society became entrenched; Tanzania had become a one-party state in 1964, and what followed in 1967 was full control by the ruling party of the country's economy, land, and educational institutions, amongst other things.

Nyerere, one of Africa's foremost intellectuals, wrote extensively about socialism, and contextualised his vision of *ujamaa* within the wider international socialist movement. Whilst Nyerere's personal philosophies are not the main subject of this chapter, a couple of his arguments are important to note when seeking to understand the reception of *ujamaa* in Tanzanian society. For example, as scholars such as Per Frostin have noted, for Nyerere, *ujamaa* presented a significant departure from the forms of socialism better known outside of Africa.¹¹ He believed that, unlike 'Western' socialism, which focused on class struggle and the socio-economic emancipation of the proletariat, *ujamaa* offered freedom from a neoliberal world order to all Tanzanians, regardless of background. In fact, Nyerere was sceptical of the concept of class altogether in Tanzanian society – at least any sort of 'class' as was understood in Europe and North America at the time. Instead, he argued that traditional African society was centred upon a belief and ontology which highlighted the equality and interdependence of all people in that society. Thus, rather than solving the problems of inequality and exploitation by setting the victimised against their abusers, as Nyerere believed 'Western' socialism attempted to do, *ujamaa* sought to promote harmony by appealing to an egalitarian past and a shared humanity. Whilst such understandings of pre-colonial African societies may have been romanticised, Nyerere's central point – that Marxism was a context-specific philosophy, forged

¹¹ Frostin, *Liberation*, 34-45.

in the flames of European industrialisation, which did not neatly overlay African social systems – was nevertheless valid. As Nyerere himself put it, if Marx ‘had lived in Sukumaland, Maasailand or Ruvuma, he would have written a different book than *Das Kapital*.’¹²

Another important distinction between *ujamaa* and other forms of socialism, according to Nyerere, was to be found in the holistic nature of the Tanzanian movement. A ‘holistic socialism’, one which was as much about culture, morality, thought and belief as it was about actions and socio-economic organisation, meant that *ujamaa* was more than simply a socio-political philosophy; rather, it was an all-encompassing way of life to which African people needed to return.¹³ It is no coincidence that such a blurring of the lines between theory and practice, and between the political and the personal, is reminiscent of understandings of African belief and ontology as presented by scholars of religion such as John Mbiti and Joseph Healey.¹⁴ Whilst Nyerere himself was careful to promote *ujamaa*’s religious secularism, and although a small number of academics such as Herbert Neve have been sceptical of religion’s role in his political thinking, other scholars and clergymen have argued convincingly that his ideology was more than likely influenced by his own faith.¹⁵ A committed Catholic, Nyerere

¹² J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism. A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1965-67* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968), 16.

¹³ Frostin, *Liberation*, 48-58.

¹⁴ J. Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy* (London: Heinemann, 1969), 2; J.G. Healey, *A Fifth Gospel: The Experience of Black Christian Values* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981), 140-149.

¹⁵ H.T. Neve, ‘The Political Life of Julius K. Nyerere in Religious Perspective’, *Africa Today*, 23:4 (1976), 29-45. For scholarship suggesting Nyerere’s faith was important to his political ideology, see: T. Molony, *Nyerere: The Early Years* (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2014), 295-310; T. Huddleston, ‘The Person Nyerere’, in C. Legum and G. Mmari (Eds.), *Mwalimu: The Influence of Nyerere* (London: James Currey, 1995), 6-7; R.H. Green, ‘Vision of Human-Centred Development: A Study in Moral Economy’, in C. Legum and G. Mmari (Eds.), *Mwalimu: The Influence of Nyerere* (London: James Currey, 1995), 81; R.J.P. Baitu, *Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere’s Vision of Education* (Inter Press of Tanzania Ltd, 2019), 14-20; P. Bjerck, ‘Sovereignty and Socialism in Tanzania: The Historiography of an African State’, *History in Africa*, 37 (2010), 275-319; J.P. van Bergen, *Development and Social Religion in Tanzania: Sociological Soundings on Christian Participation in Rural Transformation* (Leiden, 1981); Magoti, ‘Nyerere’s Ujamaa’. For summaries of the debate, see: Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini*, 78-80; Frostin, *Liberation*, 59-65.

believed that African socialism was grounded in a humanism which promoted ‘Man’ as its ‘purpose’ and worked towards the equality of all people, writing that ‘The human equality before God which is the basis of all the great religions of the world is also the basis of the political philosophy of socialism’.¹⁶ By extension, socialism was ardently opposed to the idolatry of capitalism, which relied on human exploitation for material gain. Nyerere was also explicit in stating that Christianity and the churches had an important part to play in the liberation of African peoples from exploitation.¹⁷ Consequently, for Frostin and others, including Tanzanian theologians such as Charles Nyamiti, Laurenti Magesa, and Christopher Mwoleka, *ujamaa* could even be understood as a form of liberation theology.¹⁸

Thus, by differentiating *ujamaa* from Marxism-Leninism and other ‘Western’ understandings of socialism, Nyerere was able to present his philosophy as something truly organic and revolutionary, breaking away at the most fundamental level from the capitalistic understanding of society which class-oriented socialism promoted. Moreover, the ‘secularism’ of *ujamaa* was not understood by its architects to mean that religion had no part to play – indeed, churches were in fact called on to play their part in the new system.¹⁹ Rather, the ‘secularism’ of *ujamaa*, like the secularism of Tanzanian politics discussed in the previous chapter, meant that it had no formal religion and was not driven by religious organisations; it

¹⁶ Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism*, 303.

¹⁷ J.K. Nyerere, ‘The Christian Rebellion’, in A. Shorter (ed.), *African Christian Spirituality* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1980), 82-88.

¹⁸ C. Nyamiti, *African Traditions and the Christian God* (Eldoret: Gaba Publications, 1978); L. Magesa, *The Church and Liberation in Africa* (Eldoret: Gaba Publications, 1976); L. Magesa, ‘Towards a Theology of Liberation in Tanzania’, in E. Fasholé-Luke, R. Gray, A. Hastings, and G. Tasie (eds.), *Christianity in Independent Africa* (London: Indiana University Press, 1978), 503-515; Magesa, ‘Reflections’, 2-7; Lyimo, ‘Ujamaa Theology’, 126-129; Mwoleka and Healey, *Christian Communities*, 6-30; Soka, ‘Ujamaa Theology’, 29-37; Frostin, *Liberation*, 49-73; 77-83; Frostin’s book includes a good overview of African theologians’ assessments of *Ujamaa*.

¹⁹ F. Ludwig, *Church and State in Tanzania: Aspects of a Changing Relationship, 1961-1994* (Brill, 1999), 93-123; Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini*, 61-62; 108-117; 180.

was a way of ensuring and protecting religious freedom in a pluralistic society where Christian and Muslim communities were increasingly wary of each other's political influence.²⁰ As discussed later, these philosophical nuances allowed for the potential acceptance of *ujamaa* in circles which were strongly opposed to 'foreign' forms of socialist and communist thought.

It is important to recognise, however, that some of the philosophies behind Tanzania's development into a socialist state had been a feature of public discourse for some time before the formal establishment of *ujamaa* in 1967, and indeed before independence, and that these discussions had not been confined purely to political elites. Moreover, as might be expected, the anti-Marxist nuances of Nyerere's vision of *ujamaa* and his accommodating of religious influences were not always carried over into these discussions, which often understood the growing African socialist movement primarily within the epistemological parameters of non-African socialist thought.²¹ The spectre of communism had been a common feature in the discourse of the colonial state, both in government and in the churches, with officials and religious leaders concerned by the potential for communist sympathies to develop amongst anti-colonial activists. For example, in 1957, colonial officials in the Northern Province wrote to the government in Dar es Salaam to express concern over a number of TANU-organised scholarships for Chagga students at Lincoln University in the USA, with the Acting Provincial Commissioner stating that 'My informant states that this University has a bad communist

²⁰ For a discussion of the perception of Tanzanian secularism in Christian and Muslim communities during *ujamaa*, see: D. Westerlund, 'Freedom of Religion under Socialist Rule in Tanzania, 1961-1977', *Journal of Church and State*, 24:1 (1982), 87-103.

²¹ For example, other TANU elites and much of the TANU Youth League had a more Marxist-Leninist understanding of socialism, and a different image of what *ujamaa* should entail in Tanzania. For a good discussion of the tensions and debates between the different sides, see: R. Aminzade, *Race, Nation and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 132-160; 186-200. See also: G. Roberts, *Revolutionary State-Making in Dar es Salaam: African Liberation and the Global Cold War, 1961-1974* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

reputation and the influence on the students would be most undesirable'.²² Likewise, the government kept a close eye on students travelling to Iron Curtain countries and on the influx of Sino-Soviet literature into Tanganyika, as well as on the links between communist or socialist organisations abroad and organisations like TANU or agricultural co-operatives.²³

Christian publications from the colonial period also show that a preoccupation with communism was evident amongst both Catholics and Lutherans. In 1953, the Catholic Church in Tanganyika published a pastoral letter, in which the bishops stated that 'Communism is little more than a diabolical attempt to abolish not only the rights of man but also those of God'.²⁴ Lutheran youth newspapers were similarly keen to point out the evils of communist philosophy, presumably in order to dissuade the increasingly politically active youth – on whom the anti-colonial movement relied heavily – from becoming communist sympathisers. For example, in a *Vijana* article from 1956, readers were presented with a picture of East Germany which highlighted the abuses of the communist state and the misery of East German residents.²⁵ Similar stories were told of the USSR, where the history of the Bolshevik movement was compared with the horrors of Nazi Germany and the Italy of Benito Mussolini.²⁶ It was argued that in Russia, as in Germany and Italy, a departure from the moral teachings of Christianity, as well as a narrow focus on science and the establishment of a technocracy, was to blame for

²² Acting PC, Northern Province, to the Chief Secretary (15/05/1957), TNA-UK: FCO 141/17830/15, 1.

²³ For example: Commissioner of Police to Permanent Secretary, 'Students in or Proceeding to Iron Curtain Countries' (06/02/1960), TNA-UK: FCO 141/17830/73A; Tanganyika Intelligence Summary, February 1961, TNA-UK: CO 822/2062/E17; Commissioner of Police to Chief Secretary (16/10/1956), TNA-UK: FCO 141/17744/20.

²⁴ *Africans and the Christian Way of Life*. Pastoral Letter of the Archbishops, Bishops and Prefects Apostolic to the Catholic People of Tanganyika (Tabora, 1953), quoted in: Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini*, 111. For more on Catholic attitudes to communism, see: L. Mbogoni, *The Cross Versus The Crescent: Religion and Politics in Tanzania from the 1880s to the 1990s* (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota, 2004), ch. 7.

²⁵ 'Je, Biblia yako ina maana gani kwako?', *Vijana*, 4 (June 1956), 3.

²⁶ 'Elimu na Ukristo (Education and Christianity)', *Vijana*, 13 (December 1957), 3.

the descent of these societies into evil. These stories served as warnings to young Christians of the potential for evil to flourish when faith was not nurtured and preserved, with Nazism and communism presented as the pinnacles of societal evil.

It is therefore unsurprising that contributors to Lutheran youth newspapers also presented Christianity as a force of anti-extremism and anti-communism, one which could draw on the strength of its dedicated youth to stem the tide of anti-capitalist, anti-Western ideology coming out of China, the USSR, and Eastern Europe. For example, *Vijana* argued it was the dedication to their faith which had enabled East German Christian youth to resist indoctrination at school and to counter the teachings of communism.²⁷ Similarly, in two Christmas *Vijana* articles published in 1961, a story was told of how Vladimir Lenin had been brought to tears after helping to decorate a Christmas tree, as he reflected on the things in his life which had led to his losing his faith.²⁸ The point the story was making was that even Lenin, whose lack of faith was presented as one of the main reasons for political discord in Russia, was touched deep in his soul by Christ. Thus, communism and associated beliefs were seen as a threat not only to the churches, but to wider society as well, and it was made clear that Christianity itself was the antidote to the perceived evil of such ideology.

However, whilst much of the discourse surrounding communist and socialist philosophy was negative, it is important to note that there was also a desire to understand what socialism meant in a Christian context, and whether socialism and Christianity could coexist in Tanzanian society. Evidence for this can be seen in a 1963 article from *Umoja*, the monthly newspaper of the Northern Diocese of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania (ELCT),

²⁷ 'Biblia yako', 3.

²⁸ 'Mkutano wa kumi na sita', *Vijana*, 34 (November 1961), 4; Christmas – Sikukuu ya Kuzaliwa kwa Bwana: Ina maana gani na wewe?', *Vijana*, 35 (December 1961), 1-2.

entitled ‘Can a Christian be a Communist?’²⁹ Whilst the article suggested that Christianity and communism were largely incompatible, the inclusion of this publication is indicative of a society where individuals were questioning the relationship between the two, including in Christian communities. This was reflective of a socio-political space where communism and associated beliefs had become important, controversial topics of debate, with a growing number of people advocating for a form of nation-building which incorporated communist or socialist teaching. As this article stated: ‘A new word which is circulating in our country is “communism”. In the past, you did not hear this word; these days, it is in the mouths of all. In the past, communists did not reside in our country, now their advocates are among us’.³⁰

Interviewees in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, from both Lutheran and Catholic communities, recalled the growing interest in socialist thought in their communities throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s. Moreover, they remembered people being divided about what socialism meant, and about its potential merits and dangers. A Catholic woman in Kagera described how:

Many people in Bukoba and in the villages wanted to know more about socialism ... Even in the Church, it was a big discussion; there were some who said it was anti-Catholic, and others who said it was more Christian than capitalism ... Men, women, young, old, everybody – they all wondered if it could help Tanzania, or if it would hurt us and drive us backwards.³¹

Similar memories were recounted by other interviewees, whose testimonies point to the existence of disparate Christian communities in which the same questions of religion, socio-political ideology, and modernity were discussed in the home, in the public sphere, and in religious circles. Some people also spoke of the growing relationship between Tanzania and

²⁹ ‘Je, Mkristo aweza kuwa Mkomunisti’, *Umoja*, 178 (April 1963), 2.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former schoolteacher, born 1939.

the USSR and China during this period, and how young Tanzanians – especially well-educated Christians – were able to make use of scholarships offered to them abroad in Communist countries. A Lutheran man in Kilimanjaro summed up the sentiments of many interviewees when he spoke of how:

After independence, fewer students went to Europe and America, and more people went to Russia; Tanzania was breaking away from Britain and its allies and becoming closer to the communist countries which had supported our independence. Naturally, this made people think about emulating their political system, even though the Church was against it.³²

Testimonies such as these, along with the various discussions of socialist and communist ideology published in newspapers such as *Umoja* and *Vijana*, are evidence that, from the very beginning, the discussions surrounding socialism were complex and contested, even within small communities and religious institutions. Several scholars have written about the plurality of socialisms which developed in Tanzania both before and after the Arusha Declaration, arguing that different understandings of the term became central to debates around morality, community, and exploitation.³³ The testimonies of interviewees recounted here show that this was certainly true of conformist Christian communities in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, where the many socialisms which developed are well preserved in local historical memory.

Thus, socialism and communism had been a dynamic, contested feature of the discourse in Christian communities for some time before the Arusha declaration in 1967, and when it came to the reception of *ujamaa* philosophy itself in Chagga and Haya society, conformist Christian memories displayed some interesting trends and contestations. In general, interviewees in both regions remembered their communities being more sceptical of *ujamaa*

³² Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, government worker, born 1941.

³³ Samoff, 'Crises', 210-226; Hunter, *Political Thought*, 210-226; Hunter 'Revisiting Ujamaa', 471-485; Aminzade, *Citizenship*, 132-200.

than other Tanzanians. This is unsurprising since, as will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter, wealthier regions of the country were hesitant to embrace socialist ideology or practice. As William Tordoff and Ali Mazrui noted as early as 1972, the demand from the centre that peasant life be socialist was unlikely to work in areas where individual farming was a longstanding tradition.³⁴ However, interviewees in Kagera also remembered stronger support in their communities for *ujamaa* than did interviewees in Kilimanjaro. Meanwhile, Catholics in both regions remembered their communities being slightly more supportive of *ujamaa* than did Lutherans, though even Catholics – particularly in Kilimanjaro – were often critical of it. In keeping with the theme discussed in previous chapters of Lutheranism, and especially Chagga Lutheranism, being associated with political dissent, Lutherans in Kilimanjaro were the group with the least favourable memories of the period. Addressing the difference between Catholic and Lutheran attitudes to *ujamaa*, one priest in Moshi stated:

The Lutheran Church was much more resistant to *ujamaa* than the Catholic Church here. It is because we have different understandings of society. Lutheranism is more individualistic than Catholicism. The Catholic Church is large, with one leader, and we place importance on the whole community. As such, Catholicism shared many features with *ujamaa*, with a focus on the community and the authority of a single leader. The Lutheran Church in Tanzania is not as unified, and the focus in Lutheranism is on the individual and his family. For that reason, Lutherans did not accept the philosophy of *ujamaa* as readily as we did.³⁵

The testimony of a Lutheran Chagga woman resonated with this assessment:

My father owned a business and was very involved in the Church. He was opposed to Nyerere and *ujamaa* because he believed it was going to take away our livelihood and the individualism that the Church and Chagga society encouraged... we believed that it was against what we were

³⁴ W. Tordoff and A. Mazrui, 'The Left and the Super-Left in Tanzania', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10:3 (1972), 435.

³⁵ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, priest.

taught in Church about people's individuals rights and the need to work hard to provide for your family.³⁶

Examples such as these, then, demonstrate how denominational differences, particularly in relation to power, community, and development, were remembered to have influenced how Lutherans and Catholics interpreted *ujamaa* and its associated beliefs. Moreover, the familiar motif of decentralised Lutheran individualism, especially when contrasted with authoritative Catholic communitarianism, influenced the formation of these narratives. Likewise, another theme which featured in discussions of *ujamaa*, which the last chapter touched on, was that of Catholic favouritism and Nyerere's personal faith. Lutheran interviewees in both regions recalled how with *ujamaa*, just as with independence and nation-building, there was a fear that Catholics would benefit most from Nyerere's vision. Catholics, meanwhile, spoke of how Nyerere's Catholicism was reassuring to many in their communities; not only were they confident that his faith had guided the design of *ujamaa*, which to many had much in common with Catholic teaching, but they also deemed it unlikely that he could design and promote a socio-political system which would in any way damage the Church to which he was so dedicated. However, it is important to note that the situation was highly variable even within individual congregations, and that people's perceptions of *ujamaa* were not static. One senior Lutheran clergyman, for example, illustrated this point:

To begin with, we were very wary of *ujamaa* because we did not understand it. So, Bishop [Stefano] Moshi sent his deputy [and successor as bishop], Erasto Kweka, to Kivukoni College in Dar es Salaam to learn more about it. When he returned, he assured us that *ujamaa* was a moral programme and nothing to be frightened of.³⁷

³⁶ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, businesswoman, born 1953.

³⁷ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, pastor; See also: Ludwig, *Church and State*, 96-97. Ludwig notes that several religious leaders attended Kivukoni College to find out more about the country's political development.

Thus, conformist Chagga and Haya Christians understood *ujamaa* through a complex, denominationally coloured but dynamic lens, and consequently retained in the historical memory of *ujamaa* a distinct but variable religious dimension.

Building on the general theme of Catholic – and particularly Haya Catholic – sympathy for *ujamaa* teaching, a senior Catholic clergyman in Kagera, though opposed to *ujamaa* himself, recalled how many in the church, among both the clergy and the laity, were receptive to Nyerere’s vision on both theological and traditional philosophical grounds. He described how, in his opinion, the Haya shared in wider African beliefs which, like the *Ubuntu* of the Nguni peoples, emphasised the interrelatedness of all people and the reliance of the individual on their group:

Haya people, like other Africans, are collective; they believe that it is impossible to be strong alone – to live alone – and that individuals must work together for the common good. For many people here, *maendeleo*, both for Tanzania and for the Haya, needed to come from a system like *ujamaa*.³⁸

The link to *maendeleo* here is important, not only because it was a topic which, as previous chapters have shown, was central to the broader memory of the Nyerere years in Chagga and Haya conformist Christian communities. Several scholars have written about how the rhetoric of *maendeleo* was integral to the *ujamaa* movement, since *ujamaa* was, in many ways, a large-scale development project, albeit one which contained a significant element of social engineering.³⁹ However, as Hunter argues, *maendeleo* meant different things to different people, and one of the most significant things that *ujamaa* did was to allow for the public

³⁸ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest. Interestingly, the Haya Lutheran Bishop Josiah Kibira also wrote about the importance of *Ubuntu*: J. Kibira, *Church, Clan, and the World* (Uppsala: Gleerup, 1974), 67-68.

³⁹ See: F. Becker, *The Politics of Poverty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), ch. 5; E. Hunter, *Political Thought*, 212-224.

exchange of understandings of the term.⁴⁰ As the following pages show, how interviewees remembered the interaction between *ujamaa* and *maendeleo* was reflective of this.

Interestingly, much of what the clergyman quoted above said was also reminiscent of the work of other Catholic intellectuals such as Placide Tempels, whose 1945 study entitled *Bantu Philosophy* attempted to understand on their own terms the thought systems of sub-Saharan African societies.⁴¹ For Tempels, Bantu understandings of being, and of the nature of personhood, were inextricably linked with, and forged within, a hierarchy of relationships with family, clan, ancestors, humanity, land, and the natural world. Consequently, he argued that Western notions of individualism were not only alien to such a philosophy, but unable even to be understood or accommodated within its associated intellectual frameworks. Whilst Tempels' study, which was very much a product of its time, made vast generalisations of sub-Saharan philosophies and was written in part to better understand the 'civilising mission' of Christianity, he nevertheless identified through his own interviews and observations elements of local philosophies which African leaders, intellectuals, clergy, and lay Christians would later promote and build upon. As R.H. Green suggests, Nyerere himself echoed Tempels' beliefs, being guided by both his understanding of communitarian African culture and his Catholic faith.⁴² Additionally, whilst this is merely speculative, it is possible that, in Catholic intellectual circles, Tempels' work may have had a direct influence on how individuals such as the clergyman whose testimony was presented above understood and remembered *ujamaa*, the nation-building project, and people's reactions to them. Indeed, Westerlund notes that, following Tempels' lead, African theologians – including the Haya priest Wilson Niwagila – often described African society as inherently 'religious' and 'collectivistic', as opposed to the

⁴⁰ Hunter, *Political Thought*, 212-224.

⁴¹ P. Tempels, *Bantu Philosophy* (Orlando: HBC Publishing, 1952).

⁴² Green, 'Human-Centred', 81.

‘secularised’ and ‘individualistic’ nature of Western society.⁴³ Regardless of Tempels’ direct influence, it is evident that the memory of *ujamaa* in Christian regions has thus been shaped by beliefs surrounding understandings of the self, the community, and authority. Moreover, ethnic and denominational identity were clearly remembered as significant factors in how these ideas were formed and articulated.

There were also significant tribe-specific factors which were remembered to have influenced the acceptance of *ujamaa* philosophy in Tanzania. In Kilimanjaro, for example, some interviewees recalled how Chagga people had considered *ujamaa* to be a threat to elements of their culture and had therefore opposed it. In particular, *ujamaa* was considered to be incompatible with Chagga notions of *maendeleo*, land ownership and private business. As one Lutheran woman put it:

My father and many others in the village were scared that Nyerere and the government would take their farms and their money. They were worried that *ujamaa* and socialism would mean that our farms could not be kept in our families, and that we would not be able to do business.⁴⁴

She went on to explain this latter point, saying that:

For the Chagga, the family land is sacred: we grow up on it, we work it, we inherit it, we are buried on it, and we pass it on to our children in accordance with our customs. It is what people use to make a living and feed their families. Nobody wanted the government to take it or control who got it – we still do not want that. We wanted to be able to keep doing what we had always done, and *ujamaa* threatened that ...⁴⁵

⁴³ D. Westerlund, ‘Christianity and Socialism in Tanzania, 1967-1977’, *Journal of Religion in Africa*, XI:1 (1980), 31. Westerlund is referring here to Niwagila’s master’s thesis: W.B. Niwagila, ‘A sociological-theological study of the Haya ‘tribe’ in Tanzania’ (MTh thesis: Dubuque, 1972).

⁴⁴ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, businesswoman, born 1947.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

Other interviewees also highlighted the conspicuous Chagga role in running businesses throughout Tanzania, and how *ujamaa* was viewed by many as a direct attack on ethnic groups whose understandings of *maendeleo* were ‘more capitalistic’ than others in the country. As previous chapters have explored, ‘Chagga capitalism’ is something which is particularly associated with the Lutheran Church and Lutheran individuals, and so it is perhaps unsurprising that this theme was most often a feature of interviews with Lutheran Chaggas. However, Catholic interviewees in Kilimanjaro also spoke of *ujamaa*’s perceived incompatibility with Chagga culture, although they tended not to recall their communities placing as much emphasis on maintaining traditional land ownership – something which could perhaps be linked to the promotion of traditional ways of life in the Lutheran Church on Kilimanjaro, as discussed in Chapter One.

At the same time, several sources also spoke of how Chagga culture had been used by Nyerere and TANU to convince Kilimanjaro residents not only of the benefits of *ujamaa*, but also of its similarities to pre-existing Chagga society. As one Catholic man put it:

Nyerere knew that many Chagga people did not want *ujamaa* or any form of socialism. So, he tried to convince us of its merits by telling us that we Chaggas were already socialists and that we already followed an *ujamaa* system here on the mountain with our villages and our furrow systems. TANU told us that nothing would change for us, because we were already doing it all correctly.⁴⁶

Another Lutheran interviewee described a similar memory of Nyerere and TANU utilising the strong co-operative culture in Kilimanjaro to argue that the Chagga were already socialist.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, businessman, born 1941. Interestingly, the Chagga chief Petro Itossi Marealle had also written of the importance of *ujamaa* to Chagga families and the community: P.I. Marealle, *Maisha ya Mchagga hapa Duniani na Ahera* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2002 [first published 1947]), 121-122.

⁴⁷ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, former government worker, born 1936; Hunter has written about the longstanding ideas of the links between socialism and *ujamaa* on the one hand, and culture, tradition, and co-operatives, on the other, both amongst the Chagga and the Haya: Hunter, *Political Thought*, 220-222.

Memories such as these speak to a situation which developed in the *ujamaa* period wherein primarily rural, relatively densely populated regions such as those found in Kilimanjaro, Kagera, parts of Arusha, and Uluguru were able to avoid some of the most drastic, authoritarian elements of the new system, such as forced villagisation.⁴⁸ This is a phenomenon which the second section of this chapter, which deals with *ujamaa* in practice, discusses in more detail. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that so many interviewees mentioned it, since it points to the existence in local memory of a nuanced reflection upon how Chagga ethnicity and ways of life were interpreted in ways which both opposed and potentially accommodated *ujamaa* philosophy.

Where in Kilimanjaro capitalism and the Chagga village and land systems were remembered as the things which most affected the acceptance of *ujamaa* ideology, in Kagera, *ujamaa*'s somewhat more favourable reception was remembered by some to have been influenced by Haya society's rigidly hierarchical nature. As the centrepiece of TANU's nation-building project, one which sought to dismantle traditional power structures which had ostensibly been corrupted by the colonial regime, socialism offered an emancipatory opportunity for those at the bottom of the social ladder. Moreover, it gave such people the tools and avenues for participation in civil society in a manner not previously possible. As one Catholic woman explained:

Under *ujamaa*, everyone was equal, and everyone had their part to play. Equality was new for us; we had never had it. Even after independence, some people here felt that Haya society had not changed much. Nyerere got rid of the chiefs, but the system was still there. Men still controlled everything, and rich people and noble families still held all

⁴⁸ A. Keshomshahara, *A Theology of Poverty Reduction in Tanzania* (Moshi: Moshi Lutheran Printing Press, 2008), 86; A. Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013 [first published 1982]), 280-318; Hyden, 'Villagisation', 56-57.

the power. *Ujamaa* offered something different to a lot of people, and they liked that.⁴⁹

Thus, in much the same way that the churches were remembered to have allowed Haya women to escape the control of Haya men, as previous chapters have explored, interviewees recalled how *ujamaa* had promised Haya people – particularly the youth – an escape from the control of local elites. Importantly, however, for Christian Hayas such as the woman quoted here, *ujamaa* did not, as Nyerere argued, provide an avenue to reclaim an egalitarian ‘tradition’. Rather, it provided a radical break with the past, a form of modernity which promised an entirely new way of living and being for many Haya people. This point is important, as it illustrates how, even where *ujamaa* was embraced, its meaning and purpose was contested amongst its supporters and adherents. These different *ujamaas* which developed in Tanzanian political thought reinforce the need to develop more regional, subaltern histories in the country, utilising an ever-wider variety of sources.

Ujamaa in Practice:

The realities of *ujamaa* were, as may be expected, far more complex than the idea of it had been. Importantly, it also proved to be much more divisive and inequitable than its architects had promised in their unifying vision for the country. This led to much resentment, with J. P. van Bergen noting towards the end of the Nyerere years that Christians in Tanzania were particularly unenthusiastic about socialism.⁵⁰ Although the minutiae of the *ujamaa* system are not the focus of this investigation, it is worth noting that two of its central features – villagisation and nationalisation – are particularly important aspects of how it has been

⁴⁹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, farmer, born 1939.

⁵⁰ J.P. van Bergen, *Social Religion*.

remembered in Kilimanjaro and Kagera amongst conformist Chagga and Haya Christians. Indeed, these two elements of Nyerere's political system were reflected upon by almost every interviewee, for whom the memory of the realities of *ujamaa* were noticeably more uniform than were the previously discussed memories of *ujamaa* as an abstract ideology. Consequently, it is worth briefly describing what each of these two things meant in the Tanzanian context.

The first of these, villagisation, can be divided into two phases, as noted by Goran Hyden.⁵¹ The earlier phase relied on Tanzanians living in rural areas voluntarily organising themselves into small *ujamaa* villages, as called for in the Arusha Declaration, where they were to jointly own the means of production and undertake communal agricultural work for the good of Tanzanian society. Although this phase saw some traction in relatively underdeveloped regions, particularly in southern Tanzania, it did not lead to the villagized society that Nyerere and the other architects of *ujamaa* had envisaged, or to the celebration of rural society that *ujamaa* called for. This was primarily due to a reluctance in most of Tanzanian society to move to *ujamaa* villages, but it was also complicated by individuals and co-operatives attempting to hijack the movement to increase their own landholdings. To quote Felicitas Becker, 'several years of sticks and carrots short of actual force had failed to speed up rural development'.⁵² Consequently, a second phase of the villagisation programme gathered pace in the early 1970s; this time, citizens were forcefully moved to *ujamaa* villages by the authorities, with violence and the destruction of people's previous homes becoming prominent features of the new approach. It is unclear how much of the Tanzanian population was affected by the villagisation project. Hyden, writing in 1975, estimated that the first phase of villagisation had affected only 15% of Tanzanians, whilst forced villagisation had directly impacted roughly 50%.⁵³ However,

⁵¹ Hyden, 'Villagisation', 53-72.

⁵² F. Becker, *The Politics of Poverty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 183.

⁵³ Hyden, 'Villagisation', 53-72.

in 1999, he stated that the proportion of Tanzanians who were forcibly resettled was probably around 25%, with over five million citizens moving to the *ujamaa* communes.⁵⁴

Nationalisation, meanwhile, was aimed at sectors such as industry, agriculture, education, and healthcare. Nyerere and TANU believed that, for the country to be self-sufficient, these elements of Tanzanian society had to be owned and operated by the people. Consequently, private farms, factories, businesses, hotels, hospitals and dispensaries, and schools which received money from the government, were nationalised, so that by the 1970s, the state exercised almost total control over these sectors. Much like villagisation, nationalisation – particularly of educational and healthcare institutions – started with a soft touch right after the Arusha Declaration, before becoming increasingly forceful in the 1970s. Initially, organisations such as churches were encouraged to hand the running of their government-subsidised public schools over to the government.⁵⁵ In 1970, however, all such schools were forcefully nationalised by the Nyerere regime, and education became highly influenced by *ujamaa* philosophy. Meanwhile, the nationalisation of private businesses and agricultural co-operatives went hand-in-hand with increasingly strict controls on the circulation of money and foreign currency. Thus, by the mid-1970s, through both villagisation and nationalisation, TANU and Nyerere had established a tightly controlled state which exercised authority over almost every aspect of many Tanzanians' daily lives.

The government's increasing control of Tanzanian society and public political discourse notwithstanding, *ujamaa* nevertheless meant different things for different communities throughout the country, and indeed for different individuals within those

⁵⁴ G. Hyden, 'Top-Down Democracy in Tanzania', *Journal of Politics*, 10:4 (1999), 143.

⁵⁵ It is important to note that, even during the *ujamaa* period, Christian churches maintained personal and financial links with institutions outside of Tanzania, usually in Europe or the USA. As such, as van Bergen notes, churches, unlike many citizens and institutions in Tanzania, continued to have access to capital over which the state had no control. See: J.P. van Bergen, *Social Religion*.

communities; Christian communities in Kilimanjaro and Kagera were no exception to this. Villagisation, for example, was remembered by Haya and Chagga interviewees in a variety of ways, although this did not detract from broader, mostly negative communal memories about its implementation and consequences, as discussed below. For example, Catholic interviewees in both regions, particularly members of the clergy, were more likely to link the idea of *ujamaa* villages to Small Christian Communities, where socio-political, spiritual and pastoral development and support could go hand in hand at the local level.⁵⁶ Michael Jennings has gone so far as to suggest that the Catholic Church actively promoted villagisation because it gave the Church more control over its flock.⁵⁷ However, Ludwig's work suggests that this was true only in limited cases, since Christian leaders actually often found their flocks relocated a long way from churches and other mission institutions.⁵⁸ Moreover, most Catholic interviewees – like their Lutheran counterparts – in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera also argued that the force used by the authorities to establish *ujamaa* villages was unforgiveable, and that it went against Christian teachings on peace, freedom, and good governance.⁵⁹ Ludwig similarly notes that letters to *Kiongozi*, the national newspaper of the Catholic Church in Tanzania, often complained about the shortcomings of villagisation policy, whilst Cardinal Rugambwa, the

⁵⁶ For more on this idea, see: Frostin, *Liberation*, 68-71; Healey, *Fifth Gospel*, 9-14; 111-128; Lyimo, 'Ujamaa Theology', 128; Mwoleka and Healey, *Christian Communities*, 6-30; Soka, 'An Ujamaa Theology', 31. See also: S. Nyanto, 'Ujamaa, Small Christian Communities, and Moral Reform in Western Tanzania, 1960s–1990', *The Catholic Historical Review*, 106:2 (2020), 312-334. Priya Lal also notes the parallels between Christian teaching and rural *ujamaa* village philosophy when it came to the domestic virtues and duties of women: P. Lal, 'Militants, Mothers, and the National Family: "Ujamaa", Gender, and Rural Development in Postcolonial Tanzania', *The Journal of African History*, 51:1 (2010), 1-20.

⁵⁷ M. Jennings, *Surrogates of the State: NGOs, Development, and Ujamaa in Tanzania* (Bloomfield, C.T.: Kumarian Press, 2008). Jennings uses as his main source for this assessment the PhD thesis of J.C. Sivalon: J.C. Sivalon, 'Roman Catholicism and the Defining of Tanzanian Socialism, 1953-1985: An Analysis of the Social Ministry of the Roman Catholic Church in Tanzania' (PhD Dissertation: University of St. Michael's College, 1990).

⁵⁸ Ludwig, *Church and State*, 128.

⁵⁹ About two-thirds of Catholic interviewees expressed this viewpoint. Amongst Lutherans, the rate was even higher at about four-fifths of interviewees. Importantly, no interviewee supported forced villagisation.

Haya who became the first black African cardinal, stated in 1974 that citizens had the right to choose for themselves whether or not to move to *ujamaa* villages.⁶⁰ Amongst Lutherans, the memory of villagisation was even more negative, with many interviewees describing it as an attempt to stifle the *maendeleo* of more capitalistic and developed regions of the country – an argument which some Catholics also made. That Christian *maendeleo* and capitalism were slightly more important to Lutheran memories resonates with the perceived links between the denomination and these elements of Haya and, especially, Chagga society, as discussed in previous chapters.

However, it is important to remember that both the Chagga and the Haya, whether Catholic or Lutheran, were relatively unaffected by villagisation. Indeed, several scholars have noted how, in the first, voluntary phase of villagisation, the wealthy co-operatives discussed in previous chapters had in fact attempted to co-opt the system for their own use, particularly in Kilimanjaro, by buying up land ostensibly for the *ujamaa* project, when in fact it simply served to add to their landholdings and income.⁶¹ More importantly, however, when it came to the most oppressive forms of villagisation, Kilimanjaro and Kagera were also largely spared.⁶² Abednego Keshomshahara, the current Lutheran Bishop of Bukoba, argues that this was due in part to the fact that densely populated rural areas like those on Kilimanjaro and around Bukoba did not need to be reorganised into the sorts of communities that the government wanted, as they already fulfilled Nyerere's vision for Tanzania.⁶³ Instead, new administrative

⁶⁰ Ludwig, *Church and State*, 128.

⁶¹ Raikes, 'Ujamaa', 45; Hyden, 'Villagisation', 56.

⁶² This was not always true. I.K.S. Musoke provides an important example of forced villagisation in Kagera, where 36 of the 42 villagers he interviewed at Rugazi Ujamaa Village claimed that they had been forced to move there. See: I.K.S. Musoke, 'Building Socialism in Bukoba: The Establishment of Rugazi (Nyerere) Ujamaa Village', *International Journal of Politics*, 4:4 (Winter 1974-75), 107.

⁶³ Keshomshahara, *Poverty Reduction*, 86.

lines were simply drawn around and between existing villages, organising them into the movement without actually having to change anything on the ground. Several interviewees, particularly Lutherans in Kilimanjaro, also recalled how the government was reliant on the economic strength of these regions, and so any major disruption was seen as a hindrance to Tanzania's drive for self-reliance. Similarly, a number of scholars have argued that the notion of forced villagisation in wealthier, export-driven agricultural regions which had developed strong local markets was soon abandoned by the authorities due to both the economic value of these regions and the risk of violent resistance.⁶⁴ In Iringa Region, in south-central Tanzania, an attempt to implement the policy had in fact led to the murder of the Regional Commissioner by a disgruntled farmer.⁶⁵ Likewise, one Chagga Catholic man from Rombo, on the eastern slopes of Kilimanjaro, recounted a similar story which suggested that the government was wise to adopt a hands-off approach:

The Regional Commissioner came to Rombo to tell us about villagisation. When he arrived, a grave had been dug, waiting for him. He was silently shown the grave by the villagers, at which point he got back in his car, and returned to Moshi as quickly as possible! That was the last we heard about villagisation on the mountain.⁶⁶

In Kagera, the memory of villagisation as recounted by interviewees was slightly more complicated and contested. Though Bukoba itself and much of the land which the Haya inhabited was largely unaffected by forced villagisation, Christian dioceses headquartered in Bukoba or run primarily by Haya individuals were responsible for other areas and peoples in Kagera as well.⁶⁷ For some Christian leaders in the region, such as Christopher Mwoleka, the

⁶⁴ J. Samoff and R. Samoff, 'The Local Politics of Underdevelopment', *Politics and Society*, 6:4 (1976), 92; Hyden, 'Villagisation', 56.

⁶⁵ Hyden, 'Villagisation', 56.

⁶⁶ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, banker, born 1939.

⁶⁷ For more on *ujamaa* in Kagera, see: J. Boesen, B.S. Madsen and T. Moody, *Ujamaa – Socialism from Above* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1977).

Catholic bishop of the Rulenge diocese, *ujamaa* and villagisation provided a way not only to develop Tanzania, but to live a Christ-centred life.⁶⁸ Consequently, Mwoleka became well known throughout Tanzania for his promotion of Nyerere's vision; the 'Ujamaa Priest', or 'Ujamaa Bishop', was famous for his vocal support for villagisation, and for personally getting involved in the communal agricultural work of *ujamaa* villages in his diocese. Joseph Healey, an American Maryknoll missionary priest and expert on Small Christian Communities who was active in East Africa during the *ujamaa* period, recalled meeting Mwoleka 'dressed in dungarees and an old shirt coming from hoeing in the community farm'.⁶⁹ He went on to say that the bishop embraced a 'simple lifestyle' and that the two of them had 'many inspiring conversations on the importance of Small Christian Communities when the Bishop would be "on fire" with commitment and new ideas'.⁷⁰ Many interviewees in Kagera remembered Mwoleka and his activism, with opinions divided on his support for *ujamaa* and villagisation. Some respondents, particularly Catholics, thought that he was right to support Nyerere's vision for an equitable society, and to attempt to educate his congregation on the links between *ujamaa* and Christian teachings. At the same time, however, other interviewees believed Mwoleka's activism to be misjudged and unrepresentative of Haya Christian philosophy. Significantly, one senior Catholic clergyman who knew Mwoleka recalled how:

We had one bishop, Bishop Mwoleka, who became known as the 'Ujamaa Priest'. He tried to mobilise the Catholics to support the *ujamaa* villages, and he went and worked on the farms with his flock. It was admirable in some ways, but I don't think he changed that many people's minds. He was supporting something that many in Bukoba just could

⁶⁸ See: Mwoleka and Healey, *Christian Communities*, 6-30. See also: 'This Bishop Carries a Hoe', *The Catholic Advocate*, 25:41 (16/09/1976).

⁶⁹ J. G. Healey, quoted in 'Tanzania: Bishop Emeritus Christopher Mwoleka has Died', *ICN: Independent Catholic News*, October 2002.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

not. That sort of support did not spread to most of us in the Church.⁷¹

Importantly, whilst Haya Christians were evidently divided on the question of Mwoleka's activism at a personal level, and on how this related to Christian teaching, they were nevertheless in agreement that villagisation was ultimately unsuccessful and generally harmful due to how it was implemented.

In both Kilimanjaro and Kagera, then, villagisation was remembered as one of *ujamaa*'s defining characteristics, largely because it was something that the regions had been able to resist – proudly, for many interviewees – because of their local culture and organisation. Christianity also evidently played a complex role in the relationship these regions had with villagisation. On the one hand, some individuals like Mwoleka and some of the nuns in his diocese clearly supported it, believing it to provide an opportunity to live their religion in a purer, Christ-centred way. However, many also considered it, particularly in its authoritarian form, to go against the free will and peaceful life which Christianity taught them to embrace, whilst also threatening local institutions like co-operatives and small businesses which the churches had helped to establish and strengthen. The collective memory in both regions on the matter of villagisation was well summed up by one Lutheran woman from Kagera, who stated:

Christianity teaches freedom. We are taught we have a choice ... [and that] to force others to do things they do not want to do is morally wrong. Burning down people's homes so that they are forced to move is sinful, so obviously good Christians could not support such a thing.⁷²

⁷¹ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest. Westerlund similarly states that Mwoleka was 'extreme and exceptional in his support for *ujamaa*', and that, in general, Christians in developed regions of Tanzania 'deeply resented the villagization policy because of fear that it might inhibit private enterprise and initiative': Westerlund, 'Christianity and Socialism', 46.

⁷² Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, lawyer, born 1941.

The second defining characteristic of *ujamaa*, nationalisation, was remembered very differently. Rather than something which Kilimanjaro and Kagera had managed to avoid, nationalisation was something they experienced alongside the rest of Tanzania. In fact, for many interviewees, the nationalisation of farms, co-operatives, industry, and especially schools was remembered as a direct attack on both Chagga and Haya society, which were considered to have suffered more than other Tanzanian groups as a result of Nyerere's policies.⁷³ When it came to the uncompensated nationalisation of agriculture and industry, most interviewees in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera, whether Catholic or Lutheran, stated that many in their communities considered this policy to be blatant theft. As might be expected, the depth of disdain for the nationalisation of business was more pronounced in Kilimanjaro and among Lutheran interviewees, likely because of the strong links between Chagga Lutherans, agricultural co-operatives, and wealth generation in the region. Indeed, some Lutherans even claimed that Lutheran businesses had been disproportionately affected by nationalisation when compared with Catholics, whom Nyerere, as a Catholic himself, supposedly favoured. However, the 'nationalisation as theft' motif was common amongst all respondents. Moreover, it was evident that for many, this was a viewpoint influenced to a large extent by their faith, as a quote from one Catholic woman in Kilimanjaro demonstrates:

It was very difficult for us to think of nationalisation in a good way, or a moral way. To us, taking away people's farms and businesses was stealing. We were taught, not just at home by our parents, but also by the Church, that stealing was always wrong ... If the government takes your land, that is theft. Christians can't support theft.⁷⁴

⁷³ Thomas Fisher's Chagga interviewees similarly remembered the nationalisation of the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU) as being extremely damaging to local society: T. Fisher, 'Chagga Elites and the Politics of Ethnicity in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania' (PhD Thesis: University of Edinburgh, 2012), 142-143.

⁷⁴ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, former schoolteacher, born 1943.

In two regions where land and commerce were so important, and where Christian churches and institutions had fostered the development of agricultural co-operatives and a certain way of thinking about *maendeleo*, it is unsurprising that so many people felt this way. Whilst some interviewees acknowledged that nationalisation might have been the only way to implement *ujamaa* in a way that was equitable for all Tanzanians, even they were mostly unable to reconcile this with what they viewed as an inherent immorality in the policies of nationalisation when they were implemented. The similarities between how people spoke of the ‘morality’ of nationalisation on the one hand, and forced villagisation on the other, as evidenced by the examples above, are also striking, and point to a trend in conformist Christian communities in Kilimanjaro and Kagera of individuals remembering and interpreting the realities of *ujamaa* through a religious lens.

The nationalisation of schools was considered by interviewees to have been just as damaging to their local communities, in a way which many believed to be even more sinister. People spoke of how the handing over of religious institutions to the government meant that the churches, longstanding guides and protectors of the community and its young, were pushed aside by TANU, who many believed lacked the moral authority of Christian institutions. One Catholic man in Kagera said that:

When the schools were nationalised, the churches really began to lose their authority. Religion and religious instruction was no longer prioritised and we no longer had much of a role in raising the young people in our society. The government wanted to make sure that the youth followed their way of thinking, and that they were following a secular educational plan.⁷⁵

The de-prioritisation of religious instruction and the loss of authority which the churches had in society were things that Catholics and Lutherans in Kilimanjaro and Kagera spoke of,

⁷⁵ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, businessman, born 1943.

indicating these were common concerns in conformist Christian society.⁷⁶ Members of the clergy also emphasised that this was not just a concern for the laity, but something that the churches worried about at an institutional level as well.⁷⁷ The idea of indoctrination through educational nationalisation, hinted at in the quotation above, was also a common theme. Indoctrination, according to interviewees, undermined religious and traditional authority not only by instilling in children certain beliefs about *ujamaa* and Tanzanian society, but also in making sure that no space was left for anything else. Moreover, this was remembered to have been done not only in schools, but also in the youth associations and women's associations to which many Chaggas and Hayas belonged or with which they interacted.⁷⁸ As a Lutheran Chagga woman, who had been a school pupil during the *ujamaa* years, put it:

We had no time to do anything within our churches after the Arusha Declaration. Everything was about TANU. We were all members of the party, and we spent all our time supporting Nyerere and *ujamaa*.⁷⁹

The nationalisation of education, then, has been remembered in Kilimanjaro and Kagera in large part because of the way it 'captured' the Christian youth of Chagga and Haya society.

Importantly, however, the nationalisation of educational institutions was not only remembered as presenting a challenge to the authority of the churches. There was also a

⁷⁶ Joel Samoff presents a slightly different picture of the effects of *ujamaa* on education in Kilimanjaro, arguing that nationalisation only really affected primary schooling. He notes that wealthy Chaggas, with the support of the churches, simply established private secondary schools for their children, with Kilimanjaro becoming home to one-quarter of all private schools in the country by 1974: J. Samoff, 'Education in Tanzania: Class Formation and Reproduction', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 17:1 (1979), 47-69.

⁷⁷ See also: ELCT-ND: 186/003: Handing over of Secondary Schools, Teachers Training Schools, and Primary Schools, 1970-1971.

⁷⁸ This would support the argument made by Aminzade that the TANU Youth League (TYL) and *Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania* (Union of Tanzanian Women; UWT), which were supposed to allow for mass participation at the grassroots level and which were presented as giving a voice to the peasantry, were in fact tightly controlled by TANU, who were engaging in a project of mass social engineering. See: Aminzade, *Citizenship*, 140.

⁷⁹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, businesswoman, born 1953.

significant ethno-religious element at play. For many Chaggas and Hayas, there was a belief that, like the nationalisation of industry and agriculture, the nationalisation of educational institutions was unfairly harsh on Kilimanjaro and Kagera. This was because these two regions had developed many more schools and training centres than most parts of Tanzania, largely due to the churches. However, one of TANU's key aims in nationalising these institutions was to make access to education more equitable for both children and adults throughout Tanzania. Consequently, policies were put in place to ensure that certain ethnic groups and Muslims who had historically not had good access to education were given the same opportunities as people from communities which, in the past, had been over-represented in Tanzania's schools and training institutions. A Lutheran woman from Kagera explained the situation in the following way:

TANU needed the support of other tribes and of Muslims at the coast. These were people who had not cared much about their education in colonial times, and they were angry that people like Hayas and Chaggas were being employed everywhere due to their education ... Nyerere also did not like relying on us ... [so] he made it so that they were able to use our schools, and we had to compete for the remaining places ... in the end, it came down to luck [whether or not you got a place at school].⁸⁰

Thus, Chaggas and Hayas, particularly those from Christian communities which had traditionally been relatively very well educated, felt that they were being disproportionately affected and discriminated against. The idea of Chagga and Haya society – and of Christian society – being held back for other Tanzanians, particularly Muslims, to 'catch up', was therefore a common feature of the memory of educational policies during *ujamaa*. The exceptionalism of Chagga, Haya, and Christian *maendeleo*, a theme explored in previous

⁸⁰ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, former schoolteacher, born 1941.

chapters, has thus become a defining characteristic of the historical memory of *ujamaa* amongst conformist Christians in Kilimanjaro and Kagera.

As some of the testimonies above illustrate, one thing which several of the interviews concerning the nationalisation of schools hinted at was the assault on ethnic identity and culture. This was an aspect of *ujamaa* which many interviewees considered to be its most sinister, alongside the increasing authoritarianism of the state. This sentiment was demonstrated by a Catholic woman in Kilimanjaro who, though supportive of many of the philosophical underpinnings of *ujamaa*, was highly critical of its ultimate design and implementation:

You have to know that *ujamaa* was not really designed to help us. It was designed to strengthen Nyerere and TANU, and to dismantle our traditional culture ... Before *ujamaa*, our focus was on our tribe, but Nyerere forced us to forget that ... Tanzania was the only community to which we were allowed to belong ... [and] when the schools were nationalised, our children were easier to indoctrinate into this way of thinking.⁸¹

Similarly, a Catholic priest in Kagera spoke of how *ujamaa* was the continuation of the erosion of the 'three pillars' of Haya culture:

Originally, Haya society was built on three pillars: the kings, the church, and coffee ... Nyerere got rid of the kings and other chiefs just after independence, and so we lost that pillar ... With *ujamaa*, both the co-operatives and the church were weakened. By the late 70s, only the church remained, though it had lost much of its influence in Haya society.⁸²

A Chagga Lutheran man, meanwhile, went so far as to argue that even the communism of the USSR was less damaging to local cultures than *ujamaa* had been:

Nyerere claimed that our socialism was different because it built on our culture as Africans, but that was a lie.

⁸¹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, businesswoman, born 1943.

⁸² Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest.

Socialism here was about building the nation up and destroying our local culture so that traditional leaders could not challenge the government ... I studied in the USSR, and there they did things very differently. The different nations and peoples were allowed – in fact encouraged – to develop and preserve their own cultures and languages. Consequently, regional identities remained strong. But here, *ujamaa* did the opposite; the youth here lost the connection with their tribe and region. We were made to forget our language and instead learn Swahili; we were made to forget our traditions that were not in keeping with *ujamaa* teachings ... Anything which set us apart from other tribes in Tanzania was forbidden. That was always the intention.⁸³

Whilst such romanticised memories of the USSR's approach to cultural heterogeneity may gloss over the historical reality of the highly centralised power structure which existed in the country, their use as a comparator in the narratives of conformist Christians about the Tanzanian experience of socialism is significant. It demonstrates that, for some Tanzanians, Nyerere's policies were extreme examples of authoritarianism and indoctrination, antithetical to traditional power structures, cultures, and identities. Of course, it should also be remembered, as previous chapters have highlighted, that such memories must be understood alongside a broader narrative in Kagera and Kilimanjaro of the two regions and their churches being harmed and failed by successive governments since independence, which in turn feeds into a nostalgia for a 'more Christian' past. This is explored further in the following chapter.

Importantly, some interviewees were careful to point out that the government was never able to entirely dispense with the services of the churches in very Christian areas like Kilimanjaro and Kagera. As several scholars have noted, Nyerere was very clear that the churches had a part to play in *ujamaa*.⁸⁴ Interviewees suggested that there were two main

⁸³ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, businessman, born 1934.

⁸⁴ C.L. Nyaki, *Nyerere's Philosophy of Economic Equality* (Peramiho: Ndanda Mission Press, 2015), 121-124; Frostin, *Liberation*, 71-77; Ludwig, *Church and State*, 103-109; Keshomshahara, *Poverty Reduction*, 88-91.

reasons for Nyerere's desire to keep the church involved. The first reason, particularly prevalent in Catholic memories, was Nyerere's commitment to the Catholic Church and his personal faith, which had shaped his political philosophy. Catholic clergy and laity in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera mentioned that Nyerere was close to and took the advice of religious leaders, particularly Catholic bishops, and that he made a point to visit religious leaders when he toured the country.⁸⁵ The second reason, mentioned by people of both denominations, was that the state simply did not have the resources, knowledge, or reach of the churches in places like Kilimanjaro and Kagera. As such, the churches and religious institutions were still needed to fill in the gaps. For example, the churches continued to help the state to manage teaching hospitals such as the KCMC in Moshi since, to quote a Chagga pastor, 'the government was not able to practicably take over the hospitals in the same way that they had the schools'.⁸⁶ Moreover, whilst the state had taken over religious schools and promoted a largely secular curriculum, they nevertheless allowed for classes in religious studies, and had to rely on teachers provided by the churches for this. The churches also actively helped with one of *ujamaa*'s most important educational policies: the provision of classes, seminars, and training for adults in a wide variety of disciplines, as noted in Chapter 4. Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, some interviewees in a few Catholic communities in Kilimanjaro and Kagera remembered their local churches acting as venues for government addresses to the people. These interviewees said that this was because the churches were the only places with the facilities and local reach to make such meetings viable, and they were careful to point out that these were government, rather than party-political, meetings and announcements. Of course, in a one-party state where TANU and the government were inextricably intertwined, such a

⁸⁵ For a similar argument that the churches and TANU developed a good relationship due to Nyerere's Catholicism, see: J.P. van Bergen, *Social Religion*.

⁸⁶ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, pastor.

distinction is complicated. Nevertheless, it is significant that interviewees spoke of the churches helping the government and the *ujamaa* project alone, rather than supporting TANU's own political project, since such memories arguably support the idea of Catholics embracing the philosophical aims of *ujamaa* whilst simultaneously rejecting the way TANU wanted to implement it. As such, these memories feed into a broader trend in conformist Christian communities in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera wherein the philosophies of *ujamaa* are remembered to have been both more contested and possible to accommodate in religious thinking than was its implementation.

A final aspect *ujamaa* which is worth exploring is that of language. As alluded to in previous chapters, rhetoric and politicised language was a key aspect of socio-political discourse and philosophy in Nyerere's Tanzania. From early in the post-independence period onwards, certain words and phrases entered the public lexicon because of their utilisation in the political sphere. The power of the language of Tanzanian socialism and *ujamaa*, as well as the extent to which it permeated ostensibly non-political discourse, is illustrated in the pages of *Umoja*. For example, the word '*kujitegemea*' ('to be self-reliant'), uncommon in the publication before 1967, became a feature of the writings of multiple contributors to the newspaper following the Arusha Declaration. Thus, in much the same way that the Africanisation debate of the immediate post-independence era had fed into religious institutions, the language of *ujamaa* was now working its way into Christian society as well. Moreover, it appears that the adoption of this language served multiple purposes; whilst, in some circumstances, it worked to promote the nation-building project, in others it was evidently an attempt to strengthen the Church. In a particularly interesting example in a 1967 article titled 'The Gospel in a Changing Tanzania', a young Lutheran Chagga pastor named Martin Shao – who would go on to serve as the third bishop of the ELCT Northern Diocese between 2004 and 2014 – told his readers that:

The Church needs to be self-reliant. We cannot continue on our own if we rely on being spoon-fed like a small child. In order that we may be self-reliant, we must donate more money for the sake of the Gospel. We must also be self-reliant in [our] leadership and [structures of] power. We require many pastors so that today's Tanzanians can be cared for spiritually.⁸⁷

Shao's words were indicative of a wider movement in Christian communities, with the adoption of words like '*kujitegemea*' and the language of *ujamaa* more generally coming to play a big part in how the churches discussed Tanzanian society and planned for their future in that society. Likewise, in Kagera, a Catholic woman recalled how:

Even in church, we heard words like *ndugu* and *kujitegemea* after the Arusha Declaration. These were ideas which were in keeping with Catholic teaching – the need to treat each other with dignity and to work together to be strong.⁸⁸

Taken together, examples such as these paint a picture of a Christian society which believed that it still had an important role to play in Tanzania, but which also recognised that it needed to embrace the political philosophy of the nation, both for its own good and for the benefit of wider Tanzanian society.

The memories of Chagga and Haya Christians explored above are interesting, and significant, in that, even on the nationalisation front, scholars have sometimes argued that wealthier regions – particularly Kilimanjaro – were able to a large extent to withstand TANU's attempts at asserting control. Joel and Rachel Samoff, for example, have shown how the same petty bourgeoisie who ran the coffee co-operatives and pre-independence political associations

⁸⁷ M. Shao, 'Injili Katika Tanzania Inayobadilika', *Umoja*, 223 (June 1967), 2.

⁸⁸ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former schoolteacher, born 1939. The word '*ndugu*' (Swahili for 'relative') predated *ujamaa* but became politicised under the socialist system and acquired a new meaning similar to 'comrade'. As Aminzade argues, this was an extension of the 'familial' political philosophy of *ujamaa*, which utilised words associated with the family to describe socio-political relationships at the national level. See: Aminzade, *Citizenship*, 142.

in Kilimanjaro were successful at infiltrating TANU and local government by virtue of their high educational attainment and community relations, thereby continuing to influence decisions on the region's *maendeleo*.⁸⁹ Similarly, Sally Falk Moore argues that, for most Chaggas, *ujamaa* did not represent much of a break with the past, stating:

African socialism profoundly affected church properties and institutional influence, but for most independent farmers, socialism was just one more bureaucratic layer of ideas and organizations to which the residents of Kilimanjaro were subject.⁹⁰

As the interviews presented here show, however, such analyses do not necessarily reflect the enduring psychological impact of *ujamaa*, at least as far as conformist Christian communities are concerned. The 'ideas' and 'organizations' Moore speaks of had a significant impact on public thought and discourse, particularly amongst the youth and members of the churches, and they have continued to shape the memory of *ujamaa*.

Conclusion:

This chapter has shown that Christianity, through both its teachings and its institutions, greatly influenced not only how *ujamaa* developed at the national level, but also how it was understood, experienced, and received in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. Moreover, it shows that religion plays a central role in conformist Christian Chagga and Haya memories of the *ujamaa* period, partly due to the long-term influence of *ujamaa* on Christian institutions, and partly because conformist Christians continue to discuss the philosophies and consequences of *ujamaa* in a moral framework shaped by Christian teaching. By extension, it has shown the

⁸⁹ Samoff and Samoff, 'Local Politics', 69-97. See also: Samoff, 'Bureaucracy', 30-62; Samoff, 'Education', 47-69. The Samoffs use definitions of 'class' which are somewhat Eurocentric, but the conclusions they draw concerning Chagga resistance to *ujamaa* policies are nevertheless convincing.

⁹⁰ S.F. Moore, 'From Tribes and Traditions to Composites and Conjectures', *Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice*, 49 (2005), 262.

need to delve into the foundations and philosophies of *ujamaa*, exploring not only how it was understood amongst political elites, but how these ideas were received and interpreted by overlooked groups such as lay Catholic and Lutheran conformists in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. In so doing, it has built on the work of historians such as Emma Hunter, James Brennan and Andrew Ivaska by providing an analysis focused on communities at the periphery of the Tanzanian state, whilst simultaneously adding to the body of scholarship on religion and *ujamaa* by presenting the perspectives of conformist Chagga and Haya Christians.

Ujamaa was designed – and was understood and remembered – as a system which drew not only on traditional African thought systems, but also on religious moral teachings about the relationships and obligations between all people. Rather than the class-based socialism of Europe and North America, where ‘secularism’ was understood to mean a rejection of religion, *ujamaa* was ostensibly a holistic philosophy, a way of life where ‘secularism’ meant the refusal to institute a state religion, rather than a rejection of religious teaching. Whilst understandings of *ujamaa* differed among Tanzanians, the interviews presented here nevertheless demonstrate that the ‘African-ness’ of *ujamaa*, and its accommodating of religious life, provided for a potential receptivity in some circles and amongst some individuals to the philosophical foundations of the movement, even in organisations which had openly opposed ‘foreign’ socialist teaching in the period before the Arusha Declaration. To quote Paul Bjerck, ‘*Ujamaa* bridged religious, political, and cultural divides’, mixing with religious discourse to create a space where ideas of morality, belonging and communalism could be discussed.⁹¹

It was this receptivity, particularly amongst Catholics, that Nyerere and other African Socialists could build on in these regions when they presented the movement as an indigenous set of beliefs which bore little resemblance to the anti-Christian socialism which was known to

⁹¹ Bjerck, ‘Sovereignty’, 289.

the West. In general, Catholic interviewees remembered their communities being slightly more receptive to the philosophies of *ujamaa* than did Lutherans, with both Nyerere's personal faith and the more community-oriented perception of Catholicism influencing these beliefs. This could go some way to explaining why *ujamaa* was also remembered to have had slightly more success in Kagera, where the Catholic Church was dominant, than it did in Kilimanjaro, where there was a much stronger Lutheran influence. Meanwhile, as other examples from Kagera show, some supporters of *ujamaa* understood it completely differently, interpreting it as a force of modernity which broke, rather than reintroduced, traditional ways of being and knowing. At the same time, for other Christians in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, particularly Chagga Lutherans, *ujamaa* was seen as a threat not only to their traditions, but to the lives, often prosperous and secure, that they had built in the recent past with the support of the Church and, in some cases, the colonial state. The common theme, noted in previous chapters, of greater Lutheran dissent against imposed government policies, influenced by notions of Lutheran capitalism and the cultural and economic resistance facilitated by the churches, was therefore evident in these narratives. Thus, *ujamaa*'s philosophical reception amongst conformist Chagga and Haya Christians was highly complex, and was tempered to a large extent by regional, denominational, and ethnic factors. As such, contested understandings and memories of the meanings of *ujamaa*, at a philosophical level, exist in these communities.

When it came to the real-world effects of *ujamaa*, the situation was again multifaceted, though the memory of it amongst conformist Christians was somewhat less contested than were understandings of *ujamaa* as an ideology. Two major elements of *ujamaa*, villagisation and nationalisation, appear to have become the most important characteristics of this period in the communal and personal memories of many Chagga and Haya Christians. Whilst neither the Chagga nor the Haya were as affected by forced villagisation as were millions of other Tanzanians, the churches to which they belonged also cared for peoples who were not as

sheltered from government policy which, along with news from elsewhere in the country, branded the national experience of villagisation onto people's memories. Moreover, the way that Chagga and Haya communities were able to escape the worst aspects of villagisation due to the nature and organisation of their societies fed into already existing ideas of exceptionalism. Nationalisation, on the other hand, and particularly the nationalisation of religious institutions, was believed by interviewees to have harmed the people of Kilimanjaro and Kagera in a more profound sense than it had the other peoples of Tanzania. For some, it was remembered as a targeted attack on the 'more developed' Chagga and Haya ethnic groups, and on the Christian churches – particularly the Lutheran churches – for the benefit of Tanzanian Muslims and 'less developed' peoples. Ultimately, nationalisation was blamed for causing a decline in the authority of the churches in local communities, a trend which reportedly continues to the present day, and which was a source of regret for many Chagga and Haya Christians.

Thus, religion and *ujamaa* have a complex relationship in the memory of conformist Christian communities in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. As was the case with memories of the earlier nationalist period, it is evident that opinions and understandings of *ujamaa* were often highly individual and dependent on personal circumstances and beliefs, but that this did not detract from broader communal memories concerning the impact and legacy of *ujamaa* in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. Moreover, themes explored throughout this thesis, including the importance of Chagga and Haya *maendeleo* and perceived exceptionalism, church-facilitated resistance, and the influence of Christian-Muslim divisions on political thought and action, also clearly affected how conformist Christians articulated these memories. For many, the moral teachings of *ujamaa* were attractive and, in many respects, mirrored Christian teachings. However, at the same time, the realities of Nyerere and TANU's policies, and of rising authoritarianism, were difficult to justify, and, overall, in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera amongst Christians of both

denominations, *ujamaa* was remembered to have had a primarily deleterious effect on local society. Ultimately, for many Chagga and Haya Christians, the process of attempting to reconcile the ideas and experiences of *ujamaa* with their faith, as well as with their ethnic and other identities, proved to be very complicated. However, it is also important to remember that the memories of *ujamaa* explored in this chapter, both those concerned with its moral teachings and those detailing its negative effects, were articulated in 2019 at a time of significant political turmoil in Tanzania, when both religion and the legacy of Nyerere and his successors were increasingly sensitive subjects. Thus, in the next chapter, how the present influenced such memories, and how memories were used to understand that present, is explored.

Chapter 7

The Past in the Present: Nyerere in Christian Memory

Introduction:

In the preceding chapters, a history of the Nyerere years, how they were interpreted, and how they have been remembered has been told through the lens of conformist Christian communities in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. Where these chapters looked at Tanzania when Julius Nyerere led the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM; ‘Party of the Revolution’), the current chapter analyses Nyerere’s legacy following his resignation as President of Tanzania. As such, it serves to further contextualise and reflect upon the topics and memories discussed in previous chapters, and to explore further how the issues affecting Tanzanian society in 2019, subject as it was to the increasingly authoritarian regime of the late president John Magufuli, affected how conformist Christians in Kilimanjaro and Kagera remembered, spoke about, and utilised the memory of the Nyerere years. The chapter argues that memories of the Nyerere period in these communities are dynamic, flexible, and useful for contextualising the present, with an even greater level of uniformity in historical memory than that discussed in previous chapters developing where Nyerere was being compared with his successors. Moreover, it shows that the teachings and institutions of the Catholic and Lutheran churches continue to shape how conformist Chagga and Haya Christians think about and discuss politics, morality, culture, and modernity in contemporary Tanzania.

How and why Nyerere’s legacy has influenced Tanzania under his successors, and how his leadership and philosophy have been preserved in the post-*ujamaa* state, is well-studied. For example, historians including Emma Hunter and Felicitas Becker have investigated why Nyerere is an integral part of the memory of the state and why he has been remembered differently in different communities, showing that both positive and negative memories of the

socio-political and politico-religious developments of mid-twentieth century Tanzania became, in effect, distilled within the solitary figure of Nyerere.¹ Meanwhile, anthropologists including Marie-Aude Fouéré, Kristin D. Phillips and Kelly Askew have comprehensively analysed the nature of the memory of Nyerere in Tanzania, particularly at an institutional level following his death in 1999, describing how his memory has become an important factor in how people of all political persuasions and from all sections of society talk about politics, society, and morality.² Likewise, when it comes to Magufuli-era Tanzania, political scientists like Dan Paget have illustrated the utilisation of Nyerere's legacy in the political arena, including attempts to legitimise increasing authoritarianism by appealing to the founding father's memory.³ Such scholarship shows that Nyerere and his legacy continue to define Tanzania at all levels of society, and that the figure of Nyerere is central to much of the country's contemporary socio-political discourse. Thus, one aim of this chapter is to supplement this

¹ E. Hunter, 'Julius Nyerere, the Arusha Declaration, and the Deep Roots of a Contemporary Political Metaphor', in M. Fouéré (ed.), *Remembering Nyerere in Tanzania: Myth, Memory, Legacy* (Mkuki na Nyota: Dar es Salaam, 2005), 73-94; F. Becker, 'Remembering Nyerere: Political Rhetoric and Dissent in Contemporary Tanzania', *African Affairs*, 112:447 (2013), 238-261; F. Becker, 'Tanzania's Authoritarian Turn: Less Sudden than it Seems', *Current History*, 120:826 (2021), 189-195.

² Fouéré's writing on the memory of Nyerere is probably the most comprehensive there is; examples include: M. Fouéré (ed.), *Remembering Nyerere in Tanzania: Myth, Memory, Legacy* (Mkuki na Nyota: Dar es Salaam, 2005), chs. 1, 2; 8; M. Fouéré, 'Commemorating Nyerere, Celebrating Magufuli in Tanzania', *Mambo!*, XVI:11 (2019), 1-12; M. Fouéré, 'Recasting Julius Nyerere in Zanzibar: the Revolution, the Union, and the Enemy of the Nation', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8:3 (2014), 478-496; M. Fouéré, 'Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa, and Political Morality in Contemporary Tanzania', *African Studies Review*, 57:1 (2014), 1-24. For Kristin Phillips' work, see: K.D. Phillips, 'Pater Rules Best: Political Kinship and Party Politics in Tanzania's Presidential Elections', *Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, 33:1 (2010), 109-132; K.D. Phillips, 'Nyerere's Ghost: Political Filiation, Paternal Discipline, and the Construction of Legitimacy in Multiparty Tanzania', in M. Fouéré (ed.), *Remembering Nyerere in Tanzania: Myth, Memory, Legacy* (Mkuki na Nyota: Dar es Salaam, 2005), 97-126. For scholarship by Kelly Askew, who focuses particularly on political songs, see: K. Askew, 'Tanzanian Newspaper Poetry: Political Commentary in Verse', in M. Fouéré (ed.), *Remembering Nyerere in Tanzania: Myth, Memory, Legacy* (Mkuki na Nyota: Dar es Salaam, 2005), 213-250; K. Askew, 'Sung and Unsung: Musical Reflections on Tanzanian Postsocialism', *Africa*, 76:1 (2006), 15-43; K. Askew, *Performing the Nation: Swahili Music and Cultural Politics in Tanzania* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

³ D. Paget, 'Shrinking Space and Opposition Protest', *Journal of Democracy*, 28:3 (2017), 153-167; D. Paget, 'Again, Making Tanzania: Magufuli's Restorationist Developmental Nationalism', *Democratization*, 27:7 (2020), 1240-1260; D. Paget, 'Mistaken for Populism: Magufuli, Ambiguity and Elitist Plebeianism in Tanzania', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 26:2 (2021), 121-141; D. Paget, 'Tanzania: The Authoritarian Landslide', *Journal of Democracy*, 32:2 (2021), 61-76.

literature by focusing on the legacy of Nyerere in conformist Christian communities in Kilimanjaro and Kagera.

Following a brief history of the Tanzanian state – particularly its leadership – after Nyerere’s resignation as president in 1985, this chapter analyses Nyerere’s legacy in two parts. The first discusses the general situation that developed in Tanzania under Nyerere’s successors, whereby Nyerere became central to how the country defined itself and interpreted its history. The second assesses the memory of Nyerere in the Magufuli years, following his election in 2015, and details how Chagga and Haya Christians interpreted Magufuli’s presidency alongside that memory.

The Late Nyerere Presidency and Beyond:

It is worth beginning with a brief history of the Tanzanian state and its leaders between the socialist period and 2019, when the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted. *Ujamaa*, whilst never officially dropped as an endeavour of the Tanzanian government, began to lose momentum in the late 1970s, as economic stagnation and unrealised development goals, as well as the authoritarian villagisation campaign, dampened its appeal both within CCM and in wider Tanzanian society.⁴ Tanzania’s economy had been badly damaged by the 1970s energy crisis and a continued lack of foreign investment during the *ujamaa* period, as well as by severe droughts which affected agricultural output, high inflation, and a declining income from exports.⁵

⁴ Fouéré, ‘Political Morality’, 22.

⁵ A. Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013 [first published 1982]), ch. 20; R. Aminzade, *Race, Nation and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 205-207.

Tanzania's economic problems worsened in 1978 when Ugandan forces invaded the Kagera region on the orders of Idi Amin, after several years of increasingly fraught Tanzania-Uganda relations. Arguing that the Kagera Salient was the territory of Uganda rather than Tanzania, Amin's forces quickly occupied the region, killing Tanzanian civilians and looting as they did so.⁶ Nyerere's response was swift and strong, and Tanzanian forces quickly drove the Ugandan army out of the Kagera Salient, before launching a counter-invasion of Uganda which ultimately resulted in the overthrow and exile of Amin. Although the war lasted only eight months, it wrought severe damage on the already weak Tanzanian economy, so that by late 1979, the country was facing a dire situation. As a Catholic priest in Bukoba remembered:

The war with Uganda was really the final nail in the coffin for *ujamaa*, and perhaps even for Nyerere's presidency. The economy was already suffering because of *ujamaa* policies and the economic problems outside of Tanzania, and there was nothing the government could do within the confines of the socialist system to turn it around. The war saved Kagera, but it also would have condemned the country to a prolonged period of total bankruptcy if an alternative economic model hadn't been found.⁷

In an effort to rescue the economy, Edwin Mtei, a Chagga Lutheran serving as Tanzania's Minister for Finance, negotiated a deal on debt relief with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1979, in return for which the IMF requested a loosening of the Tanzanian state's control over the economy and called for the Tanzanian shilling to be devalued.⁸ However, Nyerere rejected the proposal on the grounds that it undermined *ujamaa*, a decision which ultimately led to Mtei's resignation. One Chagga Lutheran man, who knew Mtei personally, had the following to say about the matter:

Mtei knew that Nyerere's system couldn't survive ... but Nyerere was stubborn and didn't want to abandon *ujamaa*.

⁶ P. Bjerk, *Julius Nyerere* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2017), 111-123; Aminzade, *Citizenship*, 199-200.

⁷ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest.

⁸ E. Mtei, *From Goatherd to Governor* (Mkuki na Nyota, Dar es Salaam, 2009), 149-157. See also: Aminzade, *Citizenship*, chs. 8-9; Bjerk, *Julius Nyerere*, 119-123.

So Mtei had to be pragmatic [and leave] as he knew nobody could change Nyerere's mind.⁹

Nevertheless, aspects of *ujamaa*'s socialist dimension, such as the villagisation programme, were increasingly side-lined in the early 1980s, and Nyerere and CCM began to focus on finding an individual to succeed him as president at the 1985 election, all the while attempting to keep the struggling economy limping along.

With African Socialism largely abandoned and a new approach clearly needed, Nyerere voluntarily resigned as President in 1985, making way for Ali Hassan Mwinyi, the third President of semi-autonomous Zanzibar, to succeed him. Under Mwinyi, economic liberalisation quickly gathered pace, with the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that were becoming so prevalent elsewhere on the economically beleaguered African continent introduced to Tanzania by the IMF, for whom Edwin Mtei now worked.¹⁰ Nyerere, still serving as CCM's chairman until 1990, was opposed to the economic demands of the SAPs, which called for an abandoning of most of Tanzania's socialist policies. However, the reforms were implemented regardless, and a few years later in 1992, during Mwinyi's second five-year term, multi-party politics was reintroduced for the first time in nearly thirty years. For twenty years following Mwinyi's presidency, Tanzanian politics followed a largely, though admittedly not entirely, stable course. Mwinyi was succeeded by the Christian Benjamin Mkapa in 1995, who in turn was succeeded in 2005 by the Muslim Jakaya Kikwete, with the convention of the presidency alternating between Christian and Muslim individuals every ten years becoming ingrained in CCM and Tanzanian politics. The Mkapa and Kikwete regimes expanded upon the economic, social, and political liberalisation of the Mwinyi years, although CCM remained

⁹ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, businessman, born 1935.

¹⁰ Mtei, *Goatherd*, 182-188; Aminzade, *Citizenship*, chs. 8-9.

totally dominant in the political sphere.¹¹ Nevertheless, opposition parties had a part to play in the new Tanzania, and the press enjoyed greater freedoms than it had during Nyerere's presidency.

Prior to the 2015 election, CCM's new presidential candidates had been well-known and influential members of the party, with Mwinyi, Mkapa, and Kikwete all sharing working relationships with the still-influential Nyerere at the top of the CCM hierarchy before his death in 1999. In 2015, however, the situation changed. The new CCM presidential candidate, John Pombe Magufuli, was a relatively unknown individual who was seen as something of a surprise by the Tanzanian electorate.¹² Magufuli, a Catholic from the Chato District of the Geita Region, was not new to Tanzanian politics; he was first elected to parliament in 1995 and had been a member of Kikwete's government from 2005–2015, serving first as the Minister of Lands and Human Settlements, then as Minister of Livestock and Fisheries Development, and finally as Minister of Works, Transport and Communications. However, much better-known individuals ran for – and were expected to win – the CCM presidential candidacy in 2015. As Paget and Becker note, and as is discussed in more detail below, Magufuli was something of a compromise candidate who emerged from a CCM party which by 2015 had become rife with bitter factionalism.¹³ 2015 also ultimately proved to be CCM's worst performance at a national election, with opposition parties gaining more votes in both the presidential election and the parliamentary election than in any previous years. Nevertheless, Magufuli won the presidency and CCM won the majority of seats in parliament.

¹¹ M. Fouéré, 'J.K. Nyerere entre Mythe et Histoire: Analyse de la Production d'une Mémoire Publique Officielle en Tanzanie Post-Socialiste', *Les Cahiers d'Afrique de l'Est*, 41 (2009), 203-204; Becker, 'Authoritarian Turn', 189, 191; Phillips, 'Pater Rules', 109-132.

¹² Paget, 'Shrinking Space', 158; Becker, 'Authoritarian Turn', 190.

¹³ *Ibid.*

Magufuli's rise to power had come along with promises to tackle corruption and immorality, both in government and in Tanzanian society more generally. Central to Magufuli's election and rule was the idea of a return to the ideals of the Nyerere years and *ujamaa* – albeit stripped of its socialist associations, as Paget notes.¹⁴ Indeed, as is explored later, Magufuli and his supporters worked tirelessly to point out the similarities between himself and Nyerere, amplifying a trend which had developed in the Tanzanian presidency whereby successive presidents made sure to detail and broadcast to the public their connection to Nyerere. However, whilst early impressions of the new president were often optimistic, the Magufuli regime quickly developed a reputation for increasingly violent repression. Opposition parties were stifled, press freedoms were withdrawn, and the security services, working on behalf of CCM, quickly clamped down on anyone who was considered critical of the president or his government.¹⁵ Importantly for the current study, Magufuli's relationship with the churches and with religion more generally also became politicised and, at times, conflictual.

Nyerere in the Post-Socialist State:

To understand Nyerere's legacy and its uses in the Magufuli years, it is necessary to first trace its development in the Tanzanian state prior to 2015. As noted above, the memory of Nyerere is a well-researched topic, at least at an institutional level. Several scholars have described how, from the 1990s onwards, and particularly since Nyerere's death in 1999, Tanzania's first president became immortalised and praised in the official memory of the state. Nyerere as an

¹⁴ Paget, 'Making Tanzania', 1246; Paget, 'Elitist Plebeianism', 129.

¹⁵ For more details on the restriction on democratic freedoms under Magufuli, see: N. Cheeseman, H. Matfess and A. Amani, 'Tanzania: The Roots of Repression', *Journal of Democracy*, 32:2 (2021), 77-89; Becker, 'Authoritarian Turn', 189-195; Fouéré, 'Celebrating Magufuli', 1-12; Paget, 'Landslide', 61-76; Paget, 'Making Tanzania', 1240-1260; Paget, 'Shrinking Space', 153-167; Paget, 'Elitist Plebeianism', 121-141.

individual came to signify and embody an idealised Tanzanian past, one which served as a convenient discursive tool with which to contextualise, understand and critique post-*ujamaa* Tanzanian society.¹⁶ As such, Nyerere was painted in this period by CCM and Tanzanian society more generally as not only the principal founder of the nation, but also as a benevolent guide for the country going forward, both in a political sense and, perhaps more importantly, in a moral sense as well. However, it is also important to note that these memories were rarely static, particularly at the community and individual level, but rather subject to constant reworking and re-utilisation based on the context of their articulation and expression.

The ways in which Nyerere came to be, and continues to be, remembered, celebrated, and revered in Tanzanian society are numerous. Perhaps the most obvious commemoration of the president can be seen in the annual ‘Nyerere Day’ celebrations, a public holiday which takes place on October 14th, the anniversary of Nyerere’s death. Each year, as Fouéré notes, politicians have used Nyerere Day as an opportunity to give speeches praising the first president, his wisdom, and his service to the country.¹⁷ Nyerere has been celebrated in a similar fashion in the national media each October, with newspapers publishing a variety of his speeches and writings, as well as the words of influential individuals, both foreign and domestic, who have heaped praise on Nyerere. Themes explored in the previous chapters of this thesis, such as *maendeleo*, independence and nation-building, strict secularism, and the moral lessons of *ujamaa*, are central to this memorialisation of the first president. To quote one Catholic woman in Kilimanjaro:

Every year, the country celebrates Nyerere’s legacy and his leadership of the country. We are reminded of how he won independence, of his moral guidance, of *ujamaa* and the spirit of working for the national good ... The community

¹⁶ The continual re-creation and re-imagining of Ujamaa and Nyerere’s legacy is analysed in more detail by Emma Hunter: Hunter, ‘Deep Roots’, 73-91.

¹⁷ Fouéré, ‘Political Morality’, 7-14; Fouéré, ‘Celebrating Magufuli’, 1, 10.

leaders give speeches, the youth learn about him on the radio and on TV.¹⁸

However, Nyerere Day has also historically served as a strategic political platform, falling as it does in the same month as the annual local elections in Tanzania.¹⁹ CCM and other political parties have therefore often used the day as an opportunity to promote their own messages by tying them to the memory of Nyerere, thereby using the continued popular support for Nyerere to drum up votes.

Nyerere Day is, of course, not the only instance when the first president's legacy has been strengthened or utilised. Statues and memorials to Nyerere are ubiquitous, and a portrait of him hangs alongside the portrait of the current president in official buildings as well as private businesses.²⁰ Following his death, radio stations continued to play clips of his speeches on a regular basis, ensuring that the sound of his voice remained well known throughout the country. Moreover, terms like *Baba wa Taifa* ('Father of the Nation') and *Mwalimu* ('Teacher'), both of which originated during the Nyerere years, became even more widespread after his death, as his status as the country's founder and guiding thinker became more entrenched both officially and unofficially.²¹ When asked for his views on the nature and significance of Nyerere's legacy and public image, as well as the language used to refer to him since his death, a Lutheran man in Kagera stated:

Nyerere was always well-known and generally well-regarded. He was already a legendary figure all over Africa and elsewhere in the world even when he was alive. But after he died, I suppose you could say he became almost mythical, [in the sense that] he became a paragon of virtue and wisdom, while at the same time his bad features were

¹⁸ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, former nurse, born 1940.

¹⁹ Fouéré, 'Political Morality', 7-14; Fouéré, 'Celebrating Magufuli', 1, 10.

²⁰ Fouéré, 'Political Morality', 7.

²¹ See: M.G. Schatzberg, *Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 11-12; Fouéré, 'Political Morality', 2, 6-10.

erased and forgotten ... Using words like *Mwalimu* reinforces that message of Nyerere as the nation's teacher – not only its first teacher, but perhaps its only teacher, in the same way that he is the only one regarded as its founder, despite the reality being more complicated.²²

Such an understanding of Nyerere's legacy and place in Tanzanian socio-political thought helps to explain why, following his death, Nyerere's example and teachings were embraced by politicians across the political spectrum. To quote a Lutheran woman in Kilimanjaro, who was disdainful of what she saw as opportunistic behaviour on the part of political leaders:

All the politicians became obsessed with showing us that they were following in Nyerere's footsteps after he died. They still do it. They believe that if people think they are following the example of the *Baba wa Taifa*, then they will be popular with voters ... They also use Nyerere to attack their political rivals, accusing them of destroying his legacy. They do this to turn the people against them, because so many still follow Nyerere.²³

Thus, whilst CCM and its leaders could claim to be continuing the nation-building project spearheaded by Nyerere and explored in the two preceding chapters, opposition leaders and activists were also adept at harnessing the memory of the first president to criticise CCM and the current president for deviating from the true path of Nyerere's vision and teachings.

The use of Nyerere's legacy in the exercising of political power went all the way to the top. Indeed, even the presidency derived its legitimacy in large part from Nyerere's legacy and place in the wider Tanzanian consciousness. Prior to Magufuli's tenure, Jakaya Kikwete's selection as the CCM candidate in 2005 is probably the best example of this. Kikwete and his supporters made sure to publicise his links to Nyerere from the very beginning, keen to present him to the public as the latest amongst Nyerere's rightful successors.²⁴ Unlike Mwinyi and

²² Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, farmer, born 1938.

²³ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, lawyer, born 1941.

²⁴ Becker, 'Remembering Nyerere', 252.

Mkapa, who had both been selected by CCM when Nyerere was alive and could openly give them his support, Kikwete needed to draw on Nyerere's place in the national memory six years after his death. Thus, as both Fouéré and Phillips have detailed, Kikwete embarked on a pilgrimage to Butiama, a town and district in the Mara Region to the east of Lake Victoria, where Nyerere had been born and to which he retired with his wife Maria.²⁵ There, Kikwete met with Maria Nyerere, who gifted him a bible. The symbolism of this exchange did not go unnoticed by the Tanzanian press who, to quote Fouéré, 'abundantly recounted and analysed' its meaning.²⁶ The meeting and the gift were seen as a conferral upon Kikwete of Julius Nyerere's posthumous approval, confirming Kikwete's 'lineage to the Nyerere line', to borrow Phillips' phrase.²⁷

Publicising this approval was likely particularly important to Kikwete since, as was well known in certain circles, he had sought selection for the presidency in 1995 but had been passed over by Nyerere and the party in favour of Mkapa.²⁸ One interviewee, who knew Kikwete and several Chagga CCM elites personally, told the following story:

Kikwete was very popular even back then, and Nyerere was worried that he was on track to win the CCM selection. But he didn't think he was ready, and he wanted Mkapa to be the next president. So, he took him aside and told him that he was still too young and that he needed more experience in government, and that he should wait his turn. Kikwete of course listened to him.²⁹

Thus, in 2005, it was important that Kikwete could show to the Tanzanian public that now was his time, and that Nyerere would have approved. Mama Maria's gift of the Bible also held

²⁵ Fouéré, 'Political Morality', 10; Phillips, 'Pater Rules', 122.

²⁶ Fouéré, 'Political Morality', 10.

²⁷ Phillips, 'Pater Rules', 121.

²⁸ Bjerk, *Nyerere*, 137.

²⁹ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, lawyer, born 1939.

significant religious meaning. As Fouéré notes, the suggestion in the press was that the Bible was an acknowledgement that the Muslim Kikwete would be able to uphold Nyerere's Christian values and his commitment to religious tolerance.³⁰ In effect, it signified a handing down of the guardianship of both political secularism and religiously inspired moral leadership in Tanzanian society – both of which were, as the two previous chapters discuss, foundational pillars of the nation at its birth – from the Catholic founding father to his Muslim descendant.

Kikwete's pilgrimage to Butiama was not the only example of religion playing a role in the entrenching of Nyerere's legacy. At an institutional level, the Catholic Church in Tanzania was instrumental in this endeavour. A custom has developed whereby, each Nyerere Day, a Catholic mass is said in Butiama, at which members of the clergy, Nyerere's family, government officials and local citizens take part in a procession to Nyerere's mausoleum, where a prayer service is held.³¹ Moreover, even in the Lutheran Church, which has historically distanced itself more from Nyerere and his politics, some interviewees argued that his influence and legacy had been institutionalised, albeit not to the same extent as in the Catholic Church. For example, one pastor in Kilimanjaro reflected on Nyerere's influence on the Lutheran Church in the following way:

They say that the Lutherans were not as invested in *ujamaa* or *Mwalimu's* politics as the Catholics, and that is probably true. But we can't pretend that his rhetoric had no influence on us and did not shape our institutions. ... Just look here in Moshi – we have a hostel named Uhuru Hostel and another named the Umoja Hostel ... These were words that were everywhere during *ujamaa* and the struggle for our independence ... I don't believe that the Church would have chosen those names if it weren't for Nyerere's influence.³²

³⁰ Fouéré, 'Political Morality', 10.

³¹ Fouéré, 'Political Morality', 30.

³² Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, pastor. Of course, the local diocese's newsletter was also already called *Umoja* prior to the formation of TANU.

Perhaps most strikingly, however, the Catholic Church went as far as to begin the process of canonisation for Nyerere, with the Diocese of Musoma – in which his home, Butiama, is located – first proposing the idea in 2005, and Cardinal Polycarp Pengo, the Archbishop of Dar es Salaam, confirming in 2006 that Pope Benedict XVI had approved the first step of the process by declaring Nyerere a ‘Servant of God’.³³ When asked about Nyerere’s canonization, a Catholic priest in Kagera said:

The Church wanted to recognise that Nyerere lived his life as an ideal Christian, and that he set an example for other Christians – and non-Christians – all over the world to follow ... It was also said that, like other saints, he had worked miracles, since he had succeeded in uniting a country of so many different peoples, languages and religions that had been thrown together under the colonial system.³⁴

Fouéré has suggested that Nyerere’s posthumous treatment by the Catholic Church is, in a way, a rejection of his teachings, in that it blurs the lines between the secular and the sacred.³⁵ She points to Nyerere’s public warnings against the mixing of religion and politics as evidence of this. As such, she argues that there is in essence an ideological gulf between Nyerere’s personal beliefs and his memory. However, this argument is something of an oversimplification since, as previous chapters in this thesis have argued, the distinction between the two was blurry even during the Nyerere years, especially in religious communities and even in the writings and speeches of Nyerere himself. Nevertheless, Fouéré is right to draw attention to the striking message which the Catholic Church and the state were sending to Tanzanian citizens and the

³³ For more on the Catholic Church and Nyerere’s legacy, see: S. Mesaki and M. Malipula, ‘Julius Nyerere’s Influence and Legacy: From a Proponent of Familyhood to a Candidate for Sainthood’, *International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology*, 3:3 (2011), 93-100; M. Fouéré, ‘La Fabrique d’un Saint en Tanzanie Post-Socialiste: Essai d’Analyse sur l’Église, l’État et la Premier Président Julius Nyerere’, *Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est*, 39 (2008), 47-97.

³⁴ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest.

³⁵ Fouéré, ‘Political Morality’, 9.

wider world – namely, that Nyerere was not just a political and moral guide, but a person of saintly character, capable of performing miracles that ordinary political leaders could not.

However, whilst Nyerere's legacy generally came to be entrenched in an overwhelmingly positive sense in Tanzania, in some regions, his place in collective memory was far more contested. Indeed, in some circles, Nyerere became openly demonised for his past actions.³⁶ This was particularly true in Muslim communities, especially in Zanzibar, where Nyerere came to be seen as the first in a long line of CCM presidents who had obstructed Zanzibari autonomy and Muslim agency.³⁷ In these regions, many of the Christian-Muslim tensions explored in previous chapters – particularly those associated with *maendeleo*, education, and political leadership – continued to influence people's opinions; Nyerere's legacy was thus often tied to ideas of repression, Christian domination in both politics and the economy, and mainland arrogance, and was understood to have contributed to the poor treatment of Zanzibar by CCM ever since. In Kilimanjaro and Kagera, Christians reflected on Nyerere's more recent legacy in Zanzibar in a variety of ways. Some characterised Zanzibari and Muslim memory as opportunistically political; as one individual, himself fairly critical of Nyerere and his regime, put it:

Many in Zanzibar still want independence. They think the union with Tanganyika was a mistake, and that Muslims have been left out of government deliberately by the Christians. They seem to forget that we've had two Muslim presidents, both of whom gave many jobs to Muslims. And as far as people here are concerned, Nyerere actually helped the Muslims at the expense of more developed

³⁶ For a good overview of Nyerere's various critics, from the pre-independence era to Kikwete's presidency, see: J. Brennan, 'Julius Rex: Nyerere through the Eyes of his Critics, 1953-2013', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8:3 (2014), 459-477.

³⁷ Fouéré, 'Recasting', 478-496. For an analysis of Nyerere's controversial legacy in the Muslim community in Dar es Salaam, see: G.R. Owens, 'The Secret History of TANU: Rumor, Historiography and Muslim Unrest in Contemporary Dar es Salaam', *History and Anthropology*, 16:4 (2005), 441-463. For a similar discussion of Nyerere in the memory of Muslim-majority communities in the Lindi Region of the mainland, see: Becker, 'Remembering Nyerere', 248-252.

Christian places ... But it's convenient to remember what you want to be true ... Some people say that they just want to have their own state where they can impose *sharia* law, but who knows if that's really the case.³⁸

Others, however, were more sympathetic to Zanzibari and Muslim concerns, as the following excerpt from an interview with a Lutheran Haya woman shows:

The Zanzibaris have been very poorly treated by the government on the mainland. Here on the mainland, we have some idea of democracy, but there, CCM has been suppressing their voices for decades. The people they elect are never allowed to run the Zanzibari government, so it makes sense that they feel like prisoners ... Most of them are Muslim, and they follow Muslim leaders whom CCM opposes, which is not something that Christians experience so much ... Nyerere is still seen throughout Tanzania as the father of CCM and the Tanzanian government, so I think that is probably why his popularity is not so high [in Zanzibar].³⁹

The suppression of Zanzibari democracy referred to in this excerpt is a reference to well-documented vote rigging and political interference which CCM has been accused of carrying out in the supposedly semi-autonomous jurisdiction since 1995.⁴⁰ It has even been suggested that CCM's past actions in Zanzibar became something of a blueprint for its tactics during the Magufuli presidency, which is discussed below.⁴¹ Most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, though, both of the interviewees quoted above were explicit in their linking of the Zanzibari memory of Nyerere to religion and its role in local and national society and politics. Moreover, they openly analysed the matter from within the context of their own experiences as Christians. That they came to noticeably different conclusions is testament to the complexity of Nyerere's legacy in conformist Christian communities, particularly at the personal level.

³⁸ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, businessman, born 1941.

³⁹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, former schoolteacher, born 1936.

⁴⁰ See: Paget, 'Shrinking Space', 163-165.

⁴¹ Ibid.

This complexity was demonstrated further when interviewees talked about the often-contested memory of Nyerere in their own communities. Several trends became evident in these discussions, many of which backed up those identified in earlier chapters. For example, Catholics generally had more favourable perceptions of Nyerere than did Lutherans, while Chagga people – particularly men – were generally more critical of him than were Haya people. However, these divisions were certainly not stark, and there was a significant overlap of opinions between groups. In both Kilimanjaro and Kagera, Christian individuals from both denominations were broadly positive about Nyerere’s role in uniting a diverse collection of peoples and cultures, as well as his leadership of the independence campaign. A Catholic man in Kagera commented that ‘Nyerere is remembered in this community for bringing peace and freedom to Tanzania’, while a Lutheran woman in Kilimanjaro said, ‘we have great respect for Nyerere for ensuring the stability of Tanzania, which many [other countries] did not have’.⁴² In Kagera, both Catholics and Lutherans also highlighted the fact that, to use one Catholic woman’s particularly striking phrase, ‘Nyerere saved us from Idi Amin and his army, so people remember that he protected us from a monster’.⁴³

On the other hand, as previous chapters demonstrated, certain aspects of the nation-building campaign, such as the rejection of tradition, as well as features of the *ujamaa* period such as nationalisation policies and villagisation, remained much thornier issues which appear to have dampened opinions of Nyerere amongst Haya and Chagga Christians. As one man in Kilimanjaro put it:

I think Nyerere meant well, but the truth is that many things he and his supporters did were damaging to our communities on the mountain. Our traditions were lost, the churches had their schools taken from them, we were held

⁴² Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, former police officer, born 1939; Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, former schoolteacher, born 1945.

⁴³ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, doctor, born 1946.

back so that the less advanced peoples could catch up with us ... Many feel we would be richer and more developed if, say, we had broken off and gone with Kenya after the British left. Of course, Kenya has its own issues which we've avoided here ... Villagisation was also a very misguided policy, which brought a lot of suffering to many people in Tanzania.⁴⁴

The belief expressed here of policies being implemented badly despite Nyerere meaning well was a common one amongst Haya and Chagga Christians – particularly Catholics – and is perhaps related to the phenomenon described by Leander Schneider whereby the official record and contemporary public image of Nyerere has often attempted to distance him from the negatively perceived aspects of his regime.⁴⁵

Nyerere's legacy in these communities was also related to people's opinions of the presidents and governments that followed him. For example, Nyerere appears to have been remembered more favourably by Chagga and Haya Christians than his immediate successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi. One Catholic woman in Kagera described how, 'when Mwinyi came to power, things changed for the worse. There was corruption everywhere that had not existed under Nyerere'.⁴⁶ There was also a perception that Mwinyi had favoured Muslims in his administration over better-educated Christians. As a Lutheran woman in Kilimanjaro put it: 'Mwinyi wanted more Muslims in power and in well-paid positions, so better-educated people such as those who went to the good government and Christian schools did not get the jobs they used to get'.⁴⁷ That the Tanzanian economy continued to stagnate after the introduction of Mwinyi's reforms and did not truly begin to recover until Mkapa, a Christian, was in charge

⁴⁴ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, former government advisor, born 1940.

⁴⁵ L. Schneider, 'Freedom and Unfreedom in Rural Development: Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa Vijijini*, and Villagization', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 38:2 (2004), 346. See also: Askew, 'Sung and Unsung', 15-43.

⁴⁶ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, farmer, born 1939.

⁴⁷ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, former schoolteacher, born 1945.

likely reinforces such sentiments. Opinions such as these are interesting since, as explored in previous chapters, similar arguments were made about Christians, particularly from Chagga and Haya communities, losing out on influential positions to less-educated Muslims in Nyerere's nation-building programme. However, the memories conveyed by interviewees suggested that, under Mwinyi, the situation was remembered to have been worse and to have affected more Christian communities, who were being targeted by disgruntled Muslims now in positions of power.

It is also arguable that these memories are reflective of another widespread belief concerning the Mwinyi period, namely, a significant rise in religious tensions between Christians and Muslims in Tanzania more generally. For example, one Catholic man in Kilimanjaro described how: 'In the early 1990s, we started seeing more violence and disruption from Muslim communities. Not so much up here, but certainly in Dar es Salaam and elsewhere on the coast.'⁴⁸ Consequently, for many Christians in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, the Mwinyi presidency was remembered as a departure from the relative order and honesty of the Nyerere years.

The memories of Benjamin Mkapa's tenure as president amongst interviewees were somewhat more mixed. For example, some people commented on the fact that Tanzanians had been able to build wealth whilst foreign investment had boosted the economy, with others pointing to Mkapa's Christianity which 'meant that he appreciated the benefits of Christian education and enterprise'.⁴⁹ Indeed, it could be argued that, in some ways, the period when

⁴⁸ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, farmer, born 1950. For analyses of religious instrumentalism following the introduction of multiparty politics in 1992, see: J. Campbell, 'Nationalism, ethnicity and religion: fundamental conflicts and the politics of identity in Tanzania', *Nations and Nationalism*, 5:1 (1999), 115-120; B.G. Brents and D.S. Mshigeni, 'Terrorism in Context: Race, Religion, Party, and Violent Conflict in Zanzibar', *The American Sociologist*, (Summer 2004), 61-70.

⁴⁹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, accountant, born 1950.

Mkapa was in office was remembered as a time when the types of *maendeleo* which interviewees associated with the Chagga and Haya – and which both Nyerere and Mwinyi had hampered – could again gather momentum. Here again, Nyerere’s influence was often alluded to, with one interviewee saying: ‘Nyerere and CCM chose Mkapa because they knew that he would be able to manage the government’.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, Mkapa’s presidency was not presented by interviewees as providing a reversal in the socio-political problems associated with the Mwinyi years; rather, to quote one Catholic priest, they were a ‘continuation of thirty years of moral decline’ following Nyerere’s retirement.⁵¹ As previous chapters have discussed, the moral economy and high moral standards which Nyerere and TANU promoted were believed to be directly related to his faith, and so this ‘decline’ also symbolised a weakening of the influence of religious moral teaching in Tanzanian society.

Memories of Jakaya Kikwete’s time in office were similarly mixed. ‘Kikwete was very charming, and everybody liked him’, commented one Lutheran Chagga man, before adding that, ‘He could convince anyone of anything, a bit like Tony Blair! But my goodness, nobody had control over anything. It was a mess. Nothing worked and you had to pay bribes to get anything done.’⁵² This was a running theme in memories of the Kikwete presidency – that of increasing corruption and disorder. Several interviewees also commented on the fact that Islamic extremism was perceived to have become more of a problem during Kikwete’s time in office, although it should be noted that this was never presented as having anything to do with his own Muslim faith; rather, most agreed with a Catholic woman in Kagera who stated that problems such as these were due to the Kikwete government’s ‘inability to stop the problems

⁵⁰ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, doctor, born 1937.

⁵¹ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, priest.

⁵² Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, lawyer, born 1939.

[of Islamic extremism] in Somalia and Kenya from making their way into Tanzania'.⁵³ Once again, this was sometimes contrasted with Nyerere, with the same woman remarking that 'During Nyerere's time, such things would not have been possible', both due to the respect which Nyerere commanded and due to the 'superior morality' of Nyerere's Tanzania.⁵⁴

It is necessary to note, however, that whilst Nyerere's example was used to highlight both Mkapa and Kikwete's shortcomings, very few interviewees were overwhelmingly critical of either president. Of course, it should also be remembered that Mkapa and Kikwete oversaw twenty years of relative freedom and, for many, prosperity in Tanzania before John Magufuli came to power. As such, not only should their religions be considered when analysing conformist Chagga and Haya Christians' memories of their tenures, but so should the nature of the socio-political sphere that came after them. Indeed, as the following section shows, readings of the past, especially the contested memory of the Nyerere years, were particularly pertinent to Chagga and Haya Christians' lives during the presidency of John Magufuli.

Nyerere and Magufuli:

In 2015, CCM experienced its lowest ever vote share in a general election. In elections to the *Bunge* (National Assembly), the unicameral legislature of Tanzania located in Dodoma, CCM received 55.04% of the vote and won 252 of the 366 seats, whilst its presidential candidate, John Magufuli, won 58.46% of the presidential vote.⁵⁵ Although, to outsiders, this may still

⁵³ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former secretary, born 1951.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ African Democracy Encyclopaedia Project, 'Tanzania: 2015 National Assembly Election Results', <https://www.eisa.org/wep/tan2015nationalassemblyresults.htm> (accessed 05/10/2022); African Democracy Encyclopaedia Project, 'Tanzania: 2015 Presidential Election Results', <https://www.eisa.org/wep/tan2015presidentialresults.htm> (accessed 05/10/2022).

have appeared to be something of a landslide, it was in fact evidence of a continued decline in support for the ruling party, which only ten years previously, at the 2005 elections, had won 69.99% of the National Assembly vote and 80.28% of the presidential vote.⁵⁶ By the 2010 election, following Kikwete's first term as president, support had fallen to 60.2% in the National Assembly elections and 62.83% in the presidential election.⁵⁷ Therefore, the 2015 elections signalled the continuation of a worrying trend for CCM, with opposition parties, particularly Chadema (*Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo*; 'Party of Democracy and Progress'), becoming increasingly strong.

The reasons behind CCM's declining popularity were complex. Whilst a full analysis of these causes is not within the scope of this investigation, one of the most important factors was the perception amongst the public of a significant rise in corruption and a loss of moral and stable leadership within the ruling party during Kikwete's presidency. Consequently, by 2015, as Becker notes, CCM had also become riven with factionalism, and much of the rhetoric in the lead up to the election concerned the divisions between the *masafi* ('clean') and *mafisadi* ('corrupt') camps within the party; the former advocated for a strict clamping down on corruption within the party and government, whilst the latter group essentially championed a continuation of the *status quo*, whereby officials were free to reap the unofficial benefits afforded to them by their stations.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ African Democracy Encyclopaedia Project, 'Tanzania: 2005 National Assembly Election Results', <https://www.eisa.org/wep/tan2005resultsb.htm> (accessed 05/10/2022); African Democracy Encyclopaedia Project, 'Tanzania: 2005 Presidential Election Results', <https://www.eisa.org/wep/tan2005resultsa.htm> (accessed 05/10/2022).

⁵⁷ African Democracy Encyclopaedia Project, 'Tanzania: 2010 National Assembly Election Results', <https://www.eisa.org/wep/tan2010nationalassemblyresults.htm> (accessed 05/10/2022); African Democracy Encyclopaedia Project, 'Tanzania: 2010 Presidential Election Results', <https://www.eisa.org/wep/tan2010resultsa.htm> (accessed 05/10/2022).

⁵⁸ Becker, 'Authoritarian Turn', 190.

It was within this bitter factionalism and a political space where issues of morality were becoming hotly contested that Magufuli, a less well-known and ostensibly ‘clean’ candidate, emerged as CCM’s figurehead. A vociferous proponent of the *masafi* camp, Magufuli promised to rid the country of corruption, poor governance, and idleness. Once elected, he embarked upon a well-publicised campaign to bring order back to Tanzanian society, often treating the public to theatrical displays of strength by, for example, dismissing senior officials from their jobs without warning at public meetings.⁵⁹ Magufuli sought to re-instil in the populace and the government an appreciation for ‘hard work’ and discipline, adopting as his mantra the phrase ‘*Hapa Kazi Tu!*’ (‘Only Work Here!’), a somewhat less idealistic and more straightforward sentiment than Kikwete’s ‘*Maisha Bora kwa Wote*’ (‘A Better Life for All’), as Becker points out.⁶⁰ Again, public demonstrations were employed, with Magufuli taking part in community clean-up projects and expecting his officials to do the same. To begin with, Magufuli’s actions were cause for cautious optimism. As one Catholic woman in Kagera put it:

Before Magufuli, there was so much corruption and scandal. Everything ran on bribes – the police, the government offices, the ministries. So, when he came along and started getting tough, many people were very glad. It seemed that the only way some of these people would learn was for the person at the top to punish them for their actions.⁶¹

A Catholic woman in Kilimanjaro, meanwhile, spoke of how pre-Magufuli Tanzania had become increasingly ‘sinful’, and how early in Magufuli’s presidency many hoped that he, like Nyerere, would take a moral stand informed by his faith.⁶² However, Magufuli’s regime quickly developed a reputation for increasingly repressive behaviour, often employing violence

⁵⁹ Paget, ‘Making Tanzania’, 1246-1249.

⁶⁰ Becker, ‘Authoritarian Turn’, 191.

⁶¹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former schoolteacher, born 1952.

⁶² Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, shopkeeper, born 1951.

and intimidation to silence its critics and enforce its policies. Through a series of legal and procedural restrictions, opposition parties were effectively banned from either public campaigning or speaking in the National Assembly, and laws were put in place which made publicly offending the president or the vice-president illegal – with ‘offending’ seemingly understood to include simply ‘criticising’.⁶³ Press freedoms were curtailed, and any politicians, journalists, or activists who spoke out against the president or his government faced the wrath of the security services, with arrests, kidnappings, disappearances, torture and, in a few very worrying cases, murders becoming the tools the regime employed against the citizenry. In effect, by the time the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted, Tanzania was slipping quickly into what one Chagga Lutheran man described as a ‘one-party dictatorship’.⁶⁴

The significance of Nyerere’s legacy in the Magufuli era and this slide into overt authoritarianism cannot be overstated. When it came to the political utilisation of the memory of Nyerere and his regime, which the previous section showed to be an entrenched feature of the post-socialist Tanzanian state, Magufuli and his supporters took this practice to a new level. The relationship between Magufuli and Nyerere became central to attempts to legitimise the former’s policies; Magufuli’s no-nonsense, strict approach was presented as the only way that the country could return to the path of *ujamaa* that Nyerere had designed – albeit an *ujamaa* which, to paraphrase Paget, CCM ‘shone of its socialism’.⁶⁵ Certainly, it is possible to see in Magufuli’s rhetoric and policies traits which were reminiscent of Nyerere and the form of nation-building that he championed. For example, one can point to Magufuli’s professed focus on morality and on ridding the country of idleness, as well as to his rhetoric against ‘exploiters’, both foreign and domestic. Likewise, those who disagreed with Magufuli and his policies, such

⁶³ Paget, ‘Shrinking Space’, 156-158.

⁶⁴ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, lawyer, born 1947.

⁶⁵ Paget, ‘Elitist Plebeianism’, 129.

as opposition MPs and critical journalists, were increasingly labelled as ‘unpatriotic’, in much the same way that those who opposed both TANU’s vision for independence and the *ujamaa* programmes had been vilified.⁶⁶ In the public realm, the parallels between Magufuli and Nyerere were alluded to by his supporters, be they politicians or individuals in the media. For example, as Fouéré has noted, songs were written and widely shared which often explicitly eulogised the two men together, portraying Magufuli as the man to continue to build upon Nyerere’s work and lead the country to greatness.⁶⁷ Nyerere Day in 2019 – the twentieth anniversary of Nyerere’s death – was thus, unsurprisingly, used by the government as a way to publicise Magufuli’s dedication to the country and to present him as Nyerere’s rightful descendant.

The interviews for this thesis were carried out prior to Nyerere Day in 2019, but it was already clear to interviewees what Magufuli and his supporters were attempting to do with the memory of Nyerere. Indeed, Magufuli’s antics, as well as his self-proclaimed and media-driven relationship with Nyerere, were the subject of a great deal of discussion amongst Chagga and Haya Christians. Whilst a handful of individuals had some good things to say about him, most interviewees were unsupportive of the new president, even if they acknowledged the parallels between him and Nyerere; indeed, in many cases, these parallels were used to show the difference in moral quality between the two men. For example, one Lutheran woman in Kagera who was very critical of the government had the following to say on the matter:

Magufuli thinks he is a new Nyerere and that he can do whatever he likes as Nyerere did. His supporters are almost fanatical about telling us that he has Nyerere’s intelligence and moral authority.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Paget, ‘Making Tanzania’, 1246, 1250-1251.

⁶⁷ Fouéré, ‘Celebrating Magufuli’, 4-7.

⁶⁸ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, shopkeeper, born 1946.

Another Lutheran individual, in this case a Chagga man in Kilimanjaro, was even more critical:

It seems almost as if some of the people who sing songs about him believe that Magufuli is Nyerere reincarnated! Or maybe they're just scared of not taking part in the whole performance. Regardless, here in Kilimanjaro, many people just think he's a joke, and certainly he doesn't get the respect that Nyerere does. They've started calling him 'Megafool' behind closed doors, which I think is very amusing. When Donald Trump was elected, I heard people saying that he was the 'Magufuli of America'!⁶⁹

Several scholars have also pointed out that Magufuli relied on the authoritarian seeds planted by Nyerere to legitimise his intolerance for dissent. Paget and Becker, for example, have shown convincingly that Magufuli's Tanzania was not so much a sudden descent from democracy into dictatorship, but rather a continuation and rapid acceleration of anti-democratic reforms that CCM had been implementing for some time before his presidency, some of which had their origins in the Nyerere years.⁷⁰ Meanwhile, Nic Cheeseman, Hilary Matfess and Alitalali Amani have gone a step further in laying the foundations for Magufuli's autocracy more explicitly at the feet of Nyerere and his regime, suggesting that the true authoritarianism of the Nyerere years has been widely ignored or understated.⁷¹ However, the arguments presented by Cheeseman *et al* are somewhat reductive and do not do enough either to analyse the period between Nyerere and Magufuli, or to acknowledge the significant body of historical literature which has detailed the authoritarian nature of the state under Nyerere. Moreover, the differences between Magufuli's form of authoritarianism and that which existed under Nyerere are brushed over, meaning that neither the novel uses of violence in Magufuli's Tanzania nor the opinions of Tanzanian people are given due attention. Whilst it is certainly true that Nyerere led a system which limited democratic rights and whilst, as Schneider has shown, he himself

⁶⁹ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, lawyer, born 1947.

⁷⁰ Becker, 'Authoritarian Turn', 189-195; Paget, 'Landslide', 61-76; Paget, 'Elitist Plebeianism', 121-141.

⁷¹ Cheeseman *et al.*, 'Roots of Repression', 77-89.

was just as complicit as his officials in making decisions which harmed Tanzanian citizens and their rights and freedoms, it is important to note that the unpredictable and often shocking violence of Magufuli's presidency was, for many Tanzanians who lived through both regimes, markedly different.⁷² As one Catholic man in Kagera who echoed the views of many interviewees put it:

[Magufuli] relies on many of the laws that Nyerere and the British came up with to control the people. But whereas back then you were arrested and maybe imprisoned, nowadays you might be beaten, tortured, or killed for opposing the president and the government ... He wants to be like Nyerere, but he is excessive in how he does that.⁷³

Thus, whilst it is necessary to understand the parallels between Magufuli and Nyerere, in particular the authoritarian policies of the Nyerere years which served to legitimise the autocracy of the Magufuli regime, it is also important to acknowledge the novel features of the Tanzanian state after 2015. Most importantly, it is necessary to acknowledge how Tanzanians, to whom the contested links between Nyerere and Magufuli were often very clear, experienced, understood, and differentiated between the two regimes, and to draw attention to those experiences and beliefs.

An aspect of Magufuli's presidency which is particularly important to explore here was his relationship with religious institutions, particularly the Christian churches. Magufuli himself was adept at performing his Christian faith for political purposes, keen to show that he was a pious Catholic – like Nyerere, though of a more charismatic persuasion – who believed in the power of prayer and the importance of personal religious dedication.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, from early on in his presidency, Magufuli came into conflict with the churches and religious

⁷² Schneider, 'Freedom', 344-392.

⁷³ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, farmer, born 1953.

⁷⁴ Becker, 'Authoritarian Turn', 193-194.

leaders. In 2017, two senior church leaders, the Catholic Bishop Severine NiweMugizi of the Rulenge Diocese in Kagera, and Zachary Kakobe of the Pentecostal Full Gospel Bible Fellowship in Dar es Salaam, criticised the erosion of democratic freedoms under Magufuli and the violent repression of critics. NiweMugizi, who was calling for a review of the Tanzanian Constitution, put out a statement in which he said:

Even God does not intimidate his critics and He is mightier than Magufuli. Who are you not to be criticised? Military forces are not mightier than God... it is high time Magufuli repented.⁷⁵

A few months later, in a Christmas sermon, Kakobe echoed these sentiments, calling on Magufuli to repent and adding: ‘If the country has been returned to a one-party state, we should be told so’.⁷⁶ The government’s response to these two clergymen was typically authoritarian. NiweMugizi, whose diocese was located near the Rwandan border, was questioned by the Immigration Department, a favourite intimidation tactic of the Magufuli regime.⁷⁷ Meanwhile, Magufuli responded to Kakobe’s sermon by warning all churches to stay out of politics, using Tanzania’s supposedly strict tradition of secularism, a central feature of Nyerere’s legacy in the official record, to justify threats to de-register any churches that did not comply.⁷⁸ Magufuli’s loyal followers in CCM also warned the churches not to interfere, with individuals such as Frank Kamugisha quoting Romans 13:1 to legitimise his rule: ‘Everyone must submit

⁷⁵ C. Kidanka, D. Ndalu and F. Oluoch, ‘Magufuli’s Leadership Style Under Fire as Bishops Accuse Him of Intolerance’, *The East African* (30/12/2017), <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/magufuli-s-leadership-style-under-fire-as-bishops-accuse-him-of-intolerance--1380808> (accessed 27/08/2022).

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ ‘Tanzania Threatens to Shut Churches After Magufuli Criticism’, *BBC News* (29/12/2017), <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-42517535> (accessed 28/08/2022).

himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God.’⁷⁹

However, the churches were not cowed by Magufuli’s threats and, a couple of months later in February 2018, a pastoral letter signed by the Conference of Catholic Bishops of Tanzania detailed and criticised the many abuses of the government against the press, opposition MPs and members of the public, and called for Magufuli to act urgently to combat the divisive climate that had become a threat to people’s lives.⁸⁰ Later in the year, following the arrests of senior Chadema leaders who were charged with sedition, unlawful assembly and incitement to violence, as well as the arrest of a Lutheran pastor, Fred Njama, who intended to talk to his congregation about the assault on Tanzanian democracy, the Lutheran Church put out a statement supporting the concerns of the Catholic bishops. In its Easter message, the Lutheran Church made clear that it now considered the right to freedom of worship itself under threat: ‘There are signs of dwindling freedom of expression, assembly and right to information ... There is a fear that even the right to worship is in danger.’⁸¹ Unsurprisingly, Christians in Kilimanjaro and Kagera were very aware of the tension that had emerged between the government and the churches. One Lutheran woman in Kagera spoke of how:

It is very unusual for the Catholic Church and the Lutheran Church to come together and criticise the government. Usually, they spend their time disagreeing with each other. That really shows how dangerous they think the situation here is becoming nowadays ... They know that

⁷⁹ Kidanka *et al.*, ‘Magufuli’s Leadership’.

⁸⁰ ‘Bishops in Tanzania Denounce Government for Suppressing Freedoms’, *Catholic News Agency* (14/02/2018), <https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/37769/bishops-in-tanzania-denounce-government-for-suppressing-freedoms> (accessed 28/08/2022).

⁸¹ Jared Jefferey, ‘Op:Ed: Does Tanzania’s President John Magufuli Dare Take on the Church?’, *CNBC Africa* (07/04/2018), <https://www.cnbc africa.com/2018/oped-tanzanias-president-john-magufuli-dare-take-church/> (accessed 28/08/2022).

[Magufuli's] actions go against the teachings of Christianity and of democracy.⁸²

Crucially, interviewees also often compared the situation with Nyerere's presidency. The consensus seemed to be that, whilst Nyerere and the churches certainly had their differences of opinion, particularly surrounding issues such as socialism, nationalisation, and local traditions, they also enjoyed a much better relationship, one in which Nyerere understood the importance of the churches to society and the value of church leaders' advice. As a Chagga Catholic priest argued:

Nyerere had a much better relationship with the churches than Magufuli does. He was close to religious leaders and would consider the advice of the bishops. Magufuli likes to show that he's a godly man who goes to church, but he doesn't pay attention to the advice of church leaders. He just warns them to stay out of politics and threatens them with losing their churches ... Nyerere understood how important the churches were in helping to build and develop the nation, but that understanding has been lost ... [Nyerere] would never have threatened to shut churches as Magufuli has done.⁸³

Similar sentiments were expressed by many interviewees, including among other members of the clergy. Thus, for conformist Christians in both regions, the Magufuli regime was interpreted as a threat not only to the teachings of Christianity, but to the survival of the churches themselves; meanwhile, the memory of the Nyerere years served to contextualise and critique this development, showing the relative moral and intellectual deficit of the Magufuli regime.

It is worth noting here that whilst Magufuli was criticised in both regions, in Kilimanjaro, there was an added sense that the new president, in ways reminiscent for some of Nyerere, was singling out the Chagga – especially the well-educated, Christian Chagga – for particular punishment. Although, as previous chapters have noted, longstanding narratives of

⁸² Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, farmer, born 1950.

⁸³ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, priest.

repression and dissent exist in both Kilimanjaro and Kagera, these ideas were expressed much more strongly amongst Chagga interviewees, who suggested that there were two main reasons for Kilimanjaro being targeted. Firstly, there was the idea that Chagga entrepreneurship – which as previous chapters have shown, was particularly associated with Lutheranism – was blamed by the authorities for exacerbating inequality in Tanzania, thus leading to the government demonising Chagga businesses and people as unpatriotic and exploitative. Such sentiments resonate with Paget’s idea of ‘elitist plebeianism’ in Tanzania, wherein Magufuli’s authoritarianism relied on the creation and public demonisation of a group in the middle at whom they could redirect public anger, and from whose greed and influence political elites promised to protect the citizenry, thus entrenching themselves as the guardians of society.⁸⁴ Moreover, interviewees suggested that this was a continuation of a trend started in the Nyerere years, with once Catholic man stating: ‘whenever presidents have tried to rebuild the country – for example after independence or during *ujamaa* or in the present day – the Chagga have been made into the villains of Tanzania’.⁸⁵

Secondly, interviewees argued that opposition parties like Chadema, which were becoming heavily repressed, were believed by many to be closely associated with the Chagga people. Many interviewees pointed out that, when multiparty politics were introduced to Tanzania in the 1990s, several of the individuals who founded or became involved with opposition parties were from Kilimanjaro. Some, such as Freeman Mbowe, the current chairman of Chadema and a former presidential candidate, were relatively new to politics at the time. Others had been members of CCM and the government before switching allegiance, such as Augustine Mrema, Mwinyi’s Minister of Home Affairs who joined the National Convention for Construction and Reform – *Mageuzi* (NCCR-*Mageuzi*) just before the first

⁸⁴ Paget, ‘Elitist Plebeianism’, 121-141.

⁸⁵ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, lawyer, born 1944.

multi-party elections in 1995, and Edwin Mtei, Nyerere's former Minister of Finance mentioned earlier in this chapter, who was one of the founders of Chadema in 1992. Consequently, one Lutheran Chagga woman in Kilimanjaro characterised the clamping down on opposition parties, especially Chadema, during Magufuli's early years in the following way:

Many people in Kilimanjaro believe that the Chagga are unfairly affected by attempts to restrict opposition parties ... CCM and people elsewhere in Tanzania think that parties like Chadema have too much Chagga influence ... They think too many Chagga businesspeople support the party, and they are scared of how unpopular CCM is in Kilimanjaro and Arusha.⁸⁶

A religious dimension to this topic was also commented on by several people; for example, a Catholic Chagga woman stated: 'I've heard people say that many Muslims who support CCM also think that Chadema is too Christian and will not look out for Muslims'.⁸⁷ Beliefs such as the ones expressed here were widespread amongst Chagga Christians when these interviews were conducted, showing, as have previous chapters of this thesis, that the perceived associations between the Chagga, Christianity, Kilimanjaro, and opposition politics, both in the Nyerere period and in the modern day, are a common feature of how conformist Christians in the region think about and discuss politics.

The discussion in the preceding paragraphs explains why, by 2019, wariness of the government had become widespread amongst Chagga and Haya conformist Christians. It was evident that anxieties concerning the upcoming local elections and the following year's general elections were common, with several people expressing concern that they expected CCM to rig the elections, which they feared could turn violent, and to further erode democratic practices afterwards. 'They will make sure they win. They'll cheat if they have to. They can't look weak

⁸⁶ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, former government worker, born 1936.

⁸⁷ Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, shopkeeper, born 1951.

in front of the opposition,’ said one Catholic man in Kagera, who added that, ‘That sort of thing would have been unthinkable when Nyerere was president. We had elections then too, even if all the candidates were from the same party’.⁸⁸ Another Lutheran man spoke of how ‘Many people expect Magufuli and his supporters to try to change the constitution after he wins next year ... then he will be able to rule unopposed for longer than ten years [the current maximum], just as Nyerere did.’⁸⁹ Moreover, some people asked not to be recorded because they did not want our conversations – even those concerned with the Nyerere years – to fall into the wrong hands and be used against them. Others were careful to suggest meeting places where they could speak freely and would not be overheard, with several people stating that government informers could be anywhere. As one Chagga Catholic man put it:

Magufuli has spies everywhere. You cannot even speak freely in small shops on the street. The police go around recruiting informers so that we are listened to and monitored everywhere.⁹⁰

At the same time, however, as the rest of this section has shown, the memory of Nyerere and the Nyerere years was often used to highlight the abuses of the Magufuli regime, sometimes indirectly but often quite explicitly. Indeed, even on the topic of government spies and informants, a woman in Kagera noted that Magufuli and his followers had strayed dangerously from the examples set by Nyerere.

Nyerere’s spies got you thrown in jail if you were unlucky. People were not free to criticise him, but he didn’t harm them or their families ... Magufuli’s spies ensure you go missing if you criticise him ... Maybe you come home beaten severely, or perhaps you end up face-down in a river.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, businessman, born 1945.

⁸⁹ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, doctor, born 1957.

⁹⁰ Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, government worker, born 1952.

⁹¹ Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, businesswoman, born 1955.

Thus, it is important to bear in mind the political situation which had developed by 2019 when reading through the testimonies and memories of Chagga and Haya Christians presented here and throughout this thesis – particularly where the issues of morality and freedom are concerned. These views were articulated within the context of a Tanzania undergoing worrying changes, by people in communities which were increasingly questioning the morality of the new socio-political landscape and where discussions of politics were often hushed up. The Nyerere years – the focus of the interviews – could serve as a useful lens through which this new landscape could be framed by interviewees, who used the discussions not only to detail the oral record in their communities, but also sometimes to reflect upon history’s place in the present. Moreover, the slight differences and contestations of memory between groups and individuals explored in previous chapters also evidently became even less pronounced when Nyerere was being compared against Magufuli, with a great deal of nostalgia for Nyerere’s leadership – though it is arguable that the links between Chagga Lutheranism and political dissent remained somewhat pronounced. This is not to say that the oral evidence presented in previous chapters is somehow less reliable as a historical source or that people’s previous criticisms of Nyerere were suddenly forgotten, but rather that, as noted in the introduction to this thesis, it is necessary to understand the context in which these sources – like any sources – are formed and articulated, and to understand the consequent dynamism of silence and consensus.

It is worth finishing this section by stating that, sadly, the concerns and suspicions expressed by interviewees ultimately proved to be correct. At the 2020 elections, after widespread intimidation, violence, and vote-rigging, CCM ‘won’ 84.4% of the presidential vote for Magufuli, whilst his main rival Tundu Lissu, Chadema’s presidential candidate who three years previously had survived an assassination attempt in a government compound,

received only 13.04% of the vote.⁹² CCM quickly cracked down on the disorder that followed through the security services which now serve as something of a paramilitary wing for the party, and Tundu Lissu and other opposition figures were either forced to flee the country or else arrested. To quote Paget, Tanzania had gone ‘from a partly authoritarian regime in which electoral competition is permitted to a fully authoritarian regime in which, *de facto*, it is not’.⁹³ However, in a surprising development in 2021, John Magufuli died in office, ostensibly of a heart condition, though rumours circulated that Covid-19 was to blame. Whether or not the late president contracted Covid-19, it is perhaps worth noting that the government had denied the virus’s presence in Tanzania during the pandemic, with Magufuli himself claiming it could be cured and prevented through the power of prayer and the use of traditional medicines. It remains to be seen whether or not Magufuli’s successor, Samia Suluhu Hassan, Tanzania’s first female and third Muslim president, will reverse the slide into authoritarianism that the country has experienced.

Conclusion:

The legacy of Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, as well as the memory of the Nyerere years, is multifaceted, dynamic, and contested. This chapter has analysed this legacy, supplementing a comprehensive body of existing scholarship by using conformist Christian communities in Kilimanjaro and Kagera as a case study. Following his resignation in 1985, and especially after his death in 1999, Nyerere became distanced in the public and official imagination from many of the negative and controversial aspects of his time in power. In this way, an idealised,

⁹² African Democracy Encyclopaedia Project, ‘Tanzania: 2020 Presidential Election Results’, <https://www.eisa.org/wep/tan2020presidentialresults.htm> (accessed 05/10/2022).

⁹³ Paget, ‘Landslide’, 62.

imagined past for the nation could be constructed and celebrated, one in which the story of Tanzania's birth and development could be distilled into the figure of the first president as the founder and father of the nation. Consequently, the memory of Nyerere permeated into the socio-political discourse of all sections of society, often, though admittedly not always, as a symbol of morality, vision, perseverance, and leadership against which contemporary issues and individuals could be measured. The memory of topics discussed in previous chapters of this thesis, from *maendeleo* to nation-building and the moral teachings of *ujamaa*, became central to this legacy. Whether in the political, religious, public, or private spheres, this memory served not only as a guide and yardstick, but also as a rhetorical device, and was subject to change according to its utilisation and the context in which it was called upon. Indeed, it could be argued that, following his death, Nyerere became woven into the fabric of the Tanzanian state – and became central to its socio-political discourse and culture – in a way that he never was when he was alive.

The memory of the first president was and still is subject to interpretation and utilisation not only at the national level, but at the community and the personal level too. In religious communities, Nyerere's legacy was just as complex as it was in the political arena, with institutions such as the Catholic Church fervently celebrating the founding father's life and contributions to the nation whilst, in some Muslim communities, the perceived damage which Nyerere inflicted on local communities in places like Zanzibar led to his being associated with the worst aspects of CCM and the government. Amongst conformist Christians in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, away from the more sanitised official memory of Nyerere, opinions of his leadership at the personal level could be contested, particularly where controversial subjects such as *ujamaa* were involved, whilst communal memory and opinions concerning the effect of his leadership on local society showed a greater degree of consensus across both regions. Of

course, this is something that previous chapters in this thesis – particularly those focusing on nation-building, secularism, and African Socialism – have also discussed.

In the Tanzania of 2019, Christians in Kilimanjaro and Kagera faced a new socio-political climate, one in which democratic freedoms were being eroded and fear of the government was mounting amongst both individuals and religious institutions. At the same time, the memory of Nyerere became highly politicised and contentious, with the Magufuli regime attempting to legitimise its increasingly autocratic and intolerant behaviour by highlighting the parallels between the current president and the father of the nation, portraying the former as the only true successor of the latter, both morally and intellectually. For Chagga and Haya conformist Christians, however, Nyerere and his legacy frequently served as a discursive tool with which to criticise Magufuli and the excesses of his government, alongside the moral frameworks provided by Christianity and the leadership of the Christian churches in rejecting Magufuli's autocratic rule. Whilst few presented Nyerere and his legacy in terms as laudatory as those expressed by the government and the Catholic Church, these individuals nevertheless argued that Magufuli – and indeed all of Tanzania's presidents since 1985 – had strayed from the significantly better examples set by Nyerere. Though interviewees reiterated much of the criticism of Nyerere articulated in previous chapters, their juxtaposing of the apparently morally superior Nyerere years with those that came after 1985, and particularly since 2015, is significant; it supports the idea, already noted in the literature on Nyerere's legacy and discussed in the introduction to this thesis, that individuals' contemporary opinions of him and his leadership are subject to constant reinterpretation and moral reworking according to the context in which they are articulated. Consequently, the example of conformist Christian communities in Kilimanjaro and Kagera demonstrates that memories of the Nyerere years should be understood not only as sources which help in creating an oral, grassroots

history of Tanzania, but also as reflective devices through which to understand, contextualise, and critique the present.

Conclusion

This thesis has examined the complex, evolving relationship between Christianity and socio-political thought in Kilimanjaro and Kagera amongst Chagga and Haya conformist Catholics and Lutherans. It has argued that, in these communities, Christianity, through both its teachings and institutions, was central to how politics, culture, identity, modernity, and morality were discussed, understood, debated, and reworked throughout the twentieth century, whilst also showing the religious influences on political discourse at the national level. Moreover, it has shown that the churches, their institutions, and the *maendeleo* ('progress'/'modernity'/'development') that they fostered developed into sites and philosophies of local resistance, contributing to ideas of regional and ethnic exceptionalism. Whilst this thesis focused primarily on the period during which Julius Nyerere led the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and then served as the first leader of an independent Tanzania, it has also contextualised the 'Nyerere years' by exploring Christianity's place in Chagga and Haya society in the early twentieth century, as well as Nyerere's legacy in conformist Christian communities since his retirement. Consequently, it has shown that religion and its moral frameworks play a part not only in how Nyerere is remembered, but also in how Chagga and Haya conformist Christians discuss contemporary Tanzanian politics.

Soon after its introduction to Kilimanjaro and Kagera, Christianity began to shape Chagga and Haya culture and ethnicity. Traditions were constantly challenged and changed, whilst local power networks, both those associated with kinship structures and those surrounding chiefs and kings, were remoulded through the institutions and teachings of the churches. However, the changes seen in Kilimanjaro and Kagera were not merely the result of foreign interference or the imposition of an unwanted belief system; rather, African Christians

themselves were responsible for the re-articulation of local norms and customs, in some instances rejecting not only the demands of traditional leaders, but also the paternalistic and ‘old-fashioned’ teachings of missionaries. Thus, by 1954, when TANU was formed, Christianities shaped largely by local actors had become intrinsic aspects of Chagga and Haya identity.

Chagga and Haya identity was – and still is – associated with localised concepts of *maendeleo*, which themselves were shaped by Christian beliefs and institutions. An abundance of mission schools contributed to the Chagga and Haya becoming two of the best-educated groups in Tanzania, whilst both Christians and non-Christians quickly benefitted from the dispensaries and hospitals attached to the churches in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. A philosophy of ‘hard work’, tied in part to Christian teachings, as well as the introduction of new agricultural techniques, also helped to foster the development of cash cropping and entrepreneurship amongst the Chagga and Haya. Coffee, which was introduced to Kilimanjaro by missionaries and was at the heart of significant racial and religious tensions in Kagera, became central to the economies of both regions, furthering smallholders’ independence from traditional leaders and colonial governments, and the politics associated with its production, sale and control were thus enveloped in religion well into the Nyerere years. Moreover, whilst the associational politics which grew, in part, out of coffee production, and which went on to shape local ideas about citizenship and belonging in the era of anti-colonialism and early nationalism, were not exclusively religious in origin, it is arguable that they nevertheless drew on the ideas of associational life promoted by the churches. Christian women and Christian youth, too, benefitted from the emancipatory power of Christianity, and were encouraged to embrace an associational life through which they could foster their own forms of *maendeleo*, whether educational, spiritual, political, or economic. Thus, for conformist Christians in Kilimanjaro and Kagera, *maendeleo* and associational life were inherently both Christian and Chagga or

Haya, whilst other groups – particularly majority-Muslim peoples – were believed to have fallen behind in economic and social development due to a less *maendeleo*-driven mindset.

Religion again played an important role in how Chagga and Haya conformist Christians interpreted Tanzanian nation-building. Independence, freedom, ‘good citizenship’, secularism, and leadership were hot topics both in religious publications and in conformist Christian social circles, whilst tensions between Christians and Muslims fed into debates about the nature of an independent state and the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar at both the local and the national level. Though Christian institutions and individuals were generally supportive of Tanzanian nation-building, there was also significant friction between religious communities and Nyerere’s government, particularly during the *ujamaa* period. Warned by religious leaders since the late colonial period of communist and socialist ideology, many Christians were wary of the new path Tanzania was taking, even if African Socialism was acknowledged by the churches and lay Christians as constituting a preferable form of socialistic thinking which could accommodate religious life. The nationalisation of schools, co-operatives, and businesses was unpopular in conformist Christian circles and the local influence of churches and Christian leaders was affected by the state’s decision to monopolise education and agricultural production. In Kilimanjaro in particular, especially in Lutheran circles, the idea of being ‘kept back’ to allow the rest of the country to catch up, and of the government putting obstacles in the way of educated Chagga Christians, became common and endures to this day. Forced villagisation also proved to be very contentious, with Chagga and Haya Christians unable to reconcile the actions of the government with the moral teachings of their religion. Yet, Kilimanjaro and Kagera were also able to escape many of the repercussions of the *ujamaa* system – including widescale forced villagisation – in large part due to the Christian-influenced *maendeleo* they enjoyed.

For conformist Chagga and Haya Christians, the memory and legacy of the Nyerere years continue to influence contemporary socio-political discourse. The political traditions and moral teachings shaped by Nyerere and TANU remain influential, and the true nature of Nyerere's vision for the country has consequently been hotly debated at the top of Tanzanian politics and throughout Tanzanian society for the past three decades. Local communities, meanwhile, continue to live with the effects of decisions made by his regime, as do Christian institutions and individuals. Moreover, developments in Tanzania since Nyerere's resignation in 1985, and particularly since his death in 1999, have led in some instances to a reframing of his presidency amongst Tanzanian citizens; whilst his leadership has not been sanitised to the extent that it has been in the official record, his years in power and his decisions nevertheless provide useful comparators for those wishing to understand and critique his successors. In particular, a desire to return to the Christian-influenced 'morality' and 'order' of the Nyerere years, if not to the economic policies or restricted freedoms of that time, permeates into much of the discourse in Chagga and Haya conformist Christian circles. Indeed, it could be argued that, for many in these communities – and perhaps for Tanzanians more generally – the 'Nyerere years' are still ongoing, since Nyerere, as *Baba wa Taifa* ('Father of the Nation') and *Mwalimu* ('Teacher'), continues to shape the nature of public and private discourse.

From a methodological perspective, this thesis has further highlighted the need to incorporate oral sources into studies of Tanzanian history. A major obstacle facing historians of Africa is a lack of written sources, and it is therefore unsurprising that discourse amongst political elites and histories through the eyes of settlers and missionaries often dominated academic literature in the past. Oral histories, as an increasing number of studies show, help to supplement and reframe the existing historiography, and are especially important for building a better understanding of those peoples and places whose stories remain largely unwritten. By utilising interviews, this thesis has shown how the past has been remembered in the

communities whose histories are being told, and has highlighted how the different meanings of that past are important to understandings of the present. It is quite evident that complex and contested ideas about Tanzanian society and politics were discussed and debated not just in Dar es Salaam, the universities, and amongst the clergy, but in the congregations as well. Religion may not have been the most important thing influencing Christians in these discussions, but religious ideology and identity clearly tempered socio-political thought and discourse to a significant extent. Varying identities and beliefs, shaped by religion, ethnicity, nationality, and locality, among other things, came together to produce a space where conformist Christians interpreted and understood the many developments, both philosophical and material, which they witnessed during the Nyerere years. Memories of these developments have, in turn, continued to influence how these people discuss contemporary politics and Tanzanian society. Thus, it is only through engaging with the oral record that the true extent and complexities of this subject can be appreciated.

The use of a comparative study here, between two regions and two different Christian denominations, has illustrated the subtle differences between what happened in each region and community and, importantly, how these differences have affected communal historical memory. Certain trends and slight contestations of memory are evident in how these groups remember the Nyerere years, with interviewees generally associating Chagga identity and Lutheranism – particularly Chagga Lutheranism – with greater levels of African agency, dissent and political dynamism than Catholicism or Haya identity, whilst Catholicism and Haya society were remembered to have better accommodated the philosophies – if not the realities – of nationalism and socialism. Moreover, the East African Revival clearly influenced memories of Christianity's interaction with culture in Kagera in a way not mirrored in Kilimanjaro.

However, such contestations notwithstanding, one of the most important things that this thesis has demonstrated is the striking degree of consensus shown in conformist Christian Chagga and Haya communities, at least as far as communal memory is concerned. The divisions noted above were rarely stark, with significant overlaps in opinion between members of different groups. Indeed, any significant contestations of memory were expressed at the individual, rather than the communal, level, with a small number of individuals expressing opposing viewpoints. Evidently, Chagga and Haya conformist Christians, despite coming from very different places and societies, and regardless of denominational background, often experienced the developments and legacy of the Nyerere years in their communities in similar ways. That these shared memories serve both as useful comparators for the present and as a method through which localised meanings of the past reinforce communal identities highlights the importance of locating agency in consensus as much as in dissent and contestation. Of course, whilst Christians were – and still are – informed by their faith and community in how they perceived and discussed society and politics, and in how they remembered these things, the process was also an individual one, and no two people experienced exactly the same influences on idea formation. This study therefore further reinforces the need for more historical studies which centre the experiences and memories of individuals and local communities in wider historical studies. Some of the religious publications discussed in this thesis to which many lay Christians contributed, such as the Lutheran newsletter *Umoja*, provide a particularly useful avenue for exploring these questions, and future work on Tanzanian Christian history would certainly benefit from focusing on these rich, under-utilised sources.

It is also worth highlighting some of the limitations of this study. Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, there is the question of how interviewees were affected by the political situation in Tanzania in 2019, as discussed in the introduction to this thesis and explored further

in Chapter 7. The fact that interviewees emphasised the central importance of Christianity to local society and *maendeleo*, as well as the idea of Nyerere and his successors harming these things by limiting the influence of Christian institutions and repressing local cultures, must be understood alongside Magufuli's overt conflict with the churches, how unpopular he was amongst interviewees, and his desire to present himself as Nyerere's ideological heir. Secondly, the similarities between Kagera and Kilimanjaro, and between twentieth-century Chagga and Haya economic, political, and religious history, arguably highlight the need to analyse the question of religion and socio-political thought in other regions of Tanzania with contrasting religious demographics and which have had different types of relationships with the administrative centre. Thus, it would be interesting to revisit these questions when feelings of government repression are less acute, and to expand the investigation to Muslim communities, including in inland regions where Muslims form a minority, as well as smaller Christian denominations in other regions. Such studies would not only uncover a more diverse collection of memories and opinions but would also improve understandings of the level of consensus seen in regions like Kilimanjaro and Kagera in 2019.

Another point worth considering is that, when the fieldwork for this thesis was being conducted, documentary Chagga and Lutheran sources were more readily available than were Catholic and Haya sources, meaning that some of the analysis presented in the preceding chapters has necessarily been built on and drawn from a somewhat uneven set of data. Whilst the inclusion of an equal number of interviews in each region and from each denomination offsets the imbalance in documentary sources to a certain extent, the recording of oral history was also a more straightforward task in Chagga Christian circles than it was amongst Haya Christians. As noted in the introduction, I benefitted from a level of access and familiarity in Kilimanjaro that allowed me to gather resources and make connections relatively easily. In Kagera, I was much more reliant on the generous assistance of local individuals to be able to

conduct my research. Consequently, the sourcing and selection of people willing to speak with me was, at least initially, heavily influenced by those who worked so tirelessly to introduce me to people in their community. It is probably unsurprising, therefore, that interviewees were sometimes somewhat more guarded in their responses to my questions in Kagera than they were in Kilimanjaro, which may in turn have influenced the information gathered in each region. This should be kept in mind where this thesis has linked Chagga identity more closely with political dissent, both historically and in the present day, than Haya identity.

A final important limitation to acknowledge, and one that was alluded to in the introduction and first two chapters, is that both Chagga and Haya historiography are unavoidably shaped by a Christianised historical record, whether that be due to a reliance on early missionary accounts or because Christian institutions have often kept the best records in local communities. That much of the source material available lends itself to a reading of Chagga and Haya history which emphasises the role of Christianity could therefore be influenced by how and why such material was recorded and preserved. This is not to say that the influence of Christianity in Chagga and Haya society should be downplayed or ignored, but rather that its shaping of the historical record should always be borne in mind.

Nyerere's Tanzania is one of the best-studied places and time periods in Africa, largely due to the complex, dynamic, and contested socio-political discourse that developed in the country, and which has continued to occupy scholars from a range of disciplines. This thesis supplements a growing body of literature focusing primarily on the ways in which Tanzanian citizens experienced the Nyerere years, thereby furthering our understanding of the production and articulation of ideas outside of the circles traditionally associated with the philosophical developments of the time. By focusing on conformist Christian individuals and communities, it has also argued in favour of a methodological approach which attempts to understand African

Christianities from the bottom up as collections of beliefs and institutions that have, from the very beginning, been driven by African Christians and both local and global concerns and ideas. Moreover, it has emphasised the need for religion and its role in local epistemologies to be taken seriously in historical studies of Tanzania. Finally, it has shown that both the legacy of the Nyerere years and the Christianities which have developed in Kilimanjaro and Kagera continue to affect how Chagga and Haya conformist Christians understand, discuss, and contextualise Tanzanian politics, religious dynamics, and the societies in which they live.

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Interviewees in Kagera:

Haya Catholic Women:

Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former domestic worker, born 1935
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former nurse, born 1937
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former government worker, born 1938
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former schoolteacher, born 1939
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, farmer, born 1939
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, businesswoman, born 1942
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, doctor, born 1946
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former secretary, born 1951
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, former schoolteacher, born 1952
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Catholic, businesswoman, born 1955

Haya Lutheran Women:

Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, lawyer, born 1934
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, doctor, born 1936
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, former schoolteacher, born 1936
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, businesswoman, born 1938
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, former schoolteacher, born 1941
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, lawyer, born 1941
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, former secretary, born 1944
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, shopkeeper, born 1946
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, farmer, born 1950
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, businesswoman, born 1955

Haya Catholic Men:

Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, former schoolteacher, born 1936
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, doctor, born 1936
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, former driver, born 1937
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, former government worker, born 1937
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, former police officer, born 1939
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, businessman, born 1943
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, businessman, born 1945
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, former office manager, born 1948
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, lawyer, born 1953
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, farmer, born 1953

Haya Lutheran Men:

Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, businessman, born 1935
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, doctor, born 1937
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, former schoolteacher, born 1938
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, farmer, born 1938
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, company director, born 1939
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, businessman, born 1943
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, lawyer, born 1945
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, lawyer, born 1947
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, businessman, born 1950
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, former farm manager, born 1953

Haya Catholic Priests:

Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Catholic, priest

Haya Lutheran Pastors:

Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, pastor
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, pastor
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, pastor
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, pastor
Interviewee Profile: Female, Haya, Lutheran, pastor
Interviewee Profile: Male, Haya, Lutheran, pastor

Interviewees in Kilimanjaro:

Chagga Catholic Women:

Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, former office worker, born 1934
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, former schoolteacher, born 1936
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, former secretary, born 1937
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, doctor, born 1939
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, former nurse, born 1940
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, businesswoman, born 1943
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, former schoolteacher, born 1943
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, lawyer, born 1947
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, shopkeeper, born 1951
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Catholic, former government worker, born 1953

Chagga Lutheran Women:

Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, former schoolteacher, born 1935
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, former government worker, born 1936
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, businesswoman, born 1938
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, doctor, born 1940
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, lawyer, born 1941
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, former schoolteacher, born 1945
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, businesswoman, born 1947
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, accountant, born 1950
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, businesswoman, born 1953
Interviewee Profile: Female, Chagga, Lutheran, company director, born 1956

Chagga Catholic Men:

Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, former office manager, born 1935
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, doctor, born 1938
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, banker, born 1939
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, former government advisor, born 1940
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, businessman, born 1941
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, shopkeeper, born 1944
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, lawyer, born 1944
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, farmer, born 1950
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, lawyer, born 1953
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, government worker, born 1952

Chagga Lutheran Men:

Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, businessman, born 1934
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, businessman, born 1935
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, former office manager, born 1938
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, lawyer, born 1939
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, government worker, born 1941
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, doctor, born 1944
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, lawyer, born 1947
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, businessman, born 1950
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, businessman, born 1953
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, doctor, born 1957

Chagga Catholic Priests:

Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, priest
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, priest
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, priest
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, priest
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Catholic, priest
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Chagga Lutheran Pastors:

Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, pastor
Interviewee Profile: Male, Chagga, Lutheran, pastor
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