



# THE UNIVERSITY *of* EDINBURGH

This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use:

This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated.

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge.

This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author.

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author.

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given.

Emotional Politics in the *Iliad*

Angeliki Pesmatzoglou

PhD

The University of Edinburgh

2020



*Signed Declaration*

I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself and has not been submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Except where stated otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work presented is entirely my own.

Signed:

Angeliki Pesmatzoglou  
Edinburgh, 31 August 2020



## *Acknowledgements*

I would like to thank my primary supervisor Prof Douglas Cairns whose insightful comments on, and constructive criticism of, the various drafts of this thesis helped me to develop my ideas and to better articulate my argument. I would also like to thank Dr Lilah Grace Canevaro (my secondary supervisor in the first two years of my PhD studies) and Prof Mirko Canevaro (my secondary supervisor in the third year of my PhD studies) whose remarks helped me to further refine my thesis and its structure. Finally, my thanks go to Inês Silva and Roberta Leotta for all engaging discussions both within and beyond our cognitive reading group, Ideas Are Food (<https://ideasare.food.blog/>).



ἴστε γὰρ δήπου ὅτι Ὅμηρος ὁ σοφώτατος πεποίηκε σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων τῶν  
ἀνθρωπίνων.’

Ξενοφῶν, Συμπόσιον 4.8



## *Abstract*

This thesis constitutes a systematic analysis of emotion's role in Iliadic politics. I hereby argue that emotions, which the evidence of Homer's *Iliad* reveals as shaping and shaped by communal norms, are constitutive of Iliadic politics both normatively and anti-normatively. This means that the way in which leaders experience emotions, enact communal rules, and manage honour dynamics, especially within a deliberative context, is intimately bound up with the wellbeing of the community. Ch. 2 concerns political debate and variants of leadership emerging from the Achaeans' community. I show that a worsening of conflict is linked to individuals' focus on their own emotions and priorities, thereby failing to consider the emotions and rights of others. To this end, intersubjective thinking and feeling are of central importance vis-à-vis Iliadic honour dynamics and interpersonal relationships. Ch. 3 discusses decision-making processes in the Trojan community, showing that leaders must not only be able to follow procedural rules but propose constitutively rational plans of action. This involves the sound evaluation of one's emotions while giving due consideration to the advice of one's counsellors. Ch. 4 demonstrates that, unlike the Achaeans' and the Trojans', the Olympian assemblies unexceptionally engender effective decision-making. This is because Olympian actors do not push their claims to honour too far. Rather they display behaviour in accordance with communal norms and  $\mu\omicron\iota\pi\alpha$  (fate). Following this, Ch. 4 shows that when leaders succeed in correctly deploying political mechanisms, the negotiation of communal norms and management of honour dynamics are able to accommodate dissent and emotional tension. Thereafter, Ch. 5 explains that effective negotiations are not restricted to members belonging to the same community but extend to those of warring communities, namely, the Achaeans and the Trojans. In these contexts, such negotiations are grounded in ethical values and shared religious beliefs, which transcend individual communities. However, because shared moral values are typically enacted on an interpersonal level only (and rarely on an intercommunal level), the instantiation of a superordinate 'community of communities' is not ultimately realised to any great extent within the epos. Still the *Iliad* gifts to readers such an aspiration.



## Contents

<i>Signed Declaration</i> .....	3
<i>Acknowledgements</i> .....	5
<i>Abstract</i> .....	9
<i>Contents</i> .....	11
<i>A Note on Texts, Translations, and Abbreviations</i> .....	12
1. Introduction .....	15
1.1 Emotion .....	16
1.2 The interrelation between emotions and politics .....	28
1.3 Outline of the work.....	44
2. The Achaean political community .....	47
2.1 Honour and emotions: the conflict in the assembly of <i>Iliad</i> 1.....	48
2.2 The Achaeans' first attempt to resolve the conflict.....	63
2.2.1 The assembly and council in <i>Iliad</i> 9: balance between individuals' emotions and political decision-making?.....	63
2.2.2 The embassy: emotional negotiations in political context.....	71
2.3 Balancing emotions with communal norms: the reconciliation between Agamemnon and Achilles in the assembly of <i>Iliad</i> 19 .....	81
2.3.1 Achilles's emotional and political turn.....	82
2.3.2 Agamemnon's emotional and political turn .....	87
2.3.3 Odysseus's sensible leadership.....	92
2.4 Conclusions .....	96
3. The Trojan political community.....	99
3.1 Examples of successful assemblies .....	100
3.2 The Trojan assembly of <i>Iliad</i> 18 and Hector's failure.....	106
3.3 Conclusions .....	116
4. The Olympian political community .....	119
4.1 Olympian conflict: honour and emotions .....	123
4.2 Olympian consensus.....	128
4.2.1 Olympian reconciliation: honour and emotions .....	129
4.2.2 Face-saving mechanisms and willing compromises.....	138
4.3 Conclusions .....	144
5. Politics, ethics, and emotions in war: towards a superordinate 'community of communities' in the <i>Iliad</i> .....	145
6. Conclusion.....	181

*Bibliography*.....187

*A Note on Texts, Translations, and Abbreviations*

Extracts from the *Iliad* are cited from H. van Thiel's edition (van Thiel (2010)). Quotations from the *Odyssey* follow the Teubner edition of M. L. West (West (2017)). All translations of this thesis are my own, and are intended to be useful rather than elegant. Ancient authors, ancient works, and journal abbreviations follow those of *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (4<sup>th</sup> edition). Other abbreviations are listed below:

LSJ            H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, revised and augmented by H. S. Jones (Oxford 1940<sup>9</sup>).

*LfgrE*        B. Snell and H. J. Mette, *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos* (Göttingen 1995).



## 1. Introduction

Iliadic politics is a research field within Homeric studies which has been studied from a variety of angles, such as the historical background of the Homeric poems (*e.g.*, van Wees (1992)), the nature of community life (*e.g.*, Hammer (2002)), or the oral poetic tradition (*e.g.*, Elmer (2013)). Although such approaches have shed light on the way that Iliadic politics function, and in certain cases, have explored individuals' emotions in relation to political phenomena, they nevertheless fail to account for the full potential of the emotions, as they emerge from situations of personal interaction, negotiation, and decision-making in the context of political structures and institutions, as well as political actions and processes. In this thesis, I argue that emotions, shaping and shaped by communal norms, are constitutive of Iliadic politics, both normatively and anti-normatively. That is to say that the way leaders experience and respond to emotions, enact communal norms, and manage dynamics revolving around honour, particularly within a deliberative context, is intimately bound up with the community's wellbeing. Accordingly, in this thesis, I have the following aims. First, I seek to demonstrate the fundamental role of the emotions in political contexts of cooperation and conflict within the *Iliad*. Secondly, I aim to contribute to scholarship on the history of the emotions, thereby bridging the gap between ancient sources and contemporary theoretical approaches. To this end, I refer to ancient and modern psychological, sociopolitical, and philosophical accounts, particularly those that foreground the significance of the association of emotions with communal norms and politics.

This project raises several theoretical and methodological questions, which span definitional questions about the nature of emotion itself, with regard to the study of emotion as a socially-situated phenomenon with a clear political dimension. The latter question shall be explored through the study of communal dynamics, *viz.* the ways in which members of communities internalise and enact communal norms. To this end, questions regarding individuals' emotional experiences within the group shall be foregrounded, thereby addressing concomitant questions regarding the formation of communal norms. This chapter addresses these issues, while also constructing a theoretical framework for the thesis as a whole.

My plan for this chapter is as follows. In Section 1.1, after providing a brief history of the concept of emotion in English, I call attention to complexities surrounding this concept. I then discuss the (partly) equivalent Greek term for emotion, namely, τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη, along with the so-called ‘psychic organs’ (*e.g.*, θυμός, φρένες, *etc.*), which demonstrate that Homeric characters think, feel, and act in holistic ways, that is, free from clear-cut dichotomies, such as mind vs body, reason vs passion. Finally, I explain that emotion in this thesis is treated as a social phenomenon. Section 1.2 discusses the interrelation between emotions and politics after summarising the main works of Homeric scholarship on this topic. I thereby clarify that, owing to their embeddedness within social contexts, emotions affect political concepts, such as leadership, as well as political practices, including the distribution of resources. These respective concepts are bound up with what I shall be calling ‘honour dynamics’. In Section 1.3, I provide a general outline of the thesis, unpacking the contents of its respective chapters.

## 1.1 Emotion

As with all other concepts, ‘emotion’ has its own history and background. The term made its first appearance in the English language through John Florio’s translation of Michel de Montaigne’s essays in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. As Thomas Dixon remarks “‘emotion’ was a word for denoting physical disturbance and bodily movement”.<sup>1</sup> During the 18<sup>th</sup> century, emotion indicated the bodily stirrings that accompanied mental feelings, while from the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century onwards, the concept moved from the bodily to the mental domain. Only since the 19<sup>th</sup> century has emotion denominated a psychological category, and thereafter a subject of painstaking research: emotion has encompassed and been partly synonymous with a range of terms, which include the appetites, passions, affections, and sentiments. The establishment of emotion as a subject of research in its own right is largely due to the work of two researchers at the University of Edinburgh: Thomas Brown (1778-1820) and Charles Bell (1774-1842). While both Brown and Bell agreed about the mental aspect of emotion, only the latter took the body to be a constitutive cause of emotional experiences.<sup>2</sup> This difference in their approaches can be explained by the fact that Brown was a philosopher and Bell a neuroscientist. This observation seems to be consistent with the fact that even today

---

<sup>1</sup> Dixon (2012) 340. See also Dixon (2003).

<sup>2</sup> Dixon (2012) 341.

disparate fields provide different definitions of emotion or no definition at all.<sup>3</sup> Yet the indeterminacy of the term under investigation should not prevent scholars from exploring the phenomenon; on the contrary, it should explain why it is absolutely essential to develop interdisciplinary approaches.

The literature on what should be included in the category of emotion, or on the nature of the phenomena, is vast.<sup>4</sup> In what follows, I consider some of those accounts, while attempting to distinguish my approach from others, thereby illuminating the parameters that will affect the project ahead. I maintain that, because emotion is a category, and categories have no strict boundaries,<sup>5</sup> the vagueness of emotion is an essential characteristic of the phenomenon, rather than a problem with it.<sup>6</sup> I argue that emotion is neither a purely irrational nor a purely internal event; it is a *social* phenomenon that evaluates real states of affairs, emerging in social situations. This study therefore takes an inclusive, holistic approach with regard to emotion in two senses: in terms of the category and in terms of the phenomena.

To begin, Ekman's work on emotion is among the most discussed works within emotion research, particularly known for introducing the term 'basic emotions'. Specifically, Ekman together with Friesen distinguishes between 'basic emotions' (which are anger, fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, happiness, and contempt) and 'non-basic emotions'.<sup>7</sup> 'Basic emotions' are building blocks of their non-basic counterparts, that is, the former are a constitutive part of the latter, and are to be understood as a genetically determined set of instructions.<sup>8</sup> The list of the 'basic

---

<sup>3</sup> Issues regarding the definition of emotion are discussed in a special section of *Emotion Review* 4 (2012) 337-93.

<sup>4</sup> For a good overview of the study of emotion across many academic disciplines, see Plamper (2015).

<sup>5</sup> In this thesis, 'category' is not to be understood on its classical view, namely, as defined by the common properties that all category members share. Instead, it is to be defined by the so-called 'prototype theory'. The origins of this theory hark back to Wittgenstein's (1953) conception of family resemblance (*Familienähnlichkeit*), according to which 'members of a category may be related to one another without all members having any properties in common that define the category': see Lakoff (1987) 12. For a list of further prototype effects with words of explanation, see Lakoff (1987) 12-13. See *ibid.* 14-15, for some key scholars whose research shaped Lakoff's prototype effects.

<sup>6</sup> See Cairns and Fulkerson (2015). Cf. Elster (1999) 241, who 'prefer[s] to leave the concept open-ended and ambiguous'; yet, following Aristotle, Elster uses seven qualities to analyse categories of emotions, still recognising the possibility that such an approach may be challenged (Elster (1999) 246-8). Cf. also Lakoff (2016) 272: 'There is no one "correct definition" of "emotion" or "basic emotion." But there are real phenomena that is reasonable to call "emotional" and they are probably of many types.'

<sup>7</sup> See Ekman and Friesen (1971); Ekman and Friesen (1986).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. the notion of 'affect programme' in Tomkins and McCarter (1964), which introduces this idea of the existence of a natural mechanism that guides emotional behaviour.

emotions’ may be based on a similar list by Darwin (1872); however, as Colombetti (2014) points out, Darwin never actually proffered a distinction between emotions that are primary or basic – he rather focused on the emotions (and their respective facial expressions) that occur in both humans and animals.<sup>9</sup> In fact, in later work, Ekman argues further that ‘non-basic emotions’ are not emotions at all.<sup>10</sup> In Ekman’s view, the category of emotion is defined by a specific set of certain characteristics,<sup>11</sup> with the emphasis being placed on the facial expression accompanying the emotion.<sup>12</sup> Such an approach, however, has caused Ekman to adopt a limited view about what count as emotion, excluding (*inter alia*) all cases of emotion in language, where the emotion category is extended (see below).

Parrott (2010) advocates replacing the term ‘basic emotion’ with the term ‘Ur-emotion’. This revision seeks to underline emotions’ abstract structure, in particular by acknowledging the similarities of emotions across cultures, without thereby implying that the differences are unimportant. ‘Ur-emotions’ are ‘an aspect of actual emotional states, but are not themselves actual, occurring emotions’.<sup>13</sup> In a similar vein, Frijda and Parrott (2011) argue that ‘Ur-emotions’ are not themselves emotions but refer to the processes of action of readiness, which lie behind the actual emotions.<sup>14</sup> In so doing, however, Frijda and Parrott (like Ekman) adopt a limited view about emotion, while these quarrels about whether one term is better than another fail to enhance our understanding of the phenomenon at hand.

On the other hand, Colombetti (2014) does not recommend any replacement of the term ‘basic emotion’ with another but rejects the very distinction between basic and non-basic emotions. She argues that all emotions, with no distinction in classes, are to be perceived as complex and dynamical patterns of cerebral and corporeal

---

<sup>9</sup> See Colombetti (2014) 38. For the impact of Darwin’s (1872) book on the study of emotion (and its relation to Ekman’s work), see Plamper (2015) 164-73.

<sup>10</sup> Ekman (1994); Ekman (2003); Ekman and Cordaro (2011).

<sup>11</sup> See Ekman’s own recap: ‘Distinctive universal signals; Distinctive physiology; Automatic appraisal; Distinctive universals in antecedent events; Presence in other primates; Capable of quick onset; Can be of brief duration; Unbidden occurrence; Distinctive thoughts, memories, and images; Distinctive subjective experience; Refractory period filters information available to what supports the emotion; Target of emotion unconstrained; The emotion can be enacted in either a constructive or destructive fashion’; Ekman and Cordaro (2011) 365.

<sup>12</sup> For a view against the argument of facial expression in relation to the universality of emotion, see, for example, Mesquita (2003).

<sup>13</sup> Parrott (2010) 20.

<sup>14</sup> On the action of readiness as the principal element of emotion, see Frijda (1986).

events.<sup>15</sup> While, however, it is true that certain emotions should be conceived of in physical terms, it is scarcely plausible for *all* uses of emotion words, including examples such as ‘I’m afraid that I will not be able to attend’, to imply a physical symptomatology. If there is not always a corresponding physiological state, then do these episodes not really count as emotional? Since the English language classifies such cases under the same superordinate category,<sup>16</sup> *i.e.*, emotion, there is no reason to exclude such cases from the category. This is not to suggest that there is no difference between ‘fear’ in expressions like the one aforementioned and ‘fear’ as communicated through expressions, such as ‘oh my god, there’s a fire’. Nor is the relation between different kinds of emotion arbitrary. Rather, their relation relies on concepts such as that of family resemblance, metonymous expression, or metaphorical extension.<sup>17</sup> By implication, some features of the basic category ‘fear’ may be true of some cases of fear but not of others. In a similar vein, some examples of the superordinate category emotion, *e.g.*, fear or anger, may be automatically identified as parts of the category, that is, they are prototypical examples of the emotion category, in contrast to less prototypical examples, *e.g.*, hope. In other words, neither the basic categories (*e.g.*, fear) nor the superordinate category, *i.e.*, emotion, has clear boundaries.

A prototypical feature of the phenomena under investigation is the perception of emotions as passive phenomena, namely, as something that happens to the individual, not as phenomena which the individual causes. The idea of passivity which represents a vernacular categorisation of emotion<sup>18</sup> brings our discussion to the work of the philosopher Griffiths (1998), who, in contrast to other researchers dealing with the definition of the concept of emotion, renounces emotion as a category. Griffiths (1998) distinguishes between three different classes of emotions,<sup>19</sup> which

---

<sup>15</sup> See Colombetti (2014) *passim*, especially 53-82.

<sup>16</sup> According to prototype theory (Rosch 1973; Rosch 1978), category systems or taxonomies can have a horizontal and vertical dimension. The vertical dimension pertains to hierarchical relations between categories, which can normally be analysed in terms of three main levels of inclusiveness: the *superordinate* (*e.g.*, furniture); the *basic* (chair); and the *subordinate* (office chair).

<sup>17</sup> Thus, when Elster (1999) 249 excludes visceral factors (such as pain, bodily pleasures, thirst, or hunger) from the category of emotion, owing to their lacking cognitive antecedents and/or intentional objects, he does not seem to acknowledge that language may be extended in various ways, *e.g.*, ‘I am thirsty for knowledge’.

<sup>18</sup> Examples of the vernacular categorisation of emotion as passive phenomena are expressions such as ‘they were seized by anger’; ‘they were overwhelmed by joy’. Note, however, the passivity of emotion (as depicted in language) should not be understood as if individuals do not really cause their emotions. As Section 1.2 shows, emotions are embedded in social norms, while the way in which norms are enacted is bound up with the individuals’ agency and responsibility as interactants in a social context.

<sup>19</sup> Griffiths (1998) 15, 17.

may represent different phenomena, but nonetheless share phenomenological passivity as a common characteristic. Still, because the phenomenon under investigation does not have any ‘discernible theoretical utility’,<sup>20</sup> *i.e.*, it fails to establish a scientific category that corresponds to a natural kind, Griffiths (1998), along with his own proposal for passivity as a typical feature of emotion, rejects emotion as a category. Given, however, that categories are constructions of language and culture, categories do not have to correspond with natural kinds only.<sup>21</sup>

While Griffiths (1998) advocates the view that the only scientific concept of emotion is biological, Gross’s (2006) work provides a counterpoint. In his account, emotions cannot be considered independently cultural or historical contexts: they can only be understood in relation to power dynamics and social hierarchies, that is, emotions are above all socially constructed. Although rhetoric can be a useful tool for considering emotions as social constructions, as Gross (2006) argues,<sup>22</sup> this does not necessarily mean that we have to exclude their natural aspect, as his argument implies.

Gross’s (2006) approach can be subsumed under the so-called ‘strong thesis of constructionism’. According to Armon-Jones (1986), there are two versions of the constructionist view of emotions, *viz.* the weaker thesis and the strong thesis. The former ‘concedes to the naturalist the existence of a limited range of natural emotion responses’,<sup>23</sup> whereas the latter supports the idea that ‘emotion is an irreducibly sociocultural product’, and because ‘No emotion can be a natural state, ... the complex or sophisticated emotions cannot be regarded as cultural modifications of natural states’.<sup>24</sup>

Within this context, Harré (1986) further contends that the ‘historical changes in the emotional repertoire of a continuous national culture’ demonstrate the cultural construction of emotion.<sup>25</sup> Together with Finlay-Jones, Harré (1986) explores the case of ‘acedia’, arguing that ‘with the decay of a moral order, *accidie* lost to view’.<sup>26</sup> In

---

<sup>20</sup> Griffiths (1998) 242.

<sup>21</sup> *Cf.* Cairns and Fulkerson (2015).

<sup>22</sup> See Gross (2006) 1-20, especially 10-17, where he connects social phenomena, culture, and politics through the rubric of rhetoric.

<sup>23</sup> Harré (1986) 38.

<sup>24</sup> Harré (1986) 37.

<sup>25</sup> Harré (1986) 11. See also Harré and Finlay-Jones (1986) 220-33.

<sup>26</sup> Harré and Finlay-Jones (1986) 220.

their view, *accidie* consists in negligence (a matter of behaviour) and a kind of misery (a matter of feelings). When negligence is embedded within a moral order (one's duty to God), an emotion is born ('acedia').<sup>27</sup> However, it seems that emotion is a more complicated interaction than a merely causal interpretation between feelings and behavioural manifestations based on moral judgments. In contrast to Harré's and Finlay-Jones' (1986) argument,<sup>28</sup> the disappearance of 'acedia' from the explicit repertoire of English (corresponding with the rise of Protestantism) does not thereby imply the disappearance of the emotion, for the lack of a word does not imply the absence of its phenomenal manifestations.<sup>29</sup> When, for example, English speakers seek to describe their joy at another's misfortune, they use the German term *Schadenfreude*.<sup>30</sup> Thus Anglophone people still experience the emotion despite lacking an English word for the phenomenon which expresses the concept.<sup>31</sup> Harré and Finlay-Jones (1986) include in their discussion other concepts, such as, melancholy and lethargy.<sup>32</sup> They conclude that a syndrome which has been called (at various points) 'acedia', 'lethargy', 'mopishness', or 'insensibility' may in fact be 'acedia'. Thus 'acedia' returns to our conceptual and lexical repertoire. However, something else strikes me as more important here: the different terms used to describe the same emotional state/syndrome are in fact part of the concept, thereby indicating the existence of something real.<sup>33</sup>

Although language can describe, or is part of, real things, different languages do not identify precisely the same things with equivalent notions. Nevertheless, one of the effects of the prototype theory, namely, family resemblance can help us to identify areas of overlap for different terminologies across different cultures. In the case of emotion, Wierzbicka (1999) points out that most languages include such a category in their repertoire.<sup>34</sup> But why do most languages have a similar category for emotion? As Cairns and Fulkerson (2015) observe, emotion seems to pick out aspects of the human experience that stand out; aspects that any human being and any culture could

---

<sup>27</sup> Harré and Finlay-Jones (1986) 221.

<sup>28</sup> Harré and Finlay-Jones (1986) 230.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Schnell (2015) 8, 92, 224, 241, 305, 589, 592-3, 596-8, 774, 981.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. the ancient Greek term *ἐπιχαίρεκακία*.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Elster's (1999) 101; 255 term 'weak proto-emotion', which indicates an emotion for which a culture lacks a concept. For Elster's (1999) discussion on 'acedia', see *ibid.* 258.

<sup>32</sup> Harré and Finlay-Jones (1986) 222-32.

<sup>33</sup> That is, they indicate the social construction of something, not the social construction out of nothing: see Hacking (1999).

<sup>34</sup> Wierzbicka (1999) 275-307.

encounter.<sup>35</sup> This observation does not imply that these aspects are necessarily features *either* of ‘the world’ *or* humans. Rather these aspects are features of the interaction between human beings *and* ‘the world’. That is to say, emotion is an interactive property *partly* located in human experience, while human experience is *also* an aspect of ‘the world’, and is therefore at once social and rooted in biological capacities. This is in turn linked to what has already been discussed above, namely, that language partly creates the concepts, which explains why concepts are not co-extensive cross-culturally.

However, even the same concept within a language does not define one thing univocally.<sup>36</sup> This observation is immediately relevant to the fact that the Greek notion of the πάθη of the ψυχή is only partially equivalent to the English term ‘emotion’. To prove the legitimacy of this point, let us turn our attention to Aristotle. When we read the second book of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, which enumerates some of the πάθη of the ψυχή, viz. the affections of the soul, we consider the items included in the list as emotions. At the beginning of Book 1 of the *De Anima*, moreover, Aristotle asks a question that pertains to the nature of the ψυχή and its definition, namely, whether all the affections of the ψυχή are connected to the body, and the main issue that Aristotle seeks to address thereby, is whether τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη include everything that happens to the ψυχή (Arist. *De an.* 403a3-b19).<sup>37</sup> This question is, in turn, bound up with Aristotle’s view that even δίανοια (thought) *is* a πάθος of the ψυχή (Arist. *De an.* 403a8). As in the *Rhetoric*, in the *De anima*, by mentioning ‘πάθη of the ψυχή’, Aristotle refers to situations that foreground feelings (ὅλως αισθάνεσθαι), e.g., ‘to get angry’ (ὀργίζεσθαι); ‘to feel confident/have no fear’ (θαρρεῖν). In the context of the *De Anima*, however, Aristotle’s examples are rather used as *prototypical* examples of the πάθη of the ψυχή, because they show *prima facie* that they have both the material component (ὄλη; i.e., physical symptoms), and the λόγος component (Arist. *De an.* 403a24-b2), which, in the case of anger, for example, may be the desire for retaliation. In bringing to the fore these insights, Aristotle attempts to construct his argument such that all πάθη of the ψυχή are ‘with

---

<sup>35</sup> Cairns and Fulkerson (2015) 10.

<sup>36</sup> See Lakoff (1987).

<sup>37</sup> Konstan (2006) 3-40 deals with the term πάθος in the first chapter of his book. However, he excludes the *De Anima* from his investigation, focusing instead on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. While in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle approaches the particular term from a dialectic perspective (thereby aiming his attention at the ‘argument’), the *De Anima*, an important psychological text, affords a deeper account of the term under investigation.

the body' (μετὰ σώματος) (Arist. *De an.* 403a10-19). Yet the ways in which prototypical and other examples of the πάθη of the ψυχή are with the body are not necessarily the same. For, in the case of an occurrence of anger, for example, the increase in the blood temperature of the individual experiencing the emotion shows directly how anger relates to the body (cf. Arist. *De an.* 403a31-b1). In the case of δῖανοια, on the other hand, its association with the term of the πάθος of the ψυχή, along with the body is different. δῖανοια requires the notion of φαντασία; φαντασία, in turn, requires the notion of αἴσθησις; and αἴσθησις requires the body to interact with the world (cf. Arist. *De an.* 403a9-11). Since for Aristotle occurrences such as anger and δῖανοια are with the body, and both count as πάθη of the ψυχή, then τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη seem to be a broader category than the category of emotion, thereby spanning a broader array of senses and connotations. By implication, what English speakers call emotions is the prototypical examples of the category of the πάθη of the ψυχή. This does not suggest that Aristotle did not develop his own theory of the emotions. Rather, it reveals that he took there to be a more general sense of the πάθη of the ψυχή, as well as a more limited one. πάθος of the ψυχή may then be considered as tantamount to emotion regarding its limited sense, although we should also acknowledge its broader extension.

Thus, bearing in mind the idea of the construction of categories and concepts within languages and cultures,<sup>38</sup> as well as the differentiations in equivalent terms across languages and cultures (e.g., emotion; τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη), we can study emotions as pan-cultural phenomena. Indeed, we can do so without having to establish a scientific language in contradistinction with vernacular concepts, as has been suggested.<sup>39</sup> Still we can clarify that although, in the vernacular use of language, English speakers might, for the most part, associate emotion with automatic responses and short-term projects, or often perceive emotion as the opposite of reason (e.g., ‘my head said this, but my heart said that’), emotional factors also play an integral part in decision-making processes for long-term projects, to which we shall now turn. In *Odyssey* 9, for example, after eating some of Odysseus’s comrades, Polyphemos lies down among his sheep (*Od.* 9.296-8). Odysseus then considers, in his θυμός (*Od.*

---

<sup>38</sup> This construction is linked to the way human beings exist in the world (i.e., their biological nature) but also to the way in which they interact with one another and with the environment, as mentioned above.

<sup>39</sup> E.g., Wierzbicka (1999).

9.299: βούλευσα κατὰ μεγαλήτορα θυμόν), to kill the Cyclops (*Od.* 9.300-3). Ultimately, however, another kind of θυμός holds him back (*Od.* 9.303: ἕτερος δέ με θυμός ἔρκεν). That is, Odysseus's agency appears to be divided in two parts, which up to certain extent, is similar to the division described in the scenario mentioned above, viz. 'my head said this, but my heart said that'. This similarity, viz. that metonymies for psychic processes are in conflict, appears in both Homeric epic and modern English, suggesting that different cultures may have similar ways of understanding the phenomenology of the experience itself. In the Homeric example, the θυμός urging Odysseus to kill Polyphemos seems to represent a prototypically emotional scenario: one wants to act immediately because an emotion can directly cause individuals to act. Note, however, that, in the Homeric text, a verb of deliberation is used, viz. βούλευσα (*Od.* 9.299), which seems to suggest that cognition and affectivity are not mutually exclusive.<sup>40</sup> (In the English example, however, as noted above, affectivity is usually excluded from long-term projects in vernacular language use.) Now, if the θυμός holding Odysseus back is also affective, then we have here two kinds of affectivity, viz. automatic/short-term planning affectivity and long-term planning affectivity. This distinction moves our discussion towards Kahneman's (2011) so-called System 1 and System 2 from his book *Thinking Fast and Slow*.

According to Kahneman (2011), mental work takes place within two different systems: System 1 and System 2. System 1 operates automatically, with little to no effort, and with no sense of voluntary control. System 2, however, allocates attention to the effortful mental activities. On this distinction, Kahneman (2011) writes: 'When we think of ourselves, we identify with System 2, the conscious reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to think about and what to do', but, in fact, 'the automatic System 1 is the hero of the book'.<sup>41</sup> Note, however, that this does not imply a clear-cut dichotomy between Systems 1 and 2, nor that System 2 is free from emotional impetus. As Kahneman (2011) explains, System 1 produces with great ease 'impressions and feelings that are the main sources of the explicit beliefs and deliberate choices of System 2'. Thus both short- and long-term projects involve emotion, *i.e.*, they require motivations that are by definition affective. By implication,

---

<sup>40</sup> This point is discussed in more detail below.

<sup>41</sup> Kahneman (2011) 20-1.

even if the interference of deliberation may give the impression of the absence of emotion, decisions are made and shaped by emotional factors.

Kahneman's (2011) argument relies on insights from cognitive psychology, which he appropriates to explain phenomena within economics. Yet the fact that deliberation is intimately linked to emotional activity (since, in his account, the slow and deliberative System 2 is influenced by the intuitive and affective System 1), is corroborated by neuroscientific evidence. According to Damasio (1994),<sup>42</sup> 'emotions and feelings may not be intruders in the bastion of reason at all: they may be enmeshed *in its networks*, for worse *and* for better'.<sup>43</sup> In other words, emotions and feelings influence rationality enormously: brain systems that are necessary for the former are entangled with those that require the latter. Such specific systems are, in turn, intimately linked with other brain systems, which are essential to the regulation of the entire body. Far from promoting unfruitful dichotomies, Damasio's (1994) work demonstrates that emotions are an integral part of decision-making processes, and human beings operate in holistic ways while in interaction with their physical and social environments.

Similarly to Damasio, Colombetti (2014)<sup>44</sup> argues that organisms that are capable of subjective experience can have no mind without affectivity, meaning that affectivity is constitutive of the embodied mind, and enactive cognition understood as 'sense-making' implies that cognition is likewise affective. That is to say that enactivism takes thinking, feeling, and desiring as to be inseparable processes and actions, while the mind, body, and environment are entangled in mental processes. Enactivism explains how organisms get information from the world. As Colombetti (2014) points out, 'Cognition from an enactive perspective is ... the capacity to enact or bring forth a world of sense ... that has a special significance for the organism enacting it.'<sup>45</sup>

The insights of the enactive approach have two important implications for the concept of emotion, as invoked by this thesis. First, by understanding cognition and affectivity as one single process, or as actions of a holistic person, and by connecting

---

<sup>42</sup> For discussion, and certain points of criticism regarding Damasio's (1994) argument, see Elster (1999) 138; 289-98.

<sup>43</sup> Damasio (1994) XII.

<sup>44</sup> The extent to which Colombetti differs from Damasio is accounted for in Colombetti (2014) 23-4.

<sup>45</sup> Colombetti (2014) 18.

the concepts of emotion, reason, and the body, enactivism aligns with an Aristotelian tenet mentioned above, namely, that the πάθη of the ψυχή – which are at once emotional and thinking processes – are μετὰ σώματος. This in turn is consistent with Homeric evidence. Secondly, it brings out the important interrelation between emotion and the world, which powerfully corroborates the concept of emotion as not a merely psychological ascription but as a social phenomenon. Allow me to elaborate upon these two points.

With regard to the first observation, viz. the consistency between enactivism, Aristotle’s hylomorphic understanding of τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη, and the Homeric evidence, two remarks must be made explicit. First, the fact that the term πάθος only made its first appearance in 472 BC (Aesch. *Pers.* 254), that is, the lack of any other term, indicating a corresponding category to τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη in Homer, does not mean that Homeric characters do not experience what English speakers denominate with the term ‘emotion’ (e.g., anger, fear, etc.). It is well known that the very first word of the *Iliad* is μῆνις, typically translated as ‘wrath’ or ‘rage’. That is, the lack of a word indicating the existence of a superordinate category within a language does *not* suggest the absence of basic categories that would counterfactually fall under it. Secondly, being a literary work, while the *Iliad* may not discuss the nature of the emotions in theoretical or philosophical terms, the use of the so-called ‘psychic organs’ (θυμός,<sup>46</sup> φρένες, ἦτορ, κῆρ, κραδίη, στήθος, πραπίδες)<sup>47</sup> demonstrates that there is no absolute opposition between cognition and affectivity in the *Iliad*. In fact, Homeric characters act as holistic agents, who resist being reduced to the dichotomy between mind and body.<sup>48</sup> While exploring θυμός, φρένες, ἦτορ, κῆρ, κραδίη,

---

<sup>46</sup> Pelliccia (1995) offers a detailed analysis of the literal and metaphorical function of θυμός, making clear that the expansion of θυμός is to be linked with the activity of the individual themselves, not an agent inside the person (e.g., a homunculus) who performs a special function. Thus θυμός is an aspect or a mode of the person. On this point, see also Cairns (2014 and 2019), who argues that θυμός does not express its own feelings or thoughts, but conveys the individual’s thought processes, thereby offering an insight into the phenomenology of the agent’s mental life, which encompasses a range of experiences from deliberative processes to emotional responses.

<sup>47</sup> See Jahn’s (1987) monograph, which is the most detailed work on Homeric psychological terms. For an earlier account of the psychic organs in Greek and Roman culture, see Onians (1954) 23-83. For other discussions of Homeric psychology, see, for example, Schmitt (1990). On the Homeric psychic terms, cf. also Claus (1981); Bremmer (1983); Casswell (1990); van der Mije (2011); Sullivan (1988), Clarke (1999), Classen (2005).

<sup>48</sup> Snell (1946) 16-25 is right to insist on the lack of Homeric words corresponding with the terms ‘body’ (‘Körper’) and ‘mind’ (‘Seele’). However, this insistence is exhausted in identifying different nuances of words or different meanings (e.g., δέμας (in accusative: ‘an Bau’; ‘an Gestalt’), σῶμα (‘Leiche’); γυῖα (‘Glieder’); χρώς: (‘Haut’); ψυχή (‘Leben’; ‘Abbild’); θυμός (‘das, was die Regungen verursacht’; ‘was die Knochen und die Glieder in Bewegung setzte’); νόος (‘das, was die Vorstellungen

πραπίδες as parts of the body,<sup>49</sup> and as ‘seelisch-geistige Instanzen’, Jahn (1987) shows that these terms are interchangeable, insofar as they perform adverbial functions (that is, when a ‘psychic organ’ word goes with a preposition (*e.g.*, ἐν θυμῷ); is in the instrumental dative (*e.g.*, θυμῷ); or in equivalent uses of an oblique case).<sup>50</sup> Following Jahn’s (1987) account, a specific psychic organ (say, θυμός) may perform emotional, volitional, as well as calculative functions, but so might another organ.<sup>51</sup> This means that these functions are not unique to disparate psychic organs. Achilles in *Iliad* 1, for example, utterly furious with Agamemnon’s offensive behaviour therefore considers killing him and calculates whether to hold his θυμός (ἠὲ χόλον πύσειεν ἐρητύσειέ τε θυμόν: or to check his anger and restrain his θυμός; 1.192), which is a metonymy for his emotion. The organ of this deliberative procedure is the heart (ἦτορ) (ἐν δέ οἱ ἦτορ/ στήθεσσι λασίοισι διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν: and within his shaggy chest his heart, divided two ways, debated; 1.188-9), with Achilles’s mental processes taking place in his φρένες and θυμός, as mentioned several lines later (ἔως ὃ ταῦθ’ ὄρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν: as he revolved in mind and spirit these (options): 1.193). Achilles’s decision is then ascribed to ἦτορ, a physical organ that we typically associate with the emotions, and his θυμός is linked to both emotional responses and calculative processes.

As noted above, concerning the interrelation between emotion and the world, it must be stressed that emotion, as treated in this thesis, is not a private experience that merely takes place within the mind and body of individuals. Instead, emotion is to be understood as a social phenomenon, involving the world and interaction with other people. Thus emotion is not taken to be a merely psychological episode: instead it is a kind of script. The theoretical notion of a ‘script’ has been established by Schank and Abelson (1977). It means a mental construct consisting in a sequence of actions or episodes, which may include other people, locations, or objects, which are respectively necessary for achieving a goal. Thus ‘emotion scripts’ rest on the assumption that emotion *qua* phenomenon tends to be played out over time between

---

bringt’) *etc.*), and does not result in any conclusion whether or why these differences would be important. Against Snell (1946), see Williams (1993). *Cf.* also Gill (1996); Schmitt (1990).

<sup>49</sup> See Jahn (1987) 9-18. Note that νόος, μένος, and ψυχή are not parts of the body. In fact, νόος needs to be treated as *sui generis*; see Jahn (1987) 20; 46-118.

<sup>50</sup> See Jahn (1987) 182-211.

<sup>51</sup> This point is statistically demonstrated by Jahn’s (1987) 186-92 table.

two or more individuals, and involves intentionality,<sup>52</sup> meaning that emotion is *about* something. To this end, emotion is capable of evaluating real states of affairs; it may also lead to actions in the world, as well as the establishment, facilitation, or prevention of communication between persons. This is to say that in an emotional event, external stimuli can give rise to an individual's internal, emotional experience, in turn contributing to ways of thinking, understanding, and responding to both external and internal phenomena. Emotion is thereby *embedded* in a social or narrative context, insofar as, when we talk about an emotion, there must be a story that narrates its cause, what it felt like, and how the individual chose to act upon it. In connection to the idea of a narrative context with regard to emotion, Gallagher's (2020) analysis of intentional action is illuminating. Gallagher (2020) distinguishes between the external and internal temporality of the narrative frame,<sup>53</sup> explaining the significance of viewing intrinsic temporality from a dynamic perspective: the meaning of an action in the present is not merely shaped by a past event but incorporates some possibility, viz. a goal in the *future*.<sup>54</sup> Any objective temporal standards are then relativised by the individuals' intentions and motivations within the narrative. Bearing Gallagher's (2020) point in mind, words and utterances that might not *typically* be regarded as emotional may *become* emotional if they bear an emotional load and/or convey emotional meaning embedded within a certain social *narrative* context. Such a possibility can be instantiated in a person's tone of voice, (facial) expression, gesture, movement in space, and the direction of gaze while interacting with other individuals and the environment.<sup>55</sup>

## 1.2 The interrelation between emotions and politics

Book-length studies on emotion in Homeric scholarship partly consider aspects of the social nature of emotion, albeit not particularly successfully. Muellner's (1996) work investigates the meaning of the concept of μῆνις in Greek epic, both in general and in relation to Achilles's anger in the *Iliad*. In introducing his theoretical framework, Muellner (1996) cites Lakoff's and Kövesces's (1987) study on anger – which

---

<sup>52</sup> The concept of intentionality was first introduced by Brentano (1874). In his account, intentionality is a pervasive feature of many mental states, *e.g.*, beliefs, judgements, and emotions. This account has significantly influenced the philosophical school of phenomenology, as founded by Husserl.

<sup>53</sup> External temporality refers to the narrator's temporal perspective with regard to the story narrated while internal temporality pertains to the order of narrative events; see Gallagher (2020) 37-8.

<sup>54</sup> Gallagher (2020) 37-41.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Gallagher (2020) 102-5; 112; 121-31; 159-60; 168-9.

investigates how metaphors and metonymies about anger in English form a cognitive model acquired by native speakers within the language – only to make the following summary statement: ‘One society may share some of its elaborate metaphors and moral rules with other societies, but there is no reason to assume that the metaphors, the rules, and therefore the emotions that they represent and that we tend to experience as inherent in human nature are actually universal.’<sup>56</sup> That is, Muellner (1996) might point out that there are metaphors for anger in Homer. He seems, however, to deny the universality of emotion. Yet, in his later article, ‘Homeric Anger Revisited’, Muellner (2011) clarifies that, with the above-quoted statement, he did not mean to ‘rule out the possibility that emotions *might* be the same, only that “there was no reason to assume” *that they were the same*’.<sup>57</sup> In this article, Muellner (2011) expands (and, perhaps, modifies) his view regarding the concept of emotion, thereby informing his earlier work on μῆνις (Muellner (1996)). Nevertheless, in contrast to the methodology employed in the present thesis, Muellner’s (1996) methodology relies heavily on the poetic tradition and the poetics of Epic poetry – μῆνις is treated as a ‘theme’ in Albert Lord’s sense.<sup>58</sup> While his analysis and conclusions of χόλος as opposed to φιλότης in the context of reciprocal relationships and Homeric values is particularly useful and insightful (see all my references to Muellner’s (1996) work in Chapter 2), his definition of μῆνις as ‘the *nomen sacrum* for the ultimate sanction that enforces the world-defining prohibitions, the tabus that are basic to the establishment and perpetuation of the world of Zeus and the society of mortals he presides over’<sup>59</sup> is unattested by the Iliadic evidence. This is because Achilles’s anger, which brought about disaster, is the result of the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles following Agamemnon’s removal of Achilles’s prize. That is, the quarrel does not emerge from a violation of any ‘world-defining’ rule on the part of Agamemnon (as Muellner’s (1996) argument implies), but from Agamemnon’s fundamental breach of a social norm in the Achaeans’ community, namely, the distribution of prizes (see Chapter 2). Thus Achilles’s anger is not a cosmic sanction, following from Muellner’s (1996) definition of μῆνις. It rather expresses the intensity of Achilles’s indignation

---

<sup>56</sup> Muellner (1996) 1.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Muellner’s (2011) §7.

<sup>58</sup> Epic songs are produced by themes combined in different ways – these themes, *i.e.*, cluster of patterns consist in groups of words and syntactic motifs.

<sup>59</sup> Muellner (1996) 129.

towards the leadership style of Agamemnon, thereby performing an important, political function (see Chapter 2).

As does Muellner's (1996), Walsh's (2005) study focuses on anger. Still his concern is not on μῆνις. Instead, he focuses on two other Homeric terms denoting anger: χόλος and κότος. While employing his own methodology, which combines diction, historical linguistics, and anthropological material, Walsh (2005) relies significantly on Muellner's (1996) framework and conclusions,<sup>60</sup> thereby following a similar argumentative line, arriving at rather unsupported conclusions. One such example from Walsh (2005) is the association between Achilles's rejection of the ambassadors' appeals in *Iliad* 9 and Achilles's intention to question his culture's conceptual category of anger by moving from χόλος to κότος.<sup>61</sup> This conclusion follows from Walsh's (2005) overall account of a clear-cut distinction between κότος and χόλος: κότος (in contrast to χόλος) constitutes an unmanageable form of anger, which does not correspond with any particular bodily experience.<sup>62</sup> According to Walsh (2005), the opposition between these kinds of anger represents a cultural belief, viz. that while anger may, on the one hand, be linked to 'the perceived need for the violence that satisfies some perceived social necessity',<sup>63</sup> it may, on the other, be related to 'the recognition that cultivating violence is dangerous in the extreme'.<sup>64</sup> However, χόλος and κότος do not always cover different phenomena but may in fact overlap.<sup>65</sup> By implication, Achilles's rejection of the embassy cannot result from his intention to survey any supposed cultural distinction between manageable and unmanageable anger, as reflected in the usage of the two terms (χόλος and κότος) as Walsh (2005) claims. Instead, the necessity for Achilles to restrain his anger can be found in his social obligation to feel pity towards his comrades, while his insistence on his anger is to be linked to his excessive focus on his status and Agamemnon's violating behaviour in *Iliad* 1 (see Chapter 2).

---

<sup>60</sup> Walsh (2005) 5-8.

<sup>61</sup> Walsh (2005) 233-4.

<sup>62</sup> The foreground of Walsh's (2005) clear-cut distinction between the two terms is a passage of *Iliad* 1. There, Calchas communicates his anxiety to Achilles regarding Agamemnon's anger: a king who becomes angry towards a lesser man might swallow down his χόλος on the same day, but he might retain his κότος until it is fulfilled (1.80-2). See Walsh (2005) 12-13.

<sup>63</sup> For example, when anger maintains concepts such as ξενία, hence the war between the Achaeans and the Trojans following Paris's violating behaviour.

<sup>64</sup> Walsh (2005) 234.

<sup>65</sup> See Cairns (2003) 30-1.

Thus, while setting out to answer the question regarding why warriors fight, van Wees (1992) is right in highlighting the intimate link between anger and honour dynamics. Indeed, as the third chapter of his book (van Wees (1992)) demonstrates, conflict in Homeric society results from the fact that recognition by one's fellows of a warrior's τιμή is partly constitutive of that warrior's status. By implication, heroes get angry when their status is disregarded. To this end, in contrast to other scholars (e.g., Adkins (1960)), van Wees (1992) successfully shows that honour dynamics do not simply take the form of a zero-sum game.<sup>66</sup> Yet van Wees's (1992) account does not consider the importance of the audience in contexts of social interaction. This omission can, for example, be seen in his claim that a *hybristes* can actually diminish the other's status. However, even if the dishonoured person *feels* dishonoured, the (internal) audience does not necessarily hold the same view.<sup>67</sup> In the chariot race of *Iliad* 23, for example, Menelaus might say to Antilochus that he has shamed his ἀρετή (23.571). Still he asks Antilochus to swear an oath that he used no guile to block his chariot (23.585), appealing to the audience to make a judgement (23.573-4), which reveals that the audience *does* play a role in social interaction. To this end, in contrast to van Wees's (1992) view that 'it matters little whether respect is won by force or commanded by custom and merit',<sup>68</sup> it is significant that in the context of communal dynamics deference is granted willingly rather than imposed (see Chapter 2). While van Wees's (1992) fourth chapter offers important insights regarding conflict and status between (individuals of) different communities, his claim that the Trojans do not consider Helen's abduction as a violating act is unfounded.<sup>69</sup> As we shall see in Chapter 5, intercommunal arrangements with the aim of ending the war in *Iliad* 3 take place following Hector's reproach of Paris for his transgressive behaviour regarding Helen's seizure. In fact, the Achaeans' and the Trojans' shared ethical values and religious beliefs offer grounds for negotiations between (individuals of) different communities, in spite of the war. Overall, the broader aim of van Wees's (1992) book is to infer whether the society presented in Homer corresponds with a hypothetical society that is historically situated in the period before the emergence of the πόλις,

---

<sup>66</sup> Against Adkins (1960), see also Cairns (2001a) discussed below.

<sup>67</sup> On the importance of the audience in validating or refusing to validate the individual's honour within the community, see Cairns (2001a), discussed below.

<sup>68</sup> Van Wees (1992) 122.

<sup>69</sup> See, for example, van Wees's (1992) 179 following statement: 'no Trojan ever argues that the abduction of Helena was unjustified and should not be condoned'.

understood as a kind of socially and politically organised system,<sup>70</sup> rather than explicitly focusing on emotional and political processes in deliberative contexts of the *Iliad*, which lie at the heart of this thesis.

Among the studies that investigate Iliadic politics rather than the historicity of Homeric society is Hammer's (2002) work on the nature and organisation of communal life in the *Iliad*. Hammer (2002) argues that elite leaders must respect one another's claims while also being able to manage any emerging differences, before presenting their plans of action to the people for approval. He effectively applies Max Weber's notion of plebiscitary politics to the model of Iliadic leadership, pointing out Agamemnon's failure to enact the rules of the community, which are collectively expressed by the notion of *θέμις*.<sup>71</sup> Hammer's (2002) treatment of *θέμις* develops the scholarly debate about a concept that is linked to the idea of kingship, deriving from Zeus.<sup>72</sup> In Hammer's (2002) account, '*Themis* appears as a notion of reciprocity among political actors that makes possible the existence of the public space', that is, '*Themis* is no longer a personal claim of the king to exclusive knowledge, but a public claim of reciprocity.'<sup>73</sup> In addition to *θέμις*, Hammer (2002) explores other 'divine elements' of the Iliadic narrative to inform his discussion about Iliadic human politics, viz. the gods' role concerning human agency.<sup>74</sup> Following Hammer (2002), the gods' involvement in human affairs and activity in the *Iliad* is to be understood in relation to the ways in which communities understand chance,<sup>75</sup> especially in situations where Iliadic characters are not able to explain certain occurrences or had no intention to cause those (e.g., in the chariot race in *Iliad* 23, Apollo removes Diomedes's whip from his hands (23.384), thereby disabling him from overtaking Eumelos). Hammer's (2002) 'contention is that accident or chance has its most profound effect on one's *aretē*',<sup>76</sup> while 'The response to chance ... serves as a reaffirmation of the status

---

<sup>70</sup> For other works studying the historicity of the society represented in Homeric poetry, see Finley (1956); Snodgrass (1974); Carlier (1984); Morris (1986; revised extensively 2001); Ulf (1990a); Raaflaub (1997), Donlan (1997). Against Finley, see van Wees (1992).

<sup>71</sup> See Hammer's (2002) chapters 3 to 6.

<sup>72</sup> For a discussion of the main bibliographical references to *θέμις* in relation to divine kingship, see Hammer (2002) 116-20.

<sup>73</sup> Hammer (2002) 121.

<sup>74</sup> See Hammer (2002) 51-7; 67-9. In contrast to modern discussions, which mainly study the gods in relation to human agency, ancient approaches view the gods as 'ethical, allegorical, or mistaken poetic creations': see Hammer (2002) 50.

<sup>75</sup> Hammer (2002) 51; 69-79.

<sup>76</sup> Hammer (2002) 69-70.

ranking of Achaian and Trojan society.’<sup>77</sup> In this light, Hammer (2002) effectively utilises the gods’ domain in support of his account on Iliadic human politics. Yet there remains an important space that demands further exploration: the study of the Olympian community as an example of a political community in its own right. This will be the subject of Chapter 4. Hammer’s (2002) representation of the enactment of rules with regard to Iliadic politics is fundamentally sound. However, his perception of what counts as political becomes rather too abstract: in the seventh chapter of his book, Hammer (2002) argues for the formation of a political community between the Achaeans and the Trojans, which is grounded in the political ethic of Achilles’s pity as emerged from the encounter between Priam and Achilles. As we shall see in Chapter 5, however, this community is not exemplified within the *Iliad*: the war will continue once the truce is over. Owing to this, Hammer (2002) seems to step away from his own conception of politics defined in his introduction as the reflection of the organisation of community life.

Elmer (2013), on the other hand, explores community life by focusing on the poetics of collective decision-making. To this end, he grounds his methodological approach in the following observation: although αἰνεῖν/αἴνεος can have different meanings within and beyond the Homeric epic, ἐπαινεῖν in Homer is used exclusively in the context of collective deliberation and communicating the community’s approval of a leader’s proposal.<sup>78</sup> This approval then transforms the leader’s proposal into action. Therefore, the ἐπαινεῖν scenario forms a speech act, which, in Elmer’s (2013) view, is linked to the significance of speech in connection to the social order in Indo-European societies.<sup>79</sup> Although it is true that decision-making in the *Iliad* is based on community consensus, Elmer’s (2013) methodology cannot always be effectively applied: absence of the verb ἐπαινεῖν – a verb that, following Elmer’s (2013) analysis, signifies the use of a formula expressing consensus – does not equate to the absence of collective decision-making. For the fact that a certain word may only be used to express a specific meaning does not deprive the language of its ability to exploit narrative dynamics in communicating the same meaning that a specific word would express were it used in the same context. An example of such a scenario is the Olympian decision-making process in *Iliad* 24, which shall be explored in Chapter 4.

---

<sup>77</sup> Hammer (2002) 72.

<sup>78</sup> Elmer (2013) 21-7.

<sup>79</sup> Elmer (2013) 48-55.

Elmer's (2013) methodology exploits principles from oral poetic theory, whereby the idea of collective decision-making is constructed out of Flaig's (1994) analysis of the Olympian assembly in *Iliad* 4.<sup>80</sup> That analysis aimed to illuminate the model of consensus in contrast with the model of majority rule. Still Elmer (2013) does not take advantage of the full potential of Flaig's (1994) approach.

From Flaig's (1994) general account of the principle of consensus ('Konsensprinzip'), two major points emerge that can inform this study. First, the disposition to yield ('Disposition des Nachgebens'); and secondly, the principle of deferred compensation ('das Prinzip der vertagten Gegenleistung').<sup>81</sup> Although Flaig (1994) does not *explicitly* underline the importance of emotion in relation to consensus, his analysis implies the involvement of emotional factors in the decision-making process: the *intensity* with which opposed opinions are defended is decisive regarding the outcome of the decision.<sup>82</sup> This is to say that individuals' emotional engagement in arguing for a view influences and shapes the consensus and any ensuing plan of action. The efficacy of the disposition to yield rests, in turn, on the principle of deferred compensation: one is now willing to yield to another's position on the grounds that the other would *also* be willing to yield, at some point in the future. Such a scenario requires that one's yielding is not perceived as weakness or defeat: loss of face must be prevented.<sup>83</sup> To stress the role of emotion that is at play: the one whose opinion prevails needs to ensure that the other does not feel excluded or isolated but is instead *incorporated* into the eventual course of action. Although Flaig's (1994) approach aligns with my argumentation – in terms of both consensus and reciprocity – we differ on two counts. First, it is unfortunate that Flaig (1994) chooses to treat Zeus's concession to Hera's request as if this concession were genuine: as we shall see in Chapter 4, Zeus's real intention is to provoke Hera. Secondly, Iliadic decision-making does *not* represent a primitive model as opposed to decision-making in the *Odyssey*, especially *Odyssey* 24 (*Od.* 24.419-70), which, on Flaig's developmental account (2013) XVIII, is viewed as the starting point for majority rule in decision-making processes (a practice, Flaig (2013) claims,

---

<sup>80</sup> Elmer (2013) 4-6.

<sup>81</sup> Flaig (1994) 15-17.

<sup>82</sup> Flaig (1994) 15: 'Wenn eine kleine Gruppe für die Option A eintritt, aber intensiv, eine größere dagegen für die Option B, aber nur halbherzig, dann wird der Konsens dadurch erreicht, daß die laue Mehrheit der intensiven Minderheit nachgibt; das kann sie, weil ihre Präferenz schwächer ist.'

<sup>83</sup> Flaig (1994) 16.

burgeoned thenceforth in classical and Hellenistic times).<sup>84</sup> The assembly of *Odyssey* 24 constitutes only an example of an assembly whose members do not succeed in arriving at any conclusion. This is because more than half of the assembly (*Od.* 24.464: ἡμίσεων πλείους) call themselves out of the assembly, that is, they refuse to make any discussion. This course of action can be, in turn, explained by considering the individuals' negotiations of honour. In *Odyssey* 22, Odysseus retrieves his honour by killing the suitors, who displayed disrespectful behaviour in his palace while he was away from Ithaca. Then, in *Odyssey* 24, the suitors' relatives want to take revenge on Odysseus, for they feel dishonoured after he killed their relatives. However, once one part of the assembly left the assembly, the remainder drew no conclusion. From this perspective, *Odyssey* 24 constitutes another example of how honour dynamics can create division; not an example of a decision-making based on majority rule as Flaig (2013) argues.

Among those scholars who have argued for the significance of group approval and collective decision-making in the *Iliad* is Cairns (2001a).<sup>85</sup> While reviewing the erroneous assumptions of Adkin's theory, Cairns (2001a) discusses conflict in Homeric society by drawing important interconnections between νέμεσις, αἰδώς, and τιμή. From Cairns's (2001a) account, two points are especially salient to the argument of the present thesis: first, the inclusiveness of the concept of τιμή; and secondly, the importance of the audience in awarding τιμή to members of the group in connection to the individuals' emotions of αἰδώς and νέμεσις. Both of these points emerge from Cairns's (2001a) demonstration that conflict is viewed negatively in Homeric society.<sup>86</sup> Therefore, continuation of conflict may cause the νέμεσις of the observer but also the νέμεσις of those parties directly involved in the quarrel (if they were able to take a step back and view things for themselves as external observers of their own

---

<sup>84</sup> On the role of consensus in decision-making processes in the classical and Hellenistic period, see Canevaro (2018), which includes a review of Flaig's (2013) approach.

<sup>85</sup> Note that the 'Affronts and Quarrels in the *Iliad*' was initially published in *Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar* 7 (1993) 155-67.

<sup>86</sup> In a similar vein to Cairns's (2001a) analysis, see Ulf's (1990b) article, 'Die Abwehr von internem Streit als Teil des politischen Programms der Homerischen Epen'. There, Ulf (1990b) questions two flawed assumptions regarding the Homeric epics: (a) that the characters of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* act as members of an aristocracy, linked to a powerful kingship, and (b) that the audience of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* consisted exclusively in this aristocracy. In noting these flawed assumptions, Ulf (1990b) demonstrates that the absence of conflict in Homeric society serves the interests of all society members, not only the prerogatives of the aristocrats. By implication, Homeric values are not those of a single part of the society. This observation may in turn suggest that the *Iliad's* and the *Odyssey's* audience cannot but be inclusive.

behaviour). Because the continuation of conflict constitutes an unseemly act, neither the pursuit of quarrelling merits honour nor the individual's withdrawal from arguing diminishes the individual's honour. That conflict is to be avoided is, in turn, linked to the individual's legitimate claim to honour: individuals should not act showing no αἰδώς towards the honour of others, thereby aiming to preserve and further their own interests. In effect, dishonouring the other may imply dishonouring yourself because the members of the community may refuse to grant honour to the individual attempting another's dishonor. Cairns's (2001a) analysis makes it clear that, far from being a zero-sum game, τιμή is an inclusive concept: there is no clear-cut dichotomy between values that promote competition and values that promote cooperation. Following his account, my analysis will underscore how these aspects of Homeric society are intimately bound up with *political* issues within Iliadic communities, and will broaden the discussion of the emotions involved in scenarios of rivalry as well as united action. In fact, the political significance of norms and values in connection to leadership and communal interests in the *Iliad* has been brought out in Allan's and Cairns's (2011) exploration of the conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles in the Achaean community. While my research draws on their account, it also widens their perspective. It does this by placing the emphasis on the import of emotion *vis-à-vis* communal norms while also including not only the Achaean but the Trojan and Olympian communities, as well as the kind of community that exists somewhere in-between the Achaeans and the Trojans.

This connection between emotions and communal norms is linked to the point already made in Section 1.1, viz. emotion does not merely have a personal and internal aspect but is also a social phenomenon. The treatment of emotion as a social phenomenon leads our discussion to the main contention of this thesis: emotions are an integral part of Iliadic politics. In Book V of his *Politics*, Aristotle considers the ways in which a πολιτεία can be preserved, namely, by preventing στάσις. To this end, Aristotle offers a theoretical discussion of the causes that lead to στάσις, with the disposition of individuals being among them (Arist. *Pol.* 1302a18-21). Thus individual psychology is fundamentally involved in the stability or instability of the constitution, that is, individual psychology forms a constitutive part of the constitution. The psychology of individuals, which contributes to στάσις, may in turn have just or unjust grounds (Arist. *Pol.* 1302a28-9). From this perspective, how

individuals feel towards the constitution is linked to issues of justice, viz. issues pertaining to the distribution of resources (*cf.* Arist. *Pol.* 1302a31-2). Aristotle's understanding of distributive justice is not to be understood in absolute terms, something that emerges from his notion of proportionality with regard to *στάσις*: wherever *στάσις* emerges, it does so owing to inequality, unless there is proportion among the unequal (Arist. *Pol.* 1301b26-7); or even if there is proportion among the unequal, the unequal may (unjustly) refuse to accept it. Following from this point, we must clarify three elements. First, the stability (or instability) of the constitution exists in an interdependent relation with the individuals' internalisation of the notion of distributive justice, which in turn implies the individuals' internalisation of social norms. Secondly, the notion of distributive justice, which implies a reference point, is to be linked with distribution in terms of rights and entitlements, *i.e.*, *τιμή*, the individual's fulfilment of a particular role within the community, which contributes towards that individual's status. Finally, the individuals' disposition, which propels them towards *στάσις* and causes them to negotiate norms and the distribution of resources, implies that individuals may in fact have different ideas about the qualities meriting *τιμή*, and the qualities to which the constitution should ascribe esteem. The latter emerges as a problem *only if* the constitution promotes exclusiveness rather than inclusiveness with regard to its values (*cf.* Arist. *Pol.* 1302a2-8).<sup>87</sup> From this perspective, the object of politics is the reconciliation of individuals' different claims to *τιμή*, namely, different claims to recognition and respect. That is to say, communities should be able to find ways to dispel tension arising from arguments regarding which criteria deserve prominence. Therefore, good leaders, when it comes to decision-making processes in deliberative contexts, *i.e.*, in institutions such as assemblies and councils, should be able to exploit communal mechanisms and norms in ways that are considerate about the emotions and claims of all people – not just their own.

Our understanding of emotion as a social phenomenon in tandem with our understanding of politics as shaped by individual psychology, particularly in relation

---

<sup>87</sup> According to this passage, unlike both the democrats, for whom what matters is equality based on freedom (the logic being that, because they are equal in something, then they should be equal in all respects), and the oligarchs or aristocrats, who desire equality based on wealth (the logic being that, because they are unequal in some respects, then they need to be unequal in all respects), Aristotle's position appears to be more inclusive: it is wrong for constitutions to consider only one type of equality given that the existing constitutions that do so are unstable.

to the notion of distributive justice, implies two crucial elements that sustain the argument of the present thesis, which I shall elaborate below: (a) the intimate link between emotions and norms, which the individuals internalise and enact in social interaction; (b) and the fundamental role of ‘the other’ and ‘the group’ with regard to emotions and norms. I discuss both points, while also explaining their intimate link to honour, namely, the individual’s fulfilment of a specific role within the community, which constitutes a key part in social and political dynamics as they play out in (Iliadic) decision-making processes within institutional contexts.

Emotion, as emphasised above, is to be perceived as a *socially embedded* phenomenon. According to the social and political theorist Elster, emotions and norms are mutually informed. One of the main contentions of Elster’s (1999) discussion is that emotions may operate as the medium through which norms regulate behaviour, viz. in order to move from the norms to action and behaviour, emotion is required. As Elster (1999) puts it, ‘social norms regulate behaviour through the twin mechanisms of shame in the subject and disgust or contempt in the observer’.<sup>88</sup> This is a pervasive pattern in instances involving honour dynamics: individuals seek to perform honourable acts, because if they do something *dishonouring*, then they *themselves* would feel ashamed while also incurring the contempt of others.<sup>89</sup> Thus the experience of certain emotions is bound up with certain norms. As we shall see in Chapter 2, for example, in the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles, Agamemnon violates the norm of the distribution of prizes according to which – Achilles repeatedly stresses – once the Achaeans have allocated the prizes, nobody can remove or redistribute them anew – especially not an individual, Agamemnon. Agamemnon’s breach of the norm provokes Achilles’s anger and contempt: he deprecates Agamemnon as a leader and eventually withdraws from the battlefield. On the other hand, by performing a dishonouring act towards Achilles, Agamemnon fails to feel shame for his violating behaviour, only evincing an interest in demonstrating his power.

Thus a norm is a generally applicable, desirable form of behaviour. Emotions come into play when norms are enforced or breached. That is, emotions *are about* norms, and because norms are shared by each member of a community, its members

---

<sup>88</sup> See Elster (1999) 154-5.

<sup>89</sup> See Elster (1999) 206.

can enforce the norms by imposing sanctions on the transgressor.<sup>90</sup> Thus, whether or not members of communities manage to live side-by-side successfully depends upon the individuals' internalisation of norms and the emotions they experience accordingly. Indeed, it is this process that creates a sense of normative order *vis-à-vis* social interactions.

The importance of the other in connection to emotions and norms becomes clear in Elster's (1999) exploration of La Rochefoucauld's concept of *amour-propre* or 'pridefulness' ('the love of oneself and of all things in terms of oneself'). This concept reflects the desire for esteem by others, as well as self-esteem: 'We are concerned both with the image others have of us and with our self-image.'<sup>91</sup> This distinction in turn implies another: deception and self-deception. As we shall see in Chapter 3, Hector, for example, is self-deceived in assuming that Zeus is on his side; an assumption resulting from his excessive eagerness to defeat the Achaeans in order to gain esteem, thereby failing to appreciate Polydamas's thoughtful advice. By implication, when individuals manage to properly regulate their behaviour in accordance with norms of esteem and self-esteem within a certain context, they manage to deliberate *wisely*. Sensible decisions are, in turn, all the more important when they are political, that is, they affect the community's wellbeing. To this end, the internalisation of the normative order mentioned above is of the utmost importance. This internalisation, however, does not amount to the internalisation of some fixed rules and practices, which are first defined and then performed: members of a community internalise shared practices, while also *enacting* them. In other words, individuals perform norms by observing them in quotidian practices, that is, they embody norms that are socially and historically situated.

The idea of a norm's enactment implies Bourdieu's (1977) concept of *habitus*. According to Bourdieu (1977), *habitus* is a system of dispositions offering the same range of possibilities (the 'homogeneity of habitus')<sup>92</sup> to all agents within a group in a negotiation context, thereby creating a sense of normality. To explain the process or the mechanism behind agents' internalisation of *habitus*, Bourdieu (1977) develops the notion of a 'feel for the game'. He invokes game metaphors, which stand as

---

<sup>90</sup> See Elster (1999) 145-6 and more broadly 145-8.

<sup>91</sup> See Elster (1999) 85.

<sup>92</sup> Bourdieu (1977) 80.

examples for social situations.<sup>93</sup> As the player unconsciously ‘just knows’ how to enact the rules of a game, so too agents within a social context have an embodied ‘feel’ for how they should behave. In enacting this ‘feel for the game’, an agent is able to interact with other agents, thereby successfully navigating and dominating within a particular social context. The notion of dominance results from Bourdieu’s (1977) claim that some agents are more effective at navigating social contexts than others, depending upon the ‘capital’<sup>94</sup> that they can bring to bear, an idea that is central to his account of *habitus*. Although Bourdieu’s (1977) notion of practice, the enactment of rules, and the notion of a ‘feel for the game’ are undoubtedly insightful to this study’s ends, his idea that dominance is the ultimate aim of all agents in social interactions can be challenged. As we shall see in Chapter 4, for example, Hephaestus succeeds in cooling the tension within the divine assembly of *Iliad* 1: he embodies the rules and expectations of how the gods should behave towards one another. That is, he respects both Zeus’s and Hera’s honour; he finds the correct feeling tone for narrating his experience of Zeus’s violence; and limping to pour the gods wine evinces a certain kind of behaviour that garners a positive response. The gods’ laughter shows that they, too, embody certain expectations and norms, which, in turn, *informs* the proper emotional atmosphere created by Hephaestus. Thus Hephaestus has succeeded in making *everyone* feel good, without necessarily *aiming* to take advantage of the others within the assembly as would be implied by a full application of Bourdieu’s (1977) account.

The centrality of the group in connection with the relation between emotions and norms – and their internalisation and enactment – does not merely lie in interplay, viz. members’ interactions with each other: this interaction creates a dynamic. But not only that: both the interaction and ‘the other’ influence and shape the individual’s identity. According to the philosopher Honneth, one can form and develop one’s identity ‘only when one has learned to view oneself from the normative perspective of one’s partners in interaction, as their social addressee’.<sup>95</sup> That is to say, there is an intimate relation between intersubjectivity and the formation of self-identity, *i.e.*, there is a kind of negotiation between an individual’s projection of themselves and the

---

<sup>93</sup> *Cf.*, for example, Bourdieu (1977) 58, where he compares matrimonial strategies to the strategies of a card player.

<sup>94</sup> For the notion of capital, see Bourdieu (1977) *passim*, especially 171-83.

<sup>95</sup> See Honneth (1995) 92.

others' recognition of this projection. From a different stance, the social psychologist Goffman offers a similar insight: human beings share a universal human nature but this nature 'is not a very human thing. By acquiring it, the person becomes a kind of construct, built up not from inner psychic propensities but from moral rules that are impressed upon him from without.'<sup>96</sup> Thus social norms shape the person's evaluation of themselves, as well as others, and form their experience and interpretation of emotions within a particular context. The encounter with the other is then part of the construct of the person. Indeed, because this encounter may take place continuously – in different circumstances and with different interactants – the self, their qualities, and the status of the person are neither permanent nor fixed: they are under constant contextual negotiation.

From this perspective, intersubjectivity implies a form of bidirectionality, namely, a reciprocal obligation emerging from the fact that identity is created only through interaction. In this regard, Gallagher's (2020) account that action emerges from interaction within a certain narrative is particularly useful: 'to the extent that we learn to act in specific ways, and that our actions aim at some goal, we learn to act in contexts of interaction, and we learn from others what counts as possible and preferred goals'.<sup>97</sup> By implication, the autonomy of an individual is mutually reliant upon the autonomy of the other, and this mutual reliance is instantiated within a certain context, which in turn suggests another autonomy, namely, 'that of the larger relational unit'.<sup>98</sup> For Gallagher (2020), interaction therefore implies 'responsivity': a form of *recognition* performed by social practices within certain narrative contexts.<sup>99</sup>

In this regard, from Honneth's (1995) account on social dynamics, we learn that the struggle for recognition is – and should be – at the centre of social conflict.<sup>100</sup> In particular, through an analysis of Hegel's philosophy, which he then supplements with Mead's social psychology, Honneth (1995) argues that community life is regulated by a need for mutual recognition. Therefore, what both parties in an opposition attempt to achieve is to provide evidence that they deserve recognition. Honneth (1995) associates this struggle for recognition with the idea of honour,

---

<sup>96</sup> Goffman (1969) 45.

<sup>97</sup> Gallagher (2020) 44.

<sup>98</sup> Gallagher (2020) 211.

<sup>99</sup> See Gallagher (2020) 187-211, especially 203-7.

<sup>100</sup> Note that Honneth's account of recognition (along with Fichte's and Ricoeur's) is considered and reviewed by Gallagher (2020).

which, following Hegel, he describes as ‘an affirmative relation-to-self that is structurally tied to the presupposition that each individual particularly receives intersubjective recognition’.<sup>101</sup> By implication, because τιμή is bidirectional insofar as it is both the claim to esteem as well as the esteem that an individual receives from others, τιμή can be understood as relevant to the model proposed by Honneth (1995). Thus, as we shall see in Chapter 2, for example, the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles is intimately linked to their τιμή from two perspectives: (a) Agamemnon demands a γέρας owing to his claim to τιμή, *i.e.*, his rank, while Achilles demands the maintenance of his γέρας owing to his claim to τιμή, *i.e.*, his prowess; (b) for both Agamemnon and Achilles, τιμή constitutes the recognition that each of them receives from the other(s).

In the context of intersubjectivity in relation to the construction of self-identity, Gallagher’s (2020) approach to interaction and ‘responsivity’, as well as Honneth’s (1995) approach to honour and recognition, take us back to Elster’s (1999) point regarding individuals’ concerns about their image in the minds of others and their self-image. Elster’s (1999) point is in turn linked to Goffman’s (1969) terminology of ‘face’,<sup>102</sup> and ‘demeanour’ and ‘deference’ – terminology that Scodel (2008) has successfully applied to the Homeric poems, thereby bringing out important aspects of Homeric ethics, honour, and status in social interaction contexts. Following Goffman’s (1969) definition, ‘Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes’.<sup>103</sup> A person’s face is shared by the group, at least when the person properly plays their role within a community. The person is emotionally attached to their face, which, along with the fluid nature of the person’s and the group’s participation in the formation of face, offers an explanation as to why the person considers their participation in interaction to be a commitment.<sup>104</sup> This commitment is in turn linked to the person’s tendency to project a consistent image of their face within different contexts. According to the rules of conduct, individuals are expected to have self-respect, while also considering the feelings of others. In so doing, they succeed in maintaining their own, as well as the other’s, face, thereby protecting and

---

<sup>101</sup> See Honneth (1995) 22-3.

<sup>102</sup> On this concept, see also Brown and Levinson (1987).

<sup>103</sup> Goffman (1969) 5. Goffman’s (1969) *Interaction Ritual* is a collection of six essays, most of which go back to Goffman’s work published in the 1950s.

<sup>104</sup> Goffman (1969) 6.

maintaining the relationship established during the interaction.<sup>105</sup> In other words, the rules of conduct, and the maintenance of everyone's face, imply demands that promote cooperative values, which form the person's expectations, *i.e.*, the way in which the person 'is morally constrained to conduct himself', and the others' obligations, *i.e.*, the way they 'are morally bound to act in regard to' the other person.<sup>106</sup> By implication, the violation of a rule of conduct may cause the loss of face for two individuals: for one individual that has an obligation and 'should have governed himself by the rule'; and for the other that has an expectation, and 'should have been treated in a particular way' owing to the governance of that rule.<sup>107</sup> In the context of obligations and expectations, individuals are expected to show deference, *i.e.*, to show gratitude to other individuals (although they may long for, and may be worthy of, deference, individuals are typically not permitted to attribute it to themselves; they are instead compelled to pursue and receive it from others, as well as to accord it to others). In this regard, van Wees's (1992) association to τιμή is important: taking into account Goffman's approach, van Wees (1992) points out that the use of the verb τιμῶ in Homeric evidence demonstrates that τιμᾶν means to show deference. In addition to showing deference, actors should comport themselves in accordance with 'demeanour', *i.e.*, to behave properly, when projecting their claims to esteem, which are brought to bear in social interaction.<sup>108</sup> This mechanism of attributing and pursuing deference, along with the qualities of demeanour, creates a dynamical, reciprocal framework in which individuals find themselves in an interdependent relationship, which forces them to cooperate with and be recognised by others.<sup>109</sup> In other words, this notion of interdependence is linked to Gallagher's (2020) point mentioned above, *viz.* that individuals can most properly be said to act when in social dynamism with others – they act by interacting, being mutually reliant upon 'the other'. To this end, the context and circumstances of action (understood dynamically) create meaning from that interaction, which is regulated by the norms and social and cultural practices.

Thus, when leaders take decisions, through institutional structures and mechanisms, they are expected to take these decisions by committing themselves to

---

<sup>105</sup> Goffman (1969) 10-11; 42.

<sup>106</sup> Goffman (1969) 49.

<sup>107</sup> Goffman (1969) 51.

<sup>108</sup> Goffman (1969) 77-81.

<sup>109</sup> See Goffman (1969) 56-76.

respectful and cooperative conduct with others (*e.g.*, Zeus’s stance in the assembly of *Iliad* 24 – see Chapter 4; Polydamas’s stance in the assembly of *Iliad* 18 – see Chapter 3), not through an excessive desire to maintain or save face (*e.g.*, Agamemnon’s stance in *Iliad* 1, *Iliad* 9, and *Iliad* 19 – see Chapter 2). They should not be simply focused on securing τιμή but should recognise others’ claims to τιμή, according them the esteem that they are accounted for (*e.g.*, Nestor’s intervention in the assembly of *Iliad* 1; Odysseus’s intervention in the assembly of *Iliad* 19 – see Chapter 2). Thus, while leaders may constantly negotiate their own interests, when enacting communal norms and making decisions, they should do so without edging out the interest of others and the community: they ought to consider and reflect upon not only their own emotions, but those of others, as well.

### 1.3 Outline of the work

In this chapter, I have discussed the terms that will be employed in the current thesis, engaging in interdisciplinary discourse, while situating my research in the context of Homeric scholarship. I have directed attention to the vagueness of the category of emotion, which can be studied as a cross-cultural phenomenon, especially when considering family-resemblance relations between languages. For example, τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη is only in a limited sense equivalent to emotion. Rather than reducing the range of phenomena included in this category, I take an inclusive approach: emotion is not merely an internal, biological event, but a social phenomenon, involving interaction between the world and the individual, who thinks, feels, and acts in holistic ways. I take emotion as a kind of script, which has a narrative within a specific context, interacting with norms. The ability of emotion to shape and be shaped by norms may ascribe to emotion a political role, and, *ipso facto*, to politics an emotional aspect. The community’s wellbeing demands, then, that political decision-making is considerate to emotional responses. To this end, the leaders should be able to enact communal norms in ways that recognise and respect individual rights and claims to τιμή in bidirectional terms.

Hereafter, Chapters 2-4 focus on negotiations within three distinct communities in the *Iliad* (the Achaean, Trojan, and Olympian communities). I explore these negotiations as they play out in institutional structures, such as the assembly and the council. Thereafter, Chapter 5 discusses negotiations between the Achaean and

Trojan communities, focusing on institutional practices and institutions, such as, oaths, ξενία, and ικεσία.

I argue that emotions are part of the political developments both in situations of conflict and in situations of cooperation, showing that communal norms, shaping and shaped by emotions, influence the structures of political institutions and institutional practices. While the ways in which Achaean and Trojan leaders enact communal rules in deliberative contexts may cause them to take decisions with disastrous consequences for the community, Olympian assemblies show that, although the gods' behaviour may create (emotional) tension, the negotiations of honour dynamics always result in the production of plans of action that serve the interests of *all* members of the community. Finally, negotiations between the Achaeans and the Trojans show that warring communities may find points of contact in respecting ethical values that transcend communities. These values may then create a basis for common coexistence. Indeed, while this common framework (which would rather include not just the Achaeans and the Trojans but any human being) is not employed to any great end within the *Iliad*, the *Iliad* still gifts to readers such an aspiration.



## 2. The Achaean political community

In this chapter, I explore variants of leadership style within the Achaean community, as marked by the leader's different attitudes in relation to experiencing and evaluating his own and others' emotions in the context of decision-making processes and political debates within political institutions such as the assembly, the council, and the embassy, as well as in other institutional structures (*e.g.*, the heralds' practice of exercising authority on Agamemnon's behalf), or personal interactions among the Achaean leaders (*e.g.*, the Achaean leaders' consolation of Achilles while in his quarters in *Iliad* 19). I show how communal norms shape the structures within the Achaean political community and further affect the way in which individuals think, feel, and act. One of the central norms is the obligation on the part of community members to respect the honour of the other individuals. Failure to respect one's honour is considered a slight that might cause feelings of anger and indignation in the slighted individual. Such anger is viewed as legitimate because it is reactive, *i.e.*, it falls into the fundamental norm of reciprocity. Still the normative nature of such anger is not viewed as giving a license to contradict other communal norms. That is to say, emotions play a crucial role in the way (Achaean) political institutions work, because they constitute responses to political issues and thereby influence political developments and decision-making processes. These emotional responses are (partly) legitimate, while political processes themselves also influence the individuals' emotional state. Viewed in this light, emotions may constitute a normative (as well as anti-normative) part of political structures and procedures. They are therefore important not only from an emotional but also from a political perspective. Emotions both form and are formed by the communal norms that shape the political setting.

Chapter 2 is divided into three sections. In the first section (2.1), I focus on the conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles and the decision-making process within the assembly of *Iliad* 1, showing that while there is a political mechanism that could, if employed correctly, solve this political issue, the way the individuals involved in the conflict choose to negotiate the communal norms leads to an outcome that is detrimental to communal interests. In Sections 2.2 and 2.3, I explore how the Achaeans attempt to leverage political structures and institutions in order to achieve reconciliation between Agamemnon and Achilles, thereby securing the interests of the

community. In the embassy of *Iliad* 9 (Section 2.2), the attempt at reconciliation fails to achieve its ends for emotional reasons, an attempt that resulted from a preceding assembly and council, which were rather unsuccessful, albeit not completely non-functional as the assembly in *Iliad* 1. In contrast to *Iliad* 9, reconciliation is achieved in *Iliad* 19 because, this time, leaders manage to wield political mechanisms effectively. Unlike Agamemnon's behaviour in *Iliad* 1 and Achilles's stance in *Iliad* 9, in the assembly of *Iliad* 19 both leaders heed sage advice and display (emotional) behaviour in line with communal norms, therefore promoting the good of the community (Section 2.3).

## 2.1 Honour and emotions: the conflict in the assembly of *Iliad* 1

In Section 2.1, I show how, within the context of the assembly in *Iliad* 1, honour dynamics, viz. the individuals' concern for the defence and maintenance of their τιμή, may lead to forms of passion and opposition, which breed strife with disastrous consequences for the community.<sup>110</sup> In particular, I seek to emphasise how the dispute over prizes (*i.e.*, emblems of honour) as shaped by the individuals' emotions precipitates a dispute over different claims to τιμή, in spite of the concept's inclusivity. The result of this dispute points towards Agamemnon's failure to secure the wellbeing of the community, for he does not listen to useful advice but instead insists on bending communal norms for his own ends, thereby failing to respect others' claims and rights.

In *Iliad* 1, Achilles summons the assembly<sup>111</sup> so that the Achaeans can consult a seer to explain the reason for the plague afflicting them, suggesting a remedy for it (1.53-67). Both the narrator (1.9-12; 1.43-52) and Calchas's divination (1.93-100) make it clear that the mass destruction of the Achaean army is owing to Agamemnon's outright rejection to accept Chryses's supplication and exchange Chryseis's with ransom (1.26-32). This rejection is linked to Agamemnon's failure to

---

<sup>110</sup> On the relationship between leaders and λαοί, see, for example, Ulf (1990a) 99-105; Taplin (1992) 46-50; van Wees (1992) 31-6; Donlan (1999) 18-21; Haubold (2000) 52-68; Hammer (2002) 144-69.

<sup>111</sup> In calling the assembly, Achilles does not violate any norm at the expense of Agamemnon's domain of exercising authority: Hera, who clearly supports the Achaeans (see Chapter 4), and therefore would not initiate any offence against the expedition's leader, urges Achilles's act (*cf.* 1.54-5). Note also that in *Iliad* 19, Achilles calls the assembly (again following divine motivation (*cf.* his mother's exhortation at 19.34) while his intentions to leave the conflict behind are indisputable (see Section 2.3.1 below).

honour Chryses both as a priest and a father (1.11-12; 1.14; 1.28-31;<sup>112</sup> 1.94), which is further linked to Agamemnon's disregard of communal norms from (at least) two perspectives. First, he does not consider the fact that Chryses's address is made to the community (1.15) and so the Achaeans' consent (1.22) must be weighted. By implication, he is wrong to take a unilateral decision on a political matter. Secondly, he rejects the mechanisms of exchange and reciprocity: Chryses might not belong to the Achaean community;<sup>113</sup> nevertheless, all the Achaeans acknowledge his status as a priest (1.23) and therefore the requirement of accepting his request.

The first decision (of the Achaean community) in the *Iliad* already reveals how emotions influence the political setting and decision-making process.<sup>114</sup> First, the Achaeans' consensus is expressed through their emotions (the Achaeans *approve of* Chryses's request *enthusiastically* – cf. 1.22: πάντες ἐπευφήμησαν Ἀχαιοί). Secondly, this consensus pertains to the normative emotions that the Achaeans (should) have towards Chryses (they agree to *respect* the priest – cf. 1.23: αἰδεῖσθαι θ' ἱερῆα). Next, Agamemnon's rejection of Chryses's offer is linked to his (undue) discontent with (and aggressive disposition to (1.24-5)) what may result from accepting Chryses's request, viz. the exchange of his γέρας (gift of honour) with ransom. Agamemnon's aggression comes to the fore through the repetitive negatives in his speech.<sup>115</sup> Indeed, despite the absence of clear emotional language explicitly denoting Agamemnon's anger, Agamemnon's reprimand that Chryses should not make him angry (1.32) already signifies his anger.<sup>116</sup> As a result, Agamemnon's emotional state isolates him from the rest of the community, shaping the Achaeans' eventual decision towards Chryses's request, a political matter.

Agamemnon's (emotional) stance towards Chryses creates a disastrous situation for the Achaeans, which can only be rectified if Chryseis is returned to her

<sup>112</sup> Agamemnon announces to Chryses that his staff and the gods' wreaths will not help him, while Chryseis will become Agamemnon's companion in his palace. In this regard, Kakridis (1971) 131 notes that the daughter's removal from home is linked to the father's utmost pain.

<sup>113</sup> On Iliadic negotiations between different communities and between individuals from different communities, see Chapter 5.

<sup>114</sup> On Iliadic decision-making process, see, for example, Carlier (1984) 182-7; Drews (1983); Schofield (1986); Flaig (1994); Raaflaub (1997) 643; Hammer (2002) 127-43; Allan and Cairns (2011); Elmer (2013); Kelly (2017).

<sup>115</sup> Cf. 1.26 'μή σε ... κηχίω': 'do not let me catch you'; 1.28; 'μή νύ τοι οὐ χραίσμη σκῆπτρον καὶ στέμμα θεοῦ': 'lest staff and wreath of the god be useless to you'; 1.29; 'τὴν δ' ἐγὼ οὐ λύσω': 'I will not release her'; 'μή μ' ἐρέθιζε': 'do not irritate me'; 1.32.

<sup>116</sup> Scodel (2008) 127.

father without ransom (1.98-100). Thus, because Agamemnon disregarded the norms in the first place, thereby endangering his community, to redress communal interests he is now asked to return Chryseis without any compensation for the concession. That is, in rejecting Chryses's appeal, Agamemnon disturbed the norms of reciprocity, which is linked to his suffering a negation of reciprocity (*cf.* his threats to remove the γέρας of another leader (see below); his announcement of the grandiose offer of gifts towards Achilles in the council of *Iliad* 9 (see Section 2.2); his readiness to return to the battlefield, thereby disregarding the reconciliation's protocol in the assembly of *Iliad* 19 (see Section 2.3)). Like Agamemnon's attitude towards Chryses, isolation and aggression shape Agamemnon's stance towards Calchas as well.<sup>117</sup> Like what happened after Chryses's request, so too after Calchas's intervention Agamemnon focuses on himself, taking the message communicated to the Achaeans in personal terms,<sup>118</sup> going further to reproach Calchas for what he revealed to him after his divinations (1.106-15).<sup>119</sup> In so doing, he tries to justify his previous disregard of the norms, thereby saving face,<sup>120</sup> passing over the glaring error of dishonouring Chryses, and avoiding responsibility for the corollary of this decision.<sup>121</sup> Yet, even when he comes to see that the interests of the community will be served by agreeing to return

<sup>117</sup> *Cf.* the narrator's explicit emotional language at 1.103-4 (ἀχνύμενος· μένεος δὲ μέγα φρένες ἀμφιμέλαινα/ πίμπλαντ'; raging; and his [*i.e.*, Agamemnon's] heart, darkened on either side, fills with great fury), as well as the conceptualisation of φρένες as a container full of anger at 1.103-4. Note that the darkness of φρένες (*cf.* ἀμφιμέλαινα) may be linked to the intensity of the emotion and its physiology: the experience of the emotion is linked to the blood circulation; *cf.* Latacz (2002) 65 on 1.103. In this connection, see also Arist. *De an.* 405b6-9: some philosophers hold the ψυχή to be blood, because τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι – being the most representative element of the ψυχή – owes its existence to the nature of blood. Regarding Agamemnon's emotional state, note furthermore the comparison of the glance of Agamemnon's eyes with the fire (*cf.* 1.104: ὄσσε δὲ οἱ πυρὶ λαμπετόωντι εἴκτην; and his two eyes shining like fire), a comparison that, along with a further reference to Agamemnon's eyes, communicates his aggression (*cf.* 1.105: Κάλχαντα πρότιστα κάκ' ὀσόμενος; first of all, looking at Calchas in a bad manner). On the concept of gaze in the *Iliad*, see Constantinidou (2019). For further bibliographical references, see also below.

<sup>118</sup> *Cf.* the use of the first-person singular perspective: μοι (1.106); ἔθελον (1.112); ἐγώ (1.111); βούλομαι (1.112); προβέβουλα (1.113). Contrast the use of the third-person plural perspective: σφιν (1.110: ὥς δὴ τοῦδ' ἔνεκά σφιν ἐκηβόλος ἄλγεα τεύχει'), where Agamemnon excludes himself from the rest of the Achaeans when referring to the plague.

<sup>119</sup> Lines 1.106-7 (ἄντι κακῶν, οὐ πῶ ποτέ μοι τὸ κρήγυρον εἶπες./ αἰεὶ τοι τὰ κάκ' ἐστὶ φίλα φρεσὶ μαντεύεσθαι': 'seer of evil, you have never so far told me a good thing. Always the evil is dear to your heart to divine') may refer to Iphigeneia's sacrifice in Aulis. On this, see, for example, Reinhardt (1961). Note that, in both cases, Calchas merely correctly interprets the will of the gods. Therefore, Agamemnon's reproach is unfair. On the issue regarding whether the audience is aware of this and other allusions in the *Iliad*, see, *e.g.*, Scodel (2002).

<sup>120</sup> On the concept of face, see the discussion in Chapter 1, Section 1.2. On the concept of face in Homer, see Scodel (2008) *passim*, especially 6-16; 20-1; 37; 51; 100; 111; 127-9; 138; 140; 155.

<sup>121</sup> Denying responsibility while attempting to save face appears to be a recurring strategy of Agamemnon's leadership style; *cf.* Agamemnon's apology in *Iliad* 19, which is the strongest attempt at blame-shifting in Homer. On this, see Scodel (2008) 117-25. See also Section 2.3.2 below.

Chryseis to his father (1.116), he demands that the Achaeans grant him another γέρας: it would be inappropriate, he says, if he were the only one to remain without a prize (1.118-19). In this regard, note Achilles's words at 1.128-9, which suggest that Agamemnon makes a normative claim:

‘τριπλῆ τετραπλῆ τ’ ἀποτίσομεν, αἶ κέ ποθι Ζεὺς  
δῶσι πόλιν Τροίην εὐτείχεον ἐξαλαπάξαι’.

‘Thrice and four times we will repay you if ever Zeus grants us to plunder the well-walled city, Troy’.

However, following Achilles's argument once again (*cf.* 1.123-6), Agamemnon's claim constitutes a violation of communal norms. For, if the replacement of Agamemnon's γέρας takes place at this very moment, as Agamemnon suggests (*cf.* 1.118: ‘αὐτίχ’; ‘immediately’), it would incorporate an illicit act, *viz.* the recollection and redistribution of the prizes.

The rules regarding the gift distribution are clear.<sup>122</sup> First, there are two types of booty: the prize or gift of honour (γέρας), and the share or portion (μοῖρα). Once the booty is gathered, Agamemnon picks his γέρας first (*cf.* 2.228; 8.289), and then gives prizes to the other leaders (*cf.* 9.328-34). The same likewise applies to the shares. Agamemnon significantly influences both forms of distribution. However, while the distribution of the shares takes place in his own name, the distribution of the prizes occurs on behalf of the community (*cf.* 1.123-6; 1.162; 1.276).<sup>123</sup> Moreover, once the booty is distributed, Agamemnon has no right to redistribute it anew.<sup>124</sup>

Despite Achilles's pointing out that there is a shortage of prizes for distribution, Agamemnon is unwilling to wait to be accorded a greater number of rewards after the Fall of Troy (1.128-9), being determined to replace his γέρας *immediately* (*cf.* 1.135-9; 1.181-7).<sup>125</sup> The execution of this objective (*cf.* 1.322-6; 1.346-8) shows that, rather than rectifying his previous mistake regarding Chryses's offer, Agamemnon makes yet another one. There are two elements closely linked to

---

<sup>122</sup> For the mechanisms and principles of the distribution of the booty, see van Wees (1992) 299-310.

<sup>123</sup> See van Wees (1992) 306-10.

<sup>124</sup> Van Wees (1992) 309-10. Contrast Wilson (2002) 36, who claims that Agamemnon has the right to redistribute the booty, referring to Donlan (1982) 153; Donlan (1993) 160 in support of her argument; see Wilson (2002) 36 with n. 109.

<sup>125</sup> For an analysis of the conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles viewed as a male competition through women, see Felson and Slatkin (2004) 93-7.

one another that explain, but do not legitimise, Agamemnon's violating behaviour. First, what γέρας represents in the Achaean community. Secondly, how Agamemnon perceives Achilles's suggestion that Agamemnon wait until later to replace his γέρας.

What is at stake in the matter of the prizes and their distribution pertains to the hero's τιμή within the community. An example that clearly shows the connection between γέρας and τιμή is Achilles's response to Ajax's speech in *Iliad* 9: Agamemnon's behaviour towards Achilles makes the latter feel that he has been treated as if he were a migrant in the community without honour (9.648: 'Ἀτρείδης, ὡς εἴ τιν' ἀτίμητον μετανάστατην').<sup>126</sup> Since the removal of γέρας is linked to the offence against τιμή, by implication, then, γέρας functions as a symbol of someone's τιμή, constituting a way of recognising someone's τιμή. Moreover, the use of common language with respect to both concepts is another element that connects γέρας to τιμή. At 1.276 and 1.278, Nestor refers to both terms using the verbs δίδωμι (to give) and μείρομαι (to obtain one's share of), respectively (cf. 1.276: 'ἀλλ' ἔα ὡς οἱ πρῶτα δόσαν γέρας υἱέσ Αἰχαιῶν': 'but let it as the sons of the Achaeans first gave him the prize'; 1.278: 'ἐπεὶ οὐ ποθ' ὁμοίης ἔμμορε τιμῆς': 'because you have never obtained the same share of honour'). The literal use of the verb δίδωμι (prizes can be enumerated) and the metaphorical use of the verb μείρομαι (honour or esteem are intangible goods) show that there is a distribution of countable goods, such as prizes, as well as a distribution of intangible goods, such as honour or esteem. However, the use of common language, viz. the language of exchange and commodity, describes a kind of economic distribution connecting both cases.<sup>127</sup>

γέρας is, then, a special share that acknowledges status and confers esteem, without thereby being *simply* material or physical.<sup>128</sup> When Agamemnon rejects

---

<sup>126</sup> For a discussion of the notion of μετανάστης, see Hammer (2002) 94-5.

<sup>127</sup> Cf. Finley's (1956) notion of 'embedded economy', which suggests that there is no clear-cut distinction between economic distribution and distribution of esteem. Cf. also Donlan (1997) 649-51. Note that the idea of an economy of esteem exists still today. See, for example, Brennan and Pettit (2005).

<sup>128</sup> Thus τιμή may be a property of material goods without being a material good itself. Regarding the fact that τιμή is not always expressed in material or physical terms, see, for example, lines 9.401-16, where Achilles's approach to life shows that material goods are not necessarily connected to τιμή, for goods such as life cannot be compensated through material objects. (On the scholarship's debate as to whether Achilles refuses the heroic world or expresses an aspect of it, see Gill (1996) 138-41, and Section 2.2.2 below; cf. also Scodel (2008) 152 n. 38.) Even when τιμή is expressed in material terms, the objects acquire a symbolic function. See, for example, Sarpedon's words towards Glaucus at 12.310-12, where there is a comparison or association between a lavish meal and τιμή which is directed to the gods. For further examples of indicators of honour, see Cairns (2011a) 29-30. On the importance

Chryses's offer, he then rejects maintaining his τιμή by exchanging Chryseis for an immense ransom, because he prefers Chryseis to Clytemnestra (1.113), thereby being unable to foresee<sup>129</sup> that declining Chryses's offer is a poor decision, which will ultimately cause him to lose τιμή. He only comes to realise this loss when he has to return Chryseis, receiving nothing in exchange, reprimanding Calchas while rejecting Achilles's proposal by interpreting Achilles's reminder of the communal norms as an attempt by Achilles to deceive him (*cf.* 1.131-4). In Agamemnon's view, Achilles's proposal constitutes a degradation of his honour in favour of Achilles's, since, unlike Achilles, he will have to be deprived of his prize, *i.e.*, of the symbol of his τιμή. Although he recognises the social, political, and religious necessity of the return of Chryseis to her father, and engages the community as a collective group in proposing the plan of action and organising the Achaeans' mission for Chryseis's return at 1.140-4,<sup>130</sup> Agamemnon ultimately turns to the second-person singular perspective (*cf.* 1.147: 'ἰλάσσει') when asking Achilles to appease Apollo.<sup>131</sup> Thus he is not only unwilling to drop his initial request, but, in being sarcastic, he implicitly shifts responsibility for his own grave error to Achilles.

Achilles's proposal may cause Agamemnon to lose face for the time being. However, as discussed above, there is no other legitimate way for Agamemnon to proceed but to accept Achilles's proposal, thereby remaining without γέρας until the Fall of Troy. Because Agamemnon is unable to trust Achilles, but perceives his proposal as an attempt at deception (the aim of which is to reduce his τιμή) and, because his τιμή is linked to his status within the community (*cf.* 1.278-9),<sup>132</sup> Agamemnon feels that his leadership is subverted. Therefore, rather than recognising

---

of symbolic deference to material goods for the hero, see van Wees (1992) 61-125. Contrast Finley (1956) 125-36, who considers τιμή only in connection with material evidence. On Finley's broader understanding of τιμή, see also *ibid.* 28-9 and 119-22. For a criticism of Finley's (1956) approach, see van Wees (1992); van Wees and Fisher (2015) 16-17.

<sup>129</sup> For Agamemnon's inability to be perceptive and insightful, *cf.* Achilles's words at 1.343: 'οὐδέ τι οἶδε νοῆσαι ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω'; 'he [*i.e.*, Agamemnon] is not able to see forwards and backwards at the same time'.

<sup>130</sup> Note the inclusiveness of Agamemnon's speech through the use of the first-person plural: 'μεταφρασόμεθα' (1.140), 'ἐρύσσομεν' (1.141), 'ἀγείρομεν' (1.142), 'θειόμεν' (1.143), 'βήσομεν' (1.144).

<sup>131</sup> On the abrupt changes in Agamemnon's mood within this speech (1.131-47), which is linked to Agamemnon's volatile character, see Martin (1989) 115-16. On Agamemnon's speech style in general, see *ibid.* 113-19. Note that the verb ἰλάσσομαι (to appease) in all other cases in *Iliad* 1 takes as its subject the Achaeans as a group (*cf.* 1.110; 1.386; 1.444; 1.472). On Agamemnon, see Taplin (1990).

<sup>132</sup> The association between Agamemnon's rank and τιμή at 1.278-9, along with the reference to the different qualities of both leaders at 1.280-1, implies also the association between Achilles's prowess and τιμή. For Nestor's intervention in lines 1.275-84, see more details below.

and accepting the legitimacy of Achilles's proposal, he is only interested in establishing authority, turning the dispute over the prizes into a dispute over rank and status (1.181-7):<sup>133</sup>

‘... ἀπειλήσω δέ τοι ὧδε·  
ὡς ἔμ’ ἀφαιρεῖται Χρυσήϊδα Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων,  
τὴν μὲν ἐγὼ σὺν νηί τ’ ἐμῇ καὶ ἐμοῖς ἐτάροισι  
πέμψω, ἐγὼ δέ κ’ ἄγω Βρισηίδα καλλιπάρρηον  
αὐτὸς ἰὼν κλισίηνδε, τὸ σὸν γέρας, ὄφρ’ εὖ εἰδῆς,  
ὅσσον φέρτερός εἰμι σέθεν, στυγέη δὲ καὶ ἄλλος  
ἴσον ἐμοὶ φάσθαι καὶ ὁμοιωθήμεναι ἄντην.’

‘... And I will threaten you as follows; as Phoibos Apollo is taking away from me Chryseis, who I shall send back with my ship and my comrades, so I shall carry off Briseis the beautiful-cheeked, your own prize, going myself into your hut, so that you may know well, how much better I am than you, and anyone else may be afraid to say that he is equal to me and match himself against me.’

The formulation of such threats shows that Agamemnon grounds his authority in the people's intimidation, while also exploiting his own anger.<sup>134</sup> This practice of Agamemnon's is already foregrounded through Calchas's appeal to Achilles (1.74-83): Calchas's request for an oath (1.76), seeking to ensure Achilles's defence (1.77; *cf.* also 1.83) over him, does not imply his mistrust of Achilles. It rather underscores his fear of Agamemnon's anger (*cf.* 1.78-83). That is, owing to his fear of Agamemnon's emotional reaction and its consequences upon him, Chryses seeks to protect himself by resorting to Achilles's support. Even if Agamemnon's indignation

---

<sup>133</sup> See Allan and Cairns (2011) 115. *Cf.* also Hammer (2002) 81-2. *Pace* Pucci's account (1998), who, based on 1.181-7, argues that word and power coincide, see Hammer (2002) 84-6: 'Through the first nine books, the *Iliad* traces the consequences of Agamemnon's leadership, revealing a seemingly paradoxical situation in which Agamemnon's exercise of authority leaves him without power.' See below, especially Section 2.3.2.

<sup>134</sup> *Cf.* van Wees (1992) 94: 'Threats and violence are used to protect the reputation of those whose personal qualities are already regarded as superior or whose force is greater'. Note Achilles's threat at 1.302-3: he will kill anyone who tries to remove anything from his property, following Briseis's removal. *Cf.* also Achilles's threats to leave Troy and return to Greece (1.169; 9.357-61). However, unlike Agamemnon, Achilles does not carry out these threats: see 9.619, where he states that the Myrmidons will decide the next day whether to return home or remain in Troy; 9.650-3, where he announces that he will not return to the battlefield until Hector reaches the Myrmidons' ships. On Achilles's stance, see below. On the fact that fear cannot sufficiently replace willing obedience (for once the fear dies down, so does compliance), see Hammer (2002) 83-4. *Cf.* also the saying of Bias of Priene: 'πείσας λαβέ, μὴ βιασάμενος ... ἔξεις ... λόγῳ πειθῶ'; 'take by persuading, not by being violent ... you will earn ... persuasion with *logos*'. See Stob. *Flor.* 3.1.172a.

at Calchas is limited, since he realises that he has no choice but to return Chryseis (*cf.* 1.116-17), Agamemnon's threats towards Achilles (1.181-7; *cf.* also 1.137-9) confirm Calchas's fear of the consequences of Agamemnon's anger. If Agamemnon's distrust of Achilles (1.131-4) only implies Agamemnon's aggressive disposition while negotiating Chryseis's immediate replacement, then the comparison between the deprivation of his γέρας resulting from Apollo's anger (*cf.* 1.43-7; 1.64; 1.75; 1.97-100) and Agamemnon's threat to remove Briseis (*cf.* 1.181-7) makes Agamemnon's anger indisputable.<sup>135</sup> Emotions are thus constitutive of Agamemnon's authority, shaping the decision-making within the assembly, while his fixation on his τιμή and status highlights his sensitivity regarding his role as the expedition's leader.

However, this sensitivity is triggered or reinforced by Achilles's sharp criticism of Agamemnon's failure to distribute esteem according to justice.<sup>136</sup> Because Agamemnon displays unjust behaviour, Achilles threatens to leave Troy (1.169-71), thereby calling into question the underlying foundation of the expedition. Indeed, he posits that the Achaeans will be unable to continue *willingly* obeying Agamemnon, because Agamemnon fails to appreciate their support (1.150-60; *cf.* also 9.337-45).<sup>137</sup> The issue of the Achaeans' willing obedience to Agamemnon's leadership, as revealed through Achilles's speech (*cf.* 1.150: 'πῶς τίς τοι πρόφρων ἔπεσιν πείθεται Ἀχαιῶν'),<sup>138</sup> foregrounds another fundamental discrepancy of Agamemnon's

<sup>135</sup> On Agamemnon's aggression towards Achilles, *cf.* also his imposing tone through the use of the imperative at 1.173 ('φεῦγε'), his reference to his feelings of hatred at 1.176 ('ἔχθιστος δέ μοι ἐσσι διοτρεφέων βασιλῆων': 'to me, you are the most hated of all the kings, cherished by Zeus's'), as well as his attempt to degrade Achilles's status by presenting him as a hawkish character whose exceptional fighting abilities are only owing to his divine origin (1.177-8). While Agamemnon implicitly recognises Achilles's input in the burgeoning of his own τιμή, he still disregards this input when arguing that he has other fellows on his side to contribute towards his τιμή (1.174-5). *Cf.* also the narrator's explicit reference to Agamemnon's anger at 1.247 (Ἀτρείδης δ' ἐτέρωθεν ἐμήνιε: the son of Atreus on the other side was still wroth). To Agamemnon's disparaging reference to Achilles's divine parentage (1.178), contrast Nestor's reference at 1.280, which associates Achilles's divine status with his legitimate claim to τιμή.

<sup>136</sup> Although Achilles contributes to enhancing Agamemnon's wealth (1.171; 9.328-32) and τιμή (1.158-9), Agamemnon threatens to remove Achilles's γέρας (1.138; 1.161; 1.184). In fact, in Achilles's view, reciprocity and justice are already absent in the initial distribution of booty, because there is no equivalence between achievements on the battlefield and the apportioning of booty (1.163-8; 9.315-20). In this regard, see also Section 2.2.2 below. This complaint does not imply Achilles's challenge of communal norms, but underlines the extent of Agamemnon's unfairness; *cf.* Gill (1996) 138-9. Contrast Balot (2001) 65, who agrees with Finley's understanding of τιμή (against Finley, see above) and presents Achilles as if he were 'to exclude Agamemnon from the Greek ethical community [and] represent his own dispute with Agamemnon as an issue of general concern among the troops'. Agamemnon's and Achilles's conflict is intimately linked to Agamemnon's decision to violate the protocol of prize distribution, and, as such, it is an issue that matters to the community.

<sup>137</sup> Contrast Wees (1992) 122. See Chapter 1, Section 1.2.

<sup>138</sup> See Hammer (1997) 4 ff.; Taplin (1992) 56-7.

leadership style: although he recognises the interrelation between command and persuasion for his own part,<sup>139</sup> Agamemnon fails to do the same when instead relying on threats to coerce obedience from others (1.181-7 cited above; *cf.* also 1.137-9; 1.161). Moreover, Calchas's request for Achilles's *willing* support (1.77: *πρόφρων*)<sup>140</sup> before Agamemnon is another element that attests the importance of consent vis-à-vis obedience.<sup>141</sup> Thus, while underlining Agamemnon's injustice, Achilles makes a moral as well as a political argument: fairness demands that individuals treat others by following the 'golden rule' (*viz.* by treating others the way they wish to be treated themselves). Achilles's criticism of Agamemnon's failure to behave justly is bound up with the latter's failure to experience the expected emotions towards his φίλοι. In pointing out Agamemnon's lack of αἰδώς (1.149: 'ἀναιδείη ἐπιειμένε'; 1.158: 'ὦ μέγ' ἀναιδέες'; *cf.* also 9.372),<sup>142</sup> Achilles expresses dissatisfaction or frustration with his failure to respect his status or to count his criticism as consequential.<sup>143</sup> Agamemnon's lack of αἰδώς is emphasised by his greed (*cf.* 1.149; 1.160-8; 1.230-1), preventing him from recognising others' rights. In this regard, the understanding of αἰδώς as shame and respect shows that, in both distinct usages, individuals are focused on their own status.<sup>144</sup> However, the lack of αἰδώς does not mean that individuals are *not* focused on themselves. Instead it implies that they are focused on themselves too much. The idea of excessively concentrating on oneself connects Agamemnon's ἀναιδείη not only with greed but also with ὕβρις: as with ἀναιδείη, so with ὕβρις individuals act or speak offensively. For, while aiming to feel pleasure by appearing superior, they end up disregarding the status of others.<sup>145</sup> Agamemnon's

<sup>139</sup> *Cf.* Agamemnon's rejection of Achilles's proposal: 1.134: 'κέλει δέ με τήνδ' ἀποδοῦναι'; 'and you command me to return her'; 1.132: 'οὐδέ με πείσεις'; 'neither you will convince me'.

<sup>140</sup> 1.76-7: 'σὺ δὲ σύνθεο καὶ μοι ὄμοσον/ ἢ μὲν μοι πρόφρων ἔπεσιν καὶ χερσὶν ἀρήξειν'; 'promise and swear before me that you will *willingly* defend me by words and deeds'.

<sup>141</sup> Note that Achilles's affirmative response to Calchas's request (1.85-91) marks Achilles's commitment to defending the interests of the community, while possibly hinting at the antagonism between Agamemnon and Achilles.

<sup>142</sup> On the concept of αἰδώς in general, see Cairns (1993) *passim*. That Agamemnon and Achilles are obliged to accord αἰδώς to each other, because they belong to the same group of φίλοι, see Cairns (1993) 92.

<sup>143</sup> On the connection between αἰδώς and criticism, see Cairns (1993) 2-3. On the connection between the garment metaphor and the conceptualisation of emotion, see Cairns (2016); particularly for the utterance 'ἀναιδείη ἐπιειμένε' (1.149), see *ibid.* 36-8. Agamemnon's lack of αἰδώς is also expressed in the metonymy (or synecdoche) at 1.159 ('κυνῶπα'), as well as in Achilles's reference at 1.225 ('κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων'). On the connection between κύνωψ and ἀναιδείη, see Latacz (2002) 80; Pulleyn (2000) 169.

<sup>144</sup> See Cairns (1993) 2-3.

<sup>145</sup> On Aristotle's definition of ὕβρις, see *Rh.* 1378b24-30. For a modern discussion of the concept, see Fisher (1992), with Cairns (1996).

disregard of Achilles's τιμή in order to indulge himself and impose power (*cf.* 1.173-87) is classified by Achilles as ὕβρις at 1.203 ('ἵνα ὕβριν ἴδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονος'; 'so that you may see Agamemnon's *hybris*'), which is corroborated by Athena at 1.214 ('ὕβριος εἵνεκα τῆσδε'; 'owing to this *hybris*').<sup>146</sup>

Owing to Achilles's indignation regarding Agamemnon's transgression (which is committed against his status), the former's response towards the latter's slight is shaped by anger.<sup>147</sup> Achilles's emotional response is first expressed in bodily terms through the narrator's description of Achilles's glaring look towards Agamemnon (*cf.* 1.148).<sup>148</sup> After Agamemnon has gone as far as to completely devalue Achilles's stature within the community (1.173-87), Achilles suffers an intense emotional state such that he even considers killing Agamemnon (*cf.* 1.188-94; 1.202-5).<sup>149</sup> Achilles ultimately musters his composure, thereby refraining from murdering Agamemnon.<sup>150</sup> Still Agamemnon's ὕβρις does justify Achilles's offensive behaviour towards him: Athena explicitly exhorts Achilles to verbally attack Agamemnon (1.211-14), and we see Achilles following Athena's advice in nullifying

---

<sup>146</sup> Athena's attribution of ὕβρις to Agamemnon's act is objective. This can be explained through Athena's obedience to Hera's request, the latter of whom is concerned about both Agamemnon and Achilles: *cf.* 1.194-6; 1.208-9.

<sup>147</sup> For the connection between Aristotle's definition of anger, viz. anger as a response to an unwarranted slight (*Rh.* 1378a31-3), Homeric anger, and the English concept of anger, see Cairns (2003) 17-18. The prototypical case of χόλος in Homer, which also holds largely for Aristotle's prototypical case of ὀργή, overlaps significantly with the American English scenario of anger proposed by Lakoff and Kövecses (1987), as well as with the prototypical scenario of anger in other languages (see Kövecses 2000). For Homeric cases in which anger is not to be understood as the individual's reaction towards unwarranted slight, *i.e.*, for Homeric cases which are less linked to the prototypical scenario of Aristotle's anger, *cf.* Achilles's anger towards Hector after Patroclus's death. On this matter, see Chapter 5. For a discussion of Muellner's (1996) and Walsh's (2005) accounts on Homeric anger, see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.

<sup>148</sup> On the utterance ὑπόδρα ἰδών as an indication of the individual's anger, see Holoka (1983); Cairns (2003) 42-4. For a discussion about 'sharp glances' in Homer, see Lonsdale (1989). For other non-verbal expressions of anger, see, *e.g.*, Cairns (2003) 40-9; Cairns (2001c), which particularly focuses on the connection between anger and the use of veils or other similar garments. For a broad discussion of the role of eyes as an essential part of social interaction in ancient Greek culture, see Cairns (2005).

<sup>149</sup> Note that the deliberative process by which Achilles attempts to manage his distress and anger is expressed both in physical and psychic terms; *cf.* the use of the terms ἦτορ (1.188) and στήθεσσιν (1.189) as well as the expression κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν (1.193). For a discussion of this passage and relevant bibliographical references regarding the 'psychic organs', see Chapter 1, Section 1.1. On the term ἄχος, which is used at 1.188 and denotes the mental distress that among other emotions is also linked to anger, see E.M. Voigt in *Lfgre* s.v. ἄχος i.1774-8; contrast Nagy (1979) 69-83, who considers ἄχος as grief.

<sup>150</sup> On the question as to whether Achilles would have made the same decision without Athena's intervention, see, for example, Schmitt (1990) 76-81. For a criticism of Schmitt's (1990) account, see Cairns (2001b) 16-17.

Agamemnon's abilities in battle (1.225-8; similarly at 9.332),<sup>151</sup> thereby displaying behaviour that constitutes yet another expression of Achilles's anger (1.223-4):

Πηλείδης δ' ἐξ᾽αὔτις ἀταρτηροῖς ἐπέεσσιν  
Ἄτρεϊδην προσέειπε, καὶ οὐ πῶ λῆγε χόλοιο.

And the son of Peleus anew with contumelious words spoke to the son of Atreus, and did not yet cease his anger.

Although Agamemnon is well aware that the removal of another fellow's γέρας would incur that fellow's anger, he still feigns indifference towards anyone's angry reaction to his norms' violation (cf. 1.137-9).<sup>152</sup>

While underlining Agamemnon's poor leadership style, Achilles's anger is politically important from another perspective. It gradually leads to his isolation from the community, thereby influencing the decision-making process within the assembly. Achilles tries to defend the Achaeans' rights against Agamemnon's fundamental violation, as discussed above. The Achaeans, however, do not exactly stand up in support of his criticism against Agamemnon. Owing to their lack of endorsement, Achilles separates himself from the community. He does this not only by voicing his condemnation of Agamemnon's leadership style but by blaming the Achaeans for enabling Agamemnon's odious and illegitimate behaviour through tolerating it (1.230-2; 1.299). Agamemnon, being a king who removes the presents from any dissenter (1.230), thereby devouring the common stock (1.231: 'δημοβόρος βασιλεύς'),<sup>153</sup> remains a king because the Achaeans are of no account (1.231:

---

<sup>151</sup> In so doing, on the one hand, he implicitly underscores the importance of his own claim to τιμή, while, on the other hand, he diminishes Agamemnon's status. Note that Agamemnon's ἀριστεία in *Iliad* 11 seems to contradict Achilles's words at 1.225-8, claiming Agamemnon's inability in fighting. Cf. van Wees (1992) 79: 'Another remarkable characteristic of princes is that they are all excellent warriors.' Taplin (1990) 72 argues that Agamemnon's ἀριστεία should not be considered as such, because it barely covers 100 lines.

<sup>152</sup> 'εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώσωσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλωμαι/ ἢ τεὸν ἢ Αἴαντος ἰὼν γέρας, ἢ Ὀδυσῆος/ ἄξω ἐλών-  
δ' δέ κεν κεχολώσεται ὄν κεν ἴκωμαι': 'if they will not give one to me, I myself shall take yours [*i.e.*, Achilles] or Ajax's or Odysseus's prize, going and taking it myself; and *he whom I come to will grow angry*'. Note that the change of mood at 1.137 (εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώωσι) and 1.135 (εἰ μὲν δώσουσι) is another element of Agamemnon's awareness of the unlikelihood of anyone's willing concession of γέρας; cf. Latacz (2002) 74: 'Der Moduswechsel (εἰ + Ind. Fut.: neutrale Fallsetzung; εἰ ... κε + Konj.: Ausdruck einer bestimmten Erwartung) macht deutlich, daß der Sprecher die zweite Möglichkeit für die wahrscheinlichere hält'.

<sup>153</sup> The utterance δημοβόρος βασιλεύς is a Hesiodic one (cf. *WD* 260-4 – see Allan and Cairns (2011) 116 with n. 10), constituting another accusation of Achilles for Agamemnon's greediness (see above), and thereby another reference to his fundamental injustice. Thus, when considering all accusations of

‘οὐτιδανοῖσσι’). For, if the Achaeans were not of no account, then Agamemnon’s offence against Achilles would have been the last one (1.232). Thus, while at the beginning of *Iliad* 1 Achilles summons the assembly, thereby backstopping the interests of all community members, he ends up taking an oath predicting the Achaeans’ disaster, as well as Agamemnon’s failure in his duty to protect his people by failing to honour Achilles, the Achaeans’ best fighter (1.239-44). In fact, the oath expresses Achilles’s own desire for the Achaeans’ defeat resulting from Agamemnon’s insult and its toleration by the Achaeans. This desire is underlined not only by his emphatic reference to the σκῆπτρον (1.234-9)<sup>154</sup> but also through his appeal to his mother later on (*cf.* 1.408-12; see below).

In short: Agamemnon makes a normative claim within the assembly. Owing to his leadership, he should not be alone in remaining without γέρας. This is the reason why he becomes angry when this claim has to be relinquished for the time being. However, Agamemnon’s claim is illegitimate in violating the protocol regarding the distribution of prizes. This illegitimacy rightly incurs Achilles’s anger. For the violation of the prizes’ distribution entails a violation of the communal norms, thereby the dishonouring of others. The disagreement that arises between the two leaders evolves into a conflict pertaining to their different qualities of τιμή, viz. rank and prowess. If, in this dispute, these qualities are presented as antagonistic, then Nestor’s intervention (as we shall now see) makes it clear that τιμή does not consist solely in either rank or ability in fighting. Instead it counts as a value encompassing multifarious claims.<sup>155</sup>

Nestor’s exhortation is explicit. On the one hand, Agamemnon should not deprive Achilles of Briseis. Instead he should respect the Achaeans’ distribution of the prizes (1.275-6). On the other hand, Achilles should not quarrel with the king, viz. Agamemnon (1.277-8), for Agamemnon’s rank is under the protection of Zeus

---

Achilles about Agamemnon’s greed, Achilles’s reference to the norms at 1.126 (‘λαοὺς δ’ οὐκ ἐπέοικε παλλύλογα ταῦτ’ ἐπαγείρειν’; ‘it is inappropriate for the people to collect again those things that are already allotted’) does not merely pertain to ‘the action but the motivation of the king’; *cf.* also Thersites’s words at 2.226-33: see Hammer (2002) 129-30.

<sup>154</sup> The oath’s unavoidability in relation to the σκῆπτρον is explicit: just as the staff will never blossom again, so too Achilles’s oath will assuredly come true.

<sup>155</sup> That is, τιμή is not to be viewed as a zero-sum game. See van Wees (1992), with Cairns (2001a), both discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.2. *Cf.* also Scodel (2008) 6-12. For cases in which τιμή is indeed zero-sum, see, for example, Scodel (2008) 16-21.

(1.279).<sup>156</sup> Nestor's claim that Agamemnon has more τιμή, because he is a king (1.278), thanks to which rank (*cf.* 'φέρτερος' at 1.181) is considered more important, does not imply that prowess (*cf.* 'κατερός' at 1.280) is unimportant (*cf.* 1.283-4). Following Nestor's argument, the resolution of the conflict requires Agamemnon's and Achilles's mutual respect for one another's claims to τιμή. To this end, Nestor exhorts Agamemnon to end his fury and leave his bitterness towards Achilles behind (1.282-3). Thus the display of proper emotional behaviour serves political purposes. To this end, Nestor attempts to foster a conciliatory atmosphere before he begins his actual exhortation. He does this by stressing the commonalities between Agamemnon and Achilles. Indeed, he distinguishes them from the rest of the Achaeans by pointing out their excellence in council and battle (1.258: 'οἱ περὶ μὲν βουλήν Δαναῶν, περὶ δ' ἔστ' ἐμάχεσθαι'), reminding them of their shared responsibility for the conflict's consequences, as expressed through the emotional contrast between the Trojans' joy and the Achaeans' grief (1.254-8).<sup>157</sup> From this perspective, Nestor's awareness of the impact of the leaders' emotions on the political setting, *viz.* the decision-making and its consequences (including the people's suffering and distress), suggests that his emotional intelligence directly shapes his interventions within the assembly.

By following Nestor's advice, Agamemnon and Achilles respect not only one another's status but also Nestor's. The propriety of Nestor's argument is grounded in the claims of his status (yet another indication of the inclusivity of τιμή), as already stressed in the narrator's introduction to his speech, *viz.* Nestor's age and ability in council (1.248-9; 1.252; 1.250; *cf.* also line 1.259 in Nestor's speech). In fact, the requirement that his advice be followed is reinforced through the comparison between Agamemnon's and Achilles's status, on the one hand, and the Lapiths' status, on the other. Since men better than Agamemnon and Achilles have always heeded Nestor's advice, then Agamemnon and Achilles should follow it, too (1.260-1; *cf.* also 1.273-

---

<sup>156</sup> On the claim that Agamemnon's superiority is Zeus-derived, *cf.* also 2.196-7; 2.204-6; 9.97-9, as well as the narration of Agamemnon's staff at 2.100-6. Note, however, that this superiority is not to be understood in absolute terms. Like everyone else, Agamemnon has to abide by communal norms. Also note Achilles's point about the Achaeans' *willing* obedience to Agamemnon, discussed above.

<sup>157</sup> Nestor's remark may then imply that both Agamemnon and Achilles should feel pity towards the Achaeans' imminent grief, resulting from their conflict, and should therefore opt to refrain from the continuation of the quarrel. In this regard, note that, in the *Iliad*, to feel pity for your comrades is not considered to be a spontaneous emotion that the individual may or may not experience based on the individual's subjective perspective. Feeling pity rather constitutes the individual's moral obligation towards the community (see Section 2.2.2).

4).<sup>158</sup> Thus, by leveraging the claims of his status, Nestor underlines the necessity that both leaders be persuaded by his exhortation (1.259; twice at 1.274). This, however, does not produce the intended results.

In spite of recognising the legitimacy of Nestor's words, Agamemnon continues to perceive Achilles's stance in antagonistic terms, emphasising Achilles's strong desire to dominate (1.286-9):

‘ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, γέρον, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες.  
ἀλλ’ ὄδ’ ἀνήρ ἐθέλει περὶ πάντων ἔμμεναι ἄλλων,  
πάντων μὲν κρατέειν ἐθέλει, πάντεσσι δ’ ἀνάσσειν,  
πᾶσι δὲ σημαίνειν, ἅ τιν’ οὐ πείσεσθαι οἴω.’

‘Yes, old man, all this you said is in accordance with fate. Yet this man over here wants to be superior from everyone else, and wants to rule over everybody and to everybody wants to give orders, which nobody will obey, I think.’

From this perspective, Achilles is presented as if arrogating Agamemnon's leadership. In so doing, Agamemnon projects his own insatiable desire for dominance over Achilles (*cf.* Agamemnon's words at 1.186-7).<sup>159</sup> At the same time, he implicitly requests that the Achaeans refrain from supporting Achilles when claiming that nobody is to follow him (1.289; *cf.* also Agamemnon's strategy of intimidation mentioned above). Thus, rather than securing communal wellbeing and respecting others' rights, Agamemnon promotes division, thereby failing to perform his role as a leader.<sup>160</sup> As a result, Achilles emphatically<sup>161</sup> rejects his submission to Agamemnon's authority, thereby separating himself from the rest of the community

---

<sup>158</sup> Note that the mythological exemplum of Hippodamia's wedding underlines Nestor's status from a different perspective, too. It stresses Nestor's former fighting abilities in battle (1.271).

<sup>159</sup> Note that, when highlighting the norm of the prize distribution in order to flag up Agamemnon's illegitimate claim (*viz.* the immediate replacing of Briseis), Achilles does so on behalf of the community (*cf.* 1.123; 1.126; 1.128). Agamemnon apparently focuses only on the fact he has to concede his γέρας (1.127) without immediate replacement.

<sup>160</sup> Regarding the necessity of a leader to secure the wellbeing of their community, *cf.* Philodemos's book *On the good king according to Homer*. Here the two heroes who are considered as exemplars of good leadership are Odysseus and Nestor, for they are always willing to conciliate without getting angry too readily. *Cf.* also van Wees's and Fisher's (2015) 17-18 account, who argue for the elite's duty to protect the community. For secondary literature on Philodemos, see Cairns (2015a) 64 n. 16. On Odysseus's example as a good leader, see Section 2.3.3 below; *cf.* also Cairns (2015a) 53-60.

<sup>161</sup> Note the repetition of similar meaning (1.293: ‘δειλός’; ‘οὐτιδανός’; 1.294: ‘σοὶ πᾶν ἔργον’; ‘ὄττι κεν εἴπης’; 1.295: ‘ἐπιτέλλεο’; 1.296: ‘σήμαινε’; 1.294: ‘ὑπείξομαι’; 1.296: ‘πείσεσθαι’).

(*cf.* 1.293-6).<sup>162</sup> In sharp contrast with Agamemnon's argument (*cf.* 1.290-1),<sup>163</sup> Achilles is given the gods' permission to speak offensively precisely because Agamemnon displayed hubristic behaviour (*cf.* 1.211 and 1.214). The end of the assembly finds Achilles throwing the sceptre against the ground (1.245), a gesture that communicates his anger while also underscoring his separation from the Achaeans' community and his firm belief about the failure of Agamemnon's leadership, who exploits norms as his own privilege.<sup>164</sup> There is no doubt that Achilles is right to be indignant about Agamemnon's gross violation of protocols and express his anger, which is grounded in communal norms. However, his desire for the Achaeans to be destroyed invoking Zeus's support (*cf.* 1.408-12) inches towards an illegitimate stance, for, in this case, Achilles's anger goes beyond the limits set by the community insofar as the Achaeans' death nullifies the community's existence. Thus, in *Iliad* 9, Achilles's rejection of the ambassadors' message (which calls for Achilles to embody communal standards) is a fundamental mistake (see Section 2.2), which Achilles will come to realise only after being informed about Patroclus's death in *Iliad* 18 (see Section 2.3).

Let us summarise Section 2.1. Agamemnon's and Achilles's respectively uncompromising stances within the assembly show that honour dynamics may lead to conflict, thereby preventing leaders from making effective decisions on behalf of the community. Honour dynamics are then underpinned by anger, which, while shaping normative claims, are not always linked to legitimate claims: when anger surpasses the conditions that cause it, it becomes pathological (*cf.* Agamemnon's stance towards Chryses, Calchas, and Achilles; Achilles's stance by the end of the assembly – see more details in Sections 2.2 and 2.3). This pathology typically results in the individual's isolation from the community, and with disastrous consequences. The fact that τιμή may be comparative does not entail that it is competitive. Nestor's intervention makes it clear that τιμή is an inclusive concept, showing that honour

---

<sup>162</sup> In these lines (1.293-6), Achilles makes it clear that, in contrast to the rest of the Achaeans, he is neither cowardly nor worthless, for he does not obey Agamemnon's commands blindly.

<sup>163</sup> 'εἰ δέ μιν αἰχμητῆν ἔθεσαν θεοὶ αἰὲν ἔόντες./ τοῦνεκά οἱ προθέουσιν ὀνειδέα μυθήσασθαι;': 'if the undying gods have made him a spearmen, do they therefore assign him to speak disgracefully?'

<sup>164</sup> Contrast Mondi (1980) 211, who argues that by throwing the staff against the ground, Achilles 'affirms' the authority it carries. For a criticism of Mondi's (1980) approach, see Hammer (2002) 118-19; see also *ibid.* 120-1 for further discussion on the σκῆπτρον and bibliographical references, and *ibid.* 132 for his interpretation of Achilles's gesture: when throwing the sceptre against the ground, Achilles 'shows the untenability of *themis* as a prerogative of the king'.

dynamics do not just cause conflict but are intimately bound up with notions of respect and reconciliation. Nevertheless, when leaders are excessively focused on their own priorities and emotions, without considering the emotions and interests of others, they fail to consider sagacious advice that is based on communal norms, which would also allow them to save face insofar as these norms serve as grounds for justifying their retreat from an earlier position. By disregarding Nestor's thoughtful intervention, Agamemnon will have to deal with the consequences of his failed leadership after Achilles's withdrawal from the battlefield, and Achilles will have to face the loss of his best friend after falling short of the expectations set by communal norms (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3).

## 2.2 The Achaeans' first attempt to resolve the conflict

After nine years of success, and following Achilles's withdrawal from the battlefield as a result of decision-making in the assembly of *Iliad* 1, the Achaeans begin suffering defeats. The Achaeans' failed battle in *Iliad* 8 causes them to negotiate the reconciliation between Agamemnon and Achilles in *Iliad* 9. However, the political mechanisms, which are employed to this end, fail to achieve this reconciliation for emotional reasons. In Section 2.2, I argue that, as in the assembly of *Iliad* 1, so too in the assembly, the council (see Section 2.2.1), and the embassy (see Section 2.2.2) of *Iliad* 9, the individuals' emotions may respond rationally to external events, evaluating real states of affairs. Still they become damaging in part because, rather than taking communal norms and social values seriously, individuals are instead excessively focused on their τιμή, thereby enabling their emotions to persist for too long.

### 2.2.1 The assembly and council in *Iliad* 9: balance between individuals' emotions and political decision-making?

First, I show how the Achaeans' defeat on battle is linked to the narrator's emphasis on the Achaeans' emotions at the beginning of *Iliad* 9, and how this development urges Agamemnon to call the assembly. Then, I focus on the impact of emotions on the political debate within the assembly and council of *Iliad* 9, culminating in the Achaeans' decision to send an embassy to Achilles.

At the beginning of *Iliad* 9, the Achaeans have retreated, having being defeated by the Trojans on the battlefield. The magnitude of the Achaeans' defeat is illustrated through the intensity of their emotional state while retreating, the intensity of which is expressed through the use of literal emotional language (9.3: πένθει; 9.9: ἄχει; 9.13: τετιηότες; 9.14: δάκρυ; 9.16 βαρὺ στενάχων), as well as through the use of different kinds of figures of thought, which conceptualise the Achaeans' fear and/or distress, viz. metaphors,<sup>165</sup> two similes (9.4-8; 9.14-15),<sup>166</sup> and two instances of metonymy (9.2: φύζα; φόβου).<sup>167</sup> The full extent of the Achaeans' agitation becomes clear through its contrast with the Trojans' emotional state at the end of *Iliad* 8, as illustrated by the simile at 8.555-61.<sup>168</sup> However, the similes are only fully understood through the concept of conceptual metaphor.<sup>169</sup> For, on the one hand, there is a connection between windless weather, and the explicit happiness of the shepherds and the implicit satisfaction of the Trojans, which arises from the context (viz. the Trojans' success on the battlefield in *Iliad* 8), and on the other hand, there is a connection between the windstorm in *Iliad* 9, and the Achaeans' unambiguous grief and the state of their θυμός. That is, the different environmental implications caused by the wind are to be linked to different emotional experiences. Note also that what links the concepts of metaphor, simile, and metonymy to literal emotional language

<sup>165</sup> Cf. 9.2: φόβου κρυόεντος (icy panic flight), 9.3: πένθει δ' ατλήτω βεβολήατο (be stricken by unbearable grief); 9.8: ἐδαίζετο θυμός (*thymos* torn apart); 9.9: ἄχει μεγάλῳ βεβολημένος (struck by strong grief); 9.14: ὡς τε κρήνη μελάνυδρος (like a spring with black water); 9.15: δνοφερὸν ὕδωρ (dark water).

<sup>166</sup> 9.4-8: the narrator compares the winds' intense activity, causing the rising of dark waves, and the accumulation of seaweed along the seacoast, with the Achaeans' serious disturbance of their θυμός; 9.14-15: the narrator compares the lachrymal Agamemnon with a dark-running water spring. Note that the adjective αἰγίλιψ (destitute of goats) *metaphorically* means 'steep', 'sheer': cf. 9.15: κατ' αἰγίλιπος πέτρης. Water flowing down from a steep rock might in turn imply a large amount of water, *i.e.*, it attests Agamemnon's great distress. For a comparison between the similes at 9.14-15 and 16.3-4, see Tsagalis (2012) 324-5.

<sup>167</sup> In contrast to the meaning of φόβος in classical Greek, in Homer, the usual sense of φόβος is not 'fear' but 'running away'; cf. LSJ s.v. φόβος. Thus φόβος, in Homer, is not what you feel when you run away; it is rather what you do when you are afraid. The depiction of φύζα (headlong flight) as a comrade of φόβος (cf. 9.2: φύζα φόβου κρυόεντος ἑταίρη) might prelude the starting point of the alteration in the meaning of φόβος, which follows in the next centuries. This suggests that φόβος only gradually becomes known as the emotion itself. In other words, the starting point of an emotional concept might be something visible, physical, and concrete, but then the same word may be used to describe something more abstract. This idea explains the fact that some examples of the category of emotion are physical, while others are not at all. Cf. the discussion in Chapter 1, Section 1.1. See also Cairns's (2015c) 5 study on φόβος: 'The importance of emotional symptoms in the construction of emotional concepts underlines the fundamental importance of physical embodiment in the concept of emotion itself'.

<sup>168</sup> On the role of the simile at the end of *Iliad* 8 in connection with the Trojans' emotional state after their assembly, see Chapter 3, Section 3.1.

<sup>169</sup> On 'conceptual metaphor', see Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 3: 'Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.'

are the associations with their physical aspects: the Achaeans run away (9.2: ἔχε φύζα, φόβου κρυόεντος), struck by unbearable grief (9.3: πένθει δ' ἄτλητω βεβολήατο); Agamemnon, struck by distress (9.9: ἄχει μεγάλῳ βεβολημένος), sheds tears (9.14 δάκρυ χέων). The physical aspect of emotion, used here to emphasise a painful emotional process, is further depicted through the individuals' experiences, as expressed through the narrator's references to their 'psychic organs',<sup>170</sup> namely, the division or tearing apart of the Achaeans' θυμός (9.8), as well as Agamemnon's stricken ἦτορ (9.9). The physicality of the parties' emotions is mirrored in the symbolism of the physical environment, so that what is 'inside' mirrors the external world (especially in the way that the disturbance of the θυμός mirrors the storm). Viewed in this light, the beginning of *Iliad* 9 underlines the Achaeans' distress and fear, thereby emphasising the severity of their defeat on battle, a turn of events forcing Agamemnon to call the assembly (9.10-12).

The interrelation between the Achaeans' emotional state and the alarming developments on the battlefield not only cause the summoning of the assembly in *Iliad* 9, but also shapes the content of Agamemnon's proposal therein, viz. the Achaeans' abandonment of the expedition against Troy (9.26-8). In Agamemnon's view in *Iliad* 9, the Achaeans' defeat in *Iliad* 8 (9.22) results from his ἄτη<sup>171</sup> in *Iliad* 2. While in *Iliad* 2, Agamemnon was trying to deceive the Greeks (*cf.* 2.72-5; 2.110-14; note also the *verbatim* repetition at 2.111-18 and 9.18-25),<sup>172</sup> in *Iliad* 9 he realises that he has been deceived himself (9.18: 'Ζεὺς με μέγα Κρονίδης ἄτη ἐνέδησε βαρείη').<sup>173</sup> In fact, the starting point of Agamemnon's deception can be traced to *Iliad* 1 (viz. Agamemnon's ὕβρις and norm-violating behaviour in dishonouring Achilles), which Agamemnon has already acknowledged in the assembly of *Iliad* 2. Indeed, in recognising the importance of Achilles's battlefield prowess (*cf.* 2.370-80), Agamemnon considers himself the initiator of the quarrel (*cf.* 2.378: 'ἐγὼ δ' ἦρχον χαλεπαίνων'), ultimately admitting his misconduct in the sense of ἄτη (*cf.* 9.115-16),

<sup>170</sup> On the 'psychic organs', see the discussion in Chapter 1, Section 1.1, including bibliographical references.

<sup>171</sup> For the concept of ἄτη in Homer, see Cairns (2012), including both non-recent and recent bibliography.

<sup>172</sup> Hammer (2002) 87 argues that Agamemnon challenging of the troops in *Iliad* 2 is linked to his attempt to test the Achaeans' support after Achilles questioned the expedition in *Iliad* 1. *Cf.* Cook (2003). See also Kelly's (2014) illuminating analysis of the episode, combining accurate reading of the Homeric evidence and a useful employment of the comparative study.

<sup>173</sup> On a comparison of Agamemnon's speeches in *Iliad* 2 and *Iliad* 9, see Lohmann (1970) 216-18.

following Nestor's criticism in the council of *Iliad* 9 (see below).<sup>174</sup> From this perspective, Agamemnon's ἄτη is politically important, for it encompasses the starting point of Agamemnon's delusion, as well as the end of his thought process, *i.e.*, the result of his mistake: the Achaeans' defeat. Thus the consequences of the leader's ἄτη enormously impact upon community wellbeing. At the same time, Agamemnon's ἄτη is important from an emotional point of view, which affects the political perspective. It may imply Agamemnon's *regret* (*cf.* 9.18-19; 9.22)<sup>175</sup> for his failure to properly evaluate a situation in advance and in detail (*cf.* 1.343; and Agamemnon's stance towards Chryses (Section 2.1)), which is bound up with Agamemnon's *excessive confidence* in defeating the Trojans absent Achilles's participation in battle. Agamemnon's excessive confidence is, in turn, linked to Agamemnon's obsessive preoccupation with his honour, along with his conviction of sharing the same agenda with the gods (*cf.* 2.35-8; 2.110-41). For, rather than honouring Agamemnon, as Agamemnon believes (*cf.* 1.173-5), Zeus aims to honour Thetis, thereby honouring Achilles (*e.g.*, 1.525-8; 2.3-4; 13.347-50; 15.74-7).<sup>176</sup> Viewed in this light, Agamemnon's ἄτη shapes his emotions, while also explaining his poor leadership and judgement.

Just as Agamemnon's emotional state influences his suggestion that the Achaeans abandon Troy, emotions likewise shape Diomedes's response to Agamemnon. Diomedes *aggressively* rejects Agamemnon's current proposal (9.32-49; especially 9.32: μαχήσομαι; 9.39-42; 9.48-9), and unlike his silent stance in *Iliad* 4, he now criticises Agamemnon's transgression (*cf.* 9.34-6).<sup>177</sup> That is to say, like his emotional tact in *Iliad* 4,<sup>178</sup> so Diomedes's performance in *Iliad* 9 is consistent with

---

<sup>174</sup> *Cf.* Wyatt (1982) 250-1.

<sup>175</sup> *Cf.* above for the use of metaphor and physicality in connection with the Achaeans' emotional tension. The formulation ἄτη ἐνέδησε (9.18) likewise exploits both concepts: ἄτη cannot bind Agamemnon in a literal sense, while the idea of the literal binding requires the involvement of a physical object in the process.

<sup>176</sup> For the connection between Agamemnon's and Hector's excessive confidence in association with their failure to understand Zeus's plan to honour Thetis, see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.

<sup>177</sup> On this 'Fernbeziehung', see also Reichel (1994) 219. In addition to the contrast between *Iliad* 4 and *Iliad* 9 regarding Diomedes's behaviour, Diomedes's silence in *Iliad* 4 contrasts with Achilles's behaviour in *Iliad* 9: whereas Diomedes is able to control his anger, Achilles insists on his anger, thereby rejecting the embassy; *cf.* Griffin (1980) 74; Cairns (2001a) 210-11.

<sup>178</sup> A disagreement on the battlefield could imply insubordination, thereby causing practical and political problems. Contrast Hammer (2002) 133, who views Diomedes's different behaviour as 'a change in Diomedes's own understanding of a political space'.

the normative behaviour established by the community: individuals within the assembly are entitled to disagree with those who behave thoughtlessly (9.32-3).<sup>179</sup>

The contrast between Diomedes's behaviour in *Iliad* 4 and *Iliad* 9 shows that silence<sup>180</sup> does constitute a meaningful and expressive form of response.<sup>181</sup> Indeed, the assembly's silence following Agamemnon's proposal (9.29-30), when compared to the Achaeans' approbation after Diomedes's statement (9.50-1), likewise has a political function, communicating the Achaeans' discreet disapproval of Agamemnon's statement.<sup>182</sup> Both through silence and approbation, the assembly's response is shaped by the Achaeans' emotions, viz. through the Achaeans' distress in the first case (*cf.* 9.30: τετηότατες) and their delight in the second (*cf.* 9.51: ἀγασσάμενοι).

Similarly to *Iliad* 1 (see above Section 2.1), in *Iliad* 9 there is division and disagreement between Agamemnon and the Achaeans, and between Agamemnon and another individual. However, unlike *Iliad* 1, the disagreement in *Iliad* 9 does not bear consequences detrimental to the community. Still, as in *Iliad* 1, so too in *Iliad* 9 the assembly has to be abandoned. This is because Agamemnon's emotional state does not enable him to suggest an effective plan of action: Agamemnon may realise Zeus's deception in *Iliad* 2 (*cf.* 2.1-14); however, the people's discontent with his suggestion (viz. that the Achaeans return to Greece) flouts the basic rule of politics (viz. that leadership secures communal welfare).<sup>183</sup> Nevertheless, unlike *Iliad* 1, in the assembly of *Iliad* 9 Agamemnon complies with Nestor's suggestion and summons a council after offering a meal. This decision prevents the worsening of communal division, thereby protecting Agamemnon from losing face by being excessively criticised within the public space of the assembly (which is reminiscent of Odysseus's

---

<sup>179</sup> By saying 'you though do not get angry about it' (9.33: σὺ δὲ μὴ τι χολωθῆς), Diomedes makes implicitly a political comment on Agamemnon's emotions in the assembly context of *Iliad* 1. Note also that unlike his stance in *Iliad* 1, in *Iliad* 9 Agamemnon does not grow angry following someone's objection to his statement; see below. Schofield (1986) 29-30 argues how essential it is for Homer to present Diomedes as an effective speaker. Contrast Elmer (2013) 118 and 124, who considers Diomedes's speech at 9.32-49 deficient in contrast with his speech at the end of *Iliad* 9 (9.697-709). For a different interpretation, see Martin (1989) 23-6, especially 24.

<sup>180</sup> *Cf.* Minchin (2008) 18 with n. 7: communication can take place in the absence of talk. See also *ibid.* 26 for *Il.* 9.223, where Ajax motions to Phoenix, with Odysseus noticing the gesture.

<sup>181</sup> On Diomedes's speech as an act of prowess, see Schofield (1986) 14-15.

<sup>182</sup> For a similar case, *cf.* 7.398 and 7.403, where the Achaeans remain silent following the Trojan heralds' announcement, as well as following Diomedes's sharp response. For an analysis of the similarities between *Iliad* 7 and *Iliad* 9, see Elmer (2013) 114-25.

<sup>183</sup> See Section 2.1 above.

stance in *Iliad* 2 (2.244-64; 2.284-335) in defending Agamemnon after Thersites's offence (2.221-42)).<sup>184</sup> From this perspective, damaging implications affecting the community owing to Agamemnon's stance are prevented thanks to other individuals' thoughtful intervention in the decision-making process, along with Agamemnon's acquiescence to said intervention.

Without disregarding Diomedes's status (9.53-6), or not approving his pertinent involvement (9.58-9), as well as by leveraging the claims of his own status, namely, his age and efficiency in council (9.60-2),<sup>185</sup> Nestor reinstates Agamemnon to his stature following Diomedes's judgemental intervention.<sup>186</sup> His attempt is successful, for Nestor has more authority over Diomedes than he has over the Achaeans. In reinstating Agamemnon to his position, Nestor creates the grounds for him to manage his emotions. He does this by offering Agamemnon the space and time to cope with his acute distress, while also enabling him to put into practice Diomedes's reminder of communal norms (viz. that disagreement within an assembly should not lead someone to anger (9.32-3)). In the latter connection, it should be noted that, owing to Agamemnon's demoralisation resulting from the Achaeans' defeat, the possibility that he becomes angry after Diomedes's intervention lessens. That said, while protecting Agamemnon from harsh criticism within the assembly, Nestor becomes very critical within the council.<sup>187</sup> He underlines Agamemnon's responsibilities as a leader (viz. that he ought to make effective proposals, listen to others' view, and follow their suggestions should these suggestions be more salient than his own (9.99-102)), pointing out the essential reason for the Achaeans' defeat (viz. Agamemnon's failure to honour Achilles (9.106-111) by disregarding sage advice (9.105: 'οἶον ἐγὼ νοέω ἡμὲν πάλαι ἠδ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν'; 9.108-9)). Following this

---

<sup>184</sup> Nicolai (1993) 334 observes that the assembly is summoned for the arrangement or settlement of public issues, whereas the council is preferred for more delicate matters (cf. the decision of the army's challenge in *Iliad* 2; Nestor's criticism of Agamemnon, along with his exhortation for Agamemnon's compensation to Achilles in *Iliad* 9).

<sup>185</sup> On Nestor's status and, in particular, on the different nuances of the phrase 'ἀτὰρ οὐ τέλος ἵκεο μύθων' (cf. 9.56), see Christensen (2009); cf. also Frame (2009) 195. Line 9.56 underlines Nestor's ability in council, for unlike Diomedes, Nestor will complete his speech; cf. Elmer (2013) 118. On Nestor's rhetoric in this speech, see also Martin (1989) 24-5; 60-1. On Nestor's strategy to stress the claims of his status before his actual exhortation and demand for obedience, see above Section 2.1.

<sup>186</sup> Cf. the use of explicit honorific language at 9.69 ('Ἀτρεΐδη, σὺ μὲν ἄρχε· σὺ γὰρ βασιλευτάτος ἐσσι') and 9.73 ('πολέεσσι δ' ἀνάσσεις'), as well as the hint at Agamemnon's claim to τιμή, namely, his wealth at 9.71-2 ('πλεῖαί τοι οἴνου κλισία') and at 9.73 ('πᾶσά τοι ἔσθ' ὑποδεξίη'). On wealth as a criterion of status, see, for example, van Wees (1992) 72-5; 103-5. Note furthermore that by highlighting Agamemnon's status, Nestor justifies his own proposal to Agamemnon to offer a meal and summon a council.

<sup>187</sup> On the theme of 'praise and control' in Nestor's speech, see Martin (1989) 60-1.

point, while the public space of the assembly is not opportune for harsh criticism, the council's private context enables issues of authority and justice vis-à-vis leadership to be addressed. That is, the disparate institutional setting entails a difference in terms of the behavioural rules. Nevertheless, when suggesting Achilles's compensation, Nestor uses the inclusive first-person plural (*cf.* 9.112: 'φραζώμεσθ', ὥς κέν μιν ἄρεσσάμενοι πεπιθούμεν'), thanks to which he avoids causing Agamemnon to feel alienated by the community, thereby getting angry in an attempt to defend his status.<sup>188</sup>

In a similar vein, Nestor is concerned with Achilles's emotions. Following Nestor's suggestion, the Achaeans' compensation should consist in 'splendid gifts' (9.113: 'δῶροισίν τ' ἀγανοῖσι') and 'sweet words' (9.113: 'ἔπεσσί τε μελιχίοισι'), which seek to appease Achilles (9.112: 'ἀρεσσάμενοι').<sup>189</sup> Although Agamemnon is willing to deploy the social mechanism of compensation in order to assuage Achilles's anger (9.120-1), even admitting responsibility for his fundamental mistake in *Iliad* 1 (9.115-16; 9.119),<sup>190</sup> in contrast to Nestor's suggestion, Agamemnon does not manage to find the right language to make his offer.<sup>191</sup> For he limits the 'sweet words' to three lines (as seen in his oath that he did not sleep with Briseis; 9.132-4), thereby failing to find balance in what he offers. By offering too much, he creates an obligation that Achilles will never be able to repay.<sup>192</sup> If the element of hyperbole,

<sup>188</sup> In this regard, note also Nestor's reference (which includes Nestor's honorific address to Agamemnon and the association between Agamemnon's kingship and Zeus's support, who granted Agamemnon with the σκῆπτρον and θέμιστες) to Agamemnon's status (9.96-9) before directing criticism. That Nestor pays attention to Agamemnon's emotional state even when he criticises him does not constitute discrimination on Agamemnon's part at the expense of the community. Instead it safeguards communal interests by preventing the situation from spiralling out of control, as in *Iliad* 1.

<sup>189</sup> Note that, in the context of ξενία and gift exchange, gifts are also accompanied by 'sweet words'; *e.g.*, *Od.* 15.53. See van Wees (2002) 352. Similarly, gift-receivers are supposed to show some sort of thankfulness as well: they are told to delight (*Od.* 1.311; *Od.* 8.394-5; 15.128); are delighted (*Od.* 15.130); express good wishes (*Od.* 6.180-2; *Od.* 13.45-6; *Od.* 13.59-62; *Od.* 14.53-4; *Od.* 14.440-1); commit themselves to reciprocate (*Od.* 1.318; *Od.* 24.284-6). See *ibid.* 352-3. *Cf.* Odysseus's exhortation to Achilles at 19.178-9. See Section 2.3.3 below.

<sup>190</sup> On the scholarship debate about whether Agamemnon accepts or denies responsibility, see Section 2.3.2 below, combined with the discussion about Agamemnon's ἄτη above.

<sup>191</sup> Wilson (2002) 81 is right in noting that, when advising the ambassadors, Nestor seeks to secure the use of appropriate language towards Achilles despite Agamemnon's stance. However, in contrast to Wilson's (2002) 81 claim, Nestor and the embassy find Agamemnon's offer satisfactory from at least a few perspectives. *Cf.* Nestor's remark at 9.164 ('δῶρα μὲν οὐκέτ' ὄνοστὰ διδοῖς Ἀχιλλῆϊ'; 'you would give Achilles gifts not at all negligible'); Odysseus's comment at 9.261 ('ἄξια δῶρα δίδωσι': 'he gives you worthy gifts'); Phoenix's words at 9.515-18 (explaining that he would not ask Achilles to abandon his anger were Agamemnon not offering him gifts); and Ajax's point at 9.638-9 (highlighting that Agamemnon does not give back to Achilles *only* Briseis). See Allan and Cairns (2011) 122. On the ambassadors' arguments, see Section 2.2.2 below.

<sup>192</sup> On the importance of the way material goods are offered in a society in which they help to represent the individual's τιμή, *cf.* van Wees (1992) 228-37; Hainsworth (1993) 143 on 9.367-9; Allan and Cairns (2011) 123-5.

along with Achilles's possible marriage with Agamemnon's daughter (*cf.* 9.142), only implies Agamemnon's desire to establish authority,<sup>193</sup> then the last lines of his speech suggest it explicitly (9.158-61):

‘δηθήτω – Αΐδης τοι ἀμείλιχος ἦδ’ ἀδάμαστος,  
τοῦνεκα καί τε βροτοῖσι θεῶν ἔχθιστος ἀπάντων –  
καί μοι ὑποστήτω, ὅσσον βασιλεύτερός εἰμι  
ἦδ’ ὅσσον γενεῇ προγενέστερος εὔχομαι εἶναι.’

‘Let him be subdued – only Hades is implacable and unsubdued and is therefore the most hated of the gods among mortals – and be placed under me, as long as I am kinglier and boast that I am elder in age.’

From this perspective, Agamemnon remains insecure about his power (*cf.* 1.182-7 – see above Section 2.1). Thus, rather than aiming for Achilles's voluntarily consent (*cf.* 1.150 – see again Section 2.1), he insists on using aggression – as expressed through the imperatives at 9.158 (‘δηθήτω’) and at 9.160 (‘ὑποστήτω’), as well as through the comparative forms at 9.160 (‘βασιλεύτερος’) and 9.161 (‘προγενέστερος’) – in order to extract obedience and secure his place within the hierarchy while offering compensation.<sup>194</sup>

In this light, while Nestor's intervention is thoughtful (for he prevents conflict by protecting Agamemnon's face both in the assembly and council, as well as by evaluating everyone else's emotional state and possible reaction, motivated by and acting in a sense of justice), the council's final decision-making, as shaped by the announcement of Agamemnon's offer, fails to properly consider Achilles's emotions (if at all), thereby provoking Achilles's rejection (see below). However, as we shall now see, although Agamemnon's offer itself is (partially) deficient, the ambassadors present Achilles with additional reasons for his return to the battlefield. These reasons are grounded in communal norms, and should therefore persuade Achilles, enabling the institution of the embassy to function effectively.

---

<sup>193</sup> Regarding the argument that, if Achilles marries Agamemnon's daughter (following the latter's proposal), he is placed in a permanently inferior position (because the father-in-law is always superior to the son-in-law), see Donlan (1993).

<sup>194</sup> According to Scodel (2008) 140-1, Agamemnon asks Achilles to recognise his ‘claims to deference’. Whether he also insinuates that ‘Achilles should accept subordination to Agamemnon is not clear’. However, whether Agamemnon asks for an explicit subordination or not is not the crucial point; for, in either case, Agamemnon's stance reveals a desire to demonstrate his power.

## 2.2.2 The embassy: emotional negotiations in political context

As emotions are a constitutive part of decision-making processes within the assembly and council, they likewise shape another political institution: the embassy. Emotions influence both the ambassadors' strategy and Achilles's response. My analysis begins with the embassy's emotional and political argument which consists in the ambassadors' appeal for Achilles's pity shaped by communal norms. After exploring the portion of the ambassadors' argument, focusing on the pity's recipients, *i.e.*, Achilles's comrades, I then move on to the agent-centred aspect of the argument, which focuses on Achilles's future regret in the event that he refuses to show pity to his comrades as a result of his anger towards Agamemnon.

Odysseus is the first ambassador attempting to persuade Achilles. While explicitly transferring Agamemnon's message in enumerating Agamemnon's gifts (9.264-99), he also communicates his own view in omitting Agamemnon's words that explicitly express superiority in rank (*cf.* 9.158-61). By implication, while the audience does not know that *verbatim* repetition is coming, it is significant when it comes, because it underpins Agamemnon's and Odysseus's differing perspectives.<sup>195</sup> This difference is amplified by Odysseus's further distinction between Agamemnon and the rest of the Achaeans. Odysseus appeals to Achilles's pity throughout his speech (*cf.* 9.229-31; 9.247-8). However, he emphasises the political necessity of Achilles's pity only when clearly distinguishing between Agamemnon and the community at the end of his speech (9.300-2):<sup>196</sup>

---

<sup>195</sup> Contrast Scodel (2008) 141-4, who argues that Agamemnon's speech at 9.115-61 is not to be understood as a *verbatim* message that the embassy is supposed to transfer to Achilles: Odysseus omits not only the provocative conclusion but also Agamemnon's admission of ἄτη. Note, however, that Agamemnon's admission of ἄτη is explicitly addressed to Nestor (*cf.* 1.115: 'ὦ γέρον, οὐ τι ψεῦδος ἐμὰς ἄτας κατέλεξας'; 'old man, there was no lie when you talked about my delusions').

<sup>196</sup> Contrast Scodel (2008) 144, who argues that the last part of Odysseus's speech (9.300-6) 'sounds almost like an afterthought'. Just as the narrator describes the Achaeans' emotional state at the beginning of *Iliad* 9, underlining the seriousness of the political situation (see Section 2.2.1 above), so too Odysseus exploits the Achaeans' fear and distress (9.230: 'δεῖδιμεν'; 9.244: 'δεῖδοικα'; 9.248: 'τειρομένους'; 9.302: 'τειρομένους') to emphasise the danger to the community: it is doubtful that the Achaean ships will not be destroyed (9.230), considering the proximity of the Trojans to the Greek camp (9.232-5), the Trojans' support by Zeus (9.236), and the exultation of Hector (9.237-43). Hammer (2002) 99 explores lines 9.300-2 considering Aristotle's account of pity in the *Rhetoric*: 'pity arises from the sight of pain that befalls one who does not deserve (*anaxiou*) it'. See Arist. *Rh.* 1385b13-16.

‘εἰ δέ τοι Ἀτρείδης μὲν ἀπήχθετο κηρόθι μᾶλλον,  
αὐτὸς καὶ τοῦ δῶρα, σὺ δ’ ἄλλους περ Παναχαιοὺς  
τειρομένους ἐλέαιρε κατὰ στρατὸν, ... .’

‘But if to you the son of Atreus is hateful in your heart more (than anyone else), he himself and his presents, you, on all other Achaeans, who are suffering in the army, take pity ... .’

While highlighting Odysseus’s different perspective, the distinction between Agamemnon and the Achaeans is also linked to Odysseus’s awareness of, and understanding for, Achilles’s possible interpretation of Agamemnon’s offer as insufficient. Thus, as Odysseus puts it, rather than concentrating on the interpersonal aspect of the conflict, namely, his opposition to Agamemnon, Achilles must take communal interests into account. In fact, Odysseus exhorts Achilles to reject his anger (9.259-61),<sup>197</sup> only after presenting anger as an opposition to the social values, thereby reminding Achilles of Peleus’s advice (9.252-8): individuals need to control their emotions in accordance with norms, such as φιλοφροσύνη.<sup>198</sup> The reference to Achilles’s father reinforces Odysseus’s argument in emotional and social terms on two counts. First, the father’s figure emblematises the ideals that individuals should try to embody, thereby crystallising the idea of the son’s standards of honour and shame.<sup>199</sup> Secondly, the figure of the father is typically trustworthy given his role as the son’s caregiver, trust that, in turn, strengthens Odysseus’s reliability and his argument.<sup>200</sup>

---

<sup>197</sup> ‘ἄλλ’ ἔτι καὶ νῦν/ παύε’, ἔα δὲ χόλον θυμαλγέα· σοὶ δ’ Ἀγαμέμνων/ ἄξια δῶρα δίδωσι μεταλήξαντι χόλοιο’: ‘yet even now stop, leave the heart-hurting anger; Agamemnon gives you worthy gifts if you cease from your anger.’

<sup>198</sup> That is to say, in his attempt to persuade Achilles to relinquish his anger (note the repetition with the use of two imperatives ‘παύε’ and ‘ἔα’ at 9.260, the participle ‘μεταλήξαντι’ at 9.261, and the repetition of χόλος at 9.260 and 9.261), Odysseus deploys the past to create a placatory background in the present, seeking the current and future wellbeing of the community. Contrast Scodel (2008) 145, who argues that Odysseus’s argument is exclusively focused on the future. On the fact that an action in the *present* may incorporate something oriented towards the *future*, see Gallagher’s (2020) account, discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.1. On the opposition between χόλος and φιλότης, see Muellner (1996) 135-67.

<sup>199</sup> Contrast Mackie (1996) 146, who understands the use of the father’s model in Odysseus’s and Phoenix’s speeches as a patronising strategy, as in Agamemnon’s case. On Agamemnon’s concealed intentions when establishing the father-son relationship, see Section 2.2.1 above. On the father’s expectation that his son becomes better than himself, cf. Hector’s wish at 6.476-9, where he appeals to Zeus and the rest of the gods so that they make it possible for his son to stand out among the Trojans (as Hector himself does) and to surpass his father in excellence.

<sup>200</sup> Note also the emotional load in the utterances ‘ὦ πέπον’ (9.252) and ‘τέκνον ἐμόν’ (9.254), which are linked to the father-son relationship.

The important role of social values and communal norms in connection to the appeal for pity from the perspective of the pity's recipient is also foregrounded through Ajax's argumentation. In his view, Achilles's behaviour countermands the norm of reciprocity (9.630-2): while the community honours Achilles, by not showing pity to his comrades he fails to reciprocate their respect for him.<sup>201</sup> This point is amplified by Ajax's emphasis on φιλότης vis-à-vis the emotion of αἰδώς. Achilles needs to be gracious respecting the μέλαθρον (9.639-40; 'σὺ δ' ἴλαον ἔνθεο θυμόν./ αἰδέσσαι δὲ μέλαθρον') which symbolises the relationship between φίλοι. Furthermore, in contrast to *Iliad* 1, where Achilles accused Agamemnon of disregarding the Achaeans' willing support in defending Agamemnon's and Menelaus's τιμή (cf. 1.150-60; especially 1.158-60), he is now being accused himself of discounting φιλότης (9.630).<sup>202</sup> This idea is emphasised by Ajax's *a fortiori* argument: even someone who loses his own brother accepts ποινή (9.632-6).<sup>203</sup> Nevertheless, despite his strong criticism and the absence of any honorific utterance addressed to Achilles,<sup>204</sup> Ajax still justifies Achilles's anger in attributing the agency of Achilles's θυμός to the gods (9.636-7).<sup>205</sup> In this way, Achilles is given space to shift the perspective away from his current implacable stance.<sup>206</sup>

Summarily, in the light of Ajax's emphasis on φιλότης, τιμή, and αἰδώς Odysseus's distinction between Agamemnon and the rest of the Achaeans, as well as Odysseus's reminder of Peleus's advice regarding the threat of anger to φιλοφροσύνη, the ambassadors' appeal to pity is grounded in the communal interests. Pity therefore

<sup>201</sup> Note that Odysseus makes a similar point from a different perspective: the community will give more τιμή to Achilles, if he shows pity to the community (cf. 9.302-3; cf. also 9.297). Scodel (2008) 143-4 argues that Odysseus's promise insinuates Achilles's loss of τιμή (owing to his absence from the battlefield), as well as Achilles's responsibility for the Achaeans' defeat. This claim could be true had Odysseus not shown understanding for Achilles's emotions towards Agamemnon, mentioned above.

<sup>202</sup> Note that Achilles is unwilling to display reciprocal behaviour, for he feels that the compensation does not rectify Agamemnon's fundamental mistake, viz. because Agamemnon does not display reciprocal behaviour in the first place. For details on Achilles's stance towards the embassy, see below. Nevertheless, Ajax's point does not focus on Agamemnon but all the Achaeans.

<sup>203</sup> Phoenix likewise makes a similar point: even the gods accept amends (cf. 9.496-501). See van Wees (1992) 137-8. For details on Phoenix's intervention, see below.

<sup>204</sup> In fact, at first, Ajax does not address Achilles at all: he only talks *about* him, not *to* him. Contrast the honorific address to Odysseus at the beginning of Ajax's speech (9.624: 'διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ'). See Cairns (2001b) 16.

<sup>205</sup> While addressing Odysseus, Ajax presents Achilles as the responsible agent of his θυμός (9.629-30). In Ajax's address to Achilles, it is the gods who are presented as responsible for Achilles's θυμός (9.637). In the actual exhortation (viz. when he is asked to adjust his behaviour in accordance with communal norms), it is once again Achilles who is presented as his θυμός' agent (9.639). Contrast Hainsworth (1993) 143 on 9.637-9. On the relation between θυμός and the phenomenology of the individual's mental events, cf. above Sections 2.1 and 2.2.1, and Chapter 1, Section 1.1.

<sup>206</sup> Note Ajax's references to Achilles's θυμός at 9.629: 'ἄγριον'; 9.636: 'ἄλληκτον', 'κακόν'.

takes the form of a normatively emotional obligation, which in turn implies that the appeal for pity does not constitute an appeal to a spontaneous subjective feeling but an appeal to sharing the same values.<sup>207</sup> In order to be able to show pity, Achilles must reject his anger. Thus there is an opposition between his pity for the other's suffering (viz. the Achaeans' defeat) and his anger regarding his own suffering (viz. Agamemnon's offence against Achilles).<sup>208</sup>

This opposition furthermore implies another: the opposition between anger/pity and regret. For, if an individual insists upon his anger, thereby failing to show pity, they will come to regret their insistence on anger. This opposition is introduced through Odysseus words at 9.249-50. However, it comes notably to the fore through Phoenix's argument exploiting the paradigms of the Prayers (9.502-12) and Meleager (9.524-99), primarily focusing on the consequences of Achilles's anger on Achilles himself.<sup>209</sup> Before informing Odysseus's argument about pity with his warning of regret (9.249-50), I first explore Phoenix's intervention, which underscores the importance of the emotion of regret in the embassy's appeals.

The significance of Phoenix's intervention comes to the fore through its length (9.434-605), the establishment of Phoenix's status<sup>210</sup> (viz. through the references to his pedagogical role in Troy (9.438-43) and autobiography (9.445-84) and his presentation as a father figure (9.485-95)),<sup>211</sup> as well as the use of allegorical language and authoritative speech-genre (*cf.* the allegory of the Prayers; the narration of Meleager – see below). Phoenix's presentation as a father figure<sup>212</sup> seeks to remind Achilles of Phoenix's affection (9.486-8), thereby establishing trust and creating a sense of obligation. Since Phoenix has suffered for Achilles in the past (9.492: 'ὧς ἐπὶ σοὶ μάλα πόλλ' ἔπαθον καὶ πόλλ' ἐμόγησα'), Achilles should now show respect to the norms of reciprocity and meet Phoenix's expectations by following his advice and

<sup>207</sup> Contrast the concept of pity after Homer; see Konstan (2001) 59: 'pity involves a distance between the pitier and the pitied'.

<sup>208</sup> That is to say, feeling pity or anger depends upon Achilles's evaluation of the same situation, which, in turn, depends upon his focus and perspective. *Cf.* Most (2003) 61: 'When we feel distress at someone else's real or threatened undeserved suffering, we can focus either upon the dimension of the person who experiences that suffering or upon that of the person who causes it: in the former case we feel Homeric pity; in the latter case, Homeric anger'. *Cf.* also *ibid.* 54ff.

<sup>209</sup> On the connection between the emotion of regret and the narratives of the Λιταί and Meleager, see Cairns (2012) 27-9. Note furthermore the connection between regret and ἄτη beyond Phoenix's speech; see Cairns (2012) 11; 20; 31; 46. See also below.

<sup>210</sup> *Cf.* Nestor's intervention in *Iliad* 1 and *Iliad* 9; see Sections 2.1 and 2.2.1 respectively.

<sup>211</sup> On the theme of Phoenix as a father, see, for example, Lohmann (1970) 247-52.

<sup>212</sup> On the father figure in connection to the ideals of honour, *cf.* also Odysseus's argument; see above.

managing his anger. Moreover, Phoenix's autobiography creates emotional parallels with Achilles's emotional state.<sup>213</sup> In so doing, Phoenix seeks to demonstrate his understanding for Achilles's anger.<sup>214</sup> While establishing acceptance and sympathy, Phoenix's autobiography also offers an implicit warning: if Achilles refuses to let go of his anger, he will lose his community just as Phoenix did.<sup>215</sup> Phoenix then confirms his role as Achilles's educator in Troy (*cf.* 9.438-43). All things considered, because he communicates his compassion towards Achilles by sharing his similar experience to Achilles's current situation (while also not judging Achilles's anger at the beginning of his speech (*cf.* 9.434-8)), Phoenix's narration of his own past serves (*inter alia*) as the grounds for Achilles's appeasement.

In the narration of the allegory of the Prayers (9.502-12),<sup>216</sup> Phoenix makes the essential point that any human being can make a mistake, but everyone should have a chance to make amends (for, in depriving an individual of an opportunity to rectify a mistake, one might be making a mistake oneself).<sup>217</sup> From this perspective, the allegory of the Prayers can be read as an allegory for Agamemnon's behaviour. Agamemnon's seizure of Briseis is Agamemnon's ἄτη; Achilles refers to ἄτη for Agamemnon's failure to honour him (*cf.* 1.412 – see Section 2.1); Agamemnon describes ἄτη as a valid ground for one's blame (see Section 2.2.1); Phoenix likewise perceives ἄτη as a damaging factor, while the embassy and the compensation represent the Prayers. Thus, if Achilles does not accept them, Ἄτη will come to him, thereby causing him to regret his implacable stance.<sup>218</sup> Moreover, the adaptation of the

---

<sup>213</sup> In both cases, Phoenix's and Achilles's dispute about a girl involves emotions of anger, love, and hatred, while also raising issues of honour. In the latter connection, Phoenix and Achilles feel disrespected, which in turn prompts both to consider committing a crime (*cf.* 9.458-9 and 1.188f. respectively).

<sup>214</sup> For Phoenix's autobiography and its relation to the emotional bond between Phoenix and Achilles, see, for example, Lesky (1952).

<sup>215</sup> For a full discussion of the resemblance between Phoenix's autobiography and Achilles's situation, see Rosner (1976) 314-27; *cf.* also Lohmann (1980) 268-9. On the contribution of Phoenix's autobiography to the rhetorical purpose of his speech, see further Scodel (1982) 128-36.

<sup>216</sup> This is the narration in a nutshell: there is Ἄτη who is fast and harms individuals (9.505-7), and then the slower Λιταί come to amend an individual's mistake (9.503-4). The Prayers are Zeus's daughters (9.502) and benefit those who respect them (9.508-9). By contrast, they beg Zeus to send Ἄτη to those who reject them (9.510-12).

<sup>217</sup> In this sense, despite the religious character of the narration, ἄτη does not merely pertain to religion but highlights the danger of being too rigid. Owing to this, Phoenix's appeal represents an appeal of a universal truth. Contrast Kim (2002) 25, who argues that, in Phoenix's narration of the Prayers, ἄτη can only be linked to Agamemnon and not to Achilles.

<sup>218</sup> For a detailed analysis of the concept of ἄτη in the allegory of the Prayers, see Cairns (2012) 7-9; 14-16.

Meleager paradigm (9.524-99)<sup>219</sup> to Achilles's case reveals<sup>220</sup> that Achilles will be forced to return to battle not from a position of strength but from a position of weakness, which becomes yet more crucial in considering the discussion between Zeus and Hera at the end of *Iliad* 8. In fact, for Achilles, the situation will be worse compared with Meleager's case, for Patroclus is going to die (*cf.* 8.473-7).<sup>221</sup> Phoenix, then, may have a fairly mistaken idea of what it is that Achilles will ultimately come to regret. Like Phoenix, Odysseus, too, may not be able to specify what will cause Achilles's regret. However, he also imagines – and explicitly warns – that Achilles's behaviour will have irreversible and disastrous consequences, directly affecting Achilles himself (9.247-51):<sup>222</sup>

‘ἀλλ’ ἄνα, εἰ μέμονάς γε καὶ ὀψέ περ υἴας Ἀχαιῶν  
 τειρομένους ἐρύεσθαι ὑπὸ Τρώων ὀρυμαγδοῦ.  
 αὐτῷ τοι μετόπισθ’ ἄχος ἔσσεται, οὐδέ τι μῆχος  
 ῥεχθέντος κακοῦ ἔστ’ ἄκος εὐρεῖν· ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρὶν  
 φράζευ ὅπως Δαναοῖσιν ἀλεξήσεις κακὸν ἦμαρ.’

<sup>219</sup> The following is Meleager's story, as presented by Phoenix: Meleager insisted on his anger, thereby refusing to return to the battlefield, despite the offer of gifts, along with his comrades' repeated appeals. His ultimate return to the battlefield was forced and came too late (*viz.* following the city's destruction), which implied the loss of the gifts initially offered. For a succinct summary of the bibliography on the mythological exemplum of Meleager, see Hainsworth (1993) 130 on 524-605. *Cf.* also *ibid.* 131-2. See Grossardt (2001). For an emphasis on the relation between Meleager's/Achilles's stance and the community's suffering, *cf.* also Nicolai (1983) 11.

<sup>220</sup> Clearly, the ambassadors' pleading appeals do not have the same extent as those in the story of Meleager; *cf.* the repetition at 9.574: 'λίσσοντο'; 9.581: 'λιτάνευε'; 9.585: 'ἐλλίσσονθ'; 9.591: 'λίσσετ' as well as the desperation at 9.583: 'σειῶν κολλητὰς σανίδας'; 9.583: 'γουνούμενος υἰόν'; 9.591: 'λίσσετ' ὀδυρομένη'. Wilson (2002) 99 correctly notices Phoenix's extensive exploitation of the verb λίσσομαι within his speech, but she is wrong to state that 'he directs no words or gestures of supplication to Achilleus himself'; *cf.* 9.520: 'ἄνδρας δὲ λίσσεσθαι ἐπιπροέηκεν ἀρίστους'. Nevertheless, in contrast to Thornton (1984) 115; 123; 125-7; 130-2, who claims that the ambassadors' approach towards Achilles forms a case of supplication, I maintain that the embassy does not constitute such an example: no ambassador performs any ritual gesture (*e.g.*, touching of the knees or chin), nor do they refer to this ritual verbally. For a discussion of, and bibliographical references to, the theme of supplication, see Chapter 5. Wilson (2002) and Elmer (2013) 78 argue that Agamemnon should go to Achilles himself. Contrast Scodel (2008) 142, who observes that Nestor – an excellent advisor and the initiator of Achilles's compensation – does not urge Agamemnon to visit Achilles's hut. Scodel's (2008) observation is true, but only because Nestor has witnessed Agamemnon's behaviour at 9.158-61 (for discussion of these lines, see Section 2.2.1 above). In this connection, note the use of the *solitarium* μέν at 9.164 ('δῶρα μὲν οὐκέτ' ὀνοσά'), implying Nestor's silent comment on the absence of any 'sweet words' and Agamemnon's incompetent attempt at rectifying the situation (so, *e.g.*, Thornton (1984) 127); Nestor's attempt to counterbalance the situation when advising the ambassadors himself (9.179-81); and Achilles's remark on Agamemnon's weakness of failing to face him in person (*cf.* 9.172-3); see Cairns (2005) 130.

<sup>221</sup> For a discussion of these lines, see Chapter 4.

<sup>222</sup> *Cf.* Most (2003) 61: Achilles can prevent other people from suffering by showing pity for them and killing those who would cause their suffering. This likewise applies to Hector. He could protect Troy if he did not fight Achilles, but entered his city's wall, following his parents' appeals. On Hector's leadership style, see Chapter 3, especially Section 3.2.

‘Stand up then, if you [*i.e.*, Achilles], though late it may be, intend to save the distressed sons of the Achaeans from the Trojans’ din. You will suffer afterwards, and there will be no means to find a cure, once the bad thing has been done; but, well in advance, consider how you will ward off the bad day from the Danaans.’

The implication is that, if Achilles does not heed the embassy (*viz.* if he fails to show pity for his comrades), thereby discounting the Achaeans’ suffering, then there will be dire consequences on his part, which will cause him to regret his rejection of the embassy.

From this perspective, the argument about regret, which is an emotion that focuses on the self (as does anger), as opposed to one’s failure to show pity, which is an emotion that focuses on the other, constitutes an emotional argument: while revealing that a lack of other-regard may bear negative consequences for oneself, it also exploits the Achaeans’ current emotions and Achilles’s contingent emotions in the future by means of projection or imagination (*cf.* the third Book of Aristotle’s *De anima* on the role of φαντασία).<sup>223</sup> The argument then takes the form of ‘emotions about emotions’, that is, individuals may have emotions about their preceding and prospective emotions. This is still a political argument. For it is part of the decision-making process in the institution of the embassy, affecting the Achaeans’ current political situation on the battlefield (*cf.* the Achaeans’ council at the end of *Iliad* 9). It is political because, by urging Achilles to find a balance between his personal priorities and communal obligations, it attempts to alter his evaluative stance towards a political matter, which impacts upon the communal wellbeing.

Despite grounding their arguments in communal norms (thereby not merely in Agamemnon’s deficient approach), the ambassadors fail to change Achilles’s current perspective. They fail to do so because Achilles’s emotions, shaped as they are by his evaluation of Agamemnon’s misconduct in *Iliad* 1, in both political and personal terms, render him unable to focus on the interests of the community (instead of his

---

<sup>223</sup> In this connection, note also the role of memory in the experience or construction of future emotion: Achilles’s memory of his rejection of Phoenix’s and Odysseus’s advice and his insistence upon holding on to his anger will cause him to feel regret. Achilles’s memory also contributes to the argument in the present, considering Achilles’s recall of Peleus’s advice about emotions and Achilles’s own emotions for his father. Moreover, both Odysseus and Phoenix deploy their memory in the present, when the former recalls Peleus’s advice and the latter his autobiography and the mythological exemplum of Meleager. On the relation between ‘memory and poetic performance’, see Martin (1989) 77-88, who expands on Moran’s (1975) argument. *Cf.* also Notopoulos (1938).

personal ends) as advised by the ambassadors. In particular, Achilles's response to the embassy is powerfully influenced through his distrust of Agamemnon. This is because Achilles perceives Agamemnon's removal of Briseis as token of his failure to deliver promises, viz. as deceptive behaviour (*cf.* 9.312-13;<sup>224</sup> 9.344-5; 9.375-6;<sup>225</sup> 9.369-71). He is therefore determined to not allow himself to be deceived another time (*cf.* 9.344-5; 9.375-7). While explaining Achilles's hints at (or explicit references to) Agamemnon's opacity in contrast to his openness (*cf.* 9.308-13; 9.367-73),<sup>226</sup> Achilles's distrust takes on a political character (especially when considering Achilles's harsh criticism of Agamemnon's leadership, which is redolent of Achilles's criticism in the assembly of *Iliad* 1).<sup>227</sup> Agamemnon's failure to allow the proper and smooth operation of the mechanism of prize allocation (*cf.* 9.331-7; 9.367-73) and esteem distribution in line with justice (*cf.* 9.328-32)<sup>228</sup> prompts Achilles to challenge the expedition against Troy (*cf.* 9.337-45 and Section 2.1 above).<sup>229</sup> This is to say that

<sup>224</sup> Note the ambiguity of lines 9.312-13 ('ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κείνος ὁμῶς Αἶδαο πύλησιν./ ὅς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κεῦθη ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἶπη'; 'for as I hate the gates of Hades, I hate that man who hides one thing in his mind, but says another') implying Achilles's sarcasm and irony. Achilles may mean that, in contrast to Odysseus's and Agamemnon's practice, there will be no discrepancy between his own words and thoughts (*cf.* Taplin (1992) 70; similarly Wilson (2002) 86 and Whitman (1958) 192; *cf.* also Elmer (2013) 79), or that Odysseus's speech may *sound* good, but it does not represent the entire truth. Contrast Auerbach (1953) 3-23, who believes that everything in Homer is on the surface. On Achilles's sarcasm, *cf.* also lines 9.391-2: Achilles refuses to marry Agamemnon's daughter, and exhorts him to choose another Achaeans who would be kinglier and would therefore match his status. Achilles may then recognise Agamemnon's intentions to establish power – *cf.* also below. On Achilles's language, see Parry (1956). Against Parry (1956), see Reeve (1973); Claus (1975); Griffin (1980) 100; Hainsworth (1993); Elmer (2013) 79-80. For a detailed analysis of Achilles's language, see Martin (1989) 146-205. *Cf.* also Hogan (1976); Friedrich and Redfield (1978); Scully (1984); Nimis (1986).

<sup>225</sup> Note the emphatic repetition: 'ἀπάτησε' (9.375); 'ἦλτεν' (9.375); 'ἐξαπάφοιτ' (9.376). On the types of repetition in Achilles's speech and rhetoric, see Martin (1989) 171-9; 220-1.

<sup>226</sup> *Cf.* Stanley (1993) 113: 'Achilleus' first words set out the distinction between truth and falsehood, between being and seeming, that will form the basis of his entire speech.' For further examples indicating how significant for Achilles is that individuals do not hide their real intentions, and for the connection of this pattern with Achilles's thought, see Cramer (1976) 302.

<sup>227</sup> On Achilles's persuasion in *Iliad* 9 and a comparison with his stance in *Iliad* 1, see Martin (1989) 197-205. *Cf.* also Lohmann (1970) 239-41; Hammer (2002) 95-6.

<sup>228</sup> Achilles argues that, although he conquered many cities, bringing the booty to Agamemnon, he received nothing in return. In fact, he is alone in having no γέρας (following Briseis's removal). By contrast, Agamemnon's wealth has been increasing, although he never joins the battle. In this connection, *cf.* lines 9.315-20, where Achilles likewise states that there is no correspondence between one's contribution to fighting and rewards (another hint at Agamemnon's failure to act justly; see above). Claus (1975) observes the double meaning of the word μοῖρα at 9.318 ('ἴση μοῖρα μένοντι καὶ εἰ μάλ' αὖ τις πολέμιοι'), viz. 'portion' and 'death'. Zanker (1994) 83-4 notes the same wordplay, pointing out Achilles's sarcastic disposition. Although I agree with Zanker's (1994) point on Achilles's sarcasm, I disagree with his conclusion that Achilles does not accept the embassy's argument based on honour, because Achilles equates death with τιμή. Instead, Achilles rejects the equation between his honour and its representation through material goods. *Cf.* Griffin (1980) 99-100.

<sup>229</sup> On Achilles's rhetorical questions and the reasons why the Achaeans fight the Trojans, see Parry (1956) refuted by Martin (1989) 205-19, and Gill (1996) 140-1.

Achilles's distrust, provoked by Agamemnon's fundamental unfairness, goes hand-in-hand with Achilles's anger (cf. 9.646-8; 9.386-7). Thus Achilles's repeated references to Agamemnon's deception, entangled with Achilles's fury, evaluate firmly Agamemnon's arbitrariness. For *every time* Achilles recalls Agamemnon's poor behaviour (9.646-7: *ὀππότ' ἐκείνων μνήσομαι*), he becomes angry.<sup>230</sup> From this perspective, Achilles's thought process and memory reveal the intensity of Achilles's emotional state, as well as his fixation on Agamemnon's norm-violating behaviour. This fixation is intimately bound up with Achilles's resentment (cf. 9.321: οὐδέ τί μοι περίκειται, ἐπεὶ πάθον ἄλγεα θυμῷ; nothing remains there for me, for my heart have suffered these plights). Without thereby specifying what would actually appease him, Achilles rejects Agamemnon's hyperbolic offer<sup>231</sup> in a similarly hyperbolic manner (9.385-7):

‘οὐδ’ εἴ μοι τόσα δοίη ὄσα ψάμαθός τε κόνις τε,  
οὐδέ κεν ὦς ἔτι θυμὸν ἐμὸν πείσει Ἄγαμέμνων,  
πρὶν γ’ ἀπὸ πᾶσαν ἐμοὶ δόμεναι θυμαλγέα λώβην.’

‘Even if he gave me as much as the sand and the dust, not even so will Agamemnon convince my *thymos*, until he pays me back for all the heart-rending outrage.’<sup>232</sup>

<sup>230</sup> Note also the simile at 9.647-8: Achilles grows angry at Agamemnon, because the latter has treated the former *like an immigrant*. For an analysis of this passage (9.644-9), see Gill (1996) 190-204. On Achilles's strategy of ‘rebuking by recollection’, cf. Martin (1989) 142. Martin (1989) also observes that in line 9.645 (‘πάντα τί μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἐείσω μνησασθαι’: ‘it seems to me that you spoke everything following your heart’), Achilles uses the phrase κατὰ θυμὸν and not κατὰ μοῖραν: Achilles may recognise and accept Ajax's feelings, but he, being full of anger, has a different perspective from Ajax's.

<sup>231</sup> On Agamemnon's offer, see Section 2.2.1 above.

<sup>232</sup> Line 9.387 (‘πρὶν γ’ ἀπὸ πᾶσαν ἐμοὶ δόμεναι θυμαλγέα λώβην’) is especially debated. For a summary of the main bibliography, see Wilson (2002) 90-1. Achilles does not say that he wants Agamemnon to undo the insult, which is impossible. Neither does he imply that he wants to take vengeance on Agamemnon: see Scodel (2008) 89, who observes that ‘Achilles does not use the language of revenge’, even when he is about to kill Agamemnon in *Iliad* 1. Contrast Nussbaum (2016), who argues that retribution is a conceptual part of anger, and that Aristotle's definition of anger encompasses the concept of revenge (τιμωρία). On the meaning of τιμωρία, see Cairns (2015b). Wilson (2002) 91-3 is right to argue that the verb ἀποδίδωμι, despite the particular syntactical structure, *i.e.*, ἀποδίδωμι + direct object, means to pay *for* something rather than to pay something back. Cf. Allan and Cairns (2011) 126: this ‘is a simple statement of the failure of Agamemnon's offer to assuage Achilles's hurt’. The problem is not then the material compensation, but Achilles's own feelings, which cannot be appeased through the material goods that Agamemnon offers. On Achilles's hyperbole, cf. also 9.378-84 (where Achilles states that he would not accept Agamemnon's offer, even if it were ten or twenty times bigger, or even if it included all the wealth of Orchomenos and Thebes), as well as 9.388-91 (where Achilles announces his refusal to marry Agamemnon's daughter, even if she were equally beautiful to Aphrodite or equally skilful to Athena). Note furthermore that Achilles's rejection of marrying Agamemnon's daughter is underlined by a *παρονομασία* (9.388: ‘κούρην δ’ οὐ γαμέω

The ambassadors do express their understanding for Achilles's anger (*cf.* 9.523: 'πρὶν δ' οὐ τι νεμεσσητὸν κεχολῶσθαι'; 'your anger was not to be blamed before'; 9.300: 'εἰ δέ τοι Ἀτρεΐδης μὲν ἀπήχθετο κηρόθι μᾶλλον'; 'if the son of Atreus is most hated in your heart'). However, they clarify that Achilles's extreme stance cannot be legitimised because, in rejecting Agamemnon's offer, Achilles disregards the entire community.<sup>233</sup> In responding to the ambassadors, although Achilles does not become disrespectful (*e.g.*, 9.308),<sup>234</sup> and may even change his mind to certain degree (*cf.* 9.428-9; 9.619; 9.650-3),<sup>235</sup> he still does not distinguish between Agamemnon and the rest of the Achaeans, thereby making it clear that neither Agamemnon nor any other Achaean would be able to persuade him to return to the fight (9.315-16). Therefore, Agamemnon, along with the rest of the Achaeans' leaders, should contrive another way of protecting the Achaean ships (9.346-7). Achilles takes this stance while being well aware of the gravity of the matter: he explicitly acknowledges that the Achaeans did not manage to face Hector due to his absence from the battlefield, and despite their attempt to build a wall for protection (9.349-52). Achilles appears unable to overcome his personal feelings in the interest of the community, although he presents himself as a selfless defender of the community: just as the mother bird may feed her nestlings at her own expense, so too does Achilles fight for the Achaeans (9.323-5).<sup>236</sup> However, unlike a mother's love, which is typically unconditional, Achilles *does* expect rewards from the community. The simile might then function as a hyperbole, thereby emphasising Achilles's announcement to no longer contribute to the Achaeans' wellbeing.

---

Ἀγαμέμνωνος'); see Martin (1989) 221 n. 17, who credits this observation to David Packard's lecture, at Princeton, in 1984.

<sup>233</sup> Scodel (2008) 141 argues that either Agamemnon's offer is 'devious and hypocritical', and thus Achilles's anger is justifiable, or 'it is simply an attempt at very generous compensation', and thus, Achilles is wrong to insist on his anger. Clearly, whether Agamemnon has good or bad intentions is a matter of interpretation. What is also clear, however, is that Agamemnon fails to find the right way of offering amends, thereby reinforcing Achilles's anger. Whether Achilles is right to remain implacable does not completely depend on Agamemnon's actual offer but, as the ambassadors clarify, on the norms of friendship and reciprocity. That both Agamemnon and Achilles are mistaken is said by Diomedes at 9.699-700, as observed by Allan and Cairns (2011) 121.

<sup>234</sup> Line 9.308 ('διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ'; 'son of Laertes sprung from Zeus, resourceful Odysseus) is ambiguous if taken together with line 9.309 ('χρὴ μὲν δὴ τὸν μῦθον ἀπηλεγέως ἀποιπεῖν'; 'I must utter my word outright'). While Achilles himself declares that he will talk bluntly (9.309), he may also imply what Odysseus just did not do. If so, then line 9.308 is intended ironically.

<sup>235</sup> On Achilles's changing position, see Muellner (1996) 150-5; Hammer (2002) 102-4.

<sup>236</sup> For a detailed analysis of the simile, see Martin (1989) 204-5.

Thus, although Agamemnon's fundamental unfairness justifies Achilles's anger, Achilles's anger has social implications linked to the ability of emotion to sustain social values: when emotions go beyond the conditions that cause them, they become detrimental, thereby affecting negatively both individual and communal interests (*cf.* the paradigms of the Prayers and Meleager). Therefore, despite Agamemnon's attempt to impose authority, all the ambassadors agree that Agamemnon's offer measures up to Achilles's status (9.261; 9.602-5; 9.368-9). Since the social values and communal norms favour reconciliation, in being excessively preoccupied with his anger (as provoked by Agamemnon's offence) and failing to feel pity for his comrades, Achilles disregards his communal obligations and falls short of the communal standards.<sup>237</sup>

To summarise, then, this section has shown that the embassy fails to fulfil its purpose because Achilles is emotionally unready for reconciliation.<sup>238</sup> Nevertheless, he should have been able to reconcile, for it would be better for him; it would be better for Patroclus; it would be better for the community. Following Zeus's words towards Hera (regarding the Achaeans' defeat until Patroclus dies), the audience may have already realised in *Iliad* 8 that Achilles will not reconcile with Agamemnon. Indeed, as we see in *Iliad* 9, this happens because Achilles is too angry and resentful to make amends. Thus, for reasons of plot, as well as for emotional reasons, the embassy could not meet its end. However, for political reasons, the embassy should have been able to reach an agreement. The communal norms are explicit: reconciliation ensures the community's wellbeing.

### 2.3 Balancing emotions with communal norms: the reconciliation between Agamemnon and Achilles in the assembly of *Iliad* 19

In Sections 2.1 and 2.2, we have seen that, unlike the assembly in *Iliad* 1, the assembly and the council in *Iliad* 9 do not result in complete failure. Nevertheless, the stance of the individuals does not lead to practical solutions either: following the

---

<sup>237</sup> On the fact that Achilles does not feel pity for anybody but himself up to *Iliad* 16, along with his excessive concentration on his own suffering, see Most (2003) 65-6. On Achilles's pity for Patroclus (*Iliad* 16); for Eumelos (*Iliad* 23); and for Priam (*Iliad* 24), see Most (2003) 67-71. In connection to Achilles's pity for Priam, see also the discussion in Chapter 5.

<sup>238</sup> *Cf.* Scodel (2008) 145, who argues that, whether Agamemnon's excessive offer creates a win-win situation, depends upon how other individuals evaluate this offer. By implication, if the offended individual is not satisfied, then this suggests that an individual's feelings significantly shape communal standards.

Achaean defeat in *Iliad* 8, Agamemnon's fear, distress, and regret over his behaviour in the council and assembly in *Iliad* 2 prompt him to suggest that the Achaeans leave Troy in the assembly of *Iliad* 9. This suggestion, in turn, provokes the assembly's dissatisfaction and its abandonment, while Agamemnon's insecurity regarding his rank, as well as his immodest desire to reign cause him to make a rather grandiose offer to Achilles, which is still lacking in 'sweet words', thereby failing to follow Nestor's suggestion within the council. As with Agamemnon's behaviour towards Achilles in *Iliad* 1, in *Iliad* 9 Achilles fails to manage his emotions towards Agamemnon, causing him to disregard the ambassadors' appeals, thereby neglecting his obligations to the community. In this section, I show that in contrast to *Iliad* 9, in *Iliad* 19 Agamemnon's and Achilles's emotional behaviour is eventually consistent with communal norms (Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2), which, in turn, affects the assembly's decision: thanks to Odysseus's intervention (Section 2.3.3), the assembly in *Iliad* 19 results in the formal reconciliation of Agamemnon and Achilles.

### 2.3.1 Achilles's emotional and political turn

In order to demonstrate how the change of Achilles's emotional state influences his political stance, thereby shaping the political setting in *Iliad* 19, I first consider how the political developments after *Iliad* 9, which result in the death of Patroclus, shape Achilles's emotional state, viz. Achilles's intense suffering, which is bound up with Achilles's profound respect and affection for his best friend, Patroclus (*cf.* 18.80-2). I then consider how Achilles's suffering impacts upon his disposition towards Agamemnon and Hector which contributes to resolving his conflict with Agamemnon.

Achilles's holding on to his anger causes the continuous retreat of the Achaeans despite Agamemnon's ἀπιστία in *Iliad* 11, as well as the support of Hera and Poseidon in *Iliad* 14.<sup>239</sup> Although Achilles recognises that what happened should be left in the past for anger cannot last forever (16.60-1)<sup>240</sup> – and he agrees to provide Patroclus with his armour (16.64-5), thereby aiming to impede the Achaeans' retreat (*cf.* 16.40-3; 16.241-5; *cf.* also 16.126-9) – Achilles remains focused on his own

<sup>239</sup> On Hera's and Poseidon's support for the Achaeans' in *Iliad* 14, see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.

<sup>240</sup> On the different interpretations of lines 16.60-5, see Muellner (1996) 156-60.

emotions, being unable to overcome Agamemnon's insult (11.609-10;<sup>241</sup> 16.17-18; 16.52-9). Achilles's failure to feel the pity he feels for Patroclus (*cf.* 16.5-11)<sup>242</sup> for the entire community leads to Patroclus's death (16.855), proving right the ambassadors' warning (regarding the deleterious consequences on Achilles's part, following his rejection of the embassy in *Iliad* 9 (*cf.* Section 2.2.2)). Patroclus dies because he disregards Achilles's advice not to approach Troy's wall, chasing after the Trojans (*cf.* 16.91-6; 16.246-8; 18.13-14; 16.684-7; 16.855), but also because Achilles himself fails to protect his beloved friend (18.98-9; 18.102). Thus, when Antilochus informs Achilles about Patroclus's death (18.18-21), Achilles is forced to face the consequences of his election to disregard the ambassadors' message. That is to say, the loss of Patroclus causes him to realise the consequences of rejecting the embassy's appeals on both a personal and a communal level: there is no joy or satisfaction as a result of Zeus's fulfilment of his request, viz. the Achaeans' defeat for the sake of his τιμή (18.79-80), but rather only his failure to protect his friend, to defend the Achaeans' community, and to participate in political debate (18.102-6). In other words, Achilles's realisation of what his implacable stance has caused – to both himself and the community – prompts him to feel the regret that was predicted in *Iliad* 9, which, in turn, contrasts with his feelings at the end of *Iliad* 1 vis-à-vis his excessive attention to the individual as opposed to the community. Achilles's excessive anger against Agamemnon and his disregard of the community result in Achilles's having to endure the pain caused by Patroclus's loss, as well as the bitter awakening of his failure to live up to communal standards and expectations.

Just as Achilles's anger precipitates the continuous retreat of the Achaeans, and eventually leads to Patroclus's death, so too does Achilles's suffering impact upon the assembly decision-making in *Iliad* 19 and the ensuing political

---

<sup>241</sup> Note that, in *Iliad* 11, Achilles begins to worry about the Achaeans: he sends Patroclus to the Achaeans' camp to find out about the wounded Machaon carried by Nestor (11.599-603; 11.611-15). However, despite his concern for Machaon, Achilles expects the Achaeans to fall into his knees and beg for his help (11.609-10). Note the contrast to 18.102-6; see below.

<sup>242</sup> Achilles's pity for Patroclus in *Iliad* 16 constitutes the starting point of Achilles's emotional change, resulting in the renouncement of his anger; see Most (2003) 67-9. On Achilles's pity for Patroclus at 16.7-12, *cf.* also Cairns (2009) 45 in contrast to Föllinger (2009) 22. While he pities Patroclus, Achilles still wishes the Achaeans' disaster, imagining himself and Patroclus as a community of two, capturing Troy without anyone else's help: 16.97-100. On Patroclus's weeping at 16.2-4, which causes Achilles's compassion, and the function of non-verbal communication in this context, see Minchin (2008) 30-2. On the similarities between Patroclus's attempt to convince Achilles at 16.22-7 and Nestor's speech at 11.656-62, as well as Patroclus's words towards Achilles at 16.36-45 (which are almost a verbatim repetition of Nestor's (11.794-803)), see Reichel (1994) 138-44.

developments. Achilles's emotional state is expressed explicitly through literal language (cf. 18.22: ἄχος (pain); 18.33: ἔστενε (he was groaning); 18.35: σμερδαλέον δ' ὄμωξεν (he plangently lamented); 18.73: 'τί κλαίεις' ('why are you crying'); 18.78: βαρὺ στενάχων (heavily sighing); 18.235: δάκρυα θερμὰ χέων (pouring hot tears); 19.5: κλαίοντα λυγέως (crying shrilly); 19.57: ἀχνυμένω (grieving); 19.307: ἄχος αἰνόν (terrible pain)); metaphorical language (cf. 18.22: ἄχος νεφέλη (cloud of pain), as well as the assimilation of clouds and garments (in connection to the use of the verb ἐκάλυψε; covered)); and body language. Here, the connection between grief and the body is multi-faceted. First, it may be linked to the externalisation of the emotion vis-à-vis the body, namely, the disfiguring of the body as an indication of one's suffering or the individual's attempt to cause self-harm (cf. 18.23-4; 18.26-7).<sup>243</sup> The act of disfiguring is a ritual mourning gesture (cf. also 22.414; 24.640),<sup>244</sup> while Achilles's experience of grief is evinced by the homology of grief and death.<sup>245</sup> This homology becomes all the more important given that Patroclus is a surrogate of Achilles,<sup>246</sup> and that Achilles's mourning may allude to Achilles's own death in the tradition.<sup>247</sup> By implication, when grieving for Patroclus, Achilles acts as if he were in Patroclus's position, which in turn is bound up with Antilochus's fear of the possibility that Achilles might opt to take his own life (18.33-4). Here, what Achilles views as his failure to be a good friend makes him wish for his own death (18.98-100), while his failure as a leader makes him feel as if he lacks

<sup>243</sup> Achilles pours dust over his head (18.23), disfigures his face (18.24), lies in the dust (18.26), and tears his hair (18.27). Note the emphasis on the act of disfiguring through the repetition of αἰσχύνω (18.24: ἤσχυνε; 18.27: ἤσχυνε).

<sup>244</sup> On the ritual mourning for Patroclus's death, cf. also 18.339-55; 19.286-300 (on these lines, see Alexiou (1974) 165; 132-3 with n. 7 and n. 8). On the issue of differences in Homeric mourning or weeping based on gender, see Monsacré (1984); Arnould (1990); Holst-Warhaft (1992); Murnaghan (1999); Perkell (2008); Föllinger (2009) in contrast to van Wees (1998); Cairns (2009) 43-5.

<sup>245</sup> The dead are covered by a garment (see, for example, 18.352-3; 23.254; 24.587-8; 24.795-6); Achilles is covered by a cloud (18.22); the dead are defiled and covered in the earth by the earth; Achilles lies down, and dust covers his garment (cf. 18.25-6). For an analysis of lines 18.22-7, with a focus on the significance of veiling in the passage, see Cairns (2009) 51-2; Cairns (2016). For the homology of cloud, grief, and death, cf. also Onians (1954) 420-66.

<sup>246</sup> Patroclus goes into battle in Achilles's armour (16.64-5; 16.129-54).

<sup>247</sup> Note the use of μέγας μεγαλωστί at 18.26 (αὐτὸς δ' ἐν κονίησι μέγας μεγαλωστί τανυσθεῖς; and he himself outstretched in the dust far and wide): Achilles lies down like a dead body; in fact, he is like his own dead body; cf. Agamemnon's words towards Achilles in *Od.* 24.40 (κεῖσο μέγας μεγαλωστί, λελασμένος ἵπποσυνάων; you were lying far and wide, having lost your horsemanship). On the connection between these two uses of μέγας μεγαλωστί and the third one at *Il.* 16.776 (κεῖτο μέγας μεγαλωστί, λελασμένος ἵπποσυνάων), which pertains to Cebriones, Hector's charioteer, see Janko (1994) 408 on 16.775-6.

any purpose in life (18.102-4).<sup>248</sup> The connection between the body and grief is further linked to the connection between the function of the human organism (viz. the relation between emotion and physicality) and the cohesion of the community: Achilles suggests that the meal is to be foregone (19.205-10; *cf.* also 19.304-8; 19.319-21), thereby jeopardising the Achaeans' endurance in the imminent battle, as well as the social relationships between community members (regarding the social importance of the meal, see Section 2.3.3 below).

Despite his lack of motivation to keep living (*cf.* 18.79-82; 18.98-100; 18.102-4; 19.319-22), Achilles's suffering for Patroclus's fate creates an emotional dynamic of political importance which contributes to the end of the quarrel and the beginning of his reintegration within the Achaean community. It causes Achilles to give up his anger at Agamemnon and grow angry at Hector, while longing for his return to the battlefield. This emotional development not only shapes the assembly in *Iliad* 19 but justifies its convocation. Indeed, Thetis urges Achilles to call the assembly in order to renounce his anger towards Agamemnon (19.34-5).<sup>249</sup> In the presence of Achilles, after his extended detachment from the community and battle (19.45-6), the Achaeans are gathered in an assembly (19.54). The importance of this assembly is marked by the assembly's full attendance (19.54; 19.42-6). While in the embassy of *Iliad* 9 Achilles was unable to see himself as part of the Achaean community, and so could not take on responsibility for his communal obligations (Section 2.2.2) owing to his focus on Agamemnon's blatant violation of the prize-distribution protocol (Section 2.1), in the assembly of *Iliad* 19 Achilles appears to share the same interests as Agamemnon. Indeed, he now comes to realise that the quarrel in *Iliad* 1 has caused negative consequences for both himself and Agamemnon (*cf.* his rhetorical question at 19.56-8).<sup>250</sup> Thus, although Achilles does not *explicitly* admit that he should have

---

<sup>248</sup> On the identification between Achilles and Patroclus and the difference between Achilles's stance in *Iliad* 16 and *Iliad* 18, see Muellner (1996) 134-6; 154-62, especially 161: 'Whereas before, his gesture of *philótēs* had been a total identification with his best friend Patroklos, now his concern is to avenge that friend's death but also to redress his neglect of the social group.'

<sup>249</sup> As in *Iliad* 1, in *Iliad* 19 Achilles calls the assembly after divine intervention (*cf.* 1.54-5). Achilles does not violate any norm at the expense of Agamemnon's power by calling the assembly himself. See Section 2.1. Note the contrast: 'Die Agora im 19. Buch ist die inhaltliche Umkehrung der ersten Versammlung'; Lohmann (1970) 173.

<sup>250</sup> Elmer (2013) 126-7 argues that Achilles's and Agamemnon's approaches within the assembly present their conflict as a private matter that pertains to only the two of them. However, while it is true that Achilles does not address the assembly, he still takes into account the disastrous consequences of the conflict on the community (*cf.* 19.59-62). Note furthermore that neither in *Iliad* 1 (before the outbreak of the quarrel) does Achilles address the assembly (1.59). *Cf.* also Taplin (1992) 205: Achilles

accepted the embassy's message, his view aligns with the embassy's argumentation. In contrast to Achilles's argument in *Iliad* 9,<sup>251</sup> in *Iliad* 19 Briseis is depicted as the main cause of the Achaeans' disaster. Achilles now wishes that Artemis had killed her in Lyrnessus; this would prevent the Achaeans' loss, which was the result of Achilles's anger and his concomitant withdrawal from the battlefield (*cf.* 19.59-63).<sup>252</sup> While renouncing his anger, Achilles admits the impropriety of his insistence on it (19.67-8: 'νῦν δ' ἤτοι μὲν ἐγὼ παύω χόλον, οὐδέ τί με χρῆ/ ἄσκελέως αἰεὶ μενεαινέμεν' – 'yet now I am putting an end to my anger; I must not be relentlessly angry'), and recognises the importance of relinquishing the anger even forcibly (*cf.* 19.66 and 18.113: θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλον δαμάσαντες ἀνάγκη) or despite any suffering (*cf.* 19.65 and 18.112: ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν προτετύχθαι ἐάσομεν ἀχνύμενοί περ). He even wishes the absence of conflict and anger (18.107-8), which contrasts with his stance in *Iliad* 1, notably in *Iliad* 9 (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2.2 respectively). Along with these admissions comes Achilles's significant realisation that his anger-driven attitude caused regrettable results (18.79-82), an eventuality that was acutely stressed by the embassy (Section 2.2.2). Thus Achilles realises that Patroclus's death resulted from his own ἄτη; the form of lamentable consequences about which Phoenix warned. In spite of this, Achilles ostensibly agrees with Agamemnon who attributes to Zeus his own ἄτη, which prompted the quarrel in the first place (see Section 2.3.2 below).

Achilles's suffering over Patroclus's death prevents him from focusing on Agamemnon's insult, thereby managing his anger towards him (19.67-8). In so doing, Achilles begins the process of reintegrating himself within the Achaean community,<sup>253</sup> displaying emotional and political behaviour in accordance with the

---

'uses conciliatory duals (*cf.* 'ἐμῆς καὶ σῆς ('yours and mine') in 64)'. *Cf.* Scodel (2008) 118, who observes that Achilles's first speech in the assembly of *Iliad* 19 'functions as a remedial speech not only towards Agamemnon but towards all the Achaeans.'

<sup>251</sup> *Cf.* Achilles's rhetorical question at 9.340-1, which highlights Agamemnon's fundamental injustice, exploiting moral and political argumentation (discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.2): it is not just the sons of Atreus who love their women, Achilles does too (9.343). That is, Achilles's attitude towards Briseis appears to change in accordance with context depending upon Achilles's emotions about other things. In this connection, Hammer (2002) 104 argues that Achilles distances himself from Briseis already at 9.343 (ἐκ θυμοῦ φίλεον· δουρικτήτην περ ἐοῦσαν: 'I loved her from my heart even though she was won by the spear') and that 'His original relationship to Briseis is defined solely by social convention.' Contrast Stanley (1993) 112: 'Achilleus' rejection of external forms in favour of essential value is perhaps most poignantly expressed in his assertion (341ff) that even though Briseis was a captive of war his feeling for her was genuine (*ek thymou*, 343)'.  
<sup>252</sup> See Ajax's point of view at 9.636-9; *cf.* Allan and Cairns (2011) 129-30.

<sup>253</sup> Scholars argue that Achilles is never really reintegrated into the community: he does not take food until *Iliad* 24; he does not participate in Patroclus's funeral games; his reconciliation with Agamemnon is only partial owing to Achilles's leading attitude in *Iliad* 23 and *Iliad* 24. *Cf.* for example Redfield

communal norms. That is, he begins realising that one's anger needs to be experienced with certain limitations, viz. as regulated by communal interests.

### 2.3.2 Agamemnon's emotional and political turn

Just as Achilles's emotional state affects his political stance and the political developments within the assembly of *Iliad* 19, so too does Agamemnon's. In this section, then, I first argue for Agamemnon's unwillingness to participate in the assembly of *Iliad* 19. Next, I explore Agamemnon's attempt to control his discomfort within the assembly, expressing his readiness to offer gifts to Achilles, despite his initial failure to endorse Achilles's announcement that he will be returning to the battlefield.

Agamemnon's unwillingness to participate in the assembly comes to the fore through his body language, along with his disapproval of the Achaeans' excitement. He breaches the protocol requiring speakers to stand<sup>254</sup> in the centre of the assembly<sup>255</sup> by delivering his speech while seated (19.77: ἀυτόθεν ἐξ ἔδρης, οὐδ' ἐν μέσσοισιν ἀναστάς).<sup>256</sup> Although the fact that Agamemnon is injured (19.51-3) can be used to explain his decision to remain seated, his physical stance is not the only thing

---

(1994) 218; Wilson (2002) 116; Elmer (2013) 128-30. Contrast Muellner (1996) 163: 'the bond of *philótēs* and the formal reintegration of Achilles into Achaean society through the renunciation of his *mēnis* and the public distribution to Achilles of the gifts from Agamemnon terminate his alienation'. Most (2003) 70 argues that Achilles begins to reintegrate into the Achaeans' community after killing Hector and burying Patroclus. While it is important to know whether or when Achilles is fully integrated in the community, the crucial point from the political perspective is how Achilles's behaviour impacts upon the community: Achilles eventually agrees that the Achaeans should have a meal and contributes to the Trojans' defeat. On this, see Section 2.3.3. Contrast Elmer (2013) 128, who agrees with Wilson's (2002) argument about the different use of the terms δῶρα; ἄποινα; ποιμή, and argues that by using the term ἄποινα at 19.138 ('ἂν ἐθέλω ἀρέσαι δόμενά τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα'), Agamemnon emphasises Achilles's isolation from the community. For a critique of Wilson's (2002) general argument, see Cairns (2011b) 87-116.

<sup>254</sup> Cf. 1.58; 1.68; 1.101; 1.248; 2.76; 2.101; 2.279; 9.14; 9.52; 19.55; 19.269. Cf. also Kirk (1985) 145, on 2.278-82: 'the would-be speaker rising to his feet is regular procedure'. Note that the Trojans' behaviour in the assembly of *Iliad* 18 also deviates from the norms. On this assembly, see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.

<sup>255</sup> On the fact that speakers normally deliver the speech in the middle of the assembly, see Detienne (1996) 90-102. I do not agree with Kurz (1966) 60; Clay (1995) 73; and Elmer (2013) 127, who advocate a similar approach, viz. that by not moving to the centre of the assembly, Agamemnon wants to address his words primarily to Achilles, thereby privatising the conflict.

<sup>256</sup> Edwards (1991), 243-5 on 19.76-7 gives a summary of the interpretations on Agamemnon's stance here. On the concept of 'elevation' in Homer and Agamemnon's body language in this context, see Lateiner (1995) 95-8. Cf. also Clay (1995) 72-5, including bibliographical references. Contrast Thornton (1984) 129, who argues that by remaining seated, 'Agamemnon comes before Achilles as a suppliant'.

that flouts protocols.<sup>257</sup> His emotional attitude likewise contravenes communal norms because, rather than being happy about Achilles's decision to let go of his anger as the rest of the Achaeans are (*cf.* 19.74-5), Agamemnon asks them to be silent, thereby communicating dissatisfaction and annoyance with the Achaeans' approbation of Achilles's speech (*cf.* 19.79-82). In so doing, Agamemnon yet again fails to acknowledge the crucial role of approbation within the decision-making process, which is reminiscent of his failure to consider the Achaeans' approval of Chryses's request in *Iliad* 1, causing him to initiate the quarrel with Achilles and its corollary, *viz.* the Achaeans' suffering.

Agamemnon's demand that the assembly be silent is bound up with his loss of status: the Achaeans' excitement about Achilles's announcement seals the failure of his political project announced at 1.185-7 (see Section 2.1), showing that he has lost the Achaeans' attention (given that they respond to Achilles's speech without waiting for Agamemnon's own response). In fact, the situation has already spiralled out of Agamemnon's control in the council of *Iliad* 14. There Agamemnon suggests that the Achaeans abandon the expedition (14.72-81),<sup>258</sup> and, following Odysseus's outright rejection of this idea (14.83-102), he abrogates his role in the decision-making process (*cf.* 14.107-8), that is, he abrogates his institutional authority within the council. This abrogation does not merely result from a strong disagreement. It instead underscores his seriously weakened political standing. For, although there were other oppositions (as seen in Nestor's vain intervention in *Iliad* 1 (1.254-84), as well as Diomedes's and Nestor's speeches in *Iliad* 9 (*cf.* 9.32-49; 9.53-78; 9.96-113; 9.115-20)), still these arguments did not prompt him to disclaim his part in decision-making processes. Thus, in abstaining from the decision-making in *Iliad* 14, Agamemnon implicitly acknowledges his poor leadership, which justifies the anger of both Achilles and the rest of the Achaeans, following his own confession at 14.49-51:

---

<sup>257</sup> Note that Agamemnon's wound does not actually affect his ability to stand. Clay (1995) 74 quotes Leaf (1900-1902) on 16.76-7, who notices that Agamemnon is wounded in his elbow (*cf.* 11.252), while Lateiner (1995) 97 n. 9 observes that Agamemnon is well enough to perform the sacrifice at 19.266. Thus Allan and Cairns (2011) 131 are right to observe that Agamemnon's wound represents his political failure. See more details below. *Cf.* also Clay (1995) 74: 'the wound is merely an alibi for the king's ungracious stance'.

<sup>258</sup> *Cf.* the similarity between *Iliad* 9 and *Iliad* 14. In both cases, Agamemnon is in fear owing to the Achaeans' defeat (9.1-3; 14.44-8), therefore suggesting that they leave Troy (9.26-8; 14.74-9). *Cf.* also Schofield (1986) 24-5.

‘ὦ πόποι, ἦ ῥα καὶ ἄλλοι εὐκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοὶ  
ἐν θυμῷ βάλλονται ἐμοὶ χόλον ὡς περ Ἀχιλλεύς,  
οὐδ’ ἐθέλουσι μάχεσθαι ἐπὶ πρύμνησι νέεσσι.’

‘Oh shame, all the other well-greaved Achaeans are surely accumulating anger in their heart against me, as does Achilles, and are not willing to fight by the sterns’ ships.’<sup>259</sup>

Following the council in *Iliad* 14, in the assembly of *Iliad* 19 Agamemnon appears to remain unable to exploit the institutional structures of his authority, viz. the exercise of authority on his own behalf (*cf.* the heralds’ absence in the assembly). He therefore has to demand a hearing himself.<sup>260</sup> By implication, Achilles’s withdrawal from the battlefield – resulting in the injuries of Diomedes, Odysseus, and Agamemnon (*cf.* 19.47-52; all wounded in *Iliad* 11), Patroclus’s death (16.855), as well as the Achaeans’ defeat (with the Trojans’ presence by the Achaean ships) – causes the Achaeans to view Agamemnon as a failed leader. This perception, in turn, reinforces Agamemnon’s sensitivity regarding his leadership.

Viewed in this light, Agamemnon’s demand for silence signifies Agamemnon’s profound demoralisation and inept attempt to save face, a need certainly conditioned by the public nature of the reconciliation in assembly context. In order to save face, he ascribes his misconduct to ἄτη (*cf.* 19.86-8; 19.134-7), manipulating the concept in rhetorical ways to exculpate himself from his fundamental violation in *Iliad* 1, that is, he seeks to dissociate himself from his own wrongdoing (18.86: ‘ἐγὼ δ’ οὐκ αἰτιός εἰμι’).<sup>261</sup> As he himself puts it, the arbitrary withdrawal of Briseis was not his fault. Instead it was an act out of his control, for the

---

<sup>259</sup> *Cf.* Agamemnon’s recognition of his failure at 2.370-80, 9.115-20. See, for example, Taplin (1990); *cf.* also above Section 2.2.1. In this regard, also note Lohnman’s (1970) 173 pertinent observation: ‘In allen 4 Versammlungen spielt Agamemnon eine zentrale Rolle, wobei das ständige Sinken seiner Autorität als Heerführer schön an den einzelnen Stufen zu beobachten ist.’

<sup>260</sup> After the end of the assembly in *Iliad* 1, the heralds exercise authority on Agamemnon’s behalf, and remove Briseis from Achilles (*cf.* 1.320-1; 1.326-7; 1.347). Similarly, in *Iliad* 2 and *Iliad* 9, the heralds call the assembly (*cf.* 2.50-2; 9.10-11) on behalf of Agamemnon. Note, however, that, in *Iliad* 9, where he is clearly in a weakened position (Section 2.2.1), Agamemnon appears to get involved himself in the summoning of the assembly (9.12). Thus the heralds’ contribution to the exercise of authority on Agamemnon’s behalf is equivalent to Agamemnon’s political strength in different contexts. *Cf.* Allan and Cairns (2011) 143 n. 52.

<sup>261</sup> *Cf.* Cairns (2012) 19: ‘*Atē* can be used to exculpate, excuse, or mitigate because it facilitates a distinction between a person’s enduring character and a single sequence of action that can be represented as the result of a temporary, aberrant state of mind (one that may, but need not, be externally induced).’ *Cf.* also *ibid.* 25-6.

fault lies with Zeus, Moira, Erinys, and Ate (*cf.* 19.87-93). In this connection, he furthermore narrates the mythical example of Zeus’s deception in detail (*cf.* 19.95-129), thereby seeking to emphasise his disavowal of responsibility for his former disrespect towards Achilles. If ἄτη managed to deceive Zeus, then he is justified in having been deceived himself.<sup>262</sup>

Despite Agamemnon’s attempts to deny responsibility (based on ἄτη), ἄτη does render Agamemnon responsible for his transgression.<sup>263</sup> First, Achilles has used the same concept in *Iliad* 1 to underline his commitment against Agamemnon (1.407-12): as Achilles puts it, Agamemnon must understand that failing to honour him was a grave error of judgment, the responsibility of which rests squarely on his side (*cf.* 1.411-12). Secondly, in the council of *Iliad* 9, Agamemnon himself associates responsibility with ἄτη in accepting Nestor’s criticism on his breach of communal norms (*cf.* 9.115-16: ‘ὦ γέρον, οὐ τι ψεῦδος ἐμὰς ἄτας κατέλεξας/ ἀασάμην, οὐδ’ αὐτὸς ἀναίνομαι’: ‘old man, there is no lie that you recounted my delusions’; ‘I acted foolishly, I am not refusing it myself’; 9.119: ‘ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ ἀασάμην φρεσὶ λευγαλέησι πιθήσας’; ‘but because I acted foolishly, having obeyed to harmful thoughts’). Thus, when in *Iliad* 19 Agamemnon uses the concept to deny responsibility (*cf.* 19.86-9), it is nigh on impossible that the (internal) audience believes him. In fact, like Nestor in *Iliad* 9, so too Odysseus in *Iliad* 19 criticises Agamemnon’s attitude, thereby making it clear that the fault was undoubtedly Agamemnon’s (*cf.* 19.181-3), which, on the one hand, proves Agamemnon’s attempt at self-exculpation unconvincing, and on the other, makes Achilles’s complaint in *Iliad* 1 legitimate. In this connection, while hoping that Agamemnon will not repeat any fundamental violation against the norms, Odysseus stresses the requirement that Agamemnon be a fair leader, thereby underscoring the crucial role of justice in leadership (19.181-3):

‘Ἀτρείδη, σὺ δ’ ἔπειτα δικαιότερος καὶ ἐπ’ ἄλλω  
 ἔσσαι. οὐ μὲν γάρ τι νεμεσσητὸν βασιλῆα  
 ἄνδρ’ ἀπαρέσασθαι, ὅτε τις πρότερος χαλεπήνη.’

<sup>262</sup> *Cf.* Allan and Cairns (2011) 131; Scodel (2008) 119; ἄτη can, in fact, deceive everyone (19.91 and 19.129: “Ἄτη, ἢ πάντα ἄται”). For a comparison between Agamemnon’s and Zeus’s ἄτη in connection to the structure of the passage (19.85-138), see Lohmann (1970) 75-80.

<sup>263</sup> See Cairns (2012). *Cf.* also Cairns (2001b) 15-19, including review of Lesky’s (2001) and Schmitt’s (1990) account. Contrast scholars (such as Dodds (1951); Adkins (1960); Gagarin (1987)), who consider Agamemnon’s apology as conventional because, in their view, Homeric society operates on the basis of the person’s liability, *not* the person’s responsibility for their actions.

‘Son of Atreus, you shall be fairer hereafter with anyone else, for it is not inappropriate for a king to appease a man, when one was the first to get angry.’<sup>264</sup>

Note, however, that, unlike Odysseus, Achilles appears to agree with Agamemnon’s excuses (viz. that Zeus must have wanted their conflict (19.270-5)). Still it is highly questionable that he does actually believe Agamemnon’s explanations.<sup>265</sup> Agreeing with Agamemnon on the attribution of the quarrel to the gods (19.270-5) appears to serve Achilles’s ends insofar as, if he gets along with Agamemnon, he will sooner be able to return to the battlefield. This is to say that Achilles’s desire to avenge Patroclus’s death is stronger than his desire to humiliate Agamemnon (contrast Achilles’s desire in *Iliad* 9). Thus, while he does not believe him, Achilles uses face-saving language not to save face *himself*, but to allow *Agamemnon* to save face, with the aim of expediting the Achaean army’s return to the battlefield (19.275-6).<sup>266</sup> Along with Odysseus and Achilles, even Agamemnon suspects that the assembly is unlikely to share his interpretation, for they all think that he is the one to blame. Indeed, according to Agamemnon’s words at 19.85-6, the Achaeans have repeatedly reproached him for his transgression. Thus, although Agamemnon’s clear political failure causes him to accept only liability (19.86; 19.137-8), thereby saving face in the public context of an assembly, *everyone* knows that he must make amends owing to his responsibility.<sup>267</sup>

---

<sup>264</sup> Thus the absence of any explicit reference to δίκη in Nestor’s words in *Iliad* 1 and *Iliad* 9 does not suggest that, in those cases, justice does not come into play: since the same pragmatic evaluation includes reference to justice on a third occasion, then justice is also relevant in the foregoing examples. See Cairns (2001a).

<sup>265</sup> Edwards (1991) 266-7 on 19.270-5 notes the irony in lines 19.273-4 in connection to Achilles’s wish at 1.408-12, whereby Achilles asks for Zeus’s involvement through his appeal to his mother.

<sup>266</sup> Cairns (2010) 4-5; Allan and Cairns (2011) 131-2 argue that Achilles follows Agamemnon’s example and agrees with Agamemnon on attributing the quarrel to Zeus, because, like Agamemnon, Achilles himself wants to save face. Contrast Scodel (2008) 121, who argues that ‘For Achilles, the desire to avenge Patroclus makes face-considerations irrelevant’. Yet Achilles does consider face-saving dynamics, when referring to Olympian manipulation of the quarrel’s onset: because he wants to return to the battlefield as soon as possible, he has to allow Agamemnon to save face. Other scholars argue that Agamemnon’s and Achilles’s relationship is never really restored (*cf.* Donlan (1993) 168; Postlethwaite (1995) 100-2). While it is true that there might be a ‘continuing antagonism’ between Agamemnon and Achilles (see Allan and Cairns (2011) 136), their behaviour from *Iliad* 19 onwards does not violate any communal protocols as it does in *Iliad* 1 and *Iliad* 9. By arguing that Achilles places himself as a ‘social and military superior’, including passages such as 24.669f., Postlethwaite (1995) 102 fails to take into account the human side that urges Achilles to sympathise with the pain of a father, who has lost his son, and to admire Priam for his courage in meeting him in person. Note, also, Achilles’s recognition of Agamemnon’s authority at 24.654-5: see Chapter 5. On the fact that Achilles’s actions in *Iliad* 23 are in accordance with justice, see Hammer (2002) 136-43.

<sup>267</sup> See Taplin (1992) 203-10, especially 207-8; Scodel (2008) 118. Contrast Williams (1993) 54, who argues that Agamemnon is not αἴτιος in the sense that ‘he was not in a normal state of mind’. Contrast

Thus, while denying blameworthiness, Agamemnon explicitly states his desire to make amends (19.138; *cf.* also 9.119-20), which is another implicit admission of his responsibility and fault. Agamemnon is therefore willing to offer Achilles gifts that suit his desires (19.143-4; *cf.* also 19.140-1; 19.138). In so doing, he does not issue threats within the assembly (contrast 1.137-9; 1.181-5) nor does he try to establish dominance (contrast 1.185-7; 9.158-61; 9.141-2).<sup>268</sup> Thus, despite being annoyed at the beginning of his speech, Agamemnon eventually manages to control his discomfort in accordance with communal norms.

In a nutshell, like Achilles, Agamemnon displays diverse emotional behaviour at different parts of the epos, with a marked change taking place in *Iliad* 19 compared to *Iliad* 1 and *Iliad* 9, a change that is owing to the political developments following *Iliad* 9. However, as we shall see below, while being willing to reconcile, both heroes disregard important aspects of the institutional part of the reconciliation process, thereby jeopardising the interests of the community.

### 2.3.3 Odysseus's sensible leadership

In this section, I first demonstrate the political and emotional implications of Odysseus's proposal that the Achaeans take a meal before the battle. Secondly, I underscore the political and personal importance of the reconciliation protocol vis-à-vis emotion. Thanks to his intervention, Odysseus spurs the assembly into reaching a decision that properly considers the overarching interests of the community, thereby not merely the priorities of the two leaders.<sup>269</sup> In contrast to former decisions of

---

Wilson (2002) 117, who argues that Agamemnon accepts responsibility neither in *Iliad* 9 nor in *Iliad* 19.

<sup>268</sup> Contrast the view of other scholars (*e.g.*, Wilson (2002) 118; Elmer (2013) 141 n. 35), who argue that by reoffering the gifts in *Iliad* 19, Agamemnon has the same intention to impose power as in *Iliad* 9.

<sup>269</sup> *Cf.* also Odysseus's intervention in *Iliad* 2 and *Iliad* 14. On Odysseus's stance in *Iliad* 2, Hammer (2002) 87-8 argues that although Odysseus might bring back the order in the Achaean community, he does not restore Agamemnon's power. He has taken Agamemnon's staff (2.186; *cf.* also the irony at 2.203-6), and unlike Achilles's point about willing obedience (1.150), he coerces obedience by exploiting force towards the other leaders (2.195) and physical violence towards the people (2.199). Note, however, that Agamemnon's true restoration of power cannot be entirely based on initiatives of others but requires his own negotiations. Moreover, Odysseus publicly shows his understanding for the reaction of the Achaeans (2.296-7) while also employing the mechanism of shame, as well as Calchas's divination of the Fall of Troy (see Schofield (1986) 26) to persuade the community. That Odysseus's words towards the other leaders are not necessarily to be understood in terms of force, *cf.* the narrator's comment at 2.189 (τὸν δ' ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσσιν ἐρητύσασκε παραστάς: *with soft words*, he [*i.e.*, Odysseus] would try to restrain him [*i.e.*, any leader Odysseus was encountering], standing beside him); *cf.* also Athena's similar words at 2.180 ('σοῖς δ' ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσσιν ἐρήτυε φῶτα ἕκαστον'). On the importance

Achaean political institutions, the assembly's decision-making in *Iliad* 19 furthers the communal interest, because individuals succeed in aligning their emotional behaviour with the community's norms, while taking sound advice into account.

Achilles's affection towards Patroclus is bound up with his great suffering, following Patroclus's death. Yet, while Patroclus's death causes Achilles to suffer to the extent that he loses his will to live (see Section 2.3.1), it also causes him to desire revenge, which, in turn, becomes Achilles's only motivation to continue living (18.90-3). Achilles's emotions towards Hector lead him to overlook certain communal norms, thereby insisting on the army's immediate return to the battlefield (19.68-9; 19.148-50; 19.205-8). As Odysseus points out, however, the Achaeans need to first have a meal, which will enable them to rest and achieve better results on the battlefield (19.155-70; 19.230-4). The meal not only fulfils the Achaeans' biological needs but undergirds the identity and cohesion of the group by reinforcing the social values of φιλότις and solidarity.<sup>270</sup> In the latter connection, Odysseus fosters solidarity through commensality (19.230-2), foregrounding the norms of mourning (19.225; 19.228-9). Mourning norms place limitations upon the Achaeans' grief regarding their comrades' death,<sup>271</sup> thereby reminding Achilles of the consolatory *topos*, viz. that he is not alone in suffering.<sup>272</sup> Just as the other Achaeans control their mourning for the sake of the community (19.225-33), before dismissing the meal's

---

of the community to act 'in their name' vis-à-vis effective power, see Hammer (2002) 90-1, who exploits in his discussion Arendt (1972) and Arendt (1958); cf. also Hammer (2002) 114ff., where he defines θέμις as a 'public claim of reciprocity' (p. 121) and a form of 'public enactment' (p. 129) and argues for its requirement for the exercise of effective power. Cf. the discussion in Chapter 1, Section 1.2. Note also that Hammer (2002) 123-6 includes in his discussion of justice Havelock's (1978) argumentation, as well as its criticism by Adkins (1983).

<sup>270</sup> Cf. van Wees (1992) 46: 'table-companionship in Homer is predominately an egalitarian, not a hierarchical relation. The obligations it creates, therefore, are not those of obedience and service but those of mutual support.' For further discussion on commensality and feasts vis-à-vis social status, see van Wees (1992) 44-8; van Wees (1995) 147-82 with n. 42; n. 47; n.57, which include approaches of other scholars. Although feasts may distinguish the mass from the elite (van Wees (1995)), feasts may also achieve release of tension in favour of the community, including the people: cf. the meal (and council) in *Iliad* 9 that prevents the escalation of confrontation between Agamemnon and Diomedes in the assembly (see Section 2.2.1 above). Note, furthermore, the role of the sacrificial ritual, the meal, and their connection to the identity and cohesion of the community: see Burkert (1985) 55-9; 254-6. Cf. also how the sacrifice at 19.252-69 affects Achilles's attitude at 19.275 (viz. by prompting the Achaeans to take a meal before their return to battle). On the sacrificial meal in Homer, see Seaford (1994) 42-53. The role of the meal protocol is significant for the Trojans (see Chapter 3, Section 3.1), the gods (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2), as well as the encounter between Priam and Achilles (see Chapter 5).

<sup>271</sup> On the constraints of the experience of grief and mourning, particularly of weeping, in Homer, see Cairns (2009) 41-3.

<sup>272</sup> Contrast Achilles's behaviour at 24.601; 24.618-20; 24.641-2: see Chapter 5.

necessity, Achilles should likewise consider the communal interest, thereby managing his suffering for Patroclus's death and his anger towards Hector.

Agamemnon's agreement about Achilles's exhortation (viz. that the army return to the battlefield immediately (*cf.* 19.139)) does not merely disregard the meal protocol: it constitutes a violation of the reconciliation ceremony, as well as its institutional character. Since Agamemnon has insulted Achilles publicly and has publicly promised to reconcile by offering gifts, Agamemnon should fulfil his promise in public.<sup>273</sup> Agamemnon must bring the gifts to the centre of the assembly (19.173; *cf.* also 19.249),<sup>274</sup> and unlike formerly when he gave his speech while seated (Section 2.3.2), he should stand (19.175; *cf.* also 19.250) and take an oath before the Achaeans (19.175).<sup>275</sup> The oath is important for political and personal reasons, both involving emotion: it publicly attests (19.249-65) Agamemnon's respect towards Achilles's personal emotions for Briseis (19.176-7; 19.261-3), while also implicating the assembly and the gods in the end of the quarrel. In addition to the oath, there is another element indispensable to the reconciliation's political and personal importance: Agamemnon should offer Achilles a meal (19.179). For, if the personal emotions between the leaders are balanced, their political cooperation is likewise more effective.<sup>276</sup> Yet the offer of the meal implies another association with the enactment of communal norms. On this point, Odysseus is once again explicit: by offering Achilles a meal, Agamemnon's behaviour is not deprived of justice (*cf.* 19.180: 'ἴνα μὴ τι δίκης ἐπιδευῆς ἔχησθα'). Following Odysseus's argument, in being fair on a personal level, Agamemnon displays fair behaviour on a political level, since

---

<sup>273</sup> *Cf.* Cairns (2015a) 58-9.

<sup>274</sup> *Cf.* Detienne (1973) 87-95.

<sup>275</sup> Note, furthermore, that while it is true that Achilles receives Agamemnon's offer on his own terms (see, e.g., Donlan (1989) 6; Postlethwaite (1995) 100), Agamemnon offers the gifts not from a position of strength but from a position of weakness: Achilles has renounced his anger irrespective of any offer. Contrast Page (1959) 305-9, who argues that there is an inconsistency with Achilles's initial refusal in *Iliad* 9. Contrast Eichholz (1953) 141-2; Willcock (1976) on 11.608 and 16.49-86. Moreover, the fact that Achilles receives the gifts on his terms does not mean that he is the 'ultimate winner' (*cf.*, e.g., Donlan (1989) 6; similarly Postlethwaite (1995) 102). The conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles ends in a lose-lose situation: Achilles loses Patroclus; Agamemnon fails as the Achaeans' leader.

<sup>276</sup> *Cf.* also Achilles's consolation from Agamemnon, Menelaus, Phoenix, Idomeneus, and Odysseus in Achilles's quarters (19.309-12). Achilles's consolation clearly has a purely interpersonal character, but emotional understanding on a personal level promotes political coaction, with Agamemnon's presence in Achilles's quarters contributing to this development. Contrast Postlethwaite (1995) 102, who argues that this consolation indicates Achilles's dominance over Agamemnon. On the failed political decisions as a result of failed personal interaction between the two leaders, see Agamemnon's distrust at Achilles in *Iliad* 1 (Section 2.1) and Achilles's distrust at Agamemnon in *Iliad* 9 (Section 2.2.2).

he enacts the standards of reciprocity and justice that support the king's admission of his own mistake (*cf.* 19.181-3 – Section 2.3.2).<sup>277</sup>

Odysseus does not only comment upon Agamemnon's proper behaviour. Achilles is also expected to display feelings of pleasure at Agamemnon's public oath and gifts (19.174; 19.178-9), which, in turn, implies that Achilles is wrong in disdaining Agamemnon's gifts (19.146-8; 19.199-202). Thus, in Odysseus's view, while Agamemnon's actions (as part of the formal reconciliation) are meant to act as political and personal reparations, Achilles should endorse this conciliatory gesture by reacting positively (*viz.* in a genuinely emotional manner).<sup>278</sup> Odysseus's expectations of the nature of Achilles's response are yet another indication of how the personal aspect of the reconciliation interacts with its political aspect while on both sides (*viz.* the personal and the political) emotion performs a crucial role. Unlike Agamemnon and Achilles, who both agree to end the quarrel rather precipitously, thereby permitting the army's immediate return to the battlefield, Odysseus's stance shows that his insistence on normative behaviour is *not* a matter of formality but an essential part of the reconciliation process.

In sum, then, Odysseus insists on individuals' normative behaviour in present, because he seeks to secure communal wellbeing in future. Indeed, norms, when are not exploited as the personal prerogative of leaders, but enacted impartially, can achieve personal and political wellbeing. To this end, the meal must be taken (given that it affects the Achaeans' performance on the battlefield from both a biological and a social perspective), while Agamemnon must understand that justice is part and parcel of good leadership. Thus a good leader must be able to achieve reconciliation especially when the leader himself is the conflict's instigator. By insisting upon individuals' normative behaviour, Odysseus demonstrates his own authority,<sup>279</sup> while

---

<sup>277</sup> Thus Odysseus agrees with Agamemnon in offering gifts to Achilles (19.138; 19.172-4), not because, as Wilson (2002) 119-20 argues, Odysseus supports Agamemnon's request for a public ceremony of the gifts' offering, but because he is interested in the resolution of the quarrel, and Agamemnon's fair and respectful behaviour as a leader in the future.

<sup>278</sup> See Allan and Cairns (2011) 133.

<sup>279</sup> See Allan and Cairns (2011) 132-3. Note also Odysseus's own defence of his status at 19.216-20, where, while acknowledging Achilles's exceptional skills in fighting, he points out his own efficiency in council (on this, *cf.* Martin (1989) 96-7), as well as the narrator's comment at 19.242 (αὐτίκ' ἐπειθ' ἄμα μῦθος ἔην, τετέλεστο δὲ ἔργον). On the function of the words ἔπος and μῦθος (*cf.* 19.220: μῦθοισι; 19.242: μῦθος), and their relation to the authoritative proposal or command, see Martin (1989) 26-37. On Nestor's and Phoenix's strategy to exploit the claims of their status to make their argument effective, see above Sections 2.1 and 2.2.

his focus on protocol and communal wellbeing legitimises his reprimand to Agamemnon,<sup>280</sup> thereby revealing the impact of institutional structures on the way in which individuals behave and communicate in personal and political contexts. In short, Odysseus's intervention emphasises the important role of communal norms vis-à-vis the balance between individuals' emotions and communal interests. Thus, owing to their emotional intelligence (viz. their ability to evaluate and incorporate in the course of action their own and others' emotions) and reflection on communal primacies, individuals like Odysseus and Nestor are exemplars of good leadership. For, in contrast to Agamemnon and Achilles, they are always able to prioritise the community's welfare, thereby abstaining from toppling matters of common good for the sake of personal priorities.

## 2.4 Conclusions

This chapter has discussed the leadership style and political judgement of the Achaean community, as grounded in decision-making processes within political institutions, such as the assembly, the council, and the embassy. I have argued that emotions, being embedded in communal norms, constitute a normative, as well as anti-normative, part of decision-making processes, for they both enhance and diminish the efficacy and suitability of decisions made by political institutions. Against this background, I have shown that decisions that disregard communal norms have disastrous consequences for both the individuals who make these decisions, and the community at large. Such decisions are caused by the individuals' unsuccessful negotiation of honour dynamics, which leads to division, typically underpinned by anger. Note, however, that while anger may be bound up with the individuals' appeal to normative claims, these claims are not invariably legitimate claims. Leaders must be able to manage their emotions while considering others' rights, needs, and feelings, not just their own. This is to say that they must act in accordance with the standards of reciprocity and justice: the λαός may remain, in some sense, undifferentiated. Still there are leaders, such as Odysseus and Nestor, in contrast to Agamemnon and Achilles, who always put the community first. The advice, proposals, and exhortations of such leaders are bound up with effective decision-making, which can be realised when the institution secures the consent of all its members. Effective

---

<sup>280</sup> On Odysseus's legitimate role in this context, cf. also Martin (1989) 28.

decision-making implies, therefore, a shared value system with a proper order and distribution of τιμή, whereby emotions such as ἔλεος and αἰδώς (in both its senses, viz. shame and respect) promote communal interests.



### 3. The Trojan political community

In Chapter 2, I argued that the Achaean institutions of the assembly, the council, and the embassy serve and secure the interests of the community when, in decision-making processes, leaders refrain from simply considering their own emotions and personal priorities and do not make appeals to normative claims unilaterally but allow for the community's wellbeing through the enactment of communal norms in collective terms. I argued that both scenarios, *i.e.*, effective and ineffective decision-making, shape and are shaped by individuals' emotions, which acquire a normative or anti-normative character depending upon the context. Thus, within the Achaean institutions, the outcome of negotiations of honour, a great – if not the greatest – motivational force in Iliadic communities, depends upon individuals' abilities to manage their own emotions, while also evaluating the emotions of others effectively, by considering communal norms from a bidirectional perspective in deliberative processes.

In Chapter 3, while continuing the exploration of different variants of leadership, I focus on the Trojan community. I argue that, as in the Achaean, so too in the Trojan assemblies, emotions are constitutive of decision-making processes. Yet, unlike the Achaean assemblies, consensus within Trojan assemblies is not always linked to effective decision-making: when an assembly's decision is procedurally but not also *constitutively* sound, the decision reached might lead to disastrous consequences for the community.<sup>281</sup> This is to say that following the procedure does not always guarantee success. Chapter 3 is divided into two sections. In Section 3.1, I discuss examples of effective decision-making within Trojan assemblies, while in Section 3.2, I focus on cases of ineffective decision-making, which is linked to poor leadership, *viz.* the leader's inability to be perspicacious himself, or at least to leverage the sound advice offered by his counsellors. I argue that the context in which

---

<sup>281</sup> This difference does not imply that the Achaean and Trojan (and Olympian) political institutions function differently. While their mechanisms are the same, it is the way the agents perform the regulations that can differ. For more on this, see below, and especially Section 3.2, along with the comparison between Agamemnon's and Hector's leadership. Although they belong to different communities, within their communities the Achaeans and Trojans share the same values (*e.g.*, ξενία, φιλότις). For more on this, see Chapter 5. Contrast Mackie (1996), who compares the Achaean and the Trojan community starting from the different use of language culminating in differences of basic social structures. Contrast also Sale (1994), who argues for different social structures between the Achaean and the Trojan community, situating his case in the context of the oral tradition. Schein (1984) 171-2 argues that 'the differences between the two societies are thematically determined'.

a decision is made may offer clues as to whether or not a decision is right before the actual consequences of this decision transpire.

### 3.1 Examples of successful assemblies

For three (*Iliad* 2, *Iliad* 7, and *Iliad* 8) out of four Trojan assemblies in the *Iliad* (*Iliad* 2, *Iliad* 7, *Iliad* 8, and *Iliad* 18),<sup>282</sup> the context of the narrative does not suggest that the Trojans make a decision that proves detrimental to their community.

In the Trojan assembly of *Iliad* 7, there is a clash between the positions of Antenor and Paris. Antenor was one of the Trojan counsellors known for his wisdom (7.347: *πεπνυμένος*;<sup>283</sup> cf. 3.203) and hospitality, which he offered to Menelaus and Odysseus, ambassadors for Helen's sake in an earlier stage of the war (3.205-7).<sup>284</sup> Antenor now emphasises the need to return Helen to the Achaeans along with her possessions (7.350-2). On the other hand, Paris, while willing to return Helen's possessions, professes his absolute opposition to Helen's return (7.357-64). The disagreement between Antenor and Paris is shaped by the former's concern about the Trojans' violation of the oaths in *Iliad* 3 and the implications of this violation (7.351-3), as well as by the latter's desire to keep Helen,<sup>285</sup> which prompts aggression towards Antenor.<sup>286</sup> Although Antenor's concern is justified in considering the consequences of the violation of the oaths (3.298-301 – see Chapter 5), it triggers Paris's point-blank refusal of his proposal, which in turn creates division within the Trojan assembly.

The division that results from the confrontation between Paris and Antenor is smoothed out by Priam's fruitful intervention, introduced by the narrator with a positively evaluating comment regarding Priam's efficacy in counsel (cf. 7.366:

---

<sup>282</sup> There is also an allusion to a retrospective assembly in Priam's narration in *Iliad* 3 (3.209: *ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ Τρώεσσι ἐν ἀγρομένοισιν ἔμιχθεν*; but when they (*i.e.*, Menelaus and Odysseus) mingled with the Trojans assembled), but the decision-making of this assembly goes unmentioned.

<sup>283</sup> On the meaning of *πεπνυμένος*, see for example Heath (2001) 129-57.

<sup>284</sup> The Achaeans might acknowledge these attributes of wisdom and hospitality when sparing Antenor's family at the capture of Troy. According to Strabo 13.1.53, who refers to Sophocles (Soph. fr. 10 Nauck), the Achaeans put a leopard skin in front of Antenor's house, so that it does not become part of the plunder. Antenor and his children then resort to Thrace; cf. Sophocles, *Antenoridai*; Pind. *Pyth.* 5.83-5.

<sup>285</sup> Note the use of affective language at 7.357 (*οὐκέτ' ... φίλα*: 'no longer ... pleasant') and at 7.364 (*ἔθέλω*: 'I want').

<sup>286</sup> In Paris's view, Antenor's proposal of Helen's return is an indication of Antenor being out of his mind (cf. 7.360: *ἔξ ἄρα δὴ τοι ἔπειτα θεοὶ φρένας ὄλεσαν αὐτοί*: 'the very gods then surely destroyed your mind').

θεόφιν μήστωρ ἀτάλαντος; counsellor equivalent to the gods). Just as Antenor's and Hector's stance is shaped by their disposition, affect likewise moulds Priam's standpoint.<sup>287</sup> Although he accepts Paris's position, Priam attributes responsibility over the outbreak of the war to Paris's behaviour (7.373-4),<sup>288</sup> which hints at Paris's lack of leadership abilities. Unlike Paris, who seems to disregard the people's safety, Priam takes the wellbeing of the community into consideration: based on communal norms (*cf.* 7.370: ὡς τὸ πάρος περ: 'as this was very much (the case) before'), he first points out the necessity of a meal (7.370; *cf.* also Hector's proposal in *Iliad* 8 – see below), then moving on to underline the importance of the Trojans' watchfulness (7.371). In addition, he considers Antenor's point about the Trojans' ethics and the implications of their oath violation: Priam might not support the return of Helen as proposed by Antenor, but still suggests negotiations with the Achaeans regarding the collection of corpses to enable their proper burial (7.375-7).<sup>289</sup> That is to say, the Trojans have *de facto* violated an institution that unites the two communities (*i.e.*, the oaths specifying the terms of the duel between Paris and Menelaus in *Iliad* 3). Priam, however, proposes to rely on another institution (*i.e.*, the burial of the dead),<sup>290</sup> and so, to that extent, he attempts to restore intracommunal relationships: observing a communal norm is propounded as a way of avoiding potential communal strife.<sup>291</sup> Although the narrator's introductory line to Antenor's speech (*cf.* 7.347; see above) may imply that Antenor's proposal could constitute a prudent act vis-à-vis effective

<sup>287</sup> Note the reference to θυμός in both Priam's (7.368-9) and Antenor's speech (7.348-9): 'κέκλυτέ μεν, Τρῶες καὶ Δάρδανοι ἠδ' ἐπίκουροι, ὄφρ' εἶπω, τά με θυμός ἐνὶ στήθεσσι κελεύει': 'Trojans and Dardanians and allies, hear me, so that I say what my *thymos* within the breast urges' – θυμός is affective because it is motivational: it causes the heroes to speak. On the use of the verb κελεύω with θυμός (*cf.* 7.349; 7.369), as well as a discussion of its literal or metaphorical meaning, see Pelliccia (1995) 46-57. On the function of θυμός as a motivational force, see Cairns (2019). Its involvement in the decision-making process is not necessarily a bad thing. For, while θυμός may often be irrational, this does not mean that all θυμός-drives are 'bad': see Pelliccia (1995) 260. On the 'psychic organs' in general, see Chapter 1, Section 1.1.

<sup>288</sup> 'ἠῶθεν δ' Ἰδαῖος ἴτω κοίλας ἐπὶ νῆας, / εἰπέμεν Ἀτρεΐδης' Ἀγαμέμνονι καὶ Μενελάω / μῦθον Ἀλεξάνδροιο, τοῦ εἴνεκα νεῖκος ὄρωρε': 'and at dawn, let Idaeus go to the hollow ships to say to the sons of Atreus, Agamemnon and Menelaus, the word of Alexander *on whose account this strife has arisen*'.

<sup>289</sup> Van Wees (1992) 179 claims that Antenor's 'point is completely ignored by Paris and Priamos in their replies'.

<sup>290</sup> For a discussion about institutions as the link between the Achaean and Trojan communities, including an analysis of the duel in *Iliad* 3 and the Achaean-Trojan negotiations in *Iliad* 7, see Chapter 5.

<sup>291</sup> For the fact that the norms in the Trojan community suggest the proper burial and protection of the corpses of the dead, *cf.*, for example, Hector's attempt to convince Achilles to return his body to his parents in *Iliad* 22 (22.338-43; *cf.* also 22.254-9); Priam's visit to Achilles's tent in this regard in *Iliad* 24; Hecuba's words at 22.82-9, in her attempt to convince Hector to enter the wall. *Cf.* also the warriors' attempt on the battlefield to protect the corpses of their comrades; see, for example, Sarpedon's case in *Iliad* 16 (16.545; 16.562-6). *Cf.* Chapter 5.

decision-making, the narrator's comment concerning Priam (*cf.* 7.366; see above) seems to advance the latter's proposal.<sup>292</sup> It turns out that, after smoothing over the disagreement between Antenor and Paris, Priam succeeds in persuading the Trojans' assembly (7.379: ὡς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἄρα τοῦ μάλα μὲν κλύον ἠδ' ἐπίθοντο; so he spoke, and they gave ear to him and obeyed),<sup>293</sup> and contributes to an effective outcome insofar as it prevents the worsening of intracommunal division, and results in negotiations with the Achaeans, which facilitate the dead's burial (7.408-20).<sup>294</sup>

Unlike the assembly of *Iliad* 7, the Trojans' decisions in the assemblies of *Iliad* 8 and *Iliad* 2 pertain to their strategy against the Achaeans on the battlefield. Yet, similarly to Priam's proposal in *Iliad* 7, in the assembly of *Iliad* 8 Hector pays heed to the Trojans' need to eat before returning to the battlefield (8.503; *cf.* also 8.505-7). Hector's proposal is reminiscent of Odysseus's insistence on the meal protocol in the assembly of *Iliad* 19. As observed in Chapter 2,<sup>295</sup> in addition to serving basic human needs, sharing food brings people together and reinforces the sense of belonging to the same community. From this perspective, the institutional function of the meal is significant because it operates as a communal mechanism for social coherence and inclusion, which reinforce the (emotional) strength of the warriors. In addition to the necessity of the meal, Hector aims to ensure Troy's safety (8.521-2). To prevent the Achaeans' departure from Troy (8.510-11) or an Achaean

<sup>292</sup> For a different view, see Elmer (2013) 137, who compares Priam's leadership in *Iliad* 7 with Hector's leadership and Polydamas's criticism at 12.211-12, arguing that 'a wise counsellor's sound advice is unceremoniously rebuffed by a representative of that [*i.e.*, Priam's] family'. For my interpretation of the Hector's scene with Polydamas, see Section 3.2.

<sup>293</sup> Thus, even if the Trojans may agree with Antenor's proposal – as for example Nicolai (1983) 4 n. 4, Kirk (1990) 284 on 7.392-3, and van Wees (1992) 177-8 claim is implied by the words of Idaeus, the Trojans' messenger, towards the Achaeans at 7.392-3 ('κουριδίην δ' ἄλοχον Μενελάου κυδαλίμοιο/ οὐ φησὶν δώσειν· ἢ μὴν Τρῶές γε κέλονται': 'but he [*i.e.*, Paris] refuses to give the wedded wife of the glorious Menelaus; yet the Trojans now verily urge him to do (it)' – the Trojans actually decide to follow Priam's proposal (7.379). Idaeus's words may then reveal his (and possibly the Trojans') dissatisfaction with Paris's behaviour, which, even Priam agrees (7.374), caused the outbreak of the war. In this connection, *cf.* Idaeus's curse at 7.390 ('ὡς πρὶν ὄφελλ' ἀπολέσθαι': 'if only he had died before'). Thus a messenger may modify a message (indeed, intentionally so). On this point and for a broader discussion of repeated speeches in the *Iliad*, see de Jong (1987/2003) 180-5.

<sup>294</sup> For a different view, see Nicolai (1983) 3-4 with n. 4, who considers Antenor's suggestion as a last chance for Troy's rescue, and comments on the narrator's words at 7.366 (Δαρδανίδης Πρίαμος, θεόφιν μῆστορ ἀτάλαντος; Priam, the son of Dardanus, counsellor equivalent to the gods) the following: 'Welche entlastenden Motive er [*i.e.*, the narrator] ihm [*i.e.*, Priam] dabei zugute gehalten haben mag (Mitleid mit Helena, stolze Selbstbehauptung gegenüber dem feindlichen Auslieferungsbegehren, Respektierung des Eigenwillens des Sohnes oder religiöse Bedenken gegen eine Abschiebung?), bleibt ungewiss.' *Cf.* Allan (2006) 5: 'No less than Paris, Priam is responsible for the destruction of Troy, his city. He acts wrongly, and he – and everyone else who depends on him – must suffer the consequences.'

<sup>295</sup> See Section 2.3.3, including bibliographical references; *cf.* also Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.

attack on the city (8.522), he orders the lighting of fires both on the battlefield (8.507-9) and in the Trojans' houses (8.520-1), and reinforces the Trojans' efficiency on the battlefield when taking into account the needs of the horses, as well (8.504).

Hector's emphasis on the blazing fire to such an extent that it reaches the sky (*cf.* 8.509) is important from an emotional point of view on two counts. On the one hand, it is linked to his *feravour* for defeating the Achaeans (*cf.* 8.512-14). On the other hand, owing to its potential contribution to the Trojans' victory, anyone else's *fear* (*cf.* 8.515: στρυγέησι) to wage war against Troy is reinforced (*cf.* 8.515-16).<sup>296</sup> In addition to this emphasis on the need to keep fires burning, Hector's strong desire to defeat the Achaeans is brought out in his appeal to Zeus and the other gods, as well as in his disparaging reference to the Achaeans (8.526-8).

The idea of the flame reaching the sky (8.509) is reinforced by the simile at the end of *Iliad* 8 (8.555-61), where the narrator compares the brightness of the stars' light in windless weather (8.556: νήνεμος αιθήρ, 8.558: ἄσπετος αιθήρ) to the fires burning at the Trojans' camp (8.560-1). As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.1), this simile in *Iliad* 8 emphasises the Achaeans' distress at the beginning of *Iliad* 9. The importance of the simile from an emotional point of view pertains to the Trojans, as well: the dead calm connects with the shepherds' explicit happiness (8.559) and the Trojans' implicit satisfaction,<sup>297</sup> given their performance on the battlefield in *Iliad* 8 and Hector's exultant speech in the assembly. Thus, just as emotions shape Hector's performance in the decision-making process, the reactions to this decision are likewise emotional. Indeed, if in *Iliad* 7, the narrator only mentions the Trojans' attention and obedience to Priam's speech (7.379; see above), in the assembly of *Iliad* 8 the Trojans' approval is stated more vehemently: following Hector's speech, the Trojans shout aloud in applause (8.542).

From this perspective, both in the assembly of *Iliad* 7 and *Iliad* 8, the decision-making aligns with the procedural aspects of Iliadic assemblies (as we saw them in the community of the Achaeans (Chapter 2), and we see them in the community of the gods (Chapter 4)). These procedural aspects aim to achieve consensus. Moreover, the

---

<sup>296</sup> Note that Hector's aggressive strategy may be related to the absence of Achilles on the battlefield; see Mueller (1984) 36, 40-1.

<sup>297</sup> Note that, from an emotional perspective, the simile is to be understood through the lens of conceptual metaphor, which connects windless weather with joy (or satisfaction). On the concept of conceptual metaphor, see Section 2.2.1.

context of the assembly in *Iliad* 8 corroborates the rightness of the Trojans' consensus in terms of content. The audience already knows that the Trojans are about to gain ground in the following battles: Zeus's weighing of the scales (8.68-74), as well as his reaction to Hera's complaints at 8.470-83 (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1), shortly before the summoning of the Trojans' assembly, make it clear that the Trojans will be victorious over the Achaeans until Achilles returns to fight.

In contrast to the assembly in *Iliad* 7, in which there is no reference to Hector, in the assembly of *Iliad* 8 it is mainly Hector who drives the decision-making, while in *Iliad* 2, he is involved in the decision-making less directly: rather than himself suggesting the Trojans' strategy, Hector follows the suggestion of Iris, who has taken the form of Polites, one of the sons of Priam. Iris/Polites appears to be concerned with the particularity of the war (as emphasised at 2.800) – the exceptional size of the Greek army being illustrated through comparison with leaves or sand – and underlines that the Trojans' should consider the peculiarities of their own army. Since the Trojan forces *contra* the Achaean consist of different communities who speak different languages, Hector should allow each leader of the Trojans' allies to command their troops (2.802-6). Only then may victory be achieved, viz. when the exercise of authority is distributed between community leaders.<sup>298</sup> Hector dissolves the assembly and follows Iris's/Polites's exhortation (2.807-8).<sup>299</sup>

In the context of the decision-making in the assembly of *Iliad* 2, there is nothing to suggest that Iris's/Polites's exhortation would have disastrous consequences. Although Iris's/Polites's intervention does not actually come from a real Trojan, the decision-making in the assembly of *Iliad* 2 is important for at least two reasons. First, it reveals Hector's acknowledgement of, and respect for, the legitimate right of other people to influence the decision-making process. That is to say, exercising authority is not limited to one individual, an idea expressed already in the exhortation of Iris/Polites. Indeed, owing to the heterogeneity of the Trojan army, there ought to be more than one leader commanding the troops. Secondly, by allowing

---

<sup>298</sup> For a different interpretation of the scene, see Elmer (2013) 134-5. He claims that 'lacking a common language makes true collective action a practical impossibility'. However, if we consider the lack of a common language to be a real hindrance to communication, then we will encounter difficulties in understanding scenes concerning the Achaean-Trojan negotiations on the battlefield, and encounters such as the one between Priam and Achilles, or Chryses and the Achaeans.

<sup>299</sup> Note that unlike the assemblies of *Iliad* 7 and *Iliad* 8, in the assembly of *Iliad* 2 there is no reference to the people's response.

himself to follow Iris's/Polites's exhortation, Hector demonstrates that he is willing to listen to and accept the advice of others.

The leader's ability to listen to others' advice is intimately linked to effective decision-making.<sup>300</sup> This idea is introduced for the Trojan community in *Iliad* 2 and becomes yet explicit in the informal context of decision-making in *Iliad* 12 (12.60-81) and *Iliad* 13 (13.735-53) – see below. The important connection between paying heed to others' advice and good leadership is developed fully in Section 3.2, in which I discuss the ineffective decision-making in the Trojan assembly of *Iliad* 18, along with non-assembly decision-making at 12.195-250, which pertains to Polydamas's interpretation of the omen and is examined in tandem with Polydamas's criticism of Hector at 13.725-34.<sup>301</sup>

At the beginning of *Iliad* 12, although no assembly takes place, the Trojans have to make a decision in order to escape a battlefield predicament. While on their horses, they fail to cross the ditch before the Achaeans' wall (12.41-59). After pointing out the dangers of fighting close to the ditch (12.61-6; 12.71-4), Polydamas urges the Trojans to follow his suggestion: the attendants should remain at the passage by the ditch, while all soldiers should follow Hector (12.75-8). As at the beginning of *Iliad* 12, at the end of *Iliad* 13 the Trojans have to overcome another predicament on the battlefield. While they managed to surmount the wall, they are yet unable to defeat the Achaeans owing to the Achaeans' numerical superiority. After criticising him (see Section 3.2), Polydamas points out to Hector the necessity of summoning a council in order to discuss whether they should attack the Achaean ships or instead refrain (13.740-4). As with Iris's/Polites's advice in *Iliad* 2, so too with the advice of Polydamas in *Iliad* 12 and *Iliad* 13, there is nothing to suggest that what Hector was advised could incur unwelcome consequences for the Trojan community. Thus, in all

---

<sup>300</sup> On the significance of this point in the Achaean community, see Chapter 2, in particular, Agamemnon's behaviour towards Nestor in *Iliad* 9 and towards Odysseus in *Iliad* 14; and Agamemnon's and Achilles's stance towards Odysseus in *Iliad* 19. Contrast Agamemnon's behaviour towards Nestor in *Iliad* 1 and Achilles's behaviour towards the ambassadors in *Iliad* 9. Note furthermore the gods' attitude: cf. Zeus's behaviour towards Hera in *Iliad* 16 and towards Athena in *Iliad* 22, as well as Poseidon's stance towards Iris in *Iliad* 15. For a detailed analysis of the gods' stance, see Chapter 4.

<sup>301</sup> For a comparison of Polydamas's advice to Hector in all four scenes, see Lohmann (1970) 178-82. See also *ibid.* 117-19, and below. For the relationship between Hector and Polydamas in the *Iliad*, see also Reichel (1994) 175-82. For Polydamas's 'doubts about Hector's mastery of commands' and Hector's performance, see Martin (1989) 133-5. For a comparison between Helenus's and Polydamas's advice to Hector, see Bannert (1988) 71-81.

three cases, Hector rightly takes into account a counsellor's advice and follows it (2.807; 12.80; 13.748-53).

In brief, Section 3.1 has focused on examples of effective decision-making amongst the Trojans. I have argued that emotions play an important role vis-à-vis individuals' participation in political debate, as well as in persuading others to agree upon a proposed course of action. The idea of 'being persuaded' is then intimately linked to the procedural aspect of decision-making within assemblies, namely, achieving consensus. The assemblies in *Iliad* 7, *Iliad* 8, and *Iliad* 2 as well as cases of informal decision-making in *Iliad* 12 (12.41-74) and *Iliad* 13 (13.740-53) show that leaders act in the interests of the community when decisions are not based on the preferences of a single individual. Authority should be distributed between members of the same group, thereby securing the community's welfare. To this end, considering other people's advice is of utmost importance and constitutive of good leadership style, something that becomes more prominent in the example of ineffective decision-making in the Trojan assembly of *Iliad* 18, which I explore in Section 3.2.

### 3.2 The Trojan assembly of *Iliad* 18 and Hector's failure

Although all other examples of assembly consensus in the *Iliad* beget positive results for the community (see Section 3.1; *cf.* also Chapters 2 and 4), the Trojan assembly of *Iliad* 18 evinces that consensus within the assembly does not always entail beneficial consequences for the community. This is to say that when decision-making is only *procedurally* rational, not also *constitutively* rational, assembly consensus can cause the suffering of the community. In order to understand how the context shows that the Trojan decision made in *Iliad* 18 is not sensible, I further explore Iris's message to Hector in *Iliad* 11, as well as Hector's inability to act as a good leader, in both assembly contexts and other less formal occasions of decision-making on the battlefield (*cf.* Polydamas's criticism of Hector at 13.726-34; in this regard, *cf.* also Polydamas's and Hector's stance<sup>302</sup> in the informal decision-making at 12.210-50).

---

<sup>302</sup> For a comparison between Hector's and Polydamas's speeches, see Lohmann (1970) 30-3; see also above.

As in rational decision-making, so in non-sensible decisions, emotions have an important part to play.<sup>303</sup> In the context of assembly decision-making in *Iliad* 18, the appearance of Achilles on the battlefield prompts the Trojans' dread (18.246-8) and the assembly's urgent summoning (18.243-5). The Trojans' dread is further linked to the deviation from the assembly norms, viz. with the Trojans' standing rather than seated (18.246-7),<sup>304</sup> combined with their indifference towards having a meal (18.245).<sup>305</sup>

Emotions not only influence the assembly's very summoning but also form the developments therein. In Polydamas's speech (18.254-83), there is an association between his fear (18.261) – resulting from his intuition about Achilles's intentions to both fight on the battlefield and attempt to assault the Trojan Wall (18.262-5) – and his exhortation towards the Trojans to leave the battlefield (18.266).<sup>306</sup> In his attempt to convince them of the gravity of the situation, which is underlined by the assembly's unusual character (*cf.* the deviation from the norms above), Polydamas does not simply communicate his own fear; he moreover attempts to reinforce the Trojans' trepidation, viz. by referring to the disastrous consequences of their stay on the battlefield. For most of them will not manage to reach Troy; instead, they will be killed by Achilles and get eaten by the dogs (18.270-2). In so doing, Polydamas leverages the emotion that prompted their assemblage to make them approve his proposal, thereby securing their safety and wellbeing. Fear, therefore, as caused by Odysseus in *Iliad* 2 and in contrast to Agamemnon's practice in *Iliad* 1,<sup>307</sup> has potentially positive implications on the community.

Although Polydamas may wish that, in spite of their distress, the Trojans follow his advice (18.273: 'εἰ δ' ἂν ἐμοῖς ἐπέεσσι πιθώμεθα κηδόμενοι περ'; 'if we

---

<sup>303</sup> That is to say, the concepts of procedural and constitutive rationality do not imply any absence of emotion vis-à-vis decision-making processes. Note also that the concept of emotion itself does not exclude the idea of rationality. See de Souza (1987). *Cf.* also that the 'psychic organs' in Homer may indicate both emotion and deliberation. See Jahn (1987). *Cf.* Chapter 1, Section 1.1.

<sup>304</sup> That the norms suggest that the assembly's members are seated is linked to the speaker's standing position; *cf.* Agamemnon's deviation from the norms in the assembly of *Iliad* 19 (19.77). See the discussion in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2.

<sup>305</sup> For the significant role of the meal, see above Section 3.1.

<sup>306</sup> Note that this fear contrasts with Polydamas's former joy at the prospect of spending the night close to the Achaeans' ships (18.259-60). On Hector's charges about Polydamas's cowardice, see below.

<sup>307</sup> See Chapter 2. For the positive effects of fear in decision-making processes, *cf.* also Zeus's leadership in Chapter 4 (see, especially, Hera's fear in *Iliad* 1, as well as hers and Athena's fear in *Iliad* 15).

obey my words, though distressed we may be’) and return to Troy, Hector expresses his strong disagreement with Polydamas’s proposal (18.285-7):<sup>308</sup>

‘Πουλυδάμα, σὺ μὲν οὐκέτ’ ἐμοὶ φίλα ταῦτ’ ἀγορεύεις,  
ὄς κέλεαι κατὰ ἄστυ ἀλήμεναι αὐτίς ἰόντας.  
ἦ οὐ πω κεκόρησθε ἐελμένοι ἔνδοθι πύργων;’

‘Polydamas, you say things that are no longer pleasant to me, ordering us to go back again and be shut in our city. Have you [*i.e.*, Trojans] not yet been gluttoned of being shut in the city walls?’<sup>309</sup>

This expression of disagreement is shaped by Hector’s disposition, which is indicated through the narrator’s comment on Hector’s aggressive mood in the introductory line of his speech (18.284: τὸν δ’ ἄρ’ ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν προσέφη κορυθαίολος Ἴκτωρ; looking askance at him, Hector said),<sup>310</sup> as well as by Hector’s own words towards Polydamas. Hector first expresses his discontent with the content of the proposal (18.285; identically at 12.231),<sup>311</sup> thereafter questioning the Trojans’ willingness to fight (18.286-7),<sup>312</sup> while addressing Polydamas dismissively (18.295: ‘νήπιε’; ‘fool’).

The Trojans cheer Hector’s plan of action (18.310). Still the narrator’s evaluative comment about their approval – as well as on Hector’s speech (18.310-13) – declares their fallacious judgement:

ὣς Ἴκτωρ ἀγόρευ’, ἐπὶ δὲ Τρῶες κελάδησαν  
νήπιοι· ἐκ γάρ σφεων φρένας εἴλετο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη.  
Ἴκτορι μὲν γὰρ ἐπήνησαν κακὰ μητιόωντι,  
Πουλυδάμαντι δ’ ἄρ’ οὐ τις, ὄς ἐσθλὴν φράζετο βουλήν.

So Hector spoke, and the Trojans cheered in response – fools! For Pallas Athena had taken their wits away. They praised Hector, whose plan was bad, but Polydamas, who had contrived a good plan, nobody praised.

<sup>308</sup> Hammer (2002) 111 notes the connection between the disagreement of Hector and Polydamas, and a similar case of division linked to the advice of a warrior depicted on Achilles’s Shield.

<sup>309</sup> Cf. also lines 18.295-6, which are discussed below.

<sup>310</sup> For bibliographical references on the expression ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν, see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.

<sup>311</sup> On 12.231 and Hector’s rejection of Polydamas’s interpretation of Zeus’s omen, see below.

<sup>312</sup> Cf. Hector’s charges against Polydamas for being a coward in *Iliad* 12 (12.244-7), where Hector rejects Polydamas’s interpretation of Zeus’s omen. See below.

The narrator is here explicit: the Trojans' approval of Hector's commands leads them to a bad decision. Hector's commands (viz. to have a meal, keep watch, and be ready for action (18.289-99)) are reminiscent of his commands in the assembly of *Iliad* 8 (Section 3.1). Yet the situation for the Trojans at this stage of the poem (viz. at the moment of Achilles's appearance on the battlefield in *Iliad* 18) is different.

First of all, the audience is already aware that Troy will fall (12.15-18;<sup>313</sup> 15.70-1),<sup>314</sup> as well as of the fact that Hector will die at the hands of Achilles (*cf.* Zeus's words at 15.68).<sup>315</sup> The audience is moreover aware of the link between the current success of the Trojans, on the one hand, and Zeus's commitment in *Iliad* 1 to honour Thetis, on the other. This link is covertly communicated by Zeus's nod towards Thetis's request in *Iliad* 1 (1.525-8; see Chapter 4),<sup>316</sup> and is more explicitly expressed through Zeus's reference, in the assembly of *Iliad* 15, to his promise to Thetis (15.74-7), while it becomes more than explicit in the narrator's words at 13.347-50:

Ζεὺς μὲν ἄρα Τρώεσσι καὶ Ἔκτορι βούλετο νίκην,  
 κυδαίνων Ἀχιλλῆα πόδας ταχύν· οὐδέ τι πάμπαν  
 ἦθελε λαὸν ὀλέσθαι Ἀχαιικὸν Ἰλιόθι πρό,  
 ἀλλὰ Θέτιν κύδαινε καὶ νιέα καρτερόθυμον.

Zeus, then, wanted victory for the Trojans and Hector, because he wanted to give honour to the swift-footed Achilles; he did not at all want to destroy the Achaean people in front of Troy, but to Thetis he was aiming to give honour and her strong-hearted son.

The narrator thus makes it clear that Zeus's support for the Trojans is linked to his plan to satisfy Thetis's request, which only *incidentally* secures victory for the Trojans.<sup>317</sup> Even if Hector were not completely aware of Zeus's broader plan, and does not have access to the narrator's words, he is still aware of Zeus's message (11.192-4) which Iris transmits to him (11.207-9), namely, that Hector's own

<sup>313</sup> In these lines, the narrator refers to the Fall of Troy, the Achaeans' return to Greece, and Apollo's and Poseidon's plan to destroy the Achaeans' wall.

<sup>314</sup> Zeus mentions that the Achaeans will conquer Troy with Athena's help.

<sup>315</sup> For Zeus's stance in the assembly of *Iliad* 15, see Chapter 4.

<sup>316</sup> For another covert reference on the narrator's part, *cf.* the narrator's words concerning Zeus's difficulty to fall asleep while he was devising a plan to honour Achilles: 2.3-4.

<sup>317</sup> For a discussion of the Fall of Troy vis-à-vis Zeus's justice and approval, see Allan (2006) 6-8.

achievements will only last for one day.<sup>318</sup> He nevertheless appears to perceive Zeus's words as a means of contributing to success *overall*, not to the success of one particular day,<sup>319</sup> something that runs counter to his attitude before the Trojans' victory in *Iliad* 8 and Iris's message in *Iliad* 11. In his encounter with Andromache in *Iliad* 6, Hector appears to be certain and well aware of the imminent Fall of Troy and the loss of Priam and the other Trojans (6.447-9). Hector's inability to heed the details of Iris's speech, and his consequent overconfidence in the possibility of routing the Achaeans completely, cause him to fail to make effective decisions, thereby condemning the Trojans to failure on the battlefield.<sup>320</sup> That is to say, Hector's failure to effectively interpret the evidence transmitted to him causes him to disregard the validity of Polydamas's advice, which underlines the contrast between Hector's tendency towards poor judgment (*cf.* Hector's judgment in the assembly of *Iliad* 18: 18.285-312; Polydamas's reference to Hector's tendency to discard the advice of others at 13.726-9 and 12.211-14, which are discussed below) and Polydamas's competence in giving sound counsel (*cf.* the narrator's reference at 18.249-52 and 18.313; Polydamas's own words at 13.726-48 and 12.215-29, which are also discussed below).

In this regard, and specifically in the context of the Trojan assembly in *Iliad* 18, while introducing Polydamas's intervention the narrator comments on Hector's and Polydamas's shared birth date, which is contrasted to their abilities (18.249-52):

---

<sup>318</sup> From this perspective, there is no ambiguity in Zeus's promise as claimed by Redfield (1975) 145. Indeed, in contrast to the latter's argument (*viz.* that someone 'must rely on his hope that the determination he has already made is correct'), a good leader should be considerate of the sound advice of others. I do not then agree with Redfield's (1975) 146 interpretation that 'in rejecting Polydamas, Hector is doing his best to meet his responsibilities' (see below). Moreover, Erbse (1978) 21 may be right in defending Hector's argument insofar as Zeus has given him the power to defeat the Achaeans; yet Zeus's promise only holds true for one day; *cf.* Schofield (1986) 20 n. 32.

<sup>319</sup> Kozak (2017) 100; 111 does not refer to this point when justifying Hector's stance following Iris's message; she argues that Hector must not be aware of Patroclus's death and Achilles's return, that is, unlike the audience (thanks to Zeus's speech at the end of *Iliad* 8). Nevertheless, she *does* refer to the limited time of Hector's success according to Iris's message when discussing the assembly in *Iliad* 18; see Kozak (2017) 180. Morrison (1992) 1-2 focuses on the contradiction between Zeus's promise for Hector's victory (11.191-3) and Hector's retreat following his encounter with Diomedes and Odysseus (11.345-56). The overall goal of his book is to explain ambiguous predictions in the *Iliad* and their effects to the audience. Regardless of Hector's personal failure immediately following Agamemnon's wounding (*cf.* 11.345-56; 11.251-3), which contrasts with Zeus's promise at 11.191-4 (*cf.* also 11.206-9), the Trojans still take ground during this day of battle, and Zeus still cares about Hector (*cf.* *Iliad* 12). Morrison (1992) 2 n. 3 notes that Zeus's care about Hector in *Iliad* 12 (12.173-4; 12.254-5; 12.290-3; 12.436-8), which comes after Hector's retreat in *Iliad* 11, does not come soon enough.

<sup>320</sup> Hainsworth (1993) 247 on 11.200-1 is then right to note that the utterance at 11.200 ('Ἐκτορ, υἱὲ Πριάμοιο, Διὶ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντε': 'Hector, son of Priam, equal to Zeus in counsel') is 'an ornamental compliment', which is 'not esp. appropriate in view of his [*i.e.* Hector's] portrayal with increasing emphasis in books 11-18 as overconfident, in contrast to the prudent Pouludamas'.

τοῖσι δὲ Πουλυδάμας πεπνυμένος ἦρχ' ἀγορεύειν  
 Πανθοίδης· ὃ γὰρ οἶος ὄρα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω.  
 Ἕκτορι δ' ἦεν ἑταῖρος, ἱῆ δ' ἐν νυκτὶ γέγοντο·  
 ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν ἄρ' μύθοισιν, ὃ δ' ἔγχει πολλὸν ἐνίκαι·  
 ὃ σφιν ἐὺ φρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν.

Among them the son of Panthous started to speak, the wise Polydamas; for he alone looked forwards and backwards. And he was companion to Hector, and they were born on the same night; but the one was better in words, the other in the spear much better. And rightly thinking, he [*i.e.*, Polydamas] addressed them and spoke among them.

Polydamas's ability in counsel, here emphasised through multiple references of the narrator (πεπνυμένος; οἶος ὄρα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω; μύθοισιν ... ἐνίκαι; ἐὺ φρονέων), is compared and contrasted with Hector's ability vis-à-vis fighting. Polydamas's and Hector's abilities in turn point towards their different claims to τιμή.<sup>321</sup> For prevailing in a specific domain warrants a claim to τιμή.<sup>322</sup> By implication, like Agamemnon, in *Iliad* 1 (who discards Nestor's advice and fails to honour Achilles), Hector likewise fails to respect Polydamas's τιμή by disregarding his counsel. On the other hand, Polydamas's exceptional value as a counsellor comes from his ability to consider things retrospectively and prospectively (18.250), an ability essential to good leadership, which both Agamemnon (1.343; see Chapter 2) and Hector lack (contrast Zeus's leadership abilities – see Chapter 4).

If, in the context of the assembly in *Iliad* 18, it is only the external audience who is reminded of Polydamas's efficiency in giving good advice, then in the private context of the decision-making process in *Iliad* 13, this is furthermore made clear to Hector himself. Like the narrator's words in *Iliad* 18, as discussed above (18.249-52),

<sup>321</sup> For a discussion of Hector's and Polydamas's prudence in relation to honour dynamics, see Schofield (1986) 18-22, especially 20-2. Note also that the reference to Hector's and Polydamas's birth on the same date (18.251) depicts them as being doubles. For a discussion of this literary device in the context of the assembly in *Iliad* 18, see Clark (2007) 95-7. For further bibliographical details on Polydamas and his relation to Hector, see Clark (2007) 85 n. 2. *Cf.* also Reinhardt (1961) 172-7; Schadewaldt (1966); Griffin (1980). For a discussion of Homeric fellow relationships in general, see, for example, Ulf (1990a) 127-38.

<sup>322</sup> The qualities of individual excellence attract what Darwall (1977) calls 'appraisal respect' (as opposed to 'recognition respect'). Note, however, that Darwall (1977) is wrong to argue that 'appraisal respect' involves no claim. As we see in Polydamas's case, for example, his skill in giving sound advice is a skill that entitles him to act in certain ways in deliberative contexts, thereby demanding his skills to this end be recognised. On Polydamas's entitlement, see details below. On the concept of τιμή, *cf.* the discussion in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.

in *Iliad* 13 Polydamas explicitly states that there are people who are good at fighting, while others are wise, and therefore are also able to protect others (13.730-4). Polydamas directs substantial criticism towards Hector by declaring that the latter refuses to be persuaded because he associates excellence in war with corresponding excellence in counsel (13.726-8). However, it is not possible for someone to have every conceivable trait (13.729). As in *Iliad* 13, in *Iliad* 12 Hector is accused of neither listening enough to his people nor giving his people a voice (12.211-14),<sup>323</sup> which again reminds one of Agamemnon's behaviour in *Iliad* 1. Hector tries to overcome other people not through the content of his proposal but by way of rebuke (12.211-12). This phenomenon entails the danger of affording too much weight to status and rank, a problem that also occurs in *Iliad* 1 (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1). Although Hector may prevent people from expressing their views, Polydamas does make his own proposal (based on his claim to wise counsel). Despite Hector's typical behaviour, opting to criticise Polydamas's good advice (12.211), Polydamas is explicit in noting the correctness of his suggestion (12.215; *cf.* also 12.212), thereby reinforcing the credibility of his explanation of the omen (12.210-27) by referring to his status as a seer (12.228-9).

Unlike his behaviour at the beginning of *Iliad* 12 (see Section 3.1), and though reminded of Polydamas's efficiency in counsel, Hector confirms Polydamas's criticism and disregards the latter's thoughtful advice (12.237-40).<sup>324</sup> Like the eagle that fails to return the snake it is holding to its nest and eaglets, according to Polydamas's interpretation of the omen (12.216-26), the Trojans will fail to return to Troy if they decide to pass through the gates and the wall of the Achaeans, attacking their ships. In contrast to the assembly of *Iliad* 2, in which Hector follows Iris's/Polites's advice and recognises that authority can be distributed (see Section 3.1), in *Iliad* 12 Hector fails to recognise Polydamas's prudent recommendations, concentrating exclusively on his own interpretation of Zeus's message in *Iliad* 11 (12.235-8),<sup>325</sup> thereby unjustifiably suggesting that Polydamas is a coward (12.244-

<sup>323</sup> On the meaning of these verses, see Schofield (1986) 19 n. 30.

<sup>324</sup> Mueller (1984) 43 notes that Hector's acceptance of Polydamas's advice would permit the Trojans' retreat without any loss of face on Hector's part.

<sup>325</sup> 'ὅς κέλεαι Ζητὸς μὲν ἐριγδοῦποιο λαθέσθαι/ βουλέων, ἅς τέ μοι αὐτὸς ὑπέσχετο καὶ κατένευσε/ τὴν δ' οἴωνοισι τανυπτερύγεσσι κελεύεις/ πείθεσθαι': '(you) who order me to forget the counsels of the thundering Zeus, which he himself promised and granted to me; you order me to obey long-winged birds.'

6).<sup>326</sup> His excessive confidence, such that he can afford to blatantly disregard Polydamas's advice (12.238),<sup>327</sup> is reminiscent of Agamemnon's arrogance in *Iliad* 1 and *Iliad* 2, who likewise fallaciously believes that he meets with Zeus's support (*cf.* 1.173-5; see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1). However, as Athenian argues in Plato's *Laws* (644c-d), being one of the two kinds of ἔλπις,<sup>328</sup> *confidence* (θάρος) needs to work in tandem with λογισμός in order to be beneficial. By implication, someone's failure to properly evaluate their emotions may lead to poor judgement. Thus, even if we consider Hector's rejection as effective at this stage of the poem (*viz.* in *Iliad* 12 as some scholars argue),<sup>329</sup> Polydamas's criticism still offers us a deeper perspective regarding Trojan assemblies and debates, which are intimately connected with Hector's failure. For, while Hector's (excessive) confidence and inability to listen to other people's advice may not be disastrous in the context of *Iliad* 12.210ff., it is revealed to be fatal once and for all in *Iliad* 18 onwards.<sup>330</sup>

The first actual developments which prove Polydamas's advice sound do not come at 16.364ff.,<sup>331</sup> but are already traced in *Iliad* 13 (*cf.* 13.719-23), where the Trojans have to contend with another battlefield predicament (see Section 3.1). Although Hector may agree with, and take into account, Polydamas's advice to summon a council at the end of *Iliad* 13, his behaviour in *Iliad* 18 shows that he has clearly *not* digested the importance of Polydamas's message that he should heed the views of others. As with the second Trojan decision-making process in *Iliad* 12 (12.235-8), in *Iliad* 18 Hector's misplaced trust in Zeus's support (18.293-4), as well as his insistence on ensuring obedience through intimidation and fear (18.295-7; 12.248-50; *cf.* Agamemnon's vein in *Iliad* 1 (1.181-7; see Chapter 2), are linked to Hector's failure in leadership. For Hector is indifferent to the idea of allowing his people to be persuaded in accordance with their own will (18.295-6):

‘νήπιε, μηκέτι ταῦτα νοήματα φαῖν’ ἐνὶ δῆμῳ·  
οὐ γάρ τις Τρώων ἐπιτίσεται· οὐ γὰρ ἔάσω.’

<sup>326</sup> Note Polydamas's implicit response to this accusation at 18.259-60. See above.

<sup>327</sup> ‘τῶν οὐ τι μετατρέπομ’ οὐδ’ ἀλεγίζω’: ‘neither I care for these nor I take them into account’. *Cf.* Achilles's similar language at 1.160 and 9.630, pointing out Agamemnon's indifference towards the other.

<sup>328</sup> The other is fear.

<sup>329</sup> See, for example, Erbse (1978) 20; Taplin (1992) 157 with n. 12; de Jong (1987/2003) 214-15. Contrast, for example, Schein (1984) 183-6.

<sup>330</sup> See the narrator's evaluative comment, discussed above.

<sup>331</sup> *Cf.* Taplin (1992) 157 n. 12: ‘Polydamas’ fears are actually not fulfilled until much later, at 16.364 ff.; and even then they do not prove disastrous.’

‘Fool, do not reveal these thoughts among people; for none of the Trojans will obey (them); I will not allow (them to).’

Hector further evinces indifference in attempting to persuade his people of the possible advantages of his proposal. He is instead interested in coercing their obedience (12.248-50):

‘εἰ δὲ σὺ δημοτῆτος ἀφέξειαι ἢ ἐτιν’ ἄλλον  
παρφάμενος ἐπέεσσιν ἀποστρέψεις πολέμοιο,  
αὐτίκ’ ἐμῶ ὑπὸ δουρὶ τυπεῖς ἀπὸ θυμὸν ὀλέσσεις.’

‘Yet, if you [*i.e.*, Polydamas] keep yourself away from the battle or persuading someone else with words you deter them from war, immediately struck under my spear you will lose your life.’

In this light, Hector’s poor judgment in disregarding Polydamas’s advice is not merely an unfortunate, isolated incident: it is characteristic of Hector’s flawed leadership style.<sup>332</sup> Like Agamemnon, Hector fails to foresee the implications of his judgement on his community (and himself), in contrast to the likes of Nestor, Odysseus, and Polydamas, who are capable of giving sound counsel and considering the consequences of an action in advance and in detail.<sup>333</sup> As already noted in Section 3.1, Hector may listen to Polydamas’s advice in *Iliad* 13, as well as at the beginning of *Iliad* 12. Yet, in *Iliad* 18, his insistence on following his own counsel and rejecting

---

<sup>332</sup> For additional evidence related to Hector’s incapability to listen to practical advice, note his disregard for Andromache’s advice at 6.407; 6.433-9. Note furthermore that, as he discards Polydamas’s advice for emotional reasons (*i.e.*, excessive confidence), emotional reasons likewise explain his disregard for Andromache’s counsel. See his shame, which results from thinking about his people’s judgement of him (6.441-2); his desire to gain glory (6.446); his affection for his wife (6.454-65), which causes him to put aside his leadership responsibilities (*cf.* his indifference to his people’s fortune (6.447-53), a reference that is rather made to underline his feelings for Andromache – he might be indifferent to his people’s fortune, but their judgement on his leadership *does* affect him: 22.99-110; 6.441-2 already cited above). *Cf.* also his own words at 15.721-3, through which he condemns the elders for preventing him – against his will – and the army from attacking the Achaean ships in the past. Hector once again is wrong: Achilles’s presence on the battlefield would have made Trojan success in such a venture impossible; on 15.721-3, see, for example, Ulf (1990a) 102. See also Priam’s (22.38-40; 22.56-8) and Hecuba’s advice (22.82-9), who respectively attempt to persuade Hector to return to Troy and avoid fighting Achilles; for Hector’s disregard of those appeals, see below. Other evidence for Hector’s flawed leadership style consists in Hector’s desire to become immortal (*cf.* 8.538-41; 13.824-32). Since he achieved success on the battlefield once (*cf.* the Trojans’ victory in *Iliad* 8), he then seems to believe that he can achieve success that would be beyond his abilities. *Cf.* Farron (1978) 40, who observes that Hector ‘has a strong tendency to overvalue his own martial ability’.

<sup>333</sup> *Cf.* Nicolai (1983) 5: ‘Die Abwege, in die der Iliasdichter seine Haupthelden sich verrennen lässt, führen also dahin, daß sie über weite Strecken paradoxerweise weniger ihren Feinden Schaden antun als vielmehr der eigenen Gemeinschaft: die Fehlkalkulationen der Könige als Sicherheitsrisiko für ihre eigenen Völker.’

Polydamas's proposal proves fatal. Thus it is not Polydamas who is deluded – as Hector claims at 12.234 (‘ἐξ ἄρα δὴ τοι ἔπειτα θεοὶ φρένας ὤλεσαν αὐτοί’: ‘the very gods then surely destroyed your mind’) – but Hector himself (*cf.*, *e.g.*, 13.824-32; 18.293-4).<sup>334</sup> Indeed, if in *Iliad* 13 Hector does not express acknowledgement of Polydamas's criticisms despite following his advice, he does so explicitly in *Iliad* 22 (22.99-103).

Feeling shame at the thought of the Trojans' possible disapproval,<sup>335</sup> Hector decides to fight against Achilles (*cf.* 22.99-110).<sup>336</sup> Hector's realisation that it was a fundamental mistake (22.104) not to bring the Trojans back to their citadel but to urge them (or even force them – *cf.* 18.295-6) to stay overnight on the battlefield, thereby disregarding Polydamas's prudence, comes rather too late for both Hector and his community. Hector's imaginary speech (*cf.* 22.99-125) constitutes a self-reflective criticism of his poor leadership style,<sup>337</sup> insofar as his excessive confidence in his own strength and power has been disastrous for his people (*cf.* 22.107).<sup>338</sup> Hector reflects on his leadership in his own terms, by himself, whereby his imagination about the other people's possible judgement constitutes a projection of his cognizance of his own failure. That is, Hector's self-reproach may imply regret regarding his former conduct. By implication, Hector's shame towards his people along with his possible regret for his disastrous leadership bespeaks his real intentions. For Hector did not deliberately intend to damage his people's interests nor to increase his own τιμή by

---

<sup>334</sup> On Hector's delusion in connection to ἄτη, see Cairns (2012) 14, 19, especially 33-9; 44-9. For Cairns's account on the difference between ἄτη and ἀτασθαλῖαι, see *ibid.* 35-49. Cairns (2012) 35, 37 also discusses Finkelberg's (1995) position on the matter. Stanley (1993) 107-8 traces Hector's delusion already in (*Iliad* 5 and) *Iliad* 6: ‘the capacity for self-delusion in Hector's encounter with Andromache within the walls reasserts itself and he sacrifices the constraints of truth and practical realism to compulsions of *aidos* outside them’.

<sup>335</sup> On Hector's emotional state note also the narrator's words at 22.98: ὀχθήσας δ' ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς ὄν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν; greatly vexed he spoke to his great-hearted *thymos* – see de Jong (2012) 82-3 on 98.

<sup>336</sup> For an analysis of this scene in connection to αἰδώς, see Cairns (1993) 81-3. See also Gill's (1996) 81-91 account on the relation between Hector's shame and the concept of personhood; *cf.* also Cairns (2014) 37-9.

<sup>337</sup> Scodel (2008) 20 explains how Hector's criticism is linked to his concern about his τιμή: Hector ‘imagines criticism he would not actually hear – that is, bad kleos; but because he imagines it, his subjective perception of not only his reputation but also his *time* suffers’. See also *ibid.* 11-12 and 23.

<sup>338</sup> *Cf.* Haubold (2000) 93: ‘unlike Agamemnon, he [*i.e.*, Hector] does not attempt to excuse himself’. Note, however, that unlike *Iliad* 19, in *Iliad* 2 and *Iliad* 9 Agamemnon admits his mistake without seeking excuses (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2). Haubold (2000) 94 compares further the scene of Hector in *Iliad* 22 with Nestor's words in the Achaeans' council at 9.109-11, and comments the following: ‘In book 9, too, excessive behaviour had caused a problem between the people and their leader. The city is not the only competitor for the attention claimed by the laos. Individual ambition can always be mobilised as an alternative code.’

dishonouring Polydamas.<sup>339</sup> From this perspective, Hector, while culpable, does not display ἀναιδής behaviour like Agamemnon (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1). In recognising the wrongness of the decision taken in *Iliad* 18 comes a further realisation on Hector's part of his deception by the gods (*cf.* 22.297-303, where Hector reflects on his imminent death, his deception by Athena, and the absence of Zeus's support; contrast Hector's certainty about Zeus being on his side at 12.234 and 13.824-32 already discussed above). Thus Hector experiences now certain emotions (*viz.* shame and regret) as a result of his previous emotions (*viz.* excessive confidence), and we see that, in both cases, Hector's emotions are bound up with his failed attitude as a political leader.

To summarise, in Section 3.2 I have focused on the decision-making process of the Trojan assembly in *Iliad* 18, drawing comparisons with informal Trojan decision-making in *Iliad* 11, *Iliad* 12, and *Iliad* 13. I have argued that individuals' emotions constitute a normative, as well as an anti-normative, part of such decision-making processes. Thus emotions function for both good and ill given that, in certain instances, emotions serve to support deliberative norms, while, in other cases, they function to their detriment. Despite the consensus of the Trojans, their decision to spend the night on the battlefield (rather than returning to their city) has disastrous consequences for the community, culminating in Hector's death. Therefore, though procedurally legitimate, the Trojans' judgement in *Iliad* 18 is constitutively calamitous.

### 3.3 Conclusions

This chapter has discussed the Trojans' leadership taking into consideration political discourse in assemblies as well as in less-formal deliberative occasions. I have shown that emotions, which assume a beneficial or destructive character depending upon the context, play a major role in the formation of different leadership styles. I have shown that individuals like Priam and Polydamas – those who are capable of judging aright potential developments, thereby assessing all prospective options – are exemplars of good leadership. On the contrary, leaders like Hector who do not always appreciate the value of distributing authority, nor do they always evince the ability to listen to others' advice, thereby acknowledging others' claims, fail to protect the community

---

<sup>339</sup> See Fisher (1992) 178, who rightly makes the point that Hector's ἀτασθαλίαι do not equate to ὕβρις.

and secure its wellbeing, owing to their focus on personal preferences and/or excessive confidence, which causes them to put trust in their fatally misplaced judgement. By implication, when such leaders take the principal role in decision-making processes, the accession of these decisions may irredeemably harm the community. This is in spite of the unanimous agreement of assembly members, which results from abidance by procedural rules. If decision-making eventuates from the people's consensus while the content of the approved proposal is unsound, then the decision-making produces a plan of action that proves ineffectual. Therefore, instead of coercing obedience from their people, a good leader should be able to see all aspects of an issue, leveraging advice from sound counsellors.



## 4. The Olympian political community

Chapters 2 and 3 unpacked the Achaeans' and Trojans' leadership styles and characteristic attributes vis-à-vis emotions. I thereby examined the ways in which decision-making processes and political debate are bound up with the individuals' emotions, contextualised in political institutions such as the assembly and council, as well as in less formal deliberation contexts on the battlefield. I argued that political leaders are only able to ensure the people's welfare when their judgement is grounded in impartial enactment of communal norms, that is, when leaders do not think of the communal norms as a means to serve their personal priorities, infringing the rights, especially honour claims, of others. Leaders should then recognise that honour dynamics operate *bidirectionally*. In this regard, consensus within political institutions is essential for successful course of political action. Still this consensus must be reached on the basis of a fundamentally sensible undertaking, which in turn can only be contrived through the leader's prudential reasoning, their accurate evaluation of their own and others' emotions, as well as their ability to heed sound advice of good counsellors.

In this chapter, I argue that, unlike humans, the collective action of gods in assembly contexts<sup>340</sup> never jeopardise the communal interest. This is because, in spite of reflecting a range of positions that are based on differing prerogatives, the gods ultimately respect rules and protocols, and are not excessively focused on their own τιμή. This is to say that, while the gods may occasionally be moved by their personal convictions and emotions, they eventually act in the overall benefit of the community. Thus, unlike the leadership styles of Agamemnon and Hector, Zeus is an exemplar of good leadership. In the first section of this chapter, I show the intimate link between honour and emotion as motives for divine conflict (4.1). Then, in the second section, I

---

<sup>340</sup> I focus mainly on assemblies because these are the main political institutions in which decisions are made. Yet I illuminate these decisions in two ways: a) by considering decisions that eventuate from other institutional structures; *cf.*, for example, the institutional structures of Zeus's authority (*e.g.*, the other gods' exercise of authority on Zeus's behalf) in the decision-making process in *Iliad* 15 (namely, Hera's and Iris's roles in transmitting Zeus's message: 15.53-79; 15.143-8; 15.158-69; 15.174-83 – for a comparison between the ways in which divine messengers function in the Greek and Near Eastern epic, see West (1997) 190-1); and b) by considering decisions that result from the gods' social interaction in less formal contexts (see, for example, Zeus's and Hera's opposition over Sarpedon's fate in *Iliad* 16). Both within and beyond assembly contexts, the decisions heed the same principles (*viz.* the gods' recognition of, and respect for, each other's claims to τιμή).

show how these factors constitute motives for divine consensus and reconciliation (4.2).

Before proceeding with Sections 4.1 and 4.2, I would first like to outline my argument and its basis. We begin with the claim that the structure of the divine community and the gods' negotiations of communal norms result from developments that are described in Hesiod's *Theogony*.<sup>341</sup> Specifically, my argument in this chapter is based on the postulation that the powers of the gods are their τιμαί and have been allocated to them as domains of experience and operation in which they are meant to have a certain amount of autonomy which the other gods should not transgress (*cf.* 15.185-93).<sup>342</sup> When Poseidon refers to his, Zeus's, and Hades's domains (15.190-3), he is not merely describing how things are but how they *should* be. That is, the divine dispensation of domains and rights is to be understood *prescriptively*. Owing to this, the τιμαί of the gods, *i.e.*, their role or status, are linked to other senses of τιμή, viz. to the gods' τιμή *qua* dignity or claim, on the one hand, and *qua* deference, esteem, or recognition, on the other. The allocation of domains expresses recognition of what the gods do, and what the gods do is what entitles them to honour. The gods' τιμαί, in turn, licenses their claims to performing certain activity. Indeed, because they fulfil these claims, they receive esteem from others (both gods and humans). By implication, the senses of the gods' τιμή *qua* role, claim, and deference are interconnected, and they are interconnected as a matter of reciprocity and intersubjectivity.<sup>343</sup>

The gods' domains of power (τιμαί) are then closely linked to the gods' claims. These claims are (*inter alia*) related to the gods' pedigree and family

---

<sup>341</sup> Schein (1984) 45 makes a similar point: 'The stories and representations of the gods in the *Iliad* are consistent with those found elsewhere in poems belonging to the same oral poetic tradition – the *Odyssey*, the poetry of Hesiod, and the so-called Homeric Hymn'. However, unlike the approach taken here, Schein's (1984) 45-7; 49-51 analysis pins down differences and similarities between Iliadic and Theogonic evidence *without* situating the discussion in the context of operative norms of the divine community. On the importance of the *Theogony* in the construction of the Greek mythology, see, for example, Littleton (1970) 83-121. Note also that the Theogonic developments as a presupposition of the *Iliad* should not be interpreted as a comment on the chronology of the *Iliad's* composition in relation to the *Theogony*. For a discussion on the dating of the *Iliad*, see, for example, Cairns (2001b) 1-12.

<sup>342</sup> Zeus's dominance is constrained to the ether and clouds (15.192), whereas Poseidon presides over the sea (15.190), and the underworld, in turn, belongs to Hades (15.191). On earth and Mount Olympus, these three gods have equally legitimate claims to exercising authority (15.193).

<sup>343</sup> See the relevant discussion in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.

structures,<sup>344</sup> physical strength (*e.g.*, 1.567; 8.17; 15.108; 15.164), intelligence (*e.g.*, 13.631). Indeed, based on these claims, Zeus's power exceeds all of the other gods (*e.g.*, 13.355; 5.756). While there may be no *explicit* association between these claims and τιμή, these claims are nevertheless τιμή-related claims. For instance, in *Iliad* 15, Poseidon refers to τιμή (15.186: 'ὀμότιμον'; 15.189: 'ἕκαστος δ' ἔμμορε τιμῆς') to support his initial objection to heed Zeus's command (*cf.* 15.185-96), although Zeus does not use the term τιμή when referring to his physical strength and pedigree (15.165: 'βίη πολὺ φέρτερος'; 15.166: 'γενεῆ πρότερος') in commanding Poseidon to refrain from battle (*cf.* 15.160-1). At the same time, in underlining the dispensation of τιμαί as a ground for disobeying Zeus's command (15.185-93), Poseidon does not challenge Zeus's honour; he only points out its limitations as prescribed by the other gods' prerogatives. This is in fact corroborated by Poseidon's commitment to sustaining the current order of things (*cf.* 15.211-17; elaborated upon in Section 4.2), something that, in turn, explains his eventual retreat to Zeus's request. Thus Olympian τιμή may be linked to both conflict and cooperation; its competitive aspect lies in subjectivity, in which case a god might seek more τιμή for themselves, while its cooperative aspect lies in intersubjectivity, in which case a god recognises and accepts the limits imposed by the other gods' claims.

Poseidon's stance in *Iliad* 15, with his eventual consent to Zeus's request, shows that the Olympian negotiations of τιμή is linked to a wider order that the gods do not wish to abolish. Yet, as implied in some Iliadic references (*e.g.*, Zeus's threats of violence) and as explicitly shown in Hesiod's *Theogony*, the current order of things has not always been granted: it was very hard won (*cf.* the succession struggles: *Th.* 154-82; 453-506; and further struggles or threats: *Th.* 565-70; 635-721; 820-68; 886-900). Thanks to his invincible strength (*e.g.*, *Th.* 687-710) and wit (*e.g.*, *Th.* 613: ὧς οὐκ ἔστι Διὸς κλέψαι νόον οὐδὲ παρελθεῖν; thus it is not possible to deceive nor surpass Zeus; 656), Zeus managed to *fairly* allot the τιμαί between the gods (*e.g.*, *Th.* 71-74; 402-3; 885: ὁ δὲ τοῖσιν ἐν διεδάσσατο τιμάς; *cf.* the *Iliadic* passage 15.185-93, which, however, does not ascribe the allotment of the τιμαί to a specific god) in order

---

<sup>344</sup> The following are illustrative examples: Hera is distinguished from the rest of the gods thanks to being Zeus's wife (1.546-8; 4.60-1) or Cronus's daughter (4.58-9). Similarly, Athena enjoys special treatment as Zeus's daughter (8.39-40; 22.183-5), as does Ares for being the son of Zeus and Hera (5.895-8). *Cf.* also the reference to Zeus's pedigree at 15.166 ('γενεῆ πρότερος'), the reference to Zeus as father (*e.g.* 5.757: 'Ζεῦ πάτερ') or as father of gods and men (4.68: πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε). On the family structures of the divine community in the *Iliad*, see Erbse (1989) 209-18.

to bring stability in the Olympian community, with the other gods encouraging him to rule over them (*Th.* 881-5; 883: ὄτρυνον βασιλευμένον ἠδὲ ἀνάσσειν). Securing succession (by violence) and the dispensing of τιμή are, then, complementary. From this perspective, in the Olympian community within the *Iliad*, threats of violence against those gods who challenge the current order of things may generate conflict (e.g., 15.16-33; 1.589-94 – see Section 4.1). They also encompass, however, grounds of resolution insofar as these threats constitute a reminder of earlier phases of genuinely violent conflict, which really *did* threaten the status quo (cf. the gods' struggles in the *Theogony*). Therefore, like Poseidon in *Iliad* 15, the gods are determined not to disturb the present dispensation of power (see Section 4.2).<sup>345</sup> By implication, Chapter 4 shows that the gods (unlike humans), in spite of their disagreements, commit themselves to properly fulfilling their roles within the community by not violating those institutions and processes that undergird communal stability. Indeed, what arises when everyone fulfils their role as a member of a successfully cooperative community is what Plato calls justice (cf. *Resp.* 433a).<sup>346</sup> In this light, I argue that the way in which the Olympian community uses its institutions to negotiate norms underlines the way in which human institutions *should* and *could* work effectively, following the Olympian paradigm.<sup>347</sup>

---

<sup>345</sup> Cf. Clay (1989) 11-12, who notes the important relation between the divine order in the *Iliad* and the divine order in the *Theogony* as part of her discussion about the history of the gods in connection to the Homeric Hymns. Contrast Ulf (1990a) 263-7 for whom there is no divine acceptance of Zeus's leadership in the *Iliad* in contrast to the *Theogony*. In Ulf's (1990a) view, Zeus attempts to establish a new order among the gods in the *Iliad*.

<sup>346</sup> On divine justice in early Greek epic, see Allan (2006), whose article brings out the consistency of the gods' morality: unlike the views of other scholars (e.g., Lloyd-Jones (1971), Heubeck (1988)), Allan (2006) (*inter alia*) shows the absence of any contrast between the gods in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*: as in the *Odyssey*, in the *Iliad* the gods are not 'amoral' or only self-interested. In connection to Zeus's justice, cf. also Erbse (1986) 213, who argues: 'Verwandeln wir in Gedanken den Sinn seines Vorhabens in das Bestreben, Gerechtigkeit zu üben, dann erhalten wir den Zeus des Hesiod, der in den homerischen Epen bereits vorgebildet ist, nicht nur in der Odyssee, sondern in einigen Partien der Ilias.' As Chapter 4 explains, even in those scenarios in which he appears unyielding, Zeus does not become unfair; Zeus as well as all the other gods contribute to the maintenance of a fair community (see especially Section 4.2).

<sup>347</sup> Contrast Schein (1984) 52-6, who considers honour dynamics among gods as not genuinely essential, the Olympian community as 'amoral', and the contrast between humans and gods as a mere contrast between the former's suffering and the latter's unconcern. Contrast Bell (2007) 3, who argues that gods 'are rarely moved to sympathy or empathy, or to reflection or introspection'.

## 4.1 Olympian conflict: honour and emotions

In five (*Iliad* 1, 4, 8, 15,<sup>348</sup> 22) out of seven divine assemblies in the *Iliad* (*Iliad* 1, 4, 8, 15, 20, 22, 24) we find oppositions between Zeus, on the one hand, and Hera (*Iliad* 1, 4, and 15), Athena (*Iliad* 8, 22),<sup>349</sup> or Poseidon (*Iliad* 15) on the other.<sup>350</sup> In the assembly of *Iliad* 24, there is an opposition between Apollo and Hera. In such clashes, divine actors refer to their τιμή or claims to τιμή (e.g., pedigree or family structures; physical strength) in support of their position in the decision-making process, which partly shapes (and is, in part, shaped by) the individuals' emotions. Thus, as in human communities (see Chapters 2 and 3), so too within the divine community, honour and its associated emotional responses may generate conflict.

The impact of honour dynamics on divine institutions vis-à-vis conflict already becomes clear at the beginning of all Iliadic episodes involving divine opposition, namely, in Thetis's request towards Zeus in the assembly of *Iliad* 1. While in her first appeal (that is, while pleading with Zeus to permit the Trojans to defeat the Achaeans (1.503-10) as promised to Achilles),<sup>351</sup> Thetis emphasises Achilles's τιμή (cf. 1.505; 1.507-8; 1.510), in her second appeal (1.514-16), she explicitly associates the fulfilment of her request with her own τιμή: if Zeus decides to disregard her appeal, Thetis will be the most dishonoured goddess among gods (1.515-16). Thus, as Thetis puts it, Zeus has to satisfy her plea, because her supplication (cf. 1.500-2; cf. also 1.512-13)<sup>352</sup> pertains to the defence of her τιμή.<sup>353</sup> Unlike Agamemnon and

---

<sup>348</sup> Note that the decision-making process in *Iliad* 15 does not take place in a typical assembly, where all gods (including Zeus) are gathered together; yet the decision-making remains of political importance.

<sup>349</sup> I explore Athena's opposition to Zeus in Section 4.2, because, unlike Hera and Poseidon, Athena never takes a provocative stance towards Zeus.

<sup>350</sup> This antagonism between Zeus, and Hera, Poseidon, and Athena might be related to Iliadic allusions of events taking place beyond the *Iliad*; cf. 1.396-400. See below.

<sup>351</sup> On the idea that Achilles's reference to the Briareus-episode (cf. 1.393-404) implies another mythological narrative, which is first explicitly mentioned in *Pi. I.* 8.31-5 (viz. that Thetis married Peleus instead of Zeus, because the son of Thetis would become mightier than his father), see, e.g., Slatkin (1986; 1991). Contrast Willcock (1964), who argues that when Homer uses preexisting stories, there can still be elements revealing aspects of the alternative version. Yasumura (2011) 13 notes that Thetis's decision to underline Achilles's short life (1.505: 'ὄκυμορότατος'), rather than Zeus's obligation to her, might be linked to Thetis's intention to stress Achilles's mortality. Yasumura (2011) 13 n. 5 also cites Aristotle's account of Thetis's decision to exclude the Briareus-episode from her speech (*Arist. Eth. Nic.* 1124b12-17): 'being a god full of μεγαλοψυχία, [Zeus] disliked being reminded of the benefit that he received'. For further discussions of Thetis's mediation in *Iliad* 1, see, for example, Austin (1966); Wyatt (1988).

<sup>352</sup> For an analysis of the ritual of (Thetis's) supplication, see Gould (1973) 75-7. Naiden (2006) 47-8 claims that the suppliant's touching the head of the supplicated implies that the supplicated is asked to make up his mind, and therefore, the combination of gestures (viz. touching Zeus's chin and clasping

Hector, who are incapable of judging things retrospectively and prospectively (see Chapters 2 and 3), Zeus is aware that Thetis's request may disrupt the equilibrium of τιμή within the divine community. He therefore initially hesitates to give his consent to Thetis (note Zeus's silence at 1.511-12), and then goes on to predict Hera's stance as a result of his (possible) fulfilment of Thetis's request (1.518-19). Hera confirms Zeus's prediction, communicating her displeasure at Zeus's arrangements with Thetis by explicitly expressing her objections towards Zeus's intention to satisfy Thetis's request. Hera first questions the possibility that Zeus may meet other gods, making arrangements with them in her absence (1.541-3). She then clearly communicates her concern regarding the possibility that Thetis would persuade Zeus to honour Achilles at the expense of the rest of the Achaeans (1.555-9). Like her stance in *Iliad* 1, in the assembly of *Iliad* 4 Hera is opposed to Zeus's suggestion that the war between the Achaeans and the Trojans be made to end (4.25-9): this development would go against Hera's attempt to restore her τιμή after Paris's Judgement.<sup>354</sup> By implication, like *Iliad* 4, in *Iliad* 1 Hera appears to perceive Zeus's activity as going against her τιμή, since the Trojans' success (which is bound up with the issue of Thetis's and Achilles's honour) undercuts Hera's attempts to defend her own status.

In the assembly of *Iliad* 1, there is only one explicit reference to Hera's emotions, namely, her anxiety (*cf.* 'νῦν δ' αἰνῶς δειδοῖκα κατὰ φρένα': 'but now I am terribly afraid in my heart'; 1.555) regarding the Achaeans' possible defeat (1.558-9). Despite the absence of any other explicit reference to her emotional state, her apprehension appears to cause her to behave aggressively. Since she is trying to prevent her worst fears, and because she assumes that Zeus's plans go against her preferences, her stance towards Zeus is argumentative, which is clearly conveyed by the narrator at 1.539 (αὐτίκα κερτομίοισι Δία Κρονίωνα προσηύδα; at once, she [*i.e.*,

---

his knees) implies Zeus's responsibility to honour Thetis, 'who has helped him in the past but is too discrete to say so'. For a discussion of the concept and practice of supplication in general, including further bibliographical references, see Chapter 5. For a comparison between the motive of a goddess supplicating the leader god in Greek and Near Eastern Literature, see West (1997) 353-6.

<sup>353</sup> Tsagalis (2001) 24 argues that Zeus's silence at 1.511-12 stresses the turn in Thetis's appeal from the 'politics of reciprocity' to the 'rhetoric of honour' (1.516). Yet reciprocity and honour are not unrelated concepts. Reciprocity is embedded in the concept of τιμή, and τιμή is embedded in the concept of reciprocity. For when someone reciprocates, someone acknowledges a debt of honour. See Riedinger (1976); Riedinger (1980). Even if, initially, there is no reference to τιμή in Thetis's reminder of Zeus's obligation to satisfy her request (1.503-4), as lines 1.514-16 make clear, Zeus should not infringe upon her request for τιμή-related reasons.

<sup>354</sup> On the discussion regarding Paris's Judgement in connection to the *Iliad* as well as for relevant bibliographical references, see below.

Hera] addressed Zeus with taunting words), the use of the superlative at 1.552 (‘αἰνότετε’), as well as Hera’s challenging words in the same line (1.552: ‘αἰνότετε Κρονίδη, ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες’; ‘most dreadful son of Cronus, what sort of thing have you spoken’).<sup>355</sup> As in *Iliad* 1, in *Iliad* 4, her anger once again shapes her political stance. Indeed, this anger is not merely inferred through utterances such as that quoted above (1.552), which appears identically at 4.25, but is now explicitly stated (4.24): “Ἡρῆ δ’ οὐκ ἔχαδε στῆθος χόλον, ἀλλὰ προσηύδα (yet Hera could not hold her anger in her heart but spoke forth). Since Hera is here focusing on her own emotions and interests, which occasionally may coincide with those of the community (cf. 4.29: ‘ἔρδ’· ἀτὰρ οὐ τοὶ πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι’; ‘do it; but we all other gods do not approve you’), she perceives Zeus’s intentions as going against her desires (4.26-8):<sup>356</sup>

‘πῶς ἐθέλεις ἄλιον θεῖναι πόνον ἠδ’ ἀτέλεστον  
ιδρῶ θ’ ὄν ἰδρῶσα μόγῳ, καμέτην δέ μοι ἵπποι  
λαδὸν ἀγειρούση, Πριάμῳ κακὰ τοῖό τε παισίν;’

‘How do you want to make fruitless and unaccomplished my hard work, sweat that I sweated in toil and the horses laboured for me, who was gathering people, evil to Priam and his children?’

Hera’s anger results from her subjective interpretation of a state of affairs, in turn prompting Zeus’s anger, which comes to the fore through explicit references (e.g., 4.30: ὀχθήσας) as well as through his (ostensibly) authoritative attitude, namely, his declaration of non-acceptance of any disobedience to his announcement (1.565-7; cf. also 8.13-27; 15.16-24). In *Iliad* 1 and *Iliad* 4, in which Zeus’s anger is shaped by the political developments within the assembly (viz. Hera’s argumentative stance), but also in cases where Zeus’s anger is owing to developments beyond the context of the

---

<sup>355</sup> Note also that, in line 1.553, despite using the utterance ‘καὶ λῆν’ (‘surely’), which typically introduces an emphatic assent (see Latacz (2002) 173), Hera doubts Zeus’s statement that she has been questioning him: ‘καὶ λῆν σε πάρος γ’οὔτ’ εἶρομαι οὔτε μεταλλῶ’; ‘surely, formerly, I have neither questioned nor probed you’.

<sup>356</sup> Note that, in *Iliad* 15, Hera becomes angry (15.103) once again, openly expressing her disagreement (15.97-9), and even going as far as to obliquely provoke Ares’s opposition to Zeus’s wishes (15.109-12). Note, however, that she displayed different emotional behaviour in the presence of Zeus: earlier, in *Iliad* 15, Hera was afraid and yielded to his authority (see Section 4.2).

assembly,<sup>357</sup> Zeus uses the implications of his emotional state as a tool to underline the necessity that his orders must be followed. By declaring his claim to τιμή (namely, his physical strength), Zeus issues threats (cf. 1.1591-2; 8.19-20; 15.18-23),<sup>358</sup> and, in so doing, he attempts to prevent the gods' disobedience towards his orders. (Note that Zeus never actually comes to carry out these threats within the *Iliad*, which implies that none of the gods is willing to experience the implications of violence in the community – elaborated upon in Section 4.2.) That is to say, in addition to his own disposition, Zeus's strategy likewise exploits the gods' disposition. Zeus's threats intimidate the divine actors (e.g., 1.563: 'τὸ δέ τοι καὶ ῥίγιον ἔσται'; 'and this will be more horrible for you [*i.e.*, Hera]'; cf. also 4.37-42; 8.18-27; 15.16-33).<sup>359</sup> Thus Zeus's anger – along with the other gods' fear<sup>360</sup> – is constitutive of Zeus's power (which serves to safeguard the status quo (see below Section 4.2)).

In the assembly of *Iliad* 1, Zeus might choose to act on Hera's general complaint regarding his (supposed) support of the Trojans (1.520-1). There are, however, other gods who favour the Achaeans' victory (*i.e.*, Poseidon; Athena; Hermes: 15.213-17; cf. also 24.25-30). In *Iliad* 15, while focusing on the personal aspects of their controversy – namely, on the different domains of their τιμή (cf. 15.185-93) – Poseidon gets angry towards Zeus after the latter's earlier command to refrain from the battlefield (15.184). Poseidon makes it clear that his anger (along with that of the other gods) will be unassuageable if Zeus decides to go against their preferences by not allowing the Achaeans to defeat the Trojans (15.213-17). When we take into account Poseidon's earlier emphasis on his τιμή-related rights (cf. 15.189: 'ἕκαστος δ' ἔμμορε τιμῆς'), then Zeus's possible decision to dismiss or ignore the gods' preferences suggests his disregard for their τιμή, namely, the violation of the current order of things.

<sup>357</sup> Cf. Zeus's attitude in *Iliad* 8, which is owing to the Achaeans' victory over the Trojans, as well as Zeus's stance in *Iliad* 15, as a result of the gods' disobedience in *Iliad* 14 causing the Achaeans' victory over the Trojans.

<sup>358</sup> The extent of Zeus's anger comes to the fore through his physical strength on which his threats are based. He appears to exploit the same patterns to emphasise his physical dominance over the other gods, namely, their suspension (cf. 8.19-20; 15.18-20) and expulsion from Olympus (cf. 15.22-3; 1.1591-2). Zeus physical strength is also expressed in the metonymy 'ἀάπτους χεῖρας' (1.567) and 'γείρες ἄαπτοι' (8.450); 'invincible hands'.

<sup>359</sup> Stanley (1993) 161 observes that Zeus's anger towards Hera, along with his threats of violence, are more intense in *Iliad* 15, in comparison with previous books. For unlike on previous occasions, by *Iliad* 15, Hera has not just expressed opposition against Zeus, but she has also managed to deceive him.

<sup>360</sup> Note that the gods' fear is, *prima facie*, linked to Zeus *per se*. However, it is really connected with what is at stake through Zeus's threats, namely, the stability of the community. Cf. the introduction of this chapter.

Like the conflicts between Zeus, on the one hand, and Hera and Poseidon, on the other, the opposition between Apollo and Hera in the assembly of *Iliad* 24 results from negotiations of honour, viz. forms of social and political interaction, underpinned by anger. In *Iliad* 24, Apollo expresses fierce criticism of Achilles's (24.39-45) and the other gods' behaviour (24.33-9). In being extremely angry towards Hector while grieving for Patroclus, Achilles violates fundamental human norms, discounting the value of solidarity, which encompasses display of ἔλεος and αἰδώς (cf. 24.44-5).<sup>361</sup> Moreover, in allowing Achilles to mistreat Hector's body, the gods – like Achilles – disregard communal norms. As we may infer from Apollo's rhetorical question at 24.33-4, the gods fail to reciprocate Hector's offerings:

‘σχέτλιοι ἔστε, θεοί, δηλήμονες· οὐ νύ ποθ' ὕμιν  
Ἔκτωρ μηρί' ἔκρη βοῶν αἰγῶν τε τελείων;’

‘You are merciless, you gods, destructive; did not ever Hector burn thigh bones of oxen and flawless goats for your sake?’

On the other hand, Hera focuses on Achilles's perspective. Her opposition towards Apollo first manifests itself in emotional terms, as introduced by the narrator at 24.55: τὸν δὲ χολωσαμένη προσέφη λευκώλενος Ἥρη (and the white-handed Hera responded to him in anger). In her view, the protection of Hector's body implies that Achilles and Hector have an equal amount of τιμή (24.56-7). However, such an equation cannot be permitted because it fails to account for Achilles's divine origin (cf. 24.59).<sup>362</sup> Despite Hera's ostensible defence of Achilles's τιμή, lines 24.27-30 show that her support of Achilles's actions serves the defence of her own τιμή: Hera fosters feelings of hatred towards the Trojans, because, when she came to Paris in his courtyard along with Athena and Aphrodite, he favoured Aphrodite over her.<sup>363</sup> The

<sup>361</sup> From this perspective, Achilles's anger towards Hector – as a result of his grief for Patroclus – is excessive. Taplin (1992) 262 notes that ‘the poetry of Apollo's speech at 33ff. ... makes powerful connections with the ethics of the whole poem, and speaks to the human audience’. For a full discussion of the norms between the Trojan and the Achaean community, see Chapter 5. On Apollo's general hostile stance towards Achilles, cf. Achilles's reference to his death by Apollo at *Iliad* 21.277; Hector's reference to Achilles's death by Apollo at 22.359-60; the beginning of *Iliad* 22.

<sup>362</sup> To support her argument, Hera points out the affective relationship between her and Thetis (24.59-61). Note that Hera's emotions towards Thetis change in accordance with context; cf. Hera's stance in relation to Thetis in *Iliad* 1 (1.55-7) and *Iliad* 15 (15.93-4), where Hera in a brisk manner responds to Thetis's question about the reason of her frustration, following her encounter with Zeus.

<sup>363</sup> On the interpretation of these lines, see Reinhardt (1960) 16-36, especially 28, who demonstrates the relationship between the Judgement of Paris and the Iliadic narrative. See also Stinton (1990) 17ff. Cf. further Davies (1981) 56-62, who shows why there is the need even of this one reference to Paris's

reason why Apollo's stance causes Hera's anger is then to be found in Hera's focus on her own priorities: by allowing Achilles to mistreat Hector's body, Hera gathers that she is defending her τιμή following Paris's insult (*cf.* above for Hera's argumentative attitude towards Zeus in the assemblie of *Iliad* 1 and *Iliad* 4). From this perspective, as in *Iliad* 1, so too in *Iliad* 24 the τιμή of a human being affects divine decision-making and divine honour dynamics.

Allow me to summarise Section 4.1. I have here argued that, just as in human, so too in divine assemblies, honour dynamics may create division in decision-making processes, which is typically underpinned by anger. Anger, in turn, results from individuals' attempts to make normative claims based on their τιμή: when such anger is only concerned with an individual's subjective perception of a state of affairs, the assembly risks taking a decision at the cost of the community, thereby jeopardising community wellbeing. However, as I show in Section 4.2, divine assemblies do not secure the interests of only *one* individual: they negotiate norms in such ways that – even after strong disagreements – prioritise the interests of the communal, common good.

## 4.2 Olympian consensus

In this section, I focus on the important role of honour and emotions in the resolution of opposition within divine assemblies. I argue that, despite passion and conflict (see Section 4.1), divine actors manage to acknowledge the significant role of consent when taking decisions in an assembly context. In so doing, they eventually succeed in accommodating different views within assemblies by deferring to communal norms, mainly through recognising the importance of μοῖρα in the decision-making process, as well as through respecting one another's τιμή.

Section 4.2 is divided in two subsections. In Section 4.2.1, I show how the gods adopt emotional and political stances that minimise the possibility of creating a deadlock in the assembly. I do this first by analysing Zeus's stance and then by focusing on Zeus's 'opponents'. Then, in Section 4.2.2, I expand upon the idea of effective divine decision-making, arguing that, in cases of vehement disagreements that require major concessions, any radical yielding (which may possibly be seen as

---

Judgement and why this reference takes place at the very end of the epos. The connection between the Judgement of Paris and the notion of (impartial) justice is well brought out by Allan (2006) 12-13.

humiliating) is assuaged by permitting face-saving gestures and actions. I therefore argue that mechanisms of face saving, which are intimately bound up with honour and emotion, enable divine institutions to diffuse tension and create consensus.

#### 4.2.1 Olympian reconciliation: honour and emotions

Zeus's leadership in effective decision-making is fundamental. Although his rule appears ostensibly despotic,<sup>364</sup> Zeus never *actually* enacts his claims of power in an arbitrary manner, violating the norms.<sup>365</sup> This characteristic of Zeus's leadership style is already explicit in *Iliad* 1. Despite his vehement disagreement with Hera, Zeus takes her preferences into account before deciding upon a course of action. In the first instance, he considers the likely political fallout should he choose to grant Thetis's request, and reflects on Hera's anger should the request be granted (*cf.* Zeus's silence at 1.512;<sup>366</sup> *cf.* also 1.518-21). While Zeus clearly states that he has the right to make decisions apart from the other gods (1.545-6; 1.549-50),<sup>367</sup> he still shows an awareness of Hera's important role within the decision-making process of the Olympian assembly (1.547-8): where appropriate, Hera will be the first (among gods and mortals) to be informed about Zeus's arrangements. Thus, despite making decisions on his own, Zeus gives weight to Hera's τιμή in the Olympian community.

In *Iliad* 8, we find another example of Zeus refraining from despotic behaviour and tyrannical uses of authority and power.<sup>368</sup> In *Iliad* 8, Zeus announces that the gods will abstain from influencing the battle (8.5-11), and refuses to countenance objections to this course of action (8.12-27). This appears as a clearly

---

<sup>364</sup> Whitman (1958) 225-31 associates Zeus's ostensibly arbitrary behaviour with the development of Achilles's anger.

<sup>365</sup> Contrast Anhalt (2017) 24, who argues that 'the society on Olympus is firmly autocratic, and Zeus has no obligation to the gods he rules over'. See also *ibid.* 9; 25; 52.

<sup>366</sup> On Zeus's silence at this point *cf.* Danek (2014a) 15: 'Das Schweigen des Zeus verrät, dass er überlegt, wie er die Bitte der Thetis in seine bereits zuvor bestehende Planung (Zerstörung Troias, Beendigung des Heroengeschlechts) integrieren kann.' See also Elmer (2013) 158, who cites Clay (1999) 43-4; Erbse (1986) 225; Montiglio (1993) 184; Tsagalis (2001) 24. Contrast Griffin (1980) 199, who reads Zeus's response to Thetis as 'anxiety about the trouble he will have with his wife ..., until he adds the terrific nod of his head'.

<sup>367</sup> Contrast Elmer (2013) 159, who understands Hera's complaint at 1.540-3 as legitimate. For Hera's complaint, *cf.* above Section 4.1.

<sup>368</sup> Contrast Elmer (2013) 160-2. Despite noting Zeus's mild response to Athena at 8.39-40, Elmer (2013) gives too much attention to Zeus's rhetoric at 8.5-17, without paying enough heed to Zeus's real intentions and actions. Zeus does not disregard the communal interest, although he resorts rhetorically to threats. Following Hera's deception in *Iliad* 14 and Poseidon's intervention into the battlefield, Zeus does not make use of the threats announced in *Iliad* 8. Thus, in contrast to Elmer's (2013) argumentation, Zeus differs from Agamemnon, such as when the latter threatens Chryses in *Iliad* 1, and from Hector, such as when he demands Polydamas's silence in *Iliad* 18.

autocratic action. However, in spite of emphasising his own power (*cf.* the references to his superior physical strength at 8.17; 8.27), as well as on his use of threats to dissuade opposition to his decision (*cf.* Zeus’s threats against the gods at 8.12-27: he will strike or dash to Tartarus anyone who defies his orders), Zeus still takes the reaction of the other gods to his exercise of power into consideration, and even takes steps to conciliate them. The first proof that Zeus is mindful of the reaction of the other gods can be seen in his muted response (8.39-40) to Athena’s objection (8.33-7): Athena asks Zeus to allow the gods’ contribution to the war from afar (*viz.* by influencing the Achaeans’ deliberation process), to which Zeus responds with a smile, and clarifies that he did not really mean his previous threatening words. Thus Zeus’s threats of violence only ostensibly leave no space for disagreement, giving him the façade of a relentless leader. Zeus’s initiative that the fortunes of the Trojans and the Achaeans be ‘weighted’ (*cf.* 8.66-74), shortly after Athena’s voicing of her request within the assembly, likewise constitutes a conciliatory move with the aim of ‘blunting’ the impact of his ‘autocratic’ speech. However, since the ‘fatal day’ is the lot of the Achaeans (*cf.* 8.72: ῥέπε δ’ αἴσιμον ἦμαρ Ἀχαιῶν: and the Achaeans’ death-day turned the scale), Zeus’s stance within the assembly shows that he does not disregard communal norms. In a similar vein, in sending Iris to prevent Hera and Athena from entering the battlefield for the Achaeans’ sake (8.399-407), Zeus does not satisfy his own personal preference at the expense of the communal interest. Indeed, in his announcement at the end of *Iliad* 8 – which follows Hera’s and Athena’s discontent, owing to hearing Zeus’s Iris-delivered message (8.443-7) – Zeus makes it clear that he is considerate to the μοῖρα-defined developments pertaining to the Achaeans’ defeat until Patroclus’s death (8.470-6).<sup>369</sup> This is to say that Zeus’s order within the assembly of *Iliad* 8, along with his similar command at the end of the same book, is not to be construed as a proof of arbitrary behaviour. Instead, it should be understood as Zeus’s defence of μοῖρα-related decisions (*cf.* 8.477: ὥς γὰρ θέσφατόν<sup>370</sup> ἐστὶ: ‘for so this is fated’).<sup>371</sup> Zeus’s acknowledgment of μοῖρα in

<sup>369</sup> Note that within the assembly Zeus’s command pertains to *all* gods. However, in spite of their general silence and dissatisfaction (8.28-9), objections only come from the side that supports the Achaeans (*cf.* Athena’s speech at 8.31-7 – see above).

<sup>370</sup> Kirk (1990) 334 on 447 notes that θέσφατον is to be associated with fate rather than with Zeus’s will. Morrison (1997) 291 also shares this view that Zeus’s will is not identical to fate. Contrast Lloyd-Jones (1971) 5: ‘Moirai, one’s ‘portion’, is in the last resort identical with the will of Zeus; when Hera reminds him that he cannot save his son Sarpedon she is only warning him that he cannot sacrifice to a sudden whim his own settled policy.’ Similarly Taplin (1992) 238 n. 59, who argues that fate ‘is not some power independent of Zeus’; *cf.* also *ibid.* 141-2; 239. On the association between Zeus and fate,

considering a course of action fundamentally characterises his exercise of authority. Like *Iliad* 8, in *Iliad* 15, in order to demonstrate the legitimacy of his command, Zeus refers to future developments.<sup>372</sup> That Zeus's announced developments in the decision-making process of *Iliad* 15 (namely, that his anger will not cease and that the Achaeans will have to suffer defeats until Patroclus kills Sarpedon, Patroclus is killed by Hector, and Hector by Achilles (15.61-8)) are not individually driven but relate to μοῖρα's judgement becomes clear during the episode of conflict between Zeus and Hera in *Iliad* 16. In feeling compassion towards Sarpedon (*cf.* 16.431: ἐλέησε), Zeus is tempted to save his life. Yet, as Hera explicitly states, Sarpedon's salvation would constitute a violation of μοῖρα (16.440-2):<sup>373</sup>

‘αἰνότατε Κρονίδη, ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες;  
 ἄνδρα θνητὸν ἔόντα, πάλαι πεπρωμένον αἴση,  
 ἄψ ἐθέλεις θανάτοιο δυσηχέος ἐξαναλῦσαι;’

‘Most dreadful son of Cronus, what sort of thing have you spoken? Do you wish again to free a man from the ill-sounding death, although he is mortal, doomed by destiny long ago?’

Since Hera refers to Sarpedon's fate<sup>374</sup> in order to discourage Zeus from saving Sarpedon's life, Zeus's announcement at the beginning of *Iliad* 15, which mentions Sarpedon's fortune,<sup>375</sup> should be viewed in terms of the role of μοῖρα in the decision-making process. Owing to this, we must underscore the following point. The gods govern their actions in accordance with μοῖρα in the sense that μοῖρα is descriptive of an order that the gods regard as typical. This is to say that μοῖρα has the form of a law

---

see also Whitman (1958) 225-9; Erbse (1986) 284-93. For my view on μοῖρα, see below in the main text.

<sup>371</sup> In contrast to *Iliad* 8 and *Iliad* 15, in the divine assembly of *Iliad* 20, Zeus allows the intervention of the gods in battle. (For the Iliadic theomachy, see, for example, Graziosi (2017) 49f.) However, as in *Iliad* 8 and *Iliad* 15, in *Iliad* 20 Zeus is a defender of fate; see Zeus's words at 20.23-30, especially line 22.30: ‘δεῖδω μὴ καὶ τεῖχος ὑπὲρ μόρον ἐξαλαπάξῃ’: ‘I am afraid lest he destroy the wall beyond what is fated’. For the meaning of the concepts of μοῖρα, μόρος, πόντος, οἶτος, κῆρ (κῆρες), αἴσα, see Erbse (1986) 273-84.

<sup>372</sup> For the inconsistencies between Zeus's predictions in *Iliad* 15 and the actual events, see Janko (1991) 234-5 on 56-77.

<sup>373</sup> *Cf.* Athena's similar reaction to Zeus's vacillation over Hector's life in *Iliad* 22: 22.168-81. As in *Iliad* 16, in *Iliad* 22 Zeus does not eventually defy the role of μοῖρα in the decision-making process. For a comparison between these scenes, see for example Taplin (1992) 237-8.

<sup>374</sup> Also note that, at 16.452, Hera refers explicitly to Sarpedon's killing by Patroclus.

<sup>375</sup> Concerning the Achaeans' defeat and Patroclus's death as μοῖρα-defined developments, which are also encompassed in Zeus's declaration at the beginning of *Iliad* 15, see the end of *Iliad* 8 mentioned above.

or rule that should not be violated. Therefore, while the breach of this law or rule is theoretically possible, the gods willingly respect it.<sup>376</sup> By implication, in *Iliad* 15, as in *Iliad* 8, Zeus's unyielding stance results from his adherence to communal norms, *not* his focus on subjective desires.<sup>377</sup> In other words, Zeus's ostensibly authoritarian behaviour (in both *Iliad* 8<sup>378</sup> and *Iliad* 15) does not point towards an unseemly preoccupation with his individual priorities. Instead, it attests his being a good leader who places communal interests and related norms above other considerations.<sup>379</sup>

While underlining the importance of μοῖρα in divine decision-making, Hera's disagreement over Sarpedon's fortune brings out another important political facet of collective action among the gods, viz. the mechanism of consensus. While Hera is aware that she is unable to force Zeus to comply with her wishes, she attempts to induce him to comply by underscoring the risks associated with disregarding μοῖρα and saving Sarpedon's life (16.443: 'ἔδρ'· ἀτὰρ οὐ τοὶ πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι': 'do it; but all other gods do not approve you'); that is, by underlining the communal representation of the gods against Zeus should he disregard the role of fate.<sup>380</sup> A similar scenario can be observed in *Iliad* 4 (cf. 4.29) and *Iliad* 15 (cf. 15.213-217), whereby Zeus is reminded of the importance of the other gods in the decision-making

<sup>376</sup> Contrast Bonnet's (2016) 118-27 analysis of divine assemblies, which seems to identify Zeus's plans with μοῖρα, taking for granted that neither of those can be violated. Bonnet (2016) is right to argue that Zeus is determined to maintain the current order of things. However, as this chapter shows, this determination pertains to all gods, and Zeus's leadership, along with the other gods' agency, is not to be understood as an external factor that manages or imposes the cosmic balance. Cosmic balance, linked to the way in which the gods enact norms, is constantly negotiated.

<sup>377</sup> Contrast Ulf (1990a) 19, who argues that, like Agamemnon in *Iliad* 1, so too Zeus in *Iliad* 15 acts against the communal norms. Contrast also Elmer (2013) 151, who argues that only gods can predict the implications of their decisions. Humans are clearly also capable of such predictions: cf. the embassy's message to Achilles in *Iliad* 9, especially Phoenix's intervention (see my analysis of this passage in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2). Contrast Morrison (1997) 286; Elmer (2013) 151, who argue that humans are always ignorant of what fate defines. It seems to me that humans may indeed have access to this knowledge through divine mediation (cf. Achilles's words at 9.410-16). While the gods occasionally entertain ideas that disregard fate-defined developments (cf. Morrison (1997) 286-8), they never choose to ignore the role of fate in the decision-making process.

<sup>378</sup> Note that Hera has already referred to Zeus's leading role within the decision-making process in lines 8.427-31; especially 8.430-1: 'κεῖνος δὲ τὰ ἄ φρονέων ἐνὶ θυμῷ/ Τρῳσὶ τε καὶ Δαναοῖσι δικαζέτω, ὡς ἐπιεικέες': 'and let him decide about what he considers in his heart with regard to the Trojans and the Achaeans, as it is appropriate.'

<sup>379</sup> This statement also applies to Zeus's βουλή (cf. 1.5), a much discussed matter; see, e.g., Schein (1984) 59-60; Morrison (1997) 286-96; Clay (1999) 40-60, including discussion of the bibliography; Elmer (2013) 153-9; Danek (2014a) 9-28, including discussion of the bibliography; Pironti (2016) 104-8.

<sup>380</sup> To support her point further, Hera exploits moral argumentation. If Zeus decides to violate communal norms, then he should likewise expect other gods to encroach upon those norms (16.445-9). In short, Zeus should heed the golden rule: treat others as you want to be treated yourself. Cf. Achilles's criticism of Agamemnon's leadership in *Iliad* 1: see Chapter 2; the encounter between Priam and Achilles in *Iliad* 24: see Chapter 5.

process. As noted in Section 4.1, in the assembly of *Iliad* 4, Hera points out that the end of the war between the Achaeans and the Trojans, following Zeus's suggestion, is not condoned by the other gods. In fact, Zeus appears to count *precisely* on the very mechanism of consensus. By pretending to view the end of the war as a possible course of action (*cf.* 4.16), he aims to provoke Hera's counteraction implied by the narrator's words at 4.5-6:

αὐτίκ' ἐπειρᾶτο Κρονίδης ἐρεθιζέμεν Ἥρην  
κερτομίους ἐπέεσσι, παραβλήδην ἀγορεύων·

At once, the son of Cronus wished to attempt to irritate Hera with provocative words, speaking in a misleading manner.<sup>381</sup>

Thus, although Zeus's eventual retreat to Hera's request that the war recommences is not genuine,<sup>382</sup> Zeus's strategic attempt to fulfil Thetis's request – thereby honouring Thetis (and Achilles) through the Achaeans' defeat – relies heavily on the mechanism of consensus in the decision-making process.<sup>383</sup> In short, despite Zeus's primacy, the consent of *all* gods remains central to effective decision-making. Indeed, Zeus, while a leader, is not an autocrat: he never pushes his claims of power too far but always recognises the views of others and the degree of agency of the community he leads.<sup>384</sup>

That Zeus does show respect for the rights of others is illustrated most clearly in the divine assembly of *Iliad* 24, an assembly that foregrounds his leadership abilities and substantial contribution to the efficacy of divine decision-making. The tension created due to the opposition between Apollo and Hera (see above Section 4.1) is eased thanks to Zeus's masterful skills vis-à-vis conciliation. Zeus

<sup>381</sup> For a different interpretation of these lines, see Pucci (2002) 22.

<sup>382</sup> *Cf.* Danek (2014a) 20-3, who rightly notes that Zeus's suggestion that the gods end the war between the Achaeans and the Trojans in *Iliad* 4 is actually meant to facilitate Zeus's plan to fulfil Thetis's request. See also Elmer (2013) 149. Elmer (2013) 150, however, is wrong in arguing further that the Fall of Troy goes against Zeus's will (based on Zeus's statement at 4.43 and 16.435, viz. that the Fall of Troy does not heed Zeus's preferences). See Allan (2006) 6, who rightly argues that 'Zeus's presumed feelings of pity at the city's destruction and his conviction that the fall of Troy is right are not mutually exclusive'. Note also Zeus's and Hera's deal: Zeus 'loses' Troy; Hera will 'lose' Argos, Sparta, or Mycenae (4.51-4). Zeus (ostensibly) retreats to Hera's request only after she has referred to both his and her own status (4.55-61), thereby underlining the importance of mutual concession (4.62-3).

<sup>383</sup> Flaig (1994) 13-31 has well brought out the importance of the role of consensus in his analysis of the Olympian assembly in *Iliad* 4. Still on Flaig's (1994) account, Zeus's stance in the assembly is perceived as authentic. For my review of Flaig (1994), see Chapter 1, Section 1.2. On the interpretation of Zeus's strategies in general, see also Schaeffer (1990) 48-56.

<sup>384</sup> From this perspective, there is no contradiction in Zeus's behaviour as noted by Flaig (1994) 19. Zeus's obedience to communal norms appears to unify his behaviour throughout the *Iliad*.

acknowledges the legitimacy of Apollo's stance (through confirming the reciprocal relationship between the gods and Hector and recognising that Hector always offered Zeus gifts to his liking; 24.66-70), while reassuring Hera that honouring Hector does not detract from Achilles's τιμή (24.66).<sup>385</sup> To this end, while addressing Thetis,<sup>386</sup> Zeus emphasises his own defence of Achilles's τιμή (24.110) – an act that is bound up with the on-going, reciprocal dynamics of honour, given that, in securing Achilles's τιμή, Zeus seeks to secure Thetis's αἰδώς and φιλότις towards him in the future (24.111) – and takes both Thetis's and Achilles's emotional state into account. That is, he recognises Thetis's deep distress for her son (24.104-5), and aims to appease Achilles's anger by incorporating into the proposed plan of action Priam's offer of gifts to Achilles (24.117-19).<sup>387</sup> Thus, by balancing Apollo's and Hera's differing viewpoints – while also successfully gauging the importance of Thetis's (and Achilles's) emotional state vis-à-vis the decision-making process – Zeus safeguards the wellbeing of his community.

Like Zeus's respectful attitude towards the rights of his counterparts, the other gods likewise negotiate norms in ways that are ultimately respectful towards Zeus: even though divine actors may occasionally challenge Zeus's status, actions, and intentions (see Section 4.1), like Zeus's, the gods' behaviour aligns with the communal interest. In the divine assembly of *Iliad* 1, although Hera challenges Zeus's right to make arrangements on his own (1.540-3), she eventually recognises the legitimacy of his action (when rejecting Zeus's charges about her inquisitorial stance (1.553-4) which she has previously maintained, as discussed in Section 4.1). Although Hera's major concern regarding Zeus's acceptance of Thetis's request to honour Achilles through the Achaeans' defeat (as expressed at 1.555-9) casts doubt upon Zeus's intentions vis-à-vis his consideration of her preferences, Hera realises and accepts that it would not be wise to challenge Zeus's primacy further. In fear of Zeus's aggressive stance (as conveyed by his threats of violence issued against her (1.561-7)), Hera retreats from her position (1.568-9):

---

<sup>385</sup> Contrast Elmer (2013) 173, who argues that, in the absence of any formula, pointing towards a group response to Zeus's solution the decision-making is based on individual preferences. See Chapter 1, Section 1.2 for my review of Elmer's (2013) methodology.

<sup>386</sup> For a comparison between Thetis's presence on Olympus in *Iliad* 1 and in *Iliad* 24, see Taplin (1992) 263.

<sup>387</sup> The gifts typically offered to Achilles in the *Iliad* seek to appease his heart (cf. *Iliad* 9, *Iliad* 19: see Chapter 2, Sections 2.2. and 2.3).

ὡς ἔφατ'· ἔδδεισεν δὲ βοῶπις πότνια Ἥρη,  
καὶ ῥ' ἀκέουσα καθῆστο ἐπιγνάμψασα φίλον κῆρ.

So he spoke; and the ox-eyed lady Hera was frightened, and sat down in silence, bending her beloved heart.

In a similar vein, despite her actions in *Iliad* 14 (cf. Διὸς ἀπάτη:<sup>388</sup> 14.157-66; 14.197-210; 14.233-41;<sup>389</sup> 14.267-9; 14.300-11; 14.330-40), which result in (Hypnos's and) Poseidon's disregard of Zeus's command to abstain from the battlefield (14.352-87), Hera retreats fearful (15.34-5) of Zeus's threats of exercising violence against her,<sup>390</sup> and recognises the illegitimacy of Poseidon's intervention on the battlefield in *Iliad* 14 (15.36-46), thereby admitting the legitimacy of Zeus's authority. Hera's recognition of the need to compromise on Zeus's request is expressed in her attempt to *rectify* the situation: she swears that she is not responsible for Poseidon's action (15.36-44),<sup>391</sup> going as far as stating her intention to urge Poseidon to follow Zeus's orders (15.45-6). Moreover, Hera accepts Zeus's command to transmit his orders to Iris and Apollo (15.78). All things considered: regardless of anger, Hera's fear of the consequences of defying Zeus's legitimate action causes her to eventually display emotionally-driven behaviour that does respect the current dispensation of τιμή.

Unlike Hera, Poseidon's general stance in the *Iliad* gives the impression that his retreat from his position of opposition towards Zeus is not motivated by fear.<sup>392</sup> As

---

<sup>388</sup> For an analysis of this scene, see, for example, Stanley (1993) 152-9; Pironti (2016) 89-106.

<sup>389</sup> This is a prominent passage regarding divine reciprocity dynamics: Hera asks Hypnos to put Zeus to sleep; if he agrees to satisfy her request, then she will give him a throne in exchange, and feel gratitude forever. That is, we see a clear example in which a god asks another god for a favour while explicitly promising to reciprocate the favour in the future (cf. also, for example, 21.369-76). Contrast Slatkin (1991) 64, who claims that 'the conventional form in which one god asks a favour of another does not include the reminder of a past favour or the promise of a future one on either part'.

<sup>390</sup> Hera is reminded of the threats which Zeus did inflict upon her in the past, namely, when she troubled Heracles in the sea with the North Wind's aid (15.18-30).

<sup>391</sup> Note that Hera is very careful in her oath formulation: it is true that it was not her who urged Poseidon to enter the battlefield, for she did not tell Hypnos to transmit a message to Poseidon; she only asked Hypnos to put Zeus to sleep (14.233-41). It was in fact Hypnos's initiative to inform Poseidon about Zeus's sleep, urging Poseidon to help the Achaeans (14.354-60).

<sup>392</sup> Even in *Iliad* 8, when he rejects (8.209-11) Hera's prompting to go against Zeus for the Achaeans' sake (8.201-7, especially 8.205-7: 'εἴ περ γάρ κ' ἐθέλομεν, ὅσοι Δαναοῖσιν ἀρωγοί,/ Τρῶας ἀπόσασθαι καὶ ἐρκεῖμεν εὐρύοπα Ζῆν./ αὐτοῦ κ' ἔνθ' ἀκάχοιτο καθήμενος οἶος ἐν Ἴδῃ'; 'for, if we, who support the Danaans, were willing to thrust away the Trojans and restrain the wide-eyed Zeus, he would be dejected there, where he sits on his own on Ida'), Poseidon does so out of respect for Zeus's rank (cf. 8.211: 'ἐπεὶ ἦ πολὺ φέρτερος': 'because he [*i.e.*, Zeus] is much better') rather than fear. Thus Poseidon's rejection of Hera's suggestion, which seems to challenge the current order of things, shows his determination not to violate this order. Contrast Pironti (2016) 88: 'il fratello e cognato le oppone un netto rifiuto (*Iliade*, VIII, 208-211), preso dal timore della superiora forza di Zeus. Era invece non

Zeus takes into account the verdict of μοῖρα (see above), Poseidon manages to control his anger (15.211: ‘ἀλλ’ ἤτοι νῦν μὲν κε νεμεσσηθεὶς ὑποείζω’: ‘still, though I feel fairly vexed, I will now draw back’) when taking Iris’s words to be words in accordance with fate (15.206-7).<sup>393</sup> He thus realises that it would be wise to follow the advice of Iris (viz. to reflect upon his argumentative message, which was about to be transferred to Zeus, and to consider the implications of his insistence on his opinion (15.201-4)). Nevertheless, Poseidon chooses to follow Iris’s advice insofar as it relates to his disagreement with Zeus on a personal level. While he still places this disagreement on the fair system of the dispensation of τιμή, thereby communicating his displeasure about Zeus’s commanding tone towards those who have an equal share with him (15.208-10), Poseidon eventually acquiesces to Zeus’s command, putting aside his own priorities.<sup>394</sup> Nevertheless, if Zeus completely disregards the prerogatives of the other gods (which are likewise based on τιμή distribution), then he will have to contend with the anger that such a decision will incur (15.212-17). Poseidon’s recognition of the legitimacy of Iris’s words and μοῖρα, as well as his commitment to the defence of the prerogatives of the other gods, are in the interests of the community, because they both work for communal stability, considering the current order of things. To this end, prudent actors retreat from their initial point of view, which follows from Iris’s advice,<sup>395</sup> thereby respecting the communal norms in decision-making processes, while also being ready to express their disagreement with anyone who attempts to flout them.

In addition to Hera and Poseidon, who vehemently express their opposition towards Zeus, Athena likewise contributes to effective decision-making.<sup>396</sup> In the

---

ha paura e agisce, prima in modo indiretto, infondendo coraggio in Agamemnone, poi in modo diretto, quando, insieme ad Athena, lascia l’ Olimpo’. Note, however, that Hera is not afraid precisely because she acts *together* with Athena (8.350-96; cf. also Hera’s attempt to secure Poseidon’s (and the other gods’) help noted above: 8.205-7) or acts *from afar* (8.218-19), which Zeus neither explicitly confirmed nor rejected at the beginning of *Iliad* 8 (cf. Athena’s words at 8.35-7 and Zeus’s response at 8.38-40).

<sup>393</sup> ‘Ἴρι θεά, μάλα τοῦτο ἔπος κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες/ ἐσθλὸν καὶ τὸ τέτυκται, ὅτ’ ἄγγελος αἴσιμα εἰδῆ.’

<sup>394</sup> Cf. also Poseidon’s stance at 8.209-11; see above.

<sup>395</sup> See Iris’s words at 15.203 (‘ἢ τι μεταστρέψεις; στρεπταὶ μὲν τε φρένες ἐσθλῶν’: ‘or will you change your mind? The minds of the great can be twisted’), which are similar to Phoenix’s words at 9.496-7 (‘ἀλλ’ Ἀχιλεῦ, δάμασον θυμὸν μέγαν· οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ/ νηλεὲς ἦτορ ἔχειν· στρεπτοὶ δὲ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί’: ‘but Achilles, tame your great anger; you should not have a pitiless heart; even the very gods can change their minds’). However, unlike Poseidon, Achilles does not concede to Phoenix’s exhortation, thereby failing to make a sound judgement (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2).

<sup>396</sup> As noted in Section 4.1, Athena (in contrast to Hera and Poseidon) takes a less forceful tack when displeased with Zeus. That Athena (typically) adopts a milder stance compared to Hera (and Poseidon) is also depicted in Zeus’s expectations at 8.406-8: ‘ὄφρ’ εἰδῆ γλαυκῶπις, ὅτ’ ἂν ᾗ πατρὶ μάχηται./ Ἥρη

divine assembly of *Iliad* 4, despite being angry with Zeus's supposed desire to end the war between the Achaeans and the Trojans, Athena manages to restrain her anger (4.22-3).<sup>397</sup> Moreover, after Zeus's angry declaration in *Iliad* 8, Athena expresses her opposition to his plans without taking a provocative stance (8.31-7). She first acknowledges the supremacy of Zeus's status (8.31-2), and accepts Zeus's command to abstain from battle (8.35). But then, having invoked the gods' great distress due to the Achaeans' defeat (8.33-4), she requests (as mentioned above) that Zeus permit the gods to interfere in the Achaeans' deliberation as a means of preventing their wholesale destruction (8.36-7). As a result of her diplomatic manoeuvre, she manages to elicit these reassuring words (8.39-40):

‘θάρσει, Τριτογένεια, φίλον τέκος· οὐ νύ τι θυμῷ  
πρόφρονι μυθέομαι, ἐθέλω δέ τοι ἥπιος εἶναι.’

‘Fear not, Tritogeneia, dear child; I am not saying this in willing heart, and I want to be gentle with you.’

As in *Iliad* 4 and *Iliad* 8, so too in the decision-making process of *Iliad* 15, Athena does not (openly) express anger towards Zeus. In fact, being afraid of the political implications of Ares's intention to disregard Zeus's command and intervene on the battlefield (15.123), Athena acts in physically and verbally aggressive ways towards Ares: she removes parts of his martial equipment, and points out his lack of αἰδώς and νόος (15.127-9). Ares's intentions would violate the status quo, a development that, as Athena's harsh criticism makes clear, is utterly undesirable. Thus Athena's fear for the future causes her to display, in the present, behaviour influenced by anger.<sup>398</sup> As such, her emotions have a tangible impact on the decision-making process.

In short, the gods may be said to engage in acts that come close to crossing the boundaries of communally endorsed behaviour. They do not, however, actually do so.

---

δ' οὐ τι τόσον νημεσίζομαι οὐδὲ χολοῦμαι· αἰεὶ γάρ μοι ἔωθεν ἐνικλᾶν ὅτι νοήσω'; 'so that the gleaming-eyed Athena may know when it happens to be her father with whom she fights. Yet, with Hera, I am not so much indignant nor angry; for she is always wont to break off what I devise.'

<sup>397</sup> ἦτοι Ἀθηναίη ἀκέων ἦν οὐδὲ τι εἶπε./ σκυζομένη Διὶ πατρί, χόλος δέ μιν ἄγριος ἦρει: truly, Athena remained silent, and said nothing, but she was cross with father Zeus, and was seized by fierce anger. The same lines are repeated at the end of *Iliad* 8 (8.459-60), depicting, once again, Athena's ability to hold her anger.

<sup>398</sup> Note that also Ares's emotional and political stance within the decision-making process of *Iliad* 15 is shaped by two different emotions, viz. his sadness for his son's death (15.113-14) and his anger against the Trojans, which fuels his desire to seek revenge (15.116).

In acting collectively within a political context, the gods eventually come to respect the τιμή of the members of the community, as well as the function of the normative order of μοῖρα. In so doing, they manage to compromise on different views and agree upon decisions, thereby achieving consensus. As shall be explained in Section 4.2.2, any compromises to the positions of others (with the aim of reaching consensus) do not result entirely from the use or threat of force; they moreover rely on dissenters who eventually adjust their positions *willingly*. I therefore argue that exploiting face-saving mechanisms contributes to effective decision-making in divine assemblies.

#### 4.2.2 Face-saving<sup>399</sup> mechanisms and willing compromises

Face-saving mechanisms facilitate the maintenance of communal equilibrium, for, by preventing loss of face, whoever gives their consent does not feel isolated nor do they feel that their τιμή has been disregarded. Dissenters are in fact given the space and time to remember that what is at stake is not simply their personal honour: it is the community's stability. The more sharply someone disagrees with the view of another member of the community, the more necessary face saving becomes. In this section, then, I focus on the two gods whose opposition to Zeus is the starkest, viz. Hera and Poseidon.

In the divine assembly of *Iliad* 1, Hera's fearful retreat – while appearing forced owing to Zeus's threats, which ostensibly impose decisions (see above) – can actually be understood as stemming from voluntary consent, accompanied by some kind of face saving, thanks to Hephaestus's intervention. Hephaestus first changes the focus of the assembly from the opposition between Zeus and Hera to its political and institutional implications, *i.e.*, the disturbance of the divine meal (1.573-6; 1.579). The quarrel between Zeus and Hera will have disastrous consequences, causing a rift among the gods due to the mortals, thereby preventing the Olympians from enjoying the feast. Conflict, then, between Zeus and Hera causes the disturbance of Olympian collegiality, for it affects the basic, civic institution of prandial partaking, the role of which is to diffuse tension and foster *bonhomie* and cooperation. Put differently, the communal interest must stand above personal priorities or disagreements, which

---

<sup>399</sup> For the concept of face saving, see my discussion in Chapter 1, Section 1.2. Note that Scodel's (2008) book, *Epic Facework*, focuses on human rather divine affairs. For my discussion of face-saving dynamics within the Achaean community, see Chapter 2, especially Sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.2.

disturb the efficacy of communal processes.<sup>400</sup> Secondly, although he points out that Hera needs to appease Zeus (1.582: ‘ἀλλὰ σὺ τόν γ’ ἐπέεσσι καθάπτεσθαι μαλακοῖσιν’; ‘but you, at any rate, accost him with gentle words’), Hephaestus reassures her that Zeus’s response to her conciliating approach will be positive (1.583: ‘αὐτίκ’ ἐπειθ’ ἴλαος Ὀλύμπιος ἔσσεται ἡμῖν’; ‘at once, then, the Olympian will be gracious to us’), and tries further to console her by asking her to be patient and acknowledging her distress (1.586: ‘τέτλαθι, μήτηρ ἐμή, καὶ ἀνάσχεο κηδομένη περ’; ‘have patience, mother, and bear up, though distressed you may be’), as well as by referring to his own prior experience – he makes it clear that he has suffered the consequences of Zeus’s anger himself in attempting her rescue (1.590-4):

ἤδη γάρ με καὶ ἄλλοτ’ ἀλεξέμεναι μεμαῶτα  
 ῥίψε, ποδὸς τεταγών, ἀπὸ βηλοῦ θεσπεσίωιο.  
 πᾶν δ’ ἤμαρ φερόμην, ἅμα δ’ ἠελίῳ καταδύντι  
 κάππεσον ἐν Λήμνω, ὀλίγος δ’ ἔτι θυμὸς ἐνῆεν·  
 ἔνθα με Σίντιες ἄνδρες ἄφαρ κομίσαντο πεσόντα.’

‘For already in another occasion, because I wanted to help you, he [*i.e.*, Zeus] caught me by the foot and threw me from the divine threshold. And all day long I was falling, and at sunset, I landed in Lemnos, and still there was little life within me, and there, the Sintian men straightaway took care of me, who had fallen.’

Thus, using the memory of what he has suffered, Hephaestus attempts to minimise the effect of Zeus’s aggressive behaviour against Hera, while also reminding her of earlier times of violence within the divine community which resulted from her disputatious stance in the past.<sup>401</sup> In this way, Hephaestus succeeds in being considerate about the maintenance of both Hera’s and Zeus’s τιμή, in the context of safeguarding its communal dispensation. By showing that Zeus’s response to Hera’s challenge does not merely pertain to Zeus’s and Hera’s interpersonal disagreement, but rather impacts upon the entire community, Hephaestus implies that Hera should understand that her excessive focus on her own honour affects the communal cohesiveness. This, in turn, reduces the stakes for Hera. For now her retreat can be viewed as an act performed to protect the common good. To this end, Hephaestus

<sup>400</sup> For the fundamental role of meal as an institution, *cf.* also Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3 including bibliographical references, and Chapter 3, Section 3.1.

<sup>401</sup> Thus, in addition to Zeus’s threats, Hephaestus’s reference to violence constitutes another hint at past violence of a Theogonic type. See the introduction to this chapter and below.

does not fail to explicitly recognise Hera's status, for he does not utter anything of which Hera herself is ignorant (1.577): 'μητρὶ δ' ἐγὼ παράφημι, καὶ αὐτῇ περ νεούση'; 'I advise the mother, though she herself knows'. In a similar vein, despite consoling Hera, he recognises Zeus's claims to τιμή by referring to his rank (1.581: 'ὁ γὰρ πολὺ φέρτατός ἐστιν'; 'for he is by far the best'), as well as his physical strength. For, if he so desired, Zeus could hurl the gods out of their seats (1.580-1). It is therefore nigh on impossible to fight against him (1.589). Indeed, Hephaestus's narration of his own experience makes it clear that Zeus's threats have a real point of reference. All things considered, unlike Nestor (who urges both Agamemnon and Achilles to retreat mutually (1.275-84; see Chapter 2, Section 2.1)), Hephaestus does not mention any injustice on Zeus's part, which could be understood as yet another proof of Zeus's behavioural legitimacy. Unlike Agamemnon who does not respect Achilles, Zeus does not discount Hera's status; and unlike Agamemnon and Achilles, Hera takes Hephaestus's advice into consideration.

Hera's consideration of Hephaestus's advice impacts upon developments within the assembly of *Iliad* 1. This impact begins with Hera's emotional change: whereas, following Zeus's aggressive and threatening speech (1.561-7), Hera retreats in fear (1.568: ἔδδεισεν; cf. also 1.569: ἐπιγνάμψασα φίλον κῆρ – see Section 4.2.1 above), after Hephaestus's intervention, she is happier, and this cheerful disposition is emphasised through the narrator's double reference to her smile (1.595-6):<sup>402</sup>

ὣς φάτο, μείδησεν δὲ θεὰ λευκώλενος Ἥρη,  
μειδήσασα δὲ παιδὸς ἐδέξατο χειρὶ κύπελλον.

So he spoke, and the weight-handed Hera smiled, and smiling accepted the goblet out of her child's hand.

Hera's emotional change, along with the acceptance of a glass of wine, allows the gods to conduct the meal (1.595f.), that is, the divine community once again achieves *détente*. Moreover, Hephaestus's initiative to share the wine to the other gods (1.597-

---

<sup>402</sup> On how mythology can explain Hera's smile, see Halliwell (2008) 60 with n. 24 for bibliographical references: Hera welcomes Hephaestus's omission to her violence against him (cf. 18.395-7, with *Hom. Hymn* 3.316-18: see Gantz (1993) 74-6), which is accompanied by his realistic observation that Zeus is able to exercise authority by leveraging his invincible strength. On Halliwell's (2008) interpretation of Hera's smile in *Iliad* 1, see also *ibid.* 61; 63-4; 67. Note also that Hera's smile is emphasised by the parataxis, as noted in Halliwell (2008) 66.

8) prompts a change in their disposition, viz. from irritation (following Zeus's aggressive message) to laughter, which resulted from Hephaestus's idea to pour wine, exploiting his lameness (*cf.* 1.570 in contrast to 1.599-600):

ὄχθησαν δ' ἀνὰ δῶμα Διὸς θεοὶ Οὐρανίωνες; and all the Uranian gods in the house of Zeus were sorely vexed

ἄσβεστος δ' ἄρ' ἐνῶρτο γέλως μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν,  
ὥς ἶδον Ἥφαιστον διὰ δώματα ποιπνύοντα.

And unquenchable/ceaseless laughter arose among the blessed gods, once they saw Hephaestus bustling about the house.

In this light, Hera's disposition is not only important from an emotional point of view, but from a political perspective. For, it marks the beginning of a change which bears political meaning, viz. the unhampered continuation of the assembly and the gods' feast. To this end, the emotional state of the gods, as expressed through their laughter, is likewise significant, for it consolidates what has already been seen in Hera's emotional change, viz. the way in which an emotion may allow an institution – or an institutional process – to surmount disagreement, thereby realising communal stability.<sup>403</sup> Note that both the emotional change of Hera, bound up with her face saving, and the emotional change of the rest of the gods result from Hephaestus's intervention which is, therefore, politically of utmost importance. Thus the way in which all gods embody and enact communal norms within the assembly of *Iliad* 1 contributes to promoting the collective interest.

Similarly to *Iliad* 1, in *Iliad* 15 Hera, being fearful (15.34: ὧς φάτο, ῥίγησεν δὲ βοῶπις πότνια Ἥρη; so he [*i.e.*, Zeus] spoke, and the lady the ox-eyed Hera shuddered), concedes to Zeus, suggesting her recognition of Zeus's legitimate statement. Yet she displays yielding behaviour, while avoiding referring to her actions to deceive Zeus in *Iliad* 14, with the aid of Aphrodite and Hypnos, resulting in Poseidon's disregard of Zeus's earlier command. Despite Hera's subtle attempt to

---

<sup>403</sup> Thus, even if Levine (1982/1983) 99 is right in arguing that the gods' laughter pertains to their 'supremacy' and 'affection' towards Hephaestus, Hephaestus behaves in the assembly as if he wants to provoke this laughter, using it as a means to diffuse the tension within the assembly. *Cf.* the function of Zeus's smile towards Athena in *Iliad* 8 (8.38); on Zeus's stance in *Iliad* 8, see above Section 4.2.1.

conceal part of the truth,<sup>404</sup> Zeus is suspicious of her real plan of action. Indeed, as before her defence (whereby Zeus explicitly asks her to give up her deceptions and strategy to exploit the other gods' help to trick him for her purposes (15.31-3)), so too after her oath and Hera's expression of willingness to advise Poseidon to follow Zeus's will, Zeus makes it clear that he is aware of her fraud: if Zeus and Hera shared the same opinion, with Poseidon holding another view of theirs, he would still change his mind and comport himself in accordance with their preference (15.49-52). Still, despite being convinced of her deceptive plan, Zeus displays a different emotional attitude: desisting from his anger, he smiles (15.47)<sup>405</sup> and enables Hera to save face by leaving open the possibility of her trustworthiness (15.53: 'ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ ῥ' ἔτεόν γε καὶ ἀτρεκέως ἀγορεύεις'; 'but if you [*i.e.*, Hera] say the truth and speak accurately'). To this end, he focuses on the next step of the decision-making process, asking her to call Iris and Apollo (15.54-5), so that the former can transmit Zeus's message to Poseidon to withdraw from battle, and the latter supports Hector on the battlefield (15.56-61). By *including* her in his plan of action, Zeus drives the decision-making process forward, thereby smoothing out issues resulting from the gods' disregard of decision-making in *Iliad* 8. In so doing, he makes a kind of normative statement about how the person whose opinion prevails within a deliberative context should behave towards the other who has to retreat to the former's position, a statement illustrative of Zeus's leadership abilities from another perspective.

In addition to Hera's face saving, some form of face saving likewise accompanies Poseidon's decision to abandon his plan to defy Zeus's command in *Iliad* 15, having expressed his strong disagreement pointing out the different domains of their τιμή (15.185-93). As we noted in Section 4.2.1, what makes Poseidon change his mind is Iris's thoughtful intervention at 15.201-4:

‘οὕτω γὰρ δὴ τοι, γαίηοχε κυανοχαῖτα,  
τόνδε φέρω Διὶ μῦθον ἀπηγέα τε κρατερόν τε,

<sup>404</sup> Cf. the accuracy of her oath bound up with her assurance towards Zeus that Poseidon himself wanted to help the Achaeans, as already noted above in Section 4.2.1.

<sup>405</sup> On Zeus's smile at 15.47 (ὡς φάτο· μείδησεν δὲ πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε; so she spoke, and the father of men and mortals smiled), see Pironti (2016) 106: 'e dal sorriso del dio trapela la consapevolezza che l'antagonismo di Era nei suoi confronti è parte dell'ordine delle cose (cfr. *Iliade*, VIII, 407-408, e *supra*, p. 88)'. See also Halliwell (2008) 66, who notes: it is a 'veiled expression of his authority and an oblique signal of his confidence that he has Hera cornered' (p. 66); cf. also *ibid.* 67: 'a motivic counterpart to, and a kind of reversal of, Hera's at 14.222-3'.

ἢ τι μεταστρέψεις; στρεπταὶ μὲν τε φρένες ἐσθλῶν.  
οἷσθ' ὡς πρεσβυτέροισιν Ἐρινύες αἰὲν ἔπονται.'

'Earth-moving, dark-haired, so, from you, am I then to transfer to Zeus this word, which is both harsh and strong, or will you change your mind? The minds of the great can be twisted. You know that the Erinys follow the elder forever.'

In a strategy similar to Hephaestus's, Iris<sup>406</sup> manages to secure Poseidon's consent, because she acknowledges Poseidon's adherence to behavioural norms: she includes Poseidon in the ἐσθλοί, recognising in advance the prudence of a decision to change his mind, as well as his awareness of the consequences should he disobey Zeus's command. As a result, Iris provides the space for Poseidon to reconsider Zeus's request not by chastising him for his plans, only by reminding him of things that he already knows, thereby recognising Poseidon's position in the community. Consequently, Poseidon is offered the chance to accede to Zeus's request without losing face. Indeed, Poseidon accepts Iris's considerate intervention, and changes his mind by referring to the important role of μοῖρα (15.206-7), as discussed above. As in Hera's case, so too with Poseidon's, his retreat is then framed as an act done in the interests of the community, preventing any worsening of conflict that would have arisen from excessive focus on the competitive aspect of honour.

In Section 4.2.2, I have shown how – in the public context of the divine assembly in *Iliad* 1 – Hephaestus, an actor not implicated in the opposition, contributes to Hera's face saving, while the private context of *Iliad* 15 enables Zeus to accept Hera's excuses, letting her save face without losing face himself. Like *Iliad* 1, in *Iliad* 15 Iris, who is not involved in the opposition between Zeus and Poseidon but exercises authority on Zeus's behalf, takes over to balance the competitive and cooperative sides of honour, allowing Poseidon to retreat from his position, without losing face.

To summarise, then, Section 4.2 has shown that, despite anger and opposition, divine actors when acting collectively (in assemblies) always manage to prioritise the communal interest. Such coordination arises from the gods' respect for the other Olympians' τιμή, their recognition of μοῖρα's role and consensus in decision-making

---

<sup>406</sup> On the role of Iris and Hermes in Homer, see, for example, Pisano (2016).

processes, as well as their initiatives to facilitate others' face saving following sharp disagreement.

### 4.3 Conclusions

Chapter 4 has shown that interrelation between honour and emotions affects divine political institutions just as it does in political institutions involving humans (see Chapters 2 and 3). As in human communities, so too in the gods' community, such interrelation may generate conflict but it can also produce consensus. This is because honour dynamics encompass both competitive and cooperative affairs, depending on the ways in which individuals negotiate communal norms in politically deliberative contexts. However, unlike human leadership, divine leadership always succeeds in safeguarding communal wellbeing, because, unlike humans, the gods are committed to maintaining the status quo without allowing conflict to harden within the community. This commitment to the current order of things is the result of an earlier past in which *τιμή* was allotted between the gods as a way of avoiding violence and its consequences; an earlier past known to us through Hesiod's *Theogony*, and to which the *Iliad* repeatedly alludes through Zeus's threats and other similar references. Although he appears to give in to his anger, thereby autocratically imposing his will, Zeus, unlike Agamemnon and Hector, acts in considering communal practices, such as showing respect for others' *τιμή*, or acknowledging the role of *μοῖρα* and others' recommendations in decision-making processes. Zeus thereby safeguards overarching communal interests without prioritising his own desires. In a similar vein, the gods who oppose to Zeus, sometimes pursuing their individual ambitions to the greatest extent possible, eventually conform to the interests of the community, largely because they recognise that Zeus's threats do not really violate communal norms; they only serve to remind them of former strife which they do not wish to experience again. To this end, divine social and political interaction, which shapes and is shaped by honour dynamics, leverages face-saving mechanisms to facilitate agreement in cases of discord. Such instances of consenting are ultimately achieved through the individual's *willing* compliance with communal norms, and not through the exclusive use or threat of force. In brief, the gods represent the kind of community in which there is a shared value system whose negotiation of norms accommodates disagreement and emotional tension without producing disastrous plans of action, nor infringing on important concepts, such as pluralism, inclusiveness, and respect.

## 5. Politics, ethics, and emotions in war: towards a superordinate 'community of communities' in the *Iliad*

In Chapter 4, I argued that, in contrast to human political institutions (see Chapters 2 and 3), *divine* political institutions invariably result in effective decision-making in the *Iliad*. This is because the gods' respect for one another's τιμή ultimately prevails over any other emotion which could otherwise result in a worsening of conflict within a deliberative context. In other words, unlike humans, the gods' ability to negotiate communal norms never compromises matters of communal interest. For, in acting collectively, the gods always prioritise communal stability above all other considerations. Chapter 4 thus delineated the way in which passion and disagreement may form part of communal negotiations without thereby leading to disastrous results for the community.

The negotiations discussed in the previous three chapters are negotiations between individuals of the same community. This chapter takes the discussion a step further by exploring negotiations that take place between different communities and between individuals of different communities. As in negotiations between individuals belonging to the same community, so too in intercommunal negotiations, emotions constitute an integral part of the negotiation process. I argue that, in spite of the state of war, the Achaean and the Trojan community, or individuals belonging to these communities, come to negotiations, grounding these negotiations on shared ethical values, which are reflected in institutions, such as the supplication, guest-friendship, and religion. This may then form the basis for a shared community. However, because the ethical values shared by the Achaeans and the Trojans are not consistently taken into account, or are enacted only on an interpersonal level, the overarching framework between the Achaeans and Trojans in the *Iliad* may represent only an *abstract*, fragile kind of community. One might otherwise say that the partial enactment of ethical values, religious beliefs, and shared norms may attest both the absence and presence of a superordinate 'community of communities' within the *Iliad*.

In what follows, we shall explore this superordinate 'community of communities' (if it indeed exists). To this end, we begin with negotiations that are grounded in the institutional practice of oath exchange, aiming to bring an end to the war. I then discuss Achaean-Trojan negotiations pertaining to the dead's burial which

results in a temporary ceasefire. Finally, I focus on the institution of supplication on and off the battlefield. Through this, I show how suppliants – by employing the mechanism of exchange and reciprocity – negotiate their lives, the treatment of their corpses, or the treatment of their child(’s corpse). Across all such negotiations, the individuals’ emotions and religious beliefs play a significant role.

In *Iliad* 3, the Achaeans and the Trojans negotiate the end of war while negotiating the return of Helen to Menelaus. These negotiations thereby bring to the fore the very reason for the war’s outbreak, viz. Paris’s abduction of Helen. That the outbreak of war is due to Paris’s fault is agreed upon by both the Achaeans and the Trojans. Indeed, Hector, commencing the negotiation process, says explicitly that Paris began the conflict (3.86-7):

‘κέκλυτέ μεν, Τρῶες καὶ εὐκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοί,  
μῦθον Ἀλεξάνδροιο, τοῦ εἵνεκα νεῖκος ὄρωρεν.’

‘Hear from me, Trojans and well-greaved Achaeans, the word of Alexander on account of whom this strife has arisen.’<sup>407</sup>

Menelaus, while acknowledging that both the Achaeans and the Trojans have suffered owing to his conflict with Paris, likewise clearly states that Paris was the conflict’s initiator (3.97-100):

‘κέκλυτε νῦν καὶ ἐμεῖο· μάλιστα γὰρ ἄλγος ἰκάνει  
θυμὸν ἐμόν, φρονέω δὲ διακρινθήμεναι ἤδη  
Ἀργείους καὶ Τρῶας, ἐπεὶ κακὰ πολλὰ πέποσθε  
εἵνεκ’ ἐμῆς ἔριδος καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔνεκ’ ἀρχῆς.’

‘Listen now to me also; for above all pain comes to my heart, and I think that the Achaeans and the Trojans can already separate from one another, for they have suffered much evil due to my quarrel which Alexander started.’

The agreement, therefore, between the Achaeans and the Trojans regarding the outbreak of the war underlines that, in the context of an on-going exchange process,

---

<sup>407</sup> The same point is also made by Priam in the Trojan assembly of *Iliad* 7 (7.374: ‘μῦθον Ἀλεξάνδροιο, τοῦ εἵνεκα νεῖκος ὄρωρε’). See Chapter 3, Section 3.1.

initiating harm, *i.e.*, negative reciprocity,<sup>408</sup> is normatively viewed in negative terms. This is to say that the offended party has a right to freedom from harm. This is, in turn, bound up with the idea of legitimate retaliation,<sup>409</sup> *i.e.*, balanced reciprocity. Balanced reciprocity is undergirded by the standards of justice, and owing to which it can be said that the Achaeans wage war against the Trojans as a result of Paris's 'negative reciprocity'.

In this regard, two points can be made more explicit. First, interpersonal conflict which involves two individuals of different communities (*i.e.*, Menelaus and Paris) results in a political conflict between two communities, viz. the Achaeans and the Trojans. That is, a breach of an interpersonal tie (viz. Paris's violation of Menelaus's *ξενία* – an issue that Menelaus addresses explicitly at 3.351-4),<sup>410</sup> creates an intercommunal problem, since Paris's and Menelaus's connections get involved. The Trojans support Paris, because the solidarity among the Trojans is greater than the solidarity between the Trojans and the Achaeans.<sup>411</sup> In a similar vein, Tyndareus's oath explains why the Achaeans rally around Menelaus (*cf.* Paus. 3.20.9).<sup>412</sup> Therefore, negative reciprocity on an interpersonal level takes on an important *intercommunal* dimension. Secondly, legitimate retaliation in response to negative reciprocity is bound up with standards of justice, which are rooted in values of honour, thereby always incorporating an affective dimension. The importance of

---

<sup>408</sup> On the notion of negative reciprocity, which is distinguished from generalised reciprocity and balanced reciprocity, see Sahlins (1972) 193-5: negative reciprocity, 'the most impersonal sort of exchange', is 'the attempt to get something for nothing with impunity'. 'Indicative ethnographic terms include "haggling" or "barter", "gambling", "chicanery", "theft", and other varieties of seizure.'

<sup>409</sup> That the initiator of conflict plays an important role within the Iliadic narrative is already seen in how the narrator at the beginning of the *Iliad* associates Achilles's anger with Agamemnon's refusal of Chryses's appeal. On this matter, see Chapter 2, Section 2.1; *cf.* also below. On the connections between the theme of negative reciprocity and legitimate retaliation in Homer and Herodotus, see Gould (1989) 42-85.

<sup>410</sup> Ζεῦ ἄνα, δὸς τίσασθαι, ὃ με πρότερος κάκ' ἔοργε,/ δῖον Ἀλέξανδρον, καὶ ἐμῆς ὑπὸ χερσὶ δάμασσον./ ὄφρα τις ἐρρίγησι καὶ ὀπιγόνων ἀνθρώπων/ ξεινοδόκον κακὰ ῥέξαι, ὃ κεν φιλότητα παράσχη': 'Zeus, king, grant me to punish the noble Alexander who first did evil to me, and overpower him under my hands, so that anyone from the men to come may shudder *to wrong any host who has given them friendship*.' *Cf.* also Menelaus's justified emotional outburst regarding Paris's previously poor behaviour at 3.365-8. There, Menelaus addresses Zeus, after his spear broke during his duel with Paris. See also 13.620-39; especially 13.631-5, whereby Menelaus wonders how it is possible for Zeus to enable victory for men that are ὕβρισται.

<sup>411</sup> See van Wees's (1992) fourth chapter, which explores the conflict between communities and between individuals of different communities, in relation to the warriors' status, underlining the importance of connections.

<sup>412</sup> Following Odysseus's suggestion, Tyndareus makes Helen's suitors swear that they will defend Helen's husband against any wrong done to him with regards to his marriage. For a list of Helen's suitors, see Apollod. *Bibl.* 3.10.8. Note that Achilles, who is not included in the list, makes it clear that the Trojans have never acted against his (nor his community's) interest: *cf.* 1.152-60 – see Chapter 2.

honour dynamics in relation to Paris's abduction of Helen comes to the fore when Agamemnon makes it clear that the Trojans are expected to restore the Achaeans' τιμή (3.286: 'τιμὴν δ' Ἀργείοις ἀποτινέμεν ἢν τιν' ἔοικεν': 'to pay to the Achaeans honour, which is fitting'), otherwise he is entitled to continue seeking revenge, until the desire for the restoration of the Achaeans' τιμή is fulfilled (3.290-1: 'αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ ἔπειτα μαχήσομαι εἵνεκα ποινῆς/ αὐθι μένων, εἴως κε τέλος πολέμοιο κιχέω': 'but I will fight hereafter for recompense, here remaining, until I have reached the purpose of the war'). Thus Paris's defiant behaviour involves an offence against the τιμή of Menelaus on an interpersonal level, as well as an offence against his (and Agamemnon's) allies, viz. the Achaeans, on an intercommunal level.

Note, however, that the Trojans' support for Paris on an intercommunal level does not entail their approval of his behaviour on an *intra*-community level. For, in Hector's view (3.39-57),<sup>413</sup> Paris's abduction of Helen is a matter of Paris's own disgrace (3.42).<sup>414</sup> Still this transgression is taken to be as Troy's calamity (3.50) that could even justify Paris's being stoned to death, although that is prevented thanks to the Trojans' fear or cowardice (3.56-7) and their feelings of solidarity (as aforementioned). In the face of Hector's fierce criticism, Paris tries to save face to some degree. To this end, he emphasises Hector's hardness (even comparing his unbending will and fearless heart to the force of an axe, as employed by artisans in shipbuildings – *cf.* 3.60-3), and allusively denies any responsibility for abducting Helen, claiming that he only accepted her as a present (an offering from Aphrodite) because men should not reject god-given gifts (3.364-6).<sup>415</sup> Nevertheless, Paris recognises the legitimacy of Hector's rebuke, and acknowledges the fairness of his criticism (3.59). Note, however, that, because Paris's proposal to Hector that he fight a duel with Menelaus, the war be made to end, and the fortune of Helen (as well as her possessions) be decided by the duel's outcome (3.67-75)<sup>416</sup> is placed as late as in

<sup>413</sup> Contrast van Wees (1992) 172; see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.

<sup>414</sup> In this context, Hector's charges against Paris contrast with his neutral formulation at 3.87, quoted above. Concerning line 3.87, 'The little or no acknowledgement of blame in Hector's description of Paris', claimed by Taplin (1992) 98, is to be associated with the public context of Hector's speech (*cf.* also Priam's words in the assembly of *Iliad* 7 at 7.374 – see above and Chapter 3, Section 3.1) rather than Homer's awareness of the 'complexities of human affairs' that prevents him from presenting Paris's blameworthiness in 'black or white' terms, as Taplin (1992) argues.

<sup>415</sup> Contrast Scodel (2008) 53, who argues that Paris's mild response to Hector does not conceal any face-saving attempt, which is to be associated with Paris's 'lack of heroic αἰδώς'.

<sup>416</sup> Paris is willing to fight Menelaus only after Hector's reproach: see his stance at 3.30-2, where, afraid of facing Menelaus on the battlefield, Paris hides himself among the other soldiers. Contrast

the tenth year of the war, this proposal scarcely reveals any sensitivity on Paris's part regarding moral or political considerations. Instead, the Trojans' initiative to negotiate the end of war<sup>417</sup> resulting in a truce and a duel<sup>418</sup> is to be construed from an artistic perspective: *Iliad* 2 to *Iliad* 8 seem to remind the audience of the beginning of the war, recapitulating its origins and the reasons why conflict between the Achaeans and the Trojans began in the first instance.<sup>419</sup>

The pact between the Achaeans and the Trojans that Menelaus and Paris fight a duel is based on, and bound by, the mutual exchange of oaths (*cf.* 3.73; 3.94; 3.105; 3.256).<sup>420</sup> The need to exchange oaths is underlined by the extensive references to institutional protocol (*cf.* 3.268-309), implying a lack of trust between the two communities. This lack of trust is particularly evident on the Achaeans' side towards the Trojans: owing to Paris's transgressive behaviour on an interpersonal level, Menelaus challenges the trustworthiness all of Priam's sons on the intercommunal level, stressing the importance that Priam superintends the oath process (*cf.* 3.106-7). Moreover, Agamemnon refers explicitly to the consequences on the Trojans' part in the event that they fail to meet the conditions of the oath:<sup>421</sup> the Trojans' failure to

---

Redfield (1994) 113-14, who considers Hector's charges of cowardice on Paris's part unwarranted. Hector blames Paris precisely because he saw him retreating (3.38): τὸν δ' Ἔκτωρ νείκεσσεν ἰδὼν αἰσχροῖς ἐπέεσσιν; but Hector saw him [*i.e.* Paris] and rebuked him with shameful words.

<sup>417</sup> *Cf.* Hector's acceptance of Paris's proposal and its announcement to the Achaeans (3.76; 3.86-94).

<sup>418</sup> *Cf.* Menelaus's acceptance of Hector's proposal (3.97-110) and the implied joy of the Achaeans and the Trojans in the hope of the end of the war (3.111-12). Note that the Achaeans' and the Trojans' common emotional response is expressive of a view. That is, as in *Iliad* 19 (19.74: ὡς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἐχάρησαν ἐυκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοί; so he spoke, and the well-greaved Achaeans rejoiced), so in *Iliad* 3 (3.111: ὡς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἐχάρησαν Ἀχαιοί τε Τρῳῆές τε; so he spoke, and the Achaeans and the Trojans rejoiced), reference to the group's emotional state communicates the group's approval of what has preceded. Contrast Elmer (2013) 127-8 with n. 33, who seems to exclude the 'expressive' from the 'affective', and uses this similarity between *Iliad* 3 and *Iliad* 19 to argue that 'Achilles remains as alien to the Achaean community as Paris or another Trojan'. On my view regarding the Achaeans' response to Achilles's speech in *Iliad* 19, see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2.

<sup>419</sup> *Iliad* 1 to *Iliad* 9 can be understood as one section of a ring composition: *Iliad* 1 describes the beginning of the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles, while *Iliad* 9 explores the attempt at its resolution; *Iliad* 2 returns to the beginning of the war, and the catalogues of the Achaeans and the Trojans, while *Iliad* 8 seems to refer to the end of that phase, with the Trojans suddenly overcoming the Achaeans; *Iliad* 3 includes a truce and a duel, as does *Iliad* 7. For a discussion of the theme of 'ring composition' in the *Iliad* (including a discussion of bibliographical references), see, for example, Douglas (2007) 101-24. On the parallels between *Iliad* 1 and *Iliad* 24 specifically, see, for example, MacLeod (1982).

<sup>420</sup> For an analysis of the oath ritual in *Iliad* 3, a comparison with *Iliad* 19, and the relation between ritual practice and epic narrative, see Kitts (2005) 115ff.

<sup>421</sup> Unlike Agamemnon, Priam does not specify any consequences should the Achaeans break the oaths. This difference may be linked to the Trojans' imminent violation of the oaths (*cf.* Pandarus's act of shooting an arrow against Menelaus following Athena's intervention: 4.93-126 – see below) or the absence of any violation on the part of the Achaeans in the past.

restore the Achaeans' τιμή (cf. 3.284-7;<sup>422</sup> see also 3.458-60) would entail the war's legitimate continuation (cf. 3.288-91), as explained above.

While intimating a lack of trust, the mechanism of the oath exchange attests the existence of a common belief between the two communities which can ground a state of φιλότης in the future (cf. 3.73: 'οἱ δ' ἄλλοι φιλότητα καὶ ὄρκια πιστὰ ταμόντες'; 'but the rest of you having taken solemn oaths of friendship'; similarly at 3.94 and identically at 3.256). Thus, while casting doubt on the trustworthiness of Priam's sons, Menelaus's trust in Priam's presence as a protector of the oaths (cf. the double reference that Priam be present in the oath exchange: 3.105-110; 3.250-8) enables the Achaean-Trojan negotiations to come to fruition. To this end, the invocation of Zeus, the rest of the gods, and other divine entities in order to safeguard the observance of the oaths of friendship (cf. 3.276-80; 298-301; 308-9) is important, revealing the Achaeans' and Trojans' common belief in the same gods. This means, importantly, that the Achaeans and the Trojans share same religious, moral convictions. Still the fact that some of the gods whom the Achaeans and the Trojans both worship support the Achaeans (while others among them support the Trojans)<sup>423</sup> signifies that the Achaeans and the Trojans also share a common space. For since the gods themselves comprise a community, the Achaeans and the Trojans belong to a community that has to interact with these gods, who have laid down certain common standards for all communities. By implication, while underlying the importance and formality of the oath exchange, the presence of the gods in the oath exchange is linked to appropriate behaviour, which the members of both communities ought to display. The importance of respecting the oaths is best reflected in the curse upon the oath-breaker, which, being part of the oath process, is uttered by both communities, and aims to arouse emotions of fear and/or shame (cf. 3.298-301), thereby discouraging the oath's violation:

‘Ζεῦ κύδιστε μέγιστε καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι,  
ὀππότεροι πρότεροι ὑπὲρ ὄρκια πημήνειαν,

---

<sup>422</sup> The condition of τιμή is only stated at this stage of the negotiations because 'it has been ... taken for granted ... and ... a solemn oath requires careful formulations of the conditions': see van Wees (1992) 175 n. 28. Contrast Wilson (2002) 178, who seems to contradict herself by citing van Wees (1992) in support of her argument, while also arguing that 'Agamemnon calculates that he is in a position to achieve more than just a balance for Menelaos [and] elects to seek a favourable disequilibrium'.

<sup>423</sup> Cf. situations of conflict between the gods, as discussed in Chapter 4, as well as the involvement of the gods in the violation of the oaths in *Iliad* 3, below.

ὤδέ σφ' ἐγκέφαλος χαμάδις ῥέοι ὡς ὄδε οἶνος  
αὐτῶν καὶ τεκέων, ἄλοχοι δ' ἄλλοισι δαμεῖεν.<sup>7</sup>

‘Zeus, most honoured and greatest, and you, other immortal gods, whichever of the two sides might first violate the oaths, like this wine, let their brain and that of their children run to the ground, and their wives be spoils of others.’

From this perspective, the political consequences for the Achaeans and the Trojans (that is, the end or the continuation of the war) depend upon the emotional behaviour of the members of both communities towards the oaths. For, if each side takes certain norms into account which are acknowledged by both communities (viz. respect for the oaths and the gods, who operate as oath protectors), their trust in this common institutional mechanism (namely, the oath exchange) will overcome any distrust resulting from their enmity, thereby enabling the resolution of intercommunal conflict, while potentially establishing grounds for future cooperation. If, on the other hand, either of the two sides displays *shameless* behaviour, then the end of the war will be suspended, and emotions of revenge will come into play once again. That is, if both the Achaeans and the Trojans enact the dynamics of shame, then their intercommunal conflict will come to an end. These shame dynamics unfold in the imagination of disgrace. By means of projection, the imagined disgrace would cause either party to shrink from violating behaviour in order to maintain their honour, the result of which will be the display of *respectful* behaviour towards the oaths.<sup>424</sup> In this light, a mechanism that rests on a shared ethical and religious background, which is acknowledged by both communities, creates expectations between the Achaeans and the Trojans, and functions as a bridge for their intercommunal negotiations.

Nevertheless, the Achaean-Trojan negotiations in *Iliad* 3 do not produce the intended outcome: while Aphrodite has removed Paris from the battlefield, securing for him safety and protection in the palace (3.373-83), Athena, having taken the form of a Trojan warrior, urges Pandarus to defy the oaths and shoot an arrow against Menelaus (4.93-126). Then, Agamemnon while addressing the wounded Menelaus, voices his readiness to heed the (emotional) conditions of the oaths, that is, to seek

---

<sup>424</sup> In connection to the role of imagination in the experience of the emotion, cf. the argument of the embassy in *Iliad* 9. In this regard, see the reference to Aristotle’s *De Anima* and Gallagher’s (2020) account in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2. See also Chapter 1, Section 1.2 for Elster’s (1999) account on shame in relation to honour dynamics.

revenge, expressing his certainty that – sooner or later – Zeus will enable the Trojans’ defeat (4.155-68).<sup>425</sup> The violation of the oaths therefore confounds any expectations that φιλότης between the two communities can be established, while waiving thereby the possibility for instantiation of an overarching community.

In *Iliad* 7, the two communities proceed to negotiations once again. Rather than negotiating the end of the war (as in *Iliad* 3), in *Iliad* 7, Hector, following divine intervention (viz. Apollo’s and Athena’s debate which results in Helenus advising Hector (7.24-53)), proclaims his intention to fight with anyone of the best of the Achaeans in order to achieve temporary ceasefire (7.74-5). The Achaeans’ hesitation, here, appears stronger when compared to *Iliad* 3.<sup>426</sup> This hesitation is bound up with the Achaeans’ shame at the prospect of refusing, shame that eventually prevails over their fear of facing Hector (*cf.* 7.93), with Menelaus assenting to Hector’s proposal.<sup>427</sup> Nevertheless, after considering Hector’s fighting abilities, Agamemnon<sup>428</sup> rejects Menelaus’s willingness to fight Hector (7.115-16), while Nestor reprimands the Achaeans for their initial cowardice (7.124f.). Ajax is eventually summoned to confront Hector in the duel as a result of the draw (7.187-92). As in *Iliad* 3, in *Iliad* 7 Hector invokes Zeus to secure the observance of the truce conditions (7.76). However, unlike *Iliad* 3, in *Iliad* 7<sup>429</sup> there is no extensive reference to the oath protocol.<sup>430</sup> Although there is no use of the oath protocol to its fullest extent, the duel benefits from another institutional practice – common in both communities – viz. the heralds’ mediation. Their intervention, which is undergirded by a strong sense of

---

<sup>425</sup> *Cf.* also Agamemnon’s similar words at 4.234-9 when he attempts to encourage the troops.

<sup>426</sup> In both *Iliad* 3 and *Iliad* 7, silence is the Achaeans’ first reaction to the Trojans’ proposal (*cf.* 3.95; 7.92). In both cases, this silence is interrupted by Menelaus. However, unlike in *Iliad* 3, in *Iliad* 7 the narrator comments on the time taken before Menelaus’s intervention; *cf.* 3.96: τοῖσι δὲ καὶ μετέειπε βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος (and then among them the brave Menelaus shouted aloud); 7.94: ὧπὲ δὲ Μενέλαος ἀνίστατο καὶ μετέειπε (after a long time Menelaus stood up and spoke among them). About the face-threat considerations in the context of Hector’s proposal in *Iliad* 7, see Scodel (2008) 69-71.

<sup>427</sup> The Achaeans do not consider denying Hector’s proposal by leveraging the Trojans’ failure to respect the oaths in *Iliad* 3. Thus they seem to agree with Hector’s view that Zeus has defined the Trojans’ violation of the oath in *Iliad* 4 (*cf.* 7.69) – *cf.* below. On the violation of the oaths, see, *e.g.*, Taplin (1992) 104-6.

<sup>428</sup> On Agamemnon’s behaviour in these first books of the *Iliad* (from *Iliad* 1 to *Iliad* 8), see Taplin (1990) 60-70.

<sup>429</sup> For the absence of hostility in this duel and its function, see van Wees (1992) 200-2.

<sup>430</sup> This absence may be understood in the context of what is at stake: in *Iliad* 3, the communities negotiate the end of the war, while, in *Iliad* 7, they aim at a brief truce. The same idea of what is at stake might also explain why unlike *Iliad* 3, in *Iliad* 7 the Achaeans do not touch upon the Trojans’ untrustworthiness by referring to the Trojans’ failure to respect the oaths. Rather they appear to accept Hector’s view that Zeus has defined the Trojans’ violation of the oath in *Iliad* 4 (7.69). Note, further, that unlike Paris, Hector has not displayed violating behaviour in the past, which makes him more trustworthy. Nevertheless, at 3.106, Menelaus does not distinguish between Priam’s sons (see above).

fairness (*cf.* their unanimous feeling for an even result (7.274-82)), ensures that the duel goes smoothly, while supporting the negotiation process on an intercommunal level. Indeed, although the duel itself only involves two individuals, the brief truce pertains to *all* members of both communities. Note, however, that unlike the rest of the members of the Achaean and Trojan communities, Hector and Ajax gain further benefits from their fighting. For, while both are willing to recognise and accept their tie in the duel (*cf.* 7.284-302), Hector stresses their friendship, which unites them regardless of their previous fighting and the context of war. To this end, he proposes an exchange of gifts (7.299; *cf.* also 7.303-5), which are testament to their ongoing φιλότης in the future (7.299-302):<sup>431</sup>

‘δῶρα δ’ ἄγ’ ἀλλήλοισι περικλυτὰ δώομεν ἄμφω,  
 ὄφρα τις ᾧδ’ εἴπησιν Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρώων τε·  
 “ἡμὲν ἐμαρνάσθην ἔριδος περὶ θυμοβόροιο,  
 ἦδ’ αὖτ’ ἐν φιλότητι διέτμαγεν ἀρθμήσαντε.” ’

‘Come on! Let us both give to each other renowned gifts, so that any of the Achaeans and the Trojans may say so: “these two both fought each other in heart-devouring battle strife and then again, before they parted, joined with each other in friendship.” ’

An Iliadic example that explicitly reveals how interpersonal relationships between individuals who belong to different communities unite them, despite their being opponents on the battlefield as a result of intercommunal conflict, is the encounter between Diomedes and Glaucus in *Iliad* 6. Because Oeneus, Diomedes’s grandfather, has offered hospitality to Bellerophon, Glaucus’s grandfather (6.216-17), which was then sealed by a gift-exchange (6.218-20), Diomedes and Glaucus decide to maintain and extend their ancestors’ tie. When facing each other on the battlefield, they agree to keep away from each other during the war (6.226), and like the attitude of their grandfathers as well as Hector’s and Ajax’s practice they exchange armour, proud of their interpersonal connection (6.230-1):

‘τεύχεα δ’ ἀλλήλλοις ἐπαμείψομεν, ὄφρα καὶ οἶδε  
 γῶσι, ὅτι ξεῖνοι πατρώιοι εὐχόμεθ’ εἶναι.’

<sup>431</sup> On the different kinds of gift exchange between enemies in the *Iliad*, see van Wees (2002).

‘But let us exchange armour, so that these over here may know that we boast of being hereditary guest-friends.’

In this light, individuals that are connected by bonds of ξενία and/or φιλότης appear to be willing to overcome intercommunal conflict, thereby attesting the existence of an overarching framework, which is ethical in nature and transcends individual communities. Thus, like that of Diomedes’s and Glaucus’s, Hector’s and Ajax’s practice also implies this kind of overarching framework, although this framework pertains only to these two individuals, without being extended to all of the Achaeans and Trojans.

In addition to their battlefield negotiations which resulted in Paris’s and Menelaus’s duel in *Iliad* 3 as well as that of Hector and Ajax duel in *Iliad* 7 – negotiations that, while bringing different results, were both bound by oath exchanges, thereby attesting the Achaeans’ and Trojans’ belief in the same gods – in *Iliad* 7, the Achaeans and the Trojans once again proceed to negotiations. On this occasion, the two communities negotiate a truce to collect and take care of their fallen comrades’ corpses. Although their political aim is to restore their τιμή following Paris’s disrespect for Menelaus’s ξενία (as well as the violation of the oaths in *Iliad* 3), in the council of *Iliad* 7, the Achaeans reflect upon their moral obligations to the dead: Nestor prompts the Achaeans to bury the dead (7.327-37), which they approve (*cf.* 7.344). Thus, although they partly reject the message of the Trojans’ heralds (7.385-93), viz. to take Helen’s possessions, leaving her in Troy, and returning home (as clarified by Diomedes’s sharp response (7.400-2) and its endorsement by the group (7.403)), the Achaeans eventually agree with the Trojans’ proposal<sup>432</sup> to make a truce for the corpses’ collection: Agamemnon upholds the community’s unanimous response by communicating his pleasure (7.406-7) – another reference to the role of emotion in political decision-making processes – while granting the Achaeans’ consent to the burial of the dead (7.408-11), consent that was given earlier in the Achaeans’ council.

Like battlefield negotiations in the context of the truce in *Iliad* 7, vis-à-vis the duel between Hector and Ajax Achaean-Trojan respect for the dead is also taken into account. While proposing to fight with any of the Achaeans (7.74-5), Hector specifies

---

<sup>432</sup> For the Trojans’ proposal and a discussion of the relevant passages, see Chapter 3, Section 3.1.

how the warrior's corpse (following their duel) should be treated irrespective of whether the vanquished warrior fought for the Achaean or the Trojan side. Although he appears to consider the removal of the armour a legitimate act that proves the warrior's victory,<sup>433</sup> Hector suggests the corpse be returned to its community for proper burial (7.77-84). An individual's honour might then be increased, albeit not completely disregarding the opponent's τιμή, as appears in Hector's imaginary speech (7.89-90):

‘ “ἀνδρὸς μὲν τόδε σῆμα πάλαι κατατεθνηῶτος,  
ὄν ποτ’ ἀριστεύοντα κατέκτανε φαίδιμος Ἴκτωρ.” ’

‘ “This is the tomb of a dead man, whom once, *though being the best*, the splendid Hector killed.” ’

Thus the grave (a physical object) operates as a material representation of both the winner's and the loser's honour.<sup>434</sup>

In contrast to both scenarios of Achaean-Trojan negotiations in *Iliad 7* which consider the fortunes of the dead, there are (at least) three cases (viz. Sarpedon's, Patroclus's, and Hector's case) whereby the proper burial of the dead is hampered by the enemy. That is, the warriors' failure to protect their comrades' bodies is linked to the possibility of the opponents' unseemly treatment of the corpses.<sup>435</sup> Thus, although they may occasionally operate as an engine for fruitful negotiations, it is possible that ethical values – such as the shared respect for the dead – are legitimately suspended during the battle, thereby invalidating the Achaeans' and the Trojans' readiness (or willingness) to share membership in any kind of community.

---

<sup>433</sup> Examples of this practice are: 4.465-6; 5.48-52; 5.163-4; 6.70-1; 10.342-3; 10.387; 12.195; 15.343 13.201-2; 13.640-1; 17.60; 17.537; 21.183; 22.376. The heroes continue fighting to get (5.617-22; 15.556-61) or protect (13.425-8; 16.538-47; 17.366-9; 17.415-22) an opponent's or a fellow's armour respectively.

<sup>434</sup> Cf. the distribution of the booty in connection to the individuals' τιμή, as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.

<sup>435</sup> Cf. Glaucus's anxiety for Sarpedon's body at 16.545; Patroclus's words at 16.559, showing that Glaucus's anxiety has a real reference point. Regarding Hector's and Patroclus's cases, see details below. Note that indignation (16.544; 17.254) and/or fear (17.240) motivate(s) the comrades of the dead; anger, a vindictive disposition, and/or feelings of superiority incite the opponents (16.829-36; 16.546-7; 22.830-9).

If, in the cases of Sarpedon and Patroclus, the opponents do not ultimately succeed in taking the body away,<sup>436</sup> and no negotiations between the two parties arise, then the fate of Hector's body (which is linked to Achilles's desire for vengeance) shows best that warriors in battle act in a state of cognitive dissonance. For, while they are mindful of ethical values, they are mindful of those only unilaterally. That is, because they consider the loss of their fellows to be an inappropriate act, their actions are driven by anger and strong desire for revenge, viz. they take their opponents' acts of killing their comrades in personal terms. However, the very participation in war implies that warriors expect their opponents to kill combatants on the other side. By implication, Aristotle's definition of anger in the *Rhetoric* (viz. that anger is a response to unwarranted slight (Arist. *Rh.* 1378a31-3)),<sup>437</sup> while applicable to instances within a specific community (e.g., the Achaean – see Chapter 2), does not apply to the typical case of anger's expression between members of communities at war.<sup>438</sup> For, in the context of war, the act of killing an opponent is legitimate, owing to which anger is inapposite (on Aristotle's account). However, because warriors do become angry towards their opponents, anger does not then respond to unjust behaviour in a normative sense. Instead, it reveals what warriors perceive as descriptively unfair.

Bearing this scenario in mind, let us now move on to another example of Achaean-Trojan negotiations, in particular the encounter between Achilles and Hector in *Iliad* 22. Like his stance in *Iliad* 7, in *Iliad* 22 Hector suggests that the winner of the duel between himself and Achilles give the opponent's corpse to his community (22.256-9), invoking the gods to uphold this clause of the agreement (22.254-5).<sup>439</sup> In contrast to Hector's disposition for arrangements, Achilles does not see any point of contact that would allow for any form of negotiations or would set up any kind of expectations for friendship and exchanging oaths (22.261-7):

“Ἐκτορ, μή μοι, ἄλαστε, συνημοσύνας ἀγόρευε.  
ὥς οὐκ λέουσι καὶ ἀνδράσιν ὄρκια πιστά,

<sup>436</sup> Note that, in contrast to the case of Patroclus's body (17.708ff.), in the salvation of Sarpedon's corpse, divine actors are involved (16.667-83; cf. also 16.453-7); see Segal (1971) 19.

<sup>437</sup> Note that, in the *De Anima*, Aristotle (Arist. *DA* 403a29-b2) considers also other cases of anger.

<sup>438</sup> For a discussion of Aristotle's prototypical definition of anger, as well as less prototypical scenarios connected to Homeric *χόλος*, see Cairns (2003) 26-9. Cf. also Chapter 2, Section 2.1.

<sup>439</sup> For a detailed analysis of the encounter between Achilles and Hector in *Iliad* 22, see, for example, Taplin (1992) 240-7.

οὐδὲ λύκοι τε καὶ ἄρνες ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν ἔχουσιν,  
ἀλλὰ κακὰ φρονέουσι διαμπερὲς ἀλλήλοισιν,  
ὥς οὐκ ἔστ' ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ φιλήμεναι, οὐδέ τι νῶϊν  
ὄρκια ἔσσονται, πρὶν γ' ἢ ἕτερόν γε πεσόντα  
αἵματος ἄσαι Ἄρηα, ταλαύρινον πολεμιστήν.'

'Hector, do not mention any agreements to me; I do not forgive you. As there are no trustworthy oaths between lions and men, nor wolves and lambs have united spirit, but forever contrive bad things for each other, so there can be no love/friendship between me and you, nor shall there be any oaths between us, before the one or the other, having fallen, gluts with his blood Ares, the warrior with the bull's hide shield.'

From Achilles's point of view, the simile marks the distance between himself and Hector, hinting at his intention to not treat Hector as a human being.<sup>440</sup> Such an intention is driven by Achilles's fierce anger, which accompanies his return to the battlefield, expressed explicitly through the use of literal emotional language (*e.g.*, Zeus's reference to Achilles's emotional state in the divine assembly of *Iliad* 20 (20.29: *χῶεται αἰνῶς*); the narrator's reference to Achilles's disposition in his first encounter with Hector in *Iliad* 20 (20.442: *μενεαίνων*)), as well as the use of several similes (*e.g.*, the passage at 20.490-9, which compares the destructive power of fire to Achilles's violence on the battlefield; or lines 21.12-16 that juxtapose grasshoppers, attempting to save themselves from fire by falling into the river, and the Trojans, whose dead bodies are piled up in the river Xanthos, as a result of Achilles's rage). Achilles's intense anger explains, then, his blanket rejection of negotiations with Hector, which is in turn linked to Achilles's need for retaliation for the death of his comrades (22.271-2):

ἔγχει ἐμῶ δαμάα· νῦν δ' ἀθρόα πάντ' ἀποτίσεις  
κῆδε' ἐμῶν ἐτάρων, οὓς ἔκτανε ἔγχει θύων.'

'But now you [*i.e.*, Hector] will pay all at once for all the sorrows of my comrades you killed with your spear being in rage.'

---

<sup>440</sup> See Segal (1971) 36-7, who notes that this simile 'is only the last stage in a gradual progression' of a number of animal similes that precede; *cf.* 22.93-5; 22.1; 22.189-92; 22.139-42.

Note, however, that among Achilles's comrades, Patroclus enjoys a special position, with his death hugely impacting upon Achilles's burning desire for retaliation. The intensity of this desire is not merely seen in Achilles's one and only motivation for life (*cf.* Achilles's words towards Thetis at 18.90-3) and his implicated insistence that the Achaeans return to the battlefield immediately:<sup>441</sup> it is repeatedly underlined through Achilles's eagerness to kill all the opponents he encounters on the battle in order to confront Hector. In *Iliad* 20, the narrator marks Achilles's thirst to meet Hector (20.76-8), and following Hector's escape from death thanks to Apollo's intervention, Achilles voices his readiness to kill other Trojans until he runs into Hector once more (20.452-4). Achilles's state of readiness to confront *anyone* he encounters reaches its zenith in *Iliad* 21. Even if he has to fight against a divine entity, viz. the river Xanthos (*cf.* 21.233-344), and prompts its anger due to his relentless fury and pursuit of revenge (21.130-6; 21.146; 21.234; 21.305-7; 21.324-5), Achilles is resolved to obey no request – not even Xanthos's (21.214-21) – until he meets Hector (21.223-6).<sup>442</sup> Therefore, when he *comes* to meet him, not only does he dismiss Hector's call for arrangements, before their duel starts (as quoted above), and ironically comments upon Hector's failure to consider his reaction while stripping Patroclus of his arms (22.331-6), but he also rejects Hector's supplication shortly before his death, which consists in Hector's pleading with Achilles to exchange his body with ransom (22.338-43).<sup>443</sup> In sharp contrast to Hector's request, Achilles can only think of letting Hector's body be eaten by dogs and/or vultures (*cf.* Achilles's words towards Hector: 22.335; 22.348; 22.354; Achilles's words towards Patroclus: 23.21; 23.182-3).<sup>444</sup> Once Hector lies dead before him, Achilles begins the process of mutilating his corpse: he pierces Hector's feet from heel to ankle in order to fasten them with straps to his chariot, and starts dragging his body (*cf.* 22.395-404), transferring it to the Achaeans' camp (an act that Andromache sees from the Trojans' wall (22.462-5)). He then proceeds with further mutilation – thrice every morning –

---

<sup>441</sup> Regarding Achilles's emotional state following Patroclus's death and its impact on the developments of the assembly in *Iliad* 19, see the discussion in Chapter 2, Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.3.

<sup>442</sup> On Achilles's cruelty in the context of the fight in Scamander and the outrage of the dead bodies, see Segal (1971) 30-2.

<sup>443</sup> For a comparison between Achilles's rejection to accept ἄποινα in *Iliad* 9 and *Iliad* 22, see Taplin (1992) 245. For a comparison between Achilles's rejection of Hector's and Lycaon's supplication, *cf.* Segal (1971) 38-9. For my view on the theme of supplication, see below.

<sup>444</sup> Note that Achilles's fury is so fierce that his emotion urges him to even eat Hector (22.346-7). On the narrator's comment on Achilles's shameful intentions towards Hector's body (22.395) and relevant discussion of the bibliography, see de Jong (2012) 162-3 on 395. On the cannibalism theme in Homer (as an Indo-European motif), see Griffin (1980) 19-21.

dragging Hector's body around Patroclus's tomb (24.12-18), which gives rise to Apollo's indignation in the divine assembly of *Iliad* 24 (24.50-2),<sup>445</sup> and which Priam will learn from Hermes on his way to the Achaeans' camp (*cf.* 24.416-17).<sup>446</sup> Achilles's unrestrained fury towards Hector appears to be the result of his perception that Hector was not entitled to kill Patroclus.

Note, however, that Achilles is not alone in mistreating the enemy's dead body. In contrast to his eagerness for negotiations with Achilles in the context of their duel (as well as in the context of his duel with Ajax), Hector displays different behaviour in the context of Patroclus's death: he erroneously imagines Achilles ordering Patroclus to kill Hector (16.839-41), sarcastically observing Achilles's absence at Patroclus's side (16.837), and, most importantly, he announces that Patroclus's corpse is to be eaten by vultures (16.836), while eagerly dragging the corpse with the aim of its decapitation (17.125-7).<sup>447</sup> From this perspective, albeit to a lesser extent, not just Achilles, but Hector, too, fails to enact consistently ethical norms while fighting: although Hector did try to mistreat Patroclus's corpse, he then implored Achilles to accept his parents' ransom in exchange for the body.

While Hector does not make an appeal to save his life, in contrast to the majority of battlefield suppliants, his supplication introduces into our discussion the association between battlefield supplication, as part of Achaean-Trojan negotiations and the suppliant's bias: although battlefield suppliants have just attempted to kill their opponents, they eventually come to plead with them to save their lives. Yet, whether they manage to prevail upon their opponents appears to be dependent upon the latter's emotional state in the context: turning down the battlefield suppliant's request does not seem to bring any sanctions for the individual rejecting the supplication. However, in *off*-battlefield supplications, the religious sanction *comes* into play in the event of a rejection. This difference aligns with Parker's distinction

---

<sup>445</sup> For a discussion on Apollo's stance in the gods' assembly in *Iliad* 24, see below in conjunction with Chapter 4, Section 4.2. For the fact that mutilation is not to be viewed as an illegitimate practice when a state of war exists, but it is only Achilles's long-lasting mutilation of Hector's body that goes beyond limits, see, for example, van Wees (1992) 129-30. See also below. That the stem ἀεϋκ- in *Iliad* 22, *Iliad* 23, and *Iliad* 24 is used in both objective and subjective terms, see Danek (2014b) 137-9. For a comparison between the motif of the body's mutilation in Homer and Assyrian practices, see Griffin (1980) 45-9.

<sup>446</sup> On Achilles's mistreatment of Hector's corpse, see also Hecuba's reference in her mourning of Hector at the end of *Iliad* 24 (24.755).

<sup>447</sup> See also Thetis's message to Achilles at 18.175-7, communicating Hector's intentions towards Patroclus, and Hippothous's dragging of Patroclus's body by his foot at 17.288-91.

between ‘spare me’ and ‘help me’ supplications.<sup>448</sup> Thus the context in which a supplication occurs – whether on or off the battlefield – explains why the acceptance of ransom appears optional in battlefield situations but not in cases away from the battlefield.

Below, I further inform our discussion of Achaean-Trojans negotiations. I first do this by exploring cases of battlefield supplication. Then, I focus on examples of off-battlefield supplication. As we shall see, examples of Homeric battlefield or conflict supplication are both rejected (*cf.* Agamemnon’s practice in *Iliad* 6, *Iliad* 11; Achilles’s practice in *Iliad* 20; *Iliad* 21; *Iliad* 22; and Odysseus’s practice in *Odyssey* 22) and accepted (*cf.* Lycaon’s reference to his first supplication in *Iliad* 21 and Achilles’s tendency to spare suppliants before Patroclus’s death, as mentioned by Achilles in *Iliad* 21 and by Hecuba in *Iliad* 24, as well as Phemios’s and Medon’s fortune in *Odyssey* 22). Yet, because cases of rejected battlefield/conflict supplication are not followed by any form of sanction, it seems that accepted battlefield/conflict supplications point towards a supererogatory practice. On the other hand, the off-battlefield context seems to attest the necessity for Achilles to accept Priam’s supplication in *Iliad* 24, and gives grounds for the acceptance of Odysseus’s supplications in *Odyssey* 6 and *Odyssey* 7.<sup>449</sup> By implication, the rejection of Chryses’s pleading in *Iliad* 1 (which is a priest’s supplication in an off-battlefield

---

<sup>448</sup> Parker (1983) 181. This difference is rejected by Naiden (2006). On this, see, *e.g.*, Naiden (2006) 120, and especially Naiden’s (2006) 133-6 account of the reasons for rejecting supplication. However, precisely because battlefield suppliants are enemies who have been acting against the supplicated, battlefield suppliants do form a different kind of suppliant. Even if the supplicated does ‘not describe battlefield suppliants as belonging to a different type’ (Naiden (2006) 136), the pragmatics clearly do. Naiden (2006) 161 does, however, mark the difference in terms of outcome depending on the context: ‘Rejection is more common in the *Iliad* than in the *Odyssey* because battles are more frequent’. Contrast Pedrick (1982) 129: following her argument, a significant number of supplication rejections in the *Iliad* (in contrast to the *Odyssey*) can be explained by the ‘very different attitude toward the force of the ceremony’ in each epos: Iliadic ‘supplication operates strictly on a human level, commanding respect only so far as custom and human sanctions compel’, whereas in the *Odyssey*, ‘Zeus appears as the upholder of the suppliant’s appeals’, even if his protection is not granted everywhere in this epos. Pedrick’s (1982) claim is misguided: gods do get involved in Iliadic supplications. See the role of Apollo in the supplication of Chryses in *Iliad* 1, and Apollo’s, Zeus’s, Thetis’s, and Hermes’s involvement in Priam’s supplication in *Iliad* 24 (see below). As in Iliadic battlefield supplications, the context of the conflict explains the non-involvement of Zeus in *Odyssey* supplications (*cf.* Parker’s (1983) distinction between ‘spare me’ and ‘help me’ supplication mentioned above).

<sup>449</sup> Note that, in the case of the Cyclops’s rejection of Odysseus’s supplication (*Od.* 9.273-80), the Cyclops does not share the norms that generally serve as grounds for an appeal, and are mentioned by Odysseus, namely, the respect for and belief in Zeus in connection to his role as protector of the suppliants and strangers (*Od.* 9.269-71). Note also that Odysseus’s incentives regarding whether he gets the Cyclops’s presents (*Od.* 9.228-9), along with his decision to enter his cave and consume food without permission (*Od.* 9.231-3), align neither with the standards of the suppliant’s nor with the stranger’s behaviour. In the latter connection, see Naiden (2006) 139-40.

context) is a fundamental mistake that causes all of the Achaeans to suffer the consequences.

In *Iliad* 6, Adrastus touches Menelaus's knees, making a ritual gesture,<sup>450</sup> pleading with him to save his life, and promising that his father would offer Menelaus ἄποινα in exchange for his life (6.45-50). That is, by exploiting the mechanism of exchange and reciprocity, Adrastus attempts to escape death, while securing for his opponent a visible proof of success.<sup>451</sup> Although he would have shown pity (6.51-3; 6.55), Agamemnon's reminder of the Trojans' violation (along with his demand for the death of all the Trojans) changes Menelaus's mind (6.53-61): Menelaus breaks physical contact with Adrastus, allowing Agamemnon to kill the suppliant (6.63-5). Rather than being a comment on the part of the narrator, the expression αἴσιμα παρειπών (saying what is proper: 6.62), which follows Agamemnon's criticism towards Menelaus's initially merciful stance, is to be understood as an embedded focalisation<sup>452</sup> capturing Agamemnon as a harsher and more vindictive character than Menelaus.<sup>453</sup> However, even if αἴσιμα παρειπών (6.62) expressed the narrator's own judgement, there would not be an enormous difference in our understanding of the passage, since there is no individual criticising Agamemnon for his stance, nor any form of sanction that follows the killing of Adrastus.<sup>454</sup> From this perspective, far from representing a normative response to a battlefield supplication, Menelaus's

---

<sup>450</sup> On the importance of physical contact in the supplication process, see Gould (1973) 76-7; 96-8. Note also Gould's distinction between 'complete' supplication and 'figurative' supplication, *i.e.*, supplication that does not involve physical contact: *e.g.*, Odysseus's supplication to Nausicaa in *Odyssey* 6 (6.149-97). Naiden (2006) 43-69 emphasises the complementary role between words and gestures in supplication, although his interpretations are not always persuasive. See below.

<sup>451</sup> *Cf.* Gould's (1973) 75 important point: 'A prime interest of *ἱκετεία* is that it displays a particular instance of the ritualisation of reciprocity around a value (prestige) of universally accepted significance in the society of ancient Greece.' Contrast Pedrick (1982) 129, who argues that suppliants in the *Iliad* offer ransom to make their case stronger, because the supplicated has no religious or moral qualms; in her view, 'the main purpose of supplication in this epic [*i.e.*, the *Iliad*] is to get one's request heard'. In contrast to Pedrick's (1982) account, *cf.* the point made above regarding her argumentation.

<sup>452</sup> For this narratological term, see de Jong (1987/2003).

<sup>453</sup> Agamemnon's stance in the context of Adrastus's supplication is similar to his ruthless behaviour in *Iliad* 11. After pointing out the reason for his revenge (11.138-42), Agamemnon rejects Peisander's and Hippolochus's supplication (11.130-5) and kills them (11.143-7). Wilson (2002) 166 argues that because 'Helen is eventually recovered, the path devolves into all life for outrage, that is, loss of *timē*'. Wilson (2002) 166 argues that Agamemnon suggests the rejection of ἄποινα 'in favor of *poinë* for prior damage'. Note, however, that Helen has not been returned by the time of the supplication.

<sup>454</sup> For further discussion on αἴσιμα παρειπών, see Wilson (2002) 166-7 with n. 25 for bibliographical references; Taplin (1992) 72 n. 11: 'I should add that I take αἴσιμα παρειπών ['saying what seemed right'] at 6.62 not as the poet's own moral corroboration, but as marking that the sentiments strike Menelaus as αἴσιμα'; contrast Most (2003) 55 'Homer expresses explicit approval of Agamemnon's words, calling them αἴσιμα ('fated, fitting') (6.62)'; and Naiden (2006) 143: 'One endorser [of Agamemnon's speech] is the narrator of the *Iliad*.'

initial pity towards Adrastus, as well as his willingness to accept the ransom seems optional.<sup>455</sup>

Like *Iliad* 6, in *Iliad* 21, the state of war between the Achaeans and the Trojans does not obligate the acceptance of a defeated enemy's supplication.<sup>456</sup> After making physical contact with Achilles (*cf.* Lycaon's touching of Achilles's knees at 21.68; 21.71), explicitly uttering this contact in his appeal (*cf.* the use of the verb γουνοῦμαι at 21.74), and asking for Achilles's αἰδώς and ἔλεος (21.74), Lycaon pleads with Achilles not to kill him, reminding him of his formerly benign behaviour (*cf.* 21.75-9).<sup>457</sup> Although Achilles agrees with Lycaon that he would usually show ἔλεος and αἰδώς in the past, avoiding killing his opponents (*cf.* 21.100-2),<sup>458</sup> Patroclus's death has altered Achilles's approach to battlefield supplication. Achilles is no longer willing to spare the lives of any of his vanquished foes, especially if this foe is Priam's son (21.103-5).<sup>459</sup> Like the case of Adrastus, whose death is linked to Agamemnon's and Menelaus's retaliation for the Trojans' former violations, Achilles's anger over Patroclus's death (see above) causes him to display vindictive behaviour that prevents him from feeling compassion towards his opponents. In fact, Achilles justifies his decision not to spare Lycaon's life by emphasising humans' common fate, *viz.* their shared mortality. Since no single person is spared death, it does not really matter whether Lycaon is killed now (21.106-13). Indeed, because Patroclus (who was much better than Lycaon) died (*cf.* 21.107), and as Achilles (who is better than both Patroclus and Lycaon) *will* die (*cf.* 21.108-13), Lycaon must die as

---

<sup>455</sup> Naiden (2006) 143 rightly observes that 'Menelaus intends to accept the offer, the usual practice in the Homeric background.' Note however that all actual examples of *battlefield* supplication in the *Iliad* fail (*cf.* Adrastus's, Peisander's and Hippolochus's, Tros's, Lycaon's, and Hector's supplication).

<sup>456</sup> Contrast Thornton (1984) 138-9, who argues that Lycaon's performance of the supplication ritual 'should prevent Achilles from killing' him.

<sup>457</sup> For other discussions of the episode, see, *e.g.*, Taplin (1992) 218-24; Cairns (1993) 116-18. On Wilson's account (2002) 171, Lycaon's attempt to differentiate himself from Hector by referring to their mothers 'only underscores his desperate strategy', and 'has no basis in Homeric or Greek convention'. Although it is true that Lycaon's attempt to distance himself from Hector is part of his rhetorical strategy, the motive to distinguish someone's children on the basis of their mother can likewise be found elsewhere in the *Iliad*; see, for example, 24.495-7, whereby Priam, in his supplication towards Achilles, mentions that 19 out of his 50 sons were begotten from the same mother, while the rest of them were the offspring of other women in the palace. Note, furthermore, that in attempting to deter Priam from going to Achilles's tent (24.204-5), Hecuba refers to Priam's sons as if they were his alone, not hers as well.

<sup>458</sup> This is corroborated by Hecuba's words towards Hector's corpse in *Iliad* 24, namely, that unlike his attitude towards Hector, Achilles spared other sons of Hecuba, selling them as slaves (24.751-3).

<sup>459</sup> For another example of Achilles's refusal to accept battlefield supplication after Patroclus's death, *cf.* Tros's supplication at 20.463-72. On the economics of Lycaon's exchange in the past, see Scodel (2008) 79-80. On the material economy and its connection to esteem in the *Iliad* in general, see, for example, van Wees (1992) 238-48.

well (21.106). Lycaon's appeal to φιλότης, as implied in his reference to Achilles's former offer of food (21.76),<sup>460</sup> is then *ironically* accepted: 'ἀλλά, φίλος, θάνε καὶ σὺ'; 'but, *friend*, you die, too' (21.106).<sup>461</sup> As in Adrastus's case, so too in Lycaon's, the suppliant is killed, once the physical contact is broken (*cf.* 21.115: ἔγχος μὲν ῥ' ἀφέηκεν; he [*i.e.*, Lycaon] released the spear). Still, unlike Adrastus, Lycaon is killed by the supplicated (*cf.* 21.116-20).

The fact that sparing the suppliant's life in cases of battlefield supplication rests on the disposition of the supplicated is further corroborated by evidence from the *Odyssey*. Although the supplication of Leodes in *Odyssey* 22 (*Od.* 22.310-29) neither takes place on the battlefield nor does it pertain to individuals belonging to different communities, it is nonetheless an example of supplication in a situation of conflict. After performing the ritual gesture of supplication by touching Odysseus's knees (*Od.* 22.310), Leodes (one of Penelope's suitors) pleads with Odysseus to show ἔλεος and αἰδώς (*Od.* 22.312) and spare his life. Unlike the other suitors, he never said or did anything against the women in the palace; he only urged them to display proper behaviour, and, because they never listened, they will now have to pay with their death (*Od.* 22.312-17). These appeals to reciprocity and justice do not convince Odysseus, however, who rejects the supplication and kills Leodes (*Od.* 22.321-9).<sup>462</sup> Granted that none of the characters condemns Odysseus's act – nor does any form of sanction follow – Odysseus's rejection does not appear to violate any ethical norms or standards.

While, in *Iliad* 21, Achilles uses the idea of humanity to reject Lycaon's supplication, in *Iliad* 24 humanity serves as the ground for Priam's supplication, which gains acceptance. This difference is to be understood in the context of the difference in pragmatics, which seem to compel Achilles to adopt a different

---

<sup>460</sup> Thus Naiden (2006) 120 is incorrect to argue that transactions linked to suppliants and slavery exclude any element of group membership. Note, furthermore, that, in Parker's (1983) terms, Lycaon's attempt to convince Achilles to spare his life is grounded in his attempt to make a 'help me' rather than 'spare me' supplication. This is to say that, by referring to their φιλότης bond, and by emphasising his former relationship with Achilles, Lycaon seeks to underline that Achilles *should* (rather than *could*) save Lycaon's life, since following Parker's (1983) 182 analysis, 'the 'spare me' [as opposed to the 'help me'] suppliant has no Zeus of Suppliants to invoke in his defence, and thus nothing like an absolute title to mercy'. See Parker (1983) 181-2.

<sup>461</sup> For a detailed analysis of this passage and the use of the word φίλος which highlights Achilles's ruthlessness rather than suggesting his softening, see Fisher (2020) 31-58.

<sup>462</sup> Contrast Odysseus's compassionate stance in the supplications of Phemius and Medon, following that of Leodes (*cf.* *Od.* 22.330-80): it is only Telemachus's intervention that persuades Odysseus to spare Phemius's and Medon's life.

(emotional) stance: rejecting Lycaon's appeal on the battlefield appears to be different from the flagrant mistreatment of dead bodies and rejecting the pleading of a father who meets the murder of his son to offer ransom for his son's corpse in an off-battlefield context. In the latter connection, as we shall see below, Achilles's own progress through the process of grieving also makes a difference.

That Achilles in *Iliad* 24, in contrast to *Iliad* 21, should display different behaviour is made explicit in the god's debate in the assembly of *Iliad* 24. There, Apollo criticises not only Achilles's behaviour for lacking ἔλεος and αἰδώς (24.44-5), but also the behaviour of the gods, who are tolerant of Achilles's stance (24.33-41). That is, the gods' tolerance of Achilles's merciless and shameless behaviour implies not only Achilles but also the gods' failure to respect the norms: on the one hand, Achilles violates the norms concerning the treatment of the corpse (in off-battlefield context); on the other hand, the gods fail to reciprocate Hector's offerings. Following Apollo's argument, instead of being rigid and unyielding, Achilles must moderate his ferocity and show compassion.<sup>463</sup> That is, human beings should have feelings of justice and make righteous judgments, reflecting a willingness to change their minds (cf. Apollo's words for Achilles's attitude at 24.40-1: 'ὦ οὔτ' ἄρ φρένες εἰσὶν ἐνάϊσμοι οὔτε νόημα/ γναμπτὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι'). However, as we saw in Chapter 2 (Sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.1), Achilles has a difficulty in modifying his perspective,<sup>464</sup> which runs counter to the standards of prudent actors, who are typically able to change their view not only according to Apollo's argument here discussed but also following Phoenix's advice towards Achilles in *Iliad* 9 (as discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.2)), and Iris's exhortation to Poseidon in *Iliad* 15 (as discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.1)). Because even those who have lost their child or sibling manage to mitigate their grief and mourning after a while (for Μοῖραι made humans that are able to endure pain (24.46-9)), Achilles, who lost Patroclus, should likewise be able to handle his emotions. In this regard, Apollo does not make any differentiation between individuals suffering at peace and those at war. This, in turn, implies an overarching ethical framework which delimits someone's experience of suffering, regardless of

---

<sup>463</sup> For the connection between anger and pity in the *Iliad*, and the poem's unity, see, for example, Most (2003) 50-75, especially 71-5; Kim (2000).

<sup>464</sup> Note, however, that, unlike *Iliad* 9, in *Iliad* 19 Achilles eventually aligns his behaviour with communal norms. Nevertheless, as we explain in this chapter, Achilles's grief over Patroclus does not justify the ongoing mutilation of Hector's corpse. Regarding why this development must take place from the perspective of literary criticism, see Segal (1971) 13-17.

one's comrades or opponents on the battlefield. To this end, individuals should be able to handle their own θυμός rather than acting violently like a beast, seeking food (cf. 24.41-3). By implication, mistreating bodies in the way that Achilles mistreats Hector's corpse does not conform to proper human behaviour but rather matches action that an animal would perform. Thus Apollo's point does not focus so much on Hector (being human) but on Achilles (being inhuman).<sup>465</sup> In displaying relentless behaviour, mistreating Hector's body (around Patroclus's tomb) (24.50-1; 24.54), Achilles achieves nothing other than the serious possibility of invoking the νέμεσις of the gods (24.52-3):

ἔλκει· οὐ μὴν οἱ τό γε κάλλιον οὐδέ τ' ἄμεινον.  
μὴ ἀγαθῶ περ ἔόντι νεμεσσηθῶμέν οἱ ἡμεῖς.'

'But, for him [*i.e.*, Achilles], this [*viz.* the dragging of Hector's corpse] is not beneficial nor makes him better. Though he is noble, he better not let us become angry towards him.'

Thus, if Achilles remains incapable of enduring pain, insisting on his dishonouring behaviour towards Hector, Achilles will fail to embrace transcendent human values which require limitations in one's expression (and experience) of grief, as well as showing respect towards the dead. Failure to display such decency would legitimately incur Olympian sanctions following the gods' νέμεσις. Thus the grounds of Apollo's argument, *viz.* the person's necessary ability to change their mind, and most importantly the resilience and the limitations of one's grief as human universals (esp. when considering the implicated indignation of the gods following one's failure to respect ethical values) make Apollo's argument unbiased.

---

<sup>465</sup> In this light, Apollo's reference to the emotions of ἔλεος and αἰδώς can only be understood within a moral context. Naiden's (2006) 10 review of past scholarship seems to differentiate from emotions and morality: 'As a consequence, Onians did not discuss myth or morality, and passed down these omissions to Gould and later scholars. Instead he stressed the psychology of ritual, a topic that also entered into later scholarship, which sought to describe the emotions suitable for *Kontaktmagie*, notably *aidōs*, a sense of respect for the gods.' In the latter connection, Naiden cites Cairns (1993), but neither Cairns (1993) nor Gould (1973) understands emotions in a vacuum. See, for example, Gould's (1973) consideration of the context, noted above, which is clearly taken into account by Cairns (1993). On the fact that Cairns situates emotions within a particular context, see also Chapter 1, Section 1.2, where Cairns (2001a) is discussed. Naiden (2006) makes similar criticism on pp. 69-70; 78-9. Note, however, Naiden's (2006) overall approach of supplication as a 'quasilegal practice' is pertinent, and his analysis covers an impressive collection of evidence from Near Eastern literature and Homer to Hebrew, classical, and Roman sources.

The fact that Apollo, albeit a partisan of the Trojan side,<sup>466</sup> proffers an impartial argument, is corroborated by Zeus's attitude. Zeus agrees with Apollo that Hector's body has to be given up to Priam (24.65-76), highlighting his personal anger towards Achilles regarding his mistreatment of Hector, while also communicating the anger of the rest of the gods as a result of this mistreatment (*cf.* 24.113-15).<sup>467</sup> Zeus then goes on to show support to Priam, when securing the successful prosecution of Priam's expedition: not only does he respond positively to his appeal for an omen (24.314-20) after Hecuba's exhortation, he also sends Hermes (who specifies the supplication's content regarding Priam's reference to Achilles's father (24.465-7)) to accompany Priam to Achilles's tent (24.152-4; 24.334-8).<sup>468</sup>

Taking Apollo's and Zeus's stance into account, the following point must be raised explicitly. The fact that there is a war between the Achaean and the Trojan community does not justify any sort of behaviour towards individuals belonging to a different community. In the context of battle, the validity or suspension of ethical boundaries may rest on the warriors' disposition vis-à-vis the different circumstances of negotiations. However, in off-battlefield situations, individuals *should* be amenable to respecting human commonalities and moral values which transcend individual communities. As the discussion of the divine debate in *Iliad* 24 has shown, these values point towards an ethical community that could include not only the Achaeans and the Trojans, but any human being, with religion constituting a means for enforcing moral norms. Still the idea of a human community that creates an overarching, ethical framework between individuals of different communities within the *Iliad* is not sufficiently robust. This is because there is no political institution to impose sanctions in the event of those norms' violation. Indeed, precisely because this

---

<sup>466</sup> See, for example, his intervention in stopping Athena from helping the Achaeans at 7.24-7; his substantial contribution to Hector's victory over Patroclus at 16.788-93; his rescuing Hector from Achilles's attack at 20.43-4.

<sup>467</sup> Note, however, that, unlike Apollo, Zeus does not make any explicit reference to Achilles's lack of αἰδώς or ἔλεος. Note, furthermore, Zeus's affirmation that Achilles is not 'ἄφρων' ('senseless'), 'ἄσκοπος' ('inconsiderate'), or 'ἀλιτήμων' ('transgressor'): 24.157; 24.186. *Cf.* MacLeod (1982) on 24.154, and Danek (2014b) 143.

<sup>468</sup> On Zeus's endorsement of Priam's supplication, *cf.* also the former's words towards Thetis at 24.117-19, namely, that Iris would communicate Zeus's support to Priam; Zeus announces the same message to Iris herself at 24.144-51, and Iris delivers it to Priam at 24.169-87.

level of human community is very abstract, Priam's supplication towards Achilles appears to be a decidedly risky undertaking.<sup>469</sup>

The risk of Priam's expedition is marked by the contrast between Priam, desiring to meet Achilles, and the Trojans, who are hardly able to hold him back (22.412-13), as well as Hecuba initially<sup>470</sup> being at odds with Priam's intention to plead for Hector's body in Achilles's tent (24.201-8; 24.288-9). Nevertheless, Priam's profound grief at his son's death urges him to attempt supplicating Achilles: because Hector's death heightens Priam's pain, which was already intense owing to the death of his other sons (22.422-6; *cf.* also 22.43-55), he entirely overlooks the perils of his course of action.<sup>471</sup> Owing to this, his need to mourn his son's death grows stronger than his thoughts regarding, or fear of, Achilles's callousness (*cf.* 22.418: 'λίσσωμ' ἀνέρα τοῦτον ἀτάσθαλον<sup>472</sup> ὀβριμοεργόν': 'I should plead with this man, who is *outrageous* and *violent*'). Achilles's cruelty also makes an appearance in Hecuba's objection to Priam's plan. However, unlike Hecuba, who takes Achilles's ruthlessness for granted (24.206-8; *cf.* also 22.88-9),<sup>473</sup> based on Achilles's merciless behaviour towards Priam's sons in the past (24.203-5),<sup>474</sup> Priam still hopes that Achilles will accept his pleading out of respect for his age (22.418-20) and his status as a father, as

---

<sup>469</sup> In chapter 7 of his book, Hammer (2002) associates Achilles's behaviour towards Priam with Achilles's review of 'his sense of worth through recognising how his choices affect him, as his choices affect others' (p. 172), and shows that Achilles's turn from 'suffering-from' Agamemnon's violating act in *Iliad* 1 (p. 175) to 'suffering-with' Patroclus after his death (p. 176) enlightens Achilles's stance towards Priam in *Iliad* 24 (pp. 176-82). Although this analysis of Hammer is insightful, I do not agree with its culmination, namely that 'pity provides the foundation for a political ethic that makes possible community life in the context of community suffering' (p. 189): Hammer's interpretation of Priam's encounter with Achilles presupposes that Priam and Achilles are members of the same political community, but they only share membership in the human community, if that is indeed a community. For a thorough review of Hammer's book, see Cairns (2004) 345-9. *Cf.* Chapter 1, Section 1.2. For my analysis of Priam's supplication, see below.

<sup>470</sup> Hecuba gives eventually her consent only because Zeus obtains his approval (*cf.* 24.296-8). For Zeus's approval, *cf.* 24.314-20; see above.

<sup>471</sup> Taplin (1992) 265 notes that 'the extraordinary courage of Priam's enterprise is brought out by the protraction of his departure from 188 to 329 [in *Iliad* 24]'

<sup>472</sup> De Jong (2012) 168-9 on 22.418 notes that 'ἀτάσθαλον, "outrageous", refers to behaviour which breaks social or religious rules'. *Cf.* also Priam's words at 22.62-76 regarding the Achaeans' cruelty in general. In his attempt to rouse Hector's pity and prevent him from fighting Achilles, Priam refers to what he is afraid might happen, *viz.* seeing his sons killed, his daughters captured, thereby becoming slaves, his palace to be ransacked and conquered, with Priam himself being eaten by his own dogs.

<sup>473</sup> Wilson (2002) 174 claims that Hecuba is willing to leave the body of her son as prey for the dogs. In my view, she only feels compelled to do so owing to Achilles's cruelty. Like Priam (see above), Hecuba, too, experiences deep grief regarding Hector's death (22.405-7; 22.430-7), grief that is linked to intense anger and a vindictive disposition: Hecuba wishes she ate Achilles's liver (*cf.* 24.212-14), which is redolent of Achilles's words towards Hector, *viz.* that his fury could cause him to eat Hector's flesh (22.346-7) – *cf.* above.

<sup>474</sup> Contrast Hecuba's words towards Hector's corpse at 24.751-3, aforementioned in connection to Achilles's practice towards supplication before Patroclus's death.

expressed in the analogy he makes (viz. when referring to himself and Achilles's father).<sup>475</sup> (The importance of this analogy, which Priam first mentions in *Iliad* 22 (22.420-1) and then performs in *Iliad* 24 (24.504), is underlined by Hermes's advice towards Priam at 24.486-7, shortly before Priam encounters Achilles). That is, Priam is determined to pursue ethical expectations which, being linked to Achilles's respect for Priam's τιμή,<sup>476</sup> are based on Priam's and Achilles's shared humanity. Priam's argument regarding the father-son relationship does not then pertain to the specific relationship between Priam-Peleus and Hector-Achilles: it refers to any father-son relationship, which is inevitably found on either side of any political division.

What is of utmost importance here is that, while Priam explores the institution of supplication – as well as that of religion through his appeal for Achilles's respect towards the gods (cf. 24.503: 'αἰδεῖο θεούς') – the main point of the analogy regarding the father-son relationship and the idea of a shared humanity is firmly grounded in an emotion: pity. That is, although supplication and religion are necessary for Priam's enterprise, they are not sufficient, for, if Achilles does not weep, then Priam's venture will fail. Thus, to render his supplication successful, Priam aims for Achilles's pity, and, to this end, he makes the point that he is, in fact, less fortunate than Achilles's father. The greater misfortune of Priam is emphasised more than once. At the beginning of his speech, Priam points out that, although he and Peleus are of the same age, unlike him, Peleus lives peacefully among his people, and may hope to meet Achilles, since the latter is alive (cf. 24.486-92). Likewise, in the last lines of his appeal, Priam stresses yet again (24.503-6):

‘ἀλλ’ αἰδεῖο θεούς, Ἀχιλεῦ, αὐτόν τ’ ἔλεησον  
 μνησάμενος σοῦ πατρός· ἐγὼ δ’ ἔλεεινότερός περ,  
 ἔτλην δ’ οἷ’ οὐ πῶ τις ἐπιχθόνιος βροτὸς ἄλλος,  
 ἀνδρὸς παιδοφόνιοιο ποτὶ στόμα χεῖρ’ ὀρέγεσθαι.’

<sup>475</sup> On the relation between father and son in *Iliad* 24, see, for example, Felson (2002) 46-50; Pratt (2007) 38-40; Tsoutsouki (2014) 78-92. Mueller (1984) 73 notes that the theme of fatherhood points towards ‘a shared humanity that transcends the opposition of Achaean and Trojan in which their hostility is rooted’.

<sup>476</sup> Cf. Menelaus's respect towards Priam's age in *Iliad* 3, as noted above. On the factor of age as a τιμή-related claim, see, for example, van Wees (1992) 75. Contrast Gould (1973) 94, who argues that the suppliant ‘stresses his own defencelessness and lack of any claim to τιμή’. Contrast Thornton (1984) 118, who agrees with Gould (1973). See also Thetis's supplication to Zeus based on her τιμή, as discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.

‘But respect the gods, Achilles, and upon me take pity, remembering your father; still I am more pitiable; I endured what no other mortal upon earth up until today has endured, to kiss the hands of the man who has killed my children.’

By implication, the analogy between Priam and Peleus is not to be understood in absolute terms. Indeed, while relying on similarity, it incorporates a certain differentiation: as Priam puts it, he is more pitiable than Achilles’s father.

Importantly, Achilles’s memory of his father<sup>477</sup> stimulates his sensitivity (24.507; 24.511-12) and compassion for Priam’s age (24.516). This causes him to accept Priam’s supplication.<sup>478</sup> Although he initially pushes (albeit gently) Priam’s hands from his knees – breaking physical contact, thereby circumventing the supplication ritual – Achilles eventually displays behaviour in accordance with the ceremonial process. Like Alcinous in *Odyssey* 7 who leads Odysseus to sit down (*Od.* 7.167-71),<sup>479</sup> Achilles asks Priam to take a seat (*cf.* 24.522). While he accepts the ἄποινα in exchange for Hector’s body, in keeping with his general attitude (*cf. Iliad* 9 and *Iliad* 19),<sup>480</sup> Achilles is not overly attached to the ransom: he shares it with Patroclus (24.590), as well as with Hector (24.580-1). Priam and his escort will carry Hector’s body, shrouded in clothing which forms part of the ἄποινα for Hector’s release.

That said, Achilles does not come to terms with Priam’s point of differentiation between Priam and Peleus, viz. that Peleus is more fortunate than Priam. For, while he is rich and king of the Myrmidons, and while he is mortal with a goddess for a wife, Peleus has a single child that will die an untimely death. Instead of taking care of his own father, Achilles ‘brings cares’ to Priam (24.534-41), a tragic contrast, communicating Achilles’s realisation that Priam is just like his own father. That is, Achilles’s rejection of Priam’s argument (such that Priam is less fortunate than Peleus) is bound up with Achilles’s acknowledgement of a shared humanity. In

---

<sup>477</sup> Note the repetition of the verb μμνήσκω. This verb is uttered twice in Priam’s appeal to Achilles (24.486; 24.504) and once again in the narrator’s description (24.509) before Achilles’s answer to Priam.

<sup>478</sup> Contrast Achilles’s lack of readiness to accept Hector’s ἱκεσία in *Iliad* 22 (22.345) despite Hector’s attempt to arouse Achilles’s compassion by referring to the latter’s parents (22.338). On the connection between Achilles’s pity towards Priam after satisfying his anger towards Hector, see Most (2003) 71-4. On Achilles’s (lack of) pity towards the Achaeans, see Chapter 2, Sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.1.

<sup>479</sup> On the symbolic function of the procedure, see Gould (1973) 79.

<sup>480</sup> See Chapter 2, Sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.3 respectively. Note also that, unlike Agamemnon in *Iliad* 9, Priam does not place any emphasis on ἄποινα but on himself and his role as a father: see Taplin (1992) 269.

stating that humans, unlike the gods (who have no sufferings), may experience a mix of good and evil, or only evil, depending upon Zeus's distribution (*cf.* Achilles's narration of the jars of Zeus at 24.525-33), Achilles actually recognises that all human beings belong to the same community of suffering mortals, whereby being at peace with the conditions under which all human beings exist, shows an awareness of the fact that everyone is just like everybody else, insofar as rules that apply to one individual may indeed apply to all. By implication, an individual who is suffering is not the only one who suffers, and, therefore, one has to find a way to continue one's life – a point that reminds us of Apollo's argument in the Olympian assembly of *Iliad* 24, discussed above. Hence, Priam should not mourn endlessly, for his grief will not bring Hector back (24.549-51).

From this perspective, Achilles's rejection of Priam's greater misfortune (compared with Peleus) is intimately linked to his taking pity on Priam, as well as the idea that Priam's suffering for Hector would not differ from Peleus's suffering for Achilles.<sup>481</sup> This is, in turn, bound up with Aristotle's analysis of pity in the *Rhetoric*. In that account, pity is the kind of pain that one feels for the other's suffering which one might expect oneself to suffer, particularly when one feels close to this suffering (*cf.* Arist. *Rh.* 1385b13-16).<sup>482</sup> Thus Achilles takes pity on Priam, for he realises that human vulnerability affects all humans. He thereby understands that humans are all subject to the same conditions. Achilles seems then to perceive himself and Priam, as well as any other individual, as members of the human community. Yet, because the Achaeans and the Trojans will not end the war, this community – if it indeed exists – is fragile, and can therefore be understood only in abstract terms.

While Priam's venture is based on an element of impartiality, thereby decentring the individual from the self, as well as on Priam's longing for Achilles's acknowledgement and acceptance of their shared humanity, it also creates a personal connection between Priam and Achilles insofar as the sympathy generated involves seeing *this* person as someone *like oneself*.<sup>483</sup> What this means is that one follows the

---

<sup>481</sup> Thus, while Hammer (2002) 184-5 is right to note that the analogy between Priam and Peleus does not have to work on all possible counts, I do not agree with his claim that the differentiation between Priam and Peleus creates a distance, thereby affecting the supplication effectively.

<sup>482</sup> For a detailed analysis of the definition of pity in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, see Konstan (2001) 128-36.

<sup>483</sup> The absence of any other Trojan apart from Priam in the supplication process (24.470-2), as advised by Zeus (24.148; *cf.* also 24.177), reinforces the personal, emotional element of the encounter between Priam and Achilles.

principle of the ‘golden rule’ (viz. that one treats the other as *oneself* would want to be treated).<sup>484</sup> In this regard, Achilles’s emotions of wonder are particularly important. In amazement, Achilles sees Priam kneeling before him, performing the supplication ritual: Priam touches Achilles’s knees and hands, thereafter proceeding to kiss the hands that killed his sons (24.478-80).<sup>485</sup> Achilles’s amazement is emphasised by the simile that compares his wonder at Priam with people’s wonder in observing an exile seeking refuge in a foreign land, having committed a murder in his own community (24.480-4).<sup>486</sup> The simile’s literary power lies in its reversal.<sup>487</sup> For, while not in his own community, it is not Priam who is a killer but Achilles. Priam, who is not a killer, has to make an appeal, because previously Achilles has rejected entreaty that raised the same point, viz. the exchange of Hector’s corpse for ἄποινα (*cf.* Hector’s supplication). Achilles’s wonder at Priam is linked to Achilles’s perception of Priam’s heart which is as though it is made of iron (24.521; *cf.* Hecuba at 24.205), as well as to his acknowledgement that Priam’s act of entering the enemy camp is an example of a truly formidable act (24.518-21). Priam’s courageous deed forms, then, a kind of ἀριστεία, that is, a great achievement. For, through this deed, Priam, an old man, bears all the hallmarks of a great warrior, a substantial political figure in his own right, causing Achilles to admire Priam’s act and speech (24.631-2). Achilles’s emotions of admiration and wonder towards Hector’s father remind one of his σέβας towards Andromache’s father: although he killed him, Achilles, out of deep respect for Eetion, not only did not remove his armour, he also took care of his proper burial (6.416-20). Thus, in accepting Priam’s supplication, while also being awed by Priam’s achievement, Achilles shows behaviour that, although contrasting with his previous attitude towards Hector’s corpse, is analogous to the respectful behaviour he has displayed in the past. For, out of awe, Achilles himself facilitated Eetion’s burial,

<sup>484</sup> Contrast Zanker (1994), who believes that reciprocity plays no part in this scene. On the issue of behaving in accordance with the ‘golden rule’, *cf.* Achilles’s criticism of Agamemnon in *Iliad* 1 (see Chapter 2); Hera’s point in her argument with Zeus regarding Sarpedon’s fate in *Iliad* 16 (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1).

<sup>485</sup> Naiden (2006) 46-7 argues that the suppliant’s gesture of kissing the hands of the supplicated depends on the circumstances, *e.g.*, whether the supplicated is sitting or holding a knife. He then claims that because, according to Eustathius, the hand ‘represents the power to make a pledge’, Priam ‘is expressing his wish that Achilles makes a pledge; the kiss adds deference to this wish’. In my view, the fact that Achilles is in a position that allows Priam to kiss Achilles’s hands underscores Priam’s tremendous courage which, in turn, inspires Achilles’s astonishment for Priam, an emotion that is essential for the outcome of this supplication. Contrast Crotty (1994) 71, who interprets Priam’s kissing of Achilles’s hands as if ‘There could scarcely be a more extravagant proof of the greatness of Achilles’ victory.’ Note that Achilles’s acceptance of the ransom creates a win-win situation.

<sup>486</sup> For the connection between θάμπος and αἰδώς in this context, see Cairns (1993) 119.

<sup>487</sup> See Elmer (2013) 179.

and, out of similar wonder, Achilles accepts Priam's supplication, allowing him to honour Hector's death. Although essential to the outcome of supplication, wonder and admiration do not have the form of an obligation conferred by the rules and norms of a concrete political community: one could experience these emotions towards any human being that would achieve such a great accomplishment as Priam's.

Nevertheless, Achilles's acceptance of Priam's supplication is not entirely the result of Achilles's respect for their shared humanity, nor their interpersonal interaction and mutual admiration (*cf.* Priam's admiration towards Achilles at 24.629-30). It requires Achilles's reflection on his own emotions and their implications, a lesson that Achilles paid for with Patroclus's death.<sup>488</sup> As a result, while affirming Hector's release (24.561-6), Achilles first explicitly warns Priam to comply with his commands (*i.e.*, to accept his invitation to take a seat; 24.523), attempting to control his anger (24.560) and not to reject the supplication (*cf.* 24.568-70). He then orders the slaves to take care of Hector's body away from his tent, considering, in advance, that Hector's view may stir up his anger, resulting in his transgression of divine orders (*cf.* 24.582-6).<sup>489</sup> Moreover, while advising Priam to limit his grief over his son (24.549-51),<sup>490</sup> Achilles explicitly accepts that his lamentation for Patroclus has certain limitations, understanding that Priam's offer justifies the release of Hector's body. Therefore, when addressing Patroclus, he asks him not to get angry with him for returning Hector's corpse to his father (*cf.* 24.592-4). Achilles's acknowledgement of the bounds of grief goes hand-in-hand with his acknowledgement of the need for food and rest (24.601; 24.618-20). Thus it is only during his encounter with Priam that Achilles appears to fully assimilate Odysseus's message in *Iliad* 19.<sup>491</sup> Achilles's

---

<sup>488</sup> *Cf.* Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1: Achilles realises the bad consequences of his excessive anger on his side; the embassy's message in *Iliad* 9 is proven right. Contrast Achilles's behaviour in *Iliad* 9, whereby he is unable to grasp the implications of his anger despite the ambassadors' message; see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2. Contrast Achilles's behaviour in *Iliad* 19, where he needed Odysseus's intervention to understand that his anger against Hector disregards certain communal processes; see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3.

<sup>489</sup> In contrast to scholars, such as Whitman (1958) 183 and MacCary (1982) 92, van Wees (1992) does not view Achilles's quick temper at 24.559-69 as a flaw arguing that the heroes' tendency to get angry is linked to the notions of honour, deference, and respect: see van Wees (1992) 109ff. *Cf.* Chapter 1, Section 1.2.

<sup>490</sup> Note, however, that Priam's insistence on seeing his son when responding to Achilles (24.553-5) would provoke Achilles. Achilles's success in dealing with his emotions at this stage of the poem prevents an excessive reaction on his part: see Taplin (1992) 273.

<sup>491</sup> Contrast Achilles's insistence on omitting the meal and returning to the battlefield in *Iliad* 19. As in the case of Achilles's remembrance of his father, his recognising of the need for food is likewise linked to memory (*cf.* the narration of the myth of Niobe at 24.602-17, where there is also an emphasis on

and Priam's meal (24.621-7),<sup>492</sup> as well as Priam's overnight stay in Achilles's quarters (24.635-6; 24.643-8; 24.650), seal Achilles's acceptance of Priam's supplication, while also reminding us of Achilles's previous stance towards the institution, as expressed through Achilles's attitude in his first encounter with Lycaon (see above). From this perspective, the change in Achilles's emotional state (viz. moving on from a fixation on his own suffering, thereby allowing himself to sympathise with the suffering of another human being) causes him to respect Priam (as already communicated by the gods), and further perform the normative behaviour associated with ξενία, namely, the offering of food and hospitality. Thus Achilles's behaviour towards Priam reminds us once again of Alcinous's behaviour towards Odysseus in *Odyssey 7*: like Odysseus, Priam is also first a suppliant and then a guest. Thus Achilles's attitude is typical of the standards of supplication which is normally extended to ξενία in off-battlefield context.<sup>493</sup>

Yet the fulfilment of Priam's request (that he is given Hector's corpse) requires not only Achilles's reflection on his own emotions but also his attention to Agamemnon's and the other Achaeans' dispositions and reactions. Achilles, therefore, urges Priam to sleep outside his tent, and arranges a truce with Priam, such that he makes it possible for him and the Trojans to pay homage to the fallen Hector (24.650f.). This truce is not purely a personal but clearly also a political decision, since it impacts on the political setting by interrupting the fighting. Still Achilles's choice to omit the procedural part of the decision-making process (which, as we saw in Chapter 2, demands the Achaeans' consensus) posits that the shared plights and sufferings of humans stand above political priorities and other hostilities.<sup>494</sup> Achilles takes a political decision for emotional reasons, having formed emotional ties with

---

memory, expressed through the repetition of the verb μυνήσκω: 24.601; 24.603; 24.613). On the Niobe narration, see, for example, Kakridis (1949); Whitman (1958); Willcock (1964).

<sup>492</sup> Griffin (1980) 16 sees Achilles's and Priam's meal as 'a metaphor which enables Achilles to return to humanity before he meets death'.

<sup>493</sup> For a detailed comparison between Priam's and Odysseus's supplication, see Gould (1973) 79-80. On the intimate connection between ξενία and supplication in Homer, see Gould (1973) 91-4.

<sup>494</sup> Elmer's (2013) 181 analysis of Priam's scene with Achilles does not seem to consider the importance of the truce in ethical terms. It rather overemphasises the absence of collective decision-making in *Iliad 24* through a comparison between Priam's encounter with Achilles and the Achaean council and Trojan assembly in the truce arrangements for the burial of the dead in *Iliad 7*. If Priam's and Achilles's encounter aims to single out the personal, emotional bonds between human beings (in spite of major differences that may separate them), then the private context of Priam's and Achilles's encounter is justified. Neither the divine decision-making in *Iliad 24* (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2) nor Achilles's initiative in arranging the truce is to be linked with an individual's unilateral decision as Elmer (2013) 181 claims for both cases. It is instead concerned with Zeus's enactment of communal norms in the first case, and Achilles's respect for common ethical values in the second.

Priam. After all, Chapter 3 showed that decision-making that is only procedurally (not also constitutively) rational may have disastrous consequences for the community. That said, although Achilles's and Priam's agreement to facilitate the proper process of grief and lamentation over Hector underpins the ability of human solidarity and sympathy to transcend political differences – including the mutual antagonism engendered by war – this transcendence brings together these two individuals, something that is not also extended to their communities.

Thus, because Priam's supplication and the *ξενία* ties between Priam and Achilles do not thereby bind the Trojans and the Achaeans on an intercommunal level but only Priam and Achilles on an interpersonal level, yet, in influencing the course of the war, they can only hint at a kind of a shared community that remains undeveloped. It remains undeveloped, because, after the truce, the Achaeans and the Trojans will continue fighting, and the audience – being aware of the tradition – well knows that the war will result in the absolute destruction of Troy, as well as the killing of Priam over Zeus's altar by Achilles's son (Neoptolemus), the desecration of shrines, and the murder of Astyanax.<sup>495</sup> Although Priam's accepted supplication by Achilles only creates an interpersonal bond, it is nonetheless significant that the *Iliad* ends with a truce between the Achaeans and the Trojans. For the outcome of Priam's and Achilles's encounter evinces the possibility of the instantiation of a superordinate 'community of communities' in contrast to the tragic and destructive nature of war. Indeed, the fact that this possibility is partly owing to the best Iliadic fighter may sound almost incredible or paradoxical when we think of Achilles in *Iliad* 9, in *Iliad* 21, and *Iliad* 22. However, it is rather almost natural when we think of Achilles's affection towards Patroclus, his respect towards Eetion, as well as his sympathy towards the battlefield suppliants preceding Patroclus's death.

Before moving on to discuss the final instance of Achaean-Trojan negotiations, as well as the last example of off-battlefield supplication, (viz. Chryses's appeal to the Achaeans), let us first summarise Priam's venture. Priam's supplication constitutes an example of effective Achaean-Trojan negotiations off of the battlefield, which is based on shared ethical values and norms, acknowledged and enacted by Priam and Achilles. Despite Achilles's excessive grief regarding Patroclus's death,

---

<sup>495</sup> Cf. the events that are described in *Iliupersis* as we know them through the summary of Proclus's *Chrestomathy* in Photius's *Bibliotheca*. See, also, Virgil's *Aeneid*, Book 2.

which is intimately linked with his excessive anger against Hector,<sup>496</sup> Zeus can guarantee Achilles's respect for a supplicant (24.158; *cf.* also 24.187), reassuring Priam that his life will not be endangered if he goes on the expedition to meet Achilles (24.152; 24.156; *cf.* also 24.181; 24.185), thereby neutralising Hecuba's not unreasonable objections. Zeus's assertions about Achilles's trustworthiness prove right to the extent that Priam has no concerns about Achilles's reliability by the end of their discussion: Hermes has to interrupt Priam's sleep, reminding him that, just because Achilles did not harm him, does not mean that he is not in the enemy's camp (24.683-4). Then, when returning to the Trojans, Priam reassures them that they have twelve days for Hector's lamentation, thereby communicating his trust towards Achilles's pledge (24.778-81). Nevertheless, Priam's eventual unconcern does not mean that Hecuba was completely wrong to doubt Achilles's sympathy. What makes the difference, however, is that Achilles is now able to reflect upon, and manage, his emotions. This furthermore enables him to enact the laws of human decency, recognising that not just himself and Priam but *all* human beings share in the same suffering.

In contrast to Priam's supplication in *Iliad* 24, Chryses's supplication in *Iliad* 1 is unfruitful.<sup>497</sup> Note, however, that while both Priam's and Chryses's are off-battlefield supplications (pertaining to a father's negotiations for the return of his child or his child's body) Chryses's supplication is significantly different: it does not have any personal character, and fundamentally depends upon the institutional context of his priesthood – as well as his offer of boundless ransom, which involves the principles of reciprocity. Chryses's priesthood and the ransom (in conjunction with the Achaeans' consensus to Chryses's appeal) advance the reasons why Chryses's supplication should be accepted: it creates a more robust ground for negotiations in a state of war insofar as the expectations that are built up are not merely speculative (as in the case of battlefield supplications) but normative.

---

<sup>496</sup> See above, and Chapter 2, Section 2.3.

<sup>497</sup> Although he is not a Trojan, Chryses still represents an individual who belongs to a politically different community to that of the Achaeans which, in the context of the Trojan war, is included among the Achaeans' enemies (Chryses's daughter forms part of the Achaeans' spoils given to Agamemnon after Thebe's conquest: 1.366-9). Therefore, I include Chryses's case in my discussion of the Achaean-Trojan negotiations off of the battlefield. Note, also, that, while his community is included in the Achaeans' enemies, in his appeal Chryses wishes that the Achaeans conquer Troy and return home safely (1.18-19).

That these expectations are to be understood in normative terms is already hinted through the narrator's evaluative comment at 1.9-12. Here, the narrator ascribes the plague in the Achaean camp to Apollo's anger; anger that is owing to Agamemnon's dishonour of Apollo's priest, (viz. his rejection of Chryses's appeal). If the narrator's comment (namely, that such a rejection has induced religious sanction) only implies the illegitimate nature of the rejection, then the Achaeans' consensus in respecting the priest (1.23) explicitly stresses Agamemnon's anti-normative attitude. The Achaeans' consensus regarding Chryses's request shows that Agamemnon, being unable to enact ethical values, disregards the Achaeans' and Chryses's shared ethical expectations (that religious norms and norms of fair compensation must be respected), while also invalidating the Achaeans' political expectations on an intra-communal level: since Chryses's appeal addresses all the Achaeans (1.15), and the Achaeans' response is collective and unanimous (1.22), thereby rendering Chryses's supplication a political matter, Agamemnon must take the Achaeans' judgment into account.<sup>498</sup> Nevertheless, he decides to act unilaterally. While disregarding (1.29) the Achaeans' verdict to respect Chryses and accept the exchange of Chryseis with ransom (1.22-3), he disdains Chryses's status – status that is explicitly communicated through Apollo's wreath and the σκήπτρον that Chryses holds (1.14-15),<sup>499</sup> and further implied by Chryses's appeal that the Achaeans respect Apollo (1.21). That the status of a priest must be respected is further corroborated by *Od.* 9.197-201. Although there is no reference to supplication in this context, we still hear about Odysseus's decision to spare Maron's life out of respect for his priesthood, and Maron, like Chryses, shows his readiness to reciprocate in offering Odysseus 'splendid gifts' (*Od.* 9.201: ἀγλαὰ δῶρα). Thus not only does Agamemnon devalue precisely what he must respect, *i.e.* Chryses as a priest (*cf.* Agamemnon's contemptuous reference to Chryses's priestly symbols at 1.28),<sup>500</sup> he also rejects the mechanism of reciprocity. Given the Achaeans' consensus on accepting Chryses's ransom (1.23), the mechanism of exchange has a double function: it allows a transaction between a community and an

<sup>498</sup> See Chapter 2, Section 2.1.

<sup>499</sup> Naiden (2006) 56-7 is right to point out that, by holding both the wreath and the σκήπτρον, Chryses uses 'a signal that is supplicatory with one that is not'. He is moreover correct in saying that, in so doing, Chryses 'combines ways, hoping that the Greeks will act both as supplicandi and as worshippers of his god, Apollo'. Yet this combination does not imply that 'the suppliant does not know which way to deal with the supplicandus'. On the contrary, the combination shows the suppliant's attempt to make his case stronger.

<sup>500</sup> Note that Agamemnon disregards Chryses's status as a father, too (*cf.* Agamemnon's detailed reference to Chryseis's fate away from home at 1.29-31).

individual belonging to a different community, while also allowing the individual directly implicated in the transaction to maintain his status on an intra-communal level. That is to say, the exchange of Chryseis's with ransom would be a win-win situation: Chryses would get his daughter back, and Agamemnon would get 'boundless ransom' (1.13: ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα), *i.e.*, he would enhance his τιμή within the Achaean community after the concession of his γέρας, which symbolises his status – Agamemnon uses a γέρας to leverage 'boundless ransom'; he gives something up, but gets more in return, confirming his status as the stronger party.<sup>501</sup>

Chryses's paternal affection for his daughter, Chryseis, motivating his journey to the Achaean camp, as well as the Achaeans' acclamation (*cf.* 1.22: ἐπευφήμησαν) to respect the priest (*cf.* 1.23: αἰδεῖσθαί θ' ἱερέα) show how emotions play a part in successful negotiations between parties belonging to different political communities in a warring context. Still Agamemnon's failure to acknowledge values transcending communities, *e.g.*, the respect for priests, and abide by communal rules, which might respond to and regulate issues coming from outside of the community, shows how emotions may operate to the detriment of negotiations. Owing to his displeasure following Chryses's appeal (1.24), Agamemnon becomes aggressive towards Chryses, 'sending him away in a bad manner' (as the narrator comments at 1.25: κακῶς ἀφίει),<sup>502</sup> thereby rejecting his supplication. However, the illegitimacy of this rejection bears consequences that are in turn linked to an individual's emotions. For, while he obeys Agamemnon's command owing to his fear, causing him to retreat (*cf.* 1.33), Chryses's grief for his daughter prompts him to seek vengeance against the Achaeans, appealing to Apollo: 'τίσειαν Δαναοὶ ἐμὰ δάκρυα σοῖσι βέλεσσιν'; 'let the Danaans pay for my tears with your arrows'(1.42).

In brief, Chryses's supplication in the off-battlefield context, his priesthood, and the offer of ransom give grounds for effective negotiations between opposing parties in a state of war. Nevertheless, despite the dynamics of consensus within the Achaean community, making an explicit statement that Chryses's appeal must be

---

<sup>501</sup> On the connection between γέρας and τιμή, see the discussion in Chapter 2, Section 2.1. On Agamemnon's anger regarding Chryses's request as a face threat to Agamemnon, see Scodel (2008) 127-8. If Scodel (2008) rightly interprets Chryses's request as a face threat from Agamemnon's point of view, Agamemnon is then wrong to perceive Chryses's request as such. The ransom balances out the concession of Chryseis, while Agamemnon's respect for the Achaeans' consensus would uphold Agamemnon as a good leader within the Achaean community, because he would abide by communal norms.

<sup>502</sup> For Agamemnon's emotional state in this context, *cf.* Chapter 2, Section 2.1.

accepted, the eventual rejection of Chryses's supplication, owing to Agamemnon's failure to align his behaviour with intra-communal norms and shared ethical standards between individuals of different communities, does not allow negotiations to thrive.

Let us now summarise what has been discussed in Chapter 5. Here, I have shown that Achaean-Trojan negotiations between communities, or between individuals of different communities, are based on common religious beliefs, shared ethical values, and/or the acknowledgement and acceptance of sharing the same human nature. These factors create an overarching structure that is ethical in character and stands above individual communities, thereby pointing towards a superordinate 'community of communities' in the *Iliad*. Although this superordinate community includes mechanisms such as that of exchanging oaths and reciprocity, institutions such as ἰκετεία, ξενία and/or φιλότις, institutional practices like the heralds' mediatorial duties, as well as shared respect for common claims to τιμή, it does not include principally political institutions, such as the assembly and/or the council. Examples of failed, or only partially successful, negotiations between the Achaean and Trojan communities (with their implied return to the state of war) evince the fluid nature of the kind of community that the Achaeans and the Trojans may share, while the fact that negotiations between individuals of different communities may bring together only individuals, not communities, demonstrates their shared membership on a rather more abstract level. In this light, the kind of community that unites the Achaean and the Trojan communities does not have the sense of a shared, politically robust, community. Indeed, one might say that the bonds tying individuals of the Achaean and the Trojan community – not the communities themselves – attest both the absence and presence of community between the Achaeans and the Trojans within the *Iliad*. The individuals' awareness of their emotions and their ability to reflect upon the implications emotions can cause are essential for a well-tempered operation of overarching ethical structures. Emotions such as anger and vengeance may be justified when, for example, a dishonourable act has taken place. Cooperation can only be promoted, however, when one's perception of an act is based on an impartial consideration of ethical values. Still the members of the Achaean and Trojan communities rarely think in bidirectional terms. In a similar vein, thinking of the other by putting yourself in their shoes, that is, by thinking and acting in accordance with the 'golden rule', gives grounds for collaboration, with the emotions of trust, respect,

admiration, and sympathy performing a fundamental role. However, the experience of these emotions regarding the Achaeans and the Trojans typically unfolds on an *interpersonal* level.

In sum, then, Achaean-Trojan negotiations on an interpersonal and intercommunal level show the existence of shared ethical values and religious beliefs that because they are not consistently taken into account, and/or are enacted on the interpersonal level, do not culminate in a shared basis for political debate and collective decision-making for both the Achaean and the Trojan community; still they offer the aspiration of a superordinate ‘community of communities’ for the future. This future is not a particular future in the sense of a historical stage (*e.g.*, by Alexander the Great and by the Romans, who conquered others’ lands, nor by the United Nations and EU). While, nowadays, (some) citizens in certain countries are fortunate enough to be entitled with fundamental rights, countries still wage wars that harm and damage one another, with global capitalism benefiting the developed world at the expense of the developing world.<sup>503</sup> The Iliadic idea of the possibility of a superordinate ‘community of communities’ is then instantiated every time the Iliadic reader realises that, in the very first work of European literature, when an enemy dies, it is just as pitiful and sad as when a friend dies. In this light, it would then be legitimately to say that *Iliad* 24 and the encounter between Priam and Achilles offer a definition of what it means to be human.

---

<sup>503</sup> On the ways in which global capitalism brings benefits to some people of the world by harming others, see, for example, Sassen (1988).



## 6. Conclusion

This study explored the role of emotion in relation to Iliadic politics. I contended that research regarding Iliadic politics would benefit from a greater attention to the ways in which leaders experience emotion vis-à-vis the enactment of communal norms and the management of honour dynamics, especially within deliberative contexts. My approach is undergirded by the idea that emotion is a kind of script. As such, I hereby studied emotion in relation to its embeddedness within the narrative and social context of Iliadic political communities. In so doing, I brought out the connection between emotion as a social phenomenon and politics as shaped by individual psychology within the *Iliad*. Here, I advanced a new interpretation of Iliadic politics. I did so, by combining the insights of enactivism, Aristotle's notion of τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη, his analysis of the reasons for στάσις in *Politics* V, as well as socio-political and philosophical approaches to the internalisation of norms and the importance of 'the other' and 'the group'. On this novel account, Iliadic politics are intimately bound up with the individual's emotions, while emotions shape, and are shaped by, communal norms, which are not fixed or imposed, but are enacted, thereby being continuously negotiated by all community members. Against this background, my thesis explored variants of leadership as they are played out in the contexts of negotiation and decision-making within Iliadic political institutions. These contexts have encompassed the communities of the Achaeans, the Trojans, as well as the gods and the kind of community formed between the Achaeans and the Trojans. I hereby demonstrated that the wellbeing of the community relies on leaders who consider the emotions and interests of all community members, without being self-centred by indulging personal priorities and desires at the expense of the communal good.

After establishing the framework of this project (Chapter 1), we began our analysis of Iliadic politics in Chapter 2, whereby we considered the political community of the Achaeans, in particular investigating the conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles from its outbreak in *Iliad* 1 to the Achaeans' attempt at its resolution in *Iliad* 9 and its official resolution in *Iliad* 19. I showed that when honour dynamics lead to strife, they are typically underpinned by anger, anger that may be based on *normative* but not always *legitimate* claims. Conflict results from a myopic preoccupation with one's perception of personal honour, which – as seen in

Agamemnon's stance in *Iliad* 1 – is bound up with antagonism rather than cooperation and respect. By failing to honour Achilles and recognise his claims to τιμή among the Achaeans, Agamemnon provoked Achilles's withdrawal from battle, thereby bringing suffering to the entire community.

Unlike Agamemnon, Achilles's anger in the assembly of *Iliad* 1 is legitimately grounded. For, removing a warrior's γέρας, which he was given by the Achaeans in recognition of his τιμή, is a fundamental violation of protocols, and flagrantly disregards the communal norms, especially the distribution of prizes. Thus, in *Iliad* 1, because Agamemnon fails to display just behaviour, Achilles becomes angry, which is bound up with his respect for the communal norms. However, in insisting on his anger (thereby isolating himself from the community) and failing to feel ἔλεος towards his comrades (thereby falling short of his social obligations towards his comrades) despite the ambassadors' appeals in *Iliad* 9, Achilles is likewise engrossed in the subjective aspect of honour. This focus renders his anger pathological, resulting in his rejection of the embassy's message, a decision that incurs severe repercussions for Achilles as an individual (see Patroclus's death) and the community as a whole (see the Achaeans' defeat on the battlefield). From this perspective, because both Agamemnon and Achilles fail to successfully evaluate their emotions, they are unable to recognise the important role of intersubjectivity in honour dynamics, which powerfully impacts upon the communal wellbeing.

In contrast to Agamemnon and Achilles, Nestor's performance in the assembly of *Iliad* 1, as well as the assembly and council of *Iliad* 9, and Odysseus's interposition in the assembly of *Iliad* 19 show that honour dynamics may also result in cooperation between members of a community, thereby serving the interests of all. This aspect of honour dynamics is bound up with the leader's ability to listen to others' advice, considering in advance and in detail the course of an action, while successfully evaluating their own and others' emotions vis-à-vis the communal norms. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, Odysseus's and Nestor's leadership showcase emotional intelligence and accurate judgement, which enable the leaders to uphold standards of justice and reciprocity.

Thus Chapter 2 showed that consensus is an essential part of effective decision-making: failing to achieve consensus leads to the community's suffering, as

seen in *Iliad* 1 and *Iliad* 9. Consensus, however, is not sole criterion of wise decision-making. The fact that decisions must be not only *procedurally* but also *constitutively* sound became especially explicit in Chapter 3, which focused on Hector's leadership within the Trojan community. Despite securing everyone's consent, the decision proposed by Hector (as approved by the Trojans in the assembly of *Iliad* 18) led to their defeat the next day, and to Hector's own death. Following this point, like Agamemnon in *Iliad* 1 and Achilles in *Iliad* 9, Hector's inability to heed to counsellors' sagacious advice is part and parcel with his poor leadership. By discounting Polydamas's valid claims, Hector fails to realise that his desire to gain more honour impeded him from safeguarding the safety and interests of the community. Indeed, excessive confidence vis-à-vis the likelihood of Trojans' victory over the Achaeans was grounded in Hector's mistaken assumption of Zeus's support. In failing to properly evaluate his emotions, Hector led the Trojan assembly of *Iliad* 18 to make a fatally injudicious decision, thereby condemning his community to suffer.

Poor leadership and decision-making (as illustrated in the respective leadership styles of Agamemnon, Achilles, and Hector) do not entail that honour dynamics only result in the community's suffering. On the contrary, Nestor's, Odysseus's, and Polydamas's interventions prove that honour is an inclusive value. In fact, as discussed in Chapter 4, in contrast to both the Achaean and the Trojan community, the Olympian community exemplifies how the negotiation of honour can always serve communal interests despite any concomitant emotional tension and conflict. Zeus's leadership style, along with his and the other gods' commitment to protecting the status quo (while also acknowledging the role of  $\mu\omicron\iota\rho\alpha$  in the decision-making process), is bound up with negotiations of communal norms which, albeit occasionally affected by the gods' focus on the subjective aspect of honour, are ultimately grounded in intersubjectivity. Thus the gods' respect for the others' claims and rights surmounts their personal primacies. The gods' commitment to enacting communal norms (considering the other) results from earlier periods of actual violence which greatly disturbed the status quo. This pattern is borne out in the succession struggles of Hesiod's *Theogony*, while also seen in Zeus's threats and other similar Iliadic references. Thus Thetis's request that Zeus honour her by honouring Achilles may upset the 'honour equilibrium' among the gods in the

assembly of *Iliad* 1, for example, given that the implications of Thetis's request clash with Hera's priorities to defend her τιμή following Paris's Judgement. Still this equilibrium is eventually achieved thanks to everyone's contribution. Reciprocal esteem dynamics (shaping and shaped by everyone's sound evaluation of their own and others' emotions) are operative to this end: Zeus acknowledges Hera's role in the decision-making process; Hera concedes that Zeus's motives are not at the expense of the communal interest; Hephaestus allows Hera to save face when she has to retreat from her initial stance; while the rest of the gods respond cheerily towards Hephaestus's gesture to serve wine. In sum, the Olympian assembly in *Iliad* 1 constitutes a clear example whereby the gods successfully manage honour dynamics in spite of any passionate disagreement.

Chapters 2-4 discussed negotiations of honour vis-à-vis individuals' emotions, with each chapter focusing on a specific community, while Chapter 5 broadened this analysis by exploring honour negotiations between (individuals of) different communities. Although belonging to politically different communities, the Achaeans and the Trojans share same ethical values, religious beliefs, and institutions. Despite the state of war, consensus upon these matters brings these communities in certain cases together, thereby creating a common ground. However, because commonalities are typically only instantiated on an *interpersonal* level (and rarely on an *intercommunal* level), I contended that any union between the Achaeans and the Trojans appears to attest both the presence and the absence of a shared community, or to form an abstract, fragile kind of community. This kind of community is ethical rather than political in nature, for it lacks any politically robust institutions (such as the assembly and the council), which typically enable political debate and decision-making. Thus no superordinate 'community of communities' can ultimately be realised within the *Iliad* to any great end. Nevertheless, the *Iliad* offers its readers the aspiration of such a community. Above all, this possibility is to be found in the encounter between Priam and Achilles: Achilles's ἔλεος towards Priam, as well as their mutual respect and admiration offer a definition of what it means to be human.

My overall approach to emotion vis-à-vis politics offers significant advantages. I demonstrated that honour dynamics, which are bound up with political scenarios of conflict and cooperation (as they play out within Iliadic deliberative contexts), are ultimately underpinned by the individuals' emotions. That is, in taking a

more dynamic approach compared with previous accounts, I argued that political processes and actions which affect community wellbeing are greatly illuminated when we foreground the role of the individuals' emotions. In this regard, I clarified that emotions *per se* do not have positive or negative valence; it is the context that affords them their particular meaning. For, emotions spring from certain causes, and imply a certain kind of intentionality. Emotions also trigger, and are triggered by, personal interactions which thereby affect political debate and decision-making processes. In bringing these insights to the fore, my research illuminated the connection between the importance of 'the other' and leadership within the *Iliad*. I argued that leaders secure the wellbeing of the community by enacting communal norms *bidirectionally*. Thus, with regard to honour dynamics, it can be said that leaders act rationally, in both procedural and constitutive terms, by acknowledging and evaluating their own and others' emotions, thereby enabling dissenters' psychological flexibility (viz. the leeway to change their minds), promoting inclusion and diversity in the process of political decision-making.

This research on Iliadic politics, then, contributed to the study of the history of emotions, while also broadening the methodological apparatus employed in Iliadic studies. Specifically, by taking an interdisciplinary approach (when, for example, dealing with questions regarding the universality or cultural specificity of emotion, and by adopting an inclusive approach thereby, in terms of both the category and the phenomena), I showed that emotions are a valuable tool for the study of Iliadic politics. To this end, I brought together Aristotle's approach on *στάσις* in *Politics* V, on which account individuals' psychology forms part of the constitution, alongside modern socio-political and philosophical theories regarding the intimate link between emotions and (the internalisation of) communal norms (on which, see Elster (1999), Bourdieu (1977), Honneth (1995), Goffman (1969), and Gallagher (2020)). Such an interdisciplinary methodology contributes, then, to the vitality of research in Homeric studies, thereby allowing Homerists to raise new and contemporary questions with regard to Homer. At the same time, this study contributes to broader intellectual discourse. For, its insights – especially regarding the dynamical nature of respect and honour – are positioned to illuminate, for instance, psychological and philosophical approaches to esteem dynamics, thereby attracting the interests of scholars in other fields. In brief, while enriching our understanding of Iliadic politics through the study

of emotion, my thesis informs and fosters dialogue across disciplines. In so doing, my thesis shows that the *Iliad* – the oldest extant work of Western literature – still today constitutes the fount of inspiration for the humanities and social sciences, and accordingly promotes critical thinking and reflection.

## *Bibliography*

- Adkins, A. W. H. (1960), *Merit and Responsibility: a Study in Greek Values*, Oxford.
- Adkins, A. W. H. (1983), 'Orality and Philosophy', in K. Robb (ed.), *Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy*, La Salle, Illinois, 207-27.
- Allan, W. (2006), 'Divine Justice and Cosmic Order in Early Greek Epic', *JHS* 126, 1-35.
- Allan, W. and Cairns, D. L. (2011), 'Conflict and Community in the *Iliad*', in N. R. E. Fisher and H. van Wees (eds.), *Competition in the Ancient World*, Swansea, 113-46.
- Anhalt, E. K. (2017), *Enraged: Why Violent Times Need Ancient Greek Myths*, New Haven; London.
- Arendt, H. (1958), *The Human Condition*, Chicago.
- Arendt, H. (1972), *Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics, Civil Disobedience, On Violence, Thoughts on Politics and Revolution*, New York.
- Armon-Jones, C. (1986), 'The Thesis of Constructionism', in R. Harré (ed.), *The Social Construction of Emotions*, New York, 32-56.
- Arnould, D. (1990), *Le rire et les larmes dans la littérature Grecque d' Homère à Platon*, Paris.
- Auerbach, E. (1953), *Mimesis: the Representation of Reality in Western Literature*, Princeton.
- Austin, N. (1966), 'The Function of Digressions in the *Iliad*', *GRBS* 7, 295-312.
- Balot, R. K. (2001), *Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens*, Princeton.
- Bannert, H. (1988), *Formen des Wiederholens bei Homer*, Vienna.
- Bell, R. H. (2007), 'Homer's Humor: Laughter in the *Iliad*', *Humanitas/Bowie* 20, 96-116.
- Bonnet, C. (2016), 'Gli dèi in assemblea', in G. Pironti and C. Bonnet (eds.), *Gli dèi di Omero: politeismo e poesia nella Grecia Antica*, 113-46.

- Bourdieu, P. (1977), *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, translated by R. Nice, Cambridge.
- Bremmer, J. (1983), *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul*, Princeton.
- Brennan, G. and Pettit P. (2005), *The Economy of Esteem: an Essay on Civil and Political Society*, Oxford.
- Brentano, F. C. (1874), *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, Leipzig.
- Brown, P. and Levinson, S. (1987), *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*, Cambridge.
- Burkert, W. (1985), *Greek Religion*, translated by J. Raffan, Oxford.
- Cairns, D. L. (1993), *Aidos: the Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature*, Oxford.
- Cairns, D. L. (1996), 'Hybris, Dishonour, and Thinking Big', *JHS* 116, 1-32.
- Cairns, D. L. (2001a), 'Affronts and Quarrels in the *Iliad*', in D. L. Cairns (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Homer's Iliad*, Oxford, 203-19.
- Cairns, D. L. (2001b), 'Introduction', in D. L. Cairns (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Homer's Iliad*, Oxford, 1-56.
- Cairns, D. L. (2001c), 'Anger and the Veil in Ancient Greece', *Greece & Rome* 48, 18-32.
- Cairns, D. L. (2003), 'Ethics, Ethology, Terminology: Iliadic Anger and the Cross-cultural Study of Emotion', in S. Braund and G. Most (eds.), *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen*, New York, 11-49.
- Cairns, D. L. (2004), review of D. Hammer, '*The Iliad as Politics: the Performance of Political Thought*', *CJ* 99, 345-9.
- Cairns, D. L. (2005), 'Bullish Looks and Sidelong Glances: Social Interaction and the Eyes in Ancient Greek Culture', in D. L. Cairns (ed.), *Body Language in the Greek and Roman Worlds*, Wales, 123-55.
- Cairns, D. L. (2008), 'Look Both Ways: Studying Emotion in Ancient Greek', *Critical Quarterly* 50, 43-62.

Cairns, D. L. (2009), 'Weeping and Veiling: Grief, Display and Concealment in Ancient Greek Culture', in Th. Fögen (ed.), *Tears in the Greco-Roman World*, Berlin, 37-58.

Cairns, D. L. (2010), 'Self and Society in the *Iliad*, *Omnibus* 59, 3-5.

Cairns, D. L. (2011a), 'Honour and Shame: Modern Controversies and Ancient Values', *Critical Quarterly* 53, 23-41.

Cairns, D. L. (2011b), 'Ransom and Revenge in the *Iliad*', in S. D. Lambert (ed.), *Sociable Man*, Wales, 87-116.

Cairns, D. L. (2012), 'atē in the Homeric Poems', *Papers of the Langford Latin Seminar* 15, 1-52.

Cairns, D. L. (2014), 'ψυχή, θυμός, and Metaphor in Homer and Plato', *EPlaton* 11 (online at <https://journals.openedition.org/etudesplatoniciennes/566#bodyftn50>).

Cairns, D. L. (2015a), 'The First Odysseus: *Iliad*, *Odyssey*, and the Ideology of Kingship', *Gaia* 18, 51-66 (= F. Dell'Oro and O. Lagacherie (eds.), *Hommages à Françoise Létoublon*).

Cairns, D. L. (2015b), 'Revenge, Punishment, and Justice in Athenian Homicide Law', *Journal of Value Enquiry* 49, 645-65.

Cairns, D. L. (2015c), 'The Horror and the Pity: *phrikē* as a Tragic Emotion', *Psychoanalytic Inquiry: a Topical Journal for Mental Health Professionals* 35, 75-94.

Cairns, D. L. (2016), 'Cloth in Shamelessness, Shrouded in Grief: the Role of 'Garment' Metaphors in Ancient Greek Concepts of Emotion', in G. Fanfani, M. Harlow, and M.-L. Nosch (eds.), *Spinning Fates and the Song of the Loom: the Use of Textiles, Clothing, and Cloth Production as Metaphor, Symbol, and Narrative*, Oxford, 25-41.

Cairns, D. L. (2019), 'Thymos', *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (online at <http://oxfordre.com/classics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199381135.001.0001/acrefore-9780199381135-e-8180>); DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199381135.013.8180>).

- Cairns, D. L. and Fulkerson, L. (2015), 'Introduction', in D. L. Cairns and L. Fulkerson (eds.), *Emotions between Greece and Rome*, Exeter, 1-22.
- Canevaro, M. (2018), 'Majority Rules vs. Consensus: the Practice of Democratic Deliberation in the Greek Poleis', in M. Canevaro, A. Erskine, B. Gray, and J. Ober (eds.), *Ancient Greek History and Contemporary Social Science*, 101-56, Edinburgh.
- Carlier, P. (1984), *La royauté en Grèce avant Alexandre*, Strasbourg.
- Casswell, C. (1990), *A Study of Thymos in Early Greek Epic*, Leiden.
- Christensen, J. (2009), 'The End of Speeches and a Speech's End: Nestor, Diomedes and the *telos mythōn*', in K. Myrsiades (ed.), *Reading Homer: Film and Text*, Madison, New Jersey, 136-62.
- Clark, M. (2007), 'Poulydamas and Hector', *College Literature* 54, 85-106.
- Clarke, M. (1991), *Flesh and Spirit in the Songs of Homer*, Oxford.
- Classen, C. J. (2005), 'Zu den homerischen Bezeichnungen für die Träger oder Organe seelischer ungeistiger Fähigkeiten und Tätigkeiten', *Emerita* 73, 57-71.
- Claus, D. B. (1975), 'Aidos in the Language of Achilles', *TAPA* 105, 13-28.
- Claus, D. B. (1981), *Toward the Soul: an Inquiry into the Meaning of Psyche before Plato*, New Haven; London.
- Clay, J. S. (1989), *The Politics of Olympus: Form and Meaning in the Major Homeric Hymns*, Princeton.
- Clay, J. S. (1995), 'Agamemnon's Stance (*Iliad* 19.51-77)', *Philologus* 139, 72-5.
- Clay, J. S. (1999), 'The Whip and Will of Zeus', *Literary Imagination* 1, 40-60.
- Colombetti, G. (2014), *The Feeling Body: Affective Science meets the Enactive Mind*, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- Constantinidou, S. (2019), *The Gaze of Homer: Light and Vision in the Iliad*, Athens.
- Cook, E. F. (2003), 'Agamemnon's Test of the Army in *Iliad* Book 2 and the Function of Homeric *akhos*', *AJPh* 124, 165-98.

- Cramer, O. (1976), 'Speech and Silence in *the Iliad*', *CJ* 71, 300-4.
- Crotty, K. (1994), *The Poetics of Supplication. Homer's Iliad and Odyssey*, Ithaca.
- Damasio, A. R. (1995), *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*, London.
- Danek, G. (2014a), 'Der Plan des Zeus am ersten Schlachttag der *Ilias*', *Wiener Humanistische Blätter* 55, 9-25.
- Danek, G. (2014b), 'Achilles *hybristes*? *tisis* and *nemesis* in *Iliad* 24', in M. Christopoulos and M. Paizi-Apostolopoulou (eds.), *Crime and Punishment in Homeric and Archaic Epic*, Ithaca, 137-52.
- Darwall, S. L. (1977), 'Two Kinds of Respect', *Ethics* 88, 36-49.
- Darwin, Ch. (1872), *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, London.
- Davies, M. (1981), 'The Judgement of Paris and *Iliad* XXIV', *JHS* 101, 56-62.
- De Jong, I. J. F. (1987/2003), *Narrators and Focalizers: the Presentation of the Story in the Iliad*, Bristol.
- De Jong, I. J. F. (2012), *Homer: Iliad Book 22*, Cambridge.
- De Souza, R. (1987), *The Rationality of Emotion*, Cambridge, Mass; London.
- Detienne, M. (1973), *Les maîtres de vérité en Grèce ancienne*, Paris.
- Detienne, M. (1996), *The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece*, translated by J. Lloyd, New York.
- Dixon, T. (2003), *From Passions to Emotions: the Creation of a Secular Psychological Category*, Cambridge.
- Dixon, T. (2012), '“Emotion”: the History of a Keyword in Crisis', *Emotion Review* 4, 338-44.
- Dodds, E. R. (1951), *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley.
- Donlan, W. F. (1982), 'Reciprocities in Homer', *CW* 75, 137-75.
- Donlan, W. F. (1989), 'The Unequal Exchange between Glaucus and Diomedes in Light of the Homeric Gift-economy', *Phoenix* 43, 1-15.

- Donlan, W. F. (1993), 'Dueling with Gifts in the *Iliad*: as the Audience saw It', *Colby Quarterly* 29, 155-72.
- Donlan, W. F. (1997), 'The Homeric Economy', in I. Morris and B. Powell (eds.), *A New Companion to Homer*, Leiden; New York, 649-67.
- Donlan, W. F. (1999), *The Aristocratic Ideal and Selected Papers*, Wauconda.
- Douglas, M. (2007), *Thinking in Circles: an Essay on Ring Composition*, New Haven.
- Drews, R. (1983), *Basileus: the Evidence for Kingship in Geometric Greece*, New Haven.
- Eichholz, D. (1953), 'The Propitiation of Achilles', *AJPhil.* 74, 137-48.
- Elmer, D. (2013), *The Poetics of Consent: Collective Decision-making and the Iliad*, Baltimore.
- Elster, J. (1999), *The Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions*, Cambridge.
- Ekman, P. (1994), 'All Emotions Are Basic', in P. Ekman and R. Davidson (eds.), *The Nature of Emotion*, Oxford, 15-19.
- Ekman, P. (2003), *Emotions Revealed: Understanding Faces and Feelings*, London.
- Ekman, P. and Cordaro, D. (2011), 'What is meant by Calling Emotions Basic', *Emotion Review* 3, 364-70.
- Ekman, P. and Friesen, W. V. (1971), 'Constants across Culture in the Face and Emotion', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 17, 124-9.
- Ekman, P. and Friesen, W. V. (1986), 'A New Pan-cultural Facial Expression of Emotion', *Motivation and Emotion* 10, 159-68.
- Erbse, H. (1978), 'Ettore nell' Iliade', *Studi Classici e Orientali* 28, 13-34.
- Erbse, H. (1986), *Untersuchungen zur Funktion der Götter im homerischen Epos*. Berlin; New York.
- Farron, S. (1978), 'The Character of Hector in the *Iliad*', *Arta Classica* 21, 39-57.

- Felson, N. (2002), 'Threpretra and Invincible Hands: the Father-son Relationship in *Iliad* 24', *Arethusa* 35, 35-50.
- Felson, N. and Slatkin, L. (2004), 'Gender and Homeric Epic', in R. Fowler, *The Cambridge Companion to Homer*, Cambridge, 91-114.
- Finkelberg, M. (1995), 'Patterns of Human Error in Homer', *JHS* 115, 15-28.
- Finley, M. (1956), *The World of Odysseus*, London.
- Fisher, N. R. E. (1992), *Hybris: a Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece*, Warminster.
- Fisher, N. R. E. (2020), 'The Friendships of Achilles and the Killing of Lykaon', in M. Liatsi (ed.), *Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature. Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond*, Berlin; Boston, 31-58.
- Flaig, E. (1994), 'Das Konsensprinzip im homerischen Olymp. Überlegungen zum göttlichen Entscheidungsprozess *Ilias* 4.1-72', *Hermes* 122, 13-31.
- Flaig, E. (2013), 'Die Mehrheitsentscheidung – Ihre multiple Genesis und ihre kulturelle Dynamik', in E. Flaig (ed.), *Genesis und Dynamiken der Mehrheitsentscheidung*, Munich, VII-XXXII.
- Föllinger, S. (2009), 'Tears and Crying in Archaic Greek Poetry (esp. Homer)', in Th. Fögen (ed.), *Tears in the Greco-roman World*, Berlin, 17-36.
- Frame, D. (2009), *Hippota Nestor*, Washington.
- Friedrich, P. and Redfield, J. M. (1978), 'Speech as a Personality Symbol: the Case of Achilles', *Language* 54 (2), 263-88.
- Frijda, N. H. (1986), *The Emotions*, Cambridge.
- Frijda, N. H. and Parrott, W. G. (2011), 'Basic Emotions or Ur-Emotions?', *Emotion Review* 3, 406-15.
- Gallagher, S. (2020), *Action and Interaction*, Oxford.
- Gantz, T. (1993), *Early Greek Myth: a Guide to Literary and Artistic Sources*, Baltimore; London.
- Gagarin, M. (1987), 'Morality in Homer', *CPhil* 82, 285-306.

- Gill, Chr. (1996), *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: the Self in Dialogue*, Oxford.
- Goffman, E. (1969), *Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-face Behaviour*, New York.
- Gould, J. (1973), 'Hiketeia', *JHS* 93, 74-103.
- Gould, J. (1989), *Herodotus*, London.
- Graziosi, B. (2016), 'Theologies of the Family in Homer and Hesiod', in E. Eidinow, J. Kindt, and R. Osborne (eds.), *Theologies of Ancient Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 35-61.
- Griffiths, P. E. (1998), *What Emotions Really Are: the Problem of Psychological Categories*, Chicago; London.
- Griffin, J. (1980), *Homer on Life and Death*, Oxford.
- Gross, D. (2006), *The Secret History of Emotion: from Aristotle's Rhetoric to Modern Brain Science*, Chicago, Illinois; London.
- Grossardt, P. (2001), *Die Erzählung von Meleagros zur literarischen Entwicklung der kalydonischen Kultlegende*, Leiden.
- Hacking, I. (1999), *The Social Construction of what*, Cambridge, Massachusetts; London.
- Hainsworth, B. (1993), *The Iliad: A Commentary, Volume III: Books 9-12*, Cambridge.
- Halliwell, S. (2008), *Greek Laughter: a Study of Cultural Psychology from Homer to Early Christianity*, Cambridge.
- Hammer, D. (1997), 'Who Shall Readily Obey? Authority and Politics in the *Iliad*', *Phoenix* 51, 1-24.
- Hammer, D. (2002), *The Iliad as Politics: the Performance of Political Thought*, Norman.

- Harré, R. (1986), 'An Outline of the Social Constructionist Viewpoint', in R. Harré (ed.), *The Social Construction of Emotions*, New York, 2-14.
- Harré, R. and Finlay-Jones, R. (1986), 'Emotion Talk across Times', in R. Harré (ed.), *The Social Construction of Emotions*, New York, 220-33.
- Haubold, J. (2000), *Homer's People: Epic Poetry and Social Formation*, Cambridge; New York.
- Havelock, E. (1978), *The Greek Concept of Justice: From Its Shadow in Homer to Its Reality in Plato*, Cambridge.
- Heath, J. (2001), 'Telemachus πεπνυμένος: Growing into an Epithet', *Mnemosyne* 54, 129-57.
- Heubeck A., West S., and Hainsworth, J. B. (1988), *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey. Volume I. Introduction and Books I-VIII*, Oxford.
- Hogan, J. (1976), 'Double πρίν and the Language of Achilles', *CJ* 71, 305-10.
- Holoka, J. P. (1983), 'Looking Darkly (ὕποδρα ἰδών): Reflections on Status and Decorum in Homer', *TAPA* 113; 1-16.
- Honneth, A. (1995), *The Struggle for Recognition: the Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, Cambridge; Massachusetts.
- Jahn, Th. (1987), *Zum Wortfeld Seele-Geist in der Sprache Homers*, Munich.
- Janko, R. (1994), *The Iliad. A Commentary. Volume IV: Books 13-16*, Cambridge.
- Kahneman, D. (2011), *Thinking Fast and Slow*, London.
- Kakridis, J. T. (1949), *Homeric Researches*, Lund.
- Kakridis, J. T. (1971), *Homer Revisited*, Lund.
- Kelly, A. (2014), 'Homeric Battle and the Ancient Near East', in D. L. Cairns and R. Scodel, *Defining Greek Narrative*, Edinburgh, 29-54.
- Kelly, A. (2017), 'Achilles in Control? Managing Oneself and Others in the Funeral Games', in P. Bassino, L. G. Canevaro, and B. Graziosi, *Conflict and Consensus in Early Greek Hexameter Poetry*, Cambridge, 87-108.

- Kim, J. (2000), *The Pity of Achilles: Oral Style and the Unity of the Iliad*, Lanham; Oxford.
- Kitts, M. (2005), *Sanctified Violence in Homeric Society: Oath-making Rituals in the Iliad*, Cambridge.
- Kirk, G. S. (1985), *The Iliad: A Commentary. Volume I: Books 1-4*, Cambridge.
- Kirk, G. S. (1990), *The Iliad: A Commentary. Volume II: Books 5-8*, Cambridge.
- Konstan, D. (2001), *Pity Transformed*, London.
- Kövecses, Z. (2000), *Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling*, Cambridge.
- Kozak, L. (2017), *Experiencing Hector Character in the Iliad*, London.
- Kurz, G. (1966), *Darstellungsformen menschlicher Bewegung in der Ilias*, Heidelberg.
- Lakoff, G. (1987), *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. What Categories Reveal about the Mind*, Chicago; London.
- Lakoff, G. (2016), 'Language and Emotion', *Emotion Review* 8, 269-73.
- Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. (1980), *Metaphors we Live by*, Chicago.
- Lakoff, G. and Kövecses, Z. (1987), 'The Cognitive Model of Anger Inherent in American English', in D. Holland and N. Quinn, *Cultural Models in Language and Thought*, Cambridge, 195-221.
- Latacz, J. (2002), *Homers Ilias. Gesamtkommentar. Band I. Erster Gesang (A)*, Munich; Leipzig.
- Lateiner, D. (1995), *Sardonic Smile: Nonverbal Behavior in Homeric Epic*, Ann Arbor.
- Lesky, A. (1952), *Die Homerforschung in der Gegenwart*, Vienna.
- Lesky, A. (2001), 'Divine and Human Accusation in Homeric Epic', in D. L. Cairns (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Homer's Iliad*, Oxford, 170-202.

- Levine, D. B. (1982/1983), 'Homeric Laughter and the Unsmiling Suitors', *CJ* 78, 97-104.
- Littleton, S. (1970), 'The 'Kingship in Heaven' Theme', in J. Puhvel (ed.), *Myth and Law among the Indo-Europeans*, Berkeley, 83-121.
- Lloyd-Jones, H. (1971), *The Justice of Zeus*, Berkeley; Los Angeles.
- Lohmann, D. (1970), *Die Komposition der Reden in der Ilias*, Berlin.
- Lonsdale, S. H. (1989), 'If Looks could kill: παπταίνω and the Interpenetration of Imagery and Narrative in Homer', *CJ* 84, 325-33.
- MacCary, T. W., (1982), *Childlike Achilles. Ontogeny and Phylogeny in the Iliad*, New York.
- Mackie, H. S. (1996), *Talking Trojan: Speech and Community in the Iliad*, Lanham.
- MacLeod, C. W. (1982), *Homer. Iliad. Book XXIV*, Cambridge.
- Martin, R. (1989), *The Language of Heroes. Speech and Performance in the Iliad (Myth and Poetics)*, Ithaca; London.
- Mesquita, B. (2003), 'Emotions as Dynamic Cultural Phenomena', in R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, H. H. Goldsmith (eds.), *Handbook of Affective Sciences*, New York, 871-90.
- Minchin, E. (2008), 'Communication without Words: Body Language, 'Pictureability', and Memorability in the *Iliad*', *Ordia Prima* 7, 17-38.
- Mondi, R. (1980), 'σκηπτοῦχοι βασιλεῖς: an Argument for Divine Kingship in Early Greece', *Arethusa* 13, 203-16.
- Monsacré, H. (1984), 'Weeping Heroes in the *Iliad*', *History and Anthropology* 1, 57-75.
- Montiglio, S. (1993), 'La menace du silence pour l' héros de l' *Iliade*', *Métis* 8, 161-86.
- Moran, W. (1975), 'Mimnēskomai and 'Remembering' Epic Stories in Homer and the Hymns', *Quarderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica* 20, 195-211.

- Morris, I. (1986), 'The Use and Abuse of Homer', *Cl. Ant.* 5, 81-138.
- Morris, I. (2001), 'The Use and Abuse of Homer', in D. L. Cairns (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Homer's Iliad*, Oxford, 57-91.
- Morrison, J. V. (1992), *Homeric Misdirection: False Predictions in the Iliad*, Ann Arbor.
- Morrison, J. V. (1997), 'Kerostasia, the Dictates of Fate, and the Will of Zeus in the *Iliad*', *Arethusa* 30, 273-96.
- Most, G. (2004), 'Anger and Pity in Homer's *Iliad*', in S. Braund and G. Most (eds.), *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen*, New York, 50-75.
- Mueller, M. (1984), *The Iliad*, London.
- Muellner, L. (1996), *The Anger of Achilles: Menis in Greek Epic*, Ithaca; London.
- Muellner, L. (2011), 'Homeric Anger Revisited' (online at <https://chs.harvard.edu/CHS/article/display/4022>)
- Murnaghan, S. (1999), 'The Poetics of Loss in Greek Epic,' in M. Beissinger, J. Tylus and S. Wofford (eds.), *Epic Traditions in the Contemporary World*, Berkeley, 203-20.
- Naiden, F. (2006), *Ancient Supplication*, Oxford.
- Nagy, G. (1979), *The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry*, Baltimore.
- Nicolai, W. (1983), 'Rezeptionssteuerung in der *Ilias*', *Philologus* 127, 1-12.
- Nicolai, W. (1993), 'Gefolgschaftsverweigerung als politisches Druckmittel in der *Ilias*', in K. Raaflaub (ed.), *Anfänge politischen Denkens in der Antike. Die nahöstlichen Kulturen und die Griechen* (Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien, 24), Munich, 317-41.
- Nimis, S. (1986), 'The Language of Achilles: Construction vs. Representation', *CW* 79, 217-25.
- Notopoulos, J. (1938), 'Mnemosyne in Oral Literature', *TAPA* 69, 465-93.
- Nussbaum, M. (2016), *Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice*, New York.

- Onians, R. B. (1954), *The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, and Fate*, Cambridge.
- Page, D. (1959), *History and the Homeric Iliad*, Berkeley.
- Parrott, W. G. (2010), 'Ur-emotions and your Emotions: Reconceptualising *Basic Emotion*', *Emotion Review* 2, 14-21.
- Parry, A. (1956), 'The Language of Achilles', *TAPA* 87, 1-7.
- Pedrick, V. (1982), 'Supplication in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*', *TAPhA* 112, 125-40.
- Pelliccia, H. (1995), *Mind, Body, and Speech in Homer and Pindar*, Göttingen.
- Perkell, Chr. (2008), 'Reading the Laments of *Iliad* 24', in A. Suter (ed.), *Lament: Studies in the Ancient Mediterranean and Beyond*, New York, 93-117.
- Pironti, G. (2016), 'Dall' eros al racconto: Zeus e la sua sposa', in G. Pironti and C. Bonnet (eds.), *Gli dèi di Omero: politeismo e poesia nella Grecia antica*, 85-110.
- Pisano, C. (2016), 'Iris e Hermes, mediatori in azione', in G. Pironti and C. Bonnet (eds.), *Gli dèi di Omero: politeismo e poesia nella Grecia antica*, 147-73.
- Plamper, J. (2015), *The History of Emotions: An Introduction*, translated by K. Tribe, Oxford.
- Postlethwaite, N. (1995), 'Agamemnon Best of Spearmen', *Phoenix* 49, 95-103.
- Pratt, L. (2007), 'The Parental Ethos of the *Iliad*', *Hesperia Supplements* 41, (Constructions of Childhood in Ancient Greece and Italy), 24-40.
- Pucci, P. (1998), 'Honour and Glory in the *Iliad*', in P. Pucci (ed.), *The Songs of the Sirens: Essays on Homer*, Lanham, Maryland, 179-230.
- Pucci, P. (2002), 'Theology and Poetics in the *Iliad*', *Arethusa* 35, 17-34.
- Pulley, S. (2000), *Homer. Iliad. Book One*. New York.
- Raaflaub, K. (1997), 'Homeric Society', in I. Morris and B. Powell (eds.), *A New Companion to Homer*, Leiden; New York, 624-48.
- Redfield, J. M. (1994), *Nature and Culture in the Iliad: the Tragedy of Hector*, Durham/London.

- Reddy, M. J. (1979), 'The Conduit Metaphor: a Case of Frame Conflict in our Language about Language', *Metaphor and Thought* 2, 164-201.
- Reeve, M. (1973), 'The Language of Achilles', *CQ* 23, 193-5.
- Reichel M. (1994), *Fernbeziehungen in der Ilias*, Tübingen.
- Reinhardt, K. (1960), *Tradition und Geist: Gesammelte Essays zur Dichtung*, Göttingen.
- Reinhardt, K. (1961), *Die Ilias und Ihr Dichter*, Göttingen.
- Riedinger, J.-C. (1976), 'Remarques sur la τιμή chez Homère', *Revue Études Grecques* 89, 244-64.
- Riedinger, J.-C. (1980), 'Les deux aidos chez Homère', *Rev. Phil.* 54, 62-79.
- Rosch, E. (1973), 'On the Internal Structure of Perceptual and Semantic Categories', in T. E. Moore (ed.), *Cognitive Development and the Acquisition of Language*, New York, 111-44.
- Rosch, E. (1978), 'Principles of Categorization', in E. Rosch and B. B. Lloyd (eds.), *Cognition and Categorization*, Hillsdale, 27-48.
- Rosner, J. (1976), 'The Speech of Phoenix: *Iliad* 9:434-65', *Phoenix* 30, 314-27.
- Saskia, S. (1988), *The Mobility of Labor and Capital*, Cambridge.
- Sahlins, M. (1972), *Stone Age Economics*, Chicago.
- Sale, W. M. (2005), 'The Government of Troy: Politics in the *Iliad*', *GRBS* 35, 5-102.
- Schadewaldt, W., (1966<sup>3</sup>), *Iliasstudien*, Darmstadt.
- Schäfer, M. (1990), *Der Götterstreit in der Ilias*, Stuttgart.
- Schank, R. C. and Abelson, R. (1977), *Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding: an Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures*, Hillsdale.
- Schein, S. (1984), *The Mortal Hero*, Berkeley.
- Schmitt, A. (1990), *Selbständigkeit und Abhängigkeit Menschlichen Handelns bei Homer*, Mainz; Stuttgart.

- Schnell, R. (2015), *Haben Gefühle eine Geschichte: Aporien einer History of Emotions*, Göttingen.
- Schofield, M. (1986), 'Euboulia in the Iliad', *CQ* 36, 6-31.
- Scodel, R. (2002), *Listening to Homer: Tradition, Narrative, and Audience*, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
- Scodel, R. (2008), *Epic Facework: Self-presentation and Social Interaction in Homer*, Swansea.
- Scully, S. (1984), 'The Language of Achilles', *TAPA* 114, 11-27.
- Seaford, R. (1994), *Reciprocity and Ritual: Homer and Tragedy in the Developing City-state*, Oxford.
- Segal, C. (1971), *The Theme of the Mutilation of the Corpse in the Iliad* (*Supplementum* 17), Leiden.
- Slatkin, L. (1986), 'The Wrath of Thetis', *TAPA* 116, 1-24.
- Slatkin, L. (1991), *The Power of Thetis: Allusion and Interpretation in the Iliad*, Berkeley.
- Snell, B. (1946), *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, Hamburg.
- Snodgrass, A. M. (1974), 'A Historical Homeric Society?', *JHS* 94, 114-25.
- Stanley, K. (1993), *The Shield of Homer: Narrative Structure in the Iliad*, Princeton.
- Stinton, T. C. W. (1990), *Collected Papers on Greek Tragedy*, Oxford.
- Sullivan, S. D. (1988), *Psychological Activity in Homer: A Study of phren*, Ottawa.
- Taplin, O. (1990), 'Agamemnon's Role in the Iliad', in C. Pelling (ed.), *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature*, Oxford, 60-82.
- Taplin, O. (1992), *Homeric Soundings: the Shaping of the Iliad*, Oxford.
- Thornton, A. (1984), *Homer's Iliad: its Composition and the Motif of Supplication* (*Hypomnemata* 81), Göttingen.
- Tomkins, S. S. and CrCarter, R. (1964), 'What and where are the Primary Affects? Some Evidence for a Theory', *Perceptual and Motor Skills* 18, 119-58.

- Tsagalis, Chr. (2001), 'Style and Construction, Sound and Rhythm: Thetis' Supplication to Zeus (*Iliad* 1.493-516)', *Arethusa* 34, 1-29.
- Tsagalis, Chr. (2012), *From Listeners to Viewers: Space in the Iliad*, Washington.
- Tsoutsouki, C. (2014), 'The Father-son Relationship in the *Iliad*: the Case of Priam-Hector Introduction', *Rosetta* 16, 78-92.
- Ulf, Chr. (1990a), *Die homerische Gesellschaft: Materialien zur analytischen Beschreibung und historischen Lokalisierung*, Munich.
- Ulf, Chr. (1990b), 'Die Abwehr von internem Streit als Teil des "politischen" Programms der homerischen Epen', *Grazer Beiträge* 17, 1-25.
- Van der Mije, S. R. (2011), 'πείθειν φρένα(ς), πείθειν θυμόν – A Note on Homeric Psychology', *Mnemosyne* 64, 447-54.
- Van Wees, H. (1992), *Status Warriors: War, Violence and Society in Homer and History*, Amsterdam.
- Van Wees, H. (1995), 'Princes at Dinner: Social Event and Social Structure in Homer', in J. P. Crielaard (ed.), *Homeric Questions: Essays in Philology, Ancient History, and Archaeology, Including the Papers of a Conference Organised by the Netherlands Institute at Athens (15 May 1993)*, Amsterdam, 147-82.
- Van Wees, H. (1998), 'A Brief History of Tears. Gender Differentiation in Archaic Greece', in L. Foxhall and J. Salmon (eds.), *When Men were Men. Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity*, London; New York, 10-53.
- Van Wees, H. (2002), 'Greed, Generosity and Gift-exchange in Early Greece and the Western Pacific', in W. Jongman and M. Kleijwegt (eds.), *After the Past: Essays in Ancient History in Honour of H.W. Pleket*, Leiden; Boston; Cologne, 341-78.
- Van Wees, H. and Fisher, N. R. E. (2015), 'The Trouble with 'Aristocracy'', in N. R. E. Fisher and H. van Wees (eds.), *'Aristocracy' in Antiquity*, Wales, 1-57.
- Walsh, Th. R. (2005), *Fighting Words and Feuding Words: Anger and the Homeric Poems* (online at [http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebook:CHS\\_WalshT.Fighting\\_Words\\_and\\_Feuding\\_Words.2005](http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebook:CHS_WalshT.Fighting_Words_and_Feuding_Words.2005))

- West, M. (1997), *The East Face of Helicon: West Asiatic Elements in Greek Poetry and Myth*, Oxford.
- Wierzbicka, A. (1999), *Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals*, Cambridge.
- Whitman, C. (1958), *Homer and the Heroic Tradition*, Cambridge, Mass.
- Willcock (1964), 'Mythological Paradeigma in the *Iliad*', *CQ* 14, 141-54.
- Willcock, M. (1976), *A Companion to the Iliad. Based on the Translation by Richard Lattimore*, Chicago; London.
- Williams, B. (1993), *Shame and Necessity*, Berkeley; Los Angeles.
- Wilson, D. (2002), *Ransom, Revenge, and Heroic Identity in the Iliad*, Cambridge.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1953), *Philosophical Investigations*, New York.
- Wyatt, W. (1982), 'Homeric *ath*', *AJPhil.* 103, 247-76.
- Wyatt, W. (1988), 'Homer in Performance: *Iliad* I.348-427', *CJ* 83, 289-97.
- Yamagata, N. (1991), 'Phoenix's Speech – Is Achilles punished', *CQ* 41, 1-15.
- Yasumura, N. (2011), *Challenges to the Power of Zeus in Early Greek Poetry*, London.
- Zanker, G. (1994), *The Heart of Achilles*, Ann Arbor.