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To the Faculty of Divinity,
New College,
University of Edinburgh,
Edinburgh, Scotland.


Reverend and dear Sirs:-

It is my privilege and pleasure herewith to submit to the Faculty of Divinity of the University of Edinburgh a Thesis on the subject: "The Righteousness of God' in the Conception of St. Paul". The work is based on resident study at New College during the years 1938--1940, including a permitted period of study at the University of Munich and the University of Tübingen.

Strangely enough, this study of "Righteousness" has for the most part been pursued in a time when a vicious "unrighteousness", on an unparalleled scale, has rocked the modern nations. The writer, on active service for more than a year, must confess to have confronted difficulties in bringing this work to its desired completeness, and in retracing and confirming certain small details. A portion of the work was done aboard a troop transport ship, and a considerable part was completed between hours of duty in a sorely troubled Middle East. The final portion has been completed in the Land of the Bible, the writer having recently had the happy privilege of frequenting Jerusalem, and -- the "Damascus road"!

If in even a small way this thesis correctly reflects the profound conception of Him who from these humble parts challenged and conquered the tyrant powers of that day and still proclaims the final solution for all men before God, the writer shall have been richly repaid for his effort.

In deepest esteem,


Duncan D. MacBryde,
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ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ ΘΕΟΥ

In the Conception of St. Paul

with

special reference to

The Epistle to the Romans

by

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I.

INTRODUCTION

Among subjects of New Testament exegetical interpretation about which there is still a lack of unanimity, one of the most interesting and important is seen in the distinctively Pauline usage --

δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ

On first thought one seems at a loss to explain the flood of literature which has appeared concerning this phrase of such innocent appearance. It would be supposed that the expression would be clear even to a child. But it is just that profundity in simplicity which so often threatens to elude even the most earnest enquirer. Like a fathomless lake, it lures us deceptively with its clearness, only to surprise us by its sheer depth. Martin Luther's discovery of these depths produced Archimedean astonishment.⁽¹⁾ Indeed, the extensive literature which has arisen in the attempt fully to explain it, seems, in itself, an evidence of the difficulty of exhausting the meaning of the Apostle's expression.

We can only hope, through a re-examination of some of this vast literature, and an attempt to relate this Pauline concept more closely to its proper background and contemporary setting, to approach a fuller understanding of its significant usage.

(1) Concerning the Lutheran re-discovery and Reformation reaction, see E. von Dobschütz, Die Rechtfertigung bei Paulus, in ThStKr., 85, 1912, p. 38ff.

Regarding the schools of thought with which we must deal, we realise that their boundaries are not to be identified with any national or linguistic frontiers. Albert Schweitzer's interpretation, for example, resembles more closely that of J.H. Newman, or G.B. Stevens, than the interpretation of Hans Lietzmann. And Hermann Cremer or Paul Althaus have more in common with such Scottish and American theologians as James Denney, A.B. Bruce, Charles Hodge and A.T. Robertson, than with Albrecht Ritschl. The "schools" which will prove rather of more moment are represented, for instance, by the mystical, forensic, and sacramentalist tendencies in thought.

Now great significance attaches to the fact that Paul seems to employ the phrase *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* in a fashion peculiar to himself. Other terms of his theology are encountered in various other New Testament writers; but this phraseology appears more or less distinctively Pauline. Holtzmann describes this usage as a "technische Abbréviatur", as a symbol comparable to those of mathematics or philosophy.⁽¹⁾ Paul, like other creative writers of all ages, seems to find the terminology of his times inadequate to express the magnitude of a new perception. Like John in his use of the symbol *λόγος*, Paul must coin a new phrase, or, rather, re-employ an old one, -- a phrase which, because it is not hackneyed in this relation, he can infuse with new meaning.

This interpretation of Paul's expression belongs admittedly to a certain school of thought. Whether this phrase is to be defined as a "technische Abbréviatur" or a non-technical description

(1) H. J. Holtzmann, Neutestamentliche Theologie² II, 1911, p. 139.

of God's nature is the question at issue.⁽¹⁾ This debate is of far-reaching significance, for the implications of our interpretation necessarily affect the whole of Pauline Soteriology. If the Apostle means to say that our righteousness comes from God as source, then his interpretation of the atonement, redemption and salvation, as well as his conception of faith, grace, works and sacraments, should harmonize with this meaning. Surely, if the most important theological question for sinful man is "How can I appear righteous before God?", then it is of paramount importance to discover the full content of δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ. Indeed Bruce⁽²⁾ sees, in this one concept, the religious foundation, beyond which all else is "theological superstructure".

Regarding the meaning of this important expression, there are two vital introductory questions to be raised:

1. Can the term have a double signification in a certain given passage?

2. Can it possess different significance in different occurrences (and yet form a harmonious total concept) ?

Let us look briefly at some of the many meanings attached by scholars to "righteousness" in the writings of Paul⁽³⁾. Some critics maintain that this is the attribute of God which would best be translated "righteousness", and in which are such constituent elements as truthfulness, fidelity, faithfulness⁽⁴⁾-- especially as a covenant-keeper and rememberer of promises --

(1) Cf. Theodor Häring, Dikaiosune Theou bei Paulus, 1896, pp12, 22.

(2) A. Bruce, St. Paul's Conception of Christianity, 1894, p.150

(3) Cp. Häring, Op.cit., 17ff; G.A. Fricke, Der paulinische Grundbegriff der Dik.Theou, 1888, passim; P.Kölbinger, Studien zur paulinischen Theologie, ThStKr, I, 1895, pp.9ff; (art.) "Righteousness", ERE, 1919.

(4) Cf. J. Morison, A Critical Exposition of the 3rd Chapter of... Romans, 1866, 316ff; E.Kühl, Der Brief des P. an die Römer, 1913, 41ff.

holiness, rectitude and probity⁽¹⁾. This is God's own character, a "righteousness" which connotes His moral perfection. Other scholars turn, with Ritschl, to make much of the fact that in the Septuagint translation the Hebrew term is translated interchangeably as δικαιοσύνη or ἐλεημοσύνη. If the terms are practically equivalent, they argue, then the meaning of the former in the phrase δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ must be that mercy of God by which He is pleased freely to pardon every sinner. This attribute includes the goodness, love and compassion of God, His kindness, tenderness and sympathy with the erring.⁽²⁾ Still another class of writers tend to limit the meaning of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ to God's act of declaring the sinner just.⁽³⁾ As we shall later see, there is more disagreement among the writers of this group than among those of the other two; for while there is agreement that God is able to accept whom He will, men have fought bitterly over the basis of that reception. Does God accept man in consideration of the Church, or the sacraments, or works, or faith, or imparted righteousness, or the work of Christ alone?

Thus the question, whether δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is capable of more than one limited meaning is encountered by divided scholarly opinion⁽⁴⁾. Now, the very fact that men have with such satisfaction in their own minds held so many and such divided opinions should doubtless caution us not to look for too nice a distinction or too narrow a definition. For we reflect that we are not dealing here with a simple fact. We are not describing some such

(1) Fuerst, Konkordenz: "Probity (Probus) in act, thought, and word, in accordance with a recognized standard". Cit., W.L. Lofthouse, (art. "The Righteousness of Jahveh") Expository Times, L, p. 342.

(2) A. Ritschl, Die Christliche Lehre v. d. Rechtfertigung, II, 103ff.

(3) Cf. G. R. Wetter, Der Vergeltungsgedanke bei Paulus, 1912, p. 165.

(4) See G. Kittel, Zur Erklärung v. Röm 3:21-6, ThStKr, 1907, p. 221; Häring, Op. cit., pp. 18, 25, 26.

simple object or perception -- such as an altar, or a lamb slain, or a priest before the altar. We are rather dealing in difficult conceptual thinking which bears upon ultimate realities in the relationship of God and man. If, like Bergson, we find ourselves unable because of our clumsiness of language to pour into the mould of our thought the simplest intuition of life or space or time, then surely we can anticipate difficulty in attempting to grasp the many-sidedness of such a concept as Paul's multum in parvo: "a Righteousness of God".

We have seen in the varying views of scholars a hint of the complex significance of the Pauline term. Such is also seen in the fact that the expression has an underlying redemptive meaning, and accordingly must somehow relate both to God and man. Still another evidence is seen in the fact that, into an already familiar concept, Paul is quite obviously striving to infuse new significance. For, though the term is already freighted with meaning, A.B. Bruce quite rightly says "It seems to be something original the Apostle has in mind, for he labours to express his thought about it by a variety of phrases".⁽¹⁾ And Hans Lietzmann quite clearly sees in the formula an "iridescent double-sense":

"Das Wort δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ hat für Paulus eine schillernde Doppelbedeutung; es bezeichnet die göttliche Eigenschaft der δικαιοσύνη und die dem Menschen geschenkte Gottesgabe der δικαιοσύνη (Vgl. Röm. 3:26)".⁽²⁾

If, then, this expression had an 'iridescent' meaning, then our second question -as to the possibility of a different significance in different occurrences- is clear. If, in other words,

(1) Op.cit., p.114.

(2) H. Lietzmann, Einführung in die Textgeschichte der Paulusbriefe. An die Römer (Handbuch zum N.T.), 1933, p.30.

Paul had certain definitions in mind, yet he expressed them in words which carried for him a consciousness of their overtones.⁽¹⁾ Hence it is a very likely possibility that in different occurrences of the phrase, these different elements of meaning might have received the major stress. However our test must be empirical. We must examine Paul's writings exegetically and critically, to determine in each case just what meaning he intended to convey. Only then will we be able to relate the varying emphases, and see the larger, unified conception, and its vital function in the Pauline Theology.

Bearing in mind the general problems facing us in the interpretation of this "righteousness of God", we now require to look briefly into primitive thought and ancient religious cultures, to learn if there be any hints, in the usage of "righteousness", which aid us intelligently to approach the Pauline usage. What did the ancients regard as "righteousness"? What, especially, did the Greeks, whose language Paul spoke, mean by this word? And, yet more important, how did Paul's spiritual forefathers, the Jews, use this word? What significance attaches to its employment in their prophetic utterances, in their terminology of the Law, and in their conception of the peculiar relationship of Jehovah to His Chosen among the peoples? Unless the flow of Paul's thought is entirely unique, then somewhere in this spiritual and linguistic hinterland lie the tributaries upon which he must have drawn.

(1) von Dobschütz (Op.cit., 53) suggests that Paul himself was conscious of the fact that his readers would not understand him entirely!

Chapter II

NON-BIBLICAL CONCEPTIONS OF "RIGHTEOUSNESS"

Among the EGYPTIANS, a single word $m\}$ ' (or mē'et) signified 'truth', 'justice', or 'righteousness'. A.M.Blackman says the root meaning was 'to be straight, or even'(1). And, according to Breasted and Ranke the Egyptian equivalent for δικαιοσύνη has the meaning "..ist richtig befunden (vor Gericht)"(2).

On the Egyptian monuments frequent claims are made to rectitude. The people looked for such character in their leaders. Some rulers boasted of their justice, their impartiality, their readiness to give each subject his due. They prided themselves on their benevolence, their truthfulness, trustworthiness, and regard for the rights of others(3). To such righteousness, the Egyptian found many incentives: posthumous judgment on the basis of worldly deeds, future happiness for the upright, punishment and torture for the wicked. A further reward was favour in the eyes of contemporaries, and an enduring name.(4) Such righteousness, unlike that described by Paul, could be earned by a certain kind of living, as well as through such ceremonial observations as pilgrimages, mysteries, purification, and usage of magical formulae(5). Thus for the Egyptian "righteousness" was predominantly a materialistic conception: an attribute of character established ^{by} performance and productive of merit.

(1) ERE, p.792 (Art. "Righteousness")

(2) Geschichte Agyptens, 1910, 161, cit. Schrenk, TWB, II, 216, note 8.

(3) ERE., 793-5

(4) Ibid., 797-9

(5) Ibid., 799

Likewise among the BABYLONIANS, "righteousness" (or kîttu) was an attribute of moral character. The abstract notions of "righteousness" and "justice" seem to be regarded as synonymous in the Sumerian Poem of Paradise⁽¹⁾, which tells of their being given by the gods to mankind. And the two terms are similarly equated in the affirmation of Hammurabi: "I established right and law in the land"⁽²⁾. Those Babylonian monarchs who had the peoples' interests in mind, who sought justice and punished its violations, and who judged in accordance with understanding and truth were spoken of as "righteous" kings.⁽³⁾

BUDDHISM is naively inconsistent on the subject of righteousness. Karma is the law of the cosmos. Each man receives exactly what he deserves⁽⁴⁾. But so impersonal is this principle of righteousness that morality is severed at the root⁽⁵⁾. Why should anyone attempt to help another, to save a drowning man, if every man is getting exactly what he deserves? While Hinayana Buddhism denies the value of good works, the branch of Mahayana reinstates them⁽⁶⁾. Buddhism simultaneously affirms a 'Noble Eightfold Path' and denies the value of any desire save that for non-existence. For such a system of belief, righteousness is at best the adherence to ethical principles; but even this act is discouraged by the doctrine of Karma and the evils of existence. Its highest stage is seen in the ascetic life, or arhat, which leads to oblivion. In its extremist forms of Chan and Zen mysticism an enervating immorality prevails.⁽⁷⁾

(1) T.Fish, (Art) "Law and Religion in Babylonia", Law and Religion (Ed., E.Rosenthal), p.35.

(2) Cod.Hammurabi (Deimel, 1930); 5, 20f. cit., Fish, Ibid., 42.

(3) T.G.Pinches, ERE, 777-8.

(4) Cf. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, 1890, pp.27ff.

(5) Cf. D.T.Suzuki, Essays in Buddhism, 234ff.

(6) Ibid, 778. (7) Suzuki, Op.cit., 248ff.

Undoubtedly the greatest early philosophical attempt to analyze the concept of "righteousness" is seen in the Republic of PLATO.⁽¹⁾ In the first book he states the thesis of Simonides:

τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιόν ἐστι.⁽²⁾

Socrates, by asking leading questions, draws out the belief that each man has a duty to perform as a specialist in his own sphere, whether it be that of a shoemaker, husbandman or pilot. To this, Thrasymachus makes the Machiavellian reply:

*φημι γὰρ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο
τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον* (3)

Socrates finally gives his answer, a practical definition of what it is to be righteous:

*οὐδ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ ἀρχῇ,
καθ' ὅσον ἀρχῶν ἐστὶ, τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον
σχοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ
ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς δημιουργῆ.
καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπων καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖνῳ συμφέρον
καὶ πρέπον καὶ λέγει ἢ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ἢ
ποιεῖ ἅπαντα.* (4)

Socrates would then consider "righteousness" as "justice writ large" in the State. The reason he goes to the State becomes apparent when we realize that his definition of the term is functional: a just state is one in which each individual is fulfilling his own function, performing that which cannot be done so well by any other. In this ideal State, life promises complete happiness; each man will derive the utmost benefit from his fellows, and give his maximum in return.

(1) The concept not found in early profane literature (Homer, Hesiod); appears first in post-epical period -- Schrenk, TWB, II, 194

(2) ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ, ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ, A. (Bekkerus), Londini, 1825, par. 6 (p. 25)

(3) Ibid, par. 12 (p. 43).

(4) Ibid, par. 15 (p. 53).

Plato's Republic is thus a bold affirmation of a belief in a pattern of social excellence for the members of the State, as embodied in a fixed standard. This classical philosopher elsewhere employs *δίκαιος* in a sense ('right') which would show his conception of the term *δικαιοσύνη* to be born of a broadly conceived justitia distributiva⁽¹⁾. "Righteousness" is seen in the character of a man who conforms to that standard (which standard is, however, not conceived of as defined by *δικαιοσύνη*), which is required for the maintenance of an equitable relationship between himself and his fellows. Within this lofty conception of *δικαιοσύνη* (on which he bases his ideal State), there seems to be a synthesis of political, ethical, even religious⁽²⁾ factors. However the narrower sense of "justice" generally prevailed, and the forensic usage is borne out by his use of the term as descriptive of the function of a judge -- although always in the unfavourable sense of condemnation and punishment.⁽³⁾ This latter factor will prove of paramount significance; its prevailing negative sense will be found in strong contrast to the Biblical usage of the positive sense.

ARISTOTLE defines "righteousness" (justice) in the following words of his Nichomachean Ethics:

ὀρώμεν δὲ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἔξιν βουλομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην, ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀφ' ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια (4)

He later relates this moral state to a norm, the law, which aims

(1) Gorg., 507:B.

(2) Schrenk, TWB, II, 194

(3) Gorg., 464:B, C. Cf. Schrenk, TWB, II, 215: "Vornehmlich...im negativen Sinne..."

(4) Aristotelis, Ethica Nichomachea, Oxonii, 1890, 1129a 3-10.

more or less high according to the standard adopted:

δηλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμα ἐστὶ πῶς δίκαια· τὰ τε γὰρ ὠρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναί φημεν. οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ πάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῆ συμφέροντος πάντων ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις [κατ' ἀρετὴν] ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιούτου· (1)

Trying to define more exactly what δικαιοσύνη means in a given situation, Aristotle gives two other definitions, the

"proportionate" and the "corrective": ἐστὶν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν τῷ διορθωτικῷ ὁ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. (2)

Naturally if δικαιοσύνη is giving each man his due and making corrections, human nature being what it is, the necessity for a court arises. Injustice being found in unequal proportions, the judge endeavours to restore equality by a penalty, which deprives the oppressor of his wrongful gain, and enables just recompense to the party deprived⁽³⁾.

Finally combining all of these ideas, Aristotle defines Righteousness thus:

ἢ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τίς ἐστίν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν· ἢ δ' ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. καὶ ἢ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διανεμητικὸς καὶ αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἰρετοῦ πλήρον αὐτῷ ἔλαττον δὲ τῷ πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλον. (4)

(1) Ethica Nicomachea, 1129b 12-14

(2) Ibid., 1131a 29 -- 1131b 25

(3) Ibid., 1132a 7ff; 25ff.

(4) Ibid., 1133b 32 -- 1134a 6

Δικαιοσύνη is seen, then, in terms of an ideal social righteousness, as compliance with an external norm (as compared with courage, for example, or temperance, which arise from within the individual character, each man being a law unto himself). In the conception of *Δικαιοσύνη* there is something of an abnegation of individuality in obedience to a standard which is one and the same for all: that which society pronounces 'fair' (*τοῦ μεσοῦ ἕστυ*). In a word, the prevailing tendency of the Greek world whether Platonic or Aristotelian (or Stoic, as we shall see later), seems to have been to think of "righteousness" more or less predominantly in the narrower sense of "justice"⁽¹⁾. And, as we saw (page 10), "to justify" has the prevailing negative sense, punish.

Our survey of the above extra-Biblical religions, and of the greater Greek philosophies thus affords some understanding of the general conception of *Δικαιοσύνη*. But if, as subsequent enquiry will show, *Δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* reveals not a merely subjective genitive, and represents not so much an ordinary but a distinctive usage, then we must turn to further, more closely related sources for his inspiration. Of these, the most important is contained in the canonical Hebrew Scriptures, which we consider in the chapter immediately following.

(1) Thus C.H.Dodd, The Bible and The Greeks, 1935, pp42f.

CHAPTER III.

THE OLD TESTAMENT CONCEPTION OF $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ PAULINE AFFINITIES: QUOTATIONS FROM THE
OLD TESTAMENT.

Since Paul was a Jew, it is only natural to expect him to show the influence of the Hebrew Scriptures. A mere cataloguing of his quotations would furnish demonstration of the extent to which he saturated his thought with the language of the Old Testament. Within the relatively short Epistle to the Romans alone, we count nearly ninety quotations. While he cites passages from all three conventional Jewish groups of Scripture -- Torah, Nebim and Kethubim -- his most frequent references are to the books of Genesis, Exodus, Deuteronomy, Psalms and Isaiah(1). In the Epistle to the Romans, his quoting is more extensive than in any other writings definitely ascribed to him (2). Certainly, then, in these quotations, we have on the part of the Apostle a conscious relation of his thoughts to that of the Old Testament, And this conclusion remains valid, however much Paul advances beyond the conceptions of the Old Testament, or reverses its emphases. Consequently, we should rightly expect to be provided, in this great thesaurus of Hebrew religious thought, with much that will throw light on his usage of $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$.

If Paul never stopped, in the course of his urgent delivery of 'that which he had received', to define the word $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ (3), Bernhard Weiss cogently points out that the Apostle assumed that his readers already knew its meaning (4).

(1) Th, Häring, $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ bei Paulus, 1896, p,42.

(2) (The Epistle to the Hebrews, e.g., contains more)

(3) Cf, H. Cremer, Die paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre, 1899, p.3.

(4) (Biblical Theology of the N.T., 1883, 315 ff.

But what if Paul is using this term (as described above by Holtzmann) as a 'technische Abbreiviatur'? How can he expect his readers to grasp the significance of such an abbreviatory term without explaining it? Again the reply is that his readers were familiar with the Old Testament: he presupposes not a knowledge of the Greek classics, but of the Hebrew Scriptures. And although he introduced a new 'turn of thought' when he used the formula:

(Ro 3:21)

χωρὶς νόμου δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ

nevertheless the truth which lay behind the component elements of the expression would be quickly recognised by the Jewish hearer, whether he pondered the Greek expression, or translated to himself:

(1) בבלי תורה צדקת אלהים

צדק IN OLD TESTAMENT USAGE

As we undertake, in English, to analyse the Hebrew terminology relevant to our subject, we are not unaware of the vastly different genius of the Semitic vernacular as compared with our own. Regarding our particular theme, we note with Girdlestone that there is no English word which can convey the idea of 'righteousness' and 'justification' as contained in the Scriptures. Girdlestone adds:

"We see the wisdom of God in selecting Hebrew as the means of communication with His creatures, because here the ideas of righteousness, justification and acquittal all cluster round one verbal root, and are seen to be parts of one whole" (2)

Principal W.F. Lofthouse, writing more recently, specifically cautions us against attempting to assign to צדקה any one English equivalent(3), In following out the view of philologists in general,

(1) See Delitzsch's הברית החדשה, in loco, (1937)

(2) R.B. Girdlestone, Synonyms of the O.T., 1897, p.158f.

(3) Exp. Times, vol. L, 341; Art. on The Righteousness of Jahveh.

that "there is no word in any language, the frontiers of whose territory precisely coincide with those of any one word in another language", affirms that this is especially true of the group δικαιοσύνη, justice, right, Recht, Gerechtigkeit, -- and that "justice and la justice do not even mean the same thing". This warning of philologists is supported by the history of Christian thought. Diversity of interpretation of words derived from צדק and δικαιοσύνη, involving the relation of restored man to his God, eventuated to a great extent the controversy between Roman and Reformed Theology. Consequently, in regard to that which we shall hereinafter refer to as 'righteousness', we should seek to divest it of meaning later attached, and repossess for it the component values originally basic to it. And if, as we shall later see, the term is one that describes a relationship ('Verhåltnisbegriff'), then the partial definitions which we establish as we proceed must ultimately be taken together, each contributing its indispensable element to the total concept.

The Hebrew words contributing to this 'total concept' which is the object of our study, are: צדק, the noun, (often taking the feminine form צדקה); then the adjective צדיק; and finally the important verbal stem (Qal): צדק. To these forms we assign the approximate meanings 'righteousness', 'righteous' (or 'in the right'), and 'to be in the right'. The hiph'il form of the verb ('to declare in the right'), is of especial importance and will require full investigation,

Scholars disagree as to the exactness with which we can determine the root meaning of this Hebrew word-cluster (1) A.B. Davidson

(1) Cf. W. Eichrodt, Theologie des A.T., 1933, p.121. ('no longer derivable')

believes that the root has not survived, and agrees with A.R. Gordon that it is related to the Arabic sidk. If that be true, some light might be shed by such forms as صَدَقَ (to be sincere); صَدَحَ (to be sound); صَالِحٌ (honest).⁽¹⁾ And for what secondary evidence they may afford, the Syriac ܐܘܨܐ (right), and ܐܘܨܐܘܬܐ (righteousness) may be mentioned.

So far as the scant evidence enables us to judge, we find inherent in the root סדק the idea of adherence to some implied norm or standard (2). This in turn implies a relationship between two or more parties (for with one person both 'norm' and 'conformity' would be meaningless). And, since 'conformity' implies adjudgment as conformity, the term סדק indicates a forensic usage (3).

The basic importance of the reciprocal element in סדק will be developed in our subsequent discussion of the Covenant concept. But, even as we turn now to consider the 'forensic' nature of the term, we must constantly bear in mind that idea of a relationship, without which the root סדק and its derivatives cannot be fully understood (4).

- (1) Lofthouse, Op. cit., p.341, terms it 'telling the truth'. (An Arab once remarked to me that the Arabic equivalent to סדק means 'the opposite of a liar'!). In addition to the Arabic root, Lofthouse mentions two other cognates: 'to be excellent' (Sab.), and 'to be true or righteous' (Ethiop), and the occurrence of saduk in the Tel-el-Amarna letters, which means 'innocent'.
- (2) E. Kautzsch, Über die Derivate des Stammes sdk im at. liche Sprachgebrauch, 1881, 29: "Man sieht: das normierende Sinnliche kann ein sehr verschiedenes sein (ein bestimmtes Gewichts- oder Raum-volumen, das Gleichgewicht der Waagschalen), immer aber heisst die wechselnde Beschaffenheit sdk sobald sie einer gegebenen Norm entspricht". Cremer, (ut supra, 343), stresses the real relationship between the several branches,
- (3) E. Burton, Galatians, (ICC, 1920), p.461.
- (4) A. Robertson, Studies in the Ep. to the Romans, Expositor, IX, (1899), page 199.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HIPH'IL USAGE.

Now this forensic, or 'declarative' usage inherent in דָּרַשׁ is perhaps most clearly manifested in the causative (hiph'il) form of the verb. It would seem pertinent to our study to notice the way in which the hiph'il is derived. Then, having made a test case of the hiph'il, the significance of the other verb forms will be obvious.

From the stem idea of this form, the Hebrew language allowed the formation of two other conditions, the intensive and the causative. By this process a simple trilateral root was fruitful in producing an amazing variety of derived verbs. A.B. Davidson thus describes this phenomenon:

"The stem idea or meaning of the verb is presented in three conditions or degrees; the Simple (qal), as to eat; the Intensive, as to eat much, often, greedily; and the Extensive, to make, (cause, give), to eat. These are formed by manipulating or adding to the radicals of the verb in a way which has no approximate analogy in English. It is as if the intensive idea of the verb lament...were expressed by some such form as lIMment; and the causative idea, (to cause some one to lament), were expressed...as HILment"

And, specifically regarding the hiph'il:

"The hiph'il may be declaratory, e.g., דָּרַשׁ ('to declare one to be (דָּרַשׁ) in the right'), that is, to acquit; (and) דָּרַשׁ ('to declare to be (דָּרַשׁ) in the wrong'), that is, to condemn".

Now the question in which we are interested is whether the hiph'il of דָּרַשׁ has the causative or the declarative meaning. And if either is allowable from the point of view of philology (2), then

(1) An Introductory Hebrew Grammar, Ed. 19, pp 72f; 95.

(2) Burton, ut supra, p, 464), admits that the causative cannot perhaps be categorically denied in Isa. 53:11 and Dan. 12:3; but he finds no sufficient ground for taking it in the 'purely causative sense', and prefers rather a 'prevaillingly forensic sense of the term',

our test must be empirical. If הִצְדִּיק has the causative signification, then Cardinal Newman and the Scholastics have a strong argument for their belief that justification is a matter of causing a man to be just. If, on the other hand, we find that the hiph'il is used throughout in the declarative sense, then we have Hebrew witness to the fact that God accepts man after declaring him just. After determining which is the case, related problems can be studied. Further interest we have in the hiph'il arises from the fact that the LXX translates this form with δικαίω, a word from the same stem as δικαιοσύνη. As we shall see in a later chapter (on the LXX), the Greek verb lacks the fuller range of the Hebrew verb, and cannot follow the subtle adaptiveness of the Hebrew voices. One example will suffice here: "'He that is righteous let him be righteous still' (must become)...if literally rendered, 'He that is righteous let him be justified still'". (1)

Now, then, does the Old Testament employ the hiph'il? Is it purely causative, or declarative? (2) Its occurrences follow: (3)

Exodus 23:7b: (לֹא-יִצְדִּיקוּ רָשָׁעִים) Who are these wicked? They are those who wrest judgment, who have dealings in a 'false matter', who slay the 'innocent and righteous'. Obviously, God is not speaking of making the wicked righteous; rather that they cannot be adjudged as righteous. He will not declare the wrongdoer just.

Deuteronomy 25:1b- (וְהִצְדִּיקוּ אֶת-הַצְדִּיק) Here we see clearly that the judges in question cannot cause the righteous man to be righteous: he is such already. But they can very easily and with reason declare him to be what he is -- that is all-important when his character or action has been challenged,

- (1) Girdlestone's analysis (Op. cit., p.162) of Revelation 22:11. (We note the necessity, in the Greek, for two words)
- (2) Cf. G.A. Fricke, Die paulinische Grundbegriff der Dikaiose Theou, 1887, page 7.
- (3) Cf. J.A. Morison, Critical Exposition of the Third Chapter of.. Romans, 1866, pp. 190-195.

II Samuel 15:4-- (והצדקתיר) In this case Absalom wanted to have the authority of a king's deputy in order that he might steal away the king's people. He desired to declare every man just. A stranger had but to tell him his tribal connection. and Absalom would say unto him: 'See, thy matters are good and right; but there is no man of the king deputed to hear thee. A self-appointed judge, Absalom declared every newcomer a good man,

I Kgs 8:31,32. ('...Judge Thy servants, condemning the wicked, to bring his way upon his head; and justifying the righteous, to give him according to his righteousness'.) Solomon asks that God look into the heart of the wicked and of the good not to make both equally good but to declare what each really is. Neither does Solomon ask God, as the Hiph'il would allow, to cause the wicked to be wicked, nor to cause the just to be just. One meaning only is possible, declare the one the one and the other the other; i.e., to condemn and to acquit. All that Solomon wants is a clear declaration by God himself of the actual state of things.

II Chron 6:23. ('..and judge Thy servants, by requiting the wicked, by recompensing his way upon his own head; and by justifying the righteous, by giving him according to his righteousness'), The Hebrew obviously does not mean 'make the righteous the righteous according to his righteousness', but rather to declare him righteous, thus giving him what is his due,

Job 27:5,6. ('God forbid that I should justify you: till I die I will not remove mine integrity from me. My righteousness I hold fast, and will not let it go: my heart shall not reproach me so long as I live.'). The rendition of this in the LXX is thus: μή μοι εἶη δικαίους ὑμᾶς ἀποφῆναι. Job is refusing to pronounce his visitors just. At the same time he talks of the other type of righteousness, conformity to God's laws.

Psa 82:1-3. ('...He judgeth among the gods. How long will ye judge unjustly, and accept the persons of the wicked?...Defend the fatherless: do justice to the afflicted and needy.'). The LXX reads δικαιοσύνη. Again we can see that God does not ask the judges to make the poor and needy just or even to declare them just indiscriminately. What God asks is a declaration of justice despite poverty and helplessness,

Prov 17:15. ('He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination to the Lord'). The LXX has: ὁς δίκαιον κρινεὶ τὸν ἀδίκον. What does this judge do? As the LXX says, he judges the unjust just. He esteems the wicked righteous. If he made the wicked righteous by an infusion of justice, certainly he would receive God's praise, but only one meaning is possible.

Isa 5:22-3. ('woe unto them which justify the wicked for reward, and take away the righteousness of the righteous from him!'), In the LXX we note: ὁ δίκαιοῦντες τὸν ἀσεβῆ —. How can any man 'justify' the wicked, or 'take away' righteousness? Only one means is possible — that of the judge who makes an untrue statement, a forensic reversal of the actual status of the man in question,

Isa.50:8. The background of this picture is the judicial seat, and the prophet expects a favourable pronouncement: that God who is Himself righteous, will openly sustain his right-ness in the case in question.

Isa 53:11. ('...by His knowledge shall My righteous Servant justify many; for He shall bear their iniquities.') Here we read in the LXX: δικαιώσας δικαίων: "For my servant who by his knowledge did justify the Righteous One to the many" (Hebrew translation). "By the knowledge of himself shall my righteous servant justify many" (Revised Version). The Hebrew allows either translation. In the former case the justification can only be forensic. In the latter case, there is, of course, room for disagreement, since, as the Romanists show, this could mean make righteous. The difficulty of this whole passage of Isaiah is in determining how the parts of each sentence are related. Without changing the order of the sentence, a third translation is possible: "By his knowledge shall my servant to many declare righteous the just". Whatever the translation, the word-order is clumsy. Because this is the case, it seems wisest not to lay great stress on this passage by itself, but to rely on the analogy of Scripture for its interpretation. Since the Bible teaches that there will be a final judgment at which Christ shall judge, it seems reasonable to believe that this passage is wholly forensic in character. (1)

Not relevant to the question!

Dan 12:3. ('...and they that turn many to righteousness,..') We should note here: יְשַׁדְּקוּ הַרְכִּים As Morison points out, (Op cit 195, 6) this is the only one of the 12 instances in which the Hiph'il of the verb occurs, about which there can be any serious dispute. Bellarmin insists that the verb signifies the ability of one man to make another righteous. But this can occur only as one man makes an instrument of himself. Therefore in the light of the general OT doctrine of justification, we can quite as fairly argue that the teachers and leaders here referred to are the instruments or agents of bringing many to a knowledge of forensic righteousness. Another interpretation is possible. We can accept Theodotion's reading: Ἀπὸ τῶν δικαίων τῶν πολλῶν , "Above the many righteous". (2) With slightly different punctuation, this reading is quite natural.

As we reach the end of our analysis (particularly of the Hiph'il usage), what conclusions are we justified in drawing? If within the rich concept-cluster derivable from PT5, the

(1) Cf. Kautzsch, Op. cit., p. 13.

(2) Cf. Cremer, Op. cit., p. 37; P. Feine, Theologie des N.T., 7 Aufl., 1936, p.220.

ideas of 'righteousness', 'justification' and 'acquittal' are inherent parts of one whole, and if in the Hebrew the Hiph'il form denotes causation, then we have a test case for judging the nature of this composite idea, in its most significant usage,

Now if in the Hiph'il the conceptions of righteousness and causality are so related that the verb means to cause to be righteous, then the O T conception is not forensic. But our experience has shown this to be far from the case.

While in two possible instances in the O T we have felt that the causative sense cannot perhaps be categorically denied, we have in all other cases seen a prevaillingly forensic usage. And, since relationship has been found to be inseparably connected with the root idea, then the forensic usage implies that the person or persons concerned are declared, or adjudged to be in the right relationship, or deemed righteous (i.e., 'in the right'),⁽¹⁾ And this seems to be valid whether the adjudicated 'righteousness' be conceived of as absolute, approximate, or qualitative (i.e., without reference to the actual degree of conformity.⁽²⁾) Such related questions as the adequacy of this legal language, the elements of mercy and merit, etc., must be subsequently discussed. And such discussions will conceivably qualify our present interpretation; but thus far our study seems clearly to bear out the predominantly forensic sense of the Hebrew terminology as seen in extant usage.

(1) Cf. H. St. J. Thackeray, The Relation of St. Paul to Contemporary Jewish Thought, 1900, P.87; E. Vischer, RGG², IV, 1745 ff.

(2) Cf. Burton, Op, cit., p. 462.

THE LEGAL TERMINOLOGY AND JURIDICAL CONCEPTS.

Now we have seen that 'righteousness' and its related concepts are described by the Hebrew in forensic terms, in the language of the courts of law. And, while we have already sensed a difficulty in the fact that there is a sense of 'relationship' in righteousness, we have nevertheless to reckon with the fact that the language was that of the law court.

Whatever we may think of the use of legal language to express religious truths, we cannot neglect the fact that for the Israelites the law court was so essential an institution in all life that he did not hesitate to use its language to describe the deepest spiritual realities (1). Indeed the supreme gift of God to man was seen in the handing down of the 'Law', "und das Recht gestaltet die ethische Norm" (2). Throughout the OT runs the silver thread -- the idea of an ideal justice (with, however, an inseparably religious interpretation!). We cannot understand the OT nor the Jewish tradition of the NT unless we recognise the important role of legal terminology. If Law is of God, its exercise is among the noblest privileges of man, and there is no incongruity in using legal language for spiritual phenomena (3). We speak here of use, in contradiction to abuse, of Law.

In the first of Moses' final addresses, he reminds the Israelites of the hierarchy of leaders whom he places in charge of them. Then he reminds them of their judges, the deputies of God (4).

(1) Cf. Thackeray, *Op. cit.*, 81, on Jewish usage.

(2) Quell, *Theologisches Wörterbuch z. N.T.*, 176, on 'Rechtsgedanke'.

(3) Even Paul can speak of the 'law of Christ'!

(4) Note the definitive Hebrew phrase: **לאלהים הוא** (Dt.1:17)

Here we have an example of what the judge meant from the beginning of the Hebrew nation. He was to hear cases and give every man his own due in accordance with the law of God, Because he represents not the state nor any private interest, but God himself; for, as the above quotation expresses it, 'the judgment is God's'. The poor, the weak, the stranger are to have their due since God is the real and final judge, the Judge of all judges! Note the following exhortation:

"Judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates, which the Lord thy God giveth thee...and they shall judge the people with just judgment. Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons... That which is altogether just shalt thou follow" (1)

Judges stand in all the gates so that justice or righteousness is near at hand, accessible to the poorest and the weakest. Every precaution must be taken to keep the judge from perverted judgement. He is to see each case on its own merits, unblinded by bribes.

When Job tells of his former judicial utterances made before young and old, princes and paupers, he uses language that aptly describes a judge of exemplary character:

"When I went out to the gate through the city, when I prepared my seat in the street...I delivered the poor that cried, and the fatherless, and him that had none to help him...I caused the widow's heart to sing for joy. I put on righteousness, and it clothed me; my judgment was a robe and a diadem. I was eyes unto the blind, and feet was I unto the lame. I was a father to the poor; and the cause which I knew not I searched out". (2)

(1) Dt 16:18-20. Underscored phrases are significant in the Hebrew: דָּן בְּשַׁעַר, and דָּן בְּשַׁעַר

(2) Job 29:7,12-16. Vs.17 quoted subsequently.

With our modern idea of a judge as an impartial, impersonal, objective interpreter of the law (1), we are tempted to object that this is not a picture of a judge but rather of a benevolent patron or philanthropist (2).

Indeed the Hebrews were generally accustomed to consider righteousness more from the standpoint of the oppressed, the poor, the helpless, than from that of a person who sees righteousness executed upon evil-doers (3). Their tendency is seen in the exhortation: "When you see a rich man and a poor man quarreling, take the side of the poor man until you have discovered where justice lies!" (4)

But full judgment must ultimately be established! This factor in the Hebrew concept may often be overlooked by Ritschl and Diestel and others, but in actuality it cannot be neglected. The final verse of the above words from Job we have purposely withheld until now:

"And I brake the jaws of the wicked, and plucked the spoil out of his teeth" (vs.17)

Mercy is enjoined, but never at the expense of justice. It is not forbidden (though in Occidental eyes it is extra-legal) to treat a man better than he deserves, but it is forbidden to treat him worse

- (1) "We instinctively think of justice as retributive or distributive; and with our knowledge of our own legal systems and the relation of the judge to the plaintiff and the accused, it is difficult not to breathe the atmosphere of the law-court in London or Berlin, when we are standing at the city-gate of Hebron or Samaria"- Lofthouse, ut supra (Exp Times L, 341). See Cremer, ut supra, p.38: "Das romische Recht kennt kein Interesse fur die Person, sondern nur fur die sogenannte 'Sache'". Cf. Dodd, C.H., Romans, p.60.
- (2) Diestel, L., Die Idee der Gerechtigkeit, A.T. Jahrbucher fur Deutsche Theologie.5.Band.2.Heft., 1860, p.188, gives us just such a picture, when he relinquishes the juridical concept and gives his attention to what he terms the Hilfe und dem Heil".
- (3) J.H. Ropes, Art. 'Righteousness' and 'The Righteousness of God' in the O.T. and in St.Paul, JBL., XXII, 1903, p.216.
- (4) For this expression I am indebted to Professor R. Niebuhr.

worse than he deserves¹. Anything more than justice is grace; anything less would be disgrace, for judge and judged alike. Mercy cannot violate justice; and while they are often closely associated in the Hebrew mind⁽²⁾, they can never be made identical. Indeed in this very thought we catch a glimpse of the greatest dilemma in spiritual strivings of the Old Testament peoples -- elsewhere referred to as an "unresolved tension between God's mercy and God's justice"! And if they would not relinquish the idea of Divine Mercy, they could not relinquish the idea of Divine Justice!

ANALYSIS OF RITSOHL.

When Ritschl practically equates justice and mercy, he can find as we have seen much which seemingly substantiates his thesis.⁽³⁾ However, we would again stress the fact that, while mercy is a concomitant of complete justice for the Hebrew, it is also true that the judge is to help the oppressed to obtain that which is JUSTLY his.⁽⁴⁾ The judge is not merely a soft-hearted, sentimental philanthropist who goes about doing good without regard for the right and the wrong. He must determine what is right, Then he

(1) Cf. Burton, ut supra, 468 (footnote).

(2) Cf. Sellin, E., Theologie des A.T., 1936, p.30f,

(3) Ritschl, A. Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Vers"ohung, II, 1882, p. 107 et. al.

(4) Ct. Eichrodt, W., Theol. des A.T., Teil I, 1933, p. 121.

relieves the oppressed.⁽¹⁾ He has of course a right to mercy.⁽²⁾ When God himself speaks to Moses concerning his own nature as of a judge. He proclaims:⁽³⁾ He is merciful, Yes, and longsuffering. But He also refuses to clear the guilty⁽⁴⁾ To forget this truth is to wipe out all the distinctions between righteousness and wickedness, to look at them as in the gloaming, when everything seems gray.

"Give the king thy Judgments, O God, and thy righteousness unto the king's son. He shall judge thy people with righteousness, and thy poor with judgment." (Psa. 72: 1,2)

What does this Psalmist desire? Why does he ask for justice for the poor and needy? Is it not because they are those least likely to receive justice? Surely this writer is not asking the Holy God of Israel for indiscriminately-given mercy. He who is asked to "crush the oppressor" is too stern a ruler to go about doing acts of mercy without regard for his own standard. It is because the weak, human judge is all too often tempted to "judge unjustly and respect the persons of the wicked", that he is repeatedly warned

- (1) Cf. Sellin, ut supra, 83-85: the great judgment of the people, the liberation from oppression and God's impartial judgment.
- (2) Cf. Cremer, ut supra, 24, as against L. Kohler, Theol des A T, Neue Theologische Grundrisse, 1936, 16f.
- (3) Exodus 34:6-7. Note the incorrect analysis of this passage by Ritschl (ut supra, 103) "Denn die Eigenschaften unter denen sich God dem Mose offenbart...sind die Barmherzigkeit und Langmut...die Gerechtigkeit ist in dieser Selbstdarstellung Gottes nicht genannt".
- (4) Eichrodt, ut supra, p. 124.

to judge righteously. To give righteous judgments is not to help every man to an easier life, but to judge according to God's law EVEN in the case of that man who has nothing of wealth or prestige with which to plead his case. The just judge to be sure is merciful, but not every merciful judge is of necessity just.

A locus classicus for the OT conception of God's judgment and of His grace is the 3rd chapter of Zechariah. Joshua, the high priest, stands before the angel of the Lord. He is clothed in filthy garments. He is a lost man, but God restores him as a brand plucked from the burning. God, not for any reason in Joshua, but out of His own mercy, has him clothed in fair garments and a beautiful mitre placed on his head, Satan, the adversary, would condemn Joshua, but God rebukes Satan. And to Joshua and those with him, God promises a Servant, the Shoot, and the removal of iniquity in one day. Note that this is a forensic scene; the setting is a courtroom; an accuser stands before the judge. Yet this very courtroom is the scene of God's gracious bestowal of forgiveness.

God is often thus thought of as a judge. So ingrained was the idea of the court, that the Hebrew thought of the righteous man as he whose records were approved by God. Writers claimed to know the workings of the mind of God, as when we read of Abraham: "And he believed in the Lord, and He counted it to him for righteousness" (Gen 15 6). In this statement the author declares the mind of God and the language is that of either the court or the account-book.

But we must remember that we are dealing with a figure of speech when we speak of God's forgiveness as being like the pronouncement of a judge. The Bible never forsakes this figure and yet

(1) See Cremer, Op, cit., 23f.

continually transcends it for, as all figurative expressions, it conveys but part of the truth. When David says "Happy-- (Psa 32: 1, 2)" he is using forensic language of the non-imputation of sin, but we hear overtones never possible in any human court, God's compassion and willingness to forgive, no human judge can equal. When He forgives, man can forget its bitter past, or remember it with peace.⁽¹⁾

JUST WHAT IS THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD IN THE OLD TESTAMENT?⁽²⁾
Is it conceived forensically? What is the relationship to grace?

Paul says: "But now apart from law a righteousness of God has been revealed, being witnessed by the law and prophets" (Ro:3:21). Let us look at some of the passages which witness to this righteousness in order to determine what description in general OT writers give. Twice in the Pentateuch God is called righteous.

(Ex 9 27). In the first instance Pharaoh is speaking: "I have sinned this time; Jehovah is righteous, and I and my people are wicked".

Here we have an evident contrast between Pharaoh's evil ways and God's perfection of action. In the second instance Moses is describing God in lyrical poetry:

"The Rock, His work is perfect; for all His ways are justice; a God of faithfulness and without iniquity, just and right is He; They have dealt corruptly with Him, they are not His children, it is their blemish. They are a perverse and crooked generation" (Dt 32:4-5). Once again the RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD takes its meaning from the contrasted wickedness of man. God is a God of integrity. God's action is in harmony with His nature. He is good, faithful, just.

But the RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD in the OT is as broadly conceived as the righteousness of a judge.⁽³⁾ As a righteous being, God

(1) Cf. Isa.54:4 ff. (2) Cf. Diestel, ut supra, 175.

(3) Cf. Sellin, ut supra, 30.

does acts of great grace and mercy, Samuel calls unto the people: (I Sam,12;7; note יְדָוָה). Now as we examine those acts we find that they include elements of mercy and wrath, integrity and justice. The Israelites cried in the land of Egypt unto God, and he sent them deliverers, Moses and Aaron. That was an act of mercy. But when they forgot God, He sold them into the hands of Sisera, the Philistines, and the king of Moab. That was an act of divine wrath. Then they plead forgiveness. God sent them deliverers, Jerubbaal, Bedan, Jephthah, and Samuel, an act of divine mercy. When they asked for a king, God gave them one. Samuel thus summarizes the righteousness of God: (1 Sam 12:14-15).

From this and similar passages we get a composite picture of what the Hebrew meant by the righteousness of God. He is a deliverer and a strong helper in time of need, often "championing" His people even when their conduct does not appear to deserve it⁽¹⁾. But He will not forget evil forever; when His people forsake Him, He allows their enemies to punish them⁽²⁾; and herein we see a glimmer of 'supranational' in their concept of this righteousness in operation⁽³⁾. He grants reasonable requests, To the just and merciful, He is just and merciful; He will honor a change in conduct by a change of attitude⁽⁴⁾. He favours them who obey Him, and chastises them who forsake Him,⁽⁵⁾ even though they remain His people!⁽⁶⁾

- (1) P. Volz, Phophetengestalten des A.T., p.91. (Jacob blessed at the expense of Esau!)
- (2) But see Diestel, *ibid.*, p.199.
- (3) Volz, ut supra, 103. Cf. II Sam 21.
- (4) Cf. Jer. 18:1. cit. Volz, *ibid.*, 134.
- (5) Cp. C.v.Orelli, Einige at. liche Prämissen zur nt, lichen Versöhnungslehre, ZWL.5.1884, pp.75.76.
- (6) P.Volz, ut supra, 103. Cf. II Sam 21; Isa 43:27f--44:1. This anticipates the Covenant concept, treated in following chapter.

We notice much parallelism between this and the description of a righteous judge, an impartial arbiter, a gracious leader, a strong deliverer,⁽¹⁾ He does not consider the prestige or the wealth of the wicked. His judgment is always true even when the defendant is a weak, defenceless nobody, His mercy is as broad as His ability is deep to dispense blessings.

But the righteousness of Jehovah, as we elsewhere further demonstrate, far transcends (in proportion to O T depth of insight) the merely juridical concept; it is not based on a stereotyped system of reward and punishment, and as Volz says, it cannot be measured by any human scale since sedakah could never be satisfactorily defined as purely retributive justice.⁽²⁾ We remark that 'court-room repentance' is of no avail before a human judge, charged with the strict execution of established laws; it does however avail before the Divine Judge, whose transcendent 'righteousness' combines both justice and mercy. This seems essentially true of the O T, even though the nature and necessity of repentance was often unrealized or neglected, and despite the varying amount of insight with which 'justice' and 'mercy' were related to one another. Our only point in making the observation is to note the inadequacy of a merely juridical concept of Jehovah's relation to His people. Hence, it is in its totality neither purely juridical nor merely eleemosynary.

(1) Cp. P. Kölbinger, Studien zur paulinischen Theologie. ThStKr. 1. Heft, 1895, page 11.

(2) P. Volz, ut supra, 188f., also see note 1, p.188. But regarding the necessity of Divine retribution, see 291.

Notice Micah's double picture of the 'righteousness of God'. He reviews the case of Balak and Balaam, and finds that it is not in the nature of God to change, compromise, or falsify His word. These were the righteous works of God.⁽¹⁾ He goes on to ask: What is pleasing to the Lord? Dismissing 'rams', 'rivers of oil' and such external and formal things, as grossly inadequate, he affirms that God desires righteousness (here in the sense of mishpath), mercy and a humble walk with God. Thus for Micah also, God's righteousness is that which includes both loving-kindness and such justice as gives every man his due whether that be punishment or reward.

In a later prophet - Jeremiah - man is exhorted not to glory in his wisdom, might or riches, but to glory in that "he understandeth and knoweth me, that I am the Lord which exercise loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness, in the earth."⁽²⁾ Again we see the word righteousness keeping company with such words as judgment (justice), and lovingkindness (mercy), not to overlook wrath.⁽³⁾

Thus far, we have dwelt mostly on the forensic aspect of the derivatives of sdk in the OT, and have seen that while 'righteousness' and 'mercy' are closely associated, they cannot be equated. But, despite the inescapable fact that the linguistic usage in this connection is definitely forensic, we have found evidence that

(1) Cf. Micah 6:5-8.

(2) Cf. Jeremiah 9:23,24; cp. 23:5-7 and Hosea 2:20-22.

(3) See Eichrodt, ut supra, I, p. 122.

the nature of the conception which the words express cannot be fully described as purely forensic.

In speaking of this inadequacy of the purely forensic sense, we mean that, while the Hebrew's thoughts concerning the divine-human relationship were couched in the language of the law-court, such concepts were nevertheless very much modified by the fact that they were, simultaneously, religious concepts -- for the moral element is never entirely absent. To be more specific, while they continually spoke of God as a judge, they never thought of him as a mere judge (i.e., absolutely impartial and impersonal arbiter)⁽¹⁾. He was a judge, yes; but in the law upon the basis of which He made His pronouncements, they (the Israelites) had, so to speak, a 'most favoured nation clause'. God would judge all nations, distinguishing between the righteous and the wicked with corresponding 'deliverance' and punishment, BUT they were in possession of something within the law, by which they could be certain of recognition as 'in the right', and of consequent 'vindication' in the eyes of all nations. This was because God had given them, in the Covenant, a certain 'claim' upon Himself. God was, in the words of Quell,⁽²⁾ not only "Rechtsherr" but "Rechtsgenosse" as well! We have thus again anticipated the subject-matter of the following section of our discussion (the Covenant) -- but the very necessity of studying the covenant idea in order to understand the Hebrew concept fully is itself evidence of the inadequacy of the purely juridical nature of sedeq and its cognate terms.

(1) The content with which the Hebrew invested the word 'judge' (as applied to God), so extended its normal dimensions that we have more a 'champion', 'vindicator', 'deliverer', than judge qua judge. So Lofthouse, ut supra, 343.

(2) TWB, II, 178.

In other words we must again recognise a tendency in Hebrew religion to 'halt between two opinions' -- a spiritual struggle (whether felt as a struggle, or naively overlooked in logical inconsistency), in which, as we have seen, they could not free themselves from the grip of the 'law' and its demands, yet would not release their grip on the idea of 'lovingkindness'. This fundamental irresolution is only properly treated in connection with the Covenant conception and the deeper prophetic insight, to a discussion of which we now turn. But whether this irresolution took the form of an 'unresolved tension' actually felt by those of greater spiritual perception, or of an 'inherent incompatibility' naively ignored by the masses -- the antithesis was nevertheless a real one.

How can we, in concluding this section, summarise our findings concerning the "forensic, yet more than forensic" nature and usage of the relative concept of 'righteousness'? If we artificially term it a 'supra-forensic' usage and sense, it is to admit that our vernacular no longer lends itself to the expression of such a composite term as the broader Hebrew concept comprised. While the 'forensic' sense is undoubtedly more predominant in the O T usage, yet we cannot fail to see its broader religious significance in the Hebrew mind, perhaps to be partially explained in the fact that for him no clear distinction was ever established between 'law' and 'religion'. Hence we would perhaps more nearly define the usage of this concept in the Old Testament as "moral-forensic". For greater clarity as to the place occupied by this general idea, let us now extend our investigation to include the Covenant idea and consciousness in Israel.

THE COVENANT IDEA IN O.T. RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.

A. Robertson points out that we cannot understand the Hebrews' point of view regarding 'righteousness' unless we recognise the element of reciprocity in their relation to God, ⁽¹⁾ represented by the 'Covenant' conception. Or, whatever our designation of this fact may be, we must acknowledge its existence ⁽²⁾. Though mentioned infrequently in the O.T. as such, this Covenant-idea is nevertheless found underlying the whole divine-human relationship. Without it we cannot understand what it was, among the Hebrews, for a man to be saddik. Indeed the whole relationship implied in sedeq, according to Principal Lofthouse, 'must be understood in the light of the Covenant in which God has chosen that He and His people should stand with one another' ⁽³⁾.

The Hebrews are God's people ⁽⁴⁾. God appears to Moses at the burning bush and says: "Come now, therefore, and I will send thee unto Pharaoh, that thou mayest bring forth my people the children of Israel out of Egypt" ⁽⁵⁾. A Psalmist again calls to his fellow-countrymen: "Know ye that the Lord He is God; it is He that hath made us, and not we ourselves. We-are His people, and the sheep of His pasture" ⁽⁶⁾. It is unnecessary to do more than recall this everywhere patent fact that the Hebrews considered themselves God's people because He had made them and chosen them. And their state was a religious community - a THEO-cracy - because their one Sovereign was God. If in imagination we could think of it as a

(1) ut supra, p.199.

(2) Cf. H.St J. Thackeray, ut supra, p.83 (on Covenant concept in Judaism).

(3) Art. 'Righteousness of God', Exp Times, L, p.441.

(4) Strathman, TWB, IV, 35. (Article).

(5) Ex 3:10.

(6) Ps 100:3.

'constitutional Theocracy', it would be because their 'constitution' was contained in the Covenant.

Indeed they did believe that God had made certain 'agreements' with them not for His own good, but for theirs; not of any necessity but of His own good grace. Yet, paradoxical though it sound, this Covenant of grace was conceived of as firmly grounded in law. Indeed, strange though it seem to Occidental minds (which are wont to set law in contrast to grace), the nearest analogy in Judaism to ~~the~~ a Pauline conception of grace, is found in the OT teaching that God gave to Israel the Law. Wetter⁽¹⁾ pointedly remarks:

"Wollten wir es versuchen eine Analogie zu den paulinischen Gnadengedanken im Judentum zu finden, so liegt sie am nächsten eben in diesem Gedanken, dass Gott Israel das Gesetz (die Erwählung) gegeben hat. (Vgl. Rom. 3:1ff, 9ff)"

Despite any logical difficulties in reconciling 'law' and 'grace', the Hebrew from Moses to Paul looked upon the Law as bene volens; the Torah revealed the nature of the righteousness which God required. and even Paul conceded it the role of 'schoolmaster'. In its use (again in contradistinction to abuse), even Jesus and Paul do not deny that the Law is caritative. Ideally, the issue inherent in the Law was a personal, a divine-human relationship, in which man sought - res ipsa loquitur - not an absolute right-ness, but a relative righteousness: not to be right (in the narrower classical sense), but to be in the right relation to God. This is attested generally by Cremer, Eichrodt, Dodd, and Schrenk. The latter insists that sedeq or sedagah is to be understood as a

(1) G.P. Wetter, Charis, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des ältesten Christentums, 1913, p.10.

"Verhältnisbegriff": "Gerecht ist, wer Ansprüchen gerecht wird, die jemand an ihn kraft eines Verhältnisses hat" (1). In regard to this 'Verhältnis' is a 'Gemeinschaftsverhältnis', in which each man has his 'Recht' and 'Pflicht' (2).

That this 'Recht', and 'Pflicht', were seldom if ever seen, in the OT, in their true perspectives is attested in the general testimony of the Scriptures themselves. It was so easy to mistake the means for the end, to take the outward and visible formalism for the inward spiritual realities. But royal privilege and royal duty can only be maintained on a kingly basis! This type of higher insight glimmers in certain OT passages, and will be presently seen in Isaiah. Our important point here is to establish the fact that, under the Covenant, the "righteousness of God" implied both these elements -- privilege, graciously extended, but never at the expense of moral limitation (i.e., the necessity for 'living up to this privilege'). Grace conditioned upon obedience.

Gracious though God was to Adam, there was a 'Divine imperative' that must be obeyed. Again, God's treatment of the men of the time of Noah had this significant implication: He grants them certain rights but demands observance of His laws. His dealings with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are likewise to be interpreted.

In the berith that God made with Israel as a nation in the wilderness of Sinai, He was the first party to the agreement. Israel was the second party. The condition of the covenant was

(1) Schrenk, TWB, II, 197.

(2) Eichrodt, *ut sup.*, I, 121ff; Cf. Dodd, The Bible & The Greeks, 42ff., Cf. Gen 38:26; Job 11:2; 34:5; I Sam 24:17; II Sam 19:24.)

adherence on the part of the nation to the covenant conditions:
the promise would take the form of special blessing.

"Now therefore, if ye will harken unto My voice indeed, and keep My covenant, then ye shall be Mine own treasure from among all peoples; for all the earth is Mine; and ye shall be unto Me a kingdom of priests, and a holy nation". (Exodus, 19:5,6) (Cf Ex 34:27-8)

Later Moses, reminding the people of their relationship to God, warns them of the existence of stern will as well as grace,
on the part of God,⁽¹⁾

The Hebrew affirms that God as Creator has the right to ask what He will of men. What He chooses to give men He gives freely; He owes man neither benevolence nor justice -- EXCEPT (and this is of paramount significance) through such obligations as He Himself has chosen to assume.

However, on man's side, God's will is conceived of as absolutely binding. God commands. Man has but to obey. God sets forth the elements of His law. Man must recognise and keep it.⁽²⁾
In God's Law they are, we might say, to 'live, move, and have their being'.

Since the OT from the beginning represents God as the author of man and of law, obedience from the very start is a religious duty. The saddik is looked upon as such because he stands in a certain relationship to God: he is an adherent to the Law. (Now

(1) Deut. 11: 26-28.

(2) Deut. 9: 18f.

we must recall that, since this is a relationship, 'adherence' cannot be merely quantitatively applied to the degree of statute obedience --- and this holds, in principle, no matter how frequently the people erred in taking the lower, quantitative, legalistic view of this 'adherence'. This all-important distinction must be kept in mind as we speak hereinafter of the 'obedience' required by the Law. Of course obedience was not by any means to be neglected; only it was to serve to draw man spiritually nearer to God, rather than to accumulate merit with a view to establishing same as a claim upon God,)

'The Law', then, is the standard on which the relationship of 'righteousness' is established. Man is to yield himself entirely to the direction of Jehovah: to 'do all as unto God'. Moses says:

"And the Lord commanded us to do all these statutes, to fear (reverence) the Lord our God, for our good always, that He might preserve us alive, as it is at this day. And it shall be our righteousness, if we observe to do all these commandments before the Lord our God as He hath commanded us to do" (1)

Notice how easy it would be, particularly for people who incline to the use of legal language, to take the first of the above underscored phrases ('...do all these statutes') erroneously as the quintessence of 'our righteousness', at the expense of the second underscored, and more subtle, phrase ("..reverence the Lord our God")! Once again, we see possible range of Hebrew (and later Judaistic) interpretation, from the lower, narrower, quantitative conception, to the higher, comprehensive conception. It is just this which is of utmost significance for our investigation -- not the precise extent to which

(1) Dt 6: 24f.

this or that conception predominated. For our present purpose we need principally to understand the range of Hebrew thought, in order to appreciate that in it which is integral to the thought of the Apostle Paul, and that in it against which the Apostle strove. In view of this fact, it suffices for our purpose (as far as Hebrew tendencies were concerned), to note the general prophetic attestation that the 'masses' fell lamentably short, in their evaluation of the 'law of God'.⁽¹⁾

Let us look at some final examples of the connection between law, -the Law -, and that which is 'righteous'. In Leviticus we see the comprehensiveness of the Law in its inclusion of justice in weights and measures⁽²⁾, and fair dealing⁽³⁾. The whole of life is related to God; because He is the Lord, He possesses the people, He is their redeemer. The lofty basis of it all is seen in the frequently appended maxim: 'I AM JEHVEH'.

We reflect that if Israel ever dissociated 'right' or 'justice' from religion, it might be expected at this level of ordinary business; but even routine business dealings are given both an historic and a deep religious foundation, and depend on Israel's relationship to God. For these and all standards have their sanctions in the nature of God himself⁽⁴⁾.

As A.B. Davidson says: "Righteousness consisted in a right attitude toward the existing constitution, and in conduct, in harmony with its traditions"⁽⁵⁾ This definition leaves little to

(1) (See further incidental evidence in following section on Isaiah)

(2) Lev. 19:35-7.

(3) Deut. 25:13-16.

(4) Quelle, TWB II 178: 'Jahwe ist Rechtsquelle für alle Gesetzes-korpora, die das A.T. enthält'.
(Notice his citation, Dt.1:17: . קַיְמָה לְאֵלֹהִים הוּא

This same inherent insistence exists from the very beginning, no matter how we date the various books of the O.T.: for it is patent not only in the Pentateuch, but in Amos, Proverbs (cf 11:1), etc.

be added. We have previously seen that, for both God and man, the Covenant idea implied loyalty as the modus operandi. We now see the 'content' of this loyalty required on the part of man. It is the complete and harmonious attitude and activity of full devotion, -- not to the 'Law' as law, but as a revelation of God's will and loving relationship to man.

Unless this interpretation be true, we would be at a loss to explain occasional OT statements in which a man seems to claim 'righteousness' for himself, as in the lyrical strain of David:

"according unto my righteousness" (1)

For, as evidence that this righteousness is conceived of as relative and qualitative, we hear such refrains in the selfsame songs, as:

"It is God that girdeth me with strength,
and maketh my way perfect....."

"Thou hast...given me the shield of thy
salvation....." (2) and:

"My defence is of God, which saveth the
upright in heart...."

"I will praise the Lord according to his
righteousness...." (3)

If, then, such an OT writer seems to arrogate to himself such 'righteousness', it would seem to imply that he has in some respect adhered to the 'Law of God', -- not that he is without sin⁽⁴⁾. For

(1) Psa 18:20; 18:24; 7:8;.

(2) Psa 18:32, 35.

(3) Psa 7:10, 17.

(4) We cannot accept Sellin's terminology (ut supra, 76): "die Einwirkung des Vergeltungsdogmas und des Sichmessens am Gesetze" and "ein Dogma" as over against "bitterernste Erfahrungsurteile". On the other hand Diestel (ut supra, 182) goes too far in saying: Die Vorstellung, dass die Errettung aus Not von Seiten des Gerechten als ein Lohn anzusprechen sei, mag pharisaisch sein, aber alttestamentlich ist sie nicht". (Cf also H. Braun, Gerichtsgedanke und Rechtfertigungslehre bei Paulus, UNT, 19.1930, p, 7.)

God to pronounce a man 'righteous' cannot properly mean, then, to declare him to have obeyed all the statutes (which quantitative obedience at best could never be anything but partial), but to declare him to be rightly related, correctly re-oriented, in and through the Law.

The Covenant conception shows righteousness, then, not as purely juridicial, nor, indeed as purely ethical. For in this higher insight the personal relationship of man and God becomes more clearly realised, and the rightness of personal relations receives more emphasis.

As elsewhere shown, the Covenant idea rests on a paradox: to man, who has no rights against God, God gives [him] rights, so that each has a certain amount of claim upon the other. Lofthouse points out that it is even more paradoxical than this, for "when Israel has broken the covenant, and felt the inescapable consequences, Jehovah sets Himself to re-establish the bond and write a new covenant on the heart. (Jer 31:33)...Jehovah does not accomplish this despite His sedaqah, but because of it. It is concerned ... with sin, personal estrangement (rather than breach of law)...punishment alone can never satisfy any but the revengeful. What Jehovah desires, and what He maintains and restores, is the mutual trust and love...the fulfilling of the terms of the compact between himself and Israel. (Ez.37:27; Jer 31:9)"(1)

(1) ut supra, 344.

Having previously found that the extant usage of sdk in the OT is forensic, we have yet further found that the full content of the idea in sdk cannot be completely explained apart from the Covenant relationship⁽¹⁾, through which it is seen as a "more-than-forensic" conception. Let us now extend this same consideration to include the prophetic insight of the ('Second') Isaiah.

(1) ibid., 345; cf Schrenk TWB II 197; Eichrodt, ut supra, I, 121ff; Hempel, J., Das Ethos des. A.T., 1938, 156-162.

RIGHTEOUSNESS IN THE CONCEPTION OF ISAIAH.

What does Isaiah have to say of the RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD? Scholars rightly point out that Paul's use of THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD is more influenced by this one book than any other of the O.T. That Paul showed such influence can be seen in his twenty-five quotations from Isaiah in Romans alone.

What is this RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD in Isaiah? ⁽¹⁾ In Chapter 41 God calls the nations to compare their righteousness with His. George Adam Smith analyzes Isaiah's conception of the righteousness of God to find several constituent elements: this righteousness is true to fact. Isaiah says: "Who hath declared from the beginning, that we may know? And before time that we may say that He is right?" (41:26). This righteousness is 'clearness, straight-forwardness and practical effectiveness': "I have not spoken in secret, in a place of the land of darkness; I have not said unto the seed of Jacob 'Seek ye Me in vain'; I the Lord speak righteousness, I declare things that are right". This righteousness has in it the element of purposefulness; God created the earth not a waste, but a place to be inhabited; neither did He ask Jacob to seek Him in vain, for He speaks righteousness. (49:19).

Again this righteousness has in it the element of faithfulness: God says to His chosen Israel:

(1) See G.A. Smith Expositor's Bible, Vol.III, in loco.

"Fear thou not: for I am with thee:
be not dismayed; for I am thy God: I
will strengthen thee; yea, I will
help thee; yea, I will uphold thee with
the right hand of my righteousness" (1)

This type of righteousness is closely associated with the redemptive.

So far Isaiah's characterisation of the righteousness has nothing distinctive about it: what he says might conceivably have been said by a man of another vision. But our interpretation has wider scope than these passages. Hear these significant words:

"I, even I, am He that blotteth out thy transgressions for mine own sake, and will not remember thy sins. Put me in remembrance: let us plead together: declare thou, that thou mayest be justified" (2).

This whole chapter is an affirmation: God will redeem His people. He claims for Himself the title 'Saviour' (43:3). No other Saviour exists beside Him (43:11). Jacob and Israel are His because He made them and wills to save them. Yes, and He goes further: He blots out sin although He is the Holy One of Israel. Here the forensic and redemptive purposes of the righteousness of God are closely associated in the inclusive covenant. He has chosen them.

See, again, the redemptive purpose of God:

"Look unto me, and be ye saved.... I have sworn by myself, the word is gone out of my mouth in righteousness, and shall not return.... In the Lord shall all the seed of Israel be justified"... (3)

This verb shall be justified (קָדַשׁ) is representative of more than a score of instances where the verb קָדַשׁ is used in the

- (1) Isaiah 41:10.
- (2) Isaiah 43:25.
- (3) Isaiah 45:22...25.

active voice. ⁽¹⁾ From our study thus far, particularly in the investigation of the verbal usage, we readily recognise the inadequacy of the translation shall be justified. If our linguistic medium can not be made to translate the term felicitously, we must nevertheless point out that the sense is more nearly that of: in Jehovah shall declared be 'in the right' all the seed of Israel.

We are aware of the fact that Isaiah often speaks of the 'righteousness of God' and the 'salvation' of Israel in what outwardly appear to be parallel terms. But to infer that the two are identical would be gross error. In every instance, careful study reveals that 'salvation' is the result of the operation of the 'righteousness of God'. Only in this very modified sense can the two terms be thought of together. ⁽²⁾ The 'righteousness of God' is a discriminating activity, which vindicates those who are considered 'in the right', (and thus it is, "in effect", salvation); but which condemns those deemed not to be 'in the right', with the consequent effect of retribution. We repeat, then, that only in a very qualified sense, can the two be thought of together.

J.A. Alexander offers this explanation:

"The sense in which salvation can be referred to as the righteousness of God is clear from (Isaiah), chapter 1:17: 'Zion shall be redeemed with judgment, and her converts with righteousness. And the destruction of the transgressors and of the sinners shall be together, and they that forsake the Lord shall be consumed'. The exhibition of God's righteousness consists in the salvation of His people and the simultaneous destruction of His enemies". (3).

- (1) Besides Isaiah 43:9, 43:26, 45:25, see Genesis 38:26, Job 4:17, 9:2, 9:15, 9:20, 10:15, 11:2, 13:18, 15:14, 22:3, 25:4, 33:12, 34:5, 35:7, 40:8, Psalms 19:9, 51:4, 143:2 and Ezekial 16:52.
 (2) See Burton, ut supra, 462, paragraph 4.
 (3) Isaiah, 1887, II, pp.178-9. Cf. Dodd, Bible & The Greeks, 48, 50.

This explanation, like Volz's frequent substitution of Yeshu'ah for sedaqah⁽¹⁾, are allowable only in the above-mentioned modified sense. For the clarification it affords, 'salvation' may be likened to a new 'être', of which the 'righteousness of God' is the 'raison d'être'.⁽²⁾ We note here that this is not the full doctrine of the righteousness of God as stated by Paul, but has at its base the same seminal truth, that righteousness is from God.

Now Isaiah seems clearly to recognize, in the sedaqah of God, the efficient cause of man's resultant 'salvation'. Kautzsch speaks of it as "ein von Gott bewirkter Zustand".⁽³⁾ But here we run into a great problem in the interpretation of the OT conception -- to what extent did the Hebrew feel that he 'had a hand in the matter' of his own salvation? In having appropriated the advantages of the covenant relationship (by accepting and adhering to it), to what extent did he feel that he had established a 'claim' on God? In a word, how did they relate human merit and Divine grace?

Here we must observe greatest caution against reading into Isaiah anything from without. Actually, we find in his writings more a lack of clarity than any sort of overemphasis. But his very lack of clarity proves to be a lack of crystallisation -- an irresolution -- which leaves room within itself for two later prevailing emphasis -- one in Judaism and the other in St. Paul:

As C.H. Dodd puts it:

"... (Second) Isaiah spoke of God as ... vindicating and so delivering His people. What **the** prophet has never made perfectly clear is whether they are thus vindicated on their merits, or by the sheer grace of God". (To which he adds: "Paul puts the matter beyond question") (4)

- (1) Lofthouse, ut. supra, 345, finds this tendency in Volz's Commentary on Second Isaiah (1932).
 (2) Cf. Isa. 41:10, 42:6, 45:8, 13, 51:5. Cp. Psa. 7:17, 35:24 ff.
 (3) Über die Derivate.... p.38.
 (4) Bible & The Greeks, p.58.

This charge of 'irresolution' does not overlook the great prophetic insight that the Prophet Isaiah did show. If it is true that he never negated the factor of the efficacy of human activity, it is nevertheless true that he lifted the essential demands of religion far above what Kent terms 'the increasing trend toward ceremonialism which was chilling the heart of Judaism'⁽¹⁾. Our charge, furthermore, does not deny to Isaiah a very lofty intuition of God's role in the deliverance of His people. This is seen in the following appraisal by Principal Lofthouse of the function of the 'righteousness of God':

"(God) is righteous when He keeps (this) covenant, as He always does and must do; they are unrighteous when they turn away from the personal relation of obedience and trust and reverence towards Him which the covenant demands; and then His righteousness is seen in a new light; it is His to bring them back, to restore them to the joy of the covenant state which they have wantonly flung aside, but which he will never forget or dishonour. What is righteousness in Him becomes salvation for them: and they once more are righteous".

"Such is the profound and daring conviction that animates the noblest passages of Second Isaiah, and is seen at its highest when the righteous servant of Jahveh, submitting to a death of dishonour and shame to release Jahveh's people from the load of their self-chosen alienation and sin, 'makes many righteous'. This insight, doubtless, can only be granted to a few; but throughout the OT righteousness always can be felt to imply the rightness of personal relations. Jahveh does not want the slavish or perfunctory obedience of His people; He wants their heart" (2)

We do note in Isaiah a tendency to limit the functioning of this 'righteousness' (and its resultant 'salvation') to those who are of Hebrew lineage⁽³⁾, and a failure expressly to grant full

(1) C.F. Kent, The Social Teachings of the Prophets and Jesus, 1932, 139

(2) Ut supra, Art. "The Righteousness of God", p.44lf.

(3) Isaiah 41:8-10; 43:1, 3ff, 11ff, 21. (This is not to deny to Isaiah any glimmerings of the supra-national potentialities within the 'righteousness of God' -- cf. Ch.42:6, cp. Psa.98:2,3-- but merely to indicate that the main 'burden' of his thought was Israel and her deliverance. Cf. Jer.51:10; Psa.37:6, 51:14).

scope to Divine grace⁽¹⁾. Nevertheless we see in the deep insight of Isaiah⁽²⁾, and reflected in others⁽³⁾, a (partial but) remarkable ^{the} ^{Partial} anticipation of the Gospel as set forth by St. Paul.

Undoubtedly Paul knew these passages we have quoted as well as he knew any of the sacred writings. But it would be a mistake to infer that from these alone his doctrine originated. Paul contradicts nothing that Isaiah affirms. For him, as for Isaiah, the 'righteousness of God' is a gift to His people -- though the one is indefinite and the other quite definite, as to the basis of the giving! He, like Isaiah, speaks of righteousness as a concomitant of salvation. And, like the Prophet, he speaks of righteousness as different from the universal salvation of mankind. Indeed, those who confuse salvation and righteousness err equally in their interpretation of Isaiah and Paul.

However, we note a certain amount of difference between the ways in which these two men speak of righteousness. Isaiah emphasizes more the outward appearance of righteousness: God will cause it to spring forth before all the nations. The whole world will see the vindication by Jehovah of His Chosen people. Paul also teaches that righteousness will appear, but his emphasis is on the individual rather than the nation. The history of Israel itself perhaps greatly helps to explain this change of stress. The Hebrews lay cardinal stress on the fact that they had Abraham for their father. Later Judaism stressed it, apparently, even more.

(1) See above quotation, p.(32), from C.H. Dodd). This is not to overlook the probability that Isaiah came nearer than any others of OT times, to realising the utter futility of human 'works' to achieve meritorious ethical right-ness (cf.64:6). But even the ethically un-righteous is not un-deserving in the covenant relationship!

(2) Note usage of sedakah in ch. 40-66, esp.56:1--62:1.

(3) Cf., e.g., Psa 35:24ff; 51:14; 94:4f; 96:2.

Paul found it necessary to devote the central portion of his Epistle to the Romans to the nullifying of this short-sighted boast. (Cf. 9:7f).

Surely it is significant that 18 of St. Paul's quotations from Isaiah in Romans are found within the limits of the three chapters in which he sets himself to nullify this boast. This is not to assert that this boast, or the broader teaching of merit, is clearly contained in Isaiah's writings. As we have shown, Isaiah's conception does not lend itself to easy analysis. But we have seen in him a certain irresolution potentially productive of emphasis on either merit or grace. If, as seems manifest, he reached nobly toward the inscrutable grace of God, yet his reach exceeded his grasp; for he could never entirely release from that grasp all idea of the efficacy of human works. This, we repeat, is inferred more from Isaiah's lack of clarity, than deduced from actual statements.

In Isaiah's prophetic passages we do have a lofty conception of the righteousness of God; and we have reason to believe that, to a great extent, Paul was consciously correcting not **so much** Isaiah, as a misconception fostered by the misreading of his writing. But he also goes far beyond even the teaching of Isaiah. For when Isaiah speaks of the 'righteousness' God will adjudicate, he seems to limit the recipients to those who are 'God's people' -- and he is not clear as to the efficient basis (merit or grace). Paul goes a 'seven-league' step further and very carefully defines God's people as those of EVERY race who BELIEVE in God, and rely absolutely on His grace!

RECAPITULATION.

In concluding our survey of the OT., what, briefly, have we learned of the meaning of 'righteousness' and the 'righteousness of God'? We recall our two introductory questions:

- (1) Can this term mean more than one thing at a time?
(i.e. Can it refer simultaneously to both God and man?)
- (2) How can the different meanings (if such there be), be reconciled, to form a unified concept?

Our unqualified answer to the first is, yes. While 'righteousness' seems sometimes to be spoken of as belonging to God (as in Psalm 98:2, etc.), and at other times as belonging to men, ⁽¹⁾ yet we have seen that neither has meaning apart from the other. This is seen as due to their integral and reciprocal relationship, as particularly implicit in the covenant relationship.

The latter statement has anticipated and answered our second question, as to the inclusion of diverse elements in a unified concept. Both redemptive and retributive elements are possible, nay, necessary, in the OT conception of the righteousness of God as an activity. For "a righteous God must distinguish in his dealings between the wicked man, who neither fears God nor deals justly with men, and the righteous man, who though he be not perfect but is indeed often confessedly a sinner, yet relatively speaking lives uprightly and trusts in God". ⁽²⁾ The underscored portions of this sentence from Burton intimate the so-called 'moral-forensic' usage of the term, and its patent modification within the reciprocal relationship (Divine-human) inherent in the covenant.

(1) So Denney, Romans (ExGkTest) p.590.

(2) So Burton, Galatians (ICC) p.462. (Underscorings mine).

If there is one word in the Old Testament scriptures which comes near summarising the composite meaning of the term we have been studying, it is seen in the name which the Prophet Jeremiah gives to God himself -- a name which illumines at once the source, the end, and the reciprocal nature of the term: '(Jehovah) OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS' ! This one word in the Hebrew is:

יְדִקְנוּ



PART II.'RIGHTEOUSNESS' IN THE AGE OF TRANSITION.Introductory.

Between the relatively smooth channels of Mosaic-Prophetic religion in the Old Testament, and the relatively unified stream of religious thought in the New Testament, we encounter nothing more nor less than a spiritual maelstrom. The difficulties which scholarship experiences in attempting to trace the many social and political, as well as religious, cross-currents which converge at this point of world history, is tacit evidence of its complexity. With justifiable trepidation we single out and consider briefly only certain of these streams of thought, in this period of transition, for such additional light on our particular theme as they afford.

We shall look first at what we loosely term "Pharisaism", or normative Judaism, including both Rabbinical and Apocryphal elements. Moving then from this more Palestinian sphere, we study Diaspora Judaism as particularly revealed in its greatest document, the Septuagint translation. To this study will be appended a consid^{er}ation of Josephus and Philo, as classical examples of Hellenistic Judaism. As for the possible contribution to our theme of Hellenism itself, we shall require to look briefly at Stoicism and the Mystery Religions.

CHAPTER I.LEGALISTIC PHARISAISM AND "RIGHTFOUSNESS".

By 'Pharisaism' we refer, for convenience sake, to that "continuing stream of religious ideas and practices, flowing from the time of Ezra.... and widening and deepening to form the Judaism called normative"⁽¹⁾, -- that system of belief and practice in which law and religion are 'inseparably blended and hardly to be distinguished'. More specifically we mean that development of the religion of Israel a long a line which "began with Ezra , continued with the Sopherim, the early Scribes, was taken up by the 'Pharisees' properly so-called, and carried on by the Rabbis whose teachings are recorded in the Talmud and cognate literature".⁽²⁾ Under this heading we shall also treat the Jewish Apocryphal writings.

The name 'Legalistic Pharisaism' seems allowable, - despite the necessity for distinguishing the temporary party-label "Pharisee", - since it conceives a vast system in terms of principles which remained substantially consistent throughout.⁽³⁾ It is this larger Pharisaism, which forms Paul's background, and against whose beliefs and practices nascent Christianity most definitively fulminated, with which we are concerned.

We cannot hope to investigate the highly selective and dogmatically related history of this long period, such as that traced in

(1) A.C. Purdy (et al.) Jew and Greek, 1936, 55.

(2) So R.T. Herford, 'The Law and Pharisaism', Judaism and Christianity vol.III (Ed. E. Rosenthal), p.92. He uses 'Pharisaism' in this sense.

(3) Hence the allowable extension of the term to include Ezra, the 're-integrator' of Law and religion (b.Sanh.21b;b.Succ.20a), who in canonical literature is termed a 'Scribe' (Ez.7:6). C.H.Toy, Judaism and Christianity, 252: "Pharisaism was practically identical with Judaism". Cf. Herford, Pharisaism, 1912, 16.

Pirke Aboth, from Ezra and the men of the Great Synagogue -- Simon the Righteous -- Antigonus of Socho -- through the pairs of colleagues in each succeeding generation down to Shammai and Hillel. But we do note, as significant for our present study, that through the whole period "from Sirach⁽¹⁾ and beyond, an uninterrupted stream of influence, characterized by reverence for the Law and its development through tradition, flowed down through the centuries"⁽²⁾. They were, then, the inheritors and transmitters -- and interpreters -- of the Law. The nation became the embodiment of devotion to an external standard of right. Here is seen perhaps the most thoroughgoing attempt in all history to order the whole of life by religion.⁽³⁾ But this centralizing of Law proved bane, as well as blessing. C.H. Toy points out two difficulties in attempting to devise and impose an absolutely controlling external standard:

"... it is impossible for man to construct a perfect law, and even that which is relatively perfect for one generation is in danger of losing its pertinancy for the next;

"... and what is more serious, the Law does not in itself supply the motive of conduct, -- tends, indeed, by emphasizing the outward standard, to attract the will from that inward love and devotion which is the mainspring of the moral-religious life".⁽⁴⁾

Actually this seems a very true picture of what transpired in the case of Pharisaism. This seems most clearly demonstrated in the very concept which is the object of our study -- righteousness.

Turning back for a moment, we remember that in the OT we found this this concept of righteousness had a double sense -- the written code which the masses tended to follow more or less perfunctorily,

- (1) This is attested by internal evidence in Ecclesiasticus. Cf. Purdy, ut sup., 58 (with supporting references: Gore, Oesterley).
 (2) Purdy, ibid, 65. Eventually he takes this back to Ezra (p.67).
 (3) So Purdy, ibid, 73.
 (4) Toy, ut sup, 240.

-- and the higher righteousness which such voices in the Wilderness as those of Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekial extolled; the righteousness which springs from a harmonious attitude and impulse of heart. To both these ranges of conception Judaism was heir. 'Righteousness', certainly, was one of the most dominant factors in their religious thought and practice. And even at the advent of Christianity, we know that righteousness was the very highest moral ideal, the guiding principle in the conduct of life, the summum bonum of earthly existence.

We could dwell at greater length on this, the brighter side of Pharisaic nomistic development ⁽¹⁾ and its quest for righteousness -- "the creation of a self-centred, well-balanced, intelligent, and strenuous moral-religious life, illustrated by many shining examples of lofty probity and spiritual piety". ⁽²⁾ According to another writer:

"... Righteousness was (its) keynote, and the honour of the one true God (the) constant theme. So full of contaminating influences was the age... so deadly the pressure of the surrounding paganism, that laxity of any kind could not be tolerated: rigid obedience to law and tradition was the one hope of salvation..." (3)

But if the centrality given to righteousness was Pharisaism's greatest blessing, the way it went about to attain this righteousness was its greatest curse. (4) The inevitable evils of nomism began to make themselves apparent. ⁽⁵⁾ Toy points out many of these ill effects.

(1) There is very much, in the works of qualified writers on Pharisaism (such as Travers Herford, Schlechter, Montefiore, Oesterley, Loewe, Abrahams, Moore, and Purdy), which successfully clears up some of the charges made against Pharisaism by its less kindly critics (as Weber, Schurer, Charles and Bousset). But, while such clarification deserves to be better known, in order that Pharisaism may be more sympathetically understood, we can hardly do more here than acknowledge that clarification (of many examples, see 'halachah and haggadah'). But we must nevertheless affirm that the inevitable evils of nomism in Pharisaism mentioned hereinafter do seem substantiated by the facts.

(2) Toy, ut supra, 241.

(3) J.S. Stewart, A Man in Christ, 1935, p36.

(4) So S. & H. p.29.

(5) Toy, ut supra, 241ff.

Pride, hostile to moral-religious growth, sprang from a consciousness of the possession of the 'oracles of God' and all attendant privileges. This pride, naturally repellant, alienated foreign thought, and tended to isolate Pharisaism and induce, in it, moral blindness to its own defects. Complete devotion to an external law brought increasing stress on details, on the code as a code⁽¹⁾, and a consequent loss of deeper spiritual tone. The multiplication of particulars, bearing on every phase and individual act of life (as seen fully developed in the Talmud and Midraschic accretions), brought the most lamentable -- and for our study most significant -- result: the tendency to define righteousness as obedience to a mass of precepts. The natural outgrowth was a system of casuistry that paralyzed the moral sense. And the result of increasing slavery to the letter of the law was that "righteousness was not the essence of the soul, but a garment which could shift its place and be put off and on at the pleasure of the wearer"⁽²⁾. Isaiah spoke more prophetically than he realized, when he said, of this lower concept: "our righteousness is but filthy rags".

This is by no means a total deprecation of Pharisaism in belief or in practice. Such would be unfair. And here we grant⁽³⁾ fullest sympathy to the former group in the abovementioned "schools", who rightly resent what seems to resemble condescension in judging Pharisaism by the standard of the Christian religion, and seeming

(1) So S. & H, p.29.

(2) Toy, ut sup., 244-5.

(3) See footnote number one, page preceding. Herford (Pharisaism p.vi), seems to imply this when he speaks of Weber: "He is typical of them all in their attitude towards Rabbinical Judaism".

therewith to demean Pharisaism in toto. For, indeed, within the Pharisaic system, as we have already pointed out, there were shining examples of lofty probity and spiritual piety "from Mattathias and Judas Maccabaeus to Hillel, Gamaliel, Akiba, and Jehuda the Holy"⁽¹⁾. But we are forced to affirm that the above analysis of the prevailing trend of Pharisaic thought does fairly portray the 'logical tendencies of the Jewish Law'⁽²⁾. And its heavy toll taken on the spirituality of Pharisaism is as indubitable as it was inevitable. Anomalous though it is, in the case of a people, at least outwardly, the most religious of all religious groups, the conclusion seems justified that: "substantially, the familiar picture of Pharisaic religion in the NT is true to fact"⁽³⁾. This is true, we conclude, not because they had the Law, with its sublime moral-spiritual potentialities, but because they so preponderantly abused it.⁽⁴⁾

This study of the background and logical tendency (increasingly nomistic) of Pharisaism has anticipated our more specific study of their actual Judaistic concepts of righteousness, and the righteousness of God. The essential idea of relationship, inherent in the terms since OT times, remained. But the whole conception had become so externalized that the human aspect of 'righteousness' was conceived of as obedience to law⁽⁵⁾, and the conception of the 'righteousness of God' was one of judicial righteousness, manifesting

(1) Toy, ut sup., 245.

(2) Toy, Ibid, 245; cf. 265.

(3) J.S. Stewart, Op.Cit. 37.

(4) Toy, Op.Cit., 267, and S.H. 29.

(5) S. & H., 30.

itself in distributive (redemptive and retributive) justice. It had become a matter of one's "own righteousness, which is of the Law".

The words of Feine are definitive:

".... der Pharisaismus... (hat)... unter der göttlichen Gerechtigkeit die richterliche Gerechtigkeit verstanden, der zufolge Gott den Gerechten belohnt, den Ungerechten verdammt, und unter der menschlichen Gerechtigkeit die Erfüllung des Gesetzes, welche Anspruch auf göttliche Anerkennung und göttlichen Lohn gewährt. Die menschliche Gerechtigkeit war also für ihn durchaus aktive Gerechtigkeit, die Rechtfertigung die "göttliche Anerkennung der tatsächlichen Rechtsbeschaffenheit des Menschen.... im Sinn des Pharisaismus und des Judentums überhaupt..... ein analytisches Urteil". (1)

Here we are squarely confronted with the problem of MERIT and GRACE, an understanding of which is indispensable to our understanding of the Pharisaic concept of 'righteousness' and the 'righteousness of God', and its relationship to OT and Pauline concepts.

Throughout the OT we saw the existence of an idea of grace. Its existence and fundamental importance are patent, despite what Bousset termed an 'unresolved tension' between this conception and that of divine justice. Even the giving of the Law was felt by Israel to be an act of divine grace; and covenant-grace was an indispensable element in their religion. It is the wonder of the 8th century prophets. Jeremiah elevated the idea as he proclaimed the new covenant, inward and written on the heart. The riches of grace were the theme of worship, as seen in the devotional literature of the Psalter. Job, and indeed Jonah, contributed much to the progressive insight into the nature of grace; and Deutero-Isaiah carried the idea perhaps to its greatest heights, as the faithful in Israel were called upon to suffer, that the nation

(1) P. Feine, Theol. des N.T. 1910, p.402.

might be led from unrighteousness to righteousness; from estrangement to communion.

Now the question is, did Pharisaic theology continue to evolve the new religious values (ethical and spiritual) as taught by Jeremiah, the Psalmist, Job, and Deutero-Isaiah? There seems to be dubiety as to the answer. In legalistic Pharisaism these loftier trends of thought ebbed rather than flowed. In addition to the increased stress on good works for the achievement of righteousness, a doctrine of Grace remained. But the idea of Grace had become hardened into what might almost be termed a 'nationalistic apologetic dogma'. Against increasing outside attack on its nation, its Torah and its religious unity, Pharisaism barricaded itself behind an exclusive and deterministic formula, that divine grace availed only for the 'saint' within the Covenant framework. By this process, 'Grace' was reduced to a cold regulative principle. To a person outside the Covenant scheme, it was unavailable; to the one within, it was not only available, but was the essential presupposition of the efficacy of good works.

We note, then, that it is not the disappearance of a doctrine of Grace, nor a mere dependence on good works, but a tendency to regiment Grace itself, that made Pharisaism so intolerable to nascent Christianity. The 'righteous' can form a 'limited corporation' within the sanctions of the Torah, and can even discriminate against fellow Jews.⁽¹⁾

Though divine Grace, then, is an essential presupposition, yet 'righteousness' has come to mean something that a man can DO. He who does righteousness lays up treasure of life with God!⁽²⁾

(1) I Macc. 2:44; 10:61; I Enoch 13:6f (cf. I Enoch 103:14f)

(2) Pag. Sol. 9:9.

Here we perceive that religion has become greatly individualized. Formerly it was Israel that was exhorted to incline its heart to Jehovah: individual misdeeds were not felt to be destructive of the communal Covenant relationship. In these later times God's justice was conceived of more and more as distributive (justitia distributiva): the individual can only insure his deliverance as he actually does God's will. Conversely, as he performs so will he be judged (i.e., rewarded or punished). Thus we see the emergence of the view that the more a man did the more he deserved; the more "righteousness" he "performed", the surer he was of the divine acknowledgment, of being declared righteous by God.

Before we pass on to a consideration of this doctrine of Merit, it is important to notice the linguistic usage of *δικαιοσύνη* and its cognates in the Jewish literature now under consideration. Since this usage is so very closely related to that seen throughout the LXX⁽¹⁾, which is more fully treated in the following chapter, we need here only summarize the Rabbinical and Apocryphal usage. As in the Old Testament (and in the LXX), so here also, "Righteousness" represents a moral-forensic usage, implying a judgment based on a Norm, and expressed in terms of a relationship. The "righteousness of God" is seen in His discriminating (judgment) between the "righteous" and the wicked, delivering the former and punishing the latter.⁽²⁾

(1) Feine, Op.cit., 410: "... in durchaus verwandter Weise gebraucht".

(2) Sirach 10:29; 42:2; Ps. Sol. 2:16; cf. 2:12,19,26; 5:1, 8:8, 9:4,10:6; cp. 17:35; Enoch 10:16,18; 12:4, 13:10; 32:3 (For Rabbinical examples, cf: Pesikt. r. 40; b.Erub. 19a; Midr. Ps. 143; Tg. Ps. 51:6, cit. TWB, II 216).

The usage of the verb bears out this forensic nature of the whole concept. (1) However a definite element of externalism is to be seen. When "righteousness" is used in reference to man, it shows the narrowing and hardening of the term, as compared with the Old Testament usage. Here it is more predominantly legalistic and formal, constituting that which makes man acceptable to God, (2) indeed at times seeming to equate "righteousness" with the very "acceptance" which is "secured". (3) Thus we return to our discussion of "righteousness" as something a man can do, as "meritorious good works". (4)

This development of a doctrine of Merit, based on observance of the Torah, is a predominant characteristic in Jewish literature. Alms and the saying of prayers and observing of fasts are spoken of as better than the laying up of gold. (5) This affirmation of Tobit is echoed in the writings of Ben Sira (6), who also attaches merit to the honouring of parents (7), and visiting the sick. (8) Accumulated merit (the Zachuth of the Fathers), could even overrule later sin (9) though in Midrashic literature this was limited to the merit of the Patriarchs. In further writings, alms are equivalent to

- (1) Sirach 10:29; 13:22; 18:2; 23:11; 26:29; Cp 42:2; Test.XII: Sim 6:1; Dan 3:3; Esth 10:9; Tob 6:12,13; 12:4; Cp IV Ezra 4:18; 10:16; Cp (human parallel): Ps.Sol 2:16; 8:7, 27:31.
 (2) Tob 13:9; 14:11; Wisd. 1:15.
 (3) Wisd 14:7; esp. 15:3; Cf. I. Macc. 2:52.
 (4) Schrenk (TWB, II,198) "verdienstlichen guten Werken...."
 (5) Tobit 12:8ff.
 (6) Ibid, 7:10; cf. 3:30; 29:12-13.
 (7) It brings atonement for sin. See 3:3,14:16.
 (8) Ben Sira 7:35.
 (9) Ben Sira 47:12

righteousness; ⁽¹⁾ upholding the law enlists the help of Providence ⁽²⁾,
and to the man who has merit, even death itself need offer no
anxiety. ⁽³⁾

Against our charge of a doctrine of Merit, or of the closely related idea of ex opere operato, there is a certain amount of protest, but none of which seems substantially to negate the above described general trends. Herford denies the charge against Pharisaism as being a 'merely legal religion', and says such a view takes into ⁽⁴⁾ consideration only the Halachah, to the exclusion of the Haggadah. While we do not press a charge of 'pure legalism', yet we would answer that even the Haggadah existed for the sole purpose of aiding a person more completely than ever, to fulfil the whole law. The above writer also claims that the theory of opus operatum "was definitely ruled out by the Pharisaic teachers", ⁽⁵⁾ but he adduces no supporting references whatever. In another volume, he makes this significant statement regarding an adherent of Pharisaism: "He can always repent; and if he does, God will always forgive him" ⁽⁶⁾ He admits that this belief makes possible a sort of "easy presumption of forgiveness". Of this danger, however, he says the Pharisees were well aware, and were careful to warn against it. But here again he adduces no documentary evidence to that effect. Later, in defining 'Zachuth' (merit), he says it was an "accumulation of

(1) Tes. Levi, 13:5

(2) Ibid, 321f.

(3) II Baruch 51:3, 85:2; cf. 14:12.

(4) Judaism and Christianity, vol. III, (Ed. E. Rosenthal), p. 111.

(5) Ibid (J & C. Vol. iii,) p. 117.

(6) Pharisaism, 215. (underscor. mine)

goodness, through the performance of 'Mitzvoth'".⁽¹⁾ But then the writer hastens to add that "they were careful to keep the idea of merit within limits", and describes the merit acquired as "not a motive, but an accessory".⁽¹⁾ Again --- after acknowledging that "they believed, certainly, that merit counted for much with God" -- he urges: "But they did not presume to set up a claim against Him; and while they pleaded merit before Him, they were taught that it was not their own merit they should plead, but that of others".⁽²⁾ But in this he contradicts his own definition (above) of "Zachuth", and reduces his argument ad absurdum. We cannot escape the conviction that to actual performance, definite merit was attached. And, despite the possibility of a deeper insight on the part of some, the conclusion seems quite justified that, as Oesterley states:

"... wheresoever the Law was practised there the Divine Presence was ipso facto manifesting itself.."
(3)

Schrenk, in speaking of statute obedience as the central element in the 'background of the Rabbinical conception', clearly points out the rationale of this system of merit:

(1) Pharisaism, (278 (underscoring mine))

(2) ibid 279. (Note quotation from b.Ber. 10^b. He who pleads the merits of others is answered for his own....")

(3) Parting of The Roads, p.92.

"Jede Gebotserfüllung (קִיּוּם) schliesst ein Verdienst ein (זְכוּת), das sich der Israelit vor Gott erwirbt... Die Anhäufung von Gebotserfüllung und guten Werken, dh Verdiensten, wird zum Ziel.... Der stand vor Gott richtet sich genau nach dem Überwiegen der Verdienste oder Übertretungen. Das rechtfertigende Urteil Gottes im Endgericht hat der Israelit dann für sich, wenn seine Verdienste überwiegen. Dann steht er vor Gott als Gerechter da. Das Verfahren des Endgerichtes besteht in der Untersuchung, ob die Wagschale des Verdienstes oder die der Schuld die Oberhand behält". (1)

In their attempt to meet the onslaught against their faith, the Pharisaic community lay increasing stress on the greatness of God's favour to them in giving them the Law and its privileges, -- which favour was only available for members who stood within the Law. (3) This idea of favour, or grace, was a real one⁽²⁾, though exclusive, and they did view it as necessary, even though merely as a pre-supposition of the efficacy of their good works, which were considered equally necessary, under the Law!

James Moffat infers (from the quotation in Makkot 23b) the normal temper of Scribism: "it was because the Holy One wished to give Israel an opportunity to acquire merit that He gave them so much Torah and so many commandments". He quotes further, a modern writer's conclusion: "Man has got the ability to acquire merits before the Heavenly Father. However weak and frail man may be, physically and morally, he is in a position to gather merits in the eyes of God"⁽⁴⁾.

(1) Schrenk, TWB II, 198.

(2) See Ass. Moses 12:7f,31; cf. 5:15; 7:4f; Ben Sira 11:26; 13:11; 18:13f; IV Ezdras 7:132-140.

(3) The feeling of ethical superiority (through the knowledge of the divine revelation in the Torah), involved a strict emphasis on moral uprightness, but says Moffatt (Grace in the N.T. 247): "it also tended to produce the feeling that God, being merciful, would not be unduly hard upon the offences of the People, whatever might be the case with the idolatrous and lax pagans" (underscoring mine).

(4) Op.Cit., 247.

(5) A.Marmorstein, The Doctrine of Merits in Old Rabbinical Literature, 10. (cit. Ibid, 247).

Such was the restless nature of Pharisaism; the ever-increasing and exclusive arrogation to its 'saddikim' alone the Grace of Jehovah through the Law, and at the same time, the desperate and cumulative efforts to 'establish' their 'own righteousness' through rigorous obedience to that Law. The "righteousness of Jehovah" had lost its fuller Old Testament meaning⁽¹⁾, and now bespoke the strict justice of God's judgment⁽²⁾. Over against this concept of divine righteousness, we find constant reference to God's saving 'goodness' and 'mercy' -- but there seems little compromise, indeed strong antagonism, between these two spheres of thought⁽³⁾, as contrasted with Paul's postulate of forensic adjudgment of 'righteousness' through 'grace'⁽⁴⁾.

It is true that we constantly encounter the view in Jewish literature that the quantity of divine 'goodness' is somehow greater than that of the divine 'righteousness', and there is the consequent vague hope that grace for the Jews will prevail against strict justice; that indulgence will somehow outweigh legal strictness.⁽⁵⁾ But they were nevertheless unable to escape the idea of God's 'righteousness' as strictly juridical in its nature:

(1) See Schrenk, TWB II 198. צדקה יהוה (Dt 33:21) was characteristically interpreted as applying to Moses himself (who in his charitable acts was godly); or as meritorious in the sight of God, or as justice in judgment.

(2) Cf. Ps. Sol. 2:16; 3:5; 4:28; 8:29f,31; 9:3,7; cp. 2:12,19,36; 3:3, 5:1, 8:27, 10: 6, 17:2; Jub 21:4, cit. ut sup. 199.

(3) Ibid (TWB) 199.

(4) Some evidence to the contrary is seen, e.g. in 4 Ez.8:36, which comes very near to the Pauline usage. But Feine (ut sup. p.401) would disclaim this as characteristic, and Schrenk, (ut sup.199) says that this concept, at most, "an der Grenze des Spätjudentums steht, und.... in Ps. Sal. undenkbar wäre".

(5) So Schrenk, *ibid*, 199. See extensive references in footnotes number 26 and 27.

"Der Glaube an die Barmherzigkeit und Güte Gottes verschwindet zwar keineswegs aus der spätjüdischen Frömmigkeit. Oft und viel ist in den Schriften dieser Zeit von ihr die Rede. Aber, sie beherrscht doch nicht mehr das Denken des Frommen. Sie steht unausgeglichen neben dem Glauben an Gottes richterliche Gerechtigkeit, und diese ist es überwiegend, welche der Jude furchtet". (1)

Schrenk, considering both these elements in Judaistic thought, concludes:-

"... es bleibt in der Synagoge bei der Unsicherheit, bei einem tastenden Hin und Her, wenn Gottes Gerechtigkeit und sein Erbarmen gegeneinander abgewogen werden". (2)

As we thus complete our study of 'Pharisaism', we have a picture that makes 'Saul of Tarsus' a very understandable figure: his passionate, desperate search for "righteousness", and his vehement persecution of emergent christianity, which threatened the sole authority of the LAW. At the same time, we have seen in Judaism's decadent admixture of regimented-Grace and Righteousness-based-on-merit, the intolerable situation from which the same Saul of Tarsus finally and completely broke away. Lastly, and most specifically, we realise that, only as we hold fresh in our minds this outlook of Judaism, can we see the full and revolutionary significance of the Apostle Paul's dynamic proclamation of

A RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD -- APART FROM THE LAW!

(1) Feine, ut sup. 401.

(2) Schrenk, ut sup. 199.

CHAPTER II

DIASPORA JUDAISM AND THE SEPTUAGINT

"Ye are entreated...to make your perusal with favour and attention, and to be indulgent, if in any parts of what we have laboured to interpret we may seem to fail in some of the phrases. For things originally spoken in Hebrew have not the same force when they are translated into another tongue..." (1)

In these words, the grandson of Jesus Sirach, translating his illustrious grandfather's Ecclesiasticus into Greek, shows an acute consciousness of the difficulty of transmitting an exact idea in a translation.

As we turn to the consideration of a parallel phenomenon, the Septuagint translation of the Hebrew canonical Scriptures into Greek, we cannot afford to ignore this classical warning. Literal transmission is an impossible art; for the terms of one language seldom, if ever, convey precisely the same idea as the corresponding words of another tongue. The inevitable differences, both of thoughts and their expression, make translation, at best, an interpretation.

The translation by the septuaginta had two important results. The passage of the Scriptures from Hebrew into Greek caused the words and concepts partly to lose one set of associations, and partly to gain another. And at the same time there was imported into the Greek terms something (hitherto unknown to them) of the value of the Hebrew word they now represented. (2)

(1) From the Prologue to 1st Chapter of Ecclesiasticus, vvs 15ff.

(2) Thus C. H. Dodd, The Bible and The Greeks, 1935, p. xi.

The value of the Septuagint as a grammatical and lexical link between the Hebrew of the Old Testament and the Greek of the New Testament can scarcely be overestimated. This translation, through its use during the two centuries before Christ, had naturally endeared itself to the Jews. It constituted the fundamental document of Hellenistic Judaism; and was undoubtedly a mighty instrument in their hands as they dealt with the Gentiles. However Paul was to find it a 'two-edged sword', equally powerful in combatting errors in Judaism itself. It facilitated religious thought in the Greek vernacular, though it introduced subtle differences in Diaspora Judaism. Furthermore, although we must make due allowance for its peculiar Zeitgeist, it is indispensable for our understanding of the New Testament writers; for while they wrote in Greek, they were thinking largely in terms of Hebrew categories.

St. Paul's Use of the Septuagint

Scholars are not all agreed that Paul used the Septuagint exclusively when he referred to the Old Testament. We are not always able to say just what version lay behind a specific excerpt. C. H. Toy points out that the Apostle "almost always" cites the Septuagint.⁽¹⁾


For our purposes it is not necessary to inquire further into the exact source of individual quotations. What is important is this fact that Paul usually quotes the Septuagint. That means that the version with which he was most familiar was in Greek.

(1) Quotations in the New Testament, 1884, p. xxxvi. He differs with Kautzsch (De V.T. Locis a Paul. Ap. Allegatis), who maintains Paul's exclusive use of the LXX; in some passages where it is hard to explain his words from the Greek, a citation from an Aramaic translation is suggested. Cf. BFT, 2. Reihe, 18 Band, 1929, pp 53ff; Cp. H. St. J. Thackeray, The Relation of St. Paul to Contemporary Jewish Thought, 1900, p. 181.

The more he used the LXX the more likely it is that its modes of expression lay behind his own writings; nevertheless, in and behind each Greek expression, he was in a position to see the larger linguistic background and the less tangible Hebraic connotation. Since he is bi-lingual, he can speak to his congregation of *δικαιοσύνη*, the familiar LXX word, and yet be quite aware of the deeper significance of the underlying *צדק*.

But this is to anticipate the character of the LXX usage, to which we must now turn for fuller investigation. By noting just which Hebrew words are translated by these Greek words, and by discovering what other Greek words are used more or less interchangeably, we can approach the more precise meaning of the Greek. A further reference to the Hexapla, Origen's third Century version, should also contribute to the understanding of the shades of meaning.

The inter-relation of *צדק* and *δικαιοσύνη*, and their connotations for the LXX translators, might be more easily visualized by some such partial list as that below, in which the two words are linked up with most of the forms by which they are translated:



'Righteousness' and 'Mercy'

Both to a classical Greek scholar and a classical Hebrew scholar, the above inter-relation would undoubtedly seem strange. The chief reason for this, and one that is very significant for our study, is seen in the following analysis of the usage of 'righteousness' and of 'mercy':

The Hebrew word דִּקְדֻּשׁ , usually translated by $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\sigma\upsilon\eta$, is translated in at least twelve passages by $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\eta\mu\omicron\sigma\upsilon\eta$ (or by $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$); and דִּסְחָ , conventionally rendered by some form of the word $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$, is yet translated in ten instances (in Genesis, Exodus, Proverbs, and Isaiah) by $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\sigma\upsilon\eta$ (once by $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\varsigma$).

Now the fact that the LXX translators are seen here to give 'righteousness' an added 'eleemosynary' connotation, does not imply that the two conceptions were so nearly merged in the minds of the Old Testament writers. Our study of the Old Testament showed us that, while both 'mercy' and 'justice' were closely associated with the divine-human covenant relationship of 'righteousness', yet that 'righteousness' was never mere justice nor mere benevolence. On the other hand, our study of later Judaism clearly revealed just this erroneous tendency to conceive 'righteousness' in terms of eleemosynary acts! The fact that דִּסְחָ which lies definitely outside the scope of what $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\sigma\upsilon\eta$ meant to the Greek, could yet be forced by the LXX into $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\sigma\upsilon\eta$ ⁽¹⁾, reveals some of the confusion that prevailed in this period of Hellenization. This confusion, (or combination, which resulted in confusion of terms), is further demonstrated in the rendering of דִּקְדֻּשׁ (in both its human and divine aspects), as $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ ⁽²⁾,

(1) Cf. Gen. 19:19; 20:13; 21:23; 24:27 32:10; Ex. 15:13; Pro. 20:22

(2) Isa. 56:1.

or as *ἐνφροσύνη*⁽¹⁾. In one instance, **קִדְשׁ** appears in the form of *δικαιοσύνη*, which the Greek reader understands as justice; in another instance, **קִדְשׁ** suddenly becomes *ἔλεος*, and the reader is now obliged to think of mercy. This intermingling of "righteousness" and "mercy" would have to be put down as inexplicable, except for the fact that they reflect the trend of the times when the LXX translation was made. C. H. Dodd concludes:

"This overlapping of *δικαιοσύνη* and *ἐλεημοσύνη*, both representing sometimes **קִדְשׁ**, sometimes **חַסֵּד**, is a curious linguistic phenomenon. It is explained partly by the lack of any quite exact equivalence between the Greek and the Hebrew words, but more significantly by the tension within Judaism, between the older and more humane religion, of which the prophets were the leading exponents, and the growing legalism of the period in which the LXX translation was made" (2).

Let us look at this characteristic trend of the times, from the standpoint of the genial Old Testament word **חַסֵּד**⁽³⁾. This originally represented a kindly attitude and activity which went beyond the requirements of strict justice. It was the element that made piety warm. It was enjoined in the Law. And to a man who did **חַסֵּד**, the name **חַסֵּדִים** became attached. But as increasing externalism began to stereotype all religious concepts, this kindly ingredient of the term fell entirely into the background. The 'religious' of the post-Exilic period still called themselves the **חַסֵּדִים**⁽⁴⁾, but had come to conceive piety more and more exclusively as strict devotion to the law, whether or not it had any direct relation to human kindness! This same unfortunate tendency manifested itself in their concept of the **חַסֵּד** of God, to whom the term (LXX: *ὄσιος*) became likewise applied.

(1) Isa. 61:10

(2) Dodd, ut supra, 65.

(3) Cf. Dodd, ibid., section on Mercy, pp. 59-65.

(4) The Greek parallel becomes *οἱ δίκαιοι*

Thus from another angle we have witnessed the externalizing process that took place in the whole conception of the God-man relationship. As a natural result of the nomistic tendency of the age, all the finer distinctions in piety and redemption have been amalgamated into a predominantly legalistic system. Gottlob Schrenk finds, regarding the concept of divine righteousness, that despite evidences of a "hellsbetonten Gerechtigkeit" yet "auch die rein richterliche Gerechtigkeit, die lediglich auf ihn das Bild des Richters anwendet, einfach durch *δικαιοσύνη* wiedergegeben wird. (LXX: Ps. 9:5; 34:24; 95:13)"⁽¹⁾ And he thus summarizes the conception of the period on the human aspect of righteousness:

"Als das Gott wohlgefällige Tun seines Willens erscheint die *δικαιοσύνη* im Gegensatz zur *ἀνομία* : Js 5:7; Tob 14:7...und Sap 5:6... Hier hat das Wort die Bedeutung: Rechtschaffenheit (vgl Eph 5:9). Der Parallelismus entspricht dem göttlichen Vorbild, in dem sich *קִדְּוָה* und *קִדְּוָה* eint. (Von Gott: Sach 8:8; OSal 25:10; Pist Soph 69; vom Menschen: 3 Bas 3:6)"⁽²⁾

A noteworthy reaction to this intermingling of concepts is seen in the Hexapla of Origen and the revisers. Here we find changes from Greek to Greek. Edwin Hatch believes the change from *δικαιοσύνη* to *ἐλεημοσύνη*, and vice versa, were motivated by a desire for exactness. The revisers apparently desired to utilize with regularity *ἐλεημοσύνη* for *ἰσχυρία* and *δικαιοσύνη* for *ἰσχυρία*. Hatch's explanation of this phenomenon⁽³⁾ is that the sense in which *δικαιοσύνη* was used in the LXX was a peculiar one, not universally accepted. Is it not also possible that in the interest of greater precision and a nicer observance of the classical usage, the Hexapla revisers went back to a meaning antedating that of the LXX times? They would thus come nearer to the Classical, than to the Hellenistic Greek.

(1) TWB, II, 198.

(2) Ibid., 198.

(3) Cf. E. Hatch, Essays in Biblical Greek, 1889, pp. 45-51.

The fact that the revisers thought it desirable to define these two words more precisely would lead us to believe that, although the words had influenced each other and become confused in the popular mind at the time of the LXX translations, they still possessed quite distinct meanings some centuries later. If the Hexapla revisers quite consistently distinguished them, there is no reason for believing that they were necessarily synonymous for Paul. All his writings are eloquent testimony to the contrary. And, if in the Apostle's writings these great concepts of righteousness and mercy and grace become first clearly reconciled, it is for no other reason than that he has first clearly distinguished them for confused contemporary thought.

It is interesting to note that a trace of this intermingling of concepts still remains in Matthew 6:1 -- "Take heed that ye do not your ALMS (righteousness) before men..." Hatch remarks: "The established reading is unfortunately *δικαιοσύνην*, for which the later uncials and most cursives have the other term *ἐλεημοσύνην*, and for which also an early reviser of Cod. Aleph, as in some similar cases in the LXX, substituted *δοσιν* ⁽¹⁾."

While, then, Paul read the LXX, and perforce used the term *δικαιοσύνην* for "righteousness", the preponderant evidence is that his usage of *δικαιοσύνην* harkens back to the fuller meaning of צדקה. Delitzsch undoubtedly recaptures this fuller Pauline connotation of δικαιούμενοι δωρεάν τῆ αὐτοῦ χάριτι (Ro 3:24), as he translates it back into the Hebrew:

וְנִצְדְּקוּ הַנֶּאֱמָר בְּהַסְדָּו (2)

(1) Hatch, ut supra, p. 51.

(2) Delitzsch, הברית החדשה, in loco.

ΔΙΚΑΛΟΥΝ IN THE SEPTUAGINT

Our discussion of the content of "righteousness" has already anticipated the forensic usage of the words concerned. This forensic element is clearly manifested in the employment of the word δικαλόω. The primary implication in this usage is that of a declarative action based on a judicial judgment.

Except in some seven passages, where δικαλόω appears as a translation of other Hebrew words, it represents the Kal, Piel, Hithpa'el or Hiph'il of קָדַשׁ. But the prevailingly forensic usage holds, even where δικαλόω appears in translation of these other Hebrew words (רִיב, זָכָה, rarely בָּהֶן, שָׁפַת).

This declarative element in the usage of the verb is widely recognized. Schrenk traces this in detail through the various active as well as passive Greek forms, and on the basis of his investigation declares the 'forensische Moment' even more manifest in the LXX than in the Massoretic text.⁽¹⁾ As we traced the Hiph'il usage in the Hebrew text, so we could trace the corresponding forms in the LXX. We would again find a prevailingly forensic usage, as for example in Exodus 23:7; Deuteronomy 25:1; II Samuel 15:4; Psalms 82:3⁽²⁾; Proverbs 17:15; Isaiah 5:23; 50:8; and 52:11⁽³⁾. We shall return to a discussion of the declarative usage, as contrasted with a usage implying "to make righteous"; but as for the forensic element in the LXX usage, it seems patent.

If קָדַשׁ underwent a change when translated in the LXX, it is only natural to suppose that the causative verb form in Greek experienced an extension of meaning. Δικαλόουν in the nor-

(1) TWB, II, p. 216

(2) Ibid. But here Schrenk translates: "zum Recht verhelfen".

(3) Feine, P., Theologie des N.T., p. 401, note 1: "er wird viele zur Gerechtigkeit führen". This is an exception.

mal Greek usage had a prevailing negative content⁽¹⁾, to condemn, punish (Schrenk: 'verurteilen, strafen'). But this sense was foreign to קִיְיָ, which implied a positive (i.e., favourable) judgment, acquittal, or vindication (Schrenk: 'Recht verschaffen'). Therefore the Greek causative is extended to include this meaning. A clear example is seen in the translation of Isaiah 5:23: οἱ δικαιούντες τὸν ἄδικον ἐνεκεν σωθῶν (Heb: קִיְיָ)⁽²⁾.

This introduces a second extension of the normal Greek usage: the giving to the verb of a personal object. This positive usage of the causative verb with a personal object -- 'aliquem iustum reddere' -- is not found outside the LXX and the New Testament⁽³⁾.

'DECLARATIVE' OR 'FACTITIVE' JUSTIFICATION?

Two rather closely related questions remain: the status of the personal object prior to the action, and the nature of that action, implied in the causative usage.

The second of these questions has for the most part been previously answered: the activity is forensic in nature. It only remains to be pointed out that nowhere, either in the Hebrew or LXX versions, and perhaps nowhere in non-Biblical Greek, is there a usage of δικαῶν which means to make a person righteous. This is, indeed, inconceivable. As Sanday and Headlam significantly remark: "There may be other influences which go to make a person righteous, but they are not contained, nor even hinted at, in the word δικαῶν"⁽⁴⁾. The term is, then, primarily a forensic or 'declarative' one, and under no circumstances 'factitive'.

(1) So Schrenk, TWB, II, pp. 215ff. Cf. Dodd, ut supra, pp. 46ff.

(2) Cf. Ex. 23:7; Isa 43:9, 26; cit. Dodd, ibid., p. 52.

(3) So Schrenk, ut supra, pp. 215ff.; Dodd ut supra, p. 53.

(4) Romans, pp. 30f.

The other question, now, deals with the status (e.g., as "righteous", or "wicked") of the personal object, prior to the action of δικαιοῦν. The Hebrew and the Hellenistic-Jewish reply is unequivocal: ὁ δίκαιος! Judges are instructed to 'justify' the 'righteous' and condemn the wicked⁽¹⁾. God is thought of as dealing with man in a similar fashion, "condemning the wicked, to bring his way upon his head; and justifying the righteous, to give him according to his righteousness"⁽²⁾. Ben Sira implies that no one will "justify him that sinneth"⁽³⁾, and seems to consider it a cardinal sin against the law of the most High and his covenant to "justify the ungodly"!⁽⁴⁾

How revolutionary, then, and yet how understandable, is Paul's daring proclamation that it is just that -- δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἀσεβῆ -- which is the fundamental purpose of the "RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD"!

.....

To proceed from this point to any subject other than the New Testament would seem to be a digression. In the Hebraic and Hellenistic-Jewish spheres we believe we have seen that which, by comparison and contrast, is of principal importance for the understanding of Paul's teaching on "The Righteousness of God". But our present study of the Period of Transition must include brief mention of the usage of Philo and Josephus, as well as a consideration of the possible contribution of Hellenism to the Pauline concept.

(1) Dt 25:1 (2) I Kgs 8:32 (LXX:II Chron 6:23: ἀνομιμαὶ ἀνομιῶν ... τὸν δίκαιον δίκαιον). Cf. Ex 23:7: "I will not justify the wicked".

(3) Ecclus. 10:29

(4) Ibid., 42:2.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER TWO:

"RIGHTEOUSNESS" IN THE USAGE OF PHILO
AND JOSEPHUS

We now look back on two very important phenomena: the Dispersion of the Jewish race, and the diffusion of the Greek language. We have seen something of the contrasted conceptions of "righteousness" in earlier Hebrew religion and in classical Greek thought, as well as the later impact of Greek and Jewish elements in the formation of the Septuagint. Turning from these sacred writings to contemporary profane literature, we look briefly into the works of Josephus and Philo, in whom we see to a remarkable degree a fusion of Jewish religious tradition and Hellenistic ethical teaching.

Since the fabric of these two men's thought had the same (Judaistic-Hellenistic) warp and weft as that of the period we have just studied, we are not surprized to find a close similarity in their usage of δικαιοσύνη. Strangely enough, there is but one clear reference by each of them to the δικαιοσύνη θεού. Josephus' usage is predominantly forensic and implies retribution.¹ Philo, showing greater Stoic influence, gives it the content of an ethical attribute of God.²

δικαιοσύνη is, then, preponderantly applied to man³, and we find it repeatedly associated with the other three of the four Cardinal Virtues of Platonic and Stoic thought (Wisdom, Courage, and Temperance).⁴ Often it is apparently given highest rank among

(1) Antt. 11:268

(2) Deus Imm., 79

(3) Abr., 208: πρὸς ἀνθρώπους; Antt. 4:223; 18:117

(4) Leg. All., I 63. Or possibly related to the older scheme (Aesch., Sept. c. Theb. 610: βῶπρον, δίκαιος, ἀγαθός, εὐσεβής. Cf. Antt. 6:160.

these virtues.¹ But while for both writers the term is quite adapted to Hellenistic thought, it yet retains the Jewish sense of obedience to divine Law,² as well as the underlying Pharisean conception of the acquisition of merit.³ The legalistic usage of δικαιολογία is manifest throughout their writing.⁴ And (which is important for our subsequent consideration of faith) Philo clearly includes faith as a part of righteousness (i.e., a work).⁵

Especially in the work of Philo is the Hellenistic influence clearly visible. In the case of Philo and Paul, the question as to the relationship of these two great contemporaries naturally arises. In the case of each, the same treasures of Jewish and Hellenistic thought were available. It is natural that certain borrowings and usages would be almost identical. But a difference in stamp showed a difference in coin. Each was, in a sense, an 'Apostle to the Gentiles'; each bases his missionary effort on the Jewish scriptures, and employs almost the same strategy in the use of Types and Allegories. W.L.Knox says it would be very difficult to find two writers "who have so much in common and yet are so totally unlike in their whole outlook".⁶ The fundamental difference is revealed in the fact that Paul's controlling purpose is in such essential opposition to the motive of the writer of Alexandria. This diversity in ultimate objective is clearly shown in Knox's analysis:

"St. Paul's object is to find in the O.T. types and allegories which will justify his contention that the Christian revelation, interpreted in the light of his own view of its theological implications, is in fulfilment of Judaism (true as far as it went, but now superseded by fuller revelation.) Philo's object is to prove that the Jew-

1 - Ap. 2:170; Antt. 4:223; Leg. All. I, 72.

2 - Antt. 8:21; 12:291; Mut. Nom., 197; Op. Mund. 81 (On divine origin of the Law, see: Antt. 4, 278; Spec. Leg., I 67; II 72, 113.)

3 - Antt., 11:169; Leg. All., III, 77.

4 - Schrenk, TWB, II. 195f.

5 - Antt. 17, 206; 18, 178; Mut. Nom., 19; Ebr., 95; Rer. Div. Her., 93ff.

6 - St. Paul and the Church of Jerusalem, p. 129

ish religion is the one true revelation of God, which anticipates and ratifies all that is best in the philosophy of the world. (Cf. Leg. All. i, 33)"¹

Strangely enough, Paul is a much more consistent Hebraist, even though he transcends Judaism, than Philo, who forces us constantly to regard him primarily as a Greek philosopher. At best, Philo's Messianic hope seems little more than nationalistic idealism, and his conception of deity seems little more than that of a philosophical Absolute. Regarding the mystical awareness of, and union with God, Philo and Paul differ very greatly. In contrast to Paul's conception of an abiding communion with the glorified Lord, available "for any soul which gave itself in faith to Christ"², Philo's mystical apprehension is seen as "a state of philosophical contemplation of a more or less abstract perfection",³ which was at best transitory, and outside the comparatively limited circle of initiates remained unknown.

In the light of these considerations, especially on the evidence of Paul's quite different objective and more genuine development from the deep religious thought of the Old Testament, we seem justified in disclaiming for him any essential dependence upon Philo's usage of the conception of "Righteousness". As for the occurrence of similar renderings in their work, the conclusion we draw is that they "are not due to any direct contact but to the fact that both S. Paul and Philo are acquainted with and make use of the general outlook of Hellenistic Jewish thought and its conventional methods of interpreting the Scriptures ... as generally current in Hellenistic Judaism."⁴

1 - St. Paul and the Church of Jerusalem, p. 130.

2 - J. S. Stewart, Op. cit., p. 163.

3 - Knox, Op. cit., p. 130

4 - Ibid., 135f.

CHAPTER THREE:

HELLENISM: STOICISM AND THE GREEK
MYSTERY-RELIGIONS

STOICISM

If Philo of Alexandria was most truly 'in his element' when moving in the sphere of Stoicism,¹ we would naturally expect to find little difference in his and its usage of δικαιοσύνη. And, furthermore, since Stoicism is the spiritual heir of the older schools of Plato and Aristotle, whose usage of δικαιοσύνη we have already seen,² then we can likewise expect little additional light to be thrown upon the term by Zeno and his followers.

As with Aristotle, and especially manifest in Platonic philosophy, δικαιοσύνη became predominantly conceived as a virtue among other virtues, and generally used as a human ἕξις. The same tendency is seen in such a Stoic as Epictetus. He, too, gives high rank to δικαιοσύνη in the scheme of the Cardinal Virtues³, and uses δικαίος in the corresponding sense of 'just' or 'right'.⁴

This high ethical ideal of Stoicism was naturally familiar to the Apostle Paul, and beyond any doubt it pervaded the spiritual atmosphere of Tarsus and of most of the centres of Paul's later missionary labours. But it would be idle to claim that the passionate zeal for 'righteousness' which led Saul of Tarsus to the class-

1 - Schrenk (TWE II 196): "Das Pulsieren des wärmsten religiösen Interesses ist bei Philo dann spürbar, wenn er innerhalb der Platonisch-stoischen Traditionen dem Psychologischen und Mystischen nachgeht".

2 - See Part I, Chapter II.

3 - Diss., I 22:1; II 17:6; III 26:32; Cf. Stobaeus, Ecl., II:102.

4 - Diss., II 1:3.

room of Gamaliel, and beyond to the fiery persecution of nascent Christianity, is explained by the teaching of Stoic metaphysics. And a theory of dependence on Stoicism would be even more preposterous regarding Paul's proclamation of a δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, which (although 'apart from Law') is 'witnessed by the Law and the prophets'! The same mind that followed the Hebrew illusion of a (legalistic) righteousness 'down the nights and down the days' and finally dispelled it, could certainly have perceived that the autocratic 'righteousness' of Stoicism was equally illusory. The author of A Man in Christ, pointing out that Stoicism was essentially a religion of despair, asks poignantly: "Was Paul, realizing this, likely to borrow much?"¹ Stressing the differences between Paul and the Stoics, this same writer places a finger on this crucial fact: in Stoicism there was no doctrine of Grace. And the fact that Grace is, on the other hand, the sine qua non of Paul's whole message, brings the undoubtedly correct verdict: "This alone rules out any theory of dependence".² One further corroborating statement will well bear mention here -- the conclusion of Liechtenhan, in his study of the Poseidonianische Philosophie:

"The element of affinity with the divine is praised indeed by Poseidonius as a divine gift, but at bottom it is an original factor of nature, whereas in Paul it is a marvel of grace, it is redemption. ... The Stoic says to his god, 'I have come to thee'; Paul says, 'Thou has drawn me to Thyself by pure gracious favour.' No doubt this requires something in man which responds to the call, answers it, and acts upon it. But with Paul the initiative lies always with God; in Stoicism it lies with man".³

In short, we see in Stoicism a sphere of thought in which the quintessence of 'righteousness' is actually self-righteousness.

1 - J.S. Stewart, Ut Supra, p.63.

2 - Ibid., p.61.

3 - Die göttliche Vorherbestimmung bei Paulus und in der Poseidonianischen Philosophie, 1922, p.117, cit. James Moffatt, Grace in the New Testament, 1931, p.64.

Doubtless Paul's charge against the Jews, that they had sought to establish τὴν ἰδίαν δικαιοσύνην¹, could also be directed against the Stoics, and is consequently included in the implication of his message? That consideration would not be invalidated by the difference in the conception of "law" that lay behind the two great movements -- although Paul's great polemic against legalism is primarily aimed at Judaism itself. But the fact of principal significance for our present study is that Paul's roots are found in Judaism and in the new revelation through Jesus, and in these alone is sufficient basis -- indeed the only adequate basis -- for an understanding of the conception of δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ. We therefore conclude that, since the Pauline doctrine can be explained entirely apart from Stoicism, and has such a diametrically opposed objective, any theory of dependence on its philosophy for the idea or usage of δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ is unacceptable.

THE GREEK MYSTERY - RELIGIONS

"It is unnecessary and unsound to trace back to the mystery religions Pauline conceptions whose true ancestry might more profitably be looked for in the Old Testament".²

This judgment, based on comprehensive acquaintance with research on primitive Christian thought, applies most definitely and decisively to an interpretation of the Pauline conception of δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ. If, as cumulative evidence has shown, the true roots of primitive and Pauline Christianity are to be found

 1 - Rom.10:3. For universal application: Rom.2:20. Presumably the exception that proves the rule is seen in Rom.9:30.

2 - Stewart, Op.cit., p.146.

in Judaism and the religion of the Old Testament, then we have the greatest reason to believe that the 'righteousness' of Saul and the 'righteousness' of Paul are integrally related, and to believe that the former, with the added Christian experience, is fully adequate to explain the latter. And if, despite the extent to which Christianity superceded the older faith, Paul still regarded it as the lawful successor of Judaism (and the true development from it), it seems indeed unnecessary and unsound to seek to trace such a Pauline conception as δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in the mystery religions of the Hellenistic world.

By this we do not, by any means, seek to deny that there was much in the theological sub-stratum of the Hellenistic age which lent a great amount of similarity to the Pauline theology and the mystery-cult theology. Nor do we deny that much of Paul's 'Judaism' became universalized and more metaphysically developed, as a result of the impact of the Hellenistic world. In certain respects, Christianity can even be spoken of (by Knox) as a 'mystery-religion'¹, (in that it offers salvation to mankind by means of access to the Deity through a Mediator, and in combining the offer with a sacramental system). But such a writer does this only to differentiate the more clearly between the mythical and esoteric nature of these other religions, and the historical basis of Christianity as the lawful successor of Judaism -- insistent on the necessity of holiness derived from the Old Testament, firmly based on the fact of Christ, definitely opposed to syncretism, and organized after the model of the Synagogue into a distinctive Church. If then, for Paul, Christianity is the true development of Judaism, Knox rightly says that "although he may employ the language

1 - St. Paul and the Church of Jerusalem, 148; cf. pp. 136-149.

and ideas of Hellenistic thought, Hellenistic religion as such can never be anything but idolatry".¹ On such a basis there is no conceivable reason why Paul would desire to borrow any essential concepts from Hellenistic ideology. Any theory, therefore, that would interpret 'familiarity with' as 'dependence upon' -- as so often characteristic of the religionsgeschichtliche interpretations-- can hardly be taken seriously. Indeed the weight of evidence is against such: "Of direct borrowing on the part of S. Paul from the religious institutions of the mystery-cults we have no clear evidence; and there is strong evidence to the contrary".²

We have mentioned, above, (1) the strong presumptive argument that Paul's conception of 'righteousness' is logically to be related to the Old Testament, and (2), the essential independence of Paul's theology, in its fundamentals, from the Hellenistic religions. In addition to these two factors, we have already seen (In Platonic and Stoic thought) that Hellenism in general has little, if anything, to offer toward an explanation of the Pauline usage of δικαιούνη θεου. It only remains to be noted that, where superficial resemblances in usage exist, a comparison of the two usages only reveals the impassable cleft between their underlying bases.

An example of this is seen in the Hermetic writings,³ where Schrenk finds in the usage of the Greek causative the meaning: "wir sind sündlos geworden"⁴. That this bears superficial resemblance to Pauline usage is quite admissible. Schrenk says it is perhaps used with conscious reference to the Christian usage

1 - Ibid., p. 146.

2 - Ibid.

3 - Corp. Herm. XIII:9 (causative usage); XIII:18 (substantive).

4 - TWB, II, p. 216.

of the term. But the vastly different implication of the word δικαιοσύνη for the mystery religions is clearly shown in his valuable summary:

"Die δικαιοσύνη wird dem Mysten gegenständlich zuteil, indem durch Verhichtung aller bösen, dem Körper entstammenden Neigungen die ἀδικία vertrieben wird... Aber die Vorstellung einer Gerechtsprechung im Gericht wird hier abgelehnt, möglicherweise geradezu polemisiert gegen die jüdisch-christliche Vorstellung des δικαιωθῆναι. Es mag auch sein, dass die ägyptische Auffassung von der Rechtfertigung durch das Totengericht hier mystisch nivelliert ist. Dort kommt der Tote, vor Osiris gestellt, auf die Totenwage, wird geprüft und auf Grund des Überwiegens der guten Werke (aber nicht nur Werk, sondern auch Wissen rechtfertigt) gerecht gesprochen. Die Schulden werden durch Sühneriten, Zauber entfernt."¹

In such a ritualistic system of magic (ex opere operato), there is no genuinely ethical basis at all.² Professor Kennedy, looking from the nebulous and non-ethical nature of the mystery religions to the thoroughly ethical character of Pauline mysticism, says: "This (latter) is no vague absorption in the supra-sensible Reality. It is a personal relationship established by adoring trust in and devotion to Him in whom Paul has reached the possibility of a life which shall be 'right' with God".³ This penetrating analysis anticipates the further differentia between the two theologies -- the Mysteries' lack of any real concept of faith⁴, -- and throws into clear relief the infinitely higher Pauline conception of what it means to be "right with God". This Pauline "right" and the Hellenistic "rite" present, far more than incidental word-play, the fundamental antithesis between the two distinct conceptions. The only contribution of

1 - Schrenk, TWB, II, 216.

2 - See Stewart, Op.cit., 76f; Knox, Op.Cit., 148; MacGregor and Purdy, Jew and Greek: Tutors unto Christ, 228.

3 - H.A.A.Kennedy, St.Paul and the Mystery Religions, p.223.

4 - Reitzenstein's study of Faith in Hellenism only reveals the meagreness of the concept: Kennedy, 223; Stewart, 223; on Reitzenstein's overemphasis on Mystery influence, cf. Dodd, Bible and the Greeks, xv; Knox, Op.cit., 136ff., passim.

this conception of the Hellenistic mystery-religions, toward an understanding of the Pauline conception, is a negative one. In them we see what the Apostle's conception is not. As we turn to the New Testament, and to the writings of Paul, we are therefore only the more convinced that it is to the Old Testament religious thought that we must resort, for the true background of the δικαίωμα θεοῦ.

PART THREE

"RIGHTEOUSNESS" IN EARLY CHRISTIANITY

CHAPTER ONE

ROOTS OF THE PAULINE CONCEPTION IN THE
TEACHING OF JESUS

"Righteousness" in the New Testament is predominantly a Pauline word. Mark does not use it at all. Matthew uses it some seven or eight times, Luke once, and John twice; in Acts it appears four times. But in the writings of Paul this one word occurs fifty-six times. This fact gives us a hint of the centrality of the concept in the Apostle's thought. Nevertheless, in taking over the term, and indeed attaching to it a peculiar technical significance, the Apostle definitely relates it to the "Gospel of Christ" -- "for therein", he says to the Romans, "is the righteousness of God revealed .." (1)

This conception of the "righteousness of God" was, naturally, based on a perspective that included the Cross. This crowning act undoubtedly 'filled up that which was lacking' in the pre-Pauline idea, and gave it a fuller meaning. But it is equally true that Paul's concept involves the whole of Jesus' earthly life -- all that He was, and said, and did. (2) If the burden of the Apostle's doctrine was the 'divine initiative', it is clear that for him Jesus was the divine initiative incarnate. In the record of the life and teachings of Jesus, therefore, there is the greatest reason to expect to find the roots of the Pauline conception.

(1) Romans 1:17.

(2) See M. Goguel, Life of Jesus, p. 552.

Although the actual term *δικαιοσύνη* is of rather rare occurrence in the Gospels and Acts, yet the reality which it describes is the constant theme underlying all of them. This is inevitable, because "righteousness" is so integrally connected with the scheme of salvation. And this is equally true whether Law or Grace be deemed the essential ground for the hope of salvation. We might notice, for instance, the series of Jesus' teachings recorded in Mark 10:1-45. Here we feel the impact of the Lord's teaching on the conception of "righteousness" in popular Judaism. These verses present a contrast between the Pharisean ideal of righteousness (= merit) securing salvation as its heavenly reward, and the Christian ideal of a childlike dependence on the righteousness (= grace) of the Father in Heaven. This is implicit in the passage, although no explicit reference is made to "righteousness". And the fact that the term "righteousness", as the term "grace", can be inserted without any violation of the essential teaching of the passage, gives a hint of the consonance of the Apostle's conception with the teaching of his Lord. For Jesus unequivocally opposed what He elsewhere termed the "righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees", with what can be termed a doctrine of "grace". Indeed, even though the words "righteousness" and "grace" had not yet acquired the more fully-formulated Pauline connotation, the presentation of "righteousness" in this whole passage - and especially in Matthew 5-7 - presupposes and is based on, the grace of God the Father in bringing in His Kingdom. It was precisely this "righteousness", grâce à Dieu, which Jesus was setting over against the "righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees".

This opposition of Jesus to the "righteousness of the scribes

and Pharisees" is apparent throughout His teaching. We need only recall a few incidents -- the Setting of the Child in the Midst, the 'What-shall-I-do?' of the Rich Enquirer, the parable of the Dissatisfied Wage-earners, even the apostles' claim of merit for 'Leaving All' -- to see how diametrically opposed was the teaching of Jesus to any idea that eternal life and its attendant blessings can be secured by a righteousness based on merit. Such things depend on the will of the Father, with whom is the sole prerogative. Servants who have done all they were commanded cannot claim any reward; they have only done 'that which ~~was~~ their duty'.⁽¹⁾ The Pharisees who murmur at Jesus' welcome extended to 'Publicans and sinners' are put to shame by the example of the Elder Brother, envious of the Prodigal.⁽²⁾ For it is they -- (like the Elder Brother whose merit-philosophy is more deeply rooted than his love) -- who actually stand condemned! Those whose legalistic conceptions would limit God's righteousness to 'justice', Jesus attacks with the example of the householder rebuking the complaining worker in the vineyard.⁽³⁾ It is clear that Jesus' purpose in telling this parable "was to convey to those who had ears to hear the truth that the man who thinks to bargain about final reward will always be wrong, and that God's sovereign loving-kindness will always have the last unchallengeable word; and what is this but Paul's thought of a God who 'justifies the ungodly'?"⁽⁴⁾ Another instance in which Jesus lashes out against the "righteousness of the scribes and

(1) Luke 17:10

(2) Luke 15:11

(3) Matt. 20:1ff

(4) J.S. Stewart, A Man in Christ, 252. (Underscoring mine)

Pharisees" and its underlying doctrine of Merit, as the parable describing the toil-worn servant returning to prepare his master's evening meal before attending to his own cares. In this action Jesus denies to the servant any merit for doing that which was merely his duty. "So likewise ye", Jesus admonishes his hearers, "when ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say: 'We are unprofitable servants'".⁽¹⁾ This pessimism of Jesus regarding the merely human effort is, as Goguel poignantly observes, "only equalled by his optimism when he turns to God". Stewart comments: "Here again the germ of Paul's doctrine is clear".⁽²⁾

For our specific study, one of the most significant teachings of Jesus is seen in the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican.⁽³⁾ This parable, according to Luke, was spoken by Jesus "unto certain which trusted in themselves that they were righteous (δικαιοι) and despised others". The importance of the familiar story for our investigation is seen in the judgment pronounced by Jesus: "I tell you that this man (the Publican) went down to his house justified (δικαιωμένος) rather than the other". Here Jesus presents a most striking contrast between a (self-) righteousness based on the presumption of merit, and a higher and self-less righteousness which is absolute self-surrender and faithful dependence on the grace of God. The latter of the two is, by inference, "δικαιος", and exhibits the only type of "δικαιοσύνη" that is justifiable in the sight of God. A.B. Bruce comments: "Christ's reflection on the two men is equivalent in drift to Paul's doctrine of justification by grace through faith".⁽⁴⁾

(1) Luke 17:10; See Goguel, Life of Jesus, p.559

(2) Ut supra, 253

(3) Luke 18:9-14

(4) The Parabolic Teaching of Christ, 314. Schrenk (TWB, II, 219), also shows similarity of Jesus' and Paul's concepts, with the one difference that here no mention of the Cross is made.

Similarly, J.S.Stewart concludes: "When justification is understood, it is seen to be an unfolding of the central truths of Jesus' message". (1)

The above inference as to the new "righteousness" and "justification" must, and does, find support in Jesus' conception of God and His "Kingdom". This is clearly brought out by such scholars as Holl, Goguel, and Ehrhardt.⁽²⁾ The "great and paradoxical new element in the Gospel of Jesus" (Goguel), as depicted by Holl, is precisely this distinctive idea of a God who pardons sin and yet remains a just God. Commissioned to go to the lost, Jesus speaks with obvious denunciation of the nominally "righteous" and preaches " a God who wants to have dealings with sinful men, a God to whom he who has sunk deep stands, in certain circumstances, especially near".⁽³⁾ In proclaiming the Kingdom of God, Jesus' proclamation far outstrips the conception of Judaism and of John the Baptist by setting up the highest conceivable standard of judgment -- God's own perfection. At the same time, Jesus regards the will to forgiveness as grounded in God's very innermost being. Holl reconciles these two elements thus:

"... Jesus regards the will to forgiveness as rooted in God's very innermost being...For Jesus judgment and grace both stand out as obviously valid truths. It is against the background of the conception of judgment that His preaching of grace takes its most pointed meaning. The God who rigorously insists on the highest does not will that any man should come within range of His judgment. He is not the aloof judge who decides impartially either for one side or the other. He is concerned about men, even the least of them. Therefore He seeks them out. And

(1) Op. cit. 252; Cf. W.C.Allen, Matthew (ICC), 1912, p.784.

(2) Karl Holl, The Distinctive Elements in Christianity (Gesammelte Aufsätze, II, 9ff) trans. by. N.V.Hope, Edinburgh 1937; see esp. Chap.2: "Jesus' Conception of God". See also M.Goguel, op. cit. 557ff; E.Ehrhardt, Le Principe de la Morale de Jesus, 23, cit. by Goguel, ut supra, 560.

(3) Holl, ibid.15.

the means by which He lays hold on them is His pardoning grace.... Jesus (in contrast to the tendency in all other doctrines of salvation) sees a deep gulf between God and man. According to Him, salvation consists rather in this, that God of His free grace comes down to meet man". (1)

Our chief purpose in the above discussion has been to discover if, in the teachings of Jesus, the germ of the more formally stated Pauline conception of "righteousness" is to be found. Is Paul's doctrine of justification by grace through faith a mere invention? Is his 'theological symbol' of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ a mere legacy of Rabbinical scholasticism? Or is Paul's doctrine consonant with Jesus' teaching? In the above discussion we have seen unquestionable evidence that the Pauline conception is rooted in the teachings of Jesus.

(1) Ibid. 16f.

Essential Harmony, Yet Difference of Emphasis, Between
Jesus and the Apostle Paul

Our study thus far has shown that the Biblical usage of the word "righteousness" is, in general, what we have herein several times referred to as a 'moral-forensic' usage.⁽¹⁾ It has an essentially religious connotation, carrying a profound emphasis on God and the divine-human relationship. The forensic element varies greatly in intensity, as between Judaism and Jesus, but is nowhere lacking in Hebraeo-Christian thought. It implies a moral standard, but refers principally to conformity to that standard: such conduct, character, or attitude as will prove acceptable in the light of that standard. Making due allowance for varying emphases, this general 'moral-forensic' usage is found common to the Old Testament and Judaism, to Jesus, and as we shall see, to Paul.

As for the pre-Christian usage, we recall that the profound spiritual aspect of "righteousness" was impoverished to the point of practical extinction by a growing tendency to legalistic formalism. The 'spirit' (of the law) was supplanted by a grasping after the 'letter'. The prevailing spirit of the age when Jesus appeared on the scene was 'What shall I do?', and the resultant tendency was a polishing of the 'outside of the cup', overlooking their inner moral defilement. The significance of Jesus' impact on this prevailing tendency is now clear. Taking over, for the most part, the terminology of His contemporaries (i.e., the 'moral-forensic' connotation) He revealed the infinitely more profound moral depths, the 'inward morality', of the conception of the "righteousness" which God requires -- which conception had come to have such a shallow meaning. As Goguel points out, "He substituted the ethic

⁽¹⁾ Burton, Galatians, 466, 468ff; TWB, II, 190f, 200ff. See references pp. 55, 50, etc., to moral-forensic usage.

of intention and of the will for that of the act, or, in other words, He made morality an inward thing. Thus He has not merely transformed the moral side of life, but religion itself; the religion of the heart, of inner moral purity, replaces a religion of outward conformity to God's commands".⁽¹⁾ True righteousness was thus shown by Jesus to be a matter of the heart. Indeed, when He speaks of the Pharisean 'righteousness', that of severe legalism and of 'calculating' good works, it is as though He used inverted commas. Turning to His own followers, He says, in effect, "If your righteousness is nothing more than the 'righteousness' of the scribes and Pharisees, -- your doom is sealed!"⁽²⁾

Thus the prevailing emphasis of Jesus consists in an absolute deepening of the moral aspect of the general 'moral-forensic' usage-- though not to the exclusion of the forensic.⁽³⁾ In Paul's developed doctrine, on the other hand, we seem to find greater emphasis upon the forensic, yet with retention of the indispensable moral-spiritual basis. Burton, in his source-book on the Teaching of Jesus, summarizes this relationship of Jesus and Paul by pointing out that, for Jesus, the right attitude toward God is perhaps most nearly summed up in the word 'love', whereas:

"Paul, while usually led by the controversies in which he was engaged to employ the term forensically, yet found the basis of acceptance with God not in obedience to statutes, but, as Jesus did, in an attitude of mind and heart, in this connection, however, emphasizing faith even more than love".⁽⁴⁾

We feel justified in concluding, however, that this difference of emphasis is nowhere fundamental, and that in the very slightness of the difference of emphasis on the part of Jesus and of Paul, their essential harmony is established.

(1) Life of Jesus, p.556

(2) Cf. Matt. 5:20

(3) See above discussion of δικαιοσύνη

(4) The Teaching of Jesus, 1923, p.91

Teaching of Jesus and Paul Equally Incompatible with
Mere Legalism:

The Revelation of Forgiveness (=Grace)

Another way of saying that Jesus laid more stress on the moral, and Paul on the forensic aspect of "righteousness" is that Jesus set the true righteousness over against merit, whereas Paul set it over against what he termed "Law". But we now pause to consider the fact that Jesus' teaching, no less than Paul's, was fundamentally incompatible with mere legalism.

Jesus did not attack what He termed the "Law", or criticize it; (1) He came expressly to fulfil it. And equally in life and teaching -- if supremely in death -- He demonstrated that love is its fulfilment. Here we see how His attitude toward the Law, although related to "that of the great prophets and psalmists, of John the Baptist, and of many of the enlightened scribes of His own time" (2) yet quite superseded theirs; for even His forerunner, John the Baptist, did not really understand that love is the fulfilling of the Law. (3) Similarly, Johannes Weiss indicates that Jesus' ethical ideals are at once related to those of His spiritual forerunners, and yet transcended them:

".. the ethical ideals of Jesus...show an advance upon popular Judaism (which they presuppose, but from which they sever their connection), in the manner of the old prophetic religion.." (4)

Jesus' new ethic does indeed include principles for regulating the Christian life; and the sermon delivered on the Mount is surcharged with the idea of the necessity for complete obedience to the

(1) B.W.Bacon, Studies in Matthew, 1930; cf. p.357

(2) Bacon, Ibid., 357.

(3) A.B.Bruce, Ex. Gk. Test., on Matt. 3:15, (Vol.I,p.86)

(4) Johannes Weiss, History of Primitive Christianity, I,p.12;
M.Goguel, Life of Jesus, 552,3ff.

will of the Father. The question that concerns us is: do these principles of ("obedience") imply merely a new legalism -- profoundly deepened and infinitely more spiritual, but nevertheless legalism sui generis? Jesus' words clearly imply that nothing is secured: after we have done everything, we are obliged to regard ourselves as 'unprofitable servants', without the slightest claim for reward from the Great Householder. That rests with Him alone who can forgive sins, and restore man to a right relationship with Himself.

This anticipates the final and crucial issue between Jesus and Judaism, and at the same time establishes most firmly the essential harmony between the subsequent Pauline doctrine and the revelation of the Father (through Jesus' words and works) of the reality of reestablished personal "right-ness" before God through the forgiveness of sins. The most pious Jew could scarcely escape the feeling that the ethical is the foundation of morality, the sine qua non of divine-human relations. He glories in the Law, but loses his prophetic insight; in his desperate grasping after security, he has substituted law-keeping for constant and complete dependence upon the grace of God. His complete ethic is contained in the Law¹. And in Law there is no place for forgiveness². If law has been broken, the only true "righteousness" that can consistently issue is retribution. But as we noted in our study of Pharisaism, the doctrine of Merit made the conception of Righteousness anything but consistent. Far from allowing for a doctrine of forgiveness, they strove unceasingly to "establish their own righteousness" through the Law, to lay claims upon God, to "make out, and reckon on, His ways, And bargain for His love, and stand, Paying a price, at His right hand." 3

It is this "righteousness" which evoked the most withering denunciation from Jesus. Against the foil of this "righteousness", He placed the "your righteousness" of His disciples. This second type of righteousness cannot, in the light of His

(1) C.H. Dodd, The Meaning of Paul for Today, 78.

(2) Cf. Karl Heim, Jesus der Weltvollender, 48, 63; but cp. Matt. 11:28.

(3) (Browning's Johannes Agricola) Cit. Stewart, Life & Teachings of Jesus Christ, 94.

general teaching, connote merely a greater quantity of the same "righteousness" ascribed to the Pharisees. Principal Lofthouse affirms that it must be different not in degree but in kind -- "not ἄλλο but ἕτερον"¹ Note Jesus' summary, toward the end of His series of sayings: "But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and His righteousness."² The direction of thought here is inescapable: 'Your righteousness must transcend theirs; seek ye His righteousness!'. In the words of Lofthouse, "God's righteousness and the righteousness of the disciples approach. They imply one another. They are two aspects of the same relation".³ Such interpretation is naturally inference, but we believe it to be correctly inferred. Our Lord did not make extensive use of the word righteousness⁴; and even when He used it, it was generally in order to show what the so-called "righteousness" lacked. Only in Matthew 6:33 does He speak of the righteousness of God. But we submit, regarding the above interpretation, that it does not violate the general tenor of Jesus' teaching -- even if it "sounds more Pauline". And it is in that very fact that we see the underlying harmony and consonance of Paul's doctrine with the teaching of Jesus.

Finally, we note one further and significant factor in the question as to the existence of roots of the Pauline doctrine in the revelation we have through Jesus. That is the awareness of Jesus of His own forgiving and redemptive power⁵. There seems no doubt whatever that this crucial factor is integral to Pauline thought. It is certainly echoed in his writings, a classic example appearing in Romans 5:1f:

Ἐκ τῆς πίστεως εἰρήνην ἔχωμεν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, δι' οὗ καὶ τὴν προσαγωγὴν ἐσχήκαμεν [τῆ πίστει] εἰς τὴν χάριν ταύτην ἐν ᾗ ἐσχηκαμεν..... κτλ."

(1) Op. cit., 442; cp. Gal. 1:6

(2) Matt. 6:33

(3) Op. cit., 442.

(4) Matt. 3:15; 5:6,10,20; 6:1,33; John 16:8,10.

(5) Cf. Matt. 11:28.

Jesus' usage is seen, then, to partake of what we have termed the "moral-forensic" employment of "righteousness"; hence integrally related to prophetic, Judaistic and Pauline terminology. However we have seen in His teachings a more profound emphasis on the moral aspect of Righteousness. Indeed His words take on such far-reaching significance as inevitably to imply a further, divine aspect -- the ultimate and integral relationship of real righteousness to the grace of God. Indeed the very raison d'etre of this whole concept of the righteousness of God, insofar as explicitly depicted by Jesus, was the determining factor of the grace of God in the bringing in of His kingdom, with all the benefits which accompany and flow from this new relationship of the human and the divine.

We may pardonably say that Jesus prepared the way for the more fully formulated Pauline doctrine -- negatively in demanding a deeper and humbler sense of sin¹, and in an absolute cleansing of the "inside of the cup" of spiritual existence²; and positively, in requiring recourse to Him, by those who felt the burden of their sins³. as well as to God the Father⁴.

Our Lord's earthly mission was, without doubt, more an impact and a dynamic than a system of thought; nevertheless we affirm the conviction that in His teachings as we have them, we see the absolute sine qua non of the more fully formulated doctrine of the Apostle Paul. "It was for sinners and to sinners that He came", Faulkner aptly writes, "just as Paul understood; and the way for their salvation was not better law-keeping but trusting prayer in the confession of sin -- really equivalent to faith, the humble heart, and a hunger for righteousness(= faith)."⁵

1 Matthew 5:3, passim

2 Matthew 5:6,8,20,48: cf. M.Goguel, The Life of Jesus, p.556.

3 Matthew 11:28, et al.

4 Echoed in Romans 5:1 (quoted in the Greek on page preceding).

5 John A. Faulkner, International Standard Biblical Encyclopaedia, (article on "Righteousness"), p. 1785.

CHAPTER TWO

"RIGHTEOUSNESS" IN PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY AND THE NON-PAULINE NEW TESTAMENT WRITINGS

"The hardest of all periods in Church History for the historian to recover and to understand is that short interval, variously estimated between one and six years, that lies between the crucifixion and Paul's journey to Damascus" (T.R.Glover, in Paul of Tarsus, 198)

Having reached the conclusion that in Jesus' teaching we clearly see the sine qua non of Paul's fuller doctrine of the "righteousness of God", the next logical step would seem to be a consideration of Paul's own writings. But the problematical period between the ^{ci}crucifixion and Paul's entry into Christendom via the Damascus road, as well as the non-Pauline writings that grew out of primitive Christianity, should be considered here, despite an inevitable overlapping between this study and that of Jesus' and Paul's teachings.

Johannes Weiss, like T. R. Glover, finds that our knowledge of the earliest, pre-Pauline, Christian community is very unsatisfactory. And it is doubtless safe to say that no scholar seems to have sought more assiduously than Weiss, to discern what he terms the "definite residuum of old traditional material", the primitive Christian complex of ideas previous to, and available to the Apostle Paul.

Between the close of Jesus' life and teaching and the beginning of Paul's Christian experience, we find Judaism at the crossroads -- indeed we may pardonably speak of discerning two Judaisms, for there has been a parting of the ways. The "righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees" moves on through Rabbinical channels; the "your righteousness", enjoined by the Master, enters the Judaeo-Christian heritage.

Jesus nowhere proclaimed a "new Judaism" as such; but the impact of His authoritative teachings ("not as the Scribes") could but inevitably reveal the impasse between the two conceptions of righteousness. He never despaired of ideal

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Judaism; He seemed rather, ultimately, to despair of actual Judaism because its slavish adherence to the letter precluded a proper grasping of the deeper basis of divine Law. Indeed, as Goguel points out, it was through fidelity to the ideal Judaism that Jesus became more detached from empirical Judaism and condemned it. Judaism, as such, failed because it refused to accept the insight of Jesus, and thus lost the opportunity of realizing all the latent possibilities native to it. From that time on, it was to become a "religion which had survived itself".¹

But for the "other Judaism" it was a different story. In the faith implanted by Jesus in the salvaged remnant, the corruptible individual got a glimmer of the incorruptible spiritual ideal. The righteousness which was seen and temporal (and attainable by human effort) was perceived to be transcended by a righteousness unseen and eternal, mediated only through divine grace. To this transcendent grace of the Father, Jesus' teachings ever pointed. When all the circumstances of the Pharisee and the Publican were weighed in the light of this factor, the judgment was reversed; pharisaical piosity stood condemned, and the essential righteousness of selfless dependence on God was recognized. Jesus had always taught that "man's outward circumstances were no evidence of his standing with God, and that success and righteousness in the sight of God were by no means synonymous terms".² It remained for Paul to elucidate and amplify this new realization that within the mysterious working of God something was accomplished for man which man within his own resources could not bring about.

In this continuum in Paul's writings, indubitably integral to the teaching of Jesus, we see a partial reflection of the contribution of the early founders of the Judaeo-Christian Church. This, Goguel describes as an effort "to develop the feelings and experiences which, directly or indirectly, had been implanted in them through the impression made on them by (Jesus') person and teaching"³. His sayings

1) Goguel, ut supra, 586; cf 585.

2) So Johannes Weiss, History of Primitive Christianity, p. 12.

3) Goguel, ut sup., p.585.

and directions constituted the Law of this original Christian community. The essence of this new constitution is crystalized in the great Discourse on the True Righteousness -- the Sermon on the Mount -- the quintessence of which is seen in the realization that "in the end it is still a matter of grace...if one is to be numbered among the 'sons of peace'"¹. In elemental truths such as this which Paul directly or indirectly "received" from fledgling Christianity, we see the sharp contrast with the external, self-centered piety of continuing Judaism which drew out his withering denunciation². But to speak of this sharp contrast is not to imply that it was suddenly established. There seems rather to have been a very gradual metamorphosis in the primitive Christian attitude toward the Law. The great gulf, fixed but only gradually discerned, began with evidences (such as adduced by Weiss from "independent and advanced sayings"³) of a developing implicit or explicit criticism of the law by means of the law itself. We would cite such anti-Pharisaic and revolutionary results as the judgment that no external thing can render a man unclean, but only sins of the heart.⁴

We might again stress the fact that this developing awareness of a qualitatively different type of righteousness, while revolutionary, was nevertheless very gradual. We have seen how nearly totally the rare flashes of early Hebrew prophetic insight were blacked out in normative Judaism (Pharisaism). We have further seen that the clarified concept of righteousness as found, for example, in Romans 3:21, was to all intents and purposes lacking in the thought of the Synagogue.⁵ This is not dogmatically to imply that in the predominantly legalistic thought of Judaism the higher insight ceased altogether to exist. On the very edge of late Judaism Schrenk cites at least one usage which appears undeniably to furnish a glimmer of the later and fuller Pauline conception:

"...In 4 Esr 8,36 eine Aussage von der erbarmenden Gerechtigkeit, die ganz nahe an den Sprachgebrauch des Paulus heranreicht: 'Denn dadurch wird deine Gerechtigkeit und Güte...offenbar, dass du dich derer erbarmest, die keinen Schatz von guten Werken haben'" (6)

But this glimmer is at best hardly more than a lone oasis on an otherwise legalistic Sahara of Pharisaic Verdeinstlehre.

(1) Weiss, ut sup, 78; cf Luke 10:6 (2) Ibid, 82.
 (3) Ibid, 80. (4) Cf Mark 7:15, cit. Weiss, 81.
 (5) TWB II 198:16ff (6) Ibid, 199:19f.

Symptomatic of the gradual change in the conception of righteousness, and very significant, is the very slowly appearing pessimism regarding man's ability to keep the law. The essential motive force in Judaism is echoed in the statement which Shrenck puts into its mouth: "Ich kann das Gesetz erfüllen!".¹ Indeed, we might note that the Rich Young Ruler even went a step further, instead of "ich kann", "ich habe!"² Similarly, on into the ranks of the primitive Christian community, which still thought in predominantly Jewish terms, it can hardly be denied that this optimism died only after the most lingering illness. The high standard set for them³ seems still to have carried with it -- in their minds -- vestiges of the possibility of effectual personal compliance. Weiss finds among them no consideration as to whether this high standard is possible for them to attain, or as to whether their very natures are too corrupt. "The deep pessimism of a Saint Paul", he points out, "lies remote".⁴

Along with this gradually diminishing optimism, we note that primitive Christianity began instinctively to feel (as the Rich Young Ruler) that something else, something beyond their own present effort, was necessary. This nascent dunamis that began to attend their yearning included mystery and miracle. For the sake of rough analogy, we might liken the puzzled query of the primitive community to another query, from the lips of those who heard the Teacher's remarks on the difficulty of entering the kingdom of Heaven-- "Who, then, can be saved?". This query brought an immediate answer from Jesus, but an answer which was only gradually understood: "With men (and human effort alone!) it is impossible, but not with God..."⁵ That they somehow felt the existence of, and absolute need of this transcendent righteousness, is patent in the fragments of primitive Christian dialectic. But their reach exceeded their grasp. They waited for a Paul to give utterance to what oft was felt but ne'er so well expressed -- if we might so adapt the poet's line.

- (1) TWB II 205:18
- (2) Mark 10: 20.
- (3) Luke 6: 43f.
- (4) Weiss, ut sup.,p. 79.
- (5) Mark 10: 26f.

Karl Holl , in his search for the distinctive elements in Christianity, gives (from the cur deus homo strain of thought) a significant illustration of this trend:

"Right from the very beginning the Christian theologians were aware that their business **was** to comprehend and express in words a miracle of **miracles**. They felt the deep gulf between God and man, and felt it not only as a metaphysical, but even more as a moral fact. For them, therefore, it became a serious question, how God could become man, how the holy God could consort with sinful humanity; they **considered** it their primary task to awaken the feeling that here was something absolutely without parallel"¹.

And, regarding the slow grasp of the primitive **community**, as contrasted to Paul's fuller insight:

"We cannot but admire the sureness with which Paul, who had never heard Jesus speak, nevertheless seized upon the distinctive principles of his Gospel. Certainly it is all expressed theologically; but none of the primitive Church understood so well as Paul the real meaning contained in Jesus' conception of God".²

Apart from the employment by Jesus of the concept of righteousness, considered in the preceding chapter, we have already mentioned the scant reference to that concept by most of the New Testament writers other than Paul. Before turning from the Synoptic Gospels to these further non-Pauline writings, we note one lone reference in Luke:

"..that we being delivered out of the hand of our enemies might serve him (God) without fear, in holiness and righteousness before him, all the days of our life."³

In this verse from the Benedictus, according to Manson, is reflected the hope of Israel, based on national deliverance foreshadowed in the Abrahamic covenant, for "religious peace enabling a pure worship and observance of the law, to be established as the permanent rule of life in Israel"⁴, when "Palestine shall be devoted to the pure observation of the law, free from the interference and defiling influences of the gentiles".⁵ Zecharias is depicting the godly ethical life, and his usage of "righteousness" is what we might term (for the purpose of our analysis) the "non-technical" usage, comparable with some such general usage by Paul as, for example: "...not meat and drink; but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy

Ghost"⁶. Naturally it should be stressed that this usage, its generality and its

(1) Ut sup., p.51.

(2) Ibid., p.49.

(3) Luke 1: 74f.

(4) W.Manson, The Gospel of Luke, 1930, p.79.

(5) Ibid., 79, quoting Easton.

(6) Rom. 14: 17f.

similarity to Greek usage notwithstanding, far exceeds the classical connotation of an isolated "ἔξις"; it is more a modus vivendi which will be well pleasing to God¹, with no necessary implication, however, that this is per se the effectual means of salvation.

If in the Synoptic Gospels essential and effectual righteousness was perceived to be grounded in the grace of God, the same is equally true in the writings of John. Righteousness, for him, would cease to have efficacious meaning if dissociated from Christ, "the righteous". Through his writings, human eyes perceive in Christ the perfect manifestation of divine righteousness.² The term manifestation we use advisedly; the different passages only presenting different aspects of Jesus words and works, all combining, if we might so adapt Paul's own words, εἰς ἐνδεδίξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ!

With special reference to John 16: 8ff ("..He will reprove the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment"), but applicable generally, Marcus Dod comments:

"The world will see in the exaltation of Christ proof of His righteousness and will accordingly cherish new convictions regarding righteousness".³

It is the belief of Matthew Henry that we can understand John as speaking of "Christ's righteousness communicated to us for our justification and salvation; that everlasting righteousness which the Messiah was to bring in (Dan.9:24)". This process he further describes and qualifies:

"The Spirit shall convince men of this unrighteousness. Having by convictions of sin shown them their need of a righteousness, lest this should drive them to despair he will show them where it is to be had, and how they may upon their believing, be acquitted from guilt, and accepted as righteous in God's sight. It was hard to convince those of this righteousness that ~~went~~ about to establish their own (Rom.10:3), but the Spirit will do it".⁴

Some might here protest that we are reading something into John's words. While a

(1) So Schrenk, TWB II 200, passim.

(2) Cf. John 16: 8-10; I John 2:29, 3:7,10.

(3) Expositor's Greek Testament I p. 835.

(4) "Exposition", vol. viii, p.292--(An Exposition of the Old and New Testaments, 1875)

possible interpretation of this righteousness might be the attribute thereof, as exhibited in the sinless life of Jesus, yet, if Paul's expressions reflect a widely used body of teaching, there is no reason to doubt that John here speaks of a righteousness of relationship (human-divine), initiated in the depths of divine grace and accompanied by this striving of the Spirit in the hearts of men.¹

The four specific references in the Acts to "righteousness" are general, actually, in nature, implying probity or rectitude, or absolute justice -- much the same as the "man-in-the-street" at that time would have used them. They do not therefore call for extensive consideration.² However, this is not for a moment to say that Paul's conception, more fully developed in his own writings, is foreign to the writer of the Acts. On the contrary, we find indirect yet very definite echoes in Acts of the same conception which became the keystone to the theological structure of the Epistle to the Romans. Specifically, we might note a portion of a speech made in Pisidian Antioch, recorded by the writer of the Acts:

"Be it known unto you therefore, brethren, that through this man is proclaimed unto you the forgiveness of sins; and by him all that believe are justified from all things, from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses.."³

Although the noun righteousness does not occur in the discourse, we have here a clear picture of Paul's preaching the same Gospel as in Romans -- reconciliation of man to God; belief accompanied by forgiveness of sins and crowned with the free and gracious justification of the human, in relationship with the divine.

(1) Cf. Schrenk, Theologisches Wörterbuch, II p. 202.

(2) Occurrences of "righteousness" in Acts:

a. Acts 10:35 (.."and worketh righteousness.."). Doing good. "Nicht als der göttliche Heilsweg gedacht"--Schrenk, TWB II p. 201.

b. Acts 13:10 (.."thou enemy of all righteousness.."). Those whose actions are against that which is just and right. (So Calvin, B.C.R., Corpus Reformatorum, Vol. LXXVI, 1892; Ioannis Calvini Opera, en loco (p.285).

c. Acts 17:31 (.."he will judge the world in righteousness") Part of a sermon to legislators; referring to absolute justice as standard of judgment (Bengel).

d. Acts 24:25f ("righteousness, temperance..."). Righteousness as rectitude; apparently a general usage of righteousness as ethical probity.

(3) Acts 13: 38ff.

In non-Pauline New Testament writings in general, the ποιεῖν τὴν δικαιοσύνην ("Lebensgerechtigkeit"--Schrenk) is consistently enjoined¹, but it is as consistently integrally related to the perfect exhibition of righteousness in Christ. In John's total presentation, belief in Christ is seen as being essential, and unbelief is viewed as heinous sin. We are in effectual possession of "righteousness" only insofar as we are inseparably bound to Him who is "righteous" -- for in and through Him alone is there the possibility of the human being rightly related to the divine.

Another non-Pauline writer approaches the great thesis of Romans, as Peter asserts that ultimate deliverance from sin can only come about through the mystery of the Cross.² This implication is inferred by Schrenk from pertinent passages from that Apostle.³ If there be objection that this is more than is there implied, we nevertheless affirm that the writer inseparably associated the morally righteous life with the death of Christ. Again, Peter's formula πίστιν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ θεοῦ clearly implies more than the everyday moral connotation of rectitude -- which connotation, however, obtains in the four further usages of "righteousness" in the Petrine epistles⁴. Again, similar customary usage is for the most part found in Hebrews,⁵ although consistent stress is placed on the close relationship of righteousness and faith. In one instance this is given special stress⁶. Because of his obedience Noah was said to have become heir τῆς κατὰ πίστιν δικαιοσύνης. The use of κληρονόμος would seem to relegate Noah's actual performance to the background, and emphasize righteousness as a gift -- without, however, necessarily giving a definitely forensic coloring to the term "righteousness".

In the primitive Christian community, then, and in the subsequent writings thus far considered, we find recurrent attestation of Weiss' analysis of the period: that in the end salvation is still conceived to be a matter of grace. Essential righteousness is essentially charitable -- a gift which eludes human grasp and somehow begins and ends in the infinite χάρις of God. But clarity as to how this gift is made, how the ungodly can be adjudicated "righteousness", is lacking. Except for James, whose writings will hereafter receive special consideration, the early Christian era waited for Paul for more lucid ἐνδεξιὸν τῆς δικαιοσύνης θεοῦ --

(1-6) Footnotes on following page.

διὰ τῆς πίστεως τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ — — δωρεὰν τῆς
αὐτοῦ χάριτος .

(Footnotes to preceding page)

(1) Cf. I Jno. 3:10; Acts 22:11.

(2) 1 Pet. 2: 24; (note strong resemblance to Ro. 6: 2)

(3) Theologisches Wörterbuch z. N. T., II 202: 21.

(4) II Pet. 1:1.

(5) Heb. 1:9; 5:13; 7:2; 11:33; 12:11

(6) Heb. 11:7.

CHAPTER THREE

THE PAULINE CONCEPTION OF THE "RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD"

I.

In Writings Other Than Romans

We have now reached the principal burden of our study -- the usage and connotation of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in the writings of the Apostle Paul. Presumptive evidence has already been shown, and cumulative evidence of a more specific nature will be subsequently adduced, as to the prismatic or iridescent character of this Pauline phrase. We have already mentioned the apt observation of Lietzmann -- that this term possesses "eine schillernde Doppelbedeutung"; and with this analysis we find ourselves in substantial agreement. Scholars have never succeeded in isolating and ascribing to this concept any one colouring, any more than scientists have done for the rainbow. We believe it to be for the same reason. For in this expression δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, which itself is of the utmost generality¹, there are different shades of meaning which have a natural affinity of inter-relation, and which yet will not individually yield adequate definition of the total content of the conception.

It is clearly implied, as Paul introduces the phrase in the opening chapter of the epistle to the Romans, that the Gospel is a saving power because it is the medium through which this δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is revealed. δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ provides, then, the answer to man's fundamental religious problem, How can I be accepted as righteous in the sight of God? By natural inference, it is the sine qua non of σωτηρία, the objective of man's religious quest, and the result of his acceptance of the Gospel. It has to do, then, with a divine activity and its application, through man's faith, to the divine-human relationship.

(1) So Denny, Expositor's Greek Testament, Romans, (Romans 1:17, en loco.)

It follows, then, that while Paul might be expected to use the term "righteousness of God" to refer to an attribute of God, and also in the course of events to use the word "righteousness" in the lay, ethical sense common to men of his day, these two usages have nevertheless only an indirect bearing upon our problem. For Paul is proclaiming, in this δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ something which, previous to what he refers to specifically as ἁποκαλύπτειν, had been μυστήριον. Now God's own attribute of righteousness had always been recognized. Indeed it was that recognized standard which ever caused man's self-attained righteousness to suffer by awful contrast -- the very contrast which haunted Saul of Tarsus long before he set forth upon the Damascus road. Truly God's attribute of righteousness, and the vulgar conception of righteousness as rectitude both had a part in the setting of the stage for the drama of the reconciliation of God and man -- but it would be confusion to identify either of them with the great drama (i.e., the activity) which is now "revealed" in the Gospel. Those two aspects of "righteousness", while far from unrelated to that which now is made manifest, are yet distinct from the latter δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ, which has become the principal burden of the Apostle's message to the Church at Rome.

CLEARLY ETHICAL USAGES

For present purposes of analysis, and in the light of Lietzmann's description of this phrase as possessed of "eine schillernde Doppelbedeutung", we may conveniently note, in the first place, various "non-technical" (clearly ethical) uses by Paul of "righteousness". We may thereafter proceed to a study of the more pertinent, or "technical" usage -- in the sense in which Holtzmann spoke of it as a "technische abbreviatur". The theologically developed concept and the "non-technical" usage do not, naturally, lend themselves to hard-and-fast and artificial "classification" in every case. Keeping that in mind, we must nevertheless attempt to distinguish generally, between these two essentially different conceptual colourings. Let us then briefly note some of the "non-technical" (for the moment so-called) uses.

In his letters to Timothy, for example, Paul thrice refers to "righteousness" in what is obviously to be taken as the common usage of the word as moral rectitude:

"...and follow after righteousness, godliness, faith, love..."¹
 "...follow righteousness, faith, charity..."²
 "...Scripture..profitable..for instruction in righteousness..."³

"Righteousness" is here seen associated with other virtues generally implying right conduct; and the study of the Scriptures is apparently enjoined as being a guide-book for rectitudinous living.

In the letters of Paul to his friends in Corinth we find even more profuse references to righteousness, of the familiar ethical temper:

"by the armour of righteousness on the righthand and...left"⁴

In this magnificent description of the true ministry, Paul is urging highest moral standards of conscience and of activity -- in the words of Calvin "conscientiae rectitudine et vitae sanctimonia".⁵

"For what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness, and what communion hath light with darkness?"⁶

Lawlessness is opposed to lawfulness. Perhaps the most apt comment on this passage is seen in the way in which J. A. Best characterizes the one as "practical conformity to the law", and the other as "practical disregard of it".⁷

"..he hath given to the poor;his righteousness remaineth..."
"..multiply your seed sown,and increase the fruits of your righteousness....."⁸

The source of the first of these quotations being from the Psalms (112:9),this is taken to be a usage in the older Hebrew sense of philanthropy; the second quotation is a continuation of the thought of that preceding.

"Ministers of righteousness;whose ends shall be according to their works"⁹

Righteousness here understood as that which is opposed by all the forces of evil. In this passage Paul is doubtless giving an apologia for his much-attacked doctrine of Christianfreedom.¹⁰ The righteousness of Christian freedom is not unethical.

(1)(2)(3)- I.Tim.6:11; II Tim. 2:22; 3:16f, resp.

(4)- II Cor 6: 7

(5)- Commentarius in Epis.Post.ad Cor.,BCR 1893,Vol.L.,en loco.

(6)- II Cor 6: 14

(7)- Reference misplaced and unavailable at time of typing (in Egypt).

(8)- II Cor 9:9,10 (9)-II Cor 11:15 (10)Cf.A.Plummer,Comm..II Cor.,1915,p.310.

Again, in his writings to the learners of "the Way" in Ephesus, Paul is seen to make this ordinary usage of "righteousness" (--rectitude):

"..put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness AND true holiness....."

"..fruit of the Spirit is in all goodness and righteousness and truth....."

"..having on the breastplate of righteousness.."¹

In the first instance, Christians are to put off wrong-doing (lying, wrath, stealing, etc), and put on right-doing. Similarly, in the second instance, they are being told how to walk. Righteousness, which is in the company of benevolence and truth evidently is in the sense of uprightness. Over the third passage, there is a natural division of opinion, between those who believe that this is a man's own moral character, and those who believe that this refers to the righteousness of faith. Perhaps the companion expression "shield of faith" lends strength to the second view. R.W. Dale comments:

"In the conflicts of the Christian life, we are safe only when we practice every personal and private virtue, and discharge with fidelity every duty both to man and to God"²

Hodge takes the opposing view:

"Many say it is our own righteousness, integrity or rectitude of mind. But this is no protection. It cannot resist the accusation, much less the severity of the law, or the assaults of Satan. What Paul desired for himself was not to have his own righteousness, but that which is of God by faith."³

Lacking definitive internal evidence of Paul's meaning conveyed in this passage, we do not feel justified in urging dogmatic "classification"; either of the above views is in this case equally possible. Indeed its indeterminate character lends incidental significance to Lietzmann's characterization -- "eine schillernde Doppelbedeutung".

"...Touching the righteousness which is in the law, blameless"⁴

The author intimates that he had met the demands of the law. As far as the law went, he was blameless. It would seem then, from the Judaistic legalistic viewpoint,

(1) Ephesians 4:24f; 5:9; 6:14-16, resp.

(2) R.W. Dale, The Epistle to the Ephesians, London, 1887, p. 428.

(3) C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, (III), New York, 1894, p. 1875.

(4) Phil. 3: 6.

that he had "become blameless"--met the full legal requirement for gaining the favour of God.¹

We have seen that Paul's usage of "righteousness" does not easily lend itself to precise classification. For him, righteousness is something living and therefore beyond all neat categories. God's graciously instituted righteousness and man's ethical righteousness of conduct are not un-related. At the same time, and of cardinal importance to our whole interpretation of Pauline thought, there is nevertheless a spiritual "great gulf fixed" between any righteousness of conduct attainable by human effort, and the effectual righteousness adjudicated to man through faith in Christ -- however relatively commendable the human effort may be. For himself, the Apostle's own life and experience is a test case, and on it his theology is based. Regarding the first type of righteousness (the ἰδίᾳ δικαιοσύνη of Romans 10:3; the personal δικαιοσύνη ἐκ νόμου of Phil. 3:9, etc.), he found it ineffectual, and felt himself still in desperate need of "that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God through faith."² Despite any hesitation, then, to dogmatize as to the implication of certain specific passages, there is an inescapable line of demarkation between the two types of righteousness.

Let us, then, proceed to this second and peculiarly Pauline use of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. We shall first consider briefly this usage in writings other than the epistle to the Romans, finally proceeding to the more fully developed usage in that key document of Pauline thought.

"FAITH-RIGHTEOUSNESS"

"But of him are ye in Christ Jesus, who of God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption..."³

Christ became to us (i.e., "our") righteousness--"for by means of faith we are through the Lord's atoning death constituted righteous before God!"⁴ When confronted by such

(1) So J.A. Beet, Comm. on St. Paul's Ep. to the Philippians, London, 1882, p. 93.
 (2) Phil. 3: 9.
 (3) I Cor. 1: 30f.
 (4) H.A.W. Meyer, ut sup., 37.

implications as "righteousness" here contains, we find ourselves in a different sphere from that of the passages considered in the preceding section of our study. The atmosphere here is that of Romans.¹ In this usage are clear implications of the Pauline doctrine of justification through the dying and risen Lord.² We have, it is here implied, come into possession of righteousness through Christ -- a righteousness far different from any we might have struggled to achieve by our own efforts, and a righteousness that goes far above and beyond the reach of "legal requirement and requirement".³

"For He hath made Him to be sin for us, who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him".⁴

Paul takes as an established principle -- based on the idea of the scapegoat in the doctrines of Judaism -- the ability of one to bear the sins of another. In this and similar passages he depicts the one eternal drama of full and final vicarious payment of the wages of sin. It is a legalistic transaction which yet transcends legalism -- the justifying of the "unjust", brought to classic expression in the epistle to the early Christians in Rome.

"I do not frustrate the grace of God: for if righteousness come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain.."⁵

Paul opposes one righteousness to another. If men could earn their own righteousness, the sacrifice of Christ would be unwarranted and meaningless. Paul, in rebuking Peter, had told him not to insist on Jewish ritual; for justification comes not by legal practices but by faith in the Saviour. The passage yields a negative attestation of a righteousness based on divine activity transcending human effort.

"If there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law".⁶

By proclaiming the Christians' freedom from law, Paul has seemingly made the

(1) So Beet, Comm. on Rominthians, en loco.

(2) G. Findlay, Expositor's Gk. Test. II, 775.

(3) Cf. P. Feine, Theologie des N.T., 7 Aufl., 1936, 239ff.

(4) II Cor 5:21.

(5) Gal. 2: 21.

— (6) Gal. 3:21

law of no value. He says that the law was given because of sin until God's promise should be completely fulfilled, i.e. until the advent of His Son, the Redeemer. Inherent in law is the inability to lead men to true righteousness, hence the necessity for providing a better way. Thus again we have this distinction between the successful and unsuccessful ways to righteousness.¹

"For we through the Spirit wait for...righteousness by faith"²

Here, continuing the thought in the paragraph immediately preceding, is the "better way". No longer, for those who choose this more excellent way, is there the agonizing and unending question of "What more must I do?", but the righteousness of Christ transmitted to them by faith⁴, they thereby--

"Being filled with the fruits of righteousness which are by Jesus Christ"⁵

"And be found in him, not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith". 6

In drawing this clear distinction between the two types of righteousness, Paul again disclaims any merit for law observance as a reason for favour before God; yearning rather for the transcendent righteousness born of faith. If we compare this phrase "my own righteousness" with the parallel phrase of Romans 10:3, we perceive that the righteousness of God corresponds to the righteousness from God.⁷ Then, comparing these two passages, phrase by phrase, with Romans 1:17 and 3:21f, we discover that the righteousness of God is equivalent to the righteousness of faith (Romans 10:6), and the righteousness from God through faith (Phil 3:9).⁸

"...Is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give me....."⁹

If we had only this passage, we might have reason to think Paul to be claiming a crown for having fought the good fight. But he is here describing explicitly what

(1) E. Tobac, ut sup., 116: "La promesse n'est autre chose pour Paul qu'une premiere manifestation de la justice de Dieu dans l'Ancien Testament"; cf. Luther, Gal., p. 259.

(2) Gal. 5:5.

(3) Cf. Calvin (Comm...Gal.), en loco.

(5) Phil. 1: 11.

(6) Ibid., 3: 8, 9.

(7) Cp. Thackeray, ut sup., 85; W. Macholz: Zum Verständnis der paulinischen Rechtfertigungsgedanken, ThStKr, 88, 1915, p. 41

(8) Con., Häring, Dik. Theou, p. 64 (9) II Tim. 4:8.

what elsewhere lies behind his figures of speech -- that great judgment day, when God will bless all those worthy of the pronouncement "Thou are righteous". And the sole adequate means for the reception of that pronouncement, we find from Paul's total doctrine, is belief in Jesus Christ. As with the salvation, so with the bestowal; it is all of grace, to be thankfully received, never to be claimed as a debt.¹ In the one remaining passage which we consider before proceeding to the Epistle to the Romans, Paul is heard repeating this basis of salvation:

"Not by works of righteousness which we have done,
but according to his mercy he saved us..."²

These passages have given us a clear indication of the unity of Paul's total preachments, and of the distinctive nature of the "righteousness of God" which through human faith and divine grace accomplishes the reconciliation of man to God. These passages naturally do not exhaust what Paul has to say of this righteousness which is not of works but of grace through faith. For a fuller study of the centrality and distinctiveness of "the righteousness of God" in his theology, we therefore turn now to the Apostle's magnum opus -- the Epistle to the Romans.

(1) So Fairbairn, op.cit., (The Pastoral Epistles, 1874), p. 392

(2) Titus 3: 5.

CHAPTER III

THE PAULINE CONCEPTION OF "THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD"

II.

In The Epistle To The Romans.

"..I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ; for it is the power of God unto salvation, to everyone that believeth; to the Jew first, and also to the Greek. For therein is the RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD revealed from faith to faith: as it is written, the just shall live by faith". (Romans 1: 16f).

In this apologia , destined to dawn with new light upon Martin Luther of Eisleben, Paul holds aloft before the eyes of mighty Rome a new and revolutionary force -- the power of God unto salvation. This challenging, new and transcendent power, resident in the Gospel of Christ, is offered, not to those who might think they had the might to seize it or to those who might think their exemplary deeds might merit it, but to **everyone** that believeth! This "gospel" banishes all cowering deference and makes him bold to speak even to those under the aegis of Rome, because in it is revealed "the **righteousness of God**".

The question naturally arises as to how a righteousness of God can be called the power of God unto salvation, the expressed equivalent of the Gospel of Christ. From the rest of the Epistle, we know that Paul's "Gospel" is not merely the Old Testament revelation already known to the Jews. He obviously feels himself to be proclaiming a new element in the body of religious truth. Certainly the Jews would profess already to possess a knowledge of the righteousness of God, reaching back through the years to the time of Moses. Even the gentiles have an awareness of a righteous deity; to them his αἰὶός ὁνάμις καὶ θελότης is nothing new.

Is the Apostle then preaching a deepened conception of what both Jew and Gentile have already known? Only in a very limited sense. He calls this Gospel "my Gospel". The genius of the Old Testament forms, of course, a magnificent background for the fuller revelation of God in Christ; but tragically has for the most part left Paul's Jewish friends with "zeal, but not according to knowledge". But this Gospel, proclaimed by Paul, furnishes that vital knowledge -- the full

redemptive purpose of God as revealed in Jesus Christ.¹

Although we have represented Paul's message as being a distinct advance upon the teachings of the Old Testament, we must nevertheless equally realize that it is in essential continuity with the Old Testament -- though to Judaism contemporary to Paul, his proclamation was viewed as anything but harmonious! This continuity is widely attested by scholars, who repeatedly draw attention² to the suggestive parallelism in many passages (especially Deutero-Isaiah) between "the righteousness of God" and His "salvation" (vindication, deliverance, etc.) -- for example:

"There is no God beside me;
a **Just** God and a **Saviour**..."

.....
"I bring my **righteousness** near;
it shall not be far off, and my
salvation shall not tarry..."

.....
"My **righteousness** is near;
my **salvation** is gone forth..."³

Certainly in these passages God's "righteousness" is not a mere attribute, any more than the parallel term "salvation". From the early prophetic era to the time of Paul there was always the conception that it was as "salvation" (i.e. an activity) that God's "righteousness" would be manifested to His people. Paul's advance upon this extant conception consisted in the disclosure of the newly-revealed modus operandi -- justification of the unjust, through a Redeemer, Christ, "the righteous".⁴ By "my Gospel", he means then, as shown in the opening quotation above, "the Gospel of Christ"---the full and sufficient revelation, the climax and final chapter, of the ageless quest for reconciliation of man to God.

In seeming to equate "the righteousness of God" and "the power of God unto salvation", we need carefully to note that such saving activity is never thereby to be construed as "easy", automatic, mechanical or arbitrary. Only by violating

(1)-Cf. v.Zahn, Der Brief des Paulus an die Römer, 2 Aufl., 1910, pp 173ff.

(2)-E.g., Sanday & Headlam, Romans, p. 34; A. Scott, Christianity According to St. Paul, p. 64; A. B. Davidson, Old Test. Theology, 143ff, 398; J. Skinner "Righteousness in the Old Testament" (HDB)

(3)-Isaiah xlv:21; xlvi:13; li:5, resp.; cf. Psa. xxiv:5.

(4)-So Scott, ut sup., p. 64.

both the Old Testament conception of righteousness, as well as that of Paul, can we infer or conjure an easy picture of a God of mercy and free pardon.¹ Wrath has also been revealed from heaven, against un-righteousness!².....God, by His very nature, His own righteousness, cannot arbitrarily (without special and adequate provision) pardon the unrighteous, or accept one as righteous whose righteousness has no basis in fact.

Furthermore, to say that this "righteousness of God" (as an activity) is a force God chooses to exercise because of His omnipotence, would be unwarranted presumption. It is not a matter of metaphysics but of revealed theology; we are not questioning the possibility of God's doing with man and the universe as He pleases. Rather than such indulgence in casuistry, we seek to ascertain just what God has done and is doing. The question is in the realm of empirical, rather than speculative, theology. As creatures of God, we can but marvel at His wisdom and try as we can to express our praise.³

We might note, in passing, that δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in Paul's classic proclamation has no article. If he were speaking of the (attribute of) righteousness of God recognized by men generally -- or if he were referring to the prevailing conception of Judaism! -- it would indeed be strange for him not to say "the" righteousness of God. But he is not referring to either; rather to something newly revealed, in Christ. Again, it would hardly be "the righteousness of God" made available to man; for man never becomes righteous as God is righteous (pantheistic mysticism)---

(1) Cf. Schrenk, Theologisches Wörterbuch..z.NT, II, 298ff--"die Kraft Gottes"; also Kölbling, P., Studium zur Paulinischen Gedanken Theologie, ThStKr, Gotha, 1895, p.13.

(2) Cf. Romans 1: 18.

(3) Best example of this, known to the writer, if inclusion of poetry here be pardoned, is in the following poem by an unknown Spanish poet:

No me mueve mi Dios para quererte
El Cielo que me tienes prometido;
Ni me mueve el infierno tan temido,
Para dejar por eso de ofenderte.....
Tú me mueves.....en tal manera
Que, aunque no hubiera cielo yo te amara,
Y, aunque no hubiera infierno, te temiera,
No tienes que me dar porque te quiera,
Porque aunque cuanto espero no esperara,
Lo mismo que te quiero te quisiera."

we are convinced that this interpretation is Pauline, his mystical allusions notwithstanding. Man's righteousness is adjudicated; God's righteousness is peculiar. God is essentially righteous; man, through Christ, has become "rightly related".¹

This "righteousness of God" is further qualified by the Apostle, as being revealed "from faith to faith". The difficulty of analyzing this latter phrase is reflected in the multiplicity of interpretations that have been suggested. Does it mean from the faith of one man to the faith of another? It then refers to the communication of faith. Or does it imply that faith **grows** from more to more², and that the more faith one has, the more he will progress in faith? Anderson Scott aptly points out that, if 'apokaluptetai' has the sense of "being revealed so as to reach", then the phrase has the meaning "on the ground of faith, to faith" (faith being at once the ground on which justification is conferred, and the faculty which receives it).³ Naturally we would agree that faith is both contagious, and cumulative; but of more fundamental importance here, is the dual nature of faith as the basis and medium, the fountain-head and channel (we speak as men!) of our new righteousness before God.

The Apostle then proceeds to attempt an augmentation, or at least an illustration, of the basic nature of faith in maintenance of righteous existence. His quotation from Habakkuk may be rendered "The righteous in his faith (fidelity) shall live", or "The righteous shall live in (by, or because of) his faith", or the literal Greek rendering "from faith". It would be unfair, and anomalous, to attempt to claim that Habakkuk had the Pauline doctrine in mind. And it is irrelevant to theorize at length as to possible liberties taken by the writer of Romans, with the prophet's term אֱמוּנָה.⁴ But certainly, for both men, righteousness and faith are inextricably linked. That which motivates the righteous man is the dynamic of his faith; morality springs from belief.

(1) cf. v. Zahn, ut. sup., 87; comp. A. Michelson, Die Dikaisoune Theou in Briefe an die Römer (Zeitschrift für kirchliche Wissenschaft) V, 1884, p. 134; Fricke, ut. sup., 78-93; Kühl, ut. sup., 41-43. (2) S&H, Romans (ICC), en loco; Lipsius, ut. sup., p. 7. (3) Christianity According to St. Paul, p. 63. (4) Cf. Quell, TWB, II, 180, note 12, and, Ibid., 189.

We have already noted that Paul's conception of the vital role of faith by no means vitiates the ethical aspect of the Gospel. There is no easy compromise. The ~~ōpōn~~ of God, the Apostle hastens to add to his proclamation, has also been revealed -- against ungodliness and injustice. Pertinent to this mention of God's wrath, it is fitting to reemphasize the falsity of that conception of God which obliterates the retributive judgment of God under a blanket of divine benevolence and mercy. Only in abstract scholasticism do we find God's goodness and His condemnation of evil dissociated. No more thunderous passage than this first chapter of Romans has ever been written stressing the heinousness of sin. Both retribution and grace must of necessity be involved in the approach to the problem of redemption.

Once the inability of man effectually to transform his own inherently sinful nature is recognized, there can be no question as to the need for some form of atonement, otherwise the warning of the Apostle becomes effective:

"..treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God."¹

Indeed the felt need for an atonement, the conception of human (universal) sinfulness, is no new proclamation or implication by Paul. As Davidson finds², the Old Testament itself teaches that all individuals are sinners, that their sinfulness is an instance of the general fact that all mankind is sinful; and that 'the sin of man can only be taken away by Jahveh'. Anderson Scott traces this speculation on the origin of human sinfulness, and its relation to Adam, on through post-canonical writings of Enoch, Baruch and 4th Ezra, and finds in Baruch "the same paradoxical juxtaposition of hereditary sinfulness with personal responsibility which we find in Paul", and he seems correct in concluding that, in this matter, Paul was probably reflecting the view of his Rabbinical teachers.³ In any case, the universality of sinfulness was then a deeply established concept, and doubtlessly furnished Paul the cogent illustration of the parallel universality of the need of reconciliation.⁴

(1) Romans 2: 4-5 (2) A.B. Davidson, op. cit., (O. Test. Theol.), p. 217
 (3) Christianity According to St. Paul, p. 50.; but comp. Braun, H., Gerichtsgedanke und Rechtfertigungslehre bei Paulus, UNT., Heft 19, Leipzig, 1930, pp. 56-59; 94-98; Oltmanns, K., Das Verhältnis von Röm. 1:18--3:20 zu 3:21ff., Th. Bl. 8. Jhrgng, 1884, p. 115.
 (4) Cf. Romans 5:12-17

Without attempting to summarize for ourselves the elements of the passage quoted from the first chapter of the Epistle, let us proceed directly to Paul's own synthesis on the "righteousness of God", as furnished in the third chapter:

"But now the righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets; even the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe; for there is no difference: for all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God; being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: whom God set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness: that he might be just and justifier of him which believeth in Jesus". (III: 21-6)

Still prominent here in the Apostle's mind is his thesis of universal sinfulness--the Jew having sinned against the law of Moses, and the Gentile against the God-given law written in the heart of natural man. Now the righteousness of God has been revealed to all those who believe. To sinners, regardless of category and without essential distinction between Jew and Gentile, there has now been revealed something as a result of which believers are accepted as righteous in the sight of God. The offer of succour is no less universal than the universality of human sin; for as there is no longer any individual claim of merit, there is likewise no peculiarly individual means of appropriation -- all who are justified must rely upon faith in Jesus Christ.¹

The definite divine purpose is declared: the λύτρον of human sinfulness is borne by the Son of God, set forth as the one who alone could be the perfect ἰλαστήριον. Thus alone can the demands, both of justice and of grace, be met. For, as man cannot save himself, an act that transcends human effort is the only adequate answer. And being far above the highest price which human hands can proffer, it can only first be purchased with the riches of divine grace, then freely bestowed as a gift. Thus heavily freighted with meaning does δικαιούμενοι come to readers at Rome, from the pen of the Apostle Paul.

(1) Cp. E. v Lohmeyer, Grundlagen paulinischer Theologie, (Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 1929, I, p. 55.

This propitiation is said to be through "faith in His blood". Such faith can but mean belief that the life and death of Christ are inseparably and uniquely related to human salvation. Faith, per se, does not make man holy, but is the means by which he appropriates the saving effects of Christ's sacrificial death; the objective ground of man's salvation becomes effectual to the individual sinner in need of forgiveness, when he truly believes in, and relies upon the saving power of Christ's satisfaction.

In this propitiatory action of divine grace, there appear to be three time-aspects: with regard to the past, God's righteousness, now revealed, has "cleared up" any possible misunderstanding or accusation regarding the apparent passing over of sins previously committed in His forbearance. By that, we mean to say that the sacrifice of Christ "cleared" God (we "speak as men"!) of any apparent discrepancy or inconsistency with regard to His own perfect justice. With regard to the present, (ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ), God desired to reveal His righteousness because He would still appear, apart from the work of Christ, inconsistent in His attitude and activity regarding human sin. Finally, and with regard to all eternity, the purpose of the Father in setting forth His Son as a propitiation was that He might "justifiably justify" those who turned to Him in the full reliance of true faith. In such manner mankind for all time was furnished a clear picture of the perfect reconciliation of God's unquestionable justice and unending love, accomplished in "the redemption purchased by Christ". Thus, from beyond history, this eternal purpose was unveiled in and to history, in the earthly existence and expiation effected by Our Lord. And so, essentially, "ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ" transcends time, and becomes the eternal "now" of every needy soul.

C. Anderson Scott opposes what he terms the traditional exegetical view: "that the purpose and result of Christ's sacrificial death is to demonstrate the righteousness of God which has been impugned!"¹ He points out (1) that St. Paul was not inter-

(1) Christianity According to St. Paul, Cambridge, 1927, p.64 et seqq.

ested in the question of "righteousness" as an abstract quality of the divine nature; (2) that there is even less reason to presuppose that the divine attribute of righteousness had been impugned or challenged because God in the past had failed adequately to punish sin, and (3) that there appears to be ^{no} sufficient Scriptural basis to indicate a "recognized necessity for the vindication or demonstration of the abstract righteousness of God".

We can agree with these three findings only in likewise opposing the view of "the righteousness of God" as an "abstract quality of the divine nature". Regarding his objection to what he infers to be the traditional view, we cannot but feel that the purpose of Christ's earthly mission was to manifest, to incarnate (in His death), the active, saving "righteousness of God" ("The divine Theodicy for the past history of the world"--Tholuck); and that it resulted in what Denny describes as "the demonstration of His righteousness -- that is, in the widest sense, of His consistency with His own character."¹

Throughout the spiritual symphony of the Old Testament there runs a minor theme -- the perplexity regarding the perfect justice of God, as over against His mercy. This can be traced on through Judaism and down to the Christian era, in what Bousset calls "the unresolved tension between faith in God's compassion, and faith in His righteousness."² It would then surely seem that one of the reasons for this new revelation of the full and effectual nature of "the righteousness of God", was for the resolving of this tension, through the reconciliation of His justice and His compassion -- "at once the vindication of God and the salvation of man."³

Let us consider briefly Paul's further qualification of this "righteousness of God", as being revealed "Χρὴς νόμου". It seems significant that he does not say "the law", especially inasmuch as he does in the second part of this very same sentence refer to the law (and the prophets) -- an explicit reference to the

1 - James Denny, Expositor's Greek Testament, en loco. (Also quotation from Tholuck)

2 - Die Religion des Judentums, 3, p. 384.

3 - Denny, ut sup., en loco

Old Testament.¹ The former phrase we therefore take as a reference to law in general, whether Hebrew or Gentile.² In any case, and of primary importance here, Paul's thesis here is that no one shall be justified in God's sight through mere obedience to statutes; that, as a matter of fact, "through law is the knowledge of sin".³ Law, (the writer once heard from an Edinburgh pulpit), rather than a set of rules which man was expected to obey perfectly, is more like a great mirror, which reflects men's shortcomings. Surely some such thought was in the mind of the Apostle, law being considered principally as the means of "the knowledge of sin", its slavish adherence never eliciting a person's justification in the sight of God.⁴ This "righteousness of God" which Paul now proclaims is, therefore, manifested independently of any consideration as to legalistic obedience; or, in the words of Haldane, "without any regard whatever to the obedience of the law".⁵

"Ὡς δὲ... ΠΕΡΑΝΕΡΟΤΑΙ" shows Paul re-emphasizing the element of new-ness in this revelation of the "righteousness of God". "But now" divides mankind's spiritual chronology into two parts; that before and after the revelation of God in Christ.⁶ This is of great significance for our interpretation of the "righteousness of God" which he is proclaiming, in that it enunciates in an unmistakable way the unique role of Christ in the unfolding of God's plan of **salvation**. Note the following, which is an even more explicit expression in this regard:

"Ye being in time past without Christ, being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise, having no hope, and without God in the world; but now in Christ Jesus ye who sometimes were far off are made nigh by the blood of Christ"⁷

For all mankind, if here especially emphasized in the case of Gentiles, the advent and activity of Christ marked a turning point in the quest of salvation. Or, more than a turning point, it was the end of the road; for it was the revelation of the mystery "for eternal times kept silent but now revealed"⁸, to revert to Paul's words.

- 1- Cf. Cremer, Die paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre, Güttersloh, 1899, pp. 6, 9.
 2- Con., Feine, op cit., 208; W. Bauer, Griech-deutsches Wörterbuch, 3, (1937), p. 898
 3- Romans, 3:20 4- Cf. A. Schlatter, Gottes Gerechtigkeit, 1935, en loco (Ro. 3:20).
 5- Cit., J. A. Morison, Critical Expos. of 3rd Chap. . . Romans, pp. 210-212.
 6- Con., v Zahn, op cit., en loco.
 7- Ephesians, 2: 11-13
 8- Romans, 16: 25-27.

"But now"...God has entered into history in the garments of human flesh. Eternity has shattered, for the human spirit, the temporal mould of futile human effort. And the result of this is a newly manifested righteousness of God, made available through grace and effectual through acceptance in faith. The words Paul writes have familiar associations for his readers; associations from the spiritual heritage of earlier generations, from the parlance of Judaism of his day, from the phraseology of the Septuagint, and from Hellenic tongue of such widespread usage. "But now", a new content has been poured into these erstwhile familiar thought forms -- a new entity, a new reality, the appearance of God to man in time, the work of Christ, and through it all a divinely-initiated, and therefore effectual, means of acceptance as righteous in the sight of God. How natural, then, the strain upon the old linguistic thought-forms, which now must accomodate new truths. And how inevitable the measure of difficulty in the communication of these new truths, as Paul finds it necessary to infuse new meaning into jaded phraseology! But the truth did find its mark, and was communicated, ~~controversely~~ notwithstanding. Thus an Augustine could perceive the paradoxical nature of this "righteousness of God", as that whereby God "endows man when He 'justifies the ungodly'":

"Iustitia, inquit, dei manifestata est. Hanc ignorant qui suam volent constituere, huic nolunt esse subiecti. Iustitia, inquit, dei manifestata est -- non dixit: 'Iustitia hominis dei iustitia propriae voluntatis' -- iustitia dei, non qua deus iustus est, sed qua inducit hominem cum justificat impium". (1)

And thus, later, a John Calvin could be enabled so clearly to distinguish between the ineffectual righteousness "of the law" and that "of God", the latter made effectual through grace, with Christ as the material cause and human faith the instrument:

"Iustificacionis nostrae causam non ad hominum iudicium referri, sed ad Dei tribunal, ubi nulla iustitia censetur nisi perfecta absolutaque legis obedientia: quod facile patet ex promissionibus et minis. Quod si nemo hominum reperitur, qui ad tam exactam sanctitatem conscenderit: sequitur, omnes iustitia in se ipsis destitui. Tum occurrat Christus oportet: qui ut solus iustus est, ita suam iustitiam in nos transferendo iustos nos reddit. Nunc vides ut iustitia fidei iustitia Christi sit. Ut ergo

(1) Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, LX, Sect.viii; I:167.

iustificemur, causa efficiens est misericordia Dei; Christus, materia: verbum cum fide, instrumentum. Quare fides iustificare dicitur: quia instrumentum est recipiende Christi, in quo nobis communicatur iustitia." (1)

In this key passage from the third chapter of Romans, and indeed in the majority of Paul's passages referring to "justification" -- and this applies equally to his references to the "righteousness of God" -- such reference is made to it in its connection with faith. Indeed here in the third chapter his emphasis on the vital role of faith all but leads him into tautology: "...through faith...unto all... that believe". Furthermore, his marked emphasis on faith appears at times almost to lead to the complete nullification of the law -- although to take it as such would be a misunderstanding of his conception of the role of faith. It appears, then, that the reason for such emphasis is to make sure, doubly sure, that, in his use of forensic conceptions that will be understandable to legalistically-inclined ears, faith will nevertheless be understood as the key and vital factor in justification, from the point of view of man's participation in the process.²

This thought receives support and further clarification in the noteworthy fact that throughout the epistle διὰ always takes the genitive and never the accusative form of πίστις. The accusative would express the cause of this righteousness; whereas the genitive expresses the means. Righteousness is through faith, not on account of faith.

Δικαιούμενοι δωρεάν τῆ αὐτοῦ χάριτι. This phrase would appear to constitute the verbal equivalent of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. We have already noted that Paul uses the verb δικαιόω as the equivalent of קָדַשׁ.³ If that is the case, Paul here means that sinners are declared just, not made just. The declaration is of grace, not because it is given without reason, but because of "the redemption which is in Christ Jesus". Looking at the passage in toto we see then, first the substantive "righteousness of God", secondly, and in apposition, the essentially synonymous resultant state: "being justified freely by his grace".

1- Corpus Reformatorum, B-C-R, Brunsvigae, 1892, XLIX, p. 60 (vs. 22, en loco).

2- Comp. v Zahn, op cit., p. 176; W. Michaelis, Rechtfertigung aus Glauben bei Paulus, 1927, p. 116-138.

3- Cf. H. E. Weber, Eschatologie und Mystik im N. Test., BFT., Gütersloh, 1930, p. 92f.

While man through faith is thus "justified freely", yet on the part of God a tremendous price has been paid: this gracious adjudication of "righteousness" has been made possible through "the ἀπολυτρώσεως which is in Christ Jesus".¹ James Denny believes that "liberation" is a better translation than "redemption", since in the one case in the Septuagint where this word is used, it refers to the recovery of Nebuchadnezzar from madness, i.e. a liberation without a price.² But as he himself admits, examples from classical writers such as Josephus and Philo, combined with the testimony of the whole New Testament to the cost of liberation, would tend to show that this was a liberation with a price. Noting, furthermore, the fact that the term contains the word "λύτρον", it would seem that there could be little doubt that Paul has in mind the cost of the process, as well as the resultant state. Wherever the New Testament speaks of ἀπολυτρώσις as being "through Christ", the ground of redemption is always given as His blood, or suffering, or death.³

Although the causa efficiens of man's adjudicated righteousness is a free and gracious decision emanating from the divine Will, and the instrumentum is free exercise of human faith, the causa materia is not free: it is the great price paid by the sacrifice of Christ, "whom God set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood". This latter expression is perhaps the very heart of the fuller expression from the third chapter of Romans, which we have been considering.

Ἰλαστήριον has provoked almost interminable discussion. Scholars have been divided as to whether the term is to be taken adjectivally, or as a noun: whether God set Christ forth "as propitiatory", or "as a propitiation". Insofar as it relates to our present thesis, the force behind either translation is essentially the same: man's deliverance is freely offered, but furnished at great cost to God.⁴

To arrive at a more precise definition of the term, scholars have gone to various corresponding Greek and Hebrew words. In the Greek, the general sense is "to appease"

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- 1- Comp. Lietzmann, Einführung in die Textgeschichte der Paulusbriefe. An die Römer. (Handbuch zum N. Test., 4 Aufl.), Tübingen, 1933, p. 50f.; Ritschl, op cit 221ff.
 2- Expositor's Greek Test., II, p. 610; (Passage cited from LXX: Daniel, 4:29)
 3- Comp. C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, III, 1875, p. 141; Cf: 1 Tim. 2:6; Matt. 20:28; and I Pet. 1:18 (note ἐλυτρώθητε)
 4- Cf. G. Kittel, Zur Erklärung von Römerbrief 3:21-26, (Th. St. Kr.), Gotha, 1907, p. 224.

or "to placate", whether God or man. Then, by means of the linguistic bridge furnished us in the Septuagint, we go over to the corresponding Hebrew word כָּפַר, "to cover (over)". This term appears most frequently in the pi'el form, where it has the sense of "to cover (over), forgive, expiate, atone for, make atonement (for and offender). When God forgives sins, He covers them over --according to the sense here noted --with something else, superimposes something upon them which blots them out. When man attempts to atone for his sin, it is an attempt likewise to cover it over, and thus make propitiation. Thus it is that the word contains within itself both the idea of covering sin, and the idea of the result of that covering.

From such parallel terms as כַּפֶּרֶת in Exodus, 25:16, and ἱλαστήριον ἐπίθεμα in the Septuagint translation, scholars have argued that this is a propitiation lid, cover, mercy seat. But if this is the case, Paul's figure is very obscure, if not mixed. If Jesus is the mercy-seat, and yet His blood is poured on the mercy-seat, it would result in an awkward construction that would not be tenable.

Others have taken this as an adjective modifying the verb for sacrifice. Again, in the case of James Denny, the word is taken rather as masculine, in agreement with ὅν, and translated "whom God set forth in propitiatory power".¹

But whether we translate this word as "the mercy-seat", with Ritschl², or as a "propitiatory sacrifice", or a "propitiation", our discussion serves to make plain the fact that in Christ a sacrifice was effected. It would naturally seem that Paul would speak of it in personal terms, rather than in terms of the place of the sacrifice; but in either case, the matter of cardinal importance is that the sacrificial blood of Christ performed an expiatory office. It hardly needs mentioning, furthermore, that the propitiatory act of Christ, sui generis, is in contradistinction to the heathen idea of appeasement, which latter interpretation may be summarily rejected.³

1- Op.cit., en loco

2- Op. cit., 166f.

3- Cf. Bishop Westcott's The Epistles of St. John, p.85; F.Platt, Dictionary of the Apostolic Church, II, p.281

This propitiation Paul describes as "through faith in His blood". For our purpose it is not necessary to discuss at length whether "faith" and "His blood" are thus to be placed together, or are to be so understood that "in His blood" is associated with one of the preceding phrases of the passage. What should be noted is that God set Jesus Christ forth as a propitiation, i.e., as a means of effecting divine-human reconciliation; that the blood of Christ, sacrificially shed, is organically related to this propitiation as the quid pro quo; and, parenthetically, that faith is the essential factor in man's response.¹ For to say, for instance, that God set Jesus forth through man's faith, is most unnatural and out of accord with the rest of Paul's statements concerning faith.² Calvin prefers definitely to accept the literal order in which Paul's words are written, and claims to find the following uninterrupted sequence of thought:

"...proprium nobis Deum reddi simul ac in Christi sanguine repositam habemus fiduciam: quia per fidem in eius beneficii possessionem venimus. Sanguinem autem solum nominando non voluit alias redemptionis partes excludere, sed potius sub una parte totam summam comprehendere: sanguinem vero nominavit, in quo habemus nostrum lavacrum." 3

We could scarcely wish to find a more clearly Pauline definition of faith than this "our confidence reposed in the blood of Christ", by which we "come into possession of His benefit".⁴

We see how closely this discussion of redemption and propitiation is related to the righteousness of God, as we note the way in which Paul encloses his words about being justified, with his references to God's righteousness. This is superbly illustrated in the passage in Romans, third chapter, which we have been considering.

Following his statement that God set Jesus forth, Paul adduces three reasons for that proposition: Firstly, for the declaration of His righteousness on account of the passing over of sins committed aforesaid; secondly, for the declaration of His righteousness in the present time; and thirdly, to be righteous and the justifier of the

1- Cf. A. Schlatter, Gottes Gerechtigkeit, Stuttgart, 1935, en loco; Denny, Expositor's Greek Testament, en loco.

2- Cf. G. Kittel, Op.cit., p.228; A. Scott, Op.Cit., 69f.

3- Ioannis Calvini, Opera, B-C-Reuss, Brunsvigae, 1892, vol.xlix, p.62, par.25.

4- Cf. K lbing, P., Studium zur paulinischen Theologie, Th.St.Kr., Gotha, 1895, pp.23ff.

believer in Christ. Let us consider these in that order:

For a declaration of His righteousness...shown in the long-suffering of God.

God purposed this setting forth of Christ that He might make plain His righteousness.¹

Now, **while** we believe that Christ's death, His shed blood, was the ground on which God's adjudication of "righteousness" was based, we have yet seen reasons for interpreting this particular usage of "righteousness" as an attribute of God. The reason for this is, that God's tolerance regarding sin in time past might appear to obscure His own perfect justice. If this particular reference were to God's "gift-righteousness", it could not have been obscured by forbearance; for gift-righteousness makes God's long-suffering understandable. But if this is a reference to God's own nature, then we can see why it should be publicly manifested, because His apparent neglect in righting wrongs and punishing evil would appear to bring into question this aspect of His nature.² The dual usage of "righteousness" comes out more clearly in the later phrase "just and justifier", which will be treated subsequently; suffice it here to point out that Paul is emphasizing a contrast, between God's unimpeachable justice and His paradoxical "adjudicated just-ness", if we may so speak of it. And, in this particular instance, it is the **former**, to which Paul has reference. As long as God appeared to any man not to have any regard for sin, that man felt reason to question God's (retributive) justice. But when Christ was set forth, God made His final and public reckoning with sin.³ But, simultaneously, and essentially inseparable, there was also revealed the resultant means of adjudicated righteousness for man.

For a declaration of His righteousness in the present time. Actually we cannot understand this purpose without its explanation: "that he might be just and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus". Whereas, regarding the passing over of sins committed aforetime, the result was primarily a removal of any question as to the essential justice of God, this present manifestation "in the now time" clearly extends in scope to include, not only the attributive righteousness of God, but an eternal **means** to the divine adjudication of righteousness to true believers. Thus

1- Cf. Th. Häring, Dikaiosune Theou.., p.36.

2- Comp. E. Tobac, Le Probleme de la Justification, p.124f.; Ritschl, op. cit., p.219f.

3- Cf. E. von Dobschütz, Die Rechtfertigung bei Paulus, Th. St. Kr., 85, Gotha, 1912, p.48f;
G.A. Fricke, Der paulinische Grundbegriff der Dik. Theou...Röm. 3:21-6. p. 67.

at that time and for all eternity, God's own justice was clarified in the hitherto clouded mind of man, and an avenue to man's acceptance as righteous before God was also opened; thus could Paul speak of God as "just and justifier".

On the connecting "and", of "just and justifier", commentators are divided. Does it signify and also, and therefore or because? Or, on the other hand, does it have adversative force, just although justifier? Does Paul mean to imply that God's justice and His gift of righteousness are in opposition to one another, or in essential harmony hitherto unrealized but now demonstrated?

If God's nature is correctly portrayed in the sermon on His name, recorded in Exodus, then there seems little doubt that it is a profound problem, how to be just and yet a justifier. God is there referred to as saying of himself:

"..The Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin..." 1

If the statement had stopped there, then "to be just" might have appeared synonymous with "to be a justifier". But He continues:

"..but one who will never accept the guilty, one who avenges the sins of fathers on their children and their children's children."

Who will deny that this was the conception of God which Paul shared: a gracious God, who yet took account of sin? Who, indeed, can deny that this is a typical example of the one consistent representation of God in both the Old Testament and the New? Paradoxically, but inescapably, both the retributive and the charitable elements are bound up in this "problem worthy of divine wisdom", to use the words of Godet, who finds that God had, in Christ, the means of being "just while justifying, and justifying while remaining just"! His summary of this great problem is worthy of fuller quotation:

"C'était un grand problème, un problème digne de la sagesse divine, que celui que le péché de l'homme posait à Dieu: rester juste tout en justifiant (déclarant juste), l'homme devenu injuste. Dieu n'a pas reculé devant cette tâche. Il l'avait même déjà résolue d'avance,

1- Exodus 34:6ff; latter portion according to Moffatt's translation; cf. Rom. 1:18.

dans son conseil éternel, avant de créer l'homme libre; autrement cette création n'eut-elle pas mérité le nom d'imprudence? Dieu possédait par devers lui, en Christ ("proetheto", vs.25; Eph.1:3-4) le moyen d'être à la fois juste et justifiant, c'est-à-dire juste en justifiant, justifiant tout en restant juste." 1

The purpose and accomplishment of God's activity, then, was the demonstration of divine "rectitude" and human "rectification", to attempt in English to show the dual nature of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. This was accomplished, according to the Scriptures, from the foundation of the world; but now demonstrated to man, in the earthly mission of Our Lord.

Doubt as to Paul's special use of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is further dispelled by an examination of a subsequent passage in the epistle, in the ninth and tenth chapters, showing how Israel's unbelief has defeated the purpose of law, and has witnessed the disclosure of another type of "righteousness" - the righteousness of faith.² With "zeal, but not according to knowledge", they overlooked God's righteousness, in seeking to establish their own.³ "The Gentiles", Paul writes,

which followed not after righteousness, have attained to righteousness, even the righteousness which is of faith. But Israel, which followed after the law of righteousness, hath not attained to the law of righteousness. Wherefore? Because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the works of the law...they stumbled at the stumbling-stone."

Certainly it is clear here that Paul is distinguishing one righteousness by opposing it to another. He sets God's righteousness in violent contrast with their own righteousness, and calls Christ the end of law to everyone that believeth. We are, again, shown the great contrast between the Gentile's uncultivated righteousness which is of faith, and Israel's cultivated righteousness which is of works. We perceive the close association of thought between God's righteousness and the simple spontaneous righteousness of faith; whereas their (Israel's) own righteousness is depicted as the grasping and ineffectual righteousness which is of works. It appears

1- F. Godet, Commentaire sur l'Épître aux Romains, Paris, 1879, p.339f.

2- Romans 9:30 -- 10:13

3- Cf. Fricke, Der Paulinische Grundbegriff..., p.24; F.V.Filson, St. Paul's Conception of Recompense, U.N.T., Heft 21, Leipzig, 1931, pp.4-12; v. Dobschütz, Op.cit., pp.40,48; W. Grundmann, Rechtfertigung und Mystik bei Paulus, ZNW, 32, 1933, p.54; H. Braun, Gerichtsgedanke und Rechtfertigungslehre bei Paulus, UNT, Heft 19, Leipzig, 1930, pp.56-58; F. Weber, Op.cit., pp.268-290.

quite clearly, as in numerous instances heretofore, that the implication is that effectual righteousness cannot be earned by human effort; rather that it is a righteousness which, being beyond the grasp of man's own striving, can only be graciously bestowed on him by God, through faith.¹

Those who are unwilling to believe that Paul means that God adjudicates righteousness without reference to merit profess to gather that the Apostle is here talking of a wrongly conceived morality.² The Jews, they say, were not misguided in their attempt to win God's favor by godly lives, but were mistaken in the spirit of such life, or in the inner principle, or in the nature of the precepts themselves. All the pantheistic-mystical schools, as well as the Roman Catholic holders of the doctrine of iustitia infusa, find it impossible for God to give an absolutely free gift. Cardinal Newman argues that it would be dishonest of God to conceal the blackness of a negro and then call him white. The Mystic speaks of "life" as a transforming principle which makes man righteous before God pronounces him just.

But what does Paul further say by way of clarification? He admits that the man who keeps God's law shall live in it.³ Is Paul then proposing a new attitude toward the law, or the formulation of a new legalism? It is far from his purpose. Rather does he clearly perceive that no man, Jew or Gentile, has ever been able to live up to the law -- either that of Moses or of the natural conscience.⁴ Therefore, though the condition of life was full obedience, the condition has never been fully met. The effect of Paul's resorting to the Old Testament is to demonstrate that in it is to be found not only the economy of law, but the economy of grace. Since man has never attained fullness of life under law, it is necessary to enquire what further provision God has made. Following immediately upon his reference to the "righteousness which is of the law", Paul draws attention to the other type of righteousness,

ἡ ἐκ ΠΙΣΤΕΩΣ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ. This type has an adequate answer for the seeker:

"The word is nigh ~~to~~ thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that is, the word of faith, which we preach; that if thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thine heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved. For with the heart man believeth unto righteousness; and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation." 5

Thus, again, we have had another clear differentiation between distinct types of "righteousness" -- the foredoomed "righteousness which is of the law", and the "righteousness which is of faith", which carries the assurance of salvation because "the Lord Jesus" is such faith's objective, and the "righteousness" thereby bestowed is the adjudicated "righteousness of God". And this ~~just~~ justification (adjudicated righteousness) is not, in the mind of Paul, merely an inner subjective occurrence, a merely superficial appeasing of his spiritual longings, but a real act of judgment, since God has given to believers an absolutely clear pledge of His favor.¹

Paul has virtually equated this "righteousness" to "salvation", for belief leads to salvation: "If thou...believe in thine heart...thou shalt be saved"; and "with the heart man believes unto righteousness and with the mouth confesses unto salvation". He who knows the principle of Hebrew poetry and parallelism, sees how nicely Paul is defining his terms. Righteousness, functionally, approaches essential synonymity with salvation. We could not go far wrong if, taking our lead from Volz,² in his substituting of jeshu'ah for sedakah, we substituted "salvation" for "righteousness" in the numerous cases where Paul uses δικαιοσύνη as his "technische Abbeviatur" for the justification of believing man by God, through the work of Christ!

1- So Johannes Weiss, History of Primitive Christianity, vol. II, p. 503; cf. cit., II Corinthinans, 5:5; 1:22.

2- See Lofthouse, Expository Times, May, 1939, p. 345 (Article: "The Righteousness of Jahveh"). This is to be noted as a tendency in Volz' commentary on Second Isaiah (1932), and was observed by the writer in Professor Volz' lectures in Tübingen, on Old Testament theology.

PART FOUR

"THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD -- THEOLOGICALLY INTER-RELATED

I

THE NATURE OF GOD AND THE NECESSITY FOR A DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION.

We have one examination of Paul's conception of "the righteousness of God" yet to make: that of related doctrines. When we test a system of thought, we have to go back to its premises; because the logic of the thinker leads him to build a consistent whole on these basic assumptions. And only when each part fits properly into the larger framework, is the total structure acceptable. Thus, in the present case, we need to consider such closely related doctrines as the nature of God, and of His revelation, the nature of law and sin, justification and atonement, faith, grace, imputation, union with Christ and Christian righteousness of life.

In that very influential book "Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification", John Henry Newman attacks Martin Luther as though he were the inventor of a strange new doctrine called "justification by faith":

"Luther found in the church great moral corruption countenanced by the highest authorities; he felt them, but instead of meeting them with divine weapons, he used one of his own. He adopted a doctrine original, specious, fascinating, persuasive, powerful against Rome, and wonderfully adapted, as if prophetically, to the genius of the times which were to follow. He found Christians in bondage to their works and observances; he released them by his doctrine of faith, and he left them in bondage to their feelings." 1

Is it true that Luther cut out of whole cloth his doctrine of "justification by faith"? Was he deceived when he believed that he had at last discovered the meaning of the righteousness of God and the true message of Paul's Epistle to the Romans? Or did he ingeniously forge a sword to meet the Catholic Church? 2

1 New York, 1874, p. 340:

2 Cf. Fricke, Der paulinische Grundbegriff der Dikaiosune Theou, p. 6.

Let us seek to discover what support, if any, is given by the Apostle Paul to this allegedly "original, specious, fascinating doctrine"!

First of all, as we have noted throughout the Scriptures, we find the insistence that God is just and that His justice requires Him to take account of sin. Every man knows enough of the nature of God to find himself without any excuse. But Paul finds that men characteristically turn from serving the creator to serving the creature. Knowing their wrongs, they nevertheless persist in them. But knowing that God is just, and that righteousness alone leads to life, even the man who judges others must know himself a sinner; for his essential nature is the same. God is his judge and judges him according to absolute truth. But perverse man stores up for himself the wrath of God, on that day when God shall make His righteous and perfectly just judgment known. All His creatures must face the same tribunal. Righteousness alone has weight in the scales of just judgment; only the doers of righteousness can be considered "righteous" in His sight. But who are the righteous? Judged by God's standards, all have gone astray; not even one does good. God cannot, in consistency with His own nature, justify any man on the basis of imperfect works of the law. At very best, through law comes the knowledge of sin. Every approach brings the same dilemma into view: God cannot "justly justify" the sinner without some adequate basis. Wherein, then, lies the possibility of reconciliation?

Speculations on the necessity for some price being paid have been endless, as the history of Christian doctrine shows. One school of thought, that of Ritschl, "justifies" the principle of human justification solely on the basis of divine mercy, as we have heretofore noted. For them, "to be just" is "to be justifier" ("just and therefore justifier").¹ They look only upon the merciful, benevolent side of God's nature. They allude to the judge in Israel who was to be a strong deliverer; but they forget that even he waited until he had discovered justice before he considered mercy!² Permeating the whole word of God is the truth that He

1- Cf. Ritschl, Op.cit., 103, 220

2- The judge may have followed the ancient proverb: "When a quarrel has arisen between a poor man and a rich man, always side with the poor man until you find where the truth lies" (Reinhold Niebuhr--quoted in presentation of Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh, 1939). But surely no such method could be predicated to an omniscient God.

cannot be just and the justifier of the un-godly. And since in God's sight all men are sinners, He cannot be just and simultaneously exhonorate any man. Surely those who solve the question of the necessity for an atonement by denying its reality, go far afield from Biblical reasoning.

Both Old and New Testaments include all men among the group of sinners. Men have not yielded what God's nature demands; His law has never been perfectly obeyed. As the school of the Rabbis would sadly admit, there has not been one single day within which no single law has been broken. This is no old idea, merely; it is a truth recognized then and recognized in most modern times. One widely-heard voice of recent years, that of Karl Barth, is especially noted for its constant reiteration of this theme. Speaking of the burden of Bible writers, he makes this very pertinent observation:

"Their theme - and it is the proper theme of history - is not concerned with denying or affirming what men are in themselves; it is concerned with the perception of the uncertainty of men in relation to what they are not, that is to say, in their relation to God, who is their eternal Origin the empty canal speaks of the water which does not flow through it. The sign-post points to a destination which is precisely where the sign-post is not. The impress (Romans 2:20) speaks of the genuine signet-ring which is not where the impress is, but which has left upon it its negative -- and so it is with the course of history as a chronicle of the nobility of men, not history as a chronique scandaleuse, which contains the accusation of history against history." 1

We are alternately aware of two poles, God's righteousness, and "history's accusation against history". Human nature, spiritually awakened, longs to remove itself from the tension: finds itself unable to escape either. God and His righteousness, God and His law, point us to the way, but we aren't on the way!

Does God's grace deliver us from our sin? May we sin that grace may the more abound? Paul is horrified at the thought². Is the Christian, then, he who escapes the tension? Does he find release from the bondage of sin? As he walks in newness

1- Epistle to the Romans ("Römerbrief"), p.87f.

2- Romans 6: 1-4.

of life, does he fulfill the law's demands and make himself pleasing in the sight of God? Can he justify himself by making his spirit one with Christ?

It seems clear that when Paul speaks as though he appears blameless before the law, he is speaking only of righteousness as in the conception of the Pharisees, not as in the sight of God. This brings up the question as to whether the Apostle ever escaped the tension between sin and righteousness. Evidently not, "For", he says:

"..the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do." 1

Paul is speaking from his own experience, not as an unregenerate man before becoming a Christian, but as a veritable saint in the ranks of Christ. To deny this would be a denial of the deadly struggle within the soul of true believers of all ages.¹ Pantheistic Mystics speak of the Christian life as one with that of the Lord Jesus, of the drop of water losing itself in the greater Sea. Christ and the believer are united; but not so that the believer loses his identity -- nor his propensities for sinning.

Can it be that Paul is here speaking of the same man who is later referred to as no longer in the body but in the spirit (Romans 8:9) ? The Spirit of God lives in this man. Who does not possess the Spirit of Christ does not belong to His flock. But he who has the Spirit of Christ walks not according to the flesh but according to the spirit. Can that be the same man who knows that no goodness dwells in his flesh? Yes! For that is the peculiar theme of this whole section: we have peace; the love of God dwells in our hearts; we are justified, redeemed. Yet Paul can add the question "How shall we, that are dead to sin, live any longer therein?" (Romans 6:2). The sequence, from the fifth to the eighth chapter of his epistle, is no simple affirmation, but includes such pressing reminders as that in the sixth chapter (vss.12ff), that there is not necessarily one man who stands completely under the direction of the Spirit. The obvious fact that Paul is admonishing those whom he deals with as Christians, is evidence that the possibility of sinning still stirs within them.² Not only creation stands in mortal struggle, "but ourselves also

1- Rom. 7:19 (cf.vss.14-25); Comp.P.Althaus, Paulus und Luther über den Menschen, 1938, pp. 21ff. 2- Cf. Macholz, Paulin.Rechtfertigungsgedanken, p. 44.

which have the first-fruits of the Spirit"¹ This, then, is the struggle of Christendom; the constant strife within every Christian between the flesh and the spirit. Indeed herein lies the glory of Christianity, in its power to kindle and keep alive this tormenting struggle until death, but unto Life!

Where, then, is the necessity for an atonement? It is in this eternal tension between God's perfection and man's sinfulness, a tension from which not even the grace of God releases man. Arbitrary release would be inconsistent with the just nature of God. Here lies the profound and inescapable need for justification and redemption.

This justification, its whole idea and conception, operates on the ground of the divine law. And the divine law is unchanging and irreducible -- as much so as the God whose perfect justice it reflects. Furthermore both nature, in the shape of the human conscience, and revelation in Scripture, "testify that we are in all things, and at all times, under law to God."² Whether we like Paul's constant emphasis of law, or wish to ignore it with Cardinal Newman, we cannot miss the fact that the Apostle believes that every man is under the heavy burden of a law which he has never been able to keep. Indeed, as Schlatter correctly emphasizes, Paul's view of law differs only in one respect from that of the Jews, in that he takes its demands in dead earnest, in the way it is actually intended to be taken.³

Not antinomism, therefore, but deadly earnest reckoning with law, is the key to Paul's conception of the "righteousness" of God. Only thus is full justice done to the nature of God; and only thus is a doctrine of human redemption meaningful.

"The standard of this righteousness is divine law. Righteousness in a creature is measured by the standard of justice. There is a manifestation of justice in demanding the satisfaction, and then in preparing and accepting this righteousness of God; 'that He might be just and the justifier'. But specially the law is the standard of righteousness; that is, the law considered as a definite expression of the justice of God. The idea of righteousness in a creature implies conformity to law: law is the sphere of righteousness, the element in which it moves. These two terms, law and righteousness, are correlatives, and suppose each other."⁴

1- Ro., 8:23

2- A. Whyte, Comm. on Shorter Catechism, p. 79

3- (Der Glaube im N. Testament); cp. Grundmann, Gesetz, Rechtfertigung und Mystik bei Paulus, p. 59.

4- G. Smeaton, Doct. of the Atonement., 1870, p. 119f.

THE REVELATION OF GOD:JUSTIFICATION AND DIVINE RIGHTEOUSNESS.

Paul takes for granted the fact that man can learn of God's effectual righteousness only through revelation. We may speak of the mysticism of the Apostle; but we do not find him urging men to follow some inner light. Truly he refers insistently to the reality of being "in Christ", and of Christ being "in us"; but this is no far-fetched mystical conception of the good or the true or the beautiful in everyman. The Christ of Paul is an historic figure; one who lived, suffered, died, rose again and appeared to His disciples. For Paul, Christ is God's perfect pattern for man, the "word" of man's spiritual enlightenment, and efficient cause of his reconciliation to God.

This "Word" it is, then, which through the Gospel has been revealed. Apart from and above all natural human reason or intuition, God has "spoken" through the law, the prophets, and supremely and effectually through Jesus Christ. Transcendent to a man's natural reason, there has for example been revealed such a truth as

"The man who worketh not, but believeth on Him that justifieth the ungodly shall live." 1

Furthermore, the necessity for revelation is seen in that God's mercy cannot be deduced; mercy is optional and depends on the free decision of God,² and were it not for divine revelation, the problem of God's remaining just while justifying the ungodly would remain inconceivable as well as insoluble by human reasoning.

In contrast to the revelation of a special "righteousness" (unto salvation) of God, we note that it is not necessary to re-declare the goodness or truthfulness or fidelity of God. Of that, mankind has long known, or felt an awareness. Of course, the mystic can likewise think of this "righteousness" of God as simply the impartation of God's own goodness (iustitia infusa); but this reduces to an idle gesture the plan of God for human salvation: no Golgotha is called for - no Gethsemane - not even a Bethlehem!

References 1
2

Do Paul's utterances on the "righteousness of God" support the Reformed doctrine of justification? How do we come to the place where we can claim righteousness in the sight of God? The Pelagian says: "God has given me the endowments necessary: I will achieve righteousness". The Ascetic says: "I will cut myself off from all evil and all temptation. I will purge my soul and exorcise my flesh".. The answer of the Sacerdotalist is: "The priest will work my salvation". The Romanist puts his faith in "Mother Church". But, as one writer has poignantly interposed, Christ did not offer salvation by these means:

"His teaching was not ceremonial, for he bade us worship in spirit and in truth; not ascetic, for he consecrated marriage at Cana, and cleansed all meats; not sacerdotal, for He claimed to be the one divine Mediator, and left no sacrifices for men to offer but the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving." 1

Taking his stand also against men of the Newman school, and speaking more specifically of the nature of Paul's usage of the "righteousness of God", Karl Barth gives his credo in "Römerbrief":

"Gerechtigkeit Gottes ist vergebung, grundlegende Veränderung des Verhältnisses zwischen Gott und Mensch, Erklärung, dass die menschliche Ehrfurchtslosigkeit und Unbotmäßigkeit und die durch sie geschaffene Lage der Welt vor ihm unbedeutlich ist und ihn nicht hindert, uns die Seinigen sein. Gerechtigkeit Gottes ist justitia forensis, justitia aliena...und wie er spricht, dass es ist (nicht wie es irgendwie sonst ist), so ist es". 2

Opposed to such a view as this is one such as that of John Miley, the Arminian theologian:

"Justification...cannot be strictly forensic...the subjects of the divine justification are sinners. This fact is so explicitly scriptural that it cannot be questioned. Such they are in the divine judgment and condemnation; and as such they cannot be the subjects of a forensic justification. The thesis really requires a two-fold justification: one in the literal sense of making righteous; the other in the judicial sense of declaring righteous." 3

What Miley neglects to say is that forensic justification, as expounded by the great reformers was always on the ground of Christ's sacrifice. Miley objects

- 1- H.M.Gwatkin, Early Ideals of Righteousness, 1910, p.82f.
- 2- Römerbrief, 68.
- 3- J. Miley, Systematic Theology, II., 1894, p. 310.

to this doctrine as being too complicated. But if human thought becomes involved in attempts to explain divine truths, does that invalidate those truths? Again, who has denied that sinners are the subjects of justification? Who else but a sinner could benefit by this divine act? The true magnificence of the Gospel only appears when that fact is fully realized: that "while we were yet sinners", God encompassed us with His plan of salvation, reversing His attitude toward the sinner, because of the sinner's new relation to Christ.¹

Thus we have a conflict between two groups of men, one claiming that justification is freely adjudicated, the gracious gift of God;² the other that justification is a benefit which man must earn. In the history of Christianity have appeared new forms of legalism, asceticism, monasticism and sacerdotalism. Man has not felt comfortable with spiritual freedom. Conscious of his sinfulness, and apprehensive regarding the awful responsibilities of spiritual freedom, man has often desired something to do, some restrictions to observe, some manner of attainments that will give him a sense of security.

Pelagius gives classic expression to this longing, in his controversies with Augustine; every man has within him the ability to become a perfect Christian if he but obey the will of God.³ **Socinius** took up the same strain: he denied that justice was an essential attribute of God and taught that justification was possible for every man on condition of faith and obedience. The Atonement is thus rendered unnecessary, and vicarious propitiation pointless.⁴

These are attempts to lay hands upon security by human works. The Romanist, also, who claims to put all faith in God, yet actually relies not upon the work of Christ, but on grace infused at baptism. This, at any rate, is the opinion of

1- So A. Strong, Systematic Theology, III, 1909, p. 849; comp Macholz, op cit., p. 43.

2- (For Judaism, of course, justification was forensic, but not free. Comp. v. Dobschutz, op. cit., p. 55.)

3- Cp. W. G. T. Shedd, A History of Christian Doctrine, II, 1873, pp. 258ff.

4- Ibid., pp. 381-386.

anyone who reads objectively such a representative statement, as follows, by Cardinal Newman:

"When we go on to enquire what it is which God has made His instrument, then, as I have said, we find ourselves upon the main subject of dispute between ourselves and the strict followers of the German Reformer. Our Church considers it to be the Sacrament of Baptism; they consider it to be faith." 1

On this point Newman would appear to voice the unanimous view of the Roman Catholic Church: He believes that such grace is infused by and at baptism, and that through the absolution of sin, the sinner is justified. That, then, is his righteousness. For it, he continues to do good works, which secure for him his final place before God. Newman further points out:

"If, then, by a gift is meant a certain faculty or talent, moral, intellectual, or other, justification is some such faculty. It is not a mere change of purpose or disposition in God towards us, or a liberty, privilege, or (as it may be called) citizenship, accorded to us, but a something lodged within us." 2

Thus this theologian confuses justification and sanctification-- He seems purposely to avoid the ground of justification, and by emphasizing continually the "sacred indwelling", he comes to the point where he equates justification and sanctification. Thus he begins with the sacrament of baptism as the gateway to sanctification; he arrives at a point where he is willing to take his stand as a just and holy man. God's attitude toward sin he does not fear, for he is satisfied with the justitia infusa of baptism, and its replenishment through subsequent sacramental observances and the merit of good works.

Now the question at issue is not concerning the morality necessary in a Christian life. The Christian can never be too moral. On that all the writers we have referred to would agree. What they would not agree on is the reason for a moral life, and the ground of justification. One great group of men depend on what they themselves do. Another group depend on what Church and sacraments do for them. The consistent Protestant rests in faith solely on the grace of God, as manifested in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

1- Newman, op. cit., p. 4.
2- Ibid., p. 141.

Inevitably what a theologian believes about justification directly influences his view of the "righteousness of God". If it is true that in that phrase we have the symbolic expression for a justification from God, then Pelagian, Socinian, Arminian and High Churchman all appear to stand corrected. Justification cannot be at once a gift and an earned reward; it cannot originate at once from an act of God's free grace, and from the performance of a sacrament (ex opere).

As we look back over Paul's argument, what does he have to say on these views? We have seen that the righteousness of which he speaks is opposed to man's righteousness. The difference is qualitative and absolute, certain efforts at compromise notwithstanding. Let us rapidly review some of the Apostle's representative statements on righteousness:

"For as many as have sinned without the law shall also perish without the law: and as many have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law; (for not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified)".¹ Then, in the following chapter:

"...For we have before proved both Jews and Gentiles, they are all under sin; as it is written, There is none righteous, no not one."²

The Catholic may now say: "That is true of works, but what of the sacraments?" In reply Paul would point out the circumstances in such a case as that of Abraham.³ Abraham was blessed: his faith was reckoned to him for righteousness; but this happened not after the sacrament of circumcision, but before it! Abraham is the father of all believers who have not the benefit of a sacrament, neither his faith nor his reckoned righteousness having depended upon the seal of circumcision.

"For the promise, that he should be the heir of the world was not to Abraham, or to his seed, through the law, but through the **righteousness of faith**. For if they which are of the law be heirs, faith is made void, and the promise is made of none effect: because the law worketh wrath: for where no law is, there is no transgression. Therefore it is of faith, that it might be by grace; to the end that the promise might be sure to all the seed; not to that only which is of the law, but to that also which is of the faith of Abraham, who is the father of us all."⁴

1- Romans 2: 12f
2- Ibid., 3:9b,10
3- Ibid., 4: 9ff.
4- Ibid., 4: 13-16.

In other words, Paul is saying that circumcision was but an external symbol of that faith which Abraham had, independently of the symbol. The promise came to him not through the law, but through the "righteousness of faith". It was "of faith" and "by grace". The magnitude of his faith was marked by his belief in the seemingly impossible. He believed in God as one "who giveth life to the dead, and calleth those things that are not as though they were".¹ Therefore his faith was reckoned for righteousness.² And, of cardinal importance, he is set forth as a type, an example for all mankind:

"Now it was not written for his sake alone, that it was imputed to him; but for us also, to whom it shall be imputed, if we believe on him that raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead; who was delivered for our offences, and was raised for our justification." 3

Then Paul concluded with the expression of the result of that justification:

"Therefore being justified by faith, we have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ". 4

This is the expression of the subjective side of justification. Subsequently, Paul's words draw out the fuller aspects of this reconciliation:

"But God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him. For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life." 5

Here is brought out also the objective aspect of justification. Christ's blood, His sacrifice effectually implements our reconciliation with God. On man's side, justification is ἐκ πίστεως. On God's side, it is ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ.

This idea emphatically bears out our feeling that Paul was speaking of a righteousness "from" God. We had nothing to do with Christ's death on our behalf. Yet we receive its benefits. Our righteousness is not of our own works, but of God's grace. Even our faith is not a thing to flaunt: boasting is shut out, because the very essence of faith is complete reliance on another, on God Himself.⁶

1- Romans 4: 17

2- Cf. Thackeray, The Relation of Paul to Contemporary Jewish Thought, pp.90-97.

3- Romans 4: 23-5.

4- Ibid., 5:1. 5- Ibid., 5: 8-10.

6- Cf. Macholz, op cit., 39ff; comp. v. Dobschutz, op. cit., 59f.

Righteousness is a gift. We are justified, as Professor Köberle in his lectures in Tübingen puts it, "Geschenck-weise",¹ for men are spoken of by Paul as receiving the "abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness".² In the case of the Jews, they erred not for lack of effort at good works; their error was rather in their reliance upon the efficacy of self-effort, and thus failing to yield their hearts to God in faith and the higher obedience of spiritual dependence on divine grace. The righteousness of God comes not by man's will and striving, but by humble submission and childlike reliance on the goodness of God.³

We find in the tenth chapter of Romans -- as we have already found in other instances -- that this "righteousness" of God is essentially equated with "salvation". Paul prays that the Jews may be saved because, although they have zeal, they are yet ignorant of God's righteousness. This is tantamount to his saying: "The righteousness of God is salvation". And the Apostle never tires of repeating that this salvation or justification is not a work of man, but that Christ is our righteousness; that He is God's gift, the expression and earnest of God's grace; that justification is by faith. So consistent is this whole doctrine that we cannot discuss one phase of it without involving the whole truth. We speak of justification and find ourselves quoting passages which are also stressing the poverty of man's works, the meaning of Christ's death, and the significance of faith and grace. All aspects point to the fact that the righteousness of God is that righteousness or justification which God freely, and independently of human effort, bestows on sinners who believe in Jesus Christ alone for salvation.

The word "justify" by itself might also conceivable mean "make righteous". Such process or act might take place either through some such instrument as a sacrament, or through some arbitrary exertion of will. A priori, these meanings are possibilities. But as we have examined the evidence, we have found denial of both.

We have maintained that God's gift rests on the ground of Christ's work in the

1- (In his interpretation of Romans 3:24)

2- Romans 5:17.

3- Romans 9:30--10:13; Cp. Lipsius, Op.cit., p.27.

Atonement. But like all the elements of our interpretation of Paul, this one also is claimed by some to be a mere construction, an invention of some theologians.¹

Willibald Beyschlag is a representative of this group. A statement of his follows:

"In diesem Kreis der ethischen Eigenschaften gehört nun auch seine Gerechtigkeit, welche nach Römerbrief 3;5 und 25,26 bei dem Erlösungswerke wesentlich zur Bethätigung kommt und irriger= oder doch einseitiger Weise gewöhnlich als richterliche Gerechtigkeit oder Strafgerechtigkeit gefasst, daher mit der göttlichen Gnade in einen grundsätzlichen Widerspruch gesetzt wird. Nicht nur des paulinische, sondern überhaupt der biblische Begriff und Sprachgebrauch von "Gerechtigkeit" ist ein wesentlich anderer, nicht ein juridischer, sondern ein ethischen." 1

For Beyschlag the atonement appeared wholly unnecessary.² A sinner remained a sinner until he repented, but it was necessary for him to repent and turn to God to have forgiveness. This theologian speaks of the prodigal son who but returned to his father to receive forgiveness; of the Pharisee and the Publican, which latter as soon as he became penitent, was able to go down to his house justified; and of the servant who but prayed that he might be released from his debt before his master forgave him.

With this emphasis on repentance, Beyschlag couples a stress on a new legalism. Jesus did not come to destroy but to fulfill the law. But beyond the "letter" must be the "spirit". It is he who does the will of God who will be blessed. The Christian must exceed the Scribes and Pharisees in righteousness.

Now it seems on the surface that such a writer has much truth on his side. But as we look deeper, we find we cannot accept his system of thought. We have noted that both the Old and New Testaments are full of legal terms, and that righteousness can be understood only in relationship with some norm or law. Again we have pointed out that God's "holy love" is not antinomian, but that God pays for the right to love and to forgive. And we would charge that it is rather just such men as this scholar who have antinomian tendencies; for the whole of Scripture denies that God can forgive even the sincerely repentant without a sacrifice. It seems quite unwarrantable

1- Cf. Ritschl, op.cit., pp.232-240; W.Beyschlag, Neutestamentliche Theologie, II, Malle, 1896, p.95f; cf. 187ff. (Underscoring in quotation mine).

2- Cf. Beyschlag, Ibid., pp.187-190.

to deny that Jesus saw the meaning of His death, and prophesied and explained it.¹ On the contrary, we have seen that Jesus' teaching on righteousness, rather than calling for a new legalism, takes man to those depths of experience where he realizes how complete a sinner he is, and how dependent on the mercy of God he is obliged to be, for reconciliation.

In our interpretation, the "righteousness of God" is something made possible by, and resulting from, Christ's atonement. We take this phrase to be descriptive of that which He accomplished. This "righteousness of God", indeed appears to us to be the fugue-theme of the Epistle to the Romans. The great passage in the third chapter makes this appear indubitable. A righteousness, or means of justification from God has been made manifest. Bearing in mind that the Greek words "righteousness" and "justify" stem from the same basic idea, we note that Paul no sooner mentions the "righteousness of God" than he speaks of "being justified...through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." Elsewhere he gives this explanation:

"Therefore as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life; for as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." 2

Some may disagree that Paul taught the substitutionary righteousness of Christ, but it is not easy to overlook his expressed desire to be found "not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but the righteousness of Christ". Furthermore, we remember that Paul believed that Christ, "the righteous", was "made sin for us, that we might become in Him the righteousness of God."³ He protests that he does not set aside the grace of God, "for if righteousness came by the law, then Christ is dead in vain."⁴

1- Cf. Matt. 16:21; 17:9,12,22f; 20:18; 27:63; Mark 9:9,12,31; Luke 17:25; 18:32; 24:7,44f; John 2:19; 13:3,31. In the words of Jesus there is the striking insistence that the Scriptures must be fulfilled, and His knowledge (as His rebuking of Peter shows) that His death should take place according to God's plan (Mt 16:23). According to the four Gospels, Jesus had foreseen His death as an unavoidable necessity, as an incident which must precede His resurrection and His coming again in glory. Luke 24:45-7 would appear to show that Jesus Himself connected His death with the forgiveness of sins, and this is clearly reflected in Paul's quotation of the words of Jesus, upon the institution of the Lord's Supper.

2- Romans 5: 18f.

3- II Cor. 5: 21

4- Galatians 2: 21.

Again and again Paul reiterates his belief that Jesus Christ the sinless gave His life for the sinful. So clearly does the Apostle reflect the Hebrew belief that blood must be shed if there is to be remission of sins, that one hesitates to quote passages from his writings to prove his belief in the necessity for an Atonement.

The relationship of the "righteousness of God" to the death of Christ is plain. Paul speaks of a gift-like justification. John speaks of God loving the world so much that He gave His Son **that** believers might have everlasting life. Paul connects this gift with all the terms for a vicarious atonement. Beyond that, man with his poor language cannot go. Paul tells us in innumerable ways that God must, in consistency with His own just nature, have a reason for pronouncing a man **just**. Since man has been found incapable of measuring up to the perfect standard which God requires, it is clear that God alone can meet the requirement. This He did in Jesus Christ, His life, death, and resurrection. Because of this act of mercy, He can with justice declare the believing sinner just.

III

GRACE, FAITH, MYSTICISM AND

ETHICS.

with his conception of the "righteousness of God", based on the teaching of Christ, are the Apostle's teachings concerning grace. If the salvation of man can only be accomplished by God, then such a divine righteousness cannot be earned, and quite obviously the believer stands in a state of helplessness. The history of Christian doctrine discloses numerous descriptions of grace, and clearly enough, they cannot all be correct. Ptolemaius believed that God was too benevolent to be just.¹ And such a viewpoint has coloured the doctrines of others. Origen believed that the death of Christ exhibited love only, and not justice.² For Abelard, grace was pure benevolence.³ Socinius taught that justice does not hinder mercy, and also that, if Christ paid a full satisfaction, forgiveness was not an exhibition of God's mercy.⁴ The element of truth in these doctrines is that as far as man is concerned, God's forgiveness is free.⁵ But they all overlook the fact that God is just and has revealed His inability to forgive sin ^{without} the payment of a price. On the sinner's side, forgiveness is free. On God's side, forgiveness is declarative, but based on the Atonement.

Beyschlag makes this statement regarding sin and forgiveness:

"Die Sünde ist den ewigen Anrechten Gottes gegenüber Rückstand schuldiger Leistung, sie ist Schuld und diese Schuld kann durch keine menschliche Überleistung gutgemacht, sondern nur durch göttliche Vergebung weggenommen werden." 6

This observation in itself calls for no objection, but as we have seen, Beyschlag denies the need for an atonement. Therefore his whole doctrine of grace is hardly consonant with that of the Apostle Paul, who stresses the fundamental principle

1- So Shedd, Hist. of Christian Doctrine, 228ff 2- Ibid., 234. 3- Ibid. 4- Ibid., 380
5- Cf. Ritschl, Op. cit., 103f. 6- N. Testamentliche Theologie, I, p. 102.

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GRACE, FAITH, MYSTICISM AND
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Closely connected with his conception of the "righteousness of God", based on the atoning work of Christ, are the Apostle's teachings concerning grace. If the reconciliation of man can only be accomplished by God, then such a divine favour cannot be earned, and quite obviously the believer stands in a state of grace.

The history of Christian doctrine discloses numerous descriptions of grace, and clearly enough, they cannot all be correct. Ptolemaius believed that God was too benevolent to be just.¹ And such a viewpoint has coloured the doctrines of others. Origen believed that the death of Christ exhibited love only, and not justice.² For Abelard, grace was pure benevolence.³ Socinius taught that justice does not hinder mercy, and also that, if Christ paid a full satisfaction, forgiveness was not an exhibition of God's mercy.⁴ The element of truth in these doctrines is that as far as man is concerned, God's forgiveness is free.⁵ But they all overlook the fact that God is just and has revealed His inability to forgive sin the payment of a price. On the sinner's side, forgiveness is free. On God's side, forgiveness is declarative, but based on the Atonement.

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of the cost of grace -- that God through Christ purchased the right to be merciful!

Does God owe us grace for our good deeds, or our churchliness, or our sacraments, or the quality of our lives? Speaking of Abraham, Paul clearly opposes grace to any debt which might be the result of works:

"Now to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt; but to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness." 1

Later he makes this further succinct distinction:

"Even so then at **h**is present time also there is a remnant according to the election of grace. And if by grace, then it is no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace." 2

In both cases, the Apostle sets grace over against works and debt. And we have already seen, in discussing man's righteousness, what Paul means by works. His insistence, as that of Jesus, is that no man has any claim upon God for any favour in His sight. God, in sovereignty, can have mercy on whom He will have mercy and compassion on whom He will have compassion, since it "is not of him that willeth...but of God that sheweth mercy." 3 "For by grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God". 4 In many such utterances, Paul is striving to present to the legalistic minds of his readers the legalistic paradox of justification by grace -- the extraordinary fact that nothing in man so calls forth the grace of God as the humbly confessed lack of any merit.⁵

Thus integrally are these ideas of grace related to our basic theme. Since God provided both Christ's sacrifice for human sin, and the possibility of acquittal through reckoning as righteous in His sight, our salvation can come to us only by grace. A righteousness for which we ourselves were responsible could hardly be a gift; only a "righteousness of God", a justification based on the resources of divine grace, could fit this description.

1- Romans 4: 4-5

2- Romans 11: 5-6

3- Romans 9:16

4- Ephesians 2:9

5- On ideas of "merit" in Protestantism, cf. Nygren, Agape and Eros, pp.52ff;165.

Correlative with grace is faith.¹ When through divine grace the sacrifice of Christ was effected for human sinfulness, what did sinful humanity have to do with the act? Nothing. And what can humanity do about it? Faith is the one recourse. Faith alone can transform the human relationship to this divine fait accompli. Man can believe in it, and allow it (as is entailed in full acceptance) to revolutionize his life.²

Though his salvation is grounded in the vicarious atonement of Christ, man's faith cannot be vicarious; faith is the one divine imperative for man. Superficial consideration of such a Pauline phrase as πίστεως ἡοῦ χριστοῦ³ might seem to indicate the contrary. But we know that when the verb to believe is replaced by a substantive, the dative is replaced by a genitive, both for the person whose word is believed, and for the word believed, Christ being in such case the one whose word is believed.⁴ As aptly put by Augustine, just as the righteousness of God is not the attribute of God, so this faith is not Christ's faith!⁵ Faith is, and must remain, the imperative human factor in the justification of man. It is the indispensable human part in the "new covenant", instituted by Christ, and proclaimed in the writings of Paul.

From this theological inter-relating of faith and the application of "the righteousness of God", we need finally to pass on to a consideration of the relation of mysticism and ethics to our central theme.

As pointed out by James Denney, the faith of the forensic gospel and substitutionary death is held by some to be empty and unreal, while faith in ethical identification is a rich, powerful moral force; the former being only imputed, the latter being that of a real union with Christ.⁶ But while Paul speaks of union, he never does so as of a substitute for Christ's redemptive work; apart from the particular significance of Christ's death, there is no more reason why Christ on the cross should

1- Cf. Mundle, W., Der Glaubensbegriff des Paulus, Leipzig, 1932, pp. 82ff.

2- Comp. Schlatter, Gottes Gerechtigkeit, p. 152

3- Ro. 3: 22.

4- Beet, Romans, p. 284

5- Op. cit., p. 167

6- The Expositor, iv., p. 83.

draw men than why any martyr or saint in the arena or in battle should do so. As Professor Denny further observes, when one blots out the forensic side of Paul's gospel, then the ethical-mystical aspect "has the breath of its life withdrawn".¹

George B. Stevens represents that group of theologians which opposes the interpretation just given. He also sees clearly the issue: he realizes that faith may be related to justification in two ways. According to the first, faith is not righteousness; our sins are imputed to Christ, and His righteousness to us. The man whose sins are blotted out is not really righteous ethically, but imputatively he is considered righteous.² According to the second, faith is reckoned as righteousness because it is the beginning of a highly ethical life; it is the entrance into the righteous life, the beginning of obedience through union with Christ. Stevens believes that the legal language of Paul is but the form; that legal terms were "symbols" of living spiritual realities. He notes that--

"The very same spiritual process which in the formal development is now described as ethical and spiritual transformation, is figuratively called a 'death', in order at once to emphasize the completeness of the change and causally to connect it with Christ's sacrifice. So completely identical are the juridical justification and the ethical death that the apostle can mingle in the same sentence the terms which are descriptive of each, and say 'He that hath died is justified from sin'.³

There is an element of truth in this argument. In our attempts to exhibit the grounds of our righteousness as the work of Christ, we are guilty of speaking as though that righteousness has nothing to do with the righteous lives which we as believers attempt to live. The Gospel begins in the righteousness and love of God and is not complete until it bears fruit in human lives, fruits of righteousness and love -- a reproduction, though a poor one, of the divine counterpart. But what Stevens forgets is that in analyzing justification, we are forced to categorize and separate. When we do so, we cannot fail to see that Paul constantly says that our justification is from God, through grace, and never comes because of our works or

1- Cp. H. Weber, "Eschatologie" und "Mystik" im N. Testament, Gütersloh, 1930, p. 123.

2- Cp. Macholz, Zum Verständnis des paulinischen Rechtfertigungsgedankens, p. 49ff.

3- G. B. Stevens, The Pauline Theology, p. 273.

or our righteousness.¹ The doctrine of imputation may be hard to believe, but we cannot deny that Paul taught it.² It is true that Paul's use of legal language is symbolic to an extent, but to say that is not to negate the basic truth it expresses. We may closely associate God's righteousness with man's union with Christ, but never for a moment should we be mistaken in believing that God justifies because man is ever to become of his own efforts righteous.³ Salvation is solely of grace, and the ground of justification will always be the work of Christ.

Albert Schweitzer takes great pains to show that the message of Paul can only be understood from the mystical viewpoint.⁴ The concept "righteousness of faith" arose only in contrast to "righteousness of the law". In Galatians we are still able to discover the original Pauline message of righteousness without the mention of the forgiveness of sins and the atoning death of Christ, however in very close relationship "mit der eschatologischen Erlösungslehre und der Mystik des Seins in Christo".⁵ The doctrine of a righteousness of faith is "nur ein Fragment einer Erlösungslehre"-- "nur ein Nebenkrater". The forgiveness of sins comes into being not because of the death of Christ, but rests "auf seinem Tod als solchem, und zwar in seiner Verbindung mit der Auferstehung".⁶ The death and the resurrection of Christ do not mean for us the forgiveness of sins, but the possibility of their annihilation through a mystical death and a mystical resurrection.

Against Schweitzer's argument comes the conviction that the theology of Paul shows a clear consistency to the contrary; that his eschatological mysticism is in complete harmony with his doctrine of justification.⁷ In order to see this consistency, the theologian should not begin with the "mysticism" approach, but with the Rabbinical concept of Law and Righteousness, viz., that righteousness, if it does not come through law, must come from beyond this life, i.e., in death. Paul teaches that man cannot attain to righteousness through the law, but rather through participation

1- Cf. Lipsius, Die Paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre., pp. 10, 27.

2- Cf. Thackeray, Op.cit., p. 82, concerning the Rabbinical conception.

3- Righteousness being rather conceived as a new relationship, Cf. C.H. Dodd, Meaning of Paul for Today., p.111.

4- Die Mystik des Apostels Paulus, p.215.

5- Ibid., p.204.

6- Ibid., p.217; cf. K.G.Kuhn on Röm 6:7, Z.N.W., Band 29, Heft 2, 1930.

7- Grundmann, Gesetz, Rechtfertigung und Mystik, p. 53.

in the death and resurrection of Christ; and that this achievement is as well a present as a future reality.¹ Thus justification, mysticism and eschatology find proper inter-relation. It is felt that Schweitzer errs greatly in looking upon the "righteousness of faith" as a "nebenkrater"; and that Grundmann is possessed of much clearer theological focus in conceiving Paul's eschatological mysticism to be in complete harmony with his doctrine of justification.

The danger in emphasizing the fact that justification does not depend on man's works is to make the gospel appear wholly unrelated to a highly moral life.² Unbalanced perspective, failing to perceive the moral content of true faith, has often had just that effect. Augustine recognized this peril:

"Volo igitur scire, si quis mihi dicere audeat, utrum lex fidei non dicat: non concupisces. Si enim non dicit quid causae est, cur non in ea positi securi atque impune peccemus?" 3

A. B. Bruce gives the proper answer:

"A faith which is no more than a mere hand to lay hold of an external righteousness has no existence except in the brain of a scholastic theologian. Faith, if it deserve the name, is always very much more than this ... Faith cannot have too much moral content, the more it has, the better it will serve us from the beginning to the end of our Christian career. At the very least, true faith is always a humble trust in the grace of God, and that is a thing of real moral value. Then it lies in the very nature of true faith to open the soul to the influence of Christ, so that from the day we believe in Him He becomes a renovating power in our life". 4

What is that element in faith which makes it into a moral and saving power? Man cannot really trust in God and hope for redemption, and recognize himself as being in such an exigency as faith certainly presumes, without having the wish to make his sins against God, with God's help, less obstreperous. Such a faith is faith in the complete reality of righteousness, it is faith in a gift more valuable than all other gifts. This gift only has meaning because God insists on righteousness, which is lacking in man. The believer finds himself in a position in which

1- Cf. K. Mittring, Heilswirklichkeit bei Paulus, N.F., 1 Reihe, 5 Heft, 1929, pp124ff.
 2- Ibid., for clear portrayal of this relationship.
 3- Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, p. 174.
 4- Saint Paul's Conception of Christianity, p. 156.

he is under obligation to give gratefully what God demands of him, and rightfully expects. There is no justification for confusing, however, "Lebensgerechtigkeit" and "Glaubensgerechtigkeit"; for the former never constitutes a claim upon God, whereas the latter can and does depend entirely upon the saving activity of God. If only God is righteous, and only He through Christ can pay the price for our being put into right relation again with Himself, then that righteousness must be of and from God, imputed and forensically applied, and receivable by faith alone. This whole and great reality arises because of, and in answer to, the revealed desire of One who in inscrutable and infinite righteousness, wished yet to put again into righteous relationship with Himself the unrighteous hosts of men, and in the reaches of His transcendent righteousness alone was there room for justice and love to meet, and fully to be compounded.

CONCLUSION

As we survey finally the path we have taken, what do we discover? Certainly we have found "righteousness" in Paul's usage to possess an "iridescent nature", requiring what might pardonably be termed "spectroscopic" analysis. The more simple "spectra", and more easily identified, are the purely ethical usages depicting righteousness as an attribute, whether of God or man. Such usage lends itself quite readily to understanding, and becomes the more intelligible in the light of both Jewish and Greek popular thought. But more peculiarly Pauline is the further usage that denotes juridical activity on the part of God, in His relationship with man. This is a forensic conception, wherein God by grace accepts believing man as righteous, on the basis of the expiatory work of Christ. Although this usage is peculiar to Paul in its full development and application, its underlying conception is traceable in the warp and woof of Hebrew life and thought. In our consideration of the Old Testament, it became apparent that the higher prophetic insight looked not entirely upon personal goodness but somehow to the favor and grace of God. Isaiah, most clearly of all, demonstrated the close link between righteousness and salvation. Taking the hiph'il as a test case for declarative, as opposed to factative, righteousness, we found little reason to doubt that the Hebrew believed in declarative justification -- although based predominantly on merit; however we found that it remained for Christ to constitute, and Paul to proclaim, the efficient ground which "justified God's justification of the ungodly". Finally, looking at examples of the New Testament conception of righteousness, and Paul's own references and related doctrines, we have found essential agreement. Paul's fuller formulation was seen not to do violence to, but to form a harmonious enlargement upon, the essential teaching of Jesus. Each rejected the efficacy of human merit. Righteousness on the part of God, in its fullest sense, meant for Paul the placing by God of believing man into "right relation" with Himself.

As his own experience typified, Paul realized and affirmed that human imperfection ever proves unable of itself to take on the perfection characteristic of the divine nature, and demanded by God of men who would seek communion with Him. Human righteousness, so-called, required for its own "rectification" the mediation and application of a transcendent righteousness, i.e., a status and a means of attaining that status. And such was the glorious burden of the Gospel preached by Paul -- the "righteousness of God apart from law".

If this new relationship were attained or earned by mere human effort (which is a contradiction in itself), the essential distinction between the human and the divine would be belied; if it were given without having been purchased, it would be immoral; unless there has been actual and adequate provision made, then imputation would be impiety, and forensic reckoning a farce, and the "righteousness" demanded by God an ironic travesty.

The Torah, as we have already seen, revealed the nature of the righteousness which God demanded. This was common ground to Paul and the strictest Rabbi. Paul, expressing in the terms of the theology of his day an ultimate fact of his experience, "went beyond them by denying that it was possible to attain to that righteousness except in virtue of the one act of righteousness, the life and death of Jesus"¹, and thus he provided the key to the final solution of the problem of man's fruitless search for righteousness, and God's desire to be just and yet the justifier of the ungodly.

Thus we believe to have established as both Biblically accurate and theologically harmonious this Pauline doctrinal multum in parvo - "the righteousness of God" - as the divine, free, forensic reinstatement through grace into a relationship of divine acceptability, of the sinner who receives in faith this salvation revealed to him, accomplished by the imputation to him of the righteousness of the **One sinless Son of Man, Son of God, "Jesus Christ, the Righteous"**.

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 (1- W.L.Knox, St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles, p.96)

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