

INHABITING ETHICS
Educational Praxis in the Design Studio, the Music Class and the Dojo

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VOLUME II
Appendix

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Appendix

Defienda me Dios de my,
God guard me from myself,
that is to say from the nature
already educated into me.

Nietzsche, Friedrich, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,"
In *Untimely Meditations*, 57-123, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. p. 119

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE APPENDIX	352
TRANSCRIPT SYMBOLS FOR CONVERSATION ANALYSIS	353
CONSENT FORM & FAQ	355
CONTENTS OF GATHERED DATA	
- <i>Dojo</i>	359
- <i>Music class</i>	364
- <i>Design Studio</i>	370
DOJO	
- <i>Etiquete</i>	374
- <i>Grading</i>	376
MUSIC CLASS	378
DESIGN STUDIO	
- <i>AD1</i>	387
- <i>MArch</i>	409
CORRESPONDENCE WITH MAURICE LAGUEUX	415
PEER REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS	
- <i>The House and the Flute</i>	425
- <i>Performing Mimetic Mapping</i>	439
- <i>Actions and the Energeiai</i>	453
- <i>Ethics and the Architectural Design Studio</i>	477
- <i>The Switch of Ethics and the Reflective Architect</i>	486
- <i>Ethics of Virtuality</i>	500
OTHER PUBLICATIONS	
- <i>The Praxis and Theoria Continuum</i>	508
- <i>Revealing Ethics Through Architectural Praxis</i>	523
SELECTED PRESENTATIONS FROM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES	
- <i>inHumanities: Ethics in Architectural Praxis</i>	544
- <i>Hybrid Studio Matters: Ethnomethodological Documentary of a Tutorial</i>	556
- <i>Constructing Narratives of Ethics, mimesis₁ in the Design Studio</i>	565
- <i>Connecting Phronēsis with Reflection-in-action</i>	582
- <i>The Way of Phronēsis: Revisiting Traditional Wisdom in Architecture</i>	594

Transcript Symbols for Conversation Analysis

Selected and adopted by the website of Emanuel A. Schegloff

<http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/schegloff/TranscriptionProject/page1.html> [27. 11. 2006]

[[Overlapping or simultaneous talk Separate left square brackets, one above the other on two successive lines with utterances by different speakers, indicates a point of overlap onset, whether at the start of an utterance or later.
]]	Separate right square brackets, one above the other on two successive lines with utterances by different speakers indicates a point at which two overlapping utterances both end, where one ends while the other continues, or simultaneous moments in overlaps which continue.
=	Equal signs ordinarily come in pairs -- one at the end of a line and another at the start of the next line or one shortly thereafter. They are used to indicate two things: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1) If the lines connected by two equal signs are by different speakers, then the second followed the first with no discernable silence between them, or was "latched" to it. 2) If the two lines connected by the equal signs are by the same speaker, then there was a single, continuous utterance with no break or pause, which was broken up in order to accommodate the placement of overlapping talk.
::	Colons are used to indicate the prolongation or stretching of the sound just preceding them. The more colons, the longer the stretching. On the other hand, graphically stretching a word on the page by inserting blank spaces between letters does <u>not</u> necessarily indicate how it was pronounced; it is used to allow alignment with overlapping talk.
(0.5)	Numbers in parenthesis indicate silence, represented in tenths of a second; what is given here in the left margin indicates 5/10 seconds of silence. Silences may be marked either within an utterance or between utterances. A rough "rule of thumb" for timing pauses involves saying to yourself the phrase "no one thousand, one one thousand... etc." at roughly the pace of the preceding talk, beginning at the last sound preceding the silence. If the silence is broken at the end of "no," it is about 0.2 seconds; if at the "th" of "thousand," it is about 0.5 seconds; if at the "s" of "thousand," it is about 0.8 seconds. You can fill in the intervening values. if you get through all of "no one thousand," that is 1.0 seconds, and you can use the same guidelines to roughly measure additional fractions.
(.)	A dot in parentheses indicates a "micropause," a silence hearable but not readily measurable; ordinarily less than 2/10 of a second.
(word) (word)	When all or part of an utterance is in parentheses, or the speaker identification is, this indicates uncertainty on the transcriber's part, but represents a likely possibility. Empty parentheses indicate that something is being said, but no hearing could be achieved. If the empty parentheses is where speakers are identified, it indicates that no identification of the speaker could be achieved.

(try1) (try2)	In transcription fragments in papers, two parentheses may be printed, one above the other; these represent alternative hearings of the same strip of talk. On the computer, this format cannot be reproduced, and is replaced by putting the alternative hearings in parentheses, separated by a single oblique or slash, as in TG,
(())	Double parentheses are used to mark transcriber's description of events, rather than representations of them. Thus ((cough)), ((sniff)), ((telephone rings)), ((footsteps)), ((whispered)), ((pause)) and the like.
^ or ↑ or ↓	The up and down arrows mark sharper rises or falls in pitch than would be indicated by combinations of colons and underlining, or may mark a whole shift, or resetting, of the pitch register at which the talk is being produced. (Don't worry about these technical terms, like "pitch" or "register;" they are all readily explained and understood.) Up arrow
> < < > <	The combination of "more than" and "less than" symbols indicates that the talk between them is compressed or rushed. Used in the reverse order, they can indicate that a stretch of talk is markedly slow or drawn out. The "less than" symbol by itself indicates that the immediately following talk is "jump-started," i.e., sounds like it starts with a rush. Compressed
hh (hh) .hh	Hearable aspiration (breathing) is shown where it occurs in the talk by the letter "h" -- the more h's, the more aspiration. The aspiration may represent breathing, laughter, etc. If it occurs inside the boundaries of a word, it may be enclosed in parentheses in order to set it apart from the sounds of the word. If the aspiration is an inhalation, it is shown with a dot before it (usually a raised dot).
° ° °	The degree sign indicates that the talk following it was markedly quiet or soft. When there are two degree signs, the talk between them is markedly softer than the talk around it.
<u>word</u> <u>word</u> WOrd <u>WOrd</u>	Underlining is used to indicate some form of stress or emphasis, either by increased loudness or higher pitch. The more underlining, the greater the emphasis. Therefore, underlining sometimes is placed under the first letter or two of a word, rather than under the letters which are actually raised pitch or volume. Especially loud talk may be indicated by upper case; again the louder, the more letters in upper case. And in extreme case, upper case may be underlined.
· ? , ?, ?	The punctuation marks are <u>not</u> used grammatically, but to indicate intonation. The period indicates a falling, or final, intonation contour, not necessarily the end of a sentence. Similarly, a question mark indicates rising intonation, not necessarily a question, and a comma indicates "continuing" intonation, not necessarily a clause boundary. In some transcript fragments in your readings you may see a combined question mark and comma, which indicates a rise stronger than a comma but weaker than a question mark. Because this symbol cannot be produced by the computer, the inverted question mark is used for this purpose.



State Scholarships Foundation



CONSENT FORM

for the research (working title) :

Ethics in Architectural Design Education:

praxis in the design studio, the music class and the dojo

Architecture, School of Arts, Culture and Environment, University of Edinburgh

As part of this project a video or audio recording has been made of you while you participated in the research. We would like you to indicate below what uses of these records you are willing to consent to. This is completely up to you and you may withdraw from the research at this point if you wish. We will only use the records in ways that you agree to. In any use of these records, names will not be identified.

Please read the accompanying FAQ sheet before filling out this form.

[Tick to indicate those permissions you wish to give]

- The records can be studied by the researchers for use in the research
- The records can be used for scientific publications
- The records can be shown at scientific meetings, conferences etc
- The records can be kept in an archive to be used by future researchers
- The records can be used on the research project website
- The records can be shown in classrooms to students
- The records can be shown in public presentations to non-scientific groups
- The records can be used on television and radio

By signing below, you also agree the following:

- You agree to participate in this research.
- You understand that you are under no obligation to take part in the study and a decision not to participate will not be a problem.
- You have read this consent form and the information sheet (FAQ) that accompanies it and you had the chance to ask questions about the ongoing research.
- You understand that you have a right to withdraw from this study at any stage.
- You understand that this is a non-therapeutic research from which you cannot expect to derive any benefit.
- You are over 18 years old, or the parent/guardian of participant below the age of 18.

Name

Address

Phone number

Signature Date

DO NOT WRITE UNDER THIS LINE – TO BE FILLED BY THE RESEARCHER

Signature of researcher

Please return this consent form to:

Leonidas Koutsoumpos
Architecture
University of Edinburgh
20 Chambers Street
Edinburgh, EH1 1JZ
0131 6502617



State Scholarships Foundation



FAQ (info sheet)

for the research (working title) :

Ethics in Architectural Design Education:

praxis in the design studio, the music class and the dojo

Architecture, School of Arts, Culture and Environment, University of Edinburgh

What is this research all about?

This study is part of a research conducted in the department of Architecture in the University of Edinburgh. It inquires the nature of Ethics in architectural design education in university level and more specifically it compares the education of the *design studio* in architecture, to that of a *music class* and that of a *dojo* (the place for educating Japanese Martial Arts).

Who is responsible for it?

Leonidas Koutsoumpos is an architect who is currently conducting a PhD thesis supervised by Professor Richard Coyne and Dr. John Lee. Contact details can be found at the end of this document.

Why do you record?

In order to make the comparison of the three educational places the research includes taking pictures and recording audio and video that allow the retrospective detailed analysis of the educational activities that take place in the three cases. The research also holds interviews from participants from all three cases and focus groups to gather a variety of responses to these recordings.

What are you going to do with this material?

These recordings will be kept securely, and used solely for research and teaching purposes. The main aim is the completion of a doctoral thesis, but secondary, in the future, there is a hope to make the research known in academic meetings and conferences and also publish the results of the research in journals, books and the world wide web, but always in a strictly academic way.

Who will look at the resulting data?

Segments of the tape with accompanying transcriptions may be presented in the context of the research's results and final report to its funding body (Greek State Scholarship Foundation), scholarly publications, academic symposia, university classes, professional training activities or dissemination of results to the media, policymakers, government and industry.

What are the risks of this study?

Because of the nature of the data being gathered (i.e. video-recordings), it may not be possible to conceal your identity as a participant. There is a potential risk that people known or unknown to you will formulate negative opinions of you or your behavior on the basis of their viewing of these data. There are three safeguards against this:

- You can request that taping be stopped at any point during the activity, thereby preventing a record from ever being produced.
- You will be able to review the recordings we wish to use. If you wish, particular segments containing your likeness will be deleted or erased.
- As discussed in the section on confidentiality below, all further personal data (i.e. names, addresses and any other revealing information) will be confidential.

What about confidentiality?

The nature of the data being gathered precludes completely concealing your identity as a participant. Anyone who happens to know you personally may be able to identify you from the recording. If this occurs, and you are unhappy about it, we will refrain from making further use of these recordings. In addition, any further information that the researcher has about you will be kept confidential through the use of pseudonyms. The original recordings will not be made available for any purposes outside of research activities.

Are there benefits to taking part in this study?

There are no direct benefits to you personally for participating in this study (this is a non-therapeutic research). The primary benefits from this work are for the advancement of scientific understanding of educational processes. The availability of these data may lead to improvements in the subject areas under research and development of which you or others may be a direct or indirect beneficiary. If you are interested in these scientific outcomes, and we hope you will be, arrangements can be made to provide you with copies of your digitized files of the interaction, along with transcripts, analyses, and articles as they become available.

Will I receive any payment or other monetary benefits?

You will receive no payment for being recorded. The ethnographic and video data will not be used for commercial purposes. Therefore, you should not expect any royalties or payments from the research project in the future. This study relies on and appreciates the goodwill of the participants in the research. As noted above, copies of your edited recording on CD or DVD can be provided.

What are my rights as a participant?

Taking part in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to take part or, subsequently, cease participation at any time.

Please keep this information sheet.

You are encouraged to get in touch anytime if you have further questions.

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Catalogue and Contents of the Dojo Videos

	min	MB	Notes
2006_01_23			
Aikido voiceless show.mov	1.16	5.3	Poor. Students practicing. Laurent interupts and shows a technique.
Aikido whole.mov	7.39	32.5	poor
Aikido- explanation.mov	1.48	7.2	Poor. Laurent interupts the students and makes an explanation
Laurent Scott.mov	1.29	6.3	Laurent shows a technique to Scott, while the other students continue practicing
MVI_0355.AVI	7.39	142.8	The same like "Aikido whole"
Dojo_2006_01_23 a.dvf		3.5	Audio Recording
Dojo_2006_01_23 b.dvf		2	Audio Recording
2006_01_26			
Aikido 26 01 2006_0001.AVI	4	1	Test
Aikido 26 01 2006_0002.AVI	15.28	290.5	Very good video with lots of voiceless showing from Laurent. From 4.35 - 7.10 there is a very good show infront of the camera with Otty. From 10.10-11.20 with a junior student
Aikido 26 01 2006_0003.AVI	24.44	472.8	Very good video. Front view. Includes the concluding ceremony and the end of the class (From 22.10-23.50
Aikido 2006_01_26.dvf			
2006_01_30			
Aikido 2006_01_30.dvf			
Aikido Changing rooms 2006_01_30.dvf		6.4	Audio Recording
2006_02_02			
Dojo 02 02 2006_0001.AVI	1.28	80	Weapons class. Laurent shows something without the weapons the students start to practice it. Laurent shows to Scott
Dojo 02 02 2006_0002.AVI	1.4	91.5	Continue the same exercisewith above. Laurent shows to S the stiffness. For quite some time they practice without talking. At the end Laurent describes what they did to S.
Dojo 02 02 2006_0003.AVI	16	16.6	Close to the camera. Laurent shows the same thing to Andrei but using Otti as uke.
Dojo 02 02 2006_0005.AVI	42	38.5	Laurent comes and shows to Otti. The jo slip's Otti's hands and falls down.
Dojo 02 02 2006_0006.AVI	0.56	51.4	Laurent shows to all the class using Otti.

Dojo 02 02 2006_0007.AVI	1.25	77.6	Close to the camera. Laurent shows to S how he is putting his body of-balance. He laughs because the jo xgets mingled in his hakama
Dojo 02 02 2006_0016.AVI	19	17.9	Laurent shows to Andrei.
Dojo 02 02 2006_0017.AVI	4.38	250	Chi excercises and the ritual of the end of class. After the class and before the next one, Paul corrects the mats
Dojo 02 02 2006_0018.AVI	0.37	32.9	Ritual of the beginning of the next class. Start of chi excercises
Dojo 02 02 2006_0019.AVI	0.48	43.7	A close up to Laurent that shows Lawrie how he is stiff. No talking
Dojo 02 02 2006_0020.AVI	0.47	42	Laurent shows in the whole class the same exercise with Lawrie
Dojo 02 02 2006_0021.AVI	1.12	65.9	Laurent shows the same exercise to Paul.
Dojo 2 2006_02_02.dvf		3.6	Audio Recording
Dojo 2006_02_02.dvf		2.3	Audio Recording
2006_02_20			
Aikido_2006_02_20.dvf		6.6	Audio Recording
2006_02_23			
001_A_001_qingfeng_2006_02_23.dvf		5.8	Audio Recording
001_A_002_qingfeng_2006_02_23.dvf		7.7	Audio Recording
Aikido 23 02 2006_0002_1.AVI	1.27	78.7	Very good example of mimesis. Laurent shows to Jeniffer while Tom mimics the same exercise alone. Laurent comes back and shows to the 3rd. Jennifer and Tom both mimic the gesture.
Aikido 23 02 2006_0002.AVI	1.32	82.6	Laurent comes to correct Tom who is practicing with S in boken.
Aikido 23 02 2006_0003_1.AVI	0.39	35.8	Laurent uses Andrei to show to the tough guy that he shouldn't run around the partner.
Aikido 23 02 2006_0003.AVI	1.52	100.5	Laurent goes through various pairs and correct their boken exercise.
Aikido 23 02 2006_0004_1.AVI	1.53	106.7	Laurent shows to Jennifer. She struggles to move him. He uses talk as well as gestures to show her the point
Aikido 23 02 2006_0004.AVI	1.03	56.9	Laurent shows to the whole class. He uses a jounior student as an example, and asks them "Do you see what is happening"
Aikido 23 02 2006_0008.AVI	1.23	76.1	Laurent shows to the whole class. Boken. He talks a lot explaining

Aikido 23 02 2006_0013.AVI	0.2	18.9	In-between the two classes. Students on the mats stretching
Aikido 23 02 2006_0014.AVI	1.01	56.7	Ritual of the beginning of the class
Aikido 23 02 2006_0015.AVI	1.43	94.1	Students practicing ukemi. Laurent shows to individuals and then to all the students by expaining
Aikido 23 02 2006_0016.AVI	0.36	33.3	Laurent shows a return-forward ukemi to individual students while practicing
Aikido 23 02 2006_0017.AVI	12	11.6	Students practicing
2006_03_03			
Aikido 2006_03_03_0002.AVI	0.01	1.1	test
Aikido 2006_03_03_0003.AVI	1.5	99.6	The students practice jo.Laurent corrects Otti. Then he shows to all with Tom. The students start to practice again.
Aikido 2006_03_03_0006.AVI	0.41	39.9	Laurent shows with Scot. The students leave the weapons and start practicing too
Aikido 2006_03_03_0007.AVI	1	52.6	Tom practices with Andrei
Aikido 2006_03_03_0008.AVI	0.21	17.3	Laurent shows to Otti. He attacks and Otti blocks since he is not sure with which hand he should defend. Laurent laughs and shows him.
Aikido 2006_03_03_0009.AVI	0.46	38.4	Continue from above. Otti is still confused
Aikido 2006_03_03_0010.AVI	0.01	1.1	test
Aikido 2006_03_03_0011.AVI	0.29	33.3	Laurent finishes showing to a guy and goes around the students that exercise
Aikido 2006_03_03_0012.AVI	0.35	43.8	Laurent shows to all using Otti. At the end he pushes him too much and laughs about the insident. The students laugh too.
Aikido 2006_03_03_0013.AVI	0.27	33.3	Laurent shows to the tough guy using Tom. He explains at the same time
Aikido 2006_03_03_0014.AVI	0.14	18.4	Laurent shows to the tough guy by showing to Andrei. At the end he gestures showing the meaning of what he did.
Aikido 2006_03_03_0015.AVI	0.23	29.4	Laurent tries something alone while the students are practicing.
Aikido 2006_03_03_0023.AVI	0.51	63.8	End of class ritual. New students come in. Laurent outside the mats talks with Otti who is in the mats
Aikido 2006_03_03_0024.AVI	1	74.1	The break inbetween the two classes. Some people stretching some practicing. Beginning of class ritual.

Aikido 2006_03_03_0025.AVI	0.28	34.8	Laurent shows to Andrei. Finishes by emphasising a gesture of what he meant
Aikido 2006_03_03_0026.AVI	0.45	57.9	Laurent shows to everyone what he showed to Andrei individually before. He explains with voice
Aikido 2006_03_03_0035.AVI	1	73.6	Laurent shows the same technique to Andrei individually. He then continues to a different student.
Aikido 2006_03_03_0036.AVI	0.43	53.3	Laurent shows the same technique to the tough guy. At the end Laurent laughs
Aikido 2006_03_03_0044.AVI	0.12	14.9	Laurent shows an exercise to S by starting with a laugh
2006_03_13			
Aikido 2006_03_13_0001.AVI	1.46	96.5	Andrei practices with Tom and Otti. Laurent comes and shows without voice to Andrei. End of class ceremony.
2006_06_15 dojo_001.AVI			
	1.05	20.7	End of class ritual, with Scot teaching. All the class is junior students (No hakama). It takes much more time for the students to find their position on the line or stand up and bow.
2006_06_29			
Accident.mov	0.54	17.6	The accident with Young and Scott
Formality of Excercise.mov	1.27	28.2	Laurent shows to everyone the 'breaking of the formality' of the exercise
Lawrie shows a complete circle.mov	1.43	33.1	Lawrie practices with a young student girl. He shows her very slowly the circle of the body. Laurent wanders around and corrects various students.
Loose everything.mov	1.04	20.7	Laurent shows to all. He says: before we lost the formality now we loose the technique. We loose everything.
MVI_0001.AVI	0.41	37.1	Laurent shows to 3 group the same exercise. All jounior students

MVI_0002.AVI	2.51	54.3	Young students practicing with each other and strangling to find which hand to use. Laurent shows to all how to move towards the center of the opponent.
MVI_0003.AVI	0.44	13.6	Close up to Laurent showing to Andrei
MVI_0014 copy.AVI	16.5	323	Long video with very good stuff, from which the first ones are excerpts
MVI_0014.AVI	16.5	323	Same as above
MVI_0017.AVI	8.54	168.2	Beginning of examinations. Andrei on Norman
MVI_0018.AVI	13.35	255.6	Continue from above. Then Norman on Andrei. Norman gets tired. At 8.10 L asks N to attack faster. At 12.20 L asks Paul to replace Norman
MVI_0019.AVI	6.46	111.2	Continue from above. At 12.45 L asks Norman to come back. At 4.00 Norman tries to fix his gi but is told off by L "This is unacceptable". Finish of the exams
TOTAL	254.2		

Catalogue and Contents of the Music Videos

2005_11_24	min	MB	Notes
music in the community -1	44.2	35.5	Audio Recording
music in the community -1		35.3	Audio Recording
2005_12_01			
MVI_0121.avi	0.56	17.9	Students dancing on the canvas. Dee is interveaning by painting too.
MVI_0122.avi	0.06	2.1	"STOP" Dee finishes the performance
MVI_0129.avi	0.13	4.1	A student paints with a big spatula
10 images			
2006_02_08			
Music 08 02 2006_0001.avi	4.37	87.9	Three different groups perform a coordination exercise. Ruxana asks the students questions. Both Ruxana and Dee are showing with gestures what the students should do. People keep on passing in between the students and the teacher.
Music 15 02 2006_0002	1.31	28.9	A group performs the same exercise. Ruxana asks the students to reflect on what they have learned the last 10'.
Music 15 02 2006_0003	4.11	64.5	The camera is set on the ground and the students are gradually start to run arround
Music 15 02 2006_0004	8.16	161.1	Camera on the ground. Same as before but starts with the poem by ... Dee is in the foreground doing various stuff and talk to Ruxana on the bridge. Ruxana talks. Clear iamge and expressive running
Music 15 02 2006_0005	0.09	2.9	Outside of the Glashouse Ruxana asks about a coat
Music 15 02 2006_0007	1.04	20.3	Students rehearsing the final song. Dee seems sceptical
Music 15 02 2006_0008	0.25	8	A student makes a suggestion and Dee seems to dissagree.
Music 15 02 2006_0009	0.01	0.892	not substantial info
Music 15 02 2006_00010	0.17	16.1	Students waiting to get a bell. Dee asks for something
Music 15 02 2006_00011	1.58	106.8	The students ring the bells and Dee gives instructions and then they start to sing "The Garden"

Music 15 02 2006_00020	5.5	314.6	Ruxana asks the students to perform two exercises at the same time: Singing 'the Garden' and standing up at the same time. She moves inbetween them in order to make them stand up
Music 15 02 2006_00022	0.16	15.3	The class finishes and Dee asks some students to collect some instruments back to the boxes. A student approaches her and asks for something
2006_02_15			
Music 15 02 2006_0001_1.AVI	2.5	153.2	on the bridge. Dee and Ruxana give instructions to the students that form a small band. The focus on the posture while playing. Lots of visitors pass by.
Music 15 02 2006_0001.AVI	2.53	156	Kicking the botle
Music 15 02 2006_0002.AVI	3.44	202.4	Continuing from the above. The girls start from laying down. Boys are singing too. Ruxana enterferes. Girls walking. Lots of visitors
Music 15 02 2006_0003.AVI	1.18	70.9	Ruxana explains to the students the moral of the portraits
Music 15 02 2006_0004.AVI	0.03	3.5	On the bridge. not substantial
Music 15 02 2006_0005.AVI	0.58	52.3	Rehearsal from the band on the bridge
Music 15 02 2006_0006_1.AVI	0.4	34.6	In the 'Garden' students running around. Ruxana shows them how they will go back to their positions.
Music 15 02 2006_0007_1.AVI	1.21	71.7	Before leaving. Aranging some details about special music instruction
Music 15 02 2006_0008_1.AVI	1.26	76.7	Continuing from before. Dee asks the students to have learned the scores and congratulates them. Ruxana afirms. They discuss about clothes.
2006_02_22			
Music 22 02 2006_0007	1.4	87.3	In the pond. Ruxana walks around the pond. Two men with uniforms go to spray in the next room. 5 minutes later we were asked to leave the room for the danger of the chemicals.
Music 22 02 2006_0012	1.07	60.6	Rehearsing "will he buy?" and passing to "there is a lady"
Music 22 02 2006_0015	1.11	64.2	Ruxana sits on a bench on the bridge and describes where the students should go and where they should hide the instruments. A lot of descriptions of directions
Music 22 02 2006_0016	1.24	75.9	Rehearsing on the bridge. Percusions and instruments

Music 22 02 2006_0017	1.4	90	Continuing on the bridge. Ruxana and Dee have a small argument
Music 22 02 2006_0031	0.4	36.4	The students are lying on the floor. Dee comes to tell how they are going to get the key note.
Music 22 02 2006_0032	0.3	26.9	Continuing from above. The girls get up and start to sing
Music 22 02 2006_0033	1.55	49.6	Ruxana on the bridge gives instructions to the girls. A girl asks a question and Ruxana replies. The boys are chatting what they should be doing.
Music 22 02 2006_0035	3.47	204.1	Ruxana explains how they should be standing up in a spiral movement. She asks them to repeat. Saying which hand should use to stand up. Iulian comes in with the frames. The students are asked to applaud. They continue practicing.

Notes from the day

2006_03_01

Music 01 03 2006_0002_1.AVI	0.4	36.3	Dee rehearsing the 'Death' with the students. Dee says that she should be in the middle.
Music 01 03 2006_0013.AVI	1.04	57.4	Rehearsing the breaking egg
Music 01 03 2006_0014.AVI	1.5	101.9	Rehearsing the walk with the frames. Ruxana emphasises on the dropping of the head and the movement.
Music 01 03 2006_0016.AVI	1	55.2	A student makes a suggestion and Ruxana accepts it.
Music 01 03 2006_0017.AVI	1.13	65.8	Ruxana is down on the same level with the students and they are trying the frame- masks
Music 01 03 2006_0018.AVI	0.37	33.9	Ruxana explains again the importance of keeping the head. The girls lay down again to rehearse
Music 01 03 2006_0019.AVI	4.08	221.9	Ruxana rehearses the "will he buy flowers", with the couple. Ruxana asks from the other students to give support
Music 01 03 2006_0022.AVI	0.3	27.5	Close up. Ruxana discusses with the professional but we cannot hear what they say. Ruxana seems not to be satisfied.

2006_03_06

Music 2006_03_06_0001_1.AVI	1.09	48.3	Dark. Girls rehearse the masks
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Music 2006_03_06_0008.AVI	1.02	55.7	Rehearsal of the puppets in the pond. Accident of the moon being stuck on a piece of wood.
Music 2006_03_06_0009.AVI	0.4	36.8	Rehearsal of the 'flowers'
Music 2006_03_06_0030.AVI	1.08	61.2	Iulian and Ruxana in the pond. They are discussing with the others out of the pond. Ruxana asks from the students for silence???
Music 2006_03_06_0031.AVI	0.45	41	Ruxana and Iulian they are discussing with the (lightingman?) about the fishing positions
Music 2006_03_06_0035.AVI	0.19	15	Iulian comes out making fan "I am coming from another world". Ruxana's uniform has a hole.
Music 2006_03_06_0036.AVI	0.36	28.6	Shadow theatre. The animation students discussing.
Music 2006_03_06_0037.AVI	0.24	19.6	Shadow theatre. Iulian gives some suggestions to the students
2006_03_07-08 music_0001.AVI	2.21	108.4	In the backstage. Ruxana makes suggestions to the students. They are discussing about moving in the glasshouses without being noticed by the public
music_0006.AVI	3.14	175.7	Continues from the above. Ruxana is dramatic. She makes a good question at the end "How do we know that it is the end of the show?" Students respond
music_0007.AVI	3.12	71.1	Dee makes suggestions. "Don't be afraid of the silence." Suggests not to eat in the room because of the coqrauches
music_0008.AVI	1.1	39.1	Dark video. In the glashouse. I ask "how do we wrap the whole thing up?"
music_0073.AVI	0.4	36.5	Ruxana makes suggestions about the students positions. She also says when they should go to the toilet.
music_0078.AVI	1.45	94.9	From the performance. In the pond
music_0079.AVI	1.16	56.9	Ruxana and Dee on the bridge. They all sing the Niglel's song
music_0080.AVI	2.01	107.7	Backstage. Ruxana, "make the hair of their skin stand up". Then with Dee they discuss about the getting of the tune.
music_0083.AVI	0.35	32.6	Backstage. They discuss how many times they should sing 'Tarnanina'. Lets practice it now.

music_0086.AVI	1.31	83.1	Backstage. Discussing about the leading of the audience back to the wine reception. A student suggests that he should lead. Nigel announces that the performance is being received very well and a critic has appointed it with 5stars
2006_03_09			
music_0001.AVI	1.3	78.7	Backstage. Reflections of the previous day. Dee asks for a volunteer to bring back Nigel's bass, I do the job
music_0016.AVI	2.07	96.7	From the performance. People are entering into the pond
music_0017.AVI	1.36	86.7	From the performance. Puppets
music_0025.AVI	0.3	27.8	From the performance. Puppets- the end of singing
music_0026.AVI	7.58	319.1	From the performance. The garden until the end
2006_03_10			
Music 2006_03_10_0001_2.AVI	2.07	113.2	Warming up the voice. At the end singing the trilo
Music 2006_03_10_0002_2.AVI	0.42	29	Dark. From the performance. My home.
Music 2006_03_10_0003_1.AVI	2.19	92.4	Dark. From the performance. My home.
Music 2006_03_10_0003.AVI	2	11.1	A student makes comments about something. Ruxana responds agreeing. I make a comment about the band and the way we come back very quickly. This comment is being dismissed.
Music 2006_03_10_0004_1.AVI	2.28	94.2	Dark. From the performance. My home.
Music 2006_03_10_0005_1.AVI	2.07	99	From the performance. My home. The girls and the masks
Music 2006_03_10_0006_1.AVI	0.45	34.6	From the performance. Just before entering in the pond
Music 2006_03_10_0006.AVI	2.01	109.6	Preperation for the warming up. Ruxana comes and takes hold of the warming up
Music 2006_03_10_0007.AVI	2.01	109.2	Warming up. Body movements
Music 2006_03_10_0008.AVI	2.16	123.5	End of body movement warm up and beginning of voice warm up. Ruxana promises the 'Team Clap'.
Music 2006_03_10_0035.AVI	0.31	23.4	From the performance. The garden
2006_03_11(?)			

100_2276.MOV	1.55	75.2	Ruxana asks the student to reflect on two moments to improve. Claping at the end interrupted by the arrival of some people.
100_2277.MOV	1.1	46	Team Claping. Nigel is invited to give the sign.
2006_03_20			
001_A_001_qingfeng.dvf		0.52	Audio recording
001_A_002_qingfeng.dvf		0.62	Audio recording
001_A_003_qingfeng.dvf		0.42	Audio recording
001_A_004_qingfeng.dvf		14.2	Audio recording
Prison 2006_03_20_0004.AVI	0.24	19.8	Before the beginning of a recording, discussing about videoing and taking pictures
Prison 2006_03_20_0022.AVI	1.06	60.2	Performing the "Inside your heaven' finish and applauding
Prison 2006_03_20_0026.AVI	0.23	20.7	Performance
Prison 2006_03_20_0033.AVI	0.13	11.5	Rehearsing 'Everybody is changing' Martha gives instructions
Prison 2006_03_20_0037.AVI		50.6	End of performance and applauding. Discussions and Martha gives instructions
Prison 2006_03_20_0051.AVI	0.01	1.2	Test. Rehearsing precusions
Prison 2006_03_20_0065.AVI	0.52	47.6	Performance of hotel california
Prison 2006_03_20_0074.AVI	0.18	16.8	Preparing a performance
TOTAL		66.5	

Catalogue and Contents of the Design Studio Videos

AD1

	min	MB	Notes
2006_01_23 AD1 27 01 2006_0001.AVI	0.02	0.828	Test
AD1 27 01 2006_0002.AVI	39.42	763	I tutor with Keith. Includes the 'Victorian Doors'. The guy with the karate object.
AD1 27 01 2006_0002.mov	39.42	638.1	The same as above
doors broadband high.mov	39.42	245.3	The same as above
Victorian doors.mov	2.44	5.3	Victorian doors
AD1 2006_01_27.dvf		6.4	Audio Recording
AD1 2006_01_27b.dvf		7	Audio Recording
2006_02_03			
Midterm review 'Retreat'			
AD1 -1_2006_02_03.dvf		4.6	Audio Recording
AD1 -2_2006_02_03.dvf		3.3	Audio Recording
AD1 -3_2006_02_03.dvf		3	Audio Recording
AD1 -4_2006_02_03.dvf		2.6	Audio Recording
AD1 -5_2006_02_03.dvf		3	Audio Recording
AD1 -6_2006_02_03.dvf		2.9	Audio Recording
AD1 -7_2006_02_03.dvf		2.9	Audio Recording
AD1 -8_2006_02_03.dvf		0.42	Audio Recording
AD1_001 2006_02_03.dvf		3.1	Audio Recording
AD1 03 02 2006_0001.AVI	18.52	963.1	Crit of the guy with the 'simple' building. Me and Ollie
2006_02_17			
001_2006_02_17.dvf		0.74	Audio Recording
002- Nicholas Sharp _2006_02_17.dvf		2.4	Audio Recording
003_2006_02_17.dvf		2.1	Audio Recording
004- Stephen Fong _2006_02_17.dvf		2.9	Audio Recording
005- Daisy Barber 2006_02_17.dvf		2.1	Audio Recording
006 Richard Collins 2006_02_17.dvf		3.3	Audio Recording
007- Adelaine Lawrence_2006_02_17.dvf		0.96	Audio Recording
2006_02_24			
AD1_001_Richard Collins_2006_02_24.dvf		3.1	Audio Recording

AD1_002_Claire Freake_2006_02_24.dvf	0.496		Audio Recording
AD1_003_Brian Maguire_2006_02_24.dvf	3.6		Audio Recording
AD1_004_Daisy Barber_2006_02_24.dvf	1.02		Audio Recording
AD1_005_qingfeng_2006_02_24.dvf	2.2		Audio Recording
AD1_006_qingfeng_2006_02_24.dvf	4		Audio Recording
AD1_007_Tom Hayes_2006_02_24.dvf	4.7		Audio Recording
AD1_008_Stephen Fong_2006_02_24.dvf	3		Audio Recording
AD1_009_Robert Morgan_2006_02_24.dvf	3.6		Audio Recording
AD1_010_Alistair Stuart_2006_02_24.dvf	4.6		Audio Recording
2006_03_03 light workshop			
AD 1_1_2006_02_28.dvf		5	
AD 1_2_2006_02_28.dvf		0.26	
AD 1_3_2006_02_28.dvf		6.4	
AD 1_Thea's lecture_2006_02_28.dvf		2.9	
AD1 28 02 2006_0041.AVI	1.2	72.4	Keith talks to Sophie
AD1 28 02 2006_0042.AVI	0.01	1.4	test
AD1 28 02 2006_0047.AVI	0.42	38.4	Keith talks to Sophie. He makes at the end a comment that your maybe recorded.
AD1 28 02 2006_0050.AVI	3.1	172.8	Keith talks to Kuceck
AD1 28 02 2006_0051.AVI	2.3	133	Keith talks to Kuceck continue from above
2006_03_03 Midterm reviews of "Live/Work"			
AD1 03_03_2006_0002_2.AVI	11.38	628.4	Keith and Thea's husband on Steven Fung
AD1 03_03_2006_0002_3.AVI	0.26	23.7	Me and Keith on Alistair Blake
AD1 03_03_2006_0003_2.AVI	1.29	82	Continue from above
AD1 03_03_2006_0004_1.AVI	0.5	45.4	Continue from above
AD1 03_03_2006_0005_1.AVI	7.56	427.1	Continue from above. Includes the "Breaking the model
AD1 03_03_2006_0006.AVI	0.02	2.5	Continue from above

AD1_2006_03_03_0001.AVI	3.19	178.9	Keith talks to S about her project
AD1_001_qingfeng_2006_03_03.dvf		9.2	Audio Recording
AD1_002_2006_03_03.dvf		4	Audio Recording
AD1_003_2006_03_03.dvf		4.4	Audio Recording
AD1_004_2006_03_03.dvf		7.5	Audio Recording
AD1_005_2006_03_03.dvf		5.1	Audio Recording
AD1_006_2006_03_03.dvf		5.6	Audio Recording
AD1_007_2006_03_03.dvf		12.1	Audio Recording

AD2

2005_10_04

AD2 Crit 2005_10_04.WAV	5.06	6.5	Audio recording.
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M.Arch 1

2005_01_24

MArch1_2006_01_24 b.dvf		8.5	Audio recording.
MArch1_2006_01_24.dvf		16.1	Audio recording.

MVI_0358.AVI	30.16	361.1	Ethics of Borderland
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2005_02_23

Visiting reviewer from New York

001_A_001_qingfeng_2006_02_23.dvf		7.5	Audio recording.
001_A_002_qingfeng_2006_02_23.dvf		6.9	Audio recording.
002_B_006_qingfeng_2006_02_23.dvf		14.4	Audio recording.
MArch 23 02 2006_0001.AVI	9.27	514.6	Dorian talks to a student about the work
MArch 23 02 2006_0002.AVI	4.4	255.8	The Visiting Reviewer comment on the student's work. The student hardly speaks
MArch 23 02 2006_0003.AVI	2.51	153.6	Continue from above, Liam makes comments

2005_02_23

Visiting Chinese scholar

March1 2006_03_17_0001.AVI	3	20.3	The Visiting Reviewer comments on the student's work. Liam makes coments too student hardly speaks
March1 2006_03_17_0002.AVI	0.01	0.1	test
March1 2006_03_17_0003.AVI	3	22	A group of students start to present a project
March1 2006_03_17_0004.AVI	3.07	57.5	Mathew Gallery The students defend their work
March1 2006_03_17_0005.AVI	9.04	173.6	Continue from the above. Dorian and the visitng Reviewer make comments
March1 2006_03_17_0016.AVI	5.01	91.1	Continue form above. Dorian attacks the students about superficiality and 'of the highest order'
March1 2006_03_17_0017.AVI	3.18	55.6	A group present their work.
March1 2006_03_17_0018.AVI	8.46	160.8	Continue from above. Discussion about the project
March1 2006_03_17_0023.AVI	4.27	72.8	Rust project. Dorian coments
March1 2006_03_17_0024.AVI	8.52	124.5	Continue from above. General discussion about the project
Stich of pictures of the Mathew Galery review			
TOTAL		269.43	



Aikido etiquette:

Aikido is not a sport. It is a discipline for training the mind, body, and spirit. Physical technique is not the true object, but a tool for personal refinement and spiritual growth. An Aikido dojo is not a gymnasium. It is the place where the teachings of Master Morihei Ueshiba are studied. The following rules are necessary to the maintenance of the proper atmosphere for this study.

Dojo Etiquette

It is the responsibility of each student to:

- cooperate in creating a positive atmosphere of harmony and respect
- assist in setting up mats and cleaning the dojo
- never use Aikido technique to harm another person or as a way to display ego

The dojo is not to be used for any purpose other than regularly scheduled classes without the direct permission of the Senior Instructor.

All personal belongings will be left in the changing room. A regular student will be in charge of controlling access to the building and changing rooms during each class.

The termly membership dues provide a place to practise and provide you with a way to show gratitude for the teaching received. Students must pay dues on time (before beginning of each term).

Practice Etiquette

- 1 Upon entering and leaving the practice area of the dojo, make a standing bow.
- 2 Always bow when stepping on or off the tatami (mats) in the direction of O'Sensei (founder's) picture.
- 3 Respect your training tools. Keikogi (training suit) should be clean and mended. Weapons should be in good condition and in their proper place when not in use.
- 4 Zori (sandals) and not outside shoes must be worn in the dojo (outside the mats).
- 5 A high standard of personal hygiene is expected. Do not wear long nails, or any perfume and make up.
- 6 No jewelry should be worn during practice.
- 7 A few minutes before time for practice to begin, you should be warmed up, seated formally in order of rank, and in quiet meditation.
- 8 The class is opened and closed with a formal ceremony. It is important to be on time and participate in this ceremony, but if you are unavoidably late, you should join the class without disrupting the practice (ie once students are practising).
- 9 The proper way to sit on the mat is in seiza (formal sitting position). If you have a knee injury, you may sit cross-legged, but never sit with legs outstretched and never lean against walls or post.
- 10 Do not leave the mat during practice except in case of injury or illness; on such occasion and where possible always notify the Instructor in charge.

- 11 During class, when the Instructor demonstrate a technique for practice, you should sit quietly and attentively in seiza. After the demonstration, bow to the Instructor and then to a partner and begin practice at once.
- 12 When the end of a technique is signaled, stop immediately. Bow to your partner and quickly line up with the other students.
- 13 Never stand around idly on the tatami. You should be practising or if necessary be waiting your turn. You must be alert at all time.
- 14 If for some reason it is absolutely necessary to ask a question of the Instructor, go to him (never call him over), bow respectfully, and wait for his acknowledgment (a standing bow is appropriate).
- 15 When receiving personal instruction during class, bow formally to the Instructor when he has finished (a standing bow is appropriate).
- 16 Respect those who are more experienced, never argue about technique.
- 17 If you know the technique being studied and are working with somebody who does not. You may help your partner study the technique demonstrated by the Instructor. However do not attempt to teach your partner. This is the role of the Instructor in charge of the class. Beginners should not presume they know a technique.
- 18 Keep talking on the tatami to an absolute minimum. Aikido is experience.
- 19 Do not lounge around the tatami before or after the class. The space is for students who wish to train in Aikido. Socializing in other parts of the dojo should not disrupt an ongoing practice.
- 20 No eating, drinking, smoking, or gum chewing on or off the tatami during practice, nor on the mat at any time.
- 21 Never drink alcoholic beverages while still wearing your keikogi.

Visitors Etiquette

You are welcome to sit and observe a class at any time, but the following rules of etiquette must be observed.

- 1- Sit respectfully, never with legs propped on the furniture or in a reclining position.
- 2- No eating, drinking, smoking while class is in progress.
- 3- Do not talk to anyone while that person is on the mat.
- 4- Do not talk or walk around while the Instructor is demonstrating or lecturing.
- 5- At the opening and closing of the class, sit formally and perform the ceremony with the class. Remain seated until the Instructor has signaled the end of the class or has left the mat at the end.

Thank you for respecting the Dojo you are about to enter - LH

l'art du chi - aikido grades preparation/exam (up to 1st kyu)

In the absence of competition in Aikido, gradings though not compulsory are an essential part of our practice. For many students they provide the necessary focus to validate one's progression in the discipline of Aikido. To prepare for and formally present a grade in front of one's instructor and fellow aikidokas is an important moment for all concerned.

The following document sets out to explain what grading preparation and exam with l'art du chi entails.

At l'art du chi – aikido, we can prepare you for:

Kyu (beginners) grades:

- These take place in our Dojo (Epworth Halls – Edinburgh) toward the end of term.

As you progress through the Kyu, you will become eligible to prepare for Aikikai Dan (black belt) gradings. The Aikikai grades are issued by the Hombu Dojo (Worldwide Aikido Headquarters in Japan) the Aikido organization, which sets standards for Aikido practice/teaching worldwide. See: *a-booklet-dan-grading.doc* for more information.

Students wishing to prepare for a grading are asked to:

- Put their name down on the *grading list* (see dojo information board) during the first week of term.
- Note date/time of the grading
- Obtain relevant *grading syllabus*: <http://www.art-of-chi.co.uk/aikido/information.html>.
- Obtain and study *dojo etiquette*: <http://www.art-of-chi.co.uk/aikido/information.html>
- Attend weekly classe(s) regularly (how many classes is dependent on grade)
- Attend l'art du chi- aikido workshop(s) where possible
- Attend mock grading class organized during term
- Undergo physical preparation at each class (see ukemi practice on your *grading syllabus*)
- Take on a more active role in the running of the dojo/classes/workshops

l'art du chi – aikido standard:

- l'art du chi upholds a very high standard of practice. This is reflected on all levels:
 - *the teaching offered in weekly classes,
 - *the experts which are regularly invited to run week end courses
- *the level required for the different kyu grades
- This standard is set by our Technical Director: N.Tamura (8th Dan Aikikai); Tamura Shihan is widely recognized as one of the world leading figure in Aikido.

Students presenting the Kyu exam must on the day:

- Arrive at 5.30pm to clean dojo and lay out mats/weapons...
- Present impeccably:

- keikogi cleaned and ironed
- zori sandals worn inside dojo
- high standard of personal hygiene, clean shaven (men), nails/toe nails cut short, no make up, perfume or jewellery worn
- have set of weapons at hand (from 4th kyu upward)
- long hair tied (women and men)
- Warm up or practice required number of ukemis (see *grading syllabus*)

Evaluation of participants takes into account:

Techniques:

- Formal knowledge:
The techniques (form of work/attack/technique) asked by the jury should be known and executed without hesitation.
- Construction of techniques:
Coordination with the partner's attack and fluid execution of the following phases:
 - 1-initial phase (applying irimi/tenkan/ma-ai)
 - 2-create and actively maintain uke's imbalance
 - 3-final phase (projection/immobilization)
 These 3 phases must not lead to lack of continuity

Etiquette:

- Understanding and respect of etiquette (see *dojo etiquette*)

Fitness:

- Evaluation will be based on the basis of participants' efforts to develop their fitness during training. This as well as sex and age will taken into consideration.

Results:

- These criteria are only indicative and that ultimately the decision and responsibility to pass or fail a candidate rests with the jury based on their/his experience. This decision is final.
- Please note that the evaluation of future candidates is ongoing; and not limited to the exam.
- Participants must present (or obtain) their aikido passport for signature to the jury after results have been announced
- Jury to give feedback to candidates as applicable

See aikido examinations: <http://www.art-of-chi.co.uk/aikido/resources> for further information.

Celebration:

- Traditionally, the candidates would show their appreciation to their instructor after the grading in the form of a present, or by inviting them and their fellow Aikidoka for a drink/meal...

M.Sc. IN MUSIC IN THE COMMUNITY

FUTHER INFORMATION

Course Organisers:

Prof. Nigel Osborne & Dr. Katie Overy

January 2006

GENERAL DESCRIPTION AND EDUCATIONAL AIMS

Music in the Community is a relatively young discipline that has emerged at an influential meeting point of a large number of diverse concerns, including cultural development, the advancement of creativity, education, creative arts therapies, health care, special needs, rehabilitation, performing arts outreach, community development, the promotion of social expression, identity and self-respect and conflict resolution. The University of Edinburgh has been a pioneer in the implementation of Music in the Community projects and in developing related methodologies and training programmes, and has more than ten years of experience in this area.

The MSc is designed as a course in advanced practical skills, applied methodologies, new bases of knowledge, and methods of research, development and assessment for practitioners of Music in the Community. It relates to the following strands of innovation in Music:

- the award-winning Music in the Community undergraduate course (Thorn-EMI Award 1994, Queen's Anniversary Prize 1996) and the success of Music in the Community as a minor option at M.Mus. level;
- pioneering work in new areas of community arts, e.g. work with traumatised children in conflict and post-conflict settings;
- the new Institute for Music in Human and Social Development, including research groups in Music and Medicine, and Music and Child Development;
- a wide and well-established network of collaborative relationships with departments of Health, Education and Social Services, Local Authorities in Scotland, and also with international agencies and NGOs;
- a vibrant environment for the joining of musical creativity and science.

The current MSc proposal is intended to be a bridgehead to further developments, including links to universities in areas of particular social need (for example Tbilisi, Prishtina [Pristina], Sarajevo, Grozny, Bangkok, Hanoi and the Edward Said Conservatoire, Palestine) to facilitate collaborative teaching and distance learning for community workers in the field.

The aims of the course are:

- to offer students a programme of advanced personal creative development;
- to promote advanced skills in the practice of Music in the Community
- to introduce students to relevant research and assessment approaches to Music in the Community.
- to present and encourage critique of the current methodologies of Music in the Community;
- to familiarise students with current theories and models relevant to the practice of Music in the Community, in particular those drawn from recent advances in the biological sciences, psychology and social science;
- to equip students with the know-how to plan, design, finance and implement community music programmes;

PROGRAMME OUTCOMES

Professional/subject-specific/practical skills

- the development of personal musical/creative resources to a high level;
- the ability to practice the communicative, motivational, inspirational, educational, therapeutic, social and organisational skills of a community music *animateur*/workshop leader to an advanced level;
- the experience to design and implement imaginative and innovatory programmes of community arts work to meet the specific needs of varying client groups;
- the means to assess the outcomes of programmes in a scientific manner.

These skills will be taught through practical workshops and supervised placements. They will be assessed by the grading of creative presentations, by the evaluation of student performance on placement and by examination of a final project on the basis of the success of its design and implementation, its documentation and the quality of the scientific assessment of its outcomes.

Knowledge and understanding

- a thorough grasp and understanding of current methodologies for Community Music activities;
- a working knowledge of applicable theory relating to Music in the Community, and in particular of the currently emerging bio-psycho-social paradigm;
- the knowledge and ability to prepare and initiate programmes of research in the domain of Community Music and related disciplines.

This knowledge and understanding will be introduced through lectures and seminars, and examined by the presentation and submission of seminar papers and a short dissertation.

Intellectual skills

- the general intellectual facility to apply profound, focussed reflection to wide-ranging creativity and useful human action;
- the intellectual skills to grasp the essence of current research and thinking in science and the humanities relevant to Music in the Community;
- the ability to relate and apply this knowledge to specific practice.

These skills will be taught in the course of the workshops, placements, lectures and seminars outlined above, and examined as part of assessment of placements, seminar papers, the final project and short dissertation.

Transferable skills

Creativity, imagination, expression, communication, social skills, motivation, inspiration, sensitisation, empathy and understanding, organisation, educational and therapeutic methods, knowledge and action, awareness of the social situation and needs of a wide variety of client groups, project design, financial planning, research methods and assessment methods. These skills will be taught and assessed in the context of the discipline-specific programme of study outlined above.

PROGRAMME STRUCTURE AND FEATURES

The programme unfolds in two halves:

- i) Semesters 1 and 2
An intensive programme of workshops, supervised placements, seminars and lectures.
- ii) Summer
A supervised community placement project, with a related dissertation.

Courses

Semester 1

P01187	Creative and Professional Development A	40 credits
P01189	Music, Mind and Body A: Physiology and Neurology	20 credits

Semester 2

P01188	Creative and Professional Development B	20 credits
P01190	Music, Mind and Body B: Psychology and Sociology	20 credits
P00312	MMus Research Methods B	20 credits

Summer

P01191	Community Project and Dissertation	60 credits
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Overview

SEMESTER 1		
Creative and Professional Development A (40 credits)		Music, Mind and Body A: Physiology & Neurology (20 credits)
Group creative development workshops, individual creative project workshops, short placement, workshop skills for <i>animateurs</i> , project planning and design seminars.		Lectures and seminars on the neurology and physiology of music.
SEMESTER 2		
Creative & Professional Development B (20 credits)	MMus Research Methods B (20 credits)	Music, Mind and Body B: Psychology & Sociology (20 credits)
Creative development, individual placement, group placement project, educational approaches, therapeutic approaches.	Seminars on research design and methodology, including quantitative and qualitative techniques.	Lectures and seminars on the psychology and sociology of music.
SUMMER		
Final Placement and Dissertation (60 credits)		
Summer placement, supported by supervision, and related dissertation, supported by tutorials.		

Entry requirements

- Either: a) a first degree at the equivalent of UK honours level in Music or Music and the Creative Arts, or
- b) a first degree at the equivalent of UK honours level in a discipline relevant to the practice of Community Music, e.g. Education, Medicine, Therapeutic Studies, Nursing Studies, Psychology or Social Science, with evidence of an appropriate level of musicianship and musical literacy.

In exceptional circumstances, accomplished musicians and Community Music practitioners who have no first degree, but who can provide evidence of an equivalent experience and competence may be considered for admission.

Modes of study

In the first instance, the course will be offered as full-time. In the future, there may be opportunities for part-time, distance and collaborative learning.

Learning and teaching environment

The new course will benefit from a well-established teaching environment for Music in the Community at Edinburgh. This includes an evolved network of community contacts for student placement opportunities in Scotland, a well-tested system of support and supervision for students on placement in the community, and a number of projects overseas initiated and mentored by music staff, which offer challenging opportunities for advanced placement work. Creative activities in Music take place in an active and internationally respected context of composition and performance. The new Institute for Music in Human and Social Development provides a clear focus for related research and development.

DETAILS OF CURRICULUM AND ASSESSMENT

These details are guidelines, to be confirmed at the start of each academic year.

P01187: Creative and Professional Development A

(40 credits - 4 hours per week for 10 weeks)

This course will include group creative workshops, practical training in *animateur*/workshop leader skills, supervised placements in community settings, as well as seminars in the planning, design and implementation of community projects. Students will develop their personal creative resources and their ability to communicate and motivate as a music *animateur*/workshop leader. Students will also gain the understanding and skills required to design and implement imaginative programmes of community arts work for specific client groups.

Curriculum

Weeks 1-5	Creative development workshops <i>Animateur</i> skills workshops
Week 6	Reading week
Weeks 7-11	Creative project workshops Placement A

Assessment

Group creative presentation:	10 %
Individual creative presentation:	20 %
Supervised placement:	30 %
Project design (3,000 words):	40 %

P01189: Music, Mind and Body A: Physiology and Neurology

(20 credits - 2 hours per week for 10 weeks)

This course will introduce topics regarding the physiology and neurology of music, including the auditory system, the autonomic system, the motor system and the emotional system. Students will gain an understanding of the currently emerging bio-psycho-social paradigm for human music-making, and will develop the intellectual facility to apply this knowledge to specific practice.

Curriculum

Weeks 1-2	Music, sound and hearing
Weeks 3-4	Music and the autonomous system
Week 5	Music and movement
Week 6	Reading week
Week 7-8	Music and the emotions
Week 9-10	Music and medicine
Week 11	Music and special needs

Assessment

Seminar presentation:	20 %
Essay (3,000 words):	80 %

P01188: Creative and Professional Development B

(20 credits, 2 hours per week for 10 weeks)

This course will include creative workshops, advanced training in *animateur*/workshop leader skills, a supervised placement and practical workshops investigating educational and therapeutic methodologies. In addition, a large-scale community project will be implemented collaboratively by the students.

Curriculum

Weeks 1-5	Creative development workshops Placement B
Week 6	Reading week
Weeks 7-11	Methodological workshops Group project placement

Assessment

Individual creative presentation:	20%
Group placement project:	30 %
Supervised placement:	50 %

P01190: Music, Mind and Body B: Psychology and Sociology

(20 credits - 2 hours per week for 10 weeks)

This course will introduce topics regarding the psychology and sociology of music, including perception and cognition, communication, theory of groups, trusts and self-esteem, and music in the community. Students will gain an understanding of the currently emerging bio-psycho-social paradigm for human music-making, with specific reference to psychological and sociological theories, and will develop the intellectual facility to apply this knowledge to specific practice.

Curriculum

Weeks 1-2	Communicative musicality
Weeks 3-4	Music cognition
Week 5	Music and theory of groups
Week 6	Reading week
Week 7-8	The sociology of music
Week 9-10	Music, trust and self-esteem
Week 11	Music in the community

Assessment

Seminar presentation:	20 %
Essay (3,000 words):	80 %

P00312: MMus Research Methods B

(20 credits - 2 hours per week for 10 weeks)

This course will introduce various approaches to research design, including quantitative and qualitative methodologies and their relative advantages and disadvantages. Students will learn to focus and adapt their research questions according to different contexts and methodological approaches.

Curriculum

Week 1	Identifying and refining a research question
Week 2	Exploring the context of a research question
Week 3-4	Quantitative methods i-ii
Week 5	Qualitative methods i
Week 6	Reading week
Week 7	Qualitative methods ii
Week 8	Interpreting and discussing research findings
Week 9	Presentations: talks, posters and papers
Week 10-11	Individual presentations

Assessment

Presentation:	20 %
Essay (3,000 words):	80 %

P01191: Community Project and Dissertation

(60 credits – minimum of 4 tutorials / placement supervisions)

This course consists of a final, supervised community music placement, with a related dissertation. The students will thus demonstrate their ability to successfully organise and conduct an imaginative community music project, while reflecting on the theoretical and practical issues involved and/or conducting research into the outcomes of the project.

Assessment

Individual placement assessment:	50 %
Dissertation (6,000 words):	50 %

ARRANGEMENTS FOR TEACHING AND SUPERVISION

Course tutors

Professor Nigel Osborne is a pioneer in the field of Community Music, consultant to many projects internationally, and a composer with research interests in the neurophysiology of music, music and trauma, and music, health and education.

Dr Katie Overy is a music psychologist with research interests in music education, music and dyslexia, the neurological basis of music processing, and applications of brain imaging techniques to questions of musical experience and child development.

Dee Isaacs is a composer, performer and Community Music practitioner with particular interests in world music, education, creative arts outreach, special needs - including adults with learning difficulties - and the promotion of social creativity.

In addition, there will be regular guest lecturers from areas of professional activity and scientific research related to course content, and assistant professional supervisors for work on placement.

Joint teaching

In Semester 1, students with lower levels of community music experience will be located and supervised alongside B.Mus. Music in the Community honours students, for Placement A.

In Semester 2, Research Methods B will be taught jointly with MMus students.

Supervision of placements

The Department has a long and successful experience of supervising students on placement in the community. In semesters 1 and 2, students will be visited on their 5-week placement at least twice. During the summer placement there will be a minimum of the equivalent of 4 placement supervisions or tutorials. In some cases, students may elect to undertake their final placement projects overseas. Settings may be selected from a menu of locations where the Department has regular consultancy/training contact, and can supervise students during the course of such training visits.

Architecture

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH : SCHOOL OF ARTS, CULTURE & ENVIRONMENT

Architectural Design 1

Course Organiser:
Keith Ballantyne

2006/2007

Disability Statement

A copy of this document can be made available in alternative formats (Braille, large print, electronic, audiotape), on request from the Undergraduate Office.

Anyone requiring additional support relating to disability, i.e. note-taking, proof reading, etc., should make a first approach to their Director of Studies and/or the Disability Office.

Contact the Disability Office:
Telephone 0131 650 6828
Email disability.office@ed.ac.uk.

Further information can be found at
www.disability-office.ed.ac.uk.

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
Architectural Design 1
 Semester 1 & 2: Session 2006/07

ARCHITECTURE
CREDIT POINTS : 40
 Course Code U01499

INTRODUCTORY NOTES

AD 1 Intro



Architectural Design 1 comprises two half courses, **Architectural Design 1A (U00734)** and **Architectural Design 1B (U00735)**, running in Semester 1 and 2 respectively, and each worth 20 credit points. Under certain special circumstances, these can be taken individually.

SEMESTER	1	18 September 2005	to	15 December 2005
DATES	2	8 January 2006	to	25 May 2006

Please note that the studio work of AD1 only runs until 1 December 2006 in Semester 1 and 23 March 2007 in Semester 2. Thus, the studio work consists of two 11-week semesters, followed by periods of examination and consolidation. Weeks 12 and 13 in Semester 1 are designated examination weeks. As a consequence there will be no studio tuition during these weeks. There may, however, be reviews of projects (our exam equivalents).

INTRODUCTION: ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN 1

Welcome to ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN 1 or AD1.

This course in architectural design will emphasize the notion of **practice**: of doing, making and constructing. Designing through these processes is central to the activities in the school, and is at the core of the curriculum.

Your work will focus on the studio and the crit room, and will touch all streams of architectural education.

SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE COURSE

Semester 1:

The course seeks to encourage an enthusiastic approach to knowledge and skills appropriate to the practice of architectural design. The emphasis is on the relationship between architecture and imagination, and the design process is explorative, a process of enquiry and reflection. Students therefore work on a continuous series of design exercises and projects, which require individual or group submission of models, constructs and drawings.

Semester 2:

Students work on a continuous series of design exercises and projects of increasing complexity. Skills developed include the representation of architecture through scale drawings and models, the visualisation and manipulation of architectural space, and the integration of basic systems of structure, construction and environmental control.

Summary of intended Learning outcomes¹

These form the basis for evaluation/assessment of student work. Each project brief will indicate which outcomes are related specifically to the project.

- An ability to visualize architectural space, and an understanding of architectural drawing conventions.²
- An awareness of rigorous and disciplined processes of the evolution of an architectural idea, from intention to proposition.³
- An ability to explore an architectural idea from intention to proposition.⁴
- A basic ability to communicate effectively, both verbally and visually.⁵
- A basic understanding of design principles and theories.⁶
- An appreciation of the relationship of buildings to their physical and cultural context.⁷
- An ability to respond to a given brief.⁸
- An ability to draw and to model as both investigative and presentational devices.⁹
- A basic understanding of the technologies, environmental design and methods of construction inherent in the design and construction of buildings with specific focus on construction/building processes.¹⁰
- An ability to work and contribute as part of a group.¹¹

¹ The learning outcomes are designed to cover aspects of the ARB/RIBA Criteria which are listed in the MA (Hons) Architectural Design Programme booklet

² C1/C2

³ D1/CC3

⁴ D1

⁵ C1/C2

⁶ D3/CC3

⁷ D1/D3/CC1

⁸ D1

⁹ C1/C2

¹⁰ T&E1/T&E5

¹¹ D4

- An understanding of the value and importance of the review/critique process in architectural education with the development of listening and critical appraisal skills, and participation in this process.¹²

METHODS

A series of studio-based **design projects** over the year require individual or group submission of models, constructs and drawings. Projects culminate at the end of the year in the submission of a portfolio, which forms the basis for final examination.

Each project is introduced with **lectures and/or seminars**, outlining specific objectives of the project and suggesting some points of departure; examples of built work and theoretical propositions will also be considered so that the students may be exposed to a range of architectural possibilities.

STUDIO-BASED TEACHING AND LEARNING

The studio provides opportunity for collective discussion, and for students to develop their own design process. This includes individual and group tutorials, design reviews and workshops. Skills in exploring and communicating architectural ideas are developed through the making of objects, drawings, models, computer images, and through oral presentation.

DESIGN PROJECT PROGRAMME 2006/07 : ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN 1

Week	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
SEMESTER 1												
1 point, line, plane	III	III	III	III								17%
2 casting					III	III						10%
3 precedent study							III	III				
4 computer modelling									III			5%
5 retreat – part 1										III	III	8%
SEMESTER 2												
6 retreat – part 2	III	III	III	III								25%
7 urban live/work					III	III	III	III	III	III		35%
8 presentation preparation											III	
TOTAL												100%

¹² C3/CC4/D4

DESIGN PROJECTS

The year's work is divided into projects. Each project is introduced at a specified time - usually **Tuesdays at 11.10am** - and a set period is allowed for the work. The length of the projects varies from 1 week for a short project, to 6 weeks for a long one. Each project will be introduced by a lecture, which will set out some themes and objectives. **Full attendance at these introductory sessions is mandatory.** At the commencement of each project you will be issued with a **brief**. This will describe the aims and requirements of the project, with some indication of the way you might proceed. The brief should be considered carefully and examined throughout the project; it will provide you with a structure for exploration and your particular interpretation. You will work individually or in groups (as stated in the brief), with tutors or your colleagues available for consultation and discussions as the work progresses.

DESIGN TUTORIALS

There are no absolute answers to design briefs, only questions and possibilities. One of the skills you will develop is explorative thinking in and through the work. Understanding can only come through questioning. This means that you should not look to tutors solely for answers, but also for clues about which questions to ask. The tutors have knowledge and experience in many areas, and will make valuable suggestions.

Tutors will be available in the studio for discussions on Fridays, and some Tuesday mornings, as shown on the timetable. Tutorial lists will be pinned up on the notice board: you will be allocated a tutorial group or a tutor for each project. Every student should attend the Tuesday lecture/seminar and one Friday tutorial. Failure to do so could seriously affect your progress. There is also much to be learnt by working throughout the week in the studio. Make the most of your fellow students. Make the most of your tutors. Always produce as much work as you can for a tutorial, to gain the maximum benefit. It is only by having something concrete to discuss that you will be able to communicate effectively with the tutors. There is no substitute for producing work - remember again the term "practice". If not enough work is produced for a tutorial, it may be deemed an inappropriate use of the tutor's time. **This fact will be recorded.** If you are having problems, see the Course Organiser or speak to your Director of Studies.

PROJECT REVIEWS

At the end of each project there will be a fixed **hand-in** time before which you will be expected to have displayed your work in the crit room. No further work may be done after this time. Your work will then be '**presented**' by you at a review or '**crit**', usually held the following day. The process of continuous, constructive criticism of the ideas put forward by students is the essence of architectural education. Remember that the criticism is intended to be helpful, and the experience gained should be carried into the next project.

Presentation involves communicating your work, in whatever manner is appropriate. Some projects will involve finished drawings and models, while others might have additional explanatory information in more sketchy form.¹³ It is important to explore ways of expressing your **process** in your presentation. Presented work should be appropriately labelled, with information on scale, orientation, etc. **Your name must appear on the presentation** to enable identification during marking. It is essential that you communicate your ideas clearly.

A '**crit**' then is an opportunity for you to present your design to other students, tutors and invited critics. Your presentation material should do this effectively, but you should also say a few words of introduction. It is worth considering beforehand to which points you wish to draw attention. Following your introduction, the audience will make comments on how well different aspects of your design succeed, and what you might learn from your project. The discussion at your crit is as much a part of the course as your studio work, and **you may find it useful to ask another student to take notes on what is said.**

All students are required to attend all crits. As it may not be possible to provide individual crits for all students, the importance of attendance is amplified. This is critical, as the crits are the most valuable opportunity to learn about shared concerns. It is time well spent listening to the discussions of your colleagues' work. Students are encouraged to comment in order to raise issues they feel to be pertinent; participation leads to a richer discussion of issues often relevant to many of the designs presented. If, for any reason, you are unable to attend, please advise the Course Organiser prior to the crit. If you fail to attend your own crit, your Director of Studies will be advised.

Following the crit, the work should be left on display and the tutors will grade it. Notices will indicate when the work is to be removed, so that other year groups may use the crit rooms. The building is open at weekends¹⁴ – you should take advantage of this fact. **It is very important to remove work when requested,** otherwise it may be taken as unwanted and disposed of. **You must store your work safely during the year, as all work needs to be exhibited in your academic portfolio in June for examination. All work MUST also be retained until the end of fourth year, where it will form a part of the Academic Portfolio 1 course.**

Although each project will be marked after the crit, marks given at this stage will always be provisional and as such will not be provided. **If you are in difficulties, you will be advised.** You will be given feedback at the end of semester one if desired. This too will be provisional but should

¹³ We actively encourage the use of various media for presentation, such as collage, painting, photography, computer-aided presentations and video, in addition to drawing and modelling. There is a multi-media studio in the Maltings, and a workshop in the basement of the Maltings.

¹⁴ Refer to the General Handbook for building opening hours and note specifically when the building is closed for use in the evenings – this must be adhered to.

give a reasonable assessment of your standing in the course. You will all have an opportunity to meet the Course Organiser at the specified feedback sessions to discuss your progress, your marks, and the potential for further work on any projects. Your provisional marks will be reviewed at the end of the year. During the period for consolidation you will be given the opportunity to complete your portfolio presentation and review projects which are incomplete. This is particularly relevant if you fail to submit a project. (refer to the MA (Hons) Architectural Design Programme handbook for essential information on assessment).

WEEKLY AD 1 TIMETABLE

	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI
9.00 -9.50					STUDIO TUTORIAL/ CRIT
10.00 -10.50		[PREVIOUS PROJECT FEEDBACK]			STUDIO TUTORIAL/ CRIT
11.10 -12.00		PROJECT INTRO or <i>Practice</i> LECTURE			STUDIO TUTORIAL/ CRIT
12.10 -1.00		PROJECT INTRO or <i>Practice</i> LECTURE			STUDIO TUTORIAL/ CRIT
2.00 -6.00					STUDIO TUTORIAL/ CRIT

To maximise tuition, please avoid 'outside subject' commitments, including outside subject tutorials, on Tuesday mornings and all day on every Friday, as these are studio days and the days on which we hold crits – which we STRONGLY advise you to attend.

STUDIO DESIGN TUTORS

The tutors listed below will be teaching in the first year design studio. There will also be, from time to time, additional tutors available for individual projects, lectures and particularly crits.

Keith Ballantyne

Keith is the Course Organiser for AD1. He is a postgraduate student at the University of Edinburgh with research interests in contemporary

architectural design theory. He is also an architect with over 13 years practical experience.

Thea McMillan

Thea is the Lead Tutor for AD1. Thea has previously worked in architectural practices in London and Berlin. She has recently completed an MA in Architecture and Critical Theory.

Oliver Chapman

Oliver has his own practice, Oliver Chapman Architects, which he set up after working for four years with Richard Murphy Architects.

William Tunnell

Will has recently set up his own practice, after working for several years with Richard Murphy Architects.

Leonidas Koutsoumpos

Leonidas is an architect and PhD researcher at the University of Edinburgh. He has been active in teaching at Edinburgh at both the MArch and first-year levels.

Yahya Islami

Yahya is a postgraduate researcher at the University of Edinburgh and graduate from the MArch programme (with Honours). He has been active in teaching history and design here and continues with first-year.

Jeremie McGowan

Jeremie is a Fulbright Scholar and postgraduate student at the University of Edinburgh. He has expertise in product and furniture design and is an exceptional resource to the first year course.

AD 1 YEAR STRUCTURE

AD 1 serves as an introduction to architecture and the fundamentals of design.

You all come with a variety of skills, knowledge, experience and preconceptions. This year attempts to build on all of them, even by overturning some of them. By giving you the benefits of critical thinking, we would like to reinforce and supplement some of your inherent abilities, extend your knowledge, and introduce new skills. You will develop new ways of understanding and creating architecture.

The year will take projects that have programmes or functions that may initially seem to be of an everyday nature. This will facilitate your understanding of the familiar and unfamiliar. The year should be seen as a progression of spatial, material and representational considerations.

Throughout the year students are encouraged to consider that representation is not just about communication (although this is important too), but that finding ways of representing the spaces and qualities they wish to make is all part of the process of creating them. Through the

consideration of many different architectural propositions, artists' expressions of ideas, and the thought-provoking effect of the written word, students are encouraged to learn to read buildings, cities and spaces, and to use this skill to develop and articulate an individual architectural language. This includes exploration of the technology of a proposition as an integral (and ongoing) part of the design process.

In the first semester students begin to develop the ability to think and design in both two and three dimensions, through projects concerned with relationships. The projects take their impetus through an encouragement to "see", record and analyse architectural elements and are designed to help develop a series of skills necessary in the later, more complex design projects. In the "Point, line, plane..." project students are asked to use their own images of elements of their town/city to examine two and three dimensional interpretations of an existing space, and how the relationships between the 2 and 3D shifts through the students explorations. In a short but intense casting project the students explore in detail the interface between an existing space and the city, thus becoming aware of ideas of solid/void, form and space, and materiality through the physical process of casting.

The Precedent Study will be taught in conjunction with Architectural History 1 and its chief aim will be to highlight the fundamental importance of an understanding of architectural history and tradition to architectural design. Through the careful study, drawing and modelling of historical precedents, students will gain another understanding of architectural form and meaning. Thus they will begin to build up a repertoire of architectural themes or situations, which will become a resource for their own future interpretations. The other purpose of the Precedent Study is to acquire representational skills, by drawing and modelling seminal existing buildings in imaginative ways. The understanding of three-dimensional spaces through the conventions of orthographic projection drawing will also be developed.

The Retreat is the first individual design project and is this year situated on Crammond Island. This project will be preceded by a CAD workshop, which emphasizes the development of three-dimensional computer skills for purposes of visualizing and testing propositions, while specifically avoiding "rendering" design proposals. The Retreat project introduces the notion of ritual in architecture. It is concerned with the exploration of the relationship between the space occupied by a person going about the activities of retreat, and the space of the site out of which it has developed, which together form the context for intervention. The first part of the project (the final two weeks of the semester) will begin with site mapping and the making of an object central to a ritual that is to be situated in the building.

In the second semester the students return to design the Retreat building. Attention is paid to poetics of space and constructional techniques with further emphasis on specific site considerations. The final project, the Urban Live/Work, continues the theme of ritual already explored in the retreat, moving the considerations into a more complex building. Students will consider; multiple levels through the section, how the context affects the design and how the design has an effect on the existing city grain,

materiality and the changing effects of light, water and air on it, and how the sequence of the ritual can be articulated in both plan and section. Part of this project will also explore how the notion of “universal access” can enhance and inform how different ways of moving through a building, and different perceptions of space, material, light and sound can be understood and manipulated to be positive influences on the design process.

Throughout the year workshops are held as intensive investigations of ways of working, including casting, painting materiality, line drawing, many ways of modelling, and site mapping. All of these skills are very much incorporated into the projects, and develop through the year, so that they become ways of investigating and designing, just as much as ways of communicating and representing.

COMPLIANCE WITH ARB/RIBA CRITERIA (PART1)

The content and structure of the AD1 course takes into account a number of the ARB/RIBA criteria for Part 1 and satisfies them specifically in the following ways:

Design

Students will be required to produce coherent architectural designs, commensurate with first-year level, demonstrating their developing skills at site research and analysis, interpretation of a brief, and design development. The importance of architectural and cultural history and tradition will be stressed by the inclusion of the “Point, Line, Plane...” and Precedent Study projects, as well as by the significant theoretical and cultural content of each of the other projects. Students will develop their ability to work effectively as part of a team, as a substantial portion of the course involves some form of group work.

Technology and Environment

A knowledge of the principles of building technologies, environmental design and construction methods is an essential part of architectural design, which has to be developed in reciprocity with it. The incorporation of technical means as one of the components of the design process is a continuing theme of our discussions. The two major projects each have a technical study component, in which students are required to demonstrate their ability to integrate technical, environmental and structural considerations in their design. Furthermore, Architectural Design 1 is taught in conjunction with Technology & Environment 1, which provides a firm grounding in these areas.

Cultural Context

Throughout the course considerable stress is placed on the cultural context of architecture. While the projects in first year necessarily begin at the scale of an individual dwelling, great emphasis is also placed on the urban context as an embodiment of culture. AD1 is taught in conjunction with Architectural History 1, an intensive survey of the history of Western architecture up to the present time. This provides the students with a solid foundation in the history of ideas, architecture and the city, and impresses upon them the importance of architectural traditions as a resource to

design. The Precedent Study project, taught jointly with AH1, is aimed at developing students' interests and knowledge in these areas. In addition, most of the projects comprise cultural components, such as lectures, seminars or films dealing with, amongst other things, and the work of various contemporary figures.

Communication Skills

Throughout the course, the students are encouraged to develop their verbal, written and visual communication skills. Architectural representation methods range from hand sketching, collage, modelling and drawing to digital and electronic techniques. The first semester projects are specifically geared towards developing such communication skills, and include two explorative drawing projects, as well as a CAD and a casting workshop.

PORTFOLIO CARE AND DIGITAL ARCHIVING

The work that you produce during the course of the academic year should be documented and carefully stored away in the storage tubes/ plan chests, on the shelves and within the designated areas of the AD1 studio. The careful and considered treatment of your work is important on three levels:

- Professional architectural practice
- Final portfolio examination in May
- The role of AD1 work in Academic Portfolio 1 submission in your fourth year as required for professional accreditation of course work.

It is strongly recommended that you also document your work in the form of an ongoing digital archive recording drawings, maquettes, models, photographs, group and individual work [acknowledge those students in all group projects], pertinent journal pages and all design work produced towards the completion of a given project. This Digital Archive should be stored in duplicate on CD and/or personal hard drives. **A copy MUST also be given to the Course Organizer on the completion of each project component.**

AD 1 READING LIST

Each **design project** will feature prescribed **readings**, issued as part of the project brief. It is important for these to be read prior to, **and** during each project. The readings may seem difficult, however, with practice, they will become more accessible.

The list below suggests an overview of references relevant to the course. All of these are available in the Architecture Library as well as many architectural periodicals, covering contemporary architectural production and debate. Although no monographs of specific architect's works are suggested, the more widely you read, the better you will become at understanding your own design process.

ESSENTIAL READING

Bachelard, Gaston, *The Poetics of Space, the dialectics of inside and outside*, John Stilgoe, Beacon Press, Boston, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1994

Ching, Francis D. K., *Architecture: Form, Space and Order*, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1979

Le Corbusier, *texts and sketches for Ronchamp*, COOPI, Geneva 1995

Rasmussen, Steen Eiler, *Experiencing Architecture*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1962.

Tanizaki, Jun'Ichiro, *In Praise of Shadows*, Lette's Books Inc., London, 1991

SUGGESTED READING**Classics:**

Banham, Reyner, *The Architecture of the Well-tempered Environment*, London: The Architectural Press, 1969

Frampton, Kenneth, *Modern Architecture, A critical history*, London: Thames & Hudson, 1985

Le Corbusier. *Towards a New Architecture* (1923). New York: Dover, 1986.

Pevsner, Sir Nikolaus, *An Outline of European Architecture*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990

Rykwert, Joseph. *The Necessity of Artifice*. London: Academy, 1982 [especially 'One Way of Thinking About a House', 'The Sitting Position' and 'The Importance of Ceremonies'].

Rykwert, Joseph. *On Adam's House in Paradise: The Idea of the Primitive Hut in Architectural History*, New York : Museum of Modern Art, 1972.

Ways of seeing the world:

Daza, Ricardo, *Looking for Mies*, Basel; Boston; Berlin: Birkhauser, 2000

Eames, Charles and Ray, *Powers of Ten*, Venice, CA: Eames Office, 1977

Leatherbarrow, David, *The Roots of Architectural Invention- Site, enclosure, materials*, Cambridge, CUPress, 1993

Lyndon, Donlyn & Moore, Charles, *Chambers for a Memory Palace*, Cambridge, Mass., & London: MIT Press, 1994

Norberg-Schulz, Christian, *Existence, Space & Architecture*, London: Studio Vista, 1972

Pallasmaa, Juhani. 'An Architecture of the Seven Senses', in A. **Pérez-Gómez** et al. eds. *The Question of Perception. Phenomenology of Architecture*. A+U Special Issue, July 1994. Pp. 27-38 [good on perception and architecture].

Pollan, Michael, *A Place of My Own, The education of an amateur builder*, London: Bloomsbury, 1997

Rasmussen, Steen Eiler, *Experiencing Architecture*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1962

Sebald, W.G., *Vertigo*, Vintage, Frankfurt am Main 2002.

Theories:

Borden, Ian and Rendell, Jane, *Intersections: Architectural Histories and Critical Theories*, London: Routledge, 2000

Colomina, Beatrice et al, *Sexuality and Space*, New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1992

Leach, Neil (ed.), *Rethinking Architecture. A Reader in Cultural Theory*, London: Routledge, 1997

Representation:

Ching, Francis D. K, *Architectural Graphics*, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1985

Evans, Robin, *The Projective Cast*, Cambridge, Mass: MIT 1995

Perez Gomez and Pelletier, *Architectural Representation and the Perspective Hinge*, Cambridge Mass.: MIT 1997

Pérez-Gómez, Alberto and Pelletier, Louise. 'Architectural Representation Beyond Perspectivism', *Perspecta* 27, 1992, pp.20-39

Writings:

Calvino, Italo, *Invisible Cities*, London: Pan 1979

Benjamin, Walter, *One Way Street*, London: Verso, 1979

Borges, Jorge Luis, *Labyrinths*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964

Ishiguro, Kazuo, *The Unconsoled*, London: Faber and Faber, 1995

Other Reading:

Benevolo, Leonardo. *History of the City*. London: Scolar, 1980.

Clarke, John R. *The Houses of Roman Italy, 100 B.C. – A.D. 250: Ritual, Space and Decoration*. Berkeley: university of California Press, 1991.

Deamer, Peggy and **Ledbetter**, Lee, eds. *Ritual. The Princeton Journal*. Vol 1, 1983

Frampton, Kenneth. *Studies in Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of Construction in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Architecture*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1995.

Graves, Michael. 'A Case for Figurative Architecture,' in K. Vogel Wheeler and others eds, *Michael Graves: Buildings and Projects 1966-1981*. New York: Rizzoli, pp. 11-13

Harries, Karsten. 'Thoughts on a Non-Arbitrary Architecture,' *Perspecta* 20, 1983, pp. 9-20

Hertzberger, Herman. *Lessons for Students of Architecture*. Rotterdam: Uitgeverij 010, c1991.

Lyndon, Donlyn and **Moore**, Charles. *Chambers for a Memory Palace*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994.

Pollan, Michael. *A Place of My Own: The Education of an Amateur Builder*. London: Bloomsbury, 1997.

Periodicals:

All of the periodicals on offer in the Architecture Library but with particular focus on:

Architects' Journal
 Building Design
 Architecture Today
 Architectural Review
 El Croquis (monographs on various contemporary architects)
 Materia
 Yearbook: architecture in the Netherlands

GRADING:

The heading of each brief includes the value of the piece of work as a percentage of the year's work. Your final grade at the end of the year will be a reflection of these grades but may be moderated (by up to 10%) to reflect the overall impression of your work.

Marking Scale:

In each element of assessment, the Marks and Grades used within the University are as follows:

Extended Common Marking Scheme			
Grade	Mark	Interpretation of grade	Honours class
A1	90-100	Outstanding	1st Class
A2	80-89	Fine Work	1st Class
A3	70-79	Excellent	1st Class
B	60-69	Very Good	2:1
C	50-59	Good	2:2
D	40-49	Satisfactory	3rd Class
E	30-39	Falls short of the standard expected for a pass	Marginal Fail
F	20-29	Clear Fail	Fail
G	10-19	Bad Fail	Fail
H	0-9	Very Bad Fail	Fail

Refer to the MA (Hons) Architectural Design Programme handbook for details of the marking scale.

Students whose work is consistently 'A' or 'B' grade will be nominated for the appropriate merit certificate.

Anyone consistently achieving 'D's or below risks failing the year.

It is acceptable, and on occasions advisable, for you to improve some of your work over the year after the projects have been graded. If you choose to do so, it is better to do this at the end of each semester, over the vacation period. This should be drawn to our attention at a mutually convenient point after the vacation, or at examination time. It **may** be taken into account in determination of the final mark.

At the end of each Semester there will be a feedback session with the Course Organizer. Only on these occasions will you be given your **provisional** marks. You will be given some advice on your trajectory. This

will be a short meeting and is not intended as a feedback session on specific projects.

As a finale to the year, you must put your total year's work on display, **in portfolio form, to be examined by panels of internal and external examiners who corroborate, or otherwise, the grades that we have given you.** This display must be conscientiously put together. It may convince the respective panels to moderate the mark.

Late Submissions

The responsibility rests with you to ensure that your coursework is handed in on time. If there is a legitimate reason for not being able to meet the specified deadline for a piece of work, you should discuss with your tutor or course organiser the possibility of being given more time to complete it. Do this as soon as you become aware that you might have a problem. Do not leave it until the day of the submission deadline. An extension will only be granted on the grounds of illness or unforeseen personal circumstances. In either case you will have to supply appropriate documentation: a Medical Certificate, which should be presented to your Director of studies, a letter or email from your Director of Studies or an Illness Self-Certification Form. This form will be issued to you at the beginning of the academic year and should be used in cases of illness of up to seven days duration. It should be submitted to the Architecture Office, who will pass the information to your Director of Studies and to any outside subject affected. Please note that this form does not in itself guarantee an extension and you must still ask for this in the normal way. Without it, however, extensions on the grounds of minor illness will not be granted.

Foreseeable problems, such as computer or printer failures, difficulty in obtaining access to source material, common ailments such as colds, etc. should be allowed for in the planning of your work schedule.

Penalties - In accordance with University policy, items of coursework for which two weeks or more notice has been given, which are submitted after the specified date or, where an extension has been granted, the re-negotiated date, will be deemed to be late submissions and will be subject to a deduction of five marks for each working day up to five days; thereafter a mark of 0% will be recorded. In this event, if the coursework is submitted before feedback has been given on the assignment, it will still be recorded as a submission.

Non-submission - A mark of zero will be allocated to any item of compulsory coursework which is not submitted.

Plagiarism

Plagiarism is a serious offence against university discipline. For detailed advice on how to avoid this, please see the Architectural History/Design/Studies/M.Arch Programme Handbook or the WebCTt page for this course.

The full text of the university's policy, and a statement of the steps which the university may take in cases of plagiarism, are listed in full in the Examination Regulations and Guidelines at :

[http://www.aaps.ed.ac.uk/regulations/Plagiarism/Intro.htm#GUIDANCE FOR STUDENTS](http://www.aaps.ed.ac.uk/regulations/Plagiarism/Intro.htm#GUIDANCE_FOR_STUDENTS)

DEPARTMENTAL STAFF/STUDENT LIAISON COMMITTEE

This class should send 2 representatives to be on the Staff/Student Liaison Committee. The committee meets regularly throughout the session. It is intended to facilitate discussion between staff and students about all aspects of study, teaching methods and curricula. If you are interested in sitting on the committee, please let Claire Davies (Secretary to the Committee) know by end of Week 1.

TEACHING QUESTIONNAIRE

Towards the end of the session, there will be a structured group discussion about the quality of the course. You will also be asked to complete a questionnaire about the conduct and content of the course. Your views regarding the course are valuable guides to those conducting it. Please formulate your opinions on these matters during the session and express them in response to the questionnaire. There is a notes page at the end of this document, which may be used to compile an *aide-mémoire* for your own reference at the end of year meeting.

A questionnaire is attached at the end of this handout. You may use this either to comment on the course at any time during the academic year or to comment on the format of the questionnaire itself.

EMAIL

From time to time communication between the department and student will be by email, using the student's University account. If you use another provider, please consult your University email login page at sms.ed.ac.uk to learn how to link the two accounts.

WebCT

There is a WebCT page for this course. You can access this through My Ed (www.myed.ed.ac.uk) and use it both as a means of revising the course material and also for communication with fellow students, where necessary. NB Information will be posted here from time to time on tutorial topics and day-to-day information relating to the course. Lecture summaries and all images will be placed on WebCT as soon as possible after each lecture. We advise you to make regular checks on your WebCT sites.

HEALTH AND SAFETY

Architecture takes the issue of Health and Safety very seriously to try to minimise the risks involved in our working environment. **A separate Health and Safety handbook is issued to all building users involved in teaching and learning and users must confirm in writing that they have read and agree to act in accordance with the advice given.** The Health and Safety Officer is Alistair Craig (Workshop).

The main issue in relation to this degree programme is studio course "housekeeping". Students must clear their work from crit rooms as soon as possible after the review, must NOT leave any work (even temporarily) in fire exits and stairs, must keep studios tidy and must remove ALL work at the end of the year.

Safe working is encouraged and students must prepare risk assessments for activities not covered by the architecture risk assessments. Attendance at an annual Health & Safety seminar is a condition of late working for senior students in this degree.

The University of Edinburgh operates a no-smoking policy. It is very important that all students give full consideration to health and safety in the studios, crit rooms, and in all parts of the building. All students should familiarise themselves with the location of fire exits and the routes to them

In the studios, it is critical to maintain clear escape routes from any point to the nearest fire exit. These may be marked on the floor, or may be otherwise designated by the studio tutor. Nothing should be allowed to restrict these routes, or access to them, even for a limited period. This will sometimes be inconvenient, but **is of crucial importance to your safety.** Clutter, rubbish and paper must not be allowed to accumulate, as they pose a fire hazard. Nothing should ever be allowed to restrict access to fire extinguishers, and these must never be interfered with or moved except in the event of a fire.

Crit rooms are equally subject to these rules. Similarly, they are often through-routes for cleaners and other staff, and students must have full consideration for possible dangers represented by items on the floor, suspended from wires, involving spikes or sharp edges, etc. In all cases of installations in crit rooms, a risk assessment should be carried out, using the risk assessment checklist (with adaptations for specific projects if necessary). Note that crit rooms should be used *only* for displaying work — the construction of all pieces should be carried out in the studio or workshop. *Before* the construction of anything large or heavy is undertaken, careful thought, including an assessment of risks, should be given to how it will be moved, displayed, stored and ultimately disposed of.

Please recognise that these points are made in the interests of all users of the building. Good health and safety practices need be neither onerous nor obstructive if they are carried out continuously and routinely. Failure to comply with the regulations in this area may result in serious consequences. An appreciation of health and safety is also an important general aspect of

the design and use of all buildings, and increasingly, of any professional or managerial role.

University of Edinburgh Degree Regulations and Programmes of Study (DRPS)

This booklet should be read in conjunction with the University of Edinburgh Degree Regulations and Programmes of Study (DRPS). Great care has been taken to ensure that the contents of this booklet are correct. If, however, anything contained in it conflicts with the DRPS, the online version of that publication will be taken as the master document which is available online at <http://www.cpa.ed.ac.uk/tmp/drpspdf/>

ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN 1 2006-2007**COURSE EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE**

5 = strongly agree : 4 = agree : 3 = no strong feelings : 2 = disagree : 1 = strongly disagree

The Course as a Whole

1	The objectives of the course were clear	5	4	3	2	1
2	The course was effectively organised	5	4	3	2	1
3	The course requirements and assessment system were clear from the start	5	4	3	2	1
4	There was adequate design tutorial provision	5	4	3	2	1
5	Crits/reviews were helpful and constructive	5	4	3	2	1
6	Studio provision is congenial	5	4	3	2	1
7	The design programmes were stimulating and interesting	5	4	3	2	1
8	The introductory lectures were useful in informing the studio work	5	4	3	2	1
9	The range of tutors offered an interesting range of complimentary skills	5	4	3	2	1
10	Each project successfully built on the previous ones	5	4	3	2	1
11	Lectures were stimulating and interesting	5	4	3	2	1
12	There was enough opportunity to explore one's own ambitions	5	4	3	2	1
13	A good architectural education was offered by this course	5	4	3	2	1

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

Project	1 (all parts)	2 (cast)	4 (CAD D)	5a (object)	5b (map)	5c (retreat)	6 (live/work)
Good	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Bad	1	1	1	1	1	1	1





NOTES:

<p>M Arch Architectural Design Thesis Closure U00768 Credit Points: 40</p>
<p>Session 2006-7 Course Organiser: Dorian Wiszniewski</p> <p>Course Tutors: Liam Ross Bruce Ross</p>
<p>Tectonics in Borderlands – Borderlands in Shanghai XIV</p>
<p>“Stepping in and out of Line 3 – Circulation + Threshold”</p>
<p>City as Vestige - Vestige as Footprints - City as rhythm of Footprints</p>

thesis

Hypotheses . . .
proto-thesis . . .
thesis . . .
closure.

the signs of movement and
rhythm as urbanity is
deconstructed and
reconstructed.



Borderlands in Shanghai
Tectonics in Borderlands
Architecture in Borderlands

¹ Jean Prouve, *Pavillon du centenaire de l'aluminium*, Paris, 1954,

² Bolles-Wilson Architects, *Münster Library*, 1988-1993,

Learning Outcomes:

- An awareness of the full complexity of the contemporary urban environment and of the possibilities and problematics of architecture's interaction with it (D1, D2; CC3, CC4).
- Methods for substantiation of hypotheses into a thesis (D5)
- Production of architecture borne from critical processes of enquiry (D5; C3).
- Refined ability to critically scrutinise the physical, institutional and historical aspects of the context within which a design is proposed (D2, D5; CC3, CC4).
- The ability to develop a theoretically and historically informed thesis, within which the development of the project is grounded, and to understand its consequences across the full range of architectural scales, from the urban strategy to the detail (D1, D2; CC3, CC4).
- An enhanced understanding of the production of architecture as a relationship between individual and collective endeavour and the development of an ethos which recognises and values this (D6; C1).
- A sophisticated approach to the programmatic organisation, arrangement, and structuring of a complex architectural assemblage in a loaded contextual situation (e.g. the built, social, historical, technological and environmental contexts) (D1, D3; CC3, CC4).
- A knowledge of how to work through, at a high degree of resolution, the structural, constructional, material and environmental aspects of a complex building with reference to discussions with specialised consultants (D3, D5; T&E1, T&E2, T&E3, T&E4, T&E5, T&E6, T&E7, T&E8, T&E9, T&E10, T&E11; CC5; C1).
- An understanding of the issues relating to the question of sustainability, and its concomitant architectural, technological, environmental and urban and strategies (D2, T&E3, T&E4, T&E5, T&E6; CC5; C1).
- Highly developed technical skills (drawing, modelling, photography, use of the computer and workshop) and a critical understanding of the effects of differing forms of representation (C3).

Preface:

Remember, the enquiry into Borderlands is a question of territoriality. Borderlands are in-between conditions – areas between areas of resolute difference, areas of territorial dispute or areas formed by utter indifference. They are understood through questions of limit, connection and discontinuity, inside and outside and, although they may be political or philosophical in character, they always have architectural manifestations that have circulatory possibilities and limits. A Borderland of course may be considered a threshold condition, but, under the specific deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation strategies that the enquiry of Architecture in Borderland initiates, *Tectonics in Borderlands* takes a positive outlook and speculates into the possible architectural manifestations of new limits and thresholds that emerge from renegotiating the political and philosophical tensions in Borderland.

The Thesis Project developed through ADT O, ADT 1 and ADT 2 raises many issues concerning architecture in the urban context, *Architecture in Borderland*. ADT C has a single objective. The objective is to present the Thesis Project of ADT O, ADT 1 and ADT 2 as complete, in its own terms. Students will frame issues that either require specific further development or may arise as parallel concerns of the Thesis Project. These will range between design, philosophical, technological, environmental, cultural, political, economic, management, and presentational issues.

Introduction: Programme Overview

Borderlands in Shanghai: Semester 1 – Hypothesis

1. Brief ADO B I, *Architecture in Borderlands – Borderlands in Shanghai I, "Shanghainese Whispers"*. Prior to going to Shanghai we held a conference. This was undertaken so as to have some grounding in the physical and historical circumstances of Shanghai prior to visiting and pre-figured some possible issues for investigation, e.g. The Concession Territories, The Bund, and The Party, State and Apparatus.
2. Brief ADO B II, *Architecture in Borderlands – Borderlands in Shanghai II, Technology and Environment*. The students visited Shanghai for two weeks from 24 October to 4 November 2005 as the beginning of ADOB. The themes from the Conference were placed under five other themes co-determined by John Brennan and Dorian Wiszniewski as a way to link the

socio-politico-historical circumstances of Shanghai directly with significant environmental and technological issues: The Traditional, The Contemporary, Movement, Water and Bioregionalism.

3. Brief ADO B III, Architecture in Borderlands – Borderlands in Shanghai III, [Hypothesis 1](#), Drawing 1. The first “Drawing” (Abstract Machine) project was issued for consideration whilst in Shanghai. The first questions of “territoriality” were to be posed and framed by this project.

4. Brief ADO B IV, Architecture in Borderlands – Borderlands in Shanghai IV, [Hypothesis 2](#), Fragment 1. The first “Fragment” project was issued on return from Shanghai and after a week or so of drawing the territories under investigation. This required the design of a small intervention that would begin to pose how questions of tectonics might be framed by the confluence of territories under investigation and the techniques of representation.

5. Brief ADO B Exhibition, Architecture in Borderlands – Borderlands in Shanghai V, Exhibition. The exhibition was an opportunity to frame the emerging hypotheses for the various questions of territoriality and put them in proximity to each other.

Borderlands in Shanghai: Semester 2 – Proto-thesis

6. Brief ADT 1, Architecture in Borderlands – Borderlands in Shanghai VI, [Protothesis 1](#), Drawing 2. This was the second significant drawing stage of the thesis and opened the idea of Proto-thesis. The various ‘sketchy’ hypotheses framed during the first semester would be tested, revised, extended and substantiated over the second semester. This semester is considered a significant period of architectural research. Having moved from the concrete to the abstract in semester 1, the Proto-thesis encouraged an oscillation between the concrete and abstract through a sequence of drawings (Abstract Machines). The sequence of drawings was to culminate in the ‘active plan’ and ‘fragment’. The ‘choreographic scripting’ was a way of managing the oscillatory dynamic, encouraging a to-and-fro between site-specific issues and experimental representation techniques. The ‘active plan’ was a way of recording the many issues that constitute the Borderland. The plan, therefore, was to be more a plan of action than a plan of existing conditions. The Fragment would begin to pose not only how questions of tectonics might be framed by the confluence of territories under investigation and the techniques of representation, but also how tectonics may now contribute to the further elaboration of the developing thesis.

7. Brief ADT 1, Architecture in Borderlands – Borderlands in Shanghai VII, [Protothesis 2](#), “Line In The Sand” (The Bridge and Fragment). This project had two components – the ‘bridge’ and the ‘fragment’. The bridge provided a way to embody and prioritise all that had been researched in Architectural Design Opening B and in Architectural Design Thesis 1 through Abstract Machines 1-3. The complexities of Shanghai materiality required a concrete means by which to arrange the emerging issues. The bridge was a means to literally ‘draw lines in the sand’. What is connected to what? What is disconnected from what? How are the connections and disconnections to be made? What is to be crossed? The lines were to be seen as bridge. Bridging, breaching, passing (or not) through, over, by and between were the critical issues. Between movement and fixity is the concern of Architecture in Borderlands. The ‘Fragment’ was to be seen as part of the Bridge.

8. Brief ADT 1, Architecture in Borderlands – Borderlands in Shanghai VIII, Fragment 2, Technical Drawing. Although not seen initially to be the necessary time by which to address the technological concerns of the Thesis, this project was seen as a contribution to the Fragment project and as an investment for the forthcoming more detailed aspects of technology and environment in the first semester of March 2. The focus here was on the correspondence between building and drawing of building.

Borderlands in Shanghai: Semester 3 – Thesis

9. Brief ADT 2, Architecture in Borderlands – Borderlands in Shanghai IX, [thesis 1](#), The Matrix. Two things were asked by this brief – to prepare a taxonomy of the issues in the territories under enquiry and a briefing document for the thesis. This was done over the summer period in preparation for the new semester. It was a way of consolidating and framing the proto-thesis as thesis. The ‘matrix’ was to be generated from the intersections between a qualitative axis (a summary of all Borderland issues) and an empirical axis (measured drawings of city, territorial limits and lines [orientation and extent] of possible ‘bridges’, ‘fragments’ and building programmes).

10. Brief ADT 2, Architecture in Borderlands – Borderlands in Shanghai X, [thesis 2](#), “Stepping in and Out of Line (In The Sand)”. There were three steps to this brief. The first required a building design to be progressed. The second required a technological issue concerning the building to be developed. The third required the consolidation of the building design as informed by

the technological focus of step 2. All three steps – the building design, its own footprint and its technological imprint – were to be seen as a record of specific steps along the line in the sand through the Borderlands under enquiry.

11. Brief ADT2, Architecture in Borderlands – Borderlands in Shanghai XI, [thesis 2](#), “Design Progression Through Technology”. This brief, step 2 of “Stepping in and Out of Line”, had three aspects/movements – first, developing the proposition through research and design; second, a short technical report based on the research and design of the first movement; third, a single A0 drawing that communicates the technical resolution, materiality and environmental appropriateness of an important aspect of the building design.

Borderlands in Shanghai: Semester 4 – Thesis and Presentation

12. Brief ADT C, Architecture in Borderlands – Borderlands in Shanghai XII, [thesis closure 1](#), “The Matrix – Reloaded”. Given that the design of part of an urban composition has been significantly advanced through semester 3, the Matrix as first conceived at the end of semester 2, should need revision to accommodate all that has been learned through development of building and construction. This document should contribute to the Design Report of ADT C. However, it should also help re-frame the thesis and establish the trajectory for the final semester.

13. Brief ADT C, Architecture in Borderlands – Borderlands in Shanghai XIII, [thesis closure 2](#), “Stepping in and Out of Line (In The Sand) 2”, the Poster Project. The posters as prepared by the teaching staff over the last three semesters have been intended as a means for maintaining a hold on the varying scales between, city, territory, building and individuals. They act as diagrams, as abstract machines, to hold both the limits of territoriality but also the impetus for re-territorialising city constructions. The poster projects are the penultimate posters and penultimate diagrams for locating the projects of each student in the city.

14. Brief ADT C, Architecture in Borderlands – Borderlands in Shanghai XIV, [thesis closure 3](#), “Stepping in and Out of Line (In The Sand) 3”, Borderland in Shanghai, [Thesis Presentation](#).

Brief:

1. For presentation at 10.00 a.m. Monday 15th January in the Matthew Architecture Gallery, prepare a new diagram of the thesis in the context of all others relevant to your territorial investigations at the scale of 1:500. Use marks and codes appropriate to your own project, including the ground plan in black and white as the 1:200 Nolli plan. This should be no more than taking the work prepared for the Poster Project, Borderlands in Shanghai XIII and re-organising it as a new drawing. Be sure to liaise with all others, re-establishing old groups and new groups where appropriate. The 1:500 diagrams should be prepared as single drawings by the newly established groups. Use the gallery as a map of Shanghai to locate all drawings relative to each other at tabletop level. The gallery walls should contain all 1:200 ground plans and be referenced to the 1:500 plans.
 2. For 10.00 Monday 22nd January, prepare a drawing schedule and programme of output for the extent of semester 4. Submit this to the main office. Have the Matthew Gallery cleared by end of Friday 19th January and the plans installed in studio 4.
 3. The general presentation requirements for this semester will involve the making and presentation of all drawings and models necessary for the presentation of the thesis.
 4. 20% group model; 50% design drawings and individual models; 30% Design Report.
-
1. Design a building for Shanghai.
 2. The buildings can be designed by individuals or groups. However, the advantage to the investigation of group territories (and beyond) by individuals taking on individual buildings should be fully considered.
 3. First, prepare the brief. Prepare an extract from the Shanghai Matrix that will act as the briefing document for the building. Do not worry initially about the apparent fixity of the brief. The design of the building will challenge your first assumptions about programme mix, magnitudes and relationships.
 4. Prepare a diagram of the building footprint. This diagram should be articulated as a 1:200 model, 1:200 plans, sections and elevations within the first week of semester 1 M

Arch 2. Therefore, they will be very diagrammatic at this point. Enjoy the diagrammatic aspects of the building (see *Borderlands in Shanghai III - "The diagram and abstract machine have lines of flight that are primary, which are not phenomena of resistance or counterattack in an assemblage, but cutting edges of creation and deterritorialization"*, Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari, Chapter 5, *On Several Regimes of Signs*, in *A Thousand Plateaus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, The Athlone Press, London, 2002 (1980), pp140-141, endnote 39,

5. Subsequently challenge the footprint with detailed exploration of specific gestures through a series of 1:50 models, sections, plans and isometrics.
6. Always allow for the relationship between the building and the wider city in every presentation of the project to both designer and wider audience. Each section of the building is also a section of the city. Therefore, also challenge the footprint by placing it against the "line in the sand". Re-articulate the line as necessary.
7. Be sure to keep records of the existing and proposed circumstances at every stage for communication to tutors and a wider audience. These drawings can be quite diagrammatic initially also but they should be elucidated in due course for final presentation.
8. Keep updating the briefing document and the broader Shanghai Matrix document.
9. Keep working the appropriate city scale plan as "abstract machine".
10. Present as exhibition and portfolio of Tectonics in Borderlands and Borderlands in Shanghai the building designs for the end of semester 1.

Presentation Requirements:

As Exhibition and Portfolio for examination at 9.00 Wednesday 13th December in studio 4 (Note: there will be no reviews before examination, therefore, the work has to be exhibited with this in mind):

1. All relevant material from ADO and ADT 1.
2. 1:1000/1:500 Cartesian³ city plan of existing circumstance.
3. 1:1000/1:500 Cartesian city plan of proposed circumstances.
4. 1:1000/1:500 qualitative⁴ city plan (Active Plan).
5. 1:200/1:100 plans, sections and elevations.
6. 1:50 series of plans and sections
7. 1:50 series of models to coordinate with the 1:50 plans and sections
8. 1:100 exploded isometric.
9. 1:200 model (it may be relevant to display more than one model)
10. Building Programme brief.
11. Shanghai Matrix/Archive – The Archive should be the reworked Shanghai Matrix, which will now include an expanded section that illustrates how the building operates as part of the matrix. It should include all relevant components from the environment and technology step (2) of the building development.
12. Technology and Environment Submission (see separate handout, *Borderlands in Shanghai XI*):
 - Movement 1. Framing The Proposition:* the project summary, 3 x A4 pages.
 - Movement 2. Developing The Proposition:* a record of the technology and environment progression organized as archive and report. There is no limit to the extent of archive but the format is to be consistent with the Shanghai Matrix/Archive document. The Report is to be 10 x A4 pages.
 - Movement 3. Integrating and Communicating the Proposition:* the major output of step 2 is a drawn submission on a single A0 sheet.

Programme of Production and Reviews:

Assessment Criteria:

³ Pertaining to Descartes invoking the spatial system noted by x, y, and z coordinates, therefore, concerned with relative dimension and formal arrangement between what is solid and what is open space (void) most easily represented by black and white drawings; see images referenced by footnote 1 above.

⁴ Of a multiple dimensional character (perhaps even of a "fourth dimension", thus, all prior references to Duchamp – for example, see brief *Borderlands in Shanghai III*) that will communicate more than geometric, dimensional or formal arrangements, e.g. ideological (mental), political, material, technological and matters of light and shade – all that has been explored thus far under the title *Abstract Machine*.

Drawn, modelled and documented design studio work presented as exhibition and portfolio for assessment at the end of the course.

Urban and Building Design Project (45%)

Technology and Environment Strategy [movements 1-3] (45%)

Exhibition, Portfolio and Archive (10%)

Bibliography

Agamben, Giorgio. *Means Without End, Notes on Politics*, trans. Incenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino, *Theory out of Bounds*, Vol. 20, University of Minnesota Press, 2000.

Deplazes, Andrea (ed.), *Constructing Architecture, Materials Processes Structures, A Handbook*, Birkhauser, Basel, 2005.

Heidegger, Martin, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt, Harper & Row, New York, 1977

Shane, David Grahame, *Recombinant Urbanism, Conceptual Modelling in Architecture, Urban Design, and City Theory*, Wiley-Academy, Chichester, England, 2005.

Lagueux, Maurice, email, 25/7/2005

Comment on Leonidas Koutsoumpos' paper entitled "*Practise the practice in praxis*"

Dear Leonidas

I have read your paper attentively and I found it interesting, well written and well constructed. Linking the issue of ethics with the question of architectural education is a good idea and it might give way to original results. The main question that this reading suggests to me concerns the very notion of ethics. If I have well understood, you oppose ethics to morality by restricting the couples good/bad and right/wrong (which imply value judgments) to morality and associate ethics with the notions of custom and praxis. Naturally this depends of what is included in the Aristotelian notion of praxis, but it seems clear to me that the Aristotelian Ethical tradition includes a reference to the couples good/bad and right/wrong. Actually, the distinction between ethics and morality is far from being established in a standard fashion. It seems to me that, usually enough, morality is associated with the *characterisation* of behaviour as good or bad, whereas ethics refer to a more theoretical analysis of the *foundations* of such value judgments (something which is not too far from what you call metaethics by the end of your paper. But, as I said, this way to characterise matters has no authoritative value; many authors can decide to present the distinction otherwise. MacIntyre, which I had never read before two weeks ago, but that I read since then very partially (my reading being limited to chapter 14, "The nature of virtue" in *After Virtue*) defines virtue as a practice, but, by the end of this chapter 14, he insists to claim that the notion of practice is not sufficient to characterise virtue, all practices being not necessarily virtuous.

But if morality and architecture cannot be severed so radically, it might be problematic to present — as you do by the end of the second page (and the beginning of the third) of your four-pages paper — morality as "external to the practice of design education" and ethics as internal to it. I will come back below on the internal/external question, but I observe first that this radical distinction might raise some doubts about the idea according to which, in a Wittgensteinian perspective, morality would "remain under the sceptical thread of silence" whereas ethics could be object of showing. I am not an expert of Wittgenstein, but it seems to me that you are quite right to claim that, from a Wittgensteinian point of view, ethics (if understood as pure custom or praxis) can be communicated (in education) through showing, whereas morality might be reduced to silence. However, this claim supposes that what is called *ethics* has nothing to do with the question of good and bad, a point which, as I said, seems very doubtful to me.

I found quite interesting and appropriate the relation that you established and illustrated between "the design studio, the music class and the dojo" and I have nothing to object to it. But, here again, the question is what is implied in the "communication of Ethics embodied in the educational practice". Let us consider the dojo, for example. If the ethics involved concerns the proper way to combat, including the respect of the adversary, the importance of developing through this practice a better way of life characterised by the sense of justice, equity, respect and self-control, etc., you are right to say that these virtues can be acquired through the practice considered as the key of learning from a master, but such a view (which oppose what is good to what is bad) would be hardly compatible with your radical distinction between morality and ethics; such an ethics would be clearly related to the couples good/bad and right/wrong and it

would imply value judgments. In contrast, if the ethics involved concerns only the efficient way to combat and to win (which can be also acquired through practice after all), then the radical distinction between ethics and morality would be maintained, but, according to me, at the expense of what is the essential character of ethics.

A judo champion does not necessarily behave in a more ethical way than the debutant who lose frequently for being less apt in mastering the sophisticated techniques of judo. If the champion developed very sophisticated ways to cheat without being observed by the referee and the spectators (or by using a quite undetectable drug), it would be odd to present his perfect mastery of these morally reprehensible techniques as the mark of ethical standards much superior to those mastered by the honest debutant. You may argue that such behaviour would be external (in MacIntyre's sense) to the practice of judo, but I take this example only to emphasise the fact that ethical considerations can hardly be severed from considerations about what is good or bad. In fact, we may forget cheating and simply come back to my first presentation of the matter: "A [honest] judo champion does not necessarily behave in a more ethical way than the [equally honest] debutant who lose frequently for being less apt in mastering the sophisticated techniques of judo". Similarly, compare an architect who has developed through practice exceptional technical skills allowing him/her to build the most sculpturally remarkable buildings, with a colleague whose buildings are more simply built partly because this latter architect is not so crafted and imaginative than the first one and partly because he/she is primarily guided by the goal of fully satisfying what is judged by him/her as the most valuable need of the customer and the public. Could we really say that the former is necessarily superior to the latter from an *ethical* point of view?

Finally, I would like to come back to the internal/external distinction. I thank you very much for having drawn my attention to MacIntyre views that I just had time to examine very summarily during the last days. I found them quite interesting, but not really identical to my use of a similar distinction. For MacIntyre, it is the good, or one could say, as far as I can see, the value which is targeted by a practice which is internal or external to it. As he said, prestige, monetary gains to be obtained by an adequate practice of an activity are external to it, whereas the perfect mastery of this practice is internal. From this point of view, for the reasons briefly evoked above when I referred to the end of chapter 14, I am far from being sure that considerations about the moral goodness or badness of a practice would be considered by him as external to this practice.

As for my own distinction, it concerns the ethical problems raised by an activity: those problems will be said internal to this activity if their solution is part of what make this activity successful. To illustrate its meaning in a context which is more closely related to education, which interests you particularly, I will present the matter in the following way. Suppose that three young students are arrived at the point where they have to engage in University studies. One of them wants to go in science (either physics or biology), a second one wants to become a painter and the third one an architect. All of them are extremely ambitious and they want to excel in their domain, to obtain prizes, to be praised by most people and, why not, to be recognized as one of the great genius of the century. Each of them asks to a very experimented person what one has to do to realize such a dream. The person answers to the future scientist that the point is to manage in such a way that well tested knowledge be increased and a lot of phenomena be explained in a way which is perfectly compelling and which resists fairly well to both theoretical

and empirical objections. The young asks then whether it is essential to bother about ethical consequences of eventual discoveries; the answer is that it is desirable that the consequences be fine for humanity, but that, insofar as the question concerns success in the scientific career, this dimension is unessential; ethical problems remain external to the successful practice of science. The consulted person answers to the future painter that the point is to produce highly original works which can contribute to the aesthetic experience of human beings and allow them the possibility of increasing their sensible perception of the world. To a similar question concerning ethical consequences of works of art to be produced, the answer is similar, while more nuanced: it is desirable that these works respond to the aesthetical needs of human beings and also contribute to their general well-being, but this remains a secondary and not universally accepted consideration; ethical problems remain largely external, and according to many theoreticians, totally external to the practice of arts other than architecture; painters can experiment in all directions without inquiring first whether their works contribute really to improve (from a moral point of view) the quality of life of human beings or whether they might have negative consequence on this quality of life. In contrast, the consulted person answers to the future architect, that it is essential to design buildings which can improve the quality of life of their future inhabitants and even of the general public; good architects should make a major contribution not only to the aesthetic satisfaction of these people, but they must manage in such a way that their way of life be improved, and that they are in some way induced to adopt a good life (even from a moral point of view). If these buildings provoke hostile, depressive or even anti-equalitarian feelings in the population, the architects might be blamed and lose all chances to be considered as one of the greatest architects. Those ethical problems are internal to the practice of architecture in the sense that architects have not the right to ignore them or even to leave their solutions to other specialists.

I conclude by attempting a comparison of my distinction with MacIntyre's, even if I might have to reconsider this comment later, given the limitations of my knowledge of MacIntyre's works. MacIntyre's distinction and mine are not designed to answer the same kind of question. The former aims to characterise what is virtuous, and a first step in this direction is to claim that virtues are to be located in practices. But practices must be clearly characterised themselves and, for that, it is important to determine what is included in the definition of a practice: advantages or disadvantages more or less accidentally associated with this practice remain *external* to it. Only what is essential (including goods to be attained through this practice) to its correct characterisation are said to be *internal*.

My goal is much more limited. I do not pretend to define virtue or practice. I aim rather to compare, from the point of view of moral responsibility, architecture and other intellectual activities like other arts and science. The practice of all these activities may have moral (or ethical) consequences, which raise moral (or ethical) problems for those who practice them. I claim that, in architecture, a satisfactory solution to those problems is clearly a condition of success, whereas it is in no way the case in science, and it is the case only in a very partial and discussable way in other arts. If my point of view is transposed at a sufficiently high level of abstraction, where the solution of an ethical problem is characterised as a good (in MacIntyre's meaning of this word), and where architecture and other arts are characterised as practices, it would be possible to say, in the wording of MacIntyre, that such a good is internal to the practice of architecture since architecture correctly understood requires it. However, it would be

difficult to deal with the case of other arts in MacIntyre language, since from this point of view, their situation is not clear-cut and, in contrast with my distinction, MacIntyre's one was designed to define the very nature of a practice, a situation which may render it less appropriate for characterising cases like the one concerning ethics in arts like literature, painting and music. Indeed, when it comes to these arts, it is much more difficult to say whether a "good" like the solution of ethical problems is (strictly speaking) internal or external to the practice of these arts. In other word, it seems to me that my distinction makes more room for differences of degree (in contrast with differences of nature) than MacIntyre's one does. But, may be, will I change my mind on this point after a more complete reading of *After Virtue*.

To conclude, I would say that your thesis project is quite stimulating and interesting. The comparison between architecture, music and martial arts is promising, but the whole thing is made problematic by a too purely "matter of fact" characterisation of ethics. In other words, ethics lose its proper meaning if it is stripped from (moral) value questions or, alternatively, those questions are surreptitiously reintroduced in it, a situation that tends to create some confusion. But is it necessary for your thesis to define ethics in such a way and to isolate it totally from moral questions concerning what is good or bad? I don't think so; architectural behaviour oriented towards the improvement of good life can also be learnt by the way of praxis, like the moral behaviour of the judoka (including the development of a better way of life characterised by the sense of justice, equity, respect and self-control, etc.) can be learned, I suppose, through a well guided practice of this art.

Maurice Lagueux

Dear Leonidas

I have read your paper with great interest. I found that it shows that you have a sense of the central theses of important philosophical theories, a sense that we rarely meet by architects. I also appreciate very much the way you draw philosophical relevant considerations from concrete examples like those concerning a student in architecture and a naïve builder, and the one concerning the two climbers. Though I say below why I find a bit odd the way you use the distinction internal-external, I think that you have very well understood my distinction when you expose it for itself and I think also that you present in a very clear fashion MacIntyre's distinction.

In fact, I think that I saw essentially one problem in your paper, though a central one, and it is related to the distinction you make between morality and ethics, a distinction that you push very far by saying that “the *morality* and *ethics* do not just differ in degree or quality but in nature”, this distinction being still more complicated by the fact that you also treat Ethics as a global concept which include ethics “(Ethics = ethics + morality)». As I said, I have also some reservations about your use of the internal-external distinction, but it concerns essentially its association with the problematic ethics-moral distinction. I am sure that you are not surprised by my concern about the latter distinction, because, as it is clearly shown by your own analysis of the English dictionaries and philosophical works on ethics, this distinction is far from being clear, and various authors have developed their own way of slightly distinguishing these words in ways that are frequently incompatible. More generally they are considering these two terms as almost synonyms. According to me, they differ only by the fact that morality points more immediately in the direction of concrete problems about what is good and bad, whereas ethics points more to a theoretical-critical analysis of the reasons why behaviour is characterised as good or bad; but such a quasi-distinction is more or less personal and far from being universal.

I do not see clearly why you find appropriate and useful to oppose them as normative vs descriptive. You mention yourself a traditional definition of ethics: “*Ethics* in architecture is the knowledge concerned with the normative evaluation of the design actions as good or bad ». For sure, you may have good reasons to rather define concept in a non-standard way, but I think that more justification would be required to avoid some possible confusions. It is true that you observe frequent circles in the definitions of morality and ethics, but this

awkward fashion of defining them does not justify a definition that void ethics from its relation to evaluation of good and bad which always made the specificity of this concept, at least in English or in French. In fact, the whole matter is made more perplexing by the fact that *you often refer to the normative dimension of ethics*. For example, you describe MacIntyre view on the question by saying that “Ethics may be identified as emphasizing ‘the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism)”, and you do not seem to reject this view.

The decision of defining ethics the way you did has curious consequences; for example, you say: “ALL Questions about architecture would be ethical”. Does this mean that no questions in architecture raised issues about good and bad? Remark, that this does not exclude that you say quite interesting things about *what you call* ethics in its relation to *what you call* morality. For example, the following paragraph in which the relation social-individual is quite interestingly related to the above distinction:

“One could say that the evaluative character of *morality* can be related both, to social environment on the one hand, because it forms, constitutes and uses codes and systems of judging human interaction and the relationships and to individual persons on the other hand, since they are the agents of the evaluation. At the same time *ethics* can be related to the social environment creating the tradition and the mechanisms that inherit the ways that things take place, and the individuals since they are the ones that carry the dispositions and the pre-accepted customs that form their life.”

However, I have some concerns about the way you associate the oddly named distinction between morality and ethics with the internality-externality distinction when you say: “*morality* is referring to a notion of *externality* (morality-externality), while *ethics* is referring to a notion of *internality* to a practice (ethics-internality). I am not convinced by the argument on which this association is based: “*ethics* have a descriptive character concerning the customs, the dispositions and principles that guide individuals through the practices of everyday life and for this they are related to the internal goods to these practices, the ones that are achieved by participating *in* a specific practice. At the same time the schema suggests that *morality*, since it is concerned with the evaluation of actions and characters as good or bad according to a rule, is related mainly with the *external* goods to a practice.”

I understand very well why you say that the moral issues that you described as raised in the practice of climbing are absolutely “*external* to the practice of climbing” [in MacIntyre’s sense, not mine]. Indeed “The same issues would rise no matter if Joe and Simon would travel around to practice football, chess or architecture. The moral problems would remain the same and would have to deal in a way that is *external* to the specific practice. Being ‘good climbers’ would not really help them solve these kinds of problem.”. But why do you associate ethics and internality? Your argument seems to hold in the following statement: “ethics’ has a *descriptive* character *internal* to it” (my emphasis) But is it sufficient to associate ethics and internality? On the one hand, if you mean that, by the very fact of being descriptive, ethics essentially describes something that is the practice considered itself, and then is necessarily internal in the sense according to which a correct description can hardly be separable from what is described — a sense of “internal” which does not seem to be either MacIntyre’s either mine — the problem of the definition of ethics remains because ethics would be, by definition, nothing but a description of any practice, which sounds to me a rather odd and arbitrary definition of ethics. On the other hand, if you include a larger content in the notion of ethics, ethics (or what is associated with it) should not remain internal in the latter sense. And it could not be internal in my sense since my sense concerns only «ethical problems» that might be either internal or external to a practice. It cannot be internal neither in MacIntyre’s, as far as I understand it, because ethics (whether descriptive or normative) is not a good to be realised by the very nature of the practice. It is true that you probably does not mean that ethics *as such* is internal, since in your application to architecture, that “the customs, the dispositions and principles that guide architects during the everyday practicing of their art and profession... the techniques... the pre-accepted principles” are internal to architecture. But what do we gain by saying that what characterises (or describes) architecture is internal to it? I found MacIntyre’s distinction important, because it concerns *goods (or moral values)* which are aimed by a practice, and because it is implied that some of these goods (evaluated by the those who practice something) are internal to the practice and other external.

You have very well exposed both my distinction and MacIntyre’s one, and at some point you came very close to associate our respective meaning of “external” in a fine way in the following passage: “Nevertheless what I want to show with these descriptions is that all these very important Ethical issues are absolutely *external* to the practice of climbing. The same issues would rise no matter if Joe and Simon would travel around to practice football, chess or

architecture. The moral problems would remain the same and would have to deal in a way that is *external* to the specific practice. Being ‘good climbers’ would not really help them solve these kinds of problem” In fact, you use MacIntyre’s kind of examples illustrating that realising a good or bad action may not be internal to some practice since it is not a specific part of it, and you do this for discussing a problem of the type I am discussing, namely, ethical (or moral) *problems raised* by a particular practice: the problem is external in the sense that it is not (except in the case of architecture and, to a lesser degree, of a few other activities) the competence of those who practice a speciality which can help to solve such problems: “Being ‘good climbers’ would not really help them solve these kinds of problem”

However, the essential difference between my distinction and MacIntyre’s one is that mine concerns the solution of (ethical) problems, whereas MacIntyre’s concerns the (ethical) goals (presented as goods) that are aimed (looked for) in action. For me, it is problems which are internal or external to a practice; for MacIntyre, it is goods which are internal or external to a practice. But naturally this does not exclude to put both approach in relations as you did.

May be I can mention one sentence of your text which was not clear for me:

What is the meaning of “ In these terms ethics provided an un-challenged, un-discussed and *un-chosen* identity to the building that the man was constructing and ultimately to the man himself ». In what sense can ethical provide to a building such an identity (un-challenged, un-discussed and *un-chosen*)?

It might be interesting also to clarify the meaning of “good” in “his action was *good* because it was incorporating all his unchallenged beliefs about what is a house and how one makes an addition to it.”. Does “good” mean: “naively perceived as good” or “adequate, given the means available” or “meritorious” or something else?

Before answering your specific questions, let me mention, in case it might be useful, the very few typos I have noted in your paper, but given my limited mastery of English, it might be due to my mistaken reading:

that (i) what **me** do to

in this more restricted **and** sense

so far, **accpted** as axioms

the base of the mountain **they** two friends

Finally, I may try to answer your questions.

I am far from being a specialist of Greek philosophy, and my knowledge of Ethical works of Aristotle are mostly based on my vague souvenir of my student's year very far ago, except for chapters 5, 8 and 9 of *Nichomachean Ethics*, because I wrote with somebody else a paper in French about Justice and Friendship by Aristotle. I think that the concept of *praxis* is mostly used in the Ethics and in Politics, but I could not be more precise without doing a research work with books from library, since I have even not at home a sufficiently reliable edition of *Nichomachean Ethics*. Actually, I did not develop anything important in my comments to you concerning the use of the word *praxis* by Aristotle. I did not say, as far as I remember, that he himself refers to the couple good/bad. I think that I just observed that *praxis*, in contrast with *poiesis*, *technè* and *theoria*, is, to some extent, related to ethical (or moral) issues. As you have very clearly exposed in your paper, "For the Greeks, *praxis* in contrast to *technè*, is an activity involving judgement. It is the making of ethical decisions by the exercise of *phronesis* ..., that is, 'practical reasonableness', acting by way of tacit understanding gained from the experience and within a context of ethical behaviour, by which was meant behaviour that is conducive to the well-being of oneself and others." (Note, by the way, that you refer to "ethical decisions" and "ethical behaviour" which implies that ethics is not purely descriptive since "ethical" qualify a certain type of decision, or of behaviour; it is true that an ethics may *describe* such decisions or behaviour, but *characterising* them as "ethical" implies that other decisions and behaviour are "unethical", the word "ethical" being taken then in a sense which has nothing to do with description). In any case, to come back to my main point, I rather refer to the Aristotelian *tradition* which generally used the concept in a sense that is related to good and bad. The most famous example would be Marx by whom *praxis* has very much to do with a morally (in spite of Marx's disgust for this word) acceptable type of society. Another example would be MacIntyre himself to whom you refer in your paper in a relevant way: "MacIntyre (who finds himself continuing the Aristotelian Ethical tradition) calls *practice*, as the main concept that allows Ethics through *virtues* to manifest themselves."

In any case, you are quite right to say that I do not propose a very strict definition of what is practice. In fact, I did not give any one, because when I used this word, I just meant the fact of practicing one of the activities that I considered in my paper: architecture, physics, painting, novel writing, etc.).

Concerning your question on MacIntyre, your statements do not seem incorrect when I read them, but as I said, I never read anything from MacIntyre, before last July when I read his

chapter on virtue in order to answer you. Neither I have bought his book for my home library, which is (especially since I move from my office to home office) overcrowded by books on architecture, economics, and philosophy of the social sciences, etc. Here again, I am sorry not to be more helpful to you.

Be that as it may, I hope that these few remarks might be of some utility.

Maurice Lagueux

The Politics of Making

Edited by Mark Swenarton, Igea Troiani
and Helena Webster

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The Flute and the House

Doing the architecture of making

Leonidas Koutsoumpos

Introduction

The title of the 2006 AHRA conference, *The Politics of Making: Theory, Practice, Product*, seems to adopt the established Aristotelian categories and, moreover, the correspondence of the conference's three strands (divided into Theory, Practice and Product) with the three basic types of Aristotelian knowledge,¹ makes this standpoint explicit. In terms of these categorical distinctions, according to David Ross,² the science of Politics, for Aristotle, is divided into two folds: *ethics* and *politics*. Ethics refer to the appropriate way of life of the individual, while politics refer to the social interaction between individuals. Nevertheless, Ross also suggests that the two folds in Aristotle are intertwined: ethics are social and politics are ethical.³ Nikolaus Lobckowicz argues further that Aristotle's philosophical analysis of political life is also responsible for the contemporary understanding of the term *practice* as *doing* and subsequently to the understanding of theory as an opposing pole.⁴ Under this light, the title of the conference makes an implicit identification of *architecture as a form of 'making.'*

This chapter will discuss the origins of this affiliation, will challenge the above categories and will argue for the possibility of seeing architecture *as a form of 'doing.'* By revisiting Aristotle's Ethical writings, I will focus on the relationship between 'doing' and 'making' in the context of architecture and I will discuss the problematic of this distinction. Finally, the chapter will discuss the *ethical dimension of politics* as it appears in the realm of architecture and will emphasise the importance of 'doing,' especially in architectural design education.

Making and doing; *praxis* and *poēsis*; the house and the flute

The analysis of the ethics of politics in the context of architecture will focus on line 1140a 1 of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* where he makes a very interesting comment concerning *architecture as a form of making*:

Hence the rational quality concerned with *doing* is different from the rational quality concerned with *making*; nor is one of them a part of the other, for doing is not a form of making, nor making a form of doing. ... Now *architectural skill*, for instance, is an art. ... But as doing and making are distinct, it follows that Art, being concerned with making, is not concerned with doing [my italics].⁵

In the original text, one reads instead of 'doing,' the ancient Greek term *praxis* (πράξις) and instead of 'making,' the term *poēsis* (ποίησις). The refined distinction between the two ancient Greek terms is not easily rendered in the English language,⁶ but the difference between the words 'doing' and 'making' comes as close as possible.

Aristotle several times opposes *praxis* to *poēsis*⁷ basing his argument on the difference of the aim or end (*telos*) of each activity. In this perspective, *poēsis* or 'making' aims at an end different from the act of 'making,' while the end of *praxis*, or 'doing,' is nothing else but the very act of 'doing' itself. *Praxis* and *poēsis* are two of three kinds of activities (*energeia*) which are, according to Aristotle, in order of importance: *theoria*, *poēsis* and *praxis*. Quite often *praxis* and *poēsis* have been conflated and seen as dual aspects of one side of a coin, the opposite side of which is considered to be *theoria*, meaning theory or contemplation. Elsewhere,⁸ I have discussed the problems of seeing practice and theory in contrast and not in relation to each other, arguing that the operations of *praxis* and *theoria* are, in reality, inextricable. *Theoria* is not in any way a set of rules or laws that prescribe practice in advance, but it is participation in it.⁹

Aristotle uses the term *praxis* in order to generally refer to activities of various forms of life. Nevertheless, he refers mainly to the life of the free man and the actions taken in political and ethical life, especially the sciences and arts. In ancient Greece the term *praxis* did not have the same meaning as it has in our times. Nowadays, *praxis* is usually affiliated with the mere application of abstract ideas, rules and principles preconceived by theory. However, such a meaning would, in ancient Greece, have been signified by the term *technē*. *Praxis* was in fact an autonomous activity achieved in accomplishing the very action in itself, without aiming at a goal that is distinct from the action. As Richard Coyne and Adrian Snodgrass put it:

For the Greeks, *praxis* in contrast to *technē*, is an activity involving judgment. It is the making of ethical decisions by the exercise of *phronesis* ..., that is, 'practical reasonableness', acting by way of tacit understanding gained from the experience and within a context of ethical behaviour, by which was meant behaviour that is conducive to the well-being of oneself and others.¹⁰

The term *poēsis* is analysed by Aristotle in a separate book, the famous *Poetics*. A central concept in his understanding of the various arts is the term *mimēsis*, the idea that all arts are ways of some kind of imitation. In this book Aristotle refers mainly to tragedy, play, music and the various kinds of poetry, making only minor comments on

arts like painting and sculpture and unfortunately he does not make a single reference to architecture. Despite not making explicit reference to architecture in *Poetics*, Aristotle often invoked the activity of building a house as an example of *praxis* in his various ethical treatises. Especially in *Magna Moralia*, his minor (despite the title) work on ethics, he gives a very interesting example of the difference between *praxis* and *poēsis*. In line 1211b 27 Aristotle gives the art of building as an example of 'making' in contrast to flute-playing as an example of 'doing':

... in some [sciences] the end and the activity are the same, and there is not any other end beyond the activity; for instance, to the flute player the activity and end are the same (for to play the flute is both his end and his activity); but not to the art of housebuilding (for it has a different end beyond the activity) ...¹¹

In this example, Aristotle suggests that the art of building is a form of 'making' because the end of the activity is something different from the activity itself. Building a house is a *poēsis* because there is an aim – the production of the house – that stands beyond the building activity itself. Moreover, building a house cannot be regarded as a finished action before the outcome, the house itself, is finished. On the other hand Aristotle suggests that playing the flute is a form of 'doing,' because there is no end beyond the activity of mere playing. The pressing of one's fingertips against the holes of the flute is *praxis* because the activity produces no obvious physically tangible outcome, like in the case of building a house. For this reason Aristotle implies that one can stop playing the flute at any time without leaving something incomplete.



Playing the flute
(*praxis*) and building
a house (*poēsis*).

Architecture in-between *making* and *doing*

All of the above categorisations seem to provide a solid body of thought until the point that one tries to fit architecture (in its contemporary understanding) into this scheme. At first glance it appears obvious that, according to the previous categories, architecture is on the side of *poēsis*, as an art of 'making,' close to the activity of building the house. But upon closer observation things are not so straightforward.

First of all, architecture today is very far from being simply the activity of building a house. From the Renaissance onwards, the architect has increasingly come to be seen to operate beyond the level of the builder. The architect became an educated person whose skills and knowledge were acquired not in the construction site or the Lodges of the Free Masons, but in specialised schools.¹² *Academia Platonica*, *Académie Royale d'Architecture*, *École Polytechnique*, *École Royale des Beaux Arts*, Bauhaus, Illinois Institute of Technology, Cooper Union, Architectural Association are maybe the most important stops in the journey of architectural education over the last 500 years that has consolidated and reinforced the differentiation of the architect from the builder.

Architecture, as part of the process of this journey, has developed its own theory; texts that try to find the appropriate language to narrate a meaning for the 'building of houses.' More and more, architecture has been associated with the creation of spatial *representations*¹³ which will actually be built later by someone else, rather than the straightforward action of 'building' the house itself. But the question still remains: 'is architecture a form of *praxis* or *poēsis*?'; 'do we *do architecture* or *make architecture*?'; 'is the activity of architecture (as a verb) closer to building a house or playing the flute?'

According to the Aristotelian definitions, the answer should be found at the production of an outcome. As I mentioned above, if there is a production of an artefact, then this is not the building (or generally the space) itself; it is, rather, the representation of the space that an architect creates. The architect's job is to create conventional drawings: plans, sections, elevations, as well as models (physical and – nowadays – digital) and images or videos that describe space. But beyond that, architects also produce texts, either to accompany their images or to create technical reports, and sometimes they create texts narrating the history of the buildings of the past or even theories on how architecture should be built or how we should understand what architecture is. According to this description of architectural production, architecture appears to be a form of *poēsis*, but still one could ask: 'is this not the case of the musician?' Does not the musician produce artefacts like musical scores or texts about music or even material evidence of music such as tapes, LPs or CDs? An argument against this view could be that this is the job of the composer and maybe not of the virtuoso of the flute. In this case, one could argue that the job of the architect is equal to that of the composer who is the 'mastermind' behind the music: both roles consist in creating something new, something that did not exist before it was thought and then put down on paper.

But if creation is simply the ideas that come into one's mind, then the material artefacts that are the outcome of such a creative process are just coincidental appearances that simply help one to remember ideas. Indeed, it is perfectly possible to imagine an architect with a great memory and developed organisational skills having a vision of a building and being able to supervise the construction without having to draw up plans. In this case, the architectural outcome that is actually created is not the material products of the architect's job, but the thoughts that he creates about the final product, the building (or the real space generally). Consequently, this means that architecture is *praxis* and not *poēsis*, since the products of its outcome are purely coincidental.

A more complicated argument, according to the Aristotelian definitions, has to do with the existence of an aim, or *telos*, that is beyond the activity itself. Again, in the case of architecture, it originally seems to relate to *poēsis*, since it aims at an outcome that is beyond the mere thinking of it or the action of drawing lines on a paper (or, nowadays, clicking a mouse on a mouse pad, or maybe in the future, gesturing in front of a screen). One could say that this aim is the outcome of the building that the architect imagines in a specific place that is going to be erected. Every drawn line represents more than the line itself, aiming to or inferring a wall, a window or a piece of specific technical information about the creation of the building.

Similarly, then, the playing of the flute aims at something that goes beyond the mere pressing of one's fingertips against the flute's holes. The flute player aims for



Model of Tatlin's
Monument for the
3rd Communist
International.

the creation of a certain atmosphere, the re-creation of the whole of the piece of music. Contrary to what Aristotle argues, when the flutist finishes playing a concert, something has been created through the ears of the audience, in their heart or their mind and this thing they carry with them on their way back home.¹⁴ Moreover, if the flutist stops playing in the middle of the song then one feels the incompleteness in the same sense as when a wall is left half built.

Furthermore, suggesting that architecture always aims for spatial realisation is simply not true. Very often architectural projects are left as drawings without losing any of their importance or glamour. For example, most architects know Tatlin's monument tower for the 3rd International (see figure on p. 109), despite that no one has actually really visited it, as it was never realised physically. Again, one could say that it could actually have been built in Petrograd, as originally designed, and certainly Tatlin would have been very happy to see his vision realised. But again, there are other architects who have never really intended or cared about the actual realisation of their projects. Etienne-Louis Boullée, Claude-Nicolas Ledoux, most of Futurists and Constructivists architects, as well as contemporary architects like Zaha Hadid and Greg Lynn, have an ambiguous relationship with making their spaces real. Does this mean that they are just *doing* architecture without *making* it?

Finally, one could wonder how playing the flute can be a mere *praxis* when it has a poetic effect on people, makes them feel inspired, takes them to a world of emotions and dreams. Similarly, how can the building of a house be related to *poēsis* when it is restricted by the mundane and practical implications of client needs, construction details and planning permissions? All these arguments and questions presented above challenge the straightforward connection of architecture to *poēsis* and the activity of *making*, providing at the same time an opening from where one could imagine architecture as *praxis* and the activity of *doing*.

Architectural design education, in-between *praxis* and *poēsis*

Stepping backwards for a moment, in order to see the wider concept of Politics, I feel that the question that underlies the chapters in this book is: 'how shall we *make* architecture in the context of twenty-first-century politics?' Here, I wish to argue that the *ethics of politics* in architecture cannot take place away from the practical aspects of creation. Particularly in architectural education, the wider question transforms¹⁵ into a more specific one: 'how shall we *teach* architecture under the conditions of twenty-first-century politics?'

Undoubtedly, answering this question involves the reappraisal of the metaphorical journey of architectural education over time that I already mentioned. In order to envision the education of the twenty-first century one has to understand what happened to architectural education of the twentieth century and even further back in the past in order to meet the Aristotelian philosophical origins; not as separate, disconnected stops, but rather as interlinked continuities. Nevertheless, such a detailed

study is beyond the scope of this chapter, so here, I can only give a hint, as an example, about the romantic revisiting of the Gothic by Ruskin and the influence that this had on the development of design education during the modern movement.¹⁶ Interrelations like this build a web whose threads allow us to grasp links and continuities in a wide spectrum of the history of design education, in order to project the future.

Having this historic framework in mind, I will focus on an important contemporary thinker, that emphasises the ethical link between architecture and its education: Alberto Perez-Gomez and his paper entitled 'Ethics and Poetics in Architectural Education.'¹⁷ Perez-Gomez, in his overall theoretical work and in this paper specifically, argues against the traditional techno-romantic request for ready-to-work practitioners. His reference to poetics is made explicit through a metaphor that suggests that *architecture is like a poem*,¹⁸ because it occurs *in* experience. A poem's meaning, like architecture's meaning, is inseparable from the experience of the poem itself. In another analogy that refers to poetics, Perez-Gomez says that 'Architectural beauty, like erotic love, burns itself into our soul; it inspires fear and reverence through a "poetic image," one that affects us primarily through our vision, and yet is fully sensuous, synaesthetic ...'¹⁹ Subsequently, architectural theory is 'rooted in mythic or poetic stories'²⁰ and its main concern is ethical, 'with its purpose being to find appropriate language (in the form of stories) capable of modulating a project in view of ethical imperatives, always specific to each task at hand.'²¹ Theory in this sense is related to a critical thinking that is often underestimated by 'pragmatic practitioners that prioritize training for work over critical thinking in school ... [who contribute] significantly toward denying architecture, from the inside, its potential ethical ground.'²²

The way that Perez-Gomez uses the terms *poēsis* and *praxis* deliberately lacks the established Aristotelian categorical distinction. This fact is even explicit when he says that '[o]nce a modern philosophical theory is understood as being primarily driven by ethics, as practical philosophy in the tradition of Aristotle's *phronesis*, *techne* – *poesis* or practice appears as process, as a fully embodied, personal engagement with the crafts.'²³ His reference to *phronesis*, or practical wisdom, brings architecture to a critical point of conciliation between *praxis* and *poēsis* that allows the two terms to meet beyond their categorical differences. Nevertheless, *poēsis* seems to be privileged in Perez-Gomez's overall argument.²⁴

Here, I would like to stress the importance of *praxis* in architectural education. Although I agree with Perez-Gomez's overall argument that architectural education should go beyond the simplistic demand for professional practice, I believe that *praxis* provides even stronger armour to fight against such techno-romantic views. *Praxis*, as Perez-Gomez acknowledges, is much more than technical expertise: 'it concerns values, articulated through the stories that ground acts and deeds in particular culture. This *practical wisdom* is usually of the order of oral transmission, rather than of textual information.'²⁵

Nevertheless, *phronesis* comes directly from the Ethical discourse of *praxis*²⁶ and it relates to a wisdom that stands beyond scientific operations and technical skills. Standing in the middle of the climax of the Aristotelian intellectual

**The design studio as
place of *praxis*.**




virtues,²⁷ *phronesis* keeps the balance between the practical logic and the theoretical intuition. Recently, philosophers like Hans Georg Gadamer and educationists like Shaun Gallagher²⁸ have emphasised the role that *phronesis* can play in interpersonal understanding and interpretation. For this, as I have argued elsewhere,²⁹ the role that *phronesis* can play in the design studio is critical in order to understand it as the primary locus of ethics in architectural conduct.

Another critical term that can be adopted from the arsenal of *praxis* is that of *eupraxia*. *Eupraxia* is a step beyond the *mere doing*, referring to the notion of *doing something well*.³⁰ This action that refers to a notion of 'properness,' allows the uplifting of the simplest activity, like building a wall, or drawing a line (see figure opposite) to a level of creativity that allows the exercise of a skill that goes beyond the skill itself into the realm of appropriateness. This notion of appropriateness is very close to what Donald Schön suggest as 'skilfulness' that becomes part of the routine of doing something well.³¹ For this, *eupraxia* as an aim sets in motion a personal ethos that is closely connected to *phronesis*. While at the same time the developing and application of *phronesis* results in doing something well, which is *eupraxia*.

Furthermore, the *phronetic* procedure of *doing architecture as practice*³² retains issues of ethics that, by definition (*ethos* = addiction), are implicit in having to do with customs, dispositions and the way that usually things take place in practice. For this, architectural education is not just a marginal area of architectural conduct, an introductory preparation for the 'real' practice that will follow up. The design studio, in particular, the core of architectural education, becomes an extremely important place where the customs and the dispositions will be acquired and form the basis of *phronesis* that will accompany all the other future areas of architectural conduct.

The *praxis* of drawing a line can reach such a point of 'skill' that can refer to *eupraxia* (doing well).



Apart from this implicit notion of ethics, there is another aspect equally important that is explicit and allows us to return to the wider concept of Politics. Architecture as *praxis* through *eupraxia*, constantly strives to become aware of its customs and dispositions in order to become better. *Doing* architecture is an ethical action that implies drawing lines 'properly,' by operating within this framework of dispositions. So educating the architecture of *doing* means to be aware that every single line plays a political role in establishing 'real' boundaries³³ and, by drawing it, one has to take the responsibility for doing so.

Conclusions

There are still a number of questions that this chapter has opened up but not resolved: 'how shall we *make* architecture and how shall we *teach* it in the understanding of politics in the twenty-first century?'; 'is the activity of architecture (as a verb) closer to building a house or playing the flute?'; and, ultimately, 'is architecture a form of *praxis* or *poēsis*?'

The final answers to these questions, if any, definitely lie beyond the scope of this chapter. As I have already mentioned, a careful tracing back in time of the concepts of *making* and *doing* and the various answers given in every society is needed in order to allow a clearer overview of the historic horizons that define our times. Nevertheless, in the thesis that has been developed here, I have argued for a new way of seeing architecture as *praxis*. Showing the origins of the affiliation of architecture with *poēsis* in the Aristotelian ethical tradition, I challenged its established categories

through the examples of the house and the flute, thus opening the possibility of seeing architecture as a form of 'doing.' A major advantage to this line of argument against techno-romantic notions of architectural education is the armour of *phronesis* and *eupraxia* that can be taken from the arsenal of *praxis*, avoiding its ambiguous relationship to *poēsis*.

Finally, by suggesting we should see *architecture as praxis*, I am pointing to a process of 'doing' architecture that challenges the primacy of the poetic aspect of creation, and focuses on the simple and mundane action of doing architecture in the everyday sense of the practice. But what I have tried to show here is that such a view of architecture is beyond the techno-romantic vision of mere progress, efficiency or effectiveness. On the contrary, the poetic aspect of *making* architecture derives from the primary action of simply *doing* it and not the other way around.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Lisa Otty, Yue Zhuang and Keith Ballantyne for their critical comments and valuable suggestions in various stages of this work and also Andreas Laudwein and Brenda Anderson for sharing their brilliant photographs.

Notes

- 1 David, Ross, *Aristotle*, 5th edn, *University Paperbacks*, London, New York: Methuen and Barnes & Noble, 1964 (1923), p. 187.
- 2 *Ibid.*, p. 187.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 187.
- 4 Nikolaus Lobkowitz, *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967, p. 3.
- 5 Aristotle, 1934, *Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. H. Rackham. Harvard University Press and William Heinemann Ltd. Online at Perseus Digital Library, perseus.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Aristot.+Nic.+Eth.+1177b+1 (accessed 15 March 2003), 1140a 1.
- 6 Lobkowitz, *Theory and Practice*, p. 9.
- 7 Nic. Eth. VI, 4, 1140a 2 ff; 5, 1140b 3 ff.: Mag. Moral. I, 34, 1197a 3 ff.; II 12 1211b 27 ff.; Pol. I, 2, 1254a 6.
- 8 Leonidas Koutsoumpos, 'The Switch of Ethics and the Reflective Architect: In-between Practice and Theory,' Research Paper presented at the Conference: *Reflections on Creativity: Exploring the Role of Theory in Creative Practices*, organised by the University of Dundee, in Dundee, 21–22 April 2006.
- 9 Richard Coyne and Adrian Snodgrass, *Interpretation in Architecture*, London, New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2006, p. 112 [*italics in the original*].
- 10 *Ibid.*, p. 112.
- 11 Aristotle, 'Magna Moralia,' in *The Works of Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea; by W.D. Ross, Magna Moralia; by St. George Stock, Ethica Eudemia, De Virtutibus Et Vitiis; by J. Solomon*, edited by W.D. Ross, London: Oxford University Press, 1915, 1211b 27.
- 12 Geoffrey Broadbend, 'Architectural Education,' in *Educating Architects*, edited by Martin

- Pearce and Maggie Toy, pp. 10–23, London: Academy Editions, 1995.
- 13 A very interesting analysis of architecture as representation and symbol is made in Chapter 7 of Harries' book, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, particularly on p. 99, where he says: 'To understand the representational character of a particular building, we have to understand just how it pictures, that is, the form of representation employed. . . . Works of architecture represent buildings' (Karsten Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997).
 - 14 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968, p. 151. See also Marcel Proust, *In Search of Lost Time Vol. 1: Swann's Way*, C.K. Scott Moncreiff and T. Kilimartin, trans., D.J. Enright Revision, London: Vintage, 2002, p. 262.
 - 15 'All Art deals with bringing some thing into existence; and *to pursue an art means to study how to bring into existence* a thing which may either exist or not, and the efficient cause of which *lies in the maker* and not in the thing made . . .' (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1140a 1 [my italics]).
 - 16 Since the paradigmatic shift from the medieval times to Renaissance, almost every historical movement that tried to challenge established orthodoxies has gone back into re-problematising this shift. Maybe the most obvious example being the way that Ruskin conceptualised romantically 'The Nature of the Gothic' both as outward form and as the character of the builders (Swenarton 1989, p. 30) and the chain of influences that John Ruskin's thought caused to William Morris' challenging the industrial production and the division of labour and Lethaby's establishment of schools of 'practical architecture' like the Central School of Arts and Crafts (Swenarton 1989, p. 111). One can also see the continuation of this influence, through Muthesius, to Gropius and the establishment of Bauhaus, one of the most famous schools of architecture for having touched the fundamentals of *doing* and *making* (Saint 1983, p. 122).
 - 17 Alberto Pérez-Gómez, 'Ethics and Poetics in Architectural Education – I,' *SCROOPE – Cambridge Architecture Journal*, 16, 2004.
 - 18 *Ibid.*, p. 26.
 - 19 *Ibid.*, p. 26.
 - 20 *Ibid.*, p. 26.
 - 21 *Ibid.*, p. 26.
 - 22 *Ibid.*, p. 27.
 - 23 *Ibid.*, p. 31.
 - 24 For the dangers of the aesthetic aspect of creation that I think is usually related to *poēsis*, Harries quotes Bullough saying:

. . . aesthetic experience 'has a negative, inhibitory aspect – the cutting out of the practical side of things and of our practical attitude to them – and a positive side – the elaboration of the experience on the basis created by the inhibitory action of distance.' [Edward Bullough, 'Physical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Esthetic Principle,' in *A Modern Book of Esthetics: an Anthology*, ed. Melvin Rader (New York: Holt, 1952), p. 404].

(Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, pp. 122–123)
 - 25 Pérez-Gómez, 'Ethics and Poetics in Architectural Education – I,' p. 27 [my italics].
 - 26 A connection between *phronesis* and *poēsis*, different from that of Perez-Gomez, can be found at John Wall, 'Phronesis, Poetics and Moral Creativity,' *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 6, 2003, pp. 317–341.
 - 27 For Aristotle, *phronesis* is placed between Scientific Knowledge (*Epēstēmē*) and Art (*Tecnē*) in the one side, and Intuition (*Nous*) and Theoretical wisdom (*Sofia*) in the other (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, 1139b).
 - 28 For Gadamer, *phronesis* is a key to understanding the process of interpretation. He

clarifies the difference between technical and moral knowledge and he claims that *phronesis* involves a kind of self-knowledge that is not present in technological knowledge. Gallagher also argues that *phronesis* applies to situations that resemble a mystery rather than a problem (using the terms as defined by Gabriel Marce) in a way that the person cannot stand out of a given situation in order to see it in an objective way (Shaun Gallagher, *Hermeneutics and Education*, edited by Dennis J. Schmidt, *Suny Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy*, New York, Albany: State University of New York, 1992, p. 152). Moreover, in *The Postmodern Condition*, a concept of *phronesis* developed by Lyotard appears as the only way out of the *paralogy* of postmodernism. *Phronesis* as a purely prescriptive, case-by-case judging, without appeal to theoretical criteria, stays independent of any big narrative. And despite the disagreements for its radical role, there is no doubt of the importance that it has in our times (Shaun Gallagher, 'The Place of Phronesis in Postmodern Hermeneutics,' *Philosophy Today*, 37, 1993, pp. 298–305).

- 29 Leonidas Koutsoumpos, 'Heterotopic Metaphors of the Design Studio: Bazaar, Agora Gymnasium or Dojo?,' Research paper presented at the conference: *XXII World Congress of Architecture 'Cities: Grand Bazaar of Architectures'*, organised by the UIA (International Union of Architects), in Istanbul on 3–7 July, 2005.

- 30 The point here is to distinguish activities and disciplines which are primarily a form of making (building a house, writing a play) from *doing* proper, where the end or *telos* of the activity is not primarily the production of an artefact, but rather performing the particular activity in a certain way, i.e. performing the activity well: '*eupraxia*'. 'Praxis' in this more restricted sense signifies the disciplines and activities predominant in man's ethical and political life.

(Richard Bernstein, *Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971, pp. ix–x
[italics in the original])

- 31 '... the starting condition of reflection-in-action is the repertoire of routinized responses that skilful practitioners bring to their practice. This is what I call the practitioner's *knowing-in-action*' (Donald, Schön, *The Design Studio: an Exploration of its Traditions and Potentials*, London: RIBA Publications Limited, 1985, p. 24). For other implications of the concept of reflection in action in relationship to the concept of practice, see Koutsoumpos, 'The Switch of Ethics and the Reflective Architect' and also Helena, Webster, 'The Design Diary: Promoting Reflective Practice in the Design Studio,' in *EAAE, Transactions on Architectural Education*, 17: *Monitoring Architectural Design Education in European Schools of Architecture*, 2004.
- 32 See MacIntyre's definition of practice in Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory* (2nd edn, corrected with postscript), London: Duckworth, 1985 (1981), p. 187.
- 33 Maurice Lagueux, 'Ethics Versus Aesthetics in Architecture,' *The Philosophical Forum*, XXXV, 2 (2004), 117–133, see p.122.

Performing Mimetic Mapping

A Non-Visualisable Map of the Suzhou River Area of Shanghai

Anastasia Karandinou and Leonidas Koutsoumpos

Introduction

In this paper we examine a process of mapping the Suzhou River area of Shanghai, focusing on the procedure of its making as well as on the re-exploration of the city as performed through the map, rather than on its material outcome as a final object. We argue that the map is actually the mimetic re-performance of the exploration and experience of the Suzhou River area. Through the description of the processes involved we analyse the position of this particular map within contemporary discourse about mapping. We also question the purpose of the process, its desired outcome, the consciousness of the significance of each event within this procedure, and the possible significance of the final traces that the map will leave behind.

This map was created by a group of four map-makers who were postgraduate students of architecture at the University of Edinburgh, and it was part of the M.Arch./M.Sc. course requirements. The overall procedure was not predetermined from the beginning; the strategy was not specified in detail and the sequence of activities, involving and evolving the map, was intended to be mainly intuitive. The mapping was a re-exploration, a re-visiting and navigation within the part of Shanghai under study. As a result, we suggest that the map-making process is a 'mimesis', in the sense that it re-performed the physical exploration of the actual site that had taken place earlier. Mimesis, as a 'conscious' repetition and creative evolution of an action (rather than a pure imitation or tracing), is a

key concept that will be discussed in further detail throughout the paper.

After the mapping had been carried out, the procedure was analysed, post-rationalised, justified, and partly documented. In this paper we also question the methods and reasons for these later practices, as well as their possible meaning, purpose, demands and/or context. This paper presents the map in detail, sidetracking where necessary in order to give information about the Suzhou River area, as well as about the academic course as the context within which the mapping was carried out. In this way it interprets the map-makers' gestures and reveals possible links between their performance and this area of Shanghai itself.

Mapping procedure 1

The part of the city selected for mapping

The physical object was not intended to be a conventional cartographic map (carto meaning 'written-on-paper'), rather it was to be a multilayered model. Everything started on a piece of plywood (approximate size 1 x 1.7m) upon which a series of interventions were layered using a variety of materials and techniques [fig.1].

The mapping process presents the map-makers' experience of the Suzhou River area. The Suzhou River had always been a significant boundary in Shanghai; connecting and separating territories, neighbourhoods, activities and people. During the last two centuries both sides of the river have been




Fig. 1: Model-making process. Photo courtesy of the authors.

connected and disconnected several times; the layout of the activities occupying the neighbouring zones were also rearranged. During the foreign concession era (1842 to 1943), for example, the regions on either side of the river were completely separated. The southern side had been part of the British settlement and the northern part of the American one. At that time several bridges had been demolished and transport between the two sides either forbidden or controlled. Since there were no connections, the Suzhou River area turned into the 'back' side of both regions, and functioned as an industrial zone with small factories and storage spaces. The transport systems on either side developed independently, and even the building typology on either side is different. Later on, when the concession era officially ended (in 1943), the banks of the river started to get gradually reconnected; the demolished bridges were rebuilt and new ones were constructed. The city 'turns' once again towards the river, and many activities started to take place there, such as commerce, transportation, and everyday activities like cooking and recreation (e.g. tai-chi).

Over the past few decades this part of Shanghai has been developing rapidly. Several activities – varying along the waterway – take place, but traces of the past are visible too. The older buildings are different on the two sides, and the road network is very busy and inefficient, partly due to the fact that it was developed independently on either side. Many of the inhabitants of the Suzhou River area are immigrants from other parts of China – some from the Three Gorges region¹ and others from other rural areas.

Mapping procedure 2

The context of the mapping-procedure place (the game-board rules)

The place where the mapping is carried out inevitably affects the procedure a lot; the spatial, conceptual and physical context matters. The reason for the mapping, although not easily definable, emerges (at

least partly) out of the course's and the individual students' orientation, the course's guidelines and the students' own interests and inquiries.

The map was created within the design studio of the M.Arch.² program of the University of Edinburgh, during the academic year 2005-2006. The course organiser was Dorian Wiszniewski and the authors were engaged in the course as tutor and student. The title of the overall project was 'Architecture in Borderlands – Borderlands in Shanghai' and its general aim was the study of the city of Shanghai, the production of maps and drawings and the designing of spatial interventions. The wider project or 'thesis' consisted of a series of smaller projects described by a series of handouts, which progressively disclosed parts of the project to the students. In detail, the project consisted of:

- (1) A small conference that introduced the city of Shanghai to the students.
- (2) A visit to the city itself.
- (3) An 'hypo-thesis' – drawing maps of the city and fragment interventions that suggested a scenario of territoriality, out of which the map under examination was created.
- (4) A 'proto-thesis' that tested the previous propositions by designing sequences of oscillation between the concrete and the abstract at a range of scales.
- (5) The 'thesis' itself, which mainly consisted of a building design (including 'its own footprint and its technological imprint').³
- (6) Finally, the 'thesis closure' allowed a re-framing of the 'thesis' by revisions, the creation of a drawing report and the presentation of the overall project. One of the last handouts given to the students summarised the project as follows:

Remember, the enquiry into Borderlands is a question of territoriality. Borderlands are in-between conditions – areas between areas of resolute difference, areas of territorial dispute or areas formed by utter indifference. They are understood through questions of limit, connection and discontinu-

ity, inside and outside and, although they may be political or philosophical in character, they always have architectural manifestations that have circulatory possibilities and limits. A Borderland of course may be considered a threshold condition, but, under the specific deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation strategies that the enquiry of Architecture in Borderland initiates, Tectonics in Borderlands takes a positive outlook and speculates into the possible architectural manifestations of new limits and thresholds that emerge from renegotiating the political and philosophical tensions in Borderland.⁴

As is obvious from the quote above, the course adopts a Deleuzian terminology/worldview both implicitly and explicitly, and it has a clear orientation towards creative map-making. Mapping was not just a separate analytic phase of the design process, the map-making process was already interpreting the site and intervening in it.

Mapping, as a generative process, has become central to the focus of architecture, suggesting – as Mark Dorrian calls it – a ‘cartographic turn’.⁵ According to this view, Deleuze and Guattari provide the philosophical background that backs up the cartographic turn and with it the ‘end’ of man, humanism and architecture as stable entities that have a fixed representable meaning. The interest shifts, thus, to what the representation does; how representation changes the city itself. Within this approach, the mimetic process is not a one-way mechanism of the map imitating the city; it is a two-way interaction which acknowledges a mutual interface between the city and the map. In this way, the cartographer can never master the map, and neither can he dominate the terrain.⁶ The strategy is not to implant architecture within the site, but rather to ‘unground it, to detach it from its accommodation to the dominant discourses within which the identity of the site is constructed.’⁷ Mark Dorrian proposes a schema that sees Eisenman and Libeskind as paradigmatic figures who made a major contribution towards the

‘cartographic turn’ in architecture, either as a pursuit of the exile of the human from the anthropocentric functionalism (Eisenman), or in an attempt to re-establish a ‘phenomenological’ bringing forth into visibility, memory and historicity (Libeskind).

Mapping procedure 3

The first move (the ‘Icarus’ conventions and beyond)

The first thing that was done within this mapping process was the tracing of a conventional urban planning map onto the plywood surface. The urban planning map was printed onto A4 paper sheets and then printed onto the base surface by acetone.

This stage already sets the question of scale, orientation, size, and of the initial information drawn onto the map surface. The overall size derived from the size of the drawing table; the place where the map was made – the design studio of the particular school, the industrial design dimensions of such tables, etc. – although of no significance to the represented place (the Suzhou River area), mattered at this stage of the mapping procedure. The tracing of an urban planning map is also an issue worth noticing. The starting point, quite often, is the most ordinary or conventional information about a place; its plan. By plan we mean the traditionally known drawing (to scale) which presents the outlines of the built forms, the edge of roads and rivers. Even before ‘starting’ our mapping we already encountered the ‘ordinary’, some fundamental and useful (at least in the everyday life of architects and designers) ways of representing, understanding and communicating some ‘objective’ aspects of the place. This choice already brings forth, in the context wherein we work, a map made up of lines that present information that is generally used – for the majority of building interventions carried out in the western world – for the documenting of a site or a plot. At the same time, the fact that it is (intuitively) considered as ‘given’ indicates the group’s intention to go (or draw) beyond that.

The selection of the plan as a first gesture is already a strong decision; it is not a video, a story or a book that is mapping the experience of that space – it is a *plan*, a simulation of a visual overview. The tracing, made here, represents some of the experience that ‘Icarus’ would have had from above the city. If we follow Michel de Certeau’s distinction between experiencing the city from above (like Icarus) and from within, walking and exploring it step by step, this tracing provides a kind of ‘overview’. It is not a complete overview since it only gives the geometrical shapes of the built blocks, the roads, and the outline of the river, at a certain (spatial) scale; nevertheless, neither is it the route of a *flâneur*.

The following performances of the map-makers, as we will later see, challenge this first gesture of capturing the overview, and attempt to re-perform the routes of a *flâneur*. Their practice is the mimesis of the experience of the city – simultaneously – both from above and from within; both from far away through (‘overview’) maps and photos, and from within (the recalling and re-practising of the memory of the actual experience of the place step by step). It is – at all times – a struggle between the desired understanding or overview and the experiential immediacy that only the actual physical experience on the site can offer. The inevitable conflict between (1) experiencing the place without knowing the overview, and (2) re-experiencing the place with the knowledge of this overview, seems to be an intriguing point in this process. In other words, it challenges the impossible situation of experiencing a place with and without knowing what the next step brings.

Mapping procedure 4

The first improvisation (performance)

The second activity carried out was to draw the routes that the map-makers walked, with water – using a brush. The longer the time spent along

an actual route, the slower the brush stroke. The faster and more complicated the turns and routes, the faster the brush strokes. The parts of the route that were traversed several times during the group’s visit to Shanghai were drawn (with water) several times as well.

The water evaporated within a few seconds or minutes; the time for it to evaporate and disappear depended upon the amount of water applied to the plywood surface. While the brush was re-visiting a road (or part of a route) it might find traces of a previous visit, if it was an intense or slow one, or had been repeated several times; or else the trace of the previous crossing(s) had already vanished. The time it takes for the water to evaporate could be proportionally equivalent to the intensity or duration of a memory, either of the atmosphere, or of small details of the place.

The point where the description ends and the interpretation or justification starts is not clear. What the map-makers had in mind while making the map, and interpreting their activity after the map-making process, are two series of thoughts and activities not easily distinguishable. What was carried out by intuition or by some spontaneous reasoning, might have been forgotten in the meantime, and replaced by some other justification, reasoning or interpretation that suddenly appeared obvious after the initial drawing activity was accomplished.

An old Shanghainese man used to walk along the part of the Suzhou River under study every day, carrying a brush and a bottle of water. Every day, at the same time (and sometimes, if the weather was good, twice a day), he used to write with his brush and water a phrase that had been spoken by Mao Zedong when fighting against the Japanese during the 2nd Sino-Japanese war, in which he had taken part when he was young. As he told us, he was doing this calligraphy exercise regularly in order to practice his body and his mind. The phrase was

ten to fifteen metres long and took fifteen minutes to write. While he is writing the last few characters of the phrase, on a sunny autumn morning with a temperature of 15°C, the first ones start fading. This story can be narrated in several different ways and accordingly related to the map-making technique in various ways.

It becomes apparent that there is some sort of mimetic relation between the old Shanghainese man and the map-makers. One interpretation could be that by their mimetic practice, the map-makers 'affect' the city itself. They rewrite it again and again, and re-perform in the studio something that they encountered on site. This is not dissimilar from our earlier analysis of the cartographic turn, as a wish to invert the one-way mimetic power of the city towards the map. Assimilated to magic, mimesis expresses this power of representing the order/disorder of a cosmos through re-enaction.⁸

The performance of an activity reflecting the practice of the Shanghainese man, can also be interpreted in another (parallel) way: by drawing routes with water, a few seconds later one does not have in front of one an overview of the complete experience or route; one only has traces of the most intense or recent moments of the route. The overall labyrinthine navigation within the city is not visualised in this way, which may, at this stage, be a desired thing. Although the map-makers could already have an overview of their routes, they chose to have their previous 'steps' erased or, rather, evaporated.

Mapping procedure 5

Exploring the Suzhou River area on foot (embodiment)

After performing several routes with water, the map-makers re-performed some particular ones with pencils, ink and colours; they also drew certain buildings of the studied area by various means. Buildings of the same typology, the same time of construction, or function, are mapped in an equiva-

lent way. The buildings, thus, have been mapped by different tools according to the characteristics of their various aspects. The territories on either sides of the river – the British and the American settlements – are drawn, thus, by different means; not because of the tracing of historical maps, but because of the differences noticed on the site. The information drawn on the map was collected mainly through the experience of the site from within; by walking it. At some stages of the map-making process, the areas on either side of the river were re-performed by different map-makers – by different members of the group. The fact that the two sides had been for a long time separated was being re-performed by the strategy and procedure of their mapping.

One member of the group of map-makers drew the roads with intense commercial activity using a black pencil. He also mapped the area where people practiced tai-chi, using small pieces of wood directed towards the river. Another member drew with colour the buildings accommodating companies, amongst which were several western ones. By use of other pens and materials, other attributes of the space were mapped; the place of the residential buildings (according to the explorer's observations), the place of intense commercial activity, the public places that accommodated everyday family activities (such as cooking or washing clothes), etc.

The map-makers were re-performing (through their minds and hands) the routes that they had followed on the site and thus re-experienced the city. This event could be characterised as 'mimesis', in the sense that the map-makers were re-performing themselves; re-visiting and re-embodimenting the experience of the city, re-performing the visit and exploration of the site, this time, on the plywood map-space.

The analysis of the map through the concept of mimesis takes as its starting point the classical Aristotelian view that sees mimesis as a fundamental

concept of artistic creation. Every art according to Aristotle (especially tragedy) is a mimesis of a praxis. In the second chapter of the *Poetics* he makes clear that the 'objects' of poetic mimesis are 'men in action' (*μιμούνται οι μιμούμενοι πράττοντας*).⁹ For this we employ the concept of mimesis as a strategy towards knowledge, interpretation and understanding: 'Like is known by like' writes Aristotle, citing Empedocles.¹⁰ Mimesis for Aristotle is constituted by mythos and praxis, which are both close to time and action. This view of mimesis should be seen in opposition to Plato's understanding of this concept, which is closer to image, imagination and imitation.¹¹ For Plato the issue of mimesis is related to the theory of forms where the distinction between ideas and appearances is clear: all appearances copy the divine forms (the appearances are in the darkness of the cave while the forms are in the light above). Within this view, the artistic mimesis – e.g. the painting of a chair – is a double mediation; the carpenter imitates the 'Ideal Form' and the painter imitates its imitation. Accordingly, the map of the Suzhou River can be considered as a map of an image of the city. By contrast, within the Aristotelian understanding of mimesis, the map under examination can be considered as an active re-enactment of human life, as was perceived during the students' visit to Shanghai. The focus of our analysis is the active participation in the mimetic phenomenon of map-making, and not the mapping as a final-product-oriented process.

Mapping procedure 6

Floating population, floating boundaries, floating buildings (demolishing and re-building the model)

While the group visited Shanghai, a new bridge, connecting both sides of the Suzhou River, was being built. The bridge-in-progress and the surrounding bank of the river (under reconstruction) were mapped by vertical cardboard elements, and covered by strips of recent Chinese newspapers. To be more precise, what was actually mapped

were the vertical obstacles that prevented the map-makers from crossing the construction site. The group learned about the bridge from local people and the local newspapers. What is being mapped (in the first place) is not the (non-visible) bridge-under-construction, but the blocking elements and the blocked, inaccessible territory. What is mapped, thus, is what was actually experienced by the members of the group on site. The newspapers were bought and read in Shanghai. Then, they were taken to Edinburgh by the map-makers, together with pencils, inks, brushes and other things and tools.

Part of the wall of the riverside is represented by vertical cardboard. Some parts of this wall (the ones represented on the map) are quite high, blocking the view of the river. They serve, thus, as a 'back' for several outdoor public activities, such as commerce, cooking, hanging clothes to dry, etc. They might also act as a precaution against humidity; in the past the walls along the longer parts of the river were high, possibly to prevent it from flooding.

The newer buildings, that – as far as the group members were informed – were not meant to be demolished, were mapped as blocks of wood stuck onto the plywood surface. Their height on the map doesn't represent their actual height; the wooden blocks indicate the field of land they occupy. The territories that were being demolished and those which were being rebuilt or were soon to be re-built, were drawn in outline using ink.

The buildings which were being demolished while the group was in Shanghai were drawn and constructed by blocks of wood, and then erased or removed by water or carving tools. As the map makers noticed (and as they were also informed before visiting the city), during the last few years the Suzhou River area has been changing extremely rapidly. Small old houses and blocks are being demolished and new high-rise buildings are being

constructed, while the inhabitants of the demolished ones move to other parts of the city. While the plots remain unbuilt – after the demolition but before the construction of new buildings – they are temporarily inhabited by Chinese people (mainly migrants) who build their own sheds out of wood, and tents. Pockets of the population float from one area to another, the value of the land changes rapidly, and the spatio-temporal mix and sequence of situations becomes more and more complex. While luxurious flats are being built and inhabited, small houses are being demolished (and their inhabitants look for affordable accommodation in other, mainly suburban, places), and in the meantime temporary constructions house moving populations. The layout of the built territories, and also the layout of groups of inhabitants, shifts from day to day.

Within these last few steps of the mapping process a range of information and spatial elements was mapped, represented or re-performed using various ways and means. The mapped aspects were the ones recorded or remembered by the map-makers; this was due either to randomness or to their significance. Randomness and possible significance were, thus, the two parameters that brought the above-mentioned information to the map-making field (without the identification of one or the other always being possible).

Mapping procedure 7

Re-exploring, re-performing, re-concealing

After some stages of re-performing the experience of the actual place onto the mapping-place, the group covered everything with a fine layer of Vaseline. Then, plaster was poured onto the model and most of it covered. The Vaseline allowed the possibility of removal, if desired, later on. What resulted was, thus, a white surface with which to re-start mapping; the previous practices are there – not visible though, and not easily accessible either. At this stage, the plaster covered everything, rendering it invisible, apart from the wooden blocks present-

ing the seemingly permanent buildings, and some (seemingly permanent) parts of the river wall too.

After the plaster dried, the group retraced some of the lines from the urban planning map mentioned at the beginning. They knew, thus, the precise position of their previous mapping interventions. Using some carving tools, they 'dug' into the plaster and removed bits that covered certain territories, such as the busy riverside public space where tai-chi, commerce and everyday recreation took place. The previous notation of these places again became visible on the surface.

At the same time, the group members placed some vertical plastic planes enclosing the territories of buildings being demolished or of the ones recently demolished (and where new ones are going to be built). On these territories, as mentioned earlier, there are people living in small temporary sheds that they built themselves. These temporary 'floating' spaces of the floating population are being notated by an enclosure that prevents them from being flooded by the following layer of plaster.

A second layer of plaster was poured onto the map. This time, within the enclosed spaces one can see the thickness of the plaster layer just poured, as well as the upper surface of the previous one. A large part of the map again became a blank for further study, performance or mapping – apart from the above-mentioned territories-in-progress. Those remained 'excavated', uncovered, while the rest of the place would need to be carved and literally excavated in order to be brought (once again) to the surface.

Thus, if the map was to be 'read', the 'reading' activity would include carving, scratching and breaking, in order to uncover and make visible parts of the mapping process. The one who reads the map, at the same time creates it too; he gets inevitably involved in the map-making process. The map-

makers also read the map they create, and when needed, cover it and re-reveal it. The 'play' of the memory and the conflict between the whole and the fragmented experience, re-emerges as a challenge to hide and reveal parts of the (re)experience of the Suzhou River area.

Mapping procedure 8

Re-viewing the mapping and the mimesis

The issues mapped or presented by the map-performing are some of the events and conditions of the studied site; not the only ones and not necessarily the most important. They are, though, of some significance to the activity of exploration. It is a re-exploration of the place, and as such it makes visible – at least for a while – some of its qualities. As a re-exploration, it addresses issues that the map-makers came across either consciously or not, through their journey. Some of the information was put on the map-board straight away, and some others emerged out of the overlaying of multiple representations and actions. As James Corner mentions, referring to Robinson and Petchenik's arguments, 'there are some phenomena that can only achieve visibility through representation rather than through direct experience'.¹²

'The map 'gathers' and 'shows' things presently (and always) invisible, things which may appear incongruous or untimely but which may also harbour enormous potential for the unfolding of alternative events'.¹³ What is mapped does not indicate what there is or what happens on the studied site; the map indicates qualities and it functions as an active milieu itself, so as to engage not only with the actual reality of the place but also with the potential ones. Italo Calvino's room with the glass spheres could be considered, thus, as a kind of map of the city; the spheres presented the future of the city as each one of the inhabitants had imagined it, and which was never realised as such.

The map's significance, as Mark Dorrian

mentions, referring to Deleuze and Guattari, turns out to be related more to what the map as 'architectural strategy/representation does rather than what it means'.¹⁴ In our case the map-in-progress presents and conceals itself. It also signifies, in the sense that it creates a situation against which the possible viewer has to re-act (by the cutting, carving and digging mentioned earlier), in order to experience the map's potential. According to Deleuze and Guattari, '[t]he map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by the individual, group or social formation.'¹⁵

Here comes the question about the use, the function and the readability of a map or mapping process. Some geographical maps are tracings, and although they might not give more information than one would find on the site, they are of some use. Their production does not reveal; it is not an exploratory experience for the map-makers. The outcome, though, that the physical map produced, will be used by travellers and visitors to the place. Other kinds of maps provide an enlightening experience for their makers, since the map-makers re-explore the place and reveal or bring forth interesting things and experiences. These kinds of maps may have the potential to be experienced by other people rather than their makers, or not.

In our case, the map does not exist (in some sense) as a final object; it is a procedure or re-performing of the experience of the site. There is, though, the video recording of the mapping process, and also the map-board, left in the state it was in when the mapping process stopped. The mapping procedure as such, though, cannot be re-visited, since its being lies in the making of that map, in the being-involved in the making and not in the viewing of it, or of its video recording. If the purpose of that map was, as we argue, the better understanding of the place and the re-experience

or re-performance of it, by a creative mimesis, then the map cannot have a receiver, a reader anyway. Having said that, one might still argue that this map does have receivers, since we are now presenting it. Our presentation, though, is another map, and its existence depends fully upon our narration. Without our narration that map is almost unreadable.

Deleuze and Guattari, referring to the map, argue that '[i]t can be drawn on the wall, conceived of as a work of art, constructed as a political action or as a meditation'.¹⁶ According to their arguments, the map can have any form – it can be of any nature desired. Within this field of thought we can name as 'map' the experience of the mapping, or the potential experience of the map re-visited: a viewing of the map that would involve its physical deconstruction in order to gain a rich physical and conceptual experience of its nature and making. Still, we could argue that the map as such, as a means without an end, is a pure 'gesture.' Giorgio Agamben describes gesture as a kind of activity that opposes Aristotelian teleology:

*...if producing is a means in view of an end and praxis is an end without means, the gesture then breaks with the false alternative between ends and means that paralyzes morality and presents instead means that, as such, evade the orbit of mediality without becoming, for this reason, ends.*¹⁷

As we have already mentioned, Deleuze and Guattari are key-figures in the cartographic turn in architecture. Especially with the example of the orchid and the wasp¹⁸ they expose the limitations of mimesis as mere imitation. Nevertheless they still mention the mimetic characteristics as part of the semiotic chains that the rhizome connects.¹⁹ Referring to maps in particular, they pose the question: 'Does not a multiplicity have strata upon which unifications and totalisations, massifications, mimetic mechanisms, signifying power takeovers, and subjective attributions take root?'²⁰ But they quickly affirm that the opposite is also true, exposing the dangers of

simple dualisms of tracing: 'The imitator always creates the model, and attracts it. The tracing has already translated the map into an image;' Finally, they acknowledge that the entire understanding of their book as disseminating and dispersing its unity through mimetic procedures between each plateau. This view of mimesis and mapping is not dissimilar to contemporary approaches that relate mimesis to play;²¹ play is related again through the game-board mapping to the educational aspect of the map:

*In the case of the child, gestural, mimetic, ludic, and other semiotic systems regain their freedom and extricate themselves from the 'tracing,' that is, from the dominant competence of the teacher's language a microscopic event upsets the local balance of power.*²²

Although the course required an 'active' map to be presented, the map under examination was not a map-to-be-presented. It was a 'game' played by the group members (the map-makers) in order to re-visit, understand and interpret the city and particularly the part of Shanghai that was studied. The map-making was a field for discussion, interaction and interpretation – for a game; it was a field for events that were not to be presented as an object map-outcome.

In order to understand mimesis as a play/game one has to understand the shift that Nietzsche brought forth by going beyond the Greek philosophers (Plato and Aristotle), focusing on the 'performative' aspects of mimesis. The 'performative' mimesis becomes a play as a 'dramatic representation where the artist takes art personally.'²³ For Nietzsche the art-as-play is the only way for humans to find the truth, a truth that is different from truth-as-correspondence. 'Nietzsche's notion of play was radical, since he ultimately understood it through a cosmic (rather than human) disinterestedness.'²⁴ This disinterestedness is a characteristic of the child's attitude and (in our case) becomes

prominent in the way that the map was actually left aside half/non-finished. It is considered here as half-finished in opposition the 'finished' or the expected which would consist of a visible material (possibly readable) map.

The fact that mimesis creates a second nature (physis), has been identified as a major philosophical problem even from the early treatises on the topic. Plato, recognising the power of mimesis, privileged it as a fundamental way of educating the noble quality of men in his ideal city, since the mimesis of their outlook can 'settle down into habits and second nature in the body, the speech, and the thought.'²⁵ Nevertheless, for the same reason Plato actually prevented the poets from joining his Ideal state, because through the mimetic acts of poetry and theatre 'one forgets his own role or duty in the state, for if a guard always mimes foreign characters, his soul would be split up between these untrue lives.'²⁶ In another instance, Plato argues that in order for Ion to recite Homer, his *nous*, or his self awareness, is not with him anymore.²⁷

Within the context of this mimetic mapping, it could be argued that mimesis was a way of approaching the other in order to establish a dialogue with it – where 'unconscious strata of culture are built into social routines as bodily disposition.'²⁸ It could be argued that the mimesis of the old Shanghainese man writing with water (by applying the same gesture onto the map) made the map-makers step out of themselves in order to become temporarily the other. Performing a mimetic action, in this sense, is an instantaneous trip to the Other, becoming the other for a while and coming back again, changed only by the experience of being someone else. What is gained through this mimetic activity is not a tangible outcome that can be rationally measured as such. In some sense it is – by nature – against rationality:

Mimesis on the other hand [of rationality which is

abstract, oppositional and hierarchical], is responsive and concrete. It works through images rather than concepts and approaches the other (nature, the unconscious, social others) as something different yet related, more 'powerful' than the self. It responds emotionally, intuitively. Through gesture and movements it sets forth the self's experience of what it feels apart from yet also a part of, assuming -for the moment- the features of the other.'²⁹

The map-makers were inspired by the old Shanghainese man's technique, onto which they projected their own thoughts and metaphors. The reason for engaging in such a practice is not clear, neither is it absolutely nor rationally justified. It is a mimesis of praxis within a different context. The difference of the context already shifts the situation, the reason and the possible meanings or significance of the praxis. Thus, apart from the experience of the other's self that the mimesis (to some extent) provides, the repetition of the praxis in a different context provides a better understanding of both contexts as such.

After the map

Arguably, the mimetic aspect of mapping has been over-emphasised in an attempt to apply it to heterogeneous and even contradictory processes. To some extent, in contrast with the map-makers' practice (who performed mimetically without being aware of it), the use of mimesis in this paper is intentionally amplified: a mimetic excess.³⁰ This excess is a subversive mechanism that wishes to challenge and question the suppression of mimesis in western 'civilised' societies.³¹ This unprompted revival of the mimetic practices by the students brings forth a trajectory of pre-reflective human activity. By putting mimesis back into the game, the map-makers spontaneously transgressed the conventional binary oppositions (subject/object) and offered an accessible re-narration of Shanghai.

Within this paper our aim was to revisit the map-making process described, revisiting at the same

time the part of Shanghai that was studied. Our aim was to understand, explore and interpret some aspects of the city. What revealed or interpreted Shanghai, was the narration of the creation of the map, rather than the object-outcome of the map-making process. The narration of the map-makers' practices and choices brought into question issues concerning the map-making practice as such: its purpose, techniques, readability and recipients. The mapping described was accomplished as a mimetic process of their actual experience of Shanghai. The mapping was revisited and narrated, here, as a mimesis (again) of the map-makers' process, through textual description and interpretation. The map, thus, cannot be seen but can only be interpreted again and again; just like the city. The map does not represent the city; it does the city.

Notes

1. There is a hydroelectric dam being constructed at the Three Gorges area. Because of that, a vast region is being flooded and the inhabitants of the numerous towns and villages are being relocated, some within the same province (Hubei Province), whereas many others to other eastern and central provinces.
2. The M.Arch. course in the university of Edinburgh has the special characteristic of being a two year (four semesters) course that is dealing with one single big project, the 'thesis'. For most of the students this is the 5th or 6th year of their architectural education, whereas for some others it is part of their postgraduate M.Sc. degree. The M.Arch. is formally divided into two years (M.Arch. 1 and M.Arch. 2). The first semester, formally called Architectural Design Opening, introduces the course; semesters 2 and 3 form the main body of the course named M.Arch. 'Thesis'; the fourth and last semester allows for 'wrapping up' and is named *Architectural Design Thesis Closure*, giving also the opportunity to the students to prepare an Academic Portfolio. Two further lecture-based courses run parallel to M.Arch. 'Thesis' entitled 'Studies in Contemporary Architectural Theory' and 'Architectural Man'. The mapping described in this paper has been carried out by the group consisting of: Will Flint, Gregor Horn, Anastasia Karandinou, and Jeremy Lewin (M.Arch. and M.Sc. students).
3. Dorrian Wiszniewsky, 'Closure Thesis Handout, MArch, Architectural Design', Architecture Faculty, University of Edinburgh, 2007, p. 4.
4. Ibid. p. 2 [bold in the original]
5. Mark Dorrian, 'Architecture's 'Cartographic Turn'', in *Figures de la Ville, et Construction des Saviour*, edited by Frederic Pousin (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2005). p. 61
6. Before controlling/understanding things have to be internalised through mimetic actions (mimesis is a kind of autism).
7. Mark Dorrian, 'Architecture's 'Cartographic Turn'', p. 61.
8. '...mimesis is a creative imitation where something that exists potentially is recognized and re-enacted as something actual. For example, movement can be recognized and re-enacted as a significant gesture; sound, as song or music; visible reality, as image or picture; and ideas, as an articulated and structured experience. In its most original sense, mimesis is a re-enactment of order.' See: Dalibor Vesely, 'Architecture and the Question of Technology', in *Architecture, Ethics and Technology*, edited by Alberto Perez-Gomez and Louis Pelletier (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1994), p. 33.
9. Göran Sörbom, *Mimesis and Art: Studies in the Origin and Early Development of an Aesthetic Vocabulary* (Bonniers: Svenska Bokförlaget, 1966). p. 189-190.
10. David Appelbaum, *Disruption* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996). p.103.
11. Arne Merlberg, 'Theories of Mimesis', in *Literature, Culture, Theory*, edited by Richard Macksey and Michael Sprinker, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1995). p. 44.
12. James Corner, 'The Agency of Mapping', in *Mappings*, edited by Denis Cosgrove (London: Reaktion, 2002), p. 229; see also: 'Mapping is neither secondary nor representational but doubly operative: digging, finding, and exposing on the one hand, and relating, connecting and structuring on the other. Through visual disclosure,

- mapping both sets up and puts into effect complex sets of relationship that remain to be more fully actualized. Thus mapping is not subsequent to but prior to landscape and urban formations. In this sense, mapping is returned to its origins as a process of exploration discovery and enablement. This is less a case of mapping to assert authority, stability and control, and more one of searching, disclosing and engendering new sets of possibility. Like a nomadic grazer, the explanatory mapper detours around the obvious so as to engage what remains hidden.' Ibid. p. 225.
13. Ibid. p. 225.
14. Mark Dorrian, 'Architecture's 'Cartographic Turn'.
15. Gilles Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Athlone Press, 1987), pp.13-14.
16. Ibid. p. 14.
17. Giorgio Agamben, Vincenzo Binetti, and Cesare Casarino, 'Means without End : Notes on Politics', *Theory out of Bounds*; V. 20 (Minneapolis ; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. 57.
18. Ibid. p. 11.
19. Ibid. p. 8.
20. Ibid. p. 14 [our italics].
21. Miahri Spariosu, 'Mimesis in Contemporary Theory and Interdisciplinary Approach', in *Imitation and Play in Western Culture*, Vol. I, edited by Miahri Spariosu and Giuseppe Mazzotta (Hohn Benjamins Publishing Company, 1984),.p. x; p. 78.
22. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Vol. 2, trans. by Brian Massumi, (London & New York: Continuum, 2004/1980), p. 16.
23. Kwok-kui Wong, 'Nietzsche, Plato and Aristotle on Mimesis', (2003), in *DOGMA*, edited by Angèle Kremer Marietti and Thierry Simonelli: <http://dogma.free.fr/txt/KwokKuiNietzschePlatoAristotle.htm>. (accessed 9 May 2007).
24. Alberto Pérez-Gómez, *Built Upon Love, Architectural Longing after Ethics and Aesthetics* (Cambridge Massachusetts; London, England: The MIT Press, 2006). p. 24.
25. Plato, *Republic* 395d1-3.
26. Kwok-kui Wong, 'Nietzsche, Plato and Aristotle on Mimesis'.
27. Plato, *Ion* 534b5-6.
28. Michael Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses*, (New York, London: Routledge, 1993), p. 25.
29. Karla L. Schultz, *Mimesis on the Move: Theodor W. Adorno's Concept of Imitation* (Berne, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Paris: Peter Lang, 1990), p. 16.
30. 'Mimetic excess as a form of human capacity potentiated by post-coloniality provides a welcome opportunity to live subjunctively as neither subject nor object of history but both, at one and the same time. Mimetic excess provides access to understanding the unbearable truths of make-believe as foundation of an all-too-seriously serious reality, manipulated but also manipulatable.' In Michael Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity*, p. 255.
31. 'Civilization has replaced the organic adaptation to others and mimetic behaviour proper, by organized control of mimesis, in the magical phase; and, finally, by rational practice, by work, in the historical phase. Uncontrolled mimesis is outlawed.' In Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Verso Classics (London, New York: Verso, 1997), p.180.

Biographies

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Actions and the energeiai: the 'ethics of borderlands' in the educational praxis of architecture

Leonidas Koutsoumpos (University of Edinburgh)

Introduction: human conduct, morality and ethics

My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it. (Wittgenstein 1965, p.11-12).

Sometime between September 1929 and December 1930 Ludwig Wittgenstein delivered a lecture to 'The Heretics', a society of Cambridge. The untitled manuscript was published posthumously with the title 'A Lecture on Ethics', giving a hint about the content of the lecture, and it is the only public lecture that Wittgenstein gave dealing explicitly¹ with the topic of Ethics. This is extremely important because in his book, the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein claimed that 'ethics cannot be expressed' (1922, par. 6.421) and that '[w]hereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent' (1922, par.7). Wittgenstein broke his silence by opening that

¹ Nevertheless, according to James Edwards 1982, p.81, all of Wittgenstein's work, and especially *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, deals with Ethics.

lecture with a definition of Ethics taken from G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica*: 'I am using it [the word "Ethics"] to cover an enquiry for which, at all events, there is no other word: *the general enquiry into what is good*'. (Moore 1962, p.2). The italicised words were the ones quoted by Wittgenstein. Moore in his book argued that he used this definition in contrast to the disposition of many philosophers to accept as an 'adequate definition of "Ethics" the statement that it deals with the question of what is good or bad *in human conduct*'. (Moore 1962, p.2, emphasis added). Moore also claimed further that the enquiries of Ethics of these philosophers 'are properly confined to "conduct" or "practice" ' (1962, p.2). Moore clarified further that 'good conduct' is a complex notion where both 'good' (and/or 'bad'), as well as 'conduct', need to be defined. Moreover, he followed on that '*we all know pretty well what "conduct" is*' (1962, p.3), so the focus should remain on the moral uses of the terms 'good' and/or 'bad' (Quinton 1968, p.125). 'What is good? and What is bad? and the discussion of this question (or these questions) I give the name of Ethics[...]' (Moore 1962, p.3).

This paper proceeds to examine the discourse of Ethics as it appears in architectural education, by doing exactly the *opposite*² of what Moore suggests. I start by challenging the fact that we all know 'pretty well' what 'human conduct' is, and I focus especially on defining this term in its relation to architecture, and especially to architectural education. The reason for doing this is *not* because I trust the dispositions of the 'many' other philosophers more than Moore, but because my aim and Moore's are dissimilar. Moore's aim, as he stated clearly above, is to define Ethics, and find what is

² There is a contradiction here with Moore's non-naturalism, that 'good is good, and that is the end of the matter'. Moore 1962, pp.6-7. See more in Daly 1996, p.31. 'Nothing can be said about 'good' except that is good'.

good (and /or bad). My aim is different, since I deliberately do not define Ethics, but rather discuss it through its manifestations of *morality* and *ethics* in concrete situations.³

Although in their practical and common usage the terms ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ have similar meanings in the modern English language, as I have elsewhere argued (Koutsoumpos 2006), their etymological genealogy implies that ‘*morality*’ is associated with normative rules, while ‘*ethics*’ is characterised by a reference to more mundane notions of habit or addiction. Bernard Williams has suggested that ‘morality’ in Western culture has a unique significance ‘developing a special notion of *obligation*’ (1985, p.6). For this, Williams comes to call ‘morality’ a narrower system of the wider discourse of ‘ethics’. The distinction here can be summarised by describing a connection between ‘*morality*’ with normative obligation and external rule, and ‘*ethics*’ with habitual action, pre-accepted customs and dispositions. Hereafter, I expand Williams’ categorical distinctions by introducing another narrow system that focuses on an understanding of disposition, which I name ‘*ethics*’. *Morality* and *ethics* (note the italics) will be two distinct areas of the overall discourse of Ethics, which for the sake of clarity, I am going to call ‘Ethics’ (note the capital E).

My tactic here is to trust the fact that everyone understands something as having to do with notions of good or bad (in its manifestation as *morality* or *ethics*), despite the fact that these notions can be different amongst different people. In these terms, I invert Moore’s approach by suggesting that ‘we all know pretty well what

³ It is this decision that is aware of the contradiction of ‘wanting to support ethics but rejecting its defining them’ that Johnston 1999, p.167 discusses. This in some sense, responds to Wittgenstein’s conviction that Ethics can not be communicated or expressed; a conviction that is rooted well back in the history of philosophy starting in Plato’s dialogues *Protagoras* and *Meno*.

Ethics is', and I focus instead on the question of '*what is human conduct*', or in other words, '*where can we find Ethics?*', or else, 'in which area of human life does Ethics become manifested?'

This paper is divided into two parts. The first part utilises the Aristotelian Ethics that distinguish three areas of human action or conduct: thinking, making and doing (*theoretical, poetic and practical*). Through the analysis of the terms I show that, so far, 'thinking' and 'making' have been the conventional ways of seeing architectural Ethics as *morality*. On the other hand, 'doing' which is associated with *ethics*, has been largely underestimated in the role that it plays in the wider Ethical discourse. For this, I build an argument that supports *ethics* through 'doing' and *praxis*. The second part of the paper presents this argument in a concrete situation of a dialogical interaction between students and tutors from the design studio, the core of architectural education, where they discuss 'ethics of borderlands'. In this concrete situation I focus on *ethics* and present its manifestation in *praxis*.⁴

Action, conduct and the energeiai (theory, poesis, praxis)

The aim of this paper, to identify the area of life where Ethics become manifested, is very similar to the structure of *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle's major treatise on Ethics. According to Deborah Achtenberg, before proceeding into defining the human good, Aristotle first tried to identify its field of exercise, what he calls the human *ergon*, a term that has been translated by Bradshaw as 'deed' or 'thing done' (2004, p.1), and by Heidegger as 'what is

⁴ Note the contrast with Daly 1996, p.204 when he says that 'ethical value cannot reside in my action or in the world'.

accomplished in action’, or ‘what is effected in working’ (1975, p. 12). After this, Aristotle tried to find what completes human good, namely virtue and happiness: ‘Aristotle claims that virtue *is derived from our ergon* [...]’ (1991, p.60). This is a rather bottom-up process for the enquiry of Ethics, contrary to the top-down approach suggested by Moore. Aristotle used this approach deliberately in contrast to Plato (1096a 9; Gadamer 2004, p.310), in order to avoid the impasses that his teacher had come to concerning the education of Ethics.⁵ Consecutively, from Aristotle’s arguments, *ergon* becomes the field for the exercise of Ethics, and this leads us to the term *energeia* (‘in’ the *ergon*), which most probably was invented by Aristotle (Bradshaw 2004, p.1). The definition of *energeia* appears to give great pains to contemporary philosophers, mainly because of the frequency (Bradshaw 2004, p.1) and the inconsistency (Chen 1956) of its use by Aristotle in his various treatises, and also because of the language and culture shifts that changed the meaning of its translation through the ages. For example, Heidegger (1975, p.12) argues that the translation from the ancient Greek *energeia* to the Latin *actualitas* and the modern actuality is deceptive: ‘The literal translation is misleading. In truth it brings precisely another transposition or misplacement to the word of Being’_Heidegger argues overall that with the translations of the words through the historical time and shift of the historic paradigms (Ancient Greek, Latin, modern world) the fundamental concepts of metaphysics do not remain the same but change, loosing every time something of their original meaning. Going into further detail is beyond the scope of this paper, so here I will use Heidegger’s definition of ‘*ergon*’, and extend it to define

⁵ Plato in his dialogues *Meno* and *Protagoras* claimed that virtue is not possible to be taught. For the contrast between the *Meno* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* see Reuter 2001, p.82. In defence of the Platonic method of enquiry see Annas 1999, p.96.

energeia as ‘what is accomplished *in action*’, emphasising the *inner* and ‘active’ connection with action as such. From these definitions, we can conclude that human conduct is demonstrated by the activities that constitute human life, and is revealed *in action* (or *en-ergon*).

In the context of Ethics, however, human conduct usually means the ‘[m]anner of conducting oneself or one's life; behaviour; usually with more or less reference to its moral quality (good or bad)’ (OED 2nd edn 1989, under conduct). In other words, human conduct is the ‘way of life’ and according to Oakeshott it appears as ‘*inter homines*’ (Oakeshott 1975, p.35), because it engages people in inter-action. The word ‘conduct’ means the action of leading or guidance, which nowadays is almost identical with the root word ‘duct’. This notion of guidance is important in the context of this paper because of its implicit educational inference between the teacher with the student, or a student with a colleague. Con-duct, though, should rather emphasise a meaning of inter-action that is fundamental for the Aristotelian understanding of the human being as a political animal; while, according to Oakeshott, ‘what joins agents *in conduct* is to be recognized as a “practice”[...]’ (Oakeshott 1975, p.55 –emphasis added). Following this line of thought, my overall argument will support an understanding of Ethics that appears *in* ‘practice’ and especially, a narrower notion of practice, that of *praxis*. For education, this means that the conduct of Ethics appears not only *in action*, but more specifically *in* the exercise of the actual process of education; the educational *praxis*, in its most mundane level of everyday life.

In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle defined three prominent ways of life. The first one, ‘the life of enjoyment’, Aristotle dismissed as ‘vulgar’, since it is the way of life that identifies ‘the good or

happiness, with pleasure' (1998, 1095b 14, p.6). The other two ways of life are the 'political' and the 'contemplative'.⁶ According to Nicolaus Lobckowicz (1967), the 'political life' is the origin of our contemporary notion of *practice* and the 'contemplative life' is the origin to our understanding of *theory*: 'In fact Aristotle seems to have been the first Greek thinker to reduce the many different walks of life to three and in a sense to two, thus becoming the first to explicitly contrast "theory" and "practice" ' (1967, p.4). Since Aristotle, the distinction between the equivalent Greek terms of '*theoria*' and '*praxis*' has been central to the Western philosophical tradition, forming a fundamental opposition. Furthermore, Aristotle very often 'introduces a more refined distinction between "*poesis*" and "*praxis*" ' (Bernstein 1971, p.ix), a difference that is rendered in English as 'making' and 'doing'. A characteristic example of the above distinction is the title of the Architectural Humanities Research Association (AHRA) conference, *The Politics of Making: Theory, Practice, Product*, that took place in Oxford in November 2006. Namely its subtitle appears to have adopted the established Aristotelian categories; a fact that is also apparent from the correspondence of the conference's three strands, being divided into Theory, Practice and Product, with the three basic types of Aristotelian knowledge.⁷

⁶ An earlier version of this tripartite distinction is attributed to Pythagoras who described the human conducts through a metaphor of a festival: Some people join in it in order to sell their merchandise and gain money; some to display their physical force; and some only to admire the beauty of the displayed things as well as the speeches and the performances. Lobckowicz 1967, p.5 mentions this story accrediting Cicero and Jamblichus, who refer to a lost treatise of Heracleides of Pontus.

⁷ Aristotle 1989, 1025b 25 in *Metaphysics* claims that 'every intellectual activity is either practical or productive or speculative'. See also Ross 1964, p.187.

Elsewhere, I have analysed in detail the philosophical origins of the terms ‘thinking,’ ‘making’, and ‘doing’ by revisiting Aristotle’s Ethical writings through two dipoles: *theoria/praxis* (Koutsoumpos 2006) and *poesis/praxis* (Koutsoumpos 2007), and because of the limited space, I will take the details of this analysis for granted. Here, I can only summarise the overall argument that *theoria* is an understanding of theory that does not proceed from practice and does not prescribe and predetermine action, but it rather *participates in the praxis*. On the other hand, the difference between *poesis* and *praxis* lies in the fact that making is an activity that has a purpose, an aim, an end or a *telos*, that is outside the activity itself (building a house); while doing is an activity that embodies an aim in itself (playing the flute). My overall project challenges the above categories, especially the dominance of *theoria* and *poesis* over *praxis*, and argues for the possibility of seeing architecture as a form of *praxis* or ‘doing’. In what follows I examine the previous theoretical discourse on a concrete situation of the design studio in architecture.

The situation of ‘ethics of borderlands’ in the design studio

Ethnomethodological studies *analyze everyday activities as members’ methods* [...] Their study is directed to the tasks of *learning* how members’ actual, ordinary activities consist of methods to make *practical* actions, *practical* circumstances, *common sense* knowledge of social structures, and *practical* sociological reasoning analyzeable; and of discovering the formal properties of *commonplace*, *practical common sense* actions, “*from within*” actual settings, as ongoing accomplishments of those settings. (Garfinkel 1967, p.vii-viii –emphasis added).

The key study below is part of a wider research project that examines the manifestation of Ethics in three educational case studies: the architectural design studio, the music class and the *dojo* (the place for the education of martial arts). The use of the everyday situations to answer theoretical problems is actually not different from Wittgenstein's later suggestion of philosophising: inquiring ethics *without* philosophy. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein adopted a much more diffuse and humble style of writing, 'showing his unsayable answer to an unutterable question. *Here*, in a life exemplified by this sort of writing, by this kind of attention to things, is found "the sense of life" ' (Edwards 1982, p. 104, –emphasis added). Wittgenstein in his later work came to suggest that '[t]here is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies' (Wittgenstein 2001, par. 133). One such 'method' or therapy⁸ that was strongly influenced from Wittgenstein's thought is *ethnomethodology* (Lynch 1993, p.20). Developed by Harold Garfinkel in the late '60s, ethnomethodology still remains today one of the most unconventional means of sociological analysis, exactly because of its radical way of de-literalising the common understandings of the way that people accomplish their actions, through a painstaking focus on the practical and mundane horizon of everyday situated practices. The following

⁸ 'Ethnomethodological studies are not directed to formulating or arguing correctives. They are useless when they are done as ironies. Although they are directed to the preparation of manuals on sociological methods, these are in no way supplements to "standard procedure," but are distinct of them. They do not formulate a remedy for practical action, as if it was being found about practical action that they were better or worse than they are usually cracked up to be. Nor are they in search of humanistic arguments, nor do they engage in or encourage permissive discussions of theory'. Garfinkel 1967, p.viii.

presentation⁹ of the situation and its analysis owes a lot to an ethnomethodological understanding of the way that people give accounts about their methods.

In the design studio of the School of Architecture of the University of Edinburgh, a tutor (John) and a group of students (amongst them Mary) were having a tutorial. They were all sitting around a big table where drawings, models and a laptop lay on top. David, the course organiser, came by and having attended part of the tutorial-discussion between John and the students, he made a long (>30 min) intervention (Figure 1). At some point Mary came to ask about the purpose of the project (Figure 2):

Mary: I just wanted to ask (.) sometimes (we want to be) (0.5) that (1) e:m (0.5) I need to figure out (.) some kind of (.) pu:rpore in order to (prioritise)(concretise) (.) for example (.) my question (0.5) for the information (in each case)

David: Okeyy

John: I think that was (.) part of (.) our discussion (.) our initial discussion (0.5) when they were trying to describe their project=

D: =So what is your purpose?

M: That is what I a:m trying to figure out fro:m (0.5) e::m what questions tha::t (I have) (0.5) and (.) wha:t (.) seems to be interesting to: (.) deal with [so this]

D: [but you already] answered the (.) (main aim) (0.5) your purpose is to investigate (.) here (2) that

⁹ Here, I have used the Conversation Analysis' transcript techniques offered by Emanuel Schegloff, in his online transcription project <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/schegloff/TranscriptionProject/index.html> (23. 03. 2007). In brief, the number in parenthesis indicate the length of a pause in seconds and the bracketed words represents overlapping speech.

is your (purpose) isn't it? (0.5) em and in investigating here with all the skills and the techniques that you have and (enschooled) as an architect (0.5) which include the fact that the project (makes) interventions (it is just experiment isn't it?) big interventions (.) and (.) we are drawing (again) as we like it (.) as we see it (.) as we understand it and as we gather more and more information (in it) (1) maybe in the process of doing that (.) the purpose of your (endeavour) is: (.) to establish (further purpose) (.) to establish (further purpose) (1.5) but we know that the difference that drives all purposes (.) thus far is the interest (.) in (0.5) reconsidering (.) the traditional notion of limits (0.5) architectural limitation (.) and that's already driving your (intrigence area) because you found (.) this line (.) goes out quite far (0.5) the river is merely a line (when amount) (.) does not omit (.) and it has traditions (.) conventions (.) being (caused) already (1) there are (merely) new techniques further underlining that (.) line (1) I mean what (particularly) issue someone etc etc (0.5) so there are all sorts of purposes yeah? Is this not good enough purpose? =

M: ahm ((affirming))

D: I don't think we need purpose in sense of the use of your purpose is to design a museum (.) your purpose is to design and archive (.) your purpose is to make a primary school (.) your purpose is (.) you know (.) maybe that might be a programmatic value of plan that could rise from this investigation of limits of the city (1) I think that's where (.) we are quite useful to the city authorities (in the purpose that) they would have an agenda which may much more driven by the scientific technological advancement program (1) (while we) we may want to look at the fantastic (.) wonderful context of Shanghai (.) and show architectural language (.) as it comes out of the reevaluation of (.) its: historical limits (4) Simple isn't it?

Student: Hehh ((laughs affirming))

J: But I guess (.) they have to give an answer and (2) on how they understand these limits (.) they have to to ha(.) have a proposition against how they [would]

- D: [but they]=
- J: =if they would have to transform it and this [is I] think the job of the archit[ect]
- D: [I agree] [I agree]
- J: =then they need to have a tendency and this is what a thesis is [in my understanding]
- D: [Well I think (.) if you take that slo]wly (.) you need to have (.) an understanding of the limits
- J: Ahm ((affirming))
- D: and you say oke::y (.) lets do that (.) so what do we do: as architects (.) we draw (.) where all the drawings are limits (0.5) these are all wonderful limits (.) born out of techni:ques of representations (1) but they are not necessarily the limits of this thesis (.) what limits (.) that's clear limitation when you section you draw limits (.) that's the main key about sections (.) that's why we draw them all the time (.) that why it's difficult as architects to (.) eh (0.5) realise sometimes that what we are doing (.) (in principle) (intrinsically) (.) is limiting (1) is why (.) is interesting to (.) invert (.) that (.) picture (0.5) of (.) ou:r sections as (.) em: (0.5) connectivity (...vity) rather than (2)
- J: separation=
- D: =separation. (3) A project of (.) I mean you don't hear this (.) in architecture schools (.) because this is difficult to imagine (.) given our normal lexicons (.) but (.) how do you draw (.) an inrelation=
- J: =hh ((affirming)) (1)
- D: as opposed to a section (0.5) because under the (0.5) ethics of borderlands (and our interest) (.) in borderlands

you would have to draw an inrelation (0.5) (inaudible)
 (2) You'd have to change the title (.) of our (.)
 orthographic eh tradition (0.5) to draw inrelations. (1) It
 is quite good, [isn't it] John?

- J: [aha:]
 ((affirming))
- D: I know (.) I have to remember that (.) hhh[hh]hhhh
 ((laughter))
- J: [hh]
 ((laughter affirming))
- D: I have never said it that way before=
- J: =hhhh ((laughter)) (1.5)
- D: I have written it in all sorts of (0.5) (converting) ways but
 that is very clear (0.5) to draw an inrelation (.) Jesus.

The above discussion gives a first hint that, in spite of the theoretical obstacles pointed out by Wittgenstein for the communication and education of Ethics, students and tutors in the design studio do discuss notions of Ethics in architectural contexts. These notions of Ethics are not just abstract or theoretical reflections about goodness or badness in general, but they are actually rooted deeply in architecture. The whole discussion evolves around the concept of *section*, one of the most fundamental tools of architectural representation. In the above dialogue, every architectural view is a section (including plans and elevations), and for this it draws limits. This leads David to speak explicitly in the given extract about the *Ethics of Borderlands*, despite the arguments for the ineffability of Ethics by Wittgenstein.

This dialogue also provides a first glimpse of the fact that the students and the tutors were not just exchanging logical propositions or pure statements about Ethical issues as passive agents. On the contrary, Mary appeared to ask for advice that can be seen as having to do with Ethics. When asking for a purpose to understand her own questions in order to choose ‘what is interesting to deal with’ she is acknowledging an impasse, a lack of aim, or *telos*, in her work so far. Although that in her words it is not clear if this is an Ethical impasse or a general question about the brief of the building that she has to design, David deliberately opens up the discussion to Ethics by introducing the aim as ‘the establishment of difference’ and that ‘the difference that drives all purposes is the interest in reconsidering the traditional notion of limits and architectural limitation’. The purpose is not just the brief that defines the conventional category of the building (museum, school, archive), but rather the experimentation with the overcoming of limits and the drawing of ‘inrelations’ through conventional sections. In this sense, it is obvious that the teacher did actually engage in conveying moral education to the students by providing examples and suggestions on how an Ethical architecture should be approached. He even makes this explicit with the use of the phrase the ‘Ethics of Borderlands’.

From the beginning part of this paper, I have pointed out that the main difference between *praxis* and *poesis* is the existence of an aim beyond the activity itself. In some sense we can suggest that the whole dialogue was concerned exactly with the destabilization of *telos* or aim in architecture. According to that discussion, the teacher and the student used the term ‘purpose’ that is very similar if not identical to that of aim or *telos*. I already mentioned before that when Mary asks about a ‘purpose’ it points towards a lack of aim, or *telos*,

in her work. Moreover, I pointed out that David deliberately gave an Ethical twist to her question by promoting ‘the establishment of difference’ as an ultimate aim, going beyond conventional notions that see the purpose as the brief or the program that leads directly to a building. For this reason, the purpose of the project was not given in advance in a handout, but it was constructed in the design studio as part of the educational process. In what follows I show how different ‘purposes’ are constructed in the dialogue.

First of all, Mary’s question came to initiate a new sub-theme, that of ‘purpose-finding’, in a discussion that was considering issues of representation as sectioning. Nevertheless very quickly Mary’s role in the discussion was superseded by David’s long responses, and also by a secondary discussion between the two tutors. David’s long responses, in particular, structure the above situation into three distinct parts. In some sense his responses can be described as monologues not only because of their length and the lack of interaction from the other parties, but also because of the fact each response has an internal structure that includes a start, middle and end. The ending is being made especially explicit by the announcement of a rhetorical question each time: ‘Is this not good enough purpose?’, ‘Simple, isn’t it?’, ‘It is quite good, isn’t it John?’ These monologues convey an explicit theoretical delivery of notions of morality. As David was telling the students just before the given extract, the section is an action of separation, distantiation and ghettoing, or organization, neatening and tidying, according to which side of the coin one chooses to focus on. By drawing or creating walls and boundaries of various forms, architects continually make ethical decisions that historically, at the city level, have led to ghetto-sectioning Jews ‘in the sixteenth century in Venice’, or mad people

‘in eighteenth or nineteenth century in Europe’. ‘Your sections draw limits,’ says David to the students and what we as architects are doing ‘in principle is limiting’. David was setting an external rule, that ‘limiting is bad’, and that what the students should do is supersede this by drawing ‘inrelations’ instead of sections. He even titled this moral lesson as the ‘Ethics of Borderlands’. This understanding of Ethics is very similar to the concept of *morality*. No matter how Ethically correct and progressive this idea of drawing inrelations is, the way that it is delivered, through these kind of monologues that aim to stimulate the students through their reflective faculties, aim to point the students towards the ‘right way’ of *morality*. Nevertheless, David did not actually give a lecture about the Ethics of Borderlands, and the monologues were actually part of a dialogue where the different parties negotiated the purposes of the project.

This negotiation becomes apparent in the way that the three parties use personal pronouns in the above excerpt, revealing very different approaches of purpose that have to do with the notion of aim or *telos* of the architectural action. First of all Mary makes her question in first-person singular, referring to a personal problem, a situation that she is facing right now: ‘I need to figure out some kind of purpose’. David’s first monologue started with referring to Mary’s problem in particular by using second person: ‘Your purpose is to investigate here’, ‘the skills and techniques that *you* have’. Very soon though he introduces the project, and from then on he switches to first-person plural: ‘We are drawing as *we* like it’, or ‘*we* know that the difference that drives all purposes’. By this fact he starts to include the demands of the project and those that are part of it, like an ideal group of students who are approaching this ideal purpose. When he has to make a specific comment on Mary he returns to the

second-person: 'That is already driving *your* area, because *you* found this line'. The second part of the monologue (after Mary's affirmation) starts with the repetitive use of the second-person again, but this time not to refer to Mary's specific problem, but rather in order to emphasise an imperative voice that imposes a rule: '*Your* purpose is to design a museum', in the same sense that we understand a sentence '*You* shall not steal!' This second paragraph emphasises David's personal view of the topic by saying '*I* think'. The second-person plural follows to show again a different category; the role of the architects, in contrast to the third person plural; the role of the commissioning authorities. '*We* are quite useful to the planning authorities, in the purpose that *they* would have an agenda', the distinction here is not very far from the practice/theory division as presented before.

John nevertheless intervened, and started using the third person plural in order to refer to the students: '*they* have to give an answer, on how *they* understand these limits, *they* have to have a proposition[...]' which emphasises the responsibility of the students to commit in a design proposal, that needs an aim. Finally in the third part of David's monologue, he said: '*You* need to have an understanding of the limits and *you* say ok lets do that, so what do *we* do as architects? *We* draw!' Again, here, David changes from the second-person singular to the second-person plural in order to differentiate, somehow, John's views from his own that are part of what an 'ideal' again group of architects do. David also says: 'that's a limitation when *you* section *you* draw limits that's the main key about sections that's why *we* draw them all the time'. In this case the second-person singular is making a reference to the student's work again, a fact that is confirmed by the fact that, while saying this,

David points towards the model and looks toward the student. The change to the second-person plural, 'that's why *we* draw them all the time', starts to refer to the totality of architects who admit of being sometimes unaware of 'what *we* are doing'. Finally, after John's affirmation, David changes back to the clear second person singular-plural distinction in order to emphasise the responsibility of the students in contrast to the 'ideal' standards of the project: '[...]under the ethics of borderlands (and *our* interest) in borderlands *you* would have to draw an inrelation[...]'.

From the above analysis we can see vividly the variety of purposes or aims that one can find in architecture, and how these are constructed through discussion between the students and the tutors. There is the first-person singular (*I*) or personal purpose that here is identified with a need to set up the program of the brief for a building; there is the second-person singular (*you*) purpose that refers to the students and their responsibility to meet an imperative purpose in order to be part of 'the project', or part of the ideal team that understands the purpose; there is the third-person plural (*they*) referring again to the responsibility of the students in order to cultivate a tendency towards a thesis; and there is the first-person plural (*we*) that refers to the ideal team of students that understand the purpose or sometimes the totality of architects that are misled but should go back to the 'right' purpose: *Drawing inrelations* (according to the Ethics of borderlands).

All these different purposes are actually external to the activity of architecture. While the purpose in the case of poetics is different from the activity itself, in the *praxis* it is inherent in the activity. In this sense, in terms of Ethics, architecture as *poesis* has a purpose that is external to it, and for this is related to *morality*. On the other hand

architecture as *praxis* has a purpose that is internal to it, and for this it is related to *ethics*. Nevertheless, the variety of purposes in this situation of the design studio, was constructed *in* the dialogue that consists of the educational activity itself. Although it may reflect moral beliefs and opinions about how architecture is being done, the way that these beliefs were negotiated in the dialogue was not given in advance as a theoretical remedy, or crystallised from the beginning. For this, the educational practice was not a form of making that was leading towards an explicit aim, but it was a form of *praxis*, where the educational aim was inherent in the educational activity: the dialogue.

The dialogue as *praxis* is not relying only on the succession of reflective responses that aim to deliver each time a monologue. Dialogue as *praxis* is a participation in a state of mind characterised by an openness towards the other, and this creates a horizon that is habituated during the educational *praxis*. As Jodie Nicotra argues in *The Force of Habit*, habit does not *stick to* an individual, in a sense that a self pre-exists, and then habit comes to join it. On the contrary, habit *happens to* one (Nicotra 2005, p.8), in a sense that is beyond one's free will, and at the same time is constitutive of the self; the self is a collection of habits. Deleuze describes the constitution of the self like this: 'We are habits, nothing but habits: the habit of saying "I"' (Deleuze 1991, p.x –cited in Nicotra 2005, p.1). So when each party was conversing in the dialogue delivering *moral* views about Ethics, at the very same time they were habitually using personal pronouns to communicate these Ethical ideas. This habitual response embodies *ethics* in the *praxis* of the dialogue, and it was part of undeclared lessons of this course. In this way we can see that *ethics* and *morality*, although they are connected, since they refer to

evaluation of good and bad or right and wrong as part of the overall Ethical discourse, differ in something extremely substantive. Morality's nature is inseparably related to a normative evaluation external to a practice, while 'ethics' has a descriptive character internal to it. This difference as we saw above is not just a difference in degree or value, but a difference of nature and for this reason should not be mixed, especially in the area of education.

Concluding remarks

It [architecture] may be better grasped *as a verb rather than through its heterogeneous products*; it is a process with inherent value. The presence of a well-grounded *praxis*, the trajectory of an architect's words and deeds over time that embody a responsible practical philosophy, is far more crucial than the aesthetic or functional qualities of a particular work. (Pérez-Gómez 2006, p.205, emphasis added).

This paper attempted a revisit of human action in order to locate the area where *morality* and *ethics* become manifested. Action, conduct, *ergon* and *energeiai* lead to an examination of the Aristotelian notions of *theoria*, *poesis* and *praxis*, of which the first two are connected with *morality* as the so far privileged discourse of Ethics, having to do with normative evaluations according to an external rule. *Praxis*, on the other hand, the activity that does not have an aim apart from the activity itself, embodies *ethics*, the spontaneous evaluation that is based on habit, custom and disposition. This *praxis* in the architectural design studio is the dialogue itself that leads the trajectory.

In this sense, this paper defends the hypothesis that Wittgenstein gestures towards; an area of Ethics that has the

characteristics of an ineffable discourse. A discourse which, although is implicit, cannot be expressed, cannot be put in words, it can arguably be taught through a tacit mode of undeclared lessons. This area of Ethics is *ethics* that is very different from the canonical view that sees Ethics as a normative doctrine. *Morality*, on the other hand, although effable, explicit, expressible and reflective, *cannot* be taught exactly because of its normative character that resists the rationalization of Ethics.

The mundane activity of *praxis* was found to encompass the *ethics* of the educational activity, diluted in the repetitive nature of the dialogue in the context of the design studio. On the other hand, *morality* was found to be part of a distilling process that refines argument about how things should be – here, the Ethics of Borderlands. During this process of dilution and distillation, although *ethics* and *morality* are connected, since they refer to evaluation of good and bad or right and wrong as part of the spirit of the overall Ethical discourse, they differ in something extremely substantive. *Morality's* nature is inseparably related to a normative evaluation external to a practice, while *ethics* has a descriptive character internal to it. This difference as we saw above is not just a difference of degree or value, but a difference of nature and for this reason should not be mixed, especially in the area of education.

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Ethics and the Architectural Design Studio: 1+3 Ahistorical Metaphors

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The metaphor of education as a marketplace for ideas is not new in the post-modern era. This paper argues that the architectural design studio is not only a site for free, promiscuous and productive exchange. It is also a site for demonstration, showing, doing and making, as captured in the topoi of agora, gymnasium and dojo. What is the character of these creative heterotopic metaphors?

Introduction: Metaphors, Ethics, and the Design Studio

The last conference of the International Union of Architects -the highest forum for Architects internationally to shape thoughts on architecture- was titled 'Cities: Grand Bazaar of Architecture'¹. The premise of this innovative theme was one great metaphor; that architectural education is a *bazaar* of knowledge. This metaphor suggests in terms of place that the design studio, the core of architectural education, is itself a *bazaar*. This paper, will reflect on the extremely wide concept of Ethics in architectural design education, by challenging one particular view of this metaphor; the one that sees the *bazaar* as the place of free and promiscuous trading, where Ethics have no place.

In order to do that I will suggest a series of alternative metaphors: the design studio as an *agora*, as a *gymnasium* and as a *dojo* (the place for the education of Japanese martial arts). These metaphors will illustrate a schema with three different levels of discourse concerning Ethics that take place in the design studio; a schema that contrasts, in terms of ethics, the design studio as a *bazaar* against the design studio as an *agora*, a *gymnasium* and a *dojo*.

Apart from the first metaphor of the *bazaar* which is taken by the UIA congress' theme, the other three are chosen without any chronological, topological, geographical or historical order. For this one should not try to find in this paper an account of the function, the history or the architectural stylistic difference of these places, because I have focused on their general, common sense and usage in order to reveal hidden characteristics of Ethics in the design studio. The *bazaar* the *agora*, the *gymnasium* and the *dojo*, should be seen as abstract places that serve as models to

enhance our understanding of the design studio itself. What holds them together is the narrative that I am going to unfold, hoping to illustrate in an interesting way the different Ethical layers that one can see in architectural design education.

The *ahistorical* understanding of the design studio that I propose here, is not trying to substitute any scholarly historical review of design education. Since Renaissance, the emergence of the design studio as part of the architectural education provides a long history of explicit teaching and learning that was taking place in didactic places beyond the construction site or the Lodges of the Free Masons. From *Academia Platonica*, constituted by Lorenzo de Medici and onwards, architectural profession constituted a new *ethos* that was reflecting (and reflected by) a new architectural education. Académie Royale d' Architecture, École Polytechnique, École Royale des Beaux Arts, Bauhaus, Illinois Institute of Technology, Cooper Union, Architectural Association are maybe the most important stops in the trip of architectural education over the last 500 years². Nevertheless, a lot of issues -that are, I argue, fundamentally Ethical issues- remain still open. In various formal forums on architectural education, from the Oxford conference in 1958, until the recent UIA congress³, architecture schools and institutions are still straggling to find their way for an education with impact to the build environment.

The *ahistorical* metaphors presented here; the *design studio as a bazaar*, as opposed to the *design studio as an agora*, as a *gymnasium* and as a *dojo*, are arguing for a need to *forgetting* history, temporarily, in order to *create new* understanding of Ethics in the design studio. The *ahistorical*, according to Nietzsche,⁴ is beyond history; it is *suprahistorical* and its role of concealing things under the veil of forgetfulness, is as important as the need to root them in the historical and the *remembrance* of being as part of the world. For this, the *ahistorical* metaphors are not caricatures of places, but representations of paradigmatic places deriving from a common understanding of the terms⁵.

In this sense, metaphor here is used as an *ahistorical tool* to force the production of new meaning. For example, when we read Shakespeare's words through

Romeo's lips that "Juliet is the sun", we can understand the metaphor without necessarily referring to the swift between the Aristotelian and the Copernican universe, or the whole discourse about heliocentrism, that took place at the same historical time⁶ of the writing of the play (although such an interpretation would be very interesting, indeed). Through common sense, one can understand a palpable and poetic metaphor of love, as Juliet is compared to the sun, despite the fact that she has nothing physically in common with a glowing star and despite our historic knowledge of the order of the universe.

Moreover, postmodernism has emphasised on metaphor's power to reveal hidden characteristics, or to enhance understanding, usually not by clarifying, things but rather by enriching them, making them flourish through their difference. Especially in the Hermeneutic philosophical tradition metaphor appears to be a journey⁷. Leaving home to go to the 'other', the unknown; in order to come back again wealthier. In our case the home is the design studio and the other, the unknown, is the *bazaar*, the *agora*, the *gymnasium* and the *dojo*.

The design studio as a bazaar

A *bazaar* is a market, often covered, typically found in areas of Middle Eastern culture. The word seems to come to the English language through the Italian word *bazarrà*, deriving from the Persian word *bazār* (Pahlavi *vacar*)⁸. The Oxford English Dictionary suggests that the *bazaar* is an oriental market-place or permanent market, usually consisting of ranges of shops or stalls, where all kinds of merchandise are offered for sale.

In this metaphor I would like to stand on the common sense of the bazaar that sees it as an ideal, prototype free market which is supposed to be ruled by the policy of *laissez-faire*, without ethical or commercial rules. The *bazaar* as commercial market is characterized by the extremely wide variety of merchandise and people. Potentially at the same place one can find the richest traders and the poorest beggars; the most delicate essences and aromas, blending with the smell of spices and foods; and even maybe from the fresh flesh and the blood of slaughtered animals.

Anything goes trying to persuade buyers and sellers of the existence of something interesting to trade. There,

in the *bazaar*, one can find the most bizarre things. The most exotic spices standing together with the most common ones; saffron next to salt; the most precious stone rings next to the *faux bijoux*.

The colourful and lively environment of flux in the *bazaar* confuses the senses. One could feel dizzy, be afraid of the flow and the noise, try to get her/himself out of it. But the most common reaction for people is to throw themselves into the stream without any hesitation, try to grasp any given chance; swim with or against the flow, start to commerce their merchandise, becoming hawkers and hagglers, without any ethical hesitation.



Fig. 1: Students queuing for Zaha

The core of architectural education, the design studio, appears to obtain these characteristics of the *bazaar*. It is very common to have at the same time teachers with extremely different academic interests standing side by side or in the studio next door trying to sell what they believe as 'true' architecture. The variety of the students also appears to be quite amazing. Especially in the famous Western design schools one can find people of literally every place of the world. All of them trying to find in the various 'Meccas' of design the key answers for being good architects or just certificates that can be traded at a good price in the design market when they will graduate.

Moreover a very common practice in the contemporary design schools is to organize panegyric⁹ lectures inviting speakers from all over the world. The pop stars/idols of architecture fly from the one school

to the other in order to reflect their wisdom upon the problems of architecture and the solutions they propose. Radical, Cutting Edge, Fractal, Folded Anti-Theory and generally ‘Out there’; putting before the making of good architecture the ‘Wow Factor’ or the ‘Sustainability Agenda’¹⁰. A parade of ideas and styles that even if it is not taking place literally in the design studio it tries to sell itself for application in it, looking for followers and supporters.

This flux of an extremely wide variety of people and ideas makes the design studio seem as if everything goes, as in the *bazaar*. Even in a closer look, OED suggests a second definition for the *bazaar*: “A fancy fair in imitation of the Eastern *bazaar*.... Also used of a shop, or arcade of shops, displaying an assortment of fancy goods”¹¹ (see quot. 1889). But is the design studio one of these shops? Is the trading in the design studio a fancy fair selling fancy goods? Can *anything go* in the design studio? Is the design studio a place without rules, where Ethics have no place? My answer is ‘no’.

The design studio as an agora

In an attempt to support this answer I introduce the metaphor that sees *the design studio as an agora*. The comparison and the contrast of the previous metaphor that sees the design studio as a bazaar and the new one reflecting to each other reveal a first ethical layer of the design studio.

The ancient Greek *agora* was not only the locus of trading like the *bazaar* but also for governing. It was “a large, open public space which served as a place for assembly of the citizens and, hence, the political, civic, religious and commercial centre of a Greek city.”¹² The *agora* was the first step for the constitution of the early Greek states-*polis*¹³, as opposed to the barbaric. “The uncivilized condition of the Cyclopes is characterized by their wanting such an assembly”¹⁴. The power and the rights of the people that participated in these assemblies are not clear especially in the early stages¹⁵. It is clear though that there was a change and an evolution during the Homeric, archaic, and classical periods and every ancient Greek polis interpreted the institution in a different way. The highlight of classical times is the Athenian *agora* mainly because of the democratic government.

*The law courts were located there, and any citizen who happened to be in the agora when a case was being heard, could be forced to serve as a juror; the Scythian archers, a kind of mercenary police force, often wandered the agora specifically looking for jurors.*¹⁶

The Athenian *agora* was at the same time the place for trading and decision making, both a market and a place of governance. The presence of politics in the most central and open place of the city was not only a functional characteristic, but mainly a symbolic statement of the way that the city was ruled. Furthermore, Despotopoulos suggests that the primitive *agora* was the core around which the city developed¹⁷. This dual character of the ancient Greek *agora* was balancing the individual interest of the market with the common good of the city. The equal presence of trade and politics constituted the citizens’ *ethos* forming both their rights and duties.

The presence of decision making as ethical duty has not always been part of the architectural agenda. Especially the last “...three decades of postmodern,



Fig. 2: Code of Ethics & Professional Conduct, American Institute of Architects, 2004

poststructuralist, and deconstructive experimentation”¹⁸ architecture seemed to have marginalized the question about the duties of the architect. One could also argue that the rights that were discussed, were only the rights of a formalistic exercise or an aesthetic game, a *phantasmagoria*¹⁹; “...an architecture treated as playboys treated life, jumping from one sensation to another and quickly bored with everything”.²⁰ The last years there is an increased concern about the ethical aspects of architecture.

The most common concept of ethics, opposing the common perception of the design studio as a *laissez-faire bazaar*, focuses on the duty of the student as a potential professional and consequently on the *professional ethics* of architecture. In order to define the rights and the duties of architecture, codes of practice are constituted. Governmental and non-governmental, organizations construct Canons, Rules of Conduct and Ethical Standards²¹ in order to formalise an ethical behaviour among the profession.

*Members of The American Institute of Architects are dedicated to the highest standards of professionalism, integrity and competence. This Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct states the guidelines for the conduct of the Members in fulfilling those obligations.*²²

This formalisation even though it forms a law itself, it is beyond the laws that prescribe a building’s technical details, regulations about the fire escapes, the height of the buildings or the minimum standards of a corridor. Professional ethics try to define an ethically ‘good’ or ‘right’ way of practising architecture -as opposed to a ‘bad’ or a ‘wrong’ one-, by describing the responsibilities and the obligations that the architect has against the public, the clients, the profession and the architectural colleagues²³. Principles like “honesty, integrity and competency, as well as concern for others and for the environment”²⁴ are expected to form the values for ‘good’ practice.

Professional ethics is the first layer of ethics that apply in architecture, affecting the design studio, mainly in an indirect way. More and more in the future, the students will be asked to incorporate in the design studio such codes of practice which are going to impose themselves as an imperative rule. It is obvious that the

descriptive and absolute account of standards for the qualifications of the future architect raises problems of applicability of rules and freedom of thought.

The design studio as a gymnasium

Through the metaphor of *the design studio as a gymnasium*, a different kind of ethics shows itself, which will turn out to be much less technical and transcendental to architecture than the professional Ethics of the *agora*. But let’s see first what the gymnasium is.

Gymnasium is a place or building for the practice of or instruction in athletic exercises; a gymnastic school²⁵. Literally it means the place to train naked (*gymnos*). Gymnastics, physical exercise, was extremely important part of a young’s education in Ancient Greece and it was continuing in all ages. Of course there were differences in the way that different states understood these terms. The Dorians were seeing *gymnasium* as a place to harden the body and train in military discipline, while “the Ionians and especially the Athenians, they had an additional and higher object, namely, to give to the body and its movements grace and beauty, and to make it the basis of a healthy and sound mind.”²⁶



Fig. 3: Education in the gymnasium. Musical instruments and scrolls or books indicate the strong presence of subjects beyond athletics.

Ancient Greece’s citizens tried to prepare young people for the *agora* (political and professional). This education, both mental and physical took place together in the *gymnasia*. Athens in particular possessed three great gymnasia -the Lyceum, the Cynosarges, and the Academia. It is well know also that these three gymnasia constituted the three main branches of the classic philosophy; the Aristotelian,

the Stoic and the Platonic tradition. For the same reason the word *gymnasium* tended also to mean “philosophic school”²⁷.

The design studio is also the place where philosophy is taught, as in the *gymnasium*. ‘Philosophy’, not as a separate marginal course in architectural education that is used to ‘expand’ horizons or provide a better understanding of architecture as humanistic discipline. But rather philosophy as the essence of *philosophia* (the love, study, or pursuit of wisdom [OED]), the fundamental examining of the world in order to understand it.

The new metaphor of the design studio as a *gymnasium* challenges the relationship of architecture with the concepts of right and the duty, giving a different notion of ethics, than the professional ethics seen in the agora. This time ethics as part of philosophy are incorporated in the design studio. Maurice Laugeaux argues that architecture raises ethical issues because it “produces an obligatory framework for social life”²⁸, allowing or not people to come together, or prescribing the way that they perform socially. The design studio is the place in architectural education where these ethical problems are supposed to be raised, discussed and solutions to be proposed.

Harries in the *Ethical Function of Architecture* while wondering on the role that philosophy can play to architecture, argues that “uncertainty has spilled over into our schools of architecture”²⁹. This uncertainty does not only come from the difficulty of giving answer to Ethical problems. Part of it, comes from the inherent difficulty of communication between the teacher and the student of the potential propositions that embody ethical meanings.

Early Wittgenstein, in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, made clear that from now on the philosophical discourse will always be embodied into the language. Distinguishing every possible proposition to Logic, Aesthetic and Ethic, he made explicit that “ethics cannot be expressed”³⁰ meaning that ethics are not part of the logical use of language, which is the only one that can be expressed. He also ended this work with his famous enigmatic quote that “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”³¹

How is it possible then the communication of the philosophical propositions concerning ethics in the design studio? How can one exercise/discuss in the *gymnasium* of the design discourse about the rights and the duties of architecture as they revealed in this new layer of ethical discourse? How can the teachers and the students communicate with words about the ‘obligatory framework’ that is going to enclose, construct or produce our social life?

The design studio as a dojo

Trying to answer this question I will introduce the last metaphor that describes *the design studio as a dojo*. This new metaphor brings to light a final layer of Ethics, which is so internal to the architectural design education that one can see them as inseparable.

Dojo is a Japanese word that means the place for practising mainly the traditional martial arts. OED suggests that *dojo* is “a room or a hall in which judo is practised”, but this is a rather narrow or inaccurate definition. Actually the *dojo* is not necessarily an enclosed space; it could be every site or physical location where a practise could take place. At the same time it is not restricted only to the practise of judo but it is used specifically for every kind of martial art (like *kendo* and *aikido*); and generally for every art.

The word *dojo* in Japanese language consists of two characters *do-jo* (道場) that means *way-place*. Literally *dojo* means “the place of the Way”³². The two characters are borrowed from the Chinese script where they pronounced *dao-chang* and have the same meaning as in Japanese. Furthermore it seems to correspond to the Sanskrit word *bodhimanda*, the “place where one cultivates the Way, or one’s spiritual Path. The original Wayplace was the spot under the Bodhi tree where the Buddha became fully enlightened. The term ‘Wayplace’ includes monasteries and other auspicious sites where people, either singly or together, put the Buddhadharma into practice.”³³

Returning back to the Japanese language, *dojo* is every place where a particular *way* is cultivated (*kendo* –the way of the sword-, *aikido* –the way of the balance of the spirit- etc). For this reason it is used referring also to the tea ceremony (*sado* –the way of the tea-) and the art of calligraphy (*shodo*- the way of writing). “A speciality (e.g. studies, arts), a manner according

to a *field*³⁴ is constitutive part of the *dojo*. At the same time “a *dojo* is a practical kind of place, used not only to foster lofty ideas, but to realize them in some physical or at least palpable way”³⁵. Hereafter by *dojo* I will mean the place for practising martial arts because I am particularly interested in its educational character based on the explicit existence of students and teachers, which is less profound in the other ways like the *sado*.

One could understand better the concept of *do-way* by understanding some points of the education in the *dojo*. A very brief description of the sessions should include a very short time of meditation followed by some warming up stretching. The main course consists of a number of demonstrations of the way, performed by the teacher, that the students every time have to practise individually or in pairs. The sessions end again with meditation and a quite ritual way of thanking each other.



Fig. 4: Education in the *dojo*

In the *dojo* the teaching and equally the learning is ideally a voiceless procedure. The *dojo* is a relatively quiet and spiritual place where, especially in the beginning, the amateur student literally imitates the others. The whole education in the *dojo* is happening through *gestures* that designate the appropriate movements should be done without relying on the voice as a means of explanation. The understanding in the *dojo* is happening slowly and evolves during the exercise of practice. Although someone has straight from the beginning an overall view of the way, since it is very common that students from every level practise

at the same time, the understanding gets broader, wider and deeper through time.

Gestures in the *dojo* are not only literal movements of the hand or the body. Metaphorical gestures also exist that symbolise things and provide a *tacit* understanding and thus knowledge. For example before and after the performance of an exercise between two students, they bow to each other. This is not only an embodied gesture that means ‘thank you’, a quite common way to show respect for the other in Japanese culture. It can also be seen as a theatrical figure that cultivates an understanding of the performance itself as something abstract. It shows the awareness that what is going to take place is an imitation, that there should be not real hostile feelings and real anger since this performance is a *mimesis praxis*.

One can read the whole educational practice in the *dojo* through these gestures that do not focus only to teach mere skills to student, but mainly cultivate a particular *ethos*. The way is not described (or prescribed) by speech but it *shows itself* through the constant practice.

The concept of gesture in the *dojo* provides a colourful paradigm for design education. In the design studio (as in the *dojo*) one can understand a considerable part of the educational practice as being full of this kind of *gestures*. Furthermore it is interesting that these gestures always embody ethical meanings.

If we will see the *gesture* in relation to the question of the possibility of communicating ethical propositions, it seems that we have reached close to a possible answer. As we have already seen in the *gymnasium*, Wittgenstein would not ‘allow’ us to communicate ethical beliefs through the logical part of language. This concept of *gesture* seems to overpass this problem, since Wittgenstein himself suggests that “There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical”³⁶. Acknowledging at the same time that “What can be shown cannot be said”.³⁷

Another important aspect of the *dojo* is the fact that Ethics are based on a totally practical philosophy or a philosophy that exists only through *praxis*³⁸, on the contrary of any over-imposed transcendental theory. This practical character could also be seen in the

design studio. Despite the fact that the design studio seems to be full of theories and schemata, philosophy as such cannot be separate by design praxis. This means that, in terms of ethics, the wisdom acquired in the design studio (as in the dojo too) is not a theoretical wisdom, transcendental to what is happening *in* the studio. On the contrary it is a practical wisdom that someone can get only through the practice of design. Practical wisdom (*Phronesis*) was very important on the climax of virtues for Aristotle. Standing in the middle of the intellectual virtues³⁹, *phronesis* keeps the balance between the reasonal-practical logic and the philosophical-theoretical intuition. Nowadays, philosophers like Gadamer and educationists like Gallagher⁴⁰ has emphasized on the role that *phronesis* can play in interpersonal understanding and interpretation. They suggest that it is not possible to stand out of a given situation in order to see it in an objective way. Knowledge of a situation is always imperfect knowledge gained *within* the situation. This is the case in the design studio as well as in the dojo. The design studio is the place where design practice conciliates every other theoretical and practical skills and knowledge acquired during architectural education. It is where the design practice meets the philosophical query not only at the same place but into the same *praxis*. This procedure problematizes and involves Ethics in a new perspective. A perspective that sees Ethics inherited in the way that things take place in the design practice.

Conclusion

The original question faced in the *bazaar* 'Is the design studio a place without rules, where Ethics have no place?' has justifiably now got a response that Ethics definitely have a place in the design studio.

This paper, revealed three different layers of this implication. In the *agora* we saw the possibility of an indirect application of Professional Ethics in the design studio. In the *gymnasium* we came across the Moral philosophical argument that the design studio proposes the construction of 'the obligatory framework for the human social life'. And finally in the *dojo* we understood Ethics being embodied in the way of practising the design through the everyday praxis of the design studio.

A question seems to raise after this summary. Is it

possible to choose one of the notions of ethics that we described between the metaphors of the *agora*, the *gymnasium* and the *dojo*? My answer is that despite ones specific interests, these three layers of Ethics in the design studio are *not* isolated and separated. All of them co-exist and function at the same time in a way that someone can only focus to one of them but cannot dismiss the others. For this reason the design studio is not a *bazaar* (the way that I presented it), since Ethics are inherent into it.

Nevertheless, this paper has been stigmatized by the metaphor of the *bazaar*. One can read the paper itself as a *bazaar of metaphors* for the design studio. The *bazaar*, the *agora*, the *gymnasium* and the *dojo* are all metaphorical shops, on our way to understand the role of Ethics in the design studio. This paper is also a *bazaar* because it participates in the 'academic market' enhancing the author's cultural capital and because it asks from the reader to 'buy' it. So, intellectual haggling seems the appropriate thing to follow.

NOTES TO THE FIGURES

Figure 1: " 'Students queuing for Zaha' Photo from the website of the AA School of Architecture" (photo: Valerie Bennett/Architectural Association) <http://www.aaschool.ac.uk/chair/schedule.shtml> [20. 06. 2005]

Figure 2: "Code of Ethics & Professional Conduct, American Institute of Architects, 2004" document available online at: <http://www.aia.org/SiteObjects/files/codeofethics.pdf> [05. 03. 2007]

Figure 3: "Education in the gymnasium. Music instruments and scrolls or books indicate the strong presence of subjects beyond athletics." Red-figure kylix by Douris, ca. 480 BC Berlin Staatliche Museen -Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Antikensammlung, inv. no. F2285B (photo: Johannes Laurentius)

Figure 4: "Education in the *dojo*" (photo by the author)

NOTES TO THE TEXT

¹ An earlier version of this paper, titled "Heterotopic Metaphors of the Design Studio: Bazaar, Agora Gymnasium or Dojo?", was presented at the XXII World Congress of Architecture of UIA 'Cities: Grand Bazaar of Architectures' in Istanbul, July 2005.

² Broadbend, Geoffrey, 'Architectural Education', in Martin Pearce and Maggie Toy, eds, *Educating Architects*, London, Academy Editions, 1995

³ The UIA congress in Istanbul had a separate strand dedicated on 'New Forms of Architectural Profession and Education'.

⁴ "...the antidote to the historical is called- the unhistorical and suprahistorical. ... With the word 'the unhistorical' I designate the art and power of forgetting and of enclosing oneself within a bounded horizon; ..." Nietzsche, Friedrich. "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life." In *Untimely Meditations*, p.p. 57-123, Cambridge et. al.: Cambridge University Press, 1983 p. 120 [italics in the original]

⁵ In the earlier version of this paper mentioned above, I had described these places as heterotopias. Foucault describes these places with the following lines "There are also, probably in every culture, in every civilization, real places - places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of society - which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality" Foucault, Michele, *Of Other Spaces, Heterotopias* (Des Espace Autres), 1967, First published by the French journal *Architecture /Mouvement/ Continuité* in October, 1984, based on a lecture given by Michel Foucault in March 67, Translated from French by Jay Miskowiec, <http://foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html>, [10. 07. 2006]

⁶ Copernicus' *De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium* (On the Revolutions of the Celestial Orbs), was published in Nuremberg in 1543; and at least until Kepler's *Tabulae Rudolphinae* (Rudolphine Tables), published in 1627, a huge discussion took place in the astronomers' circles. Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet* was first performed at the last decade of the 16th century (probably 1591) and it was published on the turning of the 17th (dates vary depending on the Quarto edition), while *The First Folio* of Shakespeare was published in 1623.

⁷ Snodgrass, Adrian. "Random Thoughts on the Way: The Architecture of Excursion and Return." *Architectural Theory Review* 6, no. 1, April, 2001: 15 [pp. 8-10].

⁸ Online Etymology Dictionary <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=bazaar&searchmode=none> [15. 04. 2005.] Wikipedia also suggests that etymology goes back to the Pahlavi word *baha-char* meaning "the place of prices" <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bazaar> [15. 04. 2005.]

⁹ The word 'panegyric' (πανηγυρική) in the Modern Greek language has also the meaning of the bazaar.

¹⁰ "If I will not be cutting edge and Radical, Fractaled, Folded, Anti-Theory and generally 'Out-There', and if I will not put the delivery of the 'Wow Factor' or the 'Sustainability Agenda' before making good architecture; Can I at least be Simple and Decent" Malcolm Fraser, Lecture for the EUSAS at the University of Edinburgh at 25. 03. 2005.

¹¹ Oxford English Dictionary, [15. 04. 2005] [my italics]

¹² Perseus Encyclopedia <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0004&layout=&loc=agora> [15. 04. 2005]

¹³ Δεσποτόπουλος, Ιωάννης Η ιδεολογική δομή της πόλης, Εκδόσεις ΕΜΠ, 1997 (Despotopoulos, Ioannis, *The ideological structure of the City, Athens*, NTUA Press, 1997 [my translation from the Greek]) p. 20

¹⁴ Peck, Harry Thurston, *Harpers Dictionary of Classical Antiquities* (1898). [Online hypertext edition, part of the Perseus project] <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0062&layout=&loc=agora> [15. 04. 2005]

¹⁵ *ibid*

¹⁶ http://www.explore-places.com/greece/A/Ancient_Agora_of_Athens.html

¹⁷ Despo, Jan. *Die Ideologische Struktur Der Stadt*: Mann Verlag, 1973

¹⁸ Harries, Karsten. *The Ethical Function of Architecture*. Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997, p.2

¹⁹ phantasma+agora "A name invented for an exhibition of optical illusions produced chiefly by means of the magic lantern, first exhibited in London in 1802. (Sometimes erroneously applied to the mechanism used.) In Philipstal's 'phantasmagoria' the figures were made rapidly to increase and decrease in size, to advance and retreat, dissolve, vanish, and pass into each other, in a manner then considered marvellous. (But the inventor of the word prob. only wanted a mouth-filling and startling term, and may have fixed on - agoria without any reference to the Greek lexicon)."OED

²⁰ Giedion, Sigfried. *Space, Time and Architecture*. 5th ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974. p. xxxii

²¹ The American Institute of Architects "2004 Code of Ethics & Professional Conduct" <http://www.areforum.org/guest/Pre%20Design/code%20of%20ethics.pdf> [Accessed 19. 06. 2005]

²² *ibid*

²³ *ibid*

²⁴ RIBA "Code of Professional Conduct" January 2005 http://www.riba.org/fileLibrary/pdf/code_of_prof_conduct.pdf [Accessed 19. 06. 2005]

²⁵ Oxford English Dictionary

²⁶ Peck, Harry Thurston, op. cit.

²⁷ "of a philosophic school, ek tou autou gymnasiou Pl.Grg.493d" Liddell-Scott, op. cit.

²⁸ Lagueux, Maurice. "Ethics Versus Aesthetics in Architecture.", *The Philosophical Forum* XXXV, no.2, 2004: 117-33. p. 122

²⁹ Harries, op. cit. p. 10

³⁰ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. London, New York: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., LTD., 1922, proposition 6.421

³¹ *ibid*, proposition 7

³² Wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dojo> [15. 04. 2005]

³³ <http://online.sfsu.edu/~rone/Buddhism/BuddhistDict/BDW.html>

³⁴ Dictionary of Japanese (Nihon Kokugo Daijiten)[ranslated by Dr. Yuka Kadoi]

³⁵ Davis, Winston. *Magic and Exorcism in Modern Japan*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1980, p. 1

³⁶ Wittgenstein, op.cit., proposition 6.522

³⁷ ibid, proposition 4.122

³⁸ Compare also to the concept of practice introduced by MacIntyre in his attempt to re-establish an Aristotelic notion of virtue Ethics. MacIntyre, Alasdair. *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. 2nd (Corrected, with Postscript) ed. London: Duckworth, 1985 (1981).

³⁹ For Aristotle phronesis is placed between Scientific Knowledge (Episteme) and Art (Tecne) in the one side, and Intuition (Nous) and Theoretical wisdom (Sofia) in the other. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, 1139b

⁴⁰ For Gadamer phronesis is a key to understand the process of interpretation. He clarifies the difference between technical and moral knowledge and he claims that phronesis involves a kind of self-knowledge that is not present in technological knowledge. Gallagher also argues that phronesis applies to situations that resembles to a mystery rather than a problem (using the terms as defined by Gabriel Marcel) in a way that the person cannot stand out of a given situation in order to see it in an objective way. Gallagher, Shaun. *Hermeneutics and Education*. Edited by Dennis J. Schmidt, Suny Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy. New York, Albany: State University of New York, 1992, p.152

In *The postmodern Condition* a concept of phronesis developed by Lyotard, appears as the only way out of the paralogy of the postmodernism. Phronesis as a purely prescriptive, case by case judging, without appeal to theoretical criteria, stays independent of any big narrative. And despite the disagreements⁴¹ for its radical role there is no doubt for the importance that it has in our times. Gallagher, Shaun. "The Place of Phronesis in Postmodern Hermeneutics." *Philosophy Today*, no. 37, 1993 (1990): p. 298-305.

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RIBA "Code of Professional Conduct" January 2005 http://www.riba.org/fileLibrary/pdf/code_of_prof_conduct.pdf [Accessed 19. 06. 2005]

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The Switch of Ethics and the Reflective Architect: In-between Practice and Theory

Leonidas Koutsoumpos

Abstract

This paper re-examines the problematic distinction between theory and practice, as it appears in architectural design education by relating it to the overall discourse of philosophical Ethics. For this I associate the term *morality* with normative evaluations according to a rule, while the term *ethics* with the concept of custom or habit. *Morality*, then, being related to a transcendental rule, appears to have a rather *theoretical* overview over practice, while *ethics* constitute the *practical* application of theory. Finally, I argue for a holistic overview that sees the embedment of practice into theory and theory into practice, by re-examining the original Greek terms *theoria* and *praxis*. In these terms, *reflection-in-action* appears to be a key concept of understanding the way that these cases appear in the everyday practice of architecture.

Keywords: ethics, morality, praxis, theoria, reflection-in-action

Full Paper

Introduction

An electrical switch is any device used to interrupt the flow of electrons in a circuit. Switches are essentially *binary devices*: they are either completely on ('closed') or completely off ('open').¹

Very little research has been accomplished so far which relates Ethics with creativity. Especially in architecture, creativity is usually affiliated with imagination, inspiration, and the wider realm of Aesthetics. On the other hand, Ethics have mainly been thought in terms of responsibility, duties, and obligations; haunted by the polarity between 'good' and 'bad'.

On the contrary, I would like to address herein the Ethics of creativity, emphasising the process of creation itself. The practice of

¹ Kuphaldt, T. R. *Switch types*,
Available at: http://www.allaboutcircuits.com/vol_4/chpt_4/1.html (16/06/06)
(author's emphasis).

creation will be used as a focal point to describe aspects of Ethics that occur during the action of architectural design and the reflection that accompanies it.

Moreover, I am going to use the concept and the imagery of the switch² to represent the polarity that appears to be inherent in Ethics. Toggle switches, rocker switches, pushbutton switches, tact switches, slide switches, rotary switches, leaf switches and detector switches, are only a small number of the wide variety of switches that can be found according to the use they are designed for. For the purpose of this paper I will start by using the simple light switch that we are all familiar with through our everyday mundane activity of switching on and off the lights.

The Switch of *Morality* and *Ethics* in Architecture

Does the attempt to assign an *ethical function* to art, and especially to architecture, not represent a cultural regression? Is it not reason alone that in the end should determine our *ethos*?³

Despite the lack of extensive scholarly research on the topic, Ethical terms are used widely in everyday life in order to describe, judge or evaluate architectural creations. For example, I can describe a building by using terms like *good* and *bad* architecture, architectural *lies*, *corruption* in the profession and *unethical* points of view; I can also raise issues of *consistency*, *truth*, *purity*, *obligations*, things that architects and students or architecture are supposed or are expected and *should* do; issues of *exclusion* and *inclusion*, *ignorance* and *arrogance* of the building, *respect* of the context and *sustainability* or resources; things that are *moral* or *immoral*, that architecture can *provide* and *deprive* from; I can also talk about *discrimination*, *social inequality* and *virtuous* architects. This vocabulary that is used to describe any architectural example is obviously a vocabulary borrowed from the discourse of Ethics and it is very common amongst architects when they describe their work.

However, the above account is far from being systematic and coherent. Some of the terms refer to the social role of architecture

² A switch at the ON position was the iconic logo of the conference 'Reflections ON Creativity' at the University of Dundee, 21-22 April 2006 from which this paper originates.

³ Harries, K. *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997, p.360 (author's emphasis).

and the way that architects can improve the human environment, while others refer to the way that design as a procedure takes place. I have referred to the economic and political role of architecture and I have mentioned some virtues that a good architect must have. Moreover, I have mentioned notions of Ethics that are explicit decisions and others being 'unconscious'. But, is there any way to understand these issues, apart from the fact that they all in some way refer to Ethics?

The first switch will be introduced in order to distinguish two possible levels of discourse of Ethics in architecture, based on the existence in modern English language⁴ of two terms with similar (but still different) meanings: *morality* and *ethics*.⁵ According to John Lawrence:

In accordance with ordinary language and the practice of many philosophers, these terms [morality and ethics] will be used interchangeably. Although they are sometimes distinguished, there is no standard distinction between them.⁶

Despite the fact that the two terms usually substitute each other, both in everyday life and in academia, there are some attempts by distinguished philosophers such as John Wilson⁷ and Bernard Williams⁸ to draw a line between the two terms. The terms *morality* and *ethics* derive from the Latin root *mores* and the ancient Greek *ethos* whereby both mean 'custom'. Nevertheless, according to Williams the term *morality* tends to refer to the social expectations, while *ethics* to the individual character.⁹ Here, I wish to exploit the difference of the two terms by pushing the limits of the common usage of the term *morality* describing characters or attitudes that are evaluated as good/bad and the term *ethics* as embodying the original concept of addiction, of custom or of the way that things take place in practice.

⁴ This is not the case in all languages. For example, in Modern Greek there exists only one term: 'ἠθικὴ' (*ēthēkē*).

⁵ From now on I will conventionally call Ethics (note the capital 'E') the totality of the discourse that evaluates human conduct and character. This convention is suggested because I want to distinguish between the meaning of *ethics* and that of *morality*.

⁶ Lawrence, J. *Argument for Action: Ethics and Professional Conduct*, Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate, 1999, p.5.

⁷ Wilson, J. *Preface to Morality*, Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books, 1988.

⁸ Williams, B. *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, London: Fontana Press/Collins, 1985.

⁹ Williams, B. *ibid.*, p.6.

If we apply this line of thought in the context of architecture, *morality* can be defined as *the conscious and normative evaluation of design actions as good or bad, according to an external rule*. The issues of *morality* are *external*¹⁰ to the practice of architecture, meaning that during the creation of architecture, *morality* is external to the inherent notion of architecture for the different kind of agents. For this, *morality* is in need of a theoretical wisdom that is somehow external of the action of design itself.

On the other hand *ethics* is the 'unconscious' evaluation concerning the prejudices, customs, or dispositions by which an architect is guided in the everyday professional practice, having pre-accepted them as good. Issues of *ethics* are *internal*¹¹ to the practice of architecture, in a sense that, during the creation of architecture, *ethics* is internal to an inherent and pre-accepted notion of what architecture is. Ethics, at the same time, are connected with a practical wisdom that is internal to design.



Fig. 1 The switch of morality/ethics, author's photograph, 2006

¹⁰ Here I use the external-internal distinction by combining Alasdair MacIntyre's and Maurice Lagueux's theories of ethics. MacIntyre, A. *After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory*, London: Duckworth, 1985, pp.187, 191 & 219. For Lagueux see footnote 11.

¹¹ 'Architecture continuously raises ethical problems, which, however, are nothing more than normal problems that architects must solve in practicing their art. It is for this reason that these ethical problems can be called internal to their discipline.' Lagueux, M. 'Ethics Versus Aesthetics in Architecture', *The Philosophical Forum* XXXV, no.2, 2004, p.119.

According to these definitions, *morality* and *ethics* take oppositional places on the switch (figure 1). The external rule of *morality* opposes the internal prejudice of *ethics*, while the theoretical wisdom implied in morality opposes to the practical wisdom of ethics. The overall distinction between *morality* and *ethics*, as presented in figure 1, appears to be based on a fundamental distinction between 'theory' and 'practice'. Following, I will focus on the distinction between theory and practice in order to understand better the switch of *morality* and *ethics*.

The Switch of *Theoria* and *Praxis*¹²

'Theory' is commonly understood as usually relating to reflection, thinking about things, abstract ideas and contemplation in general. 'Practice', on the contrary, is usually related with action, doing things, concrete applications and the wider notion of politics. Gilbert Ryle describes this common understanding as a fundamental legend that has its roots in Modernism:

To do something thinking what one is doing is, according to this legend, always to do two things; namely, to consider certain appropriate propositions, or prescription, and to put into practice what these propositions or prescription enjoin. *It is to do a bit of theory and then to do a bit of practice.*¹³

'Theory' and 'practice' appear to be another dipole that forms a second switch, represented by figure 2.

¹² This part of the paper, referring to the distinction between *theoria* and *praxis*, and especially the connection to architectural practice and academia, owes a lot to the discussions that I had with Keith Ballantyne. In those discussions the four terms were referred as pairs of a continuum. See Koutsoumpos, L. and K. Ballantyne 'Architectural Practice and Academia: The Praxis and Theoria Continuum', *Changing Trends in Architectural Education* Rabat, Morocco: CSAAR (The Center for the Study of Architecture in the Arab Region), 2006.

¹³ Ryle, G. *The Concept of Mind*, England: Middlesex, Australia: Victoria: Penguin Books, 1973 (1949), p.30 (author's emphasis).



Fig.2 The switch of theory/practice, author's photograph, 2006

If we accept for the moment this common notion of the terms 'theory' and 'practice' it appears that this new switch is 'attracted' with the previous one between *morality* and *ethics*. This 'attraction' has to do with the practical notion that *ethics* evaluate and judge things that take place *during the action* of various human practices; while *morality*, seems to have a rather more abstract way of contemplating the evaluation or judgment of human conduct and character.

Figure 3 represents the 'attraction' that we can see between the two switches of *morality-ethics* and *practice-theory*. As a result of this attraction the polarity between the two poles is increased. This means that because *morality* is attracted by *theory* and *ethics* by *practice*, the gap (*) between *morality*-*-*ethics* and *practice*-*-*theory*, is even larger.



Fig.3 The attraction between ethics-practice and morality-theory, author's photograph, 2006

According to Donald Schön, the common notion of practice and theory, as presented here, derives from the Technical Rationality¹⁴ of Positivism:

The Positivist epistemology of practice rests on three dichotomies. Given the *separation of means from ends*, instrumental problem solving can be seen as technical procedure to be measured by its effectiveness in achieving a pre-established objective. Given the *separation of research from practice*, rigorous practice can be seen as an application to instrumental problems of research-based theories and techniques whose objectivity and generality derive from the method of controlled experiment. Given the *separation of knowing from doing*, action is only an implementation and test of technical decision.¹⁵

Following on, I will present an argument that sees *practice* and *theory* not in opposition but rather in relation to each other. Contrary to 'theories of philosophical psychology [that] appear to have started from an uncritical assumption that the relations into which theory and practice can be said to enter include those of a temporal kind...'¹⁶ here, I will try to attack 'the problem by

¹⁴ Schön, D. A. *The Reflective Practitioner*, London: Temple Smith, 1983, p.21.

¹⁵ Schön, D. A. *ibid.*, p.165 (author's emphasis).

¹⁶ Carr, D. 'Theory and Practice: Some Analogous Concepts and Their Disanalogies', *Metaphilosophy* 13, nos. 3&4, 1982, p.228.

attending to notions of theory and practice both separately *and* together at once.¹⁷

According to Lobkowitz, in pursuing the exact meaning of these terms, one refers back to Aristotle. 'In fact, *Aristotle seems to have been the first Greek thinker to reduce the many different walks of life to three and in a sense to two, thus becoming the first explicitly to contrast 'theory' and 'practice'.*'¹⁸ The contemporary terms 'practice' and 'theory' derive from the ancient Greek '*praxis*' (*πράξις*) and '*theoria*' (*θεωρία*), but their exact translation of the terms is quite problematic. The term *praxis* today would be translated as 'doing' and it did not have the same notion as it has today, meaning 'the application in action of rules and principles provided in advance by theory. This latter meaning of the term corresponds to what the Greeks termed *technē*.'¹⁹

Praxis was the activity achieved in *accomplishing the very action itself*, without aiming for a goal that is distinct from the action (which was the case of *poiēsis*). An example of *praxis* usually given by Aristotle is the action of playing the flute, which is an end in itself, without the production of an obvious outcome. The aim of playing the flute has been achieved while the *praxis* is taking place and we don't wait for a further outcome after the playing.

'Praxis' takes on a distinctive and quasi-technical meaning in Aristotle. Aristotle continues to use the expression in a general way to refer to a variety of biological life activities, but he also uses '*praxis*' to designate one of the ways of life open to a free man, and to signify the sciences and arts that deal with the activities characteristic of man's ethical and political life. In this context, the contrast that Aristotle draws is between '*theoria*' and '*praxis*' where the former expression signifies those sciences and activities that are concerned with knowing for its own sake....²⁰

Theoria on the other hand was not just the passive way of thinking as presented in figure 2. *Theoria*, being related to contemplative life, was considered as relating to the Gods, because it meant

¹⁷ Carr, D. *ibid.*, p.229 (original emphasis).

¹⁸ Lobkowitz, N. *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx*, Notre Dame [Ind.]: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967, p.3 (author's emphasis).

¹⁹ Coyne, R. and A. Snodgrass *Interpretation in Architecture*, London, New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006, p.111-112.

²⁰ Bernstein, R. J. *Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971, p. ix-x (original emphasis).

reflecting upon 'eternal truths'.²¹ The philosopher, especially, is the man who, more than anyone else, acts in the realm of contemplation, and is considered as walking in a sublime way of life:

The philosopher is removed from the agitation and transitory character which life has for ordinary man: he contemplates the divine order and takes part in its eternity, *thus somehow succeeding in transcending... his mortality.*²²

Theoria was a rather active participation in an event, although 'off the stage'. According to Lobkowitz, '...the expression *θεωρός*' means 'spectator at games'; *θεωρία*, then, would mean what a spectator at games does, namely, watching.²³ Originally, always according to Lobkowitz, *θεωρός* was the title of person or the envoy sent to consult an oracle. Furthermore, *θεωρία* used to be the group of state-ambassadors who were sent to represent their city-state during the sacral festivals of another city-state. From this notion of travelling in order to become witnesses, *θεωρός* also came to refer to a traveller who visits foreign countries to learn something about their customs and laws.²⁴

Lobkowitz's analysis of the origins of the word provides a quite clear explanation of the contemporary reduction of the term, into the passive way that we understand theory as a mere 'watching'. Nevertheless, for the ancient Greeks *theoria* as well as *praxis* were inseparable parts of every human activity. The distinction between the two terms was not an opposition between abstract knowledge and concrete application or theoretical endeavours, such as science, and practical, everyday life. 'Rather, it was an opposition (and tension) between what was strictly *human* and what was *divine* in man.'²⁵ Subsequently, theory in

²¹ 'Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man should have man's thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we ought so far as possible to achieve *immortality*, and do all that man may to live in accordance with the highest thing in him; for though this be small in bulk, in power and value it far surpasses all the rest.' -1177b 8- Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, in H. Rackham (ed.) Perseus Digital Library, Harvard University Press and William Heinemann Ltd., 1934. Available at: <http://perseus.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Aristot.+Nic.+Eth.+1177b+1> (15/03/03).

²² Lobkowitz, N. *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx*, p.7 (author's emphasis).

²³ Lobkowitz, N. *ibid.*, p.7 (author's emphasis).

²⁴ Lobkowitz, N. *ibid.*, p.6.

²⁵ Lobkowitz, N. *ibid.*, p.26-27 (author's emphasis).

architecture, deriving from *theoria*, does not come before architectural *praxis*, and it is clear that it is not a set of abstract rules which govern the actions of the practitioner architect. *Theoria* and *praxis* operate in an inseparable link, where '*theoria* is not something that precedes *praxis*, nor is it the repository of the rules and principles governing action. It is, rather, a participation in practice.'²⁶

Reflection-in-action: In Between the Switch

The terms *praxis* and *theoria*, as presented above, challenge the original distinction between practice and theory that is commonly perceived as in Figure 2. If the one term is seen unprivileged to the other, as their etymologies imply, they appear to be inseparable and form a new kind of unity, beyond the dipolar scheme that was originally presented. Through the concepts of *praxis* and *theoria* we have gained a central focal point that ties practice and theory close together in an unbreakable link. 'Theory and practice' is not 'reflection *and* action' any more, but rather *reflection-in-action*.

Schön was the first to introduce the concept of reflection-in-action in order to understand professional practice and its relation to thinking. Schön used a series of key studies from a wide range of fields such as psychotherapy, management and especially design, town planning and architecture, based on a very simple observation that 'usually reflection on knowing-in-action goes together *with reflection on the stuff at hand*.'²⁷

While practicing, the practitioner contemplates on his/her practice and at the same time he/she internalises an implicit understanding of his/her action. Although one makes innumerable judgements without being able to provide adequate criteria for them, he/she does enhance the whole horizon of his/her practice. In this sense one potentially becomes ready, in the long run, for a further action that can be critically improved in comparison to the previous, and this is because know-how is *in* the action.

In the reflective conversations of Quist and the Supervisor, [an architect and a psychotherapist, main characters in Schön's key studies] these [positivist's] dichotomies do not hold. For Quist and the Supervisor, *practice is a kind of research*. In their problem setting, means and ends are framed interdependently. And their inquiry is a transaction

²⁶ Coyne, R. and A. Snodgrass op. cit., p.112 (original emphasis).

²⁷ Schön, D. op. cit., p.50 (author's emphasis).

with the situation in which *knowing and doing are inseparable*.²⁸

Gilbert Ryle has played a major role in Schön's theoretical background by distinguishing the terms 'knowing-how' and 'knowing-that': '*Intelligent practice is not a step child of theory. On the contrary theorizing is one practice amongst others and is itself intelligently or stupidly conducted*'.²⁹

Furthermore, Michael Polanyi's notion of *tacit knowledge* was another influence in order to arrive at the concept of reflection-in-action, 'tacit knowing is seen to operate here on an internal action that we are quite incapable of controlling or even feeling in itself.'³⁰ Arguably, the origins of this line of thought go back to the concept of *phronēsis*³¹ (practical wisdom) as described by Aristotle, which appears to be a key concept to understand the practical basis of reflective action.

Summarizing the above arguments, reflection-in-action not only conflates *praxis* and *theoria*, but also draws practice and theory together in a sense that subverts the dipolar properties suggested by the positivist's legend. Reflection-in-action becomes an attractor in between the poles of practice and theory that actually questions the distance between the two terms.

²⁸ Schön, D. *ibid.*, p.165 (author's emphasis).

²⁹ Ryle, G. *op. cit.*, p.27.

³⁰ Polanyi, M., *The Tacit Dimension*, Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1966, p.14.

³¹ Practical wisdom (*Phronēsis*) was very important on the climax of virtues for Aristotle and it was placed between Scientific Knowledge (*Epēstēmē*) and Art (*Technē*) in the one side, and Intuition (*Nous*) and Theoretical wisdom (*Sofia*) in the other. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, 1139b.



Fig. 4 Reflection-in-action: in-between the switch, Author's Photograph, 2006

But, if the distance between practice and theory is being challenged, then what is also challenged is the distance between *morality* and *ethics*. As discussed in the first part of the paper, the two terms (as I defined them), have a straightforward connection to theory and practice. If reflection-in-action intrudes between theory and practice then inevitably it should be found in-between *morality* and *ethics* too.

It is quite interesting that Schön does not seem to be interested in the wider Ethical discourse in any of his key studies. Nevertheless, he does make an explicit comment (and if I am correct, it is the only one in the whole book) in which one can see a clear relation of reflection-in-action with *ethics*:

His ability to do this [arrive at a deeper and broader coherence of artefact and idea] depends on certain relatively constant elements that he may bring to a situation otherwise in flux: an overarching theory, an appreciative system, and a stance of reflection in action which can become, in some practitioners, an ethics for inquiry.³²

Moreover, Ryle admits that, '*Moral knowledge*' - Ethics for my definitions – 'if the strained phrase is to be used at all, is knowing how to behave in certain sorts of situations in which the problems are *neither merely theoretical nor merely technical*'.³³

³² Schön, D. op. cit., p.164 (author's emphasis).

³³ Ryle, G. op. cit., p.297 (author's emphasis).

And, even further, Polanyi ties Ethics with tacit knowledge when he refers to the decision to dwell on a moral teaching and its interiorization. 'To interiorize is to identify ourselves with the teachings in question, by making them function as the proximal term of a tacit moral knowledge, as applied in practice.'³⁴

It starts to become obvious that the simple switches used so far to represent the polarity (that Positivism and Technical Rationality suggests) of *practice* and *theory* as well as *ethics* and *morality* are not adequate to represent the outcomes of a more complex understanding of the terms. The new notion of the terms can be represented only by a different kind of switch which goes beyond the binary oppositions of an ON-OFF situation. Reflection-in-action becomes a central focus point that draws *practice*, *theory*, *morality* and *ethics* close together in a less categorical and unprivileged relationship of equal distance.

The dimmer-type switch is a way to represent such a scheme since it is able to go beyond the binary ON-OFF positions by holding in-between conditions. Dimmer switches provide the possibility to vary the intensity of light according to one's will and for this they allow the flow between the extreme conditions from nearly dark to fully lit, by simply turning a knob. Figure 5 shows a graphic representation of this new scheme.



Fig. 5 The dimmer switch as an area of creative play, Author's Photograph, 2006

³⁴ Polanyi, M. op. cit., p.17 (original emphasis).

Conclusion

This paper argues for an enhanced understanding of the discourse of Ethics in architecture. Firstly, it suggests that this discourse should go beyond the simplistic view that sees Ethics only as a set of rules and codes of professional conduct (*morality*), by proposing a practical understanding of Ethics that takes place during the action of design (*ethics*). Secondly, it argues that the area of interest in *morality* and *ethics* is not the two opposing ends of an ON-OFF switch, but rather the in-between positions of a dimmer switch.

In order to fully understand this dimmer switch in architecture, it is necessary to consider examples that cannot be covered in the limited space provided here. The philosophical exploration³⁵ of the terms under examination here, despite its exploratory character, is sometimes not enough to give an understanding that touches on both the architectural theory and practice at the same time. So, there is still a need for concrete case studies³⁶ that can illustrate the overall argument of the dimmer-switch of Ethics in architectural context.

In these terms, Schön's work is a very good example (still not fully exploited in architecture) of using extensive key studies that play a substantial role in the development of theory. Here, I have used the concept of *reflection-in-action* as a re-problematisation of the switch of theory and practice, suggesting that it can be viewed as a critical term that allows the osmosis of *morality* and *ethics*. The rules and the prejudices co-exist in the design activity, together with the internal-practical and the external-theoretical wisdom.

This reconciled condition demands an understanding of creativity that goes beyond the traditional opposition of theory and practice. In this condition, creativity emerges through the theorising *in* practice, and the practicing *in* theory. *Praxis* and *theoria*, *morality* and *ethics* provide not the extreme poles, but rather an area for creative play in which architects engage in both reflection *and* action, thinking *and* doing, contemplation *and* politics, abstract ideas *and* concrete applications.

³⁵ An interesting reflection on what philosophy has to contribute to architecture is given by Harries, K. op. cit., p.12-13.

³⁶ An example of such a key study in the context of architectural education is Koutsoumpos, L. 'Revealing Ethics through Architectural Praxis: The Example of a Student Design Project', Research Paper presented at the conference *Enhancing Curricula: Contributing to the Future - Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century*, Centre for Teaching and Learning in Arts and Design (CLTAD), Lisbon, 6-7 April, 2006.

Ethics of Virtuality... Virtuality of Ethics

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This paper addresses issues pertaining to architecture, virtuality and ethics by establishing an interactive, non-linear virtual environment as a tool for investigation into the virtuality of ethics and ethics of virtuality, in the context of architecture. Starting from the assertion that 'Virtual Environment (VE) is a metaphor of Real Environment (RE)', we test the proposition that suggests 'Ethics of RE can be tested and simulated in VE'. Challenging the notion that sees people reacting to VE in the same way as they interact with their surroundings in RE, we propose that since ethics are engulfing architecture they are also present and simulated in VE. Virtual architecture has elements of ethics that we refer to as 'Ethics of Virtuality'. In this context, VE ethics seem to lose the ubiquity that is present in RE. In order to examine this hypothesis, we created a VE that corresponds to the RE of the PhD students' offices, within the Department of Architecture, School of Arts, Culture, and Environment in the University of Edinburgh. The real life users of these offices were subjected to this VE. A qualitative method of research followed to probe their experience, focusing on issues related to ethics. Subjects were asked to give a personal accounts of their experience which gave us an insight into how they think. The compiled list of results and their evaluation showed startling possibilities, further establishing VE as an arena for investigating issues pertaining to both architecture and ethics.

Keywords: *Virtual Environments; Ethics; Place; Representation; Trust*

"They say he raped them that night. ...And though I wasn't there that night, I think I can assure you that what they say is true, because it all happened right in the *living room* -- right there amid the well-stocked *bookcases* and the *sofas* and the *fireplace* -- of a *house* I came later to think of as my second *home*." A Rape in Cyberspace (Dibbel, 1998, par. 1) (italics by the authors)

In order to communicate space, architects as well

as movie makers and game designers are using Virtual Environments (VE) as forms of representation in order to simulate endless scenarios and possibilities that otherwise cannot be experienced in Real Environments (RE). The connection between this representation and Ethics is self evident in several situations. For example, in a simple computer game, players are ready to kill their opponents relentlessly, in order to achieve their goal and get their reward, unlike most forms of competitions in reality, where players or opponents have to stay within acceptable

limits. In reality, Ethics engulf this notion of limits or rules. On the other hand, VE appear to release one from these limitations.

Computers introduce an interesting mode of interaction using a metaphorical world or space. As users of this metaphorical space, we are familiar with it, but familiarity does not provide a strong connection between both Virtual and Real modes of space, i.e. not enough to describe our interaction with this space. The connection is more of a relationship in which the consciousness of the user is highly augmented in terms of sensory data perceived from objects in their environment, and from relationships between these objects.

Departing from the basic concept of familiarity, we decided to ask a simple question: *Can Ethics of the Real Environment be tested in a Virtual Environment?*

Answering this question requires more than simply reviewing technical terminologies. Rather we must rigorously engage in the personal experience of the user of this virtual environment.

The various topics of research within cyberspace and VE are generally approached using 'subjective' and 'objective' methods. Some of the techniques used in the 'subjective' methods include self-evaluations produced by subjects in the form of questionnaires (Singer and Witmer, 1999; Lombard and Ditton, 2000), collecting self-reported breakdowns (Slater and Steed, 2000), comments and interviews; or, as in ethics, narratives constructed similar to self-reports (Dibbell, 1998). Problems that have been identified so far include uncertainty regarding whether or not users are aware of their interaction, or if they are over-interacting.

'Objective' methods to measure different physical aspects have been proposed, yet, establishing a correlation between the objective results, like heart rate, skin conductance or posture, and concepts or notions like ethics is possible only when imitating real-life situations. For this, our investigation rather takes us into the realms of phenomenology of place, perception, spatial representation, the nature of digital media and embodiment.

Ethics and the place of Architecture

"For while the *facts* attached to any event born of a MUD's [*Multi-User Dungeon*] strange, ethereal universe may march in straight, tandem lines *separated* neatly into the virtual and the real, *its meaning lies always in that gap*." (Dibbell, 1998, par. 15) (italics by the authors)

By ethics we usually mean the discourse concerning the evaluation of human actions, characters and feelings, as good or bad in a moral sense. Architecture, according to Maurice Lagueur, raises ethical issues because it 'produces the obligatory framework for social life' (Lagueux, 2004, p. 122), allowing people to come together, or prescribing the way that they perform socially. Departing from this statement, *ethics are ubiquitous in architecture* since one can read every architectural design, built or not, from an ethical point of view.

In this sense, Ethics in the context of architecture is both the normative evaluations of design actions and design outcomes (buildings, landscapes etc) as good or bad according to an external rule or a law; and any descriptive evaluation based on the pre-accepted customs, dispositions or principles by which an architect is guided in the everyday practice of architecture.

This definition of Ethics includes every creation of space both as an outcome and procedure and for this it relates to both the Real and the Virtual environment. Two folds can be examined through this definition. First of all, one can see 'sins' and 'crimes' that take place in the Virtual and Real space. Dibbell's *Rape in the Cyberspace* problematises in a very interesting way the inclusive/exclusive character of the 'halls of LambdaMOO', the VE of a MUD community and its connection with his real life. Secondly, one can see the responsibility of the designer as an architect on the creation of the space that they people will come together. The responsibility of architects in this sense is similar to the responsibility of hackers, wizards and webmasters

"Should architecture not continue to help us find our place and way in an ever more disorienting world? In this sense I shall speak of the ethical function of architecture. "Ethical" derives from "ethos". By a person's ethos we mean his or her character, nature, or disposition. Similarly we speak of a community's ethos, referring to the spirit that presides over its activities. "Ethos" here names the way human beings exist in the world: their way of dwelling. By the ethical function of architecture I mean its task to help articulate a common ethos." (Harries, 1998, p.4)

The ethical function of architecture that Harries envisions derives from the Heideggerian notion of *dwelling*, as the condition of being-in-the-world to happen both in the Real and the Virtual Environment. In these terms every subject-being simultaneously dwells in a Real and a Virtual *place* that inherits Ethics to appear both in a Real and Virtual mode.

The relation between subject and space is a problematic one. In a way we have the dilemma of having a real space that has a function and meaning and for many users it stands as a repository for memories and interactions.

The real space is a space with function, memories and interactions, that define 'place'. While the virtual environment is a representation of the 'real' and a repository of meaning, it has no 'real' space. It is a place but not a space. Every subject explores the character of built environment as described in Bachelard's *Poetics of Space* (1964), the home as a cellar, a garret and a hut. The phenomenon of space is closely linked to intimacy and memory in Bachelard's writing. Certain parts of our everyday spaces serve as "repositories" of memories. They also provide a person's prototypical spatial experience, a reference point from which all other spatial experiences derive and with which they are compared. These spaces, or places, are also understood episodically, in relation to sequences of events (walking down the corridor, setting down for lunch, setting down, chatting, etc). From this perspective, our being-in-the-world is

structured narratively. The house serves as a space for Bachelard's narrative, and a house is itself a narrative space.

Although VE is understood in the same way we understand RE, it consists of a 'place' which is separate from 'space' (Malpas, 1999; Gieryn, 2000). 'Place' is a 'space' holding activities and cultural meanings and for this it carries Ethical load.

Description and methodology of the experiment

"...every set of facts in virtual reality (or VR, as the locals abbreviate it) is shadowed by a second, complicating set: the "real-life" facts." (Dibbel, 1998, par. 8)

In order to examine this original hypothesis '*Can Ethics of the Real Environment be tested in Virtual Environment?*', we created a VE that corresponds to the RE of the PhD students' offices and common room. The real life users of these offices were asked to perform the same ethically ambiguous action, both in the Real and the Virtual Environment, while their reactions were recorded. In order to increase the familiarity of subjects with their environment, we selected subjects that were users of the environment. All the subjects were international students from both sexes, they all share a design background, and were exposed to the first part of this experiment without knowledge of their active participation.

In the RE phase of the experiment the subjects were called on their mobile phones receiving a call on their mobile phone from one of the authors (from now on 'L'), while working on their office. The scenario was that L could not get into the building because he had left the lock for his bicycle at home and he did not want to leave the bicycle unattended. L asked each subject to bring him a certain amount of money from a pencil case that was in a drawer of an absent colleague, Gabriela. We will refer to this drawer as 'Gabriella's Barrier'.

To further challenge the ethics surrounding

their action, and to create a problematic situation, 'Gabriela's Barrier' was in a public domain, the Common Room that most of the users of that level in the building use to have their lunches and tea breaks. 'Gabriella's barrier' was known as a 'private' domain within the Common Room. The other author (from now on 'A') was in the Common Room at that time working on the common computers, making even more explicit the public character of the place.

In the drawer there was an A4 size note that could only be read when the drawer was fully open, making explicit that the drawer is the property of Gabriela and that they "should not even think of touching it". Moreover, a smaller sticker was attached on the banknotes themselves, with a personal note that gave an extra hurdle by making the subject feel that the money is the personal possession of the owner of the drawer.

The RE, where the first part of the experiment took place, is in the 4th level of The Maltings; one of two buildings housing the Departments of Architecture and History of Art within the University of Edinburgh. Dimensions were measured and the real environment was modelled in a 3D modelling Software (3D Studio Max).

The 3D model from 3D Studio Max was rendered with texture maps taken from the real environment. The model was exported as a Shockwave 3D model into Macromedia Director. Director enables certain interactions with Shockwave 3D models. In our case, we created collision detection in the model and allowed real-time navigation anywhere in the model and in any direction and angle.

To instantiate Bachelard's spatial narrative as a 3D computer model available for game-like navigation and interaction introduces some startling incongruities. As users of this new space representation we sense a familiarity with it, though we are perhaps struck by the mismatch between the medium and our bodily awareness. Our physical presence is perhaps reduced and moved into hardware and software. Our sense of recognition is suspended and the spatial phenomenon reduced to concepts of digital

interaction.

Through the experiment we established familiarity through the similarity between the real and the virtual environment, and then we recorded the natural action of the subject in the real environment and asked the subjects to perform the same action in the virtual environment and measure the virtual action to the scale of the real action.

If the goal is to understand any kind of users' responses (in this case, ethical) in the simulated space, then creating virtual interaction according to the physical one, or identifying the limitation of this system's capabilities, therefore its ability to reflect the ethics, would be of a little use.

Focusing on the general common themes emerging from participants' engagement with the simulation, or the following interviews, is more of use as it is meaningful to the users of the VE (Spagnolli et al., 2003). Perhaps such emerging themes may form the basic foundation for ethics of virtuality, or maybe a more virtual ethics.

A qualitative method of research followed to probe their experience, focusing on issues related to ethics. Subjects were asked to give a personal account of their experience through a questionnaire and semi-structured interviews which gave us an insight into how they think. For the limited space of this paper, what follows is a brief analysis of the most important outcomes of the interviews focusing on the issues of *trust*, *signification*, *consciousness*, *unawareness*.

Analysis of the experiment

The complex situation that we created through the experiment described above, raises Ethical issues because it puts the subjects into a difficult position from a moral point of view.

The subjects were asked to perform an action that was putting to question more than one aspect of their character. Their colleague, L, was asking for a favour; he was calling, being 'trapped' outside the building while he was in need. All of the subjects felt

that they should help. None of the subjects showed any sign of impatience during the whole process of the experiment in the RE; they all felt that they had to accomplish a task; to help their colleague. This can be also related to the fact that during the interviews all the subjects admitted to giving high priority to Ethical issues and, in the relevant question in the questionnaire, they all evaluated Ethics as very important in their life.

The trust “I know you”

“I wasn’t really thinking... you phoned me asking for something. I know that you are a good guy and a friend, so... I think that even if I had noticed the note I would have done it anyway, because the trust I have in you and the importance I gave to what you asked me to do was more important than a note.” (transcripts from interviews)

It is very interesting that all subjects offered as justification to their action the fact that they trusted L. Knowing quite well the person who was asking them to ‘steal’ (their term) the money, seemed to have played a major role on the construction of their ‘alibi’, during the interviews. All the subjects in the post-rationalization process of the VE experiment created some sort of story about why L was asking them for the money. Some thought that the money was related to the petty-cash of the Postgraduate Seminar Series or more simply that he needed the money because he forgot his wallet as well as his keys, but everyone was trusted that he would put the money back.

Trust has come to be of considerable importance in the study of Ethics only the last twenty years. Baier’s influential article (1986) revealed a big gap in the way that Moral philosophy handled the understanding of trust thus far. Following the feminist line initiated by Gilligan, Baier suggested nothing less than the re-orientation of Ethics around the concept of trust in such a way that “servants, ex-slaves, and women are taken seriously as moral subjects and

agents” (Baier, 1986, p. 247). Even more interesting for the terms of this paper is Baier’s proposal for a moral test of trust that in her own words

“[T]rust is morally decent only if, in addition to whatever else is entrusted, knowledge of each party’s reasons for confident reliance on the other to continue the relationship could in principle also be entrusted –since such mutual knowledge would be itself a good, not a threat to other goods. To the extent that mutual reliance can be accompanied by mutual knowledge of the conditions for that reliance, trust is above suspicion, and trustworthiness a nonsuspect virtue.” (Baier, 1986, p. 260)

In our experiment Baier’s moral test is taken into account, since the researchers did not entrust to the subjects the knowledge of the necessary reasons for ‘confident reliance’. This was done so that the subjects would be responsible themselves for creating the conditions of trust that would allow them to perform the requested action. In terms of Baier’s test all our colleagues took a decision that was performing in the sphere of Ethics. “A trust relationship is morally bad to the extent that either party relies on qualities in the other which would be weakened by the knowledge that the other relies on them” (Baier, 1986, pp. 255-6) Of course the point here is not to argue whether their action was morally good or bad. The point is to the examination of their moral attitude between the Virtual and the Real Environment.

Baier’s innovative definition of trust has been major influence in the literature of trust in Virtual Communities (Friedman et.al., 2000; Chopra and Wallace, 2002; Schneider, 1999).

The sign “Do NOT even think of touching them”

A very interesting aspect of the experiment connected to the concept of trust is that during the RE phase the subjects ignored all the signs that made explicit the fact that they were crossing some boundaries

of privacy; the note that said 'Gabriella's stuff, don't even think of touching them!' and the sticker on the money itself saying 'Viva Brasil'.

One can easily think that since the subjects had already decided to help their colleague they would not stop by such warnings. But this is an oversimplified version of taking Ethical decisions. On the contrary, Ethical decisions are not just a matter of an initial decision making, but rather a constant interpretation of the situation (Coyne and Wiszniewski, 2000). In fact we deliberately put these signs in the drawer in order to create continuous repetition of Ethical boundaries that the subjects would have to cross.

What was really unexpected though, was the fact that all the subjects suppressed the existence of the signs in the RE and they were surprised to see the very same notes in the VE phase.

"I also didn't pay any attention to the note 'Don't take my stuff', cause I was on a mission to go to the coloured pencil thing and steal money. [laughter] So I didn't read the note. I didn't even know that it was there. In fact this is the first time that I was aware that there was a note in that drawer. That's interesting." (transcripts from interviews)

"Now, was that sheet there when I opened the drawer? -Yeah -It must be, it must have been. It wasn't on top of things, I don't know did I just miss it or what? It was in exactly the same place as in the VE." (transcripts from interviews)

One can draw the conclusion that the trust they showed their colleague withdrew the existence of the signs from their notice or memory. The trust that was the result and the outcome of a series of boundary-crossings concealed important facts of the RE, that during the Virtual phase were revealed and made obvious.

Consciousness: "That money would have been replaced."

The process of "changing environments" induces a momentary sense of distance from ethics. With the issue of RE and VE there is an interaction between the two conditions suggested by Heidegger, of the "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand", and is also supported by the 'space' 'place' relationship. Ultimately, we maintain that the subject alternates between these two positions of interaction with RE and VE while trying to achieve the goal. Performing both tasks provides a means of abetting this process. The subject, without being aware of it, highlighted the feeling of discomfort in the first phase as he was reacting to the experiment. Ethics was the background player. In the second phase, ethics became a present-at-hand element.

Our investigation takes us into the realms of the phenomenology of perception, spatial representation, the nature of digital media and embodiment. We illustrate our point with an example from one of the user's responses and attitudes to the issue

"That's it. I have gone down. I have opened the door. I opened the drawer, and I was not confronted by any dilemmas..... whereas before I was." (transcripts from interviews)

Unawareness: "So you did not make the connection?!"

The French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in *Phenomenology of Perception*, first published in 1945, emphasises the role of the human body in perception. He analyses different bodily attributes to account for this role: the body as object, the experience of the body, spatiality, motility, synthesis, the sexual being, and the body as expression.

As our body constitutes a first "frontier" when encountering the world, the way we structure space draws from it. Everything about our body is not only co-ordinated, but derives a functional value that we don't have to learn but is already known to us. His investigation leads him to assert that our conscious-

ness is *embodied* in the world.

Merleau-Ponty maintains that “the perception of space and the perception of the thing, the spatiality of the thing and its being as a thing, are not two distinct problems.” (Merleau-ponty 2003, p. 171). The subject’s awareness of the surroundings and the surroundings themselves are not two different things. RE and VE are what the subject perceives them to be. Although the task was oriented towards a target, the subject missed essential information and did not build or construct the relation between booth phases. Instead, the subject carried both tasks separately and successfully. Ethics is a value embedded in both RE and VE.

“...it was the first time I heard Gabriela had a drawer. And now when I heard it there, it reminded me of something like I have already heard Gabriela’s thing somewhere, but I did not remember when or where.” (transcripts from interviews)

“I do so many things without thinking; I put my keys in my pocket and then I don’t remember where they are, or I borrowed a book from the library and then I went again asking for the same book. I don’t think” (transcripts from interviews)

Conclusion

Returning back to the original question ‘*Can Ethics of the Real Environment be tested in Virtual Environment?*’, our experiment has made a contribution towards a positive answer. The comparison of the *Ethics of place* in RE and VE seems to promise a wealth of potential investigation that could follow on. Beyond the analysis of *trust, signification, consciousness, un-awareness* that were tackled here, a number of other issues were raised during our experiment, but cannot be expanded in the limited space of this paper: the understanding of the task as a *game*, the connection of trust with the existence of an already strong community, the connection between the attention

to navigation; and the lack of focus on the Ethical dimension of the task and ultimately the dilemma of the virtuality

However, we realize the limitations of this experiment since it is still far from providing a formal testing procedure. For example, in its current form, the experiment fails to address issues related to the presence of the other in the VE, the creation of the emotional load in the delivery of the instructions in the VE and the awareness –though partial– of the repetition of a procedure that corresponds to the RE.

Nevertheless, the compiled list of results and their evaluation shows startling possibilities, further establishing VE as an arena for investigating issues pertaining to both architecture and ethics

Finally, it occurs –altering Diddel’s words of the rape– that ‘To participate, in this disembodied enactment of life’s most body-centered activity is to risk the realization that when it comes to Ethics [and not only sex], perhaps the body in question is not the physical one at all, but its psychic double, the bodylike self-representation we carry around in our heads.’

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Architectural Practice and Academia: the *praxis* and *theoria* continuum

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Abstract

This paper will problematise the contemporary fundamental distinction between architectural profession (practice) and architectural education (academia). The common understanding sees these two domains as separate, disconnected and even in opposition in the arena of architectural conduct. This common notion usually affiliates professional practice with the concept of *praxis* and academic education with the concept of *theory*.

In this situation, one could suggest that professional practice and academia become the limits of a continuum; at one end, professionals disparaging academia seeing it as theoretical, abstract and removed from everyday practice, while academics disparage practice, thinking of it as a banal, anti-intellectual and base application of theoretical concepts.

Returning to the origins of the concepts of *praxis* and *theory*, this paper attempts to re-address their problematic by finding threads of connection within the context of architecture. Aristotelian Ethical tradition situates three kinds of ethical activities (*energeiai*), in order of importance: *theoria*, *poiésis* and *praxis*. Aristotle, in privileging theory over practice, established the foundation of our current polemic. Through a greater understanding of the roles and relationships of each of these activities it becomes clear that none works in abstraction from the other.

In these terms, if we accept *theoria* (*theory*) as the pursuit of truth and knowledge for its own sake through contemplation, and practice (*praxis*), as a

pursuit for knowledge and creation through 'making', we can begin to understand more clearly how a shifted notion of theory relates to *praxis*. So, far from being in opposition to theory, practice has an inseparable relationship with it. Architectural practice is not merely the doing of something, but rather a considered, creative, dialectical act of creation fully engaged in the pursuit of truth and knowledge.

This conflation of practice and theory is examined through an analysis of studio teaching and student projects at the first-year level at the Architecture School at the University of Edinburgh in 2005/06, where the authors are Course Organiser and Tutors. Using studio projects as key studies, we will test the teaching and learning procedures that reflect the notions of theory and practice that appear in design education.

Ongoing ethnomethodological study of these projects through interviews; video and audio recordings from the tutorials and the reviews; photos of the drawings, sketches and models made during the design process; and the experience of participant observation as teachers - contrasted with our experience in professional architectural practice - illustrate a fresh interrelation between practice and theory. By moving along the continuum between architectural academia and practice, we will explore the space between the extremes of the Aristotelian *theoria* and *praxis*.

Keywords: Praxis, theory, practice, academia, architectural design pedagogy

Introduction

“Architectural education has always been in *tension* with architectural practice. That is how it should be; practice sometimes gets complacent and education is there as a kind of conscience, trying to correct what seems to be going wrong. So from time immemorial the architect has been subject to *learning in two quite different ways; theory in a classroom of some kind and practice, on the job or in the office.*”¹ [italics by author]

In this paper, we will problematize the contemporary fundamental distinction between architectural profession (*practice*²) and architectural education (*academia*). The common understanding of the ‘tension’ mentioned by Broadbent, sees these two domains as separate, disconnected and even in opposition.

Moreover, Broadbent’s quote implies another separation; that between practice and theory - the architect is learning practice on the job or in the office and theory in the ‘classroom’. According to this view, architectural profession (*practice*) is related with a general notion of practice, while architectural education (*academia*) relates to some notion of theory. “When today we oppose “practice” to “theory”, we usually have in mind lived life as opposed to abstract ideas, or else man’s acting as opposed to his “mere” thinking and reflecting.”³

Keeping on this line of thought one could continue by relating *academia* on the one hand to the realm of thinking, while on the other hand *practice* with the realm of acting. In, this way *academia* is related to a way of life dedicated to contemplation, while *practice* relates to a way of life in politics (in the broad sense of the term, meaning, the active engagement with the social condition). Furthermore, one could argue that *academia*, through theory, deals with abstract ideas, while professional *practice*, through practice, deals with concrete application.

These concepts supporting the separation between *academia* and *practice*, can be represented with the following table:

¹ Broadbent, Geoffrey. Architectural Education in “Educating Architects”, Martin Pearce & Maggie Toy, eds., London: Academy Editions, 1995, p. 10.

² In order to distinguish the notion of ‘practice’ as architectural profession from the everyday notion of practice, we will use the term in italics. For symmetry, we will do the same for the term academia.

³ Lobkowitz, Nikolaus. Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx Notre Dame [Ind.]: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967 p. 3

<i>academia</i> (education)	<i>practice</i> (profession)
theory thinking contemplation abstract ideas	practice acting politics concrete application

Table 1

While it is clear that a division exists between these two realms of architectural conduct, it is not enough to accept the authority of the above scheme, nor that it is an historic, chronic, or perpetual fact.

Broadbent contends that another of the myriad roles of *education* is to ‘correct’ *practice*. There is inherent in such a position, a privileging of education over practice as evidenced by the fact that clearly the one (education) holds a higher (moral/ethical) ground over the other, and thus rightly sits in a position to make judgment as to correctness or rightness.⁴

Understanding *praxis* and *theoria*

The overall distinction between *practice* and *academia*, as presented in Table 1, appears to be based on a fundamental distinction between practice and theory. In pursuing the exact meaning of these terms, one must turn to philosophy. In that context the history of the two terms goes back to Aristotle. According to Lobkowitz:

“That which we call “theory” today corresponds to what Aristotle called “contemplative life”. And what we call “practice” has its origins in Aristotle’s analysis of “political life.” In fact, *Aristotle seems to have been the first Greek thinker to reduce the many different walks of life to three and in a sense to two, thus becoming the first explicitly to contrast “theory” and “practice”*.⁵

Actually the contemporary terms ‘practice’ and ‘theory’ are derived from the ancient Greek ‘*praxis*’ (πράξις) and ‘*theoria*’ (θεωρία), nevertheless, the exact translation of the terms is quite problematic.

The term *praxis* today would be translated as ‘doing’ and it didn’t have the same notion as it has today, meaning ‘...the application in action of rules and

⁴ It is clear that his choice of terminology must have been deliberate and that ‘practice’ is the errant teenager in need of constant monitoring for fear of his misbehaving.

⁵ Lobkowitz, Nikolaus. *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx* (Notre Dame [Ind.]: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967). p. 3 Author’s italics

principles provided in advance by theory. This latter meaning of the term corresponds to what the Greeks termed *techne*, ...⁶. *Praxis* was the activity achieved in *accomplishing the very action itself*, without aiming for a goal that is distinct from the action (which was the case of *poiésis*). An example of *praxis* usually given by Aristotle himself is the action of playing the flute, which is an end in itself without the production of something obvious. The aim of playing the flute is been achieved while the *praxis* is taking place and we don't wait for an outcome after the playing.

“...“praxis” takes on a distinctive and quasi-technical meaning in Aristotle. Aristotle continues to use the expression in a general way to refer to a variety of biological life activities, but he also uses ‘praxis’ to designate one of the ways of life open to a free man, and to signify the sciences and arts that deal with the activities characteristic of man’s ethical and political life. In this context, the contrast that Aristotle draws is between “*theoria*” and “*praxis*” where the former expression signifies those sciences and activities that are concerned with knowing for its own sake... At times, Aristotle introduces a more refined distinction between “*poesis*” and “*praxis*”. The point here is to distinguish activities and disciplines which are primarily a form of making (building a house, writing a play) from *doing* proper, where the end or telos of the activity is not primarily the production of an artefact, but rather **performing the particular activity in a certain way, i.e. performing the activity well: “eupraxia”**. “Praxis” in this more restricted and sense signifies the disciplines and activities predominant in man’s ethical and political life.”⁷ [bold by authors]

Theoria on the other side was not just the passive way of thinking the way that Broadbent presents theory. Being related to contemplative life, *theoria* was considered as relating to the Gods, because it was reflecting upon ‘eternal truths’⁸. Especially the philosopher, the man who more than anyone else was acts in the realm of contemplation, is considered as walking in a sublime way of life.

⁶ Richard Coyne and Adrian Snodgrass, *Interpretation in Architecture* London, New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006

⁷ Bernstein, Richard J. *Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971, p. ix-x

⁸ “Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man should have man’s thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we ought so far as possible to achieve *immortality*, and do all that man may to live in accordance with the highest thing in him; for though this be small in bulk, in power and value it far surpasses all the rest.” Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1177b 8, <http://perseus.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Aristot.+Nic.+Eth.+1177b+1> [15. 03. 2006]

“... the philosopher is removed from the agitation and transitory character which life has for ordinary man: he contemplates the divine order and takes part in its eternity, *thus somehow succeeding in transcending... his mortality.*”⁹ *Theoria* was a rather active participation in an event, although ‘of the stage’.

“It is well known that the expression ‘*θεωρός*’ means “spectator at games”; ‘*θεωρία*,’ then, would mean what a spectator at games does, namely, watching. However, ‘*θεωρός*’ originally referred to the envoy sent to consult an oracle; ‘*θεωρία*’ was the official title of the group of state-ambassadors which a city-state delegated to the sacral festivals of another city-state. ... ‘*θεωρός*’ also came to refer to a traveler who visits foreign countries to learn something about their customs and laws.”¹⁰

Lobkowich’s quote gives us a quite clear explanation of the contemporary reduction of the term, into the passive way that we understand theory as a mere ‘watching’. Nevertheless, for the ancient Greeks *theoria* as well as *praxis* were inseparable parts of every human activity. “Thus “theory” and “practice” became two dimensions or poles of human existence. But it is important to see in that this polarity ultimately consisted for the Greeks. It certainly was not an opposition between abstract knowledge and concrete application; not was it an opposition between “theoretical” endeavours, such as science, and “lived life.” *Rather, it was an opposition (and tension) between what was strictly human and what was divine in man.*”¹¹

Subsequently, theory in architecture, deriving from *theoria*, does not come before architectural *praxis*, and it is clear that it is not a set of abstract rules which govern the actions of the practitioner. Theory and practice operate in an inseparable link. “... *theoria* is not something that precedes *praxis*, nor is it the repository of the rules and principles governing action. It is, rather, **a participation in practice.**”¹²

The praxis-theoria continuum of practice and academia

The terms *praxis* and *theoria*, as presented above, challenge the original distinction between practice and theory that Broadbent suggests. If we see the two terms unprivileged one to the other, as their etymologies imply, they appear to be inseparable and forming a new kind of unity, beyond its dipolar scheme that was originally presented.

⁹ Lobkowicz, *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx*. p. 7 [author’s italics]

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 6

¹¹ Ibid. p.26-27 [author’s italics]

¹² Snodgrass, Adrian and Richard Coyne. *Interpretation in Architecture: Design as a way of thinking*. London: Routledge, 2006, p. 112 - italics in the original, bold by authors

Equally, *practice* and *academia*, far from being isolated concepts, are a unified and continuous entity. We invoke the term ‘continuum’ as it seems to describe the relationship between *practice* and *academia* better than any other does. The simple premise of the continuum suggests by definition, two strands of the same discipline put in relation one to the other seem quite similar, but whose extremes are fundamentally different.¹³




Table 2

Although, *practice* and *academia* can be understood as distinct extremes of a continuous sequence, the terms *praxis* and *theoria* bring them together in a way that they cannot be perceptibly different from each other. Table 2 (above) describes graphically the suggested scheme.

The Practice/Academia Continuum invoked here is not a new idea. Vitruvius, in his *Ten Books on Architecture* addresses the issue in Book I, Chapter I - *The Education of the Architect*.

“1. The architect should be equipped with knowledge of many branches of study and varied kinds of learning, for it is by his judgment that all work done by the other arts is put to test. This knowledge is the child of *practice* and *theory*. Practice is the continuous and regular exercise of employment where manual work is done with any necessary material according to the design of a drawing. Theory, on the other hand, is the ability to demonstrate and explain the productions of dexterity on the principles of proportion.”¹⁴ [author’s italics]

¹³ “A continuous sequence in which adjacent elements are not perceptibly different from each other, although the extremes are quite distinct.” Oxford American Dictionary, 2nd Ed., 2005

¹⁴ Morgan, Morris Hicky, trans.. *Vitruvius: The Ten Books on Architecture*. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1960, p. 5.

It is clear that Vitruvius was applying a rational understanding of the more philosophically eloquent notions of practice and theory from a few hundred years prior, but as he acknowledges "... it is not as a very great philosopher, nor as an eloquent rhetorician, nor as a grammarian trained in the highest principles of his art, that I have striven to write this work, but as an architect who has had only a dip into those studies."¹⁵

Vitruvius' conviction of the importance to gain exposure to as broad a range of disciplines as possible, was understood to be a vast resource from which to draw insight, inspiration and knowledge; a clear necessity to combat the often incestuous confines of architectural activity. Importantly, however, there is also an acceptance of the limits of proficiency to which one can be expected to operate in these various spheres. Balance seems a key operative term; neither complacent in the rigors of learning, to coin Broadbent, nor forgetful of the fact that one is an architect; not a musician, astronomer, philosopher, etc.

In the context of contemporary architecture, Snodgrass and Coyne provide an understanding of the relationship between *praxis* and *theoria* as a 'kenning' that is not far from the proposed idea of the continuum. Practice since it derives from *praxis*, " **is an activity involving judgement. It is the making of ethical decisions by the exercise of *phronesis*...** , that is, 'practical reasonableness', **acting by way of tacit understanding gained from the experience**".¹⁶ Practice, in its contemporary invocation as addressed by Broadbent, relates more with what the Greeks termed *techne*, which is the making of something in accordance with knowledge that is consciously known or which pre-exists the activity of making. In contrast, *praxis*, as a way of making, includes the making of ethical judgments as part of its process.

Moreover, there are two forms of this considered activity; *phronesis* and *prohairesis*. The first, *phronesis*, is the understanding of how to act in a given circumstance while the second, *prohairesis*, adds the complexities of choice and preference, which then heightens the influence of social and ethical considerations, as the consequences of the choices made are understood as having social and ethical ramifications.

"Practical wisdom (*Phronesis*) was very important on the climax of virtues for Aristotle. Standing in the middle of the intellectual virtues¹⁷, *phronesis* keeps the balance between the reasonal-practical logic and the

¹⁵ *ibid.* p. 13 - I acknowledge similar limitation herein as well.

¹⁶ Snodgrass, Adrian and Richard Coyne. *Interpretation in Architecture: Design as a way of thinking*, London: Routledge, 2006, p. 112

¹⁷ For Aristotle *phronesis* is placed between Scientific Knowledge (*Epeisteme*) and Art (*Tecne*) in the one side, and Intuition (*Nous*) and Theoretical wisdom (*Sofia*) in the other. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, 1139b

philosophical-theoretical intuition. Nowadays, philosophers like Gadamer and educationists like Gallagher¹⁸ have emphasized the role that *phronesis* can play in interpersonal understanding and interpretation. They suggest that it is not possible to stand out of a given situation in order to see it in an objective way. Knowledge of a situation is always imperfect knowledge gained *within* the situation.”¹⁹

The *praxis-theoria* continuum and the policies on architectural education

Daniel Libeskind, in *An Open Letter to Architectural Educators and Students of Architecture*,²⁰ outlines a cry to the profession to save it from yet another crisis, he states:

“Architecture as taught and practiced today is but a grammatical fiction. Enough to see the gulf which separates what is taught (an how!) and what is built (and why!) to understand that somewhere a lie is being perpetuated. Only a sophistic method could mask a situation where so many spend so much to do so little - with such damaging results.”²¹

The letter ends with a declaration to his founding of the *Architecture Intermundium* in Milan, suggesting that he is on the case to turn things around. His suggestion that architecture had become an arena for the purveyance of

¹⁸ For Gadamer *phronesis* is a key to understand the process of interpretation. He clarifies the difference between technical and moral knowledge and he claims that *phronesis* involves a kind of self-knowledge that is not present in technological knowledge. Gallagher also argues that *phronesis* applies to situations that resembles to a mystery rather than a problem (using the terms as defined by Gabriel Marce) in a way that the person cannot stand out of a given situation in order to see it in an objective way. Gallagher, Shaun. *Hermeneutics and Education*. Edited by Dennis J. Schmidt, Suny Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy. New York, Albany: State University of New York, 1992, p.152

Moreover, in *The Postmodern Condition* a concept of *phronesis* developed by Lyotard, appears as the only way out of the *paralogy* of the postmodernism. *Phronesis* as a purely prescriptive, case by case judging, without appeal to theoretical criteria, stays independent of any big narrative. And despite the disagreements for its radical role there is no doubt for the importance that it has in our times.

Gallagher, Shaun. "The Place of Phronesis in Postmodern Hermeneutics." *Philosophy Today*, no. 37, 1993 (1990): p. 298-305.

¹⁹ Koutsoumpos, Leonidas, "Heterotopic metaphors of the design studio: bazaar, agora gymnasium or dojo?" Paper presented in the XXII World Congress of Architecture of UIA 'Cities: Grand Bazaar of Architectures' Istanbul in 2005.

²⁰ Libeskind, Daniel. *An Open Letter to Architectural Educators and Students of Architecture*, Journal of Architectural Education, Vol. 40, No. 2, Jubilee Issue - Winter, 1987, p. 46

²¹ *ibid.*

opinion, “[h]aving relinquished love of the divine *episteme* in favor of opinion,”²² thus diffusing its “potentially explosive content”, blasts the contemporary tendency toward a theorization that is divorced from *praxis*. His use of the term *episteme*, without the employment of its more critical *prohairesis*, would suggest however that he is more closely aligned with the ‘corrupt’ instrumental and manipulated architecture he is meant to be operating to remedy. Nonetheless, his call for a release in architectural education, and in practice for that matter, to explore and allow a “groundlessness which moves the participant in Architecture toward the void” is a call for real change in the way architecture is conceived, considered and constructed.

Since the drafting of Libeskind’s letter, a great deal of consideration has been given over to notions of how best architects should be trained. There are today in the United States, two clear camps in architectural education; those that lie on the side of theory and those that lie on the side of practice. In this instance, I diverge from the previous reference to the Greek, as they constitute the desired model, and instead am invoking the more contemporary notion, that of research (theory) and pragmatics (practice).

In the early 1990’s, *The Boyer Report* was commissioned by the collateral organizations AIA, AIAS, NCARB, NAAB and ACSI²³ as an independent study into the profession of architecture. The aim of the study was to determine how architectural practice and architectural education could work more closely to enrich the experience for the students, assure well-trained graduates would be introduced to the profession and create a more ‘unified’ profession. The report outlined what are considered their “seven essential goals”. Almost without exception, the goals were directed at ways in which academia could/should change to accommodate the needs of the profession, and never outlined requirements for ‘practice’ to engage in a deliberate and considered way in academia. Calls to integrate practice into the curriculum of academia through “participation by practitioners, clients and society as a whole” are rife but the imbalance remains immanently clear as ‘participation’ often takes the form of sales pitches disguised as seminars.²⁴

It’s no wonder Libeskind rants about what he called the “process of de-culturation called education and practice [that] has eclipsed Architecture so far

²² *ibid.*

²³ Boyer, Ernest L., and Lee D. Mitgang. *Building Community: A New Future for Architecture Education and Practice : A Special Report*. Princeton, N.J. : Jossey-Bass Inc Pub, 1996. AIA - American Institute of Architects; AIAS - American Institute of Architecture Students; NCARB - National Council of Architectural Registration Boards; NAAB - National Architecture Accreditation Board; ACSI - ?

²⁴ <http://academics.triton.edu/faculty/fheitzman/boyer.html> - this online article titled “The Boyer Report” summarizes the specific goals of the report.

and so thoroughly by the fictions of ‘common sense’ and the ‘real world’....”²⁵ And it is even more concerning when considering that the thoughts of Libeskind, shared amongst many others in academia, nearly a decade prior to the commissioning of the report, were seemingly brushed aside in preference for a more pragmatic program. Snodgrass and Coyne suggest “*Praxis* has been totally subsumed within *techne*, so that the problems confronting us,... are the province of technical experts (experts in *techne*),”²⁶ I assert this reflects the current situation in a majority of US schools of architecture as they work to respond to the ‘goals’ of the *Boyer Report*.

Accepting that one of the charges of the academy in architecture is to prepare its graduates for productive participation in what is a professional, vocational industry, it is imperative the graduate be equipped appropriately in the ways of industry. That pragmatic concerns become a focus of the educational enterprise reinforces an already well established imbalance toward the *techne*, thus subverting any attempt to prepare the student to participate in *praxis*; that act of participation in *theoria* and making through a process of considered ethical judgments.

Furthermore, to disconnect with the social and political program, within which architecture is wholly implicated, through the unbalanced employment of disconnected theorization is equally problematic. Again, the aim is to find a balance of practice in the studio, both within and outwith academia that strengthens a relationship with both *praxis* and *theoria*.

The *praxis-theoria* continuum in the design studio: a case study

What follows are quotes taken from a wider ethnomethodological study of studio teaching and student projects at the first-year level at the Architecture School at the University of Edinburgh in 2005/06, where the authors are Course Organizer and Tutors. Interviews, video and audio recordings from the tutorials and the reviews, photos of the drawings, sketches and models made during the design process; and the experience of participant observation as teachers; are contrasted with interviews from other teaching staff, as well as with our personal experience in professional architectural practice, will illustrate a fresh interrelation between practice and theory.

At the time of the writing of this article, the material had not been fully indexed or interpreted but did nonetheless illustrate some interesting moments that pertain directly to our interest in the relationship between practice and theory. The fullness of the information will continue to be analysed as the research develops. We want to share just a couple of common themes arising from this research.

²⁵ Libeskind, Op. Cit.

²⁶ Snodgrass, Coyne. Op. Cit., p. 113

Student – Em, didn't want boxy rooms... that's another thing of which I didn't talk about, what I don't really want to, em, extrude these lines as I'm sure I did, as you said before, em, and create cells. Like, I've tried to link the larder and kitchen by creating an open space here and just have a, a sort of having a partition that doesn't totally fully enclose the larder. But I don't know how I could do that elsewhere because I everything else is bedrooms or bathrooms and living rooms next to each other.

Tutor – Why? What's wrong with the rooms

S – Um... nothing but it's just a bit too everyday; sort of just the way we have to do things and I want to change it.

T – Why do we do it like that?

S – Because it's easier... it's just a box.

T – Why/how do you think it's easier?

S – Em... (chuckle) – in like houses they'll look for the cheap way to do things; shoot them up as quick as possible.

T – So you're trying to make an expensive house?

S – No sayin' tha [I'm not saying that] the architect's in the they're gonna want to portray some form of good quality.

T – And why good quality cannot be cheap?

S – I just thought, I heard one or two people saying that extruding lines up from our diagrams...

T – Well, I would agree but this is again a diagram and you will just extrude the lines from the diagram, so I don't think that you are really – I think you have tried, you, you have to try to understand somehow deeper why we usually make the rooms like boxes and not just make it their – if you would like to challenge this notion then do it in the whole house and try and approach the things in the same way and not just making this 'arrowish' thing... do you see what I mean?

The preceding dialogue was excerpted from a tutorial where the student was challenged with designing a live/work project in an urban setting. It is clear the student is wrestling with how to make design decisions. In this particular instance, he had taken his space adjacency diagram and extruded the lines into walls. Being dissatisfied with the outcome (cellular rooms) and not knowing

what to do next, he began altering the geometry in an effort to add interest. When challenged, his only frame of reference is the loaded preconception that architects want to “portray some form of good quality.” This, in combination with the typically naive understanding that simple somehow equates to ‘boring’ or ‘uninteresting’ poses numerous *praxis* related questions.

Had the student engaged in a conversation where issues of function had entered into this dialogue, rather than strictly focusing on aesthetic concerns, his case may have been more engaging. The interest in this course is not to teach ‘basics’ to such an extent as to discourage complexity, far from it, but when a student gets lost in a process that depends wholly on the subjective nature of one’s interpretation of the proposition, without regard for function and without the benefit of experience (*episteme*, *phronesis*) then he is destined to ongoing frustration. By the tutor, asking the seemingly obvious questions as to “why do you think it’s (making boxy buildings) easier?” the student is forced to confront social and economical realities and make informed judgments. In asking the question, the ignorance of the student is exposed and he must confront it.

By not simply indulging the student’s interest in an empty aesthetic exercise, we begin, in very simple and obvious terms, the process of engaging the student in *praxis*. The student is encouraged to rigorously pursue his question to the fullest extent possible, in an informed manner; technically, programmatically, socially and ultimately politically.

In the design studio, the educational process acquires some very special characteristics, which can be concentrated to the practice-based notion of learning how to design. There, in contrast to the most common educational practices in higher education that take place in the form of lectures, is characterized by the dialogical form of verbal communication. Education in the design studio is achieved through a sequence of questions and answers that accompany the design language and gestures over models (both literal and metaphorical).

Efforts to have thinking, rigorous practitioners participating in the idealized setting of the design studio, engaging in design processes in which they can share ways of designing, making and creating with fresh minds is another way to engage the students with a process of *praxis* as they see ‘real life’ architects thinking and drawing. This is always done with a clear understanding of a desired pedagogical emphasis; this is academia, not practice. In other words, we do not burden students with concerns for pragmatics, budgets and other conventions of practice. There is inherent in such a positioning another posture that reinforces a divide between the two spheres of architectural operation. That said, it is a first-year course and as such there is little scope for engaging in such practical measures. While we do not specifically engage *practice* at this stage, it is encouraged as the student progresses through the academy.

One of the difficulties with this study has already become quite evident. As we are working with the first-year studio as the basis for our research, we recognize that it is a special and privileged year in architectural education having very limited dialogue with notions of practice. As such, we are including interviews with practitioners who are teaching in the studio and with students at the later years of their degree programme and in the early years of their practice experience. We are attempting to determine at what point these students become aware of their role as social and political agents within a greater socio-political structure, thus making more evident the importance of their engagement in a greater social and ethical framework; where this study of *praxis* and *theoria* becomes of greater(est) concern. The research is ongoing.

Conclusion

This paper argues against an oversimplified scheme that usually contrasts between architectural *practice* and *academia* as a black and white image. For this we presented a new scheme to describe the tension that exists between them by implying the notion of a continuum. *Practice* and *academia* were 'forced' to come closer together by looking back to the deriving terms of *praxis* and *theoria*.

In this in-between space between the *praxis* and *theoria* continuum we found that architects engage in both thinking *and* acting, contemplation *and* politics, abstract ideas *and* concrete applications. In this grey zone of architectural conduct, *phronesis* and *prohairesis* appear to be fundamental virtues that can be cultivated only in the design studio, the place where both practice and theory are fundamentally embedded.

Architectural education is an ongoing process. One cannot hope to learn all that needs to be taught in the span of only a 5 or 6 or even 10 years. It is called 'practice' for another reason outside of all of this etymological investigation as well; you need to keep working at it to get good at it.²⁷ It is the role of both academia and practice to support the profession in the education of its practitioners if Architecture is to hope to contribute in ethical and meaningful ways to society.

Nevertheless, our looking back to philosophy does not look for ready-made answers in problems that essentially the architects have to deal themselves. We don't believe that the answers in the architectural problematic will come outside from the boundaries of the discipline. However, we strongly believe that these limits have to be challenged and that new answers will come out only by having architects travelling through the planes of interdisciplinarity.

²⁷ "Repeated exercise in or performance of an activity or skill so as to acquire or maintain proficiency in it." Oxford American Dictionary, 2nd Ed., 2005

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13

Revealing Ethics through architectural praxis: the example of a student design project

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Keywords: morality, ethics, design studio, praxis, phronesis

Abstract

This paper highlights the importance and the ubiquitous character of the education of Ethics in the design studio. Focusing on the educational procedure in a specific key study, I re-examine and establish the distinction between the terms *morality* and *ethics*. The analysis of the two different aspects of discourse of Ethics reveals two different kinds of connection between architectural education and *moral-ethical* issues raised in the design studio. The one (*education-morality*) consists mainly of the communication of moral propositions and judgements which are applications of an external rule to the practice of design. The other (*education-ethics*) keeps its place in the tacit introduction in a way of doing, in the customs and dispositions of individuals which at the same time are internal to the practice of design education.

Introduction¹

It is quite common nowadays to criticise the postmodern condition for being mainly affiliated to the aesthetic aspect of creation. Especially over the last ‘three decades of postmodern’¹

poststructuralist, and deconstructive experimentation² architecture seemed to have marginalised the question about the duties of the architect. One could also argue that the rights that were discussed were only the rights of a formalistic exercise or an aesthetic game, a *phantasmagoria*³. Ganiatsas, quoting Carlo Diano, goes even further:

The aestheticization of a rapidly changing number of arbitrary *images and forms, without any meaningful depth or cultural content*, functions as a substitute for the lack of aesthetic consistence of *forms that owns ontological essence and cultural orientated meaning*.⁴

During recent years, the concern about the Ethical aspects of architecture has increased. However, this interest on re-examining Ethics has mainly focused on the duties, the rights and social responsibilities that architecture raises, concealing at the same time a practical notion of Ethics that is connected with the customs, the dispositions and the way that things take place in practice. Moreover, this turn has not linked these Ethical issues with architectural education, the place where the new architects are forming their architectural identity and consequently their customs and dispositions.

Morality and ethics in architecture

Very often in architecture, Ethical terms are used in order to describe, judge or evaluate the architectural practice. For example, one can talk about the controversial building of the Scottish parliament in Edinburgh, designed by Enric Miralles, using terms like *good* and *bad* architecture, architectural *lies*, *corruption* in the profession and *unethical* points of view; one can also raise issues of *consistency*, *truth*, *purity*, *obligations*, things that architects are supposed or are expected to do and *should* do; issues of *exclusion* and *inclusion*, *ignorance* and *arrogance* of the building, *respect* for context and *sustainability* or resources; things that are *moral* or *immoral* that architecture can *provide* or *withhold* from; one can also talk about *discrimination*, social *inequality* and *virtuous* architects. This vocabulary that is used to describe any architectural example is obviously a vocabulary borrowed from the discourse of Ethics and it is very common among architects when they describe or discuss their work.

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In the previous discussion where I relate architecture with Ethics it is clear that their relationship is far from being systematic and coherent. Some of my comments referred to the social role of architecture and the way that architects can improve the human environment; to the way that design as a procedure takes place; or the economic and political role of architecture; and I mentioned some virtues that a good architect must have. However, aside from their common general reference to Ethics, what holds the relationship of Ethics and architecture together?

In this paper I will distinguish two possible levels of discourse of Ethics in architecture, based on the existence in modern English language⁵ of two terms with similar (but still different) meanings: *morality* and *ethics*.⁶

John Lawrence starts the first chapter of his book *Argument for Action: Ethics and Professional Conduct* with the following words: 'Ethics or morality* is concerned with the evaluation of human conduct and human character'. In the place of the * asterisk he puts his first footnote clarifying:

In accordance with ordinary language and the practice of many philosophers, *these terms will be used interchangeably*. Although they are sometimes distinguished, there is no standard distinction between them. 'Ethics' comes from Greek, and 'morality' (or 'morals') from Latin. Both origins mean 'disposition' or 'custom'; the Latin giving more emphasis to *social expectations*, the Greek, to *individual character*. (Williams, 1985: 6) Some philosophers describe ethics as the philosophical study of morality: others, especially in Britain, call this 'moral philosophy' ⁷

Despite the fact that both in everyday life and in academia the two terms are used synonymously, there are some attempts from distinguished philosophers [Williams, Wilson] to draw a line between the two terms. The terms *morality* and *ethics* derive from the Latin root (*mores*) and the ancient Greek (*ēthos*) that both mean 'custom'. Here, I wish to exploit the common usage of the term *morality* describing characters or attitudes that are evaluated according to a rule and the term *ethics* as embodying the original concept of addiction, of custom or of the way that things are taking place into *praxis*.

If we apply this line of thought in the context of architecture, *morality* can be defined as *the conscious and normative evaluation of design actions as good or bad, according to an external rule related to social expectations*. Moreover, the issues of *morality* are *external*⁸ to the practice of architecture. Meaning that, during the creation of architecture, *morality* is external to the inherent notion of architecture for the different kind of agents.

On the other hand, *ethics* is *the unconscious evaluation concerning the customs, the dispositions or the principles by which an individual is guided in the practices of the everyday life, having pre-accepted them as good*. At the same times, issues of *ethics* are *internal*⁹ to the practice of architecture, in the sense that, during the creation of architecture, *ethics* is internal to an inherent and pre-accepted notion of what architecture is.

Hereafter, I will elaborate on the different roles that *morality* and *ethics* play in the education of architecture. For this I will analyse the process of education itself as *praxis* in relation to Ethics.

It is important to clarify from the outset that Ethics is not extended only to architectural actions (design) but it also incorporates how people feel¹⁰ towards each other, being-in-the-world of architecture. Although the distinction between the two is difficult, since feelings determine activities and activities determine feelings in a vicious circle, hereafter, I will deliberately focus on the notion of *praxis*, since it is closely related to the practical character of design education in architecture.

Praxis in the Aristotelian notion of the concept – the activity that aims in nothing else than in the action itself – will be the key to unlocking the connection between Ethics on the one hand and education in the design studio on the other. In order to understand education as practice, I focus on the practical character of education in the design studio. Learning and teaching design is facilitated through ‘practising design’ in practice. In other words, the students are learning how to design by executing a design project as if they were already architects.

In the design studio the educational process acquires some very special characteristics that can be concentrated to a practice-based notion of learning 'how to design'. The design studio, in contrast to the most common educational practices in higher education that take place in the form of lectures, is characterised by the practice of doing the action of design itself, accompanied with the dialogical form of verbal communication between teacher and student.

Undoubtedly, there is an enormous amount of literature about the education of Ethics. Both philosophers and educationalists have explored extensively the parameters and characteristics of teaching and learning how to become 'better' from an Ethical point of view. Maybe it is not very surprising that most of this literature examines the general philosophy and technicalities of education for young children, focusing mainly on the first stages of their lives. The literature seems to decrease as the age of the students grows and, especially at the university level, the education of Ethics appears to be minimal. This fact is not surprising, because it is based on the assumption that Ethics is something that can only be learned when a person is young.

It is beyond the scope and the ability of this paper to give answers to the extremely complicated topic of the education of Ethics in higher education in total. Nevertheless, my approach problematises the current notion of Ethics in architecture by expanding our current notion to include *not only the procedure of creation of architecture, but also that of becoming an architect*.

A case study: showing morality and ethics

Furthermore, I will elaborate the difference between *morality* and *ethics* by analysing a student design project as a key study that I monitored as assistant tutor¹¹ in the Department of Architecture in the National Technical University of Athens during the academic year 2003/2004. The examined project took place in the fourth year of study and it was designed by the fourth-year students Dimitra Kanelopoulou and Eleni Papanastasiou who formed one team and elaborated the project together (a common practice in the particular

school). This particular project was chosen because of my frequent interaction with the students during the tutorials, as well as with the early interest that the particular students showed for the educational process itself that intrigued my educational study.

But I would like to preliminarily say that methodologically there is nothing particular about the selected project that makes it preferable to others. The same, or at least equal, notes could be extracted from any other project of the various student teams that were working at the same time under the same group of teachers. Nevertheless, it was this particular project that inspired me to start elaborating this study, and the material that the students kept as an archive appeared to illustrate – in an interesting and palpable way – the design procedure, methods and phases through which the students went during the overall education process.

The project that the students were asked to design was a new building for the Hellenic Festival Organisation. The site for the building was chosen to be the empty space that exists between the streets *Paparigopoulou* and *Palaion Patron Germanou*, in one of the corners of *Klathmonos* square in Athens, Greece.



Figure 1



Figure 2

Here, I propose the analysis of the design process in nine distinct phases that formed concrete units in the educational procedure. The number of these different phases was identified after the re-examination of the design procedure, which took place together with the students during an interview on 28 March 2003. At that time the overall project had been crystallised and was heading to the final

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submission. At this point I asked the students to review their work and play the 'film' of the creation of this project backwards, in order to understand its birth, grown and maturity. The outcome of this 'flashback' provided at the same time the necessary material to illustrate this paper and it is summarised in the following table.











1. The first intentions		
2. Different functions and separate volumes		
3. The corner and the box		
4. The performance hall in the public bar		
5. The performance hall in the basement		

Table 1





6. The intersection of the two legs of L	
7. The performance hall on the air – ramps	
8. The performance hall on the air – ramps – black period	
9. Finalisation: external ramps – 2nd staircase – entrance	

Table 1 (continued)

For the limited space of this paper I will analyse two of the nine stages shown above since they are representative examples of the overall procedure. Focusing on the tutorials that took place in each stage I will identify the one as related to *morality* (Stage 2) and the other as related to *ethics* (Stage 3). By contrasting the two examples I will emphasise the difference that *ethics* and *morality* contributes to the education process.

Stage 2 – morality: different functions and separate volumes

The second stage of the design process came after the first review where the students had presented their first intentions on the site.

Enhancing curricula: meeting the challenges of the 21st century

In this stage the students focused on the segregation of the various functions of the building into basic entities; the library, the archive, the offices, the permanent and temporary exhibitions and the performance hall. Moreover, these five entities were 'translated' into five volumes that were arranged along an L-form, which had been identified during the previous phase as the appropriate abstract form of building for the site.



Figure 3




Figure 4

During the tutorial that took place at this phase, the teacher¹² made a fierce criticism of the disjunctive nature of the building proposition. He emphasised the lack of functionality of the proposal as each of these separate volumes would require its own staircase in order to function properly. So finally, he suggested they view the building as one entity.

During this tutorial, the teacher used a single external rule, that of *functionality*, to judge the students' designs at that stage. Of course

the students already had a notion of functionality, but their understanding was not sophisticated enough to appreciate the importance of integrating such a staircase into this kind of building. This was the result of a lack of exposure to such an expansive building programme, with multiple stories, and an appreciation of the significance of such elements, whether simply pragmatic or culturally.

This issue was not limited only to the student team of Eleni and Dimitra, but was a major problem with most of the other students as well. The teachers gathered all of the students together in order to give specific advice for the entire class. Regardless, the issue of creating a central staircase or alternative staircases kept coming up during the following weeks.




Figure 5

In Ethical terms, the issue of functionality in architecture is external to the practice of architecture itself and, as such, the criticism proffered by the teachers was in the sphere of *morality*. Although functionality is one of the main issues that has been associated with architecture since antiquity (Vitruvius –*utilitas*¹³), there have been numerous periods in architecture when it was set aside, playing a secondary role (baroque, rococo, postmodernism). Especially during the post-modern era, the concept of functionality became the focus of criticism as it was associated with the failure of modern urban planning and the problems created in the post-war cities.

Enhancing curricula: meeting the challenges of the 21st century

In this sense, functionality is a rule, which in this case is applied to architecture, having an Ethical value. For example, architects during modernism were consciously and deliberately choosing to invest in the concept of functionality (as opposed to other concepts of historicism, eclecticism, ornament) by loading the term with Ethical value. Their buildings were not just 'different', compared to those of previous periods, they were 'better' because they were 'true', having disposed the ornamental 'crimes'¹⁴ of the past. The Ethical value of functionality in this case is related to *morality* because it is a preset rule that is used to evaluate the design actions. In this sense, the criticism that the students received at this phase of the project was embedded in *morality*.

It is important to understand that the teacher's disagreement with the design proposition was an Ethical problem. One could think that because of the relation of functionality and rationality, a dialogue about functionality should be related with Logic. On the contrary, I believe that a standpoint arguing that architecture should *not* be functional is not logically wrong, but Ethically bad. The problem that such a statement raises inhabits the realm of Ethics, because most commonly the architects connect the concept of functionality with economic aspects and, furthermore, with notions of inclusion and accessibility.

It is also interesting that the students accepted the *moral* value of this criticism because it was already part of their understanding of how architecture should be; it was in accordance with, and not opposite to, their *moral* beliefs about architecture. The students did not set out to produce a building that would not work functionally. Both the teacher and the students were sharing similar moral prejudices relating to this matter for the creation of architecture. Nevertheless, this notion of *morality* exposed a series of issues that were previously veiled.

Dimitra and Eleni realised, and reiterated later during the interviews, that they created the separate volumes because they wanted to show the function of each of the volumes in a 'clear' and 'pure' way. They described this phase as having created five different buildings in the same site.

In a way, they also realised that at that stage they had produced a building that was the diagram of the different functions, 'crystallised' as building. 'The diagram became a building,'¹⁵ was their own words.

Stage 3 – morality: the corner and the box

During the next phase, the students tried to digest and incorporate the comments that they received from the previous tutorial. It had become obvious to them that the form of the 'L' itself was the element that connects the various elements of the building and aides in understanding the building as one unity.

The students, having realised the importance of the staircase for the building, decided to place it in the wider area of the corner. They now considered the staircase to be the connecting element between the two main entities of the building; the offices and the public functions.




Figure 6

At this stage, the problem of the corner became apparent as they realised that the corner of the site is perhaps the most difficult, but also the most interesting, area of their building. At this stage they proposed to place there a separate 'cube' that would facilitate a canteen for the entire building, in the corner and having an overview of the *Klathmonos* square and signifying the building from a distance.




Figure 7

During the tutorial that followed, the teacher¹⁶ emphasised how the corner of the building had not been addressed in a satisfactory way. He emphasised that the cube-canteen was a very weak element that was not operating in correspondence with the other units of the building. Furthermore, the programme of ‘canteen’ was not a strong enough element to support the desired prominence of the corner.

The tutorial that took place at this stage was not based on ‘strong and coherent’ arguments like the previous one. The teacher’s comments were rather initiated by intuition and not by ‘absolute and linear logic’. It is also interesting that this tutorial finished without any suggestions as to how the students might proceed. It was a denial of the design that was proposed without being able to propose something different.

I believe that this happened mainly because there was no concrete basis by which to judge the project and the whole discussion was based on intuition. Even the language used was characteristic of this. ‘The corner is loose,’¹⁷ the teacher repeated.

This criticism based on intuition and experience, when applied in the field of Ethics, is a very good example of what I call *ethics*. In this case, the teacher didn’t have a handy rule to apply to the students’ design, since it was a unique and very special case that was being

judged. He had to build some kind of argument that was based on his experience and the practical knowledge (*phronesis*) that he had acquired by designing other projects that were more or less different.

This *phronetic* way of criticising the project was focusing mainly on the 'harmonious' relationship of the corner with the overall building that the students were expected to define. It is very interesting that despite the lack of coherent logical arguments about the reason why the proposal was not good, the teacher's criticism was not ambiguous. Although he was vague¹⁸ on why the corner should be different, he was absolutely sure and he was insisting that the design should be changed, not knowing in which direction, but still that it should be changed.

Finally, his criticism was not just a denial of taste, based only on aesthetic judgement. The teacher kept emphasising that the building was 'not good' as it was, having in mind a notion of Ethics that was beyond simply saying that it is 'not beautiful'. This notion of Ethics had to do with the consistency of the building, the existence of the necessary connections between the various elements and the whole and, finally, the entire notion of what he believes architecture should be. This notion of Ethics is exactly the notion of *ethics* that I have proposed. The descriptive (and not the normative, like the previous crit) evaluation of how one believes architecture should be approached as a notion of consistency; a notion that distinguishes one design proposal to be called 'Architecture' and another one not.

The teacher emphasised that the building was 'not good' as it was, not because he didn't like the proportions of the cube-canteen, or the height of the volumes, or the general aesthetic quality of the project. At that stage he was judging in the realm of Ethics the consistency of the building itself. He was making a descriptive evaluation of how he believed architecture should be in terms of consistency. As I argued earlier in my definition of ethics, this evaluation combines the pre-accepted customs, the dispositions and the principles by which the teacher has been guided in the everyday practice of architecture.

In these terms, *ethics* are deriving from the teacher's practical knowledge of architecture that it is ubiquitous in the experience of practicing the architectural *praxis*. The reasons for the vagueness in his comments, and the dialogue overall, were actually due to the lack of having absolute rules by which the project could be judged. The teacher had to use the practical knowledge of his own projects – the mistakes and successes from his own experience – in order to judge the proposal that he had in front of him. This practical knowledge (*phronesis*) that he had from designing other projects that were pretty much different. Contrary to *episteme* (scientific wisdom), *phronesis* is not a kind of knowledge that can be represented apart from the knower; it is rather a capacity to act.¹⁹ It was this capacity the teacher is using during the educational procedure. 'For the Greeks, *praxis* in contrast to *techne*, is an activity involving judgement. It is the making of ethical decisions by the exercise of *phronesis* ... that is, "practical reasonableness", acting by way of tacit understanding gained from the experience and within a context of ethical behaviour, by which was meant behaviour that is conducive to the well-being of oneself and others.'²⁰

Conclusion

The parallel examination of the two different tutorials revealed two kinds of communication of Ethics in the design studio. The one, embedded in *morality*, was communicating *moral* propositions about how things should be according to a preset rule. The other, embedded in *ethics*, was actually communicating dispositions, customs and principles that can guide the students in the everyday practice of designing.

The two examples reveal the ubiquitous character of Ethics in design education. The design studio, in this sense, appears to be the place where both the explicit and abstract rules of *morality* and the implicit and practical notion of *ethics* coexist.

As I mention elsewhere,²¹ the design studio is the place where design practice conciliates every other theoretical and practical skill and knowledge acquired during architectural education. It is where the

design practice meets the philosophical query not only at the same place but into the same praxis. This procedure problematizes and involves Ethics in a new perspective. A perspective that sees Ethics inherited in the way that things take place in the design practice.

So, ultimately two questions seem to arise: 'How can we communicate Ethics in the design studio in order to enhance our curricula?' or 'How can we encourage students of architecture to become good architects from an Ethical point of view?'.²²

I hope that through the elaboration of this paper it starts to become clear that the two questions are of a different nature and should be treated as such. In the first question, this paper may have a contribution in suggesting two different ways of understanding the formation of Ethics; *morality* and *ethics*. For the second question, the paper has no answer. However, this paper is not about how to become better architects from an Ethical point of view; it is rather about understanding *what we mean when we are talking about 'becoming better architects from an Ethical point of view'*.

Since architects themselves must solve ethical problems by virtue of their internal character, one should not expect from philosophy the keys to their solution. Philosophical ethics, whether eudemonist, utilitarian, contractualist, or communitarian, is not in a position to suggest solutions to architects, whose business is to find aesthetic solutions applicable to ethical problems. Therefore, the present paper does not try to determine what ethical orientation an architect should take; rather, it proposes no more than an analysis of what characterizes architecture's ethical problems and of what distinguishes the latter from those encountered in other human activities.²³

Nevertheless, I would like to suggest that, according to the overall argument, an *extra separate course* theorising the Ethical aspects of architecture is far from offering the answer to these questions. Such a module that would possibly take place through lectures and theoretical discussions would actually fail to teach both the *external-moral* aspects of architecture or the *internal-ethical* aspects. Because *morality* has actually been educated through every human activity (and only in this sense could one argue that a course about moral issues could educate

Enhancing curricula: meeting the challenges of the 21st century

morality), but not more successfully than any other course that teaches design, drawing, sculpture, painting, statics etc. *Ethics* on the other hand, can only be taught through courses that exercise design through practice, since it concerns dispositions of a way of doing.²⁴

However, I should admit that such an extra course would be valid in the level of meta-ethics. The aim of such a course would be to exercise a student's skills in logic; the rational meta-analysis and defence of design from the scope of its theory. But the internal virtues of architectural Ethics can only manifest themselves by practising the design practice – in *praxis*.

Notes

- ¹ This paper summarises part of the argument of my thesis '*Η Αποκάλυψη της Ηθικής μέσα από την Πράξη μιας σχεδιαστικής σπουδαστικής εργασίας*' [The Revelation of Ethics through the Praxis of a Student Design Project (my translation from Greek)] for the postgraduate programme: Architecture-Spatial Design in the direction Architectural Design – Space – Culture in the National Technical University of Athens, which I submitted on January 2006. The thesis was supervised by Assistant Professor Vasilis Ganiatsas and Associate Professor Aristofanis Koutougos, Professor Giorgos Parmenidis and Professor Aristedes Baltas
- ² Harries, K. (1997), *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, p. 2 (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
- ³ phantasma+agora 'A name invented for an exhibition of optical illusions produced chiefly by means of the magic lantern, first exhibited in London in 1802. (Sometimes erroneously applied to the mechanism used.) In Philipstal's 'phantasmagoria' the figures were made rapidly to increase and decrease in size, to advance and retreat, dissolve, vanish, and pass into each other, in a manner then considered marvellous.' Oxford English Dictionary Online, Second Edition 1989
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50177120?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=phantasmagoria&first=1&max_to_show=10 [Accessed 07. 12. 2005]
- ⁴ Γκανιάτσας, Βασίλης. *Η Αισθητική στη Διαδικασία της Δημιουργίας: Μια Φιλοσοφική Προσέγγιση στον Αρχιτεκτονικό Σχεδιασμό. Χρονικά Αισθητικής* 41β:559-571. 2002. from now on: Ganiatsas, Vasilis. Aesthetics in the Creation Process: A Philosophical Approach to Architectural Design. *Aesthetic Annals* 41b:559-571. 2002. par. 6 [my translation from Greek, italics in the original]

research papers

- ⁵ This is not the case in all languages. For example in Modern Greek there exists only one term: 'ἠθικὴ' (*ēthēkē*).
- ⁶ From now on I will conventionally call Ethics (note the capital 'E') the totality of the discourse that evaluates human conduct and character. This convention is suggested because I want to distinguish between the meaning of *ethics* and that of *morality*.
- ⁷ Lawrence, J. (1999), *Argument for Action: Ethics and Professional Conduct* [my italics], p. 5 (Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate)
- ⁸ Here I use the external-internal distinction from combining MacIntyre and Lagueux: MacIntyre, A. (1985 [1981]), *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2nd edition, p.187, 191, 219 (London: Duckworth); Lagueux, M. (2004), 'Ethics versus aesthetics in architecture', *The Philosophical Forum*, XXXV (2), pp. 117-33
- ⁹ 'Architecture continuously raises ethical problems, which, however, are nothing more than normal problems that architects must solve in practicing their art. It is for this reason that these ethical problems can be called *internal* to their discipline.' Lagueux, M. (2004), 'Ethics versus aesthetics in architecture', *The Philosophical Forum*, XXXV (2), p. 119 [italics in the original]
- ¹⁰ Wilson, J. (1987), *A Preface to Morality*, p. 12 (Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books)
- ¹¹ The inter-division teaching team that tutored the project was constituted by Sonia Charalampidou, Argyris Rokas, and Panagiotis Toulitatos.
- ¹² See footnote 17
- ¹³ Although 'utilitas' is usually translated as 'commodity', Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, in *A Latin Dictionary*, translate the term as 'use, usefulness, utility, serviceableness, service, expediency, benefit, profit, advantage': <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgibin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3D%2349997> (accessed 18 May 2006). Moreover, Indra McEwen in her recent book translates the term as 'use'. McEwen, Indra & Kagis (2003), *Vitruvius: Writing the Body of Architecture*, p. 199 (Cambridge Massachusetts London, England: MIT Press)
- ¹⁴ Loos, A. (1908) 'Ornament and crime', reprinted in Miller, B. & Ward, M. (eds.) (2002), *Crime and Ornament: The Arts and Popular Culture in the Shadow of Adolf Loos* (Toronto: YYZ Books)
- ¹⁵ Transcripts from interview on 28 March 2004 [my translation]
- ¹⁶ This tutorial was executed by a different tutor. The names of the teachers are not revealed in terms of respect to their teaching. It is important to understand though that I don't suggest here that the one tutorial was better than the other. What I try to point out here is the substantial

Enhancing curricula: meeting the challenges of the 21st century

difference in relation to Ethics, which is beyond the difference of personality or the skills of the teachers.

- ¹⁷ My translation from Greek. Originally: 'Η γωνία μπάζει.'
- ¹⁸ On the difference of vagueness and ambiguity of Ethics look at Wilson, A preface to morality, op. cit. p. 6
- ¹⁹ Halverson, R. & Gomez, L. (2001) 'Phronesis and design: how practical wisdom is disclosed through collaborative design', paper presented at the 2001 American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, Seattle WA. , p.3, available online (accessed 17 May 2006) at: <<http://www.letus.org/PDF/HalversonAERA2001.pdf>>
- ²⁰ Coyne, R. & Snodgrass, A. (2006), Interpretation in architecture, Chapter 5: Ethics and Practice, p. 112 (London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group)
- ²¹ Koutsoumpou, L. (2005), 'Heterotopic metaphors of the design studio: bazaar, agora, gymnasium or dojo?' paper presented at the XXII World Congress of Architecture, organised by the International Union of Architects (UIA) titled 'Cities: Grand Bazaar of ArchitectureS', at the strand 'New Forms of Architectural Profession and Education' in Istanbul, 3–7 July
- ²² To claim that architecture today faces a philosophical problem and to suggest that philosophical reflection should be part of any well-constructed program of architectural education is to claim not just that architects have become uncertain of their way and of the maps that on which they have been relying, but that such uncertainty reflects a deeper uncertainty about how we ought to live, where our place should be, and how architects are to help shape that place, to 'edify', to build in that sense.' Harries, The Ethical Function of Architecture, op. cit. p.11
- ²³ Lagueux, 'Ethics Versus Aesthetics in Architecture.' op.cit. p.133
- ²⁴ It is also important to understand that the above statements concerning the im/possibility of educating Ethics are not ethical or moral propositions. These statements, according to the original separation of Logic- Ethics- Aesthetics, dwell in Logic and can be only proven right or wrong, from a Logical point of view. In particular they belong to the specific level of Metaethics which examines the area of Ethics from the area of Logic.

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Image references

All the images of the design project are taken by the author with the agreement of the students.

The only exception is the top right picture at table 1, that is the picture 24 titled 'χειρονομία' [gesture], by Ilias Handelis, from the book: Μπίρης Κ. Τάσος, Αρχιτεκτονικής Σημάδια και Διδάγματα, στο Ίχνος της Συνθετικής Δομής, Αθήνα: Μορφωτικό Ίδρυμα Εθνικής Τραπέζης, 1996.

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Introduction

“For this is humanism: meditating and caring, that man be human and not inhumane, “inhuman,” that is, outside its essence.”¹

This paper is going to discuss the premise behind the title of the conference and the inherent value of its constitutive terms: ‘humanities’ and ‘design creativity’. The fundamental hypothesis of the call for papers was the fact that humanities have been marginalised in higher education by the monopoly of technological development. This view gives to humanities an inherent value in the context of the design disciplines and architecture in particular. Moreover, this value is arguably not aesthetic or of any other kind, but primarily Ethical. It is exactly this Ethical value that I am going to discuss arguing that it lies *in* the practice of architecture.² My argument, opposes other views that approach the problems of Ethics as an application of a theoretical problem to ‘real world dilemmas’. Often such views end up suggesting norms or rules that can be applied *on* architecture as external imperatives. But what does the term *ethics* means in the context of architecture?



Figure 1

Berlin: Opening the wall

Photo by: Gavin Stewart

[<http://www.flickr.com/photos/gavinandrewstewart/93221691/in/set-72057594056444639/>]



Figure 2

Jerusalem: Closed by the wall

Photo by Tal Bright

[<http://www.flickr.com/photos/bright/23327473/>]

Here, I will deliberately avoid the problem of defining Ethics³ by giving two examples that I hope everyone understands as having to do with Ethics: the fall of the wall in Berlin, and the building of the wall in Jerusalem. Although I will not analyse them as political or urban/architectural actions, I will illustrate my arguments with constant references to both of these walls. Moreover, I am going to provide the reader with a sharp observation by Maurice Lagueux who stated that architecture constantly raises Ethical problems because it “produces the *obligatory framework* for social life.”⁴ Despite how little or how much we know about the walls in Berlin and in Jerusalem, we can understand that having a wall dissecting or circumscribing a city can cause major distress for the people that live on either side, exactly because of its obligatory character, causing isolation, depriving access, separating families, promoting nationalism etc. Moreover, I would like to argue that these two examples are paradigmatic metaphors of every architectural activity, which arguably, can be reduced to two actions: breaking and creating boundaries. Both of them are also paradigmatic because they highlight the two Ethical extremes of ‘human’ (the fall of the Berlin wall as ‘good’) and ‘inhuman’ (the erection of the Jerusalem wall as ‘bad’) practice.

Having provided a preliminary description of Ethics, I will proceed by playing with the word ‘in’ in an attempt to understand the place of Ethics in contemporary architectural design. By arguing for the need to understand ethics *in* the design activity itself, I see architecture as an *inherent* human activity. But, at the same time, I will challenge the centrality of human rationality as it appears in the tradition of the Enlightenment and by doing this I will highlight its *inhuman* potential.

Defining ‘in’ and its architectural metaphors

Although a small word, ‘in,’ can be used in a wide variety of ways that have interesting references to architecture. ‘In’ most commonly appears as a preposition. For example when Descartes says “...I am here, seated by the fire, attired *in* a dressing gown, having this paper *in* my hands...”⁵ we can understand that he is *in* his study room, his body is *in* his gown (17th century robe) and he holds a paper *in* his hand. In the context of architecture, the pre-position ‘in’ is location specific.⁶ According to Oxford English Dictionary, it is primarily understood in opposition to the proposition ‘out’ (of), where “anything which is *in* a given space is not *out of* it, and *vice versa*.”⁷ So, in these terms we can understand Descartes’ location from its dialectic opposite: he is *not* out of the house (he is not homeless), his body is *not* outside of the robe (he is not naked) and the paper is *not* in the fireplace (as Hume would have liked⁸). This definition, through its opposite, describes the word ‘in’ from the outside. Moreover, the compound ‘with-in’ emphasises on “the relationship to the limits”⁹ in the same sense that West Berlin was with-in East Germany and it was defined by its limits: the Wall. In a very similar sense the simplest definition of humanism finds itself identified by its contrast to its categorical opposite: the animals. Especially the very first notion of Roman humanism constitutes man to be *animal rationale*.¹⁰ In this sense the boundary separating humans and animals is reason. In a very similar sense to Descartes identifying his existence with his ability to think (*cogito ergo sum*= I think therefore I am). Reason and the *cogito* is the wall that keeps us humans *in* humanity.



Figure 3

Berlin Wall as boundary: see-through, texture and materiality

Photo by Phil Moore

<http://www.flickr.com/photos/fil/138558135/>

‘In’ as within relates to the material extension of the boundaries by being “within (any place or thing)”¹¹. For this it expresses “relation to that which covers, clothes or envelops,”¹² its material, its colour (*in* linen, *in* red). The limits or bounds can be either real and literal (*in* a box) or virtual and immaterial (*in* a book, *in* school). ‘In’ also refers to a condition or state, physical, mental or moral: e.g. *in* doubt, *in* love, or can relate to a manner (way, mode, style, fashion). It can also express reference or relation to something: *in* reference, *in* regard to, *in* the case of, *in* the matter of etc. Furthermore, the Latin preposition ‘in’ enters in a number of formal phrases that refer to theology, law, logic or philosophy; for example ‘*in situ*’ meaning in its original place, in position, or ‘*in actu*’ meaning “in practice (as opposed to theory or potentiality).”¹³ While this paper argues that Ethics should be seen ‘in practice,’ though it is not interested in such a formal way of expressing (*moralia in actu*), it does refer to a notion of practice that as an envelope embraces Ethics.

The word ‘in’ can also be found as a prefix. OED, again, argues for an understanding of complicated changes from in- to on- and sometimes reduced to a-. For example, the Gothic word *inliuhtjan*, through the Old High German *inliuhten*, and the Old English *onliehtan* came to mean to enlighten, to illuminate;¹⁴ our well known Enlightenment. There is also another prefix that comes from the Latin *in-* which cognates with the Greek $\alpha-$ and the Common Teutonic *un-*. This is usually prefixed to adjectives and their derivatives expressing “negation or privation”¹⁵. In this sense ‘inhuman’ is an adjective referring to either a person without “the qualities proper or natural to a human being,”¹⁶ or a practice that is “brutal, savage, barbarous or cruel.”¹⁷ Arguably such cruelties are happening nowadays in Jerusalem by erecting a ‘monstrous’ wall that negotiates one of the most fundamental human needs: ‘to dwell’ or to feel at home.¹⁸ Although Heidegger challenges whether the essence of man “lies in the dimension of *animalitas* at all,”¹⁹ humans persistently behave like beasts to each other by employing strategic reason to survive. Architecture and the building of walls participates predominantly in their exercise of ‘cruelties’ in the name of reason.



Figure 4

No way *in* (Note the ironic label ‘Welcome to Jerusalem!’)

Photo by: Freepal

http://www.flickr.com/photo_zoom.gne?id=341995265&size=o

‘In’ appears also as a noun and an adjective, but due to the limited space I will choose to focus on its usage as an adverb and a verb. As an adverb, apart from its positional characteristics, it can also express motion or direction, sometimes towards a central point, or most often “from a point without certain limits to a place within these; so as to penetrate or pass into a certain space”²⁰ (See also figure 4). ‘In’ as verb today means “to take in, include, inclose”²¹ or to gather into the barn or the stackyard, “to harvest or house” and generally to collect. It has etymological references to the adverb mentioned before, which appears to have a common origin in various Common Teutonic languages: like the Old English *in* (and the noun from the Old Frisian, Old Saxon, Old High German *in*) as well as the Middle High German *in*, *în*, and the German *ein*. In Gothic language, when composed with other verbs, ‘in’ becomes *inn-*, a transformation that is also apparent in the Old Norse *inn*. According to the OED, some Old English words like *innian* or *einnian*, “appear to attach themselves in part directly to the adverb *inn*, partly to be more immediately associated with the derivative, *inn*”²². The verb ‘inn’, now rarely in use²³, used to mean to lodge, house, or the action of finding a lodging. As a noun ‘inn’ used to mean a dwelling-place, habitation, abode, lodging; or more simply a house (in relation to its inhabitant).²⁴ It also refers to a public house for lodging and entertainment of travellers, a kind of hotel, but today “sometimes, erroneously, it means a tavern which does *not* provide lodging.”²⁵

The reader may find all this etymological archaeology unnecessary and boring, but I think that we are in front of an important discovery. We found that ‘in’ used to have another ‘n’ in it and for this it used to be richer in meaning. And here, I would also like to argue that during the centuries (especially during those of Enlightenment), with the reduction from the ‘inn’ to the ‘in’ we have lost more than a letter. By using a rhetoric of rationality and efficiency, we are building an inhuman wall in Jerusalem that creates boundaries between our co-humans. As an outcome of our eager to become more human we have lost something that is crucial for the understanding of ethics in architecture (that ethics dwell *in* its practice) and for this we have become more *inhuman*.

‘Inn’ and Heidegger: Dwelling in the Hyphens of ‘Being-in-the world’

This understanding of ‘in’ and consecutively ‘inn’ as dwelling, finds itself at home in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger (1889- 1976). Especially in his major work *Being and Time* Heidegger makes an explicit reference to the notion of ‘in’ as residing:

“ ‘In’ is derived from “*innan*”- “to reside”, “*habitare*”, “to dwell” [sich auf halten]. ‘An’ signifies “I am accustomed”, “I am familiar with”, “I look after something”.”²⁶ [H 54]

As the English translators (John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson) inform us in a footnote to the words “to reside” of the above quote, Heidegger himself references back to Jacob Grimm’s (1785- 1863) *Kleinere Schriften*, Vol. VII, pp. 247 ff. There, Grimm compares various archaic German words that mean ‘*domus*’ and he also mentions that they are similar to the English word ‘inn’, as we saw it earlier. He then suggests “a strong verb “*innan*”, which, must have meant either “*habitare*”, “*domi esse*”, or “*recipere in domum*”... ”²⁷ Moreover, (always according to Macquire and

Robinson) Grimm argues that our most familiar notion of ‘in’ as preposition, actually derives from the form of the word as a verb, and not the other way round.

Looking back to the original German text of the above quote, Heidegger writes “... *“an” bedeutet: ich bin gewohnt, vertraut mit, ich pflege etwas.*”²⁸ It is very interesting for our view of Ethics in architecture, that although the verb ‘*wohnen*’ usually means ‘to dwell’, in the specific context it collides with the English expression that ‘I am accustomed to the place where I reside –to my surroundings.’²⁹ At the same time ‘*ich pflege etwas*’ means that ‘I am accustomed to do something/ to take care of it/ devote myself to it’³⁰, in an explicitly Ethical notion.

For the Heideggerian philosophy³¹ this notion of ‘in’ plays an extremely significant role in the understanding of (human) Being, as a Being that is aware of its existence, a Being for which ‘to Be’ “is an *issue* for it.”³² This is what Heidegger calls Dasein (from the German *Da*=there + *Sein*=Being): the Being that wonders about its existence or that for whom the fact that is there ‘is an issue.’ One of the most important ways to understand Dasein, argues Heidegger, is the fact that it exists³³ right there, right now. Dasein is present *in* the world and for this it is what he calls ‘Being-in-the-world’ (German: *in-der-Welt-sein*). Heidegger explains this notion of ‘in’ in two ways: the one is location-specific and refers to the definitions of ‘in’ as we saw them before:

“What is meant by “*Being-in*”? Our proximal reaction is to round out this expression to “Being-in ‘in the world’”, and we are inclined to understand this Being-in as ‘Being in something’ [“*Sein in...*”]. This later term designates the kind of Being which an entity has when it is ‘in’ another one, as the water is ‘in’ the glass...”³⁴ [H 53-54, italics in the original]



Figure 5

Being in as location-specific (Russian dolls -the one is *in* the other)

photo by: Jememoi

<http://www.flickr.com/photos/marites/330610550/>

This relationship can be expanded in a way that this bench, there, is in the lecture-room, the lecture-room is in the university, the university in the city etc. until we can finally say that it is in the world. This example, that Heidegger himself gives, reminds the Russian dolls that provide an excellent example of location-specific notion of ‘in’. Every doll is inside the other, so for each internal doll, its external ones are confined boundaries that have to open-up in order for the internals to come into the light (see Figure 5).

But for Heidegger, the second and most important understanding of ‘in’ is existential-specific. Being-in-the-world means to dwell in this world, to care about it, to be devoted to it and ultimately: to ‘have a place on earth.’ This refers to Dasein’s *existential spatiality*,³⁵ which is fundamental for the understanding of Dasein. According to this view, the human being is not a spiritual entity that is misplaced ‘into’ the space, but on the contrary it acquires its spiritual existence by the fact that it *is* now, there. This understanding of Being-in-the-world refers to the word ‘inn’ as we already saw.



Figure 6

Being *inn* as Existential-specific (Heidegger ‘*inn*’ his hut in Todtnauberg)

Note that fact that Heidegger dwells the hut is not provided by the fact that he is *in* it, but from the small details of the cup, the plate and the spoon in front of him

[<http://www.denisdutton.com/heidegger2.jpg>]

Here, I would like to argue that this second notion of Being-in-the-world as ‘inn’ shows itself *in* the hyphens. The hyphens have replaced the second ‘n’ of the ‘inn’ and they are needed in order to re-connect the Being with the World. The hyphens emphasise the experience carried by the Being that *is* in the world. The Being and the World are in unity with each other and do not operate only as location-specific entities like the Russian dolls, but co-exist in inseparable link. As Wesley Moriston puts it:

“For Heidegger, man is being-in-the-world, an expression which is hyphenated to express the fact that no one of the items constitutive for this phenomenon can be understood in abstraction from the others.”³⁶

The hyphen as a punctuation mark has been used traditionally in philosophy in order to relate different terms. In a text, the hyphen interrupts the always-the-same distance of the common space between the words, offering a bridge between them. It creates a special link between the words, which differs from the single space of the words before and after. But, at the same time, the hyphen keeps them in a distance, it sets them apart or establishes their difference. Postmodern philosophers such as Lyotard,³⁷ have placed emphasis on the distance that the hyphen interposes. In these terms the word Dasein is different from the dual word Being-there, since the proximity or the ‘innes’ of the ‘Being’ in the ‘there’ is not the same. In the word ‘Dasein’ the ‘Being’ is an inherent part of the ‘there’, while the distance in the word ‘Being-there’ is greater.

This has to do with the specific possibility that the German language provides for connecting words without the need of hyphens. Nevertheless, Heidegger in the original text writes *in-der-Welt-sein* choosing to utilise the hyphens and for this we can say that the second ‘n’ of the ‘inn’ is *in* the hyphens.

Ethics ‘in’ the world and the verb of architecture

In his *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger responded to Jean Beaufret’s question³⁸ about a possible connection of Ethics in the ontology of Being-in-the-world seemingly negatively: “The thinking that inquires into the truth of Being and so defines man’s essential abode from Being and toward Being is neither ethics nor ontology.”³⁹ Nevertheless, despite rejecting the question, Heidegger does not reject Ethics overall. It is important to understand that for Heidegger, Ethics actually means adobe or dwelling place “[t]he word [*ēthos*] names the open region in which man dwells.”⁴⁰ Obviously, this definition of Ethics is directly related to his understanding of Being-in-the-world and understanding of ‘inn’ as I have presented here. Furthermore, one could argue that Heidegger does not separate his ontology from ethics: they are one and the same. As he explains, the various disciplines of philosophy like ‘logic’, ‘physics’ or ‘ethics’ are historically defined during the classic Greek period mainly by Plato’s *Academy* and Aristotle’s *Lyceum*. The ‘philosophers’ before this period were hardly aware of the categorical distinction of these areas of study in philosophy. “Yet their thinking was neither illogical nor immoral.”⁴¹

In the contemporary architectural context, when we ‘do’ architecture we constantly make judgements concerning the creation or the demolition of walls. In the extreme cases of the fall of the wall of Berlin and the building of the wall of Jerusalem, these actions are valued as ‘human’ or ‘inhuman’, expressing as we already saw an Ethical point of view. This evaluation is not a random proposition for the quality of the built environment, but it refers to a wider perspective in life: the world *in* which one dwells. When such propositions are expressed by the architects themselves though, this evaluation refers to the very action of their profession. They are judgements about the thing that they do in order to accomplish their everyday activity of designing and creating space. But what is this activity? What do architects do when they practice architecture?

Inevitably these questions lead us back to the Aristotelian distinction of human activities (*energeiai*) into three categories: *theoria*, *poēsis* and *praxis*. In two earlier essays, I have discussed extensively the problems of trying to position architecture as an activity amongst these Aristotelian categories. Very briefly, I will resume by saying that the most popular dipole is the one that contrasts *theoria* and *praxis* by assuming that thinking of building a wall is different thing from doing it. My essay *The Switch of Ethics and the Reflective Architect: In-between Practice and Theory*,⁴² nevertheless, aligns with views that consider the operations of *praxis* and *theoria* as inextricable. *Theoria* is not in any way a set of rules or laws that prescribe practice in advance, but it is participation *in* it. The dipole between *praxis* and *poēsis* is less popular, but hides interesting misunderstandings especially for architecture. Architecture usually is seen as *poēsis*, since it usually has to do with an aim or a goal that stands beyond the mere doing, relating to the production of the physical wall. In the essay *The Flute and the House; Doing the Architecture of Making*⁴³ I analysed the examples that Aristotle

himself gives (building a house and playing the flute) and ended up arguing that the poetic aspect of *making* architecture derives from the primary action of simply *doing* it and not the other way around.

Nowadays, *praxis* is usually affiliated with the mere application of abstract ideas, rules and principles preconceived by theory. The building of the wall in Jerusalem, or the fall of the wall in Berlin is a mere product of a political thought. Similarly every wall to be drawn or built in architecture is the outcome of a theory. However, such a meaning would, in ancient Greece, have been signified by the term *technē*. *Praxis* was in fact an autonomous activity achieved in accomplishing the very action in itself, without aiming at a goal that is distinct from the action. As Richard Coyne and Adrian Snodgrass puts it: “For the Greeks, *praxis* in contrast to *technē*, is an activity involving judgment. It is the making of ethical decisions by the exercise of *phronesis*..., that is, ‘practical reasonableness’, acting by way of tacit understanding gained from the experience and within a context of ethical behaviour, by which was meant behaviour that is conducive to the well-being of oneself and others.”⁴⁴

Conclusions

“It ought to be a bit clearer now that opposition to “humanism” in no way implies a defense of the inhuman but rather opens other vistas.”⁴⁵

Obviously, the thesis of this paper is not against ‘humanism’ in order to promote barbaric brutality. By problematizing the definition of ‘humanism’ as ‘reasonable faculty’ the aim was to reveal the levels of inhumanity that can be achieved by building walls under the excuse of reason. If we remain mere ‘logical animals’ we will always be thinking in oppositional terms, like *in/out*, forgetting the *inn* that dwells in-between. According to these oppositions⁴⁶ when something problematizes the human, it is ‘inhuman’, barbaric, bestial or illogical.

It needs more than pure logic to understand architecture as a ‘humane’ activity and even more to transcend it and conceive its divine aspects.⁴⁷ However, the way to arrive there is not pure reflection (or thinking as Heidegger argues), but through the close examination of its practice: We have to see in detail how the wall in Jerusalem is built and how the wall in Berlin was demolished, not only as political acts but also as architectural practices. Because thinking in architecture is taking place by doing what architects do: designing, writing or building with their own hands –and at the very same time thinking.



Figure 7

Beyond the wall

Photo by: Freepal

<http://www.flickr.com/photos/freepal/308460780/>

Similarly, the Ethics of the architectural practice, should be examined *inn* the praxis of actually doing it. And by this I mean, not just by doing what the architects do, but also by dwelling *in* the practice of architecture; by understanding Ethics in a perspective of Being-in-the-world and focusing on its hyphens.

This point of view stands against the concept of Ethics as an applied discipline. Any proposal to solve the inhuman problem of architecture by merely defining a set of rules (eg. “Do NOT build walls!”) that can be applied to its practice as ‘Professional Ethics’ or ‘Codes of Conduct’ is condemned to fail. Even the term ‘applied ethics’ is deeply ‘inhuman’ and the notion of ‘ethics *on* architecture’ reveals only hierarchical dominance and empowerment. On the contrary, as presented above, Ethics is deeply inherent to architectural activity and for this should be understood through its *inner* relationship: Ethics dwells *in* architectural *praxis*. Otherwise, architecture will keep on building walls without thresholds, and it will keep on being a field for humans to exercise their competence of being inhuman.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in *Basic Writings From "Being and Time" (1927) To "The Task of Thinking" (1964)* (London: Routledge, 1993). p. 224
- ² Note that by practice I don't mean the casual term of 'architectural practice' as opposed to 'architectural academia,' but rather, the activity of generally doing what architects do in their everyday *praxis*. A more detail analysis of the term will be provided towards the end of the paper. See also Alisdair MacIntyre's definition of practice in: Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2nd (Corrected, with Postscript) ed. (London: Duckworth, 1985). p. 187
- ³ As an example of the problematic of defining Ethics, see Plato's Meno and Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico Philosophicus
- ⁴ Maurice Lagueux, "Ethics Versus Aesthetics in Architecture," *The Philosophical Forum* XXXV, no. 2 (2004). p. 122 [my italics]
- ⁵ Descartes, "Meditations on the First Philosophy in Which the Existence of God and The distinction between Mind and Body Are Demonstrated," in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes* (New York: Dover, 1955). p. 145
- ⁶ According to English Dictionary there is also a time-specific notion of 'in', of "being within limits of periods of time." in, prep. Oxford English Dictionary online version, Second Edition, 1989 http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50113658?query_type=word&queryword=in&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&search_id=qd8q-qkX18I-2522&result_place=10 [10. 07. 2007]
- ⁷ *ibid*
- ⁸ "If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, *Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?* No. *Does it contain any experimental reasoning, concerning matter of fact and existence?* No. Commit it then to flames: for it can contain nothing but *sophistry and illusion.*" David Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding," in *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Selections from a Treatise of Human Nature, with Hume's Autobiography and a Letter from Adam Smith* (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1912). p. 176
- ⁹ in, prep. Oxford English Dictionary op.cit.
- ¹⁰ Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism." p. 226
- ¹¹ in, prep. Oxford English Dictionary op.cit.
- ¹² *ibid*
- ¹³ in, prep. Oxford English Dictionary online version, Second Edition, 1989 http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50113659?query_type=word&queryword=in&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&search_id=qd8q-qkX18I-2522&result_place=10 [10. 07. 2007]
- ¹⁴ in-, prefix¹. Oxford English Dictionary online version, Second Edition, 1989 http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50113661?query_type=word&queryword=in&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&search_id=qd8q-qkX18I-2522&result_place=10 [10. 07. 2007]
- ¹⁵ in-, prefix³. Oxford English Dictionary online version, Second Edition, 1989 http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50113663?query_type=word&queryword=in&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&search_id=qd8q-qkX18I-2522&result_place=10 [10. 07. 2007]
- ¹⁶ inhuman, a. (n.) Oxford English Dictionary online version, Second Edition, http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50117015?query_type=word&queryword=inhuman&first=1&max_to_show=10&single=1&sort_type=alpha [10. 07. 2007]
- ¹⁷ *ibid*
- ¹⁸ The state of Israel backs up the building of the wall in Jerusalem by using a rhetoric that prioritizes the security of the Israeli citizens' homes from being attacked by the Palestinians. Ironically, at the very same time, this Wall deprives the Palestinians from their own homes and their feeling of security or 'dwelling'.
- ¹⁹ Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism." p. 227 see also 228-229
- ²⁰ in, adv. Oxford English Dictionary online version, Second Edition, 1989 http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50113657?query_type=word&queryword=in&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&search_id=VBow-Gm8570-5558&result_place=10 [11. 07. 2007]
- ²¹ in, v. Oxford English Dictionary online version, Second Edition, 1989 http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50113656?query_type=word&queryword=in&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&search_id=VBow-Gm8570-5558&result_place=10 [11. 07. 2007]
- ²² *ibid*
- ²³ inn, v. Oxford English Dictionary online version, Second Edition, 1989 http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50117304?query_type=word&queryword=in&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=10 [11. 07. 2007]

- ²⁴ inn, n. Oxford English Dictionary online version, Second Edition, 1989
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50117303?query_type=word&queryword=in&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=10 [11. 07. 2007]
- ²⁵ *ibid* [my italics]
- ²⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquire & Edward Robinson (Oxford UK & Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1962 (1927); reprint, 2005). p. 80
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*
- ³¹ The reader should be aware that any attempt to reduce the philosophy of Heidegger into a few quotes is an attempt fail to be doomed. At the same time though it is impossible to understand my arguments that follow, without having even a vague idea of the core concepts of Heidegger mentioned here. This is a warning for the reader and a remainder for the author of the inherent impossibility of his task.
- ³² Heidegger, *Being and Time*. H 12, p. 32 [italics in the original]
- ³³ *Ibid.* H 53, p. 78
- ³⁴ *Ibid.* H 53-54, p. 79 [italics in the original]
- ³⁵ *Ibid.* H 56, p. 83
- ³⁶ Wesley Morriston, "Heidegger on the World," *Man and World* 5 (1972). p. 265
- ³⁷ see for example: Jean François Lyotard, *The Hyphen: Between Judaism and Christianity* (New York: Amherst, 1999).
- ³⁸ Beaufret says "What I have been trying to do for a long time now is to determine precisely the relation of ontology to a possible ethics." Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism." p. 255
- ³⁹ *Ibid.* p. 259
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.* p. 256
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.* p. 256
- ⁴² Leonidas Koutsoumpos, "The Switch of Ethics and the Reflective Architect: In-between Practice and Theory," Research Paper presented at the Conference: *Reflections on Creativity: Exploring the Role of Theory in Creative Practices*, organized by the University of Dundee, in Dundee, at 21-22 April, 2006
- ⁴³ Leonidas Koutsoumpos, "The Flute and the House; Doing the Architecture of Making," in *The Politics of Making*, ed. Mark Swenarton, Igea Troiani, and Helena Webster, *Critiques S.* (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2007).
- ⁴⁴ *ibid.* p. 112
- ⁴⁵ Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism." p. 250
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.* p. 249
- ⁴⁷ Arguably, for Heidegger, the human Being operates in between its animal appearance and its divine potential.

Hybrid Studio Matters

Ethnomethodological Documentary of a Tutorial

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Abstract

This paper looks into the electronically augmented, or 'hybrid' contemporary environment, through the spatial and temporal thresholds or 'seams' that it encompasses. The electronically augmented contemporary environments have been increasingly studied within the past few years. The question about how architects respond to the new spatial conditions, how they interpret and design space, is a major emerging issue. Within this broad field of questions, our study conducts an ethnomethodological analysis of a particular environment-example: the architectural design studio, through the documentation and analysis of a brief architectural tutorial. The analysis of this case-study is being based upon the seams, the thresholds or ruptures that occur between different media. We argue that the shift or transition from one medium to another can be smooth and un-noticed, whereas, in other instances, it shifts completely the centre of attention, the flow of the tutorial or the perception of the means (and other elements) engaged. The transitions, occurring within the recorded tutorial, are studied in relation to the notions of *engagement*, *immediacy* and *continuity*. We consider that these three notions bring forth the complexities, conflicts and richness (of the hybrid environment) that the tutorial recording reveals.

1. The immaterial, the fusion and the seam

As it has been argued in many contemporary texts, the space we inhabit is increasingly constituted by non-visible or non-material elements, some of which are closely related to the new technologies. By 'technologies' we mean both the ones merged within the conventional construction of the building (either as part of its infrastructure or as electromagnetic waves) and also the portable, mobile, temporal ones, such as small functional devices. Both kinds of new technologies create spatial qualities and affect the way we perceive spaces and their interconnections. The electromagnetic field, for example, although not visible, it does define territories, connections, thresholds and edges. Jonathan Hill, refers to this condition as 'electromagnetic weather'¹, and he looks particularly into the way that it defines the place and thresholds of the home. The electromagnetic weather's relation to 'home-ness' is considered mainly in two ways: The electromagnetic weather enters the physical home (through electronic devices) and shifts the way the home is connected to the 'outside' or to the 'unknown'. The electromagnetic weather, though, can also re-create a 'homely' condition *elsewhere*, since the devices that control the electromagnetic 'thresholds' of the home are portable.² In the same way that the electronic technologies create the homeness, they can re-create other spatial qualities too, such as place for work, teaching, learning, communicating, etc.

William Mitchell looks into the contemporary 'hybrid' environments by opposing them to the 'virtual reality fascination' of the recent past. Mitchell argues³ that the debates about new technologies, the virtual spaces and their potential, or limitations give their place to discussions and research about the *fusion* of the new media in their physical environment. One of the examples that he gives is that of a young researcher in a library, surrounded by books, connected to the internet through his portable computer, taking pictures of interesting pages with a digital camera, and getting guidance through his mobile phone by his supervisor or colleagues. As he argues, "[t]he challenge... is to start thinking like creative fusion chefs –to create spaces that satisfy important human needs in effective new ways, and that surprise and delight us through digitally enabled combinations of the unexpected."⁴

This quest for fusion uses a language of continuity, viscosity, or flow, and its 'collapse' implies a condition which wishes to conflate any possible opposition, like the observer with the observed, the human with the machine, the subject with the object.⁵ This conflation transforms previously discrete dualities into smooth ambiguity, a blurring of meanings. Of course, this conflation also becomes responsible for rupturing and unsettling the interface; in the manner of a collapse, it becomes a major contributor to distress.⁶ In contrast to this ambition towards the smooth, there are numerous examples of tools and technologies the use of which seems to rely on the obviousness of the seam, a conspicuous and distressed relationship between the performer and instrument. The ideals of 'smart architecture' and tangible computing, in blending and merging, can be distressed by resistance — an architecture that does not only facilitate but fights and provokes in an articulation of space by event.⁷ Within this context, our paper explores the seam or transitions between digital and physical media within an ordinary architectural tutorial, and the issues, that the observation of these transitions, bring forth.

2. Methodology

In order to examine the way that the members of the education activity carry out their everyday tasks we recorded an all-day tutorial of the 1st year architectural design studio, where we teach, functioning, thus, as participants-observers. The selected footage was then studied within an interdisciplinary focus group (that includes researchers from Human Geography, Computer Sciences, Sociology and Architecture). In order to represent the footage in textual form, it has been transcribed through the techniques of conversation analysis.⁸

We follow Garfinkel's consideration of ethnomethodology, as the study of the methods that people use in accomplishing their mundane everyday activities "by paying to the most commonplace activities of daily life the attention usually accorded extraordinary events, seek to learn about them as *phenomena in their own right*."⁹ In this sense we are not interested in an extreme or extraordinary hi-tech studio-situation, but in the mundane level of an ordinary design studio class (here the first year design studio of the University of Edinburgh, Scotland). Ethnomethodological studies have been emphatically distinctive in giving an analysis 'from within' to what is actually going on in social activities. By focusing on the micro-practices of people's life inform us about details that our habitual seeing of the world actually overlooks.¹⁰

Methodologically, the use of a concrete example is not a mere application of existing theory but as emphasized by Flyvbjerg, it stands as a fundamental generator of knowledge.¹¹ By focusing on the minimal level of what people actually do when they perform their mundane activities, it is possible to go beyond the stereotypical view that considers technology as a

'mere' tool non-implicated into the discussion about the substance of the project itself. In our case, new technologies are part of a procedure and of a discussion involving all aspects of being, doing or interconnecting things.

3. The situation of the tutorial

Jonathan (tutor) and Mark (student) are having a tutorial about the designing of a small house. They are sitting in front of Mark's desk: on the desktop there is a drawing board and on top of it there is an open notebook with lots of sketches and notes, on it, a technical pen, a pair of eyeglasses and an open laptop with a 3D model. The tutorial is leading towards the end and Jonathan makes specific comments on how Mark should continue working. Jonathan rotates the 3d model while talking and Mark takes notes of Jonathan's comments on his notebook:

Figure 1. The scene

- Tutor (Jonathan): you need to address the rest of the site now too (1) and, yea, put your service
 ((M starts writing something on his notebook))
 ((J gestures generally over the site in front of the screen))
 ((J puts his hand on the laptop's
 trackpad and starts rotating the 3D model))
 spaces in:: (here), em.. (yea), and that's what you do on that wall, I guess you
 ((J zooms in the model))
 ((M writes on his notebook))
 put your service spaces in here::: the bathrooms, the toilets, the storage rooms,
 whatever else you need back here.
 ((J zooms even more and looks inside the room))
- Student (Mark): yea:: I was thinking also:: the traffic would probably be quite a bit of a
 ((M stops writing))
 (reprobation) on that back wall, so not that suitable for bedrooms.
 ((M points towards the screen))
 ((J who has zoomed to close to the building, gets stuck for a couple of seconds
 in between the two floors))
- T: yea, =
 ((zooming in and out in the computer model))
 = (3) that's useful tool, I think that I would (...) probably do a quick physical model
- S: yes, it might be useful..
- T: and then em..
- S: I can probably make, e:: you were saying to do wax model=
 T: =I think you (should) just do massy models right now=
 S: =do you recommend maybe considering doing (.) some cast models
- T: I don't thi:nk so (.) I don't think you need to (.) cause that sounds like it's going take
 lots of time and effort to me (.) I would just do it in wooden blocks (.) and and then (.)
 [start working on your paths]
 ((J takes his hands of the computer and sits back))
 [Chop some woods from the workshop]
 in wood and then: and paths like this that go around it (.) you know (1) because you're
 going to spend all day sort of working on this thi:ng and trying to reso:lve it, I think (.5)

- ((J points towards the computer screen))
- = it is kind of more manageable idea (probably)
- S: (...) so probably start with (this) (...)
- T: I think you leave this now and you'll come back to this later on, but, em:
 ((J points towards the computer screen))
 ((M writes on his notebook))
 you leave that and you see what you (need to)
- S: to change (...)
 ((J nods his head affirming))

Figure 2. Interaction with the physical model.

- T: to clarify a little bit, and then (...) cause there is an immediate, right?, like (1.5)
 ((J turns to his left and takes a small carton model))
 = when: there is the front area you going to move and shift things=
 ((J gestures with the model in hand))
 ((J puts the carton model back on his left))
 I like working on the computer as well actually (...) I can find it in visualizing pretty well e
 ((J points towards the computer screen))
- S: (...) that's something I was trying to (...) (in hand) and then (...) study the structure (...) especially in plans and sections, so (...) that's (why) (...)
- T: the other thing you've got to do is (...) speaking of sections (...) is draw sections, and
 ((J flips to the previous page of Mark's notebook, where there are some sketches of sections))
 and real sections, not just (0.5) you kind of need to move beyond this =
 ((J points towards the sketchy sections in the notebook))
 = and get to (.75) heights (.5) and actually to scale=

Figure 3. Showing the sections in the notebook.

- S: but I could probably (...) could I not do it from (...) [here]
 ((M flips back the page to the one that was open before))
- T: ((M points towards the computer model))
 [from here]
 ((J points towards the computer model))

Figure 4. Cutting a section on the 3D model.

Figure 5. Close-up of the section.

- T: yeah I mean you can (...) you can cut sections (...) you can cut sections and then they can
 ((Mark puts his hand on the computer's trackpad))
 ((J make a gesture like a cut))
 print them off=
- S: =in sketch form (...) and then [I can]
 ((Mark clicks on the section tool at the toolbar))

- T: [yeah] (.) print them o:ff and then sketch on top of them
 maybe but you should have some re:al (0.5)
 ((Mark clicks over a surface that automatically creates a section
 of the building))
- S: so, probably work from here and (...)
 ((Mark points at the computer screen, and then takes his hands from the computer))
 ((J nods affirming))

4. Inquiring the situation

In the above situation we see five major seams in the transition between different media: 1)The first one happens in the beginning of the dialogue where Jonathan puts his hands on the trackpad and starts to navigate in the model; 2)the second one when Jonathan leaves the computer, sits back while describing the new model that Mark should make; 3)the third is when Jonathan reaches the carton model and leaves it back; 4)the fourth is when Jonathan flips the page on Marks notebook and comments about his sketchy sections; 5) and the fifth when Mark puts his hand on the trackpad and makes the section of the 3D model. Nevertheless, there are further minor seams that we discuss later on. Because of the limited space of this paper instead of dealing with each one of the five seams separately we organize our comments under three themes that summarize our inquiry: *engagement*, *immediacy* and *continuity*.

4.1 Engagement

“A hot medium is one that extends one single sense in ‘high definition.’ High definition is the state of being well filled with data. ... Hot media are, therefore, low in participation, and cool media are high in participation or completion by the audience.”¹²

The five abovementioned seams happen between three different media: the computer, the physical model and the notebook. During the situation there appears to be a circle that moves from the computer to the physical model, to the notepad and goes back to the computer again. If we would accept McLuhan’s distinction between hot and cool media, we could argue that the computer is the ‘hottest’ medium of all three. The glossy high definition screen is compacted with visual information that is deliberately created to attract the eye, by real-like textures and colors. On the other side, the physical model is the ‘coolest’ medium since it is small and abstract, allowing a plethora of interpretations.

The reason for mentioning this distinction is not the mere categorization of the media, but the consideration of the way in which Jonathan and Mark become engaged with them in different degrees. According to McLuhan, hot media allow less participation since the density of their information leads to a passive stance.¹³ In the case of the computer, the shiny screen seems to dominate in the setup of the scene of the tutorial. The engagement of the parties, though, is asymmetrical since there is only one who leads the navigation within the model and controls what appears in the screen. Since the view of the virtual model is actually flat (a sequence of perspective images of an imaginative 3d space), the one who has control of the trackpad (or the mouse) leads both observers through the virtual space. Here we can, again, make a distinction between the medium as it is experienced by the one who navigates and by the one who watches; for the one who watches it is even more passive, since he cannot virtually navigate himself exactly as he would wish to. In our case

study, the control of the navigation is passing back and forth from the student to the tutor. The control of this navigation is quite closely related to the sequence of issues emerging within the discussion; in some sense, and to some extent, the one who controls the trackpad controls the flow of the discussion too. A characteristic shift (or seam) within the tutorial dialogue related to that is the moment when the student replies to the inquiry of the tutor (about making a drawing of a section) by 'cutting' the virtual model and showing, thus, its section. At that moment the student takes control of the trackpad, offers a new input and navigates the following part of the dialogue.

We could argue, thus, that the computer, and particularly the immersive virtual environments are 'hotter' or 'colder' according to whether one is actively engaged to them, or if he is a passive receiver of their attractive images. Here comes also the issue of 'enjoyment'; the tutor, while suggesting to the student to try some thing out with a physical model, he says (as if admitting something not generally obvious or accepted) that he actually enjoys working with computer models himself too. Although it is traditionally believed that the physical manual work provides the enjoyment of making, in our dialogue the opposite is also there; the computer model is not only a tool for dis-engaged work, but an immersive tool like many others. At this stage the discussion is being developed around the medium itself, whether physical or electronic, and not the space. The two participants have moved back, facing the computer as a tool 'present at hand'. the medium, though, still affects the discussion, and although they are not moving within the virtual space, the one who controls it makes an input to the dialogue.

4.2. Immediacy

"A weave always weaves in several directions, several meanings and beyond meaning. A network-stratagem, and thus a singular device. Which? A dissociated series of 'points', red points, constitutes the grid, spacing a multiplicity of matrices of generative cells whose transformations will never let themselves be calmed, stabilized, installed, identified in a continuum. Divisible themselves, these cells also point towards instants of rupture, discontinuity, disjunction."¹⁴

The last seams, towards the end of the discussion - that negotiate how the section would be made - reveal interesting points about how the two parties construct notions of immediacy. When Jonathan pointed out that Mark should make some sections he asked for 'real' section asking for a shift from the sketchy sections towards 'proper' drawings that have more accurate heights and 'actual' scale. Mark's response was to turn flip back the page to the original one, an action that prepares the fact that he was going to take the situation under control, and asked whether he could do this from the computer, a question accompanied with a definitive gesture towards the computer. Although Jonathan understood immediately what Mark wanted to say, since – as we already mentioned - they repeated the same word 'from here,' Mark took control of the trackpad and executed the section 'right there' in 'real time.'

This seam makes explicit a suggestion about a hybrid-section that was using the computer-generated (out of the 3D model) section and then elaborated further in hand or through some other means. Nevertheless, this section was not a smooth transition between the digital and manual but rather a stratagem of discontinuity, rupture and overlap of the two media, that is revealed in the phrase 'print them off and sketch on top of them'. Furthermore, there is another issue emerging here: arguably, the section is generally made to present an abstract aspect of space that cannot be visualized otherwise. Here, though, Jonathan and Mark followed the other way round, since the 3D model was already there,

they rotated it to see it from all sides or from within. However Jonathan still asked for a section and Mark did offer it to him, as a need for a different kind of projection of the space. A question raised here is whether the tutor asks for a section because there is not enough information and detail presented through the computer 3d model, or because there are other aspects of space that a 'real-like' 3d image cannot provide, whereas the projection of a section (although a non-realistic view) can.

At the same time, when Jonathan asked for the sections, we saw that he did not take hold of the trackpad and cut a section of the model himself. This fact shows, first of all, that sometimes the tutor may not be familiar with the specific software that the student is using and for this is unable to perform operations that in a physical model would be obvious, cut things off, add a piece of carton to make a point as he did while describing how Mark should make the model with the wooden blocks and the paths around by using a little piece of card that was lying around on the desk. Secondly, it shows that Jonathan had a lesser degree of immediacy into performing radical changes on Mark's digital model (a common practice in physical media). Even if such a change was attempted there is always a variety of backup strategies by using commands like 'Save As' or 'Go Back', that restore some relative safety. This is also related to issues of authority, but also the notion of 'damage' or the value of the artifact: the student's model is sometimes not only a means or a tool for investigating and designing the space, but also a valuable object, because of the time and effort spent on it; because of the care and engagement he committed; and because of the fact that it is made by himself and it thus has a meaning that is immediate for him.

4.3. Continuity

"What interests us in operations of striation and smoothing are precisely the passages or combinations: how the forces at work within space continually striated it, and how in the course of its striation it develops other forces and emits new smooth spaces."¹⁵

The shift between the space of the designed house to the space of the tutorial is quite characteristic at the stage of the dialogue where the tutor starts – for the first time – talking about the medium itself, saying "It is a useful too." The shift from the 'virtual' space to the actual physical space of the studio seems to be occurring in several stages, two of which have special significance. The first is when the discussion (verbally) moves from one environment to the other, and the second is when the hand movement does the same shift some seconds later on.

While the tutor was – in some sense – situated within the designed house, navigating within it and exploring its spatial qualities (in order to understand it and give comments about its qualities to the student), when he commented about the usefulness of the tool, he started commenting about the medium itself. At that particular moment we could argue that he moved back to the physical environment of the studio, whereas previously we were immersed and engaged with the 'virtual' space of the house. At the moment that he started discussing about the medium itself and its several aspects in relation to the designing process (such as the time needed to make it, the degree of precision necessary at each stage of the student's investigation etc.), he turned the software and the computer into an object 'present at hand' laying in front of them.¹³

Nevertheless, by following the movement of the tutor's hands, we could argue that this transition actually occurs later on: when he actually stopped navigating himself within the virtual space, left the touch-pad and sat back, and also by starting indicating with his hands the computer as an object itself. Although he first made the shift by starting

commenting on the medium, he was still half immersed within the virtual space; still navigating within the house. If we were not listening to the dialogue we would still think that he is ontologically immersed within the designed house, imagining himself walking within it.

The transition, thus, from the virtual to the physical space is not simple to identify, and there are moments where we are not fully here or there, not fully immersed within the physical or virtual environment. Although the transition becomes more obvious in some key moments such as the ones described it occurs in a lot more subtle ways. This is frequently revealed through the way the language is used, regarding oneself either fully immersed or fully aware of the environment he is situated in. One could argue that we inhabit within such transitions or seams since these are practically always there in different degrees of consciousness and in different intensity. While for some moments one medium attracts our attention, we are continuously aware of its nature and potentially in a distance from it.

5. Concluding remarks

In this paper we argued for the significance of the seam, against the presupposition that considers hybrid environments as fused spaces that are characterized by smooth homogeneity. One approach to resisting the imperative towards seamless interfaces is to counteract it with the concept of perturbation: a time-based disturbance of the surface, that may tear, rupture and otherwise fracture it. The continuity implied in designing spatial form can be troubled, resisted and ameliorated by an articulation of time.¹⁶ Such temporal seams we found to be present in the study of the tutorial between Jonathan and Mark in the architectural design studio.

Although the 'seams' between the experience of different mediums can often remain unnoticed, it can also possibly bring forth to our perception the nature of the medium itself. The transition from a medium as a tool 'ready to hand' to one 'present in hand' (and the other way round) brings our attention the qualities of the medium and also to the relation between the medium and the substance itself; the relation between the medium as a medium and the medium as a 'message'.

The transition between mediums, we argue should not be seen as a smooth sequence-shot in a film. Instead of conveying a scene as one continuous time sequence filmmakers use extensively the element of temporal disruption, in montage, by switching from one spatial location to another. At the same time, though, these cuts convey overall a sense of the smooth. Especially in the situation that we studied the interest of our analysis lies in the seams between the different sequences. In this sense, we promote the enculturation not of 'fusion chefs' but rather of film editors that focus more on the montage and the way that the cuts or the seams articulate a whole image, without necessarily conflating the one scene with the other.¹⁷

6. Figures and tables

Figure 1. The scene.

Figure 2. Interaction with the physical model.

Figure 3. Showing the sections in the notebook.

Figure 4. Cutting a section on the 3D model.

Figure 5. Close-up of the section.

7. Endnotes

¹ Jonathan Hill, *Immaterial Architecture* (London: Routledge, 2006). p.23

² The portable computers and the mobile phones, for example, can re-create a homely feeling or atmosphere elsewhere, far from the physical home, by connecting the user to his familiar faces, activities, etc. The 'homely' here is not based upon the physical space but rather upon the links, connections, possibilities of communication and electronic objects or databases available to the user.

³ in his essay "After the revolution_ Instruments of displacement"

⁴ William Mitchell, "After Revolution_Insturments of Displacement," in *Disappearing Architecture: From Real to Virtual to Quantum*, ed. G. Flachbart and P. Weibel (Blackwell Synergy, 2005).

⁵ Pedro Rebelo and Richard Coyne, "Resisting the Smooth: Time-Based Interactive Media in the Production of Distressed Space" (paper presented at the Digital Design: 21st eCAADe Conference, Graz, Austria, 2003).

⁶ Richard Coyne, Pedro Rebelo, and Martin Parker, "Resisting the Seamless Interface," *International Journal of Architectural Computing* 4, no. 2 (2004).

⁷ Bernard Tschumi, *Event-Cities 3: Concept Vs. Context Vs. Content* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 2004).

⁸ Here, I have used the Conversation Analysis' transcript techniques offered by Emanuel Schegloff, in his online transcription project

<http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/schegloff/TranscriptionProject/index.html> [accessed 23. 03. 2007]

⁹ Harold Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967). p.1 [my italics]

¹⁰ This fact does not mean that ethnomethodology ignores the wider context (social, political, economical, material, or immaterial) of the micro-practice. On the contrary suggests that the context, either material or immaterial, does not merely surround the activities, but the context and the activity co-exist. Michael Lynch, *Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action: Ethnomethodology and Social Studies of Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). p. 29

¹¹ Bent Flyvbjerg, *Making Social Science Matter, Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again* (Cambridge et. al.: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Flyvbjerg mentions also the role of ethnomethodology as "especially interesting" view within the wider hermeneutic-phenomenological strand of sociology.

¹² Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (Oxon: Rutledge, 2001/1964). p. 24-25

¹³ Ibid. p. 25

¹⁴ Jacques Derrida, "Where the Desire May Live (Interview)," in *Rethinking Architecture*, ed. Neil Leach (London: Routledge, 1997). p. 332

¹⁵ Coyne, Rebelo, and Parker, "Resisting the Seamless Interface."

¹⁶ G. Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Athlone Press, 1987). p. 551

Constructing Narratives of Ethics: mimesis₁ in the design studio

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Repetitive mimesis and *ethics* in the design studio: Victorian doors

The following is an excerpt of a tutorial with first year students about a retreat project. Keith, the course organizer (American) and John, a tutor (Greek) are discussing Mary's project. They sit around a table, which is full of drawings and models, while Sarah and a group of other students (all British) are attending.



- K: How does the door swing?
- M: (its) I've never done that again
((gestures over the plan to the direction of the door))
- K: [Bu(t)]
((K, who is already holding a pencil, puts his hand on the plan ready to draw))
- M: [Whot]
((The student bends over the plan to see what K is pointing to))
- K: (Is it not) (.) would it not swing (1)
((talks while drawing with thin lines over the student's plan))
- M: (You know (.) I was looking at other bit) (1.5)
((K finishes drawing and takes his hand back)) ((the student goes back to a normal sitting position))
- does it matter which way it swings=
((J nods affirming))
- K: =I don't know (.) does it?
- J: Hhhh (2)
((laughing, looks at K and the student))
- K: I think it does (.) I think it does (1)
((the student tries the bodily movement of opening the door three times, first at the direction that she designed the door to swing, then to the other side and then again like the first))



- K: I had this conversation with somebody last week I think (.) about em (.) door:
swings (.) you know how in this country (0.5)
((K starts to draw a small diagram on a piece of paper))
when you have a room [like this] (0.5)
- M: [(swing is like this)]



Figure 1

- K: you have the swing like that
- J: that's cra:zy=
((looking at K))
- K: I know
- J: That's a:bsolutely insa:ne=
- K: I know (.) you know why:: (.) its insane
((K stops drawing and looks at the student))
- M: is it not
- J: I know why it is insane (0.5) I don't know why they keep on doing it here
((looking at K))
- K: Do you know why they did it in the first [place?]
((looking at J))
- T: [no]
- M: Isn't it for people in the room (having) privacy bef[ore the (others entry)]
((S performs the bodily movement of opening the door))
- K: [yes (0.75) it's this] (0.5)
Victorian fetish about p[rivacy]
- J: [really]=
- K: yes (1) it [absolutely is]
- M: [(all the do]ors open like this)=
((S makes the bodily movement of opening the door))
- K: =I know (0.5) I think its aslotly silly=
- M: Why:: it looks stupid to be done (like that)

((S makes the bodily movement of opening the door))

K: Look at how much room (.) look at how much room you do:n't have because of it

((K draws back to the little piece of paper))

(0.5) look at how much room you have when it's open (0.5) the whole room

((K stops drawing))

M: I like it when (it boom)

((S makes the bodily movement of opening the door))

K: [I kno]



Figure 2

M: [I like it like this (.) ye[ah yea]h

((Sarah makes the bodily movement of opening the door))

J: [such a] (.) such a door is ru:ining my kitchen

((T points to K's little sketch))

(0.5) it is ruining it

((Students laugh))

K: The first thing that I did when I moved into my flat was (.) cha:nge the doors

J: [Really]

K: I flipped them all around cause I just could NOT get why you would make a small_place (0.5) even smaller (1) by putting the doors all backwards (.) so anyway (.) yeah

J: [Hhhh]

K: does it matter (.) yeah it matters (.) but this is your place (.) and it's good of you to be aware (.) that the affect that this has (0.5) (or) the reason of that first of all (.) came

((K draws to the little sketch))

around (.) it i:s a Victorian construct (0.75) and it remains (0.5) as a bit of left over of Victorian influence (.) in your housing schemes here

S: (Is it not ...)

K: Ye:a::h which I cannot get cause the bed (.) the bedrooms are so small that you
 ((K points to his sketch))
 can't put a double bed in them (.) as it is (0.5) even in modern homes and again
 you crap it out so much by having this kind of door swing (0.5) but you are
 allowed (.) you are

allowed to have this sort of things influence you (.) if you think that makes your
 entry

movement of opening the door)) ((K makes the bodily



Figure 3

mo::re: (0.75) deliberated o:r celebrated o::r purposeful o::r whatever (.) I think
 that that's (.) fair enough (.) but you have to be aware of its impact (.) of what is
 (.) that is going on (0.5) I would never(.) I would never do that on a house (0.5) I
 wouldn't (1.5)

((students laugh))

K: It would (.) it would be my mission (.) it would be my mission if I was a
 practicing architect

J: Hhhhhhhh
 ((laughing))

K: here to change that in the entire country

J: Hhhhhhhhhhh
 ((laughing))

K: But its fair enough (.) I just wanted to know if that was a purposefully done (0.5)
 which it seem it is (1) ok

The dialogue of this excerpt pertains to *ethics* since it explicitly refers to notions of privacy in different cultures. It shows vividly how people have formed embodied habitual understandings of crossing architectural thresholds (here doors), and how they find themselves to be estranged by other such concepts that come from a different cultural background. Especially, the discussion focuses on the British cultural tradition of opening a door towards the open space of the room (see figure 3), as opposed to the tradition of opening the door towards the wall, that conventionally here I will name ‘Continental’ (figure 4). In this tutorial the students come to think, most probably for the first time in their life, that there are other ways of opening (and thus designing) a door.




Figure 4: The ‘British’ door




Figure 5: The ‘Continental’ door

XXXXXXXX Christofer Alexander Patern Language XXXXXX

The issue of privacy that is discussed here has to do with the fact that in the ‘continental’ way of door opening one can see the entire room even by a slight opening of the door. On the contrary, at the ‘British’ way of door opening one can see the whole room only after having opened widely the door and having made a few steps inwards. This latter way provides more privacy to the people that are already in the room, ‘announcing’ the entrance of the newcomer and giving them more time to prepare (whatever this means) for the actual encounter. At the same time, though, the British way wastes more space, especially when the door is open, because it is always on the way, affecting the arrangement of the furniture in the room. On the other hand in the ‘continental’ way, when open, the door becomes ‘one’ with the wall allowing the free flow of motion in and out of the room. Architecture in this sense creates very

different kinds of threshold for performing exactly the same function: entering in a room.

There are two main expressions of mimesis that I want to focus in the above incident: The one has to do with the mimesis of each individual of his or her own cultural background and the other with the mimesis of the embodied physical movement of opening the door, by both the students and the tutors. What I primarily want to show is that the two aspects are extremely close the one to the other.

For the students this is the first time that they were asked to design an actual building (a small retreat). When Keith asked Mary to explain in her design the opening of the door, her first reaction was to defend herself by saying that 'I have never done that again.' This shows that her drawing was an immediate response towards the brief according to her predispositions and her perceptions of opening doors in her everyday life. When Keith started drawing on her drawing to indicate the opening of the door, her second reaction was slight frustration and impatience on the focus on such details, by saying 'Does it matter which way it swings?' (emphasising the word 'matter'). Most probably Mary would rather expect to focus on 'more important' aspects of her project like the form of the retreat and especially those curvy walls that have made her design really 'wacky'. When Keith threw back rhetorically the same question to her, then John, the second tutor, laughed looking at both Mary and Keith indicating that something interesting was going on.

This disruptive moment of the discussion, initiated a breakage in Mary's certainty about how a door opens. The disruption in some sense blocked her mind and she found herself unable to comprehend what was the fuss about and how could the things being done differently. She had to retreat back to a more primordial way of understanding the world by repeating the gesture of opening the door, as if she was actually in front of the door of her retreat wishing to open it. She had to utilise the knowledge of her body that had been opening doors dozens of times everyday, millions of times in her life, before this disruption take place. It is also very interesting that she did not perform this action just once, as an instantaneous go back and forth to her embodied knowledge of door-opening. She actually performed this action three times consecutively, first with her right hand (Figure 5), on the direction

that she actually drew the door; the second with her left hand (Figure 6), the way that Keith had proposed on his drawing; and one more time with her right hand again (Figure 7), just to make sure of the difference. But these were not enough; Mary actually performed the same movement seven times in only one minute of the footage.



Figure 6



Figure 7



Figure 8

Mary's performance of this bodily gesture is actually a mimetic performance; Mary mimics herself in order to remember how she actually opens the door in her everyday encounter with them. Opening a door is such a mundane activity of everyday life that obviously one hardly notices. One becomes accustomed in doing it from a young age, and after getting over the first struggles of opening because of lack of height or strength, it becomes part of the automatic routine under the tag 'door-opening'. We don't really think what they do when they open a door; we just open it. The reason for that is also the fact that what we actually think is the aim that we have that usually lies on the other side of the door. When we start to think about the opening is usually when some kind of disruption takes place and our automatic routine 'malfunctions' (for example when the key doesn't turn, when the handle is broken, or the door is stiff).

A personal experience may illuminate further the above example: at some point I suddenly realised that the way of opening a 'reversed' door is very similar to some particular movement from my aikido practice. This attitude emphasises on the difference of using the movement of the hips in order to 'pull' something (or someone, in the case of aikido), instead of using merely the muscles of the arm/shoulder. Since that first thought, the reversed door in the corridor of my office became a challenging threshold and field of experimentation. Using my casual, but

very often crossings, I was pausing for a second, drawing my attention to my action trying deliberately to think what I actually do when I open the door; do I use my hips or arms? Opening this door is not the same any more: I have been mimicking myself drawing a fictional partner in the aikido practice. Only when the attention is drawn to something else (the book that I forgot back in the office, the rush to the toilet, or the anxiety of the meeting that I am late) can I enjoy a 'forgetful door-opening'. In our studio example, Mary started to think about door-opening only after Keith broke her preconceptions of how a door should open.

There is also a contrast in the way that Keith communicated the opening of the doors using the medium of the drawing while Mary persisted on performing the bodily gesture of door-opening. Actually both ways are kinds of mimesis. Obviously, Mary's gesture of opening the door imitates the actual gesture that she performs when opening the door. But Keith's way of drawing sketches of rooms and doors, similar to the ones that I have reproduced in Figures 3 & 4, is also an imitation. By representing graphically the plans of the rooms Keith is mimicking, his own teachers, and behind them the whole cultural traditions that represents architectural space through Cartesian drawings. Although both Mary and Keith are referring to the same space, Mary's imaginary retreat, they are using completely different representation techniques following different mimetic forces. Keith follows an abstract, rationalised system of representation that follows a set of explicit rules, while Mary follows a personal, primordial, knowledge through her body that has immediate connection to the actual movement of opening the door of her room. Mary imitates the physical movement itself, by repeating it, while Keith mediates the opening of the door through the pencil and the drawing. Architectural education, in its formal and institutional sense, aims to passing from the one type of mimesis to the other.¹ In some other sense, though, architectural education could be seen as the retainment or rediscovery of this type of 'naivety' in the way of experiencing and representing architectural space. The above schema of showing the two different ways of imitation is in some sense schematic for our specific example, since Mary has actually created a

¹ In some other sense, though, architectural education should be the retainment or rediscovery of this type of 'naivety' in the way of experiencing and representing architectural space.

Cartesian drawing of the space, and Keith does actually perform the bodily movement of opening the door once (Figure 5) towards the end of the excerpt.

Finally, it becomes apparent that Keith and Mary are coming from a different cultural background that evaluates differently the ethical issue of privacy. Moreover, this difference does not stay between them, but engages all the other students as well as John, the second tutor, in an amusing if not comical situation. The people around the table are separated into two groups, the British students and the foreigner (American and Greek) tutors. Despite that power relationship between the two groups was unequal, because of the teachers are part of the one group and the students on the other, it becomes obvious that the students were not ready to follow and adapt the teachers' view. From the very beginning the tutors lunched a fierce attack with an account of personal anecdotes, accompanied with strong expressions like 'such a door is ruining my kitchen', 'that's crazy', 'it is insane' or 'absolutely silly'. But the students held their positions with statements like 'all the doors open like this', 'it looks silly to be done like that', 'I like it when it "boom" (indication of immediacy and straightforwardness), 'I like it like this, yeah, yeah.' Finally, Keith gave a solution in the argument by giving his rhetorical permission and approval, if this helps the overall design, in means of 'deliberation, celebration, purposefulness or whatever...' acknowledging at the same time that he deliberately pushed the discussion to its limits in order to draw the student's awareness on the topic. Nevertheless, at the end he launched his final attack making clear his missionary engagement with the topic to 'change that in the entire country' if only he would be practicing architecture 'here'.

Although, both the students and the teachers enjoyed challenging each other in this explicit formation of allies and verbal conflict, under the 'typical' power structure that wants the teachers to be opposing the students; the actual power relationship is much more complicated and we shouldn't leave it in this reductionist state. For example, it is very interesting that when Keith addressing to Mary asked her 'You know in this country when you have a room like this, you have the swing like that' then John jumped in the dialogue leading to his admitting his ignorance about the topic, since, although he knows why he doesn't like it (because it is 'insane'), he doesn't know 'why the keep on doing it here.' It was actually Mary who gave the answer, teaching

her tutor that the whole thing was about privacy and Keith who supplemented that it comes from the Victorian times and he quickly characterised it as a fetish. In this incident the roles were inverted and the teacher was Mary and Keith and the student was found to be John, which shows that the roles of the teacher and the student are far from being fixed and one-way hierarchical.

Ricoeuer mimesis₁

“Mimesis is inherently and always already a repetition –meaning that mimesis is always the meeting place of two opposing but connected ways of thinking, acting and making: similarity and difference.”²

By juxtaposing the three examples previously examined, a mechanism becomes apparent, through which *mimesis through repetition* generates judgements of *ethics*. Through these examples we saw a wide variety of expressions of mimesis that go far beyond the stereotypical notion that sees the students to imitate dully their teachers. Again and again, the teachers imitate the students, the students imitate their colleagues, the teachers imitate other teachers and all of them imitate methods of representation, models of ideal execution, professional aspects of each practice, or their cultural background in general. This repetitive mimesis forms prejudices, customs, dispositions and habitual responses of *ethics*.

All three examples show a repertory of embodied and practical categories that make the mimetic actions that take place in each classroom intelligible. It is an education *in* a ‘knowing how’ of ethics that constitutes a common understanding between the teachers and the students, without the externalising of an explicit set of codes that makes their actions intelligible. Nowhere in the design studio any explicit reference is been made in the way that doors are drawn according to ones cultural background. There is no need for these things to become explicit, since the meaning of *ethics* of these mimetic actions is commonly shared amongst the members of the community in every case. First of all it would be impossible to compile a list of all the conventions and customs that are necessary to hold together the meaning of each action and even if we could imagine its existence, it would be the oddest list of the world. It would be

² Arne Merlberg, *Theories of Mimesis*, ed. Richard Macksey and Michael Sprinker, *Literature, Culture, Theory* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1995). p. 1

silly, in the sense of non-sense to make explicit something that is obvious to everyone. Things need to be clarified when a breakage on the pre-understanding of things occur, like in the case of the design studio where the tutor, John, becomes suddenly aware of the reason of having put the doors in this way. When things run within the conventions there is no need to make things explicit. Analytic philosophy claims the non-sensial character of the Continental philosophy on exactly this ground. (The well known joke goes like this: “Continental philosophy is like continental breakfast: There is no such thing.”)³

There is also a common way in which mimesis in the three examples convey a symbolism of *ethics* that is habitual. Mimesis, mediates into putting in action these symbolisms in a way that is implicit but commonly understood. For example, in the dojo, the bow as a mimetic action conveys strong ethical meanings that show at the same time hierarchical subordination when made towards the teacher in the opening ritual and mutual respect towards the each other, during the course of the class. In the music class again, the ‘person in front,’ after going through all the training exercises, becomes ‘automatically’ responsible for being a mimetic model, while the other students habitually get to follow her or him, symbolising equally power and passivity in each case. Finally, in the design studio the symbolic realm of privacy that became a fetisch during Victorian times, is mimetically appropriated, and habitually repeated, by the young members of this community that came to grow up in it. Symbols in this sense, internalised to the actions of the members of each group, and through the repetitive mimesis they become part of their prejudices about their world. These symbols become habituated customs to the encounter of the other, in the sense that they create automated responses, which nevertheless, as we saw, embody notions of *ethics*.

Furthermore, the three examples of *ethics* in education employ mimetic action that has a temporal basis. This temporal basis is revealed in the repetitive dimension of mimesis that becomes a catalyst for the formation of habitual ethical responses. The repetition of the mimetic action is most obvious in the dojo, where both the teacher

³ This is equal to the joke that asks ‘How many Dadaists do it take to change a bulb’ in order to continue ‘in order to go to the other side?’

and the students constantly reproduce again and again the same movement (*ai hamni kote gaeshi*), dozens of times just in a couple of minute, until it becomes a second nature. Also in the music we saw how Roxana continuously emphasised on the repetition of similar exercises with an aim to acquire this ‘group feeling;’ following the ‘person in front,’ and becoming ready to care the responsibility of become the one. In the design studio one can imagine the millions of times of opening a door that can lead to the accustomed stance of ethics about the privacy issues of entering in a room, at least not before this is revealed by the explicit discussion. Furthermore, temporality in all three examples becomes a fundamental issue because in every case the mimetic action takes place *within* a specific time that localises *ethics* in a specific moment of time of a specific tradition and within a certain cultural context.

The three characteristics of repetitive mimesis that I presented in the previous paragraphs (semantics or structure of common meaning⁴, symbolism and temporality) are the fundamental concepts for the constitution of mimesis₁, for Paul Ricoeur. Although referring in a different context, that of narrative and textual hermeneutics, Ricoeur made a definitive threefold distinction of mimesis (mimesis₁, mimesis₂ and mimesis₃) the first of which is important for our context of *ethics*. The three levels of his mimesis aimed to re-address the problem of representation between the world of the novel and the ‘real’ world or life itself. According to his argument, mimesis₂ stands for the conventional understanding of poetics that have its origins in Plato and mainly in Aristotle;⁵ poetic imitation is the activity of arranging incidents in a plot (con-figuration).⁶ Ricoeur, extended this definition to mimesis₁ that consist of a pre-understanding that is the knowledge commonly shared between the writer and her or his readers that allows them to communicate (pre-figuration);⁷ and to mimesis₃ that is the power of literature through mimesis to change the ‘real’ world (re-figuration).⁸ In

⁴ See the difference between Ricoeur’s book *Time and Narrative* and his earlier paper “Mimesis and Representation” on the way that mimesis₁ is presented in reference to the meaning as semantics in the earlier version and structure in his later work.

Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin & David Pellauer, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984 (1983)).

Paul Ricoeur, "Mimesis and Representation," in *A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination*, ed. Mario J. Valdes (New York et. al.: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991 (1980)).

⁵ Ricoeur, "Mimesis and Representation." p. 138-139

⁶ Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*. p. 64

⁷ Ibid. p. 54

⁸ Ibid. p. 70

this way Ricoeur tried to “dissolve the opposition between inside [of fiction] and outside [of life], which itself arise from the representative illusion.”⁹

Mimesis₁, more than any of the other two concepts of mimesis, relates to *ethics* because it is based upon a sense of familiarity and prior acquaintance to the world. Ricoeur explicitly states that “[m]imesis₁ is the pre-understanding of what human action is, of its semantics, its symbolism, its temporality.”¹⁰ In explaining further these three terms, Ricoeur assimilates the notion of semantics or structure of meaning to a ‘know how’¹¹ that constitutes a common repertory between the writer and the reader; that being members of this shared set are in a relation of ‘practical understanding’¹². “To understand a story is to understand both the language of ‘doing something’ and the cultural tradition from which proceeds the typology of plots.”¹³ For the symbolic aspect of mimesis₁, Ricoeur borrows an anthropological and sociological understanding of the term (which is very close to this research as well), which argues that symbolism is not a theoretical concept in the mind, but it is “meaning incorporated into action”¹⁴ In this sense, in order to understand a ritual act, like the bow in the dojo, one has “to situate it within a ritual, set within a cultic system, and by degrees within the whole set of conventions, beliefs, and institutions that make up the symbolic framework of a culture.”¹⁵ Temporality for Ricoeur has a strong connection to repetition which comes from an anthropological (again) reading of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*.¹⁶ Ricoeur denies a partition between future, past and present time and substitutes it to “a threefold present: a present of future things, a present of past things, and a present of present things.”¹⁷ In our examples, the ‘present of the future’ becomes manifested when Keith expressed his mission that from *now* on he would change the door-opening system in the entire country (if his commitment was true); the ‘present of the past,’ when John would commit from *now* on to draw

⁹ Ricoeur, "Mimesis and Representation." p. 151

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 142

¹¹ Ibid. p. 141

¹² Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*. p. 55

¹³ Ibid. p. 57

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 57

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 58

¹⁶ Temporality has also a connection to *ethics* through the notion of Care, that is central for Heidegger, as a concept of temporal engagement with the world, implicitly, because the ‘day has come’ or “because it is ‘time to do something, where ‘now’ signifies ‘now that....’ It is the time of work and days.” Ibid. p. 63

¹⁷ Ibid. p. 60

doors in the British way, because he *just* realised that it secures more privacy; and finally, the ‘present of the present,’¹⁸ when Mary in the music class took *now* the decision to start turning as the ‘person in front’, because *now* she can do it. Finally, Ricoeur makes explicit comments on the ethics involved in mimesis₁ by referring back to Hegel, when he says: “Manners and customs, along with everything Hegel put under the title “ethical substance” the *Sittlichkeit* prior to any *Moralität* of a reflective order, thus take over from the genetic codes.”¹⁹

Ricoeur’s mimesis₁ provides a convincing account about the connection to my definition of *ethics* as related to customs, prejudices and dispositions that hold our sensuous understanding of the world together. This understanding should not be limited only in literature and is equally valid in ‘real’ life, since, as I already mentioned, Ricoeur’s project was actually to overcome this distinction. But I would also like to emphasise that when Ricoeur says that “[m]imesis₁ is the pre-understanding of what human action is” he gives a fixed character to this pre-understanding, or at least the change comes only through the shift between the other two concepts of mimesis. Nevertheless, I would like to argue that mimesis through repetition actually *forms* this pre-understanding of the world. The habits that the students acquire in the design studio become habits through the repetitive mimesis, by performing mimetic action like the ones we saw, again and again. There is a big difference in the mimesis that happens once, for example Laurent’s mimesis of the drunk person in front of the students in order to show them a way of being relaxed and lowering their ‘centre,’ and the mimesis that happens repeatedly, for example when Jeremy, mimicking Laurent, was performing again and again the same small fragment of the exercise. The repetitive mimesis by constantly creating habits changes the human nature by creating a *second nature*. This second nature is the ‘group feeling’ that we saw in the example in music, the understanding of balancing the center in aikido, and the opening the door according to one *way* (either Continental or British) in architecture. As we saw in all three examples the second nature is an embodied process that leads to a state of ceasing being aware of her or his way of

¹⁸ There is an interesting connection of repetition with Ricoeur’s ‘present of the present’ and what Derrida calls the presence-of-the-presence: “The presence-of-the-present is derived from repetition, and not the reverse.” Jaques Derrida, *La voix et le phenomene* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967) p. 58 [Quoted in: Merlberg, *Theories of Mimesis*. p. 168]

¹⁹ Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*. p. 58

doing the things and this embodied process has to do with ethics because the second nature is pre-accepted as good.

The fact that mimesis creates a second nature (*physisn*), has been identified as a major philosophical problem even from the early treatises dealing with mimesis. Plato recognizing the power of mimesis he privileged it as a fundamental way of educating the noble quality of men in his ideal city, since the mimesis of their outlook can “settle down into habits and second nature in the body, the speech, and the thought.”²⁰ In this sense, Plato implies that “mimesis can go through to habit and to human nature, also “in relation to body and tone and disposition.”²¹ Nevertheless, for the same reason actually Plato prevented the poets from joining this state, because through the mimetic acts of poetry and theater “one forgets his own role or duty in the state, for if a guard always mimes foreign characters, his soul would be split up between these untrue lives.”²² In another instance, Plato argues that in order for Ion to recite Homer, his *nous*, or his self awareness, is not with him anymore.²³ In other words the mimetic faculty is “the capacity to Other.”²⁴

“Seeing oneself altered before one’s very eyes and now acting, as though one had really entered into another body, another character.”

Aristotle’s concept of mimesis, on the other hand, engaged repetition in a different way. In contrast to the imitative character of Plato’s mimesis, which is close to image and imagination, Aristotle focused on mimesis through *mythos* and *praxis*, which is close to time and action.²⁵ Arne Merlberg has argued extensively in her book *Theories of Mimesis* that Aristotle’s focus on *praxis* and time brings mimesis and repetition very close to each other. In her words: “when Aristotle tried to create temporal order out of the paradoxes of Platonic poetics he did so with Time. And then he hit upon the most differentiating of all categories, the one that was transforming... *mimesis* into

²⁰ *Republic* 395d1-3

²¹ Kwok-kui Wong, *Nietzsche, Plato and Aristotle on Mimesis* (2003 [cited 9. 5 2007]); available from <http://dogma.free.fr/txt/KwokKuiNietzschePlatoAristotle.htm>.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ion* 534b5-6

²⁴ Michael Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity : A Particular History of the Senses* (New York, London: Routledge, 1993). p. 19

²⁵ Merlberg, *Theories of Mimesis*. p. 44

repetition.”²⁶ In this sense, the concept of repetitive mimesis that I examine here in the three case studies is actually

Performing a mimetic action once, in this sense, is instantaneous trip to the Other, becoming the other for a while and coming back again, changed only by the experience of being someone else (like being in a costume ball). Nevertheless, the repetitive mimesis, by forming habits, through an embodied and tacit understanding, reconstitutes the self by *becoming* an other, by using an addictive drag. Similarly to the transformation of Dr Jekyll to Mr. Hyde: “I was slowly losing hold of my original and better self, and becoming slowly incorporated with my second and worse.” Michael Tausig, in his insightful book *Mimesis and Alterity* has argued, from a straightforward anthropological point of view, that habit is actually itself an instinctive way of tactile knowing, “because only at the depth of habit is radical change effected, where unconscious strata of culture are built into social routines as bodily disposition.”²⁷

“... imitation is given a *place* ... a locus the students are to inhabit to the extent that the practices begin to inhabit them...”²⁸

²⁶ Ibid. p. 50

²⁷ Tausig, *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses*. p. 25

²⁸ Debra Hawhee, "Bodily Pedagogies: Rhetoric, Athletics, and the Sophists' Three Rs," *College English* 65, no. 2 (2002). p. 154

Connecting Phronēsis with Reflection-in-action: The Wise Architect as an Ethical Professional

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Reflection-in-action: in between the switch

The genealogy of the terms of *praxis* and *theoria*, together with the situations from the educational activity, challenge the original distinction between practice and theory that firstly Broadbent and secondary the first reading of the dialogue from the design studio originally suggested (represented in Figure 2). If the one term is seen unprivileged to the other, as their etymologies imply, they appear to be inseparable and forming a new kind of unity, beyond the dipolar scheme that was originally presented. Through the concepts of *praxis* and *theoria* arises a central focal point that ties practice and theory close together in an unbreakable link. 'Theory and practice' is not anymore 'reflection *and* action', but rather *reflection-in-action*.



Figure 1

Donald Schön was the first to introduce the concept of reflection-in-action in order to understand professional practice and its relation to thinking. Schön used a series of key studies from a wide diversity of fields like psychotherapy, management and especially design, town planning and architecture, based on a very simple observation: “Usually reflection on knowing-in-action goes together *with reflection on the stuff at hand.*”¹ While practicing, the practitioner contemplates on his/her practice and at the same time he/she internalises an implicit understanding of his/her action. Although one makes innumerable judgements without being able to provide adequate criteria for them, he/she does enhance the whole horizon of his/her practice. In this sense one potentially becomes ready, in the long run, for a further action that can be critically improved in comparison to the previous. And this is because know-how is *in* the action.

“In the reflective conversations of Quist and the Supervisor, [an architect and a psychotherapist, main characters in Schön’s key studies] these [Positivist’s] dichotomies do not hold. For Quist and Supervisor, practice is a kind of research. In their problem setting, means and ends are framed interdependently. And their inquiry is a transaction with the situation in which knowing and doing are inseparable.”²

Gilbert Ryle has played a major role on Schön’s theoretical background by distinguishing the terms *knowing-how* and *knowing-that*. “*Intelligent practice is not a step child of theory.* On the contrary theorizing is one

¹ Schön, *The Reflective Practitioner*. p. 50 [my italics]

² Ibid. p. 165 [my italics]

practice amongst others and is itself intelligently or stupidly conducted.”³ Further more, Michael Polanyi’s notion of *tacit knowledge* was another influence in order to get to the concept of reflection-in-action. “Tacit knowing is seen to operate here on an internal action that we are quite incapable of controlling or even feeling in itself.”⁴ Summarizing the above arguments, reflection-in-action not only conflates *praxis* and *theoria*, but also draws practice and theory together in a sense that subverts the dipolar properties suggested by the Positivist’s legend. Reflection-in-action becomes an attractor in between the poles of practice and theory that actually questions the distance between the two terms.



The participatory character of theory in the practice becomes apparent in the situation of ‘kicking the bottle’ in the music class. As we saw there, Mary was facing the teacher, like all the other students attending the explanations about how they should turn around (Figure 8). She turned over her shoulder towards the entrance (Figure 9), probably because she heard the door opening and saw the visitors coming; she heard the opening door as a ‘call from the other.’ Then she turned further back (Figure 10) to see the bottle laying on the path and immediately she turned around to take it out of the way. She made a first attempt to kick the bottle, but she could not reach it and so she made one more step away from the group and kicked the bottle successfully this time. She looked towards the visitors again and she returned back to her position to participate in the turning that the students were already executing.



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4

³ Ryle, *The Concept of Mind.*, p. 27

⁴ Michael Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension*, Reprint by arrangement with Doubleday & Company, Inc ed. (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1966; reprint, 1983)., p. 14

All these actions that Mary performed were disruptive for the educational process, but they did not take her out of the educational activity. This becomes apparent from the fact that she kept on holding the scores/frame all the time in an upright position in front of her. She did not drop her hands, abandoning her role in the class in order to help the visitors pass, finish helping them and then come back to the class. She kept on being present *both* in the educational activity *and* in Ethically reflective activity of kicking the bottle. Chapter four of this thesis will come back on this example and will examine it in even closer detail.

If we return back to Schön's discourse of the term *reflection-in-action*, there does not seem to be a specific focus on Ethics in any of his key studies. Nevertheless, he does make an explicit comment (and if I am correct, it is the only one in the whole book) in which one can see a way of relation of reflection-in-action with Ethics:

“His ability to do this [arrive at a deeper and broader coherence of artefact and idea] depends on certain relatively constant elements that he may bring to a situation otherwise in flux: an overarching theory, an appreciative system, and a stance of reflection in action which can become, in some practitioners, an ethics for inquiry.”⁵

Moreover, Ryle admits that: “...*moral knowledge*, if the strained phrase is to be used at all, is knowing how to behave in certain sorts of situations in which the problems are *neither merely theoretical nor merely technical*.”⁶ In this sense, reflection-in-action can be consieved as a term that can bridge the gap between theory and practice having at the same time a specific focus on Ethics. Nevertheless, Polanyi ties Ethics with tacit knowledge, close together and emphasises that tacit moral knowledge should be primarily seen of belonging *in practice*:

“We meet with another indication of the wide functions of indwelling when we find acceptance to **moral teachings** described as their *interiorization*. To interiorize is to identify ourselves with the teachings in question, by making them function as the proximal term of a **tacit moral knowledge, as applied in practice**.”⁷

⁵ Schön, *The Reflective Practitioner*. p. 164

⁶ Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*., p. 297 [my italics]

⁷ Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension*., p.17 [italics in the original, my bold]

Phronesis* in-between the switch of *praxis* and *poesis

According to the above, *phronesis* appears to be a key term that draws *praxis* and *poesis* close together. Apart from Perez-Gomez, other contemporary thinkers like MacIntyre, Dunne and Nussbaum have also emphasised the importance of *phronesis* for poetics. Especially Ricoeur introduced the term ‘critical *phronesis*’ in an attempt to deconstruct moral philosophy and bring together Kantian deontology and Aristotelian teleology.⁸ For his wider project of poetic narrative, *phronesis* plays a role of taking into account the singularity and alterity of the other, overcoming this way a hegemonic solipsism.⁹ In this sense, the switch between *praxis* and *poesis* can be revisited to incorporate *phronesis* as an attractor between the two poles (Figure 18).



Figure 5

Beyond the relationship between *phronesis* and poetics and the abovementioned thinkers like Perez-Gomez and Ricoeur suggest, still *phronesis* is the fundamental virtue that can lead to the fulfilment of *praxis*. In ancient Greek philosophy, Aristotle was the first to define the term as ‘practical wisdom’ that is “a state conjoined with reason, true, having human good for its objects, and apt to do”¹⁰. *Phronesis* was the intellectual virtue of

⁸ “if there is anything to deconstruct in ‘moral philosophy,’ it is precisely [the] quickly stated opposition between the deontological and the teleological.” Paul Ricoeur, “Ethics and Human Capability: A Response,” in *Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought*, ed. W. Schweiker, J. Wall, and D. Hallam, Susan (New York: Routledge, 2002). p. 287

⁹ John Wall, “Phronesis, Poetics and Moral Creativity,” *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 6 (2003). p. 323

¹⁰ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1140b 23

the calculating part of the rational part of psyche.¹¹ In the division that Aristotle makes between moral and intellectual virtues, *phronesis* while being in the intellectual part, keeps a very special place as a term that brings the two categories together. Standing in the middle of the intellectual virtues (see Figure 19, below), between Scientific Knowledge (*Epestēmē*) and Art (*Tecnē*), on the one side, and Intuition (*Nous*) and Theoretical wisdom (*Sofia*), on the other; Practical Wisdom keeps the balance between the extremely realistic and practical aspect of *epestēmē* and *technē* and the philosophical and theoretical aspect of *nous* and *sofia* of the human intellectual knowledge. At the same time *phronesis* bridges the gap between the moral and the intellectual part of soul, because it works as instrument to achieve happiness (*eudaimonia*) the ultimate human goal for Aristotle. *Phronēsis* involves perception of ethically relevant particulars, which are hard to get in epistemic handle on.¹² For this, it is practical in the sense that any knowledge of ethical universals is seek in order that *phronesis* can bring it to bear in particular situations. Furthermore, because it has for its object particular facts, which come to be known from experience, *phronesis* is a virtue acquired through length of time and usually it is not possessed during youth.¹³



Figure 6

Contrary to *episteme*, which according to Aristotle, is been able to universally taught and learned,¹⁴ *phronesis* is a kind of knowledge that cannot be represented apart from the knower, it is rather a capacity to act.¹⁵

¹¹ C.D.C. Reeve, *Practices of Reason, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). p. 97

¹² Ibid. pp. 76-77

¹³ NE 1142a 14

¹⁴ "All scientific knowledge is thought to be able of being taught and what comes within its range of being learned. And all teaching is based upon previous knowledge." *Nicomachean Ethics* 1139b 29 see also: H. H. Joachim, *Aristotle, the Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. D.A. Rees (London: Oxford University Press, 1951). p. 192

¹⁵ Richard Halverson and Louis Gomez, "Phronesis and Design: How Practical Wisdom Is Disclosed through Collaborative Design," (2004?). p. 3

Because of the fact that practical wisdom studies things that admit of being otherwise (*endechomena*), it always keeps an eye on action;¹⁶ and for this it is an empirical knowledge that comes from the constant action, deriving from, and, at the same time, forming *ethos*. Aristotle also argues that knowing what is good is insufficient by itself to make one practically wise, but it is the practical action of becoming good or in other words, exercising the good in *praxis*.¹⁷ This can be also proved by the fact that sometimes men who do not have much knowledge are more practical than others who have (Thalis)¹⁸; and this is because one can derive all she or he knows from actual experience. Aristotle also argues that one ought to have both kinds of knowledge or, if only one the knowledge of details rather than of principles.¹⁹

In terms of education, this means that one should attend to the indemonstrable dicta and opinions of the skilful, the old and the practically wise men, no less than to those which are based on strict reasoning, because they see aright, having gained their power of moral vision from experience.²⁰ Shaun Gallagher, referring to education, argues that *phronesis* applies to situations that resemble to a *mystery* rather than a *problem*,²¹ in a way that the person cannot stand out of the situation in order to see it in an objective way. Knowledge of a situation is always imperfect knowledge gained *within* the situation, and the model for that knowledge is *phronesis*.²² This fact can be seen in the situation of the 'Boxy Rooms' from the design studio. John and Mark were within the educational situation, without a privileged outside fixed point. Although John (through his dual role as a teacher and a practitioner) had an experience from the professional world, this experience did not serve as a predestined response, but rather as an awareness of the wideness of the overall discussion, opening the topic instead of closing it. Both Mark's and John's knowledge about the situation was imperfect before the conversation, as well as after, since no final answer was given to the original questions.

¹⁶ Reeve, *Practices of Reason, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. pp. 74-75

¹⁷ NE 1143b 30

¹⁸ Aristotle mentions the story where Thalis fell in a hole in the earth, while contemplating the stars.

¹⁹ NE 1141b 19

²⁰ NE 1143b 13

²¹ Referring to the definition of the terms given by Gabriel Marcel.

²² Shaun Gallagher, *Hermeneutics and Education*, ed. Dennis J. Schmidt, *Suny Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy* (New York, Albany: State University of New York, 1992). p. 152

In this sense, participation *in* the dialogue appears to play a fundamental role for the possibility of education of Ethics. Discussing things that have to do with *phronesis*, according to Aristotle, has educational implications that become apparent through the ancient Greek term for learning as *synienai* (*συνιέναι*). According to Liddle and Scott this word means “...‘to send, bring or set together,’ ‘to perceive or hear,’ and even in the middle voice, ‘to come to an understanding about something’.”²³ *Synienai*, connotes a communal activity which usually through dialogue²⁴ leads to a thorough *grasp*, that furthermore, is able to *use* the acquired knowledge. The term also refers to notions of ‘seeing together’ and sharing some knowledge and it relates to Ethics mainly through a connection with ‘conscience’, which in Ancient Greek was not different from ‘consciousness’. *Synienai* further implies “the existence of a capacity to understand... in perfect harmony and even a symbiosis with the complex structure of *reality*.”²⁵ So *synienai* employs the opinionative faculty of judging (and especially judging well) concerning issues of *phronesis*, when someone else enunciate them. *Synienai* is also a term very close to understanding and for this *phronesis* has played a special role in philosophical hermeneutics.

Gadamer, in particular, clarifies the difference between technical and moral knowledge and claims that *phronesis* involves a kind of self-knowledge that is not present in technological knowledge.²⁶ The hermeneutical situation appears to be a non-objective situation that asimilates to the situations of Ethics that one encounters in the every day life. Gadamer also defines that “For moral knowledge, as Aristotle describes it, is clearly not objective knowledge- i.e., the knowledge is not standing over against a situation that he merely observes; he is directly affected by what he knows. It is something that he has to do.”²⁷ In this way Gadamer’s view of the way of interpretation utilises the Aristotelian concept of *phronesis* “as the operative ‘intellectual

²³ Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, p. 1712 as quoted by Christopher P. Long, "The Ontological Reappropriation of Phronēsis," *Continental Philosophy Review* 35, no. 1 (2004). p. 58

²⁴ “concerning those things with which *phronesis* is concerned, when someone else speaks” NE 1143a14-15 Note that when someone else speaks in the original term is termed ‘*alou legontos*’ which according to Long, it emphasizes that *synesis* “is not pursued in isolation, but rather, is situated in concrete, dialogical encounters with others.” Ibid. p. 46

²⁵ Xavier Zubiri, *Nature, History God* ([cited 12. 10 2007]); available from <http://zubiri.org/works/englishworks/nhg/scienceandreality.htm>. [p. 63]

²⁶ Gallagher, *Hermeneutics and Education*. p. 153

²⁷ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*. p. 314

virtue' in understanding."²⁸ A relatively different view of *phronesis* was developed by Lyotard, in *The Postmodern Condition*, where a concept of *phronesis*, appears as the only way out of the paralogy of the postmodernism. This is because *phronesis* as a purely prescriptive, case by case judging, without appeal to theoretical criteria, stays autonomous of any big narrative.²⁹ In contrast to Lyotard, Caputo, in his *Radical Hermeneutics* invented the term of meta-*phronesis*. Drawing a distinction to the failure of *phronesis* in the post-modern era, for him *meta-phronesis* is "the skill to cope with the competing paradigms and the virtue of knowing how to like and live with the dissemination of ethos".³⁰ Gallagher, in defence of Gadamer's initial definition, has argued that Lyotard and Caputo offer an overplayed radical description of the paralogical situation that has reduced *phronesis* to either a skill of cleverness,³¹ or a mere method -a piece of *techne*. Finally, he claims that *phronesis* as understood in the hermeneutical situation is still valid in the post-modern society as a way of understanding the world or as a mode of knowledge (*eidōs gnōseōs*).³² I will finish this account of *phronēsis* with a quote from Flyvbjerg,³³ about a way of 'phronetic research,' that describes quite well the context of this thesis:

"Phronetic research focuses on practical activity and practical knowledge in everyday situations. It *may* mean, but is certainly not limited to, a focus on known sociological, ethnographic, and historical phenomena such as "everyday life" and "everyday people." What it *always* means, however, is a focus on the actual daily practices which constitute a given field of interest, regardless of whether these practices take place on the floor of a stock exchange, a grassroots organization, a hospital, or a local school board."³⁴

²⁸ Richard Coyne, *Design Information Technology in the Postmodern Age: From Method to Metaphor* (Cambridge: Massachusetts, London: England: The MIT Press, 1997 (1995)). p. 14

²⁹ Shaun Gallagher, "The Place of Phronesis in Postmodern Hermeneutics," *Philosophy Today*, no. 37 (1993 (1990)). p. 2

³⁰ Ibid. p.3

³¹ The argument here has to do with a notion of temporality. Gallagher argues that this cleverness denies the long and slow time experience that it takes in order to develop.

³² Gallagher, "The Place of Phronesis in Postmodern Hermeneutics." p. 4

³³ Flyvbjerg's project is to show the failure of contemporary social sciences for this he proposes a fundamental review of its way through *phronēsis*.

³⁴ Bent Flyvbjerg, *Making Social Science Matter, Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again* (Cambridge et. al.: Cambridge University Press, 2001). p. 134 Note also that Flyvbjerg, in relation to the following section, does not make any reference to reflection-in-action or Schon. Nevertheless, he could have done so very easily, for example in pp.16-19

Connecting reflection-in-action with phronesis

All of the above discussions can be summarised by saying that, although praxis is maybe the most important field for the exercise of Ethics in architecture and especially in architectural design education; the visited dipoles of *praxis/theory*, and *praxis/poesis* represented as on/off switches are inadequate to describe the complexity of the phenomenon of Ethics. This inadequacy becomes apparent by the two key terms of *reflection-in-action* and *phronesis*, that although offer a firm grasp of situations of Ethics in each case; at the same time, they stand in-between the switches, disrupting their clear-cut polarity and blurring their categorical distinction. *Reflection-in-action* and *phronesis*, in this sense, should not be seen as the hinge that stands in the centre of the switch, allowing its operation. On the contrary, they are catalytic terms that shift our focus from at the switch, to the gesture that approaches the switch takes the Ethical decision and the responsibility to operate it: 'click'.

In pursuing further the connection between *reflection-in-action* and *phronesis*, one is surprised by the fact that there is no major treatise that makes explicit the relationship between the two terms. First of all, Schon in *The Reflective Practitioner*, does not make, any reference to *phronesis*, or, Aristotle as influence for his coining the term reflection-in-action. Schon could have referred to Aristotle in two possible ways: In some sense, Aristotle's categorical distinctions stand as the origins of Logical Positivism, that Schon reacts against; but in another sense, Aristotle's *phronesis* lies beyond a mere positivist attitude.³⁵ Nevertheless, Schon does not comment in favour or against Aristotle at all. Despite the lack of a major work that summarises the connection of *reflection-in-action* and *phronesis*, quite a lot of scholars have got very close in doing so, in a wide variety of fields.³⁶ For example: Phelps attempts to enrich the hermeneutic processes of *phronesis* with the 'artistry' that underlies Schon's 'reflective practice.'³⁷ Eikland makes the explicit connection between the two terms by warning at the same time that "...phronesis does not cover all kinds of 'reflection-in-action' as Schon (1983) calls it in an undifferentiated modern sense."³⁸ In the context

³⁵ Stephen Toulmin, "Logical Positivism and after, or Back to Aristotle," *Higher Education Quarterly* 11, no. 4 (1957).

³⁶ It is interesting that most relevance between the two terms can be found amongst scholars of 'action research' and 'teacher's education'.

³⁷ Louise Wetherbee Phelps, "Practical Wisdom and the Geography of Knowledge in Composition," *College English* 53, no. 8 (1991). p. 865

³⁸ Oslo Eikeland, "Action Research as the Hidden Curriculum of the Western Tradition," in *Handbook of Action Research: Participative Inquiry and Practice*, ed. Peter Reason and Hilary Bradbury (London: Sage, 2001). p. 148

of education, McLaughlin suggests that a desirable 'wider understanding' of the world can part of a teachers worldview, although implicit, both in reflection-in-action and in *phronesis*.³⁹ Sullivan & Porter note that *phronesis* is the judgment that enables the dynamic of reflection-in-action.⁴⁰ Ehn, in the context of design refers to the designer as a reflective practitioner that makes ethical and aesthetic judgement, and proceeds into analysing the concept of *phronesis*.⁴¹ Levin & Ravn in social sciences put close together a Gadamerian interpretation of *phronetic praxis* to Schon's reflective practitioner.⁴² Barazangi presents a case study of replying on a question about Schon, by using Flyvbjerg's concept of 'phronetic social science'.⁴³ Fennell in the context of Ethical tourism discusses how Tribe's (2002) notion of flux between reflection and action distils theory in general embracing at the same time *phronesis*.⁴⁴ Moreover, a large number of other scholars have brought *reflection-in-action* very close to *phronesis*, without drawing the necessary link between them (Ham & Kane,⁴⁵ Russell & Hrycenko,⁴⁶ Porter,⁴⁷ Beckett⁴⁸).

³⁹ Terence H. McLaughlin, "Beyond the Reflective Teacher," in *Philosophy of Education: An Anthology*, ed. Randall R. Curren (Malden, Oxford, Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2007). p. 363

⁴⁰ Patricia Sullivan and James E. Porter, *Opening Spaces, Writing Technologies and Critical Research Practices*, ed. Gail E. Hawisher and Cynthia L. Selfe, *New Directions in Computers and Composition Studies* (Westport: Alex Publishing Corporation, 1997).p. 26

⁴¹ Pelle Ehn, "Participation in Interaction Design: Actors and Artifacts in Interaction," in *Theories and Practice in Interaction Design*, ed. Sebastiano Bagnara and Gillian Crampton Smith (Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc, 2006). p. 150 See also a previous version in: Pelle Ehn, "Neither Bauhäusler nor Nerd Educating the Interaction Designer," in *Symposium on Designing Interactive Systems* (London, England: ACM, 2002). p. 21

⁴² Morten Levin and Johan Ravn, "Involved in Praxis and Analytical at a Distance," *Systemic Practice and Action Research* 20, no. 1 (2007). p. 9-10

⁴³ Nimat Hafez Barazangi "An Ethical Theory of Action Research Pedagogy," *Action Research* 4, no. 1 (2006). p. 110-111

⁴⁴ David Fennell, *Tourism Ethics* (Clevedon, Tonawanda, Ontario: Channel View Publications, 2006). p. 351

⁴⁵ Vince Ham and Ruth Kane, "Finding a Way through the Swamp: A Case for Self-Study as Research," in *International Handbook of Self-Study of Teaching and Teacher Education Practices*, ed. J. J. Loughran, et al. (Dordrecht: Sage, 2004). p. 122

⁴⁶ Tom Russell and Michael Hrycenko, "The Role of Metaphor in a New Science Teachers' Lived Experience," in *Metaphor and Analogy in Science Education*, ed. Peter Aubsoson, Allan G. Harrison, and Stephen M. Ritchie (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006). p. 137

⁴⁷ James E. Porter, *Rhetorical Ethics and Internetworked Writing* (Greenwich, London: Alex Publishing Corporation, JAI Press Ltd, 1998). p. 61

⁴⁸ David Beckett, "Past the Guru and up the Garden Path, the New Organic Mangement Learning," in *Understanding Learning at Work*, ed. David Boud and John Garrick (London: Routledge, 1999). p. 93-94

The above examples show that there is definitely a connection between the two terms. The point is to determine their relationship. Sullivan & Porter, as noted above, have suggested that *phronesis* is the judgment that enables the dynamic of reflection-in-action,⁴⁹ but still this is not a very satisfactory definition, because it relates only to the one dipole of *praxis/theoria* and ignores that of *praxis/poesis*. The way to continue is by instilling this definition something from the difference of *praxis* and *poesis*, which is the relationship of means and ends. In this direction, Jordan Howard Sobel, claims that practical wisdom is necessary for virtuous acting (and I extend, the Ethical understanding of reflection-in-action, proposed here) for two reasons. The one has to do with *means*, by which phronesis help to choose the right steps or the ‘how’ when the ends are given; and the other has to do with *ends*, where it helps into ‘seeing’ which goal is worthy pursuit in each situation. In his words: “The man of practical wisdom deliberates well and reaches correct convictions not only with regard to sundry ends he sets for himself, but concerning what action in particular circumstances can be conducive to the end of action.”⁵⁰ In this way, one could interpret Aristotle’s quote about the target and the arrow⁵¹ like this: the intellectual part of *phronesis*, as *means*, help us to aim well in order to hit the target, while moral part of *phronesis*,⁵² as *ends*, help us to ‘see’ the right target. In this sense, one could continue by suggesting that reflection-in-action is the intellectual part of phronesis, which is related to means. *Phronesis*-mediates-reflect-in-action,

⁴⁹ Sullivan and Porter, *Opening Spaces, Writing Technologies and Critical Research Practices*.p. 26

⁵⁰ Jordan Howard Sobel, "Ends and Means, Aristotle on Happiness and Virtue," (University of Toronto 2007). p. 109

⁵¹ See Aristotle VI,12,1144a6-8 and Ibid. p. 111

⁵² What I claim here is not entirely correct, since phronesis is intellectual virtue and not a moral one. Nevertheless, as I have claimed before, phronesis mediates between intellectual and moral virtues and this mediacy is what I am referring to, here.

The Way of Phronesis

revisiting traditional wisdom in architecture

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Introduction

This paper is an attempt to re-establish the importance of traditional wisdom by suggesting the conflation of the Chinese ideogram of 道 (*tao* = way), with the Greek term of φρόνησις (*phronēsis* = practical wisdom) as it can be expressed in the ‘ambiguous’¹ discipline of architecture. Although the connection of the two terms, that relates the ethical treatises of Confucius and Aristotle, is not new in philosophy,² this research has never reached the western discourse of architecture that focuses only on *phronēsis*. Here, we are going to emphasise the validity of the traditional character of the *way*, not only as a still valid discourse for architectural theory, but mainly as a critical concept that can be used to redefine architectural practice.

Two cases studies are utilised in order to analyse the concepts of *tao* and *phronēsis*. The one is an example from the history of Chinese gardens (The Garden of Solitary Enjoyment) as a manifestation of *tao*, and the other is a contemporary example from the architectural design studio from the architecture school of Edinburgh, as a manifestation of *phronēsis*. The common thread in these so very different examples is the emphasis on the ‘process of doing’ the ordinary activities of gardening and discussing about architecture, as constitutive for the understanding of architecture and the world. In this way, both the ancient gardener/owner and the contemporary student/teacher participate in a revelatory creation of the way that can lead to a phronetic understanding of ethics in the world.

Tao in a Chinese Garden

The concept of Tao has been a prevailing one in Chinese philosophy, but at the same time it has been used in a great variety of ways. Here we shall confine our discussion on *Tao* to the understanding of Confucius. For this, on

¹ There is a long controversy in architectural discussions about its positions amongst the dipole art/science. Characteristic is also the fact that schools of architecture are sometimes grouped with departments of Engineering (Athens-Greece, Tianjin-China) and sometimes with departments of arts or social sciences (Edinburgh-Scotland).

² For example: May Sim, *Remastering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Jiyuan Yu, *The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle : Mirrors of Virtue* (New York: Routledge, 2007). Francis Y. P. Chin, *Confucius and Aristotle : A Comparative Study on the Confucian and Aristotelian Political Ideals, [Chung-Hua Ts*Ung Shu]* (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China: Committee for Compilation and Examination of the Series of Chinese Classics, National Institute for Compilation and Translation, 1981). Also (Hamburger 1959)

the one hand, we reject the more dominant view in the West which perceives *tao* as ‘one infallible method of rule’³, or ‘single, definite order,’⁴ quite contrary to Confucius’ thinking that precludes the existence of any transcendent being or principle. On the other hand, we also distinguish *tao* from that of the Taoists who, similarly to Confucians, consider it as a field of existence as an ongoing process, but are more focused on a metaphysical level and seldom attend to the human world. We shall argue that for Confucius, *tao*, is a verb rather than a static stance; its several derived meanings include: to lead through; to explain, to tell.⁵ As a way of ‘road making’ or ‘world making’, *tao* is also immediately associated with, if not defined in terms of, *jen* as ‘person making’, and the ultimate goal of human life or *yao* (enjoyment, happiness),⁶ While *phronēsis*, as ‘practical wisdom’, plays a role in unifying all the virtues and leads through to *eudaimonia* (happiness).⁷ It is on this ground that we found it promising to build the link between *tao* and *phronesis* in the discourse of architecture.

In accord with Confucius’ concern on the human world, his thoughts on architecture are also from an ethical perspective, focusing on the agent of dwelling instead of objects of buildings. It is highly emphasized that dwelling—almost an equivalent of the term ‘architecture’ in Chinese, greatly influences the cultivation of human virtues. For example, Confucius once said, “It is virtuous manners which constitute the excellence of a neighbourhood. If a man in selecting a residence does not fix on one where such prevail, how can he be wise?” (*Analects IV*) His eminent follower Mencius spells out more clearly the ontological significance of dwelling: ‘Ones’ dwelling alters the *chi*

³ Arthur Waley, *The Analects of Confucius* (New York: Random House, 1938). p. 30

⁴ Herbert Fingarette, "Following the 'One Thread' of the *Analects*," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* no. 3S, no. Thematic Issue 47 (1979). Fingarette, H. (1979). p. 373-406

⁵ See David and Ames Hall, Roger, *Thinking through Confucius* (New York: State University of New York Press, Albany, 1987). p. 226-227. Also Peter Boodberg, "Philological Notes on Chapter One of the Lao Tzu," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 20 (1957). p. 598-618

⁶ As Confucius said: ‘The gentleman-scholar must be strong and determined, for his task is a heavy one and his way (*tao*) is long. Where he takes as his task becoming authoritatively human, is it not a heavy one? And where his way ends only with his death, is it not indeed long?!’ (*Analects VIII*) see David Hall & Roger Ames (1987). p229. The connection of *tao* and *yao* as enjoyment, happiness will be discussed further later.

⁷ Julia Annas, *The Morality of Happiness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). p. 73. A discuss on the similarity between Confucius’ *junzi*, the exemplary person who fulfils *tao* and Aristotle’s *phronimos*, the person who has *phronesis* can be found in May Sim (2007). p. 23-25. He also suggests that for both, to talk of the good life is to talk about the kind of person.

(vital energy), just as the nurture affects the body. Great is the influence of dwelling!’ (*Work of Mencius, Book VII*). Such an emphasis can be understood better upon a twofold background: the Confucianism recognition that the existentiality of man is perceived as a matter of self-cultivation,⁸ which dependent much on her/his engagement to everyday life; and the fact that dwelling remains an agency for man’s everyday experience.

Further, we acknowledge that, for Confucius, the completion of a human being (or an exemplary person) is based on a sound co-operation between two spheres of human life, the *li* (ritual action, orders) and *yao* (music, art, enjoyment)⁹, roughly the ‘on-duty’ and ‘off-duty’, or the public and the private, the outer and the inner, with an emphasis on the latter.¹⁰ In his view, the constitution of flourishing life cannot be secured only from the outer force of the public, but more from the inner of each individual, as it is more clearly within the control of the individual who has it than the ‘outer’ values: ‘let the character be . . . established by the ritual order; and perfected by music or art.’ (*Analects VIII*) And apparently it was in his off-duty life that Confucius attained enjoyment: ‘when the master was dwelling without occupied with business, his manner was easy, and he looked pleased.’ (*Analects VII*) In the sphere of architecture, such a division is embodied in a dichotomy of housing and gardens. As the Chinese word of housing, *zhai di* shows itself that *di* means order, so housing embodies the outer force of the public life; while the garden, an indispensable part of a typical Chinese intellectual dwelling complex, is associated with the off-duty life. This is the reason why most of the Confucians’ discourse on *Tao* within architecture is on gardens, or garden dwelling. For example, ‘In the *tao* of the exemplary person, it is the dwelling of the mind has to be placed first and then that of the body... for the building of one’s housing, in my thinking, it is the garden to be

⁸ Chung-ying Cheng, "Confucius, Heidegger, and the Philosophy of the I Ching: A Comparative Inquiry into the Truth of Human Being," *Philosophy East and West* 37, no. 1 (1987). p. 51-70

⁹ It is quite a commonplace in China that the understanding of *yao*, not limited to music, poetry and dance, but includes more broadly fine arts and martial arts, or anything that offers enjoyment. See Guo moruo (1943), Zehou Li, *Li Zehou Shi Nian Ji* (Hefei: Anhui Press, 1994), Qiheng Wang, "'Yao' and Chinese Traditional Gardens.," *Gui hua Shi* no. 1 (1997). p. 38-41. While the western scholarship seems to be more narrowed down at music, with the exception of David Hall and Roger Ames (1987). p. 274-283

¹⁰ Here again we found similarities between Confucius and Aristotle, both of whom take the life as a whole, contrary to post-classical Ethics in the West, which merely focused on the former. see Joel J. Kupperman, *Learning from Asian Philosophy* (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). p. 153-155

established before the house, as house only meets the needs of body, but cannot entertain that of ears and eyes.’¹¹

For a case study, we shall view a well-known garden of the 11th century, the Garden of Solitary Enjoyment (*Du Le Yuan*) to exemplify that garden, for Chinese intellectuals, is a practice of dwelling, and *tao* is to be embodied through it. This garden belongs to Sima Guang (1019-1086), whose essay ‘Record of the Garden of solitary enjoyment’ gives us a detailed account:

“He usually spent a lot of time reading in the hall. He took the sages as his teachers and the many virtuous men (of antiquity) as his friends, and he got an insight into the origins of benevolence and righteousness, and investigated the ins and outs of the Rites and of Arts. . . . The principles of things gathered before his eyes. If his resolve was weary and his body exhausted, he took a rod and caught fish, he held up his sleeves and picked herbs, made a breach in the canal and watered the flowers, took up an axe and cut down bamboos, washed his hands in the water to cool himself down, and, near the highest spot, let his eyes wander to and fro wherever he pleased. Occasionally, when a bright moon came round and a clear wind arrived, he walked without any restrictions. His eyes, his lungs, his feelings were all his very own. . . . What enjoyment could replace this? Because of this he called the garden the Park of Solitary Enjoyment.”¹²

Here, it is worthy of attention that this record is not an aesthetic account of the beauty of the garden—the garden is not represented as an object—but is a description of gardening activities of everyday life.¹³ And it is from these everyday activities that the owner lived his off-duty life towards ‘enjoyment’ or *yao*, an equivalent of *tao* in individuals. To use Gadamer’s language, we don’t see in the garden a distinction of subject and object, that is, a gardener and a garden; but a situation where a human being giving himself totally to everyday activities, and absorbed into these activities. It is in these practices that he forms an attitude towards the nature of creatures and things, and also finds his ability to assist the transforming and nourishing power of Heaven and Earth; and also through these practices it comes forth the truth of his

¹¹ Wang Shizhen (1526-1590), *Tai Cang Zhu Yuan Xiao Ji*. See Cheng meng lei etl., *Gu Jin Tu Shu Ji Cheng* (Beijing: Zhong hua shu ju, 1986).

¹² Sima Guang ‘Record of the Garden of Solitary Enjoyment’ from *Sima Wen gong wen ji* (Taipei, 1967), translated for Maggie Keswick by Paul Clifford. Maggie Keswick, Alison Hardie, and Charles Jencks, *The Chinese Garden : History, Art and Architecture*, Rev. ed. (London: Frances Lincoln, 2003). p. 97

¹³ This point seems to have been largely neglected by the modern scholarship on Chinese gardens.

worlds, in which it is revealed the very relationship of his creativities and the deep source of the world, which leads through to the ultimate enjoyment¹⁴— ‘He walked without any restrictions. His eyes, his lungs, his feelings were all his very own... What enjoyment could replace this?’

What is also worth noting of this garden is the phenomenon of naming sceneries after a gardening activity engaged by a famous antiquity figure, such as ‘pavilion of watering flower’ alluding to Bai juyi, and ‘Hall of reading’ to Dong Zhongshu, etc. It indicates that Sima’s garden dwelling is actually the practice of a way of life or *tao* that extends to him from the past. And in such practicing, this inherited way is certainly nothing as it was, but has to be adapted and developed to the present contextual in unique and qualitatively different ways. It is from such a way of living that gardeners-scholars like Sima get engaged in the ongoing tradition and requires his own continuity. This is most illuminating in the revelation of *tao* as *Way* that *tao* is not to be received as a legacy, instead, the realization of *tao* is to experience, to interpret, and to influence the world in such a way as to reinforce a way of life established by one’s cultural precursors.¹⁵ This way of living in the world, is the very wisdom practiced in the gardening world of Chinese Confucians, and leads through to the ultimate enjoyment.

***Phronēsis* and the design studio**

Contemporary western-focused architecture of East and West seems to be very distant and indifferent from the above analysis of Chinese gardens. The concepts of *tao* and virtue are estranged from design processes and the interpretation of architecture. Nevertheless, the design studio in architectural education not only allows a fruitful cross-examination between *phronēsis* and *tao*, but also makes sense to study because of its impact in the production of landscape and the built environment.

¹⁴ This view is borrowed from a conflation of the Chinese classics and recent western scholarship on philosophy. ‘It is only he who is possessed of the most completed sincerity that can exist under heaven, who can give its full development to his nature. . . Able to give their development to the natures of creatures and things, he can assist the transforming and nourishing powers of Heaven and Earth. Able to assist the transforming and nourishing powers of Heaven and Earth, he may with Heaven and Earth form a ternion.’ /The Doctrine of the Mean. Chap XXII/ and ‘The garden, then, is an epiphany—a symbol, in the Romantic sense—of the relation between the source of the world and ourselves.’ David E. Cooper, *A Philosophy of Gardens* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc, 2006). p. 150

¹⁵ David Hall & Roger Ames (1986). p. 227

The design studio is the core of architectural education where the students of architecture come to design projects that imitate situations that they would deal with as professionals. The design studio is the place where design practice conciliates all other theoretical and practical skills and knowledge acquired during architectural education. It is where design practice meets philosophical query not only at the same place but into the same *praxis*.¹⁶ Snodgrass and Coyne argue that for a hermeneutic view of the educational process in the design studio that establishes *phronēsis* as an important mechanism that through constantly renewed metaphors interprets each specific design situation.¹⁷ Moreover, Perez-Gomez emphasises the fact that practical wisdom in the design studio is based on the oral transmission rather than on textual information.¹⁸ In this way *phronēsis* is the fundamental virtue that can lead to the fulfilment of *praxis*, the core of human life.¹⁹

In ancient Greek philosophy, Aristotle was the first to define *phronēsis* as ‘practical wisdom’ that is “a state conjoined with reason, true, having human good for its objects, and apt to do”²⁰. In the division that Aristotle makes between moral and intellectual virtues, *phronēsis* while being in the intellectual part, keeps a very special place as a term that brings the two categories together. Standing in the middle of the intellectual virtues (Figure 1), between Scientific Knowledge (*Epestēmē*) and Art (*Tecnē*), on the one side, and Intuition (*Nous*) and Theoretical wisdom (*Sofia*), on the other; Practical Wisdom keeps the balance between the extremely realistic and practical aspect of *epestēmē* and *technē* and the philosophical and theoretical aspect of *nous* and *sofia* of the human intellectual knowledge. At the same time *phronēsis* bridges the gap between the moral and the intellectual part of soul, because it works as instrument to achieve happiness (*eudaimonia*), the ultimate human goal for Aristotle.

¹⁶ Leonidas Koutsoumpos, "Ethics and the Architectural Design Studio: 1+3 Ahistorical Metaphors," *EAR (Edinburgh Architecture Research)* 30 (2007). p. 69

¹⁷ Adrian Snodgrass and Richard Coyne, "Models, Metaphors and the Hermeneutics of Designing," *Design Issues* 9, no. 1 (1992). p. 73

¹⁸ Pérez-Gómez, "Ethics and Poetics in Architectural Education -I". p.27 [my italics]

¹⁹ "Life is praxis" Oded Balaban, "Praxis and Poesis in Aristotle's Practical Philosophy," *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 24 (1990). p. 196 [emphasis added]

²⁰ Nicomachean Ethics 1140b 23




Figure 1

Shaun Gallagher, referring to education, argues that *phronēsis* engages with situations in a way that the person cannot stand out of the situation in order to see it in an objective way. Knowledge of a situation is always imperfect knowledge gained *within* the situation, and the model for that knowledge is *phronēsis*.²¹ Gadamer, furthermore, clarifies the difference between technical and moral knowledge and claims that *phronēsis* involves a kind of self-knowledge that is not present in technological knowledge.²² The hermeneutical situation appears to be a non-objective situation that assimilates to the situations of Ethics that one encounters in the every day life. Gadamer also argues that “For moral knowledge, as Aristotle describes it, is clearly not objective knowledge- i.e., the knowledge is not standing over against a situation that he merely observes; he is directly affected by what he knows. It is something that he has to do.”²³ In this way Gadamer’s view of the way of interpretation utilises the Aristotelian concept of *phronēsis* “as the operative ‘intellectual virtue’ in understanding.”²⁴

In order to illustrate the above thoughts we will visit a conversation²⁵ between a tutor (John) and a first year student (Mark) during a tutorial about a small domestic project in an urban environment. The project is still in an early stage and Mark has just proposed a basic diagram of space adjacencies and now he tries to justify the curvy shape of the rooms.

²¹ Shaun Gallagher, *Hermeneutics and Education*, ed. Dennis J. Schmidt, *Suny Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy* (New York, Albany: State University of New York, 1992). p. 152

²² Ibid. p. 153

²³ Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, Second Revised Edition ed. (London, New York: Continuum, 2004). p. 314

²⁴ Richard Coyne, *Design Information Technology in the Postmodern Age: From Method to Metaphor* (Cambridge: Massachusetts, London: England: The MIT Press, 1997 (1995)). p. 14

²⁵ This case study comes from the transcripts of a real dialogue that took place in the school of architecture in the University of Edinburgh. Very small omissions have been made due to the restrictions of space indicated with the symbol (...).The names of the participants have been changed in order to secure their privacy.

- Mark: I didn't want boxy rooms... that's another thing which I didn't talk about. I don't really want to extrude these lines as I'm sure I did, as you said before and create cells (...)
- John: Why? What's wrong with rooms looking like cells?
- M: Um, nothing but it's just a bit too everyday; sort of just the way we have to do things and I want to change it.
- J: Why do we do it like that?
- M: Because it's easier, it's just a box.
- J: Why do you think it's easier?
- M: Em, in like houses they'll look for the cheap way to do things; shoot them up as quickly as possible.
- J: So you're trying to make an expensive house?
- M: I'm not saying that the architect's in the they're gonna want to portray some form of good quality.
- J: And why good quality cannot be cheap?
- M: I just thought, I heard one or two people saying that extruding lines up from our diagrams.
- J: Well, I would agree but what you are proposing is again a diagram and you will just extrude the lines from this new diagram, so I think that you have to try to understand somehow deeper why we usually make the rooms like boxes and not just refute it – if you would like to challenge this notion then do it in the whole house and try and approach the things in the same way and not just making this strange thing (pointing in a plan at a corner of a project)... do you see what I mean?

John and Mark were within the educational situation, without a privileged outside fixed point. Although John (through his dual role as a teacher and a practitioner) had an experience from the professional world, this experience did not serve as a predestined response, but rather as an awareness of the wideness of the overall discussion, opening the topic instead of closing it. Both Mark's and John's knowledge about the situation was imperfect before the conversation, as well as after, since no final answer was given to the original questions. Nevertheless they both engaged in an educational process that lead them to a better grasping of the design situation. Nevertheless, this knowledge was not predetermined like a lecture that delivered some amount of knowledge, but it was rather a practical knowledge that had to do with the specific situation and it was constructed on the way. Like Sima Guang and his Garden of Solitary Enjoyment, where there was no distinction between the garden and the gardener; similarly here the object and subject of the education cannot be distinguished. For this it is characteristic that John did not answer his own original question and asked from the student to contemplate further

the reasons that lead to the specific way of design and thus leaving the issue open for further contemplation. In this sense, participation *in* the dialogue appears to play a fundamental role for the possibility of education of Ethics. And it is also in the dialogue that the very nature of architecture emerged, not as an artwork whose only commitment is to be self-expressive; but rather as belonging to the wider economy of ‘unselfing’, and the same for architects who are meant to lead a ‘unselfed life.’²⁶ By practicing the dialogue in the design studio, Mark and John are ‘making their way’ towards a more *phronetic* attitude of architecture, since the ultimate aim of architectural education is the cultivation of Ethics, as the way of *phronēsis*. “*Phronēsis*... is inseparable from ethics and from our involvements in a society. *Phronēsis* has an inherently ethical aspect.”²⁷

Conclusions

The two case studies show eloquently that there is an apparent connection between the construction of the *tao* in the Chinese Garden and in the cultivation of *phronēsis* in the design studio, that is, a certain attitude of engagement in the world.²⁸

This attitude though, should not be taken for granted, since it is not always present. Contemporary China, for example, the largest construction site in the world, has been dominated in a large extent by techno-scientific knowledge that is erroneously capitalistic in origin, architecture is seen as a mere object, that has no connection to the human being apart from its commodity. Within such a complicated situation full of conflictions, there is a need of an ethics of architecture, in order to secure an ethical urban and architectural environment. But in fact, architecture in China seeks a Western Cartesian enlightenment of object-subject divisions, having forgotten the

²⁶ ‘Unselfing’, a term of Iris Murdoch’s, who sees it as a process of detachment from absorption in what peculiarly concerns one’s own interests and ambitions, David Cooper has used it to label the virtues induced by garden-practices. see Iris Murdoch and Peter Conradi, *Existentialists and Mystics : Writings on Philosophy and Literature* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1997). p. 385. And David Cooper (2006). p. 95-96

²⁷ Richard Coyne and Adrian Snodgrass, *Interpretation in Architecture: Design as a Way of Thinking* (London, New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006). p. 112 [italics in the original]

²⁸ We should also note an asymmetry between the two case studies. The fact that it is rather possible to justify that Sima Guang lived a virtuous life, while we cannot justify Mark’s future moral stance. The historical perspective in the one case allows an overview, that is not possible in the level of the contemporary design studio.

meaning of enlightenment in its traditional philosophy. There is neither lack of design studios in its schools of architecture, nor of historical references in order to cultivate a phronetic way of making architecture. On the contrary, what is lacking, most of the times, is this particular attitude towards the world that identifies a unifying of personal virtues with the good life.

For this, in Chinese architectural education, (as well as in every other country with similar characteristics, no matter if it is in the East or the West), there is an urgent need to recall the long missed-out traditional wisdom of *tao*. This can happen not by merely copying the form of the Western studios, but by grasping the essential spirit of *phronēsis*, which transcends conventional West/East divisions. This attitude seems to be the only way of educating architects who are competent in dealing with contemporary situations in a sense that they do not only have a command of building skills, or techniques of form making. Such an architect must be cultivated *in phronēsis*, that leads in a thorough understanding of her or his commitment in the role of 'world making', which is not only to be the *tao* of architecture, but also the *tao* of our present world.

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