

THE FORENSIC THEORY OF THE ATONEMENT
IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the
degree of

D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y

to the

SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

of the

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH

by

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Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
October 1, 1933



TO

PROFESSOR W. P. PATERSON, D. D.

PREFACE

During my Seminary days I was unable to feel satisfied with the theory of Christ's atonement presented in Dr. A. H. Strong's Systematic Theology. Later the historic power and persistence of faith in the "blood-atonement" of our Lord aroused my intellectual curiosity. When about to leave America for post-graduate theological study in the University of Edinburgh, I came across a statement in Dr. John Hutton's book, That the Ministry Be Not Blamed, declaring that "How can a man be just with God?" is the greatest question of this as of all ages. While in Edinburgh there appeared that fine book of Professor H. R. Mackintosh, The Christian Experience of Forgiveness. There came a desire to write on some phase of the atonement. At the suggestion of my adviser, Professor W. P. Paterson, D.D., I chose the theory which may claim classic importance in the history of western Protestantism.

I gladly take this opportunity of acknowledging the helpfulness of many professors and students during my Edinburgh experience, and especially the unfailing courtesy and kindness of that loyal friend of American theological students, Professor W. P. Paterson, D.D.

Webster's New International Dictionary has been considered as authority in matters of spelling and definition of words.

O.M.R.

October 1, 1933

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"I saw One hanging on a tree,
In agonies and blood,
Who fixed His languid eyes on me
As near His cross I stood.

"Sure never till my latest breath
Can I forget that look;
It seemed to charge me with His death,
Though not a word He spoke.

"My conscience felt and owned the guilt,
And plunged me in despair;
I saw my sins His blood had spilt,
And helped to nail Him there.

"A second look He gave which said,
'I freely all forgive,
This blood is for thy ransom paid;
I die that thou mayest live.'

"Thus while His death my sin displays
In all its blackest hue,
Such is the mystery of grace,
It seals my pardon too."

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

THE SUBJECT-MATTER, POINT OF VIEW, AND METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

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INTRODUCTION

THE SUBJECT-MATTER, POINT OF VIEW, AND METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

In those religions and beliefs which undervalue or deny personality the problem of atonement does not arise. The reason for this is that impersonal religion loses all moral distinctions. In Buddhism, for example, the religious ultimate is conceived as a "sleep-like coma---Nirvana." The means to this goal is absolute cessation of desire. Moral values arise out of the relationships between personalities, and so this thoroughly impersonal idea of salvation does not distinguish moral deficiency or imperfection. Redemption is through the negation of personal relationships, not through their restoration and perfecting. The idea of moral evil necessary for a problem of atonement is therefore wanting.

But when the religious ultimate is pictured in personal terms, the religious subject and object being conceived as personal and sustaining personal relationships, the conception of moral evil as a disturber of personal relationships at once sets the problem of atonement. Wherever personal relationships and moral values are recognized, the fact of impurity, sin, and guilt, however crudely experienced and inadequately conceived, must be related to the experience and concept of the gods or God. As Dr. J. K. Mozley puts it: "The problem of atonement is the problem of the way in which that relationship may still

be regarded as existing, despite certain facts which appear to affect it adversely."

J. K. Mozley, The Doctrine of the Atonement, p. 5.

The idea of atonement, then, is evolved from the answers given to the questions raised by moral evil in the life of a religious person who believes that he is related to the divine personality, and that salvation is to be attained through a perfected divine-human personal relationship. The questions raised by the presence of moral evil are of supreme importance, and may be stated as follows: How is the divine personality related to human beings? Is it possible for anything to affect this relationship? Does it make any difference to God if this relationship is affected? On what terms can the divine-human relationship be restored? What part in the restoration is played by the religious subject, and what by the religious object?

I. THE SUBJECT-MATTER.

To fully understand the different answers which have been made to these questions concerning the problem of atonement, one would have to acquire an intimate understanding of the religious experience of which they are the rationalization. The objective would be to gather a circle of ideas, a body of teaching concerning this great religious problem by means of a concrete study

of the historical situations in which the ideas have emerged. Such a study would lead far afield, and even in outline form does not fall within the scope of this introduction. This may be said, however: the great variety of religious experiences would lead one to assume that ideas of atonement are many and diverse, and such is certainly the case.

A. THE TERMINOLOGY OF ATONEMENT.

Alternative to the study of the related experience is that of terminology in order to understand the principal ideas of atonement that have been held. It is true that the word is an intellectual symbol, and does not carry a key to the meaning which it symbolizes. While it more or less perfectly conveys the ideational content of the concept which it is meant to express, it generally fails signally to communicate the emotional aspects of its basic religious experience, and the moral intuition associated with it. Nevertheless, a study of the principal terms associated with the idea of atonement is not without value. As groundwork for the distinguishing marks of the Christian dogma and the Forensic theory, we shall summarize briefly the significance of important Hebrew, Greek, Latin, and English words.

1. HEBREW TERMS.

The word "atonement" is used to translate כַּפָּרָה , kaphar; חַטָּאת , hata; רָצוֹן , rāḥāh. The root meanings

of these Hebrew words in order are: to "cover," hence expiate, condone, cancel, placate; to "offer," or "receive a sin offering," hence make atonement, appease, propitiate; "effect reconciliation," that is, by some conduct, or course of action.

William Carver, International Standard Bible Encyclopedia, I., p. 321.

The primary meaning of the word כִּפֶּר , "kipper," which in Hebrew corresponds to the English expressions, "make expiation" and "make atonement," is either "cover" from the Arabic, or "wipe away" from the Syriac. Dr. J. K. Mozley thinks it is easier to carry the idea of "covering" through the passages in which "kipper" occurs than that of "wiping away." According to Professor S. R. Driver, the word כִּפֶּר was in early use in Israel associated with the idea of ritual purgation, and gradually came to mean expiation, purification from sin, propitiation, and reconciliation. After a summary of the recent debate of scholars, Professor Buchanan Gray comes to these conclusions: "In any case since in the P. C. (priestly code) the Hebrew verb is sometimes construed with an accusative of the thing that is in a state of sin, but never with God as an object, it is more probable that 'to make expiation' is the most adequate rendering of כִּפֶּר used in its technical sense and without a direct object, that is, throughout Ezekiel and P; the sense, 'to expiate,' also attaches to the verb in the

earlier and later literature when it is construed with an accusative of the sin, though the idea of propitiation obviously comes to the front in the rare examples of personal objects to the verb."

Sacrifice In the Old Testament, p. 74.

2. GREEK TERMS.

The word "atonement" is further used to translate the Greek stems, ἱλᾶσ-, hilas-, ἀλλᾶγ-, allag-, λύπ-, lip- (Daniel 9:24). Taking them in order, these words mean: "to be, or cause to be, friendly"; "to render other," hence to "restore"; "to leave," and with preposition, "to leave off, that is, enmity, or evil, etc."; "to render holy", "to set apart for"; hence of the Deity, "to appropriate or accept for himself." ἱλασκέσθαι, hiláskesthai, means "to make propitious" (Hebrews 2:17; Leviticus 6:30; 16:20; Ezekiel 45:20). Ἀλλᾶττειν, allátein, used only in composition with prepositions, means "to render other," "to restore" to another condition of harmony (William Carver, Op. Cit., I, p. 321).

Λύτρον, lútron (Matthew 20:28; Mark 10:45) has been interpreted as signifying payment (ransom), but this meaning is disputed. It would seem reasonable, however, to find in it the idea that Christ's self-offering was related to the divine gift of forgiveness, as well as to the bringing of men to repentance. "To people who think in the exact terms of the propitiatory system of the Law,

the words may suggest that the Lord in dying was bearing the divinely appointed penalty for sin: but for those who penetrate the form in order to discover the substance, the physical blood-shedding will stand for the perfect self-offering, which reached its final manifestation in the supreme sacrifice that was demanded by the enemies of Jesus as the price of His obedience."

L. W. Grensted, Ed., The Atonement In History and Life, p. 132.

The Greek word, ἱλαστήριον, hilasterion, (Romans 3:25), has been correlated with the sprinkling of the victim's blood by the High Priest in the Holy of Holies, in St. Paul's use of it, as well as in the Epistle to the Hebrews. In recent times Professor Adolph Deissman has protested against this, and holds that since the word is used in the Septuagint with a wider meaning, it should not be restricted, and that it has the more general meaning of "object" or "means" of propitiation. Canon D. Dawson-Walker suggests that "St. Paul is not using the word as a substantive at all, but as an adjective (the form admits this possibility), and that he simply means to say that God 'set forth' Christ in a propitiary character, to effect a work of propitiation" (L. W. Grensted, Ed., Op. Cit., pp. 139, 140). This view would bring St. Paul into agreement with St. John (I John 2:2; 4:10) and also the writer to the

Hebrews (Hebrews 2:17).

It would appear that there is sufficient evidence in their theology to show that the early Greek fathers believed Christ's death was an offering of sacrifice to God. Their language, however, is not always unambiguous. Principal Franks holds, in opposition to the view of Harnack, that sacrifice and ransom are not "merely circumferential" ideas, "since the idea of a sacrifice to God naturally corresponds to the practical belief in a forgiveness of sins bestowed in baptism, a very vital element in the religion of the Greek church."

R. S. Franks, *The History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ*, I., p. 97.

With particular reference to precedents for the Forensic theory of the atonement, Rashdall holds that in spite of language suggesting some sort of vicarious punishment, sacrifice, or expiation, there was an instinctive shrinking from the substitutionary theory which St. Paul attempted to work out. Along with this may be

Hastings Rashdall, *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology*, p. 205.

placed the estimate of Professor Francis J. Hall: "That the beginnings of a penal conception of the passion can be found in the Greek Fathers cannot be denied, but this conception receives no formal development; and, generally speaking at least, the term 'substitution' is quite too strong as a description of their thought concerning the vicariousness of our Lord's passion." At all events we

Francis J. Hall, Dogmatic Theology, I, pp. 24, 25.

may safely assert that St. Paul was never without some following, slight though it may have been.

3. LATIN TERMS.

The word "sacrificium," means "something made holy, that is, by dedication to God." Hence "sacrifice consists

S. C. Gayford, Sacrifice and Priesthood, p. 24.

not merely in killing something, but in the offering of a life that has passed through death, that is, a risen life." (S. C. Gayford, Op. Cit., p. 1). If the word "sacrifice" is used in reference to death, we then need two words for its complete meaning--sacrifice and offering, the latter of which refers to the presenting of blood.

Tertullian (died 240) was a Roman lawyer who applied the ideas of meritum and satisfactio, common in Roman law as meaning the discharge of an obligation, to the death of Christ, which he emphasized strongly. "In innumerable passages he has emphatically affirmed that the whole work of Christ is involved in his death on the Cross, in that the death on the Cross was the mission of Christ" (R. S. Franks, Op. Cit., p. 102). Satisfactio refers to the necessity of reparation for an injury or an offence. As to its nature, we find this: "Every sin is discharged either by pardon (venia) or penalty (poena); pardon as the result of condemnation" (R. S. Franks, Op. Cit., p. 105). From this beginning developed the doctrine of human satisfaction, which in turn lent itself to the corruption

associated with the indulgences sold at the beginning of the Reformation.

In Hilary (died 367) and Ambrose (died 397) we have pointers to the Forensic theory of the atonement. They define sacrifice as coming under the concept of satisfaction. Hilary affirms the necessity of Christ's passion "voluntarily undertaken to satisfy a penal obligation (officio satisfactura poenali)" (R. S. Franks, Op. Cit., p. 109, ff.). Ambrose views the death of Christ as a sacrifice satisfying the divine sentence of death against sinful humanity. Satisfaction in Tertullian is merit to pay a debt, but in Hilary and Ambrose it means that Christ underwent as a substitute the suffering which sinners should have borne. Says Ambrose: "..... since the divine decree cannot be dissolved, the person rather than the sentence might be changed."

Augustine (died 430) held that by "taking on him punishment (poenam) and not taking on him guilt (culpam) he destroyed both guilt and punishment." His views are summed up by Rashdall (Op. Cit., p. 331): "More usually Christ's death is treated as a penal infliction endured by Christ instead of man; but still it is endured because justice requires that it should be endured..... He paid to the devil as the executioner of God's justice. 'He, who had no sins of his own, dismissed them (our sins) and yet was undeservedly conducted by him (the devil) to death! Sometimes he (Augustine) represents it

(the death of Christ) as a sacrifice of unique expiatory value.... On the whole, in St. Augustine the idea of substituted or vicarious punishment is the central one."

In his Cur Deus Homo, Anselm (died 1109) insists that some reparation for sin must be made, if the moral interests of the universe are to be safeguarded. So he applied the concept of satisfactio to his death. But the meaning of satisfaction had come to be the idea that "men, by various works which they can perform,--especially prayers, fastings, and almsgivings,--can and do make satisfaction or compensation to God for the temporal punishment due to them, and thus escape the necessity of enduring it." Thus the alternatives set the formula:

William Cunningham, Historical Theology, II, p. 93.

aut satisfactio aut poena. The result of this innovation of meaning in the word satisfaction, and the application of the category of satisfaction to the death of Christ made it natural to think of Christ as placating an angry God. Anselm also used the ecclesiastical category of

D.M. Ross, The Cross of Christ, p. 238.

meritum in reference to the death of Christ,--the idea that those who do more in their life and service than is strictly obligatory make available supererogatory merit. God could transfer or impute to sinners the supererogatory merit created by Christ.

Duns Scotus (died 1308) believed that the remission of sins and infusion of grace were independent of each

other, and that they co-existed by the divine decree only. The remission of sins is ideal, not any real change through the infusion of grace; indeed, guilt is ideal. It is simply a relation in the divine mind between a certain person and punishment, and remission is the removal of this obstacle (R. S. Franks, *Op. Cit.*, p. 328). Hence, according to Duns Scotus, "there was no necessity of any kind, apart from the mere will of God, for atonement or satisfaction" (J. K. Mozley, *Op. Cit.*, p. 137). Everything is referred to the acceptatio of God. The value of Christ's death was just as high as God chose to rate it.

A. Harnack, Dogma, VI, 196, quoted by J. K. Mozley, *Op. Cit.*, p. 137.

It was Thomas Aquinas (died 1274) who first made a distinction between meritum and satisfactio. "By satisfactio," says A. A. Hodge, "he intended the bearing of Christ's work considered as penal suffering, which satisfies the penal claims of the law for the demerit of sin. By meritum he intended the bearing of Christ's work considered as a holy obedience, fulfilling all the conditions of the original covenant of life upon which the eternal well-being of his people was suspended."

The Atonement, p. 43.

In the theory of Anselm meritum appears only in connection with Christ's death which is a work of supererogation.

In Aquinas the meritum of the Passion is due to its not

being imposed from without (the way of obedience). Professor James Denney says merit in Aquinas seems to imply that "the whole work of Christ, including his death, must be capable of being morally interpreted." When related to the divine nature, the Passion of Christ acts per modum efficientiae; when related to the will of Christ's soul, it acts per modum meriti; when considered as in the very flesh of Christ, it acts per modum satisfactionis, per modum redemptionis, and per modum sacrificii.

The term, "justitia," represents not only the justice under which the judge gives judgment, but also the legal condition of the one upon whom the judge pronounces the verdict of acquittal. The word has a double meaning, and its objective and subjective aspects have been frequently confused in western theological theories.

L. W. Grensted, A Short History of the Atonement, p. 47.

Professor R. Dick Fleming points out (Redemption, p.69) that the old debate as to whether "justify" means "to declare just", or "to make just," misses the real difficulty. He says that if the term "just" means "legally just, that is, righteous before the law which judges of human actions," both definitions are wrong. The believer is not made at once righteous, nor can God pronounce him to be what he is not. But if "just" means "set right with God," both definitions are quite acceptable. The believer who is justified is both set right and

pronounced to be set right, with God.

Socinus (died 1604) was accused by Grotius (died 1645) of holding the doctrine of acceptatio, though without justification. But Grotius himself holds a view of what Christ accomplished, quite similar to that of Duns Scotus. He makes use of the idea of relaxation of the law from the Latin word, relaxatio, meaning "a release; an instrument by which a person relinquishes to another his right in anything." God released man from full punishment for his sins; Christ's death has the value of penal example, but not penal expiation. The theory of Grotius "has no coherence at all apart from the Scotist idea, to which the term acceptilation is technically applied, that God can fix a value as He will" (J. K. Mozley, Op. Cit., p. 155).

4. ENGLISH TERMS.

The English word, "atonement," does not correspond etymologically with any Hebrew or Greek word it translates. Probably it is derived from the phrase, "at one," (at-one-ment) and so signifies "harmony of relationship or unity of life, etc." The single instance in the New Testament where it occurs is Romans 5:11, and this is changed to "reconciliation" in the American Revised Version. This change is an improvement, for the noun ($\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha\gamma\eta$) corresponds to the verb, "to reconcile" ($\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha\sigma\sigma\epsilon\iota\nu$), twice used in the preceding verse. While in strict etymology the word need connote only the active

or conscious exercise of unity of life or harmony of relations, the causative idea perhaps belongs to the original use of the term, as it certainly is present in all current use of the term.

Shakespeare uses "atonement" in the sense of bringing two estranged persons together, and making them "at one." In Richard III, Act I, Scene 3, he makes his character say:

"He desires to make atonement
Between the Duke of Gloucester and your brother."

It is possible, as Edward ~~Grubb~~ thinks, that the idea of "atoning" for a crime by making reparation, or suffering punishment for it, is a later meaning. In any case, that is, whether it is a later development or originally present as first suggested, such a representative modern theologian as William Adams Brown accepts the idea of reparation as the true and distinctive element in the significance of the term. In his opinion, "atonement" properly signifies "satisfaction or reparation made for wrong or injury by doing or suffering something which is received in lieu of an equivalent."

Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, V, p. 641.

B. THE CHRISTIAN DOGMA OF THE ATONEMENT.

It is true that one may think of atonement as a practical matter without taking into account theological considerations, but that is not the way in which Christianity

deals with it. Christianity claims to be the true religion, and as such to reveal the truth concerning atonement. Dr. J. K. Mozley says: "If Christianity, as a religion of atonement, is not true, then there is no true religion of atonement, at the best there are only floating conceptions" (Op. Cit., p. 2). The implication of this claim to reveal the truth concerning atonement is, of course, a denial of all supposed atonement outside the Christian faith. The basic contention of Christianity concerning atonement is: we should speak of the atonement rather than an atonement for sin. Atonement is a specific rather than a generic term.

How shall we state the Christian dogma of atonement founded upon this basic position of a specific atonement? Many and divergent are the views of those who have attempted to interpret the Christian experience of atonement. Doubt may be raised as to whether there is any truth about it which would be acceptable to all Christian thinkers. In spite of the many partial and conflicting ideas, however, there is agreement that the forgiveness of sins is basic. It will be convenient to state the Christian dogma of the atonement as we answer the questions raised in connection with the mode and nature of forgiveness.

First, how is the divine personality related to human beings? The Christian answer to this question is

that man is united to God, for he is made in the divine image. All through the Old Testament the underlying position is that God and the nation (if not the individual) are sharers in a common life with common concerns. The deepest idea of the sacrificial system is found in this conception, and unity with God is the key to the symbolism which it embodies. Salvation is found through union with Jehovah, identification with his life, and obedience to his will. The same idea is even more plainly taught in the New Testament. Jesus placed love to God (in return for the divine love) and love to fellow men above all other commandments. One who loves seeks union with the object of his love, and gives himself to it without stint. The Christian conception of the relation of the divine personality, then, to human beings, is that relationship exists because of kinship of nature, and that this kinship is manifested in a union of love.

Second, is it possible for anything to affect this relationship? Christianity asserts that this relationship of the union of love may be all but completely broken by sin. The self-will of man introduces a breach into his relationship with God of which he may be well aware. Even when without any consciousness of wilful sin, the Christian knows that he falls far short of the moral ideal conceived to be the will of God. Consequently, he cannot claim that his relationship to the divine personality is a perfect one. Sin is a matter of omission as

well as commission. It is a serious matter because of the results which it produces, for it comes between man and God. The Christian conception is that sin is a disturbing element which imperils the divine-human bond which is the essence of religion.

Third, does it make any difference to God if this relationship is affected? The effect of the entrance of sin into the life of man, says Christianity, is to bring into action all the divine resources for its destruction. As St. Paul puts it, "Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound" (Romans 5:20). Love in the nature of God prompts him to seek the restoration of the breach in the divine-human relationship, even if the price of such a restoration be beyond human calculation. And God does not merely seek a restoration to the status before sin impaired the relationship, but positively seeks to perfect the relationship to the point of an ideal union between him and man. God, then, is supremely concerned with the fact of sin which threatens the relationship which he is attempting to restore and develop into an ideal union.

Fourth, on what terms can the divine-human relationship be restored? All Christian thinkers are agreed that there must be a divine procuring cause of atonement, but their theories clash when they attempt to define the conditions under which the atonement was accomplished. The unity which marks their answers to the other four questions

gives way here to a diversity of opinion. The "how" of God's method of salvation is the rock on which the theologians have come to grief. After all, this is scarcely to be wondered at, for views of the atonement emphasize differences in conceptions of the nature of God, the nature of man, and the nature of sin--conceptions upon which atonement views are dependent. A theory of the atonement is not so much a single theory, as the focusing point of one's whole conception of salvation, and this is colored by changing factors and conditions.

Fifth, what part in the restoration is played by the religious subject, and what by the religious object? The part of the religious subject in the restoration of the divine-human relationship is the acceptance of the terms upon which the restoration may take place, and trust in the provision of God for meeting these terms. This means that he makes that response to the gracious approach of God which we call faith, and so union becomes actual in the soul of the believer. Faith implies an object, and this object is found in Jesus Christ. The work of atonement is a principle and process grounded in the nature of God, and it reaches a climax in the crucial act of the death of Christ wherein union with the divine is effected. The locus of the atonement in the life, and especially the death of Jesus Christ, is that truth which causes the theologian to speak of the atonement of Christ.

C. THE FORENSIC THEORY OF THE ATONEMENT.

The distinctive mark of the Forensic theory of the atonement is its consistent resort to politics and law-courts in its exposition of the atoning work of Christ. The word, "forensic", (L., forensis, fr. forum, a public place, market place) signifies belonging to courts of judicature, and is used in legal proceedings; but it may also refer to the treatment of man as a subject of moral law. The Forensic theory builds upon the abstract justice emphasized in the contemporary political state. In elaborating the relations of God and man, and the restoration of fellowship after the breach caused by sin, the theologians unconsciously made a new departure by going into detail and drawing out logical deductions. The Forensic theory is to be carefully distinguished from the Anselmic theory which preceded it, as well as from the Grotian theory which succeeded it in the attempt to avoid its difficulties. In spite of the common elements, these other theories are really quite different in their conception of "how the death of Christ saves us."

Because of ambiguity in the use of the word "atonement"; and its limitation to the passive side of obedience, both Charles and A. A. Hodge argue for the word "satisfaction," as designating the whole work of Christ for sinners. "Satisfaction" is defined by the latter as the idea "that Christ fully satisfied all that the justice and law of God

required, on the part of mankind, as the condition of their being admitted to divine favor and eternal happiness," and hence offered "that obedience which the law demands as the condition of life," and endured "that suffering which it demands as the penalty of sin" (Op. Cit., p.34).

Penal and pecuniary satisfaction differ precisely as do crime and debt, things and persons. "..... In a pecuniary debt the payment of the thing owed ipso facto liberates the debtor from all obligations whatsoever, because here the point is not who pays, but what is paid; with respect to a penal debt ... the demand is upon the person who pays as well as the thing paid; that is, that the penalty should be suffered by the person sinning: for as the law demands personal and proper obedience, so it exacts personal enduring of the penalty. Therefore, in order that a criminal should be absolved--a vicarious satisfaction being rendered by another hand--it is necessary that there should intervene a sovereign act of the supreme law-giver, which, with respect to the law, is called relaxation, and with respect to the debtor is called remission, because the personal endurance of the penalty is remitted, and a vicarious endurance of it is accepted in its stead" (A. A. Hodge, Op. Cit., pp. 35, 36).

Penalty is to be distinguished from suffering considered without respect to its design (calamities); from suffering considered as a means of moral improvement (chastisements); and hence must be considered as suffering

designed to satisfy law and justice.

By substitution, the makers of the Forensic theory meant that Christ "by divine appointment, and of his own free will, assumed our law-place, binding himself to do in our stead all that the law demanded of him when he suffered the penalty due us, and rendered the obedience upon which our well-being was made to depend." The vicarious nature of Christ's sufferings and obedience consists in the fact that they were rendered "in our place or stead (vice), as well as in our behalf by our substitute" (A. A. Hodge, Op. Cit., p. 39).

Expiation has to do with sin. It removes its reatus or guilt. By reatus is meant the obligation to suffer the penalty inevitably due to sin. The other aspect of sin, its pollution, is removed through the process of sanctification. By propitiation God's judicial displeasure is done away. "Propitiation, as a theological term, means that peculiar method of rendering placable which affects the heart of a deity, who at the same time hates the sin and is determined to punish it, yet loves the sinner; and which proceeds by means of expiation, or the vicarious suffering of the penalty by a substituted victim."

In connection with the controversy concerning a "limited" atonement, a distinction was made between impetration and application. By impetration was meant

"the purchase, or meritorious procurement by sacrifice, of all of those objective conditions of salvation which are offered to all men in the gospel; that is, salvation made available on the condition of faith." By application was meant " the actual application of that salvation to individuals upon faith." The former was held to be general and indefinite; the latter was believed to be personal, definite, and limited to believers (A. A. Hodge, Op. Cit., p. 40).

The meaning of redemption is "deliverance from loss or from ruin by the payment for us of a ransom by our Substitute. Hence it may signify the act of our Substitute in paying that ransom. Or it may be used to express the completed deliverance itself, the consummation of which is of course future" (A. A. Hodge, Op. Cit., p.42).

Active obedience and passive obedience are English phrases corresponding to Aquinas' Latin terms, meritum and satisfactio, the meanings of which have already been explained. Active obedience is Christ's fulfilment of the precepts of God's law which brings eternal life and felicity; passive obedience is his suffering the penalty due to man for his sins which enables God to remit human penalties. Both of these aspects of Christ's work are embraced under the term, "satisfaction," as comprehensively defined previously.

In his The Cross of Christ, D. M. Ross gives this

excellent summary of the chief elements in the different statements of the Forensic theory:

"Men are by nature, so the theory takes its starting point, in an estate of sin and misery. They are in bondage to sin, a bondage which, if it persists, can have no other issue than eternal suffering. But God in his pity and love has purposed to intervene for their deliverance from this bondage and to make them meet for a life of eternal blessedness in heaven.

"God, however, is confronted with an obstacle which must be got out of the way before his purpose of love can be carried out.

"God has decreed and made known that every violation of the laws he has prescribed for man in the conduct of his life will be followed (or punished) by certain painful consequences here and hereafter. If God is to be true to his character as a righteous Lawgiver and Judge and to safeguard the moral interests of the universe of which he is the Governor, these consequences of sin must first be adequately dealt with if God is to be free to carry out his purpose to deliver sinners from their bondage of sin. How to adjust his loving purpose with what is demanded of him as a righteous Judge--this is what has been described as 'the problem for God.'

"Sinful man cannot pay the penalties due to his sin, for eternity is needed for their payment. He may in this

life pay part of these penalties, but not the major part, eternal suffering in the future life. So long as this major part of the penalties is unpaid, there is no hope of his deliverance from the bondage of sin, and of the renewed life which is to make him meet for heaven.

"Some other than sinful man himself must be found to endure in his room this major part of the penalties of sin. This other is the eternal Son of God. He becomes man that, partaker of human nature, he may endure for all men, or at least for such as will be eventually saved, the penal consequences of their sin; if not precisely these very consequences, at least their equivalent in intensity. If it be asked how One man in the course of his finite life could endure the eternal sufferings of so vast a number of individuals, the answer is that as this One man is God as well as man his sufferings have an infinite value.

"God is now free, as he was not before, to carry out his purpose of love for sinners in consistency with his character as a righteous Judge, but on certain conditions being fulfilled by sinners. God demands that they on their part take up an appropriate attitude towards what Christ has thus done on their behalf. Faith is the usual word for this appropriate attitude. Such faith involves a belief that Christ has so borne the penalties due to sin that God can justly remit them. Repentance is usually regarded as a necessary concomitant of faith,

but the prominence is given to faith, in order to bar out the intrusion of the idea that repentance merits the remission of sin's penalties. Further, to indicate that faith is no mere intellectual assent to a doctrine about the work of Christ, it is often added that faith involves fiducia, that is, trust in the love of God which has devised the gracious means whereby the penalties of sin may be remitted in consistency with the divine justice.

"Faith which secures the remission of sin's penalties is only the beginning of God's gracious work with the sinner. It is fruitful in results. God becomes reconciled to the sinner, receives him into his favor, bestows upon him the gift of the Spirit through whose working he is renewed in his inmost nature, lives henceforth in fellowship with God as a son with his Father and is made more and more meet for the life of eternal blessedness."

D. M. Ross, The Cross of Christ, p. 183 ff.

II. THE POINT OF VIEW.

The socio-psychological should be clearly distinguished from the philosophical and theological points of view. The effort is to understand and appreciate the mental processes involved by relating religion to the total life of the group and individual. As Woodburne says, "The interest is not that of trying to establish absolute truth or falsity with reference to the different forms and

beliefs, but seeking to understand what need was satisfied, what motive released, what tension relieved, what interest served, or what emotion expressed. Religious practices and ideas can be neither understood nor explained apart from the mental and social complex in which they emerge and to which they minister."

A. S. Woodburne, The Religious Attitude, p. 14.

A. IN THE STUDY OF THEOLOGY.

Modern psychology sees the human mind as a function. The socio-psychological approach to religion emphasizes its functional value for the group and the individual. As a rationalization of religion, theology is also functional in character. "A theology is a function of the religious life of a given period!" By function is

Shailer Mathews, The Atonement and the Social Process, p. 11.

meant "the part that any organ or process has in maintaining, reproducing, or improving the life of any individual or group to which an individual belongs." Hence the social and religious experience of a group must be studied in order to understand the values rationalized in its theology.

A creative theologian explains the religious faith of the group by means of a social pattern which has become a universal presupposition of action and thought. The process is described by Professor Case. "The language and imagery employed by society to interpret its prevailing

economic, political, social and cultural attainments and outreach pass over into religion to become the standard means used by the theologian in his effort to interpret the values of religion for himself and his contemporaries."

Miles H. Krumbine, Ed., *The Process of Religion*, p. 68.

It is necessary to distinguish carefully between an analogy and a pattern. An analogy takes the form of stating a sort of proportion. For example: As a subject is to a king, so is man to God. But the interpreter is not content with conscious analogy, and descriptions are regarded as elements in the religious concepts themselves. "That is to say, they (are) patterns rather than metaphors. For a pattern is a social institution or practice used to give content and intelligibility to otherwise unrationalized beliefs. What the axiom is to mathematics, a pattern is to thought. Later criticism may discover the analogical character of the pattern, but as long as it brings intellectual serenity and allays intellectual obscurity a pattern is regarded as fact rather than as metaphor. As such it forms a distinct element in the total conception which expresses religious fact or an element of faith" (Shailer Mathews, Op. Cit. pp.30 ff.).

When there is conflict between old and new ways of looking at things, a feeling of strain is prominent. The theological reformer overcomes this tension by restating the religious fact and conserving the religious

value in terms of the new social pattern. It is unconsciously accepted on account of its supposed intrinsic truth, its practical value, or because it is a generalized form of a habit of thought which nobody questions. Thus the cause of the difficulty becomes the means by which it is overcome.

The only way in which religious values can be conserved is through the development of concepts based upon a social pattern which has become a universal presupposition of thought. Therefore the culture of a particular era tends to channelize its theology. Every culture has its own particular presuppositions of thought, and discourages other forms of thinking. It has certain grooves within which it moves, and to get out of the rut requires great daring, or a change in the culture patterns themselves.

But if culture tends to channelize theological thinking, theology also tends to channelize the thought of its time. The temptation is to shove new insights into traditional forms, impeding the spontaneity and the quick running of ideas. At their best, inherited concepts give a formal justification or rationalization of conclusions otherwise arrived at.

As a part of the cultural tradition, theology may limit and frustrate the social wishes of mankind. In channelizing thought, it may seriously limit social wish goals. Because changes in religious concepts may

be the cause, as well as the effect, of changes in other aspects of social life, they may react upon social experience in such a way as to satisfy or frustrate human desires, and promote or stunt the growth of personality.

B. IN THE STUDY OF THE ATONEMENT DOGMA.

In the socio-psychological study of the atonement dogma, an attempt is made to distinguish and describe those elements of Christian experience which lie behind the conviction of reconciliation. It is obvious that no two individuals have exactly the same sense of union with the divine. Their experiences must vary according to their individual mentality, and their particular psychical state at a given time and place under particular circumstances. Also important are the ideas which the individual carries with him into his experience of rapport with God. These not only color his interpretation, but actually condition his experience. If there are varieties of religious experience, the religious experience of at-one-ment must include considerable difference of content.

In a fine book Professor H. R. Mackintosh seeks to describe the experiential basis of the Christian conviction that "the death of Christ is the revelation of the moral unity of the love and law of God." He is justified in speaking of the Christian experience of forgiveness, for the distinctive ideas of the faith make

it certain that the experience of the Christian is not like that of the devotees of any other religion. Describing the forgiveness of God, he writes: "It signifies that despite this sin against which his indignation flames, as it must if the world's pillars are not to be based on rottenness, the Father takes the amazing step of receiving sinful men into his life of friendship, that within that life there may be actualized in them his purpose of a loving brotherhood. To the man who asks: 'Can I be cleansed? Must I forever bear this load? Can there be no piercing of this alienating barrier between God and me?' an answer comes and makes itself credible: 'I am thy salvation; only believe.' "

H. R. Mackintosh, The Christian Experience of Forgiveness, p. 33.

It is to express this Christian experience of forgiveness that the dogma of the atonement has arisen. In the Christian sense, atonement means "the relation of the suffering and death of Jesus Christ to human salvation, and, in particular, to the forgiveness of sins." This dogma has served to safeguard and foster the experience of forgiveness from God through Jesus Christ his Son. It has fulfilled this function by revealing the divine love and making clear that God forgives the sinner without tolerating his sin.

C. IN THE STUDY OF THE FORENSIC THEORY.

The different theories of the procuring cause of forgiveness were necessary, at the time, that the dogma might continue to serve the faith. To quote Dean Mathews again: "But when one thinks of forgiveness he at once recalls preconditions of forgiveness in social practice. Not only that, but he begins to query whether those preconditions have been met in the forgiveness of God which he enjoys. Unless they have been met, such forgiveness must appear morally unjustifiable" (Op. Cit., p. 166). The different theories arose, then, because of changing social conditions which suggested different objections to divine forgiveness.

The aspect of Christian experience underlying all the theories of atonement is that of moral responsibility. Man is not an automaton completely governed in his actions by physical and chemical laws. Nor is he bound by external fate to take a rigidly determined course. The essential fact about a human being is that he is free, and capable of rational choice. He has moral responsibility to Almighty God for his life and deeds. The consciousness of his moral responsibility on the part of the natural man (the presupposition of the whole structure of the institutions and practices of civilization) is heightened in the Christian consciousness. To the Christian, freedom is a God-given gift, and hence "man's chief end is to glorify God" through obeying his word

and will.

Any theory of the atonement depends upon the interpretation of moral responsibility. If, due to the influence of contemporary social practices, the law of God is conceived as a set of mechanically rigid decrees enforced by inevitable penalties, the theory which is formed as a result of such presuppositions will be legalistic. The forensic character of a satisfactory theory of the atonement is inevitable.

III. THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION.

The importance of our problem is enhanced by the persisting strength of the Forensic theory. Up until a generation ago it was emphasized in evangelical circles, in teaching and preaching, as the central article of the creed. In pulpit, Sunday school, Y. M. C. A. classes, tracts and other literature, it was a leading theme. A main line of approach in evangelistic effort, individual and organized, it was taught to children with all the force of parental approval. The whole Bible was interpreted from the standpoint of Christ's death. The atonement was emphasized in the missionary enterprise and furnished a large portion of the dynamic for the great expansion of this movement. Even today we find that the theory is far from having lost its power. Five hundred ministers were asked: "Do you believe that Jesus' death

on the Cross was the one act which made possible the remission of man's sins?" Seventy per cent reported in the affirmative, six per cent were uncertain, and only twenty-four per cent answered in the negative.

George H. Betts, The Beliefs of 700 Ministers, p. 28.

A post-graduate student of theology said to the writer in private conversation: "I may be old-fashioned, but I still hold to the substitutionary theory of the atonement."

A. THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

We are to limit our study of the Forensic theory, in its psychological aspects, to the development in the Protestant churches of the evangelical type, in Europe and America (during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries particularly) where it has remained as a survival down to the present time. We shall not be concerned with the philosophical or theological validity of the theory, and we shall pay only passing attention to the various statements of it by the theologians and in the several creeds. Nor shall we seek to describe the religious experience underlying all theories of the atonement. It is the special situation, factors and forces of the social environment which explain the differentia of the Forensic theory that form the subject of study. We seek to show how, given the universal Christian experience of the Cross and the historical situation of the Reformation era, this theory was as necessary and reasonable as it seems

unnecessary and unreasonable to many today.

B. THE PROCEDURE USED.

Historians of dogma have not neglected the study of the Forensic theory from the analytic point of view. There are numerous books which regard it as an object and seek to analyze the whole into its different parts, and examine them carefully. They ask how it is constituted, how it is to be recognized; that is, what are its characteristics? They seek to classify it along with the other theories. This procedure ~~doctrine~~ has value, but it cannot explain its rise, spread and persistence. In contrast with it is the socio-psychological approach. Since the aim becomes to find out what happens when the conditions are changed without change of its basic character, a theological theory is treated not as an object, but as an event which persists throughout time. We ask concerning this event: How are we to explain it? Why did it occur? What effects did it produce? The effort is to see religion and theology as a part of the social history of the people who formed and hold it.

In order to prepare oneself for the socio-psychological approach, it is necessary to have a working knowledge of the history of civilization viewed as adjustment,-the attempt which man has made to make himself at home in the world. In particular, a knowledge of the religion and theology, in relation to the contemporary

social experience and evolution, is needed. One must use his imagination, if he would understand the thinking of the theologians. Only so is there realization of the validity and power of the presuppositions and analogies used. It may be difficult to enter into the spirit and atmosphere of this by-gone age, but a sincere attempt must be made to understand its interests and motives.

In the socio-psychological approach, overt behavior should be studied to the fullest possible extent, although this must always be supplemented by cautious introspective deduction. One must employ the historical method, and interpret findings in the light of concepts derived from social psychology.

The historical method is the use of all kinds and types of cumulative evidence in order to select significant events,--movements with certain tendencies as well as specific activities--, give an accurate description of them, discover the causes and effects involved, and predict future events in terms of the cause-and-effect relationships discovered in past events. It thus furnishes, says Woodburne, "a survey of the way or ways in which human products have functioned and have altered to meet the exigencies of social situations." The historical method gives us data for the work of classification and evaluation.

The other method which must be used is the interpre-

tation of the data provided by the historical investigation in terms of the concepts of social psychology. Fundamental concepts here used are: Personality as the higher organization of attitudes and habits into wishes, which are more or less hidden and ascertained only through indirect evidence; attitudes as traits belonging to a social group, or social environment (if relatively permanent, called cultural), and merely reflected or expressed through individuals; and social interaction or behavior in which the responses may serve as social stimuli or are evoked by social stimuli, between individuals and individuals, individuals and groups, groups and groups, culture traits and culture traits (cultural change).

C. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT.

The use of the historical method and social psychological interpretive concepts discloses two basic factors in the psychological environment of the Reformation theology, including the Forensic theory as an integral part. These are the form of social organization, and the traditional ideology. Any adequate interpretation must begin with a thorough understanding of these background factors which influenced thought about the meaning of Christ's death so greatly.

I. THE CONDITIONING OF THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION.

In the bewildering confusion of human activity two main types of human groups are distinguishable. These are best characterized by the integrative process used.

Individuals become a group through pressure, and this is of two kinds: pressure from within and pressure from without. Accordingly, a group may be impulsive or compulsive in type. While purity of type is never found, either impulsion or compulsion is predominant in any actual group.

The compulsive group differs in its psychology from the impulsive group. The psychology of compulsion divides into two sub-types: the matriarchal and the patriarchal. The matriarchal group is patterned after the mother-integrated family: the mother compels uniform emotional activity through her emotional pressure. The patriarchal group is patterned after the father-integrated family: the father compels uniform volitional activity through his volitional pressure. As the integrative process necessarily conditions the self the psychology of the matriarchal group is emotionally conditioned, and that of the patriarchal group is volitionally conditioned.

When the individual is dominantly volitionally integrated, he perceives the group self with dominant volitional conditioning. The supersession of constant warfare among primitive tribes by gradually emerging order suggests that the volitionally conditioned group percept follows the emotionally conditioned one. In other words, the patriarchal type follows the matriarchal one. In the evolutionary advance a matriarchal society suffers from the withdrawal of patriarchal groups.

Just as a matriarchal percept of the group self is succeeded by a patriarchal percept, so a maternalistic percept of the cosmic self is succeeded by a paternalistic one. God is perceived no longer as dominantly emotionally, but dominantly volitionally conditioned. The volitional activity of God,-his manifested glory, as expressed in his sovereignty, predestination, foreordination, election, and limited atonement,- becomes the fundamental factor in the percept of God. Such a percept subordinates the emotional activity of the deity to his volitional activity. The sturdiness of the sixteenth century Reformation God became, when fully developed, the sternness of the seventeenth century deity. The more dominant the volitional activity, the more suppressed the emotional activity of the cosmic self.

When the perceiving self is dominantly conditioned by volitional activity, its percept of the individual is masculine in nature. A masculine self is conditioned more by its volitions than its emotions. Men are dominantly masculine, as women are dominantly feminine in nature. The masculine percept of the individual self makes for masculine or activist personalities as the feminine percept makes for feminine or quietistic personalities. In patriarchal groups we find a paternalistic religion, and the masculine type of personality. Such a personality is more volitionally than emotionally conditioned,

more apt to be disloyal and unsubmitive, and comparatively difficult to keep under the sway of its leadership. The extremely masculine personality is essentially anti-social, and is commonly called egotistic or individualistic.

Percepts are made in the image of the perceiving self. This statement holds for percepts of the group, the cosmic and the individual selves. All percepts of a compulsive group, then, fall into two great classes corresponding to the two kinds of self-integration. Percepts are dominantly either emotionally or volitionally conditioned; hence the experience and concepts based upon them are dominantly either emotionally or volitionally conditioned. The patriarchal form of social organization of the Reformation period ensured a volitionally conditioned psychology. The deity was seen as a Father-God who rules by compulsion, and the religious individual as the one who renders perfect obedience.

2. THE CONDITIONING OF THE TRADITIONAL IDEOLOGY.

The other conditioning factor is the psychological ideology of the inherited tradition. Scholars were dominated by the animistic conception which postulates a mental cause for physical effects--"activity in things is due to the presence of a spirit which functions as a carrier of motives." They were also under the influence of the Platonic conception which affirms that the philo-

sophical universal is the real, while the concrete particular has no reality except as an illustration in time of an eternal essence or substance. These conceptions led the Reformers, in common with other thinkers of their age and the popular mind of every age (compare the way in which magazine writers use the word "instinct"), to assume a mind or soul, and posit for it faculties, or capacities to carry out certain activities. Inhering in the mind as the qualities inhere in the essence of a thing, the faculties are objective forces within the individual.

The Reformed theologians held to a generic human nature. They believed that man is no mere individual or isolated unity, but a race--a connected, coherent, organic unity. Individual human natures proceed in a series from the genus, human nature. While the individual is local and particular, human nature in the generic sense is universal. Since the universal must exist before the particular, human nature must precede the human being, and so man should be interpreted in terms of mankind rather than mankind in terms of a single man. The race is a unity in character, and any change in individual human beings must be made by changing human nature as a whole. Thus was the general idea of human nature hypostasized into an energetic thing, made the basis of all concrete human nature, and the study of actual human experience despised.

In their repudiation of the work-salvation of the Roman church, the Reformers held that the will of man is enslaved in religious matters. They naturally fell back upon the psychology of Augustine. That great theologian derived much of his soul doctrine from the later Platonists. He made the soul independent but closely related to the body. In his view the soul is created at the same time as the body, and controls man's acts in every way. It is present in all life processes and in all parts of the body, but especially in the brain. The brain receives impressions from the senses and sends out motor impulses to muscles elsewhere. The resulting movements are not spontaneous as in reflex acts, but closely directed by the soul. Augustine recognizes Aristotle's common sense as mediator between the separate senses and the soul, since it makes the preliminary coordination of the sense data.

The most important feature of Augustine's psychology is his emphasis upon the will. In it he found the supremacy among the different faculties of the soul. He held that imagination is intermediate in function between the memory and reason. Imagination uses the materials of sense retained by the memory, but has certain of the independent capacities of reason. The faculties are regarded as partially independent capacities, probably under a human analogy. Each one of them stands to the others as one man in a partnership, with a partially independent voice, but



bound by the final decisions of the whole group. While each of the faculties is a part of the unitary soul, it has considerable independence. The supremacy of the will among the faculties is seen in attention. The will selects from among the objects offered by the senses a few to become conscious, and in determining stimuli determines the action of the individual.

The Reformed theologians lived long before the theory of evolution was applied to the origin of man. They never conceived of a time when human nature had not yet emerged. If human nature had always existed since the completion of creation, what was it like before the changes of history began? This basic question may be divided into three: How were generic and individual human nature related at the beginning? What was the condition of the human will at the beginning? How was it possible to perpetuate the original state of human nature? The answers given to these questions are exceedingly important for an understanding of the seeming reasonableness of the Forensic theory.

The answer to the first of these questions is that in Adam we have generic and individual human nature united. He embodied not only generic human nature, but the first link in the chain which connects individual human nature with the original essence which forms its source. This view is not to be confounded with the Realistic theory of individuals as co-agents with the first man possessed

of generic human nature. All individuals were not present in Adam: only the first of the series emanating from him was present along with generic human nature. The only sense in which the individuals following Adam can be said to be in him is that they are bound to him by ordinary generation. And generic human nature is more than the source of individual human nature: the former also conditions the latter.

The answer to the question concerning the original condition of the will is that it was at first in a state of unstable equilibrium. It might choose one or the other of alternative courses of action. As the strategic faculty of the mind, the will must receive fixation to guarantee the permanence of the original state of human nature. If this were not done the will might choose its present course on one day, and change to another on the following day. The generic human nature of Adam must be made permanent in order to give consistency to his individual human nature. Since a change of will means a change of nature, permanence of nature calls for a way of fixing the will in the original way of life. There must be continuity in the functioning of the determiner of human action.

To overcome the formlessness of behavior which negates the permanence of the original human state, there must be a decisive act which fixes the will, introduces

continuity and consistency into its choices, and makes for similar action in similar circumstances. In other words, there must be a confirmation of the original condition by means of self-determination. Whether the original state of bliss is to continue unchanged depends upon Adam's action while on probation. A single momentous choice will confirm or overthrow the original human nature with which he was endowed at creation. Through probationary choice and in no other way can he gain escape from contradictory action, and attain to permanence of life. If the will is king of the faculties, it must act once for all time for the attainment of harmony among them.

Any view of the constitution and original state of human nature determines the view of how changes are to be affected in it. How did the generic human nature in Adam affect individual human nature in him and his descendants? How did the change which generic human nature underwent in Jesus Christ affect him as an individual and those spiritually descended from him? To answer these questions, we must discuss the necessity of changing generic before individual human nature, the basis of the connection of generic with individual human nature, and finally how individual human nature is transformed. We shall do this with the problem of the Forensic theory always in mind.

Under the psychology held by the Reformed theologians,

there was but one way in which to change the nature of the individual human being. This was by changing the generic human nature which originated and conditioned it. There was no way to act directly upon individual human nature. But how was individual human nature to be changed indirectly through a change in generic human nature, that is, what would a change in generic human nature involve? The permanent sinful state of the generic human nature incurred through Adam's sinful act must be counteracted by another act of will as decisive as his, opposite in character, which would dissolve the corrupted state and make permanent a righteous and holy state of that nature. Christ must take on humanity, live under the law, and by the decisive act of his death on the Cross undo the work of Adam. From the generic human nature transformed by him comes the transformed individual nature of believers.

As a basis for the impartation of the transformed human nature to the individual, the Reformed theologians held to the physical bond of unity of blood among all men. This made possible the investment of the individual with the transformed generic human nature. Physical oneness with Adam was the necessary connection for the transmission of sinful generic nature. Physical oneness with Jesus Christ through his incarnation made possible the transformation of individual nature through him. Physical

heredity is the carrier of the generic human nature to the single individual. The connection in each case is not personal but intrinsic, because consequent upon existence. The will of the individual does not need to consent to form the relationship, for that relationship is automatically constituted at birth, or before birth.

Generic human nature is changed by a decisive act of will, and there is a physical connection between the man with the generic human nature and the individual. What are the means by which the transformed generic human nature actually becomes that of the individual? The answer to this question is: by infusion of the transformed generic nature, which brings a new will and consequent new life. The transformed generic nature is infused in believers through faith; it gives them a new will of obedience in place of the old rebellious will, and produces a new life of righteousness in contrast with the old life of sin. Such is the effect of the work for which Christ was born of a woman, and died upon the Cross of Calvary.

CHAPTER I

THE GROUP EXPERIENCE OF NORTHERN EUROPE

I. The Suppression of Patriarchal Experience.

- A. The Paternalistic Nationalism.
- B. The Father-deity Religion.
- C. The Masculine Individuality.

II. The Conflict Between Northern and Southern Europe.

- A. The Political Conflict.
- B. The Religious Conflict.
- C. The Personal Conflict.

III. The Resurgence of Northern Culture.

- A. The Monarchical State.
- B. The Father-God.
- C. The Volitional Individual.

PART I

THE SOCIAL CONDITIONING

CHAPTER I

THE GROUP EXPERIENCE OF NORTHERN EUROPE

In his Social Substance of Religion, Gerald Heard presents strong arguments for the priority of matriarchal over patriarchal culture in the evolution of society. This principle throws light upon the history of European culture. The north of Europe was pushed on by a stern struggle for survival with a hostile nature, and reached the more advanced stage of patriarchal culture before the societies of the south (1). When southern matriarchal culture was spread over Europe by the power of the sword, it did not destroy patriarchalism. The northern culture was simply overlaid for a time. As soon as conditions allowed, the north revolted against the alien civilization and exalted its own. The deeper significance of the sixteenth century Reformation lies in this resurgence of patriarchal group experience in northern Europe.

I. THE SUPPRESSION OF PATRIARCHAL EXPERIENCE.

The aim of the Roman empire--universal temporal dominion--was achieved to a large extent. Most of the countries of the continent of Europe came under the sway of Rome, and were subjected to her influence for a period of centuries. The subjection of the northern nations was at the cost of their traditional paternalistic form of government. While the kings and princes might be allowed

to retain their titles and possess considerable control of internal affairs, the prestige and power of the far-flung empire guaranteed that the seat of sovereignty should be in the southern capital. The paternalistic nationalism of the north was compelled to yield to the maternalistic universalism of the south in the political sphere.

Along with paternalistic nationalism the north of Europe was the home of father-deity religion. Even a slight acquaintance with the old Teutonic religions will suffice to show their father-type character. Now, in taking over the functions of the Roman empire, the Christian church developed a mother-deity interpretation of Christianity. So the influence of the south was in the direction of mother-deity religion as well as maternalistic government. The old conception of deity, exemplified in the characteristics of such gods as Thor and Wodin, was suppressed in favor of a deity symbolized by the piteous compassion of the Virgin Mary.

Further, the northerner found his masculine individuality taken away. The lingering spell of the old Roman empire, the need for some central power to prevent social chaos, the susceptibility of the ignorant and suggestible plain man to the influence of the crowd, the rich tradition embracing a world-view and code of conduct as well as a religious faith--all these factors combined to foster the feminine individuality developed by

the southern matriarchal culture.

II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN EUROPE.

Increasingly concerned for their rights and powers, the rulers of the various countries and provinces began to dispute seriously the exercise of temporal power by the pope after the thirteenth century. Modern historical scholars lay great emphasis upon the political aspects of the situation during this period. Professor C. J. H. Hayes holds that the Reformation was "merely an accentuation of the conflict which had long been increasing in virulence between the spiritual and temporal authorities" (Political and Social History of Europe, p. 124). Social disorder strengthened the demand for the former paternalistic nationalism as the ambitious maternalistic universalism broke down almost completely (2).

Along with growing opposition from the kings and princes went the efforts of those who sought to reexpress Christianity in terms of father-deity religion. The mother-worship of the Middle Ages was distasteful to the north of Europe. As "the religion of southern Europe," the Roman Catholic church might be the natural expression of the essentially matriarchal Mediterranean societies, but it was ill-suited to northern needs. The north had no more use for mother-deity Christianity than for maternalism in government. In spite of excommunication and persecution the religious controversy grew ever more heated.

Instead of submitting any longer to the suppression of their masculine individuality, men began to speak out on its behalf. The naturally decisive people of the north resented the weak-kneed attitude of the southerner. The more self-conscious they became, the more intolerable the situation seemed to them. Exasperation and anger increased greatly as the masses came to long for volitional power (3).

III. THE RESURGENCE OF NORTHERN CULTURE.

In the Reformation we have the resurgence of the suppressed patriarchal culture of the northern peoples. Paternalistic nationalism took the form of the monarchical state, since opportunity for commercial development and peaceful progress could be best provided for in a political unit neither too large nor too small for social efficiency. With the emperor as universal sovereign dead, the temporal power of the papacy repudiated, the feudal system crumbled, the power of the king grew in every country. "The sovereignty of the state," declares G. W. Clark, "was becoming more and more the key to the general organization of Europe. Energies which had previously been controlled from a variety of centers...were becoming polarized about the state."

The Seventeenth Century, p. 124.

In religion a mother-deity interpretation of Christianity was replaced by a father-deity one. The mother-God, the Virgin Mary, had to give way to the Father-God,

Jehovah of battles. The Father-God enforces a morality beneficial for all. The patria potestas places men under martial law; the Father-God compels obedience. He has a sacrificial Son, and his Son helps men fulfil the Law. If they live as good citizens, the Father-God rewards them after death; if as bad citizens, he punishes them.

Gerald Heard, Social Substance of Religion, p. 282.

Against the feminine individuality of the south came the resurgence of masculine individuality. Appearing first at the top, this took the form of a new inquiry into presuppositions. It then penetrated deeper, and becoming truly revolutionary, vented itself in economic pillage. Referring undoubtedly to the volitional type, Bishop Westcott speaks of the Reformation as the "affirmation of individuality."

The Reformation was a tremendous cultural conflict. J. H. P. Belloc asserts: "What we call the 'Reformation' was essentially the reaction of the barbaric, ill-tutored, and the isolated places external to the old and deep-rooted Roman civilization against the influences of that civilization." More accurately, the Reformation was the resurgence of an overlaid patriarchalism which marked a more advanced stage of cultural evolution.

NOTES

(1) Some writers have thought to find racial differences between the peoples of the north and the south of Europe. It is now widely believed, however, that many so-called racial traits are not biological. Harry Elmer Barnes writes on this point:

"Though there is no historic basis for the exaggerated claims for Nordic ascendancy in civilization which have been made by certain modern writers, the Nordics have played a creditable part in the political, economic, and cultural evolution of western European society.... But undoubtedly the most important fact about the racial basis of the history of modern times has been the fact that racial admixture had progressed so far by the end of the Middle Ages as to make quite ridiculous any racial interpretation of either western European culture as a whole or of the culture of any important European state" (An Introduction to Sociology, p.110).

(2) The necessity for a new social order is briefly stated in The Cambridge Modern History, III, p. 737:

"The passion for unity in the medieval mind only expressed the fact that this unity was so seldom realized. Even before and apart from the Reformation, the widespread sense of the appalling evils of disorder and the supreme necessity of social peace proved the most efficacious support to the growth of national despotism."

(3) In his authoritative Folkways, Professor William Graham Sumner writes:

"The ultimate reasons for the mother family and for a change to the father family are in the life conditions, industrial arts, war, pressure of population, etc. In fact, our terms are only names for a group of mores which cover some set of interests.... By the mother family we mean the system in which descent and kin are reckoned through women, not through men.... Religion, political control, modes of warfare and alliance, and education are all constructed to fit the family-form.... All this grows up as a part of the folkways, instinctively, without plan or guidance of intelligent control.... We meet with

many variations of it in transitional forms, or in combination with later institutions, but they belong to the time when this arrangement is breaking down, and passing into the father family. The mother family system is definite and complete when flourishing and normal (p. 354).

"It may well be believed that the change from the mother family to the father family is the greatest and most revolutionary in the history of civilization.... When the life conditions so changed that it became possible, the father family displaced the mother family. All the folkways followed the change. Family arrangements, kin, industry, war, political organization, property rights must all conform to the change (p. 355).

"In the mores of any form of the family the ideas of rights, and of right and wrong, will conform to the theory of the institution, and they may offer us notions of moral things which are radically divergent or antagonistic" (p. 356).

CHAPTER II

THE AD HOC ASPECT OF THE REFORMATION RELIGION

- I. The Similarity of Political and Religious Experience.
 - A. The Common Element of Universality.
 - B. The Common Element of a Powerful Sentiment.
 - C. The Common Element of Self-Sacrifice.
- II. The Practical Values of the Monarchy.
 - A. The Value of Social Security.
 - B. The Value of National Symbolism.
 - C. The Value of Political Efficiency.
- III. The Preoccupation With Political Problems.
 - A. The Pressure of Revolutionary Events.
 - B. The Supreme Problem of Authority.
 - C. The Theory of Divine-Right Monarchy.

CHAPTER II

THE AD HOC ASPECT OF THE REFORMATION RELIGION

Christian theology has always assumed that political experience may well be used to show the reasonableness of religious convictions. "Speaking generally," writes Dean Shailer Mathews, "orthodox theology is the use of political experience to set forth the reasonableness of Christian confidence in salvation. It is, in fact, transcendentalized politics" (Op. Cit., p. 33). St. Paul pictured the kingdom of God in terms of the Jewish kingdom, and Augustine pictured the City of God in terms of the Roman Empire. When they "conceived of God as a king, and his relations with men as subject to conditions identical with those found in the new states" (Shailer Mathews, Op. Cit., p. 19) the Reformers were simply using the creative social pattern of their day, and following the traditional procedure of Christian theology.

I. THE SIMILARITY OF POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.

~~A. THE COMMON ELEMENT OF UNIVERSALITY.~~

Political experience is a natural realm from which to draw patterns for theology, for it is a universal kind of experience. Everyone lives under some government or other. Imagery drawn from the state is intelligible and persuasive to the humblest individual. No one can disregard the government, or fail to be interested in it, and concerned about it. All recognize that it conditions

them in countless ways for better or for worse. A man's political experience may seem to him good or bad, but he must have decided opinions about it. Because political experience is universal, a pattern drawn from it is bound to be vivid, significant, and forceful for all. Hence theologians have found it easiest to rationalize Christian experience by means of concepts developed from the imagery of political patterns.

Political experience develops a patriotic sentiment which is much like the religious sentiment. The patriotic sentiment exalts the idea of one's country as sacred, virtuous, and glorious. Like the religious sentiment it is marked by awe, which develops through wonder to reverence, fascination, and love. The primary element in the core around which the emotions become organized is the geographical territory occupied by the political unit. Then come the people in it with whom a bond is felt, and there is a cultural tradition to which affections cling. Shared experiences, especially crises, intensify the patriotic sentiment and bring the people of a nation together. The patriot loves his country as the religious devotee his god, and hates national enemies with all the resentment of the orthodox against the heretical.

The conviction that the state sustains and promotes the highest social good draws out the utmost devotion of the patriot. He is glad to submit to an authority unquestionably powerful beyond his power to dispute, and

to make sacrifices for it. He loses himself in the common cause, and in thus losing his life he finds great satisfaction. He feels that he is sharing in the glory of his country, in the power manifest in her achievements, in the benevolence to be seen in her good deeds. Along with this sense of sharing is stimulation of his ego feeling. He comes to believe that he is specially favored by God, who has chosen his nation for great things. The expression, "God's country," suggests predestination and election. It is not surprising that the theologians have seen no incongruity in turning to political experience for imagery and concepts, for this often exemplifies the sublime selflessness of utter devotion and obedience to something outside of and far greater than oneself.

II. THE PRACTICAL VALUES OF THE MONARCHY.

The foremost of the values is that of security. There was no hope of justice through the old papal system, for it was too weak to enforce order and too unscrupulous to refrain from tyranny and exploitation. Nor were the feudalistic nobles to be counted on, for their selfish quarrels among themselves kept political conditions virtually in a state of anarchy. In neither of these directions was there any likelihood of freedom and progress. The monarchical state was the best hope of the people for security from foes without and within. It was the one means available for the achievement of sovereignty, that is, freedom for self-development and progress with-

out artificial hindrances. The common people rallied around the king, for he promised the greatest efficiency in securing order and the means of ~~prosperity~~ *prosperity*.

Another value associated with monarchy grew out of its symbolization of the growing national consciousness. The fusion of races had caused the artificial universalism of the Empire to dissolve, and the merely local feeling of feudalism to give way. The rise of the vernacular literature, the rise of the middle class through their commercial enterprise, and other causes had combined to promote this growing consciousness. The increasing power of the king enabled him to become a symbol of national unity, and won for him the support of the more and more wealthy middle class "so long as the concentration of power did not prove inconsistent with their growing freedom." With the king as the symbol of

H. E. Barnes, The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences, p. 342.

national unity, the monarchy took on great value. All the devotion and altruism of the patriotic sentiment became bound up with the monarchical national state.

The monarchical state took on further value because it was the necessary step toward the constitutional government of today. This was true, not only because it established complete independence of external control, and exercised supremacy over civil and feudal authorities within its own bounds, but also because it unified the

peoples of similar language and customs. In a word, "the work of monarchy in the seventeenth century may be described as the substitution of a simpler and more unified government for the complexities of feudalism."

G. N. Clark, The Seventeenth Century, p. 91.

This was a real advance in the evolution toward political liberty and progress. Because the state waxed strong, it took over many former church functions as well as much of the church's property. In addition to social and educational work the Prince must maintain true religion, extinguish heresy, punish the evil doer, and reward him that did well. Its efficiency enabled the monarchy to fulfill both the old and new functions of the state so as to enhance its value in the eyes of the people.

III. THE PREOCCUPATION WITH POLITICAL PROBLEMS.

The events of the times made a political mind-set inevitable. Political forces played such a large part in the Reformation that Professor James Harvey Robinson, an American historical scholar, thinks the great movement was primarily political. ~~Another writer believes that the Reformation was "merely an accentuation of the conflict which had long been increasing in virulence between the spiritual and temporal authorities."~~ Protestan-

~~C. J. H. Hayes, Political and Social History of Europe, p. 124.~~

tism certainly tended to become stamped with "political features which arose, not from Christianity, but from

ancient national and individual liberties; and the course and forms of Protestantism were largely determined by varying political and economic facts."

The great problem of politics was that of establishing and maintaining order, the condition of peace so much needed for prosperity and progress. The practical question was that of securing a profound recognition of obedience to authority. Two aspects of political thought during the sixteenth century stand out: the exaltation of the divine-right monarch as against the divinely supported papacy; and the setting of the king over against the heritage of feudal custom and power. As one writer puts

J. H. Randall, The Making of the Modern Mind, p. 178.

it: "To transfer the allegiance of the human spirit from clerical authority to civil authority was roughly speaking the effect of the movement of the sixteenth century, alike in Catholic and Protestant countries."

The result of the political preoccupation was the theory of divine-right monarchy. This was founded on the Old Testament. Since Hebrew was widely studied at that time, educated men were familiar with the important institutions and characteristic conceptions of the Hebrews. So, "the despotism of monarchies divinely appointed to be the instruments of God's wrath on earth was accepted as the highest possible form of government; so long as this attitude to the Old Testament was unquestioned, the divine-right theory was a perfectly consistent one and

the doubters were guilty of heresy and sacrilege."

David Ogg, The Seventeenth Century, p. 318.

The clergy associated this theory with true religion and clung to it long after its force had been spent. Any sincere believer, who accepted the king as "over the water," was all the more loyal to him for that reason.

When the nations were fighting for existence, they needed every possible support. It is not surprising that the nationalists seized upon the religious Reformation as a means of establishing and consolidating the authority of the king over that of the bishops and nobles. They transformed the universal church into national churches. The headship of the church gave to the edicts of the kings the sanctity of religion in the eyes of the people, and secured obedience not otherwise obtainable. In short, the North rationalized its revolt by raising an ad hoc religion and theology to sanction the new social structure it had created, and "act as a spiritual policeman in that growing number of cases where simple law could not guard against commercial finesse."

CHAPTER III

THE POLITICAL PRESUPPOSITION OF PROTESTANT THOUGHT

- I. The Idea of Executive Sovereignty.
 - A. The Representative Member.
 - B. The Authoritative Member.
 - C. The Infallible Member.
- II. The Idea of Legislative Sovereignty.
 - A. The King's Command.
 - B. The External Sanctions.
 - C. The Evil Sanctions.
- III. The Idea of Judicial Sovereignty.
 - A. The Strictness of Construction.
 - B. The Retribution of Punishment.
 - C. The Graciousness of Pardon.

CHAPTER III,

THE POLITICAL PRESUPPOSITION OF PROTESTANT THOUGHT

Along with the resurgent monarchical nationalism went a certain conception of sovereignty. A compulsive group must necessarily justify the authority exercised by the super-member in his integrative capacity, and the theory must become explicit and detailed in a patriarchal group. Intelligent grounds for obedience are demanded by those whose psychology is volitionally conditioned. Hence the great questions were: how authority is derived; on what rests the obligation to obey; and in what sense authority is limited. The answers made put new content into the central concept of sovereignty: authority was conceived as statutory, not customary. Monarchical sovereignty became the presupposition of Protestant thought in the patriarchal states.

I. THE IDEA OF EXECUTIVE SOVEREIGNTY.

It is not necessary, in a group integrated through inner impulsion, that sovereignty reside in any member. The integrative power works through the purpose and ideal held by the members in common. But in a group integrated through pressure from without, there is no sovereignty apart from some embodiment in a class of members, or centralized in a single member. And it is just as obvious that the centralized form offers the maximum efficiency

in group integration.

When a member is chosen for investment with the sovereignty of a group, he ceases to be like other members. He automatically becomes its representative, and the concrete symbol of the group. John Austin insists that it is the sovereign super-member who makes the group sovereign, putting it this way: "If a determinate human superior not in a habit of obedience to a like superior, receive habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the society (including the superior) is a society political and independent."

Lectures on Jurisprudence, I. p. 266.

The actual personal superiority of early sovereigns is manifest from the fact that they gained their positions of authority through their physical skill, their foresight, and their ability to win the admiration of the masses.

As the group representative vested with its sovereignty, the super-member is also authoritative. Group integration demands that the authority of the sovereign be absolute. There must be one supreme, inalienable, indivisible, controlling power recognized by all as the court of last resort. Social disorder emphasizes the necessity of group integration for survival, and so "it was natural....that an age which had only just made the discovery of the fact of sovereignty--the necessity, that

is, for any perfect state, of the existence of a power above the law, because able to alter it--should ascribe all the attributes of this authority to the monarch, and should look with an unfriendly eye on all traditions or assemblies which claimed in any way as a matter of right to limit it."

It was inevitable that the sovereign should further be thought of as infallible. The group naturally believes in its ability to meet and solve the problems which confront it. As the authoritative representative of the group, the sovereign focuses upon himself the self-confidence and self-respect of the group. The members cannot easily imagine either the group's or the sovereign's inability. He says and does the right thing. He is infallible because the group is infallible. Such a belief is necessary adaptation for group survival. Intellectual security is as necessary for the mind as physical security for the body. This is found through belief in the infallibility of the sovereign when he acts for the group.

II. THE IDEA OF LEGISLATIVE SOVEREIGNTY.

There must be some way of making the sovereign authority effective in promoting group integration. The function of law-making, therefore, is that of the super-member, and his laws as made are binding. The sovereignty invested in the representative of the group includes the legislative as well as executive power. The demands of

the group in the interest of its integration are made explicit in this way. The sovereign states the requirements of the group from its members. His words express its legislative sovereignty. There can be no sovereignty without statutory law any more than without a super-member possessing authority over the other members.

Since the sovereign is the one in whom the compulsive power resides, law takes on positive character. Positive law is to be distinguished from natural law; it is not a force, but a statute. The sovereign is the law-maker in that he commands, and does not merely explicate principles of eternal validity--the inalienable heritage of man in society. Law has the nature of an expression of will. The sovereign commands with right to obedience, for the sovereign commands for the group. Law proceeds from the superior member and binds the inferior member. Austin held that "every law is a command--the command of a monarch or sovereign to persons in a state of subjection to its authority."

Quoted by Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, p. 193.

It is the sanction which distinguishes a law from a rule. Natural law lays the emphasis upon content, and carries its sanctions within it in the inevitable consequences which follow right- or wrong- doing. Positive law must have external sanctions, for it is not self-enforcing. It is a statutory, not a cosmic energy. If legislative sovereignty is invested in the super-member

of the group, he must attach sanctions to the laws which he promulgates, for in no other way can enforcement be guaranteed. "Law exists only by virtue of a sanction from the state or ultimate political authority." The sovereign must provide two kinds of sanctions for the laws: the good, or freedom for the obedient; the evil, or punishment for the disobedient.

While the good sanctions are taken for granted and not written into the statute, the evil sanctions are made explicit. These remove the disobedient from the freedom and benefits of the group. Emphasis falls upon the punishment of the evil sanctions rather than the free rewards of the good sanctions. The idea of group command through the sovereign resembles the child's conception of the admonition of its father. Austin held that "if you express or intimate a wish that I shall do or forbear from some act, and if you visit me with evil in case I comply ^{not} with your wishes, the expression or intimation of your wish is a command" (Quoted by Jerome Frank, Op. Cit. p. 193). Physical punishment is one kind of evil sanction: others are substitutional redress, specific redress, and prevention.

III. THE IDEA OF JUDICIAL SOVEREIGNTY.

The investment of a super-member with sovereignty includes the third function of administering the law and seeing that justice is maintained. Sovereignty is

exercised through a commandment usually enforced with the sanction of physical punishment, and requires the effective carrying out of the law. This involves courtroom procedure, since "no court, no law." As judicial authority, the sovereign is judge as well as law-giver. The agents of the sovereign sit on the "King's Bench." Judicial sovereignty requires the overt application and enforcement of the law by the execution of the sanctions which the super-member has proclaimed.

In the judging process the law may be interpreted and applied in two ways: by loose construction which admits discretion; or by strict construction which rules out discretion. Loose construction admits that the judge, while holding fast to well proved general principles, must change his decisions with the times in order to ensure justice in a particular case. But the infallible character of sovereignty calls for strict construction of the law. Judging is thought to be uniform, general, continuous, equal, certain and pure. Loose construction would be inconsistent with the idea of law as the sovereign's command, for his command is that of the group and thought infallible. Discretion must necessarily be ruled out if justice is to prevail.

The deterrent and reformatory ideas of punishment are both inconsistent with the concept of statutory legal sovereignty, for they appeal to social good and personal values without regard to any sovereign power. The only

way in which sovereignty can become fully explicit is through the visiting of the appropriate punishment upon every crime. Any lack here imperils sovereignty and so group integration. The natural feeling of vengeance will not explain the retributory theory of punishment. Justice must be carried out in strict fashion, and hence punishment must follow inevitably upon disobedience. If the sanction is not executed there is open derogation of the law, and sovereignty comes under a cloud. Perfect sovereignty cannot allow a single relaxation in legal administration.

While unconditional pardon is impossible, this is not true of conditional pardon. If the sovereign wishes to intervene, it is his right to do so. He can not stop the course of justice, but he may turn the wrath of the law aside from the head of a particular person. Justice does not prevent mercy in a given case, for the pardoning power is coextensive with the punishing power. Pardon is a sovereign act of grace--an offer of the sovereign's good pleasure made to any one whom he sees fit to favor. It is the remission of penalty imposed by law, exempting the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment due for his crime. The effect of it is "to make the offender a new man: to acquit him of all corporal penalties and forfeitures annexed to that offense for which he obtains his pardon; and not so much to restore his former, as to give him a new credit and capacity."

William Blackstone, Commentaries, IV, p. 1793.

The organizing presupposition of monarchical sovereignty includes the idea of executive sovereignty through a single representative, authoritative, infallible super-member; the idea of legislative sovereignty through statutory law regarded as the king's command, and enforced by definite external sanctions, the most emphatic of which is the evil one of physical punishment; and the idea of judicial sovereignty through the justice of strict legal construction, retributive punishment, and gracious pardon. Because he embodies the authority of the group, the sovereign is not the law personified (*Lex animata*), or the agent of the law (*Lex rex*), but the fountain source of law (*Rex Lex*). Law is the creation of the group sovereignty embodied in the sovereign super-member, and exists only by virtue of its expression of group sovereignty.

CHAPTER IV

THE SEARCH FOR THEOLOGICAL CERTAINTY

- I. The Problem of a Sense of Certainty.
 - A. The Need for Legal Stability.
 - B. The Need for Religious Stability.
 - C. The Stability of Infallibility.
- II. The Weakening of the Legal Myth.
 - A. The Influence of Economic Practice.
 - B. The Influence of Scientific Theory.
 - C. The Influence of ~~Political~~ ^{Political} New Thought.
- III. Absolute Certainty Through An Infallible Soteriology.
 - A. Through Justification by Faith.
 - B. Through a Forensic Atonement.
 - C. Through Plenary Inspiration of the Scriptures.

CHAPTER IV

THE SEARCH FOR THEOLOGICAL CERTAINTY

The cultural revolution ended in the wish for sanction and security. An alliance with the Protestant religion was formed, and this was rationalized by means of the political concept of monarchical sovereignty. The continued existence of the state was assured, but physical security was not enough. As the nationalists began to reflect upon what they had done, they wanted to be certain that it was right. They must feel that the new order was the means to social salvation. Freedom from doubt as well as from military attack was at a premium.

I. THE PROBLEM OF A SENSE OF CERTAINTY.

It is quite normal to desire a sense of security, the emotional phase of which is a feeling of certitude. Such a normal feeling of certitude is based on relative rather than absolute grounds. But this normal desire for practical certainty may be changed into the abnormal desire for absolute certainty. It is very easy for adults, in a time of tension and crisis, to slip back to childish attitudes and desires. At such a time they long for the absolute certainty which they thought they found in the words and deeds of their father, and which relieved them from the responsibility for making important decisions. "They revert to childish longings, which they attempt to satisfy through the 'rediscovery of the father,' through

father-substitutes. Even where the fear factor is absent, the desire for father-substitutes may persist; father-dependence, originally a means of adaptation, has become an end in itself." (Jerome Frank, Op. Cit., p. 19).

The demand for absolute certainty could be met only by the stability of the political state and its religious sanctions. In other words, the need was for legal and religious stability to give a sense of security beyond the physical sphere. Dean Pound speaks of the "social interest in the general security," and of "a paramount social interest in the general security, which as an interest in peace and order dictated the very beginnings of law, has led men to seek some fixed basis of a certain ordering of human action which should....assure a firm and stable social order" (Quoted by Jerome Frank, Op. Cit. p. 289). After the upheaval and great changes of the Reformation era, one can believe that the desire for a stable social order was never stronger.

Nor was the independent need for religious stability less. The desire for such became more insistent as time went on. The twentieth article of the Augsburg Confession speaks of consolation to pious and trembling consciences, and says that the whole of Reformed teaching is to be referred to the struggle of the terrified conscience. Calvin made predestination the central and controlling doctrine in his theological system in the interest of divine assurance. Gradually the conservatism of the

Reformation movement became more pronounced. Even before the death of Luther, the growing dominance of the demand for stability led him to shrink from the implications of his interpretation of the Scriptures, and tacitly to agree to the subordination of the church to the state. Protestantism, which had begun as a universal movement, found it necessary to align itself with the middle class in order to survive.

The times were too chaotic for men to think of approximate standards and practical certainty. They must have fixity in the law which defended and regulated in the interests of the common welfare, and the religious sanctions of their political order must be raised above all shadow of doubt. They would not admit that practical certainty is all that can be obtained in a changing, chancy world, for their thought of the world made reality fixed and unchanging. Hence the ideas of juristic-theological infallibility inevitably became highly important in a cultural scheme which united the state and religion. Dean Pound describes the vital urge toward certainty through juristic absolutism as essentially "a justifiable groping for a firm and stable social order, a longing having its roots deep in reality." And as much may be said for the quest for theological infallibility.

II. THE WEAKENING OF THE LEGAL MYTH.

While no realm is free from father-substitution, law is the greatest example of all. As Jerome Frank explains,

"the law can easily be made to play an important part in the rediscovery of the father. For, functionally the law apparently resembles the Father-as-Judge. The child's Father-as-Judge was infallible...Grown men..., without being consciously aware of their motivation, seek in their legal systems the authoritativeness, certainty and predictability which the child believed that he had found in the law laid down by his father" (Op. Cit., p. 20). But during the Reformation period the revived archaic codes were so irrelevant to actual conditions that the legal myth could not be maintained. The illusion of absolute certainty through the law simply would not live. The manipulation of the Roman law in favor of the nobles was too plain, the disrespect of the lawyers themselves for the local courts was too open, to preserve the idea that certainty could be found through the law.

Not only was the law weak in a negative sense through irrelevance to contemporary conditions, it was positively weak through what the sociologists call "social lag." There was great development in the economic life of Europe. A change of size finally requires a change of system. So economic progress brought about a change in organization and practice. With keen insight G. W. Clark points out that the clock (latterly, supplemented by the stop-watch) is the modern idol. It stands for punctuality, exactness, system. The state might provide the opportunity for protection and regimentation, but the defects of the

law were such that it was little characterized by these qualities held necessary in daily life, and which alone could commend it to a mercantile era.

Not only the irrelevance and "social lag" of the law were to blame for the weakening of the myth that absolute certainty may be found through it. Intellectual influences also were widening the gap between theory and fact, and making the illusion impossible. One must consider the scientific progress of the Reformation period. This was based upon the use of mathematical method, in accordance with the Pythagorean idea of the world as that of an intelligible order based on number. To the scientific mind, "Law is not only the most general expression of a fact: it is also the expression of an ultimate fact. Law cannot be arbitrary or repealable. We must see law (so far as it goes) as an eternal attribute of 'Eternal Being'." The reign of law is seen in the development and processes of the universe. God is a law-making and law-abiding being instead of an arbitrary violater of natural laws,

The effect of both economic practice and scientific theory upon contemporary political thought is seen in its increasingly mathematical character. Henceforth, the theory of politics is to proceed from "the assumption that the same cause will always produce the same effect, the fundamental postulate of science" (G. W. Clark, Op. Cit., p. 214). All of which emphasized the failure of law as it was actually administered in the courts.

III. ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY THROUGH AN INFALLIBLE SOTERIOLOGY.

The failure of the law to provide an adequate sense of certainty threw men back upon the sanction of the law. They satisfied their wish for safety by finding absolute certainty, not through the usual legal myth of infallibility, but through the compensatory theological fiction of infallible theological sanctions; i.e. through an infallible soteriology. The absolute guarantee of the truth and reality of the religious experience of salvation and the beliefs associated with it, meant an absolute guarantee of the infallibility of the national state and the law which enforced its control. Theological dogma given the value of factual reality was the solution. The Reformers, under the unconscious influence to which they were subjected, believed that in the religious predicates of orthodoxy they had a key "not only to the understanding of the essence of religion, but also to the whole of existence." In their theological formulations they sought to construct a higher science, and were confident that their views were altogether rational. Theology was infallible because it was the explication of an infallible revelation to man given in the Holy Scriptures which are the very Word of God. In the Bible there was supposed to exist a perfect body of truth sanctioned by God, and beyond which there was no appeal.

Taunted by the Roman Catholics with the lack of certitude of their teaching, the first step taken toward the

formulation of an infallible Protestant soteriology was made in the promulgation of the doctrine of "justification by faith alone." The idea of free grace "broke on men's minds with the force of revelation," and the contrast with the despair engendered by the legalism of the Roman church was so great that they had a vivid sense of release from sin and peace with God. Using the imagery of the courtroom, they affirmed that just as the human judge justifies the human prisoner, so God sets the believer right with him, and pronounces that he is free from all claims of the law, for its precepts have been obeyed and its penalties paid by the Lord Jesus Christ in his stead. The doctrine of justification was the direct outgrowth of religious experience; it expressed and rationalized the new experience of communion with God which constituted the heart of Protestant religion, bringing certainty because fully believed to be the cardinal teaching of the New Testament.

Even with the doctrine of justification formulated and believed to be taught in the Word of God, the question always remained: How was it possible for man to be justified by faith in God as revealed in Jesus Christ? Dr. James Orr puts the situation accurately: "What men sought above all was the grounding of the certainty of their ~~peace~~ ^{peace} and acceptance of their persons. But this intensely personal interest could not but react with transforming influence on the doctrine of Christ's work, as that which

laid the foundation of the sinner's peace."

The Progress of Dogma, p. 234.

The reason for such reaction was that a new theory of the atonement was the logical implication of the new doctrine of justification. The intimate and vital connection of the Forensic theory with the doctrine of justification is shown by the fact that Gerhard treated it simply as a part of the locus de justificatione.

W. R. Matthews, Ed., Dogma in History and Thought, pp. 123, 124.

At first not a primary issue, the Forensic theory gained in importance as time went on, and men appreciated its necessity for any theology which pretended to support the feeling of assurance with a foundation of absolute certainty.

The truths of justification by faith and the Forensic theory of the atonement of Christ were revealed in the Holy Scriptures, and their certainty rested on that of their directly inspired source. To complete the infallible soteriological structure, there was needed the capstone of the dogma of an infallible Bible to guarantee the truth of the other two doctrines. The Protestants found their sole source of authority in the Bible, and could not afford to admit tradition as authoritative because the Pauline doctrine of justification, as taught by Luther, was blunted by the Augustinian gloss, "Quid aliud est justificatio quam justi facti" (W. R. Matthews, Ed., Op.

Cit., p. 121). By this famous doctrine of the testimonium Spiritus Sancti they believed that they had established the infallibility of the Scriptures, and so their whole position against the attacks of Rome.

¶ There can be no doubt that strong psychological needs are asserted in the craving of men for authority. The concept of authority held by men who live in a static thought-world must be of the infallible sort. Hence, the history of civilizations shows that taboos, ceremonies, dogmas, creeds, affirmations, axioms, persons, books, councils, and laws have all been held infallible at some time or other by some group or other. The infallible soteriology lending support, as sanction, to the weakening legal myth of infallible law of the state, brought a strange, intoxicating joy to those who held it. It should be no occasion for surprise that men love the fiction which miraculously guarantees against error, and provides a source of ready-made truth. They are saved the pains of growth and the search for knowledge.

PART II

THE THEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

CHAPTER V

THE MONARCHICAL PERCEPTION OF THE
COSMIC GROUP

- I. The Picture of the Cosmic Group Integration.
 - A. The Ultimate Event.
 - B. The Ultimate Rule.
 - C. The Ultimate Life.
- II. The Picture of the Cosmic Sovereign.
 - A. The Executive Sovereignty of God.
 - B. The Legislative Sovereignty of God.
 - C. The Judicial Sovereignty of God.
- III. The Picture of the Cosmic Citizen.
 - A. The Ideal Cosmic Relationship.
 - B. The Broken Cosmic Relationship.
 - C. The Restored Cosmic Relationship.

CHAPTER V

THE IMAGINATIVE PERCEPTION OF THE COSMIC GROUP

Since the perception of the cosmic group is a universalization of that of the social group, the former is but a projection of the latter upon the cosmos. In a patriarchal group, therefore, men see the cosmic group integrated through divine coercive power, as the social group is integrated through human coercive power. The religious object is pictured as a cosmic sovereign, and the religious subject as a cosmic citizen. Calvin "built his theology upon a principle of royalty, the highest known to him and his contemporaries."

The History of Christianity in the Light of Modern Knowledge: A Collective Work, p. 616.

I. THE PICTURE OF THE COSMIC GROUP INTEGRATION.

In picturing the cosmic group-integration, the Reformers envisaged a heavenly kingdom modeled after the monarchical state. The Holy City was a royal capital, described in Pilgrim's Progress as the heavenly Jerusalem: "'There,' said they, 'is Mount Sion, the heavenly Jerusalem.... There you shall not see again such things as you saw when you were in the lower region upon the earth, to wit, sorrow, sickness, affliction, and death; 'for the former things are passed away.'" When Christian and his companion came up to the gates, they found written on them in letters of gold: "Blessed are they that do

his commandments, that they may have the right to the tree of life, and may enter in through the gates into the city." After the gates were opened, Christian looked in and "behold, the city shone like the sun; the streets also were paved with gold; and in them walked many men."

The ultimate event of the heavenly kingdom is the last Judgment. As described in the Westminster Confession of Faith (XXXIII,2), it is evident that the judgment is that of a sovereign monarch. The purpose of the appointment of the day of judgment is held to be the "manifestation of the glory of his (God's) mercy in the eternal salvation of the elect, and of his justice in the damnation of the reprobate, who are wicked and disobedient. For then shall the righteous go into everlasting life, and receive that fulness of joy and refreshing which shall come from the presence of the Lord; but the wicked, who know not God, and obey not the gospel of Jesus Christ, shall be cast into eternal torments, and be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power." The judicial principle is that of retributive justice, for apostate angels and all men that have lived upon the earth shall "receive according to what they have done in the body, whether good or evil."

In the ideal heavenly kingdom, the monarch rules with an absolutism exceeding any exercised by the kings of earth. No one can enter the royal capital without

his consent, for his will determines all things. Bunyan expresses this conception of absolute sovereignty in his description of the conditions of entrance: "Then I saw in my dream, that the shining men bid them call at the gate: the which when they did, some from above looked over the gate, to wit, Enoch, Moses, and Elijah, etc., to whom it was said, 'These pilgrims are come from the city of Destruction, for the love that they bear to the King of this place: and then the pilgrims gave in unto them each man his certificate, which they had received in the beginning; those therefore were carried in unto the King, who, when he had read them, said, 'Where are the men?' To whom it was answered, 'They are standing without the gate.' The King then commanded to open the gate, 'That the righteous nation,' said he, 'that keepeth the truth may enter in.'"

The life of those living in the heavenly kingdom is one of homage to the King. As soon as Christian and Hopeful entered the City, they were met by men who gave them harps to praise God, and crowns in token of the honor of their arrival. They found those walking the streets of gold had crowns on their heads, palms in their hands, and golden harps to sing praises withal. Some of them had wings, and these answered one another without intermission, saying, "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord." Others sang with a loud voice: "BLESSING, AND HONOR, AND GLORY, AND POWER, BE UNTO HIM THAT SITTETH

UPON THE THRONE, AND UNTO THE LAMB, FOR EVER AND EVER."

It was refusal of this homage, which caused the expulsion of Satan from heaven, when

".....aspiring,
To set himself in glory above his peers,
He trusted to have equall'd the Most High."

--Paradise Lost, Book I.

II. THE PICTURE OF THE COSMIC SOVEREIGN.

The picture of the cosmic group integration determined by implication the picture drawn of the cosmic sovereign. If the ideal social order is that of a monarchical state, the ideal ruler must be a monarch. So the cosmic sovereign was thought of as a king, and his attributes and characteristics as describable in terms of those of an earthly king. Professor Rauschenbusch declares: "As long as kings and governors were the greatest human beings in the public eye, it was inevitable that their image be superimposed on the idea of God."

Walter Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, p. 170

In agreement with this is the statement of the Cambridge History writer that "to the Calvinistic view God is the ideal type of absolute monarch. Theology once more goes hand in hand with politics."

Cambridge Modern History, III, p. 474.

In filling out the picture of God as the heavenly sovereign, the Reformed theologians applied to him the executive characteristics possessed by the contemporary kings. "The pattern of absolute sovereignty with decrees

and unconditioned acts controls Protestant as well as Roman theology. It is the center of the theology of all the Reformed confessions" (Shailer Mathews, Op. Cit., p. 133). Wace asserts that this development was inevitable: "By that inevitable tendency, by which men transfer, in some degree, their own image and similitude to their conception of God, so Calvin conceives of the world as regulated by definite and immutable divine decrees. All is determined by God beforehand, all is regulated by precise decisions; and the place and fate of every individual has been assigned to him."

Henry Wace, Principles of the Reformation, pp. 149, 150.

As the king's will is the source of human laws, so God's will is the source of divine laws. These are defined by Austin as "laws set by God to his human creatures." As the earthly sovereign proclaims laws by virtue of his sovereignty, so God has ordained the moral law over all. This is conceived as "the eternal, sovereign, reasonable will of God, objectively regarded as fixing the standard of the morally right under all circumstances and conditions," and formulated in the ten commandments given to Moses. The laws of God are not without sanctions, and punishment is the most prominent element in these. As Austin says, religious sanctions "consist of the evils or pains, which we may suffer here or hereafter, by the immediate appointment of God, and as consequences of breaking his commandments."

As a monarchical sovereign, God is Judge as well as Executive and Law-Giver. Smeaton complains that the Socinians "sought to explode every attempt to compare the divine being with worldly judges or princes."

George Smeaton, *The Doctrine of the Atonement*, p. 480.

God sees that the law is administered, as the inner necessity of his action is justice. To maintain the majesty of his sovereignty, God must exact the full penalty for every sin,--"the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children," and the innocent must suffer for the guilty. Like an earthly sovereign, God can pardon if justice is satisfied in such a way as to allow remission of penalty. Pardon is a royal prerogative, exercised on condition of vicarious suffering by some competent sacrificial person. So satisfaction made to the law "becomes the ground or reason from a regard to which God pardons and accepts."

William Cunningham, *Historical Theology*, II, p. 77.

III. THE PICTURE OF THE COSMIC CITIZEN.

Religion involves the relation of God and the soul, and this relation is perceived by those within a patriarchal group as one of authority. It is not the authority of lord and vassal, or master and slave, but that of a king over his subject. Religious perception which pictures heaven as a monarchical state not only includes God as a monarch, but further implies that man must be looked upon as a royal subject, whether he recognizes

his status or not. In A Holy Commonwealth, Richard Baxter states: "The world is a kingdom, as to obligations and duty, and God is the king.....All men as men are the subjects of God's kingdom, as to obligations and duty, and God will not ask the consent of any man to be so obliged....." As a royal subject is to his monarch,

Quoted by H. W. Schneider, The Puritan Mind, pp. 14,15.

so is every man to God.

The ideal religious relationship is in terms of ascendance-submission. Since the will of God is absolute and the will of man dependent, the ideal religious relationship calls for an absolutely submissive royal subject. The fundamental principle of Calvinism lies in its "profound apprehension of God in his majesty, with the inevitably accompanying poignant realization of the exact nature of the relation sustained to him by the creature as such, and particularly by the sinful creature... The religious relation attains its purity only when an attitude of absolute dependence on God is not merely temporarily assumed,.., but is sustained through all the activities of life."

B. B. Warfield, Calvin and Calvinism, pp. 354, 355.

Sin is ignoring God, the withholding or denial of absolute dependence and submission to the will of God. Since the required loyalty and obedience exemplifying the submissive spirit must be absolute, a single act is sufficient to bring all the guilt of the traitor.

"Even were it possible for us to perform works absolutely pure, yet one sin is sufficient to efface and extinguish all remembrance of former righteousness, it is in vain to produce one or two single works! We must show an uninterrupted obedience."

John Calvin, Institutes, III, xiv, 10.

The sinner is hostile to God, rebellious against his sovereignty, rather than loyal and submissive to him. In the words of the Westminster Shorter Catechism, blameworthiness lies in "any want of conformity unto, or transgression of the law of God."

The righteous man has neither attained the ideal religious state of the absolutely submissive royal subject, nor been left in the broken religious relationship of the traitorous sinful subject: ~~he~~ he enjoys the relationship of the courtier chosen to receive the king's favor. The end of God's legislation is not freedom, or morality, but piety, and piety operates through loyalty. The elect man of faith, like the courtier who serves the king, proves his gratitude for the king's favor by unquestioning obedience to the commandments of God. He is righteous, not in the sense that he has never in all his life disobeyed God, but in that he supremely reverences his majesty and wills to obey him henceforth. "What kind of righteousness do you call it," queries Calvin, "not to commit theft and rapine, if you, in the meantime, with impious sacrilege, rob God of his glory?..... It is

vain, therefore, to talk of righteousness apart from religion. Such righteousness has no more beauty than the trunk of a body deprived of its head."

Institutes, II, 8, 11.

The influence of patriarchal culture was clearly operative in the development of the religious imagery of the Reformation and post-Reformation periods. In the picture of the cosmic group integration, the ultimate event was pictured as the last judgment of the heavenly sovereign; the ultimate rule as his absolute will; and the ultimate life as one of reverence and homage before him. In the picture of the cosmic sovereign, God is represented as executive, legislative, and judicial ruler of the universe. In the picture of the cosmic citizen, the ideal religious relationship is held to consist in the absolute submission of the royal subject; the broken relationship in the lack of submission of the traitor; and the restored relationship in the reverence and obedience of the courtier. A king on earth suggests a King on High, and the strength of the monarchical idea due to resurgent nationalism made it inevitable, says William James, that God should be thought of as "a sort of Louis XIV of the heavens." Canon Streeter also observes that "a race or a generation which reverences pomp and circumstance, and loves to abase itself before a splendid violence and a domineering will, thinks of God

as a celestial Sultan."

B. H. Streeter, Reality, p. 149.

CHAPTER VI

THE CONCEPT OF THE RELIGIOUS OBJECT: GOD

- I. The Implications Affecting the Idea of God.
 - A. That Vindictive Justice Is the Supreme Divine Perfection.
 - B. That the Divine Nature Demands the Punishment of Sin.
 - C. That Punishment Is Supreme In the Satisfaction of God's Law.

- II. The Consequences In the Thought of God.
 - A. The Contradiction of Love and Vindictive Justice.
 - B. The Subordination of Love.
 - C. The Domination of Vindictive Justice.

CHAPTER VI

THE CONCEPT OF THE RELIGIOUS OBJECT: GOD

At the time of the Reformation the older theology was a mixture of two elements: Greek philosophy and political absolutism. Originally, the Christian God was one to whom man was kin, and with whom he could have fellowship of a personal character. God had been good, an object of reverence, loyalty, aspiration; a living, creative, directive God of redemptive love. But under the influence of the Greek philosophy this personal God became an eternal essence or abstract idea--static, absolute, timeless, negative perfection. God was pictured as a distant, magnified Roman Emperor in absolute control of the universe through his decrees. The God of the religious experience of the prophets and the New Testament writings was smothered by philosophical formulation of current political thought.

Luther revolted against this older idea of God, and took his stand upon the belief that God is our Father. A father has personal relations with his children, and ever acts on the principle of love. "The living God, not a philosophical or mystical abstraction--the manifest and gracious God who is revealed in Jesus Christ--was a God to be reached immediately by every Christian: that was at the basis of Luther's greatness and achievements....What it means to have God in Christ, what this God is, how he

became related to us in Christ, and how we can apprehend and hold on to him--all that Luther experienced and that he proclaimed. Casting himself on Christ in confidence and trust--that was to Luther the sum of religion, the vital thought and power of his life."

David H. Bauslin, The Lutheran Movement of the Sixteenth Century, p. 131.

The influence of patriarchal culture, seen in the successors of Luther, removed the personal element from the idea of God. An impersonal concept of deity is consequential to the perception of God as a monarchical sovereign. Such a result logically follows if authority is coercive, and sovereignty is manifested in statutory law. As the secular law embodies the king's character through his will expressed in its commands, so the divine law embodies the heavenly Monarch's character through his will expressed in the ten commandments. Impersonal legal analogies are adequate to mirror God's character and relations to mankind. His "law is not the expression of some, but of all the divine perfections."

John M. Armour, Atonement and Law, p. 96.

I. THE IMPLICATIONS AFFECTING THE IDEA OF GOD.

Since vindicative justice is the one essential in the prestige of the divine sovereignty, it must be accounted God's supremely glorious perfection. "If vindicative justice," argues an old divine, "is a glorious and amiable perfection, then it was a glorious and amiable thing in God to bruise him and put his soul to grief, who

had espoused our cause....But if vindicative justice is not glorious, there is no glory in the Cross of Christ.... If vindicative justice is an amiable, glorious perfection, then the grace of God in the gift of his Son was free grace indeed....Therefore those who are wholly blind to the beauty of vindicative justice are wholly blind to the nature and glory of the grace of the Gospel" (Quoted by H. W. Schneider, The Puritan Mind, p. 228).

The divine nature, therefore, demands punishment for every sin. The Reformed theologians held firmly to their conviction that punishment was necessary because God's nature (expressed through his law and its commands) demanded it, and not because he decreed it for the good of society, or even arbitrarily. "As it is inconceivable that God should in a single instance fail to hate sin as pollution, so it is inconceivable that he should in a single instance fail to punish it as demerit. There has often been forgiveness for the sinner, but not a single instance of forgiveness for the sin; and the sinner is never forgiven except on condition of the condign punishment of the sin" (A. A. Hodge, Op. Cit., p. 52).

Hence endurance of penalties or punishment is the supreme element in the divine satisfaction. The Reformed theologians held that Christ "gave to the whole moral universe the highest conceivable demonstration of God's inexorable determination to punish all sin, just because he did so punish it even in the person of his son"

(A. A. Hodge, Op. Cit., p. 28). The reward sanction is secondary to that of the punishment sanction. The former is taken for granted, while the execution of the latter is regarded necessary to the maintenance of the honor and majesty of the divine Sovereign. "Sinful men....cannot properly be reconciled to God until after provision has been made to demonstrate to all the subjects of God's government his immutable determination to punish sin in all cases without exception" (A. A. Hodge, Op. Cit., p. 28).

II. THE CONSEQUENCES IN THE THOUGHT OF GOD.

When sovereignty is seen as external authority and vindicative justice is the supreme essential in sovereignty, this vindicative justice easily becomes an end in itself and greatly exaggerated. Divine justice becomes blind, impersonal, inexorable. It must have the full and exact penalty for every sin. "There seemed nothing strange in the belief that Christ should have intervened to take this penal consequence upon himself, and that God's judgment upon sin should thereby be fulfilled and satisfied." Though compatible with his vindicative justice, God's mercy must take second place among his perfections. This thought was summed up in the formula: "God must be just; but he may at his discretion be merciful."

Love says: "Save the sinner." Justice says: "Exact the penalty." Both love and vindicative justice are held to be perfections of God. How then can God be just and

justify the ungodly? Luther did not attempt to introduce consistency into his ideas of God, and so work out this problem. Like Calvin, he believed it impious to inquire into the secret nature of God. He took for granted this hidden, inscrutable aspect of God, and had "no difficulty in leaving justice and love side by side, unreconciled. God 'does not wish the death of a sinner, that is (as revealed) by the Word, but he does wish it by that inscrutable will.'" The early Reformers traced everything back to the decrees of God, and found mental relief by resting their hope of salvation upon God's sovereign benevolent purpose, but love was actually dominant in Luther's thought of God.

Later theologians could not escape the problem of contradictory elements in the idea of God, and the result was the gradual subordination of the divine love. Anselm had made central the honor or majesty of God, the element in his nature which demands satisfaction for the affront of sin. In his conception all the attributes are gathered up and harmonized in the divine majesty, and so justice could not so well be exalted above love and mercy. In the Reformation theology, however, there was no inclusive attribute of God. Holiness was dominant without being a comprehensive perfection. But holiness is seen as requiring legal righteousness. This implies mercy and justice, rather than love in the character of God. Mercy prompts the offer of salvation and accepts

Christ's satisfaction of the divine justice for sinners. Further development subordinated love more and more,-- a fact illustrated by the difference between the Westminster Confession and Catechisms. The first change omits the words "most loving," and the second "merciful, gracious, and longsuffering." Love became but one of the constituents of holiness.

The final result was the exaltation of vindictive justice as dominant over love. "God is not conceived as a loving Father, who comes very close to his estranged children, who is encompassing them with his reconciling love, who is at work in their hearts with all the resources of a fatherly love that cannot be repressed" (D. M. Ross, *Op. Cit.*, p. 190). Instead of this, it was believed that God stands in the capacity of a judge, and only after reconciliation in the capacity of a father, when, says Principal Cunningham, "God has virtually laid aside, so far as they are concerned, the character of a judge and assumed that of a father" (Quoted by D. M. Ross, *Op. Cit.*, p. 190). God's sovereignty is in effect more judicial and retributive than gracious and salutary. He has to reckon with the requirements of his own law, for in order to secure freedom for the impulses of his grace, he must buy off the claims of the law. He is not an arbitrary but a constitutional monarch.

R. Mackintosh, Theories of the Atonement, p. 150.

Implications of monarchical sovereignty affecting the idea of God were: that vindicative justice is the supreme divine perfection; that the divine nature demands the punishment of sin; and that punishment is the predominant sanction of the divine law. The consequences in the thought of God were that the contradiction between the divine love and justice led to the supremacy of vindicative justice as the controlling element in the thought of God. The Reformed theologians held the justice of God to be basic, and that the "necessity to punish" was heaven's first law.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONCEPT OF THE RELIGIOUS SUBJECT: MAN

- I. The Concept of the Sinful Man.
 - A. The Implications Affecting the Idea of Sin.
 - B. The Consequences In the Thought of Sin.
- II. The Concept of the Forgiven Man.
 - A. The Implications Affecting the Idea of Forgiveness.
 - B. The Consequences In the Thought of Forgiveness.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONCEPT OF THE RELIGIOUS SUBJECT: MAN

In the mold of monarchical sovereignty sin becomes a crime, and forgiveness judicial pardon. It was inevitable that the Reformed theologians should think of sin not as a personal defect from which we need cleansing, but as a violation of God's law involving legal guilt and punishment and calling for expiation. It was certainly easier to think of forgiveness as pardon or remission of penalty rather than as restoration to a fellowship, insuring the integration of acts and purposes at a new and higher level. In their ideas of sin and forgiveness theologians were influenced by the atmosphere and procedure of the courtroom. This centers attention upon the penal consequences of sin, and the way in which those consequences can be removed.

I. THE CONCEPT OF THE SINFUL MAN.

Sin is a sort of duel between the sinner and God. God sits upon his throne in glory, and the first duty of man is to bow to the royal will expressed in the divine law. In the monarchies of the past a man might spear peasants or outrage their wives, but crossing the king was another matter. "When theological definitions speak of rebellion against God as the common characteristic of all sin, it reminds one of the readiness of despotic governments to treat every offense as treason" (Walter

Rauschenbusch, Op. Cit., p. 48). The theology of non-architectural sovereignty makes ignoring God the essence of sin and the source of damnation. Sin is refusal to consent to the commands of the divine Sovereign, as in real life men dodge and evade the mandates of the law.

A. THE IMPLICATIONS AFFECTING THE IDEA OF SIN.

As criminal in character, sin is a violation of public law, a legal offense. The law looks upon criminal wrong-doing as a violation of the code, either negatively through the omission of obedience to its precepts, or positively through the transgression of its commands. Crime is a breach of the King's peace, or failure to render perfect obedience on the part of the subject. It is "an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law either forbidding or commanding it" (William Blackstone, Commentaries, IV, p. 1427). Like crime, sin is lack of conformity to or transgression of the law of the divine government,-- the authoritative, commanding will of a holy and righteous ruler.

As an offense against the divine law, sin is to be thought of in terms of law. It brings criminality, guilt, demerit, blameworthiness, judicial condemnation and wrath, and judgment. The law is not particularly concerned with the moral condition of the criminal, but with the rights of sovereign justice and its demands for punishment. Legal offenses bring legal guilt. Liability to punishment is the supreme consequence of sin. The sense of sin is

the awareness of a condition of legal demerit, not the awareness of moral imperfection. The prospect of penalty to the offender is predominant, and he is swayed by the emotion of fear. There may be a sense of moral retribution; of the dishonor of the soul in view of the just incurrance of penalty; a craving for the means of expiation, and the riddance of guilt.

"Attention is concentrated upon the physical consequences of sin, as in the law-court" (D. M. Ross, *Op. Cit.*, p. 194). The physical aspect of sin's consequences is seen in the stress upon eternal suffering in a future life--the punishment of sin unrepented of and unforgiven. Ritschl clearly states: "The threat of eternal condemnation, or hell, which was held out against sin, had been regarded as the punishment that God in his good pleasure had appointed; and anything else that might possibly be regarded as punishment thereof was not taken into account--not in theological theory at least" (Quoted by D. M. Ross, *Op. Cit.*, p. 115).

B. THE CONSEQUENCES IN THE THOUGHT OF SIN.

There is no lack of evidence that the Reformed theologians thought of sin not only as legal offense, but also as involving moral degeneration. They held to original sin as corruption, and even exaggerated the conception. They believed man "totally depraved," and that nothing except sin could proceed from the perverted will of man. Luther compares the heart of the unregenerate

man "to a hard stone, which does not yield to the one who touches it, but resists, and to a rough block, and to a wild, unmanageable beast." Man is utterly unresponsive to God as a Father and to his loving purposes for his life.

But they emphasized sin as that which renders us guilty, and binds us over to punishment. Sin in a three-fold sense was defined by Turretin as "a debt which we are bound to pay to divine justice,...a principle of enmity, whereby we hate God; and he becomes our enemy,... a crime against the government of the universe by which, before God the supreme governor and judge, we become deserving of everlasting death and malediction. Whence, sinners are expressly called 'debtors'" (Matthew 6:12), 'enemies to God,' both actively and passively (Colossians 1:21), and 'guilty before God' (Romans 3:19)."

James R. Willson, Historical Opinions on the Atonement, p. 220.

In the Westminster Confession of Faith we have an attempt to combine the two ways of thinking which fully recognizes "original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil," and from which proceed all actual transgressions. But when the nature of the cause of both original corruption and actual sin in the individual is stated, the influence of monarchical sovereignty is obvious. The concluding and most emphatic section

affirms: "Every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of God, and contrary thereunto, doth, in its own nature, bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God, and curse of the law, and so made subject to death, with all miseries spiritual, temporal, and eternal."

II. THE CONCEPT OF THE FORGIVEN MAN.

The Reformed concept of divine forgiveness has been described as "a disturbing and confusing influence" (D. M. Ross, Op. Cit., p. 196). Legal analogies lead into difficulties, for one thinks of forgiveness as coming from a father. Then, there is no fixity in the use of words which can assure clarity of meaning. It seems necessary to concede that "pardon may sometimes denote the experience of the forgiving love of God, and forgiveness may sometimes denote little more than the remission of the penalties of sin" (D. M. Ross, Op. Cit., p. 197). Forgiveness in any legal sense is very different from the personal significance with which the word is more frequently used.

A. THE IMPLICATIONS AFFECTING THE IDEA OF FORGIVENESS.

If sin is lack of obedience to or positive disobedience to the law of God, divine forgiveness must be the granting of freedom from the claims of the law, and restoration to judicial favor. Legal justification is the act of declaring that the law has no more claims upon

the prisoner, that he has gained a new status in the eyes of the law. Hence divine forgiveness refers to status before God. It is not a subjective work, nor is it the mere act of a sovereign suspending the action of the law. It is the opposite of condemnation, a "declaration that the claims of justice are satisfied," and that the sinner is entitled to all the privileges of an obedient subject of the heavenly Sovereign.

Forgiveness has to do with the overcoming of guilt, and not the new life of the believer. Legal justification stresses taking care of the guilt of actual violations of the law. Freedom from the law means the wiping out of the guilty past; there is cancellation of the record, and the beginning of a new page. Divine forgiveness blots out the guilt of past sins without any particular reference to the new life. It is release from guilt growing out of the past rather than a means of fulfilling the law in the future.

If divine forgiveness is mainly freedom from guilt growing out of past acts, it necessarily brings pardon or remission of penalties. And since the punishment of sin is physical suffering in the future life, forgiveness is essentially "remission of the penalties due to sin in the future life." Divine forgiveness interpreted as release from the claims of the divine law, makes it consist in the freedom from past guilt, and future suffering, while neglecting the conception of it as "deliverance

from the evil self here and now."

B. THE CONSEQUENCES IN THE THOUGHT OF FORGIVENESS.

Luther's idea of justification is thoroughly Forensic, but does not overstress the divine act. O. Ritschl has summed up Luther's view as follows:

(1) God, out of mercy for Christ's sake, justifies, that is, holds and declares to be righteous--sinners--if they believe.

(2) God justifies, in that he gives to the sinner justifying faith.

(3) Faith justifies, so far as it establishes that relation of the sinner to God, which God by means of his imputation holds for righteousness and allows to avail as such.

(4) Faith justifies, in that it is the righteousness of Christ, entirely alien to sinners, but infused into their hearts, and in so far is the ideal fulfillment of the law.

(5) Thus there increasingly proceeds from the purity of the heart, which thus comes to be in faith, the proper righteousness and fulfillment of the law of believers, which indeed is never perfect in this life, but in spite of the constant element of sin which it contains, is yet pleasing to God, since the latter is not imputed to them.

Quoted by R. S. Franks, The History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ, p. 353.

The increasing development of this idea of forgiveness is shown when Calvin holds justification to be an act of God, in which he judicially pronounces the person before his judgment-seat, to be in the view of the law, a just person, against whom justice has no demand, and in favor of whom justice demands acceptance. "So we simply expound justification to be an acceptation, whereby God receiveth us into favor and accepteth us for righteous, and we say, that the same consisteth in the forgiveness of sins, and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ" (Institutes, III, xi, 2). This forgiveness of sins must mean remission of penalties.

When the attempt was made to give a complete statement of forgiveness, pardon or the remission of penalties was the emphatic and determining factor of the two--remission and restoration to personal favor. In the Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter XI deals with Justification, and Chapter XII with Adoption, the order of treatment being significant of the relative emphasis. Not only is justification given the more emphatic position; it is also expressly stated that it is a condition of adoption, for we read: "All those that are justified, God vouchsafeth, in and for his only Son Jesus Christ, to make partakers of the grace of adoption." As Ross puts it: "The sinner, the penalty of whose sin has been remitted, is, as the result of his being pardoned, re-

ceived into God's favor, has the experience of God's forgiving love, and has bestowed upon him the gift of the Spirit by whose gracious working he is renewed and made meet for heaven" (D. M. Ross, Op. Cit., p. 197).

Sin is criminal in character. It brings legal guilt and punishment in eternal physical suffering. The consequence of these implications was the interpretation of forgiveness as restoration of judicial favor by imputation rather than restoration of personal relations by wiping out sin. This followed from the belief that "saving work does not immediately undertake to make available the divine power for deliverance from actual sinning, but rather to secure a divine judicial pardon by virtue of which the sinner may be assured of escaping the post-mortem penalties of his transgression."

D. C. Macintosh, Theology As An Empirical Science, pp. 124, 125.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONCEPT OF THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: SALVATION

- I. The Concept of the Human Element--Faith.
 - A. The Implications Affecting the Idea of Faith.
 - B. The Consequences In the Thought of Faith.
- II. The Concept of the Divine Element--Christ's Ministry.
 - A. The Implications Affecting Christ's Ministry.
 - B. The Consequences In the Thought of Christ's Ministry.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONCEPT OF THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: SALVATION

Legal benefit is received from above without the active participation of the receiver. Faith is a receptive organ rather than a creative force, and calls for trust in the veracity of the sovereign instead of identification of life with him. Faith as appropriation of legal benefit implies the legal character of its object. Christ's gift to the sinner is not ethical energy for filial living, but vicarious obedience and righteousness which puts the sinner legally right with the divine Sovereign. The faith of the believer is directed not to Christ himself, as eager for spiritual union with the sinner, but to the transaction achieved for his legal good.

I. THE CONCEPT OF THE HUMAN ELEMENT-FAITH.

The Forensic analogy in the case of faith is the reception of legal justification by the criminal offender. The criminal must respond to the sovereign initiative in offering him justification instead of condemnation for his crime. Faith is the name given to the response of the sinner to the divine offer of pardon. It includes two elements corresponding to the two legal benefits of justification: assent to and confidence in the means of remission and appropriation of the new freedom. The

skeptical sinner can no more benefit by the justification which God offers, than the criminal can benefit by legal justification in case he refuses to accept his pardon and liberty.

A. THE IMPLICATIONS AFFECTING THE IDEA OF FAITH.

The emphasis in faith is upon the appropriation of remission of penalties. The prisoner's one supreme concern is to gain the pardon which consists of this remission. His fear of death or hatred of confinement away from the benefits of society leads him to seek pardon or remission of penalties above all things. Remorse for his sins might make him eager to know that another will be substituted to bear his penalties, but there is no guarantee that he is anxious to see justice carried out. He is moved primarily by self-interest, and wants to be certain that the sovereign will not fail to make good his offer of pardon.

The sinner must acknowledge that God is able to bring remission of penalties. As the criminal must believe in the ability of the sovereign to legally accomplish the needed deliverance, so the sinner must give his assent to the divine transaction making possible his pardon. He must know God's purpose of salvation for all men, and his gracious provision for the remission of the eternal penalties due to sin, and believe that God meets the demands of justice in such a way that he can justify him and remit his penalties.

The prisoner must have a feeling of confident trust which will prompt him to accept the provision made for remission--a gift from above,-if he is to benefit by it. Likewise the sinner cannot help himself or effect his own deliverance. All he can do is to passively accept what is offered to him as a free gift from God. There is nothing which the prisoner can do to effect a change of legal status, for this power is not within but beyond him. The significance of the Forensic emphasis is that what God looks for in response to his gracious overture is faith defined as confident acceptance of the ability of God to remit the penalties which must otherwise have been endured by the sinner.

B. THE CONSEQUENCES IN THE THOUGHT OF FAITH.

At the time of Reformation, it was held that faith is no mere intellectual acceptance of Christ and his atoning death. It was a spiritual incorporation of the soul with its savior involving a changed individuality, a renewed and strengthened nature, out of which all the fruits of righteousness naturally grew. Luther held to faith as trust in God's grace in Christ: fiducia, not assensus; not mere acceptance of historic statements, but a response to God when he approaches through his Son,-- a divine effect wrought in the soul, and not a product of man's will. Such faith was not alone, but involved repentance and trust in the love of God, and was "accom-
plished by ~~with~~ all other saving graces."

Even Luther's conception of faith presupposed belief in the articles of the creed. The large and emphatic place later given to the intellectual element shows the growing influence of monarchical sovereignty. The Christian brings his mind and heart into submission to the Word of God in faith, for "by this faith a Christian believeth to be true whatsoever is revealed in the Word, for the authority of God himself is speaking therein."

Westminster Larger Catechism, XIV, 2.

Calvin gives this full definition: "We shall have a full definition of faith if we say that it is a firm and sure knowledge of the divine favor toward us, founded on the truth of a free promise in Christ, and revealed to our minds, and sealed on our hearts by the Holy Spirit" (Institutes, III, ii, 7).

In the synthesis of Reformation theology we see the extent to which the Forensic influence dominated in the thought of faith. "By this (saving) faith," says the Westminster Confession of Faith, "a Christian believeth to be true whatsoever is revealed in the Word, for the authority of God himself speaketh therein; and acteth differently upon that which each particular passage thereof containeth; yielding obedience to the commands, trembling at the threatenings, and embracing the promises of God for this life and that which is to come. But the principal acts of saving faith are, accepting, receiving, and resting upon Christ alone for justification, sancti-

fication, and eternal life, by virtue of the covenant of grace" (XIV, 2).

II. THE CONCEPT OF THE DIVINE

ELEMENT-CHRIST'S MINISTRY.

The interpretation of Christ's ministry rests upon the analogy of the legal concept of substitution. It is implied that Jesus Christ was officially appointed to take the law-place of the sinner and that Christ made satisfaction to the divine law in his stead. Such satisfaction must include obedience on the one hand, and the bearing of penalties on the other. As a substitute for sinful men, Jesus Christ rendered a perfect obedience unto the law of God, and bore all the punishment due sinners for their transgression of its precepts. This interpretation of the significance of Christ's ministry led inevitably to an emphasis upon his death which obscured the historical and ethical significance of his life and teaching. Saviorhood by legal satisfaction of the divine justice gives us a theological Christ.

A. THE IMPLICATIONS AFFECTING CHRIST'S MINISTRY.

A fundamental implication of the Forensic ^{thought} theory is that obedience will receive its reward and sin be punished to the full extent of the sanctions prescribed in the law. But this obedience or punishment need not be required or exacted from the person of the sinner. The way in which Jesus Christ became the Savior of sinful

men was by offering himself as a substitute, rendering to God legal obedience, and enduring the punishment on account of sin. These two aspects include all of Christ's ministry. The incarnation was for the purpose of the atonement instead of the atonement for the purpose of incarnation. The important thing was not the truth concerning God which Jesus spoke or embodied in his character and deeds, but his vicarious work of obedience and endurance of suffering.

The ministry of Christ was a transaction rather than a revelation. But what sort of transaction was demanded of the Christ who would substitute for sinful man? Since the law does not so much define the right as defend the right by imposition of penalty, the emphasis in the administration of the law is on ascertaining guilt and exacting punishment. Satisfaction of the law is mainly paying penalties due for transgressions. Substitution must be mainly accepting guilt and bearing penalties. Obedience may be looked upon as active and passive, but the emphasis will fall upon passive obedience, for this is enduring the suffering due as penalties for violation of the law. Passive obedience is the most necessary element in the satisfaction demanded of the substitute.

If Christ's ministry be viewed as a transaction, and if the emphasis be laid upon the passive obedience or suffering as the major element in the satisfaction for sin, the death of Christ is bound to overshadow his life.

From the time of Judaism it was widely believed that death is the supreme penalty for sin. There was no conception of its biological aspects in this connection. Death was inherently and altogether penal. If the purpose of Christ's ministry was a transaction in which his passive obedience outranks his active obedience, his death had more value than his life. Only that part of his life which consisted in suffering was possessed of penal value, while his death was wholly penal. The search for penal significance with which to prove his satisfaction of the demands of the law, necessitates the superiority of the death of Jesus.

B. THE CONSEQUENCES IN THE THOUGHT OF CHRIST'S MINISTRY.

Calvin speaks of the work to be performed by the Mediator as: "To restore us to the divine favor, so as to make us, instead of sons of men, sons of God; instead of heirs of hell, heirs of a heavenly kingdom....We trust that we are the sons of God, because the natural son of God...declined not to take what was peculiar to us, that he might in his turn extend to us what was peculiarly his own, and thus might be in common with us both Son of God and Son of man.... In this way, we have a sure inheritance in the heavenly kingdom, because the only Son of God, to whom it entirely belonged, has adopted us as his brethren; and if brethren, then partners with him in the inheritance (Romans 8:17)" (Institutes, II, xii, 2).

But the emphasis on Christ's ministry as the achievement of legal merit, made available for sinners through imputation, led Calvin also to speak of Christ's ministry as deserving favor for us. "It is truly and properly said," he declares, "that Christ has deserved God's favor for us, with the result that God cannot consistently with his justice, punish for the sins which have been atoned for, or refuse to accept those for whom a vicarious righteousness has been procured." And A. A. Hodge says that Christ "cannot be primarily the medium of divine influences upon men, but, on the contrary, ^{is} the mediating person, propitiating God in behalf of men, acting in behalf of men in those things which have a bearing upon God" (Op. Cit., p. 159).

Due to monarchical influence, the satisfaction of justice became the conditioning element in the mediatorship of Christ, and logically prior to the benefits derived therefrom, as stated finally in the Westminster Confession of Faith: "The Lord Jesus Christ, by his perfect obedience and sacrifice of himself, which he through the eternal Spirit once offered up unto God, hath fully satisfied the justice of his Father; and purchased not only reconciliation, but an everlasting inheritance in the kingdom of heaven, for all these whom the Father hath given unto him" (XIV, 2). Here we have the language of two concepts, yet there can be no question as to which of these holds the dominant position in the

mind of the Westminster fathers.

The reaction of monarchical sovereignty upon the concept of faith was through its implication that faith is essentially intellectual appropriation, and the consequent making of knowledge dominant and controlling. Its influence upon the concept of Christ's ministry was through its implication that his death is of supreme importance, and the consequent obscuring of the personal and ethical values of his ministry. Such forensic reasoning attaches this supreme importance to Christ's death in itself as the guarantee of pardon. "When Christ says, 'I lay down my life for the sheep,' he means that by his death he is doing or gaining something for them. 'He gave himself a ransom for all': his blood is shed for the forgiveness of sin. Only then can we speak of love in connection with Christ's death if his death was a vicarious sacrifice by which propitiation was made to God for our sins."

E. H. Klotsche, Christian Symbolics, p. 162.

PART III

THE CONTENT ANALYSIS

CHAPTER IX

THE ELEMENTS OF THE FORENSIC THEORY

- I. The ~~Experiential~~ ^{Practical} Element.
 - A. The Need of A New Pattern of Thought.
 - B. The Need of Agreement with Religious Experience.
 - C. The Need of a Fresh Formulation.
- II. The Traditional Element.
 - A. The Foundation in Pauline Teaching.
 - B. The Precedents in the Church Fathers.
 - C. The Influence of the Anselmic Theory.
- III. The Distinctive Element.
 - A. The ~~Personal~~ ^{Experiential} Contribution of Luther.
 - B. The Systematic Contribution of Calvin.
 - C. The Philosophical Contribution of Turretin.

CHAPTER IX

THE ELEMENTS OF THE FORENSIC THEORY

It seems likely that, originally, sacrifice meant much more than death: it was the offering of all that was lifted up to heaven. But the system was misunderstood, and the church in the middle ages narrowed the idea of sacrifice to that of death, and thought of it as expiatory in character. As Bishop Hicks declares, "Once the idea of sacrifice is limited to the act of death, the Cross becomes an altar and 'offer' becomes equivalent to 'immolate'."

F. C. N. Hicks, The Fulness of Sacrifice, p. 312.

The Reformers protested and revolted against this idea and all the supposed possibilities of the "application" of sacrifice leading to a quantitative idea of sins and masses. It seemed to them to impugn the all-sufficiency of the Cross, which they considered unique, all-availing, and possessed of infinite merit. They believed themselves confronted with two alternatives forcing a choice--the preaching of the Cross or "another gospel."

I. THE ^{Practical}~~Experiential~~ ELEMENT.

The preaching of the Cross necessarily called for a definite concept of its nature and value for the believer. In thinking over their problem the theologians must have thought of the short-cut offered by Scotist theory. The Scotists asserted that whatever God's will

determined, as by some arbitrary fiat, was therefore right. If the Protestants had been willing to accept this view as exponents of the sacrificial satisfaction of Christ, they would be freed from the necessity of justifying it either to the conscience or the reason. But this they would not do. So their consciousness of justification "needed for its support the rock-like foundation of a work of atonement resting on an eternal ground of righteousness-- not a mere governmental expedient, but such a work as would secure the conscience against all sense of arbitrariness in the pardon bestowed" (James Orr, *Op. Cit.*, p. 256).

Now the outstanding fact of the social situation was the change in the social organization from feudalism to monarchy. From the point of view of a feudal society the argument of Anselm is intelligible and convincing (Shailer Mathews, *Op. Cit.*, p. 106). But monarchy brought in the new pattern of thought. The old argument was no longer convincing because of the change in the pattern which was the presupposition of the theory. The only way in which the satisfaction of Christ could once more bring assurance that God could forgive, was by restating the theory in terms of monarchical sovereignty. The mental tension could be resolved only when "the assurance-giving interpretation placed upon the death of Christ" was "derived from the same pattern as that which

gave rise to the question concerning the credibility or even possibility of the already experienced salvation" (Shailer Mathews, Op. Cit., p. 38).

The Anselmic theory did not satisfy the need for a rational theory of Christ's satisfaction because of the further defect of its sacrifice of the testimony of religious experience. Anselm approached Christ's atonement more as a problem in scholastic philosophy than as a fact of concrete religious experience demanding some adequate explanation. The Protestants would not accept theology which was not in accord with their fresh religious experience. They had a very acute consciousness of sin and its guilt. Once they had been terrified by fear of punishment for their sins; now they had found peace. They wanted a view of the atonement marked by its faithfulness to religious experience. Luther did not attempt "to prove, almost a priori, why the crucifixion must have taken place, but rather to give some explanation of the fact that in the contemplation of the Cross he had found peace" (L. W. Grensted, Ed., Op. Cit., p. 221).

The influence of monarchical sovereignty and the consciousness of the inadequate explanation of religious experience explains the measure of acceptance and rejection of the Anselmic theory upon the part of Luther."

W. F. Lofthouse, Altar, Cross, and Community, p. 228.

He accepted with Anselm the ideas of satisfaction and substitution, and believed that Anselm had demonstrated that Christ, as our substitute, had made a perfect satisfaction of the claim of God upon the sinner. He saw further that if this were true, it was incongruous to add to this the puny satisfactions of man as part of salvation. But, while the Anselmic theory contained so much of truth, he felt that it offers no theory of the way in which Christ effects this satisfaction. Luther had felt his failure to carry out God's immutable will, expressed in the law, as a barrier between himself and God, the Judge. If the thought of the Cross brought him peace, it was not unnatural for him to hold that the Cross was the removal of the barrier, the satisfying of the claims of the law which stood between him and God's love. Since the Anselmic theory did not show how this barrier was broken down by Christ, there was need for a new theory of the atonement.

II. THE TRADITIONAL ELEMENT.

The makers of the Forensic theory believed they were returning to the teaching of St. Paul (II Corinthians 5:21; Romans 8:3,4; II Corinthians 5:14,15; Galatians 3:10-14; Romans 1:16,17; I Corinthians 15:3). Numerous volumes have been published to prove that St. Paul did not hold the idea of legal satisfaction, but a recent writer still holds that "in spite of the attractive exegesis of Romans 3:24-26, which has recently been put forward by Dr. Anderson

Scott in his book, Christianity According to St. Paul, it seems most probable that the real starting point of the Forensic theory of Christ's satisfaction is to be found in St. Paul's epistles. This view is supported by so outstanding a modern authority as Lietzmann in his Commentary on Romans" (W. R. Matthews, Ed., Dogma, p. 126). There was an attempt to wield the rudimentary ideas of St. Paul into a coherent system, while the theologians were not unmindful of the forensic precedents in the church fathers, and the great contribution of Anselm. A. A. Hodge entitles one of his chapters: "The Reformed Doctrine As to the Nature of the Atonement Proved to Have Been the Faith of the Entire Christian Church Through All Ages."

It is not within the scope of our subject to attempt to decide whether St. Paul taught a theory of legal satisfaction, or merely used the terminology of legalism to deny its spirit. We are here concerned with the impact of his mind upon that of the Reformers in connection with the Forensic theory of the atonement. Fundamental pre-suppositions derived from him were: the righteousness of God; the wrath of God; reconciliation with God through Jesus Christ. The Cross, then, was the revelation of the righteousness and love and mercy of God. Justification itself is justified by the death of Christ. "That death has allowed God, as it were, to act as a gracious Judge and say to the convicted sinner, 'not guilty,' and declare

him righteous before the law. In a legal situation, God did not exercise his omnipotent right to pardon whom he would. So the law and its representatives were considered and fully satisfied by Christ's death. In justification God was legally just, and there was no ground for complaint."

The Forensic (realist) view of the atonement as found in the church fathers is summed up by Tixeront as follows: "The sinner must expiate his faults and satisfy divine justice. Jesus Christ substitutes himself for all men.... By his sufferings and death he pays our debt to God and ransoms us. He expiates our sins by undergoing the penalty due to us; he satisfies justice, he appeases God's anger, and makes him favorable. In a word, he offers to God the expiatory and propitiatory sacrifice, which blots out the sins of the world" (L. W. Grensted, Ed., Op. Cit., p. 187). While secondary to the mystical view in the Greek fathers, it is the predominant view among the Latin Fathers. Especially pertinent are the ideas of substitutionary functional value (Eusebius); the satisfaction of Christ (Tertullian) made possible by his voluntariness (Hilary) and deity (Ambrose); and the supremacy of the death of Christ, which Tertullian called "the whole weight and fruit of the Christian religion" (totum Christiani nominis et pondus et fructus).

The significance of Anselm for the invention of the Forensic theory lies in the fact that his theory forms

the point of departure, and furnishes three fundamental presuppositions of great importance. First, was the metaphysical necessity of the death of Christ paralleled in the Forensic theory by the idea of the necessity of God to punish the sinner; second, the idea that sin is a debt of obligation to God's honor which involves eternal punishment, paralleled by the idea that Christ suffered the tortures of the damned soul in hell; third, the idea that Christ satisfied God's offended honor, and won by his merit salvation for believers, paralleled by the idea that the value of Christ's satisfaction was fully equivalent in value (if not in quantity) to the sins of the elect. As a matter of fact Luther gave us a new theory of the atonement, although he never thought of anything as ambitious as that.

III. THE DISTINCTIVE ELEMENT.

After the social stimulus has set the religious thinker to work, and he has felt the impact of the thinkers who have preceded him, comes the process of putting into language the results of his mental labor. This process develops through three stages: the ^{experiential}~~experiential~~, the systematic, and the philosophical. The ability to feel deeply the distinctive values of religious experience is an essential ^{quality}~~element~~ in the ^{experiential}~~experiential~~ thinker, and this capacity was outstanding in Luther, the originator of the Forensic theory. An intellect characterized by logical consistency is necessary for the systematic

thinker, and Calvin was outstanding in this quality of mind. Speculative power and rational interest are prerequisites of the philosophical thinker, and Turretin, in whom the Forensic theory reached its culmination, has been called "the Aristotle of theology."

The contributions of Luther to the Forensic theory were: shifting the emphasis from God's private satisfaction to the vindication of public right--a great gain over any preceding theory of the atonement; showing that the death of Christ operates on man by faith, self-identification with Christ as bearer (and bearer away) of sins, and as the perfectly righteous and obedient son of God; introducing the idea that the satisfaction of Christ was by means of punishment for our sins. To Luther, sin was something which called aloud for punishment. "If he was not punished for it by actual and eternal ruin, some one must be punished for it instead. Who could that be except Christ? Thus the satisfaction wrought on the Cross was penal and vicarious" (W. F. Lofthouse, *Op. Cit.*, p.230).

We quote the classical summary of Luther's view of the atonement: "Although now purely out of grace our sin is non-imputed to us by God, yet he would nevertheless not do this, unless satisfaction should first be fully and superfluously rendered to his law and his justice. It was required that such gracious imputation should first be purchased and secured for us from his justice. Therefore since this was impossible for us, he appointed One

for us in our stead, who should take upon himself all the punishment which we had merited, and fulfil for us the law, and thus avert from us God's judgment and reconcile his wrath."

The systematic interest of Calvin is manifested in two important chapters of his Institutes which deal with the atonement of Christ. Chapter xvi (Book II) discusses "how Christ performed the Office of Redeemer in Procuring our Salvation," and contains the famous passage on the descent into hell. In Chapter xvii Calvin argues the thesis: "Christ Rightly and Properly Said to Have Merited Grace and Salvation for Us." The three leading divisions attempt to prove: that the grace of God and the merit of Christ are "perfectly compatible"; that Christ, by his obedience, even to the death of the Cross, merited divine favor for us; and that the Schoolmen fall into presumptuous rashness in treating this doctrine. Calvin is more affected by the sovereignty of God than the consciousness of guilt, and his zeal almost betrays him into accepting the "acceptilation" theory of Duns Scotus.

In Book I, Chapter xv, section 6, of the Institutes, we have a general statement of Calvin's view which suggests that his work on the atonement was largely formulating the unrelated ideas of Luther; "With regard to the priesthood, we must briefly hold its end and use to be, that as a mediator, free from all taint, he may by his own holiness procure the favor of God for us. But because a deserved

curse obstructs the entrance, and God in his character of Judge is hostile to us, expiation must necessarily intervene, that as a priest employed to appease the wrath of God, he may reinstate us in his favor. Wherefore, in order that Christ might fulfil this office, it behooved him to appear with a sacrifice By the sacrifice of his death he wiped away our guilt, and made satisfaction for sin."

In his three-volume Institutes, Turretin devotes five chapters to the atonement--a portion translated^d into English from the Latin. Turretin begins his scholastic argument with Chapter I, "On the Necessity of the Atonement," in which he seeks to refute the Socinian denial of any necessity for atonement, and also the idea of a hypothetical necessity, by showing the errors in the views of the nature of sin, of the satisfaction itself, of God's character, and of the Christ who renders it; and then gives positive reasons for holding to the absolute necessity of the atonement. Chapter II, "On the Truth of the Atonement," deals with the Scriptural proof, and the three following chapters are concerned with the perfection, substance, and extent of the atonement. One must admire the effectiveness of the case Turretin makes, provided only that he is granted his basic contention stated as follows: "Sin is of necessity to be punished impersonally, but every sinner is not therefore of necessity to be punished personally. Through the singular mercy of God

some may be exempted from punishment, by the substitution of a surety in their stead" (James R. Willson, Op. Cit., p. 223).

With the Socinian arguments as the object of attack, Turretin deals with the question of satisfaction. Holding that sin is a crime as well as a debt, he defends the compatibility of satisfaction and forgiveness. His view is that satisfaction consists in the bearing of punishment, while forgiveness is the admission and acceptance of Christ as a substitute. In a characteristic passage, we find this confident reasoning: "Satisfaction and remission are inconsistent with one another when referred to the same thing, but not so when they are referred to different things. Satisfaction has God for its object, remission man for its object. Satisfaction is made by Christ to God for man, and yet man is freely pardoned. Justice and mercy reciprocate. Justice is exercised against sin as imputed to Christ, and mercy, free and sovereign mercy is shown to sinners. The pardon granted to us is entirely of grace, while full satisfaction is demanded of the surety. Nothing is demanded of us, full payment having been made by Christ" (James. R. Willson, Op. Cit., p. 249).

The Cross of Christ was the warrant for all the ecclesiastical machinery developed by the Roman Catholic church at the time of the Reformation, and the same Cross of Christ was the warrant for repudiation of that

machinery by the Protestant church. Upon the basis of St. Paul, the Greek and Latin Fathers, and Anselm himself, they developed the Forensic theory through the experiential, and the systematic, to the philosophical stage. They believed that their theory described a salvation which accords with instinctive conceptions of penalty; that it holds to an uncompromising union of justice and love; that it "offers a pardon to every criminal; provides a cure for every spiritual ailment; and turns the penal consequences of sin into agents in man's moral improvement."

CHAPTER X

THE NECESSITY AND PRE-CONDITIONS OF ATONEMENT

- I. The Necessity for Atonement.
 - A. The Decree of Election.
 - B. The Decree of Punishment.
 - C. The Decree of Pardon.
- II. The Pre-Conditions of Atonement.
 - A. The Possibility of Legal Substitution.
 - B. The Nature of Legal Substitution.
 - C. The Presuppositions of Legal Substitution.

CHAPTER X

THE NECESSITY AND PRE-CONDITIONS OF ATONEMENT

It must be constantly kept in mind that the Reformed theologians thought of the atonement as a method of reconciliation, primarily in connection with the divine purpose appointing it, and the divine power making it effectual. The Reformed confessions teach divinity in its application to humanity. Always the sovereignty of God is a guiding and ruling idea, and the glory of the divine sovereignty was the concern of the theologians. "To uphold the honor of the Lawgiver was the first and the last thought of theologians of the Calvinistic type." They saw divine glory in the sovereign decrees, and greater glory in the sovereign expedient for reconciling their contradictory character.

I. THE NECESSITY FOR ATONEMENT.

Since the sovereignty of God is absolute, there was no obligation upon him either to create or to save mankind. As with the political monarch, the ultimate motive of all his acts is found on himself alone. Redemption is a purely sovereign determination of the divine will. John M. Armour writes emphatically on this point: "No doctrine of redemption that in any way casts the slightest shadow over the high mountain of divine sovereignty can be tolerated for a moment. All theologies that in any manner teach or imply that there was any obligation upon

God to do this or that for fallen, rebellious subjects of law, are unscriptural, unreasonable, if not blasphemous. Divine sovereignty is to be recognized in determining to save any fallen one, in determining who should be saved, in 'choosing,' 'raising up,' and 'delivering up' the Savior, and in the Savior's giving up of himself."

A. THE DECREE OF ELECTION.

Absolute sovereignty forbids that God should be moved to action by anything outside of himself. Why, then, did he issue his decree of election to eternal life? The answer is found in the consideration of the glory of his executive sovereignty. Since God is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, his motive in creation must have been "just the exercise of his own essential perfections, and in their exercise the manifestation of their excellence" (A. A. Hodge, *Op. Cit.*, p. 48). In other words, God created for the glory of his infinite power. His glory as monarch required some action for the exercise of his essential perfections; otherwise their excellence would not be manifested. The action took the form of creation, and so his creatures must serve his glory. God created man "to glorify and enjoy him forever."

The full glory of God's executive sovereignty requires the exercise of all his perfections, and the manifestation of all his excellences. The creature must not only be a means to the end of God's glory, but the best possible means to the entire glory of God. The executive glory

of God requires the submission of the creature to the creator. Reverence, obedience, and obeisance are essential in man, as well as his creation, if the authority of God is to be exercised, and its excellence manifested. Sovereignty demands such recognition and exaltation, and full glory requires absolute submission. The spirit of man must bow in homage and devotion before God as the source of all excellence and dignity. Piety involves faith which prompts unquestioning obedience, even when the reason for the command of God is hidden.

Since God as absolute monarch is moved only by his "good pleasure", and the glory of his executive sovereignty moved him to create men to serve his glory through absolute submission, he decreed the election of some of mankind to eternal life. They were to be as courtiers--loyal, reverent, and ready to do his will. "Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to his eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will, hath chosen in Christ unto everlasting glory, out of his mere free grace and love, without any foresight of faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any thing in the creature, as conditions, or causes moving him thereunto; and to the praise of his glorious grace."

Westminster Confession of Faith, III, 5.

The undiminished glory of God's executive sovereignty

called for his eternal decree of election to life with him.

B. THE DECREE OF PUNISHMENT.

The glory of God's legislative sovereignty ~~also~~ required the decree of punishment. The glory of God is the end of the precepts of the law, for they are commanded in exercise of his attribute of holiness. The holy is that which is intrinsically right. "All involved in the preceptive part (of the law) is commanded because it is intrinsically right and obligatory." If the ultimate motive of God's actions is in himself, the purpose of the law must be the manifestation of his excellence by the exercise of his perfections. "If the thing commanded is intrinsically right, then the true reason for the commandment is in the nature of the thing itself, and not in its effects upon the universe." (A. A. Hodge, Op. Cit., p. 60). God's legislative sovereignty required for its glory the precepts of the law. These serve the glory of his legislative sovereignty in that they embody his holiness or that which is intrinsically right.

A law cannot exist without penalties as sanctions, and the penalties are just as essential to the divine glory as the precepts. The holiness of God is exercised in punishing as well as commanding, since the punishment is for that which is intrinsically wrong. "As we have seen that the reason of the precept is the intrinsic rightness of the thing commanded, so the reason of the penalty is the intrinsic demerit of the thing forbidden.

As the chief end of the precept is the glory of God, that is, the manifestation of his excellence through the exercise of his attributes as they are concerned in commanding, so the chief end of the penalty is his glory through the exercise of his attributes as they are concerned in punishing" (A. A. Hodge, Op. Cit., p. 63).

If the full glory of the legislative sovereignty of God requires both the precepts and the penalties of the law, then it calls for the decree of punishment for all violations of it. "It is an intrinsic and immutable attribute of sin that it ought to be punished" (A. A. Hodge, Op. Cit., p. 55). It is just as necessary for God to set the penalties as to command the precept, for the glory of his legislative sovereignty requires both these actions. So he "has decreed and made known that every violation of the law he has prescribed for man in the conduct of his life will be followed (or punished) by painful consequences here or hereafter" (D. M. Ross, Op. Cit., p. 183). As God's executive sovereignty calls for the decree of election for its glory, his legislative sovereignty demands the decree of punishment that its glory may be perfect.

C. THE DECREE OF PARDON.

Further, the judicial sovereignty of God requires the decree of pardon for fallen man that its glory may be complete. This requirement follows from the fact that his judicial sovereignty requires absolute justice for its

glory. Absolute justice requires the infliction of punishment for every sin. God cannot be unjust, and "justice is as essentially involved in the infliction of the penalty as it is in the imposition of the precept... it would be unjust not to punish" (A. A. Hodge, Op. Cit., p. 70). The remission of penalties would reflect upon the law, and so the legislative sovereignty of God. The glory of sovereignty calls for the universal, uniform operation of justice, enforced through penalties as sanctions of the law. "As the moral principle involved in every precept cannot be compromised, so the divine judgment of the ill-desert of sin involved in all penalty cannot be relaxed. The precept and the penalty alike express the infallible judgment of the divine intelligence, on a question of moral obligation founded on the divine nature" (A. A. Hodge, Op. Cit., p. 63).

But the benevolent character of God makes it inevitable that he should also require mercy for the full glory of his judicial sovereignty. If the perfection of benevolence is to be exercised and its excellence manifested, there must be mercy as well as justice in the administration of the law. If justice calls for the exaction of the penalty for every sin, mercy requires the remission of the penalties of the elect. Both are essential to the glory of the divine judicial sovereignty. "It is claimed that benevolence is as essential an element of the divine nature as is holy abhorrence of

sin....The infinite moral perfection of God stands affected as benevolence to all his creatures, considered simply as sentient beings. Without any change in itself, its relations only being changed, it is mercy in respect to all miserable creatures" (A. A. Hodge, Op. Cit., pp. 56, 57).

The full glory of the judicial sovereignty of God requires both mercy and justice, and hence the decree of the conditional pardon of the elect. Pardon is remission of penalty and so implies mercy; it is granted on condition that the claims of the law are satisfied, and so implies justice. It is the manifested excellence of the benevolence of God, the exercise of which toward guilty creatures is called grace.

"O Father, gracious was that word which closed
Thy sovereign sentence, that man should find grace,
For which both heaven and earth shall high extol
Thy praises, with the innumerable sound
Of hymns and sacred songs, wherewith thy throne
Encompass'd shall resound thee ever blest."

--Paradise Lost, Book III.

II. THE PRE-CONDITIONS OF ATONEMENT.

The fall of all mankind in Adam's first sin seemed to introduce contradiction and conflict between the decrees of God, and so detriment to the glory of his eternal sovereign majesty. His decree of election was apparently to be defeated by the sin of man. The reason was that his decree of punishment for every sin (and man had sinned) was incompatible with his decree of pardon or remission of penalties for the elect. The problem was to retain

the glory of his executive sovereignty, his legislative sovereignty, and his judicial sovereignty all at once. If the decree of pardon was sacrificed, the decree of punishment could be carried out; if the decree of pardon for the elect was executed, the decree of punishment must be sacrificed. The divine solution of this problem brought even greater glory to the heavenly sovereign through the expedient of legal substitution (subrogatio), which provided for the execution of all three decrees. As whipping boys were provided to bear the punishment of the misdemeanors of royal princes, so the penalties of the elect might be shifted to other shoulders.

H. Maldwyn Hughes, What is the Atonement?, p. 127.

A. THE POSSIBILITY OF LEGAL SUBSTITUTION.

Legal substitution is possible, because God, as sovereign, is the supreme Judge, and not an inferior one. When he agreed that justice has been satisfied, there is nothing more to be said. Turretin argues: God "must be considered not as an inferior judge appointed by law. An officer of that character cannot remit anything of the rigor of the law by transferring the punishment, from the actual offender, to another person. God must be viewed in his true character, as a supreme judge who giveth account of none of his matters, who will satisfy his justice by the punishment of sin, and who, through his infinite wisdom, and unspeakable mercy, determines to do this in such a way as shall relax somewhat of the extreme

rigor of punishment, by admitting a substitute, and letting the sinner go free" (James R. Willson, Op. Cit., pp. 223, 224).

Again, legal substitution is possible because the manner and circumstances of the bearing of the punishment demanded by the law are not essential. Turretin insists that we distinguish between the enforcing of the penalty, and the manner and circumstances under which it is enforced. The former is essential, but the latter is not. God's justice requires that every sin be punished, but does not dictate how the penalty shall be enforced. The manner and circumstances of the punishment are to be arranged according to his sovereign will and pleasure. "It may seem fit to the goodness of God that there should be, in relation to time, a delay of punishment--in relation to degree, a mitigation of it, and in relation to persons a substitution. For although the person sinning deserves punishment and might be punished with strictest justice, yet such punishment is not necessarily, indispensable. For persons of great importance, there may be a transfer of the punishment to a surety. In this sense it is said by divines that sin is of necessity punished impersonally, but every sinner is not therefore of necessity to be punished personally (James R. Willson, Op. Cit., p. 223).

Once more, substitution is possible because of the legitimacy of legal satisfaction in the case of a penal

debt. In paying a pecuniary debt, the exact amount of it is offered to the creditor, for nothing else is acceptable, and so no substitute is possible. But in the case of a penal debt, it may be that "the payment is not precisely that which is demanded in the obligation, but an equivalent. In this case, though the creditor has a right to refuse the acceptance of such payment, yet he admits it and esteems it a payment, which is entitled a satisfaction" (James R. Willson, Op. Cit., p. 221).

Because sin incurs a penal debt, and a penal debt may be paid by satisfaction, it is possible for a substitute to bear the punishment of the sinner.

B. THE NATURE OF LEGAL SUBSTITUTION.

What sort of an equivalent will be demanded when the substitute offers a satisfaction instead of the original punishment demanded from the sinner? Since satisfaction is the exhaustion of an obligation by its performance, or some act equivalent to it, this act may be exactly the same as that owed by the debtor, exactly equivalent in kind, in quantity and quality. But this is not necessarily the case. There may be alternatives as to the kind of equivalence. The essential thing to be remembered is that God "demands a punishment not numerically but specifically the same which we owed" (James R. Willson, Op. Cit., p. 222). If the sinner is to be freed from the penalty of his sin, the surety in the act of satisfaction must bear not an exact but a specific equivalent of the

punishment which the sinner owed.

A specific equivalent does not require that the substitute must bear the identical punishment owed by the sinner, or the quantitative amount of his debt, but that the "same nature which has sinned must make restitution for the sin" (James R. Willson, Op. Cit., p. 224). This means that no animal could act as a substitute for the human sinner, and so bear his punishment as to make a true satisfaction to justice. It means also that no angel could perform that kindly deed of mercy for the sinner. Neither the animal kingdom below, nor the angelic kingdom above could help the sinner by taking his place. A true substitution requires a human substitute for the bearing of the punishment of the human sinner. A common nature, "that sin may be punished in the same nature which is guilty, is a condition of specific equivalence, and so of true satisfaction through substitution" (James R. Willson, Op. Cit., p. 225).

Specific equivalence also requires equal value. Quantitative measurements do not apply, but there must be equivalence in value. Otherwise there is no true satisfaction and substitution. And in the case of the infinite guilt of sin calling for eternal punishment as its infinite penalty, the equivalence of value calls for an infinite satisfaction. As Turretin says, "the consideration given must possess infinite value, in order to *effect*

the removal of the infinite demerit of sin" (James R. Willson, Op. Cit., p. 225). This would require a substitute with infinite capacity for loyalty and obedience, and infinite ability to suffer for others because he did not need to suffer for himself. Only a perfect religious subject could fully endure all the penalties of the sinner, and discharge all his obligations to the law.

C. THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF LEGAL SUBSTITUTION.

A presupposition of acceptable substitution for the sinner is the consent of the surety. God cannot send out, as was sometimes done by a press gang, and round up some individual whom he forces to bear the punishment instead of the sinner. The injustice of such a procedure would be obvious. The obvious condition of a just substitution is willingness to suffer instead of the offender. If the substitute were not willing, he would be suffering not punishment, but the persecution of a martyr. True substitution requires willingness in the heart of the surety, whatever be the motive of that consent. There is necessary "the consent of the will, that he should voluntarily take the burden upon himself" (James R. Willson, Op. Cit., p. 225), and since sin brings infinite punishment, the substitute must be willing to bear infinite punishment.

Another presupposition of acceptable substitution is that the substitute be a responsible party. He must know what he is doing, and have the right to suffer the

punishment of the sinner, if he chooses to do so. Justice requires that the substitute be the captain of his soul, that he have the power to do what he wants to do--"power and right over his own life, so that, of his own right, he may resolve respecting his own life or death" (James R. Willson, Op. Cit., p. 225). He must have this power and right over his life, because the penalty of sin is death. If the surety is going to act as substitute, he must suffer the penalty of death for the sins of the sinner. He must be one who knows what sin and its consequences mean, has faced the penalty which they bring, and has the right to give his life in the place of that of the sinner.

A third presupposition of a just substitution is that the substitute possess sufficient capacity for his task. It would avail nothing if the substitute were unable to bear (and bear away) the punishment of the sinner, were he never so willing, and possessed of the ability and right to lay down his life for the sinner. The substitute must have "the power of bearing the punishment....., and of freeing both himself and us from the power of death; because, if he himself, could be holden of death, he could free no one from its dominion" (James R. Willson, Op. Cit., p. 225). The substitute must be able to discharge every obligation of conformity and punishment owed by the sinner for whom he is making satisfaction. The law must not be cheated of its due, and so the substitute

must be able to satisfy it in every particular. Full satisfaction through substitution is a just and effective way of remitting the penalties due the sinner for his disobedience to the law.

The Reformed theologians declared the necessity of atonement to lie in God's contradictory decrees of election to eternal life, punishment for every sin, and pardon for the elect; and its pre-conditions to be the possibility, nature, and presuppositions of the expedient of legal substitution. The poet expresses their confidence in a moving interrogation and answer:

".....should man finally be lost, should man
Thy creature late so loved, thy youngest son,
Fall circumvented thus by fraud, though join'd
With his own folly? That be from Thee far,
That far be from Thee, Father, who art Judge
Of all things made, and judgest only right."

--Paradise Lost, Book III.

CHAPTER XI

THE NATURE, APPLICATION, AND EFFECT OF ATONEMENT

- I. The Nature of the Atoning Power.
 - A. The Appointment to Suretyship.
 - B. The Equivalence of Christ's Satisfaction.
 - C. The Conformity to Requirements.
- II. The Application of the Atoning Power.
 - A. The Non-Imputation of Guilt to Believers.
 - B. The Imputation of Guilt to Christ.
 - C. The Imputation of Righteousness to Believers.
- III. The Effect of the Atoning Power.
 - A. The Act of Justification.
 - B. The Motive of Gratitude.
 - C. The Life of Loyalty.

CHAPTER XI

THE NATURE, APPLICATION, AND EFFECT OF ATONEMENT

John Milton represents the Father holding counsel in heaven, discussing the sin of man, the misfortune it brought upon him, and the necessary conditions of recovering the paradise from which Adam and Eve had been expelled. There comes the query as to who shall undertake the execution of the divine expedient for the elect. All the angels stand silent at the cost of this charity, and then the Son speaks:

"Behold me, then; me for him, life for life
I offer; on me let thine anger fall."

--Paradise Lost, Book III.

The Father accepts the intervention of the Son on behalf of mankind, and Christ agrees to all the necessary conditions of human salvation.

I. THE NATURE OF THE ATONING POWER.

God executed his divine expedient of substitution in the work of Jesus Christ, his Son. James Buchanan writes: "There may be other methods of mediation more or less partial, in many conceivable cases; but he identified himself with his people, and acted toward God as their substitute and representative. His legal liability on their account depended on his taking their law-place, and becoming answerable for them at the bar of justice; and as this is involved in the kind of mediation which is

ascribed to him in Scripture, so it is fully expressed when he is called 'the surety' or 'the sponsor' of the covenant; for just as a cautioner becomes the legal substitute of a debtor, and is liable for the payment of whatever he undertakes to discharge, Christ became surety for the debts of his people, when they were bankrupt, and 'had nothing to pay.'"

The Doctrine of Justification, p. 299.

An initial requirement in winning back salvation for the elect was that of being appointed legal surety for the race. Such a one has authority to act in its stead (any obligations he incurs becoming those of his descendants after him). So Christ became our surety and bound himself for the whole human race to pay off the debt of punishment and render a perfect obedience to the will of the heavenly Father. Luther writes: "He has ordained one for us in our place, who should take upon himself all our punishments, which we had deserved, and fulfil the law for us, and thus turn them from us and reconcile God's wrath."

Another requirement in winning salvation is that of paying an equivalent in satisfaction of the original debt of punishment and obligation to obedience. At first the tendency was to stress the literal equivalence of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ. In one of Luther's extreme statements we have: "Christ really and truly offered himself to the Father for eternal punishment on our behalf."

Christ was thought to have endured on the Cross the very pangs of hell. Calvin interpreted the clause in the Apostle's Creed as referring to the necessity for him to engage "as it were at close quarters with the powers of hell, and the horrors of eternal death." He declares that "there is nothing strange in its being said that he descended to hell, seeing he endured the death which is inflicted on the wicked by an angry God" (Institutes, II, xvi, 10).

But the equivalence of the satisfaction is chiefly found in two factors: first, that Christ suffered in the same nature as that which sinned. Here was the motive of the incarnation. Christ became man that he might make atonement for the sins of the people. Calvin writes: "Our Lord came forth very man, adopted the person of Adam, and assumed his name, that he might in his stead obey the Father; that he might present our flesh as the price of satisfaction to the just judgment of God, and in the same flesh pay the penalty which we had incurred" (Institutes, II, xii, 3). Charles Hodge avers: "It was for the accomplishment of this purpose of mercy that he assumed our nature, was born of a woman, and did and suffered all that he was called upon to do and to endure in working out our salvation."

Systematic Theology, II, p. 52.

The other necessity in a true satisfaction is equivalence of value, and this was guaranteed by the divine

nature of Christ, as made plain by Turretin: "Though a death of infinite value was due for every individual sinner, yet such a death as Christ's is quite sufficient for the redemption of the whole elect world...penal satisfaction is appreciated by the dignity of the person who makes it, and is increased in worth in proportion to his dignity, and hence avails for many as well as for one.....Christ alone is more excellent than all men together. The dignity of an infinite person swallows up all the infinities of punishment due to us--they sink into it and are lost...One cannot satisfy for many, when he and they are of the same rank. One plebeian cannot satisfy for many plebeians; but one prince may satisfy for many plebeians. If this is admitted among creatures who are all finite and mortal, how much more between creatures and the Creator, between whom there is an infinite distance" (James R. Willson, Op. Cit., pp. 251, 252).

In his saving work Jesus Christ fulfilled all the obligations of legal substitution. Describing the consent of the surety, Milton represents Christ's willingness to undertake the intervention which he proposed:

"Account me man; I for his sake will leave
 Thy bosom, and this glory next to thee
 Freely put off, and for him lastly die
 Well pleased; on me let Death wreak all his rage."

--Paradise Lost, Book III.

The events of Christ's ministry, especially those of the last week of his life, make it clear that Christ offered

himself willingly on the Cross for the sins of the people. God did not force him to die; there was no compulsion about it. "He set his face steadfastly to go up to Jerusalem."

Another obligation of legal suretyship fulfilled by Jesus was that of being a responsible moral agent. Christ "had sovereign right over his own life to dispose of it as he willed" (A. A. Hodge, Op. Cit., p. 29). By virtue of this right he made his decision to yield the life that the Father had given to him saying:

".....thou hast given me to possess
Life in myself for ever; by thee I live,
Though now to Death I yield, and am his due,
All that of me can die."

--Paradise Lost, Book III.

And Turretin quotes Christ's words in John 10:18: "No one taketh away my life, but I lay it down of myself, for I have power to lay it down, and take it up again."

The remaining essential of acceptable substitution is that the surety possess sufficient capacity to reinstate the prisoner in the favor of the king. Now Christ was fully capable of enacting the role of surety for mankind, for as the Westminster Confession of Faith (XI,3) emphatically says: "Christ, by his obedience and death, did fully discharge the debt of all those who are justified, and did make a proper, real and full satisfaction to his Father's justice in their behalf." Luther seems to delight in dwelling upon the victory of Jesus over

all the enemies of mankind. He took the things which had been committed by us to satisfy for them, and in doing so "Jesus Christ, the Son of God, dies on the Cross and bears my sin, law, death, devil, hell in His own body" (Quoted by L. W. Grensted, Op. Cit., p. 215).

II. THE APPLICATION OF THE ATONING POWER.

God as sovereign and moral governor of the universe has imputed guilt to the human race on account of its fall in Adam. Disobedience to the laws he has decreed inevitably results in the imputation of guilt to the offender. God holds the human race responsible for discharging its obligation of punishment, due not only to personal individual sins, but to the racial transgression and fall. The first man was our legal representative, and in his sin the whole race sinned. So because we have descended from Adam by ordinary generation God imputes racial guilt to us. Adam's obligation to bear punishment owed on account of the first sin, is ours as well as his, by legal imputation apart from our own consciousness and will.

The first step in the application of Christ's work is the non-imputation of racial guilt to the believer. No longer is he held responsible for the sin of Adam and his obligation of punishment. His account is cleared of all charges, and he can no longer be arraigned for inherited guilt. The cloud under which he was born is removed, and never can return to darken his career. Christ

is the "obtainer of forgiveness for our sinnes; and by his blood all our spots of sins be washed cleane: he hath pacified and set at one, all things by the blood of his crosse;...he by the same one only sacrifice, which he once offered upon the crosse, hath brought to effect, and fulfilled all things."

English Confession, 1562.

If a prisoner is to be pardoned, the guilt which is the ground of punishment must be lifted from his shoulders. This is accomplished by a legal act of imputation. The offense of the criminal automatically caused the imputation of guilt to him incident to his crime. The obligation to suffer the punishment prescribed by the sanction of the law is irrevocable and unavoidable. But the gracious character of the sovereign leads him to transfer this guilt to another, to impute it to a substitute. The substitute then becomes legally bound to discharge the debt of punishment owing to the law. Guilt, because it is a legal thing - liability to punishment - can be transferred. There is nothing mysterious or impossible about this legal transfer. There is no guilt without imputation, and when the object of the imputation is changed, the obligation to suffer punishment is changed along with it.

This is the means by which God pardons the sinner. The sinner has imputed to him the guilt of Adam, that is,

he is held responsible for suffering the punishment called for by Adam's sin. Before any pardon can be given, this punishment must be imputed to some other. Who will take the responsibility for discharging it? Jesus Christ offered himself. Just as God appointed the first Adam to be legal representative of the race, in whom all the race is to act, so Christ is the second Adam. God imputes the whole of the guilt and punishment due on account of the sin of Adam to Jesus Christ, and on the Cross he bears the load of guilt and discharges the obligation of punishment which belongs to the human race.

But pardon is more than imputation of one's guilt to another with consequent remission of penalties. The prisoner may have as a substitute a man with an unimpeachable record of obedience. The friend has never failed to be a loyal subject of the sovereign, has always obeyed his laws, and has even exceeded their requirements in a remarkable way. The sovereign decides that for the sake of the substitute he will do more than merely impute the sinner's guilt to him. He will impute the righteousness of the substitute to the prisoner. This means that he will credit the prisoner with full obedience to the law. It will be as if the prisoner had never failed in obedience, and his record always perfect.

The analogy is clear between this conception of pardon and that of the imputed righteousness of Christ.

Imputation brings not only remission of the penalties of

the violated divine law, but also escape from the law itself. The way in which this is accomplished is through the transferred obedience of Jesus Christ. Not only does Christ bear the guilt of humanity imputed to him, but he also becomes the source of perfect obedience of the law for the believer. This righteousness of Christ is imputed by God to the believer. God acts as if Adam had never sinned, as if he had perfectly kept the law of the covenant of life. While formerly angry because of the guilt of mankind, believers united with Christ through faith and clothed with his righteousness are the objects of his favor.

III. THE EFFECT OF THE ATONING POWER.

As a result of the work of Christ, the curse of sin is overcome and the favor of God restored to the elect. Calvin puts it this way: "But because a deserved curse obstructs the entrance, and God in his character of Judge is hostile to us, expiation must necessarily intervene, that as a priest employed to appease the wrath of God, he may reinstate us in his favor." And again: "Our acquittal is in this--that the guilt which made us liable to punishment was transferred to the head of the Son of God. We must specially remember this substitution in order that we may not be all our lives in trepidation and anxiety, as if the just vengeance, which the Son of God transferred to Himself, were still impending over us" (Institutes, II, xvi, 5). Because Jesus Christ acts as his surety, and

makes substitution for him, the believer is freed from the law, has fellowship with God, finds the power of sin broken, death conquered, the devil vanquished, and salvation prepared as he looks to the Savior in faith.

A friend has offered himself as substitute for a disobedient royal subject. When the time for trial has come, the prisoner is summoned into court. The judge enters and the case is called. His honor announces that he has granted a pardon. He officially declares that the demands of the law have been met by the offer of the person acting as substitute. The guilt will be imputed to him, and on account of his wonderful record the offender is given a new status. He is now restored to the favor of the king, for pardon is an act of will by which there is cancelled that aspect of an injury received which interrupts intercourse between the injured person and the offender (Ritschl). Due to the intervention of the substitute, the prisoner is free from the law through the act of justification performed by the judge.

In like manner God justifies the sinner on account of the vicarious suffering and perfect obedience of Christ. The Reformed theologians laid great stress upon the act which sets forth judicially the fact that the claims of the law have been satisfied, and that Christ has won a new status of favor for mankind. "This justification is a purely judicial act of God as judge, whereby he pardons all the sins of a believer, and

accounts, accepts, and treats him as a person righteous in the eyes of the divine law." Justification is a "declaring righteous," not a "making righteous." At the very moment the sinner by faith accepts the redemption of Jesus Christ as his hope of salvation, God cancels his sin with its penalties, and credits him with perfect righteousness which is the passport to his favor.

After the declaration of justification, and freedom to go anywhere and do anything he chooses, the prisoner must feel a sense of gratitude to the sovereign for his mercy. That mercy is manifested in allowing a substitute in the remission of penalties, and the new condition of credit in which the prisoner is placed. It is all a matter of grace. The prisoner has nothing to plead for himself, and in justice could expect nothing save the full penalties of the law. The beneficence of the sovereign saves him from the inexorable course of justice. His better impulses are aroused. He cannot be too thankful for the undeserved favor which has come to him. He must praise the sovereign for his large-heartedness.

God has manifested his mercy in Jesus Christ in a superlative way: (1) It was an act of mercy to mankind to permit a substitute; (2) It was a greater act of mercy that God not only permitted a substitute, but that he himself provided one, and himself became that substitute; (3) Since the law of God could neither be annulled

nor lowered, and sin could not go unpunished, God himself in the person of his Son submitted to the penalty in order to set man free (John 3:16). Such an act of mercy cannot fail to engender the deepest gratitude in the heart of man for his divine lover. It must draw from him deepest feelings of thanksgiving and foster a sense of indebtedness quite opposite to that due to his guilt. The old obligation to suffer punishment is displaced by the new obligation to manifest gratitude and answering love.

The gratitude of the pardoned prisoner, which causes him to recognize a debt to the sovereign which he can never repay, makes him resolve to live a life which shall be blameless, in so far as he is able, in the future. The attitude of rebellion and the criminal acts which grew out of it, are replaced by the attitude of loyalty and a life of submission to the will of the sovereign. Obedience to the laws of the land is no longer a duty refused or ignored, or given with much grudging and complaint. It is a matter of willingness, and rendered with joy and gladness. No longer is he afraid of the sovereign or his representatives; now he knows they are on his side. He has no effort in living the life of a loyal citizen.

If the pardoned prisoner must feel the stirrings of gratitude for the favor which he has received, how much more the sinner whose new extra-legal status must lead

him to praise God for his goodness! He puts off the old man, and puts on the new. The things which he once hated, he now loves; and the things which he once loved, he now hates. The lawlessness of sin is replaced by the life of loving adoration and service. He cannot live perfectly, it is true, but he will try his best, for the remainder of his life is too short to even begin to repay God for his kindness. Gladly, he is loyal and submissive, for God is his friend. If he should be tempted to disloyal conduct, he has but to think of his former perilous state, and his will will be strengthened to continue his devotion to the heavenly sovereign.

The makers of the Forensic theory held to the intervention of Jesus Christ in his appointment to suretyship, the equivalence of his satisfaction to the debt of sin, and his conformity to the requirements of legal substitution. They held that his saving work was applied to believers in the non-imputation of their guilt, the imputation of their guilt to Christ, and his divine righteousness to them. They believed that the new status of the elect is founded on the divine act of justification, and that it is motivated by gratitude for gracious pardon, and expresses itself through the obedience of loyalty. Their feeling is expressed in the lines of Isaac Watts, who sang his faith that indeed

"Rich were the drops of Jesus' blood
Which calmed God's frowning face,
That sprinkled o'er the burning throne
And turned the wrath to grace."

CHAPTER XII

THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE LIFE OF
AT-ONE-MENT

- I. The Instrumental Character of Ethical Values.
 - A. The Ethical Code As a Means of Preparation.
 - B. The Resignation Required by Other-Worldliness.
 - C. The Abstention Required by Other-Worldliness.
- II. The Negative Character of Ethical Virtues.
 - A. The Embodiment of God's Will.
 - B. The Requirement of Conformity to an External Standard.
 - C. The Defensive Function of the Puritan Virtues.
- III. The Interested Character of Ethical Motives.
 - A. The Sanctions of Reward and Punishment.
 - B. The Appeal to the Motive of Self-Interest.
 - C. The Appeal to the Motive of Fear.

CHAPTER XII

THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE LIFE OF AT-ONE-MENT

While theology does not affect ethics directly, it does so indirectly through its implications. The monarchical theology which found its culminating expression in the Forensic theory, affected thinking about the summum bonum of human life. This way of thinking became so widespread that it has exerted great power as a paradoxical cultural force. In a recent study of the ethics of Calvin, Georgia Harkness writes: "The moral effect of the Calvinistic theology was to give rise to a set of paradoxes. Intense practical activity was joined with mystical self-forgetfulness; shrewd concern for success in this life with absorption in the next; zealous service to neighbor with equally zealous persecution for doctrinal aberrations; man's abasement with his exaltation; autocracy with democracy; conservatism with progress."

Georgia Harkness, John Calvin: The Man and His Ethics, pp. 88, 89.

I. THE INSTRUMENTAL CHARACTER OF ETHICAL VALUES.

The Protestant Reformers reacted against the corruptions of the Roman Catholic church, and sought to reunite religion and ethics. They laid emphasis upon the intent and essence of conduct as supreme over ritualistic formalism. As a substitute for the Romanist distinction between precepts and counsels, they adopted the idea of

vocation which individualizes the divine law, and rescues it from atomism. Beruf is the work the believer accepts as God's decree (Georgia Harkness, Op. Cit., p. 181). The divine sovereign decrees that the believer fulfil his calling in the world. In the view of Calvin the obligation to glorify God in one's daily toil passes from service in vocation to per vocationem. In a letter to Bousset, Calvin writes: "If our calling (vocatio) is indeed of the Lord, as we firmly believe that it is, the Lord himself will bestow his blessing, although the whole universe be opposed to us. Let us, therefore, try every remedy, while, if such is not to be found, let us, notwithstanding, persevere to the last gasp."

Quoted by George W. Richards, Waves of Salvation, p. 208.

If the ethical code of the believer is decreed by God for his own glory it is a means rather than an end in itself. Ethical values are instrumental instead of being intrinsic. The summum bonum is the complete subordination of the creatures to the Creator, and not the enrichment of the personality--either in oneself or another (Georgia Harkness, Op. Cit., p. 64). The ethical objective is not the creation of good citizens of this world, but preparation for another world. Speaking of a certain type of religious instruction, Adam Smith said: "This is a species of instruction of which the object is not so much to render the people good citizens in this world as to prepare them for another and better world in the life to come"

(Quoted by D. M. Ross, Op. Cit., p. 198). One is reminded of the lady who insisted that her citizenship was in heaven, so refused to vote in an important election.

The believer must glorify God, not by fleeing from the world and devoting ^{him} ~~oneself~~ wholly to adoration of the divine perfections, but by remaining in the world and subjecting ^{him} ~~oneself~~ to the divine dominions. This attitude has been called intramundane asceticism. Accepting the world as they accepted wind and weather, the Calvinists adapted themselves to it instead of fleeing from it. "We are to live in it and overcome it through itself, placing all our good and blessedness only in our justification and the death of Christ in our stead; we must never put our trust in the world, and must always be prepared for the punishment of sin, submitting ourselves humbly to the world and its course."

Ernst Troeltsch, Protestantism and Progress, p. 79.

The world was to be endured patiently, and only God was to be enjoyed.

Nothing can be permitted to infringe upon the divine right to utter devotion. Calvin believed that "all things that are connected with the enjoyment of the present life are sacred gifts of God, but we pollute them when we abuse them." Not because he was opposed to them on account of their intrinsic character, but because they might easily be abused, he forbade pleasures suspected of drawing people away from God. He could enjoin the contemptus

mundi upon faithful believers because of the necessity of keeping the soul uncorrupted. He was led to disparage the sensuous, the aesthetic, and the emotional elements of culture because they seemed to stand in the way of complete devotion to the divine glory. The Calvinist sought to avoid the "creature worship" involved in the love of the world. While the Lutheran asceticism was metaphysical in nature, the Reformed type was actively rational severity,-- a systematic disciplining of the believer for the attainment of the goal of life in the hereafter.

II. THE NEGATIVE CHARACTER OF ETHICAL VIRTUES.

Another implication of the monarchical theology is that virtue is to be identified with the will of God. Calvin was not concerned to work out a theory of virtue, but did seek to live according to the divine will. Obedience to the decree of God was for him the sum of ethical duty. All his ideas of the right sprang from the consciousness of being under imperative divine law entitled to command absolutely. "God's righteousness must be upheld" (Georgia Harkness, *Op. Cit.*, p. 63). Human rights are grounded in the divine right of obedience springing from our relation to God and his claims upon us. The discharge of our obligation to the sovereign God constitutes ethical virtue as well as religious piety. Indeed, there can be no virtue without exalting God and obeying his will.

Since God's will is revealed in the moral law, virtue consists in obedience to the moral law. By law is meant statutory precepts, and so the moral law consists of the Mosaic code summed up in the ten commandments. Calvin "conceived the will of God in terms of Biblical literalism and set up a legalistic moral code" (Georgia Harkness, *Op. Cit.*, p. 63). If the law of nature was to be obeyed, it was only because it coincided with the law of Moses (Georgia Harkness, *Op. Cit.*, p. 64). Instead of finding the will of God expressed in the law of love which cannot be reduced to a code of legal statutes, we find that in Calvin's writings there is a "lack of the note of warm, personal fellowship with Christ, and in his moral injunctions the Decalogue looms above the Sermon on the Mount. The place of Christ in Calvin's scheme of things is theological rather than personal and ethical" (Georgia Harkness, *Op. Cit.*, p. 72).

Virtue as obedience to God's will expressed in external law calls for conformity to an external standard. The law of the external God is immutable, and hence the code in which his law is embodied must be infallible. "The law of the ten words is an infallible rule revealing with perfect justice the whole will of God, and all particular laws are compassed within it" (Georgia Harkness, *Op. Cit.*, p. 64). Calvin held that even Christ has added nothing to the Decalogue except interpretation, and that obedience to it was all that God required of any man

(Opera, VII, 81). Since conformity is the sine qua non of ethical virtue in the monarchical theology, "it is not by accident that so large a part of the doctrine and practice of Calvinism is built upon the Old Testament, for the exaltation of human personality which permeates the message of Jesus is foreign to its spirit" (Georgia Harkness, Op. Cit., p. 84).

The Puritans were stalwart and ethically insistent in spite of the fact that predestination would seem to dull the edge of moral endeavor. Good works might be a sign that God had saved one, so they labored to make their calling and election sure. The virtues they developed, however, are more adapted to defend the right than create the positive good. Due to the attitude of conformity, appropriate when God's will is conceived as embodied in external law, they exalted as virtues: reverence, carrying with it orthodoxy, the horror of profanity, the pope, and the devil, church-going, and Sabbath-keeping; chastity, implying the sanctity of marriage, and a horror of sexual sins; and economic virtues such as sobriety, frugality, industry, and honesty. It is to be noted that the negative character of this summary is quite in keeping with the "thou shalt nots" of the ten commandments: "To fear God and keep the Sabbath; to shun scandal and do a sober honest day's work; to live simply, invest shrewdly and put by for a rainy day--this to many a 'substantial' citizen still sums up the whole duty of man" (Georgia

Harkness, Op. Cit., p. 158).

III. THE INTERESTED CHARACTER OF ETHICAL MOTIVES.

The early believers in justification really held that morality was **supreme** and unselfishly served God's goodness for love of his nature. "Where the Catholics acted basely in fear and hope, they glorified God and enjoyed him forever.... Their ethics was based on the profound psychological insight that the noblest life must spring from confidence instead of fear, liberty instead of bondage, gratitude instead of the desire for reward, love for others instead of thought of self."

A. C. McGiffert, *Protestant Thought Before Kant*, p. 39.

But the influence of a fully developed monarchical theology, exalting the moral code as God's will, implies appeal to the sense of duty or moral obligation. The holiness of God embodied in the moral law is intrinsically right, and appeals to our sense of oughtness. The obedience of duty, and not the obedience of love, is called for by a legalized idea of virtue.

Statutory law must have its sanctions, whether civil or moral. The civil sanction is physical punishment imposed and executed here on earth, regardless of whether the sufferer recognizes the legitimacy of the imposing authority or the rationality of punishment. The monarchical theology enforces the divine law by the moral sanctions of reward and punishment in the next life--

a heaven of bliss and a hell of torment. The theologians were in line with the penology of their time. "The moralists had pointed out the essential baseness of humanity, and Augustine's and Calvin's emphasis on man's sinfulness was an expression rather than a ~~curse~~^{cause} of the age-long grudge which western thought has cherished against man's moral nature."

Gardner Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, p. 15.

Calvin is very insistent that the fact of reward does not imply the righteousness of works, while he holds firmly to heavenly reward as aid and encouragement amidst the difficulties of the Christian life. "That they may not fail in these great straits, the Lord is present reminding them to lift their head higher and extend their view farther, that in him they may find a happiness which they see not in the world: to this happiness he gives the name of reward, hire, recompense, not as estimating the merit of works, but intimating that it is a compensation for their straits, sufferings, and affronts, etc. Wherefore, there is nothing to prevent us from calling eternal life a recompense after the example of Scripture, because in it the Lord brings his people from labor to quiet, from affliction to a prosperous and desirable condition, from sorrow to joy, from poverty to affluence, from ignominy to glory; in short, exchanges all the evils which they endured for blessings" (Institutes, III, xviii, 4).

The idea of punishment as a sanction appealed to fear. No better example of the unabashed appeal to fear made by the monarchical theology can be found than in this passage from *Pilgrim's Progress*, consisting of conversation between Evangelist and Christian:

"Wherefore dost thou cry?

"He answered, 'Sir, I perceive, by the book in my hand, that I am condemned to die, and after that to come to judgment; and I find that I am not willing to do the first nor able to do the second.'

"Then said Evangelist, 'Why not willing to die, since this life is attended with so many evils?' The man answered, 'Because I fear that this burden that is upon my back will sink lower than the grave, and I shall fall into Tophet. And, Sir, if I be not fit to go to prison, I am not fit to go to judgment, and from thence to execution; and the thoughts of these things make me cry.'

"Then said Evangelist, 'If this be thy condition, why standest thou still?' He answered, 'Because I know not whither to go.' Then he gave him a parchment roll, and there was written within, 'Fly from the wrath to come.'

The ethical implications of the widespread monarchical theology, underlying the Puritan viewpoint, were: the instrumental character of ethical values, making the ethical life a means of preparation for the hereafter, and involving resignation to the world on the one hand, and abstention from its pleasures on the other; the

negative character of ethical virtues, making the moral law the embodiment of God's will, calling for conformity to an external standard, and defensive rather than creative virtues; and the interested character of ethical motives, involving the sanctions of reward and punishment, and the appeal to self-interest and fear. When such sanctions are thoroughly and widely believed, there is certainly a tremendous power of control, for they have "kept peace and order for long periods in vast portions of the earth and....promoted charity and brotherly love when there was nothing else or little else to rely on."

PART IV

THE HISTORICAL INFLUENCE

CHAPTER XIII

THE SPREAD THROUGHOUT WESTERN PROTESTANTISM

- I. Diffusion Through the Prestige of Leadership.
 - A. The Emotional Leadership of Luther.
 - B. The Intellectual Leadership of Calvin.
 - C. The Secondary Leadership of Others.
- II. Diffusion Through the Appeal of Public Worship.
 - A. Diffusion Through Ritualistic Prayer.
 - B. Diffusion Through Famous Hymns.
 - C. Diffusion Through Many Sermons.
- III. Diffusion Through Group Authority.
 - A. As an Article of the Creeds.
 - B. As an Ordination Requirement.
 - C. As an Obligation Upon Church Members.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SPREAD THROUGHOUT WESTERN PROTESTANTISM

To understand the reason for the spread of the Forensic theory throughout a large part of Protestantism, it is necessary to remember that it implies salvation by faith alone. Now faith includes knowledge as one of its important elements. Theology was the concern of every member of the Protestant church, and it was increasingly plain that the atonement was the pivotal doctrine in support of the purified religion. A knowledge of the procuring cause of salvation became urgent, for "if God, as the only means of saving sinners....., sent his Only-Begotten Son into the world to suffer and die for them, it must be of the last importance that men should distinctly and correctly understand how it is that the mediatorial work of Christ bears upon their relation to God and their everlasting destiny." So the Forensic William Cunningham, Historical Theology, II, p.119.

theory became at once "the accepted doctrine of the Reform movement" (L. W. Grensted, Ed., Op. Cit., p. 222).

I. DIFFUSION THROUGH THE PRESTIGE OF LEADERSHIP.

Practical leadership had much to do with the diffusion of the Forensic theory. It is not likely that a theological theory will become common until a leader, or group of leaders, in whom the public has confidence, personally accept that theory with its implications, and

openly propagate it among their followers. The loyalty which binds the followers to their leader throws them open to his suggestions. When his prestige grows until it seems almost universal in extent and unlimited in power, inhibitions are lost and his views are accepted uncritically by his followers. The control of the leader over his followers includes a large degree of control over their beliefs. After the leader has once demonstrated his superiority and won his place as a leader, his followers accept his views as having objective validity simply because they are his. The practical leader always keeps in touch with the crowd, and is bound to exert an incalculable influence on the hero-worshipping multitude.

Luther was the emotional type of leader. He was certain and firm in his views for he was sure he had the truth. It never occurred to Luther not to spread abroad his new gospel of free grace. But he could also appeal to the heart with emotional vividness, and because he himself epitomized the age, Luther could appeal to the men of his age as no other. "When the science of psychology is sufficiently developed to be applied without hesitation, it will doubtless be possible to discern in the individual whose personal effort precipitates a revolution the clearly and strongly marked representative of a group or family of like yet diversified minds re-

curring again and again down through the ages."

Lucien Febvre, Martin Luther: A Destiny, pp. 73,74.

Luther's prestige was so great that Calvin once said:
 "Though Luther should call me a devil, I would still
 revere and love him as an eminent servant of God."

Quoted by Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, II,
 p. 215.

It is not surprising to find the estimate that Luther's
 views on the atonement have had "an immense influence on
 the whole of evangelical thought" (W. F. Lofthouse, Op.
 Cit., p. 228).

If Luther was the emotional leader of the Reformation,
 Calvin was the almost equally influential intellectual
 leader. Personally, Calvin set an example of stern sim-
 plicity, relentless activity, and participation in pub-
 lic affairs. He was destined to provide a backbone for
 the Reformation at a critical time in its history. Calvin
 fired men with zeal for action; he met the Roman Cath-
 olic counter-offensive with a theology which stiffened
 the "elect" to stand militantly, and become aggressive
 internationally. His great Institutes became the theo-
 logical handbook of the Reformation, and their signifi-
 cance lies in the fact that they are not only a clear
 and systematic statement of the Protestant position, but
 also that in them Calvin stoutly supports his arguments
 by Scriptural appeal. The Biblical character of his
 defense greatly multiplied its influence, for the

argument from Scripture could be understood by the humblest. Calvin became the "Protestant Pope," and his theological system fascinated Europe for two centuries. His systematic statement set the unofficial seal of approval upon the Forensic theory, and guaranteed its diffusion through many countries.

It was not merely the sanction of Luther and Calvin, great as this was in the case of both, that constitutes the influence of leadership in diffusing the Forensic theory. The less well-known leaders who worked with the giants--Melancthon in Germany, Beza in Switzerland, and Knox in Scotland, were in agreement with their masters concerning the Forensic theory of the atonement. L. W. Grensted writes: "All the reformers agree in accepting the penal view of the Cross as being the sole sufficient cause of reconciliation between man and God" (Op. Cit., p.235). And James Orr gives the same testimony: "The Reformers were at one in this view of the expiatory character of the death of Christ, as rendering satisfaction to the majesty of the law of God, violated by sin" (Op. Cit., p. 238). To the weight of the prestige of the outstanding leaders of the Reformation, must be added the additional power due to the universality of acceptance of the Forensic theory by the secondary leaders. It is difficult to doubt what everybody in a position of responsibility in your group accepts.

II. DIFFUSION THROUGH THE APPEAL OF PUBLIC WORSHIP.

The Forensic theory rapidly became a doctrina publica, and was spread through the liturgy, hymnology, preaching, and devotional literature of the church. It radiated from the centers of influence under the domination of the leaders, and impinged upon the beliefs of all by means of group-suggestion. It came from the group with instinctive force, seeming to need no proof except its own self-evidence, and by processes of imitation, sympathy, and suggestion, operating in the divine service, entered into the life of the people. Doubtless the Forensic theory has been a powerful motive in the lives of more people than any other view of the atonement of Christ. This is certainly true if we confine our statement to western Protestantism, and we may well call it "the classic Protestant theory of the atonement of Christ."

Devotional expression was given to the Forensic theory in the Order for Public Confession in the Lutheran Common Service: "Our Lord Jesus Christ hath had mercy upon us, and hath taken upon himself our nature, that so he might fulfil for us the whole will and law of God, and for us and for our deliverance suffer death and all that we by our sins have deserved" (Quoted by E. H. Klotsche, *Op. Cit.*, p. 162). In the account of the First Sacrament in Scotland, given by John Knox after his return from Geneva in August, 1555, we find: "We praise thee, O Lord! that thou, rich in mercy, and infinite in goodness, hast

provided our redemption to stand in thine only and well-beloved Son, whom of very love thou didst give to be made man like unto us in all things, sin excepted, in his body to receive the punishment of our transgression, by his death to make satisfaction to thy justice, and through his resurrection to destroy him that was the author of death."

Eutaxia, or the Presbyterian Liturgies, pp. 123, 124.

Many of the great hymns of the Cross were widely used during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries under the direct inspiration of the Forensic theory of the atonement. Perhaps the most famous of all of them is "O Haupt Voll Blut und Wunden" ("O Sacred Head Bloody and Wounded"), the first stanza of which is immortal:

"O Sacred Head, now wounded,
With grief and shame bow'd down,
Now scornfully surrounded,
With thorns, Thy only crown.
O Sacred Head, what glory,
What bliss till now was Thine,
Yet, though despised and gory,
I joy to call Thee mine."

It has been said that "the very heart of the Protestant church" speaks in this famous rendering by Paul Gerhardt of Bernard's "Passion Hymn." It has certainly shown an imperishable vitality in passing from the Latin into the German, and from the German into the English. Even Ritschl, who criticized it severely in his History of Pietism, asked for the recitation of the last verse when he lay on his deathbed.

H. C. Mable, How Does the Death of Christ Save Us?, p. 149.

Nor was there any lack of sermons devoted to the theme of the satisfaction of Christ. Many must have been preached, on communion occasions and evangelistic occasions, similar to that of the great French preacher, Louis Bourdaloue (1632-1704), entitled "The Passion of Jesus Christ" (Luke 23:27, 28), from which we take this dramatic passage: "Yes, Christians, it is God himself, and not the counsel of the Jews, that delivers Jesus Christ.... For it was thyself, O Lord, who justly changed into an incensed God, madest not merely thy servant Job, but also thine only Son to feel the weight of thine arm. Long didst thou look for this victim. He was needful to repair thy glory and satisfy thy justice Behold a victim worthy of thyself; a victim capable of expiating the sins of a thousand worlds; a victim such as thou requirest and dost justly deserve. Strike now, Lord! Strike! This victim is disposed to receive thy blows! And without considering that he is thy Christ, behold him but to remember that he is ours; that he is our substitute; and that in immolating him thou wilt satisfy thy divine hatred with which thou viewest sin."

H. C. Fish, Ed., Pulpit Eloquence, I, pp. 55,56.

III. DIFFUSION THROUGH GROUP AUTHORITY.

A creed may be defined as the statement of belief sanctioned by a group. In so far as he is integrated in the life of the group, the values of the group and its

loyalties become those of the individual member. He feels himself bound to recognize and adopt that which it urges. The authority of the group operates through the power of public opinion. The group commands: "believe," just as insistently as it says: "you ought." "Public opinion," says Allport, "acquires power through the individual ascribing universality to certain convictions and then supporting them strongly in order to conform with the supposed universal view." Most individuals take

Floyd Allport, *Social Psychology*, p. 396.

over much from their social environment without critical examination. The social streams of belief give rise to their faith. It is hard to be a religious independent.

Frankis S. Hickman, *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, p. 446.

As would be expected after the agreement of the leading Reformers, the Forensic theory was included in all the great creeds of the Creed-making period. "In all the great Protestant creeds ... is enshrined in some form of words the testimony--'he satisfied the divine justice'" (James Orr, *Op. Cit.*, p. 238). The Forensic theory became the official theory of the atonement of all those Protestants who accepted as their standards: the Augsburg Confession, 1536; the French Confession of Faith, 1559; the Scotch Confession of Faith, 1560; the Belgic Confession, 1561; the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, 1562; the Irish Articles of Religion, 1615;

the Canons of the Synod of Dort, 1619; and the Westminster Confession of Faith, 1647, from which we quote: "V. The Lord Jesus, by his perfect obedience and sacrifice of himself, which he through the eternal spirit once offered up unto God, hath fully satisfied the justice of his Father, and purchased not only reconciliation, but an everlasting inheritance in the kingdom of heaven, for all those whom the Father hath given unto him."

As a part of the Protestant creeds, the Forensic theory of the atonement would become formally binding upon ministers through ordination vows of allegiance to the church's teaching. According to the ordination forms agreed upon by the Westminster Assembly divines, "he that is to be ordained, ... must address himself to the presbytery, and bring with him a testimonial of his taking the Covenant of the three kingdoms" (Scotland, England, and Ireland). This covenanted uniformity in religion called for adherence to the Westminster Confession of Faith, and the Larger and Shorter Catechisms. Again we read: "After the sermon (before ordination), the minister who hath preached shall, in the face of the congregation, demand of him who is now to be ordained, concerning... his persuasion of the truth of the reformed religion." Thus the candidate for ordination definitely committed himself to the support of the reformed doctrine as found in the Confession of Faith, which teaches the

Forensic theory of the atonement. In this way it became binding upon him.

Upon joining the church, the Forensic theory would become the view of the atonement to which loyalty was pledged. Preparation for intelligently taking the covenant was made by catechizing, a duty of the pastor. The Westminster divines define this as "a plain laying down of the first principles of the oracles of God, or of the doctrine of Christ." When members were examined by sessions as to their knowledge of the church's doctrines, inquiry must have been made as to knowledge of the Forensic theory as the most important official teaching of the church. In preparation for such examination we may cite this excerpt from an old-time manual for new communicants: "Q. What was the third remarkable part of his last sufferings? A. It was the painful thirst which our blessed Lord endured. How must the arrows of the Almighty have, as it were, drunk up our Savior's blood, when he thus complained of thirst! How must his soul have labored, during the three hours of darkness, and his body, already exhausted by the loss of so much blood, have been totally deprived of its strength, so that his tongue cleaved to the roof of his mouth!"

The tremendous response to the affirmation of the Forensic theory made possible its wide diffusion through the prestige of Luther, Calvin, and other leaders; through

the appeal of prayers, hymns, and sermons of public worship; and through the group authority exercised by the creed, the ordination requirement, and the membership covenant. Of all these methods of bringing the Forensic theory into the daily life of the people, the hymns were doubtless the most effective. Hymns have the authority of poetry, the thought of strong and deeply experienced souls, kindled into song. They claim the authority of democracy, for they are accepted by all sorts and conditions of men. As the voice of organized religion speaking out of ^{the} ages and present life, they embody the authority of the church universal. It is impossible to imagine the influence of Cowper's famous hymn, teaching the Forensic theory, which begins realistically:

"There is a fountain filled with blood."

CHAPTER XIV

THE OPPOSITION OF FAUSTUS SOCINUS

- I. The Protagonist and the Controversy.
 - A. The Background of the Controversy.
 - B. The History of the Controversy.
 - C. The Literature of the Controversy.
- II. The Theological Position of Socinus.
 - A. His View of Divine Justice.
 - B. His View of Human Ability.
 - C. His View of Christ's Atonement.
- III. The Weaknesses of the Socinian Attack.
 - A. The Weakness of a Discarnate God.
 - B. The Weakness of an Undetermined Humanity.
 - C. The Weakness of an Individualistic Atonement.

CHAPTER XIV

THE OPPOSITION OF FAUSTUS SOCINUS

The working of the universal law of action and reaction is seen plainly in the realm of social and cultural evolution. It is illustrated in the history of the Forensic theory by the opposition which it encountered at the hands of Faustus Socinus and his followers. The extreme and uncompromising character of the theory left theologians no opportunity for neutrality: they must either accept it heartily or oppose it with all their power. Of its many assailants Faustus Socinus is chief, for he made the most fierce and thorough attack. He detailed, says Charles Beard, "every rational and moral argument since directed against the theory of satisfaction." The De Jesu Christo Servatore of Socinus is called by Gordon "the great storehouse whence all the modern arguments against the mediaeval doctrine of Christ's satisfaction for sin have been drawn."

Quoted by David M. Cory, Faustus Socinus, p. 38.

I. THE PROTAGONIST AND THE CONTROVERSY.

Faustus Socinus was born in Siena, Italy, in 1539, and died in Poland, March 4, 1604. It is noteworthy that his humanistic and rationalistic interests were natural, since he came of a noble family of scholars and lawyers. He was keenly antagonistic to the prevailing intolerant dogmatism of Italy, and eventually found friends among

the nobility of Poland where he did his great work for religious freedom. Socinus was possessed of commanding intellectual power, organizing genius, and a determined will. He is acknowledged by his opponents to have been praiseworthy for his virtues and gifts, his love of the truth, his generous compassion for the poor, his genuine piety, his zeal for the churches, his patience, his greatness of soul, and his unfailing courtesy and good temper--qualities all too rare among the theological disputants of his time.

Socinus was a product of the Italian Renaissance of the sixteenth century. He represents a strongly intellectual and cultural, rather than an exclusively religious influence, as in the case of Luther. His background gave him a new sense of individuality, and a clear realization of the discrepancy between the dogmas of the old church and the contemporary Christian experience. When combined with his intense moral passion, these factors became motivating in his fresh theological speculation which caused such alarm in the ranks of the orthodox. Socinus sought a rational approach to the New Testament as the basis of a new theology, and complete freedom of thought concerning religious and theological matters. He emphasized conscience, reason, and Scripture as over against the appeal to external authority of any kind. But reason was held the most important of all. Socinianism is an intellectual and rationalist system of Christian

doctrine on a supernatural foundation. It assumes the necessity and fact of divine revelation, that the Scriptures are its record, and that reason--the moral and religious nature--is the sole and final arbiter of truth.

The situation in Switzerland when Socinus arrived there, has been described in this way: "The result of the Counter-Reformation in Switzerland was to stiffen Protestant resistance all along the line. Dogmas assumed a position of supreme importance, and aberrations from the orthodox interpretation were dealt with severely"

(David M. Cory, Op. Cit., p. 36). The spirit of the age is shown in the concern with soteriology. In the controversies that arose the doctrine of the atonement was a great topic of discussion, and Socinus was soon taking a part. He absolutely denied the orthodox view of the work of Christ on the Cross, which saw it as an expiation made on behalf of men to conciliate or satisfy the estranged majesty or implacable justice of God. Answering Socinus was Jacques Couet (Couetus), one of the principal defenders of the Forensic theory.

Out of this controversy came what is perhaps the greatest work of Socinus, the Disputationis De Christo Servatore, which was completed and circulated in 1578, and published in 1590. In this treatise he maintains that Christ's atoning work consists in reconciling sinful men to a loving Father rather than in propitiating

an offended deity. The later views of Socinus will be found in his Praelectiones Theologicae, chapters XV-XXIX, and in his uncompleted Christianae Institutio (see Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, I, pp. 664-668). Since Socinus died before the Racovian Catechism was more than planned, it was formulated by others. The later edition, from which the English translation was made by Thomas Rees, had been much revised. In particular, says Professor Earl Morse Wilbur in a personal letter, it "shows the influence of Remonstrant thought on the question of the atonement."

II. THE THEOLOGICAL POSITION OF SOCINUS.

Fundamentally determinative in his theology and idea of atonement is the doctrine of God held by Socinus. To him God's will is an arbitrium imperium. His willing is entirely free and bound by no law the human mind can formulate. At the very beginning he does away with important and characteristic doctrines of orthodoxy-- predestination, and the necessity of penalty or the holding to forgiveness in relation to law. Socinus was deeply impressed with the unity and sovereignty of God, and greatly emphasized the divine will as Duns Scotus had done before him. But his emphasis upon the divine will was practical rather than metaphysical. Man's duty is that of unquestioning and complete obedience, i. e., to "keep the precepts of God as given us through Christ." In spite of

the fact that Socinus called him "Father," God is for him a great Sovereign and Law-Giver who is to be obeyed rather than loved.

The aspect of God's nature with which we are particularly concerned is the divine justice (righteousness and equity). Socinus denies the orthodox doctrine of the divine justice. He does not admit that justice in God is more than a quality or characteristic. He absolutely repudiates the orthodox view that the divine justice is fixed, immutable, and necessary in the divine nature, demanding when offended a corresponding and complete satisfaction. In the Disputationis De Jesu Christo Servatore, he writes: "But you will say that it is necessary for God's justice to be satisfied--that kind of justice which you contend must be wholly satisfied does not reside in God, but is an effect of his will. For when God punishes sinners, since we call this work of his by some worthy name, we say that he then employs justice; likewise when he spares some offender, the Scripture says that he has employed mercy. Wherefore, it is not necessary for God to have that kind of justice satisfied, or to revoke it" (David M. Cory, Op. Cit., p.110).

Also fundamental in his doctrine of atonement is the assertion by Socinus of the moral ability of man. Man must obey the precepts of Christ to attain eternal life. Granted that the first man was endowed with free will, there

is reason to believe that he retained it after the fall. At least it is reasonable to suppose that "neither the nature of the case demands it (loss of free will) nor the justice of God permits it" (David M. Cory, Op. Cit., p. 108). There is no original sin or total depravity. Whether sin be considered as guilt (culpa) or penalty (poena) it is of individual and not social origin. The lack of a conscious will in the newborn babe makes original sin impossible, for there is "no taint or depravity in-born of necessity in all human kind, nor in any way inflicted" (David M. Cory, Op. Cit., p. 108). Sin is not the transgression of a holy and indefeasible law or a state of enmity to God. It is the offence of an individual man against the divine Individual, an injury which God may pass by on any condition chosen.

Any atonement in the orthodox sense Socinus held to be superfluous. "God, whose will could have chosen any mode of forgiveness which is not foreign to his nature, chose to make acceptance (acceptatio) of Christ's death at Calvary, but especially of its offering in heaven, the ground of forgiveness. Forgiveness is not propter Christum, and not even per Christum, but gratuita, because God was willing to accept Christ's sacrifice." Christ's saving work consists in showing us the way of life through his obedience, death, and resurrection. He inspires in believers the same courage to undergo affliction and death

in the certain hope of salvation; he enables them to persevere, for he is with them in every struggle, and temptation, suffering, or danger, giving assistance and at length delivering from eternal death. It is emphatically necessary to imitate Christ, and so attain the immortality he has won for us. Such imitation is possible to the fullest extent, so that to equal Christ in holiness should be our aim.

III. THE WEAKNESSES OF THE SOCINIAN ATTACK.

Socinus takes as his rational thesis that "to forgive sins and to receive satisfaction for sins are plainly contradictory and cannot exist together" (Quoted by J. K. Mozley, *Op. Cit.*, p. 148). On this basis he makes five principal criticisms of the Forensic theory: (1) It is unethical because it excludes the divine mercy; (2) it is impossible in that it involves the substitution of penalty; (3) it is inadequate since the sufferings of Christ on the Cross, however great, were finite and insufficient to cover the sins of the whole world; (4) it is absurd because Christ's obedience was valid for his own exaltation, but could not be transferred to others; (5) it is illogical because satisfaction and imputation are incompatible concepts. In spite of the logical acuteness of these arguments, they failed to convince the vast majority of Protestants. Although Grotius was driven into an unconscious compromise (his work, Defensio Fidei Catholicae

de Satisfactione Christi adversus Faustus Socinus, was answered by Johannes Crellius in his Ad Librum Hugonis Grotii Responsio) and the controversy dragged on, it became very evident that Socinianism had failed to win any signal victory.

In his recent Materialism, Professor J. S. Haldane affirms "that the real power of the Christian religion in a world of ignorance, sorrow sin, and ugliness, is the conception of God as not a perfect being dwelling apart from an imperfect world, but as actually present in that world, and entering into the sorrow of its suffering and sin, of which the Cross is an appropriate symbol." If this statement be a true one, Socinianism sacrifices this "real power" with its exclusive emphasis upon the unity of a transcendent God. Although its ethical character has been too largely obscured by metaphysical theories about it, orthodoxy always has held to a real incarnation. Socinus denied any real incarnation of God in Christ, and attributed to Jesus a sort of ethical divinity. If he had allowed that God is immanent as well as transcendent, his idea of ethical divinity would have provided a strong rival for the older view. As it was, however, while he gained ethically, he lost religiously to even a greater extent. His ethical advance was nullified because not aided by a view of God which allowed Socinianism to be combined with the immensely valuable concept of incarnation.

The view of man as morally able, naturally appeals to those assured of economic security and social prestige. Their ability in some things of this world tends to beguile them into thinking that they are self-determining in a universal sense. But this superficial view has never attracted the masses, and it is not alone their frequent misery and destitution which has led them to reject it. The human will is free in part, but it is also determined to a very great extent. It is the deepest religious conviction that we are dependent not only upon society, but upon cosmic forces and powers, as well. We do not bend the universe to our purposes so much as it works its will through us. Any philosophy of absolute free will and moral ability leaves man with overwhelming responsibility and a sense of failure which drives him to despair. Man cannot live without hope, the absence of which leaves him paralyzed and helpless. Hence Socinianism, which asserts free will and calls for perfect obedience as the prerequisite of immortality, met with no general favor.

Not only did Socinianism forfeit the attractive power of God incarnate upon the Cross, and cut the nerve of the religious life by precluding hope. It also failed to see beyond individual and personal piety, and so neglected the corporate character of life and salvation. Socinianism is a rationalistic system of religious individualism. To Socinus Christ made atonement for men as individuals, and

saves them through faith in him and obedience to his precepts. There is nothing in his theory to indicate that Christ saves men as a group, or society as a whole. Over against this is the age-long conviction that Christ made atonement not only for individual men, but for the race as a unity. The intuition has been that Christ changed the moral status of mankind, that he accomplished something beyond the changing of a limited number of individuals in his short career. The Cross initiated and assured a Christian society, and the gradual realization of the kingdom of God. Taking this for granted, the Forensic theory seeks to explain how Christ's death avails for the race, and hence grapples with the real problem of the atonement. But Socinianism does not allow the conviction, and so denies the existence of any atonement problem needing explanation.

In sum, the great mass of Protestants felt that the Forensic theory, with all of the difficulties due to its legalistic form, was closer to evangelical realities than anything Socinianism could offer. In spite of his independence and radicalism, Socinus could not escape many common presuppositions, and did his work within the general theological framework of the age. Consequently, his criticism was largely destructive, and the value of his fresh speculation and originality were nullified to a great extent. He could point out defects in orthodoxy with

great skill, but failed to offer substitutes adequately constructive in nature. And since groups are naturally conservative, they are usually willing to give up something good only for something which is thought to be better. The force of the Socinian criticisms was recognized. Yet the Forensic theory was not therefore abandoned, but rather defended and revised.

CHAPTER XV

THE ADAPTIVE CAPACITY FOR SURVIVAL

- I. Survival Through Accomodation.
 - A. The Elimination of Objectionable Features.
 - B. The Enlargement of the Concept of Satisfaction.
 - C. The Setting of the Three-fold Office.
- II. Survival Through Transvaluation.
 - A. The Strategic Position.
 - B. The Typical Character.
 - C. The Religious Indispensableness.
- III. Survival Through Inertia.
 - A. Inertia of the Religious Conservative.
 - B. Inertia of the Religious Heritage.
 - C. Inertia of the Religious Indoctrination.

CHAPTER XV

THE ADAPTIVE CAPACITY FOR SURVIVAL

The Socinian controversy resulted in victory for the Forensic theory because a single large advantage is overvalued in relation to the sum of smaller disadvantages which may (or may not) compensate for it. There was some value in the criticism made, although the justice of the criticism was blunted by the inadequacy of the reconstruction proposed in its place. But the advantage which enabled the Forensic theory to survive was its superiority in adaptive power. Without this advantage, plausibility would have been lost in the eyes of intelligent men. Few theories have shown greater adaptive capacity for survival.

I. SURVIVAL THROUGH ACCOMODATION.

It was felt that the defenders of the Forensic theory were contending for certain vital factors in the Christian faith which were in danger of being ignored or obscured by the critics. So the theory held the field as long as these vital factors were not sufficiently safeguarded (D. M. Ross, Op. Cit., p. 241). On the other hand, the advocates of the Forensic theory strengthened their position by compromising to the fullest extent compatible with their basic contention. They revised and developed their theory in the most acceptable manner. Socinianism saw something not included in orthodoxy. It did not become orthodoxy, but contributed to it.

In the process of accommodation, the makers of the Forensic theory sought to eliminate the objectional features of the theory as far as possible. While Luther had boldly represented Christ as maledictum dei, and Calvin had declared that "there is nothing strange in its being said that he (Christ) descended into hell, seeing he endured the death which is inflicted by an angry God," from the time of the seventeenth century onwards, the Forensic theory began to be toned down in its details by the theologians. The mediaeval picture of eternal sufferings in hell became less lurid. Less was said of Christ enduring "the pains of hell," and "the dreadful torments of a condemned and lost man"; of Christ placating an angry God by his sufferings and death; of Christ dying only for the elect (D. M. Ross, Op. Cit., pp. 241, 242). Love was stressed as the source of all redemption, for God had provided the means of reconciliation. The merit of Christ's suffering was not wholly in the pain he bore--emphasis was laid on the voluntariness of his sacrifice, the love of Christ, and his will of obedience as giving value to his suffering.

The Lutherans of the later sixteenth century developed the idea of the double obedience of Christ. They held that both the active obedience of Christ's life, and the passive obedience of his death were necessary to an adequate view of his atoning work. This idea of double obedience

led to the enlargement of the concept of satisfaction, so that it became much more capable of rationalization. Formerly, satisfaction had referred to the enduring of the penalty of the law, altogether or predominantly; now stress was laid on the perfect fulfillment of the law by Christ. Thus the satisfaction of Christ was made to God and was by no means wholly negative, but positive as well. The enlarged concept of satisfaction included the old idea of merit, representing a compromise calculated to silence its opponents.

Another element in the accomodation which enhanced the survival value of the Forensic theory was the strength which it gained through association with the setting in which it was placed. First, it was treated simply as a part of the Locus de justificatione; later it was treated in connection with the incarnation in the chapter, "De Officio Christi," and finally it was set in the framework of Calvin's doctrine of the three-fold office of Christ. Principal Franks insists that we cannot understand the value attached to this theory if we regard it apart from Christ's work as a whole. The place of the Forensic theory in the soteriological formulation is stated in epitome by Gerhard, as follows:

"The office of Christ is three-fold--prophetic, priestly, and kingly. The prophetic office is that by which Christ revealed to us the will of God concerning our salvation, which he executes, first by himself publishing

the Gospel, and next by establishing the ministry of teaching in the Church, with which also is to be taken the institution of the sacraments.

"The priestly office of Christ is that by which, interposing himself between man and God, he reconciled the whole human race to God, making satisfaction to the Divine law, and interceding with God; wherefore the parts of the priestly office are two, satisfaction and intercession. Satisfaction is that by which he paid to God a price sufficient for the sins of the whole human race, and obtained for it righteousness and eternal life. This satisfaction is to be seen, first, in the fulfilment of the Divine Law, and secondly, in the payment of the penalties of sin. It is commonly spoken of as Christ's active and passive obedience, each of which is a part of his priestly office.

"The kingly office of Christ is that by which he governs all things in heaven and earth, and above all, His Church" (R. S. Franks, Op. Cit., II, p. 3).

II. SURVIVAL THROUGH TRANSVALUATION.

J. K. Folsom points out that a culture trait "may change its function without greatly changing its obvious form or content." The changes which were made in the

J. K. Folsom, *Social Psychology*, p. 587.

form of the Forensic theory are secondary to considerable changes in its function which constitutes an important element in its survival value. For we must recognize that,

just as there are alternative personalities, so there is more than one social mind in an epoch. Progress comes through conflict of these, and each of them has its characteristic expression--the opposition theologies represent the religious expression of minorities. The Forensic theory survived because better able to adapt itself, so that it continued to satisfy the religious needs set by the dominant mind which determined the main course of history.

G. B. Smith, Ed., A Guide to the Study of the Christian Religion, pp. 52, 53.

The Forensic theory was the logical implication of the doctrine of justification. Its function of bringing absolute certainty to the Protestant believer in turn implied the infallibility of the Scriptures. The psychological order of the development of the doctrines corresponds largely with the chronological order. The logical order, of course, is the reverse. The infallibility of the Bible guarantees absolute certainty through atonement as the foundation of the doctrine of justification. Whether viewed psychologically or logically, the central position of the Forensic theory is seen! it was indispensable from either standpoint. Hence it became the doctrine of the greatest importance to the practical Protestant believer. This is the explanation of Professor Rauschenbusch's statement: "To countless Christian minds

the doctrine of the atonement has been the marrow of theology" (Walter Rauschenbusch, Op. Cit., p. 240).

From being the outstanding doctrine with the most important function to perform, the Forensic theory became, by the simple process of the part coming to stand for the whole, the typical and representative theological belief of the Protestant movement. D. M. Ross declares: "It came to be a widely prevalent view that a distinct and correct understanding of the doctrine of the atonement was essential for salvation, and it came also to be a widely prevalent view that the true interpretation of the atonement was to be found in the Forensic theory" (Op. Cit., p. 241). As Rashdall says, they made everything of "a particular view of the atonement: if that is taken away, there is nothing left" (Hastings Rashdall, Op. Cit., p. 400, footnote).

The end of this process of transvaluation was that the Forensic theory became essential to the Protestant religious experience. Dr. William Adams Brown writes: "In Protestantism the atonement and redemption are frequently used as synonymous. Thus the Westminster Confession of Faith (I,6) speaks of the elect who have 'fallen in Adam' as being 'redeemed by Christ,' whereas the context makes it plain that the reference is to the atonement." By the atonement, of course, is meant the Forensic theory. Through confusion with the religious

experience associated with it, the Forensic theory came to have the same function as the religious experience itself, and hence an increased survival value.

III. SURVIVAL THROUGH INERTIA.

The desire for certainty, definiteness, facility, and knowledge induce reluctance to change our beliefs in general, and these eight reasons are given by Professor Betts for defending our religious beliefs in particular: they seem true, and we want to defend the truth; we want to acquire merit as a defender of the faith; we believe our eternal salvation depends on them; they are tied up with the source of authority, as the Bible of the Church, and it is impossible to let them go; we may cherish beliefs from the mere pride of possession; we are expected to continue in our beliefs; we may defend beliefs because they are a self-protective measure of church authority; we defend our beliefs because we look on beliefs as guides to conduct, as sources of character and personality (George H. Betts, Op. Cit., pp. 11, 12). We may be sure that all of these motives, to a greater or less extent, were influential in the perpetuation of the Forensic theory.

Emotion has been called "the stickiest glue there is." When the Forensic theory became interwoven with religious experience, it quickened the consciousness of the meaning of the Cross, and made it more rich and vivid in content. The imagery it suggested filled with sorrow and also joy.

Made eloquent by the idealizing touch of the poet, and the sanctity of long recollection, it was impossible to lightly cast it aside, even if recognized as inadequate to carry the thought of those using it.

The intellectual bias of the mind toward unity also aided the survival of the Forensic theory. This desire not only led the theologians to work it out to complete a comprehensive system of doctrine, but also made him loath to part with his synthetic creation. The Forensic theory was bound up with others, particularly the incarnation and deity of Christ, in its assertion of the infinite value of Christ's death. The Protestant scholastics had beaten mediaeval scholasticism at its own game, and achieved a more complete and more closely knit soteriology than the Roman church ever possessed. After their pains in perfecting the system, they did not relish attempts to destroy it.

There is also the power of convention based on the simple attitude of conformity in the belief that the convention is universal; social disapproval in case of departure from the customary mode, and habit-fixation. When the cultural environment made it almost necessary to believe in the Forensic theory, its way of thinking would color the perception of Christ's work, so that one could no longer look upon it with fresh vision even if he tried. So the habit-forming tendency of the mind made for the

survival of the Forensic theory after it was no longer integrated with the changed environment.

The inertia due to the religious heritage grows out of its tremendous mass and weight. The existing religion into which we are born is not the work of one mind, or one generation, but that of many minds throughout many generations. Each single generation can modify and increase the total scheme but little during its lifetime. Religion seems to be fixed and unchanging unless we look back; then we can discern the changes. The magnitude and interdependence combine with the slowness of its changes to give it tremendous inertia. When the Forensic theory became a cultural trait in a traditional religious heritage, it gained survival value by the permanence of the complex in which it was integrated. Since it was not so much one theory as the focus of all, it could not very well be changed until that basic viewpoint was finally given up.

The Protestant child drank in the Forensic theory of the atonement "almost with his mother's milk." It was taught at home, at school, and directly and indirectly in other ways. Luther's Small Catechism (to mention no other) was printed in two tables, intended to be hung upon the wall for the instruction of children by their parents. It was also used in the public schools and churches, and it is claimed that "it has been translated into more languages

and circulated in larger numbers than any other book in the world, except the Bible" (E. H. Klotzsch, *Op. Cit.*, p. 139). The result of this indoctrination, says Professor Hickman, is "the tenacious hold which the substitutionary theory of the atonement has upon many Christians. When children are brought up under this conception of the mission of Christ in the world, that is, that Christ's mission was literally to put himself into the scales of justice in the place of sinful men and pay for their sins through his suffering, they cannot easily bring themselves to think of the meaning of the death of Jesus in any other way. Any other interpretation of the mission and death of Jesus is a violation of what they conscientiously believe about the atonement" (Frank S. Hickman, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 332, 333).

In spite of opposition the Forensic theory survived, long after its social milieu had changed, through accommodation in the elimination of objectional features, the enlargement of the concept of satisfaction to include Christ's active obedience, and its setting in the three-fold office of Christ; through cultural transvaluation which lifted it from strategic to typical to supreme importance; and through cultural inertia due to the religious individual, the religious heritage, and religious indoctrination. The Forensic theory was the pride and strength of orthodox Protestant scholasticism, triumphing

because of the religious values sacrificed in the criticism of Socinus. It persists even today, for most men pass through the nomistic stage in morals and religion, representing the divine moral government, with its associated rewards and penalties, as the supreme category of thought. In transition to a higher religion it has proved "a stepping stone to a living faith in the unmerited grace of heaven."

CHAPTER XVI

THE OUTCOME IN WISH FULFILLMENT AND LIMITATION

- I. The Effect Upon the Wish for Recognition.
 - A. The Fulfillment Through Sovereign Election.
 - B. The Limitation Through Sovereign Election.
- II. The Effect Upon the Wish for Participation.
 - A. The Fulfillment Through External Conformity.
 - B. The Limitation Through External Conformity.
- III. The Effect Upon the Wish for Response.
 - A. The Fulfillment Through Dutifulness.
 - B. The Limitation Through Dutifulness.

CHAPTER XVI

THE OUTCOME IN WISH FULFILLMENT AND LIMITATION

Our experience is shaped by the thought molds to which we are accustomed. The theology of monarchical sovereignty and the Forensic theory in particular, fostered a particular type of social experience. This experience partially fulfilled and partially limited the goal functions of society. These are identical with the wish satisfactions of the individual. As Professor J. K. Folsom declares: "The total function or goal of culture may be subdivided into the same fundamental wish components in which...we analyzed the organization of the individual personality. Here at last is the meeting-point of psychology and sociology. The goal functions of culture are the wish satisfactions of the individual" (J. K. Folsom, Op. Cit., p. 493).

I. THE EFFECT UPON THE WISH FOR RECOGNITION.

The wish for recognition is expressed in the struggle of men for status in their social group. It arises from the early patterns of attention-getting, and self-assertion, mastery, and domination. The showy motives connected with the appeal for recognition are called "vanity," and the creative activities associated with it are spoken of as "ambition." The satisfaction of the desire for recognition or superiority may be gained through individual status or through being one of a superior group (J. K. Folsom, Op.

Cit., p. 150 ff), Professor W. I. Thomas points out that "the importance of recognition and status for the individual and society is very great. The individual not only wants them but he needs them for the development of his personality. On the other hand, society alone is able to confer status on the individual, and in seeking to obtain it he makes himself responsible to society and is forced to regulate the expression of his wishes."

Quoted by E. T. Krueger and W. C. Reckless, Social Psychology, p. 173.

In order to gain authority ranking with that of the Roman church, and to stand on an equality with those of the nobility, the Protestant Reformers developed and emphasized the doctrine of election as a means of gaining status in society. They asserted they had been chosen from all eternity by the heavenly sovereign unto salvation, and hence could fittingly judge the existing state of the church, and need not bow down to any man. The assertion of superiority through the doctrine of election undoubtedly satisfied a real need. A. B. D. Alexander, referring to the doctrine of election specifically, well says: "A man might very well exaggerate his subjective faith; but to know that he had been chosen as an object of divine mercy from the foundation of the world, and to be convinced that the conditions of salvation were so absolutely fulfilled that no one could pluck him out of God's hand, proved to many a disquieted soul a powerful support."

The Shaping Forces of Modern Religious Thought, p. 41.

Election is the mark of the favor of the heavenly sovereign. It draws attention because it proclaims that the elect man has the status and superiority of a royal courtier. Although he possessed no merit to deserve the favor, it was a fact that the irresistible grace had fallen on him and determined his destiny. While he is nothing but "a worm in the dust," he may assert himself for God and perform mighty service for the cause of the Lord. All that is on the earth must submit to the divine dominion. Because they feared God, and so feared no one else, the Calvinist "felt the call to action, to glorify God. They dared to do and die. They went forth into the wilderness as pioneers; they fought their battles to the tune of the psalms; they defied kings and bishops, and parliaments; and for the sovereignty of God they gave their lives."

George W. Richards, Ways of Salvation, p. 208

II. THE EFFECT UPON THE WISH FOR PARTICIPATION.

While not included by some other psychologists in their lists of human wishes, Professor E. G. Bogardus, in his Fundamentals of Social Psychology, insists that human beings have the wish to aid others. This wish is manifested in those actions which terminate in others rather than the acting individual. Professor Ellsworth Faris tested the validity of the work of Professor W. I. Thomas

on wishes, and developed a revised classification which recognizes the contention of Professor Bogardus in his wish for participation. This is defined as the "wish to be attached to or identified with a cause, a movement, something larger than oneself" (E. T. Krueger and W. C. Reckless, *Op. Cit.*, p. 175). While this altruistic wish may not be as strong as the others, there is ample evidence to show that it is found all through human life and even in the animal world.

The adherent of the monarchical theology sought to bring his individual life and that of society into conformity with the will of God revealed in the moral code. Calvin held that "God is the sole Master and Director of our lives, and He requires of us nothing more than obedience." As one must make the moral law dominant in his own life, he must also work for its regnancy in the realm of social affairs. Hence Calvin undertook to make Geneva a civitas Dei. In a day when it was assumed that the Old Testament was a book of rules for the regulation of all the affairs of life, he attempted to make the famous city one in which the Word of God was ultimate authority in matters of morals as well as of belief. He held that it was the duty of the state to use its power to enforce moral living in accordance with the Word as interpreted by the Church. The commonwealth must be reared upon the foundations of the moral law of God.

Social service is for the glory of the heavenly Sovereign, not for the good of the individuals affected. The gospel of the divine sovereignty holds that "the world is designed solely for God's glory, and the elect must honor him by obedience to his will in the social order. For God's glory society must be served....It is a rationalized and impersonal social service....It finds its foremost expression in fidelity to the duties of one's daily task" (Georgia Harkness, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 182, 183). It is a type of social service quite consistent with other-worldly individualism. In Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, Christian is so concerned with his own lost soul that he ignores his wife and children. Personality may be slighted or even ignored altogether in the onward sweep of the sovereign rule of God over society.

III. THE EFFECT UPON THE WISH FOR RESPONSE.

The wish for response is that for appreciation of the loved one's words, character, etc.; for loyalty manifesting itself in obedience to him--loving what he loves, seeking what he seeks, making him a second conscience; and for gratitude for the experience of enjoying and returning his love. Professor W. I. Thomas writes: "The desire for response is primarily related to the instinct of love, and shows itself in the tendency to seek and to give signs of appreciation in connection with other individuals....The devotion to child and family and devotion

to causes, principles, and ideals may be the same attitude in different fields of application" (quoted by E. T. Krueger and W. C. Reckless, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 172, 173). The wish for response is reenforced by the attitudes of pleasure which we develop towards persons who have satisfied non-amatory needs (J. K. Folsom, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 153, 154).

The way of response to God is expressed by Calvin: "The great point.....is, that we are consecrated and dedicated to God, and, therefore, should not henceforth think, speak, design, or act, without a view to his glory" (Institutes, III, vii, 1). There is satisfaction in the safety which may be obtained through utter dutifulness: "O how great the proficiency of him who, taught that he is not his own, has withdrawn the dominion and government of himself from his own reason that he may give them to God! For as the surest source of destruction to men is to obey themselves, so the only haven of safety is to have no other will, no other wisdom, than to follow the Lord wherever he leads. Let this, then, be the first step, to abandon ourselves, and devote the whole energy of our minds to the service of God" (Institutes, III, vii, 1). The devout man is willing to be "damned for the glory of God."

Dutifulness in the sight of God for his glory means obedience to the moral law which includes devotion to

fellow men. But the more clearly the infinitude of God's law is revealed, the more hopeless becomes the effort to rise to the moral standard. If righteousness is the proper response to God, fellowship with him must be chilled or curtailed. Instead of loving God and with him the human beings he has created, the worshipper humbles himself and cries:

"Alas! and did my Saviour bleed,
 And did my Sovereign die,
 Would He devote that sacred head
 For such a worm as I?"

To satisfy his wish for response, the believer must be possessed by and possess God, and not stand before him in timid humility. Such a limitation in the response to God introduces caution into the response to others.

The experience fostered by the monarchical theology included partial fulfillment and partial limitation of the wish for recognition through the idea of election; of the wish for participation through external conformity; and of the wish for response through dutifulness. Professor Charles A. Ellwood charges that the "very emphasis of Protestantism upon individual conscience had given birth to an individualistic movement." Such a statement certainly holds, if by individualism is meant the type of experience here described.

PART V

A CRITICAL EVALUATION

CHAPTER XVII

THE FUNCTIONAL VALUES FOR THE GROUP

- I. The Strategic Value of a Return to St. Paul.
 - A. The Value of the Ancient Tradition.
 - B. The Value of the Uncorrupted Tradition.
 - C. The Value of the Authoritative Tradition.
- II. The Apologetic Value of Moral Vindication.
 - A. The Two Creedal Values.
 - B. The Value of Moral Worth.
 - C. The Value of Moral Safeguarding.
- III. The Loyalty Value of a Good Formula.
 - A. The Binding Value.
 - B. The Associative Value.
 - C. The Symbolic Value.

CHAPTER XVII

THE FUNCTIONAL VALUES FOR THE GROUP

The Protestant movement, after the first flush of success and enthusiasm, needed an organizing focus for continuity and permanence. Against secular humanism on the one hand, and the Catholic conception of sacrifice (the doctrines associated with the mass) on the other, the Reformers had revolted in favor of a self-sufficient Cross, and the unique, all-availing, infinite merit of Christ. But there was danger that some would fail to find consolation for the things left behind in the old Roman fold. Were they convinced once and for all that ritual was of no avail? Our feelings are ever more conservative than our intellectual convictions. The old religion of the Protestant was intertwined with the very fiber of his being. Perhaps salvation did depend on the sacraments of the ancient church. There was need for loyalty as well as assent to new principles. Protestantism would be established only when its members became emotionally organized around a new center of religious culture. The new awareness of salvation needed such incorporation as would give a sense of reality and solidity to the group movement of Protestantism.

I. THE TRADITIONAL VALUE OF A RETURN TO ST. PAUL.

We do not like to make a break with tradition which is very noticeable. In creeds it is wise to mingle the

new with the old, and so gain for the progressive principle the advantage of emotional satisfaction. Again, when new doctrines are set forth in familiar terminology, the pleasantness is a sign for contentment. Because we are well acquainted with the terms, we infer if we think at all, that as these terms awaken a hedonic response, therefore the doctrines expressed by them are true. In both these ways--by mingling with the old doctrines, and using familiar terminology--the Forensic theory made for the integration of Protestantism, and with increasing force as the years went by. As one psychologist puts it: "If laid down solemnly in plastic youth, repeated again and again by elders and practiced by the majority of associates, woven into the social life of the community, and if it appeals to the most ancient form of adjustment, the imagination, such reaction patterns mean revelation!"

Jesse W. Sprowls, *Social Psychology Interpreted*, p. 146.

The value of a theory of the atonement, believed to have the sanction of St. Paul and the early church, in the promotion of the Reformation movement, was very great. The Reformation was really an advance, but the best strategy for any movement seeking to expand is to make their advance look like a return to a former position unwarrantedly deserted by the opposing movement. If a religious movement can make it appear that it is trying to get back to the truth, to return to the true gospel, it has a great advantage. The supposed effort to purify the corrupted

tradition, and to return to the original faith readily wins support. The new movement finds effective rationalization through a connection with the earliest form of the tradition. The Forensic theory was the instrument of this process for Protestant religion.

The Reformers repudiated the authority of the then existing Roman Catholic church, but not that of the church altogether. So there was need of some substitute for the satisfaction found in conformity to an outer authority. The Forensic theory brought that satisfaction, for in accepting it Protestants believed they were in line with the Bible and the early church. The makers of the Forensic theory were convinced that both Old and New Testaments taught their theory, and that they had the sanction of St. Paul in particular for their view. They presented the atonement in such light that the pull of tradition, instead of being against them, ~~was~~ worked in their favor. If Protestants could not have the satisfaction of conformity to the teachings of the contemporary Roman church, they did have (in the Forensic theory) the satisfaction of a return to the Bible and the church tradition while still fresh in its virgin purity.

II. THE APOLOGETIC VALUE OF MORAL VINDICATION.

The function of a creed is not merely to state the truth as its authors see it, but even more to guard against errors and perversions of the truth. It has an apologetic

purpose of both a positive and negative kind, and especially the latter. Professor A. E. Taylor writes: "For the most part, the presence of a clause in such a confession means that it is desired to deny some speculation which would strike at the root of our confidence that Christ really can meet all our needs in life and in death" (Quoted in Biblical Review, October, 1929, p. 590). Since the fruit is the test of the tree, the crucial apology which any movement must make is the moral one. In this matter the Forensic theory was of good service to the Protestant cause: first, in generating moral power; and second, in safeguarding against certain moral dangers connected with the Reformation movement.

A new movement is always under suspicion of corrupting morals, and is compelled to vindicate itself before its teachings are accepted. It must submit to the most critical examination. Men want to know the moral character of the beliefs which they are asked to accept. Their moral implications must be drawn out, and shown to correspond with contemporary ideas of the good and worthwhile. At least until it becomes well established, no movement can afford to sanction any teachings whose implications seem to be contrary to the morality of the times. Even with the utmost care, one may be assured that prejudice and persecution are inevitable. The unsettled moral conditions incident to the transition character of the Reformation

period augmented the abuses of the justification doctrine. Luther and Melancthon openly mourned because things seemed to be getting worse rather than better. The Forensic theory took on value as a means by which Protestantism could guard against moral attack on its teachings.

The Forensic theory was a rock against which the antinomians dashed themselves in vain. These radicals carried the doctrine of justification to such an extreme that they repudiated good works for any and all purposes. Spiritual freedom from the law was in grave danger of degenerating into outright moral license. The Forensic theory guarded against such an unfortunate tendency, for it does not allow that believers are without sin or can dispense with good works. It does affirm emphatically that they can be justly forgiven while yet sinners, that good works are proof of saving faith in Christ's atonement, and manifestations of gratitude to him. As a delicately balanced adjustment between the objective and subjective aspects of the total salvation process, its functional value is seen in its effectiveness in answer to the Romanists who said that a freely forgiving God was winking at sin.

III. THE LOYALTY VALUE OF A GOOD FORMULA.

To succeed, a new movement needs not only to show itself in harmony with the best in tradition, and to vindicate its new principles as in accordance with the moral

standards of the times. It must also find a formula as a sort of flag for the movement. Like a plank in a party platform, the formula becomes a bond--a common denominator of intellectual attitudes and an ideal for common devotion. Once the assent and loyalty of the mass is secured for the formula, it becomes a means of: (1) keeping the people together; (2) securing uniformity of behavior; and (3) over-awing those who stand in the way of the group's interests. As the battle-ory of the Protestant movement, the Forensic theory became the real driving power behind the propagation of its principles.

The Forensic theory made the act of Christ on the historical Cross so meaningful and vivid that it came to have the religious value of the repetition of that act in the ritual of the Roman church. It conjures up the Protestant interpretation of Christianity just as the mass recalls the Roman interpretation. Of Paul Gerhardt it is said that in his hymns the seventeenth century expressed once for all the depths of feeling associated with the doctrines of orthodox Protestantism (W. R. Matthews, *Op. Cit.*, p. 127), and that "on the basis of the atonement there springs up in his mind the whole Christian life with all its experiences of salvation, consolation, patience, mastery of sin and suffering." Gerhardt wrote one hundred and thirty-two poems in all, and seventeen of his hymns (by far the most numerous classification of his poems)

have been called "Songs of the Cross and Consolation."

This theory came to serve as the very badge of Protestant piety and devotion. What the crucifix is to the Roman Catholic, that the Forensic orthodox theory of the atonement was to the Protestant. It was a good formula, not to be despised. This doctrine of the crucified Son of God washing away the sin of the world became the test of evangelical Christianity, and "gave to thousands not ripe for a purer doctrine of Christ, a symbol that was no empty fancy, but by which they could benefit in practice and theory." Even today there may yet be heard the call

Egon Friedell, A Cultural History of the Modern Age, I, p. 256.

of the Salvationist to the unconverted, "Are you washed in the blood of the Lamb?"

The functional value of the Forensic theory, through its setting forth the love of God back of the sacrifice of his Son, through which he won the moral right to forgive the sinner, was very great in its social setting. A touching evidence of the early date at which this theory became the center of Protestant religious culture is to be seen in this epitaph which the grieving Luther placed upon the tomb of his little favorite daughter Lena (Magdalen):

"Here do I Lena, Luther's daughter rest,
 Sleep in my little bed with all the blessed.
 In sin and trespass was I born;
 Forever would I be forlorn,
 But yet I live, and all is good--
 Thou, Christ, didst save me with thy blood."

CHAPTER XVIII

THE THERAPEUTIC VIRTUES FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

- I. The Virtue of Religious Assurance.
 - A. Through Providing a Substitute.
 - B. Through Furnishing Objectivity.
 - C. Through Resolving the Sin-Conflict.
- II. The Virtue of Moral Dynamic.
 - A. Through Self-Examination.
 - B. Through Idealization of Duty.
 - C. Strengthening of Sanctions.
- III. The Virtue of Intellectual Serenity.
 - A. Through Rationalization of Experience.
 - B. Through Accord With Common Sense.
 - C. Through Easy Intelligibility.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE THERAPEUTIC VIRTUES FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Whether we regard it as based on objective reality or a legal fiction, one must candidly admit that the Forensic theory has value for faith as conditioned by its particular cultural environment. From the standpoint of mental hygiene, it is better to think of the love and mercy of God than of his wrath and punishment. It is hard to see how, in the Reformation age, any other theory could have been the means of allowing men to believe in the love of God. In the gracious offer of free pardon by God they found their hope of salvation. It is impossible to doubt the truth of this passage, referring to the Forensic theory of the atonement: "It was the pillar of Luther's soul toiling for man;...It inspired the beautiful humility of Fenelon; fostered the devotion and self-sacrifice of Oberlin;...and kindled the deep and steady raptures of Wesley's heart."

Quoted by L. B. Hartman, Divine Penology, p. 79.

I. THE VIRTUE OF RELIGIOUS ASSURANCE.

To the Protestant true salvation lay in his new awareness of a higher and more blessed relation to God than Catholicism could reveal. This new awareness needed some intellectual justification for its support. The Forensic theory filled this need, and its value was all the greater because it alone took the place of many aids enjoyed by

the Roman opponents. Ogg strikingly states: "The Reformation made this topic (eternal damnation) more acute than ever before; to an earnest and imaginative Protestant spiritual failure might mean something infinitely worse than death, because his religion allowed of no such alternative as purgatory, and if he was a Calvinist he was taught to believe that only a small portion of men are predestined to be among the elect. Moreover, for many men, the Protestant doctrines were more difficult to act upon; there was no regular purging, by the Confessional, no dependence on a favorite and benevolent saint, no expiation by a willingly performed penance or health-giving pilgrimage, no solace to be derived from passible acquiescence in the graceful ritual of an ancient church."

David Ogg, Europe In the Seventeenth Century, p. 84.

The particular value for assurance lay in the fact that the Forensic theory gave the doubting Protestant something objective and definite to which to cling. No one could question the historical fact that Christ had died for mankind, the just for the unjust. Because the Forensic theory rests solely and completely upon the life and (especially) the death upon the Cross of the historical Christ, it has all the advantage to be gained from an entire absence of subjectivity. It makes men sure that the necessary and vital atonement does not depend upon

individual idiosyncrasy or feeling. The old Greek theology, in order to prove the competency of salvation, had developed and safeguarded the doctrine which held to Christ as a competent savior--the doctrine of his person having to do with his deity and humanity. Western theology saw the guarantee of salvation not so much in what Christ was, as in what he did. It emphasized the external fact of the gospel, and thinks of redemption as an objective act. In the Forensic theory Protestants found the absolute guarantee of the sufficiency of the deed on the Cross to secure a perfect and eternal salvation.

The Forensic theory asserts the possibility of, and provides a basis for the following processes which bring peaceful assurance: (1) the ejection of evil from the personality; (2) identification with the source of a higher good; and (3) love for an ideal love-object. Given its teaching, one can believe that God, the Father of grace, hates sin with an endless hatred; that he cannot ignore it; that his love has provided a remedy for it in the Cross through which we are saved. Thus the sin-conflict is resolved, the self is no longer divided. In the Forensic theory we have a reaffirmation of the continuing tradition of ancient tragic drama "that, through union with the divine, man may overcome the evil which threatens to destroy him."

Justin Wroe Nixon, An Emerging Christian Faith, p. 223.

II. THE VIRTUE OF MORAL DYNAMIC.

The Forensic theory was not only emotionally effective because of the assurance it conveyed, but morally dynamic through the ideal it exalted and the sanction it gave. At the time of the Reformation there was great need for the reunion of religion and ethics to overcome the mechanical character of the latter due to the effects of the catholic system. Emphasis was needed upon the inward aspects of morality rather than outward forms of conduct. Men must examine themselves, and face their consciences. Under the Forensic theory, there was no escaping introspection and the consequent development of moral power. It made men stern, aggressive, and self-sacrificing. Often they rose to moral heroism, especially in connection with reform movements and the missionary enterprise. Tremendous moral reserves are suggested by the endurance, courage, sympathy, and enthusiasm of the missionary who is glad to die a martyr, and the crusaders for abolition of slavery and temperance who bore ignominy and shame for the cause to which they were consecrated.

The Forensic theory made for moral power by idealizing the duties of king and people. As God's representative, the king must emulate his perfect justice in all his dealings with the people, and the people must give perfect homage and submission to the king and his laws as of divine right. The God of the Forensic theory is not an

oriental despot whose will is caprice, or a feudal lord punctilious as to his honor, or a pope dispensing grace for a consideration. He is not only the source of all law, but he himself is law-abiding and perfectly just. The universe is a moral order. Sin and punishment are closely connected; punishment is retributive; there is moral necessity for atonement. The people must conform their wills to that of the king, as well as the king emulate his divine Sponsor. If only justice can justify requiring conformity to the king's will and law, only submission and obedience can discharge the obligation of his subjects.

Not only was the moral ideal clarified and vivified by the picture of the divine-human relationship. It was motivated and reinforced by the strengthening of the sanctions for its realization. At the time of the Reformation heaven and hell were very real places and could not be forgotten through absorption in the affairs of this world. As all through the Middle Ages, they entered into the motivation of everyday affairs in such a way as we can scarcely realize today. Fear of hell and hope of heaven were real and powerful motives for the curbing of evil and the performance of good works. Protestantism took away the mitigating factor of purgatory, and the trembling conscience was left with the prospect of but two alternative states immediately after death. In

stressing the way of escape from future punishment, the Forensic theory brings the heaven-hell sanction for the accepted moral ideal into focus. The consequences of evil were made so plain that fear must act as a mighty deterrent force in the lives of believers.

III. THE VIRTUE OF INTELLECTUAL TRANSPARENCY.

There is need that the religious consciousness have separated out of the confused mass of feeling, which constitutes its awareness of spiritual realities, certain features, and to discern those features in clear-cut and definite distinction. A satisfactory concept of one's experience, enabling one to express it, seems to make the experience itself more permanent, and give to it the aspect of reality. Men believed they were saved through faith in the Cross of Christ, and they found their experience of salvation rationalized in the Forensic theory of the atonement. One might search through the Anselmic theory in vain for the means by which the sacrifice of Christ was effective in satisfying the offended honor of God, but there was no similar failure in the Forensic theory.

Whatever one may think of the theology of Calvin in general, and the Forensic theory in particular, it must be admitted that the Forensic scheme begins somewhere, gets somewhere, and does it without taking one through misty fogs of omission and obscurity in between. The rigid conception of the cause-effect relationship (which,

applied to morals, is the basis of the theory) appeals to the common sense of the average man. It was familiar to men of the Reformation age in the legal principle of Action and Award, and appealed to them in a commercial age accustomed to mathematical exactness. And as much may be said of the principle of legal substitution by which the privileged were exempted from the working of the principle of Action and Award. It was not uncommon for whipping boys to bear the punishment decreed for the misdemeanors of princes. So the Forensic theory was easily understood.

H. Maldwyn Hughes, What Is the Atonement?, p. 127.

It clearly showed the nature of the barrier to divine forgiveness, and how that barrier was removed.

The Forensic theory, therefore, took on value because of its intellectual simplicity. Even the simplest person could see that eternal death is the inevitable penalty of sin, because decreed by God as punishment for it. He could grasp the additional idea that Christ suffered on the Cross the death that would otherwise have been his punishment on account of his sins. An easily intelligible theory seems to be truer than one which is difficult to comprehend, for we naturally suspect the verifiability of involved and intricate ideas. This basic simplicity makes for consistency. Dr. Stevens goes so far as to say that there are only two consistent theories of the atonement—the penal(Forensic) and the moral influence views. Cer-

tainly, the strength of the Forensic theory in its logical coherence made a tremendous appeal.

We do not merely prefer or desire to conceive our values, for they result from "our creative reaction and reply to our environment." Both ritualistic practice and

R. H. Strachan, The Authority of Christian Experience, p. 46.

the attendant theological concept are functional ways of expressing a human urge. As one of the historic forms in which men have done their religious thinking, the Forensic theory has been just as essential to religious assurance, moral dynamic, and intellectual serenity as a dam, sluiceway, and turbine are to the generation of electric power. It was the distinctive and definitive doctrine of the Protestant faith, and regarded, in the words of Turretin, as "the foundation of all practical piety and all Christian hopes."

CHAPTER XIX

THE FORENSIC THEORY AND PERSONALITY

- I. In the Sphere of Group Relationships.
 - A. The Forensic Concept of Authority.
 - B. The Forensic Concept of Law.
 - C. The Forensic Concept of Justice.
- II. In the Sphere of Cosmic Relationships.
 - A. The Forensic Divine-Human Relationship.
 - B. The Forensic Broken Divine-Human Relationship.
 - C. The Forensic Restored Divine-Human Relationship.

CHAPTER XIX

THE FORENSIC THEORY AND PERSONALITY

The objections made to the Forensic theory and the refutations made of them, as well as the content of the theory itself, reveal the vital influence of monarchical sovereignty in the thinking of the Reformed theologians. The plausibility of legalistic religious perception follows upon legalistic political perception. A government must be moral, at least outwardly, for its continued existence depends upon its ability to serve its citizens, to make secure the lives and property and pursuit of happiness of those who live under its rule. The state, however, is largely limited in its function to the maintenance of the outward conditions of peace and prosperity. Whether matriarchal or patriarchal in form, it depends much upon coercion through threats of physical violence, always holding actual physical force in reserve in armies. Political concepts usually imply that a man must be coaxed through some reward to do his duty, and frightened by the anticipation of punishment to keep from transgressing upon the rights of others.

I. IN THE SPHERE OF GROUP RELATIONSHIPS.

A. THE FORENSIC CONCEPT OF AUTHORITY.

A true moral, i.e., personal, value in the Forensic concept is insistence upon the necessity of some kind of

authority. The state keeps before the common man constantly the profound truth that morality is not simply a private affair, that a moral code is not for one individual alone. A hermit would not need morality, but man is a gregarious being. When Robinson Crusoe found Friday, he was forced to consider arrangements for living together with him. Because it is concerned with the problem of living together, morality calls for some plan agreed upon by at least the majority of those concerned. A few reluctant individuals may be forced into line by group pressure, but the majority must bind themselves to the plan if it is to work. To please the majority, the plan must seem best for all, and therefore in accord not only with the interests of individuals, but with the interests of the group as a whole. It is absolutely necessary that there be some authority to secure conformity to the plan.

While there is moral value in the implication of the necessity of authority, the kind of authority which political thinking emphasizes is inadequate for a high morality. The external character of political authority fails to develop ~~character~~ ^{personality} to its fullest extent. Authority which has its sanctions outside the individual is not moralized authority. Authority can become fully moral only when conscious intelligence and will (which alone can bring responsibility) enter into its recognition. The man who fears the policeman is not truly moral. The authority he recognizes is the ~~eter~~^xnal one represented by the physical arm of the law in the person of its authorized representative. The man who respects

the policeman as a worthy servant of society recognizes a different kind of authority of a non-physical sort. Through his understanding and assent to it the authority of the state has become his own inner authority. In a word, the recognition of outer authority is negatively moral, but the recognition of inner authority is positively moral.

B. THE FORENSIC CONCEPT OF LAW.

There is also moral value in the political concept of law. The law keeps ever before men the cause-effect relationship as it applies to human conduct. If one performs his political duties, he is assured, as his reward, of the guarantee of his rights by the government. If he fails in his duties or trespasses against the law, he will receive as punishment the partial or complete loss of his citizenship rights. The principle of sowing and reaping applies to human life as well as external nature. Generality, equality, and certainty are marks of law. Retribution follows in the wake of wrong-doing, for there is no escaping the principle of antecedent and consequence. The moral value of law in inducing self-control is very great. Legalism may even take the form of willing obedience exalting reverence for law above every other motive. It curbs a sentimentalized and aesthetic morality, and has educational value in habituating men to resist their natural impulses. It is a condition of moral liberty, for it reminds us that we are free only as we detach our-

selves from egoism and rise above the claims of the individual self.

Just as external authority largely dispenses with the conscious intelligence and will of the individual (which are necessary to full responsibility and complete morality), so the external character of the law prevents a fully moralizing effect upon those who obey. Political law is inherently statutory. Ignorance of the law or disagreement with it is not considered excuse for violation of it. The law calls for the discipline of outward obedience, which may become purely formal. Political thinking finds morality in the observance of a law or a body of laws, as opposed to the conception that it consists in the pursuit of an end or the realization of an ideal. Without inner coherence, the precepts of political morality are capable of codification, as the morality of obedience to an inner principle is not. The political concept of law implies the rigidity of the cause-effect relationship as applied to human conduct. It makes morality mechanical and scientific in the mathematical sense rather than vital and artistic. In so far as it depends upon rigid rules rather than broad principles it is incompletely moral. Law and obedience are not the form, but the substance of the moral life. Legal maxims with their sanctions, instead of allegiance of the will to the spirit of law, form an insufficient motive for

vital moral living. In true morals the dominant motive is more important than any single act. It is altruistic feeling, not fear, self-interest, or conventionality that makes men moral in the true sense of that word.

C. THE FORENSIC CONCEPT OF JUSTICE.

Justice as securing the enjoyment of every right earned by fulfillment of duty, and the administration of punishment equivalent to the transgression of law has real moral value. It provides for the maintenance in human life of the sense of the balancing association between cause and effect which is necessary to morality. There is truth behind the ancient recognition of the right of vengeance, "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth." The Forensic concept of justice keeps before men the truth that every man must face the consequences of his acts. Heaven and hell are of humanity's own making. "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap," applies to the sphere of moral action as well as to the tilling of the soil. A crop follows planting and cultivation, but neglect results in weeds.

The weakness of the Forensic concept of justice is seen in the rigidity of the application of the law, and consequently the incompletely moral character of its inevitable and precise judgments. The implication is not only that justice can be expressed in the form of an inflexible legal maxim, but also that human action should

be in accordance with rigid laws. One may not doubt that the sphere of morality is subject to the principle of causation, but moral causes are so intertwined, so intricate and complex, that the cause-effect relationship should be maintained by adherence not to rigid rules, but to general principles considered approximately true. Justice secured through application of precisely retributive punishment ignores individual differences in intelligence and will-power, and hence responsibility. It does not study environmental background and particular circumstances, and hence allow that the individual is socially determined, or not altogether free. Such justice cannot be fully moral, for it subordinates the individual, not to the general welfare, but to an impersonal rule without intrinsic value, and even harmful in so far as it becomes an end in itself.

II. IN THE SPHERE OF COSMIC RELATIONSHIPS.

A. THE FORENSIC DIVINE-HUMAN RELATIONSHIP.

The Forensic concept of the divine-human relationship fully recognizes that any satisfying idea of deity must include the element of absolute supremacy. The way of life is the way of the "reality-principle," and reality must be conceived as worthy of commanding complete submission. A concept including the element of absolute dominance is helpful, for the human being needs a supreme personality before whom to bow in reverence

and trustful obedience. The idea of growth is not inconsistent with that of a God possessing absolute dominance over his creation, but a struggling God has no place here. If God does not hold the mastery, what sane man can whole-heartedly accept the universe? "There is a deep want," says Hickok, "even in the purest created creature, for some revealed source of all excellence and dignity in whom the spirit may trust, and before whom it may bow in homage and religious devotion."

Yet the legal character of the divine-human relationship calls for an impersonal conception of divine authority. Authority under the legal relationship must be rule imposed from above, not from within. Such a form of dominance is coercive rather than persuasive. There is a real difference between enforced conformity and voluntary assent. From the psychological standpoint, true authority is found in voluntary assent to ideals, standards, and the self-commendatory experiences of others. These do not violate the sanctity and integrity of the personality as does external authority. External authority, however imposed, "excludes the exercise of certain powers, essential to the development of personality, from participation in the activity of the persons so ruled, causes atrophy of the powers, annuls the functioning which is necessary to the perfecting of personality."

Spenser B. Meeker, The Religion of Freedom and Personality, Crozier Quarterly, April, 1931, p. 257.

B. THE FORENSIC BROKEN DIVINE-HUMAN RELATIONSHIP.

Personalizing value is to be found in the legal idea of the broken divine-human relationship in its keeping alive a sense of sin. A sense of sin is necessary to progress in the growth of personality. The great enemy to the organization of emotions, attitudes, and habits into a unified system, centering around a dominant purpose, is lethargy due to a feeling of self-sufficiency. As discontent with present achievements is the sine qua non of material progress, so progress in the building of personality is dependent upon a sense of inadequacy which will lead one to press on toward the ideal. As the inventor must fail many times in his attempts and never reach absolute perfection in his final success, but make stepping stones of his mistakes, so the self-builder must use a sense of failure as a means of raising the edifice of personality. For a man to realize through self-examination, that he, like all other men, has not and cannot keep the divine law, promotes that humility and penitence which necessarily precede amendment of life.

When under the legal idea of the broken relationship, the sense of sin is interpreted as knowledge of legal guilt, the results are not happy. Since the individual is not conscious of having made or broken a legal contract with God through Adam, attention is diverted from the real difficulty--his present state of

enmity to God--and he is apt to take inherited guilt lightly because of his irresponsible feeling. If, on the other hand, he is overwhelmed by the legacy of guilt, he is made timid, self-effacing, and self-condemnatory. He welcomes suffering, and is plagued by doubt of the possibility of salvation. Such a one is likely to have a marked suspicion of others, and engage in denunciation of them. The essence of the feeling of guilt is the fear of delayed punishment which is regarded as inevitable. It is this dread which for an a Kempie, a Luther, and an Edwards made hell as vivid as the exquisite cruelties of a torture chamber or fire in a field of peat. The extroverted individual might suppress such an imaginative picture and substitute less painful ideas, but the introverted person may well find this impossible.

C. THE FORENSIC RESTORED DIVINE-HUMAN RELATIONSHIP.

Personality-development requires not only a great purpose to which to devote oneself as to a person, and a sense of sin to keep one humbly aware that he has "not yet attained," but constant seeking and striving. The legal idea of the restored relationship provides for the new life by including the removal of the sense of guilt and the furnishing of a new motive to replace the old self-seeking interest. The idea of legal justification is true to the facts of human nature. It recognizes that actions do not so much determine personality

as they are determined by it. It provides for the restoration of the divine-human relationship at the beginning, as the prerequisite of the new life, and not as the result or reward of it. There is consequently an immediate accession of power to the personality through catharsis in view of removed guilt, and gratitude in view of accepted or received righteousness. The Reformers were psychologically correct in their perception that "peace, or harmony of mind and personality, was the truest condition of personal spirit; that paralysis of the spirit must be overcome before we can cooperate with God in any real sense."

The idea of legal justification, however, can scarcely bring peace to one acutely conscious of doing less than his best. Nor can it supply the motive for complete self-giving. Human nature needs surcease through forgiveness for present, and not merely past errors and sins. Man needs a motive stronger than gratitude for unmerited favor. He needs to lose his sense of blameworthiness in the confidence that his sins and their consequences will be absorbed and overcome by the perfection of a personality to whom he gives himself utterly. He needs such passionate attachment to this personality as will enable him to rise above the discipline of gratitude, or outward obedience, to the discipline of love which demands future living in the spirit of the beloved. The Forensic

concept fails to see Jesus as more than a drudge to bear the penalties of sin. Instead, he takes away sin through his ethical perfection, and human love answering to his, is the mainspring of Christian living.

Personality is the product of the interaction of the individual with his environment. Love is the unifying and socializing factor. One becomes a self, in a full sense, only by "abandoning himself to the inspiration and will-power of another, so that the strength and goodness and purity of that other gradually becomes his." Because the Forensic theory holds the believer in an external relationship to God as Lawgiver and Moral Governor, it fails to lead him into an experience of conscious unity of life with one's fellow men, and so participation in the ministry of a universal good. "The Calvinist seems to derive from, or perhaps carry into, his religion a fervid spirit, impatient of check or control, intolerant of criticism or dissent, united with a great tenacity of purpose and the sense of a divine intention in human life. Austerity, a conviction of personal responsibility and a desire to dominate others, a suggestion of intolerance, and an attitude of exclusiveness and reserve, are typical of the Calvinist" (David Ogg, Op. Cit., p. 89).

CHAPTER XX

THE UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION OF JESUS

- I. Jesus and the Way of At-one-ment.
 - A. The Way of Inner At-one-ment.
 - B. The Way of Outer At-one-ment.
 - C. The Way of Complete At-one-ment.
- II. Jesus and the Truth of At-one-ment.
 - A. The Truth of Group At-one-ment.
 - B. The Truth of Cosmic At-one-ment.
 - C. The Truth of Individual At-one-ment.
- III. Jesus and the Life of At-one-ment.
 - A. The Emotional Life of At-one-ment.
 - B. The Volitional Life of At-one-ment.
 - C. The Cognitive Life of At-one-ment.

CHAPTER XX

THE UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION OF JESUS

The contribution of Jesus to the solution of the at-one-ment problem (including the lesser problem of means, or atonement) does not lie in any formal concepts which have come down to us. Rather, it is found in his manner of perceiving the group, the cosmic and the individual self. This was made possible by his possession of complete self-integration--a fact which alone can explain his abiding influence upon mankind. Jesus himself was aware of his unique contribution. He said: "I am the way, the truth, and the life," and he did his utmost to persuade men to accept him as such. He was even willing to go to the Cross in pursuit of his purpose of bringing at-one-ment to the world, and men call him savior because of the success of his mission.

I. JESUS AND THE WAY OF AT-ONE-MENT.

The great secret of the clear and accurate perception of Jesus was his completely integrated self. At every stage in his development from infancy to manhood, there was harmonious unification of all his activity. Each particular activity contributed to his activity as a whole. When Jesus said; "I am the way," he expressed his conviction as a completely integrated self that his was the norm and example for all other selves. Nothing less than complete integration should be the goal, for the incom-

pletely integrated self cannot feel, act, and see as he should, and so misses the true manner of life. This is the ideal toward which all imperfect personalities must strive in the confidence that more abundant life will be their reward, even at the cost of suffering-death, if need be.

An examination of the rich and full inner activity of Jesus will reveal a lack of those conflicts found in sick personalities. What a contrast he provides to the ambivalent Peter! Calm, serene, poised, he says to his disciples in a crisis, "Be of good cheer." At the end of his earthly mission he could murmur, "Into thy hands I commend my spirit." The examples of petulance sometimes cited, such as his supposed rebuke to his mother at the Cana of Galilee wedding and the supposed cry of despair upon the Cross, present only apparent difficulties which vanish in the light of a knowledge of oriental speech and historical exegesis. The strength of Jesus in the face of temptation is inexplicable except on the supposition that he was unweakened by incomplete inner integration and conflict.

Jesus not only experienced activity in every phase without loss of inner integration, but also without loss of outer integration. Again and again his enemies tried by all sorts of ruses to snare him into inconsistency of conduct. An outstanding example is the attempt to make him a temporal king after his feeding of the multitude.

But Jesus stood unswervingly loyal to his mission, and maintained his integrity of behavior. He would not be untrue by adopting an unspiritual method. Toward the last, Jesus set his face "steadfastly" to go up to Jerusalem. None of the taunting darts launched at him during his agony on the Cross could pierce the armor of his "fidelity to vocation." His outer activity was organically unified, free from inconsistency and deadlock. As completely integrated, he could say truly of his work, "It is finished."

Jesus claims he is the "way" as a self-integrated human being. This claim includes integration not only within inner and outer activity, but between them. In other words, integration in the comprehensive sense refers to a balance between the two kinds of activity made possible only by their unity and interdependence. Neither is overemphasized at the cost of the suppression of the other. Jesus appeals to mankind as the ideal personality because he is neither an introvert nor an extrovert. He presents the strength of both types in perfect integration and harmony. Worship and service never interfere with one another in his life. On the Cross he sympathizes with his mother and the repentant thief, and provides for the needs of them both.

II. JESUS AND THE TRUTH OF AT-ONE-MENT.

The complete self-integration of Jesus enabled him to perceive the true nature of the group, the cosmic,

and the individual self. It is the manner of his perception of them as ideally completely integrated, that constitutes his contribution to the truth of at-one-ment. Just as the mode of his activity, i.e., completely integrated, is his contribution to the way of atonement, so is his mode of perceiving his contribution to the truth of atonement. It is the completely integrative character of his perception which constitutes his perennial charm and fascination for mankind, rather than any specific percept. It is because it reveals his wholeness (holiness) that we prize it so much. And it is because all that we see through him is summed up and brought to vivid focus on the Cross that it has become the symbol of Christianity.

The contribution which Jesus made to the truth of group at-one-ment lies in the wholly integrated character of his group percept. He perceived that the group members are wholly interdependent, and not partially so. His ideal group would be neither maternalistic nor paternalistic in character, but democratic in all relationships. There would be oneness in spirit, purpose, and philosophy. "Love thy neighbor as thyself," golden rule conduct, and the principle of brotherhood all imply utter interdependence, mutuality, and reciprocation. Social fellowship, communion, and peace within and between groups all call for the perception of the truth that, for good or

ill, we are all bound together in the bundle of life. To the question, "Am I my brother's keeper?" the crucified Jesus would answer with a confident "Yes."

Men have ever failed to perceive God without false coloring and distorted perspective. The contribution of Jesus to our perception of God lies in his complete integration which corrects other pictures. Jesus reasoned from the less to the greater, from nature to man, because he believed in a self-integrated God who would not contradict himself. "If God so clothe the grass of the field, . . . shall he not much more clothe you." Jesus means to say: Of course, God will take care of those who trust in him. He often contrasted his teaching with that of the Old Testament, but never in the sense of denying its partial truth. "I am come," he said, "not to destroy but to fulfil." When he faced the Cross in the Garden of Gethsemane, and prayed, "Not my will, but thine be done," he gave undeniable proof of his perception of God as unified and harmonious in all his activity, and so worthy of supreme trust and devotion in the darkest hour.

Jesus believed that the percept of the individual self depends upon the percept of the cosmic self. "I and the Father are one" means certainly that Jesus perceived their emotional and volitional activities were in common, and so their cognitive activities or percepts

were the same. How did the fully self-integrated Jesus perceive the individual self? In a word, unitary like God, with all his activities interdependent. "Ye cannot serve God and mammon." The self cannot be partially or wholly split without partial or total disaster. There can be no lack of emotional and volitional and cognitive balance in the ideal individual personality. Jesus would not deny himself by listening to Peter's pleading that he evade the Cross. The devil of compromise was defeated finally then and there.

III. JESUS AND THE LIFE OF AT-ONE-MENT.

The abiding conviction of Christian people has been that the desire for at-one-ment with society, the cosmos, and the individual self, found the means of its fulfillment in and through the whole life, and especially through the epitomizing death, of Jesus of Nazareth in a unique way. Jesus has been the Great Habit-breaker who made possible for them new emotional, volitional, and cognitive activity--the salvation of indefinitely increasing self-integration. The inescapable impression of ideal humanity which Jesus makes upon men heartens, and strengthens, and clarifies the vision of those who submit themselves to him in fellowship and communion. Jesus is the life, as well as the way and the truth. He provides the means, the power, the atonement, which is necessary for at-one-ment.

The writer has witnessed "The Sign of the Cross" on both stage and screen, and could not help marvelling afresh at the bravery and courage of the early Christians whose blood became the "seed of the church." The remarkable psychological phenomenon is the emotional integration of the martyrs. Their joy and peace could not be disturbed even by the threat of death. It was an honor to die for the Jesus who had literally transformed their lives. Martyrdom for the Gospel actually came to be wished for, and Nero and other emperors were defeated in their purpose of exterminating the Christians. In only three centuries Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire. Whence came the emotional drive back of such a triumph except from Jesus himself? His emotional at-one-ment was the source of the emotional at-one-ment of his followers who gladly shared the Cross with him.

Books are still appearing in the vein of the classic "Gesta Christi." The title of the old volume is significant of the secret of the effect of the Christian church upon the practical life and affairs of men. The altruistic efforts, the evils overcome, the services rendered to society did not come about by accident. Men in their own strength could never have performed them. The only true explanation of Christian missionary enterprise and constructive social achievements is found in the forti-

fication of the purposes of Christians by the steadfast purpose of Jesus. It is the volitional at-one-ment of Jesus, especially manifest in his crucifixion, which enables Christians to carry on in their unselfish aims. Skeptical George Eliot pays an unconscious tribute when she relates that she kept a crucifix on her table during the tedious hours spent in translating Straus's "Leben Jesu."

Through Jesus men find self-integration, including the power of vision which enables them to "see life steadily and to see it whole." With all its defects the Christian church has never failed utterly. It has mediated to men in some measure the meaning of life as seen by Jesus. In his perception of life, and particularly his perception of victorious life by way of the cross, we find light on life's puzzles, contradictions, and tragedies. Jesus saw that all life is interdependent in its activities and relationships, and that the more abundant life comes through the integration based upon a recognition of this fact. "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." We shall never reach ultimate truth by rationalizing our own imperfectly integrated experience, but only in so far as we accept the perception of one "without spot or blemish, or any such thing."

In sum, the contribution which Jesus has to make to

the problem of at-one-ment is made possible by virtue of the completeness of his self-integration. By his example and precepts, Jesus presents the basic truth of group, cosmic, and individual at-one-ment as that of complete interdependence. He mediates the life of at-one-ment, and so becomes our atonement, because he is the Supreme Habit-breaker who leads men into new emotional, volitional, and cognitive activity and integration. Especially on the Cross does Jesus stand out unique and supreme as "the way, the truth, and the life" for those who seek to obey his injunction: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God...., and thy neighbor as thyself."

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